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    [Illustration: Chinese title]

    TI-PING TIEN-KWOH;
    THE HISTORY OF
    THE TI-PING REVOLUTION,

    INCLUDING
    A Narrative of the Author's Personal Adventures.

    BY
    [Illustration: First character of author's Chinese name]
    LIN-LE.

   FORMERLY HONORARY OFFICER, CHUNG-WANG'S GUARDS; SPECIAL AGENT OF
   THE TI-PING GENERAL-IN-CHIEF; AND LATE COMMANDER OF THE "LOYAL
   AND FAITHFUL AUXILIARY LEGION."

    VOLUME II.

    LONDON:
    DAY & SON (LIMITED), LITHOGRAPHERS & PUBLISHERS,
    GATE STREET, LINCOLN'S INN FIELDS.
    1866.




    COX AND WYMAN,
    ORIENTAL, CLASSICAL, AND GENERAL PRINTERS,
    GREAT QUEEN STREET, LONDON, W.C.




CONTENTS OF VOL. II.


    CHAPTER XV.                                                     PAGE

    Chinese Custom-houses.--Attempts at Extortion.--An
    Adventure.--Ruse de Guerre.--Its Success.--Peace
    Negotiations.--Their abrupt Termination.--The Plot thickens.--A
    Companion in Misfortune.--Negotiations renewed.--Their
    Failure.--Hostilities.--Critical Position.--Danger
    increases.--Attempted Rescue.--The Mud Fort Mandarin.--His
    Fate.--The Civil Mandarin.--Rescued at last.--The _Williamette_  425

    CHAPTER XVI.

    Hang-chow.--Ti-pings approach Shanghae.--Their Reception.--The
    _Casus Belli._--The First Blow.--Filibuster Ward.--Admiral
    Hope's Exploits.--Captures Hsiun-tang.--The
    Consequences.--Hope's Policy condemned.--The real _Casus
    Belli_.--Defence of Shanghae justified.--Inducements to oppose
    the Ti-pings.--Official Reports.--Mr. Consul
    Meadows.--Recognition of the Ti-pings.--The _Shanghae
    Times_.--Mr. John's Report.--Edict of Religious
    Toleration.--Report continued.--Mr. Muirhead's Report            445

    CHAPTER XVII.

    On Board the _Williamette_.--Blockade running.--Arrival at
    Nankin.--Solemn Thanksgiving.--Domestic Arrangements.--Phillip's
    Wife.--The Wooing.--The Dowry.--The Wedding.--Trade
    established.--Imperialist Corruption.--Preparations for
    leaving.--An Elopement.--The Journey.--The Surprise.--The
    Repulse.--Arrival at Hang-chow.--Its capture.--The
    Particulars.--Cum-ho.--The Chung-wang.--His mistaken Policy      475

    CHAPTER XVIII.

    Earl Russell's Despatch.--Its Effect.--"Taking the
    Offensive."--Official Reports.--General Staveley.--Attacks the
    Ti-pings.--General Ward.--Hope and Ward repulsed.--Che-poo
    attacked.--Its Capture.--Loot Regulations.--Kah-ding
    attacked.--Its Capture.--Ti-ping Loss.--Newspaper
    Comments.--Tsing-poo besieged.--Inside the City.--Ti-ping
    Losses.--Na-jaor besieged.--Cho-lin besieged.--Ti-ping
    Bravery.--Cho-lin captured.--The Chung-wang.--Kah-ding
    evacuated.--Consul Harvey's Despatch.--Despatch
    reviewed.--Ningpo threatened.--Captain Dew at Ningpo.--His
    Despatch.--The Reply.--Captain Dew's Rejoinder.--Preparation to
    attack Ningpo.--Captain Dew's Inconsistency.--His
    Ultimatum.--Official Despatches.--Ningpo attacked.--Ningpo
    evacuated.--Newspaper Reports                                    498

    CHAPTER XIX.

    A Double Wedding.--Its Celebration.--The Honeymoon.--Its
    Interruption.--Warlike Preparations.--Soong-kong
    invested.--General Ching's Despatch.--Tsing-poo
    recaptured.--Ti-ping Severity excused.--England's
    Responsibility.--Curious Chinese Custom.--The Chung-wang's
    Policy.--His Explanation.--The Ti-ping Court of Justice.--How
    conducted.--Opium Smoking.--Its Effects.--Evidence
    thereof.--Forbidden by Ti-ping Law.--Opium Trade                 539

    CHAPTER XX.

    Ti-ping Disasters.--The Vampyre Fleet.--Important Letters.--Mr.
    Roberts's Case.--Mr. Consul Harvey.--Letters
    continued.--Misrepresentations.--Anti-Ti-ping Meeting.--The
    Sherrard Osborne Theory.--The Fleet Afloat.--The "Lay" and
    "Osborne" Agreement.--The Fleet repudiated.--Pecuniary Loss to
    England.--A Resume.--General Burgevine.--Lieutenant Ridge.--Act
    of Piracy.--A Tartar caught.--Exit of the Anglo-Chinese
    Flotilla.--General Ward's Proceedings.--Progress of the
    War.--Death of General Ward.--Captain Dew's Disgrace.--How
    caused.--His Mode of Proceeding.--Its Effect upon
    Trade.--Operations before Kah-ding.--"Wong-e-poo."--General
    Burgevine dismissed from his Command.--Major Gordon takes
    Command.--Sir F. Bruce's Despatches.--His Objections to Gordon's
    Appointment.--Also to General Brown's Interference               562

    CHAPTER XXI.

    Personal Narrative continued.--Mr. Lobschied.--His Reception at
    Nankin.--Press Publications.--Mr. Lobschied leaves
    Nankin.--Operations before Tait-san.--The Assault.--Act of
    Bravery.--Rout of the Imperialists.--Gordon's Art of
    War.--Tait-san reinvested.--Siege of Tait-san.--Its
    Capture.--Manchoo Atrocities.--Treatment of Ti-ping
    Prisoners.--Mr. Sillar's Statement.--Quin-san
    captured.--Gordon's Report.--Gordon reinforced.--The Chung-wang
    recalled.--Critical Position of the Ti-pings.--The Chung-wang's
    Retreat.--Difficulties encountered.--Reinforcements.--The Scene
    of Battle.--Its Horrors.--Arrival at Nankin.--The Chung-wang's
    Army.--General Attack.--The Repulse.--The Surprise.--The Night
    Attack.--The Flight and Pursuit.--Death of Marie                 598

    CHAPTER XXII.

    On the Wong-poo River.--Ningpo Sam.--The _China_.--Her
    Passengers.--The Ta-hoo Lake.--Its Scenery.--The Canals of
    Central China.--General
    Burgevine.--Soo-chow.--Deserters.--Burgevine suspected.--The
    Americo-Ti-ping Legions.--Burgevine's Policy.--Colonel
    Morton.--The Mo-wang.--Arrival of the Chung-wang.--The Loyal and
    Faithful Auxiliary Legion.--How regulated.--Affair at
    Wo-kong.--Recruiting.--Plan of Operations.--A _coup de
    main_.--Arrangement.--Interruptions.--Postponed                  632

    CHAPTER XXIII.

    Renewed Attempt.--Its Success.--Narrow Escape.--British
    Interference.--How explained.--Its Failure.--The _coup de main_
    succeeds.--Groundless Alarm.--Route to Soo-chow.--Its
    Difficulties.--Generous Conduct.--Arrival at
    Wu-see.--Prize-Money.--Treachery.--Preparations for an
    Attack.--Manoeuvring.--The Attack.--Warm Reception.--The Enemy
    repulsed.--The Result.--Wu-see evacuated.--Return to
    Shanghae.--Last Interview with the Chung-wang.--Manchoo
    Cruelty.--Result of British Interference.--Evidence
    thereof.--Newspaper Extracts.--Further Extracts.--England's
    Policy.--Its Consequences.--Its Inconsistency.--Her Policy in
    Japan.--Religious Character of the Ti-pings.--Their Christianity 658

    CHAPTER XXIV.

    Kar-sing-foo.--Christmas in Ti-pingdom.--Works of
    Art.--Dangerous Companions.--Narrow Escape.--Retribution.--Adieu
    to Ti-pingdom.--Mr. White's Case.--The Neutrality
    Ordnance.--Order of July 9th, 1864.--Intended Return to
    England.--Particulars of the Siege of Soo-chow.--Strength of the
    Garrison.--The Assault described.--The Nar-wang's
    Treachery.--Its Cause.--Major Gordon's Report.--The _Friend of
    China_.--Gordon's Report continued.--Narrative by an
    Eye-Witness.--The Soo-chow Tragedy.--Major Gordon.--His
    Conduct.--Gordon's Letter to Sir F. Bruce.--Analysis
    thereof.--Newspaper Extract.--Gordon's "Reasons"
    refuted.--Analysis Continued.--Gordon's "Personal
    Considerations."--His Motives explained.--Newspaper
    Extracts.--Sir F. Bruce's Despatch.--Its Analysis.--Falsity of
    Gordon's Statements.--How proved.--Extract from the
    _Times_.--Deductions                                             694

    CHAPTER XXV.

    Operations Resumed.--Attack on Kin-tang.--The Battle of the
    Brickbats.--Ti-ping Success.--Active
    Operations.--Manoeuvring.--Hang-chow invested.--Fall of
    Kar-sing-foo.--Gordon's Proceedings.--Chang-chow-foo.--Narrative
    of the Siege.--Fall of Chang-chow.--The Foo-wang.--Manchoo
    Cruelty.--Debate on the Chinese War.--Lord Palmerston's
    Policy.--Its Errors.--Mr. Cobden's Policy.--Mr. Layard.--His
    Inaccuracy.--Extracts from the Debate.--Result of Lord
    Palmerston's Policy.--Fall of Nankin.--"Imperialist"
    Account.--The Chung-wang's Capture.--Other Reports.--Digest of
    Events.--The Chung-wang.--His Position in Nankin.--Events in the
    City.--Newspaper Reports.--Doubts as to the Chung-wang's
    Fate.--The Retreat from Nankin.--Newspaper Extracts.--The
    Shi-wang's Proclamations.--Lee Shai-Yin's Address                743

    CHAPTER XXVI.

    Results of British Policy.--Its Effect on Trade.--The
    Inspectorate System.--The Tien-tsin Treaty.--Present State of
    China.--Rebellion in the Ascendant.--Proposed Remedy.--The
    Mandarin Policy.--The Extradition Treaty.--The Mo-wang's
    Case.--Its Injustice.--Its Illegality.--Burgevine's Case.--Our
    Treatment by the Manchoos.--Russia's Policy in
    China.--Contrasted with that of England.--Russian
    Progress.--Statistics.--Acquisition of Territory by
    Russia.--Her Approach to British India.--Russia's
    Advantages.--Her Future Policy.--"Peking and the
    Pekingese."--Its Author's
    Misstatements.--Misquotations.--Examples thereof.--"Chinese
    Miscellanies."--Ti-ping Movements.--The Future of the Ti-pings
    Doubtful.--Latest Movements.--The Kan-wang.--Nien-fie
    Victories.--Future Prospects.--Finis                             788


    APPENDIX A.

    Decalogue                                                        823
    The Trimetrical Classic                                          827
    Ode for Youth                                                    832

    APPENDIX B.

    Export of Tea and Silk from China                                838

    APPENDIX C.

    Memorandum of Ti-pings killed during the British Hostilities against
    them                                                             840




LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.


    CHROMOLITHOGRAPHS.

    Brought to Bay at the Mud Fort                    _to face page_ 440
    A view in the inner apartments of the Chung-wang's
    Palace--Miss Cum-ho and her two governesses             "        479
    Interior of an Opium Smoking Saloon                     "        559
    Imperialist attack on the River Forts at Nankin         "        629
    View from the Summit of a Mountain in the Western
    Tung-shan district on the Northern shore of the
    Ta-hoo Lake, province of Keang-su                       "        637
    Naval Engagement and Capture of Imperialist Gunboats
    at Wu-see                                               "        675
    Map, Present state of China                             "        794

    WOOD ENGRAVINGS.

    The Mud Fort Mandarin                                     _page_ 440
    A View on the Journey to Soo-chow of a portion of country
    near the City of Wu-se lately desolated by Imperialists.       " 657




CHAPTER XV.

    Chinese Custom-houses.--Attempts at Extortion.--An
    Adventure.--Ruse de Guerre.--Its Success.--Peace
    Negotiations.--Their abrupt Termination.--The Plot thickens.--A
    Companion in Misfortune.--Negotiations renewed.--Their
    Failure.--Hostilities.--Critical Position.--Danger
    increases.--Attempted Rescue.--The Mud Fort Mandarin.--His
    Fate.--The Civil Mandarin.--Rescued at last.--The _Williamette_.


The route by which I returned to the broad expanse of "The Son of the
Sea" was, if possible, more infested with so-called custom-houses than
that by which I had reached Sin-ya-meu. Every two or three _le_ some
wretched little bamboo-hut would make its appearance round a bend of the
creek, with a long pole and a dirty white rag on the end, containing
huge red and black characters, setting forth the official nature of the
den. Then sundry opium-stupified, villanous-looking mandarin soldiers
would rush from their pipes and gambling, catch up their rusty gingalls
and long bamboo spears, and loudly call upon my Chinese captain to
"soong mow" (let go the anchor), and pay a duty, or squeeze, into their
dirty hands. Upon such occasions P---- and myself would be compelled to
get on deck with our fowling-pieces, and drive the harpies off, when
they would sullenly retire to their opium and cards, muttering curses
upon the _Yang-quitzo_, and trusting for better prey next time.

This sort of thing may seem very like smuggling, but it was really far
from being so. The duty upon my cargo was levied at Sin-ya-meu, previous
to embarkation, and was paid to the customs officials; and from that
town to Kwa-chow the fifteen to twenty custom stations were every one
of them charging in excess of the legal duty. Chinese have frequently
informed me that the governor of a province lets these squeeze stations
out to subordinate mandarins, who then farm them at discretion. The
mandarins have _braves_ enough to enforce their extortion; all passing
junks are stopped until payment is made; and if the aggrieved people
should complain, their petition goes before the governor who thrives
upon the system. This is one of the many forms of Government corruption
throughout China; to many the extortionate _regime_ of the Manchoo must
appear incredible, though it is a fact pretty widely known, even by
those who are striving to uphold it.

Although during our dinner a couple of _braves_ succeeded in getting on
board from a squeeze barrier, which led to their tailor becoming
acquainted with our shoemaker during the process of summary ejectment,
myself and friend reached the great river without further mishap than an
occasional exposure to the ill-aimed gingall balls of some of the
baffled plunderers. At Kwa-chow, the entrance to the Grand Canal on the
northern bank of the Yang-tze, we passed through a large fleet of
Imperialist _Ti-mungs_, row-gunboats, and a big customs station; the
officials evidently wished to squeeze us, but, I imagine, the vicinity
of the treaty port Chin-kiang deterred them. Shooting into the yellow
waters once more, a fair wind carried us bravely over the strong adverse
current.

Winter having now set in, and the north-east monsoon commenced to blow
up the whole length of the Yang-tze-kiang, thus enabling vessels to sail
against the tide very well, we made considerable progress on our way to
Nankin before anchoring for the night. At daylight we were underweigh
and sailing merrily along, myself and P---- keeping regular watch and
watch--a course rendered necessary by the danger apprehended from the
numerous Imperialist gunboats and fortified positions in the
neighbourhood of Ti-pingdom.

Till noon we carried the breeze, but the day becoming hot the wind fell,
and so we were obliged to run close to the bank, land our crew with a
mast-head rope, and slowly track up stream. Just before dusk a light
breeze sprang up again, and getting the men on board we made sail to
round the "Mud Port," situated on the extreme point of the elbow formed
by the river at Nin-gan-shan. This fort, upon my passage down from
Nankin, was held by the Ti-pings; upon this occasion, to my sorrow, I
found the Imperialists in possession; its former garrison having
betrayed their charge, and sold it to the enemy.

We had barely rounded the point, making almost imperceptible headway,
when the wind failed, and the tide, at this point very strong, began to
carry us down stream. At this moment, five gunboats put off from the
shore and pulled directly towards my vessel. Upon nearing her, they
hailed and ordered us to anchor. I now perceived that they were
Imperialists, and, from the flags displayed, that they were of the
squeezing, or custom-house genus. P---- and myself immediately armed
ourselves, and ordered the _lowder_ to hold on his course. The tide was
fast drifting our vessel in to the bank, right under the guns of the
fort, and directly the men in the gunboats perceived this, and saw only
two foreigners on board, and that we mounted no guns, they surrounded us
and opened fire.

Our position was now decidedly unpleasant. We had drifted to within a
few yards of the bank, the guns in the fort were manned, several more
boats were putting off, filled with men, and the shore was lined with
soldiers, placing their gingalls and matchlocks, and making ready to
fire upon us. I well knew the unscrupulous nature of these plundering
Imperialists, that our duty-receipts from Sin-ya-meu would not be
regarded, and that they would most willingly cut our throats for the
value of five dollars. With the force opposed to us, and no chance to
make even a running fight, it would have been madness to have returned
the gunboats' fire with our rifles and fowling-pieces; we therefore took
it like lambs, and devoutly wished for a sudden puff of wind to waft us
from our perilous situation. Not a breath, not the very gentlest zephyr
came, excepting the wind caused by the shots that were flying all
around, some of which, better aimed than the majority, were smashing
into our poor old vessel, quite regardless of the consequences. The men
on shore and the guns of the fort now opened fire; while the gunboats,
finding we did not seem inclined to fight, appeared to be getting ready
to board.

At this critical juncture a fortunate thought came into my head. I had
my old uniform on board, and the idea formed was to use it to personate
a foreign official, and so endeavour to save our heads by giving the
imps an impression as to our importance, and a dread of the consequences
in case of molestation. Jumping into the cabin, I quickly reappeared
with uniform and sword. My friend P---- also had some uniform he had
worn in the Indian navy, so following my example, he dived into his
chest and then rushed on deck gorgeous in brass-bound array. We were not
a moment too soon with our device, for P---- had just got on deck when
one of our Chinese sailors was knocked over by a shot, and the rest,
taking fright, suddenly let go the anchor, and casting adrift the
halyards of the sails, let them go by the run; after which they ran and
hid themselves down below. I now hailed the nearest gunboat to come
alongside, telling my interpreter to state that we were foreign
officers, or mandarins, that we were followed by a man-of-war, and that
we were sailing about in the junk for pleasure.

When the _braves_ observed our uniform, and were invited to board, their
hitherto noisy courage seemed to vanish, and they would not come.
However, they ceased blazing their confounded guns at us, much to our
satisfaction, for although Chinese shot, with a tremendous whistling by
reason of its uneven casting, makes much more noise than effect, and
generally performs parabolas of singular eccentricity, _some_ strike the
object, especially when fired at a distance of only a few yards.

Our vessel was anchored within 30 feet of the bank, we were therefore
completely in the power of the imps, who mustered at least 600 strong at
that place. I again hailed the gunboat containing the man I imagined to
be the principal officer, to come alongside, and let me know what they
wanted; but the fellows seemed suspicious of some trap, and continued to
lay on their oars, all talking and yelling together at the top of their
individual voices, each trying to make himself heard above every one
else, in approved Chinese style.

At last the mandarin in charge of the fort made his appearance on the
bank, and after his attendants had shouted themselves hoarse, trying to
make his orders heard above the din, the jabbering in the gunboats
ceased, and the one I had hailed proceeded very slowly and cautiously to
come alongside. She contained a couple of officers, whom we got on
board, showing them our revolvers, and politely informing them, in pure
mandarin dialect, that if their men followed them, we should be under
the painful necessity of depositing a bullet or two in their yellow
carcasses. This had the desired effect, and the fierce-looking _braves_
were ordered to remain in their boats, much to their disgust, for their
fingers, no doubt, were itching to handle the valuables of the "foreign
devils."

When we had seated the two officials in our cabin, an old number of the
_Hong-Kong Daily Press_ was produced as our commission in the service of
His Majesty the Emperor of America, while a Manchester rug, of the stars
and stripes pattern, was displayed as our banner. To all this the
Chinamen "chin-chin'd" with the greatest respect, but they still
referred to the fact that our vessel carried a cargo, and declared their
chief's intention to squeeze a certain amount of dollars out of us. The
duty-passes we had received at Sin-ya-meu were then produced and the
officers took them ashore to their superior. They soon returned, and
requested me to accompany them to an interview with the head mandarin,
stating that he was determined to have some money, which he chose to
term "duty," for conscience' sake, I suppose, although it was certainly
a most unmitigated attempt at robbery.

Before landing, I made my conductors fully understand that, upon the
slightest attempt at treachery I should shoot _them_. I took my revolver
with me, and proceeded to the mandarin's presence, leaving P---- on
board, to preserve our effects from the plundering propensities of the
villanous mob into whose clutches we had fallen.

My interpreter A-ling, our cook, Ganymede, and the _lowder_, accompanied
me on shore as a retinue of state, somewhat suitable for the dignity of
representatives of our supposed emperor. The _Daily Press_ was carefully
carried in an old glove-box by A-ling, while the cook was deputed to
carry our cards (in the shape of two labels from bottles of Bass's pale
ale) to the mandarin; the boy carried presents, consisting of a couple
of empty eau-de-cologne bottles, an _Illustrated London News_, and a box
of damaged percussion caps; the _lowder_ brought up the rear with our
(Manchester) banner streaming from a tall bamboo. Although the soldiers
crowded round us they did not offer much annoyance; probably they were
awed by our stately bearing and procession. We reached the Yamun
(official residence), the pale-ale labels were duly delivered, and then
we were ushered into the august presence of the cruel, sensual,
dirty-looking mandarin, my followers imposingly taking up their position
behind me. The _Daily Press_ was displayed by A-ling, who, clever fellow
that he was, to show its importance, bent on one knee while presenting
it.

The display of the newspaper, the presents, and our uniform, seemed to
make a decided impression upon the mandarin, and we should probably have
been set free but for a _mal-a-propos_ circumstance that now occurred.
I had sent the _lowder_ down to the beach, loudly ordering him to look
out for the imaginary man-of-war steamer I gave our captors to
understand was following me, and to report her approach whenever she
came in sight. This had considerably subdued the mandarin's arrogant
tone, for he was evidently not well up in foreign affairs, and
provincial Chinese have a wonderful idea of the "fiery dragon ships" of
the "foreign devils." He was just commencing a set apology for the
mistake committed by his "ignorant _braves_," when in came our
pig-headed _lowder_, or rather, into the apartment he was kicked by a
couple of soldiers holding on to his tail, and most unmercifully
thumping, kicking, and bumping him along from behind.

It appeared that the wretch had got into conversation with some of the
_braves_ on the beach; they had asked him where our vessel was bound,
and he naively told them to Nankin, _the rebel capital_! They instantly
seized and dragged him before the mandarin. The long-winded apology came
to an abrupt termination, and the orator turned his attention to
examining the miserable _lowder_ as to our connection with the Ti-pings.
The stupid captain of our sailors now declared that he only _thought_ we
were going to touch at Nankin _en route_, to make some demand upon the
rebels with regard to the seizure of some foreign-owned junks. The
mandarin at last ordered him to be taken into the fort, and dismissed us
with an intimation that we must wait till the next morning to have a
duty levied upon our cargo, and to adjust the whole affair.

The _Daily Press_ was ceremoniously returned to the glove-box, the stars
and stripes were rolled up, and we were escorted back to our vessel by
the two officers. Upon getting on board, I found P---- all safe, and
promenading the deck like a moving armory, with a rifle over his
shoulder, a revolver and brace of horse-pistols in his belt, and a sword
by his side; while four gunboats were chained fast alongside, the crews
of which, with their heads poked over our bulwarks, were viciously
eyeing the Cerberus who prevented them from indulging their natural
propensities.

I found our vessel thoroughly secured by the imps, who had taken every
precaution to guard against a _coup-de-main_ upon our part. Chains were
rove through each ring-bolt on our deck and fastened on board the
gunboats, two of them being lashed on each side, full of armed men
watchful and on the alert. A long chain was passed from our bows to the
shore, and a number of matchlock men were encamped for the night right
abreast. Even had it been possible to strike a sudden blow and release
ourselves, as it was a dead calm they could have pulled after our vessel
and blown her to pieces, if they could not have mustered courage to
board us. There was nothing to do but to trust to the chapter of
accidents for a way out of the difficulty, and, if necessary, to sell
our lives dearly.

It was a matter of considerable surprise to myself and friend that the
Imperialists did not behave worse to us, for they neither yelled
"Yang-quitzo," threw stones, nor seemed so anxious to attack us as the
generality of Manchoo troops would have been. This we afterwards
accounted for by the fact that they had formerly been Ti-pings, and had
not quite forgotten that they had once been worshippers of Yesu, and had
looked upon strangers from the West as "foreign brethren." Their chief
had turned traitor to the Ti-ping cause, and betrayed the "Mud Fort" to
the Manchoo, in consideration of retaining his own followers, receiving
_carte blanche_ to squeeze all passing vessels, and being decorated with
a mandarin button and feathers. They were a savage-looking set, these
"Mud Fort" banditti, yet, bad as they seemed to be, were much better
than the usual style of Imperialists; had we fallen into the hands of
the latter we should have been treated with much indignity and violence,
if not killed.

We were aroused in the middle of the night by a tremendous hubbub, and,
running on deck, found it was the Mud Fort people engaged seizing
another unfortunate European vessel. Getting into our boat, I went on
board, and found she was a _Ningpo Boat_, from Shanghae to Hankow, and
that the only foreigner on board was an Englishman, to whom she
belonged. The soldiers hauled his vessel close in to the bank a little
below mine, and there made her fast in a similar manner. After talking
over our mutual misfortune, we agreed that in the morning I should land,
and endeavour to obtain our release; failing which, I was to get on
board his craft with P----; we were then to man her guns (she carried
two six-pounders), try to force both vessels adrift, and make a fight to
escape.

After a not particularly refreshing sleep, I again went on board the
_Ningpo Boat_, to settle our plan for the last time, preparatory to
putting it into execution. Upon returning to my own vessel, we carefully
loaded all our firearms; I then concealed my own revolver and a long
bowie knife under my uniform, took A-ling and our cook with me; the one
carrying the _Daily Press_, and the other two more pale-ale labels; and
proceeded on shore.

The imps had at daylight cast off the chains wherewith they secured our
vessel for the night; leaving, however, a couple of thick ropes
fastening her to the bank by head and stern; these P---- had prepared an
axe to cut in case of emergency. Our cabin was formed by a half-raised
deckhouse aft, on the top of this a few bags of charcoal were placed, so
as to form a sort of fortlet, inside which the arms, with a good supply
of ammunition, were hidden; the ropes were laid ready, fore and aft, to
make sail, and the _Ningpo Boat_ was hauled quite close to the bank, so
as to enable me to get on board her in event of hostilities, while P----
could pull to her in our boat.

As I walked away from the bank, and observed P----ensconce himself among
the bags of charcoal, my feelings were not of the most pleasant
description. However, there was no choice of conduct; so, making the
best of a bad affair, I proceeded straight for the den of the bandit
chief, assuming a stolid, immovable sort of Dogberry officiality,
peculiarly effective with the Chinese. Upon sending in our extemporized
cards, and being admitted to the mandarin's state hall (a dirty
apartment in a dirty house within the dirty fort), I was kept waiting
till noon for the appearance, from among his many wives and opium pipes,
of the owner.

Meanwhile, a breeze had sprung up, and was gradually increasing; so
that, although the delay proved rather discreditable as to my veracity
about the expected man-of-war, a chance of escape was apparent. If we
could not obtain our release by fair means, we might be able to get our
vessels clear, make sail, and keep up a running fight.

At length, half-stupified with opium, the mandarin made his appearance,
the remaining part of his senses seemingly concentrated into a dull
cunning sort of ferocity. His first act was to summon quite a number of
armed soldiers to his Yamun, who stationed themselves in and about the
building. Our wretched _lowder_ was then dragged forth, and presented a
pitiable sight. He had been tortured by having his ankle joints crushed
between logs of wood, and by placing smaller pieces between his fingers,
which were then pressed together by several men, causing intense agony,
and severely injuring the fingerbones. The torture had compelled him to
divulge all he knew of our proceedings at Nankin, besides a great deal
more which he did not know, but simply stated to anticipate the wish of
his interrogators and another squeeze of the wooden bars, failing a
satisfactory reply. He was now examined before me, and confessed that we
had left Nankin, and were returning thither. The mandarin then declared
that he must have 2,000 dollars, or else he would keep our vessel, and
send us into the interior _as Ti-ping prisoners for execution_.

For some time I argued against either proceeding, displaying the _Daily
Press_, the duty-passes I had received at Sin-ya-meu, and endeavouring
to convince the mandarin as to the serious consequences of exciting the
anger of the Emperor of America by molesting either myself and friend,
or the vessel seized during the night. At last, after the robber had
lowered his demand to 1,000 dollars, and while the discussion was
becoming very warm, a soldier brought a report to the mandarin, who
instantly issued some order to an attendant officer. What the tenor of
this might be I heard not, but my cook did, and it evidently alarmed
him, for, exclaiming, "More bettah, go just now," he rushed out of the
room and disappeared. A-ling immediately told the mandarin that he would
pay his so-called custom-house authorities a sum of 500 dollars, and
then, telling me not to stay any longer, left the Yamun, begging me to
accompany him. Making a bow to the angered official plunderer, I
leisurely walked forth, and, upon reaching the rear of the fort, quickly
passed through the gate, just as he appeared in his doorway, and gave a
sharp command to some of the attendant soldiers.

Before I had turned the angle of the fort and got within sight of my
vessel, half-a-dozen officers with drawn swords came running after me,
calling upon me to stop and return with them to the mandarin. A-ling,
stating he would run to the pseudo custom-house, a few hundred yards
distant, and bring with him the officials to receive the squeeze of 500
dollars that we had offered to pay, advised me to get on board as
quickly as possible.

I waited until my pursuers had reached to within a a few feet, and then,
suddenly drawing my revolver, jumped towards them with it levelled to
the foremost. They instantly turned tail and rushed back to the fort,
while I ran down towards the beach, holding the revolver above my head
to signalize P---- and the master of the _Ningpo Boat_ that danger was
at hand.

Ere I had reached more than half-way between the fort and the river, a
tremendous outcry arose from the former, accompanied by the blowing of
horns, the beating of gongs, and the noise of the Chinese drum. As I
ran, I turned my head in the direction of the uproar and observed the
mandarin, followed by a crowd of soldiery, rushing after me. Before I
could gain the beach, to my surprise, I saw the _Ningpo Boat_ land some
of her crew, cast off from the bank, and proceed to track up stream,
thus breaking the terms of the agreement upon which I had landed, and
cutting off my only chance of escape from the pursuing imps. When I did
reach the river bank, every boat had been warned away by the shouts and
gestures of the mob behind me, and the _Ningpo Boat_ was some distance
off the shore, and fast tracking away.

For a moment I gazed around, and found myself completely at the mercy of
my pursuers; in front ran the swift current of the Yang-tze--behind came
the savage yelling crowd of armed men.

I had just time to notice P---- on the top of our cabin deck, rifle in
hand, and hear him shout, while pointing to the receding _Ningpo Boat_:
"The coward has made terms with them and deserted us--jump up in the
boat on the beach; I will open fire on the imps if they attempt to seize
you, and I'll get you off with our boat if I have a chance; the imps
have stolen the oars, and our crew have stowed themselves away below!"

The boat my friend referred to was a large one hauled up slantingly on
the beach, one side touching the water of the river, and the other
turned towards my pursuers. She stood some four or five feet off the
ground; and climbing into her highest part, which was about level with
the edge of the river bank before it shelved down into the narrow beach
upon which she rested, I turned to face the enemy, after answering
P----, and telling him not to fire until I gave him the signal to do so
by commencing with my revolver.

By this time the horde of banditti were within a few yards, armed in
every fashion, and neither dressed as Imperialists nor Ti-pings, but
clad in a multitude of colours. The whole garrison of the place seemed
to be turned out, and with much gesticulation, and the usual terrifying
yelling of Chinese soldiery, rushed along after their leader. Bamboo
spears, gingalls, matchlocks, scythe-headed halberts, broad
three-pronged pikes, and large knives, were waving all about, and beyond
all I distinguished _the apparatus to which a prisoner is fastened when
barbarously put to death by "cutting into a thousand pieces_."

On they came, with their fiendish cry, "Tah! tah!" until right down to
the edge of the bank, where they formed a tumultuous crowd, brandishing
their arms, some opening their clothing and beating their breasts in
defiance, but all arrested by my levelled revolver. The mandarin used
his utmost exertions to urge them on, but one and all seemed disinclined
to become the _first_ to draw a bullet from the six-shooter. The men who
carried firearms in the front rank I sharply observed, and instantly
took aim at any one who attempted to handle his weapon offensively.
Meanwhile, upon either side, the men above and below my position got
down on the beach, and gradually advanced towards me, while those not
immediately covered by my revolver began firing their matchlocks.

I now, for the first time in my life, _really_ experienced fear. In
front and flank I saw nothing but a dense array of savage men thirsting
to slay me; beyond them were a corps of executioners erecting their
triangles in anticipation of having the cruel delight to slowly cut me
into pieces; and when I gave a sidelong glance behind (I dared not
attempt more, or the imps would have taken advantage and rushed forward)
the deep and turbid river met my view.

For a moment or two, during which the enemy might have cut down or
seized me without my being able to pull trigger, I became quite
nerveless, while an icy chill came over my heart and made me feel both
sick and helpless. Fortunately, I soon rallied. It is unpleasant to
mention such a fear as I had felt, much less to dwell upon it. Just as
the events of my life seemed striving together in a confused jumble for
the first place in a rapid mental panorama, my presence of mind
returned. I felt a sudden glow of enthusiasm for the Ti-ping cause,
through which I had got into the danger, and a determination to die, if
death it was to be, in a manner worthy of an Englishman before a mob of
Chinese.

To this day I am surprised at the sudden revulsion of feeling I
experienced. One moment I was powerless, trembling, and terrified; the
next, I was keenly alive to every incident in the scene, collectedly
watching each movement of my individual assailants, and confidently
prepared for any result.

At this moment P---- hailed me: "I have covered the mandarin; shall I
shoot him? I can cut her" (our vessel) "adrift. Jump into the river and
swim off, I will pick you up."

A little sooner I should have done this, but now I was prepared to take
advantage of the slightest chance of escape; the soldiers were still to
be kept back by my revolver; a peaceful termination of the difficulty
_might_ be obtained; but if I were to take to the water I should almost
certainly be shot like a dog in it, even if I were not swept away and
drowned by the swift current.

I shouted to P----, "Hold on yet. I think I can keep them at bay
myself." He had hitherto been supporting me with his rifle levelled at
the mandarin. "Try and take me off with the boat."

Although our vessel was lying some little distance above me and some 30
feet from the bank, and although the oars had been stolen from our boat,
P---- was a thorough sailor, and I trusted that he would find some means
of dropping it down to me with a line. I did not think so without
reason, for he replied to me:--

"Look out, then! I am going to put down my rifle. I will drop the boat
down to you; stand by to jump into her!"

Meanwhile, the imps seemed striving to work themselves into a frenzy,
when they would probably rush forward, receive my few shots, and
overpower me by numbers. The mandarin kept running to his men and trying
to make them point their matchlocks at me, but directly any one
attempted to do so, my revolver barrel stared him full in the face.

At last, I had the satisfaction to hear P----'s voice again:--

"Stand by, old fellow," he hailed; "I am just going to shove the boat
off from our inshore quarter with a line fast to her."

Without daring to turn my head for a moment, I replied: "All right,
shove her off, and hail me directly she comes close enough for a jump."

The suspense of the next minute or two was very great, then I heard my
friend shout: "Now, jump now if you can; I am covering the imps with my
rifle."

I gave a half glance over my shoulder, but, alas! the boat was too
distant. The rope had tautened too soon, and she had been swept into a
parallel line with our vessel, without reaching within twenty feet of my
position. Hauling her alongside, P---- and As-sam, our boy, got into
her, and shoving well off with a boat-hook, drifted down, endeavouring
to grapple the boat I stood in. Again she fell short, and was swept out
by the tide, amid a storm of bullets splashing all around her, from the
men behind, from whose fire I was sheltered by the front rank, but who
were easily able to shoot at the boat, and who managed to wound As-sam
in the arm.

P----, finding that without oars it was impossible to reach me with the
boat, reluctantly returned on board to his former position behind the
bags of charcoal, and there resumed his rifle. Just at the same time the
mandarin, finding his soldiers afraid to break the ominous pause by
attacking me and exposing their leaders to certain death, began to set
the example himself. He was certainly a far braver man than any of his
followers, for dashing forward, sword in hand, he got to the lowest end
of the boat and clambered into her, although I could easily have shot
him at any instant. Steadying himself, he began to advance towards me,
along the gunnel of the boat, which was open amidships and had a decked
bow and stern.

[Illustration: THE MUD FORT MANDARIN.]

It was now a most trying moment for me. The mandarin was already within
nine or ten feet, and another second would bring him to striking
distance. His life was entirely in my power; I could have shot him; but
the _first_ blow was only wanted to break the treacherous calm, and
cause the immediate slaughter of myself. I felt that my last chance of
life depended upon delay; two more seconds would decide it one way or
the other. The suspense of that smallest passage of time was
indescribable; many days of intense excitement and danger seemed crowded
into one moment. The short though terrible hesitation in my mind,
whether to shoot the mandarin, fire the remaining barrels of the
revolver at his followers, and then jump into the river and swim off, or
to delay another second, so as to lose not the merest chance of saving
my life, seemed to occupy an age of anxious and momentous thought. At
this crisis P---- spoke to me again:

[Illustration: London Published March 15^{th} 1866 by Day & Son,
Limited, Lithog^{rs} Gate Str. Lincoln's Inn Fields
Day & Son, Limited, Lith.
BROUGHT TO BAY AT THE MUD FORT.]

"Shoot the mandarin," he shouted. "I will cut the vessel adrift, sheer
her in, and try to pick you up. If I cannot quite reach you, take to the
water; you can easily get on board, and I'll protect you by opening fire
on the imps."

Rapidly glancing, as I fully expected for the last time, upon the clear
blue sky above, the bright sun shining upon and making the earth _so_
beautiful and attractive, and vividly recalling a far distant home and a
loved mother for my latest earthly thought, I took steady aim at the
mandarin's heart and pulled the trigger, shouting to P----, "Cut her
adrift, and be sharp about it!"

I naturally expected to hear the report of my pistol, and to see the
mandarin fall, while the soldiers would rush forward to avenge his
death. Although I am certain I gave the trigger a sufficient pull, the
hammer never fell and the mandarin at the moment, when another step
towards me would have brought his uplifted sword upon my head, suddenly
lost his balance and fell from the narrow gunnel of the boat to the
beach. I instantly hailed P---- to "hold on," and he returned to his
former position to watch the progress of events.

When the mandarin rolled on the beach, several of his officers seized
him and dragged him up the bank, regardless of the struggles he made to
return and attack me. Fortunately A-ling arrived upon the scene at this
moment, and going to the mandarin, told him that he would go on board
and bring the money required. While the leader of the robbers was being
brought to his fort, A-ling was taken on board our vessel, after
receiving my assent to procure the dollars from P----. Meanwhile the
soldiers remained in the same position around myself, while I
endeavoured to show them my indifference by producing a cigar and
lighting it.

After A-ling had paid the money into the coffers of the banditti, he
came to me with two inferior officers, and getting the soldiers to fall
back, induced me to descend from my position of vantage, believing all
danger was over. Although at first they seemed quiet enough and retired
from the boat, I had no sooner reached some little distance from it than
they crowded round me. Suddenly, and before I could use my revolver, I
was seized from behind by many hands, and while every incident of my
life rushed with supernatural rapidity and minuteness of detail through
my mind, I was forced upon my knees, when one of the soldiers raised a
long and heavy sword to behead me.

The steel flashed as it was raised above me, and commending myself to
God, I shivered while for a fearful moment awaiting the blow. Again,
however, I was saved from the very jaws of death. My would-be
executioner was thrust aside, and I believe that I fainted for a second
or two. I then found myself surrounded by a strange mandarin and his
attendants, A-ling, my cook, and a few of the more kindly disposed among
the robber band. A-ling informed me that the stranger was a "civil"
mandarin who had just arrived from a neighbouring city; that he had
happened to notice my gold band, and had opportunely rushed forward and
rescued me. Thus for the first time the uniform had done me good.

At first, after expressing my gratitude, I felt perfectly safe under the
protection of the fresh arrival, for I knew that the rank and authority
of a civil mandarin was far superior to that of a military one like the
commandant of the Mud Fort. However, upon the people around me moving a
little away, I saw three soldiers on the ground, two dead and one
severely wounded; for it appeared that P----, upon observing my seizure,
had opened fire on the crowd. It was now evening and the dusk was fast
approaching, and it was evident that not a moment should be lost in
getting away from the place. Two men had been killed, and their chief
would undoubtedly endeavour to avenge their death. After giving the
watch I wore as a memento to the mandarin who had so kindly saved me,
and being supplied with a boat by him, I at last got safely on board
with A-ling and the cook.

My friend P---- had barely gripped me by the hand and congratulated me
upon my escape, when we were startled by the blowing of the war-horns on
shore, and the clang of gongs. While we were hard at work getting our
vessel underweigh, the soldiers came rushing down to the beach again,
waving their flags and arms about, planting their gingalls, and swearing
vengeance for the death of their comrades. In a few minutes they opened
a heavy fire upon us, while a number of them ran along the bank in the
direction of a creek where their gunboats were moored.

The wind had fallen comparatively light, and we would not have been able
to escape from the smaller vessels of the enemy, when, to our great joy,
a steamer rounded the bend of the river below, and came into full view.
At this moment the gunboats were just shoving off from the shore, but
directly they observed the steamship only a few miles distant they
pulled up the creek again, while the men along the beach ceased firing
and ran into the fort, doubtless believing that the approaching vessel
was the man-of-war I had told them about.

When the steamer had arrived pretty near, I signalized her, and saw that
she was one of the American river boats. To my horror, when close
alongside she hoisted the Imperialist flag, and I then knew her to be
the _Williamette_, a vessel belonging to the Manchoo Government. When
right abeam she stopped and sent a boat to my vessel. Fortunately she
was manned with an American crew, and in consideration of the sum of 300
dollars, her captain, whose name, singularly enough, happened to be
Friend, Imperialist though he was, agreed to tow my vessel up to the
Nankin forts.

Before dark we had the satisfaction to bid adieu to the Mud Fort, as we
ploughed up the fast rolling yellow waters astern of the _Williamette_.
To our sorrow, however, we were just able to discern on the beach the
execution of our _lowder_, who was dragged down and decapitated there
before our eyes, while we were powerless to save the poor fellow.




CHAPTER XVI.

    Hang-chow.--Ti-pings approach Shanghae.--Their Reception.--The
    _Casus Belli_.--The First Blow.--Fillibuster Ward.--Admiral
    Hope's Exploits.--Captures Hsiun-tang.--The
    Consequences.--Hope's Policy condemned.--The real _Casus
    Belli_.--Defence of Shanghae justified.--Inducements to oppose
    the Ti-pings.--Official Reports.--Mr. Consul
    Meadows.--Recognition of the Ti-pings.--The _Shanghae
    Times_.--Mr. John's Report.--Edict of Religious
    Toleration.--Report continued.--Mr. Muirhead's Report.


Hang-Chow, the provincial capital, was carried by assault upon the 29th
of December. The Chinese part of the garrison, unable to endure the
horrors of the close siege, after everything in the shape of food had
been consumed, and even human flesh exposed for sale in the
market-place, opened the gates of the outer city and surrendered to the
Ti-pings. The Manchoo troops defended themselves to the last, neither
giving nor accepting quarter, and when the walls of the inner city were
carried by the victorious insurgents, the Tartar general, Luy, and a
number of his men, sprang a mine and blew themselves up with their
citadel.

The capture of this important city and of the treaty port Ningpo having
placed the Ti-pings in possession of the whole Che-kiang province, with
the exception of Shanghae and a few miles around it, they resolved, upon
the termination of the year, as previously agreed to, to follow up the
enemy to this last stronghold.

Although, before his unsuccessful trip to Nankin, Admiral Hope had
seemed willing to treat with the Ti-pings, when he returned to Shanghae,
after finding it impossible to again deceive them, his conduct
underwent a marked change, as evinced by the eager way in which he
sought the opportunity to indulge his warlike propensities. This
opportunity was soon afforded him.

Immediately upon the expiration of the year, Chung-wang, the Ti-ping
Commander-in-Chief, moved an army towards Shanghae. No attack was made
upon the city, but this force gradually occupied every position in the
neighbourhood, till at length not an Imperialist soldier remained beyond
gunshot range of its walls. The Ti-pings again manifested their
extraordinary friendliness towards foreigners by not attacking the city,
and with similar forbearance and moderation to that evinced upon their
approach in 1860, endeavouring to open peaceable negotiation with the
foreign authorities. The leaders of the different _corps d'armee_ sent
in the usual nobly worded proclamations, relating to the oppression of
the Manchoo and their own mission to free and Christianize China; the
success hitherto vouchsafed to their cause by the "Heavenly Father"; the
earnest desire to enter into friendly relations with the "foreign
brethren"; their wish to continue all present trade and to open the
whole country up, &c.

Now, at this time the political position of England with regard to the
rebellion was as follows. By the written guarantee of Sir George Bonham,
by that of Admiral Hope, by that from the British representative at
Ningpo, and by many other acts, her national honour was pledged to
maintain a strict neutrality. The last orders to her officials in China
were, as already quoted:--

    "Her Majesty's Government desire to maintain ... neutrality
    between the two contending parties;" save British subjects from
    punishment, "but otherwise you should abstain from all
    interference in the civil war."

    [Dated, Foreign Office, August 8, 1861.]

This was the standing order; the only later direction being Lord
Russell's suggestion: "But it _might_ be expedient to defend the treaty
ports _if_ the Chinese would consent not to use those ports for purposes
of aggression."

The way the British Consul, Admiral, and General, at Shanghae, abstained
from all interference was by converting that city into the grand
rendezvous of the Imperialist forces, and then helping them to defend
the Chinese city by garrisoning it with British troops; by conveying
Manchoo soldiery down the Yang-tze to Shanghae in English steamers; by
supplying the Imperialists with artillery, &c., while strictly
prohibiting any trade in the same articles with the other of the two
"contending parties"; and by attacking the Ti-pings when they found that
the Ti-pings would not attack them. That useful triumvirate--the sailor,
the soldier, and the diplomatist--placed the following construction upon
Lord Russell's ambiguous _ifs_ and _ands_. "It _might_ be expedient,"
they singularly understood to mean, it was expedient; and "_if_ the
Chinese, &c.," they converted into assisting and joining the Chinese
"_to use_ those ports for purposes of aggression." Consequently, in
direct violation of their public orders, but in conformity with the
conduct I have just stated, they issued the following reply to the
friendly overtures of the Ti-ping chiefs:--

    "Whereas we, the Commanders of the French and British forces now
    occupying the city and environs of Shanghae, have received
    letters from Lion and Ho, persons styling themselves ...,
    informing us that said Lion and Ho are intending to attack and
    occupy Shanghae; and whereas we have no means of communicating
    with the said Lion and Ho, or any of their people:--Therefore,
    this is to give notice to whomsoever it may concern, that
    Shanghae city and its environs, Woo-sung included, are at
    present in the possession of the troops under our respective
    commands, and that if Lion or Ho, or any persons claiming
    fraternity with them, attempt to attack these places they will
    do so at their peril."

Even this was insufficient to effect the desired object, namely, to
drive the Ti-pings to defiance, and force them to acts of retaliation.
When, therefore, it became apparent that, notwithstanding all the aid
afforded to the Imperialists, they could not succeed, and that
eventually Shanghae must be given up to the revolutionists, or become
annexed to France or England, the British Government threw off the mask,
and prepared for open hostilities.

Consul Medhurst, in a despatch to Admiral Hope, dated "Shanghae,
February 19, 1862," states the grounds upon which the good faith and
honour of England were to be openly violated.

    "Granting, of course, that a _strictly neutral policy_ is at
    present the only correct one, and that whatever is done in the
    protection of this city and settlement must be undertaken with
    _careful regard_ to that important axiom, it follows, I think,
    that there are two points to be considered as bearing materially
    on the present crisis. The first is, what resources we have in
    the way of supplies for the city and settlement; and the second,
    how far the present action of the Taepings so endangers those
    supplies as to make it necessary for us to interfere with them
    in our own defence."

The falsity of this shallow pretence for war becomes at once apparent.
In the first place, it was simply necessary to allow the Chinese city to
revert peaceably to the Ti-pings, when the inhabitants as well as they
would have had ample supplies. In the second place, the vast river and
sea communication of Shanghae was entirely open (excepting the Wong-poo
branch), while a fleet of some two hundred European steamers and ships
and several thousand large native junks crowded the anchorage, and could
easily have furnished a line of communication for any amount of
supplies. Evidence is abundant to prove what a mere pretence this _casus
belli_ was, but two reasons will be sufficient justification for so
designating it. First. If the Ti-pings, by surrounding Shanghae,
endangered its supplies, when they came with the most friendly feeling
for Europeans, they would certainly, if driven to become enemies and to
use the justifiable retaliation of enemies, have it in their power to
utterly destroy those supplies by devastating the whole neighbouring
country; therefore, in all human probability, an attack upon them would
render imminent the very crisis to avoid which it was thought
justifiable to violate a nation's pledges. Secondly. The following
extract from Admiral Hope's despatch shows that he conceived that Consul
Medhurst had not made a sufficient case. Upon the 21st of February,
1862, the Admiral struck the first blow. Upon the evening of the same
day, in his despatch to the Admiralty, he gave this reason for his open
violation of his own and his Government's faith:--

    "These proceedings" (movements of the Ti-pings) "have been
    conducted at a distance much too close to be consistent with the
    _respect due to the occupation of the town_ by French and
    English forces, or to leave its supplies of provisions and
    native trade _unaffected_."

Is it to be supposed that any city could be captured or placed in a
state of siege without native trade or supplies being affected, or is it
to be argued that the Ti-pings should be crushed in consequence of the
natural results of their patriotic struggle?

The presence of the Ti-pings only "_affected_" the trade and supplies it
seems; when, had they been so disposed, they might have stopped the
entire, excepting what could have been obtained by water.

The only thing that affected the supplies of Shanghae so far as
Europeans and citizens were concerned, was the increase in the price,
which was quickly raised by the provision-dealers, who are always ready
to seize the smallest opportunity to make a little extra profit.
Probably Admiral Hope saw this, and its damaging bearing upon his
alleged _casus belli_; at all events, he thought fit to add another,
though equally flimsy.

    "The tract of country enclosed within the line BC, which this
    village, with others in their" (Ti-pings) "possession, entirely
    commanded, is that from which the supplies of Shanghae are
    chiefly drawn, and its proximity to the Woo-sung river was such
    as to afford the PROSPECT of the Chinese traffic, also material
    to the support of the town, being seriously impeded, if not
    altogether stopped; and for these reasons I considered the case
    to be one calling for my interference."

On these pretences war was made upon the Ti-pings. It will be noticed
that nothing material has ever been _proved_ against the revolutionists,
or urged as an established fact, sufficient to justify hostilities, or
even a remonstrance. The British officials in China and the Government
at home attempt to justify their course of action by mere conjecture as
to what they might do, but never do we find a plain or straightforward
accusation made against them for anything they _had done_.

Admiral Hope, in his attack upon the Ti-pings, associated himself with
one Ward, an American filibuster, in the service of the Manchoos.
Previous to this, and to the Admiral's unsuccessful attempt to juggle
the Ti-ping authorities into another agreement not to approach Shanghae,
the said Ward was persecuted and reviled very fiercely; but no sooner
did the Admiral and his colleagues think it necessary to pull in the
same boat, than the Yankee filibuster became their pattern and ally. The
whilom _rowdie_ companion of _ci-devant_ General Walker, of Nicaraguan
memory, mercenary leader of a band of Anglo-Saxon freebooters in Manchoo
pay, and sometime fugitive from English marines sent to weed his
ruffians of their countrymen, suddenly became the friend and ally of the
British and French Admirals, Generals, and Consuls. The surprise of Ward
can only have been equalled by his gratification upon finding his very
questionable presence, and still more doubtful pursuits, patronized and
imitated. No doubt, at first, he felt considerably elated and vastly
astonished at the idea of filibusting having become an honourable and
recognised profession; but soon, poor fellow! a black, or rather green,
shadow came across his uncertain dream of happiness and
respectability--he became jealous of his friend Admiral Hope, whose
talent and zeal for making war without declaring it or being authorized
so to do by any Government, he found surpassed even his own.

The village of Kao-kiau was garrisoned by a few hundred Ti-pings, and
several thousand country people, who had just joined them, the whole
mostly armed with bamboo spears. The force led against them by Admiral
Hope comprised 350 British seamen with a six-pound rocket-tube, and
about 600 disciplined Chinese, under Ward, besides which, the French
Admiral, Protet, commanded 160 Frenchmen, with a couple of field-pieces.
Of course, the ill-armed Ti-pings were unable to resist the European
artillery and arms of precision, and were consequently driven from the
village, with a loss of more than 100 men killed. This gallant exploit
was safely performed by the Anglo-Franco contingent, who, completely out
of range of the few wretched matchlocks of the Ti-pings, shot them down
at their ease with rifles and artillery, with a loss to themselves of
_only one_ French sailor, killed by a stray shot.

This murderous and cowardly deed was quickly followed up by the gallant
Admiral, who seemed unable to refrain from action, especially when it
could be indulged with comparative safety.

We have already noticed that one excuse Admiral Hope made to justify his
broken faith was the probability that the Ti-pings might injure the
supply of provisions. Strange to say, the Admiral did the very things he
pretended the rebels might have done. At the capture of Kao-kiau all
hands dispersed to loot whatever the Ti-pings had left behind; and,
quoting from the official report of the affair, "Large stores of grain
were discovered about the place, _the greater part of which were
burned_."

After the exploit of Kao-kiau, Admiral Hope, with a small party of
seamen and Ward's filibusters, went roving about the country for a week
in search of some one to fight. His warlike spirit was gratified at a
place named Hsiau-tang, in the vicinity of Ming-hong (nearly twenty
miles away from Shanghae), a fortified village occupied by several
thousand Ti-pings. Directly he found this place in the way, an order
was sent to Shanghae for reinforcements to attack it with. These having
arrived, upon the 1st of March, 1862, the whole force, consisting of 750
of Ward's disciplined Chinese, 350 British sailors and marines, and 35
artillery-men, with four light howitzers, one field-piece, and some
rocket-tubes, and 200 French, with two brass howitzers, moved forward to
the attack. Again, as at Kao-kiau, the murderous work was executed, and
the poorly-armed Ti-pings slaughtered with impunity. For more than an
hour they bravely held their mud and brick entrenchments, but at last
the crushing fire from the foreign artillery, and the sharp practice of
the Enfield rifles, carried the day. After standing to their few
gingalls to the last, amid a storm of shot and shell (all fresh from
British arsenals and paid for by British tax-payers), they were driven
from the lines of defence and through the village with immense
slaughter. As they retreated from the rear, the shell from the
irresistible foreign artillery "were thrown rapidly amongst them,
committing fearful havoc. Numbers also fell under the fire from the
rifles of the French and English sailors." In the centre of the village
the rear guard made a gallant effort to repulse their pursuers, but they
could not withstand the deadly volleys and bayonet charge of the
marines; and although their bravest men fell in heaps, while many
hand-to-hand conflicts took place, they were ultimately driven out with
a loss of 1,000 killed and 300 taken prisoners, the English and French
_not losing a single man_. A great massacre of the unfortunate
non-combatants was perpetrated by the Imperialist soldiery, who actually
forced very many of the living wounded into the flames of the burning
village. In one official report it is stated:--

    "The streets and houses presented an awful spectacle, the bodies
    in some places lying in heaps; and the plain beyond the village
    was strewed with those shot down in the flight."

Another report states:--

    "The rebels ran from the fortifications and came to a stand in
    the main street.... Upon this, the field-piece from the
    _Imperieuse_, in charge of Lieutenants Stuart and Richardson,
    swept them down with grape and canister shot; after this their
    retreat became a flight, when the party of marines and Chinese
    detached to cut them off did considerable execution, some 900 or
    1,000 having been killed and wounded."

The same report concludes with this sentence:--

    "After all was over, _the village was set on fire_,[1] and the
    foreign troops embarked for Shanghae."

What will those who falsely accuse the Ti-pings of devastating and
destroying say to this? They have declared that the Christian patriots'
"success in any locality is attended with its total destruction," &c.;
but it appears that these totally destroyed places were reserved for
Admiral Hope to burn down.

As this history progresses we shall find that although the Admiral made
the damaging effect which the presence of the Ti-pings _might_ have upon
supplies one element of his _casus belli_, _he_ actually destroyed the
very supply of grain which he dreaded might be affected by the rebels!

There is a more serious matter to be deplored with regard to the
numerous raids commenced and followed up by Admiral Hope, namely, the
cruel slaughter of so many hundreds of his fellow-men. We have reviewed
the unmeaning pretences invented by the Admiral and his co-adjutors, but
even should it be admitted they were valid, is it possible any
Englishman can be found willing to justify the massacre of thousands of
human beings, because, although ever friendly to them, they affected the
mercenary speculations of a few merchants? If, in order to maintain the
immediate profit of their mercantile adventurers, any Englishman can
attempt to justify or palliate these summary proceedings against the
unfortunate Ti-pings, then I say, far better should that unholy traffic
perish, cursed as it is by the slaughter of thousands of our
fellow-creatures, whose blood has cried aloud to Heaven for vengeance
upon their assailants.

Even the pretence that the revolutionists would have injured our
"commercial interests" falls to the ground by the testimony of the very
merchants themselves, for the leading mercantile house in China, Messrs.
Jardine, Matheson, & Co., in their business circular, dated "Kong-kong,
27th February, 1862," referring to Admiral Hope's first massacre of
Ti-pings, state:--

    "During the interval that has elapsed since the date of our last
    circular there is no particular change to notice in the state of
    matters about Shanghae; but the policy the Allied Commanders are
    adopting will, it is feared, lead to disastrous consequences....
    _Our interests call for a strict neutrality_, but so far from
    this course being pursued, our last advices report a combined
    expedition of English and French marines and sailors in
    conjunction with a force of Imperialists, commanded in person by
    their respective Admirals, against a body of some 6,000 rebels,
    which of course they defeated with great slaughter.... The whole
    country being in the hands of the Taepings, should this
    _suicidal_ policy be persisted in, must in the end materially
    interfere with, if not ruin, all trade, as it cannot do
    otherwise than exasperate a foe by no means to be despised."

What stronger condemnation of the policy pursued against the Ti-pings
can be made, coming, as it does, from the principal representative of
the very class whose interests it was pretended necessary to protect?
That this opinion of Messrs. Jardine, Matheson, & Co. was correct has at
the present time been pretty well ascertained, for it did "in the end
materially interfere with" trade, as the fall off of silk _after_ the
expulsion of the Ti-pings from the producing district proves. This,
however, was not occasioned, as that firm expected, by the exasperation
of "a foe by no means to be despised," for the Ti-pings (with a
Christian humanity far excelling that possessed by their _civilized_
enemies) never retaliated either upon the trade (entirely in their
power) or the lives of Europeans. The decrease of silk was caused
entirely by the ruthless nature of the war carried by British officers
and Imperialists into the once happy districts of Ti-ping-tien-kwo. The
Ti-ping patriots were either fools or saints, for by their mad
forbearance they suffered themselves to be driven from their former
possessions with incalculable loss of life; whereas, a system of
retaliation on their part would have endangered the entire trade of the
district, and consequently have forced the enemy to relinquish
hostilities which so conclusively endangered the prospect of our
"commercial interests."

As the first mercantile house in China considered the policy of the
British Government "suicidal," we may safely pronounce the affected
anxiety for commercial interests a shallow pretext. What then remains to
constitute the real _casus belli_, unless it be "the temporary interest
arising out of the indemnities," and the great revenue arising out of
the vile opium traffic, the loss of which would have caused a deficit of
many millions in the British treasury?

The seeming inconsistency of allowing the Ti-pings to take Ningpo and
yet defending Shanghae against them is easily explained. At the capture
of the former city no British force was present, and although the seven
days' grace so cunningly obtained from the Ti-ping leaders seems to have
been employed in endeavouring to raise a sufficient force to oppose
their entrance, this, in the shape of H.M.S. _Scout_ and several other
vessels, arrived too late, having reached Ningpo some hours after its
fall. Then, as Admiral Hope very wisely observed with regard to the
policy of exasperating the Ti-pings, "We cannot afford to quarrel with
them, as at any moment they _might_ stop the whole trade of Shanghae."
Their wonderful forbearance had not at that time become assured;
directly it was, hostilities were commenced. Before taking up the sword
for good, it became necessary to try the temper of the Ti-pings. This
Admiral Hope effectually did by his arrogance at Nankin; his "every
obstruction" plan at Ningpo; his raids around Shanghae; an example
followed by the British and French authorities by their unwarrantable
notifications and defence of Shanghae Chinese city.

There are, in fact, very many reasons by which the defence of Shanghae
may be accounted for; but five of the most important will sufficiently
illustrate the principle of the whole.

Firstly. The British Government and its officials interfered in order to
save the indemnity and opium trade, which the capture of Shanghae by the
Ti-pings would have annihilated, and they were strongly supported by the
opium merchants, who, by this vile traffic, made their largest profits.

Secondly. A large number of the Shanghae foreign landholders approved of
the defence of the city, because it enabled them to obtain fresh lots at
their own prices from the Chinese proprietors. From the "minutes of a
meeting of land-renters, held at the British Consulate, Shanghae,
January 12, 1862," it appears that during a council of war with the
Manchoo authorities of the Chinese city (all in accordance with the
pledges of "strict neutrality," of course?)--

    "The Taoutae undertook to do this also" (open a road to
    facilitate military operations) "_by obliging the Chinese
    renters interested to part with their land to the foreign
    applicants whose names stood recorded first for purchase_."

Thirdly. A certain proportion of traders having taken advantage of the
Ti-ping movement to circulate unfounded reports as to its brigandage, in
order to monopolize the trade by frightening outsiders away, naturally
sanctioned the defence of Shanghae, as the capture of the city would
have exposed the trick by proving the Ti-pings were not brigands and
robbers.

Fourthly. Many land and house speculators opposed the success of the
insurgents for this reason. The foreign settlements in the vicinity of
the Chinese city had become crowded with fugitives awaiting the firm
establishment of Ti-ping jurisdiction in the interior; by numerous
lawless Chinamen attracted by the shadow of foreign protection and the
opportunity of establishing gambling hells and bagnios, _ad libitum_;
and by the manifold parasites and hangers-on of the Imperial authority
in its last stronghold. Therefore, while this state of affairs lasted,
the land speculators made prodigious wealth by the letting of their
property to the natives at almost fabulous rents, but the capture of the
city by the Ti-pings would have altered all this. The vile manner in
which many colossal fortunes have thus been obtained is lost sight of in
England by the glitter of the ingots.

Fifthly. A large proportion of partners in mercantile houses _upon the
spot_, expected to make their fortunes and retire to their home in three
years; but the occupation of Shanghae by the Ti-pings, and the natural
effect of the civil war, must have interfered with the import trade and
injured their immediate profits.

Upon these grounds British faith was dishonoured and a murderous war
waged against the unfortunate Ti-pings. Admiral Hope continued the work
of destruction with his artillery and rifles from a safe distance, until
his recall to England. Violation of good faith, misrepresentation, and
partial aggression, became superseded by regular hostilities, carried on
without any previous declaration of war, or even statement of grievance.
What would such manner of warfare be denominated in Europe?

Having reviewed the policy of the British Government, and the conduct of
its officials in China, it may be well to notice a few reports upon the
Ti-ping rebellion, well worthy of attention, even though ignored by the
British Ministry. These testimonies prove that the Ti-pings have not
been decimated because they were misunderstood by the British
Government, but that the latter were as well acquainted with their
Christianity, friendliness, political object, superiority to the
Manchoos, and generally improved character, as the writer of this
history, or the authors of the statements he quotes. Therefore, when the
evil policy of those who authorized the unnecessary and unjustifiable
hostilities upon the part of England shall become more generally
admitted, they cannot palliate their wickedness by pleading ignorance of
the true merits of the people. It is difficult to speak of this British
interference in any but the most forcible and unmeasured terms of
condemnation. Not a solitary excuse can be truly made for it; and when
the selfishness of that policy is thoroughly appreciated (which is
rapidly becoming the case), the atrocities committed by its sanction,
and their consequences, will be looked back upon with grief and sadness
by every loyal Englishman.

The first and most important of the above-mentioned reports was made by
Mr. Consul Meadows to Lord Russell. Mr. Meadows was better acquainted
with the Ti-pings than any other English official in existence. He was
the most talented in China, the most honourable and disinterested;
therefore, it may be that his statements were not regarded, and that his
presence at Shanghae became an inconvenience. This difficulty was soon
surmounted by the removal of Mr. Meadows from Shanghae to New-chwang,
very soon after his truthful and independent exposition of the Ti-ping
rebellion, and by naming as his successor a Consul who was more pliable.

The following despatch of Mr. Meadows bears date "February 19, 1861,"
and is worthy of most attentive perusal:--

    "CONSUL MEADOWS TO LORD J. RUSSELL.--(Received April 12.)

    "Shanghae, February 19, 1861.

    "British trade and British-India trade with this country, and
    the revenues derived from the one and the other, are among the
    most important of British interests abroad. A necessary
    condition to the flourishing of these is the existence of
    order--of security to life and property--in this country; and
    the existence of this order and security, again, requires the
    existence of a strong national government. These propositions
    are so well established that I merely state them.

    "But the hitherto existing Imperial Government, that of the
    Manchoo or Ta-tsing dynasty, which was already becoming weak
    from internal causes, has received its death-blows from the
    external action, first of British arms alone, and now of British
    and French combined. No strong national government now exists
    anywhere; and in large, and to us very important, portions of
    the country, anarchy and insecurity prevail.

    "It becomes, therefore, of the utmost importance to look around
    us for some other power in the nation to take its place. If we
    find any such other power, we must not only not attack it, but
    must earnestly desire its speedy growth. An adherence, not less
    wise than just, to the principle of non-intervention, together
    with the due observance of the treaties with the Ta-tsing
    Government, should prevent our taking direct positive steps to
    aid that growth; but assuredly it would be a most suicidal
    course, as regards those large interests to which I have
    pointed, first to achieve the destruction of the government we
    find existing, and then to proceed to prevent any other from
    coming into existence.

    "Now we have such another power in the Taepings, and such
    another government in the government which they have established
    at Nanking.

    "It has been, and by many is still, denied that the Taepings
    have any regular government, or can be considered a political
    power.

    "For one moment I will grant this, but only in order to point
    out that after maintaining themselves for eleven years in arms
    in China, and for eight in the centre of the empire, the
    Taepings are manifestly a power of some sort, and to ask--Are
    we, because this power does not come up to all that is expected
    of it, are we, therefore, gratuitously to attack it, and either
    greatly lessen or altogether destroy its chances of ever
    realizing those expectations? What else have we got to look to
    for the re-establishment of a government having power to
    preserve order?

    "But I entirely deny that the Taepings have no regular
    government, and have no claim to be considered a political
    power.

    "Ten years ago, almost immediately after they rose in arms, they
    threw off the characteristics of local insurgents, and
    proclaimed themselves the irreconcilable enemies of the Ta-tsing
    dynasty. From that time to this they have never left us in doubt
    of their object. It has always been the great one of making
    themselves the heads of the first state in Asia, and the
    governors of the largest people in the world. So much has been
    established, not only by their own published manifestoes, but by
    the official documents of their enemies.

    "As to their manner of pursuing that object, whether it is such
    as befits a power assuming to be political, it would too much
    prolong even this letter to meet in detail all the objections
    of those foreigners who declaim against them.

    "Speaking generally, these objections may be classed under two
    heads. First, those which are based on the application to this
    region and its peoples, of arguments drawn from the state of
    society and modes of political action of Western Europe, in
    defiance of the fact that these arguments are wholly
    inapplicable to a state of civilization and a polity so
    different; and secondly, those which are applied in entire
    disregard of the parallel transactions in Western Europe itself,
    a disregard of obvious analogies, which can only be the result
    of great ignorance or of wilful prejudice.

    "Among the former, are nearly all the objections to their
    military discipline, tactics, and strategy, and to their
    administrative forms, whether of a civil or a military nature.

    "Among the latter, are objections such as that they do not fix
    themselves in the places they take; that they take them and then
    leave them again, &c.

    "The obvious rejoinder, drawn from the history of Western Europe
    is, how often, during the great rebellion in England, were
    important cities and strong places taken and evacuated or
    retaken? Did that prove that the English noblemen and gentlemen
    who first headed that rebellion were unfit to establish a
    government? Did it prove that Cromwell was neither a general nor
    an administrator? And when, ten years ago, the Italians left
    Milan to be reoccupied by its former oppressors, after these had
    been once expelled, and also allowed the foreign dynasties to
    reinstate themselves in their principalities, did that prove
    that the Italian party which aimed at expelling all these
    foreigners was not a political power?

    "A stock argument against the Taepings was drawn from their
    destruction of the suburbs of the cities they occupied. This,
    however, was finally silenced when, on the approach of the
    Taepings to Shanghae a few months ago, the British and French
    garrison in that city fired all its suburbs, not excepting the
    densely peopled and commercially important suburb between the
    city and the river.

    "Then, again, ruthless and wanton slaughter, not only of the
    foreign Manchoos, but of their Chinese countrymen, has been
    urged against the Taepings as a proof that they were a mere gang
    of robbers and murderers. But was there during the revolutionary
    struggle in France no mutual killing of the opposing parties of
    Frenchmen? I mention only the Reign of Terror, and the
    'Noyades,' and, leaving it to your Lordship's memory to add
    further illustrative transactions, I ask, do such
    well-established historical facts prove that the revolutionary
    party were merely a large gang of robbers and murderers, and not
    a political power?

    "While, however, considering it an established fact in the
    history of the Taepings that they, on taking Nanking, put the
    whole of the Manchoos to death, not sparing even the women and
    children; and while thinking it highly probable that they will
    treat in the same way any other of the military colonies of the
    Tartar conquerors of their country that may fall into their
    power, I have long ago arrived at the full conviction that the
    tales of the slaughter committed by them on their own countrymen
    are not only exaggerated, but very grossly exaggerated.

    "My own experience has furnished me with an instructive example
    of gross exaggeration of the kind. In the beginning of
    September, 1853, when, not the Taepings, but the Triad Society
    rebels, suddenly rose and seized the city of Shanghae, I was
    travelling alone from Ningpo to Shanghae, _via_ Chapoo. It was
    on reaching this latter place, about sixty miles from Shanghae,
    that I first got the news from the crew of my own river-craft,
    which had come there to meet me. The insurrection having broken
    out just as they had left, they themselves could give no
    particulars about it. But from other vessels, and from the local
    merchants and officials, I learnt that there had been a fearful
    slaughter in the city of Shanghae; that the streets were covered
    with dead bodies and blood; that the foreigners and the rebels
    had been fighting; and that the whole of the foreign community
    had retired in the shipping outside of Woo-sung. So uniform and
    consistent were these reports, and so certain did it appear that
    I should be unable to pass Shanghae out to Woo-sung, that I set
    about studying the Chinese maps, with a view of finding a
    succession of river-passages by which I might, keeping some
    twenty or thirty miles distant, make my way through the country
    inside of it, and so out into the Great River, and down that to
    the reported position of the foreign shipping. But before
    undertaking so serious a circuit I, of course, determined to
    approach nearer to Shanghae city. As I did so, I found the
    prevalent reports less and less alarming; and at length, when
    about twelve miles distant, ascertained the fact--one well known
    here at the time--that there had been no fighting whatever with
    the foreigners, and that, in the whole city the slaughter and
    bloodshed was limited to the killing of one man. Yet the current
    and fully-believed reports only sixty miles off were exactly
    like those we have so often heard of the slaughter committed by
    the Taepings. We know, from the experience of British troops
    during the last twenty years, that much loss of life usually
    ensues on the forcible occupation of Chinese cities from men
    destroying their families, and then themselves; from women,
    young and old, committing suicide; and from an unreasoning
    terror, that drives people into deep canals or rivers, in vain
    attempts to cross them. In these very ways several lives were
    nearly lost, a few months back, in the Chinese portion of this
    settlement before an alarm subsided which was caused by a sudden
    outcry that the Taepings were entering it, none being at the
    time within twenty miles' distance.

    "From these habits of the Chinese, we may infer that there has
    been, in the many populous cities occupied by the Taepings in
    this province, much loss of life among women and children, as
    well as grown men--non-combatants; and the inference is
    supported by the fact of foreigners who having visited such
    cities seeing in the canals many unwounded bodies. But that the
    Taeping troops have directly put to death a greater proportion
    of their non-combatant countrymen, or have even refused quarter
    to the armed, to a greater extent than have done revolutionary
    parties in the civil wars of England and France, is, I am fully
    satisfied, a prejudiced repetition on the part of inimical
    foreigners of the interested calumnies of the Ta-tsing party.

    "Some time back it had become a good conclusion that in the
    tracts of country occupied by the Taepings there must be greater
    security for life and property than in those occupied by the
    Ta-tsings. We knew that the Taepings had long given up that
    system of universal conscription on which they acted in 1853,
    and which then made their approach a source of peculiar terror.
    We knew that they depended on voluntary enrolment for the
    support of their fighting force, and that they were earnestly
    endeavouring to get the inhabitants generally of hamlets and
    open towns to remain at their usual occupations. This being the
    case, it was plain that the Taepings could preserve the public
    peace better than the Ta-tsings. For the bulk of the leading
    officials among the former were themselves not only fighting
    men, but about the best fighting men that they had; men who owed
    their position to their military qualities. To them there could,
    among their own party, be no open defiance. There might be
    nothing of that military drill and tactics which characterize
    European armies, but that discipline, which consists in strict
    obedience to orders could not fail to be there. On the other
    hand, the bulk of the leading Ta-tsing officials, the mandarins,
    were about the most inactive and timid, the most unwarlike of
    their party, and were, we knew, compelled to employ, as their
    chief fighting men, the ex-pirates of the south-eastern
    coast-land, who, with their followers, would not content
    themselves with their official pay, but would also, in defiance
    of the wishes of their weak employers, exact money from, or
    plunder outright, the peaceable populations whom they were hired
    to protect.

    "These inferences have been amply confirmed by recent
    unquestionable experiences. Mr. John, an English missionary of
    education and intelligence, went two or three months ago from
    Shanghae to Soo-chow, and thence to Nanking, where he stayed for
    seven days. Mr. John put the question to the Taeping officials
    why it was that the walled cities held by them were so entirely
    deserted by their former populations of tradesmen, artificers,
    &c. He received answers to the effect that those cities had been
    transformed into fortresses, necessary to be held for the
    reconquest of the country from the Manchoos; that having been
    once deserted, no population was readmitted, as, under the guise
    of tradesmen, &c., they might gradually be filled with hostile
    forces; but that, as soon as their own progress advanced their
    frontier to other points, they themselves would be anxious to
    see these places repeopled by a peaceful population. In the mean
    time they were doing their best to protect, in the hamlets,
    villages, and open towns, all who choose to remain in them, in
    quiet submission to the Taeping rule.

    "Now these explanations and statements were fully supported by
    the nature of the circumstances and by what Mr. John saw
    himself. He was altogether about a month in the country held by
    the Taepings. He traversed a tract of that country of about 120
    miles in extent (Tsing-poo to Nanking), and travelled by night
    as well as by day, quite unarmed, and never molested. He found
    the country people quietly pursuing their usual occupations;
    and--a proof of the understanding between them and their Taeping
    rulers--saw the soldiers of the latter moving from place to
    place in large bodies without inspiring terror, and in parties
    of three or two without being assailed. At Soo-chow, both Mr.
    John and a well-educated and observant Chinese who accompanied
    him, and whom I questioned closely, saw the veritable landed
    gentry coming in parties to give in to the civil governor their
    adhesion to the Taeping dynasty.

    "What, on the other hand, is the state of the country on this
    side of the Ta-tsing lines? Not only do the exactions of the
    mandarins for military objects equal any similar demands that
    can be made by the Taepings, but piracy and robbery are well
    known to be everywhere rife. During an excursion, in the end of
    October, of some ninety miles up the Yang-tze, I had myself full
    opportunity of observing the prevalence of piracy and the alarm
    of the country people; and reports came constantly in, on all
    sides, showing that the reign of lawless violence is rather
    increasing than diminishing.

    "It is impossible to say how much of China proper the Taepings
    hold altogether, clear of Ta-tsing authorities or troops. But in
    proof of their right to be considered a political power, we have
    the fact that their armies are operating successfully up into
    Shang-tung in the North, down into Kwang-tung and Kwang-se in the
    South, and in Sze-chuen in the West, while nothing prevents
    their penetrating to the sea in the East but the presence of the
    foreign forces at Shanghae.

    "On the religion of the Taepings little need here be said.
    Viewed as a piece of contemporary history, the fact of the rise
    and progress, in this old seat of Confucianism and Buddhism, of
    the Bible-spreading Taeping Christianity--be its exact character
    what it may--is one of the most interesting spectacles that the
    annals of the human race present; and if the Taepings succeed in
    becoming the rulers of the Chinese people, it will prove one of
    the most momentous. A foreign official agent, whose nature or
    the limited extent of whose information permits of his viewing
    that spectacle with indifference, must surely be adjudged
    mentally unfitted for the career he has chosen. But except as a
    deeply interesting piece of contemporary history, we have
    nothing to do with it. If we aid the Taepings on account of
    their professed creed, we propagate religion by the sword; if we
    attack them on account of it, we engage in a religious
    persecution.

    "One circumstance, which does not directly interest us, remains
    to be considered; the disposition of the Taepings towards us. On
    this point, the testimony is continuous, always consistent, and
    remarkably satisfactory. On three or four occasions, on which
    foreign war-vessels have, without any previous communication,
    steamed right up to the river batteries of the Taeping fortified
    places, they have exercised the right--a right inherent in every
    belligerent power--of endeavouring to keep off a suspicious and,
    for their means of defence, formidable force. But so soon as
    they have been told that it was not the hired foreign steamers
    of their Ta-tsing enemies, but the Government vessels of neutral
    foreigners that were before them, they have in every instance at
    once ceased firing. Their superior officers have fully explained
    that if foreign neutral vessels would send small unarmed boats
    in advance, they would not be fired at; and whenever this has
    been done, they have kept faith. As for the white flag of truce,
    it is simply absurd to suppose that that purely conventional
    signal of the Western world can be known to the commander of
    every Taeping battery. But the Taepings have a complete
    justification for disregarding it, even if they knew it; they
    are fighting with an enemy who would not hesitate an instant
    about sending in his own foreign steamers to open fire or effect
    a hostile landing, with a white flag or a British ensign flying
    at each mast-head. In no one of the numerous cases of one or
    more unarmed foreigners advancing to the Taeping outposts, since
    I first landed at Nanking in April, 1853, up till the most
    recent visits of Shanghae traders to Soo-chow, have they been
    received otherwise than peacefully; while in several cases those
    who have visited them as prejudiced unfriends have been
    converted into well-wishers by the friendliness of their
    reception.

    "They appeared in force before Shanghae six months ago, but I
    have good reasons for feeling satisfied that they were deluded
    into so doing by certain foreigners who wished to bring on an
    irremediable hostility between them and us, and who had held out
    to them the hope that we should give up the place to them. They
    fired a few ineffectual shots at the Chinese troops who were
    mingled with the British on the walls, and who kept discharging
    their matchlocks. But they did not fire at all where there were
    only British in front of them, and not one of the foreign
    soldiers received a wound, though a number of the Taepings were
    killed by our fire. Lastly, during the half-year that has
    elapsed since they retired, foreigners have been received at
    their places, if not with the same hopeful cordiality, as
    peacefully and as civilly as before.

    "We have a long succession of irrefragable proofs that the
    Taepings do earnestly desire friendly commercial relations with
    us. The fact is so well known that inimical foreigners have been
    constrained to endeavour, with a curiously blind ingenuity, to
    turn it against them. 'All that is mere pretence,' it has been
    argued; 'if they felt sure they were strong enough to attack us
    with advantage, they would do it.' In reply, I ask if it be so,
    in how far do the Taepings differ in that respect from the
    Russians, French, and Americans? Is the peaceful and civil
    reception the English get from these nations the result of pure
    friendliness or of policy? Would they attack us if they felt
    sure they could do so with advantage? What are our Channel
    fleets, our fortifications, and our 150,000 volunteers for?

    "A few years back the aid of a small British army and naval
    squadron, operating along a portion of the Great River, could
    perhaps have enabled the Manchoos to suppress this particular
    Chinese rising against their rule; but now it would require a
    large fleet of steamers, operating throughout some 1,500 to
    2,000 miles of the Great River and its larger branches, and some
    20,000 troops, operating in three or four complete small armies
    in different parts of the tract of country mentioned above as
    being more or less in the occupation of Taeping forces, and
    which extends about 800 to 900 miles from north to south, and
    1,000 to 1,100 from east to west. It would prove one of the most
    troublesome and costly wars that England ever engaged in; costly
    as regarded the direct outlay, and still more costly as regarded
    the consequences to our trade; for the region in question is
    that which, practically speaking, produces the whole of our tea
    and silk exports, and which consumes the larger portion of our
    manufactured imports; and the effect of our hostilities in it
    would be to overspread it with anarchy and desolation."

From this despatch it will be seen that every point upon which the
British Government has based its hostilities against the Ti-pings is
plainly disproved. The last paragraph may be regarded by some few
bigoted pro-Imperialists as an exaggeration; but when they glance at the
present state of China (1865), and see the Ti-pings still victoriously
disputing the supremacy of the Manchoo, when they look upon the very
diminished export of silk, and upon the rebellion rampant in every
province of China, they can hardly dispute that a "large fleet of
steamers" and 20,000 troops was correctly considered by Mr. Meadows
necessary to suppress the revolution.

As for the justice of the British intervention, it is hardly necessary
to speak any further. The belligerent character of the Ti-ping rebellion
was recognised immediately after its origin, simply because the British
remained neutral towards a Power carrying on war, and moreover, from the
fact that English representatives sought out and made guarantees of
neutrality with the Ti-ping authorities. But, while openly recognising
the belligerent rights of the revolutionists, the British Government has
invariably evaded a strict interpretation of its professions, and given
a tacit support to the Manchoos, thereby making themselves a party to
the war, and constituting themselves the allies of the latter Power.

The Ti-pings were fully entitled to equal rights with the Imperialists,
whether upon the high seas, neutral waters, at the treaty ports, or
elsewhere. They possessed a settled Government at Nankin, a vast
territory, and _several_ ports; and such being the case, should, and had
the British authorities acted honourably would, have enjoyed any and
every privilege given or allowed to the other party in the civil war.
When the Spanish colonies cast off their allegiance to Spain, when
Brazil revolted against Portugal, when Texas seceded from Mexico, when
Greece rebelled against its Turkish rulers, when the Southern States of
America seceded from the Union, when Santo Domingo rose against Spain,
when the Neapolitans revolted against their Government, in every one of
these, and countless other cases, each belligerent as a matter of right
received equal privileges from neutral Powers.

Had England and other neutral Powers acted according to their own laws,
they would have been bound to recognise the independence of the
Ti-pings, for the utter inability of the ousted Manchoo Government to
recover its authority within a reasonable time was apparent. More than
this, it was universally admitted that the Tartars, if unassisted by
foreigners, would be overthrown, and when such contingency became
certain, England was dragged in to assist them. The excuse about danger
to British lives and property from the occupation of the treaty ports by
the insurgents is proved false by the capture of Shanghae in 1853, and
the capture of Ningpo in 1861. The only other excuse of any moment is
the "_might_ injure trade" one; but is that to be considered a
sufficient justification? In all the cases of rebellion just cited,
England remained neutral; why then has she been made to assume to
herself, in China _only_, the right to interfere in internecine strife?
Why not interfere in America for the sake of trade and to prevent
so-called rebels from collecting duties? As principle has nothing to do
with the policy pursued in China, why should it elsewhere? Or why may it
not be boasted that England feared to interfere in America, and
therefore refrained; but acted differently in China, having no fear.

The _Shanghae Times_, a paper giving its general support to the
Government, in its issue of March 15, 1862, thus describes the
initiation of hostilities against the Ti-pings:--

    "We believe that Admiral Hope is the first English officer of
    the present century who has adopted the unsoldierly practice of
    making war without having declared war. Having recognised the
    Taepings as a Power, according to the usage of civilized
    nations, he ought to have given them the alternative of retreat,
    submission, or butchery, before commencing the latter. This he
    did not. But as the Imperialists served him at Taku, he served
    the Taepings at Ming-hong. Honourable men condemned the conduct
    of the Imperial general at the Taku, and if the code of honour
    has not changed since then, it has been _grossly_ violated in
    the two recent attacks on the Taepings."

We have in a former chapter noticed the false assertion of the British
minister in China with regard to "all classes of observers" condemning
the religion of the revolutionists, and his equally unfounded statement
that the Revds. J. Edkins and Griffith John met with an "ungracious
reception." The following reports by the Rev. G. John (of the London
Missionary Society) will not only expose the truthlessness of Mr. Bruce,
but also multiply proofs as to the Christianity of the Ti-pings, the
evil policy of the British Government, and the astounding apathy of the
missionary body at large.

The Rev. Griffith John, in a report to the secretary of his society,
dated "Shanghae, December 6, 1860," states:--

    "They" (the Ti-pings) "have created a vacuum, not only in the
    temples, but also in the hearts of the people, which remains to
    be filled. This is the missionary's work--_a work that might be
    done immediately, were it not for the unaccountable policy of
    the representatives of foreign Powers at this port_. My
    principal object in going has been fully realized.

    "My object was to obtain from the chief an edict of religious
    toleration. This I have obtained. It gives full permission to
    missionaries of every persuasion to enter into and live in the
    insurgents' territory, for the purpose of carrying on missionary
    work. The phraseology, in some parts, is bombastic, and
    therefore objectionable; but the simple meaning is full
    toleration to all Christians, whether Protestant or Catholic. 'I
    see that the missionaries are sincere and faithful men, and that
    they do not count suffering with Christ anything; and because of
    this I esteem them very highly.' Such are the words of the
    edict. Then comes a command to the chief officers to issue
    orders to all the (insurgent) brethren to treat the missionaries
    well. I showed the edict at Su-cheu, and asked the chiefs if
    they would help me to get a house, a chapel, &c. 'Yes,' said
    they, 'you come, and it will be all right.' I send you the
    original of this edict, written by the young prince himself, and
    bearing the seal of his father, and I intend to furnish you with
    a translation by the first opportunity. _I firmly believe that
    God is uprooting idolatry in the land, through the insurgents,
    and that He will by means of them_, in connection with the
    foreign missionary, plant Christianity in its stead. Let the
    prayers of our brethren in England be more fervent than ever in
    behalf of China. If these men succeed, the days of idolatry are
    numbered in the land. I am fully convinced that, should they
    succeed to establish order within the boundary of the Keang-su
    province, it would be _nominally_ a Christian province before
    the expiration of twenty years. The same observation will hold
    good of all the other provinces."

This is the edict referred to by Mr. John:--

    "'EDICT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION,' BY THE CHIEF OF THE CHINESE
    INSURGENTS.[2]

    "'Having received the decree of my Heavenly Father (God), of my
    Heavenly adopted Father (Christ), and of my Father (the
    Celestial King), I command all the King's officers, both civil
    and military, and all the Brethren, to be acquainted with it.
    The true doctrine of my Father (God), and of my adopted Father
    (Christ), is the religion of Heaven. The religion of Christ
    (Protestant religion), and the religion of the Lord of Heaven
    (Roman Catholic religion), are included in it. The whole world,
    together with my father and myself, are one family. Those who
    lovingly and harmoniously observe the regulations of the
    heavenly religion are permitted to come and visit (us). Now,
    from the _memorial_ presented to us by my uncles, Kan, Tsan,
    Chung, and others, I learn that the foreign teacher G. John and
    his friends, esteeming the Kingdom of Heaven, and reverencing
    and believing in my Father (God), and my adopted Father
    (Christ), to whom be thanks for the bestowment upon us of
    authority, power, and wonders, of which those who are far and
    near have reverentially heard--have come for the express purpose
    of seeing the light, of beholding God and Christ, and of
    requesting permission to spread abroad the true doctrine.
    Seeing, however, that the present time is a time of war, and
    that the soldiers are scattered abroad in every direction, I am
    truly afraid that the missionaries might be injured by following
    the rabble soldiery, and that thus serious consequence might
    ensue. Still, I truly perceive that these (missionaries) are
    sincere and faithful men, and that they count it nothing to
    suffer with Christ; and because of this I esteem them very
    highly.

    "'Let the kings inform all the officers and others, that they
    must all act lovingly and harmoniously towards these men, and by
    no means engender contention and strife. Let all know, that the
    Father (God), my adopted Father (Christ), my father and myself,
    are one family; and let these men (missionaries) be treated
    exceedingly well.

    "'Respect this.'

    "NOTE.--The Kan-wang told us that the chief is anxious that his
    son should feel an interest in the propagation of the Gospel,
    and therefore directed him to write it....

    "The expressions 'to the light,' and 'behold Christ and God,'
    are explained in the fact that Nanking is the Jerusalem of the
    Celestial dynasty. I asked the Kan-wang if the above edict opens
    up the whole of the insurgents' territory--Nanking not
    excepted--to missionary operations. He replied that it does....

    "Thus, then, the above throws open the whole of the insurgents'
    territory to missionary work, so far as the insurgents
    themselves are concerned. Here and there the phraseology is
    objectionable; still, this point is quite clear: they have done
    this not in ignorance, but with their eyes quite open to the
    difference which exists between them and ourselves."

In a letter, dated twelve days later than that already quoted from, Mr.
John gives this reason for not going to live among the Ti-pings:--

    "When I returned from Nankin I fully intended to go to live in
    that city, if practicable; but after much thought, _and some
    consultation with those who are in authority_, I have come to
    the conclusion that it would be premature to do so just now....
    The river, I am told on good authority, is to be opened at once,
    and the ports of Han-kow and Kin-kiang are to become consular
    ports. Another expedition is about to go up the river, and then
    it will be determined what is to be done with the insurgents.
    They may be treated as friends, or, on the other hand, as foes.
    If not as friends, I AM CONVINCED THAT IT WILL BE OUR FAULT,
    because they cherish the kindliest feeling towards us, in spite
    of our conduct towards them when they visited Shanghae."

We will conclude Mr. John's reports with three short extracts; the first
of which clearly shows what good might have been effected by the British
missionaries had they performed their duty; the second goes far to
establish the superiority of the Ti-pings over the Manchoos.

    1. "The insurgents are making rapid strides, and are determined,
    as you will learn from my journal, to uproot idolatry in the
    land, _and to plant Christianity in its room_. The former they
    will do with a strong hand, and the latter will not be left
    undone, _if the Churches and missionaries are alive to their
    duty in reference to this great movement_."

    2. "They have doubtless gross defects; but in every
    respect--religious, political, social, &c.--they are centuries
    ahead of the Imperialists, and I cannot but wish them God
    speed."

The third and last extract from Mr. John's reports is taken from one
dated "February 2, 1861," and fully shadows forth what England has _now_
been compelled to understand, and what every sensible person fully
comprehended long since. Mr. John states:--

    "It is fortunate for us that the Tartars have their hands full
    just now, _as the value of the recent treaty rests solely on the
    weakness of the existing dynasty_. The Tartars hate us with an
    insatiable hatred, and would, in spite of the treaty, recommence
    warlike operations to-morrow had they the power. To break faith
    with the _barbarian_ is not crime but virtue, according to their
    creed, if his humiliation and expulsion might thereby be
    effected. From the Manchoos we have nothing to hope, but
    everything to fear. They are sworn enemies to Christianity and
    civilization, and they have set their iron faces determinedly
    against both. They _can_ do but little at present. The wonderful
    progress of the insurrection in the South, during the last
    year, and the repeated defeats and the complete discomfiture of
    the Tartar hosts in the North, have thoroughly undermined the
    Manchoo power. It must fall. There is no power in China to
    uphold it. The Kwang-si insurrection, on the other hand, must
    triumph, _if foreign Powers do not interfere_. The Manchoos
    might as well attempt to blow the sun out of the heavens as to
    quench this flame which their folly and tyranny have kindled....

    "The insurgents themselves are still determinately opposed to
    idolatry in all its features. At their approach the idols
    vanish, and the priests of Buddh and Tau disappear. The downfall
    of idolatry in the land seems to be bound up with their success.
    Never did China present such a spectacle to the Christian world.
    Will the Church, _unfaithful to her Head and false to herself_,
    as the depository of the blessings of light and life for the
    world, look on with indifference? Shall the four hundred
    millions of China remain in their state of darkness and death,
    _because of the worldliness and deadness_ of the people of God?"

