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  THE OFFICER’S MANUAL.

  NAPOLEON’S
  MAXIMS OF WAR.


  RICHMOND, VA.:
  WEST & JOHNSTON.
  1862.




  EVANS & COGSWELL, PRINTERS.
  NO. 3 BROAD ST., CHARLESTON, S. C.




RECOMMENDATION.


“After refreshing my memory by looking over again ‘The Officer’s
Manual,’ or ‘Maxims of Napoleon,’ I think I may safely recommend the
republication, in America, of the work in English, as likely to be
called for by many officers, regular and volunteer. It contains a
circle of maxims, deduced from the highest source of military science
and experience, with practical illustrations of the principles taken
from the most celebrated campaigns of modern times. The study of the
book cannot fail to set all young officers on a course of inquiry and
reflection greatly to their improvement.

            “WINFIELD SCOTT.”




PREFACE.


The publisher has reissued this little volume as a publication timely
for the occasion. A collection of maxims which directed the military
operations of the greatest captain of modern times, cannot fail to
prove of great use to such young officers as really desire a knowledge
of the art of war. The maxims are illustrated by instances drawn from
the campaigns of Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Frederick, and Napoleon.
These great men were all governed by the same principles, and it is by
applying these principles to the perusal of their respective campaigns,
that every military man will recognize their wisdom, and make such use
of them hereafter as his own particular genius shall point out.

“And here, perhaps,” says the translator, Col. D’Aguilar, “my task
might have been considered finished; but perceiving how incomplete
the collection was alone, I have endeavored to supply the deficiency
by having recourse for further illustration to the memoirs of
Montécuculli, and the instructions of Frederick to his generals. The
analogy of their principles with those of Napoleon, has convinced me
that the art of war is susceptible of two points of view: one, which
relates entirely to the acquirements and genius of the general; the
other, which refers to matters of detail.

“The first is the same in all ages, and with all nations, whatever be
the arms with which they fight. Hence it follows that, in every age,
great commanders have been governed by the same principles.

“The business of detail, on the contrary, is controlled by existing
circumstances. It varies with the character of a people, and the
quality of their arms.

“It is with a view to impress the justice of this remark, that I have
sought for facts in different periods of history, to illustrate these
maxims, and to prove that nothing is _problematical_ in war; but that
failure and success in military operations depend almost always on the
natural genius and science of the chief.”




NAPOLEON’S

MAXIMS OF WAR.




MAXIM I.


The frontiers of states are either large rivers, or chains of
mountains, or deserts. Of all these obstacles to the march of an army,
the most difficult to overcome is the desert; mountains come next, and
broad rivers occupy the third place.


NOTE.

Napoleon, in his military career, appears to have been called upon to
surmount every difficulty which can occur in wars of invasion.

In Egypt he traversed deserts, and vanquished and destroyed the
Mamelukes, so celebrated for their address and courage. His genius
knew how to accommodate itself to all the dangers of this distant
enterprise, in a country ill adapted to supply the wants of his troops.

In the conquest of Italy, he twice crossed the Alps by the most
difficult passes, and at a season, too, which rendered this undertaking
still more formidable. In three months he passed the Pyrenees, defeated
and dispersed four Spanish armies. In short, from the Rhine to the
Borysthenes, no natural obstacle could be found to arrest the rapid
march of his victorious army.




MAXIM II.


In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee
everything the enemy may do, and to be prepared with the necessary
means to counteract it.

Plans of campaign may be modified _ad infinitum_ according to
circumstances--the genius of the general, the character of the troops,
and the topography of the theatre of action.


NOTE.

Sometimes we see a hazardous campaign succeed, the plan of which is
directly at variance with the principles of the art of war. But this
success depends generally on the caprice of fortune, or upon faults
committed by the enemy--two things upon which a general must never
count. Sometimes the plan of a campaign, although based on sound
principles of war, runs the risk of failing at the outset if opposed
by an adversary who acts at first on the defensive, and then, suddenly
seizing the initiative, surprises by the skilfulness of his manœuvres.
Such was the fate of the plan laid down by the Aulic council for the
campaign of 1796, under the command of Marshal Wurmser. From his
great numerical superiority, the marshal had calculated on the entire
destruction of the French army, by cutting off its retreat. He founded
his operations on the defensive attitude of his adversary, who was
posted on the line of the Adige, and had to cover the siege of Mantua,
as well as central and lower Italy.

Wurmser, supposing the French army fixed in the neighborhood of
Mantua, divided his forces into three corps, which marched separately,
intending to unite at that place. Napoleon, having penetrated the
design of the Austrian general, perceived the advantage to be derived
from striking the first blow against an army divided into three corps,
with no communication between them. He hastened, therefore, to raise
the siege of Mantua, assembled the whole of his forces, and by this
means became superior to the imperialists, whose divisions he attacked
and beat in detail. Thus Wurmser, who fancied he had only to march
to certain victory, saw himself compelled, after ten days campaign,
to retire with the remains of his army into the Tyrol, after a loss
of twenty-five thousand men in killed and wounded, fifteen thousand
prisoners, nine stand of colors, and seventy pieces of cannon.

Hence, nothing is so difficult as to prescribe beforehand to a general
the line of conduct he shall pursue during the course of a campaign.
Success must often depend on circumstances that cannot be foreseen;
and it should be remembered, likewise, that nothing cramps so much the
efforts of genius as compelling the head of an army to be governed by
any will but his own.




MAXIM III.


An army which undertakes the conquest of a country, has its two
wings resting either upon neutral territories, or upon great natural
obstacles, such as rivers or chains of mountains. It happens in some
cases that only one wing is so supported; and in others that both are
exposed.

In the first instance cited, viz., where both wings are protected,
a general has only to protect his front from being penetrated. In
the second, where one wing only is supported, he should rest upon
the supported wing. In the third, where both wings are exposed, he
should depend upon a central formation, and never allow the different
corps under his command to depart from this: for if it be difficult
to contend with the disadvantage of having _two_ flanks exposed,
the inconvenience is doubled by having _four_, trebled if there be
_six_--that is to say, if the army is divided into two or three
different corps. In the first instance, then, as above quoted, the line
of operation may rest indifferently on the right or on the left. In
the second, it should be directed toward the wing in support. In the
third, it should be perpendicular to the centre of the army’s line of
march. But in all these cases it is necessary, at a distance of every
five or six days march, to have a strong post or an entrenched position
upon the line of operation, in order to collect military stores and
provisions, to organize convoys, to form of it a centre of movement,
and establish a point of defence to shorten the line of operation of
the army.


NOTE.

These general principles in the art of war were entirely unknown, or
lost sight of, in the middle ages. The crusaders in their incursions
into Palestine appear to have had no object but to fight and to
conquer, so little pains did they take to profit by their victories.
Hence, innumerable armies perished in Syria, without any other
advantage than that derived from the momentary success obtained by
superior numbers.

It was by the neglect of these principles, also, that Charles XII,
abandoning his line of operation and all communication with Sweden,
threw himself into the Ukraine, and lost the greater part of his army
by the fatigue of a winter campaign in a barren country destitute of
resources.

Defeated at Pultawa, he was obliged to seek refuge in Turkey, after
crossing the Nieper with the remains of his army, diminished to little
more than one thousand men.

Gustavus Adolphus was the first who brought back the art of war to its
true principles. His operations in Germany were bold, rapid, and well
executed. He made success at all times conducive to future security,
and established his line of operation so as to prevent the possibility
of any interruption in his communications with Sweden. His campaigns
form a new era in the art of war.




MAXIM IV.


When the conquest of a country is undertaken by two or three armies,
which have each their separate line of operation, until they arrive at
a point fixed upon for their concentration, it should be laid down as a
principle, that the union of these different corps should never take
place near the enemy; because the enemy, in uniting his forces, may not
only prevent this junction, but may beat the armies in detail.


NOTE.

In the campaign of 1757, Frederick, marching to the conquest of Bohemia
with two armies, which had each their separate line of operation,
succeeded, notwithstanding, in uniting them in sight of the Duke of
Lorraine, who covered Prague with the imperial army; but his example
should not be followed. The success of this march depended entirely on
the inaction of the duke, who, at the head of seventy thousand men, did
nothing to prevent the junction of the two Prussian armies.




MAXIM V.


All wars should be governed by certain principles, for every war should
have a definite object, and be conducted according to the rules of
art. (A war should only be undertaken with forces proportioned to the
obstacles to be overcome.)


NOTE.

It was a saying of Marshal Villars, that when war is decided on, it is
necessary to have exact information of the number of troops the enemy
can bring into the field, since it is impossible to lay down any solid
plan of offensive or defensive operation without an accurate knowledge
of what you have to expect and fear. “When the first shot is fired,”
observes Marshal Villars, “no one can calculate what will be the issue
of the war. It is, therefore, of vast importance to reflect maturely
before we begin it.” When once, however, this is decided, the marshal
observes that the boldest and most extended plans are generally the
wisest and the most successful. “When we are determined upon war,” he
adds, “we should carry it on vigorously and without trifling.”




MAXIM VI.


At the commencement of a campaign, to _advance_ or _not to advance_,
is a matter for grave consideration; but when once the offensive has
been assumed, it must be sustained to the last extremity. However
skilful the manœuvres in a retreat, it will always weaken the _morale_
of an army, because, in losing the chances of success, these last are
transferred to the enemy. Besides, retreats always cost more men and
_materiel_ than the most bloody engagements; with this difference, that
in a battle the enemy’s loss is nearly equal to your own--whereas in a
retreat the loss is on your side only.


NOTE.

Marshal Saxe remarks, that no retreats are so favorable as those which
are made before a languid and unenterprising enemy, for when he pursues
with vigor, the retreat soon degenerates into a rout. “Upon this
principle it is a great error,” says the marshal, “to adhere to the
proverb which recommends us to build a bridge of gold for a retreating
enemy. No; follow him up with spirit, and he is destroyed!”




MAXIM VII.


An army should be ready every day, every night, and at all times of the
day and night, to oppose all the resistance of which it is capable.
With this view, the soldier should always be furnished completely
with arms and ammunition; the infantry should never be without its
artillery, its cavalry, and its generals; and the different divisions
of the army should be constantly in a state to support, to be
supported, and to protect itself.

The troops, whether halted, or encamped, or on the march, should be
always in favorable positions, possessing the essentials required for
a field of battle; for example, the flanks should be well covered, and
all the artillery so placed as to have free range, and to play with the
greatest advantage. When an army is in column of march, it should have
advanced guards and flanking parties, to examine well the country in
front, to the right, and to the left, and always at such distance as
to enable the main body to deploy into position.


NOTE.

The following maxims, taken from the memoirs of Montécuculli, appear
to me well suited to this place, and calculated to form a useful
commentary on the general principles laid down in the preceding maxim:

1. When war has been once decided on, the moment is past for doubts and
scruples. On the contrary, we are bound to hope that all the evil which
may ensue, will not; that Providence, or our own wisdom, may avert it;
or that the want of talent on the part of the enemy may prevent him
from benefiting by it. The first security for success is to confer the
command on one individual. When the authority is divided, the opinions
of the commanders often vary, and the operations are deprived of that
_ensemble_ which is the first essential to victory. Besides, when an
enterprise is common to many, and not confined to a single person, it
is conducted without vigor, and less interest is attached to the result.

After having strictly conformed to all the rules of war, and satisfied
ourselves that nothing has been omitted to ensure eventual success,
we must then leave the issue in the hands of Providence, and repose
ourselves tranquilly in the decision of a higher power.

Let what will arrive, it is the part of a general-in-chief to remain
firm and constant in his purposes; he must not allow himself to be
elated by prosperity, nor to be depressed by adversity: for in war good
and bad and fortune succeed each other by turns, form the ebb and flow
of military operations.

2. When your own army is strong and inured to service, and that of the
enemy is weak and consists of new levies, or of troops enervated by
long inaction, then you should exert every means to bring him to battle.

If, on the other hand, your adversary has the advantage in troops, a
decisive combat is to be avoided, and you must be content to impede
his progress, by encamping advantageously, and fortifying favorable
passes. When armies are nearly equal in force, it is desirable _not_ to
avoid a battle, but only to attempt to fight one to advantage. For this
purpose, care should be taken to encamp always in front of the enemy;
to move when he moves, and occupy the heights and advantageous grounds
that lie upon his line of march; to seize upon all the buildings and
roads adjoining to his camp, and post yourself advantageously in the
places by which he must pass. It is always something gained to make
_him_ lose time, to thwart his designs, or to <DW44> their progress
and execution. If, however, an army is altogether inferior to that
of the enemy, and there is no possibility of manœuvring against him
with success, then the campaign must be abandoned, and the troops must
retire into the fortresses.

3. The principal object of a general-in-chief, in the moment of battle,
should be to secure the flanks of his army. It is true that natural
positions may be found to effect this object, but these positions being
fixed and immovable in themselves, they are only advantageous to a
general who wishes to wait the shock of the enemy, and not to one who
marches to the attack.

A general can, therefore, rely only on the proper arrangement of his
troops, to enable him to repel any attempt the adversary may make upon
the front, or flanks, or rear of his army.

If one flank of an army rests upon a river, or an impassable ravine,
the whole of the cavalry may be posted with the other wing, in order to
envelop the enemy more easily by its superiority in numbers.

If the enemy has his flanks supported by woods, light cavalry or
infantry should be despatched to attack him in flank or in rear during
the heat of the battle. If practicable, also, an attack should be made
upon the baggage, to add to his confusion.

If you desire to beat the enemy’s left with your right wing, or his
right with your left wing, the wing with which you attack should be
reinforced by the _élite_ of your army. At the same moment, the other
wing should avoid battle, and the attacking wing brought rapidly
forward, so as to overwhelm the enemy. If the nature of the ground
admits, he should be approached by stealth, and attacked before he
is on his guard. If any signs of fear are discoverable in the enemy,
and which are always to be detected by confusion or disorder in his
movements, he should be pursued immediately, without allowing him
time to recover himself. It is now the cavalry should be brought into
action, and manœuvre so as to surprise and cut off his artillery and
baggage.

4. The order of march should always be subservient to the order of
battle, which last should be arranged beforehand. The march of an army
is always well regulated when it is governed by the distance to be
accomplished, and by the time required for its performance. The front
of the column of march should be diminished or increased according
to the nature of the country, taking care that the artillery always
proceeds by the main road.

When a river is to be passed, the artillery should be placed in battery
upon the bank opposite the point of crossing.

It is a great advantage, when a river forms a sweep or angle, and
when a ford is to be found near the place where you wish to effect a
passage. As the construction of the bridge proceeds, infantry should
be advanced to cover the workmen, by keeping up a fire on the opposite
bank; but the moment it is finished, a corps of infantry and cavalry,
and some field-pieces, should be pushed across. The infantry should
entrench itself immediately at the head of the bridge, and it is
prudent, moreover, to fortify on the same side of the river, in order
to protect the bridge in case the enemy should venture an offensive
movement.

The advanced guard of an army should be always provided with trusty
guides, and with a corps of pioneers: the first to point out the best
roads, the second to render these roads more practicable.

If the army marches in detachments, the commander of each detachment
should be furnished with the name of the place in writing, where the
whole are to be reassembled; the place should be sufficiently removed
from the enemy to prevent him from occupying it before the junction of
all the detachments. To this end, it is of importance to keep the name
a secret.

