



Produced by Jeroen Hellingman and the Online Distributed
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                    The Philippines Past and Present








                         Peace and Prosperity.

    This chance photograph showing General Emilio Aguinaldo as he is
  to-day, standing with Director of Education Frank L. Crone, beside a
  field of corn raised by Emilio Aguinaldo, Jr., in a school contest,
   typifies the peace, prosperity, and enlightenment which have been
      brought about in the Philippine Islands under American rule.








                    The Philippines Past and Present


                                   By

                           Dean C. Worcester

     Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands 1901-1913;
             Member of the Philippine Commission, 1900-1913

          Author of "The Philippine Islands and Their People"



                   In Two Volumes -- With 128 Plates
                                Volume I
                                  1914






CONTENTS

VOL. I


Chapter

I.          View Point and Subject-Matter
II.         Was Independence Promised?
III.        Insurgent "Cooeperation"
IV.         The Premeditated Insurgent Attack
V.          Insurgent Rule and the Wilcox-Sargent Report
VI.         Insurgent Rule in the Cagayan Valley
VII.        Insurgent Rule in the Visayas and Elsewhere
VIII.       Did We Destroy a Republic?
IX.         The Conduct of the War
X.          Mr. Bryan and Independence
XI.         The First Philippine Commission
XII.        The Establishment of Civil Government
XIII.       The Philippine Civil Service
XIV.        The Constabulary and Public Order
XV.         The Administration of Justice
XVI.        Health Conditions
XVII.       Baguio and the Benguet Road
XVIII.      The Cooerdination of Scientific Work




LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

VOL. I


Peace and Prosperity
Fort San Antonio Abad, showing the Effect of the Fire from Dewey's
Fleet
Felipe Buencamino
The San Juan Bridge
Insurgent Prisoners
Typical Insurgent Trenches
Inside View of Insurgent Trenches at the Bagbag River
General Henry W. Lawton
Feeding Filipino Refugees
The First Philippine Commission
The Second Philippine Commission
The Return of Mr. Taft
Governor-general James F. Smith with a Bontoc Igorot Escort
Governor-general Forbes in the Wild Man's Country
The Philippine Supreme Court
An Unsanitary Well
A Flowing Artesian Well
An Unimproved Street in the Filipino Quarter of Manila
An Improved Street in the Filipino Quarter of Manila
Disinfecting by the Acre
An Old-style Provincial Jail
Retreat at Bilibid Prison, Manila
Bilibid Prison Hospital
Modern Contagious Disease Ward, San Lazaro Hospital
Filipina Trained Nurses
Staff of the Bontoc Hospital
A Victim of Yaws before and after Treatment with Salvarsan
The Culion Leper Colony
Building the Benguet Road
Freight Autos on the Benguet Road
The Famous Zig-zag on the Benguet Road
A Typical Baguio Road
One of the First Benguet Government Cottages
Typical Cottages at Baguio
A Baguio Home
The Baguio Hospital
Government Centre at Baguio
A Scene in the Baguio Teachers' Camp
The Baguio Country Club
The Bureau of Science Building, Manila
The Philippine General Hospital
The College of Medicine and Surgery, Manila
An Old-style Schoolhouse, with Teachers and Pupils
A Modern Primary School Building
Old-style Central School Building
Modern Central School Building
Typical Scene in a Trade School
An Embroidery Class
Philippine Embroidery
Filipino Trained Nurses
A School Athletic Team
Filipina Girls playing Basket-ball
University Hall, Manila
Bakidan
In Hostile Country
Travel under Difficulties
Dangerous Navigation
A Negrito Family and their "House"
A Typical Negrito
Typical Kalingas
Settling a Head-hunting Feud
Entertaining the Kalingas
An Ifugao Family
Ifugao Dancers
An Ifugao Dancer
Ifugao Rice Terraces






                    THE PHILIPPINES PAST AND PRESENT




CHAPTER I

View Point and Subject-Matter


It is customary in Latin countries for a would-be author or orator to
endeavour, at the beginning of his book or his speech, to establish
his status. Possibly I have become partially Latinized as the result
of some eighteen years of residence in the Philippines. At all events
it is my purpose to state at the outset facts which will tend to
make clear my view point and at the same time briefly to outline the
subject-matter which I hereinafter discuss.

As a boy I went through several of the successive stages of collector's
fever from which the young commonly suffer. First it was postage
stamps; then birds' nests, obtained during the winter season when no
longer of use to their builders. Later I was allowed to collect eggs,
and finally the birds themselves. At one time my great ambition was to
become a taxidermist. My family did not actively oppose this desire
but suggested that a few preliminary years in school and college
might prove useful.

I eventually lost my ambition to be a taxidermist but did not lose my
interest in zooelogy and botany. While a student at the University of
Michigan I specialized in these subjects. I was fortunate in having
as one of my instructors Professor Joseph B. Steere, then at the
head of the Department of Zooelogy. Professor Steere, who had been a
great traveller, at times entertained his classes with wonderfully
interesting tales of adventure on the Amazon and in the Andes, Peru,
Formosa, the Philippines and the Dutch Moluccas. My ambition was
fired by his stories and when in the spring of 1886 he announced his
intention of returning to the Philippines the following year to take
up and prosecute anew zooelogical work which he had begun there in
1874, offering to take with him a limited number of his students who
were to have the benefit of his knowledge of Spanish and of his wide
experience as a traveller and collector, and were in turn to allow him
to work up their collections after their return to the United States,
I made up my mind to go.

I was then endeavouring to get through the University on an allowance
of $375 per year and was in consequence not overburdened with surplus
funds. I however managed to get my life insured for $1500 and to
borrow $1200 on the policy, and with this rather limited sum upon
which to draw purchased an outfit for a year's collecting and sailed
with Doctor Steere for Manila. Two other young Americans accompanied
him. One of these, Doctor Frank S. Bourns, was like myself afterwards
destined to play a part in Philippine affairs which was not then
dreamed of by either of us.

We spent approximately a year in the islands. Unfortunately we had
neglected to provide ourselves with proper official credentials and
as a result we had some embarrassing experiences. We were arrested by
suspicious Spanish officials shortly after our arrival and were tried
on trumped-up charges. On several subsequent occasions we narrowly
escaped arrest and imprisonment.

The unfriendly attitude of certain of our Spanish acquaintances
was hardly to be wondered at. They could not believe that sensible,
civilized human beings would shoot tiny birds, pay for eggs the size
of the tip of one's little finger more than hens' eggs were worth,
undergo not a few hardships and run many risks while living in the
simplest of native houses on very inadequate food, unless actuated by
some hidden purpose. At different times they suspected us of looking
for gold deposits, of designing to stir up trouble among the natives,
or of being political spies.

When Doctor Bourns came back with the American troops in 1908 and
I returned as a member of the first Philippine Commission in 1909,
this last supposition became a fixed belief with many of our former
Spanish acquaintances who still remained in the islands, and they
frankly expressed their regret that they had not shot us while they
had the chance.

Over against certain unpleasant experiences with those who could
not understand us or our work I must set much kind and invaluable
assistance rendered by others who could, and did.

All in all we spent a most interesting year, visiting eighteen of
the more important islands. [1]

Throughout this trip we lived in very close contact with the Filipinos,
either occupying the _tribunales_, the municipal buildings of their
towns, where they felt at liberty to call and observe us at all hours
of the day and night, or actually living in their houses, which in
some instances were not vacated by the owners during our occupancy.

Incidentally we saw something of several of the wild tribes, including
the Tagbanuas of Palawan, the Moros of Jolo, Basilan and Mindanao,
and the Mangyans of Mindoro.

We experienced many very real hardships, ran not a few serious risks
and ended our sojourn with six weeks of fever and starvation in the
interior of Mindoro. While we would not have cut short our appointed
stay by a day, we were nevertheless delighted when we could turn our
faces homeward, and Doctor Bourns and I agreed that we had had quite
enough of life in the Philippines.

Upon my arrival at my home in Vermont a competent physician told my
family that I might not live a week. I however recuperated so rapidly
that I was able to return to the University of Michigan that fall
and to complete the work of my senior year. I became a member of the
teaching staff of the institution before my graduation.

Little as I suspected it at the time, the tropics had fixed their
strangely firm grip on me during that fateful first trip to the Far
East which was destined to modify my whole subsequent life. I had
firmly believed that if fortunate enough to get home I should have
sense enough to stay there, but before six months had elapsed I was
finding life at Ann Arbor, Michigan, decidedly prosaic, and longing
to return to the Philippines and finish a piece of zooelogical work
which I knew was as yet only begun.

Doctor Bourns, like myself, was eager to go back, and we set out to
raise $10,000 to pay the expenses of a two-years collecting tour, in
the course of which we hoped to visit regions not hitherto penetrated
by any zooelogist.

Times were then getting hard, and good Doctor Angell, the president
of the university, thought it a great joke that two young fellows
like ourselves should attempt to raise so considerable a sum to be
spent largely for our own benefit. Whenever he met me on the street he
used to ask whether we had obtained that $10,000 yet, and then shake
with laughter. One of the great satisfactions of my life came when,
on a beautiful May morning in 1890, I was able to answer his inquiry
in the affirmative.

He fairly staggered with amazement, but promptly recovering himself
warmly congratulated me, and with that kindly interest which he has
always shown in the affairs of young men, asked how he could help
us. Through his kindly offices and the intervention of the State
Department we were able to obtain a royal order from the Spanish
government which assured us a very different reception on our return
to the Philippines in August from that which had been accorded us on
the occasion of our first visit to the islands.

There was now revealed to us a pleasing side of Spanish character
which we had largely missed during our first visit. Satisfied
as to our identity and as to the motives which actuated us, the
Spanish officials, practically without exception, did everything
in their power to assist us and to render our sojourn pleasant and
profitable. Our mail was delivered to us at points fifty miles distant
from provincial capitals. When our remittances failed to reach us
on time, as they not infrequently did, money was loaned to us freely
without security. Troops were urged upon us for our protection when we
desired to penetrate regions considered to be dangerous. Our Spanish
friends constantly offered us the hospitality of their homes and
with many of them the offer was more than _pro forma_. Indeed, in
several instances it was insisted upon so strongly that we accepted
it, to our great pleasure and profit.

Officials were quite frank in discussing before us the affairs of
their several provinces, and we gained a very clear insight into
existing political methods and conditions.

During this trip we lived in even closer contact with the Filipino
[2] population than on the occasion of our first visit. Our rapidly
growing knowledge of Spanish, and of Visayan, one of the more important
native dialects, rendered it increasingly easy for us to communicate
with them, gain their confidence and learn to look at things from
their view point. They talked with us most frankly and fully about
their political troubles.

During this our second sojourn in the Philippines, which lengthened to
two years and six months, we revisited the islands with which we had
become more or less familiar on our first trip and added six others
to the list. [3] We lived for a time among the wild Bukidnons and
Negritos of the <DW64>s mountains.

After my companion had gone to Borneo I had the misfortune to contract
typhoid fever when alone in Busuanga, and being ignorant of the nature
of the malady from which I was suffering, kept on my feet until I
could no longer stand, with the natural result that I came uncommonly
near paying for my foolishness with my life, and have ever since
suffered from resulting physical disabilities. When able to travel,
I left the islands upon the urgent recommendation of my physician,
feeling that the task which had led me to return there was almost
accomplished and sure that my wanderings in the Far East were over.

Shortly after my return to the United States I was offered a position
as a member of the zooelogical staff of the University of Michigan,
accepted it, received speedy promotion, and hoped and expected to
end my days as a college professor.

In 1898 the prospect of war with Spain awakened old memories. I fancy
that the knowledge then possessed by the average American citizen
relative to the Philippines was fairly well typified by that of a
good old lady at my Vermont birthplace who had spanked me when I was a
small boy, and who, after my first return from the Philippine Islands,
said to me, "Deanie, are them Philippians you have been a visitin'
the people that Paul wrote the Epistle to?"

I endeavoured to do my part toward dispelling this ignorance. My
knowledge of Philippine affairs led me strongly to favour armed
intervention in Cuba, where similar political conditions seemed to
prevail to a considerable extent, and I fear that I was considered
by many of my university colleagues something of a "jingo." Indeed,
a member of the University Board of Regents said that I ought to be
compelled to enlist. As a matter of fact, compulsion would have been
quite unnecessary had it not been for physical disability.

My life-long friend and former travelling companion, Doctor Bourns,
was not similarly hampered. He promptly joined the army as a medical
officer with the rank of major, and sailed for the islands on the
second steamer which carried United States troops there. As a natural
result of his familiarity with Spanish and his wide acquaintanceship
among the Filipinos, he was ordered from the outset to devote his
time more largely to political matters than to the practice of his
profession. He did all that he could to prevent misunderstandings
between Filipinos and Americans. He assisted as an interpreter at
the negotiations for the surrender of Manila on August 13, 1898,
after taking part in the attack on the city. Later he was given
the rather difficult task of suppressing a bad outbreak of smallpox
among the Spanish prisoners of war, which he performed with great
success. He was finally made chief health officer of Manila, although
he continued to devote himself largely to political matters, got
numberless deserving Filipinos out of trouble, and rapidly increased
his already wide circle of Filipino friends. Through his letters I
was kept quite closely in touch with the situation.

Meanwhile I decided that the Philippines were not for me, asked for
and obtained leave for study in Europe, and in December 1898 set
out for New York to engage passage for myself and my family. I went
by way of Washington in order to communicate to President McKinley
certain facts relative to the Philippine situation which it seemed
to me ought to be brought to his attention.

I believed that there was serious danger of an outbreak of hostilities
between Filipinos and Americans, and that such a catastrophe, resulting
from mutual misunderstanding, might be avoided if seasonable action
were taken. I have since learned how wrong was this latter belief. My
previous experience had been almost exclusively with the Visayans and
the wild tribes, and the revolution against the United States was at
the outset a strictly Tagalog affair, and hence beyond my ken.

President McKinley very kindly gave me all the time I wanted, displayed
a most earnest desire to learn the truth, and showed the deepest and
most friendly interest in the Filipinos. Let no man believe that then
or later he had the slightest idea of bringing about the exploitation
of their country. On the contrary, he evinced a most earnest desire
to learn what was best for them and then to do it if it lay within
his power.

To my amazement, at the end of our interview he asked me whether I
would be willing to go to the islands as his personal representative.

I could not immediately decide to make such a radical change in my
plans as this would involve, and asked for a week's time to think
the matter over, which was granted. I decided to go.

Meanwhile, the President had evolved the idea of sending out a
commission and asked me if I would serve on it. I told him that I would
and left for my home to make preparations for an early departure. A
few days later he announced the names of the commissioners. They were
Jacob Gould Schurman, President of Cornell University; Major-General
Elwell S. Otis, then the ranking army officer in the Philippines;
Rear-Admiral George Dewey, then in command of the United States fleet
in Philippine waters; Colonel Charles Denby, who had for fourteen
years served as United States Minister to China, and myself.

Colonel Denby was delayed in Washington by public
business. Mr. Schurman and I reached Yokohama on the morning of
February 13, and on arrival there learned, to our deep regret, that
hostilities had broken out on the fourth instant. We reached Manila on
the evening of March 4, but Colonel Denby was unable to join us until
April 2. Meanwhile, as we could not begin our work in his absence,
I had an exceptional opportunity to observe conditions in the field,
of which I availed myself.

I served with the first Philippine Commission until it had completed
its work, and was then appointed to the second Philippine Commission
without a day's break in my period of service.

The members of this latter body were William H. Taft of Ohio; Luke
E. Wright of Tennessee; Henry C. Ide of Vermont; Bernard Moses of
California, and myself. Briefly stated, the task before us was to
establish civil government in the Philippine Islands. After a period
of ninety days, to be spent in observation, the commission was to
become the legislative body, while executive power continued to be
vested for a time in the military.

This condition endured until the 4th of July, 1901, on which
day Mr. Taft was appointed civil governor. On September 1, 1901,
each of the remaining original members of the commission became
an executive officer as well. Mr. Wright was appointed secretary
of commerce and police; Mr. Ide, secretary of finance and justice;
Mr. Moses, secretary of public instruction, and I myself, Secretary
of the Interior. On the same day three Filipino members were added
to the commission: Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, Sr. Benito Legarda and
Sr. Jose R. de Luzuriaga.

Until the 16th of October, 1907, the Commission continued to serve as
the sole legislative body. It is at the present time the upper house
of the Philippine Legislature, the Philippine Assembly, composed of
eighty-one elective members, constituting the lower house.

I have therefore had a hand in the enactment of all legislation put
in force in the Philippine Islands since the American occupation, with
the exception of certain laws passed during my few and brief absences.

As secretary of the interior it fell to my lot to organize and
direct the operations of a Bureau of Health, a Bureau of Govermnent
Laboratories, a Bureau of Forestry, a Bureau of Public Lands, a Bureau
of Agriculture, a Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, a Mining Bureau
and a Weather Bureau. Ultimately, the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes
and the Mining Bureau were incorporated with the Bureau of Government
Laboratories to form the Bureau of Science, which continued under my
executive control. The Bureau of Agriculture was transferred to the
Department of Public Instruction in 1909.

I was at the outset given administrative control of all matters
pertaining to the non-Christian tribes, which constitute, roughly
speaking, an eighth of the population of the Philippines, and until
my resignation retained such control throughout the islands, except
in the Moro Province, which at an early day was put directly under
the governor-general.

I participated in the organization of civil government in the several
provinces of the archipelago, and myself drafted the Municipal Code
for the government of the towns inhabited by Filipinos, as well as
the Special Provincial Government Act and the Township Government
Act for that of the provinces and settlements inhabited chiefly by
the non-Christian tribes.

At the outset we did not so much as know with certainty the names
of the several wild and savage tribes inhabiting the more remote and
inaccessible portions of the archipelago. As I was unable to obtain
reliable information concerning them on which to base legislation
for their control and uplifting, I proceeded to get such information
for myself by visiting their territory, much of which was then quite
unexplored.

After this territory was organized into five so-called "Special
Government Provinces," some of my Filipino friends, I fear not
moved solely by anxiety for the public good, favoured and secured a
legislative enactment which made it my official duty to visit and
inspect these provinces at least once during each fiscal year. I
shall always feel indebted to them for giving me this opportunity to
become intimately acquainted with some of the most interesting, most
progressive, and potentially most important peoples of the Philippines.

When in 1901 I received the news that a central government was soon to
be established, I was in the Sub-province of Lepanto on my first trip
through the wilder and less-known portions of northern Luzon. During
each succeeding year I have spent from two to four months in travel
through the archipelago, familiarizing myself at first hand with
local conditions.

I have frequently taken with me on these inspection trips
representatives of the Bureaus of Forestry, Agriculture, Science
and Health to carry on practical investigations, and have made it my
business to visit and explore little known and unknown regions. There
are very few islands worthy of the name which it has not been my
privilege to visit.

The organization of an effective campaign against diseases like bubonic
plague, smallpox, Asiatic cholera and leprosy in a country where no
similar work had ever previously been undertaken, inhabited by people
profoundly ignorant of the benefits to be derived from modern methods
of sanitation, and superstitious to a degree, promptly brought me
into violent conflict with the beliefs and prejudices of a large
portion of the Filipino population.

A similar result followed the inauguration of an active campaign for
the suppression of surra, foot and mouth disease, and rinderpest,
which were rapidly destroying the horses and cattle.

From the outset I was held responsible for the enforcement of marine
and land quarantine regulations, which were at first very obnoxious
to the general public.

When the Pure Food and Drugs Act adopted by Congress for the United
States was made applicable to the Philippines without any provision for
its enforcement, this not altogether pleasant duty was assigned to me.

I did not seek appointment to the Philippine service in the first
instance. The political influence at my command has never extended
beyond my own vote. During a period of twelve years my removal was
loudly and frequently demanded, yet I saw President Schurman, Colonel
Denby, General Otis, Admiral Dewey, Commissioner Moses, Governor Taft,
Governor Wright, Governor Ide, Governor Smith, Secretary Shuster,
Commissioner Tavera, Commissioner Legarda and Governor Forbes, all my
colleagues on one or the other of the Philippine commissions, leave
the service, before my own voluntary retirement on September 15, 1913.

I had long expected a request for my resignation at any time, and
had often wished that it might come. Indeed I once before tendered
it voluntarily, only to have President Taft say that he thought I
should withdraw it, which I did. I am absolutely without political
ambition save an earnest desire to earn the political epitaph,
"He did what he could."

During my brief and infrequent visits to the United States I have
discovered there widespread and radical misapprehension as to
conditions in the Philippines, but have failed to find that lack of
interest in them which is commonly said to exist. On the contrary,
I have found the American public keenly desirous of getting at the
real facts whenever there was an opportunity to do so.

The extraordinary extent to which untrue statements have been accepted
at their face value has surprised and deeply disturbed me. I have
conversed with three college presidents, each of whom believed that
the current expenses of the Philippine government were paid from the
United States Treasury.

The preponderance of false and misleading statements about the
Philippines is due, it seems to me, primarily to the fact that it is
those persons with whom the climate disagrees and who in consequence
are invalided home, and those who are separated from the service in
the interest of the public good, who return to the United States and
get an audience there; while those who successfully adapt themselves to
local conditions, display interest in their work and become proficient
in it, remain in the islands for long periods during which they are
too busy, and too far from home, to make themselves heard.

Incidentally it must be remembered that if such persons do attempt to
set forth facts which years of practical experience have taught them,
they are promptly accused of endeavouring to save their own bread and
butter by seeking to perpetuate conditions which insure them fat jobs.

When I think of the splendid men who have uncomplainingly laid down
their lives in the military and in the civil service of their country
in these islands, and of the larger number who have given freely of
their best years to unselfish, efficient work for others, this charge
fills me with indignation.

The only thing that kept me in the Philippine service for so long
a time was my interest in the work for the non-Christian tribes and
my fear that while my successor was gaining knowledge concerning it
which can be had only through experience, matters might temporarily
go to the bad. It has been my ambition to bring this work to such a
point that it would move on, for a time at least, by its own momentum.

I am now setting forth my views relative to the past and present
situation in the islands because I believe that their inhabitants
are confronted by a danger graver than any which they have before
faced since the time when their fate wavered in the balance, while the
question whether the United States should acquire sovereignty over them
or should allow Spain to continue to rule them was under consideration.

It is my purpose to tell the plain, hard truth regardless of the effect
of such conduct upon my future career. It has been alleged that my
views on Philippine problems were  by a desire to retain my
official position. Nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed,
no man who has not served for long and sometimes very weary years
as a public official, and has not been a target for numerous more
or less irresponsible individuals whose hands were filled with mud
and who were actuated by a fixed desire to throw it at something,
can appreciate as keenly as I do the manifold blessings which attend
the life of a private citizen.

I trust that I have said enough to make clear my view point, and
now a word as to subject-matter. It is my intention to correct some
of the very numerous misstatements which have been made concerning
past and present conditions in the Philippines. I shall quote, from
time to time, such statements, both verbal and written, and more
especially some of those which have recently appeared in a book
entitled "The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912,"
by James H. Blount, who signs himself "Officer of the United States
Volunteers in the Philippines, 1899-1901; United States District
Judge in the Philippines, 1901-1905."

Judge Blount has indulged so freely in obvious hyperbole, and has made
so very evident the bitter personal animosities which inspire many
of his statements, that it has been a genuine surprise to his former
associates and acquaintances that his book has been taken seriously.

It should be sufficiently evident to any unprejudiced reader that in
writing it he has played the part of the special pleader rather than
that of the historian. He has used government records freely, and as
is usually the case when a special pleader quotes from such records,
the nature of the matter which he has omitted is worthy of more than
passing attention. I shall hope to be able to fill some of the gaps
that he has left in the documentary history of the events which he
discusses and by so doing, very materially to change its purport.

As public documents have been so misused, and as a new administration
is bestowing on Filipinos political offices, and giving them
opportunities, for which they are as yet utterly unprepared, thus
endangering the results of years of hard, patient, self-sacrificing
work performed by experienced and competent men, it becomes necessary
to strike home by revealing unpleasant facts which are of record
but have not heretofore been disclosed because of the injury to
reputations and the wounding of feelings which would result from their
publication. In doing this I feel that I am only discharging a duty to
the people of the United States, who are entitled to know the truth if
the present possibility of Philippine independence is to be seriously
considered, and to the several Filipino peoples who are to-day in
danger of rushing headlong to their own utter and final destruction.

At the outset I shall discuss the oft-asserted claim that the Filipino
leaders were deceived and betrayed by American officials whom they
assisted, and that this unpardonable conduct led to the outbreak of
active hostilities which occurred just prior to the arrival at Manila
of the first Philippine Commission.

I shall then show that these leaders never established a
government which adequately protected life and property, or gave
to their people peace, happiness or justice, but on the contrary
inaugurated a veritable reign of terror under which murder became a
governmental institution, while rape, inhuman torture, burying alive
and other ghastly crimes were of common occurrence, and usually went
unpunished. The data which I use in establishing these contentions
are for the most part taken directly from the Insurgent records,
in referring to which I employ the war department abbreviation
"P.I.R." followed by a number.

I next take up some of the more important subsequent historical events,
describing the work of the first Philippine Commission, and showing
in what manner the government established by the second Philippine
Commission has discharged its stewardship, subsequently discussing
certain as yet unsolved problems which confront the present government,
such as that presented by the existence of slavery and peonage, and
that of the non-Christian tribes. For the benefit of those who, like
Judge Blount, consider the Philippines "a vast straggly archipelago of
jungle-covered islands in the south seas which have been a nuisance to
every government that ever owned them," I give some facts as to the
islands, their climate, their natural resources and their commercial
possibilities, and close by setting forth my views as to the present
ability of the civilized Cagayans, Ilocanos, Pampangans, Zambals,
Pangasinans, Tagalogs, Bicols and Visayans, commonly and correctly
called _Filipinos_, to establish, or to maintain when established,
a stable government throughout Filipino territory, to say nothing
of bringing under just and effective control, and of protecting and
civilizing, the people of some twenty-seven non-Christian tribes which
constitute an eighth of the population, and occupy approximately half
of the territory, of the Philippine Islands.

I wish here to acknowledge my very great indebtedness to Major
J. R. M. Taylor, who has translated and compiled the Insurgent [4]
records, thereby making available a very large mass of reliable
and most valuable information without which a number of chapters of
this book would have remained unwritten. Surely no man who bases his
statements concerning Filipino rule on the facts set forth in these
records can be accused of deriving his information from hostile or
prejudiced sources.

Of them, Major Taylor says:--

    "No one reading the Insurgent records can fail to be
    impressed with the difference between the Spanish and
    the Tagalog documents. Many of the former are doubtless
    written with a view to their coming into the hands of the
    Americans, or with deliberate purpose to have them do so,
    and are framed accordingly. All Tagalog documents, intended
    only for Filipinos, say much that is not said in the Spanish
    documents. The orders of the Dictator [5] to his subjects
    were conveyed in the latter series of documents."





CHAPTER II

Was Independence Promised?


It has long been the fashion in certain quarters to allege, or to
insinuate, that American consuls and naval officers promised the
Insurgent leaders that the independence of the Philippines would be
recognized by the United States. It has been claimed by some that
the cooeperation of the Insurgents in the military operations against
Manila was sought for and secured. Others say that they were at least
_de facto_ allies of the United States, and that they were in the
end shamelessly betrayed and wantonly attacked.

These are very serious charges. I shall prove, chiefly by the Insurgent
records, that each of them is false. I ask the forbearance of my
readers if, in the three chapters which I devote to these matters,
I quote documentary evidence at length. When original documents
or extracts from them tell a clear and reasonably concise story,
I sometimes insert them bodily in the text. In other cases I give my
own version of the facts which they set forth, but give the full text
in foot-notes. In nearly all instances references are given to sources
of documentary information. I greatly regret that Taylor's narrative,
with its very numerous supporting documents, is not readily accessible
to the student of history. It ought to have been published, but never
got beyond the galley-proof stage. In referring to it, I am therefore
obliged to use the word Taylor followed by the letters and figures
designating the page of this galley proof on which the passage referred
to is found. Whenever possible I give the War Department numbers [6]
of Insurgent documents, but in a few cases can give only the exhibit
numbers assigned by Taylor in printing the documents.

As his exhibits are serially arranged it is easy to find any one of
them. Copies of his work may be found in the War Department and in
the office of the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary.

Referring to the charge that the Insurgents were deceived, even had
deceit been practised as claimed, Aguinaldo would have had no just
ground for complaint, for he himself not only frankly advocated its
use, but deliberately employed it in his dealings with the Americans,
as clearly appears in records hereinafter cited. [7] However, most
Americans hold to a standard very different from his. Was it departed
from in this instance?

Aguinaldo has specifically and repeatedly charged that Pratt and Dewey
promised him the recognition of the independence of the Philippines
by the United States. [8]

Judge Blount has referred to the "_de facto_ alliance between the
Americans and Aguinaldo," and has dwelt at length on "promises,
both expressed and implied," which were subsequently repudiated
by Consul Pratt, Admiral Dewey and Generals Anderson and Merritt,
constantly suggesting, even when he does not specifically charge,
bad faith on the part of these officers of the United States. [9]

On analyzing his statements we find that he is discreetly non-committal
as to exactly what were the expressed promises, nor does he make it so
plain as might be desired what legitimate inferences were deducible
from the acts of the Americans in question. He quotes an alleged
statement of General Anderson to the effect that:--

    "Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman, [10] and
    Williams [11] did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a
    Philippino government would be recognized, the Phillippinos
    certainly thought so, judging from their acts rather than
    from their words. Admiral Dewey gave them arms and ammunition,
    as I did subsequently at his request." [12]

Before discussing these charges I will briefly review certain
historical facts, knowledge of which will be useful in considering
them.

In August, 1896, an insurrection against Spain had broken out in the
Philippines under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, a resident of
Cavite Viejo, who had been a school teacher, and was, at that time,
_gobernadorcillo_ [13] of his town.

It had been terminated by the so-called "Treaty of Biacnabato,"
signed in Manila on December 15, 1897.

This document provided for the surrender of "Don Emilio Aguinaldo,
Supreme Chief of the Insurgents in arms," and Don Marciano Llanera
and Don Baldomero Aguinaldo, his subordinates, together with their
soldiers and arms.

"The Excellent Senor General in Chief" of the Spanish forces was to
"provide the necessary means for supporting the lives" of those who
surrendered before a certain fixed date.

In actual practice what was done was to agree to pay them $800,000
[14] in three instalments, the first of $400,000, the second and
third of $200,000 each.

Aguinaldo and certain other leaders were to take up their residence
outside the islands. Their deportation was duly provided for, and
Aguinaldo and twenty-six of his companions were taken to Hongkong,
on the Spanish steamer _Uranus_; arriving there on December 31, 1897.

On January 2, 1898, $400,000 were deposited in the Hongkong Bank,
to the credit of Aguinaldo and Co.

The Insurgent leaders remaining at Biacnabato had a meeting under the
presidency of Isabelo Artacho, an Ilocano [15] who was the ranking
officer in the absence of Aguinaldo, and requested that the second
instalment, of $200,000, be paid to them. The Spanish governor-general,
Primo de Rivera, acceded to their request, and they divided the money,
although Aguinaldo denied their right to do so, claiming that it
should have been sent to Hongkong.

The third payment of $200,000 was apparently never made. Primo de
Rivera says that he turned over a check for $200,000 to his successor,
General Augustin, in April, 1898; giving as his reason for refusing to
pay it to the Insurgents that there seemed to him to be no prospect of
its being equitably divided among those who were entitled to receive
it under the agreement.

Aguinaldo and his associates claimed that certain reforms were promised
by the Spanish government at the time the treaty of Biacnabato
was negotiated, and as these measures were not put into effect,
they organized a junta or revolutionary committee at Hongkong. It
included in its membership a number of Filipino political exiles,
then residing at that place.

The men who composed this organization soon fell to quarrelling and
it became necessary to come to a definite understanding as to its
aims. Under the arrangement finally reached, the junta, as a whole,
was charged with the work of propaganda outside of the archipelago;
with all diplomatic negotiations with foreign governments; and
with the preparation and shipment of such articles as were needed
to carry on the revolution in the Philippines. It was to be allowed
voice by Aguinaldo's government in any serious question which might
arise abroad, and would aid that government in bringing the civil
administration of the Philippines to the level of that of the most
advanced nations.

Trouble soon arose among the former Insurgent leaders over the division
of the funds deposited at Hongkong.

Taylor gives a trustworthy and concise account of the events of this
period, and as it is of historic interest, and makes clear just
how Aguinaldo came to go to Singapore, meet Pratt, and enter into
negotiations with him, I quote extensive extracts from it. [16]

    "From January 4 to April 4, Aguinaldo withdrew from the
    banks 5786.46 pesos in part interest on the money he had
    deposited. This was used to pay the expenses of himself and his
    companions in Hongkong. These expenses were kept at a minimum;
    the money was drawn and spent by him. If one of the men with
    him needed a new pair of shoes, Aguinaldo paid for them;
    if another wanted a new coat, Aguinaldo bought it. Minute
    accounts were kept, which are on file among his papers,
    and it is seen from them that his expenses were exceeding
    his income, which could only be 12,000 pesos a year, while he
    was living at the rate of 22,000, with constant demands being
    made upon him by men who came from the Philippines. Life was
    not easy under these conditions. Aguinaldo's companions were
    entirely dependent upon him. Their most trivial expenses had
    to be approved by him, and he held them down with a strong
    hand. They were men living in a strange land, among a people
    whose language they did not speak, having nothing to do but
    quarrel among themselves, exiles waiting for a chance to
    return to their own country, which they watched with weary
    eyes while they guarded the embers by which they hoped to
    light the fires of a new insurrection.

    "The men who had accompanied Aguinaldo to Hongkong were
    not the only Filipinos domiciled there; a number of men had
    taken refuge in that British colony after the events of 1872,
    and some of them at least had prospered. Some of them, like
    the members of the Cortes family, seem to have had almost
    no relations with the followers of Aguinaldo; some, like
    J. M. Basa, knew them and took part in some of the meetings of
    the governing groups, but were probably not admitted to their
    full confidence, as Aguinaldo and his immediate following
    wanted and were working for independence and independence
    alone, while the Filipinos who had long lived in Hongkong
    wanted to see the archipelago lost to Spain, but had no
    confidence in the ability of the country to stand alone or
    in the fitness of Aguinaldo and his following to direct the
    councils of a state. The character of the new refugees did
    not inspire confidence in these older men, who hoped for a
    protectorate by or annexation to the United States.

    "On May 6, 1898, the consul-general of the United States there
    informed the State Department that D. Cortes, M. Cortes,
    A. Rosario, Gracio Gonzaga, and Jose Maria Basa (50), all
    very wealthy land-owners, bankers, and lawyers of Manila,
    desired to tender their allegiance and the allegiance of
    their powerful families in Manila to the United States,
    and that they had instructed all their connections to render
    every aid to the United States forces in Manila. On May 14 he
    forwarded statements of other Filipinos domiciled in Hongkong,
    not members of the junta, that they desired to submit their
    allegiance and the allegiance of their families in the
    Philippine Islands to the United States. One of Aguinaldo's
    followers, writing somewhat later, spoke with bitterness
    of the rich old men who went about calling their companions
    'beggarly rebels,' but these men were rich, and their names and
    their apparent adhesion to the cause represented by Aguinaldo
    would inspire confidence in him among men of property in
    the Philippines. They were, accordingly, not to be lightly
    alienated; therefore, at first, at least, no open break took
    place with them, but their attitude toward the leaders of
    the insurrection is shown by the fact that after the early
    summer of 1898 they took no, or very little, part in the
    insurgent movement, although they were living in Hongkong,
    the seat of the junta, which conducted the propaganda for
    the insurgent government of the Philippines.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "But, in fact, Aguinaldo had no just conception of the
    conditions and of the opportunities which were about to open
    before the Hongkong junta, for although war between Spain and
    the United States was imminent and a United States squadron
    was in Hongkong threatening Manila, Aguinaldo was chiefly
    concerned in finding how to avoid losing the money which
    had been received from the Spanish government as the price
    of his surrender. The importance of his presence near the
    Philippines in case of war did not occur to him, or if it did
    occur to him anything which he could obtain there from the
    aid of the United States probably seemed for the moment of
    little consequence compared with escaping from his wrangling
    companions with enough money to live on in Paris.

    "Artacho, who had received 5000 pesos as his share of the
    second payment, arrived in Hongkong and on April 5 demanded
    200,000 pesos of the insurgent funds, probably under the
    agreement that he should establish a company in Hongkong
    for the benefit of the former leaders and not merely of
    those who had accompanied Aguinaldo. But the leaders in
    Hongkong had denounced that agreement, and refused to pay. He
    then entered suit before the supreme court of Hongkong,
    calling upon Aguinaldo for an accounting of the trust funds
    deposited in his hands for the benefit of Artacho and others,
    and asked for an injunction restraining Aguinaldo or any
    member of the junta from handling or disposing of any part
    of said funds. He filed as evidence copies of the Biacnabato
    agreement and of the agreement made by the leaders on December
    19. This suit was brought not merely in the name of Artacho,
    but in that of all the exiles who were described as living
    in exile in Hongkong in accordance with an agreement made
    with the Spanish Government. Artacho probably had adherents
    among these men, some at least of whom were utterly weary
    of waiting in Hongkong and of living upon what was doled out
    to them. Some at least saw no chance of any other fate than
    indefinite exile spent in dependence upon the inner group
    for even the means of existence.

    "The suit was in equity, and called for an accounting for the
    trust funds which the complainant recognized were legally
    in the hands of Aguinaldo. It could be carried on only
    with great difficulty without his presence and without his
    account books. Meetings were held, and Artacho was denounced
    as attempting to extort blackmail, but he refused to yield,
    and Aguinaldo, rather than explain the inner workings of the
    Hongkong junta before a British court, prepared for flight. A
    summons was issued for his appearance before the supreme court
    of Hongkong on April 13, 1898, but he was by that time beyond
    its jurisdiction.

    "He drew out the 50,000 pesos from the Chartered Bank,
    which had become due according to the terms of the deposit,
    and perhaps such other sums as could be drawn upon by check,
    engaged passage for Europe by way of Singapore for G. H. del
    Pilar, J. M. Leyba, and himself under assumed names, appointed
    V. Belarmino to succeed to his functions, and gave him checks
    signed in blank to draw the interest of the sums on deposit to
    provide for the support of the exiles. He gave as his reason
    for departure that he was going to remain under cover until
    Artacho could be bought off, but he intended to go far afield
    for this purpose, as he gave his destination as Europe and
    the United States.

    "Aguinaldo and his companions probably sailed from Hongkong
    on April 8, 1898, and arrived in Singapore on April 21, after
    stopping in Saigon. War between the United States and Spain
    had been rendered inevitable by the resolution of Congress
    demanding that Spain should withdraw her forces from Cuba,
    and was declared on April 21. Although Aguinaldo and his
    followers did not appreciate the influence which conditions on
    the other side of the world might have upon the future of the
    Philippines, it happened that in Singapore at that time there
    was an Englishman named Bray who did. He had been a member of
    the civil service in India, and had lived for some years in the
    Philippines, but he had fallen upon evil days and was engaged
    in writing letters to the Singapore _Free Press_ upon the
    Philippines, and in retailing such information as was in his
    possession concerning them to the United States consul-general
    in Singapore, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, for transmittal to
    Commodore Dewey. Bray heard of the arrival of Aguinaldo and
    realized what could be done with him, and that if the matter
    were well handled it might be to his own advantage. He went
    at once to see Aguinaldo and informed him that the United
    States consul-general was anxious to see him. He went to the
    consul-general and informed him of the importance of Aguinaldo,
    and that he was in Singapore. Aguinaldo had to be persuaded
    to agree to a meeting. The consul-general was anxious for it,
    and it took place, according to Aguinaldo, on the night of
    April 22 (according to Pratt, on the morning of April 24). The
    statement made by Aguinaldo is probably correct. According
    to his account book, he paid $11 on April 23, 1898, for a
    telegram to the Hongkong junta concerning the negotiations
    'with America.'

    "Aguinaldo knew but little English, Pratt knew no Spanish, so
    in their interview Bray acted as interpreter. An interpreter
    who is interested in the subject of the discussion may
    be a dangerous man. It is impossible to say what he told
    Aguinaldo. Certainly Pratt did not know; but whatever was
    said during these conversations it is within the limits
    of possibility that Pratt may have been made to say by the
    interpreter more than he intended, and that his statements of
    what would probably be granted by the United States Government
    and his expression of good wishes for the cause of Filipino
    independence may have been translated as assurances and as
    promises. Bray, who, according to his Filipino former friends,
    was apt to talk too much, may have talked too much on this
    occasion, and so the myth of the formal agreement between
    Aguinaldo on behalf of the Filipino insurgents and Pratt on
    behalf of the United States grew up, a fiction which Bray
    himself, with a natural desire to add to his own importance,
    did his best to circulate.

    "Bray did not ask for his reward at the time, but probably
    reckoned upon making himself indispensable as an adviser,
    so that later he could make his own terms. For a time he
    wrote letters of advice to Aguinaldo, which may have had
    some influence upon the line of conduct which he adopted, and
    later was employed in furnishing from Hongkong news to various
    newspapers of events and conditions in the Philippines. His
    cablegrams shortly before the outbreak of hostilities between
    the United States and the insurgents were more picturesque
    than veracious, but they were apparently considered effective,
    as Aguinaldo ordered that he should be given $5000. He wanted
    more, but the Hongkong junta did not trust him, and he ceased
    to be in their employment." [17]

As we shall see, Bray did not do all of the interpreting at Singapore,
and we shall be able to determine with some accuracy what actually
transpired there.

We can now consider understandingly the charges made against Pratt
and Dewey.

It has been claimed over and over again, that Pratt promised Aguinaldo
recognition of tile independence of the Philippines if he and his
people would cooperate with the United States forces against Spain.

Aguinaldo himself made the charge in his "Resena Veridica" [18]
in the following words:--

    "In this interview Consul Pratt told me that because the
    Spaniards had not complied with the agreement of Biac-na-bato,
    the Filipinos had a right to renew their interrupted revolution
    and advised me to take up arms anew against Spain, assuring me
    that America would give the Filipinos the greatest advantages
    (mayores ventajas). Then I asked the Consul what advantages the
    United States would concede to the Philippines, suggesting,
    when I had the proper opening, the propriety of making an
    agreement in writing, to which the Consul answered that he
    would report, by telegraph, on the subject to Mr. Dewey,
    who was the chief of the expedition against the Philippines,
    and who had ample powers from President McKinley.

    "On the following day, between 10 and 12 in the morning, we
    again took up the matter, Consul Pratt saying that the admiral
    had answered my inquiry by saying that the United States
    would at least recognize the independence of the Philippine
    government under a naval protectorate, but that there was no
    necessity to put it in writing, as the words of the admiral
    and the American consul were sacred and would be fulfilled,
    not being like those of the Spaniards, and finally, that the
    Government of North America was a very honourable Government,
    a very just and very powerful one." [19]

On April 27, 1908, Pratt telegraphed the Secretary of State as
follows: --

    "General Aguinaldo gone my instance Hongkong arrange with
    Dewey cooeperation insurgents Manila.

    "_Pratt_."

On the 28th he wrote the Secretary, explaining how he had come to
meet Aguinaldo, and stating just what he had done. He said:--

    "At this interview, after learning from General Aguinaldo
    the state of an object sought to be obtained by the present
    insurrectionary movement, which, though absent from the
    Philippines, he was still directing, I took it upon myself,
    whilst explaining that I had no authority to speak for the
    Government, to point out the danger of continuing independent
    action at this stage; and, having convinced him of the
    expediency of cooperating with our fleet, then at Hongkong,
    and obtained the assurance of his willingness to proceed
    thither and confer with Commodore Dewey to that end, should
    the latter so desire, I telegraphed the Commodore the same
    day as follows, through our consul-general at Hongkong:--

    "'Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong
    arrange with Commodore for general cooperation insurgents
    Manila if desired. Telegraph.

    "'_Pratt_.'"

The Commodore's reply read thus:--

    "'Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible.

    "'_Dewey_.'"

Pratt adds:--

    "I received it late at night, and at once communicated to
    General Aguinaldo, who, with his aide-de-camp and private
    secretary, all under assumed names, I succeeded in getting
    off by the British Steamer _Malacca_, which left here on
    Tuesday the 26th.

    "Just previous to his departure, I had a second and last
    interview with General Aguinaldo, the particulars of which
    I shall give you by next mail.

    "The general impressed me as a man of intelligence, ability,
    and courage, and worthy the confidence that had been placed
    in him.

    "I think that in arranging for his direct cooperation with the
    commander of our forces, I have prevented possible conflict of
    action and facilitated the work of occupying and administering
    the Philippines.

    "If this course of mine meets with the Government's approval,
    as I trust it may, I shall be fully satisfied; to Mr. Bray,
    however, I consider there is due some special recognition
    for most valuable services rendered.

    "How that recognition can best be made I leave to you to
    decide.

    "I have, etc." [20]

It will be noted that Pratt explained to Aguinaldo that he had no
authority to speak for the government; that there was no mention in
the cablegrams between Pratt and Dewey of independence or indeed of
any conditions on which Aguinaldo was to cooeperate, these details
being left for future arrangement with Dewey; and that Pratt thought
that he had prevented possible conflict of action and facilitated
the work of occupying and administering the Philippines.

The particulars as to the second and last interview between Aguinaldo
and Pratt were embodied in the following letter:--

    "No. 213. _Consulate-General of the United States._

    "_Singapore_, April 30, 1898.

    "_Sir_: Referring to my dispatch No. 212, of the 28th instant,
    I have the honor to report that in the second and last
    interview I had with Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo on the eve of his
    departure for Hongkong, I enjoined upon him the necessity,
    under Commodore Dewey's direction, of exerting absolute
    control over his forces in the Philippines, as no excesses
    on their part would be tolerated by the American Government,
    the President having declared that the present hostilities
    with Spain were to be carried on in strict accord with modern
    principles of civilized warfare.

    "To this General Aguinaldo fully assented, assuring me that
    he intended and was perfectly able, once on the field, to
    hold his followers, the insurgents, in check and lead them
    as our commander should direct.

    "The general stated that he hoped the United States would
    assume protection of the Philippines for at least long enough
    to allow the inhabitants to establish a government of their
    own, in the organization of which he would desire American
    advice and assistance.

    "These questions I told him I had no authority to discuss.

    "I have, etc.,

    "_E. Spencer Pratt_,

    "_United States Consul-General_."

In a subsequent communication written on July 28, 1898, Pratt made
the following statement:--

    "I declined even to discuss with General Aguinaldo the
    question of the future policy of the United States with
    regard to the Philippines, that I held out no hopes to him
    of any kind, committed the government in no way whatever,
    and, in the course of our confidences, never acted upon
    the assumption that the Government would cooperate with
    him--General Aguinaldo--for the furtherance of any plans
    of his own, nor that, in accepting his said cooperation,
    it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political
    claims which he might put forward." [21]

What reason if any is there for denying the truth of this allegation?

I will give in full Blount's statement as to what occurred at a
meeting held at Singapore, to celebrate the early successes of Dewey
and Aguinaldo, as it constitutes his nearest approach to a direct
claim, that any one at any time promised independence:--

    "First there was music by the band. Then followed the formal
    reading and presentation of the address by a Dr. Santos,
    representing the Filipino community of Singapore. The address
    pledged the 'eternal gratitude' of the Filipino people to
    Admiral Dewey and the honored addressee; alluded to the glories
    of independence, and to how Aguinaldo had been enabled; by the
    arrangement so happily effected with Admiral Dewey by Consul
    Pratt, to arouse eight millions of Filipinos to take up arms
    'in defence of those principles of justice and liberty of
    which your country is the foremost champion' and trusted
    'that the United States... will efficaciously second the
    programme arranged between you, sir, and General Aguinaldo
    in this port of Singapore, and secure to us our independence
    under the protection of the United States.'

    "Mr. Pratt arose and 'proceeded, speaking in French,'
    says the newspaper--it does not say Alabama French, but
    that is doubtless what it was--'to state his belief that the
    Filipinos would prove and were now proving themselves fit for
    self-government.' The gentleman from Alabama then went on to
    review the mighty events and developments of the preceding six
    weeks, Dewey's victory of May 1st, 'the brilliant achievements
    of your own distinguished leader, General Emilio Aguinaldo,
    _cooperating on land with the Americans at sea_,' etc. 'You
    have just reason to be proud of what has been and is being
    accomplished by General Aguinaldo and your fellow-countrymen
    under his command. When, six weeks ago, I learned that General
    Aguinaldo had arrived _incognito_ in Singapore, I immediately
    _sought him out_. An hour's interview convinced me that he
    _was the man for the occasion_; and, having communicated
    with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly arranged for him to join
    the latter, which he did at Cavite. The rest you know.'" [22]

Now, it happens that Dr. Santos himself forwarded his speech, and
his version of Pratt's reply thereto, in a letter to Aguinaldo, dated
Singapore, June 9, 1898. As he served as interpreter, he, if any one,
should know what Pratt said. After describing the change in tone of
the Singapore _Free Press_, with which strained relations had formerly
existed, and the subsequent friendliness of the editor of this paper
and that of the _Straits Times_, he says that on the previous afternoon
he went with the other Filipinos to greet Pratt. He continues:--

    "This occasion was unusually opportune by reason of ours having
    been victorious and immediately after the cry of our worthy
    chief which found an echo in this colony. For this purpose 30
    or more Filipinos--9 of the higher class, 15 musicians and the
    remainder of the middle class--went to greet Consul A., here,
    and on the invitation of Mr. Bray we ascended. He received us
    in his private office, and it was imposing to see that the only
    decoration was the American flag which covered the desk, and in
    its centre, a carved wooden frame holding the portrait of our
    worthy chief. He shook hands with all of us, and I introduced
    them all. We found there also, and were introduced to, the
    Editor of the _Straits Times_ and the _Free Press_ of here,
    and after being thus assembled, after a musical selection,
    I read the following speech in French:--

        "'_His Excellency, The Consul General of the United
        States of America in Singapore_:

        "'_Your Excellency_: The Filipinos of all social
        classes residing in this port, have come to greet
        Your Excellency as the genuine representative of
        the great and powerful American Republic in order to
        express to you our eternal gratitude for the moral
        and material support given by Admiral Dewey to our
        General Aguinaldo in his campaign for the liberty of
        eight million Filipinos. The latter and we ourselves
        hope that the United States, your nation, persevering
        in its humanitarian policy, will without cessation and
        (with) decided energy continue to support the programme
        agreed upon in Singapore between Your Excellency and
        General Aguinaldo, that is to say, the Independence
        of the Philippine Islands, under an American
        protectorate. Accept our cordial acknowledgments and
        congratulations on being the first one in accepting
        and supporting this idea which time and events have
        well developed to the great satisfaction of our
        nation. Finally, we request you, Most Excellent Sir,
        to express to your worthy President and the American
        Republic, our sincere acknowledgments and our fervent
        wishes for their prosperity. I have concluded.'

    "The Consul replied hereto in French, in more or less the
    following terms:--

    "'You have nothing to thank me for, because I have only
    faithfully followed the instructions received from my
    Government; the fact of the sudden departure of your General
    will permit you to infer that I have done so. I shall in any
    case inform my Government of your good wishes and I thank you
    in its name. You know that your wishes are mine also, and for
    this reason at the last interview I had with Mr. Aguinaldo,
    I repeated to him that he should observe the greatest humanity
    possible in the war, in order that our army, our soldiers,
    our nation and all the other nations may see that you are
    humane and not savages, as has erroneously been believed.'

    "After this there was enthusiastic applause for the Consul;
    he offered us all cigars, glasses of very fine sherry, and
    lemonade for the musicians and the majority. The toasts were
    offered with the sherry by your humble servant, Sres. Cannon,
    Enriquez, Celio, Reyes, the Consul, the editors of the _Free
    Press_, _Straits Times_ and Mr. Bray. We drank to America
    and her humanitarian work of redemption; to the Philippines
    with America; we gave thanks to the Consul, to Mr. Bray as an
    important defender; we drank to the _Free Press_ for taking
    such an interest in our affairs, and to the _Straits Times_
    (sarcastically); but I was very careful not to propose a toast
    to our general, which was done at the proper time by 'Flaco'
    [23] when we gave three cheers; for the sake of courtesy we
    cheered for England, which had been so hospitable to us, and
    when everybody had become quiet, the Editor of the _Straits
    Times_ took his glass in his hand and cried in a loud voice,
    'The Philippine Republic,' to which we all responded. 'Flaco'
    disappeared a moment, and when he returned he brought with
    him the American flag, and formally presented it to us in
    French, which I interpreted to all in Spanish, as follows:
    'Gentlemen: The American Consul, with his deep affection for
    us, presents us this flag as the greatest and most expressive
    remembrance which he can give us. The red stripes stand for
    the generous blood of her sons, shed to obtain her liberty;
    the white stripes stand for her virginity and purity as our
    country; the blue background indicates the sky and each star
    represents a free and independent State; this is America, and
    the Consul is desirous that we also should have so glorious
    a history as hers and that it may be as brilliant as could
    be wished, securing peace with respect, and may God be our
    help and guide in securing liberty. Viva and with it our
    most sincere thanks for so signal a courtesy.' Hereupon, to
    the surprise of everybody as no one expected it, the Consul
    requested that some Filipino airs be played which seemed to
    please him very much. Finally, about 6.15, we left, very well
    satisfied with the reception accorded us and the kindness
    of the Consul. Mr. Bray asked me for the text of my speech,
    which I insert above and I secured from the Consul his French
    text, which I enclose in my letter to Naning. Without anything
    further for the present, awaiting your reply and your opinion
    as to the above, as also orders and instructions for the
    future, I am,

    "Yours, etc.

    (Signed) "_Isidoro de los Santos_."

To this letter Major Taylor has appended the following note:--

    "(_Note by Compiler._--In a letter written in Tagalog to
    Aguinaldo on June 6 by Santos he describes the American consul
    general as having cried out 'Hurrah for General Aguinaldo,
    hurrah for the Republic of the Philippines' and then, having
    apparently taken several drinks, he passed up and down the
    room waving the American flag before giving it to the assembled
    Filipinos (P.I.R., 406.7).)" [24]

This final statement does not present the representative of the United
States government at Singapore in a very favourable light, but I take
the facts as I find them. If now we compare the speech actually made
by Dr. Santos with Blount's version of it, we shall find that with
the exception of the words "eternal gratitude" the passages which
he encloses in quotation marks are not in the original at all. The
glories of independence are not alluded to, nor is there so much as
a suggestion that Aguinaldo had been enabled to arouse eight millions
of Filipinos to take up arms, which he certainly had not done.

Dr. Santos in his speech did resort to a stereotyped Filipino procedure
so very commonly employed that those of us who have dealt much with
his people have learned to meet it almost automatically. It consists
in referring to one's having said just exactly what one did not say,
and then if one fails to note the trap and avoid it, in claiming that
because one did not deny the allegation one has admitted its truth.

Aguinaldo himself later repeatedly resorted to this procedure in his
dealings with Dewey and others.

In the present instance Santos employed it rather cleverly when he
expressed the hope that the United States would "continue to support
the programme agreed upon in Singapore, between your Excellency and
General Aguinaldo, that is to say, the independence of the Philippine
Islands under an American protectorate."

Now if this was agreed to, Aguinaldo later constantly violated his
part of the agreement, for we shall see that he stated over and
over again, in correspondence with members of the junta and others,
that a protectorate would be considered only if absolute independence
finally proved unattainable, but there is no reason to believe that
any such agreement was made.

Dr. Santos read his speech to Mr. Pratt in French. Blount implies,
whether rightly or wrongly I do not know, that Pratt's knowledge
of French was poor. At all events Pratt in his reply made not the
slightest reference to the hope expressed by Santos that the United
States would continue to support the programme which Santos said
had been agreed upon between Pratt and Aguinaldo, and claim of a
promise of independence based on these speeches must obviously be
abandoned. There is no doubt that Pratt personally sympathized with
the ambitions of the Filipino leaders, and openly expressed his
sympathy on this and other occasions, but to do this was one thing
and to have attempted to compromise his government would have been
another and very different one. The shrewd Filipinos with whom he
was dealing understood this difference perfectly well.

It is a regrettable fact that there exists some reason to believe that
his sympathy was not purely disinterested. Aguinaldo claims that Pratt
wished to be appointed "representative of the Philippines in the United
States to promptly secure the official recognition of our independence"
and that he promised him "a high post in the customs service." [25]

It will be noted that several sentences and phrases in Blount's
statement are enclosed in quotation marks. From what were they
quoted? The next paragraph in his book tells us:--

    "Says the newspaper clipping which has preserved the Pratt
    oration: At the conclusion of Mr. Pratt's speech, refreshments
    were served, and as the Filipinos, _being Christians,
    drink alcohol_, there was no difficulty in arranging as to
    refreshments." [26]

The use of this clipping from the Singapore _Free Press_ illustrates
admirably Blount's methods. The _Free Press_ had at first displayed
a marked coldness toward the insurgent cause, but its editor,
Mr. St. Clair, was opportunely "seen" by Bray, who reported that as a
result of his visit, both the editor and the paper would thereafter be
friendly, and they were. In other words, the _Free Press_ became the
Singapore organ of the insurrection, and its editor, according to Bray,
"a true and loyal friend" of Aguinaldo.

Blount claims to have made "an exhaustive examination of the records
of that period." [27] Why then did he use as evidence a newspaper
clipping from an Insurgent organ, instead of Santos's letter?

Blount endeavours to make capital out of the fact that Pratt forwarded
to the State Department a proclamation which he says was gotten up
by the Insurgent leaders at Hongkong and sent to the Philippines in
advance of Aguinaldo's coming. He says that it was headed "America's
Allies" and quotes from it as follows:--

    "Compatriots: Divine Providence is about to place independence
    within our reach.... The Americans, not from mercenary
    motives, but for the sake of humanity and the lamentations
    of so many persecuted people, have considered it opportune,
    etc. [Here follows a reference to Cuba.] At the present
    moment an American squadron is preparing to sail for the
    Philippines.... The Americans will attack by sea and prevent
    any reenforcements coming from Spain; ... we insurgents must
    attack by land. Probably you will have more than sufficient
    arms, because the Americans have arms and will find means
    to assist us. _There where you see the American flag flying,
    assemble in numbers; they are our redeemers!_" [28]

The translation that he used is that given in Senate Document No. 62,
L. 60, and is none too accurate. He allows it to be inferred that
this proclamation was actually issued. It was not. Its history is
as follows:--

On May 16, 1898, J. M. Basa, a Filipino, who had lived in Hongkong
since 1872, on account of his connection with the troubles of that
year, wrote letters [29] to a number of friends recommending the
widest possible circulation of a proclamation enclosed therewith, as
an aid to the American policy in the Philippines "in the war against
the tyrannical friars and the Spaniards."

With these letters there were sent two different proclamations,
each beginning with the words "Fellow Countrymen." The first, which
is the one referred to by Blount, continues:--

    "Divine Providence places us in a position to secure our
    independence, and this under the freest form to which all
    individuals, all people, all countries, may aspire.

    "The Americans, more for humanity than for self-interest,
    attentive to the complaints of so many persecuted Filipinos,
    find it opportune to extend to our Philippines their protective
    mantle, now that they find themselves obliged to break their
    friendship with the Spanish people, because of the tyranny
    they have exercised in Cuba, causing all Americans, with whom
    they have great commercial relations, enormous damages.

    "At this moment an American fleet is prepared to go to the
    Philippines.

    "We, your fellow-countrymen, fear that you will make use of
    your arms to fire upon the Americans. No, brothers; do not
    make such a mistake; rather (shoot) kill yourselves than
    treat our liberators as enemies.

    "Do not pay attention to the decree of Primo de Rivera,
    calling on you to enlist for the war, for that will cost
    you your lives: rather die than act as ingrates toward our
    redeemers, the Americans.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "Note well that the Americans have to attack by sea, at the
    same time avoiding reinforcements which may come from Spain;
    therefore the insurrection must attack by land. Perhaps you
    will have more than sufficient arms, as the Americans have
    arms, and will find the means to aid you.

    "Whenever you see the American flag, bear in mind that they
    are our redeemers." [30]

On the margin is written: "Viva, for America with the Philippines!"

Apparently what Basa here means by independence is independence from
Spain, for it is known that he was in favour of annexation to the
United States, and in the second proclamation we find the following:--

    "This is the best opportunity which we have ever had for
    contriving that our country (all the Philippine Archipelago)
    may be counted as another Star in the Great Republic of
    the United States, great because of its wisdom, its wealth,
    and its constitutional laws.

    "Now is the time to offer ourselves to that great nation. With
    America we shall have development in the broadest sense
    (of advancement) in civilization.

    "With America we shall be rich, civilized and happy.

    "Fellow patriots, add your signatures to those which have
    already been given. Explain to all our fellow countrymen the
    benefits of this change, which will be blessed by Heaven,
    by men and by our children.

    "Viva America with the Philippines!!!" [31]

The letters were undoubtedly given to Aguinaldo for delivery on his
arrival. They were never delivered, and it is reasonable to suppose,
especially as Basa, who was a man of importance and means, was a
member of the group who desired annexation to the United States, that
Aguinaldo took the letters along in order to avoid a rupture with him
and then quietly suppressed them. Obviously, however, he sent or gave
a copy of the first one to Pratt, presumably without the written words:
"Viva, for America with the Philippines!"

And now comes a bit of evidence as to what occurred at Singapore
which I consider incontrovertible.

Aguinaldo returned promptly to Hongkong and on May 4, 1898, a meeting
of the junta was held. The minutes of this meeting, [32] signed by
each of the several Filipinos present, form a part of the Insurgent
records which have come into the possession of the United States
Government. They state among other things that:--

    "The temporary Secretary read the minutes of the preceding
    meeting, which were approved. The temporary President reported
    that D. Emilio Aguinaldo had just arrived from Singapore and
    it became necessary for him to take possession of the office
    to which he has been elected."

After the transaction of some further business Aguinaldo was summoned,
appeared at the meeting, and was duly installed as President. Then:--

    "The President described the negotiations which took place
    during his absence in Singapore with the American Consul of
    that English colony. Both agreed that the President should
    confer with the Admiral commanding the American squadron in
    Mirs Bay, and if the latter should accept his propositions,
    advantageous, in his judgment, to the Philippines, he would go
    to said country in one of the cruisers which form the fleet
    for the purpose of taking part in the present events. And
    as he did not find the Admiral, he thought it well to have
    an interview with the American Consul of this colony on the
    day of his arrival, but was not satisfied with such interview.

    "Considering the critical conditions in the Philippines at
    present, he begged the committee to discuss the advisability of
    his going to said islands with all the leaders of prominence
    in the last rebellion residing in this colony, in case the
    Admiral gave them an opportunity to do so."

Note that there is here absolutely not one word of any promise
of independence made to Aguinaldo by Pratt or any one else. Is it
conceivable that Aguinaldo in describing "the negotiations which
took place during his absence in Singapore with the American Consul
of the English Colony" would, by any chance, have failed to inform
his associates in Hongkong of such an extraordinary and fortunate
occurrence as the promising by Mr. Pratt and Admiral Dewey that the
United States would recognize Philippine independence?

Sandico [33] thought that Aguinaldo ought to go, for--

    "From conferences which he had with the Admiral of the
    American fleet and with the American Consul in this colony,
    he believed that under present conditions it was absolutely
    necessary for the President to go to the Philippines, since,
    according to the American Consul, Manila had been taken by
    said fleet, and a provisional government was now being formed
    in that capital. The intervention of the President in the
    formation of that government is undoubtedly essential, since
    his prestige, which everybody recognizes, would evidently
    prevent dissensions among the sons of the country, and it
    would be possible thereby to obtain a perfect organization
    both for the military and civil evolution of that country.

    "Srs. Garchitorena [34] and Apacible [35] expressed themselves
    in similar terms. Notwithstanding the previous remarks,
    the President insisted that he considered it reckless for
    him to go to the Philippines without first making a written
    agreement with the Admiral, as it might happen, if he placed
    himself at his orders, that he might make him subscribe to
    or sign a document containing proposals highly prejudicial
    to the interests of the country, from which might arise the
    following two very grave contingencies:

    "1st. If he should accept them, he would undoubtedly commit
    an unpatriotic act, and his name would justly be eternally
    cursed by the Filipinos.

    "2d. If he should refuse, then the break between the two
    would be evident.

    "And to avoid this sad dilemma, he proposed to the committee
    that the four parties (?) of the insurgents now here, under
    charge of the competent chiefs authorized in writing by him,
    should go to the Philippines to intervene, after a conference
    with the Admiral, in these important questions; such means,
    in his opinion, should be first employed to ascertain in an
    authentic manner what the intentions of the United States
    in regard to that country are; and if his intervention is
    absolutely necessary, he would not object to go at once to
    the Philippines, endeavouring by all the means in his power
    to remedy the critical condition of the country, to which he
    had offered, and always would willingly offer, to sacrifice
    his life."

Why adopt means to learn from the admiral what the intentions of the
United States were in regard to the Philippines if both he and Pratt
had already promised recognition of independence?

    "Srs. Sandico, Garchitorena, Gonzaga [36] and Apacible
    replied that they were fully convinced the Admiral of the
    American squadron would furnish the President all the arms
    which he might desire, since the former was convinced that
    the fleet could do nothing in the Philippines unless it were
    used in conjunction  with the insurgents in the development
    of their plans of war against the Spanish government.... The
    authority to treat which the President desired to give to the
    other chiefs, without reflecting at all upon their personal
    qualifications, they did not believe would be as efficacious
    as his personal intervention which is necessary in grave
    affairs, such as those the subject of discussion; there would
    be no better occasion than that afforded them to insure the
    landing of the expeditionary forces on those islands and to
    arm themselves at the expense of the Americans and to assure
    the situation of the Philippines in regard to our legitimate
    aspirations against those very people. The Filipino people,
    unprovided with arms, would be the victims of the demands
    and exactions of the United States; but, provided with arms,
    would be able to oppose themselves to them, struggling for
    independence, in which consists the true happiness of the
    Philippines. And they finished by saying that it made no
    difference if the Spanish government did demand the return
    of the P400,000, and if the demand were allowed in an action,
    since the object of the sum would be obtained by the Admiral
    furnishing the Filipinos the arms which they required for
    the struggle for their legitimate aspirations."

Here, then, was a definite plan to obtain arms from the Americans to
be used if necessary "against those very people" later.

    "The President, with his prestige in the Philippines, would be
    able to arouse those masses to combat the demands of the United
    States, if they colonized that country, and would drive them,
    if circumstances rendered it necessary, to a Titanic struggle
    for their independence, even if they should succumb in shaking
    off the yoke of a new oppressor. If Washington proposed to
    carry out the fundamental principles of its constitution,
    there was no doubt that it would not attempt to colonize the
    Philippines, or even to annex them. It was probable then that
    it would give them independence and guarantee it; in such
    case the presence of the President was necessary, as he would
    prevent dissensions among the sons of the country who sought
    office, who might cause the intervention of European powers, an
    intervention which there was no reason to doubt would be highly
    prejudicial to the interests of the country.... What injury
    could come to the Philippines, even if we admitted that the
    Admiral would not give arms to the President on account of his
    refusal to sign a document prejudicial to the country, after
    he had taken all means to provide for her defence? None. Such
    an act of the President could not be censured, but, on the
    other hand, would be most meritorious, because it would be
    one proof more of his undoubted patriotism."

Not one word of any promise of independence do we find in this
remarkable document. On the contrary it furnishes conclusive proof
that no such promise had been made and that the future relations
between Filipinos and Americans were still completely uncertain.

And now comes some direct evidence. Bray and St. Clair, the latter
the editor of the Insurgent organ in Singapore, were present on
the occasion when independence was said to have been promised by
Pratt. Bray subsequently declared in the most positive terms that it
was promised. St. Clair wrote him a letter taking him roundly to task
for this claim, in the following very interesting terms:--

    "I felt it to be my duty to let Pratt know that you still hold
    that you and Santos have evidence that will controvert his,
    (and) he was, of course, extremely disappointed, because he
    (is) quite aware of what took place in Spanish, and as to
    turning of his conversation into a pretense of agreement
    he knows nothing. He says very truly: 'My own party, the
    Democrats, will say if they read this book--If this man takes
    it upon himself to be a Plenipotentiary without authority, we
    had better not employ him any more--I frankly cannot understand
    your action, as to its unwisdom I have no doubt at all.'

    "Admiral Dewey goes home, it is believed, to advise the
    President on Naval and Colonial Affairs, he knows exactly
    what did take place and what did not, and I should know if
    he had any ground to think that the slightest promise was
    made by Pratt to Aguinaldo he would declare it unauthorized
    and decline to sanction it. I am certain Pratt reported what
    he supposed took place accurately; he had no surety on what
    you might have said, naturally.

    "And, curiously, you never mentioned to me anything of
    the agreement as having taken place then, nor in the paper
    you communicated to me was there any mention of one, nor
    did Pratt know of any. It is only more recently that the
    fiction took shape. 'The wish father to the thought,' or
    the statement repeated till it has become believed by the--,
    [37] this is common.

    "Now I would like to urge you, from the practical point
    of view, to drop any such foolishness. The vital thing,
    and nothing else counts, is what Dewey said and did when
    he at last met Aguinaldo. That, that, that, is the thing,
    all else is empty wind.

    "Supposing that Pratt and Wildman had covered inches of
    paper with 'Clauses' and put on a ton of sealing wax as
    consular seals, what, pray, to any common sense mind would
    all that have been worth? Nothing!! Nothing!! And yet,
    where is the agreement, where is the seal? Where are there
    any signatures? And if you had them--waste paper--believe
    me, that all this potter about Pratt and Wildman is energy
    misdirected. The sole thing to have impressed upon the
    public in America would be the chaining of Dewey and
    Aguinaldo together as participants in common action; you
    surely comprehend this means! Think and think again; it
    means success as far as it is possible. The other work is
    not only lost, but does not gain much sympathy, especially
    this criticism of the conduct of American troops; things may
    be true that are not expedient to say. Sink everything into
    Dewey-Aguinaldo cooeperation, that was on both sides honest
    even if it did not imply any actual arrangement, which, of
    course, Dewey himself could not make. That here you have the
    facts,--undenied--incontrovertible." [38]

The following letter of Bray to Aguinaldo, dated January 12, 1899,
seems to me to throw much light on the question of how these claims
relative to the promised recognition of Filipino independence sometimes
originated and were bolstered up:--

    "With regard to your proclamation, there is still a trump card
    to be played. Did you not say that the basis of any negotiation
    in Singapore was the Independence of the Philippines under an
    American protectorate? This is what Consul Pratt telegraphed
    and to which Dewey and Washington agreed; as I figured up
    the 'price' of the telegram, I know very well what occurred,
    and I am ready to state it and to swear to it when the proper
    time comes. There are five of us against one in the event of
    Consul Pratt receiving instructions to deny it. Furthermore,
    Mr. St. Clair knows what happened and I am certain that he
    also would testify. St. Clair still has the rough draft as
    an historical relic, and St. Clair is a true and loyal friend
    of yours, as is your humble servant." [39]

The utter unscrupulousness of Bray is shown by his claim that St. Clair
would confirm his false statements, made as it was after receiving
St. Clair's letter above quoted.

But Bray did not wait for Aguinaldo to play this trump card. He tried
to play it himself by cabling Senator Hoar, on the same day, that as
the man who introduced General Aguinaldo to the American government
through the consul at Singapore he was prepared to swear that the
conditions under which Aguinaldo promised to cooperate with Dewey
were independence under a protectorate. [40]

Let us now trace Aguinaldo's subsequent movements, and see what
promises, if any, were made to him by Wildman and Dewey. He had
returned to Hongkong with two companions, all travelling under assumed
names. Only his most trusted friends among the members of the junta
were at first allowed to know where he was living.

His situation was a difficult one. It was necessary for him to come
to some sort of a temporary arrangement with Artacho, if he was to
avoid legal difficulties, and to reestablish himself with some of
his companions, who had accused him of deserting with the intention
of going to Europe to live on money which belonged to them. When
harmony had been temporarily restored through the good offices of
Sandico, Aguinaldo had an interview with Consul General Wildman. He
has since claimed that Wildman, too, promised him independence, but
the truth seems to be that he himself said he was anxious to become
an American citizen. This being impossible, he wanted to return to
the Philippines and place himself under Dewey's orders. He wanted to
help throw off the yoke of Spain, and this done, would abide by the
decision of the United States as to the fate of the Philippines. [41]

Any claim that Aguinaldo had been promised independence by Wildman, or,
indeed, that the latter had been allowed to know that the Filipinos
desired it, seems to me to be negatived, not only by Wildman's own
statements, but by a letter from Agoncillo to Aguinaldo written on
August 5, 1908, in which he says:--

    "The American consul left my house to-day at 3 o'clock, as I
    had requested an interview with him before his departure, and
    I was unable to go to the Consulate on account of the swelling
    of my feet. From our conversation I infer that independence
    will be given to us. I did not, however, disclose to him
    our true desires.... Said consul approved my telegram to
    McKinley, which has been sent to-day through him, a copy of
    which is herewith enclosed. If they accept our representative
    in the commission, we may arrive at a friendly understanding,
    and it will enable us to prepare for the fight in case they
    refuse to listen to our request. On the other hand, if at
    the very beginning they refuse to admit our representative,
    we will at once be in a position to know what should be done,
    _i.e._ to prepare for war." [42]

On May 4, 1898, the Hongkong junta voted that Aguinaldo ought to go
to the Philippines, and go he did. It would seem that he at first gave
up the idea of joining Dewey, for on May 11 he wrote a cipher letter,
giving minute directions for the preparation of signals to assist
his ship in making land, by day or by night, at Dingalan Bay on the
east coast of Luzon; directing the capture of the town of San Antonio,
just back of Capones Islands, in Zambales, and ending with the words:
"We will surely arrive at one of the two places above mentioned,
so you must be prepared."

Something led him again to change his mind, and he finally sailed on
the _McCulloch_.

In his "Resena Veridica" written later for political purposes,
Aguinaldo has definitely claimed that Dewey promised him that
the United States would recognize the independence of the Filipino
people. I will let him tell his own story, confronting his statements
with those of the admiral.

    "May 19, 1898.

    "The _McCulloch_ started at eleven o'clock on the morning of
    the 17th of May for the Philippines; we anchored, between
    twelve and one o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th, in
    the waters of Cavite, and immediately the launch of the
    Admiral--with his aid and private secretary--came to convey
    me to the _Olympia_, where I was received, with my aid,
    Sr. Leyva, with the honors of a general, by a section of
    marine guards." [43]

Relative to this matter, Admiral Dewey has testified: [44]

    "_The Chairman_. You, of course, never saluted the flag?

    _Admiral Dewey_. Certainly not; and I do not think I ever
    called Aguinaldo anything but Don Emilio; I don't think I
    ever called him 'General.'

    _The Chairman_. And when he came on board ship was he received
    with any special honors at the side?

    _Admiral Dewey_. Never."

The "Resena Veridica" continues:--

    "The Admiral received me in a salon, and after greetings of
    courtesy I asked him 'if all the telegrams relative to myself
    which he had addressed to the Consul at Singapore, Mr. Pratt,
    were true.' He replied in the affirmative, and added, 'that
    the United States had come to the Philippines to protect its
    natives and free them from the yoke of Spain.'

    He said, moreover, that 'America was rich in territory and
    money, and needed no colonies,' concluding by assuring me,
    'to have no doubt whatever about the recognition of Philippine
    independence by the United States.' Thereupon he asked me
    if I could get the people to arise against the Spaniards and
    carry on a rapid campaign." [45]

As we have seen, Dewey sent only one telegram to Pratt about
Aguinaldo. It merely directed that the latter be sent.

    "I then expressed to him my profound acknowledgment for the
    generous help which the United States was giving the Filipino
    people, as well as my admiration for the magnificence and
    goodness of the American people. I also stated to him that
    'before leaving Hongkong, the Filipino Colony had held a
    meeting, at which was discussed and considered the possibility
    that--after defeating the Spaniards--the Filipinos might have a
    war with the Americans, if they should refuse to recognize our
    independence, who were sure to defeat us because they should
    find us tired out, poor in ammunitions and worn out in the war
    against the Spaniards,' requesting that he pardon my frankness.

    "The Admiral replied that he 'was delighted at my sincerity,
    and believed that both Filipinos and Americans should treat
    each other as allies and friends, clearly explaining all
    doubts for the better understanding between both parties,' and
    added that, 'so he had been informed, the United States would
    recognize the independence of the Filipino people, guaranteed
    by the word of honor of the Americans,--more binding than
    documents which may remain unfulfilled when it is desired
    to fail in them as happened with the compacts signed by the
    Spaniards, advising me to form at once a Filipino national
    flag, offering in virtue thereof to recognize and protect
    it before the other nations, which were represented by the
    various squadrons then in the Bay; although he said we should
    conquer the power from the Spaniards before floating said
    flag, so that the act should be more honourable in the sight
    of the whole world, and, above all, before the United States,
    in order that when the Filipino ships with their national
    flag would pass before the foreign squadrons they should
    inspire respect and esteem.'

    "Again I thanked the Admiral for his good advice and generous
    offers, informing him that if the sacrifice of my life was
    necessary to honor the Admiral before the United States,
    I was then ready to sacrifice it.

    "I added that under such conditions I could assure him that
    all the Filipino people would unite in the revolution to
    shake off the yoke of Spain; that it was not strange that
    some few were not yet on his side on account of lack of arms
    or because of personal expediency.

    "Thus ended this first conference with Admiral Dewey, to whom
    I announced that I would take up my residence at the Naval
    Headquarters in the Cavite Arsenal." [46]

Further on, in the same document, Aguinaldo advances the claim that
on the occasion of the visit of General Anderson and Admiral Dewey
the latter again promised him independence.

He says:--

    "In the same month of July, the Admiral, accompanied by General
    Anderson, presented himself, and after greetings of courtesy
    said to me: 'You have seen confirmed all of what I promised
    and said to you. How pretty your flag is. It has a triangle,
    and it looks like Cuba's. Will you give me one as a reminder
    when I return to America?'

    "I replied to him that I was convinced of his word of
    honour and that there was no necessity whatever to draw up
    in documentary form his agreements, and as for the flag,
    that he could count on it, even at that very moment.

    "Dewey continued: 'Documents are not complied with when
    there is no honour, as has happened with your agreement
    with the Spaniards, who have failed in what was written
    and signed. Trust in my word for I hold myself responsible
    that the United States will recognize the independence of
    the country. But I recommend to you [plural.--TR.] to keep
    everything which we have talked about and agreed upon with
    a great deal of secrecy for the present. And, moreover,
    I entreat you [plural.--TR.] to be patient if our soldiers
    should insult some Filipino, because, as volunteers, they
    are yet lacking in discipline.'" [47]

Admiral Dewey has testified as follows, concerning the recognition
of Philippine independence by him:--

    "_The Chairman_. You remember the question of your recognizing
    his republic was a good deal discussed and you wrote me a
    letter, which I read in the senate. Of course, I am only
    asking now about what you said in the letter. There was no
    recognition of the republic?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. Never. I did not think I had any authority to
    do it and it never occurred to me to do it. There was a sort
    of a reign of terror; there was no government. These people
    had got power for the first time in their lives and they
    were riding roughshod over the community. The acts of cruelty
    which were brought to my notice were hardly credible. I sent
    word to Aguinaldo that he must treat his prisoners kindly,
    and he said he would."

He has further testified that he never as much as heard of independence
until the appearance of Aguinaldo's proclamation of June 15, 1898:--

    "_Admiral Dewey_.... Then when I heard that our troops were
    coming I asked him to withdraw his troops from Cavite and make
    room for our men. He demurred at this, but finally withdrew
    and established headquarters across the bay at a place called
    Bacoor, from which place on the 15th of June he sent me a
    proclamation declaring the independence of the Philippines.

    "_The Chairman_. Was that the first?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. That was the first intimation; the first
    I had ever heard of independence of the Philippines.

    "_The Chairman_. He had said something to you--

    "_Admiral Dewey_. Not a word. He had done what I told him. He
    was most obedient; whatever I told him to do he did. I attached
    so little importance to this proclamation that I did not even
    cable its contents to Washington, but forwarded it through
    the mails. I never dreamed that they wanted independence."

Remembering that Admiral Dewey was not being interrogated as to the
statements of the "Resena Veridica," it will be seen that he has,
nevertheless, covered them fully.

It was my good fortune to be long and intimately associated with
Admiral Dewey while serving on the first Philippine commission. He
always grew indignant when the subject of any promises relative to
independence said to have been made by him was so much as mentioned,
and gave to the commission in writing the following:--

    "The statement of Emilio Aguinaldo, under date of Sept. 23,
    published in the _Springfield Republican_, so far as it
    relates to reported conversations with me, or actions of mine,
    is a tissue of falsehood. I never, directly or indirectly,
    promised the Filipinos independence. I never received Aguinaldo
    with military honors, or recognized or saluted the so-called
    Filipino flag. I never considered him as an ally, although
    I did make use of him and the natives to assist me in my
    operations against the Spaniards." [48]

As Dewey's allegations flatly contradict those of Aguinaldo, we
must choose between the two. While I have no doubt as to where
the choice will fall, I will now submit some additional matter of
interest. Let us first consider the history of the "Resena Veridica"
in which Aguinaldo makes the charges above quoted. On September 12,
1899, Buencamino wrote of it to Apacible in Hongkong, saying:--

    "This work is entitled 'Resena Veridica de la Revolucion
    Filipina' in which Don Emilio relates in detail his acts with
    Admiral Dewey. It has been distributed to the Consuls and
    you are ordered to reprint it there translated into English
    and send some copies to the United States, even though only
    a thousand, if you deem it advisable. Send copies also to
    Europe, Senor Agoncillo taking charge of the publication. If
    the Agent you may have selected for the United States should
    still be there, it would be advisable for him to take a copy
    of the pamphlet with him for its publication.

    "This is an order of the Government which I take pleasure in
    transmitting to you for due execution." [49]

But there was a change of heart about giving the pamphlet to the
consuls, for under date of September 30 Buencamino wrote:--

    "We have not distributed them here in order that Otis may
    not counteract the effects that we desire to produce with
    this publication, through his usual machinations. Nor do we
    believe it advisable to make this pamphlet public in those
    colonies before your arrival in the United States." [50]

To this letter he added in cipher the following postscript to Pablo
Ocampo, in charge of Aguinaldo's correspondence in Manila:--

    "At last moment--Nota bene:

    "Don't deliver any copy of the 'Resena Veridica' to the
    Consuls, even though it was so directed in the beginning of
    the letter. All except one, which is for you, will be sent
    to Hong-kong, Don Pedro de la Vina being bearer of the same,
    as also of the other documents. The copy intended for you
    is neither to be divulged nor published, for strict reserve
    is required until those which are being sent arrive at their
    destination." [51]

The reason for preserving such secrecy relative to this document
until it could reach its destination and work its harm is of course
obvious. Its statements were so outrageously false that they would
have been instantly and authoritatively contradicted had it been
issued seasonably at Manila.

The truth is that Aguinaldo's claim that he had been promised
independence was a gradual growth. Let us trace it.

On May 21, he wrote a circular letter to "My dear brother," inviting
the recipients and their companions to meet him at once, and arrange
the best way to entrap all the enemy in their homes.

In this he says that he has promised the American admiral that they
will "carry on modern war" and adds: "Even if a Spaniard surrenders,
he must be pardoned and treated well, and then you will see that
our reputation will be very good in all Europe, which will declare
for our independence; but if we do not conduct ourselves thus, the
Americans will decide to sell us or else divide up our territory. As
they will hold us incapable of governing our land, we shall not secure
our liberty, rather the contrary; our own soil will be delivered over
to other hands." [52]

In this letter, written on the very day of the interview at which he
subsequently claimed that Admiral Dewey had promised independence,
does he make any claim that this had occurred? No, he very distinctly
implies the contrary. Is it believable that if he could truly have
said "The United States, through its representatives Dewey and Pratt,
has promised to recognize our independence" he would have failed to
do so when this would instantly have secured him the vigorous support
which he was then uncertain of obtaining? I think not.

In this letter Aguinaldo specifically directs that deceit be employed
and that Spanish officers be treacherously attacked. The practising of
deceit was a carefully considered part of the insurgent policy. In a
letter from Hongkong dated July 21, 1898, Agoncillo writes as follows
to Mabini: [53]--

    "the time will come when disguises must be set aside and
    we will see who is deceiving whom. The statements made by
    some of the commanders of the fleet here to Don Emilio and
    myself were to the effect that the exclusive purpose of the
    Government at Washington with regard to the Filipinos, is to
    grant this country independence, without any conditions,
    although I said to myself that such a purpose was too
    philanthropical. Don Emilio knew what I thought then, and
    I still think the same; that is to say that we are the ones
    who must secure the independence of our country by means of
    unheard of sacrifices and thus work out its happiness." [54]

Aguinaldo himself frankly advocated the use of deceit. He practised
what he preached. Simeon Villa, one of his companions on his
subsequent flight through Northern Luzon, before he finally took
refuge at Palanan, kept a diary, which constitutes an official record
of this long journey. In it he has inserted some bits of history of
other days, of which none is more interesting than his account of the
beginning of hostilities against the Spaniards, in August, 1896. From
it we learn that Aguinaldo, who was known to the friar of his town to
be both a mason and a chief of the Katipunan, was in danger during
August, and on the night of the 29th of that month called a meeting
of all the compromised persons of the place, who agreed that on the
following day he should "make representations to the governor of the
province." Villa says that he was greatly beloved by the governor and
his wife. Early on the following morning, he "presented himself to the
governor, and in the name of the people of Cavite Viejo, offered him
their respects and their loyalty to Spain," at the same time asking
a garrison of a hundred men for his town, which the governor promised
to send at once if the captain-general approved.

That afternoon he reported the results of his efforts to his
fellow-conspirators, "and told them that then was the opportune moment
for rising against the Spaniards." He initiated the uprising himself
the next morning. [55]

Could deceit be more deliberately practised or treachery more frankly
employed?

I have indulged in this digression to show that Aguinaldo could
hardly have complained had the methods which he used against others
been employed against him. He was never deceived by the Americans,
but his claims relative to independence grew rapidly, and he was soon
deceiving his own people.

On May 24th, he issued no less than four proclamations. One of
these, doubtless intended to be seen by Americans, made no mention
of Independence, but said: [56]--

"The great powerful North American nation has offered its disinterested
protection to secure the liberty of this country."

In another proclamation, doubtless intended for a different use,
he made the statement that the great North American nation had come
to give decisive and disinterested protection, "considering us as
sufficiently civilized and capable of governing ourselves." [57]

On June 5, having practically gained control of Cavite Province, he
felt strong enough to announce that independence would be proclaimed
on June 12, and on that date he did proclaim it in a decree.

The Admiral of the American Squadron, with the commanders and officers
of his command, was invited to the ceremonies, but none of them
went. As it was important for Aguinaldo to have some one there to
pose as a representative of the United States, he utilized for this
purpose a certain "Colonel" Johnson, an ex-hotel keeper of Shanghai,
who was running a cinematograph show. He appeared as Aguinaldo's chief
of artillery and the representative of the North American nation. [58]

    *       *       *       *       *

Even as late as October 3, 1898, Agoncillo in a memorandum addressed to
President McKinley did not claim that independence had been promised,
but said:--

    "As soon as the Spanish-American war began, the American
    representatives and officials in Singapore, Hongkong and
    Manila, invited the natives of the Philippines to assist
    the American arms, which they did gladly and loyally, as
    allies, with the conviction that their personality would
    be recognized, as well as their political, autonomous and
    sovereign rights." [59]

In it he does, however, claim that the organization of a government
independent of America and Spain was accomplished with the tacit
consent of the admiral commanding the fleet and with that of the
general and military and political commanders of the United States
of North America in the Philippines.

    "Who, knowing these facts, not only did not object but accepted
    them as a consummated legal act, and maintained official
    relations with the new organization, making use thereof in
    its subsequent actions and for the subsequent development of
    the campaign, which was consequently brought to such a happy
    end." [60]

This is a second illustration of the stereotyped insurgent procedure
of announcing a policy and then claiming that failure to attack it
meant acquiescence in it. Admiral Dewey says that he did not even read
this proclamation. There was no reason why he should have done so,
as it did not deal with matters which he was authorized to settle. He
had no instructions relative to the recognition of new governments,
and he sent this document to Washington without comment, as he should
have done. [61]

Apropos of this claim that American officers tacitly recognized
the Insurgent government, certain passages from an unsigned
document in the handwriting of Mabini, prepared about July 15,
1898, are of interest. Mabini, speaking of the attitude of the
Americans, says, "Notwithstanding all this and in spite of their
protestations of friendship, they have always refused to recognize
that government." Also, "If they persist in refusing to recognize our
government, we shall see ourselves compelled to come to an agreement
with any other government that will consent to recognize us on friendly
terms." [62]

This statement is certainly sufficiently specific as to whether
Americans had recognized the Insurgent government on or before the
date when it was written.

Let us now consider the relations between Aguinaldo and General
Anderson.

Blount attempts to make much of a cablegram, sent by the latter, in
which, after describing the Filipinos, he adds, "The people expect
independence." Blount says:--

    "That cablegram of July 22nd, above quoted, in which the
    commanding general of our forces in the Philippines advises
    the Washington Government, 'The people expect independence'
    is the hardest thing in the public archives of our government
    covering that momentous period for those who love the memory of
    Mr. McKinley to get around. After the war with the Filipinos
    broke out, McKinley said repeatedly in public speeches,
    'I never dreamed they would turn against us.'" [63]

If there is nothing harder than this to get around the memory of
President McKinley will not suffer, as the important thing is not
what Aguinaldo had led his people to expect, but what the American
officials had promised him. The President was certainly not bound to
believe that the Filipinos would turn against us even if they did
then expect independence. Blount has seen fit to leave unmentioned
certain other facts which are very pertinent in this connection.

Apparently sometime during September, 1898, Sandico made the following
statement in a letter to Aguinaldo:--

    "I also have to inform you that Senores Basa, Cortes and
    Co. have congratulated the Government of the United States
    upon the capture of Manila, stating at the same time that now
    that Filipino soil had been soaked with American blood, the
    Islands must remain American. I believe that a telegram should
    be sent immediately, to counteract that sent by them." [64]

Probably Sandico did not know that on August 15, 1898, Agoncillo
had transmitted another telegram to President McKinley through
Consul-General Wildman, reading as follows:--

    "Agoncillo, my Commissioner and Ambassador-Extraordinary,
    representing the provisional government of the Philippine
    Islands, in its name and the name of its President, Emilio
    Aguinaldo, congratulates you on the successful termination of
    the war, and commends the occupancy of Manila. I assure the
    United States of the allegiance and unquestioning support
    of our people, and petition that we be granted one or more
    representatives on the commission that is to decide the future
    of our Islands." [65]

It would appear, therefore, that the President had more information
on this subject than was transmitted by General Anderson!

Not only did the latter passively refrain from recognizing Aguinaldo's
pretensions, but on July 22, 1898, he wrote to him as follows:--

    "I observe that your Excellency has announced yourself
    Dictator and proclaimed martial law. As I am here simply in
    a military capacity, I have no authority to recognize such
    an assumption. I have no orders from my government on the
    subject." [66]

The effort to keep Americans in ignorance of the true state of affairs
was kept up until further deception was useless. Consul Williams,
for instance, wrote on June 16, 1898:--

    "For future advantage, I am maintaining cordial relations
    with General Aguinaldo, having stipulated submissiveness to
    our forces when treating for their return here. Last Sunday,
    12th, they held a council to form provisional government. I
    was urged to attend, but thought best to decline. A form of
    government was adopted, but General Aguinaldo told me today
    that his friends all hoped that the Philippines would be held
    as a colony of the United States of America." [67]

Yet on Sunday, June 12, Aguinaldo had in reality proclaimed the
independence of the Philippines. Few Americans at this time knew any
Spanish and none understood Tagalog, so that it was comparatively
easy to deceive them. What Consul Williams reported was what Aguinaldo
considered it expedient to have him believe.

The following undated letter from Aguinaldo to Mabini, supposed to have
been sent at this time, is of especial interest in this connection:--

    "My dear Brother: I do not want to go there [where the
    addressee is] until after the visit of the American Consul,
    because I do not wish the negotiations to end in an ultimatum,
    and in order that you may tell him all that is favourable for
    the cause of our Nation. I charge you with the task of giving
    him a reply, and if he should ask about me tell him that
    since the time of his last visit there I have not recovered
    from my illness. If anything important should happen we can
    communicate with each other by telegraph, using a code in
    matters that require secrecy." [68]

In a letter supposed to have been written during November, 1898,
prepared for Aguinaldo's signature and addressed to Senor McKinley,
President of the Republic of the United States of North America, but
apparently never sent, Aguinaldo renews the charge [69] previously
made in his "Resenia Veridica," that Pratt and Dewey promised
independence. It need not be further discussed.

The climax was finally reached in an official protest against the
Paris Treaty written by Agoncillo in Paris on the 12th of December,
1898, in which occurs the following:--

    "The United States of America, on their part, cannot allege
    a better right to constitute themselves as arbitrators as to
    the future of the Philippines.

    "On the contrary, the demands of honour and good faith impose
    on them the explicit recognition of the political status of
    the people, who, loyal to their conventions, were a devoted
    ally of their forces in the moments of danger and strife. The
    noble general Emilio Aguinaldo and the other Filipino chiefs
    were solicited to place themselves at the head of the suffering
    and heroic sons of that country, to fight against Spain and
    to second the action of the brave and skilful Admiral Dewey.

    "At the time of employing their armed cooeperation, both the
    Commander of the _Petrel_ and Captain Wood in Hongkong, before
    the declaration of war, the American Consuls-General Mr. Pratt
    in Singapore, Mr. Wildman, in Hongkong, and Mr. Williams in
    Cavite, acting as international agents of the great American
    nation, at a moment of great anxiety offered to recognize
    the independence of the Filipino nation, as soon as triumph
    was obtained.

    "Under the faith of such promises, an American man-of-war,
    the _McCulloch_ was placed at the disposal of the said leaders
    and which took them to their native shores; and Admiral Dewey
    himself, by sending the man-of-war; by not denying to General
    Aguinaldo and his companions the exacting of his promises,
    when they were presented to him on board his flag-ship in
    the Bay of Manila; by receiving the said General Aguinaldo
    before and after his victories and notable deeds of arms,
    with the honours due the Commander-in-Chief of an allied
    army, and chief of an independent state; by accepting the
    efficacious cooeperation of that Army and of those Generals;
    by recognizing the Filipino flag, and permitting it to be
    hoisted on sea and land, consenting that their ships should
    sail with the said flag within the places which were blockaded;
    by receiving a solemn notification of the formal proclamation
    of the Philippine nation, without protesting against it,
    nor opposing in any way its existence; by entering into
    relations with those Generals and with the national Filipino
    authorities recently established, recognized without question
    the corporated body and autonomous sovereignty of the people
    who had just succeeded in breaking their fetters and freeing
    themselves by the impulse of their own force." [70]

It will be noted that the claim constantly grows. The commander of
the _Petrel_ Captain Wood, Consul Wildman and Consul Williams are
now included among those alleged to have promised independence, and
it is claimed that Aguinaldo was received with the honours due the
chief of an independent state when he visited Admiral Dewey, whereas
his own original claim was that he was received with the honours due
a general, which is quite a different matter.

As a matter of fact, American officers usually addressed and treated
Aguinaldo as a general. The extent to which they were able to use
his organization to further the ends of their government will be set
forth later.

In a letter to Wildman, dated August 7, 1898, Aguinaldo admits that
there is no agreement, but says that he cannot tell the peoples that
it does not exist, "fearing that I may not be able to restrain the
popular excitement." [71] He begs Wildman to use his influence on his
government so that it will realize the inadvisability of deciding the
fate of the people "without considering their will duly represented by
my government." Is it conceivable that, if there had been any ground
for claiming a promise of independence, Aguinaldo would have failed
to mention it at this time?

We may summarize the well-established facts as follows:--

Consul-General Pratt was, or professed to be, in hearty sympathy
with the ambition of the Filipino leaders to obtain independence, and
would personally have profited from such a result, but he refrained
from compromising his government and made no promises in its behalf.

Admiral Dewey never even discussed with Aguinaldo the possibility
of independence.

There is no reason to believe that any subordinate of the Admiral
ever discussed independence with any Filipino,  much less made any
promise concerning it.

Neither Consul Wildman nor Consul Williams promised it, and both
were kept in ignorance of the fact that it was desired up to the last
possible moment.

It is not claimed that either General Anderson or General Merritt
made any promise concerning it.

The conclusion that no such promise was ever made by any of these
men is fully justified by well-established facts.

Aguinaldo himself carefully refrained at the outset from saying,
in any document which Americans could read, that independence
had been promised, and advanced this claim only when the growing
strength of his land force had given him confidence. He repeated it,
with increasing emphasis, as his army increased in size, ultimately
openly threatening war if his pretensions were not recognized. In
doing this, he was merely carrying out a carefully prearranged plan,
agreed upon by the Hongkong junta.

And now let us examine the claim that the insurgents were our "faithful
allies" and "cooeperated" with us in the taking of Manila. We shall
find that this subject richly repays investigation.






CHAPTER III

Insurgent "Cooeperation"


I have previously [72] called attention to the minutes of a session
of the Hongkong junta held on May 4, 1898, from which it indirectly
appears that the Filipino leaders at that time hoped to secure arms
at the expense of the Americans and purposed to attack them later if
it seemed advisable.

The treacherous policy then outlined was never departed from by
Aguinaldo and his associates, who sailed for Manila with their eyes
wide open, knowing full well that they had been promised nothing;
prepared to match their wits against those of Admiral Dewey, and
intent on deceiving him and on securing from him arms to be used
first against the Spaniards and later against the Americans, after
they had been employed to help bring about the downfall of Spain.

There exists a significant circular signed "J.M.B." [73] believed
to have been an outright forgery, both from its tenor and from the
fact that the signature "J.M.B." is not in the handwriting of Basa's
letter hereinbefore quoted.

It contains the following statements:--

    "The true patriots have organized a committee to which
    I belong, naming Aguinaldo as President and Agoncillo as
    Vice-President. The latter and three others have commenced
    diplomatic negotiations with the Admiral and American Consul,
    and we infer that they are trying to make colonies of us,
    although they said they would give us independence. The
    Committee deemed it advisable to simulate belief, at the same
    time equipping ourselves with arms.

    "We have accepted arms offered by the Admiral which will be
    disembarked in the Philippines by the squadron.

    "A part of our forces will aid the Americans by fighting with
    them in order to conceal our real intentions, and part will
    be held in reserve. If America triumphs and proposes a colony,
    we shall reject such offer and rise in arms.

    "A separate expedition will disembark at whatever point may
    be considered suitable.

    "Jose Alejandrino embarked with the American squadron in
    order to give secret instructions to the Chiefs.

    "Be very cautious about this exceedingly delicate point;
    you will communicate with prudent and intelligent chiefs who
    will recognize the gravity of the subject." [74]

Here, then, in a faked-up letter on which Basa's initials were forged
in order to gain the prestige of his name for this treacherous plan,
we have definitely set forth the purpose of the Filipinos to deceive
the Americans by allowing a part of the Insurgent force to fight with
them, and then to attack them.

Reference has already been made to Agoncillo's advice to Aguinaldo,
given under date of August 26, 1898, to the effect that friendly
relations should be maintained with the Americans until the diplomatic
negotiations at Paris should end; that an effort should be made
to find out the future status of the islands "by deceitful means,"
and that confidence should never be put in the Americans.