To these questions the British Government appears to have returned an
affirmative answer.

A few extracts from a report of the Rev. W. Muirhead, in harmony with
the testimonies of other missionaries, both as to the death-blow
idolatry had received from the victorious arms of the Ti-pings, and the
general knowledge of Christianity possessed by them, shall close our
quoted evidence for the present. In the spring of 1861, Mr. Muirhead
spent a month among the Ti-pings at Nankin, and while there was
constantly engaged in preaching about the city, and thus describes his
experience:--

    "Going about sometimes for several hours a day, I have been
    abundantly encouraged by the number and attention of the
    audiences. It seems as if there were a foundation to go upon,
    from the amount of religious knowledge diffused among the
    people. There is a response, if not in their hearts, at least in
    their thoughts, to the tidings of mercy. They are made familiar
    at every step with the name and compassion of the Heavenly
    Father, _by the unprecedented practice of recording the fact
    over every door_. When, therefore, the same truths are announced
    in their hearing by a foreign missionary, _they give a ready
    assent, and express their cordial approval_. How different is
    all this from our experience in Shanghae and elsewhere! There we
    have a hard and strong ground to work upon; ignorance and
    _opposition_ prevail in abundant measure. Here, on the part
    both of the military and civilians, there _is_ knowledge, and
    there _is_ appreciation of the truth to a certain extent, which
    renders the spiritual enforcement of it a more easy and pleasant
    duty."

These extracts must naturally make one believe that the "all classes of
observers," so cunningly invented by Mr. Bruce and his ministerial
friends, consist of Mr. American Baptist Missionary Holmes.

The Kan-wang, the missionaries' friend, having left the city while Mr.
Muirhead was there, that event was mentioned in the following
language:--

    "In prospect of his going out, I had occasion some time ago to
    allude to his constant dependence on God, and to urge upon him
    the duty of earnest prayer. But in this I was anticipated by a
    previous request of his own, when, after describing the trials
    and difficulties of his situation, he said to me: '_Mr.
    Muirhead, pray for me!_' He has need of our prayers, and I trust
    his request will be attended to by many friends at home."

Poor Kan-wang! The only prayers have been those devoutly entertained by
opium traders and "indemnity" interested people for the destruction of
him and his confederates.

Of the Ti-ping women Mr. Muirhead states:--

    "While walking along the streets, the number of females that are
    seen on the way is rather a novelty. They are in general well
    dressed, and of very respectable appearance. Many are riding on
    horseback, others are walking, and most of them have large feet.
    Not a few stop to hear our preaching, and always conduct
    themselves with perfect propriety. _This is new, as compared
    with the former course of things, and the whole reminds one
    partly of home life._ It will be a blessing if the revolution
    should tend to break up the system of female exclusion, hitherto
    practised."

We will conclude our extracts from Mr. Muirhead's report with the
following interesting account of a conversation between himself and a
young Ti-ping soldier:--

    "And now a word or two, with regard to the character and
    prospects of the movement. Those engaged in it speak not
    boastfully, but calmly and confidently, of its success. They
    acknowledge the difficulties in the way, yet believe in the Lord
    God that they shall be established. They do not apprehend it
    will be an easy thing to overcome their enemies; but fighting,
    as they think, under the banners of the 'Heavenly Father' and
    'Heavenly Brother,' they contemplate a happy issue as a matter
    of course.

    "As Kan-wang's followers were assembling in front of his palace,
    a young man came upstairs. I asked him if he was going out to
    join the army. He said yes. 'Was he not afraid of being wounded
    or killed?' 'Oh, no,' he replied, 'the Heavenly Father will
    befriend me.' 'Well, but suppose you should be killed, what
    then?' 'Why, my soul will go to heaven.' 'How can you expect to
    go to heaven? What merit have you to get there?' 'None, none in
    myself. It is entirely through the merits of the Heavenly
    Brother that this is to be done.' 'Who is the Heavenly Brother?'
    'I am not very learned,' he said, 'and request instruction.' I
    then began to tell him that He was the Son of the Heavenly
    Father; but before I had finished the sentence, he replied
    correctly. 'What great work did Christ do?' I asked. The young
    man gave an explicit statement of the Saviour's work for
    sinners, of his coming into the world, suffering and dying in
    the room of sinful man, in order to redeem us from sin and
    misery. I inquired if he believed all this. 'Assuredly,' was his
    reply. 'When did you join the dynasty?' 'Last year.' 'Can you
    read?' 'No.' 'Who instructed you in these things?' 'The
    Tsan-wang.' 'What does he in the way of instructing his people?'
    'He has daily service in his palace, and often preaches to them
    alike at home and when engaged in the field.' 'What book does he
    use?' 'He has a number belonging to the dynasty.' 'Do you know
    the New Testament?' 'Yes, but cannot read it.' 'Can you repeat
    the doxology of the Heavenly Father?' He went over it correctly.
    It contains in simple language the fundamental tenets of
    Christianity. 'Are there any special laws or commands connected
    with the dynasty?' 'There are the ten commandments.' 'Repeat
    them.' He went over a number of them, till he came to the sixth.
    'Now,' I said, 'how is this command observed by you, seeing that
    so much cruelty and wickedness are practised by your brethren
    all around?' 'Oh,' he replied, 'in so far as fighting in the
    open field is concerned, that is all fair play and cannot be
    helped. It is not intended in the command.' 'No,' I remarked,
    'that is not my meaning; but look at your brethren going
    privately into the country and robbing and killing the innocent
    people; what of that?' 'It is very bad, and such will only go to
    hell.' 'What, notwithstanding their adherence to the dynasty,
    and fighting under the same banners as yourself?' 'Yes, that is
    no matter; when the laws of Christ and the Heavenly Father are
    not attended to, these guilty individuals ought to die and go to
    hell.' 'But is not this the case with a great number of your
    adherents?' 'Alas! it is especially among our new recruits,
    whose hearts are not impressed with the true doctrine.' 'In all
    the public offices is care taken to instruct the soldiers and
    civilians connected with them?' 'Yes, every man, woman, and
    child of reasonable age in the capital, can repeat the doxology
    of the Heavenly Father.' 'And what about those in the country?'
    'Those who have short hair are not yet sufficiently taught, but
    books are being distributed amongst them, in order that they may
    learn those things."

Can this be called a "blasphemous and immoral" basis of religion? If
those who so designated it possessed but a tithe of the temporal
practice and spiritual faith of this illiterate young Ti-ping, they
would be happier men; but it must be admitted that their sentiments and
actions hardly induce such a belief.


FOOTNOTES:

[1] _Vide_ p. 6, "Further Papers relating to the Rebellion in China,
1862."

[2] "The original is written by the young prince, in the name of his
father, on satin, with the vermilion pencil, and stamped with the seal
of the Taeping-wang, the Celestial king."




CHAPTER XVII.

    On board the _Williamette_.--Blockade running.--Arrival at
    Nankin.--Solemn Thanksgiving.--Domestic Arrangements.--Phillip's
    Wife.--The Wooing.--The Dowry.--The Wedding.--Trade
    established.--Imperialist Corruption.--Preparations for
    leaving.--An Elopement.--The Journey.--The Surprise.--The
    Repulse.--Arrival at Hang-chow.--Its capture.--The
    particulars.--Cum-ho.--The Chung-wang.--His mistaken Policy.


Thanks to the impish steamer _Williamette_, we escaped any further
annoyance at the hands of her friends, for, according to agreement, she
towed us past all the Imperialist positions. Although I had paid rather
dear for this favour, the danger we had escaped at that atrocious Mud
Fort, and those troubles we avoided by towing past the unscrupulous
batteries and piratical squadrons of the enemy, made it well worth more.
Had we sailed to Nankin, our nights would have been far from pleasant,
sleep being rendered impossible from the unceasing watching for some
hostile demonstration, and the excitement attendant on the several
skirmishes which we must have had with the Manchoos.

The worry and excitement of running the Nankin blockade can only be
thoroughly appreciated by those who have experienced its perils. The
Ti-ping adherents certainly found few pleasures to reward them, and
their lot was very far indeed from being cast in pleasant places. Such
dangers as myself and many others have endured while assisting the cause
of these patriots have left an impression which even time cannot
efface.

Perchance, we are sailing peacefully and slowly along the broad
Yang-tze, dreaming of home or philosophizing upon the spread of liberty
and Christianity by our Ti-ping friends, when crash comes a discharge of
artillery from some Manchoo fort, as the first intimation that we were
within the meshes of those who would destroy all hope of improving China
or of realizing our own dreams, with equal indifference. This danger
passes over, and the wearied have sought for slumber, when those on
their anxious watch suddenly discover a squadron of the sometime pirate
_Ti-mungs_ hired to fight the battles of the Manchoo; and at the same
instant those below are startled by the broadsides fired at their
devoted vessel. After running the gauntlet of these heavily-armed
vessels, the sleepers, with rifles by their side and revolvers under
pillow, are subject to incessant disturbance from the attack of the
centipede gunboats, as the latter pull from sly corners and creeks, in
twos, tens, or twenties, and chase the passing ship, eager for the blood
of those on board, or the pleasure of looting their effects.

Many of the few Europeans who were engaged assisting the Ti-pings were
captured and barbarously killed by the Imperialists; yet, in spite of
these dangers, and the certain prospect of a cruel death if unfortunate
enough to fall into their hands, every man willingly incurred them, with
a full conviction that the cause was worthy of any risk or sacrifice.

Some have been found daring enough to allege that personal profit was
the motive which induced so many to incur suffering and danger in
support of the Ti-pings. The absurdity of such a statement is made clear
by the fact, that from 1860 to 1863 the principal supply of silk and tea
was derived by the merchants of China from the Ti-pings, and that it was
possible to carry on trade with the Imperialists with perfect safety,
and with as large, if not larger, profit.

The true reason why those engaged in assisting the Ti-pings preferred
that course, with all its troubles and dangers, is that, having once met
the revolutionists, the immense superiority of the latter to the
Manchoos had enlisted their sympathies and active support. Money, of
course, in many cases had a great deal to do with the transactions of
those who _traded_ among the Ti-pings; but others, I am certain, were
solely actuated by disinterested motives. He must, indeed, be a singular
specimen of a man who could really know and experience the society of
the Ti-pings, and not become a warm friend to them.

The _Williamette_ was a powerful steamer, and on the evening of the day
after she had taken us in tow, we had the satisfaction to be cast off
right in the mouth of the Nankin creek, while the good ship continued on
her way to Ngan-kin, whither she was bound with munitions of war freshly
obtained from the British arsenals in China, to be expended in the
slaughter of those who held England's pledge of strict neutrality.

Upon bringing up in the creek, I landed and paid my friend the Sz-wang a
visit. He gave me a hearty welcome, and immediately set his servants to
prepare a regular feast for myself and friend. I could not refuse the
kind hospitality of my worthy host, even impatient as I was to get into
the city and see Marie, who, he assured me, was in perfect health and
happiness, and a vast favourite among the ladies at the Ti-ping capital,
at the same time astonishing me by saying that Phillip had been married
since my departure from Nankin.

At last, while the dinner was progressing, and the Sz-wang had for a
moment been called away by a courier from the city, I left the table,
and, assisted by his eldest nephew, who was a great friend of mine, I
mounted one of his best horses and set off for Nankin, leaving my friend
P. to excuse me and relate our adventures and the intentions of the
so-called "foreign brethren" at Shanghae towards the Ti-pings; a point
upon which the Sz-wang always felt the deepest anxiety.

Upon reaching the Chung-wang's palace, I found a large number of chiefs
assembled in the "Heavenly Hall," and all greatly elated by despatches
just received from the Commander-in-Chief detailing the capture of the
seaport Ningpo. Anxious as I naturally felt to meet my betrothed, I was
yet obliged to join the chiefs in the solemn thanksgiving they were
about offering to the Great Giver of all victory. Upon this occasion, as
usual, whether after triumph or defeat, the Ti-pings attributed their
important success entirely to the will of "The Heavenly Father." Their
absorbing reliance upon God, because of their belief in the
righteousness and Christianity of their cause has often startled me by
its singular devotedness and simplicity. It was not only those who had
been of the original "Society of the Worshippers of God" in Kwang-si,
that were so fervent and hopeful, but all _bona fide_ Ti-pings, and even
many among the latest recruits were equally inspired. It is a well-known
fact that young boys, of twelve to fifteen years of age, are commonly
the bravest soldiers and most daring spirits in the ranks of the Ti-ping
soldiery. Formerly the very women fought by the side of their male
relatives; at the present time they still undergo the hard dangers of
the camp. Thus, upon consideration of all the facts bearing upon the
motive and practice of the Ti-pings, it cannot be difficult to
understand that some mighty inspiration has affected a large portion of
the Chinese in a remarkably striking manner. Some term the cause and
effect evil; others, not so self-conceited and hypercritical, say "it is
good." By some the great Ti-ping revolution has been considered a
religious fanaticism, an extensive leaguing together of banditti for the
sake of plunder; the fact being that the only religious enthusiasm is to
establish our Bible throughout China, and the only physical action an
endeavour to liberate that vast empire from what even their worst
opponents declare a hopelessly corrupt and oppressive Government!

[Illustration:
Day & Son, (Limited), Lith.
A VIEW IN THE INNER APARTMENTS OF THE CHUNG WANG'S PALACE]

When the thanksgiving prayers in the "Heavenly Hall" were brought to a
conclusion, I soon found my way to the inner apartments, and had the
happiness to find Marie looking, if possible, better and more handsome
than ever. She was delighted with the kindness of the Ti-ping ladies,
and particularly noticed their sincere piety and continual study of the
Holy Scriptures. Before long her inseparable companion, Miss Cum-ho,
appeared, and considerably amused us by her roundabout inquiries after
my friend L., who, much to her satisfaction, I stated might be shortly
expected.

While taking a stroll in the garden, Marie informed me that during my
absence she had been much annoyed by the importunate attentions of a
young chief, the son of the Tsan-wang, one of the principal members of
the Ti-ping Government. In fact, to so unpleasant an extent had his
sudden passion carried him that, upon two occasions, his emissaries had
attempted her abduction, the last attempt having taken place only a few
evenings before my return, and while she was walking in the palace
grounds alone. The young chief I knew by reputation as a wild and
unscrupulous character, but his father was a most influential personage;
therefore, though I might readily have avoided further trouble by
representing the affair to the authorities, I decided to take Marie with
me and join the Chung-wang at Hang-chow, rather than excite any bad
feeling by making a public case when it could be avoided. Ti-ping
justice was remarkably prompt and severe, and conviction of the chief
would very likely have led to decapitation. Before putting my plan into
execution, it was necessary to await the arrival of L. with our lorcha.

In the evening I found Phillip with his wife waiting to see me in the
old rooms at the back of the Chung-wang's palace. I had ample occasion
to congratulate him upon his choice, for the lady was by no means
wanting in personal beauty. She was a really fine girl, taller than the
generality of Chinese women, with very pretty and regular features,
light-complexioned and rosy-cheeked, and was quite black-eyed and
long-haired enough to please the greatest brunette admirer; besides
which she was fortunate enough to possess nice little feet, not deformed
according to Imperialist Chinese taste. How Phillip met her, and how she
became his wife, took place, as he informed me, in the following way:--

A week or two after my departure from Nankin, intelligence was received
of the capture of the city of Ngan-kin by the Imperialists, and the
defeat of the Ying-wang, who had been prevented effecting its relief
through the delay caused by his communication with the British
expedition up the Yang-tze. Reinforcements having been ordered from
Nankin to the north bank of the river, so as to co-operate in the
Ying-wang's retreat, Phillip accompanied them, taking charge of the few
pieces of artillery they carried.

One day, while with the foremost of the advanced guard, he became
engaged in an attack upon a fortified hamlet, which was obstinately
defended by some Manchoo troops, who were assisted by the inhabitants.
In such cases, of course, the Ti-pings treat the villagers as enemies,
making prisoners of those who escape the battle, and seizing their
effects.

While driving the Imperialists out of the palace, Phillip received a
slight though painful spear-wound in one of his hands, and, upon
entering a house to obtain some water, he saw his future wife for the
first time. The house was, apparently, one of the poorest in the
village, and the young woman, with her aged father and a little
servant-girl, constituted its only occupants. They were naturally much
alarmed by the conflict raging about them, and while the timid daughter
supplied him with a draught of water, her father threw himself at his
knees, _ketowing_ and imploring protection.

Phillip was considerably impressed by the charms of the celestial
damsel, and with his brave though tender heart sincerely pitied her
unprotected state, so he waited until the arrival of the main body of
the forces; and then, after obtaining from the chief in command a
protection _chop_, or paper, to affix to the door of the house, and
thereby make it inviolate, he continued on the march, leaving father and
daughter showering Chinese blessings upon his foreign head.

My friend had not proceeded very far when he reflected that a great
proportion of the rear guard (which in this case was a position of no
moment) was composed of quite new levies, many of whom had been
Imperialist _braves_, and had only lately been enlisted as Ti-pings, and
who, probably, still retained the old propensities to excess and plunder
strong within them. Thinking thus, and, I dare say, with a lively
remembrance of the daughter's pretty face--her equal not being seen
every day in China--he determined to ride back and protect the old man's
house, if necessary, till the last of the force had passed through the
village. During his return he had met a number of the recruits as
prisoners for looting houses and robbing country people, the punishment
for which would almost certainly be decapitation, and upon reaching the
place he found many were plundering and destroying all they could lay
hands on.

Phillip had scarcely noticed this when the little girl he had seen at
the house came running up to him, screaming and holding out her hands,
and with the blood pouring from a large gash across her cheek.

Fearing the worst, and blaming himself for not having made greater
haste, he left one of his men to attend to the poor child, and galloped
up to the house with the rest.

The building was beginning to smoke where some of the marauders had just
applied the torch, while, right across the threshold of his once happy
home, the apparently lifeless body of the old man lay before my friend.
Hearing the noise of voices inside the house, Phillip expecting at each
step to come across the daughter's corpse, drew his revolver and
entered. He arrived not a moment too soon, for, upon reaching the inner
chamber, he found the poor girl struggling in the hands of several
soldiers. The next instant and his pistol had effectually released her,
when she rushed fainting and dishevelled to his arms. Carrying her to
the outer apartment, he laid her on a couch, and then turned his
attention to the father. The latter still lived, but death was evidently
fast approaching as his life ebbed away from several ghastly wounds
inflicted by the heavy knives of the ruthless murderers.

The fire being extinguished by some of his men, Phillip got the poor old
man moved into the house, and, assisted by the sorrow-stricken daughter,
did all that was possible to save him. It was, however, soon apparent
that his end was drawing near; he seemed quite sensible, though for some
time unable to speak. At last, with a flickering revival before the
total eclipse of life's lamp, he pointed with one nerveless hand to the
wainscot, and ejaculated, "Tseen!--che-mo!" (Money!--take away the
wood!) Upon going to the spot indicated, Phillip found a crevice in the
panelling, and, using the blade of his sword, he managed to wrench away
a large piece, exposing a hollow containing a small bundle tied up in
blue Chinese cloth. While lifting this up he knew by its weight that it
must contain gold, and when he placed it by the side of the dying man,
the latter with difficulty managed to say "Gno--show--ne!"
(I--give--you). Then, calling his daughter, he with a last effort
stretched forth his arms, and, grasping her hand and that of the
stranger from the far West, and feebly endeavouring to place them
together, fell back, and in a little while expired.

After a distressing scene with the bereaved girl, Phillip was compelled
to order the interment, under a few inches of earth, of her father's
body. Immediately afterwards it was necessary to set out for the now
distant army, and when Phillip overtook it his future wife was with him,
as her fate would have been certain had she remained alone at the
desolated village, defenceless, with her gold and beauty, before the
incursions of Imperialist or Ti-ping marauders. There were many Ti-ping
women accompanying their husbands with the army, so the poor girl had
some of her own sex to comfort her. The expedition was not long away
from Nankin, and upon its return to the city, Phillip and the orphan
were married in the Ti-ping church, thus accomplishing not only what
they supposed to have been the wish of the dead father, but also what
accorded with their mutual inclination.

And so it was that my friend Phillip obtained a wife and a fortune with
her, for that heavy little bundle contained more than sixty gold bars,
each worth about 300 dollars. Phillip Bosse, or Boze, declared himself
so satisfied with his wife, his present affairs, and the Ti-pings, that
he vowed he would never leave them. He kept his word, for he died
amongst the patriots, and as his relatives in Greece may never otherwise
hear of his death, I give his name as I knew it; so that should this
book ever fall into their hands, they may at least have the melancholy
satisfaction to know where his body rests, and that he died like a
gallant and noble-hearted man, serving a righteous and a great cause.

A few days after my arrival at Nankin, my friend L. brought our lorcha
safely into the creek, accompanied by three other vessels of the same
class, the owners of which had availed themselves of the passes I had
given them from the Chang-wang. Each craft was deeply laden with rice
and other provisions. My own junk and lorcha, containing rice belonging
to the Ti-ping Government, we left in charge of certain officials, and
my friends all joined me in the city. Soon after the arrival of L.,
several vessels came in from Shanghae to trade; these were succeeded by
others, and a regular commerce sprang up and was continued for a year
or two. In a few months the trade had become so great that it was quite
common for more than thirty vessels (both foreign and Chinese-owned) to
arrive in one day. The large supplies received by this line of
communication were stored in the extensive Nankin granaries, and while
these were always kept full, the residue was distributed through the
town and villages of the district, the neighbouring country being much
impoverished by the continual warfare raging around the Ti-ping capital.

The fraudulent and corrupt revenue institutions of the Manchoo
Government have long been notorious. The enormous extortion practised
upon foreign trade until the wars with Great Britain compelled a more
regular tariff, and the plundering squeeze stations scattered over every
half-mile of Imperialist territory, each of which pilfer a sum from the
unfortunate owner of all passing merchandise, be he a foreigner who
ought to pass clear by virtue of the transit duty clauses of the treaty,
or a Chinaman who is legitimate prey, have made China a vast system of
independent official violence and rapacity.

No wonder the naturally astute Chinese appear so particularly cunning
and deceitful to Europeans! The possession of money is a sure attraction
for the mandarin vultures; so that beyond the pale of the foreign
settlements at the treaty ports, throughout the country, every native
merchant and civilian is bred up to habits of mendacity, and
particularly to conceal his real income and condition.

The endless ramifications of the Manchoo administrative extend from each
remote corner of China to the central power; and although every one of
the myriad feelers sucking away at the substance of the nation (in the
shape of mandarins, all appointed with merely nominal salary, but given
_carte blanche_ to obtain emolument after sending an annual stipulated
sum to the emperor), crams its individual self with spoil, the
squeezing and contracting of the Manchoo canker feeds the insatiable
core at Pekin. It is useless to think of curing or mitigating the evil,
though some have vainly advocated doing so. The only remedy must
necessarily be a change of dynasty, such as the Ti-pings would certainly
have effected had they not been wickedly opposed by foreigners. Every
branch of civil, military, social, political and religious organization
has become so hopelessly corrupted since the Manchoo era, that any
attempt to change or improve the deplorable results of their evil rule
might be carried on _ad infinitum_, only to result in certain failure.
But one course affords a prospect of cure and a consequent chance of
happiness for China: that is, a radical change of Government.

Let foreigners be righteous, and permit the native to expel the Tartar;
and the Chinese, when ruled by Chinese, will become benefited by western
civilization, and (if the Ti-ping should not become exterminated by
British intervention) in all probability Christianized.

In striking contrast to the excessively corrupt Imperialist customs, the
Ti-ping revenue organization was just, regular, and simple. Throughout
every part of Ti-ping-tien-kwoh but one custom-house was established at
each town or village where trade was carried on. The rate of tariff has
always been moderate, and the great advantage of the system consisted in
being able to clear goods by one payment, upon which a pass would be
given to take them free of further charge or hindrance to their
destination. The Ti-ping Government deserved no little credit for the
simplicity and effectiveness of their Board of Revenue, and it is mainly
due to that branch of their administration that the valuable silk trade
_increased_ and continued progressing so favourably during their
possession of the producing districts.

Not only can all who have traded at Nankin testify to the entire
superiority of the Ti-ping custom-house, but many silk and tea merchants
now revelling in England have to thank the admirable regulations and
forbearance of the revolutionists for their well-lined pockets. Every
customs establishment in the late Ti-ping territory was composed of a
superintendent, several deputies, and a very efficient staff of
surveyors, clerks, and weighers, and at places frequented by Europeans,
one or more interpreters were always found. Rice and other grain were
quite free of duty, and that upon dried and preserved provisions was
very low. All other produce and general merchandise were moderately
taxed, either by tariff or _ad valorem_. Such were the regulations,
which were not (like the Imperialist maritime customs) simply binding
upon foreign goods, but were applicable in an equal degree to the
property of natives.

Before putting into execution the design I had formed to depart suddenly
from Nankin, D., an old friend of mine, arrived from Hankow, where he
was established as the principal partner of a large mercantile firm. He
brought several vessels to trade with the city, and he came to an
arrangement by which he was to sail with Captain P., and another
European as mate, in our lorcha _Anglo Ti-ping_, the latter to convoy
his junks and our old one. D. was a perfect Chinese linguist, and to him
I am indebted for much valuable information.

I waited until P., in charge of the lorcha and her consorts, had sailed
up the river to obtain cargoes of rice, edible oil, bacon, salt fish,
and other articles of consumption, and then prepared to leave the city.

During a few days I sent Phillip and L. into the country to buy some
horses, and at last, together with our own, managed to muster fourteen
strong animals, which were then stabled at a remote part of the city,
close to the north-east gate. Since the return of my friend and
companion L., we had successfully concealed his presence from the female
part of the Chung-wang's household, with one exception, and by this
_ruse_ he had obtained several interviews with the lady of his
affections, the (according to his idea) incomparable Cum-ho. The result
of these meetings soon transpired.

At length the day came, the close of which was settled for our exit from
Nankin. Six picked men, belonging to an artillery corps we had formed of
some of the Chung-wang's troops, were selected to accompany myself and
comrades. The horses were particularly attended to, and our weapons were
well cleaned and then carefully loaded, for danger had warned us against
the risk of rusty locks and carelessly charged fire-arms. When all had
been arranged, L. informed me that he had determined to carry Cum-ho,
who had agreed to elope with him, to Hang-chow, and so induce her father
to sanction their marriage. I found it impossible to dissuade him from
doing so, and he assured me that the lady's mind was equally decided;
therefore, much as I feared the affair would injure our satisfactory and
friendly relations with the Chung-wang, I had no choice but to accede.
Cum-ho, in order to find an opportunity to join us, had paid a visit to
the Ying-wang's ladies, and as their dwelling was close by, she was only
accompanied by her own female attendant.

Just when the shadows of evening were cast in long dark lines from the
tall battlements and high pagodas of the city, we prepared to assemble
at the appointed rendezvous. Phillip, with the six Ti-ping soldiers, I
sent on to the stables, while L., with our boy As-sam, waited outside
the Ying-wang's palace for Miss Cum-ho; and I, taking A-ling, my trusty
interpreter, joined Marie in the Chung-wang's gardens. As the hour fixed
upon for a general meet drew near, myself and party, each carrying a
small quantity of baggage, left the gardens by a small door and
proceeded to the somewhat distant stables. Upon reaching the rendezvous,
I found Phillip had brought his wife with him, and also another horse
for her use. We had not long to wait for L., who, with his fair runaway
and her maid, arrived soon after myself. The horses were now led forth,
and we, numbering fifteen persons, having mounted, the word was given to
spur and away.

Upon reaching the city gate we were detained for a long while by the
warder, in consequence of the late hour, although I had taken care to
provide myself with the requisite pass from the proper authority to
permit my egress or ingress at any time. At last the surly guardians of
the portal turned out, shuffling their clothes about their backs with a
style peculiar to the Chinese, who generally sleep quite naked, and have
a curious way of drawing their arms from the sleeves of their clothing
when dressed, and shrugging them up next their body. After the
shuffling, stocking-pulling, and preliminary spitting (a great and
indispensable habit with Chinamen), had partially subsided, the sleepy
guards managed to draw back sundry huge wooden bars, to undo any amount
of rusty locks and bolts, and then the massive doors creaked slowly
open. While the gates of the city clanged together, we set off at a
gallop for the road leading south, to reach which we turned westward and
skirted a considerable part of the walls.

Chinese horses, though small, are wonderfully strong and enduring, and
it was not till the close of the day after our start that we came to a
regular halt, and only then because our fair companions were fatigued.
My literally fair readers need not take umbrage at this appellation, for
yellow-tinted celestial and dusky Portuguese as they were, their beauty
was undeniable, and their figures such that many a European dame might
justly envy. The rough riding through the mountain-passes on the
southern road from Nankin affected our hardy animals but very little;
and when our camp was pitched for the night under the shelter of the
wall of a ruined Buddhist temple, and they were picketed in a
semi-circle around, they set to work cropping the short grass as
leisurely as though they had just left the stable. We carried three
tents with our baggage, and these were pitched; one for the women; one
for my comrades, A-ling, and our boy; and the other for our six men.

A large fire was lighted, and we had nearly finished the supper served
up by As-sam, when crash came a volley of musketry among us, directed
from the crest of a small hill directly fronting and overlooking our
camp at a distance of some eighty or ninety yards. I had stupidly
neglected to choose the other side of the wall for our resting-place. Of
course, we instantly started to our feet and snatched up the arms at
hand, and while the Ti-pings shortened in the tether of our horses,
forming a close array of the well-trained, docile animals, fastened
together head and tail, the rest of our party placed the women directly
under the shelter of the living rampart. These measures were barely
effected when a body of more than fifty horsemen dashed round the hill
and charged upon our position. We had no difficulty in discovering them
to be Ti-pings, and when they came closer we saw the Tsan-wang's son was
at their head. Their first volley had fortunately been aimed far too
high; it may be that, fearing to injure the woman he pursued, the chief
had done this, trusting to cause an alarm, during which he might dash
forward and carry off the prize. Our reply to the advancing party was
not so bloodless as the commencement of their attack. My own comrades,
and even A-ling and As-sam, were capital marksmen, while the six men had
been selected for their approved courage and the well-known skill so
peculiar to Chinese when properly instructed.

Every man of our party was armed with either an Enfield or some other
rifle (two being Sharp's breech-loaders), and all were able to use them
with deadly accuracy; therefore, the number of the approaching foe gave
us but little dread, especially as we saw they were armed only with
short European-made double-barrelled guns and Chinese matchlocks. We
waited until they had galloped to within twenty yards, but receiving
only the war cry, "Tah! Tah!" in reply to our challenge, we then took
steady aim, and commenced firing upon them by successive volleys from
each half of our number. The affair was settled in a moment almost. The
leader and half a dozen of his men, with twice that number of horses,
were quickly rolling on the turf, for at that short distance the
difficulty would have been to miss them with our rifles. When their
charge was entirely repulsed we ceased firing, a dozen men came forward
on foot and carried off their fallen comrades and chief, and then they
all slowly disappeared in the direction of Nankin. During their advance
they had kept up an irregular fire, which, with the exception of grazing
the other arm of our boy, As-sam (one had been wounded at the Mud Fort),
and shooting away the ear of one of our horses, did no damage.

Upon the fortunate termination of the skirmish we dispatched the
remainder of our supper, turned in for the night upon the opposite side
of the wall, and kept three men on sentry till morning. Upon resuming
our journey, we soon came to a rich and thickly-populated country, and
during the next few days, while traversing the silk districts from end
to end, along the eastern shore of the Ta-hoo lake, _via_ the city of
Soo-chow, Kia-shing-foo, and the Grand Canal, I particularly noticed the
vast improvement that had taken place since my first visit to Soo-chow
some eight months ago. Everywhere around the traces of war (always
excepting the demolished Buddhist temples) had disappeared before the
progress of peace and plenty; and although I may be accused of
exaggeration, I do not hesitate to affirm that the establishment of
Ti-ping supremacy and administration over these, the most valuable
districts of China, had restored them to prosperity and happiness in a
shortness of time hitherto unparalleled in the case of either Chinese or
any other civil war desolation.

Although during my previous visit I had seen amply sufficient to
undeceive me as to the wickedly false allegations of Ti-ping
devastations, &c., still I was hardly prepared for the flourishing state
in which I found the _settled_ territory of the revolutionists. I knew
that the export of silk within the current year (1861) had already
increased to upwards of 20,000 bales more than during the corresponding
period of last year (when till May the districts were under Imperialist
rule); but then I imagined the great increase might be due to the wish
of holders to realize. I found, upon the contrary, that the improvement
was entirely due to the Ti-ping occupation. In less than two years the
districts under Ti-ping jurisdiction had produced silk representing a
sum of not less than L3,000,000 per annum more than previously! At each
of the many villages and at every peasant's cot, the happy-looking
people were engaged tending their silkworms for winter, reeling the last
cocoons, or tilling their fields.

Great as the prosperity of the country seemed, there was something even
more gratifying and interesting in the changed appearance and
disposition of the people. All the unfavourable characteristics of the
Manchoo-oppressed Chinese had vanished, and their natural character was
manifested in a way which illustrated their candour, hospitality to
foreigners, and native good temper.

After a twelve days' journey, the later part of the time in large canal
boats, we arrived within a day's march of Hang-chow. Leaving the water
route, we disembarked our horses and set forward in the direction of the
provincial capital, guided by the continual booming of heavy guns. Upon
reaching the crest of some high ground, the city lay before us in the
clear frosty air of a fine December morning. But, as we find the case
every day, the beauty of nature was marred by the passions and strife of
mankind. The extensive city was in flames in several quarters, and the
dense columns of smoke shrouded as with a pall the slaughter taking
place beneath. As we rode forward through the beautiful neighbouring
country, we were enabled gradually to discern dark masses of troops
rushing forward against the city amid the constant roar of artillery and
the rattling crash of smaller arms. It was evident that we had arrived
at the moment of a grand assault by the Ti-ping forces.

As our soldiers each declared that the Chung-wang's head-quarters were
to the west of the city, we made a considerable detour in that
direction. We had not proceeded far when a disorderly crowd came in
sight, hurrying away from the city. Directly they observed my party, the
greater number turned off and precipitately fled in another line of
retreat. As those who stood their ground were making ready with spears
and gingalls to give us a warm reception, and as we were not out like a
parcel of knights errant seeking adventure and fighting from pure love,
we wisely followed those who ran away, and succeeded in catching one of
the hindermost, to question as to the state of affairs in the city. At
first the man was terribly frightened, and we could make nothing of him;
then he became still more alarmed, and we found out all we wished. His
fear was the usual one accompanying the flight of disorganized
_undisciplined_ troops, which with Chinese becomes a wild panic; not
because the men fear death, for no people can meet it with the stolidity
and callousness with which they will suffer execution and torture, but
from the simple fact that they are not sufficiently disciplined to know
how to be killed in an orderly manner on the field of battle. They see a
chance of escape, and on one taking it the whole follow like a flock of
sheep.

Having ascertained from our prisoner, who with his friends were all
Imperialist soldiery from the garrison of Hang-chow, that the Ti-pings
had just captured the city, we set him at liberty, and then galloped for
the west gate. On the way we passed many fugitives fleeing in every
direction. Upon reaching the rear of the Ti-ping lines of
circumvallation, we found them almost denuded of troops, the few
remaining being fully occupied in guarding prisoners. We soon found the
Commander-in-Chief's head-quarters, but no Chung-wang was there. The
scanty number of soldiers on guard were in a great state of excitement
about the success of the siege, and we managed to elicit from them that
the Chung-wang had entered the city with his whole force, and was now
engaged attacking the Tartar quarter, an _imperium in imperio_, city
within city, being protected by its own walls, and with a central
citadel towering above all. Leaving the women in a house protected by
the main guard, with the remainder of my party I rode towards the city.
Upon entering by the nearest gate, we found the streets unoccupied,
except by the bodies of the slain; but the noise of battle guided us to
the spot where living men were busily engaged increasing the number of
the dead and dying.

Hang-chow, cut off from all communication with the outside world, every
line of supply severed by the besiegers, and famine raging among the
unfortunate garrison and inhabitants, fell to the investing army upon
the 29th of December, 1861. Early on that day the Chung-wang had
commenced a grand assault, conducted upon each gate of the city. After a
fiercely contested fight, the assaulting columns having gained some
advantages at the south and east gates, the Chinese portion of the
defenders at those points surrendered, probably induced to take that
step by the very short rations to which they had been reduced. When the
gates had been given up, the Ti-ping troops poured into the city with
such ardour that the Tartar bannermen were quickly driven within their
inner defence. Hundreds of the miserable citizens of the provincial
capital were starved to death during the siege, hundreds more, with
their families, committed suicide. The nature of war in China has
usually been so merciless, and the conduct of victorious troops at the
capture of a city so outrageous, that in many cases during the civil
war, and the wars with Great Britain, the people, probably imbued with a
dread of these consequences, have committed wholesale suicide when they
were not in the slightest danger of being molested.

I managed to find the Chung-wang just in time to join the last attack
upon the inner or Tartar city. The Commander-in-Chief, surrounded by his
officers, received myself and friends with evident signs of
satisfaction. His men had just been repulsed by the Manchoo troops, who
were fighting with the greatest bravery and determination. The Ti-pings
had eight or nine pieces of artillery turned against the wall of the
inner city; but these were established in one position, firing point
blank upon the rampart, so that when the assaulting parties moved
forward the guns became useless. I instantly advised the Chung-wang to
move two or three guns away upon each flank, so as to enfilade the
parapet and protect the advance of his stormers. This was quickly done,
and upon joining the leaders of the next assault, we had the
satisfaction to find it successful. The Tartar bannermen retreated to
the citadel in the centre of their city, fighting to the very last,
assisted by their women, who fought with them like men, and one of whom
inflicted a severe spear-wound upon Ling-ho, a Ti-ping general, when he
would have saved her life. The greater portion of the Chinese troops
garrisoning Hang-chow were captured, but the Manchoos fell almost to the
last man. Their loss during the capture of the city was very great, and
when at length they were driven into their citadel, Luy, their general,
blew the remnant into the air, the entire Tartar force, men, women, and
children, perishing in the ruins.

After the capture of Hang-chow, the anti-Ti-pings, who were in the habit
of howling over Ti-ping atrocities, though oblivious to those of the
Manchoo, indulged their distorted though vivid imaginations by
inveighing against such indiscriminate slaughter. It is true that a
great loss of life occurred, but not a man fell except in battle,
neither were any non-combatants killed except by starvation or their own
hands. It is a singular fact that those who have been loudest to exclaim
against Ti-ping cruelty, have always delighted in Imperialist
barbarities and success, the words being synonymous.

When the last note of conflict had died away, and the Chung-wang had
fixed his head-quarters within the city, I broached the subject of his
daughter's presence and her attachment to my friend. The time was
propitious, for it was the moment of a great triumph, and I suppose it
had put the Ti-ping generalissimo into an immensely good and benevolent
frame of mind, for he simply expressed his intention to take her back to
Nankin, and settle the affair upon our return to that city. In the
evening Cum-ho waited upon her father, having taken up her quarters with
the rest of our feminine fellow travellers in a house close to the large
building occupied by himself and staff.

On the morning of the first day of the new year, a large body of the
army was dispatched in the direction of Shanghae, under the command of
the Shi-wang, with orders to occupy every town and village up to the
walls of that port, and then to open negotiations with the British and
other authorities, who had so unjustly assumed to themselves the right
of holding a Chinese city for the Manchoo against the Chinese patriots.
During the next few weeks the Chung-wang busied himself establishing the
different offices of Ti-ping Government in Hang-chow, and completing his
plans for the occupation and retention of the remainder of the provinces
of Kiang-su and Che-kiang. At length the Commander-in-Chief, seldom more
than a month in any city (during his remarkably energetic and rapid
conduct of the Ti-ping operations), took his departure for Nankin, there
to mature further tactics as to the mode of prosecuting the war against
the Manchoo, and also to consult with his king the Tien-wang, and
receive further commands.

I had ample opportunity to notice the exceeding popularity the
Chung-wang had attained among the country people, for everywhere we
passed they turned out to welcome his arrival, and all I questioned
declared him to be a good and just man, who respected and protected the
rights of the meanest peasant of the land. Many of the Ti-ping chiefs
were popular with the civilians, some were disliked, all were considered
better than the Manchoo, but none were so beloved as the Chung-wang.
Before the troops had been marched towards Shanghae, a day of
thanksgiving was held at Hang-chow; and although the motive of the
Ti-ping is that of justice and Christianity, I could not help thinking
of the similar practice among Europeans, who never fail to return thanks
to God for triumph over their weaker brethren, whether their cause be
righteous or quite the reverse.

On our march to Nankin, the Chung-wang took a route which embraced all
the principal cities captured during the last year, including Hoo-chow,
Kar-shing-foo, Soo-chow, Wo-kong, Quin-san, Tat-san, &c., and at each
thanksgivings were offered up for the late important success. About this
time the Commander-in-Chief committed his first great error. His mistake
consisted in breaking up a large proportion of his forces into garrisons
for the numerous walled cities in Ti-ping possession, and in moving the
rest of his troops to other quarters.[3] It is true, he had nothing to
fear from the enemy, all their armies in the field (with the exception
of those operating against the Ying-wang, on the line of the Yang-tze
river, above Nankin) having been utterly dispersed; but no preparation
whatever was made to resist the probable hostility of England and
France, beyond such defence as the widely separated fortified towns
might be able to make. This neglect, when the British scheme of
intervention came into full play, proved fatal to the welfare of
Ti-pingdom. City after city was captured in detail by British
_artillery_ and troops; when, had the patriots only concentrated their
numerous but greatly scattered forces, the result might have proved very
different. I wearied myself, the Chung-wang, and many other chiefs, by
continually representing the danger in case of foreign hostility (which
I felt certain would be the result of Lord Elgin's policy in China), but
the poor Ti-pings seemed infatuated, and resolutely refused to believe
that the unbrotherly so-called "foreign brethren" entertained such
perfectly unprovoked and cruel intentions. Fatally have they been
undeceived! Deeply responsible have England and France become for the
consequences!


FOOTNOTE:

[3] This was, however, in accordance with the Tien-wang's orders.




CHAPTER XVIII.

    Earl Russell's Despatch.--Its Effect.--"Taking the
    Offensive."--Official Reports.--General Staveley.--Attacks the
    Ti-pings.--General Ward.--Hope and Ward repulsed.--Che-poo
    attacked.--Its Capture.--Loot Regulations.--Kah-ding
    attacked.--Its Capture.--Ti-ping Loss.--Newspaper
    Comments.--Tsing-poo besieged.--Inside the City.--Ti-ping
    Losses.--Na-jaor besieged.--Cho-lin besieged.--Ti-ping
    Bravery.--Cho-lin captured.--The Chung-wang.--Kah-ding
    evacuated.--Consul Harvey's Despatch.--Despatch
    reviewed.--Ningpo threatened.--Captain Dew at Ning-po.--His
    Despatch.--The Reply.--Captain Dew's Rejoinder.--Preparation to
    attack Ning-po.--Captain Dew's Inconsistency.--His
    Ultimatum.--Official Despatches.--Ning-po attacked.--Ning-po
    evacuated.--Newspaper Reports.


After hostilities had been commenced by Admiral Hope, and upon hearing
of the capture of Ningpo by the Ti-pings, Earl Russell endorsed the
violation of British faith by approving the hostile maintenance of
Shanghae and the other treaty ports against the Ti-ping belligerents, in
the following despatch to the Admiralty, dated, "Foreign Office, March
11, 1862":--

    "I have, therefore, to signify to your Lordships the Queen's
    commands that Vice-Admiral Hope should be instructed to defend
    Shanghae, and to protect the other treaty ports not in the hands
    of the rebels, so far as it is in the power of Her Majesty's
    _naval forces_ to do so."

Before, however, these instructions were received (they bearing date
March 11, and occupying at least three months in reaching Mr. Bruce at
Pekin, and being by him communicated to Admiral Hope at Shanghae), the
war was carried far into the interior and thoroughly established,
although, in the first instance, it had been pretended that the
operations were only undertaken in defence of Shanghae.

Mr. Bruce having stated his opinion by the following passage in a
despatch, dated March 4, 1862:--"Shanghae is threatened, and its
supplies cut off, and the insurgents will be emboldened by our
passiveness and their success at Ningpo to press us still closer. I have
stated to Sir J. Hope that, in my opinion, we are perfectly justified in
taking the offensive against the insurgents;"--Lord Russell again
approves of the disobedience of his former orders, by stating in a
despatch, dated "Foreign Office, June 2, 1862:--"I have to convey to you
my approval of the views expressed in your despatch of the 4th of March,
with regard to the course to be pursued towards the Taepings." This
sanction for the British authorities in China to take "the offensive"
was, of course, tantamount to a declaration of war against the
revolutionists; yet Earl Russell and his co-adjutors preferred working
in secrecy, the approval of Parliament was not sought, neither did Her
Majesty's Ministers ever deign to trouble themselves by announcing their
policy. This, however, can hardly be a matter of surprise, considering
that they had no _casus belli_ to set forward as a justification--the
multitude of excuses sent home by those who violated solemn pledges in
China no more constituting one than a number of petty faults would
justify hanging a man in England.

Admiral Hope having reported his breach of faith and neutrality by the
murderous raid upon Kao-kiau, which he termed "certain _moral_ support;"
and having requested the shadow of the Ministers' countenance and
support in these words, "I therefore strongly recommend that the French
and English commanders should be required by yourself and M. Bourboulon
to free the country from the rebels within a line commencing at Kading
on the Yang-tze above Woo-sung, through Tsing-poo to Sung-kong on the
Woo-sung river, and thence across to a walled town opposite on the
Yang-tze;" he received full approval from Mr. Bruce to continue as he
had commenced, at his own goodwill and pleasure.

In his despatch, authorizing the very course he had previously stated
would be more calculated than any other "to lower our national
reputation," Mr. Bruce, with his usual bad memory and inconsistent
policy, states of Ti-pingdom and the people "that its sources are
exhausted; that neither money nor supplies are to be drawn from the
_deserts_ to which the provinces overrun by them are reduced;"
completely oblivious of the "85,000 bales" of silk he had declared, only
a few months previous, were drawn from the producing districts--the
_deserts_ of his vivid though forgetful imagination.

The report of the Admiral and the reply of the Minister each discuss the
radius project shortly established against the Ti-ping belligerent only,
and the further increase and support of Ward's and fresh legions of
mercenaries. This is the first official mention of those now notorious
schemes.

When the Kao-kiau massacre, the radius plan, and the organization of
foreign-disciplined filibustering corps, _a la_ Ward, were reported to
him, Earl Russell again followed the path already laid out by his
subordinates in China--a system of policy that could not be defended on
principle, and still worse in execution.[4] The officials in China
always acted directly against the spirit and letter of their _public_
instructions; then reported what they had done, and obtained the
sanction of the British Government.

Admiral Hope, immediately upon receiving the support of Mr. Bruce,
gathered together his well-armed sailors and marines, his big guns and
his little guns, and, assisted by the French Admiral, Protet, and
Brigadier-general Staveley in command of the British troops, eagerly
continued "taking the offensive" against the badly-armed Ti-pings. The
war upon those to whom England was pledged to observe neutrality--a war
never stated to the British Parliament--and, moreover, a war never even
declared to the Ti-pings themselves, was rapidly prosecuted. General
Staveley having assumed chief command of the allied Anglo-Franco-Manchoo
filibuster operations, did so entirely against the spirit of the orders
of his Government, for not until some months later did the approval of
Admiral Hope's conduct (bearing date, "Foreign Office, June 12, 1862")
reach China, and even these instructions only referred to the _naval
expeditions_, already authorized by the despatch of March 11, 1862.

Mr. Bruce admits this in a despatch to General Staveley, dated "Pekin,
April 23, 1862," although at the same time he prompts him to join the
Admiral's raids. He thus states:--

    "It is clear that, at that date, Her Majesty's Government had
    not resolved on doing more than aiding in the defence of the
    treaty ports by means of the naval forces on the station."

Now, it is utterly impossible that Mr. Bruce can have received the
instructions to _employ_ the naval force so soon as the 23rd of April.
The first despatch of Lord Russell, authorizing Admiral Hope to defend
the treaty ports against the Ti-pings bears date March 11, and has
already been noticed; but even supposing it left England on the same
day, it could not have reached Pekin when Admiral Hope and General
Staveley had taken the offensive, and made incessant attacks upon every
Ti-ping position within some thirty miles of Shanghae. The last
instructions from Earl Russell were those suppositional ones, dated 7th
September, 1861:--

    "It _might_ be expedient to defend the treaty ports, _if_ the
    Chinese Government would consent not to use them."

Referring back to the only definite order of Her Majesty's Government at
the time of the unparalleled breaches of neutrality, we find it to be
that bearing date August 8, 1861:--

    "Her Majesty's Government desire to maintain, as they have done
    hitherto, _neutrality_ between the two contending parties in
    China."

Thus, it cannot fail to be seen that hostilities were established
against the Ti-pings, not only in violation of the pledged faith of
England, but also in direct opposition to the _public_ orders of her
Government. Eventually the Government sanctioned and authorized a
continuance of these raids, although they carefully avoided making any
straightforward announcement of their policy. Their plan was always to
approve the aggressive action of the officials in China, but never to
order them publicly. The despatches approving General Staveley's
unjustifiable attack upon innocent men respectively bear date--"Foreign
Office, July 7, 1862," and "War Office, July 23." These documents,
however, which take the odium and responsibility of the massacres from
the active agents, and place them upon the British nation, could not
have reached Pekin, and been communicated to the naval and military
commanders at Shanghae, until late in September. We shall see what
unauthorized and unnecessary hostilities were perpetrated previous to
their arrival.

General Staveley, having assumed the principal command of the raiding
expeditions, finding that the friendly Ti-pings would not come and fight
him, went to fight them. Upon the 3rd of April a strong force of 2,207
British and French troops, with naval detachments under command of
Admirals Hope and Protet, and thirteen pieces of artillery, moved out
from Shanghae to continue "taking the offensive." The place doomed to
destruction was a large, and for Chinese warfare, strong, entrenched
Ti-ping camp at Wong-ka-dza, garrisoned by about 4,000 men. After a hot
day's march, the whole force, including some hundreds of Imperialists
dragging the guns, carrying portable bridges, extra loads of ammunition,
and every requisite appliance of modern warfare, arrived at a deserted
village within twelve miles from Shanghae, and about two from the
Ti-ping camp. Here they encamped for the night. Early on the following
morning the combined forces,[5] taking advantage of the cover afforded
by a thick mist, moved on the position of the Ti-pings, establishing
themselves within a few hundred yards of the defences just as the fog
cleared away. The entrenched camp consisted of some ten or twelve
stockades, each surrounded by a ditch, yet communicating with the
others. The Ti-pings, as usual, waited for those they invariably looked
upon as "foreign brethren" to take the offensive. They had not long to
wait. Having taken up a position fairly within range of their Enfield
rifles and artillery, but safely out of range of the useless gingalls
and matchlocks of the Ti-pings, the "foreign brethren" opened a
murderous fire upon the line of entrenchments. The devoted defenders
replied as well they could, without artillery or effective fire-arms,
and bravely held their stockades for nearly an hour, amid the storm of
shrapnel-shell, rifle-balls, &c., poured in upon them with terrible
effect. At length the irresistible foreign artillery drove them from the
stockades with heavy loss, and played upon their retreating columns with
deadly accuracy. During the attack and retreat the Ti-pings lost upwards
of 600 killed and wounded (the wounded falling into the hands of the
Imperialists were all put to death), while the allies had _one_ man
killed and another wounded.

Admiral Hope, who grounded his precious _casus belli_ upon the
_possible_ destruction of supplies _by the Ti-pings_, states in his
report of this and the following actions:--

    "All these camps, which contained large quantities of rice
    collected from the surrounding country, were burnt, AND THE
    GRAIN DESTROYED."

A few days before the attack upon Wong-ka-dza, H.M. gunboat _Flamer_
attacked and destroyed a fleet of 300 Ti-ping boats, "_deeply laden with
rice and live stock_." Who, then, proved to be the devastator and
marauder; the uncivilized Chinese, or the civilized Christian? Yet the
principal pretence given for attacking the Ti-pings was that they
_might_ do what Admiral Hope and his colleagues so effectually _did_.

After chasing the fugitives so long as the Enfield would reach them, the
allied force gave up the pursuit, and retired to the village of Che-poo,
where they had rested the previous night. Meanwhile, those who escaped
from this slaughter met with another enemy, in the shape of a strong
contingent of the filibuster Ward's disciplined Chinese. This ally of
Admiral Hope, chagrined at having lost this opportunity, determined to
attack another fortified camp with his own men. The position assigned to
this respectable person during the first engagement was to cut off and
kill the Ti-pings as they fled from the fire of the British and French
artillery. Fortunately for those unoffending people he arrived too late.
When he did honour his worthy friends with his presence, history telleth
not whether they were tired, or engaged looting, or making merry; but
certain it is that they let him make his attack unassisted, except by
Admiral Hope.

This PAR NOBILE, on valorous deeds intent, heedless alike of mud, heat,
and fatigue, marched for several miles by intricate pathways, through
creeks, ditches, and swampy paddy-fields, to the rebel camp near the
village of Lu-ka-kong; and elated, doubtless, by the Admiral's narration
of his chivalrous deeds at Wong-ka-dza, and assured by his loss of only
one man, halted in front of the Ti-ping stockade.

Drawing his mercenary sword, and brushing back the Yankee locks, General
Ward gave the word to assault in a tone of assured victory. The
disciplined Chinamen, led by their foreign officers, rushed forward
bravely enough; but the Ti-pings had not been half destroyed by shot and
shell; neither at that time had they lost their best troops in conflict
with the British and French, nor the moral effect of their former
triumphs. Consequently, after three attempts to storm the stockade, when
five officers and seventy men were placed _hors de combat_, Admiral Hope
advanced to call off the men, and was rewarded with a Ti-ping bullet
lodged in the calf of his leg. Ward, having none of the resistless
artillery to mow down the patriotic Ti-pings, found them more than a
match for his men--disciplined, led by foreigners, and well armed as
they were. A retreat was therefore sounded, and the British Admiral was
ignominiously carried away upon a litter borne by sundry cursing
Celestials.

To avenge the glaring insult and audacity of those rebels who had dared
to deposit a bullet in the calf of a leg of a British Admiral, who was
doing his utmost to kill them, the next morning the allied forces
brought their artillery to bear, and without a single casualty succeeded
in driving the Ti-pings from this and several neighbouring
entrenchments, killing some 300, and burning and destroying the large
quantities of grain, as stated by Admiral Hope. Not only in this
instance, but very many others, the allies acted with far more wanton
destructiveness than ever the Ti-pings did.

The next attack upon the Ti-pings by the gallant allies came off on the
17th of April. Upon this occasion the redoubtable Admiral was unable to
act, in consequence of his injured limb. The place at which the combined
English, French, and mercenaries gathered fresh (Chinese) laurels, was
the village of Che-poo, with its defences, situated about 18 miles S.E.
of Shanghae. The attacking force mustered some 2,500 strong, with 14
pieces of artillery, the whole commanded by General Staveley and Admiral
Protet, assisted by Captain Borlase, R.N., and the filibuster Ward.[6]
These troops were embarked in a flotilla of British and French gunboats,
and carried up the Shanghae river, to cause as much devastation and
bloodshed as they had already created elsewhere.

It was a splendid morning, and the landscape seemed beautiful, as the
troops, after landing in the neighbourhood of Chee-poo, marched forward
on their mission. Through fields rich with the ungathered crops, which
it was pretended the Ti-pings might devastate, over seven or eight miles
of smiling and profusely-cultivated country they wound their way. Upon
arriving within a mile of the village, they halted for their guns to
come up, and rested preparatory to the coming attack.

The guns having arrived, at 2 p.m. were in position, and opened a most
destructive fire at 500 yards, and in half an hour the rebels were in
full retreat. The poor fellows endeavoured to face the overwhelming hail
of shot and shell; and, as one official report states, "returned a
desultory fire, _but without doing any mischief_, while the allies made
dreadful havoc amongst them." Driven from their works by the
irresistible artillery, the Ti-pings retreated in three columns in the
direction of the walled city, Chan-za, when, as the official report
states, "the Royal artillery and naval guns were brought to bear upon
the retreating mass with terrible effect." The loss of the Ti-pings, out
of a total strength of less than 4,000, amounted to more than 600 killed
and 300 taken prisoners, who were, of course, cruelly executed by the
Manchoo mandarins; the allied loss was _nil_!

The Ti-pings had not expected any attack upon that day, and when the
camp was entered, their dinners were found smoking in the cups, while
half-finished letters were lying on the chiefs' table.

The report published in the _Shanghae Daily Shipping List_ states:--

    "As the houses were _ransacked_, great quantities of valuable
    jewels, gold, silver, dollars, and costly dresses were found,
    which was fair (?) _loot_ to the officers and men. One
    blue-jacket found 1,600 dollars, and several soldiers upwards of
    500 each, while many picked up gold bangles, earrings, and other
    ornaments and pearls set with precious stones. _It was a
    glorious day of looting for everybody_, and we hear that one
    party, who discovered the Ti-ping treasury chest with several
    thousand dollars in it, after loading himself to his heart's
    content, was obliged to give some of them away to lighten his
    pockets, which were heavier than he could well bear--a marked
    case of _l'embarras des richesses_. The rebel stud of ponies was
    well supplied also, and many of the soldiers rode back with
    their booty."

All this _looting_ and butchery of unresisting men (it would be absurd
to term the defence of the Ti-pings, resulting in one Englishman
wounded, but hundreds of themselves killed--a resistance according to
military _parlance_) was executed, we must particularly remember,
because their cause, which had for its sole object expulsion of the
foreign Manchoo and establishment of Christianity, _might_ interfere
with British commercial interests, and that "temporary one arising out
of the indemnities!"

The _Shanghae Daily Shipping List_, just quoted from, was the paid
official organ of the British Government, and when it stated the above,
it may easily be imagined what the disgraceful scene really was. This
journal, under a variety of style and title, has been repeatedly quoted
in the Blue Books upon China, issued by Her Majesty's Government, as the
opinion of the press in China. Its truthfulness may fairly be estimated
from the following comparison of a statement which appeared in its
columns upon the massacre at Wong-ka-dza, and another upon the one at
Che-poo. Both places are situated in the same tract of country, and only
a few miles apart. In its detail of the first affair, the official
organ, speaking of the slaughter of the Ti-pings, terms it:--

    "A just retaliation on those wretches who had made their smiling
    land _a scene of misery and desolation_."

Reporting the second affair, it states:--

    "_The aspect of the country looked charming_, as the expedition
    threaded its way among _cultivated fields covered with the green
    crops_ sown by the industrious inhabitants."

Like all other unscrupulous sources of opposition to the revolutionists,
the _Shanghae Daily Shipping List_ is sufficiently condemned by its own
words. It needeth not a partizan to advocate Ti-pingdom; any person not
blinded by prejudice or dollars, and who will take the trouble to study
both sides of the question with proverbial English fair-play, cannot
fail to become favourably interested in the insurgents, simply through
the rabid diatribes which prove the bigotry of opponents and the
inadvertent contradictions which prove their falseness.

In order to avoid quarrelling about the plunder, General Staveley and
the Admirals entered into the following agreement with regard to the
future freebooting exploits. Immediately after the heavily laden heroes,
sailors, soldiers, marines, and all had deposited their _loot_ in safe
quarters, the triumviri, in solemn conclave, assembled upon the 22nd of
April, and made the following formal regulations:--

    "Previous to the capture of Kah-ding and the other towns from
    the rebels, proper arrangements shall be made ... to collect
    whatever may be of value, in order to its fair distribution
    amongst the troops, to whom the same is to be made known before
    the commencement of the operations."

Eager to try the merit of their regulated loot hunting, on the 27th of
April, the allies again set forth to attack the Ti-pings. Upon this
occasion their looting propensities were indulged in at the town of
Kah-ding, situate about 30 miles to the N.W. of Shanghae. The allied
force consisted of nearly 4,000 men, with 30 pieces of artillery,[7]
assisted by an army of Imperialist _braves_, under the command of Le, a
Chinese general.

The advance guard of the allies having been arrested by two small
stockades, defending the water approach to Kah-ding, upon the morning of
the 29th, the artillery was brought into play and the defenders of the
outwork driven back upon the city, losing some 50 men during their
resistance and retreat, the European enemy following in rapid pursuit up
to the walls of Kah-ding without a single casualty.

The last day of April was spent by the allies in reconnoitering the city
and landing the heavy guns, which had been brought in boats from
Shanghae. Before dawn on the morning of May the 1st, the whole of the
guns were in position, and the troops safely under cover in the ruined
suburbs, ready to pick off the defenceless Ti-pings with their
far-reaching rifles. The country traversed during the preceding days is
thus spoken of in the _China Mail_, a paper bitterly hostile to the
insurgents:--

    "After marching along a good road, and through _a beautiful
    country with fine thriving crops_, the troops reached the
    southern suburb of Kah-ding."

Daylight of the 1st of charming May was ushered in by the roar of a
large park of foreign artillery. Kah-ding, although a walled town, was
undefended with cannon, and its garrison of some 5,000 or 6,000 men
were, for the most part, armed with bamboo spears. The European troops
having invested three of the city gates, the fourth, the only way of
retreat for the besieged, was watched by the Imperialist _braves_,
commissioned to cut up the Ti-pings as they fled from the British and
French artillery. To the concentrated and terrific fire of thirty pieces
of large ordnance, the defenders of the city replied with a brisk though
totally ineffective discharge of gingalls. The storm of iron poured upon
them soon silenced their fire and drove them from the walls, and with a
loss of several hundred, they fled from the town, cutting their way
through the Imperialist troops, who watched their only line of retreat.
In order to delay the storming of the city, and so afford time for its
evacuation, a small body of the Ti-ping soldierly nobly remained and
sacrificed themselves for their comrades. This devoted band, numbering
about 130, held their post at the south gate, the principal point of
attack, until the European stormers were on the walls, three little
2-pound Chinese guns on the gate tower having been worked till the
parapet, overthrown by the crushing fire of the siege train, fell upon
and buried the gunners beneath the _debris_.

Driven back by the overwhelming advance of the storming party, the
heroic few retired to the north gate, through which the garrison had
made their escape; here to a man they fell, while courageously placing
themselves between the foe and their retreating comrades. The greater
number of them were mere boys, and from the richness of their dress,
evidently of good position among their friends. Three little fellows,
each armed with a small matchlock, were seen by a friend of mine to rush
forward directly a large shell would knock down a portion of the parapet
and fire off their puny weapons at the foe. They were too small to reach
the loop-holes, and so waited till the 32-pound shot of the besiegers
made a hole for them to use. To avoid the deadly rifles they never used
the same hole twice, but nevertheless were all killed, for my friend,
when passing round the walls, found their bodies lying close together
and crushed by a mass of fallen stonework.

The _China Mail_, in its account of the assault, states:--

    "The scene was now most picturesque. A shell had set fire to
    part of the city close at hand; the early morning sun was
    shining pleasantly upon the fields, _rich with ungathered
    crops_, and the French band played as the troops scaled the
    walls."

The loss of the Ti-pings at the capture of Kah-ding was nearly 500
killed in the city; 2,000 slaughtered while escaping from the murderous
artillery, by the Manchoo troops under Le, who had the bodies mutilated,
and offered to produce their ears to General Staveley; and about 1,000
taken prisoners, who, although captured by the assistance of British
soldiers, perished in the Manchoo execution shambles.

The stolen property agreement proved very useful at the capture of
Kan-ding, nearly 200,000 dollars' worth having been seized in that city
without the loss of a single life to the brave allies.

The _China Mail_, in its issue, "15th May, 1862," although mistakenly
considering the Ti-ping revenue (obtained from taxation, silk, &c.) as
"the poor people's property," very rightly condemns the wholesale system
of brigandage practised by the allies. After referring to the
"mercenary" and "sordid" nature of the intervention, it states:--

    "There is another matter of regret, and that is, that while we
    are stigmatizing the rebels as robbers and bandits, we should
    take their treasures and divide it among ourselves."

Again it continues:--

    "It would be difficult to say which are the more shameless
    robbers of the two, the Taepings who spoil the people, or the
    English forces who retake the spoil and share it among
    themselves, while those originally robbed are famishing in
    Shanghae. It may well be questioned whether the whole history of
    warfare can record a parallel example of forgetfulness, utter
    forgetfulness, of all propriety to this loot-hunting game which
    Admiral Hope is now engaged in. An expedition against the rebels
    is now shown to be so harmless to those engaged in it that we
    may expect to hear of gentlemen giving their wives and sisters a
    picnic in front of the next town that is besieged, when we have
    no doubt that much amusement could be had among the engineers
    and artillery by allowing the girls to point the guns. And this
    is the sort of warfare in which the heart of the jaded and
    harassed soldier is to be cheered with _loot_!... There is every
    reason to believe that England's chivalry is likely to be kept a
    profound secret from the people of China so long as her affairs
    are under the present guidance."

Such is the opinion of a journal always hostile to the Ti-pings.

Having loaded their boats with plunder, and placed a garrison of some
500 European troops in Kah-ding, the British and French warriors
returned to Shanghae and vain-gloriously displayed their evilly acquired
riches about the rum-shops of that model settlement, while their worthy
allies, the _braves_, made a gallant and triumphant entry, with
trophies of Ti-ping heads, cruelly hacked from the men vanquished by
British and French artillery. When these heads became unpleasant to
parade about the foreign settlement, and the _loot_ became exhausted, or
the allied commanders eager for more, the combined forces were mustered
together for another desolating raid into a country that would have been
happy and peaceful but for their wicked interference.

The city of Tsing-poo, situated close upon 32 miles to the west of
Shanghae, although falsely represented by officialdom as "in the
neighbourhood," was next selected for sack and pillage.

Starting from Shanghae in British gunboats (which, by the by, always
returned towing long tiers of loot laden boats) upon the 7th of May, the
expedition, after being placed in country boats about twenty miles up
the river, arrived before Tsing-poo on the evening of the second day.

General Staveley was Commander-in-chief, assisted by the French Admiral,
while the English Admiral, in spite of his wound, was present as an
admiring non-effective.

The combined force comprised 2,613 British and French troops, with
nearly forty pieces of artillery; about 1,800 of Ward's filibusters; and
an Imperialist army of 5,000 to 7,000 men, under their general, Le.[8]
Tsing-poo was garrisoned by some 4,000 Ti-pings, very few of whom
escaped.

Before daylight on the 12th of May, the besieging forces, with guns and
ladders, covering and storming parties, were in position. They moved up
silently in the dead of night and early morning, and were in their
places by 4 a.m. Then came a short half-hour of the peculiar suspense
before battle, while all those valiant British and French well-armed
troops lay flat on their faces, safely under cover, and breathing not a
word, for fear the doomed Ti-pings _might_ by a singular piece of good
fortune manage to hurt some of them. By this time, however, the warm
summer day was dawning, and the beleaguered garrison, discovering the
formidable array against them, opened fire with the few small guns they
possessed, sending their uneven roundshot whizzing over the heads of the
crouching enemy.

Almost at the same moment the besiegers opened fire from their numerous
and overwhelming artillery. Armstrong guns, naval 32-pounders, French
rifled guns and mortars (with one French 68-pounder, rifled piece,
mounted on board a light draught gunboat) in breaching and enfilading
batteries, commenced a terrific bombardment of the south gate and wall.

The city, during the night, had been surrounded by the Chinese _braves_;
no hope of escape presented itself, and the besieged fought as desperate
men will fight for their lives. Amid the torrent of shells, shrapnel,
Moorsom, conical, diaphragm, Armstrong, and other scientific engines of
destruction crashing and continuously exploding among them, they bravely
stood to their four or five 2-pounders, and resolutely manned their
walls under the fearful and murderous fire. The poor Ti-pings, in order
to protect themselves from the irresistible foreign shell, or "twice eye
shot," as the Cantonese in their _pidgeon_ English term it, had built a
sort of stockade all round the city wall; this, with the parapet, formed
a passage, which was covered in with a beamed and tiled roof. Instead of
affording safety to them, however, this work added to the
destructiveness of the enemy's fire, though it would have been better
for the doomed men to have been killed outright by British shot than be
captured and tortured to death in the execution grounds of the Manchoos.
A battery of four Armstrong guns enfilading the wall sent almost every
shell through the roof, to burst between the parapet and stockade,
thereby inflicting fearful havoc among the crowded defenders.

After about an hour's bombardment, two practicable breaches were
effected by the besiegers; the English and French storming parties then
advanced, protected by strong covering parties, who kept up a deadly
rifle fire on the besieged, while the field-pieces being dragged forward
enfiladed the parapet and breaches, mowing them down by dozens as they
courageously crowded behind their broken wall to repel the stormers. The
two snake flags of the Chief were planted on the summit of the breach,
while his bravest men surrounding him did their utmost to drive the
assaulting column back. The carnage at this point was immense; the
defenders no sooner rushed into view than withering volleys of musketry
and a storm of grape and canister destroyed them. The principal Ti-ping
chiefs were killed at the head of their men; still, a smart fire from
jingalls was kept up till the stormers gained the top of the breach and
effected a lodgement; and then, it is sufficient to say, the defenders
were attacked with the British bayonet. Even when driven from the wall,
several hundred of the Ti-ping soldiery rallied at its foot, and
fruitlessly sacrificed themselves in attempting to expel the successful
enemy.

The Ti-pings lost upwards of 1,000 men in their obstinate defence, the
Allies 2 killed and 10 wounded! About 2,000 were taken prisoners, the
greater part of whom supplied the Shanghae execution ground, while the
remnant of the garrison succeeded in cutting their way through the
hostile lines. Not more than half of the prisoners were fighting men.

Whether the most Christian and civilized allies had not obtained
sufficient loot, or killed enough fellow-creatures to satisfy them, I am
unable safely to state, but I opine that in neither particular were they
satiated. At all events, after sacking Tsing-poo and delivering up their
unfortunate captives to the tender mercies of the merciless
Imperialists, General Staveley and his co-adjutors started off in quest
of further glory, dollars, and Ti-pings. These noble crusaders at
length came to the fortified village of Na-jaor, where one of the
_triumviri_ met with his death.

Na-jaor was simply a village, but a wall having been built around it, a
small outwork erected, and the whole surrounded by <DW18>s and dry
ditches, with _chevaux de frize_ and pallisades between them, it would
have been a difficult place to capture without artillery. The outwork
mounted three small guns, and a few others were divided between the
usual square flanking defences of a Chinese wall. The garrison of this
place can scarcely have numbered 1,000, all told.

The Armstrong guns and other artillery of the British and French opened
fire and shelled the defenders out of the small redoubt, upon the
afternoon of the 17th of May. While this was going on the garrison of
the village made a spirited sortie, but, with only an armament of bamboo
spears and rusty jingalls, were of course driven back with great loss.
At last the fire of the besieged seemed silenced, while their wall was
breached and crumbling in every direction. The stormers now rushed
forward with their usual bravery, sword in hand and bayonet to the
charge, to assault a Ti-ping post that had been thoroughly shelled for a
couple of hours, and in which nought but a few frightened fugitives and
the bodies of the slain were likely to be found. In the case of Na-jaor,
however, there was more courage required than the attacking force
imagined, for, instead of finding the walls deserted except by the
killed and wounded, and the garrison in flight, they were suddenly faced
by an ambuscade which had been concealed under comparative protection at
the interior <DW72> of the wall during the bombardment. The British and
French were rushing forward at the double, their leading files had
already reached the ditch at the foot of the rampart, when the Ti-pings,
starting from their cover, remanned the walls and opened a sharp fire
with jingalls, matchlocks, and the few European-made fire-arms which
they possessed. Cheering vigorously, or rather yelling, the defenders
maintained a well-directed fire for some little time, killing the French
Admiral with a ball through his heart, and wounding about a dozen other
of the assailants. The allies experienced a momentary check, but the
whole resistless array of artillery having swept the walls with their
iron tempest, the storming parties again rushed forward and succeeded in
establishing themselves upon the walls before the defenders were able to
re-man them. Then the work of slaughter was continued with the rifle,
the unwieldy bamboos, with iron spikes at the ends, proving a worse than
useless defence.

Mercy seems never to have entered into the minds of those Christian
warriors, who loudly inveighed against the Ti-pings as "bloodthirsty
monsters," &c., &c.; for when victory crowned their unparalleled feats
of arms, no effort to save the defenceless and unresisting fugitives was
ever made, but while those who had thrown down their arms were vainly
trying to hide or flee from the deadly rifle, or stood blocked in a
gateway of the tower, the valorous conquerors calmly and easily
continued to shoot them down so long as they remained within range.

The total loss of the Allies at the capture of Na-jaor was, the French
Admiral killed, and sixteen men wounded. The Ti-pings left dead at their
posts, which they had _really_ bravely though fruitlessly striven to
defend, upwards of 500 men, more than half their whole force. Directly
the place was fairly in their possession the respectable victors
dispersed in search of plunder; as one report has it, "looting parties
were formed, the French looting one half and the English the other."

The ill-gained spoil having been stowed away in the boats, the Allies
marched on for the next Ti-ping position devoted to destruction, leaving
a strong detachment in charge of Na-jaor. The place which had now
attracted the cupidity, love of military _glory_, or some unknown
sentiment of the Allies, was a small town named Cho-lin, situated about
six miles from Na-jaor, 26 miles to the S.S.W. of Shanghae, and within
two miles of the sea.

Having arrived before Cho-lin during the night of May 18, the Allies
began to establish their powerful batteries, and on the morning of the
19th opened fire upon the town. The Ti-pings in garrison, some 2,000 or
3,000 strong, replied to the best of their resources with a few pieces
of immoveable Chinese artillery, jingalls, and matchlocks. At noon the
besiegers ceased firing and refreshed themselves with _chow-chow_ and
brandy. Meanwhile, a Ti-ping chief performed an act of the most daring
courage with remarkable coolness and audacity. Having observed the
occupation of the besiegers, this chief, leaving the town by the
opposite side, made a circuit, and coming upon the rear of the enemy's
position, calmly rode right through it with a few followers, satisfying
himself as to their composition and numbers. "Everyone took him for an
Imperialist and allowed him to pass on. When he got near the town he
rode for his life, and got to his friends inside the city." So reported
one of the officers engaged in the attack. Undaunted by the powerful
artillery and formidable array of the European troops, the Ti-ping chief
determined to hold and defend his trust against them, even although he
must have been convinced that he had no effectual means by which he
could repel or reply to their attack. The day passed on and with it the
last hope of the beleaguered garrison, who scorned to take advantage of
the opportunity to evacuate the town and save their lives.

At daylight on the 20th all the Allies' guns, being in position, opened
fire again, the Armstrong guns and field pieces sweeping the defenders
from the walls, and the hoarsely-roaring 32's steadily firing to effect
a breach. Storming, covering, and sharpshooting parties waited around
the devoted place until the murderous shelling should subdue all
opposition to their heroic advance. At length, two practicable breaches
were effected, the enfilading batteries, established on either flank,
poured their crushing _mitraille_ along the parapet, sweeping away every
man who dared to show himself, and the assaulting column pushed forward
to the breaches. The Ti-pings had in this case been able to maintain a
small number of troops on the wall by means of some ingeniously
contrived bomb-proofs. A few narrow pits were dug behind the parapet and
covered in with planks overlaid with earth, under which some hundred or
two found shelter. When the artillery ceased its fire as the stormers
mounted the breach, these men made a desperate defence, while the rest
of the garrison, emerging from their places of concealment, rushed to
man the walls and assist them. But what could these miserably armed men
effect against the hundreds of perfectly equipped Europeans pouring over
their shattered walls? They fell bravely, disputing every inch of
ground.

The defenders driven from the ramparts or killed, the gallant Allies
rushed through the small town, _indiscriminately massacring every man,
woman, and child within its walls_. The Ti-pings had so earnestly
endeavoured to shut out the besiegers that they had most effectually
blocked themselves in, and were consequently butchered almost to a man.
After the massacre was over, an officer of the force, writing to the
_North China Herald_, stated, "Almost every house we entered contained
dead and dying men."

The _China Mail_, in its report of the affair, terms it: "A most
indiscriminate carnage on the part of our Allies at the taking of
Cho-lin." The _Overland Trade Report_, in its issue of June 10,
states:--

    "Since the death of Admiral Protet the French troops have been
    behaving like fiends, killing indiscriminately men, women, and
    children. Truth demands the confession that British sailors have
    likewise been guilty of the commission of similar revolting
    barbarities--not only on the Taepings, but upon the inoffensive
    helpless country people. It is a most singular circumstance, but
    no less strange than true, that the Taepings _have never yet
    committed an act of retaliation_ upon any European who may have
    fallen into their hands."

Cho-lin captured and the _loot_ safely packed up, the conquerors, who
only lost _one_ killed and four slightly wounded, proceeded to destroy
the town itself.

The correspondent of the _North China Herald_, in his report, says:--

    "At two o'clock the order was given to set the city on fire,
    which was executed with such rapidity that the Sikhs had hardly
    time to get the ponies out of the town, and most of the last
    collected had to be abandoned."

The poor horses were admittedly roasted alive; but, when the writer goes
on to state "a great many dead bodies" were left in the fired city, he
forgets the wounded and "dying men" whom he found in "almost every
house," and who no doubt perished in the flames.

With the destruction of Cho-lin the murderous and desolating track of
the British and French was for a time arrested. Hitherto, without
exception, they had, in Mohawk Indian style, surprised and captured
isolated towns and villages. Nothing but the garrisons of these places
had opposed them. Upon the day of their last exploit, however,
intelligence reached General Staveley that the Chung-wang, with a large
army, had taken the field against him, and that Kah-ding was already
invested, Tsing-poo threatened, and the Imperialist troops everywhere
flying like chaff before the stormy wind. Hastily returning to Shanghae,
the authenticity of these reports was at once confirmed by the abject
state of terror in which the Manchoo authorities were plunged. It
appeared that, during General Staveley's laurel-gathering exploits,
nearly the whole available force of Imperialist troops had been
concentrated upon Kah-ding, and, having moved upon the next Ti-ping
city, Tat-seang, had been there totally defeated; the fugitives, a few
hundred out of an army nearly 20,000 strong, having been chased about
thirty miles, and into the village of Woo-sung under the protection of
the Allies' artillery.

In consequence of this, and the inability of the Manchoo authorities to
even garrison the places captured from the patriots by the allied
forces, General Staveley proceeded to the relief of Kah-ding with a
strong force of British troops. Upon reaching the village of Na-zain, a
few miles from the city, they were continually attacked by the Ti-ping
force investing it. In all these attacks, however, the assailants were
driven back by rifle and artillery fire with heavy loss, the English
losing but _one_ Sepoy killed and four wounded. It now appearing that
the Ti-pings were in the field in force, that the communications of
Kah-ding were in their hands, and that the towns of Tsing-poo and
Soon-kong were also invested, General Staveley decided upon evacuating
Kah-ding; and, pending the arrival of reinforcements, discontinuing his
raids upon the Ti-ping strongholds.

We must now for a while turn to other quarters, and record the
performance of another act of the Ti-ping drama. While the allied forces
were violating their pledges, their orders, and the ordinary laws and
usages of civilized or Christian men, the Ti-pings at Ningpo, as
everywhere else, were scrupulously observing all their promises, and
striving to enter into friendly and commercial relations with
foreigners.

It will be remembered that the withdrawal of British missionaries from
Ningpo, upon the capture of that city by the Ti-pings, has already been
noticed; also Mr. Consul Harvey's sinister reason: "This step will tend
to simplify considerably our future relations with the Taepings at
Ningpo." We will now proceed to notice what those "future relations"
were.

Mr. Consul Harvey having been requested by Mr. Bruce to report upon the
character of the Ti-pings, and having been prompted even in the _public_
despatches, forthwith indulged his feelings of hostility against those
people. It is desirable to notice some of the more salient and
characteristic features of the despatch of Mr. Harvey as briefly as
possible.

The despatch containing Mr. Harvey's exposition bears date March 20th,
1862, some three months after the occupation of Ningpo by the Ti-pings,
and _after_ hostilities had been established against them by Admiral
Hope and his friends.

Mr. Harvey states:--

    "_Not one single step_[9] in the direction of a 'good
    government' has been taken by the Taepings; _not any attempt_
    made to organize a political body or commercial institutions;
    _not a vestige, not a trace of anything_ approaching to order,
    or regularity of action, or consistency of purpose, can be found
    in any one of their public acts."

In a despatch dated "Ningpo, December 31, 1861," he had stated as
follows:--

    "They _have_ even established a native custom-house, wherein
    duties will be levied on the Chinese after ten days' grace....
    It has been reported to me that the insurgents propose
    establishing a foreign custom-house at this port, such being, it
    is said, one of their favourite ideas, and forming part of their
    programme in the capture of Ningpo."

And again--

    "The Taepings possess a regular embodied force, a draft from
    which forms the nucleus of the body of men sent upon any special
    service."

Mr. Harvey, with an extraordinary self-complacent assumption of
impartiality, proceeds to declare that he "judged of Taepingdom in sober
sense and dispassionately," yet he concludes the same paragraph by
stating that at Ningpo "the last three months had produced ruin,
desolation, and the annihilation of _every_ vital principle in _all_
that surrounds the presence, or lies under the bane, of the Taepings."
Again, only a few lines further on, he says:--

    "It is palpable that a party which, after ten years' full trial,
    is found to produce _nothing_, and to destroy _everything_,
    cannot pretend to last, or be admitted, even indirectly, into
    the comity of nations."


Now, as Mr. Bruce himself reports that "85,000 bales of silk" were
obtained from people who "destroy everything," and as the Ti-pings did
"pretend to last"--so much so, indeed, that British and French
assistance to the Manchoos was necessary to save them from total
destruction, Mr. Harvey's "sober sense," to say the least, seems very
doubtful.

The despatch under review is one of the most extraordinary series of
contradictory terms ever produced, and really deserves a place in the
British Museum or some old curiosity shop, as the "sober" creation of a
person who takes remarkable care to assure his readers that he is
perfectly "unbiassed." Within half a dozen lines of the last quoted
passage Mr. Harvey audaciously protests:--"I repeat I have no bias one
way or the other...." He then proceeds to state:--

    "I have found in official dealings with them" (the Ti-ping
    chiefs) "_a rough and blunt sort of honesty quite unexpected and
    surprising_, after years of public intercourse with the Imperial
    mandarins."

Now, in the very next paragraph he speaks of them as--

    "The naturally suspicious Taepings, who, amongst other
    peculiarities, _possess a power of concealment and general
    secresy quite wonderful_ to meet in China."

Mr. Harvey attempts to prove the plundering propensities of the Ti-ping
soldiery by the following invention:--

    "On questioning decently-dressed Taeping soldiers as to how they
    liked their profession, the reply has ever been the following:--

    "'Why should I not like it? I help myself to everything I choose
    to lay hands upon; and if interfered with, I just cut the man's
    head off who so interferes.'"

By the side of this we will just place Mr. Hewlett's report to Consul
Harvey of his embassy to the Ti-pings at Yu-yaou, upon their advance to
Ningpo:--

    "We saw but few dead bodies about, and of those some were their
    own men _who had been caught plundering and burning_."

Endeavouring to vilify the social _regime_ of the Christian patriots,
Mr. Harvey trusts to his inventive genius again, and writes:--

    "Your Excellency is doubtless aware that marriage is strictly
    forbidden amongst the Taepings, and forms, with opium-smoking, a
    capital offence."

Now, Mr. Harvey makes this false assertion in face of the "Proclamation
by Tien-wang, establishing a scale according to which the number of
wives are to be regulated in all ranks," as published in 1862, at page
45, Blue Book upon "The Rebellion in China," and which commences--

    "Formerly I made a decree as to the canon of marriages...."

This unbiassed official winds up his sober and dispassionate effusion
with a few equally temperate conclusions. For example--

    "I now, therefore, take the liberty of declaring, once for all
    (_and for ten years I have firmly adhered to, and been
    consistent in, this opinion_), that the Taeping rebellion is the
    greatest delusion as a political or popular movement, and the
    Taeping doctrines the most gigantic and blasphemous imposition
    as a creed, or ethics, that the world ever witnessed.... There
    is nothing in past records so dark or so bad; such abominations
    committed under the name of religion; such mock-heroic
    buffoonery; such horrors accompanied by pantaloonery; and so
    much flimsy web worked in the midst of blood and high tragical
    events."

If the "ten years" of obstinate adhesion to an opinion formed before
anything was known of the Ti-pings, is Mr. Harvey's idea of "sober
sense" and "no bias" (and he declares it is), we can easily believe that
the "dispassionate" ruminations of so long a period destroyed what
little reason and religion he may at one time have possessed. His
partizanship even lays him open to the charge with which he has so
falsely accused the Ti-pings when stating that their doctrines were "the
most gigantic and blasphemous imposition," &c.; inasmuch as the Ti-ping
doctrines are taken from our Bible, are in all essential particulars
precisely similar to our own, and alone constitute their "creed, or
ethics."

Mr. Harvey terms himself "a sensible and reasoning Englishman," and
proceeds to declare the revolution--

    "A sanguinary raid, and an extended brigandage over the country,
    burning, destroying, _and killing_ EVERYTHING _that has life in
    it_."

In a surprising manner, after a few sentences, he brings the dead to
life:--

    "They come, and the helpless inhabitants crouch down and submit.
    They (the Taepings) go, and the people breathe again and
    rejoice."

"Tel maitre, tel valet," it is said, and Mr. Harvey seems to have
likened into Mr. Bruce amazingly. Mr. Bruce has stated, "every locality
is totally destroyed by the Ti-pings." Mr. Harvey chimes in with the
above, "killing everything," and "not a vestige" diatribes. Mr. Bruce,
in a despatch dated "Pekin, April 10, 1862," inclosing Mr. Harvey's
precious production to Earl Russell, states with regard to the
Ti-pings:--

    "NO commerce can co-exist with their presence, and NO specific
    relations are possible with a horde of pirates and brigands, who
    are allowed to commit every excess, while professing a nominal
    allegiance to an ignorant and ferocious fanatic."

Again, in a despatch dated "Pekin, April 18, 1862," Mr. Bruce states
that their presence in any district is "accompanied by the _utter_
destruction of the materials of trade."

Singularly enough, General Staveley, although chief leader of the
massacres of Ti-pings, in a despatch to the Secretary of State for War,
dated "Shanghae, July 3, 1862," entirely and absolutely contradicts the
imaginary devastations of Mr. Bruce and his Consul by the following
statement:--

    "Europeans continue to visit the rebel country _for purposes of
    trade_, and are treated with civility; _large quantities of
    silk_ have been brought into Shanghae during the last fortnight,
    _and trade seems in a thriving state_."[10]


Mr. Harvey concludes his judgment passed in "sober sense and
dispassionately" by the following words:--

    "Your Excellency may rest assured that we shall only arrive at a
    correct appreciation of this movement, and do it thorough
    justice, when it is treated by us as land piracy on an extensive
    scale--piracy odious in the eyes of _all_ men--and, as such, to
    be swept off the face of the earth by _every means_ within the
    power of the Christian and civilized nations trading with this
    vast empire."

Such are the avowed sentiments of the man who protests that he has "no
bias" or prejudice.

Although the occupation of Ningpo by the Ti-pings actually increased the
export trade, and although even Mr. Consul Harvey admitted that it was
captured and held with "wonderful moderation;" still, when hostilities
had become established by Admiral Hope and General Staveley, it was
impossible either their designs could succeed while Ningpo was in
Ti-ping possession, or the anomalous policy of holding Shanghae, and not
Ningpo, be continued. Consequently, both to stop the supplies and
munitions the Ti-pings obtained at the port, and to follow out the
hostile policy settled upon, the British authorities determined upon
driving them out of Ningpo on the first opportunity. As the scrupulous
good conduct and friendliness of the revolutionists afforded no cause of
hostility, it became necessary to invent one. How this was effected the
following account will show.

One day (the 22nd April, 1862), while giving a salute upon the return of
the General Fang from Nankin, several shots appear to have been fired by
some Ti-pings in the direction of the foreign settlement. It was
thereupon _reported_ that these shots had killed a Chinaman or two in
that location. This, however, seems very doubtful. At all events, the
affair was immediately taken up by Captain Cragie, of H.M.S. _Ringdove_,
who wrote to the Chiefs upon the subject, and received a completely
satisfactory answer, stating--

    "I beg to assure you that, as soon as I have discovered the
    offenders, I will punish them very severely. I hope, then, that
    you will think no more about the matter."[11]

Upon the 26th of April Captain R. Dew, with H.M.S. _Encounter_, arrived
at Ningpo from Shanghae, having been ordered there by Admiral Hope.
Judging by the conduct of the Admiral at that time, and by the whole
circumstances of the war upon the Ti-pings, it becomes morally certain
that Captain Dew was dispatched with the reinforcement to Ningpo on
purpose to drive them out. The day after his arrival (27th April, dates
are important), Captain Dew wrote as follows to the Ti-ping generals in
command of the city:--


    "_Encounter_, Ningpo, April 27, 1862.

    "Sir,--We have received from Commander Cragie your communication
    regarding the _accidental_ discharge of bullets whilst firing a
    salute ... as well as the communication from General Hwang. Both
    these are _so satisfactory_, and tend so much to impress on us
    your wish to maintain friendly relations with the English and
    French, that we beg to inform you _that we shall not insist on
    the demolition of the battery at the point_,[12] but we still do
    that you remove the guns....

    "We again inform you that it is the earnest wish of our Chiefs
    to remain neutral[13] and on good terms with you at Ningpo. Till
    the late acts, they had every reason to be satisfied with your
    conduct, and you may rest assured that no breach of friendly
    relations shall emanate from our side....

    "(Signed) R. DEW."

As Colonel Sykes, M.P., has very justly observed in his work, "The
Ti-ping Rebellion in China," incredible as it may appear, the very day
after the above letter was sent, which condoned all previous offences,
and which expressed the most earnest wish to remain on friendly terms,
Captain Dew, in oblivion of his promises, addressed the following letter
to the Generals:--


    "_Encounter_, Ningpo, April 28, 1862.

    "Sir,--" (After mentioning the firing of musket balls during the
    salute, he continues) "I have been sent here _with a
    considerable force to demand apology_.... Having consulted with
    the officers here in command, I have come to the conclusion that
    the foreign settlement is now being seriously menaced by a large
    battery in course of construction at a point outside the city
    wall ... _so I have to request that you will cause it to be
    immediately pulled down_, and that all guns now mounted on the
    walls opposite our settlement, be removed as well. I am
    requested by my Admiral to inform you that it would grieve him
    much[14] to be obliged, by the hostile acts of your people, to
    come into collision with them. He will be very sorry to resort
    to force (?), as he has not the intention or wish to interfere
    with the Imperialists and yourself at Ningpo, and if the former
    should attack the city, _we should be entirely neutral, and will
    not even allow the foreign settlement to harbour the
    Imperialists_." (After threatening to destroy the battery and
    capture Ningpo if the guns and fortifications were not removed
    in "twenty-four hours," Captain Dew concludes with the following
    passage:)

    "When these, my _reasonable_ (?) demands, have been carried into
    effect, I beg you will report them...."

    "I have, &c.,
    "(Signed) R. DEW."

It is to be remembered that Captain Dew had received and accepted the
"apology" on the 27th, and had replied by stating, "we shall _not_
insist on the demolition of the battery." The renewal of the demands
which had been formally abandoned on the previous day convinced the
Ti-ping generals that Captain Dew was determined to quarrel with them.
That officer knew perfectly well, as Colonel Sykes has forcibly
expressed it, "that no human being with an ounce of militant blood in
his veins would comply with such insulting demands."

The Ti-ping generals, ever forbearing, and always truly earnest in their
efforts to obtain the goodwill and friendship of the "foreign brethren,"
made the following admirable reply to Captain Dew's grossly offensive
despatch, and its readers will find every word truth and sound
reason:--

    (Precis.)

    "Hwang, General, &c., Pang, General, &c., in official
    communication with Captain R. Dew, R.N., H.M.S. _Encounter_:--In
    reply to your letter requesting the removal of the battery and
    guns, we would remark that ever since the capture of Ningpo,
    both parties have been on most friendly and intimate terms. No
    suspicions or dislikes; _we have done everything in our power to
    protect your trade, and kept good faith in every respect_; have
    always inquired into complaints made to us of our soldiers, and
    even beheaded some men who broke into a foreign hong; _have
    wished to keep a lasting peace with you, and have done all in
    our power to that end_.

    "The discharge of bullets in firing the salute the other day was
    _quite accidental_;--have already taken steps towards punishing
    offenders. With regard to the erection of a fort at the point,
    _it is a precautionary measure that a proper regard for the
    lives of our soldiers renders indispensable, and has nothing
    whatever to do with foreigners_, as has been already stated to
    Captain Montgomerie. It is now completed, and we cannot assent
    to its removal; so also we cannot agree to the removal of the
    guns from the walls. We have continually esteemed good faith and
    right....

