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  CAVALRY IN FUTURE WARS


  By HIS EXCELLENCY LIEUT.-GENERAL
  FREDERICK VON BERNHARDI

  Commander of the Seventh Division of the German Army


  Translated by CHARLES SYDNEY GOLDMAN

  Author of 'With General French and the Cavalry in South Africa'
  Editor of 'The Empire and the Century'


  With an Introduction by

  LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR JOHN FRENCH
  K.C.M.G., K.C.B., G.C.V.O.




  LONDON
  JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.
  1909

  _First Edition, October, 1906_
  _Second Edition, April, 1909_




PREFACE


I ventured to express the opinion in my book, 'With General French and
the Cavalry in South Africa,' that if a high ideal of the duties and
possibilities of Cavalry is set before our officers, and the means of
instruction and training are placed within their reach, we shall
possess in our next great War a force which, if led by men of the
stamp of General Sir John French, will prove to the world that the day
of Cavalry is far indeed from being past.

In other words, I am convinced that, with good leadership and the
right material in men, which the South African War has shown we
possess, all that we need to perfect our system is a proper
recognition of the changed conditions of modern Warfare, and a resolve
to break with the old and adapt ourselves to the new situation.

Reforms such as this would necessitate must affect all arms of the
Service, but no branch more than the Cavalry, whose task in future
will be more difficult, yet whose compensation lies in the
possibilities of successes possessing greater significance than any
hitherto attained.

The South African War has roused the Cavalry into a renewal of
activity, and has caused their leaders to encourage the study of
Cavalry literature likely to develop the capacity of the officer for
writing on these special subjects.

As a step in that direction, I gave whatever little co-operation I
could to the formation of the _Cavalry Journal_, in the hope that it
may be conducive to the creation of a class of literature in which our
Service is peculiarly deficient.

It is of the first importance to realize the conditions that are
revolutionizing the conduct of Modern Warfare.

Such knowledge can alone enable us to appreciate the task which is
given to the Cavalry, and to estimate the increased difficulties of
their function. As their range of activity has become restricted in
certain directions, their sphere of usefulness in others has largely
increased.

The want of an up-to-date work dealing with these facts has, I
believe, been supplied by the recent publication of General von
Bernhardi's book, 'Our Cavalry in Future Wars,' translated in the
following pages with the object of making it more generally known in
this country.

Not only is the contribution valuable as having been written by a
soldier of experience in the field, who has imbued his work with the
dash and fire of the spirit of Cavalry, but it also reveals a profound
insight into the modern conditions of War and the heightened demands
exacted from Cavalry training. The author lays continual emphasis on
the fact that Cavalry trained and organized on his lines should
produce in the early stages of a War effects so decisive as to
influence and even determine the succeeding phases of the campaign.

General von Bernhardi has the gift of close and searching reasoning,
and the ability to present his views in a vivid and trenchant form,
as convincing as the writings of the late Colonel Henderson.

His opening chapter deals with the conception of the conduct of War in
the sense of to-day, and he proceeds to analyze the functions of the
Cavalry as modified by the changes which have occurred.

In lively detail he explains the difficulties which in future will
confront all Cavalry operations, and the sacrifices that will be
exacted from this Arm.

Serious study and untiring perseverance must be claimed from the
individual in order to equip himself mentally and physically for the
task of overcoming these obstacles, while Bernhardi shows in
convincing argument the brilliant opportunities of success.

Although the opportunity of tactical action on the battle-field may
have somewhat suffered, Bernhardi sees in the strategical handling of
the Arm its chief possibilities, and here he includes reconnaissance
and operations against the enemy's rearward communications and pursuit
of a defeated Army.

He considers cohesion and mobility to be essential to insure superior
striking power by shock and fire action at the decisive point, and
emphasizes this principle again and again as the means of attaining a
high fighting efficiency.

In the chapters on Tactical Leading in Mounted Combats and Tactical
Conduct of Dismounted Action, General von Bernhardi deals with the
merits of shock and fire action, and the enhanced importance of the
latter as an accessory to, though never as a substitute for, shock,
and he defines the respective dispositions for dismounted action when
serving an offensive or defensive purpose.

At the same time, he avers that success must depend upon the ability
of the leader to realize the situation, on his qualities of decision,
and on his capacity to maintain a correct balance between the
application respectively of shock and fire action.

The qualifications which General von Bernhardi expects in the Cavalry
leader and those under him go to prove the scientific character of the
profession, which demands a standard of extreme efficiency.

Successful Cavalry leading will only be possible when the machinery of
the instrument employed is technically perfected down to the minutest
detail, and this can only be attained by a very elaborate and thorough
training.

The book should commend itself particularly to those critics who,
drawing conclusions from the South African War, contend that the
united offensive action of man and horse, culminating in the charge,
can no longer avail, and that the future lies with the mounted
riflemen, trained only to dismounted action. General von Bernhardi
makes it clear that the theatre of War in South Africa does not assist
us with any complete object-lessons from which to evolve a change of
tactical principles, inasmuch as the conditions were entirely
abnormal, and in European Warfare are unlikely to recur.

It must be remembered that after the first few weeks of 1900 the
Cavalry in South Africa as an effective force had practically ceased
to exist, and that its offensive action was greatly hampered by the
strategical plan of campaign which we adopted subsequently to the
occupation of Bloemfontein.

All that might be deduced from the defensive tactics of a mounted
force, such as the Boers put into the field, during this period, is
that, possessing greater mobility, they were able to hold up, during
short intervals, Cavalry whose capacity for mounted action was
practically destroyed by the 'want of condition' of their horses.

Acting strategically as they did at Colesberg, in the relief of
Kimberley, and in the operations leading up to Paardeberg, results
were obtained which affected the whole subsequent conduct of the War.
From then onwards, with the Cavalry acting tactically on the enemy's
flank, the Boer Army withdrew practically on Pretoria, and no decisive
tactical result was obtained.

If that was the object which the Superior Command had in view, the
Cavalry carried out that purpose with remarkable distinction.

It is, however, conceivable that their strategical employment in rear
of the Boer Army might have produced a situation compelling the Boers
to fight a pitched battle or to surrender.

If the Cavalry failed to achieve more, it was not from any want of
opportunity which the theatre of War presented, but because their true
role was rarely assigned to them.

That the Boers were able at a later period to develop a vigorous
scheme of action was largely owing to our conception of a plan of
campaign which made the occupation of small capitals rather than the
destruction of the enemy's Army the strategic objective.

Had the Boers understood the Art of War and taken advantage of the
openings which their superior mobility gave them, or had they been
possessed of a body of Cavalry capable of mounted action, say at
Magersfontein, they might repeatedly have wrought confusion in our
ranks.

Although the Boer War was of an exceptional nature, and of a character
unlikely to be met with again, it furnishes some useful object-lessons
which exemplify the importance of preparedness in peace for the sudden
outbreak of War, so that the Army may take the field in such force and
so disposed as to compel decisive action on the part of the enemy in
the first stages of the War, and be in a position to inflict a
crushing defeat rather than a series of light blows, which latter tend
to disperse rather than destroy the enemy's forces.

The War further shows how highly mobile forces, such as those of the
Boers, can withdraw from a combat to avoid defeat, and by scattering
to elude pursuit, and then, by reassembling where least expected, can
strike a sudden blow at the enemy's weakest point. That they failed to
accomplish more was due to their ignorance of the higher Art of War.

To this neglect of the strategic advantage which mobility gives we
must add the many lost tactical opportunities of converting a British
reverse into a decisive defeat. The Boers did all that could be
expected of Mounted Infantry, but were powerless to crown victory as
only the dash of Cavalry can do.

If we take into account the many opportunities which the Boers gave
for successful strategic and tactical employment to men trained to
fight on horseback, we arrive at the conclusion that the Boer War may
nevertheless, if studied carefully and intelligently, teach us the
indispensability of Cavalry in the role so clearly described in
General von Bernhardi's instructive work.

In conclusion, I must express my thanks to His Excellency General von
Bernhardi for his courtesy towards me in concurring in the idea of an
English translation, and to General Sir John French for his valuable
introductory comments.

I also wish to express to Colonel F. N. Maude my best thanks for his
friendly co-operation, which gave me the advantage of his expert
interpretation of German technicalities.

                                             C. S. GOLDMAN.

  34, QUEEN ANNE'S GATE,
       WESTMINSTER,
           _September, 1906_.




AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION


When, in the Spring of 1899, I published the first edition of this
work, I ventured to express the hope that it might incite others both
to thought and exertion, and might further prove of practical
assistance to many.

I think I may claim without undue immodesty that this wish of mine has
in many directions been fulfilled. Of the demands, however, which I
put forward concerning the organization and equipment of the Cavalry,
none have as yet been put into execution, but much wholesome spade
work has been accomplished, and the necessity of reforms, together
with due recognition of their importance, has everywhere made further
progress. It is to be hoped that the next few years will bring the
fulfilment of some of these our most earnest desires.

The principles of training and of tactics which I have advanced and
endeavoured to establish have found very general acceptance throughout
the Arm, and have helped to clear up difficulties, although, as indeed
was to be expected, they have encountered opposition from several
quarters.

This result of my labours has encouraged me in the preparation of this
new edition to make use of all the latest experience, to bring out
with additional clearness essential points, and to add much new
material.

I trust that in this manner I have materially increased the practical
value of the work, and hope that in its new form it will continue to
exert its silent influence, winning new supporters for my views, and
helping to gain for the splendid Arm to which I belong the place
which, in the interest of the whole Army, it deserves.

                                             THE AUTHOR.

  STRAZBURG, IN THE WINTER OF 1902.




AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION


It would be difficult for a layman to form even an approximate
conception of the amount of work annually accomplished in the German
Army.

The very vivid consciousness stirring everywhere as to the magnitude
of the demands the not far distant future may make upon us, and the
knowledge that the means with which we are compelled to work are
certainly not always in agreement with our ideals, incite us to strain
every nerve to make the most of what we have; and I believe I am not
far wrong in asserting that it is the Cavalry Arm which, under
pressure of circumstances, responds to these demands with the greatest
avidity. This is, in fact, but the necessary consequence of the
many-sidedness of our duties.

Whether, however, the end and aim of all our exertions is everywhere
attained must remain an open question.

In every long period of peace there lurks the danger that methods of
training may deviate after false ideals, lose themselves in the cult
of imposing appearances, and in the clash of individual opinions fail
to distinguish the essential--_i.e._, what is really practicable under
the conditions of active service.

This danger is all the more imminent when the characters and forms of
Warfare itself are constantly changing; hence, ever new demands have
to be made upon the troops themselves, and the exact bearing of each
of these is not easily to be appreciated in the humdrum surroundings
of our peace-time duties.

It seems, therefore, a most pressing necessity at the present moment,
when changes in social conditions and constant technical progress are
exerting on the external phenomena and conditions of Warfare a steady
pressure in the direction of modification, that we should compare our
peace training with the requirements likely to be made upon us in time
of War. Thus we can note where further adjustments between the two are
necessary and can be usefully made.

In this process of analysis it will not suffice to take each changing
factor independently, following it out to its utmost ramifications,
but rather we must endeavour to take a general view of the whole, and
balance the variables one against the other.

The man who concentrates his attention only on one detail easily loses
his grasp of relative values, and runs the risk of failing 'to see the
wood for the trees,' and only the mind trained to contemplate each
factor in its relation to the whole, and with a clear idea of the
ultimate purpose for which this whole is intended, will be able to
avoid this pitfall; for only an intellect thus prepared can
successfully harmonize the whole with its part, and, while keeping the
essentials clearly before its eyes, treat the unessential as it
deserves.

It is in order to bring out this point of view that the following
pages have been undertaken.

As I endeavoured to arrive at a thoroughly clear comprehension of the
many conflicting interests involved in the training of men and horses,
as I tried to decide how to apportion both time and means to each
individual branch of their education, and to see how far the
traditions of the past could be harmonized with the requirements of
the future, or where and how they need further development and
simplification, I found myself compelled at every turn to go back and
seek my ideal standard in the demands which War itself must make upon
all Arms.

Thus my work must be considered as an attempt to represent in broad
outlines the conditions of the coming War, and from these to deduce
logically the requirements a rational system of organization and
training must satisfy.

Those who hold different opinions as to the tasks which will be
entrusted to our particular Arm will naturally come to other
conclusions as to the values to be assigned to peace education, and I
do not wish to present my opinions as absolutely final, although I
have done my utmost to treat my subject-matter objectively and without
prejudice.

Meanwhile, the problems I have submitted for investigation are not
only of military interest, but of the utmost military importance, and
it has, therefore, seemed to me well worth while to discuss them from
every point of view.

Further, because these investigations owe their origin to the
practical need I experienced during the course of my service to clear
up the many points I have dwelt on, I have considered it a duty to
make them accessible to all those who have at heart the development in
our Cavalry of a thoroughly sound spirit in full harmony with the
necessities of our present times.

                                             THE AUTHOR.

  BERLIN,
     _March, 1899_.




CONTENTS


                                                                  Page

  INTRODUCTION                                                     xxi


  PART I

  EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY AND ESSENTIALS OF LEADERSHIP

  Chapter

     I. THE MODERN CONDITIONS OF WAR, AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE
        EMPLOYMENT AND USEFULNESS OF CAVALRY                         3

    II. DUTIES AT THE BEGINNING AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE WAR    19

   III. STRATEGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE CAVALRY                     38

    IV. INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF DISMOUNTED ACTION                   49

     V. THE TACTICAL LEADING IN MOUNTED COMBATS                     62

    VI. TACTICAL CONDUCT OF DISMOUNTED ACTIONS                      90

   VII. STRATEGICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY                          104

  VIII. PATROLS--TRANSMISSION OF REPORTS--CYCLISTS                 132


  PART II

  ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING

     I. NUMBERS                                                    151

    II. RIDING, FEEDING, AND TRAINING                              184

   III. THE TRAINING FOR MOUNTED COMBAT                            213

    IV. TRAINING FOR DISMOUNTED FIGHTING                           247

     V. FIELD-SERVICE TRAINING AND MANOEUVRES                      265

    VI. THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF OUR OFFICERS                       286


  CONCLUSION                                                       294

  INDEX                                                            298




INTRODUCTION


General von Bernhardi's work, 'Cavalry in Future Wars' (translated
from the German by Mr. C. S. Goldman), is a most valuable addition to
modern Cavalry literature, and appears at an opportune moment to
counteract and dispel some misleading conclusions which have been
drawn by certain writers (both English and foreign) from reported
operations in the late Manchurian War.

One or two distinguished foreign soldiers who have publicly commented
upon that campaign have said that what is termed the 'Cavalry spirit'
is opposed to the idea of dismounted action. They hold that the
Cavalry disdain to dismount, and they see in riding the end instead of
the means. They consider that events in the Far East teach us that we
must render our Cavalry less devoted to 'manoeuvres' and to
'tournaments,' in order to enable them to fit themselves to take part
in modern fighting; that the times have come when the methods of
Warfare should be changed; and that the Cavalry must determine to
defeat the enemy by dismounted action entirely.

I cannot speak with any certainty as to what has happened in European
Armies, but as regards the British Cavalry, I am absolutely convinced
that the Cavalry spirit is and may be encouraged to the utmost without
in the least degree prejudicing either training in dismounted duties
or the acquirement of such tactical knowledge on the part of leaders
as will enable them to discern when and where to resort to dismounted
methods.

How, I ask, can the Cavalry perform its role in war until the enemy's
Cavalry is defeated and paralyzed? I challenge any Cavalry officer,
British or foreign, to deny the principle that Cavalry, acting as such
against its own Arm, can never attain complete success unless it is
proficient in shock tactics.

Cavalry soldiers must of course learn to be expert rifle shots, but
the attainment of this desirable object will be brought no nearer by
ignoring the horse, the sword, or the lance. On the contrary, the
'elan' and dash which perfection in Cavalry manoeuvre imparts to large
bodies of horsemen will be of inestimable value in their employment as
mounted riflemen when the field is laid open to their enterprise in
this role by the defeat of the hostile Cavalry.

That the Cavalry on both sides in the recent War did not distinguish
themselves or their Arm is an undoubted fact, but the reason is quite
apparent. On the Japanese side they were indifferently mounted, the
riding was not good, and they were very inferior in numbers, and hence
were only enabled to fulfil generally the role of Divisional Cavalry,
which they appear to have done very well. The cause of failure on the
Russian side is to be found in the fact that for years they have been
trained on _exactly the same principles_ which these writers now
advocate. They were devoid of real Cavalry training, they thought of
nothing but getting off their horses and shooting; hence they
lamentably failed in enterprises which demanded, before all, a display
of the highest form of Cavalry spirit.

The author of this book is an eminent soldier, possessing an intimate
knowledge of practical fighting, gained chiefly in one of the greatest
Wars of modern times--the Franco-German Campaign of 1870-1871.

His opinions are entitled to profound respect, and demand close
attention and consideration. The General has treated his subject and
marshalled his arguments and statements in so logical and intelligent
a manner, and the principles he deduces seem so sound and appropriate,
that the conclusions he arrives at appear to me unanswerable.

In the exhaustive and capable summary of the work of Cavalry in War,
General von Bernhardi seems to follow very closely the line of thought
which has in recent years occupied the brains of many practical
Cavalry soldiers in this country. He appeals strongly to our
intellectual sympathy when he first of all discusses the strategical
employment of Cavalry in all its bearings, and afterwards proceeds to
unfold his views as to the role of the Cavalry Arm, first when the
enemy's Cavalry has been driven from the field, and secondly in
conjunction with the other Arms. Personally, I have never known the
'Case for the Cavalry' stated more clearly and intelligently.

In recommending the study of the book to all British soldiers, I would
draw particular attention to the author's constant and repeated
references to the necessity of first seeking out and fighting the
hostile Cavalry and driving them from the field--in other words, to
the immediate and complete attainment of the moral superiority.

In support of his opinions, he reminds us forcibly that the important
results gained by the German Cavalry in the 1870-1871 campaign were
due to the absence of opposition on the part of the French Cavalry
more than to anything else, and he contends that in future Wars, where
the Cavalry on either side have been properly trained as such, this
supremacy will have to be fought for, and will involve an enormous
increase in the difficulty with which the Cavalry Arm will carry out
its role. He scoffs at the idea held by so many 'amateurs' that
'Cavalry duels' are superfluous.

Only those who have led Cavalry on active service in the field, and
have been charged with their training in peace-time, can realize to
the full the absolute soundness of the conclusions at which General
von Bernhardi has arrived, and it is much to be feared that the
mischievous teaching which scoffs at 'manoeuvres,' 'tournaments,' and
the 'Cavalry spirit,' proceeds almost entirely from the pens and from
the brains of men who have no practical knowledge of the handling of
the Cavalry Arm.

The great value of this book to the British Cavalry officer of to-day
seems to me to lie in the fact that this particular vein of thought
and argument pervades it throughout.

The General tells us, with the soundest arguments and the most
positive proofs, that 'the brilliant field of enterprise which is open
to the Cavalry soldier in his role as a mounted rifleman can only be
attained by him when he has overthrown the enemy's Cavalry.'

The author, having unmistakably insisted upon the preliminary
overthrow of the enemy's Cavalry, proceeds to vindicate the idea that
the Cavalry spirit is in any degree opposed to the idea of dismounted
action when necessary. On the contrary, he declares emphatically that
the Cavalry fight is only a means to an end, and that the hostile
Cavalry once disposed of by means of horse and cold steel alone, a
brilliant role lies open to that Arm by reason of their possession of
an efficient firearm, in the use of which the cavalryman has received
a thorough training.

The great difficulty, he tells us, lies in the necessity of
discovering a Leader who possesses the 'power of holding the balance
correctly between fire power and shock, and in the training for the
former never to allow troops to lose confidence in the latter.'
'Whether,' says the General, 'it be in the working out of some
strategical design, or in joining hands with the other Arms to obtain
by united fire action some common purpose, a balance of judgment and
absence of prejudice is implied which is of the rarest occurrence in
normal natures.'

In dwelling so persistently upon the necessity for Cavalry being
trained to the highest possible pitch to meet the enemy's Cavalry, I
do not wish to be misunderstood. I agree absolutely with the author in
the principle he lays down that the Cavalry fight is only a means to
an end, but it is the most important means, and I have thought it
right to comment upon this because it is a principle which in this
country, since the South African War, we have been very much inclined
to overlook. To place a force of Cavalry in the field in support of a
great Army which is deficient in the power to overcome the opposing
Cavalry is to act like one who would despatch a squadron of
war-vessels badly armed, badly trained, and ill found, to blockade a
distant coast-line defended by a powerful fleet. What is the naval
fight in the open sea but a means to an end? It would be as sensible
to dwell on the inutility and waste of a duel between hostile fleets
as to lay down the principle that the 'Cavalry battle' in no way
affects the mutual situation of hostile armies.

But the 'end' in view which General von Bernhardi has so clearly laid
down must never be lost sight of.

Whilst the conditions of modern War have rendered the service of
reconnaissance far more difficult, the same causes lend themselves to
a much easier deception of the enemy by means of feints, etc. Cavalry,
when working with the other Arms, can render valuable service in this
way, and also in bringing rapid support to a main or counter attack.

Another most important point must be noticed. I allude to the
increasing tendency of umpires and superior officers to insist on
Cavalry at manoeuvres and elsewhere being _ultra-cautious_. They try
to inculcate such a respect for Infantry fire that Cavalry is taught
to shirk exposure, and the moment Infantry come within sight,
squadrons are made either to retire altogether, or dismount and shoot,
regardless of what the 'Cavalry value' of the ground happens to be.

I have no hesitation in saying that immense harm is done to the war
efficiency of Cavalry by decisions of this kind, which disregard
altogether the human factor in the problem. We ought the more to be on
our guard against false teaching of this nature, seeing that there are
many grave warnings to be found in history of the inevitable
consequences of thus placing the weapon above the men.

After the war of 1866 the great von Moltke made the following report
to the King of Prussia:--

'Our Cavalry failed, perhaps not so much in actual capacity as in
_self-confidence_. All its initiative had been destroyed at manoeuvres,
where criticism and blame had become almost synonymous, and it therefore
shirked independent bold action, and kept far in rear, and as much as
possible out of sight' (Moltke's 'Taktisch-Strategische Aufsaetze,'
Berlin, 1900).

By like methods in peace training prior to the War with Turkey such
timidity had been developed in the Russian Cavalry that, in the words
of General Baykow, Cavalry commanders showed a marked disinclination
to undertake operations which were well within their powers, but which
might bring them in contact with the Turkish Infantry, and so run risk
of suffering loss.

History is full of similar instances of how _not_ to train Cavalry,
and I hold most strongly that the Arm must be educated up to a
readiness _to act_, to come to close quarters in co-operation with the
other Arms, and to risk casualties, as Infantry has often done before
without losing its 'battle' value.

To sum up, training with a view to self-sacrifice during peace
exercises is essential for the success of all Arms in War, but
especially so for Cavalry.

With remarkable perspicuity and telling conviction, General von
Bernhardi has dealt in an exhaustive manner with every subject
demanding a Cavalry soldier's study and thought. I am convinced that
he who thoroughly masters the contents of his book will feel no doubt
and will entertain no misapprehension as to the vast role his Arm is
called upon to fulfil in War, and he will realize how, in mastering
the great essentials of which it treats, he will himself be assisting
in the best possible manner to maintain the prestige and glory of the
great Service to which he belongs.




I

EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY AND ESSENTIALS OF LEADERSHIP




CHAPTER I

THE MODERN CONDITIONS OF WAR, AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE EMPLOYMENT
AND USEFULNESS OF CAVALRY


The Art of War has undergone a momentous change; indeed, it has been
revolutionized since the Franco-German War. Every condition that
affects the conduct of warlike operations seems changed in almost
every particular. Arms of precision have reached a degree of
perfection which compels us to take into account possibilities which
did not exist a few years ago, and for which the experience of the
past can offer no scale of comparison. The all but universal
introduction of Compulsory Service, and the consequent reduction in
length of time spent by the soldier with the colours, have changed the
character of almost all European Armies.

All the most typical factors in the standing Armies of former days
disappear more or less on the issue of the order to mobilize. New
groupings of units are formed from the first outbreak of hostilities,
and the fact that these bodies are put together only on mobilization,
together with the reduction in the period of service which has been
very generally accepted, tend to depreciate the average value of the
troops, whilst at the same time the 'masses' have risen to
unimaginable dimensions. This '_folie des nombres_,' against which
certain French Authorities have warned us, is a very stern reality.

Experience has shown that the mere preparation for War, penetrating
year by year more deeply into the very heart of nations, must in
future unchain, from the first moment that the Armies of the Continent
come into collision, all the horrors of a racial conflict, in which,
from the first, the interests of every individual are involved.

The enormous development of railway communication has changed all
conditions of strategical operations. Whilst the power of the railway
to move masses since 1871 has increased, owing to the development both
in the number and condition of the great trunk lines, the Armies
themselves have become dependent on the railways in an ever-increasing
degree. Further developments in Steam and Electricity will probably
make these rearward communications both more necessary and at the same
time more susceptible to injury. Thus all strategical conditions
appear modified. Masses necessitate, even in the richest theatre of
War, the return to the magazine system; hence the lines of
communication are acquiring increased importance, and simultaneously
great vulnerability.

On the other hand, the increased power of the weapons in use offers
greater advantages to the local defence. The prospects of success in
the direct frontal attack of strong positions have diminished
enormously. The assailant, therefore, no longer able to succeed by
frontal attack, is compelled to endeavour to work round the enemy's
flanks, and thus exercise pressure upon his communications. His
endeavour must be, as Frederick the Great would have said, 'to compel
his opponent to fight outside of his chosen position.'

This increased importance of the communications, which in already
exhausted districts will make itself particularly felt, will compel
the defenders to take greater measures for their protection.

All these conditions taken together must of necessity increase the
importance of strategy in the Wars of the future to an extent which,
in my opinion, no sufficient conception has as yet been made. This
final conclusion at least we must recognise, however much we may
struggle against it (partly as a consequence of our somewhat one-sided
experiences in 1870, and partly through the increased difficulty of
all operations due to the increased masses and the more concentrated
susceptibility of the railway communication): that the decisive
factors in the next War must be 'superiority in the strategic
direction of the troops, together with the increased efficiency they
have attained and their endurance.'[1]

         [Footnote 1: The contrary view to this was largely held by a
         certain school in Germany, whose views the author is here
         endeavouring to combat.]

To meet this drastic revolution in all these conditions, the pressure
of which has compelled the artillery into new lines of development and
forced the infantry to change their whole constitution (whether to
their advantage or not may remain an open question), no changes at all
commensurate to their importance have as yet been initiated in the
Cavalry.

Artillery and Infantry now have behind them the nation, from which
they can draw inexhaustible reserves of trained men for their constant
replenishment. The Cavalry alone remains a specialized service,
because, owing to the peculiar circumstances of its existence, it can
scarcely count on having the wastage of War made good by equally
well-trained men and horses; still less is its complete replacement in
case of disaster to be hoped for. In spite of this, we have to
recognise the fact that the proportion the Cavalry bears in all
European Armies to the ever-increasing numerical proportion of the
other Arms has steadily receded. The Peace establishments show this
clearly. Thus, taking the Germans' figures for 1870, we had:

  1870.

  463 Battalions.
  460 Squadrons.
  251 Batteries.
  15-3/4 Pioneer Battalions.

  1902.

  625 Battalions (including 18 of 'Rifles').
  486 Squadrons (including 16 squadrons of Mounted Rifles).
  562 Batteries.
  38 Battalions Heavy Artillery.
  28 Pioneer Battalions.

This ratio to the disadvantage of the Cavalry is even more apparent on
mobilization for War, owing to the many Reserve and Landwehr
formations of Infantry and Artillery, in comparison with which the few
new units provided by the Cavalry are relatively unimportant.
Considering the mobilized Army as a whole, the Cavalry forms
numerically an almost insignificant factor.

There remains yet another point of view to be considered. Undoubtedly
there has been in the Cavalry a most active spirit of reform. On the
basis of the experience derived from the great Wars of the last forty
years (in the list I include the American War of Secession), changes
in armament and equipment have taken place in every direction, more
particularly with regard to armament. The necessity and possibility
of strategical reconnaissance by independent bodies of Cavalry have
been fully recognised.

The conviction also has been arrived at that only when supplied with a
useful firearm and an adequate allowance of Horse Artillery will such
'masses' prove adequate for the accomplishment of this special task.
With the same object in view, the means have been granted to them with
which to destroy telegraphs and railways, to bridge rivers, and so
forth. The conviction also has been gained that the Cavalry require to
be so familiarized with tactical formations for their employment in
'mass' that they shall have become a second nature to them if they are
to fight with a reasonable prospect of success. But all that has been
done in these directions still remains insufficient. On the one hand,
the improvements introduced have not taken into account the decisive
changes in the general conditions which only the last few years have
brought about. On the other, we must not forget that neither the
Prussian Cavalry in 1870 in France nor the Russians against the Turks
in 1877-1878 had even approximately equal Cavalry to oppose them. Even
the great results achieved alternately by the Cavalry on both sides
during the American Civil War were obtained in general under
conditions which can no longer be anticipated, for at the moment of
collision neither encountered, as a rule, either equal quality or
numbers sufficient to develop their full power of attack.

The very important data obtained during the campaign of 1899-1900 in
South Africa as to the employment of dismounted action by Cavalry were
also not then before us. One could only, therefore, reason from
one-sided experiences, which can no longer be recognised as generally
sufficient for our purpose. In future the mere possibility of results
such as in 1870-1871 we so often gained owing to the absence of any
serious opposition on the part of the opposing Cavalry, will nowadays
have to be obstinately fought for, not without considerable loss; and
it needs no special proof to show what an enormous increase in the
difficulty of our task this involves, and how, as a consequence, all
the conditions of our future action must be modified.

Thus, the Cavalry stands face to face with new conditions, and sees
itself everywhere confronted--on the battle-field and in the wider
field of strategical operations--with new problems, towards the
solution of which the history of the past furnishes only very general
indications.

If we mean to maintain our position as an effective Arm, and satisfy
the demands that of necessity must be made upon us by these new
conditions, _we must break_ with many experiences of the past, and
work out for ourselves principles of action which must be deduced
essentially from the probable requirements of the future.

Each epoch-making War makes new demands upon us and prescribes new
tasks, and he only will reap the palm of success who is able to meet
them, because, with wise prevision, he has prepared himself to solve
their difficulties in peace.

If we wish to make an approximately correct picture of the future that
awaits us, we must first face the question, What will be the influence
that the changed conditions in the Art of War considered as a whole
must exercise on the possible scope of action of our Arm?

From the answer to this we can deduce the demands on the Cavalry in
particular, and these demands give us a means for determining the
limits of its employment, its consequent organization, and the
training best suited to enable it to meet these requirements.

If we summarize all the conditions which have modified the conduct of
War and contrast with them what Cavalry, from the very nature of its
being, is capable of performing, it would appear at first sight as if
every form of action of the mounted Arm has been impeded and rendered
more difficult in the highest degree; more particularly is this the
case when opposed to the increased power of modern arms. Certainly,
the impact of a modern bullet may at times produce less immediate
effect than formerly. Cases have occurred in which serious wounds did
not place the individual out of action immediately, and we may
therefore anticipate that many horses will not be stopped in the
charge, despite severe injuries. But this drawback the Infantry can
meet by opening fire sooner. To the Artillery this does not apply;
and, in any case, this objection is not of such importance as to
neutralize in any way the other advantages conferred by modern
weapons.

Owing to the fact that the extent of the danger zone has been very
considerably increased, and that within these zones the amount of fire
which has to be faced in a given time has been intensified to a degree
which formerly could hardly have been dreamt of, it has ceased to be
possible to ride straight at the front of an unshaken enemy.

Thus, essentially the Cavalry has been driven out of its former place
of honour on the battle-fields of the plains, and has been compelled
to seek the assistance of the cover the ground affords in order to
carry its own power of destruction into immediate contact with its
enemy, and only under most exceptionally favourable conditions will it
still be possible to deliver a charge direct across the open.

Further, as far as the Infantry are concerned, it will be quite the
exception to encounter them in closed bodies; generally we shall have
to ride against extended lines, which offer a most unfavourable target
for our purpose.

The difficulties both of observation and reconnaissance have also been
materially increased, for, on the one hand, the increased range of the
firearm compels one to keep further away from the enemy, thus making
it more difficult to judge with accuracy his strength and positions;
on the other, the use of smokeless powder, which no longer reveals the
position of the firing line, renders a more thorough searching of the
ground even more indispensable than formerly.

The possible participation of the civilian inhabitants of the invaded
Nation in the War will hamper most severely all forms of Cavalry
action other than on the battle-field. In intersected districts it
may, indeed, suffice to paralyze completely the execution of all
patrolling duties; and thus the offensive finds itself confronted by a
new and permanent element of danger and delay, whose gravity we may
estimate by the events which occurred in the latter portion of the
Franco-German War, and we may be quite certain that in future all such
experiences will be very much intensified.

Lastly, the fall in the numerical proportion of the Cavalry to the
other Arms is all to our disadvantage. The greater numbers of the
latter cover larger areas, and whether to cover these or to
reconnoitre them, it will be necessary to embrace far larger spaces,
notwithstanding our relatively smaller numbers--_i.e._, on each square
mile we shall only be able to employ, on an average, a largely reduced
number of patrols, etc.

Tactically this want of numbers again affects us. If the necessity to
intervene arises, not only have we better firearms against us, but
relatively a larger number of troops. Each tactical advantage secured
will thus exercise far less effect than formerly upon our opponent,
since the fraction of the enemy's force ridden down represents a
smaller proportion of his whole Army.

If an Infantry Brigade, one of a force of ten Army Corps, is
annihilated, the effect is not nearly so far-reaching as if this
Brigade formed part of an Army of two or even three Corps.

If in these changed relations there are obviously factors which
materially limit the tactical importance of Cavalry, and which must
make the solution of their strategical tasks far more difficult, on
the other side we find opportunities in the probable phenomena of a
future War which, though less obvious, nevertheless on investigation
lead us to the conclusion that the importance of the Arm is even
greater than formerly, opening for it a wider sphere of activity, and
even on the battle-field revealing new chances of success.

Let us consider these opportunities more closely. The greater the
pitch of nervous tension to which men are wrought up in battle, the
greater the pitch of excitement reached, the more decisive will be the
reaction when the flood-tide of defeat overwhelms them.

Now that all European States are straining every nerve to employ
enormous masses of men from the first moment of hostilities, in order
thus to gain an advantage whilst their enemy is still concentrating,
and when we further consider how these exertions must increase the
strain throughout the nation to the very utmost, it must be apparent
that the first great decision of Arms must be of overwhelming
importance. Not only the troops directly concerned, but the 'masses'
behind them, find themselves for the moment involved in the
consequences of victory or defeat. Hence the reaction in either
direction, owing to the lower average quality of the troops, their
greater numbers, the increased difficulties of moving them, and the
susceptibility to congestion of their rearward communications, must be
far greater and far more disastrous than hitherto under similar
tactical conditions.

The more important it is to secure a favourable decision, the more
difficult with growing masses to divert an operation once commenced,
to give it a new direction or assign it a new objective, the less
possible it becomes to alter dispositions which may have been issued
on false premises; hence again _the greater grows the value of
thorough and active reconnoitring_.

If this holds good, more especially for the first great collision, it
remains also a guiding principle for all future operations; for, on
the one side, it is probable that even in its later stages the War
will be conducted with comparatively great masses; on the other, as we
have seen, _the importance of the strategical element has
unquestionably grown_; hence the _value of efficient reconnaissance_
has been proportionably intensified.

In similar measure the importance of screening has also developed. In
proportion as the assailant is compelled to resort to turning
movements and surprises, the defender is obliged to have recourse to
timely changes of front and unexpected counter-attacks; hence for
both timely reconnaissance of the enemy's, as well as for trustworthy
screening of one's own operations, the extended employment of the
mounted Arms has become imperative. In other words, although
reconnaissance and screening for strategical purposes by the Cavalry
have been rendered more difficult by the conditions we must expect to
meet in the future, on the other hand, they have gained enormously in
importance. And it is not in this direction alone that the value of
the Arm has increased, but it has also had a new and important field
of activity thrown open to it owing to the increased susceptibility
the rearward communications of the enemy and his railways have
developed.

As a consequence of the increased liability to interruption of these
communications, and also of the far more serious confusion to which
any such interruption can give rise, it has become far more difficult
than in the past to execute offensive flanking operations, changes of
front, or counter-attacks, all of which are movements which the
practical strategist must bear in mind. On paper and on the map such
undertakings appear to present no more elements of friction than
formerly, but on the ground itself those who have once seen masses of
several corps all huddled together know that things are very
different. All such movements nowadays are tied to the railway-lines,
and these, again, are congested by the flow of food and ammunition,
which must at all costs be maintained. Fresh units also of troops may
be coming up to the front, whose arrival is of the last importance in
the plans of the generalissimo, and a single broken viaduct may throw
confusion into the whole design.

In a densely-populated and fruitful district the resulting failure of
supply may be endured, but it is very different when in a
poverty-stricken district the supply of a whole Army depends on
perhaps a single line of railway.

Thus the Cavalry sees itself confronted by a task in the solution of
which it can achieve results of _decisive importance_ in a new
direction, for the following reasons: The relative importance of the
Arm during actual operations having been materially increased, the
period of concentration preceding actual collision (notwithstanding
the fact that the actual effectiveness of Cavalry in the face of
modern firearms has been decreased) offers opportunities which under
certain conditions promise higher results than formerly.

If every delay in the march which may be caused by the action of
Cavalry against the flanking lines of advance of an Army concentrating
for battle is detrimental, how much greater would be the
disorganization resulting from similar operations after defeat! Very
rarely in such a case would it be possible to retire eccentrically by
the same roads which were used for advance. The beaten troops
generally drift back quite involuntarily in the direction into which
they have been compelled by the results of the tactical decision. The
wider the original front, the greater the masses of the troops
concerned (which are now not only in a demoralized condition, but are
compelled, under pressure of pursuit, to change their communications
into new directions, and for this purpose to disentangle the columns
drawn in for the concentration) and the greater the certainty that
conditions must arise which will give to an active Cavalry an even
richer opportunity of harvest than was formerly open to them.

This will in future be all the more the case when troops of lower
quality, and therefore more liable to become shaken and dispirited,
have to be employed. Reserve formations--Landwehr and the like--which
under favourable conditions might render excellent service, when once
beaten, without officers, weary and hungry, lose all cohesion, when,
with baggage, wounded, and stragglers, they are driven back over
crowded roads; and then, no matter how well they are armed, they are
an easy prey to a pursuing Cavalry.

The man who throws his rifle away or shoots in the air will not find
salvation either in clip-loading or smokeless powder against the lance
in the hands of a relentless pursuing Cavalry.

The same holds good for the fight itself. We cannot attack even
inferior Infantry as long as it only keeps the muzzles of its rifles
down and shoots straight; but once it is morally broken and surprised,
then the greatest results are still to be achieved even on an open
battle-field. That, at least, the campaign of 1870-1871 sufficiently
proved, although the Cavalry were so seldom allowed the opportunity to
reap the ripe harvest our strategy and the action of the other Arms
had so abundantly prepared for them.

A further point in our favour is to be found in the fact that the
increased power of modern Artillery fire has rendered the defence of
villages and woods practically an impossibility. The Infantry are thus
compelled to seek open but rolling ground, and it is precisely such
ground which favours the concealed approach and sudden attack of the
Cavalry; but surprise is the very essence of successful Cavalry
action.

If we bring together all these points of view which have been hitherto
only indicated, we find, on the one hand, the absolute fighting value
of the Cavalry has considerably diminished, and that in modern War the
conditions of Cavalry employment will in every direction be rendered
more difficult; on the other hand, the strategical importance of the
Arm, as well as the scope of the duties which it may be called upon to
fulfil, have increased very decidedly, and very important new
opportunities for successes have been thrown open to it.

We cannot sufficiently insist upon the cumulative effects which all
these general changes in the nature of War have exercised upon the
Cavalry Arm; for not only has public opinion taken up the opposite
view, but even in the Army itself these positive views have not
received the attention they deserve.

The exploits of our Cavalry in 1870-1871 have been universally
admired, without, however, being appreciated at their true relative
value. On the other hand, reasoning from the mechanical perfection of
the firearm, the conclusion has been reached that, as against Infantry
and Artillery, the Cavalry can no longer hope to achieve any results
of importance. It has been shown that in 1870-1871 the German Cavalry
possessed a great numerical superiority over its adversary--that, in
fact, numerous regiments during the whole War either never came into
action at all or at least never had the opportunity to exhibit their
full value in other fields of employment, and hence it has been
concluded that an increase or organic reform of what they are pleased
to consider a somewhat antiquated Cavalry is quite superfluous.

An attempt on the part of the Imperial Government to introduce an
increase of establishments had to give way to more important
considerations. In fact, practically the German Cavalry in number and
organization remains to-day the same as in 1870.

But the duties which in future will fall to the Cavalry are so
wide-reaching, and for the conduct of the War are often of such
decisive importance, that on the manner of their execution the
ultimate results of a campaign must very materially depend.

If the Cavalry is not in a condition to prove equal to these duties,
we shall find ourselves confronted with a situation of the gravest
danger. Hence it becomes unconditionally necessary to apply the
reforming hand where important deficiencies and practical
insufficiencies can be recognised. In order to apply the lever of
reform at once to the best advantage, we must be quite clear in our
own minds in which part of the conduct of War the importance of the
Cavalry will principally be felt. Only from the recognition of the
demands which will there be made upon it can we conclude in what
direction its further evolution can be initiated.

We must, therefore, get a clear conception of the probable demands to
be made upon the Arm in each individual phase of a future War, test
them with a view to their relative importance towards the result as a
whole, and then endeavour to recognise on which factors the success in
each individual phase principally depends.

In the first place stands naturally the demands which will be made on
the Cavalry during the early periods after the declaration of
hostilities--that is, during mobilization and concentration. These
require all the more attention because, as we have seen, it is
particularly these introductory stages of future War which will be of
particular importance, and because it is precisely in these very
points that opinion is as yet not united.

Then we must follow the employment of the Arm in the further course of
operations, and endeavour to determine in what direction the most
important results are to be obtained.




CHAPTER II

DUTIES AT THE BEGINNING AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE WAR


The importance which attaches to the first tactical decisions, the
fact that their success is mainly determined by the uninterrupted
execution of the railway deployment, the safe arrival of the troops
and war material in the appointed zones of concentration, the
consideration that the continuance of the operation after the first
battle--retreat or pursuit--is mainly conditioned by the uninterrupted
action of the rearward communications, make it indubitable that it is
of the utmost importance to disturb the corresponding operations of
the enemy, and thus place one's own Army from the very beginning in a
position of material and strategic advantage.

Since the Cavalry is not only able to cover great distances with
overwhelming rapidity, but also, owing to its special character as a
standing branch of the Army, is always ready to march and operate,
whilst the other portions of the Army are still occupied with their
mobilization, the opinion has been freely expressed that it would be
advantageous to utilize this period required for the mobilization and
railway transport of the other Arms for Cavalry raids, either into
the zone of concentration, or against the communications of the enemy.
Russia has for this very purpose concentrated upon the German and
Austrian frontiers enormous Cavalry forces, supported by light
infantry. France also keeps a numerous Cavalry practically on a war
footing on the frontiers of Lorraine.

On the outbreak of War these masses are ready at the shortest notice
to ride over our frontiers, to break up our railways, to seize our
horses and depots, to destroy our magazines, and to carry terror and
consternation into our zone of assembly.

It cannot be denied that in such manner by no means inconsiderable
damage could be caused, and hence one must earnestly consider, first,
what chances of success such enterprises offer, and next, whether the
relative magnitude of the probable results are proportionate to the
probable losses they must necessarily entail.

Cool and objective consideration of such ideas must, in my opinion,
lead us to negative such undertakings--on our side, at any rate. In
the first place, the enemy will always be in a position, by suitable
organization of his frontier guards and the situation selected for the
front of his strategic deployment, to withdraw himself either
altogether from the radius of action of the Cavalry, or at least
render its advance both difficult and dangerous. The danger will be
the greater the more it has been possible to provide for the armament
and organization of the population in the frontier provinces. Where
the conditions on the side of the defender are not unusually
unfavourable--as, for instance, in wide open districts--or where there
is a want of troops in strategically unimportant provinces, then even
if the invading masses break in on the very first day of mobilization,
they will find railways, defiles, river-crossings already defended by
infantry or popular levies. If they come upon an insurgent population
they will find great difficulties both in reconnaissance and
subsistence.

At every step they advance, the numbers of the opponent will be
constantly increasing, while their own strength diminishes. The
defiles will be occupied between their several columns, and they must
guard themselves in every direction. Their trains and baggage get into
confusion, and supply becomes all the more difficult the more rapidly
they advance, because the waggons cannot keep up with their movement,
and there is no time for requisitioning. Field batteries and lines of
infantry occupy the more important positions, the enemy's Cavalry
appears on the flanks, and man and horse break down at length under
the severity of the strain. Retreat becomes inevitable, and if they
ever get back at all, they can only reach their own Army after heavy
losses and with broken force. The damage which they can do to the
enemy remains small in proportion to his total power, even though it
is locally not inconsiderable. At the best one may hope to destroy
some railway not too far from the frontier, interrupt some telegraph
lines of communication, and disperse or capture some ammunition
depots, magazines, or snap up some convoys of reserve men and horses.
But the enemy has already taken these possibilities into account; they
will soon be overcome, and his arrangements in general will be hardly
disturbed.

If, on the other hand, the Cavalry is accompanied by infantry, it will
be even more hampered in its movements than by its own trains, and
will soon have to decide whether it should make its movements
dependent on those of its escort, thereby renouncing all hopes of
further results, or whether it should abandon the infantry to its
fate. Certain defiles in the vicinity of the frontier, which the
combined forces were able in advancing to occupy, the infantry may
well succeed in keeping open; but if it attempts to follow the tracks
of its own Cavalry, there can be no doubt it would be exposed to
inevitable destruction.

This applies equally to the cyclist--at least, as far as the machine
has as yet been developed; for though one cannot deny the great
advantage which its mobility under certain circumstances offers, yet
it remains too dependent on roads and weather to insure that freedom
and certainty of movement which in such undertakings in conjunction
with Cavalry are unconditionally necessary.

The attempt to break up communications by well-mounted officers
patrols boldly pushed forward in advance would seem to offer even less
chances of securing permanent results. They, too, will find the
country obstructed by the armed population, or by troops in the act of
concentration. Even weak detachments or patrols along the railway
would suffice to effectively resist them; they can depend for success
only on their rapidity and cunning. But most rivers are unfordable,
and in the woods patrols can hardly venture, because every tree may
shelter a man with a rifle. Once they leave the roads, their pace
diminishes; they easily lose their direction; nowhere can they obtain
security for rest and food, even if they are fortunate enough in
procuring any. If, in spite of all this, they do happen to succeed in
blowing up a railway or cutting a telegraph, the effect is
infinitesimal.

The patrol itself will find its chances of escape decreasing in exact
proportion to the distance it has penetrated into the enemy's country.

The greater the number of the patrols employed, the more irreplaceable
will the inevitable loss become; for it will always be the best
officers, the men who put most energy and determination into the
execution of their instructions, who are the most likely to fall
victims to their courage and audacity.

Premature advance of the Cavalry during mobilization and concentration
can only procure information of little or no importance, for the
existing railways, the direction of the frontiers, and the peace-time
distribution of the troops reveal all this to the General Staff
beforehand. These, together with the secret service, political
conditions obtaining at the moment, and press intelligence, will
enable one to forecast with some degree of precision the general
situation.

Now, the Cavalry can hardly expect to attain more--indeed, it is
doubtful whether they would succeed even in confirming what is already
known, for the difficulties to be overcome, as we have seen, are
numerous, and nowhere can one find completed situations from which to
make reliable deductions. At most they can determine that certain
places are already occupied, and that the traffic on certain lines is
considerable, things that one knew _a priori_, which, therefore, are
not worth any serious sacrifice. Moreover, it is exceedingly doubtful
whether, at such an early period, when conditions are changing from
day to day, such information has any practical value.

Of course, it is not intended to maintain that one should not from the
very first moment after the declaration of War keep a sharp look-out
upon the enemy, work up to him, and seek to determine as much as
rapidity and daring can succeed, with any probability of success, in
attaining--that goes without saying. Particular value will always
attach to the taking of prisoners, whose regimental numbers enable us
to check the accuracy of our existing information. But against this we
must emphasize all the more forcibly that in this first period of
hostilities an inundation of the enemy's zone of concentration with
masses or by far-flung lines of patrols is not only not expedient, but
absolutely detrimental, since the certain cost of such undertakings
stands in no reasonable proportion to the probably negative, or at
most insignificant, result to be expected. Further, our own
concentration has already been so prepared in peace that it must be
carried out with clock-like regularity, even should the results of the
reconnaissance disclose that the conditions on the side of the enemy
were not quite those that we had originally expected.

Even the mere transference backwards of the line of strategic
deployment, which in 1870 could still be carried out without serious
difficulties or drawbacks, could nowadays, in view of the high tension
induced by modern conditions, only be executed with extraordinary
difficulty, whilst lateral displacement of such numbers is quite
inconceivable. For even if the railway organization would suffice for
the execution of such a design, the many other preparations in the
zone of concentration can neither be moved nor improvised.

Summarizing the whole question, the conclusion, I think, must be, that
only that Army which has at its disposal a great preponderance of
Cavalry could allow itself the luxury of such premature commitment of
its mounted forces.

In general, the difficulties of replacing the losses of the Cavalry
with material of equal quality are so great that only the most
important reasons could justify any such attempts. Hence the side
which is weaker in Cavalry will meet the circumstances best by keeping
back its horsemen, and not sacrificing its officers for infinitesimal,
and probably unattainable, advantages. It will be better merely to
work up to the enemy as close as may be possible without serious
losses, allow the enemy's mounted forces to wreck themselves against
the opposing infantry and armed population, and only then to put in
its Cavalry for decisive action when the opponent has already wasted
his best elements in the pursuit of insignificant advantages. After
all, it is only then, when the strategical concentration commences,
after railway movement is completed, that reconnaissance becomes both
possible and important.

Circumstances can, of course, arise in which, already during the first
period of operations, exhaustive independent activity may be demanded
from the Cavalry, as, for instance, when one has reason to believe
that the enemy has changed his previously-selected zone of
concentration, or, as when in 1870 on the German side, it becomes
necessary to take steps to protect the frontier districts against the
enemy's raids. In the first case the attempts to discover, by the
employment of Cavalry, the changed dispositions of the enemy are
certainly permissible. The patrols must then go forward until they can
settle the decisive questions, and strong detachments must be pushed
out so close behind them that the patrols and their following
squadrons can find a safe retreat, and insure the transmission of the
intelligence they have collected.