Aguinaldo put the whole matter in a nutshell in a postscript  to this
letter, saying:--

    "You should issue an order commanding that all our chiefs
    should employ a policy of friendship toward the Americans until
    our status is defined; but said order should be confidentially
    given. Try to mislead them." [75]

Bray also very strongly advised awaiting the results of the Paris
conference. [76]

Blount claims that the Filipinos hoped that the Treaty of Paris
would leave their country to them as it left Cuba to the Cubans,
[77] and adds that having helped us take the city of Manila, they
"felt that they had been 'given the double cross,'" "believed that
the Americans had been guilty of a duplicity rankly Machiavellian,
and that was the cause of the war." [78]

The quotations already given from Insurgent records show plainly
that the principal thing for which the Filipinos were waiting was
the ousting of Spain from the Philippines by the United States; those
which follow show that war was by no means inevitable as a result of
a a decision at Paris adverse to Filipino hopes, for the question of
whether a United States protectorate, or even annexation to the United
States, might be considered, was left open to a very late date. [79]

It has been claimed not only that the Insurgents whipped the Spaniards
without our assistance, but whipped them so thoroughly that Spanish
sovereignty had practically disappeared from the islands at the time
Manila surrendered. It has further been alleged that "decrepit"
Spain "could not possibly have sent any reinforcements to the
Philippines. Besides, the Filipinos would have 'eaten them up.'" [80]

But the Filipinos had fought Spain before and were by no means
sanguine. Their more intelligent and reasonable men clearly foresaw
that they could not win unaided. Senor Antonio Regidor was at the
time residing in London. He was a Filipino of unusual intelligence and
exceptionally good education. He took a keen interest in the situation,
and on July 28, 1898, telegraphed Agoncillo as follows:--

    "In the name of the Filipinos, you should immediately send
    a telegraphic message to MacKinley, requesting him not to
    abandon the islands, after having fought as brothers for a
    common cause. Pledge him our unconditional adhesion, especially
    of well-to-do people. To return to Spain, in whatever form,
    would mean annihilation, perpetual anarchy. Filipinos en
    masse should visit the consuls at Hongkong, Singapore. London
    commerce support it. Influence Aguinaldo to accept American
    flag, flying it everywhere, thus obliging them to remain." [81]

This leaves no room for doubt as to Regidor's views, but Agoncillo
did not share them. He replied on July 29:--

    "Provisional government's aspiration is independence. Make
    this campaign." [82]

Regidor was not to be persuaded. On July 30 he replied as follows,
addressing his communication to Basa:

    "America vacillating as to remaining fears conflicts later with
    natives international question other difficulties necessary to
    encourage her all of you submit united unconditionally raising
    American flag great demonstrations necessary to influence
    outside opinion show islands resolved united America high
    circles advise in view present circumstances only feasible
    programme is protectorate." [83]

Obviously, Agoncillo was somewhat impressed by this cablegram, for
on August 1 in a letter to Aguinaldo he made the following statements
and inquiries:--

    "If the American troops leave us alone there, the questions
    which will arise are these: Have we sufficient arms to maintain
    the war against Spain in order to secure our independence? If
    the other nations are opposed to our independence and wish
    that we should continue under the Spanish sovereignty,
    have we sufficient strength to wage a war and obtain victory
    over Spain and over them in the future? If you think that we
    have not sufficient strength to fight against them, should
    we accept independence under the American protectorate? And
    if so, what conditions or advantages should we give to the
    United States? You should carefully consider the preceding
    questions, and I suggest that you should, in a confidential
    manner, consult them with your cabinet-in-banc, as well as
    with your private secretary and military chiefs of rank;
    and your decision be notified to our representatives abroad
    in order that they may know what they must do in their
    negotiations. You will see from the telegram addressed to
    me by Regidor that he suggests to me to send a message to
    MacKinley requesting him not to abandon us, and to submit
    to them [the U. S.] unconditionally. As I do not agree with
    him and as I cannot take any action which is against the
    instructions of the government, I replied to him that the
    only desire of our government is independence. This may be
    seen from the enclosed telegram. On account of this reply,
    he was, I think, somewhat offended, as he afterwards sent a
    telegram to Joviales [Basa] instead of to me. The latter,
    upon receiving the telegram, convened all the boastful
    patriots, and they adopted a resolution to send a message
    to MacKinley requesting annexation. Fortunately, in the
    meeting there was present Dr. Justo Lucban, who protested
    against such measure. In view of this protest, they again
    agreed that I should be present in the meeting, since I am
    the representative of our government. At the meeting where
    I was present, I pointed out the inadvisability of their
    resolution, stating, as one of the reasons, that we should
    await your instructions in regard to the matter before sending
    any message of that character. So the message was not sent;
    but I was later informed that Basa had, after all, sent it
    yesterday, because he believed that it would not injure our
    cause. Upon learning this, I was carried away by passion and
    went so far as to say to Basa the following: 'Many of us,
    especially myself, think ourselves to be wise, without being
    so; politicians for what we hear from others; we claim to be
    patriots, but we are only so in words; we wish to be chiefs,
    but none of us act in a way worthy of a chief.' To this he
    did not reply. Perhaps his conscience accused him of an act
    of treachery, since we agreed in the meeting to await your
    letter. What union can you expect from this people?" [84]

Note that the Basa here referred to is the man whose initials were
forged on the letter quoted on page 67.

In the course of the above-mentioned letter Agoncillo came back once
more to the question of independence under a protectorate and made
it very clear that at this late day he did not know whether this was
or was not what the Filipinos desired. [85]

On August 21, Apacible obviously did not think that it would be an
easy matter to escape from Spanish domination, much less that the
islands were already rid of it, for he wrote to Mabini that the United
States were likely again to deliver the Filipinos into the hands of
Spain. He said that "if events will be what their telegrams indicate,
we have a dark and bloody future before us. To be again in the hands
of Spain will mean a long and bloody war, and it is doubtful whether
the end will be favourable to us... Spain free from Cuba and her
other colonies will employ her energy to crush us and will send here
the 150,000 men she has in Cuba." [86] Apacible thought that the best
thing was independence under an American protectorate.

On August 7, 1898, Aguinaldo warned Agoncillo that in the United States
he should "not accept any contracts or give any promises respecting
protection or annexation, because we will see first if we can obtain
independence." [87]

Even annexation to the United States was not excluded by Aguinaldo
from the possible accepted solutions, for in outlining the policy of
the Philippine government to Sandico on August 10, 1898, he wrote:--

    "The policy of the government is as follows: 1st. To struggle
    for the independence of 'the Philippines' as far as our
    strength and our means will permit. Protection or annexation
    will be acceptable only when it can be clearly seen that the
    recognition of our Independence, either by force of arms or
    diplomacy, is impossible." [88]

On August 26, 1898, Aguinaldo was still ready to consider annexation
if necessary. [89] He was apparently not sanguine at this time as
to the result of a continued struggle with Spain. At all events,
he wanted the help of the Americans if such a struggle was to come,
and desired to know on what terms it could be had. [90]

Meanwhile the Filipinos in Hongkong who favoured annexation made
themselves heard.

On July 18, 1898, Consul-General Wildman wrote from that place:--

    "I believe I know the sentiments of the political leaders
    and of the moneyed men among the insurgents, and, in spite
    of all statements to the contrary, I know that they are
    fighting for annexation to the United States first, and
    for independence secondly, if the United States decides to
    decline the sovereignty of the Islands. In fact, I have had
    the most prominent leaders call on me and say they would not
    raise one finger unless I could assure them that the United
    States intended to give them United States citizenship if
    they wished it." [91]

We have already noted the action of Basa and the Cortez family who
insisted that the Islands must remain American, [92] and that of
Agoncillo, who cabled President McKinley in Aguinaldo's name and his
own, congratulating him on the outcome of the war, commending the
occupation of Manila, and assuring the people of the United States
of the allegiance and unquestioning support of the Filipinos, [93]
but it is to be feared that the sending of this cablegram was only
one more move in the Insurgent game of deceit.

There were annexationists in Manila as well as in Hongkong. [94]
Indeed we know that some of the strongest and best of the Filipinos
there were in favour of it.

Felipe Buencamino, writing in 1901, said:--

    "In June of 1898, Don Cayetano Arellano [95] addressed to
    Don Felipe Buencamino and Don Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista a
    letter written from the town of Pagsanjan, province of Laguna,
    in reply to one addressed to him by those two gentlemen. In
    this letter Don Cayetano outlined the idea of union with the
    United States and said: 'Avoid all doing and undoing, and
    when America has established a stable order of affairs, then
    it will be time enough to make laws.' Mabini, whose influence
    at that time was in the ascendant in Aguinaldo's government,
    paid no heed to this wise advice. In October of 1898, while
    the Philippine government was established in Malolos, and
    before congress had promulgated a Philippine constitution,
    Messrs. Arellano and Pardo [96] still more earnestly advocated
    union with America, the first as secretary of foreign affairs
    and the latter as chief diplomat. Their plan consisted in
    asking the United States to acknowledge the independence
    of the country under a protectorate through the mediation
    of General Otis, and this plan was accepted at a cabinet
    meeting by Don Emilio Aguinaldo. But on the following day
    Sandico came and told Aguinaldo that he had had a conference
    with the Japanese consul and had been told by him: 'that if
    Aguinaldo would support absolute independence the Japanese
    Government would help.' Aguinaldo believed Sandico's story
    (which turned out to be absolutely false) and did not carry
    out the resolution adopted by the cabinet. Messrs. Arellano
    and Pardo, after this affront, separated themselves from
    the Malolos government. Aguinaldo told me afterwards that
    he had received a letter from Agoncillo, dated Washington,
    assuring him that a majority of the American people were
    inclined to acknowledge the independence of the Philippines
    and of Cuba." [97]

But annexationists were not confined, in the Philippines, to the
vicinity of Manila.

As late as September 6 Consul Williams reported that a delegation from
four thousand Visayan soldiers, a delegation which also represented
southern business interests, had come to him and pledged loyalty to
annexation. [98]

Clearly, then, the situation early in September was as follows: All
were agreed that the assistance of the United States was necessary
in getting rid of Spanish sovereignty.

Under the plan of Aguinaldo and his followers friendly relations were
to be maintained with the United States, if possible, until Spain
was ousted from her Philippine territory, and then they were to "show
their teeth," and see "who was deceiving whom," resorting to "force of
arms" if necessary. Protection or annexation would be accepted only
when it could be clearly seen that the recognition of independence,
won either by force of arms or by diplomacy, was impossible.

Other influential and patriotic Filipinos favored annexation to the
United States or a United States protectorate, but their views were
in the end ignored by Aguinaldo and his following, and as the latter
had the guns their ideas prevailed.

The Treaty of Paris, which terminated Spanish sovereignty in the
Philippines, was signed on December 10, 1898. It is important to
bear this date in mind later, when considering the Insurgent records
relative to the preparations which were so carefully made for attacking
the American troops.

And now let us consider the actual facts as to the cooeperation alleged
to have been asked by Americans and given by Filipinos. The following
points are not in dispute:--

Pratt asked Aguinaldo to cooeperate with Dewey.

Aguinaldo was taken to Manila with the understanding that he would
do so.

Dewey assisted Aguinaldo by destroying the main Spanish fleet; by
bringing him and his associates back to the Philippines; by furnishing
them arms and ammunition; by blockading Manila and by keeping at a safe
distance the Spanish mosquito fleet, which would have made dangerous,
or impossible, the landing of the arms subsequently imported by
the Insurgents.

Aguinaldo successfully attacked the Spanish garrisons in the provinces
and used the arms and ammunition captured, or brought in by deserters,
to equip a force which surrounded and attacked Manila, drove large
numbers of people into the walled city, thus rendering the position
of the Spanish garrison very difficult in the face of a possible
bombardment, and prevented this garrison from betaking itself to the
provinces, as it might otherwise have done, leaving Manila to shift
for itself.

Aguinaldo was powerless to take the place by assault.

It lay at the mercy of Dewey's guns, and it would have been possible
for the Admiral to take it at any time, but he could not at first
have garrisoned it with United States forces, and never thought of
attempting to use Insurgent forces for this purpose.

Did Dewey really want or need Aguinaldo's help? Let us consider his
testimony on the subject:--

    "_Senator Carmack_. You did want a man there who could organize
    and rouse the people?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. I didn't want anybody. I would like to say
    now that Aguinaldo and his people were forced on me by Consul
    Pratt and Consul Wildman; I didn't do anything--

    "_Senator Carmack_. Did they have any power to force him
    upon you?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; they had in a way. They had not the
    official power, but one will yield after a while to constant
    pressure. I did not expect anything of them; I did not
    think they would do anything. I would not have taken them;
    I did not want them; I did not believe in them; because,
    when I left Hongkong, I was led to suppose that the country
    was in a state of insurrection, and that at my first gun,
    as Mr. Williams put it, there would be a general uprising,
    and I thought these half dozen or dozen refugees at Hongkong
    would play a very small part in it." [99]

The picture of the poor admiral, busy getting his fleet ready
for battle, pestered by officious consuls on the one hand and by
irresponsible Filipinos on the other, is pathetic; but it had its
humorous features, which were not lost on the Admiral himself. I
quote the following:--

    "_Senator Patterson_. Was there any communication between
    you and Pratt in which the matter of a written pledge or
    agreement with Aguinaldo was discussed with reference to the
    Philippine Islands?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. No.

    "_Senator Patterson_. What became of the correspondence,
    Admiral, if you know?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. It is all in the Navy Department. When I
    turned over my command my official correspondence was all
    sent to the Navy Department.

    "_Senator Patterson_. You retained all of your letters from
    any United States officials?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. No; they went to the Department.

    "_Senator Patterson_. I mean you did not destroy them.

    "_Admiral Dewey_. No; I did not destroy them.

    "_Senator Patterson_. And you turned them over to the Navy
    Department?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; our regulations require that. I may say
    that for my own information I kept copies of certain telegrams
    and cablegrams. I don't think I kept copies of Mr. Pratt's
    letters, as I did not consider them of much value. He seemed to
    be a sort of busybody there and interfering in other people's
    business and I don't think his letters impressed me.

    "_Senator Patterson_. He was the consul-general?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; but he had nothing to do with the
    attack on Manila, you know.

    "_Senator Patterson_. I understand that.

    "_Admiral Dewey_. I received lots of advice, you understand,
    from many irresponsible people.

    "_Senator Patterson_. But Pratt was the consul-general of
    the Government there?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; he was consul-general.

    "_Senator Patterson_. And he communicated with you, giving you
    such information as he thought you might be interested in,
    and among other information he gave you was this concerning
    Aguinaldo?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. I don't remember; no, I really don't
    remember his telling me anything about Aguinaldo more than
    that cablegram there, and I said he might come. And you see
    how much importance I attached to him; I did not wait for him.

    "_Senator Patterson_. What you said was: 'Tell Aguinaldo to
    come as soon as possible.'

    "_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; but I did not wait a moment for him.

    "_Senator Patterson_. Yes; but there was a reason for that.

    "_Admiral Dewey_. I think more to get rid of him than
    anything else.

    "_Senator Carmack_. Rid of whom?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. Of Aguinaldo and the Filipinos. They were
    bothering me. I was very busy getting my squadron ready for
    battle, and these little men were coming on board my ship at
    Hongkong and taking a good deal of my time, and I did not
    attach the slightest importance to anything they could do,
    and they did nothing; that is, none of them went with me
    when I went to Mirs Bay. There had been a good deal of talk,
    but when the time came they did not go. One of them didn't
    go because he didn't have any toothbrush.

    "_Senator Burrows_. Did he give that as a reason?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; he said, 'I have no toothbrush.'" [100]

However, Dewey ultimately yielded to the pressure exercised on him by
Pratt and Wildman, and allowed Aguinaldo and some of his associates to
be brought to Manila. Having them there he proposed to get assistance
from them, not as allies, but as a friendly force attacking a common
enemy, in its own way.

Let us continue with his testimony as to cooperation between Aguinaldo
and the naval forces of the United States:--

    "_Senator Patterson_. Then, Admiral, until you knew that
    they were going to send land forces to your assistance you
    thought there was a necessity to organize the Filipinos into
    land forces, did you?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. No; not a necessity.

    "_Senator Patterson_. You thought it might prove of value
    to you?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. I testified here, I think, in a way that
    answers  that. I said to Aguinaldo, 'There is our enemy;
    now, you go your way and I will go mine; we had better act
    independently.' That was the wisest thing I ever said.

    "_Senator Patterson_. But you stated that you were using
    these people and they were permitted to organize, that you
    might use them.

    "_Admiral Dewey_. They were assisting us.

    "_Senator Patterson_. Very well, they were to assist you. Did
    you not either permit them or encourage them--I do not care
    which term you use--to organize into an army, such as it was,
    that they might render you such assistance as you needed?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. They were assisting us, but incidentally
    they were fighting their enemy; they were fighting an enemy
    which had been their enemy for three hundred years.

    "_Senator Patterson_. I understand that, Admiral.

    "_Admiral Dewey_. While assisting us they were fighting their
    own battles, too.

    "_The Chairman_. You were encouraging insurrection against
    a common enemy with which you were at war?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. I think so. I had in my mind an illustration
    furnished by the civil war. I was in the South in the civil
    war, and the only friends we had in the South were the <DW64>s,
    and we made use of them; they assisted us on many occasions. I
    had that in mind; I said these people were our friends, and
    'we have come here and they will help us just exactly as the
    <DW64>s helped us in the civil war.'

    "_Senator Patterson_. The <DW64>s were expecting their
    freedom--

    "_Admiral Dewey_. The Filipinos were slaves, too.

    "_Senator Patterson_. What were the Filipinos expecting?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. They wanted to get rid of the Spaniards;
    I do not think they looked much beyond that. I cannot recall
    but I have in mind that the one thing they had in their minds
    was to get rid of the Spaniards and then to accept us, and
    that would have occurred--I have thought that many times--if
    we had had troops to occupy Manila on the 1st day of May
    before the insurrection got started; these people would have
    accepted us as their friends, and they would have been our
    loyal friends--I don't know for how long, but they would have
    been our friends then.

    "_Senator Patterson_. You learned from Pratt, or Wildman,
    or Williams, very early, did you not, that the Filipinos
    wanted their own country and to rule their own country;
    that that is what they were expecting?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. I heard from Williams that there was an
    insurrection there against the Spaniards. The Spaniards were
    very cruel to them, and I think they did not look much beyond
    getting rid of them. There was one, Dr. Rizal, who had the
    idea of independence, but I don't think that Aguinaldo had
    much idea of it.

    "_Senator Carmack_. Then what useful purpose did the Filipino
    army serve; why did you want the Filipino army at all?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. I did not want them.

    "_Senator Carmack_. Did you not want the Filipino forces?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. No, not really. It was their own idea coming
    over there. We could have taken the city at any moment we
    had the troops to occupy it."

Admiral Dewey has made the following statements relative to the
importance of Aguinaldo's military operations:--

    "Then he began operations toward Manila, and he did wonderfully
    well. He whipped the Spaniards battle after battle, and finally
    put one of those old smoothbore guns on a barge, and he wanted
    to take this up--wanted me to tow it up so he could attack the
    city with it. I said, 'Oh, no, no; we can do nothing until
    our troops come.' I knew he could not take the city without
    the assistance of the navy, without my assistance, and I knew
    that what he was doing--driving the Spaniards in--was saving
    our own troops, because our own men perhaps would have had to
    do that same thing. He and I were always on the most friendly
    terms; we had never had any differences. He considered me
    as his liberator, as his friend. I think he had the highest
    admiration for us because we had whipped the Spaniards who
    had been riding them down for three hundred years.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "_Senator Patterson_ (continuing). You sent this short dispatch
    to the Secretary of the Navy:--

    "'Aguinaldo, the revolutionary leader, visited the _Olympia_
    yesterday. He expects to make general attack on May 31. Doubt
    his ability to succeed. Situation remains unchanged.'

    "Do you recall that visit?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. Yes.

    "_Senator Patterson_. He came to tell you, did he, that he
    was going to make a general attack, and you--

    "_Admiral Dewey_. Yes.

    "_Senator Patterson_. And you doubted his ability to succeed?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. And he wanted me to assist him. He wanted
    me to tow one of his guns up into position. I knew he could
    not take the city; of course he could not.

    "_Senator Patterson_. Did you urge that he should not make
    the attack?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. I do not remember that; very likely I did.

    "_Senator Patterson_. And was he not persuaded or restrained
    by you from doing so?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. I do not remember; but it is very likely. I
    did not want to see a lot of them killed unnecessarily,
    because I knew they could not take that walled city. They had
    no artillery, and they could not take it, I knew very well,
    and I wanted the situation to remain as it was until our
    troops came to occupy it.

    "_Senator Patterson_. But you found that whenever you expressed
    a strong objection to anything being done at that time that
    Aguinaldo yielded to your request?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. Up to the time the army came he did
    everything I requested. I had not much to do with him after
    the army came." [101]

But Dewey's influence over Aguinaldo was not sufficient to prevent
his looting, as the following extracts from his testimony show:--

    "_Senator Patterson_. Is that what you mean when you say he
    looted--that he made reprisals for his army, took provisions
    and whatever was necessary? That is what you meant?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. That is one part of it.

    "_Senator Carmack_. This was taking provisions for the use
    of the army?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. That is one thing he did.

    "_Senator Carmack_. You said you did not object to that at
    the time?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. No. It would have been useless; he got
    beyond me very soon--he got out of my hands very soon. [102]

    "_Senator Carmack_. You said yesterday you suspected that
    Aguinaldo took the lion's share of the provisions that were
    gathered for the army. What was the ground upon which you
    made that accusation?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. Because he was living in Malolos like a
    prince, like a king, in a way that could only have come about
    by his taking the lion's share. Then, in regard to his looting,
    I repeat what I said yesterday. He began within forty-eight
    hours after he landed in Cavite to capture and take everything
    he wanted. I know these things of my own knowledge, because
    I saw the loot brought in; and I know that every dollar that
    was taken from the workingmen at the navy-yard was taken at
    the threat of death. [103]

    *       *       *       *       *

    "_Senator Patterson_. Do you believe in this proclamation he
    was uttering falsehoods to the Filipino people?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; I do absolutely. I think he was there
    for gain--for money--that independence had never up to that
    time entered his head. He was there for loot and money. That
    is what I believe, since you ask me my belief; I believe that
    implicitly. [104]

    *       *       *       *       *

    "_Senator Patterson_. And you found nothing to cause any
    doubt as to his loyalty up to the time until after Manila
    surrendered?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. His loyalty to whom?

    "_Senator Patterson_. To you and to the cause for which he
    was fighting?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. I began to suspect he was not loyal to us
    about the time our troops arrived, when he demurred at moving
    out of Cavite to make room for our troops.

    "_Senator Patterson_. Do you mean by that that you feared
    that he was commencing to think more of independence than
    the success of the American cause?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. Yes." [105]

We have seen to what extent Aguinaldo cooeperated with the marine
forces of the United States. Now let us examine the claim that he
cooperated with the land forces after their arrival.

One of the things which the Insurgents are said to have accomplished
was the maintenance of an effective land blockade which prevented the
entrance of provisions, and produced a very serious food shortage. Both
Otis and Dewey have stated that they did this, but we learn from the
Insurgent records how erroneous was this conclusion. [106]

The landing of the American troops for the attack on Manila was
not actively opposed by the Filipinos, but it was narrowly and
distrustfully watched.

Necessary transportation requested by General Anderson was ultimately
furnished by Aguinaldo, but only grudgingly after a three weeks'
delay, and as a result of threats that it would be seized if not
voluntarily supplied.

The necessary positions in the trenches around Manila from which to
make the attack on that city were, in part at least, yielded to the
Americans by the Filipinos upon the request of the former.

The Insurgents twice informed the Spaniards in advance of projected
American attacks.

They carried out their own attack on the city without regard to the
plans, or the requests, of the Americans. They secretly treated with
the Spaniards in the endeavour to secure the surrender of the city
to themselves.

After the capitulation to the Americans had been agreed upon, and
on the very morning of the day of the surrender, they endeavoured
to push home an attack. Disregarding the request that they keep out
of the final assault, they crowded into the city with, and after,
the American troops. They fired on Spanish soldiers on the city wall
while a flag of truce was flying, provoking a return fire which killed
and wounded American soldiers.

They demanded for themselves Malacanang palace and other buildings
and a share in "the war booty." They promptly looted the parts of the
city which they occupied, and ultimately retired from their positions
within the city limits on the evening of their last day of grace
after being warned by General Otis that if they did not do so they
would be driven out.

I will now quote from the records in support of these statements.

The following is the programme of  "cooeperation" outlined to Aguinaldo
by Bray in a letter dated June 30, 1898:--

    "I am very anxious to receive the news of the capitulation of
    Manila and I hope that General Augustin will be obliged to turn
    over his sword to you in person and not to the Americans. You
    are by right entitled to it and I should like to see it so from
    a political standpoint, as I am of the opinion that you should
    declare the independence of the Philippines before the arrival
    of General Merritt, appointed by the President to be Governor
    with full powers to establish a provisional government.

    *       *       *       *       *

    Any attempt on the part of the Americans to garrison the
    interior towns with their troops or any other act which might
    be construed as a conquest, should meet with resistance.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "After having written these lines, I had another conference
    with Mr. St. Clair of the Free Press, who sent for me regarding
    the question of independence. He has had a consultation with
    the Supreme Judge of this place, and he is of opinion that you
    should proclaim independence at once, notwithstanding what
    Admiral Dewey and Consul Williams say against it, and this
    should be done before General Merritt can arrive. A Government
    having been thus constituted in due form, the Americans would
    have no right to invade the Philippines without committing a
    violation of international law. They are no longer fighting
    against the Spaniards against whom they declared war. The
    advice of Consul Williams to delay this, is a diplomatic play
    to gain time until the arrival of General Merritt, because he
    is well aware of the false position said General would find
    himself in. The key to the situation is now in your hands;
    do not permit any one to take it away from you. The Americans
    have done nothing but bombard and destroy the Spanish fleet
    on the high seas; they have not conquered any land, but in
    the meantime the control of the Philippines has passed by
    conquest from the hands of the Spaniards and the Americans
    have no right to enter further. Under certain conditions and
    guarantees, permit the landing of American troops; but be
    very careful, they must not be permitted to land until they
    execute an agreement with the duly constituted government of
    the Philippines, respecting all its institutions, and they must
    under no pretext whatever be permitted to garrison any place
    except the municipal limits of Manila, Cebu, and Iloilo, and
    even therein care should be observed ... You must not permit a
    single soldier to land without having these guarantees." [107]

When General Anderson, with the first United States troops of
occupation, arrived at Manila Bay, Aguinaldo did not call on him,
as an "ally" might have been expected to do. Later, however, Admiral
Dewey and General Anderson went to see Aguinaldo, but without any
of the ceremony of an official military call, the Admiral saying to
General Anderson:--

    "Do not take your sword or put on your uniform, but just put
    on your blouse. Do not go with any ceremony." [108]

And they went in that way.

On July 4, 1898, General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo definitely requesting
his cooeperation in the following words:--

    "For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations
    with you, and to have you and your force cooeperate with us
    in the military operations against the Spanish forces." [109]

On July 5 Aguinaldo replied, thanking General Anderson for the

    "amicable sentiments which the natives of these islands
    inspire in the Great North American nation," [110]

and also for his desire to have friendly relations with the Filipinos
and treat them with justice, courtesy and kindness. There is,
however, not a word relative to cooeperation in his reply, and
Anderson apparently never renewed his request for cooeperation in
military operations.

On July 6 he wrote to Aguinaldo again, saying:--

    "I am encouraged by the friendly sentiment expressed by
    Your Excellency in your welcome letter received on the 5th
    instant, to endeavour to come to a definite understanding,
    which I hope will be advantageous to both. Very soon we expect
    large additional land forces, and it must be apparent to you
    as a military officer that we will require much more room to
    camp our soldiers and also store room for our supplies. For
    this I would like to have Your Excellency's advice and
    cooeperation, as you are best acquainted with the resources
    of the country." [111]

To this letter there was no reply. However, in a letter dated July
9, 1898, to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army, General
Anderson says of Aguinaldo:--

    "When we first landed he seemed very suspicious, and not at
    all friendly, but I have now come to a better understanding
    with him and he is much more friendly and seems willing to
    cooeperate. But he has declared himself Dictator and President,
    and is trying to take Manila without our assistance. This
    is not probable, but if he can effect his purpose he will,
    I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on our part to establish
    a provisional government." [112]

Evidently, however, cooeperation, even in the matter of getting
necessary transportation, did not materialize, for on July 17
S. R. Jones, Chief Quartermaster, wrote Aguinaldo as follows:--

    "We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for
    transportation, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For
    all this we are willing to pay a fair price, but no more. We
    find so far that the native population are not willing to give
    us this assistance as promptly as required. But we must have
    it, and if it becomes necessary we will be compelled to send
    out parties to seize what we may need. We would regret very
    much to do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our
    nation has spent millions in money to send forces here to
    expel the Spaniards and to give good government to the whole
    people, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight.

    "General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that we are
    here for their good, and that they must supply us with labor
    and material at the current market prices. We are prepared
    to purchase five hundred horses at a fair price, but cannot
    undertake to bargain for horses with each individual owner."

Aguinaldo sent this letter by a staff officer to General Anderson
inquiring whether it was sent by authority of the latter, who then
indorsed on it in a statement that it was. Nevertheless, Major Jones
reported on July 20 that it was impossible to secure transportation
except upon Aguinaldo's order and that the natives had removed their
cart wheels and hidden them, from which it is to be inferred that
the transportation requested had not been furnished.

Obviously General Anderson was informed that Aguinaldo had given
orders against furnishing the transportation desired, for on July 21
he wrote the Adjutant-General of the Army as follows:--

    "Since I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an
    elaborate system of military government, under his assumed
    authority as Dictator, and has prohibited any supplies being
    given us, except by his order. As Go this last, I have written
    to him that our requisitions on the country for horses, ox
    carts, fuel, and bamboo (to make scaling ladders) must be
    filled, and that he must aid in having them filled."

On July 23 General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo as follows:--

    "_General_: When I came here three weeks ago I requested Your
    Excellency to give what assistance you could to procure means
    of transportation for the American Army, as it was to fight
    the cause of your people. So far we have received no response.

    "As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make
    requisition on you for five hundred horses and fifty oxen and
    ox carts. If you cannot secure these I will have to pass you
    and make requisition directly on the people.

    "I beg leave to request an answer at your earliest convenience.

    "I remain with great respect, etc." [113]

To this letter, Aguinaldo replied as follows:--

    "Replying to your letter of yesterday, I have the honor to
    manifest to Your Excellency that I am surprised beyond measure
    at that which you say to me in it, lamenting the non-receipt
    of any response relative to the assistance that you have asked
    of me in the way of horses, carabaos, and carts, because I
    did reply through the bearer that I was disposed to issue
    proper orders whenever you advised me of the number of these,
    giving me notice in advance.

    "I have sent orders to the nearest provinces in order that
    within the shortest time possible horses be brought for sale,
    but I cannot assure Your Excellency that we will have the
    number of 500 that you need, because there are not many horses
    in this vicinity, owing to deaths from epizooetic diseases in
    January, February, and March last.

    "Whenever we have them collected, I shall have the pleasure
    to advise Your Excellency.

    "I have also ordered to be placed at my disposal 50 carts that
    I shall place at your disposition when you need them, provided
    you give me previous notice four days in advance." [114]

General Anderson replied:--

    "Your favour of the 26th ultimo in relation to requisitions
    for cattle, horses, etc., is satisfactory I regret that
    there should have been any misunderstanding about it. The
    people to whom we applied even for the hiring of carromatas,
    etc., told our people that they had orders to supply nothing
    except by your orders. I am pleased to think that this was
    a misapprehension on their part." [115]

From this series of communications it appears that it took three
weeks, and a very direct threat to seize transportation, to bring
about Aguinaldo's promise of assistance in securing it. What help
had he given, meanwhile, in other matters?

On July 14, 1899, General Anderson wrote asking him to assist American
officers in making reconnaissance of the approaches to Manila, and
to favor them with his advice. [116]

On July 19, 1899, he again wrote Aguinaldo asking him to allow Major
J. F. Bell, [117] who was gathering information for General Merritt,
to see maps, and further requesting him to place at Bell's disposal any
available information about the force of the enemy and the topography
of the country. [118]

On July 21 he wrote again asking for passes for a Lieutenant
E. I. Bryan and party, who were making a reconnaissance. [119]

Such records as I have been able to find do not show what response,
if any, Aguinaldo made to these several requests, but General
Anderson's original views as to the willingness of the Insurgents to
cooeperate with him underwent an early change, for on July 18, 1898,
in a letter to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army he
makes the following statement:--

    "The Insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, has declared himself Dictator
    and self-appointed President. He has declared martial law
    and promulgated a minute method of rule and administration
    under it.

    "We have observed all official military courtesies, and he
    and his followers express great admiration and gratitude to
    the great American republic of the north, yet in many ways
    they obstruct our purposes and are using every effort to take
    Manila without us.

    "I suspect also that Aguinaldo is secretly negotiating with
    the Spanish authorities, as his confidential aide is in
    Manila." [120]

This suspicion was entirely justified, as we shall see later.

On July 24 Aguinaldo wrote a letter to General Anderson in effect
warning him not to disembark American troops in places conquered by
the Filipinos from the Spaniards without first communicating in writing
the places to be occupied and the object of the occupation. [121]

Aguinaldo's assumption of civil authority on July 15, 1899, did not
pass unnoticed. On July 21 General Anderson wrote the Adjutant-General
of the army concerning it:--

    "His assumption of civil authority I have ignored, and let
    him know verbally that I could, and would, not recognize it,
    while I did not recognize him as a military leader. It may
    seem strange that I have made no formal protest against
    his proclamation as Dictator, his declaration of martial
    law, and publication and execution of a despotic form of
    government. I wrote such a protest, but did not publish it,
    at Admiral Dewey's request, and also for fear of wounding
    the susceptibilities of Major-General Merritt, but I have let
    it be known in every other way that we do not recognize the
    Dictatorship. These people only respect force and firmness. I
    submit, with all deference, that we have heretofore underrated
    the natives. They are not ignorant, savage tribes, but have
    a civilization of their own; and although insignificant in
    appearance, are fierce fighters, and for a tropical people
    they are industrious. A small detail of natives will do more
    work in a given time than a regiment of volunteers."

Because he was invited as general rather than as president, Aguinaldo
refused to attend a parade and review on the 4th of July. This fact
is, in itself, an answer to his claim that the Americans were tacitly
recognizing his pretensions.

After referring to this incident, Blount says:--

    "On subsequent anniversaries of the day in the Philippines
    it was deemed wise simply to prohibit the reading of our
    declaration before gatherings of the Filipino people. It
    saved discussion." [122]

This statement is incorrect. I myself was present the following
year when the declaration was read on the Luneta to a considerable
gathering of Filipinos among whom were many school children, and it
has often been read since.

The landing of American troops at Paranaque and their going into
camp near that town on July 15 caused much excitement, and a lively
interchange of telegrams between Insurgent officers followed. [123]

They were suspicious of the intentions of the Americans, [124] and
trouble soon began.

On July 16 General Noriel telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--

    "An American has come here who says that he is a Colonel of
    the Army whom we should obey; and that it is your desire. We
    did not listen to him, awaiting your order."

On the back of the telegram is written the following:--

    "Reply.--You should not obey. What this American Colonel says
    is a lie. Be cautious so as not to be deceived. You should
    require from him proof. Be always vigilant, but upright,
    also all of the officers and soldiers must be strict and not
    timid." [125]

Obviously there was no real cooeperation between American and Filipino
troops at this time. General Anderson ignored General Aguinaldo's
request for information as to places where American troops were to
land in Filipino territory and the objects of disembarking them.

The Americans proceeded with their plans for the attack upon Manila,
and it became desirable to occupy some of the Insurgent trenches. On
July 29 Arevalo telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--

    "In conference with General Greene I asked for an official
    letter, a copy of which I send you: 'Headquarters 2nd Brigade,
    U. S. Expeditionary Forces, Camp Dewey, near Manila, July 29th,
    1898. _El Senor Noriel, General de Brigade_. Sir: In pursuance
    of our conversation of yesterday and the message which Captain
    Arevalo brought to me during the night, I beg to inform you
    that my troops will occupy the intrenchments between the Camino
    Real and the beach, leaving camp for that purpose at 8.00
    o'clock this morning. I will be obliged if you will give the
    necessary orders for the withdrawal of your men. Thanking you
    for your courtesy, I remain, very respectfully, your obedient
    servant, _F. V. Greene, Brigadier General_, commanding.'" [126]

This clear direct declaration of intention by General Greene is the
actual transaction referred to by Blount as "Jockeying the Insurgents
out of their trenches." He bases his statements concerning the matter
on a newspaper report.

The attitude of the army officers in the matter of obtaining permission
to occupy the trenches needed in preparing for the assault on the
city could not have been more correct.

On August 10 General Merritt gave the following emphatic instructions
relative to the matter:--

    "No rupture with Insurgents. This is imperative. Can ask
    Insurgent generals or Aguinaldo for permission to occupy
    their trenches, but if refused not to use force."

On the same day General Anderson wrote to Aguinaldo, asking
permission to occupy a trench facing blockhouse No. 14, in order
to place artillery to destroy it. The permission was granted on the
following day.

During the early part of August, Aguinaldo seems to have avoided
conferences with American officers. On the second of the month Mabini
wrote him how he had put off Admiral Dewey's aid with a false statement
that he did not know Aguinaldo's whereabouts. [127]

The landing of American troops at Paranaque for the assault on Manila
led to the concentration of Insurgent troops at the neighbouring town
of Bacoor. [128]

On August 8 Fernando Acevedo [129] wrote to General Pio del Pilar
that the Americans were going to attack the next day and that,--

    "It is requisite and necessary before their attack takes place
    to-morrow, that you to-morrow or to-night annihilate them,
    sparing none, for the way they have deceived us, and will
    again without fail, in the contract signed by Sr. Emilio;
    and convince yourself, my friend, that it is necessary to do
    this; and when it is done the whole world will wonder and say
    that we have done well, and will not be able to give out that
    the people here are fools spending the time sucking their
    fingers." [130]

Worse yet, information was sent to the Spaniards of the proposed
American attack on the 13th instant, as is shown by the following
letter:--

    "(Battalion of Cazadores, No. 2. Expeditionary. Office of
    the Lieutenant-Colonel. Private.)

    "_Senor Don Artemio Ricarte_: [131]

    "My Dear Sir: I have received to-day your kind letter giving
    warning of the attack on Manila, and I thank you for your
    personal interest in me, which, on my part, I reciprocate. I
    assure you that I am yours, most truly and sincerely,

    "_Luis Martinez Alcobendas_.

    "_Singalon_, August 10, 1898." [132]

According to Taylor, this was not the first occurrence of this
sort. He says:--

    "The officers of the United States Army who believed that
    the insurgents were informing the Spaniards of the American
    movements were right. Sastron has printed a letter from Pio
    del Pilar, dated July 30, to the Spanish officer commanding
    at Santa Ana, in which Pilar said that Aguinaldo had told him
    that the Americans would attack the Spanish lines on August 2
    and advised that the Spaniards should not give way, but hold
    their positions. Pilar added, however, that if the Spaniards
    should fall back on the walled city and surrender Santa Ana
    to himself, he would hold it with his own men. Aguinaldo's
    information was correct, and on August 2 eight American
    soldiers were killed or wounded by the Spanish fire." [133]

Taylor continues:--

    "And yet Aguinaldo claimed to be an ally of the Americans. It
    is not probable that these were the only two such letters
    written. Aguinaldo had by this time found out that although he
    could defeat the scattered Spanish detachments, he could not
    defeat the Spanish force holding the lines of Manila. He did
    not want the Americans in the Philippines. They were in his
    way, and he had already made up his mind that if they did not
    give him what he wanted, he would drive them out by force. He
    saw very early that it was extremely improbable that he should
    obtain from them what he wanted; accordingly all losses both
    among Spaniards and Americans would, from Aguinaldo's point
    of view, inure to his benefit. The best possible thing for
    him would be to hold his own force intact while they wore
    each other out. The Spanish losses, small as they were,
    occurred in front of the American lines, not in front of the
    Filipinos. There is no reason, accordingly, for believing
    that the Filipinos suffered heavily. To arrange that the
    Spaniards should inflict losses upon the Americans, while he
    saved his own men, showed ingenuity on the part of Aguinaldo;
    but it was decidedly not the conduct of an ally." [134]

The feeling toward the American troops at this time is further shown
by a telegram from General Pio del Pilar, sent from San Pedro Macati
on August 10, 1898:--

    "Commandant Acebedo writes that the Spaniards are about
    to surrender because they want to turn over the place; the
    Americans want them to leave only the batteries and say that
    they will station themselves in said batteries. It appears
    that they want to deceive us; they do not want to give us
    arms, and if they do not give us arms, we shall attack them
    and drive them out. I await your reply." [135]

This is perhaps not quite the kind of cooeperation that Admiral Dewey
and Generals Anderson and Merritt had expected.

The truth is that the Insurgents were determined to capture Manila for
themselves, not only because of the "war booty," for which they were
hungry, but because of the status which they felt that the taking of
the capital of the Philippines would assure them. The great importance
which they attached to this plan is shown in communications written
by Agoncillo, Aguinaldo and others. [136]

Of conditions at this time, Taylor says:--

    "On July 7, Aguinaldo appointed Artemio Ricarte and Pantaleon
    Garcia to negotiate the surrender of Manila by the Spaniards
    to him (Exhibit 155). On July 5 Pantaleon Garcia was planning
    to enter Manila by way of Tondo or of Santa Cruz (P.I.R.,
    243.7). On the 9th Aguinaldo ordered that rice should be
    gathered from the towns of Manila Province for the use of his
    troops in the decisive attack upon Manila which he intended
    making in a few days (P.I.R., 1087. 5).

"Aguinaldo, finding that his chance of obtaining Manila for himself was
growing steadily less, now determined to force himself into the city
with the Americans and demand a consideration for the assistance he
had rendered them during the siege. It is true he had assisted them,
but his assistance had not been intentional. It was the result of
the operations he was carrying on for his own ends. The operations of
the Filipinos and the Americans were against Spain as a common enemy
of both; but the operations were not joint operations, and although
their purpose was a common purpose, it was not a mutual one. On August
8 Aguinaldo appointed General Ricarte commander in the operations
about Manila, ordered him to respect the property of all foreigners,
and told him that in case his troops succeeded in entering Manila they
were to carry their flag and plant it there (P.I.R., 703. 2). Judging
from an unsigned draft of a letter, he must have warned the foreign
consuls in Manila about the same time to gather under the protection
of their flags all of their fellow-citizens who had not taken refuge
on the vessels in the bay, so that when his troops entered the city
no foreign lives would be taken, and no foreign property would be
injured. The earnestness with which he urged that all foreigners not
Spaniards should take steps to identify themselves and their property
shows that he considered the persons and property of Spanish civilians
as fair booty of war." [137]

There was certainly no need of Insurgent assistance in the assault
on Manila.

The reports which reached Aguinaldo that the surrender of Manila had
been agreed upon in advance were correct, as is shown by the following
testimony of Admiral Dewey:

    "_Senator Patterson_. When did you reach an understanding
    with the Spanish commander upon the subject, [138]--how long
    before the 12th or 13th of August?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. Several days before.

    "_Senator Patterson_. To whom did you communicate the
    arrangement that you had?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. General Merritt and, of course, all of my own
    captains--General Merritt, and I think a council of officers on
    board of one of the steamers. I think there were several army
    officers present when I told the General that; and I may say
    here that I do not think General Merritt took much stock in it.

    "_Senator Patterson_. What statement did you make to them,
    Admiral, in substance?

    "_Admiral Dewey_. That the Spaniards were ready to surrender,
    but before doing so I must engage one of the outlying forts. I
    selected one at Malate, away from the city. [139] They said I
    must engage that and fire for a while, and then I was to make
    a signal by the international code, 'Do you surrender?' Then
    they were to hoist a white flag at a certain bastion; and I
    may say now that I was the first one to discover the white
    flag. We had 50 people looking for that white flag, but I
    happened to be the first one who saw it. I fired for a while,
    and then made the signal according to the programme. We could
    not see the white flag--it was rather a thick day--but finally
    I discovered it on the south bastion; I don't know how long
    it had been flying there when I first saw it." [140]

On August 12, the day before Manila surrendered, Buencamino telegraphed
Aguinaldo, urging him in the strongest terms to attack that night so
that Americans might be obliged to ask him to stop, with the result
that the Insurgents would be included in the official negotiations. He
further advised Aguinaldo that he must not suspend his attack because
the Americans suspended theirs. [141]

General Anderson tells us that, on the evening of August 12,
he received an order from General Merritt to notify Aguinaldo to
forbid the Insurgents under his command from entering Manila. This
notification was delivered to Aguinaldo that night, and was received
by him with anger. [142]

On the following morning the Insurgents actually made an independent
attack of their own, as planned. [143] It promptly led to trouble
with the Americans, and at 8 A.M. Aguinaldo received a telegram from
General Anderson sternly warning him not to let his troops enter
Manila without the consent of the American commander on the south
side of the Pasig River. [144]

Aguinaldo apparently took no action in response to this request,
except to direct General Riego de Dios, who was at Cavite, to go
with Buencamino without losing a moment and ask for an explanation,
in writing if possible. [145]

At 10.50 A.M. he telegraphed General Anderson saying that his troops
were being forced, by threats of violence, to retire from positions
which they had taken, and asking Anderson to order his troops to
avoid difficulty with the Insurgent forces. Aguinaldo said that he
had directed his men to aid the American forces if the latter are
attacked by a common enemy, but was discreetly silent on the subject
of their entering Manila. [146]

Fifteen minutes later, at 11.05, he received a reply to his telegram
to General Riego de Dios, in which that officer communicated the
views of Araneta [147] and Buencamino, who had been unable to find
General Anderson. This important communication follows:--

    "Most urgent. Araneta and Buencamino having been consulted in
    regard to your telegram of to-day, they confirm capitulation,
    and in regard to the telegraphic note of General Anderson
    they are of the opinion, first that we should continue
    hostilities while we ask for an explanation; second, that
    explanation should be in the following terms: Inquire reason
    for note and ask why our troops are not to enter Manila without
    permission of the American commander; third, in case the (terms
    of?) capitulation is given as the reason, to answer that we
    do not suspend our attempt to enter Manila. Its capitulation
    is not favourable to our independence. General Anderson is not
    here. General Merritt is probably in Manila. Only Admiral Dewey
    is in the Bay. We ask authorization to express our explanation
    in the proposed terms and to have a conference with Admiral
    Dewey in order to have our claims reach General Merritt." [148]

An endorsement written by Mabini and signed by Aguinaldo on the above
paper reads:--

    "I authorize every assertion of right, but state that we
    believe that we have the right to enter Manila without
    permission as we have a part in the surrender of the
    Spaniards. They would not have surrendered if our troops had
    not cut off their retreat to the interior. Besides but for us
    the landing of troops would have cost them much blood. Obtain
    an answer as soon as possible in order to lay a protest before
    the consuls in case it is necessary." [149]

Naturally, trouble followed. At 1.30 P.M. General Ricarte telegraphed
to Aguinaldo:--

    "Americans wish to put us out. Give directions." [150]

Apparently about the same hour he wired more at length, as follows:--

    "Most urgent. American troops rearguard our trenches. Mabolo
    and San Jose warn us that they will fire on us when the time
    comes. Impossible to remain there without disagreeing with
    them. Since 5 o'clock this morning we have been furiously
    attacking. Americans firing incessantly, Spaniards silent. No
    losses yet." [151]

At 3.52 he wired again:--

    "General Pio del Pilar informs me of the following: 'Come here,
    if possible, as our soldiers at the barrio of Concepcion
    are not allowed to go out and we are prohibited to move
    on any farther. We it was who succeeded in capturing that
    place. Come here or there will be trouble, since they are
    driving me away, and refusing to listen to what I say.' I am
    at this very moment going to aforesaid place." [152]

At 5 P.M. another was sent by Ricarte to Aguinaldo as follows:--

    "Colonel San Miguel arrived here from Ermita. Regional
    Exposition, Agricultural College and other buildings are
    ours. Our flag flies already at Ermita. Colonel Agapito Donzon
    with his troops is in the Perez building, Paco. Colonels Julian
    Ocampo and Isidoro Tolentino are in the convent of Ermita. All
    houses without flag are guarded by our soldiers." [153]

At 6.15 P.M. he telegraphed as follows:--

    "I inform you that the chiefs of our troops have reported to
    me that our flag at Singalong church (_visita_) was removed by
    the Americans and they hoisted theirs instead, not allowing
    us to approach thereto. General Pio del Pilar is at present
    at the barrio of Concepcion. Americans prohibited him to move
    on any farther. How can he enter Manila?" [154]

No attention was paid to General Anderson's request that the Insurgent
troops should not enter Manila without permission. They crowded forward
with and after the American forces. Coming out on Bagumbayan drive,
they found American and Spanish troops confronting each other but not
firing, the former on the drive, the latter on the neighbouring city
wall. A flag of truce was waving from the south bastion, nevertheless
the Insurgents fired on the Spanish forces, provoking a return fire
which killed and wounded American soldiers. Of this incident General
Greene has said:--

    "At this point the California regiment a short time before
    had met some insurgents who had fired at the Spaniards on the
    walls, and the latter, in returning the fire, had caused a loss
    in the California regiment of 1 killed and 2 wounded." [155]

Some of these matters must have come to the attention of General
Anderson, for he sent Aguinaldo a telegram, received by the latter
at 6.35 P.M., as follows:--

    "Dated Ermita Headquarters 2nd Division 13 to
    Gen. Aguinaldo. Commanding Filipino Forces.--Manila,
    taken. Serious trouble threatened between our forces. Try
    and prevent it. Your troops should not force themselves in
    the city until we have received the full surrender then we
    will negotiate with you.

    "_Anderson_, commanding." [156]

It appears that the Insurgent troops took the suburb of Santa Ana,
and captured Spanish and Filipino officers and men. [157]

In view of the known facts, how absurd becomes the following contention
of Aguinaldo, advanced in his "Resena Veridica:--

    "Our own forces could see the American forces land on the beach
    of the Luneta and of the Paseo de Santa Lucia. The Spanish
    soldiers, who were on the walls of the city, drew the attention
    of every one because they did not fire on the former, a mystery
    which was explained at nightfall of that day, by the news of
    the capitulation of the place by General Senor Jaudenes [158]
    to the American General, Mr. Merritt, a capitulation which
    the American Generals claimed for themselves, an infraction of
    what had been agreed upon with Admiral Dewey, in regard to the
    formation of plans for the attack and taking of Manila by the
    two armies, American and Filipino, together and in combination.

    "This inexplicable line of conduct on the part of the American
    officers was made clearer by the telegrams, which General
    Anderson addressed to me, from Maytubig on the said 13th day,
    requesting that I should order our troops not to enter Manila,
    which request was refused, inasmuch as it was contrary to what
    was agreed upon, and to the high ends of the Revolutionary
    Government, which, on taking upon itself the immense work of
    besieging Manila, during the two months and a half, sacrificing
    thousands of lives and millions in material interests, could
    not surely have done so with any object other than that of
    capturing Manila and the Spanish garrison which with firmness
    and tenacity defended that place." [159]

On August 14 Aguinaldo telegraphed General Anderson as follows:--

    "My troops, who have been for so long besieging Manila,
    have always been promised that they could appear in it,
    as you know and cannot deny, and for this reason, and on
    account of the many sacrifices made of money, and lives, I
    do not consider it prudent to issue orders to the contrary,
    as they might be disobeyed against my authority. Besides, I
    hope that you will allow the troops to enter because we have
    given proofs many times of our friendship, ceding our positions
    at Paranaque, Pasay, Singalon and Maytubig. Nevertheless,
    if it seems best to you, and in order to enter into a frank
    and friendly understanding and avoid any disagreeable conflict
    before the eyes of the Spaniards, I will commission Don Felipe
    Buencamino and others, who will to-day go out from our lines
    and hold a conference with you, and that they will be safe
    during the conference." [160]

Aguinaldo and his associates pressed the demand for joint
occupation. On August 13 Admiral Dewey and General Merritt informed
the government that since the occupation of Manila and its suburbs
the Insurgents outside had been insisting on this, and asked how far
they might proceed in enforcing obedience in the matter.

They were informed by a telegram dated August 17 that the President
of the United States had directed:--

    "That there must be no joint occupation with the
    Insurgents. The United States in the possession of Manila city,
    Manila bay and harbor must preserve the peace and protect
    persons and property within the territory occupied by their
    military and naval forces. The insurgents and all others
    must recognize the military occupation and authority of the
    United States and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed
    by the President. Use whatever means in your judgment are
    necessary to this end." [161]

This left the military and naval commanders no option in the premises,
and in any event dual occupation was out of the question because of
the lawlessness of the Insurgent troops.

At this very time they were looting the portions of the city which
they occupied, and as is abundantly shown by their own records were
not confining their attacks to Spaniards, but were assaulting their
own people and raiding the property of foreigners as well. [162] The
continuation of such a condition of affairs was manifestly impossible.

The Insurgents promptly demanded their share in the "war booty,"
and asked certain other extraordinary concessions as follows:--

    "(4) Our sacrifices in cooeperating in the siege and taking
    of Manila being well known, it is just that we should share
    in the war booty.

    "(5) We demand for our use the palace of Malacanang and the
    Convents of Malate, Ermita and Paco or San Fernando de Dilao.

    "(6) We demand that the civil offices of Manila be filled
    by North Americans and never by Spaniards; but if General
    Merritt should require some Filipinos we should be pleased if
    he will grant our President, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, the favour
    of recommending select and skilled Filipinos. The jurisdiction
    of the authorities of Manila shall not be recognized beyond
    the municipal radius.

    "(7) The American forces shall not approach nor penetrate
    our military positions without permission of the respective
    commanders thereof and shall evacuate all the positions
    which they occupy at the present time beyond the municipal
    radius; Spaniards who pass our lines without permission of
    the commander will be considered as spies.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "(10) Lastly we state clearly that our concessions and
    petitions do not signify on our part that we recognize the
    sovereignty of North America in these islands, as they are
    made necessary by the present war." [163]

Under the instructions of the President these demands could not be
acceded to. Nor could they have been acceded to had there been no
such instructions. In this connection the following extract from
General Jaudenes's cablegram for June 8th to his home government is
highly significant:--

    "Population of suburbs have taken refuge in walled city from
    fear of outrages of insurgents, preferring to run risks of
    bombardment, which has not yet begun." [164]

It would seem that the population of the suburbs did not have a high
idea of Insurgent discipline.

That their apprehensions were not groundless is shown by a passage
in a letter sent the following day to Governor-General Augustin
by Buencamino:--

    "Manila being surrounded by land and by sea, without hope of
    assistance from anywhere, and Senor Aguinaldo being disposed to
    make use of the fleet in order to bombard, if Your Excellency
    should prolong the struggle with tenacity, I do not know,
    frankly, what else to do other than to succumb dying, but
    Your Excellency knows that the entrance of 100,000 Indians,
    [165] inflamed with battle, drunk with triumph and with
    blood, will produce the hecatomb from which there will not
    be allowed to escape either women, children, or Peninsular
    friars,--especially the friars; and, I believe that the rights
    of humanity, imperilled in such a serious way, should be well
    considered by Your Excellency, for however dear glory and
    military duty may be, although worth as much or more than
    existence itself there is no right by which they should be
    won at the cost of the rights of humanity, and the latter
    outweigh every consideration and all duty." [166]

Don Felipe knew his own people. He also knew, none better, what they
had in mind at this time.

As it was the Insurgent forces made the most of such opportunity as
they had, and their own records show it.

In the suburbs of Manila they sacked and committed outrages,
threatening people with their arms, and this was still going on a
week after the fall of Manila. [167]

General Pio del Pilar was believed to be responsible for much of this
misconduct, and Mabini proposed that as it was necessary for him to
leave the vicinity of Manila, and they could not remove him by force,
he be promoted. [168]

Some time during this month Sandico wrote Aguinaldo as follows:--

    "The Americans have already heard of the frequent cases
    of kidnapping (_dukut_) occurring in Tondo, San Sebastian
    and San Miguel. Last night some of ours were surprised in
    the act of kidnapping a person. I have also heard that many
    persons are asking for contributions of war. I tell them [169]
    that you know nothing of all this and that if some persons
    are kidnapped it is due to the hate of the natives for the
    Spanish spies and secret police, which is great." [170]

Evidently Sandico continued to interest himself in the matter of
preventing disorder, for on September 24, 1898, he wrote Aguinaldo
from Manila as follows:--

    "By authority of General Don Pio del Pilar and accompanied
    by the War Auditor, Senor Urbano, we entered a prison where
    the individuals Mariano de la Cruz and Mariano Crisostomo
    were kept. They were almost prostrated. They had lately
    been released from Bilibid where they had been confined
    for political crimes. On being asked the reason for their
    imprisonment they began by showing us their bodies from which
    blood still issued as the result of the barbarous treatment
    received from Major Carmona who, by the way, is the same
    person of whom I spoke to you in one of my previous letters;
    I declared to you then that he had assaulted, revolver in hand,
    a man in the middle of one of the most frequented streets of
    the suburb of Paco on pure suspicion.

    "The prisoners in question stated that if they admitted the
    accusations made against them it was for fear of greater
    punishments promised by said Major. The officer of the guard
    took the liberty of striking with his fist the one who dared
    to express himself so.

    "Before such a spectacle Major Bell found himself forced to
    tell them that brutal acts are not precisely a recommendation
    for a country that wished to be free and that they, the
    Americans, do not arrest any one without just cause. [171]

    "I take the liberty of calling your attention to the matter
    in question and other abuses in order that the measures you
    may think fit be adopted to remedy this evil. In fact, we are
    making a target of ourselves in the sight of all nations,
    especially so in that of the Americans who note any act of
    ours and judge us secretly now in order to do so later in
    public. To make light of this is to plant a seed of future
    injury to us, because many will desire to place themselves
    under the protection of the American flag, seeing that ours
    refuses to defend the citizens' individual rights.

    "I, for my part, ask that Major Carmona be arrested together
    with his accomplices in the matter so that it may serve as
    a lesson not only for him but also for those who think like
    him." [172]

Obviously Sandico's protest of September 24 did not produce the
desired result, for on September 28 he wrote Aguinaldo a long letter
complaining that in Manila personal security did not exist, people
were being tortured and murdered, kidnapping and theft were very
frequent, and these abuses were being committed by Filipino officers
and men. Some of the things which had come to his knowledge were of
such a nature that he preferred to speak to Aguinaldo privately about
them. [173]

Murder, pillaging, torture of prisoners, kidnapping, theft--these
are not pleasant things, but they continued to occur, and Aguinaldo,
who apparently desired to prevent them, was powerless to do so. He
did not dare discipline General Pio del Pilar, nor remove him from
the vicinity of Manila, and the soldiers of that officer continued
to work their will on their own unfortunate and helpless people.

Aguinaldo at first flatly refused to direct the disorderly Insurgent
forces to leave Manila. The American commander showed great forbearance
and negotiations continued.

On August 16, 1898, the Diplomatic Commission (Buencamino and Gregorio
Araneta) telegraphed Aguinaldo that a clause in a proposed agreement
requiring prior permission of Insurgent officers before American
troops could pass or approach their lines had greatly displeased
General Anderson who declined to treat until after the withdrawal of
Noriel's troops from Manila. [174]

Aguinaldo's reply, sent on August 17, 1898, shows that he had already
made up his mind to fight the Americans, for it contains the following
significant words: "The conflict is coming sooner or later and we
shall gain nothing by asking as favours of them what are really our
rights." [175]

While negotiations were pending General Merritt sent Major J. F. Bell
to Aguinaldo with a letter and also with a memorandum in which were
the words:--

    "In case you find Aguinaldo inclined to be generous in his
    arrangements with us, you may communicate to him as follows:
    ..."

There follow six paragraphs, of which the third is of special
importance. It reads as follows:--

    "(3) That I have every disposition to represent liberally
    the Government at Washington, which I know is inclined to
    deal fairly with him and his people; but not knowing what the
    policy of that Government will be, I am not prepared to make
    any promises, except that in the event of the United States
    withdrawing from these islands care will be taken to leave
    him _in as good condition as he was found by the forces of
    the Government_. [176]

Relative to the italicized portion of this statement Major Bell says:--

    "I was pressed to explain further just what meaning General
    M. meant to convey by the underscored portion of this remark,
    but I replied that I had repeated the language General M. had
    used to me, and I preferred they should seek any further
    explanation from him, lest I might unwittingly fall into error
    if I undertook to explain his meaning myself. Their lack of
    definiteness and my unwillingness to comment upon the language
    seemed to arouse their apprehensions and suspicions. They
    have been trying ever since to obtain in writing some definite
    promise on this subject." [177]

Aguinaldo ordered that the machinery of the water works be started up
at once, a thing which was very necessary as Manila was suffering from
lack of water. I should be glad if I could leave this matter here,
but I cannot, for Major Bell elsewhere makes the further statement:--

    "Attention is invited to General Merritt's promise made known
    to Aguinaldo by me verbally, namely, that in the event of the
    United States withdrawing from these islands, care would be
    taken to leave Aguinaldo in as good condition as he was found
    by the forces of the Government. From a remark the General
    made to me I inferred he intended to interpret the expression
    'forces of the Government' to mean the naval forces, should
    future contingencies necessitate such an interpretation." [178]

Let us hope that Major Bell misunderstood General Merritt's
intention. If this is not the case, I must say in all frankness that
in my opinion it was General Merritt's intention to indulge in sharp
practice.

Obviously, the American naval forces did not find Aguinaldo in any
"condition," in the sense in which General Merritt uses the term. On
the contrary, they brought him from Hongkong and assisted him in
starting a revolution. The negotiations in question were relative
to the positions held by the Insurgents at the time the negotiations
took place, and General Merritt's promise could not legitimately be
interpreted to refer to anything else.

Had Aguinaldo accepted his offer, a most embarrassing situation would
have resulted. General Merritt was obviously not authorized to make
such a proposition in the first instance, and the only honourable
course left open to him would have been to advise Washington of his
improper action and beg the Government to support him in it and thus
save the honour of the country.

Fortunately, Aguinaldo did not act upon the promise nor accept the
offer. On the contrary, he promptly and indignantly denied that he
was committed to anything, and sought to impose new conditions which
were not acceded to.

Meanwhile some one doubtless got hold of General Merritt and called
his attention to the fact that in making this offer he had grossly
exceeded his authority, for in his reply to Aguinaldo's protest
General Merritt says:--

    "So far as any promises as to what should be done in the event
    of a conclusion of a treaty between the United States and Spain
    are concerned, it is utterly impossible for me as the military
    representative only of the United States to make any promises
    such as you request. As you have already been informed, you
    may depend upon the good will of the Americans out here and
    the Government, of which you already know the beneficence,
    to determine these matters in the future." [179]

Coming, as this statement did, after the offer made in the memorandum
hereinbefore referred to, it must have aroused the suspicions of
Aguinaldo and his associates, and in my opinion Merritt's conduct in
making such a proposal in the first instance was inexcusable.

Before he could terminate the negotiations which followed he was called
away, and turned this matter, together with other unfinished business,
over to his successor, General E. S. Otis.

On August 31, 1898, the latter official wrote to Aguinaldo as
follows:--

    "_General Aguinaldo, Bacoor_:

    "Referring to promise made by General Merritt to reply to
    your letter of August 27 within four days, I desire to state
    that he was unexpectedly ordered away and had not opportunity
    to reply. Being unacquainted with the situation, I must take
    time to inform myself before answering, which I will do at
    the earliest opportunity.

    "_Otis_."

On September 8 General Otis wrote Aguinaldo a long letter fully
discussing the whole situation in the light of the complete information
which he had meanwhile obtained. Since so much has been made of this
incident by Blount and others, I invite attention to the following
extracts from General Otis's letter, which embody a fair and judicial
statement of the conditions which existed:--

    "You designate certain lines within the suburbs of the
    city of Manila, to which you promise to retire your troops,
    and name as conditions precedent: First, protection to your
    shipping by the United States Navy, and the free navigation of
    your vessels within the waters in United States occupation;
    second, restitution to your forces of all positions which
    are now occupied by your troops, in the event that treaty
    stipulations between the United States and Spain surrender to
    the last-named government the territory occupied by the former;
    and thirdly, that United States troops now occupying positions
    beyond the lines you name shall retire within the same.

    "A discussion of your proposition to hold, jointly, with
    the United States Government, the city of Manila, involves
    consideration of some of the other concessions you desire to
    be made, and to that I will at once refer. I wish to present
    the matter, in the first instance, in its legal aspect,
    although, from remarks contained in former correspondence,
    I am of the opinion that you are fully aware how untenable
    the proposition is. The United States and Spain were and
    are belligerent parties to a war, and were so recognized
    by the civilized world. In the course of events the entire
    city of Manila, then in full possession of Spanish forces,
    was surrendered to the first-named belligerent power. The
    articles of agreement and capitulation gave the United States
    Government full occupancy of the city and defences of Manila,
    and that Government obligated itself to insure the safety
    of the lives and property of the inhabitants of the city
    to the best of its ability. By all the laws of war and all
    international precedents the United States authority over
    Manila and its defences is full and supreme, and it cannot
    escape the obligations which it has assumed.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "But conceding, as you do, the strictly legal right of my
    Government to hold and administer the affairs of the city
    of Manila and its suburbs (I thus conclude from expressions
    contained in former correspondence and from my appreciation of
    your intellectual attainments), you base your proposition--a
    joint occupation--upon supposed equitable grounds, referring
    to the sacrifices your troops have made and the assistance they
    have rendered the American forces in the capture of Manila. It
    is well known they have made personal sacrifices, endured
    great hardships, and have rendered aid. But is it forgotten
    that my Government has swept the Spanish navy from the seas
    of both hemispheres; sent back to Spain the Spanish army and
    navy forces, recently embarked for your destruction, and the
    secure holding of the Philippine possessions; that since May
    1 last its navy has held the city of Manila at its mercy,
    but out of consideration of humanity refused to bombard it,
    preferring to send troops to demand surrender, and thereby
    preserve the lives and property of the inhabitants? Is it
    forgotten that the destruction of the Spanish navy and the
    retention of Spanish armed men in its European possessions
    has opened up to you the ports of the Island of Luzon and
    held Spain helpless to meet its refractory subjects?

    *       *       *       *       *

    "Apart from all legal and equitable considerations, and
    those having their origin in personally conceived ideas of
    justice, I wish respectfully to call your attention to the
    impracticability of maintaining a joint occupation of Manila
    and its suburbs, and in this I know that I shall have the
    approval of your excellent judgment. It would be extremely
    difficult to prevent friction between our respective forces,
    which might result in unfortunate consequences, labor as we may
    for continued harmonious relations. Located in close proximity,
    irresponsible members of our organizations, by careless or
    impertinent action, might be the means of inciting grave
    disturbances; and in this connection I call to your attention
    the recent shooting affair at Cavite, which still requires
    investigation. There might also arise conflict of authority
    between our subordinate officers. Even now, within precincts
    in entire actual possession of our troops, I find that permits
    are given to citizens, who are styled local presidents, to make
    arrests, to carry arms, etc., in violation of our instructions
    and authority, and that several cases of kidnapping have
    taken place. In pursuance of our obligations to maintain,
    in so far as we can, domestic tranquillity, our officers have
    arrested suspected parties, and they have asserted (with what
    element of truth I know not) that the insurgent forces are the
    offenders. I have declined to accept their statements, as I
    prefer to believe the contrary, although it would appear that
    officers connected with those forces have issued the permits
    to which I allude. Such interference with our administration
    of civil affairs must eventually result in conflict.

    "... And here permit me to remark upon a view of the subject
    you have advocated in support of the plea for dual occupation
    of the city's suburbs. Your forces, you say in substance,
    should have a share in the booty resulting from the conquest
    of the city, on account of hardships endured and assistance
    rendered. The facts on which you base your conclusion granted,
    your conclusion, under the rules of war which are binding on my
    Government, does not follow, for it has never recognized the
    existence of spoils of war, denominated 'booty,' as have many
    European governments. No enemy's property of any kind, public
    or private, can be seized, claimed by, or awarded to, any of
    its officers or men, and should they attempt to appropriate
    any of it for their individual benefit, they would be very
    severely punished through military tribunals, on which have
    been conferred by law very sweeping jurisdiction. The enemy's
    money and property (all that is not necessary to be expended in
    administering local affairs in the enemy's territory) must be
    preserved for final arbitrament or settlement by and between
    the supreme authorities of the nations concerned. My troops
    cannot acquire booty nor any individual benefit by reason of
    the capture of an enemy's territory. I make this comment,
    believing that you hold erroneous opinions in respect to
    individual advantages which occupation bestows.

    "I request your indulgence while I briefly consider the
    concessions you ask us to make as conditions precedent to the
    retirement of your forces to the lines indicated by your note
    of the 27th ultimo.

    "The first is: Protection to your shipping and free navigation
    to your vessels. Neither the extent of protection nor the limit
    of free navigation you request is understood. Certainly you
    could not mean protection on the high seas, or in the ports
    not in the rightful possession of the United States. That,
    as you are fully aware, could only be effected by treaty,
    or guarantee, following international recognition of
    the belligerent rights of the Philippine revolutionary
    government. While the existing armistice continues, the
    United States are in rightful possession, in so far as the
    navigable waters of the Philippine Islands are concerned, only
    of the bay of Manila and its navigable tributaries. Within the
    same all vessels of trade and commerce and the war vessels
    of recognized national powers sail freely as long as the
    sovereignty of my Government is not assailed nor the peace of
    the locality threatened. In this respect, whatever concessions
    are extended by way of relaxation of trade restrictions,
    incident to war, to the citizens of these islands will be
    extended to all alike, and discrimination in this regard
    is neither intended nor permitted. Admiral Dewey exercises
    supervision over all naval matters, and they are in no way
    related to the duties conferred upon me by law. Nor would
    it avail should I seek his consent for greater latitude of
    action, for even if disposed to grant special concessions he
    could not do so, and I doubt if the supreme authority of my
    Government could now, under the prevailing truce with Spain,
    invest him with the requisite powers to do so and at the same
    time preserve its international obligations.

    "The second concession named by you is restitution of positions
    in the city of Manila to your forces, in case the treaty
    of peace remands to Spain the territory surrendered under
    the late capitulatory articles; and the third and last is a
    promise to retire our troops within the lines indicated by
    you, as the lines on which you desire your troops to remain
    permanently. These propositions, having a kindred nature,
    may be considered together, and, indeed, have already been
    impliedly answered. From previous statements of facts and
    logical conclusions made and stated in this communication,
    concerning the nature of the obligations resting on the United
    States with regard to the territory to which they have the
    legal right of possession under contracting articles with
    Spain, it is evident that neither in law or morals can the
    concessions be made. I would be powerless to grant them in any
    aspect of the case, being nothing more than an agent to carry
    out the instructions of the executive head of my Government and
    not being vested with discretionary power to determine matters
    of such moment. In the present instance I am not only powerless
    to accede to your request, but have been strictly enjoined
    by my Government, mindful of its international promises and
    national honour, which it has never broken nor sacrificed,
    not to accede joint occupation of the city and suburbs of
    Manila and am directed specially to preserve the peace and
    protect persons and property within the territory surrendered
    under the terms of the Spanish capitulation. These mandates
    must be obeyed.

    "Thus have I endeavoured with all candor and sincerity,
    holding nothing in reserve, to place before you the situation
    as understood by me, and I doubt not by the Republic
    which I represent. I have not been instructed as to what
    policy the United States intends to pursue in regard to its
    legitimate holdings here, and hence I am unable to give you
    any information on the subject. That it will have a care
    and labor conscientiously for the welfare of your people I
    sincerely believe. It remains for you, beneficiaries of its
    sacrifices, to adopt a course of action which will manifest
    your good intentions and show to the world the principles
    which actuate your proceedings.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "It only remains for me to respectfully notify you that I am
    compelled by my instructions to direct that your armed forces
    evacuate the entire city of Manila, including its suburbs
    and defences, and that I shall be obliged to take action with
    that end in view within a very short space of time should you
    decline to comply with my Government's demands; and I hereby
    serve notice on you that unless your troops are withdrawn
    beyond the line of the city's defences before Thursday,
    the 15th instant, I shall be obliged to resort to forcible
    action, and that my Government will hold you responsible for
    any unfortunate consequences which may ensue.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "In conclusion, I beg to inform you that I have conferred
    freely with Admiral Dewey upon the contents of this
    communication and am delegated by him to state that he fully
    approves of the same in all respects; that the commands of
    our Government compel us to act as herein indicated, and
    that between our respective forces there will be unanimity
    and complete concert of action."

This calm and temperate discussion of the situation, coupled with
the firm statement of intention with which it closed, produced a
decided effect on Aguinaldo. Concerning the events to which it led,
General Otis has made this statement:--

    "On September 13, a commission sent by Aguinaldo and consisting
    of three members, one of whom was the treasurer and another
    the attorney-general of the insurgent government, called
    for the purpose of discussing the subject of my letter of
    the 8th. They asked me to withdraw it and simply request
    in writing that the insurgent troops retire to the line
    designated by General Merritt, which I refused to do, stating
    that unless they withdrew as directed we would be obliged to
    resort to force. They then asked that I withdraw the letter
    and issue a request unaccompanied by any threat to use force,
    as Aguinaldo was fearful that he would be unable to remove
    his troops upon a demand. To which I replied that the letter
    of the 8th instant would stand. They then said that as the
    demands of that letter must remain unchanged, the insurgents
    would withdraw as directed therein, but that if I would express
    in writing a simple request to Aguinaldo to withdraw to the
    lines which I designated--something which he could show to the
    troops and induce them to think that he was simply acting upon
    a request from these headquarters--he would probably be able to
    retire his men without much difficulty; that, of course, they
    themselves understood the direction to withdraw, which would
    be obeyed, and thereupon repeated their desire to obtain a note
    of request, whereupon I furnished them with the following:--

        "'_Office U. S. Military Governor in the_

        "'_Philippine Islands_,

        "'_Manila_, P. I., September 13, 1898.

        "'_The Commanding General of the Philippine Forces_:

        "'_Sir_: Referring to my communication of September
        8, I have the honour to inform you that I have had a
        most agreeable conversation with certain gentlemen who
        are in the interests of your revolutionary government
        upon the matters therein contained. We have discussed
        at length the complications now existing, which will
        exist, and will doubtless increase, while our troops
        continue to occupy jointly certain districts of the
        city of Manila. I have urged upon them the necessity
        of the withdrawal of your troops in order that the
        friendly relations which have always been maintained
        by and between them and the forces of the United
        States Government may be perpetuated. I am sure that
        the gentlemen fully appreciate my sentiments and
        will clearly report them to you. May I ask you to
        patiently listen to their report of our conversation?

        "'It is my desire that our friendly intercourse and
        mutual amicable relations be continued; that they be
        not jeopardized if we can by consistent action avoid
        it, and such, I am certain, is the desire of yourself
        and associates.

        "'May I ask, therefore, that you withdraw your troops
        from Manila?

        "'Permit me to add in conclusion that I have that
        confidence in your ability and patriotism which will
        lead you to accede to this request.

        "'I am, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

        (Signed) "'_E. S. Otis_,

        "'Major-General, U. S. V.,

        "'United States Military Governor in the Philippines.'

    "In reply to which, on the 16th, the following was received:--

        "'_Malolos, Bulacan_, September 16, 1898.

        "'_The Commanding General of the American Forces_:

        "'_My Dear Sir_: Referring to your esteemed
        communication, dated the 13th instant, I have the
        honour to inform you that I have given appropriate
        orders that my troops should abandon their most
        advanced positions within some of the suburbs, and
        that they should retire to points where contact with
        yours would be more difficult, in order to avoid all
        occasion for conflict.

        "'I hope that by these presents you will be fully
        convinced of my constant desire to preserve amicable
        relations with the American forces, even at the risk
        of sacrificing a part of the confidence placed in my
        government by the Philippine people.

        "'A consideration of my many occupations will serve to
        excuse me for not having answered with the promptness
        desired.

        "'Your very respectful servant,

        (Signed) "'_Emilio Aguinaldo_.'

    "On the evening of the 15th the armed insurgent organizations
    withdrew from the city and all of its suburbs, as
    acknowledged by their leaders, excepting from one small
    outlying district. This certain agents of Aguinaldo asked
    on the previous day to be permitted to retain for a short
    time, on the plea that the general officer in command [180]
    would not obey instructions, and they proposed to remove his
    men gradually by organizations and thereafter to punish him
    for his disobedience. The withdrawal was effected adroitly,
    as the insurgents marched out in excellent spirits, cheering
    the American troops." [181]

I have given the facts thus fully for the reason that this is the one
instance I have found in which a promise was made, fortunately in the
form of an offer which was not accepted, and then withdrawn. It has
seemed to me that the reasons why General Merritt should never have
made it, and why General Otis could not possibly have renewed it,
should be fully set forth.

On September 7, 1898, General Otis had cabled to Washington that
Admiral Dewey and he considered conditions critical, and that
the number of armed Insurgents in the city was large and rapidly
increasing. He stated that on the 8th he would send a notification
to Aguinaldo that unless the latter's troops were withdrawn beyond
the line of the suburbs of the cry before September 15 he would be
obliged to resort to forcible action and that the United States would
hold Aguinaldo responsible for any unfortunate consequences which
might ensue.

Aguinaldo still hoped to obtain recognition of his government by the
United States, but did not consider such recognition probable, and
pushed preparations to attack if a favorable opportunity should offer.

Before occupying ourselves with these preparations, let us briefly
review the results of our investigations as to Insurgent cooeperation
with the American forces up to this time.

Taylor has made the following excellent summary of the case:--

    "Up to this time Aguinaldo had continued a desultory
    warfare with the Spanish troops in Manila. That none of his
    attacks were very serious is shown from the Spanish reports
    of casualties; but although he had failed to secure the
    surrender of the city to himself, he had kept its garrison
    occupied and within their works. The American force on land
    was now strong enough to begin offensive operations. So
    far the relations between the Americans and Aguinaldo had
    not been really friendly. They were in his way, and yet he
    could not break with them, for he hoped to use them for the
    attainment of the designs which he had by this time frankly
    declared. The Americans had listened to these declarations,
    and had not answered them, nor was it possible to answer
    them. The American forces were there under the instructions
    of the President to make war on Spain and to establish a
    military government in the Philippines. Aguinaldo had declared
    himself a dictator and the Philippines independent. To have
    recognized him in his civil capacity, to have dealt with him
    in his civil capacity, would have meant a recognition of his
    government by the military commander in the field--a thing
    impossible and unlawful. Officers of the United States forces
    are not empowered to recognize governments; that function is
    reserved to the President of the United States; and in this
    case he, in his orders to the Secretary of War, dated May 19,
    copies of which were forwarded to General Merritt for his
    guidance, informed him that the army of occupation was sent
    to the Philippines 'for the twofold purpose of completing the
    reduction of the Spanish power in that quarter and of giving
    order and security to the islands while in the possession
    of the United States.' These instructions contemplated the
    establishment of a military government in the archipelago by
    military officials of the United States.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "it is true that in spite of the date of these instructions
    General Merritt in San Francisco had received no copy of
    them on August 28, three days after the departure of General
    Anderson, and what that officer knew of them could only have
    been what General Merritt remembered of the contents of an
    unsigned copy of them shown him at the White House, but they
    were in accordance with the practice of the United States
    Government in occupying conquered territory, that practice
    General Anderson well knew, and his relations with Aguinaldo
    were guided by it.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "It has been claimed that Aguinaldo and his followers received
    the impression at this time from their conversation with
    American officers that the United States would undoubtedly
    recognize the independence of the Philippines, and that the
    cooperation of the insurgents was due to this impression. There
    was no cooperation. That he attempted in vain to secure the
    surrender of Manila to himself was not cooperation. That
    he refrained from attacking the Americans and occasionally
    permitted them to be furnished supplies, for which they paid,
    was not cooperation. The fact that for a time their plans and
    his plans were parallel does not mean cooperation. Aguinaldo
    was forced by the exigencies of the situation, by the necessity
    of strengthening his hold upon the people, by the necessities
    of his operations against the Spaniards, to make Spaniards
    and natives alike believe that all that he did was with
    the aid of the Americans by whom he would be supported in
    all his acts. He needed their support, and if he could not
    obtain that he needed the appearance of their support for the
    attainment of his ends; and this he was forced to purchase by
    compliance, or apparent compliance, with their demands. But
    his compliance with them, as all American officers serving
    there well knew, was never willing, was never complete,
    and was never given except under pressure. It is true that
    writers upon the subject, speaking with the confidence which is
    born of insufficient and incomplete information, assure their
    readers that any government but that of the United States, any
    colonial administrators but Americans, would have been able to
    obtain the hearty cooperation of Aguinaldo and his followers by
    judicious concessions to them at this time. The only concession
    which would have obtained that hearty cooperation would have
    been the recognition of the independence of the Philippines
    under a United States protectorate, of Aguinaldo clothed with
    the plenitude of the powers of the Katipunan as dictator, and
    a promise to promptly withdraw from the islands. This promise
    the Government of the United States could not make. Until the
    ratification of a treaty of peace with Spain the insurgents of
    the Philippine Islands were rebellious subjects of Spain, and
    with them, except as fighting men, no relations could be had.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "No report of operations or returns of strength were rendered
    by Aguinaldo at this or any other time to any American
    commander, and no American commander ever rendered such
    returns to him. At the time of General Merritt's arrival, and
    until Manila was occupied by the Americans, the insurgents and
    United States troops were united solely by the fact that they
    had Manila as a common objective. Conditions were such that
    the Americans, in order to obtain its surrender, had to avoid
    doing anything which might cause the insurgents to attack them
    and perhaps make terms with Spain; while Aguinaldo and his
    followers, in order to accomplish the surrender of Manila to
    themselves, had to maintain such relations with the Americans
    as would induce the Spaniards to believe that their fleet
    was at his disposal, [182] and also such apparent harmony
    and cooperation with them in the execution of their plans
    that the recalcitrant among the Filipinos would be forced to
    believe that the Americans would in all ways use their forces
    to support Aguinaldo in the attainment of his desires.

    "General Merritt saw this and the necessity for immediately
    taking such steps as would lead to his occupation of
    Manila. With the arrival of the third expedition he was able
    to pass through the insurgent lines between Camp Dewey and
    Manila, for he had sufficient force to accept no refusal
    from Aguinaldo.

    "In his report he said that the insurgents had obtained
    positions of investment opposite the Spanish lines along
    their full extent, and that on the bay front their lines ran
    within 800 yards of San Antonio Abad. The approaches to the
    beach and village of Pasay were in their possession.

    "'This anomalous state of affairs, namely, having a line
    of quasi-hostile native troops between our forces and the
    Spanish position, was, of course, very objectionable, but it
    was difficult to deal with owing to the peculiar conditions
    of our relations with the insurgents.... As General Aguinaldo
    did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his services as a
    subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the
    President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by
    the American land forces, and stated that "the powers of the
    military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately
    operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants,"
    I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication
    with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession
    of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until
    then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce
    my authority in the event that his pretensions should clash
    with my designs. For these reasons the preparations for the
    attack on the city were pressed and the military operations
    conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent
    forces. The wisdom of this course was subsequently fully
    established by the fact that when the troops at my command
    carried the Spanish entrenchments, extending from the sea to
    the Pasay road on the extreme Spanish right, we were under
    no obligation, by prearranged plans of the mutual attack,
    to turn to the right and clear the front still held by the
    insurgents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy
    the city and the suburbs.'" [183]

All that the Insurgents and the Americans ever had in common was an
enemy. They each fought that enemy in their own way. There was no
cooeperation. On the part of the Insurgents there was treachery. I
will submit further evidence of this fact.






CHAPTER IV

The Premeditated Insurgent Attack


It will be remembered that the minutes of the session of the Hong
Kong junta at which Aguinaldo reported the result of his negotiations
with Pratt and received his instructions relative to the trip to
Manila, recorded the fact that there would be no better occasion for
the expeditionary forces "to arm themselves at the expense of the
Americans," and that provided with arms the Filipino people would
be able to oppose themselves to the United States and combat their
demands if they attempted to colonize the country. [184]

The possible, if not the probable, desirability of attacking the
United States troops was, it is evident, clearly foreseen from the
beginning. Active preparations for doing this now soon began.

Although Insurgent officers in full uniform freely visited Manila at
all times, Aguinaldo wrote on October 1 to his commander in Laguna
Province that he must not permit Americans there without passes. He
was to get rid of them civilly, but he was to keep them out and inform
all authorities there of his instructions.

On August 24 an American soldier was killed and others were wounded in
Cavite by Insurgent troops who fired from behind. An Insurgent officer
in Cavite at the time reported on his record of services that he--

    "took part in the movement against the Americans on the
    afternoon of the 24th of August, under the orders of the
    commander of the troops and the adjutant of the post."

This shows that the movement was ordered, but the Insurgents promptly
realized that it was ill advised.

On August 28 General Llanera was reported to be preparing for
operations against the Americans. He was ordered to suspend his
preparations. The same day General P. Mercado Rizal, commanding in
Laguna Province, wrote Mabini asking whether they were to consider
the Americans as their allies or their enemies. He wanted to know
whether the war was to stop or continue becoming more furious. This
not because he desired to ask questions about the secrets of the
government, but because he wished to prepare the minds of the people
for the future. Mabini's answer has not been found.

We have already noted that on August 8 Fernando Acevedo wrote General
Pio del Pilar recommending that he attack and annihilate the American
troops; that on August 10 Pilar wrote Aguinaldo suggesting that
the Americans be attacked, and that on August 17 Aguinaldo stated"
"The conflict is coming sooner or later." [185]

At this time Sandico entered the service of the Americans as an
interpreter and acted as a spy, endeavouring to keep his people fully
informed relative to the plans and acts of his employers. Incidentally
he endeavoured to convince the latter that the barbarities really
committed by Insurgent officers and troops in Manila were perpetrated
by enemies of the Insurgent cause who wished to discredit it.

In a letter dated September 21, 1898, Apacible says that the conflict
will come sooner or later and asks Aguinaldo if it would not be
better for them to provoke it before the Americans concentrate their
troops. [186]

On September 10 General Garcia reported to Aguinaldo that on the
previous night the Americans had attempted to push back his line
at San Lazaro, and that morning had concentrated and penetrated the
Insurgent territory, making a reconnaissance through the fields about
Sampaloc. Aguinaldo put an endorsement on this communication saying
that he had long since ordered that the Insurgent line should not
be passed. He instructed Garcia to throw troops in front of the
Americans at Sampaloc, and order them to leave, and to warn the
bolo men. Obviously, little more was needed to provoke an Insurgent
attack. [187]

An unsigned draft of an order in Aguinaldo's handwriting dated Malolos,
September 13 (?), 1898, [188] shows how tense was the situation
while the question of withdrawal of the Insurgent forces from the
city of Manila was under consideration. It contains instructions
for General Pio del Pilar, General P. Garcia and General Noriel or
Colonel Cailles. Their purpose is hardly open to doubt.

General Pio del Pilar was directed:--

    "To have a detachment posted in the interval from the branch
    of the river of Paco in a northerly direction to the bridge
    and so on up to the Pasig river in the direction of Pandacan,
    the river serving as a line until the suburb of Panque is
    reached which will be under our jurisdiction. Proceed to
    execute this order on its receipt, posting detachments where
    they are necessary and trenches will be made without loss
    of time working day and night. Do not rest for by doing so
    we may lose the opportunity; beg of the troops to assist in
    the formation of intrenchments. Matters have a bad aspect,
    we especially expect something Wednesday and Thursday, the
    15th and 16th of this month. The danger is imminent on the
    mentioned days, also in the time that follows.

    "Keep strict vigilance at all hours. In case you receive orders
    to leave that place, do not do so on any account without my
    orders, happen what may....

    "Concentrate all your forces in Santa Ana before the day
    arrives.

    "Warn your soldiers against firing at random as the Spaniards
    did, if possible have them calculate the number of their
    antagonists and how much ammunition there is in comparison
    with the number of the attacking force, in fact, there are
    occasions when each shot fired kills as many as four men.

    "I hope you will see to the execution of these instructions
    and that you will maintain the honour of the Philippines by
    your courage and in no way permit your rights to be trampled
    underfoot." [189]

General Garcia was instructed as follows:--

    "On Wednesday, the 14th of this month, you will post
    detachments in the points indicated by lines on the enclosed
    plan. On receipt of this and as soon as you learn its contents,
    proceed secretly to determine the most suitable places to
    post detachments and immediately post our troops and have
    intrenchments made employing day and night in this work. Beg
    this of our soldiers." [190]

The instructions to Noriel or Cailles read as follows:--

    "At eight o'clock in the morning of Wednesday, the 14th,
    withdraw your command from the town of Malate as indicated
    on the enclosed plan, from the bridge in Singalong and in a
    straight line from there to the branch of the river in Paco
    will be the line of our jurisdiction even though we may not
    be of one mind in the matter. On receipt of this proceed to
    determine the most suitable places to post our troops even
    if they are not supplied with batteries; on posting the
    detachments give instructions to have intrenchments made
    immediately without resting, especially on the days of the
    15th and 16th. Since affairs have a serious aspect, do not
    lose vigilance and be on the alert at all times....

    "Concentrate all the forces and have a call to arms in Cavite
    so that all the troops may be in Pasay on Wednesday night.

    "In case the Americans attempt to order you out do not leave
    your posts, happen what may, but exercise prudence and be
    prepared leaving them to give the provocation. Answer them
    that you have no instructions given you with regard to what
    they ask." [191]

Obviously the maintenance of peace at this time hung by a very slender
thread. On September 14 the governor of Cavite telegraphed Aguinaldo
as follows:--

    "Most urgent. I desire to know from you the result of the
    ultimatum. Advise me if we must prepare our troops for action
    to-morrow. I await a reply." [192]

But war was not to begin at this time. On September 23 Bray wrote
to Aguinaldo advising him to maintain a defensive attitude until
the result of the negotiations at Paris should become known, giving
way to the Americans and not showing his teeth. He could take the
offensive later if advisable and should have little difficulty in
settling accounts with the American soldiers. [193]

Bray suggested the possibility of an alliance between the American and
the Spanish soldiers if a conflict should arise before the departure
of the latter. [194]

Meanwhile preparations for the attack progressed. During September,
Sandico wrote Aguinaldo suggesting the urgent necessity of reorganizing
the "masons" and the Katipunan, [195] and that all be furnished with
knives, to be kept hidden so that they might be "ready for any event."

In spite of efforts to keep the Insurgent soldiers in hand, feeling
among them ran high, and they wanted to fight. [196] On November 30,
1898, General Mascardo telegraphed from San Fernando to Aguinaldo
asking if he might begin firing in order to prevent the American
troops from disembarking, and Aguinaldo promptly answered in the
affirmative. [197]

On December 5 Malvar telegraphed from Lipa that according to a despatch
from Batangas, American divers were working unceasingly and that a
subordinate had ordered that they be fired on if they attempted to
land. Aguinaldo replied that he did not mind their working at sea, but
that they must not be allowed to land under any circumstances. [198]

On December 6 Sandico telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--

    "The difficulty of last night at the San Juan picket with
    the American troops has been adjusted without prejudice. Our
    preparations ought to continue. Awaiting orders." [199]

San Juan was where the firing commenced on February 4, 1899.

On December 9 Cailles wired Aguinaldo as follows:--

    "Report to you that there are 3000 Americans in front of
    our position at Singalong. I do not know what they wish;
    if they enter Pineda I open fire." [200]

By this time the Insurgents had made up their minds that the
Americans, who had been bearing their insults in silence, were
cowards. Aguinaldo's indorsement on this telegram reads:--

    "Answered: Nevertheless the 3000 American soldiers are few
    against my Colonel and his 300 soldiers, and I believe you
    have more than that number. E.A., Dec. 12, 1898." [201]

Relative to the insults which were at this time showered upon
Americans, Taylor has made the following statement: [202]--

    "Fortune had been good to Aguinaldo and his associates in the
    eight months during which the United States had prevented Spain
    from relieving her beleaguered garrisons in the Philippines,
    and she might still be kind. The men about Aguinaldo who had
    risen farthest and fastest could not endure the thought of
    having to accept subordinate positions in a government not
    directed by themselves. The halberdiers at the door of the
    palace of the president saluted them as the halberdiers at
    the doorway of his lordship the governor-general in Manila
    had struck the marble steps with their halberds at the
    coming of the Spanish generals. They swaggered down the
    streets of Malolos, clashing their swords behind them,
    and they knew that if they won, the Philippines would
    be divided into fiefs which they, as dukes and marquises,
    would hold in feudal tenure from a Malay potentate. They were
    confident. They held Luzon. They held the people. They had
    no intention of returning to office stools or to the life of
    outlaws and hunted men. The United States force in Manila
    was small and America was far. It was true that they might
    have to fight for the prize which they had seized, but the
    military leaders about Aguinaldo were confident of winning in
    case they fought. They believed the Americans were afraid of
    them and would be easily beaten. American soldiers had been
    seized and had been insulted by the followers of Aguinaldo
    and no resort had been made to force. The Americans had been
    ordered to avoid bringing on an engagement and had obeyed. It
    is also probable that many of the insults to which they had
    been subjected were not appreciated by them. A tall soldier
    from western America paid no attention to the insults hurled
    at him in a language which he did not understand. And yet
    the small excited Filipinos might retire feeling that the
    American had tamely submitted to insult worse than a blow."

By the middle of December, Aguinaldo had placed in position in the
vicinity of Manila all of the field guns in his possession.

The Treaty of Paris was signed on December 10. It provided for the
termination of Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines. This was what
the Insurgents had been waiting for, and thereafter things moved
rapidly. It is obvious that an attack was definitely planned for
at this time, for on December 21, Commandant F. E. Rey telegraphed
Aguinaldo that the second chief of the second zone of Manila had
directed him to assist by entering that city as soon as they opened
fire against the American troops. [203]

On the following day Cailles reported that he had occupied blockhouse
No. 12, which was within the American lines, and added the following
significant statement:--

    "The order of yesterday was, on hearing the first shots
    from Santa Ana, for my whole force to hurl themselves on
    the American line of trenches, and to follow the living to
    Manila. The dead can lie with the dead. Yesterday we were
    content waiting for the arming of the San Quintin." [204]

San Quintin's Day was the anniversary of the Sicilian vespers, the
massacre of the French in Sicily in 1268. Obviously the Insurgents
were planning something similar for Manila.

For some reason the attack was not made as planned, but there was
no intention of abandoning it. Within fifteen days of January 1 some
40,000 Filipinos left Manila. Why? On January 7, Aguinaldo wrote to
Senor Benito Legarda at Manila, saying:--

    "I beg you to leave Manila with your family and come here to
    Malolos, but not because I wish to frighten you--I merely
    wish to warn you for your satisfaction, although it is not
    yet the day or the week." [205]

Many details of the plan of attack have come into our
possession. Doctor Manuel Xeres Burgos wrote Aguinaldo during January
relative to a plan for an uprising of the prisoners in Bilibid Prison,
saying that it should by all means come "before the movement is begun
anywhere else," and calling attention to the necessity of stationing
men to prevent the American soldiers near by in the Zorilla theatre
from coming to the rescue. On the back of this letter there is a
sketch plan showing where bolo men were to be stationed, ready to
attack these soldiers. [206]

In his message to Congress dated January 1, 1899, Aguinaldo said:--

    "I consider arguments unnecessary in support of the proposed
    amendments, every one knows that our newborn Republic now has
    to fight for its existence against giants in ambition and in
    power." [207]

An unsigned letter addressed to Apacible on January 4, 1899, contains
the following statement:--

    "It appears that conflict with the Americans is imminent
and inevitable. Several of their vessels with thousands of
soldiers commanded by General Miller were sent to Iloilo on
December 20th last to take that port together with the whole
of Visayas and Mindanao." [208]

On January 4 the following significant telegram was sent out:--

    "Circular Telegram from the Secretary of the Interior to
    Provincial Presidents, wherever there may be Telegraphic
    Service, to be communicated to the Local Chiefs of each Town.

    "_Malolos_, January 4, 1899, 9.35 A.M.

    "To the Provincial President of the Province of Pangasinan:

    "Hasten the preparation of all the towns in order to oppose the
    American invasion. See that all the inhabitants prepare their
    bolos and daggers; also that in each street and barrio national
    militia is organized, each six of whom should be commanded by
    a corporal, each thirteen by a sergeant, each twenty-six by
    a second lieutenant, each fifty-two by a first lieutenant,
    and each one hundred and four by a captain, directing that
    the soldiers of the national militia elect their own officers,
    informing all that upon our attitude depends our salvation.

    _Lingayen_, January 4, 1899."

There is a note thereon which reads:--

    "Communicate this to all of the local chiefs, and to the
    commanding general."

    (Signed by initials which are illegible, but evidently those
    of the Provincial President.) [209]

On January 5, 1899, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation which contains
the following statement:--

    "The said generals accepted my concessions in favor of
    peace and friendship as indications of weakness. Thus it is,
    that with rising ambition, they ordered forces to Iloilo on
    December 26, with the purpose of acquiring for themselves
    the title of conquerors of that portion of the Philippine
    Islands occupied by my govermnent.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "My government cannot remain indifferent in view of such a
    violent and aggressive seizure of a portion of its territory by
    a nation which has arrogated to itself the title, 'champion
    of oppressed nations.' Thus it is that my government is
    ready to open hostilities if the American troops attempt to
    take forcible possession of the Visayan Islands. I announce
    these rights before the world, in order that the conscience of
    mankind may pronounce its infallible verdict as to who are the
    true oppressors of nations and the tormentors of human kind.

    "Upon their heads be all the blood which may be shed." [210]

Three days later this proclamation, which was rather dangerously like
a declaration of war, was reissued with a significant change in the
last one of the passages quoted, the words "attempt to take forcible
possession of any part of the territory submitted to its jurisdiction"
being substituted for the words "attempt to take forcible possession
of the Visayan Islands."

On January 8, 1899, at 9.40 P.M., Sandico telegraphed Aguinaldo
as follows:--

    "_Note_.--In consequence of the orders of General Rios to his
    officers, as soon as the Filipino attack begins the Americans
    should be driven into the Intramuros district and the Walled
    city should be set on fire." [211]

Preparations for the attack, which was to begin inside the city
of Manila, were now rapidly pushed to conclusion. I quote Taylor's
excellent summary of them:--

    "After Aguinaldo's proclamation of January 5 the number of
    organizations charged with an attack within the city increased
    rapidly and it is possible that those which had been formed
    during Spanish rule had never been disbanded. Sandico's
    clubs for athletic exercises and mutual improvement formed
    a nucleus for these bodies and the directing boards of
    the popular committees took up the work of recruiting,
    while some of the members became officers of the militia or
    sandatahan. On January 6 the commander of militia in Trozo,
    Manila, reported that 1130 soldiers had been enrolled by the
    popular committee. On January 7 Bonifacio Arevalo forwarded
    to the head of the central committee a list of the officers
    of the battalion which had just been organized in Sampaloc
    for the defence of their liberties. Apparently about the
    same time J. Limjap submitted to Sandico a project for
    arming the prisoners in Bilibid Prison with the arms of the
    American soldiers quartered in the Zorrilla Theatre across
    the street. He said:--

    "'Jacinto Limjap having been proclaimed commander of the
    volunteers of the penitentiary, I ask you to authorize the
    creation of a disciplinary battalion and the provisional
    appointments of officers for 600 sandatahan, or militia,
    ready to provide themselves by force with the American rifles
    in the Zorrilla Theatre.'

    "He followed by a statement of the officers desired. It was
    not difficult for him to obtain volunteers there to rob,
    to burn, to rape and to murder. These were the crimes for
    which they were serving sentences. The political prisoners
    had been released....

    "On January 18 Sandico approved of the officers for the first
    battalion organized by the committees of Sampaloc; on January
    27 he approved those of the second battalion. By January 22 two
    battalions had been organized in Quiapo. At least one regiment
    of eight companies was raised in Binondo, for on January 23
    its commander forwarded a roll of the officers to Aguinaldo
    for his approval.... On January 25 T. Sandico, at Malolos,
    submitted for approval the names of a number of officers of the
    territorial militia in the city of Manila. On January 30, 1899,
    a roll of four companies just organized in Malate was forwarded
    approved by T. Sandico, and on the same day the committee
    of Trozo, Manila, applied to T. Sandico for permission to
    recruit a body for the defence of the country. The regiment
    of 'Armas Blancas' had already been raised in Tondo and
    Binondo. It was in existence there in December, 1898, and
    may have been originally organized to act against Spain. On
    February 2 all officers of the territorial militia in Manila
    reported at Caloocan, in accordance with orders of Sandico,
    for the purpose of receiving their commissions and taking the
    oath to the flag. A man who took part in this ceremony wrote
    that a multitude of men were present in uniform, and that
    the oath was administered by Gen. Pantaleon Garcia. There is
    no reason for believing that this is a complete statement of
    sandatahan organized in Manila by the end of January, and yet
    this statement gives a force of at least 6330 men. General
    Otis said that this force had been reported to him as being
    10,000 men. It is probably true that only a small number of
    them had rifles; but armed with long knives and daggers they
    could have inflicted much damage in a sudden night attack in
    the narrow and badly lighted streets of Manila. On January 9,
    1899, Aguinaldo wrote his instructions for the sandatahan
    of Manila. Members of this body were to enter the houses
    of the American officers on the pretext of bringing them
    presents. Once in they were to kill. The sentinels at the
    gates of the barracks were to be approached by men dressed as
    women and killed. The gates of the barracks held and as many
    officers as possible treacherously murdered, the sandatahan
    were to rise throughout the city, and by attacking in the
    rear the United States troops on the outer line were to aid
    in opening a way for Aguinaldo's force. To further increase
    the confusion and perhaps to punish the natives who had not
    joined them, the sandatahan were to fire the city.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "It is a fair deduction from Luna's orders for an uprising
    in Manila, from Aguinaldo's instructions for the sandatahan,
    from other documents among the papers of the insurgents and
    from what was done in Manila on February 22 that Aguinaldo
    and his advisers about the middle of January, 1899, drew up a
    plan of attack upon Manila which would, if carried out, have
    inflicted a severe blow upon the Americans. It was not carried
    out, but that was not the fault of Aguinaldo or of Luna.

    "It is true that the instructions were general; but that
    particular instructions were given by Aguinaldo himself for
    the murder of General Otis is shown by his note on the back
    of a document presented to him. [212]

    "... And then there was nothing abhorrent to Aguinaldo and
    the men about him in beginning a war by the murder of the
    commanding general on the other side.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "... Aguinaldo and all his followers have declared that on
    February 4 the Americans attacked the unsuspecting Filipinos
    who were using their utmost efforts to avoid a war. And yet
    here in Aguinaldo's own handwriting is the record of the
    fact that on January 10, 1899, he ordered the murder of the
    American commander.

    "The attack which Aguinaldo was preparing to deliver upon
    and in Manila was not to be a mere raid such as the bandits
    of Cavite were in the habit of making upon the defenceless
    towns. The plan was a piece of calculated savagery in which
    murder and outrage were considered means to accomplish a
    purpose. The servants were to kill their employers; organized
    bands, dressed in the dress of civilians, living in the city
    of Manila under the government of the Americans, in many cases
    employed by the Americans, were to suddenly fall upon the
    barracks of the American soldiers and massacre the inmates;
    all Americans in the streets were to be killed, the city was
    to be fired and its loot was to be the reward of loyalty to
    Aguinaldo. If this plan had been carried out no white man and
    no white woman would have escaped. The reinforcements from
    the United States would have arrived to find only the smoking
    ruins of Manila. Buencamino had warned General Augustin what
    the fate of Manila would be if taken by a horde of Indians
    drunk with victory. That fate was now deliberately planned
    for the city. Aguinaldo planned to occupy the capital not as
    it had been occupied by the Americans. He planned to take it
    as Count Tilly took Magdeburg.