From the moment an army approaches the enemy, it should march in
the order in which it is intended to fight. If anything is to be
apprehended, precautions are necessary in proportion to the degree of
the danger. When a defile is to be passed, the troops should be halted
beyond the extremity, until the whole army has quitted the defile.

In order to conceal the movements of an army, it is necessary to march
by night through woods and valleys, by the most retired roads, and out
of reach of all inhabited places. No fires should be allowed; and, to
favor the design still more, the troops should move by verbal order.
When the object of the march is to carry a post, or to relieve a place
that is besieged, the advanced guard should march within musket shot of
the main body, because then you are prepared for an immediate attack,
and ready to overthrow all before you.

When a march is made to force a pass guarded by the enemy, it is
desirable to make a feint upon one point, while, by a rapid movement,
you bring your real attack to bear upon another.

Sometimes success is obtained by pretending to fall back upon the
original line of march, and, by a sudden countermarch, seizing upon
the pass, before the enemy is able to reoccupy it. Some generals have
gained their point by manœuvring so as to deceive the enemy, while a
detachment under the cover of high grounds has surprised the passage by
a stolen march. The enemy being engaged in watching the movements of
the main body, the detachment has an opportunity of entrenching itself
in its new position.

5. An army regulates its mode of encampment according to the greater or
less degree of precaution, when circumstances require. In a friendly
country the troops are divided, to afford better accommodation and
supplies. But with the enemy in front, an army should always encamp in
order of battle. With this view, it is of the highest importance to
cover one part of the camp, as far as practicable, by natural defences,
such as a river, a chain of rocks, or a ravine. Care should be taken
also that the camp is not commanded, and that there is no obstacle to a
free communication between the different corps, and which can prevent
the troops from mutually succoring each other.

When an army occupies a fixed camp, it is necessary to be well supplied
with provisions and ammunition, or at least that these should be
within certain reach and easily obtained. To insure this, the line of
communication must be well established, and care taken not to leave an
enemy’s fortress in your rear.

When an army is established in winter quarters, its safety is best
secured either by fortifying a camp (for which purpose a spot should be
selected near a large commercial town, or a river affording facility
of transport), or by distributing it in close cantonments, so that the
troops should be near together, and capable of affording each other
mutual support.

The winter quarters of an army should be protected, likewise, by
constructing small covered works on all the lines of approach to the
cantonments, and by posting advanced guards of cavalry to observe the
motions of the enemy.

6. A battle is to be sought, when there is reason to hope for victory,
or when an army runs the risk of being ruined without fighting; also
when a besieged place is to be relieved, or when you desire to prevent
a reinforcement from reaching the enemy. Battles are useful, likewise,
when we wish to profit by a favorable opportunity which offers, to
secure a certain advantage, such as seizing upon an undefended point or
pass, attacking the enemy when he has committed a fault, or when some
misunderstanding among his generals favors the undertaking.

If an enemy declines an engagement, he may be compelled to it, either
by besieging a place of importance, or by falling upon him unawares,
and when he cannot easily effect his retreat. Or (after pretending to
retire), by making a rapid countermarch, attacking him vigorously and
forcing him to action.

The different circumstances under which a battle should be avoided
or declined, are, when there is greater danger to be apprehended
from defeat than advantage to be derived from victory; when you
are very inferior to your adversary in numbers, and are expecting
reinforcements; above all, when the enemy is advantageously posted, or
when he is contributing to his own ruin by some inherent defect in his
position, or by the errors and divisions of his generals.

To gain a battle, each arm must be advantageously posted, and have the
means of engaging its front and in flank. The wings must be protected
by natural obstacles, where these present themselves, or by having
recourse when necessary to the aid of art.

The troops must be able to assist each other without confusion, and
care must be taken that the broken corps do not fall back upon, and
throw the rest into disorder. Above all, the intervals between the
different corps must be sufficiently small to prevent the enemy from
penetrating between them, for in that case you would be obliged to
employ your reserves, and run the risk of being entirely overwhelmed.
Sometimes victory is obtained by creating a diversion in the middle of
a battle, or even by depriving the soldier of all hope of retreat, and
placing him in a situation where he is reduced to the necessity either
to conquer or die.

At the commencement of a battle, if the ground is level, you should
advance to meet the enemy, in order to inspire the soldier with
courage; but if you are well posted, and your artillery advantageously
placed, then wait for him with determination: remembering always to
fight resolutely, to succor opportunely those who require it, and never
to bring your reserves into action except in the last extremity; and
even then to preserve some support, behind which the broken corps may
rally.

When it is necessary to attack with your whole force, the battle
should commence toward evening; because then, whatever be the issue,
night will arrive to separate the combatants before your troops are
exhausted. By this means, an opportunity is afforded of affecting an
orderly retreat if the result of the battle requires it.

During an action, the general-in-chief should occupy some spot whence
he can, as far as possible, overlook his whole army. He should be
informed, immediately, of everything that passes in the different
divisions. He should be ready, in order to render success more
complete, to operate with fresh troops upon those points where the
enemy is giving way, and also to reinforce his own corps wherever they
are inclined to yield. When the enemy is beaten, he must pursue him
instantly, without giving him a moment to rally; on the other hand, if
he is himself defeated, or despairs of victory, he must retreat in the
best possible order.

7. It shows great talent in a general to bring troops, who are prepared
for action, into collision with those who are not: for example, fresh
troops against those which are exhausted--brave and disciplined men
against recruits. He must likewise be ready always to fall with his
army upon a weak or detached corps, to follow the track of the enemy,
and charge him among defiles before he can face about and get into
position.

8. A position is good when the different corps are so placed as to be
engaged with advantage, and without any remaining unemployed. If you
are superior in cavalry, positions are to be taken in plains and open
ground; if in infantry, in an enclosed and covered country. If inferior
in numbers, in confined and narrow places; if superior, in a spacious
and extensive field. With a very inferior army, a difficult pass must
be selected to occupy and fortify.

9. In order to obtain every possible advantage from a diversion, we
should ascertain first, that the country in which it is to be created
is easily penetrated. A diversion should be made vigorously, and on
those points where it is calculated to do the greatest mischief to the
enemy.

10. To make war with success, the following principles should never be
departed from:

To be superior to your enemy in numbers, as well as in _morale_; to
fight battles in order to spread terror in the country; to divide your
army into as many corps as may be effected without risk, in order to
undertake several objects at the same time; to treat WELL those who
yield, to ILL treat those who resist; to secure your rear, and occupy
and strengthen yourself at the outset in some post which shall serve
as a central point for the support of your future movements; to
guard against desertion; to make yourself master of the great rivers
and principal passes, and to establish your line of communication by
getting possession of the fortresses, by laying siege to them, and
of the open country, by giving battle; for it is vain to expect that
conquests are to be achieved without combats; although when a victory
is won, they will be best maintained by uniting mildness with valor.




MAXIM VIII.


A general-in-chief should ask himself frequently in the day: “What
should I do if the enemy’s army appeared now in my front, or on my
right, or my left?” If he have any difficulty in answering these
questions, his position is bad, and he should seek to remedy it.


NOTE.

In the campaign of 1758, the position of the Prussian army at Hohen
Kirk, being commanded by the batteries of the enemy, who occupied all
the heights, was eminently defective; notwithstanding, Frederick,
who saw his rear menaced by the corps of Laudon, remained six days
in his camp without seeking to correct his position. It would seem,
indeed, that he was ignorant of his real danger: for Marshal Daun,
having manœuvred during the night in order to attack by daybreak,
surprised the Prussians in their lines before they were able to defend
themselves, and by this means surrounded them completely.

Frederick succeeded, however, in effecting his retreat with regularity,
but not without the loss of ten thousand men, many general officers,
and almost all of his artillery. If Marshal Daun had followed up his
victory with greater boldness, the king of Prussia would never have
been able to rally his army. On this occasion, Frederick’s good fortune
balanced his imprudence.

Marshal Saxe remarks, that there is more talent than is dreamt of in
bad dispositions, if we possess the art of converting them into good
ones when the favorable moment arrives. Nothing astonishes the enemy
so much as this manœuvre; he has counted upon _something_; all his
arrangements have been founded upon it accordingly--and at the moment
of attack it escapes him! “I must repeat,” says the marshal, “there
is nothing that so completely disconcerts an enemy as this, or leads
him to commit so many errors; for it follows, that if he does _not_
change his arrangements, he is beaten; and if he _does_ change them, in
presence of his adversary, he is equally undone.”

It seems to me, however, that a general who should rest the success of
a battle upon such a principle, would be more likely to lose than to
gain by it; for if he had to deal with a skilful adversary and an alert
tactician, the latter would find time to take advantage of the previous
bad arrangements, before he would be able to remedy them.




MAXIM IX.


The strength of an army, like the power in mechanics, is estimated
by multiplying the mass by the rapidity; a rapid march augments the
_morale_ of an army, and increases its means of victory. Press on!


NOTE.

“Rapidity,” says Montécuculli, “is of importance in concealing the
movements of an army, because it leaves no time to divulge the
intention of its chief. It is, therefore, an advantage to attack the
enemy unexpectedly, to take him off his guard, to surprise him, and
let him feel the thunder before he sees the flash; but if too great
celerity exhausts your troops, while, on the other hand, delay deprives
you of the favorable moment, you must weigh the advantage against the
disadvantage, and choose between.”

Marshal Villars observes, that “in war everything depends upon being
able to deceive the enemy; and having once gained this point, in never
allowing him time to recover himself.” Villars has united practice to
precept. His bold and rapid marches were almost always crowned with
success.

It was the opinion of Frederick that all wars should be short and
rapid; because a long war insensibly relaxes discipline, depopulates
the state, and exhausts its resources.




MAXIM X.


When an army is inferior in number, inferior in cavalry, and in
artillery, it is essential to avoid a general action. The first
deficiency should be supplied by rapidity of movement; the want of
artillery, by the nature of the manœuvres; and the inferiority in
cavalry, by the choice of positions. In such circumstances, the
_morale_ of the soldier does much.


NOTE.

The campaign of 1814 in France was skilfully executed upon these
principles. Napoleon, with an army inferior in number, an army
discouraged by the disastrous retreats of Moscow and of Leipzig, and
still more by the presence of the enemy in the French territory,
contrived, notwithstanding, to supply his vast inequality of force by
the rapidity and combination of his movements. By the success obtained
at Champ-Aubert, Montmirail, Montereau, and Rheims, he began to restore
the _morale_ of the French army. The numerous recruits of which it
was composed, had already acquired that steadiness of which the old
regiments afforded them an example, when the capture of Paris, and the
astonishing revolution it produced, compelled Napoleon to lay down his
arms.

But this consequence resulted rather from the force of circumstances
than from any absolute necessity; for Napoleon, by carrying his army to
the other side of the Loire, might easily have formed a junction with
the armies of the Alps and Pyrenees, and have reappeared on the field
of battle at the head of a hundred thousand men. Such a force would
have amply sufficed to re-establish the chances of war in his favor;
more especially as the armies of the allied sovereigns were obliged to
manœuvre upon the French territory with all the strong places of Italy
and France in their rear.




MAXIM XI.


To direct operations with lines far removed from each other, and
without communications, is to commit a fault which always gives birth
to a second. The detached column has only its orders for the first
day. Its operations on the following day depend upon what may have
happened to the main body. Thus, this column either loses time upon
emergency, in waiting for orders, or it will act without them, and at
hazard. Let it therefore be held as a principle, that an army should
always keep its columns so united as to prevent the enemy from passing
between them with impunity. Whenever, for particular reasons, this
principle is departed from, the detached corps should be independent in
their operations. They should move toward a point fixed upon for their
future junction. They should advance without hesitating, and without
waiting for fresh orders; and every precaution should be taken to
prevent an attack upon them in detail.


NOTE.

The Austrian army, commanded by Field-marshal Alvinzi, was divided into
two corps, destined to act independently, until they should accomplish
their junction before Mantua. The first of these corps, consisting
of forty-five thousand men, was under the orders of Alvinzi. It was
to debouch by Monte Baldo, upon the positions occupied by the French
army on the Adige. The second corps, commanded by General Provéra,
was destined to act upon the lower Adige, and to raise the blockade
of Mantua. Napoleon, informed of the enemy’s movements, but not
entirely comprehending his projects, confined himself to concentrating
his masses, and giving orders to the troops to hold themselves in
readiness to manœuvre. In the meantime, fresh information satisfied the
general-in-chief of the French army that the corps which had debouched
by La Coronna, over Monte Baldo, was endeavoring to form a junction
with its cavalry and artillery--both which, having crossed the Adige at
Dolce, were directing their march upon the plateau of Rivoli, by the
great road leading by Incanole.

Napoleon immediately foresaw that, by having possession of the plateau,
he should be able to prevent this junction, and obtain all the
advantages of the initiative. He accordingly put his troops in motion,
and at two o’clock in the morning occupied that important position.
Once master of the point fixed upon for the junction of the Austrian
columns, success followed all his dispositions. He repulsed every
attack, made seven thousand prisoners, and took several standards and
twelve pieces of cannon. At two o’clock in the afternoon, the battle of
Rivoli was already gained, when Napoleon, learning that General Provéra
had passed the Adige at Anghiari, and was directing his march upon
Mantua, left to his generals the charge of following up the retreat of
Alvinzi, and placed himself at the head of a division for the purpose
of defeating the designs of Provéra.

By a rapid march, he again succeeded in the initiatory movement, and
in preventing the garrison of Mantua from uniting its force with
the relieving army. The corps intrusted with the blockade, eager to
distinguish itself under the eyes of the conqueror of Rivoli, compelled
the garrison to retire into the place, while the division of Victor,
forgetting the fatigues of a forced march, rushed with impetuosity on
the relieving army in front. At this moment a sortie from the lines
of St. George took him in flank, while the corps of Augereau, which
had followed the march of the Austrian general, attacked him in rear.
Provéra, surrounded on all sides, capitulated. The result of these two
battles cost the Austrians three thousand men in killed and wounded,
twenty-two thousand prisoners, twenty-four standards, and forty-six
pieces of cannon.




MAXIM XII.


An army ought to have only one line of operation. This should be
preserved with care, and never abandoned but in the last extremity.


NOTE.

“The line of communication of an army,” says Montécuculli, “must be
certain and well established, for every army that acts from a distant
base, and is not careful to keep this line perfectly open, marches upon
a precipice. It moves to certain ruin, as may be seen by an infinity
of examples. In fact, if the road by which provisions, ammunition and
reinforcements are to be brought up, is not entirely secured--if the
magazines, the hospitals, the depôts of arms, and the places of supply
are not fixed and commodiously situated--not only the army cannot keep
the field, but it will be exposed to the greatest dangers.”




MAXIM XIII.


The distances permitted between corps of an army upon the march must be
governed by the localities, by circumstances, and by the object in view.


NOTE.

When an army moves at a distance from the enemy, the columns may be
disposed along the road so as to favor the artillery and baggage. But
when it is marching into action, the different corps must be formed in
close columns in order of battle. The generals must take care that the
heads of the columns, which are to attack together, do not outstep each
other, and that in approaching the field of action they preserve the
relative intervals required for deployment.

