



Produced by Tom Sharpe.  HTML version by Al Haines.









The Ethics

(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)


by

Benedict de Spinoza




Translated from the Latin by R. H. M. Elwes




PART I. CONCERNING GOD.

DEFINITIONS.


I.  By that which is self--caused, I mean that of which the
essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only
conceivable as existent.

II.  A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be
limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a
body is called finite because we always conceive another greater
body.  So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a
body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.

III.  By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is
conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a
conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

IV.  By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as
constituting the essence of substance.

V.  By mode, I mean the modifications[1] of substance, or that
which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than
itself.

[1] "Affectiones"

VI.  By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite--that is, a
substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each
expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.

Explanation--I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its
kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite
attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite,
contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves
no negation.

VII.  That thing is called free, which exists solely by the
necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is
determined by itself alone.  On the other hand, that thing is
necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by
something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of
existence or action.

VIII.  By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is
conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of
that which is eternal.

Explanation--Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal
truth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be
explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may
be conceived without a beginning or end.


AXIOMS.

I.  Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in
something else.

II.  That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be
conceived through itself.

III.  From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows;
and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is
impossible that an effect can follow.

IV.  The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the
knowledge of a cause.

V.  Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the
one by means of the other; the conception of one does not
involve the conception of the other.

VI.  A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.

VII.  If a thing can be conceived as non--existing, its essence
does not involve existence.


PROPOSITIONS.

PROP. I.  Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.

Proof.--This is clear from Deff. iii. and v.

PROP. II.  Two substances, whose attributes are different, have
nothing in common.

Proof.--Also evident from Def. iii.  For each must exist in
itself, and be conceived through itself; in other words, the
conception of one does not imply the conception of the other.

PROP. III.  Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the
cause of the other.

Proof.--If they have nothing in common, it follows that one
cannot be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.), and,
therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.).
Q.E.D.

PROP. IV.  Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from
the other, either by the difference of the attributes of the
substances, or by the difference of their modifications.

Proof.--Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in
something else (Ax. i.),--that is (by Deff. iii. and v.), nothing
is granted in addition to the understanding, except substance and
its modifications.  Nothing is, therefore, given besides the
understanding, by which several things may be distinguished one
from the other, except the substances, or, in other words (see
Ax. iv.), their attributes and modifications.  Q.E.D.

PROP. V.  There cannot exist in the universe two or more
substances having the same nature or attribute.

Proof.--If several distinct substances be granted, they must
be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of
their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications
(Prop. iv.).  If only by the difference of their attributes, it
will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an
identical attribute.  If by the difference of their
modifications--as substance is naturally prior to its
modifications (Prop. i.),--it follows that setting the
modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is
truly, (Deff. iii. and vi.), there cannot be conceived one
substance different from another,--that is (by Prop. iv.), there
cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only.
Q.E.D.

PROP. VI.  One substance cannot be produced by another substance.

Proof.--It is impossible that there should be in the universe
two substances with an identical attribute, i.e. which have
anything common to them both (Prop. ii.), and, therefore (Prop.
iii.), one cannot be the cause of the other, neither can one be
produced by the other.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that a substance cannot be
produced by anything external to itself.  For in the universe
nothing is granted, save substances and their modifications (as
appears from Ax. i. and Deff. iii. and v.).  Now (by the last
Prop.) substance cannot be produced by another substance,
therefore it cannot be produced by anything external to itself.
Q.E.D.  This is shown still more readily by the absurdity of the
contradictory.  For, if substance be produced by an external
cause, the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its
cause (Ax. iv.), and (by Def. iii.) it would itself not be
substance.

PROP. VII.  Existence belongs to the nature of substances.

Proof.--Substance cannot be produced by anything external
(Corollary, Prop vi.), it must, therefore, be its own cause--that
is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence
belongs to its nature.

PROP. VIII.  Every substance is necessarily infinite.

Proof.--There can only be one substance with an identical
attribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.);
its nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite or
infinite.  It does not exist as finite, for (by Def. ii.) it
would then be limited by something else of the same kind, which
would also necessarily exist (Prop. vii.); and there would be
two substances with an identical attribute, which is absurd
(Prop. v.).  It therefore exists as infinite.  Q.E.D.

Note I.--As finite existence involves a partial negation, and
infinite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given
nature, it follows (solely from Prop. vii.) that every substance
is necessarily infinite.

Note II.--No doubt it will be difficult for those who think
about things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them
by their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstration of Prop.
vii.: for such persons make no distinction between the
modifications of substances and the substances themselves, and
are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced; hence
they may attribute to substances the beginning which they observe
in natural objects.  Those who are ignorant of true causes, make
complete confusion--think that trees might talk just as well as
men--that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed;
and imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So,
also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human,
readily attribute human passions to the deity, especially so long
as they do not know how passions originate in the mind.  But, if
people would consider the nature of substance, they would have no
doubt about the truth of Prop. vii.  In fact, this proposition
would be a universal axiom, and accounted a truism.  For, by
substance, would be understood that which is in itself, and is
conceived through itself--that is, something of which the
conception requires not the conception of anything else; whereas
modifications exist in something external to themselves, and a
conception of them is formed by means of a conception of the
thing in which they exist.  Therefore, we may have true ideas of
non--existent modifications; for, although they may have no
actual existence apart from the conceiving intellect, yet their
essence is so involved in something external to themselves that
they may through it be conceived.  Whereas the only truth
substances can have, external to the intellect, must consist in
their existence, because they are conceived through themselves.
Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and
distinct--that is, a true--idea of a substance, but that he is not
sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if he
said that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no it
was false (a little consideration will make this plain); or if
anyone affirmed that substance is created, it would be the same
as saying that a false idea was true--in short, the height of
absurdity.  It must, then, necessarily be admitted that the
existence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth.  And
we can hence conclude by another process of reasoning--that there
is but one such substance.  I think that this may profitably be
done at once; and, in order to proceed regularly with the
demonstration, we must premise:----

1.  The true definition of a thing neither involves nor
expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined.  From
this it follows that----

2.  No definition implies or expresses a certain number of
individuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature
of the thing defined.  For instance, the definition of a triangle
expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle: it
does not imply any fixed number of triangles.

3.  There is necessarily for each individual existent thing a
cause why it should exist.

4.  This cause of existence must either be contained in the
nature and definition of the thing defined, or must be postulated
apart from such definition.

It therefore follows that, if a given number of individual
things exist in nature, there must be some cause for the
existence of exactly that number, neither more nor less.  For
example, if twenty men exist in the universe (for simplicity's
sake, I will suppose them existing simultaneously, and to have
had no predecessors), and we want to account for the existence of
these twenty men, it will not be enough to show the cause of
human existence in general; we must also show why there are
exactly twenty men, neither more nor less: for a cause must be
assigned for the existence of each individual.  Now this cause
cannot be contained in the actual nature of man, for the true
definition of man does not involve any consideration of the
number twenty.  Consequently, the cause for the existence of
these twenty men, and, consequently, of each of them, must
necessarily be sought externally to each individual. Hence we may
lay down the absolute rule, that everything which may consist of
several individuals must have an external cause.  And, as it has
been shown already that existence appertains to the nature of
substance, existence must necessarily be included in its
definition; and from its definition alone existence must be
deducible.  But from its definition (as we have shown, notes ii.,
iii.), we cannot infer the existence of several substances;
therefore it follows that there is only one substance of the same
nature.  Q.E.D.

PROP. IX.  The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the
number of its attributes (Def. iv.).

PROP. X.  Each particular attribute of the one substance must be
conceived through itself.

Proof.--An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of
substance, as constituting its essence (Def. iv.), and,
therefore, must be conceived through itself (Def. iii.).  Q.E.D.

Note--It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in
fact, conceived as distinct--that is, one without the help of the
other--yet we cannot, therefore, conclude that they constitute two
entities, or two different substances.  For it is the nature of
substance that each of its attributes is conceived through
itself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existed
simultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other;
but each expresses the reality or being of substance.  It is,
then, far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one
substance: for nothing in nature is more clear than that each
and every entity must be conceived under some attribute, and that
its reality or being is in proportion to the number of its
attributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity.
Consequently it is abundantly clear, that an absolutely infinite
being must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite
attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and
infinite essence.

If anyone now ask, by what sign shall he be able to
distinguish different substances, let him read the following
propositions, which show that there is but one substance in the
universe, and that it is absolutely infinite, wherefore such a
sign would be sought in vain.

PROP. XI.  God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes,
of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality,
necessarily exists.

Proof.--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God
does not exist: then his essence does not involve existence.
But this (Prop. vii.) is absurd.  Therefore God necessarily
exists.

Another proof.--Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason
must be assigned, either for its existence, or for its
non--existence--e.g. if a triangle exist, a reason or cause must be
granted for its existence; if, on the contrary, it does not
exist, a cause must also be granted, which prevents it from
existing, or annuls its existence.  This reason or cause must
either be contained in the nature of the thing in question, or be
external to it.  For instance, the reason for the non--existence
of a square circle is indicated in its nature, namely, because it
would involve a contradiction.  On the other hand, the existence
of substance follows also solely from its nature, inasmuch as its
nature involves existence.  (See Prop. vii.)

But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle
does not follow from the nature of those figures, but from the
order of universal nature in extension.  From the latter it must
follow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it is
impossible that it should exist.  So much is self--evident.  It
follows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists, if no cause or
reason be granted which prevents its existence.

If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the
existence of God, or which destroys his existence, we must
certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist.  If such a
reason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the
very nature of God, or be external to him--that is, drawn from
another substance of another nature.  For if it were of the same
nature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist.  But
substance of another nature could have nothing in common with God
(by Prop. ii.), and therefore would be unable either to cause or
to destroy his existence.

As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine
existence cannot be drawn from anything external to the divine
nature, such cause must perforce, if God does not exist, be drawn
from God's own nature, which would involve a contradiction.  To
make such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and
supremely perfect is absurd; therefore, neither in the nature of
God, nor externally to his nature, can a cause or reason be
assigned which would annul his existence.  Therefore, God
necessarily exists.  Q.E.D.

Another proof.--The potentiality of non--existence is a
negation of power, and contrariwise the potentiality of existence
is a power, as is obvious.  If, then, that which necessarily
exists is nothing but finite beings, such finite beings are more
powerful than a being absolutely infinite, which is obviously
absurd; therefore, either nothing exists, or else a being
absolutely infinite necessarily exists also.  Now we exist either
in ourselves, or in something else which necessarily exists (see
Axiom. i. and Prop. vii.).  Therefore a being absolutely
infinite--in other words, God (Def. vi.)--necessarily exists.
Q.E.D.

Note.--In this last proof, I have purposely shown God's
existence a posteriori, so that the proof might be more easily
followed, not because, from the same premises, God's existence
does not follow a priori.  For, as the potentiality of existence
is a power, it follows that, in proportion as reality increases
in the nature of a thing, so also will it increase its strength
for existence.  Therefore a being absolutely infinite, such as
God, has from himself an absolutely infinite power of existence,
and hence he does absolutely exist.  Perhaps there will be many
who will be unable to see the force of this proof, inasmuch as
they are accustomed only to consider those things which flow from
external causes.  Of such things, they see that those which
quickly come to pass--that is, quickly come into existence--quickly
also disappear; whereas they regard as more difficult of
accomplishment--that is, not so easily brought into
existence--those things which they conceive as more complicated.

However, to do away with this misconception, I need not here
show the measure of truth in the proverb, "What comes quickly,
goes quickly," nor discuss whether, from the point of view of
universal nature, all things are equally easy, or otherwise: I
need only remark that I am not here speaking of things, which
come to pass through causes external to themselves, but only of
substances which (by Prop. vi.) cannot be produced by any
external cause.  Things which are produced by external causes,
whether they consist of many parts or few, owe whatsoever
perfection or reality they possess solely to the efficacy of
their external cause;  and therefore their existence arises
solely from the perfection of their external cause, not from
their own.  Contrariwise, whatsoever perfection is possessed by
substance is due to no external cause; wherefore the existence
of substance must arise solely from its own nature, which is
nothing else but its essence.  Thus, the perfection of a thing
does not annul its existence, but, on the contrary, asserts it.
Imperfection, on the other hand, does annul it; therefore we
cannot be more certain of the existence of anything, than of the
existence of a being absolutely infinite or perfect--that is, of
God.  For inasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection, and
involves absolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his
existence is done away, and the utmost certainty on the question
is given.  This, I think, will be evident to every moderately
attentive reader.

PROP. XII.  No attribute of substance can be conceived from which
it would follow that substance can be divided.

Proof.--The parts into which substance as thus conceived would
be divided either will retain the nature of substance, or they
will not.  If the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each part will
necessarily be infinite, and (by Prop. vi.) self--caused, and (by
Prop. v.) will perforce consist of a different attribute, so
that, in that case, several substances could be formed out of one
substance, which (by Prop. vi.) is absurd.  Moreover, the parts
(by Prop. ii.) would have nothing in common with their whole, and
the whole (by Def. iv. and Prop. x.) could both exist and be
conceived without its parts, which everyone will admit to be
absurd.  If we adopt the second alternative--namely, that the
parts will not retain the nature of substance--then, if the whole
substance were divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature
of substance, and would cease to exist, which (by Prop. vii.) is
absurd.

PROP. XIII.  Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.

Proof.--If it could be divided, the parts into which it was
divided would either retain the nature of absolutely infinite
substance, or they would not.  If the former, we should have
several substances of the same nature, which (by Prop. v.) is
absurd.  If the latter, then (by Prop. vii.) substance absolutely
infinite could cease to exist, which (by Prop. xi.) is also
absurd.

Corollary.--It follows, that no substance, and consequently no
extended substance, in so far as it is substance, is divisible.

Note.--The indivisibility of substance may be more easily
understood as follows.  The nature of substance can only be
conceived as infinite, and by a part of substance, nothing else
can be understood than finite substance, which (by Prop. viii)
involves a manifest contradiction.

PROP. XIV.  Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.

Proof.--As God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no
attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied
(by Def. vi.), and he necessarily exists (by Prop. xi.); if any
substance besides God were granted, it would have to be explained
by some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the same
attribute would exist, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd; therefore,
besides God no substance can be granted, or, consequently, be
conceived.  If it could be conceived, it would necessarily have
to be conceived as existent; but this (by the first part of this
proof) is absurd.  Therefore, besides God no substance can be
granted or conceived.  Q.E.D.

Corollary I.--Clearly, therefore: 1.  God is one, that is (by
Def. vi.) only one substance can be granted in the universe, and
that substance is absolutely infinite, as we have already
indicated (in the note to Prop. x.).

Corollary II.--It follows:  2.  That extension and thought
are either attributes of God or (by Ax. i.) accidents
(affectiones) of the attributes of God.

PROP. XV.  Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can
be, or be conceived.

Proof.--Besides God, no substance is granted or can be
conceived (by Prop. xiv.), that is (by Def. iii.) nothing which
is in itself and is conceived through itself.  But modes (by Def.
v.) can neither be, nor be conceived without substance;
wherefore they can only be in the divine nature, and can only
through it be conceived.  But substances and modes form the sum
total of existence (by Ax. i.), therefore, without God nothing
can be, or be conceived.  Q.E.D.

Note.--Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and
mind, and is susceptible of passions.  How far such persons have
strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been
said.  But these I pass over.  For all who have in anywise
reflected on the divine nature deny that God has a body.  Of this
they find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body
a definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a
certain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicate
such a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite.  But meanwhile
by other reasons with which they try to prove their point, they
show that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart
from the divine nature, and say it was created by God.  Wherefrom
the divine nature can have been created, they are wholly ignorant;
thus they clearly show, that they do not know the meaning of
their own words.  I myself have proved sufficiently clearly, at
any rate in my own judgment (Coroll. Prop. vi, and note 2, Prop.
viii.), that no substance can be produced or created by anything
other than itself.  Further, I showed (in Prop. xiv.), that
besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.  Hence we
drew the conclusion that extended substance is one of the
infinite attributes of God.  However, in order to explain more
fully, I will refute the arguments of my adversaries, which all
start from the following points:----

Extended substance, in so far as it is substance, consists,
as they think, in parts, wherefore they deny that it can be
infinite, or consequently, that it can appertain to God.  This
they illustrate with many examples, of which I will take one or
two.  If extended substance, they say, is infinite, let it be
conceived to be divided into two parts; each part will then be
either finite or infinite.  If the former, then infinite
substance is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd.  If
the latter, then one infinite will be twice as large as another
infinite, which is also absurd.

Further, if an infinite line be measured out in foot lengths,
it will consist of an infinite number of such parts; it would
equally consist of an infinite number of parts, if each part
measured only an inch: therefore, one infinity would be twelve
times as great as the other.

Lastly, if from a single point there be conceived to be drawn
two diverging lines which at first are at a definite distance
apart, but are produced to infinity, it is certain that the
distance between the two lines will be continually increased,
until at length it changes from definite to indefinable.  As
these absurdities follow, it is said, from considering quantity
as infinite, the conclusion is drawn, that extended substance
must necessarily be finite, and, consequently, cannot appertain
to the nature of God.

The second argument is also drawn from God's supreme
perfection.  God, it is said, inasmuch as he is a supremely
perfect being, cannot be passive; but extended substance,
insofar as it is divisible, is passive.  It follows, therefore,
that extended substance does not appertain to the essence of God.

Such are the arguments I find on the subject in writers, who
by them try to prove that extended substance is unworthy of the
divine nature, and cannot possibly appertain thereto.  However, I
think an attentive reader will see that I have already answered
their propositions; for all their arguments are founded on the
hypothesis that extended substance is composed of parts, and such
a hypothesis I have shown (Prop. xii., and Coroll. Prop. xiii.)
to be absurd.  Moreover, anyone who reflects will see that all
these absurdities (if absurdities they be, which I am not now
discussing), from which it is sought to extract the conclusion
that extended substance is finite, do not at all follow from the
notion of an infinite quantity, but merely from the notion that
an infinite quantity is measurable, and composed of finite parts
therefore, the only fair conclusion to be drawn is that:
infinite quantity is not measurable, and cannot be composed of
finite parts.  This is exactly what we have already proved (in
Prop. xii.).  Wherefore the weapon which they aimed at us has in
reality recoiled upon themselves.  If, from this absurdity of
theirs, they persist in drawing the conclusion that extended
substance must be finite, they will in good sooth be acting like
a man who asserts that circles have the properties of squares,
and, finding himself thereby landed in absurdities, proceeds to
deny that circles have any center, from which all lines drawn to
the circumference are equal.  For, taking extended substance,
which can only be conceived as infinite, one, and indivisible
(Props. viii., v., xii.) they assert, in order to prove that it
is finite, that it is composed of finite parts, and that it can
be multiplied and divided.

So, also, others, after asserting that a line is composed of
points, can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot be
infinitely divided.  Assuredly it is not less absurd to assert
that extended substance is made up of bodies or parts, than it
would be to assert that a solid is made up of surfaces, a surface
of lines, and a line of points.  This must be admitted by all who
know clear reason to be infallible, and most of all by those who
deny the possibility of a vacuum.  For if extended substance
could be so divided that its parts were really separate, why
should not one part admit of being destroyed, the others
remaining joined together as before?  And why should all be so
fitted into one another as to leave no vacuum?  Surely in the
case of things, which are really distinct one from the other, one
can exist without the other, and can remain in its original
condition.  As, then,  there does not exist a vacuum in nature
(of which anon), but all parts are bound to come together to
prevent it, it follows from this that the parts cannot really be
distinguished, and that extended substance in so far as it is
substance cannot be divided.

If anyone asks me the further question, Why are we naturally
so prone to divide quantity?  I answer, that quantity is
conceived by us in two ways; in the abstract and superficially,
as we imagine it; or as substance, as we conceive it solely by
the intellect.  If, then, we regard quantity as it is represented
in our imagination, which we often and more easily do, we shall
find that it is finite, divisible, and compounded of parts; but
if we regard it as it is represented in our intellect, and
conceive it as substance, which it is very difficult to do, we
shall then, as I have sufficiently proved, find that it is
infinite, one, and indivisible.  This will be plain enough to all
who make a distinction between the intellect and the imagination,
especially if it be remembered, that matter is everywhere the
same, that its parts are not distinguishable, except in so far as
we conceive matter as diversely modified, whence its parts are
distinguished, not really, but modally.  For instance, water, in
so far as it is water, we conceive to be divided, and its parts
to be separated one from the other; but not in so far as it is
extended substance; from this point of view it is neither
separated nor divisible.  Further, water, in so far as it is
water, is produced and corrupted; but, in so far as it is
substance, it is neither produced nor corrupted.

I think I have now answered the second argument; it is, in
fact, founded on the same assumption as the first--namely, that
matter, in so far as it is substance, is divisible, and composed
of parts.  Even if it were so, I do not know why it should be
considered unworthy of the divine nature, inasmuch as besides God
(by Prop. xiv.) no substance can be granted, wherefrom it could
receive its modifications.  All things, I repeat, are in God, and
all things which come to pass, come to pass solely through the
laws of the infinite nature of God, and follow (as I will shortly
show) from the necessity of his essence.  Wherefore it can in
nowise be said, that God is passive in respect to anything other
than himself, or that extended substance is unworthy of the
Divine nature, even if it be supposed divisible, so long as it is
granted to be infinite and eternal.  But enough of this for the
present.

PROP. XVI.  From the necessity of the divine nature must follow
an infinite number of things in infinite ways--that is, all things
which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.

Proof.--This proposition will be clear to everyone, who
remembers that from the given definition of any thing the
intellect infers several properties, which really necessarily
follow therefrom (that is, from the actual essence of the thing
defined); and it infers more properties in proportion as the
definition of the thing expresses more reality, that is, in
proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves more
reality.  Now, as the divine nature has absolutely infinite
attributes (by Def. vi.), of which each expresses infinite
essence after its kind, it follows that from the necessity of its
nature an infinite number of things (that is, everything which
can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect) must
necessarily follow.  Q.E.D.

Corollary I.--Hence it follows, that God is the efficient
cause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite
intellect.

Corollary II.--It also follows that God is a cause in himself,
and not through an accident of his nature.

Corollary III.--It follows, thirdly, that God is the
absolutely first cause.

PROP. XVII.  God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and
is not constrained by anyone.

Proof.--We have just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely from
the necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing,
solely from the laws of his nature, an infinite number of things
absolutely follow in an infinite number of ways; and we proved
(in Prop. xv.), that without God nothing can be nor be conceived
but that all things are in God.  Wherefore nothing can exist;
outside himself, whereby he can be conditioned or constrained to
act.  Wherefore God acts solely by the laws of his own nature,
and is not constrained by anyone.  Q.E.D.

Corollary I.--It follows: 1.  That there can be no cause
which, either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the
perfection of his own nature, moves God to act.

Corollary II.--It follows: 2.  That God is the sole free
cause.  For God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature
(by Prop. xi. and Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.), and acts by the sole
necessity of his own nature, wherefore God is (by Def. vii.) the
sole free cause.  Q.E.D.

Note.--Others think that God is a free cause, because he can,
as they think, bring it about, that those things which we have
said follow from his nature--that is, which are in his power,
should not come to pass, or should not be produced by him.  But
this is the same as if they said, that God could bring it about,
that it should follow from the nature of a triangle that its
three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles;
or that from a given cause no effect should follow, which is
absurd.

Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of this
proposition, that neither intellect nor will appertain to God's
nature.  I know that there are many who think that they can show,
that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to God's nature;
for they say they know of nothing more perfect, which they can
attribute to God, than that which is the highest perfection in
ourselves.  Further, although they conceive God as actually
supremely intelligent, they yet do not believe that he can bring
into existence everything which he actually understands, for they
think that they would thus destroy God's power.  If, they
contend, God had created everything which is in his intellect, he
would not be able to create anything more, and this, they think,
would clash with God's omnipotence; therefore, they prefer to
asset that God is indifferent to all things, and that he creates
nothing except that which he has decided, by some absolute
exercise of will, to create.  However, I think I have shown
sufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.), that from God's supreme
power, or infinite nature, an infinite number of things--that is,
all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite number of
ways, or always flow from the same necessity; in the same way as
from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and for
eternity, that its three interior angles are equal to two right
angles.  Wherefore the omnipotence of God has been displayed from
all eternity, and will for all eternity remain in the same state
of activity.  This manner of treating the question attributes to
God an omnipotence, in my opinion, far more perfect.  For,
otherwise, we are compelled to confess that God understands an
infinite number of creatable things, which he will never be able
to create, for, if he created all that he understands, he would,
according to this showing, exhaust his omnipotence, and render
himself imperfect.  Wherefore, in order to establish that God is
perfect, we should be reduced to establishing at the same time,
that he cannot bring to pass everything over which his power
extends; this seems to be a hypothesis most absurd, and most
repugnant to God's omnipotence.

Further (to say a word here concerning the intellect and the
will which we attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain
to the eternal essence of God, we must take these words in some
significance quite different from those they usually bear.  For
intellect and will, which should constitute the essence of God,
would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human
intellect and will, in fact, would have nothing in common with
them but the name; there would be about as much correspondence
between the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenly
constellation, and a dog, an animal that barks.  This I will
prove as follows.  If intellect belongs to the divine nature, it
cannot be in nature, as ours is generally thought to be,
posterior to, or simultaneous with the things understood,
inasmuch as God is prior to all things by reason of his causality
(Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.).  On the contrary, the truth and formal
essence of things is as it is, because it exists by
representation as such in the intellect of God.  Wherefore the
intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute
God's essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of their
essence and of their existence.  This seems to have been
recognized by those who have asserted, that God's intellect,
God's will, and God's power, are one and the same.  As,
therefore, God's intellect is the sole cause of things, namely,
both of their essence and existence, it must necessarily differ
from them in respect to its essence, and in respect to its
existence.  For a cause differs from a thing it causes, precisely
in the quality which the latter gains from the former.

For example, a man is the cause of another man's existence,
but not of his essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and,
therefore, the two men may be entirely similar in essence, but
must be different in existence; and hence if the existence of
one of them cease, the existence of the other will not
necessarily cease also; but if the essence of one could be
destroyed, and be made false, the essence of the other would be
destroyed also.  Wherefore, a thing which is the cause both of
the essence and of the existence of a given effect, must differ
from such effect both in respect to its essence, and also in
respect to its existence.  Now the intellect of God is the cause
both of the essence and the existence of our intellect;
therefore, the intellect of God in so far as it is conceived to
constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both in
respect to essence and in respect to existence, nor can it in
anywise agree therewith save in name, as we said before.  The
reasoning would be identical in the case of the will, as anyone
can easily see.

PROP. XVIII.  God is the indwelling and not the transient cause
of all things.

Proof.--All things which are, are in God, and must be
conceived through God (by Prop. xv.), therefore (by Prop. xvi.,
Coroll. i.) God is the cause of those things which are in him.
This is our first point.  Further, besides God there can be no
substance (by Prop. xiv.), that is nothing in itself external to
God.  This is our second point.  God, therefore, is the
indwelling and not the transient cause of all things.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XIX.  God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal.

Proof.--God (by Def. vi.) is substance, which (by Prop. xi.)
necessarily exists, that is (by Prop. vii.) existence appertains
to its nature, or (what is the same thing) follows from its
definition; therefore, God is eternal (by Def. viii.).  Further,
by the attributes of God we must understand that which (by Def.
iv.) expresses the essence of the divine substance--in other
words, that which appertains to substance: that, I say, should
be involved in the attributes of substance.  Now eternity
appertains to the nature of substance (as I have already shown in
Prop. vii.); therefore, eternity must appertain to each of the
attributes, and thus all are eternal.  Q.E.D.

Note.--This proposition is also evident from the manner in
which (in Prop. xi.) I demonstrated the existence of God; it is
evident, I repeat, from that proof, that the existence of God,
like his essence, is an eternal truth.  Further (in Prop. xix. of
my "Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy"), I have proved the
eternity of God, in another manner, which I need not here repeat.

PROP. XX.  The existence of God and his essence are one and the
same.

Proof.--God (by the last Prop.) and all his attributes are
eternal, that is (by Def. viii.) each of his attributes expresses
existence.  Therefore the same
attributes of God which explain his eternal essence, explain at
the same time his eternal existence--in other words, that which
constitutes God's essence constitutes at the same time his
existence.  Wherefore God's existence and God's essence are one
and the same.  Q.E.D.

Coroll. I.--Hence it follows that God's existence, like his
essence, is an eternal truth.

Coroll. II--Secondly, it follows that God, and all the
attributes of God, are unchangeable.  For if they could be
changed in respect to existence, they must also be able to be
changed in respect to essence--that is, obviously, be changed from
true to false, which is absurd.

PROP. XXI.  All things which follow from the absolute nature of
any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or, in
other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.

Proof.--Conceive, if it be possible (supposing the proposition
to be denied), that something in some attribute of God can follow
from the absolute nature of the said attribute, and that at the
same time it is finite, and has a conditioned existence or
duration; for instance, the idea of God expressed in the
attribute thought.  Now thought, in so far as it is supposed to
be an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Prop. xi.) in its
nature infinite. But, in so far as it possesses the idea of God,
it is supposed finite.  It cannot, however, be conceived as
finite, unless it be limited by thought (by Def. ii.); but it is
not limited by thought itself, in so far as it has constituted
the idea of God (for so far it is supposed to be finite);
therefore, it is limited by thought, in so far as it has not
constituted the idea of God, which nevertheless (by Prop. xi.)
must necessarily exist.

We have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the
idea of God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturally
follow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (for
it is conceived as constituting, and also as not constituting,
the idea of God), which is against our hypothesis.  Wherefore, if
the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed,
anything else in any attribute of God (for we may take any
example, as the proof is of universal application) follows from
the necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute, the
said thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our first
point.

Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of
the nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration.  For
if it can, suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of
the nature of some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God,
for instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought,
and let it be supposed at some time not to have existed, or to be
about not to exist.

Now thought being an attribute of God, must necessarily exist
unchanged (by Prop. xi., and Prop. xx., Coroll. ii.); and beyond
the limits of the duration of the idea of God (supposing the
latter at some time not to have existed, or not to be going to
exist) thought would perforce have existed without the idea of
God, which is contrary to our hypothesis, for we supposed that,
thought being given, the idea of God necessarily flowed
therefrom.  Therefore the idea of God expressed in thought, or
anything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of
some attribute of God, cannot have a limited duration, but
through the said attribute is eternal, which is our second point.
Bear in mind that the same proposition may be affirmed of
anything, which in any attribute necessarily follows from God's
absolute nature.

PROP. XXII.  Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God, in so
far as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily
and as infinite, through the said attribute, must also exist
necessarily and as infinite.

Proof.--The proof of this proposition is similar to that of
the preceding one.

PROP. XXIII.  Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as
infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature
of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a
modification which exists necessarily, and as infinite.

Proof.--A mode exists in something else, through which it must
be conceived (Def. v.), that is (Prop. xv.), it exists solely in
God, and solely through God can be conceived. If therefore a mode
is conceived as necessarily existing and infinite, it must
necessarily be inferred or perceived through some attribute of
God, in so far as such attribute is conceived as expressing the
infinity and necessity of existence, in other words (Def. viii.)
eternity; that is, in so far as it is considered absolutely.  A
mode, therefore, which necessarily exists as infinite, must
follow from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, either
immediately (Prop. xxi.) or through the means of some
modification, which follows from the absolute nature of the said
attribute; that is (by Prop. xxii.), which exists necessarily
and as infinite.

PROP. XXIV.  The essence of things produced by God does not
involve existence.

Proof.--This proposition is evident from Def. i.  For that of
which the nature (considered in itself) involves existence is
self--caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that God is not only the cause of
things coming into existence, but also of their continuing in
existence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause of
the being of things (essendi rerum).  For whether things exist,
or do not exist, whenever we contemplate their essence, we see
that it involves neither existence nor duration; consequently,
it cannot be the cause of either the one or the other.  God must
be the sole cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existence
appertain.  (Prop. xiv. Coroll. i.) Q.E.D.

PROP. XXV.  God is the efficient cause not only of the existence
of things, but also of their essence.

Proof.--If this be denied, then God is not the cause of the
essence of things; and therefore the essence of things can (by
Ax. iv.) be conceived without God.  This (by Prop. xv.) is
absurd.  Therefore, God is the cause of the essence of things.
Q.E.D.

Note.--This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi.
For it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the
essence of things must be inferred from it, no less than their
existence--in a word, God must be called the cause of all things,
in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself.  This
will be made still clearer by the following corollary.

Corollary.--Individual things are nothing but modifications of
the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God
are expressed in a fixed and definite manner.  The proof appears
from Prop. xv. and Def. v.

PROP. XXVI.  A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular
manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and that
which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to
act.

Proof.--That by which things are said to be conditioned to act
in a particular manner is necessarily something positive (this is
obvious); therefore both of its essence and of its existence God
by the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause (Props.
xxv. and xvi.); this is our first point.  Our second point is
plainly to be inferred therefrom.  For if a thing, which has not
been conditioned by God, could condition itself, the first part
of our proof would be false, and this, as we have shown is
absurd.

PROP. XXVII.  A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act
in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.

Proof.--This proposition is evident from the third axiom.

PROP. XXVIII.  Every individual thing, or everything which is
finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be
conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and
action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite, and
has a conditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in
its turn exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be
conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also
is finite, and has a conditioned existence, and so on to
infinity.

Proof.--Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has been
thus conditioned by God (by Prop. xxvi. and Prop. xxiv.,
Coroll.).

But that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence,
cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God;
for whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any
attribute of God is infinite and eternal (by Prop. xxi.).  It
must, therefore, follow from some attribute of God, in so far as
the said attribute is considered as in some way modified; for
substance and modes make up the sum total of existence (by Ax. i.
and Def. iii., v.), while modes are merely modifications of the
attributes of God.  But from God, or from any of his attributes,
in so far as the latter is modified by a modification infinite
and eternal, a conditioned thing cannot follow.  Wherefore it
must follow from, or be conditioned for, existence and action by
God or one of his attributes, in so far as the latter are
modified by some modification which is finite, and has a
conditioned existence.  This is our first point.  Again, this
cause or this modification (for the reason by which we
established the first part of this proof) must in its turn be
conditioned by another cause, which also is finite, and has a
conditioned existence, and, again, this last by another (for the
same reason); and so on (for the same reason) to infinity.
Q.E.D.

Note.--As certain things must be produced immediately by God,
namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute
nature, through the means of these primary attributes, which,
nevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived without God, it
follows:--1. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of those
things immediately produced by him.  I say absolutely, not after
his kind, as is usually stated.  For the effects of God cannot
either exist or be conceived without a cause (Prop. xv. and Prop.
xxiv. Coroll.).  2. That God cannot properly be styled the remote
cause of individual things, except for the sake of distinguishing
these from what he immediately produces, or rather from what
follows from his absolute nature.  For, by a remote cause, we
understand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the effect.
But all things which are, are in God, and so depend on God, that
without him they can neither be nor be conceived.

PROP. XXIX.  Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all
things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular
manner by the necessity of the divine nature.

Proof.--Whatsoever is, is in God (Prop. xv.).  But God cannot
be called a thing contingent.  For (by Prop. xi.) he exists
necessarily, and not contingently.  Further, the modes of the
divine nature follow therefrom necessarily, and not contingently
(Prop. xvi.); and they thus follow, whether we consider the
divine nature absolutely, or whether we consider it as in any way
conditioned to act (Prop. xxvii.).  Further, God is not only the
cause of these modes, in so far as they simply exist (by Prop.
xxiv, Coroll.), but also in so far as they are considered as
conditioned for operating in a particular manner (Prop. xxvi.).
If they be not conditioned by God (Prop. xxvi.), it is
impossible, and not contingent, that they should condition
themselves; contrariwise, if they be conditioned by God, it is
impossible, and not contingent, that they should render
themselves unconditioned. Wherefore all things are conditioned by
the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also
to exist and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothing
that is contingent.  Q.E.D.

Note.--Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what
we should understand by nature viewed as active (natura
naturans), and nature viewed as passive (natura naturata).  I say
to explain, or rather call attention to it, for I think that,
from what has been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by nature
viewed as active we should understand that which is in itself,
and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of
substance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in other
words (Prop. xiv., Coroll. i., and Prop. xvii., Coroll. ii) God,
in so far as he is considered as a free cause.

By nature viewed as passive I understand all that which
follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the
attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of
God, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God,
and which without God cannot exist or be conceived.

PROP. XXX.  Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function
infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the
modifications of God, and nothing else.

Proof.--A true idea must agree with its object (Ax. vi.); in
other words (obviously), that which is contained in the intellect
in representation must necessarily be granted in nature.  But in
nature (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) there is no substance save
God, nor any modifications save those (Prop. xv.) which are in
God, and cannot without God either be or be conceived.  Therefore
the intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must
comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God,
and nothing else.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXI.  The intellect in function, whether finite or
infinite, as will, desire, love, &c., should be referred to
passive nature and not to active nature.

Proof.--By the intellect we do not (obviously) mean absolute
thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing from
other modes, such as love, desire, &c., and therefore (Def. v.)
requiring to be conceived through absolute thought.  It must (by
Prop. xv. and Def. vi.), through some attribute of God which
expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, be so
conceived, that without such attribute it could neither be nor be
conceived.  It must therefore be referred to nature passive
rather than to nature active, as must also the other modes of
thinking.  Q.E.D.

Note.--I do not here, by speaking of intellect in function,
admit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality:
but, wishing to avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only of
what is most clearly perceived by us, namely, of the very act of
understanding, than which nothing is more clearly perceived.  For
we cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge of
the act of understanding.

PROP. XXXII.  Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a
necessary cause.

Proof.--Will is only a particular mode of thinking, like
intellect; therefore (by Prop. xxviii.) no volition can exist,
nor be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned by some cause
other than itself, which cause is conditioned by a third cause,
and so on to infinity.  But if will be supposed infinite, it must
also be conditioned to exist and act by God, not by virtue of his
being substance absolutely infinite, but by virtue of his
possessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal
essence of thought (by Prop. xxiii.).  Thus, however it be
conceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by
which it should be conditioned to exist and act.  Thus (Def.
vii.) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or
constrained cause.  Q.E.D.

Coroll. I.--Hence it follows, first, that God does not act
according to freedom of the will.

Coroll. II.--It follows, secondly, that will and intellect
stand in the same relation to the nature of God as do motion, and
rest, and absolutely all natural phenomena, which must be
conditioned by God (Prop. xxix.) to exist and act in a particular
manner.  For will, like the rest, stands in need of a cause, by
which it is conditioned to exist and act in a particular manner.
And although, when will or intellect be granted, an infinite
number of results may follow, yet God cannot on that account be
said to act from freedom of the will, any more than the infinite
number of results from motion and rest would justify us in saying
that motion and rest act by free will.  Wherefore will no more
appertains to God than does anything else in nature, but stands
in the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like, which
we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature,
and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular
manner.

PROP. XXXIII.  Things could not have been brought into being by
God in any manner or in any order different from that which has
in fact obtained.

Proof--All things necessarily follow from the nature of God
(Prop. xvi.), and by the nature of God are conditioned to exist
and act in a particular way (Prop. xxix.).  If things, therefore,
could have been of a different nature, or have been conditioned
to act in a different way, so that the order of nature would have
been different, God's nature would also have been able to be
different from what it now is; and therefore (by Prop. xi.) that
different nature also would have perforce existed, and
consequently there would have been able to be two or more Gods.
This (by Prop. xiv., Coroll. i.) is absurd.  Therefore things
could not have been brought into being by God in any other
manner, &c.  Q.E.D.

Note I.--As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun at
noonday, that there is nothing to justify us in calling things
contingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we shall
attach to the word contingent; but I will first explain the
words necessary and impossible.

A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence
or in respect to its cause; for the existence of a thing
necessarily follows, either from its essence and definition, or
from a given efficient cause.  For similar reasons a thing is
said to be impossible; namely, inasmuch as its essence or
definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause
is granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect; but
a thing can in no respect be called contingent, save in relation
to the imperfection of our knowledge.

A thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or
does not involve a contradiction, or of which, knowing that it
does not involve a contradiction, we are still in doubt
concerning the existence, because the order of causes escapes
us,--such a thing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary or
impossible.  Wherefore we call it contingent or possible.

Note II.--It clearly follows from what we have said, that
things have been brought into being by God in the highest
perfection, inasmuch as they have necessarily followed from a
most perfect nature.  Nor does this prove any imperfection in
God, for it has compelled us to affirm his perfection.  From its
contrary proposition, we should clearly gather (as I have just
shown), that God is not supremely perfect, for if things had been
brought into being in any other way, we should have to assign to
God a nature different from that, which we are bound to attribute
to him from the consideration of an absolutely perfect being.

I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and
will refuse to give their minds up to contemplating it, simply
because they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom very
different from that which we (Def. vii.) have deduced.  They
assign to him, in short, absolute free will.  However, I am also
convinced that if such persons reflect on the matter, and duly
weigh in their minds our series of propositions, they will reject
such freedom as they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory,
but also as a great impediment to organized knowledge.  There is
no need for me to repeat what I have said in the note to Prop.
xvii.  But, for the sake of my opponents, I will show further,
that although it be granted that will pertains to the essence of
God, it nevertheless follows from his perfection, that things
could not have been by him created other than they are, or in a
different order; this is easily proved, if we reflect on what
our opponents themselves concede, namely, that it depends solely
on the decree and will of God, that each thing is what it is.  If
it were otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things.
Further, that all the decrees of God have been ratified from all
eternity by God himself.  If it were otherwise, God would be
convicted of imperfection or change.  But in eternity there is no
such thing as when, before, or after; hence it follows solely
from the perfection of God, that God never can decree, or never
could have decreed anything but what is; that God did not exist
before his decrees, and would not exist without them.  But, it is
said, supposing that God had made a different universe, or had
ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature and
her order, we could not therefore conclude any imperfection in
God.  But persons who say this must admit that God can change his
decrees.  For if God had ordained any decrees concerning nature
and her order, different from those which he has ordained--in
other words, if he had willed and conceived something different
concerning nature--he would perforce have had a different
intellect from that which he has, and also a different will.  But
if it were allowable to assign to God a different intellect and a
different will, without any change in his essence or his
perfection, what would there be to prevent him changing the
decrees which he has made concerning created things, and
nevertheless remaining perfect?  For his intellect and will
concerning things created and their order are the same, in
respect to his essence and perfection, however they be conceived.

Further, all the philosophers whom I have read admit that
God's intellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential; as
they also admit that God's intellect, and God's will, and God's
essence are identical, it follows that, if God had had a
different actual intellect and a different will, his essence
would also have been different; and thus, as I concluded at
first, if things had been brought into being by God in a
different way from that which has obtained, God's intellect and
will, that is (as is admitted) his essence would perforce have
been different, which is absurd.

As these things could not have been brought into being by God
in any but the actual way and order which has obtained; and as
the truth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfection
of God; we can have no sound reason for persuading ourselves to
believe that God did not wish to create all the things which were
in his intellect, and to create them in the same perfection as he
had understood them.

But, it will be said, there is in things no perfection nor
imperfection; that which is in them, and which causes them to be
called perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on the
will of God.  If God had so willed, he might have brought it
about that what is now perfection should be extreme imperfection,
and vice versa.  What is such an assertion, but an open
declaration that God, who necessarily understands that which he
wishes, might bring it about by his will, that he should
understand things differently from the way in which he does
understand them?  This (as we have just shown) is the height of
absurdity.  Wherefore, I may turn the argument against its
employers, as follows:--All things depend on the power of God.
In order that things should be different from what they are,
God's will would necessarily have to be different.  But God's
will cannot be different (as we have just most clearly
demonstrated) from God's perfection.  Therefore neither can
things be different.  I confess, that the theory which subjects
all things to the will of an indifferent deity, and asserts that
they are all dependent on his fiat, is less far from the truth
than the theory of those, who maintain that God acts in all
things with a view of promoting what is good.  For these latter
persons seem to set up something beyond God, which does not
depend on God, but which God in acting looks to as an exemplar,
or which he aims at as a definite goal.  This is only another
name for subjecting God to the dominion of destiny, an utter
absurdity in respect to God, whom we have shown to be the first
and only free cause of the essence of all things and also of
their existence.  I need, therefore, spend no time in refuting
such wild theories.

