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_BY THE SAME AUTHOR_

INTERNATIONAL LAW

VOL. I.--PEACE

2nd Edition

8vo. 18s. net

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.

LONDON, NEW YORK, BOMBAY, AND CALCUTTA




INTERNATIONAL LAW


A TREATISE

BY

L. OPPENHEIM, M.A., LL.D.

WHEWELL PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

HONORARY MEMBER OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF JURISPRUDENCE AT MADRID


VOL. II.

WAR AND NEUTRALITY

_SECOND EDITION_


LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.

39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON

NEW YORK, BOMBAY, AND CALCUTTA

1912


All rights reserved




PREFACE

TO THE SECOND EDITION


The course of events since 1906, when the second volume of this work
first made its appearance, and the results of further research have
necessitated, as in the case of the first volume, the thorough revision
of the text, the rewriting of many portions, and the discussion of a
number of new topics. The additions to this volume are even more
numerous than those to the first, with the consequence that, in spite of
the typographical devices explained in the preface to the second edition
of the first volume, the text of this volume has been increased by one
hundred pages. The increase is, in some measure, due to the fact that
the thirteen Conventions of the Second Hague Peace Conference, and,
further, the Declaration of London, are fully discussed and expounded.
But the increase is also due to the fact that a number of other new
topics have been discussed; I will only mention the questions whether
enemy subjects have _persona standi in judicio_ ([p] 100_a_), and
whether trading with enemy subjects is permitted ([p] 101).

The system of the work, with but occasional slight alterations in
arrangement and the headings of the sections, remains the same. In those
cases, however, in which a portion had to be entirely rewritten--as, for
instance, that on Enemy Character, that on Commencement of War, and that
on Unneutral Service--the arrangement of the topics differs from that in
the first edition, and the headings of the sections also differ. Apart
from many new sections, a whole chapter treating of the proposed
International Prize Court has been added at the end of the volume.

Since some of the Conventions produced by the Second Peace Conference,
and, further, the Declaration of London, have not yet been ratified, the
task of the writer of a comprehensive treatise on International Law is
very difficult: he must certainly not treat the rules in these
unratified documents as law, but, on the other hand, he must not ignore
them. For this reason the right method seemed to be to give everywhere
the law hitherto prevailing, and to give also the changes in the law
which are proposed by these unratified documents. I venture to hope that
this method will enable the reader to form a judgment of his own with
regard to the merits of the Declaration of London. I have not concealed
my conviction that the ratification of this Declaration would mark great
progress in the development of International Law, since it offers a
common agreement upon a number of subjects concerning which there has
been hitherto much discord both in theory and practice. But I have
endeavoured to put the matter impartially before the reader, and I have
taken special care to draw attention to very numerous points which have
not been settled by the Declaration of London.

In revising and rewriting this volume I have remained true to the
principle of impartiality, neither taking the part of any one nation,
nor denouncing any other. The discredit which International Law
concerning War and Neutrality suffers in the minds of certain sections
of the public is largely due to the fact that many writers have not in
the past approached the subject with that impartial and truly
international spirit which is indispensable for its proper treatment.

Many friends of the book have asked that the second edition might, in
the Appendix, offer an English translation of the French texts
concerned. I was prepared to accede to their request, but had to abstain
from doing so on account of the fact that the addition of a translation
would have made the volume too bulky for convenience; the new
Conventions of the Second Hague Peace Conference, the Declaration of
London together with the Report of the Drafting Committee of the Naval
Conference of London, the Naval Prize Bill of 1911, and the Geneva
Convention Act of 1911, all of which necessarily had to be added, having
increased the Appendix very considerably.

It has been the aim of my assistants and myself to make the quotations
in this and the preceding volume as correct as possible. However,
considering that there are many thousands of citations, it would be a
miracle if there were not numerous mistakes and misprints in them, in
spite of the great care which has been bestowed upon the matter. I shall
be most grateful, therefore, if readers will kindly draw my attention to
any inaccuracy they may notice.

My thanks are once more due to reviewers and readers who have drawn my
attention to mistakes and misprints in the first edition; and I am again
indebted to Miss B. M. Rutter and Mr. C. F. Pond for their valuable
assistance in reading the proofs and in drawing up the Table of Cases
and the alphabetical Index.

    L. OPPENHEIM.

      WHEWELL HOUSE,
      CAMBRIDGE,
      _June 1, 1912_.




ABBREVIATIONS

OF TITLES OF BOOKS, ETC., QUOTED IN THE TEXT


The books referred to in the bibliography and notes are, as a rule,
quoted with their full titles and the date of their publication. But
certain books, periodicals, and Conventions which are very often
referred to throughout this work are quoted in an abbreviated form, as
follows:--