“The marches that are made preparatory to a battle require,” says
Frederick, “the greatest precaution.” With this view, he recommends
his generals to be particularly on their guard, and to reconnoitre
the ground at successive distances, in order to secure the initiative
by occupying those positions most calculated to favor an attack. On
a retreat, it is the opinion of many generals that an army should
concentrate its forces, and march in close columns if it is still
strong enough to resume the offensive; for by this means it is easy
to form the line when a favorable opportunity presents itself, either
for holding the enemy in check or for attacking him if he is not in a
situation to accept battle.

Such was Moreau’s retreat after the passage of the Adda by the
Austro-Russian army. The French general, after having covered the
evacuation of Milan, took up a position between the Po and the Tanaro.

His camp rested upon Alexandria and Valentia, two capital fortresses,
and had the advantage of covering the roads to Turin and Savona, by
which he could effect his retreat in case he was unable to accomplish a
junction with the _corps d’armee_ of Macdonald, who had been ordered to
quit the kingdom of Naples, and hasten his march into Tuscany.

Forced to abandon his position in consequence of the insurrection in
Piedmont and Tuscany, Moreau retired upon Asti, where he learned that
his communication with the river of Genoa had just been cut off by the
capture of Ceva. After several ineffectual attempts to retake this
place, he saw that his only safety depended upon throwing himself into
the mountains.

To effect this object, he directed the whole of his battering train
and heavy baggage by the Col de Fenestrelle upon France; then opening
himself a way over the St. Bernard, he gained Loano with his light
artillery and the small proportion of field equipment he had been able
to preserve.

By this skilful movement, he not only retained his communications with
France, but was enabled to observe the motions of the army from Naples,
and to facilitate his junction with it by directing the whole of his
force upon the points necessary for that purpose.

Macdonald, in the meantime, whose only chance of success depended on
concentrating his little army, neglected this precaution, and was
beaten in three successive actions at the Trebia.

By this retardment of his march, he rendered all Moreau’s measures to
unite the two armies in the plains of the Po useless, and his retreat,
after his brilliant but fruitless efforts at the Trebia, defeated the
other arrangements, also, which the former had made to come to his
support. The inactivity of Marshal Suwarrow, however, finally enabled
the French general to accomplish his junction with the remains of the
army from Naples. Moreau then concentrated his whole force upon the
Appenines, and placed himself in a situation to defend the important
positions of Liguria, until the chances of war should afford him an
opportunity of resuming the offensive.

When, after a decisive battle, an army has lost its artillery and
equipments, and is consequently no longer in a state to assume the
offensive, or even to arrest the pursuit of the enemy, it would
seem most desirable to divide what remains into several corps, and
order them to march by separate and distant routes upon the base of
operation, and throw themselves into the fortresses. This is the only
means of safety: for the enemy, uncertain as to the precise direction
taken by the vanquished army, is ignorant in the first instance which
corps to pursue, and it is in this moment of indecision that a march is
gained upon him. Besides, the movements of a small body being so much
easier than those of a larger one, these separate lines of march are
all in favor of a retreating army.




MAXIM XIV.


Among mountains, a great number of positions are always to be found
very strong in themselves, and which it is dangerous to attack. The
character of this mode of warfare consists in occupying camps on the
flanks or in the rear of the enemy, leaving him only the alternative
of abandoning his position without fighting, to take up another in
the rear, or to descend from it in order to attack you. In mountain
warfare, the assailant has always the disadvantage; even in offensive
warfare in the open field, the great secret consists in defensive
combats, and in obliging the enemy to attack.


NOTE.

During the campaign of 1793, in the Maritime Alps, the French army,
under the orders of General Brunet, did all in its power to get
possession of the camps at Raus and at Fourches, by an attack in front.
But these useless efforts served only to increase the courage of the
Piedmontese, and to destroy the _élite_ of the grenadiers of the
republican army. The manœuvres by which Napoleon, without fighting,
compelled the enemy to evacuate these positions in 1796, suffice to
establish the truth of these principles, and to prove how much success
in war depends upon the genius of the general as well as on the courage
of the soldier.




MAXIM XV.


The first consideration with a general who offers battle, should be the
glory and honor of his arms; the safety and preservation of his men is
only the second; but it is in the enterprise and courage resulting
from the former, that the latter will most assuredly be found. In a
retreat, besides the honor of the army, the loss of life is often
greater than in two battles. For this reason, we should never despair
while brave men are to be found with their colors. It is by this means
that we obtain victory, and deserve to obtain it.


NOTE.

In 1645, the French army, under the orders of the Prince of Condé, was
on the march to lay siege to Nordlingen, when it was discovered that
Count Merci, who commanded the Bavarians, had foreseen this intention,
and had entrenched himself in a strong position which defended
Nordlingen at the same time that it covered Donawerth.

Notwithstanding the favorable position of the enemy, Condé ordered the
attack. The combat was terrible. All the infantry in the centre and on
the right, after being successively engaged, was routed and dispersed,
in spite of the efforts of the cavalry and the reserve, which were
likewise carried away with the fugitives. The battle was lost. Condé,
in despair, having no longer either centre or right to depend upon,
collected the remnants of his battalions, and directed his march to the
left, where Turenne was still engaged. This perseverance reanimated
the ardor of the troops. They broke the right wing of the enemy,
and Turenne, by a change of front, returned to the attack upon his
centre. Night, too, favored the boldness of Condé. An entire corps of
Bavarians, fancying themselves cut off, laid down their arms; and the
obstinacy of the French general in this struggle for victory was repaid
by possession of the field of battle, together with a great number of
prisoners, and almost all the enemy’s artillery. The Bavarian army beat
a retreat, and the next day Nordlingen capitulated.




MAXIM XVI.


It is an approved maxim in war, never to do what the enemy wishes you
to do, for this reason alone, that he desires it. A field of battle,
therefore, which he has previously studied and reconnoitred, should
be avoided, and double care should be taken where he has had time to
fortify and entrench. One consequence deducible from this principle is,
never to attack a position in front which you can gain by turning.


NOTE.

It was without due regard to this principle, that Marshal Villeroi, on
assuming the command of the army of Italy, during the campaign of 1701,
attacked, with unwarrantable presumption, Prince Eugene, of Savoy, in
his entrenched position of Chiavi, on the Oglio. The French generals,
Catinat among the rest, considered the post unassailable, but Villeroi
insisted, and the result of this otherwise unimportant battle was the
loss of the _élite_ of the French army. It would have been greater
still, but for Catinat’s exertions.

It was by neglecting the same principle, that the Prince of Condé, in
the campaign of 1644, failed in all his attacks upon the entrenched
position of the Bavarian army. The Count Merci, who commanded the
latter, had drawn up his cavalry skilfully upon the plain, resting
upon Freyberg, while his infantry occupied the mountain. After many
fruitless attempts, the Prince of Condé, seeing the impossibility of
dislodging the enemy, began to menace his communications--but the
moment Merci perceived this, he broke up his camp and retired beyond
the Black mountains.




MAXIM XVII.


In a war of march and manœuvre, if you would avoid a battle with a
superior army, it is necessary to entrench every night, and occupy a
good defensive position. Those natural positions which are ordinarily
met with, are not sufficient to protect an army against superior
numbers without recourse to art.


NOTE.

The campaign of the French and Spanish army, commanded by the Duke
of Berwick, against the Portuguese, in the year 1706, affords a good
lesson on this subject. The two armies made almost the tour of Spain.
They began the campaign near Badajoz, and after manœuvring across both
Castiles, finished it in the kingdoms of Valencia and Murcia. The
Duke of Berwick encamped his army eighty-five times, and although the
campaign passed without a general action, he took about ten thousand
prisoners from the enemy. Marshal Turenne also made a fine campaign of
manœuvre against the Count Montécuculli, in 1675.

The imperial army having made its arrangements to pass the Rhine at
Strasburg, Turenne used all diligence, and, throwing a bridge over the
river near the village of Ottenheim, three leagues below Strasburg, he
crossed with the French army, and encamped close to the little town
of Vilstet, which he occupied. This position covered the bridge of
Strasburg, so that, by this manœuvre, Turenne deprived the enemy of all
approach to that city.

Upon this, Montécuculli made a movement with his whole army,
threatening the bridge at Ottenheim, by which the French received their
provisions from upper Alsace.

As soon as Turenne discovered the design of the enemy, he left a
detachment at Vilstet, and made a rapid march with his whole force
upon the village of Altenheim. This intermediate position between
the two bridges, which he wished to preserve, gave him the advantage
of being able to succor either of these posts before the enemy had
time to carry them. Montécuculli seeing that any successful attack
upon the bridges was not to be expected, resolved to pass the Rhine
below Strasburg, and with this view returned to his first position
at Offenburg. Marshal Turenne, who followed all the movements of the
Austrian army, brought back his army also to Vilstet.

In the meantime, this attempt of the enemy having convinced the French
general of the danger to which his bridge had exposed him, removed it
nearer to that of Strasburg, in order to diminish the extent of ground
he had to defend.

Montécuculli, having commanded the magistrates of Strasburg to collect
materials for a bridge, moved to Scherzheim to receive them; but
Turenne again defeated his projects by taking a position at Freistett,
where he occupied the islands of the Rhine, and immediately constructed
a stockade.

Thus it was that, during the whole of this campaign, Turenne succeeded
in gaining the initiative of the enemy, and obliging him to follow
his movements. He succeeded, also, by a rapid march, in cutting off
Montécuculli from the Town of Offenburg, whence he drew his supplies,
and would no doubt have prevented the Austrian general from effecting
his junction with the corps of Caprara, had not a cannon-shot
terminated this great man’s life.




MAXIM XVIII.


A general of ordinary talent occupying a bad position, and surprised
by a superior force, seeks his safety in retreat; but a great captain
supplies all deficiencies by his courage, and marches boldly to meet
the attack. By this means he disconcerts his adversary; and if the
latter shows any irresolution in his movements, a skilful leader,
profiting by his indecision, may even hope for victory, or at least
employ the day in manœuvring--at night he entrenches himself, or falls
back to a better position. By this determined conduct he maintains the
honor of his arms, the first essential to all military superiority.


NOTE.

In 1653, Marshal Turenne was surprised by the Prince of Condé, in a
position where his army was completely compromised. He had the power,
indeed, by an immediate retreat, of covering himself by the Somme,
which he possessed the means of crossing at Peronne, and whence he
was distant only half a league; but, fearing the influence of this
retrograde movement on the _morale_ of his army, Turenne balanced all
disadvantages by his courage, and marched boldly to meet the enemy with
very inferior forces. After marching a league, he found an advantageous
position, where he made every disposition for a battle. It was three
o’clock in the afternoon; but the Spaniards, exhausted with fatigue,
hesitated to attack him, and Turenne having covered himself with
entrenchments during the night, the enemy no longer dared to risk a
general action, and broke up his camp.




MAXIM XIX.


The transition from the defensive to the offensive is one of the most
delicate operations.


NOTE.

By studying the first campaign of Napoleon in Italy, we can learn
what genius and boldness may effect in passing with an army from the
_defensive_ to the _offensive_. The army of the allies, commanded by
General Beaulieu, was provided with every means that could render it
formidable. Its force amounted to eighty thousand men, and two hundred
pieces of cannon. The French army, on the contrary, could number
scarcely thirty thousand men under arms, and thirty pieces of cannon.
For some time there had been no issue of meat, and even the bread
was irregularly supplied. The infantry was ill clothed, the cavalry
wretchedly mounted. All the draught-horses had perished from want, so
that the service of the artillery was performed by mules. To remedy
these evils, large disbursements were necessary; and such was the state
of the finances, that the government had only been able to furnish two
thousand louis in specie for the opening of the campaign. The French
army could not possibly exist in this state. To advance or retreat was
absolutely necessary. Aware of the advantage of surprising the enemy
at the very outset of the campaign by some decisive blow, Napoleon
prepared for it by recasting the _morale_ of his army.

In a proclamation full of energy, he reminded them that an ignoble
death alone remained for them, if they continued on the defensive;
that they had nothing to expect from France, but everything to hope
from victory. “Abundance courts you in the fertile plains of Italy,”
said he; “are you deficient, soldiers, in constancy or in courage?”
Profiting by the moment of enthusiasm which he had inspired, Napoleon
concentrated his forces in order to fall with his whole weight on the
different corps of the enemy. Immediately afterward, the battles of
Montenotte, Milesimo, and Mondovi, added fresh confidence to the high
opinion already entertained by the soldier for his chief; and that army
which only a few days ago was encamped amid barren rocks, and consumed
by famine, already aspired to the conquest of Italy. In one month
after the opening of the campaign, Napoleon had terminated the war with
the King of Sardinia, and conquered the Milanese. Rich cantonments soon
dispelled from the recollection of the French soldier the misery and
fatigue attendant on this rapid march, while a vigilant administration
of the resources of the country reorganized the _materiel_ of the
French army, and created the means necessary for the attainment of
future success.




MAXIM XX.


It may be laid down as a principle, that the line of operation should
not be abandoned; but it is one of the most skilful manœuvres in war,
to know how to change it, when circumstances authorize or render this
necessary. An army which changes skilfully its line of operation
deceives the enemy, who becomes ignorant where to look for its rear, or
upon what weak points it is assailable.


NOTE.

Frederick sometimes changed his line of operation in the middle of a
campaign; but he was enabled to do this, because he was manœuvring at
that time in the centre of Germany--an abundant country, capable of
supplying all the wants of his army in case his communications with
Prussia were intercepted.

Marshal Turenne, in the campaign of 1746, gave up his line of
communication to the allies in the same manner; but, like Frederick,
he was carrying on the war at this time in the centre of Germany, and
having fallen with his whole forces upon Rain, he took the precaution
of securing to himself a depôt upon which to establish his base of
operation.

By a series of manœuvres, marked alike by audacity and genius, he
subsequently compelled the imperial army to abandon its magazines, and
retire into Austria for winter quarters.

But these are examples which it appears to me should only be imitated
when we have taken full measure of the capacity of our adversary, and
above all, when we see no reason to apprehend an insurrection in the
country to which we transfer the theatre of war.




MAXIM XXI.


When an army carries with it a battering train, or large convoys of
sick and wounded, it cannot march by too short a line upon its depôts.


NOTE.

It is above all in mountainous countries, and in those interspersed
with woods and marshes, that it is of importance to observe this maxim;
for, the convoys and means of transport being frequently embarrassed
in defiles, an enemy by manœuvring may easily disperse the escorts, or
make even a successful attack upon the whole army, when it is obliged,
from the nature of the country, to march in an extended column.




MAXIM XXII.


The art of encamping in position is the same as taking up the line in
order of battle in this position. To this end, the artillery should be
advantageously placed, ground should be selected which is not commanded
or liable to be turned, and, as far as possible, the guns should cover
and command the surrounding country.


NOTE.

Frederick has remarked that, in order to be assured that your camp is
well placed, you should see if, by making a small movement, you can
oblige the enemy to make a greater; or, if after having forced him to
retrograde one march you can compel him to fall back another.

In defensive war, all camps should be entrenched in the front and
wings of the position they occupy, and care should be taken that the
rear is left perfectly open. If you are threatened with being turned,
arrangements should be made beforehand for taking up a more distant
position; and you should profit by any disorder in the enemy’s line of
march, to make an attempt upon his artillery or baggage.