PROP. XXXIV.  God's power is identical with his essence.

Proof.--From the sole necessity of the essence of God it
follows that God is the cause of himself (Prop. xi.) and of all
things (Prop. xvi. and Coroll.).  Wherefore the power of God, by
which he and all things are and act, is identical with his
essence.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXV.  Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God,
necessarily exists.

Proof.--Whatsoever is in God's power, must (by the last Prop.)
be comprehended in his essence in such a manner, that it
necessarily follows therefrom, and therefore necessarily exists.
Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXVI.  There is no cause from whose nature some effect
does not follow.

Proof.--Whatsoever exists expresses God's nature or essence in
a given conditioned manner (by Prop. xxv., Coroll.); that is,
(by Prop. xxxiv.), whatsoever exists, expresses in a given
conditioned manner God's power, which is the cause of all things,
therefore an effect must (by Prop. xvi.) necessarily follow.
Q.E.D.


APPENDIX:

In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties
of God.  I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one:
that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature;
that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so;
that all things are in God, and so depend on him, that without
him they could neither exist nor be conceived; lastly, that all
things are predetermined by God, not through his free will or
absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power.
I have further, where occasion afforded, taken care to remove the
prejudices, which might impede the comprehension of my
demonstrations.  Yet there still remain misconceptions not a few,
which might and may prove very grave hindrances to the
understanding of the concatenation of things, as I have explained
it above.  I have therefore thought it worth while to bring these
misconceptions before the bar of reason.

All such opinions spring from the notion commonly
entertained, that all things in nature act as men themselves act,
namely, with an end in view.  It is accepted as certain, that God
himself directs all things to a definite goal (for it is said
that God made all things for man, and man that he might worship
him).  I will, therefore, consider this opinion, asking first,
why it obtains general credence, and why all men are naturally so
prone to adopt it? secondly, I will point out its falsity; and,
lastly, I will show how it has given rise to prejudices about
good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order and
confusion, beauty and ugliness, and the like.  However, this is
not the place to deduce these misconceptions from the nature of
the human mind: it will be sufficient here, if I assume as a
starting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely,
that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that all
have the desire to seek for what is useful to them, and that they
are conscious of such desire.  Herefrom it follows, first, that
men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their
volitions and desires, and never even dream, in their ignorance,
of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire.
Secondly, that men do all things for an end, namely, for that
which is useful to them, and which they seek.  Thus it comes to
pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final causes of
events, and when these are learned, they are content, as having
no cause for further doubt.  If they cannot learn such causes
from external sources, they are compelled to turn to considering
themselves, and reflecting what end would have induced them
personally to bring about the given event, and thus they
necessarily judge other natures by their own.  Further, as they
find in themselves and outside themselves many means which assist
them not a little in the search for what is useful, for instance,
eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for
yielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea for breeding
fish, &c., they come to look on the whole of nature as a means
for obtaining such conveniences.  Now as they are aware, that
they found these conveniences and did not make them, they think
they have cause for believing, that some other being has made
them for their use.  As they look upon things as means, they
cannot believe them to be self--created; but, judging from the
means which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they
are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe
endowed with human freedom, who have arranged and adapted
everything for human use.  They are bound to estimate the nature
of such rulers (having no information on the subject) in
accordance with their own nature, and therefore they assert that
the gods ordained everything for the use of man, in order to bind
man to themselves and obtain from him the highest honor.  Hence
also it follows, that everyone thought out for himself, according
to his abilities, a different way of worshipping God, so that God
might love him more than his fellows, and direct the whole course
of nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity and
insatiable avarice.  Thus the prejudice developed into
superstition, and took deep root in the human mind; and for this
reason everyone strove most zealously to understand and explain
the final causes of things; but in their endeavor to show that
nature does nothing in vain, i.e. nothing which is useless to
man, they only seem to have demonstrated that nature, the gods,
and men are all mad together.  Consider, I pray you, the result:
among the many helps of nature they were bound to find some
hindrances, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, &c.: so they
declared that such things happen, because the gods are angry at
some wrong done to them by men, or at some fault committed in
their worship.  Experience day by day protested and showed by
infinite examples, that good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of
pious and impious alike; still they would not abandon their
inveterate prejudice, for it was more easy for them to class such
contradictions among other unknown things of whose use they were
ignorant, and thus to retain their actual and innate condition of
ignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning
and start afresh.  They therefore laid down as an axiom, that
God's judgments far transcend human understanding.  Such a
doctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the
human race for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnished
another standard of verity in considering solely the essence and
properties of figures without regard to their final causes.
There are other reasons (which I need not mention here) besides
mathematics, which might have caused men's minds to be directed
to these general prejudices, and have led them to the knowledge
of the truth.

I have now sufficiently explained my first point.  There is
no need to show at length, that nature has no particular goal in
view, and that final causes are mere human figments.  This, I
think, is already evident enough, both from the causes and
foundations on which I have shown such prejudice to be based, and
also from Prop. xvi., and the Corollary of Prop. xxxii., and, in
fact, all those propositions in which I have shown, that
everything in nature proceeds from a sort of necessity, and with
the utmost perfection.  However, I will add a few remarks, in
order to overthrow this doctrine of a final cause utterly.  That
which is really a cause it considers as an effect, and vice versa:
it makes that which is by nature first to be last, and that
which is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect.  Passing
over the questions of cause and priority as self--evident, it is
plain from Props. xxi., xxii., xxiii. that the effect is most
perfect which is produced immediately by God; the effect which
requires for its production several intermediate causes is, in
that respect, more imperfect.  But if those things which were
made immediately by God were made to enable him to attain his
end, then the things which come after, for the sake of which the
first were made, are necessarily the most excellent of all.

Further, this doctrine does away with the perfection of God:
for, if God acts for an object, he necessarily desires something
which he lacks.  Certainly, theologians and metaphysicians draw a
distinction between the object of want and the object of
assimilation; still they confess that God made all things for
the sake of himself, not for the sake of creation.  They are
unable to point to anything prior to creation, except God
himself, as an object for which God should act, and are therefore
driven to admit (as they clearly must), that God lacked those
things for whose attainment he created means, and further that he
desired them.

We must not omit to notice that the followers of this
doctrine, anxious to display their talent in assigning final
causes, have imported a new method of argument in proof of their
theory--namely, a reduction, not to the impossible, but to
ignorance; thus showing that they have no other method of
exhibiting their doctrine.  For example, if a stone falls from a
roof on to someone's head, and kills him, they will demonstrate
by their new method, that the stone fell in order to kill the man;
for, if it had not by God's will fallen with that object, how
could so many circumstances (and there are often many concurrent
circumstances) have all happened together by chance?  Perhaps you
will answer that the event is due to the facts that the wind was
blowing, and the man was walking that way.  "But why," they will
insist, "was the wind blowing, and why was the man at that very
time walking that way?"  If you again answer, that the wind had
then sprung up because the sea had begun to be agitated the day
before, the weather being previously calm, and that the man had
been invited by a friend, they will again insist: "But why was
the sea agitated, and why was the man invited at that time?"
So they will pursue their questions from cause to cause, till at
last you take refuge in the will of God--in other words, the
sanctuary of ignorance.  So, again, when they survey the frame of
the human body, they are amazed; and being ignorant of the
causes of so great a work of art, conclude that it has been
fashioned, not mechanically, but by divine and supernatural
skill, and has been so put together that one part shall not hurt
another.

Hence anyone who seeks for the true causes of miracles, and
strives to understand natural phenomena as an intelligent being,
and not to gaze at them like a fool, is set down and denounced as
an impious heretic by those, whom the masses adore as the
interpreters of nature and the gods.  Such persons know that,
with the removal of ignorance, the wonder which forms their only
available means for proving and preserving their authority would
vanish also.  But I now quit this subject, and pass on to my
third point.

After men persuaded themselves, that everything which is
created is created for their sake, they were bound to consider as
the chief quality in everything that which is most useful to
themselves, and to account those things the best of all which
have the most beneficial effect on mankind.  Further, they were
bound to form abstract notions for the explanation of the nature
of things, such as goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth,
cold, beauty, deformity, and so on; and from the belief that
they are free agents arose the further notions of praise and
blame, sin and merit.

I will speak of these latter hereafter, when I treat of human
nature; the former I will briefly explain here.

Everything which conduces to health and the worship of God
they have called good, everything which hinders these objects
they have styled bad; and inasmuch as those who do not
understand the nature of things do not verify phenomena in any
way, but merely imagine them after a fashion, and mistake their
imagination for understanding, such persons firmly believe that
there is an order in things, being really ignorant both of things
and their own nature.  When phenomena are of such a kind, that
the impression they make on our senses requires little effort of
imagination, and can consequently be easily remembered, we say
that they are well--ordered; if the contrary, that they are
ill--ordered or confused.  Further, as things which are easily
imagined are more pleasing to us, men prefer order to
confusion--as though there were any order in nature, except in
relation to our imagination--and say that God has created all
things in order; thus, without knowing it, attributing
imagination to God, unless, indeed, they would have it that God
foresaw human imagination, and arranged everything, so that it
should be most easily imagined.  If this be their theory, they
would not, perhaps, be daunted by the fact that we find an
infinite number of phenomena, far surpassing our imagination, and
very many others which confound its weakness.  But enough has
been said on this subject.  The other abstract notions are
nothing but modes of imagining, in which the imagination is
differently affected: though they are considered by the ignorant
as the chief attributes of things, inasmuch as they believe that
everything was created for the sake of themselves; and,
according as they are affected by it, style it good or bad,
healthy or rotten and corrupt.  For instance, if the motion which
objects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to health,
the objects causing it are styled beautiful; if a contrary
motion be excited, they are styled ugly.

Things which are perceived through our sense of smell are
styled fragrant or fetid; if through our taste, sweet or bitter,
full--flavored or insipid; if through our touch, hard or soft,
rough or smooth, &c.

Whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise,
sound, or harmony.  In this last case, there are men lunatic
enough to believe, that even God himself takes pleasure in
harmony; and philosophers are not lacking who have persuaded
themselves, that the motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise to
harmony--all of which instances sufficiently show that everyone
judges of things according to the state of his brain, or rather
mistakes for things the forms of his imagination.  We need no
longer wonder that there have arisen all the controversies we
have witnessed, and finally skepticism: for, although human
bodies in many respects agree, yet in very many others they
differ; so that what seems good to one seems bad to another;
what seems well ordered to one seems confused to another; what
is pleasing to one displeases another, and so on.  I need not
further enumerate, because this is not the place to treat the
subject at length, and also because the fact is sufficiently well
known.  It is commonly said: "So many men, so many minds;
everyone is wise in his own way; brains differ as completely as
palates."  All of which proverbs show, that men judge of things
according to their mental disposition, and rather imagine than
understand: for, if they understood phenomena, they would, as
mathematicians attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what I
have urged.

We have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly
given of nature are mere modes of imagining, and do not indicate
the true nature of anything, but only the constitution of the
imagination; and, although they have names, as though they were
entities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them
entities imaginary rather than real; and, therefore, all
arguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily
rebutted.

Many argue in this way.  If all things follow from a
necessity of the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there
so many imperfections in nature? such, for instance, as things
corrupt to the point of putridity, loathsome deformity,
confusion, evil, sin, &c.  But these reasoners are, as I have
said, easily confuted, for the perfection of things is to be
reckoned only from their own nature and power; things are not
more or less perfect, according as they delight or offend human
senses, or according as they are serviceable or repugnant to
mankind.  To those who ask why God did not so create all men,
that they should be governed only by reason, I give no answer but
this: because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of
every degree of perfection from highest to lowest; or, more
strictly, because the laws of his nature are so vast, as to
suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an
infinite intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. xvi.

Such are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note; if
there are any more of the same sort, everyone may easily
dissipate them for himself with the aid of a little reflection.




Part II.

ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND


PREFACE



I now pass on to explaining the results, which must
necessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal and
infinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in Part
i., Prop. xvi., that an infinite number must follow in an
infinite number of ways), but only those which are able to lead
us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind
and its highest blessedness.


DEFINITIONS

DEFINITION I.  By body I mean a mode which expresses in a certain
determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as he is
considered as an extended thing.  (See Pt. i., Prop. xxv.,
Coroll.)

DEFINITION II.  I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing
that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also,
and, which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also;
in other words, that without which the thing, and which itself
without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.

DEFINITION III. By idea, I mean the mental conception which is
formed by the mind as a thinking thing.

Explanation.--I say conception rather than perception, because
the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in
respect to the object; whereas conception seems to express an
activity of the mind.

DEFINITION IV.  By an adequate idea, I mean an idea which, in so
far as it is considered in itself, without relation to the
object, has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.

Explanation.--I say intrinsic, in order to exclude that mark
which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea and
its object (ideatum).

DEFINITION V.  Duration is the indefinite continuance of
existing.

Explanation.--I say indefinite, because it cannot be
determined through the existence itself of the existing thing, or
by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence of
the thing, but does not take it away.

DEFINITION VI.  Reality and perfection I use as synonymous terms.

DEFINITION VII.  By particular things, I mean things which are
finite and have a conditioned existence; but if several
individual things concur in one action, so as to be all
simultaneously the effect of one cause, I consider them all, so
far, as one particular thing.


AXIOMS

I.  The essence of man does not involve necessary existence, that
is, it may, in the order of nature, come to pass that this or
that man does or does not exist.

II.  Man thinks.

III.  Modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or any other of
the passions, do not take place, unless there be in the same
individual an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c.  But the idea
can exist without the presence of any other mode of thinking.

IV.  We perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.

V.  We feel and perceive no particular things, save bodies and
modes of thought.

N.B.  The Postulates are given after the conclusion of Prop.
xiii.


PROPOSITIONS

PROP. I.  Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking
thing.

Proof.--Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are
modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature
of God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.).  God therefore possesses
the attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved
in all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby.
Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God,
which express God's eternal and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def.
vi.).  In other words, God is a thinking thing.  Q.E.D.

Note.--This proposition is also evident from the fact, that we
are able to conceive an infinite thinking being.  For, in
proportion as a thinking being is conceived as thinking more
thoughts, so is it conceived as containing more reality or
perfection.  Therefore a being, which can think an infinite
number of things in an infinite number of ways, is, necessarily,
in respect of thinking, infinite.  As, therefore, from the
consideration of thought alone, we conceive an infinite being,
thought is necessarily (Pt. i., Deff. iv. and vi.) one of the
infinite attributes of God, as we were desirous of showing.

PROP. II.  Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an
extended thing.

Proof.--The proof of this proposition is similar to that of
the last.

PROP. III.  In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his
essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his
essence.

Proof.--God (by the first Prop. of this Part) can think an
infinite number of things in infinite ways, or (what is the same
thing, by Prop. xvi., Part i.) can form the idea of his essence,
and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom.  Now all
that is in the power of God necessarily is (Pt. i., Prop. xxxv.).
Therefore, such an idea as we are considering necessarily is, and
in God alone.  Q.E.D.  (Part i., Prop. xv.)

Note.--The multitude understand by the power of God the free
will of God, and the right over all things that exist, which
latter are accordingly generally considered as contingent.  For
it is said that God has the power to destroy all things, and to
reduce them to nothing.  Further, the power of God is very often
likened to the power of kings.  But this doctrine we have refuted
(Pt. i., Prop. xxxii., Corolls. i. and ii.), and we have shown
(Part i., Prop. xvi.) that God acts by the same necessity, as
that by which he understands himself; in other words, as it
follows from the necessity of the divine nature (as all admit),
that God understands himself, so also does it follow by the same
necessity, that God performs infinite acts in infinite ways.  We
further showed (Part i., Prop. xxxiv.), that God's power is
identical with God's essence in action; therefore it is as
impossible for us to conceive God as not acting, as to conceive
him as non--existent.  If we might pursue the subject further, I
could point out, that the power which is commonly attributed to
God is not only human (as showing that God is conceived by the
multitude as a man, or in the likeness of a man), but involves a
negation of power.  However, I am unwilling to go over the same
ground so often.  I would only beg the reader again and again, to
turn over frequently in his mind what I have said in Part I from
Prop. xvi. to the end.  No one will be able to follow my meaning,
unless he is scrupulously careful not to confound the power of
God with the human power and right of kings.

PROP. IV.  The idea of God, from which an infinite number of
things follow in infinite ways, can only be one.

Proof.--Infinite intellect comprehends nothing save the
attributes of God and his modifications (Part i., Prop. xxx.).
Now God is one (Part i., Prop. xiv., Coroll.).  Therefore the
idea of God, wherefrom an infinite number of things follow in
infinite ways, can only be one.  Q.E.D.

PROP. V.  The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only
in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far
as he is unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas
both of the attributes of God and of particular things do not own
as their efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things
perceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.

Proof.--This proposition is evident from Prop. iii. of this
Part.  We there drew the conclusion, that God can form the idea
of his essence, and of all things which follow necessarily
therefrom, solely because he is a thinking thing, and not because
he is the object of his own idea.  Wherefore the actual being of
ideas owns for cause God, in so far as he is a thinking thing.
It may be differently proved as follows: the actual being of
ideas is (obviously) a mode of thought, that is (Part i., Prop.
xxv., Coroll.) a mode which expresses in a certain manner the
nature of God, in so far as he is a thinking thing, and therefore
(Part i., Prop. x.) involves the conception of no other attribute
of God, and consequently (by Part i., Ax. iv.) is not the effect
of any attribute save thought.  Therefore the actual being of
ideas owns God as its cause, in so far as he is considered as a
thinking thing, &c.  Q.E.D.

PROP. VI.  The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in
so far as he is considered through the attribute of which they
are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any
other attribute.

Proof.--Each attribute is conceived through itself, without
any other (Part i., Prop. x.); wherefore the modes of each
attribute involve the conception of that attribute, but not of
any other.  Thus (Part i., Ax. iv.) they are caused by God, only
in so far as he is considered through the attribute whose modes
they are, and not in so far as he is considered through any
other.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence the actual being of things, which are not
modes of thought, does not follow from the divine nature, because
that nature has prior knowledge of the things.  Things
represented in ideas follow, and are derived from their
particular attribute, in the same manner, and with the same
necessity as ideas follow (according to what we have shown) from
the attribute of thought.

PROP. VII.  The order and connection of ideas is the same as the
order and connection of things.

Proof.--This proposition is evident from Part i., Ax. iv.  For
the idea of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge of
the cause, whereof it is an effect.

Corollary.--Hence God's power of thinking is equal to his
realized power of action--that is, whatsoever follows from the
infinite nature of God in the world of extension (formaliter),
follows without exception in the same order and connection from
the idea of God in the world of thought (objective).

Note.--Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what
has been pointed out above--namely, that whatsoever can be
perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence
of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance:
consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one
and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute,
now through the other.  So, also, a mode of extension and the
idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in
two ways.  This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by
those Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and the
things understood by God are identical.  For instance, a circle
existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is
also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through
different attributes.  Thus, whether we conceive nature under the
attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or
under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one
and the same chain of causes--that is, the same things following
in either case.

I said that God is the cause of an idea--for instance, of the
idea of a circle,--in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a
circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the
actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a
proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again
through another, and so on to infinity; so that, so long as we
consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order
of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the
attribute of thought only.  And, in so far as we consider things
as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole of
nature through the attributes of extension only; and so on, in
the case of the other attributes.  Wherefore of things as they
are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he
consists of infinite attributes.  I cannot for the present
explain my meaning more clearly.

PROP. VIII.  The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do
not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in
the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes
are contained in the attributes of God.

Proof.--This proposition is evident from the last; it is
understood more clearly from the preceding note.

Corollary.--Hence, so long as particular things do not exist,
except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of
God, their representations in thought or ideas do not exist,
except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists; and when
particular things are said to exist, not only in so far as they
are involved in the attributes of God, but also in so far as they
are said to continue, their ideas will also involve existence,
through which they are said to continue.

Note.--If anyone desires an example to throw more light on
this question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any,
which adequately explains the thing of which I here speak,
inasmuch as it is unique; however, I will endeavour to
illustrate it as far as possible.  The nature of a circle is such
that if any number of straight lines intersect within it, the
rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another;
thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle.  Yet
none of these rectangles can be said to exist, except in so far
as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of these
rectangles be said to exist, except in so far as they are
comprehended in the idea of the circle.  Let us grant that, from
this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist.  The ideas of
these two not only exist, in so far as they are contained in the
idea of the circle, but also as they involve the existence of
those rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished from the
remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.

PROP. IX.  The idea of an individual thing actually existing is
caused by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as
he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually
existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected
by a third idea, and so on to infinity.

Proof.--The idea of an individual thing actually existing is
an individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes
(by the Corollary and note to Prop. viii. of this part); thus
(by Prop. vi. of this part) it is caused by God, in so far only
as he is a thinking thing.  But not (by Prop. xxviii. of Part i.)
in so far as he is a thing thinking absolutely, only in so far as
he is considered as affected by another mode of thinking; and he
is the cause of this latter, as being affected by a third, and so
on to infinity.  Now, the order and connection of ideas is (by
Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the order and connection of
causes.   Therefore of a given individual idea another individual
idea, or God, in so far as he is considered as modified by that
idea, is the cause; and of this second idea God is the cause, in
so far as he is affected by another idea, and so on to infinity.
Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Whatsoever takes place in the individual object of
any idea, the knowledge thereof is in God, in so far only as he
has the idea of the object.

Proof.--Whatsoever takes place in the object of any idea, its
idea is in God (by Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far as he
is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by
another idea of an individual thing (by the last Prop.); but (by
Prop. vii. of this part) the order and connection of ideas is the
same as the order and connection of things.  The knowledge,
therefore, of that which takes place in any individual object
will be in God, in so far only as he has the idea of that object.
Q.E.D.

PROP. X.  The being of substance does not appertain to the
essence of man--in other words, substance does not constitute the
actual being[2] of man.

[2] "Forma"


Proof.--The being of substance involves necessary existence
(Part i., Prop. vii.).  If, therefore, the being of substance
appertains to the essence of man, substance being granted, man
would necessarily be granted also (II. Def. ii.), and,
consequently, man would necessarily exist, which is absurd
(II. Ax. i.).  Therefore, &c.  Q.E.D.

Note.--This proposition may also be proved from I.v., in which
it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same
nature; for as there may be many men, the being of substance is
not that which constitutes the actual being of man.  Again, the
proposition is evident from the other properties of
substance--namely, that substance is in its nature infinite,
immutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone may see for himself.

Corollary.--Hence it follows, that the essence of man is
constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God.
For (by the last Prop.) the being of substance does not belong to
the essence of man.  That essence therefore (by i.  15) is
something which is in God, and which without God can neither be
nor be conceived, whether it be a modification (i. 25. Coroll.),
or a mode which expresses God's nature in a certain conditioned
manner.

Note.--Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be
conceived without God.  All men agree that God is the one and
only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their
existence; that is, God is not only the cause of things in
respect to their being made (secundum fieri), but also in respect
to their being (secundum esse).

At the same time many assert, that that, without which a
thing cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that
thing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of God
appertains to the essence of created things, or else that created
things can be or be conceived without God; or else, as is more
probably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines.  I think the
cause for such confusion is mainly, that they do not keep to the
proper order of philosophic thinking.  The nature of God, which
should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the
order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken to be
last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place
what they call the objects of sensation; hence, while they are
considering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to
the divine nature, and, when afterwards they apply their mind to
the study of the divine nature, they are quite unable to bear in
mind the first hypotheses, with which they have overlaid the
knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are
no help towards understanding the divine nature.  So that it is
hardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradict
themselves freely.

However, I pass over this point.  My intention her was only
to give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing
cannot be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing:
individual things cannot be or be conceived without God, yet God
does not appertain to their essence.  I said that "I considered
as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given,
the thing is necessarily given also, and which being removed, the
thing is necessarily removed also; or that without which the
thing, and which itself without the thing can neither be nor be
conceived."  (II. Def. ii.)

PROP. XI.  The first element, which constitutes the actual being
of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually
existing.

Proof.--The essence of man (by the Coroll. of the last Prop.)
is constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God, namely
(by II. Ax. ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II.
Ax. iii.) the idea is prior in nature, and, when the idea is
given, the other modes (namely, those of which the idea is prior
in nature) must be in the same individual (by the same Axiom).
Therefore an idea is the first element constituting the human
mind.  But not the idea of a non--existent thing, for then (II.
viii. Coroll.) the idea itself cannot be said to exist; it must
therefore be the idea of something actually existing.  But not of
an infinite thing.  For an infinite thing (I. xxi., xxii.), must
always necessarily exist; this would (by II. Ax. i.) involve an
absurdity.  Therefore the first element, which constitutes the
actual being of the human mind, is the idea of something actually
existing.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows, that the human mind is part of
the infinite intellect of God; thus when we say, that the human
mind perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God has
this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far
as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in so
far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; and when we
say that God has this or that idea, not only in so far as he
constitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far as
he, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea of
another thing, we assert that the human mind perceives a thing in
part or inadequately.

Note.--Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and
will call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate;
I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and
not to pronounce on my statements, till they have read to the
end.

PROP. XII.  Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea,
which constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the human
mind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of
the said occurrence.  That is, if the object of the idea
constituting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in
that body without being perceived by the mind.

Proof.--Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of any idea,
the knowledge thereof is necessarily in God (II. ix. Coroll.), in
so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of the said
object, that is (II. xi.), in so far as he constitutes the mind
of anything.  Therefore, whatsoever takes place in the object
constituting the idea of the human mind, the knowledge thereof is
necessarily in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of
the human mind; that is (by II. xi. Coroll.) the knowledge of
the said thing will necessarily be in the mind, in other words
the mind perceives it.

Note.--This proposition is also evident, and is more clearly
to be understood from II. vii., which see.

PROP. XIII.  The object of the idea constituting the human mind
is the body, in other words a certain mode of extension which
actually exists, and nothing else.

Proof.--If indeed the body were not the object of the human
mind, the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in
God (II. ix. Coroll.) in virtue of his constituting our mind, but
in virtue of his constituting the mind of something else; that
is (II. xi. Coroll.) the ideas of the modifications of the body
would not be in our mind: now (by II. Ax. iv.) we do possess the
idea of the modifications of the body.  Therefore the object of
the idea constituting the human mind is the body, and the body as
it actually exists (II. xi.).  Further, if there were any other
object of the idea constituting the mind besides body, then, as
nothing can exist from which some effect does not follow (I.
xxxvi.) there would necessarily have to be in our mind an idea,
which would be the effect of that other object (II. xi.); but
(I. Ax. v.) there is no such idea.  Wherefore the object of our
mind is the body as it exists, and nothing else.  Q.E.D.

Note.--We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is
united to the body, but also the nature of the union between mind
and body.  However, no one will be able to grasp this adequately
or distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge of the
nature of our body.  The propositions we have advanced hitherto
have been entirely general, applying not more to men than to
other individual things, all of which, though in different
degrees, are animated.[3]  For of everything there is necessarily
an idea in God, of which God is the cause, in the same way as
there is an idea of the human body; thus  whatever we have
asserted of the idea of the human body must necessarily also be
asserted of the idea of everything else.  Still, on the other
hand, we cannot deny that ideas, like objects, differ one from
the other, one being more excellent than another and containing
more reality, just as the object of one idea is more excellent
than the object of another idea, and contains more reality.

[3] "Animata"


Wherefore, in order to determine, wherein the human mind
differs from other things, and wherein it surpasses them, it is
necessary for us to know the nature of its object, that is, of
the human body.  What this nature is, I am not able here to
explain, nor is it necessary for the proof of what I advance,
that I should do so.  I will only say generally, that in
proportion as any given body is more fitted than others for doing
many actions or receiving many impressions at once, so also is
the mind, of which it is the object, more fitted than others for
forming many simultaneous perceptions; and the more the actions
of the body depend on itself alone, and the fewer other bodies
concur with it in action, the more fitted is the mind of which it
is the object for distinct comprehension.  We may thus recognize
the superiority of one mind over others, and may further see the
cause, why we have only a very confused knowledge of our body,
and also many kindred questions, which I will, in the following
propositions, deduce from what has been advanced.  Wherefore I
have thought it worth while to explain and prove more strictly my
present statements.  In order to do so, I must premise a few
propositions concerning the nature of bodies.

AXIOM I.  All bodies are either in motion or at rest.

AXIOM II.  Every body is moved sometimes more slowly,
sometimes more quickly.

LEMMA I.  Bodies are distinguished from one another in
respect of motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in
respect of substance.

Proof.--The first part of this proposition is, I take it,
self--evident.  That bodies are not distinguished in respect of
substance, is plain both from I. v. and I. viii.  It is brought
out still more clearly from I. xv, note.

LEMMA II.  All bodies agree in certain respects.

Proof.--All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve the
conception of one and the same attribute (II., Def. i.).
Further, in the fact that they may be moved less or more quickly,
and may be absolutely in motion or at rest.

LEMMA III.  A body in motion or at rest must be determined to
motion or rest by another body, which other body has been
determined to motion or rest by a third body, and that third
again by a fourth, and so on to infinity.

Proof.--Bodies are individual things (II., Def. i.), which
(Lemma I.) are distinguished one from the other in respect to
motion and rest; thus (I. xxviii.) each must necessarily be
determined to motion or rest by another individual thing, namely
(II. vi.), by another body, which other body is also (Ax. i.) in
motion or at rest.  And this body again can only have been set in
motion or caused to rest by being determined by a third body to
motion or rest.   This third body again by a fourth, and so on to
infinity.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows, that a body in motion keeps in
motion, until it is determined to a state of rest by some other
body; and a body at rest remains so, until it is determined to a
state of motion by some other body.  This is indeed self--evident.
For when I suppose, for instance, that a given body, A, is at
rest, and do not take into consideration other bodies in motion,
I cannot affirm anything concerning the body A, except that it is
at rest.  If it afterwards comes to pass that A is in motion,
this cannot have resulted from its having been at rest, for no
other consequence could have been involved than its remaining at
rest.  If, on the other hand, A be given in motion, we shall, so
long as we only consider A, be unable to affirm anything
concerning it, except that it is in motion.   If A is
subsequently found to be at rest, this rest cannot be the result
of A's previous motion, for such motion can only have led to
continued motion; the state of rest therefore must have resulted
from something, which was not in A, namely, from an external
cause determining A to a state of rest.

Axiom I.--All modes, wherein one body is affected by another
body, follow simultaneously from the nature of the body affected
and the body affecting; so that one and the same body may be
moved in different modes, according to the difference in the
nature of the bodies moving it; on the other hand, different
bodies may be moved in different modes by one and the same body.

Axiom II.--When a body in motion impinges on another body at
rest, which it is unable to move, it recoils, in order to
continue its motion, and the angle made by the line of motion in
the recoil and the plane of the body at rest, whereon the moving
body has impinged, will be equal to the angle formed by the line
of motion of incidence and the same plane.

So far we have been speaking only of the most simple bodies,
which are only distinguished one from the other by motion and
rest, quickness and slowness.  We now pass on to compound bodies.

Definition.--When any given bodies of the same or different
magnitude are compelled by other bodies to remain in contact, or
if they be moved at the same or different rates of speed, so that
their mutual movements should preserve among themselves a certain
fixed relation, we say that such bodies are in union, and that
together they compose one body or individual, which is
distinguished from other bodies by the fact of this union.

Axiom III.--In proportion as the parts of an individual, or a
compound body, are in contact over a greater or less superficies,
they will with greater or less difficulty admit of being moved
from their position; consequently the individual will, with
greater or less difficulty, be brought to assume another form.
Those bodies, whose parts are in contact over large superficies,
are called hard; those, whose parts are in contact over small
superficies, are called soft; those, whose parts are in motion
among one another, are called fluid.

LEMMA IV.  If from a body or individual, compounded of
several bodies, certain bodies be separated, and if, at the same
time, an equal number of other bodies of the same nature take
their place, the individual will preserve its nature as before,
without any change in its actuality (forma).

Proof.--Bodies (Lemma i.) are not distinguished in respect of
substance: that which constitutes the actuality (formam) of an
individual consists (by the last Def.) in a union of bodies; but
this union, although there is a continual change of bodies, will
(by our hypothesis) be maintained; the individual, therefore,
will retain its nature as before, both in respect of substance
and in respect of mode.  Q.E.D.

LEMMA V.  If the parts composing an individual become greater
or less, but in such proportion, that they all preserve the same
mutual relations of motion and rest, the individual will still
preserve its original nature, and its actuality will not be
changed.

Proof.--The same as for the last Lemma.

LEMMA VI.  If certain bodies composing an individual be
compelled to change the motion, which they have in one direction,
for motion in another direction, but in such a manner, that they
be able to continue their motions and their mutual communication
in the same relations as before, the individual will retain its
own nature without any change of its actuality.

Proof.--This proposition is self--evident, for the individual
is supposed to retain all that, which, in its definition, we
spoke of as its actual being.

LEMMA VII.  Furthermore, the individual thus composed
preserves its nature, whether it be, as a whole, in motion or at
rest, whether it be moved in this or that direction; so long as
each part retains its motion, and preserves its communication
with other parts as before.

Proof.--This proposition is evident from the definition of an
individual prefixed to Lemma iv.

Note.--We thus see, how a composite individual may be affected
in many different ways, and preserve its nature notwithstanding.
Thus far we have conceived an individual as composed of bodies
only distinguished one from the other in respect of motion and
rest, speed and slowness; that is, of bodies of the most simple
character.  If, however, we now conceive another individual
composed of several individuals of diverse natures, we shall find
that the number of ways in which it can be affected, without
losing its nature, will be greatly multiplied.  Each of its parts
would consist of several bodies, and therefore (by Lemma vi.)
each part would admit, without change to its nature, of quicker
or slower motion, and would consequently be able to transmit its
motions more quickly or more slowly to the remaining parts.  If
we further conceive a third kind of individuals composed of
individuals of this second kind, we shall find that they may be
affected in a still greater number of ways without changing their
actuality.  We may easily proceed thus to infinity, and conceive
the whole of nature as one individual, whose parts, that is, all
bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change in the
individual as a whole.  I should feel bound to explain and
demonstrate this point at more length, if I were writing a
special treatise on body.  But I have already said that such is
not my object; I have only touched on the question, because it
enables me to prove easily that which I have in view.

POSTULATES

I.  The human body is composed of a number of individual
parts, of diverse nature, each one of which is in itself
extremely complex.

II.  Of the individual parts composing the human body some
are fluid, some soft, some hard.

III.  The individual parts composing the human body, and
consequently the human body itself, are affected in a variety of
ways by external bodies.

IV.  The human body stands in need for its preservation of a
number of other bodies, by which it is continually, so to speak,
regenerated.

V.  When the fluid part of the human body is determined by an
external body to impinge often on another soft part, it changes
the surface of the latter, and, as it were, leaves the impression
thereupon of the external body which impels it.

VI.  The human body can move external bodies, and arrange
them in a variety of ways.

PROP. XIV.  The human mind is capable of perceiving a great
number of things, and is so in proportion as its body is capable
of receiving a great number of impressions.

Proof.--The human body (by Post. iii. and vi.) is affected in
very many ways by external bodies, and is capable in very many
ways of affecting external bodies.  But (II. xii.)  the human
mind must perceive all that takes place in the human body; the
human mind is, therefore, capable of perceiving a great number of
things, and is so in proportion, &c.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XV.  The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the
human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of
ideas.

Proof.--The idea constituting the actual being of the human
mind is the idea of the body (II. xiii.), which (Post. i.) is
composed of a great number of complex individual parts.  But
there is necessarily in God the idea of each individual part
whereof the body is composed (II. viii. Coroll.); therefore
(II. vii.), the idea of the human body is composed of these
numerous ideas of its component parts.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XVI.  The idea of every mode, in which the human body is
affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the human
body, and also the nature of the external body.

Proof.--All the modes, in which any given body is affected,
follow from the nature of the body affected, and also from the
nature of the affecting body (by Ax. i., after the Coroll. of
Lemma iii.), wherefore their idea also necessarily (by I. Ax.
iv.) involves the nature of both bodies; therefore, the idea of
every mode, in which the human body is affected by external
bodies, involves the nature of the human body and of the external
body.  Q.E.D.

Corollary I.--Hence it follows, first, that the human mind
perceives the nature of a variety of bodies, together with the
nature of its own.

Corollary II.--It follows, secondly, that the ideas, which we
have of external bodies, indicate rather the constitution of our
own body than the nature of external bodies.  I have amply
illustrated this in the Appendix to Part I.

PROP. XVII.  If the human body is affected in a manner which
involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will
regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present
to itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to
exclude the existence or the presence of the said external body.

Proof.--This proposition is self--evident, for so long as the
human body continues to be thus affected, so long will the human
mind (II. xii.) regard this modification of the body--that is (by
the last Prop.), it will have the idea of the mode as actually
existing, and this idea involves the nature of the external body.
In other words, it will have the idea which does not exclude, but
postulates the existence or presence of the nature of the
external body; therefore the mind (by II. xvi., Coroll. i.) will
regard the external body as actually existing, until it is
affected, &c.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--The mind is able to regard as present external
bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, even
though they be no longer in existence or present.

Proof.--When external bodies determine the fluid parts of the
human body, so that they often impinge on the softer parts, they
change the surface of the last named (Post. v.); hence (Ax. ii.,
after the Coroll. of Lemma iii.) they are refracted therefrom in
a different manner from that which they followed before such
change; and, further, when afterwards they impinge on the new
surfaces by their own spontaneous movement, they will be
refracted in the same manner, as though they had been impelled
towards those surfaces by external bodies; consequently, they
will, while they continue to be thus refracted, affect the human
body in the same manner, whereof the mind (II. xii.) will again
take cognizance--that is (II. xvii.), the mind will again regard
the external body as present, and will do so, as often as the
fluid parts of the human body impinge on the aforesaid surfaces
by their own spontaneous motion.  Wherefore, although the
external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected,
be no longer in existence, the mind will nevertheless regard them
as present, as often as this action of the body is repeated.
Q.E.D.

Note.--We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case,
that we regard as present many things which are not.  It is
possible that the same result may be brought about by other
causes; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated
one possible explanation, just as well as if I had pointed out
the true cause.  Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the
truth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, which
rest, almost without exception, on experience, that cannot be
controverted by those who have shown, as we have, that the human
body, as we feel it, exists (Coroll. after II. xiii.).
Furthermore (II. vii.  Coroll., II. xvi. Coroll. ii.), we clearly
understand what is the difference between the idea, say, of
Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the
idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul.  The
former directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and
only  implies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter
indicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature
of Peter, and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body
lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even
though he no longer exists.  Further, to retain the usual
phraseology,  the modifications of the human body, of which the
ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call
the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of
things.  When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say
that it imagines.  I will here draw attention to the fact, in
order to indicate where error lies, that the imaginations of the
mind, looked at in themselves, do not contain error.  The mind
does not err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as
it is regarded as being without the idea, which excludes the
existence of such things as it imagines to be present to it.  If
the mind, while imagining non--existent things as present to it,
is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, this
power of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its
nature, and not to a fault, especially if this faculty of
imagination depend solely on its own nature--that is (I. Def.
vii.), if this faculty of imagination be free.

PROP. XVIII.  If the human body has once been affected by two or
more bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imagines
any of them, it will straightway remember the others also.

Proof.--The mind (II. xvii. Coroll.) imagines any given body,
because the human body is affected and disposed by the
impressions from an external body, in the same manner as it is
affected when certain of its parts are acted on by the said
external body; but (by our hypothesis) the body was then so
disposed, that the mind imagined two bodies at once; therefore,
it will also in the second case imagine two bodies at once, and
the mind, when it imagines one, will straightway remember the
other.  Q.E.D.

Note.--We now clearly see what Memory is.  It is simply a
certain association of ideas involving the nature of things
outside the human body, which association arises in the mind
according to the order and association of the modifications
(affectiones) of the human body.  I say, first, it is an
association of those ideas only, which involve the nature of
things outside the human body: not of ideas which answer to the
nature of the said things: ideas of the modifications of the
human body are, strictly speaking (II. xvi.), those which involve
the nature both of the human body and of external bodies.  I say,
secondly, that this association arises according to the order and
association of the modifications of the human body, in order to
distinguish it from that association of ideas, which arises from
the order of the intellect, whereby the mind perceives things
through their primary causes, and which is in all men the same.
And hence we can further clearly understand, why the mind from
the thought of one thing, should straightway arrive at the
thought of another thing, which has no similarity with the first;
for instance, from the thought of the word pomum (an apple), a
Roman would straightway arrive at the thought of the fruit apple,
which has no similitude with the articulate sound in question,
nor anything in common with it, except that the body of the man
has often been affected by these two things; that is, that the
man has often heard the word pomum, while he was looking at the
fruit; similarly every man will go on from one thought to
another, according as his habit has ordered the images of things
in his body.  For a soldier, for instance, when he sees the
tracks of a horse in sand, will at once pass from the thought of
a horse to the thought of a horseman, and thence to the thought
of war, &c.; while a countryman will proceed from the thought of
a horse to the thought of a plough, a field, &c.  Thus every man
will follow this or that train of thought, according as he has
been in the habit of conjoining and associating the mental images
of things in this or that manner.

PROP. XIX.  The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does
not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications
whereby the body is affected.

Proof.--The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the
human body (II. xiii.), which (II. ix.) is in God, in so far as
he is regarded as affected by another idea of a particular thing
actually existing: or, inasmuch as (Post. iv.) the human body
stands in need of very many bodies whereby it is, as it were,
continually regenerated; and the order and connection of ideas
is the same as the order and connection of causes (II. vii.);
this idea will therefore be in God, in so far as he is regarded
as affected by the ideas of very many particular things.  Thus
God has the idea of the human body, or knows the human body, in
so far as he is affected by very many other ideas, and not in so
far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; that is (by
II. xi. Coroll.), the human mind does not know the human body.
But the ideas of the modifications of body are in God, in so far
as  he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human
mind perceives those modifications (II. xii.), and consequently
(II. xvi.) the human body itself, and as actually existing;
therefore the mind perceives thus far only the human body.
Q.E.D.

PROP. XX.  The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in
God, following in God in the same manner, and being referred to
God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the human
body.

Proof.--Thought is an attribute of God (II. i.); therefore
(II. iii.) there must necessarily be in God the idea both of
thought itself and of all its modifications, consequently also of
the human mind (II. xi.).  Further, this idea or knowledge of the
mind does not follow from God, in so far as he is infinite, but
in so far as he is affected by another idea of an individual
thing (II. ix.).  But (II. vii.) the order and connection of
ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes;
therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind is in God and is
referred to God, in the same manner as the idea or knowledge of
the body.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXI.  This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the
same way as the mind is united to the body.

Proof.--That the mind is united to the body we have shown from
the fact, that the body is the object of the mind (II. xii. and
xiii.); and so for the same reason the idea of the mind must be
united with its object, that is, with the mind in the same manner
as the mind is united to the body.  Q.E.D.

Note.--This proposition is comprehended much more clearly from
what we have said in the note to II. vii.  We there showed that
the idea of body and body, that is, mind and body (II. xiii.),
are one and the same individual conceived now under the attribute
of thought, now under the attribute of extension; wherefore the
idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing,
which is conceived under one and the same attribute, namely,
thought.  The idea of the mind, I repeat, and the mind itself are
in God by the same necessity and follow from him from the same
power of thinking.  Strictly speaking, the idea of the mind, that
is, the idea of an idea, is nothing but the distinctive quality
(forma) of the idea in so far as it is conceived as a mode of
thought without reference to the object; if a man knows
anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he knows it, and at
the same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on to
infinity.  But I will treat of this hereafter.

PROP. XXII.  The human mind perceives not only the modifications
of the body, but also the ideas of such modifications.