      A.J.                  =  The American Journal of International
                                   Law.
      Annuaire              =  Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit
                                   International.
      Ariga                 =  Ariga, La Guerre Russo-Japonaise
                                   (1908).
      Barboux               =  Barboux, Jurisprudence Du Conseil Des
                                   Prises Pendant La Guerre De 1870-71
                                   (1871).
      Barclay, Problems     =  Barclay, Problems of International
                                   Practice  and Diplomacy (1907).
      Bernsten              =  Bernsten, Das Seekriegsrecht (1911).
      Bluntschli            =  Bluntschli, Das moderne Voelkerrecht der
                                   civilisirten Staaten als Rechtsbuch
                                   dargestellt, 3rd ed. (1878).
      Boeck                 =  Boeck, De La Propriete Privee Ennemie
                                   Sous Pavillon Ennemi (1882).
      Boidin                =  Boidin, Les Lois De La Guerre et Les Deux
                                   Conferences De La Haye (1908).
      Bonfils               =  Bonfils, Manuel De Droit International
                                   Public, 6th ed. by Fauchille (1912).
      Bordwell              =  Bordwell, The Law of War between
                                   Belligerents (1908).
      Bulmerincq            =  Bulmerincq, Das Voelkerrecht (1887).
      Calvo                 =  Calvo, Le Droit International, etc., 5th
                                   ed., 6 vols. (1896).
      Convention I.         =  Hague Convention for the pacific
                                   settlement of international disputes.
      Convention II.        =  Hague Convention respecting the
                                   limitation of the employment of force
                                   for the recovery of contract debts.
      Convention III.       =  Hague Convention relative to the
                                   commencement of hostilities.
      Convention IV.        =  Hague Convention concerning the laws and
                                   customs of war on land.
      Convention V.         =  Hague Convention respecting the rights
                                   and duties of neutral Powers and
                                   persons in war on land.
      Convention VI.        =  Hague Convention relative to the status
                                   of enemy merchantmen at the outbreak
                                   of hostilities.
      Convention VII.       =  Hague Convention relative to the
                                   conversion of merchantmen into
                                   men-of-war.
      Convention VIII.      =  Hague Convention concerning the laying of
                                   automatic submarine contact mines.
      Convention IX.        =  Hague Convention respecting bombardment
                                   by naval forces in time of war.
      Convention X.         =  Hague Convention for the adaptation of
                                   the principles of the Geneva
                                   Convention to maritime war.
      Convention XI.        =  Hague Convention concerning certain
                                   restrictions on the exercise of the
                                   right of capture in maritime war.
      Convention XII.       =  Hague Convention concerning the
                                   establishment of an International
                                   Prize Court.
      Convention XIII.      =  Hague Convention respecting the rights
                                   and duties of neutral Powers in
                                   maritime war.
      Despagnet             =  Despagnet, Cours De Droit International
                                   Public, 4th ed. by de Boeck (1910).
      Deuxieme Conference,
          Actes             =  Deuxieme Conference Internationale De La
                                   Paix, Actes et Documents, 3 vols.
                                   (1908-1909).
      Dupuis                =  Dupuis, Le Droit De La Guerre Maritime
                                   D'apres Les Doctrines Anglaises
                                   Contemporaines (1899).
      Dupuis, Guerre        =  Dupuis, Le Droit De La Guerre Maritime
                                   D'apres Les Conferences de la Haye et
                                   de Londres (1911).
      Field                 =  Field, Outlines of an International
                                   Code, 2 vols. (1872-1873).
      Fiore                 =  Fiore, Nouveau Droit International
                                   Public, deuxieme edition, traduite
                                   de l'Italien et annotee par Antoine,
                                   3 vols. (1885).
      Fiore, Code           =  Fiore, Le Droit International Codifie,
                                   nouvelle edition, traduite de
                                   l'Italien par Antoine (1911).
      Gareis                =  Gareis, Institutionen des Voelkerrechts,
                                   2nd ed. (1901).
      Gessner               =  Gessner, Le Droit Des Neutres Sur Mer
                                   (1865).
      Grotius               =  Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625).
      Hague Regulations     =  Hague Regulations respecting the Laws
                                   and Customs of War on Land, adopted
                                   by the Hague Peace Conference of
                                   1907.
      Hall                  =  Hall, A Treatise on International Law,
                                   4th ed. (1895).
      Halleck               =  Halleck, International Law, 3rd English
                                   ed. by Sir Sherston Baker, 2 vols.
                                   (1893).
      Hartmann              =  Hartmann, Institutionen des praktischen
                                   Voelkerrechts in Friedenszeiten
                                   (1874).
      Hautefeuille          =  Hautefeuille, Des Droits Et Des Devoirs
                                   Des Nations Neutres En Temps De
                                   Guerre Maritime, 3 vols. 2nd ed.
                                   (1858).
      Heffter               =  Heffter, Das Europaeische Voelkerrecht
                                   der Gegenwart, 8th ed. by Geffcken
                                   (1888).
      Heilborn, Rechte      =  Heilborn, Rechte und Pflichten der
                                   Neutralen Staaten in Bezug auf die
                                   waehrend des Krieges auf ihr Gebiet
                                   uebertretenden Angehoerigen einer
                                   Armee und das dorthin gebrachte
                                   Kriegsmaterial der Kriegfuehrenden
                                   Parteien (1888).
      Heilborn, System      =  Heilborn, Das System des Voelkerrechts
                                   entwickelt aus den voelkerrechtlichen
                                   Begriffen (1896).
      Higgins               =  Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences
                                   (1909).
      Holland, Prize  Law   =  Holland, A Manual of Naval Prize Law
                                   (1888).
      Holland, Studies      =  Holland, Studies in International Law
                                   (1898).
      Holland,
          Jurisprudence     =  Holland, The Elements of Jurisprudence,
                                   6th ed. (1893).
      Holland, War          =  Holland, The Laws of War on Land (1908).
      Holtzendorff          =  Holtzendorff, Handbuch des Voelkerrechts,
                                   4 vols. (1885-1889).
      Kleen                 =  Kleen, Lois et Usages De La Neutralite,
                                   2 vols. (1900).
      Klueber               =  Klueber, Europaeisches Voelkerrecht, 2nd
                                   ed. by Morstadt (1851).
      Kriegsbrauch          =  Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege (1902). (Heft
                                   31 der kriegsgeschichtlichen
                                   Einzelschriften, herausgegeben vom
                                   Grossen Generalstabe,
                                   Kriegsgeschichtliche Abtheilung I.).
      Land Warfare          =  Edmonds and Oppenheim, Land Warfare. An
                                   Exposition of the Laws and Usages of
                                   War on Land for the Guidance of
                                   Officers of His Majesty's Army
                                   (1912).
      Lawrence              =  Lawrence, The Principles of International
                                   Law, 4th ed. (1910).
      Lawrence, Essays      =  Lawrence, Essays on some Disputed
                                   Questions of Modern International Law
                                   (1884).
      Lawrence, War         =  Lawrence, War and Neutrality in the Far
                                   East, 2nd ed. (1904).
      Lemonon               =  Lemonon, La Seconde Conference De La
                                   Paix (1908).
      Liszt                 =  Liszt, Das Voelkerrecht, 6th ed. (1910).
      Longuet               =  Longuet, Le Droit Actuel De La Guerre
                                   Terrestre (1901).
      Lorimer               =  Lorimer, The Institutes of International
                                   Law, 2 vols. (1883-1884).
      Maine                 =  Maine, International Law, 2nd ed. (1894).
      Manning               =  Manning, Commentaries on the Law of
                                   Nations, new ed. by Sheldon Amos
                                   (1875).
      Martens               =  Martens, Voelkerrecht, German translation
                                   of the Russian original, 2 vols.
                                   (1883).
      Martens, G. F.        =  G. F. Martens, Precis Du Droit Des Gens
                                   Moderne De l'Europe, nouvelle ed. by
                                   Verge, 2 vols. (1858).
      Martens, R.        |
      Martens, N.R.      |
      Martens, N.S.      |
      Martens, N.R.G.    |
      Martens, N.R.G.    |
          2nd Ser.       |
      Martens. N.R.G.    |
          3rd Ser.       |  =  These are the abbreviated quotations of
                                   the different parts of Martens,
                                   Recueil de Traites (see p. 102 of
                                   vol. i.), which are in common use.
      Martens, Causes       =  Martens, Causes Celebres du Droit des
          Celebres                 Gens, 5 vols., 2nd ed. (1858-1861).
      Merignhac             =  Merignhac, Les Lois Et Coutumes De La
                                   Guerre Sur Terre (1903).
      Meurer                =  Meurer, Die Haager Friedenskonferenz, 2
                                   vols. (1905-1907).
      Moore                 =  Moore, A Digest of International Law, 8
                                   vols., Washington (1906).
      Moore, Arbitrations   =  Moore, History and Digest of the
                                   Arbitrations to which the United
                                   States have been a Party, 6 vols.
                                   (1898).
      Nippold               =  Nippold, Die Zweite Haager
                                   Friedenskonferenz, 2 vols.
                                   (1908-1911).
      Nys                   =  Nys, Le Droit International, vol. i.
                                   (1904).
      Ortolan               =  Ortolan, Regles Internationales et
                                   Diplomatie de la Mer, 2 vols., 3rd
                                   ed. (1856).
      Perels                =  Perels, Das Internationale oeffentliche
                                   Seerecht der Gegenwart, 2nd ed.
                                   (1903).
      Phillimore            =  Phillimore, Commentaries upon
                                   International Law, 4 vols., 3rd ed.
                                   (1879-1888).
      Piedelievre           =  Piedelievre, Precis De Droit
                                   International Public, 2 vols.
                                   (1894-1895).
      Pillet                =  Pillet, Les Lois Actuelles De La Guerre
                                   (1901).
      Pistoye et Duverdy    =  Pistoye et Duverdy, Traite Des Prises
                                   Maritimes, 2 vols. (1854-1859).
      Pradier-Fodere        =  Pradier-Fodere, Traite De Droit
                                   International Public, 8 vols.
                                   (1885-1906).
      Pufendorf             =  Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium
                                   (1672).
      R.G.                  =  Revue Generale De Droit International
                                   Public.
      R.I.                  =  Revue De Droit International Et De
                                   Legislation Comparee.
      Rivier                =  Rivier, Principes Du Droit Des Gens, 2
                                   vols. (1896).
      Scott, Conferences    =  Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of
                                   1899 and 1907, vol. i. (1909).
      Spaight               =  Spaight, War Rights on Land (1911).
      Takahashi             =  Takahashi, International Law applied to
                                   the Russo-Japanese War (1908).
      Taylor                =  Taylor, A Treatise on International
                                   Public Law (1901).
      Testa                 =  Testa, Le Droit Public International
                                   Maritime, traduction du Portugais par
                                   Boutiron (1886).
      Twiss                 =  Twiss, The Law of Nations, 2 vols., 2nd
                                   ed. (1884, 1875).
      Ullmann               =  Ullmann, Voelkerrecht, 2nd ed. (1908).
      U.S. Naval War Code   =  The Laws and Usages of War at Sea,
                                  published on June 27, 1900, by the
                                  Navy Department, Washington, for the
                                  use of the U. S. Navy and for the
                                  information of all concerned.
      Vattel                =  Vattel, Le Droit Des Gens, 4 books in 2
                                   vols., nouvelle ed. (Neuchatel,
                                   1773).
      Walker                =  Walker, A Manual of Public International
                                   Law (1895).
      Walker, History       =  Walker, A History of the Law of Nations,
                                   vol. i. (1899).
      Walker, Science       =  Walker, The Science of International
                                   Law (1893).
      Wehberg, Kommentar    =  Wehberg, Kommentar zu dem Haager Abkommen
                                   betreffend die friedliche Erledigung
                                   internationaler Streitigkeiten
                                   (1911).
      Westlake              =  Westlake, International Law, 2 vols.
                                   (1904-1907).
      Westlake, Chapters    =  Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of
                                   International Law (1894).
      Wharton               =  Wharton, A Digest of the International
                                   Law of the United States, 3 vols.
                                   (1886).
      Wheaton               =  Wheaton, Elements of International Law,
                                   8th American ed. by Dana (1866).
      Zorn                  =  Zorn, Das Kriegsrecht zu Lande in seiner
                                   neuesten Gestaltung (1906).
      Z.V.                  =  Zeitschrift fuer Voelkerrecht und
                                   Bundesstaatsrecht.