MAXIM XXIII.


When you are occupying a position which the enemy threatens to
surround, collect all your force immediately, and menace _him_ with
an offensive movement. By this manœuvre, you will prevent him from
detaching and annoying your flanks in case you should judge it
necessary to retire.


NOTE.

This was the manœuvre practised by General Desaix, in 1798, near
Radstadt. He made up for inferiority in numbers by audacity, and
maintained himself the whole day in position in spite of the vigorous
attacks of the Archduke Charles. At night he effected his retreat in
good order, and took up a position in the rear.

It was in accordance, also, with this principle, in the same campaign,
that General Moreau gave battle at Biberach, to secure his retreat
by the passes of the Black mountains. A few days after, he fought at
Schliengen with the same object. Placed in a good defensive position,
he menaced the Archduke Charles by a sudden return to the offensive,
while his artillery and baggage were passing the Rhine by the bridge of
Huningen, and he was making all the necessary arrangements for retiring
behind that river himself.

Here, however, I would observe, that the execution of such offensive
demonstrations should be deferred always till toward the evening, in
order that you may not be compromised by engaging too early in a combat
which you cannot long maintain with success.

Night, and the uncertainty of the enemy after an affair of this kind,
will always favor your retreat, if it is judged necessary; but,
with a view to mask the operation more effectually, fires should be
lighted all along the lines, to deceive the enemy and prevent him from
discovering this retrograde movement, for in a retreat it is a great
advantage to gain a march upon your adversary.




MAXIM XXIV.


Never lose sight of this maxim: that you should establish your
cantonments at the most distant and best-protected point from the
enemy, especially where a surprise is possible. By this means you will
have time to unite all your forces before he can attack you.


NOTE.

In the campaign of 1745, Marshal Turenne lost the battle of Marienthal,
by neglecting this principle; for if, instead of reassembling his
divisions at Erbsthausen, he had rallied his troops at Mergentheim,
behind the Tauber, his army would have been much sooner reunited; and
Count Merci, in place of finding only three thousand men to fight at
Erbsthausen (of which he was well informed), would have had the whole
French army to attack in a position covered by a river.

Some one having indiscreetly asked Viscount Turenne how he had lost the
battle of Marienthal: “By my own fault,” replied the marshal; “but,”
added he, “when a man has committed no faults in war, he can only have
been engaged in it but a short time.”




MAXIM XXV.


When two armies are in order of battle, and one has to retire over a
bridge, while the other has the circumference of the circle open, all
the advantages are in favor of the latter. It is then a general should
show boldness, strike a decided blow, and manœuvre upon the flank of
his enemy. The victory is in his hands.


NOTE.

This was the position of the French army at the famous battle of
Leipzig, which terminated the campaign of 1813 so fatally for Napoleon;
for the battle of Hanau was of no consequence, comparatively, in the
desperate situation of that army.

It strikes me that, in a situation like that of the French army
previous to the battle of Leipzig, a general should never calculate
upon any of those lucky chances which may arise out of a return to the
offensive, but that he should rather adopt every possible means to
secure his retreat. With this view, he should immediately cover himself
with good entrenchments, to enable him to repel with inferior numbers
the attack of the enemy, while his own equipments are crossing the
river. As fast as the troops reach the other side, they should occupy
positions to protect the passage of the rear guard, and this last
should be covered by a _tête de pont_ as soon as the army breaks up its
camp. During the wars of the Revolution, too little regard was paid
to entrenchments; and it is for this reason we have seen large armies
dispersed after a single reverse, and the fate of nations compromised
by the issue of one battle.




MAXIM XXVI.


It is contrary to all true principle, to make corps, which have no
communication with each other, act separately against a central force
whose communications are cut off.


NOTE.

The Austrians lost the battle of Hohenlinden by neglecting this
principle. The imperial army, under the orders of the archduke John,
was divided into four columns, which had to march through an immense
forest, previous to their junction in the plain of Anzing, where they
intended to surprise the French. But these different corps, having no
direct communication, found themselves compelled to engage separately
with an enemy who had taken the precaution of concentrating his masses,
and who could move them with facility in a country with which he had
been long previously acquainted.

Thus the Austrian army, enclosed in the defiles of the forest with its
whole train of artillery and baggage, was attacked in its flanks and
rear, and the archduke John was only enabled to rally his dispersed and
shattered divisions under cover of the night.

The trophies obtained by the French army on this day were immense. They
consisted of eleven thousand prisoners, one hundred pieces of cannon,
several stand of colors, and all the baggage of the enemy.

The battle of Hohenlinden decided the fate of the campaign of 1800, and
Moreau’s brilliant and well-merited success placed him in the rank of
the first general of the age.




MAXIM XXVII.


When an army is driven from a first position, the retreating columns
should rally always sufficiently in the rear, to prevent any
interruption from the enemy. The greatest disaster that can happen, is
when the columns are attacked in detail, and before their junction.


NOTE.

One great advantage which results from rallying your columns on a point
far removed from the field of battle, or from the position previously
occupied, is, that the enemy is uncertain as to the direction you mean
to take.

If he divides his force to pursue you, he exposes himself to see his
detachments beaten in detail, especially if you have exerted all due
diligence, and have effected the junction of your troops in sufficient
time to get between his columns and disperse them one after the other.

It was by a manœuvre of this kind in the campaign of Italy, in 1799,
that General Melas gained the battle of Genola.

General Championet commanded the French army, and endeavored to cut off
the communication of the Austrians with Turin, by employing corps which
manœuvred separately to get into their rear. Melas, who divined his
project, made a retrograde march, by which he persuaded his adversary
he was in full retreat, although the real object of his movement was
to concentrate his forces at the point fixed for the junction of
the different detachments of the French army, and which he beat and
dispersed, one after another, by his great superiority in numbers. The
result of this manœuvre, in which the Austrian general displayed vigor,
decision, and foresight, secured to him the peaceable possession of
Piedmont.

It was also by the neglect of this principle that General Beaulieu, who
commanded the Austro-Sardinian army in the campaign of 1796, lost the
battle of Milesimo after that of Montenotte.

His object, in endeavoring to rally his different corps upon Milesimo,
was, to cover the high roads of Turin and Milan; but Napoleon, aware of
the advantages arising from the ardor of troops emboldened by recent
success, attacked him before he could assemble his divisions, and, by
a series of skilful manœuvres, succeeded in separating the combined
armies. They retired in the greatest disorder--the one by the road of
Milan, the other by that of Turin.




MAXIM XXVIII.


No force should be detached on the eve of a battle, because affairs may
change during the night, either by the retreat of the enemy, or by the
arrival of large reinforcements to enable him to resume the offensive,
and counteract your previous arrangements.


NOTE.

In 1796, the army of the Sambre and Meuse, commanded by General
Jourdan, effected a retreat, which was rendered still more difficult
by the loss of his line of communication. Seeing, however, that the
forces of the archduke Charles were scattered, Jourdan, in order to
accomplish his retreat upon Frankfort, resolved to open himself a way
by Wurtzburg, where there were at that moment only two divisions of
the Austrian army. This movement would have been attended with success,
if the French general, believing he had simply these two divisions to
contend with, had not committed the error of separating himself from
the corps of Lefevre--which he left at Schweinfurt to cover the only
direct communication of the army with its base of operation.

The commission of this fault at the outset, added to some slowness in
the march of the French general, secured the victory to the archduke,
who hastened to concentrate his forces.

The arrival of the two divisions, also, of Kray and Wartesleben, during
the battle, enabled him to oppose fifty thousand men to the French
army, which scarcely numbered thirty thousand combatants. This last
was consequently beaten, and obliged to continue its retreat by the
mountains of Fuldes, where the badness of the roads could be equalled
only by the difficulty of the country.

The division of Lefevre, amounting to fourteen thousand men, would,
in all probability, have turned the scale in favor of Jourdan, had
the latter not unfortunately conceived that two divisions only were
opposing his passage to Wurtzburg.




MAXIM XXIX.


When you have resolved to fight a battle, collect your whole force.
Dispense with nothing. A single battalion sometimes decides the day.


NOTE.

I think it here desirable to observe, that it is prudent before a
battle to fix upon some point in rear of the reserve for the junction
of the different detachments; for if, from unforeseen circumstances,
these detachments should be prevented from joining before the action
has commenced, they might be exposed, in case a retrograde movement
should be found necessary, to the masses of the enemy. It is desirable
also to keep the enemy in ignorance of these reinforcements, in order
to employ them with greater effect. “A seasonable reinforcement,” says
Frederick, “renders the success of a battle certain, because the enemy
will always imagine it stronger than it really is, and lose courage
accordingly.”




MAXIM XXX.


Nothing is so rash or so contrary to principle, as to make a flank
march before an army in position, especially when this army occupies
heights at the foot of which you are forced to defile.


NOTE.

It was by a neglect of this principle that Frederick was beaten at
Kollin in the first campaign of 1757. Notwithstanding prodigies of
valor, the Prussians lost fifteen thousand men and a great portion of
their artillery, while the loss of the Austrians did not exceed five
thousand men. The consequence of this battle was more unfortunate
still, since it obliged the King of Prussia to raise the siege of
Prague, and to evacuate Bohemia.

It was also by making a flank march before the Prussian army, that the
French lost the disgraceful battle of Rosbach.

This imprudent movement was still more to be reprehended, because the
Prince de Soubise, who commanded the French army, was so negligent as
to manœuvre, without either advanced guards or flanking corps, in
presence of the enemy. The result was, that his army, consisting of
fifty thousand men, was beaten by six battalions and thirty squadrons.
The French lost seven thousand men, twenty-seven standards, and a great
number of cannon. The Prussians had only three hundred men disabled.

Thus, by having forgotten this principle, _that a flank march is never
to be made before an enemy in line of battle_, Frederick lost his army
at Kollin; and Soubise, at Rosbach, lost both his army and his honor.




MAXIM XXXI.


When you determine to risk a battle, reserve to yourself every possible
chance of success, more particularly if you have to deal with an
adversary of superior talent; for if you are beaten, even in the midst
of your magazines and your communications, wo to the vanquished!


NOTE.

“We should make war,” says Marshal Saxe, “without leaving anything
to hazard, and in this especially consists the talent of a general.
But when we have incurred the risk of a battle, we should know how to
profit by the victory, and not merely content ourselves, according to
custom, with possession of the field.”

It was by neglecting to follow up the first success, that the Austrian
army, after gaining the field of Marengo, saw itself compelled on the
following day to evacuate the whole of Italy.

General Melas, observing the French in retreat, left the direction
of the movements of his army to the chief of his staff, and retired
to Alexandria to repose from the fatigues of the day. Colonel Zach,
equally convinced with his general that the French army was completely
broken, and consisted only of fugitives, formed the divisions in column
of route.

By this arrangement, the imperial army prepared to enter upon its
victorious march in a formation not less than three miles in depth.

It was near four o’clock when General Desaix rejoined the French army
with his division. His presence restored in some degree an equality
between the contending forces; and yet Napoleon hesitated for a moment
whether to resume the offensive, or to make use of this corps to secure
his retreat. The ardor of the troops to return to the charge, decided
his irresolution. He rode rapidly along the front of his divisions, and
addressing the soldiers--“We have retired far enough for to-day,” said
he; “you know I always sleep upon the field of battle!”

The army, with unanimous shout, proclaimed to him a promise of
victory. Napoleon resumed the offensive. The Austrian advance guard,
panic-struck at the sight of a formidable and unbroken body presenting
itself suddenly at a point where, a few moments before, only fugitives
were to be seen, went to the right about, and carried disorder into the
mass of its columns. Attacked immediately afterward, with impetuosity,
in its front and flanks, the Austrian army was completely routed.

Marshal Daun experienced nearly the same fate as General Melas, at the
battle of Torgau, in the campaign of 1760.

The position of the Austrian army was excellent. It had its left upon
Torgau, its right on the plateau of Siptitz, and its front covered by a
large sheet of water.

Frederick proposed to turn its right in order to make an attack upon
the rear. For this purpose he divided his army into two corps, the one
under the orders of Ziethen, with instructions to attack in front,
following the edge of the water; the other under his own immediate
command, with which he set out to turn the right of the Austrians.
But Marshal Daun having had intimation of the movements of the enemy,
changed his front by countermarching, and was thus enabled to repel
the attacks of Frederick, whom he obliged to retreat. The two corps
of the Prussian army had been acting without communication. Ziethen,
in the meantime, hearing the fire recede, concluded that the king had
been beaten, and commenced a movement by his left in order to rejoin
him; but falling in with two battalions of the reserve, the Prussian
general profited by this reinforcement to resume the offensive.
Accordingly he renewed the attack with vigor, got possession of the
plateau of Siptitz, and soon after of the whole field of battle. The
sun had already set when the King of Prussia received the news of this
unexpected good fortune. He returned in all haste, took advantage of
the night to restore order in his disorganized army, and the day after
the battle occupied Torgau.

Marshal Daun was receiving congratulations upon his victory, when he
heard that the Prussians had resumed the offensive. He immediately
commanded a retreat, and at daybreak the Austrians repassed the Elbe
with the loss of twelve thousand men, eight thousand prisoners, and
forty-five pieces of cannon.

After the battle of Marengo, General Melas, although in the midst
of his fortresses and magazines, saw himself compelled to abandon
everything, in order to save the wreck of his army.

General Mack capitulated after the battle of Ulm, although in the
centre of his own country.

The Prussians, in spite of their depôts and reserves, were obliged,
after the battle of Jena, and the French after that of Waterloo, to lay
down their arms.

Hence, we may conclude that the misfortune that results from the loss
of a battle, does not consist so much in the destruction of men and of
_materiel_ as in the discouragement which follows this disaster. The
courage and confidence of the victors augment in proportion as those
of the vanquished diminish; and whatever may be the resources of an
army, it will be found that a retreat will degenerate rapidly into a
rout unless the general-in-chief shall succeed, by combining boldness
with skill, and perseverance with firmness, in restoring the _morale_
of his army.




MAXIM XXXII.


The duty of an advanced guard does not consist in advancing or
retiring, but in manœuvring. An advanced guard should be composed
of light cavalry, supported by a reserve of heavy cavalry, and by
battalions of infantry, supported also by artillery. An advanced guard
should consist of picked troops, and the general officers, officers
and men, should be selected for their respective capabilities and
knowledge. A corps deficient in instruction is only an embarrassment to
an advanced guard.


NOTE.

It was the opinion of Frederick that an advanced guard should be
composed of detachments of troops of all arms. The commander should
possess skill in the choice of ground, and he should take care to be
instantly informed, by means of numerous patrols, of everything passing
in the enemy’s camp.

In war, it is not the business of an advanced guard to fight, but to
observe the enemy, in order to cover the movements of the army. When in
pursuit, the advanced guard should charge with vigor, and cut off the
baggage and insulated corps of the retiring enemy. For this purpose, it
should be reinforced with all the disposable light cavalry of the army.




MAXIM XXXIII.


It is contrary to the usages of war to allow parks or batteries of
artillery to enter a defile, unless you hold the other extremity. In
case of retreat, the guns will embarrass your movements and be lost.
They should be left in position, under a sufficient escort, until you
are master of the opening.