Proof.--The ideas of the ideas of modifications follow in God
in the same manner, and are referred to God in the same manner,
as the ideas of the said modifications.  This is proved in the
same way as II. xx.  But the ideas of the modifications of the
body are in the human mind (II. xii.), that is, in God, in so far
as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; therefore the
ideas of these ideas will be in God, in so far as he has the
knowledge or idea of the human mind, that is (II. xxi.), they
will be in the human mind itself, which therefore perceives not
only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such
modifications.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIII.  The mind does not know itself, except in so far as
it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body.

Proof.--The idea or knowledge of the mind (II. xx.) follows in
God in the same manner, and is referred to God in the same
manner, as the idea or knowledge of the body.  But since (II.
xix.) the human mind does not know the human body itself, that is
(II. xi. Coroll.), since the knowledge of the human body is not
referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the
human mind; therefore, neither is the knowledge of the mind
referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of the
human mind; therefore (by the same Coroll. II. xi.), the human
mind thus far has no knowledge of itself.  Further the ideas of
the modifications, whereby the body is affected, involve the
nature of the human body itself (II. xvi.), that is (II. xiii.),
they agree with the nature of the mind; wherefore the knowledge
of these ideas necessarily involves knowledge of the mind; but
(by the last Prop.) the knowledge of these ideas is in the human
mind itself; wherefore the human mind thus far only has
knowledge of itself.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIV.  The human mind does not involve an adequate
knowledge of the parts composing the human body.

Proof.--The parts composing the human body do not belong to
the essence of that body, except in so far as they communicate
their motions to one another in a certain fixed relation (Def.
after Lemma iii.), not in so far as they can be regarded as
individuals without relation to the human body.  The parts of the
human body are highly complex individuals  (Post. i.), whose
parts (Lemma iv.) can be separated from the human body without in
any way destroying the nature and distinctive quality of the
latter, and they can communicate their motions (Ax. i., after
Lemma iii.) to other bodies in another relation; therefore (II.
iii.)  the idea or knowledge of each part will be in God,
inasmuch (II. ix.) as he is regarded as affected by another idea
of a particular thing, which particular thing is prior in the
order of nature to the aforesaid part (II. vii.).  We may affirm
the same thing of each part of each individual composing the
human body; therefore, the knowledge of each part composing the
human body is in God, in so far as he is affected by very many
ideas of things, and not in so far as he has the idea of the
human body only, in other words, the idea which constitutes the
nature of the human mind (II. xiii); therefore (II. xi.
Coroll.), the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge
of the human body.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXV.  The idea of each modification of the human body does
not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body.

Proof.--We have shown that the idea of a modification of the
human body involves the nature of an external body, in so far as
that external body conditions the human body in a given manner.
But, in so far as the external body is an individual, which has
no reference to the human body, the knowledge or idea thereof is
in God (II. ix.), in so far as God is regarded as affected by the
idea of a further thing, which (II. vii.) is naturally prior to
the said external body.  Wherefore an adequate knowledge of the
external body is not in God, in so far as he has the idea of the
modification of the human body; in other words, the idea of the
modification of the human body does not involve an adequate
knowledge of the external body.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVI.  The human mind does not perceive any external body
as actually existing, except through the ideas of the
modifications of its own body.

Proof.--If the human body is in no way affected by a given
external body, then  (II. vii.) neither is the idea of the human
body, in other words, the human mind, affected in any way by the
idea of the existence of the said external body, nor does it in
any manner perceive its existence.  But, in so far as the human
body is affected in any way by a given external body, thus far
(II. xvi. and Coroll.) it perceives that external body.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--In so far as the human mind imagines an external
body, it has not an adequate knowledge thereof.

Proof.--When the human mind regards external bodies through
the ideas of the modifications of its own body, we say that it
imagines (see II. xvii. note); now the mind can only imagine
external bodies as actually existing.  Therefore (by II. xxv.),
in so far as the mind imagines external bodies, it has not an
adequate knowledge of them.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVII.  The idea of each modification of the human body
does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.

Proof.--Every idea of a modification of the human body
involves the nature of the human body, in so far as the human
body is regarded as affected in a given manner (II. xvi.).  But,
inasmuch as the human body is an individual which may be affected
in many other ways, the idea of the said modification, &c.
Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVIII.  The ideas of the modifications of the human body,
in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not
clear and distinct, but confused.

Proof.--The ideas of the modifications of the human body
involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies
(II. xvi.); they must involve the nature not only of the human
body but also of its parts; for the modifications are modes
(Post. iii.), whereby the parts of the human body, and,
consequently, the human body as a whole are affected.   But (by
II. xxiv., xxv.) the adequate knowledge of external bodies, as
also of the parts composing the human body, is not in God, in so
far as he is regarded as affected by the human mind, but in so
far as he is regarded as affected by other ideas.  These ideas of
modifications, in so far as they are referred to the human mind
alone, are as consequences without premisses, in other words,
confused ideas.  Q.E.D.

Note.--The idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind
is, in the same manner, proved not to be, when considered in
itself alone, clear and distinct; as also is the case with the
idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the
modifications of the human body, in so far as they are referred
to the mind only, as everyone may easily see.

PROP. XXIX.  The idea of the idea of each modification of the
human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human
mind.

Proof.--The idea of a modification of the human body (II.
xxvii.) does not involve an adequate knowledge of the said body,
in other words, does not adequately express its nature; that is
(II. xiii.) it does not agree with the nature of the mind
adequately; therefore (I. Ax. vi) the idea of this idea does not
adequately express the nature of the human mind, or does not
involve an adequate knowledge thereof.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that the human mind, when it
perceives things after the common order of nature, has not an
adequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself,
of its own body, and of external bodies.  For the mind does not
know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the
modifications of body (II. xxiii.).  It only perceives its own
body (II. xix.) through the ideas of the modifications, and only
perceives external bodies through the same means; thus, in so
far as it has such ideas of modification, it has not an adequate
knowledge of itself (II. xxix.), nor of its own body (II.
xxvii.), nor of external bodies (II. xxv.), but only a
fragmentary and confused knowledge thereof (II. xxviii. and
note).  Q.E.D.

Note.--I say expressly, that the mind has not an adequate but
only a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and of
external bodies, whenever it perceives things after the common
order of nature; that is, whenever it is determined from
without, namely, by the fortuitous play of circumstance, to
regard this or that; not at such times as it is determined from
within, that is, by the fact of regarding several things at once,
to understand their points of agreement, difference, and
contrast.  Whenever it is determined in anywise from within, it
regards things clearly and distinctly, as I will show below.

PROP. XXX.  We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the
duration of our body.

Proof.--The duration of our body does not depend on its
essence (II. Ax. i.), nor on the absolute nature of God (I.
xxi.).  But (I. xxviii.) it is conditioned to exist and operate
by causes, which in their turn are conditioned to exist and
operate in a fixed and definite relation by other causes, these
last again being conditioned by others, and so on to infinity.
The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of
nature, or the constitution of things.  Now, however a thing may
be constituted, the adequate knowledge of that thing is in God,
in so far as he has the ideas of all things, and not in so far as
he has the idea of the human body only.  (II. ix. Coroll.)
Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in God
very inadequate, in so far as he is only regarded as constituting
the nature of the human mind; that is (II. xi. Coroll.), this
knowledge is very inadequate to our mind.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXI.  We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the
duration of particular things external to ourselves.

Proof.--Every particular thing, like the human body, must be
conditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in a
fixed and definite relation; this other particular thing must
likewise be conditioned by a third, and so on to infinity.  (I.
xxviii.)  As we have shown in the foregoing proposition, from
this common property of particular things, we have only a very
inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body; we must draw a
similar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular
things, namely, that we can only have a very inadequate knowledge
of the duration thereof.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that all particular things are
contingent and perishable.  For we can have no adequate idea of
their duration (by the last Prop.), and this is what we must
understand by the contingency and perishableness of things.  (I.
xxxiii., Note i.)  For (I. xxix.), except in this sense, nothing
is contingent.

PROP. XXXII.  All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God,
are true.

Proof.--All ideas which are in God agree in every respect with
their objects (II. vii. Coroll.), therefore (I. Ax. vi.) they are
all true.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXIII.  There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes
them to be called false.

Proof.--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, a positive
mode of thinking, which should constitute the distinctive quality
of falsehood.  Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God (II.
xxxii.); external to God it cannot be or be conceived (I. xv.).
Therefore there is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to
be called false.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXIV.  Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and
perfect, is true.

Proof.--When we say that an idea in us is adequate and
perfect, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that the idea
is adequate and perfect in God, in so far as he constitutes the
essence of our mind; consequently (II. xxxii.), we say that such
an idea is true.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXV.  Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge,
which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve.

Proof.--There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them
to be called false (II. xxxiii.); but falsity cannot consist in
simple privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err and to
be mistaken), neither can it consist in absolute ignorance, for
ignorance and error are not identical; wherefore it consists in
the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or
confused ideas involve.  Q.E.D.

Note.--In the note to II. xvii. I explained how error consists
in the privation of knowledge, but in order to throw more light
on the subject I will give an example.  For instance, men are
mistaken in thinking themselves free; their opinion is made up
of consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of the
causes by which they are conditioned.  Their idea of freedom,
therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for their
actions.  As for their saying that human actions depend on the
will, this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond
thereto.  What the will is, and how it moves the body, they none
of them know; those who boast of such knowledge, and feign
dwellings and habitations for the soul, are wont to provoke
either laughter or disgust.  So, again, when we look at the sun,
we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet;
this error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the fact
that, while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun's true
distance or the cause of the fancy.  For although we afterwards
learn, that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of
the earth's diameters, we none the less shall fancy it to be near;
for we do not imagine the sun as near us, because we are
ignorant of its true distance, but because the modification of
our body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as our said
body is affected thereby.

PROP. XXXVI.  Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same
necessity, as adequate or clear and distinct ideas.

Proof.--All ideas are in God (I. xv.), and in so far as they
are referred to God are true (II. xxxii.) and (II. vii. Coroll.)
adequate; therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate,
except in respect to a particular mind (cf. II. xxiv. and
xxviii.); therefore all ideas, whether adequate or inadequate,
follow by the same necessity (II. vi.).  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXVII.  That which is common to all (cf. Lemma II.,
above), and which is equally in a part and in the whole, does not
constitute the essence of any particular thing.

Proof.--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that it
constitutes the essence of some particular thing; for instance,
the essence of B.  Then (II. Def. ii.) it cannot without B either
exist or be conceived; but this is against our hypothesis.
Therefore it does not appertain to B's essence, nor does it
constitute the essence of any particular thing.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXVIII.  Those things, which are common to all, and which
are equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived
except adequately.

Proof.--Let A be something, which is common to all bodies, and
which is equally present in the part of any given body and in the
whole.  I say A cannot be conceived except adequately.  For the
idea thereof in God will necessarily be adequate (II. vii.
Coroll.), both in so far as God has the idea of the human body,
and also in so far as he has the idea of the modifications of the
human body, which (II. xvi., xxv., xxvii.) involve in part the
nature of the human body and the nature of external bodies; that
is (II. xii., xiii.), the idea in God will necessarily be
adequate, both in so far as he constitutes the human mind, and in
so far as he has the ideas, which are in the human mind.
Therefore the mind (II. xi. Coroll.) necessarily perceives A
adequately, and has this adequate perception, both in so far as
it perceives itself, and in so far as it perceives its own or any
external body, nor can A be conceived in any other manner.
Q.E.D.

Corollary--Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or
notions common to all men; for (by Lemma ii.) all bodies agree
in certain respects, which (by the foregoing Prop.) must be
adequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all.

PROP. XXXIX.  That, which is common to and a property of the
human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human
body, and which is present equally in each part of either, or in
the whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind.

Proof.--If A be that, which is common to and a property of the
human body and external bodies, and equally present in the human
body and in the said external bodies, in each part of each
external body and in the whole, there will be an adequate idea of
A in God (II. vii. Coroll.), both in so far as he has the idea of
the human body, and in so far as he has the ideas of the given
external bodies.  Let it now be granted, that the human body is
affected by an external body through that, which it has in common
therewith, namely, A; the idea of this modification will involve
the property A (II. xvi.), and therefore (II. vii. Coroll.) the
idea of this modification, in so far as it involves the property
A, will be adequate in God, in so far as God is affected by the
idea of the human body; that is (II. xiii.), in so far as he
constitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore (II. xi.
Coroll.) this idea is also adequate in the human mind.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that the mind is fitted to
perceive adequately more things, in proportion as its body has
more in common with other bodies.

PROP. XL.  Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which
are therein adequate, are also themselves adequate.

Proof.--This proposition is self--evident.  For when we say
that an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are
therein adequate, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that
an idea is in the divine intellect, whereof God is the cause, not
in so far as he is infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by
the ideas of very many particular things, but only in so far as
he constitutes the essence of the human mind.

Note I.--I have thus set forth the cause of those notions,
which are common to all men, and which form the basis of our
ratiocination.  But there are other causes of certain axioms or
notions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this
method of ours; for it would thus appear what notions are more
useful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use at
all.  Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all
men, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who
are unshackled by prejudice, and we should detect those which are
ill--founded.  Again we should discern whence the notions called
secondary derived their origin, and consequently the axioms on
which they are founded, and other points of interest connected
with these questions.  But I have decided to pass over the
subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another
treatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader by
too great prolixity.  Nevertheless, in order not to omit anything
necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the causes, whence
are derived the terms styled transcendental, such as Being,
Thing, Something.  These terms arose from the fact, that the
human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming
a certain number of images (what an image is I explained in the
II. xvii. note) within itself at the same time; if this number
be exceeded, the images will begin to be confused; if this
number of images, of which the body is capable of forming
distinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all will become
entirely confused one with another.  This being so, it is evident
(from II. Prop. xvii. Coroll., and xviii.) that the human mind
can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously, as its body
can form images simultaneously.  When the images become quite
confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies
confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as
it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of
Being, Thing, &c.  The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact
that images are not always equally vivid, and from other
analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here; for
the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to
consider one only.  All may be reduced to this, that these terms
represent ideas in the highest degree confused.  From similar
causes arise those notions, which we call general, such as man,
horse, dog, &c.  They arise, to wit, from the fact that so many
images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the
human mind, that the powers of imagination break down, not indeed
utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small
differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, &c.) and
their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in
which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by
them, agree; for that is the point, in which each of the said
individuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses
by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of
particular individuals.  For, as we have said, it is unable to
imagine the definite number of individuals.  We must, however,
bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all
men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as the
point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected and
which the mind most easily imagines or remembers.  For instance,
those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of
man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect
stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some other
attribute, will form a different general image of man, for
instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two--footed animal
without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases,
everyone will form general images of things according to the
habit of his body.

It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers,
who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed
of them, so many controversies should have arisen.

Note II.--From all that has been said above it is clear, that
we, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions:--(1.)
From particular things represented to our intellect
fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses
(II. xxix. Coroll.); I have settled to call such perceptions by
the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience.[4]

[4] A Baconian phrase.  Nov. Org. Aph. 100.  [Pollock, p. 126, n.]

(2.) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard
certain words we remember things and form certain ideas
concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things
(II. xviii. note).  I shall call both these ways of regarding
things knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination.
(3.) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and
adequate ideas of the properties of things (II. xxxviii. Coroll.,
xxxix. and Coroll. and xl.); this I call reason and knowledge of
the second kind.  Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is,
as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge, which we
will call intuition.  This kind of knowledge proceeds from an
adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of
God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things.  I will
illustrate all three kinds of knowledge by a single example.
Three numbers are given for finding a fourth, which shall be to
the third as the second is to the first.  Tradesmen without
hesitation multiply the second by the third, and divide the
product by the first; either because they have not forgotten the
rule which they received from a master without any proof, or
because they have often made trial of it with simple numbers, or
by virtue of the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the
seventh book of Euclid, namely, in virtue of the general property
of proportionals.

But with very simple numbers there is no need of this.  For
instance, one, two, three, being given, everyone can see that the
fourth proportional is six; and this is much clearer, because we
infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio,
which the first bears to the second.

PROP. XLI.  Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of
falsity, knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily
true.

Proof.--To knowledge of the first kind we have (in the
foregoing note) assigned all those ideas, which are inadequate
and confused; therefore this kind of knowledge is the only
source of falsity (II. xxxv.).  Furthermore, we assigned to the
second and third kinds of knowledge those ideas which are
adequate; therefore these kinds are necessarily true (II.
xxxiv.).  Q.E.D.

PROP. XLII.  Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not
knowledge of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true
from the false.

Proof.--This proposition is self--evident.  He, who knows how
to distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate idea
of true and false.  That is (II. xl., note ii.), he must know the
true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge.

PROP. XLIII.  He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that
he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing
perceived.

Proof.--A true idea in us is an idea which is adequate in God,
in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind
(II. xi. Coroll.).  Let us suppose that there is in God, in so
far as he is displayed through the human mind, an adequate idea,
A.  The idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God, and be
referred to him in the same way as the idea A (by II. xx.,
whereof the proof is of universal application).  But the idea A
is supposed to be referred to God, in so far as he is displayed
through the human mind; therefore, the idea of the idea A must
be referred to God in the same manner; that is (by II. xi.
Coroll.), the adequate idea of the idea A will be in the mind,
which has the adequate idea A; therefore he, who has an adequate
idea or knows a thing truly (II. xxxiv.), must at the same time
have an adequate idea or true knowledge of his knowledge; that
is, obviously, he must be assured.  Q.E.D.

Note.--I explained in the note to II. xxi. what is meant by
the idea of an idea; but we may remark that the foregoing
proposition is in itself sufficiently plain.  No one, who has a
true idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest
certainty.  For to have a true idea is only another expression
for knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible.  No one,
indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is
something lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of
thinking--namely, the very act of understanding.  And who, I ask,
can know that he understands anything, unless he do first
understand it?  In other words, who can know that he is sure of a
thing, unless he be first sure of that thing?  Further, what can
there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a
standard of truth?  Even as light displays both itself and
darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity.

I think I have thus sufficiently answered these
questions--namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a false
idea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, a
true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea
(since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark);
consequently, neither will a man who has a true idea have any
advantage over him who has only false ideas.  Further, how comes
it that men have false ideas?  Lastly, how can anyone be sure,
that he has ideas which agree with their objects?  These
questions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently
answered.  The difference between a true idea and a false idea is
plain: from what was said in II. xxxv., the former is related to
the latter as being is to not--being.  The causes of falsity I
have set forth very clearly in II. xix. and II. xxxv. with the
note.  From what is there stated, the difference between a man
who has true ideas, and a man who has only false ideas, is made
apparent.  As for the last question--as to how a man can be sure
that he has ideas that agree with their objects, I have just
pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his knowledge arises
from the simple fact, that he has an idea which corresponds with
its object--in other words, that truth is its own standard.  We
may add that our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is
part of the infinite intellect of God (II. xi. Coroll.);
therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as
necessarily true as the ideas of God.

PROP. XLIV.  It is not in the nature of reason to regard things
as contingent, but as necessary.

Proof.--It is in the nature of reason to perceive things truly
(II. xli.), namely (I. Ax. vi.), as they are in themselves--that
is (I. xxix.), not as contingent, but as necessary.  Q.E.D.

Corollary I.--Hence it follows, that it is only through our
imagination that we consider things, whether in respect to the
future or the past, as contingent.

Note.--How this way of looking at things arises, I will
briefly explain.  We have shown above (II. xvii. and Coroll.)
that the mind always regards things as present to itself, even
though they be not in existence, until some causes arise which
exclude their existence and presence.  Further (II. xviii.), we
showed that, if the human body has once been affected by two
external bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards
imagines one of the said external bodies, will straightway
remember the other--that is, it will regard both as present to
itself, unless there arise causes which exclude their existence
and presence.  Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from
the fact that we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than
others, some more quickly, some at equal speed.  Thus, let us
suppose that a child yesterday saw Peter for the first time in
the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening; then, that
today he again sees Peter in the morning.  It is evident, from
II. Prop. xviii., that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he
will imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the
sky, as it did when he saw it on the preceding day; in other
words, he will imagine a complete day, and, together with his
imagination of the morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon, he
will imagine Paul; and with evening, he will imagine Simon--that
is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation
to a future time; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the
evening, he will refer Peter and Paul to a past time, by
imagining them simultaneously with the imagination of a past
time.  If it should at any time happen, that on some other
evening the child should see James instead of Simon, he will, on
the following morning, associate with his imagination of evening
sometimes Simon, sometimes James, not both together: for the
child is supposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of them,
not both together.  His imagination will therefore waver; and,
with the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first
one, then the other--that is, he will imagine them in the future,
neither of them as certain, but both as contingent.  This
wavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination
be concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing in
relation to time past or time present: consequently, we may
imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to time
present, past, or future.

Corollary II.--It is in the nature of reason to perceive
things under a certain form of eternity (sub quadam aeternitatis
specie).

Proof.--It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as
contingent, but as necessary (II. xliv.).  Reason perceives this
necessity of things (II. xli.) truly--that is (I. Ax. vi.), as it
is in itself.  But (I. xvi.) this necessity of things is the very
necessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, it is in the
nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity.
We may add that the bases of reason are the notions (II.
xxxviii.), which answer to things common to all, and which (II.
xxxvii.) do not answer to the essence of any particular thing:
which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time,
under a certain form of eternity.

PROP. XLV.  Every idea of every body, or of every particular
thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and
infinite essence of God.

Proof.--The idea of a particular thing actually existing
necessarily involves both the existence and the essence of the
said thing (II. viii.).  Now particular things cannot be
conceived without God (I. xv.); but, inasmuch as (II. vi.) they
have God for their cause, in so far as he is regarded under the
attribute of which the things in question are modes, their ideas
must necessarily involve (I. Ax. iv.) the conception of the
attributes of those ideas--that is (I. vi.), the eternal and
infinite essence of God.  Q.E.D.

Note.--By existence I do not here mean duration--that is,
existence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly, and as a
certain form of quantity.  I am speaking of the very nature of
existence, which is assigned to particular things, because they
follow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal
necessity of God's nature (I. xvi.).  I am speaking, I repeat, of
the very existence of particular things, in so far as they are in
God.  For although each particular thing be conditioned by
another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force
whereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from
the eternal necessity of God's nature (cf. I. xxiv. Coroll.).

PROP. XLVI.  The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of
God which every idea involves is adequate and perfect.

Proof.--The proof of the last proposition is universal; and
whether a thing be considered as a part or a whole, the idea
thereof, whether of the whole or of a part (by the last Prop.),
will involve God's eternal and infinite essence.  Wherefore,
that, which gives knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence
of God, is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the
whole; therefore (II. xxxviii.) this knowledge will be adequate.
Q.E.D.

PROP. XLVII.  The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the
eternal and infinite essence of God.

Proof.--The human mind has ideas (II. xxii.), from which (II.
xxiii.) it perceives itself and its own body (II. xix.) and
external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. i. and II. xvii.) as actually
existing; therefore (II. xlv. and xlvi.) it has an adequate
knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.  Q.E.D.

Note.--Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the
eternity of God are known to all.  Now as all things are in God,
and are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer
many things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that
third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in the note to II. xl.,
and of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to
speak in Part V.  Men have not so clear a knowledge of God as
they have of general notions, because they are unable to imagine
God as they do bodies, and also because they have associated the
name God with images of things that they are in the habit of
seeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing, being, as they
are, men, and continually affected by external bodies.  Many
errors, in truth, can be traced to this head, namely, that we do
not apply names to things rightly.  For instance, when a man says
that the lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its
circumference are not equal, he then, at all events, assuredly
attaches a meaning to the word circle different from that
assigned by mathematicians.  So again, when men make mistakes in
calculation, they have one set of figures in their mind, and
another on the paper.  If we could see into their minds, they do
not make a mistake; they seem to do so, because we think, that
they have the same numbers in their mind as they have on the
paper.  If this were not so, we should not believe them to be in
error, any more than I thought that a man was in error, whom I
lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into a
neighbour's hen, for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear.
Very many controversies have arisen from the fact, that men do
not rightly explain their meaning, or do not rightly interpret
the meaning of others.  For, as a matter of fact, as they flatly
contradict themselves, they assume now one side, now another, of
the argument, so as to oppose the opinions, which they consider
mistaken and absurd in their opponents.

PROP. XLVIII.  In the mind there is no absolute or free will;
but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which
has also been determined by another cause, and this last by
another cause, and so on to infinity.

Proof.--The mind is a fixed and definite mode of thought (II.
xi.), therefore it cannot be the free cause of its actions (I.
xvii. Coroll. ii.); in other words, it cannot have an absolute
faculty of positive or negative volition; but (by I. xxviii.) it
must be determined by a cause, which has also been determined by
another cause, and this last by another, &c.  Q.E.D.

Note.--In the same way it is proved, that there is in the mind
no absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, &c.
Whence it follows, that these and similar faculties are either
entirely fictitious, or are merely abstract and general terms,
such as we are accustomed to put together from particular things.
Thus the intellect and the will stand in the same relation to
this or that idea, or this or that volition, as "lapidity" to
this or that stone, or as "man" to Peter and Paul.  The cause
which leads men to consider themselves free has been set forth in
the Appendix to Part I.  But, before I proceed further, I would
here remark that, by the will to affirm and decide, I mean the
faculty, not the desire.  I mean, I repeat, the faculty, whereby
the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, not the desire,
wherewith the mind wishes for or turns away from any given thing.
After we have proved, that these faculties of ours are general
notions, which cannot be distinguished from the particular
instances on which they are based, we must inquire whether
volitions themselves are anything besides the ideas of things.
We must inquire, I say, whether there is in the mind any
affirmation or negation beyond that, which the idea, in so far as
it is an idea, involves.  On which subject see the following
proposition, and II. Def. iii., lest the idea of pictures should
suggest itself.  For by ideas I do not mean images such as are
formed at the back of the eye, or in the midst of the brain, but
the conceptions of thought.

PROP. XLIX.  There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and
negation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea,
involves.

Proof.--There is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive
or negative volition, but only particular volitions, namely, this
or that affirmation, and this or that negation.  Now let us
conceive a particular volition, namely, the mode of thinking
whereby the mind affirms, that the three interior angles of a
triangle are equal to two right angles.  This affirmation
involves the conception or idea of a triangle, that is, without
the idea of a triangle it cannot be conceived.  It is the same
thing to say, that the concept A must involve the concept B, as
it is to say, that A cannot be conceived without B.  Further,
this affirmation cannot be made (II. Ax. iii.) without the idea
of a triangle.  Therefore, this affirmation can neither be nor be
conceived, without the idea of a triangle.  Again, this idea of a
triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely, that its
three interior angles are equal to two right angles.  Wherefore,
and vice versa, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be
conceived without this affirmation, therefore, this affirmation
belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle, and is nothing
besides.  What we have said of this volition (inasmuch as we have
selected it at random) may be said of any other volition, namely,
that it is nothing but an idea.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Will and understanding are one and the same.

Proof.--Will and understanding are nothing beyond the
individual volitions and ideas (II. xlviii. and note).  But a
particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same
(by the foregoing Prop.); therefore, will and understanding are
one and the same.  Q.E.D.

Note.--We have thus removed the cause which is commonly
assigned for error.  For we have shown above, that falsity
consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas
which are fragmentary and confused.  Wherefore, a false idea,
inasmuch as it is false, does not involve certainty.  When we
say, then, that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that he
has no doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain,
but only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is
false, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which should cause his
imagination to waver (see II. xliv. note).  Thus, although the
man be assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall never say
that he is certain.  For by certainty we mean something positive
(II. xliii. and note), not merely the absence of doubt.

However, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully
explained, I will draw attention to a few additional points, and
I will furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced
against our doctrine.  Lastly, in order to remove every scruple,
I have thought it worth while to point out some of the
advantages, which follow therefrom.  I say "some," for they will
be better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth
part.

I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to
make an accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of
the mind, and the images of things which we imagine.  It is
further necessary that they should distinguish between idea and
words, whereby we signify things.  These three--namely, images,
words, and ideas--are by many persons either entirely confused
together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care,
and hence people are generally in ignorance, how absolutely
necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will, both for
philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life.  Those
who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by
contact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas
of those things, whereof we can form no mental picture, are not
ideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree of
our will; they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate
pictures on a panel, and, filled with this misconception, do not
see that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an
affirmation or negation.  Again, those who confuse words with
ideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves, think that
they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm, or
deny.  This misconception will easily be laid aside by one, who
reflects on the nature of knowledge, and seeing that it in no
wise involves the conception of extension, will therefore clearly
understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does not
consist in the image of anything, nor in words.  The essence of
words and images is put together by bodily motions, which in no
wise involve the conception of thought.


These few words on this subject will suffice: I will
therefore pass on to consider the objections, which may be raised
against our doctrine.  Of these, the first is advanced by those,
who think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding,
and that therefore it is different therefrom.  The reason for
their holding the belief, that the will has wider scope than the
understanding, is that they assert, that they have no need of an
increase in their faculty of assent, that is of affirmation or
negation, in order to assent to an infinity of things which we do
not perceive, but that they have need of an increase in their
faculty of understanding.  The will is thus distinguished from
the intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite.
Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us
especially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment
before assenting to things which we perceive; this is confirmed
by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as he
perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or dissents.

For instance, he who feigns a winged horse, does not
therefore admit that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not
deceived, unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does
exist.  Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by
experience, than that the will or faculty of assent is free and
different from the faculty of understanding.  Thirdly, it may be
objected that one affirmation does not apparently contain more
reality than another; in other words, that we do not seem to
need for affirming, that what is true is true, any greater power
than for affirming, that what is false is true.  We have,
however, seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than
another, for as objects are some more excellent than others, so
also are the ideas of them some more excellent than others; this
also seems to point to a difference between the understanding and
the will.  Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from
free will, what will happen if the incentives to action are
equally balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass?  Will he
perish of hunger and thirst?  If I say that he would, I shall
seem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man rather
than an actual man.  If I say that he would not, he would then
determine his own action, and would consequently possess the
faculty of going and doing whatever he liked.  Other objections
might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence
everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the
task of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as
possible.

To the first objection I answer, that I admit that the will
has a wider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding
be meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will
has a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of
forming conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volition
should be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling:
for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an
infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot
affirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by the
same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an
infinite number of bodies.  If it be said that there is an
infinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer,
that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor,
consequently, by any faculty of volition.  But, it may still be
urged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive
them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of
perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have
already.  This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bring
it about that we should understand an infinite number of other
entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater
understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that
which we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities.
We have shown that will is a universal entity or idea, whereby we
explain all particular volitions--in other words, that which is
common to all such volitions.

As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or
universal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to be
wondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself
into the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding: for
what is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an
infinite number of individuals.

To the second objection I reply by denying, that we have a
free power of suspending our judgment: for, when we say that
anyone suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that
he does not perceive the matter in question adequately.
Suspension of judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a
perception, and not free will.  In order to illustrate the point,
let us suppose a boy imagining a horse, and perceive nothing
else.  Inasmuch as this imagination involves the existence of the
horse (II. xvii. Coroll.), and the boy does not perceive anything
which would exclude the existence of the horse, he will
necessarily regard the horse as present: he will not be able to
doubt of its existence, although he be not certain thereof.  We
have daily experience of such a state of things in dreams; and I
do not suppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that,
while he is dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his
judgment concerning the things in his dream, and bringing it
about that he should not dream those things, which he dreams that
he sees; yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we
suspend our judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming.

Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as
actual perception extends--that is, I grant that the mind's
imaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error (II.
xvii. note); but I deny, that a man does not, in the act of
perception, make any affirmation.  For what is the perception of
a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings?  If the
mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would
regard the same as present to itself: it would have no reasons
for doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unless
the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which
precludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the mind
perceives that the idea which it possess of a winged horse is
inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the
existence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on the
subject.

I think that I have anticipated my answer to the third
objection, namely, that the will is something universal which is
predicated of all ideas, and that it only signifies that which is
common to all ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequate
essence must, therefore, in so far as it is thus conceived in the
abstract, be in every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the
same in all, not in so far as it is considered as constituting
the idea's essence: for, in this respect, particular
affirmations differ one from the other, as much as do ideas.  For
instance, the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle,
differs from that which involves the idea of a triangle, as much
as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle.

Further, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal
power of thinking, to affirm that that which is true is true, and
to affirm that that which is false is true.  These two
affirmations, if we regard the mind, are in the same relation to
one another as being and not--being; for there is nothing
positive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality of
falsehood (II. xxxv. note, and xlvii. note).

We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when
we confuse universals with singulars, and the entities of reason
and abstractions with realities.  As for the fourth objection, I
am quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium
described  (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst,
a certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant from
him) would die of hunger and thirst.  If I am asked, whether such
an one should not rather be considered an ass than a man; I
answer, that I do not know, neither do I know how a man should be
considered, who hangs himself, or how we should consider
children, fools, madmen, &c.

It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this
doctrine as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gathered
from what has been said.  The doctrine is good,

1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the
decree of God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and so
much the more, as we perform more perfect actions and more and
more understand God.  Such a doctrine not only completely
tranquilizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highest
happiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge of
God, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid
us.  We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true
estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God
with high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as
for having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and the
service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.

2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct
ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which
are not in our power, and do not follow from our nature.  For it
shows us, that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or
frowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the
eternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from
the essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two
right angles.

3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches
us to hate no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to
be angry with any.  Further, as it tells us that each should be
content with his own, and helpful to his neighbour, not from any
womanish pity, favour, or superstition, but solely by the
guidance of reason, according as the time and occasion demand, as
I will show in Part III.

4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the
commonwealth; for it teaches how citizens should be governed and
led, not so as to become slaves, but so that they may freely do
whatsoever things are best.

I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of
this note, and I thus bring the second part of my treatise to a
close.  I think I have therein explained the nature and
properties of the human mind at sufficient length, and,
considering the difficulty of the subject, with sufficient
clearness.  I have laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many
excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary
to be known, as will, in what follows, be partly made plain.




PART III.

ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS



Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be
treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural
phenomena following nature's general laws.  They appear to
conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a
kingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows
nature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions,
and that he is determined solely by himself.  They attribute
human infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature in
general, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man, which
accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or, as usually happens,
abuse: he, who succeeds in hitting off the weakness of the human
mind more eloquently or more acutely than his fellows, is looked
upon as a seer.  Still there has been no lack of very excellent
men (to whose toil and industry I confess myself much indebted),
who have written many noteworthy things concerning the right way
of life, and have given much sage advice to mankind.  But no one,
so far as I know, has defined the nature and strength of the
emotions, and the power of the mind against them for their
restraint.

I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he
believed, that the mind has absolute power over its actions,
strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes, and, at
the same time, to point out a way, by which the mind might attain
to absolute dominion over them.  However, in my opinion, he
accomplishes nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own
great intellect, as I will show in the proper place.  For the
present I wish to revert to those, who would rather abuse or
deride human emotions than understand them.  Such persons will,
doubtless think it strange that I should attempt to treat of
human vice and folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth
with rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as
repugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful.  However,
such is my plan.  Nothing comes to pass in nature, which can be
set down to a flaw therein; for nature is always the same, and
everywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of action;
that is, nature's laws and ordinances, whereby all things come to
pass and change from one form to another, are everywhere and
always the same; so that there should be one and the same method
of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely,
through nature's universal laws and rules.  Thus the passions of
hatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow
from this same necessity and efficacy of nature; they answer to
certain definite causes, through which they are understood, and
possess certain properties as worthy of being known as the
properties of anything else, whereof the contemplation in itself
affords us delight.  I shall, therefore, treat of the nature and
strength of the emotions according to the same method, as I
employed heretofore in my investigations concerning God and the
mind.  I shall consider human actions and desires in exactly the
same manner, as though I were concerned with lines, planes, and
solids.


DEFINITIONS

I.  By an adequate cause, I mean a cause through which its effect
can be clearly and distinctly perceived.  By an inadequate or
partial cause, I mean a cause through which, by itself, its
effect cannot be understood.

II.  I say that we act when anything takes place, either within
us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause; that
is (by the foregoing definition) when through our nature
something takes place within us or externally to us, which can
through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood.
On the other hand, I say that we are passive as regards something
when that something takes place within us, or follows from our
nature externally, we being only the partial cause.

III.  By emotion I mean the modifications of the body, whereby
the active power of the said body is increased or diminished,
aided or constrained, and also the ideas of such modifications.

N.B.  If we can be the adequate cause of any of these
modifications, I then call the emotion an activity, otherwise I
call it a passion, or state wherein the mind is passive.


POSTULATES

I.  The human body can be affected in many ways, whereby its
power of activity is increased or diminished, and also in other
ways which do not render its power of activity either greater or
less.

N.B.  This postulate or axiom rests on Postulate i. and
Lemmas v. and vii., which see after II. xiii.

II.  The human body can undergo many changes, and, nevertheless,
retain the impressions or traces of objects (cf. II. Post. v.),
and, consequently, the same images of things (see note II.
xvii.).

PROP. I.  Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain
cases passive.  In so far as it has adequate ideas it is
necessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it
is necessarily passive.

Proof.--In every human mind there are some adequate ideas, and
some ideas that are fragmentary and confused (II. xl. note).
Those ideas which are adequate in the mind are adequate also in
God, inasmuch as he constitutes the essence of the mind (II. xl.
Coroll.), and those which are inadequate in the mind are likewise
(by the same Coroll.) adequate in God, not inasmuch as he
contains in himself the essence of the given mind alone, but as
he, at the same time, contains the minds of other things.  Again,
from any given idea some effect must necessarily follow (I. 36);
of this effect God is the adequate cause (III. Def. i.), not
inasmuch as he is infinite, but inasmuch as he is conceived as
affected by the given idea (II. ix.).  But of that effect whereof
God is the cause, inasmuch as he is affected by an idea which is
adequate in a given mind, of that effect, I repeat, the mind in
question is the adequate cause (II. xi. Coroll.).  Therefore our
mind, in so far as it has adequate ideas (III. Def. ii.), is in
certain cases necessarily active; this was our first point.
Again, whatsoever necessarily follows from the idea which is
adequate in God, not by virtue of his possessing in himself the
mind of one man only, but by virtue of his containing, together
with the mind of that one man, the minds of other things also, of
such an effect (II. xi. Coroll.) the mind of the given man is not
an adequate, but only a partial cause; thus (III. Def. ii.) the
mind, inasmuch as it has inadequate ideas, is in certain cases
necessarily passive; this was our second point.  Therefore our
mind, &c.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that the mind is more or less
liable to be acted upon, in proportion as it possesses inadequate
ideas, and, contrariwise, is more or less active in proportion as
it possesses adequate ideas.

PROP. II.  Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind
determine body to motion or rest or any state different from
these, if such there be.

Proof.--All modes of thinking have for their cause God, by
virtue of his being a thinking thing, and not by virtue of his
being displayed under any other attribute (II. vi.).  That,
therefore, which determines the mind to thought is a mode of
thought, and not a mode of extension; that is (II. Def. i.), it
is not body.  This was our first point.  Again, the motion and
rest of a body must arise from another body, which has also been
determined to a state of motion or rest by a third body, and
absolutely everything which takes place in a body must spring
from God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by some mode of
extension, and not by some mode of thought (II. vi.); that is,
it cannot spring from the mind, which is a mode of thought.  This
was our second point.  Therefore body cannot determine mind, &c.
Q.E.D.

Note.--This is made more clear by what was said in the note to
II. vii., namely, that mind and body are one and the same thing,
conceived first under the attribute of thought, secondly, under
the attribute of extension.  Thus it follows that the order or
concatenation of things is identical, whether nature be conceived
under the one attribute or the other; consequently the order of
states of activity and passivity in our body is simultaneous in
nature with the order of states of activity and passivity in the
mind. The same conclusion is evident from the manner in which we
proved II. xii.

Nevertheless, though such is the case, and though there be no
further room for doubt, I can scarcely believe, until the fact is
proved by experience, that men can be induced to consider the
question calmly and fairly, so firmly are they convinced that it
is merely at the bidding of the mind, that the body is set in
motion or at rest, or performs a variety of actions depending
solely on the mind's will or the exercise of thought.  However,
no one has hitherto laid down the limits to the powers of the
body, that is, no one has as yet been taught by experience what
the body can accomplish solely by the laws of nature, in so far
as she is regarded as extension.  No one hitherto has gained such
an accurate knowledge of the bodily mechanism, that he can
explain all its functions; nor need I call attention to the fact
that many actions are observed in the lower animals, which far
transcend human sagacity, and that somnambulists do many things
in their sleep, which they would not venture to do when awake:
these instances are enough to show, that the body can by the sole
laws of its nature do many things which the mind wonders at.

Again, no one knows how or by what means the mind moves the
body, nor how many various degrees of motion it can impart to the
body, nor how quickly it can move it.  Thus, when men say that
this or that physical action has its origin in the mind, which
latter has dominion over the body, they are using words without
meaning, or are confessing in specious phraseology that they are
ignorant of the cause of the said action, and do not wonder at
it.

But, they will say, whether we know or do not know the means
whereby the mind acts on the body, we have, at any rate,
experience of the fact that unless the human mind is in a fit
state to think, the body remains inert.  Moreover, we have
experience, that the mind alone can determine whether we speak or
are silent, and a variety of similar states which, accordingly,
we say depend on the mind's decree.  But, as to the first point,
I ask such objectors, whether experience does not also teach,
that if the body be inactive the mind is simultaneously unfitted
for thinking?  For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mind
simultaneously is in a state of torpor also, and has no power of
thinking, such as it possesses when the body is awake.  Again, I
think everyone's experience will confirm the statement, that the
mind is not at all times equally fit for thinking on a given
subject, but according as the body is more or less fitted for
being stimulated by the image of this or that object, so also is
the mind more or less fitted for contemplating the said object.

But, it will be urged, it is impossible that solely from the
laws of nature considered as extended substance, we should be
able to deduce the causes of buildings, pictures, and things of
that kind, which are produced only by human art; nor would the
human body, unless it were determined and led by the mind, be
capable of building a single temple.  However, I have just
pointed out that the objectors cannot fix the limits of the
body's power, or say what can be concluded from a consideration
of its sole nature, whereas they have experience of many things
being accomplished solely by the laws of nature, which they would
never have believed possible except under the direction of mind:
such are the actions performed by somnambulists while asleep, and
wondered at by their performers when awake.  I would further call
attention to the mechanism of the human body, which far surpasses
in complexity all that has been put together by human art, not to
repeat what I have already shown, namely, that from nature, under
whatever attribute she be considered, infinite results follow.
As for the second objection, I submit that the world would be
much happier, if men were as fully able to keep silence as they
are to speak.  Experience abundantly shows that men can govern
anything more easily than their tongues, and restrain anything
more easily than their appetites; when it comes about that many
believe, that we are only free in respect to objects which we
moderately desire, because our desire for such can easily be
controlled by the thought of something else frequently
remembered, but that we are by no means free in respect to what
we seek with violent emotion, for our desire cannot then be
allayed with the remembrance of anything else.  However, unless
such persons had proved by experience that we do many things
which we afterwards repent of, and again that we often, when
assailed by contrary emotions, see the better and follow the
worse, there would be nothing to prevent their believing that we
are free in all things.  Thus an infant believes that of its own
free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely
desires vengeance, a timid child believes that it freely desires
to run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters from
the free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he
would willingly have withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, a
garrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believe
that they speak from the free decision of their mind, when they
are in reality unable to restrain their impulse to talk.
Experience teaches us no less clearly than reason, that men
believe themselves to be free, simply because they are conscious
of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those
actions are determined; and, further, it is plain that the
dictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites, and
therefore vary according to the varying state of the body.
Everyone shapes his actions according to his emotion, those who
are assailed by conflicting emotions know not what they wish;
those who are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayed this
way or that.  All these considerations clearly show that a mental
decision and a bodily appetite, or determined state, are
simultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing, which we call
decision, when it is regarded under and explained through the
attribute of thought, and a conditioned state, when it is
regarded under the attribute of extension, and deduced from the
laws of motion and rest.  This will appear yet more plainly in
the sequel.  For the present I wish to call attention to another
point, namely, that we cannot act by the decision of the mind,
unless we have a remembrance of having done so.  For instance, we
cannot say a word without remembering that we have done so.
Again, it is not within the free power of the mind to remember or
forget a thing at will.  Therefore the freedom of the mind must
in any case be limited to the power of uttering or not uttering
something which it remembers.  But when we dream that we speak,
we believe that we speak from a free decision of the mind, yet we
do not speak, or, if we do, it is by a spontaneous motion of the
body.  Again, we dream that we are concealing something, and we
seem to act from the same decision of the mind as that, whereby
we keep silence when awake concerning something we know.  Lastly,
we dream that from the free decision of our mind we do something,
which we should not dare to do when awake.