CASES CITED


Acteon, the, [p] 194, p. 243 note 5; [p] 431, p. 547 note 2

Adonis, the, [p] 386, p. 472 note 7; [p] 390, p. 477 note 3

Africa, the, [p] 413, p. 531 note 1

Alabama, the, [p] 335, p. 406

Alaska Boundary Dispute (1903), [p] 14, p. 18

Alcinous _v._ Nygreu, [p] 101, p. 137 note 7

Alexander, the, [p] 390, p. 477 note 3

Alexis, the, [p] 34, p. 40

Andersen _v._ Marten, [p] 435, p. 555 note 1

Andre, Major, [p] 160, p. 198

Ann Green, the, [p] 92, p. 120 note 2

Anna, the, [p] 362, p. 443

Anthon _v._ Fisher, [p] 195, p. 246 note 1

Antoine _v._ Morshead, [p] 101, p. 137 note 3

Apollo, the, [p] 427, p. 545 note 1

Aryol, the. _See_ Orel

Asgill, Captain, [p] 249, p. 307

Askold, the, [p] 347 (3), p. 422

Astrolabe, the, [p] 186, p. 233

Atalanta, the, [p] 409, p. 522; [p] 412, p. 527 note 2

Aurora, the, [p] 347 (4), p. 423

Awni-Illa, the, [p] 213, p. 269


Baltica, the, [p] 88, p. 110 note 2; [p] 90, p. 116 note 1; [p] 91,
p. 118 note 2

Bellona, the, [p] 271, p. 332

Benito Estenger, the, [p] 91, p. 118 note 2

Bentzen _v._ Boyle, [p] 90, p. 116 note 4

Bermuda, the, [p] 385, p. 470; [p] 400, p. 499 note 1; [p] 400, p. 500
note 1

Betsey, the, [p] 385, p. 469 note 1

Bolivia-Peruvian Boundary Dispute (1910), [p] 16, p. 19

Boudeuse, La. _See_ La Boudeuse

Boussmaker, _ex parte_, [p] 100_a_, p. 134 note 4; [p] 101, p. 137
note 7

Boussole, the, [p] 186, p. 233

Brandon _v._ Curling, [p] 101, p. 138 note 2

Bundesrath, the, [p] 400, p. 500; [p] 401, p. 501 note 1; [p] 402,
p. 502; [p] 402, p. 503 note 2; [p] 433, p. 552