NOTE.

Nothing encumbers the march of an army so much as a quantity of
baggage. In the campaign of 1796, Napoleon abandoned his battering
train under the walls of Mantua, after spiking the guns and destroying
the carriages. By this sacrifice, he acquired a facility of manœuvring
rapidly his little army, and obtained the initiative as well as a
general superiority over the numerous but divided forces of Marshal
Wurmser.

In 1799, during his retreat in Italy, General Moreau being compelled
to manœuvre among the mountains, preferred separating himself entirely
from his reserve artillery, which he directed upon France by the Col
de Fenestrelle, rather than embarrass his march with this part of his
equipment.

These are the examples we should follow; for if, by a rapidity of
march, and a facility of concentration upon decisive points, the
victory is gained, the _materiel_ of an army is soon re-established.
But if, on the other hand, we are beaten and compelled to retreat, it
will be difficult to save our equipments, and we may have reason to
congratulate ourselves that we abandoned them in time to prevent them
from augmenting the trophies of the enemy.




MAXIM XXXIV.


It should be laid down as a principle, never to leave intervals by
which the enemy can penetrate between corps formed in order of battle,
unless it be to draw him into a snare.


NOTE.

In the campaign of 1757, the Prince of Lorraine, who was covering
Prague with the Austrian army, perceived the Prussians threatening, by
a flank movement, to turn his right. He immediately ordered a partial
change of front by throwing back the infantry of that wing, so as to
form a right angle with the rest of the line. But this manœuvre being
executed in presence of the enemy, was not effected without some
disorder. The heads of the columns having marched too quick, caused
the rear to lengthen out, and when the line was formed to the right,
a large interval appeared at the salient angle. Frederick, observing
this error, hastened to take advantage of it. He directed his centre
corps, commanded by the Duke of Bevern, to throw itself into this
opening, and by this manœuvre decided the fate of the battle.

The Prince of Lorraine returned to Prague, beaten and pursued, with the
loss of sixteen thousand men and two hundred pieces of cannon.

It should be observed at the same time, that this operation of throwing
a corps into the intervals made by an army in time of battle, should
never be attempted unless you are at least equal in force, and have
an opportunity of outflanking the enemy on the one side or the other;
for it is then only you can hope to divide his army in the centre, and
insulate the wings entirely. If you are inferior in number, you run the
risk of being stopped by the reverses, and overpowered by the enemy’s
wings, which may deploy upon your flanks and surround you.

It was by this manœuvre that the Duke of Berwick gained the battle of
Almanza, in the year 1707, in Spain.

The Anglo-Portuguese army, under the command of Lord Galloway, came to
invest Villena. Marshal Berwick, who commanded the French and Spanish
army, quitted his camp at Montalegre, and moved upon this town to
raise the siege. At his approach, the English general, eager to fight
a battle, advanced to meet him in the plains of Almanza. The issue was
long doubtful. The first line, commanded by the Duke of Popoli, having
been broken, the Chevalier d’Asfeldt, who had charge of the second,
drew up his masses with large intervals between them; and when the
English, who were in pursuit of the first line, reached these reserves,
he took advantage of their disorder to attack them in flank and
defeated them entirely.

Marshal Berwick, perceiving the success of this manœuvre, threw open
his front, and deploying upon the enemy’s flanks, while the reserve
sustained the attack in front, and the cavalry manœuvred in their rear,
obtained a complete victory.

Lord Galloway, wounded and pursued, collected with difficulty the
remains of his army, and took shelter with them in Tortosa.




MAXIM XXXV.


Encampments of the same army should always be formed so as to protect
each other.


NOTE.

At the battle of Dresden, in the campaign of 1813, the camp of the
allies, although advantageously placed upon the heights on the left
bank of the Elbe, was nevertheless extremely defective, from being
traversed longitudinally by a deep ravine, which separated the left
wing completely from the centre and the right. This vicious arrangement
did not escape the penetrating eye of Napoleon. He instantly directed
the whole of his cavalry and two corps of infantry against the
insulated wing, attacked it with superior numbers, overthrew it, and
took ten thousand prisoners, before it was possible to come to its
support.




MAXIM XXXVI.


When the enemy’s army is covered by a river, upon which he holds
several _têtes de pont_, do not attack in front. This would divide
your force and expose you to be turned. Approach the river in echelon
of columns, in such a manner that the leading column shall be the
only one the enemy can attack, without offering you his flank. In
the meantime, let your light troops occupy the bank, and when you
have decided on the point of passage, rush upon it and fling across
your bridge. Observe that the point of passage should be always at a
distance from the leading echelon, in order to deceive the enemy.


NOTE.

If you occupy a town or a village on the bank of a river, opposite
to that held by the enemy, it is an advantage to make this spot the
crossing point, because it is easier to cover your carriages and
reserve artillery, as well as to mask the construction of your bridge,
in a town, than in the open country. It is also a great advantage
to pass a river opposite a village, when the latter is only weakly
occupied by the enemy; because as soon as the advanced guard reaches
the other side, it carries this post, makes a lodgment, and by
throwing up a few defensive works, converts it easily into a _tête de
pont_. By this means, the rest of the army is enabled to effect the
passage with facility.




MAXIM XXXVII.


From the moment you are master of a position which commands the
opposite bank, facilities are acquired for effecting the passage of
the river; above all, if this position is sufficiently extensive to
place upon it artillery in force. This advantage is diminished, if
the river is more than three hundred toises (or six hundred yards)
in breadth, because the distance being out of the range of grape, it
is easy for the troops which defend the passage to line the bank and
get under cover. Hence it follows that if the grenadiers, ordered to
pass the river for the protection of the bridge, should reach the
other side, they would be destroyed by the fire of the enemy; because
his batteries, placed at the distance of two hundred toises from the
landing, are capable of a most destructive effect, although removed
above five hundred toises from the batteries of the crossing force.
Thus the advantage of the artillery would be exclusively his. For
the same reason, the passage is impracticable, unless you succeed in
surprising the enemy, and are protected by an intermediate island, or,
unless you are able to take advantage of an angle in the river, to
establish a crossfire upon his works. In this case, the island or angle
forms a natural _tête de pont_, and gives the advantage in artillery to
the attacking army.

When a river is less than sixty toises (or one hundred and twenty
yards) in breadth, and you have a post upon the other side, the troops
which are thrown across derive such advantages from the protection of
your artillery, that, however small the angle may be, it is impossible
for the enemy to prevent the establishment of a bridge. In this case,
the most skilful generals, when they have discovered the project of
their adversary, and brought their own army to the point of crossing,
usually content themselves with opposing the passage of the bridge, by
forming a semicircle round its extremity, as round the opening of a
defile, and removing to the distance of three or four hundred toises
from the fire of the opposite side.


NOTE.

Frederick observes, that “the passage of great rivers in the presence
of the enemy is one of the most delicate operations in war.” Success on
these occasions depends on secrecy, on the rapidity of the manœuvres,
and the punctual execution of the orders given for the movements of
each division. To pass such an obstacle in presence of an enemy, and
without his knowledge, it is necessary not only that the previous
dispositions should be well conceived, but that they should be executed
without confusion.

In the campaign of 1705, Prince Eugene, of Savoy, wishing to come to
the assistance of the Prince of Piedmont, sought for a favorable point
at which to force the passage of the Adda, defended at that time by
the French army, under the command of the Duke de Vendome.

After having selected an advantageous situation, Prince Eugene erected
a battery of twenty pieces of cannon on a position which commanded the
entire of the opposite bank, and covered his infantry by a line of
entrenched parallels constructed on the <DW72> of the declivity.

They were working vigorously at the bridge, when the Duke de Vendome
appeared with his whole army. At first he seemed determined to oppose
its construction, but after having examined the position of Prince
Eugene, he judged this to be impracticable.

He therefore placed his army out of reach of the prince’s batteries,
resting both his wings upon the river, so as to form a bow, of which
the Adda was the cord. He then covered himself with entrenchments and
abattis, and was thus enabled to charge the enemy’s columns whenever
they debouched from the bridge, and to beat them in detail.

Eugene, having reconnoitred the position of the French, considered the
passage impossible. He therefore withdrew the bridge, and broke up his
camp during the night.

It was by this manœuvre, also, that, in the campaign of 1809, the
Archduke Charles compelled the French to reoccupy the isle of Lobau,
after having debouched on the left bank of the Danube. The march of the
Archduke Charles was wholly concentric. He menaced Grosaspern with his
right, Esling with his centre, and Enzersdorf with his left.

His army, with both wings resting on the Danube, formed a semicircle
around Esling. Napoleon immediately attacked and broke the centre of
the Austrians; but after having forced their first line, he found
himself arrested by the reserves. In the meantime, the bridges upon
the Danube had been destroyed, and several of his corps, with their
parks of artillery, were still on the right bank. This disappointment,
joined to the favorable position of the Austrians, decided Napoleon
to re-enter the isle of Lobau, where he had previously constructed a
line of field-works, so as to give it all the advantages of a well
entrenched camp.




MAXIM XXXVIII.


It is difficult to prevent an enemy, supplied with pontoons, from
crossing a river. When the object of an army, which defends the
passage, is to cover a siege, the moment the general has ascertained
his inability to oppose the passage, he should take measures to arrive
before the enemy, at an intermediate position between the river he
defends and the place he desires to cover.


NOTE.

Here we may observe, that this intermediate position should be
reconnoitred, or rather, well entrenched beforehand; for the enemy will
be unable to make an offensive movement against the corps employed in
the siege, until he has beaten the army of observation; and the latter,
under cover of its camp, may always await a favorable opportunity to
attack him in flank or in rear.

Besides, the army which is once entrenched in this manner, has the
advantage of being concentrated; while that of the enemy must act in
detachments, if he wishes to cover his bridge, and watch the movements
of the army of observation, so as to enable him to attack the besieging
corps in its lines, without being exposed to an attempt on his rear, or
being menaced with the loss of his bridge.




MAXIM XXXIX.


In the campaign of 1645, Turenne was attacked with his army before
Philipsburg by a very superior force. There was no bridge here over
the Rhine, but he took advantage of the ground between the river and
the place to establish his camp. This should serve as a lesson to
engineer officers, not merely in the construction of fortresses, but
of _têtes de pont_. A space should always be left between the fortress
and the river, where an army may form and rally without being obliged
to throw itself into the place, and thereby compromise its security.
An army retiring upon Mayence before a pursuing enemy, is necessarily
compromised; for this reason, because it requires more than a day to
pass the bridge, and because the lines of Cassel are too confined to
admit an army to remain there without being blocked up. Two hundred
toises should have been left between that place and the Rhine. It
is essential that all _têtes de pont_ before great rivers should be
constructed upon this principle, otherwise they will prove a very
inefficient assistance to protect the passage of a retreating army.
_Têtes de pont_, as laid down in our schools, are of use only for small
rivers, the passage of which is comparatively short.


NOTE.

Marshal Saxe, in the campaign of 1741, having passed the Moldau in
quest of a detached corps of fourteen thousand men, which was about to
throw itself into Prague, left a thousand infantry upon that river,
with orders to entrench themselves upon a height directly opposite the
_tête de pont_. By this precaution, the marshal secured his retreat,
and also the facility of repassing the bridge without disorder, by
rallying his divisions between the entrenched height and the _tête de
pont_.

Were these examples unknown to the generals of modern times, or are
they disposed to think such precautions superfluous?




MAXIM XL.


Fortresses are equally useful in offensive and defensive warfare. It
is true, they will not in themselves arrest an army, but they are an
excellent means of retarding, embarrassing, weakening and annoying a
victorious enemy.


NOTE.

The brilliant success of the allied armies in the campaign of 1814, has
given to many military men a false idea of the real value of fortresses.

The formidable bodies which crossed the Rhine and the Alps at this
period, were enabled to spare large detachments to blockade the strong
places that covered the frontiers of France, without materially
affecting the numerical superiority of the army which marched upon the
capital. This army was in a condition, therefore, to act, without the
fear of being menaced in its line of retreat.

But at no period of military history were the armies of Europe so
combined before, or governed so entirely by one common mind in the
attainment of a single object. Under these circumstances, the line of
fortresses which surround France was rendered unavailable during the
campaign; but it would be very imprudent, therefore, to conclude that
a frontier guarded by numerous fortresses may be passed with impunity;
or that battles may be fought with these places in your rear, without
previously besieging, or at least investing them with sufficient forces.




MAXIM XLI.


There are only two ways of insuring the success of a siege. The first,
to begin by beating the enemy’s army employed to cover the place,
forcing it out of the field, and throwing its remains beyond some great
natural obstacle, such as a chain of mountains, or large river. Having
accomplished this object, an army of observation should be placed
behind the natural obstacle, until the trenches are finished and the
place taken.

But if it be desired to take the place in presence of a relieving army,
without risking a battle, then the whole _materiel_ and equipment for
a siege are necessary to begin with, together with ammunition and
provisions for the presumed period of its duration, and also lines of
contravallation and circumvallation, aided by all the localities of
heights, woods, marshes and inundations.

Having no longer occasion to keep up communications with your depôts,
it is now only requisite to hold in check the relieving army. For
this purpose, an army of observation should be formed, whose business
it is never to lose sight of that of the enemy, and which, while it
effectually bars all access to the place, has always time enough to
arrive upon his flanks or rear in case he should attempt to steal a
march.

It is to be remembered, too, that by profiting judiciously by the
lines of contravallation, a portion of the besieging army will always
be available in giving battle to the approaching enemy.

Upon the same general principle, when a place is to be besieged in
presence of an enemy’s army, it is necessary to cover the siege by
lines of _circumvallation_.

If the besieging force is of numerical strength enough (after leaving
a corps before the place four times the amount of the garrison) to
cope with the relieving army, it may remove more than one day’s march
from the place; but if it be inferior in numbers after providing for
the siege, as above stated, it should remain only a short day’s march
from the spot, in order to fall back upon its lines, if necessary, or
receive succor in case of attack.

If the investing corps and army of observation are only equal when
united to the relieving force, the besieging army should remain entire
within, or near its lines, and push the works and the siege with the
greatest activity.


NOTE.

“When we undertake a siege,” says Montécuculli, “we should not seek to
place ourselves opposite the weakest part of the fortress, but at the
point most favorable for establishing a camp and executing the designs
we have in view.”

This maxim was well understood by the Duke of Berwick. Sent to form
the siege of Nice in 1706, he determined to attack on the side of
Montalban, contrary to the advice of Vauban, and even to the orders
of the king. Having a very small army at his disposal, he began by
securing his camp. This he did by constructing redoubts upon the
heights that shut in the space between the Var and the Paillon,
two rivers which supported his flanks. By this means, he protected
himself against a surprise; for the Duke of Savoy, having the power
of debouching suddenly by the Col de Tende, it was necessary that
the marshal should be enabled to assemble his forces, so as to move
rapidly upon his adversary, and fight him before he got into position;
otherwise his inferiority in numbers would have obliged him to raise
the siege.

When Marshal Saxe was besieging Brussels, with only twenty-eight
thousand men, opposed to a garrison of twelve thousand, he received
intelligence that the Prince of Waldeck was assembling his forces
to raise the siege. Not being strong enough to form an army of
observation, the marshal reconnoitred a field of battle on the little
river Voluve, and made all the necessary dispositions for moving
rapidly to the spot, in case of the approach of the enemy. By this
means he was prepared to receive his adversary without discontinuing
the operations of the siege.