Now I should like to know whether there be in the mind two
sorts of decisions, one sort illusive, and the other sort free?
If our folly does not carry us so far as this, we must
necessarily admit, that the decision of the mind, which is
believed to be free, is not distinguishable from the imagination
or memory, and is nothing more than the affirmation, which an
idea, by virtue of being an idea, necessarily involves (II.
xlix.).  Wherefore these decisions of the mind arise in the mind
by the same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing.
Therefore those who believe, that they speak or keep silence or
act in any way from the free decision of their mind, do but dream
with their eyes open.

PROP. III.  The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate
ideas; the passive states of the mind depend solely on
inadequate ideas.

Proof.--The first element, which constitutes the essence of
the mind, is nothing else but the idea of the actually existent
body (II. xi. and xiii.), which (II. xv.) is compounded of many
other ideas, whereof some are adequate and some inadequate (II.
xxix. Coroll., II. xxxviii. Coroll.).  Whatsoever therefore
follows from the nature of mind, and has mind for its proximate
cause, through which it must be understood, must necessarily
follow either from an adequate or from an inadequate idea.  But
in so far as the mind (III. i.) has inadequate ideas, it is
necessarily passive: wherefore the activities of the mind follow
solely from adequate ideas, and accordingly the mind is only
passive in so far as it has inadequate ideas.  Q.E.D.

Note.--Thus we see, that passive states are not attributed to
the mind, except in so far as it contains something involving
negation, or in so far as it is regarded as a part of nature,
which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself
without other parts: I could thus show, that passive states are
attributed to individual things in the same way that they are
attributed to the mind, and that they cannot otherwise be
perceived, but my purpose is solely to treat of the human mind.

PROP. IV.  Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external
to itself.

Proof.--This proposition is self--evident, for the definition
of anything affirms the essence of that thing, but does not
negative it; in other words, it postulates the essence of the
thing, but does not take it away.  So long therefore as we regard
only the thing itself, without taking into account external
causes, we shall not be able to find in it anything which could
destroy it.  Q.E.D.

PROP. V.  Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in
the same object, in so far as one is capable of destroying the
other.

Proof.--If they could agree together or co--exist in the same
object, there would then be in the said object something which
could destroy it; but this, by the foregoing proposition, is
absurd, therefore things, &c.  Q.E.D.

PROP. VI.  Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours
to persist in its own being.

Proof.--Individual things are modes whereby the attributes of
God are expressed in a given determinate manner (I. xxv. Coroll.);
that is, (I. xxxiv.), they are things which express in a given
determinate manner the power of God, whereby God is and acts;
now no thing contains in itself anything whereby it can be
destroyed, or which can take away its existence (III. iv.); but
contrariwise it is opposed to all that could take away its
existence (III. v.).  Therefore, in so far as it can, and in so
far as it is in itself, it endeavours to persist in its own
being.  Q.E.D.

PROP. VII.  The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to
persist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essence
of the thing in question.

Proof.--From the given essence of any thing certain
consequences necessarily follow (I. xxxvi.), nor have things any
power save such as necessarily follows from their nature as
determined (I. xxix.); wherefore the power of any given thing,
or the endeavour whereby, either alone or with other things, it
acts, or endeavours to act, that is (III. vi.), the power or
endeavour, wherewith it endeavours to persist in its own being,
is nothing else but the given or actual essence of the thing in
question.  Q.E.D.

PROP. VIII.  The endeavour, whereby a thing endeavours to persist
in its own being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite
time.

Proof.--If it involved a limited time, which should determine
the duration of the thing, it would then follow solely from that
power whereby the thing exists, that the thing could not exist
beyond the limits of that time, but that it must be destroyed;
but this (III. iv.) is absurd.  Wherefore the endeavour wherewith
a thing exists involves no definite time; but, contrariwise,
since (III. iv.) it will by the same power whereby it already
exists always continue to exist, unless it be destroyed by some
external cause, this endeavour involves an indefinite time.

PROP. IX.  The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct
ideas, and also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavours to
persist in its being for an indefinite period, and of this
endeavour it is conscious.

Proof.--The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and
inadequate ideas (III. iii.), therefore (III. vii.), both in so
far as it possesses the former, and in so far as it possesses the
latter, it endeavours to persist in its own being, and that for
an indefinite time (III. viii.).  Now as the mind (II. xxiii.) is
necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the
modifications of the body, the mind is therefore (III. vii.)
conscious of its own endeavour.

Note.--This endeavour, when referred solely to the mind, is
called will, when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it
is called appetite; it is, in fact, nothing else but man's
essence, from the nature of which necessarily follow all those
results which tend to its preservation; and which man has thus
been determined to perform.

Further, between appetite and desire there is no difference,
except that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so
far as they are conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly
be thus defined: Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof.
It is thus plain from what has been said, that in no case do we
strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we
deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be
good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or
desire it.

PROP. X.  An idea, which excludes the existence of our body,
cannot be postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto.

Proof.--Whatsoever can destroy our body, cannot be postulated
therein (III. v.).  Therefore neither can the idea of such a
thing occur in God, in so far as he has the idea of our body (II.
ix. Coroll.); that is (II. xi., xiii.), the idea of that thing
cannot be postulated as in our mind, but contrariwise, since (II.
xi., xiii.) the first element, that constitutes the essence of
the mind, is the idea of the human body as actually existing, it
follows that the first and chief endeavour of our mind is the
endeavour to affirm the existence of our body: thus, an idea,
which negatives the existence of our body, is contrary to our
mind, &c.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XI.  Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders
the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or
diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind.

Proof.--This proposition is evident from II. vii. or from II.
xiv.

Note.--Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes,
and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection,
sometimes to a state of lesser perfection.  These passive states
of transition explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain.
By pleasure therefore in the following propositions I shall
signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greater
perfection.  By pain I shall signify a passive state wherein the
mind passes to a lesser perfection.  Further, the emotion of
pleasure in reference to the body and mind together I shall call
stimulation (titillatio) or merriment (hilaritas), the emotion of
pain in the same relation I shall call suffering or melancholy.
But we must bear in mind, that stimulation and suffering are
attributed to man, when one part of his nature is more affected
than the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all parts are alike
affected.  What I mean by desire I have explained in the note to
Prop. ix. of this part; beyond these three I recognize no other
primary emotion; I will show as I proceed, that all other
emotions arise from these three.  But, before I go further, I
should like here to explain at greater length Prop. x of this
part, in order that we may clearly understand how one idea is
contrary to another.  In the note to II. xvii. we showed that the
idea, which constitutes the essence of mind, involves the
existence of body, so long as the body itself exists.  Again, it
follows from what we pointed out in the Corollary to II. viii.,
that the present existence of our mind depends solely on the
fact, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body.
Lastly, we showed (II. xvii., xviii. and note) that the power of
the mind, whereby it imagines and remembers things, also depends
on the fact, that it involves the actual existence of the body.
Whence it follows, that the present existence of the mind and its
power of imagining are removed, as soon as the mind ceases to
affirm the present existence of the body.  Now the cause, why the
mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body, cannot be the
mind itself (III. iv.), nor again the fact that the body ceases
to exist.  For (by II. vi.) the cause, why the mind affirms the
existence of the body, is not that the body began to exist;
therefore, for the same reason, it does not cease to affirm the
existence of the body, because the body ceases to exist; but
(II. xvii.) this result follows from another idea, which excludes
the present existence of our body and, consequently, of our mind,
and which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the
essence of our mind.

PROP. XII.  The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive
those things, which increase or help the power of activity in the
body.

Proof.--So long as the human body is affected in a mode, which
involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will
regard that external body as present (II. xvii.), and
consequently (II. vii.), so long as the human mind regards an
external body as present, that is (II. xvii. note), conceives it,
the human body is affected in a mode, which involves the nature
of the said external body; thus so long as the mind conceives
things, which increase or help the power of activity in our body,
the body is affected in modes which increase or help its power of
activity (III. Post. i.); consequently (III. xi.) the mind's
power of thinking is for that period increased or helped.  Thus
(III. vi., ix.) the mind, as far as it can, endeavours to imagine
such things.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XIII.  When the mind conceives things which diminish or
hinder the body's power of activity, it endeavours, as far as
possible, to remember things which exclude the existence of the
first--named things.

Proof.--So long as the mind conceives anything of the kind
alluded to, the power of the mind and body is diminished or
constrained (cf. III. xii. Proof); nevertheless it will continue
to conceive it, until the mind conceives something else, which
excludes the present existence thereof (II. xvii.); that is (as
I have just shown), the power of the mind and of the body is
diminished, or constrained, until the mind conceives something
else, which excludes the existence of the former thing conceived:
therefore the mind (III. ix.), as far as it can, will endeavour
to conceive or remember the latter.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that the mind shrinks from
conceiving those things, which diminish or constrain the power of
itself and of the body.

Note.--From what has been said we may clearly understand the
nature of Love and Hate.  Love is nothing else but pleasure
accompanied by the idea of an external cause: Hate is nothing
else but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause.  We
further see, that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have,
and to keep present to him, the object of his love; while he who
hates endeavours to remove and destroy the object of his hatred.
But I will treat of these matters at more length hereafter.

PROP. XIV.  If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at
the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one
of these two, be also affected by the other.

Proof.--If the human body has once been affected by two bodies
at once, whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of them, it
will straightway remember the other also (II. xviii.).  But the
mind's conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body than
the nature of external bodies (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.); therefore,
if the body, and consequently the mind (III. Def. iii.) has been
once affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever
it is afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by
the other.

PROP. XV.  Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure,
pain, or desire.

Proof.--Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously
affected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor
diminishes its power of activity, and the other does either
increase or diminish the said power (III. Post. i.).  From the
foregoing proposition it is evident that, whenever the mind is
afterwards affected by the former, through its true cause, which
(by hypothesis) neither increases nor diminishes its power of
action, it will be at the same time affected by the latter, which
does increase or diminish its power of activity, that is (III.
xi. note) it will be affected with pleasure or pain.  Thus the
former of the two emotions will, not through itself, but
accidentally, be the cause of pleasure or pain.  In the same way
also it can be easily shown, that a thing may be accidentally the
cause of desire.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing
with the emotion of pleasure or pain, though that thing be not
the efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hate
it.

Proof.--For from this fact alone it arises (III. xiv.), that
the mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with
the emotion of pleasure or pain, that is (III. xi. note),
according as the power of the mind and body may be increased or
diminished, &c.; and consequently (III. xii.), according as the
mind may desire or shrink from the conception of it (III. xiii.
Coroll.), in other words (III. xiii. note), according as it may
love or hate the same.  Q.E.D.

Note.--Hence we understand how it may happen, that we love or
hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us;
merely, as a phrase is, from sympathy or antipathy.  We should
refer to the same category those objects, which affect us
pleasurably or painfully, simply because they resemble other
objects which affect us in the same way.  This I will show in the
next Prop.  I am aware that certain authors, who were the first
to introduce these terms "sympathy" and "antipathy," wished to
signify thereby some occult qualities in things; nevertheless I
think we may be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known
or manifest qualities.

PROP. XVI.  Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a given
object has some point of resemblance with another object which is
wont to affect the mind pleasurably or painfully, although the
point of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said
emotions, we shall still regard the first--named object with love
or hate.

Proof.--The point of resemblance was in the object (by
hypothesis), when we regarded it with pleasure or pain, thus
(III. xiv.), when the mind is affected by the image thereof, it
will straightway be affected by one or the other emotion, and
consequently the thing, which we perceive to have the same point
of resemblance, will be accidentally (III. xv.) a cause of
pleasure or pain.  Thus (by the foregoing Corollary), although
the point in which the two objects resemble one another be not
the efficient cause of the emotion, we shall still regard the
first--named object with love or hate.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XVII.  If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect
us painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing
which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of
pleasure, we shall hate the first--named thing, and at the same
time we shall love it.

Proof.--The given thing is (by hypothesis) in itself a cause
of pain, and (III. xiii. note), in so far as we imagine it with
this emotion, we shall hate it: further, inasmuch as we conceive
that it has some point of resemblance to something else, which is
wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we
shall with an equally strong impulse of pleasure love it
(III. xvi.); thus we shall both hate and love the same thing.
Q.E.D.

Note.--This disposition of the mind, which arises from two
contrary emotions, is called vacillation; it stands to the
emotions in the same relation as doubt does to the imagination
(II. xliv. note); vacillation and doubt do not differ one from
the other, except as greater differs from less.  But we must bear
in mind that I have deduced this vacillation from causes, which
give rise through themselves to one of the emotions, and to the
other accidentally.  I have done this, in order that they might
be more easily deduced from what went before; but I do not deny
that vacillation of the disposition generally arises from an
object, which is the efficient cause of both emotions.  The human
body is composed (II. Post. i.) of a variety of individual parts
of different nature, and may therefore (Ax.i. after Lemma iii.
after II. xiii.) be affected in a variety of different ways by
one and the same body; and contrariwise, as one and the same
thing can be affected in many ways, it can also in many different
ways affect one and the same part of the body.  Hence we can
easily conceive, that one and the same object may be the cause of
many and conflicting emotions.

PROP. XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully
by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing
present.

Proof.--So long as a man is affected by the image of anything,
he will regard that thing as present, even though it be
non--existent (II. xvii. and Coroll.), he will not conceive it as
past or future, except in so far as its image is joined to the
image of time past or future (II. xliv. note).  Wherefore the
image of a thing, regarded in itself alone, is identical, whether
it be referred to time past, time future, or time present; that
is (II. xvi. Coroll.), the disposition or emotion of the body is
identical, whether the image be of a thing past, future, or
present.  Thus the emotion of pleasure or pain is the same,
whether the image be of a thing past or future.  Q.E.D.

Note I.--I call a thing past or future, according as we either
have been or shall be affected thereby.  For instance, according
as we have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it has
recreated us, or will recreate us, according as it has harmed us,
or will harm us.  For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm its
existence; that is, the body is affected by no emotion which
excludes the existence of the thing, and therefore (II. xvii.)
the body is affected by the image of the thing, in the same way
as if the thing were actually present.  However, as it generally
happens that those, who have had many experiences, vacillate, so
long as they regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in
doubt about its issue (II. xliv. note); it follows that the
emotions which arise from similar images of things are not so
constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other
things, until men become assured of the issue.

Note II.--From what has just been said, we understand what is
meant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Joy, and
Disappointment.[5]  Hope is nothing else but an inconstant
pleasure, arising from the image of something future or past,
whereof we do not yet know the issue.  Fear, on the other hand,
is an inconstant pain also arising from the image of something
concerning which we are in doubt.  If the element of doubt be
removed from these emotions, hope becomes Confidence and fear
becomes Despair.  In other words, Pleasure or Pain arising from
the image of something concerning which we have hoped or feared.
Again, Joy is Pleasure arising from the image of something past
whereof we have doubted the issue.  Disappointment is the Pain
opposed to Joy.

[5] Conscientiae morsus--thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.

PROP. XIX.  He who conceives that the object of his love is
destroyed will feel pain; if he conceives that it is preserved
he will feel pleasure.

Proof.--The mind, as far as possible, endeavours to conceive
those things which increase or help the body's power of activity
(III. xii.); in other words (III. xii. note), those things which
it loves.  But conception is helped by those things which
postulate the existence of a thing, and contrariwise is hindered
by those which exclude the existence of a thing (II. xvii.);
therefore the images of things, which postulate the existence of
an object of love, help the mind's endeavour to conceive the
object of love, in other words (III. xi. note), affect the mind
pleasurably; contrariwise those things, which exclude the
existence of an object of love, hinder the aforesaid mental
endeavour; in other words, affect the mind painfully.  He,
therefore, who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed
will feel pain, &c.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XX.  He who conceives that the object of his hate is
destroyed will also feel pleasure.

Proof.--The mind (III. xiii.) endeavours to conceive those
things, which exclude the existence of things whereby the body's
power of activity is diminished or constrained; that is (III.
xiii. note), it endeavours to conceive such things as exclude the
existence of what it hates; therefore the image of a thing,
which excludes the existence of what the mind hates, helps the
aforesaid mental effort, in other words (III. xi. note), affects
the mind pleasurably.  Thus he who conceives that the object of
his hate is destroyed will feel pleasure.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXI.  He who conceives, that the object of his love is
affected pleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected
pleasurably or painfully; and the one or the other emotion will
be greater or less in the lover according as it is greater or
less in the thing loved.

Proof.--The images of things (as we showed in III. xix.) which
postulate the existence of the object of love, help the mind's
endeavour to conceive the said object.  But pleasure postulates
the existence of something feeling pleasure, so much the more in
proportion as the emotion of pleasure is greater; for it is
(III. xi. note) a transition to a greater perfection; therefore
the image of pleasure in the object of love helps the mental
endeavour of the lover; that is, it affects the lover
pleasurably, and so much the more, in proportion as this emotion
may have been greater in the object of love.  This was our first
point.  Further, in so far as a thing is affected with pain, it
is to that extent destroyed, the extent being in proportion to
the amount of pain (III. xi. note); therefore (III. xix.) he who
conceives, that the object of his love is affected painfully,
will himself be affected painfully, in proportion as the said
emotion is greater or less in the object of love.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXII.  If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects
some object of our love, we shall be affected with love towards
that thing.  Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an
object of our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred
towards it.

Proof.--He, who affects pleasurably or painfully the object of
our love, affects us also pleasurably or painfully--that is, if we
conceive the loved object as affected with the said pleasure or
pain (III. xxi.). But this pleasure or pain is postulated to come
to us accompanied by the idea of an external cause; therefore
(III. xiii. note), if we conceive that anyone affects an object
of our love pleasurably or painfully, we shall be affected with
love or hatred towards him.  Q.E.D.

Note.--Prop. xxi. explains to us the nature of Pity, which we
may define as pain arising from another's hurt.  What term we can
use for pleasure arising from another's gain, I know not.

We will call the love towards him who confers a benefit on
another, Approval; and the hatred towards him who injures
another, we will call Indignation.  We must further remark, that
we not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved (as shown
in III. xxi.), but also for a thing which we have hitherto
regarded without emotion, provided that we deem that it resembles
ourselves (as I will show presently).  Thus, we bestow approval
on one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves, and,
contrariwise, are indignant with him who has done it an injury.

PROP. XXIII.  He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is
painfully affected, will feel pleasure.  Contrariwise, if he
thinks that the said object is pleasurably affected, he will feel
pain.  Each of these emotions will be greater or less, according
as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred.

Proof.--In so far as an object of hatred is painfully
affected, it is destroyed, to an extent proportioned to the
strength of the pain (III. xi. note).  Therefore, he (III. xx.)
who conceives, that some object of his hatred is painfully
affected, will feel pleasure, to an extent proportioned to the
amount of pain he conceives in the object of his hatred.  This
was our first point.  Again, pleasure postulates the existence of
the pleasurably affected thing (III. xi. note), in proportion as
the pleasure is greater or less.  If anyone imagines that an
object of his hatred is pleasurably affected, this conception
(III. xiii.) will hinder his own endeavour to persist; in other
words (III. xi. note), he who hates will be painfully affected.
Q.E.D.

Note.--This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed, and
without any mental conflict.  For (as I am about to show in Prop.
xxvii.), in so far as a man conceives that something similar to
himself is affected by pain, he will himself be affected in like
manner; and he will have the contrary emotion in contrary
circumstances.  But here we are regarding hatred only.

PROP. XXIV.  If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an
object of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also.  If we
conceive that he painfully affects that said object, we shall
feel love towards him.

Proof.--This proposition is proved in the same way as III.
xxii., which see.

Note.--These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable
to envy, which, accordingly, is nothing else but hatred, in so
far as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's
hurt, and to grieve at another's advantage.

PROP. XXV.  We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and
concerning what we love, everything that we can conceive to
affect pleasurably ourselves, or the loved object.  Contrariwise,
we endeavour to negative everything, which we conceive to affect
painfully ourselves or the loved object.

Proof.--That, which we conceive to affect an object of our
love pleasurably or painfully, affects us also pleasurably or
painfully (III. xxi.).  But the mind (III. xii.) endeavours, as
far as possible, to conceive those things which affect us
pleasurably; in other words (II. xvii. and Coroll.), it
endeavours to regard them as present.  And, contrariwise (III.
xiii.), it endeavours to exclude the existence of such things as
affect us painfully; therefore, we endeavour to affirm
concerning ourselves, and concerning the loved object, whatever
we conceive to affect ourselves, or the love object pleasurably.
Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVI.  We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we
hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and,
contrariwise, we endeavour to deny, concerning it, everything
which we conceive to affect it pleasurably.

Proof.--This proposition follows from III. xxiii., as the
foregoing proposition followed from III. xxi.

Note.--Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a man may
easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object, and,
contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object.  This feeling is
called pride, in reference to the man who thinks too highly of
himself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams with
his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things that
fall within the scope of his conception, and thereupon accounting
them real, and exulting in them, so long as he is unable to
conceive anything which excludes their existence, and determines
his own power of action.  Pride, therefore, is pleasure springing
from a man thinking too highly of himself.  Again, the pleasure
which arises from a man thinking too highly of another is called
over--esteem.  Whereas the pleasure which arises from thinking too
little of a man is called disdain.

PROP. XXVII.  By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is
like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion,
to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a
like emotion (affectus).

Proof.--The images of things are modifications of the human
body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to
us (II. xvii.); in other words (II. x.), whereof the ideas
involve the nature of our body, and, at the same time, the nature
of the external bodies as present.  If, therefore, the nature of
the external body be similar to the nature of our body, then the
idea which we form of the external body will involve a
modification of our own body similar to the modification of the
external body.  Consequently, if we conceive anyone similar to
ourselves as affected by any emotion, this conception will
express a modification of our body similar to that emotion.
Thus, from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to be
affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like
emotion.  If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we
shall, to that extent, be affected by a contrary, and not
similar, emotion.  Q.E.D.

Note I.--This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to
pain, is called compassion (cf. III. xxii. note); when it is
referred to desire, it is called emulation, which is nothing else
but the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact that we
conceive that others have the like desire.

Corollary I.--If we conceive that anyone, whom we have
hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurably affects something
similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him.
If, on the other hand, we conceive that he painfully affects the
same, we shall be affected with hatred towards him.

Proof.--This is proved from the last proposition in the same
manner as III. xxii. is proved from III. xxi.

Corollary II.--We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because
its misery affects us painfully.

Proof.--If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoice
in its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.

Corollary III.--We seek to free from misery, as far as we can,
a thing which we pity.

Proof.--That, which painfully affects the object of our pity,
affects us also with similar pain (by the foregoing proposition);
therefore, we shall endeavour to recall everything which
removes its existence, or which destroys it (cf. III. xiii.); in
other words (III. ix. note), we shall desire to destroy it, or we
shall be determined for its destruction; thus, we shall
endeavour to free from misery a thing which we pity.  Q.E.D.

Note II.--This will or appetite for doing good, which arises
from pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit, is
called benevolence, and is nothing else but desire arising from
compassion.  Concerning love or hate towards him who has done
good or harm to something, which we conceive to be like
ourselves, see III. xxii. note.

PROP. XXVIII.  We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive
to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavour to remove or destroy
whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to
conduce to pain.

Proof.--We endeavour, as far as possible, to conceive that
which we imagine to conduce to pleasure (III. xii.); in other
words (II. xvii.) we shall endeavour to conceive it as far as
possible as present or actually existing.  But the endeavour of
the mind, or the mind's power of thought, is equal to, and
simultaneous with, the endeavour of the body, or the body's power
of action.  (This is clear from II. vii. Coroll. and II. xi.
Coroll.).  Therefore we make an absolute endeavour for its
existence, in other words (which by III. ix. note, come to the
same thing) we desire and strive for it; this was our first
point.  Again, if we conceive that something, which we believed
to be the cause of pain, that is (III. xiii. note), which we
hate, is destroyed, we shall rejoice (III. xx.).  We shall,
therefore (by the first part of this proof), endeavour to destroy
the same, or (III. xiii.) to remove it from us, so that we may
not regard it as present; this was our second point.  Wherefore
whatsoever conduces to pleasure, &c.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIX.  We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive
men[6] to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall shrink
from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from.

[6] By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean men
whom we regard without any particular emotion.


Proof.--From the fact of imagining, that men love or hate
anything, we shall love or hate the same thing (III. xxvii.).
That is (III. xiii. note), from this mere fact we shall feel
pleasure or pain at the thing's presence.  And so we shall
endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive men to love or regard with
pleasure, etc.  Q.E.D.

Note.--This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone, solely
in order to please men, we call ambition, especially when we so
eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we do or omit
certain things to our own or another's hurt: in other cases it
is generally called kindliness.  Furthermore I give the name of
praise to the pleasure, with which we conceive the action of
another, whereby he has endeavoured to please us; but of blame
to the pain wherewith we feel aversion to his action.

PROP. XXX.  If anyone has done something which he conceives as
affecting other men pleasurably, he will be affected by pleasure,
accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other words, he
will regard himself with pleasure.  On the other hand, if he has
done anything which he conceives as affecting others painfully,
he will regard himself with pain.

Proof.--He who conceives, that he affects others with pleasure
or pain, will, by that very fact, himself be affected with
pleasure or pain (III. xxvii.), but, as a man (II. xix. and
xxiii.) is conscious of himself through the modifications whereby
he is determined to action, it follows that he who conceives,
that he affects others pleasurably, will be affected with
pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; in other
words, he will regard himself with pleasure.  And so mutatis
mutandis in the case of pain.  Q.E.D.

Note.--As love (III. xiii.) is pleasure accompanied by the
idea of an external cause, and hatred is pain accompanied by the
idea of an external cause; the pleasure and pain in question
will be a species of love and hatred.  But, as the terms love and
hatred are used in reference to external objects, we will employ
other names for the emotions now under discussion: pleasure
accompanied by the idea of an external cause[7] we will style
Honour, and the emotion contrary thereto we will style Shame: I
mean in such cases as where pleasure or pain arises from a man's
belief, that he is being praised or blamed: otherwise pleasure
accompanied by the idea of an external cause[8] is called
self--complacency, and its contrary pain is called repentance.
Again, as it may happen (II. xvii. Coroll.) that the pleasure,
wherewith a man conceives that he affects others, may exist
solely in his own imagination, and as (III. xxv.) everyone
endeavours to conceive concerning himself that which he conceives
will affect him with pleasure, it may easily come to pass that a
vain man may be proud and may imagine that he is pleasing to all,
when in reality he may be an annoyance to all.

[7] So Van Vloten and Bruder.  The Dutch version and Camerer read,
"an internal cause."  "Honor" = Gloria.

[8] See previous endnote.

PROP. XXXI.  If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates
anything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall
thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love,
&c.  On the contrary, if we think that anyone shrinks from
something that we love, we shall undergo vacillations of soul.

Proof.--From the mere fact of conceiving that anyone loves
anything we shall ourselves love that thing (III. xxvii.): but
we are assumed to love it already; there is, therefore, a new
cause of love, whereby our former emotion is fostered; hence we
shall thereupon love it more steadfastly.  Again, from the mere
fact of conceiving that anyone shrinks from anything, we shall
ourselves shrink from that thing (III. xxvii.).  If we assume
that we at the same time love it, we shall then simultaneously
love it and shrink from it; in other words, we shall be subject
to vacillation (III. xvii. note).  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--From the foregoing, and also from III. xxviii. it
follows that everyone endeavours, as far as possible, to cause
others to love what he himself loves, and to hate what he himself
hates: as the poet says:  "As lovers let us share every hope
and every fear: ironhearted were he who should love what the
other leaves."[9]

[9] Ovid, "Amores," II. xix. 4,5.  Spinoza transposes the verses.

"Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;

  Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat."


Note.--This endeavour to bring it about, that our own likes
and dislikes should meet with universal approval, is really
ambition (see III. xxix. note); wherefore we see that everyone
by nature desires (appetere), that the rest of mankind should
live according to his own individual disposition: when such a
desire is equally present in all, everyone stands in everyone
else's way, and in wishing to be loved or praised by all, all
become mutually hateful.

PROP. XXXII.  If we conceive that anyone takes delight in
something, which only one person can possess, we shall endeavour
to bring it about that the man in question shall not gain
possession thereof.

Proof.--From the mere fact of our conceiving that another
person takes delight in a thing (III. xxvii. and Coroll.) we
shall ourselves love that thing and desire to take delight
therein.  But we assumed that the pleasure in question would be
prevented by another's delight in its object; we shall,
therefore, endeavour to prevent his possession thereof (III.
xxviii.).  Q.E.D.

Note.--We thus see that man's nature is generally so
constituted, that he takes pity on those who fare ill, and envies
those who fare well with an amount of hatred proportioned to his
own love for the goods in their possession.  Further, we see that
from the same property of human nature, whence it follows that
men are merciful, it follows also that they are envious and
ambitious.  Lastly, if we make appeal to Experience, we shall
find that she entirely confirms what we have said; more
especially if we turn our attention to the first years of our
life.  We find that children, whose body is continually, as it
were, in equilibrium, laugh or cry simply because they see others
laughing or crying; moreover, they desire forthwith to imitate
whatever they see others doing, and to possess themselves of
whatever they conceive as delighting others: inasmuch as the
images of things are, as we have said, modifications of the human
body, or modes wherein the human body is affected and disposed by
external causes to act in this or that manner.

PROP. XXXIII.  When we love a thing similar to ourselves we
endeavour, as far as we can, to bring about that it should love
us in return.

Proof.--That which we love we endeavour, as far as we can, to
conceive in preference to anything else (III. xii.).  If the
thing be similar to ourselves, we shall endeavour to affect it
pleasurably in preference to anything else (III. xxix.).  In
other words, we shall endeavour, as far as we can, to bring it
about, that the thing should be affected with pleasure
accompanied by the idea of ourselves, that is (III. xiii. note),
that it should love us in return.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXIV.  The greater the emotion with which we conceive a
loved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be our
complacency.

Proof.--We endeavour (III. xxxiii.), as far as we can, to
bring about, that what we love should love us in return: in
other words, that what we love should be affected with pleasure
accompanied by the idea of ourself as cause.  Therefore, in
proportion as the loved object is more pleasurably affected
because of us, our endeavour will be assisted.--that is (III. xi.
and note) the greater will be our pleasure.  But when we take
pleasure in the fact, that we pleasurably affect something
similar to ourselves, we regard ourselves with pleasure (III. 30);
therefore the greater the emotion with which we conceive a
loved object to be affected, &c.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXV.  If anyone conceives, that an object of his love
joins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he
himself has attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards
the loved object and with envy towards his rival.

Proof.--In proportion as a man thinks, that a loved object is
well affected towards him, will be the strength of his
self--approval (by the last Prop.), that is (III. xxx. note), of
his pleasure; he will, therefore (III. xxviii.), endeavour, as
far as he can, to imagine the loved object as most closely bound
to him: this endeavour or desire will be increased, if he thinks
that someone else has a similar desire (III. xxxi.).  But this
endeavour or desire is assumed to be checked by the image of the
loved object in conjunction with the image of him whom the loved
object has joined to itself; therefore (III. xi. note) he will
for that reason be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea of
the loved object as a cause in conjunction with the image of his
rival; that is, he will be (III. xiii.) affected with hatred
towards the loved object and also towards his rival (III. xv.
Coroll.), which latter he will envy as enjoying the beloved
object.  Q.E.D.

Note.--This hatred towards an object of love joined with envy
is called Jealousy, which accordingly is nothing else but a
wavering of the disposition arising from combined love and
hatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival who is envied.
Further, this hatred towards the object of love will be greater,
in proportion to the pleasure which the jealous man had been wont
to derive from the reciprocated love of the said object; and
also in proportion to the feelings he had previously entertained
towards his rival.  If he had hated him, he will forthwith hate
the object of his love, because he conceives it is pleasurably
affected by one whom he himself hates: and also because he is
compelled to associate the image of his loved one with the image
of him whom he hates.  This condition generally comes into play
in the case of love for a woman: for he who thinks, that a woman
whom he loves prostitutes herself to another, will feel pain, not
only because his own desire is restrained, but also because,
being compelled to associate the image of her he loves with the
parts of shame and the excreta of another, he therefore shrinks
from her.

We must add, that a jealous man is not greeted by his beloved
with the same joyful countenance as before, and this also gives
him pain as a lover, as I will now show.

PROP. XXXVI.  He who remembers a thing, in which he has once
taken delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances
as when he first took delight therein.

Proof.--Everything, which a man has seen in conjunction with
the object of his love, will be to him accidentally a cause of
pleasure (III. xv.); he will, therefore, desire to possess it,
in conjunction with that wherein he has taken delight; in other
words, he will desire to possess the object of his love under the
same circumstances as when he first took delight therein.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--A lover will, therefore, feel pain if one of the
aforesaid attendant circumstances be missing.

Proof.--For, in so far as he finds some circumstance to be
missing, he conceives something which excludes its existence.  As
he is assumed to be desirous for love's sake of that thing or
circumstance (by the last Prop.), he will, in so far as he
conceives it to be missing, feel pain (III. xix.).  Q.E.D.

Note.--This pain, in so far as it has reference to the absence
of the object of love, is called Regret.

PROP. XXXVII.  Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or
love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.

Proof.--Pain diminishes or constrains a man's power of
activity (III. xi. note), in other words (III. vii.), diminishes
or constrains the effort, wherewith he endeavours to persist in
his own being; therefore (III. v.) it is contrary to the said
endeavour: thus all the endeavours of a man affected by pain are
directed to removing that pain.  But (by the definition of pain),
in proportion as the pain is greater, so also is it necessarily
opposed to a greater part of man's power of activity; therefore
the greater the pain, the greater the power of activity employed
to remove it; that is, the greater will be the desire or
appetite in endeavouring to remove it.  Again, since pleasure
(III. xi. note) increases or aids a man's power of activity, it
may easily be shown in like manner, that a man affected by
pleasure has no desire further than to preserve it, and his
desire will be in proportion to the magnitude of the pleasure.

Lastly, since hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain
and pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavour,
appetite, or desire, which arises through hatred or love, will be
greater in proportion to the hatred or love.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXVIII.  If a man has begun to hate an object of his love,
so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being
equal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it,
and his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his
former love.

Proof.--If a man begins to hate that which he had loved, more
of his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never
loved it.  For love is a pleasure (III. xiii. note) which a man
endeavours as far as he can to render permanent (III. xxviii.);
he does so by regarding the object of his love as present, and by
affecting it as far as he can pleasurably; this endeavour is
greater in proportion as the love is greater, and so also is the
endeavour to bring about that the beloved should return his
affection (III. xxxiii.).  Now these endeavours are constrained
by hatred towards the object of love (III. xiii. Coroll. and III.
xxiii.); wherefore the lover (III. xi. note) will for this cause
also be affected with pain, the more so in proportion as his love
has been greater; that is, in addition to the pain caused by
hatred, there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the
object; wherefore the lover will regard the beloved with greater
pain, or in other words, will hate it more than if he had never
loved it, and with the more intensity in proportion as his former
love was greater.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXIX.  He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an
injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue
to himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the
same law, seek to benefit him.

Proof.--To hate a man is (III. xiii. note) to conceive him as
a cause of pain; therefore he who hates a man will endeavour to
remove or destroy him.  But if anything more painful, or, in
other words, a greater evil, should accrue to the hater
thereby--and if the hater thinks he can avoid such evil by not
carrying out the injury, which he planned against the object of
his hate--he will desire to abstain from inflicting that injury
(III. xxviii.), and the strength of his endeavour (III. xxxvii.)
will be greater than his former endeavour to do injury, and will
therefore prevail over it, as we asserted.  The second part of
this proof proceeds in the same manner.  Wherefore he who hates
another, etc.  Q.E.D.

Note.--By good I here mean every kind of pleasure, and all
that conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies our
longings, whatsoever they may be.  By evil, I mean every kind of
pain, especially that which frustrates our longings.  For I have
shown (III. ix. note) that we in no case desire a thing because
we deem it good, but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good because
we desire it: consequently we deem evil that which we shrink
from; everyone, therefore, according to his particular emotions,
judges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better,
what is worse, lastly, what is best, and what is worst.  Thus a
miser thinks that abundance of money is the best, and want of
money the worst; an ambitious man desires nothing so much as
glory, and fears nothing so much as shame.  To an envious man
nothing is more delightful than another's misfortune, and nothing
more painful than another's success.  So every man, according to
his emotions, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful or
useless.  The emotion, which induces a man to turn from that
which he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, is
called timidity, which may accordingly be defined as the fear
whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as
future by encountering a lesser evil (III. xxviii.).  But if the
evil which he fears be shame, timidity becomes bashfulness.
Lastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the
fear of another evil, so that the man knows not which to choose,
fear becomes consternation, especially if both the evils feared
be very great.

PROP. XL.  He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and
believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate
that other in return.

Proof.--He who conceives another as affected with hatred, will
thereupon be affected himself with hatred (III. xxvii.), that is,
with pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.  But, by
the hypothesis, he conceives no cause for this pain except him
who is his enemy; therefore, from conceiving that he is hated by
some one, he will be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea
of his enemy; in other words, he will hate his enemy in return.
Q.E.D.

Note.--He who thinks that he has given just cause for hatred
will (III. xxx. and note) be affected with shame; but this case
(III. xxv.) rarely happens.  This reciprocation of hatred may
also arise from the hatred, which follows an endeavour to injure
the object of our hate (III. xxxix.).  He therefore who conceives
that he is hated by another will conceive his enemy as the cause
of some evil or pain; thus he will be affected with pain or
fear, accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause; in other
words, he will be affected with hatred towards his enemy, as I
said above.

Corollary I.--He who conceives, that one whom he loves hates
him, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.  For, in so
far as he conceives that he is an object of hatred, he is
determined to hate his enemy in return.  But, by the hypothesis,
he nevertheless loves him: wherefore he will be a prey to
conflicting hatred and love.

Corollary II.--If a man conceives that one, whom he has
hitherto regarded without emotion, has done him any injury from
motives of hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in
kind.

Proof.--He who conceives, that another hates him, will (by the
last proposition) hate his enemy in return, and (III. xxvi.) will
endeavour to recall everything which can affect him painfully;
he will moreover endeavour to do him an injury (III. xxxix.).
Now the first thing of this sort which he conceives is the injury
done to himself; he will, therefore, forthwith endeavour to
repay it in kind.  Q.E.D.

Note.--The endeavour to injure one whom we hate is called
Anger; the endeavour to repay in kind injury done to ourselves
is called Revenge.

PROP. XLI.  If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and
believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love
that other in return.  (Cf. III. xv. Coroll., and III. xvi.)

Proof.--This proposition is proved in the same way as the
preceding one.  See also the note appended thereto.

Note.--If he believes that he has given just cause for the
love, he will take pride therein (III. xxx. and note); this is
what most often happens (III. xxv.), and we said that its
contrary took place whenever a man conceives himself to be hated
by another.  (See note to preceding proposition.)  This
reciprocal love, and consequently the desire of benefiting him
who loves us (III. xxxix.), and who endeavours to benefit us, is
called gratitude or thankfulness.  It thus appears that men are
much more prone to take vengeance than to return benefits.

Corollary.--He who imagines that he is loved by one whom he
hates, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.  This is
proved in the same way as the first corollary of the preceding
proposition.

Note.--If hatred be the prevailing emotion, he will endeavour
to injure him who loves him; this emotion is called cruelty,
especially if the victim be believed to have given no ordinary
cause for hatred.

PROP. XLII.  He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from
motives of love or honour will feel pain, if he sees that the
benefit is received without gratitude.

Proof.--When a man loves something similar to himself, he
endeavours, as far as he can, to bring it about that he should be
loved thereby in return (III. xxxiii.).  Therefore he who has
conferred a benefit confers it in obedience to the desire, which
he feels of being loved in return; that is (III. xxxiv.) from
the hope of honour or (III. xxx. note) pleasure; hence he will
endeavour, as far as he can, to conceive this cause of honour, or
to regard it as actually existing.  But, by the hypothesis, he
conceives something else, which excludes the existence of the
said cause of honour: wherefore he will thereat feel pain (III.
xix.).  Q.E.D.

PROP. XLIII.  Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can
on the other hand be destroyed by love.

Proof.--He who conceives, that an object of his hatred hates
him in return, will thereupon feel a new hatred, while the former
hatred (by hypothesis) still remains (III. xl.).  But if, on the
other hand, he conceives that the object of hate loves him, he
will to this extent (III. xxxviii.) regard himself with pleasure,
and (III. xxix.) will endeavour to please the cause of his
emotion.  In other words, he will endeavour not to hate him (III.
xli.), and not to affect him painfully; this endeavour (III.
xxxvii.) will be greater or less in proportion to the emotion
from which it arises.  Therefore, if it be greater than that
which arises from hatred, and through which the man endeavours to
affect painfully the thing which he hates, it will get the better
of it and banish the hatred from his mind.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XLIV.  Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes
into love: and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not
preceded it.

Proof.--The proof proceeds in the same way as Prop. xxxviii.
of this Part: for he who begins to love a thing, which he was
wont to hate or regard with pain, from the very fact of loving
feels pleasure.  To this pleasure involved in love is added the
pleasure arising from aid given to the endeavour to remove the
pain involved in hatred (III. xxxvii.), accompanied by the idea
of the former object of hatred as cause.

Note.--Though this be so, no one will endeavour to hate
anything, or to be affected with pain, for the sake of enjoying
this greater pleasure; that is, no one will desire that he
should be injured, in the hope of recovering from the injury, nor
long to be ill for the sake of getting well.  For everyone will
always endeavour to persist in his being, and to ward off pain as
far as he can.  If the contrary is conceivable, namely, that a
man should desire to hate someone, in order that he might love
him the more thereafter, he will always desire to hate him.  For
the strength of love is in proportion to the strength of the
hatred, wherefore the man would desire, that the hatred be
continually increased more and more, and, for a similar reason,
he would desire to become more and more ill, in order that he
might take a greater pleasure in being restored to health: in
such a case he would always endeavour to be ill, which (III. vi.)
is absurd.

PROP. XLV.  If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself
hates anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will
hate that person.

Proof.--The beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards him
who hates it (III. xl.); therefore the lover, in conceiving that
anyone hates the beloved object, conceives the beloved thing as
affected by hatred, in other words (III. xiii.), by pain;
consequently he is himself affected by pain accompanied by the
idea of the hater of the beloved thing as cause; that is, he
will hate him who hates anything which he himself loves (III.
xiii. note).  Q.E.D.

PROP. XLVI.  If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully
by anyone, of a class or nation different from his own, and if
the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said
stranger as cause, under the general category of the class or
nation: the man will feel love or hatred, not only to the
individual stranger, but also to the whole class or nation
whereto he belongs.

Proof.--This is evident from III. xvi.

PROP. XLVII.  Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate is
destroyed, or suffers other injury, is never unaccompanied by a
certain pain in us.

Proof.--This is evident from III. xxvii.  For in so far as we
conceive a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain,
we ourselves feel pain.