    "With good faith and right feeling as the alpha and omega of
    one's conduct, each party can afford to put up with one or two
    trifling matters. With regard to that part of your letter having
    reference to a probable outbreak of hostilities (we would inform
    you) that we are not in the least concerned thereat [_lit._, we
    are not apprehensive, nor do we take offence thereat]; _we could
    not bear to break the oaths of friendship we have sworn_. We
    cannot remove the fort or the guns; should you proceed
    yourselves to move the same, then it is evident that you have
    the intention of quarrelling with us. You can, if you please,
    lead on your soldiers against this city; you can, if you please,
    attack us; _we shall stand quietly on the defensive_ [_lit._, we
    shall await the battle with hand in the cuff, _i.e._, we shall
    not strike the first blow].... You still wish to be on friendly
    terms with us; let, then, these dislikes and suspicions be
    committed to the deep.... In any large army good or bad are to
    be found; do not, therefore, let a small matter like this
    occasion a breach of such a grand principle as amity. Good
    fellowship would request you to give our argument your very best
    consideration."

The remainder of the despatch is irrelevant to the subject of the
correspondence. It was received 29th April, 1862. If the Ti-pings had
acted rather as angels than men, their rights would not have been
respected. Captain Dew, neither satisfied by their arguments nor
conciliated by their tone, addressed to them the following cartel:--

    "_Encounter_, Ningpo, May 2, 1862.

    "SIR,--We have the honour to inform you that your letter of the
    29th ult., in reply to my demands for the insults offered to the
    French and English flags, and in which you refuse to comply with
    those very moderate demands,[15] have been forwarded to our
    admirals. In the mean time, pending the decision of our chiefs,
    I have moored the foreign ships two miles down the river, and
    cut off communication with the city, and am, moreover, ordered
    by our chiefs, in the event of the following demands not being
    complied with, to prepare to blockade Ching-hae, and prevent all
    foreign ships entering the river:--1. _An ample apology._ 2.
    Removal of all guns from battery and walls opposite our ships.
    3. That an officer shall be specially appointed, and that proper
    measures, by means of guards, shall be taken to prevent anybody
    whatever coming on the wall opposite the ships or into the
    battery.--I have, &c.,

    "(Signed)      R. DEW."

This repeated attempt of Captain Dew to make the Ti-pings disarm
themselves, and his attempt to ignore the apology he had already
accepted in his letter to the chief dated 27th April, must afford
convincing proof that a premeditated and organized arrangement to
quarrel with the Ti-pings existed. The generals in command at Ningpo
gave the following reply to Captain Dew. They declared the battery and
guns necessary to defend the city against an attack by a fleet from the
coast, which in fact appeared, commanded by the notorious pirate Apak,
on the 7th May. They promised to remove all ammunition from the guns and
to prevent armed men going on the ramparts, but, as Colonel Sykes says
in his review of the affair, "Had the generals chucked the guns into the
river there would have been some new demand." In their reply the
generals state:--

    "In reply to letter of 2nd inst., submitting three demands, we
    beg to inform you that we have carefully examined its contents,
    and that we will agree to those demands as far as we are able.
    In reference to the first, our previous letter _has afforded
    full explanations on that head_, how that it was the result of
    an accidental discharge of bullets during the salute.... In
    reference to the second point, demanding removal of guns, &c.,
    _our former despatch has already explained that those guns are
    meant as a precaution against an attack from Ting-hae_, that the
    multitude of lives in the city that have to be taken care of
    urgently demands.... We shall on no account fire the guns,
    unless the imps attack us. Under the circumstances stated by
    you, we agree to stop up the port-holes of all the guns bearing
    on Keang-pih-gan, and to remove all the shot and powder from
    thence, _so as to manifest to you our desire for lasting amity_.
    Infer from the third point in your letter that you are afraid
    that, if people are allowed on the wall, there will be some
    lawless persons who will fire the guns by mistake. Far from
    allowing anybody whatever to come on the walls, there are most
    strict orders against allowing any one to go on the walls, not
    only on those opposite to Keang-pih, but also all round the
    city.... _We are inordinately desirous of remaining on good
    terms with you_, and this is our reason for this distinct
    statement." (Dated 3rd May, 1862.)

Affairs remained in this position till the 7th of May, when Captain Dew
wrote to Admiral Hope, stating that on the evening of the 5th, Consul
Harvey received a communication from the late Manchoo Governor of
Ningpo, to the effect that he was about to attack the city with a strong
force, and requesting support from the English and French admirals. The
same evening Captain Dew proceeded down the river, found the Imperialist
fleet (consisting of the pirate Apak's vessels), and visited the
Governor; again, on the following morning, Captain Dew visited that
functionary, and the latter, accompanied by his pirate-admiral Apak,
returned the visit. While closeted with Captain Dew, they made their
arrangements for the forthcoming attack on Ningpo, and the former wrote
to his senior officer:--

    "So I told them that in consequence of the rebels refusing
    certain demands we had made, I should have no objection to their
    passing up, _but that they were not to open fire till well clear
    of our men-of-war_."

Now Captain Dew may flatter himself that this statement has hoodwinked
the people of England, but unfortunately for his reputation, people
judge a man by his actions. Instead of these piratical vessels keeping
"well clear" of his ships, they proceeded to execute their part of the
programme of attack by keeping _well foul_ of his men-of-war, according
to previous arrangement.

On May 9th, Consul Harvey reported to Mr. Bruce the movements of the
Imperialist, or rather pirate fleet, under the notorious Apak, as
follows:--

    "Their fleet of junks is at the present moment _lying in front
    of our settlement_, making preparations for an assault on
    Ningpo."

He then adds:--

    "The Taoutae[16] Chang, with Commander-in-Chief Chin, came to
    see me this morning (9th) at the Consulate, _in a private
    manner_, and he informed Captain Dew and myself, that if no
    unforeseen event happened, the Imperialist attack on Ningpo
    would take place to-morrow morning _at daylight_."

Now Captain Dew (as the representative of Great Britain) having made the
following formal declaration in his despatch to the Ti-ping chiefs,
dated April 28th,

    "That he has not the intention or wish to interfere with the
    Imperialists and yourself at Ningpo; and if the former should
    attack the city, _we should be entirely neutral, and will not
    even allow the foreign settlement to harbour the Imperialists_."

And again, in his despatch dated April 27th:--

    "You may rest assured that no breach of friendly relations shall
    emanate from our  side"--

He was bound to fulfil his pledges of neutrality. He was perfectly well
aware that the city could not possibly reply to the fire of the Imperial
fleet without endangering the men-of-war and foreign settlement. It was
therefore his duty, as he himself expressed, "not to allow the foreign
settlement to harbour the Imperialists," or, to have withdrawn the ships
of war from the line of fire, as Admiral Hope had no "wish to
interfere."

Yet we find Consul Harvey stating that the pirate lorchas are "lying in
front of our settlement, making preparations for an assault on Ningpo,"
and Captain Dew not only authorized this proceeding but declared it a
_casus belli_ should the Ti-pings venture to return their fire! There
are, in fact, ample grounds for the statements in some of the China
newspapers, and in many private letters, that the whole affair was
arranged between the ex-Governor, the pirate Apak, Captain Dew, and Mr.
Consul Harvey: and the idea seems strengthened by the fact that Mr.
Harvey, in his letter to Mr. Bruce, dated May 9, terms the arrival of
the piratical fleet "an extraordinary but fortunate coincidence, and
that it was far too good an opportunity to be lost."

Immediately _after_ his second interview with the ex-Governor and the
pirate, Captain Dew and the French senior officer sent the following
crafty and equivocal ultimatum to the Ti-ping chiefs, dated May 8th:--

    "This is to inform you, on the part of the English and French
    senior naval officers, that had you agreed to their demands, and
    removed your guns from the walls, they should have felt bound in
    honour to have acted up to their promise, and have prevented an
    attack on you on the settlement side by Imperial forces, which
    in countless numbers and heavily-armed ships advance to attack
    you. We now inform you _that we maintain a perfect neutrality_,
    BUT IF YOU FIRE THE GUNS OR MUSKETS FROM THE BATTERY OR WALLS
    OPPOSITE THE SETTLEMENT ON THE ADVANCING IMPERIALISTS (thereby
    endangering the lives of our men and people in the foreign
    settlement), WE SHALL THEN FEEL IT OUR DUTY TO RETURN THE FIRE
    AND BOMBARD THE CITY."

This was equivalent to saying, "If you defend yourselves against the
Imperialists we shall kill you;" for in firing upon the pirate vessels
as they advanced from the foreign settlement and amongst the British
men-of-war, these latter must inevitably have been endangered.

The following extracts from official despatches and other memoranda will
show how the British squadron joined the fleet of pirates in driving the
Ti-pings out of Ningpo.

On the 10th of May, Captain Dew wrote to Admiral Hope:--

    "<sc>Sir</sc>,--I found it necessary to capture the city of Ningpo, and
    drive the rebels out, under the following circumstances:--

    "You are aware, Sir, that the rebel chiefs had been informed
    that if they again fired, either on our ships or in the
    _direction_ of the settlement, we should deem it a _casus
    belli_. This morning at 10 a.m., the _Kestrel_, and French
    vessels _Etoile_ and _Confucius_ were fired on by the Point
    battery. I cleared for action in this ship, when a volley of
    musketry was fired on us from the bastion abreast. The
    undermentioned vessels, viz., _Encounter_, _Ringdove_,
    _Kestrel_, and _Hardy_, with the _Etoile_ and _Confucius_,
    French gunboats, now opened fire, with shell, on the walls and
    batteries, which was replied to with much spirit from guns and
    small arms."

The despatch continues to this effect:--At noon the Ti-ping guns were
silenced and practicable breaches effected. At two o'clock the city was
stormed, and at five o'clock, all opposition having ceased, the
ex-governor and his troops landed from their junks. Captain Dew gave
them charge of the city, and re-embarked his men. We must now find out
what had become of the ex-governor, his troops, and Apak's fleet during
this time. Captain Dew carefully avoids stating whether they had made
the attack _at daylight_, according to arrangement, or left him to play
the bravo alone, for he does not mention _one word_ about his allies,
until he hands over the city to them. Consul Harvey, however, in a
despatch to Mr. Bruce, dated May the 16th, throws some light upon the
subject; he states:--

    "Shot and shell were poured into this large city with very
    little intermission for a period of five hours _by the combined
    fleet_, at the end of which time the walls were scaled, and the
    Taeping forces were at once completely routed and dispersed."

The only fleet was _eighty_ lorchas of the pirate Apak, the English and
French aiding by six vessels only, a fact suppressed by Captain Dew.

The final expulsion of the Ti-pings from Ningpo was thus effected:--

Early on the morning of the 10th, the piratical fleet commenced the
attack upon Ningpo, advancing from the foreign settlement and then
manoeuvring round and round the British and French gunboats, firing at
the Ti-pings when _between_ their line of fire and the foreign vessels.
Captain Dew never attempted to enforce his pretended order for them to
keep "well clear" of his vessels. For some time the Ti-pings bore this
attack silently and without reply, doubtless trusting that Captain Dew
would either move his vessels or make the pirates give them a clear
berth. This, however, was not done, the intention being to compel the
Ti-pings to open fire on the attacking fleet, when, as the latter were
placed directly between the British and French men-of-war and the guns
of the town, any shot must necessarily pass in the "direction" of those
vessels, and thereby constitute the false _casus belli_ required, and
eagerly watched for by Captain Dew with his vessels quite prepared and
his guns loaded and ready.

At last human nature could bear no more, and the Ti-pings opened a
musketry fire upon the pirate lorchas, yet still with extraordinary
forbearance, and such a desire to avoid endangering the foreign ships or
settlement, that they did not make use of their artillery. It is
perfectly certain that the Manchoo piratical fleet dared not have
ventured to make their attack unless fully assured of foreign
co-operation. That such assistance _was_ guaranteed and arranged has
scarcely ever been doubted.

Many of the Ti-ping soldiers had been killed by the fire of the pirate
fleet before they replied with musketry. The very instant they did so,
the British and French vessels came to the aid of their allies, and
commenced bombarding the town. It is said that a couple of bullets from
the volley fired upon a lorcha, which having just delivered her
broadside was tacking under the stern of the _Kestrel_, struck the
quarter of the latter vessel. This may have accidentally occurred; but
it is, however, perfectly certain that the Ti-pings did not fire upon
the foreign men-of-war, as stated by Captain Dew.

The Ti-pings fought their battery against the overwhelming fire from the
heavy pivot guns of the smaller vessels and the broadsides from the
_Encounter_ until every gun was dismounted and the work knocked to
pieces. When the British and French storming parties carried the walls
of Ningpo, the defenders offered a determined resistance; but shell and
Enfield rifles at last overcame it; though not until both the generals
Hwang and Fang were severely wounded did they evacuate the city, leaving
about 100 dead within and around the walls. The British loss was only 3
killed and 23 wounded.

Even Consul Harvey termed the conduct of the Ti-pings when they captured
Ningpo "wonderfully moderate." What will the British public think of the
following account of the behaviour of Captain Dew's allies when
re-established in the city? Contrasting the events which followed the
Ti-ping seizure of the city with those which occurred on its subsequent
capture by the British and French, can any question arise as to which
was the most civilized and merciful? The correspondent of the _China
Mail_, under date the 22nd May, 1862, states:--

    "The rebels retreated through the west gate--the pirates then
    entered the city and began the work of destruction, and in a few
    hours did more damage than the rebels did in the whole of the
    five months that they had possession.... On _Sunday_ the
    reinstated Taoutae was busy chopping off the heads of the
    unlucky rebels that he caught, and otherwise torturing them. I
    saw some fearful sights; such as a boy with his entrails cut
    right out, from a great gash across the stomach, carried round
    the back--a man with all the flesh torn off his ribs, leaving
    them quite bare--a man whose heart had been torn out and his
    head cut off; together with others equally revolting.... On
    Monday the same scenes were enacting.... One of the principal
    murderers and torturers of the poor fellows found in the city
    was one A-fook, the _British Consul's_ boy or personal
    attendant, who was dressed up in silks, and who, stuck upon a
    pony, paraded the city with attendants, ordering them to execute
    unfortunates, and issuing orders (which were actually obeyed) to
    the English soldiers."

Now it can safely be declared that the Ti-pings have _never_ committed
similar atrocities to the above. They have, it is true, often killed
large numbers at the capture of obstinately defended towns, but their
prisoners were never tortured to death as their comrades, captured by
British troops and then delivered up to the cruel Tartar mandarins, have
been under the shadow of the Union Jack.

The _China Overland Trade Report_ of October 14, 1862, states:--

    "So much mystery and double-dealing has been practised by the
    allies to wrest this port from the Taipings, and so little
    regard for veracity pervades the official despatches regarding
    their doings, that the truth is most difficult to arrive at, and
    has certainly never yet been published.... The possession of
    Ningpo by the Taipings was peculiarly adapted to thwart those
    schemes for aiding and abetting the Imperial cause, which have
    so peculiarly characterized the British minister. The Taipings
    held the province, and it is evident that the possession of a
    seaport would have enabled them not only to have deprived
    Shanghae of the greater proportion of the customs duties,[17]
    but to have diverted the same into their own exchequer. Now Mr.
    Lay was acting Chinese ambassador in London, and the absorption
    of these duties would have entirely frustrated the object of his
    errand[18] and indeed have destroyed the main stay of the
    Imperial cause. Besides, the possession of Ningpo would have
    enabled the Taipings to have obtained all the munitions of war
    which they stood so much in need of. It would have dispelled the
    _illusion_ of their being inimical to foreign trade.... Admiral
    Hope ... from some such cogent reasons as are above named, fell
    into the British minister's views, and clearly resolved on the
    recapture of the place by fair means or foul. The mode of
    accomplishing this design reflects _indelible disgrace_ on
    British prestige....

    "Admiral Hope detached a portion of his fleet to Ningpo under
    command of Captain Dew, of H.M.S. _Encounter_, clearly to act in
    concert with this piratical squadron, with which daily
    communications were established. The day before the Taoutae
    arrived at Ningpo, the British ships had taken up their
    stations, and had cleared for action. Captain Dew had opened a
    correspondence with the Taiping chiefs, the drift of which was a
    demand that they should remove a certain battery on some absurd
    pretext, which they refused to do. The night prior to the
    attack, a council of war was held on board the _Encounter_, and
    a private note was seen by several Europeans at Ningpo, written
    by a certain British official, which stated that the city would
    be attacked the following morning. The pirate fleet arrived
    accordingly, and proceeding in driblets _between_ the British
    men-of-war and the city, opened fire. This could not possibly be
    returned without directing the guns towards the men-of-war. The
    result is known and need not be repeated."

The _Hong-kong Daily Press_, in a long article upon the capture of
Ningpo by the Anglo-Franco-Manchoo-piratical fleet, makes precisely
similar statements to those quoted from the _Overland Trade Report_, and
commences with the following paragraph:--

    "There never was a falser, more unprovoked, or more
    unjustifiable act than the taking of Ningpo by the allies from
    the Taipings. It should, in fairness, be recorded _to the
    eternal disgrace of Captain_ RODERIC DEW, _of H.M.S.
    Encounter_."


FOOTNOTES:

[4] Lord Palmerston's Government had one great quality--it manfully
supported its subordinate officials whether right or wrong; it is at
least doubtful whether his successors will have courage to pursue the
same policy.

[5]
    The forces consisted of:--
    French, under Rear-Admiral Protet:--
        Small-arm men and Marines; field-piece party and
            4 guns                                               410
    English, under Brigadier General Staveley:--
        Royal Artillery, 6 guns                            78
        5th Bombay N. I.                                  440
        H.M. 99th Regiment                                 56
        22nd Punjaub N. I.                                519
      Under Captain Borlase, R.N.:--
        Field-piece party, 3 guns                          45
        H.M.S. _Pearl_ small-arm company                   60
        Axe party                                          16
      Under Captain Willes, R.N.:--
        H.M.S. _Imperieuse_ small-arm company             189
        Marines of Squadron                                94
                                                          -----1,497
    Disciplined Chinese of General Ward's legion                 300
                                                               -----
                        Total                                  2,207

[6]
    The force consisted of:--
    British Naval Division, with 3 howitzers                     350
    Royal Artillery, with 4 howitzers                             90
    H.M. 99th Regiment                                            80
    22nd Punjaub N. I.                                           400
    5th Bombay N. I.                                             400
    French Contingent, with 5 rifled guns and 2 field-pieces     700
    Disciplined Chinese of Ward's legion                         400
                                                               -----
                        Total                                  2,420

[7]
    The allied force consisted of:--
    British troops, under General Staveley:--
          Royal Engineers                                         22
          Royal Artillery, with 7 guns and 6 mortars             100
          H.M. 31st Regiment                                     552
          H.M. 99th and 67th Regiments                           280
          5th Bombay N.I                                         350
          22nd Punjaub N.I                                       350

    French force, under Admiral Protet:--
          Algerian Infantry, Chasseurs, Marines, and Seamen, with
             8 guns                                              900

    British Naval Division, under Captain Borlase, R.N.:--
          Seamen and Marines, with 9 guns                        330
    Ward's disciplined Chinese                                 1,000
                                                               -----
                        Total                                  3,884
    Assisted by Imperialist troops under Manchoo General Le    5,000

[8] _See_ Note, p. 509.

[9] Italics are by the Author.

[10] _Vide_ "Further Papers relating to the Rebellion in China," 1863,
p. 43; Inclosure in No. 27; Brigadier-General Staveley to Sir C. Lewis.

[11] This and all following extracts are taken from the Official
Correspondence presented to both Houses of Parliament in Blue Book form.

[12] Compare this with the next despatch of Captain Dew's.

[13] These Chiefs were at the time conducting the murderous raids from
Shanghae, already described.

[14] Did it grieve the philanthropic Admiral "much," I wonder, to
massacre them in his raids from Shanghae?

[15] We may safely presume that Captain Dew was gibing the chiefs.

[16] Governor of a city.

[17] From these duties the indemnity for the war was being extracted.

[18] The errand was to obtain the notorious Anglo-Chinese flotilla.




CHAPTER XIX.

    A Double Wedding.--Its Celebration.--The Honeymoon.--Its
    Interruption.--Warlike Preparations.--Soong-kong
    Invested.--General Ching's Despatch.--Tsing-poo
    Recaptured.--Ti-ping Seventy Excused.--England's
    Responsibility.--Curious Chinese Custom.--The Chung-wang's
    Policy.--His Explanation.--The Ti-ping Court of Justice.--How
    Conducted.--Opium Smoking.--Its Effects.--Evidence
    thereof.--Forbidden by Ti-ping Law.--Opium Trade.


Soon after our return to Nankin, the Chung-wang, having left the Shi,
Mo, Ting, and other Wangs, in charge of the lately captured Shanghae and
Hang-chow districts, despatched considerable reinforcements to the
Ying-wang, on the northern side of the Yang-tze river, and to the
Ti-ping positions along the southern bank. These troops quickly
dispersed the Imperialist force supposed to be investing Nankin from the
hills on the opposite side of the river, and recaptured many towns on
the southern side.

Meanwhile, at the Ti-ping capital, Marie became my wife, while my friend
L. received the Chung-wang's youngest daughter in marriage. When
Cum-ho's father ascertained the state of that young lady's affections,
he sanctioned her union with L., although his better half made no little
opposition at first, her ambitious mind being directed to the Mo-wang as
a suitable son-in-law. This, however, she eventually accomplished by
giving the chief her next eldest daughter as a wife. We were married
according to the ritual of the Ti-ping church, but with the addition of
using a ring, in conformity with the usage of our own. The Kan-wang's
own chaplain, who was an ordained teacher of the London Missionary
Society at Hong-kong, performed the ceremony.

Since the arrival of the Kan-wang at Nankin, he had altered the Ti-ping
marriage service so as to closely resemble that of the English church,
to which he had been used when principal native instructor and catechist
of the London Mission. Although by the laws of the state polygamy was
allowed, the improvements introduced by the Prime Minister, in fact we
may term them regulations, had almost abolished the custom, so that few
among the people married more than one wife.

Although L. and myself were married on the same day, and nearly at the
same time, there was a vast difference between the style of the two
ceremonies. Marie agreed with me in preferring a quiet solemnization,
with only a few friends present; but L., taking to wife a chief's
daughter, was obliged to undergo the usual pomp and festivity.

After my own marriage had been concluded, preparations for that of my
friend were made in the "Heavenly Hall" of the Chung-wang's palace. The
Hall was decorated with flowers and a profusion of silken flags and
streamers. Several large tables in a side chamber were loaded with
bridal presents from friends, who, with all the household, were
assembled to witness the ceremony. The Chung, Kan, Foo, and all the
other Wangs present, wore their state robes and coronets, while the
dresses of many of the ladies were still more beautiful and dazzling.
Besides the Kan-wang's chaplain, the principal ecclesiastic in Nankin
officiated, dressed in a splendid black silk garment broidered with gold
and silver crosses, both of whom, attended by several priests, took up
their position before the altar, which was decorated with large garlands
of flowers.

At last, when everything was ready, the bride, completely enveloped in a
long white veil, was escorted to the Hall by nine young girls dressed
in scarlet, and with red flowers in their hair. At the same time L., in
the full costume of a Ti-ping chief of the "Woo" rank (to which he had
been raised by the Chung-wang's wish), came to the right side of the
altar attended by nine young chiefs. After the bridegroom and bride were
united, the ceremony was concluded by a short service, nearly
approaching to that of the Sabbath, and then, entering two magnificent
sedans, they were conveyed to their new home (a house given them by the
Chung-wang) by a vast and gorgeous cavalcade. The newly-married couple
now entertained a number of guests to a festive meal in the principal
hall of their house. Meanwhile, with my wife, I removed from the
Chung-wang's palace and took up my abode with L., the house being
divided between us.

During several months, as it is, I presume, with nearly all
newly-married people, we paid but little attention to the outside world,
and, with the exception of the periodical arrival and departure of our
friends D. and Captain P. with the vessels, and the addition of three
Frenchmen, who had served in the French artillery at Shanghae, to our
corps of the Chung-wang's army, but little occurred to divert us from
our honeymoon. In the mean time the Commander-in-Chief was occupied
making his plans for further operations against the Manchoo, with the
intention of recapturing the towns and territory that had lately fallen
into their possession, and making a movement against their capital,
Pekin. Before, however, these tactics could be put into execution, news
came from the Shanghae district of the hostilities commenced by the
British and French, and of the consequent defeat of the Ti-ping local
forces, and the capture of their cities and villages. Immediately,
orders were sent recalling the reinforcements despatched to the
Ying-wang, and the force operating along the southern bank of the
Yang-tze, while from the garrisons of Nankin and other cities troops
were concentrated upon Soo-chow.

With natural reluctance I prepared to accompany the Chung-wang on his
march to the threatened districts, accompanied by my friend, who felt
how difficult it was to part with his youthful Ti-ping bride. Our
feelings were not indeed to be envied when, upon a misty, heavily
raining, and more than usually disagreeable Chinese morning in May,
between the chilly hours of three and four, we set out on the march for
Soo-chow. Even Phillip, although his honeymoon had terminated long
before ours began, appeared to feel as gloomy as myself and L. upon
parting with our wives.

As we slowly rode through the high city portal, dimly lighted by the
glare of lanterns and torches, the rain poured down in continuous
streams, as though it never intended to cease again. Fortunately we had
the promise of the rainbow, and I imagine the Chinese must have known it
also, or the whole force might have become panic-stricken with the dread
of another deluge. Splash, splash went our horses, and tramp, tramp came
the soldiery, through the mud, the former drooping and the latter
dripping. The tenacity, consistency, and otherwise sticky properties of
Chinese mud, are really wonderful, and in wet weather cause the
pedestrians' feet, to sound like a huge sucker suddenly torn from some
sympathetic substance. The rain beating in our faces every now and then
compelled us to close our eyes and risk their being picked out by the
iron spikes on the ends of the bamboos carried by the surrounding
spearmen. Every thing and animal presented a miserable and draggled
appearance. The few trees in the neighbourhood of the city, dimly seen
in the hazy grey of morning as we passed under their shadows, looked
more like huge spectres outlined against the foggy background. The very
houses presented a weird and desolate aspect as they became faintly
visible through the heavy rain and dense atmosphere.

A march of five days brought our forces to the city of Soo-chow, when
preparations were immediately made to move the troops to the defence of
the Ti-ping territory in the vicinity of Shanghae and Ningpo. The
Tow-wang, with the principal part of his forces, had been recalled from
the northern side of the Yang-tze, leaving the Ying-wang in command of
the different positions still held. This contingent, with those from
Nankin and Soo-chow, the Chung-wang's immediate command, and other
detachments, composed an army of some 50,000 men. The Commander-in-Chief,
a few days after his arrival at Soo-chow, moved forward in three columns
to the threatened quarter. With my company of partly disciplined men and
a few light pieces of artillery, I accompanied the division attached to
the Chung-wang himself. Each of the other _corps d'armee_ were
respectively commanded by the Mo and Tow Wangs.

Marching rapidly upon the places lately captured by the allied
Anglo-Franco-Manchoo forces, those garrisoned only by Imperialists were
very quickly retaken. On Kah-ding and other cities held by the
foreigners with their irresistible artillery, no direct assault was at
first made. The Chung-wang's tactics were, circulating exaggerated
rumours that with an immense force he was marching for Shanghae, and by
continual mock attacks upon Kah-ding, Na-ziang, &c., with men carrying
numberless flags, to harass the garrisons so as to compel them to
abandon their positions. These tactics were entirely successful. General
Staveley, and the other commanders, fearing for the safety of Shanghae
and the fate of their detachments guarding the lately captured towns,
evacuated all excepting Soong-kong, which was held in conjunction with
the filibuster General Ward's disciplined Chinese.

Having recaptured Kah-ding, the Chung-wang established his head-quarters
at the city of Chang-za, some forty miles north-west of Shanghae, while
his subordinate generals successively occupied the places evacuated by
the allies. The brave Ling-ho, with his regiment of Honan guards, made a
dashing attempt to carry Soong-kong by storm. Just at daylight on the
morning of May the 30th, this gallant chief, with less than 1,500 men,
made a desperate attack upon the north-east side of the city. So
suddenly was the attempt made, that when the garrison had manned the
walls, the scaling-ladders were actually planted against them. These
ladders consisted simply of two long bamboos secured together at either
end about two feet apart, the man to ascend being pushed up by men from
below with another bamboo, while he assisted himself with the uprights.
Soong-kong would certainly have been captured but for the circumstance
of its being held by a strong detachment of the seamen and marines of
Ward's dear and invaluable friend Admiral Hope, who, at the expense of
the British tax-payers, instead of attending to his ships, chose to
scour Chinese territory, hunting for Ti-pings wherever they were to be
found. The first to man the walls of Soon-kong were the men of H.B.M.S.
_Centaur_, who opened a heavy fire upon the assaulting column at a few
yards' distance. In spite of this, Ling-ho led his men up their
scaling-ladders, and was himself the first upon the wall, the second
being the French commander of his regiment. Their gallantry, however,
was unavailing, the deadly Enfield rifles and the showers of grape and
canister crashing among the Ti-pings within half pistol-range proved
irresistible. Ling-ho fell mortally wounded while striving with his
usual surpassing courage to animate his men to follow him, and his brave
French officer was killed by his side. This settled the action, and
sorrowfully carrying off their wounded leader, the Ti-pings retired from
the attack.

During the next few days a part of the Chung-wang's division having
arrived before the place, Soong-kong was closely invested. On the 2nd of
June a large Imperialist force was driven out of some strong stockades
they had erected close to the city, while one of the _Centaur's_ gigs
and a dozen Chinese gunboats loaded with arms and ammunition were
captured in a neighbouring creek. Seeing this, the whole British force,
accompanied by a body of Ward's Chinese, made a powerful sortie, and
succeeded in recapturing the gig and two or three of the gunboats, the
rest being carried off by the Ti-pings. During the 3rd, 4th, and 5th of
June, each day an attempt was made to storm the city, and outside the
west gate a battery was erected, from which the besiegers opened fire in
the morning, but upon every occasion it was effectually silenced by the
superior fire of the British guns on the walls.

The gig's crew and some other Europeans captured in the gunboats were
not harmed by the Ti-pings, although, had the latter simply followed the
law of retaliation, they would have met with the fate of the
unfortunates who were delivered over to the Manchoo execution-grounds,
after having fallen into the hands of British soldiers during the late
freebooting raids of Admirals Hope and Protet, and General Staveley.

I cannot do better than give a few extracts from the summons to
surrender sent into Soong-kong by Ching, the chief in command of the
besiegers. General Ching, after a preamble setting forth the object of
the Ti-ping revolution, stated:--

    "Now, having received our king's commands to hold the city of
    Soo-chow, we had intended to remain there, and give the
    Heavenly[19] soldiers rest, and not to take your place, not
    imagining you would league with the foreigners and attack my
    cities, forcing me to rise up and retake them. _For this
    causeless misfortune, for this injury to the people, who then is
    to blame?_ Had you not invaded my territories, I should not have
    troubled you; _the people would have remained undisturbed._
    Would not this have been better for both sides?

    "Again, all the officers, both military and civil, all the
    soldiers, too, and the people, are without exception Chinese;
    and you eat the bread of the Tsing[20] dynasty, serving a
    stranger....

    "As for you, O foreign troops, you had best return to your
    native country, as quickly as may be; _for, being a distinct
    race_, AND SEEKING TRADE ONLY, _why should you contend with me,
    or why should I be compelled to overcome you?_... If you are
    resolved and will fight with me, I fear, indeed, your trade will
    suffer."

Upon the l0th of June the Mo-wang succeeded in recapturing Tsing-poo,
the garrison of Ward's Chinese, a British force 600 strong, with six
guns, evacuating the city _after almost completely destroying it by
fire_! The filibuster officer (Colonel Forrester) in command of Ward's
force having, in his hurry, forgotten to carry off some of his loot
(gathered during the late successful campaign against the Ti-ping
cities), ran back for it, and was captured by the Mo-wang's men just as
he was rushing away loaded with sycee and dollars. This man, whom the
Europeans captured at Soong-kong, as also eleven British seamen taken
prisoners at the evacuation of Kah-ding by the allies, were all
liberated by the Ti-pings. In vain I represented to the Chung-wang the
policy of retaining them as hostages for any of his own chiefs who might
fall into the hands of the enemy, and most probably be delivered over to
the reeking execution-shambles at Shanghae and elsewhere. He would not
retain them, but had them released, so as to exhibit his unalterable
friendship for Europeans.

I would not willingly screen a single fault upon the part of my Ti-ping
friends; but, after viewing all events calmly, when many thousand miles
away from aught that could bias or warp the judgment, I must confess
that I can scarcely find the slightest grounds for censure upon any
point.

I had certainly intended to blame the Tow and Mo-wangs for the severity
of their measures towards the people of those villages, which, upon the
successful raids of the allied forces, had proved renegade, and had
given in their allegiance to the Manchoo. But, consideration of the
primary cause of the destruction of many Ti-ping cities and villages,
and the subsequent devastation of some that had been left whole by the
allies, conclusively fixes the guilty responsibility upon the latter, by
reason of their wanton attack upon the Ti-ping territory. After the
recapture of some places, people who had been well known as subjects of
the Tien-wang were found with the shaved head (the badge of the Manchoo)
and other strong and irrefragable proof of their traitorous conduct;
many of these were decapitated, and their property confiscated. In like
manner, some of the villages that had, with Chinese apathy, at once gone
over to the Imperialists, were burned down, and the people compelled to
labour as coolies. These measures may appear harsh; but, if events had
occurred otherwise, and the Imperialists had occupied the position of
the Ti-pings, fresh evidence would be given that there were prototypes
of the notorious Yeh in every Manchoo official!

The Shanghae district had been captured by the revolutionists; after
that event, the people were gradually settling down to the new state of
affairs, while those who had naturally fled from the shock of war were
fast returning to their homes and giving in allegiance to the dominant
power. In fact, so well were the lately disturbed departments recovering
from the effect of the civil war, that in a short time they would
certainly have attained the high state of prosperity enjoyed by the silk
districts, then thoroughly settled under Ti-ping rule. The question as
to the relative right of each belligerent has nothing to do with the
present argument. Each party to the civil war had their own causes and
reasons, and these certainly concerned no one but themselves. The simple
question is this:--After the Ti-pings had proved their power to
successfully dispute the Manchoo authority, and had wrested large tracts
of land from their foreign yoke, who became responsible for again
carrying the horrors of war, with its attendant misery and desolation,
into a country which would otherwise have remained happy in its freedom,
peaceful and nominally Christian? Who other than England?

Upon the suppositional "mights" elsewhere described, Admiral Hope and
his colleagues captured the cities and villages within a radius of
thirty miles from Shanghae, burning and destroying (as proved in this
work by the words of the Admiral himself) everywhere. These places were
then captured a second time by the Ti-pings, and subsequently recaptured
by the allies. Now, for the cruelties and devastations inflicted four
times over by the sword of Asiatic warfare, in the words of the Ti-ping
general long since in the presence of his God, I ask, "For this
causeless misfortune, for this injury to the people, who then is to
blame?"

Plain it is to all who will judge fairly and honourably, that England is
heavily responsible for the effects of the unprovoked hostilities
carried by her soldiers and sailors into the Ti-ping dominions. Besides
the more direct evil consequences of that most evil policy, there were
others not so well known though closely connected with it. In the first
place, few people are aware, or trouble themselves to reflect, that the
wholesale destruction of grain and rice by the allies (as per Admiral
Hope's despatches) led to the starvation of many thousands of the
unfortunate country people. The Ti-ping system of Government is one of a
paternal form (so favorite with the Chinese, but so seldom obtained),
involving a community of interests upon the part of every subject.
Consequent upon this, all rice crops and other descriptions of grain
were gathered regularly into the state granaries, and from thence
supplied to every person and family in the respective departments of the
"Land divisions of the Ti-ping dynasty." Consequently, when the whole
stores of food were destroyed in the districts ravaged by Admiral Hope
and others, the miserable people had literally nothing to eat; so that,
although the Ti-ping soldiery were killed in hundreds by the
irresistible foreign artillery, the non-combatants perished by tens of
thousands from famine.

Then again: the only means of support for the large Ti-ping armies, the
Government and administrative machinery, were precisely similar to those
of other nations; that is to say, from direct and indirect taxation.
Naturally, therefore, when England maintained the treaty ports against
the Ti-pings, and when Admiral Hope invaded their territory, many
valuable sources of revenue were cut off. If a nation, or organized body
of people, possess neither settled territory nor regular revenue, they
must plunder their neighbours in order to exist, and by this mode of
reasoning it is evident that England is responsible for all plundering
or brigandage committed by the Ti-pings when driven from their
dominions, and defrauded of their just dues by her intervention. At the
time, however, to which we have now arrived (summer of 1862), the
revolutionists had not been expelled from the valuable silk, and a great
proportion of the tea, districts, the revenue upon the productions of
which exceeded L2,500,000 sterling per annum. Previous to their
expulsion from these districts, the Ti-pings only acted as marauders
when literally compelled to do so in order to save their own lives, and
when any people in the world would have acted in the same manner. When
driven back by the raids of Admiral Hope and General Staveley, the
troops and people, rendered destitute, fell upon the nearest places to
forage and subsist. Otherwise, the only plundering ever indulged in by
Ti-ping soldiery was upon the _public_ property of the enemy. Private
property, except in dire cases of necessity, was always respected: most
especially were the troops careful to avoid injuring the standing crops
of grain--a course of conduct which forcibly contrasts with the
destruction of the cultivated fields of the unfortunate New Zealanders
by English soldiers, and with the outrages committed by the forces of
the Emperor of the French in Algeria! Most unjustly the Ti-pings have
been represented as "hordes of banditti," "ruthless marauders," &c.; but
these statements may invariably be traced to interested quarters. If a
few examples of sack and pillage have been selected to blacken the
character of the Ti-pings, are we to forget the names of Magdeburg,
Badajos, and Ciudad Rodrigo? Are we not to remember the progress of the
Federal General, Sheridan, through the Shenandoah Valley, as recorded in
the columns of the _Times_ of the 30th March, 1865? "Burning houses and
barns, he passed through the valley, and may boast of a destruction such
as _no_ Asiatic chief ever surpassed!"

When Admiral Hope ascertained that Soong-kong, the only remaining
Manchoo place outside the walls of Shanghae, was seriously threatened by
the Ti-ping forces, he sent up strong reinforcements to it, commanded by
Captain Borlase, R.N. Upon this, the Chung-wang gave orders to abandon
the siege; and, after placing strong garrisons in all the recaptured
cities, returned with the rest of his forces to Nankin. During the march
from Soo-chow to the capital, I became acquainted with a singular custom
of the Chinese. We had just passed through a village, when we came upon
a party of country people carrying a coffin to the burial-place. To the
great surprise of myself and European comrades, instead of interring the
corpse or building a grave over it, according to the usual Chinese
customs, two forked wooden stakes were fixed in the ground, and the
coffin placed upon them at either end. Upon inquiry, we were informed
that the dead man had been killed by lightning, and that the common
practice throughout the country was to dispose of the bodies of those
who perished in such a manner by placing their coffin on stakes which
would support them above the ground.

Soon after reaching Nankin, the Chung-wang seriously turned his
attention towards operating against the Manchoo forces further up the
Yang-tze, whose successes, though unimportant when compared with the
great Ti-ping victories in Che-kiang and Kiang-su, were yet becoming
dangerous to the supremacy of the revolutionists in that part of China.
When the Commander-in-Chief drew off all his troops from the Shanghae
district, after having retaken all the places previously captured by the
allies, he did so under the impression that neither England nor France
would again make war upon the re-established Ti-ping territories. A man
so noble-hearted, large-minded, and honourable, could not realize the
determined hostility entertained against his cause, or credit the
intention of Admiral Hope and General Staveley to resume active warfare
upon the arrival of reinforcements from Tien-tsin and India; he
therefore left garrisons amply sufficient to repel any effort of his
natural enemies, but neglected the precaution of leaving in the district
even a single _corps d'armee_, which would have frustrated the future
triumphs of his unexpected foemen. It was certainly necessary that large
additions should be made to the Ti-ping forces opposing the progress of
the Imperialists from the upper waters of the Yang-tze towards the city
of Nankin; still, this could have been thoroughly accomplished, and a
field force of at least 50,000 men left in the neighbourhood of Shanghae
at the same time. Had any such disposition been made, the easy success
of the allies, during their next campaign, would have been exceedingly
different; the disasters that subsequently befell the Ti-ping cause
would never have taken place; while the standard of liberty and
Christianity would now wave erect and triumphant.

During the interval between our return to Nankin and the commencement of
further military operations, I was frequently closeted with the Chung,
Kan, and other chiefs, upon the discussion of political matters. On one
occasion, at an interview with the Commander-in-Chief, my friend D----
was present, and translated a certain speech, which was subsequently
published in some of the Shanghae papers. He asked the Chung-wang "why
he had ventured within the limits of Consular Ports;" and received this
reply:--

    "Why? Because foreigners have broken faith with us! The English
    and Americans stipulated with us to remain strictly neutral in
    regard to our war with the Manchoos. This agreement was kept on
    their part by assisting, in every way they could, in the
    collection of the very 'sinews of war' for the Imperialists;
    allowing their subjects to enter the Manchoo employ, and at the
    same time sending a man-of-war to force, at the cannon's mouth,
    the return, and even punishment of the few foreigners who had
    joined us! Was _this_ neutrality?

    "This was not all: they actually, with their own Government
    troops, _invaded_ our territory, and violated the most sacred
    usages of war, by permitting, or not preventing, the Chinese
    troops from committing the most atrocious barbarities. It has
    been told us that, among foreigners, the proof of courage is
    clemency towards the vanquished. But the torture inflicted
    lately upon some of your helpless prisoners proves to us the
    quality of your _neutrality_! Neutrality! Every few days we see
    several Manchoo steam vessels, laden with munitions of war, all
    to be expended to our destruction, passing under the very walls
    of our capital, but flying the American flag! They are called by
    foreigners the _Koong-foo-tze_ (Confucius), _Kee-me-et_
    (Williamette), _An-te-lok_ (Antelope), etc. But for that flag we
    would have sunk them hundreds of times. Is _this_ neutrality? Is
    it not a most shameful perversion of the American nationality?
    Is it not a vile trading--a base jobbery in the dignity and
    honour of a noble people, who have never permitted their
    officers to _openly_ violate our rights? Would not these great
    foreign sovereigns blush to see the degradation of their flags,
    perverted to such ends as private aggrandisement and infamous
    prostitution?

    "Moreover, as lords of our immense territory, we have a perfect
    right to levy taxes on goods of natives passing through our
    dominions; but by acts of gigantic fraud,[21] the foreign
    consuls have given to native craft papers, and their national
    flag, simply for a fee--thus robbing us of our revenues, in as
    far as they _could_! Would any _other_ nation have borne these
    outrages for years, as we have done, without making reprisal?
    And we have been accused of relentless barbarity; of burning
    towns, slaughtering the people, &c. Well, granted. It is the
    hard necessity of war, which we would avoid if we could; but
    knowing, as we do, the conduct of Napoleon in Europe, of the
    British in India, &c., and the Americans in their own country,
    we think such accusations come with a bad grace from
    foreigners. The Ming dynasty was founded by a revolution such
    as is now in progress; and we have never heard of a people who
    expelled tyrants from their country who did not suffer both
    offensively and defensively.

    "That the foreign Powers are playing a game to suit their own
    profit in China, is to us perfectly clear. When, some time ago,
    we addressed their authorities on this subject (at the Consular
    Ports), our communications were returned _unopened_. This
    contemptible insult taught us that you foreigners" [the
    translation of this part cannot be literally given, by reason of
    the Chung-wang's use of idiomatic and figurative language, but
    may best be expressed as follows:--] "thought our cause a
    sinking one, or intended to make it so; and, like rats on
    shipboard, you would desert--_not us, but your own professions
    towards us_. Not long after, our capital was called, in a public
    print, the 'City of Coolie Kings.' This title, which was meant
    for a sneer, we thought the highest compliment possible: we are
    indifferent as to what the Duke of Pa-le-chiau[22] thought of
    the remark, or the Americans, whose capital might be called by
    the same name with equal justice. It was easy to judge, from
    these circumstances, and many others, at what value we could
    esteem the lofty sentiments of honour, justice, and equity,
    which foreigners professed towards the Chinese people. 1st. They
    struck a nearly fatal blow to the Manchoo power; then, in
    pretence of seeking the real good of the nation, they bolster up
    the tottering _simulacrum_, and actively carry on operations
    against us. They reform not one abuse of the Tartar Government,
    and send for Captain Osborne's fleet![23] Will the most noble
    Empress of England, the mother of her people, permit her brave
    soldiers, and noble-minded naval officers, to serve under the
    most cruel and corrupt Government officials in the world, and
    furnish them with means to come to the Middle Kingdom, to crush
    out at the cannon's mouth the last vestige of liberty, and
    freedom of being governed, while professing our religion, as
    seems to us most conformable to the sacred book (Bible)? We
    cannot think so, though her officers have refused to receive our
    communications!

    "Will not one of you here present make it known to the
    sovereigns of England and America, that by this conduct we can
    only judge of them, and that it seems that they desire to
    exterminate us. Of the French we have nothing to hope; _they_
    have never professed any friendship for us! They (the French
    Jesuits) materially assisted the Manchoos in getting possession
    of the throne, for the sake of propagating a religion which
    English missionaries have taught us to condemn. But, at least,
    they have never deceived us by false professions!"

Within two months after our return to Nankin, I became utterly
prostrated by one of the forms of low fever prevalent in China. My
illness was long in duration and slow in disappearing, even when
recovery commenced. During many months I was confined to a sickbed, from
whence, but for the tender and unremitting attentions of my wife, I
should never have risen again. In the meanwhile my comrades had all left
the city, having proceeded with another expedition against the Manchoo.

Shih-ta-kae, the I-wang and brother of the Ti-ping king, had been
recalled to the capital, and in the month of September, 1862, marched
forth in command of an army destined to operate along the south bank of
the Yang-tze. The Chung-wang, with a still larger army, crossed the
river, and commenced a campaign having for its principal objects the
recapture of Ngan-king and the capture of Pekin.

While these armies are marching along their several routes, we will
digress for a little and notice two subjects particularly favourable to
the moral aspect of the Ti-ping revolution, though one of them has
excited no little hostility to the great movement.

The justice courts of Ti-pingdom form the theme of our first eulogy.
These are invariably conducted with the strictest and most simple
equity. The disgusting scenes, the inseparable concomitants of the
Manchoo magisterial dwelling, or _yamun_,--such as the torture of
litigants, criminals, and prisoners,--are entirely abolished. Defendant,
plaintiff, and witness, are fairly confronted; but under the sway of the
Tartar despotism either the one or the other is tortured if any party
chooses to bribe the presiding mandarin; or, if none have the sense and
means to sooth the majesty of justice with lumps of virgin sycee, the
_whole_ are tortured by that impartial functionary. The infamous system
of bribery is entirely unknown in a Ti-ping court of justice; _not one_
form of torture is permitted by law,[24] and prisoners or litigants are
afforded every facility to defend themselves consistent with justice. In
no way can a rich and superior adversary obtain any unfair advantage
over a poor man, none being convicted or punished but upon the clearest
and most decisive proof of guilt.

Ti-pingdom is one of the last places in the world likely to please a
lawyer; plaintiff, defendant, and prisoner having to plead their own
cases, which are then decided upon according to their respective merits
by the presiding chief and his assistant officers. All trials are
conducted more by the dictates of right and justice than the trammels of
law, so that the glaring injustice frequently caused by European legal
technicalities and quibbles is seldom committed.

The Ti-pings have one very singular custom in connection with their
"Judgment Halls." Two large drums are always kept hanging just inside
the porch of the outer gate, and are at the use of any person who may
consider himself aggrieved, or may wish to present a complaint, when he
is at liberty to strike upon the drums and demand justice from the
chief. A Ti-ping court of justice is generally a very imposing affair.
The gorgeous dress of the chiefs, their numerous attendants and body
guard, the many beautiful silken banners around the walls, and
especially the brilliancy of colour, strongly impress the observer's
imagination with an idea of what Europe must have been during its
earlier career, when it delighted in the same barbaric splendour and
feudal display.

The second subject of our digression is the abolition of opium-smoking
by the Ti-pings, which is almost the principal cause of the hostility
the British Government and nearly all merchants who trade in the drug
have hitherto entertained against the revolutionists. Although the
arguments to prove the utterly health-destroying and mind-pervading
effect of opium are many and incontrovertible, we may dispense with them
and give a few facts to establish the value of the prohibition by the
Ti-pings. In India, as well as in China, the unfortunate natives are
thereby utterly destroyed. In a communication forwarded by General
Alexander to Earl Shaftesbury (then Lord Ashley), from Mr. A. Sym, dated
the 13th of March, 1840, the following passages occur:--

    "The health and morals of the people suffer from the production
    of opium. We are demoralizing our own subjects in India; one
    half of the crime in the opium districts--murders, rapes, and
    affrays--have their origin in opium-eating.... One opium
    cultivator demoralizes a whole village. Thus thousands of our
    fellow-subjects in India are oppressed, and their health and
    morals destroyed, for the sake of this infernal opium trade. So
    completely is the production of opium in the hands of the East
    India Company[25] that not a single poppy can be grown in the
    extent of their vast territories without either the permission
    of the Government or an infraction of its laws. The grower of
    the poppy derives only a bare subsistence for its cultivation,
    and the difference between 250 rupees and 1,200 to 1,600 rupees
    a chest goes to the Government, which exchanges the drug for
    silver at the auction mart."

This sort of thing has been continually on the increase since the above
statements were written, and the opium trade has now reached an enormous
extent, being fully equal to if not greater in value than either the
silk or tea trade. While the price of opium has been steadily maintained
or increased, that of western manufactures has gradually fallen off to
one-third the former rates, although the latter trade has not largely
increased, and that in opium has been more than doubled. The vast amount
of specie drawn from China in payment of this deleterious drug is
diverted from a more beneficial and righteous trade in British
manufactures, or in the cultivation of cotton, which the East Indian
districts now devoted to the poppy are so well adapted to produce. If
Lancashire would only look abroad it might see a mode of easily
increasing the British exports to China, till the eight or nine millions
annually paid in cash for the produce of China were replaced by them,
and the abolition of the opium trade had enabled the Chinese to barter
for English manufactures to a greater extent. The amount of clear profit
realized by the Indian Government upon the sale of opium is considerably
upwards of L5,000,000 per annum,[26] being the difference between L25 a
chest they give for it, and L115 they sell it at. The opium, upon
reaching China, extracts from that country the vast amount of specie
above mentioned, which would otherwise be expended on British produce.

Only a few years ago the following evidence was adduced before the
Select Committee of the House of Commons, on our commercial relations
with China, by Mr. Montgomery Martin, who was Her Majesty's treasurer in
India:--

    "I inquired of the Taou-tae of Shanghae what would be the best
    means of increasing our commerce with China, and his first
    answer, in the presence of Captain Balfour, was:--'_Cease to
    send us so much opium, and we shall be able to take your
    manufactures._'... The true remedy for our deficient trade with
    China is not to be found in the reduction of L1,000,000 to
    L2,000,000 sterling of tea duties, but in perfect freedom of
    intercourse with China; in facilities of access to the interior
    of that vast country; and in the abolition of the pernicious
    opium traffic, which absorbs L4,000,000 per annum, which would
    be devoted to the purchase of British manufactures."

Proofs of the immense injury the opium traffic inflicts upon British
export trade to China might be multiplied _ad infinitum_. The drug not
only destroys the moral and physical principles of those who connect
themselves with it in any way, but it has been the direct cause of every
war England has had with China. The following statement by Mr. Martin is
so identical with what I would say myself that I cannot do better than
quote it with the appreciation it so well deserves. It was adduced
before the Committee of the House of Commons already referred to:--

    "Minute 3491. In what respect do you think the trade injurious
    to us in our relations with China?

    "3492. Politically, with reference to our position with the
    Government of China, had France, or America, or Russia, granted
    us an island on their coast as a commercial station,[27] had
    they prohibited the use of opium, believing it to be injurious,
    we dare not, in that case, have made it a smoking-shop for the
    empire; and I would not act to the Chinese Government in a
    different manner than I would act to a Government in Europe.
    Then, socially speaking, I believe it is the duty of this
    Government to uphold moral principles and to disseminate
    religious truth, and she cannot do that with one hand, while on
    the other she is introducing into China an amount of opium which
    furnishes 17 grains a day to each of 3,000,000 of people, and
    which, in the language of Mr. Lay, Her Majesty's late consul at
    Amoy, 'is ham-stringing the nation.' I think it is desolating
    China, corrupting its Government, and bringing the fabric of
    that extraordinary empire to a state of rapid dissolution.
    Commercially speaking, it is injurious to us, because it
    prevents the extension of our manufactures in China. Four or
    five mercantile houses are engaged in the traffic, and derive a
    large amount of revenue from it; _but the trade of England is
    materially cramped by the extension of its consumption in China
    to the extent of at least four million sterling a year_."

Now, this truthful statement was made in the year 1857, since when the
evils mentioned have increased to more than double their extent at that
period. We will also examine the opinion of the Chinese themselves with
regard to the introduction of opium into their country. Kinshan, one of
the most celebrated of the _literati_ of China, has written on the
subject, and how correctly all can affirm who know anything of
opium-smoking in that empire. The following is his statement:--

[Illustration:
London. Published March 15^{th} 1866 by Day & Son, Limited Lithog^{rs}
Gate Str. Lincoln's Inn Fields. Day & Son, Limited, Lith.
INTERIOR OF AN OPIUM SMOKING SALOON.]

    "Opium is a poisonous drug brought from foreign countries. At
    first the smokers of it merely strive to follow the fashion of
    the day, but in the sequel the poison takes effect, and the
    habit becomes fixed. The sleeping smokers are like corpses--lean
    and haggard as demons; such are the injuries it does to life; it
    throws whole families into ruin, dissipates every kind of
    property, and destroys man himself. There cannot be a greater
    evil than this. 1st. It exhausts the animal spirits; hence the
    youth who smoke will hasten the termination of their years. 2nd.
    It wastes the flesh and blood; the faces of the weak who smoke
    become black and cadaverous. 3rd. It dissipates every kind of
    property. 4th. It renders the person ill-favoured--mucus flows
    from his nostrils, and tears from his eyes. 5th. It promotes
    obscenity. 6th. It discovers secrets. 7th. It violates laws.
    8th. It attacks the vitals. 9th. It destroys life. When the
    smoker has pawned everything in his possession, he will pawn his
    wife and sell his daughters; such are the inevitable
    consequences."

To every word of the above statement, from my own personal experience, I
can give the most unqualified assent. The following extract from a
manifesto addressed by the distinguished Imperial Commissioner Lin to
the Queen of England, with regard to the _forcible_ introduction of
opium by British subjects, places the wrongly despised Chinaman in
pleasing contrast with the opium trafficking European. Commissioner Lin
said:--

    "That in the ways of Heaven no partiality exists, and no
    sanction is allowed to the injury of others for the advantage of
    one's self--that there is not any great diversity (for where is
    he who does not abhor death and seek life?), these are
    acknowledged principles. Though not using opium one's self, to
    venture, nevertheless, on the manufacture and sale of it, and
    with it to seduce the simple folk of this land, is to seek one's
    own livelihood by the exposure of others to death--to seek one's
    own advantage by other men's injury; and such acts are utterly
    abhorrent to the nature of men, and are utterly opposed to the
    ways of Heaven."

No wonder the Rev. Dr. Medhurst, one of the most experienced
missionaries in China, has said: "Opium is demoralizing China, and
become the greatest barrier to the introduction of Christianity which
can be conceived of." And to prove this he states that almost the first
reply of a native, when urged to believe in Christ, is, "Why do
Christians bring us opium, and bring it directly in defiance of our
laws? The evil drug has poisoned my son, has ruined my brother, and well
nigh led me to barter my wife and children. Surely those who import
such a deleterious substance, and injure me for the sake of gain, cannot
wish me well or be in possession of a religion better than my own. Go
first and persuade your own countrymen to relinquish this nefarious
traffic, _and give me a prescription to correct this vile habit_,[28]
and then I will listen to your exhortations on the subject of
Christianity."

Never has there been a viler or more utterly debasing institution upon
earth than that of the opium-smoking dens in China. "Truly," as the Rev.
E. B. Squire, formerly a missionary to that empire, once said, "it is an
engine in Satan's hands, and a powerful one." It is necessary to
remember that this same engine of wickedness and abomination has been
systematically, and by the medium of several wars, forced upon China by
the English nation and the produce of her Indian possessions.

The very day that the monopoly of the China trade by the East India
Company ceased, the British Government commenced forcing the opium
traffic, by which means they brought about the first opium war. Although
the drug destroyed by Commissioner Lin was surrendered up _according to
agreement_ by H. B. Majesty's representative, Captain Elliot, yet its
destruction was afterwards perverted into a _casus belli_. From that
event may be dated a course of policy that all posterity will assuredly
condemn, terminating as it did in the Chinese Government being compelled
to legalize this nefarious trade.

Opium has ever been made contraband by the Ti-ping law, its use being
forbidden under penalty of death, and all cases of infraction being
strictly visited with the punishment of decapitation. As opium has in
every case been the primary cause of each war with China, and as it was
universally known that the success of the Ti-pings would have utterly
abolished the trade, it is by no means unfair or unreasonable to ascribe
a great proportion of the hostility the revolutionists have experienced
(from those bound by every other motive to be their warmest friends) to
the same cause. It is indisputable that nearly all who became acquainted
with the Ti-pings during the early part of their career, and even many
who did not, entertained for them the most friendly feelings; but no
sooner was it thoroughly understood that they were determined not to
submit to the introduction of opium, when, in spite of their
Christianity, &c., a strong party arose against them.

In China it is quite notorious that one of the principal mercantile
houses (Dent & Co.), after vainly endeavouring to establish an opium
trade with the Ti-pings at Wuhu (a city some fifty miles above Nankin,
on the Yang-tze River), by the means of their opium-ship _Nimrod_, which
was stationed there for six months, and where I have myself seen her,
did, after the failure of the attempt, become their most signal
revilers, and use all the interest they possessed against them.

Too many merchants, and, unfortunately, their national representatives
interested in maintaining the great opium revenue, have, in China, by
the blind pursuit of profit, sacrificed principle to lucre, heedless of
the grievous consequences. It is no less unfortunate that many of those
who are now designated "merchant princes" some years before made their
capital by opium smuggling; equally deplorable is it that still their
largest profits result from what by fire and sword has become the
legalized trade. Such, however, is the case, and principally for this
reason has it become popular to stifle the birth of freedom and
Christianity in the opium-ruined Chinese nation.


FOOTNOTES:

[19] The title (Tien-ping) of the Ti-ping soldiery.

[20] The Manchoo.

[21] Perfectly true.

[22] The French General in command during the Pekin campaign, who
received this title from his emperor.

[23] The proceedings to raise the "Vampyre" fleet in England were then
nearly concluded, and were known to the Ti-pings.

[24] The different methods of legal torture are numerated in the
Imperialist code by hundreds.

[25] The power has, of course, reverted to the Home Government since the
Sepoy revolt.

[26] By the last official return (1863-4) the export of opium from India
to China is given as 42,621 chests, and the gross revenue derived
therefrom, Rupees, 52,072,358.

[27] Alluding to Hong-Kong.

[28] These very words have frequently been addressed to myself by
Chinese opium-smokers, and I fancy scarcely any European has been in
China without having experienced the same.




CHAPTER XX.

    Ti-ping Disasters.--The Vampyre Fleet.--Important Letters.--Mr.
    Roberts's Case.--Mr. Consul Harvey.--Letters
    continued.--Misrepresentations.--Anti-Ti-ping Meeting.--The
    Sherrard Osborne Theory.--The Fleet Afloat.--The "Lay" and
    "Osborne" Agreement.--The Fleet repudiated.--Pecuniary Loss to
    England.--A Resume.--General Burgevine.--Lieutenant Ridge.--Act
    of Piracy.--A Tartar caught.--Exit of the Anglo-Chinese
    Flotilla.--General Ward's Proceedings.--Progress of the
    War.--Death of General Ward.--Captain Dew's Disgrace.--How
    caused.--His Mode of Proceeding.--Its Effect upon
    Trade.--Operations before Kah-ding.--"Wong-e-poo."--General
    Burgevine dismissed from his Command.--Major Gordon takes
    Command.--Sir F. Bruce's Despatches.--His Objections to Gordon's
    Appointment.--Also to General Brown's Interference.


During the absence of the Chung-wang on his campaign to the north, and
while I was still confined by illness in Nankin, important events
disastrous to the Ti-ping cause were occurring elsewhere. These events,
which must be described before continuing my personal narrative,
consisted of the organization of that extraordinary flotilla known in
England as the _Anglo-Chinese_, but principally as the _Vampyre_ fleet
in China; the resumption of hostilities against the Ti-pings by General
Staveley and his colleagues; and the conversion of Ward's old
mercenaries into a British contingent, besides the formation of several
other similar legions both at Shanghae and Ningpo.

The origin of the _Vampyre_ scheme to regenerate China by exterminating
the Ti-pings, is as yet uncertain, although Mr. Lay (late Inspector
General of Chinese Customs) in his pamphlet intituled "Our Interests in
China," thus describes its first practical adoption:--"Threatened by Sir
F. Bruce, 'that Her Majesty's Government will not go on protecting
Shanghae for ever,' ... [Blue Book, 1863, pp. 13 and 67], and alarmed by
the news of the loss of Ningpo, and of the advance of the Ti-pings upon
Shanghae ... they (the Manchoo Government) saw that they must
comply,[29] or perish.... The Prince Regent (Kung) accordingly declared
himself ready to adopt any measure that Sir F. Bruce might advise. What
was his bidding? 'Get foreign ships and engage foreign officers.'[30]
'Procure us the ships and the officers,' was the rejoinder."

Accordingly some one whom Mr. Lay terms "my _locum tenens_, Mr. Hart,"
received from the Manchoo Government "a certain sum of money for
transmission to England for the purchase of a steam fleet." Meanwhile
arrangements were made between Mr. Lay and Captain Sherrard Osborne,
R.N., by which that officer agreed to receive the _elevation_ to a
Manchoo Admiralship. The British Government suspended the Foreign
Enlistment Act, ignored the pledges of neutrality, and "at the Court at
Windsor, the 30th day of August, 1862," passed an "Order in Council
authorising the enlistment of officers and men, and the equipment and
fitting-out of vessels of war for the service of the Emperor of China."

Although fearing I may tire my readers, I cannot resist quoting from a
small book of official letters under my hand in order to prove by most
conclusive authoritative testimony the _false pretences_ upon which the
raising of the flotilla and the enlistment of British subjects in the
service of the barbarous Manchoo despotism was permitted in England. The
letters have been lent to me by a distinguished Member of Parliament,
and are written by one of the first Shanghae merchants to his brother, a
member of the present Government. These letters have, I am informed,
been submitted to various ministers; therefore, it may be concluded that
in addition to the despatches of Consul Meadows, &c., the Government had
ample means of becoming acquainted with the favourable characteristics
of the unfortunate Ti-pings they have devoted to destruction.

The letter I now propose quoting is written in reference to Earl
Russell's speech in the debate upon China in the House of Lords on the
2nd of July, 1862, and commences by stating "Earl Grey's view is far
sounder than that of the Government." Passing over Earl Russell's
preamble the letter states:--

    "II. Earl Russell next propounds two questions:--

    "_First._--Will the Ti-pings give us the same advantages which
    the Government of China is bound to give us?

    "_Second._--Can the Ti-pings form a Government with which
    foreign Powers can treat?

    "He argues a negative answer to these questions, and I take
    issue with him on his argument as follows:--

    "_First._--He alludes to the agreement made with the Ti-pings at
    Nankin by Admiral Hope, restricting them to a limited distance
    of thirty miles from Shanghae. The arrangement was made about
    the end of 1860, and was generally understood at the time to be
    limited to the space of one year. _The agreement was faithfully
    kept for that time._ When Admiral Hope and Mr. Parkes went to
    Nankin at the close of 1861,[31] they found the Ti-pings
    stubborn, and, I believe, the latter would give no further
    pledge, while Shanghae, under our protection, was made the
    arsenal, mint, and storehouse of their opponents!... I believe
    that the Ti-pings acted in good faith, as far as they knew, and
    that _the accusation is fallacious_.


    "Earl Russell, on the assumption of their want of faith,
    proceeds to say:--'They approached very near to Shanghae. Junks
    belonging to British owners were seized, the crews were
    imprisoned, _one_ European was murdered, and every determination
    was shown to interfere with the British _trade_ at that port.'

    "This is a very sweeping sentence, and to a great extent
    fallacious.

    "'A. The Ti-pings certainly, early _this_ year, came in strong
    force close to Shanghae. Their leaders sent in a note
    immediately to the British and French authorities.... _All
    negotiation was repudiated by our authorities._'

    "Seeing that Shanghae was the centre, from which, under cover of
    our flags, safe from harm, the Imperialists organized all their
    plans, provided all the necessaries of war, and found a ready
    treasury in the customs' revenue, it is not to be wondered at
    that the Ti-pings were most anxious to get possession of a place
    so important to the success of their cause; and it is scarcely
    reasonable, in this view, to suppose that they ever intended to
    pledge themselves in perpetuity, to allow such a state of
    matters to continue.

    "'B. Junks belonging to British owners were seized, and their
    crews imprisoned.'

    "This is so vague, that it is difficult to know what instances
    are alluded to. Some boats, British owned, were, during last
    season, stopped at the passes from the silk districts, in
    possession of the rebels, _from their attempting to run the pass
    without paying the usual toll_. I have never heard of any boat
    being molested which stopped and paid the moderate duty exacted
    by the _de facto_ power....

    "'C. _One_ European was murdered.'

    "To what case does this allude? Several Europeans have been
    murdered. A Frenchman, named Salabelle, having imprudently gone
    up the Yang-tze in a China boat with a lot of dollars, was
    murdered by pirates in collusion with the boatmen. The Ti-pings
    had nothing to do with that.

    "Another man, in charge of a silk-boat, was attacked on his way
    to Shanghae by a band of robbers. He was killed, but the robbers
    turned out to be Imperial soldiers--not Ti-pings. I have not
    heard of any European being so murdered by the Ti-pings. On the
    contrary, both last year and this season, numbers of Europeans
    have been engaged in the silk and green tea districts in
    pursuance of their business, and have been perfectly welcome, on
    paying the duty on their produce....

    "'D. And every determination was shown to interfere with the
    British trade at that port.'

    "_This, to a person on the spot, is a most extraordinary
    statement._ Both last year and this season the Ti-pings have had
    possession of the entire silk district, and a great part of the
    green tea district. Yet, for the year ending the 30th of June
    last, we exported 75,000 bales of silk, and fully 50,000 bales
    have come to market already of the new crop. What sterling money
    do these 125,000 bales of silk represent? Take them at L80 per
    bale, you have L10,000,000 sterling, or one-third of the
    L30,000,000, which Earl Russell correctly states as about the
    present annual value of the Shanghae trade. The Ti-pings might
    have cut off nearly all this, had they been so inclined, but
    they have allowed it all to come to market on payment of a
    moderate duty. I have not the figures of the green teas by me at
    this moment, but a very full supply was exported up to 30th June
    last, a great part of which came from districts in possession of
    the Ti-pings.

    "Are these facts consistent with Earl Russell's assertions?

    "I think they confute them altogether.... You are trying to
    patch up a rotten Government, which will only get weaker for all
    your efforts to mend it. Finally on this head, the Ti-pings have
    all along professed anxiety to keep on friendly terms with us,
    till our decided hostility, and harbouring of the Imperialists
    at Shanghae, has made their wish impracticable. They are not
    inimical to trade, as the facts above prove. They are not the
    savages who would murder every European who goes among them on
    peaceable pursuits, as many who have been among them could
    prove; and I believe that if we could only give up the
    unfortunate Imperialism we have espoused, we should find them
    quite ready to give every facility of trade we have now, and to
    restore this unlucky province to peace.

    "_Second._ Earl Russell asks:--

    "'Is there any chance, supposing the Ti-pings consented not to
    annoy us any longer, and we made peace with them, that they
    could form a regular government?--and upon this point we have
    most convincing testimony.'

    "Convincing testimony, indeed! Mr. Roberts[32] is the first....
    Some time back Mr. Roberts went to join his former pupil at
    Nankin. Whatever faults the chief might have, he was always most
    kind to his former teacher. The reverend gentleman, however, was
    alarmed one day, and left the place precipitately, and therefore
    wrote a recantation of his former belief in Ti-pingdom. He could
    not have been quite in his senses at the time, for the boy whom
    he said was murdered before his eyes, was seen alive and well
    afterwards....

    "His opinion is not worth much.

    "The next authority is Mr. Consul HARVEY of Ningpo."

The writer of the letter deprecates the idea of using this gentleman's
testimony in a grave debate, especially because it was permitted to
overrule the opposite evidence adduced by the talented and trustworthy
Mr. Consul Meadows. It is unnecessary to say more upon this subject than
notice the fact that Mr. Meadows is a man of honour, of noble mind, and
possesses a thorough knowledge of Ti-ping and Manchoo; Mr. Harvey
is--Mr. Harvey!

The letter continues:--

    "On the strength of these valuable witnesses, Earl Russell
    proceeds to say, 'It must therefore be clear to your lordships
    that it is quite impossible anything like civil relations can be
    established with the Ti-pings, or that they can govern the
    Chinese empire, or conduct relations with foreign countries upon
    the footing of amity upon which alone peace can be preserved.'

    "Well, if their lordships are content to come to this conclusion
    on this valuable evidence, they are very likely to find out
    their mistake in doing so."

After citing proof of the "very great system in their military
department," the writer of the letter goes on to state with regard to
the Ti-pings:--

    "If men can thus conduct the details of a military department,
    is it not probable that they have also the power of conducting
    the details of a civil department, when the military necessity
    is past? At Soo-chow, which the Ti-pings have now had for
    eighteen months, the country people round about are now living
    quietly enough, and carrying on their usual avocations....

    "With regard to the attack at Ningpo, Earl Russell asserts that
    the Ti-pings first fired on Captain Dew. The fact was, I
    believe, that the pirate, 'Apak,' anchored his boats near the
    English ships, so that in firing at 'Apak,' the shot from the
    rebel batteries came close to, or over, the foreign ships. An
    excuse for attack was wanted, this was enough, and the place was
    taken.

    "The Earl goes on to say, 'It appeared clear from this that
    there was no chance of our being able to maintain any relations
    of amity with the Ti-pings; and as they seemed determined to
    destroy us, all that we could do was to protect our trade and
    the lives of our merchants.'

    "It is not to be expected that we can be on terms of amity while
    we make Shanghae the arsenal of the Imperialists, and carry out
    our intervention on the principle by which it has hitherto been
    characterized.

    "A most disgraceful affair took place the other day. Nine young
    gentlemen, members of the Shanghae Mounted Volunteer Corps, went
    out one afternoon with Captain BORLASE, of H.M. ship _Pearl_,
    and a party of men, to reconnoitre. They came on a number of
    Ti-pings, who on seeing the horses, immediately threw away their
    arms, and ran off half naked. Captain Borlase gave the order to
    pursue and _to give no quarter_.[33] These young gentlemen
    accordingly amused themselves that afternoon in cold-blooded
    murder, and their captain distinguished himself, it is said, by
    the chivalrous action of killing a man lying badly wounded on
    the ground. One of the number, a young friend of mine, I am glad
    to say, refused to obey the order he received. I say that if
    H.M.'s officers are to be permitted to give such brutal orders,
    the sooner we cease to talk of Ti-ping cruelties and the
    savageries of General Butler the better.... A cry has been _got
    up_ about the cruelties of the Ti-pings, for want of a better
    war-cry, and our people are taught to illustrate Christianity by
    the perpetration of cruelties, considering our lights,
    infinitely more atrocious. The conduct of the Ti-pings,
    notwithstanding all the provocation they have received, towards
    foreigners who have had to enter their lines on business,
    contrasts in their favour with our conduct to them.

    "From Captain Osborne's appointment, I infer that my friend Lay
    has been entirely Imperialist in the advice he has given the
    Government.

    "I regret that Osborne should have taken such an appointment,
    and that Government should have sanctioned it.

    "I regret still more that Palmerston should be making what I
    consider such a grave mistake on this question, and that is one
    of the main reasons why I write these letters. Another is that I
    am convinced our present policy will be detrimental alike to
    British interests, and to the interests of the Chinese people."

We have seen that Messrs. Jardine and Matheson pronounced the policy of
their Government "suicidal." We have now noticed the important evidence
of another of the principal merchants, in whose interest it was alleged
to be necessary to slaughter the Ti-pings. The British Parliament was
persuaded by fallacies, and the "Vampyre" fleet was made ready and sent
to China, while the British people were led into the belief that it was
organized merely to act against Chinese pirates, the Government organs
representing the Ti-pings as "attempting to force a way to the sea
coast, where they hope to take to the amphibious life a Chinaman always
loves, and prowl at sea or penetrate the inner waters as necessity or
opportunity may tempt or dictate." This, and innumerable similar
fabrications, are perfectly astounding by the depth of their untruth and
the total absence of any foundation. The above-quoted statement is only
surpassed by another in the same article of the same newspaper:--"It is,
however, _the people of China_ who have broken the force of the
Ti-pings, and it is under the dread of their terrible reprisals that the
Ti-pings are now attempting to force a way to the sea-coast"!!!

This article, so horribly wicked in purpose and so thoroughly false in
substance, was one of those written upon the grand meeting held at the
rooms of the Royal Geological Society upon the subject of the
"Anglo-Chinese flotilla." The leaders of the quasi-regenerating
expedition here held forth to the scientific gentlemen of the Society,
their friends, and sundry members of the Government. The speeches they
made, their arguments, facts, and declared intentions, were equally
reasonable and trustworthy as the statement in the newspaper article
eulogising them, and which, by some most extraordinary perversity of
knowledge, represented the bitter and ruthless warfare prosecuted by
Admirals Hope and Protet, Generals Staveley and Brown, and others,
against the Ti-pings, as "_the people of China_ who have broken the
force of the Ti-pings." Certes, had such been the case, it required an
astonishing quantity of British shot, shell, artillery, and men, to
enable the Manchoo Government to occupy any single village or foot of
land held by the "broken force!" And one can hardly discover the object
of the flotilla if the "people of China" had already done the only thing
for which it was being organized; for which Prince Kung was paying, and
Mr. Lay, Captain Sherrard Osborne, and his men, receiving a goodly share
of that Manchoo mintage. Five months later, this "broken force" was
found to be so well able to convert its opponents into a similarly
unpleasant state, that upon the 9th day of January, 1863, another order
in counsel was passed, making it "lawful for all military officers in
Her Majesty's service to enter into the military service of the Emperor
of China."

To resume the history of the "Vampyre" expedition. At the oratorical
display of the civil leader and the naval chief, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer (with a keen eye to the guarantee the flotilla might afford
for the payment of the indemnities by China) was present to see, to
hear, to judge, and to wind up in most affecting and impressive style by
giving the well-paid, and doubtless well-deserving, adventurers his
blessing.

Mr. Lay, with a surprising theory for a questionable purpose, told the
meeting that the great cause of the civil war in China was its crowded
population, "which the productive power of the soil was not sufficient
to maintain." Emigration of the Ti-pings (when he caught them) was his
remedy. Now, how that clever, though it is just possible, mistaken
gentleman, expected to forward the change of habitation with the
Armstrong and Whitworth guns, and other deadly weapons of exceedingly
killing power he was carefully providing, is by no means clear, unless,
indeed, the emigration was to be eternal. Neither is it by any means
easy to understand that if the production of the soil was not sufficient
to maintain the natives, the distress could be alleviated by making it
support, in addition, a large number of very expensive foreign officers
and men, besides a costly fleet of steamers.

Captain Sherrard Osborne then succeeded the would-be Dictator General of
China, and with no less extraordinary principles than his civilian
superior, made the astounding declarations:--1. "That his first duty in
China would be to bear in mind that he was a member of the Geographical
Society." 2. "That he was going to China to spread peace, and not to
shed blood" (with his Armstrongs and &c.s). 3. "That his object was to
teach the Chinese rather the duty of sparing than the art of killing"
(singular that such pains were taken to procure the most effective
armament England could furnish). 4. "And that he hoped to report that
Nankin was taken without the loss of one life after the assault was
over."

1. As the _Daily News_ wrote at the time, "Though this may be very
advantageous for Burlington House, it affords an adequate explanation of
the way China is to benefit by his vaunted advent. Perhaps, however, it
may be accepted as a proof of his being a philanthropic adventurer; that
his first care will be to look after, not the interests of the Chinese
Government, which pays him 3,000_l._ a year, but those of a society to
whose funds he is called on to contribute."

4. This naive announcement is a startling one for the "pirate" dodge of
the gallant captain's friends, and proves that the only motive, which,
in fact, is admitted by all save a few bigots, was suppression of the
Ti-ping revolution.

Of Mr. Lay and his fighting-man, the _Daily News_ well said, "As these
gentlemen seem to have the power of carrying on their scheme for the
present, they will doubtless do so, but it is a mistake for them to
depart from the policy of reserve which they have hitherto followed."

In dire alarm and trouble, Prince Kung grasped at the offer of a fleet
to save the Manchoo dynasty, as a drowning man will clutch at a straw.
The British Government, wisely thinking that the fleet would guard the
treaty ports against the Ti-pings, and thereby protect both the payment
of the indemnity and the opium trade at the expense of the Chinese,
quickly seized the opportunity it shadowed forth. The justice of their
conduct is a very different matter, and it would be interesting indeed
to know by what right the capture of Nankin was undertaken,--a city far
in the interior of China, the owners of which only entreated the
friendship of foreigners, while striving to throw off a foreign yoke and
enjoy the blessing of the Christian faith and self-government.

The worst part of the tale has now to be related. Upon the individual
authority of Mr. Lay, the flotilla (consisting principally of British
men-of-war) having struck the English flag, hoisted a green and yellow
rag, and without commission or any authority to constitute them national
ships of war, proceeded to the high seas in true pirate fashion. The
laws of England were unscrupulously violated, her navy indelibly
disgraced, and all who took share in the expedition perfectly fooled, by
the _unofficial_ countenance of a Manchoo Prince, and the indecent haste
of British ministers to comply with his ambiguous request for a fleet,
in order to gratify their own ulterior motives.

Prince Kung simply authorized Mr. Lay to buy a number of vessels, but
those ships were despatched from England fully manned and armed, as
though they had been duly commissioned, which was not, and never became,
the case. Mr. Lay and Captain Osborne, between them, prepared an
agreement (that being the authority and regulation upon which the crews
were engaged, and merely a private understanding, strangely resembled
the bond of a piratical organization), which, had it been carried into
execution, would virtually have consigned the destinies and executive of
China into their hands. These were the salient features of the
agreement:--

    "4. Osborne undertakes to act upon all orders of the Emperor
    which may be conveyed direct to Lay; and Osborne engages not to
    attend to any orders conveyed through any other channel.

    "5. Lay, upon his part, engages to refuse to be the medium of
    any orders of the reasonableness of which he is not satisfied."

No wonder the Manchoo Government repudiated this pretty arrangement,
fleet and all, when it arrived in China. There is, however,
another reason to account for the ignominious failure of the
"Vampyres,"--ignominious because they had neither right nor
justification to be placed in the position of mercenaries, or to be
subjected to dismissal by a barbarous court. The Imperialists were
willing enough to receive a fleet upon _any_ terms when the success of
the Ti-ping revolution was certain unless foreigners interfered; but
when the "Vampyres" did arrive, the dread of the avenging Ti-ping no
longer existed. By English troops and English officers in command of
Chinese disciplined legions, the revolutionists had been driven back
from Shanghae and Ningpo, and were still retreating before the shock of
foreign arms. Mr. Lay and Captain Osborne came too late. They could not
become the slaves of the Manchoo, neither could they constitute
themselves his tyrants, and consequently Prince Kung repudiated all his
obligations with characteristic treachery.

When the flotilla reached China the Imperial Government endeavoured to
place it under the command of the provincial authorities, and by this
determination they effected its dissolution. Captain Osborne refused to
lower himself into the position occupied by British officers in the
neighbourhood of Shanghae and Ningpo--that of filibusters, subordinate
to the _local_ authorities--but the Tartars had the best of the
argument, for the precedent existed in the terms upon which the military
had taken service with them; they were therefore justified in applying
the same reasoning to make the navy of England subservient to their
inferior officials. Prince Kung and his colleagues were decided upon
this point and the repudiation of other guarantees; Captain Osborne
remained equally firm; consequently Mr. Lay lost his lucrative
appointment as Inspector General of Chinese customs, Captain Osborne did
not become a Manchoo Admiral, and the naval force of no nationality was
sold, while the officers and men had to go back to where they came from.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer's magniloquent benediction, in which he
prophesied of "the day when its leaders would come back rich in
professional fame, and bringing also with them fresh glory to their
country," vanished and disappeared in thin air, thanks to the failure of
the attempt to "spread peace" with rifled artillery. Mr. Lay, since his
tardy appreciation of the Manchoo, in "Our Interests in China," thus
describes the state of affairs which led to the failure of his
regenerating scheme:--

    "When I left China, the Emperor's Government, under the pressure
    of necessity,[34] and with the beneficial terror established by
    the allied foray to Pekin in 1860 fresh in their recollection,
    was in the best of moods, willing to be guided," &c. "What did I
    find on my return? The face of things was entirely changed.
    There was the old insolent demeanour, the nonsensical language
    of exclusion, the open mockery of all treaties, the declared
    determination to yield nothing that could be evaded. In short,
    all the ground gained by the treaty of 1858 had been frittered
    away, and we were thrust back into the position we occupied
    before the war--one of helpless remonstrance and impotent
    menace."

A pretty state of affairs truly! Re-established, too, by British
politicians, who, by supporting the Manchoos, have perpetuated a system
which the Ti-pings would have altered for ever.

Time has already proved the truth of the above assertion by Mr. Lay;
time will yet prove the bitter hatred the present dynasty of China
entertains towards Great Britain, the nation which has frequently
chastised them, forced them to break their own laws and receive the
obnoxious opium, humbled them before their people and compelled them to
eat the fruit of humility, and worse than all, originated the once
irresistible Ti-ping revolution by the importation of Christianity. They
would not be men did they forget the blows (not always justifiable) they
have received; they would not be Manchoo did they forget to revenge
themselves _when_ able.

Financially considered, this Anglo-Manchoo expedition was rather a
serious matter for the British Government. The only authentic estimate
of the expenditure which is at present available shows that the portion
consequent merely on the return of the flotilla when its services were
rejected, amounted to 213,000 taels, or L71,000, which was advanced in
the first instance from the Manchoo customs and subsequently refunded by
England when receiving the quarterly payment of the Indemnity.

Here is what Captain Osborne says:--

    "Dire necessity made Pekin accept our aid in a form likely to be
    beneficial to China and England. Reason or argument had nothing
    to do with it, so far as the mandarins were concerned. Most
    unexpectedly to them, our authorities repulsed the rebellion,
    without taking any guarantees from Pekin for future behaviour.
    The mandarins were at once rampant; they are not such fools as
    to spend their revenue in maintaining order, if we Englishmen
    will do it for nothing. The fear of rebellion is past. Lay, I,
    and the force may return to England."

With regard to the failure of the Osborne, Lay, and Gladstone theory, we
can only say that it was deserved. Mr. Lay was dismissed from the
service of the Manchoo, through the "Vampyre" embroglio. The many years
that he had faithfully and energetically served them were lost sight of
in the squabble arising from this unparalleled affair. He most likely
was sincere in his efforts to regenerate Tartars; he has certainly been
badly treated by them. Lay's motive in undertaking the notorious
flotilla scheme seems to have been his philanthropical idea (brightened
by the receipt of L5,000 a year), of regenerating China. Some people say
he was a puppet in the hands of "taller men" behind, who worked the
wires. Osborne's acceptance of the command without a commission may be
ascribed to the erratic notions of that gallant officer, and _his_
natural philanthropy.

The arrival of the "Vampyre" fleet was hailed with general
disapprobation upon the part of the foreign community at Shanghae; its
flight, without spreading peace, with no less satisfaction. During the
short time the would-be mercenaries--the cream of the British navy, as
they were loudly proclaimed to be, by ultra-philo-Imperialist papers and
people--remained at that port, they managed to create no little ill
feeling against themselves. Although they possessed neither warrant nor
Imperial authority for their position and action, they nevertheless had
the audacity to constitute themselves into a sort of police by _land_
and water. No business could be transacted on shore, no vessel move upon
the waters of the harbour, or work its cargo, unmolested by their
inquisition. Vessels were seized, and their crews imprisoned in irons,
upon the merest suspicion that they might be destined to assist the
Ti-pings; houses were broken into and searched throughout the British
and American settlements for supposed Ti-ping refugees, by parties armed
to the teeth. They took, however, particular care not to venture upon
the French settlement, as the Gallic authorities had given their own
police orders to arrest them if they went there; and, if they resisted,
to shoot them. The whole place was thrown into a regular ferment and
uproar by their proceedings.

Just previous to the ignominious flight of the "cream of the British
navy,"--which, by the way, possessed an extraordinary sympathy for
another sort of cream peculiar to the Shanghae rum mills,--I happened to
become personally acquainted with some of their piratical outrages,
while visiting Shanghae for medical advice, and other reasons which will
transpire by-and-by.

General Burgevine, successor to Ward in command of the disciplined
Chinese contingent, having been badly treated and cashiered by his
Manchoo masters, had joined the Ti-pings at Soo-chow. At the time of my
visit to Shanghae, Burgevine was supposed to be there also; and, using
this as their pretext, the "Vampyres" made a descent upon the house of
my friend, Mr. Tarrantt (Editor of the _Friend of China_), where we were
passing the evening with a social party. The dwelling was situated in a
compound, also containing the house of the American Marshal; and, while
walking round the grounds with my friend and another gentleman, we were
suddenly pounced upon in the dark by a party of "the cream of the
British navy," hitherto concealed in the shrubbery. At the same moment
other detachments rushed into the adjoining houses with a zeal and
alacrity tending to prove what capital burglars they were becoming, and,
making prisoners of all the men they could find, marched them up to the
position we had already been conducted to, in the broad colonnade
extending along the front of the American Marshal's house. It was very
fortunate neither myself nor any of our company were armed, otherwise,
from the suspicious and sudden circumstances under which they had made
their appearance, we might very naturally have mistaken the men who
sprang upon us for the assassins, or robbers, whom they so strongly
resembled. The "Vampyres" were commanded by a Lieutenant Ridge, the most
ungentlemanly and discourteous British officer it has ever fallen to my
lot to meet.

When our friends were all assembled under the guns of his men, he turned
to the latter and distinctly gave them this order, at least in
substance: "Now then, men, allow none of these gentlemen to leave this
place; _if they attempt to do so, shoot them down_!" This spirited
British officer then led off a party bristling with rifle, bayonet,
cutlass, and revolver, himself with sword in hand and a huge "Deane and
Adams" slung round his neck, and proceeded to tear up the flooring of
Mr. Tarrantt's printing-office, in order to search for arms destined for
the dreaded Ti-ping! Of course none were found. The man and his men then
proceeded to the sanctum of the editor, and ransacked this and the
adjoining rooms, emptying and breaking open boxes of letters, papers,
and other editorial correspondence, leaving the whole scattered about
the floor in a state of inextricable confusion, after their fruitless
search for some trace of Burgevine or his doings.

When this gallant exploit had been brought to a termination by the fact
that no private place under lock and key remained to be broken into, the
leader of the outrage turned his attention to the neighbouring mansion.
Having rummaged every nook and corner from top to bottom with a
fruitless result, excepting indeed a spoil of two old muskets, a
fowling-piece in good order, and another without any barrels, which they
carried off in triumph, the "Vampyres" released us from the
unpleasantness of their presence and took themselves off, visibly
disappointed at their want of success.

Mrs. Pindar, the wife of the American Marshal, told us that Lieutenant
Ridge had even penetrated into her bed-room and ransacked the drawers of
her toilet table, &c. That Yankee lady accompanied him during his
impertinent and unwarrantable intrusion, and assisted him by suggesting
that he had better explore the chimney pots, have the carpets lifted to
see whether Burgevine was hidden there, or perhaps he would like to
search her pockets, &c. The "Vampyre" officer wore a uniform of unknown
nationality, consisting of simple anchor buttons and a British naval
badge with the crown cut off! When asked by Mr. Tarrantt for his
authority, he produced an informal warrant from the British consul,
which could only have been legally used by a consular constable. When
this was explained to him, he agreed to the justice of the fact and
pleaded orders from his commanding officer. He was thereupon asked for
his commission, and he naively admitted he had none. He was next asked
upon what authority his commanding officer was acting, and his reply
was, upon Captain Sherrard Osborne's commission from the Emperor of
China (this in ludicrously pompous language and manner). He was then
asked whether he was aware that Captain Osborne did _not_ possess any
such commission, and confessed that, although he believed the reverse,
he thought the Commander-in-chief might have gone to Pekin to obtain it!
The judicial proceedings that would have been instituted against the
"Vampyres" but for their fortunate retreat from China, would almost
certainly have found them guilty of unqualified piracy, not only in the
case I have just described, but in several others equally outrageous.

About this time, and while it was fully expected that the flotilla would
shortly proceed to attack Nankin, the following squib appeared as an
advertisement in the _Friend of China_:--

    "WANTED:

    "Several first-class ships, to convey several thousand rebels
    from Nankin to Labuan.

    "Apply to
    "LAE, HORSEBORN, & CO."

Many foreign merchant vessels were in the habit of flying long pennants
from the main truck, a practice indulged in by some of the shipping at
Shanghae. This proved offensive to the "Vampyre" officers, who chose to
consider that it was an infringement of their _quasi_ right to the
man-of-war emblem. They consequently amused themselves by boarding
sundry easy-going Dutchmen, who, alarmed by their brass-bound appearance
and peremptory orders to strike the obnoxious pennant, generally
complied very quietly. Upon one occasion, however, while I was at
Shanghae, the would-be Tartar martinets caught a Tartar of the implied
characteristics, if not literal nationality.

An American vessel with a particularly extensive pennant, which it was
afterwards rumoured had been rigged up on purpose, happened to attract
the "fe fi fo fum" sense of a "Vampyre" commander. Instantly a cutter
was despatched with a lieutenant to humble the offending parties. The
officer proceeded on board and ordered the chief mate to haul down the
pennant. Mr. Mate immediately sang out, "Cook, bring a bucket of hot
water aft," but before this could be brought, the "Vampyre" was over the
gangway "like a streak of greased lightning," as the Yankee mate
afterwards related to an admiring audience on shore, and shouting with
might and main to his boat's crew: "Give way, men!" in order to escape
the warm reception preparing for him.

By such acts the "cream of the British navy" made few friends and many
enemies, and the lament of few indeed accompanied their ignominious
departure. During their stay some of the gallant tars deserted and went
over to the enemy, and I cannot forget a very characteristic fact
related by a friend of mine who was present. While passing a certain rum
shop in the "model settlement" of Shanghae, my friend, with several
companions, became mixed with a crowd of the tars, who were on leave,
and had just issued from the shop. Willing to see a little of the sort
of men represented as the _elite_ of the finest navy in the world, my
friend got into conversation with a warrant officer, although the man
and his companions had evidently been indulging their creamy
propensities. The result was that when questioned as to their feelings
for the service they had engaged in, the leader of the party made this
exposition of principle: "D'ye see, my hearty, so long as we gets the
dollars and can make a haul, d---- my toplights if we cares who we
fights for, the himperor of Chiny or his hinemies the t'other longshore
Chinymen."

Organized upon principles of wrong and injustice, the Anglo-Chinese
flotilla came to an unregretted, disreputable, and premature end. In the
words of the same friend who communicated the above incident we will
dismiss the subject: "Captain Sherrard Osborne, like Caesar, may exclaim,
'I came, I saw;' unlike Caesar, 'I did _not_ conquer.' The fleet was
equipped, set sail, arrived, and--was not wanted."

We must now turn to survey events far more disastrous to the Ti-ping
cause than the advent of the foreign vessels of war we have just
finished with, although the fact of their arrival, connected with what
we are about to notice, helped to produce the misfortunes.

Soon after the Chung-wang had recaptured all the places formerly taken
by the allies, and had returned to Nankin with the greater proportion of
his troops, General Staveley, having received the desirable
reinforcements of British troops from Tien-tsin and Hong-kong, resumed
hostilities.

Although Admiral Hope had respect enough for the usages of civilized
nations to invent a _casus belli_ for the raids he first initiated,
General Staveley proved himself to be above such petty considerations
when they could be ignored with impunity, and therefore, upon
commencing a fresh war against the Ti-pings, did not trouble himself to
pretend that they might, could, would, or should do anything inimical to
British interests. However much scrupulous people may think that an
English general should have paid _some_ regard to the rules of civilized
warfare, the gallant officer in question cannot at all events be charged
with hypocrisy.