MAXIM XLII.


Feuquière says that “we should never wait for the enemy in the lines
of circumvallation, but we should go out and attack him.” He is in
error. There is no authority in war without exception; and it would be
dangerous to proscribe the principle of awaiting the enemy within the
lines of circumvallation.


NOTE.

During the siege of Mons, in 1691, the Prince of Orange assembled
his army, and advanced as far as Notre Dame de Halle, making a
demonstration to succor the place. Louis XIV, who commanded the siege
in person, called a council of war to deliberate on what was to be
done in case the Prince of Orange approached. The opinion of Marshal
Luxembourg was to remain within the lines of circumvallation, and that
opinion prevailed.

The marshal laid it down as a principle that, when the besieging army
is not strong enough to defend the whole extent of circumvallation, it
should quit the lines and advance to meet the enemy; but when it is
strong enough to encamp in two lines around a place, that it is better
to profit by a good entrenchment--more especially as by this means the
siege is not interrupted.

In 1658, Marshal Turenne was besieging Dunkirk. He had already opened
the trenches, when the Spanish army, under the orders of the Prince Don
Juan, Condé, and D’Hocquincourt, appeared in sight, and took post upon
the Downs, at a distance of a league from his lines. Turenne had the
superiority in numbers, and he determined to quit his entrenchments.
He had other advantages also. The enemy was without artillery, and
their superiority in cavalry was rendered useless by the unfavorable
nature of the ground. It was, therefore, of great importance to beat
the Spanish army before it had time to entrench itself and bring up its
artillery. The victory gained by the French on this occasion justified
all the combinations of Marshal Turenne.

When Marshal Berwick was laying siege to Philipsburg, in 1733, he had
reason to apprehend that the Prince of Savoy would attack him with
all the forces of the empire before its termination. The marshal,
therefore, after having made his disposition of the troops intended for
the siege, formed, with the rest of his army, a corps of observation to
make head against Prince Eugene, in case the latter should choose to
attack him in his lines, or attempt a diversion on the Moselle or Upper
Rhine. Prince Eugene, having arrived in front of the besieging army,
some general officers were of opinion that it was better not to await
the enemy in the lines, but to move forward and attack him. But Marshal
Berwick, who agreed with the Duke of Luxembourg, that an army which
can occupy, completely, good entrenchments is not liable to be forced,
persisted in remaining within his works. The result proved that this
was also the opinion of Prince Eugene, for he did not dare to attack
the entrenchments, which he would not have failed to do if he had any
hopes of success.




MAXIM XLIII.


Those who proscribe lines of circumvallation, and all the assistance
which the science of the engineer can afford, deprive themselves
gratuitously of an auxiliary which is never injurious, almost always
useful, and often indispensable. It must be admitted, at the same time,
that the principles of field-fortification require improvement. This
important branch of the art of war has made no progress since the time
of the ancients. It is even inferior at this day to what it was two
thousand years ago. Engineer officers should be encouraged in bringing
this branch of their art to perfection, and in placing it upon a level
with the rest.


NOTE.

“If we are inferior in numbers,” says Marshal Saxe, “entrenchments
are of no use, for the enemy will bring all his forces to bear upon
particular points. If we are of equal strength they are unnecessary
also. If we are superior, we do not want them. Then why give ourselves
the trouble to entrench?” Notwithstanding this opinion of the inutility
of entrenchments, Marshal Saxe often had recourse to them.

In 1797, Generals Provéra and Hohenzollern having presented themselves
before Mantua (where Marshal Wurmser was shut up), for the purpose of
raising the siege, they were stopped by the lines of contravallation of
St. George. This slight obstacle sufficed to afford Napoleon time to
arrive from Rivoli and defeat their enterprise. It was in consequence
of neglecting to entrench themselves that the French had been obliged
to raise the siege in the preceding campaign.




MAXIM XLIV.


If circumstances prevent a sufficient garrison being left to defend
a fortified town, which contains an hospital and magazines, at least
every means should be employed to secure the citadel against a _coup
de main_.


NOTE.

A few battalions dispersed about a town, inspire no terror; but shut
up in the more narrow outline of a citadel, they assume an imposing
attitude. For this reason it appears to me that such a precaution
is always necessary, not only in fortresses, but wherever there are
hospitals or depôts of any kind. Where there is no citadel, some
quarter of the town should be fixed upon most favorable for defence,
and entrenched in such a manner as to oppose the greatest resistance
possible.




MAXIM XLV.


A fortified place can only protect the garrison and detain the enemy
for a certain time. When this time has elapsed, and the defences of
the place are destroyed, the garrison should lay down its arms. All
civilized nations are agreed on this point, and there never has been
an argument except with reference to the greater or less degree of
defence which a governor is bound to make before he capitulates. At the
same time, there are generals--Villars among the number--who are of
opinion that a governor should never surrender, but that in the last
extremity he should blow up the fortifications, and take advantage of
the night to cut his way through the besieging army. Where he is unable
to blow up the fortifications, he may always retire, they say, with his
garrison, and save the men.

Officers who have adopted this line of conduct, have often brought off
three-fourths of their garrison.


NOTE.

In 1705, the French, who were besieged in Haguenau by Count Thungen,
found themselves incapable of sustaining an assault. Péri, the
governor, who had already distinguished himself by a vigorous defence,
despairing of being allowed to capitulate on any terms short of
becoming prisoner of war, resolved to abandon the place and cut his way
through the besiegers.

In order to conceal his intention more effectually, and while he
deceived the enemy, to sound at the same time the disposition of his
officers, he assembled a council of war and declared his resolution to
die in the breach. Then, under pretext of the extremity to which he was
reduced, he commanded the whole garrison under arms; and leaving only a
few sharpshooters in the breach, gave the order to march, and set out
in silence, under cover of the night, from Haguenau. This audacious
enterprise was crowned with success, and Péri reached Saverne without
having suffered the smallest loss.

Two fine instances of defence in later times are those of Massena at
Genoa, and of Palafox at Saragossa.

The first marched out with arms and baggage, and all the honors of
war, after rejecting every summons, and defending himself until hunger
alone compelled him to capitulate. The second only yielded after having
buried his garrison amid the ruins of the city, which he defended from
house to house, until famine and death left him no alternative but to
surrender. This siege, which was equally honorable to the French as
to the Spaniards, is one of the most memorable in the history of war.
In the course of it, Palafox displayed every possible resource which
courage and obstinacy can supply in the defence of a fortress.

All real strength is founded in the mind; and on this account I am of
opinion that we should be directed in the choice of a governor, less by
his genius than his personal character. His most essential qualities
should be courage, perseverance, and soldierlike devotedness. Above
all, he should possess the talent not only of infusing courage into
the garrison, but of kindling a spirit of resistance in the whole
population. Where the latter is wanting, however art may multiply the
defences of a place, the garrison will be compelled to capitulate after
having sustained the first, or at most, the second assault.




MAXIM XLVI.


The keys of a fortress are well worth the retirement of the garrison,
when it is resolved to yield only on those conditions. On this
principle it is always wiser to grant an honorable capitulation to a
garrison which has made a vigorous resistance, than to risk an assault.


NOTE.

Marshal Villars has justly observed, that “no governor of a place
should be permitted to excuse himself for surrendering, on the ground
of wishing to preserve the king’s troops. Every garrison that displays
courage will escape being prisoners of war. For there is no general
who, however well assured of carrying a place by assault, will not
prefer granting terms of capitulation rather than risk the loss of a
thousand men in forcing determined troops to surrender.”




MAXIM XLVII.


Infantry, cavalry, and artillery, are nothing without each other;
therefore, they should always be so disposed in cantonments as to
assist each other in case of surprise.


NOTE.

“A general,” says Frederick, “should direct his whole attention to
the tranquility of his cantonments, in order that the soldier may be
relieved from all anxiety, and repose in security from his fatigues.
With this view, care should be taken that the troops are able to form
rapidly upon ground which has been previously reconnoitered; that the
generals remain always with their divisions or brigades, and that the
service is carried on throughout with exactness.”

Marshal Saxe is of opinion that an army should not be in a hurry to
quit its cantonments, but that it should wait till the enemy has
exhausted himself with marching, and be ready to fall upon him with
fresh troops when he is overcome with fatigue.

I believe, however, that it would be dangerous to trust implicitly
to this high authority, for there are many occasions where all the
advantage lies in the initiative, more especially when the enemy has
been compelled to extend his cantonments, from scarcity of subsistence,
and can be attacked before he has time to concentrate his forces.




MAXIM XLVIII.


The formation of infantry in line should be always in two ranks,
because the length of the musket only admits of an effective fire in
this formation. The discharge of the third rank is not only uncertain,
but frequently dangerous to the ranks in its front. In drawing up
infantry in two ranks, there should be a supernumerary behind every
fourth or fifth file. A reserve should likewise be placed twenty-five
paces in rear of each flank.


NOTE.

I am of opinion, if circumstances require a line of infantry to resort
to a square, that two-deep is too light a formation to resist the
shock of cavalry. However useless the third rank may appear for the
purpose of file-firing, it is, notwithstanding necessary, in order to
replace the men who fall in the ranks in front; otherwise you would
be obliged to close in the files, and by this means leave intervals
between the companies, which the cavalry would not fail to penetrate.
It appears to me, also, that when infantry is formed in two ranks, the
columns will be found to open out in marching to a flank. If it should
be considered advantageous behind entrenchments to keep the infantry
in two ranks, the third rank should be placed in reserve, and brought
forward to relieve the front rank when fatigued, or when the fire is
observed to slacken. I am induced to make these remarks, because I have
seen an excellent pamphlet which proposes the two-deep formation for
infantry as the best. The author supports his opinion by a variety of
plausible reasons, but not sufficient, as it appears to me, to answer
all the objections that may be offered to this practice.




MAXIM XLIX.


The practice of mixing small bodies of infantry and cavalry together is
a bad one, and attended with many inconveniences. The cavalry loses its
power of action. It becomes fettered in all its movements. Its energy
is destroyed; even the infantry itself is compromised, for on the
first movement of the cavalry it is left without support. The best mode
of protecting cavalry is to cover its flank.


NOTE.

This also was the opinion of Marshal Saxe. “The weakness of the above
formation,” says he, “is sufficient in itself to intimidate the
platoons of infantry, because they must be lost if the cavalry is
beaten.”

The cavalry, also, which depends on the infantry for succor, is
disconcerted the moment a brisk forward movement carries them out of
sight of their supports. Marshal Turenne, and the generals of his time,
sometimes employed this order of formation; but that does not, in my
opinion, justify a modern author for recommending it in an essay,
entitled “_Considerations sur l’Art de la Guerre_.” In fact, this
formation has long been abandoned; and, since the introduction of light
artillery, it appears to me almost ridiculous to propose it.




MAXIM L.


Charges of cavalry are equally useful at the beginning, the middle, and
the end of a battle. They should be made always, if possible, on the
flanks of the infantry, especially when the latter is engaged in front.


NOTE.

The Archduke Charles, in speaking of cavalry, recommends that it should
be brought in mass upon a decisive point, when the moment for employing
it arrives; that is to say, when it can attack with a certainty of
success. As the rapidity of its movement enables cavalry to act along
the whole line in the same day, the general who commands it should
keep it together as much as possible, and avoid dividing it into many
detachments. When the nature of the ground admits of cavalry being
employed on all points of the line, it is desirable to form it in
column behind the infantry, and in a position whence it may be easily
directed wherever it is required. If cavalry is intended to cover a
position, it should be placed sufficiently in the rear to meet at full
speed any advance of troops coming to attack that position. If it is
destined to cover the flank of the infantry, it should, for the same
reason, be placed directly behind it. As the object of cavalry is
purely offensive, it should be a rule to form it at such a distance
only from the point of collision as to enable it to acquire its utmost
impulse, and arrive at the top of its speed into action. With respect
to the cavalry reserve, this should only be employed at the end of a
battle, either to render the success more decisive, or to cover the
retreat. Napoleon remarks that, at the battle of Waterloo, the cavalry
of the guard which composed the reserve, was engaged against his
orders. He complains of having been deprived from five o’clock of the
use of this reserve, which, when well employed, had so often insured
him the victory.




MAXIM LI.


It is the business of cavalry to follow up the victory, and to prevent
the beaten enemy from rallying.


NOTE.

Victor or vanquished, it is of the greatest importance to have a body
of cavalry in reserve, either to take advantage of victory, or to
secure a retreat. The most decisive battles lose half their value to
the conqueror, when the want of cavalry prevents him from following up
his success, and depriving the enemy of the power of rallying.

When a retiring army is pursued, it is more especially upon the flanks
that the weight of cavalry should fall, if you are strong enough in
that arm to cut off his retreat.




MAXIM LII.


Artillery is more essential to cavalry than to infantry, because
cavalry has no fire for its defence, but depends upon the sabre.
It is to remedy this deficiency that recourse has been had to
horse-artillery. Cavalry, therefore, should never be without cannon,
whether when attacking, rallying, or in position.


NOTE.

Horse-artillery is an invention of Frederick. Austria lost no time in
introducing it into her armies, although in an imperfect degree. It was
only in 1792 that this arm was adopted in France, where it was brought
rapidly to its present perfection.

The services of this arm during the wars of the Revolution were
immense. It may be said to have changed to a certain extent the
character of tactics, because its facility of movement enables it to
bear with rapidity on every point where artillery can be employed
with success. Napoleon has remarked in his memoirs that a flanking
battery which strikes and rakes the enemy obliquely, is capable of
deciding a victory in itself. To this we may add that, independent of
the advantages which cavalry derives from horse-artillery in securing
its flanks, and in opening the way for a successful charge by the
destructiveness of its fire, it is desirable that these two arms
should never be separated, but ready at all times to seize upon points
where it may be necessary to employ cannon. On these occasions, the
cavalry masks the march of the artillery, protects its establishment in
position, and covers it from the attack of the enemy, until it is ready
to open its fire.




MAXIM LIII.


In march, or in position, the greater part of the artillery should
be with the divisions of infantry and cavalry. The rest should be in
reserve. Each gun should have with it three hundred rounds, without
including the limber. This is about the complement for two battles.


NOTE.

The better infantry is, the more important it is to support it by
artillery, with a view to its preservation.

It is essential, also, that the batteries attached to divisions should
march in the front, because this has a strong influence on the _morale_
of the soldier. He attacks always with confidence when he sees the
flanks of the column well covered with cannon.

The artillery reserve should be kept for a decisive moment, and then
employed in full force, for it will be difficult for the enemy at such
a time to presume to attack it.

There is scarcely an instance of a battery of sixty pieces of cannon
having been carried by a charge of infantry or cavalry, unless where
it was entirely without support, or in a position to be easily turned.




MAXIM LIV.


Artillery should always be placed in the most advantageous positions,
and as far in front of the line of cavalry and infantry as possible,
without compromising the safety of the guns.

Field batteries should command the whole country round from the level
of the platform. They should on no account be masked on the right and
left, but have free range in every direction.


NOTE.

The battery of eighteen pieces of cannon, which covered the centre of
the Russian army at the battle of La Moskwa (Borodino), may be cited as
an example.