Note.--This proposition can also be proved from the Corollary
to II. xvii.  Whenever we remember anything, even if it does not
actually exist, we regard it only as present, and the body is
affected in the same manner; wherefore, in so far as the
remembrance of the thing is strong, a man is determined to regard
it with pain; this determination, while the image of the thing
in question lasts, is indeed checked by the remembrance of other
things excluding the existence of the aforesaid thing, but is not
destroyed: hence, a man only feels pleasure in so far as the
said determination is checked: for this reason the joy arising
from the injury done to what we hate is repeated, every time we
remember that object of hatred.  For, as we have said, when the
image of the thing in question, is aroused, inasmuch as it
involves the thing's existence, it determines the man to regard
the thing with the same pain as he was wont to do, when it
actually did exist.  However, since he has joined to the image of
the thing other images, which exclude its existence, this
determination to pain is forthwith checked, and the man rejoices
afresh as often as the repetition takes place.  This is the cause
of men's pleasure in recalling past evils, and delight in
narrating dangers from which they have escaped.  For when men
conceive a danger, they conceive it as still future, and are
determined to fear it; this determination is checked afresh by
the idea of freedom, which became associated with the idea of the
danger when they escaped therefrom: this renders them secure
afresh: therefore they rejoice afresh.

PROP. XLVIII.  Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is
destroyed, if the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain
involved in the latter emotion, be associated with the idea of
another cause: and will be diminished in proportion as we
conceive Peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion.

Proof.--This Prop. is evident from the mere definition of love
and hatred (III. xiii. note).  For pleasure is called love
towards Peter, and pain is called hatred towards Peter, simply in
so far as Peter is regarded as the cause of one emotion or the
other.  When this condition of causality is either wholly or
partly removed, the emotion towards Peter also wholly or in part
vanishes.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XLIX.  Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive to
be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than if
it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity.

Proof.--A thing which we conceive as free must (I. Def. vii.)
be perceived through itself without anything else.  If,
therefore, we conceive it as the cause of pleasure or pain, we
shall therefore (III. xiii. note) love it or hate it, and shall
do so with the utmost love or hatred that can arise from the
given emotion.  But if the thing which causes the emotion be
conceived as acting by necessity, we shall then (by the same Def.
vii. Part I.) conceive it not as the sole cause, but as one of
the causes of the emotion, and therefore our love or hatred
towards it will be less.  Q.E.D.

Note.--Hence it follows, that men, thinking themselves to be
free, feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards
anything else: to this consideration we must add the imitation
of emotions treated of in III. xxvii., xxxiv., xl. and xliii.

PROP. L.  Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope
or fear.

Proof.--This proposition is proved in the same way as III.
xv., which see, together with the note to III. xviii.

Note.--Things which are accidentally the causes of hope or
fear are called good or evil omens.  Now, in so far as such omens
are the cause of hope or fear, they are (by the definitions of
hope and fear given in III. xviii. note) the causes also of
pleasure and pain; consequently we, to this extent, regard them
with love or hatred, and endeavour either to invoke them as means
towards that which we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles,
or causes of that which we fear.  It follows, further, from III.
xxv., that we are naturally so constituted as to believe readily
in that which we hope for, and with difficulty in that which we
fear; moreover, we are apt to estimate such objects above or
below their true value.  Hence there have arisen superstitions,
whereby men are everywhere assailed.  However, I do not think it
worth while to point out here the vacillations springing from
hope and fear; it follows from the definition of these emotions,
that there can be no hope without fear, and no fear without hope,
as I will duly explain in the proper place.  Further, in so far
as we hope for or fear anything, we regard it with love or hatred;
thus everyone can apply by himself to hope and fear what we
have said concerning love and hatred.

PROP. LI.  Different men may be differently affected by the same
object, and the same man may be differently affected at different
times by the same object.

Proof.--The human body is affected by external bodies in a
variety of ways (II. Post. iii.).  Two men may therefore be
differently affected at the same time, and therefore (by Ax. i.
after Lemma iii. after II. xiii.) may be differently affected by
one and the same object.  Further (by the same Post.) the human
body can be affected sometimes in one way, sometimes in another;
consequently (by the same Axiom) it may be differently affected
at different times by one and the same object.  Q.E.D.

Note.--We thus see that it is possible, that what one man
loves another may hate, and that what one man fears another may
not fear; or, again, that one and the same man may love what he
once hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on.
Again, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good,
what bad, what better, and what worse (III. xxxix. note), it
follows that men's judgments may vary no less than their
emotions[10], hence when we compare some with others, we
distinguish them solely by the diversity of their emotions, and
style some intrepid, others timid, others by some other epithet.
For instance, I shall call a man intrepid, if he despises an evil
which I am accustomed to fear; if I further take into
consideration, that, in his desire to injure his enemies and to
benefit those whom he loves, he is not restrained by the fear of
an evil which is sufficient to restrain me, I shall call him
daring.  Again, a man will appear timid to me, if he fears an
evil which I am accustomed to despise; and if I further take
into consideration that his desire is restrained by the fear of
an evil, which is not sufficient to restrain me, I shall say that
he is cowardly; and in like manner will everyone pass judgment.

[10] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine
intellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.


Lastly, from this inconstancy in the nature of human
judgment, inasmuch as a man often judges things solely by his
emotions, and inasmuch as the things which he believes cause
pleasure or pain, and therefore endeavours to promote or prevent,
are often purely imaginary, not to speak of the uncertainty of
things alluded to in III. xxviii.; we may readily conceive that
a man may be at one time affected with pleasure, and at another
with pain, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause.  Thus we
can easily understand what are Repentance and Self--complacency.
Repentance is pain, accompanied by the idea of one's self as
cause; Self--complacency is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of
one's self as cause, and these emotions are most intense because
men believe themselves to be free (III. xlix.).

PROP. LII.  An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction
with others, and which we do not conceive to have any property
that is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so
long, as an object which we conceive to have some property
peculiar to itself.

Proof.--As soon as we conceive an object which we have seen in
conjunction with others, we at once remember those others (II.
xviii. and note), and thus we pass forthwith from the
contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another
object.  And this is the case with the object, which we conceive
to have no property that is not common to many.  For we thereupon
assume that we are regarding therein nothing, which we have not
before seen in conjunction with other objects.  But when we
suppose that we conceive an object something special, which we
have never seen before, we must needs say that the mind, while
regarding that object, has in itself nothing which it can fall to
regarding instead thereof; therefore it is determined to the
contemplation of that object only.  Therefore an object, &c.
Q.E.D.

Note.--This mental modification, or imagination of a
particular thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is called
Wonder; but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is called
Consternation, because wonder at an evil keeps a man so engrossed
in the simple contemplation thereof, that he has no power to
think of anything else whereby he might avoid the evil.  If,
however, the object of wonder be a man's prudence, industry, or
anything of that sort, inasmuch as the said man, is thereby
regarded as far surpassing ourselves, wonder is called Veneration;
otherwise, if a man's anger, envy, &c., be what we wonder at,
the emotion is called Horror.  Again, if it be the prudence,
industry, or what not, of a man we love, that we wonder at, our
love will on this account be the greater (III. xii.), and when
joined to wonder or veneration is called Devotion.  We may in
like manner conceive hatred, hope, confidence, and the other
emotions, as associated with wonder; and we should thus be able
to deduce more emotions than those which have obtained names in
ordinary speech.  Whence it is evident, that the names of the
emotions have been applied in accordance rather with their
ordinary manifestations than with an accurate knowledge of their
nature.

To wonder is opposed Contempt, which generally arises from
the fact that, because we see someone wondering at, loving, or
fearing something, or because something, at first sight, appears
to be like things, which we ourselves wonder at, love, fear, &c.,
we are, in consequence (III. xv. Coroll. and III. xxvii.),
determined to wonder at, love, or fear that thing.  But if from
the presence, or more accurate contemplation of the said thing,
we are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause
of wonder, love, fear, &c., the mind then, by the presence of the
thing, remains determined to think rather of those qualities
which are not in it, than of those which are in it; whereas, on
the other hand, the presence of the object would cause it more
particularly to regard that which is therein.  As devotion
springs from wonder at a thing which we love, so does Derision
spring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear, and Scorn
from contempt of folly, as veneration from wonder at prudence.
Lastly, we can conceive the emotions of love, hope, honour, &c.,
in association with contempt, and can thence deduce other
emotions, which are not distinguished one from another by any
recognized name.

PROP. LIII.  When the mind regards itself and its own power of
activity, it feels pleasure: and that pleasure is greater in
proportion to the distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and
its own power of activity.

Proof.--A man does not know himself except through the
modifications of his body, and the ideas thereof (II. xix. and
xxiii.).  When, therefore, the mind is able to contemplate
itself, it is thereby assumed to pass to a greater perfection, or
(III. xi. note) to feel pleasure; and the pleasure will be
greater in proportion to the distinctness, wherewith it is able
to conceive itself and its own power of activity.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--This pleasure is fostered more and more, in
proportion as a man conceives himself to be praised by others.
For the more he conceives himself as praised by others, the more
he will imagine them to be affected with pleasure, accompanied by
the idea of himself (III. xxix. note); thus he is (III. xxvii.)
himself affected with greater pleasure, accompanied by the idea
of himself.  Q.E.D.

PROP. LIV. The mind endeavours to conceive only such things as
assert its power of activity.

Proof.--The endeavour or power of the mind is the actual
essence thereof (III. vii.); but the essence of the mind
obviously only affirms that which the mind is and can do; not
that which it neither is nor can do; therefore the mind
endeavours to conceive only such things as assert or affirm its
power of activity.  Q.E.D.

PROP. LV.  When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels
pain thereat.

Proof.--The essence of the mind only affirms that which the
mind is, or can do; in other words, it is the mind's nature to
conceive only such things as assert its power of activity (last
Prop.).  Thus, when we say that the mind contemplates its own
weakness, we are merely saying that while the mind is attempting
to conceive something which asserts its power of activity, it is
checked in its endeavour----in other words (III. xi. note), it
feels pain.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--This pain is more and more fostered, if a man
conceives that he is blamed by others; this may be proved in the
same way as the corollary to III. liii.

Note.--This pain, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness,
is called humility; the pleasure, which springs from the
contemplation of ourselves, is called self--love or
self--complacency.  And inasmuch as this feeling is renewed as
often as a man contemplates his own virtues, or his own power of
activity, it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his own
exploits, and displaying the force both of his body and mind, and
also that, for this reason, men are troublesome to one another.
Again, it follows that men are naturally envious (III. xxiv.
note, and III. xxxii. note), rejoicing in the shortcomings of
their equals, and feeling pain at their virtues.  For whenever a
man conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure (III.
liii.), in proportion as his actions display more perfection, and
he conceives them more distinctly--that is (II. xl. note), in
proportion as he can distinguish them from others, and regard
them as something special.  Therefore, a man will take most
pleasure in contemplating himself, when he contemplates some
quality which he denies to others.  But, if that which he affirms
of himself be attributable to the idea of man or animals in
general, he will not be so greatly pleased: he will, on the
contrary, feel pain, if he conceives that his own actions fall
short when compared with those of others.  This pain (III.
xxviii.) he will endeavour to remove, by putting a wrong
construction on the actions of his equals, or by, as far as he
can, embellishing his own.

It is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred
and envy, which latter is fostered by their education.  For
parents are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely
by the spur of honour and envy.  But, perhaps, some will scruple
to assent to what I have said, because we not seldom admire men's
virtues, and venerate their possessors.  In order to remove such
doubts, I append the following corollary.

Corollary.--No one envies the virtue of anyone who is not his
equal.

Proof.--Envy is a species of hatred (III. xxiv. note) or (III.
xiii. note) pain, that is (III. xi. note), a modification whereby
a man's power of activity, or endeavour towards activity, is
checked.  But a man does not endeavour or desire to do anything,
which cannot follow from his nature as it is given; therefore a
man will not desire any power of activity or virtue (which is the
same thing) to be attributed to him, that is appropriate to
another's nature and foreign to his own; hence his desire cannot
be checked, nor he himself pained by the contemplation of virtue
in some one unlike himself, consequently he cannot envy such an
one.  But he can envy his equal, who is assumed to have the same
nature as himself.  Q.E.D.

Note.--When, therefore, as we said in the note to III. lii.,
we venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude,
&c., we do so, because we conceive those qualities to be peculiar
to him, and not as common to our nature; we, therefore, no more
envy their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall, or lions
for being courageous.

PROP. LVI.  There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of
desire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such as
vacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love,
hatred, hope, fear, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we
are affected.

Proof.--Pleasure and pain, and consequently the emotions
compounded thereof, or derived therefrom, are passions, or
passive states (III. xi. note); now we are necessarily passive
(III. i.), in so far as we have inadequate ideas; and only in so
far as we have such ideas are we passive (III. iii.); that is,
we are only necessarily passive (II. xl. note), in so far as we
conceive, or (II. xvii. and note) in so far as we are affected by
an emotion, which involves the nature of our own body, and the
nature of an external body.  Wherefore the nature of every
passive state must necessarily be so explained, that the nature
of the object whereby we are affected be expressed.  Namely, the
pleasure, which arises from, say, the object A, involves the
nature of that object A, and the pleasure, which arises from the
object B, involves the nature of the object B; wherefore these
two pleasurable emotions are by nature different, inasmuch as the
causes whence they arise are by nature different.  So again the
emotion of pain, which arises from one object, is by nature
different from the pain arising from another object, and,
similarly, in the case of love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation,
&c.

Thus, there are necessarily as many kinds of pleasure, pain,
love, hatred, &c., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are
affected.  Now desire is each man's essence or nature, in so far
as it is conceived as determined to a particular action by any
given modification of itself (III. ix. note); therefore,
according as a man is affected through external causes by this or
that kind of pleasure, pain, love, hatred, &c., in other words,
according as his nature is disposed in this or that manner, so
will his desire be of one kind or another, and the nature of one
desire must necessarily differ from the nature of another desire,
as widely as the emotions differ, wherefrom each desire arose.
Thus there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of
pleasure, pain, love, &c., consequently (by what has been shown)
there are as many kinds of desire, as there are kinds of objects
whereby we are affected.  Q.E.D.

Note.--Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the last
proposition, must be very numerous, the chief are luxury,
drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition, being merely species of
love or desire, displaying the nature of those emotions in a
manner varying according to the object, with which they are
concerned.  For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition,
&c., we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting, drinking,
venery, riches, and fame.  Furthermore, these emotions, in so far
as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects
wherewith they are concerned, have no contraries.  For
temperance, sobriety, and chastity, which we are wont to oppose
to luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions or passive
states, but indicate a power of the mind which moderates the
last--named emotions.  However, I cannot here explain the
remaining kinds of emotions (seeing that they are as numerous as
the kinds of objects), nor, if I could, would it be necessary.
It is sufficient for our purpose, namely, to determine the
strength of the emotions, and the mind's power over them, to have
a general definition of each emotion.  It is sufficient, I
repeat, to understand the general properties of the emotions and
the mind, to enable us to determine the quality and extent of the
mind's power in moderating and checking the emotions.  Thus,
though there is a great difference between various emotions of
love, hatred, or desire, for instance between love felt towards
children, and love felt towards a wife, there is no need for us
to take cognizance of such differences, or to track out further
the nature and origin of the emotions.

PROP. LVII.  Any emotion of a given individual differs from the
emotion of another individual, only in so far as the essence of
the one individual differs from the essence of the other.

Proof.--This proposition is evident from Ax. i. (which see
after Lemma iii. Prop. xiii., Part II.).  Nevertheless, we will
prove it from the nature of the three primary emotions.

All emotions are attributable to desire, pleasure, or pain,
as their definitions above given show.  But desire is each man's
nature or essence (III. ix. note); therefore desire in one
individual differs from desire in another individual, only in so
far as the nature or essence of the one differs from the nature
or essence of the other.  Again, pleasure and pain are passive
states or passions, whereby every man's power or endeavour to
persist in his being is increased or diminished, helped or
hindered (III. xi. and note).  But by the endeavour to persist in
its being, in so far as it is attributable to mind and body in
conjunction, we mean appetite and desire (III. ix. note);
therefore pleasure and pain are identical with desire or
appetite, in so far as by external causes they are increased or
diminished, helped or hindered, in other words, they are every
man's nature; wherefore the pleasure and pain felt by one man
differ from the pleasure and pain felt by another man, only in so
far as the nature or essence of the one man differs from the
essence of the other; consequently, any emotion of one
individual only differs, &c.  Q.E.D.

Note.--Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animals
which are called irrational (for after learning the origin of
mind we cannot doubt that brutes feel) only differ from man's
emotions, to the extent that brute nature differs from human
nature.  Horse and man are alike carried away by the desire of
procreation; but the desire of the former is equine, the desire
of the latter is human.  So also the lusts and appetites of
insects, fishes, and birds must needs vary according to the
several natures.  Thus, although each individual lives content
and rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he has his
being, yet the life, wherein each is content and rejoices, is
nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said individual, and
hence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of
another, to the extent that the essence of one differs from the
essence of another.  Lastly, it follows from the foregoing
proposition, that there is no small difference between the joy
which actuates, say, a drunkard, and the joy possessed by a
philosopher, as I just mention here by the way.  Thus far I have
treated of the emotions attributable to man, in so far as he is
passive.  It remains to add a few words on those attributable to
him in so far as he is active.

PROP. LVIII.  Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities
or passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and
desire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active.

Proof.--When the mind conceives itself and its power of
activity, it feels pleasure (III. liii.): now the mind
necessarily contemplates itself, when it conceives a true or
adequate idea (II. xliii.).  But the mind does conceive certain
adequate ideas (II. xl. note 2.).  Therefore it feels pleasure in
so far as it conceives adequate ideas; that is, in so far as it
is active (III. i.).  Again, the mind, both in so far as it has
clear and distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas,
endeavours to persist in its own being (III. ix.); but by such
an endeavour we mean desire (by the note to the same Prop.);
therefore, desire is also attributable to us, in so far as we
understand, or (III. i.) in so far as we are active.  Q.E.D.

PROP. LIX.  Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as
active, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or
desire.

Proof.--All emotions can be referred to desire, pleasure, or
pain, as their definitions, already given, show.  Now by pain we
mean that the mind's power of thinking is diminished or checked
(III. xi. and note); therefore, in so far as the mind feels
pain, its power of understanding, that is, of activity, is
diminished or checked (III. i.); therefore, no painful emotions
can be attributed to the mind in virtue of its being active, but
only emotions of pleasure and desire, which (by the last Prop.)
are attributable to the mind in that condition.  Q.E.D.

Note.--All actions following from emotion, which are
attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set
down to strength of character (fortitudo), which I divide into
courage (animositas) and highmindedness (generositas).  By
courage I mean the desire whereby every man strives to preserve
his own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason.
By highmindedness I mean the desire whereby every man endeavours,
solely under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to
unite them to himself in friendship.  Those actions, therefore,
which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set down to
courage, those which aim at the good of others I set down to
highmindedness.  Thus temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind
in danger, &c., are varieties of courage; courtesy, mercy, &c.,
are varieties of highmindedness.

I think I have thus explained, and displayed through their
primary causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit,
which arise from the combination of the three primary emotions,
to wit, desire, pleasure, and pain.  It is evident from what I
have said, that we are in many ways driven about by external
causes, and that like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds
we toss to and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate.  But I
have said, that I have only set forth the chief conflicting
emotions, not all that might be given.  For, by proceeding in the
same way as above, we can easily show that love is united to
repentance, scorn, shame, &c.  I think everyone will agree from
what has been said, that the emotions may be compounded one with
another in so many ways, and so many variations may arise
therefrom, as to exceed all possibility of computation.  However,
for my purpose, it is enough to have enumerated the most
important; to reckon up the rest which I have omitted would be
more curious than profitable.  It remains to remark concerning
love, that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a
thing which we longed for, the body, from the act of enjoyment,
acquires a new disposition, whereby it is determined in another
way, other images of things are aroused in it, and the mind
begins to conceive and desire something fresh.  For example, when
we conceive something which generally delights us with its
flavour, we desire to enjoy, that is, to eat it.  But whilst we
are thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body is
otherwise disposed.  If, therefore, when the body is thus
otherwise disposed, the image of the food which is present be
stimulated, and consequently the endeavour or desire to eat it be
stimulated also, the new disposition of the body will feel
repugnance to the desire or attempt, and consequently the
presence of the food which we formerly longed for will become
odious.  This revulsion of feeling is called satiety or
weariness.  For the rest, I have neglected the outward
modifications of the body observable in emotions, such, for
instance, as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, &c., for these
are attributable to the body only, without any reference to the
mind.  Lastly, the definitions of the emotions require to be
supplemented in a few points; I will therefore repeat them,
interpolating such observations as I think should here and there
be added.


DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS

I.  Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is
conceived, as determined to a particular activity by some given
modification of itself.

Explanation.--We have said above, in the note to Prop. ix. of
this part, that desire is appetite, with consciousness thereof;
further, that appetite is the essence of man, in so far as it is
determined to act in a way tending to promote its own
persistence.  But, in the same note, I also remarked that,
strictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetite
and desire.  For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or
not, it remains one and the same appetite.  Thus, in order to
avoid the appearance of tautology, I have refrained from
explaining desire by appetite; but I have take care to define it
in such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head, all those
endeavours of human nature, which we distinguish by the terms
appetite, will, desire, or impulse.  I might, indeed, have said,
that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is conceived
as determined to a particular activity; but from such a
definition (cf. II. xxiii.) it would not follow that the mind can
be conscious of its desire or appetite.  Therefore, in order to
imply the cause of such consciousness, it was necessary to add,
in so far as it is determined by some given modification, &c.
For, by a modification of man's essence, we understand every
disposition of the said essence, whether such disposition be
innate, or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of
thought, or solely under the attribute of extension, or whether,
lastly, it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes.
By the term desire, then, I here mean all man's endeavours,
impulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary according to each
man's disposition, and are, therefore, not seldom opposed one to
another, according as a man is drawn in different directions, and
knows not where to turn.

II.  Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a greater
perfection.

III.  Pain is the transition of a man from a greater to a less
perfection.

Explanation--I say transition: for pleasure is not perfection
itself.  For, if man were born with the perfection to which he
passes, he would possess the same, without the emotion of
pleasure.  This appears more clearly from the consideration of
the contrary emotion, pain.  No one can deny, that pain consists
in the transition to a less perfection, and not in the less
perfection itself: for a man cannot be pained, in so far as he
partakes of perfection of any degree.  Neither can we say, that
pain consists in the absence of a greater perfection.  For
absence is nothing, whereas the emotion of pain is an activity;
wherefore this activity can only be the activity of transition
from a greater to a less perfection--in other words, it is an
activity whereby a man's power of action is lessened or
constrained (cf. III. xi. note).  I pass over the definitions of
merriment, stimulation, melancholy, and grief, because these
terms are generally used in reference to the body, and are merely
kinds of pleasure or pain.

IV.  Wonder is the conception (imaginatio) of anything, wherein
the mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept in
question has no connection with other concepts (cf. III. lii. and
note).

Explanation--In the note to II. xviii. we showed the reason,
why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, straightway
falls to the contemplation of another thing, namely, because the
images of the two things are so associated and arranged, that one
follows the other.  This state of association is impossible, if
the image of the thing be new; the mind will then be at a stand
in the contemplation thereof, until it is determined by other
causes to think of something else.

Thus the conception of a new object, considered in itself, is
of the same nature as other conceptions; hence, I do not include
wonder among the emotions, nor do I see why I should so include
it, inasmuch as this distraction of the mind arises from no
positive cause drawing away the mind from other objects, but
merely from the absence of a cause, which should determine the
mind to pass from the contemplation of one object to the
contemplation of another.

I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary
emotions (as I said in the note to III. xi.), namely, pleasure,
pain, and desire.  I have spoken of wonder simply because it is
customary to speak of certain emotions springing from the three
primitive ones by different names, when they are referred to the
objects of our wonder.  I am led by the same motive to add a
definition of contempt.

V.  Contempt is the conception of anything which touches the mind
so little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine those
qualities which are not in it rather than such as are in it (cf.
III. lii. note).

The definitions of veneration and scorn I here pass over, for
I am not aware that any emotions are named after them.

VI.  Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external
cause.

Explanation--This definition explains sufficiently clearly the
essence of love; the definition given by those authors who say
that love is the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved
object expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and,
as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence,
they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its
properties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted
to be very obscure.  It must, however, be noted, that when I say
that it is a property of love, that the lover should wish to
unite himself to the beloved object, I do not here mean by wish
consent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind (for I
have shown such, in II. xlviii., to be fictitious); neither do I
mean a desire of being united to the loved object when it is
absent, or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand; for
love can be conceived without either of these desires; but by
wish I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on account of
the presence of the beloved object, whereby the pleasure of the
lover is strengthened, or at least maintained.

VII.  Hatred is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external
cause.

Explanation--These observations are easily grasped after what
has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition (cf.
also III. xiii. note).

VIII.  Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of
something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure.

IX.  Aversion is pain, accompanied by the idea of something which
is accidentally the cause of pain (cf. III. xv. note).

X.  Devotion is love towards one whom we admire.

Explanation--Wonder (admiratio) arises (as we have shown, III.
lii.) from the novelty of a thing.  If, therefore, it happens
that the object of our wonder is often conceived by us, we shall
cease to wonder at it; thus we see, that the emotion of devotion
readily degenerates into simple love.

XI.  Derision is pleasure arising from our conceiving the
presence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which we
hate.

Explanation--In so far as we despise a thing which we hate, we
deny existence thereof (III. lii. note), and to that extent
rejoice (III. xx.).  But since we assume that man hates that
which he derides, it follows that the pleasure in question is not
without alloy (cf. III. xlvii. note).

XII.  Hope is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of
something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt
the issue.

XIII.  Fear is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of
something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt
the issue (cf. III. xviii. note).

Explanation--From these definitions it follows, that there is
no hope unmingled with fear, and no fear unmingled with hope.
For he, who depends on hope and doubts concerning the issue of
anything, is assumed to conceive something, which excludes the
existence of the said thing in the future; therefore he, to this
extent, feels pain (cf. III. xix.); consequently, while
dependent on hope, he fears for the issue.  Contrariwise he, who
fears, in other words doubts, concerning the issue of something
which he hates, also conceives something which excludes the
existence of the thing in question; to this extent he feels
pleasure, and consequently to this extent he hopes that it will
turn out as he desires (III. xx.).

XIV.  Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of something
past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.

XV.  Despair is pain arising from the idea of something past or
future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.

Explanation--Thus confidence springs from hope, and despair
from fear, when all cause for doubt as to the issue of an event
has been removed: this comes to pass, because man conceives
something past or future as present and regards it as such, or
else because he conceives other things, which exclude the
existence of the causes of his doubt.  For, although we can never
be absolutely certain of the issue of any particular event (II.
xxxi. Coroll.), it may nevertheless happen that we feel no doubt
concerning it.  For we have shown, that to feel no doubt
concerning a thing is not the same as to be quite certain of it
(II. xlix. note).  Thus it may happen that we are affected by the
same emotion of pleasure or pain concerning a thing past or
future, as concerning the conception of a thing present; this I
have already shown in III. xviii., to which, with its note, I
refer the reader.

XVI.  Joy is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past,
which has had an issue beyond our hope.

XVII.  Disappointment is pain accompanied by the idea of
something past, which has had an issue contrary to our hope.

XVIII.  Pity is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which has
befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves (cf.
III. xxii. note, and III. xxvii. note).

Explanation--Between pity and sympathy (misericordia) there
seems to be no difference, unless perhaps that the former term is
used in reference to a particular action, and the latter in
reference to a disposition.

XIX.  Approval is love towards one who has done good to another.

XX.  Indignation is hatred towards one who has done evil to
another.

Explanation--I am aware that these terms are employed in
senses somewhat different from those usually assigned.  But my
purpose is to explain, not the meaning of words, but the nature
of things.  I therefore make use of such terms, as may convey my
meaning without any violent departure from their ordinary
signification.  One statement of my method will suffice. As for
the cause of the above--named emotions see III. xxvii. Coroll. i.,
and III. xxii. note.

XXI.  Partiality is thinking too highly of anyone because of the
love we bear him.

XXII.  Disparagement is thinking too meanly of anyone because we
hate him.

Explanation--Thus partiality is an effect of love, and
disparagement an effect of hatred: so that partiality may also
be defined as love, in so far as it induces a man to think too
highly of a beloved object.  Contrariwise, disparagement may be
defined as hatred, in so far as it induces a man to think too
meanly of a hated object.  Cf. III. xxvi. note.

XXIII.  Envy is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be
pained by another's good fortune, and to rejoice in another's
evil fortune.

Explanation--Envy is generally opposed to sympathy, which, by
doing some violence to the meaning of the word, may therefore be
thus defined:

XXIV.  Sympathy (misericordia) is love, in so far as it induces a
man to feel pleasure at another's good fortune, and pain at
another's evil fortune.

Explanation--Concerning envy see the notes to III. xxiv. and
xxxii.  These emotions also arise from pleasure or pain
accompanied by the idea of something external, as cause either in
itself or accidentally.  I now pass on to other emotions, which
are accompanied by the idea of something within as a cause.

XXV.  Self--approval is pleasure arising from a man's
contemplation of himself and his own power of action.

XXVI.  Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his
own weakness of body or mind.

Explanation--Self--complacency is opposed to humility, in so
far as we thereby mean pleasure arising from a contemplation of
our own power of action; but, in so far as we mean thereby
pleasure accompanied by the idea of any action which we believe
we have performed by the free decision of our mind, it is opposed
to repentance, which we may thus define:

XXVII.  Repentance is pain accompanied by the idea of some
action, which we believe we have performed by the free decision
of our mind.

Explanation--The causes of these emotions we have set forth in
III. li. note, and in III. liii., liv., lv. and note.  Concerning
the free decision of the mind see II. xxxv. note.  This is
perhaps the place to call attention to the fact, that it is
nothing wonderful that all those actions, which are commonly
called wrong, are followed by pain, and all those, which are
called right, are followed by pleasure.  We can easily gather
from what has been said, that this depends in great measure on
education.  Parents, by reprobating the former class of actions,
and by frequently chiding their children because of them, and
also by persuading to and praising the latter class, have brought
it about, that the former should be associated with pain and the
latter with pleasure.  This is confirmed by experience.  For
custom and religion are not the same among all men, but that
which some consider sacred others consider profane, and what some
consider honourable others consider disgraceful.  According as
each man has been educated, he feels repentance for a given
action or glories therein.

XXVIII.  Pride is thinking too highly of one's self from
self--love.

Explanation--Thus pride is different from partiality, for the
latter term is used in reference to an external object, but pride
is used of a man thinking too highly of himself.  However, as
partiality is the effect of love, so is pride the effect or
property of self--love, which may therefore be thus defined, love
of self or self--approval, in so far as it leads a man to think
too highly of himself.  To this emotion there is no contrary.
For no one thinks too meanly of himself because of self--hatred;
I say that no one thinks too meanly of himself, in so far as he
conceives that he is incapable of doing this or that.  For
whatsoever a man imagines that he is incapable of doing, he
imagines this of necessity, and by that notion he is so disposed,
that he really cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot
do.  For, so long as he conceives that he cannot do it, so long
is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long is it
impossible for him to do it.  However, if we consider such
matters as only depend on opinion, we shall find it conceivable
that a man may think too meanly of himself; for it may happen,
that a man, sorrowfully regarding his own weakness, should
imagine that he is despised by all men, while the rest of the
world are thinking of nothing less than of despising him.  Again,
a man may think too meanly of himself, if he deny of himself in
the present something in relation to a future time of which he is
uncertain.  As, for instance, if he should say that he is unable
to form any clear conceptions, or that he can desire and do
nothing but what is wicked and base, &c.  We may also say, that a
man thinks too meanly of himself, when we see him from excessive
fear of shame refusing to do things which others, his equals,
venture.  We can, therefore, set down as a contrary to pride an
emotion which I will call self--abasement, for as from
self--complacency springs pride, so from humility springs
self--abasement, which I will accordingly thus define:

XXIX.  Self--abasement is thinking too meanly of one's self by
reason of pain.

Explanation--We are nevertheless generally accustomed to
oppose pride to humility, but in that case we pay more attention
to the effect of either emotion than to its nature.  We are wont
to call proud the man who boasts too much (III. xxx. note), who
talks of nothing but his own virtues and other people's faults,
who wishes to be first; and lastly who goes through life with a
style and pomp suitable to those far above him in station.  On
the other hand, we call humble the man who too often blushes, who
confesses his faults, who sets forth other men's virtues, and
who, lastly, walks with bent head and is negligent of his attire.
However, these emotions, humility and self--abasement, are
extremely rare.  For human nature, considered in itself, strives
against them as much as it can (see III. xiii., liv.); hence
those, who are believed to be most self--abased and humble, are
generally in reality the most ambitious and envious.

XXX.  Honour[11] is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action
of our own, which we believe to be praised by others.

[11] Gloria.

XXXI.  Shame is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of
our own, which we believe to be blamed by others.

Explanation--On this subject see the note to III. xxx.  But we
should here remark the difference which exists between shame and
modesty.  Shame is the pain following the deed whereof we are
ashamed.  Modesty is the fear or dread of shame, which restrains
a man from committing a base action.  Modesty is usually opposed
to shamelessness, but the latter is not an emotion, as I will
duly show; however, the names of the emotions (as I have
remarked already) have regard rather to their exercise than to
their nature.

I have now fulfilled the task of explaining the emotions
arising from pleasure and pain.  I therefore proceed to treat of
those which I refer to desire.

XXXII.  Regret is the desire or appetite to possess something,
kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing, and at the same
time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude
the existence of it.

Explanation--When we remember a thing, we are by that very
fact, as I have already said more than once, disposed to
contemplate it with the same emotion as if it were something
present; but this disposition or endeavour, while we are awake,
is generally checked by the images of things which exclude the
existence of that which we remember.  Thus when we remember
something which affected us with a certain pleasure, we by that
very fact endeavour to regard it with the same emotion of
pleasure as though it were present, but this endeavour is at once
checked by the remembrance of things which exclude the existence
of the thing in question.  Wherefore regret is, strictly
speaking, a pain opposed to that of pleasure, which arises from
the absence of something we hate (cf. III. xlvii. note).  But, as
the name regret seems to refer to desire, I set this emotion
down, among the emotions springing from desire.

XXXIII.  Emulation is the desire of something, engendered in us
by our conception that others have the same desire.

Explanation--He who runs away, because he sees others running
away, or he who fears, because he sees others in fear; or again,
he who, on seeing that another man has burnt his hand, draws
towards him his own hand, and moves his body as though his own
were burnt; such an one can be said to imitate another's
emotion, but not to emulate him; not because the causes of
emulation and imitation are different, but because it has become
customary to speak of emulation only in him, who imitates that
which we deem to be honourable, useful, or pleasant.  As to the
cause of emulation, cf. III. xxvii. and note.  The reason why
this emotion is generally coupled with envy may be seen from III.
xxxii. and note.

XXXIV.  Thankfulness or Gratitude is the desire or zeal springing
from love, whereby we endeavour to benefit him, who with similar
feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us.  Cf. III. xxxix.
note and xl.

XXXV.  Benevolence is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity.
Cf. III. xxvii. note.

XXXVI.  Anger is the desire, whereby through hatred we are
induced to injure one whom we hate, III. xxxix.

XXXVII.  Revenge is the desire whereby we are induced, through
mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar feelings, has
injured us.  (See III. xl. Coroll. ii and note.)

XXXVIII.  Cruelty or savageness is the desire, whereby a man is
impelled to injure one whom we love or pity.

Explanation--To cruelty is opposed clemency, which is not a
passive state of the mind, but a power whereby man restrains his
anger and revenge.

XXXIX.  Timidity is the desire to avoid a greater evil, which we
dread, by undergoing a lesser evil.  Cf. III. xxxix. note.

XL.  Daring is the desire, whereby a man is set on to do
something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.

XLI.  Cowardice is attributed to one, whose desire is checked by
the fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter.

Explanation--Cowardice is, therefore, nothing else but the
fear of some evil, which most men are wont not to fear; hence I
do not reckon it among the emotions springing from desire.
Nevertheless, I have chosen to explain it here, because, in so
far as we look to the desire, it is truly opposed to the emotion
of daring.

XLII.  Consternation is attributed to one, whose desire of
avoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he fears.

Explanation--Consternation is, therefore, a species of
cowardice.  But, inasmuch as consternation arises from a double
fear, it may be more conveniently defined as a fear which keeps a
man so bewildered and wavering, that he is not able to remove the
evil.  I say bewildered, in so far as we understand his desire of
removing the evil to be constrained by his amazement.  I say
wavering, in so far as we understand the said desire to be
constrained by the fear of another evil, which equally torments
him: whence it comes to pass that he knows not, which he may
avert of the two.  On this subject, see III. xxxix. note, and
III. lii. note.  Concerning cowardice and daring, see III. li.
note.

XLIII.  Courtesy, or deference (Humanitas seu modestia), is the
desire of acting in a way that should please men, and refraining
from that which should displease them.

XLIV.  Ambition is the immoderate desire of power.

Explanation--Ambition is the desire, whereby all the emotions
(cf. III. xxvii. and xxxi.) are fostered and strengthened;
therefore this emotion can with difficulty be overcome.  For, so
long as a man is bound by any desire, he is at the same time
necessarily bound by this.  "The best men," says Cicero, "are
especially led by honour.  Even philosophers, when they write a
book contemning honour, sign their names thereto," and so on.

XLV.  Luxury is excessive desire, or even love of living
sumptuously.

XLVI.  Intemperance is the excessive desire and love of drinking.

XLVII.  Avarice is the excessive desire and love of riches.

XLVIII.  Lust is desire and love in the matter of sexual
intercourse.

Explanation--Whether this desire be excessive or not, it is
still called lust.  These last five emotions (as I have shown in
III. lvi.) have on contraries.  For deference is a species of
ambition.  Cf. III. xxix. note.

Again, I have already pointed out, that temperance, sobriety,
and chastity indicate rather a power than a passivity of the
mind.  It may, nevertheless, happen, that an avaricious, an
ambitious, or a timid man may abstain from excess in eating,
drinking, or sexual indulgence, yet avarice, ambition, and fear
are not contraries to luxury, drunkenness, and debauchery.  For
an avaricious man often is glad to gorge himself with food and
drink at another man's expense.  An ambitious man will restrain
himself in nothing, so long as he thinks his indulgences are
secret; and if he lives among drunkards and debauchees, he will,
from the mere fact of being ambitious, be more prone to those
vices.  Lastly, a timid man does that which he would not.  For
though an avaricious man should, for the sake of avoiding death,
cast his riches into the sea, he will none the less remain
avaricious; so, also, if a lustful man is downcast, because he
cannot follow his bent, he does not, on the ground of abstention,
cease to be lustful.  In fact, these emotions are not so much
concerned with the actual feasting, drinking, &c., as with the
appetite and love of such.  Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to
these emotions, but high--mindedness and valour, whereof I will
speak presently.

The definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind I
pass over in silence, first, because they arise from the
compounding of the emotions already described; secondly, because
many of them have no distinctive names, which shows that it is
sufficient for practical purposes to have merely a general
knowledge of them.  However, it is established from the
definitions of the emotions, which we have set forth, that they
all spring from desire, pleasure, or pain, or, rather, that there
is nothing besides these three; wherefore each is wont to be
called by a variety of names in accordance with its various
relations and extrinsic tokens.  If we now direct our attention
to these primitive emotions, and to what has been said concerning
the nature of the mind, we shall be able thus to define the
emotions, in so far as they are referred to the mind only.


GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS


Emotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is a
confused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its body, or
any part thereof, a force for existence (existendi vis) greater
or less than before, and by the presence of which the mind is
determined to think of one thing rather than another.

Explanation--I say, first, that emotion or passion of the soul
is a confused idea.  For we have shown that the mind is only
passive, in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas.  (III.
iii.)  I say, further, whereby the mind affirms concerning its
body or any part thereof a force for existence greater than
before.  For all the ideas of bodies, which we possess, denote
rather the actual disposition of our own body (II. xvi. Coroll.
ii.) than the nature of an external body.  But the idea which
constitutes the reality of an emotion must denote or express the
disposition of the body, or of some part thereof, because its
power of action or force for existence is increased or
diminished, helped or hindered.  But it must be noted that, when
I say a greater or less force for existence than before, I do not
mean that the mind compares the present with the past disposition
of the body, but that the idea which constitutes the reality of
an emotion affirms something of the body, which, in fact,
involves more or less of reality than before.

And inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact (II.
xi., xiii.), that it affirms the actual existence of its own
body, and inasmuch as we understand by perfection the very
essence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to greater or
less perfection, when it happens to affirm concerning its own
body, or any part thereof, something involving more or less
reality than before.

When, therefore, I said above that the power of the mind is
increased or diminished, I merely meant that the mind had formed
of its own body, or of some part thereof, an idea involving more
or less of reality, than it had already affirmed concerning its
own body.  For the excellence of ideas, and the actual power of
thinking are measured by the excellence of the object.  Lastly, I
have added by the presence of which the mind is determined to
think of one thing rather than another, so that, besides the
nature of pleasure and pain, which the first part of the
definition explains, I might also express the nature of desire.




PART IV:

Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions


PREFACE



Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I
name bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is
not his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune: so much
so, that he is often compelled, while seeing that which is better
for him, to follow that which is worse.  Why this is so, and what
is good or evil in the emotions, I propose to show in this part
of my treatise.  But, before I begin, it would be well to make a
few prefatory observations on perfection and imperfection, good
and evil.

When a man has purposed to make a given thing, and has
brought it to perfection, his work will be pronounced perfect,
not only by himself, but by everyone who rightly knows, or thinks
that he knows, the intention and aim of its author.  For
instance, suppose anyone sees a work (which I assume to be not
yet completed), and knows that the aim of the author of that work
is to build a house, he will call the work imperfect; he will,
on the other hand, call it perfect, as soon as he sees that it is
carried through to the end, which its author had purposed for it.
But if a man sees a work, the like whereof he has never seen
before, and if he knows not the intention of the artificer, he
plainly cannot know, whether that work be perfect or imperfect.
Such seems to be the primary meaning of these terms.

But, after men began to form general ideas, to think out
types of houses, buildings, towers, &c., and to prefer certain
types to others, it came about, that each man called perfect that
which he saw agree with the general idea he had formed of the
thing in question, and called imperfect that which he saw agree
less with his own preconceived type, even though it had evidently
been completed in accordance with the idea of its artificer.
This seems to be the only reason for calling natural phenomena,
which, indeed, are not made with human hands, perfect or
imperfect: for men are wont to form general ideas of things
natural, no less than of things artificial, and such ideas they
hold as types, believing that Nature (who they think does nothing
without an object) has them in view, and has set them as types
before herself.  Therefore, when they behold something in Nature,
which does not wholly conform to the preconceived type which they
have formed of the thing in question, they say that Nature has
fallen short or has blundered, and has left her work incomplete.
Thus we see that men are wont to style natural phenomena perfect
or imperfect rather from their own prejudices, than from true
knowledge of what they pronounce upon.