Calypso, the, [p] 384, p. 467 note 3

Camille, the, [p] 349, p. 426

Captain W. Menzel, the, [p] 311, p. 376 note [375 note 4]

Carolina, the, [p] 408, p. 519

Caroline, the (1808), [p] 409, p. 522 note 1

Caroline, the (1904), [p] 311, p. 376 note 1

Carthage, the, [p] 403_a_, p. 506 note 1

Cesarewitch, the, [p] 347 (4), p. 423

Ceylon, the, [p] 185, p. 231 note 2

Charlotta, the (1810), [p] 386, p. 472 note 3

Charlotta, the (1814), [p] 101, p. 137 note 7

Circassian, the, [p] 380, p. 463 note 2

Columbia, the, [p] 382, p. 465 note 3; [p] 390, p. 477 note 3

Commercen, the, [p] 401, p. 501 note 2

Cornu _v._ Blackburne, [p] 195, p. 246 note 1

Cumberland, the, [p] 186, p. 233 note 2


Daifje, the, [p] 225, p. 283 note 4

Danous, the, [p] 88, p. 112 note 1; [p] 90, p. 115 note 1

De Fortuyn, the, [p] 181, p. 225 note 1

De Jager _v._ Attorney-General, [p] 100, p. 132 note 3

De Jarnett _v._ De Giversville, [p] 100_a_, p. 134 note 1

Dessaix, the, [p] 194, p. 244

De Wahl _v._ Browne, [p] 100_a_, p. 135 note 1

De Wuetz _v._ Hendricks, [p] 352, p. 430 note 2

Diana, the (1799), [p] 189, p. 236

Diana, the (1904), [p] 347 (3), p. 422

Discovery, the, [p] 186, p. 232

Doelwijk, the, [p] 403, p. 505; [p] 436, p. 556

Dogger Bank, [p] 5, p. 7 note 2; [p] 11, p. 15 note 1

Dorsey _v._ Kyle, [p] 100_a_, p. 134 note 1

Driefontein Consolidated Gold Mines Co. _v._ Janson, [p] 100_a_, p. 134
note 3

Du Belloix _v._ Lord Waterpark, [p] 101, p. 137 note 9

Duclair, British coal vessels at, [p] 365, p. 448


El Arish, Capitulation of, [p] 229, pp. 287-9

Elba, the, [p] 348 (2), p. 424

Elisabeth, the, [p] 189, p. 236

Eliza and Katy, the, [p] 428, p. 545 note 3

Elizabeth, the, [p] 386, p. 472 note 8

Elsebe, the, [p] 425, p. 543 note 2

Emilia, [p] 88, p. 110 note 2

Espiegle, L'. _See_ L'Espiegle

Esposito _v._ Bowden, [p] 101, p. 137 notes 1, 7, and 8; p. 138 note 1

Etoile, L'. _See_ L'Etoile

Euridice, the, [p] 349, p. 426

Exchange, the, [p] 390, p. 477 note 3


Fanny, the, [p] 185, p. 232 note 2; [p] 424, p. 542 note 2

Felicity, the, [p] 194, p. 243 note 5; [p] 431, p. 547 note 2

Florida, the, [p] 362, p. 443

Foersigtigheten, the, [p] 349, p. 426

Fortuna, the, [p] 386, p. 472 note 4

Fox and others, the, [p] 434, p. 554 note 1

Franciska, the, [p] 370, p. 452 note 2; [p] 380, p. 462 note 2;
[p] 380, p. 464 note 1; [p] 381, p. 464 note 2; [p] 382, p. 465

Freden, the, [p] 360, p. 441 note 1

Frederick Moltke, the, [p] 387, p. 473 note 3

Freundschaft, the, [p] 90, p. 116 note 5

Friendship, the, [p] 408, p. 518; [p] 412, p. 527 note 2

Furtado _v._ Rodgers, [p] 101, p. 137 note 1; [p] 101, p. 138 note 2


Gamba _v._ Le Mesurier, [p] 101, p. 138 note 2

Gelderland, the, [p] 354, p. 433

General, the, [p] 402, p. 502

General Armstrong, the, [p] 361, p. 442

General Hamilton, the, [p] 91, p. 118 note 3; [p] 389, p. 476 note 1

Genoa, Capitulation of, [p] 226, p. 284 note 1

Georgina, the, [p] 185, p. 231 note 2

Gerasimo, the, [p] 371, p. 453 note 3

German contract for cutting trees in French forests, [p] 282, p. 342

Gist _v._ Mason, [p] 101, p. 136 note 3

Gloire, La. _See_ La Gloire

Goodrich and De Forest _v._ Gordon, [p] 195, p. 246 note 1

Griswold _v._ Boddington, [p] 101, p. 137 note 8

Grossovoi, the, [p] 347 (3), p. 422


Haimun, the, [p] 210, p. 262 note 1; [p] 356, p. 437

Hale, Captain Nathan, [p] 161, p. 199

Hanger _v._ Abbot, [p] 100_a_, p. 135 note 1

Hardy, Le. _See_ Le Hardy

Harmony, the, [p] 88, p. 110 note 2

Henkle _v._ London Exchange Assurance Co., [p] 101, p. 136 note 3

Henrik and Maria, the, [p] 375, p. 456 note 1

Herzog, the, [p] 402, p. 502; [p] 433, p. 552

Hipsang, the, [p] 431, p. 548

Hoare _v._ Allan, [p] 101, p. 137 note 10

Hobbs _v._ Henning, [p] 402, p. 503 note 4

Hoffnung, the, [p] 384, p. 467 note 3

Hoop, the, [p] 100_a_, p. 133 note 2; [p] 101, p. 137 note 1;
[p] 195, p. 246 note 1