Its position, upon a circular height which commanded the field in every
direction, added so powerfully to its effect, that its fire alone
sufficed, for a considerable time, to paralyze the vigorous attack
made by the French with their right. Although twice broken, the left
of the Russian army closed to this battery, as to a pivot, and twice
recovered its former position. After repeated attacks, conducted with
a rare intrepidity, the battery was at length carried by the French,
but not till they had lost the _élite_ of their army, and with it the
Generals Caulincourt and Montbrun. Its capture decided the retreat of
the Russian left.

I might advert likewise to another instance, in the campaign of 1809,
and to the terrible effect produced by the hundred pieces of cannon of
the Guard which General Lauriston directed, at the battle of Wagram,
against the right of the Austrian army.




MAXIM LV.


A General should never put his army into cantonments, when he has the
means of collecting supplies of forage and provisions, and of thus
providing for the wants of the soldier in the field.


NOTE.

One great advantage which results from having an army in camp is,
that it is easier to direct its spirit and maintain its discipline
there. The soldier in cantonments abandons himself to repose; he ends
by finding a pleasure in idleness, and in fearing to return to the
field. The reverse takes place in a camp. There, a feeling of _ennui_,
and a severer discipline, make him anxious for the opening of the
campaign, to interrupt the monotony of the service and relieve it with
the chances and variety of war. Besides, an army in camp is much more
secure from a surprise than in cantonments--the defect of which usually
consists in their occupying too great an extent of ground. When an army
is obliged to go into quarters, the Marquis de Feuquière recommends
a camp to be selected in front of the line, where the troops can be
frequently assembled--sometimes suddenly, in order to exercise their
vigilance, or for the sole purpose of bringing the different corps
together.




MAXIM LVI.


A good general, a well-organized system, good instructions, and severe
discipline, aided by effective establishments, will always make good
troops, independently of the cause for which they fight.

At the same time, a love of country, a spirit of enthusiasm, a sense of
national honor, and fanaticism, will operate upon young soldiers with
advantage.


NOTE.

This remark appears to me less applicable to officers than to soldiers,
for as war is not a state of things natural to man, it follows
that those who maintain its cause must be governed by some strong
excitement. Much enthusiasm and devotedness are required on the part
of the troops for the general who commands, to induce an army to
perform great actions in a war in which it takes no interest. This is
sufficiently proved by the apathy of auxiliaries, unless when inspired
by the conduct of their chief.




MAXIM LVII.


When a nation is without establishments and a military system, it is
very difficult to organize an army.


NOTE.

This is an unanswerable truth, more particularly with reference to an
army intended to act upon the system of modern war, and in which order,
precision, and rapidity of movement, are the principal essentials to
success.




MAXIM LVIII.


The first qualification of a soldier is fortitude under fatigue and
privation. Courage is only the second; hardship, poverty and want, are
the best school for a soldier.


NOTE.

Valor belongs to the young soldier as well as to the veteran; but in
the former it is more evanescent. It is only by habits of service, and
after several campaigns, that the soldier acquires that moral courage
which makes him support the fatigues and privations of war without a
murmur. Experience by this time has instructed him to supply his own
wants. He is satisfied with what he can procure, because he knows that
success is only to be obtained by fortitude and perseverance. Well
might Napoleon say that misery and want were the best school for a
soldier; for as nothing could be compared with the total destitution
of the army of the Alps, when he assumed the command, so nothing
could equal the brilliant success which he obtained with this army
in the first campaign in Italy. The conquerors of Montenotte, Lodi,
Castiglione, Bassano, Arcole and Rivoli had beheld, only a few months
before, whole battalions covered with rags, and deserting for the want
of subsistence.




MAXIM LIX.


There are five things the soldier should never be without--his musket,
his ammunition, his knapsack, his provisions (for at least four days),
and his entrenching-tool. The knapsack may be reduced to the smallest
size possible, if it be thought proper, but the soldier should always
have it with him.


NOTE.

It is fortunate that Napoleon has recognized the advantage of giving
to every soldier an entrenching-tool. His authority is the best answer
to the ridicule which has been thrown upon those who proposed it. An
axe will be found to inconvenience the foot-soldier as little as the
sword he wears at his side, and it will be infinitely more useful. When
axes are given out to companies, or are carried by fatigue-men during
a campaign, they are soon lost; and it often happens, when a camp is
to be formed, that a difficulty arises in cutting wood and building
huts for the soldier; whereas, by making the axe a part of every man’s
appointments, he is obliged to have it always with him; and whether
the object be to entrench himself in a village, or to erect huts in a
camp, the commander of a corps will speedily see the advantage of this
innovation.

When once the axe has been generally adopted, we shall, perhaps,
see the desirability of issuing pickaxes and shovels to particular
companies, and also the benefit of more frequent entrenchments. It is
more particularly during retreats that it is important to entrench when
the army has reached a good position; for an entrenched camp not only
furnishes the means of rallying troops which are pursued, but if it be
fortified in such a manner as to render the issue of an attack doubtful
to the enemy, it will not only sustain the _morale_ of the soldier in
the retreat, but afford the general-in-chief opportunities for resuming
the offensive, and profiting by the first false movement on the part of
his adversary. It will be recollected how Frederick, in the campaign of
1761, when surrounded by two Russian and Austrian armies, whose united
force was quadruple his own, saved his army by entrenching himself in
the camp of Buntzalvitz.




MAXIM LX.


Every means should be taken to attach the soldier to his colors. This
is best accomplished by showing consideration and respect to the old
soldier. His pay likewise should increase with his length of service.
It is the height of injustice not to pay a veteran more than a recruit.


NOTE.

Some modern writers have recommended, on the other hand, to limit the
period of service, in order to bring the whole youth of a country
successively under arms. By this means they purpose to have the levies,
_en masse_, all ready trained and capable of resisting successfully
a war of invasion. But however advantageous at first sight such a
military system may appear, I believe it will be found to have many
objections.

In the first place, the soldier fatigued with the minutiæ of discipline
in a garrison, will not feel much inclined to re-enlist after he has
received his discharge, more especially since, having served the
prescribed time, he will consider himself to have fulfilled all the
duties of a citizen to his country. Returning to his friends, he will
probably marry, or establish himself in a trade. From that moment his
military spirit declines, and he soon becomes ill adapted to the
business of war. On the contrary, the soldier who serves long, becomes
attached to his regiment as to a new family. He submits to the yoke of
discipline, accustoms himself to the privations his situation imposes,
and ends by finding his condition agreeable. There are few officers
that have seen service who have not discovered the difference between
old and young soldiers, with reference to their power of supporting
the fatigues of a long campaign, to the determined courage that
characterizes the attack, or to the ease with which they rally after
being broken.

Montécuculli observes, that “it takes time to discipline an army; more
to inure it to war; and still more to constitute veterans.” For this
reason, he recommends that great consideration should be shown to old
soldiers; that they should be carefully provided for, and a large
body of them kept always on foot. It seems to me, also, that it is
not enough to increase the pay of the soldier according to his period
of service, but that it is highly essential to confer on him some
mark of distinction that shall secure to him privileges calculated to
encourage him to grow gray under arms, and, above all, to do so with
honor.




MAXIM LXI.


It is not set speeches at the moment of battle that render soldiers
brave. The veteran scarcely listens to them, and the recruit forgets
them at the first discharge. If discourses and harangues are useful, it
is during the campaign: to do away unfavorable impressions, to correct
false reports, to keep alive a proper spirit in the camp, and to
furnish materials and amusement for the bivouac. All printed orders of
the day should keep in view these objects.


NOTE.

The opinion of the general-in-chief, energetically expressed, is,
notwithstanding, productive of great effect on the _morale_ of the
soldier.

In 1703, at the attack of Hornbec, Marshal Villars, seeing the troops
advancing without spirit, threw himself at their head: “What!” said
he, “is it expected that I, a marshal of France, should be the first to
escalade, when I order YOU to attack?”

These few words rekindled their ardor; officers and soldiers rushed
upon the works, and the town was taken almost without loss.

“We have retired far enough for to-day; you know I always sleep upon
the field of battle!” said Napoleon, as he flew through the ranks
at the moment of resuming the offensive at Marengo. These few words
sufficed to revive the courage of the soldiers, and to make them forget
the fatigues of the day, during which almost every man had been engaged.




MAXIM LXII.


Tents are unfavorable to health. The soldier is best when he bivouacs,
because he sleeps with his feet to the fire, which speedily dries the
ground on which he lies. A few planks, or a little straw, shelter him
from the wind.

On the other hand, tents are necessary for the superior officers, who
have to write and to consult their maps. Tents should, therefore,
be issued to these, with directions to them never to sleep in a
house. Tents are always objects of observation to the enemy’s staff.
They afford information in regard to your numbers and the ground you
occupy; while an army bivouacking in two or three lines, is only
distinguishable from afar by the smoke which mingles with the clouds.
It is impossible to count the number of the fires.


NOTE.

The acknowledged advantage of bivouacking is another reason for
adding an entrenching-tool to the equipment of the soldier; for, with
the assistance of the axe and shovel, he can hut himself without
difficulty. I have seen huts erected with the branches of trees,
covered with turf, where the soldier was perfectly sheltered from the
cold and wet, even in the worst season.




MAXIM LXIII.


All information obtained from prisoners should be received with
caution, and estimated at its real value. A soldier seldom sees
anything beyond his company; and an officer can afford intelligence of
little more than the position and movements of the division to which
his regiment belongs. On this account, the general of an army should
never depend upon the information derived from prisoners, unless it
agrees with the reports received from the advanced guards, in reference
to the position, etc., of the enemy.


NOTE.

Montécuculli wisely observes that “prisoners should be interrogated
separately, in order to ascertain, by the agreement in their answers,
how far they may be endeavoring to mislead you.” Generally speaking,
the information required from officers who are prisoners, should have
reference to the strength and resources of the enemy, and sometimes to
his localities and position. Frederick recommends that prisoners should
be menaced with instant death if they are found attempting to deceive
by false reports.




MAXIM LXIV.


Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command; for this
reason, when war is carried on against a single power, there should be
only one army, acting upon one base, and conducted by one chief.


NOTE.

“Success,” says the Archduke Charles, “is only to be obtained by
simultaneous efforts, directed upon a given point, sustained with
constancy, and executed with decision.” It rarely happens that any
number of men who desire the same object are perfectly agreed as to the
means of attaining it; and if the will of one individual is not allowed
to predominate, there can be no _ensemble_ in the execution of their
operations; neither will they attain the end proposed. It is useless to
confirm this maxim by examples. History abounds in them.

Prince Eugene and Marlborough would never have been so successful in
the campaigns which they directed in concert, if a spirit of intrigue
and difference of opinion had not constantly disorganized the armies
opposed to them.




MAXIM LXV.


The same consequences which have uniformly attended long discussions
and councils of war, will follow at all times. They will terminate
in the adoption of the worst course, which in war is always the most
timid, or, if you will, the most prudent. The only true wisdom in a
general is determined courage.


NOTE.

Prince Eugene used to say that councils of war “are only useful when
you want an excuse for attempting _nothing_.” This was also the opinion
of Villars. A general-in-chief should avoid, therefore, assembling
a council on occasions of difficulty, and should confine himself to
consulting separately his most experienced generals in order to benefit
by their advice, while he is governed at the same time in his decision
by his own judgment. By this means, he becomes responsible, it is true,
for the measures he pursues; but he has the advantage also of acting
upon his own conviction, and of being certain that the secret of his
operations will not be divulged, as is usually the case where it is
discussed by a council of war.




MAXIM LXVI.


In war, the general alone can judge of certain arrangements. It depends
on him alone to conquer difficulties by his own superior talents and
resolution.


NOTE.

The officer who obeys, whatever may be the nature or extent of his
command, will always stand excused for executing implicitly the
orders which have been given to him. This is not the case with the
general-in-chief, on whom the safety of the army and the success of the
campaign depend. Occupied, without intermission, in the whole process
of observation and reflection, it is easy to conceive that he will
acquire by degrees a solidity of judgment which will enable him to see
things in a clearer and more enlarged point of view than his inferior
generals.

Marshal Villars, in his campaigns, acted almost always in opposition
to the advice of his generals, and he was almost always fortunate.
So true it is, that a general, who feels confident in his talent for
command, must follow the dictates of his own genius if he wishes to
achieve success.




MAXIM LXVII.


To authorize generals or other officers to lay down their arms in
virtue of a particular capitulation, under any other circumstances
than when they are composing the garrison of a fortress, affords a
dangerous latitude. It is destructive of all military character in a
nation to open such a door to the cowardly, the weak, or even to the
misdirected brave. Great extremities require extraordinary resolution.
The more obstinate the resistance of an army, the greater the chances
of assistance or of success.

How many seeming impossibilities have been accomplished by men whose
only resource was death!


NOTE.

In the campaign of 1759, Frederick directed General Fink, with eighteen
thousand men, upon Maxen, for the purpose of cutting off the Austrian
army from the defiles of Bohemia. Surrounded by twice his numbers, Fink
capitulated after a sharp action, and fourteen thousand men laid down
their arms. This conduct was the more disgraceful, because General
Winch, who commanded the cavalry, cut his way through the enemy. The
whole blame of the surrender fell, therefore, upon Fink, who was
tried afterward by a court-martial, and sentenced to be cashiered and
imprisoned for two years.

In the campaign of Italy in 1796, the Austrian General Provéra
capitulated with two thousand men in the castle of Cossaria.
Subsequently, at the battle of La Favorite, the same general
capitulated with a corps of six thousand men. I scarcely dare to revert
to the shameful defection of General Mack in the capitulation of Ulm
in 1805, where thirty thousand Austrians laid down their arms--when we
have seen, during the wars of the Revolution, so many generals open
themselves a way by a vigorous effort through the enemy, supported only
by a few battalions.




MAXIM LXVIII.


There is no security for any sovereign, for any nation, or for any
general, if officers are permitted to capitulate in the open field,
and to lay down their arms in virtue of conditions favorable to the
contracting party, but contrary to the interests of the army at large.
To withdraw from danger, and thereby to involve their comrades in
greater peril, is the height of cowardice. Such conduct should be
proscribed, declared infamous, and made punishable with death. All
generals, officers and soldiers, who capitulate in battle to save their
own lives, should be decimated.

He who gives the order, and those who obey, are alike traitors, and
deserve capital punishment.


NOTE.

Soldiers, who are almost always ignorant of the designs of their
chief, cannot be responsible for his conduct. If he orders them to
lay down their arms, they must do so; otherwise they fail in that law
of discipline which is more essential to an army than thousands of
men. It appears to me, therefore, under these circumstances, that the
chiefs alone are responsible, and liable to the punishment due to their
cowardice. We have no example of soldiers being wanting in their duty
in the most desperate situations, where they are commanded by officers
of approved resolution.




MAXIM LXIX.


There is but one honorable mode of becoming prisoner of war. That
is, by being taken separately; by which is meant, by being cut off
entirely, and when we can no longer make use of our arms. In this case,
there can be no conditions, for honor can impose none. We yield to an
irresistible necessity.


NOTE.