Now we showed in the Appendix to Part I., that Nature does
not work with an end in view.  For the eternal and infinite
Being, which we call God or Nature, acts by the same necessity as
that whereby it exists.  For we have shown, that by the same
necessity of its nature, whereby it exists, it likewise works (I.
xvi.).  The reason or cause why God or Nature exists, and the
reason why he acts, are one and the same.  Therefore, as he does
not exist for the sake of an end, so neither does he act for the
sake of an end; of his existence and of his action there is
neither origin nor end.  Wherefore, a cause which is called final
is nothing else but human desire, in so far as it is considered
as the origin or cause of anything.  For example, when we say
that to be inhabited is the final cause of this or that house, we
mean nothing more than that a man, conceiving the conveniences of
household life, had a desire to build a house.  Wherefore, the
being inhabited, in so far as it is regarded as a final cause, is
nothing else but this particular desire, which is really the
efficient cause; it is regarded as the primary cause, because
men are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires.  They
are, as I have often said already, conscious of their own actions
and appetites, but ignorant of the causes whereby they are
determined to any particular desire.  Therefore, the common
saying that Nature sometimes falls short, or blunders, and
produces things which are imperfect, I set down among the glosses
treated of in the Appendix to Part I.  Perfection and
imperfection, then, are in reality merely modes of thinking, or
notions which we form from a comparison among one another of
individuals of the same species; hence I said above (II. Def.
vi.), that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing.  For
we are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to one
genus, which is called the highest genus, namely, to the category
of Being, whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong.
Thus, in so far as we refer the individuals in nature to this
category, and comparing them one with another, find that some
possess more of being or reality than others, we, to this extent,
say that some are more perfect than others.  Again, in so far as
we attribute to them anything implying negation--as term, end,
infirmity, etc., we, to this extent, call them imperfect, because
they do not affect our mind so much as the things which we call
perfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency, or
because Nature has blundered.  For nothing lies within the scope
of a thing's nature, save that which follows from the necessity
of the nature of its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from
the necessity of the nature of its efficient cause necessarily
comes to pass.

As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive
quality in things regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of
thinking, or notions which we form from the comparison of things
one with another.  Thus one and the same thing can be at the same
time good, bad, and indifferent.  For instance, music is good for
him that is melancholy, bad for him that mourns; for him that is
deaf, it is neither good nor bad.

Nevertheless, though this be so, the terms should still be
retained.  For, inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a
type of human nature which we may hold in view, it will be useful
for us to retain the terms in question, in the sense I have
indicated.

In what follows, then, I shall mean by, "good" that, which we
certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the
type of human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by
"bad," that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in
approaching the said type.  Again, we shall that men are more
perfect, or more imperfect, in proportion as they approach more
or less nearly to the said type.  For it must be specially
remarked that, when I say that a man passes from a lesser to a
greater perfection, or vice versa, I do not mean that he is
changed from one essence or reality to another; for instance, a
horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a
man, as by being changed into an insect.  What I mean is, that we
conceive the thing's power of action, in so far as this is
understood by its nature, to be increased or diminished.  Lastly,
by perfection in general I shall, as I have said, mean reality--in
other words, each thing's essence, in so far as it exists, and
operates in a particular manner, and without paying any regard to
its duration.  For no given thing can be said to be more perfect,
because it has passed a longer time in existence.  The duration
of things cannot be determined by their essence, for the essence
of things involves no fixed and definite period of existence;
but everything, whether it be more perfect or less perfect, will
always be able to persist in existence with the same force
wherewith it began to exist; wherefore, in this respect, all
things are equal.


DEFINITIONS.

I.  By good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to
us.

II.  By evil I mean that which we certainly know to be a
hindrance
to us in the attainment of any good.

(Concerning these terms see the foregoing preface towards the
end.)

III.  Particular things I call contingent in so far as, while
regarding their essence only, we find nothing therein, which
necessarily asserts their existence or excludes it.

IV.  Particular things I call possible in so far as, while
regarding the causes whereby they must be produced, we know not,
whether such causes be determined for producing them.

(In I. xxxiii. note. i., I drew no distinction between
possible and contingent, because there was in that place no need
to distinguish them accurately.)

V.  By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man in
different directions, though they are of the same kind, such as
luxury and avarice, which are both species of love, and are
contraries, not by nature, but by accident.

VI.  What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing, future,
present, and past, I explained in III. xviii., notes. i. and ii.,
which see.

(But I should here also remark, that we can only distinctly
conceive distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit;
that is, all objects distant from us more than two hundred
feet, or whose distance from the place where we are exceeds that
which we can distinctly conceive, seem to be an equal distance
from us, and all in the same plane; so also objects, whose time
of existing is conceived as removed from the present by a longer
interval than we can distinctly conceive, seem to be all equally
distant from the present, and are set down, as it were, to the
same moment of time.)

VII.  By an end, for the sake of which we do something, I mean a
desire.

VIII.  By virtue (virtus) and power I mean the same thing; that
is (III. vii), virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is a
man's nature or essence, in so far as it has the power of
effecting what can only be understood by the laws of that nature.


AXIOM.


There is no individual thing in nature, than which there is
not another more powerful and strong.  Whatsoever thing be given,
there is something stronger whereby it can be destroyed.


PROPOSITIONS.

PROP. I.  No positive quality possessed by a false idea is
removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being
true.

Proof.--Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge
which inadequate ideas involve (II. xxxv.), nor have they any
positive quality on account of which they are called false (II.
xxxiii.); contrariwise, in so far as they are referred to God,
they are true (II. xxxii.).  Wherefore, if the positive quality
possessed by a false idea were removed by the presence of what is
true, in virtue of its being true, a true idea would then be
removed by itself, which (IV. iii.) is absurd.  Therefore, no
positive quality possessed by a false idea, &c.  Q.E.D.

Note.--This proposition is more clearly understood from II.
xvi. Coroll. ii.  For imagination is an idea, which indicates
rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature
of the external body; not indeed distinctly, but confusedly;
whence it comes to pass, that the mind is said to err.  For
instance, when we look at the sun, we conceive that it is distant
from us about two hundred feet; in this judgment we err, so long
as we are in ignorance of its true distance; when its true
distance is known, the error is removed, but not the imagination;
or, in other words, the idea of the sun, which only explains
tho nature of that luminary, in so far as the body is affected
thereby: wherefore, though we know the real distance, we shall
still nevertheless imagine the sun to be near us.  For, as we
said in II. xxxv. note, we do not imagine the sun to be so near
us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the
mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the
body is affected thereby.  Thus, when the rays of the sun falling
on the surface of water are reflected into our eyes, we imagine
the sun as if it were in the water, though we are aware of its
real position; and similarly other imaginations, wherein the
mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural disposition
of the body, or that its power of activity is increased or
diminished, are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish at
its presence.  It happens indeed that, when we mistakenly fear an
evil, the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings; but the
contrary also happens, namely, that we fear an evil which will
certainly come, and our fear vanishes when we hear false tidings;
thus imaginations do not vanish at the presence of the truth,
in virtue of its being true, but because other imaginations,
stronger than the first, supervene and exclude the present
existence of that which we imagined, as I have shown in II. xvii.

PROP. II.  We are only passive, in so far as we are apart of
Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts.

Proof.--We are said to be passive, when something arises in
us, whereof we are only a partial cause (III. Def. ii.), that is
(III. Def. i.), something which cannot be deduced solely from the
laws of our nature.  We are passive therefore, in so far as we
are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without
other parts.  Q.E.D.

PROP. III.  The force whereby a man persists in existing is
limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external
causes.

Proof.--This is evident from the axiom of this part.  For,
when man is given, there is something else--say A--more powerful;
when A is given, there is something else--say B--more powerful than
A, and so on to infinity; thus the power of man is limited by
the power of some other thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the
power of external causes.  Q.E.D.

PROP. IV.  It is impossible, that man should not be a part of
Nature, or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes,
save such as can be understood through his nature only as their
adequate cause.

Proof.--The power, whereby each particular thing, and
consequently man, preserves his being, is the power of God or of
Nature (I. xxiv. Coroll.); not in so far as it is infinite, but
in so far as it can be explained by the actual human essence
(III. vii.).  Thus the power of man, in so far as it is explained
through his own actual essence, is a part of the infinite power
of God or Nature, in other words, of the essence thereof (I.
xxxiv.).  This was our first point.  Again, if it were possible,
that man should undergo no changes save such as can be understood
solely through the nature of man, it would follow that he would
not be able to die, but would always necessarily exist; this
would be the necessary consequence of a cause whose power was
either finite or infinite; namely, either of man's power only,
inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself all
changes which could spring from external causes; or of the
infinite power of Nature, whereby all individual things would be
so ordered, that man should be incapable of undergoing any
changes save such as tended towards his own preservation.  But
the first alternative is absurd (by the last Prop., the proof of
which is universal, and can be applied to all individual things).
Therefore, if it be possible, that man should not be capable of
undergoing any changes, save such as can be explained solely
through his own nature, and consequently that he must always (as
we have shown) necessarily exist; such a result must follow from
the infinite power of God, and consequently (I. xvi.) from the
necessity of the divine nature, in so far as it is regarded as
affected by the idea of any given man, the whole order of nature
as conceived under the attributes of extension and thought must
be deducible.  It would therefore follow (I. xxi.) that man is
infinite, which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd.  It
is, therefore, impossible, that man should not undergo any
changes save those whereof he is the adequate cause.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows, that man is necessarily always a
prey to his passions, that he follows and obeys the general order
of nature, and that he accommodates himself thereto, as much as
the nature of things demands.

PROP. V.  The power and increase of every passion, and its
persistence in existing are not defined by the power, whereby we
ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but by the power of
an external cause compared with our own.

Proof.--The essence of a passion cannot be explained through
our essence alone (III. Deff. i. and ii.), that is (III. vii.),
the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power, whereby we
ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but (as is shown in
II. xvi.) must necessarily be defined by the power of an external
cause compared with our own.  Q.E.D.

PROP. VI.  The force of any passion or emotion can overcome the
rest of a man's activities or power, so that the emotion becomes
obstinately fixed to him.

Proof.--The force and increase of any passion and its
persistence in existing are defined by the power of an external
cause compared with our own (by the foregoing Prop.); therefore
(IV. iii.) it can overcome a man's power, &e.  Q.E.D.

PROP. VII.  An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by
another emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for
controlling emotion.

Proof.--Emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is
an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less
force of existence than before (cf. the general Definition of the
Emotions at the end of Part III.).  When, therefore, the mind is
assailed by any emotion, the body is at the same time affected
with a modification whereby its power of activity is increased or
diminished.  Now this modification of the body (IV. v.) receives
from its cause the force for persistence in its being; which
force can only be checked or destroyed by a bodily cause (II.
vi.), in virtue of the body being affected with a modification
contrary to (III. v.) and stronger than itself (IV. Ax.);
wherefore (II. xii.) the mind is affected by the idea of a
modification contrary to, and stronger than the former
modification, in other words, (by the general definition of the
emotions) the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to and
stronger than the former emotion, which will exclude or destroy
the existence of the former emotion; thus an emotion cannot be
destroyed nor controlled except by a contrary and stronger
emotion.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--An emotion, in so far as it is referred to the
mind, can only be controlled or destroyed through an idea of a
modification of the body contrary to, and stronger than, that
which we are undergoing.  For the emotion which we undergo can
only be checked or destroyed by an emotion contrary to, and
stronger than, itself, in other words, (by the general Definition
of the Emotions) only by an idea of a modification of the body
contrary to, and stronger than, the modification which we
undergo.

PROP. VIII.  The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but
the emotions of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious
thereof.

Proof.--We call a thing good or evil, when it is of service or
the reverse in preserving our being (IV. Deff. i. and ii.), that
is (III. vii.), when it increases or diminishes, helps or
hinders, our power of activity.  Thus, in so far as we perceive
that a thing affects us with pleasure or pain, we call it good or
evil; wherefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else
but the idea of the pleasure or pain, which necessarily follows
from that pleasurable or painful emotion (II. xxii.).  But this
idea is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is united
to body (II. xxi.); that is, there is no real distinction
between this idea and the emotion or idea of the modification of
the body, save in conception only.  Therefore the knowledge of
good and evil is nothing else but the emotion, in so far as we
are conscious thereof.  Q.E.D.

PROP. IX.  An emotion, whereof we conceive the cause to be with
us at the present time, is stronger than if we did not conceive
the cause to be with us.

Proof.--Imagination or conception is the idea, by which the
mind regards a thing as present (II. xvii. note), but which
indicates the disposition of the mind rather than the nature of
the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.).  An emotion is
therefore a conception, in so far as it indicates the disposition
of the body.  But a conception (by II. xvii.) is stronger, so
long as we conceive nothing which excludes the present existence
of the external object; wherefore an emotion is also stronger or
more intense, when we conceive the cause to be with us at the
present time, than when we do not conceive the cause to be with
us.  Q.E.D.

Note.--When I said above in III. xviii. that we are affected
by the image of what is past or future with the same emotion as
if the thing conceived were present, I expressly stated, that
this is only true in so far as we look solely to the image of the
thing in question itself; for the thing's nature is unchanged,
whether we have conceived it or not; I did not deny that the
image becomes weaker, when we regard as present to us other
things which exclude the present existence of the future object:
I did not expressly call attention to the fact, because I
purposed to treat of the strength of the emotions in this part of
my work.

Corollary.--The image of something past or future, that is, of
a thing which we regard as in relation to time past or time
future, to the exclusion of time present, is, when other
conditions are equal, weaker than the image of something present;
consequently an emotion felt towards what is past or future is
less intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion felt
towards something present.

PROP. X.  Towards something future, which we conceive as close at
hand, we are affected more intensely, than if we conceive that
its time for existence is separated from the present by a longer
interval; so too by the remembrance of what we conceive to have
not long passed away we are affected more intensely, than if we
conceive that it has long passed away.

Proof.--In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand, or
not long passed away, we conceive that which excludes the
presence of the object less, than if its period of future
existence were more distant from the present, or if it had long
passed away (this is obvious) therefore (by the foregoing Prop.)
we are, so far, more intensely affected towards it.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--From the remarks made in Def. vi. of this part it
follows that, if objects are separated from the present by a
longer period than we can define in conception, though their
dates of occurrence be widely separated one from the other, they
all affect us equally faintly.

PROP. XI.  An emotion towards that which we conceive as necessary
is, when other conditions are equal, more intense than an emotion
towards that which possible, or contingent, or non--necessary.

Proof.--In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary, we,
to that extent, affirm its existence; on the other hand we deny
a thing's existence, in so far as we conceive it not to be
necessary (I. xxxiii. note. i.); wherefore (IV. ix.) an emotion
towards that which is necessary is, other conditions being equal,
more intense than an emotion that which is non--necessary.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XII.  An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to
exist at the present time, and which we conceive as possible, is
more intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion
towards a thing contingent.

Proof.--In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are
affected by the conception of some further thing, which would
assert the existence of the former (IV. Def. iii.); but, on the
other hand, we (by hypothesis) conceive certain things, which
exclude its present existence.  But, in so far as we conceive a
thing to be possible in the future, we there by conceive things
which assert its existence (IV. iv.), that is (III. xviii.),
things which promote hope or fear: wherefore an emotion towards
something possible is more vehement.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to
exist in the present, and which we conceive as contingent, is far
fainter, than if we conceive the thing to be present with us.

Proof.--Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to exist,
is more intense than it would be, if we conceived the thing as
future (IV. ix. Coroll.), and is much more vehement, than if the
future time be conceived as far distant from the present (IV.
x.).  Therefore an emotion towards a thing, whose period of
existence we conceive to be far distant from the present, is far
fainter, than if we conceive the thing as present; it is,
nevertheless, more intense, than if we conceived the thing as
contingent, wherefore an emotion towards a thing, which we regard
as contingent, will be far fainter, than if we conceived the
thing to be present with us.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XIII.  Emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know
not to exist in the present, is, other conditions being equal,
fainter than an emotion towards a thing past.

Proof.--In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are
not affected by the image of any other thing, which asserts the
existence of the said thing (IV. Def. iii.), but, on the other
hand (by hypothesis), we conceive certain things excluding its
present existence.  But, in so far as we conceive it in relation
to time past, we are assumed to conceive something, which recalls
the thing to memory, or excites the image thereof (II. xviii. and
note), which is so far the same as regarding it as present (II.
xvii. Coroll.).  Therefore (IV. ix.) an emotion towards a thing
contingent, which we know does not exist in the present, is
fainter, other conditions being equal, than an emotion towards a
thing past.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XIV.  A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any
emotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as it is
considered as an emotion.

Proof.--An emotion is an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its
body a greater or less force of existing than before (by the
general Definition of the Emotions); therefore it has no
positive quality, which can be destroyed by the presence of what
is true; consequently the knowledge of good and evil cannot, by
virtue of being true, restrain any emotion.  But, in so far as
such knowledge is an emotion (IV. viii.) if it have more strength
for restraining emotion, it will to that extent be able to
restrain the given emotion.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XV.  Desire arising from the knowledge of good and bad can
be quenched or checked by many of the other desires arising from
the emotions whereby we are assailed.

Proof.--From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as
it is an emotion, necessarily arises desire (Def. of the
Emotions, i.), the strength of which is proportioned to the
strength of the emotion wherefrom it arises (III. xxxvii.).  But,
inasmuch as this desire arises (by hypothesis) from the fact of
our truly understanding anything, it follows that it is also
present with us, in so far as we are active (III. i.), and must
therefore be understood through our essence only (III. Def. ii.);
consequently (III. vii.) its force and increase can be defined
solely by human power.  Again, the desires arising from the
emotions whereby we are assailed are stronger, in proportion as
the said emotions are more vehement; wherefore their force and
increase must be defined solely by the power of external causes,
which, when compared with our own power, indefinitely surpass it
(IV. iii.); hence the desires arising from like emotions may be
more vehement, than the desire which arises from a true knowledge
of good and evil, and may, consequently, control or quench it.
Q.E.D.

PROP. XVI.  Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil,
in so far as such knowledge regards what is future, may be more
easily controlled or quenched, than the desire for what is
agreeable at the present moment.

Proof.--Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive as future,
is fainter than emotion towards a thing that is present (IV. ix.
Coroll.).  But desire, which arises from the true knowledge of
good and evil, though it be concerned with things which are good
at the moment, can be quenched or controlled by any headstrong
desire (by the last Prop., the proof whereof is of universal
application).  Wherefore desire arising from such knowledge, when
concerned with the future, can be more easily controlled or
quenched, &c.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XVII.  Desire arising from the true knowledge of good and
evil, in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what is
contingent, can be controlled far more easily still, than desire
for things that are present.

Proof.--This Prop. is proved in the same way as the last Prop.
from IV. xii. Coroll.

Note.--I think I have now shown the reason, why men are moved
by opinion more readily than by true reason, why it is that the
true knowledge of good and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul,
and often yields to every kind of passion.  This state of things
gave rise to the exclamation of the poet:[12]----
"The better path I gaze at and approve,
The worse--I follow."

[12] Ov. Met. vii.20, "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor."


Ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind,
when he says, "He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow."  I
have not written the above with the object of drawing the
conclusion, that ignorance is more excellent than knowledge, or
that a wise man is on a par with a fool in controlling his
emotions, but because it is necessary to know the power and the
infirmity of our nature, before we can determine what reason can
do in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her power.  I
have said, that in the present part I shall merely treat of human
infirmity.  The power of reason over the emotions I have settled
to treat separately.

PROP. XVIII.  Desire arising from pleasure is, other conditions
being equal, stronger than desire arising from pain.

Proof.--Desire is the essence of a man (Def. of the Emotions,
i.), that is, the endeavour whereby a man endeavours to persist
in his own being.  Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is, by
the fact of pleasure being felt, increased or helped; on the
contrary, desire arising from pain is, by the fact of pain being
felt, diminished or hindered; hence the force of desire arising
from pleasure must be defined by human power together with the
power of an external cause, whereas desire arising from pain must
be defined by human power only.  Thus the former is the stronger
of the two.  Q.E.D.

Note.--In these few remarks I have explained the causes of
human infirmity and inconstancy, and shown why men do not abide
by the precepts of reason.  It now remains for me to show what
course is marked out for us by reason, which of the emotions are
in harmony with the rules of human reason, and which of them are
contrary thereto.  But, before I begin to prove my Propositions
in detailed geometrical fashion, it is advisable to sketch them
briefly in advance, so that everyone may more readily grasp my
meaning.

As reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands,
that every man should love himself, should seek that which is
useful to him--I mean, that which is really useful to him, should
desire everything which really brings man to greater perfection,
and should, each for himself, endeavour as far as he can to
preserve his own being.  This is as necessarily true, as that a
whole is greater than its part.  (Cf. III. iv.)

Again, as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance
with the laws of one's own nature (IV. Def. viii.), and as no one
endeavours to preserve his own being, except in accordance with
the laws of his own nature, it follows, first, that the
foundation of virtue is the endeavour to preserve one's own
being, and that happiness consists in man's power of preserving
his own being; secondly, that virtue is to be desired for its
own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful
to us, for the sake of which we should desire it; thirdly and
lastly, that suicides are weak--minded, and are overcome by
external causes repugnant to their nature.  Further, it follows
from Postulate iv., Part II., that we can never arrive at doing
without all external things for the preservation of our being or
living, so as to have no relations with things which are outside
ourselves.  Again, if we consider our mind, we see that our
intellect would be more imperfect, if mind were alone, and could
understand nothing besides itself.  There are, then, many things
outside ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, therefore, to
be desired.  Of such none can be discerned more excellent, than
those which are in entire agreement with our nature.  For if, for
example, two individuals of entirely the same nature are united,
they form a combination twice as powerful as either of them
singly.

Therefore, to man there is nothing more useful than
man--nothing, I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being
can be wished for by men, than that all should so in all points
agree, that the minds and bodies of all should form, as it were,
one single mind and one single body, and that all should, with
one consent, as far as they are able, endeavour to preserve their
being, and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all.
Hence, men who are governed by reason--that is, who seek what is
useful to them in accordance with reason, desire for themselves
nothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind,
and, consequently, are just, faithful, and honourable in their
conduct.

Such are the dictates of reason, which I purposed thus
briefly to indicate, before beginning to prove them in greater
detail.  I have taken this course, in order, if possible, to gain
the attention of those who believe, that the principle that every
man is bound to seek what is useful for himself is the foundation
of impiety, rather than of piety and virtue.

Therefore, after briefly showing that the contrary is the
case, I go on to prove it by the same method, as that whereby I
have hitherto proceeded.

PROP. XIX.  Every man, by the laws of his nature, necessarily
desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad.

Proof.--The knowledge of good and evil is (IV. viii.) the
emotion of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious
thereof; therefore, every man necessarily desires what he thinks
good, and shrinks from what he thinks bad.  Now this appetite is
nothing else but man's nature or essence (Cf. the Definition of
Appetite, III. ix. note, and Def. of the Emotions, i.).
Therefore, every man, solely by the laws of his nature, desires
the one, and shrinks from the other, &c.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XX.  The more every man endeavours, and is able to seek
what is useful to him--in other words, to preserve his own
being--the more is he endowed with virtue; on the contrary, in
proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him, that
is, to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power.

Proof.--Virtue is human power, which is defined solely by
man's essence (IV. Def. viii.), that is, which is defined solely
by the endeavour made by man to persist in his own being.
Wherefore, the more a man endeavours, and is able to preserve his
own being, the more is he endowed with virtue, and, consequently
(III. iv. and vi.), in so far as a man neglects to preserve his
own being, he is wanting in power.  Q.E.D.

Note.--No one, therefore, neglects seeking his own good, or
preserving his own being, unless he be overcome by causes
external and foreign to his nature.  No one, I say, from the
necessity of his own nature, or otherwise than under compulsion
from external causes, shrinks from food, or kills himself: which
latter may be done in a variety of ways.  A man, for instance,
kills himself under the compulsion of another man, who twists
round his right hand, wherewith he happened to have taken up a
sword, and forces him to turn the blade against his own heart;
or, again, he may be compelled, like Seneca, by a tyrant's
command, to open his own veins--that is, to escape a greater evil
by incurring, a lesser; or, lastly, latent external causes may
so disorder his imagination, and so affect his body, that it may
assume a nature contrary to its former one, and whereof the idea
cannot exist in the mind (III. x.) But that a man, from the
necessity of his own nature, should endeavour to become
non--existent, is as impossible as that something should be made
out of nothing, as everyone will see for himself, after a little
reflection.

PROP. XXI.  No one can desire to be blessed, to act rightly, and
to live rightly, without at the same time wishing to be, act, and
to live--in other words, to actually exist.

Proof.--The proof of this proposition, or rather the
proposition itself, is self--evident, and is also plain from the
definition of desire.  For the desire of living, acting, &c.,
blessedly or rightly, is (Def. of the Emotions, i.) the essence
of man--that is (III. vii.), the endeavour made by everyone to
preserve his own being.  Therefore, no one can desire, &c.
Q.E.D.

PROP. XXII.  No virtue can be conceived as prior to this
endeavour to preserve one's own being.

Proof.--The effort for self--preservation is the essence of a
thing (III. vii.); therefore, if any virtue could be conceived
as prior thereto, the essence of a thing would have to be
conceived as prior to itself, which is obviously absurd.
Therefore no virtue, &c.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--The effort for self--preservation is the first and
only foundation of virtue.  For prior to this principle nothing
can be conceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived.

PROP. XXIII.  Man, in so far as he is determined to a particular
action because he has inadequate ideas, cannot be absolutely said
to act in obedience to virtue; he can only be so described, in
so far as he is determined for the action because he understands.

Proof.--In so far as a man is determined to an action through
having inadequate ideas, he is passive (III. i.), that is (III.
Deff. i., and iii.), he does something, which cannot be perceived
solely through his essence, that is (by IV. Def. viii.), which
does not follow from his virtue.  But, in so far as he is
determined for an action because he understands, he is active;
that is, he does something, which is perceived through his
essence alone, or which adequately follows from his virtue.
Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIV.  To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is in us
the same thing as to act, to live, or to preserve one's being
(these three terms are identical in meaning) in accordance with
the dictates of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to
one's self.

Proof.--To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing
else but to act according to the laws of one's own nature.  But
we only act, in so far as we understand (III. iii.): therefore
to act in obedience to virtue is in us nothing else but to act,
to live, or to preserve one's being in obedience to reason, and
that on the basis of seeking what is useful for us (IV. xxii.
Coroll.).  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXV.  No one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of
anything else.

Proof.--The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to
persist in its being, is defined solely by the essence of the
thing itself (III. vii.); from this alone, and not from the
essence of anything else, it necessarily follows (III. vi.) that
everyone endeavours to preserve his being.  Moreover, this
proposition is plain from IV. xxii. Coroll., for if a man should
endeavour to preserve his being for the sake of anything else,
the last--named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue,
which, by the foregoing corollary, is absurd.  Therefore no one,
&c.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVI.  Whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is
nothing further than to understand; neither does the mind, in so
far as it makes use of reason, judge anything to be useful to it,
save such things as are conducive to understanding.

Proof.--The effort for self--preservation is nothing else but
the essence of the thing in question (III. vii.), which, in so
far as it exists such as it is, is conceived to have force for
continuing in existence (III. vi.) and doing such things as
necessarily follow from its given nature (see the Def. of
Appetite, III. ix. note).  But the essence of reason is nought
else but our mind, in so far as it clearly and distinctly
understands (see the definition in II. xl. note. ii.); therefore
(II. xl.) whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is
nothing else but to understand.  Again, since this effort of the
mind wherewith the mind endeavours, in so far as it reasons, to
preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding; this
effort at understanding is (IV. xxii. Coroll.) the first and
single basis of virtue, nor shall we endeavour to understand
things for the sake of any ulterior object (IV. xxv.); on the
other hand, the mind, in so far as it reasons, will not be able
to conceive any good for itself, save such things as are
conducive to understanding.

PROP. XXVII.  We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, save
such things as really conduce to understanding, or such as are
able to hinder us from understanding.

Proof.--The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing
beyond understanding, and judges nothing to be useful to itself,
save such things as conduce to understanding (by the foregoing
Prop.).  But the mind (II. xli., xliii. and note) cannot possess
certainty concerning anything, except in so far as it has
adequate ideas, or (what by II. xl. note, is the same thing) in
so far as it reasons.  Therefore we know nothing to be good or
evil save such things as really conduce, &c.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVIII.  The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God,
and the mind's highest virtue is to know God.

Proof.--The mind is not capable of understanding anything
higher than God, that is (I. Def. vi.), than a Being absolutely
infinite, and without which (I. xv.) nothing can either be or be
conceived; therefore (IV. xxvi. and xxvii.), the mind's highest
utility or (IV. Def. i.) good is the knowledge of God.  Again,
the mind is active, only in so far as it understands, and only to
the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously.  The
mind's absolute virtue is therefore to understand.  Now, as we
have already shown, the highest that the mind can understand is
God; therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to understand
or to know God.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIX.  No individual thing, which is entirely different
from our own nature, can help or check our power of activity, and
absolutely nothing can do us good or harm, unless it has
something in common with our nature.

Proof.--The power of every individual thing, and consequently
the power of man, whereby he exists and operates, can only be
determined by an individual thing (I. xxviii.), whose nature (II.
vi.) must be understood through the same nature as that, through
which human nature is conceived.  Therefore our power of
activity, however it be conceived, can be determined and
consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other
individual thing, which has something in common with us, but not
by the power of anything, of which the nature is entirely
different from our own; and since we call good or evil that
which is the cause of pleasure or pain (IV. viii.), that is (III.
xi. note), which increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our
power of activity; therefore, that which is entirely different
from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXX.  A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality
which it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us in
so far as it is contrary to our nature.

Proof.--We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV.
viii.), that is (by the Def., which see in III. xi. note), when
it diminishes or checks our power of action.  Therefore, if
anything were bad for us through that quality which it has in
common with our nature, it would be able itself to diminish or
check that which it has in common with our nature, which (III.
iv.) is absurd.  Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through that
quality which it has in common with us, but, on the other hand,
in so far as it is bad for us, that is (as we have just shown),
in so far as it can diminish or check our power of action, it is
contrary to our nature.
Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXI.  In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature,
it is necessarily good.

Proof.--In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it
cannot be bad for it.  It will therefore necessarily be either
good or indifferent.  If it be assumed that it be neither good
nor bad, nothing will follow from its nature (IV. Def. i.), which
tends to the preservation of our nature, that is (by the
hypothesis), which tends to the preservation of the thing itself;
but this (III. vi.) is absurd; therefore, in so far as a thing
is in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows, that, in proportion as a thing
is in harmony with our nature, so is it more useful or better for
us, and vice versa, in proportion as a thing is more useful for
us, so is it more in harmony with our nature.  For, in so far as
it is not in harmony with our nature, it will necessarily be
different therefrom or contrary thereto.  If different, it can
neither be good nor bad (IV. xxix.); if contrary, it will be
contrary to that which is in harmony with our nature, that is,
contrary to what is good--in short, bad.  Nothing, therefore, can
be good, except in so far as it is in harmony with our nature;
and hence a thing is useful, in proportion as it is in harmony
with our nature, and vice versa.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXII.  In so far as men are a prey to passion, they
cannot, in that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony.

Proof.--Things, which are said to be in harmony naturally, are
understood to agree in power (III. vii.), not in want of power or
negation, and consequently not in passion (III. iii. note);
wherefore men, in so far as they are a prey to their passions,
cannot be said to be naturally in harmony.  Q.E.D.

Note.--This is also self--evident; for, if we say that white
and black only agree in the fact that neither is red, we
absolutely affirm that the do not agree in any respect.  So, if
we say that a man and a stone only agree in the fact that both
are finite--wanting in power, not existing by the necessity of
their own nature, or, lastly, indefinitely surpassed by the power
of external causes--we should certainly affirm that a man and a
stone are in no respect alike; therefore, things which agree
only in negation, or in qualities which neither possess, really
agree in no respect.

PROP. XXXIII.  Men can differ in nature, in so far as they are
assailed by those emotions, which are passions, or passive states;
and to this extent one and the same man is variable and
inconstant.

Proof.--The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained
 solely through our essence or nature (III. Deff. i., ii.), but
it must be defined by the power, that is (III. vii.), by the
nature of external causes in comparison with our own; hence it
follows, that there are as many kinds of each emotion as there
are external objects whereby we are affected (III. lvi.), and
that men may be differently affected by one and the same
object (III. li.), and to this extent differ in nature; lastly,
that one and the same man may be differently affected towards
the same object, and may therefore be variable and
inconstant.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXIV.  In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are
passions, they can be contrary one to another.

Proof.--A man, for instance Peter, can be the cause of Paul's
feeling pain, because he (Peter) possesses something similar to
that which Paul hates (III. xvi.), or because Peter has sole
possession of a thing which Paul also loves (III. xxxii. and
note), or for other causes (of which the chief are enumerated in
III. lv. note); it may therefore happen that Paul should hate
Peter (Def. of Emotions, vii.), consequently it may easily happen
also, that Peter should hate Paul in return, and that each should
endeavour to do the other an injury, (III. xxxix.), that is (IV.
xxx.), that they should be contrary one to another.  But the
emotion of pain is always a passion or passive state (III. lix.);
hence men, in so far as they are assailed by emotions which are
passions, can be contrary one to another.  Q.E.D.

Note.--I said that Paul may hate Peter, because he conceives
that Peter possesses something which he (Paul) also loves; from
this it seems, at first sight, to follow, that these two men,
through both loving the same thing, and, consequently, through
agreement of their respective natures, stand in one another's way;
if this were so, Props. xxx. and xxxi. of this part would be
untrue.  But if we give the matter our unbiased attention, we
shall see that the discrepancy vanishes.  For the two men are not
in one another's way in virtue of the agreement of their natures,
that is, through both loving the same thing, but in virtue of one
differing from the other.  For, in so far as each loves the same
thing, the love of each is fostered thereby (III. xxxi.), that is
(Def. of the Emotions, vi.) the pleasure of each is fostered
thereby.  Wherefore it is far from being the case, that they are
at variance through both loving the same thing, and through the
agreement in their natures.  The cause for their opposition lies,
as I have said, solely in the fact that they are assumed to
differ.  For we assume that Peter has the idea of the loved
object as already in his possession, while Paul has the idea of
the loved object as lost.  Hence the one man will be affected
with pleasure, the other will be affected with pain, and thus
they will be at variance one with another.  We can easily show in
like manner, that all other causes of hatred depend solely on
differences, and not on the agreement between men's natures.

PROP. XXXV.  In so far only as men live in obedience to reason,
do they always necessarily agree in nature.

Proof.--In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are
passions, they can be different in nature (IV. xxxiii.), and at
variance one with another.  But men are only said to be active,
in so far as they act in obedience to reason (III. iii.);
therefore, what so ever follows from human nature in so far as it
is defined by reason must (III. Def. ii.) be understood solely
through human nature as its proximate cause.  But, since every
man by the laws of his nature desires that which he deems good,
and endeavours to remove that which he deems bad (IV. xix.); and
further, since that which we, in accordance with reason, deem
good or bad, necessarily is good or bad (II. xli.); it follows
that men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason,
necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for human
nature, and consequently for each individual man (IV. xxxi.
Coroll.); in other words, such things as are in harmony with
each man's nature.  Therefore, men in so far as they live in
obedience to reason, necessarily live always in harmony one with
another.  Q.E.D.

Corollary I.--There is no individual thing in nature, which is
more useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason.
For that thing is to man most useful, which is most in harmony
with his nature (IV. xxxi. Coroll.); that is, obviously, man.
But man acts absolutely according to the laws of his nature, when
he lives in obedience to reason (III. Def. ii.), and to this
extent only is always necessarily in harmony with the nature of
another man (by the last Prop.); wherefore among individual
things nothing is more useful to man, than a man who lives in
obedience to reason.  Q.E.D.

Corollary II.--As every man seeks most that which is useful to
him, so are men most useful one to another.  For the more a man
seeks what is useful to him and endeavours to preserve himself,
the more is he endowed with virtue (IV. xx.), or, what is the
same thing (IV. Def. viii.), the more is he endowed with power to
act according to the laws of his own nature, that is to live in
obedience to reason.  But men are most in natural harmony, when
they live in obedience to reason (by the last Prop.); therefore
(by the foregoing Coroll.) men will be most useful one to
another, when each seeks most that which is useful to him.
Q.E.D.

Note.--What we have just shown is attested by experience so
conspicuously, that it is in the mouth of nearly everyone: "Man
is to man a God."  Yet it rarely happens that men live in
obedience to reason, for things are so ordered among them, that
they are generally envious and troublesome one to another.
Nevertheless they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life, so
that the definition of man as a social animal has met with
general assent; in fact, men do derive from social life much
more convenience than injury.  Let satirists then laugh their
fill at human affairs, let theologians rail, and let misanthropes
praise to their utmost the life of untutored rusticity, let them
heap contempt on men and praises on beasts; when all is said,
they will find that men can provide for their wants much more
easily by mutual help, and that only by uniting their forces can
they escape from the dangers that on every side beset them: not
to say how much more excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is,
to study the actions of men than the actions of beasts.  But I
will treat of this more at length elsewhere.

PROP. XXXVI.  The highest good of those who follow virtue is
common to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein.

Proof.--To act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason
(IV. xxiv.), and whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience to
reason is to understand (IV. xxvi.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the
highest good for those who follow after virtue is to know God;
that is (II. xlvii. and note) a good which is common to all and
can be possessed by all men equally, in so far as they are of
the same nature.  Q.E.D.

Note.--Someone may ask how it would be, if the highest good of
those who follow after virtue were not common to all?  Would it
not then follow, as above (IV. xxxiv.), that men living in
obedience to reason, that is (IV. xxxv.), men in so far as they
agree in nature, would be at variance one with another?  To such
an inquiry, I make answer, that it follows not accidentally but
from the very nature of reason, that main's highest good is
common to all, inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence of
man, in so far as defined by reason; and that a man could
neither be, nor be conceived without the power of taking pleasure
in this highest good.  For it belongs to the essence of the human
mind (II. xlvii.), to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal
and infinite essence of God.

PROP. XXXVII.  The good which every man, who follows after
virtue, desires for himself he will also desire for other men,
and so much the more, in proportion as he has a greater knowledge
of God.

Proof.--Men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason,
are most useful to their fellow men (IV. xxxv; Coroll. i.);
therefore (IV. xix.), we shall in obedience to reason necessarily
endeavour to bring about that men should live in obedience to
reason.  But the good which every man, in so far as he is guided
by reason, or, in other words, follows after virtue, desires for
himself, is to understand (IV. xxvi.); wherefore the good, which
each follower of virtue seeks for himself, he will desire also
for others.  Again, desire, in so far as it is referred to the
mind, is the very essence of the mind (Def. of the Emotions, i.);
now the essence of the mind consists in knowledge (II. xi.),
which involves the knowledge of God (II. xlvii.), and without it
(I. xv.), can neither be, nor be conceived; therefore, in
proportion as the mind's essence involves a greater knowledge of
God, so also will be greater the desire of the follower of
virtue, that other men should possess that which he seeks as good
for himself.  Q.E.D.

Another Proof.--The good, which a man desires for himself and
loves, he will love more constantly, if he sees that others love
it also (III. xxxi.); he will therefore endeavour that others
should love it also; and as the good in question is common to
all, and therefore all can rejoice therein, he will endeavour,
for the same reason, to bring about that all should rejoice
therein, and this he will do the more (III. xxxvii.), in
proportion as his own enjoyment of the good is greater.

Note I.--He who, guided by emotion only, endeavours to cause
others to love what he loves himself, and to make the rest of the
world live according to his own fancy, acts solely by impulse,
and is, therefore, hateful, especially, to those who take delight
in something different, and accordingly study and, by similar
impulse, endeavour, to make men live in accordance with what
pleases themselves.  Again, as the highest good sought by men
under the guidance of emotion is often such, that it can only be
possessed by a single individual, it follows that those who love
it are not consistent in their intentions, but, while they
delight to sing its praises, fear to be believed.  But he, who
endeavours to lead men by reason, does not act by impulse but
courteously and kindly, and his intention is always consistent.
Again, whatsoever we desire and do, whereof we are the cause in
so far as we possess the idea of God, or know God, I set down to
Religion.  The desire of well--doing, which is engendered by a
life according to reason, I call piety.  Further, the desire,
whereby a man living according to reason is bound to associate
others with himself in friendship, I call honour[13]; by
honourable I mean that which is praised by men living according
to reason, and by base I mean that which is repugnant to the
gaining of friendship.  I have also shown in addition what are
the foundations of a state; and the difference between true
virtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what I have
said; namely, that true virtue is nothing else but living in
accordance with reason; while infirmity is nothing else but
man's allowing himself to be led by things which are external to
himself, and to be by them determined to act in a manner demanded
by the general disposition of things rather than by his own
nature considered solely in itself.

[13] Honestas


Such are the matters which I engaged to prove in Prop. xviii.
of this Part, whereby it is plain that the law against the
slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition
and womanish pity than on sound reason.  The rational quest of
what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of
associating ourselves with our fellow men, but not with beasts,
or things, whose nature is different from our own; we have the
same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us.
Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men
have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men.
Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that we
may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please,
treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature
is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from
human emotions (III. lvii. note).  It remains for me to explain
what I mean by just and unjust, sin and merit.  On these points
see the following note.

Note II.--In the Appendix to Part I. I undertook to explain
praise and blame, merit and sin, justice and injustice.

Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in III. xxix. note:
the time has now come to treat of the remaining terms.  But I
must first say a few words concerning man in the state of nature
and in society.

Every man exists by sovereign natural right, and,
consequently, by sovereign natural right performs those actions
which follow from the necessity of his own nature; therefore by
sovereign natural right every man judges what is good and what is
bad, takes care of his own advantage according to his own
disposition (IV. xix. and IV. xx.), avenges the wrongs done to
him (III. xl. Coroll. ii.), and endeavours to preserve that which
he loves and to destroy that which he hates (III. xxviii.).  Now,
if men lived under the guidance of reason, everyone would remain
in possession of this his right, without any injury being done to
his neighbour (IV. xxxv. Coroll. i.).  But seeing that they are a
prey to their emotions, which far surpass human power or virtue
(IV. vi.), they are often drawn in different directions, and
being at variance one with another (IV. xxxiii. xxxiv.), stand in
need of mutual help (IV. xxxv. note).  Wherefore, in order that
men may live together in harmony, and may aid one another, it is
necessary that they should forego their natural right, and, for
the sake of security, refrain from all actions which can injure
their fellow--men.  The way in which this end can be obtained, so
that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions (IV. iv.
Coroll.), inconstant, and diverse, should be able to render each
other mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is evident from IV.
vii. and III. xxxix.  It is there shown, that an emotion can only
be restrained by an emotion stronger than, and contrary to
itself, and that men avoid inflicting injury through fear of
incurring a greater injury themselves.

On this law society can be established, so long as it keeps
in its own hand the right, possessed by everyone, of avenging
injury, and pronouncing on good and evil; and provided it also
possesses the power to lay down a general rule of conduct, and to
pass laws sanctioned, not by reason, which is powerless in
restraining emotion, but by threats (IV. xvii. note).  Such a
society established with laws and the power of preserving itself
is called a State, while those who live under its protection are
called citizens.  We may readily understand that there is in the
state of nature nothing, which by universal consent is pronounced
good or bad; for in the state of nature everyone thinks solely
of his own advantage, and according to his disposition, with
reference only to his individual advantage, decides what is good
or bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself.

In the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable; it
can only exist in a state, where good and evil are pronounced on
by common consent, and where everyone is bound to obey the State
authority.  Sin, then, is nothing else but disobedience, which is
therefore punished by the right of the State only.  Obedience, on
the other hand, is set down as merit, inasmuch as a man is
thought worthy of merit, if he takes delight in the advantages
which a State provides.

Again, in the state of nature, no one is by common consent
master of anything, nor is there anything in nature, which can be
said to belong to one man rather than another: all things are
common to all.  Hence, in the state of nature, we can conceive no
wish to render to every man his own, or to deprive a man of that
which belongs to him; in other words, there is nothing in the
state of nature answering to justice and injustice.  Such ideas
are only possible in a social state, when it is decreed by common
consent what belongs to one man and what to another.

From all these considerations it is evident, that justice and
injustice, sin and merit, are extrinsic ideas, and not attributes
which display the nature of the mind.  But I have said enough.

PROP. XXXVIII.  Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to
render it capable of being affected in an increased number of
ways, or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of
ways, is useful to man; and is so, in proportion as the body is
thereby rendered more capable of being affected or affecting
other bodies in an increased number of ways; contrariwise,
whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is
hurtful to man.