    "The authors of this plan were not savages. Mabini,
    Sandico, and Luna, Asiatics educated in European schools,
    were men of trained and subtle minds. With them cruelty
    and assassination was not a matter of savage impulse but of
    deliberate calculation; with them assassination was employed
    as an effective addition to political propaganda, and murder
    as an ultimate resource in political manoeuvres." [213]

Some portions of Aguinaldo's instructions to the _sandatahan_ are
particularly worthy of perpetuation, as they illustrate his ideas
as to the conduct which should be observed by cultured, patriotic,
honourable and very humane men, who were not cruel:--

    "_Art_. 3. The chief of those who go to attack the barracks
    should send in first four men with a good present for the
    American commander. Immediately after will follow four others
    who will make a pretence of looking for the same officer
    for some reason and a larger group shall be concealed in the
    corners or houses in order to aid the other groups at the first
    signal. This wherever it is possible at the moment of attack.

    "_Art_. 4. They should not, prior to the attack, look at
    the Americans in a threatening manner. To the contrary,
    the attack on the barracks by the sandatahan should be a
    complete surprise and with decision and courage. One should
    go alone in advance in order to kill the sentinel. In order
    to deceive the sentinel one of them should dress as a woman
    and must take great care that the sentinel is not able to
    discharge his piece, thus calling the attention of those
    in the barracks. This will enable his companions who are
    approaching to assist in the general attack.

    "_Art_. 5. At the moment of the attack the sandatahan should
    not attempt to secure rifles from their dead enemies, but
    shall pursue, slashing right and left with bolos until the
    Americans surrender, and after there remains no enemy who
    can injure them, they may take the rifles in one hand and
    the ammunition in the other.

    "_Art_. 6. The officers shall take care that on the
    tops of the houses along the streets where the American
    forces shall pass there will be placed four to six men,
    who shall be prepared with stones, timbers, red-hot iron,
    heavy furniture, as well as boiling water, oil and molasses,
    rags soaked in coal oil ready to be lighted and thrown down,
    and any other hard and heavy objects that they can throw on
    the passing American troops. At the same time in the lower
    parts of the houses will be concealed the sandatahan, who will
    attack immediately. Great care should be taken not to throw
    glass in the streets, as the greater part of our soldiers
    go barefooted. On these houses there will, if possible,
    be arranged, in addition to the objects to be thrown down,
    a number of the sandatahan, in order to cover a retreat or
    to follow up a rout of the enemy's column, so that we may be
    sure of the destruction of all the opposing forces.

    "_Art_. 7. All Filipinos, real defenders of their country,
    should live on the alert to assist simultaneously the inside
    attack at the very moment that they note the first movement
    in whatever barrio or suburb, having assurance that all
    the troops that surround Manila will proceed without delay
    to force the enemy's line and unite themselves with their
    brothers in the city. With such a general movement, so firm
    and decided against the Americans, the combat is sure to be a
    short one, and I charge and order that the persons and goods
    of all foreigners shall be respected and that the American
    prisoners shall be treated well.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "_Art_. 9. In addition to the instructions given in paragraph
    6, there shall be in the houses vessels filled with boiling
    water, tallow, molasses and other liquids, which shall be
    thrown as bombs on the Americans who pass in front of their
    houses, or they can make use of syringes or tubes of bamboo. In
    these houses shall be the sandatahan who shall hurl the
    liquids that shall be passed to them by the women and children.

    "_Art_. 10. In place of bolos or daggers, if they do not
    possess the same, the sandatahan can provide themselves with
    lances and arrows with long sharp heads, and these should be
    shot with great force in order that they may penetrate well
    into the bodies of the enemy, and these should be so made that
    in withdrawal from the body the head will remain in the flesh.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "_Art_. 12.... Neither will you forget your sacred oath and
    immaculate banner; nor will you forget the promises made
    by me to the civilized nations, whom I have assured that
    we Filipinos are not savages, nor thieves, nor assassins,
    nor are we cruel, but on the contrary, that we are men of
    culture and patriotism, honourable and very humane." [214]

Aguinaldo enjoined order on his subordinates. [215]

The Filipinos were now ready to assume the offensive, but desired, if
possible, to provoke the Americans into firing the first shot. They
made no secret of their desire for conflict, but increased their
hostile demonstrations and pushed their lines forward into forbidden
territory. Their attitude is well illustrated by the following extract
from a telegram sent by Colonel Cailles to Aguinaldo on January 10,
1899:--

    "Most urgent. An American interpreter has come to tell me to
    withdraw our forces in Maytubig fifty paces. I shall not draw
    back a step, and in place of withdrawing, I shall advance a
    little farther. He brings a letter from his general, in which
    he speaks to me as a friend. I said that from the day I knew
    that Maquinley (McKinley) opposed our independence I did not
    want any dealings with any American. War, war, is what we
    want. The Americans after this speech went off pale." [216]

Aguinaldo approved the hostile attitude of Cailles, for there is a
reply in his handwriting which reads:--

    "I approve and applaud what you have done with the Americans,
    and zeal and valour always, also my beloved officers and
    soldiers there. I believe that they are playing us until the
    arrival of their reinforcements, but I shall send an ultimatum
    and remain always on the alert.--E. A. Jan. 10, 1899." [217]

On this same day Aguinaldo commissioned Feliciano Cruz and Severino
Quitiongco to assassinate General Otis. [218]

On January 13 Noriel and Cailles telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--

    "We desire to know results of ultimatum which you mention
    in your telegram, and we also wish to know what reward our
    Government is arranging for the forces that will be able
    first to enter Manila."

This telegram is endorsed in Aguinaldo's handwriting:

    "As to the contents of your telegram, those who will be the
    heroes will have as their rewards a large quantity of money,
    extraordinary rewards, promotions, crosses of Biak-na-bato,
    Marquis of Malate, Ermita, Count of Manila, etc., besides the
    congratulations of our idolizing country on account of their
    being patriotic, and more, if they capture the regiments with
    their generals, and, if possible, the chief of them all who
    represents our future enemies in Manila, which (lot?) falls
    to you, or, better said, to General Noriel and Colonel Cailles.

    "The ultimatum has not been sent, but it will be within a
    few days.

    (Signed) "E. A.

    "_Malolos_, Jan. 14, 1899." [219]

On January 14, 1899, the people at Aparri shouted: "Death to the
Americans," and held a review to celebrate the rupture of friendly
relations with the United States. [220]

At this time Aguinaldo had a dream about a victorious attack upon
Manila and telegraphed it to some of his officers. General Garcia
replied from Caloocan on January 17 that the dream would come true
as soon as the conflict with the Americans began. [221]

In January 21, 1899, Aguinaldo was still not quite ready, and ordered
that the Filipino soldiers in the walled city keep on good terms with
the Americans, in order to deceive them, "since the hoped-for moment
has not yet arrived." [222]

The Insurgents grew surer and surer that the Americans were cowards,
[223] and openly boasted that when the attack began they would drive
them into the sea.

On January 21 General Otis wrote to Admiral Dewey that:--

    "The insurgents will not now permit us to cross their lines and
    have been very insulting to our officers, calling to them that
    very shortly they will give us battle. My best information
    is that they have fully determined to attack both outside
    and within the city before our additional troops arrive,
    and the least spark may start a conflagration." [224]

As the date of the proposed attack drew near, the work of strengthening
the Insurgent positions around Manila was pushed with all possible
speed. [225]

About the middle of January General Otis stationed the First Nebraska
Regiment upon the high ground at Santa Mesa for sanitary reasons. Of
conditions at this time, and of the circumstances leading to the
actual outbreak of hostilities Taylor says:--

    "During the latter part of January General Otis was informed
    on good insurgent authority that the insurgents meditated an
    attack upon those troops, and he was advised to remove them,
    as in their exposed position they would kill them all. General
    MacArthur, under whose command the regiment was, placed
    two guns in position there, as it was fully expected that
    the insurgents would direct their attack upon that point,
    as in fact they did. On February 4, 1899, the tents of the
    regiment covered the ridge, and its outposts extended along
    the San Juan River, a small stream which formed part of the
    line of delimitation between the Americans and the insurgents.

    "For some days before the outbreak of hostilities the pressure
    of the insurgents was constant along this position, so constant
    indeed that in the light of subsequent events it indicated a
    premeditated purpose on the part of some one in the insurgent
    army to force a collision at that point. On February 2 General
    MacArthur, commanding the Second Division of the Eighth Army
    Corps, wrote to the commanding general of the Filipino troops
    in the third zone in front of him that--

    "'An armed party from your command now occupies the village in
    front of blockhouse No. 7, at a point considerably more than
    a hundred yards on my side of the line, and is very active in
    exhibiting hostile intentions. This party must be withdrawn
    to your side of the line at once. From this date if the line
    is crossed by your men with arms in their hands they must be
    regarded as subject to such action as I may deem necessary.'

    "Colonel San Miguel, who commanded at San Juan del Monte,
    replied upon the receipt of this communication that the action
    of his troops was foreign to his wishes and that he would
    give immediate orders for them to retire. At about half past
    8 on the night of February 4 a small insurgent patrol entered
    the territory within the American lines at blockhouse No. 7
    and advanced to the little village of Santol in front of an
    outpost of the Nebraska regiment. This was the same point from
    which the insurgents had been compelled to retire on February
    2. An American outpost challenged, and then as the insurgent
    patrol continued to advance the sentinel fired, whereupon the
    insurgent patrol retired to blockhouse No. 7, from which fire
    was immediately opened upon the Americans. This fire spread
    rapidly down the American and insurgent lines and both forces
    at once sprang to arms." [226]

General Otis's account of the opening of active hostilities follows:--

    "On the night of February 2 they sent in a strong detachment
    to draw the fire of our outposts, which took up a position
    immediately in front and within a few yards of the same. The
    outpost was strengthened by a few of our men, who silently bore
    their taunts and abuse the entire night. This was reported to
    me by General MacArthur, whom I directed to communicate with
    the officer in command of the insurgent troops concerned. His
    prepared letter was shown me and approved, and the reply
    received was all that could be desired. However, the agreement
    was ignored by the insurgents and on the evening of February 4
    another demonstration was made on one of our small outposts,
    which occupied a retired position at least 150 yards within
    the line which had been mutually agreed upon, an insurgent
    approaching the picket and refusing to halt or answer when
    challenged. The result was that our picket discharged his
    piece, when the insurgent troops near Santa Mesa opened a
    spirited fire on our troops there stationed.

    "The insurgents had thus succeeded in drawing the fire of
    a small outpost, which they had evidently labored with all
    their ingenuity to accomplish, in order to justify in some
    way their premeditated attack. It is not believed that the
    chief insurgent leaders wished to open hostilities at this
    time, as they were not completely prepared to assume the
    initiative. They desired two or three days more to perfect
    their arrangements, but the zeal of their army brought on
    the crisis which anticipated their premeditated action. They
    could not have delayed long, however, for it was their object
    to force an issue before American troops, then en route,
    could arrive in Manila." [227]

Thus began the Insurgent attack, so long and so carefully planned
for. We learn from the Insurgent records that the shot of the American
sentry missed its mark. There was no reason why it should have provoked
a hot return fire, but it did.

The result of the ensuing combat was not at all what the Insurgents
had anticipated. The Americans did not drive very well. It was but a
short time before they themselves were routed and driven from their
positions.

Aguinaldo of course promptly advanced the claim that his troops had
been wantonly attacked. The plain fact is that the Insurgent patrol in
question deliberately drew the fire of the American sentry, and this
was just as much an act of war as was the firing of the shot. Whether
the patrol was acting under proper orders from higher authority is
not definitely known.

In this connection the following telegram sent by Captain Zialcita
from Santa Ana on February 4, 1899, at 9.55 P.M., to Major Gray,
San Juan del Monte, is highly interesting:

    "I received the telegram forwarded from Malolos. General
    Ricarte is not here. I believe (that if the) Americans
    open fire we shall attack. Will ask instructions (of)
    Malolos." [228]

This looks as if Zialcita at least knew that something was to be done
to draw the American fire.

Aguinaldo's first statement relative to the opening of hostilities
is embodied in a general order dated Malolos, February 4, 1899,
and reads in part as follows:--

    "Nine o'clock P.M., this date, I received from Caloocan
    station a message communicated to me that the American forces,
    without prior notification or any just motive, attacked our
    camp at San Juan del Monte and our forces garrisoning the
    blockhouses around the outskirts of Manila, causing losses
    among our soldiers, who in view of this unexpected aggression
    and of the decided attack of the aggressors, were obliged to
    defend themselves until the firing became general all along
    the line.

    "No one can deplore more than I this rupture of hostilities. I
    have a clear conscience that I have endeavoured to avoid it
    at all costs, using all my efforts to preserve friendship
    with the army of occupation, even at the cost of not a few
    humiliations and many sacrificed rights.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "... I order and command:--

    "1. Peace and friendly relations between the Philippine
    forces and the American forces of occupation are broken,
    and the latter will be treated as enemies, with the limits
    prescribed by the laws of war.

    "2. American soldiers who may be captured by the Philippine
    forces will be treated as prisoners of war.

    "3. This proclamation shall be communicated to the accredited
    consuls of Manila, and to congress, in order that it may
    accord the suspension of the constitutional guarantees and
    the resulting declaration of war." [229]

Aguinaldo's protestations relative to his efforts to avoid hostilities
are absurd, in view of his own instructions concerning the attack to
be made simultaneously within and without the city of Manila.

There is other correspondence which throws light on the situation which
existed immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities. On January
25, 1899, Agoncillo cabled from Washington to Apacible in Hongkong:
"Recommend you await beginning American aggression, justifying our
conduct nations." [230]

Apacible apparently did not take this view of the matter, for on
January 31 he wrote to Aguinaldo that the Senate in Washington would
take final vote upon the treaty of peace between the United States
and Spain on February 6, and said:--

    "It is urgently necessary for America to answer us immediately
    before the ratification of the treaty. A conflict after the
    ratification of the treaty would be unfavorable to us in
    public opinion." [231]

Obviously this letter might be interpreted as a recommendation
that hostilities begin before February 6 if America did not answer
meanwhile. It was evidently well understood in Hongkong that
Aguinaldo's receipt of Apacible's letter might cause war to begin,
for on February 3, 1899, Bray, anticipating the outbreak of hostilities
of the following day, cabled Senator Hoar at Washington as follows:--

    "Receive caution news hostilities Manila discredited here
    denied Filipino circles supposed political move influence vote
    Senate to-day any ease insignificant skirmish due intentional
    provocation.

    "_Bray_." [232]

The extracts from the Insurgent records above quoted leave no escape
from the conclusion that the outbreak of hostilities which occurred on
February 4, 1899, had been carefully prepared for and was deliberately
precipitated by the Filipinos themselves.

Blount says:--

    "It would be simply wooden-headed to affirm that they ever
    expected to succeed in a war with us." [233]

It may have been wooden-headed for the Filipinos to expect this, but
expect it they certainly did. We have seen how they held their soldiers
in check until after Spain had been ousted from the Philippines by
the Treaty of Paris as they had originally planned to do. It now only
remained to carry out the balance of their original plan to get rid
of the Americans in one way or another.

General Otis states that "when Aguinaldo had completed his preparations
for attack he prepared the outlines of his declaration of war, the
full text of which was published at Malolos on the evening, and very
shortly after, hostilities began. This declaration was circulated in
Manila on the morning of February 5." [234]

The Insurgents brought down upon themselves the punishment which they
received on February 4 and 5.

Blount has stated [235] that if the resolutions of Senator Bacon
introduced on January 11, 1899, had passed, we never should have had
any war with the Filipinos. The resolutions in question concluded
thus:--

    "That the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or
    intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control
    over said islands except for the pacification thereof, and
    assert their determination when an independent government
    shall have been duly erected therein entitled to recognition
    as such, to transfer to said government, upon terms which
    shall be reasonable and just, all rights secured under the
    cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave the government and
    control of the islands to their people."

I must take issue with Blount as to the effect which these resolutions
might have had if passed. The Insurgents felt themselves to be fully
competent to bring about such pacification of the islands as they
deemed necessary. At the time the resolutions were presented in the
Senate their soldiers were straining at the leash, ready to attack
their American opponents upon the most slender excuse. Aguinaldo
himself could not have held them much longer, and it is not impossible
that they got away from him as it was. They would have interpreted the
passage of the Bacon resolutions as a further evidence of weakness,
and hastened their attack. As we have seen, "war, war, war" was what
they wanted.

Blount has endeavoured to shift the responsibility for the outbreak
of hostilities to the United States by claiming that certain words
italicized by him in what he calls the "Benevolent Assimilation
Proclamation" were necessarily, to the Insurgents, "fighting
words." The expressions referred to have to do with the establishment
of United States sovereignty and the exercise of governmental control
in the Philippine Islands.

These words were not "fighting words," the Insurgent policy being,
as I have shown by the records, to consider the acceptance of a
protectorate or of annexation in the event that it did not prove
possible to negotiate absolute independence, or probable that the
American troops could be driven from the islands.

The growing confidence of the Insurgents in their ability to whip
the cowardly Americans, rather than any fixed determination on their
part to push a struggle for independence to the bitter end, led to
their attack.






CHAPTER V

Insurgent Rule and the Wilcox-Sargent Report


The Good Book says, "By their fruits ye shall know them, whether
they be good or evil," and it seems proper to apply this test to the
Insurgents and their government.

The extraordinary claim has been advanced that the United States
destroyed a republic in the Philippines and erected an oligarchy on
its ruins. Various writers and speakers who have not gone so far as
this have yet maintained that Aguinaldo and his associates established
a real, effective government throughout the archipelago during the
interim between his return and the outbreak of hostilities with the
United States.

In summarizing conditions on September 15, 1898, Judge Blount says:
[236]--

    "Absolute master of all Luzon outside Manila at this time,
    with complete machinery of government in each province
    for all matters of justice, taxes, and police, an army of
    some 30,000 men at his beck, and his whole people a unit
    at his back, Aguinaldo formally inaugurated his permanent
    government--permanent as opposed to the previous provisional
    government--with a Constitution, Congress, and Cabinet,
    patterned after our own, [237] just as the South American
    republics had done before him when they were freed from Spain,
    at Malolos, the new capital."

He refers to our utter failure to understand "what a wonderfully
complete 'going concern' Aguinaldo's government had become
throughout the Philippine Archipelago before the Treaty of Paris was
signed." [238]

He bases his claim as to the excellent state of public order in the
Insurgent territory at this time on a report of Paymaster W. E. Wilcox
and Naval Cadet L. R. Sargent of the United States Navy, who between
October 8 and November 20, 1898, made a long, rapid trip through
northern Luzon, traversing the provinces of Bulacan, Pampanga,
Tarlac, Pangasinan, Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela, Cagayan,
South Ilocos and Union, in the order named, thence proceeding to
Dagupan and down the railroad through Pangasinan, Tarlac, Pampanga
and Bulacan to Manila.

He says that these gentlemen found the authority of Aguinaldo's
government universally acknowledged, the country in a state of perfect
tranquillity and public order, [239] with profound peace and freedom
from brigandage and the like. [240]

Now if it be true that Aguinaldo established complete machinery of
government throughout all of Luzon outside of Manila for all matters
of justice, taxes and police, so that life and property were safe
and peace, tranquillity and justice assured, we may well dispense
with quibbling as to whether the proper name was applied to such
government. But did he?

Let us examine with some care the history of the Wilcox-Sargent trip,
and see if we can gain further light from other sources relative to
the condition of public order in the territory which they traversed.

I propose, for the most part, to let the captured Insurgent records
speak for themselves, as it is fair to assume that Insurgent officers
were at no pains to represent conditions as worse than they really
were. In view of the fragmentary character of these records, we may
also assume that the complete story would be still more interesting
and instructive than the one which I have been able to reconstruct.

Messrs. Sargent and Wilcox were almost everywhere hospitably received,
and were entertained with dinners and dances after the inimitable
fashion of the hospitable Filipino everywhere. They gained a very
favourable impression of the state of public order in the provinces
through which they passed for the reason that from the very start
their trip was strictly personally conducted. They saw exactly what
it was intended that they should see and very little more. Their
progress was several times interrupted for longer or shorter periods
without adequate explanation. We now know that on these occasions the
scenery so carefully prepared in advance for them had become a little
disarranged and needed to be straightened up. Facts which I will cite
show that most shocking and horrible events, of which they learned
nothing, were occurring in the territory through which they passed.

For a considerable time before their departure American visitors
had been carefully excluded from the Insurgent territory, but the
Filipino leaders decided to let these two men go through it to the
end that they might make as favourable a report as possible. How
carefully the way was prepared for American visitors is shown by the
following telegram:--

    "_San Pedro, Macati_,

    "July 30, 1898.

    "To the Local Presidente of Pasig:

    "You are hereby informed that the Americans are going to
    your town and they will ask your opinion [of what the people
    desire.--Tr.] You should answer them that we want a republican
    government. The same answer must be given throughout your
    jurisdiction.

    (Signed) "Pio Del Pilar,

    "General of the Second Zone." [241]

Now General Pilar had an uncomfortable way of killing people who did
not obey his orders, and under the rules of the Insurgent government
he was abundantly justified in so doing. His suggestions as to what
visiting Americans should be told or shown would be likely to be
acceded to. Certainly this seems to have been the case in the present
instance, for on the same day General Noriel reported as follows: [242]

    "President R. G., Bacoor, from Gen. Noriel, Pineda, July 30,
    12.10 P.M.: I inform your excellency that some commissioners of
    the American admiral are making investigations in the region
    around Pasay as to the wishes and opinion of the people as to
    the government. To-day I received a statement from some, giving
    the answer: 'Free government under American protectorate [copy
    mutilated, two or three words missing here] the President.'"

Blount quotes with approval Admiral Dewey's statement made shortly
after the return of Wilcox and Sargent that in his opinion their report
"contains the most complete and reliable information obtainable
in regard to the present state of the northern part of Luzon
Island." [243] This was true.

The admiral might have gone further and said that it contained
practically the only information then obtainable in regard to
conditions in the territory in question, but as I shall conclusively
show it was neither complete nor reliable.

Judge Blount in describing the experiences of Messrs. Wilcox and
Sargent naively makes the statement that:

    "The tourists were provided at Rosales by order of Aguinaldo
    with a military escort, 'which was continued by relays all
    the way to Aparri.'" [244]

It certainly was!

Very little Spanish was then spoken in Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela or
Cagayan. What opportunity had these two men, ignorant as they were
of the native dialects, to learn the sinister facts as to what had
been and was occurring in the territory which they visited?

No one can fail to be delighted with Filipino hospitality, which
was lavishly bestowed upon them everywhere, and it is only natural
that they should have reported favourably upon what they saw. It
was about this time that an order was issued [245] that fronts of
buildings should be whitewashed, streets cleaned and fences repaired
with a view to showing every one, and especially travellers through
the territory of the Insurgents, that they were "not opposed to a
good such as a refined and civilized people should have." Doubtless
the report of the two men from Dewey's fleet was made in the best
of faith. I will now endeavour to show what were some of the actual
conditions in the territory through which they passed.

_Bulacan_

They first visited Bulacan. They do not mention hearing of the
activities of a Chinaman named Ignacio Paua, who had been given
the rank of colonel by Aguinaldo and assigned the task of extorting
contributions for the revolution from his countrymen. In a letter to
Aguinaldo written on July 6, 1898, Paua states that he has collected
more than $1,000 from the Chinese of these small towns, but asks
for an order "prohibiting the outrages that are being committed
against such merchants as are not our enemies." He further says,
"When the contributions from the Chinamen of all the pueblos shall
have been completed I wish to publish a proclamation forbidding any
injury to the Chinamen and any interference with their small business
enterprises," and adds that "the natives hereabouts themselves are
the people who are committing said abuses." [246]

Apparently Paua had no objection to the committing of outrages against
merchants that were the enemies of the cause, nor does he seem to have
objected to injury to Chinamen before contributions were completed. His
own methods were none too mild. On August 27, 1898, General Pio del
Pilar telegraphed Aguinaldo that five Insurgent soldiers, under a
leader supposed to be Paua, had entered the store of a Chinaman,
and tried to kidnap his wife, but had left on the payment of $10 and
a promise to pay $50 later, saying that they would return and hang
their fellow countryman if the latter amount was not forthcoming. [247]

Paua was later made a general in consideration of his valuable
services!

_Pampanga_

Our travellers next visited Pampanga. Here they apparently overlooked
the fact that Aguinaldo did not have "his whole people a unit at
his back." The citizens of Macabebe seem not to have approved of the
Aguinaldo regime, for the Insurgent records show that:--

    "Representatives of the towns of Pampanga assembled in San
    Fernando on June 26, 1898, and under the presidency of General
    Maximino Hizon agreed to yield him complete 'obedience as
    military governor of the province and representative of
    the illustrious dictator of these Philippine Islands.' The
    town of Macabebe refused to send any delegates to this
    gathering." [248]

It may be incidentally mentioned that Blount has passed somewhat
lightly over the fact that he himself during his army days commanded
an aggregation of sturdy citizens from this town, known as Macabebe
scouts, who diligently shot the Insurgents full of holes whenever they
got a chance. He incorrectly refers to them as a "tribe or clan." [249]
It is absurd to call them a tribe. They are merely the inhabitants
of a town which has long been at odds with the neighbouring towns of
the province.

Things had come to a bad pass in Pampanga when its head wrote that
the punishment of beating people in the plaza and tying them up so
that they would be exposed to the full rays of the sun should be
stopped. He argued that such methods would not lead the people of
other nations to believe that the reign of liberty, equality and
fraternity had begun in the Philippines. [250]

When it is remembered that persons tied up and exposed to the full rays
of the sun in the Philippine lowlands soon die, in a most uncomfortable
manner, we shall agree with the head of this province that this custom
has its objectionable features!

_Tarlac_

While the failure of Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent to learn of the
relations between the Tagalogs of Macabebe and their neighbours,
or of the fact that people were being publicly tortured in Pampanga,
is perhaps not to be wondered at under the circumstances, it is hard
to see how they could have failed to hear something of the seriously
disturbed conditions in Tarlac if they so much as got off the train
there.

On August 24 the commissioner in charge of elections in that province
asked for troops to protect him, in holding them in the town of
Urdaneta, against a party of two thousand men of the place, who were
going to prevent them.

On September 22 the secretary of the interior ordered that the
requirements of the decree of June 18, establishing municipal
governments, should be strictly complied with, as in many of the towns
"the inhabitants continue to follow the ancient methods by which the
friars exploited us at their pleasure and which showed their great
contempt for the law." [251]

The following letter to Aguinaldo, from Juan Nepomuceno, Representative
from Tarlac, speaks for itself as to conditions in that province
on December 27, 1898, shortly after the American travellers passed
through it on their return:--

    "I regret exceedingly being compelled to report to you that
    since Sunday the 25th instant scandalous acts have been
    going on in the Province of Tarlac, which I represent. On the
    night of the Sunday mentioned the entire family of the Local
    Chief of Bamban was murdered, and his house and warehouse
    were burned. Also the Tax Commissioner and the Secretary,
    Fabian Ignacio, have been murdered. Last night Senor Jacinto
    Vega was kidnapped at the town of Gerona; and seven travellers
    were murdered at O'Donnel, which town was pillaged, as well as
    the barrio of Matayumtayum of the town of La Paz. On that day
    various suspicious parties were seen in the town of Panique
    and in the same barrio, according to reliable reports which
    I have just received.

    "All this general demoralization of the province, according
    to the information which I have obtained, is due to the fact
    that the province is dissatisfied with the Provincial Chief,
    Senor Alfonso Ramos, and with Major Manuel de Leon; for this
    is substantiated by the fact that all the events described
    occurred since last Sunday, when Senor Alfonso Ramos returned,
    to take charge of the Office of Provincial President, after
    having been detained for several days in this town. Wherefore,
    I believe that in order to restore tranquillity in the
    province, consideration be given to various documents that
    have been presented to the Government and to the standing
    Committee of Justice; and that there be removed from office
    Senor Alfonso Ramos, as well as said Senor Manuel de Leon,
    who has no prestige whatever in this province. Moreover on
    the day when fifty-four soldiers of the command deserted,
    he himself left for San Fernando, Pampanga." [252]

On November 30, 1898, General Macabulos sent Aguinaldo a telegram [253]
from which it evidently appears that there was an armed uprising in
Tarlac which he was endeavouring to quell and that he hoped for early
success. Apparently, however, his efforts to secure tranquillity were
not entirely successful, for on December 18 he telegraphed Aguinaldo
as follows:--

    "In a telegram dated to-day Lieut. Paraso, commanding
    a detachment at Camilin, informs me that last night his
    detachment was attacked by Tulisanes (robbers). The fire
    lasted four hours without any casualties among our men. This
    afternoon received another from the captain commanding said
    detachment, informing me of the same, and that nothing new
    has occurred. The people of the town await with anxiety the
    result of the charges they have made, especially against the
    local president and the justice of the peace, the original
    of which I sent to your high authority." [254]

Obviously the police machinery was not working quite smoothly when
a detachment of Insurgent troops could be kept under fire for four
hours by a robber band, and perhaps the attacking party were not all
"robbers." Soldiers do not ordinarily carry much to steal.

We obtain some further information from the following telegram of
December 27, 1898, sent by the secretary of the interior to the
President of the Revolutionary Government:--

    "Most urgent. According to reports no excitement except in
    Bangbang, Tarlac, which at 12 A.M., 25th, was attacked by
    Tulisanes [bandits or robbers,--D.C.W.]. The local presidente
    with his patrols arrested six of them. On continuing the
    pursuit he met in Talacon a party too large to attack. At 7
    A.M. of the 26th the town was again attacked by criminals,
    who killed the tax collector, and others who burnt some
    houses, among them that of the local presidente, and his
    stables, in which he lost two horses. I report this for your
    information." [255]

Evidently tax collectors were not popular in Tarlac.

Still further light is shed on the situation by a telegram from the
secretary of the interior to Aguinaldo, dated December 28, 1898:--

    "According to my information the excitement in Tarlac
    increases. I do not think that the people of the province
    would have committed such barbarities by themselves. For
    this reason the silence of General Macabulos is suspicious;
    to speak frankly, it encourages the rebels. Some seven hundred
    of them, with one hundred and fifty rifles, entered Panique,
    seized the arms of the police, the town funds, and attacked the
    houses of the people. I report this for your information. All
    necessary measures will be taken." [256]

Note also the following from the secretary of the interior, under
date of December 27, 1898, to Aguinaldo:--

    "I have just learned that not only in Bangbang, but also
    in Gerona, Onell, and other places in Tarlac, men have been
    assaulted by numerous Tulisanes, armed with rifles and bolos,
    who are killing and capturing the inhabitants and attacking
    travellers, robbing them of everything they have. The President
    should declare at once that that province is in state of
    siege, applying martial law to the criminals. That--(remainder
    missing)." [257]

The secretary of agriculture took a more cheerful view of the
situation. Under date of December 28 he telegraphed Aguinaldo as
follows:--

    "The events in Bangbang, Tarlac Province, according to a
    witness here worthy of credit, have arisen from an attempt
    to procure vengeance on the local presidente, and robbery of
    Chinese shops. Hence they are without political importance. The
    tax collector killed, and a countryman servant of the local
    presidente wounded. They burnt two houses of the local
    presidente, a stable, and a warehouse for sugar-cane." [258]

Obviously the robbery of Chinese shops and the killing of a few
individuals was at first considered by the secretary of agriculture
to be without political importance. Evidently he changed his mind,
however, for on the same day, December 28, 1898, he telegraphed
Aguinaldo as follows:--

    "I think it necessary to send Aglipay [259] to quiet
    Tarlac. Send for him. If you desire, I will go to Tarlac to
    investigate the causes of the disorders, in order to find a
    remedy for them." [260]

At this stage of events Aguinaldo was summoned to Malolos by a telegram
from Mabini under date of December 29, which reads as follows:--

    "Most urgent. You must come here immediately. Trias is sick. We
    can come to no decision in regard to the Tarlac matter. Cannot
    constitute a government without you." [261]

The measures which were actually taken are set forth in another
telegram of the same date from the secretaries of war and interior
to Aguinaldo, which reads as follows:--

    "We have sent civil and military commissioners to Tarlac;
    among them the Director of War and persons of much moral
    influence, in order to stifle the disturbances. The necessary
    instructions have been given them and full powers for the
    purpose, and as far as possible to satisfy the people. Have
    also sent there six companies of soldiers with explicit
    instructions to their commander to guard only the towns, and
    make the people return to a peaceful life, using a policy of
    attraction for the purpose." [262]

Let us hope that the commander was able to attract the people with
his six companies of soldiers, and make them return to a peaceful life.

Still further light is thrown on the situation in Tarlac by the
following extract from "Episodios de la Revolucion Filipina" by Padre
Joaquin D. Duran, an Augustinian priest, Manila, 1901, page 71:--

    "At that period the Filipinos, loving order, having been
    deceived of the emancipation promise, changed by the Katipunan
    into crimes and attacks on the municipality of the pueblos,
    discontent broke out in all parts, and, although latent in some
    provinces, in that of Tarlac was materialized in an ex-sergeant
    of the late Spanish civil guard. A valorous and determined
    man, he lifted up his flag against that of Aguinaldo. One
    hundred rifles were sufficient to terrorize the inhabitants
    of said province, crushing the enthusiastic members of the
    revolutionary party.... Having taken possession of four towns,
    Pecheche would have been everywhere successful if ambition
    and pride had not directed his footsteps. In January, 1899,
    the Aguinaldista commander of Tarlac province, afraid that
    his whole province would espouse the cause of the sergeant,
    attempted by every means in his power to interrupt his
    career, not hesitating to avail himself of crime to destroy
    the influence of Pecheche with the many people who had been
    incensed by the Katipunan and had in turn become firm partisans
    of the Guards of Honour.

    "The Ilocano Tranquilino Pagarigan, local presidente at
    that time of Camiling, served as an admirable instrument for
    this purpose.... Pecheche was invited to a solemn festivity
    organized by Tranquilino, who pretended to recognize him as
    his chief, and rendering himself a vassal by taking an oath
    to his flag. He accepted the invitation, and after the mass
    which was celebrated went to a meal at the convent, where,
    after the meal was over, the members of the K.K.K. surrounded
    Pecheche and 10 of his officers and killed them with bolos
    or tied them and threw them out of the windows and down the
    staircase. Some priests were held captive in the building
    where this took place and were informed of what had taken
    place immediately afterwards."

This extract shows how easy it then was for any man of determination
to acquire a following, especially if he could dispose of a few
rifles. It also gives an excellent idea of the methods employed by
the Insurgents in dealing with those who opposed their rule.

General Fred D. Grant once told me, with much amusement, of an
interesting experience during a fight on Mt. Arayat in Pampanga. His
men took a trench and captured some of its occupants. Several of these
were impressed as guides and required to show the attacking forces
the locations of other trenches. At first they served unwillingly,
but presently became enthusiastic and rushed the works of their
quondam fellow-soldiers in the van of the American attack. Finally
they begged for guns. Grant added that he could start from Bacolor
for San Fernando any morning with a supply of rifles and pick up
volunteers enough to capture the place, and that on the return trip
he could get enough more to attack Bacolor!

_Pangasinan_

And now we come to Pangasinan, the most populous province of Luzon,
and the third in the Philippines in number of inhabitants.

    "In July, 1898, the officer in Dagupan wrote to the commanding
    general of Tarlac Province that he would like to know whom
    he was required to obey, as there were so many officials of
    all ranks who gave him orders that it was impossible for him
    to know where he stood." [263]

In a letter dated August 17, 1898, to Aguinaldo, Benito Legarda
complained that a bad impression had been produced by the news from
Dagupan that when the Insurgents entered there, after many outrages
committed upon the inmates of a girls' school, every officer had
carried off those who suited him. [264]

What should we say if United States troops entered the town of
Wellesley and raped numerous students at the college, the officers
subsequently taking away with them the young ladies who happened
to suit them? Yet things of this sort hardly caused a ripple in the
country then under the Insurgent flag, and I learned of this particular
incident by accident, although I have known Legarda for years.

I quote the following general description of conditions in Pangasinan
from a letter addressed by Cecilio Apostol to General Aguinaldo on
July 6, 1898:--

    "You probably know that in the Province of Pangasinan, of
    one of the towns in which your humble servant is a resident,
    the Spanish flag through our good fortune has not flown here
    for the past few months, since the few Spaniards who lived
    here have concentrated in Dagupan, a place not difficult of
    attack, as is said.

    "But this is what is going on in this Province" There exist
    here two Departmental Governments, one calling itself that
    of Northern Luzon and of which Don Vicente del Prado is
    the President, and the other which calls itself that of
    Northern and Central Luzon, presided over by Don Juliano
    Paraiso. Besides these two gentlemen, there are two governors
    in the province(!) one Civil Political Military, living in
    Lingayen, named Don Felipe J. Bartolome, and another living in
    Real Guerrero, a town of Tayug, named Don Vicente Estrella. And
    in addition there are a large number of Administrators,
    Inspectors, Military Judges, Generals, ... they cannot be
    counted. It is a pandemonium of which even Christ, who
    permits it, cannot make anything. Indeed, the situation is
    insupportable. It reminds me of the schism in the middle
    ages when there were two Popes, both legitimate, neither
    true. Things are as clear as thick chocolate, as the
    Spaniards say. In my poor opinion, good administration is
    the mother-in-law of disorder, since disorder is chaos and
    chaos produces nothing but confusion, that is to say, death.

    "I have had an opportunity, through the kindness of a friend,
    to read the decree of that Government, dated June 18th, of
    the present year, and the accompanying 'Instructions for
    the government of towns and provinces.' Article 9 of the
    said decree says that the Superior Government will name
    a commissioner for each province with the special duty
    of establishing there the organization set forth in the
    decree. Very well so far: which of the so-called Presidents of
    Northern or of Northern and Central Luzon is the commissioner
    appointed by that government to establish the new organization
    in that province? Are military commanders named by you for
    Pangasinan? I would be very much surprised if either of them
    could show his credentials. Aside from these, the fact remains
    that in those instructions no mention is made of Presidents
    of Departments, there is a manifest contradiction in their
    jurisdictions, since while one calls himself president of a
    Departmental Government, of Northern Luzon, the other governs
    the Northern and Central portion of the Island, according to
    the seals which they use.

    "And, nevertheless, a person calling himself the General
    Administrator of the Treasury and the said Governor of the
    Province, both of whom live in Tayug, came to this town when
    the Spaniards voluntarily abandoned it and gathered all the
    people of means, and drew up an act of election, a copy of
    which is attached. From it you will see how this organization
    violates the provisions of the decree of the 18th of June.

    "Another item: They got up a contract with the people of means
    of this town, and did the same thing in the other towns,
    in which contract they exact from us $1250 which they call
    contributions of war (see document No. 2 attached). Among
    the doubtful powers of these gentlemen is the one to exact
    these sums included?

    "Have they express orders from that Government?

    "Perhaps these blessed gentlemen--they are high flyers there is
    no doubt about that,--have struck the clever idea of calling
    themselves generals, governors, etc., in order to enjoy a
    certain prestige and to give a certain color of legality to
    their acts--this, although they don't know an iota of what
    they are doing. But what I am sure of, and many other men
    also, is that there is no order, that here there is not a
    single person in authority whom to obey. This superfluity of
    rulers will finally lead to strained relations between them
    and the towns of this province will end by paying the piper.

    "But we poor ignorant creatures in so far as the republican
    form of government is concerned, in order to avoid worse
    evils took them at their word, obeyed them like automatons,
    hypnotized by the title of 'Insurgents' which they applied to
    themselves. But when I had an opportunity to read the said
    decree, doubts were forced upon me, I began to suspect--may
    God and they pardon me--that they were trying to impose upon
    us nicely, that, shielded by the motto, 'have faith in and
    submit to the will of the country' they came to these towns
    'for business.'

    "In order to dissipate this doubt, in order to do away with
    abuses, if there are abuses, I made up my mind to send you this
    account of the condition of things here. I flatter myself that
    when you learn of the lamentable situation of this province,
    you will soon deign to take steps to establish order, because
    thereon depends the tranquillity of Pangasinan and in the
    end a strict compliance with your superior orders.

    "There will be no limit to the thanks of the people of this
    province if their petitions secure favourable consideration and
    an immediate response from the high patriotism and honourable
    standpoint of the Supreme Dictator of the Philippines." [265]

It will be noted that the picture thus drawn by Senor Apostol differs
in certain important particulars from that painted in such engaging
colours by Judge Blount.

In September, 1898, the civil governor of Pangasinan had to have an
escort of troops in passing through his province. [266]

On November 20, 1898, the head of the town of San Manuel wrote the
provincial governor that his people could no longer support the troops
quartered on them, as the adherents of the Katipunan had burned or
stolen all of their property. [267]

The sum total of Blount's description of affairs in this, the
most populous province of Luzon, is derived from the narrative of
Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent and reads as follows:--

    "In Pangasinan 'the people were all very respectful and polite
    and offered the hospitality of their homes.'" [268]

Doubtless true, but as a summary of conditions perhaps a trifle
sketchy.


_Nueva Ecija_

Nueva Ecija was the next province visited by Wilcox and Sargent. They
have failed to inform us that:--

    "In December, 1899, certain men charged with being members
    of this society [Guards of Honour] were interrogated in Nueva
    Ecija as to their purposes. One of those questioned said:--

    "'That their purpose was one day, the date being unknown to
    the deponent, when the Ilocanos of Batac came, to rise up
    in arms and kill the Tagalos, both private individuals and
    public employees, excepting those who agreed to the former,
    for the reason that honours were granted only to the Tagalos,
    and but few to the Ilocanos.'" [269]

Blount has assured us that the Filipinos were a unit at Aguinaldo's
back and were and are an united people, and here are the Ilocanos of
Nueva Ecija spoiling his theory by remembering that they are Ilocanos
and proposing to kill whom? Not certain individual Filipinos, who
might have offended them, but the Tagalogs!

That there were other troubles in Nueva Ecija is shown by the following
statement:--

    "On January 7, 1899, the commissioner of Aguinaldo's treasury
    sent to collect contributions of war in Nueva Ecija Province
    reported that the company stationed in San Isidro had become
    guerillas under command of its officers and opposed his
    collections, stating that they were acting in compliance with
    orders from higher authority." [270]

And now, in following the route taken by our tourist friends, we
reach Nueva Vizcaya and the Cagayan valley.






CHAPTER VI

Insurgent Rule in the Cagayan Valley


Nueva Vizcaya is drained by the Magat River, a branch of the
Cagayan. While the provinces of Isabela and Cagayan constitute the
Cagayan valley proper, Blount includes Nueva Vizcaya in the territory
covered by this designation, and for the purpose of this discussion
I will follow his example.

Especial interest attaches to the history of Insurgent rule, in the
Cagayan valley, as above defined, for the reason that Blount himself
served there as a judge of the court of first instance. He says:
[271]--

    "The writer is perhaps as familiar with the history of that
    Cagayan valley as almost any other American."

He was. For his action in concealing the horrible conditions which
arose there under Insurgent rule, with which he was perfectly familiar,
and in foisting on the public the account of Messrs. Wilcox and
Sargent, as portraying the conditions which actually existed there,
I propose to arraign him before the bar of public opinion. In so
doing I shall consider these conditions at some length. We have much
documentary evidence concerning them in addition to that furnished
by the Insurgent records, although the latter quite sufficiently
demonstrate many of the more essential facts.

In describing the adventures of Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent in this
region, Judge Blount says: [272]--

    "There [273] they were met by Simeon Villa, military commander
    of Isabela province, the man who was chief of staff to
    Aguinaldo afterwards, and was captured by General Funston
    along with Aguinaldo in the spring of 1901."

The facts as to Villa's career in the Cagayan valley are especially
worthy of note as they seem to have entitled him, in the opinion of
his superiors, to the promotion which was afterward accorded him. He
was an intimate friend of Aguinaldo and later accompanied him on his
long flight through northern Luzon.

On August 10, 1898, Colonel Daniel Tirona, a native of Cavite Province
and one of the intimates of Aguinaldo, was ordered to proceed to Aparri
in the Insurgent steamer _Filipinas_ and establish the revolutionary
government in northern Luzon. In doing this he was to hold elections
for office-holders under Aguinaldo's government and was authorized
to approve or disapprove the results, his action being subject to
subsequent revision by Aguinaldo. His forces were composed of four
companies armed with rifles.

Tirona reached Aparri on August 25 and promptly secured the surrender
of the Spaniards there.

He was accompanied by Simeon Villa, the man under discussion, and by
Colonel Leyba, who was also very close to Aguinaldo.

Abuse of the Spanish prisoners began at once. It is claimed that the
governor of North Ilocos, who was among those captured, was grossly
mistreated.

Taylor briefly summarizes subsequent events as follows: [274]--

    "Whatever the treatment of the Spanish governor of Ilocos
    may really have been, there is testimony to show that some
    of the other prisoners, especially the priests, were abused
    and outraged under the direction of S. Villa and Colonel
    Leyba, both of whom were very close to Aguinaldo. Some of
    the Spanish civil officials were put in stocks and beaten,
    and one of the officers who had surrendered at Aparri was
    tortured to death. This was done with the purpose of extorting
    money from them, for it was believed that they had hidden
    funds in place of turning them over. All the Spaniards were
    immediately stripped of everything they had. The priests were
    subjected to a systematic series of insults and abuse under
    the direction of Villa in order to destroy their influence
    over the people by degrading them in their eyes. It was for
    this that they were beaten and exposed naked in the sun; and
    other torture, such as pouring tile wax of burning candles
    into their eyes, was used to make them disclose where they
    had hidden church vessels and church funds. The testimony of
    a friar who suffered these outrages is that the great mass
    of the people saw such treatment of their parish priests
    with horror, and were present at it only through fear of the
    organized force of the Katipunan."

Taylor's statement is mildness itself in view of the well-established
facts.

The question of killing the Spanish prisoners, including the friars,
had previously been seriously considered, [275] but it was deemed wiser
to keep most of the friars alive, extort money from them by torture,
and offer to liberate them in return for a large cash indemnity, or for
political concessions. Day after day and week after week Villa presided
at, or himself conducted, the torture of ill-fated priests and other
Spaniards who fell into his hands. Even Filipinos whom he suspected
of knowing the where-abouts of hidden friar money did not escape.

The following information relative to the conduct of the Insurgents in
the Cagayan valley is chiefly taken from manuscript copy of _"Historia
de la Conquista de Cagayan por los Tagalos Revolucionarios,"_ in
which the narratives of certain captured friars are transcribed and
compiled by Father Julian Malumbres of the Dominican Order.

The formal surrender of Aparri occurred on August 26. Tirona, his
officers and his soldiers, promptly pillaged the _convento_. [276]
The officers left the Bishop of Vigan ten pesos, but the soldiers
subsequently took them away from him. Wardrobes and trunks were
broken open; clocks, shoes, money, everything was carried off. Even
personal papers and prayer-books were taken from some of the priests,
many of whom were left with absolutely nothing save the few remaining
clothes in which they stood.

On the same day Villa, accompanied by Victa and Rafael Perea, [277]
went to the _convento_ and told the priests who were imprisoned
there that their last hour had come. He shut all of them except the
bishop and five priests in a room near the church, then separated
the Augustinians, Juan Zallo, Gabino Olaso, Fidel Franco, Mariano
Rodriguez, and Clemente Hidalgo, from the others and took them into
the lower part of the _convento_ where he told them that he intended
to kill them if they did not give him more money. The priests told
him that they had given all they had, whereupon he had their arms
tied behind their backs, kicked them, struck them and whipped them
with rattans.

Father Zallo was thrown on his face and savagely beaten. Meanwhile
two shots were fired over the heads of the others and a soldier called
out "One has fallen," badly frightening the priests who had remained
shut in the room. Villa then returned with soldiers to this room,
ordered his men to load, and directed that one priest step forward
to be shot. Father Mariano Ortiz complied with this request, asking
that he be the first victim. Villa, however, contented himself with
threatening him with a revolver and kicking and striking him until
he fell to the floor. He was then beaten with the butts of guns.

Father Jose Vazquez, an old man of sixty years, who had thrown some
money into a privy to keep it from falling into the hands of the
Insurgents, was stripped and compelled to recover it with his bare
hands, after which he was kicked, and beaten with rattans.

Father Aquilino Garcia was unmercifully kicked and beaten to make
him give up money, and this sort of thing continued until Villa,
tired out with the physical exertion involved in assaulting these
defenceless men, departed, leaving his uncompleted task to others,
who continued it for some time.

The net result to the Insurgents of the sacking of the _convento_
and of the tortures thus inflicted was approximately $20,000 gold in
addition to the silver, bank notes, letters of credit, jewels, etc.,
which they obtained.

On September 5 Villa had Fathers Juan Recio and Buenaventura Macia
given fifty blows each, although Father Juan was ill.

Villa then went to Lalloc, where other priests were imprisoned. On
September 6 he demanded money of them, causing them to be kicked and
beaten. Father Angel was beaten in an especially cruel manner for
the apparent purpose of killing him, after which he was thrust into
a privy. Father Isidro Fernandez was also fearfully abused. Stripped
of his habit, and stretched face down on the floor, he was horribly
beaten, and was then kicked, and struck with the butt of a revolver
on the forehead.

A little later the priests were offered their liberty for a million
dollars, which they were of course unable to furnish. Meanwhile the
torture continued from time to time.

On August 30 Tuguegarao was taken by the Insurgents without
resistance. Colonel Leyba promptly proceeded to the _convento_
and demanded the money of the friars as spoil of war. He found only
eight hundred pesos in the safe. Father Corujedo was threatened with
death if he did not give more. Other priests were threatened but not
tortured at this time. The prisoners in the jail were liberated,
but many of them had promptly to be put back again because of the
disorder which resulted, and that same evening Leyba was obliged to
publish a notice threatening robbers with death.

At midnight on September 3 Father Corujedo was taken from the
_convento_ by Captain Diego and was again asked for money. Replying
that he had no more to give, he was beaten with the hilt of a sabre
and stripped of his habit, preparatory to being executed. A mock
sentence of death was pronounced on him and he was placed facing to
the west to be shot in the back. Diego ordered his soldiers to load,
adding, "When I count three all fire," but the fatal count was not
completed. Three priests from Alcala were given similar treatment.

The troubles of the priests imprisoned at Tuguegarao were sufficiently
great, but they were augmented a thousand fold when Villa arrived on
September 11. He came to the building where they were imprisoned,
bearing a revolver, a sabre and a great quantity of rattans. He
ordered the priests into the corner of the room in which they were
confined, and beat those who did not move quickly enough to suit
him. He threatened them with a very rigorous examination, at the same
time assuring them that at Aparri he had hung up the bishop until
blood flowed from his mouth and his ears, and that he would do the
same with them if they did not tell him where they had their money
hidden. There followed the usual rain of kicks and blows, a number
of the priests being obliged to take off their habits in order that
they might be punished more effectively.

Fathers Calixto Prieto and Daniel Gonzales, professors in educational
institutions, he ordered beaten because they were friars.

Fathers Corujedo and Caddedila were beaten, kicked and insulted. Both
were gray-haired old men and the latter was at the time very weak,
and suffering from a severe attack of asthma. Father Pedro Vincente
was also brutally beaten.

The following is the description given by an eye-witness of conditions
at Tuguegarao:--

    "Even the Indios of Cagayan complained and were the victims of
    looting and robbery on the part of the soldiery. So lacking in
    discipline and so demoralized was that army that according to
    the confession of a prominent Filipino it was of imperative
    necessity to disarm them. [278] On the other hand we saw
    with real astonishment that instead of warlike soldiers
    accustomed to battle they were nearly all raw recruits and
    apprentices. From an army lacking in discipline, and lawless,
    only outrages, looting and all sorts of savagery and injustice
    were to be expected. Witnesses to their demoralization are,
    aside from the natives themselves who were the first to
    acknowledge it, the Chinese merchants whose losses were
    incalculable; not a single store or commercial establishment
    remained that was not looted repeatedly. As to the Spaniards
    it goes without saying because it is publicly known, that
    between soldiers and officers they despoiled them to their
    heart's content, without any right except that of brute force,
    of everything that struck their fancy, and it was of no avail
    to complain to the officers and ask for justice, as they turned
    a deaf ear to such complaints. At Tuguegarao they looted in a
    manner never seen before, like Vandals, and it was not without
    reason that a prominent Filipino said, in speaking to a priest:
    'Vandalism has taken possession of the place.' These acts of
    robbery were generally accompanied by the most savage insults;
    it was anarchy, as we heard an eye-witness affirm, who also
    stated that no law was recognized except that of danger,
    and the vanquished were granted nothing but the inevitable
    duty of bowing with resignation to the iniquitous demands of
    that soulless rabble, skilled in crime."

Villa now set forth for Isabela. Meanwhile the jailer of the priests
proceeded to steal their clothes, including shirts, shoes and even
handkerchiefs. Isabela was taken without resistance on September
12. Dimas Guzman [279] swore to the priests on his life that he would
work without rest to the end that all friars and all Spaniards might
be respected, but he perjured himself.

On September 12 Villa and others entered the town of Cabagan Viejo,
where Villa promptly assaulted Father Segundo Rodriguez, threatening
him with a revolver, beating him unmercifully, insulting him in every
possible way and robbing him of his last cent. After the bloody scene
was over he sacked the _convento_, even taking away the priests'
clothes.

Villa also cruelly beat a Filipino, Quintin Agansi, who was taking
care of money for masses which the priests wished to save from the
Insurgents.

After Father Segundo had suffered torture and abuse for two hours he
was obliged to start at once on a journey to Auitan. The suffering
priest, after being compelled to march through the street shouting
"Vivas!" for the Republic and Aguinaldo, spent the night without a
mouthful of food or a drink of water.

Father Deogracias Garcia, a priest of Cabagan Nuevo, was subjected to
torture because he had sent to Hongkong during May a letter of credit
for $5000 which belonged to the Church. Villa and Leyba entered his
_convento_ and after beating him ordered his hands and feet to be
tied together, then passed a pole between them and had him lifted
from the ground, after which two great jars of water were poured down
his nose and throat without interruption. [280] In order to make the
water flow through his nose better, they thrust a piece of wood into
the nasal passages until it came out in his throat. From time to time
the torture was suspended while they asked him whether he would tell
the truth as to where he had concealed his money. This unfortunate
priest was so sure he was going to die that while the torture was
in progress he received absolution from a fellow priest. After the
torture with water there followed a long and cruel beating, and the
unhappy victim was finally thrust into a filthy privy.

Meanwhile Father Calzada was assaulted by a group of soldiers and
badly beaten, after which he was let down into the filth of a privy,
first by the feet and afterwards by the head.

On the 14th a lieutenant with soldiers entered the _convento_ of
Tumauini and as usual demanded money of the occupants, who gave him
$80, all they had at the time. This quantity not being satisfactory,
a rope was sent for and the hands of the two priests were tied while
they were whipped, kicked and beaten. They were, however, released
when Father Bonet promised to get additional money. They had a short
respite until the arrival of Villa, who still demanded more money of
Father Blanco, and failing to get it for the reason that the father
had no more, leaped upon him and gave him a dreadful beating, his
companions joining in with whips, rattans and the butts of guns. They
at last left their victim stretched on the ground almost dead. This
priest showed the marks of his ill treatment six months afterward. Not
satisfied with this, Villa gave him the so-called "water cure."

Meanwhile his followers had also beaten Father Bonet. Villa started to
do likewise but was too tired, having exhausted his energies on Father
Blanco. While the tortures were going on, the _convento_ was completely
sacked. Father Blanco's library was thrown out of the window.

Villa entered Ilagan on the 15th of September at 8 o'clock at
night. Hastening to the _convento_, with a company of well-armed
soldiers, he had his men surround the three priests who awaited him
there, then summoned the local priest to a separate room and demanded
money. The priest gave him all he had. Not satisfied, Villa leaped
upon him, kicking him, beating him and pounding him with the butt of
a gun. Many of his associates joined in the disgraceful attack. The
unfortunate victim was then stripped of his habit, obliged to lie down
and received more than a hundred lashes. When he was nearly senseless
he was subjected to torture by water, being repeatedly lifted up when
filled with water, and allowed to fall on the floor. While some were
pouring water down his nose and throat, others spilled hot wax on his
face and head. The torment repeatedly rendered the priest senseless,
but he was allowed to recover from time to time so that he might
suffer when it was renewed.

The torturing of this unhappy man lasted for three hours, and
the horrible scene was immediately succeeded by another quite as
bad. Villa called Father Domingo Campo and, after taking from him
the little money that he had, ordered him stripped. He was then given
numberless kicks and blows from the butts of rifles and 150 lashes,
after which he was unable to rise. There followed the torture with
water, on the pretext that he had money hidden away.

Meanwhile the houses of Spaniards and the shops of the Chinese were
completely sacked, and the men who objected were knocked down or cut
down with bolos. Numerous girls and women were raped.

On September 15 Leyba received notice of the surrender of Nueva
Vizcaya. I quote the following from the narrative above referred to:--

    "Delfin's soldiers [281] were the most depraved ever seen:
    their thieving instincts had no bounds; so they had hardly
    entered Nueva Vizcaya when they started to give themselves
    up furiously to robbery, looking upon all things as loot;
    in the very shadow of these soldiers the province was invaded
    by a mob of adventurous and ragged persons from Nueva Ecija;
    between the two they picked Nueva Vizcaya clean. When they had
    grown tired of completely shearing the unfortunate Vizcayan
    people, leaving them poverty-stricken, they flew in small
    bands to the pueblos of Isabela, going as far as Angadanan,
    giving themselves up to unbridled pillage of the most unjust
    and disorderly kind. Some of these highwaymen demanded money
    and arms from the priest of Angadanan, but Father Marciano
    informed them 'that it could not be, as Leyba already knew
    what he had and would be angry.'

    "To this very day the people of Nueva Vizcaya have been
    unable to recover from the stupendous losses suffered by
    them as regards their wealth and industries. How many curses
    did they pour forth and still continue to level against the
    Katipunan that brought them naught but tribulations!"

Confirmation of these statements is found in the following brief but
significant passage from the Insurgent records:--

    "At the end of December, 1898, when the military commander
    of Nueva Vizcaya called upon the Governor of that province to
    order the police of the towns to report to him as volunteers to
    be incorporated in the army which was being prepared for the
    defence of the country, the Governor protested against it and
    informed the government that his attempt to obtain volunteers
    was in fact only a means of disarming the towns and leaving
    them without protection against the soldiers who did what
    they wanted and took what they wished and committed every
    outrage without being punished for it by their officers." [282]

The effect of the surrender of Nueva Vizcaya on Leyba and Villa is
thus described by Father Malumbres:--

    "Mad with joy and swollen with pride Leyba and company were
    like men who travelled flower-strewn paths, crowned with
    laurels, and were acclaimed as victors in all the towns on
    their road, their intoxication of joy taking a sudden rise when
    they came to believe themselves kings of the valley. It was
    then that their delirium reached its brimful measure and their
    treatment of those whom they had vanquished began to be daily
    more cruel and inhuman. In Cagayan their fear of the forces
    in Nueva Vizcaya kept them from showing such unqualifiable
    excesses of cruelty and nameless barbarities, but the triumph
    of the Katipunan arms in Nueva Vizcaya completely broke
    down the wall of restraint which somewhat repressed those
    sanguinary executioners thirsting to fatten untrammelled on
    the innocent blood of unarmed and defenceless men. From that
    melancholy time there began an era of unheard of outrages and
    barbarous scenes, unbelievable were they not proved by evidence
    of every description. The savage acts committed in Isabela by
    the inhuman Leyba and Villa cannot possibly be painted true
    to life and in all their tragic details. The blackest hues,
    the most heartrending accents, the most vigorous language
    and the most fulminating anathemas would be a pale image of
    the truth, and our pen cannot express with true ardour the
    terrifying scenes and cruel torments brought about by such
    fierce chieftains on such indefensive religious. It seems
    impossible that a fleshly heart could hold so much wickedness,
    for these petty chiefs were veritable monsters of cruelty who
    surpassed a Nero; men who were entire strangers to noble and
    humane sentiments and who in appearance having the figure of
    a man were in reality tigers roaring in desperation, or mad
    dogs who gnashed their teeth in fury."

On September 18 Leyba continued his march, while Villa remained
behind at Ilagan to torture the prisoners who might be brought in
from Isabela.

On arrival at Gamut, Leyba at once entered the _convento_ and as usual
immediately demanded money from the priests. Father Venancio gave
him all he had. He was nevertheless given a frightful whipping, six
persons holding him while others rained blows upon him. A determined
effort was made to force the priest to recant, and when this failed
Leyba leaped upon him, kicking and beating him. He then ordered him
thrown down face uppermost, and asked for a knife with the apparent
intention of mutilating him. He did not use the knife, however, but
instead, assisted by his followers, gave the unhappy priest another
terrific beating, even standing upon him and leaping up and down. The
priest was left unable to speak, and did not recover for months.

Later Leyba had torture by water applied to Father Gregorio Cabrero
and lay brother Venancio Aguinaco, while Father Sabanda was savagely
beaten.

On the 19th of September Father Miguel Garcia of Reina Mercedes was
horribly beaten in his _convento_ by a captain sent there to get what
money he had.

In Cauayan, on September 20, Fathers Perez and Aguirrezabal were
beaten and compelled to give up money by five emissaries of Leyba,
and the latter priest was cut in the face with a sabre. The _convento_
was sacked. On the 25th Leyba arrived and after kicking and beating
Father Garcia compelled him to give up $1700. He then informed the
priests that if it were not for Aguinaldo's orders he would kill all
the Spaniards.

On the afternoon of the 24th three priests and a Spaniard named Soto
arrived at Ilagan. The following is the statement of an eye-witness
as to what happened:--

    "They led the priests to the headquarters of the commanding
    officer where the tyrant Villa, always eager to inflict
    suffering on humanity, awaited them. The scene witnessed
    by the priests obeisant to the cruel judge was horrifying
    in the extreme. Four lions whose thirst for vengeance was
    extreme in all, threw themselves, blind with fury, without
    a word and with the look of a basilisk, upon poor Senor Soto
    giving him such innumerable and furious blows on head and face
    that weary as he was from his past journey, the ill-treatment
    received at Angadanan and weighted down by years, he was soon
    thrown down by his executioners under the lintel of the door
    getting a terrible blow on the head as he fell; even this did
    not satisfy nor tame down those fierce-hearted men, who on
    the contrary continued with their infamous work more furious
    than before, and their cruelty did not flag on seeing their
    victim at their feet. They could have done no worse had they
    been Silipan savages dancing in triumph around the palpitating
    head cut from the body of some enemy.

    "The priests who witnessed this blood-curdling scene trembled
    like the weak reed before the gale, waiting their turn to be
    tortured, but God willed that cruel Villa should be content
    with the butchery perpetrated upon unhappy Sr. Soto. Villa
    dismissed the priests after despoiling them of their bags and
    clothes telling them, to torment them: 'Go to the _convento_
    until the missing ones turn up so that I may shoot you all
    together.'"

Leyba entered Echague on September 22, promptly going to the _convento_
as usual and demanding money of the priest, Father Mata. When the
latter had given him all he had, he received three terrific beatings
at the hands of some twelve men armed with whips and sticks, after
which Leyba himself struck him with his fist and his sabre. He was
finally knocked down by a blow with the sabre and left disabled. It
took six months for him to recover.

Shortly after Leyba's arrival in Nueva Vizcaya on the afternoon of
the 25th, five priests were summoned to Solano and there abused in
the usual fashion in an effort to extort money from them. Only one
escaped ill treatment and one was nearly killed.

Leyba now went to Bayombong to carry out the established programme
with the priests. There he found Governor Perez of Isabela, who had
taken with him certain government moneys and employed them to pay
salaries of soldiers and other employees. He insisted on the return
of the total amount and threatened to shoot Perez if it was not
forthcoming. The Spaniards of the vicinity subscribed $700 which they
themselves badly needed and saved him from being shot. The priests
of the place were then summoned to Leyba's quarters and were beaten
and tortured. One of them was thrown on the floor and beaten nearly
to death, Leyba standing meanwhile with his foot on the unfortunate
man's neck. Another was given six hundred lashes and countless blows
and kicks. Leyba stood on this man's neck also. When the victim's back
ceased to have any feeling, his legs were beaten. Leyba terminated
this period of diversion by kicking Father Diez in the solar plexus
and then mocking him as he lay gasping on the floor. That afternoon
one of the priests, so badly injured that he could not rise unaided,
was put on a horse and compelled to ride in the hot sun to Solano.

Villa and Leyba had their able imitators, as is shown by the following
description of the torturing of Father Ceferino by Major Delfin at
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, on September 27:--

    "They wished to give brave evidence of their hate for the friar
    before Leyba left, and show him that they were as brave as
    he when it came to oppressing and torturing the friar. This
    tragedy began by Jimenez again asking Father Ceferino for
    the money. The priest answered as he had done before. Then
    Jimenez started to talk in Tagalog to the commanding officer
    and surely it was nothing good that he told him, for suddenly
    Delfin left the bench and darting fire from his eyes, fell
    in blind fury upon the defenceless priest; what harsh words
    he uttered in Tagalog while he vented his fury on his victim,
    striking him with his clenched fist, slapping him and kicking
    him, I do not know, but the religious man fell at the feet of
    his furious executioner who, being now the prey of the most
    stupendous rage, could scarcely get his tongue to stutter and
    continued to kick the priest, without seeing where he kicked
    him. Getting deeper and deeper in the abyss and perhaps not
    knowing what he was about, this petty chief made straight for
    a sabre lying on a table to continue his bloody work. In the
    meantime the priest had risen to his feet and awaited with
    resignation new torments which certainly were even worse than
    the first, for he gave him so many and such hard blows with
    the sabre that the blade was broken close to the hilt. This
    accident so infuriated Delfin that he again threw himself upon
    the priest, kicking him furiously and striking him repeatedly
    until he again threw him to the ground, and not yet satisfied,
    his vengefulness led him to throw himself upon his victim with
    the fury of a tiger after his prey, beating him on the head
    with the hilt of the saber until the blood ran in streams
    and formed pools upon the pavement. The priest, more dead
    than alive, shuddered from head to foot, and appeared to be
    struggling in a tremendous fight between life and death; he
    had hardly enough strength to get his tongue to ask for God's
    mercy. At this most critical juncture, and when it seemed as
    if death were inevitable, the martyr received absolution from
    Father Diez, who witnessed the blood-curdling picture with
    his heart pierced with grief at the sight of the sufferings
    of his innocent brother, feeling as must the condemned man
    preparing for death who sees the hours fly by with vertiginous
    rapidity. The blood flowing from the wounds on the priest's
    head appeared to infuriate and blind the heart of Delfin who,
    rising from his victim's body, sped away to the armory in the
    court house, seized a rifle, and came back furious to brain
    him with the butt and finish killing the priest; but God
    willed to free his servant from death at the hands of those
    cannibals, so that generous Lieutenant Navarro interfered,
    took the rifle away from him and caught Delfin by the arm,
    threatening him with some words spoken in Tagalog. Then
    Navarro, to appease Delfin's anger, turned the priest over
    with his face to the ground and gave him a few strokes with the
    bamboo, and feigning anger and indignation, ordered him away.

    "Those who witnessed the horrible tragedy, the brutality of the
    tyrant and the prostration of the friar were persuaded that
    the latter would never survive his martyrdom. The religious
    man himself holds it as a veritable portent that he outlived
    such a terrible trial; but even this did not satisfy them as
    subsequently the Secretary again called Father Ceferino to
    subject him to a further scrutiny, as ridiculous as it was
    malicious, though it did not go beyond words or insults."

Senor Perez, the governor of Isabela, and Father Diez were compelled
to go to Ilagan. After they had arrived there on October 2d, Villa
proceeded to torture them. At the outset ten soldiers, undoubtedly
instructed beforehand, beat the governor down to the earth, with the
butts of their guns. Villa himself struck him three times in the chest
with the butt of a gun and Father Diez gave him absolution, thinking
he was dying. Father Diez was then knocked down repeatedly with the
butts of guns, being made to stand up promptly each time in order
that he might be knocked down again. Not satisfied with this, Villa
compelled the suffering priest to kneel before him and kicked him in
the nose, repeating the operation until he left him stretched on the
floor half-senseless with his nose broken. He next had both victims
put in stocks with their weight supported by their feet alone. While
in this position soldiers beat them and jumped onto them and one set
the governor's beard on fire with matches. Father Diez was kept in
the stocks four days. He was then sent to Tuguegarao in order that
personal enemies there might take vengeance on him, Villa bidding
him good-by with the following words: "Go now to Tuguegarao and see
if they will finish killing you there." Senor Perez was kept in the
stocks eight days and it is a wonder that he did not die.

Upon the 25th of September Villa went to the _convento_ in Ilagan
prepared to torture the priests, but he succeeded in compelling a
number of them to sign indorsements in his favour on various letters
of credit payable by the Tabacalera Company and departed again in
fairly good humour, having done nothing worse than strike one of them.

Later, however, on the pretext that Fathers Aguado and Labanda had
money hidden away, he determined to torture them with water. The first
to be tortured was Father Labanda. Villa had him taken to the prison
where the priest found his two faithful Filipino servants who had
been beaten cruelly and were then hanging from a beam, this having
been done in order to make them tell where his money was.

He was tied after the usual fashion and water poured down his nose
and throat. During the brief respites necessary in order to prevent
his dying outright he was cruelly beaten. They finally dragged him
out of the prison by the feet, his head leaving a bloody trail on
the stones. After he had been taken back to his companions, one of
the men who had tortured him came to beg his pardon, saying that he
had been compelled to do it by Villa.

Father Aguado was next tortured in one of the rooms of the
_convento_. Villa finished the day's work by announcing to the band
of priests that he would have them all shot the next day on the plaza,
and ordering them to get ready.

On the 29th the barbarities practised by this inhuman fiend reached
their climax in the torturing to death of Lieutenant Piera. The
following description gives some faint idea of one of the most
diabolical crimes ever committed in the Philippines:--

    "Villa's cruelty and sanguinary jeering grew without let
    or hindrance from day to day; it seemed that this hyena
    continually cudgelled his brains to invent new kinds of
    torture and to jeer at the friars. On the night of the 29th of
    September the diabolical idea occurred to him of giving the
    _coup de grace_ to the prestige of the friars by making them
    pass through the streets of Ilagan conducting and playing
    a band of music. He carried out his nonsensical purpose by
    calling upon Father Diogracias to play the big drum, and when
    this priest had started playing Villa learned that Father
    Primo was a musician and could therefore play the drum and
    lead the band with all skill, so he called upon Father Primo
    to come forward, and with one thing and another this ridiculous
    function was carried on until the late hours of the night.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "While these two priests were serenading Villa and his
    gang, the most dreadful shrieks were heard from the jail,
    accompanied by pitiful cries that would melt the coldest
    heart. The priests hearing these echoes of sorrow and pain,
    and who did not know for what purpose Fathers Deogracias and
    Primo had been separated from them, seemed to recognize the
    voices of these two priests among the groans, believing them
    to be cruelly tortured; for this reason they began to say
    the rosary in order that the Most Holy Virgin might imbue
    them with patience and fortitude in their martyrdom. Great
    was their surprise when these priests returned saying that
    they had contented themselves with merely making fun of them
    by obliging them to play the big drum and lead the band.

    "Although this somewhat tempered their sorrow, a thorn remained
    in their hearts, fearing that the moving lamentations and the
    mortal groans came from the lips of some hapless Spaniard. This
    fatidical presentiment turned out unfortunately to be a
    fact. The victim sacrificed that melancholy night, still
    remembered with a shudder by the priests, was Lieutenant
    Salvador Piera. This brave soldier, who had made up his
    mind to die in the breach rather than surrender the town
    of Aparri, was persuaded to capitulate only by the prayers
    and tears of certain Spanish ladies who had been instructed
    to do so by a man who should have been the first one to
    shoulder a rifle. After having been harassed in Aparri he
    was taken to Tuguegarao at the request of Esteban Quinta
    or Isidoro Maquigat, two artful filibusters thirsting to
    revenge themselves on the Lieutenant, who during the time
    of the Spanish government had justly laid his heavy hand
    upon them. In the latter part of September they conducted
    him on foot and without any consideration whatever to the
    capital of Isabela. In this town he was at once placed in
    solitary confinement in one of the rooms of the _convento_
    and allowed no intercourse with any one. The sin for which
    they recriminated Piera was his having charged Dimas [283]
    with being a filibuster, and their revengefulness reached
    an incredible limit. The heartrending moans of this martyr
    to his duty still resound in that _convento_ converted into
    the scene of an orgy of blood. The unfortunate man was heard
    to shout: 'For God's sake, for God's sake, have pity,' and
    trustworthy persons tell that under the strain of torture
    he would challenge them to fight in a fair field by saying:
    'I will fight alone against twenty of you;' but the cowardly
    torturers, a reproach to the Filipino race, looked upon it as
    an amusement to glut their spite on a defenceless man whose
    hands were tied. They had him strung up all night with but
    insignificant refreshment and rest, sometimes being suspended
    by his arms which finally became disjointed and useless, and
    at others he was hung up by his feet, the blood rushing to his
    head and placing him in imminent danger of sudden death. It
    was the intention of these brutes to torture him as much as
    possible before killing him, just as a member of the feline
    race plays with, tosses in the air and pirouettes around the
    victim which falls into his claws. If to the torture of the
    rope are added the blows with cudgels and the butts of rifles
    which were frequently rained upon the victim it will be no
    surprise that early on the morning of the 30th he was in the
    throes of death in the midst of which the sufferer had just
    enough strength to say that he was hungry and thirsty; then
    those cannibals (the heart is filled with fury in setting forth
    such cruelty) cut a piece of flesh from the calf of the dying
    man's leg and conveyed it to his mouth and instead of water
    they gave him to drink some of his own urine. What savagery!

    "The blood from the wound finished the killing of the fainting
    Piera. The blood shed served to infuriate more the barbarous
    executioners who in order to give the finishing stroke to the
    martyr, as an unrivalled expression of their savage ferocity,
    thrust a red-hot iron into his mouth and eyes. That same night
    these treacherous and ferocious tyrants whose sin made them
    hate the light, buried the body in the darkness of the night
    in a patch of cogon grass adjoining the _convento_."

Piera's torture was by no means confined to this last night of his
life, as the following account of it shows:--

    "In the first days of this accursed month, while the padres
    were bemoaning their fate in jail, a dark drama was being
    enacted in the _convento_, whose hair-raising scenes would
    have inspired terror to Montepiu himself.

    "Lieutenant Salvador Piera of the Guardia Civil, commanding
    officer at Aparri, who, realizing that all resistance
    was useless, gave way to the persistent solicitations of
    Spaniards and natives and surrendered that town on honourable
    terms, which the Katipunan forces did not respect after
    the capitulation had been signed, was sent for by Villa,
    the military authority of Isabela. Something terrible was
    going to happen as Piera himself felt confident, for it is
    said that before leaving Aparri he went to confession where
    he settled the important business of his conscience in a
    Christian manner with a representative of God.

    "And so it turned out, for as soon as he arrived in Ilagan he
    was taken to the _convento_ and placed incomunicado in one of
    its apartments. Soon after, three or four vile fiends,--for
    they do not deserve the name of men,--bound him with strong
    cords and hanged him to a beam. Then they began to charge
    him with having prosecuted a certain Mason, and inflicted
    upon him the most frightful tortures. The pen refuses to set
    forth so many atrocities. For three days they had him in that
    position while his vile assassins made a martyr of him. Our
    hair stands on end to think of such crimes. The heart-rending
    cries of this unfortunate man while prey to such barbarous
    torments could be heard in every part of the town and carried
    panic to the homes of all the inhabitants.

    "The late hours of the night were always chosen by those
    treacherous fiends to give Piera the _trato de cuerda_ (this
    form of torture consists in tying the hands of the victim
    behind his back and hanging him by them by a rope passed
    through a pulley attached to a beam; his body is lifted as
    high as it will go and then allowed to fall by its own weight
    without reaching the ground); but this torture was administered
    to him in a form so terrible that all the pictures of this kind
    of torment found in the dreadful narratives of the calumniators
    of the Holy Office, pale into insignificance in comparison
    with the atrocious details of the tortures here recited; at
    each violent jerk the unhappy victim feeling that his limbs
    were being torn asunder would cry out 'My God! My God!' This
    terrifying cry reverberating through the jail would freeze
    the very blood of the poor priests therein incarcerated.

    "On the third day, when those infuriated hyenas appeared
    to have spent their diabolical rage; after they had thrust
    a red-hot iron into his eyes and left him with sightless
    sockets; the poor martyr, the prey of delirium, cried out
    that he was hungry, and one of those _sicarii_ cut a piece of
    flesh from Piera's thigh and was infamous enough to carry it
    to his mouth. On the night of the seventh of the month very
    late a number of wretches buried in the _convento_ garden a
    body still dripping warm blood from the lips of which there
    escaped the feeble plaints of anguish of a dying man."

The feeling of the Spaniards relative to this matter is well shown
by the following statement of Father Malumbres:--

    "This horrible crime cannot be pardoned by God or man, and
    is still uninvestigated, crying to Heaven for vengeance with
    greater reason than the blood of the innocent Abel. So long
    as the criminals remain unpunished it will be a black and
    indelible stigma and an ugly stain on the race harbouring
    in its midst the perpetrators of this unheard-of sin. Words
    of reprobation are not enough, justice demands exemplary and
    complete reparation, and if the powers of earth do not take
    justice into their own hands, God will send fire from Heaven
    and will cause to disappear from the face of the earth the
    criminals and even their descendants. A murder so cruel and
    premeditated can be punished in no other way.

    "If the courts here should wish to punish the guilty persons
    it would not be a difficult task; the public points its
    finger at those who dyed their hands in the blood of the
    heroic soldier, and we shall set them forth here echoing
    the voice of the people. The soulless instigator was Dimas
    Guzman. The executioners were a certain Jose Guzman (alias
    Pepin, a nephew of Dimas) and Cayetano Perez."

The matter was duly taken up in the courts, and Judge Blount himself
tried the cases.

The judge takes a very mild and liberal view of the occurrence. He
says of it: [284]--

    "Villa was accompanied by his aide, Lieutenant Ventura
    Guzman. The latter is an old acquaintance of the author
    of the present volume, who tried him afterwards, in 1901,
    for playing a minor part in the murder of an officer of the
    Spanish army committed under Villa's orders just prior to,
    or about the time of, the Wilcox-Sargent visit. He was found
    guilty, and sentenced, but later liberated under President
    Roosevelt's amnesty of 1902. He was guilty, but the deceased,
    so the people in the Cagayan Valley used to say, in being
    tortured to death, got only the same sort of medicine he had
    often administered thereabouts. At any rate, that was the
    broad theory of the amnesty in wiping out all these old cases."

He adds:--

    "I sentenced both Dimas and Ventura to life imprisonment for
    being accessory to the murder of the Spanish officer above
    named, Lieutenant Piera. Villa officiated as arch-fiend on
    the grewsome occasion. I am quite sure I would have hung
    Villa without any compunction at that time, if I could have
    gotten hold of him. I tried to get hold of him, but Governor
    Taft's attorney-general, Mr. Wilfley, wrote me that Villa was
    somewhere over on the mainland of Asia on British territory,
    and extradition would involve application to the London Foreign
    Office. The intimation was that we had trouble enough of our
    own without borrowing any from feuds that had existed under
    our predecessors in sovereignty. I have understood that Villa
    is now practising medicine in Manila. More than one officer
    of the American army that I know afterwards did things to
    the Filipinos almost as cruel as Villa did to that unhappy
    Spanish officer, Lieutenant Piera. On the whole, I think
    President Roosevelt acted wisely and humanely in wiping the
    slate. We had new problems to deal with, and were not bound
    to handicap ourselves with the old ones left over from the
    Spanish regime." [285]

But it happens that this was the Filipino regime. Piera's torture
occurred at the very time when, according to Blount, Aguinaldo had
"a wonderfully complete 'going concern' throughout the Philippine
archipelago."

Furthermore, it occurred in the Cagayan valley where Blount says
"perfect tranquillity and public order" were then being maintained
by "the authority of the Aguinaldo government" in a country which
Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent, who arrived on the scene of this barbarous
murder by torture four weeks later, found so "quiet and orderly."

Not only was Blount perfectly familiar with every detail of this
damnable crime, but he must of necessity have known of the torturing
of friars to extort money, which preceded and followed it.

The following statement seems to sum up his view of the whole matter:--

    "It is true there were cruelties practised by the Filipinos
    on the Spaniards. But they were ebullitions of revenge for
    three centuries of tyranny. They do not prove unfitness for
    self-government. I, for one, prefer to follow the example set
    by the Roosevelt amnesty of 1902, and draw the veil over all
    those matters." [286]

The judge drew the veil not only over this, but, as we have seen,
over numerous other pertinent matters which occurred in this land of
"profound peace and tranquillity" just at the time Wilcox and Sargent
were making their trip. My apologies to him for withdrawing the
veil and for maintaining that such occurrences as those in question
demonstrate complete and utter unfitness for self-government on the
part of those who brought them about!

If it be true that Blount knew more than one officer of the American
army who did things to the Filipinos almost as cruel as Villa did to
Lieutenant Piera, why did he not report them and have the criminals
brought to justice?

Such an attack on the army, in the course of which there is not given
a name or a fact which could serve as a basis for an investigation,
is cowardly and despicable.

I do not for a moment believe that Blount speaks the truth, but if
he does, then his failure to attempt to bring to justice the human
fiends concerned brands him!

It has been the fashion in certain quarters to make vile allegations
of this sort against officers of the United States army, couching them
in discreetly general terms. This is a contemptible procedure, for
it frees those who make reckless charges from danger of the criminal
proceedings which would otherwise doubtless be brought against them.

On arrival at Ilagan, the town where Piera was tortured to death,
Blount says [287] that Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent were

    "given a grand _baile_ [ball] and _fiesta_ [feast], a kind
    of dinner-dance, we would call it.... From Ilagan they
    proceeded to Aparri, cordially received everywhere, and
    finding the country in fact, as Aguinaldo always claimed in
    his proclamations of that period, seeking recognition of his
    government by the Powers, in a state of profound peace and
    tranquillity--free from brigandage and the like."

Within sight of the banquet hall, within hearing of the music, lay
a lighter on which were huddled eighty-four priests of the Catholic
Church, many of them gray-haired old men, innocent of any evil conduct,
who for weeks had suffered, mentally and physically, the tortures of
the damned.

Of the events of this evening and the following day Father Malumbres
says:--

    "From the river the _convento_ could be seen profusely
    illuminated and the strains of music could be heard, an
    evident sign that they were engaged in revelry. This gave us
    a bad start, as we came to fear that Villa had returned from
    the expedition undertaken to come up with two Americans who
    had crossed the Caraballo range and were thinking of coming
    down as far as Aparri. It was late to announce to Villa our
    arrival at Ilagan, so that we were obliged to pass the night
    on the lighter. In the morning our boat was anchored in front
    of the pueblo of Ilagan, where we were credibly informed that
    Villa had returned. This accursed news made us begin to fear
    some disagreeable incident.

    "Our Matias went ashore and delivered the official
    communication regarding our transfer to Villa, while we
    waited impatiently for his decision. Sergeant Matias at length
    returned with orders for our disembarkation; we put on the best
    clothes we had and the rowers placed a broad plank between
    the lighter and the arsenal and we left our floating prison
    two abreast. Matias called the roll and the order to march,
    we were eighty-four friars in a long column climbing the
    steep ascent to Ilagan.

    "When we had arrived in front of the building used for
    headquarters, we faced about in front thereof, and the
    first thing we saw in one of the windows were the sinister
    features of Falaris, who with a thundering brow and black
    look was delighting himself in the contemplation of so many
    priests surrounded by bayonets and filled with misery. Any
    other person but Villa would have melted on seeing such
    a spectacle, which could but incite compassion. The two
    American tourists were also looking on at this horrible scene
    as if stupefied, but they soon withdrew in order, perhaps,
    not to look upon such a painful picture. It was, indeed,
    heartrending to contemplate therein old gray-haired men who
    had passed their lives in apostolic work side by side with
    young men who had just arrived in this ungrateful land, and
    many sick who rather than men seemed to be marble statues,
    who had no recourse but to stand in line, without one word
    of consolation; therein figured some who wore religious garb,
    others in secular dress limited to a pair of rumpled trousers
    and a cast-off coat, the lack of this luxurious garment being
    replaced in some instances by a native shirt.

    "For two long hours we were detained in the middle of the
    street under the rays of a burning sun and to the scandal of
    the immense crowd which had been gathered together to witness
    the denouement of the tragedy. The priests had hardly come into
    the presence of Villa when Fathers Isidro and Florentino were
    called out for the purpose of having heaped upon them a flood
    of insults and affronts. Father Isidro was ordered by Villa to
    interview Sr. Sabas Orros, who, Villa supposed, would wreak his
    revenge blindly upon him, but he was greatly mistaken, as said
    gentleman treated the priest with great respect; the tyrant
    remained talking to Father Florentino in the reception room
    of the headquarters building, and when it appeared that such
    talk would come to blows, the elder of the Americans left one
    of the rooms toward the reception room, and the scene suddenly
    changing, Villa arose and addressing the priest said: 'I am
    pleased to introduce to you an American Brigadier-General,
    Mr. N.' The latter returned a cordial greeting in Spanish to
    the priest who made a courteous acknowledgment; after this
    exchange of courtesies, Villa resumed his defamatory work,
    pouring out a string of absurdities and infamous insults
    upon the friars, going so far as to say in so many words:
    'from the bishop down you are all thieves and depraved' he
    added another word which it would be shameful to write down,
    and so he went on from one abyss to another without regard
    to reputations or the respect due to venerated persons.

    "The American let his disgust be seen while Villa was talking,
    and the latter understood these protests and ordered the
    priest to withdraw, the comedy coming to an end by the
    American shaking hands with the priest and offering him
    assistance. Villa would not shake hands with him, as was
    natural, but the priest was able to see that he was confused
    when he saw the distinction and courtesy with which an
    American general had treated a helpless friar. What a narrow
    idea did the Americans form of the government of Aguinaldo,
    represented by men as savage and inhuman as Villa!

    "The natives averred that the Americans referred to were
    spies who had come to explore those provinces and were
    making maps of the strategic points and principal roads,
    so that a very careful watch was kept upon them and Villa
    took measures to have them go down the river without landing
    at any place between Echague and Ilagan. At Ilagan they were
    given an entertainment and dance, Villa being a skilled hand
    in this sort of thing, and a few days later he accompanied
    them to Aparri [288] without allowing them to set foot on
    land. The government of Aguinaldo no longer had everything
    its own way, and secret orders had been given to have every
    step of the explorers followed. The commanding and other
    leading officers of the Valley, supporting the orders of the
    government, circulated an order throughout the towns which
    read as follows:--

        "'_To All Local Officers_:

        "'You will not permit any maps to be made or notes
        to be taken of strategic points by Americans or
        foreigners; nor will you allow them to become
        acquainted with the points of defence; you will
        endeavour to report immediately to this Government any
        suspicious persons; you will make your investigations
        secretly, accompanying suspected persons and feigning
        that their investigations are approved, and finally
        when it shall seem to you that such suspected persons
        have finished their work, you will advise without
        loss of time, in order that their notes may be seized.'

        "Despite this order the Americans were able to
        inform themselves very thoroughly of the forces in
        the Valley and its state of defence, and Filipinos
        were not lacking who for a few pesos would put them
        abreast of all information regarding the plans and
        projects of Aguinaldo's government."

Relative to this Wilcox-Sargent trip Taylor says:--

    "In October and November, 1898, Paymaster W. B. Wilcox,
    U.S.N., and Naval Cadet L. R. Sargent, U.S.N., travelled
    through Northern Luzon from which they returned with a
    favourable impression of the government which had been set
    up by Aguinaldo's agents.

    "It was realized by the subtle men whom they met that it
    was highly expedient that they should make a favourable
    report and accordingly they were well received, and although
    constant obstacles were thrown in the way of their seeing
    what it was not considered well for them to see yet the real
    reasons for the delays in their journey were carefully kept
    from them. At least some of their letters to the fleet were
    taken, translated, and sent to Aguinaldo, who kept them,
    and constant reports upon them and their movements were made."

Blount refers to the fact that Mr. Sargent tells a characteristic
story of Villa, [289] whose vengeful feeling toward the Spaniards
showed on all occasions.

It would doubtless have interested the travellers to know that the
"robbery" consisted in taking the funds out of the province to save
them from falling into Villa's hands, and in paying them to soldiers in
Nueva Vizcaya to whom money was due. It would further have interested
them to know that this unfortunate Spaniard had been twice tortured
within an inch of his life by Villa.

But let us continue our interrupted narrative:--

    "The presence of the Americans in Ilagan soon freed us from
    certain forms of savagery and barbarous intentions on the
    part of Villa. There can be no doubt that the tyrant was
    constantly cudgelling his brains to invent new methods of
    showing his contempt for the friars; at the unlucky time we
    write of he conceived the infamous plan of ordering a circular
    enclosure of cane to be made, put a pig into it--we trust
    the reader will pardon the details--with a bell hung to his
    neck, blindfolded the priests and compelled them to enter the
    enclosure with sticks in their hands, and in this ridiculous
    attitude, obliged them to strike about when the sound of the
    bell appraised them of the animal's proximity; it is obvious
    that the principal purpose of the fiendish Villa was to have
    the priests lay about them in such a way as to deal each
    other the blows instead of the pig. The tyrant also had the
    idea of making us and the other priests in Ilagan parade the
    streets of that town dancing and playing the band. The wish
    to consummate his plan was not lacking but he was deterred by
    the presence of the Americans and the arguments of Sr. Sabas
    Orros to whom we also owed the signal favour that Villa did
    not take us to our prisons at Tumauini and Gamut on foot and
    with our clothing in a bundle at our backs."

On October 2 a banquet was given in Villa's honour at Ilagan and the
pleasant idea occurred to him to have four of the friars dance at
it for his amusement. The people of the town put their handkerchiefs
before their faces to shut out the sight, and some wept. Father Campo,
one of the priests who was obliged to dance, had great ulcers on his
legs from the wounds caused by the cords with which he had been bound
when he was tortured with water, and was at first unable to raise his
feet from the floor; but Villa threatened him with a rattan until he
finally did so. This caused the sores on his legs to burst open so
that the bones showed.

On the 3d of October a number of the friars were compelled to get up a
band and go out and meet Leyba with music on his arrival. The people
of the towns closed their windows in disgust at the sight. A great
crowd had gathered to receive Leyba, and the priests were compelled
to dance in the middle of the street, but this again only caused
disgust. A couple of priests were then beaten in the usual fashion
in a private house. This caused murmuring even among those of the
soldiers who were natives of the Cagayan valley. At the same time
two other priests were horribly whipped in the prison.

This has been a long story, but the half has not been told. Those
who escaped torture had their feelings harrowed by the sight of
the sufferings of their fellows. They were constantly and grossly
insulted; were often confined in the most unsanitary quarters; given
poor and insufficient food and bad water, or none at all; robbed of
their clothing; compelled to march long distances under a tropical
sun when sick, wounded and suffering; obliged to do servants' work
publicly; forced to make a ridiculous spectacle of themselves in the
public streets; ordered to recant, and heaven knows what not!

The torments practised on them had two principal objects: to
compel them to give up money, and to discredit them with the common
people. They failed to accomplish this latter result. There is abundant
evidence that the natives of the Cagayan valley clothed and fed
them when they could, and wept over the painful humiliations and the
dreadful sufferings which they were powerless to prevent or relieve.

The tormentors were men from distant provinces, with no possible
personal grievances against the priests whom they martyrized. Their
action was the result, not of an "ebullition of revenge for three
centuries of tyranny" as stated by Blount, but of insensate greed
of gold and damnable viciousness. I believe the American people will
hold that such cruelities brand those who practise them as unfit to
govern their fellows, or themselves.

Lest I be accused of basing my conclusions on _ex parte_ statements
I will now return to the Insurgent record of events in the Cagayan
valley.

At the outset the Spanish officers of the Tabacalera Company [290]
fared comparatively well. In a letter dated September 27, 1898, and
addressed to the secretary of war of the revolutionary government,
Leyba says of the taking of Tuguegarao that the only terms of the
surrender were to respect life. He therefore felt at liberty to seize
all the money that the friars had hidden, "which was accomplished
by applying the stick." He adds that they did nothing to the agents
of the great Tabacalera Company, then the most powerful commercial
organization in the Islands, for the significant reason that they
had found that its stock was largely held by Frenchmen and feared
trouble. [291]

On December 4, 1898, Leyba, concerning whose ideas as to public order
we are already informed, wrote a most illuminating letter setting
forth the conditions which had existed there. He does not claim that
there had been Octavian peace!

It should be borne in mind that this letter covers the very time
during which Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent passed through the Cagayan
valley. It paints a vivid picture of conditions, and as the painter
was the ranking Insurgent officer in the valley during this entire
period, he cannot be accused of hostile prejudice. I therefore give
the letter in full'--

    "_Aparri_, December 4, 1898.

    "_Don Baldomero Aguinaldo_,

    "_The Secretary of War_:

    "_Dear Sir and of My Greatest Esteem_: I take the liberty
    of addressing this to you in order to state that owing to
    the lack of discipline in the soldiers whom we have brought,
    since they are all volunteers and whom I am not able to reduce
    to rigorous subordination, for the revolution would find itself
    without soldiers with whom to win triumph, they committed many
    abuses and misdeed which, for the lack of evidence, I was
    not able to punish, although I knew of these abuses but had
    no proof, and as a lover of my country and of the prestige
    of the Revolutionary Army, I took care not to disclose the
    secret to any one, in this way avoiding the formation of an
    atmosphere against the cause of our Independence to the grave
    injury of us all. But it happened that, in spite of the good
    advice which I have given them and the punishments which I have
    given to some of the 3d Company of Cauit, they did not improve
    their conduct but have gone to the extreme of committing a
    scandalous robbery of 20,800 pesos which sum the German, Otto
    Weber, was taking to the capital, which deed has caused me
    to work without ceasing, without sleeping entire nights, for
    I understood what a serious matter it was to take money from
    a foreigner. After making many inquiries, it was discovered
    that a very large part of the money which reached the sum of
    $10,000, a little more or less, was buried under the quarters
    which the said company occupied, this with the sanction of
    all the officers, it appears to me, because it is impossible
    that such a sum could be brought into a house where so many
    soldiers are living without the knowledge of the officers.

    "Indignant at such shameful behaviour, I reprimanded the
    officers and preferred charges against the ones I deemed to
    blame in the matter.

    "Afterwards I found out that they had attempted to murder
    me for trying to find out the originators of the crime. On
    account of this, and in order to prevent a civil war which
    would have broken out against the said soldiers if precautions
    had not been taken, I decided to disarm them, to the great
    displeasure of the Colonel who was not aware of my motives.

    "This bad conduct has been copied by the soldiers of the 4th
    Company stationed in Ilagan, and I believe the Colonel, guided
    by my warning, will take the same measures in regard to them.

    "As the officers are the first ones to commit abuses and
    misdeeds, it is easily seen that the soldiers under their
    orders, guided by them, will commit worse ones than the
    chiefs, and as these seem to lack the moral strength to
    control and reprimand them, I propose to you, if it meets your
    approval, that all these soldiers and some of the officers
    be returned to their homes by the steamer _Luzon_, if there
    should be sufficient coal, or in another if you order it,
    since they tell me themselves that because they are far
    away from their homes they do not wish to continue in the
    service in this province. This is easily arranged as there
    are now men stationed in this province for instructing the
    native volunteers, many of whom have been students, and will
    therefore make good officers and non-commissioned officers,
    and in this way a battalion could be formed, well disciplined
    from the beginning and disgraceful things would be avoided
    not only towards the natives of this province but also towards
    foreigners, which is the most important. Having stated my case,
    I place myself always at your disposal, requesting you will
    attend to this affair.

    "With reference to the 4th Company stationed in the Province
    of Isabela, whose captain is Don Antonio Monzon of Panamitan,
    there are many complaints of thefts and assaults committed
    by the soldiers, and in answer to my questions, Don Simeon
    Adriano y Villa, Major and Sanitary Inspector and doctor of
    this battalion, whom I have stationed there for lack of a
    competent person, tells me that he has always punished and
    offered advice to officers and soldiers in order to prevent
    the recurrence of thefts and assaults, but he has never been
    able to suppress them completely, because the soldiers are
    abandoned by their officers, and because of lack of example
    on the part of the latter; they do not understand that it is
    a great blot when they commit these abuses, since when they
    discover the goods or house of a Spaniard they believe they
    have a right to appropriate everything which they encounter.

    "I have learned lately, that some foreigners, residents in that
    province, among them some employees of the Tobacco Factory,
    'El Oriente' and of the firm of Baer Senior & Co., who have
    Spanish employees in various pueblos of that province, have
    some very serious complaints to make of assaults committed
    against them prejudicial to their interests; however, I
    hope that now with the arrival of General Tirona he will
    regulate matters, although I believe that this gentleman
    is not sufficiently energetic in proceeding against the
    officers and soldiers, as I have seen when I reprimanded
    and punished them for faults committed he has pardoned them,
    and it appears that he censures energetic acts which we must
    use in order to subject them to rigorous discipline. The same
    thing happened when Major Sr. Victa wished to discipline them;
    it appears that the Colonel reprimanded him when he punished
    some soldiers for gambling in their quarters, since, as you
    know, that gentleman believes that he who is right is the one
    who comes to him first, and who is best able to flatter him.

    "The Colonel has agreed with me that his first act on arrival
    at the province of Isabela should be to disarm and take all
    the money he finds among the soldiers of the 4th Company
    (Panamitan) in order to serve as indemnity for the property
    of the foreigners in case they should make any claim.

    "I request that you send some leader or officer in order to
    superintend our actions, and to lift the doubt which hangs
    over the person who has worked faithfully and honourably in
    the sacred cause of our Independence.

    "I am filling the position of First Chief in the Port of
    Aparri temporarily on account of the absence of the Colonel
    who has conferred on me all his duties and power. After the
    military operations which were carried on as far as the last
    town in Isabela, being tired and somewhat sick, I was put in
    charge of these military headquarters, which I found to be
    very much mixed up, the town, moreover, being desperate on
    account of the assaults committed by my predecessor, Rafael
    Perca, who was appointed by the Colonel, and who was formerly
    2d Captain of the steamer _Filipinas._ After arriving and
    taking charge, having received numerous complaints against
    him, I had him arrested and I found that he had been guilty
    of robbery, unlawful use of insignia, illegal marriage, rape
    and attempted rape. I hold him in custody only awaiting the
    arrival of the Colonel in order to convene a court-martial
    for his trial, in which the Colonel will act as President
    and I as Judge Advocate.

    "With nothing more to communicate, I hope you will attend
    to my just claim and send a special delegate to investigate
    our acts and see the truth, for perhaps if a statement comes
    direct from me you will not believe it.

    "I am your affectionate and faithful subordinate, who kisses
    your hand,

    (Signed) "_J. N. Leyba_." [292]

Blount states that conditions existed "just like this, all over Luzon
and the Visayan Islands." [293] Unfortunately this was only too true!

The troops complained of by Leyba were made up of Aguinaldo's fellow
townsmen. They never obeyed any one else, and left a trail of murder
and rapine behind them. Aguinaldo never punished them, and from the
time when one of them tried to murder their commander until a guard
composed of them murdered General Antonio Luna in June, 1899, they
are mentioned only with fear and execration.

Blount describes with enthusiasm the establishment of civil government
in Cagayan.

Perhaps Americans will be interested in knowing who was its head and
how it worked. The "elections" were held on December 9, 1898, and Dimas
Guzman was chosen head of the province. He was the man subsequently
sentenced to life-imprisonment by Blount, for complicity in the
murder of Lieutenant Piera. In describing his method of conducting his
government he says that the people doubted the legality of attempts
to collect taxes; that the abuses of heads of towns caused rioting in
the towns, in which only Ilocanos took part; and that he not only did
not report these things but contrived to conceal them from foreigners
in the province. [294]

His failure to report these troubles and disorders to his government
is of interest, as Blount alleges [295] that differences between the
local authorities were in a number of cases referred to the Malolos
government for settlement.

Blount says [296] that General Otis's reports were full of inexcusable
blunders about the Tagalogs taking possession of provinces and making
the people do things, and cites the relations between Villa and Dimas
Guzman to illustrate the error of these allegations.

He has elsewhere [297] referred to Villa as the "arch-fiend" in the
matter of torturing the unhappy Spaniards as well as the Filipinos who
incurred his ill-will. We have seen that Guzman proved an apt pupil
and did credit to his instructor in connection with the torturing
of Lieutenant Piera, but it nevertheless appears from Guzman's own
statements that his relations with the Insurgent officers and their
subordinates involved some rather grave difficulties. Of Major Canoy,
for instance, he says:--

    "I must add that the said Major Canoy is such a remarkable
    character that he saw fit to give my cook a beating for not
    taking off his hat when he met him. He insulted the delegate
    of rents of Cabagan Viejo for the same reason. He struck the
    head man of the town of Bagabag in the face. He put some of
    the members of the town council of Echague in the stocks,
    and he had others whipped." [298]

It was really incautious for Governor Guzman to complain of these
conditions because Major Canoy and his party won, and the Governor
had to resign.

But the day of reckoning came. It was in consequence of the atrocities
committed by the Tagalog soldiers in the Cagayan valley that Captain
Batchelder was able a little later to march practically unopposed
through the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela and Cagayan with one
battalion of American <DW64> troops, for whom he had neither food nor
extra ammunition, and that Tirona surrendered the Insurgent forces
in the valley without attempting resistance!






CHAPTER VII

Insurgent Rule in the Visayas and Elsewhere


Referring to the conditions alleged to have been found by Sargent
and Wilcox in the Cagayan valley, Blount says:--

    "Had another Sargent and another Wilcox made a similar trip
    through the provinces of southern Luzon about this same time,
    under similar friendly auspices, before we turned friendship
    to hate and fear and misery, in the name of Benevolent
    Assimilation, they would, we now know, have found similar
    conditions." [299]

So far as concerns the provinces of Mindoro and Palawan, and the great
island of Mindanao, he dodges the issue, alleging the unimportance
of Mindoro and Palawan, and claiming that "Mohammedan Mindanao"
presents a problem by itself. Under such generalities he hides the
truth as to what happened in these regions.