Hope, the, [p] 412, p. 527 note 3

Hunter, the, [p] 427, p. 544 note 1

Hurtige Hanne, the, [p] 386, p. 472 note 5

Hussar, the, [p] 211, p. 263


Icona, the, [p] 431, p. 548

Iltis, the, [p] 348 (1), p. 424

Imina, the, [p] 399, p. 498 note 1; [p] 402, p. 503

Indian Chief, the, [p] 90, p. 116 note 2

Industrie, the, [p] 410, p. 525 note 1

Inflexible, the, [p] 223, p. 282

Investigator, the, [p] 186, p. 233 note 2

Invincible, the, [p] 223, p. 282

Italy _v._ Peru (Canevaro claim), [p] 24, p. 31 note 1


Jager. _See_ De Jager

Jakoga, Major, [p] 161, p. 199 note 1; [p] 255, p. 315

James Cook, the, [p] 385, p. 469 note 3

Jameson Raid, [p] 56, p. 62

Jan Frederick, the, [p] 91, p. 118 notes 4 and 6; [p] 92, p. 120 note 2

Jarnett. _See_ De Jarnett

Jemchug, the, [p] 347 (4), p. 423

Jemmy, the, [p] 91, p. 118 note 5

Joan, Le. _See_ Le Joan

Johanna Emilie, the, [p] 88, p. 110 note 2

Jonge Klassina, the, [p] 90, p. 116 note 5

Jonge Margaretha, the, [p] 394, p. 486 note 3

Jonge Pieter, the, [p] 101, p. 137 note 6

Juno, the, [p] 387, p. 473 note 4


Kellner _v._ Le Mesurier, [p] 101, p. 138 note 2

Knight Commander, the, [p] 431, p. 548

Korietz, the, [p] 320, p. 388; [p] 348 (2), p. 424; [p] 361, p. 442
note 3

Kow-shing, the, [p] 89, p. 114 note 1; [p] 348, p. 424


La Boudeuse, the, [p] 186, p. 232

La Gloire, the, [p] 225, p. 283 note 4

La Paix, the, [p] 90, p. 117 note 1

La Rosina, the, [p] 225, p. 283 note 3

La Santissima Trinidad, the, [p] 334, p. 405

Laura-Louise. _See_ Le Laura-Louise

Lavabre _v._ Wilson, [p] 101, p. 136 note 3

Le Hardy contre La Voltigeante, [p] 88, p. 111; [p] 90, p. 117 note 1

Le Joan, the, [p] 90, p. 117 note 1

Le Laura-Louise, the, [p] 90, p. 117 note 1

Lena, the, [p] 347 (3), p. 422

Le Nicolaues, the, [p] 90, p. 117 note 1

L'Espiegle, the, [p] 362, p. 443

Le Thalia, the, [p] 90, p. 117 note 1

L'Etoile, the, [p] 186, p. 232

Leucade, the, [p] 194, p. 243 note 5; [p] 431, p. 547 note 2

Lion, the, [p] 348, p. 424

Lisette, the, [p] 399, p. 498 note 1

Ludwig, the, [p] 194, p. 244

Luxor, the, [p] 404, p. 507; [p] 437, p. 558


Madison, the, [p] 409, p. 522 note 2

Madonna delle Gracie, [p] 101, p. 137 note 4

Malacca, the, [p] 84, p. 102

Manouba, the, [p] 413, p. 531 note 1

Margaret, the, [p] 404, p. 507 note 1

Maria, the (1799), [p] 422, p. 540 note 1; [p] 423, p. 541 note 1;
[p] 425, p. 543 note 1; [p] 434, p. 554 note 1

Maria, the (1805), [p] 390, p. 477 note 4

Maria _v._ Hall, [p] 100_a_, p. 134 note 2; [p] 101, p. 137 note 5

Mashona, the, [p] 101, p. 137 note 1

Mayer _v._ Reed, [p] 101, p. 137 note 9

Melville _v._ De Wold, [p] 101, p. 137 note 7

Mentor, the, [p] 272, p. 333 note 1

Mercurius, the, [p] 390, p. 477 note 3

Meteor, the, [p] 334, p. 405

Minerva, the, [p] 362, p. 443

Modeste, the, [p] 360, p. 441 note 1

Montara, the, [p] 89, p. 114 note 2


Nancy, the (1800), [p] 404, p. 507 note 1

Nancy, the (1809), [p] 380, p. 463 note 2

Nancy Court of Appeal, [p] 172, p. 215

Naniwa, the, [p] 89, p. 114 note 1; [p] 348, p. 423

Neptunus, the (1799), [p] 384, p. 467 note 3

Neptunus, the (1800), [p] 384, p. 467 note 3

Nereide, the, [p] 185, p. 232 note 2; [p] 424, p. 542, note 2

Neutralitet, the, [p] 386, p. 472 note 9

New York Life Insurance Co. _v._ Buck, [p] 101, p. 138 note 3

New York Life Insurance Co. _v._ Davis, [p] 101, p. 138 note 3

New York Life Insurance Co. _v._ Stathem, [p] 101, p. 138 note 3

New York Life Insurance Co. _v._ Symes, [p] 101, p. 138 note 3

Niagara, the, [p] 382, p. 465

Nigretia, the, [p] 408, p. 519 note 2

North-Eastern Boundary Dispute between Great Britain and the United
States (1831), [p] 16, p. 19

North German Confederation Volunteer Fleet scheme, [p] 84, p. 101

Novara, the, [p] 186, p. 233

Novik, the, [p] 347 (4), p. 423


Oki, Captain Teisuki, [p] 161, p. 199 note 1; [p] 255, p. 315

Oldhamia, the, [p] 206, p. 256 note 1; [p] 431, p. 548

Oleg, the, [p] 347 (4), p. 423

Olinde Rodrigues, the, [p] 380, p. 463 note 2

Orel (or Aryol), the, [p] 206, p. 256 note 1

Orinoco Steamship Co., [p] 16, p. 19

Orozembo, the, [p] 408, p. 518; [p] 408, p. 519


Pacifico, Don, [p] 35, p. 41; [p] 44, p. 49

Paix, La. _See_ La Paix

Palme, the, [p] 186, p. 233

Panaghia Rhomba, the, [p] 390, p. 477 note 3

Paquette Habana, the, [p] 187, p. 234 note 1

Pascal, the, [p] 348 (2), p. 424

Peterburg, the, [p] 84, p. 102

Peterhoff, the, [p] 373, p. 454; [p] 385, p. 470; [p] 400, p. 500
note 1; [p] 401, p. 501