In such enterprises tactical collision with the enemy's Cavalry and
his frontier troops might ensue. It may therefore be necessary to
support our squadrons by Infantry and Artillery.

But in every case we must be careful to keep within the limits which
are conditioned by the purpose of the undertaking, and not allow
ourselves to be involved in desperate and doubtful enterprises.

In the next case the duties of the Cavalry are merely defensive. All
that then matters is to rob small bodies of the enemy of their
opportunities, to block the traffic across the frontier, and to work
round their patrols with our own forces; but in no case are they to
attempt to obtain positive advantages by force, or to hazard important
decisions against a superior enemy. Wherever possible every effort
should be made to supplement the troops assigned to this defensive
attitude by the armed population, or even to replace them by such
levies altogether. The fortification and defence of villages and
isolated farms, occupation of railways and watercourses, and, above
all, the defence of woods which might favour the concealed advance of
the enemy's patrols, can well be left to the care of these improvised
formations.

Hostile attempts can be generally met by dismounted fire action in
well-chosen strong defensive country, possibly supported by
detachments of Infantry, Artillery, and 'Landsturm.' If the enemy's
superiority is great, then one must retire until the equilibrium of
the forces is re-established, the strategical necessity compels us to
fight, or, finally, the tactical situation gives good promise of
success.

One must, however, always keep this clearly before one's mind: that
the essence of all Cavalry action in the opening stage of the War lies
neither in this purely defensive attitude, nor in the offensive
enterprises previously alluded to, by which the concentration of the
enemy would be disturbed or other material successes might be
achieved, but that the decisive purpose only begins when important and
possible tasks can be given to the Cavalry--_i.e._, when the main
bodies of the enemy become ready for operations.

Then it becomes our duty to screen not only the advance of our own
troops and to secure to our Infantry the advantages of being able to
advance undisturbed, but the climax of all these duties will be
reached _in the far more important duty_, in the now indispensable
task, of securing the _widest possible sphere of intelligence_.

Whereas, during the period of railway concentration the front of the
enemy was conditioned by the ends of the lines employed in bringing up
the troops, who in turn spread themselves out to utilize the resources
of the country (hence generally our patrols, if sent out, would come
in contact all along the threatened frontier or the enemy's line of
detrainment, with defended villages, etc.), the troops will now be
drawn into closer cantonments, or bivouacs, and group themselves
together into clearly-defined masses.

There will therefore now arise between separate portions of his Army
and their lines of advance, spaces unoccupied by troops into which our
Cavalry can penetrate. The heads and flanks of his columns can now be
determined, and the direction in which they are marching, thus
ascertained, becomes of essential importance.

Now is the time when the Cavalry must put in its full strength to
discover the strength and direction of the enemy's movements, and the
fact of this concentration provides the Cavalry with the opportunities
necessary to solve the problem before it.

Of course, immediately after detraining, troops will have to march to
the districts to which they are assigned for convenience of supply,
and this will lead to the formation of temporary groupings, which it
will be advisable, if possible, for us to observe. But it must not be
overlooked that observations during this period may easily lead to
false conclusions, as such movements serve only secondary purposes or
introductory measures, and seldom justify any conclusions bearing upon
the design of the ultimate operations. These latter only develop after
a certain degree of concentration has been attained, and hence the
essence of the whole question resolves itself into this--that the
Cavalry should not be put in until shortly before the strategical
concentration begins.

From the results now obtained the success of the whole campaign may
entirely depend. At this climax no secondary consideration must be
allowed to distract attention from the principal object. Even the
desirability of screening the movements of one's own Army, in so far
as this duty is not fulfilled by the reconnaissance itself, must give
way to the attainment of the principal object in view, which is
_intelligence_, not _security_.

This point requires to be more particularly insisted upon, because
fundamentally different arrangements are necessary to fulfil these two
purposes. Anyone who attempted to entrust both the provision of
intelligence and the protection of the troops to one and the same body
of men would in the vast majority of cases fail to secure either
purpose as long as the enemy's mounted forces still held the field.

To secure information--_i.e._, intelligence--requires concentration of
force. The reconnoitring Cavalry must beat their opponents out of the
field in order to obtain opportunities for discovering what is going
on behind the enemy's protective screen. To accomplish this, the
Cavalry must endeavour to work round the adversary's flanks, and may
in consequence have to leave the front of its own Army entirely
uncovered. The protection of this Army, on the other hand, requires a
wide extension of front and consequent subdivision of force, the exact
opposite of the concentration the provision of intelligence
imperatively calls for.

Naturally this view encounters opposition. Some contend that the whole
triumph of the Art consists in solving both problems simultaneously.
They reason that it is superfluous to seek an encounter with the
enemy's Cavalry. Cavalry duels only lead to the mutual destruction of
both parties. They maintain that one ought to advance, in the
interests both of security and screening, on a certain breadth of
front. If, then, circumstances compel one to fight, one must
concentrate quickly, and after the combat gain again the necessary
degree of extension to cover the front of the Army. They would leave
reconnaissance to be carried out by rapidly advancing patrols, which
evade those of the enemy, find cover in the ground, gain advantageous
points of observation on the flanks and in rear of the opponent, thus
obtaining their objects in spite of the enemy.

I hold it to be a grave error of judgment to believe that any
systematic application of this line of action will give sufficient
results.

Advantages in war must be fought for; they cannot be filched.

Was it not difficult enough in 1870-1871 to obtain reliable
information, although we had no true Cavalry opponent against us, and
still more difficult to get that news through to Headquarters in time?
How much more difficult, therefore, will it not be in the future, when
we can no longer count on controlling unconditionally the country
between the two Armies, and the enemy's Cavalry hold the field as well
as we!

Who will then guarantee that our patrols will really penetrate the
enemy's screen; above all, that their reports will get back through
the district controlled by the enemy's Cavalry in time enough to be of
use to Headquarters in forming its decisions? If the patrols are
compelled to elude those of the enemy, to seek for intersected
country, and to make detours, one cannot count on the requisite
rapidity; and the greater the total numbers brought together in modern
War, the greater the distances become which have to be reckoned with.

If from the very necessity of finding the shortest way and securing
communications with one's own Headquarters it becomes necessary to
beat the enemy's Cavalry out of the field to clear up the situation
sufficiently, the need of fighting is brought home to one with all the
greater force, because any other line of action leaves the enemy
chances at least as good as our own, which can never be the objective
of any form of military action, and ultimately fighting becomes
compulsory if, in addition to reconnaissance, one attempts to carry
out screen duties at the same time. It stands to reason that the
enemy's Cavalry can only be prevented from seeing by actually driving
them off the ground and depriving them of the power of breaking
through our own screen. That a numerically and materially inferior
Cavalry does well to avoid action goes without saying, but
fundamentally the duty of the Cavalry must be to seek to bring about
collision with that of the enemy, so that from the very beginning it
secures command of the ground between the two armies, and that the
actual and moral superiority in the whole zone of operations between
the two armies is obtained from the outset for our own Cavalry.

The victory of the 'masses' intensifies and invigorates the sense of
superiority in the individual combatant, and this sense of individual
superiority is essential if the patrols are to carry through their
duties in the true Cavalry spirit.

On the one hand, they are only able to solve their tasks both of
screening and of reconnaissance by actually defeating the enemy's
patrols; on the other hand, the moral factor tells heavily in the
scale.

How can one expect courage and determination or audacity from men who
have always been taught to avoid their opponent and only fight when
they are actually compelled?

The man who leaves these psychic factors out of account will always
find himself mistaken in War.

That in certain cases it may be useful to push forward officers as
stealthy patrols, with instruction to avoid being drawn into an
action, as far as time and opportunity will allow, goes without
saying; but nevertheless stress must be laid upon the point that
already in the period which is in general taken up with the encounter
with the enemy's Cavalry, no opportunity should be lost of keeping the
principal masses of the enemy's Army under direct observation, and
that therefore it is necessary from the very commencement of the
advance to send out officers patrols for this special purpose.

These patrols will derive their best support from a tactical victory
obtained over the enemy's Cavalry, which is manoeuvring in their rear.

Thus the fact remains that we must fight to reconnoitre and fight to
screen, and that only a systematic division of the two spheres of
action can give us the freedom necessary to insure the adoption of the
proper form at the right time and place.

A victory of the reconnoitring Cavalry by shattering the strength of
the enemy's horsemen must always result, both directly and indirectly,
in the advantage of our screening force.

The whole consideration, therefore, leads me to the conclusion that
the chief task for the Cavalry consists in obtaining a victory over
the enemy's Cavalry in that direction which is of decisive importance
for the further prosecution of reconnaissance as soon after the
beginning of the great operations as possible.

That it cannot be our object to seek the opponent's horsemen in the
direction which they themselves have selected--merely to beat
them--need scarcely be insisted upon. That would be to take the law
from the enemy and allow one's self to be diverted from the principal
direction in which reconnaissance is desirable.

Time and direction of the advance must rather be so chosen that they
compel the enemy to move to meet us. At the same time our effort must
be to appear with numerical superiority, in order to be certain of
victory.

In what concerns the Cavalry in the further course of the War, the
necessity both of screening and reconnoitring recurs again and again;
and in many cases even after the enemy has been beaten out of the
field, these objects will still only be obtained by fighting. Such
cases will occur in the duties of screening and security when the
enemy still possesses enough offensive power to attempt a
reconnaissance, with the threat of attack combined, and we ourselves
are engaged in a similar manner; also in all such cases in which
turning movements entail too much delay, or are rendered impossible by
the extension of the enemy's front; or, again, when the enemy on their
part renew offensive operations.

The necessity of breaking through the line of Infantry outposts in
order to discover the whereabouts of the enemy's principal masses and
the direction of their movements will also from time to time arise,
and it may become necessary to suppress rapidly and thoroughly
attempts at armed resistance by the civilian population.

Further, our Cavalry will be called on for attempts against the
enemy's communications, the strategical importance of which has been
already discussed, and these will be all the more important in cases
where the district we are fighting over is too poor to supply the
enemy's forces, or where operations have assumed a stationary
character, as before Fredericksburg, Paris, and Plevna, and it becomes
desirable to hinder the use of the railways for the transport of
troops or evacuation of supplies.

Lastly, the Cavalry may be called on to occupy wide stretches of
country and exploit their resources, to nip in their very inception
the formation of fresh bodies of armed defenders, or on the defensive,
to secure our own communications or districts against undertakings by
flying columns of the enemy.

Such undertakings, particularly when they lead in rear of the enemy's
Armies, will frequently assume the character of 'raids' in which the
essential purpose is to cover great distances rapidly, often with the
sacrifice of all communications with one's own forces, to appear
suddenly at previously selected positions, and after completion of
one's immediate object to disappear suddenly, before the enemy can
bring overwhelming numbers against the assailant.

The success of such undertakings will depend, on the one hand, on the
rapidity with which the opportunities secured by such surprise are
utilized, and, on the other, on the available fighting power, which
must suffice to break down all opposition with certainty and speed.

Their execution, however, will always encounter many difficulties,
particularly when a hostile population has to be dealt with; but to
consider them on this account as impracticable seems to me all the
more impossible, because to my mind they embody an absolutely
indispensable element of future operations.

If it is feasible to enter upon them with fresh horses, and to make
adequate provision for supply without delaying the rapidity of
movement, either by utilizing the resources of the country, by taking
suitably organized columns with one, or by living on stores captured
from the enemy himself, then such 'raids' will succeed and exercise
most far-reaching consequences.

In my opinion all these conditions can be satisfied. We can preserve
our horses by exercising greater moderation in the pursuit of
non-essentials; difficulties of supply can be solved by suitable
preparations even in an enemy's country, and when working in our own,
the sympathetic and persistent support of our own population will
level all obstacles; but in all cases we must never leave out of sight
the cardinal point that only the concentration of sufficient force at
the right time and place can guarantee the final result.

Our conduct, however, will be different when our purpose is solely
defensive, or when we have to occupy districts which the enemy does
not seek to defend. In such cases, as also when our object is only the
concealment of our own designs, a dispersion of force may be
necessary, if only in order to occupy important defiles and defensive
sections of the ground, or for the occupation of the most important
centres of population in the enemy's country. From such tasks,
however, it should be the business of the Supreme Command to preserve
us, in order that the whole Cavalry strength should be retained intact
for offensive purposes more in harmony with its whole character and
the spirit of the Arm.

For these, if great results are to be attained, it requires in the
generality of cases concentration in time and space.

With the execution of these strategical missions, which so far alone
have attracted our attention, the duties of the Cavalry Arm are by no
means exhausted.

Nowadays, as formerly, it will still find work to its hands on the
battle-field itself, and this work will be all the more important in
proportion as the quality of the forces therein encountered is on a
lower level (_e.g._, new formations, Militia, etc.). In any case,
however, great results on the battle-field can only be expected from
the employment of numerically formidable 'Masses.' This is conditioned
by the very fact of the numbers which we must in future expect to see
engaged.

The portion of the enemy's forces affected by the results of a
successful charge must be a sufficient part of the whole which, at a
given time and place, is concerned in the task of endeavouring to
secure a decision.

Other factors also deserve consideration--above all, the increased
range of modern firearms. If the front of the attacking Cavalry is too
narrow, it will not only have to face the fire of the troops
immediately in its front, but it will be the focus of the fire from
all sides.

If the formation for attack does not supply a sufficient sequence of
successive efforts, then in many cases it can have no hope of
permanent result, for an onslaught by a single line will not have
strength enough to pierce the fire zone, and will be shot to pieces
before it can reach the enemy.[2]

         [Footnote 2: The same point also arises both in pursuit and
         in the covering of a retreat, two of our most important
         duties; for though, as already pointed out, the conditions of
         the present day offer to the Arm the opportunities of the
         richest harvests, it will only be able to utilize them when
         employed with concentrated force.]

The masses to be encountered are numerically so considerable that
single squadrons, regiments, or brigades, hardly count in the scale of
a great decision. Partial results they may, indeed, attain, but to
bring about the defeat of a whole Army, or even of an important
fraction of it, to reap the fruits of such a victory or cover a great
retreat, numbers alone can avail.

How many units to employ under any given circumstances it is, of
course, impossible to lay down beforehand; but the essence of the
matter is that the limit of force to be thus employed is far in excess
of what any existing tactical unit can supply.

If, after this short survey of the many fields of action open to
horsemen in the future, we ask the decisive question, Which tasks in
the future will need to be most carefully kept in mind in the
organization and training of this Arm in peace time? we shall not be
able to conceal from ourselves that it is in the strategical handling
of the Cavalry that by far the greatest possibilities lie. Charges
even of numerically considerable bodies on the battle-field can only
lead to success under very special conditions, and even for the
protection of a retreat our role can only be a subordinate one. But
for reconnaissance and screening, for operations against the enemy's
communications, for the pursuit of a beaten enemy, and all similar
operations of warfare, the Cavalry is, and remains, the principal Arm.
Here no other can take its place, for none possesses the requisite
mobility and independence.

At the same time, it is in these fields that its power is
all-important to the Supreme Command. Battles, under pressure of
necessity, can be fought without Cavalry at all, and the results even
partially utilized; but it is impossible to issue suitable orders
without knowledge of the enemy's operations, and equally impossible to
act against an enemy's flanks and rear with Infantry alone.

It is in these directions that the future of Cavalry lies, and it is
to fit ourselves for the tasks that we should bend all our energy in
peace.




CHAPTER III

STRATEGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE CAVALRY


We have seen in the previous chapter that the principal duties which
can fall to the lot of Cavalry in modern War will require its
employment in considerable force; hence it follows that the greatest
economy in the use of detachments for secondary purposes must be
practised.

This leads us to the consideration of the question in what manner we
can group our available means to meet these requirements in the best
possible way.

Primarily we must start from this axiom--that no portion of the Army
can do without Cavalry altogether; hence it follows that we must
maintain both Divisional and independent Cavalry.

The former remains permanently attached to each portion of the Army
whose composition, by reason of this addition of Cavalry, permits of
independent action. The latter is set aside for the great strategical
missions that may be assigned to that Arm, for execution. The question
now arises, In what proportion is this distribution to take place?

The greater number of Infantry Divisions can, in my opinion, meet all
demands upon them with a very small allotment of mounted men, as long
as they are acting in combination with the rest of the Army.

The circulation of intelligence and orders within the columns and
their outposts can generally be entrusted to cyclists. Where
independent Cavalry is deployed to cover the front of an army, the
field of activity for the Divisional Cavalry in actual outpost duties
and reconnaissance is of necessity very much limited. All they are
really required to accomplish is to maintain the connection with the
former, and for this duty the cyclist detachments above referred to
will generally suffice.

There remains, therefore, for the Divisional Cavalry only the service
with the most advanced sections of the Infantry outposts (orderly
duties with the Infantry piquets in cases where the ground precludes
the use of the cycle), duties connected with requisitioning; and
reconnaissance only during those periods in which the mass of the
independent Cavalry has been drawn away towards the wings of the Army
to clear its front for battle, carrying messages during the combat,
and actual reconnaissance during the progress of the engagement
itself. All these requirements can, I think, be met with a very small
amount of force, all the more so because reconnaissance under fire in
modern War seems to me practically impossible, and can generally only
be initiated by those Divisions which form the wings of the Army, but
even then their field would be a very limited one.

Modern firearms compel us to remain at such a distance from the enemy
that observation is rendered much more difficult, and the distances to
be traversed are so great that before any reports from the wings can
get round to the position of Headquarters, and suitable orders based
on these reports can reach their destination, the whole situation may
have changed again and again. We have only to remember the cases
which occurred in the last War (1870).

In the majority of these instances it was quite impossible that
Cavalry patrols could have sent timely information of what was going
on within the limits of the enemy's positions, and in the future the
difficulties will be even greater.

In no case, however, can such information during the progress of an
action be obtained by the actual employment of the fighting power of
the Divisional Cavalry.

If it is to be done at all, then a few well-led officers patrols will
suffice, and therefore no considerable numerical strength in the
Divisional Cavalry is required. The lines of approach of the enemy and
points on which his wings are resting must certainly be kept under
observation, but this observation cannot in principle be initiated by
the Infantry Divisions, but it is the province of the Army
Headquarters to provide, for it will be precisely the wings and the
flanks which the enemy will himself seek to protect by the massing of
his own Cavalry.

If the prospect of achieving anything by observation during the combat
through the action of the Divisional Cavalry may be considered as
well-nigh impossible, then any tactical action may also be considered
as precluded, unless it takes place in combination with the
independent Cavalry.

Occasions may certainly even nowadays occur in which a few squadrons
may achieve results by taking part in a combat between the other Arms,
but such cases are too few and unimportant to be taken into account in
a distribution of the Cavalry as a matter of organization.

In Armies deprived of the screen of independent Cavalry the want of
Divisional Cavalry will certainly be more markedly felt even in those
Army Corps which form the flanks of Armies, and in the cases of
detached expeditions, and in similar exceptional circumstances. In all
these instances more Cavalry must be sent up to the outposts, and it
will have both to screen and reconnoitre.

The demands on its fighting efficiency can, under such circumstances,
become of importance, and in these smaller operations, reconnaissance
during action is more possible than with extended battle-fronts. But
to demand for the Divisional Cavalry on these grounds a larger
proportion of sabres, and thus to paralyze a great portion of the Arm
by its inclusion in the long columns of march of the whole Army, is
not justifiable. The scale on which we must decide the apportionment
of Divisional Cavalry must depend on the fact that the Infantry does
not generally operate in small detachments, but works in large masses,
and it is the necessities of these large masses which fix the
standard.

To apportion to single columns or Divisions for particular
circumstances an increased force of Cavalry, to be taken from the
available mass of independent Cavalry Divisions, ought not in general
to occasion unusual friction; but it is most difficult and troublesome
to take away from the Infantry the squadrons definitely assigned to it
by peace-time organization, and unite these in independent Cavalry
Commands.

We must not allow ourselves to be misled in this matter by the
practice followed in peace manoeuvres. Even the largest concentration
of troops for these purposes is, in proportion to the masses to be
employed in our future War, on a most limited scale.

Our smaller Brigade and Divisional manoeuvres are restricted within
limits which can only be considered nowadays as exceptional. They are
only too well adapted to give rise to entirely false conceptions as to
the true character of the Cavalry service in these great struggles for
national survival, unless we keep steadily in mind that they apply
only to exceptional circumstances.

We must, therefore, lay down as a principle that as much Cavalry as
possible is to be organized for strategical independence, and as
little as is expedient retained for the Infantry Divisions.

My opinion is that, if we make fullest use of the bicycle, and, with
this object in view, reorganize our system of conveying orders and
intelligence, then two well-trained and effective squadrons should
amply suffice for the ordinary duties with an Infantry Division.

As to the allotment of the independent Cavalry Divisions, it follows
from all that has been said above, that to divide them in equal
proportions among the several Armies, according to their numerical
strength, can only be considered as an obstacle to the full
utilization of their potential fighting capacity. It would be better
to arrange this distribution at the beginning of each War, in
accordance with the conditions which the situation imposes. Where it
appears expedient, we should not hesitate to form Divisions of
different strength, and to group several of these to constitute
Cavalry Corps, even to unite several of such Corps for employment in a
particular strategical direction--_i.e._, in a particular portion of
the theatre of operation--whilst leaving only individual brigades, or
even regiments, to those fractions of the Army which for the moment
can best dispense with Cavalry support.

Of course, an Army taking the field with a great superiority of
Cavalry can afford to deal less sparingly with it for secondary
purposes; on the other hand, the numerically weaker side is driven to
the utmost economy of its forces, and the utmost energy in its
employment at the decisive moment. It will therefore be essential for
the latter to concentrate at the commencement of the campaign the bulk
of its Cavalry upon the decisive line of operations--that is to say,
on that line on which, from the general strategical situation, one can
expect to penetrate into the chief district of concentration of the
enemy's Armies, and hence to find out what it is of the greatest
importance for us to know, or, on the other hand, when it is to our
interests to conceal our own operations, and hence to beat the enemy's
Cavalry as thoroughly as possible wherever it shows itself. On the
remaining portion of the front we must endeavour to employ as little
Cavalry as possible, and to supplement it in the duties of security by
Infantry, whilst leaving reconnaissance to be dealt with by patrols.
If we thus gain the victory on the principal line, the results will
soon be apparent in a reduction of pressure on the adjacent sections
of the front, and then the Cavalry will find its opportunity for
increased activity in offensive enterprises. For, once the enemy's
horsemen are beaten, either he will concentrate his remaining Cavalry,
from every direction, towards the threatened points, or the victor
will be in a position to utilize the superiority he has acquired to
support any portion of his force which may have got into temporary
difficulties.

If, thus, it is the necessity of beating the enemy's Cavalry out of
the field at the very commencement of the campaign which compels the
concentration of important numbers in the decisive direction, it
follows naturally that this point of view must be fully considered in
the plan of strategical deployment.

In the further stages of Cavalry activity--_i.e._, after it has
defeated the mass of the enemy's Cavalry--the tasks which can confront
the Arm make the employment of considerable forces essential, unless,
as so often happened in 1870, its operations are to be interfered
with, if not altogether stopped, by weak Infantry detachments, or even
by an insurgent population. Against this concentration of large masses
of Cavalry many objections will naturally be raised; hence we must
consider how these are to be met, and whether, as a fact, they are of
sufficient importance to cause us to surrender the advantages they
offer.

First comes the difficulty of feeding large numbers. But military
history, from the time of Frederick the Great and Napoleon down to the
American Civil War, the unusual conditions of which latter must not be
left out of account, show conclusively that it was possible to keep
masses of 5,000 men and more together, and in full mobility, even in
poor and almost roadless districts.

If it was possible then, how much more will it be so now, with our
modern means of communication, if proper arrangements are made in
advance!

It has been further objected that the rapid circulation of information
from the front to Army Headquarters will be jeopardized by the
insertion of an additional collecting station--viz., the Corps
Command, between the two ends of the chain. But this fear can be shown
to be groundless, for in any case where at all large bodies of
Cavalry are sent out in advance, the service of intelligence must be
organized in such a manner that all really important information will
be transmitted direct to Headquarters, as well as through the usual
channels. Since this is already necessary with Cavalry Divisions,
there can be no objection to applying it to yet higher commands.

More important than this question of intelligence is the consideration
that the command of Cavalry 'Masses' which exceed more than the
present Division of six regiments involves exceptional difficulties,
and this must be granted to a certain extent as long as the question
is limited to the actual tactical handling (execution of manoeuvres)
of the Division on the battle-field.

It is, in fact, no longer possible to handle a force of six
regiments according to any set scheme, such as that known as the
'Dreitreffentaktik'--at any rate, not in hilly or difficult country. The
transition from one formation to another, the deployment of the whole
unit for attack, or the interchange of the duties between the separate
lines, are certainly hardly possible on ground over which it is
difficult to manoeuvre. It appears, however, to me that the conduct of
great Cavalry 'Masses' by ordinary drill methods is not necessary to
meet the condition of modern warfare.

When once the Cavalry Corps Commander grasps the idea of handling the
units at his disposal as the Infantry Corps Commander handles his
Divisions, sending in first one Division, and then, according to
circumstances, reinforcing it or prolonging the fighting line by
drawing on the second one, or by employing the Divisions side by side,
assigning to each a definite share in the attainment of the purpose,
which he himself keeps steadily in view, there seems no reason why
the leadership of such bodies should not be perfectly practicable.
Indeed, one may safely say that the result will be all the more
certain of attainment the more the final responsibility is
concentrated on the one head; for there is obviously a greater
possibility of a single mind pursuing consistently a given purpose
than of two or more Divisional Commanders following out the same idea
independently along the same lines.

If, then, when the Corps is united for tactical action, the
maintenance of a single Command is quite conceivable, this will be all
the more the case in matters of Strategy. It is not so much a question
then of handling the corps as a closed unit, for instance, on a single
road, but of assigning within a certain sphere a united impulse to the
constituent parts of the Command in such directions that in all cases
they should reach the ground in force superior to anything the enemy
can oppose to them. According to circumstances, different tasks may be
assigned to the several Divisions. They may march on different roads,
some of them extended, some closed, the only condition being that they
all pursue a common strategic purpose, assigned to them by the Corps
Commander, according to the same fundamental principles, and are
prevented by this higher control from flying out in eccentric
directions.

Objections based on the alleged difficulties of the conduct of such
masses are therefore untenable. On the contrary, the demand must be
made on the Chief Command that, always in accordance with the
strategical situation, it must clearly determine what it requires of
the Cavalry, and group them in a suitable manner and in sufficient
numerical strength under a single Leader, even if in the meanwhile
there may be a deficiency of the Arm at less important points. This
fundamental principle must be adhered to at all costs if full
advantages are to be derived from the employment of our Arm, for with
none other can the consequences of a dispersal of force exact more
terrible retribution than with the Cavalry.

Nevertheless, though the principle must be held inviolate, its
application must not degenerate into hide-bound rigidity. 'Strategy is
founded on a system of expedients' (Moltke), and hence expediency
remains always our highest ideal.

The essential point, however, is that our organization must be made so
elastic that we can alter the strength of our units to meet the
varying circumstances which may confront us, so that forces may not
remain unutilized in one place whilst they may be most urgently
required at another.

It is no way essential that the units combined for the express
purposes apparent at the commencement of the campaign should remain
intact throughout the War. One should be able to detach from or
reinforce them, as circumstances require; break up Corps and
Divisions, to reform them elsewhere; and employ their Leaders and
Staff first with one, then with the other.

As an example of what I have just said, I would cite the manner in
which the German Headquarters Command dealt with the Armies during the
war of 1870-1871. According to the demands of the moment, the
individual Corps or Divisions were grouped in manifold proportions to
constitute such units, and the adaptability of this organization
proved sufficient to cope with every eventuality.

As an almost ideal type we can take the manner in which Napoleon
dealt with his Cavalry Corps for the same purpose. At one moment his
bodies of horsemen unite into Divisions and Corps; at another they
dissolve into independent Brigades or regiments, operating singly,
only once more to be united into formidable 'Masses,' as circumstances
dictate. Here we see no rigid adherence to any rules, nothing pedantic
in the method of employment, and the leader and troops deftly adapt
themselves to the ever-changing conditions.

This is the ideal to which we Germans should strive to attain, and all
the more so in proportion as we are threatened by superior numbers.




CHAPTER IV

INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF DISMOUNTED ACTION


If the changed conditions of modern war have brought about new
conditions and demands which require to be considered in the
strategical combinations of the Cavalry, I believe that a similar
influence must make itself felt in the field of tactics. Whereas
formerly the _arme blanche_ was recognized as the principal method by
which the Cavalry made its inherent fighting power felt, the
employment of dismounted action nowadays has gained in importance to
such an extent that the whole character of our activity appears
completely changed.

Although hitherto the general conception has been that Cavalry should
only make use of the carbine for defence, nowadays its employment in
attack must be recognized as of the utmost importance.

Undoubtedly, however, it is, and must remain even to-day, the chief
aim of every leader in whose veins flows the hot Cavalry blood to
seize his opportunities wherever they offer themselves, and, above
all, to attack the enemy's Cavalry wherever and whenever accessible
with cold steel; but we cannot conceal from ourselves the fact that
nowadays numerous problems will present themselves to the Cavalry
which can only be solved by fire action.

In the first place, the opportunity will often arise for the weaker
side to avoid an encounter in the open field, and, with the help of
its firearm, at least to attempt behind defiles, or strong positions,
to defy the enemy's superior forces. In such cases the assailant also
will be compelled to have recourse to his carbine.

Further considerations reveal that in future, quite apart from
encounter with the enemy's Cavalry, our own horsemen will find tasks
before them which will make appeal to the rifle inevitable.

The enemy will cover his railways, and important depots by troops of
the second and third class. Reinforced by the resisting power of
popular levies, they will block woods, river crossings, and defiles.
Even the guards of their Convoys will be amply provided with
far-ranging firearms.

In the pursuit of an enemy's beaten Cavalry we shall happen upon
Infantry detachments sent out to cover their retreat, or upon defiles
which have been occupied for a similar purpose. Important
communications will be held by strong detachments of cyclist Infantry,
who will find in woods and villages protection and favourable
opportunities to use their weapons.

All these means of resistance lie beyond the field of mounted action,
but they must be overcome if success is to crown our efforts.

Already in reconnaissances, particularly in those directed against the
enemy's communications, we shall meet with these impediments, and the
same will be the case when we come to the strategical pursuit, or the
protection of a retreat.[3] In the pursuit the main object is to keep
the beaten enemy on the run, to give him neither peace nor rest until
complete exhaustion sets in. But for the mass of the Cavalry the idea
of a purely frontal pursuit should not be encouraged, for Cavalry,
even when supported by several batteries, can easily be held up by any
rearguard position in which a few intact troops remain.

         [Footnote 3: Compare 'Cavalry Regulations,' Sec. 376.]

The frontal pursuit must in such cases be left to the other Arms, only
to be taken up again when the last resistance of the enemy is broken,
and the exhaustion of our own Infantry and Horse Artillery renders
further effort on their part impossible.

On the other hand, all energy must be devoted to the initiation of a
pursuit on parallel lines, in order that we may appear unexpectedly
and repeatedly against the flanks of the enemy's columns, with the
ultimate intention of anticipating him at some point on the line of
his retreat, such as a defile, thus bringing him between two fires in
a sheerly desperate position.

Man and horse must in these cases be driven to the utmost limit of
their powers of endurance.

It is evident that in such situations the principal role falls to the
firearm, for only in the fire fight is it possible to break off an
attack without loss, in order to appear again at some other point and
recommence the engagement. In case of anticipating an enemy at a
defile, the rifle will be practically the only weapon that can find
employment.

What can be achieved in this direction is best illustrated by
Sheridan's Cavalry, whose successful flanking operations against the
lines of communication of General Lee's heroic Army brought about the
capitulation of Clover Hill.

The charge will only then secure a greater result than dismounted
action, when the tactical cohesion of the enemy has been dissolved, and
his fire power utterly broken; that is to say, generally it will be of
greater service in tactical than in strategical pursuits--unless,
indeed, as at Waterloo, the defeat has led to the complete and permanent
dissolution of the enemy's fighting power.

Further, in the endeavour to support the rearguard of a defeated Army
in retreat it will be necessary, as soon as we have got rid of the
pursuing Cavalry, to take to the rifle, because with the sword alone
we cannot hope to make any impression upon the Infantry and Artillery
of the victor.

In such cases we must strive to attack with the firearm against the
flanks of the pursuing columns, in order to draw off their attention
from our beaten main body.

Cases may frequently arise when we in turn can hold up the pursuit at
defiles and other positions by a purely frontal defence.

In such circumstances a fresh and intact Cavalry, which has not
allowed itself to be dispirited or demoralized, may render invaluable
services to the beaten Infantry, and enable them, together with the
columns and the whole supply organization of the Army, to effect an
orderly withdrawal without being molested by the enemy, thus affording
to its commander an opportunity of restoring the lost cohesion and
tactical order. It will only be the rifle of the Cavalry which will
gain for our hard-pressed comrades what is most needed--_i.e._, time.

The idea is often put forward that Cavalry should not involve itself
in an obstinate fight on foot, that it should act only by short
surprise attacks, and that it possesses in its mobility the infallible
means of circumventing points of resistance. This conception, which
restricts the functions of Cavalry within their narrowest limits,
seems to me entirely untenable. It is essentially indefensible when it
is a matter of gaining time or of carrying a given position, such as a
defensible post on the lines of communication, a convoy marching under
escort, the destruction of a defended railway, or in any similar
undertaking. It will be impossible to work round such positions--at
least when engaged on the greater operations of War--both on account
of the widths of the fronts occupied and the possibility of
interfering with the sphere of operations of the neighbouring
detachments. Often, indeed, the nature of the ground will preclude
such attempts, and the experience of 1870-1871 should suffice to show
how rarely such a circumvention can hope to succeed. But even where
neither the strategic situation nor our immediate purpose compels us
to fight, it is not always advisable or expedient to attempt to evade
the opportunity. For every evasion leaves the front of our own Army
clear, gives the enemy the very opportunity he is looking for to
reconnoitre the position of our main bodies, uncovers our own
communications (_i.e._, our own Cavalry trains and baggage), exposes
our flank to the enemy, and thus offers him many chances of obtaining
tactical results.

Again, these attempts at circumvention lead easily to a loss of
direction, which in certain cases might endanger the success of our
whole operations; and, finally, the amount of time required by such
outflanking attempts may not be justified by the possible results. In
such cases it might on the whole be better to attack direct, for
turning movements mean always a postponement of the tactical decision,
and hence are always a disadvantage to the attacking side.

The theory that Cavalry, thanks to its mobility, can always ride round
and turn the positions it encounters breaks down in practice before
the tactical and strategical demands upon the Arm, partly by reason of
the local conditions, and partly because of the consideration which
has to be given to time, to the endurance of the horses, and the
position of the following columns.

The same applies to another theory with which one tries to explain
away the necessity of dismounted combats. It is maintained that the
fire power of the Horse Artillery will suffice to clear the road for
the Cavalry; hence the latter will rarely be placed in a position
which will require energetic dismounted action on their part. This
assumption involves, in my opinion, an altogether overrated estimate
of the power of Artillery. The same reasoning would lead us logically
to the false conclusion that even Infantry do not require their
rifles. One must demand from every reliable body of troops that they
will not allow themselves to be driven out of a covered position by
Artillery alone. All previous War experience testifies to the
impossibility of achieving such results against even moderate
Infantry, and it is only with such that we are here dealing. The fact
that in 1870-1871 the Artillery often did succeed in driving a weak
and demoralized enemy out of localities the possession of which was of
no material consequence to him cannot be considered as to the point.
Certainly the effect of modern guns is greater than anything of which
we have had experience, and will act upon the defender with
correspondingly greater intensity; but, on the other hand, it must be
insisted upon that the assailant's Artillery will have to act under
the increased effect of the defender's fire power, and the latter
will choose different terrain, and utilize it far better than in the
past. The actual assault remains necessary now, as ever, to bring
about the final decision.

Anyone who has had to conduct staff rides and similar operations of
large bodies of independent Cavalry, and has endeavoured to carry
these out in the spirit of actual warfare, can hardly have failed to
notice the tendency which displays itself with all leaders to take to
dismounted action, and will have realized that one has far more
frequently to check rather than encourage this tendency; but he will
also come to the conclusion, perhaps, that this desire is well founded
on existing conditions, and that even a determined Cavalry will have
to make use of their firearms almost every day; indeed, without
adequate employment of their carbines they are no longer able to carry
out the most important of their incumbent duties.

Hence, if the use of the rifle is thus shown by instances taken from
the most divergent directions to be of absolute necessity, the
conclusion follows that even in the battle itself, that point on which
all military action is focussed, it can hardly fail to find both its
opportunities and its full justification.

In this direction the horsemen of Stuart and Sheridan have set us a
brilliant example, taking part on foot in regular pitched battles
(Stuart at Fredericksburg, and Sheridan at Five Forks), and deciding,
rifle in hand, the fate of numerous engagements, in order immediately
afterwards to mount and pursue the enemy by a succession of vehement
charges (Stuart at Brandy Station).

The South African War also has shown us what can be done by a mounted
force supplied with a reliable firearm. The Boers fought exclusively
as Cavalry (_sic_), supported by Artillery, and some of the most
celebrated British Infantry regiments suffered defeat at their hands
as long as the numerical proportion was not altogether too
unfavourable to the assailants.

Even in dismounted attack, particularly in the later period of the
war, they often attained very considerable successes, and thus proved
incontrovertibly that the double role of Cavalry on foot and on
horseback is thoroughly practical; for even the charge itself of these
same Boers often achieved brilliant results, although they were
lacking in any kind of tactical training for this particular
result.[4]

         [Footnote 4: I venture to differ from the author. The Boers
         did not fight as Cavalry. Their whole tactics were those of
         Mounted Infantry. They did on one or two occasions bring
         about a decision by rifle fire from their horses, but I can
         recall no instance where they actually charged--_i.e._,
         endeavoured to decide the action by shock.--C. S. G.]

Certainly weapons and numbers have altered materially since the days
of the American Civil War, and the experiences of South Africa,
largely conditioned by the peculiar topographical conditions and the
out-of-door habits and sporting instincts of the Boers, cannot be
transferred to European circumstance without important modifications.
But even in Europe the Cavalry retain, thanks to their mobility, their
power of opening fire in a manner calculated to create the greatest
degree of surprise against the flanks and rear of the enemy as soon as
they make up their minds to cut themselves adrift from their own Army,
and get in rear of the enemy's troops. Such enterprises offer the best
guarantee of producing a great moral result. The history of the
Franco-German War demonstrated this possibility. What might not our
Cavalry have achieved in 1870-1871 against the undisciplined forces of
the Republic had they been provided with a good firearm, and sought of
a set purpose for such opportunities?

It would take us too far to produce the numerous proofs from the pages
of our War records; only, as an example, I should like to quote the
Battle of Bapaume. In this instance the 7th Cavalry Brigade belonging
to the 3rd Cavalry Division lay on the flank--in fact, almost in rear
of--the enemy's Army, without being able to come to the help of the
hard-pressed 15th Division. Had they on that occasion been able to act
by fire, by surprise, and with determination against the rear of the
French Army of the North, the results must have been invaluable.

In future, beyond doubt, we shall have to deal with much larger masses
of the enemy than formerly, and against them one must make up for want
of numbers by an enormous expenditure of ammunition, and further
endeavour to reinforce our fire power by repeating-rifles. We must
also aim at intensifying the effect of our fire power by attacking
only at decisive points. On the other hand, it must be admitted, that
in the magnitude of the masses themselves there lies the germ of
weakness, and in our future wars we can hardly expect to find Infantry
as firmly welded together as in the Armies of the past. I therefore by
no means hold the opinion that dismounted Cavalry can achieve nothing
against Infantry, or that their chances are limited to only very
favourable opportunities.

It is, of course, true that the Infantry receive a more thorough
musketry training, particularly at long ranges, and that their
education in the use of the ground, as well as in fire control, in
peace is naturally better than with the Cavalry.

But the results obtained by the Cavalry in the field practices are by
no means so much behind those of the Infantry that any superiority of
the latter on the battle-field need be expected. A better firearm for
the Cavalry is unquestionably a necessity, for the inferiority of the
carbine compared with the infantry rifle is undoubtedly a source of
weakness; but, on the other hand, we must insist that the Cavalry
possesses sources of strength peculiar to its whole organization which
render it materially superior to the Infantry.

I have already pointed out that modern Infantry, when mobilized,
cannot be considered like the Cavalry as a standing force--that is to
say, that the latter possess much greater tactical and moral cohesion.

Let us look at this question a little more closely.

A squadron at War strength can dismount, after due deduction made of
the horse-holders, seventy carbines. These seventy men, if the annual
contingent is equally divided throughout the squadron, will consist
pretty uniformly of men belonging to all three terms of their service,
and will not include more than eight reserve men, so that there will
be at most twenty recruits amongst them, whilst the remainder will
consist half of men in their third year and half of men in their
second year; but these seventy men are led by three officers,
generally all on the active list, who in turn are supported by eight
non-commissioned officers and one trumpeter, who also mostly belong to
the active list.

Against this a section of Infantry which, when raised to War strength,
is about seventy-five strong, consists of about forty men on the
active list, of whom half are recruits, the other half men in their
second year of service, and of thirty-five reservists.

It possesses, therefore, at the outside twenty trained colour
soldiers, and these are led in most cases by a Reserve or Landwehr
officer, supported by at most seven non-commissioned officers, of whom
four on an average will belong to the Reserve. This Infantry will, as
a rule, under normal peace-time conditions, as experience teaches us,
shoot very well; but it is scarcely necessary to discuss in which body
we shall find greater cohesion, or on which one is more likely to be
able to depend in cases where moral qualities and fire discipline are
all essential, and it is these qualities which primarily condition the
number of hits in the firing line. I should only like to add, apart
from all other considerations, that the direct influence of the
Leaders in the Cavalry and their knowledge of their men is much more
highly developed than in the Infantry. It must also be remembered that
there are generally much fewer skulkers in the mounted arms, partly
because of their longer period of service and closer supervision, and
partly because everybody endeavours not to be separated from his
horse, and finds in his presence with the men of his detachment the
best guarantee of getting back to it. In view of these considerations,
I think that our Cavalry can safely claim that they can engage the
best existing Continental Infantry with reasonable prospects of
success, and against inferior foot soldiers may always preserve its
sense of superiority.

Granted this much, then, the scope of our activity is enormously
increased.

We can now approach tasks which hitherto had to be regarded as
impossible, because the conviction existed that on the appearance of
the enemy's Infantry the role of Cavalry _ipso facto_ came to an end,
unless, indeed, an opportunity could be found for the Cavalry to
charge. For now we are in a position, in harmony with the whole spirit
of the Arm, to lay principal stress upon the offensive, even when
fighting on foot. We can carry through even serious engagements, with
chances of success which no longer depend on the favour of special
circumstances.

Confident in our own strength, we can apply tactical compulsion where
formerly we could only trust to cunning, rapidity, or luck. I hold it
to be an altogether antiquated standpoint to assume that Cavalry on
foot can only attack with hope of success when it can approach on
horseback near to its enemy, suddenly deploy against him in the most
decisive directions, and generally is in a position to utilize any
special advantages offered by local circumstances.

The campaign of 1870-1871 shows that in most cases in which the
Cavalry had to take to its firearms it was acting on the offensive,
and was compelled to attack the enemy--exactly like the Infantry--in
the most diverse situations, and to shoot its way up to him. Under
modern conditions it is clear this necessity will be even more
apparent, and it would be to deprive the Cavalry again of the
independence secured for it by the addition of the rifle to its
equipment if one were to limit its power of attack on foot only to
exceptionally favourable circumstances. The Cavalry must, in fact, be
able to attack on foot exactly like Infantry when the situation
imperatively demands it; but if it is to be handled in this spirit,
then it will require to be very strongly provided with Artillery.

If it is already considered almost impossible for Infantry to turn
well-covered defenders out of their position without Artillery
support, the same naturally applies to the Cavalry. In fact, a strong
Artillery will be all the more necessary, for the attack with Cavalry
should be carried through with the utmost rapidity, and when acting on
the defensive its purpose is to gain the greatest amount of time.
Against this must be borne in mind that the Infantry should not
without necessity be deprived of its due share of Artillery, but I
think the two views can be readily united. As long as the Cavalry
'Masses' are out in front of the Armies we can safely give them as
many horse batteries as they require, and the same is the case after a
victory or after a lost battle. In the decisive battle itself this
Artillery reinforcement to the Cavalry must not be expended
eccentrically, and must be utilized to the utmost in the most decisive
direction on the battle-field itself. Here, too, a certain elasticity
of organization is most desirable, and a strict adherence to a
prearranged order of battle can only act most prejudicially.




CHAPTER V

THE TACTICAL LEADING IN MOUNTED COMBATS


Having admitted that dismounted action has increased considerably in
importance, particularly on the offensive, it nevertheless remains the
fact that the combat with cold steel remains the chief _raison d'etre_
of the Cavalry, and when the principles have to be considered
according to which troops have to be employed upon the battle-field,
the actual collision of Cavalry 'Masses' remains the predominant
factor.

The task of the Leader must be to transmit the mechanical power
inherent in the troops in the form of momentum upon the enemy. Where
he, with a clear purpose before him, acts with daring and thorough
comprehension, it is in his power to intensify this momentum many
times over; and this holds true with the Cavalry to a greater degree
than with any other Arm, for with the horsemen the personal impression
conveyed by the appearance and bearing of the Leader reacts on the
mass as in no other case. This reaction is further accentuated by the
fact that the excitement of motion on horseback, inherent in the
performance of Cavalry duties, contains something electrifying,
kindling to the imagination and exciting to the nerves, which
communicates its influence to the Leader, and thus in turn supports
him.

On the other hand, the evils of an indifferent Command make themselves
nowhere more apparent than with Cavalry. In this Arm every impulse
works itself out relentlessly down to the last consequence. Mistakes
once made can rarely be remedied. This is the necessary consequence of
the short time interval to which their activity is limited, the
rapidity of their movements, and the irresistible momentum with which
a Cavalry charge once launched presses on with ever-increasing
momentum to its final decision.

Whilst thus with the Cavalry the influence of the Command is the most
important factor of success, any deficiency in which can rarely be
made good by the excellence of the troops themselves, it is precisely
with this Arm that it is the least frequently found; for admittedly
there is nothing more difficult on the battle-field than correct
disposition and execution at the head of a great body of horsemen.

Several factors unite to explain this circumstance. In the first
place, only the shortest moment of time is available for
consideration, and then this rapid consideration and decision have to
be given under the most unfavourable external conditions, at the
fullest speed of one's horse, or in the maddening confusion of the
melee. Further, in most, cases it will be quite impossible for the
Leader of a Cavalry 'Mass' to take in with accuracy the strength and
dispositions of the enemy. The more extended radius of action of
modern firearms and the greater distance between the contending forces
thereby conditioned must in the future render this much more difficult
than in the past. Very rarely will it be possible for the Leader
either to alter or cancel an order once given in consequence of
information subsequently received. Even of the ground itself, the
importance of which is so much greater for the Cavalry than for any
other Arm, it will be impossible for the Leader to form for himself
any actual picture. Either it is already in possession of the enemy
and of his patrols, or at least in their sphere of action, or it
cannot be readily grasped from a single standpoint, and the rapidity
of movement allows no time to reconnoitre it sufficiently. Constant
reference to maps, even when available, is impossible, and the best of
these do not reveal exhaustively the actual nature of the ground to be
traversed. The orders must therefore be based on a general
consideration of the circumstances, for the Leader cannot gauge with
even approximate accuracy the strength of his enemy from the
resistance he encounters, like his more fortunate comrade of the
Infantry. His only remaining means of influencing the course of the
action lie in his intact reserves.

For subordinates, indeed, the case is even worse, for they will rarely
find existing conditions in accordance with the conception on which
their orders were issued, and will seldom have time to refer to
Headquarters for further instructions.

It must, therefore, be apparent that only the most exceptional Cavalry
training, combined with high executive talent, can suffice to
compensate for all these difficulties. Really successful leading will
only be assured to the Cavalry General when the machinery he sets in
motion is technically finished down to the last detail.

In the first place, the least that can be demanded is that the
observation of the enemy and distribution of orders are so organized
that the system works with absolute certainty. On the former depends
the correct choice of the moment of attack; on the latter that the
troops are employed in the required direction.

The place of the responsible Leader until the moment of the charge is,
therefore, well out to the front, in a position from which he can best
overlook the situation as a whole. Even the Leaders of independent
units, if possible down to the Regimental Commanders, should remain
close to him, and try to see the situation through his eyes. The
greatest fault of all is to stick too close to your troops.

Every Cavalry officer must carry his map in his head as well as in his
hand, particularly during the engagement. Every Leader must keep
before his mind the hang of the ground, the lie of the roads, the
peculiarities of the battle-field, with the chances it affords him.
Any defects he must try to make good by reconnaissance. Every possible
consequence of the collision must have been thought out beforehand.

Never should the Chief Commander take part in the charge personally
until he puts in his last reserve, and even then only when he is clear
of all responsibility, which by that time will generally be the case.
In all circumstances he must be in a position to rally his troops
after they have dispersed themselves in a melee, and to take measures
either to exploit the success, or, in case of reverse, to avert its
worst consequences. This does not apply only to the Chief Commander.

Here I would enter a particular protest against the opinion one hears
far too frequently emitted, that the place of every Cavalry Leader in
the charge is always in front of his command. This only holds good
when units charge as parts of a higher organization, or where smaller
bodies--_e.g._, squadrons, regiments, or brigades--attack as a whole,
with no rearward lines or supports to be controlled, or further
responsibilities arising out of the charge have to be considered. But
this does not relieve the Commander from the necessity of setting a
personal example in moments of wavering, or when it appears better,
after cool reflection, to risk everything, to carry the men forward to
the extreme limit of effort, rather than to reserve himself for
subsequent emergencies.

In all other cases the Commander, and his Staff, must avoid becoming
entangled in the confusion of a fight in which he must lose all view
and control over his men, and at best could achieve nothing more than
any other equally brave and determined trooper. It is, on the
contrary, his first duty to move in such a direction that he may at
all times be ready to influence with rapidity and decision the
mechanism of his command as a whole.

If he falls, then his Staff Officer or Adjutant assumes the
responsibility of the command until such time as the next senior can
be notified of the circumstance. In no case may the continuity of
action be interrupted by wasting time in looking for his successor.

When the Cavalry is working in combination with the other Arms the
point of observation of its Commander must be connected with the
latter by suitable relays, and officers must be sent out into those
sections of the ground which cannot be overlooked from the position
the Leader has selected.