I agree with him that there was essential identity between actual
conditions in the Cagayan valley and those which prevailed under
Insurgent rule elsewhere in Luzon and in the Visayas. I will go
further and say that conditions in the Cagayan valley did not differ
essentially from those which prevailed throughout all portions of
the archipelago which fell under Insurgent control, except that in
several provinces captured friars and other Spaniards were quickly
murdered whereas in the Cagayan valley no friar was quite killed
outright by torture. Those who ultimately died of their injuries
lived for some time.

Let us now consider some of the actual occurrences in these other
provinces, continuing to follow the route of our tourists until it
brings us back to Manila.

_South Ilocos_

The first province visited by Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent after
leaving Aparri was South Ilocos. The conditions which had prevailed
at Vigan, the capital of the province, shortly before their arrival,
are described in a letter signed "Mariano" and addressed under date
of September 25, 1898, to Senor Don Mena Crisologo, from which I
quote extracts:--

    "_Dear Mena_: I read with a happy heart your letter of the
    3rd instant, and in answer I have to say:--

    "On the 22nd of August a mass meeting was held for the election
    of the local presidente of this town, and I was elected to
    the office; and on the 1st instant the Colonel appointed me
    Provisional Provincial President of this province, so that
    you can imagine the position I am in and the responsibilities
    which weigh on me.

    "Your house is occupied by the Colonel, in view of the fact
    that it is not rented.

    "I have here eleven friar prisoners and the damned priests
    who escaped from here have not as yet been returned, but it
    is known that they are prisoners in Cagayan, and as soon as
    they arrive here I will treat them as they deserve.

    "It is with great regret that I have to relate the events
    and misfortunes which we have been suffering here since the
    arrival of the troops, as all the detachments are supported
    by the towns, and here in the capital where the commissary
    is established, our resources are exhausted, owing to the
    unreasonable demands of the commissary, because he never asks
    what is only just and necessary, but if he needs provisions for
    200 men, he always asks enough for 1000. And notwithstanding
    this, the most lamentable and sad occurrences are taking
    place almost daily in the different barrios, and often in
    the town itself; the soldiers are guilty of many abuses and
    disorderly acts, such as rapes and murders, which usually
    remain unpunished by reason of the real authors thereof not
    being found, and when they are found and reported to their
    commanders, the latter do nothing. One night the house and
    estate of Sario Tinon in Anannam was sacked by six armed men,
    who threatened him and took his money, his wife's jewels and
    the best horses he had. Thank God that his family was at the
    time in the capital, and it appears that now the authors of
    this act are being discovered.

    "I am at the present time working with Father Aglipay to have
    the forces stationed here replaced by our volunteers which I
    am recruiting, in order to prevent in so far as possible the
    frequent acts of barbarity which the former are committing
    in the province.

    "When the friars from Lepanto arrived here, they were made
    to publish the following proclamation:--

    "'_Proclamation_.--We, the friars, declare that all the acts
    committed by us against the honest Filipinos when we discharged
    our respective offices, were false and in contravention of the
    rights of the Holy Church, because we only wished to deceive
    and prejudice the honest inhabitants of the Philippines; for
    which reason we now suffer what we are suffering, as you see,
    according to the old adage that "he who owes must pay." And
    now we inform all you honest Filipinos that we repent for
    the acts above referred to, which are in contravention of
    the laws and good customs, and ask your pardon.--_Vigan_,
    September 13, 1898.'

    "All of which I communicate to you in order that you may
    form an idea of what is taking place here, and take such
    steps as may be proper for the common good, and especially
    for the good of this town, hoping that with the aid of your
    valuable protection the abuses and disorders suffered by the
    residents will be stopped." [300]

The province of Abra, now a subprovince of South Ilocos, was evidently
no exception to the general rule, for there is on file a letter to
Aguinaldo with twenty-six signatures, protesting bitterly against the
oppression of the poor, in the effort to compel them to contribute war
taxes, complaining against the misuse of supplies gathered ostensibly
for the soldiers, and stating that the petitioners will be obliged to
take refuge with the Igorots and Negritos, if not granted relief. [301]

Apparently the trouble grew, for on December 27, 1898, the "Director
of Diplomacy" telegraphed to Aguinaldo concerning it, saying:--

    "Most urgent. The discontent in the provinces of Pangasinan,
    Tarlac and Yloco (Ilocos) is increasing. The town of Bangbang
    rose in revolt the 25th and 26th of this month, and killed
    all of the civil officials. It is impossible to describe
    the abuses committed by the military and civil authorities
    of the said provinces. I urge you to send a force of 100 men
    and a diplomatic officer to reestablish order. The matter is
    urgent." [302]

I find nothing important in the Insurgent records concerning conditions
in La Union at this time. Pangasinan, Tarlac, Pampanga and Bulacan,
which were now revisited by our tourists, have already been discussed.

_The Province of Manila_

Conditions in Manila Province, as distinguished from Manila City,
left much to be desired.

Admiral Dewey made a statement applicable to the territory adjacent
to the city and bay of Manila in a cablegram to Washington dated
October 14, 1898, which reads as follows:--

    "It is important that the disposition of the Philippine
    Islands should be decided as soon as possible. . . . General
    anarchy prevails without the limits of the city and bay of
    Manila. Natives appear unable to govern." [303]

Of it Blount says:--

    "In this cablegram the Admiral most unfortunately repeated
    as true some wild rumours then currently accepted by the
    Europeans and Americans at Manila which, of course, were
    impossible of verification. I say 'unfortunately' with some
    earnestness, because it does not appear on the face of his
    message that they were mere rumours. And, that they were wholly
    erroneous, in point of fact, has already been cleared up in
    previous chapters, wherein the real state of peace, order,
    and tranquillity which prevailed throughout Luzon at that
    time has been, it is believed, put beyond all doubt." [304]

Blount seems here to have overlooked the fact that the admiral
himself was in Manila Bay and in Manila City at the time he sent
this cablegram. The statements in question were not rumours, they
were deliberate expressions of opinion on the part of a man who had
first-hand information and knew what he was saying.

They were not the Admiral's only allegations on this subject. When
testifying before the Senate committee he said:--

    "_Admiral Dewey_. I knew that there was no government in the
    whole of the Philippines. Our fleet had destroyed the only
    government there was, and there was no other government; there
    was a reign of terror throughout the Philippines, looting,
    robbing, murdering; a reign of terror throughout the islands."

_La Laguna_

Having brought our tourist friends safely back to Manila, we must
now leave them there and strike out by ourselves if we are to see
other provinces.

La Laguna lies just east of Manila. Of it we learn that:

    "Laguna Province was so overrun by bands of robbers that
    the head of the pueblo of San Pablo ordered the people to
    concentrate in the town to avoid their attacks." [305]

_Bataan_

The province of Bataan lies just across the bay from Manila.

    "On January 10, 1899, the secretary of the interior directed
    the governor of Bataan Province to ascertain the whereabouts of
    a number of men who had just deserted with their rifles from
    the commands there. He was to appeal to their patriotism and
    tell them that if they would but return to their companies
    their complaints would be attended to and they would be
    pardoned." [306]

_Zambales_

Zambales joins Bataan on the west and north. On November 13, 1898,
Wenceslao Vinvegra wrote to Aguinaldo describing the state of affairs
in this province. From his letter we learn that two brothers named
Teodoro and Doroteo Pansacula, claiming to be governor and brigadier
general respectively, who are charged with abandonment of their
posts in the field, disobedience and attempts against the union
of the Insurgents, had been committing all manner of abuses. They
had organized a band of cut-throats, armed with rifles and bolos,
and were terrorizing the towns, committing robberies and murders and
ordering that money be furnished for themselves and food for their men.

They were also encouraging the people to disobey the local authorities
and refuse to pay taxes, and were promulgating a theory, popular with
the masses, that the time had come for the rich to be poor and the
poor rich.

They had furthermore induced regular Insurgent troops to rise up in
arms. [307]

From this communication it would appear that the Insurgent government
had not been entirely effective in Zambales up to November 13th, 1898.

From other communications we learn that the soldiers at Alaminos were
about to desert on November 30th, 1898; [308] that it was deemed
necessary to restrict travel between Tarlac, Pampanga, Bataan and
Zambales in order to prevent robberies; [309] and that on January 9,
1899, the governor of the province found it impossible to continue
the inspection of a number of towns, as many of their officials had
fled to escape the abuses of the military. [310] Conditions were
obviously very serious in Zambales at this time.

_Cavite_

Cavite province lies immediately south of Manila province as the
latter was then constituted. On August 24, 1898, the secretary of
war wired Aguinaldo that two drunken Americans had been killed by
Insurgent soldiers. [311] On the same day General Anderson advised
the governor of Cavite that one American soldier had been killed and
three wounded by his people, and demanded his immediate withdrawal,
with his guard, from the town. [312]  The governor asked Aguinaldo for
instructions. Aguinaldo replied instructing the governor to deny that
the American had been killed by Insurgent soldiers and to claim that
he had met death at the hands of his own companions. The governor was
further directed to give up his life before leaving the place. [313]

In view of the definite statement from one of his own officers that
the soldier in question was killed by Filipino soldiers, Aguinaldo's
instructions to say that he was killed by Americans are interesting
as showing his methods.

Not only were the Insurgents obviously unable to control their own
soldiers in Cavite town sufficiently to prevent them from committing
murder, but conditions in the province of the same name left much to
be desired. On December 29, 1898, the governor wired Aguinaldo that
the town of Marigondong had risen in arms. [314]

It is a well-known fact that land records were destroyed in Cavite. Of
this matter Taylor says:--

    "In Cavite, in Cavite Province, and probably in most of the
    other provinces, one of the first acts of the insurgents
    who gathered about Aguinaldo was to destroy all the land
    titles which had been recorded and filed in the Spanish
    administrative bureaus. In case the independence of the
    Philippines was won, the land of the friars, the land of the
    Spaniards and of those who still stood by Spain, would be in
    the gift of Aguinaldo or of any strong man who could impose
    his will upon the people. And the men who joined this leader
    would be rich in the chief riches of the country, and those
    who refused to do so would be ruined men." [315]

_Sorsogon_

    "The native civil officials who took charge of the government
    of Sorsogon Province when the Spaniards abandoned it did
    not think it worth while to hoist the insurgent flag until a
    force of four companies arrived there to take station early in
    November, 1898. The officer in command promptly ordered the
    Chinamen in the town of Sorsogon, who are prosperous people,
    to contribute to the support of his troops. They at once gave
    him cloth for uniforms, provisions, and 10,000 pesos. This
    was not sufficient, for on November 8 Gen. Ignacio Paua,
    who seems to have been the insurgent agent in dealing with
    the Chinese, complained that the troops in Sorsogon were
    pillaging the Chinamen there. They had killed 13, wounded 19,
    and ruined a number of others." [316]

In January, 1899, a correspondent wrote Aguinaldo that it was very
difficult to collect taxes as every one was taking what he could lay
his hands on. [317]

_Ambos Camarines_

On September 18, 1898, Elias Angeles, a corporal of the _guardia
civil_, headed an uprising against the Spaniards. The Spanish officer
in command, and all of his family, were killed by shooting up through
the floor of the room which they occupied. Angeles then assumed the
title of Politico-Military-Governor.

When the Tagalog Vicente Lucban arrived on his way to Samar, he ordered
Angeles to meet him at Magarao, with all his troops and arms, disarmed
the troops, giving their rifles to his own followers, marched into
Nueva Caceres and took possession of the entire government. Aguinaldo
subsequently made Lucban a general, and sent him on his way to Samar.

Lucban was succeeded by another Tagalog, "General" Guevara, a very
ignorant man, who displayed special ability in making collections,
and is reported to have kept a large part of the funds which came
into his possession.

Colonel Pena, who called himself "General," was one of the worst of
the Tagalog invaders, for they were practically that. He threatened
all who opposed him with death, and summarily shot at least one man
in Tigaon. That town subsequently rose against him, and he was badly
cut up by the Bicols. [318] On getting out of the hospital he was
sent away.

The daughters of prominent families suffered at the hands of these
villains. Pena abducted one, a son of Guevara another. Her brother
followed young Guevara and killed him. If girls of the best families
were so treated, how must those of the common people have fared?

Braganza ordered the killing of all Spaniards and Chinese at
Minalabag. Some forty-eight Spaniards were murdered.

Many Chinese were killed at Pasacao; about thirty at Libmanan by
order of Vicente Ursua a Tagalog; more than twenty at Calabanga.

Conditions became so unbearable that Faustino Santa Ana gathered
around him all Bicols who were willing to fight the TagLlogs, but
the troubles were finally patched up.

American troops had little difficulty in occupying Ambos Camarines
and other Bicol provinces, owing to the hatred in which the Tagalogs
were held.

_Mindoro_

Conditions in the important island of Mindoro may be inferred from
the fact that it became necessary for its governor to issue a decree
on November 10, 1898, which contained the following provisions among
others:--

    "2nd. The local presidentes of the pueblos will not permit any
    one belonging to their jurisdiction to pass from one pueblo
    to another nor to another province without the corresponding
    pass, with a certificate upon its back that the taxes of its
    holder have been paid.

    "3rd. That from this date no one will be allowed to absent
    himself from his pueblo without previously informing its head
    who will give him an authorization on which will be noted
    the approval of the presidente of the pueblo....

    "5th. Persons arriving from a neighboring town or province in
    any pueblo of this province will immediately present themselves
    before the presidente of said pueblo with their passes. He
    will without charge, stamp them with his official seal." [319]

These are peculiar regulations for a province which is at peace,
and as Major Taylor has truly remarked:--

    "The form of liberty contemplated by the founders of the
    Philippine Republic was not considered incompatible with a
    very considerable absence of personal freedom." [320]

Later, when travelling through Mindoro, I was told how an unfortunate
legless Spaniard, who had been running a small shop in one of the towns
and who was on good terms with his Filipino neighbors, was carried
out into the plaza, seated in a chair, and then cut to pieces with
bolos in the presence of his wife and children who were compelled to
witness the horrible spectacle!

On this same trip Captain R.G. Offley, then the American Governor
of Mindoro, told me while I was at Pinamalayan that the people there
were greatly alarmed because a murderer, liberated under the amnesty,
had returned and was prowling about in that vicinity. This man had a
rather unique record. He had captured one of his enemies, and after
stripping him completely had caused the top of an immense ant-hill to
be dug off. The unfortunate victim was then tied, laid on it, and the
earth and ants which had been removed were shovelled back over his
body until only his head projected. The ants did the rest! Another
rather unusual achievement of this interesting individual was to tie
the feet of one of his enemies to a tree, fasten a rope around his
neck, hitch a carabao to the rope, and start up the carabao, thus
pulling off the head of his victim. Yet this man and others like
him were set at liberty under the amnesty proclamation, in spite of
the vigorous protests of the Philippine Commission, who thought that
murderers of this type ought to be hanged.

And now I wish to discuss briefly an interesting and highly
characteristic statement of Judge Blount. In referring to conditions
in the Visayan Islands, he says:--

    "Of course the Southern Islands were a little slower. But as
    Luzon goes, so go the rest. The rest of the archipelago is
    but the tail to the Luzon kite. Luzon contains 4,000,000 of
    the 8,000,000 people out there, and Manila is to the Filipino
    people what Paris is to the French and to France. Luzon is
    about the size of Ohio, and the other six islands that really
    matter, are in size mere little Connecticuts and Rhode Islands,
    and in population mere Arizonas or New Mexicos." [321]

This paragraph is no exception to the general rule that the statements
of this author will not bear analysis. One of the other six islands
that he says really matters is Samar. Its area is 5031 square
miles. The area of Rhode Island is 1250 square miles. The smallest of
the six islands named is Bohol, with an area of 1411 square miles. It
cannot be called a little Rhode Island.

As regards population, Arizona has 122,931. It is hardly proper to
call either Panay with a population of 743,646, Cebu with 592,247,
<DW64>s with 460,776, Leyte with 357,641, Bohol with 243,148 or even
Samar with only 222,690, a mere Arizona, and New Mexico with 195,310
is also a bit behind.

Luzon really has an area of 40,969 square miles and a population
of 3,798,507. [322] What Blount is pleased to call "the tail to the
Luzon kite," is made up as follows:--


    Island       Area (Square Miles)   Population
    Samar         5,031                  222,690
    <DW64>s        4,881                  460,776
    Panay         4,611                  743,646
    Leyte         2,722                  357,641
    Cebu          1,762                  592,247
    Bohol         1,411                  243,148
    Totals       20,419                2,620,148


Even so, the tail is a trifle long and heavy for the kite, but if we
are going to compare Luzon with "the Southern Islands," by which Blount
can presumably only mean the rest of the archipelago, why not really do
it? The process involves nothing more complicated than the subtraction
of its area and population from those of the archipelago as a whole.


                    Area (Square Miles)  Population
    Philippines     115,026              7,635,426
    Luzon            40,969              3,798,507
    Difference       74,057              3,836,919


Performing this operation, we discover that the tail would fly away
with the kite, as Luzon has less than half of the total population
and only a little more than a third of the total area.

To compare the area or the population of one large island with those of
individual small ones, in determining the relative importance of the
former in the country of which it makes up a part, is like comparing
the area and population of a great state with those of the individual
counties going to make up other states.

Blount resorts to a similar questionable procedure in trying to show
the insignificance of Mindoro and Palawan. There are an island of
Mindoro and a province of Mindoro; an island of Palawan and a province
of Palawan. In each case the province, which includes numerous small
islands, as well as the large one from which it takes its name, is
much larger and more populous than is the main island, and obviously
it is the province with which we are concerned.

Even if Blount wished to limit discussion to the Christian natives
commonly called Filipinos, his procedure is still wholly unfair. Of
these there are 3,575,001 in Luzon and 3,412,685 in the other
islands. In other words, the Filipino population is almost equally
divided between the two regions.

As he would not have found it convenient to discuss the conditions
which arose in Mindanao under Insurgent rule, he attempts to show
that no political importance attaches to them. In the passage above
quoted he does not so much as mention either Mindoro or Palawan
(Paragua). Elsewhere, however, he attempts to justify his action by
making the following statements:--

    "The political or governmental problem being now reduced
    from 3141 islands to eleven, the last three [323] of the nine
    contained in the above table may also be eliminated as follows:
    [324]--

    "Mindoro, the large island just south of the main bulk of
    Luzon, pierced by the 121st meridian of longitude east of
    Greenwich, is thick with densely wooded mountains and jungle
    over a large part of its area, has a reputation of being
    very unhealthy (malarious), is also very sparsely settled,
    and does not now, nor has it ever, cut any figure politically
    as a disturbing factor." [325]

Apart from the fact that the political problem involved in the
government of the important islands which Blount would thus leave
out of consideration, is not solved by ignoring it, certain of his
further statements cannot be allowed to go uncorrected.

The allegation that the island has never "cut any figure politically
as a disturbing factor" is absurd. In the Spanish days its forests
furnished a safe refuge for evildoers who were from time to time
driven out of Cavite and Batangas. A large proportion of its
Filipino inhabitants were criminals who not infrequently organized
regular piratical expeditions and raided towns in Masbate, Romblon
and Palawan. The people of the Cuyos and Calamianes groups lived
in constant terror of the Mindoro pirates, and _tulisanes_, [326]
who paid them frequent visits. I myself have been at Calapan, the
capital of the province, when the Spanish officials did not dare to
go without armed escort as far as the outskirts of the town for fear
of being captured and held for ransom. During considerable periods
they did not really pretend to exercise control over the criminal
Filipinos inhabiting the west coast of the island. Conditions as
to public order were worse in Mindoro than anywhere else in the
archipelago north of Mindanao and Jolo.

No less absurd are Blount's suggestions as to the general
worthlessness of the island. There are high mountains in its
interior, and there are great stretches of the most fertile land in
the world along its coast. Its northern and eastern portions have
a very heavy and evenly distributed rainfall, and are admirably
suited to the growing of cocoanuts, hemp, cacao, rubber and similar
tropical products. In this region rice flourishes wonderfully without
irrigation. There was a time in the past when Mindoro was known as
"the granary of the Philippines." Later its population was decimated
by constant Moro attacks, and cattle disease destroyed its draft
animals, with the result that the cultivated lands were abandoned
to a considerable extent and again grew up to jungle, from which,
however, it is easy to redeem them. The west coast has strongly marked
wet and dry seasons similar to those at Manila. There is abundant
water available for irrigation, furnished by streams which never run
dry. Much of the soil is rich, and will grow the best of sugar in
large quantity. The forests, which now cover extensive areas, abound
in fine woods, and produce rubber and other valuable gums. There are
outcroppings of lignite at numerous points on the island, and in the
vicinity of Mt. Halcon is found the finest marble yet discovered in
this part of the world. Gold is also present in some quantity at
various places. In short, Mindoro is naturally one of the richest
islands in the Archipelago. If its tillable lands were under high
cultivation, it would support half the population of the Philippines.

_Palawan_

In endeavouring to show that Palawan is without political importance
Blount has followed precisely the procedure which he adopted in the
case of Mindoro. First, he gives the area and the population of the
island, when he should concern himself with the province. The area of
the island is 4027 square miles; that of the province, 5238 square
miles. According to the 1903 census, the population of the island
was 10,918, while that of the province, which contains such thickly
settled and fertile islands as Cuyo and Agutaya, was 39,582. Of course,
if one wishes to emphasize the unimportance of Palawan, it is more
convenient to take the figures for the island.

Blount says:--

    "Paragua, [327] the long narrow island seen at the
    extreme lower left of any map of the archipelago, extending
    northeast-southwest at an angle of about 45 deg., is practically
    worthless, being fit for nothing much except a penal colony,
    for which purpose it is in fact now used." [328]

I must deny the truthfulness of his statements, even if we limit
our consideration to the island of Palawan. Only 159 of its 4027
square miles are utilized for a penal colony. Its natural wealth
is simply enormous. It is covered throughout the greater part of
its extent with virgin forest containing magnificent stands of the
best timber. Damar, a very valuable varnish gum, is abundant in its
mountains. Much of the so-called "Singapore cane," so highly prized by
makers of rattan and wicker furniture, comes from its west coast. It
is a well-watered island, and its level plains, which receive the
wash from its heavily forested mountains, have a soil of unsurpassed
fertility in which cocoanuts come to bearing in five years or even
less. Incidentally, the greater part of the island lies south of
the typhoon belt. Malampaya Sound, situated near its northwestern
extremity, is one of the world's great harbors. But should we wish to
rid ourselves of this wonderful island, I may say, without violating
any official confidences, that there was a time when Germany would
have been more than pleased to take it off our hands; and indeed our
British friends, who were sufficiently interested in it to survey it
some decades ago, might possibly be prevailed upon to accept it!

There are good reasons why Blount thought it convenient to make it
appear that Palawan was politically unimportant. Shortly after the
outbreak of hostilities with Spain the Filipino garrison at Puerto
Princesa mutinied, and the things which they did were not nice. Among
others, they liberated the convicts, Puerto Princesa being at the time
a penal colony, and the latter, together with some of the soldiers,
started up the east coast of the island, leaving a trail of devastation
in their wake. The prosperous town of Tinitian was abandoned as they
approached it, and was so thoroughly cleaned out by them that it has
never since been reoccupied except by a few stragglers. Other towns,
including Tay-Tay, were raided.

On November 27, 1899, Aguinaldo's representative in this province wrote
him that the inhabitants were preparing to kill all the Tagalogs and
revolt against Insurgent rule. [329] Later when some of the latter
were anxious to get the people of one of the northern settlements to
take them on a short boat journey, these Visayans consented to give
them a lift only on condition that they first allow themselves to be
bound, and then took them out to sea and threw them overboard.

Another thing which Blount would have found it inconvenient to discuss
is the conduct of the people of Cuyo, at one time the capital of
the province. On this island, which contains but twenty-one square
miles, there were in 1903 no less than 7545 inhabitants. They hated
and feared the people of Mindoro and sent messengers to Iloilo,
after the Americans had occupied that place, to beg for a garrison of
American troops, and to say that if furnished with an American flag
they themselves would defend it. For some reason they were not given
the flag, and the sending of a garrison was long delayed. Having grown
weary of waiting, they made an American flag of their own, hoisted
it, and when the Insurgents from Mindoro came intrenched themselves
and defended it. They were actually being besieged when the American
garrison finally arrived. Here is one more fact inconsistent with
the theory that the Filipino people were a unit at Aguinaldo's back,
and of course the easiest way to get around such an occurrence is to
forget to mention it!

_Mindanao_

And now we come to the great island of Mindanao, which all but equals
Luzon in size, having an area of 36,292 square miles as against the
40,969 of Luzon. Blount's first mention of it is peculiar.

In connection with the words "the other six islands that really
matter," in the passage above cited on page 116 of his book, he has
inserted a foot-note reading as follows:--

    "The six main Visayan Islands. Mohammedan Mindanao is
    always dealt with in this book as a separate and distinct
    problem." [330]

But it was hardly possible for him to dismiss this great island, which
is a little continent by itself, quite so cavalierly and I will quote
the more important of his further and later statements regarding it:--

    "While the great Mohammedan island of Mindanao, near Borneo,
    with its 36,000 square miles of area, requires that the
    Philippine archipelago be described as stretching over more
    than one thousand miles from north to south, still, inasmuch
    as Mindanao only contains about 500,000 people all told, half
    of them semi-civilized, the governmental problem it presents
    has no more to do with the main problem of whether, if ever,
    we are to grant independence to the 7,000,000 Christians of
    the other islands, than the questions that have to be passed
    on by our Commissioner of Indian Affairs have to do with the
    tariff. Mindanao's 36,000 square miles constitute nearly
    a third of the total area of the Philippine archipelago,
    and more than that fraction of the 97,500 square miles of
    territory to a consideration of which our attention is reduced
    by the process of elimination above indicated. Turning over
    Mindanao to those crudely Mohammedan semi-civilized Moros
    would indeed be 'like granting self-government to an Apache
    reservation under some local chief,' as Mr. Roosevelt, in
    the campaign of 1900, ignorantly declared it would be to
    grant self-government to Luzon under Aguinaldo. Furthermore,
    the Moros, so far as they can think, would prefer to owe
    allegiance to, and be entitled to recognition as subjects
    of, some great nation. Again, because the Filipinos have no
    moral right to control the Moros, and could not if they would,
    the latter being fierce fighters and bitterly opposed to the
    thought of possible ultimate domination by the Filipinos, the
    most uncompromising advocate of the consent of the governed
    principles has not a leg to stand on with regard to Mohammedan
    Mindanao. Hence I affirm that as to it, we have a distinct
    separate problem, which cannot be solved in the lifetime
    of anybody now living. But it is a problem which need not
    in the least delay the advent of independence for the other
    fourteen fifteenths of the inhabitants of the archipelago--all
    Christians living on islands north of Mindanao. It is true that
    there are some Christian Filipinos on Mindanao, but in policing
    the Moros, our government would of course protect them from
    the Moros. If they did not like our government, they could
    move to such parts of the islands as we might permit to be
    incorporated in an ultimate Philippine republic. Inasmuch as
    the 300,000 or so Moros of the Mohammedan island of Mindanao
    and the adjacent islets called Jolo (the 'Sulu archipelago,'
    so called, 'reigned over' by the sultan of comic opera fame)
    originally presented, as they will always present, a distinct
    and separate problem, and never did have anything more to
    do with the Philippine insurrection against us than their
    cousins and co-religionists over in near-by Borneo, the task
    which confronted Mr. Root in the fall of 1899, to wit, the
    suppression of the Philippine insurrection, meant practically
    the subjugation of one big island, Luzon, containing half the
    population and one third of the total area of the archipelago,
    and six neighbouring small ones, the Visayan Islands." [331]

Now as a matter of fact Mindanao is by no means Mohammedan. The
Mohammedan Malays, called Moros, are found here and there along the
western coast of the Zamboanga peninsula and along the southern coast
of the island as far as Davao. They also extend far up the Cotabato
River and occupy the Lake Lanao region, but that is all. The interior
of the island is for the most part occupied by the members of a
number of non-Christian, non-Mohammedan tribes, while its northern
and eastern coasts are inhabited by Visayan Filipinos, of whom there
are many in Zamboanga itself.

While, as Blount says, the Moros took no part in the insurrection
against the United States, the Visayans of Mindanao did, and we had
some lively tussles with them in Misamis and in Surigao.

It is indeed unthinkable that we should turn Mindanao over to the
Moros. Abandonment of it by us would in the end result in this,
as they would take possession of the entire island in the course of
time. Neither the other wild tribes nor the Filipinos could stand
against them. I heartily agree with the conclusion that we must retain
this island for many years before we can settle the problems which it
presents. It is further true that we might retain it and still grant
independence to the remainder of the Philippine Archipelago, but if
we are to eliminate Mindanao from consideration because the Filipinos
have no right to control the Moros, of whom there are in reality
only about a hundred and fifty-four thousand [332] on the island,
and could not if they would, what about Luzon, where there are in
reality no less than four hundred and sixty thousand non-Christians,
[333] many of whom, like the Ifugaos, Bontoc Igorots, Kalingas and
wild Tingians, are fierce fighters and practically all of whom are
bitterly opposed to the thought of possible ultimate domination by
Filipinos, while most of them welcome American rule?

Have the Filipinos any more moral right to control them than they
have to control the Moros? Could they control them if they would? And
has the most uncompromising advocate of the consent of the governed
principle "a leg to stand on" in the one case if he lacks it in
the other?

The Filipino politicians are not ready to admit that Filipinos could
not satisfactorily govern Moros and have even alleged that they did
so govern them during the period now under discussion. Let us examine
the facts.

Aguinaldo attempted to enter into negotiations with the Sultan of Jolo,
addressing him as his "great and powerful brother," [334] but this
brother does not seem to have received his advances with enthusiasm,
and the other brothers proceeded to do things to the Filipinos at
the first opportunity.

Jose Roa in writing Aguinaldo on January 26, 1899, of conditions in
the province of Misamis says: [335]--

    "Hardly had said evacuation of Iligan taken place on the 28th
    of last month, when the Moros or Mohammedans of the interior,
    our mortal enemies since times immemorial on account of their
    religious fanaticism which they carry to extremes, as do their
    co-religionists in Europe and Asia, and on account of their
    objection to leading a civilized life, began to harry the
    town of Iligan which is the nearest town to the lake around
    which is the densest Moro population. Due to the prestige
    of the local president of that town, Senor Carloto Sariol,
    and the energy that he showed, after some days of constant
    firing against groups who descended upon the suburbs of the
    town, he was successful in having them abandon their hostile
    attitude and promise to live in peace and harmony with said
    towns, this verbal agreement being participated in by the
    Dattos of some settlements who did not wish to treat with
    the Spanish Government.

    "Being acquainted nevertheless with these people, we know by
    experience that the more friendly they appear, the more we
    must watch against them, because as soon as they find a good
    opportunity they do not fail to take advantage of it to enter
    the towns for the purpose of sacking them and kidnapping as
    many of their inhabitants as possible in order to reduce them
    to slavery."

Immediately after the abandonment of Cotabato by the Spaniards the
Filipino residents set up a government there. A few days later the Moro
datos, Piang, Ali and Djimbangan, dropped in with their followers,
cut off the head of the Filipino _presidente_, served a few other
leading officials and citizens in the same manner, and proceeded to
set up a government of their own which was the only government that
the place had prior to the arrival of the American troops.

Dato Djimbangan promptly caused the Filipina women of the place to
be stripped and compelled to march before him on the public plaza in
a state of nudity.

At Zamboanga the Moros could have taken the town at any time after
the Spaniards left had they desired to do so. On the arrival of the
Americans Dato Mandi offered to take it and turn it over to them,
but his proposition was declined.

He subsequently swore to an affidavit relative to conditions under
Insurgent rule. It reads as follows:--

    "We always had peace in Zamboanga District; except during the
    revolution of the Filipinos in the year 1899, when for seven
    or eight months there was in existence the so-called Filipino
    Republic. During that time there was much robbing and killing;
    the life of a man was worth no more than that of a chicken;
    men killed one another for personal gain; enemies fought one
    another with the bolo instead of settling their differences
    before the law. It was a time of bloodshed and terror. There
    was no justice. Because of this the Moros were opposed to
    the Filipinos. There was conflict between the better class
    of Filipinos and the revolutionists, who had gained control
    of the local government." [336]

Elsewhere throughout the Moro territory those Filipinos who did
not promptly make their escape were murdered or enslaved. In short,
the lion and the lamb lay down together, with the lamb inside as usual.

Thus it will be seen that this first and last attempt of Filipinos
to govern Moros did not result in complete success.

Baldomero Aguinaldo made a subsequent attempt to open communication
with the Sultan of Jolo, authorizing him to establish in all the
_rancherias_ of Mindanao and Jolo a government in accordance with a
decree duly transmitted. The Sultan was requested to report the result
of his efforts and to give the number of his forces with their arms,
and was advised that, "if in this war, which I consider to be the last,
we secure our independence and with the opposition of our brothers
in that region, with yourself at their head, we are successful in
preventing the enemy from gaining a foothold, the grateful country will
always render a tribute of homage and gratitude to your memory." [337]
Curiously, the Sultan seems to have remained unmoved by the appeal.

_Masbate_

This tight little island of 1236 square miles had in 1903 a Visayan
population of 29,451. Its people are all Filipinos, and are on the
whole rather an unusually orderly and worthy set. There is no reason
why it should have been excluded in considering "the human problem
in its broader governmental aspect," whatever that may be, nor can I
understand why Blount should have desired to exclude it except that
he seems to have been endeavouring to exclude everything possible
outside of Luzon, in order to increase the apparent importance of
the Christian provinces of that island. Masbate should of course be
taken into account in connection with the Visayan Islands, of which
it is one.

The islands ordinarily included in the group known as "The Visayas"
from the ancient tribal name of the civilized Filipino people who
inhabit them, who are called Visayans, are Samar, Panay, <DW64>s,
Leyte, Cebu, Bohol, Masbate, Tablas, Romblon, Ticao, Burias, Siquijor
and numerous smaller islands adjacent to those named. Although their
inhabitants are all rated as one people, they speak a number of more or
less distinct dialects. Only Panay, <DW64>s, Samar, Tablas and Sibuyan
have non-Christian inhabitants, and in the three islands last named
their number is so small as to be negligible. In the mountains of Panay
and <DW64>s, however, Negritos are to be found in considerable numbers,
as are the representatives of a tribe sometimes called _Monteses_ [338]
and sometimes Bukidnon. The latter tribal designation I have thought
it best to reserve for certain inhabitants of northern Mindanao.

In the Visayas, Palawan and Mindanao the government of Aguinaldo
was established at various places and different times, without
consulting or considering the will of the people. The men who went as
his delegates were supported by armed forces, hence their authority
was not at first questioned, but soon there arose murmurings which
might easily have grown into a war cry.

The attitude of the Visayan Filipinos is clearly foreshadowed in the
following extract from a letter dated January 14, 1899, in which Mabini
discussed the advisability of putting the constitution in force:--

    "And even if this change is made, I fear that <DW64>s and Iloilo
    will form a federal Republic and not one in conformity with the
    centralized Republic provided for by the Constitution." [339]

The action later taken by <DW64>s shows that there was abundant reason
for this fear.

As late as February 26, 1899, the Insurgent government was still
ignorant as to the real conditions in <DW64>s and Mindanao. [340]

From a letter written on March 18, 1899, to Apacible at Hongkong, we
learn that Aguinaldo and his followers were even then still uninformed
as to events in the Visayan Islands. [341] In view of these facts,
how ridiculous become the contentions of those who claim that the
Malolos government represented the archipelago as a whole. And what
shall we say of the following statement, remembering that the Treaty
of Paris was signed December 10, 1899?

    "When the Treaty of Paris was signed, General Otis was in
    possession of Cavite and Manila, with less than twenty thousand
    men under his command, and Aguinaldo was in possession of
    practically all of the rest of the archipelago with between
    35,000 and 40,000 men under his command, armed with guns,
    and the whole Filipino population were in sympathy with the
    army of their country." [342]

Ultimately, by one means or another, and chiefly by the use of armed
emissaries, the Visayan Islands, with the exception of <DW64>s, were
brought into the Insurgent fold.

Mabini's fear that <DW64>s and Iloilo would form a federal republic
was not realized, but <DW64>s set up its own government, applied to the
local commander of the United States forces for help, endeavoured with
almost complete success to keep out Tagalog invaders, and presently
settled down contentedly under American rule, facts of which Blount
makes no mention. On the contrary, without just cause, he includes
this great island, with its 4881 square miles of territory and its
560,776 inhabitants, in the area over which he claims that Aguinaldo
exercised complete control.

At Iloilo the American troops encountered opposition when they planned
to land. Negotiations had been entered into with the local Filipino
officers, but the latter, under the influence of representatives
whom Aguinaldo had sent from Luzon, announced themselves as adherents
of his government, and when the American troops finally disembarked
fired the town ahead of them. It has been claimed that in doing this
they were inspired by pure patriotism, but the facts shown by their
own records present a very different picture.

In writing to Aguinaldo on April 8, 1899, Mabini says:

    "We have received a communication forwarded from Iloilo,
    from General Martin Delgado and Francisco Soriano, your
    commissioner. Soriano states that the troops of Diocno have
    done nothing except commit excesses and steal money during
    the attack by the Americans upon the town of Iloilo, even
    going so far as to break their guns by using them as poles
    to carry the stolen money which they took to Capiz. It is
    said that these forces, besides being unwilling to fight the
    Americans, refuse to give their guns to those who do wish
    to fight and do not want Capiz to aid the people of Iloilo,
    who are the ones who support the entire forces, including
    the troops of Diocno who went there." [343]

This same letter contains the following brief reference to conditions
in Cebu and Leyte:--

    "Also a native priest, Senor Pascual Reyes, has arrived
    here from Cebu, and says that in Leyte General Lucban is
    committing many abuses and that Colonel Mojica is only a
    mere figurehead. In Cebu, he says, things are also in a
    chaotic condition, because the military chief, Magsilum
    [Maxilom,--TR.], and the people are not in harmony."

Further details as to conditions in Cebu are given in a letter to
Aguinaldo from the commissioner whom he put in charge of elections
in that island, who on February 19, 1899, writes: [344]--

    "Having arrived in this province the 8th of last month, I
    left on the 11th for the northern pueblos of this Island to
    hold the elections for the offices ordered by the Superior
    Decree of June 18, last.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "The news spread like an electric spark, as in all the pueblos
    I visited later I found that almost all of the residents were
    in their homes, so that when the elections were held in the
    town hall, all the principal residents attended, requesting
    me to inform you that they were disposed to sacrifice even
    their dearest affections whenever necessary for our sacred
    cause; they only asked me to inform those who hold the reins
    of government at the present time in this province, that some
    steps be taken to put a stop to the arbitrary acts which had
    been and still are being committed by the so-called Captains,
    Majors, Colonels, Generals and Captains General, who abusing
    in the most barefaced manner the positions they claimed to
    hold, were depriving them of their horses and their carabaos,
    or cattle. I promised them that I would do this, as I do
    now, by sending a communication at once to Sres. Flores and
    Maxilom, who are at the head of the provincial government,
    impressing upon them the fact that if they continue to grant
    ranks and titles to persons of this character, as they have
    done, it would end in the utter ruin of this wealthy province."

He adds that these men did not remedy the evils complained of. It
would be possible to cover in detail all of this and the remaining
Insurgent territory, and to show that Judge Blount was quite right in
stating that conditions similar to those encountered in Luzon arose
there, but the limitations of time and space forbid, and I must ask
my readers to accept on faith the statements of Blount and myself
that such was the case!

Taylor thus summarizes the conditions which ultimately arose:--

    "The Insurgent soldiers lived in their own land as they would
    have lived in a conquered country. They were quartered on the
    towns and the towns had to feed them whether they would or not.

    "Peace there was where Aguinaldo's soldiers had not penetrated,
    but there does not seem to have been progress. Life went very
    well in a long siesta in the shady villages under the palm
    trees, but not only the structure of the State, its very
    foundations were falling apart. When Aguinaldo's soldiers
    came they brought cruelty and license with them. Proud of
    their victories and confident in themselves they felt that the
    labourers in the fields, the merchants in the towns, were for
    the purpose of administering to their necessities and their
    desires. Aguinaldo, having seen this force gather about him,
    was forced to entreat it, to appeal to it; he was never strong
    enough to enforce discipline, even if he cared to do it."

Aguinaldo himself finally became disheartened over his inability to
maintain a decent state of public order in the territory which he
claimed to govern, and in December, 1898, tendered his resignation,
giving among other reasons odious favouritism on the part of some of
the military chiefs, together with a desire to enrich themselves by
improper means, such as accepting bribes, making prisoners a source
of gain, and decreasing the allowance of the soldiers. He said that
many soldiers had received sums of money as their share of booty,
and intimated that officers must have done the same. He made charges
against civil as well as military officers and ended by saying that
he retained the evidence for presentation when called on. [345]

Aguinaldo was later persuaded to withdraw his resignation. No wonder
that he wished to tender it!

In referring to the report of Wilcox and Sargent, Blount has said:--

    "This report was submitted by them to Admiral Dewey under
    date of November 23, 1898, and by him forwarded to the Navy
    Department for its information, with the comment that it 'in
    my opinion contains the most complete and reliable information
    obtainable in regard to the present state of the northern part
    of Luzon Island.' The Admiral's indorsement was not sent to
    the Senate along with the report." [346]

He thus gives it to be understood that the admiral believed that the
report truthfully set forth the conditions which actually existed in
these provinces, and that his indorsement was suppressed. Not only was
it true that this report when rendered contained the most complete
and reliable information then available in regard to the existing
state of the northern part of Luzon Island, but it contained the only
first-hand information available. The facts ultimately leaked out and
led the admiral radically to change his opinion as to the conditions
which arose under Insurgent rule. Of them he later said:--

    "There was a sort of a reign of terror; there was no
    government. These people had got power for the first time
    in their lives and they were riding roughshod over the
    community. The acts of cruelty which were brought to my notice
    were hardly credible. I sent word to Aguinaldo that he must
    treat his prisoners kindly, and he said he would."

I believe that I have fully demonstrated the truth of these
statements. Blount was thoroughly familiar with Dewey's testimony
before the Senate Committee, in which they occur, but he did not
mention them.

I cannot close this discussion of Insurgent rule without quoting
extracts from a remarkable document written by Isabelo Artacho
in October, [347] 1899. It was entitled "Declaration Letter and
Proclamation" and was addressed to the Filipino people. While it is
probable that Artacho was impelled to tell the truth by his hatred for
Aguinaldo, tell the truth he did, and his rank and standing entitle
his statements to consideration:--

    "Study the work of the insurrection; see if it is, as is said,
    the faithful interpretation of your wishes and desires.

    "Go through your towns, fields, and mountains. Wherever you
    see an insurgent gun or bolo you will find girls and faithful
    wives violated, parents and brothers crying for the murder of
    a son or of a brother; honest families robbed and in misery;
    villages burned and plundered for the benefit of a chief or
    a General; you will see fresh and living signs yet of those
    horrible crimes perpetrated with the greatest cynicism by
    those who call themselves your liberators! Liberators because
    they wear red pants, or a red shirt, or carry on their hats
    a piece of red cloth or a triangular figure!

    "Here, a president stabs a man, perhaps the most honest of
    the village, simply for having implored mercy for a creature
    arbitrarily inflicted with the _cepo_ [an oblong square
    piece of heavy wood divided into two parts, with a lock at
    each end and six or more holes in the middle to confine the
    feet of prisoners]; there, a dying man, suspended by the feet
    in a _cepo_, raised from the level of the ground, by another
    president who has charged him with an unproved crime; there a
    poor woman falsely charged and driven by petty officers with
    their bayonets for having objected to their invasion into
    her house, or shop, they being supposed to be, each, Justice
    itself, '_Justicia_,' and to be obeyed as images of the Gods;
    there, generals who murder without fear, for an insignificant
    motive, creatures whose members are being mutilated, or
    their flesh cut in slices and afterwards roasted and given
    them to eat; there, officers braining a girl who has refused
    to accede to their sensual wishes, the lifeless body of the
    victim, pierced with shots, after having been made use of, is
    thrown into the river. It is not unusual to witness officers
    burying people alive in a tomb prepared by the victim, by order
    of the murderer; it is not unusual to see a _Puisne_-Judge
    pointing a revolver at a man who is about to give evidence,
    and threatening to brain him for having dared to ask: 'Why and
    to whom am I to declare?' And finally, on his tottering throne,
    you will see the Magistrate of the Philippines, so called by
    his worshippers, with his mephistophelian smile, disposing
    and directing the execution of a murder, of a plunder, of
    a robbery, or the execution of some other crimes against
    those who are indifferent or do not care to worship him,
    such indifference being considered a crime.

    "Putting aside the many other murders, I may mention that
    one recently committed on the person of the renowned and by
    many called the worthy General, Antonio Luna, which took place
    just at the entrance of the palace of the Republic Presidency,
    and also the assassination at Kavite of the ever remembered
    martyr, Andres Bonifacio, the founder of the 'Katipunan'
    Society, and the one who initiated the Revolution of 1896;
    against the memory of whom it has been committed, in the
    proclamation of that falsely called Republic, the criminal
    and unjust omission to render the smallest manifestation of
    Filipinos' feelings towards him, to prevent that same might
    dislike his murderers!

    "Study the ordinances and constitution of this so-called
    democratic Government of the Republic, that grand work of the
    wise Filipinos; admire with me that beautiful monument erected
    on a sheet of paper and consecrated to the conquest of reason
    and labour, especially in connection with human rights and
    property, the basis for the well-being of social life; but,
    lament and deplore with me its palpable nullity when brought
    to practice and you will again see that the laws were made
    for the people and not the people for the laws!

    "Under this republic called democratic it is a crime to
    think, to wish, to say, anything which does not agree with
    what the said Gods think, wish and say. Nobody and nothing
    is attended to, whilst those who have your lives in their
    hands must be respected.

    "Under this Goverment there cannot be the slightest notice
    taken of family, property, morality and justice, but confusion
    and disorder appear everywhere like a dreadful shadow, produced
    by the ignorance of the subordinate officers, and of the powers
    that be in the villages and provinces, who are supported by
    a special committee, or special commissioners empowered to
    impoverish and to ruin all and with the right of disposing,
    at their own accord, life, family and individual property
    without responsibility whatsoever on their part.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "Let the peaceful annexation of the whole of the Southern
    Islands of Jolo, Mindanao, Iloilo, <DW64>s, Cebu and others
    where now the American flag is hoisted and under whose shadow
    tranquillity and well-being are experienced, speak for itself.

    "Let it speak for itself, the proceeding observed by the
    whole people of Imus, who were asking protection when the
    American troops took possession of the town of Bacoor, whilst
    the insurgent troops there located were hostile.

    "Let them speak for themselves, the protests against the
    war made by the numerous persons of S. Francisco de Malabon,
    Sta. Cruz de Malabon, Perez Dasmarinias and other towns, before
    the Worthy Chief Mariano Trias, who ultimately refused, with
    dignity, the high position of Secretary of War, for which rank
    he was promoted for reasons which are not worth publishing
    here. In fine, let it speak for itself, the non-resistance
    shown by the people of Old Kavite [Kawit], Noveleta, and
    Rozario of the heroic province of Kavite, notwithstanding the
    many intrenchments and troops there located, as well as the
    identical behaviour observed by other towns of Luzon provinces
    who are ready to follow when the American troops are in them.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "In fact no one would believe it, and the Philippine people
    are tired of waiting for the day when Haring Gavino will
    shake a napkin to produce suddenly horses vomiting fire and
    lightning and troops of dangerous insects; that day in which
    they will witness the realization of that famous telegraphed
    dream to the effect that two hours after the commencement
    of the war the insurgents will take their breakfast in the
    Palace of 'Malacanang,' their tiffin in the Senate House, and
    their dinner on board the _Olympia_ or in Kavite; that day in
    which the celebrated _Pequenines_ army, with their invisible
    Chief-leader, will exterminate the American troops by means
    of handfuls of dust and sand thrown at them, which process,
    it is said, has caused the smallpox to the Americans; that day
    in which the _Colorum_ army will capture the American fleet
    with the cords their troops are provided with, in combination
    with a grand intrenchment of Tayabas made of husks of paddy,
    by a Nazarene, who will then, by merely touching, convert each
    husk into a Bee with a deadly sting; that day in which the
    insurgents, like their leaders, provided with hosts of flour,
    or of paper, pieces of candles of the holy-week matins, holy
    water, pieces of consecrated stones; of vestments belonging
    to a miraculous Saint or with some other Anting-Anting or
    talisman or _amuletos_, will make themselves invulnerable
    to bullets; also have power to convert into any of the four
    elements, like those personages of the Philippine legends and
    comedies,--Ygmidio, Tenoso, Florante, Barnardo, Carpio, etc.

    "Yes, the people of the Philippines are quite tired of waiting
    for the predicted European conflict, which it is said would
    give them their independence; if not, perhaps, divide the
    Islands as they are now amongst cousins, brothers, nephews,
    uncles and godfathers.

    "In the near future, when we have acquired the necessary
    political and social education and the habit of behaving justly
    towards ourselves and towards our fellow-brothers; when free
    from all superstition, healthy, strong and vigorous, we find
    ourselves capable of governing ourselves, without there being
    the possibility of the preponderance of our passions in the
    consideration, direction, and administration of the interests
    of our country, then, and only then, we will be free! we will
    be independent! [348]

    "_Hongkong_, 1st October, 1899."

Most of the men who perpetrated the outrages I have detailed are alive
to-day, and are powers in their respective communities. Simeon Villa
was recently elected a member of the municipal board from the south
district of Manila, but fortunately an American governor-general
prevented him from taking his seat. Just prior to my departure from
Manila he was appointed, by Speaker Osmena, a member of a committee
on reception for Governor-General Harrison.

The kind of independent "government" these men established is the
kind that they would again establish if they had the chance, [349]
but among the persons to be tortured and murdered would now be those
Americans who failed to escape seasonably. I do not mean to say
that such a state of affairs would come about immediately, but it
would certainly arise within a comparatively short time. Sooner yet
"the united Filipino people" would split up on old tribal lines,
and fly at each other's throats.






CHAPTER VIII

Did We Destroy a Republic?


The claim has frequently been made that the United States government
destroyed a republic in the Philippine Islands, [350] but some of
the critics seem to entertain peculiar ideas as to what a republic
is. Blount states [351] that Aguinaldo declined to hear our declaration
of independence read "because we would not recognize his right to
assert the same truths," and then apparently forgetting the Insurgent
chief's alleged adherence to the principles of this document, he
lets the cat out of the bag by saying that "the war satisfied us all
that Aguinaldo would have been a small edition of Porfirio Diaz,"
and would himself have been "The Republic." [352]

He would doubtless have set up just this sort of a government, if
not assassinated too soon, but it would hardly have accorded with the
principles of the declaration of independence, nor would it have been
exactly "a government of the people, by the people, for the people."

Blount truly says [353] that the educated Filipinos, admittedly
very few in number, absolutely control the masses. He adds [354]
that _presidentes_ of pueblos are as absolute bosses as is Murphy
in Tammany Hall, and that the towns taken collectively constitute
the provinces. The first statement is true, and the second, which
is tantamount to a declaration that the _presidentes_ control every
square foot of the provinces and every man in them, is not so far
from the truth as it might be. I have been old-fashioned enough to
retain the idea that a republic is "a state in which the sovereign
power resides in the whole body of the people, and is exercised by
representatives elected by them."

Blount labored under no delusion as to the fitness of the common
people to govern. [355]

Not only did the Filipinos themselves understand perfectly well that
they had no republic, but there were many of them who were fully
aware of the fact that they could establish none. Fernando Acevedo,
in writing to General Pio del Pilar on August 8, 1898, said: [356]--

    "There could be no republic here, even though the Americans
    should consent, because, according to the treaties, the
    Filipinos are not in condition for a republic. Besides this,
    all Europe will oppose it, and if it should be that they divide
    our country as though it were a round cake, what would become
    of us and what would belong to us?"

I will now trace the evolution of the government which Aguinaldo did
set up. In doing so I follow Taylor's argument very closely, drawing
on his unpublished Ms., not only for ideas, but in some instances for
the words in which they are clothed. I change his words in many cases,
and do not mean to unload on him any responsibility for my statements,
but do wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to him and at the same
time to avoid the necessity for the continual use of quotation marks.

Aguinaldo's methods in establishing his republic are shown by his order
[357] that "any person who fights for his country has absolute power
to kill any one not friendly to our cause" and the further order
[358] prescribing that twelve lashes should be given to a soldier
who lost even a single cartridge, while if he continued to waste
ammunition he should be severely punished. In March, 1899, workmen
who had abandoned their work in the arsenal at Malolos were arrested,
returned, given twenty-five lashes each and then ordered to work. [359]

The news that an American expedition was about to sail for the
Philippines made him realize that he had not much more than a month
in which to place himself in a position in which he would have to be
consulted and assisted, and this he tried to do. The arms he received
from Hongkong on May 23 enabled him to begin an insurrection, not
as an ally of the United States, but on his own account. From May 21
to May 24 he issued orders for the uprising against Spain. On May 24
he declared himself Dictator of the Philippines in a proclamation in
which he promised to resign his power into the hands of a president
and cabinet, to be appointed when a constitutional assembly was
convened, which would be as soon as the islands had passed into
his control. He further announced that the North American nation
had given its disinterested protection in order that the liberty of
the Philippines should be gained. [360] On May 25, 1898, the first
American troops sailed from San Francisco for the Philippines.

Aguinaldo still had a month in which to seize enough Spanish territory
to erect thereon what would appear to the Americans on their arrival to
be a government of Luzon, of which he was the head. The Hongkong junta
and Aguinaldo himself intended to ask for the recognition of their
government, but they had first to create it. To obtain recognition
it was necessary that the American commander on land should be able
to report that wherever he or his troops had gone the country was
ruled by Aguinaldo according to laws which showed that the people
were capable of governing themselves.

As the United States is a republic it was natural that the directing
group of insurgent leaders should decide upon a republican form of
government. That form would appeal to the people of the United States;
the first "Christian Asiatic Republic" was a description which would
inevitably awaken sympathy in that mother of republics. The idea was a
wise and subtle one; but Aguinaldo's republic was merely an elaborate
stage-setting, arranged for the contemplation of the people of the
United States.

By June 5, 1898, the success of the insurgent arms had been such that
Aguinaldo felt that he could throw down the mask. He would still
be glad of American assistance, but he felt himself strong enough
to do without it. He saw that "there can now be proclaimed before
the Filipino people and the civilized nations its only aspiration,
namely, the independence of this country, which proclamation should
not be delayed for any ulterior object of this government" [361] and
ordered that the independence of the Philippines should be proclaimed
at his birthplace, Cavite Viejo, on June 12, 1898. On that date he
formally proclaimed it. The provinces of Cavite, Bataan, Pampanga,
Batangas, Bulacan, Laguna and Morong were about to fall into his hands,
the Spanish troops in them being besieged, and about to surrender.

From the same place on June 18, 1898, Aguinaldo promulgated his decree
for the creation and administration of municipalities. [362] In brief,
this provided that as soon as the territory of the archipelago, or any
portion thereof, had passed from the possession of Spanish forces, the
people in the towns who were most conspicuous for their intelligence,
social position and upright conduct were to meet and elect a town
government. The heads of the towns in every province were to elect
a head for the province and his three counsellors. The provincial
council, composed of these four officials, with the presidente of the
capital of the province, were to see to the execution in that province
of the decrees of the central government and to advise and suggest.

This provincial council was to elect representatives for the
revolutionary congress, which was to be charged with submitting
suggestions to the central government upon interior and exterior
affairs, and was to be heard by the government upon serious matters
which admitted of delay and discussion.

Before any person elected to office was permitted to discharge
his functions, his election was to be approved by the central
government. The military commanders, except in time of war, were
to have no jurisdiction over the civil authorities. They could,
however, demand such supplies as they might need, and these could
not be refused. The government was to appoint commissioners to carry
these regulations into effect.

On June 20 Aguinaldo issued his regulations for the government of
provinces and municipalities [363] as supplemental to the decree
of two days before. It went into the details of government, under
the following heads: police, justice, taxation and registration
of property.

On June 23 he proclaimed the establishment of a revolutionary
government, with himself as "president." In this capacity he had all
the powers of the Spanish governor-general, unhampered by any orders
from Spain. It is true that the scheme provided for the eventual
formation of a republic, but it is doubtful if the people who drew it
up really knew what that word meant. What was provided for in practice
was a strong and highly centralized military dictatorship, in which,
under the form of election, provision was made for the filling of
all offices by men devoted to the group which had seized control.

According to this decree the dictatorial government was in future to
be entitled the revolutionary government. Its duty was to struggle
for the independence of the Philippines in order to establish a
true republic. The dictator was to be known as the president of the
revolutionary government. There were to be four secretaries--one of
foreign affairs, commerce and marine; one of war and public works;
one of police and interior order, justice, education and hygiene;
one of the treasury, agriculture and manufactures. The government
could increase the number of secretaries if necessary. They were to
assist the president in the despatch of business coming under their
departments.

In addition to the president and his secretaries, there was to be a
revolutionary congress composed of representatives from the provinces
of the Philippine Archipelago, elected as provided by the decree of
June 18. In case a province was not able to elect representatives,
the government would appoint them for such province. The congress
was to discuss and advise, to approve treaties and loans, and to
examine and approve the accounts of the secretary of the treasury. If
important matters admitted of delay, the congress would be heard
concerning them; but if they did not admit of delay, the president of
the government was to act at once. Projects of law could be presented
by any representative, and by the secretaries of the government.

A permanent committee of congress presided over by the vice-president
was to be chosen by that body. This was to serve as a court of appeal
in criminal cases and as a court of final jurisdiction in cases
arising between the secretaries of the government and provincial
officials. The acts of congress were not to go into effect until the
president of the government ordered their execution. He was also to
have the right of veto.

This was a well-devised plan to secure control for the central
group about Aguinaldo. His commissioners, under a form of election
in which the electors were carefully selected men, established
municipal governments devoted to the cause of the revolution. These
were to choose provincial officials and members of the congress. All
elections were subject to Aguinaldo's approval, and every province
was under the command of a military representative of his, who could
and did call upon the civil authorities for such supplies as he deemed
fit. All real power was vested in the central group, and the central
group was composed of Emilio Aguinaldo and his public and private
advisers. By this time he had gathered about him men who were trained
in the law, some of whom had served the Spanish government in various
capacities. They were accustomed to the methods that had previously
prevailed under the Spanish regime, and were now ready to draw up
constitutions and regulations for the new government. Mabini wrote
the three organic decrees. Copies of them were sent to the foreign
consuls in Manila, and on July 15, 1898 to Admiral Dewey.

Although the title of "president" was assumed by Aguinaldo, as
more likely to be favourably considered in the United States than
"dictator," the tendency of his followers who had not been educated
in Europe was to speak of and to regard him not as a president,
but as an overlord holding all power in his hands. The people did
not feel themselves citizens of a republic, copartners in an estate;
they considered themselves subject to a ruler who sometimes called
himself president, and sometimes dictator. Indeed, there is much to
show that if Aguinaldo and his followers had succeeded in their plans,
even the name "republic" would not have been long continued as the
title of his government. [364]

Aguinaldo's claim as to the effectiveness of his government on August
6, 1898, was as follows: [365] "The government of the revolution
actually rules in the provinces of Cavite, Batangas, Mindoro,
Tayabas, Laguna, Morong, Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Infanta and
besieges the capital, Manila. The most perfect order and tranquillity
reign in these provinces, governed by authorities elected by the
inhabitants in conformity with the organic decrees dated June 18 and
23 last. Moreover, the revolution has about nine thousand prisoners of
war who are treated humanely and according to the rules of civilized
warfare. We can muster more than thirty thousand men organized as a
regular army."

It may have been that in the majority of these provinces municipal
governments, formed in accordance with the provisions of the decree of
June 18, had been established; but provincial governments had not been
established in all of them, and tranquillity did not reign in any of
them, as they were the scene of operations against the Spaniards. There
could not well have been nine thousand prisoners in his hands at this
time, as that was claimed later when a large additional number of
Spaniards had surrendered. As for the thirty thousand men organized as
a regular army, there may be a certain difference of opinion as to what
constitutes a regular army; the men who saw Aguinaldo's force then,
and who have read the papers of its leaders, must be of the opinion
that that force was not a regular army. Probably only Manila Province
had a provincial government on August 6. Its local presidentes met at
Cavite Viejo on August 3 and elected three members of congress from
the province, and also the members of the provincial government. The
election took place under the supervision of Colonel Teodoro Gonzales,
whom Aguinaldo had appointed governor of Manila Province on August
1. He remained governor after the election was held. Not until August
17 did the local presidentes of Bulacan assemble under the presidency
of the secretary of the interior and proceed to elect two members to
congress and the members of the provincial government. Not until August
20 was there an election for the members of the provincial government
of Cavite Province. This was held in the town of Cavite. Isaac Fernando
Rios, who was afterwards a member of the Filipino junta in Madrid,
was chosen a representative of the province; but as he wrote that he
was in favour of coming to some agreement with Spain which would permit
the development of the Philippines, without abandoning the sovereignty
of that country, Aguinaldo promptly disapproved his election [366]
and ordered a new one held for the office thus left vacant. On October
2, 1899, Aguinaldo approved the result of a new election held there
because four of the five high officials of the province had absented
themselves, while one of them had died. Of the men who had so absented
themselves one had gone abroad, while the other three had remained
in Manila or Cavite under the government of the United States. [367]

The people of the provinces obeyed the men who had arms in their
hands. It is not probable that many of them had any conviction
concerning the form of government which would be best for the
Philippines. There were no signs of a spontaneous desire for a
republic. Orders came from the group about Aguinaldo, and the people
accepted a dictator and a republic as they accepted a president and
a republic, without knowing, and probably without caring very much,
what it all meant, except that they hoped that taxes would cease with
the departure of the friars. A determined and well-organized minority
had succeeded in imposing its will upon an unorganized, heterogeneous,
and leaderless majority.

As soon as a province was occupied by the Insurgents it was divided
into territorial zones within which command was exerted by military
officers. On July 20, 1898, Cavite had been divided into four zones,
and next day Brigadier-General Artemio Ricarte was placed in command
of the province and the first zone.

By July 7 Bulacan Province had been divided into six zones, and Nueva
Ecija into four zones, with a separate commander for each zone. These
men established the government prescribed by Aguinaldo's decrees of
the middle of June. Probably by the end of July Aguinaldo's municipal
governments had been established in the greater part of the towns
of Luzon. These governments were not established by the mass of the
people. The mass of the people were not consulted, but they were not
in the habit of being consulted in such matters and probably saw no
necessity for it in this case. As an evidence of this we have the fact
that from the beginning the acts of election were almost always drawn
up in Spanish, although by far the greater portion of the people of
the archipelago spoke only the native dialects.

The method of establishing these municipal governments employed in
Cavite in June, 1898, was continued to the end of Aguinaldo's rule. It
was the same in different places and at different times. Data obtained
from reports and documents written in towns far removed from each
other follow. They must be considered together in order to obtain an
idea of what this method really was.

When the Insurgent movement had progressed sufficiently far, the
leaders collected their adherents and obtained recognition as the
heads of their provinces or districts. For example, representatives
of the towns of Pampanga assembled at San Fernando on June 26,
1898, and under the presidency of General Maximo Hizon agreed to
yield him "complete obedience as military governor of the province
and representative of the illustrious dictator of these Philippine
Islands." [368] The town of Macabebe refused to send any delegates
to this gathering. Commissioners, in almost every case officers of
Aguinaldo's army, were empowered by him to establish the so-called
republican government. They appointed delegates who proceeded to
the smaller towns and held elections; but whenever possible the
commissioner of Aguinaldo presided. In many cases these delegates were
lieutenants of the army. The commissioners selected the electors,
for they had all to be "marked out by their good conduct, their
wealth, and their social position," and they had all to be in favour
of independence. They then presided at the elections, which were
_viva voce_. They apparently selected the people to be elected, and
forwarded a record of the proceedings to the central government. The
election had to be approved by the dictator or president before the
successful candidates could assume the duties of their offices. Later
on, the military commanders remote from the seat of government were
authorized to approve elections and install the successful candidates,
but the records of election had even then to be forwarded to the
capital for approval, the action of the commissioner not being final.

The commissioners do not seem to have been able to find many men
who had the necessary requisites for electors. In the town of Lipa,
Batangas Province, with a population of forty thousand seven hundred
forty-three, at the election held July 3, 1898, a presidente was chosen
for whom twenty-five votes were cast. On November 23, 1898, an election
was held at Vigan, Ilocos Sur, for a presidente to succeed one who had
been elected representative in congress. One hundred and sixteen votes
were cast. The population of Vigan is nineteen thousand. On October 5,
1898, at Echague, Isabela Province, a presidente was elected for whom
fifty-four votes were cast. The population of Echague is fifty-four
thousand. On October 2, 1898, at Cabagan Nuevo, Isabela, one hundred
and eleven men voted out of a population of sixty-two hundred and
forty. On January 29, 1899, the town of Hernani, in Samar, elected its
municipal officials under the supervision of V. Lukban. Fifty-four men
voted. The town has a population of twenty-five hundred and fifty-five.

The elections, so-called, were not always held without protest. For
example, the town of San Jose, Batangas, protested unavailingly
to Aguinaldo against the result of an election held at 10 P.M.,
in a storm of rain. Men who had been on friendly terms with the
Spaniards were usually excluded from all participation. If in spite
of the precautions taken men were elected who were disliked by the
commissioner or his supporters, the election could be set aside on the
ground that the person elected was not an adherent of the revolution.

The elections were often held in a singular manner, as in the following
case: [369]--

    "On August 20, 1898, four men of Tondo appeared
    before Aguinaldo on Bacoor and announced that they were
    representatives of the people of the district, who loved
    liberty. Then in accordance with the directions of the
    president of the republic under the supervision of the
    secretary of the interior, they drew lots from a hat to
    decide how the offices of the head of the district, delegate
    of police, delegate of the treasury and delegate of justice
    were to be distributed. The decision having been made in this
    simple fashion, Aguinaldo gravely approved the election as
    expressing the will of the people. Perhaps it did, for they
    seem to have continued, at least for a time, to obey them. On
    November 14, 1898, Aguinaldo again approved an election for
    local officials in Tondo which since August 13 had been within
    the American lines."

On August 23 San Carlos, in Pangasinan Province, a town of twenty-three
thousand people, elected its officials under the new form of
government. The presidente chosen was a well-known member of the
Katipunan, and before the election was held announced his intention
of killing any one who was chosen for the position for which he was a
candidate. [370] He was accordingly elected. In spite of this grave
informality, an informality which formed one ground for a protest
on the part of some of the people of the town, Aguinaldo approved
the election.

On October 21, 1898, an election was held under the supervision of
the military commander in Camarines for the municipal officials of the
town of Yriga. [371] The voting was oral, and a secretary wrote down
the votes for the two candidates under direction of the commissioner,
who finally announced that the candidate whose friend he was had been
elected, but without stating how many votes he had received. This
newly elected head of the town had the town crier on the following
night publish through the streets an address to the people, in which
he thanked those who had voted for him and warned those who had not
that it would be well for them to beware. The Spanish law known as
the Maura Law, which regulated the elections in the municipalities
under the Spanish government, provided for a limited electoral body,
composed largely of ex-officials of the municipalities. The choosing of
an electoral body by the military commander of a district probably did
not seem strange to the people. The provincial and municipal officials
were established in office by armed men, and they were obeyed because
they had been installed by armed men; but it was a form of election
to which people, as a rule, saw no reason to object. There were,
however, in many cases bitter complaints of the abuses committed by
the officers thus "elected."

This form of government spread with the advance of Aguinaldo's
arms. Municipal elections were held in Tarlac in July, in Ilocos
Norte and Tayabas in August, in Benguet and the Batanes Islands in
September, 1898, in Panay in December, 1898, and in Leyte and Samar
in January, 1899.

On December 27 Antonio Luna wrote that all the provinces of Luzon,
Mindoro, Marinduque, Masbate, and Ticao, Romblon, part of Panay,
the Batanes, and Babuyanes Islands were under the jurisdiction of
the insurgent government. [372]

By October 7, 1898, 14 of the 36 provinces and districts into
which Luzon had been divided by the Spanish government had civil
governors. [373] These 14 were Tagalog provinces or provinces which
the Tagalogs controlled. The other provinces were still under military
rule, and, indeed, even the provinces under civilians were dominated
by their military commanders. With the manner of holding elections
which prevailed, the governors must have been men who were in favour
of the military party in force, for otherwise they would not have
been elected. [374]

It is not probable that the number of provinces under civil
governors much increased. If in Pangasinan Province, where there
are many Tagalogs, organizations opposed to the rule of Aguinaldo
could cause serious disorders, as was the case, it must have been
considered expedient for the success of the attempt of the Tagalogs,
who form only a fifth of the population, to dominate the archipelago,
that all provinces in which an effective majority of the people were
not of that tribe, should be kept under military rule. The municipal
governments which had been established in Luzon were in the hands of
Aguinaldo's adherents, or of men who it was hoped would prove loyal
to him. They were men of the Spanish-speaking group, which has always
dominated the people of the islands. They were probably not as a rule
men of means. Many of them,   perhaps most of them, had been clerks
and employees under the Spanish government, and they saw no reason
for changing the methods of town administration which had then been
followed. The municipal taxes, the estimates for expenditures, and
the regulations for town government, were but little modified from
those they found in force. In many ways such changes as were made
were for the worse.

Once installed in power, Aguinaldo's officials were required to
exercise over the mass of the people about the same control that
had always been exercised over them. The governing group considered
that they were perfectly capable of providing for the welfare of
the islands, and that it was the duty of the people to obey them
without question.

When the insurgent force was increased in preparation for war with
the Americans a large number of municipal officials resigned, or
attempted to do so. It was not easy for a municipal official under
Aguinaldo's government to resign. A resignation, to be accepted, had
to be accompanied by the certificate of a physician that the person
concerned was unfit to perform the duties of his office. Judging by
the record, [375] an epidemic seems to have attacked the municipal
officials in January, 1899. It is probable that they saw that war
was inevitable and that they did not wish to remain in charge of
the towns and be responsible for providing for the necessities of
"the liberating army." In Pangasinan in that month men could not
leave their barrios without obtaining the permission of the headman,
and in one town men who had attempted to sell their property for the
purpose of going to Manila were, on January 17, ordered to be arrested
and their conduct investigated. [376]

Aguinaldo, having established himself at Malolos, ordered the congress
provided for in his decree of June 23, 1898, to  assemble at the
capital on September 15,1898, and appointed a number of provisional
representatives for provinces and islands not under his control. [377]
It has often been claimed that Aguinaldo's government controlled at
this time the whole archipelago, except the bay and city of Manila
and the town of Cavite. [378]

Blount quotes the following statement from the report of the First
Philippine Commission:--

    "While the Spanish troops now remained quietly in Manila,
    the Filipino forces made themselves masters of the entire
    island except that city." [379]

I signed that statement, and signed it in good faith; nevertheless,
it is untrue. The Filipino forces never controlled the territory
now known as Ifugao, Bontoc, Kalinga or Apayao, much less that
occupied by the Negritos on the east coast of Luzon, but this is
not all. There exists among the  Insurgent records a very important
document, prepared by Mabini, showing that when the call for the
first session of the Filipino congress was issued, there were no less
than sixty-one provinces and _commandancias_, which the Insurgents,
when talking among themselves, did not even claim to control, and
twenty-one of these were in or immediately adjacent to Luzon. [380]

The men who composed this congress were among the ablest natives of
the archipelago; but representative institutions mean nothing unless
they represent the people; if they do not, they are a conscious lie
devised either to deceive the people of the country or foreign nations,
and it is not possible for any system founded upon a lie to endure. A
real republic must be founded not upon a few brilliant men to compose
the governing group but upon a people trained in self-restraint and
accustomed to govern by compromise and concession, not by force. To
endure it must be based upon a solid foundation of self-control, of
self-respect and of respect for the rights of others upon the part of
the great majority of the common people. If it is not, the government
which follows a period of tumult, confusion and civil war will be a
government of the sword. The record the Philippine republic has left
behind it contains nothing to confirm the belief that it would have
endured, even in name, if the destinies of the islands had been left
in the hands of the men who set it up.

The national assembly met on the appointed day in the parish church
of Barasoain, Malolos, which had been set aside for the meetings
of congress. This body probably had then more elected members than
at its subsequent meetings, but even so it contained a large number
of men who were appointed by Aguinaldo after consultation with his
council to represent provinces which they had never even seen.

From a "list of representatives of the provinces and districts,
selected by election and appointment by the government up to July
7, 1899, with incomplete list of October 6, 1899" [381] I find
that there were 193 members, of whom forty-two were elected and one
hundred fifty-one were appointed. This congress was therefore not an
elective body. Was it in any sense representative? The following table,
showing the distribution of delegates between the several peoples,
will enable us to answer this question.

In considering this table it must be remembered that the relationship
given between the number of delegates assigned to a given people
and the number of individuals composing it is only approximate, as
no one of these peoples is strictly limited to the provinces where
it predominates.

I have classified the provinces as Tagalog, Visayan, etc., according
to census returns showing the people who form a majority of their
inhabitants in each case. [382]


People          Number          Elected Delegates   Appointed Delegates
Visayans        3,219,030           0                   68
Tagalogs        1,460,695          18                   19
Ilocanos          803,942           7                   11
Bicols            566,365           4                    7
Pangasinans       343,686           2                    2
Pampangans        280,984           2                    2
Cagayans          159,648           4                    6
Zambalans          48,823           1                    2
Non-Christians    647,740           4                   34
                                   42                  151


It will be noted that the Tagalog provinces had eighteen out of a
total of forty-two elected delegates. The Visayans, by far the most
numerous people in the islands, did not have one. The non-Christian
provinces had a very disproportionately large total of delegates, of
whom four are put down as elected, but on examination we find that one
of these is from Lepanto, the capital of which was an Ilocano town; one
is from Nueva Vizcaya, where there is a considerable Cagayan-Ilocano
population; one is from Benguet, the capital of which was an Ilocano
town, and one from Tiagan, which was an Iloeano settlement. These
delegates should therefore really be credited to the Ilocanos.

If the individual relationships of the several members are considered,
the result is even more striking. Of the thirty-eight delegates
assigned to the non-Christian provinces, one only, good old Lino
Abaya of Tiagan, was a non-Christian. Many of the non-Christian
_comandancias_ were given a number of delegates wholly disproportionate
to their population, and in this way the congress was stuffed full
of Tagalogs.

Think of Filipe Buencamino, of Aguinaldo's cabinet, representing the
Moros of Zamboanga; of the mild, scholarly botanist Leon Guerrero
representing the Moros, Bagobos, Mandayas and Manobos of Davao; of
Jose M. Lerma, the unscrupulous politician of the province of Bataan,
just across the bay from Manila, representing the wild Moros of
Cotabato; of Juan Tuason, a timid Chinese _mestizo_ Manila business
man, representing the Yacan and Samal Moros of Basilan; of my good
friend Benito Legarda, since a member of the Philippine Commission,
and a resident delegate from the Philippines to the congress of the
United States, representing the bloody Moros of Jolo! Yet they appear
as representatives of these several regions.

Few, indeed, of the delegates from non-Christian territory had ever
set foot in the provinces or _comandancias_ from which they were
appointed, or would have been able to so much as name the wild tribe
or tribes inhabiting them.

I have been furnished a list, made up with all possible care by
competent persons, from which it appears that there were eighty-five
delegates actually present at the opening of congress, of whom
fifty-nine were Tagalogs, five Bicols, three Pampangans, two Visayans,
and one a Zambalan. For the others there are no data available. Yet
it has been claimed that this was a representative body! It was a
Tagalog body, without enough representatives of any other one of the
numerous Philippine peoples to be worth mentioning.

With a congress thus organized, Aguinaldo should have had no difficulty
in obtaining any legislation he desired.

The committee of congress appointed to draw up a constitution set
to work promptly, and by October 16,1898, had proceeded so far
with their work that Buencamino was able to write to Aguinaldo that
while he had been of the opinion that it would have been best for
him to continue as a dictator aided by a committee of able men,
yet it would now be a blow to the prestige of congress to suspend
its sessions. Aguinaldo noted upon this letter the fact that he did
not approve of a constitution. [383]

Apparently early in December the committee submitted their project. In
presenting it to congress they said [384] that--

    "The work whose results the commission has the honour to
    present for the consideration of congress has been largely a
    matter of selection; in executing it not only has the French
    constitution been used, but also those of Belgium, Mexico,
    Brazil, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Guatemala, as we have
    considered those nations as most resembling the Filipino
    people."

The most important difference between this project and the actual
constitution adopted was that, although the project provided that
the Dominican, Recollect, Franciscan and Augustinian friars should
be expelled from the country and that their estates should become
the property of the state, yet it recognized the Catholic religion
as that of the state and forbade state contribution to the support
of any other, although it permitted the practice in private of any
religion not opposed to morality, which did not threaten the safety of
the country. The government was authorized to negotiate a concordat
with the Pope for the regulation of the relations between church and
state. A strong party was in favour of this recognition, but it finally
failed of adoption, and the constitution as promulgated provided
for the freedom and equality of religion and for free and compulsory
education which had not been provided for in the original project. The
constitution as approved forbade the granting of titles of nobility,
decorations or honorary titles by the state to any Filipino. This
paragraph did not exist in the original project, which merely forbade
any Filipino to accept them without the consent of the government.

Mabini, the ablest of all Aguinaldo's advisers, did not approve of the
constitution. He himself had drawn up a project for a constitution
during June, 1898, but it was not accepted by the committee, the
greater part of whom were Catholics and for that reason opposed to
Mabini, who was a bitter antagonist of that church. And yet when
separation of church and state was finally provided for it did not
please Mabini, who, although he was opposed to church control, wrote
to Aguinaldo [385] that the constitution as passed by congress was not
acceptable and should not be promulgated because the constitutional
guarantees of individual liberty could not be maintained, as the
army had to be in control for the time being, and furthermore it was
not expedient to separate church and state, as this separation would
alienate many of their adherents. Indeed, there was not much in the
constitution which he thought ought to take immediate effect, [386]
and he wrote that congress was ill-disposed toward him because he had
refused to agree to its promulgation. Existing conditions were such
that he believed that all powers should be vested in one person. He
warned Aguinaldo that if the constitution were put in force, he would
be at the mercy of his secretaries. On January 1, 1899, Aguinaldo,
probably at the suggestion of Mabini, proposed certain changes in
it. [387]

Evidently the provisions of the constitution did not worry Aguinaldo
much, as is shown by his reply to the request by some of his officers
for information as to what reward those who were first in the attack
on Manila should receive. He promised them such titles as marquis,
duke, etc. [388]

On January 2, 1899, Aguinaldo announced the formation of a new cabinet
made up as follows: Apolinario Mabini president and secretary of
foreign affairs; Teodoro Sandico, secretary of the interior; Mariano
Trias, secretary of the treasury; Baldomero Aguinaldo, secretary
of war and navy, and Gracio Gonzaga, secretary of _fomento_. [389]
On January 4 Mabini took the oath of office as the president of the
council of government. This body met twice a week at Malolos on set
days, and at the close of its deliberations forwarded to Aguinaldo
a statement of the subjects discussed and the conclusions reached
for his decision. The president of the republic did not preside at,
or take part in, its deliberations.

On January 4, 1899, General Otis issued a proclamation in which
he announced that the United States had obtained possession of the
Philippines and that its government would be extended over the islands
of the archipelago. Aguinaldo replied next day with one which, if
not intended to be a declaration of war, was at least a warning that
hostilities were imminent. This proclamation was carried into Manila
by his emissaries and posted up over the one issued by the American
commander. It was a challenge to a trial of strength, and Aguinaldo
and his advisers hastened their preparations for the coming combat.

The secretary of the interior on the same day sent an order to the
heads of all provinces directing the organization of territorial
militia to resist the American invasion, and ordering the heads of the
towns to hold meetings of the people to protest against the aggression
of the United States. They were held in accordance with these orders,
and records of the proceedings were sent to Malolos and published in
the official organ of the government as evidence of the feeling of the
people. It was, however, not considered necessary in publishing them
to mention the fact that they had been held in compliance with orders.

On January 14, 1899, Mabini wrote to Aguinaldo [390] recommending
changes in the proposed constitution, which he still liked as little
as ever. He was afraid that <DW64>s and Panay would refuse to accept
the form of government it prescribed. The worst thing about it was
that the Americans would be less disposed to recognize Aguinaldo's
government; for when they saw the constitution they would know, as it
made no mention of them, that the Filipinos wanted independence. Mabini
thought that it was possible that the wording of the constitution
might have been deliberately planned by members of the congress in
favour of annexation to the United States, so that that country would
be warned, would become more mistrustful, and would refuse to recognize
Aguinaldo's government. Whatever the president of the council may have
thought about the theoretical advisability of a congress to represent
the people, he found one much in the way when he had obtained it.

Buencamino advised that the constitution should be approved and
promulgated; one argument was that the congress had been consulted in
the matter of a national loan, and if it was dissolved, there could
be no loan. This was apparently the only matter upon which it had
been consulted. [391]

The constitution of the Philippine Republic was ratified at a session
of the congress on January 20, 1899.

On January 21, 1899, Aguinaldo sanctioned it and ordered that it should
be "kept, complied with and executed in all its parts because it is
the sovereign will of the Philippine people." [392] The constitution
provided for a government of three cooerdinate powers, executive,
legislative and judicial. Whether it provided for a form of government
which would have succeeded in the Philippines was not determined by
actual experience. It was never really put in force for war with the
United States began in two weeks and the constitution must stand as the
expression of the ideas of a certain group of educated natives rather
than as the working formula for the actual conduct of the political
life of a nation. One proof of this is the fact that not until June 8,
1899, were Aguinaldo's decrees upon the registration of marriages and
upon civil marriage, dated June 20,1898, revoked, and the provisions
of the constitution concerning marriage put in effect. [393]

Aguinaldo had approved the constitution; he had informed the foreign
consuls and General Otis that it had been promulgated and become the
law of the land. It was not promulgated. It had not become the law of
the land. It served one important purpose. It passed into the hands
of the Americans and showed them the ability and the aspirations of
certain individuals of the archipelago, but Mabini and his followers
did not believe in its form or in its provisions, and Mabini at least
was emphatic in his declarations that the time had not yet come for it
to be put into effect. On January 24, 1899, he wrote to Aguinaldo that
if it should be promulgated it would be absolutely necessary to give
the president the veto power, and replace the elected representatives
by others appointed by the government. If this were not done the
president would be at the mercy of congress, and the people, seeing
that disagreement between the executive government and the congress
was the cause of its misfortunes, would start another revolutionary
movement to destroy both of them. [394]

As long as Mabini remained in power the constitution was mere
paper. Its adoption was not indicative of the capacity of the people to
maintain self-government. It expressed only the academic aspirations
of the men who drafted it. There is not the slightest evidence from
any previous or subsequent experience of the people that it would have
worked in practice. It was enacted for the misleading of Americans
rather than for the benefit of the Filipinos.

While the government of Aguinaldo was called a republic, it was in
fact a Tagalog military oligarchy in which the great mass of the
people had no share. Their duty was only to give soldiers for the
army and labourers for the fields, and to obey without question the
orders they received from the military heads of their provinces.

There is no cause for vain regrets. We did not destroy a republic in
the Philippines. There never was anything there to destroy which even
remotely resembled a republic.






CHAPTER IX

The Conduct of the War


It is not my intention to attempt to write a history of the war which
began on February 4, 1899, nor to discuss any one of its several
campaigns. I propose to limit myself to a statement of the conditions
under which it was conducted, and a description of the two periods
into which it may be divided.

From the outset the Insurgent soldiers were treated with marked
severity by their leaders. On June 17, 1898, Aguinaldo issued an order
to the military chiefs of certain towns in Cavite providing that a
soldier wasting ammunition should be punished with twelve lashes for
a first offence, twenty-four for a second, and court-martialled and
"severely punished" for a third. [395]

On November 16, 1900, General Lacuna ordered that any officer allowing
his soldiers to load their rifles when not before the enemy should be
liable to capital punishment, [396] which in practice was frequently
inflicted on soldiers for very minor offences.

Men of means were drafted into the ranks and then excused from service
on the payment of cash.

The soldiery, quartered on the towns, committed endless
abuses. Conditions were bad enough before the outbreak of hostilities,
as I have shown in the chapters dealing with Insurgent rule. They
grew rapidly worse thereafter, and human life became cheap indeed.

"The documents of this period show that the insurgent troops driven
from the front of Manila fell upon the people of the neighbouring
towns and burnt, robbed, and murdered. Either their officers lost
all control over them, or else they directed these outrages. It was
not for some days that control was regained." [397]

Endless orders were issued by Aguinaldo and other high Insurgent
officers, prohibiting rape, brigandage and robbery, and there was
grave need of them. Unfortunately they could not be enforced. Indeed
it was often impossible to distinguish between Insurgent soldiers, who
removed their uniforms or had none, and brigands pure and simple. [398]

Many men were soldiers at one time and brigands at
another. Unquestionably soldiers and brigands sometimes
cooeperated. Garrisons were withdrawn from towns which did not promptly
and fully comply with the demands of Insurgent commanders, [399]
and armed bandits appeared and plundered them.

There were some Insurgent leaders, like Cailles, who suppressed
brigandage with a heavy hand, [400] but many of them were indifferent,
even if not in alliance with the evil doers.


The Visayas

Feeling between Tagalog soldiers and Visayan people grew constantly
more bitter, and before many months had passed they fell to killing
each other. The highest officers of the "Regional Revolutionary
Government of the Visayas" protested vigorously to Aguinaldo, [401]
but without result. The situation was entirely beyond his control.

On April 20, 1899, General Delgado issued an order which tells a
significant story of conditions, and of his own weakness in dealing
with them. [402]

In Luzon General Trias of Cavite accused the soldiers and citizens
of his province of committing "robberies, assaults, kidnappings and
crimes which are committed only by barbarous and savage tribes." [403]

That very serious conditions promptly became general is conclusively
shown by the record of Aguinaldo's government for February 24, 1899,
when it decided--

    "that the president of the council shall study such measures
    as will put an end to the continual discord and friction
    between the civil and military authorities of every province,
    in order that fatal consequences may be avoided."

With such conditions prevailing among the Filipinos themselves, it was
to be expected that the laws of civilized warfare would be violated and
that American soldiers taken prisoners would sometimes be treated with
barbarity. Flags of truce were deliberately violated. [404] American
soldiers were trapped, poisoned [405] and murdered in other ways. [406]

It was promptly charged in the United States that American soldiers
were committing barbarities, and Blount has revived these old tales.

I know personally that during the early days of the war Insurgent
prisoners and wounded were treated with the greatest humanity and
kindness.

A part of the Insurgent plan of campaign was the circulation of the
most shocking statements concerning the abuses committed by American
soldiers. I have elsewhere described [407] the fate that overtook
Colonel Arguelles, in part because he told the truth as to the humane
treatment by the Americans of prisoners and wounded.

Not only did some of those who did this forfeit their lives, but
newspaper articles, military orders, and proclamations issued by civil
officers informed the people that the American soldiers stole, burned,
robbed, raped and murdered. Especial stress was laid on their alleged
wholesale violations of women, partly to turn the powerful influence of
the women as a whole against them, and partly to show that they were
no better than the Insurgents themselves, who frequently committed
rape. [408]

These horrible tales were at first believed even by some of the
responsible Insurgent officers in remote regions, [409] but all such
men soon learned the truth, which was known to most of them from
the start.

In official correspondence between them, not intended for the public,
orders were given to use women as bearers of despatches for the
reason that Americans did not search them. [410] More significant
yet, when conditions became bad in the provinces, Insurgent officers
sent their women and children to seek American protection in Manila
or elsewhere. Cartload after cartload of them came in at Angeles,
shortly after General Jacob H. Smith took that place. Aguinaldo himself
followed this procedure, as is shown by the following extracts from
Villa's famous diary: [411]--

    "_December 22._--It was 7 A.M. when we arrived in
    Ambayuan. Here we found the women worn out from the painful
    journey they had suffered. They were seated on the ground. In
    their faces were observed indications of the ravages of
    hunger; but they are always smiling, saying they would prefer
    suffering in these mountains to being under the dominion of
    the Americans, and that such sacrifices are the duties of
    every patriot who loves his country.

    "We secured some camotes in this settlement, cooked them
    immediately, and everybody had breakfast. Our appetites
    were satisfied.

    "The honorable president had already decided some days before
    to send all the women to Manila, including his family, and
    this was his motive in hurrying his family forward with him.



    "_December 24._--We find ourselves still in Talubin. About 8
    o'clock this morning a report came saying the Americans had
    arrived at Bontoc, the provincial capital, the nearest town
    to Talubin, and distant from it two hours by the road. An
    immediate decision was made. The honourable president told
    his family and the other women that they should remain in the
    settlement and allow themselves to be caught by the Americans,
    and he named Senors Sytiar and Paez to remain also, with the
    obligation of conducting the women to Manila. As soon as the
    arrangement was effected, the honourable president prepared
    himself for the march. The parting was a very sad one for
    himself and for his family.

    "The honourable president left Talubin at 11 o'clock in the
    morning, his family and the other women remaining behind with
    two gentlemen charged with conducting them to Manila." [412]

In this, as in all other similar cases, the women were kindly treated
and safely conducted to their destination. Aguinaldo and his fellows
knew the happy fate of the members of his own family, as is shown by
a later entry:--

    "_February 6._--We have been informed that the mother and son
    of the honourable president are at Manila, living in the house
    of Don Benito Legarda, and that they reached that capital long
    before the wife and sister of the honourable president. We have
    also learned that Senor Buencamino, and Tirona, and Concepcion
    are prisoners of the American authorities in Manila. With
    reference to the wife and sister of the honourable president
    and the two Leyba sisters, it is said that they went to Vigan
    and from there went by steamer to Manila." [413]

The mother and son, accompanied by Buencamino, had allowed themselves
to be captured at an earlier date. What shall we say of a leader who
would turn his mother, wife, sister and son over to American soldiers
for safekeeping, and then continue to denounce the latter as murderers,
and violaters of women? Aguinaldo did just this. That the Insurgent
leaders were early and fully aware of the treatment accorded their
wounded is shown by the following extract from a letter to General
Moxica of Leyte, dated March 2, 1900, giving instructions as to what
should be done with wounded men:--

    "If by chance any of our men are wounded on the field or
    elsewhere, efforts must be made to take away the rifles and
    ammunition at once and carry them away as far as possible,
    so that they may not be captured by the enemy; and if the
    wounded cannot be immediately removed elsewhere or retreat
    from the place, let them be left there, because it is better
    to save the arms than the men, as there are many Filipinos
    to fill up the ranks, but rifles are scarce and difficult to
    secure for battle; and besides the Americans, coming upon
    any wounded, take good care of them, while the rifles are
    destroyed; therefore, I repeat, they must endeavour to save
    the arms rather than the men." [414]

There were some rare individual instances in which uninjured Filipinos
were treated with severity, and even with cruelty, by American
soldiers. They occurred for the most part late in the war when the
"water cure" in mild form was sometimes employed in order to compel
persons who had guilty knowledge of the whereabouts of firearms to
tell what they knew, to the end that the perpetration of horrible
barbarities on the common people, and the assassination of those who
had sought American protection, might the more promptly cease. Usually
the sufferers were themselves bloody murderers, who had only to tell
the truth to escape punishment. The men who performed these cruel
acts knew what treatment was being commonly accorded to Filipinos,
and in some instances to their own comrades. I mention these facts to
explain, not to excuse, their conduct. Cruel acts cannot be excused,
but those referred to seldom resulted in any permanent injury to the
men who suffered them, and were the rare and inevitable exceptions
to the general rule that the war was waged, so far as the Americans
were concerned, with a degree of humanity hitherto unprecedented under
similar conditions. The Insurgents violated every rule of civilized
warfare, yet oathbreakers, spies and men fighting in citizens' clothes
not only were not shot by the Americans, as they might very properly
have been, but were often turned loose with a mere warning not to
offend again.

The false news circulated to aid the Insurgent cause was by no means
limited to such matters. Every time their troops made a stand they were
promptly defeated and driven back, but their faltering courage was
bolstered up by glorious tidings of wonderful, but wholly imaginary,
victories won elsewhere. It was often reported that many times more
Americans had fallen in some insignificant skirmish than were actually
killed in the whole war, while generals perished by the dozen and
colonels by the thousand. Our losses on March 27, 1899, in fighting
north of Manila, were said to be twenty-eight thousand. In reality
only fifty-six Americans were killed in all northern Luzon during
the entire month.

On April 26, 1899, the governor of Iloilo published the following
remarkable news items among others:--

    "_Pavia_, April 6th, 1899.

    "The Liberating Army of the Visayan Islands to the Local
    Presidents of the towns shown on the margin:

    "_Towns:_ Santa Barbara, Pavia, Leganes, Zarraga, Dumangas,
    Batac Viejo, Tuilao, Batac Nuevo, Banate.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "Santa Ana taken by Americans burning town our troops advancing
    to Rosario and Escolta Americans request parley account death
    General and officers and many soldiers.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "At 3 P.M. of the 14th battle at Santolan 500 American
    prisoners who are to be taken to Malolos.

    "At 9.45 P.M. Commissioner Laguna details 6000 more Americans
    dead and 600 prisoners.

    "Otis requests parley, and our representatives being present,
    he tells them to request peace and conditions, to which they
    replied that he, and not they, should see to that, so the
    parley accomplished nothing.

    "To-day, Wednesday, a decisive battle will be fought.

    "Among the 5000 prisoners there are two generals. Tomorrow
    7.15 Pasig in our power. Americans little by little leaving
    for Manila.

    "General Malbar to Provincial Chief Batangas.

    "According to reports by telegraph hostilities have commenced
    and all at Santa Mesa have fallen into our hands, also Pasay
    and Maytubig.

    "American boat surrendered at Laguna de Bay many prisoners
    taken.

    "General Ricarte to Provincial Chief of Batangas: Battle
    stopped by truce Japan and Germany intervene to learn who
    provoked war.

    "Foreigners favor parley one American general and chiefs and
    officers dead." [415]

Santa Ana is a suburb of Manila. The Rosario and Escolta are the main
business streets of the city.

Apparently the Insurgents must have thought that colonels were as
numerous in our army as in theirs, for they reported two thousand of
them killed on February 6, 1899, and threw in one general for good
measure. [416]

    *       *       *       *       *

We learn from the _Filipino Herald_ for February 23, 1899, that on that
day the Filipino army captured and occupied the suburbs of Manila,
while American troops were besieged in the outskirts of the city,
at La Loma, and in the neighbouring town of Caloocan. [417]

But why continue. No tale concerning American losses in the Philippines
was too fantastic to be told by the leaders and believed by the
soldiery and the populace. The American soldiers were even said to
be refusing to fight, and great prisons were being constructed in
order properly to punish them.

General MacArthur and his entire staff were captured before March 2,
1900, according to a letter sent to General Moxica of Leyte on that
date. [418]

And what of conditions in the United States during this troubled
period? We learn from the Insurgent records that prior to January 15,
1900, "the Union Army" had met with a new disaster, as a result of
which President McKinley tendered his resignation, being succeeded
by Mr. Bryan. Philippine independence was to be proclaimed on
February 4, 1899. On January 20, "General Otis's successor, John
Waterly, of the democratic party," arrived at Manila with papers and
instructions relative to proclaiming the Philippine Republic. [419]
Things now went from bad to worse. The trouble between democrats
and republicans resulted in an insurrection. Before August, 1901,
President McKinley had brought about strained relations between
Germany and the United States by bribing an anarchist to assassinate
the German Emperor. [420] Before September 15, 1901, he had been
killed by a member of the Democratic party, and the Filipinos could
acclaim their independence. [421]

The first period of the war, which we may term the period of organized
armed resistance, drew rapidly to its close, and there followed the
second period, characterized by guerrilla tactics on the part of
the Insurgents.

On September 14, 1899, Aguinaldo accepted the advice of General Pio
del Pilar, ex-bandit, if indeed he had ever ceased to rob and murder,
and authorized this man, whom he had been again and again asked to
remove, to begin guerrilla warfare in Bulacan. Guerrilla tactics
were duly authorized for, and had been adopted by, Insurgent forces
everywhere before the end of November.

Of this style of fighting Taylor has truly said:--

    "If war in certain of its aspects is a temporary reversion
    to barbarism, guerrilla warfare is a temporary reversion to
    savagery. The man who orders it assumes a grave responsibility
    before the people whose fate is in his hands, for serious
    as is the material destruction which this method of warfare
    entails, the destruction to the orderly habits of mind and
    thought which, at bottom, are civilization, is even more
    serious. Robbery and brigandage, murder and arson follow in
    its wake.

    Guerrilla warfare means a policy of destruction, a policy of
    terror, and never yet, however great may have been the injury
    caused by it, however much it may have prolonged the war
    in which it has been employed, has it secured a termination
    favorable to the people who have chosen it." [422]

The case under discussion furnished no exception to the general rule.

Such semblance of discipline as had previously existed among the
Insurgent soldiers rapidly disappeared. Conditions had been very
bad under the "Republic" and worse during the first period of the
war. During the second period they rapidly became unendurable in
many regions, and the common people were driven into the arms of
the Americans, in spite of threats of death, barbarously carried out
by Insurgent officers, soldiers and agents in thousands of cases. I
have described at some length the conditions which now arose in the
chapter on Murder as a Governmental Agency, to which the reader is
referred for details. [423]

In the effort to protect the towns which showed themselves friendly,
the American forces were divided, subdivided and subdivided again. On
March 1, 1901, they were occupying no less than five hundred two
stations. By December of the same year the number had increased
to six hundred thirty-nine, with an average of less than sixty men
to a post. As a result of the protection thus afforded and of the
humane conduct of our troops, the people turned to us in constantly
increasing numbers.

It remained to stamp out the dying embers of insurrection, while
continuing to seek to protect those who put their trust in us. Further
subdivision of the troops in order to garrison more points was hardly
possible, but field operations were actively pushed. One after another
the Insurgent leaders were captured or voluntarily surrendered. Most
officers of importance issued explanatory statements to the people
shortly after giving up active field operations, whether they
surrendered voluntarily or were taken prisoners. Aguinaldo himself
was captured on March 23, 1901, at Palanan, the northernmost point
on the east coast of Luzon inhabited by civilized people. No place
in the islands, inhabited by Filipinos, is more completely isolated,
and he had long been almost entirely cut off from his followers,
many of whom believed him to be dead. On April 19, 1901, he issued
an address to the Filipino people, in which he clearly recognized
the fact that they wanted peace. He said:--

    "_Manila_, April 19, 1901.

    "To the Filipino People:--

    "I believe that I am not in error in presuming that the
    unhappy fate to which my adverse fortune has led me is not
    a surprise to those who have been familiar day by day with
    the progress of the war. The lessons thus taught, the full
    meaning of which has recently come to my knowledge, suggested
    to me with irresistible force that the complete termination
    of   hostilities and a lasting peace are not only desirable
    but  absolutely essential to the welfare of the Philippines.

    "The Filipinos have never been dismayed by their weakness,
    nor have they faltered in following the path pointed out by
    their fortitude and courage. The time has come, however, in
    which they find their advance along the path impeded by an
    irresistible force--a force which, while it restrains them,
    yet enlightens the mind and opens another course by presenting
    to them the cause of peace. This cause has been joyfully
    embraced by a majority of our fellow-countrymen, who have
    already united around the glorious and sovereign banner of the
    United States. In this banner they repose their trust in the
    belief that under its protection our people will attain all the
    promised liberties which they are even now beginning to enjoy.

    "The country has declared unmistakably in favor of peace; so
    be it. Enough of blood; enough of tears and desolation. This
    wish cannot be ignored by the men still in arms if they are
    animated by no other desire than to serve this noble people
    which has thus clearly manifested its will.

    "So also do I respect this will now that it is known to me,
    and after mature deliberation resolutely proclaim to the world
    that I cannot refuse to heed the voice of a people longing for
    peace, nor the lamentations of thousands of families yearning
    to see their dear ones in the enjoyment of the liberty promised
    by the generosity of the great American nation.

    "By acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the United
    States throughout the entire Archipelago, as I now do without
    any reservation whatsoever, I believe that I am serving thee,
    my beloved country. May happiness be theirs.

    "_Emilio Aguinaldo_. [424]

    "_Manila_, April 19, 1901."

This announcement of Aguinaldo, published in Spanish, Tagalog and
English, undoubtedly hastened the end of the war, but it did not lead
to immediate general surrender, for as Taylor has very truly said:--

    "A force like Aguinaldo's could not be surrendered. It had been
    torn by internal dissensions and the bonds of discipline had
    always been very lax. It had originally been held together
    by a lively expectation of the advantages to be obtained
    from the pillage of Manila. That hope had disappeared, and
    the leaders had become the lords of life and property each
    in his own province. It was a force which could disintegrate,
    but which could not surrender. Only armies can do that. Forces
    over which their leaders have lost all except nominal control
    when beaten do not surrender. They disintegrate by passing
    through the stages of guerrilla warfare, of armed bands of
    highwaymen, of prowling groups of thieves, of sturdy beggars
    who at opportune moments resort to petty larceny." [425]

Aguinaldo's forces now passed through these several stages. Some of
his more important subordinates had previously been captured or had
surrendered. Others, still remaining in the field, now acted on his
advice, more or less promptly. A few remained obdurate for a time,
but as a rule not for long, and soon there remained in the field only
a very limited number of real military leaders, like General Malvar in
Batangas and General Lukban in Samar, and a very considerable number
of bandit chiefs, some of whom had posed as Insurgents. The forces
of the latter were now materially and rapidly augmented by men who
had been Insurgent officers or soldiers and  while serving in this
capacity had become so enamoured of a lawless life that they were now
unwilling to settle down and work for their daily bread, preferring
to continue to live off their long-suffering fellow-countrymen,
whom they robbed and murdered more mercilessly than ever.