Proof.--Whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the body
increases also the mind's capability of perception (II. xiv.);
therefore, whatsoever thus disposes the body and thus renders it
capable, is necessarily good or useful (IV. xxvi. xxvii.); and
is so in proportion to the extent to which it can render the body
capable; contrariwise (II. xiv., IV. xxvi. xxvii.), it is
hurtful, if it renders the body in this respect less capable.
Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXIX.  Whatsoever brings about the preservation of the
proportion of motion and rest, which the parts of the human body
mutually possess, is good; contrariwise, whatsoever causes a
change in such proportion is bad.

Proof.--The human body needs many other bodies for its
preservation (II. Post. iv.).  But that which constitutes the
specific reality (forma) of a human body is, that its parts
communicate their several motions one to another in a certain
fixed proportion (Def. before Lemma iv. after II. xiii.).
Therefore, whatsoever brings about the preservation of the
proportion between motion and rest, which the parts of the human
body mutually possess, preserves the specific reality of the
human body, and consequently renders the human body capable of
being affected in many ways and of affecting external bodies in
many ways; consequently it is good (by the last Prop.).  Again,
whatsoever brings about a change in the aforesaid proportion
causes the human body to assume another specific character, in
other words (see Preface to this Part towards the end, though the
point is indeed self--evident), to be destroyed, and consequently
totally incapable of being affected in an increased numbers of
ways; therefore it is bad.  Q.E.D.

Note.--The extent to which such causes can injure or be of
service to the mind will be explained in the Fifth Part.  But I
would here remark that I consider that a body undergoes death,
when the proportion of motion and rest which obtained mutually
among its several parts is changed.  For I do not venture to deny
that a human body, while keeping the circulation of the blood and
other properties, wherein the life of a body is thought to
consist, may none the less be changed into another nature totally
different from its own.  There is no reason, which compels me to
maintain that a body does not die, unless it becomes a corpse;
nay, experience would seem to point to the opposite conclusion.
It sometimes happens, that a man undergoes such changes, that I
should hardly call him the same.  As I have heard tell of a
certain Spanish poet, who had been seized with sickness, and
though he recovered therefrom yet remained so oblivious of his
past life, that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he
had written to be his own: indeed, he might have been taken for
a grown--up child, if he had also forgotten his native tongue.  If
this instance seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? A
man of ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own, that he can
only be persuaded that he too has been an infant by the analogy
of other men.  However, I prefer to leave such questions
undiscussed, lest I should give ground to the superstitious for
raising new issues.

PROP. XL.  Whatsoever conduces to man's social life, or causes
men to live together in harmony, is useful, whereas whatsoever
brings discord into a State is bad.

Proof.--For whatsoever causes men to live together in harmony
also causes them to live according to reason (IV. xxxv.), and is
therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.) good, and (for the same reason)
whatsoever brings about discord is bad.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XLI.  Pleasure in itself is not bad but good:
contrariwise, pain in itself is bad.

Proof.--Pleasure (III. xi. and note) is emotion, whereby the
body's power of activity is increased or helped; pain is
emotion, whereby the body's power of activity is diminished or
checked; therefore (IV. xxxviii.) pleasure in itself is good,
&c.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XLII.  Mirth cannot be excessive, but is always good;
contrariwise, Melancholy is always bad.

Proof.--Mirth (see its Def. in III. xi. note) is pleasure,
which, in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in all
parts of the body being affected equally: that is (III. xi.),
the body's power of activity is increased or aided in such a
manner, that the several parts maintain their former proportion
of motion and rest; therefore Mirth is always good (IV. xxxix.),
and cannot be excessive.  But Melancholy (see its Def. in the
same note to III. xi.) is pain, which, in so far as it is
referred to the body, consists in the absolute decrease or
hindrance of the body's power of activity; therefore (IV.
xxxviii.) it is always bad.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XLIII.  Stimulation may be excessive and bad; on the other
hand, grief may be good, in so far as stimulation or pleasure is
bad.

Proof.--Localized pleasure or stimulation (titillatio) is
pleasure, which, in so far as it is referred to the body,
consists in one or some of its parts being affected more than the
rest (see its Definition, III. xi. note); the power of this
emotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of the body
(IV. vi.), and may remain obstinately fixed therein, thus
rendering it incapable of being affected in a variety of other
ways: therefore (IV. xxxviii.) it may be bad.  Again, grief,
which is pain, cannot as such be good (IV. xli.).  But, as its
force and increase is defined by the power of an external cause
compared with our own (IV. v.), we can conceive infinite degrees
and modes of strength in this emotion (IV. iii.); we can,
therefore, conceive it as capable of restraining stimulation, and
preventing its becoming excessive, and hindering the body's
capabilities; thus, to this extent, it will be good.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XLIV.  Love and desire may be excessive.

Proof.--Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an
external cause (Def. of Emotions, vi.); therefore stimulation,
accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love (III. xi.
note); hence love maybe excessive.  Again, the strength of
desire varies in proportion to the emotion from which it arises
(III. xxxvii.).  Now emotion may overcome all the rest of men's
actions (IV. vi.); so, therefore, can desire, which arises from
the same emotion, overcome all other desires, and become
excessive, as we showed in the last proposition concerning
stimulation.

Note.--Mirth, which I have stated to be good, can be conceived
more easily than it can be observed.  For the emotions, whereby
we are daily assailed, are generally referred to some part of the
body which is affected more than the rest; hence the emotions
are generally excessive, and so fix the mind in the contemplation
of one object, that it is unable to think of others; and
although men, as a rule, are a prey to many emotions--and very few
are found who are always assailed by one and the same--yet there
are cases, where one and the same emotion remains obstinately
fixed.  We sometimes see men so absorbed in one object, that,
although it be not present, they think they have it before them;
when this is the case with a man who is not asleep, we say he is
delirious or mad; nor are those persons who are inflamed with
love, and who dream all night and all day about nothing but their
mistress, or some woman, considered as less mad, for they are
made objects of ridicule.  But when a miser thinks of nothing but
gain or money, or when an ambitious man thinks of nothing but
glory, they are not reckoned to be mad, because they are
generally harmful, and are thought worthy of being hated.  But,
in reality, Avarice, Ambition, Lust, &c., are species of madness,
though they may not be reckoned among diseases.

PROP. XLV.  Hatred can never be good.

Proof.--When we hate a man, we endeavour to destroy him (III.
xxxix.), that is (IV. xxxvii.), we endeavour to do something that
is bad.  Therefore, &c.  Q.E.D.

N.B.  Here, and in what follows, I mean by hatred only hatred
towards men.

Corollary I.--Envy, derision, contempt, anger, revenge, and
other emotions attributable to hatred, or arising therefrom, are
bad; this is evident from III. xxxix. and IV. xxxvii.

Corollary II.--Whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred is
base, and in a State unjust.  This also is evident from III.
xxxix., and from the definitions of baseness and injustice in IV.
xxxvii. note.

Note.--Between derision (which I have in Coroll. I. stated to
be bad) and laughter I recognize a great difference.  For
laughter, as also jocularity, is merely pleasure; therefore, so
long as it be not excessive, it is in itself good (IV. xli.).
Assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself, save grim and
gloomy superstition.  For why is it more lawful to satiate one's
hunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy? I reason,
and have convinced myself as follows: No deity, nor anyone else,
save the envious, takes pleasure in my infirmity and discomfort,
nor sets down to my virtue the tears, sobs, fear, and the like,
which axe signs of infirmity of spirit; on the contrary, the
greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected, the greater the
perfection whereto we pass; in other words, the more must we
necessarily partake of the divine nature.  Therefore, to make use
of what comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as possible
(not to the point of satiety, for that would not be enjoyment) is
the part of a wise man.  I say it is the part of a wise man to
refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and
drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty of growing
plants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres,
and the like, such as every man may make use of without injury to
his neighbour.  For the human body is composed of very numerous
parts, of diverse nature, which continually stand in need of
fresh and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be
equally capable of performing all the actions, which follow from
the necessity of its own nature; and, consequently, so that the
mind may also be equally capable of understanding many things
simultaneously.  This way of life, then, agrees best with our
principles, and also with general practice; therefore, if there
be any question of another plan, the plan we have mentioned is
the best, and in every way to be commended.  There is no need for
me to set forth the matter more clearly or in more detail.

PROP. XLVI.  He, who lives under the guidance of reason,
endeavours, as far as possible, to render back love, or kindness,
for other men's hatred, anger, contempt, &c., towards him.

Proof.--All emotions of hatred are bad (IV. xlv. Coroll. i.);
therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will
endeavour, as far as possible, to avoid being assailed by such
emotions (IV. xix.); consequently, he will also endeavour to
prevent others being so assailed (IV. xxxvii.).  But hatred is
increased by being reciprocated, and can be quenched by love
(III. xliii.), so that hatred may pass into love (III. xliv.);
therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will
endeavour to repay hatred with love, that is, with kindness.
Q.E.D.

Note.--He who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is
assuredly wretched.  But he, who strives to conquer hatred with
love, fights his battle in joy and confidence; he withstands
many as easily as one, and has very little need of fortune's aid.
Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure, but
through increase in their powers; all these consequences follow
so plainly from the mere definitions of love and understanding,
that I have no need to prove them in detail.

PROP. XLVII.  Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves
good.

Proof.--Emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without pain.
For fear is pain (Def. of the Emotions, xiii.), and hope (Def. of
the Emotions, Explanation xii. and xiii.) cannot exist without
fear; therefore (IV. xli.) these emotions cannot be good in
themselves, but only in so far as they can restrain excessive
pleasure (IV. xliii.).  Q.E.D.

Note.--We may add, that these emotions show defective
knowledge and an absence of power in the mind; for the same
reason confidence, despair, joy, and disappointment are signs of
a want of mental power.  For although confidence and joy are
pleasurable emotions, they nevertheless imply a preceding pain,
namely, hope and fear.  Wherefore the more we endeavour to be
guided by reason, the less do we depend on hope; we endeavour to
free ourselves from fear, and, as far as we can, to dominate
fortune, directing our actions by the sure counsels of wisdom.

PROP. XLVIII.  The emotions of over--esteem and disparagement are
always bad.

Proof.--These emotions (see Def. of the Emotions, xxi. xxii.)
are repugnant to reason; and are therefore (IV. xxvi. xxvii.)
bad.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XLIX.  Over--esteem is apt to render its object proud.

Proof.--If we see that any one rates us too highly, for love's
sake, we are apt to become elated (III. xli.), or to be
pleasurably affected (Def. of the Emotions, xxx.); the good
which we hear of ourselves we readily believe (III. xxv.); and
therefore, for love's sake, rate ourselves too highly; in other
words, we are apt to become proud.  Q.E.D.

PROP. L.  Pity, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason,
is in itself bad and useless.

Proof.--Pity (Def. of the Emotions, xviii.) is a pain, and
therefore (IV. xli.) is in itself bad.  The good effect which
follows, namely, our endeavour to free the object of our pity
from misery, is an action which we desire to do solely at the
dictation of reason (IV. xxxvii.); only at the dictation of
reason are we able to perform any action, which we know for
certain to be good (IV. xxvii.); thus, in a man who lives under
the guidance of reason, pity in itself is useless and bad.
Q.E.D.

Note.--He who rightly realizes, that all things follow from
the necessity of the divine nature, and come to pass in
accordance with the eternal laws and rules of nature, will not
find anything worthy of hatred, derision, or contempt, nor will
he bestow pity on anything, but to the utmost extent of human
virtue he will endeavour to do well, as the saying is, and to
rejoice.  We may add, that he, who is easily touched with
compassion, and is moved by another's sorrow or tears, often does
something which he afterwards regrets; partly because we can
never be sure that an action caused by emotion is good, partly
because we are easily deceived by false tears.  I am in this
place expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of
reason.  He who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by
compassion, is rightly styled inhuman, for (III. xxvii.) he seems
unlike a man.

PROP. LI.  Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agree
therewith and arise therefrom.

Proof.--Approval is love towards one who has done good to
another (Def. of the Emotions, xix.); therefore it may be
referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active (III.
lix.), that is (III. iii.), in so far as it understands;
therefore, it is in agreement with reason, &c.  Q.E.D.

Another Proof.--He, who lives under the guidance of reason,
desires for others the good which he seeks for himself (IV.
xxxvii.); wherefore from seeing someone doing good to his fellow
his own endeavour to do good is aided; in other words, he will
feel pleasure (III. xi. note) accompanied by the idea of the
benefactor.  Therefore he approves of him.  Q.E.D.

Note.--Indignation as we defined it (Def. of the Emotions,
xx.) is necessarily evil (IV. xlv.); we may, however, remark
that, when the sovereign power for the sake of preserving peace
punishes a citizen who has injured another, it should not be said
to be indignant with the criminal, for it is not incited by
hatred to ruin him, it is led by a sense of duty to punish him.

PROP. LII.  Self--approval may arise from reason, and that which
arises from reason is the highest possible.

Proof.--Self--approval is pleasure arising from a man's
contemplation of himself and his own power of action (Def. of the
Emotions, xxv.).  But a man's true power of action or virtue is
reason herself (III. iii.), as the said man clearly and
distinctly contemplates her (II. xl. xliii.); therefore
self--approval arises from reason.  Again, when a man is
contemplating himself, he only perceived clearly and distinctly
or adequately, such things as follow from his power of action
(III. Def. ii.), that is (III. iii.), from his power of
understanding; therefore in such contemplation alone does the
highest possible self--approval arise.  Q.E.D.

Note.--Self--approval is in reality the highest object for
which we can hope.  For (as we showed in IV. xxv.) no one
endeavours to preserve his being for the sake of any ulterior
object, and, as this approval is more and more fostered and
strengthened by praise (III. liii. Coroll.), and on the contrary
(III. lv. Coroll.) is more and more disturbed by blame, fame
becomes the most powerful of incitements to action, and life
under disgrace is almost unendurable.

PROP. LIII.  Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from
reason.

Proof.--Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of
his own infirmities (Def. of the Emotions, xxvi.).  But, in so
far as a man knows himself by true reason, he is assumed to
understand his essence, that is, his power (III. vii.).
Wherefore, if a man in self--contemplation perceives any infirmity
in himself, it is not by virtue of his understanding himself, but
(III. lv.) by virtue of his power of activity being checked.
But, if we assume that a man perceives his own infirmity by
virtue of understanding something stronger than himself, by the
knowledge of which he determines his own power of activity, this
is the same as saying that we conceive that a man understands
himself distinctly (IV. xxvi.), because[14] his power of activity
is aided.  Wherefore humility, or the pain which arises from a
man's contemplation of his own infirmity, does not arise from the
contemplation or reason, and is not a virtue but a passion.
Q.E.D.

[14] Land reads: "Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur"--which I
have translated above.  He suggests as alternative readings to
'quod', 'quo' (= whereby) and 'quodque' (= and that).

PROP. LIV.  Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from
reason; but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or
infirm.

Proof.--The first part of this proposition is proved like the
foregoing one.  The second part is proved from the mere
definition of the emotion in question (Def. of the Emotions,
xxvii.).  For the man allows himself to be overcome, first, by
evil desires; secondly, by pain.

Note.--As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these
two emotions, namely, Humility and Repentance, as also Hope and
Fear, bring more good than harm; hence, as we must sin, we had
better sin in that direction.  For, if all men who are a prey to
emotion were all equally proud, they would shrink from nothing,
and would fear nothing; how then could they be joined and linked
together in bonds of union?  The crowd plays the tyrant, when it
is not in fear; hence we need not wonder that the prophets, who
consulted the good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously
commended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence.  Indeed those who
are a prey to these emotions may be led much more easily than
others to live under the guidance of reason, that is, to become
free and to enjoy the life of the blessed.

PROP. LV.  Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignorance
of self.

Proof.--This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and
xxix.

PROP. LVI.  Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme
infirmity of spirit.

Proof.--The first foundation of virtue is self--preservation
(IV. xxii. Coroll.) under the guidance of reason (IV. xxiv.).
He, therefore, who is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the
foundation of all virtues, and consequently of all virtues.
Again, to act virtuously is merely to act under the guidance of
reason (IV. xxiv.): now he, that acts under the guidance of
reason, must necessarily know that he so acts (II. xliii.).
Therefore he who is in extreme ignorance of himself, and
consequently of all virtues, acts least in obedience to virtue;
in other words (IV. Def. viii.), is most infirm of spirit.  Thus
extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit.
Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and
the dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions.

Note.--Yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride;
for the latter being a pleasurable emotion, and the former a
painful emotion, the pleasurable is stronger than the painful
(IV. xviii.).

PROP. LVII.  The proud man delights in the company of flatterers
and parasites, but hates the company of the high--minded.

Proof.--Pride is pleasure arising from a man's over estimation
of himself (Def. of the Emotions, xxviii. and vi.); this
estimation the proud man will endeavour to foster by all the
means in his power (III. xiii. note); he will therefore delight
in the company of flatterers and parasites (whose character is
too well known to need definition here), and will avoid the
company of high--minded men, who value him according to his
deserts.  Q.E.D.

Note.--It would be too long a task to enumerate here all the
evil results of pride, inasmuch as the proud are a prey to all
the emotions, though to none of them less than to love and pity.
I cannot, however, pass over in silence the fact, that a man may
be called proud from his underestimation of other people; and,
therefore, pride in this sense may be defined as pleasure arising
from the false opinion, whereby a man may consider himself
superior to his fellows.  The dejection, which is the opposite
quality to this sort of pride, may be defined as pain arising
from the false opinion, whereby a man may think himself inferior
to his fellows.  Such being the ease, we can easily see that a
proud man is necessarily envious (III. xli. note), and only takes
pleasure in the company, who fool his weak mind to the top of his
bent, and make him insane instead of merely foolish.

Though dejection is the emotion contrary to pride, yet is the
dejected man very near akin to the proud man.  For, inasmuch as
his pain arises from a comparison between his own infirmity and
other men's power or virtue, it will be removed, or, in other
words, he will feel pleasure, if his imagination be occupied in
contemplating other men's faults; whence arises the proverb,
"The unhappy are comforted by finding fellow--sufferers."
Contrariwise, he will be the more pained in proportion as he
thinks himself inferior to others; hence none are so prone to
envy as the dejected, they are specially keen in observing men's
actions, with a view to fault--finding rather than correction, in
order to reserve their praises for dejection, and to glory
therein, though all the time with a dejected air.  These effects
follow as necessarily from the said emotion, as it follows from
the nature of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two
right angles.  I have already said that I call these and similar
emotions bad, solely in respect to what is useful to man.  The
laws of nature have regard to nature's general order, whereof man
is but a part.  I mention this, in passing, lest any should think
that I have wished to set forth the faults and irrational deeds
of men rather than the nature and properties of things.  For, as
I said in the preface to the third Part, I regard human emotions
and their properties as on the same footing with other natural
phenomena.  Assuredly human emotions indicate the power and
ingenuity, of nature, if not of human nature, quite as fully as
other things which we admire, and which we delight to
contemplate.  But I pass on to note those qualities in the
emotions, which bring advantage to man, or inflict injury upon
him.

PROP. LVIII.  Honour (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but may
arise therefrom.

Proof.--This is evident from Def. of the Emotions, xxx., and
also from the definition of an honourable man (IV. xxxvii. note.
i.).

Note--Empty honour, as it is styled, is self--approval,
fostered only by the good opinion of the populace; when this
good opinion ceases there ceases also the self--approval, in other
words, the highest object of each man's love (IV. lii. note);
consequently, he whose honour is rooted in popular approval must,
day by day, anxiously strive, act, and scheme in order to retain
his reputation.  For the populace is variable and inconstant, so
that, if a reputation be not kept up, it quickly withers away.
Everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself, and
readily represses the fame of others.  The object of the strife
being estimated as the greatest of all goods, each combatant is
seized with a fierce desire to put down his rivals in every
possible way, till he who at last comes out victorious is more
proud of having done harm to others than of having done good to
himself.  This sort of honour, then, is really empty, being
nothing.

The points to note concerning shame may easily be inferred
from what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance.  I
will only add that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue,
is yet good, in so far as it shows, that the feeler of shame is
really imbued with the desire to live honourably; in the same
way as suffering is good, as showing that the injured part is not
mortified.  Therefore, though a man who feels shame is sorrowful,
he is yet more perfect than he, who is shameless, and has no
desire to live honourably.

Such are the points which I undertook to remark upon
concerning the emotions of pleasure and pain; as for the
desires, they are good or bad according as they spring from good
or evil emotions.  But all, in so far as they are engendered in
us by emotions wherein the mind is passive, are blind (as is
evident from what was said in IV. xliv. note), and would be
useless, if men could easily, be induced to live by the guidance
of reason only, as I will now briefly, show.

PROP. LIX.  To all the actions, whereto we are determined by
emotion wherein the mind is passive; we can be determined
without emotion by reason.

Proof.--To act rationally, is nothing else (III. iii. and Def.
ii.) but to perform those actions, which follow from the
necessity, of our nature considered in itself alone.  But pain is
bad, in so far as it diminishes or checks the power of action
(IV. xli.); wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any
action, which we should be unable to perform under the guidance
of reason.  Again, pleasure is bad only in so far as it hinders a
man's capability for action (IV. xli. xliii.); therefore to this
extent we could not be determined by it to any action, which we
could not perform under the guidance of reason.  Lastly,
pleasure, in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for
it consists in the fact that a man's capability for action is
increased or aided); nor is the mind passive therein, except in
so far as a man's power of action is not increased to the extent
of affording him an adequate conception of himself and his
actions (III. iii., and note).

Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to
such a state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception
of himself and his own actions, he will be equally, nay more,
capable of those actions, to which he is determined by emotion
wherein the mind is passive.  But all emotions are attributable
to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the Emotions, iv.
explanation); and desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) is nothing
else but the attempt to act; therefore, to all actions, &c.
Q.E.D.

Another Proof.--A given action is called bad, in so far as it
arises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion.
But no action, considered in itself alone, is either good or bad
(as we pointed out in the preface to Pt. IV.), one and the same
action being sometimes good, sometimes bad; wherefore to the
action which is sometimes bad, or arises from some evil emotion,
we may be led by reason (IV. xix.).  Q.E.D.

Note.--An example will put this point in a clearer light.  The
action of striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and
in so far as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his
arm, clenches his fist, and moves his whole arm violently
downwards, is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper
to the structure of the human body.  If, then, a man, moved by
anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm,
this result takes place (as we showed in Pt. II.), because one
and the same action can be associated with various mental images
of things; therefore we may be determined to the performance of
one and the same action by confused ideas, or by clear and
distinct ideas.  Hence it is evident that every desire which
springs from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, would become
useless, if men could be guided by reason.  Let us now see why
desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, is
called by us blind.

PROP. LX.  Desire arising from a pleasure or pain, that is not
attributable to the whole body, but only to one or certain parts
thereof, is without utility in respect to a man as a whole.

Proof.--Let it be assumed, for instance, that A, a part of a
body, is so strengthened by some external cause, that it prevails
over the remaining parts (IV. vi.).  This part will not endeavour
to do away with its own powers, in order that the other parts of
the body may perform its office; for this it would be necessary
for it to have a force or power of doing away with its own
powers, which (III. vi.) is absurd.  The said part, and,
consequently, the mind also, will endeavour to preserve its
condition.  Wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind
aforesaid has no utility in reference to a man as a whole.  If it
be assumed, on the other hand, that the part, A, be checked so
that the remaining parts prevail, it may be proved in the same
manner that desire arising from pain has no utility in respect to
a man as a whole.  Q.E.D.

Note.--As pleasure is generally (IV. xliv. note) attributed to
one part of the body, we generally desire to preserve our being
with out taking into consideration our health as a whole: to
which it may be added, that the desires which have most hold over
us (IV. ix.) take account of the present and not of the future.

PROP. LXI.  Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive.

Proof.--Desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.) considered
absolutely is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is
conceived as in any way determined to a particular activity by
some given modification of itself.  Hence desire, which arises
from reason, that is (III. iii.), which is engendered in us in so
far as we act, is the actual essence or nature of man, in so far
as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are
adequately conceived through man's essence only (III. Def. ii.).
Now, if such desire could be excessive, human nature considered
in itself alone would be able to exceed itself, or would be able
to do more than it can, a manifest contradiction.  Therefore,
such desire cannot be excessive.  Q.E.D.

PROP. LXII.  In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the
dictates of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea be
of a thing future, past, or present.

Proof.--Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of
reason, it conceives under the form of eternity or necessity (II.
xliv. Coroll. ii.), and is therefore affected with the same
certitude (II. xliii. and note).  Wherefore, whether the thing be
present, past, or future, the mind conceives it under the same
necessity and is affected with the same certitude; and whether
the idea be of something present, past, or future, it will in all
cases be equally true (II. xli.); that is, it will always
possess the same properties of an adequate idea (II. Def. iv.);
therefore, in so far as the mind conceives things under the
dictates of reason, it is affected in the same manner, whether
the idea be of a thing future, past, or present.  Q.E.D.

Note.--If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the
duration of things, and could determine by reason their periods
of existence, we should contemplate things future with the same
emotion as things present; and the mind would desire as though
it were present the good which it conceived as future;
consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser good in the
present for the sake of a greater good in the future, and would
in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source
of evil in the future, as we shall presently show.  However, we
can have but a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of
things (II. xxxi.); and the periods of their existence (II.
xliv. note.) we can only determine by imagination, which is not
so powerfully affected by the future as by the present.  Hence
such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is merely
abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order
of things and the connection of causes, with a view to
determining what is good or bad for us in the present, is rather
imaginary than real.  Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if the
desire arising from such knowledge of good and evil, in so far as
it looks on into the future, be more readily checked than the
desire of things which are agreeable at the present time.  (Cf.
IV. xvi.)

PROP. LXIII.  He who is led by fear, and does good in order to
escape evil, is not led by reason.

Proof.--All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as
active, or in other words to reason, are emotions of pleasure and
desire (III. lix.); therefore, he who is led by fear, and does
good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason.

Note.--Superstitions persons, who know better how to rail at
vice than how to teach virtue, and who strive not to guide men by
reason, but so to restrain them that they would rather escape
evil than love virtue, have no other aim but to make others as
wretched as themselves; wherefore it is nothing wonderful, if
they be generally troublesome and odious to their fellow--men.

Corollary.--Under desire which springs from reason, we seek
good directly, and shun evil indirectly.

Proof.--Desire which springs from reason can only spring from
a pleasurable emotion, wherein the mind is not passive (III.
lix.), in other words, from a pleasure which cannot be excessive
(IV. lxi.), and not from pain; wherefore this desire springs
from the knowledge of good, not of evil (IV. viii.); hence under
the guidance of reason we seek good directly and only by
implication shun evil.  Q.E.D.

Note.--This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of a
sick and a healthy man.  The sick man through fear of death eats
what he naturally shrinks from, but the healthy man takes
pleasure in his food, and thus gets a better enjoyment out of
life, than if he were in fear of death, and desired directly to
avoid it.  So a judge, who condemns a criminal to death, not from
hatred or anger but from love of the public well--being, is guided
solely by reason.

PROP. LXIV.  The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge.

Proof.--The knowledge of evil (IV. viii.) is pain, in so far
as we are conscious thereof.  Now pain is the transition to a
lesser perfection (Def. of the Emotions, iii.) and therefore
cannot be understood through man's nature (III. vi., and vii.);
therefore it is a passive state (III. Def. ii.) which (III. iii.)
depends on inadequate ideas; consequently the knowledge thereof
(II. xxix.), namely, the knowledge of evil, is inadequate.
Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that, if the human mind possessed
only adequate ideas, it would form no conception of evil.

PROP. LXV.  Under the guidance of reason we should pursue the
greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils.

Proof.--A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good
is in reality an evil; for we apply the terms good and bad to
things, in so far as we compare them one with another (see
preface to this Part); therefore, evil is in reality a lesser
good; hence under the guidance of reason we seek or pursue only
the greater good and the lesser evil.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--We may, under the guidance of reason, pursue the
lesser evil as though it were the greater good, and we may shun
the lesser good, which would be the cause of the greater evil.
For the evil, which is here called the lesser, is really good,
and the lesser good is really evil, wherefore we may seek the
former and shun the latter.  Q.E.D.

PROP. LXVI.  We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greater
good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present,
and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a
greater evil in the future.[15]

[15] "Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro." (Van Vloten).
Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi
alicujus mali." The last word of the latter is an obvious
misprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into "majoris
boni." (Pollock, p. 268, note.)


Proof.--If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things
future, it would be affected towards what is future in the same
way as towards what is present (IV. lxii.); wherefore, looking
merely to reason, as in this proposition we are assumed to do,
there is no difference, whether the greater good or evil be
assumed as present, or assumed as future; hence (IV. lxv.) we
may seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser
good in the present, &c.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a
lesser evil in the present, because it is the cause of a greater
good in the future, and we may shun a lesser good in the present,
because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future.  This
Corollary is related to the foregoing Proposition as the
Corollary to IV. lxv. is related to the said IV. lxv.

Note.--If these statements be compared with what we have
pointed out concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part
up to Prop. xviii., we shall readily see the difference between a
man, who is led solely by emotion or opinion, and a man, who is
led by reason.  The former, whether will or no, performs actions
whereof he is utterly ignorant; the latter is his own master and
only performs such actions, as he knows are of primary importance
in life, and therefore chiefly desires; wherefore I call the
former a slave, and the latter a free man, concerning whose
disposition and manner of life it will be well to make a few
observations.

PROP. LXVII.  A free man thinks of death least of all things;
and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life.

Proof.--A free man is one who lives under the guidance of
reason, who is not led by fear (IV. lxiii.), but who directly
desires that which is good (IV. lxiii. Coroll.), in other words
(IV. xxiv.), who strives to act, to live, and to preserve his
being on the basis of seeking his own true advantage; wherefore
such an one thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom
is a meditation of life.  Q.E.D.

PROP. LXVIII.  If men were born free, they would, so long as they
remained free, form no conception of good and evil.

Proof.--I call free him who is led solely by reason; he,
therefore, who is born free, and who remains free, has only
adequate ideas; therefore (IV. lxiv. Coroll.) he has no
conception of evil, or consequently (good and evil being
correlative) of good.  Q.E.D.

Note.--It is evident, from IV. iv., that the hypothesis of
this Proposition is false and inconceivable, except in so far as
we look solely to the nature of man, or rather to God; not in so
far as the latter is infinite, but only in so far as he is the
cause of man's existence.

This, and other matters which we have already proved, seem to
have been signifieded by Moses in the history of the first man.
For in that narrative no other power of God is conceived, save
that whereby he created man, that is the power wherewith he
provided solely for man's advantage; it is stated that God
forbade man, being free, to eat of the tree of the knowledge of
good and evil, and that, as soon as man should have eaten of it,
he would straightway fear death rather than desire to live.
Further, it is written that when man had found a wife, who was in
entire harmony with his nature, he knew that there could be
nothing in nature which could be more useful to him; but that
after he believed the beasts to be like himself, he straightway
began to imitate their emotions (III. xxvii.), and to lose his
freedom; this freedom was afterwards recovered by the
patriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the idea of
God, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desire
for others the good which he desires for himself, as we have
shown above (IV. xxxvii.).

PROP. LXIX.  The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great,
when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them.

Proof.--Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion
contrary to itself, and possessing more power in restraining
emotion (IV. vii.).  But blind daring and fear are emotions,
which can be conceived as equally great (IV. v. and iii.):
hence, no less virtue or firmness is required in checking daring
than in checking fear (III. lix. note); in other words (Def. of
the Emotions, xl. and xli.), the free man shows as much virtue,
when he declines dangers, as when he strives to overcome them.
Q.E.D.

Corollary.--The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as
in combat; or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of
mind, whether he elect to give battle or to retreat.

Note.--What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby,
I explained in III. lix. note.  By danger I mean everything,
which can give rise to any evil, such as pain, hatred, discord,
&c.

PROP. LXX.  The free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives,
as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them.

Proof.--Everyone judges what is good according to his
disposition (III. xxxix. note); wherefore an ignorant man, who
has conferred a benefit on another, puts his own estimate upon
it, and, if it appears to be estimated less highly by the
receiver, will feel pain (III. xlii.).  But the free man only
desires to join other men to him in friendship (IV. xxxvii.), not
repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like value,
but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason,
and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary
importance.  Therefore the free man, lest he should become
hateful to the ignorant, or follow their desires rather than
reason, will endeavour, as far as he can, to avoid receiving
their favours.

Note.--I say, as far as he can.  For though men be ignorant,
yet are they men, and in cases of necessity could afford us human
aid, the most excellent of all things: therefore it is often
necessary to accept favours from them, and consequently to repay
such favours in kind; we must, therefore, exercise caution in
declining favours, lest we should have the appearance of
despising those who bestow them, or of being, from avaricious
motives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground for
offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it.  Thus, in
declining favours, we must look to the requirements of utility
and courtesy.

PROP. LXXI.  Only free men are thoroughly grateful one to
another.

Proof.--Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another,
and associated among themselves by the closest necessity of
friendship (IV. xxxv., and Coroll. i.), only such men endeavour,
with mutual zeal of love, to confer benefits on each other (IV.
xxxvii.), and, therefore, only they are thoroughly grateful one
to another.  Q.E.D.

Note.--The goodwill, which men who are led by blind desire
have for one another, is generally a bargaining or enticement,
rather than pure goodwill.  Moreover, ingratitude is not an
emotion.  Yet it is base, inasmuch as it generally shows, that a
man is affected by excessive hatred, anger, pride, avarice, &c.
He who, by reason of his folly, knows not how to return benefits,
is not ungrateful, much less he who is not gained over by the
gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by a thief to conceal
his thefts, or by any similar persons.  Contrariwise, such an one
shows a constant mind, inasmuch as he cannot by any gifts be
corrupted, to his own or the general hurt.

PROP. LXXII.  The free man never acts fraudulently, but always in
good faith.

Proof.--If it be asked: What should a man's conduct be in a
case where he could by breaking faith free himself from the
danger of present death? Would not his plan of self--preservation
completely persuade him to deceive? This may be answered by
pointing out that, if reason persuaded him to act thus, it would
persuade all men to act in a similar manner, in which case reason
would persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their
forces, or to have laws in common, that is, not to have any
general laws, which is absurd.

PROP. LXXIII.  The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in
a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in
solitude, where he is independent.

Proof.--The man, who is guided by reason, does not obey
through fear (IV. lxiii.): but, in so far as he endeavours to
preserve his being according to the dictates of reason, that is
(IV. lxvi. note), in so far as he endeavours to live in freedom,
he desires to order his life according to the general good (IV.
xxxvii.), and, consequently (as we showed in IV. xxxvii. note.
ii.), to live according to the laws of his country.  Therefore
the free man, in order to enjoy greater freedom, desires to
possess the general rights of citizenship.  Q.E.D.

Note.--These and similar observations, which we have made on
man's true freedom, may be referred to strength, that is, to
courage and nobility of character (III. lix. note).  I do not
think it worth while to prove separately all the properties of
strength; much less need I show, that he that is strong hates no
man, is angry with no man, envies no man, is indignant with no
man, despises no man, and least of all things is proud.  These
propositions, and all that relate to the true way of life and
religion, are easily proved from IV. xxxvii. and IV. xlvi.;
namely, that hatred should be overcome with love, and that every
man should desire for others the good which he seeks for himself.
We may also repeat what we drew attention to in the note to IV.
l., and in other places; namely, that the strong man has ever
first in his thoughts, that all things follow from the necessity
of the divine nature; so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful
and evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him impious,
horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to his
own disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe.
Wherefore he strives before all things to conceive things as they
really are, and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such
as are hatred, anger, envy, derision, pride, and similar
emotions, which I have mentioned above.  Thus he endeavours, as
we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, and to go on
his way rejoicing.  How far human virtue is capable of attaining
to such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove in
the following Part.


APPENDIX.


What have said in this Part concerning the right way of life
has not been arranged, so as to admit of being seen at one view,
but has been set forth piece--meal, according as I thought each
Proposition could most readily be deduced from what preceded it.
I propose, therefore, to rearrange my remarks and to bring them
under leading heads.

I.  All our endeavours or desires so follow from the
necessity of our nature, that they can be understood either
through it alone, as their proximate cause, or by virtue of our
being a part of nature, which cannot be adequately conceived
through itself without other individuals.

II.  Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner,
that they can be understood through it alone, are those which are
referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is conceived to
consist of adequate ideas: the remaining desires are only
referred to the mind, in so far as it conceives things
inadequately, and their force and increase are generally defined
not by the power of man, but by the power of things external to
us: wherefore the former are rightly called actions, the latter
passions, for the former always indicate our power, the latter,
on the other hand, show our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge.

III.  Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined
by man's power or reason, are always good.  The rest may be
either good or bad.

IV.  Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect
the understanding, or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone
man's highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed
blessedness is nothing else but the contentment of spirit, which
arises from the intuitive knowledge of God: now, to perfect the
understanding is nothing else but to understand God, God's
attributes, and the actions which follow from the necessity of
his nature.  Wherefore of a man, who is led by reason, the
ultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to govern all
his fellows, is that whereby he is brought to the adequate
conception of himself and of all things within the scope of his
intelligence.

V.  Therefore, without intelligence there is not rational
life: and things are only good, in so far as they aid man in his
enjoyment of the intellectual life, which is defined by
intelligence.  Contrariwise, whatsoever things hinder man's
perfecting of his reason, and capability to enjoy the rational
life, are alone called evil.

VI.  As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are
necessarily good, no evil can befall man except through external
causes; namely, by virtue of man being a part of universal
nature, whose laws human nature is compelled to obey, and to
conform to in almost infinite ways.

VII.  It is impossible, that man should not be a part of
nature, or that he should not follow her general order; but if
he be thrown among individuals whose nature is in harmony with
his own, his power of action will thereby be aided and fostered,
whereas, if he be thrown among such as are but very little in
harmony with his nature, he will hardly be able to accommodate
himself to them without undergoing a great change himself.

VIII.  Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to be
capable of injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the
rational life, we may endeavour to remove in whatever way seems
safest to us; on the other hand, whatsoever we deem to be good
or useful for preserving our being, and enabling us to enjoy the
rational life, we may appropriate to our use and employ as we
think best.  Everyone without exception may, by sovereign right
of nature, do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest.

IX.  Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any
given thing than other individuals of the same species;
therefore (cf. vii.) for man in the preservation of his being and
the enjoyment of the rational life there is nothing more useful
than his fellow--man who is led by reason.  Further, as we know
not anything among individual things which is more excellent than
a man led by reason, no man can better display the power of his
skill and disposition, than in so training men, that they come at
last to live under the dominion of their own reason.

X.  In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of
hatred, one towards another, they are at variance, and are
therefore to be feared in proportion, as they are more powerful
than their fellows.

XI.  Yet minds are not conquered by force, but by love and
high--mindedness.

XII.  It is before all things useful to men to associate
their ways of life, to bind themselves together with such bonds
as they think most fitted to gather them all into unity, and
generally to do whatsoever serves to strengthen friendship.

XIII.  But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness.
For men are diverse (seeing that those who live under the
guidance of reason are few), yet are they generally envious and
more prone to revenge than to sympathy.  No small force of
character is therefore required to take everyone as he is, and to
restrain one's self from imitating the emotions of others.  But
those who carp at mankind, and are more skilled in railing at
vice than in instilling virtue, and who break rather than
strengthen men's dispositions, are hurtful both to themselves and
others.  Thus many from too great impatience of spirit, or from
misguided religious zeal, have preferred to live among brutes
rather than among men; as boys or youths, who cannot peaceably
endure the chidings of their parents, will enlist as soldiers and
choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in
preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their
father: suffering any burden to be put upon them, so long as
they may spite their parents.

XIV.  Therefore, although men are generally governed in
everything by their own lusts, yet their association in common
brings many more advantages than drawbacks.  Wherefore it is
better to bear patiently the wrongs they may do us, and to strive
to promote whatsoever serves to bring about harmony and
friendship.

XV.  Those things, which beget harmony, are such as are
attributable to justice, equity, and honourable living.  For men
brook ill not only what is unjust or iniquitous, but also what is
reckoned disgraceful, or that a man should slight the received
customs of their society.  For winning love those qualities are
especially necessary which have regard to religion and piety (cf.
IV. xxxvii. notes. i. ii.; xlvi. note; and lxxiii. note).

XVI.  Further, harmony is often the result of fear: but such
harmony is insecure.  Further, fear arises from infirmity of
spirit, and moreover belongs not to the exercise of reason: the
same is true of compassion, though this latter seems to bear a
certain resemblance to piety.

XVII.  Men are also gained over by liberality, especially
such as have not the means to buy what is necessary to sustain
life.  However, to give aid to every poor man is far beyond the
power and the advantage of any private person.  For the riches of
any private person are wholly inadequate to meet such a call.
Again, an individual man's resources of character are too limited
for him to be able to make all men his friends.  Hence providing
for the poor is a duty, which falls on the State as a whole, and
has regard only to the general advantage.

XVIII.  In accepting favours, and in returning gratitude our
duty must be wholly different (cf. IV. lxx. note; lxxi. note).

XIX.  Again, meretricious love, that is, the lust of
generation arising from bodily beauty, and generally every sort
of love, which owns anything save freedom of soul as its cause,
readily passes into hate; unless indeed, what is worse, it is a
species of madness; and then it promotes discord rather than
harmony (cf. III. xxxi. Coroll.).

XX.  As concerning marriage, it is certain that this is in
harmony with reason, if the desire for physical union be not
engendered solely by bodily beauty, but also by the desire to
beget children and to train them up wisely; and moreover, if the
love of both, to wit, of the man and of the woman, is not caused
by bodily beauty only, but also by freedom of soul.

XXI.  Furthermore, flattery begets harmony; but only by
means of the vile offence of slavishness or treachery.  None are
more readily taken with flattery than the proud, who wish to be
first, but are not.

XXII.  There is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety
and religion.  Although abasement is the opposite to pride, yet
is he that abases himself most akin to the proud (IV. lvii.
note).

XXIII.  Shame also brings about harmony, but only in such
matters as cannot be hid.  Further, as shame is a species of
pain, it does not concern the exercise of reason.

XXIV.  The remaining emotions of pain towards men are
directly opposed to justice, equity, honour, piety, and religion;
and, although indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance
to equity, yet is life but lawless, where every man may pass
judgment on another's deeds, and vindicate his own or other men's
rights.

XXV.  Correctness of conduct (modestia), that is, the desire
of pleasing men which is determined by reason, is attributable to
piety (as we said in IV. xxxvii. note. i.).  But, if it spring
from emotion, it is ambition, or the desire whereby, men, under
the false cloak of piety, generally stir up discords and
seditions.  For he who desires to aid his fellows either in word
or in deed, so that they may together enjoy the highest good, he,
I say, will before all things strive to win them over with love:
not to draw them into admiration, so that a system may be called
after his name, nor to give any cause for envy.  Further, in his
conversation he will shrink from talking of men's faults, and
will be careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity: but
he will dwell at length on human virtue or power, and the way
whereby it may be perfected.  Thus will men be stirred not by
fear, nor by aversion, but only by the emotion of joy, to
endeavour, so far as in them lies, to live in obedience to
reason.

XXVI.  Besides men, we know of no particular thing in nature
in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with
ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore,
whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our
advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or
destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to
our use as best we may.

XXVII.  The advantage which we derive from things external to
us, besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire from
observing them, and from recombining their elements in different
forms, is principally the preservation of the body; from this
point of view, those things are most useful which can so feed and
nourish the body, that all its parts may rightly fulfil their
functions.  For, in proportion as the body is capable of being
affected in a greater variety of ways, and of affecting external
bodies in a great number of ways, so much the more is the mind
capable of thinking (IV. xxxviii., xxxix.).  But there seem to be
very few things of this kind in nature; wherefore for the due
nourishment of the body we must use many foods of diverse nature.
For the human body is composed of very many parts of different
nature, which stand in continual need of varied nourishment, so
that the whole body may be equally capable of doing everything
that can follow from its own nature, and consequently that the
mind also may be equally capable of forming many perceptions.