Combat and security patrols must be sent out in all directions from
which the enemy's reserves or fresh bodies of his troops might
approach, and even towards our own rear the ground must be
reconnoitred as far as possible by officers, who report the result of
their operations, not only to the superior Leader, but to the Brigade
and Regimental Commanders. It will also be advisable to keep the
officers of the other Arms, particularly of the reserves, as well
informed as possible about the nature of the ground and the observed
movements of the enemy's forces, so that these may always act with
full knowledge of the circumstances. A General Staff Officer should be
entrusted with the maintenance of communications with Army
Headquarters itself.

As the crisis approaches the troops must be drawn in nearer to the
point of collision. As soon as the attack has been determined on, the
Leader will be well advised to take up a position on the flank of his
troops from which he will be able to overlook the whole field of
action and keep the enemy well in view. From this point, having
previously instructed his subordinates as to the situation and purpose
of the coming combat, and having sent them back to their troops, he
will despatch executive orders to the several echelons concerned. The
line of attack must be defined with particular care, and a point of
sight visible from a considerable distance must, if possible, be
assigned to them. No room for doubt must be left open as to which
troop it is which is responsible for the direction.

But even with the finest system for reconnaissance and transmission of
orders it will be impossible to guarantee the combined action of large
'Masses' for a common purpose, and to put them into the fight, in a
thoroughly practical and not parade-ground fashion, unless good
observation, able leading, and circulation of orders are combined
with two other most important factors:

First comes the utmost possible independence of the subordinate
leaders, down to the limit of the Squadron Commander. Only when these
can help one out in cases where an order fails to arrive, or where the
circumstances compel a deviation from the letter of the order
received, or where these can only be indicated by word of mouth,
signs, bugle-calls, or even by riding in the required direction, can
there be any guarantee that all will combine intelligently for the
common purpose.

This independence must never be allowed to degenerate into selfish
wilfulness; the actual situation, as encountered on the ground itself;
must never be considered from the subordinate's point of view only,
but rather must always be solved in the spirit of the original
conception formed in the Leader's mind.

In the second place, the Leader requires tactical means and forms of
evolution which combine, with elementary simplicity and clearness, the
greatest possible degree of adaptability. Nowhere else so much as with
the Cavalry does the maxim hold good that 'In War only the simple
secures success.'[5]

         [Footnote 5: Clausewitz, 'Im Krieg ist aller Einfach, aber,
         das Einfache ist schwer.']

The prescribed orders must not place a strain on the memory of the
Leader or troops, and must operate practically mechanically. Even the
most far-reaching movements should never require either detailed
instructions or commands.

The application of the word of command should be limited to those
units which it can actually control--namely, the squadron.

The use of bugle-calls must be restricted to the utmost, and only be
permitted in circumstances where no possibility of misunderstanding
can arise--a danger not easily excluded where large bodies are acting
together.

Even the use of signs can only be relied on in a limited degree. In
dust and closed country of course they cannot be seen.

On the other hand, all movements depending on verbally transmitted
commands must be executed without loss of the spirit of uniformity.

In practice this is the only form for the communication of orders
which can be depended on to act with any degree of certainty under all
circumstances.

The Regulations must insure the possibility that, no matter under what
conditions, the unit can be formed without many words or commands into
the most diverse fighting formations in any required direction, either
from column of route, rendezvous formation, or even from the melee.
Fundamental principles of action against the different Arms must be
laid down so definitely that complicated orders in each particular
case will not be required.

The rapid change from one fighting form to another must be absolutely
guaranteed, and equally so the possibility for each unit to assume
that formation in depth called for by the circumstances of the combat,
without recourse to complicated orders and movements.[6]

         [Footnote 6: The Regimental Commander, therefore, requires
         his Adjutant and an Orderly Officer, so as to be able to
         transmit simultaneously his order to both wings of his
         regiment.]

If these requirements are to be fulfilled, then only such elementary
movements must be prescribed and regulated as can be executed under
all circumstances, as laid down in the Regulations.

These matters being settled, then tactical regulations should lay down
no fixed evolutions, but should confine themselves essentially to
forms and principles of action, which should be treated with the
utmost clearness and precision.

It is hardly necessary to adduce elaborate proof to show that our
existing Regulations by no means meet these requirements in all their
sections.

Above all, the movements and deployments laid down for the Regiment
are far too formal, based too much on accurate intervals and fixed
prescriptions for the movements of the individual squadrons to be
suitable for use on the ground which Cavalry must nowadays be prepared
to traverse, or to be executed, exactly as laid down, in face of the
enemy. Such evolutions are only possible on the drill-ground, where
bugle-sounds and words of command can still be heard, and are far too
complicated for practical use.

For instance, let us take the case of deployment to the front out of
any 'deep' formation--columns of fours, half troops, or the like,
which obviously cannot always be executed before the enemy precisely
in the manner prescribed, because all must depend on the space
available and the distance which separates us from the enemy. The head
of the column must suit its movements to these conditions, and in turn
the following sections must conform to the movements of the head;
greater freedom of choice must, therefore, be left to the latter.

On the other hand, there are evolutions of the utmost importance before
the enemy for which the book gives no guidance whatever--_e.g._, the
rapid passage from the double column into squadron columns, either to
the front or flank.

Even for the larger units all the prescriptions are by no means
adapted to the requirements of active service. For instance, the
relief of lines ('Treffen Wechsel') is an operation of no use except
on the drill-ground, and is never attempted even in manoeuvres--at
least, personally I know no instance of its ever being tried, except
as a matter of drill.

That a certain measure of justification may be found for this and
similar formations, I do not wish to dispute.

They certainly possess great educational value as a means to the
acquisition of the requisite discipline and cohesion, and they are
also well adapted for movements beyond the danger zone, when it
becomes necessary to steady the troops by the most absolute insistence
on accuracy of movement and precision of drill; and that such cases do
arise no one who has had experience of War will for one moment
dispute.[7] Hence, even if one may hold the opinion that the same
purpose may be equally well served by less complicated means better
adapted to practical requirements, one can nevertheless subscribe
unconditionally to the soundness of the principle involved. But for
actual purposes of combat we require simpler forms and more freedom in
their application, and in so far as the Regulations tend towards this
end they show a very considerable degree of improvement; for the
squadron, Section 330 provides the necessary amount of independence,
and Sections 331 and 333 give sufficient freedom to the Regiment,
subject only to the limitations referred to above. Section 346 in
particular and Section 348 are also of fundamental importance for the
higher commands.[8] Indeed, I hold the former as the most important
concession contained in the whole book, for it practically initiates a
new phase in the whole course of our drill evolution, by marking the
commencement of the breach with the old doctrine of the Three-Line
system ('Drei Treffen Taktik'). It is true that it still lays chief
importance on this method, but it no longer regards it as the one
royal road to success. Thus we enter on a path on which the Infantry
already long ago preceded us, and which, _mutatis mutandis_, offers
also for the Cavalry similar great and undeniable advantages. It is
safe to predict that Section 346 will prove the starting-point, by
sheer pressure of natural conditions, of a fresh series of development
in our Cavalry Tactics.

         [Footnote 7: Rauch's Brigade of the 6th Cavalry Division at
         Vionville, under von Schmidt, August 16, 1870.]

         [Footnote 8: Section 346 reads: 'The above general principles
         applying to the conduct and relations between the several
         "Lines" must not be allowed to lead to the adoption of any
         stereotyped form of attack. The Division Commander has full
         authority to employ his brigades as he thinks best for the
         attainment of the purpose in view.']

Thanks to these prescriptions, the Commander has now a free hand to
arrange his units (Brigades or Regiments) side by side, and to give
them the amount of depth that he considers necessary. Hence the
commands remain immeasurably more in the hands of their leaders than
was formerly the case--a point of particular importance on ground
where the view is restricted; and every unit Commander can also form
his own reserves, so that reinforcements from the rear will always
join their own Regiment (or Brigade), and thus the intermixture of the
different commands will be prevented as much as possible; and what a
gain this will be towards rapid rallying after the confusion of an
encounter will be obvious to every reader.

Finally, and perhaps this is of even greater importance, a far higher
measure of initiative will be given to the subordinate leaders than
was conceivable under the old scheme ('Treffen Taktik').

These advantages can hardly be over-estimated. There remain, however,
yet two other directions in which this paragraph may lead to yet more
important consequences.

In the first place, it secures for the Commander himself an immense
simplification of the whole mechanism he is called on to control--for
he has no longer to occupy his mind with the fundamental conception of
the 'Treffen'--_i.e._, Three-Line System.[9]

         [Footnote 9: The 'Drei Treffen Taktik' owes its origin to the
         study of the Wars of Frederick the Great, and claims to have
         again brought to life the fundamental principles to which our
         Cavalry successes in those days were due. Against this view I
         would point out that Frederick's Cavalry were always formed
         in two Lines under one common command. Besides these two
         Lines ('Treffen') there was generally, but by no means
         always, a 'Reserve'--constituted usually of Hussars
         only--who, if I do not err, are only once spoken of as a
         'Treffen' (Line). This Reserve, however, was under a special
         Commander, and was quite independent of the two 'Treffen'
         proper above referred to. Now, no one would venture to
         suggest that Frederick's Infantry fought habitually in three
         Lines ('Drei Treffen'), although a Reserve was frequently
         held back in third Line, exactly as with the Cavalry. The
         truth really is that the modern idea of the 'Drei Treffen
         Taktik' has actually nothing in common with the methods of
         employment of Frederick's days at all.]

The term 'Treffen' (Lines), in the true spirit of Frederick the
Great's day, defines the relation between a leading Line and one or
more following Lines, which succeed one another in due sequence. The
tactical evolution of the last few years has, however, led to this
result--that this definition is no longer in harmony with the modern
conception attaching to the word 'Treffen.' According to the existing
regulations and practice, the second or third Line, or both together,
may just as well form the fighting Line as the one which is
momentarily called the first. The latter may equally be used for a
flank attack or, under a change of circumstances, form the Reserve.

The supporting squadrons, as defined in the new Regulations, or the
second or third Line in the attack against Infantry or Artillery, are
nowadays the only ones to which the original conception of the
'Treffen' applies.

Whilst at present the designation of particular Brigades, etc., as
first, second, or third 'Treffen' (Lines), has practically no bearing
on their use in action, but only assigns them a temporary place during
the particular manoeuvre, we have had to invent, to express the actual
conception of the 'Treffen,' or Line--which, after all, one cannot do
without--all sorts of designations, such as supporting squadrons,
formations according to depth, waves, and so forth. Hence the word
'Treffen' has introduced a complication which finds no justification
in the true spirit of the matter. These disadvantages, of course, are
least evident when the Division is brought into action from a previous
position of assembly; but they are very apparent indeed when it is a
question of uniting a Division which has previously been acting in
separate detachments upon the field of battle itself. Then we come
face to face with the difficulty--in fact, almost impossibility--of
adopting the modern idea of the 'Three Lines.'

On the line of march a Division is divided into Advance guard and
Main body, and if moving on several roads, then into a number of such
constituent parts (two to each road). From this state of subdivision
there result a number of Tactical units which it is practically
impossible to fit into the 'Three-Line' formation without incurring
great loss of time, and possibly the loss of one's opportunity. Hence,
from the retention of this 'Three-Line' idea, we arrive at a tactical
dilemma which must react detrimentally on the handling of the whole
Arm, as long as the Leaders are compelled by Regulations to assume
their 'Three-Line formation' before they can fight at all. It is from
this contradiction that Section 346 releases us.

Of equal importance is a further possibility which the wording of the
same paragraph throws open to us. It allows, in fact, the Cavalry, no
matter in what tactical connection it may find itself, to fight always
in accordance with the same principles.

As long as we adhered to the 'Three-Line system,' this, if not
impossible, was at least practically inexpedient, for the Regulations
took cognizance only of a Division composed of three Brigades of equal
strength, were founded on this idea, and did not allow of adaptation
to any other distribution of force which might have to be employed.

It has already been pointed out in Chapter III. that they do not apply
to a Corps made up of several Divisions, and the same holds good of
Divisions of other than strictly normal composition. Everywhere, in
cases such as referred to above, the subdivision into Lines
('Treffen') in the spirit of the Regulations would very soon lead to
even worse disruption of the units than already happens with normal
Divisions of three Brigades. The want of proportion between the
number of the Lines and the columns from which they have to be formed
would be more glaring then than nowadays, when the number of Brigades
happen to be the same as the number of Lines; with the larger units
the difficulty of uniform speed and control would be a factor.

Now, Section 346 helps us over all these difficulties by
disembarrassing us of all stereotyped formations based upon numbers
alone, and leaves the Commander free to choose in what proportion and
in what order he will divide and move these masses.

Under modern conditions this latitude is indispensable, for the amount
of force to be applied depends on what is known about the enemy; but
the special shape the attack itself assumes, and more particularly its
breadth of front, will be determined by the width of front the enemy
opposes and the nature of the ground it has to move over; whilst as to
depth, this must be decided by our estimate of the quality of the
adversary's force, hence his shock power and the amount of his
possible reserves.

The consideration of all these conditions may, in proportion to the
numbers in hand, lead us to employ whole Brigades, Divisions, Corps,
or portions of these units, arranged in the most varied succession to
one another. Whether we should attack by 'Wings' or by 'Lines' must
depend on the circumstances of the movement, the order in which the
troops reach the field, and the nature of the country to be traversed;
and generally the preference will have to be given to the 'Wing
Attack,' for the reasons we have above developed.

This 'Wing Attack' will, therefore, always have to be employed when
time is available to form up the troops systematically for action, or
when the lines of approach of the units lead naturally to the
adoption of the formation. 'Lines' only then, when it is absolutely
necessary to deliver an attack from column of route as rapidly as
possible, and hence the time is lacking for a more systematic
formation. Such cases can, for instance, arise in the deployment at
the issue of a defile, or in bringing up troops from Assembly
formation through the intervals of a crowded battle-field, or under
analogous conditions; but even in these cases a foreseeing command
will endeavour to facilitate the execution of the 'Wing Attack' by the
choice of some such formation as the 'double column,' which admits of
deployment to either hand.

Thus we see that our Regulations at least give to the Leader the
possibility of choosing the best and most suitable formations for the
execution of his purpose, but the latter also must be sufficiently
master of his art to know which to select.

Further, it is the duty of the Leader, in the case of mutual encounter
between manoeuvring bodies of the Arm, to choose the momentarily most
favourable form of attack with reference to his own line of approach.
It is not easy to lay down in general terms in what manner this can be
best insured, for the circumstances of the operations themselves and
the nature of the ground are capable of influencing the decision in
too many ways. One can only lay down certain general principles which
may form a basis in the appreciation of each situation as it happens
to arise.

In the first place, one must select one's own base of attack in such a
direction that the following blow will force the enemy to retire in
what will be for him the most disadvantageous direction, and,
conversely, for one's own purposes the best.

But, naturally, in making this choice the tactical advantages or
otherwise of the ground must not be overlooked or left to the enemy,
for the tactical victory is the necessary preliminary to further
results. Further, we should always endeavour to secure the advantage
of the 'outer lines' so as to act concentrically upon the enemy. In
this position, if beaten, his lines of retreat cross one another, and
to avoid this predicament he will be compelled to endeavour to
manoeuvre across our front, always a most dangerous undertaking.

On the other hand, if our attack fails, we have still the advantage of
eccentric retreat, which compels the adversary to divide his forces,
and thus opens to us the opportunity of further tactical success if we
can concentrate our own men with sufficient rapidity, whilst at the
worst we run no risk of seeing our own troops entangled with one
another.

It should be our constant endeavour to gain these positions on the
'outer lines' by previous strategical operations, in order to avoid
the danger of being compelled at the last moment to initiate wide
flanking movements in face of the enemy. Again, a further advantage
accrues if we can rest one flank on inaccessible or difficult ground.
This flank at least will be secure, so we can spare troops from it to
strengthen the other, and thus, perhaps, act with decisive effect.

Finally, when it is presumable that we shall have to deal with
considerable numerical superiority, we should direct all our efforts
to throwing the whole weight of our charge against the enemy's flank,
so as to compel him at the last moment to change his front to meet the
blow. The opportunity for such action will arise in cases in which,
thanks to our previous strategic direction, we can succeed in uniting
the mass of our forces more rapidly than our opponent is able to do,
and this may often be the case where the ground favours our advance
and conceals the direction of our march.

Generally, it may be laid down that a simultaneous attack directed
against the enemy's front and flank is justified when we have the
advantage of a considerable numerical superiority, or when our
opponent retains for too long a faulty distribution of his forces; but
in all other cases a blow with united force against his flank will
give the most far-reaching consequences, as it brings immediate
pressure against the adversary's line of retreat, and compels him to
employ his own forces in succession, not in a concentrated effort.
Hence this form of attack gives the chance of a success even to a
force in a numerical minority, as it will often afford it the
opportunity of beating the enemy in detail, whereas against a
concentrated mass there would be no hope of success at all.

It will be evident that for the execution of such an attack the forms
laid down in the Regulations to be observed in the transition from
rendezvous to attack formations are--one is almost tempted to
write--about as unfavourable as they well can be. It is true they
afford, as already pointed out, the possibility of presenting the same
fighting formation in succession to any required point of the compass,
an advantage which has no practical importance in warfare; but against
this they increase the difficulties of deployment for attack to the
front to the utmost. If it is necessary, for instance, to send the
first Line at the enemy's flank, because at the moment that happens to
be the shortest way, the front of one of the following Brigades is at
once masked, and the latter hampered in its movements. Or if it is
desirable to employ one of the rearward Brigades for a flank movement
or any similar purposes, then either the leading 'Line' must be
checked until the others have gained the required position, or it is
certain that these latter will arrive too late to co-operate.

Further, the forms prescribed by the Regulations render it more
difficult to make use of such assistance as the nature of the ground
may offer us.

Plainly, it is very much more to our advantage in the conduct of
offensive operations to bring up those units which one has at one's
disposal--with the sole exception of a Reserve, which is not to be
kept too weak, at deploying intervals on the same alignment--in
formations which adapt themselves well to the ground, and insure rapid
deployment to the front, with the necessary depth in the supports
following. For this purpose I recommend primarily the 'double column'
either in Brigades or in Regiments.

This arrangement of the troops satisfies all practical conditions, and
insures, above all, the possibility of bringing all forces
simultaneously into action, and of carrying out offensive flanking
operations; further, it makes it easier for the Commander to take
advantage of such support as the ground affords, and to mass his chief
strength on one wing; and, finally, it gives us the shortest line of
attack upon the enemy, and makes it easier to avoid the use of inner
lines. It unites thus all the advantages of the regulation 'Line'
('Treffen') formation, and avoids its many serious disadvantages;
hence it should be employed fundamentally wherever possible.

Turning now to the employment of Cavalry on the battle-field, the
first condition which has to be satisfied is to assign to the 'Masses'
their proper place in the line of battle. They must not only be at
hand when wanted, but also at the spot which promises the most
favourable tactical chances and the greatest prospect of decisive
results. Further, they must be able to recognise the right moment to
take part in the combat.

With reference to the first point, I should, above all, like to call
attention to the writings of General von Schlichting.[10]

         [Footnote 10: 'Tactical and Strategical Principles of the
         Present Day,' part i., chap, vii., B.]

Theoretically, the Cavalry 'Mass' is best united on that wing of the
battle front which is not supported, but destined for further
manoeuvres, hence on which the Arm will enjoy freedom of movement as
far as the ground allows. Naturally, it will not always be possible to
assign them such a place, but their position will result generally
from the course of the previous manoeuvring.

Either the Cavalry must clear the front of the Army in preparation for
the battle, in which case it is not always a matter of free choice in
which direction one has to clear off, nor can the Cavalry Commander
from his standpoint always determine which wing of the battle front
will have to manoeuvre; or it must close in from a flank for the
decision, in which case the nearest wing is their natural destination.
But they must always endeavour--and here I differ from General von
Schlichting--to range themselves forwards and sidewards of their own
Army. It will only be in cases where it is necessary to keep them in
rear of the general alignment--as, for instance, it is proposed to
use them as a last resort in the interests of the other Arms, as at
Mars la Tour--or where the battle front itself is broken up by the
nature of the ground or the grouping of the forces in such manner that
the whole engagement is divided into a series of individual actions,
as may often be the case in future Wars, that this rule must be
departed from.

Such dispositions are always less favourable because they imply in a
certain degree defensive action, whereas when placed forward in the
framework of the battle the offensive element of the Arm finds its
fullest opportunity.

That the desire to occupy such positions must not become stereotyped
goes without saying; it must always be conditioned by the general and
particular circumstances of the moment.

The course of events may, indeed, require us to take up a position to
the flank and rear of the Army, but fundamentally, forwards and to the
flank, remains the most desirable disposition. In this position the
Cavalry 'Masses' are best prepared to act against the enemy's flank,
and can best combine the fire of their own Artillery concentrically
with that of the guns and Infantry of the main body without losing
their tactical connection, and thus divert the forces of the enemy
into eccentric operations. Here they occupy the most suitable position
to initiate without loss of time a parallel pursuit of the enemy, or
to counter his attempts at pursuit; and here also they are best placed
to accept the inevitable challenge of the enemy's Cavalry.

General von Schlichting considers these combats as generally
superfluous--a kind of family concern which affects the rival
Cavalries only--having no connection with the ultimate decision
between the two armies.[11]

         [Footnote 11: See 'Tactical and Strategical Principles of the
         Future,' p. 83. The view that Cavalry which has delivered one
         charge in the day is useless for the rest of the operations,
         I cannot accept. It finds no support in the facts of Military
         history--on the contrary, the most complete refutation.]

I cannot share this opinion, which seems to me to be based mainly on
peace-time experiences, in which the opposing Cavalry forces generally
neutralize one another. In actual War, however, victory more usually
opens the path to other and proportionately more far-reaching results.
I hold, therefore, not only that such Cavalry duels are essential, but
that the opportunity for engaging in them should be sought out from
the first; for it is only the defeat of the enemy's horse which can
open the door for further successful action against his other troops;
otherwise the two Cavalries mutually paralyze one another, as at Mars
la Tour.

If in practice it has often happened that this Cavalry deadlock has
supervened, and the result of their encounter has remained unimportant
on the decision of the day, this result, in my opinion, has always
been due to a reluctance on one or the other sides to press the combat
to its utmost limitations, as in the above-mentioned instance of Mars
la Tour, or because the victorious side has retained neither force nor
cohesion sufficient to act against the enemy's flanks, as at Chotusitz
and at Prague.

Matters, however, will be very different when the Cavalry is really
adequate to its duties--when it not only beats the enemy out of the
field, but remains, as at Roszbach and Soor, fit for further efforts
in pursuit.

To reach this ideal we must strain every fibre of our being, and never
rest satisfied, as on the plateau of Ville sur Yron (Mars la Tour),
with half results as long as a single trooper remains fit to gallop
and handle his lance. The last man and the last breath of his horse
must be risked, and he who is not willing to stake his soul is no true
'Cavalry Soldier.'

If we have successfully achieved this first result--_i.e._, victory
over the enemy's horsemen--then the next step is to secure rapid
rallying and the pursuit of the beaten enemy till they are finally
driven from the field; and whilst detachments follow up, the main
force of our Cavalry must wheel in upon the flank and rear of the
enemy's Army, ready to act with all vigour and determination to bring
about the final decision when and where the opportunity offers.

That we failed in the campaigns of 1866 and 1870 to obtain this
crowning purpose of the Arm is no evidence in itself that the ideal is
inaccessible, only proof that neither our training nor comprehension
of our duties was on a level with the requirements of the time.

It is certainly possible that our opponent may seek to withdraw his
horsemen from the Duel to save their strength for the protection of
his threatened flanks; but the consideration remains that by such
conduct he voluntarily renounces the best sphere of his own
activity--a degree of renunciation on his part hardly to be
expected--and precisely because its action to avert defeat may prove
of essential consequence, it is our part, in accordance with the
offensive spirit of the Arm, to seek him out and destroy his forces
before such opportunity arrives.

For this purpose, again, the position to the front and flank is most
suitable. The constant threat upon the enemy's communications it
implies cannot be disregarded, and will compel him to find means to
rid himself of such embarrassment.

Having, therefore, made it clear where the Cavalry should seek its
position on the battle-field, the next step is to settle how it should
be formed. In this direction General von Schlichting has reached the
most practicable solution in laying down that a position in which each
Division retains full space for deployment and room to manoeuvre for
the common purpose is theoretically the ideal, and this would still
apply to Divisions united to form a Corps.

It is, indeed, evident that it is far easier to unite troops for
action towards the front than, under the circumstances of the
battle-field, to deploy them outwards from a common centre. This
latter operation will be all the more difficult in proportion as the
troops themselves have been brought forward to the front to meet a
coming crisis. The danger then is ever present that, by the necessity
of gaining room for deployment,[12] the opportunity to strike will be
lost, or that the endeavour to seize the opportunity will lead to the
troops being put in without order and in confusion.

         [Footnote 12: The 6th Cavalry Division at Vionville, August
         16, 1870.]

The fundamental principle, therefore, follows that troops, whether
Corps, Divisions, or Brigades, should be grouped on the battle-field,
preserving always their full deploying intervals.

Of course, local conditions must be taken into account, above all
things the necessity of finding cover both from view and fire in the
shape of the ground. In practice, therefore, it is only the actual
facts as one finds them which can decide as to the best formation to
be assumed, but it must always be of advantage to be perfectly clear
in one's own mind as to which disposition to adopt and the
consequences which must follow from one's choice.

The chief difficulty always remains--viz., the chance of seizing the
opportunity. In the Battle of Mars la Tour our Cavalry failed to solve
the problem, and in the subsequent course of the War--particularly
against the forces of the Republic--it might often have obtained far
better results had it possessed a clearer conception of its mission
and better tactical training, as, for instance, in the action at
Coulmiers, where we missed a grand opportunity.

The more difficult it becomes, with every increment in the range of
firearms, to recognise our opportunities, the more essential is it
that we should take the field with a thorough knowledge of our
tactical power and its limitations, and it is above all things
necessary that we should keep well up to the front, and not shirk even
_heavy punishment_ if by so doing we can best secure opportunities for
great results.

If this end is to be obtained, then every Cavalry Commander requires
to have a complete grasp of the nature of the Infantry combat. He must
be able to estimate with as equal certainty as an Infantry General the
general course of an engagement, the consumption of reserves, and the
gradual moral degradation of the enemy's foot soldiers.

At any moment he must be able to grasp in his mind the whole balance
of forces in conflict on any point of the battle-field, so as to be
able to decide whether the employment of his own command at any
particular point and time is justified by the general situation of
affairs.

It is, and always must be, the moments of great crises which give the
Cavalry the best opportunities.

Since attempts to ride through the zone controlled and swept by
effective Infantry fire may be looked on as synonymous with
self-destruction, only such moments must be chosen for a charge during
which the enemy is prevented from bringing his full fire power to bear
against the assailants. These, however, only occur--except always
where the nature of the ground allows of a thorough surprise
action--when the moral disintegration of the enemy's Infantry is such
that, under the impression of the threatening Cavalry attack, they are
no longer under control, or when they are so completely taken up with
their own fire action that it is impossible for them to concern
themselves with the coming danger. Where such opportunities arise they
must be seized with lightning-like decision and be exploited with the
utmost energy. On the other hand, one should never allow one's self to
be induced to undertake charges in which the probable losses bear no
reasonable proportion to the possible results. Such conduct could only
lead to the purposeless sacrifice of men and horses, just as happened
to the French Cavalry at Woerth and Sedan.

We can always take as an example the wise restraint exercised by von
Seidlitz at Zorndorf, who, in spite of the Royal Command, refused to
attack because he did not consider that the right moment had arrived.

The Leader must always keep before his eyes the demands which either
pursuit or retreat may make on his horses. One should never sacrifice,
to secure results of secondary consideration, means that can be used
to better purposes at other times and other places, for the calls
which may be made upon Cavalry after the battle are quite exceptional
in their nature.

When, after long marches, hours of fighting, and heavy losses, the
exhausted victor bivouacs on the hard-won field, when the day is
drawing to its close and the shadows are spreading far across the
pastures, then the real work of the Cavalry begins; then, without
drawing rein, the horsemen must press forward to intercept the enemy's
retreat, attack him anywhere where he least expects it, and harry him
to utter exhaustion and dispersal (see Book I., Chap. IV., 1.4); or it
must, under the difficult conditions of a retreat at night, sacrifice
itself in charges or in protracted fire action in every direction in
which the pursuing Army can threaten danger to the retreating columns.
In such situations they must be prepared to hold suitable positions by
the hour, without thought for their own retreat, without any knowledge
of the general situation, and without any connection with the
remainder of their forces. Threatened in flank and rear, and yet
unshaken by the general collapse, by the flight and panic of their
comrades, they must hold their own, relying on their own strength and
self-reliance. These are the conditions which make the highest demands
both on the material and moral excellence of the men, as well as on
the indomitable energy and skill of the Cavalry Leader, and to few
mortals is it given to prove equal to such contingencies; hence one
must prepare one's self beforehand for such situations.

Primarily one must remember to give opportunities to both men and
horses to feed, water, and rest even during the progress of the
battle. One must endeavour, even while the fight is still raging, to
become perfectly clear in one's own mind as to the possible lines of
retreat, and the probable ulterior operations. One must try to
impress upon one's memory the lie of the roads according to the map,
and the important defiles and positions which might be favourable
either to pursuit or retreat, in order to be able to act at the right
moment, without loss of time or hesitation, in full cognizance of the
circumstances of the case. _Nothing helps a decision more than a
complete intellectual command of the situation._

Hence we see that the leading of Cavalry has been rendered
immeasurably more difficult by a whole series of external
considerations, as we have shown at the beginning of the chapter; that
at every moment the highest demands will be made on the intellectual
perception, the boldness and strength of character of the Leader, if
on the battle-field of the future he is to handle the Arm with any
prospect of success; and that the best Cavalry under modern
circumstances must fail if their Leaders prove unequal to their task.




CHAPTER VI

TACTICAL CONDUCT OF DISMOUNTED ACTIONS


If, in the shock between mounted men, the genius of the Leader is the
principal factor of success, nevertheless, the successful conduct of a
dismounted combat and of all the variations this form of action may
assume make almost equal demands upon his capacity. For the timely
recognition of opportunities which can only be turned to account by
recourse to fire power, the transition from one form of action to
another, the skilful and systematic arrangement of a dismounted
engagement, require such a complete command of the situation and such
certainty of military judgment and decision of character that the
combination will be almost as rarely found.

Moreover, in the power of holding the balance correctly between fire
power and shock, and in the training for the former never to allow the
troops to lose confidence in the latter, lies the real essence of the
Cavalry spirit. This, whether it be in the working out of some great
strategical design, or in joining hands with the other Arms to obtain
by united fire action some common purpose, implies a balance of
judgment and absence of prejudice of the rarest occurrence in normal
natures.

The essential point which differentiates the action of Cavalry
fighting on foot and of Infantry engaged in the same operation is the
dependence of the former on their horses; and to arrange that under
all circumstances of the combat the relation of the men on foot to
their means of locomotion shall be suitably maintained is at once the
most important and the most difficult task that falls to the lot of
the Leader.

Primarily we have to decide whether we intend to fight with mobile or
immobile horses,[13] and in every case the question arises how the
conditions of the moment, whether in attack or defence, can best be
dealt with.

         [Footnote 13: When only three men in four dismount the horses
         are said to be 'mobile.' When the proportion is greater the
         horses become 'immobile.']

Turning first to the attack, as the most important form of action,
consideration leads to the following conclusions: If the advance is
made with 'mobile' detachments, then in case of success the horses can
be led forward after us. It is then easy to remount, and continue the
prosecution of our ultimate purpose. If, on the other hand, we fight
with 'immobile' detachments, one cannot at once pursue one's successes
with the same body of troops with which such success has been won.
Either the position which has been captured must be retained for some
considerable period, or we must go back to where the horses were left,
at the cost of considerable loss of time, and at the risk of
intervening circumstances robbing us of further opportunity. Neither
operation commends itself to the true Cavalry spirit.

On the whole, in attack the difficulty is best met by working with
'mobile' detachments, and the requisite number of rifles in the
fighting line can then be provided by dismounting men from a larger
number of units--Squadrons, Regiments, or Brigades.

From this principle one should only deviate when, owing to the
proximity of the enemy's Cavalry or other circumstances, it is
absolutely indispensable to keep a strong mounted reserve at hand, or
when it can be foreseen that the number of rifles available, if the
'mobile' form is preferred, will obviously not be sufficient for the
appointed task; for it must never be forgotten that the rapid
attainment of fire superiority must be striven for under all
circumstances.

If we turn to the consideration of the Defensive, our conclusion must
be the exact converse.

The maintenance of fire superiority now becomes the primary objective,
and since, in case of success, a general advance is precluded by the
very conditions which compelled us to adopt the defensive role in the
first instance, and further, owing to the conditions which surround a
defensive combat generally, particularly the nature of the ground, it
is usually practicable to bring the led horses closer up to the firing
line, which remains stationary, and does not, as in the attack,
constantly increase the distance between the two, it will be wiser to
adopt the 'immobile' detachment as a fundamental proposition.

This gives us the further advantage of being able to retain a larger
mounted reserve in hand for the initiation of a possible pursuit, and
one should only depart from this principle when special circumstances
make it appear desirable to advance rapidly after the decision of the
fire fight, and the ground compels us to leave the led horses far
behind the actual shooting line of the position.

Next to this question of 'mobile' or 'immobile' detachments, the
Commander must decide how far away from the actual field of action he
should dismount his men.

Fundamentally, the idea must hold good that one must ride up as close
as possible to the line to be held or the position from whence the
advance is to be made; and the limit to the mounted approach is only
set by the necessity of retaining cover, at least from sight, for the
led horses, and time enough, in the event of failure, to insure that
the men can remount before fire can be brought upon them, even from a
distance. The possibilities of becoming exposed to the indirect fire
of Artillery must not be left out of consideration altogether in the
solution of this question.

Hence, it can only happen very rarely, and then only under
exceptionally favourable topographical conditions, that a suitable
position for the led horses can be found in immediate proximity to the
actual line of action.

We may, however, be less particular when, in fairly favourable
country, it is advisable to engage, without the intention of courting
a decision, our object being only to annoy the enemy by sudden fire,
disappearing again as soon as he retaliates, or when one is reasonably
certain of success, as against inferior or badly shaken troops.

But when such favourable conditions are not present, and a tactical
repulse is always possible, then the place for the led horses can only
be found so far to the rear that the enemy cannot take us under fire
whilst in the act of remounting, and circumstances render it
improbable that this emergency can arise before we have succeeded in
breaking off fighting contact with the enemy.

The Commander, therefore, who decides to undertake a serious fire
action must be perfectly clear in his own mind that by the act of
dismounting he has severed his connection with his horses for a very
considerable time; for if the enemy's resistance proves more obstinate
than originally anticipated, and it becomes clear that the original
purpose is not to be attained with the available means, the
expectation that after once engaging the enemy the fight can be broken
off and the horses remounted will in most cases prove entirely
illusory.

Since this operation of discontinuing a fire combat is most difficult
to carry through, even for Infantry, the dangers are immensely greater
for mounted men, owing to the added complication of their led horses.
Only the passivity of the enemy, or unusually favourable topographical
conditions, as in South Africa, can alter the general soundness of
this conclusion; and it is entirely impracticable to escape these
consequences by any attempt to lay down a limit and distance beyond
which the fight is not to be prosecuted, in the hope that by so doing
we can safely break off a combat once commenced. Generally it must be
accepted, as laid down in Cavalry Regulations, Sections 362 and 364,
that a fire action once accepted must be carried out to the end,
unless the arrival of fresh troops on the flanks makes its
interruption possible.

One must never, therefore, in reliance on this possibility of
withdrawal, allow one's self to be led into the mistake of keeping the
led horses too close at hand; but the resolution to engage in a
dismounted action must always involve measures which fully recognise
the serious possibilities such decision entails, and must be on a
scale which will insure the necessary vigour of execution.

Hence, since in all cases in which a serious dismounted combat is
absolutely necessary it is essential that the horses should be left in
the greatest attainable security, the place for them should be
selected in such a manner that they are protected against possible
turning movements by the enemy--that is to say, behind suitable
shelter provided by the ground, or behind defiles that can be easily
defended. In cases in which these conditions cannot be complied with,
which in practice will often arise, their security must be provided
for by a sufficient reserve of mounted men, particularly when the
enemy's Cavalry is in the vicinity, for 'immobile' detachments are
practically at the mercy of every mounted patrol; and as a further
precaution it will be well to spread around them a sufficient web of
reconnoitring and security patrols, and to arrange for the support of
one's own batteries.

The covering of the led horses, however, is not the only duty of the
mounted reserve: the protection of the Artillery also devolves upon
it, and generally it must be ready to meet any of the demands for
which Reserves are usually set aside. Hence it will have to provide
not only for the safety of its own side and all pertaining thereto,
but it must also threaten the enemy's flanks, undertake turning
movements, reinforce, if necessary, the fighting lines, pursue the
enemy, or cover the possible withdrawal of its own dismounted
combatants; and, further on the offensive, it is its special mission
to hold the conquered ground when the dismounted detachments are
called off to remount, and to continue to carry on the original
mission, interrupted by the combat, until relieved by the men who in
the meanwhile have regained their horses, and again assumed the role
of mounted combatants.

The first point the Commander will therefore have to decide is, how
strong it will be necessary to make his mounted reserve if it is to
suffice to meet all these requirements, and then whether, with the
remainder of the men in hand, he has any prospect of successfully
carrying out his immediate purpose. From this it will depend whether
he determines to fight or to reach his object by other means. In
general, the Reserve can be reduced in proportion to the weakness of
the enemy's Cavalry, and to the depth of the zone of security his
patrols have been able to secure for him.

Having by this line of reasoning determined the number of men he can
afford to employ on foot, he must next make up his mind as to their
tactical distribution.

In this case there can be no doubt that the method of employment by
'Wings' must commend itself even more than in cases involving only
mounted combat, for, quite apart from all the many admitted advantages
of this form, in no other way is it possible to guarantee that the
dismounted men can safely and rapidly regain their horses.

The 'Line' system would involve endless confusion and loss of time in
sorting them out amongst their respective commands.

As regards the general considerations of width of front and depth, the
same principles apply as in the case of Infantry. In the defence to
gain time is the main object, and the problem to be solved is to
secure at one and the same moment both fire superiority and a
sufficient reserve to meet all possible emergencies. A skilful
utilization of the ground, previous ascertainment of the ranges, ample
ammunition and sound fire discipline, will, as with the Infantry, be
the best means of attaining one's object.

Special conditions only arise in the defence of villages where the
horses can be brought under cover close to the men, and here it seems
to be necessary to distinguish between several possibilities, all of
which require different treatment.

If the place is to be obstinately defended, then the horses must be
kept on the side away from the enemy, or in the centre of the
buildings, the defence of the boundaries be suitably arranged, and the
men told off to their several sections. The exits must be barricaded,
and the approaches entangled with wire.

A strong inlying piquet, to act eventually as a reserve, must be
placed in a central position.

If, however, the place is to be given up when seriously attacked, and
resistance is only to be sufficient to cover withdrawal, then the
horses should be kept saddled up in the stables, etc., and
arrangements made to withdraw them rapidly without exciting attention.

In the first case, as against Infantry or mounted Cavalry only, one
can count on holding one's own without serious losses for a
considerable time; but the matter becomes very different if the
enemy's Artillery is also to be reckoned with, for modern shell fire
will soon involve the destruction of all the horses, and one must be
prepared to find retreat practically impossible once one has allowed
one's self to be committed to an engagement of this nature. Hence such
positions should only be occupied and defended when it is safe to
count on support from following troops, or when it is improbable that
the enemy will be able to bring Artillery into action. Such situations
may frequently arise in the advanced lines of a concentration zone, in
which the villages nearest the enemy form part of the general system
of security.

In all other cases, and particularly as regards the advanced
squadrons, it will be better to take up 'Alarm' quarters, and the more
unexpectedly the enemy can attack us the more stringent must be the
precautions we adopt.

If we decide to retire, a portion of the men will be detached to take
the horses out of the village, or to have them drawn up in readiness
for mounting behind the position selected, and meanwhile the remainder
of the garrison must compensate for their diminution in numbers by a
greater expenditure of ammunition, thus holding the enemy till all is
ready, and then slipping rapidly back to their horses. Without
losses--amounting, perhaps, to the sacrifice of the last covering
party--such withdrawal can hardly hope to succeed; but previous
systematic arrangements give the best chance of success, and the same
prevision will be equally necessary, even if the place is to be held
at all costs, for the situation may always change, and a retreat
become advisable.

At night, however, the aspect of affairs changes; then any attempt at
withdrawal is to be deprecated, and, as a matter of principle, must
not be contemplated. Even if the enemy breaks into the place by
surprise, it is still better to fight him on the spot rather than to
risk the certain destruction of the whole detachment by retreat. A
successful resistance is in such cases all the more probable, since
in the darkness the use of the enemy's Artillery is practically
precluded--at any rate, can attain but little result. Only the
squadrons far out in advance, and thus liable to be surrounded on all
sides and captured before help can arrive, will have to be prepared
for a night withdrawal before the assailants can close in around them.

As to the principles to be observed in such cases, there should be no
room for doubt. Everyone should know what he has to do when the case
arises.

Turning now to the consideration of the conduct to be observed in
attack, it is clear that here also the same fundamental ideas apply as
with the Infantry. Dismounted Cavalry must be prepared to work their
way up to decisive distances, to break down from this limit the
enemy's resistance, and finally to carry the position by storm. Hence
the fighting line has need of constant reinforcements to give the
necessary forward impulse, and hence we require the same distribution
in regard to 'depth.'

Nevertheless, it would be a great mistake to adopt on this point any
stereotyped formation. It must not be overlooked that the essence of
such Cavalry attacks is rapidity of execution. Hence in all cases
where this necessity for rapidity arises the endeavour must be made to
bring from the very first as many rifles into the firing line as
possible, and it follows that the greater the fire power thus obtained
the less the need for subsequent reinforcement.

If we try to picture to ourselves the conditions under which these
dismounted Cavalry attacks can occur, it is evident that only in the
most unusual instances will the necessity arise of launching them
against wide fronts of dense lines of unbroken Infantry; on the other
hand, we shall often be called upon to capture isolated villages,
etc., such as posts on the line of communication, railway-stations,
and important defiles, and in all such cases it will always be
possible to combine attacks simultaneously against both flanks, front
and rear. Thanks to its mobility, the Cavalry is exceptionally well
suited to the performance of such undertakings, because it can combine
both attack and surprise to the best advantage.

If, thanks to this possibility, it is practicable to diminish the
weight of the front attack, it follows, again, that less
depth--_i.e._, fewer successive reinforcements--will require to be
provided; but these can only be suppressed altogether when the object
aimed at does not imply the actual maintenance of the position to be
assaulted, but our purpose is only to reach a point from whence to
overwhelm the enemy with fire, previous to riding him down by our
closed squadrons, or to break off the action again and retire as soon
as a counter-attack develops. These are cases which will often present
themselves: either when in pursuit it is desirable to strike
unexpectedly at the enemy's columns, or during a battle, when it is
feasible to molest and disturb his reserves.

In the above paragraphs I have put together the chief points to be
considered in the action of dismounted Cavalry when acting
unsupported; it remains now to consider the role assigned to the Horse
Artillery allotted to it, if only to bring out those parts which, in
my opinion, lie beyond its proper field.

If we admit that in general, as between two great Cavalry masses in
actual collision, the guns can play an important part, I must yet
insist that the measure of this importance should not be overdrawn;
for it is only when the former are confined to a defensive
attitude--for instance, when they are still under cover or behind
sheltering folds of the ground, or when moving in a widely-extended
screen to mislead the enemy and tempt him into fire-swept ground, in
order to fall upon him when he has ventured into the trap--that much
is to be expected from their co-operation.

But as soon as the Cavalry begins to advance, the part the Artillery
has to play drops into the background. Then the guns become simply an
impediment, because, since they generally require a special escort,
they subtract from the total force available for the actual shock, and
always act more or less as a pivot, which hampers the free movement of
the Cavalry.

On the contrary, the Cavalry must never allow itself to be influenced
in its movements by the position of its own Artillery. The latter must
adapt itself unconditionally to the movements of the former, and must
endeavour to conform to its evolutions, so as not only to co-operate
with it, but, if possible, to dispense with a special escort.

It must, therefore, be the endeavour of the Artillery to keep well out
in front of the Cavalry, so as to take the enemy under fire, and
anticipate his batteries by coming into action first. The latter is a
most important point, for it is the essential duty of the enemy's
gunners to divert and beat down the fire which we endeavour to bring
against their horsemen.

If we can only succeed in unlimbering first, they are bound to accept
the law from us, and are thereby prevented either of availing
themselves of the advantages of the ground or of conforming to the
tactical intentions of their Leader.

The best position for Artillery must always be behind some sheltering
roll of the ground, where it requires none, or at the most a weak,
escort; and this desideratum will be best fulfilled when it is on the
inner--that is, the supported--flank of its Cavalry, because in this
position it can presumably remain in action longest, and hampers the
movements of its own force least. Similarly, in pursuit or in covering
a retreat its sphere of activity is distinctly limited. Its action can
only then become effective when the actual tactical pursuit--_i.e._,
with cold steel--ceases, the combatants have disentangled themselves,
and the strategic pursuit sets in.

The mobility of the target must naturally influence the fire effect to
be expected from the guns, as it increases the difficulty of
'ranging,' and limits the possible duration of action to a few
moments.

The batteries will only then be able to turn their fire on the enemy's
Cavalry when the latter show themselves in considerable masses moving
at the slower paces. But when the Cavalry sweep forward at full speed,
the most they can do will be to take some stretch of ground through
which the opposing Cavalry must pass, and on which there is still time
to range, and then turn on shrapnel fire to its utmost intensity.

But even for this the opportunity will only then arise when either our
own Cavalry holds back, the enemy's Artillery does not require our
full attention and fire power, or, finally, if our own guns are not
attacked by the enemy's Cavalry.

In view of all these considerations, it follows that it is impossible
to assign a decisive importance to the participation of a few Horse
Batteries in the actual shock of the opposing squadrons. Nevertheless,
one should always do one's best to use to the utmost such Artillery
power as is available, and particularly if there is any doubt as to
the strength of the enemy, and we have reason to suspect that he
possesses a marked numerical superiority.

The chief role of the Artillery must always remain the support of
dismounted action of Cavalry in attack and defence; in the battle,
protected by their own horsemen, to strike against the enemy's flank
and rear, shell his columns on the march, to drive him out of
weakly-defended places or defiles, and in all similar circumstances,
such as war always develops afresh, to inflict upon him the utmost
possible damage.

In all these cases the batteries can choose their own positions and
the nature of their fire with absolute freedom, according to the
fundamental principles of their own Arm; they have time to pick up
their own range, and to insure results by the duration of their
action.




CHAPTER VII

STRATEGICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY


The attempt has often been made to advance formal principles and rules
for the strategical, as well as tactical employment of the Arm, which
will give a more or less safe foundation on which to base the grouping
and employment of the available forces.

Some regard a Cavalry Division as normally deployed when two brigades
march on separate roads in first line, with the third following behind
the centre in Reserve. Others want to see all brigades on one front,
side by side; whilst yet others wish to see two brigades on one road,
whilst the third pursues the same objective on a country lane.

Even our Cavalry Regulations--which on this subject actually ventures
to trespass on strategical ground--lays down (see Section 318) that
'in Reconnaissance the mass of the Division must be kept together
until the enemy's Cavalry has been beaten out of the field.'

I hold all these attempts which only hamper the free strategic
employment of the Arm as not only mistaken, but contrary to the very
essence of our being, and for the same reason I hold them even to be
detrimental, because they are calculated to produce thoroughly false
views as to the conditions and demands with which in practical
warfare we are confronted. All these regulations fall to the ground
the moment they have to be applied to strategical units of variable
dimensions. Further, as I have developed above, the tasks which may
fall to us are of such different natures that they cannot possibly be
all solved by the same formulae.

The strength of the enemy must naturally exercise decisive importance
on the whole character of our action and the distribution of our
forces. The lie of the roads and the nature of the country also
exercise their influence on our decision.

To this must be added the fact that, in view of the many strategical
necessities of a great Army, the Headquarters cannot always be in a
position to allot to the Cavalry a clearly-defined task either of
reconnaissance or security, attack or defence; thus higher
considerations may prevent the massing of the Cavalry on a single road
or any other similar simple distribution. More often than not one will
have to suggest the simultaneous attainment of the most varied
objectives, and the Cavalry Leader will be lucky if he is not called
upon to solve problems of the most heterogeneous nature, things which
in their execution mutually exclude one another.

Hence one can only lay down the most general principles to govern the
strategical employment of the Arm, and to meet this difficulty it
becomes all the more important to develop the capacity for endurance
of the troops to the utmost, so that they can successfully deal with
these many variable demands.

As to how far the independent Cavalry should be thrust out in front of
the following columns of the Army, all that can be laid down is, that
the wider the fronts and the deeper the Army--hence the longer time
the Army will take to deploy, concentrate, change its position, or
execute any similar operation depending on the reports of the
Cavalry--the further that Cavalry must gain ground to the front.

As to the principles governing the formal arrangement of the troops in
contradiction to all attempts to lay down stereotyped formations, all
that can be said is that every strategical operation, if for no other
reason than to allow of reconnaissance and secure safety, requires a
certain extension in breadth; but the combat itself demands
concentration.

It follows from the above that the Cavalry Commander must in every
initial case weigh in his own mind how much the existing circumstances
may allow him to extend, and, on the other hand, how closely they
compel him to keep concentrated, and he will only be able to reconcile
the dilemma when he is actually clear in his own mind as to the
tactical and strategical results his conduct in either case will
involve.

If the essence of his duty is to secure and to screen, then, as stated
above, extension and subdivision of his command naturally follows. But
one must keep clearly before one's own eyes that any concentration for
a combat jeopardizes the performances of these tasks, for the
concentration for combat necessitates the uncovering of the front,
which it is the very object of the enemy to bring about and take
advantage of. Further, the wider the front, the less becomes the
possibility of timely tactical concentration; hence, under such
conditions, one would generally have to renounce the temptation to
engage in combat with a positive object, and content one's self with
keeping the enemy at a distance, for this purpose availing one's self
to the utmost of the advantages the ground may confer, and such
support as the reinforced Horse Artillery and mobile Infantry (in
vehicles) can afford.

When the width of extension becomes very great it will be an absolute
mistake to keep back reserves, since by doing so the actual front is
weakened, whilst there is no guarantee that the reserve can arrive in
time at the threatened point.

Further, the wider the front becomes, the greater the difficulty of
strategical change of direction.

A similar extension of front as that above indicated in this resume of
'Security' duties may also become advisable when engaged on
'Reconnaissance'--for instance, when lengthy obstacles, such as
watercourses, mountains, etc., only traversable at bridges, dams, or
defiles, have to be surmounted.