Phoenix, the, [p] 90, p. 116 note 4

Planche _v._ Fletcher, [p] 101, p. 136 note 3

Portland, the, [p] 90, p. 116 note 5

Postilion, the, [p] 88, p. 112 note 1; [p] 90, p. 115 note 1

Potts _v._ Bell, [p] 101, p. 137 note 1; [p] 101, p. 138 note 2

Princesse Marie, the, [p] 431, p. 548


Quang-nam, the, [p] 410, p. 525, note 1


Ramillies, [p] 211, p. 263

Rapid, the, [p] 409, p. 522

Ras-el-Tin Fort, [p] 223, p. 282

Recovery, the, [p] 434, p. 554 note 1

Reshitelni, the, [p] 320, p. 389; [p] 361, p. 442 note 3

Resolution, the, [p] 186, p. 232

Reuss, M. de, [p] 34, p. 40

Richmond, the, [p] 397, p. 494 note 1

Rolla, the, [p] 370, p. 452 note 2; [p] 375, p. 456 note 2

Rose in Bloom, the, [p] 387, p. 474 note 2

Rosina, La. _See_ La Rosina


St. Kilda, the, [p] 431, p. 548

St. Nicholas, the, [p] 428, p. 545 note 4

Samuel, the, [p] 101, p. 137 note 6

Santissima Trinidad, La. _See_ La Santissima Trinidad

Sarah, the, [p] 428, p. 545 note 2

Sechs Geschwistern, the, [p] 91, p. 118 note 5

Seymour _v._ London and Provincial Marine Insurance Co., [p] 402, p. 504
note [503 note 4]

Shepeler _v._ Durand, [p] 100_a_, p. 133 note 4

Shepherdess, the, [p] 386, p. 472 note 6

Sicilian Sulphur Monopoly, [p] 34, p. 39

Silesian Loan, [p] 37, p. 44; [p] 437, p. 557

Smolensk, the, [p] 84, p. 102

Society for the Propagation of the Gospel _v._ Town of Newhaven, [p] 99,
p. 130 note 1

Spes and Irene, the, [p] 386, p. 472 note 10

Springbok, the, [p] 385, p. 470; [p] 390, p. 477; [p] 400, p. 500
note 1; [p] 401, p. 501

Stackelberg, Baron de, [p] 37, p. 43

Stephen Hart, the, [p] 385, p. 470; [p] 400, p. 499 note 1

Stert, the, [p] 388, p. 474 note 3

Sutton _v._ Sutton, [p] 99, p. 130 note 1

Swineherd, the, [p] 271, p. 332

Sybille, the, [p] 211, p. 263


Talbot, the, [p] 348 (2), p. 424

Temeraire, the, [p] 223, p. 282

Tetardos, the, [p] 431, p. 548

Teutonia, the, [p] 101, p. 138 note 1

Thalia, Le. _See_ Le Thalia.

Thea, the, [p] 431, p. 548

Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar _v._ Boyle, [p] 90, p. 116 note 4

Trende Sostre, the, [p] 399, p. 498 note 1

Trent, the, [p] 408, p. 519 note 3; [p] 431, p. 530

Twee Gebroeders, the, [p] 362, p. 443


Variag, the, [p] 320, p. 388; [p] 348 (2), p. 424; [p] 361, p. 442
note 3

Vega, the, [p] 186, p. 233

Venezuelan Boundary Dispute (1900), [p] 14, p. 18

Venus, the (1803), [p] 225, p. 283 note 3

Venus, the (1814), [p] 88, p. 112 note 1; [p] 90, p. 116 note 3

Victor, the, [p] 349, p. 427

Vigilantia, the, [p] 91, p. 118 note 2

Vorwaerts, the, [p] 194, p. 244

Vrouw Judith, the, [p] 376, p. 458 note 1; [p] 384, p. 467 note 3;
[p] 387, p. 474 note 1

Vrow Houwina, the, [p] 401, p. 501

Vrow Margaretha, the, [p] 91, p. 118 note 4


Wachuset, the, [p] 362, p. 443

Wahl. _See_ De Wahl

War Onskan, the, [p] 432, p. 551 note 3

Washburne, [p] 157, p. 194

Wells _v._ Williams, [p] 100_a_, p. 133 note 3

Welvaart van Pillaw, the, [p] 389 p. 476 note 1

William, the, [p] 400, p. 499 note 1

Willison _v._ Paterson, [p] 101, p. 137 note 2


Yangtsze Insurance Association _v._ Indemnity Mutual Marine Assurance
Company, [p] 407, p. 516 note 1

Young Jacob and Joanna, the, [p] 187, p. 234 note 2




CONTENTS

OF

THE SECOND VOLUME


PART I

CHAPTER I--AMICABLE SETTLEMENT OF STATE DIFFERENCES

  I. _State Differences and their Amicable Settlement in General_

      SECT.                                                         PAGE

        1. Legal and political International Differences               3
        2. International Law not exclusively concerned with Legal
               Differences                                             4
        3. Amicable in contradistinction to compulsive settlement of
               Differences                                             4

  II. _Negotiation_

        4. In what Negotiation consists                                6
        5. International Commissions of Inquiry                        6
        6. Effect of Negotiation                                       9

  III. _Good Offices and Mediation_

        7. Occasions for Good Offices and Mediation                   10
        8. Right and Duty of offering, requesting, and rendering
               Good Offices and Mediation                             10
        9. Good Offices in contradistinction to Mediation             11
       10. Good Offices and Mediation according to the  Hague
               Arbitration Convention                                 12
       11. Value of Good Offices and Mediation                        14

  IV. _Arbitration_

       12. Conception of Arbitration                                  16
       13. Treaty of Arbitration                                      16
       14. Who is to Arbitrate?                                       17
       15. On what principles Arbitrators proceed and decide          18
       16. Binding force of Arbitral Verdict                          18
       17. What differences can be decided by Arbitration             19
       18. Value of Arbitration                                       22

  V. _Arbitration according to the Hague Convention_

       19. Arbitral Justice in general                                23
       20. Arbitration Treaty and appointment of Arbitrators          26
       21. Procedure of and before the Arbitral Tribunal              27
       22. Arbitral Award                                             30
       23. Binding force of Awards                                    30
       24. Award binding upon Parties only                            31
       25. Costs of Arbitration                                       32
       25_a_. Arbitration by Summary Procedure                        32

CHAPTER II--COMPULSIVE SETTLEMENT OF STATE DIFFERENCES

  I. _On Compulsive Means of Settlement of State Differences in General_

       26. Conception and kinds of Compulsive Means of Settlement     34
       27. Compulsive Means in contradistinction to War               34
       28. Compulsive Means in contradistinction to an Ultimatum and
               Demonstrations                                         35

  II. _Retorsion_

       29. Conception and Character of Retorsion                      36
       30. Retorsion, when justified                                  37
       31. Retorsion, how exercised                                   37
       32. Value of Retorsion                                         38