During the month of August, 1862, the filibuster, General Ward, assisted
by detachments of British and French troops, succeeded in taking several
fortified villages from the Ti-pings and recapturing the city of
Tsing-poo; the success of the operations being attributable to the large
park of artillery always employed. After the fall of Tsing-poo, Ward
moved off with the principal portion of his force into the Ningpo
district, and joined a column already operating there. Since the
atrocious expulsion of the Ti-pings from Ningpo by Captain R. Dew, R.N.,
and his pirate ally, Apak, the advance of filibustering and piracy had
made wonderful progress. Several contingents of disciplined Chinese were
raised, the most important being an officially-authorized British legion
and a similar French one, both entirely officered by foreigners,
including English, American, French, and representatives of other
nations. At first, these organizations consisted of about 1,500 men
each, besides artillery-men to work the numerous heavy guns they were
supplied with. In addition to these, and other bodies of foreign
disciplined and officered mercenaries, Captain Dew devoted the entire
service of the squadron under his command to their assistance and
support, perfectly oblivious of the fact that he was a British officer,
and that the ships prostituted by him to an infamous alliance with
pirates and freebooters were the property of British tax-payers, who
maintained them solely for the protection of their own interests.

The British men-of-war, the Manchoo gunboats, the French vessels, the
American, English, and French drilled filibusters, the Cantonese
pirates, and Imperialist troops, all leagued themselves together in the
war to exterminate the unfortunate Ti-pings, and _loot_ their cities. In
spite of their numbers, their boundless supplies of every munition of
war, their irresistible shell and artillery, and the co-operation of the
friendly legions swarming from the grand depot, Shanghae, these
heterogeneous marauders found the "broken force" able to give them many
hard knocks and many a severe repulse, although the _Times_ happened to
think that "the people of China" had somehow converted the Ti-ping
revolution into a crowd of fugitives running away from their mythical
"terrible reprisals." This statement might do very well to excite the
horror of pious people in England ready to believe anything dreadful;
but the mercenaries banded together against the would-be freemen and
Christians found that to break the force of the latter many a deadly
encounter, and many a cunningly contrived Moorsom or shrapnel shell, was
required. During a period of nearly twelve months, extending from
August, 1862, to the middle of the summer, 1863, the horrors of Chinese
warfare fluctuated backwards and forwards over what would otherwise have
been one of the fairest parts of God's earth. The Ningpo and
neighbouring districts possess a beauty and variety of scenery, added to
a surpassing richness of production (tea, silk, cotton, &c.), second to
none in the world. Yet a few experimental warriors and politicians have
been permitted to create misery and ruin throughout this smiling land,
and strew its plains with mouldering skeletons.

The war conducted by Captain Dew and his colleagues raged furiously for
many months. The cities of Tse-kie, Yu-yaou, Fung-wha, Shou-shing, &c.,
were each taken, retaken, lost, and won, several times over, by the
Allies and by their Ti-ping enemies, and were at last finally held by
the former.

To give any detailed account of the numerous actions fought within the
Ningpo province would be impossible. With one exception they resembled
those in the first campaign of Admiral Hope and General Staveley. The
same great slaughter of the Ti-pings with the deadly artillery, to which
they could make no reply; the same gallant efforts to repel the
stormers, who rushed forward after the defenders had been thoroughly
shelled for many hours; the exception being that few of the cities were
carried by assault. It is, I believe, due to the fact that a great
proportion of the Ti-ping soldiery about the Ningpo districts were
Cantonese, or Kwang-si men, that nearly every attempt to storm the
cities they held was repulsed. They were ultimately driven out of the
province, and the cities were, almost without exception, evacuated,
although the besiegers had been severely repulsed, being rendered
untenable by the severance of their lines of supply and communication.

There are two important episodes of Captain Dew's war which, from their
influence upon future events, it is necessary to notice. The first is
the death of General Ward; the second, the attack upon Shou-shing, in
consequence of which Captain Dew was reprimanded by his superior officer
and the British Government, and was thereby compelled to desist from
actually participating in the further hostilities.

General Ward, whatever his failings might have been, was a brave and
determined man. He served his Manchoo employers only too well, and at
the last, by closing a career of peril and fidelity with the sacrifice
of his life, he sealed all faults with his death, and left those who
cherished his memory to regret that he had not fallen in a worthier
cause. While directing the second attack upon the small town of Tse-kie,
some ten miles inland from Ningpo, on the 21st of September, 1862, Ward,
the American filibuster, and the first foreigner to take military
service under the Manchoo, was mortally wounded by a Ti-ping musket
ball. This adventurer originated the force that finally was the
principal instrument in driving the Ti-pings from the dominions they had
established as "Ti-ping tien kwoh." By such apparently insignificant
means does the Great Ruler of the Universe overthrow the efforts and
establish the destinies of man! The death of Ward placed _Colonel_
Burgevine, his immediate subordinate, in command of the force. Burgevine
could not agree with the mandarins, was badly treated by them, resented
their treatment, was dismissed from the command, and the old Ward force
became transformed from a rowdy, filibustering, hired legion, into a
regular contingent of British mercenaries.

The disgrace of Dew, the Ti-ping slayer, came about in this wise:--The
city of Shou-shing, distant more than _one hundred miles_ from Ningpo,
was attacked by an Imperialist army, to which the Anglo-Chinese and
Franco-Chinese contingents were attached. These forces were defeated
with severe loss, including their French general, Le Brethon, who was
killed before the city. A French captain of artillery, by name Tardife,
succeeded to the command; Captain Dew joined forces with him, and
together they proceeded to besiege the place, and to avenge the disgrace
of their former defeat.

Besides several field-pieces landed from the British men-of-war at
Ningpo and a large park of howitzers and mortars belonging to the
disciplined forces, Captain Dew provided them with a large 68-pounder
lent to him for the occasion by General Staveley. Lieutenant Tinling, of
the _Encounter_, with a party of seamen, had charge of this gun. On
their march, the allies entered a large town, which the men thoroughly
pillaged during two days; the consequence being, as it is written by one
who was present, "that it was only after much trouble they could be got
to move forward against Shou-shing. When they did so, at least 500 boats
followed, each soldier having his own private _san-pan_, containing, and
ready for more, _loot_. Many of the officers were almost as bad as the
men, drinking and smoking, and taking hardly any care to maintain
discipline." Here is a pretty description of the doings of those who
were supposed to be protecting the country people from the "ruthless
marauders!" The town referred to was not in Ti-ping possession, and all
the looting was from the unfortunate inhabitants. Facts, that can be
multiplied _ad infinitum_, exist to prove that the foreign intervention,
and the manner and details thereof, seriously increased the anarchy,
desolation, and loss of life, caused by the civil war previous to that
event. The unavoidable devastations had passed away, peace had become
established by the supremacy of the Ti-ping, when, alas!
mercenary-minded Europeans wickedly deluged the peaceful districts with
the blood of fresh victims, and causelessly maintained and prolonged the
unmitigated ravages of war.

Upon reaching the devoted city of Shou-shing,--which, in expectation,
General Tardife had promised his freebooter following the pleasure of
"forty-eight hours" to loot,--Captain Dew placed his big gun in
position, and proceeded to make a hole in the wall, by which the
respectable allies might get at the prizes within. Now it so happened
that the Ti-pings were determined neither to part with their city, nor
their private valuables. A great breach was made, a battalion of
European ruffians, and the nondescript disciplined and Imperialist
troops, rushed forward to take possession; but the defenders--who, to
use the language of an eye-witness, "fought with admirable pluck in the
breach, and exposed themselves freely"--drove them back with a loss of
half the European brigade of Shanghae _rowdies_, half the officers of
the disciplined contingents, and many men _hors de combat_. Almost at
the same moment General Tardife was killed, and Lieutenant Tinling
mortally wounded.

The death of the last-mentioned gallant young officer, by drawing the
attention of Admiral Kuper (on the station), and that of Parliament at
home, to the subject, led to the disapproval of Captain Dew's
disgraceful proceedings, and his removal from a part of China that he
had contaminated by his presence. When brought to task for his
participation in hostilities more than 100 miles from a treaty port, his
shuffling excuse was "that I had gone to watch the proceedings, and
prevent, if possible, any false step being taken by the Chinese
disciplined force, which would at once have imperilled Ningpo." Well, it
is an old saying that, if the blind lead the blind, both fall into the
ditch; and this was undoubtedly realized by Captain Dew. The untrue
statement about "any false step" being certain to imperil Ningpo,
distant 100 miles, and protected by several strong cities directly on
the way, is perfectly absurd; the crafty device was to avoid the censure
he dreaded and deserved by frightening his superiors about the safety of
Ningpo, which he pretended rested upon his exploits at Shou-shing.
Admiral Kuper, however, states in a despatch to the Admiralty, "I have
informed Captain Dew that ... I consider he exceeded his instructions,"
and the Admiralty declares "that my Lords have desired the Rear-Admiral
to inform Captain Dew that he exceeded his instructions." No wonder that
the Chinese papers stated:--

    "How Captain Dew, and all his crew, are allowed to do just what
    they have a mind to, is more than we can tell. Clearly all the
    people he slays he murders. He is violating every law, human and
    divine, to an extent which cannot be overlooked."[35]

It is a well-known fact that vast quantities of _loot_, and a money
bonus from the Imperial authorities, almost invariably attended the
capture of every Ti-ping city; and I have under my hand many apparently
authentic statements in the press, accusing Captain Dew particularly,
and others generally, of having been induced to carry on hostilities
against the Ti-pings for "private aggrandisement," and from "far less
disinterested motives than 'the love of glory.'" As for the effect the
Dew war had upon trade, the following extract from a communication dated
"Ningpo, March 28, 1863," and forwarded to H.B.M. Consul by a number of
influential firms, will show:--"So great a panic exists among the
natives on account of the lawless proceedings, that our trade is in a
worse condition than when the rebels were in the neighbourhood!"

Captain Dew attempted to shirk the responsibility of Lieutenant
Tinling's death at a place where duty did not call him, although his
commanding officer's orders did, by declaring that he (the Captain) was
there as an "amateur!" Killing one's fellow man, even when
conscience-bound by the plea of duty, is bad enough; but roving about,
seeking whom to destroy, and slaughtering innocent men for pleasure, is
somewhat different. We have seen that even the Government, which has
approved every other proceeding, completely repudiated the unpardonable
conduct of Captain Dew; we therefore say adieu to that officer, trusting
there are few like him in the British service.

It is now necessary to notice the last of the events referred to at the
beginning of this chapter. Since the death of the lamented filibuster,
various members of General Staveley's staff and command had been in a
perfect state of ferment, intriguing for the command of the Ward force,
which it was determined should be converted into a British contingent. A
battalion of Chinese, wearing shoulder-straps with the badge "67,"
drilled and officered by members of the British regiment of that number,
and popularly known as Captain "Kingsley's force," was organized and
raised to a strength of 1,000 men. Other corps, and some of Chinese
artillery, were formed, while British officers were induced to accept
various commands pertaining to the Ward force and its head quarters at
the city of Soong-kong.

After a series of preliminary operations, General Staveley effected the
recapture of Kah-ding on the 24th of October, 1862. After a desperate
defence, the Ti-pings were driven from the city with heavy loss.
According to the safe _modus operandi_ acquired by experience, General
Staveley shelled the defenders for some hours from 40 pieces of heavy
artillery and mortars. The besieging army consisted of 5,500 disciplined
troops, including about 3,000 British and French, and a large
co-operating force of Imperialist _braves_ and soldiers. The Ti-pings,
out of a garrison less than 5,000 strong, lost upwards of 1,500 men;
while the allied loss amounted to 4 killed and 20 wounded. Soon after
the capture of this city, the Ting-wang from Hang-chow, the Mo-wang from
Soo-chow, and the Tow-wang from Hoo-chow, each commanding about 5,000
men, were ordered by the Shi-wang (chief in authority over their
districts) to attempt its recovery, and also that of Tsing-poo. This
army was attacked by _General_ Burgevine's force, a column of 500
British troops, some 10,000 Imperialists, and an artillery detachment
with 20 guns. The Ti-pings had just intrenched themselves by the light
field works usual among the Chinese, when they were engaged by the
enemy. Unable to reply to the murderous artillery of the British and
disciplined troops, they still held the position, although the shot and
shell committed fearful havoc in their close ranks. At last, when the
enemy had become tired of their shell practice, and imagined the
Ti-pings were sufficiently decimated, a general assault was given. An
episode in this transaction is worthy of notice.

A division of the attacking army was led by one "Wong-e-poo," a young
Chinese officer who had been promoted to a captaincy at the request of
Admiral Hope, who had also presented him with a sword for conspicuous
bravery during the raids he had lately conducted against the Ti-pings,
and in which the officer had served as a sergeant of Ward's force. This
gallant young Chinaman was the first to cross the line of
intrenchments, and almost instantly fell mortally wounded; he then gave
the sword to General Burgevine, whom he begged to keep it, and to give
his young wife a few dollars to keep her from want--this was his last
request. The Ti-pings, when driven from their slight defences, made a
stand at a village just in the rear, and were three times brought back
to the charge by a fine-spirited young chief, who was the Mo-wang's
brother, and whose gallant bearing and handsome trappings attracted
universal attention. At the last charge, Vincente, the late _General_
Ward's _aide-de-camp_, spurred his horse into the Ti-ping ranks. Misled
by the fact that he had separated himself from the enemy, and believing
he came over as a friend, the chief unsuspiciously advanced towards him
and held out his hand; the Manilla-man replied to his friendly gesture
by shooting him dead, and then, singular to relate, managed to gallop
back to the enemy in safety.

After two hours' fighting, during which the artillery mowed them down by
hundreds, the Ti-pings were driven out of the village, and, being then
hemmed in against a wide creek, which they had only one small pontoon
bridge to cross by, suffered terribly from the deadly fire of grape and
canister shot during their retreat. Their loss in this disastrous action
was 2,300 killed (600 bodies were counted in one portion of the
intrenchments) and 700 prisoners, the latter being barbarously put to
death by their captors.

The frightful atrocities perpetrated upon the unfortunate Ti-pings by
those into whose power they had fallen, even excelled the cruelties of
the cruel Chinese and still more cruel Tartars. "How the Ti-pings were
driven out of the Provinces of Kiangnan and Chekiang," from notes kept
by an officer under Ward, Burgevine, Holland, and Gordon, is a lengthy
narrative published in the _Friend of China_. The portion contained in
the columns of that journal of April 25, 1865, describing the engagement
just noticed, states:--"General Burgevine darkened the victory with a
foul deed. The poor rebels who had been captured _were cruelly blown
away from the guns_, to the delight of a few we will not mention, but to
the disgust of the greater part of the officers." Who, after this, shall
talk of _Ti-ping_ cruelties? The revolutionists had neither made war
upon, injured, nor even insulted foreigners; yet the foreign officers,
supported by the help of British troops, actually massacred their
unoffending and helpless prisoners of war in cold blood! Perhaps
_General_ Burgevine thought he was paying a graceful compliment to his
British allies by imitating their deeds in India. No doubt some
war-Christians think these latter proceedings exceedingly worthy and
proper; however, the Ti-pings have never yet reached such a state of
Christian civilization as to copy them.

The allied loss was 5 killed and 15 wounded, including three Europeans!
And this may be taken as a fair sample of all the succeeding battles
with the British, French, and other disciplined and artillery-supplied
forces. The Ti-pings have always done all that men of flesh and blood
were capable of doing, but, without artillery to resist or reply to that
overwhelming arm of the enemy (supplied freely from the British
arsenals), their bravest and best fell to the iron storm, and the rest
fled before it.

Very shortly after the above action, _General_ Burgevine became the
victim of the scheming carried on between the mandarins and those
British officials who desired to establish the Ward force as an English
contingent. Having taken a large amount of specie from the house of
Ta-kee (the banker to the force, and in the service of the Imperial
Government), which he had been compelled to seize, _nolens volens_, in
order to satisfy his men, who were in an open state of mutiny for their
arrears of pay--pay, too, that seems to have been purposely kept lying
idle at Ta-kee's house, probably with the cunning idea it would act (as
in reality it did) upon the force, and produce some outbreak that could
be taken advantage of to disgrace Burgevine and replace him by a
British officer--he was dismissed from his command and a reward offered
for his head by the Manchoo governor, or Fu-tai, of the province. The
excuse given by the Mandarins for this transaction was that Burgevine
had disobeyed orders, resisted lawful authority, and seized the money.
Some measure of this is very probably true; but whatever offence had
been committed by him, the mandarins had themselves been the cause of it
by their peculation, withholding the wages of the troops, and underhand
intriguing. Probably the fact that Captain Holland, R.M., was installed
as Burgevine's successor, may account for the events leading to the
latter's dismissal.

The Imperialist Mandarins were only too eager to fall into the views of
those who assisted them; the command of the once despised filibustiers'
force by Englishmen meant taking all the danger and responsibility of
repelling the Ti-pings out of their own hands; consequently, availing
themselves of the subserviency of British officers and authorities, they
accepted Captain Holland as the commander of their disciplined troops,
and the services of any others who were willing, and did not feel
dishonoured by hiring themselves out to support such a cruel and corrupt
cause. From this moment the active operations by British troops ceased,
but Ward's old legion became a British contingent, and has continued one
ever since. Backed up in all their operations against the Ti-pings by
the presence of British troops to support them in case of reverse, and
supplied with every munition of war, artillery, ships, &c. they
required, the various mercenary legions infesting the neighbourhood of
Shanghae and Ningpo have managed (with the assistance of the ordinary
Chinese and Manchoo soldiers, who alone outnumbered those of Ti-ping
tien kwoh) to terminate the allied operations by driving the
revolutionists from their once happy territory.

Soon after the command of the force had been assumed by Captain
Holland, it met with the most severe defeat the Ti-pings have ever given
it, and he resigned the appointment in disgust. The Order in Council
permitting British officers to take military service with the Emperor of
China having just reached Shanghae, Major Gordon, R.E., took command of
the disciplined Chinese, and many other officers joined in the
questionable service. From this time forth the British Government became
committed to the success and responsibilities of the force; and for
every atrocity perpetrated by the Imperialists, and for every life
destroyed, are equally as much accountable as they were for the previous
conduct of their own troops. Under such auspices, and with boundless
supplies of all the material of war, similar necessaries being
successfully prevented from reaching their antagonists, it is easy to
appreciate the consequent course of events--continued triumph of the
Anglo-Franco-Manchoo mercenaries, and repeated defeat of the Ti-pings,
already much weakened by the loss of many of their best troops, and
diminished in their prestige from the result of the raids headed by
Admiral Hope and General Staveley.

The worst feature attending the conversion of the mercenary legions into
British auxiliaries, is the fact that Sir F. Bruce, the English Minister
at Pekin, distinctly repudiated any such action; and yet his Government
saw fit to sanction the arrangement when it was reported to them by
Generals Staveley and Brown, who seem to have been foremost among the
Shanghae local advocates of the system. _General_ Burgevine having
proceeded to the Manchoo court at Pekin, stated his case, and was by
them reinstated in his former command; receiving, also, the full
approval of Sir F. Bruce. Upon his return to Shanghae, with an Imperial
Commissioner to place him in position, the British generals and their
colleagues in collusion with the Imperial authorities, disregarding the
direct instructions of Sir F. Bruce, successfully opposed his
reappointment, and managed to retain Major Gordon in command; by what
means being best known to themselves.

We will conclude our notice of the establishment of the Anglo-Manchoo
contingent with a few facts proving the singular, if not sinister,
circumstance, that Sir F. Bruce, although a virulent enemy of the
Ti-pings, has always carefully avoided authorizing the employment of
British officers against the insurgents; and, in fact, has invariably
disapproved such measures, as well as the movement of British troops to
support and succour the contingents when in difficulty.

In a despatch to General Staveley, dated "Pekin, March 12, 1863,"[36]
Sir F. Bruce, referring to the liberty granted to officers to enter the
Chinese Imperial service, states:--"I should prefer that the military
men employed by the Chinese Government should _not_ belong to the great
treaty Powers;" and, with regard to British officers choosing to enter
what the Press in China has termed "the disgusting service," he
expresses the opinion that "they will then bear a Chinese, and not a
British character." How _literally_ this belief has been fulfilled, the
torture of Ti-ping prisoners captured by the Imperialists, the
treacherous massacre of the prisoners at Soo-chow, and the great loss of
life which occurred, after cities were captured, sufficiently prove.

In a despatch dated "April 10,"[37] Sir F. Bruce expresses his wish to
the same officer that Burgevine should be reinstated to the command of
the Ward force, and, speaking "of the charges brought against him,"
states: "I took occasion to examine them at length, and I am perfectly
satisfied that General Burgevine acted from a regard to the interests
confided to him, that he was sacrificed to an intrigue of some Chinese
subordinate officers, and to the jealousy entertained by the Governor
towards the Chinese drilled force." If the Minister had added the names
of a few foreigners as being privy to the "intrigue," he would have hit
upon the whole truth. The Governor was jealous of the force as a Chinese
one managed by foreigners, and successfully plotted, with no little
ingenuity and shrewdness, to make it a foreign force officered by
Englishmen, and countenanced by British authorities, who accepted all
the responsibility entailed.

Upon the subject of Major Gordon's appointment to the coveted
generalship of mercenaries, Sir F. Bruce, in a despatch to General
Brown, dated "June 11," states:[38] "It is not expedient that British
officers should command Chinese troops in the field against the
insurgents, beyond the limits of the radius deemed necessary for the
security of the ports where they are stationed.... I am further of
opinion that, unless the force be properly constituted, and relieved
from the necessity of obeying the orders of the local Government, it
will do no real and permanent good; and that the officer who commands it
will speedily find himself in a position which is neither compatible
with his professional reputation, nor what is due to the character of a
British officer. Under these circumstances, I must _decline_ accepting
the responsibility of authorizing the employment of British officers
beyond Shanghae.... I have informed the Chinese Government of my
objections to the employment of British officers in the field."
Singularly enough, every word prophesied by Sir F. Bruce came to pass;
the force became an instrument of evil in the hands of local Mandarins,
to be used for their individual purposes, and then got rid of; the
officers found their honour tarnished by complicity in deeds of blood
and treachery; some were disgusted, but the Commander retained his
position until he was _compelled_ to break up the force by orders from
his Government. In a despatch to Earl Russell, dated "October 13," Sir
F. Bruce declares:[39] "It was reluctantly, and in deference to the
naval and military authorities, that I consented to our assuming the
responsibility of defending the thirty-mile radius round Shanghae, and I
spared no effort to bring about an arrangement of Burgevine's dispute,
so as to avoid the necessity of having to place an English officer at
the head of the force destined to operate beyond the radius." Yet
members of Lord Palmerston's Government have had the hardihood to
declare that the operations against the Ti-pings _were approved_ by Sir
F. Bruce.

When Major Gordon's force was in danger, General Brown moved
detachments of British troops to support him, and to garrison the
captured towns and hold them against the Ti-pings. Sir F. Bruce, in a
despatch upon the subject, dated "October 6,"[40] clearly condemns his
conduct in these words:--"If officers go into the Chinese service, we
are not entitled to facilitate their operations by moving men, or
placing garrisons in towns beyond the radius for their support, further
than we should be if the corps assisted were commanded by a Chinese
general. We are _not_ entitled to lend them artillery, or men to work
their guns _on any pretext_!" In the very teeth of these distinct
instructions, General Brown persisted in every measure they condemn. It
was the favourite _modus operandi_ over again--the military or naval
authorities acting in direct violation of orders, the disobedience being
ultimately endorsed by the Government, and the apparently disobedient
receiving praise and C.B.'s by way of punishment.


FOOTNOTES:

[29] With the schemes of the Bruce, Wade, Lay, &c., politicians.

[30] This is a startling contrast to what Mr. Bruce declared would be
the "worst" course to pursue.

[31] To completely prove the error of Lord Russell's assumption, and the
slightness of its foundation, we will read the following extract from "A
Memorandum, dated October 15, 1862, addressed to Rear-Admiral Kuper, by
Vice-Admiral Sir J. Hope, on resigning the Command of the Station."
[Blue Book, June, 1862, to February, 1863, p. 111.]

"_The only question of real importance on which we are at variance with
the rebels_, arose from their desire to possess themselves of Shanghae,
and their capture of Ningpo, since retaken.

"On my first visit to Nanking, ... I effected an agreement with them,
_but limited to the year_, that they should not approach it within 100
_li_ (thirty miles), _on the whole tolerably_ WELL KEPT _during that
time_, but which they refused to renew on the occasion of my last
visit."

[32] Mr. Roberts, an American Baptist missionary already referred to in
this work, joined the Ti-pings at Nankin about the end of October, 1860.
Of all missionaries in China he was the least qualified for such a
position. Intolerant and bigoted to the Baptist dogmas, irritable,
peevish, inconsistent, and vacillating--a man singularly illiterate,
without stability of character or pleasantness of manner--his presence
at Nankin did far more harm than good. His objections to every other
Church, and to every other denomination of dissent except his own, went
far to give the Ti-pings a dread of that diversity of doctrine among the
British and Americans which they had always looked upon with surprise,
thinking, as they did, that God could not be well served by those who
were always quarrelling about it. The circumstances attending the advent
and career of Mr. Roberts among the Ti-pings I have avoided as a
worthless episode, but, as the facts of his indecorous flight from
Nankin have been misrepresented, I think it necessary to notice the
subject. Mr. Roberts accepted temporal rank under the Ti-pings, and by
his unwise dogmatical obstinacy frequently provoked unpleasant
discussion. During a dispute with the Kan-wang, who had entertained him
since his arrival, that chief had particular occasion to chastise a boy
of the household. Mr. Roberts was so blinded by passion, the idea that
Europeans would never know the reverse of his statement, or some other
reason, that, in a paroxysm of rage, he fled from the city, and sought
refuge on board H.M. gunboat _Renard_, which happened to be lying in the
port. By some obliquity of vision best known to himself, Mr. Roberts
mistook the stick used by the Kan-wang for a sword, and declared that
his boy _had been_ brutally murdered. Not satisfied with this, although
on the previous night he had retired to rest fully believing the
surrounding people saints, the very next day, after his quarrel with the
Kan-wang, he awoke to find them howling sinners. The many years that he
had praised the Ti-pings as holy men were, by a moment of passion,
forgotten, and within one day Mr. Roberts not only declared himself to
have been deceived so long, but, for the act of one man, gave up the
hundreds of thousands in the Ti-ping cause to fire and sword. We will
just contrast the different statements of Mr. Roberts, one with the
other, and then dismiss the subject.

This is an extract from the first, made on board the _Renard_:--

"Kan-wang, moved by his coolie elder brother--literally a coolie at
Hong-kong--and the devil, without fear of God before his eyes, did on
Monday, the 13th instant (January, 1862), come into the house in which I
was living, _and with malice aforethought murder one of my servants with
a large sword in his own hand, in my presence_, without a moment's
warning or any just cause. _And after having slain my poor, harmless,
helpless boy, he jumped on his head most fiend-like, and stamped it with
his foot._"

Now, at Canton, on the 3rd of April, 1862, when it was generally known
that the above charge of murder was incorrect, Mr. Roberts retracted
these words [Blue Book, 1862, p. 5], having reference to the Kan-wang's
form of baptism:--

"A miserable apostate, (?) polygamist, _and murderer, too_, to wish to
administer an ordinance held sacred by those who practise it. What a
sacrilege! But as to that boy, _I have since been told that he evinced
indications of life after he was dragged out_, by one who saw him. But I
think it would have been less cruel in Kan-wang to have smoothly cut off
his head than to send him out even half killed, destitute, and naked, to
freeze and starve to death. _Whether the boy was killed directly or not,
I cannot esteem Kan-wang, and his elder brother, who prompted him to the
wicked deed, less than murderers; and hence, in my judgment, they ought
both to be treated as such._"

In the pamphlet, "A Letter to the Bishop of Victoria, regarding the
Religion of the Ti-ping Rebels," the author states, "Of course you now
know that the story of that person's boy being murdered by the Kan-wang
is a fabrication. 'The Kan-wang called on me,' said Mr. Roberts, when I
asked him about the matter, 'and desired me to punish the boy. I told
him I would first remonstrate with him; and then he, the Kan-wang's
brother, dissatisfied with my answer, beat him, _as I thought_, to
death.'"

[33] This affair happened on the 25th of August, was reported to the
Shanghae _Daily Shipping and Commercial News_ of the next day, and was
widely known in China. A certain Mr. CHALONER ALABASTER, of the British
consular service, is mentioned in connection with it.

[34] From the success of the Ti-pings.

[35] _China Overland Trade Report_, February 20, 1863.

[36] Blue Book, China, No. 3, 1864, p. 68.

[37] _Id._, p. 80.

[38] Blue Book, No. 3, 1864, p. 96.

[39] _Id._, p. 162.

[40] Blue Book, No. 3, 1864, p. 163.




CHAPTER XXI.

    Personal Narrative continued.--Mr. Lobschied.--His Reception at
    Nankin.--Press Publications.--Mr. Lobschied leaves
    Nankin.--Operations before Tait-san.--The Assault.--Act of
    Bravery.--Route of the Imperialists.--Gordon's Art of
    War.--Tait-san reinvested.--Siege of Tait-san.--Its
    Capture.--Manchoo Atrocities.--Treatment of Ti-ping
    Prisoners.--Mr. Sillar's Statement.--Quin-san
    captured.--Gordon's Report.--Gordon reinforced.--The Chung-wang
    recalled.--Critical Position of the Ti-pings.--The Chung-wang's
    Retreat.--Difficulties encountered.--Reinforcements.--The Scene
    of Battle.--Its Horrors.--Arrival at Nankin.--The Chung-wang's
    Army.--General attack.--The Repulse.--The Surprise.--The Night
    Attack.--The Flight and Pursuit.--Death of Marie.


When at last I became convalescent and able to leave my house in Nankin,
for several reasons I determined to take a trip to Shanghae. My wife
wished to see her relations there; I was anxious to ascertain the
political and practical position of affairs; and, besides, there were
many things to be done toward assisting the Ti-ping cause. The principal
inducement for the trip was, however, the fact that my friends, D. and
Captain P., had, upon their last voyage, brought me some letters from
Chin-kiang (to where they had been forwarded by my agent at Shanghae),
stating that the Rev. W. Lobschied, a distinguished missionary, was
anxious to visit the Ti-ping capital. I at once decided to proceed to
Shanghae and afford him every assistance by placing one of our vessels
at his service for the journey to and from Nankin.

During the last few months of my illness messengers had continually
arrived from the head-quarters of the I- and Chung-wang's armies,
reporting the uninterrupted successes of both. But at the same time
intelligence was received of the second capture of Kah-ding and
Tsing-poo, the capture of Fu-shan by the allies, and the treachery of
the chief in command at the city of Chang-zu, who had accepted the large
bribes offered by the enemy, and surrendered the city. Orders were
consequently despatched to the I-wang's victorious army, already beyond
the Po-yang lake, and that chief detached a considerable portion of it
to return and protect the threatened districts. This force, at the time
I left Nankin (early spring of 1863), was already besieging Chang-zu,
having closely invested the city upon every side.

Having embarked with my wife on board our lorcha, the _Anglo-Ti-ping_,
we proceeded under sail to Chin-kiang, and then took passage in a
steamer to Shanghae. A month after our arrival, every motive for the
visit being accomplished, and the Rev. W. Lobschied having arranged to
accompany me, we returned to Chin-kiang together, and then, getting on
board the lorcha, made sail for Nankin. When half-way there I engaged a
small steamer to tow us up to the forts, in order to oblige the
missionary, who was averse to the delay the calm weather seemed likely
to occasion.

In a couple of days we were cast off at our destination, and I proceeded
on shore with Mr. Lobschied, introducing him to the Sz-wang, who
received him very kindly, and immediately sent word of his arrival to
the Government inside the city. The next morning horses and attendants
were in waiting to escort us to the Kan-wang's presence. Upon reaching
the palace, Mr. Lobschied met with so warm and friendly a reception from
the Kan-wang and many other chiefs, that I am quite sure he can never
cease to remember it with pleasure, and at the same time with regret
that he has not been more energetic or useful to what he knew full well
was the cause of Christianity and righteousness. Many of the Ti-pings
had known him at Canton in former days, when they had studied the
wondrous truths of Scripture, and some, I believe, had been his own
converts and pupils. These men were most anxious that he should stay
among them, and earnestly entreated him to do so; but the Rev. W.
Lobschied, as he informed me, had to attend to some appointment at
Canton, and the wishes or whims of a young wife. Thus the last
opportunity for a teacher of the Gospel to support the cause of
Christianity in China was thrown away; my trouble lost (not that I cared
for ought but the fact that it was not used to advantage when every
opportunity was offered); and the visit of the last missionary who came
to the Ti-ping capital, rendered utterly fruitless. Something did result
from the visit in the shape of the following letter:--

    "THE TAEPINGS.
    "_A Visit to Nanking, and an Interview with the Kan-Wong._
    "(To the Editor of the _Daily Press_, Hong Kong.)

    "SIR.--The dreadful accounts given of the condition and
    character of the rebels had long made me anxious to visit their
    capital, and see for myself how far all that has been said of
    them be true. There is a brisk trade carried on outside the city
    of Nanking. The fields within the ancient wall were well
    cultivated, as well as the country around; and wheat, barley,
    and large beans, appeared to be there in abundance. The people
    within the city _were certainly looking better than in any town
    along the Yang-tse-kiang_. New shops and fine buildings were in
    course of erection, and the people were in general well dressed.
    The women moved about performing their daily work as they do
    here in the South; aged persons were playing with their
    grandchildren, and wheresoever I came I was treated with respect
    and kindness. The kings, and particularly Kan-Wong, received me
    with great kindness, and I felt that I was as safe in Nanking as
    in any Chinese town I have ever visited. They were anxious to
    know why England was so hostile against them. 'Have we ever
    broken faith with foreigners? Have we ever retaliated the enmity
    of England and France?' said Kan-Wong. 'If they force us to the
    conclusion that we are to be treated as outlaws, then the day of
    retribution will come! We are fighting in our own country, and
    to rid ourselves of a foreign power, and woe to the stranger
    who falls into our hands after the first shot has been fired
    against Nanking.[41] We need not then take cities and hold them,
    or allow foreigners to assist the Imperial imps in surrounding
    us; we shall then move in one compact body, ravaging the country
    and destroying trade.[42] We have not as yet sent men into the
    foreign settlements to burn and destroy, but have strictly
    prohibited such acts. Who can prevent us from committing such
    acts, if we choose? And why should we not make the sojourn of
    foreigners here intolerable, if they come to destroy us who
    _would_ and _have_ opened to them every port we hold, and tried
    to be friends with them? We will spare neither Hankow nor any
    other place held by foreigners, who will then see the difference
    between forbearance and determined hostility.' They told me that
    they had _repeatedly_ applied to the foreign consuls, in order
    to come to some arrangements, but all their communications had
    been returned _unopened_, and no reply given. I was present at
    their religious meetings, which are regularly held every morning
    and evening, but would not join them until I knew what they were
    doing. They sang a hymn; and having previously placed three cups
    of tea on the table,[43] they knelt down, one of them[44]
    reading or saying an appropriate prayer. There was _no worship
    of Taiping-Wong_. Whilst sitting in the palace, there came
    frequent orders for books on religious subjects, and, so far as
    the Chinese care for religion, _these men sang and prayed with a
    will and with apparent devotion_. As the Imperialists are going
    to _restrict_ the development of trade on the Yang-tze-Kiang as
    soon as _Osborn's_ fleet has come out, and as the rebels _are
    willing to open the whole country to foreigners_, if they will
    stretch out a friendly hand to them, everybody may judge for
    himself which party will serve him best. China was conquered by
    the help of Roman Catholic missionaries, and the Imperial House
    has for 150 years been under their influence. So long as the
    Emperors made use of them they prospered; and the moment they
    expelled them from Pekin, misrule and effeminacy became the
    order of the day. Sir Frederick Bruce will one day be recalled
    to give an account of the _ruinous course of policy he has
    advised his Government to adopt_, and foreign influence will at
    last prevail in the council of the rebels. But whether that will
    be upon the ruins of the silk and tea plantations, or upon the
    graveyards of thousands of British subjects, we shall soon have
    an opportunity of witnessing. As almost all the officers now in
    the service of the Imperialists are on half-pay, _and receive
    besides an enormous salary from the Chinese_, nobody need feel
    any surprise at the strange doings of men worthy a more
    honourable death.[45] And if _General_ Gordon does receive 1,200
    taels per month from the Imperialists, and his half-pay as an
    officer of the British army, where then is British neutrality?
    The proclamation of the Queen is dust thrown into the eyes of
    Europe and America. But more on this subject for the second mail
    of this month.

    "Yours respectfully,
    "W. L.
    "Hong Kong, 10th June, 1863."

The Rev. W. Lobschied, by his departure from Nankin and return to the
south of China, sacrificed a glorious opportunity of serving the cause
of the Master whose word he came abroad to teach. Had he installed
himself at the Ti-ping capital and proclaimed that fact, and then
reported the favourable points of their sincere Christianity,
friendliness to foreigners, desire for unrestricted commerce and
intercourse with Europeans, and general moral and physical superiority,
in _all_ the particulars for which the Chinese are condemned, he would
most likely have been the means of arresting the interference of
England, and purifying the religious errors of the only voluntary native
worshippers of Jesus in Asia.

Had Mr. Lobschied so acted, every mission society and ordained member of
the Church of England would necessarily have supported him; this would
simply have been their duty to God. Popular opinion, when fixed by the
voice of a well-known divine, speaking the _truth_ from Nankin, and with
all the authority of his presence among the revolutionists, and
undoubted personal knowledge of them, would almost certainly have
compelled the British Government to remain neutral.

Unfortunately Mr. Lobschied had private business which possessed greater
charms for him than this, although success was certain if the effort
were made. The Manchoo-Imperialists, unassisted by foreign mercenaries,
would have fled before the progress of Ti-ping tien kwoh like fine chaff
before a gale of wind. The ultimate results would have been the sure
establishment of Christianity, freedom, and modern civilization,
throughout the vast Chinese empire.

Private affairs overpowered all other considerations, and so, after a
few days spent at Nankin, I placed the rev. gentleman on board a passing
steamer and bid him adieu.

Soon after my return to Nankin, reports of disaster to the Ti-ping
forces in the Shanghae district were received; but previous to noticing
these I must describe the complete defeat the Anglo-Manchoo legion
experienced before the city of Tait-san.

Shortly after being placed in command of the drilled force, Captain
Holland was ordered by the Fu-tai, Le, Governor of the province, to
advance upon Tait-san and wrest it from the Ti-pings. Burning to
distinguish himself, and probably not averse to the _bonus_ it is
believed the Fu-tai offered for the capture of the city, besides the
prospect of much _loot_, the newly-fledged _general_ led forward his
men.

This expedition was accompanied by British volunteers, and the British
officers belonging to the force, besides which General Staveley lent
several large howitzers, the property of the English nation, to the
commanding officer. Attached to _General_ Holland, as body-guard, was a
motley brigade of European mercenaries, consisting of almost every
nationality. The whole strength of the disciplined division inclusive
was considerably over 3,000 men, with 22 pieces of heavy artillery,
field-pieces, and mortars, supported by an army of 10,000 Imperialists.
The legionaries, and a great proportion of the irregular troops, were
well armed with English rifles and muskets, well equipped in every way,
and supplied with abundance of ammunition.

After driving the Ti-pings from several small outworks and tearing from
a neighbouring village all its "doors, windows, tables, &c.," as one
account states, the Imperialist forces took up a position under the
walls of Tait-san. Of course the Ti-ping maligners, who followed upon
the track of the allies, raven-like croaked forth from the destroyed
village about the "ruthless devastation" of those "bloodthirsty
monsters." They should have seen the village, or rather those who have
been misled by their howling should have done so, _before_ the gallant
Anglo-Manchoo forces stripped it of furniture and partially pulled down
the houses. Undoubtedly many who have accused the Ti-pings of wanton
devastation have unintentionally mistaken the ravages of their own
friends for that of the people they condemned, though it is hard to
believe that any one could credit such opinions, when, in every account
of the Imperialist operations, the destruction of some Ti-ping city,
village, or store of grain, is prominently set forth.

Rows of stakes had been driven into the creeks by the Ti-pings, and the
boats carrying the siege train of the enemy were delayed in their
advance upon Tait-san until they could be pulled up. In spite of
obstructions and a strong sortie made by the garrison, which was not
repulsed without a sharp fight, the guns were landed during the night of
the 13th of February, 1863, and placed in position.

Early on the following morning the garrison received strong
reinforcements from the Ti-ping army investing Chang-zu, distant less
than twenty-five miles, which were welcomed with immense cheering.
Shortly afterwards the besiegers opened fire from their numerous
artillery.

In about five hours a large and practicable breach was made in the city
wall, and Captain, or rather _General_, Holland ordered the assault. Now
it so happened that the defenders had wisely sheltered themselves from
the deadly artillery fire to which they had only one or two small
6-pounders to reply, and instead of recklessly exposing themselves in
the usual Ti-ping style, had remained perfectly silent behind their
defences.

Led by a party of the body-guard and their European officers, the
trained troops rushed gallantly forward to storm the city. At this
moment the defenders suddenly manned the breach, and although fearfully
thinned by the enfilading artillery fire, kept up a fusillade which told
with terrible effect upon the dense masses of the enemy. A few crossed
the moat by their bridges, only however to be shot down, and the whole
division of stormers wavered and hesitated on the brink. A
sergeant-major of the disciplined rifle regiment here performed an act
of bravery that no European could have outdone. Seizing the colours of
the regiment, Ward's old flag, he rushed to the front with it, and
calling on the men to advance, stood there alone, a mark for the fire of
the besieged. It is remarkable that, though six bullets pierced his
clothes, not one injured him, or even cut his skin.

Unable to advance against the shower of missiles directed from the
breach and city walls, where even the little boys were stationed with
heaps of bricks to throw upon them, the Imperialists fell back on their
guns in confusion. _General_ Holland then ordered the artillery to the
rear, and a rapid retreat commenced. This, however, they were not
allowed to effect so easily, for the Ti-pings dragged a 6-pounder into
the breach, where it was worked by some Europeans, and directed upon the
men endeavouring to remove the siege guns, with deadly effect. At the
same time the garrison sallied forth from two gates, while others rushed
through the breach and attacked the enemy with vigour.

For some time the rifles and 1st regiment of the British contingent,
together with the European company, fought desperately to save the guns.
Meanwhile the main Imperialist army was routed with much slaughter, and,
with all the other regiments of disciplined troops, fled in every
direction from the field. The troops who so gallantly protected the
retreat of their comrades, managed also to save all the artillery,
except two heavy 32-pounders and several light howitzers. Upon these
guns the Ti-pings incessantly charged, and both sides lost heavily in
killed and wounded. _General_ Holland had left the field, and it was
entirely due to _Colonel_ Barclay and _Major_ Cooke, who jointly
conducted the retreat, and well animated and kept their men together,
that only a few pieces of artillery, instead of the whole park, were
captured by the Ti-pings.

Seeing that his men were falling thickly, and that they were in danger
of being surrounded, Colonel Barclay abandoned the guns and made a
pretty orderly retreat. The Ti-pings marked those guns for their
especial prey, and concentrated on them such a hail of shot that no one
could approach them from the hostile ranks and live. The enemy found
that it would be impossible even to spike them without a terrible loss
of life, and so left them uninjured as trophies for the victorious
garrison of Tait-san.

The day following their defeat only 1,500 of the British contingent
mustered at their head-quarters, but stragglers shortly came dropping
in. The same force lost 5 officers killed and 16 wounded. The
co-operating Imperialist army was totally dispersed, and lost more than
2,000 men _hors de combat_. The Ti-ping casualties were also very heavy,
for the men had rushed gallantly into the breach under withering volleys
from the disciplined and well-armed assailants, and at least 1,000 were
killed and wounded during the defence and subsequent fighting.

_General_ Holland, upon reaching Shanghae, resigned his command in
disgust, and was superseded by one Major Gordon, of the Royal Engineers,
a cold, calculating man, who possessed qualities far more conducive to
successful operations against the Ti-pings than even brilliant and
dashing generalship. His tactics were to destroy them from a distance
by his long-range artillery, which was a thing to be done generally with
perfect impunity, because the Ti-pings were almost entirely without
cannon.

The aim of the revolutionists is to get at close quarters with the
enemy, and wherever they have been able to accomplish this, even the
disciplined and foreign-officered troops have been beaten. Unfortunately
they have seldom been able to effect their favourite manoeuvre against
the latter, the overwhelming artillery and regular volleys of musketry
sweeping away every attempted formation of the Ti-ping troops long
before it could be completed.

_General_ Gordon having assumed command of the once despised
mercenaries, that is to say, despised before the despisers were able to
handle the loaves and fishes, he very wisely spent several months in
thoroughly reorganizing his troops and raising his artillery to a
strength and state of efficiency perfectly irresistible by the Ti-pings.
During this period, besides the officers of the force, numerous
drill-instructors were supplied by the British general at Shanghae, so
that Gordon's, Kingsley's, Cooke's, and other legions, soon became
formidable both as to numbers, armament, and discipline, _a l'Anglais_.

The first operations directed by Gordon were against Fu-shan and the
beleaguered city of Chang-zu, the former of which was captured and the
latter relieved, the Ti-pings losing some 1,200 men; Gordon's force, 2
killed and 3 wounded! These relative casualties afford a fair sample of
the usual result of nearly every engagement. The immense loss of life
upon the Ti-ping side during the years 1862-3-4, and part of the
present, may easily be imagined, and will be found stated in detail in
the approximate table at the end of this volume,[46] which has been
compiled principally from official sources. Gordon, in his own report of
the operations above referred to, states: "The number of guns was
terrific, and although after every shot the rebels would fire from one
or two loop-holes, it was evident they had no chance." The position
exposed to this "terrific" fire was simply a few open stockades,
undefended by artillery.

At this time Gordon's force mustered, all told, about 5,000 men;
Kingsley's, 1,000; Cooke's, 1,500; and the Franco-Manchoo contingents,
commanded respectively by _Generals_ D'Aguibelle, Giquel, and Bonnefoi,
from 3,000 to 4,000. Subsequently other legions and artillery corps
attached to the irregular Imperial troops, about 2,500 in all, were
formed and commanded by _Colonels_ Bailey, Howard, Rhode, &c., while the
total force of trained Chinese generally maintained the relative
strength here given, viz., 14,000.

The disaster to the Ti-pings in the vicinity of Shanghae, the report of
which, as mentioned before their victory at Tait-san, reached Nankin
shortly after my return, consisted in their loss of the former city, and
the still more important one of Quin-san, after a desperate and gallant
defence at each.

General Brown, Commander-in-Chief of H. B. Majesty's forces in China,
having, by every description of help and assistance, placed Gordon's
troops in a state of complete effectiveness, the latter once more moved
upon the devoted city of Tait-san.

Upon this occasion Gordon was supplied with a heavy siege train,
including 8-inch howitzers and large mortars, _all belonging to the
British army_; while General Brown sent a force of 550 men (including
detachments of Royal Artillery, H. M. 31st regiment, Belooches, and B.
N. I.) to look after his guns and take care that his _protege_ should
not suffer a similar defeat to that experienced by _General_ Holland. In
fact, General Brown maintained a large force at Shanghae for the express
purpose of assisting the Imperialists, supplying them with artillery and
men to garrison the cities they captured.

The capture of Tait-san is one of the most desperate encounters on the
records of the Anglo-Manchoo forces.

In addition to the trained troops, Sing, a Manchoo general, joined in
the attack with 5,000 to 7,000 men. The strength of the garrison was not
less than 4,000, including little boys, who, according to the usual
custom, were stationed with heaps of stones to throw upon the
assailants.

After shelling the Ti-pings from their outworks, Gordon arrived under
the walls of Tait-san on the 2nd of May, 1863. In his report to _General
Brown_, Gordon states:--"About noon fire was opened from two guns, and
by degrees more guns were brought into action, till at 2 p.m. every gun
and mortar was in action, _the troops being under cover_. As the
defences got dilapidated the guns were advanced, and at 4.30 p.m. the
boats were moved up and the assault commenced. The rebels swarmed to the
breach, and for ten to twelve minutes a hand-to-hand contest took place,
canister being fired into the breach from this side of the ditch, and a
heavy musketry fire kept up."

From this statement we find that after crumbling the ancient city walls
to dust, and pouring in the tremendous fire of his numerous artillery
for four hours and a half, his own men being in perfect safety, while
the unfortunate defenders were torn to pieces by the storm of shot and
shell to which they could make no reply, _General_ Gordon at last
ordered the assault. This, however, was gallantly repulsed by the brave
garrison, who, though almost decimated by the murderous artillery,
despite the hail of "canister" from enfilading batteries and the "heavy
musketry fire" poured upon them by the adverse covering parties, rushed
into the wide-spread ruins of the breach and drove the assailants back
in a desperate hand-to-hand encounter.

Rallied by their officers, the division of stormers again returned to
the assault, only, however, to be met with equal determination by the
Ti-pings, who again successfully repulsed them.

_General_ Gordon now placed his men under cover, inflicting heavy loss
upon the defenders of the breach by pouring continual discharges of
grape and canister shot into their dense ranks. For some time this
artillery practice was resumed; a fresh storming party was then told
off, and the breach again attacked with much bravery, and again defended
with equal courage. The trained troops wavered and were nearly driven
back a third time, but being reinforced by fresh men, rallied, and
finally carried the breach. This, however, was not effected until the
commandant of the city had been severely wounded, and a great proportion
of his officers killed or disabled. The Ti-pings then gave way and
escaped, carrying off many of their wounded, with their wives and
children, through the gates at the other side of the town. The snake
flags of Tsah, the commandant, remained in the breach until the summit
was in possession of the enemy, when they were carried off in safety.

The Imperialists were assisted by the steamer _Hyson_ in their attack
upon Tait-san, which vessel caused no little alarm to the garrison by
steaming along the creeks encircling the city, and throwing heavy shell
among them, besides seriously menacing their line of retreat. Another
great help to the besiegers consisted in the presence of the British
_corps de reserve_, stationed at the village of Wy-con-sin close by, and
which the Ti-pings fully expected would attack them should the
disciplined Chinese be defeated.

The loss of the Anglo-Manchoo force upon this occasion was about two
hundred; the Ti-pings, soldiery and civilians, killed in action, or
afterwards caught by the Imperialists and cruelly put to death, cannot
have been less than two thousand.

At Tait-san, as at Kah-ding, Tsing-poo, and every other city wrested
from the Ti-pings either before or subsequently, the capture was
followed by the perpetration of most revolting barbarities by the
Imperial troops and Mandarins, whenever the attention of the British
officers who assisted them to capture the places was withdrawn.
_General_ Gordon and the commanding officers of other contingents saved
some of the Ti-ping prisoners who had been captured; but for the
destruction of many thousands of innocent men, including country people,
non-combatant inhabitants of the cities, and women and children, they
are criminally responsible.

Upon the first capture of Kah-ding by the British forces, when General
Staveley's _humane_ disposition led him to station the Imperialist
troops so as to intercept the flight of the garrison from his artillery
fire, the following scenes were enacted, as appears by a letter from the
Rev. Mr. Lobschied, published in the _Hong Kong Daily Press_ of June
28th:--

    "A small gate being the only issue through which the women and
    children could escape from their _deliverers_, they rushed upon
    the wall, and threw themselves down a great height, rather than
    fall into the hands of the combined forces. Those that were
    immediately killed were lucky enough; for they were saved from
    the sufferings that awaited the survivors. Whilst looting and
    killing was going on within the walls, until darkness threw her
    veil over the scenes of horror, several hundreds of men, women,
    and children, whose only crime was that of being citizens of
    Kah-ding when taken by the rebels, were lying outside the city
    walls with broken limbs, helpless, and parched with thirst. When
    morning arrived, a few gentlemen passed outside the wall through
    the narrow gate, in order to take a retrospect of the field of
    action. What did they see? The Imperialists, having become aware
    of the large number of sufferers outside the wall, had resorted
    thither long before the rising of the sun, were just stripping
    the poor people, and cutting off their heads, which they would
    take with them as trophies of their victory, when the two
    gentlemen (one of whom was an officer) happened to disturb
    them."

The unfortunate people above referred to were a portion of those
massacred by the troops of the Chinese general Le, the same worthy who,
when reporting to General Staveley his execution of the duties assigned
him, offered to produce the left ears of 1,300 rebels.

At Tait-san similar atrocities were committed by the forces of Sing, the
Manchoo commander. Hundreds of civilians were killed for the sake of
their heads, and some prisoners were actually taken to the camp of the
British _corps de reserve_, formed in conjunction with an Imperialist
one, and there cruelly tortured to death. The execution of seven victims
in particular is fully attested by Dr. Murtagh,[47] 22nd B. N. I.; other
"eye-witnesses," including the Bishop of Victoria, have personally
assured me of their positive knowledge as to this and other atrocities
more revolting, and upon a more extensive scale, that have been
inflicted upon Ti-pings captured by means of the British alliance with
the Manchoo. The following is an extract from a letter published in most
of the Shanghae papers, and vouched for as being true by Dr. Murtagh:--

    EXTRACT FROM THE "NORTH CHINA HERALD" OF JUNE 13, 1863.
    _Treatment of Ti-ping Prisoners._
    (To the Editor of the _Daily Shipping and Commercial News_.)

    "... About 11 o'clock a.m. on the day following the capture of
    Tait-san (_Sunday_, May 3rd), seven prisoners were brought into
    the Imperialist camp near Wy-con-sin; being stripped perfectly
    nude, they were each tied to a stake, and tortured with the most
    refined cruelty. Arrows appeared to have been forcibly driven
    into various parts of their bodies, from whence issued copious
    streams of blood. This mode of torture falling short of
    satiating the demoniacal spirit of their tormentors, recourse
    was had to other means. Strips of flesh were cut, or rather
    hacked (judging from the appearance presented, the instrument
    seemed too blunt to cut), from different parts of their bodies,
    which, hanging by a small portion of skin, presented an
    appearance truly horrible....

    "For hours these wretched beings writhed in agony. About sunset
    they were led forth more dead than alive by a brutal
    executioner, who, sword in hand, thirsting to imbrue his hand in
    blood, seemed the very incarnation of a fiend. Seizing his
    unfortunate victims, he exultingly dragged them forth, mocking
    and insulting them, and then, by hewing, hacking, and using a
    sawing motion, he succeeded eventually in putting an end to
    their sufferings by partially severing the head from the body.
    Such are the bare facts, which can, if necessary, be fully
    substantiated by other eye-witnesses....

    "(Signed) AN EYE-WITNESS."

As further evidence of the atrocities which were committed in these
fearful times, the following letter will speak emphatically. It was
written at the time, and addressed to the editor of the _Shanghae
Recorder_, by Mr. J. C. Sillar, a merchant of high position, by whose
permission it is now published:--

    "NO MORE MURDERS.
    "(To the Editor of the _Shanghae Recorder_.)

    "SIR,--A gentleman who was present at the capture of Tsingpo
    informed me that he held the heads of fourteen women with his
    own hands while their throats, which had been cut by the English
    or French soldiers (perhaps both) were being sewn up. There were
    many more, but he held the heads of fourteen with his own hands.

    "I trust that, in the event of the capture of Kading, steps may
    be taken to prevent such atrocities either by our own men or the
    'disciplined Chinese.'

    "Your obedient servant,
    "J. C. SILLAR.
    "Shanghae, October 18, 1862."

    "The women stated that their throats had been cut by the English
    soldiers; but, upon being asked to identify them, pointed to the
    French.

    "J. C. S."

Placing the Manchoo, Sing, in charge of Tait-san, _General_ Gordon moved
forward to reconnoitre Quin-san, the next Ti-ping city in the direction
of Soo-chow, the provincial capital. After establishing a large
Imperialist army in a stockaded position close to its walls, he returned
with his own force to Soong-kong, the head-quarters, for the purpose of
obtaining from General Brown, at Shanghae, further supplies of H. B.
Majesty's shot and shell, preparatory to bombarding the city. When all
the necessary munitions of war had been received from the British
arsenals, Gordon returned to his allies outside the east gate of
Quin-san.

The garrison, upon the arrival of Gordon's troops, sallied forth upon
them in strong force, but after a desperate attempt to come to close
quarters were driven back by the artillery with much loss. Now,
unfortunately for the Ti-pings, the scientific knowledge of their enemy
led him to investigate the strategic and defensive position of Quin-san
with unmistakable perception of its weak points. He quickly discovered
that the place was so situated as to possess but one line of retreat or
supply, in consequence of the numerous small lakes, Imperialist
outposts, and broad creeks in every other direction. Consequently,
instead of directly attacking the city, Gordon moved his army, supported
by the steamer _Hyson_ and a large fleet of well-armed gunboats, against
its only line of communication, a road constructed along the bank of a
wide creek leading to Soo-chow. This movement was no sooner perceived by
the garrison of Quin-san, than, finding their position rendered
perfectly untenable, they commenced to evacuate the city as fast as
possible. Refugees from Tait-san and the surrounding country had
increased the number of inhabitants considerably, and, as at many places
their only line of retreat was but a few feet broad, with deep creeks on
either side, and continual narrow bridges spanning the numerous canals
intersecting the country with a perfect maze of water, their escape from
the city occupied the entire day, and their long thin line stretched for
miles along this narrow road. The rush of the panic-stricken people was
so great that the Ti-ping troops became inextricably mingled with and
confused among them.

A few miles from Quin-san the _Hyson_ and the gunboats came upon the
fugitives where their line of retreat was intersected by the creek, up
which the vessels were advancing; their progress, however, was for some
time arrested by a couple of stockades, into which a few soldiers
managed to throw themselves, and by an obstruction presented by a strong
row of stakes driven firmly across the creek. During the delay, the
_Hyson's_ European officers amused themselves by an incessant fire of
grape and canister poured among the helpless people seeking to escape
almost in front of the muzzle of her 32-pounder bow gun. Gordon, in his
report to General Brown,[48] after noticing the "well-cultivated"
appearance of the country, states that the _Hyson_ continued this
murderous work for "over three hours," at the expiration of which time
he arrived with his troops and drove the defenders from their stockades.
Immediately upon this, the _Hyson_, as Gordon states, "overhauled the
rebels and followed them slowly up. The creek was positively jammed up
with their boats, and at the bridge at Edin the crush was awful." Now,
how those who directed the fire of shell and _mitraille_ from the
_Hyson_ managed to avoid injuring the women and children, who
constituted a great proportion of the people contained in the boats,
does not appear.

When the unfortunates had been leisurely followed up and ceaselessly
attacked until they reached the vicinity of Soo-chow, and the protection
afforded by its garrison, the steamer turned about and slowly ran back.
The report, continuing from this point, states:--

    "All this time rebel stragglers had been dropping into the
    Soochow road from all parts, and the _Hyson_ had to _continue
    her work_ all the way back, sometimes being so close on masses
    of rebels that she had to resort to some measure to get clear of
    them, and so adopted the novel expedient of using her steam
    whistle, which, singular as it may appear, had the desired
    effect.... Mounted men would try and gallop by the steamer not
    six yards from her; others positively rode or tried to ride past
    when she was alongside the road. _The grape and canister must
    have told fearfully, owing to their numbers._... We had not
    ceased shelling until 2.30 _a.m._"

At least nine-tenths of the wretched people who thus perished under the
orders of _General_ Gordon--who, by the way, seems to have become very
quickly imbued with the "Chinese character" prophesied by the British
minister at Pekin--were non-combatants. The manner in which British
officers dealt destruction to their victims during _twenty hours_, with
absolute impunity to themselves, would be too revolting to be credible,
but for its plain avowal by Major Gordon, R.E., himself. This almost
unparalleled proceeding is merely the prototype of many other atrocities
perpetrated by the Anglo-Manchoo legion and its Imperialist allies.
During all the operations against the Ti-pings, and all the terrible
consequences following the fall of their cities, can Major Gordon say
how many were peaceful inhabitants, whose only fault was the fact that
they were inmates of a town captured and held by the revolutionists?
Fully nine-tenths of the Ti-ping killed and wounded, so vain-gloriously,
were only guilty of submission to the _de facto_ Power; the remainder
were _bona fide_ Ti-ping soldiers, whose only crime was their endeavour
to expel the foreign and oppressive dynasty, and to establish the
Christian faith, the persecution of the first converts to which caused
their revolution.

Thousands of the people who fled before the ceaseless shelling from the
_Hyson_ had never seen a steamer before; even the few who had, like all
Chinese, were greatly awed by the supposed qualities of the "fiery
dragon ship;" thus, the shrieking of the steam whistle, the dashing
noise of her paddles, the flaming appearance of her funnel, and the
fearful effect of her artillery fire, must have thrown them into the
wildest consternation. Other steam gunboats, similar to the _Hyson_,
were shortly added to the flotilla attached to Gordon's force, and ever
afterwards their appearance threw the Ti-pings into confusion, and
proved more effective than a great army in the field. The dread inspired
by the steamers was always fatal to every Ti-ping position they
attacked, and not without cause. They were each protected by iron
mantlets, proof against musketry fire, which was all they had to resist,
and carried a heavy bow gun and another at the stern. If the garrison
of any stockade attempted to resist them, their artillery soon battered
down the defences or shelled the defenders, and then came a massacre
similar to that attending the evacuation of Quin-san. The whole country
between Shanghae and Soo-chow is low, marshy, and cut up by innumerable
creeks, canals, <DW18>s, and lakes, the only roads being a few narrow
causeways built along the sides of the principal creeks; therefore,
whenever the garrison of a stockade was driven out, their only line of
retreat was along the bank of a creek, up which a steamer could follow
them for miles, and pour in deadly discharges of grape and canister at a
distance of only a few feet.

It has been estimated that the Ti-ping loss during the evacuation of
Quin-san and the subsequent route was not less than 3,000. Gordon's
force lost 2 killed and 5 drowned!

Having noticed the particulars of the disastrous loss of Tait-san and
Quin-san, we must now come to the still more unfortunate effect caused
by the receipt of the intelligence at Nankin, and the further report
that the ships of the Anglo-Chinese or "Vampyre" flotilla were arriving
at Shanghae.

These events took place in the month of May, 1863, and immediately the
Ti-ping Government heard of them, couriers were despatched in hot haste
after the Chung-wang, recalling his army to the capital. At this time
the Commander-in-Chief had advanced about four hundred miles in the
direction of Pekin, having captured many cities from the enemy, and
completely defeated several large Manchoo armies, one led by the
Imperialist Prince Sung-wang, or San-ko-lin-sin, as he is known to
Europeans. Upon receipt of the orders from Nankin, the Chung-wang was
compelled to forsake all the important advantages he had gained, and
derive no benefit from the series of victories he had achieved, by
abandoning every captured position and precipitately returning to the
capital.

The Ti-ping forces had quite lately reached a fertile part of the
country, where they were recruiting and gradually recovering from the
hardships endured throughout the previous march. From the edge of the
river Yang-tze, in the vicinity where the army first crossed from
Nankin, throughout a naturally sterile country, for a distance of more
than three hundred miles, the retreating Imperialists had devastated
everything far and near, so as to stay the advance of the Ti-pings by
the deadly medium of famine. Every rice-field, farm, and plantation were
destroyed and made a desert waste, so that not the smallest article of
food could be obtained. Fortunately the Chung-wang's commissariat was
well supplied, so his troops were able to traverse the desolated regions
without very much suffering, and by quick movements to limit the
devastation to an extent of three hundred miles.

At the time, however, when the Chung-wang received his orders to return
to Nankin, the supplies of his army had become well nigh exhausted, and
the urgent tone of the despatches made an immediate retreat so
imperative, that no delay to gather in the standing crops or otherwise
collect a sufficient quantity of provisions was possible.

Besides the fall of Tait-san, Quin-san, &c., and the presence of several
"Vampyre" ships at Shanghae, where others were momentarily arriving,
other dangers menaced the Ti-pings; namely, either the destruction of
their best army by starvation, or the prevention of its retreat to
Nankin, by the immense fleet of Imperialist gunboats threatening the
city.

Since the fall of Ngan-king (towards the close of the year 1861), the
Imperialists had gradually approached along both banks of the river,
until at last they managed to capture every place up to the walls of
Nankin. This result was accomplished entirely by the presence of the
well-equipped and innumerable flotilla of row-galleys, just at the
period the Ti-ping Government was alarmed by the loss of Tait-san and
Quin-san. But though the revolutionists were unable to dispute the
supremacy on the great river, simply because they were entirely
destitute of war vessels, they held the country within five miles of the
water for a considerable distance above Nankin on the south bank of the
Yang-tze.

The army commanded by the Chung-wang consisted principally of veteran
troops, natives of the south of China, who originally joined the
movement, and was by far the best in the Ti-ping service. Its strength
of fighting men was not less than 50,000, while numberless refugees,
prisoners, coolies, and others, far more than doubled those figures.

From the intelligence conveyed in his despatches, the General knew at
once that only one course--an instant retreat by forced marches--was
possible, either to save his army from destruction, or succour the
hardly-pressed garrisons of the cities of the silk district. Gathering
all the rice at hand, though it was quite unripe, and foraging
everything that could be used as food, though a full treasury could have
supplied them with suitable provisions had such been available in
sufficient quantity, the army broke ground and commenced its disastrous
return to Nankin. The supplies soon proved inadequate to last one half
the distance to be traversed; consequently, this retreat proved more
terribly destructive to the army than a dozen bad defeats would have
been. The latter part of the forced marches these starving men had to
perform led through desert places and low marshy ground; and, to add to
the horrors of their situation, the Yang-tze having considerably
overflowed its banks, the low country for a great distance inland was
completely flooded. Through this, and many a weary mile of bamboo swamp,
had the exhausted and starving Ti-pings to force their way.

Whenever a piece of firmer ground was reached, it could only be passed
after defeating the Manchoo troops in occupation, who, well supplied
with food, clothing, and boats, swarmed around the perishing and
retreating army in thousands, now that it could be done with impunity.
As the unfortunate Ti-pings approached nearer and nearer to the bank of
the river, their sufferings (if possible) became increased. Frequently
they came to places totally impassable except by swimming, and at such
they had to cross exposed to the attacks of numerous squadrons of
Imperialist gunboats, stationed at every available position to cut off
or harass their retreat. Can anything more dreadful than the state of
these unhappy patriots be imagined? For nearly a month they had
subsisted entirely upon the grass of the fields, the green tops of
bamboo, and the bodies of the dead!--while their march lay through the
mazes of dense bamboo jungle, and swamps of mud and water--frequently of
a depth which prevented fording. During the whole of this fearful
retreat, their rear, front, and flanks were incessantly harassed by the
attacks of the cowardly and bloodthirsty enemy, who cruelly murdered
hundreds of exhausted men, whom they were quite unable to withstand in
fair fight. Thousands perished in this manner, and thousands more were
horribly suffocated in the morasses, or drowned among the swamps. Who is
responsible for all this misery and loss of life? It was _caused_
entirely through British intervention, and the material aid given to the
Manchoo. At last the leading division of the army made its appearance
opposite Nankin, and then arose the difficulty of transporting it across
the river.

During several days preceding the arrival of the remnant of the
Chung-wang's troops, the enemy had maintained an incessant attack upon
the batteries and forts commanding the passage of the river, and had
particularly concentrated their efforts against a large fort on the
opposite side, the capture of which would have placed the whole north
bank in their hands, and would also have cut off all retreat. About a
week previous, the _Anglo-Ti-ping_, with my old craft and three junks,
had run the Imperial blockade and safely arrived at the Nankin creek,
each heavily laden with rice and other provisions. My friend D---- had
caught a passing steamer, and proceeded on to Shanghae upon business.
P---- remained with the lorcha, and I joined him on board, taking my
wife with me, as the Sz-wang and principal chiefs in the city had
requested me to assist in the defence of the river forts. Directly the
Imperialists became aware of the near approach of the Chung-wang's army,
they began their attacks upon the fort on the other side of the river.
This work, Kew-fu-chew, as the Ti-pings named it, was directly opposite
the batteries (at the entrance of the creek) which extended along the
edge of the river, on the narrow strip of land forming the outer bank of
the creek until it turned inland towards the city. These batteries
mounted a number of heavy guns; though, as nearly all were of Chinese
make--huge, unwieldy masses of iron, bigger than an English 68, but with
the bore of only a 4 or 6-pounder--few were moveable or manageable. As a
rule, until taught by Europeans, the Chinese are wretched artillerists,
their guns being usually lashed firm in one position, from which they
can neither be moved by the muzzle radius, nor breech-elevating
principle; so that, be the object far or near, the guns are fired at the
same range in every case. Among the many useless guns, the appearance of
which had far more to do with frightening away the enemy than their
effectiveness, I at last found five or six that were really
serviceable--including an English naval 32-pounder, one 18-pounder, a
large French cannon, and several fine brass Chinese guns. As there
happened to be nearly thirty European and American trading vessels at
the port, I managed to raise a corps of about twenty-five volunteers to
work the artillery. My own lorcha carried two beautiful pivot-guns
amidships, which proved of no little use during the different actions.

Regularly at daylight every morning the enemy would commence their
attack upon Kew-fu-chew, and the smaller forts above the Sz-wang's
position. Their plan of battle was well formed and very picturesque in
appearance; successive squadrons of gunboats would sail down and engage
the fort, delivering their fire; and then, filling away before a fair
wind, returning to their position up the river. These vessels were
assisted by others co-operating from below the Ti-ping lines; all being
profusely decorated with gaudy flags, and propelled by numerous oars on
either side.

The whole scene of battle formed a never-to-be-forgotten spectacle. The
gallant appearance of the innumerable gunboats tacking down stream, and
opening fire, one after the other, in regular order; some crossing in
every direction, and others running back dead before the wind, with
their broad and prettily-cut lateen sails stretching out on either side
like a pair of snowy wings; the incessant roar of the cannonade; the
flash of the guns; the curling smoke, at first dense and impenetrable,
and then dissolving into thin wreaths, gracefully circling round the
rigging and the white sails; the steady reply from the flag-covered
forts, now enveloped in clouds of sulphurous vapour, anon standing forth
clear and sharply defined against the dark background formed by the
waving bamboo; the peaceful current of the noble Yang-tze river--here
narrowed to a point less than 1,800 yards across, though stretching far
and wide immediately beyond on either side; the grim embattled walls of
Nankin, towering over the plain a few miles distant; mountains of
fantastic shape on every side--some near, impending and majestic;
others, cloud-capped and dimly visible in the distance; the cheer and
cry of battle mingling with the echo of artillery--all combined,
produced an effect truly grand and imposing.

At last the garrison of Kew-fu-chew reported that the leading columns of
the Chung-wang's army were in sight; upon which further reinforcements
were instantly thrown into all the forts, while every boat was made
ready for the purpose of transporting the approaching troops across the
river. Even when they had arrived within sight of their capital, the
sufferings of the unfortunate people were not completed until they had
endured much more loss by the assaults of the enemy. Upon the arrival of
the famished and emaciated troops at the brink of the river, they were
saluted with one continuous cannonade from the gunboats that now found
ample opportunities of slaughtering them as they crowded the bank for a
distance of nearly two miles. With incredible fortitude they maintained
their position, and did not flinch backward by the least perceptible
movement; and, in the face of the terrible fire poured into their dense
masses at point-blank range (mostly from _English_ guns), proceeded to
the work of embarkation as steadily as their weakened condition would
permit.

Directly the first detachment appeared on the beach, I sailed over to
help them with all my vessels, and getting a dozen Europeans on board
the lorcha, worked her against the enemy with considerable effect. The
fearful sights that met my gaze upon every part of the shore I shall
never forget. Very many of the weakest men, totally unable to assist
themselves further, were left to die within sight of the goal for which
they had striven so hard and suffered so greatly, their number being so
large that their comrades were not sufficient to help, or get them over
the river in the presence of the enemy. The horrible "thud" of the
cannon shot crashing continuously among the living skeletons, so densely
packed at places that they were swept off by the river, into which they
were forced by the pressure from behind; the perfect immobility with
which they confronted the death hurled upon them from more than a
thousand gunboats; and the slow effort the exhausted survivors made to
extricate themselves from the mangled bodies of their stricken comrades,
were scenes awful to contemplate. It was dreadful to watch day after day
during the time occupied in getting the remnant of that once splendid
army across the river, with but little means to succour them, the lanes
cut through the helpless multitude on the beach by the merciless fire of
the enemy; all so passively endured. The gaunt, starved forms, and wild
staring eyes of those who had laid themselves down to die, haunted me
for many a future night.

Frequently during the passage of the river, some small boat, with its
scarcely living freight, would be drifted away from the protection of
the Nankin batteries by the strength of the tide, the overcrowded boat
being too heavily laden to be moved quickly enough by the weakened arms
of the rowers. Whenever such an event took place, the mandarin boats
would dart upon their defenceless prey, and immediately chop off the
heads of all on board in the most brutal manner, throwing the bodies of
the victims into the river within sight of their comrades, who were
totally unable to assist them. In these cases the poor fellows struggled
and fought against their murderers with the energy of despair, as
desperately as their enfeebled condition would permit; but this was of
little avail, for nearly all their fire-arms were rendered useless, the
powder being saturated with water, while they were far too weak to wield
other weapons effectively.

I received the Chung-wang on board my vessel, and carried him to the
Nankin side, when he had seen the greater part of his surviving troops
safely across the river. My comrade, L----, was with him, also the
Sardinian officer of the late Ling-ho's regiment; but I never saw my
brave lieutenant, Phillip Bosse, again: he had fallen at the head of the
Chung-wang's guards, while gallantly protecting the retreat of the main
body.

Upon the twelfth day all who could be saved were across the Yang-tze,
and under the friendly shadow of the Nankin walls, whilst, on the other
side of the river, none remained but the garrison of the fort and the
numerous bodies of those who had perished of hunger or had been
slaughtered by the enemy. At last all seemed laid in the sleep of death,
until some poor wretch would suddenly crawl to the brink of the desired
water, and then fall into the swift current either to quench his burning
thirst or terminate his agony.

Even now the bleached skeletons of many thousands of these unfortunate
victims to British intervention may be seen in the positions in which
they fell, waiting for the hand of decay to obliterate the last sad
trace of their existence.

The Chung-wang's army had formed the best and bravest part of the whole
Ti-ping forces; in fact, his troops were the _elite_ of the whole
military organization, being principally composed of veterans who had
joined the cause from its infancy, and to whom defeat was really
unknown. A great proportion of the original nucleus of the revolution
was included in its ranks, consisting of the men from Kwang-tung,
Kwang-si, and the Miau-tze, who, inspired with the religious enthusiasm
so conducive to the wonderful success which attended the earlier stages
of the Ti-ping movement, and imbued with that spirit of chivalry which
defied all obstacles, dreaded no dangers, and endured cruel torture,
became the true champions of the great religious and political Chinese
revolution. Unless Christendom chooses to deny the theory that Asia is
to be Christianized by a process similar to the manner in which it was
itself converted from Heathenism, it is impossible to dispute the fact
that Hung-sui-tshuen and his followers have commenced a work that shall
never perish nor be forgotten. The very fact that the leaders of the
Ti-ping movement, from the first day of its existence, forced their
tenets upon the sage contempt of the literati, the general repugnance of
the people, and the well-known hatred of the innumerable Manchoo
employes, proves most convincingly that it was a holy element which
animated those chiefs and their followers, and which induced them to
forsake the theories of their ancient and deeply venerated sages, to
rely upon the help and attributes of an Eternal Judge.

Unfortunately, by the disastrous retreat to Nankin, the Ti-pings lost
the greater proportion of those adherents whose religious fervour has
induced me to compare them to the heroes and champions of the early
Christian Church. There are doubtless those who, from their self-erected
pinnacle of righteousness, will prove sceptics as to the reality of
Ti-ping Christianity; but I trust all who have had the patience to
accompany me through this history will consider that point effectually
proved in favour of the revolutionists.

The remnant of the Chung-wang's army scarcely amounted to 15,000
effective men, and from this number reinforcements had to be thrown into
Nankin, Soo-chow, Chang-chow, Wu-sie, and other cities menaced by the
enemy; consequently, when the General-in-Chief proceeded to the
districts invaded by the Anglo-Franco-Manchoo mercenaries in the
neighbourhood of Soo-chow, he was not accompanied by more than 7,000
troops; yet with this small force he managed to keep the overwhelming
numbers of the enemy for some time at bay, to control and reassure many
garrisons wavering in loyalty, and to protect a great extent of
frontier. Had his once splendid army been intact and serviceable, the
Imperialists and their allies would have to tell a very different tale
to that of the expulsion of the Ti-pings from their former territory.

On the day succeeding the passage of the last surviving troops across
the river, the enemy seemed determined to vent his wrath at their escape
by a general attack upon all the fortifications. From early morning the
assailants had swarmed down in countless gunboats, covering the whole
expanse of the Yang-tze, and completely hiding the fort of Kew-fu-chew
from our view by the dense clouds of smoke proceeding from their
ceaseless bombardment. The adverse flotilla in the neighbourhood of
Nankin was closely estimated at a strength of 3,000 gunboats of all
sizes, some carrying only one light gun in the bow, others mounting four
or five rather heavy cannon.

The Imperialists maintained their attack with much vigour and
determination until late at night. Throughout the day we were unable to
do much harm to them, their vessels being nearly always perfectly
concealed by smoke, so that our guns could only be pointed at chance
range. The roar from nearly 2,000 pieces of artillery was terrific and
deafening beyond description. As night closed in we were enabled to make
much better practice from our batteries by noticing the flashes of the
enemy's guns, and aiming in the direction indicated. At about 10 p.m.
our fire proved so effective that the whole fleet relinquished the
attack and retreated both up and down the river. Owing to the vast
number of gunboats which were crowded together in the comparatively
small space between the Nankin batteries and the fort opposite, our fire
must have inflicted severe loss, yet they persisted in the engagement
with a courage I have never before or afterwards seen equalled by troops
of the Manchoo Government.

In spite of this resolute attack, the Ti-pings garrisoning the
fortifications were singularly indifferent, and laughed to scorn the
idea that the _Ya-mun-qui_ (Mandarin-palace devils, as they delighted to
call them) could ever capture any outwork of Nankin. When I remonstrated
with the old Kung-wang about the negligent guard at night, he replied:
"I have held these forts for twelve years, and, unless Tien-voo deserts
me, shall hold them twelve years more, so far as the 'Imps' are
concerned." That very night, or rather morning, he found occasion to
regret his overweening confidence.

The lurid glare of battle during the early night, the thunder of
artillery, the crashing of shot, the fiery track of the arrow-headed
rockets, followed by the occasional explosion of a gunboat, the whole
din and prospect of tumult, had died away, and been replaced by the
deathlike calm of a beautiful summer's night. Dirty, begrimed with
powder, and fatigued with labour and excitement, my party of European
volunteers, L---- (who had remained on board our lorcha), Captain P----,
and myself, took advantage of the quiet interval and retired to rest.
Unfortunately for us, the deceitful calm proved doubly treacherous.

Tap, tap, went the bamboo signals of the solitary sentinels around the
forts under whose shadow our vessel rode silently at anchor; tum, tum,
sounded the drums of the guards ensconced in the little look-out houses
perched along the walls; and at last these monotonous echoes, sharply
distinguished from out the surrounding stillness, proved irresistibly
somniferous; gradually they became fainter and less frequent, and then
ceased altogether.

How long our sleep lasted I do not know, but suddenly I was aroused by
the crashing roar of artillery seemingly right alongside our vessel. At
the same moment I heard my friends start up in the adjoining cabin, and
together we rushed on deck.

Daylight was just dawning, but it was not required to enlighten the
scenes taking place around. The water, neighbouring shore, and forts,
were illuminated by the red glare of war. Above and below on the river;
outside the batteries; on the broad arm of the Yang-tze, running past
the Nankin creek and forming Tasohea Island; everywhere, in fact, the
gunboats of the enemy were upon us in countless numbers; while the vivid
and repeated flashes of their artillery made the air alive with bright
coruscations. Early on the morning of June 28, 1863, the Imperialists
made their daring and partially successful _coup de main_. In dense
lines, completely covering the broad expanse of the river, they had
pulled rapidly down stream; running the gauntlet of the stronger forts
held by the Sze and Kung Wangs, and making the weaker ones just
beyond the entrance of the Nankin creek the object of their attack. Each
gunboat maintained a very quick fire of cannon, heavy gingals, rockets,
fire-arrows, and every description of missile known in China, many of
which took effect among the light-built houses inside the larger forts.
On the other hand, the Ti-pings were entirely taken by surprise; the
guns of the river forts were not loaded, and, being heavy, could not be
quickly enough worked, or sufficiently depressed to obtain more than a
couple of rounds before the last division of the enemy had swept past,
the first having run by, and entered the channel between Tasohea Island
and the mainland, almost before the alarm was given. The few shots that
were delivered inflicted great havoc among the closely-packed gunboats
right under the muzzles of the heavy artillery in the Kung-wang's fort;
and the yellow waters of the mighty Yang-tze engulphed many a shattered
man and vessel, while pieces of wreck were strewed upon the surface, and
swiftly borne away to excite the wonder of distant villagers on the
banks of the rapid river.

[Illustration:
DAY & SON (LIMITED) LITH.
IMPERIALIST ATTACK ON THE RIVER FORTS AT NANKIN]

When off Theodolite Point, hundreds of the war-boats pulled inside the
island, and made a dash upon the small forts on the mainland, and the
foreign trading vessels anchored in the channel; while many soldiers,
landing from others, captured the works on the end of the island,
killing man, woman, and child, as the affrighted people rushed from
their houses and attempted to escape. The small forts, being surrounded
by overwhelming numbers, were quickly taken and then set on fire. Three
large war-junks defending the mouth of the Nankin creek were also fired
by the enemy, before their crews were fairly awake or had time to
deliver a second broadside. At this moment I rushed on deck with my
comrades. Our lorcha was lying close astern of the last _Ti-mung_, or
war-junk, and many European craft were at anchor closer to Tasohea
Island, and nearer to the main river; some of these I saw boarded by
the Imperialists, who instantly murdered the few Europeans, plundered
the vessels, and then set them on fire.

I saw at a glance that nothing but instant flight could save our lives,
if it were not already too late. The gunboats were everywhere around,
firing away indiscriminately in all directions. Fortunately our old junk
was fast alongside the lorcha, which was far too heavy to escape from
smaller craft; so abandoning the latter, containing all our property and
nearly everything we had in the world, with my wife and friends I went
on board the lighter vessel. We then cut her adrift and tried to escape
down the channel. The land on each side being occupied by hostile
troops, and the upper part of the channel leading into the river being
crowded with their war-boats, it was the only course open.

At the moment we shoved off and left the _Anglo-Ti-ping_ to her fate,
several gunboats boarded her from the opposite side, while others poured
a terrible fire into our old junk, whose decks were covered with
grape-shot, which had fallen harmless, from the hurried loading of our
assailants.

While all around seemed a mass of fire and flame, the daylight obscured
by the dense pall of smoke above, the earth shaken by the ceaseless
cannonade below, and while the fiery track of rockets, accompanied by
their hissing sound, and the "wheep" of the shot whistling everywhere
about, kept up the jubilee of war and destruction, we had drifted with
the tide a few cables' length away from the lorcha, and made sail to the
light though freshening breeze that offered our only chance of escape.

A squall of wind was parting the heavy volume of smoke and fire, and
coming towards us, when a number of gunboats appeared in full chase,
keeping up a very heavy fire, the crew of the nearest throwing
stink-pots, with which they managed to ignite our mainsail. I was just
turning to my dear wife to hurry her below, when a volley of musketry
was poured in by the troops on board the attacking vessels. I saw my
faithful friend and companion, L----, fall to the deck, but almost at
the same moment, struck by a spent ball, I became senseless.

I know not what period may have elapsed, but when at length I was
restored to consciousness, it was but to realize the exquisite
bitterness of my loss. Close to where my best and long-proved friend had
fallen, lay the lifeless form of my well-loved wife, pierced by a flight
of bullets.


FOOTNOTES:

[41] Alluding to _Admiral_ Sherrard Osborne's 'Vampyre' fleet.

[42] Since the loss of Nankin, and all their former cities, through
British hostility, this has resulted to a certain extent only; for
still, with wonderful forbearance, the Ti-pings have not begun to ravage
the country, their moderation in the neighbourhood of Amoy, where they
now are in force, being well known.

[43] In honour of the Holy Trinity.

[44] The officiating priest.

[45] It is hardly to be understood how dishonourable men are "worthy a
more honourable death."

[46] Table of Ti-ping loss of life.

[47] _Vide_ pp. 126 and 108, Blue Book on China, No. 3, 1864, for Dr.
Murtagh's letter, and the attestation by Bishop Boone and the Bishop of
Victoria of the statements of two other eye-witnesses.

[48] _Vide_ Blue Book on China, No. 3, 1864 p. 111.




CHAPTER XXII.

    On the Wong-poo River.--Ningpo Sam.--The _China_.--Her
    passengers.--The Ta-hoo Lake.--Its Scenery.--The Canals of
    Central China.--General
    Burgevine.--Soo-chow.--Deserters.--Burgevine suspected.--The
    Americo-Ti-ping Legions.--Burgevine's policy.--Colonel
    Morton.--The Mo-wang.--Arrival of the Chung-wang.--The Loyal and
    Faithful Auxiliary Legion.--How regulated.--Affair at
    Wo-kong.--Recruiting.--Plan of Operations.--A _coup de
    main_.--Arrangement.--Interruptions.--Postponed.


Towards the close of a fine October day in 1863, an ordinary Shanghae
_san-pan_, or passage-boat, might have been seen slowly sculling
up-stream against the ebbing tide of the Wong-poo river, and carefully
hugging the bank opposite to the foreign settlements. Besides the hardy
Chinese owner (working away with a big oar over the stern, and rejoicing
in the euphonical cognomen "Ningpo Sam"), the boat was occupied by two
foreigners, seated under the arched mat cover. One seemed to be of
Anglo-Saxon race; the other, by his dusky skin, long moustache, and
jet-black hair, a native of the East Indies.

To a close observer there was something suspicious in the management of
the _san-pan_ and the movements of the people on board. All passing
craft were carefully avoided, and whenever a European ship on the river,
or European dwelling on the shore, was approached, down came the outside
mat from the cover, screening the front of the boat, and completely
hiding the two passengers inside. If the observer had been near enough,
he might have been further edified by hearing sundry energetic
expressions addressed by the irritable foreigners to "Ningpo Sam,"
whenever that stolid individual did not sheer his boat sufficiently far
from strange vessels to preserve their incognito.

As the shades of evening fell upon the shipping on the river and the
trees on the shore, the strength of the tide gradually relaxed, and the
_san-pan_ proceeded much more rapidly on her course. The see-saw rocking
from side to side became less vigorous and unpleasant as the arms of the
sculler were tired, and at last, when a point nearly three miles above
Shanghae had been reached, "Ningpo Sam" ran his boat into the bank,
threw down the heavy _yulo_, or oar, and emphatically declared his
determination not to proceed any further until he had satisfied the
cravings of his inner man with the _chow-chow_ (to "che fan"--eat
rice--as he said), bubbling over a little cooking stove in the
stern-sheets.

The Chinese are an obstinate people; some are essentially mulish, and
"Ningpo Sam" seemed to be of the latter order; consequently his
passengers very wisely produced a large hamper, and hauling bottles of
beer, with a cold fowl, _et caeteras_, from its innermost depths, were
soon busily engaged eating and drinking. By the time the hamper had been
repacked night had closed in, but still the boatman's capacious jaws
went "munch, munch." Meanwhile the dark-hued passenger, having lighted a
cigar, was taking a fisherman's quarter-deck walk--that is to the extent
of two steps and overboard--on the small fore-part of the _san-pan_. The
second traveller reclined on the thwartship seat, and seemed absorbed
with his own reflections, plainly not of the most happy tenor. He was
far from being displeased when his companion aroused him by exclaiming:

"Jump up, sir; jump up; the steamer is coming!" and then shouting to the
Chinaman, still feeding in the stern, "Yulo, yulo, Sam!"

Sam, however, did not seem at all inclined to obey the summons; upon the
contrary, he jerked the rice into his mouth and handled his chopsticks
more vigorously than ever, spluttering out at intervals "Hi-ya!--how
can?--my--wantchee chow-chow--no can yulo--just--now; by-em-by--finish
chow-chow--can--do."

Upon the termination of this cool reply, the European passenger passed
to the after-part of the boat, and with the assistance of a stout cane,
succeeded in making "Ningpo Sam" forsake gorging and resume his oar,
much to that worthy's disgust, who, for some time, gave vent to his
outraged feelings by a low-toned muttering of choice Ningpo
"Billingsgate," which, however, excited not the smallest attention from
the abused parties, who were intent upon the approaching steamer.

When the steamer had arrived quite near, the Indian produced a bright
bull's-eye lantern and displayed it for a few moments. This was answered
by a light shown over the vessel's side, and by the stoppage of her
engines. The _san-pan_ was then sculled alongside, and her passengers
taken on board. Directly the baggage had been received, the ship went on
ahead at full speed, while "Ningpo Sam" and his boat disappeared in the
distance, his gratified expectations finding vent in the following
adieu: "Chin-chin, ga-la! _Numbah one_, massa; mi too much thankee you."

Soon the loud protestations of gratitude died away in the distance, and
the only sound which disturbed the stillness of the cool night air was
the regular beat of the screw propeller, as the small steamer steadily
proceeded on her course.

The little steamer was named the _China_, belonged to Messrs. H---- &
Co., of Shanghae, and was employed in the silk trade. This valuable
branch of commerce was wholly in the hands of the Ti-pings, and
unrestricted until their expulsion from the producing districts, when
the Imperial Manchoo mandarins closed the interior to foreigners, and
the trading of steamers or other vessels was entirely prohibited.[49]

The passengers who so mysteriously embarked themselves were on their way
to Soo-chow. One was _General_ Burgevine's _aide-de-camp_, the other
being myself. Burgevine had quite lately put into execution his plan to
join the revolutionists, and was established at the large city of
Soo-chow in command of ninety to one hundred Europeans, and a batallion
of 1,000 Ti-pings, placed under his orders to be drilled according to
foreign tactics, and officered by their instructors. Burgevine's _aide_
was proceeding to join his master. I was anxious to ascertain the
principles and practical worth of the newly-formed Americo-Ti-ping
contingent, and also to rejoin the Chung-wang.

The voyage of the _China_ terminated at the town of Nan-zing, situated
almost in the centre of the silk district; and here she remained while
the Chinese supercargo went into the country with many thousands of
dollars to purchase silk; the regions under Ti-ping rule being so safe
to travel, that all the vast amount of specie (from 8 to 10 millions
sterling per annum) used during each season was carried about the
country simply under the protection of the Chinese _shroff_, employed by
the firm to whom the money belonged.

Having obtained a fine large boat from the Governor of Nan-zing--a most
friendly and courteous chief--I proceeded with my companion on our way
to Soo-chow. Although the direct distance was not much over fifty miles,
in consequence of the capture of Quin-san, and another city named
Wo-kong, by the enemy, the approaches to Soo-chow from the east and
south were not available; so that we were obliged to cross the great
Ta-hoo Lake, and reach the provincial capital by making a considerable
_detour_ to the west. The Ta-hoo, though so extensive that from its
centre no land but the highest mountains can be seen, has nowhere more
than an average depth of twelve feet; and in many parts its waters are
so encumbered with floating weeds and interwoven stems of tough aquatic
plants growing from the bottom, that navigation is impossible. The lake,
similar to every piece of water in China, swarms with fish; thereby
affording constant employment to numerous congregations of fishermen.
These men, like their brethren of the sea-coast, clan together, and are
by no means averse to a little piracy upon a favourable occasion; we
were consequently compelled to keep a sharp look-out while passing
through the lake; and, when at anchor during the second night, at least
fifty miles from land, we were under the necessity of firing into a
number of boats that bore right down upon us in a very suspicious
manner. My Indian comrade had three cases of rifles, and one of
revolvers, which he was taking to Soo-chow for his master's force, and
of these we had loaded a sufficient number to repel any attack, unless
made by overwhelming numbers; therefore, when the advancing boats were
suddenly received by thirty or forty shots fired within as many seconds,
they quickly "topped their booms" and sheered off.

The scenery of the Ta-hoo is inconceivably grand and varied. Mountains
rise to a wondrous height; limestone rocks--worn into the most grotesque
shapes--project into the clear waters of the lake; valleys of great
beauty intersect the densely wooded hills and jagged sterile mountains;
while murmuring rivulets sweep past secluded villages, on their journey
to the broad, though shallow, waters of the lake. One of the most
beautiful and romantic regions in all China is that extent of country
situated to the north-east, north, and north-west of the Ta-hoo. Being
of a mountainous nature, it is termed by the Chinese "Tung-shan," or the
Eastern Hills. After sailing past the three largest islands on the lake,
famous for producing the finest silk in the empire, we reached the most
easterly part of the Tung-ting district. This had long been celebrated
for the splendour of its mandarin palaces and heathen temples; but, when
I visited the once-admired locality, its glories had departed, for the
grand edifices of Tartar magnate and Pagan god were alike levelled with
the dust; the Ti-ping was the dominant power, and its iconoclasm and
hatred of the Manchoo had been practically manifested by the destruction
of the monumental buildings, alike degrading to the patriotism and the
religion of the nation. The villages and isolated cottages which studded
the picturesque valleys still remained; and, by their life and
prosperity, offered a striking contrast to the desolation of palace and
temple.