In such cases, especially when resistance is to be anticipated, it
will rarely be possible to count on being able to surmount the
obstacle in one single column, since even unimportant forces under
such circumstances can oppose a very protracted defence, and
neutralize a large numerical superiority. When these difficulties are
met with, it will be necessary even in reconnaissance to divide one's
force into several columns, as then there is always the chance of
successfully piercing the enemy's front at some one point, and thence
rolling up his resistance all along the line.

Even in open country conditions may be encountered that render the
subdivision of one's forces over a considerable extent of front
desirable--_i.e._, when it is necessary to find the enemy, and fix the
fact of his presence in certain specific districts. As an example,
the conduct of the Cavalry after the Battle of Gravelotte (August 18,
1870), when it became imperative to ascertain whether MacMahon's Army
was marching to the north-eastward or not.

Here it was indispensable to sweep out a wide area. To attempt such
tasks with patrols alone is unadvisable, for these always require a
certain tactical support behind them, by which they can be either
reinforced or relieved.

Still, the point must never be lost sight of, that, since the enemy
will also seek to screen his operations, a decisive collision may
become necessary at any moment to tear his screen asunder. Hence it
will be better, in opposition to the principles laid down for
'security' only, to keep one's principal force in groups or masses,
possessing considerable striking force, and to march in such manner
that a certain degree of concentration is always attainable while
meeting the necessity for extension in breadth by smaller
reconnoitring patrols.

Against an opponent whose general whereabouts has been ascertained,
whom one is determined at any price to beat, in order then to
reconnoitre, one's troops must be kept in hand, so that their complete
concentration is assured in all cases, and only to divide them to the
degree rendered indispensable by the general direction of the roads
and the nature of the ground to be traversed. The same conditions also
hold good where surprise is the essence of the undertaking. In this
case it may even be advisable to suppress one's own dispositions for
security, and accept the risk of being taken at a disadvantage rather
than run the risk of having one's intentions prematurely disclosed.

Tactically the greater concentration guarantees tactical success, and
strategically it allows greater freedom of movement and changes of
direction to meet altered conditions; but one must never lose sight of
the technical drawbacks such closer concentration entails.

The zone of reconnaissance is naturally always of less breadth than
with divided columns; hence the possibility of screening the march of
troops in the rear is diminished, the risk of being turned is
increased, and the possibility of delivering a stroke in the air is
not inconsiderable.

If the enemy wishes to evade us, we have scarcely any means of holding
him until our main force can arrive; and finally, this condition of
close concentration by no means guarantees always and everywhere
either superior readiness for action or a more favourable deployment.
Cases can arise in which strategic dispersion will prepare the way for
tactical encounter even better than the concentrated advance; and this
is particularly so when, to attain the object of our mission, a wide
turning movement is necessary, for this will generally be best brought
about by previous strategic dispositions; whilst the deployment of a
mass from a defile or its retreat may be entirely prevented if
attempted in a single column.

Hence every principle has its limitations, and circumstances will
always arise which defy all stereotyped formations. Thus, even for
'screening' and 'security' cases can arise under which concentration
is justified, even where the nature of the ground does not
imperatively dictate it, as when, for instance, the insufficiency of
one's own force excludes any distribution in breadth, and compels one
to combine all efforts for the defence of decisive points. And it is
precisely on the defensive that it may be of advantage to deal a blow
with the concentrated strength. Equally on the strategic offensive,
dispersion may be necessary, as when the enemy retreats eccentrically;
or if it is necessary to occupy districts of considerable size to
break down the resistance of the hostile population, or to interrupt
railway communication over a considerable area.

Finally, all principles fall to the ground where the enemy's Cavalry
is finally beaten out of the field, or by a succession of mistakes he
gives openings which we can seize with advantage. Thus our conduct
always remains dependent on the topographical nature of the country,
on our own purpose and the opposition of the enemy, and only one law
governs all cases--namely, expediency. The greater art of leading will
naturally be required when the necessity arises to operate with more
or less widely-separated columns. In all such cases everything depends
on the endurance of one's troops. The principal difficulty in the way
of execution lies in harmonizing and maintaining the movements of the
separate detachments.

If one has to deal with Infantry only, then, since their rate of march
is almost always the same, it is easy to calculate approximately where
the several columns may be found; but it is quite different when one
comes to deal with Cavalry, where the different Leaders may adopt very
different rates of movement, or may have such variations forced upon
them by other circumstances, and hence one has always to deal with
quite indeterminable factors. This difficulty can never be altogether
eliminated; one can only counteract it by laying down from the very
first instructions for the advance of the several columns, according
to time and space, from which no deviation is to be permitted without
sufficient reasons, and organizing the circulation of orders and
intelligence in such a manner that it will work with certainty. These
two precautions supplement one another. If one can calculate
approximately where the several detachments are to be found at a given
time, then reports can be sent by the shortest way, and will reach
their destination without delay.

It will be decidedly advisable that all detachments should report to
Headquarters, and if possible to all adjacent columns, without
distinct instructions, and at certain time intervals, both as to their
advance, their bearing in relation to adjacent columns, as also any
news they may have obtained about the enemy.

Nothing is more important to the Cavalry Leader than to be constantly
informed as to the general situation of the units he controls; but it
is equally important that the several groups should know what is
happening to one another, for only then can they act in the spirit and
in combination with the whole.

This is all the more essential because, owing to the rapidity of all
movements, and to the great extension which has often to be given to
the front, it is impossible for the higher Command to interfere in
good time, or to obtain information from its subordinates in any
emergency that may suddenly arise. The results, then, depend entirely
on the independent judgment of the man on the spot, and suitable
action can only be obtained when the latter is kept fully informed as
to the nature of the general situation.

We should, therefore, avoid as far as possible the despatch of orders
to individual Commanders without at the same time informing their
comrades of the bearing of such instructions.

Wherever possible in strategical operations, the orders should be
comprehensive, and should be circulated simultaneously to all
subordinates. Where it is impossible to convey an order simultaneously
to all, those not immediately concerned in their execution should be
informed of its issue as soon as possible. Certainly, this method
requires a large number of gallopers, orderlies, and so forth; but
this apparent waste of energy will in the end prove the best economy,
because the troops will thereby be spared many unnecessary movements.

However great the endeavour may be to diminish the difficulties of the
united action of separated bodies in the combat itself, the issue of
the Cavalry fight is decided so rapidly that its consequences must
have begun to show themselves before either the adjacent columns or
Headquarters have learnt of its commencement. We must, therefore, be
clear in our own minds that successful combination of separated bodies
in action can generally only be effected when the opponent is either
stationary, in which case one can time one's movements against him, or
when, by a protracted defence at other points, the more distant bodies
have time and opportunity to reach the field.

Even when the approach of the opponent's forces has been discovered in
time, it will be difficult to calculate with any degree of precision
the exact point at which collision will occur, as the marching rate of
the enemy's Cavalry must always remain an uncertain factor. Hence it
will not suffice to evade the enemy's advance until the adjacent
columns can unite, as one cannot assign to them any definite point of
concentration where the distance between the columns is at all
considerable. Any attempt to concentrate strategically against an
enemy in movement without at some point fighting to gain time must be
dismissed as illusory. In all these cases one must not hesitate to
take to the rifle, and to utilize all available means of defence.

Similarly, when advancing in separated columns, it will be well to
advance from one defensive section to another in rushes, and not to go
beyond any one of these until fairly assured that one can reach the
next without encountering the enemy's Cavalry.

If one should have the misfortune of being surprised in a district
which affords no points of support, then one must retire to the next
best one in order to give the adjacent columns time to swing in
against the enemy's flanks. The sound of the guns will be indication
enough to these to hasten their pace.

The more important it is, therefore, to march to the sound of the guns
in order to save time, the more careful must one be in opening fire
without sufficient cause. On the one hand, the side which wishes to
attract support will not be satisfied with a few rounds, but will
endeavour by continuous and heavy firing to make the danger of his
situation evident; on the other, the adjacent columns will only then
be justified in approaching if they are convinced that it is not a
mere matter of local and transitory advantage. The Cavalry Commander
must keep, therefore, a firm hand over his guns, and never allow these
to come into action without express sanction, except in extreme
necessity. Generally, the batteries should always march with the
advance or the rear guard in order to break down rapidly any minor
resistance, and to make the fullest use of such short opportunities as
may arise for the utilization of their full power.

The application of these principles is, of course, much simpler when
it is possible to keep the several columns close together on a
convenient group of roads, all running fairly near to one another. The
disadvantages which then arise make less demand on the skill of the
Leader, but more on the necessarily cramped form of the disposition
which, as we have above pointed out, he is compelled to adopt.

For every operation, in fact, except the direct attack, there is a
certain degree of extension, which favours the immediate purpose the
most, and this depends on the shape and nature of the ground; but one
has always to resist the temptation to dispersion which arises,
particularly when it is necessary to keep in mind the solution of
several possible problems. Only very occasionally will it be expedient
to divide one's troops to meet every emergency.

The General must use his judgment to decide where the chief weight of
his mission lies, the principal characteristics he must impress upon
his operations, and how the subsidiary purposes can be best served
without applying half-purposes to the primary object. It is these
considerations--the reduction of the complicated to the simple--which
create the chief difficulties which weigh upon the mind of the Leader.
The capacity of coming to a correct decision in every special case is
a mark of the intellectually capable Commander, and of itself gives a
certain guarantee of its success by rendering possible the
concentration of the force upon the decisive point; but it will not
alone suffice to insure success. Boldness and energy of character is
the final determining cause of successful results.

Above all, every Cavalry leader must be inspired by the determination
to keep the initiative under all circumstances, and never to
relinquish it to his opponent. The initiative alone guarantees
successes, often in a degree which one was hardly entitled to expect,
for it forces the enemy to accept the law from our hands, disturbs his
strategical combination, compels him to fight before his troops are
united, and often gives to the numerically weaker the opportunity of
establishing a relative local superiority. One must, therefore,
endeavour to introduce as much of the initiative and offensive element
as circumstances will permit even in the execution of defensive
missions.

A Leader must never allow himself to be hindered in an advance, or be
driven into an attitude of expectation by the passive opposition of
the enemy's Cavalry, as so often happens in peace.

In all such cases, when a direct frontal attack holds out no prospect
of success, he must immediately initiate a wide turning movement
outside the effective range of the enemy's Artillery, and sacrifice
without hesitation his own line of retreat. Victory restores at once
the original line of advance, and the outflanking movement threatens
also the enemy's retreat.

It is never permissible to wait until driven into action by superior
commands, but one must always endeavour to reap, on one's own
initiative, the utmost possibilities the situation holds out.

In this way we shall save the troops excessive exertions and
purposeless riding about, for since the Headquarters can never grasp
the situation as rapidly or as thoroughly as the General actually on
the spot, it follows that their orders will generally arrive too
late. Hence they often lag behind events, and call for excessive
exertions, night and forced marches if the purpose is to be attained.
The records of the Campaign of 1870-1871 give innumerable instances of
these facts, based on experience. Finally, resolutions should never be
made dependent on circumstances which may happen in the future, but
must always be based on something positive, which must be followed up
with all conceivable energy and circumspection. This most necessary
circumspection on the part of the Leader demands a clearness of
expression in the issue of orders which must never leave the
subordinate officers and troops in doubt, and should always reflect a
clear and determined purpose.

It is, however, equally necessary that the superior Leader must
himself be clear as to how he means to carry out his purpose, has also
considered all other possibilities, and has made his arrangements in
such a manner that, if necessary, he can give his operations a
different direction. This must be particularly the case where success
depends on cunning surprise. As concerns the first point, this will
require the more thorough consideration, because it is most
particularly difficult to change the strategic direction of a large
body of Cavalry when once it has been launched forward on a broad
front. In such a case the whole carefully-elaborated network of
patrols would be left, so to speak, hanging in the air. To divert it
sideways into a new direction is generally impracticable; it would, in
fact, in most cases be impossible to transmit to all the advanced
detachments the news of the change in the dispositions.

A new system of patrols will, therefore, be absolutely necessary to
save both energy and time, and the necessity for instituting this new
service will be particularly detrimental to our whole operations,
because the information from the new direction will generally arrive
too late to be of service.

It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that the Cavalry Leader
should not only reconnoitre in the direction prescribed by the higher
Command for its particular purpose, but should also scout
independently in every direction, and inform himself of all the
circumstances in the whole district over which he is operating; if
necessary, organize for himself an intelligence system.[14]

         [Footnote 14: I here call attention to the instructions of
         Frederick the Great on this subject, as well as to the
         circumspection with which General J. E. B. Stuart prepared
         for his own undertakings.]

In short, he must exercise such prevision that he can never be overtaken
by circumstances; and in every case in which action is called for in a
new, and, perhaps, unexpected direction, he should be prepared to meet
the emergency. In this way he will save himself much time and energy,
but it will facilitate his very difficult task essentially if he is
always kept informed in sufficient time of the views and possible
intention of the Chief Command; for unless this condition is complied
with, it will be impossible to insure that the whole energy of the Arm
will be directed to the carrying out of its reconnoitring functions in
conformity with the views entertained at Headquarters. It must be
characterized as one of the most suicidal errors when the superior
Command conceals its purposes from its executive organs. Diffused
activity, waste of energy, misunderstandings, and confusion would be the
inevitable consequences, and military history--not the least that of
1870-1871--gives a long role of illustrative examples.

As regards all those operations which depend on surprise, the
circumspection of the Leader becomes the decisive factor. Everything
must be thought out beforehand, and carefully considered. The very
soul and being of the Leader must be grasped by the men under his
Command, and the utmost energy in the execution of his design be
demanded from every individual. As a general rule, smaller bodies,
which can conceal themselves behind features of the ground, and hardly
require a service of security, can act quite differently to larger
ones, which cannot conceal their presence and always require a certain
degree of precaution for reconnaissance and security. Above all,
mobility is the essence of the whole situation, and darkness will
serve as a most important contributor to success.

On main roads, where it is impossible to lose one's way, darkness can
be used for forced marches to advantage if beforehand we are clear
about the conditions on the side of the enemy, and hence can act with
a certain degree of confidence.

One factor must never be left out of consideration--viz., that under
modern conditions the difficulties of action by surprise have been
enormously increased, and the enemy is under certain circumstances
enabled to paralyze the tactical results of surprise. This factor
arises from the existence of railways and telegraphs, and it will act
most detrimentally against us when moving in the enemy's country,
where both arrangements favour our opponents. Telegraphs carry the
news of the appearance of Cavalry far and wide beyond the points where
they have been seen by the enemy's troops, and the railways forward
supports to the threatened districts.

It is, therefore, of particular importance to destroy by means of
advanced patrols both telegraphs and railways all over the district on
which one hopes to act by surprise, and to repeat such active
destruction again and again. In such enterprises there is a wide field
for slimness and craftiness--qualities which might very well be
combined in greater undertakings.

Sudden changes in the line of advance behind the screen of advanced
troops, unexpected concentration of separate columns at decisive
points, separation and surprise reunions of one's forces,
dissemination of false news, feints on points of subsidiary importance
to distract the attention of the enemy--all these things can lead to
the deception of the enemy, and in one's own country they will be
materially supported by a friendly population; but timely and accurate
information of all the circumstances of the enemy remains always a
most necessary condition.

If the importance of these measures is particularly striking in these
cases where we are dealing with surprises, ambushes, and so forth,
they form also in every other type of Cavalry action one of the
principal foundations of success, for they alone insure timely
resolutions and the consequent initiation of the movements necessary
to bring about concentration and separation.

The Cavalry Commander must, therefore, always choose his position when
on the march, with the troops in immediate contact with the enemy; or
if his troops are quartered in the neighbouring villages, then
immediately behind the advanced line of cantonments, so that whenever
possible he can see with his own eyes and base his decisions on
first-hand evidence, where he can receive all reports as soon as
possible, and make his dispositions in good time. Otherwise it will
only too frequently happen that his orders and dispositions will drag
behind events, and disorder and defeat will be the consequence.

This personal supervision of matters in his front is also necessary to
enable him to come to a correct decision as to his line of action,
whereas a Commander of all Arms can better decide by the map, because
his troops are less dependent on the ground than Independent Cavalry,
move more slowly, and hence are more accessible to subsequent orders.
But even the utmost energy in the Leader will not alone suffice to
lead things into their proper lines without the most successful and
rapid reconnaissance. Hence the practical organization of the system
of reconnaissance remains the essential task of all strategical
Cavalry leadership; but it requires to be supplemented by an equally
practical system of security.

On the two subjects so much has already been written that it is
impossible to find anything new to say about them. Only one point has
not been brought out sufficiently--namely, that both security and
reconnaissance, in so far as both depend on patrols, will only then
work successfully when they are based on a thoroughly systematized
method of procedure. The subject is of such importance that I have
considered it necessary to devote a short chapter to it (Book I.,
Chap. VIII.).

If reconnaissance--apart from the fact that the roads must be cleared
for it in the first instance by the defeat of the enemy's
Cavalry--lies exclusively in the hands of the patrols, nevertheless
security depends on the arrangement and activity of the other
branches, such as advance guards, rear guards, flanking detachments,
and outposts, and the conduct of these depends, again, on thorough
systematization.

When on the move, safety lies in the distance that separates the main
body from the advanced detachments, and it is scarcely necessary to
point out that only systematic arrangements can guarantee the
necessary time for the exploration of the ground and the enemy which
is requisite for safety.

Threatened flanks require special detachments, moving on the same
level and at sufficient distance, and their co-operation will be
insured by a careful regulation of the mutual rate of march.

A uniform rate of advance in the whole mechanism is an essential
condition of complete security. Hence every means must be exhausted
down to the smallest detail. It will not be necessary to assign minor
flanking detachments for the duration of a whole march. During such a
period it is practically impossible to retain their relation to the
main body without keeping them within sight, which in most cases is
quite impracticable, for circumstances may suddenly check the main
body, or necessitate a change of direction. To advise the flanking
detachments of such occurrences will generally be impossible, or at
any rate very difficult, if one has permanently detached them, and
therefore has no certainty of finding them at any particular point.
Hence it is advisable to work them always in sections--that is to say,
when they have reached certain points to withdraw them to the main
body, and send out reliefs for the next section.

But in order that the security should never for one instant be
relaxed, these fresh reliefs should always be sent out at some little
distance before the point at which the former detachment is to be
drawn in.

Almost more important than security at night is security during
prolonged periods of rest. In that case the arrangements must be made
not only in accordance with tactical requirements, but the fact must
be taken into account that horses, in order to remain permanently
useful, require quite a different nature of rest than is needed by
men.

It is most desirable that as many horses as possible should every day
be brought under shelter and unsaddled, and all bivouacking should be
avoided as far as practicable.

The readiness for action from a purely tactical point of view
certainly suffers, but as rest at night is an absolute necessity for
the horses, one has to make the best of the matter and minimize this
disadvantage as much as possible by suitable arrangements.

Against this view it is often urged that Cavalry used to bivouac much
more frequently in former wars, and nevertheless remained fit for
service, hence they ought to be able to do the same to-day. I consider
this an entirely wrong deduction. In the first place, the demands upon
the troops in former days were generally much less than at present.
The periods of crisis in which great exertions had to be made by them
were on the whole less frequent, and the subsequent intervals for rest
and recuperation were usually longer.

Considering the average marches of the Napoleonic Cavalry as a whole,
they cannot be considered particularly great, and still less was this
the case under Frederick the Great, although under both Generals we
find instances of great individual exertion.

Moreover, the horses in those days were much less well bred, and the
commoner cold-blooded strain can stand bivouacs, cold and wet, much
better than our present high-bred material, although the latter stand
heat and exertion very much better. The leadership must adapt itself
to these conditions. Where circumstances allow the bulk of the horses
to take shelter behind the Infantry outposts, the most must be made of
the opportunity, and only the more distant patrolling service be left
to the Cavalry. Outpost service makes far less demands on the Infantry
soldier than on the Cavalry horse, for the former is allowed to sleep
when on piquet, the Cavalry horse cannot.

The Cavalry soldier certainly gains an advantage here over the
much-harassed Infantry man, for naturally the man derives advantage
from the care bestowed on the horse; but I hold this point is of far
too trifling a nature to take into consideration when the matter
affects such a necessary and important factor of strength of the whole
Army. Further, this advantage is more apparent than real, and is only
intended to give us the means, while sparing the material in one
direction, to make greater demands on it in another. When in critical
moments bold and wide-sweeping movements on the enemy's flanks and
rear become necessary, where our object is to keep the enemy's
movements under constant observation while screening our own; where,
finally, on the close of a battle we must pursue the enemy
relentlessly, or sacrifice ourselves to cover and protect the weary
and retreating Infantry, then the Cavalry which has been properly
nursed will be capable of exertions far beyond what could be expected
of troops less thoughtfully managed. These exertions can then be
unconditionally demanded, and will repay a hundredfold, both
tactically and strategically, the care bestowed in easier days.

Only rarely, however, will cases arise in which Cavalry can avail
themselves of the shelter of the Infantry, for the essence of all
Cavalry activity lies in the future in its independent undertakings.
If we were to apply to them the same principles as to the
Infantry--that is to say, make a principle of bivouacking the outposts
and exposing them daily to the effects of the weather--this would
result in a steady drain upon the horses, which would lead to serious
deterioration in their endurance. Hence the question of bringing them
under cover does not apply merely to the mass of the forces, but must
be extended to the whole system of outposts, and wherever practicable
the greatest possible number of horses must be placed under shelter in
full and complete security. This security must be sought for by the
increased depth assigned to the outpost system. Even after a
victorious advance one must not hesitate, under certain circumstances,
to withdraw the troops in order to obtain the necessary distances
between the enemy and the advance guard, as also between the advance
guard and the main body. Slightly increased distance to be covered
next day is nothing as compared to the advantage of greater security.
It will be particularly desirable to make the most of all positions
the ground may afford, which, being traversable at only certain
points, hinders the approach of the enemy--such as rivers, which can
only be crossed at the bridges, woods in which movement is confined to
the roads, marshes, and so forth. Behind these one can generally go
into cantonments without anxiety, and they offer the further advantage
that they can generally be held by small forces of dismounted men.
Hence the horses can generally be sent back and brought under shelter
at a distance, and in case of alarm can be saddled up and be made
ready by men detailed for that purpose.

Where such positions are not available, one must either go back
further, or, if not altogether too near to the enemy, make the most
advanced cantonments serve the purpose of the line of security.

Every evening these localities must be hastily prepared for defence,
with the determination, in case of attack, of defending them carbine
in hand, and without bringing out the horses until the support can
come up from the rearward cantonments.

The details of such defence I have already discussed elsewhere.

This method of defence, however, must be supplemented by a suitable
system of observation sent out towards the enemy. Even detachments far
advanced towards the enemy may, under favourable circumstances, find
temporary cover in villages, and every such period of rest is of
advantage for the horse.

The Cavalry, however, which, in full confidence of its firearms and
the alertness of its patrols, can venture to go into cantonments, and
thus save its horses from bivouacking, will very soon assert its
superiority over an enemy which seeks for safety by remaining
constantly under arms, and thus dissipates its inherent energy.

This tendency towards cantonments must not be allowed to become
stereotyped. Occasions will constantly arise when the Cavalry must
remain in immediate touch with the enemy; then it will be compelled
not only to bivouac, but will have to stand to its horses, ready to
mount at a moment's notice. Such occasions will only arise in
critical situations necessarily of short duration, and the conditions
both of the weather and the ground must be taken into careful
consideration in making the arrangements for the outposts.

Thus it is evident that it is not possible to lay down fixed rules of
conduct either for operations or for the outposts, but all must be
left to the capacity of the Leader and the adaptability of his men. On
this capacity depends in the last resort the greater or less strategic
value of the Arm. Its foundation can only be laid in peace, and will
depend on thorough and successful training, together with suitable
preparation of the whole organization for War. To both points I will
recur in the second part of this work. Here I would only insist that
naturally the collective strategic employment of the Arm must take a
thoroughly different form in proportion as the troops are rendered
more or less independent by their equipment, the leaders of all ranks
are qualified to act on their own responsibility, and mobility is not
hampered by difficulties in the provisioning of man and horse, and in
the supply of ammunition. In the one case the Leader can act with
courage and daring in the true Cavalry spirit; in the other he will
feel himself hampered at every step, will not be able to act with the
necessary degree of self-confidence, and will have to renounce the
most promising undertakings because the inefficiency of his troops
leaves him no alternative. However great his genius, no Leader can
compensate for want of efficiency in his command; but it is the duty
of such leader to maintain and increase the endurance inherent in his
material to the utmost limits of its capacity.

In this connection a well-thought-out system of saving and caring for
one's horses occupies the first position, for this is the bed-rock
foundation of all subsequent developments. We have seen of what immense
importance in this respect the sheltering and arrangements for the
outposts may be. But there are other factors to be considered--above
all, a rational arrangement of the marches. In the first instance, it is
a mistake to believe that Cavalry in the long-run can out-stay and
out-march the Infantry--that, in other words, the Cavalry horse can
endure greater hardships than well-trained Infantry. For a few days that
may well be so, but for continuous exertion it is by no means proved.

The German Cavalry horse is much more dependent on a sufficiency of
food than the man; the nature of his load, together with the rapidity
of movement, and hence the greater intensity of the exertions demanded
of him, attack the animal in a far greater degree than the more
uniform march performance of the men, who, moreover, are susceptible
to moral influences, capable of greatly increasing their powers;
finally, sore backs and lameness in long-continued exertions decimate
the ranks of the horses to a much greater degree than a well-trained
and equipped Infantry suffers from similar causes.

In normal conditions demands should not be made upon the Cavalry which
would be justified only in moments of a crisis. We must endeavour to
reduce the daily performance to the lowest limit that our purpose
allows. Only in exceptional instances should one move off at such an
early hour as to interfere materially with the night rest of the
horses. Unfortunately, there are still officers who will not be
convinced that it is the horse which most requires rest, and who are
never satisfied unless they keep the Cavalry night after night on
their legs, although in darkness they are useless either for
reconnaissance or for fighting.

Further, in War games and Staff rides it is a custom to make demands
which in practice are absolutely impossible, mostly by superior
officers who have never ridden 100 kilometres (66 miles) in a single
day.

An average of twenty to twenty-five miles a day is in practice a very
considerable performance. To demand much more of them, day in and day
out, is impracticable. On the march itself a suitable change of pace
is very necessary.

To trot hour after hour is the most fruitful source of ruin to our
horseflesh. Where it becomes necessary it is usually due to the want
of care on the part of the Leader. Much may be done to spare the
horses if we never march with considerable numbers on a single road
without absolute necessity; and when this is not to be avoided, then
we must seek to maintain an even pace throughout the column by the
intercalation of suitable distances between the several bodies;
otherwise there is a continuous hurrying up or checking of the
rearward detachments, which strains the horses to the very utmost.

One must always arrange for the halts necessary for the horses, water
them whenever opportunity offers, and never continue a movement to the
complete exhaustion of the animals. Well-timed periods of rest
increase the collective power of endurance of the horses most
materially, and as the training improves, the demands made upon them
can gradually be raised.

To bring this greater improvement into harmony with the military
requirements of the situation, next in importance to an intelligent
execution of a rational marching system comes a wise economy of forces
with regard to the performance of detached duties and patrolling. It
is particularly with the Divisional Cavalry that the lavish assignment
of orderlies and messengers to the leaders of the other Arms and to
the Infantry outposts has to be kept in check, and it must be insisted
upon that the men thus allotted should be returned punctually to their
commands, and not be employed in duties for which they are not
intended.

Thus one finds Generals who use their messengers as patrols even when
special patrols have been entrusted with this duty; others who keep
the detachments assigned to the outposts long after the outposts
themselves have been relieved. In all these things there is a
tremendous waste of energy, which must be all the more injurious the
smaller the proportion of Cavalry which can be detailed to the
Infantry Divisions.

It is a special duty of every Cavalry Commander to resist this
tendency to the utmost of his power.

Apart from the regulation of the marching column and the economy of
forces above referred to, a rational treatment of the rearward
communications, particularly with the Independent Cavalry, will go far
to maintain the troops in efficiency, and is also from the strategic
point of view an important part of the Leader's duty. The daily
despatch of numerous requisitioning detachments to great distances
weakens and diminishes the troops to an inadmissible degree, unless it
is managed with a wise foresight and on a rational system; often on
great marches it will be altogether impossible. Then the horses must
manage with what they find at their halting-places for the night. In
the case of great concentration this will be altogether insufficient.
Short rations reduce the horses very rapidly and only too thoroughly.
It is, therefore, necessary in all independent operations of great
Cavalry 'Masses' to take with one an organized and mobile supply
train, and, where circumstances require, to arrange for its defence.

The timely arrival of the supply waggons, the rational utilization of
the resources of the district, the contiguous replenishment of the
moving supply reserves, are matters which cannot be left entirely to
the Army Service Corps, but the Cavalry General must himself overlook
the whole matter, and keep the general control in his own hands. For
these arrangements must be regulated from the strategic point of view
since the power of operating at all depends essentially upon them. Of
course, the Supreme Command must lend assistance also.

In general, it will be advisable to carry with one a five to six days'
ration of corn if one is to be prepared for all emergencies. That, at
least, was the practical teaching of the War of 1870-1871. But one
must add, the further the Cavalry is separated from the masses of the
Army, and the more it renounces its communications with the latter,
the greater must be the bulk of supply it takes with it; and the
closer these supplies have to be kept to the troops, the more thorough
must be the arrangements for their protection. The latter will be of
particular importance when operating on a narrow front which favours
an enemy's outflanking endeavours, whereas wider fronts of themselves
give a certain degree of security to the rearward communications.

If we are entirely cut off from our home resources, then we must
select some point to be occupied on the flank or in the rear of the
enemy's Army, and there arrange a supply centre of our own, and make
it the point of departure for separate operations.

All means are, then, proper to accumulate in such places a sufficient
forage reserve, for the subsistence of the horses is the most
important task which falls upon the Commander. A delay in this
direction can wreck the most brilliant undertakings--jeopardize the
result even of the best executed ones. Theory does not attach
sufficient importance to the point here involved.

Thus we see that the tasks of the independent Cavalry Leader are both
many-sided and responsible. He can only then prove equal to them when
all subordinates on whom he has to count support him with the utmost
goodwill and reliability.

With this necessity a new demand is made upon him--namely, to raise
the spirit of the men he commands in such a manner that they will be
equal to the highest requirements. Only a bold, self-confident, and
active man, who everywhere sets the best example, will be able in this
manner to inspire and stimulate his command. The sum of the stimulated
individual performances brings with it also increased opportunities of
success.

Hence the last and greatest demand for the successful conduct of a
Cavalry Mass remains always the man who will inspire and stimulate the
troops under him, and thus lead them to victory.




CHAPTER VIII

PATROLS--TRANSMISSION OF REPORTS--CYCLISTS


I have already, in a former section, insisted on the fundamental
proposition that reconnaissance and security are two diametrically
opposite conceptions, and cannot on a large scale be confided to one
and the same body of troops. This conflict of purpose becomes most
evident when we come to the service of patrols in the field.

Reconnoitring patrols regulate their movements on those of the enemy.
They must keep touch with and follow him, quite irrespective of the
movement of their own side, often being compelled to creep after
him--_i.e._, to utilize intersected ground in order to avoid the
necessity of fighting.

Security patrols, on the other hand, flanking detachments, piquets,
vedettes, and the like, have to choose their position with reference
to the force it is their purpose to cover, and with which they must
remain in communication. It is their duty to attack and beat off the
enemy's patrols, as far as their strength will allow them, to prevent
these latter gaining an insight into the conditions of the marching or
resting troops whose safety they are intended to secure.

If they were to attempt to follow up their enemy to find out his
position--_i.e._, to reconnoitre--they would lose their connection
with their own troops, and endanger the security of the latter by
relinquishing the special object they are set apart to provide for.

Hence it is absolutely necessary that the two systems should be kept
separate one from the other, and that each patrol should know clearly
and distinctly for which of the two purposes it is specifically
intended. Only then can the troops in rear rely on being kept
thoroughly informed, and at the same time secure from the possible
attempts of the enemy.

The more clear and precise the mission, the more can the patrols be
relied on to execute it; but this, of course, does not exclude the
necessity for them to keep their eyes open for other things, and to
report all they may notice.

Such a systematic arrangement brings other advantages in its train. It
effects a marked economy of one's available forces, for being certain
that every mission will be settled by a special party detailed for that
purpose, it ceases to be necessary to keep on despatching fresh patrols
again and again in the same direction, a practice most detrimental to
the troops, which is constantly followed in peace-time; and it can never
happen that a body is surprised by the enemy because its scouts are
absent reconnoitring, or that it fails to receive information because
its patrols are busy with security. If, therefore, all patrols thus
naturally fall into one of these two groups--reconnoitring and security
patrols--there is still another line of distinction to be observed
between these patrols themselves, arising from the nature of the tasks
which the circumstances impose upon them.

It is impossible to lay down any distinct rules in this matter--for
War will always present new and changing problems--but broadly two
points of view must be kept in sight, which require fundamentally
different treatment, and are conditioned by our distance from the
enemy.

If the opposing forces are still engaged in preliminary approaches one
to the other, and separated by wide stretches of country, the
procedure will be altogether distinct from that to be adopted when the
outposts mutually confront one another.

Between the two extremes there are innumerable intermediate degrees,
to which one's conduct must be adapted without losing sight of the
guiding points involved.

Let us take first the period of approach, and consider the
reconnoitring problem from this aspect, taking into consideration the
broad requirements of modern War.

It will be apparent at once that there is here a double purpose to be
fulfilled--viz., to ascertain the whereabouts and direction of
movement of the elements of the enemy's main fighting force, the
primary object of all reconnaissance; and, secondly, to find the
enemy's preceding Cavalry screen, whose purpose it is, on the one
hand, to prevent our object, and, on the other hand, to conceal their
own main body. This cavalry we shall have to defeat, but we cannot
afford to await this event, but must initiate our own reconnaissance
before the decision, and endeavour to carry this through, even if the
latter prove unfavourable to us.

Hence it follows that our patrols must be systematically divided from
the first into strategical and tactical patrols, according as to
whether they are intended to find the enemy's main army or to beat his
Cavalry.

The former must not allow themselves to be held up by the enemy's
Cavalry, but must endeavour to ride through the opposing
screen--straight for the heads of the enemy's marching columns. They
must, therefore, avoid all fighting, and act by cunning and stealth,
and hence their conduct should be entrusted always to officers. They
will be directed against the probable lines of the enemy's approach,
as determined by the general strategic situation, and will further be
given all possible information as to the known whereabouts of the
enemy, together with the intentions of their own Superior Command, in
order that they may be in a position to distinguish between important
and unimportant details, and adapt their action accordingly.

That the position of heads of columns in time and place, their depths,
the flanks of the enemy's positions, extent of his outposts, districts
in which troops are quartered, the appearance of new uniforms,
indicating the presence of regiments believed to be elsewhere, etc.,
should all be carefully determined, forms part of their normal
instructions; but, in spite of that, it is very desirable to direct
their attention very particularly to all such points as are at the
moment of preponderating consequence. They must also be kept well
informed as to the mission of their neighbouring patrols, so that
under all circumstances the systematic subdivision of their several
tasks can be maintained intact.

For these patrols one must choose the best mounted officers and men
and horses, since long distances must be covered under difficult
circumstances, and it would be well to allot to each a competent
non-commissioned officer, who can carry through the task if his
Commander is killed or taken prisoner. If possible, they should also
be supplied with a concentrated horse-ration, so as to be as far as
possible independent of the resources of the country. (See Part II.,
Section I.)

As to the strength of these patrols, it will be necessary to keep
within very narrow limits, because if they are large it is difficult
for them to escape observation; on the other hand, a certain degree of
strength is necessary, because one cannot, of course, count on being
able to send back one's information by single messengers. Since it is
a prime condition of the problem that a district thoroughly commanded
by the enemy must be ridden through, the safe return of a single
messenger can never be guaranteed; hence the Commander will either be
obliged to send his reports in duplicate or triplicate, or in the last
resort fight his way through with them himself. Hence it will be
advisable to compose each party of two or three patrols, each of three
men, assigning a smart lance-corporal to each.

One officer, one non-commissioned officer, two lance-corporals, and
five men must, therefore, be considered as a fairly normal type.

The Commander can then despatch two reports, and the third he must
bring in himself, and must well consider how long it will be safe to
continue his observation, and what it is of real importance for his
superiors to know.

But he must never allow himself to be hurried into the despatch of
unimportant information. He must always keep before his mind the
essential strategical elements of the whole situation. It seems to me
altogether wrong to send off such patrols with general instructions to
keep in touch with the enemy, a common manoeuvre practice. Since
these latter generally last only a few days, there is not much
difficulty in maintaining such a system, particularly when information
is sent by single messengers. But in War everything is very different.
One would very soon have got through all one's officers and still not
be well informed. The patrols must, therefore, be told to return
within a certain time limit, and their reliefs, who are to be fully
instructed as far as the information available goes, must be
despatched before this time limit is expired. Even then we shall soon
exhaust the available supply of officers who will have been driven to
the limit of their endurance in purely strategic missions, and in the
end we shall have to fall back upon Non-commissioned Officers for
tactical observation.

This tactical reconnaissance will, in the first place, devote its
attention to the enemy's Cavalry. The patrols assigned to these duties
will attack the enemy wherever they meet him, to find out what is
going on, and as soon as possible establish a moral superiority over
them.

But even they cannot remain permanently in touch with the enemy,
because they, too, must send in their information by messenger, their
strength thus rapidly diminishing, and they, in turn, will require
relief.

If permanent observation of a yet distant enemy is necessary, we must
turn to other means. It will, then, be as well to send out whole
reconnoitring squadrons or troops (F.D.O.,[15] 128) towards the enemy,
and through them maintain a permanent tactical observation.

         [Footnote 15: Feld Dienst Ordnung.]

These serve as a patrol reserve and collecting station for
information, remaining day and night in touch with the enemy, and, of
course, will also require periodical reliefs.

It goes without saying that, in addition to these squadrons, single
patrols may be despatched in important directions from the main body
of the Cavalry, whose duty it will be to report to the latter direct.

These, again, must send off their reports by several men, whilst those
despatched from the patrols sent out by the reconnoitring squadrons
will often, owing to the shorter distance and the nearness of the
support, be able to avail themselves of the despatch riders. In
general, it cannot be insisted upon too much that the despatch rider,
so very popular in peace, can only be very occasionally employed in
War in the interval before the enemy's Cavalry is completely beaten
out of the field. In peace a man is always riding in his own country;
if he himself has not a map, he has at least been instructed from a
map, and every civilian will help him out. Even if he stumbles up
against an enemy's patrol they will generally let him pass unnoticed;
but it is quite different in War. Here even a patrol leader has rarely
got a map. The despatch rider rides across thoroughly unknown
districts, coming in contact with a foreign, perhaps hostile,
population; he cannot make himself understood, if, indeed, he is not
obliged to avoid them. The enemy's patrols are also everywhere, and if
anything happens to his horse the message does not arrive. Further,
the enormously increased distances to be traversed in modern War have
to be taken into account, and these alone render the despatch of
single horsemen a very doubtful undertaking. We must, therefore,
recognise that the conveyance of reports by individual despatch riders
is only possible under very limited conditions, and within the
districts fully controlled by one's own troops, and that even in one's
own country reconnoitring patrols sent out to a great distance can
only be very occasionally employed.

Here we come upon an increased difficulty in the whole system of
intelligence, and yet all reconnaissance is useless unless the return
of information works without a hitch. We must, therefore, endeavour to
regulate it accordingly.

Above all, the connection between the reconnoitring squadrons and the
main body by relays must be very carefully assured, and their strength
must be proportionate to the number of the enemy's patrols moving in
the district. In these cases a co-operation between Cavalry and
cyclists will be of service, whilst within the radius which we
completely command the whole rearward intelligence service, so far as
it can move upon roads, must be left as much as possible to cyclists.

_Fundamentally, no Cavalry soldier should be allowed to ride to the
rear without pressing circumstances._ This is an absolute necessity if
we are to spare our valuable and almost irreplaceable horses. Towards
these safe lines of communication all reports must be directed, in
order to be forwarded with the utmost rapidity by fresh horses or
cyclists.

If these main roads do not run as far as the reconnoitring squadrons,
in order to allow of the patrols making use of them without long
detours, then further collecting stations, protected by other troops,
must be interpolated. (F.D.O., 273.)

Occasionally the Cavalry Telegraph equipment may be of assistance, but
we must not expect too much from it in periods of rapid movement,
because since its application depends upon a number of favourable
circumstances, its value in such changing conditions is more or less
illusory.

Results obtained in manoeuvres, in my opinion, convey no correct
experience in this matter.

Another point, however, must be specially brought out--namely, the
necessity, not only of sending back information through the proper
channels, but also of forwarding all important news direct to the
principal Commander of the Cavalry or to the Army Headquarters. It is
of the utmost importance that the Headquarters in each theatre of the
War should receive information about the enemy simultaneously with
their subordinates, so that they always remain in the position to
dispose of their troops according to their own ideas, and do not find
themselves bound by instructions previously issued by their
subordinates. It is precisely this evil which made itself felt in
1870-1871. Very often the most important information never reached
Headquarters at all, and hence no action could be taken upon it.

The fault lay chiefly in the fact that the subordinates, not being
informed as to the connection of events, did not perceive the
importance of the information, and therefore did not forward it on,
and partly because the telegraph wires were overburdened by the
private messages of distinguished persons who had nothing whatever to
do with the conduct of operations.

The control of the wires for purely military purposes must, therefore,
be maintained with rigid severity, and information to Headquarters or
Army Commands must have precedence over all other business.

If collecting stations for information are not available, the
question arises, Which groups should be Authorized to report direct to
Headquarters? In my opinion this cannot be determined by the strength
of the troops concerned, but must always depend on the strategic
situation. Generally it may be laid down that the lie of the roads
must decide.

Those detachments entrusted with the reconnaissance of a single line
of road will report direct any important information gained within
their own sphere if no stronger body should be moving along the same
line, and this reporting body may, therefore, according to
circumstances, be a patrol, a regiment, or a brigade. It is desirable
from this point of view that all Cavalry officers down to patrol
leaders should be kept so thoroughly informed as to the general
situation that they may judge of the importance of the information
obtained, and hence know where to send the information they have
secured.

As the opposing Cavalries first, then the larger bodies of the Army,
approach one another the situation changes. The reconnoitring
squadrons clear the front and turn their attention to the enemy's
flanks. The advanced squadrons are withdrawn, and the larger Cavalry
bodies drawn off towards the wings of the Army, and seek shelter
behind the Infantry columns, if they have been defeated in the Cavalry
duel, or turn against flank and rear of the enemy's Army if they have
been victorious. In front of the Armies reconnaissance now falls to
the Divisional Cavalry. Here the strategical and tactical duties
coincide. What the conduct of the Independent Cavalry will be must
depend on whether it is still held in check by the enemy or not. If
the latter have been finally beaten out of the field so that one has a
free hand, then the strategic patrols will direct their attention to
the enemy's rearward communications, and will seek to determine the
approach of his reserves, but tactical reconnaissance will be directed
against his flanks.

The principles governing our conduct remain the same, only the
reconnoitring and advanced squadrons now act primarily as supports to
the strategic patrols. If, however, a decision between the two
Cavalries has not been finally arrived at, one will now endeavour to
bring it about, and for this purpose unite all available forces,
leaving meanwhile the reconnaissance to strong patrols, who in this
period of the combat must never avoid those of the enemy, for now our
object is to get information quickly, and the time for circumvention
and evasion is at an end.

When the first battle has been decided, there follows either pursuit
or retreat--operations in which the tactical reconnaissance cannot for
one moment be omitted. Then by degrees, as the defeated side succeeds
in disembarrassing itself of its pursuers, things revert to normal
conditions again. The two Armies are separated by a certain area in
depth, and a new series of operations commences, in which, as before,
reconnaissance is required.

Matters are somewhat different as regards security. Here also in
general a distinction must be drawn between safety obtained by bodies
detached in advance and that derived from piquets, etc., immediately
at hand. But too much importance cannot be laid upon the principle
that, as above pointed out, reconnaissance alone cannot suffice to
insure safety; the reconnoitring detachments must rather always be
followed by a line of security troops, so that as a general type
three lines of patrols result--viz., strategical patrols far in
advance, tactical patrols, and security patrols, which latter, when
the main body is halted, become the standing outposts.

Coming next to the measures of security necessary for Independent
Cavalry when in movement, the tactical reconnoitring patrols, by
sending in early information of the enemy, will make a far-spread line
of security patrols unnecessary. In general, the ordinary point of the
advance guard and flankers will suffice. For the latter the same holds
good which has been said in the previous section on the subject of
flanking detachments altogether--viz., that they must be worked by
sections, and arranged in a proper system of reliefs.

If the necessity arises to screen, as well as to secure--_i.e._, to
hide absolutely our movements from the enemy--then all roads leading
towards him and the section of the ground comprised between them must
be occupied in such manner that the enemy cannot find intervals at
which to break through, and this will be best attained by a system of
local patrols, tied to definite beats. These patrols must fight the
enemy wherever he appears, and must, therefore, be given sufficient
strength and be followed by small supports duly allotted to each
section of the whole front.

When the main body is stationary, the conditions are different,
because the troops require a certain time to turn out; therefore more
precautions are necessary, and the end can be best attained by placing
the patrols further to the front. Hence we arrive at a double system
of security--the first line formed by outpost squadrons, with
officers, non-commissioned officers, and small patrols, to which a
certain district to be ridden over will be assigned, and which must
maintain a systematic connection by patrols between its separate
parts, to insure absolutely the control of the ground around them; and
the second, formed of far advanced posts of observation at suitable
points--road crossings, defiles, etc.--from whence they can detect at
the earliest moment any approach of the enemy. These are indispensable
at night, when reconnaissance is always more or less liable to break
down, for darkness interferes with sight, and the horses require rest.
Their importance also increases naturally with the vicinity of the
enemy, and the consequent greater risk of surprise. In the case of the
larger bodies, whole squadrons (see F.D.O., No. 272) must be detached
for this purpose, and communication with them assured by strong relay
lines. These strong advanced detachments can, under favourable
circumstances, get shelter in villages, so that the horses at least
obtain better rest and care for a few hours, and the same applies
naturally to the reconnoitring squadrons. In all such instances the
guiding idea must be to evacuate the village the moment the enemy
appears, and evade collision with him. How this is to be managed has
been already explained (Book I., Chap. VI.). Accurate knowledge of
where all the roads lead to, the barricading of those running towards
the enemy's position, and extreme alertness on the part of the
patrols, are in such cases all-important.

Above all, the Commander must be confident in the steadiness and
coolness of his men.

As to the immediate security of the Army itself, this depends in the
first place on the Divisional Cavalry, but during the advance the
Independent Cavalry on the front and flanks guarantees this security
so thoroughly that the former can confine themselves to the most
elementary precautions, which must include primarily the maintenance
of connection with the latter for this purpose. Then they will not
only have to provide for security in the most thorough manner, but
will also have to reconnoitre, and for this purpose follow the same
rules which we have laid down for the Independent Cavalry. If the
enemy's horse prove overpowering, then they will use their power of
defence to the utmost, and seek to increase it by cyclists belonging
to the Infantry, Maxims, and Artillery, in order to beat off the enemy
with loss, and to clear the path for the reconnoitring patrols.

Speaking generally, the system I propose is in harmony with the
spirit, if not with the letter, of our Field Service Regulations, in
which the systematic distinction between reconnoitring and security,
as also between strategic and tactical patrols, is, in my opinion, not
sufficiently defined. The essential point which necessitates this
distinction has not been grasped with sufficient precision. If we are
to follow literally the wording of the Field Service Regulations, and
not the spirit which pervades it, which disregards all stereotyped
formations and keeps always the practical in view, then it would be
impossible to carry out screening operations on the scale which the
conditions of modern War will render indispensable. Sufficient stress
has not been laid on the necessary systematizing of the whole
procedure. Finally, too, much weight has been laid upon the employment
of the despatch rider (_Meldereiter_), although the experience of
1870-1871 has sufficiently shown that this system was unreliable. I
recall as an instance the pursuit of Vinoy's Corps (after Sedan), in
which case the most important report was entrusted to a despatch
rider, who only reached his destination twenty-four hours after he
was despatched, and by that time it was too late to take any action on
the information he conveyed.

The Field Service Regulations should also contain detailed
instructions as to the employment of cyclists with the Cavalry, for
the rapid development of this mode of locomotion has rendered this
absolutely indispensable. But the point must be brought out that the
use of a cyclist is always only conditional, as it depends on the
weather, the roads, and the country. On heavy, steep, and stony roads,
on which the tyres are only too apt to be punctured, the cyclists are
obliged to dismount; against a head wind they can only make progress
with difficulty. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that for the
transmission of reports from the advanced lines, as well as for
communication between separated bodies of troops within the district
controlled by our Cavalry, they are of inestimable service. Granted
that in particularly unfavourable weather and bad roads they must be
supplemented by Cavalry, they, nevertheless, on the whole, make it
possible to expedite materially the delivery of despatches. This is of
all the greater importance because in case of War the German Armies
will be relatively weak in Cavalry, and under certain circumstances
they will have to fight against a great numerical superiority.

Even though the principal use of the cyclists lies in the transmission
of information in which they can help the Divisional Cavalry most
materially, nevertheless one must not base too sanguine hopes on their
activity.

The reason is that because of their wheels they are tied to the roads,
and in consequence they can neither reconnoitre nor provide for
security independently. If for these purposes Cavalry patrols are
attached to them, the chief advantage of their greater mobility is
sacrificed, but without such supports in difficult country they are
tolerably helpless against surprise attacks. If one further takes into
account that a hill takes off from their speed to such a degree that a
horseman can easily catch them up, one must admit that they afford no
sufficient guarantee for the fulfilment of independent missions
outside of the country which our own Cavalry commands. In such
districts they can only be employed on relays, as already pointed out.
Here the duty of providing safety can best be fulfilled by the
Cavalry, because it is not a question of rapid advance, but only of
the protection of stationary posts and certain defined road stretches.
But for the defence of these posts, and for the transmission of
intelligence, the cyclists will do even better service than the
horsemen, because they can cover the ground faster, and when fighting
are not hampered by their horses. Their employment here is all the
more desirable because the relay service makes enormous demands upon
the Cavalry. That was proved up to the hilt in the War of 1870-1871;
the complaints under this head repeat themselves over and over again,
as the records of the Campaign abundantly testify.