  III. _Reprisals_

       33. Conception of Reprisals in contradistinction to Retorsion  38
       34. Reprisals admissible for all International Delinquencies   39
       35. Reprisals admissible for International Delinquencies only  40
       36. Reprisals, by whom performed                               41
       37. Objects of Reprisals                                       42
       38. Positive and Negative Reprisals                            44
       39. Reprisals must be proportionate                            44
       40. Embargo                                                    44
       41. Reprisals to be preceded by Negotiations and to be stopped
               when Reparation is made                                46
       42. Reprisals during Peace in contradistinction to Reprisals
               during War                                             46
       43. Value of Reprisals                                         46

  IV. _Pacific Blockade_

       44. Development of practice of Pacific Blockade                48
       45. Admissibility of Pacific Blockade                          50
       46. Pacific Blockade and vessels of third States               51
       47. Pacific Blockade and vessels of the blockaded State        52
       48. Manner of Pacific Blockade                                 52
       49. Value of Pacific Blockade                                  53

  V. _Intervention_

       50. Intervention in contradistinction to Participation in a
               difference                                             54
       51. Mode of Intervention                                       55
       52. Time of Intervention                                       55


PART II--_WAR_

CHAPTER I--ON WAR IN GENERAL

  I. _Characteristics of War_

       53. War no illegality                                          59
       54. Conception of War                                          60
       55. War a contention                                           61
       56. War a contention between States                            62
       57. War a contention between States through armed forces       63
       58. War a contention between States for the purpose of
               overpowering each other                                67
       59. Civil War                                                  68
       60. Guerilla War                                               70

  II. _Causes, Kinds, and Ends of War_

       61. Rules of Warfare independent of Causes of War              72
       62. Causes of War                                              73
       63. Just Causes of War                                         74
       64. Causes in contradistinction to Pretexts for War            75
       65. Different kinds of War                                     76
       66. Ends of War                                                76

  III. _The Laws of War_

       67. Origin of the Laws of War                                  78
       68. The latest Development of the Laws of War                  79
       69. Binding force of the Laws of War                           83

  IV. _The Region of War_

       70. Region of War in contradistinction to Theatre of War       85
       71. Particular Region of every War                             86
       72. Exclusion from Region of War through Neutralisation        88
       73. Asserted exclusion of the Baltic Sea from the Region of
               War                                                    90

  V. _The Belligerents_

       74. Qualification to become a Belligerent (_facultas
               bellandi_)                                             90
       75. Possibility in contradistinction to qualification to
               become a Belligerent                                   91
       76. Insurgents as a Belligerent Power                          92
       77. Principal and accessory Belligerent Parties                93

  VI. _The Armed Forces of the Belligerents_

       78. Regular Armies and Navies                                  94
       79. Non-combatant Members of Armed Forces                      95
       80. Irregular Forces                                           96
       81. Levies _en masse_                                          97
       82. Barbarous Forces                                           98
       83. Privateers                                                 99
       84. Converted Merchantmen                                     100
       85. The Crews of Merchantmen                                  104
       86. Deserters and Traitors                                    106

  VII. _Enemy Character_

       87. On Enemy Character in general                             106
       88. Enemy Character of Individuals                            108
       89. Enemy Character of Vessels                                112
       90. Enemy Character of Goods                                  115
       91. Transfer of Enemy Vessels                                 117
       92. Transfer of Goods on Enemy Vessels                        119

CHAPTER II--THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

  I. _Commencement of War_

       93. Commencement of War in General                            121
       94. Declaration of War                                        123
       95. Ultimatum                                                 125
       96. Initiative hostile Acts of War                            126

  II. _Effects of the Outbreak of War_

       97. General Effects of the Outbreak of War                    128
       98. Rupture of Diplomatic Intercourse and Consular Activity   129
       99. Cancellation of Treaties                                  129
      100. Precarious position of Belligerents' subjects on Enemy
               Territory                                             131
      100_a_. _Persona standi in judicio_ on Enemy Territory         133
      101. Intercourse, especially Trading, between Subjects of
               Belligerents                                          135
      102. Position of Belligerents' Property in the Enemy State     139
      102_a_. Effect of the Outbreak of War
               on Merchantmen                                        140

CHAPTER III--WARFARE ON LAND

  I. _On Land Warfare in General_

      103. Aims and Means of Land Warfare                            144
      104. Lawful and Unlawful Practices of Land Warfare             144
      105. Objects of the Means of Warfare                           145
      106. Land Warfare in contradistinction to Sea Warfare          145

  II. _Violence against Enemy Persons_

      107. On Violence in general against Enemy Persons              146
      108. Killing and Wounding of Combatants                        146
      109. Refusal of Quarter                                        147
      110. Lawful and Unlawful Means of killing and wounding
               Combatants                                            148
      111. Explosive Bullets                                         149
      112. Expanding (Dum-Dum) Bullets                               149
      113. Projectiles diffusing Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases   150
      114. Violence directed from Air-Vessels                        150
      115. Violence against non-combatant Members of Armed Forces    151
      116. Violence against Private Enemy Persons                    151
      117. Violence against the Head of the Enemy State and against
               Officials in Important Positions                      153

  III. _Treatment of Wounded, and Dead Bodies_

      118. Origin of Geneva Convention                               154
      119. The Wounded and the Sick                                  157
      120. Medical Units and Establishments, and Material            158
      121. Personnel                                                 159
      122. Convoys of Evacuation                                     160
      123. Distinctive Emblem                                        161
      124. Treatment of the Dead                                     162
      124_a_. Application of the Geneva Convention, and Prevention
               of Abuses                                             163
      124_b_. General provisions of the Geneva Convention            164

  IV. _Captivity_

      125. Development of International Law regarding Captivity      165
      126. Treatment of Prisoners of War                             167
      127. Who may claim to be Prisoners of War                      169
      128. Discipline                                                169
      129. Release on Parole                                         170
      130. Bureau of Information                                     171
      131. Relief Societies                                          171
      132. End of Captivity                                          172

  V. _Appropriation and Utilisation of Public Enemy Property_

      133. Appropriation of all the Enemy Property no longer
               admissible                                            174
      134. Immoveable Public Property                                174
      135. Immoveable Property of Municipalities, and of Religious,
               Charitable, and the like Institutions                 175
      136. Utilisation of Public Buildings                           175
      137. Moveable Public Property                                  176
      138. Moveable Property of Municipalities, and of Religious,
               Charitable, and the like Institutions                 177
      139. Booty on the Battlefield                                  177

  VI. _Appropriation and Utilisation of Private Enemy Property_

      140. Immoveable Private Property                               179
      141. Private War Material and Means of Transport               180
      142. Works of Art and Science, Historical Monuments            180
      143. Other Private Personal Property                           180
      144. Booty on the Battlefield                                  181
      145. Private Enemy Property brought into a Belligerent's
               Territory                                             182