[Illustration: London, Published March 15^{th} 1866 by Day & Son,
Limited Lithog^{rs} Gate Str, Lincoln's Inn Fields.
Day & Son, Limited, Lith.
VIEW FROM THE SUMMIT OF A MOUNTAIN IN THE WESTERN TUNG-SHAN DISTRICT ON
THE NORTHERN SHORE OF THE TA-HOO LAKE, PROVINCE OF KEANG-SU]

Passing on to the Western Tung-shan district, we reached the wildest and
most imposing region I have seen, either in China or any other part of
the world. Far removed from the noisy haunts of men, and peopled with
but a few solitary hamlets, it reposed in its romantic beauty,
undisturbed save by the voice of Nature, and undefiled by the hand of
man. Drawing our boat on to a long sandy beach, I wandered through the
wild and lonely region for some hours with my dark companion, who I
found could appreciate Nature's beauties more truly than many with a
whiter skin. I rambled through the silent valleys and almost
impenetrable forests of the Tung-shan, impressed with the solemn feeling
that I trod where mortal foot had not fallen before. The landscape was
most varied in its nature: massive mountains, peaceful valleys; wild and
desolate cliffs; foaming cataracts, and then the calm and shaded waters
of the lake; while the waving of the thick forest, the verdant and
feathery bamboos; the water-lilies stretching wide on the surface of
the lake; the wild orange-trees, and sweetly-perfumed shrubs and flowers
blooming around, completed an almost unrivalled picture. After leaving
this exquisite scenery, and just before entering the creek by which we
were to reach Soo-chow, we passed underneath a great natural arch of
rock, projecting some 90 feet into the lake, with a height of nearly
150, and joined to a second small arch on the outside.

This singular formation of rock lies on the border of the Ta-hoo, about
forty miles to the north-west of Soo-chow, and is an object particularly
noticed in the legendary lore of the superstitious natives.

After leaving the lake, our journey lay through a complete network of
those interminable creeks, lagoons, and canals intersecting the whole of
south and central China. Some were broad and river-like, spanned by
handsome, many-arched bridges, the banks covered with fine houses and
regular pathways; others were narrow, tortuous, almost hidden by rank
vegetation and long drooping osiers, and crossed by bridges composed of
a rough slab of granite laid horizontally upon the ends of two upright
blocks, and elevated scarcely six feet from the water. Wherever we
passed, the country people complained bitterly of the foreign soldiers
(meaning Gordon's, D'Aguibelle's, and other mercenary legions) coming to
fight the Ti-pings; they were all long-haired and happy under the new
_regime_; they were naturally averse to lose their heads because the
British Government chose to support the oppressive and merciless
Manchoo; and many of the finest grain-producing districts having been
captured by the allied Anglo-Franco-Manchoo forces, together with a
number of the principal Ti-ping granaries, a vast influx of destitute
refugees added considerably to the daily increasing distress caused by
the scarcity and exorbitant price of food.

When at last, after threading miles of creek and canal, I reached
Soo-chow, I found that I had arrived at the moment of an important
crisis--no less an event, indeed, than the dissolution of the
short-lived Americo-Ti-ping contingent. This, however, was a matter of
no surprise to me, as I had never placed the slightest faith in the
composition and motives of the force, nor felt the least hope from its
formation. Burgevine, its originator and commander, like Gordon, the
uncommissioned _General_ of the Anglo-Manchoo force, was essentially a
mercenary and filibuster; the only principle of either seems to have
been an absorbing selfishness and care for personal interest, doubtless
a very natural sentiment upon the part of the cosmopolitan adventurer,
but not a trait to be admired in the character of the British officer.
Such a principle, when supported by the material power of the British
Government, succeeded very well with those who allied themselves with
the Manchoo, simply because the latter were treacherous, thoroughly
mercenary, hated foreigners with a bitter intensity, and would naturally
enough have suspected any _apparently_ disinterested assistance, as a
means of rendering any of them liable to distasteful obligations. The
British authorities took particular care to prevent any mistake with
regard to their motives, for they always stated that they were solely
interfering in their own interest, so the Manchoo rejoicingly obtained a
large revenue from the foreign merchants, and then handed back a portion
to pay the British indemnity, which has proved the salvation of their
dynasty, by in a great measure causing the alliance against the Ti-ping.

Upon reaching the west gate of Soo-chow, we were very kindly welcomed by
the guard, and were furnished with an escort to the commandant's palace.
The city I found to be strongly garrisoned by veteran troops; new
flanking stone works were being built against the outer face of the high
walls; handsome buildings were being erected inside; provisions were
very plentiful; the soldiery and civilians seemed in high spirits, and
quite ridiculed the idea of losing their city; in fact, excepting the
distant report of artillery, Soo-chow had no more the aspect of a
besieged place than London has at the present moment, neither did its
capture by the enemy thundering at its defences seem even probable.

When we arrived at the commandant Mo-wang's palace, a number of wounded
Europeans belonging to Burgevine's contingent were being carried inside.
These men proved to be the survivors of a series of accidents that had
occurred two days previously, when the whole force, accompanied by a
division of Ti-pings under the Chung-wang, and the little steamer
_Ka-joor_, which Burgevine had seized from the Imperialists and carried
off to Soo-chow, had attacked a position of the enemy established about
twenty miles to the east of the city. The expedition was at first
successful, having turned the flank of the Imperialist stockades and
captured a flotilla of twenty-six large gunboats; but, almost
immediately afterwards, by the carelessness--some say drunkenness--of
the Europeans working the _Ka-joor's_ pivot-gun, her magazine was
ignited, the explosion blowing the fore part of the vessel to pieces,
and badly wounding several of the crew.

Soon after this catastrophe, _General_ Burgevine landed a battery from
the gunboats accompanying him (the principal way of communication being
by water), and opened fire on the stockades, held by a force of
disciplined Anglo-Manchoo mercenaries commanded by _Colonel_ Rhode,[50]
and a number of Imperialist _braves_. The enemy were just being driven
out of their intrenchments, and a storming party advancing to take them,
when the largest of the prizes--a gunboat, full of powder, shells, &c.,
and mounting six cannon, and in which the wounded from the steamer had
been placed--blew up; the fire from her explosion communicating with
four more of the captured vessels, they were also blown to pieces,
killing outright twelve, and dangerously wounding seventeen of the sixty
or seventy Europeans present. These disasters were caused by the free
use of the liquors taken from the wreck of the _Ka-joor_--officers and
men alike indulging, and the whole affair forcibly illustrating the
_rowdy_, disorderly nature of the Americo-Ti-ping legion. It is stated,
and not without strong reason, that Burgevine himself was in a state of
intoxication; still he has this excuse--the pain and debilitating effect
produced by an old and terrible wound (received in the service of the
ungrateful Manchoo), rendered the use of stimulants necessary.

After the accidents we have just noticed, the attack upon the
Imperialist position was abandoned, and the force retired upon Soo-chow,
carrying off the wounded and the remainder of the prizes.

As the Mo-wang was outside the city, and Burgevine had not returned with
the wounded men, I proceeded to one of the gates with a party of the
latter's officers, in order to go to the front of the Ti-ping outworks,
where it was expected they would be found. When we had arrived at the
gate, however, we were not allowed to pass by the soldiers on guard.
This was the first intimation I received that affairs were going wrong
with the auxiliary force, and that the Ti-pings were suspicious of their
foreign allies. At night, it appeared, they were not without reason for
their want of confidence, for, after Burgevine and the Mo-wang had
returned, _Colonel_ Morton, the second in command of the contingent, was
reported absent against orders, with all the Europeans outside the city.
When this fact was ascertained, Burgevine and the officers with him
seemed certain that the absentees had gone over to the enemy; in fact, I
soon understood that the intention for the whole force to desert had
been on the _tapis_ for some little time, only Morton and his companions
had, however, taken the opportunity to get clear themselves and leave
their co-adjutors in the lurch.

Previous to this report I had obtained an interview with the Mo-wang,
and then dined with him. He informed me that the Chung-wang was encamped
with an army outside the city; he also gave me to understand the nature
of his suspicions against Burgevine, in all of which I entirely agreed
with him. After explaining the caution rendered necessary in all
dealings with foreigners, because of the treachery and bad faith with
which they had always acted towards the Ti-pings--as particularly
exemplified by the English breaches of guaranteed neutrality,
non-observance of the pledge to prevent Manchoo expeditions equipping at
Shanghae, capture of Ningpo by the British, French, and piratical
flotilla, &c.--he proceeded to specify his reasons for dissatisfaction
with the foreign contingent.

In the first place, he spoke about the extraordinary conduct of
Burgevine himself, who, he declared, had made numerous promises, none of
which had been fulfilled. That officer had guaranteed to obtain men,
arms, and co-operation from Shanghae; large sums of money had been
supplied for the purpose, but the only return had been many cases of
brandy, brought by him after several visits to that city, and with which
both officers and men were made incapable. All the money had been
squandered or mysteriously lost, and not a single musket had been shown
for the large expenditure. Then it appeared that Burgevine and many of
his officers continued to wear the uniform of the Ward force, which they
had only left shortly before joining the Ti-pings; while, to place
themselves in a still more suspicious position, they made a practice of
visiting at night their old friends in the hostile lines occupied by
Gordon's troops. This conduct made the chiefs distrust the loyalty of
their auxiliaries and fear some organized treachery. Another ground of
suspicion was the fact that Burgevine kept his men aloof and distinct
from the people he came to serve, at the same time striving to induce
the chiefs to sanction his formation of an independent force. This was
certainly a bad way to gain the confidence of men so often deceived by
foreigners, so accustomed to community of interests, and so much imbued
with the religious and patriotic enthusiasm of their cause. Moreover,
the Ti-ping leaders had quickly penetrated the selfish and mercenary
motives of their unsatisfactory allies, and naturally felt but little
faith in their services; neither were they mean enough to desire the
support of such ignoble assistance, nor pander to it after the style of
their more unscrupulous antagonists.

Regardless of all principles of honour and chivalry, directly the
Americo-Ti-ping legionaries found that they could not reckon upon
external support, large pay, and much booty, they were not a little
disappointed; having no heart in the service they had suddenly adopted,
they became discontented and anxious to desert a failing cause for some
more congenial and _profitable_ employment. _They_ were certainly not
Quixotic enough to fight for honour, glory, or the freedom and religious
liberty of a vast empire without some substantial pecuniary recompense.

Out of a strength of 125 Europeans, not more than twenty were of any use
to the revolutionists; these few comprised men who were able to drill
and organize a disciplined force, and others who were good artillerists;
the remainder being sailors and vagrants, totally unacquainted with the
smell of powder, and not so useful in the field as the worst coolie
spearmen of the Ti-ping army; these facts were also inimical to the
existence of the force.

When, added to the circumstances just reviewed, the paroxysms of
temporary insanity (during an attack of which he wounded one of his best
officers), or the natural extravagance and obliquity of character of the
commanding officer himself, and the dissensions among his subordinates,
are considered, the failure of Burgevine's enterprise is fully accounted
for.[51]

In the evening, after Morton's absence had been reported, the Mo-wang,
accompanied by several of his chiefs, proceeded to Burgevine's quarters
and spent several hours in conversation with him. I was present during
this interview, and was favourably impressed by the magnanimous and
friendly temper of the commandant, who, despite the ample provocation he
had received from the suspicious and unsatisfactory conduct of the
auxiliaries, declared his intention to supply them with money on the
succeeding day, and to make any arrangements which would tend to
harmonize, gratify, or prosper the future welfare of the force. That
these promises would have been faithfully executed by the Mo-wang,
Burgevine has himself testified.

After the departure of the commandant, Burgevine, with some of his
favourite officers, talked over their proposed desertion from the
Ti-pings, as a long-arranged and premeditated affair, their motive for
this determination being the fact that their present service did not
seem likely to prove so easy and advantageous as they had expected. In
the course of conversation the _General_ personally informed me that his
intention had been to raise a large body of disciplined and well-armed
Ti-pings, and then to convert them into an independent force, acting
upon his private account; that is to say, he joined the revolution with
the intention of ultimately deserting it, and proceeding upon a career
of filibusting through China. This wild scheme he also mentioned to
_General_ Gordon, of the Imperialist mercenaries, proposing that they
should mutually desert their colours, join forces, and commence a system
of independent conquest. Whether this and other equally extravagant
notions were caused by mental derangement, consequent upon the effects
of his wound and the stimulants he used, or may be attributed to his
natural character, seems doubtful; but whatever may have been the cause
of _General_ Burgevine's reckless conduct, it is quite certain that he
sacrificed a splendid opportunity to insure the success of the Ti-ping
revolution. Had he at first heartily espoused the movement, and
unreservedly amalgamated his men with its members, he would infallibly
have obtained the confidence of the chiefs. He could then have organized
a disciplined and foreign-officered force far superior in material to
the Imperialist auxiliary legions, and these latter were the only forces
of the enemy that the Ti-pings had the slightest occasion to dread.

On the morning of the day succeeding my arrival at Soo-chow,
intelligence came into the city to the effect that, at about 4.30 a.m.,
_Colonel_ Morton had deserted with the detachment of Europeans under his
command, and gone over to the enemy, Morton shooting two soldiers of an
outlying picket who came to warn him of his vicinity to the Imperialist
lines. By this act of cowardly treachery, deserting his own colleagues
and the wounded in the city, he placed them in much jeopardy, and caused
the Mo-wang to feel very great exasperation, and strongly to suspect
further treachery from the remainder of the contingent. However, he
proved himself to be a more noble-minded and merciful man than any of
the traitors left behind imagined, by offering free passes and boats to
any and all who might wish to leave the city; at the same time he
expressed great disgust and contempt at the mean, dastardly conduct of
Morton and his followers, because he had always made the fact public,
that any foreigner wishing to leave Soo-chow had simply to express the
desire, when everything necessary in the way of boats, passes, &c.,
would be furnished to the confines of the Ti-ping territory.

When the fact of _Colonel_ Morton's desertion became established, I must
confess that, well as I thought I understood the noble character of the
Ti-ping chiefs, I feared the remainder of the traitors might meet with
condign punishment. In consequence, I at once sought an audience with
the Mo-wang, and having obtained it, requested that he would not wreak
any vengeance upon Burgevine and his companions. To my surprise,
although the inferior chiefs and officers were greatly excited about the
treachery of their foreign allies, the commandant instantly gave me to
understand that my fear was groundless. "Puh pa! puh pa!" (do not fear,
do not fear), he said. "These men joined me willingly and with clean
faces" (_i.e._ honour); "they can leave if they wish to do so, in like
manner; but if they sneak away to the Imps, they will lose face, and so
shall I."

Just at this moment Burgevine's interpreter came into the hall and
informed the Mo-wang that he was commissioned to ask liberty for the
remainder of the force to depart from the city and return to Shanghae.
The chief readily professed his compliance with this request, but said
that he could not definitively settle anything until the arrival of his
superior, the Chung-wang, whom he expected in the city towards evening
to consult upon the affair.

Meanwhile, with the exception of a dozen who were old adherents of the
Ti-ping king, the foreigners were in a great state of ferment, for they
fully expected the momentary appearance of executioners to cut off their
heads. Some were drinking _samshoo_ to encourage themselves; others
proposed fortifying their quarters; while a few of the boldest advocated
sallying forth and attempting to force their way out of the city. The
groans of more than twenty wounded men, some horribly burnt by the late
explosion of the steamer and the gunboats, rendered pathetic an
otherwise ridiculous scene.

Early in the evening the Chung-wang arrived, escorted by 1,000 men of
his body-guard, and at once proceeded to a council with the Mo-wang and
other chiefs. When their deliberations were concluded, I presented
myself to the Chung-wang, who, together with the Sze, Le, and Foo-wangs
(they having accompanied him from Nankin), received me with great
manifestations of pleasure, having all concluded that I had been killed
at the disastrous loss of the outer Nankin forts. I have hitherto
forgotten to mention that my faithful interpreter, A-ling, was still
with me. He also met with a very kind reception from the chiefs, for
they appreciated his services, and knew that he was warmly attached to
their cause.

Immediately upon my arrival at Soo-chow, I had determined, if possible,
to raise another body of Europeans, with whom to form a disciplined
Ti-ping force, for I saw that the dissolution of Burgevine's legion was
near at hand. Still, after the irritation the chiefs must have felt at
the treachery of their present foreign auxiliaries, I could not think
the time appropriate to submit the subject to them. I was pleasantly
surprised when, during the course of the evening, the Chung-wang
proposed that I should undertake the very work I was myself anxious to
perform. He stated that his confidence had never been placed in
Burgevine, and he expressed much satisfaction at the prospect of the
early departure of that leader of mercenaries with his men.

About this period the small steamers attached to _General_ Gordon's
force were being used with great success in the daily attacks upon the
Ti-ping stockades outside Soo-chow; consequently, the Chung-wang
proposed that I should not only endeavour to raise a contingent of
disciplined troops, but a flotilla of two or three steamers to operate
with them. He also expressed a great desire to capture Gordon's vessels,
upon which I told A-ling to obtain a separate commission to cut out any
of them I might find an opportunity to seize. The Chung-wang made a
practice never to sleep inside the walls of any beleaguered city, his
tactics being to relieve them by an army of co-operation under his own
command. It may be that he pursued such a plan as a safeguard against
treachery; but whatever the cause, he was always to be found encamped
outside. As the night advanced, he therefore made ready to leave
Soo-chow, after passing an edict and signing a special commission
written for me by his own secretary.[52] As I was well known to four or
five of the Wangs present, they were much pleased when I accepted the
authority to raise a new force; and before we separated, they became
quite enthusiastic about the anticipated results.

The designation of the proposed contingent was decided by the
Commander-in-Chief to be "the Loyal and Faithful Auxiliary Legion," a
title closely assimilating to his own, Chung-sin-wang, which may be
translated as the "Middle Heart Prince," _i.e._ the loyal or faithful
prince. The terms of organization agreed upon were: the force to be
commanded by myself, or any European I might see fit to appoint, and
subject only to the orders of the Chung-wang. The Europeans engaged to
be solely officers, two hundred in number, each captain of a company to
receive 200 taels per mensem (nearly L70), others to be paid
proportionately, and lodging found for all. Myself and principal
officers to receive no pay, but serve as commissioned volunteers, a
position which I had always maintained for myself. Two steam gunboats to
be obtained, similar to the _Hyson_, in the service of the enemy; these
to be attached to the land force, not to be used for any other purpose.
The governorship of the first city recaptured from the enemy to be
placed in my hands, while the revenue of the place would constitute a
reserve fund for the legion (including pension to disabled men, expenses
for sick and wounded, &c.), my own head to be pledged for the loyalty of
the Europeans engaged, each of whom were to become "Ti-ping brethren,"
and be entitled to every consideration as citizens.[53] The rules of
European warfare to be strictly those of the legion, and, moreover, to
be observed by any Ti-ping force acting in conjunction with it. Many
other regulations were drawn up, but these are some of the principal.

Upon the conclusion of the agreement to raise the Loyal and Faithful
Auxiliary Legion, the Chung-wang left Soo-chow and proceeded to his
intrenched camp nine miles distant. On the following day passes and
boats were provided for Burgevine and the remainder of his men. Among
the Europeans were twelve who had served in the Ti-ping army some time
previous to the advent of Burgevine, but had been placed under his
orders upon his arrival at Soo-chow. These men, and fifteen others, who
were not quite so mercenary as their fugitive comrades, and felt more
attachment to the cause, refused to desert their colours, and
volunteered to remain under command of one _Captain_ Smith, formerly a
brave non-commissioned officer of the British Marine Artillery. He was
almost the only unwounded man on board Admiral Hope's flag-ship at the
disastrous attack on the Peiho forts. The volunteers were all attached
to the Mo-wang's command, but the Chung-wang promised that, upon the
formation of the legion, they should, if required, become members, some
of them being good artillery-men or drill-instructors.

All these arrangements were carefully concealed from every European
except myself, few of those in Soo-chow being at all trustworthy, and
the few exceptions not being particularly attractive as objects of
confidential communication. In consequence of the daily increasing
strength of the forces besieging Soo-chow, time was precious and not to
be wasted in commencing my undertaking; I therefore departed from the
city on the third evening after my arrival, and proceeded to Shanghae as
fast as possible, going part of the way in company with some of the late
Americo-Ti-ping legion.

We were enabled to travel by a much shorter route than that by which I
had reached the city, in consequence of a great victory achieved within
the last few days by a Ti-ping army before the walled town Wo-kong,
which freed from the presence of the enemy a more direct road. The
battle was fought against Imperialists unassisted by foreign artillery
and disciplined troops, who were, therefore, according to the almost
infallible rule in such cases, utterly defeated, and Wo-kong would have
been recaptured in a very short time had not Gordon moved from Soo-chow
to its defence, when artillery decided the unfair fortune of war against
the Ti-pings. The force engaged had been brought up from Kar-sing-foo by
the Chung-wang's orders, and should have formed a junction with another
body of troops advancing from the city of Hoo-chow-foo, the combined
forces being destined to operate against the left flank of the Soo-chow
besiegers, while the Chung-wang himself acted against their right.
Unfortunately, the impetuosity of the leader of the first division (the
Yoong-wang) led him to commence hostilities before effecting a junction
with his allies from Hoo-chow, and, although at first eminently
successful, his rashness led to his subsequent defeat by Gordon's
disciplined troops and artillery, and also to the repulse of the second
division, each corps being compelled to fall back upon the cities from
which they had advanced, and of which they constituted the garrisons.

The heroic determination with which the Ti-pings disputed the
irresistible odds the enemy possessed by their artillery may be seen by
the following extract from "How the Taipings were driven out of the
Provinces of Kiang-nan and Che-kiang. From Notes kept by an Officer
under Ward, Burgevine, Holland, and Gordon."

    "The rebels again attempted, from Kar-sing-foo and Ping-bong, to
    capture Wo-kong. Again, therefore, a detachment was sent down
    there, and they were driven back, while the artillery made
    terrible havoc amongst them. But we must give them their due.
    They fought this day like demons, advancing up to the muzzles of
    the guns, where they of course met with death."--_Friend of
    China_, June 27, 1865.

Immediately upon reaching Shanghae I commenced engaging men for my
force, and within a few days obtained about a dozen. These were all of
good character and particularly promising for drill-instructors. Among
them were seven non-commissioned officers, formerly of the French army:
Major Moreno, of the Sardinian army, who had seen much service in Asia,
Italy, and the Crimea; a Frenchman named Lavery or Labourais (once first
sergeant of the 3rd Chasseurs d'Afrique), who had served the Ti-pings
for more than a year, but had been carried off against his will by the
deserters under _Colonel_ Morton; and my friend George White, who had
lately been introduced to me as a Ti-ping well-wisher, though formerly a
captain in the Franco-Chinese contingent at Ningpo, a service he had
resigned in disgust. Besides these, I obtained the services of several
men who had served their time in a British regiment and had received
their discharges; while many others promised to join me as soon as they
were able. This, for a beginning, was not so bad; and, to favour my
object still more, Major Moreno obtained the guarantee of certain
European ordnance officials to supply me with any quantity of war
material. Their sudden desire to assist the Ti-pings was caused, I
believe, entirely through jealousy of the British operations conducted
by General Brown, _General_ Gordon, &c.; at all events, their aid would
have proved substantial, for a sample case of French rifles and bayonets
was escorted through Shanghae by French soldiers, and safely deposited
with my colleague.

Within two weeks I was enabled to send fourteen good men--all
soldiers--under the command of Labourais, to Soo-chow, one of the
number being a bugler of the French regiment stationed at Shanghae.
Unfortunately, the last seven recruits left just one day too soon,
thereby causing me no little trouble during the execution of an
enterprise within twenty-four hours after their departure, and for which
I was obliged to engage half a dozen strangers, who subsequently proved
to be of worthless and disreputable character.

Besides A-ling, who held a Ti-ping commission, I was accompanied from
Soo-chow by two officers who had shaved their heads and assumed the
Imperialist; their object being to assist me in capturing one of the
enemy's steamers, if a chance offered, and to pilot us into the Ti-ping
territory, while their presence would incontestably prove the
belligerent nature of the act, should we be fortunate enough to cut out
a vessel. These officers were provided with a special commission for the
purpose.

On the morning of the day following the departure of the last batch of
the Loyal and Faithful Auxiliary Legion, an Imperialist war-steamer
arrived from before Soo-chow, and anchored abreast of a training camp
some two miles above Shanghae. A-ling had engaged two Canton men,
members of the Triad Association, one of whom was always kept on the
watch for such an arrival; consequently the steamer was scarcely
anchored before I received information to that effect. I at once decided
to attempt her capture. Major Moreno was to remain at Shanghae, where he
was acquainted with many French officers who were willing to serve the
revolutionists, and, as he spoke Hindoostanee perfectly well, he had
managed to ingratiate himself with native officers of the 22nd B. N. I.
and Beloochee regiment, some of whom had promised to join him; it was,
therefore, agreed that he should continue his present work, and await
the result of the capture of the steamer and the receipt of instructions
from myself. I decided to take W---- as my comrade and lieutenant during
the proposed operations. I had soon ascertained the firmness of his
principles and the sincerity of his attachment to the Ti-ping cause, and
therefore gave him a document, somewhat similar to my own special
commission, which I had obtained from the Chung-wang for the purpose of
duly authorizing whomever I might choose as my deputy and assistant.
Major Moreno, who had held field rank in several armies, I wished to
place in supreme military command of the legion (when raised), because
his education as a soldier was complete, and it would have been
difficult, if not impossible, to find a man so thoroughly qualified in
China. Both W---- and Moreno were men of honour--far different from
Gordon, D'Aguibelle, Cook, and the other mercenaries hired by the
Manchoo--and willingly, as I did, tendered their gratuitous services in
the Ti-ping cause. This coincided very agreeably with my intentions, and
caused me to reflect how superior would have been a force so organized
to the Imperialist legions constituted upon a basis of blood-money! We
had sufficient means to live; we would not increase them by taking wages
to kill our fellow-men, even though the British Government had given an
example, by authorizing its naval and military officers to fight in the
ranks of a barbarous Asiatic despot, and to take reward for so doing.

As the Imperialist steamer was under orders to return to the front on
the same day of her arrival at Shanghae, I had but little time to make
my plans. One of the Canton men who had joined me was formerly employed
on board our destined prize. I now sent him off in a boat with the view
to ascertain the strength of her crew, whether steam was kept up ready
for a start, how many Europeans were on board, &c. In a short time he
returned with the favourable announcement that only two foreign officers
were in charge, the others having gone ashore; also, that two of the
quartermasters (Manilla-men) were absent, besides some of the Chinese
soldiers.

My followers were only six in number--W---- and the five Cantonese. It
was my only chance to seize the vessel. Yet success seemed doubtful; but
I knew full well that the boldness of a sudden enterprise would prove
more effective than numbers, and felt sure that a well-managed surprise
would give us an easy victory. The people of the steamer being at
Shanghae, in the very heart of the Manchoo power, surrounded and
protected by their British and French allies, would, I imagined, be too
much astounded at the sudden attack by Ti-ping partisans to offer much
resistance.

Myself and comrade were soon ready for the attempt, our baggage being
confined to a tooth-brush each, our revolvers, and a good-sized piece of
soap; the Canton men took little besides their formidable short Chinese
swords, and a supply of those huge double-barrelled pistols in which
their countrymen delight.

Proceeding to one of the Shanghae wharves, I engaged a boat, embarked
with my men, and in a moment we were proceeding as fast as possible
towards the vessel of the enemy.

We started in broad daylight; in fact, but a short time after noon.
About one o'clock we were close up to the steamer. Sculling against the
ebb tide, our boat was slowly worked past the enemy, while, having
observed all that could be seen from outside, I made arrangements to
board. My plan was to drop alongside the steamer's bow, get on board
with W----, and then engage the Europeans in conversation, until I
decided upon the instant for our _coup de main_, which would be
signalled to A-ling (who was to hold fast the boat and watch every
movement) by a wave of my arm, who was then to rush on board with the
other Cantonese. Myself, W----, and one man, were to seize and secure
the two European officers; the other three, under A-ling's orders, were
to overpower any resistance from the Chinese soldiers and crew, and then
cut the vessel adrift; while their leader, who had been brought up as
an engineer, and understood the duties of one, took charge of the
engines and set them going ahead at full speed.

Three of our men now hid themselves behind the mat cover of the boat.
When we got alongside, A-ling and another held fast to the steamer in
such a position that they could observe the movements of myself and
W---- in the after part of the vessel. Proceeding from bow to stern, and
looking fore and aft the deck, we were able to notice that the crew on
board consisted of twelve or fourteen soldiers, one Manilla-man, six or
eight Chinese--employed as firemen, &c.--and two Europeans. With my
comrade I walked right up to the officers of the ship, and engaged in
conversation with regard to my taking a passage to Quin-san with them.
Their positions were respectively those of gunner and chief mate. They
informed me that their trip to Shanghae was for the purpose of obtaining
stores, and to deliver over to the Manchoo Governor several unfortunate
Ti-ping chiefs, captured by them on the Ta-hoo Lake. This statement,
given with a would-be air of conviction as to the glory and heroism of
their achievement, made me quite determined to attempt the capture of
the steamer at every risk, rather than lose a chance to prevent future
acts of such cold-blooded atrocity. The flotilla, with which she had
acted on the Ta-hoo, was commanded by one Macartney, formerly surgeon of
Her Majesty's 99th regiment, but who left his honourable profession to
take service under Li, the Manchoo Governor of the province. This man,
having made prisoners of the chiefs, set off in the steamer for
Shanghae, where he quickly sought the presence of his Asiatic master,
delivering up to him the miserable Ti-pings, who suffered merciless
torture and a cruel death, while this noble-minded Englishman felt no
compunction at becoming the recipient of Manchoo patronage. A more
dastardly act than thus giving over vanquished enemies to certain death
I never heard of, though it was the ordinary practice of the Europeans
in Imperialist pay. The case in question decided the fate of the
steamer, and made the Imps pay dear enough for the satisfaction of
torturing to death one or two helpless patriots.

The narrators had just finished the history of their gallant exploit
against unarmed boats, peaceable villages, and powerless captives, when
I decided to make my attempt. I stood close to the mate, while W---- was
ready at the side of the gunner; I had just waved my arm to A-ling, and
turned to seize my man, when, fortunately casting a glance astern, I
observed two boats making for the steamer, and scarcely fifty yards
distant. Quickly giving A-ling the signal to retreat, I managed to avoid
giving any alarm, or even to excite the least suspicion in the minds of
our two interlocutors, who believed that I intended to proceed up
country with them as correspondent for a certain paper. The nearest boat
contained seven Manilla-men, including two quartermasters belonging to
the vessel, and their friends; the other, the engineer, captain, and
another European, who was engaged to take command upon reaching the
lines before Soo-chow. It was, indeed, fortunate that I happened to
notice the approaching boats before commencing operations; otherwise we
would certainly have succumbed to numbers within a few minutes. When the
captain arrived on board, I requested a passage to Quin-san. This was
arranged, and I then took my departure.

Having ascertained that the steamer would not leave until late at night,
I fully determined to make another effort to capture her for the
Ti-pings. I found that it was imperative, however, before making the
attempt, to have some addition to the number of my followers. Besides
the complement of four European officers, three Manilla-men
quartermasters, twenty soldiers, and eight or nine other Chinese, it was
expected that _General_ Doctor Macartney, with an _aide-de-camp_, and
the intended future captain, would be present. Consequently, directly
we reached the shore, W---- and myself proceeded to find a few Europeans
whom we could engage for the service. Late in the evening we met at my
house, and found that we could muster five recruits. The character of
these men was far more than questionable; their social position was
among the genus _rowdy_. However, we had not time to pick and choose; a
reinforcement was essential to afford any prospect of a favourable issue
to our enterprise; the _rowdies_ were therefore engaged on the spot,
simply to assist in the capture of an Imperialist vessel, for which
service myself and lieutenant guaranteed to pay them well. We would not
have had them in our young legion.

[Illustration: A VIEW ON THE JOURNEY TO SOO-CHOW, OF A PORTION OF
COUNTRY NEAR THE CITY OF WU-SEE, LATELY DESOLATED BY IMPERIALISTS.
_See_ p. 638.]


FOOTNOTES:

[49] In the _Friend of China_, March 10, 1865, and subsequent numbers,
the following advertisement appears:--

   "The Steamer _Donnington_.--The undersigned" (H. Evans), "_in
   consequence of the determination of the provincial authorities
   not to permit the navigation of inner waters for tradal purposes_
   by vessels of the above class, being thus disappointed in the
   purpose for which he had her constructed, is desirous of
   disposing of her."

This direct violation of the last treaty is one effect of the Manchoo
restoration to power, by British means, in the Kiang-su province.

[50] Now in the service of the Ti-pings.

[51] In the mutual recriminations between the leaders of the force, upon
their arrival at Shanghae, Captain Jones states (referring to
Burgevine):--

   "He further accuses us of trying to make out a good case against
   him, thinking he would never return to Shanghae. To this I
   answer, that he and I were the instigators of the defection from
   the Ti-ping cause, for I confess I at once fell into his plans,
   glad of the opportunity to escape from what appeared likely to
   turn out _unprofitable_, and having, besides, for some time
   before lost confidence in his capacity to command."--_Vide_ Blue
   Book on China, No. 3 (1864), p. 179.

[52] See Frontispiece.

[53] The want of some such clause in Burgevine's arrangements originally
excited the suspicion of the Ti-ping chiefs.




CHAPTER XXIII.

    Renewed Attempt.--Its Success.--Narrow Escape.--British
    Interference.--How explained.--Its Failure.--The _Coup de Main_
    succeeds.--Groundless Alarm.--Route to Soo-chow.--Its
    Difficulties.--Generous Conduct.--Arrival at
    Wu-see.--Prize-Money.--Treachery.--Preparations for an
    Attack.--Manoeuvering.--The Attack.--Warm Reception.--The Enemy
    repulsed.--The Result.--Wu-see evacuated.--Return to
    Shanghae.--Last Interview with the Chung-wang.--Manchoo
    Cruelty.--Result of British Interference.--Evidence
    thereof.--Newspaper Extracts.--Further Extracts.--England's
    Policy.--Its Consequences.--Its Inconsistency.--Her Policy in
    Japan.--Religious Character of the Ti-pings.--Their
    Christianity.


As the steamer was expected to get under weigh about 1 a.m., I started
with my men a little before midnight. Upon this occasion the very
elements seemed to favour our design. The tide ran slack; the moon,
after shrouding herself within a bank of silvery-edged clouds, retired
below the horizon to rest; while even the never-setting stars were
partially hidden by the volume of damp, misty vapour hanging over the
surface of the river, and almost concealing our two small boats.

In little more than half an hour from the time we left the shore, we
were right alongside our destined prize. With the exception of a sentry
at each gangway, everything on board seemed silent and unprepared for an
attack, although by the symptoms from the funnel and steam-pipe it was
evident that the engines were in readiness. I decided to attempt cutting
the vessel out immediately, as it seemed to me that her crew were
probably turned in, and if so, not a moment should be lost in taking
advantage of the opportunity, or they might be roused out to get under
weigh, in which case we would hardly be able to effect the capture
without loss of life.

Dividing my followers equally between the two boats, one being under my
lieutenant's charge, and assigning to each man his duty in the attack, I
gave the word to pull alongside, my own party to board on the starboard
bow, the others on the port.

Another second and we were grappling at the sides of the steamer, and
scrambling over her bulwarks, sword or pistol in hand. The Chinese
sentinels on guard, and a Manilla-man who appeared on deck, were secured
without either resistance or alarming those below. In fact, the
Chinamen, directly they perceived the danger, seemed suddenly inspired
with a strong determination to take no notice, but to be very diligent
in marching up and down, and carefully employing themselves by intently
gazing somewhere else. The calmness and attentive inattention with which
they acted throughout the capture were really charming to behold. They
betrayed neither surprise, fear, sympathy, _esprit de corps_, nor any
other feeling. I then placed a guard over the hatches, set a party to
slip the cable, and sent A-ling into the engine-room to get steam up;
while, with four Europeans, I proceeded into the cabin and secured the
officers. These comprised the intended captain, the mate, and the
gunner, the others being still on shore. They submitted very quietly,
gave up their arms, and were altogether too much confounded to attempt
any resistance. Just as the vessel was entirely in our possession and I
had given the order to go ahead full speed (the cable being slipped),
the engineer came alongside in a _san-pan_, only to find himself a
prisoner when he got on board. Directly the capture was accomplished, I
produced the commission the Chung-wang had given for the purpose, and
showed it to the senior officer of the steamer, informing him that we
were Ti-ping partisans, and that we would endeavour to pass himself and
brother captives from Soo-chow into Gordon's lines as prisoners of war.

Meanwhile, steam had been got up by A-ling, and we were carried along in
the direction of the Ti-ping territory as fast as possible. During the
capture, one of the Manilla quartermasters had jumped overboard and swam
towards the shore. Fearing that this man would raise the alarm and bring
a swarm of Impish Manchoos down upon us, I was compelled to lose no time
in making good our escape, otherwise I might have managed to capture
something more than the one steamer. A few days afterwards I was much
vexed by ascertaining that I might have taken Macartney prisoner, and
with him a large sum of sycee destined to pay Gordon's mercenaries. It
appeared, from the information given by the former officers of the
steamer, when too late to take advantage of it, that the redoubtable
_General_ was to come off in a boat with the dollars and be picked up
abreast of the Fu-tai's camp. If I had known this on the same night, I
could easily have taken measures to effect his capture. Aggravated by
the infamous manner in which Macartney carried on hostilities against my
friends, I would most assuredly have given him up to the Ti-pings, and
he would have been justly punished for his cruelty to his unfortunate
prisoners, if they had treated him by the strictest law of retaliation;
but of this he would have been in little danger, the mad forbearance of
the Ti-pings causing them to suicidally avoid the only means by which
they might have saved themselves from slaughter by British means, viz.,
by proclaiming, and by _executing_ the promise, that if any British help
were given the Manchoo, either directly or indirectly, they would
retaliate by destroying the silk and tea trade (totally in their power),
and by generally making war upon British interests. As for the soundness
of such policy upon the part of the revolutionists, it could not
possibly have done them any injury, and it offered the only chance of
arresting foreign hostility.

Some hours after the capture of the steamer, the Manilla-man, as I
expected at the time, made his way to the Fu-tai's camp and reported
the circumstance. The Manchoo official had no sooner received the
information than he sent off couriers to his very good servants and
allies, the British authorities. Those devoted personages immediately
made ready one of their national gunboats, and, placing a number of
English soldiers on board, despatched her to overhaul and bring back the
missing vessel to Shanghae.

Naturally enough my readers may be inclined to wonder what business the
British officials had to interfere with the capture of an Imperialist
craft by the Ti-pings, they must therefore have an explanation.

All the English admirals, generals, consuls, and others, who were
fighting upon the side of the Manchoo, chose, with an amazing amount of
injustice and arrogance, to assume that they and their disreputable
allies were alone entitled to belligerent rights and privileges. Every
act of their enemy was very indignantly branded as either atrociously
piratical or a form of bloodthirsty brigandage. They alone were
virtuous; they alone had any right to kill, burn, and otherwise destroy!
In consequence of this very comfortable state of self-conceit, and in
order to succour the dearly beloved Manchoo, some experimental warrior
or statesman among the British officials, according to their enlightened
_ex parte_ diplomacy, did me the honour to designate my humble exploit a
piratical outrage. This of course justified their praiseworthy efforts
to capture the scoundrel who dared to differ from their immaculate
selves, by presuming to prefer and assist the rebels instead of the
Imperialists. Besides, is not the vile pirate an enemy of all mankind?
And who would be so oblivious of merit as not to do them reverence when
they caught him? Unfortunately for their visionary laurels, though
fortunately for the pirate, they did not succeed in catching him.

Now, as even at the period referred to, the Ti-ping revolution included
a population and a territory, the former at least equal in number, and
the latter in extent, to the people and soil of England; and as they
were not only recognised as a belligerent power, but as constituting the
Government _de facto_ throughout the large tract of country under their
control, I cannot understand how the military service of such a Power,
with an army of several hundred thousand men in the field, and an
organized administration ruling their possessions, was termed piracy and
brigandage.

I was not only duly commissioned by the Chung-wang, the proper Ti-ping
authority, but also acted upon a special commission issued against the
vessels of the enemy. If, therefore, the capture of the steamer could be
termed an act of piracy, what should be the language used to express the
raids and seizure of Ti-ping craft by Admiral Hope, Generals Staveley,
Brown, Michel, &c.? when it is remembered that they performed such acts
entirely without authority from their own Government or any one else.
Some pirates might feel flattered by finding themselves in the same boat
with such worthy people; but the author of this work begs most
respectfully to decline the doubtful honour. There is another point
connected with this employment of defamatory epithets. If I, holding
authority direct from the Ti-ping Commander-in-Chief (whose acts were
authorized by his king), were a pirate, then what can have been the
_status_ of Major Gordon, R.E., the commander of the Anglo-Manchoo
contingent, who held no commission whatever from Imperial authority, but
was simply employed by a _local_ Chinese mandarin?

The British gunboat did not overtake my party, though, if she had been
handled a little smarter, it would have been an easy matter, for we lost
our way several times among the labyrinth of creeks in the interior. If
it had not been prevented by the delay from taking wrong courses
(thereby affording time for the seizure of the vessel to be made known
to the enemy before Soo-chow), and from the fact that only one of the
men I had engaged at Shanghae could be depended upon, I should have
proceeded straight through the Imperialist lines and made an attempt to
seize one of their two other steamers. However, I was obliged to be
contented with my single prize. She mounted a capital pivot 32-pounder
in the bow, a good 12-pounder howitzer in the stern, was well provided
with the best description of ammunition, and she would probably prove
very serviceable in the defence of Soo-chow.

In consequence of the impossibility of forcing a passage through the
enemy's lines, it became necessary to follow some such route as that by
which I had last reached Soo-chow, however difficult it might be to find
a channel large enough to carry the steamer so great a distance.

After losing our course for the last time, and very nearly steaming into
Gordon's head-quarters at Quin-san, we managed to reach the first
Ti-ping position at San-le-jow. Directly we appeared, or rather,
directly the funnel became visible above the dense growth of rush and
bamboo lining the banks of the creek, the garrison of the fort rushed to
arms and made ready to defend themselves against the supposed and
dreaded enemy. The terror inspired by the appearance of the small
steam-vessels acting with the Imperialist mercenaries was at all times
excessive. From a distance the helpless Ti-pings were generally mowed
down with perfect impunity, and heavy artillery carried destruction
throughout their ranks, while the ships, white painted and low in the
water, were almost invisible, and were able to maintain their advantage
by retreating or advancing whenever it was desirable, at the same time
retaining a position from which shrapnel, Moorsom, and other infernally
destructive, though ingeniously contrived shell, could be thrown with
deadly accuracy.

It was no wonder that as we suddenly hove in sight, with a volume of
thick smoke puffing up from our high-pressure engines, the soldiers and
civilians about San-le-jow were dreadfully alarmed. They were well
aware that small mercy was ever shown by the "foreign brethren" in
charge of the irresistible "hoo-lung paou-chwan," for, fighting or
harmless, they were shot down whenever a gun could be brought to bear,
and so long as the missiles could be made to reach them. The rowdy
bravoes of the Imperialist flotilla being unacquainted with the
principles of military honour, seemed to believe that their sole mission
was to kill, burn, and destroy; as for extending mercy to those who were
unable to resist their appliances of modern warfare, or treating the
vanquished with magnanimity, they never entertained such ideas.

Fortunately for the people we came upon so suddenly, the steamer was
under Ti-ping colours; therefore, their alarm presented only the most
ludicrous character, unaccompanied by the tragic and heretofore
inseparable consequences of such an event. From their isolated cottages
the poor villagers rushed forth, carrying the most valued of their
homely effects; men, women, and children ran frantically in the
direction of the fort; some were laden with agricultural implements (for
even these were often destroyed by the victorious Imperialists); others
with household goods; while here and there a few noble labourers were
observed trudging along with their aged fathers or mothers on their
backs. Whenever the edge of a canal was reached, without a moment's
hesitation, the fugitives would plunge right into the water, and give
cause for merriment by the wild efforts they made to regain dry land,
often rolling back, and floundering helplessly through the soft mud.

When I perceived the alarm our appearance had created, and that the
soldiers were making ready to fire upon us with a few heavy gingalls
mounted on their fort, I stopped our vessel's way and brought up
alongside the bank, and then going ashore with A-ling, proceeded to the
fort to satisfy the commandant as to our friendly character. When it was
made known that we were in the Ti-ping service, the soldiers and people
loudly professed their gratification. The chief was a bronzed and hardy
veteran; and although his garrison did not muster nearly 100 men, he was
quite determined to defend his post to the last, had we proved to be
enemies. The answer he made when I asked him whether he would not have
acted with discretion by retreating from the steamer if she had been
still in Manchoo interest, closely resembled that given by a brave
Ti-ping officer (who had charge of a most dangerous and exposed position
near Ningpo) to a friend of mine, when the latter inquired why he did
not abandon so precarious an outpost, which was nearly surrounded by the
enemy; he replied, "Puh pa! laou Tien-ping tung shao" (No fear! an old
Ti-ping soldier knows how to die).

Passing through San-le-jow, we soon reached the small town of Pimbong,
barely twenty-five miles distant from Soo-chow, and also situated on the
Grand Canal. At this place we were very kindly received by the chief,
who, after seeing my commission, supplied me with provisions, coals,
firewood, and other necessaries. Pimbong was almost the last Ti-ping
position in the neighbourhood, as immediately beyond came the lines of
the enemy besieging Soo-chow. Here our pilots ceased to be of service,
and the chief sent on board a man well acquainted with the country, to
guide us through the largest creeks. After trying every channel
branching off from the Grand Canal, and finding them all too small for
the passage of the steamer, we were compelled to proceed on to
Kar-sing-foo, a city nearly twenty miles from Pimbong. Had the creeks we
explored been available, we could have reached Soo-chow by a _detour_ of
not more than forty miles, but by going to Kar-sing the distance would
be doubled at least.

After a short run down the splendid Grand Canal, we came to off the
city, and sent messengers to apprise the governor of our arrival. In a
little while that functionary, who proved to be the Yoong-wang, visited
the steamer in great state; he met me with much friendliness, and
declared himself delighted with the acquisition of the vessel so well
known and dreaded. Two Europeans were with the chief; they had formerly
belonged to the Franco-Manchoo contingent; and as my lieutenant had
known them to be of good character--one had been a captain in the
force--I expressed my wish that they should join me, and the Yoong-wang
very kindly consented.

As time was precious for the success of my plans, we only remained a few
hours at Kar-sing-foo, and then started away with a new pilot on board,
who was instructed to take us to the largest creeks leading to the
Ta-hoo Lake, which it would be necessary to cross in order to reach
Soo-chow.

From Pimbong everywhere we traversed a most beautiful country; and
although, from the rumours of approaching war, the influx of fugitives,
and the scarcity of provisions, no little distress was prevalent, the
people were far more happy, prosperous, and improved than Imperialists
ever have been, or seem likely to be.

Directly we steamed away from Kar-sing our troubles began. Every creek
we attempted to navigate proved either too small, or the bridges were
too narrow and low for the steamer to pass them. After getting, perhaps,
fifteen miles up a creek, and destroying several bridges by the way, the
water would suddenly shallow to less than our draught, or the channel
would narrow to less than our beam; of course, in such cases our only
plan was to get back stern foremost and try some other canal.
Fortunately the vessel was built of iron, so that her progress
overland--for often we were obliged to pass a place not more than four
feet deep, while the steamer drew five--did no further injury than
bending or indenting her pliant sides.

At last, after spending a week exploring the principal water
communication of what seemed in every respect a free and Christian
country, we approached the sea, and it was only when within fourteen
miles of Hang-chow that we managed to find an available creek. Even to
take advantage of it we were compelled to destroy many bridges; and,
upon several occasions, clear the bottom of the channel, while the work
of removing stakes and barriers was incessant. Had it not been for the
willing assistance we received from the Ti-pings, we should never have
been able to get through.

Eventually, after a passage no one would ever have believed the steamer
could have effected against so many obstacles, we arrived at the great
city of Hoo-chow-foo, situated just at the southern end of the Ta-hoo.
At this place the commandant, Tow-wang, and the Luk-wang--whose nephew,
the Mo-wang, was commandant of Soo-chow--came out and received us in
state. Upon leaving them, after having dined with the chiefs in the
city, I managed to reach the Ta-hoo after knocking down an obstructive
bridge with a few Moorsom shells. Before proceeding to cross the lake, I
obtained a dozen good men from the chiefs, and put the paddle-wheels
(which had become much dilapidated during the passage of the creeks) in
good repair; for I knew that if _General_ Gordon, of the Manchoo
mercenary service, had sufficient sense, he could easily intercept me
with two, or even three, of the steamers attached to his force. However,
fortunately for me, Gordon did not send his ships until too late; for
had they overhauled their former consort, she would have fallen an easy
prize, as I had not more than two or three Europeans and half a dozen
Chinese on whom I could depend.

As I understood there were only two channels by which Soo-chow could be
reached from the lake by a vessel drawing so much water as the steamer,
and as one of these--_via_ the Tung-shan hills and city of Wo-kong--was
already in Impish hands, I adopted the only remaining course--a creek
leading from the northern end of the Ta-hoo to the city of Wu-see; from
whence, to Soo-chow, the Grand Canal afforded an easy passage.

While stopping at a small Ti-ping position on the west side of the lake,
I was much pleased by witnessing the kind behaviour of the soldiers to a
number of destitute country people, who had fled from the advance of the
Imperialists down the Yang-tze-kiang towards Nankin. There were not more
than 150 soldiers at the station, and from their _own rations_, which
consisted solely of rice and dried fish, they charitably relieved more
than 500 starving people. This is no idle assertion, for the whole of my
confederates were present, and saw the distribution of rice. I went over
the five gunboats belonging to the troops, and found that their stores
of food were nearly exhausted. The chief told me that, when all was
used, he would be obliged to abandon the place, and leave the
unfortunate people to starve. I supplied him with a couple of bags of
rice, and then bade him farewell; although I have never seen him since,
I have not forgotten his praiseworthy conduct. Who has ever seen an
Imperialist official do the like?

At length we found the creek leading to Wu-see, and on the same
afternoon arrived at the city, greatly to the delight of the garrison,
who were much harassed by a formidable flotilla operating against their
lines of communication. Soon after our arrival, the commandant,
Saou-wang, returned to the city with his army, having beaten the enemy
after a sharp fight in the morning. The troops had marched upwards of
forty miles to and from the battle-field, and directly they came to the
creek encircling Wu-see, they threw down their arms on the bank, and
plunged into the cooling water in dense masses, clothes and all; so that
in a few minutes the surface was literally covered with them.

The Saou-wang having informed me that the Commander-in-Chief was
encamped at a place named Ma-tang-chiao--on the shore of the Ta-hoo,
and a place of strategic importance--equidistant from Wu-see and
Soo-chow, I at once requested him to despatch messengers to inform his
superior of my arrival. While awaiting their return, the commandant set
a number of men to work pulling down a very heavy stone bridge, which it
was necessary to remove before the steamer could be taken into the Grand
Canal. At this city I saw upwards of 6,000 poor people, who were
supported by the garrison. They had been driven from their homes by the
progress of the Anglo-Manchoos in the neighbourhood, and were perfectly
destitute. Every day one of the principal officers of the city came to
superintend the distribution of rice, and the ravenous manner in which
the people struggled for their food was something fearful to
contemplate, especially when it was considered that such great misery
was caused entirely by the unjustifiable intervention of my countrymen.

Upon this occasion I had not much time to notice the distress caused by
the approach of the allied English and Manchoo devastators, messengers
from the Chung-wang on the following morning bringing orders for me to
proceed back into the Ta-hoo Lake, and take the steamer to
Ma-tang-chiao. When I reached this place, the Chung-wang, attended by
the Sz, Le, and several other Wangs, came on board, and appeared to be
overjoyed with my successful enterprise and the appearance of the
steamer. A-ling, the two Ti-ping officers, and the two Cantonese were
instantly promoted; and the chiefs took off their own pearl ornaments to
decorate them. The Chung-wang then took me ashore with him, and, upon
reaching his head-quarters, confirmed my lieutenant's appointment, and
declared that he would give 20,000 dollars prize-money for the capture
of the steamer. This I considered amply sufficient for so small a
service, and I determined to divide it equally among all who had
assisted at the seizure--including the five rowdies who only came for
money--besides giving a portion to some of the former crew, who had
kept to their work and assisted me since the capture.

The encampment was formed around a large straggling village; and the
people, like those of the neighbouring hamlets, appeared more happy,
better fed, and less depressed than those of more distant parts of
Ti-pingdom. This was always the result of the Chung-wang's presence in
any locality, for he was not only the most able general, but also the
most talented organizer and pacificator among the chiefs.

At Ma-tang-chiao the Chung-wang was concentrating an army of relief for
Soo-chow; and, with the object of enabling the steamer to participate in
the same movement, men were employed to remove several bridges and other
obstructions on a creek by which she could reach the Grand Canal. This
work was hardly commenced, when two or three fugitives, shortly followed
by many others, from the suburbs of Soo-chow, arrived with the
disastrous intelligence that the city was in the hands of the enemy. How
it had fallen they could not say, further than by stating that it had
not been captured by fighting, but by some treachery. The Chung-wang
seemed much affected by the report, for Soo-chow was not only the most
important and best fortified city, the most abundantly supplied and
strongest garrisoned, but the commandant, Mo-wang, was his oldest and
bravest brother in arms.

Orders were at once given to break camp and march upon Wu-see; and while
the troops were so engaged, I returned with the steamer to the same
city. On the following day the bad news became confirmed by the arrival
of some hundreds of the garrison of Soo-chow. These men stated that the
second in command, Nar-wang, with several other principal chiefs, had
assassinated the commandant and then surrendered the city to the enemy.
A great number of the Mo-wang's men were massacred by the followers of
the other leaders, who commanded about 20,000 troops, while the
Cantonese portion of the garrison --some 5,000 strong, and unconnected
with the treachery--were compelled to fight their way out of the city.
These latter, having placed their wives and children in the centre,
proceeded to force the west gate. Unable, however, to effect the narrow
passage with their helpless families against the incessant attack by
overwhelming numbers of Imperialist and renegade soldiery, they were
driven to the horrible extreme of killing their own women and children
to save them from the worse fate of degradation and torture, if captured
by the enemy. Scarcely a third of the men succeeded in cutting their way
through, and of these many were wounded, many were covered with the
blood of their wives and little ones, while others had become raving
maniacs.

The Chinese nature, although apparently so apathetic, is yet capable of
the wildest frenzy of passion; in fact, no people have a more
paradoxical and anomalous character. It is a well-known fact that
Chinese non-combatants will commit wholesale suicide upon the approach
of enemies; but few Europeans would credit the fearful acts which the
Soo-chow fugitives were driven in desperation to commit, or the frantic
excitement leading to such deeds, and to the insanity of many of the
perpetrators. I shall never forget the terrible appearance of the madmen
stained with the blood of their own dearest relatives, whom they had
themselves killed. They rushed into Wu-see at an immense speed, passed
the city, and came to the encampment outside, and then, yelling,
shouting, and crying, threw themselves, in paroxysms of grief and
frenzy, on the ground before the Chung-wang. Several attempted to drown
themselves in a neighbouring creek; and one, a young chief, stabbed
himself to death before he could be prevented. The unfortunate men were
at last secured and taken into the city.

With the remnant of the Soo-chow garrison came seven Europeans. These
men had been sent from the city to join my legion, by order of the
Chung-wang, and having proceeded to Ma-tang-chiao, when they changed
their route for Wu-see, they were overtaken by the fugitives, and came
on with them. These seven men were not a portion of those whom I had
sent from Shanghae; all the latter (with the exception of the brave
Labourais, who was killed during a night attack on some stockades by the
enemy only a few days previously) being within Soo-chow when that city
was betrayed, and many of them there perishing. Three of the Europeans
had straggled, and did not arrive for some days. Among the four who
joined me were _Captain_ Smith, and an engineer (for the steamer) who
had hitherto been employed casting shell, guns, and executing other
important work at Soo-chow.

As it was absolutely necessary for the increase and establishment of my
legion that I should return to Shanghae, I wished to leave as soon as
the Chung-wang reached Wu-see, particularly as both I and my lieutenant
were in a very bad state of health, and urgently required medical
assistance; but the Chung-wang having requested that I would join him in
an attack upon the Imperialist force threatening Wu-see and
Chang-chow-foo, I was obliged to defer leaving until after the battle.
The enemy were intrenched in great strength within fifteen miles of
Wu-see, and were assisted by a powerful flotilla of gunboats, which gave
them entire command of the water communications of the city. It was to
drive away or destroy this fleet that an attack was decided upon.

At last all obstructions in the way of enabling the steamer--now named
the _Ti-ping_, and flying the Chung-wang's standard--to participate in
the engagement were removed; and I joined the Commander-in-Chief's
consultation held before commencing operations on the following morning.
One thousand men, composing the _elite_ of the Chung-wang's guards, and
the first division of the Loyal and Faithful Auxiliary Legion, were
placed under my orders, together with fifteen gunboats, which were to
co-operate with the steamer. With this force I was ordered to attack
the hostile flotilla, the Chung-wang himself disposing of his troops so
as to prevent a junction between the enemy and their vessels. About
midnight the army marched to take up its position, and at daylight I
advanced with the steamer and gunboats, the men of my legion
accompanying me in two divisions, one on each bank of the canal.

The morning was thick and foggy, so that we were enabled to take up a
position within cannon-range of the enemy without either attracting
their attention or discerning them ourselves. The place I chose for a
halt until the fog cleared away was at a large stone bridge, parallel to
the Grand Canal, up which we were proceeding, and over a creek leading
direct into a small lake, about a mile and a half distant, on which the
enemy's flotilla was stationed.

My plan of action was soon formed. I sent the gunboats in advance beyond
the bridge, with orders to attack the enemy at the entrance of the lake,
and then to retreat in confusion. By this manoeuvre I hoped to draw the
hostile gunboats into the creek, when I should be able to attack them
with the steamer to an advantage. On the creek not more than a dozen
boats could form abreast and work their guns, but on the lake the whole
number, estimated at 60 to 70, would be able to open a concentrated fire
on our advance; and one well-aimed shot could sink the lightly-built
_Ti-ping_, or pierce her boilers.

Taking on board fifty picked men from the Cantonese musketeers of my
legion, and making everything ready for action, I had the steamer moved
close to the side of the bridge, where she lay perfectly concealed.

Towards noon the weather began to clear, and our small squadron
immediately pulled forward and opened fire on their opponents. The
Imperialists, encouraged by their great superiority of numbers, soon
advanced into the creek and gave chase as our gunboats retreated. By
the time that they had reached half-way to the bridge, however, the day
became quite clear, and observing our troops spread out in line of
battle, they gave up any further pursuit.

This was the moment for which I had been waiting. Sending forward my men
on the shore at a run, I moved the steamer from her hidden position,
passed under the bridge, and advanced upon the enemy at full speed,
firing upon them with our 32-pounder, and warmly answered by their stern
guns as they turned and pulled back to reach the lake, which they
managed to do before we could close with them. As we approached the
termination of the creek, we were saluted with a tremendous cannonade.
The gunboats had formed in three divisions, one directly fronting the
mouth of the creek, the others upon either flank, so that they were
enabled to maintain a most powerful cross fire. I counted twenty-two
vessels in the centre squadron, and twenty in each of the others. They
were all fully manned with about 30 men in every boat, and each carried
a bow-gun, from 6 to 18-pounder; a large swivel on either side, and a
stern gun, a little smaller than that in the fore-part.

Of course, my land force could be of no assistance on the lake, all
their use being to accompany the steamer on either side of a creek, and
prevent the enemy's troops closing upon her in such an indefensible
position. Our fifteen gunboats were armed with such inferior artillery
that they were altogether unable to cope with the hostile vessels, every
one of which carried good English guns supplied by the British at
Shanghae. I therefore ordered them to remain in the creek, but to
advance and take charge of any boats we might capture.

Directly we emerged from the creek, the enemy gallantly pulled towards
us, decorated with innumerable flags, maintaining a very heavy fire,
yelling terrifically, and deafening us with a tremendous beating of
gongs and blowing of war-horns. Seeing that their only way of retreat
was by a creek in the rear of their starboard squadron, I immediately
attacked the centre, because, if successful, we should not only succeed
in capturing two-thirds of the flotilla, but would render them unable to
fire upon the steamer through danger of injuring themselves. While
steaming up to obtain this position--necessarily at slow speed, because
the lake was very shallow--showers of grape, roundshot, and every
species of Chinese rocket and missile, came rushing all around and about
our heads. Fortunately the _mitraille_ was fired too loosely, and the
solid shot too badly aimed, to cause us much damage, while every
discharge from our heavy gun, worked by _Captain_ Smith, proved very
effective among the mass of boats, men, and flags. In a short time the
central squadron gave way, and the crews, pulling close to the shore,
began to desert their vessels. The port squadron, in danger of being cut
off, took to flight and became mingled with the centre. Meanwhile, the
starboard division pulled up the creek in its rear, and took up a
position, from which it maintained a sharp fire over the low land,
nearly every shot passing close to the steamer or striking her. Several
times I turned away from the discomfited vessels to follow their
consorts up the creek, but on each occasion, with obstinate courage, the
enemy rallied, remanned their guns, and stuck to them until our return
to the attack drove them ashore again.

[Illustration:
DAY & SON, (LIMITED) LITH.
NAVAL ENGAGEMENT AND CAPTURE OF IMPERIALIST GUNBOATS AT WU-SEE.]

Thrice did the crews of the gunboats resume the conflict. On their last
attempt to turn the fortune of the day, they actually advanced upon us,
loading and firing as fast as they could, keeping up a fearful yelling
and beating of gongs, and evincing every determination to board. Had
they only possessed sufficient confidence to persist in this attempt,
they might easily have succeeded in overpowering us by numbers and
capturing the steamer. Fortunately, however, directly the heavy
discharges from our pivot gun--double-shotted with grape and
canister--and the incessant musketry fire from the small-arm men
stationed on our upper deck began to take effect upon them, they gave
way and retreated to the shore. After the last repulse, my squadron of
gunboats having arrived on the scene of conflict, their crews took
charge of the deserted vessels of the enemy and began to tow them away.

From their position on the creek, the starboard division of the
Imperialist flotilla still maintained the action; so, abandoning the two
others to our allies, we steamed after the still defiant squadron. In a
few minutes a well-aimed shot from our 32-pounder sunk two of the
gunboats, and eight others were captured. The remaining ten, after a
short chase, were abandoned by their men, who escaped ashore, carrying
with them, however, their small arms. At this moment I perceived that
the creek was lined on either side by a cunningly-contrived breast-work,
from behind which the gunboat _braves_ began to fire heavily upon us. At
the same time large columns of Imperialist troops became visible, as, by
sheer force of numbers, they pressed back the Chung-wang's divisions,
and threatened to occupy the bank of the creek by which I had advanced
the steamer, and which formed the only line of retreat to Wu-see.

Before we could secure the last abandoned gunboats, a large number of
musket-armed skirmishers were thrown into the intrenchments in our
immediate vicinity. So heavy and effective became their volleys--every
bullet striking some part of the steamer, riddling her light upper works
through and through, and wounding many men, while we could neither reply
with our heavy guns nor bring a rifle to bear upon the hidden foe--that
we were compelled to save ourselves by precipitate flight, leaving the
last captured vessels behind, and hurrying to the other creek at full
speed, in order to avoid being intercepted by the advancing troops.
Owing to the gallantry with which my land division held the enemy in
check, we were able to effect our retreat, carrying off fifty-one
gunboats as the substantial trophy of our victory, and capturing more
than fifty of the Sung-wang's[54] flags.

Upon reaching the bridge we were warmly congratulated by the Chung-wang,
who at once declared he would give 200 dols. prize-money for each
gunboat, which promise he scrupulously fulfilled. As the enemy continued
to advance in line of battle, orders were given for a general attack,
and I was despatched with the steamer to the city of Chang-chow-foo, to
join in the co-operating movements being executed therefrom. We were too
late to participate in them, for, upon reaching some outworks, about
twelve miles from the city, our orders were countermanded, the
Imperialists being defeated at every point, and the stockades from which
they had menaced the two cities being in the hands of the Ti-pings.

Our escape from the ambush into which we had fallen while pursuing the
remnant of the Imperialist flotilla was something miraculous, for,
although our casualties were only two Chinese killed, three Europeans
slightly, my interpreter A-ling dangerously, and a dozen Chinese
wounded, the steamer was pierced about her upper-works with countless
bullets; so much so, indeed, that it was difficult to understand how
every person on board had not been killed.

Some days after our victory, a large Imperial force advanced from
Soo-chow and proceeded to invest Wu-see. Upon one occasion they advanced
close up to the walls, but were driven back by the shell we threw among
them from the steamer. As the city was rendered untenable by the loss of
Soo-chow and other places, the Chung-wang decided to evacuate it and
retire upon Chang-chow-foo. Before executing this arrangement the
Commander-in-Chief, in his capacity of Vicegerent to the Ti-ping king,
TIEN-WANG, commissioned me to promulgate among foreigners the objects of
the revolution; the wishes and opinions of its leaders; the treatment
they had received from England; and all subjects relative thereto upon
which I might be able to write. This event has been the sole origin,
besides my own feelings in the cause, of the present work--"Tai Ping
Tien Kwoh."

My arrangements to return to Shanghae were soon made. _Captain_ Smith,
together with the Ke-wang (one of the Commander-in Chief's high
officers), I left in command of my legion so far as it was organized,
including the steamer and captured gunboats. My lieutenant, who was too
ill to remain on duty, the five rowdies, A-ling and his two Cantonese
friends, were to accompany me. Those who remained were given their
prize-money, but I refused to receive the share for the others until we
should reach the city of Kar-sing-foo, because this place was on the
limit of the Ti-ping territory in the direction of Shanghae, and I felt
confident that, if they had time, the rowdies would quarrel over their
money, and, probably, injure one another. It will be seen that my
anticipations were not groundless.

Thinking that the horrible Soo-chow treachery and massacre (the chiefs
and their men who surrendered upon _General_ Gordon's _guarantee of
conditions_ were put to death by the Manchoo colleague of the British
officer) would surely occasion the British Government to withdraw its
help from those whose sanguinary atrocities were not only dishonouring
them by their participation as allies, but actually making them morally,
if not materially, responsible; I set out for Shanghae under the
impression that the Anglo-Manchoo alliance would cease, and the time
prove favourable for advocating the Ti-ping cause and its claims upon
all foreign, but especially British, sympathy.

Having taken leave of the noble Chung-wang and his son Maou-lin, I left
Wu-see with an escort of fifteen gunboats; at the same time the city was
evacuated, and the Commander-in-Chief started with his troops for
Chang-chow-foo, carrying with him the four Europeans captured on board
the steamer, whom he promised to retain as prisoners of mine until the
return of myself or my lieutenant. It has since been reported that the
bodies of these four men were found some time afterwards near Wu-see,
and Major Gordon of the R. E., in his notorious capacity of
uncommissioned general to Manchoo Governor Le, took upon himself to
report that the Chung-wang had roasted them to death, his only authority
being the testimony of a demented "old woman," who declared that
"Cantonese rebels" had killed them! If the Ti-pings did kill the four
prisoners, the act was not only the first instance in which they have
retaliated upon foreigners,[55] but was also the result of Major
Gordon's treacherous capture of Soo-chow, for I should have sent the men
over to his lines as exchanged prisoners of war if I had reached that
city. It is, however, believed by all in China who are acquainted with
the facts of the case, that the men fell into the hands of the
Imperialists, and were put to death by them; and this seems to me a very
likely affair (if they have been killed, for it is by no means certain),
because the rear of the forces that retreated from Wu-see were closely
pursued by the troops of Le, Futai. But my strongest reason for
believing that the Ti-pings had no hand in killing them, if murdered
they were, is the fact that the Chung-wang was personally pledged (to
me) to keep them unharmed and properly cared for; and even Major Gordon
cannot state that this celebrated chief ever broke his word, _or
sanctioned a violation of his guarantees by associates_. Moreover, I
particularly gave the Chung-wang to understand that my future services
would depend very much upon finding my prisoners safe and sound at my
return; besides, he could not possibly have had any motive to injure
them, and thereby lose what he expected might prove valuable aid; and
certainly, to judge by the kind treatment they received within Wu-see,
he had no intention of doing so.

At my last interview with the Chung-wang I shall never forget the
speaking expression of his fine eyes, as I shook his hand for the last
time and stepped back to take my final departure. His look seemed to
express friendship and gratitude for what I had already done, doubt for
the future, and a mutely pathetic request, imploring that I, too, would
not desert him in his hour of need. This well-remembered glance created
another bond between us which only death can obliterate, and which would
alone have bound me to help the Chung-wang to the utmost of my ability.
No wonder he seemed doubtful as to my future course, for the Ti-pings
had never trusted a foreigner without being deceived, and they never
experienced anything but insult or unprovoked injury from European
officials!

From Wu-see to Kar-sing-foo, _via_ the Ta-hoo Lake and Hoo-chow-foo, I
was accompanied by the Shi-wang, a cousin of the Chung-wang, who had
received instructions to facilitate my movements and make arrangements
for my return, besides being commissioned to divert to the city of
Hoo-chow the reinforcements on their way to Ma-tang-chiao. A few days
after commencing our journey we fell in with a body of troops belonging
to the Ting-wang's command at the provincial capital Hang-chow, who were
proceeding to the appointed rendezvous; but the Shi-wang ordered them to
Hoo-chow, where they afterwards proved very useful in maintaining
communications with Nankin along the west shore of the Ta-hoo, _via_
Chang-chow, Kin-tang, Li-yang, &c.

After the evacuation of Wu-see by the Ti-ping troops, the city, of
course, fell into Imperialist hands; when the wretches, in their usual
style, commenced a general massacre of the unfortunate inhabitants, it
being estimated that 6,000, at least, were put to death, their crime
being the fact that they were found in a city which had been held by
rebels! The poor people who had been daily supplied with food from the
Ti-ping granaries were now starved to death, for charity is a virtue
unknown to Manchoo mandarins. I was at Wu-see for several weeks, and
during that period I went over the country for miles in every direction,
finding everywhere the same frightful results of British
intervention--in the devastation of the country by the allies, and the
starvation of the unfortunate Ti-ping country people. During my return
to Shanghae, every place I saw exhibited more or less misery; a painful
contrast to the prosperity universally prevailing only a few months
before, when the power and rule of the Tien-wang was unshaken. Upon
leaving the Ti-ping territory, or rather upon passing the few strong
cities they still occupied in proximity to the frontier, the desolation
of the country was perfectly appalling. Even throughout those portions
of the silk districts still untouched by the enemy, everything was in a
state of turmoil, inactivity, and distress. The mulberry-trees and the
silkworms, which require constant care, were but partially tended; in
many parts they were neglected altogether; so that these facts, coupled
to the wholesale massacre of the people by the Imperialists, fully
account for the great decrease of silk _since_ the Ti-pings have been
driven from the producing districts.

My readers have already been shown the prosperous condition of the
country entirely under Ti-ping control during the years 1860-1-2-3. We
will now notice for the last time the effect of British support of the
barbarous Manchoo.

The change for the worse may be considered to have fairly commenced
directly after the capture of the city of Quin-san by the Anglo-Manchoo
forces. Since that event, entirely caused by British means, death and
destruction have swept throughout the once free, Christian, and smiling
land. I have wandered over mile after mile of the once happy Ti-ping
districts (during the latter part of 1863 and beginning of 1864); I have
passed through twenty and thirty villages in a day, and, horrible to
relate, in almost every room of each house have found the unfortunate
people starved, starving, or barely maintaining the embers of life by a
fearful state of cannibalism, feeding on the dead bodies lying thick
around them! I have seen this sight of unparalleled horror in large
unwalled towns containing many hundred houses, and I frequently found as
many as fifteen to twenty bodies in one dwelling, the great number being
occasioned by refugees from places already occupied or threatened by
Anglo-Imperialists. I have had the fearful consolation of resuscitating
many of the miserable people for a short time by giving them all the
rice I could obtain, though I was convinced it would only give them
strength to undergo the pangs of starvation a second time. Some
insensate patriots may accuse me of un-English feeling for my
expressions against the policy of the _present_ British ministry; but
would not any Englishman feel and write strongly upon witnessing such
scenes as those I am describing, and which have been solely caused by
the wicked use of England's strength? I denounce the policy pursued
against the Ti-pings as being not only egregiously stupid and suicidal
in theory and practice, but absolutely iniquitous in every result.
Nothing could work greater harm on living mankind.

From the few poor wretches I found able to speak, in most cases I
gathered their expression of opinion "that it was through foreign
soldiers coming to fight the Tien-ping (Ti-ping troops) that their
distress had been occasioned." Some said that "they had come from places
taken by the Kwan-ping (Imperialist troops), and reaching where I found
them, could get nothing to eat, were unable to travel farther, and so
had lain them down to die." Whenever I came to villages where the people
were not yet reduced to the last stage of famine, mothers were offering
their daughters to any one who would take them; but even this was
unavailing! Although in other parts of China the young women would have
been taken for evil purposes, in Ti-pingdom the laws strictly prohibited
everything that was condemned as immoral, so they were left to starve if
provisions were not supplied from better motives. These fearful scenes
are so vividly impressed upon my memory that I am sorry I ever had the
misfortune to witness them.

The desolating sword of Asiatic warfare has been ruthlessly carried into
provinces for years in the most flourishing condition under Ti-ping
rule. Hundreds of once happy villages have been obliterated from the
face of the earth they once adorned, while the decaying skeletons of
their industrious and inoffensive people are thickly scattered
throughout the surrounding country, changing into a vast Golgotha and
desert what would otherwise have remained an earthly paradise.

As many people would probably feel inclined to deny that the
Anglo-Manchoo forces created the desolation I have described, because it
has frequently been misrepresented by interested persons that the
Ti-pings were the devastators, I have selected two or three statements
which entirely corroborate my own.

The following narrative was given by a gentleman who has comparatively
lately traversed the silk districts in search of mulberry-trees and
silkworms, in order to estimate the probable extent of the next silk
crop, and the causes of the present great fall-off. It appeared in the
_Friend of China_, Shanghae paper, of January 13, 1865, from which I
quote:--

    "When Burgevine went to Nankin, that time the country between it
    and Soo-chow was a garden for loveliness. For eighteen _le_
    (Chinese miles) along the canal, on either side, the banks were
    lined with houses--the inhabitants busy as bees, and as thriving
    as they had reason to expect to be. With the reversion of
    Soo-chow to the Imperialists, these houses and numerous bridges
    disappeared. For the whole eighteen _le_ there is not a
    roof--the country around, as far as the eye can reach, is a
    desert. The people have fled from the Imperialists as though
    they dreaded them like wolves and tigers; nor man, nor woman,
    nor child, nor beast of any description to be seen. Fowls,
    ducks, pigs, buffaloes--no such thing to be got for love or
    money.

    "Twenty-seven _le_ from Soo-chow brought me to Soo-za-qua,
    formerly a custom-house station, now the abode of part of the
    residue of Gordon's force....

    "The place is an oasis in the desert. For miles after leaving
    it, indeed, all the way thence to Wu-see, the same barren,
    weed-overgrown appearance meets the sight. Pheasants,
    partridges, and a wild deer now and then, gave me plenty of
    amusement for my fowling-piece. But the number of bleached
    skeletons, skulls, or partially decayed dead bodies, is awful to
    look at--to count them would be impossible--they literally cover
    the ground for miles. As for traffic in boats, there was none;
    trade is all gone. Wu-see is in ruins. Where they were going I
    could not make out, perhaps the boatmen themselves did not know
    beyond their next stage, but the number of soldiers passing up
    in boats was legion, the contrast between them in their fat,
    saucy appearance, and that of the meagre, starved-looking
    wretches in the streets, being very striking. Before reaching
    Wu-see I passed a camp of from 20,000 to 30,000
    soldiers--impudent rascals, shouting after me, 'Yang-qui-tsze,
    Yang-qui-tsze' (Foreign devil),[56] till I was tired of hearing
    them; beckoning me to come on shore; waving spears and dashing
    them out to show what they would do if they could. They have
    evidently no love for Westerns, these Imperial Imps....

    "On to Chang-chow-foo, for 95 _le_, still the same howling
    desert, not a working soul to be seen. The depth and strength of
    the weeds now are prodigious. Alack, for my search for
    mulberry-trees! I could not see one. All are cut down, and if
    wood at all were seen, it was borne by hungry-looking people,
    propelled by soldiers who had impressed them into the
    wood-cutting line. It was for such a state of things as this,
    was it, that Gordon gave his talents? His reward would be a
    sorry heart (?), could he only view the misery he has made. They
    are perfectly rabid after firewood, these same Mandarin
    soldiers, and cut down green wood and everything they meet. I
    should say there must be from eight to twelve thousand men at
    Tan-yang, which I next got to--Loo-tszeur, a village between
    Chang-chow-foo and it, having disappeared to a brick; not a soul
    to be seen, though they have established a custom-house station
    about five _le_ from it.

    "Tan-yang, a small city on the left bank of the canal, is almost
    entirely deserted. Soldiers presenting here, as at the other
    places, the same fat, saucy appearance I before noticed, some of
    them wearing bangles, earrings, and jewels of value, while the
    people around are clotheless and miserable, and how the poor
    wretches live at all is a mystery. All that I saw them grubbing
    at was a species of porridge, consisting of the _husks_ of
    paddy, a mess one would not give a horse. Oh, the skulls again!
    From Chang-chow-foo to Tan-yang the ground is literally white,
    like snow, with skulls and bones. The massacre of the
    unfortunate Taipings (inoffensive villagers, most likely) must
    have been awful! Between Chang-chow-foo and Wu-see stands a
    dilapidated pagoda, said to be 4,000 years old, and I went to
    look at it. What was my surprise to find it crammed with dead
    bodies, from which slices had been cut to eat as food!... I went
    on for 45 _li_ beyond Tan-yang; the farther I went, the country
    getting worse and worse, if it were possible for there to be a
    difference when one description of 'bad' does for all, and I
    began to think that my search for a mulberry-tree, _in what,
    under the Taipings, was a splendid silk-producing country_, was
    useless, and I had better turn back."

Here we have the testimony of an impartial mercantile gentleman. Comment
is needless. We will now turn to the evidence given by two of Gordon's
own officers, men who were present during the operations against the
Ti-pings, but who were ultimately honest enough to admit the truth. The
following extracts are from a letter which appeared in the _Friend of
China_, April 28, 1864:--

    "TO THE EDITOR OF THE 'FRIEND OF CHINA.'

    "SIR,--I read in the _North China Herald_ a letter from Gordon's
    head-quarters, in which the writer says that the slaughter among
    the rebels, after the capture of Hwa-soo, was terrible. Upwards
    of 9,000 were taken prisoners, and of these it was estimated
    6,000 were killed or drowned, principally by the Imperialists.
    Further, that there is no doubt they would have killed ten times
    that number if they had the chance to do so. Now, Sir, I do hope
    there will be a stop put to such massacres, though I can but
    believe that the writer of that article must be, what they call
    in Australia, a _new chum_, for he cannot know much about the
    treachery of the Imps, or he would not dwell so much on it. Why,
    did not the Imperialists take rice, beans, wheat, and all other
    kinds of grain out of Wu-see, even while those around were
    starving; and as the old people came up to the gate to go
    outside the city with their few catties of rice, were they not
    stopped and their food taken from them, while, if they spoke
    against it, they were bambooed? There was rice sufficient in
    Soo-chow and Wu-see to keep the poor in the districts around for
    many months; why, then, could not the Futai and other Mandarins
    be made to relieve the poor in the surrounding country?

    "At Chang-chow, again, in place of bambooing the poor when
    begging for a few grains of that which was taken from them, why
    were they left to die outside by starvation? I saw this, for I
    was one of the officers engaged in the capture of Wu-see, and
    other cities. From Wu-see we advanced towards Chang-chow, where,
    at first, there were but few poor to be seen. After we had been
    there a short time, however, there was a great number of them.
    Why?--_Because the Imperialists had gained so much of the
    country, and the poor had been robbed by them._ As for the
    much-lauded Gordon's troops, do they not rob the country people
    on the march? And if the disciplined troops do this with
    impunity, what can you think if the non-disciplined do it? I
    have seen beggars beheaded by these wretches in sheer
    wantonness.

    "The _Herald's_ correspondent writes within sight of the walls
    of Chang-chow, and says, the starvation and cannibalism which
    prevail are unrelieved by the fiends who have been the cause of
    so much misery! The writer of that article little thinks the
    Imperialists are the fiends, or he would not have written so. On
    the other hand, parties who have travelled in the rebel
    districts have seen the Taepings relieve their poor."

Besides the above letter, the following appears in the issue of the same
paper on the 31st of January, 1865:--

    "TO THE EDITOR OF THE 'FRIEND OF CHINA.'
    "Shanghae, 26th January, 1865.

    "SIR,--I see you say in your 'apology' for rebels that the
    destruction of the city of Quin-san was caused by the Taepings
    on their evacuation of it. Such was not the case. The idol
    temples and official quarters were destroyed or ransacked by
    them; but the destruction of the dwelling-houses of the
    inhabitants was the work of the Imperialists. I was one of the
    first in the city after its evacuation by the Taepings, and what
    I now state I saw with my own eyes. Indeed, it was, as you have
    stated repeatedly, a practice with the Imperialists to burn all
    which the Taepings left. Why they did so I can hardly tell,
    further than that the men were encouraged to do it by their
    native officers.

    "I am, dear Sir, yours truly,
    "LATE OF GORDON'S FORCE.

    "P.S.--Ching and Le[57] were the grand devastators, and have to
    be thanked for the bulk of the misery now so rampant all over
    the country."

As the Liberal Government has such a _penchant_ for interfering in the
internal affairs of other nations, why has it not devoted its meddlesome
talents to killing some one either in Denmark, America, Italy, Poland,
or Mexico? Cynical people may well say that the Premier and his
colleagues dared not more than bluster in these cases; that in the
centre of China, in Japan, Ashantee, New Zealand, &c., they became very
brave and officious because they could be so with impunity, and that
such disgraceful, unprofitable, and inconsistent, if not imbecile
policy, is either the expiring flashes of their administration or the
greatness of England.

Although it may be perfectly true that the Chancellor of the Exchequer
and his _confreres_ in office have saved the opium trade and the China
indemnity (probably also their places in office, by covering the
expenses of the last China war, which would otherwise have made a
serious cause of opposition), at the immaterial responsibility of the
destruction of a few millions of Chinese and the devastation of some
districts of China three or four times the size of England, of what
benefit has the meddling policy proved to general commercial or
mercenary interests? The silk trade, the most valuable with China, has
fallen off exactly one half at the present date,[58] since the due
effect of driving the Ti-pings from their dominions has transpired. The
interior, free and open under the revolutionists, who earnestly desired
the friendship of Europeans, has now been closed to freedom of trade or
travel by the very Mandarins who have been reinstated to tyrannize over
regions their oppression had otherwise lost to them for ever; while the
old hatred of foreigners, persistent determination to evade treaty
obligations, and the haughty, exclusive policy of the Manchoo has been
resumed, since the hypocritical pretence of adopting a more friendly
line of conduct, in order to obtain foreign assistance, has become no
longer necessary, by the recoil of the Ti-ping revolt before British
arms. Besides this, having broken the political power of the only
movement in China which afforded a prospect of improving, pacifying, or
Christianizing that vast empire, England has been the means of creating
a general state of anarchy. The Ti-pings have simply retreated to the
interior and the sea-coast province of Fu-keen, while in every other
part of the empire the people, no longer able to look upon the great
revolution as likely to overthrow the Manchoo, and being more than ever
oppressed by their foreign rulers, are not only driven to discontent but
open rebellion. Besides the Ti-ping revolution, there are at the present
time three or four powerfully organized rebellions. The "Nien-fei," in
the north; the "Honan Filchers," towards the west; and the so-called
"Mohammedan rebels," in the central provinces. Elsewhere, the
innumerable local insurrections have settled into a regular system of
brigandism, because the discontented have no longer the opportunity or
confidence to join the diminished forces of Ti-pingdom. These
circumstances, added to the fact that the Imperialist Mandarins are now
systematically enforcing at least five times the treaty-legalized
transit duties upon merchandise, are not only greatly enhancing the
price of foreign goods to the natives, but, of course, considerably
limiting their consumption. The only staple article of trade which has
not at present decreased in quantity is tea. Still the price has become
higher in China, and the non-diminution of export is due to the fact
that the Ti-pings evacuated their former tea districts and captured the
famous Vu-e, or Bohea districts, which they held for some time, without
much fighting. It would be impossible to say that, since the result of
British hostilities against the revolutionists has transpired, our
commerce with China was ever in a more stagnant, unprofitable, and
generally unsatisfactory condition. So much for the mercenary interests,
to aid which England has been unscrupulously dragged into a clandestine
and grossly criminal war!

Bad as the preceding effects of the foreign policy of the Palmerston
Government undoubtedly are, there is yet another and a far worse
consequence to be noticed. Before adverting to the most serious fact it
is as well to epitomize the political action which has created it. It
has been fondly imagined and fatally supposed by the Liberal ministers
themselves, that they, _par excellence_, are the enlightened men of
England, the only framers of philanthropical and progressive measures;
and, in fact, that their glorious and never-to-be-forgotten
place-holding is a Government of "peace, retrenchment, and reform." The
doctrine of non-intervention having even been especially professed, and
having been carried so far as to make a certain noble lord sacrifice his
publicly and officially declared determination that "Denmark should not
stand alone" in the event of certain contingencies, by leaving her to
stand alone when those contingencies did come to pass, and then framing
another set of probabilities, about the chivalrous deeds he would
initiate if the King of Denmark were to be made a prisoner. Doubtless
the admirers of that noble lord--who once made the astounding and
statesmanlike discovery that "all children are born innocent,"
especially those of his constituents, whose chubby "olive branches" were
also discovered to be the best and most beautiful in England--considered
their representative a marvellously proper man, and his bragging to
fight and then retracting a very creditable proceeding, quite in
accordance with the useful policy of non-intervention: yet, on the other
hand, there are people who have the obstinacy to review this and similar
affairs, and deduct therefrom, and observe the fact that in other parts
of the world a very different policy has been enacted where it could be
done with impunity, all of which affords sufficient evidence that the
pretended adoption of a non-interfering policy is neither more nor less
than an unprincipled truckling to strong powers, and an aggressive
bullying of the weak.

It is quite certain that, whether the rulers of China be Manchoo or
Ti-ping, the vast industrial population would still produce tea, silk,
and other commodities. Now, the professed motive for British intercourse
with China is commercial--that is to say, to buy the above-mentioned
articles, and sell the manufactures of the English markets--but not
political; for meddlesome interference with the internal affairs of
China would prove disadvantageous to both nations, and would certainly
be well calculated to bring the Imperial authority into contempt, injure
the Chinese organizations in an abortive attempt to substitute those for
which they are not yet qualified, and simply foment the troubles already
existing, by the natural consequences of injudicious and unnecessary
meddling.

But the British ministers, who would justify their broken pledges in
Europe by an appeal to the doctrine of non-intervention, act upon a very
different system towards China and Japan. They seem to make it their
business, not only to advance trade in the Celestial Empire, but to
concern themselves with its private and political disturbances, to judge
between the Ti-ping and Manchoo, and then to settle the affair by
destroying the one and bullying the other.

In Japan they have attacked feudal chieftains as though no central
Government existed in that country; and then, after degrading the
Imperial authority in the eyes of the people, force has been used to
compel the opening of ports to trade. Thus have British statesmen
pursued the best course to increase the animosities already existing, to
produce general anarchy, and to establish the violation of all
principles of international law, which they are _compelled_ to observe
in Europe. The most convincing fact with regard to the folly of
interfering in China, is, that _until_ such idiotic, or rather wicked
policy was commenced, the exports were largely on the increase, having
risen from L9,014,310 in 1859, to L14,186,310 in 1863; while the
consumption of British imports has decreased up to the same
period--about which time the operations against the Ti-pings were
exercising due effect--by more than half a million--L567,646. In 1863,
the total value of British exports to China was L3,889,927--a sum less
than the value of the exports to Brazil; yet for this comparatively
paltry amount an enormous military expenditure has been maintained,
whilst it is palpable, by the falling off of trade, that the policy has
signally failed, and the number of persons who have perished through the
mistake would make at least one life destroyed for every pound sterling.

We now come to the most serious point with regard to the war against the
Ti-pings. It is well known, and has never been denied, that throughout
the country, under their control, the Bible was circulated not only with
freedom, but gratuitously, by the Government established at Nankin.
Besides this _unparalleled_ practice, the fact that they accepted the
Word of God in its full integrity is also incontrovertible; and He has
declared, "My Word shall not return unto me void." Furthermore, it is
well known by all who have visited the Ti-pings in their cities and
camps, that (so strict an interpretation have they placed upon the
Commandments, &c.) they effectually prohibit not only the inveterate
vices of the Chinese, and their heathen practices, but the evil
indulgences which find full sway even in the most moral State of Europe.
Their abolition of opium smoking; prostitution; the hitherto universal
Chinese slave trade; the degraded Asiatic status of the women; the use
of torture and bribery in courts of justice; the deformed small feet;
the tail-wearing slave-badge of the men--these, and other facts proving
their complete superiority to the hopelessly corrupt state of public and
private life under the foreign rule of the Manchoo dynasty, we have
already noticed. Let us ask, whence these great and glorious changes?
Are they, as Lords Palmerston and Russell, and their correspondents upon
anti-Ti-ping Chinese affairs, have repeatedly declared (when obliged to
defend their un-English policy) the conduct of the Ti-pings to be, the
natural acts of "bloodthirsty marauders," "locusts," "merciless
brigands," "revolting impostors," "ferocious hordes of banditti," &c.?
Or are they not rather the blessings bestowed by God upon people who, to
the utmost of their power, and the sacrifice of their lives, have
striven to follow His Word and Law? Man may change the public and
outward forms of existence necessary for the body, but only God can
alter the private and moral character necessary for the soul. There is a
doctrine of original and natural sin; therefore it does appear
presumptuous, if not profane, when people combine together against any
vast movement in which the hand of God is visible--either in the
supernatural or the presence of the Bible; especially as they believe
that Divine interposition is necessary to convert and save the souls of
all men, and as they have neither political nor national interest in the
movement to even justify the worldly motives of their interference.

Present ministers[59] and their followers may possibly ridicule the
idea, in order to justify their policy towards China, that whatever the
Ti-pings might or might not have been--even setting apart the fact of
their Christianity--if they have been killed for the sake of British
commerce (especially the vile opium trade, which they prohibited), every
bale of silk and chest of tea brought into this land bears with it an
endless curse; and that these, together with every article of British
manufacture forced upon China, are defiled with the blood of the victims
who have been slaughtered to prosper, forsooth! "our commercial
institutions!" Man cannot serve both God and Mammon. The efforts of the
British Government to worship the latter have failed most signally; but
even had they succeeded in creating the most stupendous trade the world
ever contained, do they believe that a righteous and eternal God has not
witnessed the _means_, and that He who notes the fall of a small sparrow
hath not recorded the murder of every human being, during their unholy
crusade against the unfortunate Ti-pings?

Throughout a vast extent of China the Bible became established; but now,
through the assistance given by the British Government to the Manchoo,
the people--even including the little lisping children--have been
slaughtered, while the idols of Budha are re-erected, dominating for a
season over the desecrated ashes of _our_ Bible.

Nankin, the Ti-ping capital, has fallen, through British intervention,
since my arrival in this country; the printing and circulation of the
Holy Scriptures have therefore ceased, and the Ti-pings have become
wanderers over the face of the earth they would otherwise have adorned.
It is idle and unworthy to cavil at this dogma or that article of the
Ti-ping creed: the revolutionists did their utmost to enter into the
pale and brotherhood of Christendom. Truly and candidly speaking, the
nation solely responsible for preventing so glorious a consummation,
is--England.


FOOTNOTES:

[54] The late famous San-ko-lin-sin.

[55] Some people have thought that the four men were executed as a
retaliation for the murder of the Wangs at Soo-chow, because, naturally
enough, the Ti-pings considered the Europeans present were responsible
for the atrocities. The four prisoners were members of Gordon's force,
and it is just possible that they may have been put to death by some of
the Soo-chow refugees.

[56] My reader will contrast this with the treatment Europeans received
when these districts were in Ti-ping possession.

[57] Ching and Le were the principal Imperialist generals; they were
acting in co-operation with Gordon.

[58] June 1865. See Appendix B.

[59] Palmerston's Government.