Besides, on these relay duties the cyclists can be tactically employed
in the district which our Cavalry by its patrols commands, for the
rapid occupation of far-advanced posts which neither Cavalry nor
Infantry can reach with sufficient celerity and in adequate force; for
the defence of defiles lying to our rear, which must be kept open to
secure the retreat of the Cavalry; for the support of Independent
Cavalry on outpost duty, particularly at night; and for other similar
purposes. To satisfy all these conditions, these cyclist detachments
require a sufficient tactical training, but in times of peace one sees
in this respect feats performed whose impracticability in War are
glaringly apparent. For instance, men keep their cycles with them
right up in the firing line, and when they want to retreat or break
off the fight they try to mount under fire. As they are generally tied
to the roads, they then file off to the flanks. I have, indeed, often
seen Cyclist detachments lay down their cycles in the front of the
position, and then advance to mount them again in the teeth of the
enemy's fire. All these kind of things are absurd. The cycles must be
treated like the led horses of the Cavalry--that is to say, the men
must dismount under cover, then move up to the firing line, and then
move back to cover in order to mount again. The position must,
moreover, be so chosen as to enable them to move off without exposing
themselves. All these points, which in practice are rendered
difficult, diminish very materially the usefulness of cyclists, and
take away from them, above all, their power of offence; and in all
missions entrusted to them these limitations must be carefully kept in
mind.




II

ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING




CHAPTER I

NUMBERS

ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING


When we take into consideration the conditions of modern Warfare, as I
have endeavoured in the foregoing pages to develop them--the numerical
strength of modern Armies; the numerous formations of Artillery and
Infantry set on foot on the outbreak of hostilities; the area of
future theatres of operations--when, further, we consider how many
important tasks await the Cavalry from the moment when the first shot
is fired, and how the most important of these, as I have endeavoured
to establish, can only be dealt with satisfactorily by the employment
of Cavalry 'Masses,' the conviction must force itself home to every
mind that our German Cavalry is numerically inadequate to meet even
the principal demands the future must make upon it.

If, further, we reflect that, owing to causes which it would be out of
place to deal with in these pages at length, it is precisely upon our
Cavalry that the role of fighting against crushing numerical
superiority must devolve, this conviction must give rise to the
gravest anxiety, more especially when it is remembered that the
difficulty of securing a supply of reinforcements adequate for the
performance of our duties is greater with the Cavalry than with any
other Arm. A few days' training at a pinch will turn out an Infantry
soldier or gunner, whose presence need not necessarily be either
dangerous or even detrimental to the efficiency of his company or
battery. An unbroken horse or a bad rider may create confusion in the
ranks of the steadiest squadron.

The danger is still further aggravated by the fact that a rapid
reduction in their available numbers is certain to take place, owing
to the increased demands which the future must make upon the endurance
of our horsemen, and presumably also the heavier losses they will be
called upon to suffer in action, both of which must be intensified in
proportion as their numerical inadequacy for the tasks incurring on
them increases. Germany is certainly comparatively well supplied with
horses; but owing to the demands of the aforesaid new formations,
which must be set on foot immediately on the declaration of
hostilities, upon the complement of animals fit for War purposes
within our own frontiers, the country will be practically denuded, and
only those horses still too young or those too old for the field will
be left behind.

Even among those classified as 'fit for War' but few are fit for
Cavalry purposes. Riding horses good enough for the Infantry and
Train--even for the Artillery--may, no doubt, be found; but equal to
the requirements made on the Cavalry horse there are but few indeed,
and even this number is diminishing yearly. As regards the supply from
foreign sources, this must depend on the political situation--i.e., on
conditions which lie beyond our control. Even when these conditions
are favourable, horses cannot be usefully drafted into the ranks
without prolonged training and breaking to fit them for their new
duties. Hence the conclusion is inevitable that the numerical strength
of our Cavalry, already, as I have shown, so inadequate, must fall off
very rapidly at the commencement of a campaign, because its rapid
reinforcement with satisfactory material is, under the circumstances,
quite out of the question.

From this conclusion there is no escape; and in view of the increased
importance I have above assigned to the due performance of all Cavalry
duties, its recognition carries with it, as its corollary, the
absolute need for the numerical augmentation of this branch of the
service.

The enormous mechanism of our modern Armies can only work normally and
successfully when its constituent 'power factors'--_i.e._, the three
Arms--have been apportioned with due regard to the work to be
accomplished. If driving-power fails any one portion, the danger lies
near that at some critical moment the whole apparatus will suffer in
sympathy, and fail to respond to the strain it is called upon to
endure.

The question of this increase in the Cavalry has, indeed, often before
been raised, but never with the weight of concentrated conviction the
situation, in my opinion, deserves. For the most part, only expedients
to avoid the bitter necessity of a serious augmentation have been
suggested. Thus it has been proposed to form new regiments of four
squadrons each by taking away from the existing ones their fifth
squadron, and the suggestion has been supported by an appeal to the
fact that in War-time only four squadrons per regiment take the field.

No expert, however, can fail to agree with Lieutenant-General von
Pelet-Narbonne, who maintains in his 'Cavalry Regiments of Four
Squadrons' (_Kreuz Zeitung_, January 17, 1899) that such a measure
would entail the ruin of our Cavalry, and would destroy with one blow
all that the reorganizations of 1859 and 1860 have done for the War
efficiency of our regiments by entailing a depreciation of the value
of the squadrons at the very moment when called on to move out and
face the enemy.

Thus he writes: 405 squadrons are in Peace retained on the lower
establishment of 133, or the middle one of 137. Their numbers are 170
of the former, 235 of the latter, and the War strength averages 150
per squadron. To attain this figure those on the lower establishment
need 17 horses, those on the middle 13.

With no fifth squadron to draw upon for horses, as at present, these
vacancies would have to be filled by 'augmentation horses'--_i.e._,
animals straight from the country, thoroughly raw and unaccustomed to
work under the rider, often also of inferior quality. But these 13 to
17 horses per squadron by no means exhaust the situation. The field
squadrons must leave their youngest remounts--say 15 in number--still
too young and unbroken, behind them; for the experiences of the last
War proved abundantly that where this precaution was neglected the
greater part of them broke down under the hardships of the Campaign.
Taking even the most favourable time of year for mobilization--viz.,
in May--then out of the 15 young remounts of good material, and with
careful choice, not more than 8 will be found fit for the ranks; the
remainder will have to be left behind with the 'Depot' squadron, to
be sent on afterwards. Any other procedure would only lead to the
useless sacrifice of these valuable young animals. The places of the
horses thus left behind will, therefore, also have to be filled by
augmentation horses, thus bringing the number of these up to 24 and 20
respectively.

Then we still have to provide for the wants of the Depot squadron,
which has to train the recruits, and for these a further number of
trained horses, averaging 32, must be left behind, or another 8 from
each squadron; and, finally, another 2 per squadron will be required
for Staff orderlies and Staff guard duties.

According to this calculation, the Field squadron would have to move
out with from 34 to 30 augmentation horses (the sixty squadrons on the
higher establishment with 27).

The matter, however, presents a totally different appearance when in
peace five squadrons are in existence, of which one remains behind as
a depot. Taking away the 35 horses for recruits, and following our
previous calculation of 7 young remounts, there would remain on the
lower establishment 91 efficient horses to be divided amongst the
other four squadrons, or 23 each, so that these would take the field
with only 11, 7, or 4 'augmentation horses,' according to the
respective peace establishments of the regiments. With these numbers
the squadron suffers no reduction of its efficiency, for these few can
always be employed--in the squadron carts, etc.--at any rate, need not
be in the ranks.

These figures, worked out in the spring of 1899, are still
substantially correct, and it appears to me General von Pelet-Narbonne
deals too leniently with this proposal for forming the fifth squadrons
into new regiments, because many of the calls made on the squadrons
are even heavier than he assumes; besides, there are always in every
squadron some inefficient or sick horses, which will presently have to
be cast. Further, I consider it impracticable to take eight remounts
into the field, for these young animals are by no means equal to the
demands which modern conditions must make upon them from the very
first days of mobilization.

Hence the number of augmentation horses will be considerably increased
above General von Pelet's estimate, but he is unquestionably correct
in his opinion that a large number of these untrained animals will
exercise a more detrimental influence under existing conditions than
formerly, when, after completed mobilization, the squadrons often had
a considerable time in hand to weld into cohesion their constituent
elements. Nowadays the regiments will be rapidly forwarded to the
front by rail, and from the very commencement of hostilities the
fullest demands will be made on their efficiency. Unbroken horses, and
others not trained to the long gallops and trots of to-day, cannot
possibly carry weights of from 230 to 240 pounds for many hours a day
straight across country. After a very short spell most of the
augmentation horses would be useless, and their presence would only
have brought confusion and unsteadiness into the ranks of their
squadrons.

These disadvantages might indeed be partially mitigated if the
squadrons were raised in Peace to their full War establishment and
somewhat above it--say to 160 horses. But, on the one hand, this would
mean a not inconsiderable increase in the Cavalry; on the other, our
Peace conditions would be difficult to adapt to such an organization.
Without going closer into these details, it will be sufficient to
point out that all our barracks and riding-schools are designed for
five squadrons; and further, that we do not need numerically stronger
regiments, but a greater number, in order to satisfy all requirements.

Hence, if it is admitted that swamping our squadrons with thirty or
more augmentation horses must diminish most seriously the efficiency
of our Cavalry, then it follows that a still further increase in their
number will make matters still worse. Such proposals have no doubt
been made, and it certainly would be convenient if our Cavalry could
thus easily on mobilization be increased by one-third to one-half its
strength; but after what has been said, above all such suggestions
must be seen to be impracticable, for squadrons which consisted, for
instance, of one-half augmentation horses would be simply useless for
War purposes. A proceeding, therefore, which brought such results in
its train would imply no increase of the Arm, but rather the
destruction of the existing standard of Peace-time efficiency.

Even as Divisional Cavalry such squadrons would be useless, for these
require good individual horsemanship even more than those of the
Independent Division for the performance of their special duties, and
the necessary standard can never be attained with untrained horses.

All who put forward proposals of this nature are labouring under the
dominion of a fundamental fallacy. They overlook the fact I have
explained in the foregoing section, that Cavalry by its very nature
can never be other than a highly-specialized Arm, and hence that the
system adopted by the Infantry of raising the cadres to War strength
by the absorption of reserve men is for the Cavalry fundamentally
impossible. For in the Infantry the ranks are filled by the addition
of trained men; in the Cavalry they must be completed with untrained
horses, and the untrained horses break down under service conditions
much more rapidly than the men.

Our experience in 1870-1871 was conclusive on this point. Already
towards the end of August--_i.e._, in less than six weeks from the
outbreak of the War--the greater part of the augmentation horses were
quite useless for field purposes. If one looks up the reports in the
War Archives, everywhere this complaint about the untrained animals is
recurrent.

From all the above-mentioned circumstances it must be clear that a
numerical increase in the Cavalry is most urgently called for, and in
my opinion it would be best if this indispensable increase, the need
for which is becoming apparent even to public opinion, were grafted
upon the existing five-squadron system, which at least guarantees a
certain amount of preparation of the augmentation horses, without
entailing the reduction of the squadrons below the minimum standard
necessary for efficiency. I would, however, be willing to support any
other method which would give a sensible increase in the Cavalry
strength of our Peace establishment, and only protest against any
scheme which would seek to swell out the ranks or create new units on
mobilization; for all these are mere self-delusion, increasing, no
doubt, the numbers on paper, but in reality striking at the efficiency
of the Arm in the most vital manner.

If, then, at the moment there may be conditions outside my ken which
render a measure of the nature I have indicated impracticable, we
must, nevertheless, not close our eyes to the fact that, after the
recent reorganization of the Artillery, the creation of an adequate
number of Cavalry regiments in the nearest future is an absolute
necessity, and that in the meanwhile any such palliative as a recourse
to the cadre system must be absolutely rejected.

As an indispensable complement of the proposal to form new regiments,
so that we shall not be compelled to fall back on an inferior class of
horse to meet their requirements, and at the same time to insure as
far as possible a supply of suitable remounts to replace our losses in
War, further encouragement of horse-breeding operations in our own
territories is most urgently called for. This can only be attained by
a further reasonable increase in the price paid for remounts.[16]

         [Footnote 16: In passing, I may note that some portions of
         Lorraine are amongst the richest in horseflesh in all
         Germany. Here, by the introduction of suitable stallions, an
         excellent Artillery horse might be bred; but nothing is being
         done in this direction.]

Such a measure must form a preliminary to the coming increase of the
Arm, and the sooner it is undertaken the better will be the result.

These points of view cannot be insisted upon too vehemently, since
even in Military circles they have not everywhere received the
consideration they deserve, and it is most necessary that public
opinion, which finds its ultimate expression within the walls of the
Reichstag, should receive adequate instruction as to the vital
interests involved.

In any case, the difficulties attending any adequate increase of our
Cavalry must not be underrated, and we must remain prepared to face
the strain of a European Campaign with a strength inadequate for the
difficult and most momentous problems we shall be called on to
face--problems which, according to the measure of success or the
reverse attending their solution, will exercise the most far-reaching
consequences on the whole course of the War.

Under all circumstances we shall have to endeavour to attain at least
that measure of success which the Army Headquarters unconditionally
require to render possible their own effective operations.

Superior energy and skill in the conduct of our operations,
concentration of our forces, increased care for the maintenance both
of the moral and material in our Commands, increased boldness in our
undertakings, together with wise moderation in the choice of our
objectives, must all help to compensate for our numerical weakness,
and while consciously leaving on one side everything not directly
conducive to our immediate purpose, we must seek to appear at the
psychological moment, and from the decisive direction, with forces in
hand, and by the energetic use of the relative and local superiority
such concentration confers, to gain and keep an advantage to the end
of the campaign. The higher, however, the demands which, with this
purpose in view, we are compelled to make on the moral, physical, and
material strength of the troops, the more we are justified in
demanding that, at least as regards organization and training, they
shall be equal to all demands modern conditions may impose upon them.
If in these points we have no sufficient security guaranteeing the
highest possible performances, it would be impossible to count even on
the most necessary results in time of War.

The question, then, arises whether from these points of view our
German Cavalry is equal to the maximum strain it may be called on to
endure.

As concerns our organization, there is a widespread demand that those
commands which form the basis of our War organization--_i.e._, the
Cavalry Divisions--should exist already in Peace as concrete units;
and in support of this it is urged that men and leaders must know each
other mutually if the full effect of their combined power is to be
realized in War. It is also held that if once these Divisions were
definitely formed, then as a consequence of their existence they would
more frequently be brought together for manoeuvres on a large scale,
to the benefit of the tactical training of all concerned.

It appears to me that the real centre of gravity in this question of
organization lies less in this permanent constitution of the Division
in Peace than people generally imagine.

The requirement that leaders and men should know one another I cannot
accept as an indispensable condition of War-time efficiency. However
desirable it may appear that such a relation should exist, it is one
which has never been, and never can be, guaranteed in War. The
practicable ideal rather consists in this, that the principles in
accordance with which the commands are handled should be so thoroughly
flesh and blood of both leaders and led, that under all circumstances
a sufficient result is secure. To reach this ideal is the true purpose
of our training.

In the permanent existence of Divisions it seems to me there is great
danger that such a guarantee for their successful employment would be
sacrificed.

We have seen that the demands likely to be made on the Cavalry require
widely different arrangement of the disposable forces; that this
requirement increases in importance as the Arm falls numerically
beneath the needs of the situation, and that only a most adaptable
organization can deal adequately with the emergencies this numerical
insufficiency may entail. Hence it is to be feared that a permanent
constitution in Divisions might lose this requisite adaptability, and,
however highly we may appreciate the advantages of a firmly welded War
organization, one should never allow the form to interfere with the
practical application of the means--_i.e._, never allow the troops to
become so rigid as to hamper their employment in the field. But this
is just what would happen if the Divisions were maintained on a
permanent War footing.

Every application of Cavalry Masses requires a certain measure of
drill control, because it depends always on the movement of closed
bodies of troops, and if the Cavalry Divisions are constantly drilled
together under the same Leader in Peace, there is at least a very
great risk that this certain degree of drill control, which we
recognise as indispensable, will degenerate into hard-and-fast
prescription, since the Leader has always the same number of units at
his disposal, and will thus by degrees habituate himself to consider
these as invariable quantities in the solution of every tactical
problem.

Our experiences with the Regulations for 1876 show that this danger is
by no means imaginary, for by the constant practice of the so-called
'Three-Line Tactics' we had already progressed far on the downward
path which leads to tactical destruction. If the 'Form' would not fit
the conditions, so much the worse for the conditions. Fortunately,
thanks to subsequent changes, we have shed the worst of these
tendencies, and are on the high-road towards freer and more adaptable
tactical formations, but to me it seems that any attempt to fetter
this progress by the adoption of a more or less rigid organization can
only result in evil for the whole Arm. Rather should we lay down as a
fixed principle that all Cavalry units must be able both to move and
fight according to the same tactical principles, no matter in what
order these units may be grouped together.

The question now arises whether our present formation of six regiments
to a Division is really equal to all demands which may be made upon
it; whether, in fact, in view of the strategical requirements it may
be called on to fulfil, and the degree of resistance to their
execution it is likely to encounter, six regiments will prove
numerically equal to their task.

Considered in relation to the enormous Armies of the present day, and
the still greater possibilities a general call to arms of a whole
nation may involve, six regiments represent a very small actual factor
of strength. If they should have to take the field for an independent
mission, it would not even be possible to keep them all together. The
protection of the flanks, and of the necessary baggage and supply
trains, the far-reaching reconnaissances, and the need for extended
requisitions, all unite to compel the creation of detachments, which
in the aggregate must make considerable inroads on the total strength.
Then there is the inevitable tale of losses on the march, the
necessity for subdivision of one's forces for the passage or the
turning of defiles; in fact, the demands are so many that the true
fighting body of the Division--_i.e._, the squadrons available for the
ultimate decisive shock--is represented by a very small fraction of
its original forces. If a complete Division can place only 3,600
sabres in the field, or, dismounted, from 1,680 to 3,000 rifles,
according to the number of horse-holders required--figures which even
without the above-mentioned detachments are quite inconsiderable in
relation to what even an inconsiderable Infantry opponent can bring
into action--what prospect of success is there for the weakened
Independent Division in the execution of quite minor operations, when
even in 1870-1871, not once, but frequently, the main body of our
Cavalry Divisions shrank often to six or seven weak squadrons.

It is chiefly the consequences of our, on the whole, satisfactory
experiences in the above Campaign which have led us to accept the
existing Division of six regiments as a satisfactory solution of this
problem of strength; but we forget that in those days we had no
Cavalry opponent to encounter, and that our sphere of action, owing to
the want on our side of an adequate equipment of firearms, was small
indeed in comparison with what we must expect in the future. We are
encouraged in our illusion by the fact that in our Peace manoeuvres
the strength of the opposing forces is generally nearly equal, and
also because the actual demands War will make upon the Arm are still
in these exercises very imperfectly realized, and from the nature of
the case cannot receive full recognition. Further, there is the fact
that our possible opponents have adopted the same organization, and
last, but not least, there remains the view that every tactical unit
of the Cavalry must not only be capable of being strategically
employed as a whole, but must also be in point of size within the
control of its Leader as a tactical unit.

Our unfortunate experiences with larger formations in 1866 are often
cited in favour of our present system, the point being ignored that it
was not the size of these bodies, but the faulty methods in which
they were employed, both strategically and tactically, that led to our
disappointment.

I think, therefore, that unprejudiced consideration must come to the
conclusion that our Divisions as they now exist are too weak for the
many and most decisive operations they will be called on to undertake.
The absolute necessity to secure the victory over the enemy's Cavalry
at the decisive point under all circumstances, and at the same time to
retain a sufficient force in hand to reap all the consequences of that
victory, will, I am convinced, lead to a materially greater
concentration of power in the single unit.

If from this point of view the permanent constitution of Cavalry
Divisions cannot be upheld, it follows that even less is to be said
for the formation of still stronger units in Peace-time, for this
measure would entail in even greater degree the very same strategical
and tactical limitations we have noted in the case of the Divisions,
and still further cramp the necessary adaptability of the organization
to meet the conditions of our Peace-time training. At the same time,
it is clear that it is of the utmost importance that the formation of
these stronger formations, Corps, or Divisions of greater numerical
strength, the necessity for which can be recognised in advance, should
be arranged for in the mobilization plans, and not built up afterwards
by the mere combination of existing Divisions.

For such bodies cannot be improvised altogether. In order to develop
their full efficiency they require a carefully selected and ample
staff of men who can be trusted to pull well together, and who have at
their disposal all the auxiliary services necessary for greater
independent operations. For these both trains and columns are needed,
which must be larger than those of two or even three single Divisions;
for, on the one hand, the greater size of the Corps entails closer
concentration of its units, thus making heavier demands on the
provision columns; and, on the other, the Corps must be capable of
carrying out longer and more obstinate engagements than a single
Division.

It is, therefore, most essential that the several Staffs required for
the Corps to be created in War-time should be thoroughly trained so as
to insure their working together, and the trains and columns necessary
to complete these units should be held ready for them in time of
Peace.[17]

         [Footnote 17: In a report addressed to H.M. the King in 1868
         by General von Moltke on the experiences deduced from the
         events of 1866, it is proposed that there should be at Army
         Headquarters the Staff of a Cavalry Corps Command, together
         with its necessary Administrative services, always ready for
         the field. As Field Marshal he returns to the idea in another
         place, adding, 'particularly when we have found the right
         "Murat" to lead it' (Moltke's 'Militarische Werke,' II.,
         Second Part, First Group, B).]

To hand over the functions of Corps Commander to the senior of the two
or three Divisional Commanders would hardly be an adequate means of
securing satisfactory results even for a single day of battle; still
less could it suffice in the case of an independent strategic
operation. On the other hand, it is not at all essential that the
Corps thus formed at the outset of operations should be retained
intact throughout their whole period. One can make detachments from
them, or reinforce them according to circumstances, and thus attain
that very flexibility of organization which I have endeavoured to
prove to be an absolutely indispensable factor to meet the conditions
of our times.

It appears to me also that the same advantage which it is hoped to
realize by the creation of permanent Divisions can be reached by other
roads, and with still better results.

I would divide the whole territory of the German Empire into a number
of territorial districts, and call them Cavalry Inspections, or
Corps--the name is immaterial--each to comprise about twenty
regiments, and subdivide these again into sub-Inspections (_i.e._,
Divisions and Brigades), and thus obtain, not only the foundations and
the Staffs for a practical War formation, but for a systematic
preparation of the Arm in time of Peace. The Inspections would detail
annually the necessary squadrons on a War strength for manoeuvres of
the three Arms, according to a changing roster, and hold special
Cavalry manoeuvres in a manner I propose to develop hereafter.

We should thus, from the point of view of organization, gain the
advantage of having the cadres for both Corps and Divisions ready in
time of Peace, without being bound once for all to a hard-and-fast
strength for the Division.

It may be objected that it would be illogical to separate the Cavalry
from the Army Corps and Divisional Commands at the very moment that we
have assigned the whole of the Artillery to the Infantry Divisions,
but for the latter Arm the conditions are quite different. It always
fights in combination with the other Arms; by itself it cannot fight
at all.

The Cavalry, on the other hand, as regards its principal masses, is
quite independent, and only occasionally in moments of crisis
intervenes in the action of the other Arms, even then still as an
independent unit. The connection with the remainder of the Army would
be sufficiently secured by its participation in the annual manoeuvres
of the three Arms, and, as at present, Cavalry Brigade Commanders
would still have to be employed in the arrangement of the Brigade
manoeuvres. The participation of the Cavalry Regiments in the Garrison
Field Service exercises would remain matter of arrangement between the
respective Commands, but definite rules would have to be drawn up to
secure their effective co-operation.

The necessary trains for the Inspections and Divisions would be kept
ready in time of Peace, and, whether Horse Artillery--possibly also
Maxim guns--should be permanently allotted to them or otherwise, might
remain open for further discussion, though there is undoubtedly much
to be urged in favour of the suggestion.

In this manner I believe an organization could be created which would
meet all reasonable requirements. Certain new Staffs, fully equipped
with both General Staff Officers and those necessary for the
contemplated trains, etc., would be of course necessary, for in case
of War such creations cannot be improvised to work together without
most detrimental friction for any units, and least of all for those
which from the first moment of hostilities will be called on for
decisive action, and thus have less time and opportunity to shake down
into their new duties.

A practical Peace Organization, such as in fact we do not at present
possess, is a necessity of the first importance. But 'Mobility' in the
Arm itself remains the prime condition of efficiency in its
strategical activity, which, as we have seen above, must henceforward
be considered the most important sphere of its duties.

To secure this mobility is, therefore, our unconditional duty, and it
is in this direction in particular that, in my opinion, our Cavalry is
as yet hardly sufficiently prepared for the tasks that await it.

Strategical 'mobility' certainly depends in the first place on the
excellence of the horse supply and the suitable 'training' both of man
and horse; but the tactical independence of the troops themselves, and
the means of maintaining them in condition--_i.e._, conditions of
supply--are at least of equal importance. Owing to our experiences in
the French Campaign, where food and fodder were generally abundant,
sufficient attention has not been given universally to this factor.
Had we been compelled to undergo the same hardships as the Russians in
1877-1878, our views would doubtless have been very different.

The amount of forage that even under most favourable circumstances can
be carried on the horses is very small. To count on finding even that
amount always in the country through which we may have to operate
would be more than imprudent. Even in 1870-1871 we could not always
find what we needed in spite of the very favourable agricultural
conditions, and with the enormous Armies of the present day we shall
probably find the country even more exhausted of supplies than
formerly, particularly in the latter phases of the struggle, except
when one has the good-fortune to fall upon rich stretches of the
country which by chance may have escaped the devastation of previous
operations.

We may also be called on to work in sparsely settled districts with a
large export trade in corn, in which at times stocks may sink very
low. In short, unless we wish to be hampered at every step of our
movements by the necessity for wide-reaching foraging expeditions, we
shall have to rely upon our magazines and the supplies which can be
transmitted from them to the front through the agency of our supply
columns. The carrying capacity and mobility of the latter, therefore,
condition inexorably the degree of mobility in strategical operations
which, under all circumstances, the Cavalry can be counted on to
develop. Whoever relies on more will lay himself open to most bitter
disappointments exactly at the decisive moments.

The supply trains must, therefore, be able to march at least as fast
as the troops themselves, for only on this condition is there any
guarantee that even under difficult circumstances the necessary
supplies will be forthcoming; yet though experience most abundantly
demonstrates the difficulties of maintaining the supplies of the
Infantry in spite of the fact that, as a rule, their columns can cover
the ground faster than the men can march, there appears to be a tacit
assumption that with the Cavalry the trains will always arrive in
time, although they move far slower than the troops they follow and
supply.

There was, indeed, a certain amount of justification for this idea in
the days when Cavalry were more or less tied to the movements of the
rest of the Army; but nowadays, when Cavalry operates independently,
and must cover long distances in the shortest time, it has become
simply preposterous.

We have only to consider that we have now to reckon with average daily
marches of from twenty-five to thirty miles, and that a beaten or
evading force may have to retrace the same distance, perhaps even on
the very same day, at a much faster rate than that at which it
advanced, to perceive its absurdity. What chance would there be for
waggons which could not go out of a walk, and cannot reverse on the
road itself, which check at every hill, and sink to the axles in mud
or sand? How can strategically independent Cavalry provide for the
security of its baggage when it must often be left some days' marches
behind? And yet it is precisely when operating against an active
opposing Cavalry or an insurgent population that protection for the
baggage becomes most indispensable. Again, how are such trains to be
cleared away from the front when the main bodies of the two armies are
closing on one another for battle? or how, after it is decided, can
they be brought forward again to follow their Cavalry in pursuit, and
convey to it the supplies which in such moments it will most need, and
on whose prompt arrival its striking radius will depend? How, with
insufficient mobility, will they maintain the connection between the
combatants in front and the standing magazines, or even with the
movable supply depots following behind the marching Army?

Here we come upon one of the most difficult problems of the day, and
it cannot be insisted on too strongly that its solution during Peace
is an indispensable condition of the efficiency of the Arm in War. The
Cavalry trains must be organized in such a manner that they will be
able to march at least as fast as the Cavalry itself, and be adequate
in number to carry from five to six days' corn. Only when this demand
has been complied with will it be possible to count on the attainment
of the strategical independence at which we aim, and to attempt all
that this implies with less would only lead to the complete breakdown
of the Arm, which, as we have already seen, under existing conditions,
can never be efficiently replaced during the same Campaign.

It is not alone with the splendid chaussees of France that we must
reckon, but with the sand roads of East and West Prussia, the swamps
of Poland and Russia, and so forth, on all of which the same degree of
mobility must be developed, for the speed of the Cavalry itself is
practically independent of the nature of the roads. Without going
further into the detailed measures necessary to attain this ideal, the
importance of which must be evident to every practical soldier. I
would call attention to only one fundamental consideration: the desire
to curtail the length of supply columns by concentrating the loads,
with the object of lessening the congestion of the roads and
diminishing the time needed to bring their contents to the troops, is
sound as long as it attains its object, fatal everywhere else.[18]

         [Footnote 18: Generally defeats its own object; the heavy
         load destroys the roads, causes breakdowns and delays, etc.]

Now, the Cavalry Masses move under different conditions to the rest of
the Army. Either they are in the front of or on the flanks; in the
latter case, they have roads at their own disposal, in the former,
being generally some days' march in advance, they clear the front when
collision is imminent by moving to the flanks, and only quite
exceptionally retire through the advancing columns, and in all cases
they must be able to get off the roads quickly. The depth of these
columns is comparatively unimportant.

Hence, from the strategical relations of the Cavalry Masses to the
rest of the Army there arises no particular reason to endeavour to
shorten their trains. If the heavy baggage of a Cavalry Division is
two and a half or five kilometres in length it is tolerably
immaterial, but it is imperative, as we have seen, that they should be
able to move and get out of the way. Hence, it is not the number of
waggons which concerns us, but their individual lightness and
mobility, so that on all roads they can follow their units at a trot,
and only in the case of Divisional Cavalry can the other point of view
be admitted.

The possibility must also not be overlooked that it may not always be
practical for Cavalry masses to fill up their supply columns direct
from the Army reserves; and to meet this, second echelons of waggons
will be required, in every degree as mobile as the first, and so
organized as to require a minimum escort for their safety.

For such escorts Cavalry Reservists and men of the Landwehr exist in
adequate numbers, and armed with a useful carbine and mounted on
horses, only as a means of locomotion, they will answer their purpose
well enough.

No matter, however, how ample the supply of these columns may be, or
how mobile, circumstances will still arise during periods of great
concentration in which it will be impossible to bring up supply
waggons in sufficient numbers. In these cases we require an emergency
horse ration, which within a small compass contains great nourishment.

Too much cannot be expected from such a ration; for instance, it
cannot be bulky enough to fill the animal's stomach. All that is
necessary is that it should be willingly eaten by the horses, keep
well, and be easily carried. It should contain about three times the
nutritive qualities, weight for weight, of oats, and should suffice to
keep horses in condition for three or four days in succession. These
demands are fairly satisfied by a food manufactured by Marck at
Darmstadt. It should be always carried in the field and replenished as
consumed, and with it even the most advanced patrols might be made
independent of requisitions, a matter which appears to me of the
greatest importance.

The fundamental condition of mobility being thus satisfied, the next
step will be to insure the technical and tactical independence of the
units under all circumstances which can be reasonably foreseen.

In this direction much has been done, and materials for the
destruction of railways, folding pontoons, and a field telegraph, now
form part of our equipment. The opportunities for the use of the
latter in the course of rapid movements--_i.e._, just in the most
important sphere of our activities--seem to me highly problematical,
as I have already pointed out; and the waggons which transport the
bridging equipment are too heavy to be always at hand when most
needed. Essentially, it seems only fitted to facilitate the progress
of smaller bodies of troops, and would hardly suffice to secure rapid
and safe passage of Cavalry Masses with all their attendant trains
over the rivers for which we ought to be prepared. For such purposes
they would only suffice if all the boats of a whole Division were
united into one bridging train.

Nevertheless, the collapsible boats are a most useful concession, and
they would be still more so if the load was more suitably subdivided;
as it is, the weight of the whole waggon ties us too much to the made
roads. For the Divisional Cavalry, which always moves in close
connection with the Infantry, and in need can always fall back upon
the Divisional Bridge Train, it has no particular value, and it would
therefore be better if, in War-time, all the collapsible boat
equipment were handed over to the independent Cavalry Divisions, and
their bridging equipment thus augmented.

More important, however, than this collapsible boat question is the
matter of the pioneer detachments to be assigned to the Cavalry
Divisions which require further equipment. A waggon of bridging
material just sufficient to cross smaller ditches and watercourses,
which can neither be jumped nor scrambled over, but which require only
one, or at most two, bays, would be invaluable, for it is just these
little hindrances, whose importance cannot be measured or deduced from
the map, which may bring most important Cavalry undertakings
unexpectedly to a check, particularly when in an enemy's country all
the culverts, etc., have been destroyed. In the days of Frederick the
Great such bridging equipment was often assigned to the Cavalry
marching at the head of the Columns, in order to help them over
similar obstacles.

Given, however, that all has been done to attain the degree of
collective mobility we require, a point of equal importance is that
the troops should be adequately provided with all they require for
their tactical action. In this respect, it cannot be too much insisted
upon that carbine ammunition should be placed in the very first line;
our present allowance is altogether insufficient.

The importance of dismounted action, as we have already seen, has
enormously increased. Almost daily, under certain conditions, we shall
have to have recourse to our firearms, and often be obliged to expend
very considerable quantities of ammunition to attain the object we
fight for. The replenishment of this consumption is far more difficult
in our case than with the Infantry, particularly in operations
partaking of the nature of raids, in which our communications are
likely to be interrupted. These conditions require first of all a
considerable increase in the number of rounds carried on the man's
person, and also in the number of Small Arm Ammunition waggons
attached to the units, and the regulations for the replenishment of
these require also corresponding development.

Further, it must be pointed out with all possible insistence that the
present equipment of the trooper is thoroughly impracticable. That the
carbine should be carried on the horse and the sword on the man is
opposed to common sense, for the latter is only of use when mounted,
the former only on foot. The sword should, therefore, be attached to
the saddle, the carbine to the man, as is, in fact, the practice of
all races of born horsemen. A practicable method of attachment is
certainly capable of being devised; it is probably only the question
of expense that stands in the way of its solution. The consequences,
however, of the existing attachment to the saddle are that the weapon
must be shorter than that of the Infantry soldier, and hence has a
lesser range; but it is precisely the Cavalry that requires to be able
to obtain good results at long ranges. Even against Infantry it must
always be in a position to obtain decisive results in the shortest
time. To obtain these ends it needs a weapon at least equal, if
possible superior, to that of the Infantry; and instead it has only
the carbine, a weapon of most restricted range, and most inadequately
sighted. It is required of Cavalry that it should break off an
engagement when the enemy approaches within 700 metres (Drill
Regulations, No. 562), and all the training the man gets in Peace is
at 600 metres at target practice, and only quite occasionally, if at
all, at greater distances at field practice.

I consider it most important that the Cavalry should be supplied with
a weapon which admits of accurate practice at long ranges, and for
which the greatest number of rounds can be carried. This would entail,
on the one hand, an increase in the length of the weapon carried; on
the other, a reduction in calibre, which should be made as small as
possible. We might thus safely go down to a 6-millimetre bore, and
increase the ammunition accordingly. The desire to retain the same
cartridge as the Infantry, to facilitate mutual assistance in
ammunition supply on occasions, seems to me of quite secondary
importance. As long as the Cavalry were still tied to the Infantry on
the line of march this consideration had indeed some weight; but now
that it moves far in front of, or on the flanks of, the Infantry
columns, and has its own arrangements for ammunition supply, the case
is quite different. The point nowadays is to make sure of that degree
of effect which is unconditionally necessary to our purpose, and for
this we require a weapon specially adapted to our particular need.

Our method of carrying our cartridges in the pouch attached to the
cross-belt is also impracticable. The bandoliers of the Boers would be
undoubtedly preferable, and could at the same time be made use of to
secure the carbine on the back.

It is also a matter for serious consideration whether cycle
detachments should not be attached to the Cavalry,[19] and I think I
am not going too far in estimating fifteen to twenty cyclists per
regiment as a suitable number to perform the many duties which may
fall to their lot. On the advantages they confer I have already dwelt
(Book I., Chap. VIII.), and further, I would advocate the addition of
portable or wheelable Maxims to the Cavalry to add to their fire
power. The latest patterns of this weapon are capable of easy
transportation, and can come into action very rapidly. Naturally such
heavy batteries as we now possess should be avoided. As regards this
latter weapon, one should not think of it primarily as destined to
take part in the real Cavalry duel; one should do nothing in this
direction to rob the horsemen of their confidence in themselves by
teaching them to lean on the firearm for support. Even the effect of
the Artillery in this respect is not always and everywhere
advantageous. One is too much inclined to make the action of the
Cavalry depend on the effect of the guns, and thus to sacrifice the
initiative when opposed to an enemy's horse. Nor would there be many
opportunities in practice for the Maxims to render support to the
charge. In the introductory phases of an engagement--_i.e._, when the
enemy is still at a considerable distance--they promise little
results, and in the moments when the 'Masses' are sent forward to the
attack, they would get in the way and hinder their freedom of
movement. On the other hand, they would be of great use in cases where
it is necessary to overcome or parry an Infantry opponent, and in the
battle, or in pursuit, when the Cavalry succeed in getting in on the
flanks or rear of the enemy's chief masses, they might prove
invaluable. Here, where reserves, columns, and trains all form
suitable targets, they would not only add materially to the striking
power of the Cavalry, but increase its radius of action very
materially.

         [Footnote 19: The wheel should be so low that the man could
         use his rifle without dismounting, and, if possible, it
         should be 'transportable' (?'folding').]

By their side the Artillery will always maintain its high importance
for the fight against localities, woods, and defiles, and with this
Arm the German Cavalry is, in my opinion, sufficiently supplied;
only--and this is of the greatest importance--more adequate steps to
insure ammunition supply are essential in the case of the Independent
Cavalry Masses. Here, too, we shall have to reckon with far higher
consumption than in 1870-1871, and the greater distances will make it
impossible to replenish from the general Reserves of the Army. The
Cavalry, therefore, require sufficient ammunition columns of its very
own.

The nature of Cavalry operations indicate yet another
requirement--namely, batteries so organized that to every brigade of
two regiments one battery of four pieces should be assigned. Many will
be the occasions in our strategical operations on which guns will be
required, and in most of these it is more a question of having _some_
Artillery at hand rather than of the development of superior fire
power--_i.e._, a few shells into a village at the right time may be
all that is needed for our purpose. Further, in operating on several
roads it can seldom be foretold with exactness on which road the need
may first arise.

Under these conditions it is of the greatest importance to be able, if
necessary, to assign a battery to each brigade, and at the same time
not to allow the half of the whole available Artillery to escape from
control.[20]

         [Footnote 20: With stronger Divisions, a corresponding
         increase in Artillery must, of course, be made.]

Further, these small batteries are both handier and more mobile in
themselves; they are, therefore, better suited to Cavalry
requirements, and at the same time the power of concentration when
such is required is fully retained.

The advantage of this proposed division seems, therefore, to me
sufficiently clear to need no further recommendation.[21]

         [Footnote 21: King William I. had already suggested the
         formation of batteries of four guns for the Cavalry in
         1869--in a marginal note on the report of Moltke's of
         1868--already referred to in the note on p. 166 above.]

This organization of the Artillery requires, however, to be
supplemented by the introduction of a true quick-firing gun, even if
it is necessary to reduce the calibre somewhat to keep down the
weight. For it is particularly with the Cavalry, and especially in the
Cavalry duel, when the opportunities for Artillery action are often
compressed into a very few moments, and yet a great effect must be
attained, that a gun without recoil and a great rapidity of loading is
most urgently required. If the Cavalry is thus equipped with all that
the conditions of War demand and modern technical skill can supply,
then it will find in these--at least in part--compensation for its
numerical weakness on condition that at the same time it also succeeds
in raising its training to a corresponding height.

It cannot be denied that in this direction all ranks have worked with
most devoted and admirable industry, and that new points of view, new
methods, and new aims towards which to strive have been opened up.
But, on the whole, this question of the training of our Cavalry is
still based upon the ideas of a period which lies behind us. There has
been no conscious breach with the past, even in those very fields
wherein the developments and demands of modern times have brought
about a complete disturbance of all military relations.

That a method of training which does not take into account the
phenomena of modern Warfare, and follow them even to their furthermost
consequences, can never give satisfactory results, needs no
demonstration. But a method free from these objections we have to
find. In its training our Cavalry _must_ excel all others if it would
maintain its position on the field of battle, and it can do so, for it
possesses by far the best material both in men and horses of any
country in the Continent of Europe. There are only two essentials
which we must bear in mind. First, we must be absolutely clear as to
those points in which our system is behind the requirements of the
time, and what objectives we must now pursue. Secondly, being
satisfied as to the above, that we should take the straightest way
which leads towards them, not hesitating to break with tradition
wherever it hinders our advance.

If we now consider in the spirit of this first requirement the
separate branches of Cavalry work which our training must embrace, the
very first point which attracts attention is the vastly increased
demands on the endurance of our horseflesh that will now be made, far
exceeding what was required in our last Wars. Increase of endurance is
thus an unconditional necessity.

Further, it is perfectly clear that in the combat of Cavalry against
Cavalry, the decision will depend on the action of the great tactical
units, and that with regard to dismounted fighting, a complete
revolution in the conditions has occurred. In future this will tend
evermore to come to the front, and both points of view must be kept in
mind in our training.

Finally, it is evident that the centre of gravity of these two factors
is no longer in the same position. As long as decisive results in the
combat itself were expected from the Cavalry, it was quite right and
expedient to train them to meet this special requirement. But now,
when it is clear that the combat is only a means to an end--that end
being the possibility opened up by successful fighting to reconnoitre,
screen, or break the enemy's communications--this change in the
conditions must be taken into account in the process of our education.

Of course this is not to be understood in the sense that we can afford
to neglect the training for the actual combat: the defeat of the
enemy's Cavalry remains now, as always, the necessary condition of all
subsequent activity; but the Arm must be taught to understand that
victory in combat is only the first link in the chain of operations,
and to extend its outlook beyond the point of actual collision, and to
appreciate the tasks which are the consequence of success.

To this end we must undergo a preparation of a quite different
character, for nowadays, freed from the chains which formerly bound us
to conform to the action of the other Arms, we appear within the
framework of the Great Armies indeed, but operating in independent
'Masses,' and this change in conditions extends its influence even to
the smallest reconnoitring patrol.

In this new field our training must seek to follow the demands of War.
It must accustom the troops to the greatness of their mission both
with regard to time and space, attain higher results with the
individual, raise the education of its officers above the sphere of
the technicalities special to the Arm, and give them a wider horizon
of general military conditions.

In what way we can reach these new ideals, in the best and most
practical manner, I propose to investigate in the following chapters,
and need only point out here that it is not my object to discuss every
detail of military education, but rather to bring out the essentials,
and lay stress on those questions which, in my opinion, compel us to
strike out new ways to find our objective.




CHAPTER II

RIDING, FEEDING, AND TRAINING


When we discuss the training of the Cavalry, the first point which
naturally occurs to us is the question of 'horsemanship'--_i.e._, the
breaking-in of the horses and the teaching of equitation to the men.
Horsemanship is so absolutely the bed-rock of all Cavalry
performances, that the advantages of improved methods of breaking and
of equitation must bear fruit in every branch of their activity. Above
all, they exercise the most enduring influence both on the
conservation and endurance of the horses themselves.

Anglomaniacs and faddists, who, in spite of many a healthy impulse
they have imparted, have nevertheless exercised, and still seek to
exercise, an influence the reverse of favourable upon our Cavalry,
maintain that for certain purposes one can obtain better results with
horses broken by one of their short-cuts to the object, and then
'trained' in the sense that racehorses and hunters are prepared for
their work, than with those who have been gradually brought forward by
the methods in use in our Cavalry schools, and at the same time secure
the advantage of 'unconditional obedience' in the horse, a result
which they allege cannot be always counted on with our existing
methods.

On the other hand, the fact remains that our recruits, in the short
time available for their education, can only be well and quickly
taught on well-trained pliable horses. That such horses, with
sufficient exercise, go better and more safely across country than
those brought forward by more hasty methods, is sufficiently proved by
the fact that all our steeplechase riders in the Army take the
greatest pains to prepare their horses thoroughly (by school methods
understood), because experience shows that this preparation alone
gives them a chance against the more highly-priced animals with which
they are called on to compete. Only this thorough training guarantees
good individual riding, and insures the 'pliability' which alone makes
it possible to correct disobedience rapidly should it arise. And,
further, there can be no question that this prolonged preparation
improves the endurance of the horse--on that point at least experience
leaves no room for doubt. The thoroughly broken horse, which moves in
easy balance, with all its muscle thoroughly well and equally
developed, not only saves its forelegs and joints, and supports the
spinal arch better, but trots easier, and hence for longer periods
with less fatigue, than the unpliable animal, who stiffens itself
against the rider's load, and thus expends its power uselessly, and
the rider himself is far less shaken about under the former, a point
by no means to be neglected.

The recognition of these facts has at length led us to break with the
Anglomania of former years, and the tendency towards improved
preparation has become more evident, whilst the centrifugal strivings
of individuals no longer find acceptance. On the other hand, it seems
to me beyond a doubt that the objects which we wish to obtain from
our Military school of horsemanship could in many respects be reached
more directly and better than is at present the case.

In conformity with the whole essence of modern War, the individual
training of both man and horse must form the foundation of our whole
education--that is to say, steadiness in the movement of closed bodies
must be the consequence of individual horsemanship. Only in this way
can the bodily, intellectual, and moral qualities of both man and
horse be brought into useful activity, and in this way only can we
conquer the gregarious instincts of the horses and develop in their
riders the individuality which modern conditions absolutely demand.

More stress requires to be laid on riding with one hand only and with
arms (_i.e._, drawn swords), for the bit, with or without a feeling on
the bridoon, is in War the only practical method of direction; and the
use of his weapons when mounted must have become second nature to the
man if they are not to be a constant impediment to him in the control
of his horse. Finally, independent riding across country must be
encouraged by every conceivable means.

To attain all this will only be possible if we succeed in overcoming
the preliminary steps of the man's education--_i.e._, the elementary
training of man and horse--more rapidly than has hitherto been the
case, and thus gain time for the true practical preparation for the
field. If from this standpoint we look at our present system, it will
soon be clear where to apply the lever.

First, it should be possible, with the better bred and stauncher
material we now receive, to make more rapid progress in the first year
than has hitherto been generally the case. By the increased demands
and the greater freedom in the choice of means allowed us by the new
Regulations as compared with the conditions formerly prevalent,
considerable changes have been made; the point now is, in what manner
to derive the fullest advantage from this greater freedom for the
practical curtailment of the periods previously allotted for each
stage in the training.

But prudence is necessary in this direction. That the English
thoroughbred, for instance, develops better under work in its early
years, admits of no doubt whatever; but there is room to question
whether this experience can be transferred without modification to our
present Remounts, although many of them have a strong strain of
English blood. Our Prussian horses, for instance, only reach their
full development between the seventh and eighth years; it would,
therefore, be a mistake to attempt to force them up to the full
demands made on a Cavalry horse before that age. This slowness of
growth must always be considered, and the animals be saved as much as
possible; but there is still room to unite with this necessary
concession increased demands on the degree of training.

Without any detriment to their efficiency, the young remounts can be
taken in hand immediately on joining their regiments, instead of
waiting till the conclusion of the manoeuvres, as is still a common
practice. It seems feasible, also, to begin with the gallop earlier
than was formerly the custom; and, finally, it is by no means
absolutely necessary to go back to the bridoon again at the
commencement of their second year's training.[22] One can well go on
with riding on the bit at the point where the course was interrupted
by the manoeuvres.

         [Footnote 22: Under the new Regulations this is now left to
         the discretion of the Regimental Commander.]

All these measures together produce quite a remarkable saving of time,
and there cannot well be any doubt that in this way, as far as
concerns the riding education of the horse alone--_i.e._, without
arms--the same standard of progress can be reached by Christmas of the
second year as was formerly often only reached at the end of the
second winter.

If from this foundation we go on to specific training of the
charger--still working, of course, concurrently at the gymnastic side
of his training also--to accustoming him to the curb, then by the end
of February the remount ought easily to be ready to be placed in the
ranks.

Side by side with this increase of rapidity in his training, we both
can and must make the individual training the foundation of his whole
education, so that from the very first the horse learns to go alone
and with safety in all kinds of ground.

The very first lessons to accustom him to both saddle and rider are
better given on the lunging rein than when led by an older horse, for
nothing teaches the bad habit of 'sticking' more than this last
practice. And since now the first months of training fall in the
summer, we can avail ourselves of the fine weather to send out the
young horses in charge of trustworthy riders, some of whom must be
left behind even during the manoeuvres, to go singly or in small
groups under suitable supervision, which can easily be arranged, out
into the country, if possible into woods and fairly difficult ground,
to habituate them to minor obstacles and the objects one meets with,
instead of, as formerly, keeping them in the school or manege, and
making them into 'stickers' first, only to have the trouble of
breaking them of the habit, often after many a hard tussle,
afterwards.

All through their subsequent training they must constantly be sent out
singly into the country, and even in the school itself they should be
exercised as little as possible in squads one behind the other.

It goes without saying that only the best horsemen should be trusted
with the young horses, for bad habits developed at the beginning of
their instruction are of all the most difficult to correct hereafter,
and may ruin the result of all one's trouble.

That in this way we can meet the requirements of the service much more
rapidly than by existing methods cannot be open to question and may be
taken as practically settled, and similar considerations apply to the
recruits.

The system laid down in the regulations does not go directly enough to
the purpose, a consequence, no doubt, of the fact that we have now
better horses on which to instruct them than at the time these
instructions were evolved.

If one begins as soon as possible with the gallop and individual
riding--if necessary on the lunge--and allows the recruit as soon as
he has acquired anything approaching a firm seat to practise the aids
for the leg and the side paces--passage and shoulder-in--one will
attain quite different results than from riding only on straight lines
and practising closing in the ranks. The practice in the use of the
legs makes the men more independent and individual, compels them to
trust to their seat, and not to hang on by the reins.

The individual riding makes the man drive his horse forward by the
pressure of his legs, which he is not compelled to do in the squad,
where the horses follow one another almost automatically. The horses,
too, are saved from becoming dull and heavy, as they are only too apt
to do under the recruits of the old system.

By Christmas the recruits can thus be brought forward as far and
farther than they now are by the time of the inspection on the
bridoon, and can then go on to riding on the curb, so that by February
they should be able to ride the side paces, gallop and change, and all
other school paces, without arms, and generally be so firm in the
saddle that they may be advanced to drilling with arms, and can begin
their real instruction as troopers. Of course, it is not to be
expected that these school paces should be ridden as yet in perfect
form, but the men must understand what these lessons are intended for,
and the effort to get the correct bend should be recognisable. And we
may add that to teach them to rely on their seat and not on their
hands suitable exercises with the lance may be introduced even at an
earlier period.