The war was practically over. The insurrection had failed. In my
opinion no Filipino who held out to the end for independence compared
in intellectual power with Mabini, and I deem his views as to why
it failed worthy of special attention. At the time of his death,
he left behind a memoir from which I quote the following:--

    "The revolution failed because it was poorly led, because
    its head conquered his place, not by meritorious, but by
    reprehensible actions, because in place of supporting the men
    most useful to the people, he rendered them useless because he
    was jealous of them. Believing that the aggrandizement of the
    people was nothing more than his own personal aggrandizement,
    he did not judge the merits of men by their capacity,
    character, or patriotism, but by the degree of friendship
    and relationship which bound them to him; and wishing to have
    his favorites always ready to sacrifice themselves for him,
    he showed himself complaisant to their faults. Having thus
    secured the people, the people deserted him. And the people
    having deserted him, he had to fall like a wax idol melted
    by the heat of adversity. God forbid that we should forget
    so terrible a lesson learned at the cost of unspeakable
    sufferings." [426]

These are by no means the only reasons why the revolution failed,
but they foredoomed it to failure.

The surrender or capture of the more respectable military element
left the unsurrendered firearms in the hands of men most of whom
were ignorant, many of whom were criminal, and nearly all of whom
were irresponsible and unscrupulous.

Strict enforcement of the rules of civilized warfare against them
was threatened, but not actually resorted to.

The situation was particularly bad in Batangas. General J. F. Bell
was put in charge there, and he found a humane and satisfactory
solution of the existing difficulties in reconcentration--not the
kind of reconcentration which made the Spaniards hated in Cuba, but
a measure of a wholly different sort. This measure and its results
have been concisely described by Taylor, as follows:--

    "General Bell said he was as anxious as any one could be
    to avoid making war against those who really wanted the
    termination of hostilities, and it was his duty to protect
    them against the vengeance of others. Over and above all
    these considerations in importance, however, was the absolute
    necessity of making it impossible for insurgents to procure
    food by levying contributions. Therefore, in order to give
    those who were pacifically inclined an opportunity to escape
    hardship, as far as possible, and preserve their food supply
    for themselves and their families, it was determined to
    establish zones of protection with limits sufficiently near
    all towns to enable the small garrisons thereof to give the
    people living within these zones efficient protection against
    ruinous exactions by insurgents. He accordingly, 'in order to
    put an end to enforced contributions now levied by insurgents
    upon the inhabitants of sparsely settled and outlying barrios
    and districts by means of intimidation and assassination,'
    ordered the commanding officers of all towns in the provinces
    of Batangas and Laguna to 'immediately specify and establish
    plainly marked limits surrounding each town bounding a zone
    within which it may be practicable, with an average-sized
    garrison, to exercise sufficient supervision over and furnish
    protection to inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against
    the depredation of armed insurgents. The limits may include
    the barrios which exist sufficiently near the town to be given
    protection and supervision by the garrison, and should include
    some ground on which live stock could graze, but so situated
    that it can be patrolled and watched. All ungarrisoned towns
    will be garrisoned as soon as troops become available.

    "'Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once
    given and distributed to all the inhabitants within the
    jurisdiction of towns over which they exercise supervision,
    informing them of the danger of remaining outside of these
    limits, and that unless they move by December 25 from outlying
    barrios and districts, with all their movable food supplies,
    including rice, _palay_, [427] chickens, live stock, etc.,
    to within the limits of the zone established at their own
    or nearest town, their property (found outside of said
    zone at said date) will become liable to confiscation or
    destruction. The people will be permitted to move houses
    from outlying districts should they desire to do so, or to
    construct temporary shelter for themselves on any vacant
    land without compensation to the owner, and no owner will be
    permitted to deprive them of the privilege of doing so. In the
    discretion of commanding officers the prices of necessities of
    existence may also be regulated in the interest of those thus
    seeking protection. As soon as peaceful conditions have been
    reestablished in the brigade these persons will be encouraged
    to return to their homes, and such assistance be rendered
    them as may be found practicable.'

    "It was deemed best not to compel the people to enter these
    zones; but they were warned that unless they accepted that
    protection their property, which consisted almost entirely
    of food supplies, would become liable to confiscation or
    destruction, because it might be impossible to determine
    whether it belonged to hostile or peaceful people. To put
    an end to vengeance by assassination, it was determined to
    make use of the right of retaliation conferred by General
    Order 100 issued by President Lincoln in 1863. A circular
    telegram was published announcing an intention to retaliate
    by the execution of prisoners of war in case any more were
    assassinated by insurgents for political reasons. It was not
    found necessary to do this. Assassinations stopped at once.

    "As the campaign progressed it became more and more apparent
    that a large number of poor people had contributed through
    fear, for the power of the insurgents to collect came to
    an end after they had lost their power of intimidation. The
    efficiency of the protection afforded in such zones was the
    determining factor in forming the decision and attitude of
    many of the natives. The protection afforded was efficient,
    and from time to time many additional families entered the
    zones. The sentiment for peace grew stronger steadily and
    natives volunteered assistance to Americans at every hand and
    in every town. When these volunteers were trustworthy they were
    armed and sent out into the mountains from which they brought
    back guns, and insurgents, and hundreds of half-famished
    men, women, and children who, released from the intimidating
    influence of the insurgents, entered the zones of protection.

    "The most serious discomfort experienced by any one within
    these areas was caused to the _mestizo_ ruling group, whose
    members bitterly resented the blow to their prestige in being
    treated like every one else. They had been accustomed to have
    others work for them and obey them blindly. To a man who could
    speak Spanish and who had always been the lord of his _barrio_,
    [428] the possibility of having to cultivate a field with his
    own hands was an unthinkable and scandalous thing. These men
    suffered and suffered acutely; but it was not their bodies
    which suffered--it was their pride.

    "Malvar surrendered on April 16, 1902. Most of the people
    had turned against their once highly respected chief, and
    toward the end several thousand natives of Batangas joined
    the Americans in their determined hunt for the fugitive
    leader. Realization of the fact that the people were against
    him materially aided in forcing his surrender.

    "General Bell had captured or forced to surrender some 8000 to
    10,000 persons actively engaged, in one capacity or another,
    in the insurrection. These prisoners were rapidly released
    when they had taken the oath of allegiance. By the first week
    of July no political prisoners were held in this region. They
    had returned to their homes.

    "The policy of concentrating the people in protected zones
    and destroying the food which was used for the maintenance of
    guerrilla bands was not new. There had been precedents even
    in the United States. One of these is the order issued on
    August 25, 1863, by Brigadier-General Ewing, commanding the
    district of the border, with headquarters at Kansas City, Mo.,
    in which he ordered the inhabitants of a large part of three
    counties of that State to remove from their residences within
    fifteen days to the protection of the military stations which
    he had established. All grain and hay in that district was
    ordered to be taken to those military stations. If it was not
    convenient to so dispose of it, it would be burned (Rebellion
    Records, Series I, Vol. XXII, Part II, p. 473). The American
    commanders in the Philippines had adopted no new method of
    procedure in dealing with war traitors; they had, however,
    effectively employed an old one.

    "The insurrection had originated among the Tagalogs and had
    spread like a conflagration from the territory occupied by
    them. The fire had been quenched everywhere else. General
    Bell had now stamped out the embers in the Tagalog provinces.

    "On July 2 the Secretary of War telegraphed that the
    insurrection against the sovereign authority of the United
    States in the Philippines having come to an end, and provincial
    civil governments having been established throughout the
    entire territory of the archipelago not inhabited by Moro
    tribes, the office of military governor in the archipelago was
    terminated. On July 4, 1902, the President of the United States
    issued a proclamation of amnesty proclaiming, with certain
    reservations, a full and complete pardon and amnesty to all
    persons in the Philippine Archipelago who had participated
    in the insurrection."

General Bell's motives and methods in reconcentrating the inhabitants
of this troubled region have been grossly misrepresented, and he
himself has been sadly maligned. He is the most humane of men, and
the plan which he adopted resulted in the reestablishment of law and
order at a minimum cost of human suffering.

Many of the occupants of his reconcentration camps received there
their first lessons in hygienic living. Many of them were reluctant
to leave the camps and return to their homes when normal conditions
again prevailed.

The number of Filipinos killed during the Batangas campaign was
very small. [429] Blount has sought to make it appear that partly as
an indirect consequence of war there was dreadful mortality there,
citing by way of proof the fact that the Coast and Geodetic Atlas,
published as a part of the report of the first Philippine Commission,
gave the population of Batangas as 312,192, while the census of 1903
gave it as 257,715. [430]

The report of the United States Philippine Commission for 1903
gives the population of Manila as 221,000, while in 1900 it had been
260,000. Does this mean that there had been a holocaust in Manila? Not
at all. It means only that the thousands of Filipinos who had sought
the protection of the American forces there during the period when
they feared their own soldiers in the provinces had mostly returned
to their homes. During the disturbed period in Batangas great numbers
of people took refuge in other and more peaceful regions. Some of
them returned later; others did not.

Blount further quotes a statement in the 1901 report of the Provincial
Secretary of Batangas to the effect that:

    "The mortality, caused no longer by the war, but by disease,
    such as malaria and dysentery, has reduced to a little over
    200,000 the more than 300,000 inhabitants which in former
    years the province had." [431]

Apart from the fact that these figures, showing a mortality of a
hundred thousand from disease alone, are hardly consistent with those
quoted by Blount as showing a decrease in population during a longer
period of only fifty-four thousand four hundred and forty-seven, it is
not apparent why Americans should be charged with deaths due to malaria
or dysentery, since no systematic effort to rid Batangas of these ills
had ever previously been made, and the very thing which then prevented
the adoption of the measures subsequently so successfully put forth
to this end was the disorderly conduct of the people themselves. As a
simple matter of fact, however, there was no such dreadful mortality
from these diseases at this time. Malaria has never been especially bad
in this province, and even cholera, which swept it during the period
in question and is far more readily communicated than is dysentery,
caused only twenty-three hundred and ninety-nine known deaths.

In the end peace was established and prosperity followed in its wake.

This result was brought about in part by the efficient activity of
the armed forces of the United States and in part by the efforts of
the first and second Philippine Commissions. [432]






CHAPTER X

Mr. Bryan and Independence


In order to bring home to some of my Democratic and Anti-Imperialist
friends the unreliable character of the testimony of even the very
high officers of the so-called Philippine Republic, I here quote
certain extracts from the Insurgent records, showing the important
part played, doubtless unwittingly, by Mr. William Jennings Bryan in
Philippine politics during the war. The first of these might properly
have been considered in the chapter entitled "Was Independence
Promised?" Others are instructive in that they show the use made
of false news in bolstering up the Insurgent cause, and might with
propriety have been included in the chapter on "The Conduct of the
War." I have thought it best to keep them by themselves. Further
comment on them would seem to be superfluous.

    "On May 1, 1900 (P.I.R., 516.6), I. de los Santos wrote a
    long letter in Tagalog and cipher to Aguinaldo, in which he
    reported upon the progress of what he would have probably
    called the diplomatic campaign. If this letter is to be
    believed, the agents in the United States of the junta had
    been able to form relations which might be of great value to
    them. Santos said in part:--

    "'Commissioners... Senores Kant (G. Apacible) and Raff
    (Sixto Lopez) duly carried out your last instructions given
    at Tarlac. Senor Del Pan, sailing by way of Japan, about the
    middle of October, and Senor Caney (G. Apacible), sailing by
    way of Europe about the 1st of November, met in Toronto about
    the middle of February following. But before the arrival of
    Kant, Raff had already come from Hayti (United States) and was
    able to pry in upon our political friends and enemies. When
    they met each other they continued the voyage incognito, as
    Raft had done previously, making themselves known to a very
    few people; but later on, and according to the instructions
    carried by Caney, they made themselves known to a greater
    number of people, and have succeeded in interviewing Bryan
    who happened to be in New York. Senor Raff said that Bryan
    feared being present at a conference, lest he might be called
    a traitor by members of his own party, and also by those
    of the opposite or "imperialist" party, who are quite proud
    over the victories they have gained against our people over
    there. Nevertheless, Raff was able to be present and talk at
    some of the anti-imperialist meetings, our political friends
    introducing him as a friend from the committee (at Hongkong)
    and as an advocate of the cessation of the war over there
    in order that our sacred rights may be given consideration
    by them. And as Bryan could not personally take part in the
    conference, he sent a most trusted person, his right-hand man,
    Dr. Gardner. The results of the conference between Senor Raff
    and Dr. Gardner, the latter acting in the name of Mr. Bryan,
    are as follows:--

    "'1st. That we may fight on, and Bryan will never cease to
    defend our sacred rights. 2nd. That we must never mention
    Bryan's name in our manifestos and proclamations, lest the
    opposite party might say he is a traitor. 3rd. That we are in
    the right; and hence he promised in the name of Bryan that if
    this Senor Bryan is victorious in the presidential campaign,
    he will recognize our independence without delay. Your honored
    self can easily conclude from all the foregoing that Senor Del
    Pan, after the receipt of these promises, concurred with him;
    and he returned to inform Senor Apacible about the results
    of the conference. So these two studied over the plan of
    the policy to be adopted and carried out. I write you what
    their opinions are, viz.: 1st, that they will reside there,
    pending the outcome of the presidential contest, aiding the
    propaganda and enlivening it until November, the date set for
    the desired thing. Owing to what Dr. Gardner said and promised
    in the name of Bryan, some one ought to stay there in order
    that Bryan may be approached, if he is elected, so he can
    sign the recognition of our independence; and this should
    be done at once, lest in his excitement over the victory
    he should forget his promise. 3rd. For carrying out the two
    propositions just mentioned, they request 2000 pounds sterling,
    that is $20,000 in silver, to be used for the propaganda,
    for paying newspapers and for bribing senators--this last
    clause is somewhat dangerous and impossible. And 4th, that
    the money must be sent immediately, and that you should be
    informed not to mention the name of Bryan in the manifestos
    and proclamations.

    "'In order to answer quickly and decisively that proposition,
    and as I did not have the desired money here, I answered as
    follows: "Plan approved; for the sake of economy we have
    decided that one of the two retire, but before doing so
    make arrangements, establish communications with leaders of
    Bryan's party, and he who remains should thus cultivate the
    relations; he who is to retire will locate himself in Paris
    near Senor Katipalad (Agoncillo) with whom he will secretly
    discuss political problems that may arise. So he will watch
    for the opportune moment of Bryan's election, in order to go
    immediately to Hayti and formally arrange the contract with
    Bryan." [433]

    *       *       *       *       *

    "'By the end of 1899, by the time guerrilla warfare was well
    under way, by the time that any Filipino government, unless
    an expression of the unfettered will of the nearest bandit
    who can muster a dozen rifles may be called a government,
    had ceased to exist, a strong opposition to the policy of the
    administration had arisen in the United States and a demand for
    the recognition of the independence of the Philippines. The
    junta in Hongkong were assured that the Democratic party
    would come into power in the next elections and that this
    would mean the success of the patriotic efforts of Aguinaldo
    and his followers. The news was good and was forthwith spread
    abroad in "Extracts from our correspondence with America,"
    "News from our foreign agents," "News from America," and
    "Translations from the foreign press"--circulars and handbills
    printed on thin paper which were smuggled into the Philippines
    and passed into the hands of the guerrilla leaders who could
    read Spanish. They gathered their followers about them and
    told them that a powerful party had arisen in America which
    was going to give them all they had ever asked for. They had
    only to fight on, for success was certain. In America the
    "Anti-imperialists" were hanging the "Imperialists," and
    they should continue to harry the American adherents among
    the natives of the Philippines.

    "'There are a number of these publications among the papers
    captured from the insurgents, and the adoption of this method
    of propaganda seems to have been nearly coincident with
    Aguinaldo's orders declaring guerrilla warfare. It does not
    seem likely that the matter contained in them was supplied by
    a Filipino, for if it was he assumed a general acquaintance
    among the people with American politics and American methods
    which they were far from possessing.

    "'In these publications the Filipinos were assured that
    the Imperialists were kept in power only by the lavish
    contributions of the "truts," whatever they may have been;
    but the people of the United States were growing weary of their
    domination and were about to return to the true principles of
    Washington and Jefferson. The illustrious Americans "Crosvy
    Stickney, and Vartridge" were all laboring for the cause
    of Philippine independence. Long lists of American cities
    were given in which the illustrious orators Mr. Croshy
    and Mr. Schurts had addressed applauding crowds upon the
    necessity of throttling the "truts" because they opposed
    recognition of the rights of the Filipinos. In August, 1900,
    "News from our agents in America" informed its readers that--

        "'"W. J. Bryan has stated in a speech that his first
        act upon being elected President will be to declare
        the independence of the Philippines."

    "'On June 16, 1900, Gen. Riego de Dios, acting head of
    the Hongkong junta, wrote to Gen. I. Torres (P.I.R., 530),
    the guerrilla commander in Bulacan Province, and assured
    him that a little more endurance, a little more constancy,
    was all that was needed to secure the attainment of their
    ends. According to their advices the Democratic party would
    win in the approaching elections in the United States, and--"it
    is certain that Bryan is the incarnation of our independence."

    "'The number of men opposed to the policy of the administration
    was said to be continually increasing.

    "'The attitude of those who protect us cannot be more manly
    and resolute: "Continue the struggle until you conquer or
    die." Mr. Beecher of the League in Cincinnati writes us:
    "I shall always be the champion of the cause of justice and
    of truth," says Mr. Winslow of the Boston League. "Not even
    threats of imprisonment will make me cease in my undertaking,"
    Doctor Denziger assures us. "I shall accept every risk and
    responsibility," says Doctor Leverson. "If it is necessary, I
    shall go so far as to provoke a revolution in my own country,"
    repeats Mr. Udell. "It is necessary to save the Republic and
    democracy from the abyss of imperialism and save the worthy
    Filipinos from oppression and extermination" is cried by
    all, and the sound of this cry is ever rising louder and
    louder.'" [434]

Extract from a letter of Papa Isio [435] dated March 4, 1901:--

    "I have received from Luzon an order to proceed more rapidly
    with my operations this month, as Bryan ordered Emilio to keep
    the war going vigorously until April, and he also said that
    if independence was not given the Philippines by that time,
    he, Bryan, and his followers would rise in arms against the
    oppressors." [436]

    "_Tarlac_, Oct. 26, 1899.

    "To the Military Governor of This City, and To the Secretary
    of the Interior.

    "As a meeting shall be held on the morning of Sunday next
    in the Presidential Palace of this Republic in return for
    that held in the United States by Mr. Bryan, who drank to
    the name of our Honourable President as one of the heroes of
    the world, and for the purpose of celebrating it with more
    pomp and contributing to it the greater splendor with your
    personnel, I will be obliged to you if you will please call
    at this office to confer with me on the matter.

    "God preserve you, etc.

    (Signed) "_F. Buencamino_." [437]

In a letter written by A. Flores, acting secretary of war, to the
military governor of Tarlac on October 27, 1899, there occurs the
following:--

    "In the United States meetings and banquets have been held in
    honor of our Honourable President, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, who
    was pronounced one of the heroes of the world by Mr. Bryan,
    future president of the United States. The Masonic Society,
    therefore, interpreting the unanimous desires of the people,
    and with the approval of the government, will on Sunday the
    29th instant, organize a meeting or popular assembly in the
    interest of national independence and in honor of Mr. Bryan
    of the anti-imperialist party, the defenders of our cause in
    the United States. The meeting will consist of two functions;
    first--at nine A.M. of the 29th the assembly will convene in a
    suitable place, a national hymn will inaugurate the exercises,
    after which appropriate addresses will be delivered; and
    second--at four P.M. a popular demonstration will take place
    throughout the town, with bands of music parading the streets;
    residents will decorate and illuminate their houses.

    "Which I have the pleasure of transmitting to you for your
    information and guidance and for that of the troops under
    your command." [438]






CHAPTER XI

The First Philippine Commission


I have elsewhere mentioned the appointment of the First Philippine
Commission.

On January 18, 1899, its civilian members met at Washington and
received the President's instructions.

We were to aid in "the most humane, pacific and effective extension
of authority throughout these islands, and to secure, with the least
possible delay, the benefits of a wise and generous protection of
life and property to the inhabitants."

We were directed to meet at the earliest possible day in the city
of Manila and to announce by a public proclamation our presence
and the mission intrusted to us, carefully setting forth that while
the established military government would be continued as long as
necessity might require, efforts would be made to alleviate the burden
of taxation, to establish industrial and commercial prosperity and
to provide for the safety of persons and property by such means as
might be found conducive to those ends.

We were to endeavour, without interfering with the military
authorities, to ascertain what amelioration in the condition of the
inhabitants and what improvements in public order were practicable,
and for this purpose were to study attentively the existing social and
political state of the several populations, particularly as regarded
the forms of local government, the administration of justice, the
collection of customs and other taxes, the means of transportation and
the need of public improvements, reporting through the Department of
State the results of our observations and reflections, and recommending
such executive action as might, from time to time, seem to us wise
and useful.

We were authorized to recommend suitable persons for appointment
to offices, made necessary by personal changes in the existing
civil administration, from among the inhabitants who had previously
acknowledged their allegiance to the American government.

We were to "ever use due respect for all the ideals, customs and
institutions of the tribes which compose the population, emphasizing
upon all occasions the just and beneficent intentions of the United
States," and were commissioned on account of our "knowledge, skill, and
integrity as bearers of the good-will, the protection and the richest
blessings of a liberating rather than a conquering nation." [439]

Nothing could be more false than Blount's insinuation that we were
sent out to help Otis run the war. [440] There was no war when
we started, and we were expressly enjoined from interfering with
the military government or its officers. We were sent to deliver a
message of good-will, to investigate, and to recommend, and there
our powers ended.

Mr. Schurman and I, with a small clerical force, sailed from Vancouver,
January 31, 1899. On our arrival at Yokohama we learned with keen
regret of the outbreak of hostilities at Manila.

Blount has incorrectly stated that President McKinley had sent the
commission out when the dogs of war were already let loose. [441] The
dogs of war had not been loosed when we started, and one of the main
purposes in sending us was to keep them in their kennels if possible.

Aguinaldo has made the following statements in his "Resena Veridica":--

    "... We, the Filipinos, would have received said commission,
    as honourable agents of the great America, with demonstrations
    of true kindness and entire adhesion. The commissioners would
    have toured over all our provinces, seeing and observing
    at close range order and tranquillity, in the whole of
    our territory. They would have seen the fields tilled
    and planted. They would have examined our Constitution and
    public administration, in perfect peace, and they would have
    experienced and enjoyed that ineffable charm of our Oriental
    manner, a mixture of abandon and solicitude, of warmth and of
    frigidity, of confidence and of suspiciousness, which makes
    our relations with foreigners change into a thousand colours,
    agreeable to the utmost.

    "Ah! but this landscape suited neither General Otis nor the
    Imperialists! For their criminal intention it was better that
    the American commissioners should find war and desolation
    in the Philippines, perceiving from the day of their arrival
    the fetid stench emitted by the mingled corpses of Americans
    and Filipinos. For their purposes it was better that that
    gentleman, Mr. Schurman, President of the Commission, could not
    leave Manila, limiting himself to listen to the few Filipinos,
    who, having yielded to the reasonings of gold, were partisans
    of the Imperialists. It was better that the commission should
    contemplate the Philippine problem through conflagrations,
    to the whiz of bullets, on the transverse light of all the
    unchained passions, in order that it might not form any exact
    or complete opinion of the natural and proper limits of said
    problem. Ah! it was better, in short, that the commission
    should leave defeated in not having secured peace, and would
    blame me and the other Filipinos, when I and the whole Filipino
    people anxiously desired that peace should have been secured
    before rather than now, but an honourable and worthy peace
    for the United States and for the Philippine Republic." [442]

These statements, made to deceive the public, make interesting reading
in the light of our present knowledge as to the purposes and plans
of Aguinaldo and his associates.

On our arrival at Yokohama we were promptly informed by a secretary
from the United States Legation that no less a personage than Marquis
Ito had been in frequent communication with the Filipinos since 1894,
that they had been looking to him for advice and support, and that
he had interested himself in the present situation sufficiently to
come to the American minister and offer to go to the Philippines,
not in any sense as an agent of the United States, but as a private
individual, and to use his influence in our behalf. His contention
was that the then existing conditions resulted from misunderstandings.

He said that Americans did not understand Asiatics, but he was an
Asiatic himself and did understand the Filipinos, and thought that he
could settle the whole affair. The minister had cabled to Washington
for instructions. Naturally the offer was not accepted.

I was reminded, by this extraordinary incident, of a previous
occurrence. I spent the month of March, 1893, in Tokio when returning
from my second visit to the Philippines, and was kindly invited to
inspect the zooelogical work at the Imperial University. When I visited
the institution for that purpose, I was questioned very closely on
the islands, their people and their resources. The gentlemen who
interrogated me may have been connected with the university, but I
doubt it.

We reached Hongkong on February 22. Here I had an interview with
Dr. Apacible of the junta, while Mr. Schurman visited Canton. Apacible
told me that the Filipinos wanted an independent republic under an
American protectorate. Pressed for the details of their desires, he
said that "the function of a protector is to protect." Further than
that he could not go. I tried to convince him of the hopelessness
of the course the Filipinos were then pursuing and of the kindly
intentions of my government, but felt that I made no impression on him.

We arrived at Manila on March 4, 1899, too late to land. Firebugs were
abroad. We watched a number of houses burn, and heard the occasional
crackle of rifle fire along the line of the defences around the
city. The next morning there was artillery fire for a time at San
Pedro Macati. Everywhere were abundant evidences that the war was on.

This left little for us to do at the moment except to inform ourselves
as to conditions, especially as Colonel Denby had not yet arrived,
and General Otis was overwhelmed with work and anxiety.

I renewed my acquaintance with many old Filipino and Spanish friends
and improved the opportunity, not likely to recur in my experience,
to see as much as possible of the fighting in the field.

One day when I was at San Pedro Macati, Captain Dyer, who commanded
a battery of 3.2-inch guns there, suggested that if I wished to
investigate the effect of shrapnel fire I could do so by visiting
a place on a neighbouring hillside which he indicated. Acting upon
his suggestion, I set out, accompanied by my private secretary, who,
like myself, was clad in white duck. The Insurgent sharpshooters on
the other side of the river devoted some attention to us, but we knew
that so long as they aimed at us we were quite safe. Few of their
bullets came within hearing distance.

We were hunting about on the hillside for the place indicated by
Captain Dyer, when suddenly we heard ourselves cursed loudly and
fluently in extremely plain American, and there emerged from a
neighbouring thicket a very angry infantry officer. On venturing to
inquire the cause of his most uncomplimentary remarks, I found that he
was in command of skirmishers who were going through the brush to see
whether there was anything left there which needed shooting up. As
many of the Insurgent soldiers dressed in white, and as American
civilians were not commonly to be met in Insurgent territory, these
men had been just about to fire on us when they discovered their
mistake. We went back to Manila and bought some khaki clothes.

At first my interest in military matters was not appreciated by my army
friends, who could not see what business I had to be wandering around
without a gun in places where guns were in use. I had, however, long
since discovered that reliable first-hand information on any subject
is likely to be useful sooner or later, and so it proved in this case.

For several weeks after we reached Manila there was no active military
movement; then came the inauguration of the short, sharp campaign
which ended for the moment with the taking of Malolos. For long,
tedious weeks our soldiers had sweltered in muddy trenches, shot at
by an always invisible foe whom they were not allowed to attack. It
was anticipated that when the forward movement began, it would be
active. Close secrecy was maintained with regard to it. Captain
Hedworth Lambton, of the British cruiser _Powerful_, then lying
in Manila Bay, exacted a promise from me that I would tell him if
I found out when the advance was to begin, so that we might go to
Caloocan together and watch the fighting from the church tower,
which commanded a magnificent view of the field of operations.

I finally heard a fairly definite statement that our troops would
move the following morning. I rushed to General Otis's office and
after some parleying had it confirmed by him. It was then too late to
advise Lambton, and in fact I could not properly have done so, as the
information had been given me under pledge of secrecy. Accompanied
by my private secretary, Dr. P. L. Sherman, I hastened to Caloocan,
where we arrived just at dusk, having had to run the gantlet of
numerous inquisitive sentries _en route_.

We spent the night in the church, where General Wheaton and his staff
had their headquarters, and long before daylight were perched in
a convenient opening in its galvanized iron roof, made on a former
occasion by a shell from Dewey's fleet.

From this vantage point we could see the entire length of the line
of battle. The attack began shortly after daylight. Near Caloocan
the Insurgent works were close in, but further off toward La Loma
they were in some places distant a mile or more from the trenches of
the Americans.

The general plan of attack was that the whole American line should
rotate to the north and west on Caloocan as a pivot, driving the
Insurgents in toward Malabon if possible. The latter began to fire
as soon as the American troops showed themselves, regardless of the
fact that their enemies were quite out of range. As most of them were
using black-powder cartridges, their four or five miles of trenches
were instantly outlined. The ground was very dry so that the bullets
threw up puffs of dust where they struck, and it was possible to
judge the accuracy of the fire of each of the opposing forces.

Rather heavy resistance was encountered on the extreme right, and
the turning movement did not materialize as rapidly as had been
hoped. General Wheaton, who was in command of the forces about
the church, finally moved to the front, and as we were directly in
the rear of his line and the Insurgents, as usual, overshot badly,
we found ourselves in an uncomfortably hot corner. Bullets rattled
on the church roof like hail, and presently one passed through the
opening through which Major Bourns, Colonel Potter, of the engineer
corps, and I were sticking our heads. Immediately thereafter we
were observed by Dr. Sherman making record time on all fours along
one of the framing timbers of the church toward its tower. There we
took up our station, and thereafter observed the fighting by peeping
through windows partially closed with blocks of volcanic tuff. We
had a beautiful opportunity to see the artillery fire. The guns were
directly in front of and below us and we could watch the laying of
the several pieces and then turn our field-glasses on the particular
portions of the Insurgent trenches where the projectiles were likely to
strike. Again and again we caught bursting shells in the fields of our
glasses and could thus see their effect as accurately as if we had been
standing close by, without any danger of being perforated by shrapnel.

After the Insurgent position had been carried we walked forward
to their line of trenches and followed it east to a point beyond
the La Loma Church, counting the dead and wounded, as I had heard
wild stories of tremendous slaughter and wanted to see just how
much damage the fire of our troops had really done. On our way we
passed the Caloocan railroad station which had been converted into
a temporary field hospital. Here I saw good Father McKinnon, the
champlain of the First California Volunteers, assisting a surgeon
and soaked with the blood of wounded men. He was one chaplain in a
thousand. It was always easy to find him. One had only to look where
trouble threatened and help was needed. He was sure to be there.

On my way from the railway station to the trenches I met a very much
excited officer returning from the front. He had evidently had a long
and recent interview with Cyrus Noble, [443] and was determined to
tell me all about the fighting. I escaped from him after some delay,
and with much difficulty. Later he remembered having met me, but
made a grievous mistake as to the scene of our encounter, insisting
that we had been together in "Wheaton's Hole," an uncommonly hot
position where numerous people got hurt. He persisted in giving a
graphic account of our experiences, and in paying high tribute to
my coolness and courage under heavy fire. My efforts to persuade him
that I had not been with him there proved futile, and I finally gave
up the attempt. I wonder how many other military reputations rest
upon so slender a foundation! This experience was unique. I never
saw another officer under the influence of liquor when in the field.

At the time that we visited the Insurgent trenches, not all of our
own killed and wounded had been removed, yet every wounded Insurgent
whom we found had a United States army canteen of water at his side,
obviously left by some kindly American soldier. Not a few of the
injured had been furnished hardtack as well. All were ultimately
taken to Manila and there given the best of care by army surgeons.

Sometime later a most extraordinary account of this fight, written by a
soldier, was published in the _Springfield Republican_. It was charged
that our men had murdered prisoners in cold blood, and had committed
all manner of barbarities, the writer saying among other things:--

    "We first bombarded a town called Malabon and then entered
    it and killed every man, woman and child in the place."

The facts were briefly as follows: There was an Insurgent regiment in
and near a mangrove swamp to the right of this town. When it became
obstreperous it was shelled for a short time until it quieted down
again. None of the shells entered the town. Indeed, most of them
struck in the water. Our troops did not enter Malabon that day,
but passed to the northward, leaving behind a small guard to keep
the Insurgents from coming out of Malabon in their rear. Had they
then entered the town, they would not have found any women, children
or non-combatant men to kill for the reason that all such persons
had been sent away some time before. The town was burned, in part,
but by the Insurgents themselves. They fired the church and a great
orphan asylum, and did much other wanton damage.

Being able to speak from personal observation as to the occurrences of
that day, I sent a long cablegram direct to the _Chicago Times-Herald_
stating the facts. After my return to the United States, President
McKinley was kind enough to say to me that if there had been no
other result from the visit of the first Philippine Commission to the
islands than the sending of that cablegram, he should have considered
the expense involved more than justified. He added that the country
was being flooded at the time with false and slanderous rumours,
and people at home did not know what to believe. The statements of
army officers were discounted in advance, and other testimony from
some unprejudiced source was badly needed.

On April 2, 1899, Colonel Denby arrived, and our serious work
began. The fighting continued and there was little that we could
do save earnestly to strive to promote friendly relations with the
conservative element among the Filipinos, and to gather the information
we had been instructed to obtain.

On April 4, 1899, we issued a proclamation setting forth in clear and
simple language the purposes of the American government. [444] It was
translated into Tagalog and other dialects and widely circulated. The
Insurgent leaders were alert to keep the common people and the soldiers
from learning of the kindly purposes of the United States. They were
forbidden to read the document and we were reliably informed that
the imposition of the death penalty was threatened if this order was
violated. In Manila crowds of Filipinos gathered about copies of the
proclamation which were posted in public places. Many of them were
soon effaced by Insurgent agents or sympathizers.

This document unquestionably served a very useful purpose. [445]
For one thing, it promptly brought us into much closer touch with
the more conservative Filipinos.

We soon established relations of friendliness and confidence with men
like Arellano, Torres, Legarda and Tavera, who had left the Malolos
government when it demonstrated its futility, and were ready to turn
to the United States for help. Insurgent sympathizers also conferred
freely with us. We were invited to a beautiful function given in our
honour at the home of a wealthy family, and were impressed, as no one
can fail to be, with the dignified bearing of our Filipino hosts,
a thing which is always in evidence on such occasions. We gave a
return function which was largely attended and greatly aided in the
establishment of relations of confidence and friendship with leading
Filipino residents of Manila.

The Filipinos were much impressed with Colonel Denby. He was a handsome
man, of imposing presence, with one of the kindest hearts that ever
beat. They felt instinctively that they could have confidence in him,
and showed it on all occasions.

Meanwhile we lost no opportunity to inform ourselves as to
conditions and events, conferring with Filipinos from various parts
of the archipelago and with Chinese, Germans, Frenchmen, Belgians,
Austrians, Englishmen, Spaniards and Americans. Among the witnesses
who came before us were farmers, bankers, brokers, merchants,
lawyers, physicians, railroad men, shipowners, educators and public
officials. Certainly all classes of opinion were represented, and
when we were called upon by the President, a little later, for a
statement of the situation we felt fully prepared to make it.

Blount has charged that the commission attempted to interfere with the
conduct of the war, and cites a cablegram from General Otis stating
that conferences with Insurgents cost soldiers' lives in support of
this contention. No conference with Insurgent leaders was ever held
without the previous knowledge and approval of the general, who was
himself a member of the commission.

Late in April General Luna sent Colonel Arguelles of his staff to ask
for a fifteen days' suspension of hostilities under the pretext of
enabling the Insurgent congress to meet at San Fernando, Pampanga,
on May 1, to discuss the situation and decide what it wanted to
do. He called on the commission and urged us to ask Otis to grant
this request, but we declined to intervene, and General Otis refused
to grant it.

Mabini continued Luna's effort, sending Arguelles back with letters to
Otis and to the commission. In the latter he asked for "an armistice
and a suspension of hostilities as an indispensable means of arriving
at peace," stating explicitly that the Philippine government "does not
solicit the armistice to gain a space of time in which to reenforce
itself."

The commission again referred Arguelles to General Otis on the matter
of armistice and suspension of hostilities. We suspected that the
statement that these things were not asked for in order to gain time
was false, and this has since been definitely established.

Taylor says:--

    "On April 11 Mabini wrote to General Luna (Exhibit 719) that
    Aguinaldo's council was of the opinion that no negotiations
    for the release of the Spanish prisoners should be considered
    unless the American Commission agreed to a suspension of
    hostilities for the purpose of treating, not only in regard
    to the prisoners, but for the purpose of opening negotiations
    between Aguinaldo's government and the American authorities.

    "'In arriving at this decision we have been actuated by the
    desire to gain time for our arsenals to produce sufficient
    cartridges, if, as would seem to be probable, they persist in
    not even recognizing our belligerency, as means for furthering
    the recognition of our independence.'" [446]

Arguelles, on his return, was instructed to ask Otis for a--

    "general armistice and suspension of hostilities in all the
    archipelago for the short space of three months, in order to
    enable it to consult the opinion of the people concerning
    the government which would be the most advantageous,
    and the intervention in it which should be given to the
    North American Government, and to appoint an extraordinary
    commission with full powers, to act in the name of the
    Philippine people." [447]

General Otis naturally again declined to grant the request for a
suspension of hostilities.

Little came of the conference between Arguelles and the commission,
except that we really succeeded in convincing him of the good
intentions of our government, and this promptly got him into very
serious trouble, as we shall soon see. I took him to a tent hospital
on the First Reserve Hospital grounds where wounded Insurgents were
receiving the best of treatment at the hands of American surgeons,
and he was amazed. He had been taught to believe that the Americans
murdered prisoners, raped women, and committed similar barbarities
whenever they got a chance. As we have seen, stories of this sort
were industriously spread by many of the Insurgent leaders among
their soldiers, and among the common people as well. They served
to arouse the passions of the former, and stirred them up to acts
of devilish brutality which they might perhaps not otherwise have
perpetrated. Arguelles told the truth upon his return, and this,
together with his suggestion that it might be well to consider the
acceptance of the form of government offered by the United States,
nearly cost him his life. Relative to this matter Taylor says:--

    "When Arguelles returned to the insurgent lines, it must have
    been considered that he had said too much in Manila. While he
    had been sent there to persuade the Americans to agree to a
    suspension of hostilities to be consumed in endless discussion
    under cover of which Luna's army could be reorganized, he had
    not only failed to secure the desired armistice, but had come
    back with the opinion that it might after all be advisable
    to accept the government proposed by the United States. On
    May 22 General Luna ordered his arrest and trial for being in
    favour of the autonomy of the United States in the Philippine
    Islands. He was tried promptly, the prosecuting witness
    being another officer of Luna's staff who had accompanied
    him to Manila and acted as a spy upon his movements (P.I.R.,
    285. 2). The court sentenced him to dismissal and confinement
    at hard labor for twelve years. This did not satisfy Luna's
    thirst for vengeance, and he was imprisoned in Bautista on the
    first floor of a building whose second story was occupied by
    that officer. One night Luna came alone into the room where
    he was confined and told him that although he was a traitor,
    yet he had done good service to the cause; and it was not
    proper that a man who had been a colonel in the army should
    be seen working on the roads under a guard. He told him that
    the proper thing for him to do was to blow his brains out,
    and that if he did not do it within a reasonable time the
    sentinel at his door would shoot him. He gave him a pistol
    and left the room. Arguelles decided not to kill himself,
    but fully expected that the guard would kill him. Shortly
    afterwards Luna was summoned to meet Aguinaldo, and never
    returned. On September 29, 1899, his sentence was declared
    null and void and he was reinstated in his former rank (P.I.R.,
    285. 3, and 2030. 2)." [448]

Colonel Arguelles has told me exactly the same story. For a time it
seemed as if the views expressed by him might prevail.

    "According to Felipe Buencamino and some others, the
    majority of the members of congress had been in favour of
    absolute independence until they saw the demoralization of
    the officers and soldiers which resulted in the American
    occupation of Malolos. In the middle of April, 1899, they
    remembered Arellano's advice, and all of the intelligent
    men in Aguinaldo's government, except Antonio Luna and the
    officers who had no desire to lay down their military rank,
    decided to accept the sovereignty of the United States. At
    about the same time copies of the proclamation issued by the
    American Commission in Manila reached them and still further
    influenced them toward the adoption of this purpose. By the
    time congress met in San Isidro on May 1, 1899, all of the
    members had accepted it except a few partisans of Mabini,
    then president of the council of government. At its first
    meeting the congress resolved to change the policy of war with
    the United States to one of peace, and this change of policy
    in congress led to the fall of Mabini and his succession by
    Paterno. The first act of the new council was the appointment
    of a commission headed by Felipe Buencamino which was to go
    to Manila and there negotiate with the American authorities
    for an honourable surrender." [449]

    "Although Mabini had fallen from power, Luna and his powerful
    faction had still to be reckoned with. He was less moderate
    than Mabini, and had armed adherents, which Mabini did not, and
    when Paterno declared his policy of moderation and diplomacy
    he answered it on the day the new council of government was
    proclaimed by an order that all foreigners living in the
    Philippines except Chinese and Spaniards, should leave for
    Manila within forty-eight hours." [450]

Unfortunately Luna intercepted the Buencamino commission. Its head
he kicked, cuffed and threatened with a revolver. One of its members
was General Gregorio del Pilar. He was allowed to proceed, as he
commanded a brigade of troops which might have deserted had he been
badly treated, but Luna named three other men to go with him in place
of those who had been originally appointed. [451] They were Gracio
Gonzaga, Captain Zialcita, and Alberto Baretto. They reached Manila
on May 19, 1899, and during their stay there had two long interviews
with the commission.

They said that they had come, with larger powers than had been
conferred on Arguelles, to discuss the possibility of peace, the
form of ultimate government which might be proposed in future, and
the attitude of the United States government toward needed reforms.

Meanwhile, on May 4, we had laid before the President a plan of
government informally discussed with Arguelles, and had received the
following reply, authorizing, in substance, what we had suggested:--

    "Washington, May 5, 1899, 10.20 P.M.

    "Schurman, Manila:

    "Yours 4th received. You are authorized to propose that
    under the military power of the President, pending action of
    Congress, government of the Philippine Islands shall consist
    of a governor-general, appointed by the President; cabinet,
    appointed by the governor-general; a general advisory council
    elected by the people; the qualifications of electors to be
    carefully considered and determined; the governor-general
    to have absolute veto. Judiciary strong and independent;
    principal judges appointed by the President. The cabinet
    and judges to be chosen from natives or Americans, or both,
    having regard to fitness. The President earnestly desires the
    cessation of bloodshed, and that the people of the Philippine
    Islands at an early date shall have the largest measure of
    local self-government consistent with peace and good order.

    "_Hay_." [452]

Our proclamation of April 4, 1899, was also taken up at their request
and was gone over minutely, sentence by sentence. We were asked to
explain certain expressions which they did not fully understand.

They told us that it would be hard for their army to lay down its
arms when it had accomplished nothing, and asked if it could be taken
into the service of the United States. We answered that some of the
regiments might be taken over and employment on public works be found
for the soldiers of others.

We endeavoured to arrange for an interview with Aguinaldo, either
going to meet him or assuring him safe conduct should he desire to
confer with us at Manila.

They left, promising to return in three weeks when they had had time
to consider the matters under discussion, but they never came back.

Shortly thereafter there was an odd occurrence. Soon after our
arrival we had learned that Mr. Schurman was a man of very variable
opinions. He was rather readily convinced by plausible arguments,
but sometimes very suddenly reversed his views on an important subject.

At the outset Archbishop Nozaleda made a great impression upon
him. The Archbishop was a thoroughgoing Spaniard of the old school,
and entertained somewhat radical opinions as to what should be done
to end the distressing situation which existed. After talking with
him Mr. Schurman seemed to be convinced that we ought to adopt a
stern and bloody policy, a conclusion to which Colonel Denby and I
decidedly objected.

A little later he made a trip up the Pasig River with Admiral Dewey
and others and had a chance to see something of the aftermath of
war. It was not at all pretty. It never is. I was waiting for him
with a carriage at the river landing on his return and had hard work
to keep him away from the cable office. His feelings had undergone a
complete revulsion. He insisted that if the American people knew what
we were doing they would demand that the war be terminated immediately
at any cost and by whatsoever means, and he wanted to tell them all
about it at once. By the next morning, however, things fortunately
looked rather differently to him.

Mr. Schurman acquired a working knowledge of the Spanish language
with extraordinary promptness. Shortly thereafter Colonel Denby and
I discovered that when Filipinos came to see the commission in order
to impart information or to seek it, he was conferring with them
privately and sending them away without our seeing them at all.

Soon after we had made our formal statement of the situation to the
President, Mr. Schurman had an interview with an Englishman who had
been living in Insurgent territory north of Manila, from which he had
just been ejected, in accordance with Luna's order. This man told
him all about the mistakes of the Americans and evidently greatly
impressed him, for shortly thereafter he read to us at a commission
meeting a draft of a proposed cablegram which he said he hoped we would
approve. It would have stultified us, had we signed it, as it involved
in effect the abandonment of the position we had so recently taken
and a radical change in the policy we had recommended. Mr. Schurman
told us that if we did not care to sign it, he would send it as an
expression of his personal opinion. Colonel Denby asked him if his
personal opinion differed from his official opinion, and received an
affirmative reply. We declined to approve the proposed cablegram,
whereupon he informed us that if his policy were adopted, he and
General Aguinaldo would settle things without assistance from us,
and that otherwise he would resign. He inquired whether we, too,
would send a cable, and we told him certainly not, unless further
information from us was requested. He sent his proposed message,
in somewhat modified form, and received a prompt reply instructing
him to submit it to the full commission and cable their views.

He did submit it to Colonel Denby and myself at a regularly called
commission meeting, argued that in doing this he had obeyed the
President's instructions, and vowed that he would not show it to
General Otis. I showed it to the General myself, allowing him to
believe that I did so with Mr. Schurman's approval, and thus avoided
serious trouble, as he had been personally advised from Washington
of the instructions to Mr. Schurman. The General then joined with
Colonel Denby and myself in a cablegram setting forth our views,
and so this incident ended.

Mr. Schurman did not resign, but thereafter we saw very little of
him. He made a hasty trip to the Visayas and the Southern Islands
and sailed for the United States shortly after his return to Manila,
being anxious to get back in time for the opening of the college year
at Cornell.

Colonel Denby and I were instructed to remain at Manila, where we
rendered such assistance as we could give, and continued to gather
information relative to the situation, the country and the people. In
this latter work we were given invaluable help by Jesuit priests,
who prepared for us a comprehensive monograph embodying a very large
amount of valuable information, and furnished us a series of new maps
as well. The latter were subsequently published by the United States
Coast and Geodetic Survey in the form of an Atlas of the Philippines.

Early in September we had a most interesting interview with Sr. Jose de
Luzuriaga, a distinguished and patriotic Filipino from western <DW64>s,
where American sovereignty had been accepted without resistance. Up
to that time it had been possible for the people of <DW64>s to keep
out Tagalog invaders. Sr. Luzuriaga assured us that so long as this
condition continued, there would be no trouble, and he was quite right.

Aguinaldo's agents eventually gained a foothold there for a short time,
and did some mischief, but it did not result very seriously.

We felt an especial interest in this island, as General Otis had
asked us carefully to study and to criticise a scheme for its
government which had been drafted by General James F. Smith, who
afterward became justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines,
secretary of public instruction and governor-general of the islands,
and was then in command of the troops in <DW64>s.

General Lawton arrived in the Philippines during our stay. His
coming had been eagerly looked forward to by the army. He had sailed
with the understanding that he was to be put in charge of field
operations. While he was at sea, influences were brought to bear
which changed this plan.

It is my firm conviction that if Lawton had been put in command, the
war would have ended promptly. He was a wonderful man in the field. He
possessed the faculty of instilling his own tremendous energy into
his officers and men, whose privations and dangers he shared, thereby
arousing an unfaltering loyalty which stood him in good stead in time
of need. If there was fighting to be done, he promptly and thoroughly
whipped everything in sight. He punished looting and disorder with
a heavy hand, treated prisoners and noncombatants with the utmost
kindness, and won the good-will of all Filipinos with whom he came
in contact.

General MacArthur was always declaring that the Filipinos were a unit
against us and that he could never get information from them. General
Lawton never lacked for such information as he needed, and constantly
and successfully used the Filipinos themselves as messengers and for
other purposes. I came to know him intimately, and learned to admire
and love him as did all those who had that great privilege.

For some time I had charge of his spies. Never have men taken longer
chances than did the faithful few who at this time furnished us with
information as to events in Insurgent territory. Discovery meant prompt
and cruel death. For a long time Major F. S. Bourns had performed the
uncongenial task of directing the spies. He was then the chief health
officer of Manila, and as all sorts of people were compelled to consult
him on sanitary matters, visits to his office aroused no suspicion. He
spoke Spanish, and this was imperatively necessary. Our spies simply
would not communicate results through interpreters. The facts revealed
by the Insurgent records show how right they were in refusing to do so.

Major Bourns eventually returned to the United States. His work was
taken over by an army officer, with the result that two of our best
men died very suddenly in that gentleman's back yard. As I spoke
Spanish, and as all sorts of people came to see the commission,
I was the logical candidate for this job, which I thereupon inherited.

Each morning, if there was news, I myself laboriously thumped out
my notes on the typewriter, making an original and one copy. The
copy I took at once to General Lawton. The original I took, later,
to General Otis.

General Lawton was firmly convinced that most army officers were
unfitted by their training to perform civil functions. He organized
municipal governments with all possible promptness in the towns
occupied by his troops, and in this work he requested my assistance,
which I was of course glad to give. Sr. Felipe Calderon drafted a
simple provisional scheme of municipal government which I submitted
for criticism to that most distinguished and able of Filipinos,
Sr. Cayetano Arellano. [453] When the final changes in it had been
made, I accompanied General Lawton on a trip to try putting it into
effect. We held elections and established municipal governments in a
number of the towns just south of Manila, and in some of those along
the Pasig River.

General Otis watched our operations and their results narrowly, and
was sufficiently well pleased with the latter to order General Kobbe
to follow a similar course in various towns on or near the railroad
north of Manila. Kobbe did not profess to know much about municipal
government, and asked me to go with him and help until he got the
hang of the thing, which I did.

Thus it happened that the first Philippine Commission had a sort of
left-handed interest in the first municipal governments established
in the islands under American rule.

In his endeavour to show that the Commission interfered with military
operations, Blount has ascribed certain statements to Major Starr. He
says: " ... at San Isidro on or about November 8, Major Starr said:
'We took this town last spring,' stating how much our loss had been in
so doing, 'but partly as a result of the Schurman commission parleying
with the Insurgents, General Otis had us fall back. We have just had
to take it again.'" [454]

If Major Starr ever made such a statement he was sadly
misinformed. General Lawton was the best friend I ever had in the
United States Army. I saw him almost daily when he was in Manila,
and he showed me the whole telegraphic correspondence which passed
between him and General Otis on the subject of the withdrawal from
San Isidro and Nueva Ecija, which was certainly one of the most
ill advised moves that any military commander was ever compelled to
make. General Lawton's unremitting attacks had absolutely demoralized
the Insurgent force, and my information is that when he finally
turned back, Aguinaldo and several members of his cabinet were
waiting, ten miles away, to surrender to him when he next advanced,
believing that they could never escape from him. I have not the
telegraphic correspondence before me, but I remember its salient
features. Otis ordered Lawton to withdraw, and Lawton, convinced of
the inadvisability of the measure, objected. Otis replied that, with
the rainy season coming on, he could neither provision him nor furnish
him ammunition. Lawton answered that he had provisions enough to last
three weeks and ammunition enough to finish the war, whereupon Otis
peremptorily ordered him to withdraw. The Philippine Commission had
no more to do with this matter than they had to do with the similar
order against advancing which Otis sent Lawton on the day the latter
won the Zapote River fight, when the Insurgents were running all over
the Province of Cavite. Lawton wanted to push forward and clean the
whole place up. The reply to his request to be allowed to do so ran,
if memory serves me well, as follows:--

    "Do nothing. You have accomplished all that was expected
    of you."

Later on, Lawton and his devoted officers and men had to duplicate the
fierce campaign which had resulted in the taking of San Isidro. This
made possible the movement that Lawton had had in mind in the
first instance, which was made with the result that organized armed
resistance to the authority of the United States promptly ceased in
northern Luzon.

While on this subject I wish to record the fact that shortly after
his return from the San Isidro campaign General Lawton asked me to
accompany him on a visit to General Otis and act as a witness. I
did so. In my presence Lawton said to Otis that if the latter would
give him two regiments, would allow him to arm, equip and provision
them to suit himself, and would turn him loose, he would stake his
reputation as a soldier, and his position in the United States Army,
on the claim that within sixty days he would end the insurrection
and would deliver to General Otis one Emilio Aguinaldo, dead or
alive. The general laughed at his offer. General Lawton asked me
some day to make these facts public. As life is an uncertain thing,
I deem it proper to do so now. Personally I am convinced that if his
offer had been accepted he would have kept his promise.

On September 15, 1899, Colonel Denby and I sailed for the United
States, having been recalled to Washington. Shortly after our arrival
there the commission issued a brief preliminary report. The winter
was spent in the preparation of our final report, which constituted
a full and authoritative treatise on the islands, the people and
their resources. Father Jose Algue, the distinguished head of the
Philippine Weather Bureau, was called to Washington to help us,
and gave us invaluable assistance.

Our preliminary report, dated November 2, 1899, and the first volume
of our final report, published on January 31, 1900, contained our
observations and recommendations relative to political matters.

Mr. Schurman has been credited with saying in an address made on
January 11, 1902: "Any decent kind of government of Filipinos by
Filipinos is better than the best possible government of Filipinos
by Americans." [455]

On November 2, 1900, he signed the following statement: [456]--

    "Should our power by any fatality be withdrawn, the
    commission believe that the government of the Philippines
    would speedily lapse into anarchy, which would excuse, if it
    did not necessitate, the intervention of other powers and the
    eventual division of the islands among them. Only through
    American occupation, therefore, is the idea of a free,
    self-governing, and united Philippine commonwealth at all
    conceivable. And the indispensable need from the Filipino
    point of view of maintaining American sovereignty over the
    archipelago is recognized by all intelligent Filipinos and even
    by those insurgents who desire an American protectorate. The
    latter, it is true, would take the revenues and leave us the
    responsibilities. Nevertheless, they recognize the indubitable
    fact that the Filipinos cannot stand alone. Thus the welfare
    of the Filipinos coincides with the dictates of national
    honour in forbidding our abandonment of the archipelago. We
    cannot from any point of view escape the responsibilities of
    government which our sovereignty entails; and the commission
    is strongly persuaded that the performance of our national
    duty will prove the greatest blessing to the peoples of the
    Philippine Islands."

More than fourteen years' experience in governmental work in the
Philippines has profoundly impressed me with the fundamental soundness
of these conclusions of the first Philippine Commission. Every
statement then made still holds true.






CHAPTER XII

The Establishment of Civil Government


The first Philippine Commission did not complete its work until March,
1900. By this time conditions had so far improved in the archipelago
that President McKinley was prepared to initiate a movement looking
toward the establishment of civil government there. With this end in
view he appointed the following commission of five civilians; William
H. Taft of Ohio, Dean C. Worcester of Michigan, Luke E. Wright of
Tennessee, Henry C. Ide of Vermont and Bernard Moses of California. Our
appointments were dated March 16, 1900. Our instructions which were
full, are given in the appendix. [457] I was the only member of the
first commission to be reappointed. Neither General Otis nor Admiral
Dewey cared to serve, and indeed the professional duties of each
of them rendered his appointment to the new commission difficult,
if not impossible. Mr. Schurman had at one time expressed himself
as vigorously opposed to the idea of a new commission, maintaining
that the best results could be obtained by the appointment of a civil
governor with wide powers. It was therefore taken for granted that he
would not desire reappointment. Colonel Denby was keenly interested
in the work and would have been glad to continue it, but he was past
seventy and with his good wife had then spent some fifteen years
in the Far East. He doubted whether his strength would be adequate
to bear the strain of the arduous task which obviously lay before
the new commission, and Mrs. Denby desired to remain in the United
States where she could be near her children from whom she had been
long separated, so her husband felt constrained to say that he did
not wish to return to the Philippines.

I separated from him with the keenest regret. He was an amiable,
tactful man of commanding ability and unimpeachable integrity, actuated
by the best of motives and loyal to the highest ideals. He constantly
sought to avoid not only evil but the appearance of evil. I count it
one of the great privileges of my life to have been associated with
him. The one thing in the book written by James H. Blount which aroused
my ire was his characterization of Colonel Denby as a hypocrite. No
falser, meaner, more utterly contemptible statement was ever made,
and when I read it the temptation rose hot within me to make public
Blount's personal Philippine record, but after the first heat of
anger had passed I remembered what the good old Colonel would have
wished me to do in such a case, and forbore.

The second Philippine commission, hereinafter referred to as "the
commission," received its instructions on April 7, 1900.

They covered a most delicate and complicated subject, namely, the
gradual transfer of control from military to civil authority in a
country extensive regions of which were still in open rebellion.

In the opinion of President McKinley there was no reason why steps
should not be taken, from time to time, to inaugurate governments
essentially popular in their form as fast as territory came under
the permanent control of our troops, and indeed, as we have seen,
this had already been done by the army. It was provided that we
should continue and perfect the work of organizing and establishing
civil governments already commenced by the military authorities. In
doing this we were to act as a board of which Mr. Taft was designated
president. It was contemplated that the transfer of authority from
military commanders to civil officers would be gradual, and full and
complete cooeperation between these authorities was enjoined. Having
familiarized ourselves with the conditions then prevailing in the
islands, we were to devote our attention first to the establishment
of municipal governments, in which the natives should be given the
opportunity to manage their local affairs to the fullest extent and
with the least supervision and control found to be practicable. We were
then to consider the organization of larger administrative divisions,
and when of the opinion that the condition of affairs in the islands
was such that the central administration could safely be transferred
from military to civil control were to report this conclusion to the
secretary of war with our recommendations as to the form of central
government which should be established.

Beginning with September 1, 1900, we were authorized to exercise,
subject to the approval of the President and the secretary of war, the
legislative power, which was then to be transferred from the military
governor to us until the establishment of civil central government,
or until Congress should otherwise provide. We were authorized during
a like period to appoint to office such officers under the judicial,
educational, and civil service systems, and in the municipal and
departmental governments, as were duly provided for. Until the
complete transfer of control the military governor was to remain the
chief executive head of the government and to exercise the executive
authority previously possessed by him and not expressly assigned to
the commission by the president in his instructions. In establishing
municipal governments we were to take as the basis of our work those
established by the military governor, under the order of August 8,
1899, which I had helped to set up, as well as those established
under the report of a board constituted by the military governor by
his order of January 29, 1900, of which Senor Cayetano Arellano was
the president.

In the establishment of departmental or provincial governments we
were to give special attention to the then-existing government of the
island of <DW64>s, established with the approval of the people of that
island under the order of the military governor of July 22, 1899.

We were instructed to investigate troubles growing out of large land
holdings, including those of the religious orders, and to promote,
extend and improve the system of education already inaugurated by
the military authorities, giving first importance to the extension
of a system of primary education free to all, which would tend to fit
the people for the duties of citizenship and the ordinary avocations
of a civilized community. Instruction was to be given at first in
the native dialects, but full opportunity for all of the people to
acquire English was to be provided as soon as possible. If necessity
demanded, we were authorized to make changes in the existing system
of taxation and in the body of the laws under which the people were
governed, although such changes were to be relegated to the civil
government which we were to establish later, so far as might be. Our
instructions contained the following important passages:--

    "In all the forms of government and administrative provisions
    which they are authorized to prescribe, the commission should
    bear in mind that the government which they are establishing
    is designed not for our satisfaction, or for the expression
    of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace and
    prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the
    measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs,
    their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest
    extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable
    requisites of just and effective government.

    "At the same time the commission should bear in mind, and the
    people of the islands should be made plainly to understand,
    that there are certain great principles of government which
    have been made the basis of our governmental system which
    we deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of
    individual freedom, and of which they have, unfortunately,
    been denied the experience possessed by us; that there are
    also certain practical rules of government which we have
    found to be essential to the preservation of these great
    principles of liberty and law, and that these principles and
    these rules of government must be established and maintained
    in their islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness,
    however much they may conflict with the customs or laws of
    procedure with which they are familiar.

    "It is evident that the most enlightened thought of the
    Philippine Islands fully appreciates the importance of
    these principles and rules, and they will inevitably within
    a short time command universal assent. Upon every division
    and branch of the government of the Philippines, therefore,
    must be imposed these inviolable rules:--

    "That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
    property without due process of law; that private property
    shall not be taken for public use without just compensation;
    that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
    right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the
    nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with
    the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for
    obtaining witnesses in his favour, and to have the assistance
    of counsel for his defence; that excessive bail shall not be
    required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
    punishment inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in
    jeopardy for the same offence, or be compelled in any criminal
    case to be a witness against himself; that the right to be
    secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
    be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude
    shall exist except as a punishment for crime; that no bill
    of attainder or ex-post-facto law shall be passed; that no
    law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the
    press, or the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and
    petition the Government for a redress of grievances; that no
    law shall be made respecting the establishment of religion,
    or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free
    exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
    without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed."

It has been the fashion in some quarters to sneer at the last of these
paragraphs, and to insinuate, if not to charge, that President McKinley
in his policy toward the Philippine Islands was actuated by unworthy
motives. Nothing could be further from the truth. From the beginning
to the end the real good of the several peoples of the archipelago
came first with him, and no one who had the privilege of knowing him
well doubts it. Thoroughly imbued with the lofty sentiments expressed
by him in our instructions, we set forth on our long pilgrimage to a
country where we were to undertake a heavy task essentially different
from that which had ever before fallen to the lot of any five citizens
of the United States.

On April 17, 1900, we sailed from San Francisco on the United
States army transport _Hancock_. We were forty-five strong. Of
this goodly company only four remain in the Philippines to-day,
[458]--Mr. and Mrs. Branagan, Mrs. Worcester and myself. Singularly
enough, with two exceptions, all of the others are still alive
and at work. Arthur W. Ferguson, prince of interpreters, who was
later appointed Executive Secretary, died in the service after more
than six years of extraordinarily faithful and efficient work. James
A. LeRoy, my faithful, able and efficient private secretary, contracted
tuberculosis, and fell a victim to it after a long and gallant fight.

At Honolulu we met with a severe disappointment. It was of course
our duty to call on Governor Dole. We were advised that silk hats
and frock coats must be donned for this visit, and it was perishing
hot. We reached the palace in a reeking perspiration and had a long
wait in a suffocating room. When Mr. Dole appeared, he was closely
followed by an attendant bearing a large and most attractive-looking
bottle carefully wrapped in a napkin, and our spirits rose. But,
alas! It contained Poland water.

At Tokio we had an audience with the Emperor and were received by the
Empress as well. In the high official who had charge of the palace
where these events took place, I discovered an old University of
Michigan graduate who made the occasion especially pleasant for me.

We finally reached Manila on the morning of June 3. Although the
thermometer was in the nineties, a certain frigidity pervaded the
atmosphere on our arrival, which General MacArthur, the military
governor, seemed to regard in the light of an intrusion.

He had been directed to provide suitable office quarters for us. To
our amazement and amusement we found desks for five commissioners
and five private secretaries placed in one little room in the
Ayuntamiento. [459] While it was possible to get through the room
without scrambling over them, it would have been equally possible
to circle it, walking on them, without stepping on the floor. In
the course of our first long official interview with the General,
he informed us that we were "an injection into an otherwise normal
situation."

He added that we had already mediatized the volume of work that flowed
over his desk. At the moment none of us were quite sure what he meant,
but we found the word in the dictionary. How often in the weary
years that were to follow I wished that some one would materially
mediatize the task which fell to my lot! It was General MacArthur's
honestly held and frankly expressed opinion that what the Filipinos
needed was "military government pinned to their backs for ten years
with bayonets." He later changed that view very radically, and when
civil provincial governments were finally established it was with
his approval, and, in many instances, upon his specific recommendation.

At the outset some effort was made to keep the public away from
us. Word was passed that we had no authority, which was true enough,
as our legislative activities were not to begin until September
1. The ninety days which intervened were very advantageously spent in
gaining familiarity with the situation, which we had no difficulty
in doing. Plenty of people were already weary of military rule and
flocked to us. None of my companions had ever before set foot in the
Philippines, and although I had spent more than four years there,
I still had plenty to learn.

In this connection I am reminded of an event which occurred somewhat
later. While the commission was en route from Iloilo to Catbalogan
when we were establishing civil provincial governments, General Hughes
and Mr. Taft became involved in a somewhat animated discussion. The
General displayed an accurate knowledge of facts which were of such
a nature that one would hardly have expected an army officer to be
familiar with them. Mr. Taft said: "General, how do you do it? You
have always been a busy man, devoted to your profession. How have you
managed to accumulate such a remarkable fund of information?" The
General smiled his rare smile and replied: "Governor, I will tell
you. I always try to go to bed at night knowing a little more than
I did when I got up in the morning." It is a wise plan to follow.

On September 1 we assumed the legislative power, our first official
act being to appropriate $2,000,000 Mexican for the construction and
repair of highways and bridges.

We were impressed with the fundamental necessity of promptly opening up
lines of land communication in a country which almost completely lacked
them, and there were many poor people in dire need of employment who
would be relieved by the opportunity to earn an honest living which
the inauguration of road construction would afford them.

Our second act appropriated $5000 Mexican for the purpose of making
a survey to ascertain the most advantageous route for a railroad into
the mountains of Benguet, where we wished to establish a much-needed
health resort for the people of the archipelago.

Seven days later we passed an act for the establishment and
maintenance of an efficient and honest civil service in the Philippine
Islands. This measure was of basic importance. We had stipulated before
leaving Washington that no political appointees should be forced upon
us under any circumstances. The members of the second commission, like
their predecessors of the first, were firm in the belief that national
politics should, if possible, be kept out of the administration of
Philippine affairs, and we endeavoured to insure this result.

Our tenth act appropriated $1500 Mexican to be paid to the widow
of Salvador Reyes, vice-president of Santa Cruz in Laguna Province,
assassinated because of his loyalty to the established government.

Our fifteenth act increased the monthly salaries of Filipino public
school teachers in Manila.

Our sixteenth and seventeenth acts reorganized the Forestry Bureau
and the Mining Bureau.

On October 15 we appropriated $1,000,000 United States currency,
for improving the port of Manila, where there was urgent need of
protection for shipping during the typhoon season.

On December 12 we passed an act authorizing the establishment of local
police in cities and towns in the Philippine Islands and appropriating
$150,000 United States currency for their maintenance.

Two days later we passed a much-needed act regulating the sale of
intoxicating liquors within the city of Manila and its attached
barrios.

On December 21, we appropriated $75,000 United States currency for
the construction of the Benguet Road, little dreaming how much time
would elapse and how many more dollars would be appropriated, before
a vehicle passed over it.

It will be sufficiently evident that I cannot here give an account
of the several acts which we passed when I say that they number four
hundred forty-nine during the first year. We created the administrative
bureaus of a well-organized government, established civil rule in
numerous municipalities and provinces, provided for the necessary
expenses of government, organized courts and reformed the judiciary. So
important were the results following the establishment of the Civil
Service Act and the act providing for the organization of courts for
the Philippine Islands that I have devoted a chapter to each.

Although there were no limits on our power to enact legislation other
than those imposed by our instructions hereinbefore referred to,
nothing was further from our desire than to exercise too arbitrarily
the authority conferred upon us.

Taylor has correctly described our method of procedure in the
following words:--

    "On September 1, 1900, the Commission began its legislative
    and executive duties. In performing them it adopted the policy
    of passing no laws, except in cases of emergency, without
    publishing them in the daily press, nor until after they
    had passed a second reading and the public had been given
    an opportunity to come before the Commission and suggest
    objections or amendments to the bills. Before enacting
    them they were submitted to the military governor for his
    consideration and comment." [460]

The other especially important events of our first legislative
year were the establishment of civil rule in the municipalities
as well as in thirty-eight provinces and the substitution of the
military central government by the gradual creation of bureaus and
the ultimate appointment of a civil governor and of five heads of
executive departments.

On November 23, 1900, we passed an act providing for the establishment
of a civil government in the province of Benguet, and thus it happened
that a province practically all of whose inhabitants were members of
a non-Christian tribe was the first to enjoy the benefits of civil
rule. This action grew out of investigations by General Wright and
myself made when visiting Baguio during the latter part of July, which
led us to the conclusion that civil government could be established in
Benguet at any time and should be established as soon as possible. In
view of the rather primitive state of civilization of the people for
whom we were legislating, a special act adapted to local conditions
was passed providing for a provincial government and fixing a form
of government for the several settlements.

On January 31, 1901, we passed an act for the organization of municipal
governments in the Philippine Islands which, with various amendments,
is still in effect and has been made applicable to all municipal
corporations of the Philippines inhabited chiefly by Filipinos, except
the city of Manila, the city of Baguio and a few small settlements
in the so-called special government provinces. [461]

On February 6, 1901, we passed a general act for the organization of
provincial governments in the Philippine Islands. A special act was
required to make it applicable to any given province.

Having thus prepared for the serious work of establishing civil
government throughout the archipelago so fast and so far as conditions
might seem to justify, we determined to visit the several provinces
and to familiarize ourselves with conditions on the ground in each
case before taking action. We invariably sought the opinion of
the military authorities as to the fitness of the provinces under
consideration for civil rule, and never established it except with
their approval. Indeed, in several cases we yielded to their judgment
and organized provinces which we ourselves thought might better wait
for a time.

Our first trip was to the northward along the line of the
Manila-Dagupan railway, and in the course of it we organized the
provinces of Bulaean, Pampanga, Tarlac and Pangasinan.

On the 2d of March we crossed Manila Bay to Bataan and established
a civil provincial government there.

The first provincial officers were necessarily appointed, not
elected. I well remember the consternation which Mr. Taft created
on this trip, when in announcing the appointment of a man of strong
character who was much disliked by some of the people present, he
said that if the appointee did not behave well his official head
would be promptly removed. Surprise showed on almost every face in
the audience. They had become sufficiently accustomed to the idea of
being beheaded or otherwise sent out of the world by their own people,
but had been led to believe that the Americans were a humane nation,
and it took Mr. Taft at least five minutes to explain his joke.

During the second week in March the commission transferred its officers
bodily to the United States Army Transport _Sumner_ and started on
a long journey in the course of which it visited and established
provincial governments in eighteen provinces, [462] returning to
Manila on the 3d of May.

This trip was most interesting but dreadfully wearing. Everywhere
we were overwhelmed by the hospitality of our Filipino friends. We
arrived at some new place nearly every morning, and the programme in
each was much the same. After an early breakfast we hurried ashore,
drove or walked about for a short time to see what the town was like,
and then attended a popular meeting in its largest building, where
we held long and frank converse with the people on local conditions,
giving them every opportunity to air their views, with the result that
the local orators, of whom there were usually more than a sufficiency,
had an opportunity to bring their heavy guns into action. Then followed
a recess in the course of which we partook of a very elaborate lunch,
and when possible conferred privately with influential men, often
learning things which they did not care to tell us in public. Then came
another open meeting at which the actual organization of the province
was effected and the officials were appointed and sworn in. After
this there was a long formal dinner, with the endless courses which
characterize such functions in the Philippines, and then came a ball
which lasted till the wee small hours. When at last we got on board,
tired out, our steamer sailed, and often brought us to some new place
by sunrise.

In several instances we did not pass the act organizing a given
province at the time of our visit, but for one reason or another
postponed action until a later date. We visited a number of places
like Jolo, Basilan, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Davao and Samar, where we
had no intention of establishing civil government, in order to observe
local conditions.

We touched at Marinduque on our trip south, and found that nothing
could then be done there, but the better element were anxious for a
change, and we promised them that if they would bring about certain
specified results before our return we would give them a provincial
government. They undertook to do so, and kept their word. Needless
to say we also kept ours.

We had grave doubts as to the advisability of establishing civil
governments in Cebu, Bohol and Batangas. In the first of these
places the people were sullen and ugly. In the second there was
a marked disinclination on the part of leading citizens to accept
public office. There had been a little scattering rifle fire on the
outskirts of the capital of the third very shortly before our arrival
there, but the organization of all these provinces was recommended by
the military authorities, and we decided to try an experiment which
could do little harm, as we could return any one of them to military
control in short order should such a course seem necessary.

An effort has been made to make it appear that in organizing Cebu,
Bohol and Batangas, we acted prematurely and upon our own initiative,
thus complicating the situation for the military authorities. I will
let Blount voice this complaint. He says in part:--

    "In his report for 1901 Governor Taft says that the four
    principal provinces, including Batangas, which gave trouble
    shortly after the civil government was set up in that year,
    and had to be returned to military control, were organized
    under civil rule 'on the recommendation' of the then commanding
    general (MacArthur). It certainly seems unlikely that the haste
    to change from military rule to civil rule came on the motion
    of the military. If the Commission ever got, _in writing,_
    from General MacArthur, a 'recommendation' that any provinces
    be placed under civil rule while still in insurrection, the
    text of the writing will show a mere soldierly acquiescence in
    the will of Mr. McKinley, the commander-in-chief. Parol [463]
    contemporaneous evidence will show that General MacArthur
    told them, substantially, that they were 'riding for a
    fall.' In fact, whenever an insurrection would break out in
    a province after Governor Taft's inauguration as governor,
    the whole attitude of the army in the Philippines, from the
    commanding general down was 'I told you so.' They did not
    say this where Governor Taft could hear it, but it was common
    knowledge that they were much addicted to damning 'politics'
    as the cause of all the trouble." [464]

Prophecy is always dangerous and when unnecessary seems rather
inexcusable. I submit the essential portions of the record to
show exactly what we did get from General MacArthur, and add the
suggestion that it was really hardly essential that he should make
his recommendations in writing, as he did, for the reason that he
was a gentleman and would not have repudiated a verbal recommendation
once made.

On February 5, 1901, Governor Taft wrote General MacArthur a letter
closing with the following paragraph:--

    "As already communicated to you the purpose of the Commission
    is to make a Southern trip on the 23rd of February, or as
    soon thereafter as practicable, with the idea of arranging
    for provincial governments there, and I am directed by the
    Commission to request your opinion as to the provinces in
    which provincial governments may be safely established. It is
    understood that Panay, Romblon, Tayabas, and possibly one or
    two of the Camarines are ready for this. What has been said
    with reference to the Northern provinces applies to these,
    but we shall communicate with you further as to the Southern
    provinces when we have been advised as to the possibility of
    securing a steamer."

On February 9, General MacArthur gave the following instructions to
the Commanding General, Department of the Visayas:--

    "The Military Governor desires that you report to this
    office at the earliest date practicable the provinces in your
    department that may be considered ready for the establishment
    of civil governments therein and in this connection directs
    me to say that it should not be considered as necessary that
    complete pacification has been brought about in a province
    before reporting it as ready for such government; that the
    provincial civil governments to be established will doubtless
    prove useful agents in the further work of pacification."

On February 27, that officer reported that in his opinion Iloilo,
Capiz, Oriental <DW64>s and Occidental <DW64>s were ready; that Antique
might be in a few days, and that Cebu, Bohol and Leyte were not. These
facts were reported to Governor Taft by General MacArthur on March 4,
and on the same day Lieutenant-Colonel Crowder wrote to the commanding
general of the Visayas:--

    "The Military Governor directs me to say that he regards
    the initiation of provincial civil government as an aid in
    the work of pacification, in which view it is not necessary
    that a province should be completely pacified as a condition
    to the initiation of such government. He has expressed to the
    Commission the opinion that you may be able, upon their arrival
    at Iloilo, to submit a supplementary list of provinces in which
    it would be advisable to establish at once these governments."

Meanwhile General MacArthur wrote on February 13, to Governor Taft:--

    "In partial reply to your letter of the 5th instant I have the
    honor to inform you that the Commanding General, Department of
    Southern Luzon, reports but one province, Tayabas, as ready at
    the present time for civil government. I add the provinces of
    Laguna, Batangas and Cavite, believing that the institution of
    civil government in all these provinces will be in assistance
    of the military authorities in the work of pacification."

General MacArthur's communications seem to me to show something more
than "a mere soldierly acquiescence in the will of Mr. McKinley,"
especially as the President had no knowledge of these provinces, and
never made any recommendation whatsoever relative to the establishment
of civil government there.

Similarly, in establishing civil government in Cebu and Bohol, the
commission acted on the specific recommendation of the military, and
rather against its own judgment. There seemed no very good reason for
refusing to try civil government, if the commanding general wanted
it tried, and when it failed, as it promptly did, in Cebu, Bohol and
Batangas, these provinces were immediately returned to the full control
of the military, and left there until conditions became satisfactory.

Having escaped the perils of the deep, and the much graver perils of
the dinner table, during our southern trip, we returned to Manila,
wearier, wiser and sadder men than when we started, for we had learned
much of the superstitions, the ignorance and the obsessions which
prevailed among the Filipinos, and we knew that many of the men who
from love of country had accepted office under us had done so at the
peril of their lives. We had all had an excellent opportunity to come
to know the Filipinos. Their dignity of bearing, their courtesy,
their friendly hospitality, their love of imposing functions, and
of _fiestas_ and display, their childishness and irresponsibility
in many matters, their passion for gambling, for litigation and for
political intrigue, even the loves and the hatreds of some of them,
had been spread before us like an open book. It is a fact that except
for the inhabitants of Cebu, Bohol and Batangas, the people wanted
what we had to give them and were grateful for it. Never before had
they had their day in court, and they appreciated it.

The establishment of civil government throughout so large a proportion
of the provinces in the islands would have been impossible at this
time had it not been for the helpful activities of the Federal
Party organized on December 23, 1900, by many of the best and most
influential Filipinos in the archipelago for the purpose of aiding
in the establishment of peace and order. Its members were tireless in
their activities. They succeeded in persuading many Insurgent leaders
to lay down their arms, so that a normal condition could be restored in
territory which the latter had previously harried. They convinced many
of the common people of the true purposes of the American government,
and in numerous other ways rendered invaluable services.

The officers and many of the members and agents of this party were
promptly sentenced to death by Aguinaldo, and many of them were
assassinated; [465] but the party persisted in its efforts until
success was attained.

During June of 1901 Professor Moses and I made a horseback trip through
Pangasinan, La Union, Benguet, Lepanto and Ilocos Sur, accompanied by
our private secretaries. Professor Moses was in wretched health as the
result of overwork and confinement, and needed out-of-door exercise.

I had been intrusted with the drafting of legislation for the
government of the non-Christian tribes, and wanted to learn as much
about them as possible, so that I could act intelligently.

We started from Dagupan mounted on horses kindly furnished us by the
army, and escorted by four mounted infantrymen. None of us had ridden
for years, and army officers were offering wagers that we would not
get as far as Baguio. At Mangaldan a cavalry outfit replaced our
mounted infantrymen, and while the members of our new escort were
resting under the shade of a tree in the cemetery, I heard them
voicing joyful anticipations of the easy time they were to have
travelling with tenderfeet. I made up ray mind to give them some
healthful exercise on the trip.

Having first visited the work at the lower end of the Benguet Road and
then travelled across country in a driving storm over wretched trails,
we reached Bauang, our point of departure for the interior. Here I
called the sergeant in charge and asked him where were the extra shoes
for our horses. In some confusion he confessed that he had brought
none, whereupon I read him a homily on the duties of a cavalryman,
and sent the whole outfit to San Fernando to get the horses reshod
and provided with extra shoes for the trip.

We arrived at Baguio in a howling typhoon. When we emerged from the
hills into the open, and our horses got the full sweep of the storm,
they at first refused to face it. We forced them into it, however,
and a few moments later had found refuge in the house of Mr. Otto
Scheerer, a hospitable German. The cavalrymen and the horses got in
under the building. It gave me great joy to hear through the floor
the voice of the sergeant remarking, with much emphasis of the sort
best represented in print by dashes, that if he had known the sort
of a trip he was starting on he would have been on sick report the
morning of his departure.

We waited in vain three days for the storm to end and then rode
on. Mr. Scheerer, who accompanied us, had sent ahead to arrange for
lunch at the house of a rich Igorot named Acop, but when we arrived at
this man's place, soaked, cold, and hungry, we found it shut up. He
had not received the message and was away from home. Investigation
showed that our only resource in the commissary line were some
wads of sticky, unsalted, boiled rice which our Igorot carriers had
inside their hats, in contact with their frowsy hair. We bolted as
much of this as the Igorots could spare, killing its rather high
flavour with cayenne peppers picked beside the trail, and continued
our journey. In descending a steep hill my horse stumbled and while
attempting to recover himself drove a sharp stone into his hoof and
turned a complete somersault, throwing me over his head on to the
rocks. When I got him up he was dead lame, and I walked the rest of
the way to Ambuklao, where we arrived just at sunset.

This once prosperous little Igorot hamlet had been burned by the
Spaniards, for no apparent reason, during their flight from the
province in 1906, and we found only two houses standing. They were
naturally crowded. I was so dead with fatigue that I threw my saddle on
the ground, and using it as a pillow, lay down in a couple of inches
of water and fell sound asleep. Later the Igorots vacated one of the
houses, and placed it at our disposal. I spent the greater part of the
night in a contest with an old Igorot woman, who for the commendable
purpose of keeping us warm tended a smoky pitch-pine fire, and shut
the door, which afforded our only means of ventilation, every time I
dropped asleep. Awakened by the stifling smoke I would open it again,
but as soon as I dozed she would shut it. I finally solved the problem
by lying down with my head sticking out of the door.

The next day was bright and clear. We rested until noon, drying
out our belongings meanwhile, and then continued our journey,
visiting the Igorot settlements on the Agno River and those in
southern Lepanto and finally reaching Cervantes, the capital of that
sub-province. The Igorots of Benguet and Lepanto received us with
the utmost friendliness, and when not in danger of breaking our necks
by falling over the edges of the wretched trails, we greatly enjoyed
our trip.

At Cervantes we were met by a delegation of Bontoc Igorots, who begged
us to visit their country, and we were just preparing to do so when
we received a telegram recalling us to Manila to be present at the
inauguration of Mr. Taft as civil governor. During our absence the
commission had established provincial governments in Rizal, Cavite and
Nueva Ecija. Mr. Taft was inaugurated on July 4, 1901. Thenceforth
he exercised control over the provinces where civil government had
been established, while the military governor continued in charge
of each of the remaining provinces until it was duly organized and
transferred to civil control.

In August, 1901, the commission sailed on a tour of the remaining
northern provinces, visiting La Union, Ilocos Sur, Abra, Ilocos Norte,
Cagayan, Isabela and Zambales in the order named, and establishing
a government in each. On the trip to Abra those members of the
commission not previously accustomed to roughing it in the islands
were given a novel experience, for we went up the Abra River on
bamboo rafts. However, a veritable ship of state had been prepared
for Governor Taft, and no one suffered any great discomfort.

At Vigan, the capital of Ilocos, we narrowly escaped drowning in the
surf when returning to our steamer. For a time our good _viray_ [466]
with some twenty oarsmen was unable to make headway through the rolling
waves. It broached to, nearly filled with water, and struck the bottom
heavily several times. Some of the men quit rowing and began to pray,
whereupon General J. F. Bell, who was sitting in the stern, rose to his
feet, and shouted at them until they became more afraid of him than of
the sea, and pulled for dear life until we were out of danger. Upon
arrival at the ship we watched with interest the progress of other
boats through the surf, and were alarmed to see the men in one madly
divesting themselves of their clothing. When it finally came alongside
its occupants made flying leaps for the gangway, and we discovered
that a great hole had been knocked in its bottom, and that raincoats,
ordinary coats, and trousers had been jammed into this opening in
order to keep the rapidly sinking craft afloat for a few moments.

In the Cagayan valley we had a taste of real tropical heat. Never
have I seen a man suffer more than did Mr. Taft at Ilagan on the day
when we established a provincial government for Isabela, and the night
that followed still lingers in my memory. The air was suffocating. My
bed was in a corner. I dragged it out between a window and a door
and threw both wide open. Still I could not sleep. Slipping off
my pajamas, I seated myself on the broad window sill. The heat was
intolerable. I poured water over myself and resumed my seat in the
window. The water would not evaporate. I sat there until morning,
as I could not endure the heat lying down.

Such conditions are unknown throughout the greater part of the
archipelago, where cool sea breezes temper the heat at all times. In
the Cagayan valley an immense plain is bordered by ranges of high
mountains to the east and the west. They seem to shut off both
monsoons to a considerable extent, and there very trying heat is by
no means unusual.

On September 1, 1901, the first day of the second year of actual
service of the commission, a complete central civil government was
established. Commissioner Wright was appointed secretary of commerce
and police; Commissioner Ide, secretary of finance and justice;
Commissioner Moses, secretary of public instruction, and I myself
secretary of the interior. The commission was strengthened by the
addition of three Filipino members: Senor Benito Legarda, Senor Jose
R. de Luzuriaga, and Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, all of whom were men
of exceptional ability and had rendered distinguished service in the
establishment of peace and order.

Except for the addition of one more Filipino on July 6, 1908, the
organization of the commission has remained unchanged up to the present
time, although there have been numerous changes in its personnel. The
task which lay before it was to enact a code of laws adapted to the
peculiar conditions existing in the Philippines, and this was indeed
a herculean undertaking. Its members laboured unremittingly. Governor
Taft and General Wright were towers of strength in the early days. The
rest of us did what we could, and I, for one, am very proud of the
result. Certainly no one can ever claim that the commission was not
industrious. Before it finally ceased to be the legislative body of
the islands it had passed some eighteen hundred acts. Obviously,
as it is not my purpose to write an encyclopedia of law, I cannot
discuss them in detail, and must content myself with here barely
mentioning a few of the more important results obtained, leaving the
more detailed discussion of some of them for later chapters.

In general, it may be said that the additional bureaus necessary
for the work of the Insular government were created, and given
proper powers. Civil government was gradually extended to the entire
archipelago. [467] The criminal code was amended and supplemented
by the passage of new laws. The administration of justice was
reorganized and reformed. [468] An efficient native insular police
force was organized, and an admirable state of public order brought
about. [469] The health service was extended to the provinces, and
health conditions were greatly improved throughout the islands. [470]
Baguio was made accessible and became both the summer capital and
a health resort for the people of the islands. [471] The scientific
work of the government was cordinated, and efficiency and economy in
its performance were insured. [472]

Primary and secondary schools were established throughout the islands,
supplemented by trade schools, and a normal school at Manila. [473]
Legislation was enacted, and submitted to the President and to
Congress, covering the disposition of public lands. [474] The purchase
of extensive estates belonging to certain religious orders, and the
sale of their holdings therein to tenants, was provided for. [475]
Fairly adequate legislation for the protection and development
of the forest resources of the islands was enacted. [476] Means
of communication by land and sea were greatly improved, and the
development of commerce was thus stimulated. [477]

It is a noteworthy fact that all of these things were done with a
per capita taxation of about $2.24!

Another fundamentally important aid to the commercial development of
the islands was afforded by a radical reformation of the currency.

The islands under the sovereignty of Spain had their own distinct
silver coinage in peso, media peso, peseta and media peseta pieces.

In 1878 the Spanish government, hoping to check the heavy exportation
of gold currency from the Philippines, passed a law prohibiting the
importation of Mexican dollars, but allowed the Mexican dollars then
in the islands to continue to circulate as legal tender.

When the American troops arrived, there were in circulation the
Spanish-Philippine peso and subsidiary silver coins; Spanish pesos
of different mintings; Mexican pesos of different mintings; Hongkong
dollars, fractional silver coins from different Chinese countries,
and copper coins from nearly every country in the Orient. Although a
law had been passed prohibiting the introduction of Mexican dollars
into the islands, they were being constantly smuggled in. Fluctuations
in the price of silver affected the value of the silver coins, and the
money in common use was in reality a commodity, worth on any given day
what one could get for it. These conditions affected most disastrously
the business interests of the islands. Merchants were forced to allow
very wide margins in commercial transactions, because they did not
know what their goods would actually cost them in local currency upon
arrival. The most important business of the local banks was in reality
that of exchange brokers and note shavers. They hammered the exchange
rate down and bought silver, then boosted the rate skyward and sold.

The American army brought in a large amount of gold, but this did
not remain in circulation long, as it was exported by the different
business concerns, or hoarded.

United States silver money had a limited circulation during the
early days of American occupation, but it passed at less than its
true value. An effort was made under the military administration to
keep the ratio of exchange at two to one by the purchase from the
public of all United States currency offered at that rate to the banks.

For a long time the banks refused to carry private accounts in United
States currency, but when it was offered for deposit it was changed
into Mexicans with a heavy charge for the transaction, and an account
opened in Mexican currency to the credit of the depositor. If the
depositor afterward desired to get United States currency, he gave a
check for it at the then existing rate of exchange. Such conditions
were intolerable, and the commission passed an act making it an offence
to refuse to accept for deposit the currency of the sovereign power,
but this did not remedy the fundamental difficulty. There came a
heavy slump in the price of silver. The Insular government lost a
very large sum because of the decrease in value of its silver coin.

Mr. Charles A. Conant had been brought from the United States to make
a report on the feasibility of providing an American coinage for the
islands. He recommended that the unit of value should be a peso,
equivalent to fifty cents United States currency. Congress, by an
act passed July 1, 1902, vested general authority over the coinage
in the Philippine government, but the commission decided not to take
action until more specific authority could be obtained from Congress,
as the proposed reform was radical, and it was very important that the
new currency should at the outset command the confidence so essential
to its success.

After long discussion, Congress authorized, by an act passed March
2, 1903, a new currency system based on a theoretical peso of 12.9
grains of gold 900 fine, equivalent to one-half of a United States
gold dollar. The circulating medium was to be the Philippine silver
peso, which was to be legal tender for all debts, public and private,
and its value was to be maintained on a parity with the theoretical
gold peso. For this purpose the creation of a gold standard, or gold
reserve fund, was provided for, and this fund was to be maintained
and could be used for no other purpose.

Considerable difficulty was experienced in introducing the new currency
into the islands. The banks at first failed to give any assistance to
the government. The business men of Manila, and especially the Chinese,
discounted the new Philippine peso, because it did not contain as
much silver as did the Mexican dollar. They were quickly brought to
time, and given to understand where they stood if they discredited
the currency of the country.

The Spanish Philippine coins and the Mexican coins in circulation were
collected by the treasury and exported to the San Francisco mint,
where they were reminted into new coins of the weight and fineness
prescribed by law.

The establishment of a gold standard fund to maintain the parity
between the gold and silver dollar was quickly effected by the sale of
exchange on the United States in accordance with the established law,
at a cost estimated to be the same as the transportation of the gold
coin itself.

The army, by direction of the secretary of war, ceased to pay
in United States money, and its paymasters were given credit at
the Insular Treasury, where they obtained the necessary funds in
Philippine currency.

The government also authorized, in addition to the coinage of silver,
the issuance of paper money in two, five, and ten peso notes. All of
the coins and bills were readily interchangeable with the United States
coins in common use, the dollar being worth two pesos, the half dollar
one peso, the twenty-five cent piece a half peso, the ten-cent piece
a peseta, the five-cent piece a media peseta and the cent two centavos.

Unfortunately the silver value of the new peso was such that when the
price of silver again rose, its bullion value was greater than its
money value, and in consequence coins of this denomination were hoarded
and exported. It proved necessary to prohibit their exportation,
and to issue new coins of less bullion value, but this was the only
really serious difficulty attending a fundamental reform which put
the currency on a sound basis. The original pesos were recoined and
a handsome profit made on the transaction.

No one who has not lived in a country where the circulating medium
is constantly fluctuating in value can fully appreciate the enormous
benefit conferred on the Philippine Islands by this important reform.

Another reform of far-reaching importance was the readjustment of the
burden of taxation so that it should bear lightly on the necessities
of life, and heavily on its luxuries. This was a complete reversal
of the scheme which we found in force, under which wheat flour and
kerosene oil paid very heavy import duties while cigars and champagne
were lightly taxed.

We imposed export taxes on certain products of the country. Such taxes
are objected to by many political economists, but were approved of by
the Filipinos, who strongly opposed the imposition of a logical and
very necessary personal tax to provide funds for the construction
and maintenance of highways and bridges. It is usually wise, when
practicable, to obtain funds for necessary governmental purposes by
the imposition of taxes which are willingly paid.

Mr. Taft resigned the governorship of the Philippines to become
secretary of war, his resignation taking effect January 31, 1904. He
had performed a monumental work for the Filipinos, and for humanity at
large, during his years of service in the islands, and carried with
him the good will of most of the people whom he had so faithfully,
efficiently and self-sacrificingly served. He had at one time very
gravely impaired his health by hard work, and when the opportunity
came to satisfy a lifelong ambition by accepting appointment as a
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, he had passed
it by, in order to perform his duty to the people of the Philippine
Islands. As secretary of war, and as President of the United States,
he availed himself of every opportunity which these high offices
afforded to help the Filipinos, and to increase the prosperity of
their country. They have had no better friend, and no other friend
whom they have ever had has been so useful to them. One more proof
of his real greatness is afforded by the fact that to-day, after
being reviled by many Filipino politicians whom he befriended, who
have succeeded to a large degree in making the common people of the
Philippines consider him their enemy, his interest in the people of
the Islands is as keen, and his eagerness to help them is as great,
as in the early days when they acclaimed him their deliverer.

General Luke E. Wright, a democrat of Memphis, Tennessee, was
appointed by President Roosevelt civil governor in Mr. Taft's
place. He rendered his country and the Filipinos most distinguished
service. It is one thing to build up a great government, with numerous
political appointments at one's disposal, and another to stand by and
keep it running smoothly and efficiently, when a lot of disappointed
politicians, who have seen their last hope of political preferment go
a-glimmering, are throwing sand into the bearings of the machine. This
latter class had begun to plot against Governor Taft before his
resignation took effect, but their machinations were rendered fruitless
by the wave of regret raised by his coming departure.

They now devoted themselves, with a good deal of success, to injuring
Governor Wright, who declined to be dictated to, in the matter of
appointments, by the Federal Party, and aroused the ire of many
politicians by occasionally telling the Filipinos unpalatable but
wholesome and necessary truths relative to their fitness for immediate
independence.

General Wright, whose title had been changed from governor to
governor-general on February 6, 1905, went on leave during the latter
part of that year, fully expecting to return and resume his work
in the Philippines, but the islands were not to see him again. He
resigned, effective April 1, 1906, to become United States Ambassador
to Japan. In my opinion, the acceptance of his resignation at this time
was one of the gravest mistakes ever made in the Philippine policy of
the United States. The islands were deprived of the services of a very
able and distinguished man, thoroughly conversant with their needs,
who had the courage of his convictions, and whose convictions were
thoroughly sound.

Certain Filipino politicians openly boasted that they had secured his
removal, and they and their ilk were encouraged to put forth new and
pernicious efforts. Had General Wright returned to the islands much of
the political unrest from which they have since suffered would have
been avoided. He was beloved by his associates, who felt a sense of
personal loss when they learned that the places which had known him
in The Philippines would know him no more.

He was succeeded for the brief period of five and a half months by
Judge Henry C. Ide, vice-governor and secretary of finance and justice,
who had performed his duties while he was on leave. Judge Ide was a
republican, from Vermont. He resigned on September 19, 1906.

He was succeeded by General James F. Smith, a democrat from California,
who had come to the islands as a colonel of volunteers, and had won
promotion because of his valuable services in the Visayas, and more
especially in the island of <DW64>s, where he had earned the good
will of the Filipinos by his tact and kindness. Later he had served,
unwillingly, as head of the Manila custom house.

He was subsequently made a justice of the supreme court of the
Philippines. A lawyer by profession, he had resigned this position
with regret to accept appointment, on January 1, 1903, as secretary
of public instruction. He did not desire the governor-generalship and
made a strong but unsuccessful effort to avoid accepting the position,
which he finally took from a sense of duty. He was a good lawyer,
with a big heart, and a keen insight into human nature. He thoroughly
understood the Filipinos, and he made an excellent governor-general. It
was during his term of office that the Philippine Legislature,
composed of an upper appointive house, the Philippine Commission,
and a lower elective house, the Philippine Assembly, met for the
first time on October 16, 1907.

I devote a separate chapter [478] to the Philippine Legislature and
its work, so need not discuss it here. Suffice it to say that such
success as attended the work of this body during its inaugural, first
and special sessions, was very largely due to the tactful influence
of Governor-General Smith, who gave the speaker of the assembly
much valuable, friendly counsel, and kept the two houses working in
comparative harmony. Having struggled through one session of the
legislature, Governor-General Smith felt at liberty to resign. He
greatly desired to leave the Philippine government service and return
to the practice of his profession. His resignation was reluctantly
accepted, about a year after he had tendered it, and he left the
service on November 10, 1909.

He was succeeded by Vice-Governor W. Cameron Forbes, a republican
from Massachusetts, who had accepted appointment as secretary of
commerce and police on June 15, 1904. A man of independent means,
Mr. Forbes entered the public service only because of the opportunity
for greater usefulness which was thus afforded him. He brought to
bear on the problems which confronted him as secretary of commerce
and police intelligence and ability of a very high order. Wide
practical experience in the management of large business interests
had admirably fitted him to improve the organization and increase the
efficiency of the insular police force, and to mature and carry out
plans for bettering means of communication and otherwise facilitating
and stimulating the normal, healthful commercial development of the
islands. I have devoted several chapters to the discussion of the
results accomplished along these lines, [479] and will not attempt
here to enumerate them.

Like all of his predecessors, he brought to the office of
governor-general mature experience gained on the ground, having been
in the service more than five years at the time of his promotion.

As governor-general, he not only retained his keen interest in the
large problems which had previously engaged his attention, and laboured
unceasingly and most successfully in the performance of the duties of
his new office, but took an especial interest in the development of
the summer capital, and in the work for the non-Christian peoples of
the islands, devoting a much greater amount of time and attention to
familiarizing himself with the needs of this portion of the population
than had ever previously been given to it by any governor-general. He
visited the Moros and the Bukidnons in the south, and the Negritos,
the Benguet Igorots, the Lepanto Igorots, the Bontoc Igorots,
the Ilongots, the Ifugaos, the Kalingas, and both the wild and the
civilized Tingians, in the north, repeatedly inspecting the several
sub-provinces of the Mountain Province.

Through his generosity in making proper grounds available, public
interest in outdoor sports was greatly stimulated at Manila and
at Baguio, while his own participation in polo, baseball and golf
was a good example to Americans and Filipinos alike, in a country
where vigorous outdoor exercise is very necessary to the physical
development of the young and the preservation of the health of the
mature. He was a true friend of the Filipinos, whom he genuinely liked
and was always ready to assist. His personal influence was a powerful
factor in the success of the very important work carried on at the
Philippine Normal School and the Philippine Training School for Nurses.

During his term of office the prosperity of the islands increased
by leaps and bounds, public order became better than ever before
in their history, and the efficiency of the civil service reached
its maximum. No other governor-general ever drew so heavily on his
private means in promoting the public good, and it was the irony
of fate that he should have been accused, by certain irresponsible
anti-imperialists, of using his public office to promote his private
interests. Near the end of his administration grossly and absurdly
false charges were made against him on the floor of the House by
Representative William A. Jones. As their falsity has been conclusively
and finally shown, [480] I will not here lend importance to them
by repeating them. No official has ever given any country a cleaner
administration than Governor-General Forbes gave the Philippines.

It was his fortune to be in office at the time of the change in the
national administration of the United States. After continuing to serve
for months with no sign from Washington as to whether his resignation
was desired, he was advised by the Chief of the bureau of insular
affairs that the appointment of Mr. Francis Burton Harrison, who is a
Tammany Hall democrat, as his successor had been sent to the Senate,
[481] and three days after its confirmation received a curt request
for his resignation to be effected in a week and a day. He was also
requested to employ servants for Mr. Harrison. Spaniards who read
on the public streets newspapers which printed this message were
seen to tear them up and stamp on the pieces! Our Spanish friends
are accustomed to expect courtesy in connection with the removal of
faithful and efficient public servants.

All other governors-general had taken the oath of office at
Manila. Mr. Harrison took it at Washington on September 2, 1913. He
is the first American governor of the islands who has entered upon his
high duties without previous experience in the country which he is to
govern, and he has as yet displayed little inclination to profit by
the experience of either Filipino or American administrative insular
officials of high rank. It is too soon to discuss any feature of his
administration other than his attitude toward the civil service,
which I take up elsewhere, [482] and I can only express the hope
that when he has gained that knowledge which can come only through
personal observation on the ground, he will grow to be a wise, strong,
conservative official.

The establishment of civil government in the Philippine Islands under
American rule was a gradual evolution up to the time of the assumption
of control by Governor-General Harrison.

I will not attempt to follow in detail all of its successive stages,
but in closing this chapter will endeavour briefly to summarize the
results obtained up to that time.

The Philippines now have two delegates to the Congress of the United
States appointed by the legislature in accordance with the provision of
Section 8 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Both are Filipinos.

The ranking executive officials of the insular government are a
governor-general, a secretary of the interior, a secretary of finance
and justice, a secretary of commerce and police and a secretary
of public instruction. All of these officers are appointed by the
President, subject to confirmation by the Senate. The secretary of
finance and justice is a Filipino; the other secretaries of departments
are Americans.

There is a legislature composed of two houses known respectively as
the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly. The Philippine
Commission is composed of nine members; five are the governor-general
and the four secretaries of department _ex officio_, and four are
appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Senate. Four
of the members are Filipinos and five are Americans. [483]

The Philippine Assembly is composed of eighty-one elected members,
all of whom are Filipinos. They represent thirty-four of the
thirty-nine provinces into which the archipelago is divided. The two
houses of the legislature have equal powers. Neither has any special
privilege in the matter of initiating legislation, and affirmative
action by both is required in order to pass it. The Moro Province,
the Mountain Province and the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Agusan
are not represented in the assembly, nor are they subject to the
jurisdiction of the Philippine Legislature. The Philippine Commission
alone has legislative jurisdiction over them, their population being
largely composed of Moros, or members of other non-Christian tribes.