CHAPTER XXIV

    Kar-sing-foo.--Christmas in Ti-pingdom.--Works of
    Art.--Dangerous Companions.--Narrow Escape.--Retribution.--Adieu
    to Ti-pingdom.--Mr. White's Case.--The Neutrality
    Ordnance.--Order of July 9th, 1864.--Intended Return to
    England.--Particulars of the Siege of Soo-chow.--Strength of the
    Garrison.--The Assault Described.--The Nar-wang's
    Treachery.--Its Cause.--Major Gordon's Report.--The _Friend of
    China_.--Gordon's Report Continued.--Narrative by an
    Eye-Witness.--The Soo-chow Tragedy.--Major Gordon.--His
    Conduct.--Gordon's Letter to Sir F. Bruce.--Analysis
    thereof.--Newspaper Extract.--Gordon's "Reasons"
    Refuted.--Analysis Continued.--Gordon's "Personal
    Consideration."--His Motives explained.--Newspaper
    Extracts.--Sir F. Bruce's Despatch.--Its Analysis.--Falsity of
    Gordon's Statements.--How Proved.--Extract from the _Times_.


Upon reaching the city of Kar-sing-foo, I was kindly received by the
governor, Yoong-wang, who gave us all quarters in the Wei-wang's palace.
This latter chief had gallantly assisted in defeating the Anglo-Manchoo
forces on their first attack upon Tait-san; he had been promoted for his
services, and was celebrated as a brave leader; yet, singular to relate,
he had gone over to the enemy with the city (Haining), to which he had
been appointed governor only a few days before my arrival.

Previous to the year 1860, treachery was a thing unknown among the
Ti-pings. The baneful effect of British meddling had not been felt; they
were successful, therefore the mercenary-minded did not find occasion to
desert; neither was the number of chiefs so great as since the successes
of 1860-61, nor the Tien-wang's appointment of them so imprudent.
Latterly, however, the great extent of country and population included
within the limits of Ti-pingdom rendered necessary the employment of a
large number of civil and military officers; unfortunately, the king,
having much secluded himself from the affairs of state to study
religious matters, and being influenced by two or three of his
non-military ministers, did not exercise sufficient care in selecting or
controlling them. Thus, it came to pass that sometimes not only
incompetent, but untrustworthy men were placed in high and important
commands; and many of these new officials were neither animated by the
patriotism, nor inspired with the religious fervour of the older chiefs.
Self-aggrandizement was the motive of such men; and although some of
them were brave soldiers, directly they found British hostility was
making their cause a failing one, they did not scruple to change sides
when they could obtain reward for doing so.

At Kar-sing-foo the Shi-wang left me, after having made arrangements for
my return either to that city or Hoo-chow-foo (where I had left the
engineer and another man from Soo-chow for the purpose of making shell,
casting guns, &c.), and then proceeded on his way to other places, in
order to collect men and money with which to rejoin the Chung-wang at
Chang-chow-foo.

I found the country under the Yoong-wang's administration in a far
better state than the desolate regions through which I had passed on my
journey to his city, because the Imperialists and their allies had not
yet attacked and ravaged the neighbourhood; although, before I started
for Shanghae, they made their appearance.

Christmas Day I spent at Kar-sing-foo. The Ti-pings keep the festival
two days before we do; and, if possible, venerate it still more. I made
the Yoong-wang a present upon the occasion, and passed the day very
happily at his palace, where a grand dinner was given to all the chiefs
in the city, after special services had been held in the Heavenly Hall.
My friend W---- was present with me, and we mutually declared that we
had never enjoyed a better Christmas in our lives. Upon the 25th the
Yoong-wang sent his own cooks, attendants, plate, &c., and spread a
magnificent dinner at my quarters for all the European and Chinese
followers I had in the city.

I found much to admire during my stay with the Yoong-wang. He was one of
the best veteran Ti-ping leaders, and all his officers were stanch,
trustworthy adherents of the cause. Of one Yu, who was a general of
brigade, I became the particular friend, and dined with him nearly every
day. This officer had charge of the artillery, and I gave him all the
instruction I could in casting shell (which he had just commenced to
do), making fusees, and sighting his guns. The organization within the
city was so perfect that everything went like clockwork. Bars and bolts
were not to be found; for thieves, beggars, or robbers were unknown in
Kar-sing-foo. I felt a real happiness in living there, and was quite
sorry when I took my departure. Here I found the most splendid building
I have ever seen in China. It was a new palace, not quite finished, for
the Ting-wang, governor-general of the province; and was a standing
proof of the fact that the Ti-pings (had they been allowed to succeed by
England) would have restored the arts of China, and especially the
public works--all of which have fallen into decay since the era of the
Manchoo. In general outline the palace resembled those I have already
described as existing at Nankin, but every particle was far more
beautiful and costly. Neither in China nor elsewhere have I ever seen
such a magnificent work of complicated stone and wood carving. The
gorgeous gilding and painting was, of course, in Chinese style; and
though very effective and varied, too gaudy for European taste. The
carved work was exquisite; I have stood for hours watching either the
grotesque or the life-like representations. Many hundreds of sculptors,
painters, and artisans were employed, at a very high rate of wages, upon
the building; and I found that some of the former were the most
celebrated professors of the two arts in China, and had been induced to
come to Kar-sing from the most distant parts of the empire. From what I
have seen of China, I do not believe such a building has been commenced
for many hundred years.

At last the Imperialists came to overthrow all Ti-ping improvement, they
having succeeded in capturing Pimbong, the nearest town, with the help
of one Major Baily and a powerful artillery corps, a few days before I
left the city.

Previous to setting out for Shanghae, I gave the rowdies their share of
prize-money; and although I fully expected that they might cut each
other's throats over the coin, I hardly expected the attack they made
upon myself and lieutenant, whereby our lives were placed in danger. It
seemed that they were aware that we were taking funds to use at
Shanghae; and to three of them the temptation to possess themselves of
the same became irresistible. Upon receiving their prize-money,
furnished with passes I obtained for them, they set forth from the city;
but, on reaching the suburbs, the afore-mentioned trio made a halt for
the purpose of planning our murder, and mustering up courage to commit
the deed by indulging in a copious supply of that ardent
spirit--_samshoo_. At length, having cunningly waited until the
Yoong-wang had gone outside the city with nearly all his men, in the
direction of Pimbong, they returned upon their murderous mission.
Fortunately for myself and W----, they went in on the way for another
dose of _samshoo_, which made one of them helplessly intoxicated, but
the other two had become brave enough to proceed on their errand without
him. After obtaining admittance at one of the city gates, they came
straight to the Yoong-wang's palace, where we were engaged with an
interpreter and one of the chief's secretaries making up a communication
I wished to send to the Chung-wang.

A-ling, my own faithful interpreter and companion, was quite
incapacitated by the injury he had received at Wu-see. Although standing
directly between him and the enemy's fire when he was struck, the ball
passed me and inflicted a severe wound on his left shoulder, passing
round the back and lodging on the right shoulder blade. The poor fellow
was carried with me to Kar-sing-foo, and suffered much torture from the
Chinese doctors, who treated him by thrusting long strips of twisted
paper into the wound, and screwing them round until the ball was
reached. At last, however, a better doctor was found in the person of
the Yoong-wang's own medical attendant, who cut down to the ball and
extracted it, much to the patient's relief. A-ling was not sufficiently
recovered to accompany me to Shanghae; he therefore remained at
Kar-sing-foo, and from that day to the present I have never seen him
again, nor probably ever shall, for I believe he was killed when the
city subsequently fell into Imperialist hands.

Directly our friends, the rowdies, came into the ante-room in which we
were seated, they began to insult myself and lieutenant, knowing that
the Yoong-wang was absent and could not arrest them, and that I could
not do so either, as my few men were at the Wei-wang's palace in another
part of the city. As they were no longer under my command, it was
useless ordering them out of the place; I therefore sent an attendant to
request the officer left in charge of the city to send a guard to remove
them.

At this moment the most forward of the two suddenly drew a revolver and
fired it at W----'s head, immediately afterwards turning towards me.
Through the smoke I could not see whether my lieutenant had been killed
or not; but before the scoundrel could shoot me, I had lodged a bullet
in his carcase. Almost at the same instant I heard another shot
fired--as it afterwards proved to be, by W----, and saw that my
assailant was unable to discharge his revolver, though evidently
tugging at the trigger. The other rowdy was now advancing; and as his
companion still endeavoured to fire at me, I was compelled to again use
my own revolver in self-defence. The would-be murderer now fell dead,
while his cowardly friend ran up presenting his pistol by the barrel,
and crying, "Don't shoot, don't shoot!"

I really did feel very much inclined to take vengeance upon the fellow,
and my Cantonese (who now came up) would certainly have put him to
death, had it not been for my lieutenant's request to leave him
unharmed. As it was, the wretch seemed nearly frightened out of life,
and it was singular how such a coward could have mustered up desperation
enough to attempt murder; evidently, he depended upon the determination
of his comrade; for, had he been at all resolute, we would assuredly
have been killed. Upon examining the dead man's revolver, we found that
although the powder had exploded, the bullet had never left the barrel,
but had stuck just between it and the revolving chambers, thereby
disabling the weapon, and probably saving our lives. We accounted for
this singular circumstance by supposing the pistol must have been loaded
a long time, and that the powder had consequently lost its strength.

Upon the Yoong-wang's return, I fully intended to give up the surviving
ruffian to be dealt with according to the law. Again my brave lieutenant
begged him off, blindly and suicidally, as it afterwards appeared, for
ultimately he lost his own life through the treacherous act of the
wretch he spared. The name of the man who was killed was Hart, an
Englishman; his dastardly companion was an American named William
Thompson.

I would here give a piece of advice to those who may have the misfortune
to fall into the disreputable company of Yankee and cosmopolitan rowdies
abroad. Act with quickness and decision, and you will defeat men who are
mostly cowards at heart; but if you hesitate or endeavour to temporize,
you are a dead man; for these murderous wretches will butcher a
fellow-creature with less compunction than people generally feel at
killing a fly. I have heard that the man Hart had murdered and robbed
several Europeans in the silk districts, and I believe his Yankee
confederate is now serving a long term of imprisonment for highway
robbery. I engaged the five rowdies in the dark, and it has given me a
caution against their _genus_ that will never be forgotten.

The Yoong-wang having supplied me with a boat and guide, accompanied by
W----, I bid adieu to Ti-pingdom and set out for the Imperialist
territory and Shanghae. Between the outposts of the two belligerents I
found a considerable tract of country entirely occupied by large bodies
of banditti, who preyed alike upon Ti-ping or Imperialist. At one place
we had a very narrow escape from falling into their hands, having to run
the gauntlet of a large camp along the two banks of a narrow creek,
which we successfully did amid a storm of bullets, not one, however,
taking effect. These robbers were the wildest and most ferocious looking
men I have ever seen, and it was said that they spared neither man,
woman, nor child. Since my departure from China this sort of brigandage
has become frequent in the country wrested from the Ti-pings.

At last we reached Shanghae, after running past all the Imperialist
stations at night, when our small canoe-like boat was not easily
discerned. We at once placed ourselves under medical attendance, and for
a few days remained perfectly quiet. Within a week, however, I was
grieved to hear that my lieutenant had been seized and thrown into
prison _by the British Consul_ for being in the service of the Ti-pings
and having captured a Manchoo vessel, the ungrateful blackguard,
Thompson, having given the information which led to his arrest.

Englishmen should be aware of the gross injustice exercised by their
authorities in all affairs connected with the Ti-pings, and no more
striking example is to be found than in the case of Mr. White, who was
sentenced to three years' imprisonment by the Consular Court for doing
upon the side of the Ti-pings exactly what Admiral Hope, Generals
Staveley, Michael, and Brown, and Major Gordon, Captain Stack, Dr.
Macartney, &c., had done, and were doing, on the side of the Manchoo! He
was actually condemned upon the ordinance of _neutrality_ of Sir John
Bowring, the said ordinance being instituted in 1855, at Hong-kong, to
compel British subjects to observe neutrality towards _both_ parties to
the Chinese internecine war. This neutrality regulation had long been
annulled by the acts of the above-mentioned gallant officers on behalf
of the Manchoo, yet the Englishman who assisted the Ti-pings, and who
was no more guilty of breaking the law than they were, was condemned by
this broken and obsolete ordinance, and died (or rather, shall we say,
was murdered; for confining a man dangerously ill in such a loathsome
den was nothing else) a few days afterwards in his damp and comfortless
dungeon! Is this British justice? How long have Englishmen understood
"neutrality" to mean all help and military assistance to one
belligerent, but open hostilities towards the other, and punishment of
its allies? Had England remained neutral, or had she regularly declared
war against the Ti-pings, there might be some grounds for prosecuting
those who have assisted the latter; but as neither the one policy nor
the other has been followed, it is no more right and just to punish
those who have assisted the Ti-pings, than those who have assisted the
Manchoo. The whole course of the hostilities against the Ti-pings was
irregular and illegal, and certainly no one can deny that the British
officers already referred to have committed a breach of neutrality quite
as much as Mr. White did, even taking Sir John Bowring's ordinance as
being in full force. The proof that this argument is correct may be
gathered from the fact that when Colonel Sykes, M.P., and the Hon. Mr.
Liddel, M.P., brought forward Mr. White's case in the House of Commons,
the Government, in order to protect its agents from prosecution, _then_
passed an Order in Council[60] _condoning the offences_ against
neutrality of all those who had assisted the Imperialists, but not
extending the same favour to those who had assisted the Ti-pings. A
piece of more iniquitous and unfair legislature, or more opposed to
English feeling, it would be impossible to find. Incredible as it may
seem, the present state of the law by which British subjects are
governed in China, viz., Sir John Bowring's ordinance of neutrality, is
re-established, but _one half is declared null and void_, while the
other is made executive by the Order in Council above mentioned, which
acts both retrospectively and anticipatory! So that a law which can only
exist, or be created, for application towards two belligerents, is here
made _ex parte_, and exactly the reverse of what its denomination
implies. The wording of this fraudulent document runs thus:--

    "1. Nothing in the said ordinance, made and passed on the 17th
    day January, 1855, shall extend or apply, or be deemed to have
    extended or to have been applicable, to any British subject,
    who, _at any time heretofore_, may have assisted, _or may
    hereafter assist_, the Government of the Emperor of China....

    "2. If any subject of Her Majesty ... shall ... levy war, or
    take part in any operations of war against the Emperor of China
    ... such person shall be liable to the several penalties
    mentioned in the said ordinance of the 17th day of January,
    1855."

It is thus perfectly evident that the ostensible neutrality ordinance is
literally an alliance with one of the two belligerents. The style and
title are maintained to satisfy and hoodwink the House of Commons, to
deceive them into believing that the Government is pursuing a neutral
policy in China, while the clauses tacked to the old ordinance entirely
change its every intention, and exclude the least particle of neutrality
from its meaning.

If Lords Palmerston and Russell are so destitute of allies in Europe
that they cannot restrain themselves from rushing into alliance with the
Manchoo Emperor of China (who certainly does not reciprocate their
extraordinary ebullition of feeling, and who would take infinite delight
in making mincemeat of his officious friends and all their countrymen),
why do they not proclaim the stupendous and ever-memorable fact openly?
Why do they seek the most opposite and roundabout way of effecting their
object by employing chicanery and double dealing to convert an ordinance
of neutrality into an importunate treaty of alliance; instead of raising
themselves from their slough of shuffling and fraudulent means, by
repudiating the false ordinance and duly announcing the barbarous
Manchoo despot as their very good ally? Surely the noble lords have not
been deterred from giving to the world their wonderful act of
statesmanship, by doubting that the contented British public would
accept the affair as an agreeable compensation for their questionable
European policy? Perhaps, however, it is as well that they have
preserved a discreet reticence, because the Emperor of China is no party
to the alliance they have thrust upon him, and is particularly liable to
issue an edict for the extermination of all foreign devils, the noble
lords included, at any moment that may appear auspicious.

The shameful Order in Council of July 9, 1864, is quite sufficient proof
that the trial and condemnation of my unfortunate lieutenant was
illegal; every British officer who committed a breach of neutrality by
assisting the Imperialists was equally liable to prosecution. If the
Cabinet Council had not, with oily complacency, justified the acts of
their military subordinates in China _after_ they were committed to the
policy (in fact, when the operations resulting from their illegal
intervention had terminated), and _after_ Mr. White's death, the
friends of the latter would undoubtedly have obtained heavy
compensation.

Besides the fact that my medical adviser ordered a change of climate,
directly I became aware of my lieutenant's fate I determined to take a
trip to England.

Major Gordon, R.E., had retired with his whole force from active
co-operation with the Imperialists since the Soo-chow treachery and
massacre for which he was responsible. I therefore naturally concluded
that he would not resume the position of tool to the sanguinary,
faithless Mandarins, who had so completely dishonoured him. As a
Christian, an Englishman, and a British officer, I did not think it
possible he could himself wish to continue a participator in deeds of
revolting barbarity, and I concluded that his Government would
immediately recall him, and cease all active support of the bloodthirsty
Manchoo. Although my latter supposition proved correct, the former was
quite mistaken, as I found after my return to England. In consequence of
these circumstances, and the fact that at Shanghae I was altogether
unable to execute any of my projects for the service of the Ti-pings, I
decided to abandon the sword for the pen, and to fulfil my instructions
from the Ti-ping authorities by writing the present work, trusting that
I should serve their cause by appealing to the sympathies of the British
people, and hoping that foreign hostility would cease, in which case
their ultimate success would be a certainty.

The emissaries of the Manchoo, and the hirelings of the slaves of the
Manchoo, were not either intelligent or energetic enough to effect the
capture of their humble servant, although they amused themselves by
attempting to do so not only before but after his departure from China,
by one of the overland mail steamers.

Having brought the history of the Ti-ping revolution and my own
adventures down to this period, all that now remains to be noticed are
the events which have transpired since I sailed away from the Chinese
land. Before, however, proceeding with them, it will be necessary to
return to the fall of Soo-chow, and resume our chronicle from the
occurrence of that tragedy.

There is but little doubt that the Ti-pings would have been able to hold
their own against the enemy, even taking into consideration all the
foreign support the latter received, had the betrayal of Soo-chow never
taken place. Although Nankin, as the capital and seat of the Tien-wang's
Government, occupied the first political place, Soo-chow, in consequence
of the extraordinary measures taken to strengthen it, and its central
situation in the Ti-ping dominions, became the principal military
position. The capital, though surrounded by the highest and most massive
walls in China, and defended by some commanding fortifications, was
situated on the extreme verge of the Ti-ping territory, and was the most
assailable point, while its resources were far inferior to those of
Soo-chow. Moreover, directly the latter city became invested by the
Anglo-Manchoo forces, a powerful army was moved within its spacious
walls, while the Chung-wang, with his own division, co-operated from the
outside. These troops constituted the only Ti-ping army in the field at
that time, all the remainder of the forces being employed, according to
a mistaken defensive policy, in garrisoning the numerous walled cities
throughout their kingdom--tactics ordered by the Tien-wang in opposition
to the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief, and which ultimately led to the
destruction of the greater number of the garrisons in detail, and the
loss not only of Nankin, but all the former possessions of
Ti-ping-tien-kwo.

The siege of Soo-chow was prosecuted by an Imperialist army of from
50,000 to 70,000 men, including _General_ Gordon's and other foreign
contingents, altogether about 6,000 strong. At least 12,000 of the
Imperial troops, under General Ching, were well armed with foreign
muskets and rifles; they were partly disciplined, and constituted a very
effective force, far superior to the usual class of Chinese soldiers.
Attached both to the Anglo-Manchoo legions and ordinary troops, were
many British officers, and, what was still more useful, a very large
supply of every description of artillery. Three or four heavily armed
and shallow steamers, together with a great fleet of Mandarin gunboats,
were possessed by the besiegers. Besides all this array of strength in a
bad cause, several detachments of _British troops_ were moved up from
Shanghae, for the ostensible purpose of giving 'moral support' to the
murderous intentions of the Manchoo, but, in reality, to afford succour
in case the Ti-pings might defeat their assailants--a contingency far
from improbable. The troops so fraudulently prostituted (fraudulent,
because they were solely organized for the interests of the British
taxpayer and not the Manchoo; prostituted, because yellow gold and
mercenary motives caused their disgraceful employment) consisted of some
companies of the Beloochee Regiment, sent to garrison Quin-san (about 14
miles from Soo-chow), and a force of H. M. 67th Regiment, Royal
Artillery, and 22nd B. N. I., commanded by Captain Murray, R.A. Not only
were these troops sent to participate in Manchoo atrocities, but the
British General (Brown) in command actually took upon himself _to lend_
the Imperialists every available piece of artillery on the station, as
though the same were his private property and did not belong to the
British nation, whose trust he was abusing.

To defend Soo-chow, the Ti-pings had a force of about 40,000 fighting
men, including some 8,000 attached to the Chung-wang outside the city.
About one third of these troops were the _elite_ of the service, while
all the others were brave and veteran soldiers. Besides Mo-wang, who was
commandant of the city, four or five other Wangs were present; the
principal among them was the Nar-wang, who commanded more than half the
troops in garrison, his military power being greater than that of the
commandant, although he was placed under the orders of the latter.

The Mo and Nar Wangs were the Commander-in-Chief's two principal and
favourite generals. The former was a Kwang-si man, and had been the
Chung-wang's companion in arms from the commencement of the revolution;
the latter chief was a native of Hu-peh, and had joined the Ti-ping
cause in the year 1854, since which he had been trained to military
tactics by the Chung-wang. Both leaders were associated together in
equal rank and command for nearly ten years, and it was always
understood among the Ti-pings that they were not only bound together by
the strongest ties of adopted brotherhood and friendship, but that they
were equally attached to their renowned superior. Yet it will be seen
that, in spite of the good influences and kindly associations by which
the three were supposed to be governed, the Nar-wang was a man of evil
nature, and small, treacherous mind.

After very severe fighting, _General_ Gordon managed to effect the
capture of all the stockades outside the walls of Soo-chow. This,
however, was only accomplished after many a disastrous repulse, and a
great loss of men and officers.

The following account of the last assaults upon the fortifications
outside the East Gate, which were defended by a few pieces of artillery,
is copied from "How the Taepings were driven out of the Provinces of
Kiang-nan and Che-kiang," and will be found to illustrate the bravery
with which the garrison of Soo-chow struggled against irresistible
odds:--

    "On 27th November, after Major Gordon had all infantry (except
    1st Regiment) and artillery assembled at Waiquedong, an order
    was issued that a night attack should be made on the Low-mun
    stockade, which formed the key to all other stockades on the
    east side of Soo-chow.

    "White turbans were served out to all soldiers, so as to be able
    to distinguish them from the rebels, in case it should come to
    a hand-to-hand fight. About one o'clock Major Gordon himself,
    accompanied by Majors Howard and Williams, started with about
    two companies of men towards the stockade, leaving the remainder
    of the force behind already fallen in, so as to advance at a
    given signal. Everything seemed quiet, and in fact all thought
    the plan would succeed. After Gordon and his followers had been
    advancing close to the stockade, they found everything quiet,
    and no signs of the guards being aware of an attack. The
    remainder of the force, therefore, received orders to advance,
    while the advance guard had succeeded in climbing inside the
    breast-work. Scarcely were all troops up to the front and a
    portion of them crossing to reinforce Major Gordon, when the
    rebels began to direct a fire of grape, canister, and musketry
    on the force, which made every one shiver. The Quin-san
    artillery responded vigorously, and it was a fine spectacle to
    see fiery rockets and red-hot mortar shells going into the rebel
    works. But the rebels stood it gallantly, and did not retreat an
    inch. The whole line of stockade which the rebels held seemed
    one line of fire, and here Major Gordon perceived that Chinese
    are not fit to fight at night time, for all the begging and
    encouraging of the European officers could not make the troops
    try another attack; they seemed afraid of their own shadows. The
    only chance left therefore was to try and shell the rebels out
    of their position, and this was done till dawn of day, when
    Major Gordon, seeing the rebels still resisting desperately, and
    receiving thousands of reinforcements from the city, made good
    his retreat, leaving numbers of killed and wounded on the field.
    This was one of the most bloody fights the force encountered;
    and, judging by what the Quin-san force lost this night, the
    rebels must have lost tremendously. Still, the gallant fellows,
    encouraged by their brave chiefs, held their position manfully
    against a fire of about 20 guns, flying on them for about three
    hours. The loss of the Quin-san force was as follows:--Captains
    Wylie, 2nd Regt.; Christie, 4th Regt.; and Maule, 2nd Regt.;
    Lieut. King, 2nd Regt., killed. Major Kirkham severely wounded
    on the head; Lieut. Miok, 4th Regt., wounded in the shoulder;
    Major Tapp, wounded in the leg; and several more slightly, with
    about two hundred men killed and wounded. Major Gordon seeing
    this night attack frustrated, determined to pay the rebels off
    for it; and shortly after, on the 28th November, at night, all
    guns, about 46 in number, were brought in position within about
    700 yards of this formidable stockade, and the infantry was to
    fall in near the guns at daylight on 29th of November, to make
    another attack. The rebels were quite prepared for it, for no
    sooner did they perceive all the artillery and infantry so near
    their works, than they hoisted their red flag as a sign that
    they meant to fight, and not give up this position so easy.
    Precisely at eight o'clock the signal rocket went up, and at
    once all guns sent forth their different missiles, some
    directing their fire on the Low-mun stockade, others directing
    their fire on the stockades lying to the right and left.

    "The rebels seemed to preserve their ammunition, for but very
    little fire was encountered at first. The 8-inch mortars were
    playing havoc in the stockades, for every now and then houses,
    boats, etc., would be blown up in the air, under the cheers of
    the Imperialist soldiers, of whom thousands, under command of
    General Ching, were present, to support Gordon's force. Le Futai
    himself had taken up a place in rear, in one of the Imperial
    stockades, so as to witness the spectacle. About eleven o'clock
    the fire from both sides was furious, even the siege artillery
    had advanced within about one hundred yards of the rebel works,
    pouring forth grape at the rebels, who, however, inspirited by
    their noble leader, the Mo-wang, in person, stood it like
    European soldiers. The 5th Regiment, under Major Brennon, was
    now ordered up, to storm the stockade on the extreme right, near
    the Soo-chow creek, the most favourable point to cross the
    ditch; but although this brave regiment advanced with cheers,
    and some of the officers succeeded in crossing and trying to
    climb up the breast-works, the rebels defended this point
    desperately, and poured volley after volley of musketry into the
    ranks, so that after about ten minutes' struggle the 5th
    Regiment was obliged to retire, having lost several officers and
    men. This attack having failed, the bombardment was renewed with
    vigour, and orders given to the 3rd Regiment, under Major
    Morton, to go to the extreme left, to make feint of attack, so
    as to draw the attention of the rebels on that side. Gordon here
    succeeded beautifully, for scarcely had Morton and his regiment
    begun to engage the rebels on the left, when the Mo-wang, of
    course anticipating a real attack on that place, ordered his
    best men to defend it. Scarcely, however, had the Mo-wang's men
    moved on, than Major Williams, of the 2nd Regiment, made a dash
    at the place where Brennon had met with defeat, and not waiting
    for bridges, but swimming the moat, followed by several officers
    and men, succeeded in getting inside the breast-work, which no
    sooner had the rebels perceived than the whole fled in confusion
    into the Low-mun evacuating all the stockades along the east
    side of the city, and leaving a good number killed and wounded
    on the field. The stockades were soon occupied by Imperial
    troops, and thus Gordon's force was within one hundred yards of
    the city wall. The Quin-san force, however, paid dearly for this
    victory, their loss being Lieutenant Jones (Artillery),
    Lieutenant Williams, 5th Regiment; Captain Acgar, 4th Regiment,
    killed. Captain Shaml'sffel lost both eyes; and several more
    officers slightly wounded, with about 100 or 150 soldiers killed
    and wounded. The ground around the stockades was as if it had
    been ploughed by the shell, and no doubt the rebels deserve
    credit for having defended the place so long against such
    enormous artillery."

Previous to the capture of the last outwork (the Low-mun stockade), and
the day after the Anglo-Manchoos had experienced the severe defeat, in
attempting to surprise the position at night, the Nar-wang secretly
sent messengers into the besiegers' camp, and declared his wish to
betray the city into their hands, requesting their co-operation to
dispose of the Mo-wang, whose loyalty would be likely to defeat the
proposed treachery.

The motive for this defection at a time when the Imperialist successes
had come to a stand-still, and when Gordon himself doubted his ability
to capture Soo-chow, seems to have been caused by jealousy the Nar-wang
entertained against his old friend and companion, the commandant of the
city. Besides this, it is probable that the previous treachery of the
Americo-Ti-ping, or Burgevine, force had affected the leading traitor
and his evilly disposed associates, by giving them the idea that they
might arrange terms with the enemy, by which they would not only be able
to obtain security for their lives and property (and retire from the now
ceaseless hostilities, if not desperate straits, to which the Ti-ping
cause was driven), but also receive substantial rewards from the
Manchoo.

The Nar-wang's jealousy probably arose from the fact that the Mo-wang
was placed over him, as governor of Soo-chow and its dependencies. That
he entertained the most bitter animosity against his former friend and
comrade is quite certain, for, in order to succeed with his treachery,
he went to the dastardly extreme of assassinating him.

We have now to notice the death of the gallant and noble Mo-wang, the
fall of Soo-chow into Manchoo hands, and the various events connected
therewith. These cannot be more effectually described than in the words
of Major Gordon, R. E., and in a review of his report by the _Friend of
China_,--about the oldest and most independent paper in the foreign
settlements in that country.

    "MEMO. (BY MAJOR GORDON, R.E.) ON THE EVENTS OCCURRING BETWEEN
    THE 29TH NOVEMBER AND 7TH DECEMBER, 1863." PUBLISHED IN THE
    "FRIEND OF CHINA," SATURDAY, 12TH DECEMBER, 1863.

    "The morning after the failure of the attack by night on the
    Low-mun stockades, General Ching came to me, and informed me
    that Nar-wang, Ling-wang, Kong-wang, and Pe-wang, with
    thirty-five Tien-chwangs[61] and their followers, had opened
    negotiations with him for the coming over of their troops; that
    these men composed their quarter of the garrison, and had
    possession of four out of the six gates of Soo-chow, viz.,
    She-mun, Tcha-mun, Tche-mun, and Low-mun; and that he had
    entertained their views, and had already seen Kong-wang. He said
    that they would have difficulty in disposing of Mo-wang, who was
    averse to a surrender; but that, if we resumed our attack on the
    Low-mun stockades, they would endeavour to shut him out of the
    city. _I consented to the defection with a good deed of
    pleasure_,[62] as I considered that, if the rebels fought, we
    should lose heavily.

    "On the night of the 28th November, Chung-wang arrived in the
    city from Wusieh, and was present at the combat of the 29th. His
    arrival made a change in the state of affairs, and the
    disaffected were unable to carry out their intention of closing
    the gates on Mo-wang. They, however, sent over three
    Tien-chwangs on the night of the 30th November, and proposed to
    remain neutral if we attacked the city, and would trust us not
    to touch their men or horses; their men to be distinguished by
    white turbans. These Tien-chwangs told us that Chung-wang, on
    his return to the city after his defeat, had proposed to vacate
    Nankin and Soo-chow, and for the whole Taeping force to go down
    to Kwang-si; and, in fact, give up the cause.[63] The Mo-wang
    was averse to this, and proposed to remain and fight it out. I
    have since learned that he was most anxious to see me, and I
    think to see what could be done. This I learnt from two
    Frenchmen who came out after his death, of whom more hereafter.
    The other Wangs did not meet the Chung-wang's views, as they
    intended coming over. Chung-wang then left the city, and
    proceeded to Wusieh. General Ching came to me on the 1st
    December, and asked me if I would like to see Nar-wang. I said
    no, unless it was necessary, and told Ching at the same time
    that, if the Futai did not grant the Wangs sufficiently good
    terms as to induce them to come over, _I thought our attack on
    the city might be foiled_,[64] as we had lost heavily in
    officers and men on the attack of 27th and 29th November; and a
    little hitch with the bridge, which had to be seventy yards
    long, might cause a repulse. I told Ching on the same day that I
    could not see the necessity of my seeing Nar-wang. He, however,
    pressed it, and I consented to meet him at the north gate that
    evening. I accordingly went, and met Nar-wang in General Ching's
    boat. His first words were 'that he wanted to obtain help from
    me.' I answered that I was most happy to help him, and then I
    told him that this proposal to remain neutral would be of no
    avail, and that I could not accept it, as I should be only
    deceiving him and his chief if I did so, inasmuch as, if the
    city fell by assault, I could not, with an undisciplined force
    such as the one I command, restrain them from looting every one;
    and that, therefore, unless they could give a gate, it would be
    better for them to fight, or else vacate the city. I then told
    the Nar-wang what I thought of the Taeping prospects, and the
    little chance of success. I said that I wanted to make the
    Imperialists and rebels good friends (?); that, since the rise of
    the rebellion, the Imperialists had much changed; and did not
    dare, from fear of foreign Governments, to perpetrate cruelties
    as heretofore (?). He said he would see with General Ching what
    he could do about the city, and that he had no fear of Mo-wang
    knowing of his having seen me, or of Chung-wang either; that he
    had enough troops to keep both in check. I then left, and
    General Ching told me the next day that Nar-wang had decided to
    see the other Wangs, and to consult on the course of proceeding.
    The next day, the 3rd December, General Ching told me that
    Mo-wang had some idea of Nar-wang's negotiations, and wanted to
    decapitate him, but that Nar-wang was prepared. Nar-wang also
    sent out to tell General Ching that the other Wangs agreed to
    come over, that he personally wanted no command, but merely
    permission to retire to his home with his property; but that
    some of the other Wangs wanted to get commands of different
    sorts. He told me further that Nar-wang had some difficulty in
    seizing Mo-wang. On the morning of the 4th December, General
    Ching came to me, and told me that Nar-wang had determined and
    agreed with him to get Mo-wang on the wall of the city, and to
    throw him down and hand him over to us as a prisoner. I went to
    General Ching, and told him I must have Mo-wang given over to
    me; to which he acceded willingly, and in fact joyfully, as he
    had known him in former days. I then went to the Futai, who was
    out, but I saw a very high Civil Mandarin named Pow, who
    undertook to tell the Futai that Mo-wang must be my prisoner. I
    told him to tell the Futai that I would secure his not giving
    any more trouble to China. I had not come back five minutes
    before General Ching sent me over two Frenchmen, who had just
    come into the lines. They told me that that afternoon, at 2
    p.m., all the chiefs had been assembled in Mo-wang's palace, and
    after a dinner, they had offered up prayers and adjourned to the
    great court, and having put on their robes, crowns, &c., Mo-wang
    mounted his throne and began an address, in which he stated
    their difficulties, and expatiated on the fidelity of the
    Kwang-si and Canton men. The other Wangs answered him; the
    discussion got higher and higher, till Kong-wang got up and took
    off his robe. Mo-wang asked him what he was doing, when
    Kong-wang drew a dagger and stabbed Mo-wang in the neck.[65] The
    Mo-wang fell over the table in front of the throne, and the
    other Wangs seized him, and decapitated him in the entrance.
    They then mounted their horses and rode off to their troops;
    Mo-wang's head being sent to General Ching. Mo-wang's men and
    the other troops looted the palace. There was no fighting in the
    city till the morning of the 5th, when the Nar-wang's men had
    some trouble with the Cantonese, and drove them out of the city,
    killing some 50 or 60 of them. General Ching's men advanced, and
    with a small body, took charge of the Low-mun, my men being kept
    fallen in, as they were under stricter discipline than the
    Imperialist soldiers are. On the night of the 4th December the
    rebels all shaved their heads. I went to the Futai, and telling
    him that it would not do to let my men remain idle, proposed to
    him to march on Wusieh, if he would give the men compensation of
    two months' pay, as they had received no reward since I had
    taken the command. He objected to it, and I told him if he could
    only promise, the matter could be settled well. He still
    objected, and I then told him I should leave _his service_,[66]
    and went myself to the city. The Imperialists had some men
    straying about, but not many. I went straight to Nar-wang's
    house, and saw him and all the Wangs. I asked him if all was
    right. He said that everything was satisfactory, and appeared
    quite secure. He had not seen Ching at the time. I went to
    Mo-wang's palace, and the body was where it had fallen. I then
    went out of the city, and arrived in time to see General Ching,
    who came to me on the part of the Futai to arrange matters. It
    was now 4 p.m. I told General Ching that I was helpless in the
    matter. The colonels of regiments and the officers had little
    authority over them unless they used the harshest means, which
    they would not do in this question. General Ching offered one
    month's pay, and the officers refused it. I told Ching that it
    was not my intention to accept anything; but that I felt that
    after the length of time the force had been fighting it was only
    right the men who wished to leave should have the means of doing
    so. Matters began to look bad, and I at last determined to make
    the men accept the one month's pay, which I did with difficulty,
    the men having made an attempt to march down on the Futai. I
    then, at the _Futai's request_,[67] gave orders for the march to
    Quin-san. Ching told me at this time that the Futai had written
    to Pekin, and said that he had extended mercy to the Wangs and
    the rebels. Next morning, after the troops had left, I started
    for the city, sending the two steamers to Wu-lung-chiao to meet
    me, as I expected to be able to retake the _Fire Fly_ easily
    from information I had received from the letters in Mo-wang's
    house, and from some Europeans who were with Mo-wang, and who
    had escaped. I went to the Low-mun, and there learnt that
    Nar-wang and the other Wangs and chiefs were to come out and see
    the Futai at 12, noon, and that the city would then be given
    over. I thought I had better see Nar-wang before I went out, so
    I called at his palace, and took him aside and asked him if
    everything was all right, and if he wanted me to do anything. He
    said no; that everything was proper. I told him I was going to
    the Tai-hu; and he said, 'Why not wait? I am coming to see you.'
    I said it was important business, and that unless he
    particularly wished it, or thought it necessary, I would not
    stay. He said very good, and I left. He passed me on his way to
    the Low-mun very soon after on horseback, with all the Wangs,
    going, as I supposed, to the Futai. I went then to Mo-wang's
    palace, and then to the east, or Low-mun, to while away the
    time, till the steamers could get round from Wai-quai-dung to
    Wu-lung-chow. From the top of the Low-mun I saw a large crowd of
    people near Ching's stockades, and thought it was the ceremony
    of submission going on. A few minutes after, perhaps 12.30 p.m.,
    a large body of Imperial soldiers came up, and passing the gate,
    rushed cheering into the city, as they generally do into vacated
    stockades. I thought little of it, more than expressing my
    disapprobation to some of them. They, however, went on pouring
    in and firing off their muskets in the air and yelling. Ching
    then came up, and looked rather pale. I asked him if the
    interview was over, and if it had been satisfactory. He said
    that Nar-wang had not been to the Futai at all. I said I had
    seen him going with the others. He said no; that he could not
    say for certain; but that he thought he had run away. I said I
    could not make out what for, as I had just seen Nar-wang, and he
    said everything was all right. I asked Ching if there was any
    trouble. He said that Nar-wang had demanded the command of 2,000
    men, and of half the city of Soo-chow, the division to be a
    wall, and that the Futai had refused it, and also that he had
    let some of Chung-wang's men in. _The latter part I knew to be
    false, but, strange to say, I believed the former portion._ I
    asked him where Nar-wang could go to. He said that he would not
    go back to the rebels, but that he would go to some village and
    settle there I thought the thing so strange that I asked Dr.
    Macartney, who was by me, to go to Nar-wang's house, and to see
    him, and tell him not to fear anything.[68] Ching then told me
    that his men alone would be allowed in, and that there would be
    no looting; and as I knew before that he had his men in good
    discipline, I had no fear, and therefore rode round the wall
    with him. He kept on firing vollies in the air, which I
    remonstrated at, and could not make out the object. He said it
    was merely to prevent Kwang-si men from doing anything to his
    men while they were taking possession of the city. I became
    uneasy about Nar-wang; and at the south, or Pou-mun, I left
    General Ching and rode off to Nar-wang's palace. I got there at
    dark, and found it had been gutted. I was then met by Nar-wang's
    uncle, who asked me to come to his house. Being only with my
    interpreter, I had no one to send for General Ching, or for my
    troops; but the entreaties of this Tien-chwang being so great I
    agreed to do so, and therefore went with Nar-wang's family to
    his house. When I got there his men were all fallen in, and the
    streets barricaded. I wanted to send my interpreter for
    assistance, but they would not let him go. I therefore remained
    till 2 a.m., keeping away the Imperial looting parties. At 2
    a.m. I sent my interpreter and an Imperial soldier, who was with
    my horse, to get the steamers round to Wai-quai-dung to make the
    Futai answerable, and also sent for my body guard. After he had
    started, the man who went with him came back and said he had
    been beheaded by the Imperialists. I remained till 4 a.m., and
    then went out to send orders to the steamers myself. _I was
    taken by the Imperialists and detained an hour._ At last I got
    to the Low-mun, and sent the body guard to the Nar-wang's house,
    but it was too late, the Imperialists had entered and gutted it.
    I then went to the Low-mun, and met there General Ching, to whom
    I gave my opinion. He was most anxious to excuse himself, but I
    did not listen to him. At this time I did not know that the
    Wangs had been beheaded. I then went down to Ching's stockades,
    and met Major Baily, commanding Ching's artillery there. He said
    that General Ching was very much put out; that the Futai had
    ordered him to execute the Wangs, and had given orders to the
    troops to enter the city, that he had lost face, &c. Baily then
    told me that he had Nar-wang's son, and brought him to me. I
    refused any communication with General Ching, Nar-wang's son
    came to my boat, and, pointing to the other side, said it was
    there that the Wangs had been executed. I went over, and
    recognised Kong-wang's, Nar-wang's, Sieh-wang's, and Sung-wang's
    heads, but the body of Nar-wang was not to be seen, having been
    buried. I took, at the son's request, Nar-wang's head. _The
    bodies had been cut down the chest, and the wounds on the head
    were most horrible, showing the brutality of the executioners._
    I then was waiting for the steamers, as I had heard that there
    were some high persons still in custody, and I thought that I
    could frighten the Futai into giving them up. He, however, heard
    of my arrival, and went off to the city. _I left him a note
    telling him my opinion, and then moved off with the steamers to
    Quin-san._[69] I received, just before leaving, a letter from
    Futzu-quai, telling me that a chief had come over with 3,000 men
    to my officer in command; and that he, the officer in command,
    had received them. I sent orders to him to inform the chief of
    the treachery, and to let him go with his men and arms, if he
    liked, or else to bring his troops to Quin-san.

    "This is a brief summary of the late events, _which will prove
    to the Imperial Government a most fatal blow_. I imagine that
    the Futai and General Ching arranged this matter, and know that
    it is viewed by the mass of Mandarins with disgust.

    "Nar-wang's son tells me that Chung-wang was willing to come
    over; and that all the people in the silk districts are the
    same; but how to come they know not. Is not this a time for
    foreign governments to come forward and arrange the terms? The
    power is in this force, if the authority from Pekin is given to
    it to act under some _honest_ Chinaman. What is now to be feared
    is that foreigners will join the rebels, and will thus cause the
    war to linger on to the extermination of the unfortunate people
    on whom the burden falls, and to the detriment of trade of
    every sort. That the rebels really do not possess the qualities
    of government cannot be doubted. They merely hold cities, and
    let the villages govern themselves. The head chief may know
    something of the Christian religion, but I will answer for it
    that nine-tenths of the rebels have no real ideas on the
    subject. It is sincerely to be hoped that the Government will
    interfere at this time.[70]

    "C. E. GORDON, Major Commanding.

    "P.S. Prince F. de Wittgenstein was present at most of the above
    occurrences, and can vouch for the correctness of the same."

    "'THE FRIEND OF CHINA,' SATURDAY, OCT. 12, 1863.

    "We publish to-day a document which we consider one of the most
    remarkable that it has been our good or evil fortune to peruse
    for many a day. Emanating as it does from a man of Gordon's
    ability and position, we have been much more than disappointed.
    How we have been so, let our readers judge.

    "The exact position of the major is, it would appear, that of
    Adjutant of Quin-san, though possessing less power than General
    Ching, whose faculty of lying seems to have the wonderful power
    (by attraction we suppose) of giving credence; though the major
    tells us that he knew the rogue _was_ lying. We give the major's
    own words, 'the latter part I _knew_ to be _false_; but, strange
    to say, I believed the former portion.'

    "This General Ching, this cowardly liar, it was who voted as the
    right-hand man on all occasions concerning the conduct of
    negotiating with the rebels. The major tells us that the Taeping
    Wangs had opened negotiations with Ching for the surrender of at
    least four gates of the city. We suppose this was before the
    29th of November. On the 4th of December we learn of Ching's
    being _joyful_ at the prospect of the Mo-wang falling into the
    hands of Major Gordon, and on the same day we hear of his
    reception of the unhappy Wang's head.

    "Ching next appears as Envoy of the Futai 'to arrange matters,'
    we suppose, for the surrender of the city. Here the major slips
    out of the 'matter' by declaring himself 'helpless,' and this,
    after he had assured the Nar-wang that he wanted to make the
    Imperialists and Taepings friends, and only wanted possession of
    'a gate' to prevent looting everybody.

    "Major Gordon does not tell us _why_, at the 'supreme' moment of
    the taking of Soo-chow, he was so anxious to get possession of
    the _Fire Fly_. We beg to call our readers' attention to the
    following statement:--'I thought I had better see Nar-wang
    before I went out, so I called at his palace, and took him
    aside, and asked him if everything was all right, and if he
    wanted me to do anything. He said no; that everything was
    proper. I told him I was going to the Tai-hu; and he said, "_Why
    not_ wait? I am coming to see you at the meeting of the Wangs,"
    as he _supposed_, at the Futai's.' Why was Major Gordon absent?
    Why did he not make it his business to see that the assurances
    which he had given to the Nar-wang were carried out?

    "The major tells us that he got 'uneasy' when he found that
    Nar-wang's palace had been gutted; however, his remaining till 4
    o'clock next morning where he was (though why he did not go
    himself for his body-guard instead of sending his servant he has
    not told us) hardly seems to prove this assertion; but the
    affair of his steamers being of so great a consequence, he sends
    an assistant 'to send orders to them,' when he is taken and
    detained by the Imperialists for an hour. (General Ching was, of
    course, busy just at that moment, and Major Gordon's detention
    was most opportune.) The screaming farce of General Ching's
    losing face, and Major Gordon's refusal to have anything to do
    with him, here opportunely follows the tragedy--(one likes to
    laugh after the heavy business!). The idea of frightening the
    Futai is nicely got over. The latter gentleman----_goes into the
    city_, where, of course, he _couldn't_ be frightened! The major
    takes a steamer and goes off to Quin-san.

    "_Leaving a note_ for the Futai.

    "Our readers have the major's letter before them, and they can
    judge for themselves whether our analysis be correct or not. Our
    own opinion is that the major--owing to his recent losses,
    fearing a repulse if the city of Soo-chow had then been
    attacked, and finding occasion of taking it himself by
    treachery, and yet desiring to shield himself from the infamy of
    such a transaction--would have acted precisely as he declares he
    _has_ done.

    "Though a considerable reader of history, our recollection does
    not supply a parallel to the infamous treachery practised upon
    the unsuspecting Taeping chiefs. The conduct of Pizarro, in
    Peru, was nothing in comparison. One Inca, and a room full of
    treasure, is a small affair when compared with the confiding
    Princes of Soo-chow. Now, we ask all right-minded men to take
    Major Gordon's statement to Nar-wang, which we quote
    literally:--'I said that I wanted to make the Imperialists and
    rebels good friends. That since the rise of the rebellion the
    Imperialists had been much changed; and did not dare, from fear
    of the foreign Governments, to perpetrate cruelties as
    heretofore.' And compare his account of the atrocities committed
    upon the Princes of Kong, Nar, Seih, and Sung.

    "Our review of these facts is based upon Major Gordon's own
    statements; and if he does not find means of extrication, we
    have placed him upon a pinnacle of infamy whence he shall not
    readily descend. From the moment Major Gordon first became
    _particeps_ in the affair of the surrender with General Ching
    (the very ideal of a Manchoo liar), he should have stood between
    the Manchoo butcher of a Futai and his confiding victims, and,
    as a true soldier (the soul of honour), yielding his life rather
    than have exposed himself to the execration of all society as a
    traitor of the deepest dye.

    "Major Gordon will, no doubt, think us severe upon himself; but
    we assure him that what we have said is by no means meant as a
    personal attack. We are simply commenting upon his own statement
    of what has lately occurred at Soo-chow. It may possibly be true
    that he has been victimized by the liar, Ching, and the Futai.
    We are half inclined to think such to be the case, considering
    his simplicity in telling us, on the authority of the Nar-wang's
    son, that 'Chung-wang was willing to come over, and that all the
    people in the silk districts are the same.' He also tells us
    that the 'rebels do not possess the qualities of government.'
    That they actually allow 'villages to govern themselves;' and
    that while the 'head chief _may_ know _something_ of the
    Christian religion, nine-tenths of the rebels have no real ideas
    on the subject.'

    "We are rather astonished at Major Gordon's information as to
    this point. We have been for many years in China. We have seen
    the way in which the cherished temples and idols of the Manchoos
    have been treated by the Taepings; and it is rather late in the
    day to tell us what rebel 'ideas' are on the subject of the
    Christian religion.

    "In conclusion, Major Gordon hopes for the interference of the
    'Government.' He means, of course, the _English_ Government. If
    there were anything wanting to make Major Gordon contemptible in
    the eyes of all Europe and America, it was this last phrase.
    What! the English Government interfere to prop up the Manchoos
    after the statement of what Major Gordon says has occurred at
    Soo-chow! Major Gordon! We thought you not only an English
    officer in Chinese employ, but we considered you an honourable
    subject of our Sovereign, yet it seems you penned this sentence
    after the atrocious perfidy of Soo-chow--'It is sincerely to be
    hoped that the Government [English] will interfere at this
    time.'

    "If he had not added this last sentence we could have pardoned
    Major Gordon everything. What! the Government of Englishmen to
    sustain a Government which, by Major Gordon's own showing, is so
    perfidious that we can make no possible comparison! There is no
    Englishman in this or any other part of the world who will not
    blush for Gordon, or the era in which it was found that an
    Englishman advocated assistance for a Government which has
    violated every treaty, and even the most sacred obligations
    recognised among men.

    "As for ourselves, we are not military adventurers, and,
    perhaps, cannot understand how _any stratagem_ may be fair 'in
    war as in love,' but we do hereby protest against a violation of
    a solemn word of honour given. Major Gordon must clear himself,
    or he will go down to posterity not only 'unhonoured and
    unsung,' but as a wretch who sold blood to General Ching and the
    present Futai of Kiang-nan.

    "Major Gordon, in telling us that, or, in fact, asking the
    question, viz., 'Is this not the time for foreign Governments to
    come forward and arrange terms?' looks as though he fancied
    foreign Governments _could_ entertain the idea of an honest
    Chinaman under authority from Pekin. But in spite of the
    testimony of the Prince Wittgenstein, or any other potentate, we
    are inclined to believe that unfortunate Taepingdom has little
    to learn from Manchoo morality, and still less from mercenary
    soldiers, whose honour is bought and sold!"

Some people may consider the article last quoted as too severe upon
Gordon--perhaps they may change their opinion after perusing the
following extracts from a narrative of a journey to Soo-chow, by the
sub-editor of the _Friend of China_, soon after the great treachery. I
prefer giving this authenticated description by an eye-witness, to
narrating the facts myself, because I did not enter Soo-chow after its
betrayal, and cannot, therefore, vouch for the subsequent massacre (and
other disputed points) from my own personal observations, although
otherwise I have the strongest proof that the reported atrocities were
perpetrated:--

    "TO SOO-CHOW AND BACK, VIA QUIN-SAN.

    "After leaving Shanghae, our route (or creek) lay through a low,
    flat country, intersected by canals innumerable in all
    directions; the richest land in China, stretching away to the
    very horizon, unbroken to view, except by countless graves,
    commemorative arches, and heaps of ruins. The weather, though
    superb, seemed oppressive, from the utter abandonment of the
    country; not a soul was to be seen as far as the eye could
    reach, and the endless fields of neglected and fallow ground
    (once the garden of China) deepened that air of sadness which
    winter always seems to wear in the country. Though ashore the
    desolation is complete, not so on the water; Mandarin squeeze
    stations have sprung up in all directions.

    "At Wong-doo we were actually stopped, and 400 cash demanded
    from our Louda. Our indignation getting the better of us, we did
    then and there write our protest against thievery upon the
    rogue's ribs; and in round, legible characters, too, we did all
    we could to teach _this_ Manchoo robber that the higher the
    squeeze, the less commerce, and the less commerce will certainly
    produce less revenue. When will all Manchoos, Morrill tariff
    men, &c., learn this lesson?

    "There were, besides, a few wretches fishing by means of
    cormorants (so often described that I will say nothing about
    it), making up the sum total of population. At last, Quin-san
    pagoda became visible; and after a short run over the country
    (our boat following), we reached the city.

    "Of course, we went to see the 'lion' of the place. He seemed to
    be in a consumedly bad humour; but, nevertheless, granted us
    passes for Soo-chow. Dropping metaphor, Major Gordon impressed
    us as a very young man (say thirty) _without_ an 'old head on
    his shoulders.' We suppose coolness is a quality which he
    constantly displays on the field; he certainly displayed it in
    his own house when we called upon him.

    "On the 18th December, after a run of fifteen miles from
    Quin-san, we reached the stockades outside the city of Soo-chow.
    They had evidently been the scene of a fierce encounter.
    Innumerable shot (solid) in their interiors told the tale of
    carnage; and numerous unburied corpses were lying about in all
    directions, in spite of the number which had been disposed of in
    the creeks. As we drank our tea that evening, we studiously
    avoided any remark on _this_ subject. Four or five miles more
    brought us to the lofty walls of Soo-chow. Inside the gate
    (Lo-mun) an immense stone wall and water-gate (as protecting the
    outer bastion) will ever stand a monument of Taeping energy. Of
    course, our first move was to see the 'lion' of Soo-chow, the
    _in_-famous Futai. The palace of this magnate (the former Ya-mun
    of the Chung-wang) really 'impressed' us as something worthy of
    the 'Mings,' in which style it is erected.

    "We have visited hundreds of such structures, but the Soo-chow
    pagoda is certainly the finest we have ever seen. In ascending
    we counted 220 steps, and judged the height to be from 150 to
    170 feet from base to summit. It is nine stories high (as usual,
    an odd number); but when we reached the top, the view there
    presented well repaid our trouble. The vast city lay at our
    feet--the Venice of China--intersected with hundreds of canals,
    pagodas, and temples (in the tent-like style of the Chinese),
    relieving the otherwise monotonous view of infinite tiled roofs.

    "In many places the city was obscured by the burning of houses,
    set on fire by the Imperialist soldiers.

    "On the 19th December, having sent our cards before us, we
    called upon General Ching. While waiting for his appearance, we
    had time to examine a magnificent English clock (looted from
    Mo-wang's palace), which formed the main ornament of the
    'reception-hall.'

    "Over the dial was a fountain of water (in glass), and under it
    a pastoral scene, with moving figures of impossible shepherds
    and shepherdesses, worthy of Arcadia--all moved by the
    mechanical contrivances provided in the clock itself. At last
    Ching entered, and at first took us for a second edition of
    General Brown, for he immediately entered upon a defence of Le
    Futai. After telling him who we really were, he suddenly became
    so reserved that we beat a polite retreat (for the fate of the
    Taeping-wangs had by no means faded from our memory).

    "As it was still noon, we determined on a visit to the residence
    of Chung-wang's secretary in the neighbourhood.

    "On our arrival we found that the house had not only been
    looted, but that the valuable furniture it contained had been
    literally smashed to atoms by the Imperialist soldiery.

    "In the rear we discovered a large hall, over the entrance of
    which a rebel tablet still remained--'Teen-foo-dong'--'Hall of
    the Heavenly Father.' But what really astonished us was to find
    on the walls a complete set of elegant lithograph engravings,
    which Roman Catholics are accustomed to call the 'stations,' a
    series of pictures representing the sad journey of Jesus from
    the house of Pilate to His place of execution.

    "One of the pictures we became possessed of, and we shall ever
    keep it as the most precious souvenir of our trip to Soo-chow;
    for we think that the affecting story of Jesus' passion and
    death was _appreciated_ by these _Missionary-forsaken_ patriots.

    "It certainly shows that a high Taeping official loved to
    contemplate the various scenes of that awful tragedy (for
    principle's sake) over which the world, till the end of time,
    shall weep the bitter tears of violated right and triumphant
    wrong.

    "_20th Dec._--The day being fine, we determined to have a look
    at the steamers _Feillong_ and _Sycee_. A smart walk to the
    Padi-cho gate brought us to the 'fifty-two arched bridge,' where
    we saw the heavy artillery just outside.

    "We looked with regret upon those splendid 'peace-makers,' that
    _they_ should have been _loaned_ to the butcher of
    Soo-chow--that _they_ should be the property of the British
    Government--were thoughts upon which we need make no comment.

    "Captain Baily in charge, and very creditably too! His
    hospitality is the last pleasant impression we had of Soo-chow,
    if we omit the feeling of relief we experienced when once
    outside of its walls on our way to Shanghae.

    "_21st Dec._--On learning (to our surprise) that the _locale_ of
    the 'execution ground' was neither more nor less than the
    court-yard of the '_Shing-s-tah_,' 'twin pagodas,' where the
    unhappy rebels had paid with the forfeit of their lives for
    trusting in the word of honour of their unprincipled assailants,
    we determined on a trip thither. On our arrival, we examined
    several most ancient tablets of stone, whence we gathered that
    these pagodas were erected long anterior to the Ming dynasty
    (_i.e._ reign of Tai Ching, dynasty of Sung); but we will not
    detain our readers with antiquarian trifles. On entering the
    court-yard (about half an acre) we found the ground _soaked_
    with HUMAN BLOOD! the creek forming its drain was still (after
    twenty days of slaughter) reddish with blood, as the officers
    of Dr. Macartney's force can testify. The ground for three feet
    deep stunk with blood (and the best blood of China); though the
    weather, except at noonday, did not favour the corruption of
    animal particles, Soo-chow being situated in lat. 31 deg. 23' 25"
    N., and long. 120 deg. 25' E.; consequently of rather a warm climate
    even in winter.

    "Our Chinese informants told us that 30,000 rebels had been led
    to these shambles, and executed. We had proofs enough to know
    that the number was enormous; we have it on authority of an
    European _eye-witness_ that this creek was so full of
    decapitated rebels that the Mandarins employed boatmen to clean
    it, by pushing the bodies with boat-hooks outside of the city
    into the principal stream.

    "We quitted the 'execution ground' (travellers will know it by
    the 'twin towers'), faint at these horrible proofs of _human_
    butchery which had met our view, and overcome with emotion. Was
    it for _this_ that Englishmen fought? Was it for this that
    English guns had been loaned by the representatives of the
    British people? Was it for _this_ that the 'first nation of the
    world' and the two _Scotchmen_, Gordon and Dr. Macartney, had
    fought?

    "Let the spirit of Robert Bruce forbid it! Let the noble sons of
    Scotia contemn it; and all Christendom, in the name of ...
    liberty, protest against the unspeakable perfidy, the horrible
    treachery, and brutal butchery of Soo-chow!

    "_22nd Dec._--Though the experiences of yesterday made us long
    to leave Soo-chow, we determined to visit the ruins of Mo-wang's
    palace; though completely burned, it had evidently covered an
    immense area of several acres; huge bronzes half melted
    obstructed the passage, and only a solitary drum stood sentinel
    at the entrance.

    "It was with a melancholy satisfaction that we gazed at the
    wreck of his palace.

    "Among so many traitors (his brother Wangs) he had been _true_
    to his flag. He knew what Manchoo honour meant, and his death by
    the hands of Taeping traitors is his eulogium. If his spirit
    _can_ visit this world of ours, we must rejoice that the
    Manchoos have not profited (even in money) by his destruction.

    "If the infamous barbarity of the Futai _can_ be excused; if his
    atrocious violation of justice and right can be pardoned; if
    there is any possible Jesuitical ground of justification for his
    immeasurable atrocities, it is this--he betrayed the betrayers
    of their own cause: he was a traitor to traitors, and has broken
    faith with the recreant Wangs.

    "Depressed in spirit, we hurried from the ruins of Mo-wang's
    palace to our boat, and instantly gave orders to our crew to get
    under weigh for Shanghae.

    "Hardly had we quitted the gate, when a letter was placed in our
    hands by a trusty agent from Chung-wang, dated Kia-ching-foo;
    what were our feelings in perusing it and finding these
    words:--'You foreigners are like the Manchoos; you have no
    honour! you have deceived us!' We, as a foreigner, felt all the
    bitterness herein contained. We, a personal friend of his,
    blushed for our nationality in being compared to perfidious
    Manchoos!

    "We candidly avow it, if we thought that the sword was really
    stronger than the pen, we would have girded it on, and be one
    more 'witness' to the glorious cause of liberty! We should like
    to prove to the Taepings that European nations are not _all_
    unprincipled liars, devoid of every virtue recognised by men,
    and that sacred volume which teaches a morality of which one
    would think they were ignorant. So much for our trip to Soo-choo
    and back.

    "S. E. F. O. C."

The dreadful Soo-chow tragedy may be considered the terminating point of
that unrighteous period of British policy commencing with the
organization of the Anglo-Manchoo flotilla; the hiring out of Major
Gordon and other officers; and the making of those infamous Orders in
Council authorizing military and naval support of the Manchoo, while it
has since been declared that an ordinance of neutrality was in force all
the time! That the terrible result of their policy would have so far
influenced the supposed Christian and civilized principles of those
members of Lord Palmerston's Government who originated it, as to make
them admit their mistake with worthy humility, and seek to rectify the
wrong already done by an essay towards the much easier path of right, is
very doubtful. However, the spirit of Englishmen could no longer be
restrained, and the Government were driven to rescind their former
Orders in Council (placing the forces of England at the evil disposal of
the Manchoo) by the unanimous voice of the Parliamentary representatives
of the people.

Englishmen may thus flatter themselves that they have repudiated the
atrocities which they had occasioned; but the very fact that their
mistaken policy entirely caused such deplorable results, makes them
morally responsible for the same. Still the national complicity _may_ be
glossed over. The participation of the agents on the spot, and
especially the principal, Gordon, cannot, by any stretch of imagination,
be excused.

If Major Gordon had resigned his employment in the service of the local
servant of the Manchoo Government, he might, by thus immediately
forsaking his brother generals when he became involved in their deeds of
blood and treachery, have saved his honour from suspicion and his name
from everlasting infamy. If he had possessed the least particle of
self-respect, humanity, or Christian feeling, he could not possibly have
followed any other course. Incredible as the fact must ever seem to
right-minded Englishmen, Major Gordon, after craftily passing two months
at Quin-san, still in command of the Anglo-Manchoo contingent, and still
receiving his pay from his employer, resumed active service with those
sanguinary monsters and consummate betrayers, General Ching and the
Futai Le.

Men judge by actions, but despise words. Gordon has _said_ that his
disgust was something stupendous at the revolting barbarities
perpetrated by his friends; yet the sentiment did not make him refuse
their pay, neither did it prevent his return to participate in fresh
atrocities within two months, nor shock him sufficiently to stay his
early reconciliation with the blood-stained wretches who had smeared him
with the same unfading and polluting mark. Of course, before returning
to active service, the British officer induced his Manchoo master to
indite a cunningly worded Chinese despatch, setting forth that he was
not actually concerned in the massacre of the confiding Soo-chow
victims. Naturally enough, to retain the services of Major Gordon (and
the consequent assistance of the British Government), without which they
would still have been powerless before the Ti-pings, the Manchoos,
through Futai Le, verbosely declared all that was required. Shortly
afterwards, besides resuming his employment, the major responded by
writing an official letter, in which he forgot his former disgust, and
had the singular audacity not only to exonerate the Futai from blame for
his unparalleled atrocities, but to request Sir F. Bruce not to make any
further complaint about the same[71]--events that had seriously stained
the honour of Great Britain, and which only the most prompt and
unqualified repudiation, together with entire cessation of further
countenance and help to the Manchoo, could either erase from her
scutcheon, or clear her policy from the imputation of complicity.

Unfortunately for the reputation of Major Gordon, since his elevation to
the position of General of Futai Le's Anglo mercenaries, he had been too
much accustomed to intrigue and encouragement of treachery to have felt
a proper indignation at the Soo-chow affair; and it is possible he might
have had some knowledge of the planned perfidy before it was put into
execution, and so was not sufficiently horrified to throw up his 1,200
taels (L400) per month. Gordon's behaviour in the treachery of the
Burgevine-Ti-ping legion is one specimen, and a very strong one too, of
the conduct referred to. He induced the Europeans who went over to him
to desert the Ti-ping cause by his promises of office, bribes, and safe
conduct to Shanghae for such as were tired of fighting. Some mistaken
individuals have ascribed this proceeding to the humane disposition of
the man who condoned the ruthless massacre of his paroled prisoners, who
assisted as a principal agent in the vast destruction of life and
desolation of country during the unjustifiable British hostilities
against the Ti-pings, and who never put himself to the trouble of saving
the lives of those he assisted to vanquish. It must be a rather lax code
of military honour which could reflect any _credit_ on Gordon for
rewarding many of the traitors (mostly low American rowdies), by
bestowing upon them various commands in his own force; and he--supposed
to be an English officer and gentleman--with open arms receiving them as
his messmates and brother officers: even less creditable is the fact
that he obtained pecuniary reward for those whom he did not make his
_friends_.

The letter written to Sir F. Bruce by Gordon as a justification for his
fresh alliance with the Futai Le, appears in the Parliamentary Papers,
as noticed by the foot-note on the preceding page. This document is so
important, as showing the character of Gordon's connection with the
Imperialists, that I quote it in full, and then subject it to a close
analysis.

    "INCLOSURE 1 in No. 9.
    "_Major Gordon, R.E., to Sir F. Bruce._
    "Soo-chow, February 6, 1864.

    "My dear Sir Frederick Bruce,--

    Par. 1.--"_In consequence of the danger which will arise by my
    delaying inaction with the force any longer in a state of
    uncertainty, I have arranged with the Footae_ to issue a
    proclamation (which he will send to you), clearing me of any
    participation in the late execution of the Wangs, and have
    determined to act immediately."

    Par. 2.--"The reasons which actuate me are as follows:--_I know
    of a certainty that Burgevine meditates a return to the rebels;
    that there are upwards of 300 Europeans ready to join them, of
    no character; and that the Footae will not accept another
    British officer if I leave the service_, and therefore the
    Government may have some foreigner put in, or else the force put
    under men of Ward's and Burgevine's stamp, of whose action at
    times we should never feel certain."

    Par. 3.--"_I am aware that I am open to very grave censure for
    the course I am about to pursue_; but in the absence of advice,
    _and knowing as I do that the Peking authorities will support
    the Footae in what he has done, I have made up my mind to run
    the risk_. If I followed my own desire I should leave now, as I
    have escaped unscathed and been wonderfully successful. _But the
    rabble, called the Quin-san force, is a dangerous body_, and it
    will be my duty to see that it is dissolved as quietly as
    possible, and that, while in course of dissolution, it should
    serve to benefit the Imperial Government."

    Par. 4.--"_I do not apprehend the rebellion will last six months
    longer if I take the field. It may take six years if I leave,
    and the Government does not support the Imperialists._ I propose
    to cut through the heart of the rebellion, and to divide it
    into two parts by the capture of Ye-sing and Liyang."

    Par. 5.--"If the course I am about to pursue meets your
    approbation, I shall be glad to hear; but, if not, shall expect
    to be well rebuked. However, _I know that I am not actuated by
    personal considerations, but merely as I think will be most
    conducive to the interests of our Government_.

    "The Footae does not want the force to move against Nankin I
    imagine, as Tseng-kwo-fan has the wish to capture it himself."

    Par. 6.--"_The Footae, if he is to be believed, has some
    extenuating circumstances in his favour, for his action_; and
    although I feel deeply on the subject, I think that we can
    scarcely expect the same discernment that we should from an
    European governor.

    "This letter will relieve you from any responsibility on this
    matter, and thanking you very much for your kind letter, which I
    will answer shortly, I am, &c.,

    (Signed)      "C. G. GORDON."

    Par. 7.--"P.S. _If you would let the matter drop_, and make me
    responsible for my action in the matter, _I think it would be
    more conducive to our good relations with the Pekin Government
    than pressing them to punish or degrade the Footae_.

    "C. G. G."

    NOTE.--The parts of the letter in italics are those subjected to
    review.

_Analysis of Major Gordon's Letter._

Par. 1. Now, with regard to this first premise, what right had Major
Gordon to make a prospect of danger to the Imperialists a pretext to
resume _friendship_ and _alliance_ with the faithless and barbarous
wretches who had already implicated him in their revolting atrocities?
Major Gordon's duty as a British officer, specially executing the policy
of his Government, and leaving it responsible for his conduct, was
simple and palpable. To avoid the deathless guilt of participation in
the Soo-chow treachery and massacre, he should have repudiated both.
What course did he pursue? He wrote and talked a great deal about
disgust, indignation, horror, &c., but never took any _action_ to fulfil
his otherwise worthless protestations. By the only part we find he
really performed and did not merely talk, it appears that he actually
had the unparalleled audacity, folly, or knavishness, to _arrange_
terms with the Futai, although any intercourse, arrangement, or
communication whatever, upon a friendly basis constituted a direct
condonation and approval of the atrocities which would have made an
unqualified separation from _all_ interests and future connection
imperative to any man of honour, humanity, or Christian principle.

Par. 2. The assertion that Gordon _knew for a certainty_ that Burgevine
intended to rejoin the Ti-pings, is best controverted by the following
extract from the _Friend of China_, Shanghae newspaper (issue of
September 29, 1864), which, being one of the principal organs among a
population of Europeans and Americans, scarcely numbering 2,000 souls,
may be credited for being well informed upon affairs in their midst;
moreover, the editor was personally acquainted with Burgevine, and was
aware, equally with myself, that he entertained no enthusiasm for the
Ti-ping cause.

The article referred to states:--

    "As for Gordon's assertion to Sir F. Bruce that he knew for a
    certainty Burgevine meditated a return to the rebels, and that
    upwards of 300 Europeans--[This estimate is supremely absurd.
    During the whole time Burgevine was with the Ti-pings, and when
    everything seemed to favour his enterprise, he could never
    obtain more than one-third of 300 Europeans]--of no character,
    intended to join him. This being written in February last, we
    know for a greater certainty that, at that time, neither did
    Burgevine meditate anything of the kind, nor were there
    thirty--the tenth of 300--Europeans in this quarter available
    for any such game. And though Gordon may have been under an
    impression that he was writing truth when he made this
    assertion, his common sense might have told him the thing was as
    improbable as it has eventually proved incorrect. We say he
    _may_ have been under an impression that he was writing truth.
    We may not refrain, however, from saying we doubt it. Why,
    Gordon knew as well as we did that the rebels never sought the
    assistance of foreigners, did not care to see them in their
    ranks, and were always jealous of them. Gordon knew right well,
    moreover, that when Burgevine left Soo-chow he left the rebel
    service for ever; that he was sick and disgusted with it; and if
    ever he meditated anything afterwards, it was operation rather
    as an independent buccaneer than as a Ti-ping general. The
    assertion--yarn, wilful lie, or whatever it shall be called--did
    very well, however, in the place it was intended for, viz.
    Pekin, a place so far away from the scene of action, that there
    was no possibility of contravening it at the time."

Besides the facts--incontrovertible to those acquainted with the
case--in the above refutation of Gordon's "reasons" for his fresh
blood-alliance with that cold-blooded murderer, the Futai, another
strong argument may be proved against his veracity:--

1. We may be quite sure that the Ti-pings would never have accepted a
second time the services of the man who had once betrayed them. From my
own knowledge of the opinions entertained by the Chung-wang, I am quite
assured on this point. 2. Then with respect to the probable action of
Burgevine himself. Having deserted the Ti-ping cause before Soo-chow had
fallen, and while its prospects were in vastly more favourable condition
than at the period of Gordon's statement, he would, consequently, never
be disposed to join when its circumstances had become desperate. 3. As
for the "300 of no character," mercenaries would certainly not espouse a
failing movement, which, in fact, had become still more "unprofitable"
than when the Burgevine-Ti-ping legionaries ran away because, even at
that time, they found no sufficient inducement to remain. These
propositions cannot fail to damage the "reasons" given by Gordon,
because they show that all common sense and reason points to an exactly
opposite conclusion. Thus we find that logic reverses Gordon's
"reasons," while facts entirely prove the falseness of his statements.
The principal argument is the fact that Burgevine _did not_ join the
Ti-ping, and the mythical "300" were never more heard about.

Par. 3. This paragraph of Gordon's letter seems to contain about the
most severe condemnation of his "reasons" that it would be possible to
imagine. He states that "he is open to very grave censure for the
course he was about to pursue," and that, "knowing the Pekin authorities
will support the Futai in what he has done," he had made up his mind to
"run the risk;" that is to say, he knew that the Manchoo Government
would approve the treachery and massacre in which the Futai had involved
him; yet such was his obliquity of principle that he actually used as a
reason to resume the sanguinary alliance the very fact which should have
made his separation from the Manchoo still more imperative.

With regard to the ungenerous, if not treacherous, manner in which
Gordon, behind their backs, termed his comrades "the rabble," it is well
noticed in the quotation from the _Hong-Kong Daily Press_, at the end of
this analysis.

Par. 4. This section of the letter exhibits a very pretty ebullition of
overweening self-conceit. If the writer takes the field again, the
rebellion cannot last "six months;" without that mighty warrior's
hostility, it would last "six years." Well, Bombastes did take the
field, but the "rebellion" still flourishes. It will be seen that the
blower of his own trumpet modestly puffs his value at only twelve times
that of any other officer who might conduct the operations against the
Ti-ping.

Par. 5. Concerning this protestation of disinterested motives--"I know
that I am not actuated by personal considerations"--I beg to refer my
readers to the concluding paragraph of the analysis, when they will find
that this statement is no less questionable than others by the same
author. With regard to Gordon's excessive care of the "interests of our
Government," and his declaration (in paragraph 2 of the letter), "that
the Futai will not accept another British officer if I leave the
service," the article in the _Friend of China_, already quoted,
continues from where we left off:--"And just as likely to be true was
the statement that the Futai would not accept another _British_ officer
if he, Gordon, left the Chinese service. How did Gordon learn that fact,
or that story? What can there be in _British_ officers that they should
be so repugnant to the Deputy Viceroy? What Gordon really meant was:--If
I leave, 'the Government' will not find such a faithful tool in any one
else as they have found in me."

Par. 6. In this part of the precious letter it is shamelessly declared
that "the Futai has extenuating circumstances in his favour" for
breaking faith and cruelly butchering the defenceless prisoners at
Soo-chow, who solely surrendered upon the terms guaranteed by Gordon
himself.

Par. 7. This postscript makes a fitting conclusion to the bad principle
and illogical reasoning of the letter we have reviewed. Gordon has the
audacity to request that the "matter"--affecting not only his own
character, for that is immaterial, but the honour of the British army
and the fair fame of England herself--may be "let drop," and to opine
that "good relations" should be maintained with the Pekin Government, by
no longer expressing any indignation at the immeasurable disgrace
reflected upon England by the revolting barbarities perpetrated by her
very good Manchoo allies, through the aid, and in the actual presence,
of British officers.

Before concluding the analysis of Gordon's apology for resuming active
operations with the Futai, it is necessary to make a few further
observations. In the first place, it is quite impossible to deduce a
sufficient cause from the three "reasons" by which he declares himself
to have been actuated (paragraph No. 2). Even suppose we admit the
allegations that Burgevine meditated a return to the rebels; that 300
Europeans were ready to join him; and that the Futai would not have
accepted another _British_ officer, to what conclusion do they lead us?
Simply, that _if_ these suppositions became realized, the event might
prove disastrous to the Manchoo. Now, as Gordon chose to make this his
excuse for comfortably passing over the Soo-chow affair, and resuming
active service, it is perfectly clear that (whether he intends to convey
this meaning or not) he pursued such conduct in the interest of his
Imperialist friends; and this reduces the three "reasons" into a plea of
duty to the Manchoo. Moreover, from the independent action claimed
throughout the letter, the writer does not attempt to justify himself by
any pretence of duty to his own Government. British officers, and,
indeed, all their countrymen, may well feel astonished and disgusted at
the extraordinary reasoning of Gordon, who, though merely the hired
mercenary of a _local_ Mandarin (Le Futai), and being totally without
_status_ in the Imperialist service,[72] made his duty to the Manchoo,
forsooth, a reason for condoning the atrocities in which they had
already involved him, and justifying his future participation in deeds
equally abhorrent to every civilized and Christian sentiment.

We now come to the question as to the worth of this plea of duty. Either
Gordon was the servant of the Manchoo Government or the British
Government. When the English Commons compelled ministers to revoke the
Order in Council authorizing the employment of British officers by the
Manchoo, and to recall all so employed, _in consequence of the Soo-chow
massacre_, Gordon, eventually, was withdrawn from service with the
Futai. Now this proves that he was _bona fide_ the servant of the
British Government, and not only destroys his implied plea of duty to
the Government of China, but virtually disclaims any countenance or
indorsement of his act in joining the Futai and resuming active
operations subsequent to the Soo-chow tragedy. Thus it is palpable
beyond any manner of doubt that the course Gordon pursued was _entirely_
according to "personal considerations;" was at his own responsibility;
and was neither in consonance with duty to his own Government nor that
of the Manchoo.

There are but three other motives which might be held to account for
Gordon's conduct. The first would be, duty to his God--but this never
has been attributed to him, and it would be gross blasphemy to do so;
the second, philanthropy, has been professed both by himself and
friends; the third, which is pecuniary, has been more frequently
ascribed to him. The philanthropical motive will be controverted shortly
when we come to a case in which it is attributed to him. With one
exception (the _China Mail_), the whole European press of China lamented
Gordon's connection with the Futai at Soo-chow; still more indignant
were the channels of public opinion when they found that he quietly
ignored the treacherous massacre by remaining at his post; and then
rumours were not wanting with regard to the mercenary motives believed
by many people to be the real cause of his return to active service.
Major Gordon has not only brought himself into evil repute, but also the
service of which he is so questionable a specimen. Take, for instance,
the following extract from the _Friend of China_ (issue February 20,
1864):--"If it be true that Major Gordon has again coalesced with Le
Futai, he must not blame us if we judge of his motives according to the
old maxim, 'actions speak louder than words.' It would seem that his
late rejection of rewards from the hand of Kung was simply because of
its having been too little for his acceptance, not too vile. His
retirement to Quin-san was a safe dodge to quiet public opinion in
regard to the Soo-chow massacre.... We hope that he has stipulated for
tens of lacs of rupees. Why should a soldier of fortune not make a
fortune? When the major returns to Scotland, will any of his 'canny'
countrymen ask impertinent questions as to the source of the 'siller'?
To be sure, military men who wear Queen Victoria's uniform may hem and
haw, cough and look doubtful; but we assure the major that if one
British officer can sell his sword, the others have no right to complain
about the price.... Dollars cover every defect, and a wealthy soldier
can afford to buy the respect which he cannot exact. Let the trade of
murder flourish, as it always has done, and may Major Gordon fully enjoy
all the wealth that the Manchoos can give, and that mental satisfaction
which faithful servitude never fails to bring to those of integrity! Is
not faithfulness bought and sold in 'Vanity Fair,' and should that not
be looked for in the conduct of a--British soldier?"

If this article were to be literally intended, it would probably
indicate the principles of Gordon. It appears very unfair to judge him
by the code of honour, civilized morality, and Christian doctrine, when
he does not seem either to appreciate such restraints or conform to
them; therefore it is possible that the press has been too severe when
condemning acts that, in this case, may, perhaps, be rather virtuous
than otherwise.

We now bring the analysis of Gordon's "reasons" to a close by the
following extract from the _Hong-kong Daily Press_ (October, 1864),
which refers to paragraphs 2, 3, and 5 of the letter, and finishes by
making a direct accusation of mercenary motives for his coalescence with
the Futai:--

    "We believe it is well known that had Gordon left, Macartney
    would have succeeded. Certain it is that Macartney was an
    applicant for the post when Gordon was nominated, and as he had
    subsequently completely won the Futai's confidence, there can be
    little doubt about the matter.

    "It will be seen, therefore, that Gordon's pretexts are shallow
    subterfuges, which will not stand the test of truth for one
    moment. He admits he is open to grave censure, but he says,
    'knowing as I do that the Pekin authorities will support the
    Futai in what he has done, I have made up my mind to run the
    risk.' That is a nice process of reasoning, certainly!

    "He then turns round on his comrades--calls them a dangerous
    rabble, 'which he will make it his duty to see dissolved as
    quietly as possible, and that while in course of dissolution it
    should serve to benefit the Imperial Government.'

    "Apart from Gordon's unprincipled conduct with respect to the
    perfidy of the Futai, and to the murder of the Wangs--conduct
    which must heap disgrace on his name, and for ever prevent him
    from looking an honest man in the face again--we doubt whether,
    in the whole page of history, a parallel is to be found of a
    victorious fortunate commander turning on his comrades in the
    disgraceful, and we will add treacherous, manner in which Gordon
    turns on the Quin-san force in the letter before us. Let the
    reader remember the number of times Gordon had led the Quin-san
    force to victory--how splendidly they behaved in the campaign
    which Gordon was about to lead them through when he thus
    treacherously denounced them! Whatever they were, they had made
    him what he was; and bad as they might have been, we doubt
    whether any one of them ever departed more directly from the
    code of honour laid down by himself than Gordon did in rejoining
    the Futai, or even whether any one of them so far betrayed his
    comrades as Gordon does in the letter before us.

    "A letter from Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell, dated Pekin, 21st
    March, encloses a letter from Mr. Hart, the Inspector of
    Customs, to Sir Frederic, communicating the important fact that,
    at the interview which Colonel Gordon had had with the Futai at
    Soo-chow, about the beginning of February, he, Mr. Hart, acted
    as interpreter between the two. The ostensible reason for Mr.
    Hart thus acting was to enable the Futai to exculpate himself,
    which, according to Mr. Hart, he most completely did. Why did
    not Gordon mention this important circumstance in his letter to
    Sir Frederic advising His Excellency that he had again taken the
    field?[73] How came it that Mr. Acting-Consul Markham in his
    letter to Sir Frederic announcing the reconciliation, was silent
    on the point? How came it that General Brown was either ignorant
    of, or suppressed the fact? How did the fact come to be kept so
    secret from the public? Not a whisper nor a hint of Mr. Hart's
    presence is to be detected in the despatches of these officers,
    let alone the complete vindication of the Futai which that
    gentleman avers was effected at the interview?

    "The answer is plain. Mr. Hart is a man of good repute, of high
    standing, and is a true and faithful servant. The Mandarins have
    great faith in him, and his word goes a long way. If they sent
    him to Gordon with an offer of 50,000 _taels_, the colonel might
    be assured not only that the money would be placed to his credit
    in any bank in London he might name, but that the transaction
    would be kept an inviolable secret.

    "There, reader, you have the clue to Gordon's sacrifice of
    principle, and Mr. Hart's visit to Soo-chow."

Before narrating the events subsequent to Gordon's return to active
operations, and bringing the history of the Ti-ping revolution down to a
close, it is necessary to review a despatch written by Sir F. Bruce, the
British Minister in China. The document constitutes the only authority,
or rather the only official approval, Gordon ever received for rejoining
the Futai. It is necessary to notice the same, because, as it was an
entirely conditional approval, and the conditions were _never_ observed,
it naturally became null and void. It is, therefore, our duty to prove
these facts, and thereby elucidate what might otherwise be held to
remove the responsibility from Gordon, and, in fact, justify his
conduct. The following despatch is the one in question, and it will be
seen that it is the reply to Gordon's letter:--

    "Pekin, March 12, 1864.

    "Sir,--I have received your letter of the 6th of February,
    stating the reasons that have led to your continuing operations
    in concert with the Governor of Kiang-soo. I informed the
    Chinese Government that I did not feel called upon to interfere
    with the course you have taken, _but that my acquiescence was
    founded on the passage in their despatch to me, which states_,
    that in any future operations in which a foreign officer is
    concerned the rules of warfare as practised among foreign
    nations are to be observed, and that I should enclose you the
    extract of that despatch for your guidance, and as containing
    the arrangements agreed upon for the future. [1.]

    "I have received the strongest assurance that it will be
    strictly adhered to, and that the Governor Le is to be
    instructed to that effect. I need not impress upon you how
    essential it is that there should be no repetition of the
    occurrence at Soo-chow.

    "I fully appreciate the motives that led you, after the
    correspondence that has taken place, to resume operations at
    once, and to expose yourself thereby to hostile criticism. You
    might have limited yourself to a statement of the reasons which
    rendered the step expedient, and have thrown upon others the
    onus of decision before committing yourself to any action.

    "But you appear to have felt, as commander of a Chinese force,
    and as the only person thoroughly acquainted with its
    composition and with the dangers to which this force, if
    indiscreetly handled, might give rise that the decision must be
    based on your representations, and you therefore assumed its
    responsibility.

    "This honourable and manly conduct on your part entitles you to
    a frank expression of my opinion on the subject.

    "I think it due to you to state that my concurrence in the step
    you have taken is founded in no small measure on my knowledge of
    the high motives that have guided you while in command of the
    Chinese force, _of the disinterested conduct you have observed
    in pecuniary questions_, and of _the influence in favour of
    humanity you exercised in rescuing Burgevine and his misguided
    associates from Soo-chow_. [2.]

    "I am aware of the perseverance with which, in the face of
    serious obstacles and much discouragement, you have steadily
    pursued the _pacification of the province of Kiang-soo_. _In
    relieving it_ from being the battle-field of the insurrection,
    and in restoring to its suffering inhabitants the enjoyment of
    their homes and the uninterrupted exercise of their industry,
    you may console yourself with the assurance that you are
    rendering a service to true humanity as well as to great
    material interest. [3.]

    "It would be a serious calamity and addition to our
    embarrassments in China were you compelled to leave your work
    incomplete, and were a sudden dissolution or dispersion of the
    Chinese force to lead to the recurrence of that state of danger
    and anxiety from which, during the last two years, Shanghae has
    suffered.

    "Her Majesty's Government cannot be expected to garrison
    Shanghae indefinitely, and tranquillity cannot be relied on
    until a civil administration suited to Chinese ideas and habits
    is firmly established in the province, and until the disorderly
    and brigand elements which form the force of the Taeping
    insurrection are either put down or so thoroughly repelled from
    its frontiers as to leave that unfortunate province in peace.

    "To the force under your command we must look for that result,
    and to its efficiency and discipline your presence is
    indispensable. In a body so composed a state of inactivity is
    full of danger, and I approve your not awaiting the result of
    the inquiry into the Futai's proceedings at Soo-chow, _provided
    you take care that your efforts in favour of humanity are not in
    future defeated by the Chinese authorities_.[74] [4.]

    "I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,
    "FREDERIC W. A. BRUCE.

    "Major Gordon, R.E., &c."

[1.] Now, here we have the _condition_ upon which Sir F. Bruce agreed to
Gordon's action. Let us see how the condition has been observed. If my
readers will take the trouble to turn back to the preceding chapter,
they will find that the capture of Hwa-soo and Wu-see (as corroborated
by the letter dated "April 28, 1864," from one of Gordon's own officers)
was followed with a complete violation of Sir F. Bruce's conditional
"acquiescence" by the wholesale massacre of the unfortunate Ti-pings.
Furthermore, the following chapter will prove that at every city
captured by Gordon and the Imperialists "the rules of warfare as
practised among foreign nations" were _not_ observed, nor even pretended
to be fulfilled according to the terms of the condition upon which
Gordon's action was approved: the principal cases referred to will be
found to be the capture of Kar-sing-foo, Hwa-soo, Chang-chow-foo, and
Nankin.

[2.] The preceding quotation from the _Hong-kong Daily Press_, and the
description of Burgevine's hegira in Chapter XXII., sadly differ from
Sir F. Bruce's "pecuniary" and "influence in favour of humanity"
theories formed at Pekin upon evidence supplied by Gordon himself.
Burgevine had actually _left_ Soo-chow before Gordon interfered.

[3.] Readers of this history will at once perceive the falseness of
these statements, Major Gordon having, in fact, not only _prevented_ the
"pacification of the province of Kiang-soo" by the Ti-pings, but _made_
it "the battle-field of insurrection" by his "steadily pursued"
_invasions_ of the otherwise peaceful and settled Ti-ping territories.
As for the hypocritical cant about "a service to true humanity," &c., I
need only refer to the narrative of the journey to Soo-chow by the
sub-editor of the _Friend of China_; the travels of the silk-merchant
through the _pacified_ country; the letters from two of Gordon's own
officers, &c.

[4 and 1.] Combining the first and last paragraphs selected from the
precious letter for review, we will briefly notice the facts proving in
what manner Gordon fulfilled the proviso of Sir F. Bruce--"I approve
your not awaiting the result of the inquiry into the Futai's
proceedings at Soo-chow, PROVIDED you take care that _your efforts in
favour of humanity_ are not in future defeated by the Chinese
authorities." In Chapter XXIII., the letter from one of Gordon's
officers contains the following statement relative to the capture of the
village of Hwa-soo, subsequent to the reconciliation between the
official Manchoo murderer and the British bravo, and also subsequent to
the establishment of the conditions by Sir F. Bruce's despatch:--"The
slaughter among the rebels _after_ the capture of Hwa-soo was terrible.
Upwards of 9,000 were _taken prisoners_, and of _these_ it was estimated
6,000 were killed or drowned, principally by the Imperialists." Now,
Gordon himself commanded on this occasion, but he did not "take care"
that "the rules of warfare as practised among foreign nations should be
observed." This distinct violation of the British Minister's conditional
sanction is alone sufficient to illustrate the fact that his _protege's_
conduct was contrary to his wish or intention, and, also, to withdraw
his stipulated justification. Moreover, we shall find that, at every
succeeding capture of a Ti-ping city the same barbarities were
perpetrated, and the same indifference to his superior's instructions
exhibited by Gordon, who stuck to his dear Imperialist friends with
extraordinary devotion and tenacity, considering their sanguinary deeds
and treacherous nature.

The _Shanghae Recorder_ (a paper supporting the policy of the British
Government in China, and their very good Manchoo allies), in its issue
of March 31, 1864, thus narrates the capture of Kar-sing-foo by the
Imperialist General Ching and Major Baily, one of Gordon's
subordinates:--"As we expected, the usual horrible and revolting cruelty
was exercised, after the _surrender_ of Kar-sing-foo, by Ching's troops.
On entering the city they encountered no resistance, when the
unfortunates (_all non-combatants_) found remaining were laden with
loot, obliged to carry it out to the Imperial lines, and forthwith
beheaded, as payment in full! Truly it is the cold-blooded butcheries
which disgrace the Imperialist cause, and deaden every feeling except
unmitigated disgust at their mode of warfare." The city had been
evacuated by the troops.

The _China Mail_ (describing the capture of the city of Chang-chow-foo)
by Gordon's Anglo-Manchoo force and an army of his Imperial friends, in
its issue of May 30, 1864, states:--"The two breaches were carried in a
rush, and quarter was given _to only a few hundred men_ who had offered
to surrender some weeks before." The families of the garrison and the
other inhabitants of this large city numbered many thousand; but all,
excepting the "few hundred men," were cruelly butchered in cold blood
during several days.

The _Times_, in its issue of September 28, 1864, in a leading article
upon the fall of Nankin, states:--"What the cost of human life has been
on this occasion we cannot yet calculate. It is plain that no mercy was
extended, and although the treacherous deeds at Soo-chow must have acted
as a warning to the European officers, the account of the European
eye-witnesses makes it evident that the carnage was very great."
According to my own private advices, the _Friend of China_ and other
journals, the Ti-ping capital was evacuated; therefore, the unfortunates
butchered by the Imperialists were, probably, the sick, wounded, and
poor inhabitants who were unable to fly, or had not sufficient
inducement to do so.

With regard to Gordon's "influence in favour of humanity," can any man
of ordinary mind understand these results as philanthropical: viz., the
slaughter of thousands in the field; the cold-blooded massacre of
thousands of helpless prisoners; and the death of even hundreds of
thousands by starvation; the destruction of Christianity and free
circulation of the Bible, as practised among the Ti-pings; and the
re-establishment of Buddhism? Those who ascribe philanthropical motives
to Gordon must entertain curious ideas as to the love of mankind, when
they illustrate it by ravaging Ti-pingdom with fire and sword!

Having now terminated the narrative of Gordon's reconciliation with the
Futai, the next chapter will describe the subsequent events.


FOOTNOTES:

[60] This Order in Council was passed on the 9th July, 1864. See "Copy
of all Ordinances relating to Neutrality in China," issued in return to
an address of the House of Commons, dated May 30, 1864. (Colonel Sykes'
motion.)

[61] Tien-chwangs, colonels of regiments.

[62] Italics are by the Author.

[63] This the Chung-wang proposed, if the Tien-wang would authorise such
policy. As for his having even thought of "giving up the cause," the
assertion is equally false and absurd, which subsequent events have
proved.