As regards the remainder of the squadron, the so-called 'Dressur'[23]
detachment, it is hardly necessary to point out that one can ask of it
at least all that can be attained by the remounts and the
recruits--that is to say, that by the beginning of February the men
and horses should reach the highest point of their purely riding
training. Of course, to achieve this they must not be put back every
autumn to the very ABC of their work--riding on the bridoon. They must
go on with the curb, to which by this time they are accustomed, and in
the place of the bridoon work, individual riding must be encouraged
as much as possible.

         [Footnote 23: 'Dressur' literally means 'preparation.' We use
         the term 'breaking-in.' Note the difference.--TRANSLATOR.]

Only those squads will require somewhat different treatment in which
the best men of the second year are being trained on the best horses
for the riding of the remounts in the following year. These men will
certainly require more bridoon work in the autumn, but even these
should be sufficiently forward by Christmas-time to pass on to the
bit, so that, in spite of the very high degree of perfection required
from their horses, they can be dismissed the school by the middle of
February.

From the increased demands made on the individual training of man and
horse, it follows as a necessary consequence that a different kind of
inspection in equitation will be required to that hitherto in vogue.

The presentation of closed detachments must be restricted as much as
possible, and all previous rehearsals of a special inspection
programme absolutely prohibited. Horse and rider, since they have been
trained individually, must be inspected and judged on their individual
merits, not otherwise. In this manner not only is it easier to
appreciate difficulties, but good work also has a fairer chance of
securing recognition. It needs an expert to bring together the sum of
all the performances, and express a fair judgment on the total result.
In any case, however, such a judgment will be nearer the truth because
it is uninfluenced by 'eye-wash' and mere externals.

Hence we arrive at the conclusion that in the manner we have above
indicated the whole squadron can have completed its training in
equitation by the middle of February.

That many objections will have to be met and many difficulties
overcome before this end is attained goes without saying; but where in
human affairs can it be said that this is not the case?

It may be urged that both for horses and men there is a distinct
advantage in beginning again every year with bridoon riding.

The action of the rider is easier to control than on the bit, and if
once the men take to holding on by the curb, the consequences are much
worse than with the former. On the other hand, also, it is easier for
the horses on the curb to assume a false bend or poise, or to refuse
to go up to their bits, and thus deceive the instructor. Wrong
application of the aids with the bit entail worse consequences on the
horses than with the bridoon; hence almost exclusive work on the bit
requires better teachers and lighter hands, and if one has few of
these at one's disposal, undoubtedly a disadvantage will accrue.

It may further be objected that for such a thorough extension of the
course of individual riding as I have demanded there is neither time,
school accommodation, nor teachers available, and it must be granted
that the regulation allowance of three schools per regiment is, in
fact, insufficient for the attainment of the required standard by the
methods I have in view. Nor will it suffice to allow each training
detachment only three-quarters of an hour in the school at a time.
Detachments of average strength require daily one hour and a quarter,
if the necessary skill in individual riding is to be acquired, and
recruit squads even longer. Further, it will not do to exclude
recruits who begin early with the side paces and the gallop altogether
from the school; on the contrary, they require to attend it at least
once or twice a week.

But with only three schools per regiment, particularly in our northern
provinces, these requirements cannot be fulfilled. Four I consider as
the least number, and it would be still better if each squadron had
its own school, so that difficult animals and backward men could be
taken individually, and work on the lunge and circle thoroughly
carried out.

Still, all these obstacles can be overcome. With increased practice,
comprehension of the management of the bit in military riding would
gradually increase both with teacher and pupils, and work with the
reins in both hands be usefully employed to facilitate the transition
from the bridoon to the bit and counteract the possible evils of
riding on the bit alone.

The better training of the Remounts, which will be obtained by the
means I have indicated, will in course of time give us better, more
obedient, and more pliable horses, and better-trained recruits again
will give us a better choice of riders for the young remounts.

Our instructional staff for equitation is thoroughly satisfactory. In
this respect the Riding-School in Hanover has done excellent work. We
have also amongst our senior non-commissioned officers some excellent
instructors.

The necessary time for all my demands can very well be saved if we
make up our minds to leave out all superfluities in the daily routine
of duty; and as regards the question of school accommodation, it is
well within the bounds of possibility for most regiments to provide
themselves with a fourth school--eventually even with a fifth--out of
their own financial resources. No investment could be more
remunerative. Certainly under circumstances red tape may stand in the
way; but when his superiors will support the Regimental Commander, and
sometimes without, one will generally find appreciative backing, even
from the War Office (_Intendantur_).

If the drawbacks and difficulties in the way of the proposed changes
are, as I have endeavoured to show, to be surmounted, on the other
hand, the advantages accruing therefrom are so enormous that the
former need not be taken into consideration at all. In the first
place, as we have seen, better individual horsemanship and more
practice in riding on the bit are in themselves advantages which react
directly on the War efficiency of the whole squadron. Secondly, the
earlier completion of the remount training is a direct gain, for, in
case of mobilization, we shall be better able to place remounts in the
mobilized squadrons, leaving in exchange older horses behind, which is
again an advantage for the training of the recruits destined hereafter
to join us at the front. I cannot too earnestly warn against the
taking of _all_ the old horses into the field. No man can foretell how
great the losses will be, but that they will be great admits of no
doubt whatever. Nor is it at all certain that future Wars will be of
short duration; on the contrary, they may drag on for a very long
time. Hence it is absolutely indispensable that suitable horses for
recruit training should be left behind, even if the marching out
strength per squadron should be reduced by a file or two--it cannot be
many in any case. For the rest, the quicker and better training of the
recruits will be all to the good in case of War breaking out, as one
will be able to detail men for the field squadrons towards the close
of the winter season--_i.e._, some weeks sooner than under the old
system; and finally the proposed procedure brings with it an enormous
gain of time in the training of the whole arm.

To begin with, we gain in winter the months from the middle of
February to the beginning of the Drill Season (April). This time can
be devoted to direct training for the demands War must make upon us.
We can practise again, and confirm the men in the fundamental
principle of dressing in motion, the exact squareness of the horses to
the alignment and rallying, with which one had already commenced in
the early months of winter, before being driven into the schools by
frost and snow; and, further, take advantage of fine days and similar
circumstances to practise men in taking jumps, scrambling, etc., the
development of the regulation drill gallop (fifteen miles an hour),
whilst still maintaining the control and standard of equitation for
which the school training is specially adapted. The winter exercises
in field service duties, which, as long as they are allowed constantly
to interrupt the formal lessons in equitation, do more harm than good,
can be postponed to this period, when the recruits will now be able to
take part in them--a point of essential importance in case War breaks
out. Above all, the time thus saved must be devoted to individual
riding and single combat.

Our Regulations (Sections 129 and 324) lay special stress on this
latter point, and in most regiments it is constantly practised. The
results, however, are sometimes questionable, and many Squadron
Commanders are of opinion that such training can be overdone. Nor is
this view without foundation. If single combats are carried out in the
regulation way on imperfectly broken horses, the horse is not only
spoilt, but the rider also, and a clumsy rider will very soon make a
good horse hard in the mouth and refractory.

Now, since we have neither ideal horses nor riders at our disposal,
there is much danger in overdoing these exercises, because the method
of their execution is often thoroughly unpractical. The combatants
ride round one another in unnatural circles, one retreats, the other
pursues, and both tear at their horses' mouths to turn them sharply
about, all things which, except the latter, they never do in action.

Nor should we overlook the really imminent danger which lies in
teaching the men to run away before an opponent. Few of them are
'Horatios,' and if, in fact, they once turn about, it is, to say the
least, highly problematical whether, in a real fight, they will ever
stop again. In the field matters are very different. If one has but
one adversary, one tries to ride him down, and, if unsuccessful, then
after one turn about both get locked together, turning only on the
fore hand; and the man who turns a second time can only trust to the
speed of his horse--he has given up the fight.

Such duels are rare indeed; in most engagements the man fights between
crowds of his own comrades and the other side, in wild confusion,
under clouds of dust. He must attack at one moment to the right, at
the next to the left, and guard himself. The essential here is not so
much the skilful use of the lance, as complete command over the horse,
and the determination to _kill_, which must rise to the height of
_fanaticism_. He who can twist and turn his horse by his weight alone,
without dragging at its mouth, whose arm does not tire, and who can
make sure of striking what he aims at, even at speed, and with the
energy born of hatred, thinking only of destroying his enemy, never on
retreating--he alone can hope to remain the conqueror; but such a one
very soon learns all that is practical in the use of sword or lance.

The exercises in single combats, therefore, must be based mainly on
preparatory practice, intended to strengthen the arm, give command of
the weapon, heighten the man's energy, and, above all, aim at securing
the most perfect harmony between man and horse by constant exercise in
those forms of individual riding which are really needed in the fight:
the rapid turning about of the horse; serpentining between, and
cutting and thrusting at, different objects in varying directions, as
far as possible without reins, and never according to a prescribed
formula.

The actual combats between squads should follow only when considerable
excellence in these preliminary exercises has been attained--_i.e._,
for recruits--about the end of the summer, before the manoeuvres; and
they should always be kept down to the lowest limits, and then only
carried out in thoroughly practical form--_i.e._, between squads, and
not larger detachments. I believe that in this way a far higher
standard will be reached, and with less damage to the horses than is
possible under existing conditions, in which one generally begins with
single combats, man against man, at the very commencement of the drill
season. In any case, we shall at least obtain this advantage--that the
work to be done in the latter will be materially reduced if the
exercises I have suggested are begun already in the winter months.

The more the men have learnt to ride with a light hand on the bit, the
greater command they possess over their lances--thanks to more
constant practice--and the more thoroughly they have been grounded in
the principles of direction, pace, alignment, and rallying. Further,
the more quietly the horses move--and even at rapid paces have learnt
to carry their heads not too high, with a firm bearing on the
reins--the easier it will be for the Commander to drill his squadron,
and to eliminate all the plunging and surging in movement which is
fatal to all excellence in manoeuvring.

The drill season can thus be cut down, and the time thus saved devoted
to field service practices and riding across country, because the
whole system, thanks to this considerable saving of time it effects,
enables one to extend the education of man and horse over the whole
year instead of confining it to the winter months.

Though every efficient squadron possesses a considerable number of
horses that do not require six months' practice in 'shouldering in,'
and in 'collected paces,' on the other hand, everyone has some horses
that do urgently need 're-making,' but which one has to entrust to
inferior riders, because the better ones are all needed for the
remounts and young horses.

This is a consequence of the whole system in which the training of the
horses and of the men eventually react on one another. There will be
remounts which need correction, and horses ridden by recruits to be
cured of acquired bad habits; and on my system there will now be time
and opportunity to hand these over, say from the beginning of
February, to non-commissioned officers and the better riders, either
by forming them in a special squad or entrusting them to individuals,
and the process of re-making the horses can be continued throughout
the whole summer, for now there will be ample time.

On the importance of this latter point I would especially insist. If
this work of equitation ceases for the whole summer, and the difficult
horses are kept incessantly at drill and field service, it is
inevitable that their defects will develop and become more firmly
fixed; hence one will never get a good average of well-broken horses
in the ranks. That some of them must always be taken for drill goes
without saying; but the point is, that from February onwards, and
throughout the summer, they should be constantly taken in hand and
corrected by good riders. If this idea is applied with thoroughgoing
energy, particularly with the young horses--even if it entails at
first a diminution in the number of files on parade--the number of
difficult horses in the squadron will soon show a most encouraging
diminution.

To all these advantages there comes yet another, to my mind even more
important. According to established custom, after the inspection in
riding on the bit which forms the conclusion of the winter's training,
the whole squadron is completely reformed before it begins the drills.
The new exercises in unaccustomed surroundings are begun by the men on
strange horses, to which they have had no opportunity to accustom
themselves. This drawback can be obviated, if the squadron is
definitely made up already in February--_i.e._, after the close of the
purely equitation course. The men can now ride the same horses in the
school on the drill-ground, and in the country, which they are to
retain throughout the summer, and the squadron will commence the drill
season with much steadier ranks than would otherwise be the case,
particularly if its Commander understands how to make the most of all
the advantages his good methods and well-broken horses secure for him
by changing them about individually as circumstances require.

Much, no doubt, may be urged against this proposal, and the expert
will hardly need my assistance to recognise the difficulties that
await him. But they can be overcome, and their advantages thus
secured--and these seem to me the essential points--enormously
outweigh the minor troubles that follow in their train.

I do not believe that either thorough or essential changes are needed
in our Regulations to adapt them to the principles I have developed.
All that is important is that we should definitely break with the
routine of the several courses and inspections.

To constitute a framework, not with a view of developing a fresh
network of red tape, I here submit an outline programme of the
time-table I suggest, so far as concerns the equitation and the
training of the horses in their several periods.

Commencement of Remount training, at the latest, the end of July. It
is worth consideration whether the young horses could not be sent to
the Regiments even earlier.

Inspection of recruits on the bridoon, and of the Second Ride Second
Class shortly before Christmas.

Inspection of the second year's remounts on the bit of the whole of
the remount training squads, and of the recruits, concluding with the
latter and Second Ride Second Class about the middle of February. Then
constitution of the squadron to meet the requirements of the coming
drill season.

End of March, or beginning of April, bridoon inspection of the young
remounts, in which generally side-paces, collected canter, and the
canter and change, may be demanded.

Inspection of the squadron in 'Military riding' (_i.e._, with arms,
and on the curb); preparatory exercises for single combat, thrusting
at targets, regulation gallop, riding in the ranks, together with a
careful investigation of the teaching received in the school.
Inspection of all difficult horses.

Shortly before the manoeuvres, inspection of the young remounts on the
bit. Inspection of the second year remounts in 'rides' (at the same
time note their condition after the drill). Inspection of the
difficult horses.

Inspection of single combats.

If one tries, naturally with due regard to local and climatic
variations, to adapt the course of training to this plan of
inspection, and endeavours to arrange that every man, if only for a
few minutes every day, should practise lance exercises to develop his
hand and arm, that he should ride every day individually, and every
difficult horse should be taken in hand and corrected at once; that
the principles of dressing, alignment, and of wheeling, are daily
impressed on the men in the school, as I have already indicated; and,
if further, wherever it is in any way possible, the men are exercised
in boldly riding across country--for which purpose funds to cover
possible damage to crops, etc., must be provided by the
authorities--then I believe, and base my belief on the result of my
practical experience, that not only will a higher standard of training
for specifically military purposes be attained, but also a
considerable improvement in equitation.

It will be worth while here to add a few words on the methods of
training the horses I recommend, for it is precisely on this point that
ideas so often divide, and the most opposite views on this subject find
their expression in current literature. To stir up all these
controversies is not my object, but I want to state quite generally that
it is under all circumstances a downright evil to try to follow out any
theoretical system to its logical development, whether the one selected
be that of Captain Plinzner[24] or another's. We have neither such a
uniform type of horse nor sufficiently skilled riders as to be able to
employ the same method to all indiscriminately.

         [Footnote 24: Captain Plinzner was Equerry to H.M. the
         Emperor, and is author of a well-known work on equitation.]

We must exercise our powers of selection, and find the best method to
meet the idiosyncrasies of each man and each horse, always keeping in
mind the aim to be obtained. What we want are horses that can use
their back muscles, especially in the gallop, with pliable necks,
light on the hand, able to turn easily, and safe across country (with
special reference to rat-holes, etc., not fences), that do not refuse
to quit the ranks, and are not headstrong. To reach this aim with our
material, our present riding instructions applied in their spirit, not
their letter, are for the present, I think, a sufficiently firm
foundation.

A higher standard of riding alone will not, however, suffice. We have
seen that modern War makes also increased demands on the endurance of
the horses, and, in fact, in two directions: first, on their marching
power, and secondly, on their capacity to execute the long gallops at
the regulation pace which are indispensable for the manoeuvring of
large masses and of attacks against modern firearms. That a thorough
physical preparation of the horse increases indirectly its endurance
has been already pointed out, and when exceptional exertions are
called for, breeding plays a great part; but great as is the influence
of these two factors, the ultimate foundation on which the endurance
of our horses depends is the general 'condition' of the animal, and
this again is a consequence of the quality of his food and his
'training,' used here in the same sense as in a racing stable. I lay
special stress on this question of food, because great demands, both
in the way of covering long distances and on the drill ground, can
only be met without injury to the horses if they are supplied with a
sufficient quantity of nourishment, and our peace-time ration is
undoubtedly too small to satisfy this condition. No regiment could
maintain itself always at the high pitch of condition we have
undoubtedly attained if it did not have recourse to all manner of
expedients to increase, at any rate for the time, the amount of the
ration. Of these expedients there are quite an imposing number, and
since, however desirable an increase of the ration may be, we are not
likely to obtain it, it seems to me well worth while to develop them
to the utmost.

How this is to be done will depend mainly on the local conditions of
each garrison. The point is to make the most of the opportunities each
locality offers, and as an example it may be of interest to give my
personal experience on this head.

Thanks to the confidence reposed in me by my General and to his
liberality, I was allowed to draw the equivalent of sixty rations of
oats per day and per squadron in cash, and to handle this money to the
best of my judgment.

Since peas, beans, and white American maize--the yellow Hungarian
quality is generally considered inferior--were ninepence to one
shilling cheaper per hundredweight than oats, I laid in a stock of
them, and was able to give not only an increased weight of ration, but
one of considerably greater nutritive value. Thus I gained the double
advantage, not only of not being compelled to stint the corn ration in
winter in order to save up for the harder work of the summers, but I
was able to increase even the winter ration itself. This I consider an
essential gain, for horses that after the winter season are well fed
and in their full condition are equal to far higher exertions than
those which have been kept low, and then fed up for perhaps a very
short time before the increased strain is thrown upon them.

The food was thus divided: After the manoeuvres, in cases where an
increased ration was required, American maize was issued, and the
ration improved by half a pound. From about Christmas-time onwards
peas and beans were served out, and the amount increased until midway
through the Squadron drills, after which it was kept at the same level
until the manoeuvres. In the end it amounted to the equivalent of 15
pounds of oats, which can be considered as the normal scale for our
medium and light Cavalry horses. The peas and beans were soaked for
twelve hours, the water being twice changed during this time to
prevent their turning sour.

During the manoeuvres, according to circumstances, I laid down at
suitable points in the district stores of forage, or gave the Squadron
Commanders money with which to supply themselves locally, and thus was
able to keep up the increase in the ration during the greater part of
this trying period.

The experiment was continued for nearly two years, and its results
were astonishingly satisfactory. Not only did the visible condition of
the horses develop markedly, and maintain itself throughout the
greatest exertions, both during the manoeuvres and the Divisional
exercises, but in spite of increased performances the numbers of
breakdowns and cases of lameness sensibly diminished; the paces were
fresher; in short, the material improved most noticeably. Are not
these breakdowns, lameness, and dulness in the horses, in the great
majority of cases but the consequences of over-exertion of the animals
when in a low state of condition? The cases of colic, too, diminished
rather than increased, which speaks well for the harmlessness of the
foods employed, but may in part also have been due to the fact that
both the bulk of the ration and the amount of exertion demanded were
only gradually diminished after the manoeuvres.

The experiment also showed that most horses would not touch the white
beans at all, or only unwillingly, and the best proved to be either
the green Smyrna or brown Dutch beans, which for the same weight and
nutritive value bulked bigger, for instance, than the peas, and were
very willingly eaten. Peas and beans as a ration alone were found not
to answer, as the horse misses the mechanical action--irritation of
the bowel and stomach--and requires also certain chemical constituents
present in oats to assist digestion. Even with the proportion of oats
and beans actually used--seventy-six to seventy-eight oats to sixty
beans--it was found advisable to increase the 'Rauffutter' ration to
replace the missing oat-husks. But to provide this addition there were
ample means, since the manure fund of the regiment, or of the
squadron, was available; and in spite of the increased ration it
became possible to make savings which in a single year sufficed to
build a spacious riding-school, and thus contributed in another way
to the training and general efficiency of the squadrons.

In the third year the price of oats fell, and that of the other feed
rose; hence, and for other reasons also, the conversion of the oat
ration into other more nourishing materials had to be abandoned,
although it would still have been possible to maintain a considerable
increase in the nutritive value of the food issued. To keep the ration
up to approximately the same level as in the preceding year, recourse
had to be had to other means.

It was found by experiment that a couple of pounds of straw per horse
could easily be saved per day, and again ample funds for a supplement
to the ration were available, a measure particularly applicable when
the price of straw rules high. This year, too, as the expenditure on
the riding-school was closed, the manure fund was also available, and
the horses did nearly as well as before.

I would not maintain that similar results are everywhere obtainable.
The price of grains varies; the receipts from manure are everywhere
different; in some garrisons peas and beans are difficult to obtain;
the cost of transport also fluctuates. But all this is no reason why
we should not seize an advantage even if we cannot always retain it.
Even a few years of more and better food bring about an improvement in
the horses, which lasts for a considerable time, and every effort,
therefore, should be made to obtain these advantages offered by price
variations whenever it is possible to do so.

It is well to call attention to the fact that to accustom horses to
the most varied food--rye, barley, wheat, etc.--is part of their
indispensable training for War, where such foods are all they can
get, as the experience of our last War sufficiently demonstrated. To
this end it is necessary--and I wish particularly to insist upon this
point--that our Regimental Commanders should have the utmost latitude
of action within certain fixed limits, and should not be dependent on
the consideration of the Commissariat, with its innumerable
regulations and formal considerations. I consider the objection
sometimes urged against me that in the purchase of supplementary foods
by the Regimental Commander there would be an opening for fraud and
speculation on the part of under officials quite untenable, for a
proper system of audit and check could be quite easily devised.

The capacity of the Commander to manage affairs in a businesslike
manner can hardly be called in question, and his interest in the
matter would grow in proportion to the degree of freedom allowed to
him.

Next in importance to the question of food comes the preparation of
the horses for efforts of long duration. That this preparation must go
hand in hand with the food question is obvious, but apart from this
interdependence, it is not possible to keep horses always up to the
necessary standard of endurance; for this training not only throws
heavy strains on the muscles, joints, and sinews, but on the nervous
system of the animal, and in particular attacks the nerves of the
stomach if maintained too long. If one wishes to preserve one's
material, the horses must be allowed from time to time a thorough
rest, during which their feeding must enable them to put on the degree
of fat which is requisite for health.

The best time for this rest is about Christmas, during which one can
reduce the work to the very minimum, and feed with 'Rastfutter' hay,
maize, malt--dried brewer's--molasses, even potatoes; and also, after
reaching the highest points of the training for galloping, there must
be a certain relaxation of the strain to give the nerves time to
recuperate.

Generally, the course of training must be conducted from the
standpoint of what War demands, and never allowed to assume the
characteristics of the racing stable, for the purposes of the two are
entirely distinct, and this is particularly the case with regard to
the gallop.

It is precisely in this respect that the necessities of War are not
always seen with sufficient clearness.

We obtain from our troops by means of most careful preparation quite
remarkable performances in galloping. I have myself seen whole
regiments cover 8,800 yards (5 miles) at the regulation gallop, and
the horses at the end of it had still both strength and wind to
increase the pace. On such and similar performances we then base our
tactical exercises both for the Brigade and Division, and many horses
are sacrificed as a consequence. Now, I am the last man to suggest
that accurate drill at the gallop is not the crowning work of all
tactical education, but it must be accomplished under War conditions,
and it cannot be too persistently insisted on that all these tactical
pictures and the deductions founded thereon, which we attain in the
manner indicated, have practically nothing to do with real War at all.

In these peace exercises we usually ride with considerably less than
field service weights, on specially selected and favourable ground,
and on specially trained horses. All these conditions are wanting in
War. Then horses must carry their full marching-order kit, and
generally they will be entirely lacking in specific training for this
fast kind of work. The ordinary pace on the march and patrol is the
marching trot; only single patrols have now and again to gallop, the
troops as a whole only on the rare occasions when a charge has
actually to be delivered. Then, the carefully-selected conditions of
the drill ground are generally lacking; and, finally, in all War
strength squadrons there are always some augmentation horses and
remounts, whose weaknesses must be taken into account if they are not
to be broken down at the very beginning of operations, as too often
happened in 1870, in which case it would have been better to have left
them behind from the first. Thus the galloping possibilities are
reduced most considerably, and it is only with these reduced
possibilities that the Leader can safely reckon.

That these conditions have a most important influence on tactics is
apparent. The question is whether it is worth while to strain towards
false ideals, at a considerable cost in horseflesh, when in War they
are quite unattainable, and only serve to call up in men's minds false
pictures of the reality.

To this I return an unqualified negative. Certainly, it is
indisputable that the horses must be trained to gallop for long
distances and in suitable poise, and that men should learn to retain a
correct seat even in gallops of long duration; that they should have
their horses under complete control, and learn to turn and check by
the use of the weight of their bodies; but these demands can only be
satisfied by continuous practice under conditions which render control
over the poise both of man and horse comparatively easy to
maintain--that is to say, singly on the galloping track or in squads,
and also as closed tactical units.

Speaking generally, however, such exercises do not need to be extended
materially beyond the limit which can be attained by horses not
specifically trained to galloping under full marching order weights.

This limit depends on the degree of breeding, the strength and
condition of the horses, and may be estimated at the most at two and a
half miles for our Light Cavalry, and somewhat less for the
Cuirassiers. To exceed these distances seems both superfluous and
injurious, particularly when it goes so far as to risk permanent
depreciation of the material.

It is far more important, in my opinion, to habituate the horses to
gallop with their full marching order weights, under service
conditions, and in all kinds of ground; for nothing is more difficult
than to preserve the proper rates of movement and keep the ranks
closed under such circumstances, as experience even in the manoeuvres
abundantly shows.

The 'trot' tends always to get shorter, for the regulation pace is
already as much as Light Cavalry can manage on the Drill ground; and
the gallop, too, falls generally behind the prescribed rate, the
reason being, in my opinion, that as a rule the distances demanded are
too great, and that we do not drill with sufficient frequency in full
marching order, partly to save wear and tear of the kit, but also
because with lighter weights we can undertake in the same time more
exercises, covering a greater area, than would otherwise be possible
without knocking up the horses. Much may be used in defence of this
procedure from the point of view of the training of the Leaders, but
the dangers to the true training of the troops themselves for War
must not be overlooked, and practice under full War service conditions
must thus ever remain the keystone of our whole educational edifice.

But it is not only the training in galloping which suffers from this
practice of riding light. The preparation of the horses as regards
endurance suffers equally, for patrols and long-distance rides are
generally undertaken with stripped saddles; it is only for manoeuvres
and the larger tactical exercises away from the garrison that marching
order is carried. To me this system seems hardly rational. Rather, it
would appear to me, must such sudden increase in the weights on the
horses tend to break them down, and experience confirms this view, for
the first day's marches in the manoeuvres in marching order tire out
the horses to a quite disproportionate degree.

We can never eliminate this evil altogether, for the attempt would
entail either marching order all the year round, or the limitation of
practical exercises to certain periods of the year only, both or
either of which would conflict on the one hand with the necessity of
saving the horses as much as possible, on the other with the needs of
the military training of the men; but a gradual increase in the loads
carried and distances covered seems well within the scope of a
practical policy.

The Company Commander, who wishes to get his men fit for marching,
increases quite gradually and systematically the weight in the men's
knapsacks, till these are scarcely noticed as a hindrance by their
wearers, and similarly one could arrange in the Cavalry. In each
period we should begin with stripped saddles, progressing onwards to
the full kit; but the inspections of tactical units, and the final
inspection in individual combat, should fundamentally be taken in full
marching order always, and horses should be prepared gradually for the
full weight carried in the manoeuvres.

I believe such a system would not only bring about a considerable
improvement in the training for War both of men and horses, but would
secure us from many disappointments by insuring in the Leaders a true
idea of what may reasonably be expected from their commands in the
field. Naturally the demands made on them in the inspections must
undergo a corresponding diminution.

Only by constantly keeping these points in view and combining them in
harmonious progression will it be possible to attain the degree of
perfection in the elementary instruction of men and horses which can
alone guarantee the highest results in practice.




CHAPTER III

THE TRAINING FOR MOUNTED COMBAT


In the same manner as, in the previous chapter, I have endeavoured to
show that in many points in equitation, in the school of individual
combat, and in the 'training' both of man and horse, we can, by
alterations of method, attain more directly to a possibly higher
standard in our performances than is at present achieved, I now
propose to consider the tactical education of the troops as a whole,
with a view to their best utilization in mounted engagements.

According to the existing Regulations, the chief importance is still
laid on the efficiency of the small and medium-sized combinations.
Squadrons, Regiments, and Brigades are prepared with the utmost care
and attention, but exercises of the larger bodies only take place more
or less exceptionally, and on a very restricted scale. The systematic
education of the Cavalry does not, in fact, extend beyond the Brigade.

That this state of affairs no longer responds to the changed nature of
Warfare follows from all that I have already said, and does not
require to be insisted on.

If in War the employment of 'Masses' has become the decisive element,
our system of training must be correspondingly extended, so as to
insure the existence of the skill and power needed for their
successful application. To this end all, even the most elementary,
exercises must be permeated thoroughly by the idea of preparing the
troops for united action in adequate numbers; and the relative
importance of the several periods of training, the allotment of time
to each step in the progression, as well as the exercises themselves,
must all be dominated by the same idea.

The foundation of all sound tactical training will remain now, as
ever, the school of the squadron. The cohesion of this unit and the
ease with which it can be moved is the first condition of its useful
employment at the right time and place, and the importance of
thoroughness in this branch of training grows with every increment in
the total number to be handled. Even more attention, therefore, should
be given to squadron drill in the future than in the past.

Next comes the question of regimental drill. Here, as we shall
presently see, the chief point is to develop the independence of the
Squadron Commander and the tactical handiness of his unit; and as I
understand the problem, this calls for a more extended framework,
within which the regiment must be prepared, than was formerly the
case.

If, even under present conditions, it is scarcely possible in the few
days allowed by the Field Service Regulations to train the squadrons
up to the requirements of active service, even on a level drill
ground, it is obvious that in the future this difficulty will become
intensified. It is a question, therefore, to be considered, whether it
would not be better to remove these time limitations altogether, and
leave it to the Cavalry Commanders themselves to determine
everywhere, with regard to local conditions, how to make the best use
of the total time available. Where considerable expense would be
incurred in bringing in squadrons detached at a distance, the consent
of the War Ministry would, of course, have to be obtained.

Brigade drill, however, stands on quite a different footing; it forms,
as it were, the preparatory school for the movement of 'Masses,' in
which the principle of the employment of the constituent parts of the
'Mass,' whether in 'Lines' or by 'Wings,' has to be inculcated. But as
one has now to deal with tactically thoroughly trained bodies, less
time is required than for either squadron or regimental drill.

On the other hand, it is most essential that the 'Mass' itself, consisting
as it does of several Brigades, should be thoroughly drilled as a
Division or Corps, for it is with these units, and not with Brigades,
that one has to deal in War, and their duties are so many-sided, and
require for their due performance such thoroughly-trained Commanders,
that perfection is not to be attained in a few days, which are not even
available every year. On this point, in my opinion, there is no room for
doubt, and hence it becomes absolutely essential that, if necessary,
Brigade drill must be curtailed in order to give to all Brigades an
annual opportunity of exercising, as part of the higher units.

It might well be possible to allow a wider latitude to the Brigade
Commanders in regard to the choice of time for their special
exercises, in which they might be guided by the special circumstances
of the locality in which they are quartered, and by the advice of
their superiors.

For the exercise of the greater 'Masses,' for which, under all
circumstances, troops have to be brought together from considerable
distances, a particular period must, of necessity, be fixed by
regulations; but it must be borne in mind that these 'Masses' should
not always be formed of equal strength in Divisions of three Brigades,
for the danger to the higher education which lies in always working
with units of similar composition has already been sufficiently dwelt
on. The conditions of War absolutely demand that the higher Cavalry
Leaders should be equally at home in handling 'Masses' with certainty
and precision, no matter what their composition, and the troops
themselves must learn to apply the principles on which efficiency in
action really depends under all and every circumstance.

As regards the manner in which the several periods into which the
training is divided should follow one another, the question arises
whether the squadron, regimental, and brigade drill periods should
follow one another as a continuous whole, or whether they should go
hand in hand with Field Service Exercises.

This seems to me to need a specific reply, because, as a fact, it is
differently answered in different Army Corps.

Where the troops have to leave their garrisons in order to be
quartered in the vicinity of the ground specially selected for those
purposes, the question of expense must play an important part in the
decision; but the principle involved can hardly be affected by these
exceptional circumstances, for in by far the greater number of cases
the troops can find room to drill either within the district of their
own garrisons or on the manoeuvre grounds in the vicinity, and in
these latter the question of extra cost should hardly stand in the way
of an extension of the time allowance. Hence, if such an extension,
due to the intercalation of Field Service practices, really does offer
advantages, one could decide in principle in favour of this solution,
in spite of all other circumstances; but it still seems to me open to
discussion whether it is advisable to make the same principle
applicable in equal measure to all the time intervals.

For the squadron drill, which begins with an entirely untrained troop,
the conditions are obviously quite different to those in the
subsequent exercises, in which the point lies in the working together
of units already finished and completed in themselves; and taking
these differences into account, we must first examine more especially
the case of the squadron.

At the beginning of its drill season, the exertions demanded are
comparatively slight. The distance covered either at the trot or
gallop is only gradually increased, and the paces are at first kept
somewhat below the regulation limits--at least, from practical
experience I should recommend that they should be, for the Instructor
can control and correct the precision of all movements, and the
individual conduct both of man and horse, better at the slower paces
than when moving fast. Riders and horses accustom themselves
gradually, and hence more easily, to movement in closed bodies, and it
is of decisive importance for the whole subsequent course of their
training that at the very beginning of the drills this harmony between
man and horse under the new and unaccustomed conditions should be
secured to the utmost possible degree.

If this point of view be kept in mind, then I think the drills should
be continued daily, for, on the one hand, there is no risk of
overtiring the horses, and, on the other, the object is to weld the
men into a cohesive whole, and impress on them the essential
principles of the elementary tactical evolutions, in order to make
them as soon as possible into a combatant unit.

Towards the latter end of the squadron drills, however, the conditions
change. Now, it becomes necessary to drive into the whole body a
proper appreciation of the several 'paces,' to fit them for long
gallops, and to train them for actual combat. At this period I
consider it better to interpolate one or more Field Service days,
partly because it is of practical moment to press on this side of
their training as quick as possible, and, further, because the drills
now begin to make very considerable demands upon the horses. These
Field Service days afford an opportunity to rest the horses, and thus
to prevent small and inconsiderable injuries developing into severe
lameness and ultimate breakdowns. Further, a quiet ride in the country
gives those horses which have become nervously excited by the
unaccustomed conditions of the drill ground a chance of cooling down,
and thus saving themselves very materially; and this must certainly be
considered as one of the most important functions of the Commander,
whether in Peace or War, to keep his horses fresh on their legs, and
ready to turn out in good condition at whatever hour the call may
sound. Of course, these precautions must not go so far as to endanger
the training for service of the squadron, but drill and manoeuvre
results at excessive cost of horseflesh must be absolutely condemned.

If these reasons speak for an intercalation of Field Service exercises
between the drill days, I am further of opinion that the result which
would be arrived at by this system would give a better standard of
the drill efficiency of the unit for War than can be attained by
continuous drill alone.

With the latter, it is certainly much easier to secure unity,
cohesion, and precision in the movements; but we must remember that in
War the emergency calling for drill performances may arise after weeks
of marching, during which no drill has been practised at all, and our
Peace training must take into account such conditions, and accustom
the troops to execute with safety and cohesion such drill movement as
may be necessary without having practised them day for day.

In still greater degree do these principles apply both to regimental
and brigade drills; since in these the demands on the horses are
constantly increasing, the need to give them opportunity for rest and
recovery becomes even more pronounced.

Moreover, the purpose of these exercises is not so much to secure a
single representation of acquired skill in the exhibition of drill
evolutions, but rather to develop and confirm in the men an
ever-increasing familiarity with the principles of their tactical
employment, and this will only then be attained when, as far as
possible, these practices are continued during the whole summer, so
that the Grand Manoeuvres either in the Division or in the Corps form
the natural conclusion of the whole series. In the period of combined
manoeuvres, it is, of course, impossible, in order to save the horses,
to lengthen the fixed period allotted to them; but all the more
necessary, therefore, does it appear to spare them as much as possible
by the introduction of these Field Service days (exclusive of the
ordinary 'rest days') during the time of the drill exercises. In the
course of the subsequent considerations, we shall see that not only
will our horses gain thereby, but many other important objects of our
training be served as well.

Turning now to the subject of these exercises themselves, it must be
laid down generally that throughout a steady intensification of the
exertions demanded must be maintained, and that the gallop is not to
be employed except when, under service conditions, its use would be
practicable. Further, whatever the Regulations prescribe must be
practised, no matter what the views of the Commanding Officer as to
their practicability or otherwise may be. This is absolutely essential
to secure a uniform standard of execution throughout the Arm.

Nevertheless, it makes a very essential difference in what spirit the
Regulations are approached, for the result will depend upon which
points in the training the chief stress is laid, and generally on the
character given to the exercises.

In drilling the squadron this point is of less importance. Here, in
accordance with the spirit of the whole Arm, it is a matter of formal
drill, and nothing more. It is here that the foundation has to be laid
for smart, never-failing 'drill,' for the unconditional cohesion of
the squadron in itself, and for the certain interpretation of its
Leader's views, whether the latter makes use of commands, signals, or
merely rides in the required direction.

Here the paces must be hammered into the troops till they become
mechanical habit, and the several forms of movement and attack be
practised, so that they can be executed in any direction, whether the
squadron has been told off or not. No matter how hasty the rally may
be, the troop must charge at the moment and without hesitation.

The only difference that can arise here will be due to the
individuality of the Leader, and all are good which lead to the
required end, only the Regulations are not quite clear as to
practising the charge, and the guiding points might be laid down with
rather greater precision.

In the charge against Cavalry cohesion is the first and dominating
condition. It must be absolutely impossible for the horses to swerve
either to right or left. Accurate dressing and the maintenance of the
two ranks come only in the second place. Against Infantry or
Artillery, on the other hand, the essential is that every horse should
have room to gallop in his own form, so that no crowding or jostling
arises, thus giving the horses a chance of avoiding or jumping clear
over falling men or animals. Hence, although on the level drill ground
the requirements of Regulations as regards dressing and the
maintenance of the two well-defined lines must be attended to, one
must remember that it may be impossible to comply with these demands
across country and be prepared in such cases to stick to the spirit,
not to the letter, of the law.

In both cases it will hardly be of advantage to lay too much stress on
dressing and touch. Against Cavalry it is rather a case of jamming the
files together by pressure from the flanks, and the men must hold as a
vital article of faith that only the closest knee-to-knee riding will
guarantee either victory or their personal safety. Against Infantry,
on the contrary, the files must be loosened, and every horse go in his
normal stride, as in hunting; nor must anyone allow himself to be
squeezed out of the ranks to the rear or remain behind as long as the
strength of his horse holds out.

Utmost speed consistent with closely-locked files against Cavalry, a
natural extended gallop against Infantry or Artillery--these are the
two cardinal points to be observed in attacking. Maintenance of
dressing or of the ranks become positive evils if the above are
sacrificed to either. There, in my opinion, should be the essentials
to guide the decision of superior officers in their criticisms.

With these exceptions the lines for the squadron training are so
closely drawn that differences in practice can scarcely arise. The
matter, however, assumes quite a different aspect with the regiment,
and still more with the higher units.

Here it is not only a case of consolidating the cohesion of the troops
by the agency of the discipline of the drill ground, or of teaching
the forms of movement and of fighting, although, of course, these
points of view cannot be entirely disregarded; but the essential is to
teach the methods of employment of the forms laid down in the
Regulations for the combat.

A regiment which can work through the Drill Book smoothly and with
precision is still far from being trained for battle, but at the most
has merely laid the foundations on which such a training can be
subsequently built up. The same applies to a Brigade or Division, each
of which has practised and made certain of the execution of such
movements as passages of defiles, deployments, attacks, changes of
front or of lines, and so forth. All these things are in themselves
necessary and useful, but they make no great demands on the skill of
the Leaders, only requiring an accurate knowledge of the book, and a
certain degree of routine in the application of its prescriptions; but
War makes quite different demands on their ability, and it is for War
that we have to be prepared.

First of all, in the purely formal side of the training, stress must
especially be laid on those forms of movement which can actually be
applied on the battle-field.

Then, the troops must be exercised to apply these forms not only on
the drill ground, but over every kind of country. Further, the
tactical judgment and independence of the Leaders of all ranks must,
be thoroughly developed. They must not only learn to act on
fundamentally sound principles, but to apply these principles
everywhere where circumstances require rapid decision, utilizing at
once the tactical advantages the ground may offer, and adapting
practically the few forms which can be employed before the enemy in
the field instinctively; and, finally, opportunities must be granted
to the Commanders to practise the combination of locally separated
bodies to a single tactical purpose.

In face of these requirements, it seems to me that our tactical
training remains far too elementary in character, and does not tend
with sufficient directness towards what is alone possible in War.

The blame for this state of affairs rests by no means only on the
shoulders of the troops, but is due to a variety of complex causes
which are difficult to disentangle. In the first place comes the
passive resistance, that moment of inertia which custom and tradition
everywhere oppose to changes, and it is not to be expected that the
troops of their own initiative will be able to abandon the accustomed
ruts, when more especially the methods applied in our inspections are
not always of a nature to encourage such attempts.

A further cause is to be found in the Regulations themselves. These
give no firm foothold for the decision of the question as to what
forms and movements really are practicable in War-time, and, probably
in the endeavours not to hamper too much the initiative of the
Leaders, does not express the principle on which the conduct of the
combat is based with sufficient precision to preclude very different
opinions as to what these principles really are. Finally, the local
conditions of many of our garrisons often create an almost insuperable
difficulty for the proper training of the troops over country.

In face of these conditions, we must strike out new paths for our
guidance if we do not intend to remain behind the times altogether.

We must first, however, be perfectly clear in our own minds as to
which of the Regulation forms are really practicable, and hence
require increased attention. Then we must endeavour to formulate the
guiding principles for the conduct of an engagement in a manner so
clear and definite that they can easily be fixed in the memory, and
then work out the best way in which the troops can be thoroughly
grounded in their application. Finally, we must acquire a quite
distinct grasp of what can be practised over country, and from what
points of view such exercises are to be undertaken in order to make
them of direct utility in the solution of the problems modern Warfare
will set before us.

To clear up the first point it will be best to sketch in its general
outline the course in which events succeed one another in an
engagement, and then to deduce the forms of movement which are
essentially practical.

Taking the case of Cavalry in combination with the other Arms, at the
commencement of the action we find the squadrons in 'rendezvous'
formation under cover outside the immediate danger sphere, either on
the flanks or behind the general line of battle.

When the moment to act arrives, they advance at a rapid pace, either
in closed-up column of route or in any other dense formation which
permits of ready deployment in the direction of their allotted target.
Often in this movement they will have to overcome difficulties of the
ground--defiles and the like, of varying breadth.

Arrived in the vicinity of the field of attack, they deploy into lines
of squadron columns, form line to the front, and execute the charge.

In such cases it may often become necessary to secure one's own flanks
by forming protective echelons, or to endeavour to surround those of
the enemy by corresponding offensive movements.

In the case of Cavalry acting alone, it will often be necessary to
form for action directly from column of route, and it will be
essential to establish co-operation not only between the advance guard
and the main body, but also between columns concentrating from
different directions upon the field of coming action.

It is at once evident that for these few manoeuvres few and simple
formations and movements will suffice, and that, in view of the
excitement of the battle-field, only such are, in fact,
applicable.[25]

         [Footnote 25: As a measure of this excitement the following
         example may be useful. During the great Cavalry engagement on
         the plateau west of the Yron brook near Mars-la-Tour a
         squadron under most brilliant leadership galloped out in
         column of troops to threaten the enemy's flank. When,
         however, the order to wheel into line was given, the men were
         so excited that it was only with the utmost difficulty that
         its Captain succeeded in getting three troops to obey, whilst
         the leading one continued on in its original direction. The
         Squadron Commander was Rittmeister von Rosenberg, who
         afterwards became Inspector-General of Cavalry, and the
         above-mentioned incident was related by him personally to the
         author.]

Hence it follows that all complicated movements and changes of lines,
and similar formations occurring in the Regulations, may be classed in
the category of evolutions intended mainly for disciplinary purposes.
On the other hand, we must practise, as thoroughly as practicable,
long movements at a rapid pace in the closest formations for
manoeuvre--_i.e._, in double and Regimental Columns; changes of
direction in these columns by shouldering, passage of defiles,
deployments into fighting formations with simultaneous slight
alterations in the line of advance; further, measures to secure one's
own flanks, or to threaten those of the enemy; deployments to the
front immediately out of column of route or after the passage of
defiles; the combination of detachments arriving from different
directions; and, finally, the charge itself under the most varied
assumptions, the transition from the melee to pursuit, and rallying in
order to attack again in a new direction against a fresh enemy.
Naturally, the most rapid deployments out of any and every formation
against a suddenly appearing enemy must also be practised, for such
surprises are always possible in War-time.

To be avoided, on the other hand, as for the most part quite
impracticable, are all movements of a dilatory nature for the
formation of fronts of attack, as well as long movements of manoeuvres
and considerable changes of front when already deployed into line.

In all these exercises, as a general and fundamental principle, such a
grouping of the available forces must be striven for that the units
can be employed by 'Wings'; for, as I have endeavoured to point out,
it is this form of employment which best satisfies the requirements of
the combat and meets the needs of the Commander.

For instance, under many circumstances the Regimental Column can be
employed as a practical tactical formation. Thus, if against Infantry
or Artillery, it is desirable to attack in many following 'Lines.' The
need is at once satisfied if our advance is made in a number of
Regimental Columns, wheeled into line to a flank. For a flank attack,
if the movement is initiated in a number of Regimental Columns formed
to the front and following one another, forming line by a subsequent
wheel. In both cases--in the latter after the wheel--one has only to
insure that the laterally adjacent squadrons move off together at
'Treffen' (_i.e._, Line) distance to have all one's Lines complete.
Such a formation can secure its flanks with the greatest ease by the
retention of closed units, or, by bringing up the rearward squadrons,
can prolong its front to either flank. In any case it is preferable to
the triple column of troops, which makes all influence of the leader
impossible, mixes all units in the charge, and hence would best be
left out of the Regulations altogether. Nevertheless, practice in the
employment of 'Treffen' (_i.e._, 'Lines' as opposed to 'Wings') must
not be entirely neglected, as under certain circumstances this form
may also become necessary.

This tendency to group the available forces by 'Wings' in the larger
units from the Brigade upwards must also be extended downwards to the
regiment, which represents the fundamental tactical unit of the
Cavalry, and those formations for manoeuvre which favour the
arrangement of its constituent squadrons one behind the
other--formations which, at the same time, are both handier and
susceptible of more convenient control--must be constantly practised.

That Squadron Columns to the Front hardly meet these demands ideally
can scarcely be denied. They are unhandy, render all changes of
direction materially more difficult, lose direction and distance very
easily, and necessitate complex movements in order to arrange them one
behind the other. Already in Brigade formations these drawbacks are
apparent, and in larger masses they prove most formidable. The
Squadron Column is, in fact, a formation derived exclusively with a
view to 'Line' tactics, and for this reason alone they hamper all
other demands. There is, however, no compelling reason why they should
be retained as the principal working formation for Cavalry, and
therefore as fundamentally beyond the reach of criticism.

It seems to me that a formation which would group every two Squadron
Columns as a unit would be far preferable. The Regimental Commander
would then have only two units to direct, which would maintain their
mutual relations of distance and interval more easily than four, could
change direction more readily, and form line quicker, and allow of a
far easier transition to wing formations and other columns than is
possible at present.

The Regulations certainly do not mention this formation specifically,
but, on the other hand, this regimental double column offers
advantages for certain circumstances greater than can be found in any
of the forms it suggests. It allows in the simplest manner of
deployment into 'Lines,' either to the front or flank, the formation
of echelons in any desired direction; it is very mobile, easily
concealed in folds of the ground, and combines the advantages of
reduced depth both as a marching and as a manoeuvre formation. As the
latter, it is peculiarly adapted to the purposes of large units in
close country; for, as already pointed out, it is easy to conceal, and
whilst keeping the troops well in the hands of the Regimental
Commander, allows also of the most rapid deployments into 'Lines'
either to the front or to the flank. It confers also the same
advantages in brigade when the regiments are formed side by side, and
is particularly applicable to flanking movements in which it is
especially desirable to be able at any moment to develop strong
fighting power in the direction of the movement, and after the wheel
into line, to be formed in successive lines and protected on the
uncovered flank.

[Illustration: Double column.]

It would take us too far at this point to compare in detail the
advantages and disadvantages of this or alternative formations. I only
desire to indicate in what direction practical progress is possible,
even in the domain of formal tactics, without exceeding the limits
laid down by Regulations, although it can only be most desirable that
changes in the Regulations[26] themselves should be forthwith
undertaken. I would, in conclusion, only bring forward one point which
seems to me of particular importance.

         [Footnote 26: This formation has since been adopted, and is
         almost invariably employed.--TRANSLATOR.]

The more this employment of Cavalry by 'Wings' gains ground, the more
apparent becomes the advantages of the use of the bugle-calls assigned
to the several units, particularly of the regimental call; because
when it is used, the regiment or other unit remains as a closed body,
unmixed with other units, and hence can be employed as a distinct
tactical entity, which is not so much the case when working in
'Lines.'

These sounds are the only ones which never lead to confusion, if they
are employed not as cautions only, but as a call on which the unit
moves at once, whether in line or in column--preferably the latter--in
the direction from which the call is heard. With the call the
Commander would have the means of collecting his men behind him, and
leading them in the direction he desires, no matter in what degree of
order or the reverse they might be, without any verbal commands or
instructions.

Used in this sense these sounds--but particularly the regimental
call--might become the principal drill and manoeuvre calls for the
Cavalry.

Thus it appears to me we could achieve a considerable reduction in the
amount of practical drill necessary, and the change would tell all the
more the more frequently the call was employed, until at last it
became ingrained in the very flesh and blood of each man in the ranks.

Unfortunately the Regulations do not allow their employment in this
sense, but permit them only as cautionary sounds (Section 115, note);
but even in this restricted sense they deserve most constant use in
drilling, for they are always a means of preventing, in a measure,
misapprehensions in the execution of other sounds.

We come now to the second portion of our requirements--viz., how to
obtain clearness in the appreciation of tactical principles.
Fortunately they are few in number, but it is absolutely indispensable
that every Cavalry Leader should most fully have mastered their
meaning. No knowledge, however accurate, of the formal prescriptions
of the Regulations can in any way compensate for a deficiency in this
respect. They are certainly not indicated as 'General Principles' in
the Regulations themselves, but may be read between the lines with
more or less precision from its several paragraphs.


FOR CAVALRY VERSUS CAVALRY.

1. The German Cavalry must always endeavour to attack first in order
to utilize to the utmost its superior 'moral,' and to catch the enemy
in the act of deployment. If an opening for such an attack is offered,
then even the risks of a long preliminary gallop must be accepted
(Section 339).