The provinces may be divided into regularly organized provinces
governed under the provincial government act, and specially organized
provinces, which include the Moro Province, the Mountain Province
and the provinces of Mindoro, Palawan, Agusan and Nueva Vizcaya, of
which the first is governed under a special law and the remaining four
are governed under a different one known as "The Special Provincial
Government Act."

Regularly organized provinces have a governor and a treasurer. The
governor is elected, and the treasurer is appointed by the
governor-general with the approval of the commission. These two
officials, with another known as the third member, constitute
a provincial board. The third member is elected. As the Filipinos
usually elect to office men from among their own people, practically
all of the elective provincial officers are Filipinos, as are ten
of the appointive officers, it having been the policy to appoint
Filipinos whenever possible.

Regularly organized provinces are divided into municipalities
which elect their own officers and control their own affairs for
the most part. Provincial treasurers have intervention in municipal
expenditures, which are approved in advance for each fiscal year,
and municipal officers may be removed for misconduct by the
governor-general.

All officers of the six special government provinces are appointed
by the governor-general with the approval of the commission.

There are four regularly organized municipalities in these provinces,
but the remainder of their territory is divided into townships,
which elect their own officers, except their secretary-treasurers,
who are appointed by the provincial governor; and into _rancherias_ or
settlements, with all of their officials appointed by the provincial
governor. This latter form of local government is confined to the
more primitive wild people.

The judiciary is independent. The details of its organization will
be found in Chapter XV.

Three of the seven justices of the supreme court, including the chief
justice, are Filipinos, as are approximately half of the judges of
the courts of first instance and practically all justices of the peace.

At the close of the fiscal year ending June 30, 1913, 71 per cent
of the employees in the classified civil service of the islands were
Filipinos painstakingly trained for the positions to which they had
been appointed.

Prior to the American occupation, the Filipinos had practically no
intervention in the government of their country.

The changes introduced in the twelve years since the establishment
of civil government began are of a sweeping and radical nature. For
reasons hereinafter fully set forth, I believe they have been somewhat
too sweeping, and too radical. At all events, it is now certainly the
part of wisdom carefully to analyze their results before going further.

I deem the subject of the establishment of civil governmental control
over the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines worthy of special
consideration. [484]






CHAPTER XIII

The Philippine Civil Service


Before the Philippine Commission left Washington, a clear understanding
was reached with the President and secretary of war to the effect that
no political appointee whatsoever should under any circumstances be
forced upon us. After arrival at Manila early attention was given to
the drafting of a civil service act by Mr. Taft, who was fortunate in
having the assistance of Mr. Frank M. Kiggins, chief of the examining
division of the United States Civil Service Commission. The passage
of this act and its strict enforcement led to very favourable comment
in the United States. In his first annual message President Roosevelt
said:--

    "It is important to have this system obtain at home, but
    it is even more important to have it rigidly applied in our
    insular possessions....

    "The merit system is simply one method of securing honest and
    efficient administration of the government, and in the long
    run the sole justification of any type of government lies in
    its proving itself both honest and efficient."

Secretary Root also gave us his fullest support, calling attention to
the fact that the law which we had passed was of a very advanced type,
and that under such circumstances as confronted us, the securing of
the best men available should outweigh, and indeed practically exclude,
all other considerations.

Our action met with the unqualified approval of organizations
which especially interest themselves in the maintenance of clean
and efficient public service, such as the Cambridge (Massachusetts)
Civil Service Reform Association [485] and the National Civil Service
Reform League, whose committee on civil service in dependencies spoke
in very high terms of existing conditions in the Philippines. [486]

In its first annual report the Civil Service Board called attention
to some of the more important provisions of the Act in the following
words:--

    "Competitive examinations must, whenever practicable, be
    held for original entrance to the service, and promotions of
    employees must also be based upon competitive examinations,
    in which the previous experience and efficiency of employees
    shall be given due consideration. The examinations for entrance
    to the service must be held in the United States and in the
    Philippine Islands, and applicants are required to be tested
    in both English and Spanish.

    "Disloyalty to the United States of America as the supreme
    authority in the Islands is made a complete disqualification
    for holding office, and every applicant for admission to the
    service must, before being admitted to examination, take the
    oath of loyalty. By an amendment to the Civil Service Act on
    January 26, 1901, it is further declared that all persons
    in arms against the authority of the United States in the
    Philippine Islands, and all persons aiding or abetting them,
    on the first day of April, 1901, shall be ineligible to
    hold office.

    "A minimum age limit of eighteen years and a maximum age
    limit of forty years are fixed for those who enter the
    lowest grades in the service. This avoids the difficulty
    and embarrassment that would result from the admission of
    men advanced in years to positions where the duties can be
    better performed by younger and more energetic persons.

    "The Board is given authority to investigate matters
    relative to the enforcement of the act and the rules, and is
    empowered to administer oaths, to summon witnesses, and to
    require the production of office books and records in making
    such investigations. Without such a provision it would be
    very difficult, if not impossible, to conduct satisfactory
    investigations, but with the authority conferred by the act,
    the Board can make a rigid inquiry into the facts of every
    case arising under the act and the rules.

    "The act provides for the ultimate classification of all
    positions in the service, from laborers to heads of bureaus and
    offices, and the Board may, in its discretion, determine the
    efficiency of those now in the service as well as those who may
    enter hereafter through its examinations. This authority will
    enable the Board to ascertain the fitness of all employees so
    that only the most competent will be retained in the service.

    "As a check upon the illegal payment of salaries the act
    provides that whenever the Board finds that a person has been
    appointed in violation of its provisions or of the rules of
    the Board, and so certifies to the disbursing and auditing
    officers, such payments shall be illegal, and if payment is
    continued the disbursing officer shall not receive credit
    for the same and the auditing officer who authorizes the
    payment shall be liable on his official bond for the loss to
    the government."

In its third annual report the Civil Service Board mentioned the
following among its distinctive duties:--

    "All appointments to classified positions are required to
    be made on a form prescribed by the Board, and the Board's
    attestation is required in each case before the Civil Governor
    or Secretary of Department will approve the appointment and
    before the disbursing officer will pay any salary.

    "The papers in all cases of reduction, removal and enforced
    resignation are required to be submitted to the Board for
    recommendation before transmission to the Civil Governor or
    Secretary of Department for final action.

    "The Board is required to keep a record of all unclassified as
    well as classified employees in the Philippine civil service,
    showing among other things date of appointment, original
    position and salary, place of employment, all changes in
    status and grade, and all accrued and sick leave granted.

    "From its service records the Board is required to compile
    annually, for publication on January 1, a roster of the
    officers and employees under the Philippine Government.

    "Applications from employees, classified and unclassified,
    for accrued and sick leave for more than two days must be
    made on a form prescribed by the Board and forwarded to it
    for verification of service record and previous leave granted
    and for recommendation before final action is taken by the
    Civil Governor or Secretary of Department."

These extracts from official reports clearly show that the act was
indeed of a very advanced type, and if honestly enforced would of
necessity lead to the establishment and maintenance of "an efficient
and honest civil service," for which purpose it was enacted.

In 1905 the insular government dispensed with boards as administrative
agencies, and in accordance with this general policy, a bureau of
civil service with a director at its head was substituted for the
Civil Service Board, thus securing greater administrative efficiency
and increased economy.

At first the Civil Service Act applied to comparatively few positions,
as only a few bureaus and offices had been created, but as the
government was organized and grew, the different bureaus and offices
were placed in the classified service, the acts organizing them leaving
in the unclassified service positions to which in the judgment of
the commission the examination requirements of the act should not
apply. Ultimately these requirements were made applicable to the
treasurers of all municipalities and to all positions, including
teachers, in the executive and judicial branches of the central
government, the provincial governments, and the governments of the
cities of Manila and Baguio, except a few specifically excepted by
law, which for the most part are unclassified or exempt in almost
all governments, national, state and municipal, having civil service
laws. None of the states of the Union has such a widely extended
classification of its civil service.

With the exception of the positions specifically placed in
the unclassified service by law and of appointments made by the
Philippine Commission, all positions in the Philippine civil service
are classified and must be filled by appointees who have passed civil
service examinations. Neither the governor-general nor the Bureau of
Civil Service can, by the promulgation of civil service rules, or in
any other manner whatever, transfer any position from the classified
to the unclassified service or except from examination any position
in the classified service. Under most of the civil service laws of
the United States the President or the governor of the state has
authority to transfer positions from the non-classified or exempted
class to the competitive classified civil service or _vice versa_,
these powers sometimes leading to manipulation of the civil service
rules for political purposes.

In the Philippines, where emergencies, such as cholera epidemics,
sometimes lead to the employment of large bodies of temporary
employees without examination, when the emergency has passed the
temporary employees have always been discharged; and no employee
has ever received classification without examination on account of
temporary service. This is in marked contrast to the practice in the
United States, where large bodies of employees taken on for temporary
service due to emergencies, such as the war with Spain, are not
infrequently blanketed into the classified service without examination.

In its last annual report the board recommended that a number of
official positions in the unclassified service be placed in the
classified service, and gave as a reason therefor that such action
would "add to the attractiveness of the classified service by
increasing the opportunities therein for promotion to responsible
positions." This recommendation was adopted by providing that all
vacancies in the positions of heads and assistant heads of bureaus or
offices and of superintendents shall be filled by promotion, with or
without examination, in the discretion of the civil governor or proper
head of a department, of persons in the classified civil service,
if competent persons are found therein.

This provision is an important and distinguishing feature of the
Philippine Civil Service Act. The federal civil service has none
comparable with it. It is of special value in that it induces young
men of exceptional ability and training to enter the lower grades,
for they have the certainty that faithful and efficient work will in
the end earn for them the highest positions.

On February 25, 1909, the director of civil service made the following
statement with respect to the observance of the law:--

    "A careful study of Act 5 and all acts amendatory thereof
    will show that there has been no change in the policy adopted
    by the Commission at the outset to extend the classified
    service as widely as possible and to fill by promotion all
    the higher positions so far as practicable. The provision
    requiring the higher positions to be filled by promotion so
    far as practicable has always been regarded by the Philippine
    Commission, by this Bureau, and by others interested in
    obtaining the best possible government service in the
    Philippines as one of the most important provisions of the
    Civil Service Act. It has been faithfully observed by all
    Governors-General....With the exception of the positions
    of Governor-General and Secretaries of Departments, the
    Philippine Civil Service Act requires the highest positions
    in the executive civil service, namely, chiefs and assistant
    chiefs of Bureaus and Offices, to be filled by promotion from
    the entire service in all cases except when in the opinion of
    the appointing power there is no person competent and available
    who possesses the qualifications required, and this provision
    has been faithfully observed heretofore."

The enforcement of the law by the commission has received the
following commendation from the executive committee of the National
Civil Service Reform League:--

    "We have further to note with satisfaction the course of
    the Philippine Commission, by which, if it be persevered in,
    the merit system will be established in the Islands of that
    archipelago at least as thoroughly and consistently as in any
    department of government, Federal, State, or Municipal, in
    the Union. This must be, in any case, regarded as a gratifying
    recognition of sound principles of administration on the part
    of the Commission, and justifies the hope that, within the
    limits of their jurisdiction at least, no repetition of the
    scandals of post-bellum days will be tolerated."

Up to the time of the appointment of Governor-General Harrison the
provisions of the Civil Service Act and rules were firmly supported
by all of the governors-general and secretaries of departments,
and the annual reports of the governor-general uniformly expressed
satisfaction with their practical operation. Mr. Taft was always an
enthusiastic supporter of the merit system.

Governor-General Forbes in his inaugural address made the following
statements:--

    "It is necessary that the civil service should be rigidly
    maintained and its rules carefully observed. One very
    distinguished Filipino has recently been appointed to
    administrative control of one of the most important departments
    of the Government, equal in rank to any executive position in
    the Islands with the exception of the Executive head. In the
    executive branch of the Government, the Filipinization of the
    service must steadily continue. As vacancies occur Filipinos
    will be gradually substituted for Americans as rapidly as
    can be done without positive detriment to the service. At the
    same time, care will be taken to provide a suitable career for
    honest and capable Americans who have come out here in good
    faith. They should know that during good behavior and efficient
    performance of their duty they are secure in their positions,
    and that when they desire to return to the United States an
    effort will be made to place them in the civil service at home.

    "I want no better men than the present officers and employees
    of the Government, Americans and Filipinos. They compare
    favorably with any set of men I have ever seen both as regards
    ability and fidelity to duty."

Under the operation of the Civil Service Act the proportion of
Filipinos employed has increased from 49 per cent, in 1903, to 71
per cent in 1913, as is shown by the following table:--


           Comparison of Percentages of Americans and
                  Filipinos in the Service

        =============================================
                       |      NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
             YEAR      |-----------------------------
                       |    Americans |   Filipinos
        ---------------------------------------------
        1903 ......... |      51%     |      49%
        1904 ......... |      49      |      51
        1905 ......... |      45      |      55
        1906 [487] ... |      -       |      -
        1907 ......... |      40      |      60
        1908 ......... |      38      |      62
        1909 ......... |      38      |      62
        1910 ......... |      36      |      64
        1911 ......... |      35      |      65
        1912 ......... |      31      |      69
        1913 ......... |      29      |      71
        =============================================


For the first few years after the establishment of the government
large numbers of Americans were appointed, as there were
comparatively few Filipino candidates with the necessary educational
qualifications. During the last two years, 89 per cent of the persons
appointed in the islands have been Filipinos.

There has been a great increase in the number of Filipinos entering
the civil service examinations in English. Ten years ago 97 per cent
of those examined took their examinations in Spanish, while during
last year 89 per cent of those examined took examinations in English,
the total number so examined being 7755. Almost all appointees
for ordinary clerical work are now Filipinos, but the supply of
bookkeepers, stenographers, civil engineers, physicians, veterinarians,
surveyors, chemists, bacteriologists, agriculturists, horticulturists,
constabulary officers, nurses, electricians, mechanical engineers,
and other scientific employees is still insufficient to meet the
demands of the service. Only one Filipino has passed the stenographer
examination in English since the organization of the government, and it
is necessary each year to bring many American stenographers from the
United States. A few Filipinos pass each year the junior stenographer
examination [488] and are able to fill some of the positions which
would formerly have required the appointment of Americans.

The salaries paid to executive officials, chiefs of bureaus and
offices, chief clerks, and chiefs of divisions equal in many instances
those paid to officials occupying similar positions in the service
of the United States government.

In the legislative branch the speaker receives $8000 per annum. Members
of the Philippine Commission without portfolios receive $7500 per
annum. Members of the Philippine Assembly receive $15 a day for each
day in which the assembly is in session.

In the executive branch secretaries of departments receive $15,500
per annum each, including $5000 received by them as members of the
Philippine Commission. The executive secretary receives $9000 per
annum. The salaries of other bureau chiefs range from $2500 per annum
to $7500.

The justices of the Philippine Supreme Court receive $10,000 per
annum. Judges of courts of first instance receive from $4500 to $5500.

The following extracts from an article by the chairman of the
Philippine Civil Service Board give information with respect to
salaries in the Philippine Islands, as compared with salaries paid
in surrounding British and Dutch colonies:--

    "The salaries paid officials in all branches of the service
    of the Straits Settlements are generally lower than those paid
    in the Philippine civil service. In this connection, however,
    it is only just to state that the population and extent of the
    territory under British control, and the expenses of living,
    are less than in the Philippines, while the difficulty of
    the problems to be solved is not so great. The salaries paid
    to natives who fill the lower grade positions in the civil
    service of the Philippine Islands are three and four times
    as great as the salaries paid to natives in similar classes
    of work in the civil service of the British Malay colonies.

    "A study of the colonial civil service of the Dutch in
    the islands of Java and Madura gives us somewhat different
    results....

    "The matter of salaries is peculiarly interesting. The
    comparison made above of the compensations received by the high
    officials in the civil service of the English colonies and by
    those in the Philippines does not hold good when applied to
    the Dutch in Java. In fact, the salary of the Governor-General
    of Java is somewhat remarkable in contrast with that of the
    Civil Governor of the Philippines. As is well known, the latter
    receives $20,000, while the salary of the Governor-General of
    Java amounts to 132,000 gulden or something over $53,000. The
    American official is given, in addition, free transportation
    on all official investigations and free use of the governor's
    palace, but not the cost of maintenance. On the other hand,
    the Dutch governor is granted 51,000 gulden (about $21,500)
    as personal and household expenses and travel pay.

    "The general secretary of the government receives 24,000
    gulden ($9648), as compared with the executive secretary
    of the Philippine government, whose salary is $7500. [489]
    The seven heads of departments in the Javanese service each
    receive a like compensation of 24000 gulden. The Raad,
    or Council, of the Dutch colonial government is composed
    of a vice-president and four members--the former receiving
    about $14,500, the latter slightly over $11,500 each. In the
    Philippine government the executive functions of heads of
    departments are exercised by four members of the legislative
    body, each of whom receives $10,500 for his executive services
    and $5000 for his legislative duties. Without going further
    into detail, the conclusion is evident that all officials of
    high rank are much better paid in the Dutch service. When a
    comparison is made between the chief clerks and other office
    employees of middle grades--not natives--the salaries are
    seen to be about the same in the two countries.

    "All natives in positions of lower grades, however,
    in the Philippine Islands fare better than their Malay
    brethren, either in the Straits Settlements or in the East
    Indies."--(Second Annual Report of the Philippine Civil
    Service Board, pp. 60, 61.)

    "Difference in salaries for subordinate positions in the
    British and Dutch colonial services and the Philippine service
    are distinctly in favour of subordinate employees in the
    Philippine service; only the higher officials, after long
    experience, in the British colonial service receive larger
    salaries than corresponding officials in the Philippine
    service; the leave of absence and other privileges for the
    Philippine service are not less liberal than for other colonial
    services."--(Report of the Philippine Commission for 1905,
    p. 74.)

The entrance salaries of Americans brought to the islands are
considerably in excess of the entrance salaries received on appointment
to the civil service in the United States.

The following table shows the minimum entrance salaries given to
Americans appointed in the United States to the United States civil
service, as shown by the manual of examinations of the United States
Civil Service Commission for the fall of 1913, and to Americans
appointed in the United States to the Philippine Civil Service:--


====================================================================
                         |     Philippines      |  United States
--------------------------------------------------------------------
                         |                      |
Aid (Surveyor)           |     $1400            | $ 900
Civil Engineer           |      1400            |  1200
Forester, assistant      |      1400            |  1200
Scientific Assistant,    |                      |
(Agricultural Inspector) |      1400            |   600
Physician                |      1600            |  1320
Printer                  |      2000            |      .50 per hour
Stenographer             |      1200            |   700
Trained Nurse            |       600 Board,     |   600 and laundry
                         | quarters and laundry |
Teacher                  |      1000            |   540
Veterinarian             |      1600            |  1200
                         |                      |
====================================================================


The following cases taken from the official rosters show some
promotions to the higher positions in the service of employees who
entered the lower ranks of the classified service:--

A clerk who entered the service in 1899 at $1800 per annum was
appointed in 1903 an assistant chief of bureau at $3000 per annum and
in 1908 executive secretary at $9000 per annum. A teacher appointed in
1899 at $720 per annum was appointed a chief of an office at $4000 per
annum and in 1912 a judge at $4500 per annum. A teacher who entered
the service in 1901 at $1200 per annum was in 1909 appointed a chief
of a bureau at $6000 per annum. A teacher who entered the service in
1904 at $1000 per annum was appointed in 1911 an assistant chief of
a bureau at $6000 per annum. A clerk who entered the service in 1901
at $1200 per annum was appointed in 1909 an assistant chief of the
executive bureau at $3750 per annum and in 1912 a chief of a bureau
at $6000 per annum. A stenographer who entered the service in 1902
at $1400 per annum was in 1908 appointed an assistant chief of a
bureau at $5000 per annum. A transitman who entered the service in
1905 at $1400 per annum was in 1913 appointed an assistant chief of a
bureau at $4500 per annum. An accountant who entered the service in
1901 at $1800 per annum was in 1907 appointed an assistant chief of
a bureau at $3750 per annum and in 1909 a chief of a bureau at $6000
per annum. A law clerk who entered the service in 1904 at $1800 per
annum was in 1913 appointed judge at $4500 per annum. In no service
anywhere has promotion depended more directly on demonstrated ability,
and in many instances it has been rapid.

Young men living two in a room may obtain room and board in boarding
houses in Manila at a rate as low as $35 per month each. In the Young
Men's Christian Association building, a large reenforced concrete
structure with reading room, gymnasium, and a good restaurant, the
charge for two in a room is $10.25 each. Board costs $27.50, a total of
$37.75. The expenses for clothing in Manila are less than in the United
States, as white clothing is worn the whole year and white duck suits
may be obtained for about $3 each. The expenses for laundry amount
to about $5 a month. The necessity of employing a _muchacho_ [490] is
_nil_, in the case of an unmarried employee who boards. Servants are
far cheaper and better in the Philippines than in the United States.

In a discussion of the salaries paid in the Philippine civil service
the question of the leave allowed should be considered. Classified
employees who receive an annual salary of $1000 or more per annum may
be granted twenty-eight days' leave per annum to cover absences from
duty due to illness or other causes. If not taken during the calendar
year in which it is earned or in January or February of the succeeding
year, it is forfeited. Employees taking vacation leave during the
months of December, January, February and March may take fifty-six
days, corresponding to two years of service, at one time, and may thus
get time to visit Australia, Japan, China, and neighbouring countries.

In addition to vacation leave an employee whose salary is $1000 or
more but less than $1800 per annum is entitled to thirty days' accrued
leave per annum, and an employee whose salary is $1800 per annum or
more is entitled to thirty-five days' accrued leave per annum. Accrued
leave may accumulate for not more than five years of service.

All classified employees are entitled to visit the United States or
foreign countries once in every three years, receiving in addition to
their accrued leave, one year's vacation leave, allowance of actual
travel time at half pay not to exceed sixty days, and return travel
expenses from place of residence in the United States, or from port
of embarkation in a foreign country to Manila, on the completion of
two years of service after date of return. An employee entitled to
thirty-five days' accrued leave per annum who visits the United States
after having rendered three years of service receives a total of two
hundred thirteen days' accrued leave, vacation leave, and half-pay
travel time. If he postpones his visit till he has completed five
years of service, he receives a total of two hundred ninety-one days'
accrued leave, vacation leave and travel time. An employee entitled to
thirty days' accrued leave per annum who visits the United States after
three years of service receives a total of one hundred ninety-four
days' leave and half-pay travel time, and if he postpones his visit
until he has rendered five years of service, he receives a total of
two hundred fifty-nine days' leave and travel time.

It will be seen that these are very liberal allowances. An employee
receiving $1200 at the end of two years of service may spend eight
weeks of vacation leave visiting Japan or other surrounding countries,
and at the end of an additional year's service he may visit his home
in the United States with six and a third months' absence on full and
half pay and with his expenses from his home to Manila payable two
years after his return, and during every three years of his service
he may have the same privileges.

The law also provides that if an employee is wounded or injured in
the performance of duty, he may have a total of six months' leave on
full pay in addition to any accrued leave to his credit.

Employees who have rendered satisfactory service and resign after
three or more years receive in a lump sum all accrued leave due and
thirty days' half salary. For example, an employee who has received
$1800 per annum and has served five years without taking any leave
in excess of the four weeks' vacation leave allowable annually would
draw $1025 were he to resign.

The school sessions amount to forty weeks per annum and the school
vacations to twelve weeks per annum. [491] Teachers receive an annual
salary and draw full pay during vacations as well as during school
sessions. Every third year they are allowed to visit the United States
or foreign countries with an allowance of sixty days' half-pay travel
time in addition to the ten weeks' long vacation, and on completing
two years of service after return to the islands they are entitled to
their travelling expenses from place of residence in the United States
to Manila or from port of embarkation in a foreign country to Manila.

It is interesting to compare these provisions with the regulations
governing leave of absence in the British colonial service:--

    (1) There is no distinction between sick leave and ordinary
    leave, the leave of absence on account of sickness being
    charged against the ordinary leave allowable.

    (2) There are two classes of leave: vacation leave on full
    pay and half-pay leave.

    (3) The vacation leave amounts to three months every two
    years, and must be taken during the two years, as it does
    not accumulate.

    (4) The half-pay leave amounts to two months for each year
    of service, but cannot be taken until after a period of six
    years' resident service in the Colony, except in cases of
    serious indisposition supported by medical certificate, or of
    "urgent private affairs," the nature of which must be stated
    to the governor. In either case, the governor and council
    must be satisfied that the indulgence is indispensable.

    Half pay in African and Asiatic colonies may accumulate for
    twelve years' service--_i.e._ twenty-four months' half-pay
    leave.

    (5) After the exhaustion of all vacation leave and half-pay
    leave, an advance of six months' half-pay leave may be made on
    special grounds ("urgent private affairs" or illness supported
    by a medical certificate), the advance being charged against
    leave accruing subsequently.

    (6) For the purpose of visiting home, an officer may be
    granted the vacation leave due him (which is never more than
    three months) on full pay, and his accumulated half-pay leave,
    to commence at the expiration of his vacation leave.

    (7) Judicial and education officers do not receive the
    vacation leave described in paragraph 3 above, the vacation
    of courts and schools being considered equal to this, but
    they do receive the half-pay leave described in paragraph 4,
    and may, when visiting home on half-pay leave, receive full
    pay during any ordinary vacation of the court or school.

It will be noted that although officers in the British colonial service
are allowed much longer periods of absence, the greater part of their
absence is on half pay and the total money value of the leave allowable
in the British colonial service and in the Philippine civil service
is about the same. As officers naturally prefer to be on full pay
instead of half pay while on leave, the provision of the Philippine
law is in their interest; it is also in the interest of the service,
as the periods of the absence from duty are not so prolonged.

The Philippine Civil Service Law is now about to be put to its
first really severe test as a result of the change in the national
administration. Heretofore those whose duty and privilege it has been
to enforce it have been in the most full and hearty sympathy with its
purposes. President McKinley was from the outset definitely committed
to the widest application of the merit system to appointments in the
Philippines. Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft firmly supported that system,
as has each succeeding governor-general up to, but not including,
Mr. Harrison, who is as yet an unknown quantity.

It is interesting, however, to note that on the day following his
arrival there was a demand for the instant resignation of Mr. Thomas
Cary Welch, a faithful and efficient employee of the government,
who had been for nearly ten years in the service, whose position
was desired for, and immediately given to, Mr. Stephen Bonsal. That
gentleman had been appointed at Washington a member of the Municipal
Board of Manila immediately after Mr. Harrison's confirmation as
governor-general. It is not recorded that Mr. Bonsal rendered any
valuable service to the city on the voyage, or during the twenty-four
hours of his occupancy of his municipal post subsequent to his
arrival! Nor does it appear that he passed any examination before
his early promotion.

Following closely upon the removal of Mr. Welch came a demand for
the resignation of Captain Charles H. Sleeper, Director of Lands,
who was unquestionably one of the ablest and most efficient of the
bureau chiefs.

He had earned the ill-will of the _politicos_ by insisting that persons
authorized to make public land surveys, or other surveys on which
claims of title as against the government were to be based, should
know enough about surveying to make one correct survey when given
an opportunity practically to demonstrate their abilities under very
favourable conditions. He had also incurred the dislike of influential
_caciques_ by defending the occupants of small holdings on friar
estates from the rapacity of their rich neighbours, and by protecting
free-patent applicants and homesteaders when large landowners opposed
their applications in order to prevent their securing land, so that
they might the more easily be held as peon labourers.

He had started in his bureau a practical school for Filipino surveyors
which was training really well-qualified candidates for positions
desired by the politicians for themselves or their incompetent friends.

Last, but not least, he had helped to upset the plans of the men
primarily responsible for the so-called "friar lands investigation"
conducted by the House Committee on Insular Affairs, which cost
the United States government a very large sum, and resulted in
demonstrating his uprightness and the efficiency of his administration.

Mr. John R. Wilson, the assistant director of lands, was absent at the
moment, but his resignation was demanded on the day of his return. He
too was an active, efficient, upright man.

Both of these removals were political acts, pure and simple. Sr. Manuel
Tinio was appointed Director of Lands. He is a bright young Ilocano
of good character, who had become a "general" in the Insurgent army
at twenty-one years of age. He is unfit to hold the place, because,
as he has himself frankly said, he knows nothing about the work. He
is charged with the duty of administering $7,000,000 worth of friar
lands, and the whole public domain of the Philippine Islands, and with
such minor duties as the checkmating of the machinations of numerous
wealthy Filipinos who seek fraudulently to acquire great tracts through
fraudulent claims to unperfected titles and by other improper means.

While in Honolulu, _en route_ to Manila, Mr. Harrison gave out an
interview, which I am credibly informed he has since confirmed in
substance. It contained the following statement:--

    "For years I have been of the minority in Congress and have
    seen the Democrats kicked about, trampled upon, and otherwise
    manhandled by Republicans, so that I must confess it now gives
    me a saturnine pleasure to see the Democrats in a position
    to do the same thing to the Republicans."

His early official acts after arrival at Manila confirmed the belief
that this was indeed the spirit in which he was facing the grave
responsibilities which there confronted him.

It is beyond doubt or cavil that high ideals heretofore have prevailed
in the Philippine Civil Service. Are they now to be substituted by
the methods of the ward politician?

In its report for 1901 the Philippine Commission said:--

    "The civil service law has been in operation since our last
    report, and we see no reason to change our conclusion as
    to the absolute necessity for its existence, and strict
    enforcement. Without this law American government in these
    Islands is, in our opinion, foredoomed to humiliating failure."

I signed that report. I have not since seen any reason to change
my mind.






CHAPTER XIV

The Philippine Constabulary and Public Order


During the last thirty years of Spanish rule in the Philippines
evil-doers were pursued and apprehended and public order was maintained
chiefly by the _guardia civil_. At the time of its organization in
1868 this body had a single division. By 1880 the number had been
increased to three, two for Luzon and one for the Visayan Islands.

The _guardia civil_ was organized upon a military basis, its officers
and soldiers being drawn from the regular army of Spain by selection
or upon recommendation. Detachments were distributed throughout the
provinces and were commanded according to their size by commissioned
or non-commissioned officers. Central offices were located in district
capitals; company headquarters were stationed in provincial capitals,
and detachments were sent to places where they were deemed to be
necessary.

Under ordinary conditions they rendered service as patrols of two men
each, but for the purpose of attacking large bands of outlaws one or
several companies were employed as occasion required.

The _guardia civil_ had jurisdiction over all sorts of violations of
laws and municipal ordinances. They made reports upon which were based
the appointments of municipal officers, the granting of licenses to
carry firearms, and the determination of the loyalty or the disloyalty
of individuals.

They were vested with extraordinary powers. Offences against them
were tried by courts-martial, and were construed as offences against
sentinels on duty. Penalties were therefore extremely severe.

Officers of the _guardia civil_ on leave could by their own initiative
assume a status of duty with the full powers and responsibilities
that go with command. This is contrary to American practice, under
which only dire emergency justifies an officer in assuming an official
status unless he is duly assigned thereto by competent authority.

The _guardia civil_ could arrest on suspicion, and while the Spanish
Government did not directly authorize or sanction the use of force to
extort confessions, it was not scrupulous in the matter of accepting
confessions so obtained as evidence of crime, nor was it quick to
punish members of the _guardia civil_ charged with mistreatment
of prisoners.

Reports made by the _guardia civil_ were not questioned, but were
accepted without support even in cases of the killing of prisoners
alleged to have attempted to escape, or of men evading arrest.

This method of eliminating without trial citizens deemed to be
undesirable was applied with especial frequency in the suppression
of active brigandage, and latterly during the revolution against
Spain. Prisoners in charge of the _guardia civil_ were always tied
elbow to elbow. They knew full well that resistance or flight was
an invitation to their guards to kill them, and that this invitation
was likely to be promptly accepted.

In the investigation of crime the members of this organization arrested
persons on suspicion and compelled them to make revelations, true or
false. Eye-witnesses to the commission of crime were not needed in
the Spanish courts of that day. The confession of an accused person
secured his conviction, even though not made in the presence of a
judge. Indirect and hearsay evidence were accepted, and such things
as writs of habeas corpus and the plea of double jeopardy were unknown
in Spanish procedure.

The _guardia civil_ could rearrest individuals and again charge them
with crimes of which they had already been acquitted. I have been
assured by reliable Filipino witnesses that it was common during the
latter days of Spanish sovereignty for persons who had made themselves
obnoxious to the government to be invited by non-commissioned
officers to take a walk, which was followed either by their complete
disappearance or by the subsequent discovery of their dead bodies.

It naturally resulted that the members of the _guardia civil_ were
regarded with detestation and terror by the people, but their power
was so absolute that protest rarely became public. The one notable
exception was furnished by Dr. Rizal's book entitled "Noli Me Tangere,"
which voiced the complaints of the Filipinos against them. There is
not a vestige of doubt that hatred of them was one of the principal
causes of the insurrection against Spain.

In 1901 the American government organized a rural police force in
the Philippines. It was called the Philippine constabulary. The
insurrection was then drawing to a close, but there were left in the
field many guerilla bands armed and uniformed. Their members sought to
excuse their lawless acts under the plea of patriotism and opposition
to the forces of the United States. In many provinces they combined
with professional bandits or with religious fanatics. Various "popes"
arose, like Papa Isio in <DW64>s. The Filipinos had become accustomed
to a state of war which had continued for nearly six years. Habits
of peace had been abandoned. The once prosperous haciendas were in
ruins. War and pestilence had destroyed many of the work animals,
and those which remained continued to perish from disease. Asiatic
cholera was sweeping through the archipelago, and consternation and
disorder followed in its wake.

Under such circumstances the organization of a rural police force was
imperatively necessary. Unfortunately the most critical situation which
it was to be called upon to meet had to be faced at the very outset,
when both officers and men were inexperienced and before adequate
discipline could be established.

The law providing for its establishment was drawn by the Honourable
Luke E. Wright, at that time secretary of commerce and police and
later destined to become governor-general of the Philippines and
secretary of war of the United States.

It was intended that the constabulary should accomplish its ends by
force when necessary but by sympathetic supervision when possible,
suppressing brigandage and turning the people towards habits of
peace. The fact was clearly borne in mind that the abuses of the
_guardia civil_ had not been forgotten and the new force was designed
to meet existing conditions, to allay as rapidly as possible the
existing just rancour against the similar organization established
under the Spanish regime, and to avoid the evils which had contributed
so much toward causing the downfall of Spanish sovereignty. The law
was admirably framed to achieve these ends.

The officers of the constabulary were selected chiefly from American
volunteers recently mustered out and from honourably discharged
soldiers of the United States army. Some few Filipinos, whose loyalty
was above suspicion, were appointed to the lower grades. This number
has since been materially augumented, and some of the original Filipino
appointees have risen to the rank of captain.

It was inevitable that at the outset there should be abuses. The
organization was necessarily born at work; there was no time to
instruct, to formulate regulations, to wait until a satisfactory
state of discipline had been brought about. There were not barracks
for housing the soldiers; there were neither uniforms, nor arms,
nor ammunition. There was no system for rationing the men. All of
these things had to be provided, and they were provided through a
natural evolution of practical processes, crystallizing into form,
tested by the duties of the day. The organization which grew up was a
true survival of the fittest, both in personnel and in methods. The
wonder is not that some abuses occurred, but that they were so few;
not that there were occasional evidences of lack of efficiency,
but that efficiency was on the whole so high from the beginning.

The several provinces were made administrative units, the commanding
officer in each being designated as "senior inspector." The men who
were to serve in a given province were by preference recruited there,
and a departure was thus made from the usual foreign colonial practice.

In 1905 the total force was fixed at one hundred companies with a
nominal strength of two officers and fifty men each. Under special
conditions this rule may be departed from, and the size of the
companies or the number of officers increased.

Each province is divided by the senior inspector into sections, and the
responsibility for patrol work and general policing rests on the senior
company officer in each station. The provinces are grouped into five
districts, each commanded by an assistant chief who exercises therein
the authority, and performs the duties appropriate to the chief for
the entire Philippines. The higher administrative positions have always
been filled by detailing regular officers of the United States army.

The constabulary soldiers are now neatly uniformed, armed with Krag
carbines and well disciplined. They show the effect of good and regular
food and of systematic exercise, their physical condition being vastly
superior to that of the average Filipino. They are given regular
instruction in their military duties. It is conducted in English.

The Philippine constabulary may be defined as a body of armed men
with a military organization, recruited from among the people of the
islands, officered in part by Americans and in part by Filipinos, and
employed primarily for police duty in connection with the establishment
and maintenance of public order.

Blount's chapters on the administrations of Taft, Wright and Smith
embody one prolonged plaint to the effect that the organization of
the constabulary was premature, and that after the war proper ended,
the last smouldering embers of armed and organized insurrection should
have been stamped out, and the brigandage which had existed in the
Philippines for centuries should have been dealt with, by the United
States army rather than by the constabulary.

Even if it were true that the army could have rendered more effective
service to this end than could have been expected at the outset from
a newly organized body of Filipino soldiers, the argument against the
organization and use of the constabulary would in my opinion have
been by no means conclusive. It is our declared policy to prepare
the Filipinos to establish and maintain a stable government of their
own. The proper exercise of police powers is obviously necessary to
such an end.

From the outset we have sacrificed efficiency in order that our wards
might gain practical experience, and might demonstrate their ability,
or lack of ability, to perform necessary governmental functions. Does
any one cognizant of the situation doubt for a moment that provincial
and municipal affairs in the Philippine Islands would to-day be more
efficiently administered if provincial and municipal officers were
appointed instead of being elected? Is any one so foolish as to imagine
that the sanitary regeneration of the islands would not have progressed
much more rapidly had highly trained American health officers been used
in place of many of the badly educated and comparatively inexperienced
Filipino physicians whose services have been utilized?

Nevertheless, in the concrete case under discussion I dissent from
the claim that more satisfactory results could have been obtained by
the use of American troops.

The army had long been supreme in the Philippines. Every function of
government had been performed by its officers and men, if performed at
all. Our troops had been combating an elusive and cruel enemy. If they
were human it is to be presumed that they still harbored animosities,
born of these conditions, toward the people with whom they had
so recently been fighting. Had the work of pacification been then
turned over to them it would have meant that often in the localities
in which they had been fighting, and in dealing with the men to whom
they had very recently been actively opposed in armed conflict, they
would have been called upon to perform tasks and to entertain feelings
radically different from those of the preceding two or three years.

A detachment, marching through Leyte, found an American who had
disappeared a short time before crucified, head down. His abdominal
wall had been carefully opened so that his intestines might hang down
in his face.

Another American prisoner, found on the same trip, had been buried in
the ground with only his head projecting. His mouth had been propped
open with a stick, a trail of sugar laid to it through the forest,
and a handful thrown into it.

Millions of ants had done the rest.

Officers and men who saw such things were thereby fitted for war,
rather than for ordinary police duty.

The truth is that they had seen so many of them that they continued to
see them in imagination when they no longer existed. I well remember
when a general officer, directed by his superior to attend a banquet
at Manila in which Americans and Filipinos joined, came to it wearing
a big revolver!

Long after Manila was quiet I was obliged to get out of my carriage
in the rain and darkness half a dozen times while driving the length
of Calle Real, and "approach to be recognized" by raw "rookies,"
each of whom pointed a loaded rifle at me while I did it. I know
that this did not tend to make me feel peaceable or happy. In my
opinion it was wholly unnecessary, and yet I did not blame the army
for thinking otherwise.

After the war was over, when my private secretary, Mr. James H. LeRoy,
was one day approaching Malolos, he was sternly commanded by a sentry
to halt, the command being emphasized as usual by presenting to his
attention a most unattractive view down the muzzle of a Krag. He was
next ordered to "salute the flag," which he finally discovered with
difficulty in the distance, after being told where to look. The army
way is right and necessary in war, but it makes a lot of bother in
time of peace!

This was not the only reason for failing to make more extensive use
of American soldiers in police duty. A veteran colonel of United
States cavalry who had just read Judge Blount's book was asked what
he thought of the claim therein made that the army should have done
the police and pacification work of the Philippines. His reply was:--

    "How long would it take a regiment of Filipinos to catch an
    American outlaw in the United States? Impossible!"

Another army officer said:--

    "Catching Filipino outlaws with the Army is like catching a
    flea in a twenty-acre field with a traction engine."

There is perhaps nothing so demoralizing to regular troops as
employment on police duty which requires them to work singly or in
small squads. Discipline speedily goes to the dogs and instruction
becomes impossible.

Successful prosecution of the work of chasing _ladrones_ in the
Philippines requires a thorough knowledge of local topography and
of local native dialects. Spanish is of use, but only in dealing
with educated Filipinos. A knowledge of the Filipino himself; of his
habits of thought; of his attitude toward the white man; and toward
the _illustrado_, or educated man, of his own race; ability to enter a
town and speedily to determine the relative importance of its leading
citizens, finally centring on the one man, always to be found, who
runs it, whether he holds political office or not, and also to enlist
the sympathy and cooeperation of its people; all of these things are
essential to the successful handling of brigandage in the Philippines,
whether such brigandage has, or lacks, political significance.

The following parallel will make clear some of the reasons why it was
determined to use constabulary instead of American soldiers in policing
the Philippines from the time the insurrection officially ended:--


United States Army                  Philippine Constabulary

Soldier costs per annum $1400.      Soldier costs per annum $363.50.
(Authority: Adjutant General
Heistand in 1910.)

American soldiers come from         Constabulary soldiers are
America.                            enlisted in the province
                                    where they are to serve.

Few American soldiers speak         All constabulary soldiers
the local dialects.                 speak local dialects.

Few American soldiers speak         All educated constabulary
any Spanish.                        soldiers speak Spanish.

American soldiers usually have      Constabulary soldiers, native to
but a slight knowledge of local     the country, know the geography
geography and topography.           and topography of their respective
                                    provinces.

Few American soldiers have had      The Filipino soldier certainly
enough contact with Filipinos       knows his own kind better than
to understand them.                 the American does.

The American soldier uses a         The constabulary soldier is
ration of certain fixed components  rationed in cash and buys the
imported over sea. (A ration is     food of the country where he
the day's allowance of food for     happens to be.
one soldier.)

The American ration costs           The constabulary cash ration is
24.3 cents United States currency   10.5 cents United States currency.
(exclusive of cost of               (No freight or handling charges.)
transportation and handling).       The constabulary soldier knows not
Fresh meat requiring ice to keep    ice. His food grows in the islands.
it is a principal part of the       He buys it on the ground and needs
American ration. To supply it       no transportation to bring it to him.
requires a regular system of
transport from the United States
to Manila and from thence to local
ports, and wagon transportation
from ports to inland stations.

The American soldier is at no       The idea of enlisting the sympathy
pains to enlist the sympathy and    and cooeperation of the local
cooeperation of the people; and      population is the strongest tenet
his methods of discipline habits    in the constabulary creed.
of life, etc., make it practically
impossible for him to gain them.


Before preparing the foregoing statement relative to the reasons for
using Philippine constabulary soldiers instead of soldiers of the
United States army for police work during the period in question, I
asked Colonel J. G. Harbord, assistant director of the constabulary,
who has served with that body nine years, has been its acting director
and is an officer of the United States army, to give me a memorandum
on the subject. It is only fair to him to say that I have not only
followed very closely the line of argument embodied in the memorandum
which he was good enough to prepare for me, but have in many instances
used his very words. The parallel columns are his.

The constabulary soldier, thoroughly familiar with the topography
of the country in which he operates; speaking the local dialect and
acquainted with the persons most likely to be able and willing to
furnish accurate information; familiar with the characteristics of
his own people; able to live off the country and keep well, is under
all ordinary circumstances a more efficient and vastly less expensive
police officer than the American soldier, no matter how brave and
energetic the latter may be. Furthermore, his activities are much
less likely to arouse animosity.

Incidentally, the army is pretty consistently unwilling to take the
field unless the constitutional guarantees are temporarily suspended,
and it particularly objects to writs of habeas corpus. The suspension
of such guarantees is obviously undesirable unless really very
necessary.

Let us now consider some of the specific instances of alleged
inefficiency of the constabulary in suppressing public disorder,
cited by Blount.

On page 403 of his book he says, speaking of Governor Taft and disorder
in the province of Albay which arose in 1902-1903:--

    "He did not want to order out the military again if he could
    help it, and this relegated him to his native municipal police
    and constabulary, experimental outfits of doubtful loyalty,
    and, at best, wholly inadequate, as it afterwards turned out,
    for the maintenance of public order and for affording to
    the peaceably inclined people that sort of security for life
    and property, and that protection against semi-political as
    well as unmitigated brigandage, which would comport with the
    dignity of this nation."

The facts as to these disorders are briefly as follows:--

In 1902 an outlaw in Tayabas Province who made his living by
organizing political conspiracies and collecting contributions in
the name of patriotism, who was known as Jose Roldan when operating
in adjoining provinces, but had an alias in Tayabas, found his life
made so uncomfortable by the constabulary of that province that he
transferred his operations to Albay. There he affiliated himself
with a few ex-Insurgent officers who had turned outlaws instead
of surrendering, and with oath violators, and began the same kind
of political operations which he had carried out in Tayabas, the
principal feature of his work being the collection of "contributions."

The troubles in Albay were encouraged by wealthy Filipinos who saw in
them a probable opportunity to acquire valuable hemp lands at bottom
prices, for people dependent on their hemp fields, if prevented from
working them, might in the end be forced to sell them. Roldan soon
lost standing with his new organization because it was found that he
was using for his personal benefit the money which he collected.

About this time one Simeon Ola joined his organization. Ola was
a native of Albay, where he had been an Insurgent major under the
command of the Tagalog general, Belarmino. His temporary rank had
gone to his head, and he is reported to have shown considerable
severity and hauteur in his treatment of his former neighbours
in Guinobatan, to which place he had returned at the close of the
insurrection. Meanwhile, a wealthy Chinese _mestizo_ named Don Circilio
Jaucian, on whom Ola, during his brief career as an Insurgent officer,
had laid a heavy hand, had become _presidente_ of the town.

Smarting under the indignities which he had suffered, Jaucian made it
very uncomfortable for the former major, and in ways well understood
in Malay countries brought it home to the latter that their positions
had been reversed. Ola's house was mysteriously burned, and his life
in Guinobatan was made so unbearable that he took to the hills.

Ola had held higher military rank than had any of his outlaw
associates, and he became their dominating spirit. He had no grievance
against the Americans, but took every opportunity to avenge himself
on the _caciques_ of Guinobatan, his native town.

Three assistant chiefs of constabulary, Garwood, Baker and Bandholtz,
were successively sent to Albay to deal with this situation. Baker
and Bandholtz were regular army officers. The latter ended the
disturbances, employing first and last some twelve companies of
Philippine scouts, armed, officered, paid, equipped and disciplined
as are the regular soldiers of the United States army, and a similar
number of constabulary soldiers. Eleven stations in the restricted
field of operations of this outlaw were occupied by scouts. There were
few armed conflicts in force between Ola's men and these troops. In
fact, it was only with the greatest difficulty that this band, which
from time to time dissolved into the population only to reappear
again, could be located even by the native soldiers. It would have
been impracticable successfully to use American troops for such work.

Referring to the statement made by Blount [492] that Vice-Governor
Wright made a visit to Albay in 1903 in the interest "of the
peace-at-any-price policy that the Manila Government was bent on,"
and the implication that he went there to conduct peace negotiations,
General Bandholtz, who suppressed outlawry in Albay, has said that
Vice-Governor Wright and Commissioner Pardo de Tavera came there
at his request to look into conditions with reference to certain
allegations which had been made.

Colonel Bandholtz and the then chief of constabulary, General Allen,
were supported by the civil governor and the commission in their
recommendations that no terms should be made with the outlaws. The
following statement occurs in a letter from General Bandholtz dated
September 21, 1903:--

    "No one is more anxious to terminate this business than I am,
    nevertheless I think it would be a mistake to offer any such
    inducements, and that more lasting benefits would result by
    hammering away as we have been doing."

And General Allen said in an indorsement to the Philippine
Commission:--

    "... in my opinion the judgment of Colonel Bandholtz in
    matters connected with the pacification of Albay should
    receive favourable consideration. Halfway measures are always
    misinterpreted and used to the detriment of the Government
    among the ignorant followers of the outlaws."

These views prevailed.

Blount has claimed that the death rate in the Albay jail at this
time was very excessive, and cites it as an instance of the result
of American maladministration.

Assuming that his tabulation [493] of the dead who died in the Albay
jail between May 30 and September, 1903, amounting to 120, is correct,
the following statements should be made:--

Only recently has it been demonstrated that beri-beri is due to the
use of polished rice, which was up to the time of this discovery
regarded as far superior to unpolished rice as an article of food,
and is still much better liked by the Filipinos than is the unpolished
article. Many of these deaths were from beri-beri, and were due to
a misguided effort to give the prisoners the best possible food.

Cholera was raging in the province of Albay throughout the period
in question, and the people outside of the jail suffered no less
than did those within it. The same is true of malarial infection. In
other words, conditions inside the jail were quite similar to those
then prevailing outside, except that the prisoners got polished rice
which was given them with the best intentions in the world, and was
by them considered a superior article of food.

With the present knowledge of the methods of dissemination of
Asiatic cholera gained as a result of the American occupation of
the Philippines, we should probably be able to exclude it from a
jail under such circumstances, as the part played by "germ carriers"
who show no outward manifestations of infection is now understood,
but it was not then dreamed of. One of the greatest reforms effected
by Americans in the Philippines is the sanitation of the jails and
penitentiaries, and we cannot be fairly blamed for not knowing in
1903 what nobody then knew.

The troubles in Albay ended with the surrender of Ola on September
25, 1903. Blount gives the impression that he had a knowledge of them
which was gained by personal observation. He arrived in the province
in the middle of November, seven weeks after normal conditions had
been reestablished.

On October 5, 1903, General Bandholtz telegraphed with reference to
the final surrender of Ola's band:--

    "The towns are splitting themselves wide open celebrating
    pacification and Ramon Santos (later elected governor) is
    going to give a record-breaking fiesta at Ligao. Everybody
    invited. Scouts and Constabulary have done superb work."

Blount makes much of disorders in Samar and Leyte. Let us consider
the facts.

In all countries feuds between highlanders and lowlanders have been
common. Although the inhabitants of the hills and those of the lowlands
in the two islands under discussion are probably of identical blood
and origin, they long since became separated in thought and feeling,
and grew to be mutually antagonistic. The ignorant people of the
interior have always been oppressed by their supposedly more highly
civilized brethren living on or near the coast.

The killing of Otoy by the constabulary in 1911 marked the passing
of the last of a series of mountain chiefs who had exercised a very
powerful influence over the hill people and had claimed for themselves
supernatural powers.

Manila hemp is the principal product upon which these mountaineers
depend in bartering for cloth and other supplies. The cleaning of
hemp involves very severe exertion, and when it is cleaned it must
usually, in Samar, be carried to the seashore on the backs of the
men who raise it. Under the most favourable circumstances, it may be
transported thither in small _bancas_ [494] down the streams.

The lowland people of Samar and Leyte had long been holding up the
hill people when they brought in their hemp for sale in precisely the
way that Filipinos in other islands are accustomed to hold up members
of the non-Christian tribes. They played the part of middlemen,
purchasing the hemp of the ignorant hill people at low prices and
often reselling it, without giving it even a day's storage, at a very
much higher figure. This system was carried so far that conditions
became unbearable and finally resulted in so-called _pulajanism_
which began in the year 1904.

The term _pulajan_ is derived from a native word meaning "red" and
was given to the mountain people because in their attacks upon the
lowlanders they wore, as a distinguishing mark, red trousers or a
dash of red colour elsewhere about their sparse clothing. They raided
coast towns and did immense damage before they were finally brought
under control. It should be remembered that these conditions were
allowed to arise by a Filipino provincial governor, and by Filipino
municipal officials. It is altogether probable that a good American
governor would have prevented them, but as it was, neither their cause
nor their importance were understood at the outset. The _pulajan_
movement was directed primarily against Filipinos.

The first outbreak occurred on July 10, 1904, in the Gandara River
valley where a settlement of the lowlanders was burned and some of its
inhabitants were killed. Eventually disorder spread to many places on
the coast, and one scout garrison of a single company was surprised
and overwhelmed by superior numbers. Officers and men were massacred
and their rifles taken.

In point of area Samar is the third island in the Philippines. In
its interior are many rugged peaks and heavily forested mountains. It
was here that a detachment of United States marines under the command
of Major Waller, while attempting to cross the island, were lost for
nearly two weeks, going without food for days and enduring terrible
hardships.

At the time in question there were not five miles of road on the
island passable for a vehicle, nor were there trails through the
mountains over which horses could be ridden. The only interior lines
of communication were a few footpaths over which the natives were
accustomed to make their way from the mountains to the coast.

Troops have perhaps never attempted a campaign in a country more
difficult than the interior of Samar. The traditional needle in the
haystack would be easy to find compared with an outlaw, or band of
outlaws, in such a rugged wilderness.

Upon the outbreak of trouble troops were hurried to Samar, and by
December, 1904, according to Blount himself, there were some 1800
native soldiers on the island who were left free for active operations
in the field by the garrisoning of various coast towns with sixteen
companies of United States infantry.

If the nature of the feuds between the Samar lowlanders and highlanders
had then been better understood, the ensuing troubles, which were
more or less continuous for nearly two years, might perhaps have
been avoided. As soon as it became evident that the situation was
such as to demand the use of the army it was employed to supplement
the operations of the constabulary.

About the time that trouble ended in Samar it began in Leyte. There
was no real connection between the disorders in the two islands. No
leader on either island is known to have communicated with any leader
on the other; no fanatical follower ever left Samar for Leyte or
Leyte for Samar so far as we are informed.

For convenience of administration the two islands were grouped in a
single command after the army was requested to take over the handling
of the disturbances there, in cooeperation with the constabulary. The
trouble ended in 1907 and both islands have remained quiet ever
since. The same causes would again produce the same results now or
at any time in the future, and they would be then, as in the past,
the outcome of the oppression of the weak by the strong and without
other political significance. Under a good government they should
never recur.

Many circumstances which did not exist in 1902 and 1904 made it
feasible to use the army in Samar and Leyte during 1905 and 1906. The
high officers who had exercised such sweeping powers during the
insurrection had meanwhile given way to other commanders. Indeed,
a practically new Philippine army had come into existence. The
policy of the insular government as to the treatment of individual
Filipinos had been recognized and indorsed by Americans generally,
but many of the objections to the use of the troops, including the
heavy expense involved, still existed and I affirm without fear of
successful contradiction that had it been possible to place in Samar
and Leyte a number of constabulary soldiers equal to that of the
scouts and American troops actually employed, disorder would have
been terminated much more quickly and at very greatly less cost.

With the final breaking up of organized brigandage in 1905 law and
order may be said to have been established throughout the islands. It
has since been the business of the constabulary to maintain it. The
value of the cooeperation of the law-abiding portion of the population
has been fully recognized. The newly appointed constabulary officer
has impressed upon him the necessity of manifesting an interest in the
people with whom he comes in contact; of cultivating the acquaintance
of Filipinos of all social grades, and of assisting to settle their
disagreements and harmonize their differences whenever possible. He
is taught a native dialect.

The constabulary have to a high degree merited and secured
the confidence and good-will of the people, whose rights they
respect. There is a complete absence of the old arbitrary procedure
followed by the _guardia civil_ and as a result there are frequent
requests from Filipino officials for additional detachments, while
the removal of a company from a given community is almost invariably
followed by vigorous protests. The power of human sympathy is very
great, and as the attitude of constabulary officers and men is usually
one of sympathy, conciliation and affection, that body has earned
and deserved popularity.

The success of the constabulary in apprehending criminals has been
both praiseworthy and noteworthy. The courage and efficiency which
have often been displayed by its officers and men in hard-fought
engagements with Moro outlaws or with organized bands of thieves
and brigands have been beyond praise. Many of its officers have
rendered invaluable service in bringing the people of the more
unruly non-Christian tribes under governmental control, not only
bravely and efficiently performing their duty as police officers,
but assisting in trail construction or discharging, in effect, the
duties of lieutenant-governors in very remote places which could be
visited by the actual lieutenant-governors only infrequently. I later
take occasion to mention the valuable work done by Lieutenant Case
in the early days of Ifugao, and to dwell at length on the splendid
service rendered there by Lieutenant Jeff D. Gallman, who was for
many years lieutenant-governor of the subprovince while continuing
to serve as a constabulary officer. Lieutenant Maimban at Quiangan,
and Lieutenant Dosser at Mayoyao, have been and are most useful,
though they do not hold official positions under the Mountain Province
or receive any additional compensation for the special services which
they render. Captain Guy O. Fort served most acceptably as governor of
the province of Agusan during the interim between the resignation of
Governor Lewis and the appointment of Governor Bryant and Lieutenants
Atkins and Zapanta have also rendered valuable service as assistants to
the provincial governor. Lieutenant Turnbull is now assistant to the
governor of Nueva Vizcaya for work among the Ilongots on the Pacific
coast of northern Luzon. Other constabulary officers, who have not
been called upon for special service of this kind, have performed
their ordinary duties in such a way as to demonstrate that they were
actuated by the spirit of cooeperation and have been of great help.

But the work of the constabulary has not been confined to police
duty. They have been of the greatest assistance to the Director of
Health in effectively maintaining quarantine, and making possible the
isolation of victims of dangerous communicable diseases like cholera
and smallpox, when inefficient municipal policemen have utterly failed
to do their duty. They have given similar assistance to the Director
of Agriculture in the maintenance of quarantine in connection with
efforts to combat diseases of domestic animals. In great emergencies
such as those presented by the recent eruption of Taal volcano, and
the devastation caused by great typhoons, they have been quick to
respond to the call of duty and have rendered efficient and heroic
service. They assist internal revenue officers. Except in a few of
the largest cities they are the firemen of the islands and by their
effective work have repeatedly checked conflagrations, which are of
frequent occurrence and tend to be very destructive in this country,
where most of the houses are built of bamboo and nipa palm, and
where roofs become dry as tinder during the long period when there
is little or no rain. They have aided in combating pests of locusts,
and, in short, have been ready to meet almost any kind of an emergency
which has arisen.

The importance of having such a body of alert, industrious,
disciplined, efficient men inspired by a high sense of duty, and
physically so well developed that they can continue to perform
that duty in the face of long-continued privations and hardships,
is beyond dispute. The results which have been obtained by the
Philippine constabulary have abundantly justified the policy which
led to its organization.

Its task has been no sinecure. Eleven officers and one hundred
ninety-seven enlisted men have been killed in action. Forty-eight
officers and nine hundred ninety-one men have died of
disease. Forty-six officers have been wounded in action. Seven hundred
sixty-eight men have been discharged for disability. Seven thousand
four hundred twenty-four firearms and 45,018 rounds of ammunition have
been captured by, or surrendered to, the constabulary. Four thousand
eight hundred sixty-two outlaws have been killed and 11,977 taken
prisoners. Twelve thousand two hundred sixty-two stolen animals have
been recovered.

There are many things which are not brought home to the reader
by such statistics. The weary days and nights on tropical trails;
the weakness and pain of dysentery; the freezing and the burning of
pernicious malaria; the heavy weight of responsibility when one must
act, in matters of life and death, with no superior to consult; the
disappointment when carefully laid plans go wrong; the discouragement
caused by indifference; the danger of infection with loathsome
diseases; ingratitude; deadly peril; aching wounds; sudden death,
and, worse yet, death after suffering long drawn out, when one meets
one's end knowing that it is coming and that one's family will be
left without means or resources,--these are some of the things that
the officers and men of this gallant corps have faced unflinchingly.

The work of the constabulary and of the Philippine scouts has
conclusively demonstrated the courage and efficiency of the Filipino
as a soldier when well disciplined and well led.

The establishment and maintenance of order in the Philippines have
afforded opportunity for some of the bravest deeds in the annals of
any race, and the opportunity has been nobly met. The head-hunters
of the Mountain Province, the Mohammedan Moros of Mindanao, Jolo
and Palawan, the bloody _pulajanes_ of Samar and Leyte, the wily
_tulisanes_ of Luzon, all unrestrained by any regard for the rules
of civilized warfare, have for twelve years matched their fanatical
bravery against the gallantry of the khaki-clad Filipino soldiers. Time
and again a single officer and a handful of men have taken chances
that in almost any other land would have won them the Victoria cross,
the legion of honor, or some similar decoration. Here their only
reward has been the sense of duty well done.

The force known as the Philippine constabulary was organized for the
purpose of establishing and maintaining order. It has established
and is maintaining a condition of order never before equalled or
approached in the history of the islands. The policy which led to
its organization has been a thousand times justified.






CHAPTER XV

The Administration of Justice


In no branch of the public administration have there been more
numerous or more beneficial reforms than in the administration of
justice. They have resulted in simplifying organization, in decreasing
the possibility of corruption and partiality, and in diminishing the
cost of litigation and the time which it requires.

For the benefit of those especially interested I give in the appendix
the past and present organization of the courts. [495] The subject
is too technical to interest the average layman.

The slender salaries paid to judges, the fact that in the majority
of cases their appointment and promotion were due to influence and
suggestion, their liability to be transferred from one court to another
or from the Philippines to the Antilles, as frequently happened, and
the further fact that the subordinate personnel of the courts was not
a salaried one, caused the administration of justice in the Philippine
Islands to be looked upon askance. There was a general belief, well
founded in many instances, that lawsuits were won through influence
or bribery. Clerks and the subordinate personnel of the courts were
readily bribed. Indeed, they frequently demanded bribes from litigants,
or from defendants in criminal cases, under promise to expedite the
trials if paid to do so, or under threat to commit some injustice
if payment was not forthcoming. For many years after the American
occupation justices of the peace received no salaries and had to look
to fees for their compensation. This system worked wretchedly. The
positions were only too often filled by very incompetent and unworthy
men, who stimulated litigation in order to make more money. Now all
justices of the peace receive reasonable salaries.

The paying of regular salaries and the furnishing of necessary
offices and supplies have done much to improve the work of justice
of the peace courts, which are now presided over by men who average
far better than even their immediate predecessors.

Until they were put on a salary basis the work of the Filipino
justices of the peace left much more to be desired than is lacking
at present. In many instances they allowed gross brutalities,
perpetrated by the rich on the poor, or by the strong on the weak,
to go unpunished. The following case furnished me by an American
teacher is typical of what has occurred only too often:--

    "On another occasion, I met the brother of my house _muchacha_,
    [496] a boy about eight. He had a sort of protuberance on
    one side caused by broken ribs which had not been set. I
    questioned my _muchacha_. She said her step-father had kicked
    the child across the room some weeks before and broken his
    ribs. The next day, I took the child together with Senora
    Bayot, the wife of the Governor's secretary, before the local
    Justice of the Peace. Senora Bayot translated and the child
    told the same story as had his sister. The Justice of the
    Peace issued an order for the step-father to report to him
    on the next day. That night my _muchacha_ told me that her
    step-father had threatened to kill the child if he did not
    tell the Justice that he got the hurt by falling out of an
    orange tree. The child did as ordered, and the step-father was
    dismissed. When I questioned the Justice of the Peace as to
    why he credited the second tale, he said the child was under
    oath then, and was not under oath in the first statements."

It was not deemed wise at the outset to appoint a Filipino judge for
the city of Manila, as it was feared that there would be a lack of
confidence in a Filipino who had occasion to decide cases involving
large sums of money in which Americans or foreigners on the one hand
and Filipinos on the other were interested; but a few years after
the establishment of the new judicial system Filipino judges had won
such a reputation for justice and fairness as to gain the confidence
of Americans and foreigners and the appointment of a Filipino judge
for the court of the city of Manila did not arouse any opposition.

Filipino judges of courts of first instance seem usually to have
been actuated by a desire to do full justice. The instances in which
complaints have been made against them because of partiality to party
or to race are few. Some of them have been justly criticised for
tardiness in cleaning up their dockets, and it is undoubtedly true
that their capacity for turning out work is on the average below that
of their Americans associates.

The fact must not be forgotten that Americans are in the majority
in the Supreme Court, which reviews the decisions of courts of first
instance, and this undoubtedly exercises a restraining influence. It
is not possible accurately to judge what would be the actions of a
body of men now subject to such control if it did not exist. It is
furthermore true that the Filipinos are more inclined to be suspicious
of their own countrymen than of Americans, and there have been from
time to time specific requests from them that judges in certain
provinces be Americans.

Under the Spanish regime the fees paid by litigants were excessive
and the use of stamped paper was compulsory. Its value ranged from
twenty-five centavos to two pesos for a folio of two sheets according
to the amount involved in the suit. Now there are fixed fees of $8
in civil suits, except in probate matters, where the fee is $12.

It was in the power of an unscrupulous litigant to make a lawsuit
almost eternal. In matters involving an amount exceeding $250 it was
lawful to institute proceedings in the action whereby the decision of
the main issue was suspended pending decision of the proceedings, and
as a decision was appealable to the _audiencia_, this was often done
by attorneys who had an interest in delaying the suit. By instituting
one proceeding after another a suit could be indefinitely prolonged.

Another method of securing delay was to object to the judge. In
case the judge denied the ground of the objection, a proceeding was
instituted against him and the trial of the main issue was turned over
to another judge; although the proceeding arising out of the objection
did not suspend the trial of the main issue, when the time came to
decide the latter the decision was withheld until the proceeding
arising out of the objection was settled, and as this latter was one
in connection with which other proceedings could be instituted which
might delay the decision and consequently the decision of the main
issue, there was no end to the matter.

To-day all this has been stopped by the procedure in court. The
challenging of judges is not allowed, although they must refrain
from the trial of any matter when they are disqualified in any way
as regards it. Proceedings which suspend the trial of the main issue
cannot be instituted. The procedure itself is more expeditious,
the time allowances and formalities have been reduced, and all the
long Spanish civil procedure regarding the presentation of evidence
has been shortened. Suits are settled with a speediness previously
unknown. In order to avoid delay on the part of judges in rendering
decisions, an act has been passed prohibiting the payment of their
salaries without a certificate that they have no matter which has
been awaiting decision for more than three months.

Owing to the inquisitorial procedure which obtained under Spanish
rule, the disposition of criminal cases was even slower than that
of civil cases. The cause would be commenced, either _de officio_,
by the judge who had a knowledge of the crime, or by the prosecuting
attorney, or by virtue of private accusation on the part of the person
aggrieved. The case once started, the investigations made during the
period known as the _sumario_ were conducted in the absence of the
accused. The latter had no hand in the case, as it was thought that
the reserve and secrecy of the procedure ought not to be violated
to the end that the accused might not frustrate the evidence of
the prosecution by preparing his defence. Owing many times to the
inactivity of the judge or of the prosecuting attorney, to the great
amount of work which weighed down the courts--for actions were begun
when there was knowledge of the commission of the crime, although the
perpetrators were not known--and by the manipulations at other times
of the private accuser to whose interest it was to harm the accused
by delaying the _sumario_, this period was often made to extend over
years and years. Meanwhile the defendant was confined in prison,
as no bail was allowed in any case in which the penalty was that of
_presidio correccional_ (from six months and one day to six years'
imprisonment) or greater. In addition to this the circumstance that all
criminal causes in the islands had to be sent for review to the proper
_audiencia_, caused a large accumulation of old cases in these higher
courts, and this alone made their disposition a matter of some years.

To-day the procedure is rapid. Information having been brought against
the defendant, the trial is had in the same term or at most during
the next term of court. Sometimes the trial is suspended owing to the
non-appearance of witnesses, but it can be said that cases are rare
where causes are pending in the docket of the court for a longer period
than two terms. Causes appealed to the Supreme Court are disposed of
promptly, and as a general rule it does not take over six months to
get a decision.

Defendants in criminal cases have now been granted by the Philippine
Bill certain fundamentally important rights which they did not formerly
enjoy; namely, to appear and defend in person or by counsel at every
stage of the proceedings; to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to testify as witnesses in their own behalf; to be exempt
from testifying against themselves; to be confronted at the trial by,
and to cross-examine, the witnesses against them; to have compulsory
process issue for obtaining witnesses in their own favour; to have
speedy and public trials; to be admitted to bail with sufficient
sureties in all cases, except for capital offences. None of these
rights were enjoyed under the procedure in effect during the Spanish
regime. A man was prosecuted without being notified of the charges
against him, and he was only made aware of the case against him after
the _sumario_. When all of the evidence of the prosecution had been
taken the accused was heard in his own defence. He was compelled
to testify, and was subjected to a very inquisitorial examination,
including questions which incriminated him. Although he had the right
to compel witnesses for the prosecution to ratify over their signatures
the evidence against him given during the _sumario_, as the defence of
the majority of the accused was in the hands of attorneys _de officio_
they nearly always renounced this privilege of the defendant, and,
as has already been said, bail was not admitted in any grave offence
during the trial.

No sentence of acquittal in a criminal case can now be appealed from
by the government. Under the Spanish system sentences of acquittal of
courts of first instance had to be referred for review to the proper
_audiencia_ and the fiscal of the latter could appeal from a sentence
of acquittal by it.

The Philippine Bill grants to the inhabitants of the islands other
important individual rights which they did not formerly possess.

The Spanish constitution was not in force here, and although the
Penal Code contained provisions for punishing, in a way, officials who
violated certain rights granted by the Spanish constitution, citizens
had no expeditious method of securing their punishment. Now the Code of
Civil Procedure grants them certain special remedies by which their
rights can be made good. To illustrate: Under the Spanish regime
the only remedy for a man illegally detained was to bring a criminal
action against the person illegally detaining him. He did not have
the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus nor the writ of prohibition
against an official who attempted to make him the victim of some
unlawful act. His only remedy was to bring a criminal action against
such official, or to sue him for damages. He could not compel public
officials to perform their ministerial duties by mandamus proceedings.

The individual rights conferred by the Philippine Bill, and the
special remedies granted by the Code of Civil Procedure, assure to the
inhabitants of the islands liberties and privileges entirely unknown
to them during the days of Spanish sovereignty, and these liberties
and privileges are adequately safeguarded.

Two things still greatly complicate the administration of justice in
the Philippines.

The first is the dense ignorance of the people of the working class
who for the most part have failed to learn of their new rights,
and even if they know them are afraid to attempt to assert them in
opposition to the will of the _caciques_, whose power for evil they
know only too well.

The other is the unreliability of many witnesses and their
shocking readiness to perjure themselves. It is always possible to
manufacture testimony at small expense. While the criminal libel
suit brought against certain members of the staff of the newspaper
_El Renacimiento_, which libelled me, was in progress the judge
showed me the opinion of the two Filipino assessors [497] in one
of the cases and told me that it was written by an attorney for the
defence. I could not believe this, but a few days later an assessor
in another of the cases called at my house, bringing a draft of the
opinion of himself and his associate which he sought to submit to
me for criticism or modification, saying that I knew much more about
the case than they did! He was nonplussed at my refusal to read the
document, and left saying "_acqui tiene V. nuevo servidor_." [498]
Had I redrafted the opinion, as I might have done, my "new servant"
would have called later for a _quid pro quo_.

Some of the Filipino judges of first instance have proved weak in
matters affecting the integrity of public domain and the protection
of the public forests, but on the whole these officers have done
rather surprisingly well. It must be remembered that the best men
in the islands have now been appointed, and that another generation
must come on before there will be available any considerable number
of new candidates who are up to the standard of the present appointees.






CHAPTER XVI

Health Conditions


I had abundant opportunity to observe health conditions in the
Philippines during the Spanish regime and they were shocking in the
extreme. There were no provisions for the sanitary disposal of human
waste even in Manila. If one had occasion to be out on foot at night,
it was wise to keep in the middle of the street and still wiser to
carry a raised umbrella.

Immediately after the American occupation some five hundred barrels
of caked excrement were taken from a single tower in one of the old
Manila monasteries. The moat around the city wall, and the _esteros_,
or tidal creeks, reeked with filth, and the smells which assailed
one's nostrils, especially, at night, were disgusting.

Distilled water was not to be had for drinking purposes. The
city water supply came from the Mariquina River, and some fifteen
thousand Filipinos lived on or near the banks of that stream above the
intake. The water was often so thick with sediment that one could not
see through a glass of it, and it was out of the question to attempt
to get it boiled unless one had facilities of one's own.

Conditions in the provinces were proportionately worse. As a rule,
there was no evidence of any effort to put provincial towns into
decent sanitary conditions. I must, however, note one striking
exception. Brigadier General Juan Arolas, long the governor of Jolo,
had a thorough knowledge of modern sanitary methods and a keen
appreciation of the benefits derivable from their application. When
he was sent to Jolo, practically in banishment, the town was a plague
spot to which were assigned Spaniards whose early demise would have
been looked upon with favour by those in power. He converted it into
a healthy place the death rate of which compared favourably with that
of European cities, thereby demonstrating conclusively what could
be done even under very unfavourable conditions. No troops in the
islands were kept in anything like such physical condition as were
the regiments assigned to him, and he bore a lasting grudge against
any one inconsiderate enough to die in Jolo.

Everywhere I saw people dying of curable ailments. Malaria was
prevalent in many regions in which it was impossible to secure good
quinine. The stuff on sale usually consisted largely of cornstarch,
or plaster of Paris. Fortunately we had brought with us from the
United States a great quantity of quinine and we made friends with
the Filipinos in many a town by giving this drug gratis to their sick.

Smallpox was generally regarded as a necessary ailment of childhood. It
was a common thing to see children covered with the eruption of
this disease watching, or joining in, the play of groups of healthy
little ones.

The clothing of people who had died of smallpox was handed on to other
members of the family, sometimes without even being washed. The victims
of the disease often immersed themselves in cold water when their fever
was high, and paid the penalty for their ignorance with their lives.

The average Spaniard was a firm believer in the noxiousness of night
air, which he said produced _paludismo_. [499] Most Filipinos were
afraid of an imaginary spirit, devil or mythical creature known as
_asuang_, and closed their windows and doors after dark as a protection
against it. Thus it came about that in a country where fresh air is
especially necessary at night no one got it.

Tuberculosis was dreadfully common, and its victims were conveying
it to others without let or hindrance.

A distressingly large percentage of native-born infants died before
reaching one year of age on account of infection at birth, insufficient
clothing, or improper food. I have many times seen a native mother
thrust boiled rice into the mouth of a child only a few days old,
and I have seen babies taught to smoke tobacco before they could walk.

Before our party left the islands in 1888, cholera had broken out
at a remote and isolated place. A little later it spread over a
considerable part of the archipelago. On my return in 1890 I heard
the most shocking stories of what had occurred. Victims of this
disease were regarded with such fear and horror by their friends
that they were not infrequently carried out while in a state of
coma, and buried alive. It became necessary to issue orders to have
shelters prepared in cemeteries under which bodies were required to
be deposited and left for a certain number of hours before burial,
in order to prevent this result.

In Siquijor an unfortunate, carried to the cemetery after he had
lost consciousness, came to himself, crawled out from under a mass
of corpses which had been piled on top of him, got up and walked
home. When he entered his house, his assembled friends and relatives
vacated it through the windows, believing him to be his own ghost. They
did not return until morning, when they found him dead on the floor.

I heard a well-authenticated story of a case in which all the members
of a family died except a creeping infant who subsisted for some time
by sucking a breeding sow which was being kept in the kitchen.

During the great cholera epidemic in 1882 it is said that the
approaches to the Manila cemeteries were blocked with vehicles of
every description loaded with corpses, and that the stench from
unburied bodies in the San Lazaro district was so dreadful that one
could hardly go through it.

Beri-beri was common among the occupants of jails, lighthouses and
other government institutions, as well as in certain garrisoned towns
like Balabac.

In 1892 I found the wife of a very dear Spanish friend dying from
an ailment which in the United States could have been promptly and
certainly remedied by a surgical operation. I begged him to take her
to Manila, telling him of the ease with which any fairly good surgeon
would relieve her, and promising to interest myself in her case on
my arrival there. To my utter amazement I found that there was not a
surgeon in the Philippine Islands who would venture to open the human
abdomen. The one man who had sometimes done this in Spain stated that
it would be impossible for him to undertake it in Manila, on account
of the lack of a suitable operating room, of instruments and of the
necessary anaesthetist and other professional assistants. In fact, at
the time of the American occupation there was not a modern operating
room, much less a modern hospital, in the Philippines. Thousands upon
thousands of people were perishing needlessly every year for the lack
of surgical intervention. A common procedure in dealing with wounds
was to cover them with poultices of chewed tobacco, ashes, and leaves.

In many provinces the people were without medical assistance of
any sort, and fell into the hands of native quacks who were little,
if at all, better than witch doctors.

The most fantastic views were entertained relative to the causation
of disease. In some towns it was vigorously asserted that after a
peculiar looking black dog ran down the street cholera appeared. In
other places cholera was generally ascribed to the poisoning of wells
by Spaniards or foreigners.

Cemeteries were not infrequently situated in the very midst of towns,
or near the local supplies of drinking water. Conditions within
their walls were often shocking from an aesthetic view point. As the
area available for burials was limited, and the graves were usually
unmarked, parts of decomposed bodies were constantly being dug up. It
was the custom to throw such remains about the foot of the cross at
the centre of the cemetery.

Military sanitation was also very bad. I was at Zamboanga when
the wreck of General Weyler's expedition to Lake Lanoa began to
return. There had been no adequate provision for the medical care of
the force in the field, and the condition of many of the soldiers was
pitiable in the extreme. Disabled men were brought in by the shipload,
and the hospitals at Zamboanga, Isabela de Basilan and Jolo were soon
filled to overflowing.

The lack of adequate sanitary measures was equally in evidence in
dealing with cattle disease. Rinderpest, a highly contagious and
very destructive disease of horned cattle, was introduced in 1888 and
spread like fire in prairie grass. No real effort was made to check
it prior to the American occupation, and it caused enormous losses,
both directly by killing large numbers of beef cattle and indirectly
by depriving farmers of draft animals.

When I first visited the islands every member of our party fell
ill within a few weeks. All of us suffered intensely from tropical
ulcers. Two had malaria; one had dysentery; one, acute inflammation
of the liver, possibly of amoebic origin; and so on to the end of
the chapter. I myself got so loaded up with malaria in Mindoro that
it took me fifteen years to get rid of it.

Fortunately the American army of occupation brought with it numerous
competent physicians and surgeons, and abundant hospital equipment
and supplies, for the soldiers promptly contracted about all the
different ailments to be acquired in the islands.

When I arrived in Manila on the 5th of March, 1899, I found that a
great army hospital, called the "First Reserve," had been established
in the old rice market. There was another sizable one on the Bagumbayan
drive. A third occupied a large building belonging to French sisters
of charity which was ordinarily used for school purposes.

In immediate connection with the First Reserve Hospital was a tent
hospital where sick and wounded Insurgents were being given the best
of care.

Field hospitals were promptly established as the troops moved out
from Manila, and in connection with many of these Filipinos were given
much needed medical and surgical help. The recipients of such kindly
treatment were, however, prohibited by Insurgent officers from telling
others of their experiences lest the hatred of Americans diminish as
a result.

Smallpox had broken out among the Spanish soldiers in the walled
city and was spreading badly when my friend, Major Frank S. Bourns
of the army medical corps, was given the task of eradicating it,
which he promptly accomplished. A little later the use of the Santa
Ana church as a smallpox hospital was authorized, and sick Filipinos
were carefully tended there.

The army promptly set about cleaning up Manila and waging war
upon the more serious ailments which threatened the health of the
soldiers and that of the public. The work was at the outset put under
the direction of Major Edie, a very capable and efficient medical
officer. Subsequently it was turned over to Major Bourns, who, on
account of his intimate knowledge of Spanish, and his wide acquaintance
with the Filipinos, was able to carry out many much-needed reforms,
and in doing so aroused a minimum of public antagonism.

Upon the establishment of civil government Governor Taft was very
desirous of retaining Major Bourns's services, but this did not prove
practicable, as he desired to give up government work and engage in
private business.

There was promptly created an efficient board of health made up of men
of recognized ability and large practical experience. Its chairman was
Major Louis M. Maus, commissioner of public health. The other members
were Mr. H. D. Osgood, sanitary engineer; Dr. Franklin H. Meacham,
chief sanitary inspector; Dr. Paul C. Freer, superintendent of
government laboratories; and Dr. Manuel Gomez, secretary.

This board was promptly put upon its mettle. It had inherited from
the army an incipient epidemic of bubonic plague in Manila, and
the disease soon spread to Cavite and also to Cebu, then the second
port of the Philippines in commercial importance. It also appeared in
several provincial towns near Cavite. An effective campaign against it,
inaugurated at this time, was never abandoned until it was completely
eradicated in 1906,--a noteworthy result to achieve in a country like
the Philippines.

On March 21, 1902, I was advised that two patients at San Juan de
Dios hospital were developing symptoms of Asiatic cholera, and on the
following day a positive laboratory diagnosis was made. Other cases
followed in quick succession, and we soon found ourselves facing a
virulent epidemic of this highly dangerous disease. At the outset
the mortality was practically 100 per cent. Unfortunately, there was
no one connected with the medical service of the islands who had had
practical experience in dealing with cholera, and we had to get this
as we went along.

At the time of the outbreak, Governor Taft was in the United States,
Acting Governor Wright was in Leyte, the secretary of finance and
justice was in Japan, and there were present in Manila only the
secretary of public instruction and the secretary of the interior. As
the executive head of the government was absent, and there was no
quorum of the legislative body, I of necessity arrogated to myself
powers which I did not lawfully possess, appointing employees and
incurring expenses without the usual formalities.

On the morning of March 22 I informed General Chaffee that four cases
of cholera had occurred in Manila, and requested that an adequate
military force be despatched to the valley of the Mariquina River to
protect the city water supply from possible contamination.

This request was promptly acceded to, and the guard thereafter
maintained proved adequate to prevent infection of the city water,
although there are three towns on the river above the intake, and it
was the custom of their people to bathe and wash their clothing in
this stream. Many of the filthy surface wells of the city were filled
as rapidly as possible, and those that could not be filled were closed.

The people, entirely unaccustomed as they were to any sanitary
restrictions, believing that the disease was not cholera, and firm in
their conviction that they had a right to do whatever they liked so
long as they kept on their own premises, bitterly resented the burning
or disinfection of their houses and effects, and the restriction of
their liberty to go and come as they pleased, and in spite of the
fact that the number of cases was kept down in a manner never before
dreamed of at Manila, there arose an increasingly bitter feeling of
hostility toward the work of the board of health. In fact, the very
success of the campaign proved an obstacle, and we were assured that
the disease could not be cholera, as, if it were, there would be a
thousand deaths a day!

An educational campaign was immediately begun, and simple
directions for avoiding infection were published and scattered
broadcast. Distilled water was furnished gratis to all who would drink
it, stations for its distribution being established through the city
and supplemented by large water wagons driven through the streets. The
sale of foods likely to convey the disease was prohibited. Large
numbers of emergency sanitary inspectors were immediately appointed,
and every effort was made to detect all cases as soon as possible. A
land quarantine was established around the city, to protect the
provinces.

In anticipation of a possible extensive outbreak of contagious disease
a detention camp capable of accommodating some twenty-five hundred
people had been established previously on the San Lazaro grounds, and
to this place were taken the cholera "contacts." A cholera hospital
was opened near this camp, and the stricken were removed to it from
their homes as speedily as possible, the buildings which they had
occupied being thoroughly disinfected, or burned if disinfection
was impracticable.

The bodies of the dead were at the outset either buried in hermetically
sealed coffins or cremated. When the detention camp and hospital at
San Lazaro threatened to become crowded, a second camp and hospital
were established at Santa Mesa. At this latter place both "contacts"
and the sick were obliged to live in tents.

The Spanish residents were allowed to establish a private cholera
hospital in a large and well-ventilated _convento_ on Calle Herran. As
the number of sick Spaniards was nothing like sufficient to fill this
building, they were asked to turn over the unoccupied space in it to
the board of health, which they most generously did.

In response to popular clamour a hospital under strictly Filipino
management was opened in a nipa building in Tondo. Interest in it
soon flagged, and the government found itself with this institution
on its hands.

The epidemic came soon after the close of a long-continued war,
and there were at that time in Manila not a few evil-intentioned
persons, both foreign and native, who welcomed every opportunity
to make trouble. The difficulties arising from the claim advanced
by a number of reputable but ignorant medical men that the disease
was not cholera at all were sufficiently great. They were enormously
increased by false and malicious stories to the effect that "contacts"
were killed at the detention camp; that patients on arrival at the
cholera hospital were given a drink of poisoned _vino_ [500] and
instantly dropped dead; that the distilled water distributed free of
charge was poisoned, and that the Americans were poisoning the wells.

The necessary use of strychnine as a heart stimulant at the cholera
hospital was made the basis for a story that the sick were being
poisoned with this drug.

These silly tales were widely circulated and quite generally believed,
and as a result of the fear thus engendered, and of the desire on
the part of relatives and neighbours of stricken persons to escape
disinfection and quarantine, strong efforts were often made to conceal
the sick and the dead, and when this was not possible the "contacts"
usually ran away. There were not wanting instances of the driving of
cholera victims into the streets.

In spite of the generally hostile attitude of the public and some
grave mistakes in policy, the measures adopted sufficed at the outset
to hold the disease in check to an extent which surprised even the
health officers themselves.

On May 15 there began a rapid and quite steady decline in the number
of cases.

In June, however, it increased. During July it grew steadily larger,
and on the 25th of that month there were ninety-one cases, the
largest number which has ever occurred in Manila on any day since
the American occupation.

Throughout the early months of the epidemic Major Maus had laboured
unceasingly to check it, displaying an energy and an indifference to
fatigue and personal discomfort which were highly commendable. The
long-continued strain ultimately began to tell on him severely. On
May 17 orders were received from the Adjutant-General's Office
providing for his relief on or about July 30, and stating that Major
E. C. Carter, of the United States Army Medical Corps, would be
available for detail as commissioner of public health on that date,
if his services were desired. Arrangements were accordingly made to
have Major Carter proceed to the Philippines. Major Maus's resignation
was accepted, effective July 31. Dr. Frank S. Bourns was urged to
take temporary charge of the situation, and consented to do so.

On the 8th of August Major Carter arrived and announced his readiness
to assume his duties, but it was suggested to him that he ought first
to have some time to familiarize himself with them, and Dr. Bourns
was left free to carry out the special work for which he had been
appointed.

This he did with promptness and despatch, the number of cases for
August being but seven hundred twenty as against thirteen hundred
sixty-eight for the previous month. On the 8th of September, having
brought the disease under control at Manila, he insisted on resigning
in order to attend to his private affairs, which were suffering from
neglect, and his resignation was reluctantly accepted.

Dr. Bourns's remarkable success in dealing with a very difficult
situation was largely due to his ability to devise measures which,
while thoroughly effective, were less irritating to the public than
were those which had been previously employed.

The policy which he had inaugurated was followed by his successor
with the result that the cases fell to two hundred seventy-five
in September and eighty-eight in October. In November there was
a slight recrudescence, but the disease did not again threaten to
escape control and in February practically disappeared, there being
but two cases during the entire month.

The return of hot, damp weather again produced a slight recrudescence,
and scattering cases continued to occur until March, when the epidemic
of 1902-1904 ended in Manila.

In view of the conditions which then prevailed and of the extreme
risk of a general infection of the city water supply, which, had it
occurred, would doubtless have resulted in the death of a third of
the population, this is a record of which the Bureau of Health may
well be proud.

The effort to prevent the spread of infection by maintaining a land
quarantine around Manila proved entirely ineffective. The disease
promptly appeared in the provinces where the campaign against it
was from the outset in charge of newly appointed Filipino presidents
of provincial boards of health, aided, when practicable, by medical
inspectors from Manila.

Before it was finally checked in Manila there were 5581 cases with
4386 deaths; while in the provinces, in many of which it necessarily
long ran its course practically unhindered, there were 160,671 cases,
with 105,075 deaths.

On the 27th of April, 1904, the Board of Health passed the following
resolutions:--

    "Whereas cases of Asiatic cholera have occurred in but three
    provincial towns of the Philippine Islands since February 8,
    1904; and

    "Whereas only one case of Asiatic cholera has been reported as
    occurring any place in the Philippine Islands since March 8,
    1904; and

    "Whereas the city of Manila was declared on March 23 to be
    free from the infection of Asiatic cholera; On motion

    "_Resolved_, That the islands composing the Philippine
    Archipelago are, and are hereby declared to be, free from
    the infection of Asiatic cholera; and

    "_Be it further resolved_, That the Commissioner of Public
    Health be directed to send a copy of these resolutions to the
    honourable the Secretary of the Interior, the Municipal Board,
    the United States Marine-Hospital Service, and the Collector
    of Customs."

As a matter of fact, however, it later proved that cholera was endemic
in certain swampy regions near Manila, and in 1905 we found ourselves
with a new epidemic on our hands.

At the end of the second week, beginning August 23, there had been one
hundred thirty-seven cases, as compared with one hundred twenty-five
for the same period during the epidemic of 1902-1904.

However, the conditions for combating cholera were now far more
favourable than in 1902. Major E. C. Carter had at his own request been
relieved from duty as commissioner of public health, and Dr. Victor
G. Heiser, passed assistant surgeon of the United States public
health and marine hospital service, had been appointed to succeed
him on April 5, 1905. Dr. Heiser was a highly trained officer of one
of the most efficient services which has ever been organized for the
combating of contagious and infectious diseases.

He had under him in the city of Manila a small but thoroughly trained
body of twenty-four medical inspectors, of whom nineteen were Americans
and five Filipinos. Profiting by his previous experience and that of
his predecessors in the Philippine service, he inaugurated a campaign
which practically terminated the epidemic in Manila on February 21,
1906, [501] with a total of two hundred eighty-three cases and two
hundred forty-three deaths.

This brief and decisive campaign reflects the greatest credit on all
concerned with it.

The board of health had one great advantage in the fact that the San
Lazaro contagious disease hospital had been completed. This building,
with its cool wards and attractive surroundings, made it possible to
give cholera victims the best of care.

There was at the outset little or no fear of this hospital, but
apparently this condition of things was not satisfactory to that
small but dangerous element of the Manila public which from the time
of the American occupation has never let pass any opportunity to make
trouble. As usual, the medium of attack was the local press. _Soberania
Nacional_ published a most extraordinary article painting in vivid
colours the alleged horrors of the San Lazaro Hospital, and stating
among other things that the naked bodies of the dead, tagged and with
their feet tied together, lay about the entrance of that institution. A
more false statement was never published.

Within twenty-four hours after its appearance terror reigned among
the lower classes, and living and dead cholera victims were being
smuggled out of the city to neighbouring towns.

Feeling that the vicious attitude of a certain section of the press
had cost lives enough, I sent the editor of this paper a courteous
invitation to call at my office. He made no response. I then wrote
him, demanding a retraction, and sending him a correct statement to
publish. [502]

He was at first disposed to argue the matter, but finding that I
meant business published the article which I sent to him and made
the following retraction:--

    "We are exceedingly glad to affirm in the honour of truth and
    justice, that the news given by us on the seventh instant under
    the title 'Painful Scenes,' and 'Naked Dead,' is absolutely
    absurd, false and unreasonable.

    "We have investigated the truth of the said notice, and can
    affirm to our readers that it is entirely inaccurate, as in
    the courtyard of the said hospital the naked dead that we
    have spoken of are not now exposed, nor have they ever been
    so exposed.

    "The truth is above all things, and to rectify a baseless
    piece of news should not be a doubtful action on the part
    of the person who gave the news, but rather something in his
    favour that the public should appreciate it at its full value.

    "To conclude, we must record our gratitude to the Secretary
    of the Interior, the Hon. Dean C. Worcester, for the
    investigations made in the premises with the purpose of
    ascertaining the truth of the alleged facts, and for the
    courteous way in which he received us this morning when
    interviewed by one of our reporters."

In the provinces the results of the campaign against cholera were
far less satisfactory than in Manila as was to be anticipated, owing
to lack of adequate personnel, but the cases, which numbered 34,238
and deaths which numbered 22,938, were far fewer than during the
previous epidemic.

I shall not attempt here to trace the course of the subsequent
epidemics which have occurred from time to time, but shall content
myself with giving the deaths by years. In 1908, they numbered 18,811;
in 1909, 7306; in 1910, 6940; in 1911, 203. In 1912, there were none,
and thus far in 1913 there have been none. [503]

The superstitious practices which were formerly employed by the
Filipinos to combat this scourge have given way to simple and
inexpensive hygienic measures, and we can safely count on sufficient
cooeperation from the people to make an effective campaign possible
when it next appears.

Never shall I forget the strain of the early days of the first
epidemic. Two of my best men, Dr. Meacham and Mr. Mudge, literally
worked themselves to death, remaining on duty when they knew that
they were in imminent danger, and in the end laying down their lives
willingly for an alien and hostile people. Such things make one proud
of being an American.

At times the situation was not devoid of amusing features. I had
occasion to visit one of the northern provinces, where the epidemic was
especially severe, in an effort to calm the panic-stricken populace. I
stayed with the governor, a very intelligent Filipino. For obvious
reasons I investigated his domestic arrangements, finding that he
was boiling drinking water, thoroughly cooking all food, and taking
all usual and necessary precautions to prevent infection.

On returning to his house the first evening, after a short absence, I
found the grounds decorated with lighted Japanese lanterns. Supposing
that the proverbial Filipino hospitality had risen above even such
untoward circumstances as those which then existed, I asked the
governor what the entertainment was to be. In evident perplexity he
replied that he had not planned to have any entertainment, and on
my inquiring what the lanterns were for, said he had heard that they
were good to keep away cholera germs!

I have referred to the fact that the civil government inherited a
fairly well developed epidemic of bubonic plague. In 1901 this disease
caused four hundred twenty-seven deaths, in 1902 it caused ten only,
but the demands made on the sanitary force by the cholera epidemic
which began in that year rendered it impossible to give to plague
the attention which it otherwise would have had, with the result
that in 1903 we had one hundred seventy-four deaths. In 1904 there
were seventy-eight; in 1905, forty-three; in 1906, seven; in 1907,
none; and from 1907 until 1912, none. In the latter year the disease
was reintroduced.

Rats become infected with it, and fleas transmit it from them to human
beings. It was probably brought in by pestiferous rodents hidden
inside packages of vegetables, as it appeared in a district where
crates of vegetables are opened in large numbers, and did not appear
in the vicinity of the piers, although shore rats are abundant there,
and if diseased rodents had landed from shipping, would promptly have
become infected,--a thing which did not occur.

At about the same time plague also appeared at Iloilo, where it was
eradicated with a total of nine deaths. At Manila there have been
up to the present time [504] fifty-nine deaths, and scattering cases
continue to occur at considerable intervals.

Had plague not been promptly and effectively combated, it would
unquestionably have spread rapidly, causing untold misery and heavy
property losses.

As I have previously stated, at the time of the American occupation
smallpox was by many people regarded as an almost inevitable ailment
of childhood. It proved necessary to secure the passage of legislation
forbidding the inoculation of human beings with it to prevent misguided
Filipinos from deliberately communicating it to their children, not
because they did not dearly love them, but because they regarded
infection with it as a calamity sure to come sooner or later, and
desired to have it over with once for all.

We have performed more than ten million vaccinations, with the result
that the annual deaths from this disease have decreased from forty
thousand at the outset to seven hundred for the year just ended. There
is now less smallpox in Manila than in Washington.

In the six provinces nearest Manila it was killing, on the average,
six thousand persons annually. For a year after we finished vaccinating
the inhabitants of these provinces it did not cause a death among them;
nor has it since caused such a death except among new-born children
or newly arrived unvaccinated persons.

These extraordinary results have been achieved without the loss of
a life or a limb so far as we know. The vaccine used was prepared by
our own Bureau of Science with extraordinary care, and has proved to
be remarkably pure and active.

We at first endeavoured to have vaccinations performed by local
Filipino health officers, but, after spending large sums without
obtaining satisfactory results, gave up this plan and substituted
therefor a method of procedure by which the work was carried on under
the very immediate supervision of the director of health. We then made
substantial progress. However, under the law as it at present stands,
succeeding annual vaccination, intended to insure the immunization
of children soon after they are born and of unvaccinated persons who
may come into a given territory, are intrusted to the local Filipino
authorities, with the result that in very many cases they are not
attended to. We get elaborate returns showing the number of persons
vaccinated. Then comes an outbreak of smallpox, and on investigation
we learn that the vaccinations so fully reported were made on paper
only! In other words, the continuance of this work, of such vital
importance to the Filipino people, is still directly dependent upon
continued control by American health officers.

Another great problem now in a fair way to final solution is the
eradication of leprosy. At the outset we were told by the church
authorities that there were thirty thousand lepers in the islands. In
1905 we began to isolate and care for all supposed victims of this
disease, only to find that many outcasts believed to be suffering
from it were really afflicted with curable ailments. We were able to
restore a very large number of them to society, to their great joy
and that of their friends.

A few hundreds of true lepers were being humanely cared for in
Manila and elsewhere. Many others had been driven out of the towns
into forests or waste places on the larger islands, where they were
perishing miserably from fever and other diseases. Still others had
been isolated on sand quays, where they were in danger of dying from
thirst during the dry season. Not a few wandered through the towns
at will, spreading the disease broadcast.

All known lepers are now cared for at Culion, a healthful, sanitary
town with good streets, excellent water and sewer systems, many modern
concrete buildings and a first-class hospital.

They are not confined to the limits of the town, but wander at will,
except that they are excluded from the immediate vicinity of the
houses of the officers and employees of the colony.

They may have their little farms, and raise pigs, chickens, vegetables,
etc., if they wish. They may, and do, float about over the waters of
the neighbouring bay in boats or on rafts, and fish to their hearts'
content. They are well fed and well cared for, and their physical
condition improves to a marked degree promptly after their arrival at
the colony. The only hardship which they suffer is that necessarily
involved in separation from their relatives and friends, and this is
mitigated by occasional visits which the latter may make them.

Since we began to isolate lepers, their number has decreased to
approximately three thousand, and with a continuance of the present
policy the disease should soon disappear from the Philippines.

During the period immediately subsequent to the American occupation,
amoebic dysentery wrought sad havoc both among our soldiers and among
civil government officers and employees. Four of my own family of five
had it, and one had it twice, in spite of the fact that we took all
known precautions; and the experience of my family was by no means
exceptional. This disease then annually cost the lives of a large
number of American men and women, and a considerable additional
number went home invalids for life as a result of infection with
it. We seemed to hear almost daily of some new case.

Careful scientific investigation carried on at the bureau of science
taught us the best methods of combating this type of dysentery,
and the proper disposal of human feces, the regulation of methods
used in fertilizing vegetables, improvement in supplies of drinking
water, and other simple, hygienic measures have reduced the deaths
from it among Americans to an almost negligible minimum. Such cases
as occur are almost without exception detected early, and readily
yield to treatment.

The belief that Filipinos do not suffer from this disease has proved
to be without foundation. It kills thousands of them every year. Those
who are willing to adopt the simple precautions which experience has
shown to be necessary may enjoy the large degree of immunity from it
which Americans now have.

The chief cause of amoebic dysentery in the Philippines has undoubtedly
been infected drinking water. From time immemorial the people have
been obtaining their water for drinking purposes from flowing streams,
open springs or shallow surface wells.

The wells were especially dangerous, as it was the common custom
to wash clothing around them so that water containing disease germs
frequently seeped into wells used by whole villages. The results of
such conditions during a cholera epidemic can readily be imagined.

The drinking supplies of many provincial towns have now been radically
improved by the sinking of 853 successful artesian wells.

In many places there has been a resulting reduction of more than
fifty per cent in the annual death rate. Large sums are spent yearly
by the government in drilling additional wells,--a policy which is
warmly approved by the common people. The recent appropriations for
this purpose have been $255,000 for the fiscal year 1912, $60,000
for 1913 and $200,000 for 1914.

When we came to the islands, malaria was killing as many persons
as was smallpox. The mortality caused by it is now being greatly
reduced by giving away annually millions of doses of quinine, and by
draining or spraying with petroleum places where mosquitoes breed,
as well as by teaching the people the importance of sleeping under
mosquito nets and the necessity of keeping patients suffering from
active attacks of malaria where mosquitoes cannot get at them. Only
quinine of established quality is allowed in the market.

The results obtained in combating malaria are often very
striking. Calapan, the capital of Mindoro, was in Spanish days known as
"the white man's grave" on account of the prevalence of "pernicious
fever" there. To-day it is an exceptionally healthy provincial town.

At Iwahig, in Palawan, the Spaniards attempted to conduct a
penal colony. They were compelled to abandon it on account of
pernicious malaria, which caused continued serious mortality when
the American government attempted to establish a similar institution
there. Application of the usual sanitary measures has made it a
healthful place.

Old jails throughout the islands have been rendered sanitary,
or replaced by new ones. The loathsome skin diseases from which
prisoners formerly suffered have in consequence disappeared. The
practical results obtained in Bilibid, the insular penitentiary, are
worthy of special note. The annual death rate at this institution was
78.25 per thousand for the calendar year 1904. It increased steadily
each month from January, 1904, to September, 1905, when it reached
its maximum, deaths occurring at the rate of 241.15 per thousand per
year. At this time the director of health was given charge of the
sanitation of this prison.

By remedying overcrowding, improving drainage, installing sewers and
regulating diet along scientific lines, the rate was reduced in six
months to 70 per 1000, and there it stuck.

A systematic examination of the stools of prisoners was then
made. Eighty-four per cent were found to be afflicted with at least
one intestinal parasite. Fifty per cent had two or more, and twenty
per cent had three or more. Fifty-two per cent of the total had
hookworm. Active treatment for the elimination of these parasites was
begun in one barrack, and after the work was completed it was noted
that there was much less disease there than in the remainder. All
of the thirty-five hundred prisoners were ultimately examined,
and intestinal parasites eradicated if present. The death rate then
dropped to thirteen to the thousand, and has remained at or near this
figure up to the present time.

I have already referred to the discovery of the cause of beri-beri,
and to the effect of the governor-general's order forbidding the
use of polished rice in government institutions or by government
organizations.

I subsequently made a strong effort to secure legislation imposing
a heavy internal revenue tax on polished rice, thus penalizing its
use. I failed, but such effort will be renewed by some one, let us
hope with ultimate success.