[64] Here we have Gordon's reasons for approving the treachery.

[65] It was a follower of the Nar-wang who first attacked the Mo-wang.

[66] It will be seen that Gordon here admits he was not an Imperialist
officer, but a _local_ Mandarin's.

[67] This sinister statement, when combined with the fact that Gordon
soon afterwards returned to companionship and active co-operation with
General Ching and the Futai, regardless of his responsibility for the
Soo-chow treachery and massacre, certainly affords some ground for the
belief that the whole tragedy was previously arranged; that Gordon
retired only while compelled to do so by the unanimous expression of
indignation among all Europeans (General Brown and other authorities
included); and that his future course he originally intended to follow
whenever the universal excitement became somewhat abated, and public
attention less directed towards himself. Whether this conclusion be
correct or otherwise, Major Gordon and his Manchoo friends alone can
say; but in either case the Englishman fully deserves the imputation.
His first conduct occasioned and made him _particeps_ in the treachery;
his last act condoned the atrocities at which he had pretended to be
disgusted.

[68] This statement is quite sufficient to make Gordon entirely
responsible for every circumstance connected with the surrender of
Soo-chow. He made all the assurances and guarantees, it appears, but
never troubled himself to insure their observance, although he had
complete power to do so.

[69] Here is another extraordinary admission; for, though Gordon's
honour was pledged to preserve the lives and property of the deceived
traitors, he very coolly took himself off to Quin-san, without making
the slightest exertion to save the unfortunate people who had trusted to
his word as a British officer. Subsequent to this event hundreds and
thousands of the betrayed garrison were cruelly put to death. Who is
responsible for the massacre--the Manchoos, who followed their natural
instincts and barbarous laws, or the British officer, who obtained the
surrender, guaranteed the terms, and then quietly permitted the
violation of his pledges?

[70] This concluding paragraph is simply a tissue of mendacity and
absurdity. Does the dishonoured officer intend to qualify the
treacherous destruction of _his_ prisoners, by introducing the totally
irrelevant opinion that they have no Government, or "real ideas" of
Christianity?

[71] See Inclosure 1 in No. 9, "Return to an Address of the Honourable
House of Commons," dated July 1, 1864:--for "Copies of Communications
which have passed between Sir F. Bruce and Colonel Gordon."

[72] See "Our Interests in China," by H. Lay, C.B., late
Inspector-General of Chinese Customs, pp. 37-41. This _expose_ of
British policy in China fully proves, together with Blue Book
information, that Gordon never held any commission from the Emperor of
China; that neither did he hold any commission from the local
authorities, but, by serving without, was in reality a "filibuster."

[73] It will be seen that Gordon's letter is dated from Soo-chow.

[74] Italics by the Author.




CHAPTER XXV.

    Operations Resumed.--Attack on Kin-tang.--The Battle of the
    Brickbats.--Ti-ping Success.--Active
    Operations.--Manoeuvring.--Hang-chow Invested.--Fall of
    Kar-sing-foo.--Gordon's Proceedings.--Chang-chow-foo.--Narrative
    of the Siege.--Fall of Chang-chow.--The Foo-wang.--Manchoo
    Cruelty.--Debate on the Chinese War.--Lord Palmerston's
    Policy.--Its Errors.--Mr. Cobden's Policy.--Mr. Layard.--His
    Inaccuracy.--Extracts from the Debate.--Result of Lord
    Palmerston's Policy.--Fall of Nankin.--"Imperialist"
    Account.--The Chung-wang's Capture.--Other Reports.--Digest of
    Events.--The Chung-wang.--His Position in Nankin.--Events in the
    City.--Newspaper Reports.--Doubts as to the Chung-wang's
    Fate.--The Retreat from Nankin.--Newspaper Extracts.--The
    Shi-wang's Proclamations.--Lee Shai-Yin's Address.


Late in the month of February, 1864, the Futai's _General_, Gordon,
resumed operations against the Ti-pings. Upon this occasion it appears
that he acted entirely on his own responsibility, neither under the
orders of his hitherto controller, General Brown (commanding H.B.
Majesty's forces at Shanghae), nor the Futai. Consequently, the campaign
to be noticed partook more strongly of filibustering than any of the
preceding raids already described.

The first movement the Anglo-Manchoo force made was directed against the
walled city of Yih-sing, on the western shore of the Ta-hoo Lake, and
about forty miles south-west of Wu-see. After a short engagement, the
usual result of such operations occurred. The garrison, unable to resist
the overwhelming artillery employed by Gordon, an arm newly replenished
from the British arsenal at Shanghae before taking the field, was
driven from the city with much loss; those who managed to escape
retreating to Li-yang, the nearest walled town. Soon, however, they were
followed up to this place, but the commandant having received orders to
retire to another city, it was evacuated upon the appearance of the
disciplined troops and their irresistible guns.

The appearance of the country lately wrested from the Ti-pings is given
as follows by one of Gordon's own officers (who was present during all
operations) in his notes, "How the Taepings were driven out of the
provinces of Kiang-nan and Che-kiang." Describing the march to Yih-sing,
he states:--

    "Some commissariat boats also went astray, causing the infantry
    a few days' hunger, as scarcely any food could be obtained, the
    country being all deserted and devastated. Seemingly it had not
    been cultivated easily _after the Taepings lost possession_.
    Hundreds of dead bodies were strewn along the roads, people who
    died from starvation; and even the few who were yet alive,
    watched one of their comrades dying, so as to obtain some food
    off his dead body."[75]

Sleep calmly and sweetly, ye China-rebel-subduing English politicians,
and speak authoritatively as to the benefit of your intervention in the
Chinese civil war, after reading this testimony from the hand of one of
your mercenary tools! Is there a man so ill-"liberal" as to consider
Lord Palmerston and colleagues are responsible for the results of their
policy of interference towards the outlandish Chinamen? What do the
starving Chinamen above mentioned say?

Their easy successes seem to have made the victorious enemy too
confident in their own prowess, and less cautious than heretofore.
Leaving a garrison at Li-yang, and also a considerable portion of his
artillery, Gordon next advanced upon Kin-tang, a small city to the
north-west. Elated by his former triumphs, and believing that his
appearance alone would cause the submission of all Ti-ping cities in the
district, and place their long-haired people under the barber's razor,
Gordon expected no resistance at Kin-tang, and was induced to think that
the place would open its gates to receive him as a sort of "conquering
hero" whenever he might choose to enter. It will be seen that he became
the victim of misplaced confidence.

Although, since my departure from China, and since the Ti-pings have
been driven far inland, all information has been received from Chinese
sources--false, exaggerated, and figurative--it seems pretty certain
that the Chung-wang, after parting with me at Wu-see, placed the Shi and
Foo Wangs in charge of the military position, while he proceeded to
Nankin in order to confer with his king, the Tien-wang. Chang-chow-foo
became the head-quarters of the Foo-wang, and it so happened that
Kin-tang was similarly occupied by the Shi-wang (a general second only
to the Commander-in-Chief in talent and capability), when Gordon arrived
before its walls. Both cities were situated on the southern road from
Nankin, and their retention was absolutely necessary to maintain either
the communications of the capital, or insure the retreat of the
garrison, should they be obliged to abandon their charge. In consequence
of this the Chung-wang divided about 10,000 of the best Ti-ping troops
between his two lieutenants for the express purpose of holding Kin-tang
and Chang-chow, while another force was organized to co-operate in the
field.

The two Wangs had concentrated all their strength at Chang-chow when
intelligence of Gordon's advance upon Kin-tang reached them. The
Shi-wang, with a division of several thousand men, by forced marches,
managed to throw himself into the city just before the enemy appeared.

When the Anglo-Manchoo contingent arrived under the walls on the 20th of
March, they summoned the place to surrender, but no reply was made, for
the battlements were silent and deserted, neither soldier nor spear,
nor sign of living occupation being visible. The gates were all fast
closed, and although Gordon had been looking forward to enter peaceably,
and when he had arrived could see neither trace of man nor prospect of
opposition, something there must have been ominous and suspicious in the
stillness reigning over the city, for he preferred battering the walls
down to knocking at the gates and demanding admission. The heavy guns
were moved up to within a few hundred yards; the boats, containing
supplies, followed them by the creeks; and batteries were soon thrown
up, still amidst the same profound and mysterious silence upon the part
of the garrison. During the bombardment all the noise was on one side;
nor flag, nor face, nor living thing could be observed about the
encompassed battlements. After several hours' constant firing, a large
and practicable breach was effected, and the 1st regiment of
Anglo-Chinese ordered to storm the silent ramparts. The enemy came
forward with a loud cheer, bearing with them bamboo bridges to throw
across the moat, while the stormers were closely supported by portions
of the 2nd and 5th regiments, who were allowed to enter the city ditch
in their boats and cross unopposed. The short space between the moat and
the foot of the breach was soon passed, and the storming column began to
ascend. At this moment the hitherto invisible garrison appeared and
broke their previous silence in a manner fatal to the assailants.
Manning every available position, they threw such incessant showers of
brickbats that the Imperialists, despite the gallant behaviour of their
foreign officers, were unable to advance. The Ti-pings then rushed into
the breach, and charging with their spears, drove them back in
confusion. Three times the enemy turned to renew the struggle, but on
each occasion were hurled back with loss, being quite unable to cope
with the Ti-ping soldiers in a hand-to-hand combat. The breach was now
played upon by the artillery, and the defenders driven back with great
loss of life from the canister, grape, and shell. Gordon then ordered
his Adjutant-General, Kirkham, to bring up fresh companies of the 2nd
and 5th regiments, and himself to lead them forward to a second assault.
Scarcely, however, had he given the order, when a jingall ball reached
him at his almost secure distance and wounded him in the leg. _Colonel_
Kirkham, with great bravery, led his men into the deadly breach, but
when half-way up, fell severely wounded. Still, with courage worthy of a
better cause, his men followed their officers only to be again charged
by the valiant garrison and completely routed after a desperate conflict
at close quarters. Again the murderous artillery swept away the
defenders of the breach, and _Major_ Brown, Gordon's _aide-de-camp_,
leading forward fresh columns, made a last desperate attempt to storm
the yawning chasm. Again the disciplined Chinese and their foreign
officers rushed upon the blood-stained ruins; but with dauntless and
undiminished courage the Ti-pings again met them--spear to bayonet and
firelock, and man to man. After a terrible struggle the assailants were
finally driven off, and retreated upon Li-yang, with _Major_ Brown and
all their commanding officers _hors-de-combat_. This action has been
called "the Battle of the Brickbats," such missiles being the principal
means of defence used by the garrison.

The attack upon Kin-tang was the most severely contested action that the
Anglo-Manchoo troops had ever fought. Their defeat is to be attributed
to the fact that they were not assisted by an overwhelming park of
artillery, which usually did all the fighting. If the Imperialists had
not been supplied with British guns, men, and munitions of war, _ad
libitum_, the Ti-pings would have been quite able to manage the
disciplined legions. Gordon, in this assault, lost fourteen European
officers and nearly one-seventh of the men engaged. The destruction
amongst the defenders of Kin-tang must have been equally severe, not
less than 600 having fallen.

At this period the Ti-pings seem to have made a desperate effort to
defeat the overwhelming numbers of the enemy encircling them on every
quarter. At Nankin, Chang-chow-foo, and Kin-tang they managed to defeat
the Imperialist forces almost on the same day at each place. The
garrison of the capital having sallied forth in strength, defeated a
portion of the great beleaguering army under Tseng-kwo-fan (Imperialist
Commissioner and Governor-General of the two Kiang provinces) with much
slaughter. Upon reaching Li-yang, after narrowly escaping being
surrounded by the troops pursuing from Kin-tang, Gordon received
intelligence the same evening that the garrison of Chang-chow had
sallied out, completely routing the large investing force commanded by
the Futai's brother, and following up the success by moving between
Soo-chow and Shanghae, thereby threatening not only to recapture all the
country lately wrested from Ti-ping rule, but isolate his division and
more than counteract its operations by a powerful diversion upon
Shanghae or Soo-chow.

Leaving a strong detachment to garrison Li-yang, Gordon at once
proceeded with the remainder of his force, and all the artillery, to
operate against the Ti-pings from Chang-chow. On the 29th of March he
came upon them at Hwa-soo, in the neighbourhood of the city of Chang-zu,
about 35 miles north-east of Soo-chow. On the morning of the 30th,
finding that the Ti-pings did not number more than 3,000, he ordered
about 1,500 infantry to attack them, while he followed in the boats with
the artillery, to give assistance if required. Again, as at Kin-tang,
the Royal Engineer was completely out-generalled. The Foo and Shi Wangs
were both consummate strategists, and at irregular warfare, when
artillery was not employed against them, would easily have foiled Major
Gordon.

The Ti-pings continually gave way as the disciplined troops advanced;
but they were manoeuvred so as to draw their pursuers into a position
from which for a time they were themselves invisible, while a masked
breast-work, ingeniously stretched across the end of the slight hollow,
helped to conceal them. Barely had the retreating forces disappeared
behind their slight intrenchment and the inequalities of the ground,
when they were doubled back upon each flank so as to almost completely
envelop the enemy. The Ti-pings were allowed to execute their manoeuvre
thus easily through the incautious advance of their antagonists, for the
latter halted in the very hollow to which they had been enticed,
directly they lost sight of those whom they were pursuing. When next the
Imperialists saw their opponents, it was in the form of a serried line,
surrounding them upon every side except a small space in their rear, and
charging them on front and both flanks. After a feeble resistance,
during which they lost seven English officers and more than 200 men, the
ranks of Gordon's force were broken, and the whole mercenary contingent
fled from the field with precipitation.

According to the published accounts of this engagement, the Ti-pings
were commanded by the Foo-wang, "numbered about 3,000," and were "badly
armed." It will thus be seen that, without artillery being brought to
bear against them, they were quite able to cope hand to hand with the
disciplined troops, officered by foreigners and well armed with musket
and bayonet as the latter were, although poorly equipped with a small
supply of jingalls, a few bad European firearms, and a majority of
bamboo spears.

During the spring of the year 1864, the Ti-pings struggled with
desperate bravery against the odds opposed to them; and for some time it
seemed very doubtful whether they would succeed or not. While Gordon and
the Imperialist troops were being defeated in the northern districts of
the Ti-ping territory, the Franco-Manchoo contingent and co-operating
forces were meeting a similar fate in the south. Late in February the
Imperialists besieging Hang-chow, the provincial capital of Che-kiang,
were totally defeated by a sortie of the whole garrison. About the same
time another large army was routed by a Ti-ping force in the
neighbourhood of Fo-yang, a city not far from Hang-chow. Having
recovered from their former repulse and obtained fresh supplies of
British mercenaries and munitions of war, the Mandarins again proceeded
to invest the provincial capital. On the 2nd of March the
Franco-Chinese, commanded by _Generals_ D'Aiguebelle and Schodelana,
attacked the above city, and after several hours' hard fighting,
succeeded in capturing three forts on the south side; only, however, to
be driven out by a desperate charge the Ti-pings made during the
afternoon, with a loss of fourteen Europeans and more than a hundred
men. On the 29th of the same month, the besiegers recommenced active
operations. Supported by a strong body of Imperialists, the
Franco-Chinese attacked and carried the outworks of the city a second
time, the garrisons retiring within the walls after some hard fighting.
The next day fire was opened upon the city from numerous siege
artillery, and a practicable breach was soon effected. Again the
Franco-Chinese, or more correctly speaking, Manchoos, led the assault,
but met with such gallant resistance that they were driven back to their
supports in confusion. Twice they bravely rallied, and twice they
endeavoured to storm the breach, rendered impregnable by the brave
hearts and ready hands defending it, and each time they were repulsed
with great slaughter. At the close of the day the assault was given up,
after a heavy loss of life, and a vast expenditure of British shot and
shell without other result.

Although Hang-chow could not be wrested from the Ti-pings by force of
arms, a few days later it fell from external influences, having been
rendered untenable through the capture of Kar-sing-foo by the enemy,
whereby its supplies and lines of communication were cut off.

About the same time that Gordon commenced his raid upon Yih-sing,
Li-yang, and Kin-tang, Manchoo General Ching proceeded with a large army
and an auxiliary force composed of detachments from the English
contingent, to beleaguer the city of Kar-sing-foo, situated about midway
between Soo-chow and Hang-chow, on the Grand Canal. Ching was the
bravest native general engaged against the Ti-pings; he was a renegade
from their cause, and we all know that such people make the most bitter
enemies. He had already been defeated before the city, shortly after I
had left it on my last return to Shanghae. Gordon's subordinate,
_Colonel_ Bailey, had charge of the large siege train accompanying the
army, and in a few hours after establishing his batteries, managed to
effectively breach the walls of the doomed city. On rushed Ching's men
and their allies, but their efforts were useless, for every assault
failed; and Ching himself received a wound which, more than a month
later, proved mortal. Some few days subsequent to this repulse, large
reinforcements were received by the enemy, fresh breaches were made, and
the small but devoted garrison was compelled to evacuate the place at
night, having lost their gallant commander, Yoong-wang, and nearly
two-thirds of their number. When the Imperialists at last entered, they
put to the sword all the unfortunate non-combatants who had not fled the
city,[76] sparing neither man, woman, nor child, during their cruel
butchery of the unoffending inhabitants. Does Colonel Gordon, R.E., call
this "observing the rules of warfare as practised among foreign
nations," according to the proviso of Sir F. Bruce? Does Sir F. Bruce,
after the massacres at Wu-see, Kar-sing, &c., still term Gordon's
conduct "a service in favour of humanity"?

After the loss of Kar-sing, Hang-chow was also evacuated, and the two
garrisons retreated to the large city of Hoo-chow-foo. The fortune of
war now set strongly against the Christian patriots. With a few
memorable exceptions, they were everywhere defeated, through the British
influence so cruelly brought to bear against them, for which they were
always unprepared, and equally unable to resist.

Having retired to Quin-san (the head-quarters of the Anglo-Manchoo
contingent), after his defeat at Hwa-soo, Gordon was shortly joined by
an Imperialist army of 15,000 men. A body of troops, commanded by
officers of H.B. Majesty's 67th regiment, was also moved from Shanghae
to support them. The Imperialists and the whole disciplined force,
together with the latter's large park of artillery, now took the field
again and moved upon the Foo-wang's position. The Ti-pings were still
lightly intrenched at the village of Hwa-soo; they had been strongly
reinforced by the Shi-wang, but were considerably hampered by a large
number of country people who had fled from the enemy.

On the 11th of April the Imperialists commenced their attack, but,
warned by former defeats, they entirely depended upon their artillery,
to which the Ti-pings had not a single gun to reply with. The
over-matched defenders were at last shelled out of their open
breast-works with great slaughter, and being outflanked by the
disciplined and undisciplined enemy, were much cut up during their
retreat, while a great number were made prisoners and savagely put to
death, as described in Chapter XXIII. by the letter of an officer
present, under the eyes of _General_ Gordon. The loss of the Ti-pings on
this occasion was very heavy. Although the Shi and Foo Wangs succeeded
in cutting their way through the enemy with their best troops, at least
8,000 unfortunates, principally country people, were killed.

Following up his success, Gordon pursued the retreating force to
Chang-chow-foo. Meanwhile troops were being concentrated upon the same
point from every quarter, so that within a few days the city was
surrounded by an immense Imperialist army, which was estimated to exceed
100,000 men. The Shi-wang having proceeded to Kin-tang, the garrison
commanded by the Foo-wang cannot have consisted of more than 7,000 to
8,000 effective soldiers, but at least 10,000 civilians, including all
persons of any standing in the Chang-chow district, and who were Ti-ping
subjects, or held civil office under the Tien-wang's Government, had
sought refuge within the city walls, carrying with them their movable
property and their families, whereby the number of non-combatants was
more than doubled.

Three times already had the Imperialists been completely routed before
the city, and the siege raised by the gallant resistance of the
garrison, although on two occasions the enemy were assisted by
detachments of foreign artillery and disciplined troops. After much hard
fighting the defenders were driven from all their outworks and strictly
confined to the city walls, when the besiegers at once proceeded to
effect several breaches. The following account of the subsequent efforts
of Gordon and the Futai to storm the place is partly transcribed from
the narrative of an officer engaged, and which was published in the
_Shanghae Recorder_ of May 2, 1864.

The Ti-pings having been driven from all their stockades and
intrenchments to the west of the city, and these being occupied by a
strong force of Imperial troops, Gordon moved round opposite the
south-east angle, and commenced forming his siege batteries, while the
Imperialists placed their guns on his left, facing the south of the
city. A combined attack was arranged for the 27th of April, but as the
Imperialist batteries were ready on the 24th, and the troops who had so
often been defeated were eager to storm, and averse to relinquish their
hope of taking the city, the Futai gave orders to open fire, and by
three o'clock in the afternoon a capital breach was effected. The
advance was sounded and the stormers pushed on steadily to the city
ditch, but were there thrown into confusion by some defect in the
bridges. At last, however, they scrambled across, and advancing through
the stakes got to the foot of the breach, where they maintained
themselves for a considerable time; but the defenders, notwithstanding a
most destructive covering fire from the Imperialist guns and from a
battery of Gordon's enfilading the _terre plein_, manned the breach and
wall with great courage, regardless of life, and compelled the
assailants to fall back with heavy loss. This ended the first day's
assault.

Gordon's guns having been put in position during the night, and a
pontoon bridge laid down over the city ditch (the garrison was too weak
to prevent the same by a sortie, and had not a single cannon to oppose
its construction), at daybreak he opened fire, while the Imperialists'
batteries did the same to knock away the barricades thrown up in their
breach. Bang, bang, went the heavy guns, as quickly followed by the boom
of bursting shell tearing up ponderous masses of the wall, and burying
beneath them many of the defenders, while the smaller guns laid along
the parapet right and left operated with deadly effect wherever the
garrison appeared, or opened fire with their jingalls or musketry. By
half-past twelve o'clock the new breach was rendered practicable, and
the signal was given to the Imperialists to storm at the old one. On
rushed the 4th Regiment of Anglo-Manchoo mercenaries, bravely led by
_Colonel_ Howard, and forward came the Ti-pings to the breach,
determined and daring, to be mowed down in heaps by the terrible
covering fire of the artillery; but no sooner down than their place was
filled by their followers rushing with unabated courage to the defence.
In the words of the officer whose narrative we are making contribute to
this history:--The edge of the city ditch was gained, and over went the
4th Regiment's colours, accompanied by Colonel Howard, Captain Cane
(R.A.), and Lieutenant Stackpole, and up the breach through a shower of
missiles and fire-balls. Then came that deadly pause, the colours waving
on the breach, defended by a few brave men. The defenders and assailants
hesitated. They stood at bay for a moment. The "celestial" nature shrank
from the dread conflict hand to hand. The officers attempted to break
the spell: they pushed their men, they pulled them, they beat them with
their swords, but in vain. The Ti-pings, fighting for life, sooner
recovered their presence of mind, and every man discharged his missile
on the heads of the assailants. The colours and their defenders were
pushed off the wall down the breach, and had to retire over the bridge
on their column. A murderous fire was poured from every loop-hole, men
were falling fast, yet the attacking force stood its ground, but
hesitated to advance to where it would have been comparatively safe,
being too low for the aim of the besieged. The retire was now sounded,
and the stormers fell back to cover.

The Ti-pings suffered terribly from the superior arms of their
assailants, and now that they had succeeded in repulsing them a second
time, they were swept from the shattered walls by the artillery, which
still continued to fire on them. At half-past two o'clock in the
afternoon the enemy were ready at both points of attack for a
simultaneous movement. Up went their signal rockets, a yell burst from
the ranks of Gordon's force, which was taken up and carried along the
Imperialist lines, and on came both storming parties at a rapid pace.
The 3rd Regiment of the English contingent now made the assault, and
their colours were borne up the breach by Captain Winstanley (H.M.'s
67th Regiment), and other officers rallying around them and fighting
hand to hand with the defenders. The Imperialists crossed their bridges,
crowded at the foot of the other breach, and waved their flags about,
but hesitated to mount it. With their bamboo spears, and undiminished
courage, the brave garrison rushed to meet their well-armed enemy,
while all who possessed firearms plied them diligently from the walls,
and others kept up an incessant volley of brickbats from the heaps piled
ready for use around the rampart, and which formed a principal means of
defence. Still Gordon's troops maintained their position on the walls,
and, if possible, began to increase the extent of their lodgment, whilst
the Ti-pings were falling fast from the musketry of the enemy, which
they had but small means to answer. At this critical moment the Foo-wang
headed a last desperate charge in person. Leading forward all his
unwounded men, this gallant chief inspired them with fresh ardour, while
the efforts of the assailants began to flag. As one present stated: The
contest every moment became more close, and was prolonged for at least
twenty minutes. At length the stormers were driven from the ground they
had gained, and hurled to the bottom of the breach. Several times they
struggled to mount again, but every attempt was futile. The rear ranks
of the enemy being under the fire from the wall, lost heavily in killed
and wounded, while the front ranks, so desperately opposed, could not
advance. The order to retire was now given, and the assaulting forces
were withdrawn to cover, while their artillery again swept the breach
with canister, shell, and grape, inflicting fearful havoc among the
dauntless garrison of Chang-chow. During all this time the Imperialists
had hurried on column after column to assault by their own breach, but
none were able to effect a lodgment within the well-defended walls of
the city. Every attack was repulsed with great slaughter upon both
sides, and at last the bravest of the late General Ching's--he had died
from the effects of a wound in the head received at Kar-sing--Mandarins
advanced with his men, but though he passed the sticking point and got
his colours partly into the breach, yet he too was brought to a stand
and obliged to retire. The assault was now abandoned, and the besiegers
carried off their killed and wounded, including 27 European officers,
400 of the English contingent, and about 1,500 Imperialists.

Although the Ti-pings were victorious, and had succeeded in defeating
every attack upon the city, their triumph was only purchased by an awful
sacrifice of life. When the stormers mounted the wall a fearful sight
was before them. "Far as the eye could see, heaps upon heaps lay dead
and mangled." During the different assaults at least one half the
garrison were placed _hors-de-combat_, principally by the murderous fire
of the enemy's artillery, which they were totally unable to countervail,
having none to reply with. Chang-chow being completely surrounded by the
vast Imperialist army, its fall, either by famine or the sword, was
certain.

Having established fresh batteries at a different part of the city, on
the 11th of May the enemy succeeded in capturing it. Upon this occasion
two immense breaches were made, while the incessant artillery fire, and
the overwhelming rush of the enormously superior assailing force over
the wide-spread ruins of the wall, quickly overpowered the last gallant
resistance offered by the remnant of the garrison. A comparison of the
casualties of the English contingent at each attack affords the best
proof that the terrible results of the first had almost exterminated the
defenders. At the first attack the contingent lost 27 officers and 400
men; at the second, only 2 killed and 5 wounded! When the Imperialists
poured through the two fresh breaches, the best and bravest of the
remaining Ti-ping soldiers sacrificed themselves in the futile effort to
repulse them, while their comrades, although fighting desperately to the
last, were driven from the walls, and then through the streets of the
city, still disputing the ground step by step. At last the few survivors
were brought to bay in the commandant's palace. Throughout all the
fighting the brave Foo-wang had been foremost in leading and encouraging
his troops, and now, still unwounded, with several officers and a score
or two of men, he made a last desperate stand in his own house. One by
one his few followers--unable to conquer, but determined to die with
their faces to the foe and their hands raised to the last in defence of
their noble cause--fell around him, and then for a moment he fought
alone against a host of assailants. Still he was not killed, for a price
was fixed upon his capture alive. At length this dauntless chief, whose
acquaintance I have valued, and whose elegist I am proud though grieved
to have become, was overpowered by numbers and beaten to the ground,
though not until many an enemy had fallen under his heavy sword. Even
when disarmed and helpless in the grasp of the foe, he still struggled
against a fate that would never have befallen him but for the
unexpected, irresistible, and unrighteous military interference of
England. One report of the capture of Chang-chow (_China Mail_, May 30)
states:--"The chief (Foo-wang) of those who were in command of the city,
fought in his palace to the last, and required ten men to bind his hands
and secure him; and, when brought into the presence of the Futai,
refused submission or to pay any respect to him, saying, 'Ah! were it
not for the aid of the disciplined troops (under Gordon) he defied all
the Futai's hosts to take the city from him.'" If the British army,
arsenals, and navy had been thrown open to supply the young and vigorous
revolution, instead of _wasting_ their help upon the corrupt and
hopeless Manchoo, how great would the success and future results have
been! With all the British assistance the Imperialists have barely been
able to drive the Ti-pings from their cities and possessions in the
provinces of Che-kiang and Kiang-nan, much less to suppress the great
Christian and patriotic movement, or insure its final extinguishment.

The Foo-wang was cruelly put to death by his merciless captors. "The two
breaches were carried in a rush, and quarter was given _to only a few
hundred men_;" so says the report above quoted from. How many days the
triumphant Mandarins were engaged butchering the unfortunate inhabitants
does not transpire; but, with the exception of the small number
mentioned, the whole 12,000, besides the garrison, with their families,
were massacred. Two years' provisions were found in the city, and this
being stored in the Ti-ping granaries, was the entire produce of the
district, and was the sole means destined to support the people during
the ensuing season. The whole supply was seized by the Imperialists; and
though previous to their success much misery had been caused by the
general effect of the war, after their capture of the departmental city
the entire department was starved; such being the usual result of
Manchoo re-establishment in any locality, and particularly so at
Chang-chow-foo, as proved by the letter of the first English-contingent
officer in Chapter XXIII.

We have now noticed four authenticated instances (the captures of
Wu-see, Kar-sing-foo, Hwa-soo, and Chang-chow-foo), subsequent to
Gordon's return to service, when the conditions upon which Sir F. Bruce
gave his approval to that officer's action were violated by the
wholesale massacre of the vanquished and prisoners. We may, therefore,
while expressing boundless disgust at Colonel Gordon's persistent
continuance in the Futai's service after each and every one of these
atrocities, fairly presume that the astounding assertion as to his
influence in favour of humanity--in spite of the eulogy by Mr.
Montgomery Martin at a late "China dinner" in London, wherein he stated
that the officer in question had done more _for_ the "civil cause" in
China than all the bishops, merchants, and military put together--is not
only negatived, but quite reversed.

Soon after the capture of Chang-chow-foo, Colonel Gordon was compelled
to withdraw from active military operations by the Order in Council,
prohibiting further aid to the Manchoo. He managed, however, to continue
acting contrary to the ordinance, by organizing camps of instruction
and proceeding to Nankin in person, there to advise the besieging forces
commanded by Tseng-kwo-fan.

About the time the events noticed in this chapter were taking place in
China, in England the energetic opposition of such men as Lord Naas,
Colonel Sykes, Hon. Mr. Liddell, Mr. White, Messrs. Bright, Cobden, &c.,
from their places in the House of Commons, drew attention to the
subject, and will ever stand as a memorable protest against the criminal
policy of the Government.

During the second debate of the session on "British relations with
China" (May 20, 1864), Mr. Baxter, M.P., very happily termed the policy
of the Government "not a comedy of errors, but a tragedy of errors."
Lord Palmerston, in this case, defended his policy by a very
extraordinary argument, which it is singular that his opponents did not
use to his confusion. Coming out as the advocate of intervention in
foreign affairs, he stated, as a justification of his war against the
Ti-pings:--

    "We have interfered in other countries, and with great benefit
    to those countries.... We interfered in the case of Greece, and
    established the independence of the Greek state. We interfered
    in the affairs of Belgium, and established it as an independent
    state. We interfered in the case of Portugal, and enabled the
    people of that country to obtain a free and parliamentary
    constitution. (Hear, hear.) We interfered in the affairs of
    Spain with equal success, and a similar result.... We interfered
    in a great measure in those events which led to the Crimean
    war.... We interfered in the affairs of China; and why? Because
    our treaty rights _were_ endangered, and our national interests
    _were_ at stake."

Now, the noble Premier here cites a number of precedent cases;
unfortunately, however, for his argument and acumen, on each occasion
referred to, England, as worthily became her, interfered in the cause of
an oppressed people; whereas, in the present case, he had been the
active originator of an intervention diametrically the very opposite--a
military interference _against_ the oppressed natives of China, who were
striving to liberate _and Christianize_ their unfortunate country. If
Lord Palmerston had interfered in the spirit of the cases which came so
glibly to his voluble tongue, he would have interfered to support the
Ti-pings--not to slaughter them.

After striving to justify his policy by precedents which should have
entirely reversed it, Lord Palmerston was equally unhappy in his faulty
explanation of the reasons "why" he interfered in China. As the Hon. Mr.
Liddell, M.P., well said in his speech after the Premier, "The noble
Viscount said that the Government interfered because the treaty rights
were in danger. He wanted to know in what single instance had our treaty
rights or our trade been in danger? He had asked that question before,
and he now repeated it. (Hear, hear.) He wished to know any instance in
which either the property or the life of a British subject had been
placed in danger?"

Every member of the British Parliament, who questioned the China policy
of the Government, has asked the same question. It has never been
answered, because there is really not a single fact on which to base an
answer. Colonel Sykes, M.P., has frequently defied and challenged the
Government to cite one act ever committed by the Ti-pings prejudicial to
British interests, and they have been quite unable to do so; for none
are upon record.

Those who have been interested enough to wade through the compiled
portion of this work will, no doubt, at once perceive the truthlessness
of Lord Palmerston's charge against the Ti-pings, viz., that they
endangered the treaty rights and national interests of England. No
particle of truth mingles with the unfounded charge; no tittle of proof
has ever been produced to justify the undeclared hostilities perpetrated
against a friendly people which were consequent on it.

Besides this, the venerable Premier was no less unfortunate with each
proposition he chose to base his arguments upon. To prove the cruelty
of the Ti-pings, he stated:--

    "A steamer, called the _Firefly_, was carried off, and four or
    five men, who were upon the vessel, were roasted to death.

    "Colonel Sykes.--'By whom?'

    "Lord Palmerston.--'The Taepings.'

    "Colonel Sykes.-'No, no!'"

Now, by the above extract from the _Standard's_ report of the debate, we
find that the Prime Minister's vivid imagination positively roasted the
men whose fate has never yet been ascertained even in China. They are
referred to in Chapter XXIV. of this work, but whether they are living
or dead, and, if dead, how they were killed, are questions which have
never yet been satisfactorily answered; and, from the mystery in which
the fate of the unfortunate men is involved, probably never will be.

Again, in a feeble effort to vaunt the duration and existence of the
Manchoo dynasty, and, consequently, to make it appear that the Ti-pings
were not striving to expel a foreign rule of comparatively modern
establishment (which has never been entirely acknowledged nor submitted
to, which has always been rebelled against, and which is still foreign
to and hated by the Chinese), but, on the contrary, were simply rebels
against an ancient and legitimate throne, Lord Palmerston made another
very singular and important _mistake_. He tried to be satirical in
commenting upon the excellent speech made by Mr. Baxter, M.P., who
brought on the debate, by stating:--

    "My hon. friend says he has studied the Blue Books, but I
    apprehend that he has not equally studied the history of China.
    He talks of the Imperial dynasty as having been recently
    established over a conquered country; and, if I am not
    misinformed, I think it has existed for nearly 500 years."

Well, the noble Premier was misinformed, and very much so, too. The
Manchoo Tartars invaded China A.D. 1644; they had not established
themselves as its masters before the year 1683. It was, doubtless, very
funny and gratifying to chaff a troublesome member out of countenance,
but still there must be some people who expect the Chief Minister of the
British Government to be pretty accurate in the statements he makes from
his place in the House of Parliament.

We will now notice a few incidents of the next, and last, debate on
China; when the late Mr. Cobden, on the evening of May 31, 1864, rose to
move in the House of Commons:--

    "That, in the opinion of this House, the policy of
    non-intervention, by force of arms, in the internal political
    affairs of foreign countries, which we profess to observe in our
    relations with the states of Europe and America, should be
    observed in our intercourse with the Empire of China."

Mr. Cobden, after making a truly magnificent and exhaustive speech, was
replied to by Mr. Layard, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs. Out of the many distinguished Members who followed, only one,
Mr. Gregson, supported the policy of the Government; and he, by faintest
praise and three minutes' unmeaning talk, proved but a poor champion, if
he did not make a worse case for his superiors.

At the termination of the debate, Mr. Cobden withdrew his motion because
Lord Palmerston distinctly avowed the failure and abandonment of his
policy of intervention in China, and declared his intention to preserve
an entirely neutral, defensive attitude in future.

The faithlessness and falsehood induced by the evil course adopted by
the British Government in persistently endeavouring to carry out Lord
Palmerston's pertinacious, crotchety, unrighteous policy to force
British trade upon China (which involved the necessity of crushing the
Imperial power, and then that of the Ti-ping revolution which would have
succeeded it, so that, in fact, the British Government could dictate its
whims without fear of refusal or opposition) were singularly
exemplified during the debate referred to.

We have seen that in the preceding debate Lord Palmerston plainly and
frankly declared:--

    "We interfered in the affairs of China; and why?"

Now, Mr. Layard, when replying to Mr. Cobden's speech, stated:--

    "Her Majesty's Government had been accused of supporting the
    Chinese" (Manchoo) "government against the Taipings. [Cries of
    hear, hear!] _He had pointed out that such was not the
    case._"--He then qualified this sentence by saying,--"Beyond our
    preventing the Taepings entering the treaty ports FOR THE
    PURPOSE OF DESTROYING THEM, a course which we were compelled to
    take."

First, Mr. Layard denies the interference declared by Lord Palmerston,
and then he admits it, attempting to justify the policy by the sweeping
assertion in capitals. Now, if the ministers were "compelled" to prevent
the Ti-pings entering the treaty ports, how is it that they were allowed
to capture and occupy the treaty port of Ningpo? And now, to impugn Mr.
Layard's veracity, if the Ti-pings endeavoured to enter the treaty ports
"FOR THE PURPOSE OF DESTROYING THEM," how is it that they held the city
of Ningpo for many months and did not destroy the least particle of
property within its walls?

Mr. Layard's fault is a common one, only in an uncommon position. He
knew that the policy of the Government was wrong, he knew that he was
wrong himself, and besides occupying the pugnacious position of buffer
or breakwater to the Foreign Office, he did not like to admit it. Poor
Mr. Layard's situation must be an unpleasant one sometimes. He has
unpleasant work to do. Undoubtedly he has an irritable temper and a
sharp tongue, but it is rather unfortunate that he has a bad memory.
After stating that her Majesty's Government had not been interfering,
"such was not the case," beyond preventing the destruction of the
treaty ports, and affirming, "the hon. gentleman the member for Montrose
(Mr. Baxter), the other evening, after condemning the policy of the
Government, concluded by expressing a wish, that the Government would
continue to defend the treaty ports and protect British interests in
China. _That was what the Government had been doing all along._" After
thus expressing himself, Mr. Layard declared, "His hon. friend had
really condemned a state of things in China _which no longer existed_."
That is to say, Mr. Layard firstly stated that the hostilities waged
against the Ti-pings were only to protect British interests; in fact,
simply a defensive policy; and, secondly, he stated that such policy "no
longer existed." Therefore, the natural deduction is that the British
Government ceased to protect British interests at the treaty ports;
such, however, was not and is not the case. The change that took place
was the abandonment of the policy "of supporting the Chinese (Manchoo)
Government against the Taepings," and the cessation of further
aggressive military and naval operations against them. This was
satisfactorily proved by the Premier's speech, who sadly contradicted
his subordinate's defensive theory, as the following extracts from it
will show:--

    "Now, it is almost unnecessary, I think, for them" (the members
    who had spoken against his policy) "to have expressed their
    opinion with regard to the expedition of Captain Osborn, and the
    employment of Major Gordon and others, because we have stated on
    former occasions that those Orders in Council under which those
    officers _were employed_" (by the Manchoo Government; how about
    Mr. Layard's "such was not the case"?) "have been revoked....
    Therefore that policy is at an end." (Now the following is a
    plain avowal of what Mr. Cobden brought his motion against.) "I
    think that we were perfectly justified in the steps we took,
    because it is evident that the more we can contribute to the
    _internal classification_ of China, the more the trade, which
    everybody agrees is the main and principal object of our going
    to China, the more that trade would flourish....

    "If, by allowing a British subject _to enter into the service of
    the Emperor_ _of China_,[77] we have been the means of
    strengthening the hands of the Chinese Government, and enabling
    them to put down in any degree or diminish the scope of that
    rebellion, I say we should have been rendering not only a
    service to China, but promoting those objects to which alone our
    intercourse with China ought to be confined.[78] THOSE MEASURES
    HAVE FAILED, and I am sorry for it."

After this expression of opinion it is by no means surprising to find
the Premier declaring a little further on, in the same speech: "I say it
is the duty of this country to endeavour by _all the means_ in her power
to extend her commerce." Under _these_ circumstances it is not difficult
to account for the intervention in China, and while Englishmen, who have
any respect for the principles of right and justice, may regret their
late lamented statesman did not say, "by all the" righteous or
legitimate "means in her power," they cannot fail to feel gratified that
"those measures have failed," even though the originator of the
measures, their late popular and jaunty minister, was "sorry for it."

Those measures have failed! it is true. They have failed miserably; they
have failed to work good, but not to do harm. England has derived no
benefit from them, China has received much evil. The schemes to
Anglicise the Chinese army, navy, and civil service have failed; the
efforts to extinguish rebellion against the Manchoo allies of the
British Government (after the last war had rendered them quite powerless
and docile _for the time being_) have likewise signally failed, for
rebellion is more rife than ever: but "those measures" have been
famously successful in causing an enormous sacrifice of life, in
injuring the cause of Christianity and civilization, and obstructing its
progress in China for the present.

The failure of Lord Palmerston's policy came all too late for
rectifying the evil already perpetrated. Within two months of his public
announcement that the measures of his administration had failed, Nankin,
the capital and the political strength of the Ti-pings, fell into the
hands of the Imperialists. Assisted, as we have described, by the
powerful, though underhanded, British alliance, the Manchoo forces were
enabled to capture or isolate every city beyond the capital. When
Chang-chow-foo was taken by the Englishman Gordon, the neighbouring
cities of Tan-yang, Kin-tang, &c., became untenable, and were
consequently evacuated by their garrisons. Under command of
Le-shih-seen, the Shi-wang (the Chung-wang's cousin, sometimes
figuratively referred to as his "brother"), were also the troops from
Hang-chow (capital of Che-kiang), Kar-sing-foo, Yih-shing, Li-yang, and
many smaller places. Between these forces and Nankin the vast army
commanded by the Imperialist Le-Futai now intervened, but their
communication with the great city of Hoo-chow-foo, at the south of the
Ta-hoo lake, and strongly garrisoned by several wangs, was still intact.

Unable to advance against the superior forces of the enemy, much less to
reach Nankin and endeavour to rescue it from the besieging army of
Imperialists under Tseng-kwo-fan, at least 80,000 to 100,000 strong, the
Shi-wang commenced what seems to have been a preconcerted retreat to the
south. This occurred during the month of June.

Shortly afterwards, on the 19th of July, 1864, Nankin reverted to
Manchoo authority. Thus the city which had been the capital of the great
Ti-ping revolution and the head-quarters of its Government during more
than eleven years, and which throughout that period had defied the
strongest efforts of the rulers of the greatest and most populous empire
in the world, succumbed at last through the unjustifiable hostilities
and crotchety, bullying, meddlesomeness of the British Government or
some of its members.

Again, soon after this overwhelming disaster, the Ti-ping forces at
Hoo-chow-foo, after soundly beating their immediate adversaries,
evacuated that city, and followed in the rear of the Shi-wang's army, if
they did not join it during the nearly simultaneous retrograde movement.
During the months of May, June, July, and August, 1864, the remnants of
Ti-pingdom continued retreating to the southern provinces.

We must now consider for a moment the loss of Nankin. Of the two other
events--the retreat of the Shi-wang's army and the retreat from
Hoo-chow--it is needless to say much, as these fugitives are well known
to be safe, and at present advantageously disputing the enemy in the
south of China.

The only records of the fall of the Ti-ping capital are those of
Imperialist origin, and the lying proclivities of the whole body of
Manchoo officials are too well known to need comment.

The following particulars are condensed from the Mandarin reports; they
cannot be depended upon except to a very limited extent, and are,
therefore, succeeded by a version I have deduced from almost every
source of European information in China, comprising the Shanghae and
Hong-kong press, and intelligence gathered for me by friends on the
spot. Besides this, I have carefully traced the progress of events since
the fall of Nankin till the present moment, and have found my former
experience of much value in disentangling contradictory and confused
statements.

The Imperialist accounts of the capture of Nankin are to the following
effect:--

On the 17th of August news reached the besieging army that the Tien-wang
had committed suicide by swallowing gold-leaf. The Imperialists now
pushed on their works more rapidly than before, and on the 19th of the
same month, having run an enormous mine under the north-east gate, they
fired it, and completely destroyed a portion of the wall, about one
hundred and twenty feet in length. It is also reported that 68,000
pounds of powder were used in the explosion.

The Imperialists stated that they lost 5,000 killed and wounded in the
breach, but, as the _North China Market Report_ observed, "for this
assertion there is not the slightest foundation, as on the day following
the assault there remained no trace of a struggle." In similar style
they declared that their losses while storming the Tien-wang's palace
were immense, but, as the European journals say, "This assertion is in
like manner utterly false. The gate must have been forced with little or
no difficulty, or quietly given up, and the very citadel of Taepingdom
was in the hands of the enemy."

Now, after having poisoned the Ti-ping king with gold-leaf, the enemy
very curiously burned him to death.

Immediately after the capture of Nankin, Mr. Adkins, H.M. Consul at
Chin-kiang, proceeded to the city on board M.M.S. _Slaney_, in order, as
he expresses himself in his despatch to Earl Russell on the subject, "to
congratulate the Chinese (Manchoo) Commander-in-Chief on the auspicious
termination of his two years' siege." Well, the commander, or some of
his followers, told the officious Mr. Adkins that when they made good
their entrance into the city, "they found that the palace of the
Tien-wang _had been burnt to the ground_."

What about the "immense loss" of the other version, in which they do
such heroic deeds to capture the palace?

Mr. Adkins goes on to say "that the impostor (?) and his immediate
attendants lie buried in its ruins."

The victors also reported that they captured the Chung-wang a few days
later, and also the Kan-wang when they entered the city, finding him in
the Tien-wang's palace. Chung-wang, they say, managed to leave the city
with a number of followers, but was captured three days later by a body
of cavalry sent in pursuit: this was the account given to Mr. Adkins.
Another Imperialist version states that the Ti-ping Commander-in-Chief
was captured by _some villagers_ a few miles from the city, through
having given up his own white horse (celebrated for great strength and
fleetness) to his young prince, the Tien-wang's son, and having
compelled him to mount it and escape when he saw that at least a portion
of his party must be captured. Certainly this seems very characteristic
of the Chung-wang's brave, loyal, and generous nature, but then it is
the only incident in the whole narrative which bears the appearance of
truth and probability. Besides the above two stories of his capture,
when the enemy obtained possession of Hoo-chow-foo, they reported that
they had caught the Chung-wang _there_, and from that place a head,
stated to be the great rebel general's, was sent over the country as a
warning to the people.

As for the story of the Kan-wang's capture, there are several
contradictory and apparently authentic statements: one by a certain
Patrick Nellis, who personally saw the chief and talked with him at
Hoo-chow (subsequent to the fall of Nankin), where it seems that he
proceeded with an escort to communicate the loss or abandonment of the
capital, and concert measures for the evacuation of Hoo-chow-foo as
well.[79]

Besides the above reports, others were promulgated by the Mandarins, in
which they defeated different Ti-ping armies _en route_ for the south,
killing thousands and tens of thousands of rebels and capturing many
chiefs, among them the Shi-wang, who, singularly enough, still managed
to be in command of the Ti-pings near Amoy, until within the last few
months, when he retired to join other leaders farther inland.
Confessions were produced which professed to be written by the penitent
rebel leaders in their dungeons, while awaiting their turn to be
disembowelled, or "cut into a thousand pieces"--a pleasing prospect, of
course likely to make the destined victims suddenly feel inspired with
love and respect for the benevolent Manchoos, whom they had so
vigorously opposed all their lives! Among these seemingly fabricated
confessions only one is worthy of any attention, and that is a lengthy
composition, entitled, "The autographic deposition of Chung-wang, the
faithful king, at his trial after the capture of Nankin." Were it not
for the known mendacity of the Mandarins, and their particular addiction
to forging documents of this sort in order to lessen the prestige of the
revolution by representing its principal leaders as in their merciless
power, there would be little doubt but that the one in question was
genuine. In 1852, previous to the capture of Nankin by the Ti-pings, the
Imperial authorities concocted an article they named the "Confession of
Tien-teh," pretending that it was the deposition of the leader of the
rebellion, whom they falsely declared was their prisoner. It is quite
probable that the "Chung-wang's deposition" is of similar truthlessness,
and was made up by some prisoner of note (who may have been pardoned in
consequence), and the cunning writers attached to the Governor-General
of the two Kiang, Tseng-kwo-fan. Still it must be admitted that many
portions of the alleged deposition bear not only the impress of truth
(in so far as historical events, data, &c., are concerned), but
expressions closely resembling the well known sentiments of the great
Ti-ping general; so that if, as we trust, he was not the author, some
one pretty intimately acquainted with him must have been. However, some
facts tending to support the theory (for there is no direct proof in any
case except the Shi-wang's movements subsequent to the fall of Nankin)
of the Chung-wang's escape, will be given in the course of our
narrative.

Having noticed the Imperialist reports, it is now necessary to give the
following digest of the events referred to, and which may be depended
upon as the only possible version to be derived from the existing and
attainable sources of information:--

It is known that when the Chung-wang became convinced England was
determined to persist in prosecuting hostilities against his people, and
likewise felt their inability to cope with the foreign power, he at once
decided upon the best military movement under the circumstances--namely,
an entire abandonment of all accessible possessions, and a retreat into
the interior, where British hostility could not reach them, and where no
Manchoo forces could either prevent their operations, restrain their
consequent reinforcement, or impede their future progress.

Before parting with the Chung-wang, I was myself present at several
councils when the above plan was discussed, and unanimously agreed to by
every chief present. But one impediment prevented the Commander-in-Chief
from acting with his usual brilliancy of conception and wonderfully
successful rapidity of execution; it was the Tien-wang, who refused even
to listen to any proposal to abandon his capital.

Different people will view this ruinous obstinacy of the Ti-ping king in
various ways. Some will look upon it as sheer, downright folly; others,
as the useless, fanatical sacrifice of a bigot; while some may consider
that that great, heroic, noble-minded man, having once established the
capital of his dominions and the centre of his religio-political
movement at Nankin, did right and gloriously in meeting death rather
than turning backwards on the grand path. If we ascribe to the Tien-wang
motives partaking equally of the three traits--nobleness, fanaticism,
and rashness--we shall probably be pretty near the truth.

At all events, the Tien-wang passionately refused to entertain the only
plan by which the existence of the Ti-ping power, and the perpetuation
of his dynasty, seemed possible. All the court officers, cabinet
ministers, and other high authorities of Nankin, were blindly
subservient to the will of their king, and equally infatuated with his
religious and temporal command. Besides, many of those about him were of
the Hung family, and, being nearly related to their chief, not only
followed implicitly his wishes, but jealously formed themselves into a
clique about him, to the prejudice and exclusion of other more capable
and independent officers. All the fighting Wangs were outside the
capital, and incessantly engaged with the enemy; few troops were in
garrison, while many thousands of helpless non-combatants daily
diminished the stores of the failing granaries; and if the multitudinous
besieging army, encamped and fortified all round the devoted city, had
been animated with the slightest particle of courage or military spirit,
they might easily have captured it many months before it eventually fell
through starvation, or was evacuated by the troops.

The Chung-wang, after his separation from myself at Wu-see, proceeded
direct to Nankin _via_ Chang-chow-foo. His only object was to save the
king and his own family (living with his aged mother, whom he loved with
excessive filial tenderness), by inducing them to leave the untenable
city. He, alone, proposed the unpalatable manoeuvre to the Tien-wang,
whose severe displeasure he had already incurred, being punished in
various ways--by deprivation of titles, refusal of audience, accusation
of disloyalty, &c. How the time (December, 1863, to 19th July, 1864) was
passed, from the arrival of the Chung-wang to the fall of the capital,
unless the professed "autographic deposition" be true, or the garrison
really abandoned the city and escaped, will probably never be known to
history. Either, as the "deposition" states, the whole city petitioned
against the departure of the renowned commander, or he personally
elected to remain, rather than desert his king in the hour of death and
darkness, even though such calamity might have been avoided but for the
fatal perverseness of the monarch; perhaps both causes operated to
confine him to useless inactivity within the walls of the doomed
city--inevitably doomed, and encircled by the numberless siege works of
the enemy as with a band of impenetrable steel.

How the poor people, fated by the passive stubbornness of their rulers,
must have gathered together round their great warrior, as men will rally
about a tower of strength; how the unnumbered thousands of helpless
non-combatants must have rejoiced at the presence of him whose very name
was an army, a bulwark to his people, and a terror to the enemy; how
bitterly must the brave, energetic soldier have grieved and chafed at
the unnecessarily-incurred annihilation, and growing horrors of the
siege, which should have been avoided; but, alas! how could one great
man, without means, save a people, a sacred cause, and a city invested
by 100,000 savage foemen?

Loyalty and filial duty brought the "faithful prince" to Nankin; the
same motives bound him there to await destruction, when his presence in
the field--at the head of his own army, left under command of his
cousin, the Shi-wang--would have proved invaluable, and would surely
have placed the Ti-pings in a much better position than they occupied at
the close of the year 1865.

Nankin fell at last. All that is _positively_ known by Europeans--apart
from false, garbled, and exaggerated Mandarin sources--may be summed up
in few words:--Frightful privations were endured before the enemy took
possession; and when the city was entered by Mr. Consul Adkins, and
other gentlemen, the streets and houses were literally blocked up with
the bodies of the dead, by far the greater portion having the appearance
of death from starvation; and many being very far advanced in
decomposition, proved that, long before the Imperialists found courage
enough to blow an opening through the undefended walls, the unfortunate
people had succumbed to famine faster than the living could bury the
dead--in fact, it was evident that no such effort could have been
successful from the numbers who had daily perished.

Mr. Adkins, in his despatch to Earl Russell, places the number of people
slaughtered by the Imperialists on their entry at 10,000; but other
visitors state as many as 30,000, which is probably nearer the truth.

It is also certain that many chiefs with their followers left Nankin in
safety. A successor to the Mo-wang, assassinated at Soo-chow, having
afterwards appeared at Hong-kong; the Yu and Hsieh Wangs (the latter
being one of the Tien-wang's brothers, and always attached to the court)
being heard of in Kiang-si at the head of an army; while the following
extract from the narrative of one Patrick Nellis, already referred to,
and which was made on affidavit before the British Consul at Shanghae,
seems to prove that the Ti-ping prime minister escaped from Nankin, and
such being the case, undoubtedly there are strong grounds to believe the
military leaders did likewise. In the evidence sworn to, Nellis, after
describing an engagement with the Imperialists, states:--

    "On our return to Hoo-chow-foo, Kang-wang arrived from Nankin
    with an escort. Great ceremonies were shown at his reception; he
    did not look as if he had suffered any hardship...."

In speaking of the evacuation of the city, Nellis makes the following
statement:--

    "Kan-wang spoke to me in English very slowly. He asked me what I
    was. I said, 'an Englishman.' He said he had never met a good
    foreigner, and asked me if I would go with him to Kiang-si. I
    said I should be very glad if Tow-wang (Commandant of Hoo-chow)
    would let me."

This conversation took place more than a month after the fall of Nankin,
and a few days before the abandonment of Hoo-chow-foo on the 28th
August, 1864. Upon the strength of such facts the _Friend of China_ has
steadily maintained that Nankin was abandoned by all but the poorest
civilians when the Imperialists made their breach and marched through
without opposition.

Another circumstance damaging to the veracity of the Imperialist
reports, is a statement (contained in one of the Mandarin's inspired
"confessions,") purporting to be that of the Tien-wang's son (the heir
to the throne). The young prince is made to state that his father
"succumbed to sickness on the 24th of May, 1864;" but of this
all-important event the "Chung-wang's deposition" makes no mention. Here
is an inconsistency which at once proves either one or both the
"confessions" false; because, if the Tien-wang had really died, the
Chung-wang would have been at liberty to carry out his own views and
abandon Nankin; whereas his professed "deposition" states that, to the
day the city fell, he was unable to do so in consequence of the
Tien-wang's opposition.

The _Friend of China_ also states that a Mr. Butler, of Shanghae,
actually witnessed the withdrawal of the garrison. Moreover, adding
together the few spared by the enemy, those slain and those destroyed by
famine, we should even then scarcely have the number of destitute
people--labourers, coolies, and friendless non-combatants--who were
relieved by the Chung-wang alone during the early part of the year 1864,
when he kept a list of about 80,000 dependent upon his resources and
charity. In 1863 rations were daily issued to upwards of 400,000 people.
At the period now referred to, when the Chung-wang shut himself up in
the beleaguered city, the population, inclusive, was certainly not less
than a fifth of a million, and, probably, far exceeded that number;
therefore, even supposing that one-half (which is a large estimate)
perished, were slain, or made prisoners, during and at the termination
of the siege, how can we account for the 100,000 remaining, unless we
believe that they had previously managed to effect their retreat from
the city?

In the _Friend of China_, August 16, 1864, appears the following:--

    "We are still assured by parties who have means of knowing, that
    our first story of the evacuation of Nankin by its soldiery,
    before the Imperialists sprung their mine and rushed in, was the
    correct story; all those 30,000 massacred individuals told of by
    the _Recorder_ (but _not_ mentioned at the Asiatic Society with
    the "flushing of a pheasant") being inoffensive men, women, and
    children.

    "The Chung-wang, it is said, is not dead. He is at Hoo-chow-foo,
    while the Tien-wang is still in the body."

The strongest support of the Imperialist statement of the death of the
Tien-wang, and the capture and subsequent execution of the Chung-wang,
is the fact that, since the fall of Nankin, nothing whatever has been
heard of them elsewhere. On the other hand, however, it was supposed
that one or the other was commanding the forces in the interior, acting
in Fu-keen in concert with the Shi-wang when he occupied the city of
Chang-chow, near Amoy, from October, 1864, to May, 1865: and what seems
to lend force to this supposition is that he appeared to be acting under
the orders of some superior farther inland; the only chiefs of higher
rank being the King and his son, the Chung, Kan, I (several years absent
in Sz-chuen), and Si Wangs--the latter being a young man (son of the
original Western King) attached to the court at Nankin, and totally
without authority in military affairs. Upon the whole, it is quite
possible that the Ti-ping King, his son and heir, Prime Minister, and
General-in-Chief, may have met with the fate ascribed to them by the
enemy; still there is no positive proof, and there are good grounds for
supposing that some, if not all, are yet living and directing the
Ti-ping movements.

The siege of Hoo-chow-foo by the Imperialists was merely nominal, for,
up to the abandonment of that city by the Ti-pings, they were never
allowed within range of its walls, and were compelled to act almost
entirely on the defensive, so repeated and vigorous were the attacks by
the garrison and a corps of observation they had encamped outside the
place on a neighbouring range of hills. Only a few days before the
evacuation took place, the garrison succeeded in capturing a number of
Imperialist stockades, several hundred gunboats, and three or four
thousand men, besides inflicting heavy loss in killed and wounded; the
Franco-Manchoo disciplined auxiliaries alone losing 6 officers and 800
men. Very soon after this victory, the evacuation was effected with
consummate skill, the enemy not discovering that the Ti-pings had flown
until the day after. The number of troops forming the garrison and
encampment was very considerable, 50,000 being the lowest estimate;[80]
their line of retreat was either through the province of Fu-keen or
Kiang-si, and their destination is even yet unknown, none of the chiefs
from Hoo-chow having been recognised anywhere since. It is, however,
pretty certain that they acted in concert with the forces led by the
Shi-wang, though keeping an inland position, while the latter advanced
to the sea-board at Amoy.

The _Friend of China_, Sept. 8, 1864, under the heading,--"Another of
the parties despatched by us a short time ago, to learn the real state
of affairs about Hoo-chow-foo, has just returned,"--reports as
follows:--

    "The Chung-wang was in command up to the last.... Hoo-chow was
    evacuated.... Three days afterwards--we repeat--three days
    afterwards, Le Futai gallantly marched into the city with a
    thundering noise; and then what did he? The gates were closed,
    and then commenced a general sack, and the usual massacre of
    innocent individuals.... A laughable story is told of the
    _second_ capture of the Chung-wang here, at Hoo-chow; his
    head--the veritable caput--with loud clamour of gongs, being
    sent round to all the villages, that people might behold the
    head of the arch traitor! Our reporter, wicked sceptic! loudly
    declares that the head _said to be_ the Chung-wang's, truly sat
    on the shoulders, a week ago, of a man whose highest grade in
    life was that of a coolie!"

In the month of October, 1864, the residents of Amoy were suddenly
surprised to hear that a body of Ti-pings, about 10,000 strong, had
surprised and captured the city of Chang-chow, barely twenty miles
inland, and situated on a river emptying itself into the sea at the
Treaty Port.

From this reappearance of the Ti-pings close to a Treaty Port, we are
enabled again to obtain some authentic records--many Europeans,
including the British Consul, having visited them at Chang-chow. One
English gentleman wrote the following account (which may be relied on as
authentic) of his experiences to the _Daily Press_, and the same was
reproduced in _The Overland China Trade Report_, 1st January, 1865:--

    "A VISIT TO CHANG-CHOW.
    "_To the Editor of the 'Daily Press,' Hong-kong._

    "Sir,--As you appear desirous to obtain information regarding
    the insurgents in this neighbourhood, I take leave to furnish
    you with the following result of my personal observations, which
    were derived in the course of a visit amongst them.

    "The city and suburbs of Chang-chow are still occupied by the
    Taeping insurgents. About three-fifths of the whole city is
    burnt, and in the ruins may be seen the dead bodies of the late
    inhabitants, uninjured except by fire; not a wound could I see
    on any, which plainly shows, and as the rebels themselves
    affirm, that the inhabitants set fire to their dwellings
    themselves, and perished in them; having previously drugged
    themselves with opium rather than fall into the hands of the
    insurgents.

    "Those portions of the city unburnt are occupied by the rebels,
    but there are many streets of Hongs, the doors of which are
    sealed up, uninhabited, and apparently full of merchandise. The
    rebels appear to be very numerous; I should estimate them at
    about 12,000; but they affirm themselves that they number
    15,000. There are a great number of boys and youths among them,
    but I saw no women. They are much sunburnt, thin, and haggard in
    their appearance, and evidently have undergone much hardship
    before they took this city. I was told by many of them that they
    underwent extreme privations during their retreat from the
    north; that food of any kind, at many places, could not be
    obtained, on account of the country people being extremely
    hostile, and destroying everything as soon as they heard that
    the rebels were nearing them. That at several small towns on the
    borders of the Provinces of Che-kiang and Fokien human flesh
    was used for food; and that a peasant's body was retailed out at
    80 cash per catty by the fortunate rebel who had killed him!

    "The chief in command at Chan-chow is Tszle-wang,[81] brother to
    Chung-wang. He was at Ningpo during its occupation by the
    insurgents in 1862, and he commanded in the defence of that city
    when he was attacked and driven out by the British naval force,
    under Captain Dew. But he says he bears no animosity towards the
    British on account of it, as he is aware that Captain Dew was
    subsidized by the Chinese Government to retake Ningpo from the
    rebels. He professes the profoundest respect for the British
    nation for their bravery and power; and what he most ardently
    wishes is to be on friendly terms with her; and all that he
    requests is for her to act fairly up to her _professed
    neutrality_ to both contending parties. He says that, should
    they not succeed in conquering the Imperialists, he would be
    most happy to see the country under British rule. He promised he
    would not venture nearer to Amoy than Chang-chow (which is about
    twenty miles distant), provided the Mandarins at Chau-bay, a
    town situated on the river, about half way between Amoy and
    Chau-chow, did not blockade the river, and cut off all native
    trade and communication with them. That, in case they did, he
    should be compelled to take Chau-bay. That he should on no
    account attack Amoy, as he did not wish to have any rupture with
    foreigners. That he was very sorry the trade of Amoy suffered on
    account of their occupation of Chau-chow. That he would be only
    too happy to open trade reciprocally with foreigners; and that
    he would grant them every privilege and protection. That he was
    willing to trade with them for any description of European goods
    and native produce in return. Opium was not interdicted. He has
    made a law to protect all native farmers and tradespeople, and
    this has been already felt by the country people who have opened
    a day market in one of the main streets of the south suburb;
    and, from daylight to dark, until the gates are shut, every
    description of native 'Chow-chow' is to be obtained. Tszle-wang
    told me that the establishing of this market, though doing a
    great deal of good to both parties, had led to many executions
    of both rebels and country people--the former on account of
    taking goods and not paying for them, and natives found in the
    city setting fire to houses and plundering; who, when caught,
    are taken before a rebel Mandarin, and, if found guilty,
    executed; as no rebel, under penalty of death, can take the life
    of any person, except in action. The rebels appear to be well
    armed with rifles, revolvers, and muskets. The Imperial soldiers
    in this respect are not to be compared to them, as their arms
    consist entirely of native matchlocks, gingalls, and spears,
    and not one in ten has even a matchlock; and they are a wretched
    lot of ragged rabble. On the other side, the rebels are very
    neatly dressed, more cleanly, and are drilled after European
    tactics. There are some Europeans amongst them, but I had no
    communication with them. They have entirely routed the
    Imperialists in every engagement they have had with them; and on
    the 2nd instant they came down on the Imperial lines 2,500
    strong, the Imperial troops numbering 11,000; who have advanced
    to within about five miles of the city, to endeavour to protect
    the farmers, to gather in the standing crops of rice, which are
    in great abundance for many miles around the city, and which the
    rebels have gathered in and secured. The Imperials were encamped
    on both sides of the Rim, but their greatest force was on the
    right bank, behind a rugged hill, the inner extremity of which
    was crossed at right angles by a valley, which could have been
    easily protected by throwing up a few earthworks and mounting a
    few guns in them. Their weak point they could not see; and the
    rebels, taking advantage of the hilly ground in the
    neighbourhood to advance under cover during daylight, and,
    coming down the valley at dark, entered the Imperial camp about
    eleven p.m., without any warning being given. The Imperials were
    completely panic-struck; and having no retreat but by river,
    rushed to their boats in such numbers that many of them were
    swamped, and hundreds of soldiers drowned. Many of them ran and
    hid themselves wherever they could, and among the latter was the
    chief Mandarin in command. They offered little or no resistance;
    and the rebels, after killing 1,000 and taking 450 prisoners,
    destroying the camp equipage, returned to the city at daylight.
    Tszle-wang told me that his plan of campaign would be next to
    take the large and populous town of Tong-wah, and from thence
    march upon the district city of Chin-chew in the spring. That
    the amount of the whole rebel force in the province of Fokien
    under his command fell little short of 50,000 men; and hoping to
    increase it to 80,000 after the capture of Chin-chew, he should
    then endeavour to open communication with the British
    authorities, and arrange to take Foo-chow-foo.

    "Tszle-wang appears to be a man of considerable calibre. He
    appears, for a Chinaman, to be well up in foreign politics, and
    conversant on many subjects that you generally find the Chinese
    most ignorant on. He is affable and engaging in his manner, and
    appears to treat those about him with kindness. He is thirty-one
    years of age; short, stout, and well-made; his face is much
    sunburnt, and complexion, say dark; any person might think he
    was of Malay origin, as he has both the features and colour of a
    Malay. That he is some strategist and has considerable military
    tact must be acknowledged by the manner he took the city of
    Chang-chow, before a rumour was even circulated of the rebels
    being anywhere near the place, or intending to capture it; and
    from the defeats the Imperial force has sustained in every
    engagement they have had with him, although in numerical
    strength the Imperial force has always been 3 or 4 to 1. I
    should like to pay another visit to the insurgents, but all
    foreigners are interdicted from visiting them, both by the
    Consuls and Mandarin authorities; in fact, we are now not even
    allowed to enter the river, which is only a mile and a half, and
    nearly twenty miles from Chang-chow, on the usual shooting
    excursions, wild fowl being very plentiful in the river, and
    which is our only amusement at this season of the year. The
    whole foreign community feel this to be very hard indeed, and
    consider it to be very arbitrary on the part of the Consul, as
    this place is extremely dull--no amusements whatever, our only
    recreation being in a picnic or shooting excursion up the
    river--but Mr. Pedder tries to make himself as unpopular as he
    possibly can, and he has told the Mandarins that they can arrest
    any foreigner they can find on the river under any circumstances
    whatever, and the Mandarins have threatened to decapitate any
    boatmen who may hire their boats to or take foreigners up the
    river. I also hear that the British Consul some few days ago
    issued a _warrant_ to search the private dwelling of an English
    resident here for arms and munitions of war; and, if any were
    found, to bring him prisoner to the Consulate; but, happily, his
    suspicions were wrongly placed, as they found nothing of the
    kind in the gentleman's house whatever. Has a British Consul
    authority to search a gentleman's private dwelling whenever he
    may please, and set spies to watch the movements of a person to
    please the Chinese Mandarins? Really this is cringing or holding
    the candle to the Celestials, and taking away the liberty of the
    subject entirely; and if it goes any further, I cannot say how
    it may end.

    "Your obedient servant,
    "VERITAS.
    "Amoy, 14th December, 1864."

In a subsequent letter, describing another visit to Chang-chew, the same
writer states:--

    "The rebel campaign is about to be carried on with vigour in
    this quarter; of the 30,000 men collected in Chang-chow, not
    one-fifth are required to garrison the city. I heard from
    Tszle-wang myself that he should immediately detach 7,000, under
    Tsi-wang, to assist in the capture of Tong-san, and another
    force would be despatched simultaneously to attack Tong-wak and
    Chin-chew. The rebels (Ti-pings) are in possession of six cities
    in this part of the province of Fu-keen, and within a few days'
    march. _The rebels told me that Tien-wang's son was at one of
    the cities._"

The violation of the Queen's Order in Council (commanding neutrality to
be observed after the Soo-chow massacre) by the British Consuls in
China, is well shown by the previous letter of "Veritas." Besides the
partisan acts therein complained of, six or seven English steamers were
hired to the Mandarins at Shanghae to carry Imperialist troops to Amoy.
They did so, and were well paid for the affair; but is this neutrality?
Moreover, every kind of war material was freely supplied to them, and
British officers were allowed to command some of the Imperialist troops
(_Colonel_ Kirkham, formerly with Gordon, and one _Captain_ Macdonald
being particularly noticed), while all supplies for, or communication
with, the Ti-pings were forbidden and attempted to be cut off; but,
notwithstanding, munitions of war, and some Europeans (including
_Colonel_ Rhode, Gordon's late Adjutant-General, and _Colonel_ Williams,
who had commanded one of the Anglo-Manchoo regiments) managed to reach
the revolutionists.

Shortly after the capture of Chang-chew, the Shi-wang issued the
following proclamations:--

    "NOTIFICATION FROM THE TAIPING CHIEF AT CHANG-CHOW.

    "Notification from His Royal Highness Lee, Shee-king and
    Protector General, ordering the people to submit willingly and
    to continue their occupations.

    "Whereas agriculture is the chief of the occupations of mankind,
    upon which people necessarily subsist, and whereas, since I rule
    this city I have always informed the people everywhere that they
    may continue their duties and occupations as usual--be it
    therefore known that those who submit to this government are
    called good people. Strict orders have been given to my officers
    and soldiers not to make any disturbance among the inhabitants,
    which orders you must have heard.

    "But how is it that at present the fields are left uncultivated
    and all agricultural business seems to be entirely neglected?
    The plantations of sugar-cane are nearly ready for harvest, but
    will spoil if not cut, and the grains and paddy are nearly
    rotten, the reason of which we cannot comprehend. Probably the
    raising of arms is the cause of it, of which the people stand in
    awe, consequently they moved to their countries; or is the cause
    that at the time of fighting they are afraid that they may be
    implicated, that on this account they fled to other places? But
    the benevolent and just army will not destroy the good people;
    while they exterminate the wicked, they will not punish the
    innocent.

    "Now two villages on the south and north have already submitted,
    they are settled as usual. You people should be diligent at all
    times in trade and agriculture.

    "Further, in the four villages of that place, the sugar-canes
    may be converted into sugar and the grains be collected: if you
    do not immediately return and resume your occupations, then how
    will the people get their subsistence? Furthermore, the people
    who fled away have not paid their taxes due, being thus ignorant
    of the plan of seeking peace.

    "I treat others with great liberality, and therefore again and
    again issue these notifications, intimating to you that all
    those who have fled away may quietly return to cut the
    sugar-canes and collect the grains, and those who have not paid
    their taxes must, with submissive mind, come and pay their
    taxes. You must not cherish any doubt or hesitation, nor have a
    different heart, otherwise you will too late repent what you
    have done. I protect the people as children, and look upon them
    as wounded; therefore, for more than a month since I have taken
    possession of the place, I have never allowed a single soldier
    or officer to go to any village to give trouble. Now all the
    regulations have been arranged and the laws rectified, and
    strict orders have also repeatedly been given to the army thus
    treating you people bountifully and kindly. When the superior is
    so affectionate, you inferiors should readily come and pay
    tributes.

    "After this notification has been issued, if those who have not
    paid their taxes and still insist on their obstinacy by
    disregarding it, troops will be raised to punish them in order
    to warn those who are perverse and stubborn, without lenity.
    Every one of you must obey this command and not disappoint me of
    my affection to you.

    "LEE-SHAI-YIN,
    Shee-king, and Protector General of the Celestial Dynasty.

    "Taiping Celestial Kingdom, 14th year, 19th moon, 30th day."
    --_Daily Press._

    "ADDRESS FROM THE TAIPING CHIEF AT CHANG-CHOW TO THE TREATY
    POWERS.

    "His Royal Highness Lee-Shai-yin, Shee-king and Imperial
    Protector General of the Celestial Dynasty, to their
    Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of England, France, United
    States, and the people of their respective countries.

    "Since creation our Chinese Empire was first governed by
    Shinnung, then by the Emperors Yaw and Shun, who afterwards
    resigned their throne. Again the Emperors Tang and Mo attained to
    their throne by force of arms; then Dynasties Chun, Han, Ngai,
    and Tsiun transmitted their thrones to their respective
    posterity, and were succeeded by the Dynasties Tang, Sung, Yune,
    and Ming. It would be a matter of considerable difficulty, when
    referring to the distant generations, to repeat them all, but as
    a nation it had hitherto been in amity with all your various
    nations, no distinct border having been marked out. I was born
    late, and have not had the fortune to view these good prospects,
    and to enjoy the administration of the benevolent Government, but
    I have examined maps of the world, and studied the histories, and
    I am happy to possess a thorough knowledge of them, and the
    contents of which are as before me. For a man to guard a place,
    the watchword is to remember the fact that when the lips are cut
    off, the teeth will be endangered. To be in amity with adjacent
    countries, and for one to keep intercourse with neighbouring
    countries, it is essential not to forget the maxim of one large
    nation serving another small one. Of the history of China in
    counting back from the Dynasties of Ming and Yune, there have
    been innumerable successive revolutions of kingdoms who
    invariably paid tributes and presented precious stones to each
    other when due, and who never encroached upon other's territory.
    But the Tartars were of a different species, remarkable for their
    ravenous disposition, and for this reason, the central kingdom
    with the eastern provinces, in order to prevent their invasion,
    built the great wall. Unfortunately, during the latter part of
    the Ming Dynasty they were allowed to invade the interior, we
    became their victim, and have since been disgraced by them for
    these two centuries or more. Who then with common sense and
    natural patriotism would not strike his breast and weep? Even
    your various nations, in a practical point of view, are countries
    and in relation as lip to teeth, would not fail, I think, to hate
    them.

    "Long had it been designed to raise the just standard, but in
    consequence of their being few in China who would support the
    movement, the design had for a time to be abandoned. Happily our
    Heavenly Father the Almighty God did not desert the descendants
    of Han (China), and hated the Tartars, and sent down my Lord who
    settled at Kinling[82] as a basis of operations for more than ten
    years, and during that period exterminated thousands and ten
    thousands of Tartars. My Lord had always been in friendship with
    the heroes and enterprising men of your various nations who
    carried on their respective trades as usual. Further, the
    provinces of Kwang, Cheh, Yu, and others have been opened, and
    the ministers and people of various nations have travelled and
    rambled, and trade has been carried on uninterruptedly as usual.
    Is this not excellent? In obedience to my Lord's command I have
    been ordered to extirpate and root out the Tartars. Recently I
    attacked and took Chang-chow, where I encamped my soldiers.
    Whilst there I was glad to hear that you were close by, and I
    would ere this have sent a despatch to you, but various
    difficulties were thrown in the way. I now write this and tell
    the people of Tai-po-tsz of Cha-chow to present it for your
    perusal, earnestly hoping that after reading, you will consider
    the importance of lip-lost-and-teeth-endangered phrase, and
    perceive the advantage of a large nation serving a small one;
    that you will support our just movement by combining together to
    put an end to the Tsing Dynasty, in order that the people may
    live in happiness, and your various natives enjoy peace. The
    doctrine of our Heavenly Father, the Almighty God, and of Jesus
    Christ, teaches us that He is merciful, saving us, answering to
    prayers and unselfish--all mankind should look to future and
    believe in Christianity.

    "Therefore, more than ten years before my Lord's accession to
    the throne, he believed in Christianity, as his conduct would
    show.

    "He also received the Rev. Mr. Roberts, who preached the Gospel
    to the Chinese who believed and praised with him to God. We have
    welcomed your doctors, who cured many Chinese, and healed their
    diseases. We all feel grateful for their merciful kindness, and
    are under obligation for their favours. From this you will see
    that your nations and our Chinese in a universal point of view
    are as one. But the Tartars believe in Buddism, despise
    Christianity, and turn a dead ear to its doctrine. It may be
    argued that belief or disbelief rests with them, and they will
    afterwards reap the fruit of their conduct. Well, why then do
    they persecute Christian converts so that their lives are in
    jeopardy? Therefore my Lord reluctantly took up arms, raised an
    army, and coped with them. This has been going on for these more
    than ten years, and through the mercy of our Heavenly Father,
    the Almighty God, and Jesus Christ, and through the assistance
    of your various nations, my Lord has taken many cities and
    provinces, and killed many Tsing devils. Still to conquer and
    subdue an empire of eighteen provinces, combined with a strong
    army of Mongols and Chinese, who have ample munitions of war and
    provisions, must be extremely difficult.

    "Let us learn from the ancients as well as the moderns that to
    lead an army to battle it is indispensable to have
    reinforcements; and to establish a kingdom it is essential to
    get assistance from the neighbouring countries. Your various
    nations and China are at present like lip to teeth, and similar
    to a large country serving a small one. Let me ask you that
    before my Lord settled at Kiang-nan, could you get admittance
    into the interior? Now you can ride from east to west and from
    north to south, and the provinces of Hupeh and Ngan-hoin have
    been opened to trade. If your various nations do not ally with
    me to exterminate the Tsing Dynasty, and in case our force being
    unable to cope with the Tartars, as we are deficient in naval
    power, we shall be conquered, then the result of lip-lost and
    teeth-endangered will soon follow. Therefore it is desirable
    that your various nations should embrace this opportunity as
    presented.

    "If, on the other hand, your various nations, relying on the
    omnipotence of our Heavenly Father and Jesus Christ, and acting
    upon the doctrine of Christianity, will come to terms with us
    for destroying the Tsing Dynasty, if you command your naval
    armies and attack those places near the water, and whatever
    cities, districts, ports, and passes you will have taken and
    conquered by your force, you will be at liberty without the
    least hinderance on my part to keep them, and whatever treasures
    and food found therein, you will be at liberty to appropriate
    them. And so I will attack on land, and whatever cities,
    districts, and passes I conquer, and whatever treasures and food
    I find, I will divide, giving one half to you, and all the
    distant cities, ports, and marts will be surrendered to you.

    "Thus having your naval armies, we can cross the ocean and
    bestride the rivers without obstacle or hinderance. Our army, I
    must confess, in its beginning is weak, and food is not
    plentiful; and unless your various nations lend a hand to assist
    me, the Tartars will be more ravenous and their ferociousness
    will be greater, _and if once our army is subdued, they will as
    a matter of course come upon your various nations_, when, it is
    clear, you will be precluded from trading and travelling in the
    provinces of Kiang, Kwang, Cheh, and Yu. I earnestly pray that
    you will despatch your soldiers and co-operate with me to
    exterminate the evil posterities, and that we all may obtain
    advantages. Hoping you will comply with my views is my earnest
    prayer.

    "The statements I have made, though they are vulgar, I undertake
    to swear before heaven that I will keep them. Let us write in
    benevolence to accomplish our undertakings, then we shall make
    peace with each other, trade with each other from generation to
    generation, and enjoy together universal peace. Is this not the
    best plan? The city of Chang has been and is a rich place, at
    present both the soldiers and inhabitants are happy, trade is
    flourishing, and treasures are plentiful. I also earnestly
    request that you will convey merchandise and vessels containing
    all kinds of foreign cargo, and the caps, powder, &c., which
    will be sold immediately here. You have no occasion to fear that
    some of my men will take them without paying for them. I will
    make up the damages should they do so, and surely I will not
    break my promise!

    "On the day of this epistle reaching you, you will favour me
    with a reply.

    "With my best compliments to your gentlemen of your various
    nations,

    "I am your obedient servant,
    LEE-SHAI-YIN,

    "Shee-king, and Imperial Protector General of the Celestial
    Dynasty
    "Taiping Celestial Kingdom, 14th year, 10th moon, 1st day."
    --_Daily Press._


FOOTNOTES:

[75] See _Friend of China_, July 11, 1865.

[76] See the account from _Shanghae Recorder_, at the end of the
preceding chapter.

[77] Referring to Colonel Gordon, Captain Osborn, R.N., and their
subordinates.

[78] Meaning the noble occupation of buying and selling; and that, too,
at the point of the bayonet.

[79] _Times_, January 12, 1865. _China Overland Trade Report_, 30th
November, 1864.

[80] The _Times_, October 26, 1864, in its China intelligence (under
date, "Shanghae, September 4"), describing the evacuation of Hoo-chow,
makes the following statement, which is a further proof of the total or
partial escape of the Nankin garrison:--"The rebel force had been so
greatly swollen by fugitives _from Nankin_ and other places, that it
constituted quite a formidable army."

[81] The writer of the letter has evidently made a confusion of the
name, Le, and title, Shi, of the chief, for the following proclamations
prove him to be the Shi or Shee Wang.

[82] This must mean Nankin.




CHAPTER XXVI.

    Results of British Policy.--Its Effect on Trade.--The
    Inspectorate System.--The Tien-tsin Treaty.--Present State of
    China.--Rebellion in the Ascendant.--Proposed Remedy.--The
    Mandarin Policy.--The Extradition Treaty.--The Mo-wang's
    Case.--Its Injustice.--Its Illegality.--Burgevine's Case.--Our
    Treatment by the Manchoos.--Russia's Policy in
    China.--Contrasted with that of England.--Russian
    Progress.--Statistics.--Acquisition of Territory by Russia.--Her
    Approach to British India.--Russia's Advantages.--Her Future
    Policy.--"Peking and the Pekingese."--Its Author's
    Misstatements.--Misquotations.--Examples thereof.--"Chinese
    Miscellanies."--Ti-ping Movements.--The Future of the Ti-pings
    Doubtful.--Latest Movements.--The Kan-wang.--Nien-fie
    Victories.--Future Prospects.--Finis.


Since Whig Ministers took it into their heads to become Manchoo
Mandarins, the result may soon be told.

The wars have all been undertaken for the purpose either of forcing
trade--principally, if not wholly, that in opium--upon the Chinese, or
else to chastise that people for endeavouring to put their own laws
against opium smuggling into force, from the time of the _fracas_ with
Commissioner Lin to the lorcha _Arrow_ pretext for the last war.

The results of the late British policy in China are summed up generally
in the following sectional review:--

1. As for the vaunted treaty of Tien-tsin, _forced_ from unwilling
Manchoos by the results of the "_Arrow_ war," it has greatly restricted
trade along the coast of China, closed ports (such as Wan-chew,
Tai-chew, Lam-quan, Hoc-kau, Chin-chew, &c.), which were virtually open
to foreign trade, and by confining commerce to a few Treaty Ports,
played exactly into the hands of the anti-foreign Mandarins. Upon this
subject a capital article appears, from an old resident of many years'
standing in China, in the _Overland Trade Report_, September 11, 1865,
which, as the editor says, "contains the most able exposition of the
defects of the treaty of Tien-tsin, of the pernicious results of the
foreign inspectorate, and of the crusade carried on against foreign
shipping visiting non-treaty ports, that we ever read." The article is
long, but some of its salient points are to the following effect: Until
the signing of the treaty of Tien-tsin, the whole coast-line, from
Canton to Woo-sung, with all its intermediate ports, was virtually open
to foreign trade! Foreign vessels of all nations were allowed and even
encouraged by the local authorities to enter any port they chose, and
were permitted to trade in any article, either native or foreign,
without hindrance or molestation, provided they paid the lawful duties.

The disadvantages to which British (and all foreign) trade is subjected
by the treaty of Tien-tsin, and the establishment of the foreign
inspectorate of Chinese Customs, are these:--

1st. To pay nearly double as much duty on both imports and exports as
native vessels or junks are charged.

2nd. Heavy tonnage dues are enforced, consisting of 4 mace or 4.10 of a
tael (6s. 8d.) per ton, every four months, instead of every six months
as previous to the war; junks paying no tonnage dues!

3rd. Interdicted from carrying or trading in _salt_, one of the
principal articles of trade in all parts of China and Formosa. Likewise
saltpetre, sulphur, alum, and some other articles of general commerce,
on pain of confiscation of vessel. Junks allowed to carry or trade in
any article either native or foreign!

4th. Interdicted from entering any port on the coast of China, except
those specified "open port" by the treaty, on pain of _confiscation_ of
vessels and cargo. Junks free to enter any port or harbour either in
China or foreign countries. What a contrast of advantages and
disadvantages! Whereas, before the concoction of the Tien-tsin treaty,
foreign vessels enjoyed equal privileges with native craft, they have
since been placed at a discount by the execution of the retrogressive
measures of that treaty so inimical to British interests. No doubt the
astute Manchoo statesmen who acted for China during the negotiations
gained many advantages over the representatives of England. They
succeeded in obtaining terms which restricted trade, and limited foreign
intercourse to a few ports; their latest act has been to follow this up
(now that the dread of the Ti-ping is over and the Ta-ku forts in their
hands again) by interdicting the employment of foreign vessels to carry
goods on Chinese account even between treaty ports!

2. The foreign inspectorate of Chinese Maritime Customs was a scheme
effected by officials of Lord Elgin's embassy to China; its aim was to
make sure of the indemnity by placing Englishmen in charge of the
Imperial revenue, and to enable the squeezed Government to suppress
rebellion by handing it over the remainder. Beautifully has the Pekin
Cabinet responded by taking advantage of every opportunity to limit the
rights of Englishmen, and resuming step by step its habits of repellance
and exclusiveness!

A very significant event has lately taken place, being the elevation of
Tseng-kwo-fan, leader of the anti-foreign party, and sometime besieger
of Nankin, to a position of unprecedented magnitude. This Mandarin has
been appointed to the absolute civil and military control of all the
officials and troops, whether Tartar or Chinese, in the three provinces
of Chili, Shangtung, and Honan. Speaking of this appointment, the _China
Overland Trade Report_, 12th August, 1865, states:--

    "Lest it may be hoped by some that Tseng-kwo-fan is a man
    adapted to the times, and likely to carry into effect salutary
    reforms, it should be mentioned that he is the quintessence of
    a Mandarin in the full acceptation of the term--corrupt and
    venal to a degree, and perfectly indifferent to the welfare of
    the country or the people. His anti-foreign tendencies form the
    leading feature of his political creed, and there is good reason
    to suppose that Prince Kung fully agrees with him.... The
    influence he obtains in the empire will be irresistible, and
    must insure success in whatever line of policy he may feel
    inclined to pursue."

Tseng-kwo-fan's rank is that of Commander-in-Chief and General Viceroy
of the empire.

The inspectorate system has placed a set of cosmopolitan mercenaries in
a position not only to govern but to prey upon the whole foreign trade
with China. They are ever upon the _qui vive_ to seize and confiscate
the merchandise of their own countrymen, and have caused the effectual
closing of every port on the coast of China, except those opened by
treaty. Property that may be unprotected by every legal right, or may be
placed (through the owner's ignorance of inspectorate forms) in such a
position as to incur some of the vexatious penalties attaching to every
infraction of rules almost daily issued by the European Commissioners of
Customs, or their Mandarin colleagues, _ad libitum_, is eagerly pounced
upon and appropriated. In fact, it may safely be said that, instead of
benefiting foreigners and their trade, the scheme acts directly against
their interests; that it places a number of European and American
adventurers in a position to assist the Mandarins in taking every
advantage of each flaw in the treaty, while at the same time
constituting a capital shield behind which the still repulsive Manchoos
can execute their anti-foreign plotting in safety.

3. The hostilities against the Ti-pings were caused through the
unrighteous policy established by the treaty of Tien-tsin, the foreign
inspectorate of Customs, the extortion of indemnity for the war, and the
protection of the vile opium trade. This policy has been a great
success, in so far as arresting and beating backward the only portion
of the multitudinous Chinese whose progress afforded a prospect of
change for the better. It has, with still greater iniquity, warred
against and prevented the spread of Christianity; destroyed many
thousands and tens of thousands of those who professed that faith, and
has stopped the circulation and printing of the Bible in its full
integrity by the Ti-ping Government, besides having caused the
re-establishment of idolatry on the ashes of the destroyed Book, and the
wholesale slaughter of those who only begged for our friendship and
instruction. Through the wicked intervention of England, the former
territory of the Ti-pings has been wrested from them, and the bleached
bones of the victims mark the country thick and close for hundreds of
miles. The starvation, the horrors, have been fully described; and now
it is reported from China that many of the solitudes created where once
happy villages of Ti-pings were found, have become infested with beasts
of prey--wolves, panthers, and tigers.

As for having effected the slightest improvement in British relations
with China, made the Manchoo authorities less unfriendly and illiberal,
or rendered the least service to the general welfare of humanity, the
past policy of the British Government has proved a lamentable failure.

By unjustifiable meddling, England has thrown China into a state of
general anarchy. The cruelty and excessive corruption of the Manchoo
officials throughout the country have always been sufficiently great to
cause local insurrections and different regular systems of rebellion;
but it was only to the great Ti-ping revolution (which proved its power
so superior to that of the Imperial Government as to threaten the rapid
extermination of the latter, and compel the assistance of England to
save it) that people could look for success, and eventual pacification
of the empire. Well, these urgently required results have been prevented
by the policy in question.

Unable to depend upon the success of the Ti-ping movement, the
disaffected Chinese have joined other rebellions, and at this day there
are many desolating the country. In the north, a great amalgamation of
the Yellow River rebels (an old organization, sometimes under allegiance
to the Ti-ping king) or Nien-fie, with a force of Ti-pings, and a large
body of Mohammedan rebels, has taken place. The army of this league is
estimated at over 300,000 men; in the summer of 1865 they defeated the
Tartar Generalissimo (of Pekin campaign memory) San-ko-lin-sin, who was
afterwards killed by some country people with whom he sought a
refuge--thus showing the state of feeling amongst the population. The
northern rebels then seriously menaced Pekin itself, and at one time it
was reported that they had captured the city; lately they seem to have
moved more to the westward--probably to effect a junction with other
revolutionists; but it is quite certain that the Imperialists are unable
to subdue them.

Besides the league, there are two other formidable rebellions raging in
the north of China--the Mohammedan rebels, who defy the power of the
Government in Shen-si, Shan-se, Kan-su, and other parts of the empire.
To the south of these come the "Honan filchers," a horde of more than
100,000 banditti, who maintain, as they have done for years, an
independent existence in the Honan Province. Away to the west, the large
Tartar province of E-li, four times as large as Great Britain, has been
wrested from the Imperialists by a rising of Mahommedans.

Along the western boundary general anarchy prevails: it would almost
seem that as Russia advances into central Asia, the Mohammedans were
moving towards China.

In the great province of Sze-chuan, the Ti-pings under Shih-ta-kae, the
I-wang, or his successor, are still in power. At Hankow (treaty port) in
Hu-peh, and at Kew-kiang in Kiang-si, the Imperialist troops lately
revolted and set up the standard of rebellion. In Ngan-whui serious
disturbances have arisen. Farther south, in Kwei-chow, Yun-nan, and
Kwang-si, the Miau-tze, or independent mountaineers, are steadily
increasing in strength; in fact, every province of China is more or less
the scene of formidable revolution or local revolt.

The Ti-pings, in strong force, under the Shi-wang and other leaders, are
making rapid progress on the borders of the provinces of Kwang-tung,
Kiang-si, and Fu-keen, and the Imperialist troops seem totally unable to
interfere with them.