2. The leading lines must _always_ be followed by supporting squadrons
in adequate numbers (Section 843, and note also Section 346); that is
to say, the enemy's Cavalry will always be attacked in two 'Lines,'
unless special circumstances compel departure from this prescription.

3. One must always endeavour to keep the last closed Reserve in hand,
because in the melee the impetus of the last closed body generally
decides. One must never, therefore, as long as one suspects that the
enemy has still further Reserves in hand, engage a greater number of
squadrons than he shows, in order to save up Reserves.

4. Success must be looked for in the vehemence of the onslaught, not
in superiority of numbers (Section 313). The greatest importance must
be attached to cohesion; hence, unless necessary to surprise the enemy
in the act of deployment, the 'gallop' should not be sounded too soon,
or the 'charge' too late (Section 339).

5. Outflanking detachments, or troops in the following lines, turn
against the enemy's Reserves, or remain in reserve. They must never,
except in most pressing circumstances, throw themselves into a melee
already formed (Section 313). Following Lines must therefore not keep
too close to the leading ones--a mistake often committed in peace--as
otherwise they are committed to an attack in the same direction. They
should therefore keep so far to the rear that they can overlook the
line of collisions, and move in full freedom wherever their
intervention is most called for. This important principle was always
observed by Frederick the Great's Cavalry.

6. One must always try to cover at least one flank by obstacles of the
ground or by one's own troops; but having satisfied this condition,
then attack on the outer Lines, and endeavour to gain them by previous
strategical directions.

7. Superfluous forces, which do not follow the front as supporting
squadrons, echelon themselves in general, forwards or backwards of the
outer (unsupported) wing, to protect one's own flank and threaten
that of the enemy, also to be ready to engage the enemy's Reserves
(Sections 323, 343, 345), or they are kept together as Reserves behind
the fighting line, if it is not possible to foresee in what direction
they may be required. They must not be too weak.

8. Attempts to surround us made by the enemy are best met by a flank
movement on the original line without change of front (_cf._ Section
338). Defensive flanking cover, with the front turned outwards, gives
the worst conceivable direction for attack, since in case of failure
one is thrown back across the line of retreat of one's main body.

9. Being in 'rendezvous formation,' the leading units are, if
possible, sent off for offensive flank movements, as they have the
shortest way to traverse. Such attacks only then promise success if
they are unnoticed by the enemy--_i.e._, can be executed under the
concealment of the ground--or if the enemy has neither time nor space
to encounter them. The object of flank attacks is to induce the enemy
to use up his rearward Reserves to oppose them, or to induce him to
undertake manoeuvres before attacking.

10. Those units which are to be committed to the attack simultaneously
must never be arranged so that a part follows in echelon
backwards--they must always be disposed on the same alignment.

11. In case of a melee, which threatens to terminate unsatisfactorily,
the Reserves must be put in on a broad front and straight forward, not
directed against the flanks. For the longer the line of collision, the
less effect do such flank attacks exercise; they are only too often
mere blows in the air, and lead to waste of energy.

12. Out of every victorious melee one must endeavour, as soon as
possible, to rally closed detachments (Section 326). For immediate
pursuit only fractions of the available troops will be employed
(Section 325). This pursuit, however, must be carried out with the
utmost energy, and the complete expenditure of the horses' power--if
possible, to the total extermination of the enemy. The forces employed
must be adequate for the attainment of this end.


CAVALRY AGAINST INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY.

1. The attack must be as concentric as possible, and from different
directions, to compel the defender to scatter his fire. The units are
always to be employed by 'Wings.'

2. If possible, the defender must be surprised, and if Artillery, he
should be attacked from the flank.

3. Where a wide zone of fire has to be ridden through, though even
against Artillery, successive 'Lines' must be employed, and the less
shaken the enemy appears to be the greater the number of such 'Lines'
(Section 350). Artillery attacked frontally must be compelled by the
leading 'Lines' to change both elevation and the nature of their fire.

4. The result, however, depends less on the Form employed than on the
rapid seizure of momentarily favourable circumstances.

5. Only _closed_ 'Lines' on a broad front can be relied on for
success. Where the squadrons each seek independently for an object of
attack, they generally miss it altogether, and to assign each
individual squadron a special target will mostly be impossible, for
the attack will be launched from such a distance that separate objects
in the defender's lines will hardly be recognisable. Once within the
zone of serious losses it will be obviously impossible to undertake
those changes of direction which one sees unhappily so constantly in
peace. One rides, in general, straight at a long fire line, and
penetrates through as far as one can.

6. Such frontal attacks require, generally, reserves on both flanks
for security against possible disengaging efforts of the enemy's
Cavalry.

7. As the crisis of the engagement approaches, one must close well up
on the fighting line, no matter whether one incurs loss or not, in
order to be at hand to take advantage of opportunities.

8. Deployment, changes of direction and of front, are only possible
outside the principal fire zone of the enemy.

9. The distance between following lines varies according to the nature
of the enemy's fire.

To make these principles familiar to the troops must be one's constant
care from the commencement of the regimental drill season onwards. At
the same time, the subordinate Leaders must learn to apply them
independently, even if no direct order reaches them, or if compelled
to act on only the shortest indication of the Superior Commander
(Sections 330, 333, 348), and this independence of the subordinate
must be the more practised the greater the size of the units (Section
317).

To attain this object, as soon as the troops have sufficient mastery
of the purely mechanical part of their drill, it will be necessary to
append a series of exercises designed both to bring out the essentials
of these principles, and, at the same time, to develop the judgment
and independence of the junior officers.

Such exercises must hence always be based on a well-defined tactical
situation, from which it clearly appears whether the Cavalry is
'Independent,' or whether it is acting on the flank or behind the
middle of a fighting line; and the corresponding conditions on the
enemy's side must also be readily deducible, and on such foundation,
under constantly changing assumptions, as to strength and distance of
the enemy, all such movements as changes from one tactical formation
to another--flank attacks, deployment from column of route or after
the passage of defiles--must be practised. In all these exercises the
point at issue must be clearly and comprehensively expressed. When one
has attained a certain degree of security in the application of these
principles, these exercises must be repeated under conditions of
ever-increasing difficulty.

The order for deployment must be given whilst the troops are in rapid
motion. Observation, thought, and command when in full gallop have to
be learnt; they do not come naturally. The most various movements,
without command or bugle-call, must be executed from a message brought
by a galloper. The troops will be practised against a suddenly
appearing enemy on simple warnings such as 'Against Cavalry,' 'Against
Infantry,' or merely on the sound 'Alert,' and pains must always be
taken to see that the fundamentally right formation is adopted. In
these exercises it must be left to the initiative of the subordinates
to judge the situation for themselves, and always move to their proper
place in the prescribed formation by the shortest path. Of course, in
such movements the first principle is that the troops nearest the
enemy furnish the first 'Line'; the remainder fall into their places
as flank coverers, supporting squadrons or reserve.

If, in this manner, we succeed in imparting to the junior Leaders
thorough clearness as to the principles of the game, and to make them
both quick and skilful in their appreciation of the situation, then
the work of education on the drill ground is complete, and the troops
are ready for exercises over country. No pains must be spared to
separate the purely formal and ceremonial side of drill from the
practical field-training. The former keeps always, as I have indicated
in the first section, its full value for the creation of discipline
and alertness, but leads only too easily to a routine which has
nothing in common with the battle-field, and to that poverty-stricken
'schematisimus' to which human nature so readily inclines.

To the formal school of training, which I have hitherto only had in
mind, a whole series of exercises must now be coupled, having for
their purpose the application of the acquired forms and principles
under all circumstances of the ground. But before we proceed to their
detail consideration, we must answer the question how far the drill
ground only suffices for the purpose of training. Generally, one can
subscribe to General von Schlichting's principle--that forms and
principles must be learnt in the drill book, but their application in
action only in the open country. Tactical exercises on the drill
ground, which have not for sole purposes to bring to expression
certain formal principles, are always an evil, and mislead the troops.
On the other hand, the principles of the tactical employment of
Cavalry are particularly suited to representation on the drill ground
because they are frequently of a purely formal nature.

Keeping firmly to these established principles, then, to define the
limits of usefulness of the drill ground, we have only to answer the
question within what tactical units this formal drilling is still
instructive or possible. My opinion is that the Brigade marks the
highest limit, as within it all tactical principles find their
application, and it is the largest body which can still in any way be
handled by drill methods only. In the Division, and still more in the
higher units, the strategical element preponderates so greatly that
anything approaching real drill is out of the question, and all
movements which they can execute are based on a complete command of
these principles already. Of course, it is not intended to prohibit
altogether the formal working together of these masses at the
beginning in order to secure complete control and knowledge of them
for further instruction; but one must not delay over these formal
movements a moment longer than absolutely necessary, since the real
centre of gravity lies in the practical training, and no doubt must be
allowed to exist as to which exercises are intended as purely drill
and which as practical preparation for War.

Nor would I have it implied that brigade and regimental training
should be entirely confined to the drill ground. On the contrary, the
exercises over country are absolutely essential for practical
training, and form the keystone of the whole edifice; but it seems to
me not merely permissible but desirable that a portion of these
exercises should be carried out on the drill ground in order to
expedite this portion of the work. But all the more energetically must
it be insisted on that the remainder of the programme--the greater
part in regard to time--should be executed, as far as possible, in
variable ground, and that all exercises of the larger formations
should be confined to such ground as we shall have to work over in
War; not alone are they by far the most important for the higher
tactical education of the Arm, but they cannot be represented on drill
grounds at all; their whole essence is too entirely out of harmony
with the conditions of a level plain.

That the degree of cultivation existing in the vicinity of the
garrisons may interfere seriously with these demands is obvious, and
in the absence of the necessary spaces to work over we must fall back
on the great training grounds (Truppenuebungs Plaetze); even the
possibilities of these are very soon exhausted. But this, at least, is
certain: that it is better to hold these exercises on these training
grounds than to confine them exclusively to the drill field. Every
effort must, therefore, be made to transfer all exercises of bodies
above the regiment to the training grounds, on which one will always
find some portion sufficiently suitable for the amount of drill
required, and to extend the period of work on these grounds so that in
all periods it will be possible to interpose between the drill days a
sufficient number of field service days, always supposing that these
training grounds offer sufficient diversity of contour, etc., for our
purposes. Where this is not the case, then, in spite of the expense
entailed by possible damage to crops, etc., suitable ground will have
to be acquired. The extra cost of a few thousand pounds cannot be
allowed to stand in the way of the adequate training of the Arm which,
owing to its numerical strength, relatively small in comparison with
the magnitude of its tasks, is in the last resort dependent for its
success on its internal excellence alone.

As concerns the nature of these exercises, with special reference to
the larger formations, first of all we must secure, by means of a
graduated series, the certain co-operation of the constituent elements
and of their leaders. Next, it must be insisted on that, for the
further actual practical training, as well as for the purely formal
drill, a systematic procedure should be the fundamental principle, so
that all who participate in them may become clearly aware of the
conditions of Warfare, and the means of dealing with them. It is
evident that these conditions must form the foundation of the required
system.

As in War these are constantly changing, there seems a certain degree
of contradiction in this demand; but in reality this is not the case,
for no matter how the situation may vary, there will always be for its
proper criticism some one chief point which will characterize the
whole procedure, and thus be decisive for the systematic arrangement
of these exercises.

The latter can then be divided into two principal groups, according as
to whether they are based on the assumption of a Cavalry force acting
as an independent unit or in combination with the other Arms. The
general conditions in both cases must be clearly brought out, and give
them the point of attachment for the further subdivision of the
exercises.

Thus, with regard to the first case:

Reconnaissance from a great distance. Deployment of one or more
columns out of defiles or in open country. The land in the vicinity of
the training ground can here be advantageously employed. It is not
desirable to place the heads of the separate columns at once on the
scene of action, using these points as starting-points for the
forthcoming exercise. One must give the columns longer marches, and
demand that--assisted by a properly-working mechanism for circulating
information and orders--they should arrive at the point of action at
the proper time, in spite of possible delays or interference on the
road. The enemy, whether skeleton or otherwise, must, of course, be
handled so that collision occurs within the limits of the training
ground.

Transition from the relations of advance (or rear) guard and main body
to the order these assume on the battle-field.

Attacks on a railway or hostile post.

Government boundaries form no support for the flanks; these can only
be considered as secure when protected by natural obstacles; hence, as
a rule, measures must be taken to cover both flanks.

Transition from the tactical to the strategical form after completion
of an encounter; pursuit of the enemy with one fraction of the force,
and continuation of the operation with the remainder; for the latter,
only orders need be issued; but it is a matter of considerable
importance how this division of force rendered necessary by the
tactical encounters is arranged.

Retreat after a repulse, in one or several columns.

Retirement through defiles.

In the second case:

Selection of position on the battle-field in a proper relation to the
fighting line, zone of danger, etc., and reconnaissance to front and
flanks.

Advance from a position in reserve to attack on the enemy's Cavalry
round one wing of an Army.

Transition from a victorious charge against Cavalry to a further
attack against the enemy's flank.

Protection of the outer flank in either case.

Retreat after defeat by the enemy's Cavalry to the protection of one's
own Army wing.

Advance for frontal attack against the enemy's line of battle; passage
through the intervals of one's own Artillery and Cavalry. Protection
of both flanks. Attack upon Infantry, Artillery, or both; disengaging
a front attacked by Cavalry; combat against the latter.

Flank attacks against retreating columns; ambushes at defiles.

Of course, it is not intended in the above to lay down a hard-and-fast
scheme of instruction, but only to indicate how the work to be done
can be systematically arranged, and brought under one point of view,
so that the lessons they are intended to convey become impressed on
the mind. It is also evident that by the supposed conduct of the
enemy, and the strength assigned to him, the utmost variation can be
brought about in the grouping and representation of the several
conditioning circumstances. In short, these exercises must be taken
direct from the most diverse demands of War, and be based, as far as
possible, on an assumed general situation. They must never be allowed
to descend to mere fighting on horseback backwards and forwards across
the training ground, and with often quite unnatural sequence of ideas,
having no connection with the natural order of events. It is also most
desirable that Infantry and additional Artillery should be made
available for their execution.

How far the dismounted action of the Arm is to be represented in these
series will be gone into in the next section; but in all cases,
whether working mounted or on foot, the Leader must insist that the
troops are handled in accordance with tactical precepts suitably
applied in every case to the special circumstances of the given
situation; and for this, even on the smallest training grounds, a
proper utilization of the features of the country is essential.

The desire to suit the formation to the ground; to carry out turning
movements under cover; to find support for the flanks in natural
obstacles, so that they cannot be surrounded; to choose the actual
field of encounter, so that every advantage of the ground, the
direction of the wind, of the sun, of covered approach, etc., all fall
to our advantage; to deal with defiles and passes on correct
principles; to utilize suitably strong defensive positions--all these
must be clearly brought to light, and in the 'Critique' these points
must be particularly borne in mind, for they are by no means
universally current in the Cavalry, which has a tendency always and
everywhere in peace to revert to the levellest ground obtainable. I
have seen at Cavalry Division Exercises troops handled without the
slightest regard to the nature of the country, and without the fact
attracting attention at the 'Critique'; but these are conditions
which, thanks to the energetic action of the Inspector-General, we may
hope, are now everywhere overcome.

It must, further, be brought out in the clearest possible manner under
what conditions the employment of the units by 'Wings' is to be
recommended, and under which others their employment in 'Lines'
becomes necessary. The principles regulating this matter have already
received attention in Book I., Chap. V. The freedom which, as we have
seen, is given us by Section 346 of the Regulations must be utilized
to the fullest extent, for it alone answers to the demands of the
modern battle-field.[27]

         [Footnote 27: If, in the course of time, as I fully
         anticipate, the necessity should become apparent to give
         further expression in the form of Regulations to the point of
         view laid down in Section 346, it would certainly necessitate
         a complete rearrangement of the whole Regulations, out of
         which, in that case, other defects might then be eliminated.
         The following ideas might then be taken into consideration:

         1. Fundamental and formal separation of tactical prescription
         from instructions concerning the methods of training.

         2. Simplification of the Regimental drill in the direction of
         conferring increased freedom of movements to the Squadrons
         and double Squadrons. Limitations in the application of
         Squadron Columns, and their partial replacement by more
         suitable formations.

         3. More precise wording of the tactical principles, and their
         extension to prescriptions as to the use of 'Wing' or 'Line'
         formation.

         4. Re-introduction of the true idea of 'Line tactics,'
         limitation of the word 'Echelon' to troops overlapping the
         first line, of 'Reserve' for all held back behind it.

         5. The preparation for all instructions for the movement and
         combat of masses larger than Brigades without reference to
         any fixed standard of strength.

         6. More extended use of the different bugle sounds.

         7. Extension of the instructions for dismounted action to
         cover the employment of several Squadrons, Regiments, or
         Brigades, and with especial stress on the decisive offensive.
         (See next section.)]

One last point requires further consideration, which is of
considerable importance for Cavalry exercises--viz., the use of
skeleton enemies.

In no Arm does the skeleton enemy replace an actual enemy less than
with the Cavalry.

If it rides the prescribed paces, then, as a consequence of the ease
of movement and rapidity of deployment, it has an unfair advantage; if
it rides slowly or halts altogether as a target, it makes things
altogether too easy for the other side. Besides, it is a very much
easier matter to judge a number of flags correctly than to estimate
the actual strength of a rapidly moving body of horse.

Most movements in practice develop so quickly, and, owing to the
ground, the direction in which the dust drives, etc., give such
changing pictures, that it is most difficult to judge them accurately
when one's self is in rapid motion.

Often the Cavalry Commanders must decide, at least in general, on the
instant, strength, tactical distribution, and direction of movement of
a rapidly approaching enemy almost hidden in dense dust clouds; in the
same instant he must make up his mind with reference to the conditions
disclosed by the adversary and the nature of the ground, and issue his
orders clearly and intelligibly. The demand is such a great one that
both the physical and mental sight even of a born Leader needs
constant practice against real objects in order to be in any way equal
to it. Hence the necessity for bringing great Cavalry 'Masses'--at
least, Divisions--as frequently as possible together to manoeuvre
against one another, and in such a manner that the strength of the
opposing forces remains unknown, which, with a little management, can
easily be arranged. If one knows beforehand the precise number of the
opposing forces, as with Divisions of uniform composition will
generally be the case, the matter is very much simplified indeed, but
in proportion it is less practical, a consideration which still
further supports our already formulated demand for Cavalry Divisions
differing as far as possible in their composition.

Thus, it is clear that the field is wide indeed which opens itself for
the practical training of Cavalry as soon as one gets down to the
bed-rock conditions which determine success in actual War, and frees
one's self of all conventional suppositions. Whether we shall succeed
in satisfying the new conditions which press upon us from every side,
taking into consideration the excellence of our existing material,
equal to the highest performances, will depend in the main on the
support of the superior authorities. For the manner in which Cavalry
are inspected decides how they practise and what they learn, just as
the way in which they are led determines what they can do.




CHAPTER IV

TRAINING FOR DISMOUNTED FIGHTING


If in the previous pages it has been shown that increased attention
must be devoted, in the training of our Cavalry for its mounted
duties, to the changed conditions we shall encounter in modern War--if
it is to do justice to itself on the battle-fields of the future--it
must, on the other hand, be insisted on that the foundation available
for such further effort is indeed an excellent one. Our squadrons are,
in general, exceptionally well trained, capable of great endeavour,
and well in the hands of their Commanders.

It needs, therefore, in my opinion, but a slight change in the
direction, the practical consideration of certain new points, and,
above all, a wider range of practice in the higher Commands, to attain
the very highest mark.

With its dismounted action, however, it is a different matter.

In spite of the increased importance this form of fighting has
acquired in modern War, our Cavalry has not as yet paid anything like
the amount of attention to the subject that it deserves. Almost
everywhere it is treated as of quite minor importance, and many
Cavalrymen still close their eyes to the view that, without a training
at once as thorough and earnest for dismounted action as that
bestowed on the Arm to fit it for its mounted duties, modern Cavalry
will hardly survive the trials it will encounter in the future.

This idea rests on long-standing tradition, which is difficult to
overcome. It is not so very long ago that on the rifle ranges some
officers caused volleys to be fired in order to get through their
cartridges so as to get back to quarters the sooner; but mainly, it is
up-borne and continued by the fact that in the Inspections the
superior Commanders generally treat dismounted fighting as a matter
hardly worth their serious consideration, or judge it by
false--_i.e._, too narrow--standards. Further, because in the
manoeuvres, as in the principal Cavalry exercises generally,
situations requiring dismounted action for their due solution hardly
ever arise; and lastly, because of the manner in which the whole
subject is discussed in the Regulations themselves.

The latter approach the question from a far narrower standpoint than I
propose. They lay down quite openly that only under especially
favourable circumstances can Cavalry hope to obtain easy and minor
results from their carbine, fire, and that they are not in a position
to enter on and carry through obstinate encounters.

They lay principal stress on the defensive, and practically exclude
the combat of larger 'Masses' altogether from their horizon.[28] In
fact, they consider only the minimum conditions which the Cavalry must
fulfil if it is not to fall into the background altogether.

         [Footnote 28: Section 355, and note 357, 363, 365, 366.]

The final consequences of modern development, hardly even those
resulting from the experiences of 1870-1871, they have emphatically
not yet even approached.

Those who have studied the action of our Cavalry in that campaign
thoroughly--as I myself had full opportunity of doing--will agree that
we seldom had to have recourse to the carbine except on the offensive,
as I have pointed out above, and only in the rarest cases did we need
them for defensive purposes; and though in future against overwhelming
forces this necessity may arise more frequently, still, as in 1870,
this tendency towards a resolute offensive must always stand in the
foreground. Nevertheless, the Regulations, in spite of all practical
experience and theoretical considerations, lay down that in most cases
fire action will be confined to the defensive (Cavalry Regulations,
Section 357).

It is quite natural that the troops themselves should not place their
ideal higher than the Regulations require; all the more necessary,
therefore, do I hold it to express with all emphasis that _our
training must go far beyond the limits prescribed for it officially_
if we are in any degree to satisfy the demands that War will make upon
us. But for these, I hold our Cavalry thoroughly capable (when
trained, understood), and even if they were not, one should never
breathe such a suspicion to the men themselves. For should such an
impression get abroad, one would dig at once the grave of initiative,
daring, and resolution in the execution of all necessary undertakings.

Keenness, the very life and soul of all Cavalry action, can only grow
where the troops believe themselves fully equal to all eventualities.
The idea, therefore, that Cavalry, even when dismounted, is not equal
to any Infantry, must never be allowed to show its head; rather, the
men must be brought up in the conviction that, owing to their longer
term of service, absence of reservists, etc., they are, unit for unit,
more than a match for the best. Only when they feel this thoroughly
will they develop their utmost fighting value. But it is indispensable
that they should be thoroughly at home in all forms of the dismounted
combat, for only then will they feel confidence in the weapons they
carry.

This ideal is as yet far from being attained in our service, and we
must break entirely with the existing training and enter on new paths
if it is in any way to be attained.

For the tactical subdivision of the squadron, and the elementary forms
of skirmishing action, the Regulations afford a sufficient foundation,
but their application must be brought home to the men in a totally
different manner to that at present in use.

A few weeks after their arrival--at latest the beginning of
November--the recruits must be taken out into the country and
practised in utilizing all the advantages it offers, both as a group
and in firing lines, and at the same time they must be taught with the
carbine, aiming, judging distance, etc., always from the point of view
of making each man a practical independent shot, without any
theoretical mystification or pedantry. Soon after Christmas they must
be sufficiently far advanced to commence practice on the range, which
must be carried out with the utmost individual care.

_A considerable increase in the amount of ammunition is essential_ to
keep the men constantly in practice, so that there are no long pauses
between the days set aside for shooting, that these are divided over
the whole year, and that firing at long distances and under field
conditions can be carried out on a greater scale than at present.
Before the beginning of the squadron drills, the men must be
thoroughly at home both in mounting and dismounting for fire action;
with this object, vaulting exercises with horses in full kit must be
especially practised. They must also have progressed so far in the
elementary preliminaries that tactical training of the dismounted
squadron can be proceeded with at once; but the individual exercises
must be continued throughout the whole year if knowledge of them is to
pass over into the flesh and blood of the men.

Special importance is to be attached to field firing, and for this in
particular far more ammunition must be provided. In this most
important respect Cavalry must be put on precisely the same footing as
the Infantry, and be able to practise at real service targets exactly
like the latter. But these exercises must not be begun until the men
are thoroughly at home in judging distance and aiming, the class
shooting is at an end, and the tactical training of the squadron
completed.

In aiming practices, low targets, representing men lying down, or
well-covered shooting lines at great distances, are to be preferred;
but in field firing the targets should be so disposed as to make the
typical cases it is desired to represent, in which Cavalry will
generally have to employ their firearms on service, sufficiently clear
to the men's understanding--such, for instance, as the following:

1. Attack of an occupied position.--Fire opens according to ground at
1,100 to 1,200 yards; gradual advances by rushes to decisive
distances, which, with modern weapons and in open country, may be put
at 700 to 900 yards. Development of the principal fire effort at this
range, and beating down of the enemy's return fire. After attainment
of the fire superiority, rapid advance by rushes, and in larger
bodies. These rushes must be covered by the fire of those still lying
down, until the point for the commencement of their assault is
reached. Meanwhile, advance of the last Reserves, also by rushes, to
the last fire position to give the final impulse for assault; assault;
pursuit by fire. The strongest development possible of concentric fire
consistent with the retention of adequate reserves to carry forward
the fighting line.

2. Defence of a position.--(_a_) Obstinate defence; object not to let
the assailant come too close; hence from 1,100 yards a considerable
development of fire power; continuation of the fight at decisive
range, and, according to the result, either pursuit by fire or rapid
evacuation of the position with ultimate sacrifice of the rearguard to
be formed by the last reserve. (_b_) Defence without the intention of
standing fast, either to gain time or compel the enemy to deploy.
Hence, principal fire effort between 1,000 and 1,300 yards, and then
gradual break-off of the fight before the enemy can approach too
close.

N.B. In practice a favourable position is essential.

3. Surprise fire against marching columns or reserves whilst
reconnoitring the enemy's approach, or whilst working round his flank
and rear in the battle, or in pursuit without the intention of
charging or defending one's self, mainly with the purpose of securing
a momentary but considerable moral and material effect, then
disappearing and renewing the attempt from another place, hence sudden
'Mass' fire from 1,500 to not less than 1,000 yards. At the same
time, it must be explained that with our present carbine even a
nominal effect can hardly be secured at the greater distances. Here I
have anticipated the issue of a better weapon, an unconditional
necessity for the Cavalry in any case.

All these practices, however, will only then be of value when the
officers possess a far more thorough knowledge of musketry and the
capabilities of their weapon than is at present the case with us. It
must therefore be insisted upon that, first our Regimental Commanders,
and then the junior officers, should be ordered to attend the Infantry
School of Musketry, in order that they may thoroughly master this new
branch of knowledge.

It will be asserted that the time for such thorough training in
musketry cannot be found except at the cost of neglecting still more
important branches of our service. But from my practical experience I
cannot assent to this view. There is ample time, if it is not wasted
on unpractical affairs.

Judging distance and the use of ground can be most thoroughly taught
during field-service practices, whilst the troops are on piquet, or
the squadron at the reserve of the outposts, when the men who do not
at the moment happen to be on patrol or vedette often lie about for
hours doing nothing. We have then opportunities to take these matters
in hand in the most practical manner; particularly the former, on
which shooting in the field so essentially depends, and whose
importance is so little appreciated by our Cavalry.

The duties in the afternoon can also be much reduced to save time for
the same purpose. For instance, let me call attention to the waste of
time involved by lengthy parades for lance exercise. No man can keep
on at lance practice for an hour at a time. The consequence is that
most of it is spent in standing easy, and therefore wasted. But the
object--viz., of gradually strengthening the muscles of the arm and
making the man handy with the weapon--can be equally well attained by
a couple of parades for the purpose weekly. Perhaps still better, if
before every afternoon parade and every mounted duty throughout the
year the men are exercised with the lance for a few minutes only. In
this manner the muscles of the arm will develop more rapidly and much
time will be saved. Similarly, more can be gained by the method of
imparting the instruction pursued, if attention is restrained to the
thing that the man must know only, and everything superfluous, such as
the learning by heart of the names of every portion of the weapon and
so forth--at any rate with the recruits--is left out, and at the same
time all such opportunities as occur in stable duty, on the march, in
the cleaning hour, etc., are made the most of.

Finally, speaking generally, not only is more time than is necessary
spent on squadron drill, but also more than is advantageous. If one is
constantly drilling for four weeks at a stretch, that is ample, and
then there is time for a considerable extension of our shooting
training; and if the inspection of the squadron is postponed for any
particular reason, then shooting and field-service days can be
interpolated, which in itself is a very good thing.

If in these ways time for the elementary training for dismounted work
and for shooting can be gained, it is still easier to arrange things
for the foot training of the squadron as a unit. During the drill
period the pauses to rest the horses which must be granted to them
can be utilized, and in the field-service exercise the schemes must
often be framed so as to afford practice in dismounted operations in
suitable ground. For the technical training of the men it is of
particular importance that they should be accustomed, with immobile
horses, to couple (? knee halter) them rapidly, and with mobile horses
in bringing them up or retiring them.

These two essential practices receive far too little attention in the
German Cavalry. The chief difficulty of the latter lies in the way in
which the spare lances which the man cannot hold fast in his hand fly
backwards and forwards when in rapid motion; and the ease with which a
lance can be jerked out of the shoe, and then trail on the ground can
give rise to the gravest disorder, not to mention danger.

It is most desirable that something should be done to remove this
evil. The best, perhaps, would be to devise some arrangement by which
each lance could be attached to its own horse. If that is possible,
then the shoe must be made so deep that the lance cannot be thrown
out. It is obvious that this problem will not be long in finding a
solution as soon as attention is directed to its absolute necessity.

The above will suffice to make it abundantly clear that as far as
concerns the thorough training of the squadron for dismounted purposes
no serious difficulties exist. These only begin when we come to the
employment of larger forces, and principally because the Regulations
give us no point of support for the purpose, whilst our Cavalry
officers themselves are in no way prepared for this branch of their
duties. For the employment of the tactical units and the fundamental
principles governing their use in action we are therefore compelled to
lean on the Infantry Regulations. But how many of our Cavalry officers
are sufficiently acquainted with these to employ them practically? How
is it to be expected that they should be, when nobody expects such
knowledge of them?

Hence to prepare for the training of the Leaders, officers of all
ranks should be encouraged, whenever time and opportunity offers, to
attend the more important tactical exercises of the Infantry. It would
be better still if a sufficient number of Cavalry officers were to be
attached--Lieutenants to Companies, senior officers to Battalions and
Regiments--for suitable periods. But we must be quite clear in our
minds that in this way we have at most an expedient to meet a period
of transition, which will not suffice as a permanent remedy.

It can never be considered otherwise than as a grave disadvantage when
one Arm is compelled to seek the instruction necessary for its
practical application in War from the Regulations and parade grounds
of another, and more especially when, as in this case, the principles
of the Cavalry are by no means applicable without modification to the
other.

Actually, the peculiarities and the duties of Cavalry render many
variations from Infantry practice essential which require
consideration. For instance, the Infantry company is told off in
three, the dismounted squadron with mobile horses in two, with
immobile ones in three fractions, which are always very much weaker
than those of the Infantry, and, therefore, entail entirely different
methods of husbanding their respective strengths. I can only consider
it, therefore, as a most pressing need, and one which can no longer
be delayed, that the Cavalry Regulations should receive the necessary
expansion to meet the different conditions, and that the practical
training of the men on foot should be carried on in the same
systematic way as their preparation for mounted duties.

For these alterations in the Regulations the principles of the Company
Column tactics must, in my opinion, form the general groundwork. A
dismounted squadron with immobile horses bring 125, with mobile ones
about 70, carbines in the line of fire; a regiment, therefore, from
280 to 500--numbers, therefore, materially smaller than those of a
company or battalion respectively, and their power in action is
correspondingly reduced. Nevertheless, it will be well, with regard to
the conditions of command, to treat the squadron tactically on the
same footing as the company, and within these limits the principles
governing extensions, depth and arrangement of the units for attack or
defence must be laid down clear and distinct in the Regulations.

These principles must be formulated in general on the lines which in
discussing the question of tactical direction (Book I., Chap. V.) I
have already attempted to develop. They must distinguish clearly
between the cases of the detachment acting for itself alone or with
either or both flanks protected, and lay down what distribution of
force and apportionment of reserves is of decisive importance, and,
therefore, requiring special instructions.

The chief stress, in opposition to all previous prescriptions, must
now be laid on the combat of the regiment and the brigade, as those
units whose employment will be principally called for in modern War,
and the principle of the offensive must be steadily kept in view.
Fights for localities and about defiles require especial attention,
and further, the conditions must be laid down by Regulation in which
action is to be engaged in with mobile or immobile horses, and how
these led horses are to be placed and protected.

The present Regulations pass lightly over these questions, because, as
I have pointed out, the standpoint from which they view the matter is
fundamentally different. If, however, the increased importance of
dismounted action is granted, then these points call for decision, and
how they are to be dealt with as a matter of principle cannot be left
to the goodwill of the Leader.

A very important defect in the Regulations lies in the uncertainty it
allows to exist as to the subdivision of the dismounted squadron, and
how the skirmishers on dismounting are to form.

According to Section 54 the squadron dismounted is divided into four
troops of twelve files, or if the number of files does not suffice,
into three troops. According to Section 87, eight to twelve men form a
group, two or three groups a troop. In Section 155 the skirmishers of
a troop when dismounted, with mobile horses, form one group. How many
'troops' are to be formed is not indicated. 'The skirmishers fall in,
in front of or by the side of the squadron, arranged as on horseback.'
When working with immobile detachments, then, according to Section
156, the skirmishers form in front or by the side of the squadrons in
two ranks, and in how many groups or troops they are to be told off is
not specified.

The confusion here cannot be explained away, and its consequences are
frequently manifested. It must be laid down once for all that with
mobile horses the dismounted men of a squadron form one troop in four
groups, or with immobile ones two troops, also of four groups, and
that they always form up in front of the squadrons, each troop in
line, and one behind the other. Then everyone should know exactly what
he has to do. It is altogether a misfortune that the dismounted
squadron and the squadron on foot parade are two entirely different
things. The latter is only required for ceremonial, and everything
relating to it should be consigned to Part IV. of the Regulations
(ceremonial, etc.); whilst the training of the squadron on foot should
from the beginning be based on the needs of the squadron dismounted
for action. Then there would be unity and system in the matter.

Turning now to the practical education in larger units, it is
necessary that the fundamental principles guiding the distribution of
the men in attack or defence in the typical kinds of encounter should
be taught and practised on the drill ground. The corresponding
positions of the led horses must also be represented. As typical
situations I would enumerate the following:

Attack on localities, with or without the tendency to outflank.

Attack by surprise, or after preparation.

Defence of a section or of a locality, with known direction of the
enemy's advance, or when the flanks may be threatened.

Obstinate defence and maintenance of an isolated locality.

Keeping open the entrance of a defile, and its utilization for a
further offensive or retreat.

Deployment for surprise fire action, in order to disappear again
immediately.

Combined action of dismounted men with a mounted reserve, to ward off
an attack or pursue a retreating enemy.

In all these cases we require not only fundamentally different
methods, but the methods themselves will be different according to
whether the led horses are mobile or immobile, because in each case
the strength of the tactical units is an entirely different one.

These more or less elementary exercises, after the squadron
inspections, both mounted and on foot, have been concluded, must be
principally carried out in the regiment, which also when dismounted
remains the true tactical unit of the Cavalry; but they must be
continued by the brigade, in which the employment of the regiments
formed side by side--_i.e._, by 'Wings'--must be represented under
most varying circumstances.

It appears to me that in the present state of our training it is
exactly these elementary exercises which are the most important,
because more than any others they are adapted to make clear and
comprehensible the general conditions of successful fire employment.
This comprehension, owing to the specifically Cavalry tendencies of
our training, is in general almost entirely lacking in our Cavalry
Commanders, so that in this direction the tactical education of our
officers requires to be built up almost from the ground.

For the rest, these exercises, like the corresponding ones when
mounted, form only the basis for the true practical training, which it
is not possible to impart on a drill ground, and requires, as a first
condition, natural country, with all its changing features. For this
reason it must be insisted on that a part of the regimental and
brigade drill season should be spent in the country and on wide open
spaces, with great variety of topographical expression. Where such are
not to be had, then we must go to the troop training grounds; and
hence the desire, above expressed, to extend as far as possible the
period spent by the troops in the district or on these training
grounds, and which I have based on the necessity for holding annual
exercises for the higher units, in which all regiments should take
part, finds additional support.

Of course, this does not preclude the necessity of utilizing the
surroundings of the garrisons to their utmost.

As regards the arrangement and nature of these exercises, when working
on the drill ground they will have to be inserted between the pauses
in mounted movements necessary to rest the horses, but they must never
on this account be allowed to be treated as of any less importance.
When out in the country in larger and continuous movements, this
opportunity, from the nature of things, will not be available.

But it is precisely on the larger movements, if possible of whole
Divisions, that the principal stress should be laid. In these the
fight can be initiated under the most varied conditions, as a
consequence of the direction of approach, and after its execution
further operations arising out of the resulting situation can be set
on foot, which, as we have seen (Book I., Chap. VI.), will generally
entail the interaction of dismounted men with mounted reserves.

Such exercises must naturally be laid out quite independently, and
must take rank in the programmes for Brigade and Divisional drills on
an equal footing with the others. All Leaders must by degrees learn
to control the whole of this section, and find themselves as much at
home in every tactical situation on foot as if they were in the
saddle.

Hence great importance must be laid on the capacity for exercising
independent resolve in all ranks of the subordinate officers; but,
above all, they must be made to acquire that relentless tendency to go
forward which is the very soul of their service, and generally the
best adapted to its tactical requirements. Officers and men must
realize that, once dismounted, victory alone can restore to them their
horses. These latter must be so disposed that the impossibility of
making use of them to break off the engagement springs in the eyes of
every man. Only in this way can one get clear ideas: so long as the
men do not look on their action on foot as in itself something
serious, but are thinking principally of how to get back to their
horses, as long as the Leader himself makes his action dependent on
this possibility, for just so long will the men fail to put their
whole soul into their work, and we shall obtain only partial results,
with uncertain handling.

This point of view must be constantly kept in mind throughout the
training, and every effort be made to habituate the men to work up to
it. But we shall only then succeed in breaking with the old
traditions, and in fitting ourselves to meet the changed conditions of
War, when the superior officers in their inspections attach _as much
importance to the combat dismounted as they now do to the fight in the
saddle_, and submit the Leaders to an equally searching and practical
examination in each.

Amongst these changed conditions we must include the intelligent
co-operation of the Artillery with the skirmishers, and also of the
machine-guns, which latter may be expected to play a considerable part
in defence, and also on occasions requiring the sudden development of
a great intensity of fire. It is in this connection that lies (Book
I., Chap. VI.) the chief importance of the Horse Artillery batteries,
and yet in peace they have practically no opportunity to make
themselves familiar with its peculiarities.

Instead, we find in the great Cavalry manoeuvres the constantly
recurring tendency to theatrical display. Batteries accompany the
formal drill evolutions of the Divisions--a performance which, in my
opinion, has not the slightest practical value, but only subjects the
horses to unnecessary exertion, and prevents the Leaders from devoting
their attention to the really important elements of their
business--the enemy and the nature of the ground. Against all such
methods the sharpest protest should be entered.

As long as formal evolutions are being practised, the Artillery has no
place on the drill ground; the Cavalry only require its services when
the tactical training commences, and the batteries belong to the
places they would occupy in War--_i.e._, in the advance guard, or
before the front. But, above all, they must be given opportunity to
co-operate in the dismounted engagements, and not merely for their own
training--though this, of course, is of importance--but principally
for the education of the Cavalry officers, who must learn to employ
the power of this Arm tactically, wait for its effect, and utilize it.

That this object can only partially be obtained on the larger
exercising grounds, and not at all on the drill grounds, is
sufficiently obvious, and it is only necessary to call to mind the
attacks on villages, railway-stations, and the like, which are not
usually found on such places to make the difficulty apparent. The
keystone, therefore, for our purposes can only be found in the country
itself, or in manoeuvres, in which the application of every tactical
form develops naturally, and finds its justification in the general
scheme of operations, and in which the varying conditions are always
creating new situations, more or less practical in their nature.




CHAPTER V

FIELD-SERVICE TRAINING AND MANOEUVRES


If in the above sections we have dealt almost exclusively with the
training of the Cavalry for actual combat, the cause lies in the
nature of things. Victory whether in the shock of 'Masses' or even in
the minor encounters of patrols, forms so much the foundation of every
possible success, whether strategical or otherwise, that training with
this end in view naturally comes first under our consideration.

But as the chief importance of Cavalry no longer lies in its
application on the battle-field, but rather in the solution of the
strategical problems encountered in the progress of operations, so its
training for battle is no longer the one aim and object, but only one
element of its whole preparation for the field. Field service, its
true duties in reconnaissance and strategic movements, must all be
taken into account as factors of equal importance.

I wish to bring this necessity most especially into the foreground,
since hitherto, and particularly in view of the changed conditions of
modern Warfare, it has not attracted anything approaching the
attention it deserves.

What do we practise in the field-service exercises and in the
manoeuvres beyond the normal Cavalry versus Cavalry encounters?
Principally, only formal outpost duties in combination with Infantry,
the smallest incidents of War on the smallest scaled tactical
scouting, and the participation of small Cavalry bodies in the
encounter between the combined Arms--all matters which nowadays come
within the sphere of the Divisional Cavalry; and, indeed, only then
when the divisions to which they belong, or even smaller bodies, are
operating independently, for the daily routine of the Divisional
Cavalry in the enormous Armies of the present day will be on a most
modest scale. At most in the Army Corps manoeuvres we may get as far
as the employment of Brigades, and perhaps to the shadowing of an
enemy's line of advance.

For the most important field of our enterprise, which is to be sought
in the activity of the Independent Cavalry, all this is of small
account. The real duties of Cavalry in War are only practised in peace
on the most confined scale, and often not at all.

Long marches of endurance, independent outposts, attack and defence of
localities, the forcing of defiles, passage of rivers, etc., which are
held by an enemy's dismounted men, reconnaissances in the widest
sense, undertakings against the enemy's communications, pursuit,
protracted engagements covering retreats, marches with columns and
convoys, finally, the arrangement and execution of wide strategic
movements under practical conditions, with accurate computation of
time and space, the suitable employment of fighting power for the
attainment of the strategical object, and the best strategic
introduction of the consciously sought-out combat, all within the
limits imposed by the magnitude of the masses handled, are matters
which in future will form the principal sum of all Cavalry activity,
but find no place in our scheme of education.

Even the Imperial Manoeuvres do not meet the situation, because, in
the first place, only comparatively few regiments are annually
affected by them; and in the second, the forces are generally from the
outset in such close proximity with one another that it is only,
perhaps, on the first day that a suitable situation for their
strategic employment may be said to arise at all.

Whilst in this manner our whole training is adopted for conditions
which in future campaigns can only arise exceptionally, whilst it
practically ignores the true sphere of action of the Cavalry, we are
working in a vicious circle of forms and misrepresentations which
belong to an extinct era of Warfare, and which have long since ceased
to have any but the smallest connection with the facts of stern
reality.

That things were no better in the period before the last Wars the
negative results obtained by our Cavalry in 1866 and 1870 sufficiently
prove. In no sphere of their action during these campaigns did they
obtain the results the Arm is really capable of--not because the
material in the ranks was inferior, but simply and solely because in
equipment and training they had lagged behind the requirements of the
time. These experiences should have been to us a serious warning not
to fall into similar errors a second time; and yet at the present
there is most serious danger that a future War may again find us
regarding by far the most important branch of our duties from a
standpoint which has long since passed away.

The reasons for this state of affairs seem to me of a twofold
character. In the first place, the tasks accruing to the Arm in War do
not receive either amongst its own officers, still less amongst those
of the rest of the Army, their proper appreciation, because in this
direction guidance and instruction are alike lacking; in the second,
because most serious difficulties lie in the way of a practical
adaptation of our training to modern conditions.

In contradistinction to former times, the tasks which await the
Cavalry lie principally in the sphere of strategical operations, and
here is the root of our special difficulty.

Great Armies, with their communications, reconnaissances and raids
under really warlike conditions--that is to say, with their full
allowance of trains and baggage--extended retreats with beaten troops,
and the consequent pursuit, can only with difficulty be represented in
peace, owing to their expense and the consideration necessary to be
shown to local circumstances; but it is precisely in exercises of this
description, which might give a really working representation of the
conditions we shall be called upon to deal with, that circumstances
leave us entirely deficient.

Considering all these conditions, it must be recognised that an ideal
method of instruction is practically beyond the bounds of the
attainable; but for that very reason, in my opinion, we must pursue
with all energy the practically possible, and for the unattainable
find the best substitute we can.

The first point which strikes one, and which lies at the bottom of all
Cavalry undertakings, but in which no real education ever takes place,
is the conduct of patrols, and particularly of those employed for
reconnoitring purposes.

Instruction in the matter is certainly universal, and in the writing
of reports the non-commissioned officers have considerable practice,
but no uniform or systematic method or fixed principle is observed,
and the practical performances of the men are subject to no superior
check. It is left to the Leaders to apply practically their, for the
most part, very nebulous, theoretical knowledge. The young officer in
particular is altogether left to his own devices; no one takes the
trouble to teach him what is essential, and yet he is expected to
instruct his inferiors. The consequences are what might be
anticipated. The performances of the patrols in covering distances are
generally most commendable, but their reports most deficient. Seldom
is a clear distinction drawn between the essential and the
non-essential; the most trivial news is forwarded with the same
expenditure of horses' power as matter of greatest moment; for most
patrol Leaders find it very difficult, for want of an imagination
trained by the study of military history, to think themselves into and
see the situation as it actually would be in War, and thus to act and
ride as the circumstances viewed in this light really require. Most
information, poor as it is, is thus obtained in an unpractical manner;
and seldom is the degree of instruction realized which the situation
affords, namely, to observe keenly and clearly from a distant point,
and to carry out the ride in the spirit of the general situation, with
a proper calculation of time and space. In this branch of duty change
is imperative; the training for scouting must be made the foundation
of the whole course, and carried through in a uniform manner.
Everywhere it must be based on the conditions of a great War.

How the scientific knowledge necessary for the officers, which forms
the basis of this instruction, is to be encouraged and imparted forms
the subject of this next section. Here we can only consider what can
and must be done within the regiments and brigades, and the following
suggestions seem to me to meet the difficulty.

In the winter, as soon as the inspection 'on the curb' is over, the
Regimental Commander with his Staff Officer and Squadron Commanders
must take the training in hand. He must begin with a definite
strategical situation, and from this as a basis, devise corresponding
schemes for patrols, which can be worked out in the neighbourhood of
the garrison, and then ride out with his officers exactly as in
practice the patrols would have to do. Arrived in the vicinity in
which contact with the enemy would take place, he assumes what the
patrols would see, and lets the class form their own decisions, write
their reports, and determine the manner of their further procedure.

In these opportunities he can instil the true principles to be
followed, and demonstrate their practicability by all sorts of
exercises, until he is convinced that his hearers have completely
assimilated his standpoint and method of thought. Particular
importance must be attached to the point that the patrol leaders never
lose sight of the whole problem, and refer their observations always
to this standard, for it is only then that things appear in their true
importance; further, it must always be borne in mind up to what time
the report must be in the hands of the Leader if it is to be of use
for the special operation.

The best information may be valueless if, as in 1870 so often
happened, it arrives too late. This the patrol leader must keep in
mind throughout his ride, and thence deduce the time at which his
report must be despatched. He must also not only state clearly and
precisely what he has seen, but call attention to its probable bearing
on the operations, and inform his superior as to any peculiarities of
the ground that may influence his future conduct. The object of the
ride must be constantly in view, and the report not be overburdened
with trivialities about the enemy's patrols and the like, which are
often in War of quite negligible importance.

If the Commanding Officer chooses to take the whole of his officers
out to these expeditions, he is, of course, free to do so.

The Squadron Commanders now take their subordinates in hand and pass
on the instruction in the same spirit and manner, or hand over the
matter to the senior lieutenant, if he has been thoroughly instructed
for the purpose. In this manner a good uniform system of patrol
leading based on sound principles can be attained if the Commanding
Officer and his subordinates take all types of patrol duty into the
sphere of their practical instruction. The Brigade Commander can use
his discretion in its supervision, and give any assistance he may
consider necessary.

For the practical training of the men, the foundation must, of course,
be found in the squadron. But the teaching must start from constantly
changing standpoints, and must be systematically carried on in the
higher Commands, which is at present not the case. For though at times
such exercises are carried out by the regiments, there is no
systematic progress, and no consequent development or representation
of the most important elements, whilst higher up no attempt is even
made to continue the instruction further. The influence of the
Brigadier is confined in general to the detail education and drill,
and though the Division is now and again drilled, it never 'operates'
in the strategical sense.

As concerns the education of the squadron, this must from the very
beginning be rooted in modern conditions, which in the first place
demand the development in the man of the greatest possible
individuality. War requires this, as well as the gift of grasp and
resolution even in difficult situations, from every Cavalry soldier,
from the highest to the lowest. The exercise, however, of such
qualities can only be demanded from men who bring with them at least a
certain degree of comprehension for the nature of War, and it is
therefore of the utmost importance that this comprehension should be
developed by suitable instruction. This is often sinned against,
because sufficient attention is not paid to such instruction, and also
because we still work on out-of-date lines, and without any
well-defined principles. In my opinion the recruit must not be
overwhelmed with a whole mass of thoroughly unpractical knowledge.

In this period of education one must limit the scope to only the most
important and necessary matters, but teach these so that the men
understand them clearly and thoroughly.

In the latter years one can build out systematically on this
foundation. Thus I consider it quite unnecessary to harass the recruit
with long-winded explanations of the military virtues--loyalty,
obedience, and courage--or with long lists of different salutes to be
given, the recipients of which never come within his ken. It is quite
superfluous to teach them the different parts of the lock of the
carbine and their mutual interaction, all about stable duty and guard
mounting. Even the theoretical instruction about the organization of
the Army, treatment of sore backs, horse sickness, etc., can be
reduced to much smaller dimensions than at present. Stable work and
guard duties, and so forth, a man learns much quicker and better from
daily practice. On the other hand, the time gained by curtailing these
matters must be used most zealously to teach him what he absolutely
must know for War. That is to say, the simplest principles of Field
Service, the composition of mixed detachments, practical shooting, and
the exterior treatment of the carbine. The instruction in Field
Service, which interests us here the most, can, for the recruits, be
kept down to very narrow limits. The principles to be observed in
placing pickets, vedettes, etc., he can very well do without. On the
other hand, he must know thoroughly those things which he will have to
do himself--his duty on patrols, or as bearer of a message, or
orderly, also the general connection of the military conditions
amongst which he will have to move or to notice amongst the enemy,
such as organization of the troops, arrangement of the outposts,
relation of the commands, plan and appearance of entrenchments,
shelter trenches, gun epaulments, cover, etc.[29]

         [Footnote 29: Instruction with models helps the man quickest;
         it is very difficult for the recruit to form a mental picture
         of military things.]