In Spanish days cholera, leprosy, smallpox and other dangerous
communicable diseases were constantly reintroduced from without. This
is no longer the case. The United States public health and marine
hospital service has stretched an effective defensive line around the
archipelago and has sent its outposts to Hongkong, Shanghai and Amoy,
to prevent, so far as possible, the embarkation for Manila of persons
suffering from such ailments. We now have the most effective quarantine
system in the tropics, and one of the best in the world. At Mariveles
there is a very large and complete disinfecting plant, and vessels
may also be satisfactorily disinfected at Cebu and Iloilo.

This quarantine service kept the Philippines free from bubonic plague
for seven years, and has repeatedly prevented the entry of pneumonic
plague, that most deadly of all known diseases.

A peculiar and shockingly disfiguring disease known as yaws occurs
somewhat infrequently in the Philippine lowlands and is very prevalent
in a number of places in the highlands. In many ways it resembles
syphilis, and indeed at one time was considered to be syphilitic
in its origin. Doctor Richard P. Strong, of the Bureau of Science,
made the very important discovery that salvarsan is an absolute
specific for it. The effect of an injection of this remedy closely
approaches a miracle in medicine. In five or six days the condition
of the patient begins to improve rapidly. By the end of the second
week his horrible sores have healed.

It was with this remedy that we began our health work among some of
the wilder head-hunters of northern Luzon. Think of the advantage of
being absolutely certain of curing such an ailment in every case, and
think of the gratitude of poor wretches, undergoing untold suffering,
when they were almost immediately relieved!

Soon after this use for salvarsan was discovered, I caused a liberal
supply of it to be sent to the Bontoc Hospital. For some time we
were unable to persuade any victims of yaws to undergo treatment,
but finally we found one at Barlig who was guilty of a minor criminal
offence, arrested him, and took him to Bontoc. Instead of putting
him in jail there, we sent him to the hospital for treatment.

At first he complained bitterly that we were putting no medicine
on his sores. Then the remedy began to work and he decided it was
"strong medicine." By the tenth day he was running around town
joyfully exhibiting his rapidly healing body to every one who would
look at it. On the fourteenth day he suddenly disappeared, to the
deep regret of the medical men, who had hoped that they might keep
him as an example of what could be done, and thus persuade others
to undergo treatment. A few days later, however, he reappeared with
thirteen victims of yaws from his home town, having meanwhile twice
covered on foot the great distance which separates Barlig from Bontoc,
and assembled and brought in his fellow-sufferers.

As we have seen, the people of Manila were formerly supplied with
impure drinking water from the Mariquina River, and were therefore in
constant danger of infection with cholera and other deadly diseases. At
a cost of some $1,500,000 we have given the city a modern water system,
the intake of which is far up in the hills above the last village. The
annual deaths from ordinary water-borne diseases exclusive of cholera
have fallen from 3558--the average number at the time the new system
was introduced--to 1195. Recently a leak in the dam, which necessitated
temporary resumption of the use of the Mariquina River water, was
immediately followed by a marked increase in the number of deaths
from such diseases, thus conclusively demonstrating the fact that we
were right in ascribing the previous reduction in deaths to a better
water supply.

This annual saving of lives is an important result, but more important
yet is the fact that when Asiatic cholera reappears in the Mariquina
valley, as it inevitably will sooner or later, we shall not live in
constant fear of a general infection of the Manila water supply,
which, judging from the experience of other cities where modern
sanitary methods have been introduced, might result in the death of
a third of the population. In every country a very considerable part
of the population always fails to boil its drinking water, no matter
how great the resulting danger may be.

Manila lacked any facilities for the proper disposal of human waste,
and the conditions which resulted were unspeakable, especially in
the little _barrios_, or groups of houses, placed close together,
helter-skelter, on wet, swampy ground and reached by means of runways
not worthy even of the name of alleys, as one often had to crouch to
pass along them.

A modern sewer system costing $2,000,000, supplemented by a pail
system, has very effectively solved this problem, while thousands of
homes closely crowded on disease-infected, mosquito-breeding ground
have been removed to high, dry, sanitary sites. The regions thus
vacated have in many instances been drained, filled, provided with
city water and good streets, and made fit for human occupancy.

The old moat around the city walls was a veritable incubator of
disease. It has been converted into an athletic field where crowds
of people take healthful exercise. The _esteros_, or tidal creeks,
reeked with filth. More than twenty miles of such creeks have been
cleaned out, although much still remains to be done to put them in
really satisfactory condition.

There were no regulations covering the construction of buildings, and
it was not unusual to find six or eight persons sleeping in a closed
and unventilated room 10 x 8 x 8 feet. Manila now has an excellent
sanitary code, and such conditions have been made unlawful.

The previous woeful lack of hospital facilities has been effectively
remedied. At a cost of approximately a million and quarter pesos we
have built and equipped the great Philippine General Hospital, one of
the most modern institutions of its kind in the world, and by far the
best in the Far East. In it we have very satisfactorily solved the
question of getting sufficient light and air in the tropics without
getting excessive heat. Its buildings are certainly among the very
coolest in the city of Manila, and "the hospital smell" is everywhere
conspicuously absent.

It is called a three-hundred-bed institution, but as a matter of fact
the ventilation is so admirable that nearly two hundred additional
beds can safely be put in as an emergency measure.

Two hundred and twenty of its beds are free. In them a very large
number of persons are annually given the best of medical and surgical
care. At its free clinic some eighty thousand patients find relief
in the course of a year.

The increase in private hospital facilities has also been
noteworthy. Among the new institutions doing admirable work should be
mentioned the University Hospital, an Episcopal institution; the Mary
J. Johnston Hospital, a Methodist institution; and St. Paul's Hospital,
a Catholic institution. Patients are admitted to all of them without
regard to their religious belief, a policy the liberality of which
must commend itself to all broadminded persons.

In enumerating the hospitals of Manila, the old Spanish institution,
San Juan de Dios, should not be forgotten, for it has been improved
and modernized until it offers good facilities for the treatment of
the sick and the injured.

All of the above mentioned institutions are in effect acute-case
hospitals designed for the treatment of curable ailments. Cases
of dangerous communicable disease are excluded from them, but are
adequately provided for at San Lazaro where the insular government
has established modern and adequate hospitals for plague, smallpox,
cholera, diphtheria, scarlet fever, measles, etc., as well as a
detention hospital for lepers, pending their departure for Culion.

An insane hospital capable of comfortably accommodating 300 inmates
has also been provided. A few years since the insane were commonly
chained to floors, or tied to stakes under houses or in yards,
and were not infrequently burned alive during conflagrations. Such
conditions no longer exist, but the government is not yet able to
provide for nearly all of the insane who need institutional care.

The several institutions above mentioned have a very important
function apart from the relief of human suffering, in that they afford
unexcelled opportunities for giving practical instruction in nursing
and in the practice of medicine and surgery.

A few years ago there was not such a thing as a Filipina trained
nurse in the islands. I was firmly convinced that the Filipinas of
this country could learn to be good nurses, and made earnest efforts
to have included among the first students sent at government expense
to the United States several young women of good family who should
attend nurses' training schools and then return to assist in our
hospital work.

I failed to secure the adoption of this plan, but later the training
of nurses was inaugurated in connection with hospital work at the
old Civil Hospital, St. Paul's, the University Hospital, the Mary
J. Johnston Hospital and the Philippine General Hospital. At the latter
institution there is now conducted an admirable school where more than
two hundred young men and women are being trained. Three classes have
already graduated from it, and Filipina nurses have long since proved
themselves to be exceptionally efficient, capable and faithful. It
will be some time before we can educate as many as are needed in the
government hospitals, and after that has been accomplished a vast
field opens before others in the provincial towns, where the need of
trained assistants in caring for the sick is very great.

We found exceedingly few competent Filipino physicians or surgeons
in the islands. This condition was due not to natural incompetence
on the part of the Filipinos but to the previous lack of adequate
educational facilities. The government has established a thoroughly
modern college of medicine and surgery, well housed, and provided
with all necessary laboratory facilities. It furnishes the best of
theoretical instruction, while its students have every opportunity
for practical work at the bedsides of patients in the government
hospitals, all patients in free beds being admitted subject to the
condition that they will allow their cases to be studied.

While there is still an evident tendency on the part of graduates of
this school to feel that they know enough, and to desire to get to
making money without delay, we are nevertheless managing to attract an
increasingly large number of the more competent to the intern service
of the Philippine General Hospital, where as the result of additional
years of practical experience they become exceptionally proficient.

This institution, with its great free clinic, offers very exceptional
facilities for practical instruction, and we have already trained
some extremely competent Filipino physicians and surgeons.

As funds permit, hospital work is being extended to the provinces. At
Cebu a thoroughly up-to-date sixty-bed institution is now open. A
smaller one was established years ago at Baguio, where surgical work
may be performed with great advantage on account of the rapidity with
which convalescence occurs in the cool, pure mountain air, which also
expedites the recovery of persons recuperating from wasting diseases.

A little more than a year ago a hospital was opened at Bontoc, the
demand for accommodations being so great from the start that we did
not even await the arrival of beds. Sick Igorots were only too glad
to lie on the floor if their needs could be ministered to.

It had previously been the custom of the wild men to kill chickens,
pigs or carabaos in case of illness, in order to propitiate evil
spirits, the kind and number of animals killed being of course
determined by the wealth of the patients. They have now satisfied
themselves that quinine for malaria, salvarsan for yaws, and other
effective remedies for common ailments are more useful and more
readily obtained than was the helpful intervention of the _anitos,_
or spirits of the dead, while the methods and results of modern
surgery are a source of unending amazement and satisfaction to them.

The first surgeon to anesthetize a Kalinga became promptly and widely
known as "the man who kills people and brings them to life again,"
and the individual on whom he operated successfully, who chanced to
be the most influential chief of the tribe, became his friend for
life. Indeed, the results of medical and surgical work for the wild
men have been an important factor in bringing about and maintaining
friendly relations with them.

Their gratitude is at times very touching. At Atok, in Benguet, there
lives an Igorot chief named Palasi. When he was already old a son was
born to him. This boy, who was the delight of his declining years,
became deathly ill with confluent smallpox, and the Igorots considered
him as good as dead. At this time Sanitary Inspector Baron appeared
on the scene. He promptly turned every one else out of the house and
himself nursed the boy, saving his life. Palasi wished to pay him
for his services, but was informed by Mr. Baron that the government
paid him, and he could not accept additional compensation. Palasi
promptly made the long journey to Baguio to ascertain whether Baron
had told him the truth, and was informed by Governor Pack that this
was the case. The old man retired to Atok, quite disgusted with the
strange ways of Americans.

Six months later he again appeared at Baguio to ask the governor about
a _fiesta_ which he had just heard it was customary to celebrate
on the 25th of December. He had been told that Americans were in
the habit of giving presents to each other at this time, and asked
if this was the ease. Governor Pack said yes. Palasi then inquired
if the feast was a _good_ feast, and the custom a _good_ custom,
and was assured that both of these things were true. He next asked
if it would be a good feast for Igorots as well as for Americans,
and receiving an affirmative reply from the unsuspecting governor,
triumphantly declared that he was going to give Baron his best
horse. Under the circumstances the governor allowed him to do so.

In connection with the Bontoc Hospital we use two men, one of whom
travels from settlement to settlement, relieving minor ailments on
the spot and sending to the hospital only those patients who need
to go there, while the other stays at home and receives them. From
time to time these two doctors "change works." Pages from their daily
journals, written in the field, often read like romance.

Were I a young man, and possessed of adequate knowledge of medicine
and surgery, I would ask nothing better than to minister to the wants
of these people. One might not, and indeed would not, acquire great
wealth, but he would be rich in friends. Here lies a great field for
practical missionary work.

In connection with the health work there have been many occurrences
which were both amusing and sad. At one time there was great excitement
over a sacred spring which had appeared in Manila Bay off the district
of Tondo. It was duly blessed by Aglipay, the head of the so-called
Aglipayano church. Coincidently with its discovery there was a sharp
little outbreak of Asiatic cholera. Investigation revealed the fact
that the "spring" had its origin in a broken sewer pipe. We were
obliged to prevent the faithful from further partaking of its waters,
and thus insuring themselves a speedy trip to the better world.

At one time cases of cholera appeared scattered generally throughout
the Mariquina valley and without apparent connection. For some days we
were unable to make a guess as to their origin. Then we heard that a
"Queen" had arisen at the town of Taytay near the Laguna de Bay. An
investigation of the Queen and her activities resulted in rather
astonishing revelations. She was a very ordinary looking Tagalog girl
who had secured the body of an old bull-cart, stopped the cracks with
clay, partially filled it with water and decaying vegetable matter,
and at rather frequent intervals had bathed in the fermenting mass
thus concocted. In due time she announced herself a healer of all
the ills to which flesh is heir, and the sick flocked to her. Cholera
was then prevalent in some of the towns near Taytay, and there were
persons suffering from it among those seeking relief. Some of them
were directed to wash their hands in the extemporized tank, while
others bathed their bodies in it. As a result it soon contained a
cholera culture of unprecedented richness. This was given to patients
applying for treatment, and was bottled and sent to those who were
too ill to come in person. Hence numerous scattering cases of cholera
which did not bear any relationship to other known cases.

It proved quite an undertaking to put the Queen of Taytay out of
business. We first asked the local authorities to have her sent to
Manila, but the presidente and the police declined to act. We then
applied for a warrant to the Filipino judge of the court of first
instance having jurisdiction over Taytay, but that worthy official
found it convenient to be suddenly called out of the province. At
last we prevailed upon soldiers of the Philippine constabulary to
arrest the queen and bring her to Manila.

We had anticipated that she might prove insane, but she showed herself
to be a very keen-witted young woman. We employed her at the San Lazaro
Hospital to look after cholera patients. The people of Taytay were
not satisfied, and a few days later a large delegation of them came
to Manila and demanded the Queen. I was at my wits' end to know what
to do, but old Spanish law can usually be relied upon in emergencies,
and the attorney-general discovered a provision couched in very general
terms, which provided against disobedience to the authorities. It was
only necessary for an "authority" to have read to an ordinary person a
statement setting forth what that person must not do; then if the order
was violated, such person could be made to suffer pains and penalties.

I accordingly prepared a most impressive order prohibiting the Queen
of Taytay from further engaging in the practice of medicine, had her
followers drawn up in battalion formation, placed myself at the front
and centre, caused the Queen to be brought before me, and read her my
communication, at the same time charging the good people of Taytay
not to tempt her again to try her hand at healing, for the reason
that if they did she would surely get into serious trouble. They
marched away with the Queen and I have not heard of her since.

Hardly a year goes by that some similar miraculous healer does not
set up in business, and the supply of dupes seems to be unending.

While it is comparatively easy to combat disease in a place like
Manila, what of the provinces, where in many cases there is not one
physician to two hundred thousand inhabitants?

To meet this difficulty we have an organization of district and
municipal health officers. A district may include a single province
or several provinces. A district health officer is invariably a
physician who has had reasonably thorough practical training in the
work of public sanitation, usually at Manila.

He is supposed to spend his time in sanitary work rather than in
treating sick individuals, but it is, of course, impossible for him
always to refuse to treat such persons, and we encourage gratuitous
work for the poor when it can be carried on without interfering too
seriously with more important duties.

Presidents of municipal boards of health may exercise jurisdiction over
a single municipality or over several. They are supposed to maintain
good sanitary conditions in their respective towns, under the general
supervision of district health officers, and to instruct their people
in sanitary methods and their results, as well as to devote a certain
amount of their time to the relief of the suffering poor.

On the whole it must be admitted that while this system has
accomplished much, it has fallen far short of accomplishing what
it should.

Men like Dr. Arlington Pond of Cebu have wrought marvels, and have
conclusively demonstrated the fact that it is not the system that
is at fault. Of our thirteen district health officers, ten are
Filipinos. They are, with few exceptions, letter-perfect. They know
what they ought to do, but as a rule lack the initiative and the
courage to do it.

Recently after discovering exceptionally bad sanitary conditions in
several towns of the province of Misamis, I demanded an explanation
of the district health officer, an exceptionally well-educated and
intelligent Filipino physician. I found, as I had anticipated, that
the sanitary regulations of his towns left little to be desired,
but that they were absolutely ignored.

I asked him what sense there was in paying his salary if he failed
to remedy such conditions as I had discovered. He replied that if he
were really going to compel people to clean up, it would be necessary
to begin with the provincial governor, whose premises were in a bad
state. When I suggested that in my opinion the provincial governor
would be the best possible man to begin with, the doctor evidently
thought me crazy!

It is as yet impossible for the average intelligent Filipino to
understand that the rich and the poor, the powerful and the weak,
should be treated alike.

It often happens that a province asks for an American health officer,
or a Filipino demands the services of an American physician. My
invariable procedure in such cases has been to request that the
application be made in writing. For some mysterious reason the
petitioners are seldom willing to go on record.

A short time since we had a strong demand from Iloilo for an American
district health officer. I made the usual suggestion and got a written
request that there be sent to Iloilo a district health officer "after
the style of the district health officer of Cebu." If Dr. Pond's
nationality may be considered a part of his style, then this was a
request for an American, otherwise not!

With rather shocking frequency, Filipinos who must be examined for
leprosy or some other dangerous communicable disease strongly insist
that the examination be made by an American bacteriologist rather
than by one of their own countrymen.

In connection with recent election troubles two men were wrongfully
denounced as lepers. In several instances perfectly sound people
have been thrust among lepers who were being taken on board steamer
for transfer to Culion. This grievous wrong was committed by their
enemies under cover of darkness, and in the confusion which attends
the embarking of a number of people in a heavy sea. The reason why
the services of Americans are often specially requested for diagnostic
work is not far to seek!

It is a significant fact that our greatest success in establishing
satisfactory provincial sanitary conditions has been achieved in
certain of the "special government provinces," where the people are
under the very direct control of American officials.

There is not a regularly organized province in the Philippines in
which the towns are as clean as are those of Mindoro, where, until
recently, we have never had a resident district health officer.

I believe that nowhere in the tropics can there be found native
towns which are cleaner or more healthful than are those of Bukidnon,
inhabited in some instances by people who have literally been brought
down out of the tree-tops within the last two or three years. We have
never had a resident health officer in this subprovince.

I mention these facts not as an argument against health officers, but
as a proof of what can be done without them by intelligent Americans
vested with proper authority.

It has given me especial pleasure to see the fundamental change which
has come about in public sentiment relative to medical, surgical
and sanitary work. At the outset sanitary inspectors and vaccinators
carried on their work at serious risk of personal violence. Indeed,
several of them were killed. Incredible tales were believed by the
populace, with the result that cholera victims sometimes had to be
taken to the hospital by force. In later years it has been by no
means unusual for them to come in voluntarily and request treatment.

General hospitals were in the old days regarded as places where people
so unfortunate as to have no homes to die in might go to end their
days. It was almost impossible to get any other class of persons
into them.

Now we constantly turn away deserving patients from the Philippine
General Hospital because of lack of room. The common people are
flocking to it in rapidly increasing numbers. We even have "repeaters,"
and persons who drop in just to get a comfortable bed and a bath while
waiting for an examination which will inevitably show that there is
nothing wrong with them.

Our difficulties were increased at the outset by the fact that many
foreign medical men working in the Far East good-naturedly ridiculed
our efforts to better conditions, claiming that in tropical colonies it
was customary to take only such steps as would safeguard the health of
European residents, and that it was really best to let the masses live
as they would, since orientals were incapable of sanitary reform, and
the attempt to bring it about involved a waste of effort that might
be more profitably directed elsewhere. Furthermore these men were,
in their several countries, practising what they preached.

It has been very interesting to note the reaction of American methods
upon those previously in vogue in neighbouring colonies. At first
our efforts to make Asiatics clean up, and to eliminate diseases
like leprosy, cholera and plague, were viewed with mild amusement,
not unmixed with contempt; but the results which we obtained soon
aroused lively interest.

Foreign governments began to send representatives to the annual
meetings of the "Philippine Island Medical Association," [505] in
order to learn more of our methods. From these small beginnings sprang
"The Far Eastern Association of Tropical Medicine," the biennial
meetings of which bring together the most experienced, skilful and
widely known physicians and sanitarians in the East for an interchange
of views and experiences which is invaluable, and greatly facilitates
concerted action between the various governments concerned in dealing
with what may be termed "international health problems."

The first meeting of this Association was held at Manila, the second
at Hongkong. The third will take place at Saigon.

The results of a rigid enforcement of the "Pure Food and Drugs Act"
are worthy of more than passing notice. Such enforcement has been
comparatively easy as the officials concerned are not hampered
by politics. The Philippines were at one time a dumping-ground for
products that could not be sold elsewhere, but it is now possible for
Filipinos to obtain wholesome preserved foods and unadulterated drugs,
except in very remote places where none of any sort are available.

The cost of our medical and sanitary work has been comparatively
small. The per capita rate of taxation here is lower than in any
other civilized country. What we have done has been accomplished
without spending vast sums of money or resorting to military measures.

The results obtained are very largely due to the faithfulness
and efficiency of Dr. Victor G. Heiser, who was chief quarantine
officer of the Philippines when he succeeded Major E. C. Carter as
commissioner of public health on April 5, 1905, and was later made
director of health when the original board of health was abolished
as an administrative entity. He has continued to hold the office of
chief quarantine officer, and thus has been in complete executive
control of the health situation for eight years.

Through good report and ill, mostly ill, he has given unsparingly of
his time, his skill and his wisdom, always treating the government
money as if it were his own.

His tenure of office has been long enough to enable him to inaugurate
and carry out policies, and thus get results.

Seldom, if ever, have health officials been more viciously and
persistently attacked than have Dr. Heiser and myself. The assaults
on us have been the direct result of a firm stand for a new sanitary
order of things, established in the interest of the whole body of
inhabitants of these islands, civilized and uncivilized. We both
welcome the profound change in public sentiment, which has slowly
but surely come about as a result of practical accomplishment.

Many very grave health problems still confront the insular
administration. Of these the most serious are the eradication of
tuberculosis and the reduction of the very high infant mortality rate.

It is believed that about one Filipino in five suffers from
tuberculosis in some form during his life and the work we have thus
far accomplished in many fields must be considered as in a way a
clearing of the decks for action against this, the greatest enemy of
all. However, the Philippines do not differ essentially from other
civilized countries, in all of which tuberculosis is a very serious
factor in the death rate.

As regards infant mortality the situation is different. More than
fifty per cent of the babes die before completing their first year of
life. The causes which lead to this appalling result have been made
the subject of careful investigation which still continues. Popular
interest has been aroused, but it is undoubtedly true that many
years of patient work will be necessary before anything approaching
satisfactory results can be brought about.

The physical condition of the average Filipino is undoubtedly
bad. Of one hundred seventy-eight university students recently
examined sixty-nine were found to be suffering from serious
organic troubles. Unquestionably the great mass of the people are
underfed. This is largely due to the poor quality of the rice which
they consume, and to the fact that rice forms too large a part of
their diet. I am firmly convinced that much of the so-called laziness
of the Filipinos is the direct result of physical weakness due to
improper and insufficient food.

Since the American occupation a large amount of time has been
successfully devoted to the working out of a good all-around diet made
up of local products the cost of which comes within the means of the
poor. The next thing will be to get them to adopt it, and there comes
the rub. Incalculable good would result, if we could only persuade the
people of these islands to sleep with their windows open. Thousands
upon thousands of infant lives would be saved annually, if mothers
could be persuaded not to give solid food to their little ones during
the early months of their existence.

In the educational campaign which we have thus far conducted with some
considerable degree of success, two agencies have proved invaluable,
namely the Catholic Church and the public schools. Again and again I
have begged Apostolic Delegate Monsignor Agius and Archbishop Harty to
bring to bear the influence of the Church in favour of simple sanitary
regulations, the general adoption of which was imperatively necessary
in combating some epidemic of disease. They have invariably given me
invaluable assistance.

Through the public schools we reach more than half a million children,
and they take the information which we convey to them home to
their parents. Simple rules for the prevention of cholera have been
universally taught in the schools. When the use of English has become
generalized the difficulty now encountered in reaching the common
people will largely disappear. The truth is that they are singularly
tractable and docile when their reason can be effectively appealed
to. The readiness with which they have submitted to the rigorous
measures necessary for the elimination of leprosy is a lasting honour
to them.

Would the sanitary campaign so vitally important to the people of
the Philippines be effectively continued if American authority were
withdrawn at this time? With regret I must answer this question
emphatically in the negative. We have succeeded in training a few
good physicians and surgeons. We have thus far failed to train
really efficient sanitary officers. What is lacking is not so much
knowledge as to what should be done as initiative and courage to do
it. Until this condition changes radically for the better, Filipinos
cannot safely be intrusted with the sanitary regeneration of their
country. Under American control the population of the islands is
steadily and rapidly increasing. It is my firm conviction that if
Filipinos were at this time placed in control of the health work,
the population would steadily and rapidly decrease.

The present attitude of the Filipino press toward sanitary work is
both interesting and important. I quote the following editorial from
the March 27, 1913, issue of _El Ideal_, a paper generally believed
to be controlled by Speaker Osmena:--

    "Some persons, who, because of being ignorant of many
    things, do not sympathize with the Filipino people, who are
    in the habit of frequently throwing up to them the violent
    opposition of our masses to strict sanitary measures in cases
    of epidemics, and the lively protests which are provoked
    here on some occasions by other provisions tending to end
    some public calamity, thinking they see in this disposition
    of mind an indication of our incapacity to govern ourselves....

    "To be more expressive, we shall say that the sanitary agents
    and veterinarians of the government, swollen with power and
    overly zealous of their prestige, quickly become, when an
    occasion like those cited by us presents itself, cunning czars,
    whose sphere of influence is in direct ratio to the peaceful
    character and ignorance of the people intrusted to their
    care, and whose excesses and abuses recognize no limits but
    the natural ones established by the greater or lesser honour
    of those public servants, their greater or lesser cynicism,
    and their greater or lesser degree of temerity.

    "This, and nothing else, is the logical and natural explanation
    of the hostility of our people toward those measures of good
    government which are sincerely esteemed for what they are
    worth, but for which they have veritable terror because of
    the nameless abuses to which they give rise.

    "These comments are of palpitating current interest at this
    moment, when reports are made almost daily to the press and
    the proper authorities of misbehaviour and excesses befitting
    soulless people who live without the law committed by persons
    who should be examples of prudence, honesty and good manners,
    for it is in this concept that the people are compelled to
    furnish them their daily bread."

It is deeply to be regretted that the public press of the islands
has not yet become sufficiently enlightened to join in the great
sanitary campaign which has already relieved an enormous amount of
human suffering and has greatly increased the expectancy of life of
the people of the Philippines.

The Philippine Assembly has repeatedly passed acts providing for the
creation of a sort of sanitary council of numerous members authorized
to pass on public health measures proposed by the director of health
and instructed to disapprove them if not in accordance with the
beliefs and customs of the Filipinos.

In protecting the public health in the Philippine Islands emergencies
constantly arise which must be instantly and effectively met. It would
be as logical to place a commanding general directing a battle under
the control of an advisory board as it would thus to tie the hands of
the director of health, and it is difficult to see how any competent
and self-respecting sanitarian could be willing to continue to hold
this position if so hampered.

The Philippine Commission has heretofore invariably tabled the
acts designed to accomplish this end, but that body has now been
"Filipinized" and its future attitude on this very important
question is therefore in doubt. Hardly had the legislative session
opened in October, 1913, when the assembly again passed the same
old bill. Should it become a law, there will be occasion to watch,
with especial interest, the death rate of Manila and that of the
archipelago as a whole.






CHAPTER XVII

Baguio and the Benguet Road


In June, 1892, when sitting in a native house on a hill overlooking
Naujan Lake in Mindoro, and anxiously awaiting the boats which were
to make it possible for my party to return to the coast, I saw a
small flotilla approaching.

To my surprise and regret I found that it was not coming for us, but
brought a number of Spanish officers who had heard that we had some
mysterious procedure for killing the tamarau, an extraordinarily wild
and vicious little buffalo peculiar to this island. They had come to
get us to tell them how we did it, if possible, and if not to watch
us and find out for themselves.

We described to them our method, which was easily understood. It
consisted in picking up a likely trail along some water course,
following it until the tamarau was overtaken, and then shooting
him. This looked suspiciously simple to our Spanish friends before they
had tried it, and they shook their heads. After trying it they became
convinced that more than a few days of experience would be necessary
before satisfactory results could be obtained. They profited little
by the best information we could give them, and by the services of
the expert tracker whom we loaned to them. Meanwhile I obtained from
one of them, Senor Domingo Sanchez, information destined to become
of great importance in the development of the Philippines.

Senor Sanchez, who was an employee of the Spanish forestry bureau,
told me that in the highlands of Northern Luzon at an elevation
of about five thousand feet, there was a region of pines and oaks
blessed with a perpetually temperate climate and even with occasional
frosts. I confess that I did not believe all of his statements. I
was then experienced in climbing Philippine mountains, and at five
thousand feet had invariably found a hopeless tangle of the rankest
tropical vegetation, with humidity so high that trees were draped with
ferns, orchids, and thick moss, and dripping with moisture. However,
I knew that the mere presence of pine and oak trees would mean the
occurrence of special bird species feeding upon their seeds, and so
determined to investigate.

A severe attack of typhoid fever necessitated my leaving the islands
before I could carry out this plan, but upon my return with the first
Philippine Commission in 1899 I remembered Senor Sanchez's story. In
view of the probability that American occupation would continue
for a long period, the existence or non-existence near Manila of an
extensive highland region with a temperate climate became a question
of great practical importance. I therefore caused search to be made
in the Spanish archives to see what, if any, reliable information was
available, and to my great satisfaction unearthed a detailed report
made by a committee of three distinguished and competent Spanish
officers who had spent some weeks at Baguio in the _comandancia_ of
Benguet, during which period they had made six temperature observations
daily, had tramped over the neighbouring country very thoroughly,
had located a number of springs of potable water and determined their
approximate flow, and in short had gathered a large series of very
valuable data which more than bore out the statements of Senor Sanchez.

I found, furthermore, that Spanish engineers had made a survey for
a carriage road into this country, and had prepared a profile of it
with estimates of the amount and cost of the necessary excavation
and other work.

While in Washington during the winter of 1899-1900, I brought
this matter to the attention of Secretary Root. Just as the second
Philippine Commission was filing out of his office, after receiving
its instructions, he called out to us directing that we look into
that Benguet matter, and if the facts proved to be as stated open up
the country.

Mindful of these instructions the commission delegated General Luke
E. Wright and myself to visit Benguet and familiarize ourselves with
conditions by investigation on the ground. General MacArthur was
dubious when we expressed a desire to carry out the instructions of
the secretary of war. He told us that the country was very dangerous,
doubtless confusing it with Bangued, the capital of Abra, near which
there was at that time a strong and active Insurgent force.

We insisted on going, so he said that he would send a troop of
cavalry with us, and he kept his word. During the last week of July
we finally sailed from Manila on a naval vessel for San Fernando in
the province of Union. From this place we expected to go by road as
far as Naguilian, in the same province, and thence on horseback to
Trinidad and Baguio, in Benguet.

In order to expedite investigations as much as possible we took
with us Mr. Horace L. Higgins, president of the Manila and Dagupan
Railway Company, who was an engineer of experience, to report on
the practicability of constructing a railway to Baguio. We also took
Major L. M. Maus, of the army medical corps, and Dr. Frank S. Bourns,
who then held the volunteer rank of major in the same corps, to report
on the possibilities of the place as a health resort. Two young naval
officers went along just for the trip.

Major Maus accompanied us only because requested to do so. Taking
the latitude and altitude as a basis for his calculations, he had
already determined with a lead pencil and piece of paper just what
the climate of Baguio must be, and had demonstrated to his own
complete satisfaction that the statements of the members of the
Spanish committee above referred to were necessarily false.

His first rude shock came when we were met at San Fernando by a young
aide to Colonel [506] Duval, who was in command of the local garrison
at that place. This lieutenant told us that some <DW64> soldiers were
stationed at Trinidad and were being kept supplied by an army pack
train. I asked him how they were getting on. He said very well,
except that they could not keep warm. They had called for all the
spare blankets available, but still complained of the cold!

The trail proved to be in execrable condition. No repair work had been
done on it since 1896, and its constant use during the then-existing
rainy season by a pack train had completed its destruction. Much of
the way it was a mere V in the earth, with deep mud at the bottom.

We left Naguilian early in the morning and stopped for lunch at
a little place properly called Sablan, but unofficially known as
"The Bells." Aguinaldo had thought at one time of establishing his
headquarters in Benguet and had planned to have a gun foundry at
Sablan. His troops accordingly stole most of the church bells in
the neighbouring lowland towns, meaning to use them for gun metal,
and compelled the unfortunate Benguet Igorots to carry them up the
steep trail. Boiler pipes, which had been used in lieu of carrying
poles, had in several instances been badly bent out of shape. There
was even an old vertical boiler which had been lugged up entire for
some unknown reason.

The labour involved must have been enormous, and we were assured
that when the Igorot bearers, prostrated with fatigue, had refused
to continue their titanic task without rest, they had been driven
to it at the muzzles of Insurgent rifles, and that some of them had
been shot as a lesson to the others. At all events, the boiler and
the bells were there, and there the boiler and the larger bells have
remained ever since!

It was still steaming hot at Sablan, and the whole countryside
was buried in the densest tropical vegetation. Major Maus was
triumphant. Things were working out just as he had predicted. However,
as we were already halfway up, we thought that we might as well
continue the journey. I had expected to find pines and oaks, but
had anticipated that they would grow amidst a dense tangle of damp
tropical vegetation.

We were all literally dumfounded when within the space of a hundred
yards we suddenly left the tropics behind us and came out into a
wonderful region of pine parks. Trees stood on the rounded knolls at
comparatively wide intervals, and there were scores of places where,
in order to have a beautiful house lot, one needed only to construct
driveways and go to work with a lawn-mower. At the same moment,
a delightful cold breeze swept down from the heights above us.

Just at sunset we experienced a second surprise, coming out on the
knife-sharp crest of a ridge, and seeing spread before us the Trinidad
Valley, which is shaped like a huge wash-basin. Its floor was vividly
green with growing rice, Igorot houses were dotted here and there over
its surface, and the whole peaceful, beautiful scene was illuminated
by the rays of the setting sun. The air had been washed clean by
the heavy rain which had poured down on us throughout the afternoon,
and the sight was one never to be forgotten.

Just at dusk we reached the little settlement of Trinidad, which had
been the capital of the Spanish _comandancia_ of Benguet, finding
that its inhabitants were in part Ilocanos and in part Igorots.

Here we were hospitably entertained by the officers of the military
post. It was so cold that one's breath showed. Major Maus improved
the opportunity to indulge in a severe chill. Finding him buried
under blankets, we asked his views as to the Benguet climate. They
were radical! It is only fair to the Major to say that the report
which he ultimately made set forth the facts fully and fairly. It
did not suit General MacArthur. Years afterward, when discussing the
climate of Benguet with Surgeon-General Sternberg, I referred to this
report and found to my amazement that he had never seen it. He caused
an investigation to be made, and it was at last resurrected from a
dusty pigeonhole.

On our arrival at Trinidad we received a letter from Mr. Otto Scheerer,
the one white resident of Benguet, inviting us to make our headquarters
at his house when we visited Baguio. Bright and early the next morning
Mr. Scheerer himself appeared on the scene and guided us to his home,
where he entertained us most hospitably during our entire stay. The
trip from Trinidad, a distance of four miles, was made over a wretched
pony trail.

We found conditions exactly as described in the Spanish report. The
country was gently rolling, its elevation ranging from forty-five
hundred to fifty-two hundred feet. The hills were covered with short,
thick grass, and with magnificent pine trees, which for the most
part grew at considerable distance from each other, while along the
streams there were wonderful tree ferns and luxuriant tangles of
beautiful tropical vegetation. It took us but a short time to decide
that here was an ideal site for a future city, if water could be
found in sufficient quantity.

We revisited each of the several springs discovered and described
by the Spanish committee, but decided that they would be inadequate
to supply a town of any great size. Mr. Scheerer now came to the
front and guided us to the very thing that we were looking for,
but had hardly dared hope to find; namely, a magnificent spring of
crystal-clear water. At that time it was flowing nearly a million
gallons per day. It burst forth from a hillside in such a manner as
to make its protection from surface drainage easy, and we decided
that there was nothing lacking to make Baguio an admirable site for
the future summer capital and health resort of the Philippines.

It was obvious that the construction of a highway from San Fernando,
in Union, to Baguio would involve considerable expense, and we asked
Mr. Scheerer about other possible lines of communication. A study
of the Spanish maps had led us to consider two: one up the valley of
the Agno River, and the other up that of the Bued River. The latter
route had the great advantage of affording direct communication with
the end of the railway line at Dagupan.

Mr. Scheerer took us to a point which commanded a view for some
distance down the Bued River valley, and conditions looked rather
favourable. Mr. Higgins undertook to make a trip down this valley to
the plains of Pangasinan, reporting to us on his arrival at Manila,
so we returned to that place and awaited advices from him. He was
furnished with a guard of soldiers from Trinidad, and attempted to
go down the river bed, but encountered unexpected difficulties, and
his progress was finally checked by a box canon from which he escaped
with difficulty, spending a night without food or water on a chilly
mountain top known as "Thumb Peak." The following morning he managed
to cross to a high mountain called Santo Tomas, whence he returned
to Baguio. He was, however, of the opinion that the trip down the
canon could be made without special difficulty by a party suitably
provided with food and tentage.

Convinced by our report that active measures should be taken to
establish communication with this wonderful region, the commission,
on September 12, 1900, appropriated $5000 Mexican, "for the purpose
of making a survey to ascertain the most advantageous route for
a railway into the mountains of Benguet, Island of Luzon, and the
probable cost thereof."

Captain Charles W. Meade, then serving as city engineer of Manila,
was selected to make the survey. There was every theoretical reason to
believe him competent, and we did not question either his integrity
or his ability. After being absent from Manila for some time, he
reported in favour of the Bued River valley route, saying that it
was entirely feasible to build a railway along it.

He suggested that, as the construction of a wagon road would be
necessary in building the railroad, we might as well undertake that
first, and so be able to go to Baguio in wheeled vehicles before the
railroad was completed. He asked for $75,000 United States currency,
with which to build this road, stating that he expected to be able
to do it for $65,000, but would like $10,000 as a margin of safety.

On December 21, 1901, the commission passed an act authorizing the
construction of a highway from Pozorubio, in Pangasinan, to Baguio,
"the same to be built under the general supervision of the military
governor and the immediate direction of Captain Charles W. Meade,
Thirty-sixth Infantry, United States Volunteers, who has been detailed
by the military governor for that purpose, along the general line
of survey recently made by Captain Meade for a railway between said
towns." The $75,000 asked for were appropriated by this act.

Work began promptly at both ends of the line. In June, 1901,
I set out on my first trip through the wild man's territory in
northern Luzon. Incidentally, and for my personal satisfaction only,
I inspected the work on the road. We had been rather disappointed by
Captain Meade's failure to make more rapid progress. At the lower end
I found that delay was being caused by a huge cliff necessitating a
very heavy rock cut. I was assured by Captain Meade that from this
point on the line ran through dirt most of the way, so that the road
could be completed very rapidly. This statement proved to be grossly
in error. It took years of hard work to open up the road.

Its cost when finally ready for traffic was $1,961,847.05. Its length
was forty-five kilometers eight hundred ninety-one meters, [507] of
which thirty-four kilometers were in non-Christian territory. Some
ten kilometers of the remainder have since been incorporated in the
first-class road system of the province of Pangasinan, as this part
is chiefly used by the people of that province in shipping their
agricultural products to Benguet, and in maintaining communication
between their towns.

The additional cost of the road to date [508] since it was first
opened is $792,434, making its total cost to date $2,754,281.05. This
includes not only the actual cost of maintenance, but very extensive
improvements, such as the metalling of the road from the so-called
zigzag to Baguio, the construction of five steel bridges, and the
replacing of all the original bridges on the road and of all the
original culverts except those made of concrete or masonry.

On my arrival in Benguet in 1901, I found that good progress had been
made on the upper end of the road, which had penetrated for a short
distance into the canon proper without encountering any considerable
obstacles.

On October 15, 1901, the commission stated in its annual report to the
secretary of war, "He [509] has been much delayed by the difficulty of
procuring the labour necessary for its early completion, and several
months will yet elapse before it is finished!" They did!

On August 20, 1901, Captain Meade was relieved, and Mr. N. M. Holmes
was made engineer of the road.

On February 3, 1902, a little sanitarium was opened in a small native
house at Baguio. During the following July I was sent to it as a
patient, and while in Benguet again inspected the road which had been
continued high up on the canon wall to a point where, on a very steep
mountain side, a peculiar rock formation had been encountered at the
very grass roots. This rock disintegrated rapidly under the action
of the sun when exposed to it. Comparatively solid in the morning,
it would crack to pieces and slide down the mountain side before
night. A sixty-foot cut had already been made into the precipitous
mountain side, and the result was an unstable road-bed, hardly four
feet in width, which threatened to go out at any moment.

My trip to Baguio promptly relieved a severe attack of acute intestinal
trouble from which I had been suffering, and when Governor Taft fell
ill the following year with a similar ailment, and his physicians
recommended his return to the United States, I did my best to persuade
him to try Baguio instead. He decided to do so.

Five rough cottages had meanwhile been constructed for the use of
the commissioners, the lumber for them being sawed by hand on the
ground. Boards had been nailed to frames as rapidly as they fell
from the logs, and had shrunk to such an extent that a reasonably
expert marksman might almost have thrown a cat by the tail through
any one of the houses. At night they looked like the old-fashioned
perforated tin lanterns, leaking light in a thousand places. These
were the luxurious homes provided for the high officials of the
government of which so much has been said!

We paid for them an annual rental amounting to ten per cent of their
cost, which had of course been excessively high on account of the
necessity of packing everything used in them, except the lumber,
up the Naguilian trail.

However, we were in no frame of mind to be critical. We had put in
three years of killing hard work, labouring seven days in the week,
and keeping hours such as to arouse a feeling little short of horror
among old British and other foreign residents. We were all completely
exhausted, and Mr. Taft was ill. For my part, I would gladly have paid
almost any sum for a tent under the pine trees and the privilege of
occupying it for a few weeks.

On the trip up Mr. Taft had ridden a magnificent saddle horse which
had been given to him by General Chaffee. At the time he left, Manila
had been burning hot. When he was at last seated on the porch of the
little house which was to be his home for weeks, with a cool breeze
sighing through the needles of a spreading pine tree close at hand,
his satisfaction knew no bounds. Already his magnificent constitution
had begun to respond to the stimulation of the wonderful mountain air,
and filled with enthusiasm he summoned a stenographer and dictated
the following cablegram to the secretary of war:--

    "April 15, 1903.

    "_Secwar_,

    "_Washington_.

    "Stood trip well, rode horseback 25 miles to 5000 feet
    altitude. Hope amoebic dysentery cured. Great province this,
    only 150 miles from Manila with air as bracing as Adirondacks
    or Murray Bay. Only pines and grass lands. Temperature this
    hottest month in the Philippines in my cottage porch at three
    in the afternoon 68. Fires are necessary night and morning.

    "_Taft_."

As quick as the wires could bring it, he received the following reply:

    "_Washington_, D.C., April 16, 1903.

    "_Taft_,

    "_Manila_.

    "Referring to telegram from your office of 15th inst., how
    is horse?

    "_Root_."

When he read it his shouts of laughter, rolling over the hills of
Baguio, must have been audible half a mile away!

Mr. Taft's sojourn in the hills put him again in fine condition and
made it possible for him to return to Manila and resume the heavy
burden of work which there awaited him. The other members of the
commission also greatly benefited by their stay in the hills.

While there we heard disquieting rumours as to the practicability
of completing the road. There was a difference of opinion between
the engineer in charge and one of his immediate subordinates as to
the route which should be followed. The consulting engineer of the
commission was accordingly requested to make a survey to determine a
practicable route for the unfinished portion of the road and estimate
the cost of completing it. In due time he advised us that it was
practicable to complete it, but that the cost would be at least
$1,000,000. Warned by our experience with Meade, we wished additional
expert advice, so summoned to Baguio Colonel L. W. V. Kennon, a man
of great energy and executive ability, who had had large experience
in engineering work in mountainous country, and requested him to go
down the Bued River valley and report on the progress of the work,
and the practicability of completing the road on the route which had
been determined upon.

Being the youngest and most active member of the commission, I was
detailed to accompany him. On this trip I became convinced that
all of the engineers interested, except the consulting engineer,
had grossly understated the difficulties which must be overcome
before the road could be completed. Colonel Kennon decided that it
was entirely feasible to build the road, but that the comparatively
short stretch already completed from Baguio into the upper end of
the canon must be abandoned and a new line adopted. Furthermore,
he gave us some very definite and extremely unpleasant information
as to the probable cost of completing the work, his statements on
this subject confirming those of the consulting engineer.

The commission was thus put face to face with the hard facts but did
not flinch. On the contrary, it passed the following resolution on
June 1, 1903:--

    "On Motion, _Resolved_, That it be declared the policy of
    the Commission to make the town of Baguio, in the Province of
    Benguet, the summer capital of the Archipelago and to construct
    suitable buildings, to secure suitable transportation,
    to secure proper water supply, and to make residence in
    Baguio possible for all of the officers and employees of
    the Insular Government for four months during the year, that
    in pursuance of this purpose the Secretary of the Interior,
    the Consulting Engineer to the Commission, the Chief of the
    Bureau of Architecture, and Major [510] L. W. V. Kennon, United
    States Army, whom it is the intention of the Commission to
    put in actual charge of the improvements in Benguet Province,
    including the construction of the Benguet Road, the erection
    of the buildings and the construction of a wagon road from
    Naguilian, be appointed a Committee to report plans and
    estimates to the Commission for the proposed improvements in
    the Province of Benguet and to submit same to the Commission
    for action and necessary appropriation, and

    "_Be it further resolved_, That steps should be immediately
    taken looking to the increase of the capacity of the Sanitarium
    by at least twenty rooms, to the construction of seven more
    cottages on the grounds of the Sanitarium, to the construction
    of a Governor's residence on the site overlooking the big
    spring which is the source of the Bued River immediately
    south of the Sanitarium proper, to the construction of an
    Administration building sufficient for the Commission, the
    Commission's staff and the Executive Bureau, of at least
    twenty-five rooms, and to the making of a plan for a town
    site for the municipality of Baguio; but that the details
    of construction and improvements, with such variations from
    the indicated plan as may seem wise, shall be left to the
    committee appointed under the previous resolution."

In his annual report dated November 15, 1903, Governor Taft said:--

    "In connection with the subject of health, reference should be
    made to the province of Benguet and to Baguio, the capital of
    that province. The secretary of commerce and police will refer
    to the work now being done in the construction of the Benguet
    road from Pozorrubio, through Twin Peaks, to Baguio. There
    have been serious engineering mistakes made in the road,
    and it is proving to be much more costly than was expected;
    but when completed its importance in the development of
    these islands can hardly be overestimated. One of the things
    essential to progress in the islands is the coming of more
    Americans and Europeans who shall make this their business
    home. If there can be brought within twelve hours' travel
    of Manila a place with a climate not unlike that of the
    Adirondacks, or of Wyoming in summer, it will add greatly
    to the possibility of living in Manila for ten months of the
    year without risk. It will take away the necessity for long
    vacations spent in America; will reduce the number who go
    invalided home, and will be a saving to the insular government
    of many thousands of dollars a year. It will lengthen the
    period during which the American soldiers who are stationed
    here may remain without injury to their health and will thus
    reduce largely the expense of transportation of troops between
    the islands and the United States. More than this, Filipinos
    of the wealthier class frequently visit Japan or China for
    the purpose of recuperating. People of this class are much
    interested in the establishment of Baguio as a summer capital,
    and when the road is completed a town will spring up, made up
    of comfortable residences, of a fine, extensive army post,
    and sanitariums for the relief of persons suffering from
    diseases prevalent in the lowlands. It is the hope of the
    government that the Roman Catholic Church will send American
    priests as it has sent American bishops to the islands, to
    assist in the moral elevation of the people. The fear of the
    effect of the climate has kept many from coming. The Roman
    Catholic Church authorities have announced their intention
    of erecting rest houses at Baguio for the purpose of the
    recuperation of their ministers and agents. The Methodists and
    Episcopalians have already secured building lots in Baguio for
    this purpose. It is the settled purpose of the Commission to
    see this improvement through, no matter what the cost, because
    eventually the expenditures must redound to the benefit of the
    government and people of the islands. We have already stated,
    in the report on the public land act, that it is proposed,
    under that act, which allows the organizing of town sites,
    to sell the public land in suitable lots at auction so that
    every one interested shall have the opportunity to obtain a
    good lot upon which to build a suitable house." [511]

Mr. Taft would be delighted could he see to-day how completely his
anticipations have been fulfilled.

Colonel Kennon was put in charge of construction work, and things began
to move. They kept moving until the road was finished. From this time
on we knew that the expense involved would be out of all proportion
to the original estimate, but we were determined to push the work
through, having reached the decision that it was worth while to open
up communication with Baguio at any cost within reason, because of its
future certain value to the people of the islands as a health resort.

On April 1, 1904, I rode over the road in a vehicle nearly to Camp
Four, and came the rest of the way to Baguio on horseback over a new
trail which zigzagged up a mountain side near Camp Four and followed
the crest of the range from there in. A little later the Commission
came by the same route, and spent the hot season in the cool Benguet
hills.

On January 29, 1905, Colonel Kennon drove into Baguio in the first
wagon to arrive there over the Benguet Road, which was opened for
regular service on March 27th of the same year. The cost of the road
on November 1, 1905, had, as previously stated, been $1,966,847.05,
and the cost of the heavy work in the canon had been approximately
$75,000 per mile, which is not excessive when compared with the cost
of similar work in the United States, especially as this sum included
maintenance of the portions constructed during previous years.

The fact that a certain amount of congressional relief funds was
expended on the construction of this road has been made the subject
of very unjust criticism. A large number of poor Filipinos, who were
in dire straits, were thus given an opportunity for remunerative
employment, and the distribution of a portion of the congressional
relief fund in this way was in entire harmony with the fixed policy
of the commission to avoid pauperizing the people by giving money
or food outright to able-bodied persons, and to afford them relief
by furnishing them opportunity to work for a good wage. A further
reason why the expenditure of money from this fund on the Benguet
Road was appropriate is found in the fact that the region opened up
is destined to play a very important part in the cure of tuberculosis,
which is the principal cause of death among the people of the lowlands,
but is practically unknown among the Igorots of the hills.

During the earlier years after the road was open owners of bull carts
in Pangasinan made large sums transporting freight over it. This is
not the case at the present time, as the growing volume of freight
requiring to be moved led to the blocking of the road with bull carts
and necessitated the installation of an automobile truck line so that
it might be more expeditiously handled.

In December, 1904, the great landscape architect, Mr. D. H. Burnham,
visited Baguio, and made a plan for its future development. He was
enthusiastic over its possibilities, and gave his services free of
charge. His plan is being closely adhered to, and although funds are
not now available for going far toward carrying it out, we have at
least avoided anything which would interfere with it.

The next important event in the history of Baguio was the first sale
of residence and building lots, which took place on May 28, 1906,
and was conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Public
Land Act relative to town sites.

Although a howling typhoon was sweeping Benguet at the time, 91
residence lots and 15 business lots were disposed of at this first
sale, and at a subsequent one held in Manila a few weeks later all
the remaining lots then surveyed were sold.

The town site includes two hundred sixteen square miles, and new lots
are surveyed as required. All sums derived from the sale of lots are
used for the improvement of the town site, and thus Baguio is made
to help build itself.

In the spring of 1900 the Baguio Country Club was organized. Because
of the extraordinary false statements made concerning it by certain
unscrupulous politicians, I give its history somewhat fully. Its
purpose was to afford a meeting place for the people of the town
and to give them an opportunity for outdoor sports. It purchased a
hundred acres of land on which a low assessment had been placed in
view of the semipublic purpose which it was to serve.

At the outset the "club house" was a rude, grass-roofed shed made of
pine slabs. Its doors and windows were mere openings which could not be
closed. It was erected in about a week. Three holes of a golf course
and a croquet ground had been prepared. These decidedly primitive
club facilities nevertheless served to bring the people of Baguio
together and give them an opportunity for a good time out of doors.

In February, 1907, a Country Club Corporation was organized
with a capital stock of $5000, of which $3000 have thus far been
subscribed. The shares cost $50. No single subscriber owns more than
three, with the sole exception of Mr. Forbes, who took ten to help
the club get started. Ownership of stock brings no emoluments, but,
on the contrary, indirectly involves expense which the present owners
have been willing to bear for the public good.

From these small beginnings the Baguio country club has grown into
an important institution. As funds became available from the sale
of stock, the payment of dues and tile generous donations of a
few members, an excellent nine-hole golf course was completed, and
tennis courts and facilities for trap-shooting were installed. In
March and April, 1908, a modest club house was built at a cost of
some $5000. It has two small locker rooms, a large living room,
a tiny office, a little bath, a kitchen, and nine single sleeping
rooms. Three very small cottages, costing $375 each, were erected
on the club grounds for the use of the members. Five larger cottages
have since been constructed.

Any person of good character is eligible to membership. The entrance
fee is $25, but officers of the army, navy and marine corps stationed
at Baguio are admitted without the payment of this fee, and persons
temporarily there may secure the privileges of the club by paying at
the rate of $5 per month. The annual dues are $20. The families of
members are entitled to the privileges of the club. Among its members
are the highest officials of the insular government and teachers,
clerks, stenographers and other employees drawing small salaries,
as well as numerous permanent residents of Baguio.

It knows no race or creed, and Filipinos take advantage of its
privileges quite as freely as do Americans. Representatives of
every nationality in the islands may be found on its golf course on
a pleasant afternoon. It is the common meeting place of Baguio, and
hardly a day passes without the giving of some pleasant luncheon or
dinner in its little living room or in the outdoor space covered by
an overhanging roof at its eastern end. No more democratic institution
ever existed.

Congressman Jones, in his attacks on the Philippine administration, is
fond of stating that "there is a club for officials at Baguio." The
statement is true, but reminds one of that other statement of a
ship's first mate who came on board intoxicated just before the vessel
sailed. The following morning, happening to look at the ship's log for
the previous day, he saw the entry "The mate drunk to-day." It was his
first offence, and he begged the captain to erase this record, but the
captain said "It is true, is it not?" and insisted that it must stand.

A little later the captain was taken ill. Upon resumption of duty he
found an entry in the log reading: "The captain sober to-day." When
he furiously insisted that it be erased, the mate said "It is true, is
it not?" Now, it is true that there is a club for government officers
at Baguio, but in making this statement Mr. Jones and his ilk have
neglected to say that there is also at Baguio a club for employees; a
club for private citizens; a club for Americans; a club for Filipinos;
a club for foreign consuls and other foreign residents of the islands;
a club for business men; a club for clerks; and that all of these
institutions are one and the same, namely, the Baguio Country Club,
which is now strictly self-supporting and meets its obligations from
the funds derived from the dues of its members. These dues are absurdly
low in view of the privileges which it affords.

Although Mr. Forbes does not like to have it known, I cannot refrain
from stating that the club has not always been self-supporting, and
that he has repeatedly made up deficits from his private funds. The
cost involved in getting the golf course into shape was out of all
proportion to the resources of the organization. Sufficient funds
were not available to pay for the club house and cottages when they
were constructed, and had it not been for the generosity of Mr. Forbes
the club would not exist to-day in anything like its present form.

The polo field at Baguio has been referred to as another evidence of
extravagant governmental expenditure. It is true enough that it was
in the first instance an expensive luxury, as an immense amount of
earthwork had to be done in order to make a level piece of ground of
sufficient size. The field is administered by the Country Club, and is
open to the use of the public for any form of amusement which will not
interfere with its use for polo. The detractors of the government have
neglected to mention that the cost of its construction and maintenance
have been met from the private funds of Mr. Forbes.

Returning now to the story of the growth of Baguio, the next
step forward was the construction of an official residence for the
governor-general, for which $15,000 were appropriated. Mr. Forbes had
not the slightest personal interest in this appropriation. When it
was made he had no knowledge of the fact that he was later to become
governor-general, and his private Baguio residence was decidedly more
comfortable and commodious than this official one. His subsequent
occupancy of the latter building involved a real personal sacrifice.

In 1908 a modern hospital and the governor-general's residence were
completed. No other government official is furnished a free house. All
have to rent government cottages or stay at hotels, unless they choose
to build for themselves. The policy of giving the governor-general
an official residence in Baguio is in accord with that which gives
him one at Manila.

In April, 1908, there was opened a "Teachers' Camp," to which came
American school teachers from all over the islands. They were housed
in a hundred and fifty tents, which were set up under the shade of the
pine trees. Larger tents served as kitchen, dining room, storehouse
and recitation rooms, while a structure of bamboo and nipa palm,
erected at a total cost of $150, was utilized for general assembly
purposes. Four talented lecturers were employed to instruct and
entertain the teachers. At one time there were a hundred and ninety
persons in the camp.

The credit for initiating this very important move is due chiefly to
William F. Pack, at that time governor of the province of Benguet, who
strongly advocated bringing the teachers to Baguio, and did everything
in his power to make the first assembly the great success which it was.

It has now become a fixed institution, and has accomplished
untold good. Americans who spend too many years in out-of-the-way
municipalities of the Philippines without coming in contact with their
kind are apt to lose their sense of perspective, and there is danger
that they will grow careless, or even slovenly, in their habits. It
is of the utmost benefit for school teachers to get together once a
year, learn of each other's failures and successes, and profit by each
other's experiences, forget their troubles while engaging in healthful
athletic sports, listen to inspiring and instructive discourses,
and above all else benefit by open-air life in a temperate region.

The Teachers' Camp is now a beautiful and attractive place. A fine
system of walks and drives make every part of it readily accessible. It
has an excellent athletic field. The teachers live in tents, but
good permanent buildings have been provided in which are located the
mess, a social hall, recitation rooms, etc., and several comfortable
cottages have been constructed for the use of visiting lecturers
and others. An outdoor amphitheatre which seats a thousand persons
has been built at small expense by taking advantage of peculiarly
favorable natural conditions. Filipino teachers share the pleasures
and benefits of the camp with their American associates, and the
"assembly" certainly does great good.

During the hot season of 1908 the Bureau of Lands transferred a number
of its employees to Baguio, quartering them in tents. This was done
in order to ascertain the practical effect of sending American and
Filipino employees to this mountain resort. The conclusion was reached
that the small additional expense involved was more than justified
by the larger quantity and higher quality of the work performed as a
result of the greatly improved physical condition of the workers. Every
Filipino sent to Baguio gained in weight, with the single exception
of a messenger who had to run his legs off! Other bureaus subsequently
followed the example of the Bureau of Lands, with similar results.

During the 1909 season, the railroad having reached Camp One, five
large Stanley steam automobiles were operated by the government in
transporting passengers from this place to Baguio, and more than two
thousand persons were thus moved over the road.

Meanwhile, the unexpectedly heavy expense involved in completing the
road had been made the subject of severe criticism by the public press
of Manila. Most of the critics were entirely honest, having no idea
of the character of the country opened up, or of the importance of
making it readily accessible.

Just at the time when the commission should have crowded its programme
through to conclusion, it faltered. The only government construction
work performed at the summer capital that year, in addition to what
has been mentioned, was the erection of a small office building and of
a barrack building for labourers, the enlarging of five government
cottages, the addition of out-buildings, and the enlarging of a
building which served as a combination sanatorium and hotel.

This policy of inaction was a mistaken one. It made the Benguet Road
seem like the city avenue which ran into a street, the street into
a lane, the lane into a cow path, the cow path into a squirrel track
and the squirrel track up a tree, for while one could get to Baguio,
there was very little there after one arrived. The accommodations
at the sanatorium were strictly limited, and there was some apparent
justification for the charge freely made that the Philippine Commission
had voted to spend very large sums of money to open up a health resort
from which only its members and its staff derived benefit.

The government had at the outset been obliged to construct its
buildings on a piece of private land purchased from Mr. Otto Scheerer,
as prior to the passage of the Public Land Act and its approval by the
President and Congress, building on public land was impossible. Now,
however, a town site had been surveyed, and plans for the future
development of Baguio had been made by one of the world's most
competent experts. The time had arrived for action. Mr. Forbes, then
secretary of commerce and police, argued vigorously for the carrying
out of the original plan of the commission by the construction of
adequate public buildings. To help the development of the place,
he purchased two adjacent building lots and on the tract of land so
secured built a handsome and expensive home, where he subsequently
entertained not only his personal friends, but guests of the
government, as well as various persons who had no other claim on him
than the fact that they were officers or employees of the government
who were in need of a change of climate and could ill afford to seek it
at their own expense. Among his house guests were General Aguinaldo,
Speaker Osmena and many other Filipinos. It was Mr. Forbes's idea,
and mine as well, that members of the commission ought to set the
example by building at Baguio. I followed his example to the extent
of buying a lot and constructing on it a simple and inexpensive house,
thus obtaining the first and only home that I have ever owned.

Ultimately Mr. Forbes formulated a plan for the construction of a group
of government buildings, a mess hall and a large number of small and
inexpensive cottages for rental to government officers and employees
so that the executive offices of the government might be transferred
to Baguio during the heated term and it might become the true summer
capital of the Philippines. This plan was adopted in substance, and
it was decided to transfer the bureaus of the government to Baguio
for the coming hot season, so far as practicable.

Funds were appropriated for the carrying out of Mr. Forbes's plan,
but before the construction work had fairly begun there occurred,
on October 17, 1909, a destructive typhoon. Eighteen inches of rain
fell in nine hours, and twenty-six inches in twenty-four hours. The
Bued River quickly rose fifty feet, carrying away trees and rocks
which obstructed its course, and seriously injuring the road for
miles. Four of the largest bridges were swept away and the work of
constructing government buildings, which was just about to begin,
was greatly retarded. It was not thought possible to transfer the
bureaus of the government to Baguio for the coming hot season as
planned. Indeed, there were not lacking those who insisted that no
one would be able to get there. Mr. Haube, the energetic and capable
young engineer in charge, had the road open on the twentieth day of
December, and the projected buildings ready for occupancy in February,
a noteworthy and highly creditable achievement.

It was then thought that the storm which had done such serious damage
to the road was of unprecedented violence, but there was worse to
come. On July 14 and 15, 1911, a terrific typhoon swept across northern
Luzon, bringing down one of the world's record rainfalls. Between
noon of the 14th and noon of the 15th, forty-five and ninety-nine
hundredths inches of rain fell at Baguio. A mountain forming a part
of the wall of the Bued canon split from the top and the detached
portion toppled over into the river, damming it to a depth of about
a hundred and fifty feet at a time when it was carrying an enormous
volume of water. When this dam burst, an avalanche of earth and rock,
swept onward by a huge wave, rushed down the canon, leaving complete
destruction in its wake. Every bridge in its course was carried away,
and the road was left in such condition that it would have cost
$300,000 to open it for traffic. Then Providence, having apparently
done its worst, relented and sent another typhoon which washed away
most of the debris left by the first one, uncovering the road-bed
and making it possible to reopen communication for $50,000.

The cost of maintaining the Benguet Road has proved
excessive. Mountains tower above it on both sides to a height of four
to seven thousand feet and the drainage basin which finds its outlet
down the narrow gorge through which the road runs is enormous. Even
so, under ordinary climatic conditions its maintenance does not offer
very exceptional difficulties, as much of it is blasted out of rock;
but during extraordinarily heavy storms the danger of destruction by
overwhelming floods is great.

While a century may pass before there is another storm like the one
which brought down the terrific slide above described, there may be
one at any time, and when the railroad has once reached Baguio, it is
hardly probable that such extensive repairs as were necessary after the
last destructive typhoon will ever again be made, especially as the
horse trail built on a carriage road grade from Baguio to Naguilian
in the lowlands has been widened little by little, until it is now
safe for small automobiles. The maintenance of the bridges alone,
on the Benguet Road, is a very formidable item, while there is only
one short bridge on the Naguilian Road before the province of Union
is reached. As it runs on or near the crests of ridges all the way,
there are no extensive watersheds above it, and it is not liable
to serious injury during the most violent storms. The total cost
of the Benguet portion of this road to date [512] has been only
$33,405. This stretch is seventeen and a half miles in length and
does not include that portion of the road which lies within the city
of Baguio. The total distance from the centre of Baguio to Bauang,
the nearest railroad station on the coast, is thirty-four miles.

With the completion of the new government buildings and the transfer
of the several bureaus to Baguio for the season of 1910 a real boom
began. The old sanatorium building had long been leased to a private
individual who used it for hotel purposes, adding to it from time to
time. A second hotel had been built. The railroad had been extended
to Camp One and a regular automobile service established for the
convenience of the public between Camp One and Baguio. The Jesuits
had constructed a great rest house and meteorological observatory on
a commanding hill. The Dominicans had purchased a neighbouring hill
top and prepared to erect thereon a very large reenforced concrete
building to serve for college purposes and as a rest house for members
of the order who required a change of climate.

Development began early at Camp John Hay, an extensive and beautiful
military reservation set aside within the Baguio town site. Some
progress had been made in this direction prior to the coming of
Major-General Leonard Wood. That highly efficient and far-seeing
officer gave a tremendous impetus to the work. He had been something
of a sceptic on the subject of Baguio before visiting the place, but,
like all other responsible persons who take the trouble to see it,
promptly became an enthusiast when he had an opportunity to observe
conditions for himself. Many army officers and their families who
could not obtain accommodations in the limited number of buildings
on the reservation were glad to take tents for the season, and the
Camp promptly began to serve useful ends. It has steadily grown
and developed ever since, and is now a well-organized army post. Its
remarkable progress has been due in large measure to the initiative and
ingenuity of Captain M. R. Hilgard, who has been its commander since
October, 1905. Great progress has been made in erecting buildings,
but they are still far short of the needs of the service. At the
present writing [513] there are many tents in use by officers and
their families. These serve very well during the dry months, but with
the oncoming of the heavy showers, which usher in the rainy season,
become damp and uncomfortable and make it necessary for the occupants
to return to the lowlands just at the time when Baguio is growing
most attractive and the heat of Manila is becoming most oppressive.

The ground set aside in the military reservation is adequate for a
brigade post, and such a post should be established as soon as the
railroad reaches Baguio. The different commands in the islands could
then be ordered there in succession, and officers and men given the
benefits of one of the best climates in the world.

Baguio has continued steadily to develop, and the Benguet Road
no longer ends by running up a tree. The government has not only
erected a residence for the governor-general, but has established
offices for the chief executive, the secretaries of departments,
the Philippine Commission, the Executive Bureau, and the Bureaus of
Agriculture, Civil Service, Education, Forestry, Health, Public Works
and Constabulary. There are also a hospital, a series of tuberculosis
cottages for the treatment of patients from the lowlands, cottages
and dormitories for government officers and employees, a great mess
hall where meals may be had at moderate cost, an automobile station,
a garage, storehouses, a pumping plant, and labourers' quarters. At
the Teachers' Camp there are a separate mess hall, an assembly hall
and a fine athletic field.

The city of Baguio has a city hall, a storehouse, a corral and market
buildings. Lot owners who have built summer homes for themselves have
brought up friends to show them what Baguio was like. Curiously it has
never seemed possible to convey any adequate idea of its attractions
and advantages by word of mouth. Again and again I have urged sceptics
to come and see for themselves. When after the lapse of years they
finally did so, they have invariably asked me why I had not told them
about it before, forgetting that I had exhausted my vocabulary without
being able to make them understand. Practically without exception,
the persons who actually visit Baguio become "boosters."

It is fortunate in a way that the boom did not come quicker, for
the hard truth is that up to date the rapidity of the growth of the
summer capital has been determined absolutely by the local lumber
supply. The original Filipino hand-sawyers were ultimately replaced
by small portable mills, and these in turn by large modern mills
to which logs are brought by skidding engines or overhead cables,
yet it is true to-day, as it has always been true, that no sawmill
has ever been able to furnish dry lumber, for the simple reason that
the green output is purchased as fast as it can be sawed.

For a time the lumbermen took advantage of the necessities of the
public, but when timber on the government concessions first granted
them had been exhausted and they applied for new cutting areas,
my turn came. I fixed maximum prices on lumber which they might not
exceed without forfeiting their concessions. I also fixed a minimum
annual cut which they were compelled to make, and imposed a regulation
providing that at least half of the total cut should be offered for
sale to the public.

There is no justification for the claim that Baguio is a rich
man's city. The town site is very large and can be indefinitely
extended. Good lots may be had at extremely moderate prices, and the
cost of houses is strictly a matter of individual means and taste. A
large section is given up to small dwellings for Filipinos. The
man who earns his living with a bull cart has no more difficulty
in establishing a home there than does the Filipino millionnaire,
and rich and poor are building in constantly increasing numbers.

While experience has taught me that I cannot convey by words alone
any adequate conception of what Baguio is like, I must nevertheless
here make the attempt.

Twenty-one miles of well surfaced roads wind among its pine-covered
hills and afford beautiful glimpses of the luxuriant vegetation
along its numerous small streams. There are building sites to suit
all tastes, and each house owner is convinced that his particular
location is better than that of any one else. One spring supplies
exceptionally pure water sufficient for the needs of at least ten
thousand people, and an abundant additional supply can be obtained
when needed. The scenery is everywhere beautiful, and in many sections
truly magnificent.

Gently rolling hills enclose valleys with sides sometimes steep and
precipitous and sometimes gently sloping. The country is watered by
numerous streams bordered by magnificent tree-ferns, and by trees,
shrubs, and plants requiring a large amount of water, while the dry
hillsides bear noble pines standing at wide intervals and often
arranged as if grouped by a skilled landscape artist. During the
rainy season they are covered with ferns and orchids, while exquisite
white lilies, larger than Easter lilies, dot the hillsides. The dense
_cogon_ of the Philippine lowlands is absent. Bamboo grass or _runo_
occurs sparingly in the immediate vicinity of streams and springs, but
the hills are covered with a short grass seldom more than knee high,
so that one may ride or walk over them in almost any direction with
comfort. A system of excellent horse trails affords communication
with neighbouring provinces where one may see wonderful tropical
vegetation, magnificent scenery, strange wild peoples, and the most
remarkable terraced mountainsides in the world. These regions may
be visited with safety and comfort, as public order is well-nigh
perfect and rest houses have been provided at reasonable intervals
on all important main trails.

The delightfully cool climate of Baguio makes active outdoor exercise
enjoyable, and insures the speedy restoration to health and vigor
of persons suffering ill effects from tropical heat, or recuperation
from wasting diseases. Open fires are comfortable morning and evening
throughout the year, and the pitch pine wood burns beautifully. Except
during typhoons the rainy season weather is delightful. When one
wakens in the morning the atmosphere and the landscape have been
washed clean. The air is clear as crystal, and mountain peaks fifty
or seventy-five miles away stand out with cameo-like sharpness. The
needles of the pines fairly glisten and their delightful odor
is constantly in one's nostrils. The whole country is green as a
lawn. Roses, violets, azaleas, "jacks-in-the-pulpit," and several kinds
of raspberries and huckleberries, all growing wild, make one feel as
if back in America. One may visit the neighbouring Trinidad valley
and see cabbages and coffee, bananas and Irish potatoes, flourishing
on one piece of land. Strawberry plants imported from America bear
continuously from December to May. Fresh vegetables of all sorts tickle
palates which have grown weary of the canned goods of the lowlands.

Anywhere from twelve to three o'clock, the clouds begin to roll in and
heavy showers fall, usually lasting until nine or ten at night. Then
the stars come out. The next day is like its predecessor.

After the first rains, which usually come about the middle of April,
there is as a rule a month of beautiful weather with very little
precipitation. Then the rains begin to come steadily again, and keep
it up until the end of the wet season, falling in the manner already
described so that one can get one's outdoor exercise in the morning,
while the afternoon showers are conducive to industry.

The following table shows the average maximum, minimum and mean
temperatures for each month of the year, the figures covering the
period January, 1902, to January, 1908:--


        Month       Average  Average  Mean
                    Maximum  Minimum
                         deg.F.      deg.F.     deg.F.
        January       75.1    50.2    63.3
        February      75.4    45.8    61.6
        March         77.5    49.4    64.1
        April         78.2    51.9    65.7
        May           77.7    54      66.2
        June          77      56.8    66.2
        July          75.9    55.9    65.4
        August        76      54.9    65.1
        September     75.2    56      65.2
        October       76.4    53.8    65.1
        November      76.4    49.8    64.1
        December      76.1    50.3    64.1


All of the above figures are for temperatures at a height of six
feet above the ground. Temperatures nearer the ground are decidedly
lower. It has been found that in the Baguio plateau the lowest
temperatures correspond to the deepest valleys. In such places white
frost is not rare during the months of January, February, and March,
while on the tops of hills the temperature is milder, frost being
almost unknown. During typhoons conditions do not differ essentially
from those experienced elsewhere in the islands, except that the
rainfall is exceptionally heavy.

Major-General J. Franklin Bell, who has given special attention to
mountain resorts the world over, vigorously asserts that Baguio has
no equal on the globe. Certainly the climate is more nearly perfect
than any other of which I have personal knowledge, and the delightful
coolness and the bracing air afford heavenly relief to jangling nerves
and exhausted bodies, worn out by overwork and by a too prolonged
sojourn in tropical lowlands.

One of the very important things about the Baguio climate is its
marvellous effect upon victims of tuberculosis.

Persons suffering from this disease in its earlier stages may
confidently look forward to restored health if willing to live
out of doors under the pine trees, and there have been a number of
extraordinary recoveries among those in advanced stages.

A series of little cottages which can be thrown wide open have been
operated for some time in connection with the government hospital,
in order practically to demonstrate the effect of the climate on
tuberculosis victims.

The results are conclusive, and whenever funds are available there
should be established a settlement of such cottages on some one of
the numerous good sites sufficiently removed from the town to avoid
any possible danger of infecting healthy persons. There should also
be a large mess hall from which good nourishing food can be served,
and plenty of level ground on which tents can be erected during the
dry season. Baguio's potential importance as a resort for victims of
the great white plague justifies every cent of expenditure necessary
to make it readily accessible.

The Sisters of the Assumption have erected a handsome building which
serves as a rest house and a girls' school. The sisters known as the
"Belgian Canonist Missionaries" are erecting a building which will
afford them a place to come for recuperation when wearied by strenuous
work in the lowlands, and will make it possible for them to open a
school for Igorot girls, which they are planning to do.

Bishop Brent has established an excellent school for American boys,
situated on a sunny hilltop. The instruction is very good, the food
excellent, and a healthier, heartier-looking lot of youngsters than
those who enjoy the privileges of this institution cannot be found
anywhere. There is abundant opportunity for them to play basket-ball,
tennis and golf. Some of them indulge in polo, playing on Filipino
ponies.

Bishop Brent also has a mission school for Igorot girls, and plans
to open a boarding school for American girls in the near future.

The Belgian missionary priests, locally known as the "Missionary
Priests of the Church of San Patricio," have their headquarters at
Baguio, where the chief of their order resides and where they come
occasionally for rest and recuperation. Archbishop Harry has a modest
home on one of the numerous hilltops.

The building of a school for constabulary officers, to which young
men arriving from the United States are sent before entering upon
active service, crowns another hill and commands a magnificent view
of the surrounding country.

Several business concerns, such as the Compania General de Tabacos de
Filipinas, have erected rest houses for their officers and employees,
while the number of attractive private homes increases as rapidly as
the supply of building materials will permit. Filipino residents of
Manila have recently invested more than a hundred thousand dollars
in Baguio homes.

But this is not all. No description would be anything like complete
without mention of a unique structure which is certain to become famous
the world over. It has been built under the immediate supervision of
Major-General Bell, who has given freely of his time and thought to
make it the extraordinary success which it is. I refer to the wonderful
amphitheatre which stands at the side of the official residence of the
major-general commanding the Division of the Philippines. Advantage has
been taken of the existence of a natural amphitheatre with remarkable
acoustic properties. Man has added what Nature left undone, and the
result is an imposing and beautiful auditorium capable of seating
four thousand people, throughout which a whisper can be heard. It
is utilized for religious services, concerts, lectures, theatrical
performances and other public entertainments. No charge is exacted for
its use, but if an admission fee is collected, a liberal percentage
of the proceeds must go to some worthy charity. It has been terraced
in stone by Igorot labourers; the trees originally standing in it
have been protected, and tree ferns, shrubs and flowering plants
have been added. The result beggars description, and photographs do
it scant justice.

Igorots from Bontoc, and even Ifugaos, now visit Baguio with increasing
frequency, attracted by a large market established especially for the
benefit of the hill people, where they may sell their manufactured
articles or agricultural products, and may purchase at moderate cost
the commodities which they need. The Benguet Igorots do not raise rice
enough for their own use. Formerly they had to make up the shortage
by eating _camotes_, but they have now become so prosperous that they
can afford to buy rice, which is carted in over the Benguet Road.

There are promising gold mines close at hand. Their development would
have been impossible had not the construction of the Benguet Road
made it feasible to bring in the necessary heavy machinery.

Some of the fruits, many of the flowers and practically all of the
vegetables of the temperate zone can be advantageously produced in
Benguet. They are being shipped to Manila in steadily increasing
quantities.

One would gather from the criticisms of the enemies of the Philippine
government that the Benguet Road was a pleasure boulevard. The
government motor trucks transported over it during the last fiscal
year 22,390 passengers and 7696.24 metric tons of freight.

Railroad corporations are inclined to be a bit soulless. The Manila
Railway Company is extending its line to Baguio by means of a branch
leaving the main line at Aringay. The building of this extension is now
[514] fifty-five per cent completed, and the company is bound under
the terms of its agreement to finish the road by August, 1914. In the
event of its failure to do so, it must pay a monthly penalty amply
sufficient in amount to cover the cost of maintaining the Benguet
Road. Baguio will continue to develop steadily until the railroad
is opened and then will go ahead by leaps and bounds. It is sure to
prosper because it meets a very real and very imperative need.

In this connection the following extracts from a letter of August 7,
1913, from the director of medical services in India to the department
surgeon of the Philippines are of interest:--

    "In reply to your letter of June 31st I attach a statement
    showing the number and location of the hill stations in
    India with the approximate capacity of each, and their height
    above sea-level.

    "With regard to your inquiry regarding the number of cases
    treated in these sanitaria we use these hill stations not
    only for the treatment of convalescents, but also for giving
    healthy men an opportunity of spending the Indian hot weather
    under the best climatic conditions procurable. To this end,
    so far as is practicable, all units are sent to the hills for
    the first hot weather after their arrival in India, and they
    are thus able to settle down to their new conditions of life
    without being immediately exposed to the trying and enervating
    environment of a plains station in the summer months. We also
    send as many soldiers as we can of the older residents from
    hot stations to summer in the hills.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "Practically all soldiers' wives and families are given an
    opportunity of a change from the more unhealthy stations to
    the hills during the hot weather.

    *       *       *       *       *

    "Our experience shows that the following cases are most
    benefited by a change to the hills:--

    "1. All cases of malarial fever and malarial cachexia.

    "2. Patients recovering from acute diseases.

    "3. Convalescents after surgical operations.

    "4. Cases of anaemia and debility.

    "5. Cases of chronic venereal diseases.

    "6. Neurasthenics."

Not only are all such cases greatly benefited at Baguio, but patients
suffering from dysentery and chronic diarrhoea are also greatly
benefited and often cured by a sufficiently long sojourn there. This
is the experience of the civil government at its hospital and of
the military authorities at the Camp John Hay hospital, according to
General Bell.

Continuing the quotations from the letter of the director of medical
services in India:--

    "We have found that by the judicious use of hill stations
    for convalescents both the invaliding and death rate of the
    British troops in Indian have been enormously reduced and the
    efficiency of the Army has been increased with a considerable
    financial saving to the Government.

    "It is advisable that all troops and families should be
    accommodated in huts, especially during the rainy season in
    the hills, but there is no doubt that they are benefited by
    the change even if they have to live in tents and are thereby
    exposed to considerable discomfort."

The importance attached by the British to hill stations is shown by
the fact that there are no less than 29 in India, their height above
sea-level varying from 2000 to 7936 feet. Of these eleven have no
permanent accommodations and are used for men only.

I add the following extracts from a letter of Major P. M. Ashburn,
Medical Corps, U.S.A., president of the army board for the study of
tropical diseases:--

    "A man can remain in the tropics indefinitely without being
    actually sick, if infectious diseases are avoided. This is fast
    leading to the fallacy that we can advantageously remain many
    years in these latitudes. The fact that while a man may never
    be sick, he yet may have his physical and mental vigour greatly
    impaired by prolonged exposure to heat is thus lost sight
    of. No man can do his best work, either physical or mental,
    if he is hot and uncomfortable. The same feeling of lassitude
    and indisposition to exertion is experienced at home during
    the hot summer, which after a few years here becomes chronic."

    "It is a matter of official recognition that government
    employees need to get away from the heat of Manila each year,
    hence the removal to Baguio.

    "It is likewise commonly recognized that many women and
    children become so run down and debilitated as to need to go
    to Japan, Baguio or the United States.

    "It is often true that monotony and discomfort are the cause
    of nervous and mental breakdown, witness the often-mentioned
    insanity among farmers' wives and the nervous breakdowns
    attributable to pain and strain, even though it be, as in
    many cases of eyestrain, so slight as not to be recognized
    by the patient."

In short, it is the monotony of a tropical lowland climate which makes
an occasional change so imperatively necessary. Shall residents of
the Philippines be forced to seek that change, at great expense of
time and money, in Japan, the United States or Europe, or shall we
make and keep available for them a region which admirably answers
the purpose, distant only half a day's travel from Manila?

I give extracts from a memorandum of Col. William H. Arthur, Department
Surgeon of the Philippines, which are important in this connection:--

    "3. Experience has shown that long residence in the Philippines
    has a marked effect on the mental and physical vigour of people
    not born and raised in the tropics. This is manifested in many
    ways, and men, women and children who are not actually ill,
    seem to lose their energy, become listless, irritable, and
    forgetful, and find the least exertion burdensome. This is
    much aggravated in the hot season, and very few individuals
    manage, without permanent mental and physical deterioration,
    to live through many hot seasons in the plains.

    "4. There are in the Philippine Islands two places where
    relief from these conditions can be found:--(1) Camp John Hay,
    near Baguio, in the mountain province of Benguet, Island of
    Luzon; and (2) Camp Keithley, in the Lake Lanao District of
    the Island of Mindanao. Camp John Hay, in the province of
    Benguet, is in the mountains at an elevation of approximately
    5000 feet and is 175 miles from Manila, most of which distance
    is covered by railroad. Within 18 months it is expected that
    the railroad all the way to Baguio will be completed.

    "5. Experience has shown that a large number of cases of
    disease or injury, or patients convalescing from surgical
    operations, recover much more rapidly in the cool mountain
    climate of Baguio than in the depressing heat and humidity of
    the plains. Before the establishment of this mountain refuge
    from the heat of the plains, many cases of this class were
    transferred to the United States that are now brought back
    to health at Camp John Hay and Camp Keithley. The beneficial
    effect of the change in climate is particularly noticeable in
    people who have become run down after one or more hot seasons
    spent at the lower levels.

    "6. The great value of a refuge in the mountains from the
    effect of prolonged heat is shown in enclosed reports, which
    indicate the classes of cases especially benefited, but there
    are a great many others not reported and not actually sick
    but whose vitality and resistance are more or less diminished
    and who find great benefit from an occasional sojourn in the
    mountains of Benguet or the highlands of Mindanao, especially
    during the hottest part of the year."

I have quoted thus at length from communications of a distinguished
British medical officer, of a well-known and able special student
of tropical diseases, and of the ranking United States army surgeon
in the islands to show the consensus of opinion among experienced
experts as to the necessity of hill stations in the tropics. I might
give numerous additional similar opinions of equally competent men
but will only add two more statements of Major Ashburn, the latter
of which seems to me admirably to sum up the situation:--

    So firm is my belief in the efficacy of the place that I have
    at considerable expense kept my two sons in school there,
    instead of keeping them at home in Manila at no expense
    for schooling, and so satisfactory has been the result in
    normal, vigorous growth and robust health for both boys,
    that I consider the money so spent about the best investment
    I have ever made.

    *       *       *       *       *

    I state all this to show the faith that is in me. To experience
    Baguio and to see the rapid improvement of visitors there
    is to be convinced that it is a delightful and beneficial
    climate. To appreciate the full degree of its delights it
    is only necessary to compare in one's own experience (not
    in weather reports) a hot season in Manila and one there. To
    appreciate its benefits it is necessary to compare in one's
    own experience (not in statistics) the appearance of health
    of the people seen at the two times and places. As recent
    work on beri-beri has clearly shown the vast importance in
    diet of substances formerly not known to have any importance,
    so, I think, are the factors in climate not to be recorded by
    wind gauges, thermometers or other meteorological instruments,
    and factors in health and efficiency not recorded in books
    on physiology, bacteriology, pathology or health statistics."

Let no one think that the summer capital of the Philippines has been
built solely for the benefit of Americans. The Filipinos need it
almost as much as we do, and many of them profit by the change with
extraordinary promptness.

It is really almost incredible that such a place should exist
within eight hours' travel of Manila, and every possible victim of
tuberculosis in the islands, which means every inhabitant of the
lowlands, has a right to demand that it should be made, and kept,
readily accessible. Existing accommodations are nothing like adequate
for the crowds which desire to take advantage of them during the
season. Hotels are filled to overflowing. There are always several
different applicants for each government cottage. Many persons who
would be glad to spend the hot months in the Benguet mountains find
it impossible to do so, because they cannot obtain accommodation,
and at present many more are obliged to shorten their stay in order
to give others a chance.

In the early days, when we were facing unforeseen difficulties and
discouragements, I was for a time the one member of the Philippine
Commission who was really enthusiastically in favour of carrying
out the original plans for the summer capital. It was then the
fashion to charge me with responsibility for the policy of opening
up communication with the place and for the mistakes made in the
construction of the Benguet Road, although I had never had any control
over the road work and had been one of five at first, and later one
of nine, to vote for every appropriation found necessary in order to
complete it.

It was the enthusiasm of Mr. Forbes which at a critical time finally
saved the situation, and now that Baguio has arrived, and the wisdom of
the policy so long pursued in the face of manifold discouragements has
been demonstrated, my one fear is that he will get all the glory and
that I shall be denied credit for the part which I actually did play
in bringing about the determination to establish quick communication
with one of the most wonderful mountain health resorts to be found in
any tropical country, and in giving that determination effect. But I
have had a more than abundant reward of another sort. My wife, my son
and I myself, when seriously ill, have been restored to vigorous health
by brief sojourns at this one of the world's great health resorts.

It has been very much the fashion for Filipino politicians to rail at
Baguio, and now that the dangerous experiment of giving them control
of both houses of the legislature is being made, they may refuse to
appropriate the sums necessary to make possible the annual transfer
of the insular government to that place. The result of such a bit of
politics would be a marked increase in the present extraordinarily
low death rate among government officers and employees, American and
Filipino, [515] beginning in about two years, when the cumulative
effect of long residence in the lowlands makes itself felt.

Meanwhile, Baguio can stand on its own feet, and if, as the politicians
suggest, the government buildings there be sold at auction, purchasers
for all dwelling houses should readily be found. Too many Filipinos
have learned by happy experience the delights of this wonderful region,
to let such an opportunity pass. Baguio has come to stay.






CHAPTER XVIII

The Cooerdination of Scientific Work


When Americans landed at Manila, they found no government institutions
for the training of physicians and surgeons and no hospital in any
sense modern or indeed worthy of the name.

There did exist the equipment of what had been called a municipal
laboratory, outfitted for a limited amount of chemical work only.

When the Philippine Commission arrived on the scene, it fell to my
lot to draft the necessary legislation for placing scientific work
on a firm foundation, and, later, as secretary of the interior, to
exercise ultimate executive control over practically all such work
carried on under the insular government.

The complete initial lack of adequate hospital facilities and of
means for making chemical and bacteriological investigations had been
promptly remedied by the establishment of army hospitals and an army
laboratory. Although these could not be placed fully at the service of
the public, they nevertheless bridged the gap for the time being, and
in formulating laws and making plans for the future I was inclined to
say, "Blessed be nothing," as we were not hampered by useless employees
or archaic equipment, but were left free to make a clean start.

I had thoroughly learned one lesson at the University of Michigan while
a member of its zooelogical staff. We had a zooelogical laboratory in
which were conducted the zooelogical half of a course in general biology
and numerous other courses in animal morphology, mammalian anatomy,
comparative anatomy and embryology. There was also a botanical
laboratory in which all of the botanical work of the institution
was carried on. This did not involve any overlapping, but there was
overlapping of the work of the zooelogical laboratory and that of the
medical department, which had an anatomical laboratory, a histological
laboratory, a pathological laboratory and a so-called hygienic
laboratory. The professor of anatomy thought that his students would
understand human anatomy better if they knew something of comparative
anatomy, and instead of sending them to us wished to start his own
courses. The histologist dabbled in embryology and was soon duplicating
our course in the embryology of the chick. He was constantly at war
with the pathologist over the question of where histology left off
and pathology began, and both of them were inclined to differ with
the man in charge of the hygienic laboratory over similar questions of
jurisdiction. Furthermore, we had a chemical laboratory split up into
various more or less independent subdivisions, and a psychological
laboratory. In these several institutions for scientific research
there was much duplication of instruction and of books, apparatus
and laboratory equipment. Great economies might have been effected
by the establishment of a central purchasing agency, which could have
obtained wholesale rates on supplies ordered in large quantity. Nothing
of the sort existed. One laboratory chief would order from the corner
drug store, while another bought in Germany.

There was danger that a similar condition of things might arise in
the Philippines. The Bureau of Health would want its chemical and its
biological laboratories; the Bureau of Agriculture would need to do
chemical work covering a wide range of subjects, and botanical and
entomological work as well. The Bureau of Forestry would of course
require a large amount of botanical work, and would also need to
have chemical work done on gums, resins and other forest products,
to say nothing of investigating insects injurious to trees and more
especially to timber after cutting. The latter class of destroyers
do enormous damage in the Philippines. Much chemical work would
be required by the Bureau of Customs, which as a matter of fact
later insisted upon the necessity of a "microscopical laboratory"
to provide facilities for the examination of fibres, etc. Obviously
there would be a large amount of work for the general government in
connection with investigation of the mineral resources of the country,
and the testing of coals, cements and road materials.

Smallpox was decimating the population. There was need of the
manufacture of great quantities of virus with which to combat it,
and of other common and necessary serums and prophylactics as well.

Here then was a golden opportunity to start right. In imagination I saw
a Bureau of Science for scientific research and for routine scientific
work, a great General Hospital, and a modern and up-to-date College of
Medicine and Surgery, standing side by side and working in full and
harmonious relationship. The medical school would give to the youth
of the land the best possible facilities for theoretical training
in medicine and surgery, while access to the wards of the hospital
would make possible for them a large amount of practical bedside
work. Its operating amphitheatres would increase the opportunity
for clinical instruction, as would a great free outpatient clinic,
conducted primarily for the benefit of the poor. Professors in the
college would hold positions on the hospital staff, not only in order
to give to them and to their students every facility for clinical
demonstration work, but to enable them constantly to "keep their
hands in." Promising Filipino graduates would be given internships
and other positions on the house staff of the hospital. Patients
would be admitted to its free beds subject to the condition that they
allow their cases to be studied by the faculty and students of the
college. The necessary biological and chemical examinations for the
hospital would be made in the laboratories of the Bureau of Science,
which would at the same time afford every facility for the carrying on
of scientific investigation by advanced students, by members of the
faculty of the college and by members of the hospital staff. Members
of the staff of the biological laboratory would have the use of the
great volume of pathological material from the hospital, and with
free access to its rooms and wards, would have an almost unparalleled
opportunity for the study of tropical diseases, while some of the
officers and employees of the Bureau of Science and of the Bureau of
Health might be made members of the faculty of the college and their
services utilized as instructors.

As we had neither laboratories, hospital nor college at the time,
the realization of this somewhat comprehensive scheme seemed rather
remote. It was commonly referred to as "Worcester's dream," and one
of my friends in the army medical corps probably quite correctly
voiced public sentiment when he said, "Poor Worcester has bats in his
belfry." However, he laughs best who laughs last! After the lapse of
a good many years my dream came true. The three great institutions
which I hoped might sometime be established are to-day in existence,
and are doing the work which I hoped that they might perform. Now
let us consider how they came to be.

In the early days I drafted an act providing for the establishment of
a Bureau of Government Laboratories which should perform all of the
biological and chemical work of the government under the direction
of one chief, and on July 1, 1901 the commission passed it.

I was more than fortunate in securing as the director of this
bureau Dr. Paul C. Freer, then professor of general chemistry at the
University of Michigan.

Dr. Freer obtained leave of absence for a year, in order to help us
get started. This leave was twice extended for additional periods of
one year each, and in the end he decided to sever his connection with
the university and throw in his lot with the Philippine government.

He remained in charge of the Bureau of Government Laboratories and
of its successor, the Bureau of Science, until his death on April
17, 1912.

Himself a chemist and investigator of note, he had a wide and
catholic knowledge of science in general, and no better man could
have been found for this important piece of constructive work. For
nearly a year the two of us laboured over plans for the laboratory
building and lists of the necessary books, instruments, apparatus,
glassware, chemicals and other supplies. At the end of this time we
submitted to the commission what I do not hesitate to say was the
most complete estimate for a large project which ever came before
it. Much forethought was necessary in order to time the orders for
books, instruments and apparatus so that it would be possible to
house them properly when they arrived, and the estimated expense was
distributed over a period of two and one-half years.

Meanwhile work had begun in cramped temporary quarters in a
hot little "shack," for it deserved no better name, back of the
Civil Hospital. Here under almost impossible conditions there were
performed a large volume of routine biological and chemical work,
and a considerable amount of research, the results of which proved
to be of far-reaching importance.

With the employment of the first chemists and bacteriologists there
arose a class of questions which I determined to settle once for
all. There is a regrettable tendency among some scientific men to try
to build barbed-wire fences around particular fields of research in
which they happen to be interested, and to shoo every one else away.

At the outset I gave all employees clearly to understand that such
an unscientific and ungenerous spirit would not be tolerated in the
Bureau of Government Laboratories. The field which opened before us
was enormous. There was work enough and more than enough for all, and
we should at the outset adopt a spirit of friendliness and helpfulness
toward every scientific man who desired to lend a hand.

This rule of conduct has been steadfastly adhered to. Numerous
well-known scientists have visited the Philippines and to each we have
extended all possible assistance, furnishing laboratory quarters,
instruments, apparatus and reagents, and, whenever practicable,
material as well. Indeed, many of our scientific guests have been
made employees of the bureau without pay, so that there might be no
questioning of their right to use government equipment.

Two important results have followed this policy. One is that we have
established the friendliest and most helpful relations with numerous
research institutions. The other is that we have been able to assist
in the performance of much valuable work which has borne important
results, and which would perhaps have remained undone had it not been
possible for us to aid those who undertook it.

In due course of time came our fine new building, with good facilities
for performing all kinds of laboratory work. When it was equipped
and occupied, we were able to say that the opportunities offered at
Manila for investigating tropical diseases were probably unequalled
elsewhere, and there was a deal of such investigation urgently needing
to be made. Our equipment for chemical research was also very complete
and the vast undeveloped natural resources of the islands presented
a practically virgin field for such investigation.

At the outset absurd rumours spread as to the cost of buildings and
equipment, and there was much popular outcry against the supposed
wastefulness of the government. A simple statement of the facts
served to kill these foolish tales, and people soon began to see that
the creation of the Bureau of Government Laboratories was merely the
application of common-sense to existing conditions and had resulted in
greatly increased economy and efficiency. Indeed, at the suggestion
of a committee appointed to make a study of the government service
and suggest measures for its betterment, the principle which I had
adopted was carried still further. Not only was all zooelogical and
botanical work transferred to this bureau, but the Bureau of Ethnology
and the Bureau of Mines were abolished as separate entities and were
made divisions of it, and its title was changed to "The Bureau of
Science." Little by little the scope of the work has steadily widened.

The scientific books and periodicals of the government were scattered
among half a dozen different bureaus and were not being well cared
for. I arranged to have them all temporarily transferred to the
library of the Bureau of Science and catalogued there. Those said
to be really needed for frequent reference were then returned to
the several bureaus but were kept under observation by the bureau of
science librarian, who took particular pains to look after the binding
of serial publications as rapidly as the volumes were completed.

The list of books requested by the several bureau chiefs for
reference was suspiciously long. I gave orders that each set of bureau
bookshelves be provided with cards and a box into which to drop them,
and each time a book was used a card was made out for it and placed
in the box. After six months I quietly gathered up the cards and had
them checked against the lists of books for which the several bureau
chiefs had asked, and was then able to order a large proportion of them
back to the library for the reason that they had not been used at all.

The result of this policy is that we have to-day a central
scientific library in which are catalogued all the scientific books
of the government. Books needed by the several bureaus for frequent
reference are placed where they can be used conveniently, and the
card catalogue indicates where they are, so that they can readily be
found. In this way it has been possible to avoid much needless and
expensive duplication. The library now contains 26,652 bound volumes.

We were extremely fortunate in the men whose services we secured
in the early days, and the volume of research work turned out was
unexpectedly large. The question of how best to arrange for the
prompt publication of our results became urgent, and in the end we
answered it by publishing the _Philippine Journal of Science_, now
in its eighth year and with an assured and enviable position among
the scientific journals of the world.

In the early days before we knew what we now know about the
preservation of health in tropical countries there was a deal of
sickness among government officers and employees. While the army was
more than liberal in helping us meet the conditions which arose,
it was of course very necessary that we should establish our own
hospital as soon as possible.

On October 12, 1901, the so-called "Civil Hospital" was opened
in a large private dwelling, obtained, as we then fondly imagined,
merely as a temporary expedient. Together with two adjoining and even
smaller buildings it continued to be our only place for the treatment
of ordinary medical and surgical cases until September 1, 1910! I
can here only very briefly outline the causes of this long delay.

At the outset the building was large enough to meet immediate needs. At
the time when it began to grow inadequate there was a plan on foot
for a large private institution, in which the government was to secure
accommodations for its patients, and a hospital building was actually
erected, but interest in this project waned, the private backing which
was believed to have been assured for it failed, and the whole scheme
went by the board. Then plans for a great general hospital were called
for. A very large amount of time was consumed in their preparation and
when they were finished the expense involved in carrying them out was
found to be far beyond the means of the government. Ultimately I was
charged with the duty of securing other plans involving a more moderate
expenditure. Again long delay necessarily ensued. When semi-final
plans were submitted, the consulting architect insisted on a series
of arches along the sides of the several ward pavilions which were
doubtless most satisfying from an artistic point of view, but would
have shut off light and fresh air to an extent which I could not
tolerate. A three months' deadlock was finally broken by his acceding
to my wishes, but in October, 1906, just as the completed plans were
finally ready to submit to the commission, I was compelled by severe
illness to return to the United States. There remained three American
and three Filipino members of the commission. One of the former was
Mr. W. Morgan Shuster, then secretary of public instruction. Prior
to the time when he became a candidate for a secretaryship he had
been bitter in his criticism of the Filipinos. Coincidently with the
development of this ambition he became almost more pro-Filipino than
some of the Filipino politicians themselves. For a time he seemed to
control the Filipino vote on the commission and largely as a result of
his activities every important matter which I left pending, including
that of the establishment of the great general hospital so vitally
needed by the people of the islands, was laid on the table. I was
informed that Mr. Shuster had announced that we could have $125,000
for the hospital and no more! We needed $400,000.

Beginning on the day after my return the following April these several
projects, including that for the Baguio Hospital and that for the
Philippine General Hospital. were taken from the table and passed.

Construction work goes slowly in the tropics. One ward pavilion of the
Philippine General Hospital was occupied on September 1, 1910. Soon
afterward the four others came into use.

On June 10, 1907, a medical college was opened. It was called "The
Philippine Medical School." Its creation at this time was made possible
by the existence of the Bureaus of Science and Health. Its staff was
at the outset recruited very largely from these two bureaus. The
director of the Bureau of Science was made its dean and continued
to hold this position until his death. To his unselfish efforts and
to those of the director of health is due the well-organized modern
college which we have to-day. In lieu of better quarters the first
classes were held in an old Spanish government building which was
altered and added to until it answered the purpose reasonably well.

The preparation of the act which provided for the establishment of
this college was intrusted to me. I called for the assistance of a
committee of technical experts and asked that they submit a draft
for my consideration, which they did. It contained a provision to the
effect that the college should be under the administrative control of
the secretary of the interior. I struck out the words "secretary of the
interior" and inserted in lieu thereof the words "secretary of public
instruction" for two reasons. First, the school theoretically belongs
under that official, in spite of its necessarily close relationship
with the Bureau of Science and the Bureau of Health. Second, I wanted
the support of the secretary of public instruction for the measure,
as it involved considerable expenditure and I was not sure how the
bill might fare in the commission. It happened that the incumbent
of that position was very much inclined to take a liberal view of
bills which extended his jurisdiction. Mr. Taft, when he visited
the Philippines in 1909, reached the conclusion that I was guilty
of an error of judgment in doing this, and a little later expressed
the view that the Medical College ought to be under the control of
the secretary of the interior, because of its intimate relationship
with the bureaus above mentioned. I might perhaps even then have had
this change made, but refrained from attempting to do so, believing
that all would go well under the existing arrangement. So long as
Dr. Freer lived this was the case.

He was a man of absolute honesty and sincerity of purpose, and
was far-seeing enough fully to realize that the interests of the
government, and of individuals as well, would best be served by
carrying out the broad and liberal policy which was then in effect.

The next event of importance was the establishment of the University
of the Philippines, which was provided for by an Act passed on June
18, 1908.

The Philippine Medical School was in due time incorporated with the
university as its College of Medicine and Surgery, passing under the
executive control of the university board of regents.