Referring to the distracted state of China, the _Overland China Mail_,
June 29, 1865, truly states that "there must be something in the conduct
of the Imperial Government, and of the local Mandarins, which provokes a
strong feeling of resentment against their authority in all parts of the
empire." Singularly enough, the same journal has always opposed the
revolutionists who tried to alter a Government the people hate.

The _Times_, in its Chinese intelligence of June 21, 1865, referring to
the successes of the Nien-fie League, states:--

    "So far as we can at present see, the Nien-fie insurrection is
    likely to prove quite as formidable as was that of the Taepings.
    Their leaders have substantial wrongs to avenge, and the people
    themselves have been subjected to so many hardships at the hands
    of the local Mandarins that the slightest spark is sufficient to
    set the whole north of China in a blaze of rebellion."

Those who have advocated interfering against such a movement as that of
the Ti-pings, and supporting such a dynasty as that of the Manchoos,
must have very curious reasons to plead for a justification--they have
generally admitted the necessity for a change of government, and then
amused themselves by resisting the change when offered.

[Illustration: MAP OF CHINA _Showing the locality of the different
rebellions in that Empire, the line of retreat taken by the Ti-pings
from their settled territory, and their present position Spring of the
year 1866._]

The only policy which could have benefited China would have been, either
an energetic protectorate established by England, and maintained with
energy until the evil Government had been thoroughly and radically
reformed in every branch; or, what would have been far better, the
Chinese should have been left to themselves and allowed to choose their
own rulers. If England had simply preserved her honour and remained
neutral, China would have had a native, progressionist, and powerful
Government at the present day. That huge empire has lasted more than
2,000 years, and the only deterioration its constitution has suffered
has been caused by the Tartar conquest. The resources of China are as
great, the capacities of her people as vigorous, and the elements of her
ancient civilization as durable as ever: once let the incubus of Manchoo
maladministration be removed, that vast and intelligent people will
rapidly establish a native Government which will inaugurate an era of
progression and improvement. For some time the usurping dynasty has been
tottering towards its fall; England would have done well to have avoided
supporting the decayed and hopelessly corrupt fabric. She has served a
dying despotism, too far gone to feel even gratitude for her assistance,
and has repelled a young successor who wished ardently to become of the
same brotherhood as herself!

4. By her aggressive, meddling policy, England has alarmed the naturally
suspicious and treacherous Manchoos. Making them feel towards the "outer
barbarians" the passion of fear as well as hate, has, of course, only
tended to make them more exclusive and repellant than ever. Every mail
from China brings successive proof of the fact. Those who receive
advices from the East cannot fail to notice such passages as the
following:--

The _Overland China Trade Report_, in its issue September 11, 1865,
states:--

    "Each succeeding mail takes some instance of Mandarin repellance
    towards foreigners. There can be no doubt that this feeling is
    the policy decided on by the Pekin Cabinet.... As bearing upon
    this point, reference is called to a notification ... issued by
    the Shanghae authorities, forbidding Chinese to hire foreign
    vessels.... The hand of Tseng-kwo-fan, the leader of the
    anti-foreign party, becoming visible in the present foreign
    policy pursued...."

The article then proceeds to notice the fact that the Mandarin policy of
preventing the employment of foreign shipping, and encouraging that of
native craft, simply tends to increase piracy by providing prey; and is
further reprehensible because the Mandarins will not assist to suppress
an evil which, were it not for the presence of British men-of-war, would
destroy their entire maritime commerce. Mr. Hart, the Inspector General
of Customs, endeavoured to induce the Imperial Government to allow
Chinese to own vessels constructed after the foreign mode, but the
hatred of foreign innovation, however beneficial, prevailed, and the
authorities refused the much-desired boon.

Another instance of Manchoo repellance is the withdrawal of the
concession formerly granted to foreign vessels to visit the ports of the
Island of Formosa.

And again: the port of Wan-chew was open to foreign trade before the
treaty of Tien-tsin, and became a place of much importance. Why it was
not included in the list of open ports it is difficult to understand.
The foreign representatives and merchants lately endeavoured to obtain
the concession of having it opened to foreign trade, and for a time were
encouraged by Prince Kung to believe that their request would be
complied with. But since Tseng-kwo-fan has come to the front, the
concession is rejected, and the idea abandoned.

The notification referred to as prohibiting the employment of foreign
vessels was issued by Lin, Imperial Commissioner, and acting Viceroy of
Kiang-su, in which province Shanghae is situated. It seems to have
proved very effectual, and very injurious to British shipping interest.

The last mail from China brought the _Overland Trade Report_, dated
"Hong-kong, October 15, 1865." It contains these lines:--"The
repellance and anti-foreign tendencies of the Mandarins are becoming
more broadly marked as each month advances."

The _North China Market Report_ states "that the Chinese are rapidly
learning to disregard the most important of the treaty stipulations." In
fact, all sources of information are unanimous as to the hostile
feelings of the Manchoo Government England has done so much to bolster
up.

Just six months have elapsed since the Colonial Government of Hong-kong
perverted its powers by giving up an unfortunate refugee from Nankin to
the sanguinary Imperialist Mandarins. After noticing the facts of the
case, we will observe how the Manchoos responded to the officious and
unwarrantable efforts of the Hong-kong rulers to execute the
exterritoriality clause of the notorious treaty of Tien-tsin, the
twenty-first article of which stipulates that, "if _criminal_ subjects
of China shall take refuge in Hong-kong, or on board of British ships
there, they shall, upon due requisition by the Chinese authorities, be
searched for; and, _on proof of their guilt_, be delivered up."

Acting upon the above clause, the Canton Mandarins, in the month of
April, 1865, demanded from the Colonial Government the rendition of a
certain Chinaman residing at the latter place, on the plea of his having
been a pirate. The man demanded had been residing in Hong-kong since
September, 1864, and the following facts transpired during the inquiry
instituted. He had been a Ti-ping chief, known as the Mo-wang (probably
a successor to the rank of the assassinated Commandant of Soo-chow);
and, upon the evacuation of Nankin, had escaped and made his way to
Hong-kong, with a considerable sum of money. As this became known to
members of some secret societies established amongst the Chinese there,
he was subjected to much extortion from people who threatened to
denounce him to the Mandarins as a rebel unless he satisfied their
demands. At last the persecution drove him to seek legal advice from
some English lawyer, who told him that he was perfectly safe on British
soil. Consequently, he defied his persecutors; and they, doubtless, to
obtain reward from the Mandarins, fulfilled their threats. The principal
Manchoo official at Canton, who was certain of promotion should he
succeed in catching a rebel of such rank, forthwith demanded his
rendition _as a pirate_.

The man was seized and tried before the magistrates' court, where the
above evidence was obtained. The proof of his piracy (although
consisting of the testimony of only _one_ Chinese witness, _sent down
specially by the Mandarins_) was considered sufficient; and,
notwithstanding the protest of the counsel retained for the prisoner,
the magistrate, under the direction of the law officers of the Crown,
made out the requisite order for his rendition.

The valuable account from which the facts of this case are taken[83]
states:--

    "On this being communicated to the Mo-wang, he made up his mind
    to commit suicide, if possible, by jumping overboard on his
    passage to Canton, knowing, as he did too well, the horrid fate
    that there awaited him. When _handed over_ to the Chinese
    officials, he begged to be released from the handcuffs; but one
    of our civil officials (the man's name should be made public),
    not in the police, would not permit this; and he was therefore
    conveyed to Canton in the manacles of the Hong-kong police. On
    his arrival there he was taken to prison, the next day brought
    before the Mandarin, where he refused to plead, acknowledging
    himself a Ti-ping chief: he was taken back to prison, and the
    next day was executed in the way reserved for _political
    offenders_, viz., he was tied to a cross, his cheeks then sliced
    off, then the insides of his arms, thighs, &c., and finally
    disembowelled while yet alive. This put beyond a doubt the real
    cause of the demand for this man, and the real offence for which
    he was wanted."

Now, in this cruel case of rendition the Government of Hong-kong
committed an act repugnant alike to humanity and the Christian
principles of their countrymen, and which was not only entirely illegal,
but grossly unjust.

The Mo-wang was demanded and given up as a pirate. The only evidence
against him was given by _one_ Chinaman, and tended to prove that the
chief had once stopped a Chinese vessel, on board of which was the
witness, endeavouring to run past the Ti-ping Custom House established
at Nankin. The junk was confiscated by the Ti-ping authorities. Here we
have the main point of the case. This was the only act charged against
the Mo-wang. The only question is whether it was piracy. The Colonial
authorities, true to the Mandarin-worshipping-and-Ti-ping-destroying
policy, answered in the affirmative. Let us examine their decision.

First. The Ti-pings had been recognised as belligerents; and, moreover,
as an established power, by repeated acts upon the part of
representatives of Great Britain (and other countries); how then could
the seizure of a vessel of the enemy by the Mo-wang--a regularly
commissioned officer of the Ti-ping Government--be construed into an act
of piracy? Why, the United States of America would have stronger (though
none the less unreasonable) grounds to demand from England the rendition
of every ex-Confederate officer, as a pirate, who might be found within
her jurisdiction! The decision of the Hong-kong authorities is clearly
against the rights of the case and the law by which it was tried. But
what conclusively proves this is the fact that the Mandarins demanded
the Mo-wang as a pirate, but executed him as a _political offender_, and
nothing else.

Thus, it cannot fail to be seen that the unfortunate victim was not a
pirate--the Hong-kong Solons gave him up as one.

Secondly. The extradition treaty with China specially declares
"_criminal_" offenders as those who may be given up, upon "_proof_ of
guilt." The Mo-wang was not a criminal, therefore the Hong-kong
authorities violated the law by giving him up as such.

Thirdly. The treaty of Tien-tsin was not the law of Hong-kong,
therefore the authorities had no legal right to render up even a
criminal subject of China--how much less the innocent Mo-wang! As the
Hong-kong _China Overland Trade Report_, May 30, 1865, truly states, in
reviewing this atrocious affair:--"It would appear that the local
authorities have not only read the treaty erroneously, but that they
have no power whatever to meddle in the matter, no ordinance ever having
been passed to enable them to take cognizance of offences under the
Tien-tsin treaty....

"The case of the St. Alban's raiders has elicited the fact that a treaty
is not a statute, and cannot be adopted by a court of law without a
statutory enactment. The Ashburton treaty was not the law of Canada,
because the Government had neglected to legalize it by statute. So the
Tien-tsin treaty is not the law in Hong-kong, because no ordinance has
been passed to legalize it."

The above three objections to the rendition of the Mo-wang pretty
strongly prove that his death was a judicial murder by those who
unlawfully gave him up to so frightful a doom. Another example of
British malversation in China, and a further instance of persecution of
the Ti-pings!

It might at least have been expected when British officials exceeded
their authority and so misapplied the exterritoriality clause of the
treaty in order to oblige the Mandarins, that the latter would have
responded. We will observe how they did so.

Within _one month_ of the rendition of the Mo-wang, the Imperialists in
the neighbourhood of Amoy captured the mercenary soldier, Burgevine
(already noticed in these pages), an Englishman named Green, and a
British East Indian subject, whilst endeavouring to join the Ti-pings at
Chang-chew. These men had committed no crime, and were caught _before_
having committed any political offence (any previous episode of
Burgevine's life constituting another case, which did not concern the
Englishman, Green). Even if they had succeeded in joining the
revolutionists, and had afterwards been caught levying war against the
Imperialists, their only offence would have been a political one, viz.,
breach of neutrality, punishable by deportation from China or three
months' imprisonment.

The American Consul at Amoy, hearing of the seizure, demanded, as in
this case he had a perfect right to do, the rendition of Burgevine,
according to the terms of the exterritoriality clause of the treaty. The
Mandarins refused to fulfil their obligations and give up the men. They
carried them into the interior and murdered them by heavily ironing, and
then drowning them, afterwards pretending that the three unfortunate
prisoners had met their death by the capsize of a boat in which they
were being conveyed across a river!

Thus we see that immediately after a Chinese _political_ offender was
illegally given up to the Manchoo Government by the authorities of
Hong-kong, the Mandarins deliberately violated the exterritoriality
stipulations of the treaty, by refusing to give up the three men whom
they had seized before offence, on suspicion only, and by cruelly
putting them to death.

The last mail from China brings intelligence of the murder of three
Europeans at the treaty port of Chin-kiang. Two (Messrs. Filleul and
Pickernel) were Englishmen, and old friends of mine; the third, a Mr.
Lewis, was an American. These men were set upon by Imperialist soldiers
in the dead of the night, while sleeping, and cruelly murdered, without
having given any offence, although another European had struck a
Chinaman on the previous day. The murderers belonged to a disciplined
contingent, commanded by a Mandarin named Kwo, a force which had been
raised, officered, and equipped by British means!

Besides the continual violation of the exterritoriality clause of the
treaty, the Manchoos have lately displayed their growing disregard for
their obligations and their increasing repugnance to foreigners in a
variety of illiberal measures. To those which we have already noticed
may be added the late blunt refusal of the Pekin Cabinet to allow the
construction of a proposed Russian line of telegraph from Siberia to
that city.

Another very serious blow to British and Chinese interests has been the
fruitless mission of Sir M. Stephenson. The Manchoo Government has
pointedly refused to grant permission for the introduction or
construction of railways, and the local authorities have obstructively
prevented the formation of proposed experimental lines at Canton, and
between Shanghae and Woo-sung, a distance of about fourteen miles.

There is another case in point, which effectually proves the thorough
impracticability of the Manchoos. A few months ago an enterprising
Shanghae merchant, Mr. E. A. Reynolds, was public-spirited enough to
erect a line of telegraph from Shanghae to the sea-coast. He made all
arrangements, compensated various native landowners, and erected his
posts, only to find them all chopped down again one fine morning. The
Mandarins, when appealed to, insulted the British Consul, and refused to
allow the erection of the telegraph, the alleged reason being that it
interfered with Fung-shui--the spirit of geomancy, the air, or something
else.

Shortly before the above outrage, the Mandarins showed their gratitude
for the assistance England had given them, by closing the whole of the
silk districts and interior to steam communication or transit by
foreigners, the same having been free and open under the rule of the
Ti-pings, who encouraged the employment of steamers.

Many other instances of Manchoo repugnance and hostility could be
mentioned, but those noticed are sufficient for all purposes, and so we
will close our review of _some_ of the results of British policy in
China.

After having examined the conduct of England, it may not be out of place
to follow with a short sketch of Russian policy, which is daily becoming
so closely connected with China, whilst the frontier of the great
Muscovite Power is rapidly extending towards the Chinese and Indian
empires in one direction, is peacefully established against Chinese
territory in another, and is gradually annexing to herself vast portions
of Chinese territory in the north.

Although the Manchoos have always been hostile to British intercourse,
"there is a system of European policy which they can and do appreciate,"
as the _Standard_, August 28, 1865, well said. The substance of the
article referred to so thoroughly expresses what I would say, that I
cannot refrain from using it:--

The Manchoos comprehend the spirit of Russia, and dwell at peace with
that empire on her borders. Instead of a great wall, they are divided
from their powerful neighbour by a wooden paling, and there has not been
a shot fired between Russia and China, contiguous though they are,
during the last fifty years. But what has been the course pursued by
Russia with regard to that which is loosely and inaccurately termed the
Ti-ping revolt? One of complete neutrality. We, however, from the coast,
hoisted our flag in the war. We have taken an active and open part,
declared against a tremendous national movement, and been virtually
beaten off the Chinese soil and waters. Looking for results, it is
impossible to find any, except that our name is hated by millions of
people who desired to live and trade upon friendly terms with us. Our
representative diplomacy at Pekin is a nullity, and there is every
chance that, a change of dynasties intervening, we shall have to undo
our Manchoo statesmanship, and comply with a very different set of
political necessities in the East. Your Chinese are very intelligent
fatalists; they rarely quarrel with facts; they are convinced, it may
be, of the English fighting quality; but they can feel little respect
for our wisdom when they see us standing in a baffled attitude between
both their great parties, blundering and bewildered, with an enormous
trade to foster, with prodigious future interests to foresee, and yet
with a diplomacy which means neither peace nor war, which binds us to no
intelligible line of conduct, and which has brought us to a condition
wherein, through any accident, whether of Imperial or insurrectionary
success, we may be called upon to defend our rights by force of arms.

It is a fact no less singular than true, that the Russians, in
contradistinction to all other Europeans, show a strong tendency to
amalgamate with the higher races of Asia. In consequence of this, her
rapid progress on the continent referred to partakes of the nature of
absorption and not of conquest. The policy of Russia seems inseparable
from continual increase of her already vast dominions. In every
direction her frontier is determinately advanced, while thousands of
strange people are submitting to her sway. In Europe she uses force to
obtain any desirable locality; and although it is true that occasionally
some obstinate or patriotic chief of Central Asia may dispute her
advance, such obstructions would seem to form the exception to the
general progress she is enabled to make rather by conciliation and
clever seizure than by force of arms.

If people have the audacity to use their eyes, and the unparalleled
hardihood to discover the extraordinary increase of the Russian empire,
there is a clique of venerable wiseacres who always think to annihilate
them by the crushing denunciation, Russophobia! Now, these old
gentlemen--it is presumed that they are rather decrepit--may call the
knowledge of modern geography and the continual increase of Russia
whatever gives them a little innocent amusement; but all the calling in
the world cannot alter the fact.

There are two questions which particularly concern England: is she
content to halt on the forward path of nations, while Russia, by
reclaiming the people of Asia, bids fair to rival her in every duty
assumed by great civilized Powers? Is the meeting of the frontier lines
of Russia and India, which, according to the regular increase of the
Russian possessions in Central Asia, might be calculated almost to the
day, likely to prove disastrous to British empire in the latter country?

Other European Powers can afford to look on without being interested,
for only England has so precious a jewel as Hindoostan. The first
question may be passed over as merely bearing upon the advancement of
abstract principles, or the propagation of Christian doctrine,
philanthropy, and civilization; but the second is very different,
relating as it does exclusively to the material and commercial interests
of Great Britain. Before explaining how these may be affected by the
future movements of Russia, or describing the present position of that
Power in Central Asia, it will not be out of place to give a short
sketch of Russian progress.

At page 410, vol. ii., "MacGregor's Commercial Statistics," the
following interesting calculations are given:--

    "Russia contained--

    At the accession of Peter I. in      1689   15,000,000 inhabitants.
    At the accession of Catherine II. in 1762   25,000,000      "
    At her death in                      1796   36,000,000      "
    At the death of Alexander in         1825   58,000,000      "

    "Her acquisitions from Sweden are greater than what remains of
    that kingdom.

    "Her acquisitions from Poland are nearly equal to the Austrian
    empire.

    "Her acquisitions from Turkey in Europe are of greater extent
    than the Prussian dominions, exclusive of the Rhenish provinces.

    "Her acquisitions from Turkey in Asia are nearly equal in
    dimensions to the whole of the smaller states of Germany.

    "Her acquisitions from Persia are equal in extent to England.

    "Her acquisitions in Tartary have an area not inferior to that
    of Turkey in Europe, Greece, Italy, and Spain."

The valuable work quoted from was published in the year 1844. It
proceeds to state:--

    "The acquisitions she has made within the last sixty-four years
    are equal in extent and importance to the whole empire she had
    in Europe before that time.

    "The Russian frontier has been advanced towards--

    Berlin, Dresden, Munich, Vienna, and Paris      about 700 miles.
    Constantinople                                   "    500  "
    Stockholm                                        "    630  "
    Teheran                                          "  1,000  "

    "It is to be borne in mind that the Russian tariff _of
    exclusion_ has been extended to all those acquisitions where
    formerly British merchandise was freely sent."

To the above may be added the Russian acquisitions in North America,
which are nearly five times the extent of the British Isles.

Her acquisitions from the Chinese empire, the river Amoor territory in
Manchuria, are about equal in dimensions to England.

Her acquisitions from independent Tartary since 1844 are more than four
times greater in extent than the British Isles. The advance of the
Russian frontier from Orenburg to Samarkand is about 800 miles.

Every mail from India brings intelligence of further Russian progress or
conquest. The position at which we have placed her is within 200 miles
of Cabul, and 400 of Jellalabad and Cashmere. Nothing but the mountains
of Cashmere and Cabul separate the Russians from British India. Foiled
and driven back by the results of the Crimean war, Russia changed her
line of aggression from facing directly through Turkey, Persia, and so
to Hindoostan; but, by concentrating her forces upon and crushing poor
Circassia (which might have been protected with almost more reason than
Turkey was), she opened a direct passage to Persia upon the west of the
Caspian Sea, whilst at the same time other legions were carrying her
frontier line at a quick march through Tartary to the eastward. The
command of the Bosphorus would have made the Black Sea a Russian lake,
and the only assailable flank of a march into Persia would have been
protected against the great naval Powers. That position has been _par
force_ abandoned, but Russia has succeeded in obtaining another almost
equally good. By her extraordinary efforts against Circassia she has at
length managed to obtain the long-coveted Caucasian Mountains. These, in
the hands of a comparatively small force, constitute an effectual
barrier to any foreign offensive movement against her operations on, and
to the eastward of, the Caspian Sea. Thus it is palpable that no
European Power could in Europe, upon equal terms, or with a chance of
success, oppose her designs on the southern and eastern portions of
Asia. Meanwhile she is steadily possessing herself of the territory yet
independent on the frontiers of India and Thibet. During the last few
years she has successfully absorbed Khiva, the territories of the
Kirghiz and Kalpak Tartars, the provinces of Turkestan, and the
principal points of Kokan. The great cities of Tashkend and Samarkand
are in Russian hands, and the last mail from India (December, 1865)
announces that war has commenced between them and Bokhara--the last
independent kingdom of Tartary. There is an old Muscovite prediction,
which declares: "When the Russians shall have conquered Samarkand, and
shall have returned to the cradle of their Tartar ancestors, there shall
be but one rule in Asia, and the Mongols and Tartars united shall brave
the whole world." Certainly this prophecy is in progress; it remains to
be seen whether it will be accomplished.

The last telegrams report that the Russians are within six miles of
Bokhara, the capital of the country of that name, and that many
thousands of workmen are engaged constructing their military roads
through that kingdom. And where are these roads leading? In a direct
line for the nearest portion of British India! Perhaps the Russians
only wish to build summer-houses on the northern <DW72>s of the mountains
of Cashmere, though it is strange military roads and large bodies of
troops are required for such a purpose. Perhaps they wish to get on the
other side of these mountains,--time will show.

Such is the present (December, 1865) position of Russia in Asia; but
already there are signs indicative of a much farther progress. Already
the people a little beyond her advancing frontier are in turmoil and
confusion. Kashgar, Yarkend, and other portions of eastern Thibet,
together with Cabul, being in anarchy, and waiting for the arrival of
the pacificating, absorbing invader, whilst the great Mongolian province
of I-li has thrown off its allegiance to the Emperor of China. Already
the next nations are breaking up like fallow earth before the resistless
ploughshare.

The _Bombay Mail_ of December 13th states:--

    "Many reports are current of commotions in the Affghan states
    and along the Punjaub frontier.... The internal commotions in
    Cabul continue.... An envoy from Kotan has arrived at
    Cashmere.... The object of his visit is said to be to offer the
    Empress of India the allegiance of Kotan, in return for an
    assurance of protection from the Russians.... The inhabitants of
    Soket, in the hills north of Jullunder, lately made an attack on
    Mundi.... The country near Yarkand is reported to be in a state
    of insurrection. It is conjectured that this manifestation of
    revolt is an indication of _some greater power having instigated
    it_, having for its object the creation of universal revolt, and
    thus breaking the influence of China in these parts.

    "An affray recently took place between the sepoys of the Jeypore
    Rajah and the Rajah of Khetra, in which several lives were lost.
    Government have called upon the former chief for explanations.

    "Advices from the north-western frontier indicate the necessity
    for being more than ever on the alert against the increasing
    raids by various sects. Letters recently received report that
    the Wahabee Moulvies at Sittana have been purchasing the favour
    of the Akhoond of Swat, who was to stir up the tribes to a
    united effort against the British.

    "It is reported from Peshawur that the Afreedies are very
    restless, and inclined to give trouble. This tribe occupies the
    hills all along the western side of the Peshawur Valley, and
    their territory interposes between the Peshawur and Kohat
    districts. They can muster some 20,000 fighting men, all of them
    as good soldiers as can be found on the frontier."

It is quite plain to those who have studied the question, that Russian
progress towards India and China is seriously affecting the material and
commercial interests of Great Britain. For some years the Russians have
successfully competed with British merchants in China. Although their
trade has been carried on through a vast extent of territory, still the
import of Russian woollen and other manufactured goods, _via_ Irkoutsk,
Kiachta, and Mongolia, has been sufficient to suit and satisfy the
market of Western, Northern, and Central China, besides Mongolia and
Thibet. Every day increases this commerce, and makes it less expensive.
Russia brings into the contest with England (whether it be commercial or
military) overwhelming natural advantages. She is rapidly extending her
railway and telegraphic lines throughout her Asiatic dominions; and
these, besides serving to introduce the sciences, arts, and mechanical
inventions of modern civilization, are being constructed for the
conveyance of armies to the utmost limits of her empire. It is quite
possible that, by the time the Russian frontier joins that of India,
railway communication will be extended to the same point, and afford the
opportunity of conveying large bodies of troops. Russia undoubtedly has
a great future in Asia, and it is difficult to see how England can
ultimately avoid yielding before the natural advantages that will be
brought into the field against her--for that they will be so employed
one cannot doubt; unless, indeed, there be some charm by which British
interests are made sacred to her rival, and certainly the Russians are
not likely to prefer a barren steppe of Tartary to a rich slice of
India. As for the principle of the thing, the less said about that the
better. Considering the manner in which England obtained her dominions
in Hindoostan, the Russians have quite as much right to take them, if
they can; and why should we flatter ourselves that they will not try
when they become our neighbours, when we see them indiscriminately
seizing all territories which lie in their way?

It may be that we should rather rejoice at the position Russia is taking
up against India and China; it may be that, even should the result prove
injurious to us, it will not be felt till something like the lapse of
another century; but these are grave questions, and it is quite within
the bounds of probability that another few months may find us either
defending our Indian possessions, or crushing internal dissension
created by Russian intrigue amongst our  subjects.

It is scarcely to be expected (except in the event of European war) that
Russia will make any direct attack upon British India, but the very
contrast of her method of conquest with ours will create disaffection
amongst the excitable, fanatical, treacherous natives. Why this result
should ensue is explained by the well-known fact that (probably from the
admixture of Tartar blood) the Russians can amalgamate with Asiatics,
while the English cannot. Englishmen may flatter themselves that British
rule is adored in India, but all the flattery in the world cannot
obliterate the remembrance of the terrible mutiny, which, considering
the numbers that joined it who were not sepoys, might more appropriately
be termed a rebellion. Unless we have thoroughly established our rule in
the hearts of the people, we may be sure that the vicinity of Russian
dependencies will cause trouble, because Asiatics will become
Russianized far sooner than we can Anglicise them, and Russian
influences are already at work in Affghanistan, if not also in
Cashmere--whence disturbances were lately reported. In conclusion, on
this subject, it may fairly be said that Russia is performing a great
work, no doubt to the benefit of thousands of uncivilized nomades, and
that her course is very likely to lead her into collision with British
India. England cannot stop her if she would; but England _might have
had_ a powerful friend and ally in the shape of a great Asiatic Power if
she had not destroyed the Ti-pings who would have established it. By the
wilful, unjustifiable, short-sighted policy of her Government, England
has lost the glorious opportunity of helping to establish a vast
Christian empire in Asia--a course the more impolitic because its
reverse would not only have tended to raise a balance against the
incessant encroachment of Russia in the East, but to create a strong
friendly Power on the frontier of her own Indian possessions.

One object for which the author has steadily laboured, and which has had
no small share in causing the production of this work, is to counteract
the gross amount of ignorant prejudice which has been excited against
the Tipings through the medium of false reports in England. Persons
either individually implicated, or credulous enough to believe the
interested statements of those who have been concerned in slaughtering
the Ti-pings, have been gratified at the diffusion of their opinions by
sundry publications, journals, and magazines--patriotic, very, no doubt,
but nevertheless either unscrupulous or gullible.

Just to prove the utter worthlessness of the reports referred to, the
following statements are selected from two new books ("Peking and the
Pekingese," by Dr. Rennie; "Chinese Miscellanies," by Sir J. F. Davis);
whilst it is also unhesitatingly affirmed that every similar effusion,
having for its basis defamation of the Ti-pings, is equally
untrustworthy, and as easily, if not more so, refuted.

In the Dedication of the former of the two works to Sir F. Bruce, Dr.
Rennie has sufficient power of imagination to term that official's
vacillating and inane diplomacy--

    "A policy auguring so _favourably_[84][1] for the future of
    China."

With a further combination of inaccuracy, adulation, and prejudice, Dr.
Rennie proceeds to state:--

    "And which, _having been mainly conducive to the extinction of
    the Taeping rebellion_,[2] has already been attended with
    results of the highest importance to the _cause of
    humanity_."[3]

[1] It is for those who peruse this work, and all who have other
opportunities than such as Dr. Rennie gives to enlighten them, to judge
whether the "policy" in question has proved "_favourable_" or the
reverse.

[2] As for the second passage, if Dr. Rennie means that the shuffling,
spiritless, and vacillating conduct of Sir F. Bruce, marked by total
want of energy and impartiality, conduced to a certain result, by means
of having established no policy or principle of statesmanship whatever,
he is right; but if he means that his patron advocated, advised, or
countenanced the massacre of Ti-pings, he is labouring under some
extraordinary delusion, and the words of him he tries to praise, but
clearly misrepresents, prove it. Not only has the weather-vane of the
political fancies of Sir F. Bruce never been blown to within many points
of recommending direct intervention, but on the other hand he has
_violently_ deprecated any such operation, as may be seen by referring
to page 280, Chapter X., and many other parts of this work. The
finishing blow, however, is given to Dr. Rennie's illusory though
amusing panegyric, and his unfortunate premises are proved to be without
foundation; by the well-known fact that the "extinction of the Taeping
rebellion" has neither taken place, nor even seems likely to be, as
appears by a telegram in the London papers (November 24, 1865), viz.:--

    "Shanghae, October 9, 1865. The Taepings are reported to be
    again appearing in large bodies."

[3] With regard to Dr. Rennie's rodomontade about "_the cause of
humanity_," as the Ti-pings are not yet _exterminated_, it is simply
unmeaning; and all that can be said in its favour is, that it is
correctly copied from the Blue Book (see p. 738, Chap. XXIV.).

At the 89th page of "Peking and the Pekingese," Dr. Rennie endorses the
following misrepresentations:--

    "The Taepings who, Mr. Parkes states, endeavour to copy the most
    objectionable traits in the Imperialist character (?), in
    addition to which a sort of 'High life below stairs' farce is
    enacted, embracing the most absurd assumptions of dignity, with
    general licentiousness, blasphemy, and obscenity...."

Then Dr. Rennie's ire becomes aroused at the thought of such wickedness,
and the consciousness of moral rectitude filling him with a strange
_cacoethes scribendi_, he abuses the Ti-ping Wang very cruelly, by
declaring:--

    "This lunatic monarch (for such he would really seem to be) is
    waited on only by women, no males being allowed to approach him;
    bigamy (?), with general immorality, is said to be the prevailing
    institution of the Court of Nankin."

Now the above statement is no less incorrect than absurd. The Tien-wang
regularly held council with his ministers and chiefs. The insertion of
the word "bigamy" suggests motives on the part of the writer, who, we
may suppose, means polygamy. He not only forgets to blame his
Imperialist friends for conforming to _the same custom of China_, but he
must be ignorant of the fact that "bigamy" means the crime of marrying
more than one woman _only_ in countries where the civil law makes such
connection illegal. Not satisfied with thus abusing those he had never
seen, Dr. Rennie proceeds to _mis_quote from Blue Books. He says, at the
same page:--

    "The following rhapsody has lately appeared, in the form of a
    proclamation, from the Teen-wang."

He then quotes a decree, issued on the 7th of March, 1861, to establish
certain regulations in the civil department of the Ti-ping
Government,--a translation of the same being given at page 44 (Inclosure
6, in Number 11) of the Blue Book on China, presented to the British
Parliament, "in pursuance of their address, dated April 8, 1862."

The clause which either Dr. Rennie or his authority has altered, in the
original and official translation, is as follows:--

    "Thus, in addition to the perfect regulations, we have added six
    more, making nine altogether. Do not go and turn your backs on
    the Father, Brother, myself, and my son, who illuminate all
    places, benevolently harmonizing them for a myriad myriad
    generations...."

The words "Father--Brother" are, in the Chinese text, _raised_ the usual
number of spaces above "myself and my son," which at once properly
represents the Divinity. Any unprejudiced mind would certainly
understand the sentence as meaning that--"the Father, Brother, Myself,
and my Son," in our respective spheres, benevolently harmonize all
things. Dr. Rennie, however, tries to prove the blasphemous nature of
the Ti-pings in the following manner:--At page 90, first volume of his
work, he misquotes the clause of the proclamation referred to in this
way:--

    "Now do not in the least turn away your back upon Ya-ko-chum and
    Yan (?)--God, Christ, myself, and son--who illuminate all places
    AS ONE BODY POLITIC, benevolently harmonizing them for ten
    thousand times ten thousand generations."

Where does Dr. Rennie get the interpolation from? It is a totally
un-Chinese expression, but a favourite term _with English diplomatists_.
It appears a clever attempt to alter the sense of the proclamation, and
brand the Ti-pings with the crime of blasphemy. There are other cases in
which the author of "Peking and the Pekingese" goes out of his way to
endorse second-hand opinions inimical to the Ti-pings; but as he does
not attempt to corroborate them by any mention of his own experience, it
is unnecessary to further notice such valueless statements; the
misquotation exposed above, not only evidences how little reliance is
to be placed on the clique of Ti-ping maligners, but forms a fitting
conclusion to our acquaintance with a book which would have been more
valuable had the author refrained from aspersing a political cause of
which he knows literally nothing.

The misrepresentation contained in "Chinese Miscellanies," though merely
consisting of one sentence and a foot-note, is important and worthy of
contradiction, because it is promulgated by Sir J. F. Davis. Speaking,
in the preface, of the Governments of China and Japan, he states:--

    "With all their faults they are, in their integral
    characteristics, better than the _mock_ Christian[85] Taepings
    of China...."

As for the mockery of Christianity, perhaps the readers of "Ti-ping Tien
Kwoh" may agree with its author in believing that it has been altogether
upon the part of those who, like Sir J. Davis, have scoffed at, abused,
and ridiculed the faith of the Ti-pings. Many millions of men do not
establish a great revolution, and sacrifice their lives for a _mock_
purpose, whatever Sir J. Davis may think to the contrary. If "it has
been _plain from the first_" that the Ti-pings were no more like
Christians than Mahomet was like a Jew, will the clever discoverer
kindly explain the meaning of the statements of the Bishop of Victoria,
Revs. Edkins, John, Medhurst, Muirhead, &c., referred to and quoted in
this work?

All that now remains to be noticed are the movements of the Ti-pings
since capturing the city of Chang-chew, near Amoy, their present
circumstances and position.

After holding a large portion of the province of Fu-keen for about eight
months, on the 16th of May, 1865, the Ti-pings evacuated the city of
Chang-chew, and moved off to the westward.

This proceeding took both Europeans and Imperialists completely by
surprise; for, up to the day before the Shi-wang left Chang-chew, his
outposts were five miles from the city, and the Manchoo forces had not
ventured to attack them for a long time. The place was also strongly
fortified and well-provisioned--so much so, indeed, that large stores of
grain, &c., were left behind,--while the country to the west and south
was entirely under the control of the Ti-pings.

The explanation of the Shi-wang's sudden movement is due to the fact
that eleven days afterwards he joined his forces with Hung-jin, the
Kan-wang, at a distance of eighty or ninety miles inland.

Of course, as usual, frightful accounts of Ti-ping atrocities on the
march were concocted to harrow the feelings of those simple enough to
believe them. It is fortunate that trustworthy evidence exists to prove
that the Ti-pings have not yet become the "horde of banditti" England's
policy has worked so hard to make them. The Rev. W. McGregor, English
Presbyterian Missionary at Amoy (about fourteen miles from Chang-chew),
in a letter dated 10th April, 1865, declares that, whilst conquering
neighbouring parts of the province by expeditions issuing from
Chang-chew,[86] "the Ti-pings had been guilty of no wanton destruction
of property or slaughter of the people." Again, in another letter, dated
26th May, 1865, after the revolutionists had retreated inland, he
states:--

    "Of course many stories are being put in circulation about the
    cruelties of the Taepings when in possession of Chang-chew; but
    it must be remembered that these come from Mandarin sources, and
    thence through the foreign custom-house pass into circulation in
    the foreign community, while a little investigation often shows
    them to be quite unfounded. For example, it was reported that
    the Taepings left Chang-chew a perfect shamble, having massacred
    all the people that were of no use to take with them, and in
    corroboration of this some of the foreign community were taken
    up, and shown the city burning in several places, with numbers
    of dead bodies lying about; but it has to be kept in mind that,
    before this the Mandarin troops had been some days in the city,
    and the remembrance of Soo-chow ought to teach Englishmen, at
    least, how these days would be spent. The Chinese have a
    technical term for a proclamation issued ordering soldiers to
    desist from _indiscriminate_ slaughter and plunder, and I
    casually got the information from my teacher (who has the means
    of getting all news circulating in the Yamens), that Chang-chew
    was in the hands of the Imperialists four or five days before
    this proclamation was issued. The fact is, that, immediately on
    the Taepings leaving, the people whom they left (they took a
    large number with them as baggage-bearers, &c.), endeavoured to
    escape from it as fast as possible; and we have information from
    some who have escaped that, before the departure of the rebels
    no slaughter took place. How the Imperialists have acted in
    Chang-chew and the surrounding villages will be apparent from
    the single fact that, since they entered the city, the soldiers
    have been selling women at four dollars each. No evidence has
    yet been produced that the Taepings have been guilty of such
    atrocities as are implied in this statement. A short time ago,
    in consequence of some disturbances in the Tung-au region, a
    body of soldiers were detached from the Mandarin force, near
    Chang-chew, who by their own account burnt over twenty villages
    and massacred over 2,000 women and children, without meeting
    with any resistance. They ultimately returned, in consequence of
    the villagers, farther north, forming a combination for mutual
    protection, and threatening to join the rebels. We have not
    heard of an instance of the Taepings acting in such a manner."

It is impossible to tell, at present, whether the Ti-pings may become a
scourge to their country, or whether they will again rise into power and
importance, and occupy their old position. But the fact must be
carefully recorded that, in event of the former deplorable contingency,
it is British interference which has made them what they are, and that
it must be regarded as the original and responsible cause of all that is
or may be objectionable. It is now placed beyond doubt that the Kan-wang
is at the head of a great body of Ti-pings, although it is equally
certain that other divisions not under his command exist in various
directions; but, so long as he remains in authority, there need be
little fear as to the deterioration of the movement. One fact in
connection with the retreat from Chang-chew speaks volumes. It seems
that when some missionaries visited the place immediately after the
Ti-pings had fled, they made the interesting discovery described by Dr.
Carnegie (medical missionary) in the following words:--

   [87] "Only some two or three of the Christians have been heard of....
   A native preacher is amongst the missing. An interesting fact,
   however, remains to be told in connection with the rebels, and it
   is this:--That whilst they gutted the heathen temples and utterly
   demolished the many hundreds of idols with which these temples
   were stored, they respected the Christian places of worship, and
   in one of the chapels, where there is a scroll bearing these
   words, 'The pure religion of Jesus,' some of them added
   underneath, 'MAY IT SPREAD OVER THE WHOLE EARTH!'"

As Colonel Sykes, M.P., truly observes in a letter upon the above
subject, published in the _Star_, December 28th, 1865:--

    "These two testimonies, standing unscathed in a desolated city,
    will fall gratingly upon the memories of those who, with British
    bayonets and British shot and shell, in violation of good faith
    and in violation of a commanded neutrality, have aided a
    Government, which has been characterized for its constant
    perfidy and cruelty, to defeat a national party, in which, as we
    see, was not only a germ of Christianity, of probable
    development into a rich harvest, but which party also constantly
    had manifested a desire to cultivate friendly relations with
    foreigners, with a view to the introduction of Western science
    and art, as contra-distinguished from the Imperial Government,
    which stupidly and doggedly opposes itself to every proposition
    for the establishment of railways, telegraphs, the steam
    navigation of internal waters, and other useful objects."

Since the evacuation of Chang-chew, but little information has been
received regarding the movements and whereabouts of the Ti-pings. From
the depositions of two foreigners (Mansfield and Baffey), it has been
ascertained that the Kan-wang is in supreme command, nothing whatever
being heard of the Tien or Chung Wangs. Besides the force from
Chang-chew, and the main body with which it effected a junction, another
division seems to have arrived from the city of Kia-ying-chow, in the
province of Kiang-si, but it is not stated under what leader. The
concentration of these troops was probably caused by the orders of the
Kan-wang, who, it would seem, has since led them northward into
Kiang-si. Whither they are marching is as yet unknown. It is quite
possible that their intention is to join the Nien-fie in the northern
provinces, who have again defeated the Imperialists under Tseng-kwo-fan,
and seem to be moving in every direction in overwhelming numbers, while
one body is especially reported as making a diversion to the south-west.

The men, Mansfield and Baffey, were present at the junction of the
Ti-ping forces. The latter, in his deposition, states: "The Kan-wang is
about 35 years of age. He is the principal rebel-chief at the present
moment.... When I left, the rebels were talking of retreating towards
Kiang-si. They have great confidence in the Kan-wang. The latter is an
exceedingly clever man, very fond of European ideas, but very
distrustful of foreigners"--as well he may be.

Between the Nien-fie league in the north and the Ti-pings in the south,
it seems very probable the Manchoo dynasty will ultimately be
overthrown. If the Imperialist forces are concentrated in the north, in
all other quarters insurrection breaks out, and the Ti-pings rapidly
increase their strength and conquests; and so, upon the other hand, when
they move against the Ti-pings in the south, the Nien-fie, Mohamedan
rebels, &c., gain numberless adherents, and capture city after city with
impunity. Every mail brings some dim tidings of disaster to the Tartar
cause England has been so wantonly led to support. It is extraordinary
that while internal dangers are rapidly increasing, the Manchoos should
be fulfilling their anti-foreign intentions when foreign help alone can
save them. A late number of the _China Overland Trade Report_, dated
Hong-kong, 31st December, 1865, states:-

    "Since the late evacuation of the Taku forts much labour and
    outlay have been expended in strengthening the fortifications;
    in fact, it is said that when the plan adopted shall be carried
    out, these forts will be impregnable except to iron-clads. The
    proceeding is significant when taken in connection with the
    anti-foreign policy known to be cherished."

Intelligence from China, bearing date February 1st, 1866, announces a
Ti-ping victory in the province of Fu-keen, the Imperialists losing
their leader, Kwo-sun-liang. The Ti-pings have also recaptured the
important city of Kia-ying-chow, which had been evacuated by the third
division of the army, at present combined under the Kan-wang's command,
before the junction was effected.

At the same time further victorious progress of the Nien-fie is
reported, and a large rebel force (supposed to be of that movement) has
appeared within 30 miles of Hankow, the great commercial city and treaty
port situated some 700 miles up the river Yang-tze-kiang. It would thus
seem that a considerable division of the Nien-fie army has been detached
on a rapid march to the south-west; at the same time the Ti-pings have
moved to the north-west, and captured Kia-ying-chow, so that it is
plain, if each force continues its advance, they will shortly meet,
which is very likely their intention.

What the consequences will be if the Ti-pings are fortunate and wise
enough to effect a junction with the Nien-fie can scarcely admit of a
doubt. Without foreign assistance the Imperialists are unable to cope
with either of the great rebellions, how much less would they be able to
resist the two combined! It only requires such an amalgamation of the
two great parties in opposition to the Manchoo rule to cause the native
population to rise _en masse_. Each mail brings tidings of fresh
outbreaks in every part of the distracted empire, and it is ominous for
the present dynasty that the literary class, the highest in China, are
beginning to raise and lead local insurrection, as was the case in
December, 1865, at the town of Chin-shan, only 65 miles from Shanghae, a
part of the country just pacified by British swords!

"The unfortunate have always been deserted and betrayed," and how much
more by those who have guiltily made them unfortunate in the first
place! It is therefore easy to understand the nature of the hostility
which has been excited in England against the Ti-pings--against the only
section of the people of China whom righteous men can look to as
affording a prospect of forwarding the true interests and improvement of
that vast and beautiful and incalculably rich country.

It is bad to go to war at all; it is highly criminal to make war upon an
unoffending neighbour; and it is enormous guilt to use hostilities for
the purpose of subduing a free and happy people because they _might_
interfere with our profits; but in what words can the double crime of
waging war upon mercenary grounds against the cause of liberty and
Christianity be expressed? Yet such, unfortunately, is the course which
England has pursued by taking part against the Ti-pings.

It is true there is yet some hope that the policy of the Cabinet of her
late lamented statesman, Lord Palmerston, may prove a failure. The
Chinese Christian patriots have still a chance of successfully defending
themselves, and they have strong hope, for their chiefs have repeatedly
said, "The Mings took a hundred years to found their dynasty, and
possibly so may we, but most assuredly, sooner or later, we shall expel
the Tartars and succeed, for the Heavenly Father is with us, and who can
triumph against Him?"

Let Englishmen therefore trust that their rulers will in future observe
the neutrality they have once more professed, and not again wage an
unrighteous war without even declaring it, and in violation of their
official pledges. All men whose minds have a spark of philanthropy,
civilization, or Christian faith, will wish their Chinese brothers God
speed.

Let us trust that, phoenix-like, the Ti-pings may rise from the ashes of
their former glory and yet succeed in their great religio-political
movement, that they may again print and widely circulate the Holy Bible,
which, throughout all their former territory, British bayonets and
Manchoo torches have for a time destroyed, and that England will not
have to answer for the sin of crushing the first Christian movement in
modern Asia, and the last apparent opportunity of Christianizing and
liberating China.

While looking forward hopefully to the future of the Ti-pings, because
the cause of liberty is theirs, and the cause of the Gospel is theirs
also, let it be remembered (as applying to the former phase) that a
great man has said:--

    "For freedom's battle once begun,
    Bequeathed by bleeding sire to son,
    Though baffled oft, is ever won."

And let it be remembered (as applying to the latter phase) that the
Ti-ping movement was originated through acceptation of the Gospel, and
that to comfort those who are persecuted for Its sake, it is therein
declared:--

    "We are troubled on every side, yet not distressed; we are
    perplexed, but not in despair.
    "Persecuted, but not forsaken; cast down, but not destroyed."


FOOTNOTES:

[83] Published in the _Daily News_, August 8, 1865.

[84] The italics are ours.

[85] "It has been plain from the first, that they were no more like
Christians than Mahomet was like a Jew" (p. iv).

[86] Published in _The English Presbyterian Messenger_, July 1st and
August 1, 1865.

[87] See p. 13, "Occasional Paper," No. 10, dated July, 1865, issued
with the Tenth Annual Report of the China Mission at Amoy and Swatow,
1864-5.




APPENDIX A.

RELIGIOUS PUBLICATIONS WRITTEN BY THE TIEN-WANG HUNG-SIU-TSHUEN, AND
USED BY THE TI-PINGS.


DECALOGUE.
THE TEN CELESTIAL COMMANDS WHICH ARE TO BE CONSTANTLY OBSERVED.


THE FIRST COMMAND.
THOU SHALT HONOUR AND WORSHIP THE GREAT GOD.

_Remark._--The great God is the universal Father of all men, in every
nation under heaven. Every man is produced and nourished by him: every
man is also protected by him: every man ought, therefore, morning and
evening, to honour and worship him, with acknowledgments of his
goodness. It is a common saying, that Heaven produces, nourishes, and
protects men. Also, that being provided with food we must not deceive
Heaven. Therefore, whoever does not worship the great God breaks the
commands of Heaven.

    _The Hymn says_:--

    Imperial Heaven, the Supreme God is the true Spirit (God):
    Worship him every morning and evening, and you will be taken up;
    You ought deeply to consider the ten celestial commands,
    And not by your foolishness obscure the right principles of nature.


THE SECOND COMMAND.
THOU SHALT NOT WORSHIP CORRUPT SPIRITS (GODS).

_Remark._--The great God says, Thou shalt have no other spirits (gods)
beside me. Therefore all besides the great God are corrupt spirits
(gods), deceiving and destroying mankind; they must on no account be
worshipped: whoever worships the whole class of corrupt spirits (gods)
offends against the commands of Heaven.

    _The Hymn says_:--

    Corrupt devils very easily delude the souls of men.
    If you perversely believe in them, you will at last go down to hell.
    We exhort you all, brave people, to awake from your lethargy,
    And early make your peace with your exalted Heavenly Father.


THE THIRD COMMAND.
THOU SHALT NOT TAKE THE NAME OF THE GREAT GOD IN VAIN.

_Remark._--The name of the great God is Jehovah, which men must not take
in vain. Whoever takes God's name in vain, and rails against Heaven,
offends against this command.

    _The Hymn says_:--

    Our exalted Heavenly Father is infinitely honourable;
    Those who disobey and profane his name, seldom come to a good end.
    If unacquainted with the true doctrine, you should be on your guard,
    For those who wantonly blaspheme involve themselves in endless crime.


THE FOURTH COMMAND.
ON THE SEVENTH DAY, THE DAY OF WORSHIP, YOU SHOULD PRAISE THE GREAT GOD
FOR HIS GOODNESS.

_Remark._--In the beginning the great God made heaven and earth, land
and sea, men and things, in six days; and having finished his works on
the seventh day, he called it the day of rest (or Sabbath): therefore
all the men of the world, who enjoy the blessing of the great God,
should on every seventh day especially reverence and worship the great
God, and praise him for his goodness.

    _The Hymn says_:--

    All the happiness enjoyed in the world comes from Heaven;
    It is therefore reasonable that men should give thanks and sing;
    At the daily morning and evening meal there should be thanksgiving,
    But on the seventh day, the worship should be more intense.


THE FIFTH COMMAND.
THOU SHALT HONOUR THY FATHER AND THY MOTHER, THAT THY DAYS MAY BE
PROLONGED.

_Remark._--Whoever disobeys his parents breaks this command.

    _The Hymn says_:--

    History records that Shun honoured his parents to the end of his days,
    Causing them to experience the intensest pleasure and delight:
    August Heaven will abundantly reward all who act thus,
    And do not disappoint the expectation of the authors of their being.


THE SIXTH COMMAND.
THOU SHALT NOT KILL OR INJURE MEN.

_Remark._--He who kills another kills himself, and he who injures
another injures himself. Whoever does either of these breaks the above
command.

    _The Hymn says_:--

    The whole world is one family, and all men are brethren,
    How can they be permitted to kill and destroy one another?
    The outward form and the inward principle are both conferred by Heaven:
    Allow every one, then, to enjoy the ease and comfort which he desires.


THE SEVENTH COMMAND.
THOU SHALT NOT COMMIT ADULTERY OR ANYTHING UNCLEAN.

_Remark._--All the men in the world are brethren, and all the women in
the world are sisters. Among the sons and daughters of the celestial
hall the males are on one side and the females on the other, and are not
allowed to intermix. Should either men or women practise lewdness they
are considered outcasts, as having offended against one of the chief
commands of Heaven. The casting of amorous glances, the harbouring of
lustful imaginations, the smoking of foreign tobacco (opium), or the
singing of libidinous songs must all be considered as breaches of this
command.

    _The Hymn says_:--

    Lust and lewdness constitute the chief transgression,
    Those who practise it become outcasts, and are the objects of pity.
    If you wish to enjoy the substantial happiness of heaven,
    It is necessary to deny yourself and earnestly cultivate virtue.


THE EIGHTH COMMAND.
THOU SHALT NOT ROB OR STEAL.

_Remark._--Riches and poverty are determined by the great God; but
whosoever robs or plunders the property of others transgresses this
command.

    _The Hymn says_:--

    Rest contented with your station, however poor, and do not steal.
    Robbery and violence are low and abandoned practices.
    Those who injure others really injure themselves.
    Let the noble-minded among you immediately reform.


THE NINTH COMMAND.
THOU SHALT NOT UTTER FALSEHOOD.

_Remark._--All those who tell lies, and indulge in devilish deceits,
with every kind of coarse and abandoned talk, offend against this
command.

    _The Hymn says_:--

    Lying discourse and unfounded stories must all be abandoned.
    Deceitful and wicked words are offences against Heaven.
    Much talk will, in the end, bring evil on the speakers.
    It is then much better to be cautious, and regulate one's own mind.


THE TENTH COMMAND.
THOU SHALT NOT CONCEIVE A COVETOUS DESIRE.

_Remark._--When a man looks upon the beauty of another's wife and
daughters with covetous desires, or when he regards the elegance of
another man's possessions with covetous desires, or when he engages in
gambling, he offends against this command.

    _The Hymn says_:--

    In your daily conduct do not harbour covetous desires.
    When involved in the sea of lust the consequences are very serious.
    The above injunctions were handed down on Mount Sinai;
    And to this day the celestial commands retain all their force.

       *       *       *       *       *

    "NOTE.--The expression 'corrupt spirits' in the remarks upon the
    second commandment, rendered by the translator 'gods,' refers
    probably to the numerous malevolent spirits whom all uneducated
    Chinese believe to have power over all things noxious to the
    human race. The gods of thunder, lightning, wind, &c., are the
    principal of these, but there are also hundreds of inferior
    spirits whom poor householders believe to be abroad at night,
    with power, if they so will, to spread pestilence, disaster, and
    fire, and who consequently receive daily and nightly offerings
    of prayer and incense from the timid and trembling poor, who
    dread the exercise of their malevolence."--(_The Taepings in
    China._)




THE TRIMETRICAL CLASSIC.

EACH LINE IN THE ORIGINAL CONTAINING THREE WORDS, AND EACH VERSE FOUR
LINES.

    The Great God
    Made heaven and earth,
    Both land and sea,
    And all things therein.

    In six days
    He made the whole;
    Man, the lord of all,
    Was endowed with glory and honour.

    Every seventh day worship,
    In acknowledgment of Heaven's favour;
    Let all under Heaven
    Keep their hearts in reverence.

    It is said that in former times
    A foreign nation was commanded
    To honour God;
    The nation's name was Israel.

    Their twelve tribes
    Removed into Egypt;
    Where God favoured them,
    And their posterity increased.

    Then a king arose
    Into whose heart the devil entered;
    He envied their prosperity,
    And inflicted pain and misery.

    Ordering the daughters to be preserved,
    But not allowing the sons to live;
    Their bondage was severe
    And very difficult to bear.

    The Great God
    Viewed them with pity,
    And commanded Moses
    To return to his family.

    He commanded Aaron
    To go and meet Moses;
    When both addressed the king,
    And wrought divers miracles.

    The king hardened his heart
    And would not let them go;
    Wherefore God was angry
    And sent lice and locusts.

    He also sent flies,
    Together with frogs,
    Which entered their palaces
    And crept into their ovens.

    When the king still refused,
    The river was turned into blood!
    And the water became bitter
    Throughout all Egypt.

    God sent boils and blains,
    With pestilence and murrain;
    He also sent hail,
    Which was very grievous.

    The king still refusing,
    He slew their first-born;
    When the King of Egypt
    Had no resource,

    But let them go
    Out of his land;
    The Great God
    Upheld and sustained them.

    By day in a cloud,
    By night in a pillar of fire;
    The Great God
    Himself saved them.

    The king hardened his heart,
    And led his armies in pursuit;
    But God was angry
    And displayed his majesty.

    Arrived at the Red Sea,
    The waters were spread abroad;
    The people of Israel
    Were very much afraid.

    The pursuers overtook them,
    But God stayed their course;
    He himself fought for them,
    And the people had no trouble.

    He caused the Red Sea
    With its waters to divide;
    To stand up as a wall,
    That they might pass between.

    The people of Israel
    Marched with a steady step
    As though on dry ground,
    And thus saved their lives.

    The pursuers attempting to cross,
    Their wheels were taken off,
    When the waters closed upon them,
    And they were all drowned.

    The Great God
    Displayed his power,
    And the people of Israel
    Were all preserved.

    When they came to the desert
    They had nothing to eat;
    But the Great God
    Bade them not be afraid.

    He sent down manna,
    For each man a pint;
    It was as sweet as honey,
    And satisfied their appetites.

    The people lusted much,
    And wished to eat flesh,
    When quails were sent
    By the millions of bushels.

    At the Mount Sinai
    Miracles were displayed,
    And Moses was commanded
    To make tables of stone.

    The Great God
    Gave his celestial commands,
    Amounting to ten precepts,
    The breach of which would not be forgiven.

    He himself wrote them,
    And gave them to Moses;
    The celestial law
    Cannot be altered.

    In after ages
    It was sometimes disobeyed,
    Through the devil's temptations
    When men fell into misery.

    But the Great God,
    Out of pity to mankind,
    Sent his first-born Son
    To come down into the world.

    His name is Jesus,
    The Lord and Saviour of men,
    Who redeems them from sin
    By the endurance of extreme misery.

    Upon the cross
    They nailed his body,
    Where he shed his precious blood
    To save all mankind.

    Three days after his death
    He rose from the dead,
    And during forty days
    He discoursed on heavenly things.

    When he was about to ascend,
    He commanded his disciples
    To communicate his gospel
    And proclaim his revealed will.

    Those who believe will be saved
    And ascend to heaven;
    But those who do not believe
    Will be the first to be condemned.

    Throughout the whole world
    There is only one God,
    The Great Lord and Ruler
    Without a second.

           *       *       *       *       *

    The Chinese in early ages
    Were regarded by God;
    Together with the foreign states
    They walked in one way.

    From the time of Pwan-koo,[88]
    Down to the three dynasties,[89]
    They honoured God,
    As history records.

    T'hang of the Shang dynasty,[90]
    And Wan of the Chow,[91]
    Honoured God
    With the intensest feeling.

    The inscription on T'hang's bathing-tub
    Inculcated daily renovation of mind;
    And God commanded him
    To assume the government of the empire.

    Wan was very respectful
    And intelligently served God;
    So that the people who submitted to him
    Were two out of every three.

    When Tsin obtained the empire[92]
    He was infatuated with the genii,
    And the nation has been deluded by the devil
    For the last two thousand years.

    Suen and Woo of the Han dynasty[93]
    Both followed this bad example,
    So that the mad rebellion increased
    In imitation of Tsin's misrule.

    When Woo arrived at old age,
    He repented of his folly,
    And lamented that from his youth up
    He had always followed the wrong road.

    Ming of the Han dynasty[94]
    Welcomed the institutions of Buddha,
    And set up temples and monasteries
    To the great injury of the country.

    But Hwang of the Sung dynasty
    Was still more mad and infatuated,
    For he changed the name of Shang-te (God)
    Into that of Yuh-hwang (the pearly emperor).[95]

    But the Great God
    Is the supreme Lord
    Over all the world,
    The Great Father in heaven.

    His name is most honourable,
    To be handed down through distant ages;
    Who was this Hwuy,
    That he dared to alter it?

    It was meet that this same Hwuy
    Should be taken by the Tartars,
    And together with his son
    Perish in the northern desert.

    From Hwuy of the Sung dynasty
    Up to the present day,
    For these seven hundred years
    Men have sunk deeper and deeper in error.

    With the doctrine of God
    They have not been acquainted,
    While the king of Hades
    Has deluded them to the utmost.

           *       *       *       *       *

    The Great God displays
    Liberality deep as the sea;
    But the devil has injured man
    In a most outrageous manner.

    God is therefore displeased
    And has sent his Son[96]
    With orders to come down into the world
    Having first studied the classics.

    In the Ting-yeu year (1837)
    He was received up into Heaven,
    Where the affairs of Heaven
    Were clearly pointed out to him.

    The great God
    Personally instructed him,
    Gave him odes and documents,
    And communicated to him the true doctrine.

    God also gave him a seal,
    And conferred upon him a sword
    Connected with authority
    And majesty irresistible.

    He bade him, together with the elder brother,
    Namely Jesus,
    To drive away impish fiends
    With the co-oporation of angels.

    There was one who looked on with envy,
    Namely, the king of Hades,
    Who displayed much malignity
    And acted like a devilish serpent.

    But the great God,
    With a high hand,
    Instructed his Son
    To subdue this fiend,

    And having conquered him,
    To show him no favour;
    And in spite of his envious eye
    He damped all his courage.

    Having overcome the fiend,
    He returned to Heaven,
    Where the great God
    Gave him great authority.

    The celestial mother was kind
    And exceedingly gracious,
    Beautiful and noble in the extreme,
    Far beyond all compare.

    The celestial elder brother's wife
    Was virtuous and very considerate,
    Constantly exhorting the elder brother
    To do things deliberately.

    The great God,
    Out of love to mankind,
    Again commissioned his Son
    To come down into the world.

    And when he sent him down,
    He charged him not to be afraid;
    I am with you, said he,
    To superintend everything.

    In the Mow-shin year (1848)
    The Son was troubled and distressed,
    When the great God
    Appeared on his behalf.

    Bringing Jesus with him,
    They both came down into the world,
    Where he instructed his Son
    How to sustain the weight of government.

    God has set up his Son
    To endure for ever,
    To defeat corrupt machinations
    And to display majesty and authority.

    Also to judge the world,
    To divide the righteous from the wicked,
    And consign them to the misery of hell,
    Or bestow on them the joys of heaven.

    Heaven manages everything,
    Heaven sustains the whole;
    Let all beneath the sky
    Come and acknowledge the new monarch.

    Little children,
    Worship God,
    Keep his commandments,
    And do not disobey.

    Let your minds be refined,
    And be not depraved,
    The great God
    Constantly surveys you.

    You must refine yourselves well,
    And not be depraved:
    Vice willingly practised
    Is the first step to misery.

    To insure a good end,
    You must make a good beginning:
    An error of a hair's breadth
    May lead to a discrepancy of a thousand li.

    Be careful about little things,
    And watch the minute springs of action:
    The great God
    Is not to be deceived.

    Little children,
    Arouse your energies:
    The laws of high heaven
    Admit not of infraction.

    Upon the good blessings descend,
    And miseries on the wicked;
    Those who obey Heaven are preserved,
    And those who disobey perish.

    The great God
    Is a spiritual Father;
    All things whatever
    Depend on him.

    The great God
    Is the Father of our spirits:
    Those who devoutly serve him
    Will obtain blessings.

    Those who obey the fathers of their flesh
    Will enjoy longevity;
    Those who requite their parents
    Will certainly obtain happiness.

    Do not practise lewdness,
    Nor any uncleanness;
    Do not tell lies,
    Do not kill and slay.

    Do not steal,
    Do not covet:
    The great God
    Will strictly carry out his laws.

    Those who obey Heaven's commands
    Will enjoy celestial happiness;
    Those who are grateful for divine favours
    Will receive divine support.

    Heaven blesses the good
    And curses the bad:
    Little children!
    Maintain correct conduct.

    The correct are men,
    The corrupt are imps:
    Little children!
    Seek to avoid disgrace.

    God loves the upright,
    And he hates the vicious:
    Little children!
    Be careful to avoid error.

    The great God
    Sees everything;
    If you wish to enjoy happiness,
    Refine and correct yourselves.


FOOTNOTES:

[88] Pwan-koo, the first man, was, according to Chinese mythology, the
offspring of Chaos, and the creator of the earth, sun, moon, and stars.

[89] The period of the three dynasties began B.C. 2207, and ended B.C.
247.

[90] B.C. 1766.

[91] B.C. 1121. Both these emperors (T'hang and Wan) are stated by Du
Halde to have worshipped Heaven.

[92] B.C. 247.

[93] B.C. 74--A.D. 25.

[94] A.D. 58. The emperor Ming, having heard that the true religion was
to be found in the west, despatched (A.D. 66) ambassadors into Northern
India, who, finding the majority of the people in that region to be
worshippers of Fo, brought back with them several Bonzes in order to
spread the faith; and thus Buddhism was introduced into China.

[95] This emperor (Hwuy) was a firm believer in the superstitions of the
Taouists. A.D. 1101--1126.

[96] Hung-siu-tsuen.




ODE FOR YOUTH.

EACH LINE IN THE ORIGINAL CONTAINING FIVE WORDS, AND EACH VERSE FOUR
LINES.


ON THE WORSHIP OF GOD.

    Let the true Spirit, the great God,
    Be honoured and adored by all nations;
    Let all the inhabitants of the world
    Unite in his worship, morning and evening.

    Above and below, look where you may,
    All things are imbued with the Divine favour.
    At the beginning, in six days,
    All things were created, perfect and complete.

    Whether circumcised or uncircumcised,
    Who is not produced by God?
    Reverently praise the Divine favour
    And you will obtain eternal glory.


ON REVERENCE FOR JESUS.

    Jesus, his first-born Son,
    Was in former times sent by God:
    He willingly gave his life to redeem us from sin;
    Of a truth his merits are pre-eminent.

    His cross was hard to bear;
    The sorrowing clouds obscured the sun.
    The adorable Son, the honoured of heaven,
    Died for you, the children of men.

    After his resurrection he ascended to heaven;
    Resplendent in glory, he wields authority supreme.
    In him we know that we may trust
    To secure salvation and ascend to Heaven.


ON THE HONOUR DUE TO PARENTS.

    As grain is stored against a day of need,
    So men bring up children to tend their old age;
    A filial son begets filial children,--
    The recompense here is truly wonderful.

    Do you ask how this our body
    Is to attain to length of years?
    Keep the fifth command, we say,
    And honour and emolument will descend upon you.


ON THE COURT.

    The imperial court is an awe-inspiring spot,
    Let those about it dread celestial majesty;
    Life and death emanate from Heaven's son,
    Let every officer avoid disobedience.


ON THE DUTIES OF THE SOVEREIGN.

    When one man presides over the government,
    All nations become settled and tranquillized:
    When the sovereign grasps the sceptre of power,
    Calumny and corruption sink and disappear.


ON THE DUTIES OF MINISTERS.

    When the prince is upright, ministers are true;
    When the sovereign is intelligent, ministers will be honest.
    E and Chow are models worthy of imitation:
    They acted uprightly and aided the government.


ON THE DUTIES OF FAMILIES.

    The members of one family being intimately related,
    They should live in joy and harmony;
    When the feeling of concord unites the whole,
    Blessings will descend upon them from above.


ON THE DUTIES OF A FATHER.

    When the main beam is straight, the joists will be regular;
    When a father is strict, his duty will be fulfilled:
    Let him not provoke his children to wrath,
    And a delightful harmony will pervade the dwelling.


ON THE DUTIES OF A MOTHER.

    Ye mothers, beware of partiality,
    But tenderly instruct your children in virtue;
    When you are a fit example to your daughters,
    The happy feeling will reach to the clouds.


ON THE DUTIES OF SONS.

    Sons, be patterns to your wives;
    Consider obedience to parents the chief duty;
    Do not listen to the tattle of women,
    And you will not be estranged from your own flesh.


ON THE DUTIES OF DAUGHTERS-IN-LAW.

    Ye that are espoused into other families,
    Be gentle and yielding, and your duty is fulfilled;
    Do not quarrel with your sisters-in-law,
    And thereby vex the old father and mother.


ON THE DUTIES OF ELDER BROTHERS.

    Elder brothers, instruct your juniors;
    Remember well your common parentage;
    Should they commit a trifling fault,
    Bear with it and treat them indulgently.


ON THE DUTIES OF YOUNGER BROTHERS.

    Disparity in years is ordered by Heaven;
    Duty to seniors consists in respect.
    When younger brothers obey Heaven's dictates,
    Happiness and honour will be their portion.


ON THE DUTIES OF ELDER SISTERS.

    Elder sisters, instruct your younger sisters,
    Study improvement and fit yourselves for Heaven.
    Should you occasionally visit your former homes,
    Get the little ones around you and tell them what is right.


ON THE DUTIES OF YOUNGER SISTERS.

    Girls, obey your elder brothers and sisters,
    Be obliging and avoid arrogance,
    Carefully give yourselves to self-improvement,
    And mind and keep the Ten Commandments.


ON THE DUTIES OF HUSBANDS.

    Unbending firmness is natural to the man,
    Love for a wife should be qualified by prudence;
    And should the lioness roar,
    Let not terror fill the mind.


ON THE DUTIES OF WIVES.

    Women, be obedient to your three male relatives,
    And do not disobey your lords:
    When hens crow in the morning,
    Sorrow may be expected in the family.


ON THE DUTIES OF ELDER BROTHERS' WIVES.

    What is the duty of an elder brother's wife,
    And what her most appropriate deportment?
    Let her cheerfully harmonize with younger brothers' wives,
    And she will never do amiss.


ON THE DUTIES OF YOUNGER BROTHERS' WIVES.

    Younger brothers' wives should respect their elder brothers' wives,
    In humility honouring their elder brothers;
    In all things yielding to their senior sisters-in-law,
    Which will result in harmony superior to music.


ON THE DUTIES OF THE MALE SEX.

    Let every man have his own partner
    And maintain the duties of the human relations
    Firm and unbending; his duties lie from home,
    But he should avoid such things as cause suspicion.


ON THE DUTIES OF THE FEMALE SEX.

    The duty of woman is to maintain chastity;
    She should shun proximity to the other sex;
    Sober and decorous, she should keep at home:
    Thus she can secure happiness and felicity.


ON CONTRACTING MARRIAGES.

    Marriages are the result of some relation in a former state
    The disposal of which rests with Heaven.
    When contracted, affection should flow in a continued stream,
    And the association should be uninterrupted.


ON MANAGING THE HEART.

    For the purpose of controlling the whole body,
    God has given to man an intelligent mind;
    When the heart is correct, it becomes the true regulator
    To which the senses and members are all obedient.


ON MANAGING THE EYES.

    The various corruptions first delude the eye;
    But if the eye be correct, all evil will be avoided:
    Let the pupil of the eye be sternly fixed,
    And the light of the body will shine up to heaven.


ON MANAGING THE EAR.

    Whatever sounds assail my ear,
    Let me listen to all in silence:
    Deaf to the entrance of evil,
    Pervious to good, in order to be eminently intelligent.


ON MANAGING THE MOUTH.

    The tongue is a prolific source of strife,
    And a multitude of words leads to mischief;
    Let me not be defiled by lying and corrupt discourse,
    Careful and cautious, let reason be my guide.


ON MANAGING THE HAND.

    To cut off the hand whereby we are dragged to evil
    Appears a determination worthy of high praise;
    The duty of the hand is to manifest respect,
    But for improper objects move not a finger.


ON MANAGING THE FEET.

    Let the feet walk in the path of rectitude,
    And ever follow it, without treading awry;
    For the countless by-paths of life
    Lead only to mischief in the end.


THE WAY TO GET TO HEAVEN.

    Honour and disgrace come from a man's self;
    But men should exert themselves
    To keep the Ten Commandments,
    And they will enjoy bliss in Heaven.




APPENDIX B.

EXPORT OF TEA AND SILK FROM CHINA,

    _Showing the State of the Trade before, during, and after the
    Occupation of the producing Districts by the Ti-pings._

    [From the following Figures the Effect of their Presence upon
    Commerce may be judged.]


TOTAL EXPORTS during the Five Years immediately preceding the Outbreak
of the Ti-ping Revolution.

    +--------------------+--------------+----------+
    |  DATE OF EXPORT.   |     TEA.     | RAW SILK.|
    +--------------------+--------------+----------+
    |                    |   Pounds.    |  Bales.  |
    |  Year   1845-1846  |  57,580,000  |  18,600  |
    |    "    1846-1847  |  53,360,000  |  19,000  |
    |    "    1847-1848  |  47,690,000  |  21,377  |
    |    "    1848-1849  |  47,240,000  |  17,228  |
    |    "    1849-1850  |  53,960,000  |  16,134  |
    +--------------------+--------------+----------+

_Remarks._--These returns are quoted by Col. Sykes, M.P., in his
pamphlet on "The Progress of Trade with China, 1833-1860," and are
copied from the _Friend of China_, which journal, then established at
Canton, published a tabular form, showing the total exports (exclusive
of Ningpo) from all Treaty Ports, 1843 to 1858.

       *       *       *       *       *

TOTAL EXPORTS during the First Three Years of the Revolution, while the
Ti-pings were steadily progressing northward.

    +--------------------+--------------+----------+
    |  DATE OF EXPORT.   |     TEA.     | RAW SILK.|
    +--------------------+--------------+----------+
    |                    |   Pounds.    |  Bales.  |
    |  Year   1850-1851  |  64,020,000  |  22,143  |
    |    "    1851-1852  |  65,130,000  |  23,040  |
    |    "    1852-1853  |  72,900,000  |  25,571  |
    +--------------------+--------------+----------+

_Remarks._--It will be seen that the progress of the rebellion did not
interfere with trade, which continued steadily increasing.

       *       *       *       *       *

TOTAL EXPORTS from date of Capture of Nankin, and many producing
Districts, by the Ti-pings, to 1859.

    +--------------------+--------------+----------+
    |  DATE OF EXPORT.   |     TEA.     | RAW SILK.|
    +--------------------+--------------+----------+
    |                    |   Pounds.    |  Bales.  |
    |  Year   1853-1854  |  77,210,000  |  61,984  |
    |    "    1854-1855  |  86,500,000  |  51,486  |
    |    "    1855-1856  |  91,930,000  |  50,489  |
    |    "    1856-1857  |  61,460,000  |  74,215  |
    |    "    1857-1858  |  76,740,000  |  60,736  |
    +--------------------+--------------+----------+

_Remarks._--It will be seen that the exports, although to a certain
extent coming from, or passing through, Ti-ping territory, continued
regularly increasing, especially in the case of the silk trade.

       *       *       *       *       *

TOTAL EXPORTS during the Two Years preceding the Capture, of the entire
Silk, and about half of the Tea, Districts.

    +-----------------+-------------+------------+
    | DATE OF EXPORT. |     TEA.    |  RAW SILK. |
    +-----------------+-------------+------------+
    |                 |    Pounds.  |   Bales.   |
    | Year  1858-1859 |  65,789,792 |   81,136   |
    |  "    1859-1860 |  85,938,493 |   69,137   |
    +-----------------+-------------+------------+

_Remarks._--These returns are carefully copied from the bi-monthly
issues of _The China Overland Trade Report_.

       *       *       *       *       *

TOTAL EXPORTS during the entire Occupation of the Silk Districts.

    +-----------------+-------------+------------+
    | DATE OF EXPORT. |     TEA.    |  RAW SILK. |
    +-----------------+-------------+------------+
    |                 |   Pounds.   |   Bales.   |
    | Year  1860-1861 |  87,220,754 |   88,754   |
    |  "    1861-1862 | 107,351,649 |   73,322   |
    |  "    1862-1863 | 118,692,138 |   83,264   |
    +-----------------+-------------+------------+

_Remarks._--The Ti-pings captured Soo-chow, the capital of the silk
districts (and shortly after the _whole_ of that valuable country), in
the month of May, 1860. It will be seen that, instead of injuring the
silk trade, at the termination of the next business year--season
1860-61, commencing June 1, 1860, and ending 31st May, 1861--they had
_increased_ it to 88,754 bales, the greatest number ever exported from
China in one year; to 73,322, season 1861-62; and 83,264, season
1862-63; whilst the export of tea, mostly from regions in their
possession, was raised from 66,000,000 pounds in 1860, to 119,000,000 in
1863! These figures cover the period of entire occupation of the silk
districts by the Ti-pings, and their occupation of the tea districts of
Fy-chow, Taeping-hien, and others in the provinces of Ngan-whui,
Che-kiang, Kiang-si, and Kiang-su, and extend to the end of May, 1863.

       *       *       *       *       *

TOTAL EXPORTS _since_ the Ti-pings have been driven from the Silk
Districts.

    +-----------------+-------------+------------+
    | DATE OF EXPORT. |     TEA.    |  RAW SILK. |
    +-----------------+-------------+------------+
    |                 |   Pounds.   |   Bales.   |
    | Year  1863-1864 | 119,689,238 |   46,863   |
    |  "    1864-1865 | 121,236,870 |   41,128   |
    +-----------------+-------------+------------+

_Remarks._--These returns prove, better than any history or argument,
who were the devastators of the former Ti-ping territory. While the
revolutionists held and governed the valuable silk districts, that
article was produced and exported in larger quantities than had ever
been known before. After the British had made the producing districts
the theatre of the war, and finally succeeded in driving the Ti-pings
out, the supply of silk at once fell to half the export during the
Ti-ping dominion, and the second year after to still less.




APPENDIX C.

MEMORANDUM OF TI-PINGS KILLED DURING THE BRITISH HOSTILITIES AGAINST
THEM.


+----------------------+----------+---------------+---------+-------------+
|                      |          |               | Number  |British, or  |
|     Where Killed.    |   Date.  |By what Forces.| Killed. |Allied,      |
|                      |          |               |         |Casualties.  |
+----------------------+----------+---------------+---------+-------------+
|Before Shanghae,      |August,   |British and    |    300  |Nil.         |
|while striving        |1860.     |French.        |         |             |
|to peaceably          |          |               |         |             |
|negotiate.            |          |               |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|Near the city of      |December, |Ward's         |  2,000  |100 killed   |
|Soong-kong (twenty    |1861.     |disciplined    |         |and          |
|miles from Shanghae). |          |Contingent     |         |wounded.     |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|At the capture of the |21st      |British and    |    150  |1 killed by  |
|village Kao-kiau.     |February, |French.        |         |a stray shot.|
|                      |1862.     |               |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|During the capture    |1st       |Ditto.         |  1,300  |Nil.         |
|of stockades at       |March,    |               |         |             |
|Ming-hong.            |1862.     |               |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|At capture of         |4th       |Ditto.         |    600  |1 killed,    |
|Wong-ka-dzu stockades.|April,    |               |         |1 wounded.   |
|                      |1862.     |               |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|Capture of the village|5th       |Admiral        |    300  |Nil.         |
|of Lu-ka-kong.        |April,    |Hope's and     |         |             |
|                      |1862.     |Ward's forces. |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|At the village of     |17th      |British,       |    900  |Nil.         |
|Che-poo.              |April,    |French,        |         |             |
|                      |1862.     |and            |         |             |
|                      |          |Ward's forces. |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|At the capture of the |1st       |Allied British,|  3,500  |5 or 6       |
|city of Kah-ding.     |May,      |French, and    |         |wounded.     |
|                      |1862.     |Imperialists.  |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|At the capture of the |12th      |Ditto.         |  2,500  |2 killed,    |
|city of Tsing-poo.    |May,      |               |         |10 wounded.  |
|                      |1862.     |               |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|At the capture of the |17th      |British and    |    500  |French       |
|village of Na-joor.   |May,      |French.        |         |admiral      |
|                      |1862.     |               |         |killed, 16   |
|                      |          |               |         |men wounded. |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|At the capture of the |20th      |Ditto.         |  3,000  |1 killed,    |
|town of Cho-lin.      |May,      |               |         |4 wounded.   |
|                      |1862.     |               |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|During an engagement  |31st      |British naval  |    300  |1 killed,    |
|near Kah-ding.        |May,      |& military     |         |4 wounded.   |
|                      |1862.     |forces         |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|Upon the expulsion of |10th      |British,       |    150  |3 killed,    |
|the Ti-pings from     |May       |French,        |         |23 wounded.  |
|Ningpo.               |1862.     |and piratical  |         |             |
|                      |          |flotilla.      |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|During the recapture  |June,     |British,       |  5,000  |About 100,   |
|of Kah-ding,          |July &    |French,        |         |all told.    |
|Tsing-poo, Cho-lin,   |August,   |and            |         |             |
|Chee-poo, &c., by     |1862.     |Imperialists.  |         |             |
|the Ti-pings.         |          |               |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|During the operations |August,   |Force under    | 20,000  |About 2,000  |
|in the Ningpo         |1862,     |Capt. R. Dew,  |         |or 3,000.    |
|district, leading to  |to the    |R.N.,          |         |             |
|the capture of        |end of    |Anglo-Manchoo, |         |             |
|Tse-kie, Yu-yaon,     |1863.     |Franco-Manchoo,|         |             |
|Fung-wha, Shou-sing,  |          |and Imperialist|         |             |
|and other cities.     |          |troops.        |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|At the second capture |24th      |British,       |  1,500  |4 killed,    |
|of Kah-ding.          |October,  |French,        |         |20 wounded.  |
|                      |1862.     |and            |         |             |
|                      |          |Imperialists.  |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|Engagement during     |November, |British, Ward's|  3,000  |5 killed,    |
|Ti-ping attempt to    |1862      |force, and     |         |15 wounded.  |
|recapture Kah-ding.   |          |Imperialists   |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|During the repulse of |14th      |Anglo-Manchoo  |  1,000  |2,500 killed |
|the attack on Tait-san|February, |Contingent     |         |& wounded.   |
|                      |1863      |and Imperial   |         |             |
|                      |          |troops.        |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|Capture of Fu-shan    |6th April,|Filibuster     |  1,200  |2 killed,    |
|village, and relief of|1863      |_General_      |         |3 wounded.   |
|Chang-zu              |          |Gordon's force.|         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|Capture of the city of|2nd May,  |British,       |  2,000  |200 _hors de |
|Tait-san              |1863      |Gordon's       |         |combat_.     |
|                      |          |and Imperial   |         |             |
|                      |          |forces.        |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|Massacre of Ti-pings  |30th May, |The            |  3,000  |Gordon's     |
|during their          |1863      |Anglo-Manchoo  |         |force,       |
|evacuation  of the    |          |disciplined and|         |2 killed and |
|city of Quin-san.     |          |foreign-       |         |5 drowned;   |
|                      |          |officered      |         |Imperialist  |
|                      |          |Contingent, and|         |loss, about  |
|                      |          |an Imperialist |         |300.         |
|                      |          |army.          |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|During the retreat of |June,     |Died of        | 40,000  |Loss of      |
|the Chung-wang's army |1863      |starvation,    |         |Imperialist  |
|from the northern     |          |made prisoners |         |troops, 2,000|
|provinces; caused by  |          |and executed by|         |to 3,000.    |
|the British           |          |Imperialists,  |         |             |
|hostilities in the    |          |and killed in  |         |             |
|neighbourhood of      |          |action.        |         |             |
|Shanghae and Ningpo.  |          |               |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|At the capture of     |29th      |Anglo-Manchoo  |    150  |1 killed, 15 |
|Wo-kong city          |July,     |Contingent and |         |wounded.     |
|                      |1863      |Imperialists   |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|Engagements at        |5th, 6th, |Ditto.         |  1,000  |50 to 100.   |
|Kah-poo.              |& 7th     |               |         |             |
|                      |Aug.      |               |         |             |
|                      |1863.     |               |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|Engagements in the    |October,  |Ditto.         |  3,500  |About 200.   |
|neighbourhood of      |1863.     |               |         |             |
|Wo-kong.              |          |               |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|Engagements before    |September,|English,       |  6,000  |About 2,000. |
|Soo-chow, and capture |October,  |French, and    |         |             |
|of stockades outside  |November, |other          |         |             |
|the city.             |and       |disciplined    |         |             |
|                      |December. |Contingents,   |         |             |
|                      |          |assisted by a  |         |             |
|                      |          |Imperialist    |         |             |
|                      |          |army.          |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|The Soo-chow massacre |3rd       |Imperialists.  | 30,000  |Nil.         |
|upon capture of the   |December, |               |Estimated|             |
|city.                 |and       |               |by both  |             |
|                      |subsequent|               |Imps. &  |             |
|                      |days.     |               |Ti-Pings |             |
|                      |          |               |at this  |             |
|                      |          |               |No.      |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|Engagements around    |November &|Ditto.         |  4,000  |5,000.       |
|Wu-see and            |December. |               |         |             |
|Chang-chow-foo        |          |               |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|Upon occupation of    |12th      |Contingents and|  6,000  |Nil.         |
|Wu-see (civilians put |December. |Imperialists   |         |             |
|to death)             |          |               |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|Capture of Yih-sing.  |3rd or 4th|English        |    500  |About a dozen|
|                      |March,    |Contingent.    |         | casualties. |
|                      |1864.     |               |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|Defeat of Gordon's    |20th      |Ditto.         |    600  |About 150.   |
|force before Kin-tang.|March,    |               |         |             |
|                      |1864.     |               |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|Defeat of Gordon's    |30th      |Ditto.         |    100  |About 207.   |
|force at Hwa-soo.     |March,    |               |         |             |
|                      |1864.     |               |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|Assaults upon         |Jan.,     |English &      |  5,000  |Loss of      |
|Hang-chow (capital of |Feb.; and |French         |         |Contingents, |
|Che-kiang), capture of|Mar. 2nd, |Contingents,   |         |600;         |
|Fo-yang, and other    |and 29th; |and several    |         |Imperialists,|
|cities in the same    |April and |large          |         |3,000.       |
|district.             |May, 1864.|Imperialist    |         |             |
|                      |          |armies.        |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|Massacre of           |End of    |Imperialists   |  7,000  |Loss of      |
|non-combatants after  |March,    |and detachments|         |Imperilists  |
|capture of            |1864.     |of English     |         |and          |
|Kar-sing-foo.         |          |Contingent.    |         |detachment   |
|                      |          |               |         |under _Col._ |
|                      |          |               |         |Bailey during|
|                      |          |               |         |the seige    |
|                      |          |               |         |1,000.       |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|Defeat of Ti-pings,   |11th      |Imperialists   |  8,000  |Loss of      |
|and massacre of       |April,    |and English    |         |Allies, 100. |
|prisoners, at the     |1864.     |Contingent     |         |             |
|village of Hwa-soo.   |          |under Gordon.  |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|Repulse of Imperialist|24th and  |Ditto.         |  3,500  |427 of       |
|assaults upon         |25th      |               |         |Contingent,  |
|Chang-chow-foo        |April,    |               |         |1,500        |
|                      |1864.     |               |         |Imperialists.|
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|Capture of Chang-chow,|11th May, |Ditto.         |About    |7 of         |
|massacre of garrison  |1864.     |               | 20,000  |Contingent,  |
|and inhabitants.      |          |               |         |300          |
|                      |          |               |         |Imperialists.|
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|During the capture of |May to    |Principally    |About    |2,000 or     |
|Tan-yang, Kin-tang,   |September,|Imperialists,  | 10,000  |3,000.       |
|Ly-hong, and all other|1864      |assisted by all|         |             |
|Ti-ping towns, besides|          |foreign        |         |             |
|the districts in which|          |Contingents    |         |             |
|they are situated,    |          |except         |         |             |
|subsequent to the fall|          |Gordon's.      |         |             |
|of Chang-chow-foo.    |          |               |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|During the siege of   |Ditto.    |Imperialists   | 70,000  | Nil.        |
|Nankin about 70,000   |          |advised by     |         |             |
|people perished from  |          |Gordon,        |         |             |
|famine within its     |          |assisted by    |         |             |
|walls.                |          |French         |         |             |
|                      |          |officers.      |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|Killed during the     |Ditto.    |Ditto.         | 10,000  |5,000 to     |
|siege.                |          |               |         |10,000.      |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|Massacred after the   |18th &    |    ..  ..     | 30,000  |Very small.  |
|capture of the city.  |19th July,|               |         |             |
|                      |and       |               |         |             |
|                      |subsequent|               |         |             |
|                      |days.     |               |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|Killed during the     |January to|Imperialists   | 15,000  |9,000 to     |
|siege and fall of     |September,|and French     |         |10,000.      |
|Hoo-chow-foo.         |1864.     |Contingents.   |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|A rough estimate of   |August,   |Imperialists,  | 50,000  |Much less.   |
|the number of people  |1860, to  |English, &     |         |             |
|killed during all the |September,|French.        |         |             |
|actions not recorded, |1864.     |               |         |             |
|captures of villages, |          |               |         |             |
|skirmishes, &c., which|          |               |         |             |
|were innumerable.     |          |               |         |             |
|                      |          |               |         |             |
|To the above may be   |  ..  ..  |    ..  ..     |2,500,000|             |
|added _at least_      |          |               |         |             |
|2,000,000 to 3,000,000|          |               |         |             |
|people who perished   |          |               |         |             |
|from the terrible     |          |               |         |             |
|famine occasioned,    |          |               |         |             |
|during the years 1863 |          |               |         |             |
|and 4, by the allied  |          |               |         |             |
|operations, whilst the|          |               |         |             |
|Ti-pings were being   |          |               |         |             |
|driven from their     |          |               |         |             |
|territories, and the  |          |               |         |             |
|whole country so      |          |               |         |             |
|utterly desolated as  |          |               |         |             |
|to be covered with the|          |               |         |             |
|bodies of the starved |          |               |         |             |
|and dying.            |          |               |         |             |
+----------------------+----------+---------------+---------+-------------+
|    TOTAL NUMBER OF TI-PINGS KILLED AND          |2,872,550|             |
|    DESTROYED BY THE BRITISH INTERVENTION        |         |             |
+-------------------------------------------------+---------+-------------+




    COX AND WYMAN,
    ORIENTAL, CLASSICAL, AND GENERAL PRINTERS,
    GREAT QUEEN STREET, LONDON, W.C.




Transcriber's Notes

Obvious punctuation errors repaired.

Inconsistent transcription and hyphenation of Chinese names have not
been changed.

Hyphen removed: blood[-]thirsty (p. 704). gold[-]leaf (p. 769),
gun[-]boat(s) (pp. 513, 706, 778), out[-]work (p. 510), pic[-]nic (p.
512), re[-]cature/ed/ing (pp. 582, 583, 590, 820), re[-]manned (p. 516),
re[-]taken (p. 584), round[-]about (p. 479), treaty port (p. 445),
under[-]weigh (p. 426).

Hyphen added: artillery[-]men (p. 452), breast[-]work (p. 749, 752),
co[-]adjutor (p. 453), eye[-]witnesses (p. 741), half[-]way (p. 599),
loop[-]hole (p. 608).

Manilla-man/men used consistently instead of two words (pp. 653, 655,
656) or one word (p. 591).

The following variants appear and have not been changed: firearms and
fire-arms, _li_ and _le_ (although _li_ is the more usual romanization
of the Chinese measure of distance).

P. 443: "griped" changed to "gripped" (had barely gripped me).

P. 457: "poperty" changed to "property" (the letting of their property).

P. 460: "adminstrator" changed to "administrator" (neither a general nor
an administrator).

P. 472: "and" added (between himself and a young Ti-ping soldier).

P. 477: "prefered" changed to "preferred" (the Ti-pings preferred that
course).

PP. 484, 494: "Great Britian" changed to "Great Britain".

P. 488: "detaind" changed to "detained" (we were detained for a long
while).

P. 508: "inadvertant" changed to "inadvertent" (inadvertent
contradictions).

P. 513: extra "a" removed (desolating raid into a country).

P. 521: "infested" changed to "invested" (Soon-kong were also invested).

P. 549: "administratve" changed to "administrative" (the Government and
administrative machinery).

P. 553: "simulocrum" changed to "simulacrum" (bolster up the tottering
_simulacrum_).

P. 557: "5,20,72,358" changed to "52,072,358".

P. 565: Enumerated item "D" changed to "B".

P. 571: "oratical" changed to "oratorical" (At the oratorical display).

P. 571: "allevated" changed to "alleviated" (the distress could be
alleviated).

PP. 580, 582, 601: "Sherard" changed to "Sherrard" (Captain Sherrard
Osborne).

P. 605: "fusilade" changed to "fusillade" (kept up a fusillade).

P. 608: "Subsquently" changed to "Subsequently" (Subsquently other
legions).

P. 613: "fourteeen" changed to "fourteen" (heads of fourteen women).

P. 640: "Europeons" changed to "Europeans" (the Europeans working).

PP. 655, 656, 660, 701: "Marcartney" changed to "Macartney" on the
assumption that the person mentioned is Sir Halliday Macartney, KCMG,
MD.

P. 658: "Manoeuvring" changed to "Manoeuvering" in contents.

P. 670: "become" changed to "became" (the bad news became confirmed).

P. 689: "threefrom" changed to "therefrom" (and deduct threrefrom).

P. 689: "agressive" changed to "aggressive" (aggressive bullying of the
weak).

P. 697: "Major Bailey" changed to "Major Baily".

P. 705: "occurence" changed to "occurrence" (the occurrence of that
tragedy).

P. 709: "began" changed to "begun" (for scarcely had Morton and his
regiment begun to engage).

P. 713: "compensataion" changed to "compensation" (he would give the men
compensation).

P. 727: "knowng" changed to "knowing" (knowing as I do).

P. 749: "deperate" changed to "desperate" (with desperate bravery).

P. 799: "belligerants" changed to "belligerents" (had been recognised as
belligerents).

P. 805: added "in" (At the death of Alexander in).

P. 806: "Mauchuria" changed to "Manchuria".

P. 807: "territors" changed to "territories" (the territories of the
Kirghiz).

P. 828: "somtimes" changed to "sometimes" (It was sometimes disobeyed).

P. 841 (last entry in table): "Imperilaists" changed to "Imperialists".





End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh, by Lin-Le

*** 