XXVIII.  Now for providing these nourishments the strength of
each individual would hardly suffice, if men did not lend one
another mutual aid.  But money has furnished us with a token for
everything: hence it is with the notion of money, that the mind
of the multitude is chiefly engrossed: nay, it can hardly
conceive any kind of pleasure, which is not accompanied with the
idea of money as cause.

XXIX.  This result is the fault only of those, who seek
money, not from poverty or to supply their necessary wants, but
because they have learned the arts of gain, wherewith they bring
themselves to great splendour.  Certainly they nourish their
bodies, according to custom, but scantily, believing that they
lose as much of their wealth as they spend on the preservation of
their body.  But they who know the true use of money, and who fix
the measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs,
live content with little.

XXX.  As, therefore, those things are good which assist the
various parts of the body, and enable them to perform their
functions; and as pleasure consists in an increase of, or aid
to, man's power, in so far as he is composed of mind and body;
it follows that all those things which bring pleasure are good.
But seeing that things do not work with the object of giving us
pleasure, and that their power of action is not tempered to suit
our advantage, and, lastly, that pleasure is generally referred
to one part of the body more than to the other parts; therefore
most emotions of pleasure (unless reason and watchfulness be at
hand), and consequently the desires arising therefrom, may become
excessive.  Moreover we may add that emotion leads us to pay most
regard to what is agreeable in the present, nor can we estimate
what is future with emotions equally vivid.  (IV. xliv. note, and
lx. note.)

XXXI.  Superstition, on the other hand, seems to account as
good all that brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure.
However, as we said above (IV. xlv. note), none but the envious
take delight in my infirmity and trouble.  For the greater the
pleasure whereby we are affected, the greater is the perfection
whereto we pass, and consequently the more do we partake of the
divine nature: no pleasure can ever be evil, which is regulated
by a true regard for our advantage.  But contrariwise he, who is
led by fear and does good only to avoid evil, is not guided by
reason.

XXXII.  But human power is extremely limited, and is
infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes; we have
not, therefore, an absolute power of shaping to our use those
things which are without us.  Nevertheless, we shall bear with an
equal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claims
of our own advantage, so long as we are conscious, that we have
done our duty, and that the power which we possess is not
sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely;
remembering that we are a part of universal nature, and that we
follow her order.  If we have a clear and distinct understanding
of this, that part of our nature which is defined by
intelligence, in other words the better part of ourselves, will
assuredly acquiesce in what befalls us, and in such acquiescence
will endeavour to persist.  For, in so far as we are intelligent
beings, we cannot desire anything save that which is necessary,
nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything, save to that which
is true: wherefore, in so far as we have a right understanding
of these things, the endeavour of the better part of ourselves is
in harmony with the order of nature as a whole.



PART V:

Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom


PREFACE



At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which
is concerned with the way leading to freedom.  I shall therefore
treat therein of the power of the reason, showing how far the
reason can control the emotions, and what is the nature of Mental
Freedom or Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how much
more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant.  It is no part
of my design to point out the method and means whereby the
understanding may be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby the
body may be so tended, as to be capable of the due performance of
its functions.  The latter question lies in the province of
Medicine, the former in the province of Logic.  Here, therefore,
I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of
reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its
dominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation.
That we do not possess absolute dominion over them, I have
already shown.  Yet the Stoics have thought, that the emotions
depended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely
govern them.  But these philosophers were compelled, by the
protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess,
that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and
moderate them: and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the
example (if I remember rightly) of two dogs, the one a house--dog
and the other a hunting--dog.  For by long training it could be
brought about, that the house--dog should become accustomed to
hunt, and the hunting--dog to cease from running after hares.  To
this opinion Descartes not a little inclines.  For he maintained,
that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of
the brain, namely, to that part called the pineal gland, by the
aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which
are set going in the body, and also external objects, and which
the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various
ways.  He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the midst
of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of
the animal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended in the
midst of the brain in as many different manners, as the animal
spirits can impinge thereon; and, again, that as many different
marks are impressed on the said gland, as there are different
external objects which impel the animal spirits towards it;
whence it follows, that if the will of the soul suspends the
gland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended once
before by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the
gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving and
determining them to the condition wherein they were, when
repulsed before by a similar position of the gland.  He further
asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in nature
to a certain given motion of the gland.  For instance, whenever
anyone desires to look at a remote object, the act of volition
causes the pupil of the eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in
question had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil, the
mere wish to dilate it would not have brought about the result,
inasmuch as the motion of the gland, which serves to impel the
animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would
dilate or contract the pupil, is not associated in nature with
the wish to dilate or contract the pupil, but with the wish to
look at remote or very near objects.  Lastly, he maintained that,
although every motion of the aforesaid gland seems to have been
united by nature to one particular thought out of the whole
number of our thoughts from the very beginning of our life, yet
it can nevertheless become through habituation associated with
other thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de
l'ame, I.50.  He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak,
that it cannot, under proper direction, acquire absolute power
over its passions.  For passions as defined by him are
"perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are
referred to the soul as species, and which (mark the expression)
are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement
of the spirits." (Passions de l'ame, I.27).  But, seeing that we
can join any motion of the gland, or consequently of the spirits,
to any volition, the determination of the will depends entirely
on our own powers; if, therefore, we determine our will with
sure and firm decisions in the direction to which we wish our
actions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions which
we wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire an
absolute dominion over our passions.  Such is the doctrine of
this illustrious philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his
own words); it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I could
hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man.  Indeed, I
am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly asserted,
that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow from
self--evident premisses, and would affirm nothing which he did not
clearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to
task the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through
occult qualities, could maintain a hypothesis, beside which
occult qualities are commonplace.  What does he understand, I
ask, by the union of the mind and the body? What clear and
distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union
with a certain particle of extended matter? Truly I should like
him to explain this union through its proximate cause.  But he
had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from body,
that he could not assign any particular cause of the union
between the two, or of the mind itself, but was obliged to have
recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is to God.
Further, I should much like to know, what degree of motion the
mind can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force can it
hold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this gland can
be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the
animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we
have closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again
disjoined therefrom by physical causes; in which case it would
follow that, although the mind firmly intended to face a given
danger, and had united to this decision the motions of boldness,
yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspended
in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything
except running away.  In truth, as there is no common standard of
volition and motion, so is there no comparison possible between
the powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body;
consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined
by the strength of the other.  We may also add, that there is no
gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so placed that it
can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also that
all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the
brain.  Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes
concerning the will and its freedom, inasmuch as I have
abundantly proved that his premisses are false.  Therefore, since
the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by the
understanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of
the mind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe all
have had experience of, but do not accurately observe or
distinctly see, and from the same basis we shall deduce all those
conclusions, which have regard to the mind's blessedness.


AXIOMS.

I.  If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a
change must necessarily take place, either in both, or in one of
the two, and continue until they cease to be contrary.

II.  The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause,
in so far as its essence is explained or defined by the essence
of its cause.

(This axiom is evident from III. vii.)


PROPOSITIONS.

PROP. I.  Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged
and associated in the mind, so are the modifications of body or
the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and
associated in the body.

Proof.--The order and connection of ideas is the same (II.
vii.) as the order and connection of things, and vice versa the
order and connection of things is the same (II. vi. Coroll. and
vii.) as the order and connection of ideas.  Wherefore, even as
the order and connection of ideas in the mind takes place
according to the order and association of modifications of the
body (II. xviii.), so vice versa (III. ii.) the order and
connection of modifications of the body takes place in accordance
with the manner, in which thoughts and the ideas of things are
arranged and associated in the mind.  Q.E.D.

PROP. II.  If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion,
from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other
thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external
cause, and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these
emotions, be destroyed.

Proof.--That, which constitutes the reality of love or hatred,
is pleasure or pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause
(Def. of the Emotions, vi. vii.); wherefore, when this cause is
removed, the reality of love or hatred is removed with it;
therefore these emotions and those which arise therefrom are
destroyed.  Q.E.D.

PROP. III.  An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a
passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.

Proof.--An emotion, which is a passion, is a confused idea (by
the general Def. of the Emotions).  If, therefore, we form a
clear and distinct idea of a given emotion, that idea will only
be distinguished from the emotion, in so far as it is referred to
the mind only, by reason (II. xxi., and note); therefore (III.
iii.), the emotion will cease to be a passion.  Q.E.D.

Corollary--An emotion therefore becomes more under our
control, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in
proportion as it is more known to us.

PROP. IV.  There is no modification of the body, whereof we
cannot form some clear and distinct conception.

Proof.--Properties which are common to all things can only be
conceived adequately (II. xxxviii.); therefore (II. xii. and
Lemma ii. after II. xiii.) there is no modification of the body,
whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.
Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof
we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.  For an
emotion is the idea of a modification of the body (by the general
Def. of the Emotions), and must therefore (by the preceding
Prop.) involve some clear and distinct conception.

Note.--Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by
an effect (I. xxxvi.), and that we clearly and distinctly
understand whatever follows from an idea, which in us is adequate
(II. xl.), it follows that everyone has the power of clearly and
distinctly understanding himself and his emotions, if not
absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently of bringing it
about, that he should become less subject to them.  To attain
this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to
acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of
every emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion,
be determined to think of those things which it clearly and
distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thus
that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an
external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whence
it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, &c. will be
destroyed (V. ii.), but also that the appetites or desires, which
are wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable of
being excessive (IV. lxi.).  For it must be especially remarked,
that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and
that through which he is said to be passive is one and the same.
For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted,
that everyone desires his fellow--men to live after his own
fashion (III. xxxi. note); in a man, who is not guided by
reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and
does not greatly differ from pride; whereas in a man, who lives
by the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which is
called piety (IV. xxxvii. note. i. and second proof).  In like
manner all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as
they spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are
accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by
adequate ideas.  For all desires, whereby we are determined to
any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from
inadequate ideas (IV. lix.).  Than this remedy for the emotions
(to return to the point from which I started), which consists in
a true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being within
our power, can be devised.  For the mind has no other power save
that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas, as we have shown
above (III. iii.).

PROP. V.  An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive simply,
and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, other
conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion.

Proof.--An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to be
free, is greater than one towards what we conceive to be
necessary (III. xlix.), and, consequently, still greater than one
towards what we conceive as possible, or contingent (IV. xi.).
But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to
conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes
whereby it has been determined to action (II. xxxv. note);
therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply
is, other conditions being equal, greater than one, which we feel
towards what is necessary, possible, or contingent, and,
consequently, it is the greatest of all.  Q.E.D.

PROP. VI.  The mind has greater power over the emotions and is
less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as
necessary.

Proof.--The mind understands all things to be necessary (I.
xxix.) and to be determined to existence and operation by an
infinite chain of causes; therefore (by the foregoing
Proposition), it thus far brings it about, that it is less
subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and (III. xlviii.)
feels less emotion towards the things themselves.  Q.E.D.

Note.--The more this knowledge, that things are necessary, is
applied to particular things, which we conceive more distinctly
and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the
emotions, as experience also testifies.  For we see, that the
pain arising from the loss of any good is mitigated, as soon as
the man who has lost it perceives, that it could not by any means
have been preserved.  So also we see that no one pities an
infant, because it cannot speak, walk, or reason, or lastly,
because it passes so many years, as it were, in unconsciousness.
Whereas, if most people were born full--grown and only one here
and there as an infant, everyone would pity the infants; because
infancy would not then be looked on as a state natural and
necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in Nature; and we may
note several other instances of the same sort.

PROP. VII.  Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if
we take account of time, are stronger than those, which are
attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent.

Proof.--We do not regard a thing as absent, by reason of the
emotion wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body,
being affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the
said thing (II. xvii.).  Wherefore, the emotion, which is
referred to the thing which we regard as absent, is not of a
nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and power (IV.
vi.), but is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sort
controlled by the emotions, which exclude the existence of its
external cause (IV. ix.).  But an emotion which springs from
reason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things
(see the def. of reason in II. xl. note. ii.), which we always
regard as present (for there can be nothing to exclude their
present existence), and which we always conceive in the same
manner (II. xxxviii.).  Wherefore an emotion of this kind always
remains the same; and consequently (V. Ax. i.) emotions, which
are contrary thereto and are not kept going by their external
causes, will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more,
until they are no longer contrary to it; to this extent the
emotion which springs from reason is more powerful.  Q.E.D.

PROP. VIII.  An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number
of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.

Proof.--Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few
(III. vii.): therefore (IV. v.), in proportion to the increased
number of simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused, an emotion
becomes stronger.  Q.E.D.

Note--This proposition is also evident from V. Ax. ii.

PROP. IX.  An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse
causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion
itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less
affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different
and equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a
single cause.

Proof.--An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it
hinders the mind from being able to think (IV. xxvi. xxvii.);
therefore, an emotion, whereby the mind is determined to the
contemplation of several things at once, is less hurtful than
another equally powerful emotion, which so engrosses the mind in
the single contemplation of a few objects or of one, that it is
unable to think of anything else; this was our first point.
Again, as the mind's essence, in other words, its power (III.
vii.), consists solely in thought (II. xi.), the mind is less
passive in respect to an emotion, which causes it to think of
several things at once, than in regard to an equally strong
emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few
or of a single object: this was our second point.  Lastly, this
emotion (III. xlviii.), in so far as it is attributable to
several causes, is less powerful in regard to each of them.
Q.E.D.

PROP. X.  So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to
our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the
modifications of our body according to the intellectual order.

Proof.--The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that
is (IV. xxx.), which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede
the mind from understanding (IV. xxvii.).  So long, therefore, as
we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, the
mind's power, whereby it endeavours to understand things (IV.
xxvi.), is not impeded, and therefore it is able to form clear
and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another (II. xl.
note. ii. and II. xlvii. note); consequently we have in such
cases the power of arranging and associating the modifications of
the body according to the intellectual order.  Q.E.D.

Note.--By this power of rightly arranging and associating the
bodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily
affected by evil emotions.  For (V. vii.) a greater force is
needed for controlling the emotions, when they are arranged and
associated according to the intellectual order, than when they,
are uncertain and unsettled.  The best we can do, therefore, so
long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is
to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical precepts,
to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith[16] to the
particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so
that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that
it may be always ready to our hand.  For instance, we have laid
down among the rules of life (IV. xlvi. and note), that hatred
should be overcome with love or high--mindedness, and not required
with hatred in return.  Now, that this precept of reason may be
always ready to our hand in time of need, we should often think
over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and
in what manner and way they may be best warded off by
high--mindedness: we shall thus associate the idea of wrong with
the idea of this precept, which accordingly will always be ready
for use when a wrong is done to us (II. xviii.).  If we keep also
in readiness the notion of our true advantage, and of the good
which follows from mutual friendships, and common fellowships;
further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result
of the right way of life ( IV. lii.), and that men, no less than
everything else, act by the necessity of their nature: in such
case I say the wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises
therefrom, will engross a very small part of our imagination and
will be easily overcome; or, if the anger which springs from a
grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will nevertheless be
overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far sooner
than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand.  As
is indeed evident from V. vi. vii. viii.  We should, in the same
way, reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear; the
ordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind and
imagined, together with the means whereby through readiness of
resource and strength of mind we can avoid and overcome them.
But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and conceptions
we should always bear in mind that which is good in every
individual thing (IV. lxiii. Coroll. and III. lix.), in order
that we may always be determined to action by an emotion of
pleasure.  For instance, if a man sees that he is too keen in the
pursuit of honour, let him think over its right use, the end for
which it should be pursued, and the means whereby he may attain
it.  Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and the
fickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except
through a morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these do
the most ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of
gaining the distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving
vent to their anger would fain appear wise.  Wherefore it is
certain that those, who cry out the loudest against the misuse of
honour and the vanity of the world, are those who most greedily
covet it.  This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is common
to all who are ill--used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit.
For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the
misuse of wealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merely
torments himself, and shows the world that he is intolerant, not
only of his own poverty, but also of other people's riches.  So,
again, those who have been ill received by a woman they love
think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other stock
faults of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion,
directly they are again taken into favour by their sweetheart.
Thus he who would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the
love of freedom strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of
the virtues and their causes, and to fill his spirit with the joy
which arises from the true knowledge of them: he will in no wise
desire to dwell on men's faults, or to carp at his fellows, or to
revel in a false show of freedom.  Whosoever will diligently
observe and practise these precepts (which indeed are not
difficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for
the most part, to direct his actions according to the
commandments of reason.

[16] Continuo.  Rendered "constantly" by Mr. Pollock on the ground
that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context.

PROP. XI.  In proportion as a mental image is referred to more
objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and
occupies the mind more.

Proof.--In proportion as a mental image or an emotion is
referred to more objects, so are there more causes whereby it can
be aroused and fostered, all of which (by hypothesis) the mind
contemplates simultaneously in association with the given emotion;
therefore the emotion is more frequent, or is more often in
full vigour, and (V. viii.) occupies the mind more.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XII.  The mental images of things are more easily
associated with the images referred to things which we clearly
and distinctly understand, than with others.

Proof.--Things, which we clearly and distinctly understand,
are either the common properties of things or deductions
therefrom (see definition of Reason, II. xl. note ii.), and are
consequently (by the last Prop.) more often aroused in us.
Wherefore it may more readily happen, that we should contemplate
other things in conjunction with these than in conjunction with
something else, and consequently (II. xviii.) that the images of
the said things should be more often associated with the images
of these than with the images of something else.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XIII.  A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion as
it is associated with a greater number of other images.

Proof.--In proportion as an image is associated with a greater
number of other images, so (II. xviii.) are there more causes
whereby it can be aroused.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XIV.  The mind can bring it about, that all bodily
modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of
God.

Proof.--There is no modification of the body, whereof the mind
may not form some clear and distinct conception (V. iv.);
wherefore it can bring it about, that they should all be referred
to the idea of God (I. xv.).  Q.E.D.

PROP. XV.  He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and
his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he
more understands himself and his emotions.

Proof.--He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and
his emotions feels pleasure (III. liii.), and this pleasure is
(by the last Prop.) accompanied by the idea of God; therefore
(Def. of the Emotions, vi.) such an one loves God, and (for the
same reason) so much the more in proportion as he more
understands himself and his emotions.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XVI.  This love towards God must hold the chief place in
the mind.

Proof.--For this love is associated with all the modifications
of the body (V. xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V. xv.);
therefore (V. xi.), it must hold the chief place in the mind.
Q.E.D.

PROP. XVII.  God is without passions, neither is he affected by
any emotion of pleasure or pain.

Proof.--All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are
true (II. xxxii.), that is (II. Def. iv.) adequate; and
therefore (by the general Def. of the Emotions) God is without
passions.  Again, God cannot pass either to a greater or to a
lesser perfection (I. xx. Coroll. ii.); therefore (by Def. of
the Emotions, ii. iii.) he is not affected by any emotion of
pleasure or pain.

Corollary.--Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate
anyone.  For God (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any
emotion of pleasure or pain, consequently (Def. of the Emotions,
vi. vii.) he does not love or hate anyone.

PROP. XVIII.  No one can hate God.

Proof.--The idea of God which is in us is adequate and perfect
(II. xlvi. xlvii.); wherefore, in so far as we contemplate God,
we are active (III. iii.); consequently (III. lix.) there can be
no pain accompanied by the idea of God, in other words (Def. of
the Emotions, vii.), no one can hate God.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Love towards God cannot be turned into hate.

Note.--It may be objected that, as we understand God as the
cause of all things, we by that very fact regard God as the cause
of pain.  But I make answer, that, in so far as we understand the
causes of pain, it to that extent (V. iii.) ceases to be a
passion, that is, it ceases to be pain (III. lix.); therefore,
in so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain, we to
that extent feel pleasure.

PROP. XIX.  He, who loves God, cannot endeavour that God should
love him in return.

Proof.--For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V.
xvii. Coroll.) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and
consequently he would desire to feel pain (III. xix.); which is
absurd (III. xxviii.).  Therefore, he who loves God, &c.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XX.  This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion
of envy or jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in
proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to
God by the same bond of love.

Proof.--This love towards God is the highest good which we can
seek for under the guidance of reason (IV. xxviii.), it is common
to all men (IV. xxxvi.), and we desire that all should rejoice
therein (IV. xxxvii.); therefore (Def. of the Emotions, xxiii.),
it cannot be stained by the emotion envy, nor by the emotion of
jealousy (V. xviii. see definition of Jealousy, III. xxxv. note);
but, contrariwise, it must needs be the more fostered, in
proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice
therein.  Q.E.D.

Note.--We can in the same way show, that there is no emotion
directly contrary to this love, whereby this love can be
destroyed; therefore we may conclude, that this love towards God
is the most constant of all the emotions, and that, in so far as
it is referred to the body, it cannot be destroyed, unless the
body be destroyed also.  As to its nature, in so far as it is
referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire.

I have now gone through all the remedies against the
emotions, or all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can
do against them.  Whence it appears that the mind's power over
the emotions consists:----

I.  In the actual knowledge of the emotions (V. iv. note).

II. In the fact that it separates the emotions from the
thought of an external cause, which we conceive confusedly (V.
ii. and V. iv. note).

III.  In the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions
referred to things, which we distinctly understand, surpass those
referred to what we conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner
(V. vii.).

IV.  In the number of causes whereby those modifications[17]
are fostered, which have regard to the common properties of
things or to God (V. ix. xi.).

[17] Affectiones.  Camerer reads affectus----emotions.


V.  Lastly, in the order wherein the mind can arrange and
associate, one with another, its own emotions (V. x. note and
xii. xiii. xiv.).

But, in order that this power of the mind over the emotions
may be better understood, it should be specially observed that
the emotions are called by us strong, when we compare the emotion
of one man with the emotion of another, and see that one man is
more troubled than another by the same emotion; or when we are
comparing the various emotions of the same man one with another,
and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion than
by another.  For the strength of every emotion is defined by a
comparison of our own power with the power of an external cause.
Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its
infirmity or passion is defined by the privation of knowledge
only: it therefore follows, that that mind is most passive,
whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it
may be characterized more readily by its passive states than by
its activities: on the other hand, that mind is most active,
whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that,
although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former
mind, it may yet be more easily characterized by ideas
attributable to human virtue, than by ideas which tell of human
infirmity.  Again, it must be observed, that spiritual
unhealthiness and misfortunes can generally be traced to
excessive love for something which is subject to many variations,
and which we can never become masters of.  For no one is
solicitous or anxious about anything, unless he loves it;
neither do wrongs, suspicions, enmities, &c. arise, except in
regard to things whereof no one can be really master.

We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and
distinct knowledge, and especially that third kind of knowledge
(II. xlvii. note), founded on the actual knowledge of God,
possesses over the emotions: if it does not absolutely destroy
them, in so far as they are passions (V. iii. and iv. note); at
any rate, it causes them to occupy a very small part of the mind
(V. xiv.).  Further, it begets a love towards a thing immutable
and eternal (V. xv.), whereof we may really enter into possession
(II. xlv.); neither can it be defiled with those faults which
are inherent in ordinary love; but it may grow from strength to
strength, and may engross the greater part of the mind, and
deeply penetrate it.

And now I have finished with all that concerns this present
life: for, as I said in the beginning of this note, I have
briefly described all the remedies against the emotions.  And
this everyone may readily have seen for himself, if he has
attended to what is advanced in the present note, and also to the
definitions of the mind and its emotions, and, lastly, to
Propositions i. and iii. of Part III.  It is now, therefore, time
to pass on to those matters, which appertain to the duration of
the mind, without relation to the body.

PROP. XXI.  The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what
is past, while the body endures.

Proof.--The mind does not express the actual existence of its
body, nor does it imagine the modifications of the body as
actual, except while the body endures (II. viii. Coroll.); and,
consequently (II. xxvi.), it does not imagine
any body as actually existing, except while its own body endures.
Thus it
cannot imagine anything (for definition of Imagination, see II.
xvii. note),
or remember things past, except while the body endures (see
definition of Memory, II. xviii. note).  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXII.  Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea,
which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the
form of eternity.

Proof.--God is the cause, not only of the existence of this or
that human body, but also of its essence (I. xxv.).  This
essence, therefore, must necessarily be conceived through the
very essence of God (I. Ax. iv.), and be thus conceived by a
certain eternal necessity (I. xvi.); and this conception must
necessarily exist in God (II. iii.).  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIII.  The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with
the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.

Proof.--There is necessarily in God a concept or idea, which
expresses the essence of the human body (last Prop.), which,
therefore, is necessarily something appertaining to the essence
of the human mind (II. xiii.).  But we have not assigned to the
human mind any duration, definable by time, except in so far as
it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained
through duration, and may be defined by time--that is (II. viii.
Coroll.), we do not assign to it duration, except while the body
endures.  Yet, as there is something, notwithstanding, which is
conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence
of God (last Prop.); this something, which appertains to the
essence of the mind, will necessarily be eternal.  Q.E.D.

Note.--This idea, which expresses the essence of the body
under the form of eternity, is, as we have said, a certain mode
of thinking, which belongs to the essence of the mind, and is
necessarily eternal.  Yet it is not possible that we should
remember that we existed before our body, for our body can bear
no trace of such existence, neither can eternity be defined in
terms of time, or have any relation to time.  But,
notwithstanding, we feel and know that we are eternal.  For the
mind feels those things that it conceives by understanding, no
less than those things that it remembers.  For the eyes of the
mind, whereby it sees and observes things, are none other than
proofs.  Thus, although we do not remember that we existed before
the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the
essence of the body, under the form of eternity, is eternal, and
that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time, or
explained through duration.  Thus our mind can only be said to
endure, and its existence can only be defined by a fixed time, in
so far as it involves the actual existence of the body.  Thus far
only has it the power of determining the existence of things by
time, and conceiving them under the category of duration.

PROP. XXIV.  The more we understand particular things, the more
do we understand God.

Proof.--This is evident from I. xxv. Coroll.

PROP. XXV.  The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highest
virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.

Proof.--The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate
idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the
essence of things (see its definition II. xl. note. ii.); and,
in proportion as we understand things more in this way, we better
understand God (by the last Prop.); therefore (IV. xxviii.) the
highest virtue of the mind, that is (IV. Def. viii.) the power, or
nature, or (III. vii.) highest endeavour of the mind, is to
understand things by the third kind of knowledge.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVI.  In proportion as the mind is more capable of
understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, it desires
more to understand things by that kind.

Proof--This is evident.  For, in so far as we conceive the
mind to be capable of conceiving things by this kind of
knowledge, we, to that extent, conceive it as determined thus to
conceive things; and consequently (Def. of the Emotions, i.),
the mind desires so to do, in proportion as it is more capable
thereof.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVII.  From this third kind of knowledge arises the
highest possible mental acquiescence.

Proof.--The highest virtue of the mind is to know God (IV.
xxviii.), or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge
(V. xxv.), and this virtue is greater in proportion as the mind
knows things more by the said kind of knowledge (V. xxiv.):
consequently, he who knows things by this kind of knowledge
passes to the summit of human perfection, and is therefore (Def.
of the Emotions, ii.) affected by the highest pleasure, such
pleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own
virtue; thus (Def. of the Emotions, xxv.), from this kind of
knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXVIII.  The endeavour or desire to know things by the
third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the
second kind of knowledge.

Proof.--This proposition is self--evident.  For whatsoever we
understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either through
itself, or through that which is conceived through itself; that
is, ideas which are clear and distinct in us, or which are
referred to the third kind of knowledge (II. xl. note. ii.)
cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused, and
are referred to knowledge of the first kind, but must follow from
adequate ideas, or ideas of the second and third kind of
knowledge; therefore (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the desire of
knowing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from
the first, but from the second kind.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXIX.  Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of
eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the
present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving
the essence of the body under the form of eternity.

Proof.--In so far as the mind conceives the present existence
of its body, it to that extent conceives duration which can be
determined by time, and to that extent only has it the power of
conceiving things in relation to time (V. xxi. II. xxvi.).  But
eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration (I. Def. viii.
and explanation).  Therefore to this extent the mind has not the
power of conceiving things under the form of eternity, but it
possesses such power, because it is of the nature of reason to
conceive things under the form of eternity (II. xliv. Coroll.
ii.), and also because it is of the nature of the mind to
conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity (V.
xxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to
the essence of mind (II. xiii.).  Therefore this power of
conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to the
mind in virtue of the mind's conceiving the essence of the body
under the form of eternity.  Q.E.D.

Note.--Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways; either as
existing in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in
God and following from the necessity of the divine nature.
Whatsoever we conceive in this second way as true or real, we
conceive under the form of eternity, and their ideas involve the
eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in II. xlv. and
note, which see.

PROP. XXX.  Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body
under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a
knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived
through God.

Proof.--Eternity is the very essence of God, in so far as this
involves necessary existence (I. Def. viii.).  Therefore to
conceive things under the form of eternity, is to conceive things
in so far as they are conceived through the essence of God as
real entities, or in so far as they involve existence through the
essence of God; wherefore our mind, in so far as it conceives
itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that
extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows, &c.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXI.  The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as
its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.

Proof.--The mind does not conceive anything under the form of
eternity, except in so far as it conceives its own body under the
form of eternity (V. xxix.); that is, except in so far as it is
eternal (V. xxi. xxiii.); therefore (by the last Prop.), in so
far as it is eternal, it possesses the knowledge of God, which
knowledge is necessarily adequate (II. xlvi.); hence the mind,
in so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing everything
which can follow from this given knowledge of God (II. xl.), in
other words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge
(see Def. in II. xl. note. ii.), whereof accordingly the mind
(III. Def. i.), in so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or
formal cause of such knowledge.  Q.E.D.

Note.--In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in
this kind of knowledge, he will be more completely conscious of
himself and of God; in other words, he will be more perfect and
blessed, as will appear more clearly in the sequel.  But we must
here observe that, although we are already certain that the mind
is eternal, in so far as it conceives things under the form of
eternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be more
readily explained and better understood, we will consider the
mind itself, as though it had just begun to exist and to
understand things under the form of eternity, as indeed we have
done hitherto; this we may do without any danger of error, so
long as we are careful not to draw any conclusion, unless our
premisses are plain.

PROP. XXXII.  Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of
knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by
the idea of God as cause.

Proof.--From this kind of knowledge arises the highest
possible mental acquiescence, that is (Def of the Emotions,
xxv.), pleasure, and this acquiescence is accompanied by the idea
of the mind itself (V. xxvii.), and consequently (V. xxx.) the
idea also of God as cause.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--From the third kind of knowledge necessarily
arises the intellectual love of God.  From this kind of knowledge
arises pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is
(Def. of the Emotions, vi.), the love of God; not in so far as
we imagine him as present (V. xxix.), but in so far as we
understand him to be eternal; this is what I call the
intellectual love of God.

PROP. XXXIII.  The intellectual love of God, which arises from
the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.

Proof.--The third kind of knowledge is eternal (V. xxxi. I.
Ax. iii.); therefore (by the same Axiom) the love which arises
therefrom is also necessarily eternal.  Q.E.D.

Note.--Although this love towards God has (by the foregoing
Prop.) no beginning, it yet possesses all the perfections of
love, just as though it had arisen as we feigned in the Coroll.
of the last Prop.  Nor is there here any difference, except that
the mind possesses as eternal those same perfections which we
feigned to accrue to it, and they are accompanied by the idea of
God as eternal cause.  If pleasure consists in the transition to
a greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must consist in the
mind being endowed with perfection itself.

PROP. XXXIV.  The mind is, only while the body endures, subject
to those emotions which are attributable to passions.

Proof.--Imagination is the idea wherewith the mind
contemplates a thing as present (II. xvii. note); yet this idea
indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than
the nature of the external thing (II. xvi. Coroll. ii.).
Therefore emotion (see general Def. of Emotions) is imagination,
in so far as it indicates the present disposition of the body;
therefore (V. xxi.) the mind is, only while the body endures,
subject to emotions which are attributable to passions.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that no love save intellectual
love is eternal.

Note.--If we look to men's general opinion, we shall see that
they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their mind, but that
they confuse eternity with duration, and ascribe it to the
imagination or the memory which they believe to remain after
death.

PROP. XXXV.  God loves himself with an infinite intellectual
love.

Proof.--God is absolutely infinite (I. Def. vi.), that is (II.
Def. vi.), the nature of God rejoices in infinite perfection;
and such rejoicing is (II. iii.) accompanied by the idea of
himself, that is (I. xi. and Def. i.), the idea of his own cause:
now this is what we have (in V. xxxii. Coroll.) described as
intellectual love.

PROP. XXXVI.  The intellectual love of the mind towards God is
that very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as
he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the
essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity;
in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is
part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.

Proof.--This love of the mind must be referred to the
activities of the mind (V. xxxii. Coroll. and III. iii.); it is
itself, indeed, an activity whereby the mind regards itself
accompanied by the idea of God as cause (V. xxxii. and Coroll.);
that is (I. xxv. Coroll. and II. xi. Coroll.), an activity
whereby God, in so far as he can be explained through the human
mind, regards himself accompanied by the idea of himself;
therefore (by the last Prop.), this love of the mind is part of
the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves
himself, loves man, and, consequently, that the love of God
towards men, and the intellectual love of the mind towards God
are identical.

Note.--From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein
our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely, in
the constant and eternal love towards God, or in God's love
towards men.  This love or blessedness is, in the Bible, called
Glory, and not undeservedly.  For whether this love be referred
to God or to the mind, it may rightly be called acquiescence of
spirit, which (Def. of the Emotions, xxv. xxx.) is not really
distinguished from glory.  In so far as it is referred to God, it
is (V. xxxv.) pleasure, if we may still use that term,
accompanied by the idea of itself, and, in so far as it is
referred to the mind, it is the same (V. xxvii.).

Again, since the essence of our mind consists solely in
knowledge, whereof the beginning and the foundation is God (I.
xv., and II. xlvii. note), it becomes clear to us, in what manner
and way our mind, as to its essence and existence, follows from
the divine nature and constantly depends on God.  I have thought
it worth while here to call attention to this, in order to show
by this example how the knowledge of particular things, which I
have called intuitive or of the third kind (II. xl. note. ii.),
is potent, and more powerful than the universal knowledge, which
I have styled knowledge of the second kind.  For, although in
Part I. I showed in general terms, that all things (and
consequently, also, the human mind) depend as to their essence
and existence on God, yet that demonstration, though legitimate
and placed beyond the chances of doubt, does not affect our mind
so much, as when the same conclusion is derived from the actual
essence of some particular thing, which we say depends on God.

PROP. XXXVII.  There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to
this intellectual love, or which can take it away.

Proof.--This intellectual love follows necessarily from the
nature of the mind, in so far as the latter is regarded through
the nature of God as an eternal truth (V. xxxiii. and xxix.).
If, therefore, there should be anything which would be contrary
to this love, that thing would be contrary to that which is true;
consequently, that, which should be able to take away this
love, would cause that which is true to be false; an obvious
absurdity.  Therefore there is nothing in nature which, &c.
Q.E.D.

Note.--The Axiom of Part IV. has reference to particular
things, in so far as they are regarded in relation to a given
time and place: of this, I think, no one can doubt.

PROP. XXXVIII.  In proportion as the mind understands more things
by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to
those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death.

Proof.--The mind's essence consists in knowledge (II. xi.);
therefore, in proportion as the mind understands more things by
the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater will be the
part of it that endures (V. xxix. and xxiii.), and, consequently
(by the last Prop.), the greater will be the part that is not
touched by the emotions, which are contrary to our nature, or in
other words, evil (IV. xxx.).  Thus, in proportion as the mind
understands more things by the second and third kinds of
knowledge, the greater will be the part of it, that remains
unimpaired, and, consequently, less subject to emotions, &c.
Q.E.D.

Note.--Hence we understand that point which I touched on in
IV. xxxix. note, and which I promised to explain in this Part;
namely, that death becomes less hurtful, in proportion as the
mind's clear and distinct knowledge is greater, and,
consequently, in proportion as the mind loves God more.  Again,
since from the third kind of knowledge arises the highest
possible acquiescence (V. xxvii.), it follows that the human mind
can attain to being of such a nature, that the part thereof which
we have shown to perish with the body (V. xxi.) should be of
little importance when compared with the part which endures.  But
I will soon treat of the subject at greater length.

PROP. XXXIX.  He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest
number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part
is eternal.

Proof.--He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest
number of activities, is least agitated by those emotions which
are evil (IV. xxxviii.)--that is (IV. xxx.), by those emotions
which are contrary to our nature; therefore (V. x.), he
possesses the power of arranging and associating the
modifications of the body according to the intellectual order,
and, consequently, of bringing it about, that all the
modifications of the body should be referred to the idea of God;
whence it will come to pass that (V. xv.) he will be affected
with love towards God, which (V. xvi.) must occupy or constitute
the chief part of the mind; therefore (V. xxxiii.), such a man
will possess a mind whereof the chief part is eternal.  Q.E.D.

Note.--Since human bodies are capable of the greatest number
of activities, there is no doubt but that they may be of such a
nature, that they may be referred to minds possessing a great
knowledge of themselves and of God, and whereof the greatest or
chief part is eternal, and, therefore, that they should scarcely
fear death.  But, in order that this may be understood more
clearly, we must here call to mind, that we live in a state of
perpetual variation, and, according as we are changed for the
better or the worse, we are called happy or unhappy.

For he, who, from being an infant or a child, becomes a
corpse, is called unhappy; whereas it is set down to happiness,
if we have been able to live through the whole period of life
with a sound mind in a sound body.  And, in reality, he, who, as
in the case of an infant or a child, has a body capable of very
few activities, and depending, for the most part, on external
causes, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, is scarcely
conscious of itself, or of God, or of things; whereas, he, who
has a body capable of very many activities, has a mind which,
considered in itself alone, is highly conscious of itself, of
God, and of things.  In this life, therefore, we primarily
endeavour to bring it about, that the body of a child, in so far
as its nature allows and conduces thereto, may be changed into
something else capable of very many activities, and referable to
a mind which is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things;
and we desire so to change it, that what is referred to its
imagination and memory may become insignificant, in comparison
with its intellect, as I have already said in the note to the
last Proposition.

PROP. XL.  In proportion as each thing possesses more of
perfection, so is it more active, and less passive; and, vice
versa, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect.

Proof.--In proportion as each thing is more perfect, it
possesses more of reality (II. Def. vi.), and, consequently (III.
iii. and note), it is to that extent more active and less
passive.  This demonstration may be reversed, and thus prove
that, in proportion as a thing is more active, so is it more
perfect.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.--Hence it follows that the part of the mind which
endures, be it great or small, is more perfect than the rest.
For the eternal part of the mind (V. xxiii. xxix.) is the
understanding, through which alone we are said to act (III. iii.);
the part which we have shown to perish is the imagination (V.
xxi.), through which only we are said to be passive (III. iii.
and general Def. of the Emotions); therefore, the former, be it
great or small, is more perfect than the latter.  Q.E.D.

Note.--Such are the doctrines which I had purposed to set
forth concerning the mind, in so far as it is regarded without
relation to the body; whence, as also from I. xxi. and other
places, it is plain that our mind, in so far as it understands,
is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another
eternal mode of thinking, and this other by a third, and so on to
infinity; so that all taken together at once constitute the
eternal and infinite intellect of God.

PROP. XLI.  Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we
should still consider as of primary importance piety and
religion, and generally all things which, in Part IV., we showed
to be attributable to courage and high--mindedness.

Proof.--The first and only foundation of virtue, or the rule
of right living is (IV. xxii. Coroll. and xxiv.) seeking one's
own true interest.  Now, while we determined what reason
prescribes as useful, we took no account of the mind's eternity,
which has only become known to us in this Fifth Part.  Although
we were ignorant at that time that the mind is eternal, we
nevertheless stated that the qualities attributable to courage
and high--mindedness are of primary importance.  Therefore, even
if we were still ignorant of this doctrine, we should yet put the
aforesaid precepts of reason in the first place.  Q.E.D.

Note.--The general belief of the multitude seems to be
different.  Most people seem to believe that they are free, in so
far as they may obey their lusts, and that they cede their
rights, in so far as they are bound to live according to the
commandments of the divine law.  They therefore believe that
piety, religion, and, generally, all things attributable to
firmness of mind, are burdens, which, after death, they hope to
lay aside, and to receive the reward for their bondage, that is,
for their piety and religion; it is not only by this hope, but
also, and chiefly, by the fear of being horribly punished after
death, that they are induced to live according to the divine
commandments, so far as their feeble and infirm spirit will carry
them.

If men had not this hope and this fear, but believed that the
mind perishes with the body, and that no hope of prolonged life
remains for the wretches who are broken down with the burden of
piety, they would return to their own inclinations, controlling
everything in accordance with their lusts, and desiring to obey
fortune rather than themselves.  Such a course appears to me not
less absurd than if a man, because he does not believe that he
can by wholesome food sustain his body for ever, should wish to
cram himself with poisons and deadly fare; or if, because he
sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he should prefer
to be out of his mind altogether, and to live without the use of
reason; these ideas are so absurd as to be scarcely worth
refuting.

PROP. XLII.  Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue
itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our
lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able
to control our lusts.

Proof.--Blessedness consists in love towards God (V. xxxvi and
note), which love springs from the third kind of knowledge (V.
xxxii. Coroll.); therefore this love (III. iii. lix.) must be
referred to the mind, in so far as the latter is active;
therefore (IV. Def. viii.) it is virtue itself.  This was our
first point.  Again, in proportion as the mind rejoices more in
this divine love or blessedness, so does it the more understand
(V. xxxii.); that is (V. iii. Coroll.), so much the more power
has it over the emotions, and (V. xxxviii.) so much the less is
it subject to those emotions which are evil; therefore, in
proportion as the mind rejoices in this divine love or
blessedness, so has it the power of controlling lusts.  And,
since human power in controlling the emotions consists solely in
the understanding, it follows that no one rejoices in
blessedness, because he has controlled his lusts, but,
contrariwise, his power of controlling his lusts arises from this
blessedness itself.  Q.E.D.

Note.--I have thus completed all I wished to set forth
touching the mind's power over the emotions and the mind's
freedom.  Whence it appears, how potent is the wise man, and how
much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is driven only by his
lusts.  For the ignorant man is not only distracted in various
ways by external causes without ever gaining the true
acquiescence of his spirit, but moreover lives, as it were
unwitting of himself, and of God, and of things, and as soon as
he ceases to suffer, ceases also to be.

Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is
scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of
himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal
necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true
acquiescence of his spirit.

If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result
seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered.  Needs
must it be hard, since it is so seldom found.  How would it be
possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without
great labour be found, that it should be by almost all men
neglected? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are
rare.


End of the Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza


[1] "Affectiones"

[2] "Forma"

[3] "Animata"

[4] A Baconian phrase.  Nov. Org. Aph. 100.  [Pollock, p. 126, n.]

[5] Conscientiae morsus--thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.

[6] By "men" in this and the following propositions, I mean men
whom we regard without any particular emotion.

[7] So Van Vloten and Bruder.  The Dutch version and Camerer read,
"an internal cause."  "Honor" = Gloria.

[8] See previous endnote.

[9] Ovid, "Amores," II. xix. 4,5.  Spinoza transposes the verses.

  "Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;

  Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat."

[10] This is possible, though the human mind is part of the divine
intellect, as I have shown in II. xiii. note.

[11] Gloria.

[12] Ov. Met. vii.20, "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor."

[13] Honestas

[14] Land reads: "Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur"--which I
have translated above.  He suggests as alternative readings to
'quod', 'quo' (= whereby) and 'quodque' (= and that).

[15] "Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro." (Van Vloten).
Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod causa est faturi
alicujus mali." The last word of the latter is an obvious
misprint, and is corrected by the Dutch translator into "majoris
boni." (Pollock, p. 268, note.)

[16] Continuo.  Rendered "constantly" by Mr. Pollock on the ground
that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context.
I venture to think, however, that a tolerable sense may be
obtained without doing violence to Spinoza's scholarship.

[17] Affectiones.  Camerer reads affectus----emotions.









End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza

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