At this time the plan of which I had dreamed so many years before
was in full force and effect and was working admirably. Members of
the Bureau of Science staff served on the college faculty and held
appointments in the Philippine General Hospital as well, one of them
being the chief of a division there. Members of the college faculty
carried on research work at the Bureau of Science. The great working
library installed in the building of the latter bureau served as the
medical library. Members of the college faculty also rendered important
service in the Philippine General Hospital, where two of them were
chiefs of divisions, two held important positions on the house staff
and numerous others served as interns. Officers of the Bureau of Health
were appointed to the faculty of the college and carried on research
work at the Bureau of Science. The staff of the latter bureau made
the chemical and biological examinations needed in connection with
the work of the hospital as well as those required by the Bureau of
Health. The Bureau of Science manufactured the sera and prophylactics
required by the Bureau of Health in its work. The two large operating
amphitheatres in the Philippine General Hospital were planned with
especial reference to the accommodation of students, who could pass
along a gallery from one to the other. The work of the free clinic,
attended daily by hundreds of Filipinos seeking relief, was largely
turned over to the college faculty, and increased opportunities were
thus given for medical students to study actual cases.

The arrangement was an ideal one. It excited the admiration of numerous
visiting European and American experts, who were competent to judge
of its merits, and its continued success was dependent only upon the
honesty of purpose, loyalty and good faith of the several parties
to it.

Then came the untimely death of Dr. Freer. A few months later an
attempt was made by certain university officers to secure control of
the professional work of the hospital for that institution, leaving
the director of health and the secretary of the interior in charge
of the nurses, servants, accounts and property, and burdened with
the responsibility for the results of work involving life and death,
but without voice in the choice of the men who were to perform it.

Those who were responsible for this effort evidently had not taken
the trouble to read the law, and I had only to call attention to its
provisions in order to end for the time this first effort to disturb
the existing logical distribution of work between the two institutions.

Before I left Manila in October, 1913, a second attempt was being made
to secure control of the professional work of the hospital for the
university, but this time the plan was more far-reaching, in that it
contemplated the transfer to the university of control of the Bureau of
Science as well; and more logical, in that a bill accomplishing these
ends had been drafted for consideration by the Filipinized legislature.

The original plan for the cooerdination of the scientific work of
the Philippine government was sound in principle and will, I trust,
eventually be carried out, whatever may be done temporarily to upset
it during a period of disturbed political conditions. There is much
consolation to be derived from contemplating the fact that pendulums
swing.





NOTES


[1] Cuyo, Palawan, Balabac, Cagayan de Jolo, Jolo proper, Basilan,
Mindanao, Panay, Guimaras, <DW64>s, Siquijor, Cebu, Bohol, Samar,
Leyte, Masbate, Marinduque and Mindoro.

[2] I employ the noun Filipinos to designate collectively the eight
civilized, Christianized peoples, called respectively the Cagayans,
Ilocanos, Pangasinans, Zambalans, Pampangans, Tagalogs, Bicols and
Visayans, or any of them; the adjective Filipino to designate anything
pertaining to these peoples, or any of them; the noun Philippines
to designate the country, and the adjective Philippine to designate
anything pertaining to the country as distinguished from its people.

[3] Busuanga, Culion, Tawi Tawi, Tablas, Romblon and Sibuyan.

[4] I use the word "Insurgents" as a proper noun, to designate the
Filipinos who took up arms against the United States, hence capitalize
it, and the adjective derived from it.

[5] General Aguinaldo.

[6] Beginning with the letters "P.I.R."

[7] See pp. 53, 55, 68.

[8] See pp. 27, 47, 49, 63 of this book for repetitions and variations
of this charge of Aguinaldo.

[9] See p. 31 of his book, "The American Occupation of the
Philippines," in referring to which I will hereafter use the word
Blount, followed by a page number.

[10] U. S. Consul General Rounseville Wildman of Hongkong.

[11] U. S. Consul O. F. Williams of Manila.

[12] Blount, p. 43.

[13] A term, more or less corresponding to mayor, then applied to
the ranking municipal officer of a _pueblo_ or town.

[14] Eight hundred thousand Mexican dollars, the actual value of
which constantly fluctuated.

[15] The Ilocanos are one of the eight civilized peoples who
collectively make up the Filipinos. They number 803,942, and inhabit
certain provinces in northern Luzon.

[16] I have not felt at liberty to correct spelling, capitalization,
punctuation or grammar in quotations, except in the case of perfectly
evident printer's errors. It should be remembered that the results
of Taylor's work were left in the form of galley proof.

[17] Taylor, 42 F Z-43 F Z.

[18]  For the history of this document, see p. 51.

[19] P.I.R., 1300.2.

[20] Senate Document 62, part 1, Fifty-fifth Congress, Third Session,
P. P. 341 _et seq_.

[21] Senate Document 62, part 1, Fifty-fifth Congress, Third Session;
also P.I.R., 496.

[22] Blount, pp. 11-12.

[23] Pratt.

[24]  P.I.R., 516. 4.

[25] "The Consul--after telling me that, before arriving in Hongkong
harbor, a launch would be sent by the Admiral to secretly take us to
the North American squadron, a secrecy which pleased me also, as it
would avoid giving publicity to my acts--then advised me that I should
appoint him the representative of the Philippines in the United States
to promptly secure the official recognition of our independence. I
answered that whenever the Philippine government should be formed,
I would nominate him for the office he desired, although I considered
that but small recompense for his aid, and that in case of our having
the good fortune to secure our independence I would bestow upon him
a high post in the customs service besides granting the commercial
advantages and the participation in the expenses of the war which the
Consul asked for his Government in Washington, since the Filipinos
agreed in advance to what is here stated, considering it a proper
testimonial of gratitude."--P.I.R., 1300. 2.

[26] Blount, p. 12

[27] Blount, pp. 8-9.

[28] Ibid., p. 9.

[29] The following is one of them:--

    "_H. Kong_, May 16, 1898.

    "Senor Don Jose Enrique Basa:

    "My Dear Enrique: As an aid to the American policy in the
    Philippines,--America being the most liberal and humanitarian
    nation in the world,--I earnestly recommend the widest possible
    circulation of the proclamation which I send herewith in order
    that the Americans may be supported in the war against the
    tyrannical friars and the Spaniards who have connived with
    them, and that public order, so necessary under the present
    conditions, be preserved.

    "Thy relative, twenty-six years an emigrant.

    (Signed) "_J. M. Basa_."

--P.I.R., 1204-10.

[30] P.I.R., 1204-10.

[31] Ibid., 1204-10.

[32] P.I.R., 53-2.

[33] Teodoro Sandico, an influential Tagalog leader, who spoke English
well and afterward served as a spy while employed by the Americans
as an interpreter.

[34] Senor Garchitorena was a wealthy Tagalog of Manila, and, at
this time, a prominent member of the Hongkong junta.

[35] Dr. Galicano Apacible, a very intelligent and rather conservative
Tagalog physician. After Aguinaldo left Hongkong, he was the leading
member of the junta.

[36] Sr. Graco Gonzaga, a prominent Filipino lawyer of the province
of Cagayan.

[37] There is an illegible word in the original.

[38] P.I.R., 406-5.

[39] P.I.R., 398. 9.

[40] "_Hongkong_, 12 Jan. 1899,--2 P.M.

"_Senator Hoar_, Washington.

"As the man who introduced General Aguinaldo to the American
government through the consul at Singapore, I frankly state that the
conditions under which Aguinaldo promised to cooperate with Dewey
were independence under a protectorate. I am prepared to swear to
this. The military party suborned correspondents are deceiving the
American nation by means of malevolent lying statements. If your
powerful influence does not change this insensate policy there will
be a hopeless conflict with the inevitable results disastrous for
the Americans.

"_Bray_."

--P.I.R., 853-4.

[41] "Then Aguinaldo had an interview with the United States consul
in Hongkong, in which he told him that he was anxious to become an
American citizen, but this being impossible, he desired to be allowed
to return to the Philippines and place himself under the orders of
Commodore Dewey. According to the brother of that Consul, who certainly
must have had opportunities for knowing the facts in the case, he
made no demands for independence, but said that he hoped that the
Americans would not leave the Filipinos to their fate, but would annex
the Philippines and protect them against the Spaniards. He promised
the Consul that he would fight with the Americans and not attempt to
foment a revolution against the United States. His highest expressed
aim was to throw off the Spanish yoke, and, that once accomplished,
he would abide by the decision of the United States as to the ultimate
disposition of the Philippines. If Aguinaldo had expressed his real
intentions of obtaining arms and using them only for his own purposes,
and, if he found it expedient, against the United States, it is not
to be thought that he would have been returned to the Philippines on
a United States vessel."--Taylor, 44 F Z.

[42] P.I.R., 471. 7.

[43] P.I.R., 1300. 2.

[44] Admiral Dewey's testimony, from which I quote extracts, will
be found in Senate Documents, Vol. 25.57 Congress, 1st session,
pp. 2928, 2941.

[45] P.I.R., 1300.2.

[46] P.I.R., 1300.2.

[47] Taylor, 4 MG., E.

[48] Report of the Philippine commission to the President. January 31,
1900. Vol. I, p. 121.

[49] P.I.R., 396. 3.

[50] Ibid., 396. 3.

[51] P.I.R., 461.4.

[52] "My Dear Brother: I inform you that we arrived here in Cavite
at eleven o'clock and disembarked at four o'clock in the afternoon
after our conference with the American Admiral. Everything appears
to be favourable for obtaining our independence. I cannot say more
on that subject as it would take too long.

"I have no other object in writing this except to ask you and your
companions to meet at once and arrange the best way to entrap all the
enemy in your town, employing deceit, for instance, make a present
of whatever you think best to the chiefs successively and then
at once enter the houses and attack them, or if not this, do what
you think best. Show valor and resolution, brothers, the hour has
arrived for the Philippines to belong to her sons and not to them,
only one step and we shall reach Independence; be constant, brothers,
and be united in feelings, do not imitate those who show two faces,
whatever such people do sooner or later they will be slaves. Respect
foreigners and their property, also enemies who surrender.

"I want you to know that in respect to our conduct I have promised
the American Admiral and other nations, that we shall carry on modern
war. Even if a Spaniard surrenders, he must be pardoned and treated
well and then you will see that our reputation will be very good in
all Europe which will declare for our Independence; but if we do not
conduct ourselves thus the Americans will decide to sell us or else
divide up our territory as they will hold us incapable of governing
our land, we shall not secure our liberty; rather the contrary;
our own soil will be delivered over to other hands.

"Therefore, my brethren, I urge that we strive to unite our efforts,
and let us fire our hearts with the idea of vindicating our
country. Many nations are on our side."--P.I.R., 12. 1.

[53] Mabini was a Tagalog paralytic of exceptional ability. In my
opinion he was the strongest man whom the revolution produced.

[54] P.I.R., 451. 1.

[55] Extract from the Journal of Simeon Villa.

    "The memorable month of August, 1896, arrived. Aguinaldo was
    'master' of the Cavite Lodge. Moreover, he was a member of
    the 'Katipunan' Society and the chief of the many members
    who were in the pueblo of Cavite Viejo. What was to be
    done? Aguinaldo, not knowing what to do, and mindful of the
    fact that the curate there knew positively that he was not
    only a mason, but also the chief of the Katipunans of his
    pueblo, considered it expedient on the night of August 29 to
    at once call a meeting of all the compromised persons in his
    town. Aguinaldo made clear to them their grave situation.

"They all agreed that on the following day Aguinaldo, their chief,
should make representations to the Governor of Cavite; so he went away
very early the following morning, presented himself to the governor,
and in the name of the people of Cavite Viejo offered him their
respects and their loyalty to Spain, at the same time requesting
him to condescend to send to his town a garrison of 100 men for
its security. The governor replied that he would first consult the
captain-general, and if the proposition was approved he would send
the garrison at once.

"As Aguinaldo was greatly beloved by the governor and his wife, they
offered him wine and sweetmeats. As soon as this was over he took
his leave and returned happy to his town. On arrival in the town
he assembled all the compromised persons and informed them of the
brilliant result of his efforts. Continuing, he told them that then was
the opportune moment for rising in arms against the Spaniards. To this
they unanimously replied by saying it was terrible, because no arms
were available, and that for this reason it would certainly prove to
be a disaster for them.

"But Aguinaldo, in company with his godfather, the lamented Candido
Tirona, insisted on convincing them with their strong arguments. They
made them understand that Spanish cruelty would annihilate them
without fail, and for no other reason than that they were members of
the Katipunan.

"As it happened, at that very time there were two 'Guardia Civil'
soldiers in the court-house. So at about 2 o'clock in the morning,
Aguinaldo and Tirona went directly to the court-house. Arriving there,
these two determined insurgent chiefs intimated to the guards that
they should surrender their equipments. These replied that it was
impossible, and said they would die first. Instantly a struggle ensued
between the four men, which lasted nearly an hour. But it resulted in
favor of the insurgent chiefs who succeeded in taking the guns and
cartridges. Once in possession of these armaments, the two chiefs,
accompanied by a number of the town people, directed themselves to
the convent in order to capture the curate. Very unfortunately for
them, the curate was no longer there when they arrived; he had made
his escape. While the struggle was going on with the guards in the
court-house, he received the news and fled at once by embarking in
a native boat.

"The insurgent chiefs then returned to the court-house and immediately
prepared a communication to all the municipal captains in the provinces
of Cavite, Batangas and Laguna, inviting them to at once rise against
Spain, and stating that their own town of Cavite Viejo was already
freed from slavery.

"Each one of these communications was sent out by a mounted courier,
so that before the expiration of many hours all the towns in Cavite
Province were informed of what had taken place in Cavite Viejo.

"On the following day some of the towns took up arms. At the same
time Aguinaldo, in company with many people from his town, marched on
Imus in order to attack the Spanish troops who were there. When he
arrived in Imus the people of this town at once joined him and they
all went to the convent, in which were the friars and the soldiers
of the 'Guardia Civil.' Just as he arrived at the atrium of the
Church his companions did not wish to follow him, for fear that the
soldiers were occupying the church tower. So Aguinaldo advanced alone
until he reached the door of the convent. Once here, he called his
companions to aid him. But these were not so determined as he was,
and only about five responded. When these got to where Aguinaldo was,
he commenced breaking in the door which was soon open. They went
upstairs, but they found nobody, since the friars and soldiers had
crossed over to the treasury building.

"Aguinaldo's companions were now numerous, because the others followed
him when they saw that nothing happened to those who went up into
the convent; and all of these went immediately to the treasury
building, in which were the friars and soldiers whom they were
hunting. When they reached it they found the doors closed, so they
could not pass. Aguinaldo ordered the house burned. Those in hiding
inside the house were without any other remedy and had to surrender;
but meanwhile some of them had been burned to death, among these a
lieutenant of the 'Guardia Civil.' By this victory Aguinaldo succeeded
in taking 17 rifles and two 2 1/2 pounder guns."--P.I.R., 869.

[56] "My Beloved Countrymen: I accepted the agreement of peace
proposed by Don Pedro A. Paterno after his consultation with the
Captain-General of the islands (Philippines), agreeing in consequence
thereof to surrender our arms and disband the troops under my immediate
command under certain conditions, as I believed it more advantageous
for the country than to continue the insurrection, for which I had but
limited resources, but as some of the said conditions were not complied
with, some of the bands are discontented and have not surrendered
their arms. Five months have elapsed without the inauguration of
any of the reforms which I asked in order to place our country on
a level with civilized people--for instance, our neighbor, Japan,
which in the short space of twenty years has reached a point where
she has no reason to envy any one, her strength and ascendency being
shown in the last war with China. I see the impotence of the Spanish
Government to contend with certain elements which oppose constant
obstacles to the progress of the country itself and whose destructive
influence has been one of the causes of the uprising of the masses,
and as the great and powerful North American nation has offered its
disinterested protection to secure the liberty of this country, I again
assume command of all the troops in the struggle for the attainment
of our lofty aspirations, inaugurating a dictatorial government to be
administered by decrees promulgated under my sole responsibility and
with the advice of distinguished persons until the time when these
islands, being under our complete control, may form a constitutional
republican assembly and appoint a president and cabinet, into whose
hands I shall then resign the command of the islands.

"_Emilio Aguinaldo_.

Given at Cavite, May 24, 1898."--P.I.R. 206.6.

[57] "The great North American nation, the cradle of genuine liberty
and therefore the friend of our people oppressed and enslaved by
the tyranny and despotism of its ruler, has come to us manifesting a
protection as decisive as it is undoubtedly disinterested toward our
inhabitants, considering us as sufficiently civilized and capable of
governing ourselves and our unfortunate country. In order to maintain
this high estimate granted us by the generous North American nation
we should abominate all those deeds which tend to lower this opinion,
which are pillage, theft, and all sorts of crimes relating to persons
or property, with the purpose of avoiding international conflict
during the period of our campaign."--P.I.R., 43. 3.

[58] Of this extraordinary occurrence Taylor says:--

    "Invitations to the ceremony of the declaration of independence
    were sent to Admiral Dewey; but neither he nor any of his
    officers were present. It was, however, important to Aguinaldo
    that some American should be there whom the assembled people
    would consider a representative of the United States. 'Colonel'
    Johnson, ex-hotel keeper of Shanghai, who was in the
    Philippines exhibiting a cinematograph, kindly consented to
    appear on this occasion as Aguinaldo's Chief of Artillery and
    the representative of the North American nation. His name does
    not appear subsequently among the papers of Aguinaldo. It is
    possible that his position as colonel and chief of artillery
    was a merely temporary one which enabled him to appear in a
    uniform which would befit the character of the representative
    of a great people upon so solemn an occasion!"--Taylor, 26 A J.

[59] P.I.R., 451.4.

[60] P.I.R., 451.4.

[61] See p. 50.

[62] "They are aware that a Government has been established here from
the beginning: first the Dictatorial, and afterwards, when several
provinces had been freed from Spanish domination, there was implanted
in the same a proper organization, and thus a new Government was
established in the form best adapted to the principles of liberty;
but notwithstanding all this and in spite of their protestations of
friendship, they have always refused to recognize that government.

"The things they request involve the recognition of a right which we
cannot and ought not to grant, unless they recognize our Government
and unless the limits of the powers of both sides be defined. If they
wish us to recognize them in Cavite, let them recognize our rights
in Paranaque.

"The United States are our creditors more than any other nation;
not only are they due the gratitude of the Filipino people, but
also they should be allowed to profit by the advantages this people
can grant them without loss of our legitimate right to a free and
independent life. Therefore we are disposed to make a treaty or
convention with them. They will be no longer able to allege the
lack of national character, for in the near future there is to be
assembled the Revolutionary Congress composed of the Representatives
of the provinces.

"They should understand that they have come to make war on the
Spaniards; that the Filipinos have risen in arms against the same enemy
to achieve their liberty and independence; and that in consequence they
cannot exercise dominion over us without violation of international
law. If they persist in refusing to recognize our Government, we shall
see ourselves obliged to come to an agreement with any other government
that will consent to recognize us on friendly terms."--P.I.R., 58.

[63] Blount, p. 24.

[64] P.I.R., 416. 1.

[65] _Ibid._, 102. 5.

[66] Senate Document 208, 1900, p. 9.

[67] Taylor, 26 A J.

[68] P.I.R., 5. 10.

[69] "Going to Singapore, I had several interviews with the Consul of
the United States, Mr. Spencer Pratt, who informed me that the war was
directed against Spain only and that in addition your action in the
Philippines had as an object the independence of my beloved country.

"The Commander of the _MacCulloch_ telegraphed me also from Hongkong,
offering in the name of Commodore Dewey, to take me to Cavite, in
order to raise the Filipinos against Spain.

"Without any written treaty, counting only upon the sacred word of
American citizens, I went to Hongkong, embarked on the _MacCulloch_
and a few days later had the honor to make the acquaintance of the
victorious Commodore Dewey, who likewise informed me that he had
come to make war against Spain, that he had annihilated the fleet
of Admiral Montojo and that the United States desired to give the
Philippines their independence."--P.I.R., 441.2.

[70] P.I.R., 102. 1.

[71] P.I.R., Books C-1.

[72] P. 39.

[73] For J. M. Basa.

[74] P.I.R., 507-7.

[75] P.I.R., 477. 1.

[76] "Until the Philippine question is finally decided, you would do
well in not having any controversy with the Americans. After having
secured the extinction of Spanish control for good, you may then
liquidate accounts with the United States in the event that they wish
to control in the interior; but in the meantime, let what will occur,
do not allow yourself to have any controversy with them. Matters are
in a very delicate state at the present time."--P.I.R., 398. 3.

In a postscript to the same letter Bray says:--

"America is a great nation and does not wish that conditions be
dictated to her. I am more than ever convinced that you must be
patient and await what they propose, without opposing their wishes
and insanities, before the questions before the Paris Congress are
definitely settled and the islands ceded by Spain; then there would
still be time to show your teeth if they try to govern the country. I
would not object at present to them taking up their residence there
and acting in the capacity of guard for good government, placing
our trust for the future in Providence which will never abandon the
Philippines."--P.I.R.

[77] Blount, p. 283.

[78] _Ibid_., p. 283.

[79] See p. 74.

[80] "Both Spanish fleets had been destroyed and Spain had but one
left to protect her own coast cities. The death knell of her once
proud colonial empire had sounded. Decrepit as she was, she could not
possibly have sent any reinforcements to the Philippines. Besides,
the Filipinos would have 'eaten them up.'"--Blount, p. 127.

[81] P.I.R., 471.4.

[82] _Ibid_., 471.4.

[83] _Ibid_., 450. 2.

[84] P.I.R., 471.4.

[85] "You should not forget what I have stated at the beginning of this
letter; because I am of the opinion that those questions should be well
considered by all of you. If our people desire independence under the
American protectorate, it is necessary that our representatives to
the United States be given instructions as to the conditions which
we should grant to the United States. The peace negotiations are in
full blast, and it is probable that we will be rather late in sending
our representatives. Therefore, if you agree to independence under a
protectorate, you should recommend it at once. I leave it, however,
to your care, as you are better qualified than myself concerning the
conditions of our country."--P.I.R., 471.4.

[86] "My Dear Friend: ... The last telegrams from Europe which
Felipe will send you by this mail are alarming for our future. The
preliminaries of peace are announced. The demand of America is,
annexation of Porto Rico and the Ladrone Islands, independence of
Cuba under an American protectorate and an American coaling station
in the Philippines. That is, they will again deliver us into the hands
of Spain. On the other hand, all the powers will unite to prevent the
annexation of the Philippines, according to the telegrams of Regidor;
the American cabinet hesitates about including us in the negotiations
for peace from fear of a conflict with us and the Filipinos in Europe
advise us to send a message to America giving our unconditional
adhesion. If events will be what these telegrams indicate, we have a
dark and bloody future before us. To be again in the hands of Spain
will mean a long and bloody war, and it is doubtful whether the end
will be favourable to us. The treaty of peace sanctioned by the other
powers will assure the dominion of Spain. Spain free from Cuba and
her other colonies will employ all her energy to crush us and will
send here the 150,000 men she has in Cuba. I do not think that the
Filipinos will again submit to their tyrants and there will be a long
and bloody war. And on account of the treaty the other powers will
aid Spain to completely dominate us and place all possible obstacles
in our way to prevent shipment of arms and all kinds of revolutionary
labours. In view of all this and bearing in mind the present urgency
of the matter, it is necessary for that government to establish and
publish its policy. We believe that the best for us and the only
feasible one, if we want to establish negotiations with America,
is independence under an American protectorate."--P.I.R., 453.3.

[87] "The policy which you will pursue in the United States is the
following one:--

"Make them understand that whatever may be their intention towards us,
it is not possible for them to overrule the sentiments of the people
represented by the government, and they must first recognize it if
we are to come to an agreement. Still do not accept any contracts
or give any promises respecting protection or annexation, because we
will see first if we can obtain independence. This is what we shall
endeavour to secure; meanwhile, if it should be possible to do so,
still give them to understand in a way that you are unable to bind
yourself but that once we are independent, we will be able to make
arrangements with them."--P.I.R., Books C-1.

[88] P.I.R., 5. 7.

[89] In a letter written on that date to Agoncillo he says:--

"Notwithstanding, I enclose you the credentials as requested; thereby
you will see that in addition to your representing us at Washington,
you may assist the commission they have formed for the purpose of
determining the future condition of the Philippines.

"But you must act in such manner that they may not be able to say
that we have accepted the said commission, because it is my wish to
protect [protest? D. C. W.] at all times against their being charged
with determining our destiny. You must bear in mind that the policy of
the government is to obtain absolute independence, and if perchance
we should know by the course of events that such cannot be the case,
we will then think of protection or annexation."--P.I.R., Books C-1.

[90] On August 30, 1898, Aguinaldo wrote Agoncillo:--

"It is said that General Merritt is going away to take part in the
work of the Commission. On this account it is important that you
proceed as quickly as possible to America, in order to know what
takes place. If perchance we should go back to Spanish control, ask
them to help us as the French helped them during their own revolution
and ask also the terms."--P.I.R., Books C--1.

[91] Taylor, 18 AJ.

[92] See p. 61.

[93] _Ibid_.

[94] Some time during August, 1898, Sandico wrote a letter to Aguinaldo
of which the postscript reads as follows:--

"P.S.--If you think of appointing me as Delegate to Manila,  please
send me my credentials. There are also annexationists here  [_i.e._,
in Manila.--D. C. W.]."--P.I.R., 416. 3.

[95] Now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands. He is a man of excellent character, high attainments and
great ability. He held important legal positions under the Spanish
government. In October, 1898, he was appointed Secretary of Foreign
Relations of the "Philippine Republic," but never served as such
officer. He was given the degree of Doctor of Law by Yale University
in 1904.

[96] Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, one of the most brilliant living
Filipinos. He had spent many years in Paris, was a talented physician,
and under American rule served for more than seven years as a member
of the Philippine Commission.

[97] Taylor, 55 AJ.

[98] Taylor, 26 AJ.

[99] Senate Documents, Vol. 25, Fifty-seventh Congress, First Session,
p. 2969.

[100] Senate Documents, Vol. 25, pp. 2931-2932.

[101] Senate Documents, Vol. 25, p. 2956.

[102] _Ibid_., p. 2966.

[103] _Ibid_., p. 2966.

[104] Senate Documents, Vol. 25, p. 2955.

[105] _Ibid._, p. 2952.

[106] The following passage is an extract from an unsigned order
dated July 22, 1898:--

"For the preservation of peace and good order in the community and
to put an end to the acts of those who within and without the city
of Manila and in the neighboring provinces not under the control
of the Spanish Government, are evading the orders issued by these
Headquarters, and in view of the large number of those who are
storing and monopolizing food and other most necessary articles,
under the pretence of desiring to sell them to the Americans, but
whose real intention is to ship them secretly to Manila where they
receive higher prices for their merchandise, without regard for the
injury they are doing the cause of our independence, I have seen fit
to decree the following: ... " P.I.R., 45.5 and 125. 3.

Relative to this matter, Taylor says:--

"The defection of Buencamino and Pilar had opened the road to
Aguinaldo, but at first the blockade was not effective. There were too
many natives there with friends and relations in Aguinaldo's camp to
make him desire to subject the city to the hardships of an effective
siege. And, furthermore, he did not have the force, nor did his men
have the necessary discipline, to prevent the ingress of supplies. It
was not until the first part of July that the price of provisions
increased. It was at no time found necessary by the authorities to take
over all the stores of provisions in the city. Indeed, there seems to
have been a fairly steady traffic in supplies between Manila and the
country to the north. It was a traffic in which it has been charged
that certain Spanish officers of rank made large sums. Aguinaldo
permitted it, and on July 26, 1898, signed an order directing that
food should be sent into Manila from the north to prevent starvation
in the city, and ordered the heads of the towns in the vicinity not
to interfere with this traffic (P.I.R., 1087-4). The entrance of food
supplies was confined to the northern line, for then it would not be
known to the Americans who, after July 30, occupied the entrenchments
in front of San Antonio Abad. It was not expedient for them to see
too much of Aguinaldo's methods."--Taylor, 14 AJ.

[107] P.I.R., 398. 2.

[108] Senate Document 331, p. 2976, 1902.

[109] P.I.R., 102-10.

[110] P.I.R., Books C-1.

[111] P.I.R., 102-10.

[112] _Ibid._

[113] P.I.R., 102. 10.

[114] _Ibid_., Books C-1.

[115] _Ibid_., 102-10.

[116] P.I.R., 102-10.

[117] Now a major-general.

[118] P.I.R., 102-10.

[119] _Ibid._

[120] _Ibid._

[121] "Debtor to the generosity of the North Americans, and to the
favors we have received through Admiral Dewey and (being) more desirous
than any other person of preventing any conflict which would have as
a result foreign intervention, which must be extremely prejudicial,
not alone to my nation, but also to that of Your Excellency, I consider
it my duty to advise you of the undesirability of disembarking North
American troops in the places conquered by tho Filipinos from the
Spanish, without previous notice to this government, because as no
formal agreement yet exists between the two nations the Philippine
people might consider the occupation of its territories by North
American troops as a violation of its rights.

"I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish squadron
the Philippine revolution would not have advanced so rapidly. Because
of this I take the liberty of indicating to Your Excellency the
necessity that before disembarking, you should communicate in writing
to this government the places that are to be occupied and also the
object of the occupation, that the people may be advised in due
form and (thus) prevent the commission of any transgression against
friendship."--P.I.R., Books C-1.

[122] Blount, p. 59.

[123] On July 15 General Noriel telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--

"Urgent. Received a telegram from the captain adjutant, who is in
Paranaque, of the following tenor: 'I inform your excellency that
two cascos of armed Americans have arrived at this point. I await
orders from Your Excellency.' Which I hasten to communicate to Your
Excellency for the proper action."--P.I.R., 849.

Later on the same day Arevalo telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--

"Lieutenant-Colonel Duboce with three hundred men waiting for more
troops from Cavite, and also orders, but not to attack."--P.I.R., 849.

[124] Captain Torres telegraphed Aguinaldo on July 15 as follows:--

"I have read all your telegrams and carried out the same, and I
incidentally questioned them about their purposes, [they] replying that
they will aid; let time demonstrate it. They also intend to encamp over
here at Paranaque. I will report to you any occurrence."--P.I.R., 69.6.

[125] P.I.R., 69. 5.

[126] Ibid., 849.

[127] "Admiral Dewey's Aide was here to-day. I told him I was ignorant
of your whereabouts and, if he had no objection, he might talk with
me as I am your representative; but he said that he could not do so,
as he had orders to speak with you personally, about something very
important. He then departed."--P.I.R., 1179. 5.

[128] The following telegram was addressed to the President or the
Secretary of War by Sulpicio at Bacoor, on August 8, 1898:--

"Last night I received a telegram from General Noriel, asking
for 100 cavanes of rice which he needs immediately, since he has
ordered to send him all the troops here on account of the landing of
Americans in Paranaque. General Mascardo will send him the troops
which are here. There are 56 bundles [of rice.--TR.] deposited in
this storehouse."--P.I.R., 1179. 5.

[129] This man's record is not known to me. Apparently he was an
officer in the Spanish army, for he is later reported as surrendering
to the Insurgents at Santa Ana on August 13, 1898. See footnote 4,
p. 104.

[130] Taylor, 33 AJ.

[131] Artemio Ricarte was one of the ranking Insurgent generals
directing operations against Manila.

[132] P.I.R., 1087. 5.

[133] Taylor, 30 AJ.

[134] Taylor, 30 AJ.

[135] P.I.R., 849.

[136] On August 2, 1899, Agoncillo wrote Mabini:--

"I send Don Emilio the information I have been able to obtain here,
in order that in view thereof you [plural] may consider the best
solution of our present political problem, which is an exceptional
case in history. In my opinion, the most critical moment, which I
call agonizing, whether correctly or not I know not, is the capture of
Manila, where General Merritt will constitute a provisional government,
in compliance with the instructions from his Government. It is
unnecessary to recommend that you observe great tact, great prudence,
when this event occurs. Ascertain the real wishes of the people in
this conflict and the war resources at our disposal and those which
you may count on during the struggle until its termination."

--P.I.R., 451.3.

In his document entitled "Means for Attaining Filipino Independence"
Aguinaldo had written:--

"VIII. Exterior attack. Above everything the Revolutionists must occupy
all Manila including the Walled City with the object and purpose that
the nation possessing the Philippines according to the decision of the
Powers will be forced to come to an understanding with the Filipinos
to avoid the shedding of blood."--P.I.R., 457. 5.

[137] Taylor, 29 AJ.

[138] That is, the surrender of Manila.

[139]  Fort San Antonio A'bad.

[140] Senate Documents, Vol. 25, p. 2943.

[141] "I must tell you that I feel as you should feel in regard to
our government not having officially participated in the capitulation
of Manila. Accordingly the war must be continued with Spain, because,
if we attack to-night, the Americans, acting upon the request of the
Spaniards and foreigners in addition to those who took part in the
capitulation, will have to ask us to suspend operations; hence we shall
be included in the negotiations and this will work to our advantage.

"To-night at 2 A.M. you will attack without fail in order that we may
be included in the capitulation which the Americans made to-day. You
must not stop the attacks because they do, and this is also the opinion
of our partisans among the foreigners."--P.I.R., 1179. 5 & 427. 5.

[142] "Our Rule in the Philippines," The _North American Review_,
1900, No. 170.

[143] General Ricarte to Aguinaldo, August 12, 1898, 11.15 P.M.:

"Have received the telegram from your honourable person regarding
attack at four o'clock in the morning, although we will make the
attack anyway. I have directed Gen. Pio Del Pilar begin firing cannon
at the hour set. At the present time we are making preparations and
will also give orders to the chiefs of the columns."--P.I.R., 849.

[144] "August 13, 1898.

"Dated. Camp Dewey 13. To General Aguinaldo. Commanding Philippine
Forces, Bacoor: Do not let your troops enter Manila without the
permission of the American commander on this side of Pasig river. You
will be under our fire.

"_Anderson_, Brig. General."

--P.I.R., 102-10.

[145] "Copy: Gen. Riego, Cavite: Have just received a note from
Gen. Anderson saying to me he does not permit my troops to enter Manila
without permission from the American commander on this side of the
Pasig River. They will be under his fire. Go with Senor Buencamino
and ask for an explanation, in writing if possible, as to the motive
for said note, without losing a moment. August 13, '98. E.A."

--P.I.R., 849.

[146] "I received a telegram. My interpreter is in Cavite. In
consequence of this I have not answered until now. My troops are
forced by yours, by means of threats of violence, to retire from
positions taken. It is necessary to avoid conflict, which I should
lament, that you order your troops that they avoid difficulty with
mine, as until now they have conducted themselves as brothers to take
Manila. I have given strict orders to my chiefs that they preserve
strict respect to American forces and to aid them in ease they are
attacked by a common enemy."

[147] Gregorio Araneta, later a member of the Philippine Commission
and Secretary of Finance and Justice. He was Secretary of Justice
under the Malolos government, and was also secretary of the Insurgent
Congress. He was at this time a bright young lawyer of good ability
and character.

[148] P.I.R., 849.

[149] _Ibid_.

[150] P.I.R., 849.

[151] _Ibid_., 849.

[152] _Ibid_., 1179. 5.

[153] _Ibid_.

[154] _Ibid_.

[155] Report of War Dept., 1898, Vol. I, part 2, p. 69.

[156] Taylor, Exhibit 739.

[157] The following two telegrams were sent by General Pio del Pilar
to Aguinaldo at 9.30 P.M.:--

"I inform you that the Bayambang troops who have presented themselves
before me when we entered Santa Ana this afternoon, are: 4 lieutenants,
171 soldiers with their respective rifles and ammunitions, Major
Fernando Acevedo, Captain Licerio Geronimo, 1 Spanish lieutenant,
and 1 prisoner by the name of Enrique Flores. All of them I put under
your orders."--P.I.R., 1179.5.

"Very urgent. I inform you of the capture made by my soldiers: 2
lieutenants of the Marine Corps, 2 lieutenants of the Spanish Infantry,
52 soldiers. Rifles about 400. I put them under your orders and await
your instructions."--P.I.R., 1179. 5.

[158] The Spanish Governor-General.

[159] P.I.R., 1300. 2.

[160] Taylor, 58 HJ.

[161] _Ibid_., 59.

[162] See footnote 2, p. 108.

[163] P.I.R., Books C-1.

[164] Taylor, 15 AJ.

[165] The word Indios, here translated "Indians," means Malayan
Filipinos of pure blood as distinguished from _mestizos_ or people
of mixed blood.

[166] P.I.R., 918. 2.

[167] The following telegram was sent by Colonel Jose to Aguinaldo:--

"Urgent. August 20, 1898: Colonel Lopez reports that our troops are
still sacking and committing outrages in Malate, Paco and Ermita,
even menacing people with their arms. Urge you to take proper measures
to stop these abuses."--P.I.R., 1167. 3.

[168] Extract from a letter of August 20, 1899, from Mabini to
Aguinaldo:

"Senor Lopez, your adjutant, arrived and told me of many complaints
regarding the behaviour of the soldiers. He says that our officers
carry off many horses, some of them belonging to foreigners. If the
foreigners should enter a protest against such doings, I do not know
what will be thought of our government.

"It is also absolutely necessary that a stop should be put to the
passes, and that the tax on merchandise entering Manila, should no
longer be exacted. It is absolutely necessary, if you think well
of it, for us to promote General Pio, and make him your second in
command. It is necessary for him to leave the vicinity of Manila,
as we cannot remove him by force; and do not reprimand him.

"If you approve, I will write a Decree, but I reflect that nothing
will succeed, if our commanders are not obliged to comply."

--P.I.R., 472. 13.

[169] _I.e._ the Americans.

[170] P.I.R., 458. 8.

[171] Major J. F. Bell accompanied Sandico on this trip.

[172] P.I.R., 1166. 12.

[173] "I regret very much to have to inform you that as long as
personal property is not respected here in Manila especially, by some
of our men, as long as personal security does not exist and as long
as prisoners are tortured, we cannot hope to deserve the confidence
of the other governments. Murders, thefts of carriages and horses,
are very frequent here, as is kidnapping, ...

"Sergeant Barcena, of the Fifth Company of the Second Zone, that
is the zone of General Pio del Pilar, informed me that the cruel
officers of that Zone, were Major Carmona and a lieutenant who was
formerly a barber.

"I know that the Government has ordered that private persons and
property be respected and has withdrawn from the military the power of
trying civilians; but in view of the fact that notwithstanding this
restriction some of them continue to discharge powers of which they
have been divested, I find it necessary to call your attention thereto,
in order that more energetic measures may be adopted so that other
nations may not be led to believe that our government is very weak.

"In the jurisdiction of the Americans, I have surprised small groups
of officers, who devote themselves to summoning persons before them
and arresting them. These groups can be found in Binondo, Tondo and
Trozo. I have used all friendly measures to secure their dissolution,
but if they continue their conduct, I shall be obliged to turn them
over to the American authorities, although I inform you that I shall
not make use of such measures, until diplomatic means are exhausted.

"I understand very well that in endeavouring to stop the abuses
committed by our officers and by the Filipinos who claim to belong to
us, in Manila, I expose myself to becoming a victim of their vengeance;
nevertheless, this does not terrify me, because my duty to the country
requires it.

"I beg of you that if you take any steps against Major Carmona and the
barber lieutenant, to be very careful and call General Pio del Pilar
and come to an understanding with him as to the mode of punishment
of these officers ....

"I have discovered grave cases which are occurring in the Presidio of
Manila, which I propose to relate to you when I shall have the honor
to see you personally. The Americans are already aware of these cases,
and are working in their own interest untiringly.

"I could tell you a good many other things, but I do not do so on
account of lack of time, and because I wish to reserve them until I can
speak to you privately. In the meantime, order me as you will, etc."

--P.I.R., 416. 7.

[174] "General Anderson received us very well, but in the proposed
agreement the clauses requiring the prior permission of our commanders
before American troops could pass or approach our lines displeased him
very much. Gen. Anderson refuses to treat until after the withdrawal
of Noriel's troops. I think it prudent to yield. This telegram is in
amplification of another which, at the request of Gen. Anderson, we
sent through his telegraph station to your excellency."--P.I.R., 849.

[175]  "It is impossible to order General Noriel to fall back because
if we order it they will ask the same thing from General Pio and
we shall get nothing ourselves. And the worst is that after we have
evacuated Manila and its environs they will follow us up to our new
positions to take them too without our being able to obtain from
them any formal statement of the concession signed in duo form. Tho
conflict is coming sooner or later and we shall gain nothing by asking
as favours of them what are really our rights. We shall maintain them
as long as we are able, confiding in Providence and in Justice. I
confirm my last telegram. Tell General Anderson that we shall hold
a meeting of the council of Government in order to decide. Please
return here soon with your companions. I inclose the map which I hope
you will return."--P.I.R., 427. 1.

[176] Senate Document No. 208, p. 22.

[177] _Ibid_., p. 23.

[178] _Ibid_., p. 26.

[179] Senate Document No. 208, p. 24.

[180] Pio del Pilar.

[181] Report of the War Department, 1899, Vol. I, part IV, pp. 5-10.

[182] See Buencamino's letter to Jaudines, p. 108.

[183] Taylor 36 AJ. _et seq_.

[184] See p. 41.

[185] P.I.R., 427. 1.

[186] "The insolent commentary of the American Consul here, if it is
true, clearly shows the intention of America to impose her will upon us
by force. In this case, the conflict will come sooner or later. Would
it not be better for us to provoke the conflict while the Americans
have not as yet concentrated their troops there? Or would it be better
to wait for the results of the Congress of Paris? This question should
be answered immediately by the committee on foreign relations of the
Congress of representatives and the decision should be sent at once
to us so that we can proceed according to your instructions."--P.I.R.,
453. 11.

[187] "I gave an order long ago not to permit our line to be passed,
and to say frankly that it was by my order. To be prepared to defend
our rights you are ordered to place troops in front of American
position at Sampaloc and to tell them plainly to leave, to warn
the Sandatahan [bolo men.--D. C. W.] and get everything ready; you
must warn the commanders of the zones about Manila. Do not forget,
whenever in doubt."--P.I.R., 849.

[188] P.I.R., 88. 9.

[189] P.I.R., 88. 9.

[190] _Ibid._

[191] P.I.R., 88. 9.

[192] _Ibid_., 849.

[193] "Until the decision of the Paris Congress is known, all of us
here are of the opinion that you should maintain a defensive attitude
regarding the Americans, giving way to them with regard to Manila and
its suburbs or in anything they may wish, although apparently only,
and not show them your teeth. After the decision of the Congress
is known, you may take the offensive if advisable, and according to
the information we may have of the American soldiers it should not be
difficult for you and your army to settle accounts with them."--P.I.R.,
398. 6.

[194] "If you and the Americans should happen to come in conflict
before the departure of the Spanish soldiers, it might happen that
the Yankees would enter into an alliance with them to combat the
Filipinos. Think well over this."--P.I.R., 398. 6.

[195] "It is also of urgent necessity, Senor President, to reestablish
committees in all the suburbs and that the masons and the Katipunan be
reorganized, and it is advisable that all be provided with knives ready
for any event, but it is proper that these arms be hidden."--P.I.R.,
466. 9.

[196] "Our soldiers are always desirous of fighting in order to
bring affairs to an end, as they are very resentful with regard to
the evacuation of the suburbs mentioned."--P.I.R., Books C-1.

[197] "Most urgent. Have received telegraphic order from War Dept.,
which says: 'Prevent American troops from disembarking.' In case they
insist what am I to do? May I begin firing?"

This telegram was indorsed by Aguinaldo:--

"Answered affirmatively December 1, 1898."--P.I.R., 849.

[198] "Most urgent. According to despatch from Captain detached at
Batangas, American divers are working unceasingly. He says that he
ordered them to be fired on in case they try to land. Await your
reply."

Aguinaldo's reply ran as follows:--

"I do not mind their working at sea, but you must under no conditions
allow them to land troops; be brave for the sake of your Tagalog
heart. Approve your action."--P.I.R., 1179. 2.

[199] P.I.R., 849.

[200] _Ibid_.

[201] _Ibid_.

[202] 56 AJ.

[203] "We are constantly alarmed here by American troops who wish
to come within the military line. To-day received word from second
chief, second zone, Manila, that as soon as they opened fire against
the American troops I assist by entering Manila. I have no orders in
this matter; I await your directions."--P.I.R., 849.

[204] P.I.R., 849.

[205] Taylor, 70 AJ.

[206] "It is absolutely necessary that an order be received here
permitting the uprising of those in prison before the movement is
begun anywhere else; in the prison the word shall be given at the
moment the bugle sounds retreat; it is indispensable that some of our
party be prepared in the vicinity of the Iris bridge, San Pedro street
and Dulumbrayan bridge, in order to prevent the Americans quartered
in the Pennsylvania barracks (Zorilla theatre) from aiding those in
the prison."--P.I.R., 73. 3.

[207] P.I.R., 40. 8.

[208] _Ibid_., Books C-1.

[209] _Ibid_., 1141. 3.

[210] P.I.R., 1186. 10.

[211] _Ibid_., 849.

[212] See p. 733.

[213] Taylor, 68-69 AJ.

[214] P.I.R., 206-207.

[215] "Above all I expect that you will respect the persons and goods
of private persons of all nationalities, including the Chinese; that
you will treat well the prisoners and grant life to those of the
enemy who surrender. And that you be on the sharp lookout for those
traitors and enemies who, by robbery, will seek to mar our victory."

[216]  P.I.R., 849.

[217]  _Ibid_.

[218] For the document on which this statement is based see p. 733.

[219] P.I.R., 849.

[220] Taylor, 81 AJ.

[221] "In reply to your telegram concerning your dream of entering
Manila after four hours of combat. I have the honour to inform you
for myself and the officers and soldiers under my command that your
dream will come true as soon as the conflict with the Americans begins,
since we shall advance at any cost."--P.I.R., 849.

[222] On January 21, 1899, the commander of the fourth zone, Caloocan,
wired Aguinaldo that:

"Julian Santo, commander of the territorial militia of Trozo, informs
me that 400 native soldiers of the Spanish army to-day incorporated
in his militia. He lives in the walled city, and he wants to know
your opinion upon the present situation, since the Americans want to
hold them as prisoners or confine them in Bilibid prison."

(Indorsed, handwriting of Aguinaldo:) "Tell the Filipino soldiers
in the walled city affiliated to our cause that they must keep
on good terms with the Americans, in order to deceive them, and
prevent their confining them, since the hoped-for moment has not yet
arrived."--P.I.R., 849.

[223] On January 20, 1899, a correspondent wrote to one of the
Insurgents abroad:

"In some places (in Manila) there have been fights with bolos between
Filipinos and Americans who wanted to tear down the proclamation of
our president while the people defended it with their bolos. They
say that it amuses them to see the Americans run when they draw their
knives. It is said that some 10,000 servants have gone on strike. Some
Americans have already disappeared by the method of 'dukut' but it
will not be proper to publish this in my opinion."--P.I.R., 980. 82.

[224] Taylor, AJ. 73.

[225] (Telegram received by E. Aguinaldo:)

"To the President of the Republic, Malolos, from the Provincial
Governor of Manila, San Juan del Monte, Jan. 29, 1899, 10.25 A.M.:
I yesterday visited the military road in process of construction,
Santa Ana to Pineda. Tomorrow it will be sufficiently completed to
permit passage, and in two days after it will be finished. Considering
opening another military road direct from Caloocan to San Juan. Desire
authority.

(Endorsed, handwriting of Aguinaldo:) "Telegram received. I am very
much satisfied, and in the name of the government I congratulate you
and the presidents of Santa Ana and Pineda with their inhabitants
for their efforts for the public good. You are authorized to open
another military road from Caloocan to San Juan del Monte, and I
want you to endeavor to finish it this week, as I am certain you
will."--P.I.R., 849.

(Telegram received by E. Aguinaldo:)

"To the Secretary of the Interior, Malolos, from Sah Juan del
Monte--Received Feb. 3, 1899 from the Provincial Governor Manila:
Road marked out; work began Wednesday. I shall put forth every effort
to finish by middle of the coming week."--P.I.R., 849.

[226] Taylor, 73 AJ.

[227] Taylor, 73 AJ.

[228] P.I.R., 2018.

[229] _Ibid_., 1090. 5.

[230] P.I.R., 453. 4.

[231] P.I.R., 453. 2.

[232] P.I.R., 493. 12.

[233] Blount, p. 190.

[234] Taylor, 86 AJ.

[235] Blount, p. 175.

[236] Blount, p. 98.

[237] The constitution used was most certainly not patterned after
our own. See p. 265.

[238] Blount, p. 111.

[239] "The light Messrs. Sargent and Wilcox throw on the then universal
acknowledgment of the authority of the Aguinaldo government and the
perfect tranquillity and public order maintained under it, in the
Cagayan valley."--Blount, pp. 114-115.

[240] "The country in fact, as Aguinaldo always claimed in his
proclamations of that period seeking recognition of his government
by the Powers, in a state of profound peace and tranquillity--free
from brigandage and the like."--Blount, p. 115.

[241] P.I.R., 958. 11.

[242] P.I.R., 849.

[243] Blount, p. 108.

[244] _Ibid_., p. 109.

[245] "With a view to showing every one and especially foreigners
travelling through the territory of the Republic, that we are not
opposed to a good such as a refined and civilized people should have,
the fronts of buildings should be whitewashed, streets should be
cleaned and fences repaired."--P.I.R., 292. 3.

[246] "It would be a great satisfaction to me to aid you with all
my strength; and the only thing that I see to object to is that the
Commanders and Generals in this province are getting pretty abusive
toward our brethren and allow themselves to be bribed by the Tagalog
merchants so as to allow them to enter Manila with their goods,
which is of great assistance to our enemies.

"Concerning the contributions which I have collected from the Chinamen,
it amounts to more than P2,000 here in Tambobong, Meycauayan and
Polo alone; and those from the other pueblos have not yet come to
see me. Furthermore, I would like an order from you prohibiting the
outrages that are being committed against such merchants as are not
our enemies; and when the contributions from the Chinamen of all the
pueblos shall have been completed, I wish to publish a proclamation
forbidding any injury to the Chinamen and any interference with their
small business enterprises; since this is a disgrace to our government
and to your name; for the natives of hereabouts themselves are the
people who are committing said abuses, and in hopes of putting a
stop to them, I await your decision at the earliest possible moment
concerning the proclamation referred to."--P.I.R., 355. 11.

[247] "Last night in the place known as Santo Cristo (Manila?) the
store of J. Ricafort, a Chinaman, was entered by five soldiers of our
army under an unknown commander supposed to be Colonel Paua. They
tried to kidnap the wife of Ricafort. At the request of P. Garcia
they desisted upon payment of 20 pesos and the agreement that 100
pesos would be paid later. If this was not done they would return
and hang them. To quiet these people I gave them a pass to assure
their personal safety, and exacted at the same time a promise that
they should not report the matter to the Americans. Pauline Garcia
is now at Pedro Macati."--P.I.R., 1187.4.

[248] P.I.R., 223.

[249] "Early in the war we had availed ourselves of a certain tribe,
or clan, known as the Maccabebes, who look nowise different from all
other Filipinos, but who had, under the Spanish government, by reason
of long-standing feuds with their more rebellious neighbours, come
to be absolutely loyal to the Spanish authorities. When we came they
had transferred that loyalty to us, and had now become a recognized
and valuable part of our military force."--Blount, pp. 333-334.

[250] "On July 28, 1898, the head of the province of Pampanga wrote
that the punishment of beating people in the plaza and tying them
up so that they would be exposed to the full rays of the sun should
be stopped. He complained that these methods had been carried so far
that even people of good social position had been so punished. It was
especially undesirable to employ such punishments, as the people of
other nations weeing them would not believe that the reign of liberty,
equality, and fraternity had begun in the Philippines."--P.I.R., 196.3.

[251] Taylor, 47 AJ.

[252] P.I.R., 944.

[253] "I have the honour to inform you that I have been in this town
since yesterday afternoon issuing, in a proclamation, conciliatory
orders to the populace that the people comprised in the uprising
must present themselves and express aversion and repudiation of
it, promising them consideration and pardon as long as they lay
aside arms. In compliance with and following the earlier published
proclamation, they presented two guns and innumerable bolos. I hope
soon for tranquillity among the people there through these efforts. I
ask dispense with assembly of the Junta. _Camilin_, November 30,
1898."--P.I.R., 849.

[254] P.I.R., 849.

[255] _Ibid._

[256] P.I.R. 849.

[257] _Ibid._

[258] _Ibid._

[259] Gregorio Aglipay, an Ilocano Catholic priest who became an
active Insurgent leader. Later he abandoned the Catholic faith and
set up a new church which gained many adherents in the Philippines.

[260] P.I.R., 849.

[261] _Ibid._

[262] _Ibid._

[263] P.I.R., 1231. 2.

[264] Taylor, 62 AJ.

[265] P.I.R., 77.

[266] P.I.R., 47.7.

[267] _Ibid_., 951.3.

[268] Blount, p. 109.

[269] P.I.R., 1006.

[270] P.I.R., 870. 4.

[271] Blount, p. 113.

[272] _Ibid_., p. 111

[273] At Carig, Isabela.

[274] Taylor, 43 AJ.

[275] See p. 731.

[276] The parsonage, or residence of the priest.

[277] Insurgent officers.

[278] Their on commander so reported.  See p. 202.

[279] Shortly afterward "elected" governor.

[280] This form of torture is commonly referred to in the Philippines
as the "water cure."

[281] Major Delfin commanded the expedition which took Nueva Vizcaya.

[282] P.I.R., 246. 3.

[283] Dimas Guzman.

[284] Blount, p. 112.

[285] Blount, p. 114.

[286] Blount, p. 113

[287] Blount, p. 114.

[288] A distance of 120 miles.

[289] "The former Spanish Governor of the Province was of course a
prisoner in Villa's custody. Villa had the ex-Governor brought in,
for the travellers to see him, and remarked, in his presence to them,
'This is the man who robbed this province of twenty-five thousand
dollars during the last year of his office.'"--Blount, p. 115.

[290] _La Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas_, a very strong
commercial organization.

[291] "I call your attention to the fact that the only terms to
the surrender were to respect life, and it was for this reason that
I seized all the money they [i.e. the friars,--D.C.W.] had hidden
away, which was accomplished by applying the stick. In this capital
I found thirty-four thousand dollars in silver and a draft on the
Compania General de Tabacos for twenty thousand dollars which can be
collected here...

"The bearer can give you more details concerning the abuses
committed in this province of Vizcayana by the forces of Mayor Duflin
Esquizel. Also, I wish to inform you that we have done nothing to the
Compania General de Tabacos, for we have learned from their records
that much of their stock is held by Frenchmen, and consequently we fear
a conflict. For this reason we await your orders on this matter. We
took all the arms we found in their possession, however."--P.I.R.,
271.2.

[292] P.I.R. 192.4.

[293] "I was in that town, for a similar purpose, with Governor Taft in
1901, after a bloody war which almost certainly would not have occurred
had the Paris Peace Commission known the conditions then existing, just
like this, all over Luzon and the Visayan Islands."--Blount, p. 116.

[294] "On account of this the vulgar people doubted the legality of
our actions in the collection of taxes, and accordingly it became
difficult; and this, coupled with the inveterate abuses of the heads
of the towns, which the head of the province was not able to perceive
in time to check, caused a tumult in Echague, which, owing to wise
councils and efforts at pacification, was appeased without it being
followed by serious consequences; but I have no doubt that this tumult
was due only to the suggestions of ungovernable and passionate persons
animated by the spirit of faction, since those who took part in it
were all Ilocanos, no native of Echague having any hand in it. The
same thing occurred in Naguilian, where the disorders were also
quieted. Not only did I make no report of all this to the government of
the republic on account of the abnormality of the present conditions,
but I also succeeded in concealing them from the foreigners here so
that they should not succeed in discovering the truth, which would
be to the prejudice of our cause."--Taylor, 42 AJ.

[295] "I may add that as judge of that district in 1901-2 there came
before me a number of cases in the trial of which the fact would be
brought out of this or that difference among the local authorities
having been referred to the Malolos Government for settlement. And
they always awaited until they heard from it,"--Blount, p 112.

[296] "General Otis's reports are full of the most inexcusable
blounders about how 'the Tagals' took possession of the various
provinces and just about those of a New Yorker or a Bostonian sent up
to Vermont in the days of the American Revolution to help organize
the resistance there, in conjunction with one of the local leaders
of the patriot cause in the Green Mountain State."--Blount, p. 112.

[297] Blount, p. 114.

[298] Taylor, 42 AJ.

[299] Blount, p. 111.

[300] P.I.R., 974. 3.

[301] "December 20, 1898.

"_To the Honorable President of the Revolutionary Government_.

"The undersigned residents of the _barangay_ of D. Francisco Querubin
and D. Melchor Balueg, of Bucay, of the province of Abra, appeal to
you with the utmost subjection from their place of residence and state:
That their heads or representatives, D. Francisco Querubin and Melchor
Balueg, respectively, force them to pay two _pesos_ each as a war tax,
your humble vassals above cited being hardly able to earn their own
livelihood and support their families, and, notwithstanding their
labor, some of them cannot get anything to eat without appealing to
the charity of their richer neighbours; but notwithstanding this sad
situation, they offer a _peseta_ each as a mark of gratitude to the
mother country, Filipinas, but said gentlemen, the representatives
mentioned, have not the slightest pity and worry us to the extent
of having kept us in our houses a day and a night without anything
to eat, not even permitting us to go out to get a drink.

"We must inform you that the head of the _barangay_, D. Melchor Balueg,
when he gathers the supplies for the troops stationed in his town, said
supplies consisting of rice, pigs, chickens and eggs, uses one-half
of what is gathered, and then again orders his assistants to save."

"In fact, the undersigned request you to direct that the _peseta_
which they offer be accepted and that the said Don Francisco Querubin
and Don Melchor Balueg be relieved of their duties, in order to put
a stop to the abuses constantly committed by them; and if this be
not done, the petitioners will be obliged to leave their homes and
property in the town and take up their residences in the mountains
with the Negritos and Igorots, in order that the others may remain
in the town and live tranquilly.

"This is a grace which we do not doubt we will receive from you,
whose life may God preserve for many years.

"_Bucay_, November 12, 1898." (26 signatures)

(In blue pencil in the handwriting of Aguinaldo:) "It will be approved.

"Dec. 20, 1898.

"E. A."

--P.I.R., 991. 4.

[302] P.I.R., 849.

[303] Blount, p. 130.

[304] _Ibid_., pp. 130-131.

[305] P.I.R., 1142. 4.

[306]  _Ibid_., 2002. 3.

[307] P.I.R., 964. 3.

[308] On November 30, 1898, the commander in Alaminos, Zambales
Province, telegraphed that his soldiers were all about to desert as
the head of the town would not furnish rations or pay without orders
from the governor."--P.I.R., 2002.3.

[309] "On December 22, Aguinaldo, in accordance with a request from
the governor of Zambales Province, ordered the heads of the provinces
of Pangasinan, Tarlac, Bataan, and Pampanga to prohibit the people
of their provinces from going to Zambales without passports signed by
them, stating the route they were to take in going and returning and
the length of time to be spent in the journey. The governor of Zambales
had asked for this regulation in order to prevent the commission of
robberies in Zambales and to distinguish persons justly subject to
suspicion from those of good conduct."--P.I.R., 266. 3.

[310] "On January 9, the governor of Zambales found it impossible
to continue the inspection of certain towns of his province and to
continue holding elections, as many of the officials had fled to escape
the exactions and abuses of the military commanders."--P.I.R., 988. 2.

[311] "The Governor of Cavite reports two drunken Americans have been
killed by our soldiers. I tell him to have an investigation immediately
and report the fact to the American commander."--P.I.R., 849.

[312] "Most urgent. Gen. Anderson informs me in a letter that,
'in order to avoid the very serious misfortune of an encounter
between our troops, I demand your immediate withdrawal with your
guard from Cavite. One of my men has been killed and three wounded
by your people.' This is positive and does not admit of explanation
or delay. I ask you to inform me of your decision."--P.I.R., 849.

[313] "_Gen. Riego de Dios, Cavite_: Telegram received. Do not
leave the post, and say that you cannot abandon the city without
my orders, and say that he was not killed by our soldiers, but by
them themselves [the Americans.--D. C. W.], since they were drunk,
according to your telegram. Give up your life before abandoning that
place, and investigate matters."--P.I.R., 849.

[314] "Urgent. Gen. Alvarez telegraphed that Riego de Dios informed him
that the town of Maragondong had risen in arms on account of abuses
committed by the local President against Salvador Riego. This is the
reason the town took up arms. Will go there to-morrow."--P.I.R., 849.

[315] Taylor, 19 AJ.

[316] P.I.R., 1057. 4.

[317] Taylor, 95 HS.

[318] The name applied to the Filipinos of Ambos Camarines, Albay
and Sorsogon.

[319] P.I.R., 262. 3.

[320] Taylor, 48 AJ.

[321]  Blount, p. 116.

[322] Accepting the 1903 census figures.

[323] Aguinaldo considered Mindanao important enough to form one of the
three federal states into which he proposed to divide the Philippines.

[324] Blount, p. 228.

[325] _Ibid_., p. 229.

[326] Bandits, or organized robbers.

[327] The old Spanish name for Palawan.

[328] Blount, p. 228.

[329] P.I.R., 944. 10.

[330] Blount, p. 116.

[331] Blount, p. 229.

[332] According to the census of 1903, 154,706.

[333] See table on p. 651.

[334] (Contemporary copy in Spanish.--P.I.R., Books C-L:)

"January 19, 1899.

"The President of the Philippine Republic very cordially greets his
great and powerful brother, the Sultan of Jolo, and makes known:--

"That the Filipinos, after having thrown off the yoke of foreign
domination cannot forget their brothers of Jolo to whom they are
bound by the ties of race, interests, security and defense in this
region of the Far East.

"The Philippine Republic has resolved to respect absolutely the
beliefs and traditions of each island in order to establish on solid
bases the bonds of fraternal unity demanded by our mutual interests.

"I therefore in the name of all the Filipinos very gladly offer to
the powerful Sultan of Jolo and to all brothers who acknowledge his
great authority, the highest assurance of friendship, consideration
and esteem.

"_Malolos_, January 18, 1899."

(No signature.)

[335] P.I.R., 76. 1.

[336] From an official document on file at Manila.

[337] "Being brothers, the descendants of the same race and of one
soul, the same sun shines upon us and we breathe the same air, so
that our sentiments are also one, and we aspire to the independence
and liberty of our country in order to secure its progress and place
it on a level with other civilized nations; and with this assurance I
have taken the liberty to address you this letter, begging of you to
accept the commission which in the name of our government I have the
honour to confer upon you. You are authorized thereunder to establish
in all the 'Rancherias' of Mindanao and Jolo, a civil and military
economic-administrative organization, in accordance with the decrees
which I enclose herewith, and after having established the same,
I request that you make a report to our Honourable President of the
Philippine Republic, Sr. Emilio Aguinaldo, of the result thereof
and of the number of the force with their arms and ammunition, in
order to ascertain whether they would be sufficient to prevent the
invasion of the enemy and whether there is any necessity of sending
reinforcements of arms to said Islands for this purpose. If in this
war, which I consider to be the last, we secure our independence, and
with the opposition of our brothers in that region, with yourself at
their head, we are successful in preventing the enemy from gaining a
foothold, the grateful country will always render a tribute of homage
and gratitude to your memory.

"God preserve you many years.

"May 31, 1899. "_Baldomero Aguinaldo_,

"Lieut. Gen. Superior P. M. Commander of Southern Region.

"To _The Honourable Sultan Raha Halon_"

--P.I.R., 810-4.

[338] Spanish for "mountain people."

[339] P.I.R., 512. A 5.

[340] Extract from a letter to Apacible of the Hongkong junta dated
February 26, 1899:--

"It is also said that the Cantonal Government of <DW64>s has wished
to make a treaty with the Americans, some members of that government
having come in American transports to confer with General Otis. We
are not aware of the conditions of the arrangement, because the <DW64>s
people have thus far not wished to put themselves in communication with
us; we only know by news more or loss reliable that the capital of that
island has been occupied by the American forces without opposition.

"Of Mindanao we know absolutely nothing; we also are ignorant of what
has been the lot of our agents in America."

[341] "Of the Visayas and Mindanao we know nothing positive as yet, it
is whispered that the Americans have succeeded in occupying <DW64>s and
Cebu against the will of the inhabitants. Iloilo continues the struggle
energetically. It does not matter that they occupy temporarily those
beautiful islands, because Luzon will know how to fight for herself
and the rest of the islands, and will not lay down arms without the
independence of the Philippine Archipelago."

[342] Blount, p. 140.

[343] P.I.R., 62. 2.

[344] _Ibid_., 144. 1.

[345] "The second reason for my resignation is the pain caused me by
having still to read among the reports of our military associates that
in some of the chiefs, besides odious favouritism, is clearly seen a
desire to enrich themselves, accepting bribes, making even prisoners
a means of gain, and others there are, above all the commissaries,
who dare to decrease the allowance of the soldier, little enough
already;--I throw the blame of all this upon those who taught us such
a custom; consequently I have reason to hope that they will change
their methods.

"The same cause of complaint I have concerning some companions who
are discharging civil offices, especially those who are far from
the oversight of the government, who put their own welfare before
the common good, and devise a thousand means to further their own
ends, even to the extent of gambling. Where are the police? Are they,
perchance, also bribed? Pity money is so ill spent! However, every one
is obliged to know that falsehood will never prevail against truth,
and as evidence hereof many soldiers have confessed to the government
as to having received certain sums in the share of the booty, and
if we consider that the latter who receive their share have told the
truth, why should those who are present during the partition of the
money and receive nothing, not do so? In this way the eyes of some
that were blinded are gradually opened; I confess, moreover, that
the latter are to be blamed less than those in authority who are so
attached to the methods of the past administration, who, we may hope,
will change their mode of conduct and exhibit true patriotism.



"I certify to the truth of all the above-mentioned evils, which must
be eradicated. I retain the evidence for presentation when called on,
so that if any of the readers hereof should consider themselves
referred
to and should resent it, I am ready to beg their pardon."--P.I.R., 8.2.

[346] Blount, p. 108.

[347] Senate Documents, Vol. 25, pp. 2928-2941.

[348] P.I.R., 838-2.

[349] In this connection note Blount's statement:--

"But we are considering how much of a government the Filipinos had
in 1898, because the answer is pertinent to what sort of a government
they could run if permitted now or at any time in the future."--Blount,
p. 73.

[350] Blount refers to

"The death-warrant of the Philippine republic signed by Mr. McKinley
on September 16th."--Blount, p. 99.

Speaking of Mr. Roosevelt's opinion of the practicability of granting
independence to the Filipinos, he says--

"Yet it represented then one of the many current misapprehensions
about the Filipinos which moved this great nation to destroy a young
republic set up in a spirit of intelligent and generous emulation of
our own."--Blount, p. 230.

[351] "Here was a man claiming to be President of a newly established
republic based on the principles set forth in our Declaration of
Independence, which republic had just issued a like Declaration, and he
was invited to come and hear our declaration read, and declined because
we would not recognize his right to assert the same truths."--Blount,
p. 59.

[352] "The war satisfied us all that Aguinaldo would have
been a small edition of Porfirio Diaz, and that the Filipino
republic-that-might-have-been would have been, very decidedly,
'a going concern,' although Aguinaldo probably would have been able
to say with a degree of accuracy, as Diaz might have said in Mexico
for so many years, 'The Republic? I am the Republic.'"--Blount, p. 292.

[353] "The war demonstrated to the army, to a Q. E. D., that the
Filipinos are 'capable of self-government,' unless the kind which
happens to suit the genius of the American people is the only kind of
government on earth that is respectable, and the one panacea for all
the ills of government among men without regard to their temperament or
historical antecedents. The educated patriotic Filipinos can control
the masses of the people in their several districts as completely as
a captain ever controlled a company."--Blount, p. 292.

[354] "Even to-day the presidente of a pueblo is as absolute boss
of his town as Charles F. Murphy is in Tammany Hall. And a town or
pueblo in the Philippines is more than an area covered by more or
less contiguous buildings and grounds. It is more like a township
in Massachusetts, so that when you account governmentally for the
pueblos of a given province, you account for every square foot of
that province and for every man in it."

[355] "In there reviewing the Samar and other insurrections of 1905
in the Philippines, you find him (_i.e._ Roosevelt) dealing with
the real root of the evil with perfect honesty, though adopting the
view that the Filipino people were to blame therefor, because we
had placed too much power in the hands of an ignorant electorate,
which had elected rascally officials."--Blount, p. 297.

Also:--

"But we proceeded to ram down their throats a preconceived theory that
the only road to self-government was for an alien people to step in
and make the ignorant masses the _sine qua non_."--Blount, p. 546.

Also:--

"Of course the ignorant elecorate we perpetrated on Samar as an
'expression of our theoretical views' proved that we had 'gone too
fast' in conferring self-government, or to quote Mr. Roosevelt, had
been 'reposing too much confidence in the self-governing power of
a people,' if to begin with the rankest material for constructing a
government that there was at hand was to offer a fair test of capacity
for self-government."--Blount, p. 546.

[356] P.I.R., 499. 1 Ex. 134.

[357] Ibid., 206. 1.

[358] Ibid., 1124. 2.

[359] Ibid., 204. 6.

[360] P.I.R., 206. 6.

[361] P.I.R., 674. 1.

[362] _Ibid._, 206. 3.

[363] P.I.R., 206. 3.

[364] On July 7, 1898, the secretary of the revolutionary junta
in Mindanao, in writing to Aguinaldo, closed his letter with the
following formula: "Command this, your vassal, at all hours at the
orders of his respected chief, on whom he will never turn his back,
and whom he will never forswear. God preserve you, Captain General,
many years." P.I.R., 1080. 1. Every now and then we find a queer use
of the term "royal family." This seems to have been common among the
mass of the people. Heads of towns and men of position often used
the expression "royal orders" in speaking of the orders and decrees
issued by Aguinaldo. For example, the officials of Tayug, a town of
19,000 people in Pangasinan Province, certified, on October 9, 1898,
that they had carried out the instructions for "the establishment of
the popular government in accordance with the royal decree of June 18,
1898."--P.I.R., 1188. 1.

In October certain of Aguinaldo's adherents in Tondo wrote to him and
protested against the acts of the local presidente, who, they held,
had not been duly elected in accordance with the provisions of the
"royal order" of June 18, 1898. They closed their respectful protest
by requesting that said royal order should be obeyed.--Taylor, AJ., 63.

In 1899 an officer of the army in Union Province wrote: "In accordance
with the orders of the secretary of war of our republican government
of these islands, issued in compliance with royal decree, article 5,
published on March 8." On September 1, 1898, the local presidente
of the town of Mangatarem, writing to the head of the province,
said that he had not furnished the estimates required because the
elections provided for in "article 7 of the royal decree of the
superior government, dated June 18 last," had not been approved. A
young son of a member of Aguinaldo's cabinet, writing to his father in
September, 1899, spoke of the "royal decree of June 18, 1898."--P.I.R.,
1188. 3. In Romblon, in August, 1898, elections were held in compliance
with the prescription of the "royal decree of June 18, 1898," and
Aguinaldo approved them, apparently without considering that this
was an anomalous way of describing a decree of the dictator of the
so-called republic. On March 7, 1899, a general in the revolutionary
service stated that an officer had been released from arrest by a
"royal order." The attitude of mind which made men speak of Aguinaldo's
"royal orders" in 1898 did not change when he fled before the advance
of the United States army. His orders remained royal orders. They
were again and again referred to in this way.

[365] P.I.R., Books C-1.

[366] P.I.R., 1216. 1.

[367] P.I.R., 1216. 1.

[368] P.I.R., 223.

[369] P.I.R. 1133. 1.

[370] P.I.R., 1137. 4.

[371] _Ibid.,_ R., 1165. 2.

[372] P.I.R., 319. 1.

[373] _Ibid.,_ 3. 33.

[374] _Ibid.,_ 1022. 3.

[375] P.I.R., 1200.

[376] P.I.R., 907. 6.

[377] P.I.R., 39. 7.

[378] The following memorandum to accompany a letter from Senor Don
Sixto Lopez, Secretary of Senor Don Felipe Agoncillo, to the Honorable
the Secretary of State, written January 5, 1899, clearly sets forth
this claim:--

"Pursuant to the action of said congress a detailed system of
government has been provided for and is actually maintained in all the
portions of the Philippine Islands, except so much of the provinces of
Manila and Cavite as is now in the actual possession of the American
Army, such excepted part containing only about 3 per cent. of the
population of the entire islands and an infinitely smaller proportion
of their area.

"From the foregoing it will appear that the Philippine government is
now, as it has been practically ever since the 16th of June, 1898,
in substantially full possession of the territory of the people it
represents."--Taylor Ex. 530 57 KU., Congressional Record, June 3,
1902, Vol. 35, part 6, p. 6217.

[379] Blount, p. 70.

[380] "September, 1898.

"_Decree_

"Although article 11, Chapter 2, of the Organic Decree of June
23 (1898) last, prescribes that the appointment of provisional
representatives of Congress be given to persons who have been born
or have resided in the provinces which they are to represent; taking
into consideration the urgent necessity that said body enter upon
its functions immediately, I hereby decree the following:--

"1. The following are appointed provisional Representatives ...

"2. A meeting of Congress is called for the 15th instant, to be held
in the town of Malolos, province of Bulacan.

"3. The Secretary of the Interior shall take steps to notify the
persons appointed and those elected by the popular commanders in the
provinces already occupied by the Revolution, of the call as soon
as possible.

"Giv ...."

(Attached hereto is the following, with the names written in Mabini's
handwriting:)

"September, 1898.

"Provinces not subject to the Revolutionary Government of the
Philippines.


Names               Classes
Albay               Highest class   2. Salvador V. del Rosario and Felipe
Buencamino
Ilocos Norte        do              2. Jose, Antonio Luna
Ilocos Sur          do              2. Ignacio Villamor, Jose Aleji
Isabela de Luzon    Third class     1. Ariston Bautista
Sorsogon            do              1. Jose Albert
Cagayan             do              1. Pablo Tecson

Abra                Pol.-Mil. Govt. 1. Isidro Paredes
Nueva Viscaya       do              1. Enrique Mendiola
Corregidor          do
Catanduanes         do
Batanes             do
Masbate and Ticao   Pol.-Mil.       1. Alberto Barreto
                    Comandancia
Amburayan           do
Apayaos             do
Benguet             do              1. Joaquin Luna
Binatanga           do
Bontoc              do              1. Fernando Canon
Burias              do
Cayapa              do
Itaves              do
Lepanto             do              1. Leon Apacible
Principe            do              1. Mariano Ocampo
Quiangan            do
Tiagan              do
Cabugauan           do
Island of Cebu      Pol.-Mil. Govt. 2. Cayetano Arellano and
                    of highest      Pardo de Tavera
                    class
Iloilo, Panay       do              2. Gregorio Araneta and Melecio
Figueroa
Island of Leyte     do              1. Leon Guerrero
<DW64>s Occidental   do              1. Jose Maria de la Vina
Island of Samar     do              Pablo Ocampo
Antique,
  Island of Panay   do              1. Hipolito Magsalin
Capiz               Lowest class    1. Miguel Zaragoza
<DW64>s Oriental     do              1. Aguedo Velarde
Island of Bohol     do              1. Juan Manday Gabriel
Romblon             Pol.-Mil.       1. Vicente Gonzalez Maninang
                    Comandancia
Concepion           do              1. Mariano V. del Rosario
Zamboanga           1st Dist.       1. Pedro A. Paterno
                    Pol.-Mil. Govt.
Misamis             2d Dist. do     1. Maximino Paterno
Surigao             3d Dist. do     1. Benito Valdes
Davao               4th Dist. do    1. Telesforo Chuidian
Cotabato            5th Dist. do    1. Enrique Mercaida
Basilan             6th Dist. do    1. Juan Tuason

Lanao               7th Dist. do    1. Gonzalo Tuason
Dapitan             Pol.-Mil.       1. Gonzalo Tuason
                    Comandancia
Butuan              do
Baras               is under Pol.-Mil. Govt. of Bahia Illana
Levac               is under Pol.-Mil. Comandancia of Cottabatto
Matti               Pol.-Mil. Comandancia
Malabang.           This Comandancia is  under the Military
                    Comandancia of Bahia Illana.
Reina Regente.      This Comandancia is under the Pol.-Mil.
                    Govt. of Cottabato
Bay of Sarangani    Pol.-Mil. Comandancia
  and adjacent
  islands
Tucuran             Pol.-Mil. Govt.
Island of Jolo      do              1. Benito Legarda
Siassi              Pol.-Mil. Com.
Tataan              do
Bongao              do
Island of Paragua   Pol.-Mil. Govt. 1. Felipe Calderon.
Balabac             do              1. Manuel Jerez
Calamianes          do              1. Manuel Genato
Marianas Islands    do
Oriental Carolines  do
Camarines,
  North and South                   Don Tomas del Rosario and
                                    Don Cecilio Hilario


Exhibit 226, 76 MG, E, Extract from original in Spanish, A. L. S.,
P.I.R., 416. 1."

[381] P.I.R., 38. 3.

[382] The 1903 census returns are here used for each of the several
peoples.

[383] P.I.R., 485. 1.

[384] P.I.R., 40. 1.

[385] P.I.R., 377. 13.

[386] _Ibid_., 472. 9.

[387] _Ibid_., 40. 8.

[388] _Ibid_., 849. See p. 143.

[389] A general term covering education, public works, agriculture
and commerce.

[390] P.I.R., 512. A 5.

[391] P.I.R., 485. 5.

[392] Senate Document 138, Fifty-sixth Congress, First Session.

[393] P.I.R., Books B-6.

[394] P.I.R., 472. 8.

[395] "To the Military Chiefs of the towns mentioned in the margin

[there is nothing in the margin.--TR.]:--

"As there are still many soldiers paying no notice to the order
forbidding the waste of cartridges, you are required to give a certain
amount of ammunition to each soldier and to see every day if there
is any cartridge missing, and if so, inquire into the reason. In
order that this may be successfully carried out, I have deemed it
proper to prescribe the punishment for such offence, of which you
will inform the soldiers under your command, and post this circular
in a prominent place. Said punishments are as follows:--

"_Art_. 1. A soldier found wasting ammunition shall be punished with 12
lashes; in case he commits the same offence again he shall be punished
with 24 lashes; and on a further offence of like character by the
same soldier, he shall be court-martialled and severely punished.

"_Art_. 2. A soldier who has been found short of even one cartridge out
of the ammunition assigned to him, shall be punished with 12 lashes,
provided that he has not previously been in any engagement.

"_Art_. 3. A soldier who has been found with no cartridges by reason
of throwing them away during an engagement, shall be court-martialled,
and severely punished.

"I most earnestly recommend you to carefully look after your soldiers
and see that every one is complying with the foregoing order.

"This order should be transmitted from one town to another mentioned in
the margin, and the last one should return it to this office with the
information that the same has been received and complied with by all.

"May God guard you many years.

"_E. Aguinaldo_, Dictator.

"_Cavite_, June 17th, 1898."

--P.I.R., 1124. 2.

[396] "November 16, 1900.

(Stamp) "_Lacuna Brigade. Headquarters_.

"_Major Thomas Tagunton_: Advise all officers of this brigade that
he who allows his soldiers to load their rifles without being before
the enemy, shall be liable to capital punishment. If the soldiers
intentionally or otherwise fire their pieces, whether in the air
or at any determined or undetermined person, said soldiers and the
officers to whose command they belong shall also be liable to the same
punishment as above, without further proceedings, for the reason that
we are almost in front of the enemy, and all the more if the shots
take effect upon any of the soldiers or chiefs.

"Sergeants and corporals shall also take heed of the present warnings,
as they will also be given the same punishment if they by abandoning
their squads allow them to commit certain outrages.

"You will report receipt of and compliance with this order.

"God preserve you many years.

"General Headquarters, November 16, 1900.

(Signed) "_Lacuna_, General, Political-Military Governor and Chief
of Operations."--P.I.R., 643. 1.

[397] Taylor, AJ. 85.

[398] "_Kabatuan_, Oct. 14th, 1899.

"_Edict_

"_Martin F. Delgado, General and Politico-Military Governor of the
Province of Iloilo_.

"As a consequence of the frequent assaults and robberies committed
by persons wearing military uniforms, and with the determination to
correct, with a firm hand, such scandalous conduct, which, besides
causing such deeds to be laid at the door of the military, also
makes it easier for evil-doers to commit their misdeeds, I have,
at the suggestion of the Councillor of Police, ordered the following:--

"1. From this date forward all private citizens are absolutely
prohibited from wearing military uniforms.

"2. All authorities, both civil and military, under this Government,
are obliged to see to the strict enforcements of this edict.

"3. All persons who, not being in the military service, are, after
the publication of this edict, found wearing military uniforms,
and who cannot show that they are in the military service, will be
suspected as evil-doers and will be sent to this Government to be
subjected to the corresponding corrective measures.

(Signed) " _Martin Delgado_,

"_Governor-General-President_."

--P.I.R., 881. 4.

[399] "On April 10, 1899, General Delgado wrote that, benignity having
failed, rigorous methods would be used to enforce collections and
that if the people did not pay--

"'I shall, with great pain, see myself under the necessity of
withdrawing all my forces to the mountains and leaving them [the
pueblos] to the fate which God will decide upon,' which of course
meant that he would leave them to the mercy of the bandits who stood
ready to descend upon them."--P.I.R., B., 4.

"This threat was not an idle one."--Taylor, 67 HS. E-L.

[400] "_Santa Cruz, Laguna_, July, 1899.

"_Hon. Sr. Emilio Aguinaldo_....

"There was a notorious bandit here who was the terror of the
province with his gang; I had him arrested and shot and the robberies
ceased. Murders were being committed; I had the murderers caught, shot
one of them, and there were no more murders; officers of the reserve
would consider themselves kings in their towns, they would shoot
the local _presidentes_ and commit other unlawful acts; I disarmed
them, and tried the most celebrated one, called Arcadio Castillo,
alias Bancucane, who attempted to escape and was killed. With the
death of these persons order has been completely reestablished in
this province. Several had rifles that were used only for robbery
and after two or three trials all turned over their rifles, and the
arming of the battalion was completed.

(Signed) "_Juan Cailles_."

--P.I.R., 7 & 8.

[401] "_Regional Revolutionary Government of the Visayas_.

"_Office of the President_.

"_Kabatuan_, March 16, 1899.

"_To the Honourable President of the Philippine Republic_,

"_Senor Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy_,

"_Most Distinguished President_:

"In order to avoid the distress which the knowledge of the abuses
which are already unbearable, daily committed by the troops of Senor
Diocno, will cause you, this government has hesitated to communicate
them to you, but, as there is almost a reign of terror here, it feels
that it must inform you of them in order to remedy them. The death
of private individuals and assaults committed in the towns are daily
reported as having been committed by the troops of General Diocno. Of
the numerous companies of Senor Diocno, only two under the orders of
General Araneta fight against the enemy, the remainder are the terror
of the town and it is a week since Sr. Diocno went to Capiz without
telling any one what he was going to do.

"In view of the facts pointed out, the soldiers of this General
constituting a constant danger to the town, this government asks you to
order General Diocno to turn over his rifles to us to kill Americans
with and to enable the towns to recover their former tranquillity;
this government asks this of you, relying upon the well-known justice
with which you act and it wishes for you many years of life for our
liberty and our independence.

"_Kabatuan_, March 16, 1899.

(Signed) "_Jovito Yusay_,

"_Temporary President._

(Signed) "_Francisco Soriano_,

"_General Secretary._"

--P.I.R., 52. 5.

[402] "Martin Delgado y Bermejo, lieutenant general and general in
chief of the republican army of the Visayan Islands.

"_General Headquarters of Santa Barbara_,

"April 20, 1899.

"The existence of a state of war, and the trying circumstances through
which the country is now passing have brought about a complete
change in the order of nearly all the pueblos; and I have noticed
with profound regret that sacking, robbery, sequestrations, and
other crimes highly dishonourable to our noble cause, are of daily
occurrence. With a view to preventing such conduct in the future,
and in order to guarantee to the inhabitants of the military district
under my command the most complete tranquillity, I hereby decree:

"1. That any person or persons who commit acts of brigandage,
sequestration, incendiarism, rape, or other disturbances of a public
nature calculated to excite the public, or which infringe individual
or property rights, shall be severely punished in accordance with
military law.

"2. That all offenders who present themselves to the Local or Military
Authorities within the 30 days immediately following this date, and
who turn over their arms and join our forces and help to fight other
outlaws and to defend the nation, will be pardoned for the crimes
they have committed.

"3. That when the period of 30 days above mentioned has passed, any
person taken in the act of committing robbery, or who attempts to rob
with an organized band of outlaws, or who steals, rapes, or performs
acts of incendiarism, or any other criminal act, will be summarily
condemned to death by a military tribunal.

"The Local Juntas of the various towns in conjunction with citizens
of standing and the military authorities will organize a vigilance
service to maintain public order and the authority of the law.

"_M. Delgado_."

--P.I.R., Books B 4.

[403] "February 13, 1899.

(In the margin: A stamp which says:) "Philippine Republic--Headquarters
of operations of the provinces of Southern Luzon.

"It is with great regret that I have learned that robberies, assaults,
kidnapping, and other crimes which are committed only by barbarous
and savage tribes, are taking place in our towns, without taking
into consideration that the purpose of the insurrection which has
given origin to our social regeneration is true justice, for the
reestablishment of which the lives and property are being sacrificed
of all who are proud of being called Filipinos. These acts are being
committed without restriction by civilians as well as soldiers perhaps
with the cooeperation of their respective chiefs, to the shame of
the authority vested in them and to the prejudice of the society to
which they unworthily belong, and even to the integrity itself of
the Republic. And in order that these barbarous and savage acts may
disappear and that rigorous and exemplary punishment be meted out,
I have deemed it proper to forward to you for general information
the proclamation of these Headquarters of February 12th last, which
is as follows":

(Signed) "_Mariano Trias_.

"_Lieutenant-General_.

"_To the Politico-Military Chief of Infanta_."--P.I.R., 896-9.

[404] "There does not seem to have been the faintest conception that
there was any reason for not using the white flag to deceive people
who were foolish enough to believe that Aguinaldo was going to adhere
to the rules prescribed for its use. The writer in the early spring
of 1899 once watched an insurgent party advance under a white flag
upon an American line of trenches. When an officer and a bugler went
forward to receive them they threw down the flag and immediately
opened fire with the rifles which they were then seen to be dragging
behind them."--_Taylor_, 48 HS.

[405] "Such ammunition was not effective unless fired from very
close quarters, but even its possession made the guerrillas stronger
than the people of the country and undoubtedly had much to do with
securing their cooeperation, not only as bolomen but also in the
digging of the pits which were placed in the trails and also set
about the towns. These were required to be constructed by the local
authorities. In the bottom was set a sharp spike of bamboo, sometimes
poisoned; and the pit was covered with leaves and soil upon a fragile
framework; so that if a man stood upon it he would fall through upon
the spike. Bows were set in the jungle with a string set across the
trail so that any one stumbling over it would discharge a sharp bamboo
shaft with a poisoned head. On September 18, 1900, Lukban congratulated
the people of the town of Katubig upon the efficient use they had made
of arrows with the heads dipped in 'dita,' a native poison. (P.I.R.,
502. 8.)"

--_Taylor_, 83 HS.

[406] See also the chapter entitled "Murder as a Governmental
Institution."

[407] See p. 313.

[408] The following newspaper supplement printed in Tagalog for the
benefit of the common people, is typical of this class of literature,
with which the country was kept flooded:

(Circular printed in Tagalog. P.I.R., 17-6. Supplement to _Heraldo
Filipino_.

"Friday, 24th February, 1899.

"_Countrymen_:

"We must consider ourselves fortunate that the bad intentions of
North America were found out early. If we had not found them out by
this time we should have been entrapped. And we should thank God that
they commenced the war.

"You ought to know by this time that these people can teach us
nothing good. What we can learn from them is all evil. You must
admit the truth of what they are reported to do to our brothers in
Manila where they rob the houses when the dwellers in them are out
or busy. Their evil inclinations prevail over them to such an extent
that the houses most worthy of consideration are not safe. They are
worse than the wild people who live in the woods, they have not the
slightest idea of looking at things from the point of view of a man
of honour nor have they the slightest respect for reason, for this
does not control their actions in the least. Without the slightest
attention to civility they rush into houses and if they find the
people eating, without saying a word, they take what they want from
the table, put it into their mouths and go as they came.

"If they find people sleeping or resting, taking the siesta, it makes
no difference to them; they go into the most private parts of the
house as though they were walking in the street.

"In the shops they take what pleases them and if the owner wants
payment they threaten him with their rifles.

"One can hardly believe and my pen refuses to write all of the
perversity, and evil and bad habits of these people.

"Their habits and manners are a disgrace to the country where they
were born. In no history have such customs and manners been described
even in that of the most ignorant people.

"They search women who pass, feeling all over their bodies, taking
from them money and whatever else they carry and if they come on them
in a lonely place they strip them naked after violating them and do
not leave a rag on them.

"Are these those honest men of whom we have heard? Are these the
people who were going to teach us good habits? Are these the people who
were going to guide us? The race which does these things is the most
hated one in the world, it is the race which commits most cruelties,
it is the race which does not treat its mother with respect; in this
race there is not the slightest idea of personal dignity, it is a
race which does not know what honour is, which does not possess the
slightest vestige of regard for good manners. Are these the people
who are going to protect us? It is better for us to die at once than
fall into the power of these unequalled malefactors.

"iDown with the bad men!

"iKill the Americans!!

"iLet the people of the United States be exterminated!!!

"iNotice.--This sheet is distributed gratis."

[409] "A light upon the treatment of women by these people is given
by the fact that after an American detachment had captured Lukban's
papers and family on August 18, and came so close to taking him that
he was able to recognize their guide, one of his correspondents wrote
to him that to their surprise the women, who had fully expected to
be abused, had been treated with respect and given a house to live
in. (P.I.R., 1143.4.)"--_Taylor_, 84 HS.

[410] In a letter to General Ambrosio Moxica from ------ dated March 2,
1900, occurs the following:--

"The guerillas quartered in the neighbourhood must render mutual
assistance and keep up communication, so as to get the news as to where
the enemy comes or goes, and the time at which they will pass certain
points, endeavouring also to arrange that all the guerilla bands should
have regular couriers, with you or with general headquarters, giving
advice daily of any occurrence and carrying correspondence. They must
select trustworthy women to carry correspondence, charging them to
hide the letters underneath their skirts, bearing in mind that the
Americans do not search them; and in sending to the towns for arms
or food, the orders must be sent by women and for small quantities,
so as not to attract attention."--P.I.R., 2035. 3.

[411] Simeon Villa, who accompanied Aguinaldo on his long flight,
kept a somewhat detailed account of events in the form of a diary.

[412] P.I.R., 869.

[413] _Ibid._

[414] P.I.R., 2035. 3.

[415] P.I.R., 886. 13.

[416] Exhibit 1233

(Original in Spanish. Contemporary copy. P.I.R., Books B. 4.)

"_General Headquarters, Santa Barbara_, Feb. 28th, 1899."

(Literal copy of telegram.)

"Casualties, Americans, on 6th, 2000 Colonels dead, one General;
all churches converted into hospitals full American wounded; total
American casualties 7000 confirmed by General Fullon just arrived
from Malolos; says also Iloilo quiet and not taken.

"A true copy

"By order of Chief of Staff.

"_Juan Beloso_."

[417] (Supplement to the _Filipino Herald_.)

"Thursday, Feb. 23rd, 1899.--4 P.M.

"The Filipino Army occupies the suburbs of Manila.

"The three columns commanded by Generals Pio del Pilar and Licerio
and Col. Hizon now occupy the suburbs of Sampaloc, San Miguel, San
Sebastian, Binondo, San Nicholas and Tondo.

"The Cavite battalion has possession of the Cuartel de Meisic and
our flag is now flying there.

"_Six Thousand Americans Besieged!!!_

"The American troops now in Caloocan and La Loma to the number of over
six thousand are besieged by the columns commanded by Generals Luna,
Llanera and Garcia.

"_The Honourable President_

"This very moment the special train carrying the Honourable President
has left for Caloocan.

"Viva the independent Philippines!!!

"Viva the unconquerable Philippine Army!!!

"Notice. This sheet is distributed gratis."--P.I.R., 70-6.

[418] (News.) The American General, MacArthur, with his entire staff,
was taken prisoner by our troops in Northern Luzon. Another American
general died on the 5th of January last in the North, who was seriously
wounded in an ambush or fight. When shot he was a colonel, but on
account of said fight he was promoted to the rank of a general, so that
later when he died, he had the benefit of that rank."--P.I.R., 2035. 3.

[419] (Telegrams)

"_Washington_, January 15, 1900, 10 A.M.

"(Received, Cebu, January 16, 1900, 11 A.M.)

"Owing to a new disaster of the Union Army, MacKinley has tendered
his resignation as President, Mr. Bryan succeeding him.

"Peace promulgated in the Philippines. Basis of the protectorate is
being discussed.

"Philippine independence will be proclaimed February the 4th.

"Remark.--The basis of a protectorate has been published in
English."

"_Manila_, January 20, 1900, 10 A.M.

"(Received at Cebu on the same day, at 11 A.M.)

"Otis' successor, John Waterly, of the democratic party, has just
arrived. He brings with him papers and instructions in regard to
proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

"It is believed that Rev. Martin, Bishop of Cebu, will be transferred
to the Archbishopric of Manila, and Rev. Nozaleda to Spain."--P.I.R.,
Books B-10.

[420] P.I.R., 1193. 2.

[421] _Ibid.,_ 2025.

[422] Taylor, 47 HS.

[423] Beginning on page 730.

[424] Taylor, 36 GV, Exhibit 1017.

[425] Taylor, 28 HS.

[426] P.I.R., 1021.6.

[427] Unhusked rice.

[428] Village.

[429] 153, according to Blount himself.

[430] "Nor can the ultimate responsibility before the bar of history
for the awful fact that, according to the United States Coast and
Geodetic Survey Atlas of the Philippines of 1899, the population of
Batangas province was 312,192, and according to the American Census
of the Philippines of 1903, it was 257,715, rest entirely on military
shoulders."--Blount, pp. 383-384.

[431] Blount, p. 597.

[432] See Chapters XI and XII.

[433] Taylor, 13 KK, E.

[434] Taylor, 15 and 16 KK, E.

[435] "Pope" Isio was the last of a series of bandit leaders, claiming
for themselves miraculous powers, who long infested the mountains
of <DW64>s.

[436] P.I.R., 970. 7.

[437] P.I.R., 1134-1.

[438] P.I.R., 17. 9.

[439] For the full text of these instructions, see appendix.

[440] "Mr. McKinley sent Mr. Taft out, in the spring preceding
the election of 1900, to help General MacArthur run the
war."--_Blount_. The Taft Commission was sent out, to 'aid'
General MacArthur, as the Schurman Commission had 'aided' General
Otis."--Blount.

[441] "In February, 1899, the dogs of war being already let loose,
President McKinley had resumed his now wholly impossible Benevolent
Assimilation programme, by sending out the Schurman Commission,
which was the prototype of the Taft Commission, to yearningly
explain our intentions to the insurgents, and to make clear to them
how unqualifiedly benevolent those intentions were. The scheme was
like trying to put salt on a bird's tail after you have flushed
him."--Blount.

[442] P.I.R., 1300. 2.

[443] A brand of whiskey then much in use.

[444] For the text of this document see the Appendix, p. 977.

[445] In view of the alleged attitude of General Otis toward the work
of the Commission, the following statement by him as to the effect
of this proclamation is of interest:--

General Otis said: "It was unanimously decided to print, publish,
post, and disseminate as much as possible among the inhabitants under
insurgent domination this address, printing the same in the English,
Spanish, and Tagalog languages. This was done, but scarcely had it been
posted in Manila twenty-four hours before it was so torn and mutilated
as to be unrecognizable. It suffered the same fate as the proclamation
of January 4, set out in pages 113 and 114 of this report, but it
produced a marked beneficial influence on the people, especially those
outside our lines, as it carried with it a conviction of the United
States' intentions, on account of the source from which it emanated,
it being an expression from a committee of gentlemen especially
appointed to proclaim the policy which the United States would pursue."

--_Taylor_, 90 AJ.

Taylor adds: "The commander of one of the regiments of sandatahan in
Manila reported that he had forced the people of the city to destroy
the proclamations issued by the commission (P.I.R., 73. 9). As he
found this necessary, the action of the people could hardly have
reflected their real feelings in the matter."

[446] Taylor, 96 AJ.

[447] _Ibid._

[448] Taylor, 97 AJ.

[449] Taylor, 97 AJ.

[450] _Ibid._

[451] Nominally they were named by Aguinaldo.

[452] Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, Vol. I,
1900, p. 9.

[453] Now chief justice of the Philippine Supreme Court.

[454] Blount, p. 235.

[455] Blount, p. 105.

[456] Report Philippine Commission, Vol. I, p. 183.

[457] P. 981.

[458] September 15, 1913.

[459] The building where the executive offices of the insular
government have been located since the American occupation.

[460] Taylor, 18 HS.

[461]  This name is applied to certain provinces organized
under special acts because the majority of their inhabitants are
non-Christians.

[462] Tayabas, Romblon, Masbate, Iloilo, Antique, Capiz, Cebu, Bohol,
Occidental <DW64>s, Oriental <DW64>s, Leyte, Albay, Ambos, Camarines,
Sorsogon, Marinduque, Batangas, Surigao, and Misamis.

[463] Obviously a misprint, perhaps, for "perusal of."

[464] Blount, p. 380.

[465] For further details see pp. 746; 753.

[466] A native surf boat.

[467] See Chapters XXI-XXIV.

[468] Chap. XV.

[469] Chap. XIV.

[470] Chap. XVI.

[471] Chap. XVII.

[472] Chap. XVIII.

[473] See Chapter XIX.

[474] Chap. XXX.

[475] Chap. XXX.

[476] Chap. XXXI.

[477] Chap. XXXII.

[478] Chapter XXVII.

[479] Chapters XIV, XXII, XXIII and XXIV.

[480] Reply to Jones, Pamphlet, Manila, 1913.

[481] See pp. 375-77.

[482] See pp. 357-77.

[483] Under the new regime these figures have been reversed.

[484] See Chapters XX-XXIV.

[485] "The merit system has received renewed support from President
Roosevelt in his administration, and by the extension of civil
service throughout the nation, as well as in our new possessions. The
Philippine service is reported to be very satisfactory, and efforts
are being made for the extension and larger development of regulations
in Porto Rico."

[486] "From the President down, every official charged with a
duty touching the government of our dependencies is imbued with a
profound sense of duty, and adequate realization of the situation
and the imperative necessity of an unselfish, patriotic execution of
the laws and regulations in the interest of the highest welfare of
the inhabitants of the dependencies. With this state of affairs, the
establishment of the merit system in them on an enduring basis should
follow as a matter of course. It will be the aim of this Committee to
aid in every possible way in extending and improving the system, and
to that end to give to the whole subject careful and detailed study."

[487] No data for 1906 available.

[488] Eight passed last year.

[489] He now receives $9000.

[490] Male servant.

[491] Two weeks at Christmas and ten weeks in April, May and June.

[492] Blount, p. 425.

[493] Blount, p.430.

[494] Native dugouts.

[495] See p. 998.

[496] Female servant.

[497] Men appointed to assist the judge in deciding questions of
fact. Their decision is not binding on him.

[498] Here [_i.e._ in me] you have a new servant.

[499] Malaria.

[500] A strong alcoholic drink commonly made by diluting low-grade
alcohol with water and flavouring it.

[501] There was one stray case in March.

[502] "To the Editor of El Soberania Nacional, Manila, P.I.

"_Sir_: In your issue of the 7th of July there appeared a paragraph
embodying a shameful libel of the administration of the San Lazaro
Hospital, which reads as follows:

"'_Un cuadro verdaderamente aterrador es el que prezenta el patio del
Hospital de San Lazaro. Los fallecidos por la enfermedad del colera,
son expuestos desnudos en el atrio de dicho Hospital con un cartel
atado en los pies con la inscripcion de sus respectivos nombres._'

"This statement was so grossly and ridiculously false and at the same
time so extremely harmful in its effect as to bring you fairly and
squarely within the reach of the law.

"Yesterday morning I sent you a courteous letter requesting you to
come to my office, purposing to discuss the affair with you in a
friendly manner, and hoping to find that the statement referred to
had been prepared by some irresponsible subordinate and published
through oversight.

"As, however, you have neither acceded to my request for a conference
nor had the courtesy to reply to my letter, I now have the honour
to forward you herewith a communication which embodies a reply to
the false statement above referred to and at the same time conveys
information as to what is actually being done at the San Lazaro
Hospital. I request that you give this letter immediate publicity
through your paper, and in the editorial columns or elsewhere in
some conspicuous place retract immediately and fully the libellous
statement relative to the exposure of the dead, above referred to.

"Kindly advise me of your intention in the matter. The bearer of
this communication has instructions to wait for your reply. I shall
interpret failure to hear from you by return messenger as refusal
to retract this slander and to publish the enclosed communication,
and shall act accordingly.

"Very respectfully,

"Dean C. Worcester,

"_Secretary of the Interior._"

[503] Just before I left Manila in October, 1913, cholera reappeared
there.

[504] Sept. 15, 1913.

[505] The first organization of American physicians in the Philippines
was the Manila Medical Association, from which the Philippine Island
Medical Association ultimately developed.

[506] Now a major-general.

[507] About 28.7 miles.

[508] May 1, 1913.

[509] Captain Meade.

[510] He had the volunteer rank of colonel, but was a major in the
regular army.

[511] Report of the Philippine Commission, Part 1, 1903, p. 58.

[512] May 1, 1913.

[513] April 15, 1913.

[514] May 1, 1913.

[515] This rate, for the fiscal year 1913, was 3.33 per thousand for
Filipinos and 2.49 per thousand for Americans.






End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Philippines: Past and Present
(Volume 1 of 2), by Dean Conant Worcester

*** 