He must know, too, that if taken prisoner, he must give no correct
answers as to anything concerning his own Army.

It is quite possible to awaken the intellectual faculties of the man
and to develop them even within these narrow limits, for the more
tersely the facts are stated, and the more thorough the instructions,
the more is his thinking power stimulated, whereas a mass of material
to be absorbed merely confuses him. This intellectual pressure of the
instructor must not, of course, be limited solely to the lesson hour,
but he must seize every possible opportunity to assert his influence.
Especial attention is to be directed to habituate the men to carry in
their minds verbal messages for a considerable period, and then to
repeat them clearly and concisely. It is of great assistance to the
intellectual development of the men if they are compelled always to
express themselves in grammatically complete sentences, instead of in
broken phrases; but I should consider it as a serious error to attempt
to teach the recruit the neighbourhood of the garrison, both on the
map and on the ground. For in this way one deprives the man of one of
his few opportunities which occur to him during his whole service of
learning to find his way in unknown country, and thus to develop the
instinct of finding his way, which requires considerable practice.

That this faculty is one of the most important in War-time for every
Cavalry soldier can hardly be open to doubt. From the same point of
view I must enter a protest against the absurd misuse of maps in
Peace-time. Of course, the men, and particularly the patrol leaders,
must understand how to read a map and find their way by it, and all
non-commissioned officers and men out of their first year's service
must be trained in so doing, but it is altogether impractical, and
therefore a bad preparation for war, if in the interests of better
manoeuvre results maps are issued in uncounted numbers even on the
larger scales, so that not only every patrol leader, but every
orderly, can obtain one for a couple of pence. In War, and
particularly in an enemy's country, such extravagance in their issue
is obviously out of the question.

The education of the non-commissioned officers must also be
systematically set in hand. They should be divided, according to their
intelligence and performances, in different groups--two will generally
suffice--and the abler men should not only receive instruction for the
higher branches of their duties, but must also be rationally taught
how to teach others. The non-commissioned officers' school must also
receive thorough attention; if it is not conducted seriously, it
involves a scandalous waste of time, but if the men receive a really
earnest and stimulating instruction, it helps most materially in their
intellectual development, and thus reacts most favourably on their
military capacity.

As concerns the practical exercises of the squadron, these must, as
far as possible, cut themselves free from the spirit of minor tactics,
and work as directly as they can towards the requirements of War on a
great scale. The destruction of railways and bridges, service on
requisitioning duties, etc., must naturally continue to be practised;
for though in spirit they belong to minor tactics, they are also
required in great Wars. But, above all, one must break with the old
one-sided schemes of outpost squadron--officers and non-commissioned
officers, posts and vedettes--and the whole subject must be treated on
wider lines more in accordance with the changing requirements of
active service. The different purposes for which localities are held
and utilized in different manners, the use of woods, and waves of the
ground, must all be drawn most thoroughly into the scope of the
exercises; and whilst still at squadron work the men must be made
clearly to understand the difference between mixed outposts and those
of Independent Cavalry, and the chief importance of their whole
training in this branch of their duty must be laid on the latter,
which is even nowadays not yet sufficiently the case. Further, there
must be thorough training in duties of security and reconnoitring at
night, and in particular of the defence of cantonments against
nocturnal attacks.

In general, it must be clearly understood that all squadron training
can only be elementary, and hence must be regarded as a stepping-stone
towards the whole field-service training. Where this is left
altogether to the squadrons, the men never have the opportunity of
becoming acquainted with the conditions of time and space which limit
their action when in large bodies. Continuous exercises also, always
in the same units, lead only too easily to empty repetition and many
misunderstandings. The Squadron Field Service training must,
therefore, be limited in time, and as soon as it is completed it must
be continued in the regiment, and where the conditions at all
allow--_i.e._, where the garrisons are not too far apart--it must
culminate in brigade work.

The 'training'--_i.e._, the condition of the horses-must by this time
have made such progress that marches of twenty to thirty miles for the
main body are well within their power. Here a wide and profitable
field opens for the Brigade Commander, but it is important in every
case--security, screening, reconnaissance, raid, or surprise--to bring
out systematically and clearly the essential difference of procedure
required, so that all grades of Leaders learn to realize the
fundamental distinction which exists between these various forms of
their several duties.

It is also equally important that in each Command operations in
several detachments, the regulation of their marching speed, their
combined action in the fight, the proper working of the arrangements
for collecting information or transmitting orders, should be practised
again and again till certainty in their interaction is secured.

It is further necessary to call attention to the necessity, in the
interests of a prudent economy of one's forces, to arrange the patrol
service systematically, not only as regards the sphere of action
allotted to each, but also as to the time of their departure.

Thus, in the march of a single body, the duty of attending to its
security may be assigned to the troops themselves, whilst the
reconnoitring task is allotted by the officer directing the
operations; or, in the case of separate bodies, that each receives its
own particular scouting mission, with which, then, the Director
refrains from interfering. Otherwise it may easily happen that patrols
are despatched for the same purpose by different Commanders, with a
corresponding waste of power and the risks of leaving gaps in the
whole line.

The Commanders of mixed detachments should also make this need of
systematic procedure clear to themselves, and either leave the whole
duty of reconnaissance in the hands of the Cavalry, or if they elect
to retain certain portions of the work in their own hands they should
inform the Cavalry Commander of the fact, and not interfere afterwards
with his arrangements, or fail to keep him acquainted with the
measures they have themselves taken.

The first course is correct in principle, and will always give the
best results when a competent Cavalry officer is kept sufficiently
acquainted with the views of his superior, and made personally
responsible for results.

Finally, as concerns practice in conjunction with the other Arms,
these, too, must lead into different paths from those at present
pursued. Detachments of Infantry and Artillery need Cavalry for
reconnaissance, security, and orderly duties; but for the Cavalry
itself these exercises (of small bodies) have little importance,
except in so far as they familiarize the men with the organization and
development of the other Armies, and thus learn to form an opinion
when viewing these from a distance. The combined action of Cavalry
with companies, battalions, and regiments has no importance at all,
and is often the merest waste of time. It is much more important to
secure practice for the troops in judging the appearance of
considerable bodies of Infantry, either on the march or in position,
and thence deducing their probable numerical strength.

The former class of exercises will, therefore, be on as restricted a
scale as possible, whilst more time is given to the former, and by
arrangement with neighbouring garrisons opportunities can often be
made. In this way much can be done in the garrison and the Brigade to
further the training of Cavalry for the work of a great War, although
such exercises can in no way replace the actual manoeuvring of large
bodies.

It must rather be insisted on that the whole Field-Service training of
the Arm can only be brought to its legitimate conclusion in the
strategical exercises of large and changing combinations of units.
Even the manoeuvres, important as they undoubtedly are, can never
replace them. They must, therefore, be placed on a footing of equal
importance with the great drill practices of the higher units, since
the strategical value of the Arm to the supreme Commander of the Army
depends on its intelligent handling in this particular field, and it
is here that the difficulties to be overcome are especially great.

Again, system must be inculcated if clearness of apprehension of the
several problems is to be produced.

It will be of the utmost importance that baggage and, if possible,
trains corresponding to the conditions on mobilization should be
employed, and that men and horses should be fed from their contents;
otherwise we would only too easily drop into habits of under-estimating
the difficulties with which in real War we shall have to contend. But to
guard against this self-deception should be the end and object of all
our efforts.

It will, therefore, be necessary to calculate distance and the width
of areas to be swept over, with reference to modern conditions, and
not to work on the scale that sufficed us in France in 1870. The
telegraph must also be taken into account, and it must be strictly
insisted on that it is only to be used for such reports and in such
cases in which it would be available on service. It should, therefore,
be laid down beforehand which side is to be considered as in an
enemy's country. For the representation of following portions of the
Army, flag columns and peace garrisons may be employed, as this is of
the utmost importance for the systematic practice of the patrol
service.

The formation of territorial Cavalry Inspections and Sub-Inspections,
already advocated above, would give the necessary foundation for our
purposes. After finding the Divisional Cavalry necessary on a War
strength, the remaining regiments in their several districts could be
formed in Divisions and Corps of always varying composition in order
to carry out Independent Cavalry manoeuvres.

To practise the participation of the other Arms, corresponding
arrangements with the adjacent Corps Commanders could be made, so that
their annual manoeuvres could work in with the Cavalry scheme, but the
strategic side should have the preference. Operations would not always
culminate in a great Cavalry engagement, but a skilful conduct of the
manoeuvres in practical country would generally insure such encounters
without too great a charge for agricultural compensation.

I do not believe that such a scheme, though it would certainly mean a
complete break with established Routine, would materially increase the
cost of the manoeuvres. The damage, now disseminated by the many
regiments without any corresponding gain to their efficiency, would
now be concentrated on the same district, but the gain to the Arm
itself, as well as for the whole Army, would be both decisive and
epoch-making.

Great though the importance and necessity of such an arrangement seems
to me, yet, as circumstances at present exist, one could hardly count
on seeing it applied at once to the whole service, and meanwhile we
must search for expedients.

From this point of view, also, we must strive to extend the period
allotted for the training of the larger Cavalry bodies to such a
degree that Field-Service days can be interposed between the drill
days, in which at least the combined action of masses within the
limits of Field-Service exercises can be practised.

The question then arises whether it would not be as well to sacrifice
a part of the tactical training of the Divisional Cavalry in the
interest of the proposed strategic manoeuvres, and whether the
advantages we anticipate from these latter might not, at any rate
partially, be attained in another manner. It seems to me that to a
certain extent this may well be possible, if we can only make up our
minds to break with our existing arrangements regulating the present
exercises, and order a certain number of garrisons, detailed in
groups, to operate one against the other. If this grouping is carried
out without reference to Corps boundaries, and the exercises are so
managed that the troops need only spend one night out of quarters,
during which they can bivouac, very great advantages at very small
cost would be derived, because, since in these operations it is not at
all necessary to carry them through to their culmination in an
engagement, but only to concentrate them for the purpose, when
necessary, in a practical manner, and to set all the machinery for
reconnoitring, for transmission of orders, and reports, in operation,
the damages to cultivation might be kept within very reasonable
limits.

An example will help to make the idea clearer. If from the regiments
in Metz, Thionville, and St. Avoid on the one side, and of those in
Saarburg, Saargemund, Saarbrucken on the other, two opposing forces
are constituted, it would be easy to draw up a general idea by which
each element of the group considered as an independent Cavalry screen
covering the advance of an Army had reached on a given night the
points at which they are actually quartered. The distances of the
places named one from another are such that they fairly represent a
possible situation in War, and a single day's march might well bring
them into collision. Inexpensive bivouac places could easily be found
in the wooded districts of Lorraine or elsewhere, and the Infantry in
the respective garrisons might represent the heads of the following
Armies' columns without undue interference with their programme of
training. If the Cavalry march out with four squadrons only per
regiment, the fifth can find horses for a part of the train, the point
being not so much the number of such waggons provided as the service
loading of those that are taken. In the afternoon and night preceding
the march, outposts could be established, and the service of
exploration commenced. Thus in two or three days a strategic exercise
for the Cavalry on a large scale could be arranged at a very low cost
and with very little difficulty. Such operations would naturally be
conducted by the Inspectors-General of Cavalry, and, as the example
shows, they could be generally, if not everywhere, easily
organized.[30]

         [Footnote 30: Taking into account these and similar demands
         on the Inspectors-General, the question arises whether the
         time has not come to attach to them permanently officers of
         the General Staff. Every increase in the number of these
         officers employed in peace is a great advantage for War,
         because the War formations require far more Staff Officers to
         fill the new positions created on mobilization than are
         employed in peace--a very serious disadvantage. I consider it
         absolutely essential that each Inspector-General of Cavalry
         should be provided with a permanent Staff.]

Since it is essential in all Cavalry exercises to take into account
the numbers and distances with which we shall have to deal in future
Warfare, it would be a great gain to the Arm if in the manoeuvres, in
which its action in combination with the other Arms should be taught,
this point of view was brought more into the foreground.

Of course it is not intended that the interests of the other Arms
should be sacrificed to those of the Cavalry; the question rather is
whether these interests are not identical even for the Infantry; the
importance of minor tactics has fallen very much into the background,
and both Infantry and Artillery require far more practice in 'masses.'
Detachment warfare can for the most part be quite sufficiently
practised in the garrisons, but the opportunities for exercising the
large units are far more difficult to find.

I consider, therefore, that it would be of advantage to all Arms if
present Brigade manoeuvres, with all their superannuated customs, were
abolished in favour of more Divisional and Corps manoeuvres. The
Cavalry, at any rate, would welcome the innovation, for from its point
of view these manoeuvres could be made far more practical, and it
would be easier to arrange schemes for the latter more in accordance
with reality.

It is also most desirable that from time to time the Cavalry should
have opportunities of practising both pursuit and rearguard action on
a grand scale. At present these only arise in the manoeuvres with
mixed Arms, since in the Independent Cavalry manoeuvres they are
difficult of representation.

The Director of the manoeuvres can also do much to make the operations
instructive for the Cavalry, and also to stimulate the interests of
all engaged, if he takes care that the demands made upon the Cavalry
are kept within reasonable limits. It constantly happens that patrols
are despatched at far too late an hour to make it possible for their
reports to arrive in time. Commanders, again, frequently wish to be
informed as to the exact position of every battalion on the other
side, although they generally know his total force with accuracy, or
they want to know the exact strength of the Garrison holding a certain
village or locality, as if Cavalry could under any circumstances
supply such information; and if at night no sketch of the enemy's
outpost line has been handed in, the Cavalry are held to have failed
in their duty. All these demands are, in my opinion, entirely
unpractical; in War one never has such precise information, and no
rational man dreams of wasting the strength of his Cavalry in
endeavouring to secure such details. These things are mere remnants of
the Paleolithic Age, and only justifiable as an extreme case when
perhaps planning a surprise. Further, it is thoroughly unpractical to
require under all circumstances complete information as to the
progress of an engagement. With modern weapons this is impossible,
unless favoured by unusual topographical conditions. Not merely are
such demands unpractical, but they exercise a most prejudicial effect,
for too accurate and too detailed information gets the Generals into
bad habits of command, and the Cavalry itself is well-nigh ruined.
Certainly, when circumstances demand it, the men must not be afraid to
keep well up to the enemy, and bring back intelligence even out of the
zone of his fire; but, generally, reliable observations are only made
out of range. The Cavalry must learn principally to judge the enemy's
arrangements from a distance; they must direct their attention to the
essential only, and not waste their time in unnecessary side issues.
If justice is to be done to these requirements, it is quite impossible
to collect all the information the Generals so frequently require.
Thus they get in the habit of observing in an unpractical manner, and
the whole of this most important branch of their education suffers
accordingly. So much is this the case that nowadays the patrol leaders
often exchange mutual confidences to one another, as it is practically
impossible, owing to conditions of time and space, to obtain the
required information otherwise, and they consider it better to get it
in this manner than to accustom their men to unpractical feats of
riding.

Reconnaissance and its results can only be of value to the training
when kept within the limits that the nature of things dictates.

Whilst the constant presence of danger is the characteristic element
in which the faculties of observation have to work in War, it is the
constant pressure of uncertainty as to the exact movements of the
enemy which equally characteristically forms the conditioning element
in which the intellectual activity of the Leaders has also to work,
and neither one nor the other may be entirely ignored in our
Peace-time training.




CHAPTER VI

THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF OUR OFFICERS


The consideration we have devoted in the foregoing chapters to the
various fields for Cavalry action opened out by the changed conditions
of modern War have shown us what tremendous demands will be made upon
the leader of a great Cavalry 'Mass' in the future. He must be an
absolute master of the technical side of his own Arm. He must be ready
to enter into the spirit of the widest strategical considerations of
the Superior Command, and according to circumstances to act in harmony
with them on his own initiative. He must know the spirit, the methods
of fighting, and the peculiarities of the other Arms, so as to be able
to intervene at the right time and place in the action. He must with
swift determination combine boldness with circumspection; and in
addition, he must not only be a bold horseman, but must possess
inexhaustible activity of mind and body.

If these are the demands modern War will make upon the higher leaders
of the Arm, those which fall on the lower ranks have been intensified
in similar fashion; for, quite apart from their bodily and mental
qualifications, they will need, for the solution of the various
problems with which they will be confronted, an immensely increased
amount of military knowledge and executive ability.

The amount of initiative which will be required in simple Cavalry
engagements between the larger groups, and in strategic operations of
the Arm, from subordinate leaders has been already discussed above,
and it will be clear that only a thorough comprehension of the whole
situation will enable the individual to act opportunely when such
moments may arrive. It is not merely a general military education
which will be required, but greatly increased endurance, boldness,
and, above all, a wider understanding for the whole connection of the
great operations, and the power of judging a military situation with
accuracy, which must prevail through all ranks, down to the leader of
an independent patrol. The whole method of observation and the results
deduced therefrom will assume quite a different form when managed by
Officers who have learnt to understand and to judge operations on a
large scale. Without such training only isolated facts will be
reported--deductions will not be drawn. There will be no
discrimination between important and unimportant details, and the
Officer himself will not be able to come to a correct decision as to
the direction in which to pursue his mission. But this is exactly what
it is most important that all Officers should be relied on to perform.
They must understand how, from a given mass of observations, to deduce
the strength, bearing, and condition of the enemy in general, to
divine the probable connection of his operations, and hence to
determine the most important points and directions in which to follow
up any available clue.

If an Officer comes upon an outpost or an occupied position, he
should be able from the indications on the spot and from his map to
determine where the flanks are likely to rest, and hence on what point
to direct his further advance.

If he happens on troops at rest or on the march, he must be able to
decide whether it is more important to follow or watch their
subsequent movements, or to carry out his reconnaissance in some other
direction. He must, in fact, judge what it is of the greatest
importance for the superior staff to know when his instructions in
face of altered circumstances leave him in momentary uncertainty.

Such illustrations could be extended indefinitely, but the sum of all
points to the same conclusion--viz., that a comprehensive military
education, and at least a general grasp of the principles of the
Higher Strategy, are essential for every reconnoitring Officer. The
history of previous campaigns points the same moral by innumerable
examples, and how much more frequent must such incidents be in the
future.

Let us take the case of the Battle of Gravelotte only--the point was
to determine whether the French were still clinging to the fortress or
were marching away from it. Not one of the patrols, however, whose
doings can still be traced, or whose reports are still in existence,
seems to have possessed the comprehension of the situation which would
have enabled it to report on what it was of the utmost importance for
the Army Headquarters to know. None of them even noted the direction
in which the troops they saw were moving--a matter of most vital
importance--or estimated the strength of the several encampments, or
reported the fact that certain roads were clear, although they were
all moving in the immediate vicinity, and might easily have
ascertained these facts had they realized their importance. Thus,
because they were uncorroborated, the most important observations led
to false conclusions. The point of transcendent consequence--the
actual position of the French right flank--could not be determined
until hours after the battle had been begun under an entire
misapprehension of the actual circumstances. Similar experiences have
repeated themselves times without number.

When we now reflect upon the greatly increased importance of reliable
information in Modern War, we cannot escape the conclusion that a
proper training of our Cavalry Officers to meet their requirements is
of vital importance. Their present-day education does not sufficiently
guarantee their competence.

The knowledge of the military sciences acquired at the War schools is
on a very modest scale, nor is it, indeed, the business of these
schools to give higher education in such subjects. Hence it is all the
more deplorable that the higher intellectual training of our Cavalry
Officers practically ceases after the War School, because the
practical day-to-day duties of their profession furnishes them with
nothing which can replace the need for a higher theoretical training.
Generally, their attention is absorbed by the smallest of details,
which, though each is of immense importance to the efficiency of the
whole Arm, are not calculated to widen their intellectual horizon, and
in the few great manoeuvres in which an Officer might find an
opportunity of enlarging his knowledge, he finds himself lacking in
the foundation necessary to make full use of it.

The usual course of instruction, in fact, is not adapted to the needs
of the Cavalry Officer, who already in early youth may find himself in
situations requiring adequate strategical knowledge for their
solution; hence there is urgent need for the supreme military
authorities to concern themselves at once both with his theoretical
and practical education.

The latter could best be provided for in connection with the
development of the Field-Service training of the Troops already dealt
with above. The former--_i.e._, the scientific side--could be most
adequately met by the creation of a 'Cavalry School' on the lines of
the special Artillery and Engineer Schools which already provide for
the further education of the Officers of these Arms after they have
spent a couple of years or more in responsible command of men in their
own units.

If on the broader foundations of the military sciences--principally
those relating to the conduct of operations, to Strategy and
Tactics--thus supplied, the Regimental Commanders were to build up by
practical instruction, as above indicated, and the whole spirit of the
training were modified in conformity with the views therein already
expressed, then I consider that, with the admirable material amongst
our Officers which already exists, and which for the most part needs
only opportunity to prove its value, most important results might be
achieved.

Such a school would be most fittingly affiliated to the existing
School of Equitation in Hanover. The bright, attractive side of
Cavalry life, as we there find it, would be a useful counterpoise to
the risk of too much theory, and the district lends itself admirably
to practical exercises in reconnaissances and endurance rides.

So long as this most desirable reform remains only an ideal, we must
strive to do the utmost we can within the limits of our existing
educational system, for the need is urgent, and admits of no delay.

We must devote increased attention to this portion of our officers'
training from the very commencement of their career, and see that they
are so far initiated into the nature both of tactical and strategical
relations that they may be able, on the one hand, to reconnoitre an
enemy in the spirit of the intentions of the Supreme Command; on the
other, that they are capable of commanding their units in any given
strategical situation.

All means must be strained towards the attainment of this purpose.

One of the first stepping-stones in our progress must be the actual
horsemanship of the Officer himself. A man who under every
circumstance feels himself firm in the saddle does not need to exert
force to fight with or restrain his horse, and having learnt both how
to think and command at a gallop, will lead Cavalry and reconnoitre
before the enemy with far greater certainty and much better results
than one to whom these things are hardly second nature.

Bold and determined horsemanship acts and reacts on all a man's other
soldierly characteristics, and forms thus a basis for further progress
of the highest order, apart from the fact that it impresses the men
most favourably, and induces them to follow with greater confidence.

Hence, even from the standpoint of the higher education, the standard
of horsemanship can never be raised too high. Given this, and the
remainder can be acquired in the practical day-to-day work of the
unit, in the training of the men themselves, and in the exercises in
Field-Service duties, in manoeuvres and Cavalry exercises, always
provided that these are all conducted in conformity with the spirit of
modern operations. But since we have seen this practical duty, as at
present carried on, nowhere meets the above conditions, we must find a
supplement to it by recourse to systematic training in Field-Service
rides, War Games, and Staff Tours, for which, of course, the necessary
funds must be provided.

These exercises must be begun in the regiment, and continued through
each successive grade up to the 'Inspection,' the sphere of each being
enlarged with the increase in the importance of the Command.

But they will only then possess value and importance when based on
connected military situations arising from the operations of modern
Armies, and afford opportunities to the participants for the solution
of problems far above their existing rank, for thus only can their
mental horizon be extended. Within the radius of action of his own
Command each Officer is already in daily contact with all that it is
necessary for him to understand, and in minor tactical situations he
has abundant opportunities for training his faculties. It seems to me,
therefore, mere waste of time to give him further employment with
these matters, and the attempt could only end in depriving them of all
interest. On the other hand, the Regimental Officer is seldom if ever
placed in positions which would enable him to form any adequate
conception of the execution and connection of the greater operations,
to realize the importance of the action of the unit within the
framework of the whole, or to notice how faults in details, apparently
trivial in themselves, can mount up in the mass until they may
jeopardize the success of any given undertaking.

The higher the intellectual pinnacle on which he is placed, the wider
becomes his horizon, and consequently his appreciation of the relative
importance of each individual link in the chain.




CONCLUSION


If now, at the conclusion of my investigations, we summarize the chief
results arrived at, we find the following sequence of thought:

The value of Cavalry in relation to the other Arms has risen
materially; as a consequence of the whole range of changes introduced
into the conduct of modern War--viz., those due to changes in the
composition of Armies, to railways, telegraphs, supply, weapons, etc.
Its strategical tasks have increased in importance, and on the
battle-field new opportunities for successes have been disclosed.

Mounted and dismounted action have now become functions of equal
importance. Great results--whether strategical or tactical--can only
be obtained by the employment of 'Masses.'

The changing conditions of War demand increased mobility, both
organic, strategic, and tactical.

The difficulties of leadership, in consequence of these conditions,
have increased very materially. On the other hand, the Cavalry has
remained in every respect relatively behind the other Arms, and hence
we stand face to face with a whole list of new requirements which it
must be the task of our peace-time preparation to satisfy, and of
which the following are the most important items:

Increase in the price paid for our remounts.

Considerable increase in our numerical strength, if possible, on the
lines of our existing and well-tried organization.

Rearmament of our Cavalry with a 6-millimetre carbine, ballistically
equal in all respects to the rifle of the Infantry.

Considerable increase in the amount of ammunition carried both in
peace and War.

Improvement in the whole equipment of man and horse.

Formation of the horse batteries of four guns, with corresponding
increase in the number of batteries; introduction also of a true
quick-firer.

Supply of Maxim guns to the Cavalry. Organization of the whole of the
supply columns and pioneer detachments required to give the necessary
strategical mobility.

Improvement in the method of training horses and men, both
individually and for the purpose of securing better conditions in the
horses to stand the increased strain of modern operations.

Complete reform of our course of training, both tactical and for field
service, to fit us for employment in 'Masses,' and to meet the new
strategic requirements. The increased importance of fire-action must
be taken into account.

Further development of our Cavalry Regulations, which require not only
simplification in many details, but the addition of sections
developing the principles of the employment by 'Wings' of the several
units, an extension of the prescriptions for the use of fire-action,
and more precise formulation of tactical principles.

Rearrangement of the instructions relating to reconnaissance,
security, and the forwarding of reports, in the field-service
regulations, with due regard to the employment of cyclists where
practicable.

A more systematic, practical, and general education for our Officers;
creation of a Cavalry School, in which War should be taught on
scientific principles.

Distribution of the whole Arm into independent territorial districts,
to be termed 'Inspections' (Corps) and 'Sub-inspections' (Divisions),
which are to be entirely independent of the existing Army Corps.

Annual Cavalry Manoeuvres.

Improvement of discipline 'to meet the demands of modern Warfare.

This is a considerable list of extreme requirements put together in a
few words, and I am well aware that they are not to be obtained by a
single stroke of the pen--indeed, it needs a considerable degree of
optimism to believe that they are to be obtained at all; but I am
equally conscious that sound evolution is only possible when the
extremest purpose of our endeavours is clearly placed before our
minds, and if we have the courage to recognise openly how far we fall
short of the standard the pitiless reality of War demands.

Do not let us delude ourselves with the idea that excellence is to be
attained without exertion, or that the path of easy-going reforms,
safeguarding always existing interests, will lead us to a certain
victory.

Half-measures do more harm than good, and it will not be those races
which will survive in the great 'world struggle for existence' which
seek only for a harmonious development of all their living forces, but
rather those which devote themselves with a single mind to the
evolution of the utmost fighting power It is the triumph of
force--fighting power--which conditions the development of all other
social interests. If we possess the 'force,' the rest will follow.
Whilst, however, we seek to develop by every means in our power the
utmost strength of the nation, we must be quite clear in our own minds
as to the limits of the attainable. In War, no more than in any other
'act of human intercourse,' is the 'best' ever reached by mortal
executants. But the palm of success beckons across the field of
destiny to the race which strives towards the highest, and has made
the greatest sacrifices and dared the most to deserve it.

In this sense it is the duty of each individual unit amongst us,
unconcerned about results or consequences, to work with whole heart
and mind in the cause we serve; and the more resistance to be
encountered, the greater the obstacle to be overcome, the less may we
shun the struggle, for here also the old truth holds good: _Per aspera
ad Astra_.




INDEX


  Action, typical case of Cavalry, 225;
    example of Mars la Tour, 225 (footnote)

  Advance, time to be selected for, 32;
    rate of, 121;
    of enemy marks period for pushing forward, 27

  Advantages, in War, must be fought for, 29

  Ammunition, carbine, insufficiency of, 175, 179;
    increase in amount of, for practice, 250

  Ammunition columns, special, required for Cavalry, 179

  Armies, change of character of modern, 3

  Art of War, new conditions in, 3;
    their effect on Cavalry, 9;
    result of first engagement of overwhelming importance, 12

  Artillery, effect of modern, on defence of villages and woods, 15;
    power of, can be over-estimated, 54;
    support of dismounted Cavalry by, 60, 100;
    protection of, 95;
    Horse Artillery must adapt itself to Cavalry's action, 100;
    position for, 101;
    one battery per brigade recommended, 179;
    quick-firing guns wanted, 180;
    should be attacked from flank, 234;
    co-operation in Cavalry training, 263

  Attack, stereotyped forms of, prohibited, 72;
    on flank when advisable, 78;
    simultaneous, on front and flank, 79;
    'mobile' or 'immobile' horses during, 91;
    by dismounted troops, 99;
    change of direction of, when permissible, 116;
    importance of vehemence of onslaught, 232;
    formation for, against Infantry and Artillery, 234;
    distribution and duties of dismounted men in, 259


  Baggage-train should be represented at manoeuvres, 279

  Bapaume, Battle of, 57

  Barley as forage, 206

  Battle-field, place of Cavalry in, 81, 84;
    case of Mars la Tour, 82;
    best formation for, 85;
    decided by circumstances of case, 82, 85;
    simple formations alone applicable on, 225;
    Mars la Tour, 225 (footnote)

  Beans as a ration, 205

  Bit and bridoon, merits of, 192, 197

  Bivouac, disadvantages of, 122, 125

  Breaking in. See 'Training'

  Bridging material, sufficient, needed to be carried to deal with
    small streams, etc., 175

  Bridoon. See 'Bit'

  Brigade, highest unit for drill purposes, 238

  Bugle calls, when allowable, 69;
    value of, 230;
    regimental calls, 230;
    movements to be practised without, 236


  Cantonments, advantages of providing, 125

  Carbine, method of attachment, 176;
    improved pattern needed, 177

  Cartridges, method of carrying, 177

  Cavalry must be trained to act in 'mass,' 7;
    during Wars of 1870 and 1877-1878, 7;
    experiences of the past insufficient, 8;
    proportion to other Arms, 10;
    importance of, greater than formerly, 11;
    new tasks for, 14;
    actual fighting value diminished, 16;
    best strategic value increased, 16;
    public opinion at fault, 16;
    exploits in 1870-1871 misjudged, 16;
    German organization of, requires reform, 17;
    clear conception of requirements during each phase needed, 17;
    advance during mobilization deprecated, 23;
    should not act till enemy's strategic concentration begins, 28;
    importance of superiority over enemy's Cavalry at commencement, 31;
    in what cases the principal Arm, 37;
    Divisional, 38;
    Independent, 38;
    fire action of, during battles, 55;
    greater tactical cohesion than Infantry, 58;
    scope of, enormously increased, 59;
    importance of good leadership, 63;
    place of, in line of battle, 81, 84;
    formation of, on battle-field, 85;
    factors determining strategic employment of, 126;
    difficulty of supplying reinforcements, 151;
    augmentation of German, necessary, 153;
    and not to be postponed till mobilization, 158;
    training of, requires reforming, 181 _et seq._;
    Regulations require amendment to meet dismounted needs, 257;
    tasks for, in future War not properly appreciated, 268

  Change of formation during action, 69;
    from 'rendezvous' to 'attack,' 79

  Charge, the, when preferable to fire action, 52;
    example of Waterloo, 52;
    position of Commander during, 65;
    choice of moment for, 87;
    cohesion during, 221;
    speed of, 221

  Chargers. See 'Horses'

  Chotusitz, Battle of, 83

  Civilians, possible participation in future Wars by, 10;
    armed resistance by, to be suppressed, 33

  Column, regimental, value of, for War, 227;
    squadron, disadvantages of, 228

  Combined action, factors essential to success of, 68

  Command of Cavalry masses exceeding six regiments, 45;
    must be under a single leader, 46;
    efficiency of, more important with Cavalry than Infantry, 63

  Commander, qualities needed in a good, 64, 286;
    place of, before and during charges, 65;
    when working with other Arms, 66;
    choice of formation to be left to, 72, 76, 77;
    must be informed of progress of Infantry combat, 86;
    qualities required in covering a retreat, 86;
    in dismounted action, 93;
    must decide as to extension in strategy, 106;
    and concentration in combat, 106;
    to be kept informed of general situation, 111, 117;
    must organize his own reconnaissance, 120;
    personal supervision of front by, 121;
    forage reserve to be formed by, 131;
    to arrange times for drill, 215;
    but not to deviate from Regulations, 220;
    importance of handling 'masses,' 216.
    See also 'Leader'

  Commencement of War, essence of all Cavalry action during, 26;
    obtaining intelligence during, 27

  Communications, increased liability to interruption of, 13;
    greater opportunities for Cavalry to interfere with, 14;
    especially after victory, 14;
    to be maintained with Headquarters on field of battle, 67

  Comparison between Cavalry and Infantry, 59

  Concentration, question of disturbing enemy's communications during, 19;
    views of other Powers on this, 20;
    value of raids during, 20;
    premature commitment of Cavalry during, 24;
    reasons against sacrificing Cavalry during, 25;
    defensive duties during, 26;
    advantages of pushing forward during enemy's, 28;
    of force for raids, 35;
    of considerable masses, when essential, 44;
    for combat, 106, 108, 109

  Corn, amount of, to be carried by Cavalry, 130;
    author's experiment, 203

  Coulmiers, Battle of, 86

  'Critique' after field days, 243

  Cyclists, value of, in conjunction with Cavalry, 22, 147;
    circulation of intelligence by, 39;
    should enable Divisional Cavalry to be economized, 42;
    further Regulations required, 146;
    limitations of, 148;
    to be attached to Cavalry, 178


  Deception of enemy, means towards, 119

  Defects in horses, correction of, 199

  Defence of villages, 97

  Defensive duties at commencement of War, 26;
    combat, 92;
    'immobile' detachments during, 92;
    action, breaking off a, 94;
    action, duties of dismounted men during, 259

  Despatch riders, 138, 145

  Detachments, economy in use of, 38;
    reports from, to Headquarters, 111;
    outflanking, during attack, 232

  Direction, change of, during action, 117

  Dismounted action, increased importance of, 49;
    when desirable in attack, 49;
    when inevitable, 50;
    Sheridan's Cavalry in, 51;
    during rearguard actions, 52;
    during general engagements, 55;
    examples of Fredericksburg and Five Forks, 55;
    in South African War, 56;
    Franco-German War, 57;
    'mobile' and 'immobile' horses, 91;
    in defensive combat, 92, 93;
    tactical distribution of men in, 96;
    'Wing' or 'Line' systems, 96;
    in defence of villages, 97 _et seq._;
    in attack, 99;
    training for, 247;
    importance of, not sufficiently appreciated, 248 _et seq._;
    not to be confined to the defensive, 249;
    recruits' course, 250;
    Regulations as to, require expansion, 257 _et seq._;
    as important as fighting in the saddle, 262

  Dispersion of troops for raids, 35;
    for screening and security, 106, 109

  Divisional Cavalry defined, 38;
    duties of, 39;
    apportionment of, 41;
    as little as possible should be retained for Infantry Divisions, 42;
    reconnaissance duties of, 141;
    security duties of, 144

  Divisions of Cavalry, maintenance of, during peace, 161;
    present strength insufficient, 165;
    permanent creation of, not advisable, 167

  'Double-column' formation, when recommended, 80, 229

  'Drei Treffen Taktik,' 73

  'Dressur' detachment, 190

  Drill, shortening of season for, 198;
    importance of Squadron and Regimental, 214 _et seq._;
    merits of Brigade and Divisional, 215 _et seq._;
    ceremonial to be separated from practical, 237;
    Brigade, the highest unit for formal, 238


  Education, military, for man and horse, 186;
    tactical, for troops generally, 213 _et seq._;
    of recruits, 272;
    of non-commissioned ranks, 275;
    higher, of officers, 286 _et seq._

  Efficiency of troops essential to good leadership, 126

  Enemy, advance of, marks period for pushing forward Cavalry, 27;
    Cavalry of, must be beaten off field to obtain information, 30;
    outposts of, to be broken through, 33;
    communications, of, to be attacked, 33

  Equipment for bridging and telegraphs, 174

  Equitation, Staff for, 193;
    proposed new procedure, 200;
    school of, in Hanover, 290

  Exercises to develop 'tactical principles,' 236;
    of larger formations than Brigades, 239;
   'field-service' exercises, 240 _et seq._

  Expediency, the highest ideal of strategy, 47

  Extension of front when advisable, 107;
    in action when favourable, 240 _et seq._


  Field-firing, increased importance of, 251;
    scheme for, 252

  'Field-service' exercises, 218;
    nature of, 240;
    ground for, 239;

  Cavalry acting independently, 240;
    Cavalry in combination with other Arms, 241;
    existing deficiencies in, 266

  Fire action often imperative nowadays, 47;
    occasions when it will decide the day, 50;
    General Lee's capitulation, 51;
    South African War, 56;
    Franco-German War, 57

  Firearms, increased range of, 36;
    better class of, needed by Cavalry, 58

  Flank attack, when advisable, 78, 79;
    after victory, 83;
    during charge, 233

  Flanks of enemy to be worked round to obtain information, 29

  Forage, reserve of, 131;
    amount to be carried on horses, 169;
    author's experiment, 203

  Force necessary to be employed in various circumstances, 36

  Formation for attack, 36;
    change of, during action, 69;
    latitude to be allowed to Commander, 76, 77;
    merits of 'double column,' 80;
    'mass' when suitable, 81;
    on battle-field, 85;
    of dismounted men in action, 96;
    in defence of villages, 96;
    in dismounted attack, 100;
    best, suitable for War, 226;
    to be avoided, 226;
    regimental column, 227

  Four-squadron regiments, 154

  Frederick the Great on length of marches, 122

  Front, extension and concentration of, 107

  Frontal attack against Infantry and Artillery, 235


  Galloping, exercises in, 209

  German Cavalry, numerically inadequate, 151;
    expedients for augmenting, 153;
    proposed territorial organization, 167

  Gravelotte, example of faulty reconnaissance reports, 288

  Ground, value of tactical advantage of, 78;
    acquisition of, for field-training, 239


  Halts on march, 128

  Headquarters, reports to be sent to, from detachments, 111

  Horsemanship, 184

  Horses, demands on, 87;
    'mobile' or 'immobile,' 91;
    position for led, 93 _et seq._;
    protection of, 95;
    rest for, 122;
    security of, during rest, 122, 124;
    bivouac on march, 122;
    on outpost, 123;
    importance of care bestowed on, 123, 127;
    excessive demands on, 128;
    shortage of, in Germany, 152;
    'augmentation,' 155;
    'untrained,' of small use, 158;
    increased demands on, 181;
    training of, 185 _et seq._;
    English thoroughbreds, 187;
    Prussian, 187;
    old, 194;
    food for, increase of, 203;
    endurance of, 202;
    feeding, author's experiment in, 203;
    galloping powers, 209;
    weight to be put on, 212


  Increase of German Cavalry needed, 158

  Independence, when to be given to subordinates, 68

  'Independent Cavalry' defined, 38;
    conditions which determine allotment of, 42;
    in what cases it should be concentrated on decisive lines, 43;
    security duties of, 144

  Individual superiority essential for patrols, 31

  Infantry, effect on Cavalry of extended zone of fire of, 9;
    difficult for Cavalry to encounter in close bodies, 10;
    when once broken offer great opportunity to Cavalry, 15;
    defence of villages and woods by, more difficult now, 15;
    compared with Cavalry, 59

  Initial success, great importance of, 12

  Initiative, value of, 115

  Inspections, new scheme of, for recruits and schools, 200;
    importance of thorough, 246

  Inspector-General of Cavalry, position of, 282 and footnote

  Intelligence indispensable at commencement of War, 27;
    spaces between enemy's columns to be penetrated to obtain, 27;
    when more important than security, 28;
    circulation of, 39;
    during progress of action, 40;
    experience of 1870, 40;
    to be transmitted direct to Headquarters, as well as through
      usual channel, 45


  Lance-exercises, 254;
    better attachment of, necessary, 255

  Leader, importance of-independence of, in combined action, 68, 76;
    more initiative to be given to, 73;
    to be careful about his horses, 87;
    duty when covering a retreat, 88;
    modern requirements in a good, 89, 90;
    to be kept informed of the general situation, 111, 117;
    clearness of intention, 116;
    must organize his own intelligence, 117;
    capacity of, 126;
    of great Cavalry masses, 286

  Led horses, 91;
    place for, 93, 94;
    in dismounted practice, 259

  Lines--three-line system, 73

  Locality, faculty of finding way in unknown, 274

  Lunging rein, 188


  Manoeuvres, Brigade and Divisional, little criterion of work in War, 42;
    trotting and galloping at, 210;
    weight to be carried at, 210;
    movements which are of use for War, 226;
    theatrical display in great Cavalry, 263;
    deficiencies in existing, 266;
    Imperial, 267;
    baggage train to be represented at, 279;
    limitations of telegraphs at, 279;
    of Brigades to be abolished in favour of Divisional and Corps, 283;
    limitation of demands on Cavalry at, 284

  Maps, misuse of, 274

  Marches, flanking detachments to, 121;
    length of, 122;
    endurance of horses on, 127;
    excessive lengths of, 128;
    average lengths of, 128;
    trotting and halts on, 128

  Mars la Tour, 82, 83, 86, 225 (footnote)

  'Mass' when suitable, 81, 82

  Masses, training of Cavalry in large, 214, 215;
    necessity for bringing Cavalry together frequently in, 245

  Maxim guns with Cavalry, 178

  Messengers, employment of, to be limited, 129

  Mobility, essential in surprise actions, 118;
    German Cavalry deficient in, 169;
    of supply waggons, 173

  Mounted Reserve, duties of, 95;
    strength of, 96

  Movements most suitable for battle-field, 226;
    to be avoided, 226;
    to be practised on simple warnings, 236

  Musketry, importance of knowledge of, by officers, 253;
    judging distances, 253


  Napoleon on length of Cavalry marches, 122

  Narbonne, General von Pelet, proposals of, 155

  Numbers alone can prevail in victory or in covering retreat, 36;
    give opportunities of dismounted action, 57


  Oats, 205

  Observation of masses of enemy's army by officers patrol, 31;
    during combat, 40

  Offensive against Infantry, Cavalry capable of taking the, 60

  Officers of Cavalry have better knowledge of their men than in
      Infantry, 59;
    importance of training of, 64;
    increased importance of knowledge of musketry, 253;
    to be attached to Infantry for instruction, 256;
    higher education of, 286 _et seq._;
    training in horsemanship of, 291

  Officers patrols, when necessary, 31

  Orderlies to be limited, 128

  Orders, simplicity essential in, 68;
    how to be transmitted in the field, 69;
    by bugle call, 69;
    verbal, 69;
    to be circulated simultaneously to all subordinates, 112;
    importance of clearness in, 116

  Organization of German Cavalry unchanged, 17;
    requires reform, 17;
    must be elastic, 47;
    example of 1870, 47;
    also of Napoleon, 48;
    of German Cavalry to be by territorial districts, 167

  'Outer lines,' advantages of, 78

  Outflanking tactics, when undesirable, 53;
    detachments, work of, during charge, 232

  Outposts, necessity for breaking through enemy's, 33;
    fixed rules for, impossible, 126


  Patrols, causes of possible danger in the future, 10;
    breaking up of enemy's communications by officers, 22;
    must ascertain changes in enemy's initial dispositions, 25;
    must protect frontier districts from raids, 25;
    must avoid becoming desperately involved, 26;
    superiority in individual patroller essential, 31;
    defeat of enemy's, necessary, 31;
    'reconnoitring' distinct from 'security' patrols, 133;
    strength of, 136;
    duties of commander, 136;
    transmission of despatches by, 138;
    must report to Headquarters as well as through ordinary channel, 140;
    'tactical,' 143;
    'security,' 143;
    screening by, 144;
    Regulations need amendment, 145;
    training for scouting basis of all reconnaissance instruction, 269;
    suggestion as to instruction, 270

  Place on battle-field of Cavalry, 84, 85

  Prague, Battle of, 83

  'Principles,' tactical, of Cavalry opposed to Cavalry, 231;
    of Cavalry opposed to Infantry and Artillery, 234

  Prisoners, value of capturing, during enemy's mobilization, 24

  Protection of main force, steps required differ from those for
      obtaining information, 29;
    opposite views held, 29

  Pursuit of beaten enemy imperative, 84;
    methods of, 51;
    dismounted action during, 51;
    Waterloo, 52;
    wars of 1866 and 1870, 84;
    duties during, 88;
    to be practised on a grand scale, 283


  Quick-firing guns, employment of 180


  Raids, value of, on outbreak of War, 20;
    to exploit enemy's resources, 34;
    indispensable element in future, 34;
    depend on rapidity and surprise, 34;
    and on concentration of force at night-time, 35;
    dispersion during, 35

  Rapidity essential in raids, 34;
    and in dismounted attack, 99

  Rations, emergency, for horses, 174;
    author's experiment with forage, 203 _et seq._

  Rearguard actions, to be practised on a grand scale, 283

  Reconnaissance by independent bodies of Cavalry necessary, 7;
    rendered more difficult by range of modern firearms, 10;
    and by smokeless powder, 10;
    value of intensified, 12;
    must be a separate service from screening, 31;
    an exception to this, 41;
    advantage of defeating enemy's reconnoitrers, 31;
    under fire very difficult to effect, 39;
    on the battle-field, 66;
    cavalry leader must organize his own, 120;
    training for scouting the basis of instruction in, 269;
    knowledge of principles of 'higher strategy' essential, 288

  Reconnoitring patrols, 134 _et seq._

  Recruits, training of, 188 _et seq._, 273. See also 'Training'

  Regiment, the fundamental tactical unit, 228

  Regimental call, value of, 230 _et seq._

  'Regimental column' formation, 227;
    merits of double, 229

  Regulations should not lay down fixed evolutions, 70;
    but only essential principles of action, 70;
    existing edition of, requires revision, 70, 79;
    importance of Section 346, 76;
    rearrangement recommended, 244;
    as to training of dismounted squadrons, 253

  Reinforcements, difficulty of supplying Cavalry, 151

  Remounts, supply of, in War, 159;
    English blood in, 187;
    training of, 187

  Reports in the field to be made to Headquarters and to adjacent
      columns, 11;
    transmission of, 138 _et seq._

  Reserve forage, 131

  Reserve squadrons, position for, during attack, 232

  Reserve troops an easy prey to Cavalry when once beaten, 15

  Rest, importance of, to horses, 124, 125

  Retreat, advantages of 'outer lines' in, 78;
    duty of Cavalry covering a, 88

  Riding, cross-country, 186;
    individual, 189

  Riding School, 193 _et seq._

  Roszbach, Battle of, 83

  Rushes, advancing by, 113

  Rye as forage, 206


  Schlichting, General von, writings of, 81;
    criticism of, 83;
    on application of drill-book principles, 237

  School, Riding, 192;
    War (see 'War School');
    of Cavalry, 290

  Screening, importance of, 12;
    during absence of troops, 27;
    must give way to obtaining intelligence, 28;
    distinct from reconnoitring, 32;
    must be fought for, 33

  Security when secondary to obtaining intelligence, 28;
    during rest, 122;
    general advantages of, 124

  Sedan, Battle of, 87

  Seidlitz, Von, at Zorndorf, 87

  Simplicity essential to successful tactics, 68

  Single combat exercises, 195 _et seq._

  Skeleton enemy, 244

  Soor, action of, 83

  Squadron School, the basis of tactical training, 214;
    drill, 217;
    tactical training of dismounted, 258;
    general education of, 272, 276;
    practical exercises for, 275

  'Squadron column,' merits of, 228

  Staff required for Cavalry corps, 228

  Strategical handling of Cavalry, importance of, 37;
    fixed regulations inapplicable to, 105;
    general principles, 105

  Subdivision of force, 107

  Summary of opinions on Cavalry generally, 294

  Supply trains must march as fast as Cavalry, 171;
    length of, 172;
    mobility of, 173

  Supreme Commander, presence of Cavalry essential to success of, 37

  Surprise the essence of Cavalry actions, 16;
    indispensable in raids, 34;
    requirements for success in, 118

  System, the 'three-line,' 74


  Tactical action by Divisional Cavalry precluded, 40;
    of Cavalry changed by new conditions, 49;
    'Drei Treffen,' 73;
    training for, too elementary, 223

  Tactical education for troops generally, 213 _et seq._

  Tactical principles, Cavalry _v._ Cavalry, 231 _et seq._;
    Cavalry _v._ Infantry and Artillery, 232 _et seq._;
    exercises to develop the, 236

  Tactical and strategical principles of the future, 83

  Telegraph, control of, 140;
    limitations as to the use of, in Manoeuvres, 279

  'Three-line' system, 73

  Training, true purpose of, 161
    of Cavalry Staff, 166;
    Von Moltke's proposals, 166;
    changes must be met by new methods, 181;
    of horses and men, 184 _et seq._;
    length of period of, 188, 194;
    proposed programme for, 200;
    preparation for endurance, 207;
    War conditions essential to, 208;
    tactical, too elementary at present, 223;
    for dismounted fighting, 247 _et seq._;
    some deficiencies in present, 217;
    of squadrons a stepping-stone to field service, 276

  Training grounds ('Truppenuebungs Plaetze'), 239

  Transmission of orders during action, 69

  'Treffen,' definition of, 74

  Trotting on march, 128

  Turning movements, when imperative, 115


  Verbal orders, 69

  Villages, dismounted defence of, 97 _et seq._;
    withdrawal from, 99

  Vionville, Battle of, 107

  Von-Rosenberg at Mars la Tour, 225 (footnote)


  Waggons, supply, pace of, 171

  War conditions essential to training, 208

  War School, extent of teaching at, 289;
    creation of school for Cavalry desirable, 290

  Weight to be carried by horses, 212

  Wheat as forage, 206

  'Wing attack,' 76;
    best formation for requirements of combat, 227;
    in action against Infantry and Artillery, 234;
    freedom as to use of, 244

  Woerth, Battle of, 87


  Zone of fire, results of extension of, 9

  Zorndorf, Battle of, 87




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End of Project Gutenberg's Cavalry in Future Wars, by Frederick von Bernhardi

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