There is always time enough to surrender prisoner of war. This should
be deferred, therefore, till the last extremity. And here I may be
permitted to cite an example of rare obstinacy in defence, which has
been related to me by ocular witnesses. The captain of grenadiers,
Dubrenil, of the thirty-seventh regiment of the line, having been
sent on detachment with his company, was stopped on the march by a
large party of Cossacks, who surrounded him on every side. Dubrenil
formed his little force into square, and endeavored to gain the skirts
of a wood (within a few muskets’ shot of the spot where he had been
attacked), and reached it with very little loss. But as soon as the
grenadiers saw this refuge secured to them, they broke and fled,
leaving their captain and a few brave men, who were resolved not to
abandon him, at the mercy of the enemy. In the meantime, the fugitives,
who had rallied in the depth of the wood, ashamed of having forsaken
their leader, came to the resolution of rescuing him from the enemy,
if a prisoner, or of carrying off his body if he had fallen. With this
view, they formed once more upon the outskirts, and opening a passage
with their bayonets through the cavalry, penetrated to their captain,
who, notwithstanding seventeen wounds, was defending himself still.
They immediately surrounded him, and regained the wood with little
loss. Such examples are not rare in the wars of the Revolution, and
it were desirable to see them collected by some contemporary, that
soldiers might learn how much is to be achieved in war by determined
energy and sustained resolution.




MAXIM LXX.


The conduct of a general in a conquered country is full of
difficulties. If severe, he irritates and increases the number of his
enemies. If lenient, he gives birth to expectations which only render
the abuses and vexations, inseparable from war, the more intolerable.
A victorious general must know how to employ severity, justice and
mildness by turns, if he would allay sedition or prevent it.


NOTE.

Among the Romans, generals were only permitted to arrive at the command
of armies after having exercised the different functions of the
magistracy. Thus by a previous knowledge of administration, they were
prepared to govern the conquered provinces with all that discretion
which a newly-acquired power, supported by arbitrary force, demands.

In the military institutions of modern times, the generals, instructed
only in what concerns the operation of strategy and tactics, are
obliged to intrust the civil departments of the war to inferior agents,
who, without belonging to the army, render all those abuses and
vexations, inseparable from its operations, still more intolerable.

This observation, which I do little more than repeat, seems to me,
notwithstanding, deserving of particular attention; for if the leisure
of general officers was directed in time of peace to the study of
diplomacy--if they were employed in the different embassies which
sovereigns send to foreign courts--they would acquire a knowledge of
the laws and of the government of these countries, in which they may
be called hereafter to carry on the war. They would learn also to
distinguish those points of interest on which all treaties must be
based, which have for their object the advantageous termination of a
campaign. By the aid of this information they would obtain certain
and positive results, since all the springs of action, as well as the
machinery of war, would be in their hands. We have seen Prince Eugene,
and Marshal Villars, each fulfilling with equal ability the duties of a
general and a negotiator.

When an army which occupies a conquered province observes strict
discipline, there are few examples of insurrection among the people,
unless indeed resistance is provoked (as but too often happens), by the
exactions of inferior agents employed in the civil administration.

It is to this point, therefore, that the general-in-chief should
principally direct his attention, in order that the contributions
imposed by the wants of the army may be levied with impartiality; and
above all, that they may be applied to their true object, instead of
serving to enrich the collectors, as is ordinarily the case.




MAXIM LXXI.


Nothing can excuse a general who takes advantage of the knowledge
acquired in the service of his country, to deliver up her frontier and
her towns to foreigners. This is a crime reprobated by every principle
of religion, morality and honor.


NOTE.

Ambitious men who, listening only to their passions, arm natives of
the same land against each other (under the deceitful pretext of
the public good), are still more criminal. For however arbitrary a
government, the institutions which have been consolidated by time, are
always preferable to civil war, and to that anarchy which the latter is
obliged to create for the justification of its crimes.

To be faithful to his sovereign, and to respect the established
government, are the first principles which ought to distinguish a
soldier and a man of honor.




MAXIM LXXII.


A general-in-chief has no right to shelter his mistakes in war under
cover of his sovereign, or of a minister, when these are both distant
from the scene of operation, and must consequently be either ill
informed or wholly ignorant of the actual state of things.

Hence, it follows, that every general is culpable who undertakes the
execution of a plan which he considers faulty. It is his duty to
represent his reasons, to insist upon a change of plan, in short, to
give in his resignation, rather than allow himself to be made the
instrument of his army’s ruin. Every general-in-chief who fights a
battle in consequence of superior orders, with the certainty of losing
it, is equally blamable.

In this last-mentioned case, the general ought to refuse obedience;
because a blind obedience is due only to a military command given
by a superior present on the spot at the moment of action. Being in
possession of the real state of things, the superior has it then in his
power to afford the necessary explanations to the person who executes
his orders.

But supposing a general-in-chief to receive positive order from
his sovereign, directing him to fight a battle, with the further
injunction, to yield to his adversary, and allow himself to be
defeated--ought he to obey it? No. If the general should be able to
comprehend the meaning or utility of such an order, he should execute
it; otherwise he should refuse to obey it.


NOTE.

In the campaign of 1697, Prince Eugene caused the courier to be
intercepted, who was bringing him orders from the emperor forbidding
him to hazard a battle, for which everything had been prepared, and
which he foresaw would prove decisive. He considered, therefore,
that he did his duty in evading the orders of his sovereign; and the
victory of Zanta, in which the Turks lost about thirty thousand men,
and four thousand prisoners, rewarded his audacity. In the meantime,
notwithstanding the immense advantages which accrued from this victory
to the imperial arms, Eugene was disgraced on his arrival at Vienna.

In 1793, General Hoche, having received orders to move upon Treves with
an army harassed by constant marches in a mountainous and difficult
country, refused to obey. He observed, with reason, that in order to
obtain possession of an unimportant fortress, they were exposing his
army to inevitable ruin. He caused, therefore, his troops to return
into winter quarters, and preferred the preservation of his army, upon
which the success of the future campaign depended, to his own safety.
Recalled to Paris, he was thrown into a dungeon, which he only quitted
on the downfall of Robespierre.

I dare not decide if such examples are to be imitated; but it seems to
me highly desirable that a question so new and so important, should be
discussed by men who are capable of determining its merits.




MAXIM LXXIII.


The first qualification in a general-in-chief is a cool head--that
is, a head which receives just impressions, and estimates things and
objects at their real value. He must not allow himself to be elated by
good news, or depressed by bad.

The impressions he receives either successively or simultaneously in
the course of the day, should be so classed as to take up only the
exact place in his mind which they deserve to occupy; since it is upon
a just comparison and consideration of the weight due to different
impressions, that the power of reasoning and of right judgment depends.

Some men are so physically and morally constituted as to see everything
through a highly- medium. They raise up a picture in the mind on
every slight occasion, and give to every trivial occurrence a dramatic
interest. But whatever knowledge, or talent, or courage, or other good
qualities such men may possess, nature has not formed them for the
command of armies, or the direction of great military operations.


NOTE.

“The first quality in a general-in-chief,” says Montécuculli, “is a
great knowledge of the art of war. This is not intuitive, but the
result of experience. A man is not born a commander. He must become
one. Not to be anxious; to be always cool; to avoid confusion in his
commands; never to change countenance; to give his orders in the midst
of battle with as much composure as if he were perfectly at ease. These
are the proofs of valor in a general.

“To encourage the timid; to increase the number of the truly brave; to
revive the drooping ardor of the troops in battle; to rally those who
are broken; to bring back to the charge those who are repulsed; to find
resources in difficulty, and success even amid disaster; to be ready at
a moment to devote himself, if necessary, for the welfare of the state.
These are the actions which acquire for a general distinction and
renown.”

To this enumeration may be added, the talent of discriminating
character, and of employing every man in the particular post which
nature has qualified him to fill. “My principal attention,” said
Marshal Villars, “was always directed to the study of the younger
generals. Such a one I found, by the boldness of his character, fit
to lead a column of attack; another, from a disposition naturally
cautious, but without being deficient in courage, more perfectly to
be relied on for the defence of a country.” It is only by a just
application of these personal qualities to their respective objects,
that it is possible to command success in war.




MAXIM LXXIV.


The leading qualifications which should distinguish an officer selected
for the head of the staff, are, to know the country thoroughly; to
be able to conduct a _reconnoissance_ with skill; to superintend the
transmission of orders promptly; to lay down the most complicated
movements intelligibly, but in a few words, and with simplicity.


NOTE.

Formerly, the duties of the chiefs of the staff were confined to the
necessary preparations for carrying the plan of the campaign, and
the operations resolved on by the general-in-chief, into effect.
In a battle, they were only employed in directing movements and
superintending their execution. But in the late wars, the officers
of the staff were frequently intrusted with the command of a column
of attack, or of large detachments, when the general-in-chief feared
to disclose the secret of his plans by the transmission of orders or
instructions. Great advantages have resulted from this innovation,
although it was long resisted. By this means, the staff have been
enabled to perfect their theory by practice, and they have acquired,
moreover, the esteem of the soldiers and junior officers of the
line, who are easily led to think lightly of their superiors, whom
they do not see fighting in the ranks. The generals who have held
the arduous situation of chief of the staff during the wars of the
Revolution, have almost always been employed in the different branches
of the profession. Marshal Berthier, who filled so conspicuously this
appointment to Napoleon, was distinguished by all the essentials of a
general. He possessed calm, and at the same time brilliant courage,
excellent judgment, and approved experience. He bore arms during half
a century, made war in the four quarters of the globe, opened and
terminated thirty-two campaigns. In his youth he acquired, under the
eye of his father, who was an engineer officer, the talent of tracing
plans and finishing them with exactness, as well as the preliminary
qualifications necessary to form a staff-officer. Admitted by the
Prince de Lambesq into his regiment of dragoons, he was taught the
skilful management of his horse and his sword--accomplishments so
important to a soldier. Attached afterward to the staff of Count
Rochambeau, he made his first campaign in America, where he soon began
to distinguish himself by his valor, activity and talents. Having at
length attained superior rank in the staff-corps formed by Marshal de
Segur, he visited the camps of the King of Prussia, and discharged the
duties of chief of the staff under the Baron de Bezenval.

During nineteen years, consumed in sixteen campaigns, the history
of Marshal Berthier’s life was little else but that of the wars of
Napoleon, all the details of which he directed, both in the cabinet
and the field. A stranger to the intrigues of politics, he labored
with indefatigable activity; seized with promptitude and sagacity
upon general views, and gave the necessary orders for attaining them
with prudence, perspicuity, and conciseness. Discreet, impenetrable,
modest; he was just, exact, and even severe, in everything that
regarded the service; but he always set an example of vigilance and
zeal in his own person, and knew how to maintain discipline, and to
cause his authority to be respected by every rank under his orders.




MAXIM LXXV.


A commandant of artillery should understand well the general principles
of each branch of the service, since he is called upon to supply
arms and ammunition to the different corps of which it is composed.
His correspondence with the commanding officers of artillery at the
advanced posts, should put him in possession of all the movements of
the army, and the disposition and management of the great park of
artillery should depend upon this information.


NOTE.

After having recognized the advantage of intrusting the supply of
arms and ammunition for an army to a military body, it appears to
me extraordinary that the same regulation does not extend to that of
provisions and forage, instead of leaving it in the hands of a separate
administration, as is the practice at present.

The civil establishments attached to armies are formed almost always at
the commencement of a war, and composed of persons strangers to those
laws of discipline which they are but too much inclined to disregard.
These men are little esteemed by the military, because they serve only
to enrich themselves, without respect to the means. They consider only
their private interest in a service whose glory they cannot share,
although some portion of its success depends upon their zeal. The
disorders and defalcations incident to these establishments would
assuredly cease, if they were confided to men who had been employed
in the army, and who, in return for their labors, were permitted to
partake with their fellow-soldiers the triumph of their success.




MAXIM LXXVI.


The qualities which distinguish a good general of advanced posts, are,
to reconnoitre accurately defiles and fords of every description; to
provide guides that may be depended on; to interrogate the _curé_
and postmaster; to establish rapidly a good understanding with the
inhabitants; to send out spies; to intercept public and private
letters; to translate and analyze their contents; in a word, to be able
to answer every question of the general-in-chief, when he arrives with
the whole army.


NOTE.

Foraging parties, composed of small detachments, and which were usually
intrusted to young officers, served formerly to make good officers
of advanced posts; but now the army is supplied with provisions by
regular contributions: it is only in a course of partisan warfare that
the necessary experience can be acquired to fill these situations with
success.

A chief of partisans is, to a certain extent, independent of the army.
He receives neither pay nor provisions from it, and rarely succor, and
is abandoned during the whole campaign to his own resources.

An officer so circumstanced must unite address with courage, and
boldness with discretion, if he wishes to collect plunder without
measuring the strength of his little corps with superior forces. Always
harassed, always surrounded by dangers, which it is his business to
foresee and surmount, a leader of partisans acquires in a short time an
experience in the details of war rarely to be obtained by an officer
of the line; because the latter is almost always under the guidance of
superior authority, which directs the whole of his movements, while
the talent and genius of the partisan are developed and sustained by a
dependence on his own resources.




MAXIM LXXVII.


Generals-in-chief must be guided by their own experience, or their
genius. Tactics, evolutions, the duties and knowledge of an engineer
or artillery officer, may be learned in treatises, but the science
of strategy is only to be acquired by experience, and by studying the
campaigns of all the great captains.

Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, and Frederick, as well as Alexander,
Hannibal, and Cæsar, have all acted upon the same principles. These
have been: to keep their forces united; to leave no weak part
unguarded; to seize with rapidity on important points.

Such are the principles which lead to victory, and which, by inspiring
terror at the reputation of your arms, will at once maintain fidelity
and secure subjection.


NOTE.

“A great captain can only be formed,” says the Archduke Charles, “by
long experience and intense study: neither is his own experience
enough--for whose life is there sufficiently fruitful of events to
render his knowledge universal?” It is, therefore, by augmenting his
information from the stock of others, by appreciating justly the
discoveries of his predecessors, and by taking for his standard of
comparison those great military exploits, in connection with their
political results, in which the history of war abounds, that he can
alone become a great commander.




MAXIM LXXVIII.


Peruse again and again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar,
Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick. Model yourself
upon them. This is the only means of becoming a great captain, and
of acquiring the secret of the art of war. Your own genius will be
enlightened and improved by this study, and you will learn to reject
all maxims foreign to the principles of these great commanders.


NOTE.

It is in order to facilitate this object that I have formed the present
collection. It is after reading and meditating upon the history of
modern war that I have endeavored to illustrate, by examples, how the
maxims of a great captain may be most successfully applied to this
study. May the end I have had in view be accomplished!




Transcriber’s Notes


Cover created by Transcriber and placed in the Public Domain.

Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not
changed, except as noted below.

Unusual and archaic spellings were not changed.

Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
quotation marks retained.

Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.

Page 32: “spacious and extensive” was printed as “entensive” but
changed here.

Page 60: “1746” is a misprint; the correct date must be in the 1600's,
perhaps “1646”.

Page 63: “1798” may be a misprint for “1796”.

Page 65: “1745” is a misprint; the correct year is “1645”.

Page 75: “wo to the vanquished” was printed that way.

Page 100: “Vauban” was printed as “Vanban” but changed here.





End of Project Gutenberg's The Officer's Manual, by Napoleon Bonaparte

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