  VII. _Requisitions and Contributions_

      146. War must support War                                      183
      147. Requisitions in Kind, and Quartering                      185
      148. Contributions                                             186

  VIII. _Destruction of Enemy Property_

      149. Wanton destruction prohibited                             187
      150. Destruction for the purpose of Offence and Defence        188
      151. Destruction in marching, reconnoitring, and conducting
               Transport                                             188
      152. Destruction of Arms, Ammunition, and Provisions           189
      153. Destruction of Historical Monuments, Works of Art, and
               the like                                              189
      154. General Devastation                                       190

  IX. _Assault, Siege, and Bombardment_

      155. Assault, Siege, and Bombardment, when lawful              191
      156. Assault, how carried out                                  193
      157. Siege, how carried out                                    193
      158. Bombardment, how carried out                              194

  X. _Espionage and Treason_

      159. Twofold Character of Espionage and Treason                196
      160. Espionage in contradistinction to Scouting
               and Despatch-bearing                                  197
      161. Punishment of Espionage                                   198
      162. Treason                                                   199

  XI. _Ruses_

      163. Character of Ruses of War                                 200
      164. Different kinds of Stratagems                             201
      165. Stratagems in contradistinction to Perfidy                202

  XII. _Occupation of Enemy Territory_

      166. Occupation as an Aim of Warfare                           204
      167. Occupation, when effected                                 206
      168. Occupation, when ended                                    210
      169. Rights and Duties in General of the Occupant              210
      170. Rights of the Occupant regarding the Inhabitants          211
      171. Position of Government Officials and Municipal
               Functionaries during Occupation                       213
      172. Position of Courts of Justice during Occupation           214

CHAPTER IV--WARFARE ON SEA

  I. _On Sea Warfare in General_

      173. Aims and Means of Sea Warfare                             216
      174. Lawful and Unlawful Practices of Sea Warfare              217
      175. Objects of the Means of Sea Warfare                       218
      176. Development of International Law regarding Private
               Property on Sea                                       218
      177. Declaration of Paris                                      220
      178. The Principle of Appropriation of Private Enemy Vessels
               and Enemy Goods thereon                               221
      179. Impending Codification of Law of Sea Warfare              224

  II. _Attack and Seizure of Enemy Vessels_

      180. Importance of Attack and Seizure of Enemy Vessels         225
      181. Attack, when legitimate                                   225
      182. Attack, how effected                                      226
      182_a_. Submarine Contact Mines                                227
      183. Duty of giving Quarter                                    231
      184. Seizure                                                   231
      185. Effect of Seizure                                         231
      186. Immunity of Vessels charged with Religious, Scientific,
               or Philanthropic Mission                              232
      187. Immunity of Fishing-boats and small boats employed in
               local Trade                                           234
      188. Immunity of Merchantmen at the Outbreak of War on their
               Voyage to and from a Belligerent's Port               235
      189. Vessels in Distress                                       236
      190. Immunity of Hospital and Cartel Ships                     236
      191. Immunity of Mail-boats and Mail-bags                      236

  III. _Appropriation, and Destruction of Enemy Merchantmen_

      192. Prize Courts                                              238
      193. Conduct of Prize to Port of Prize Court                   241
      194. Destruction of Prize                                      242
      195. Ransom of Prize                                           245
      196. Loss of Prize, especially Recapture                       246
      197. Fate of Prize                                             247
      198. Vessels belonging to Subjects of Neutral States, but
               sailing under Enemy Flag                              248
      199. Effect of Sale of Enemy Vessels during War                248
      200. Goods sold by and to Enemy Subjects during War            249

  IV. _Violence against Enemy Persons_

      201. Violence against Combatants                               249
      202. Violence against Non-combatant Members of Naval Forces    250
      203. Violence against Enemy Individuals not belonging to the
               Naval Forces                                          251

  V. _Treatment of Wounded and Shipwrecked_

      204. Adaptation of Geneva Convention to Sea Warfare            252
      205. The Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked                        253
      205_a_. Treatment of the Dead                                  254
      206. Hospital Ships                                            254
      206_a_. Hospital Ships in Neutral Ports                        256
      206_b_. Sick-Bays                                              257
      207. Distinctive Colour and Emblem of Hospital Ships           258
      208. Neutral Vessels assisting the Wounded, Sick, or
               Shipwrecked                                           259
      209. The Religious, Medical, and Hospital Staff                260
      209_a_. Application of Convention X., and Prevention of
               Abuses                                                260
      209_b_. General Provisions of Convention X.                    261

  VI. _Espionage, Treason, Ruses_

      210. Espionage and Treason                                     262
      211. Ruses                                                     262

  VII. _Requisitions, Contributions, Bombardment_

      212. Requisitions and Contributions upon Coast Towns           264
      213. Bombardment of the Enemy Coast                            266

  VIII. _Interference with Submarine Telegraph Cables_

      214. Uncertainty of Rules concerning Interference with
               Submarine Telegraph Cables                            271

CHAPTER V--NON-HOSTILE RELATIONS OF BELLIGERENTS

  I. _On non-hostile Relations in General between Belligerents_

      215. _Fides etiam hosti servanda_                              273
      216. Different kinds of Non-hostile Relations                  274
      217. Licences to Trade                                         275

  II. _Passports, Safe-conducts, Safeguards_

      218. Passports and Safe-conducts                               276
      219. Safeguards                                                277

  III. _Flags of Truce_

      220. Meaning of Flags of Truce                                 278
      221. Treatment of Unadmitted Flag-bearers                      279
      222. Treatment of Admitted Flag-bearers                        279
      223. Abuse of Flag of Truce                                    281

  IV. _Cartels_

      224. Definition and Purpose of Cartels                         282
      225. Cartel Ships                                              283

  V. _Capitulations_

      226. Character and Purpose of Capitulations                    284
      227. Contents of Capitulations                                 285
      228. Form of Capitulations                                     286
      229. Competence to conclude Capitulations                      287
      230. Violation of Capitulations                                289

  VI. _Armistices_

      231. Character and Kinds of Armistices                         290
      232. Suspensions of Arms                                       291
      233. General Armistices                                        291
      234. Partial Armistices                                        293
      235. Competence to conclude Armistices                         293
      236. Form of Armistices                                        294
      237. Contents of Armistices                                    294
      238. Commencement of Armistices                                296
      239. Violation of Armistices                                   297
      240. End of Armistices                                         299

CHAPTER VI--MEANS OF SECURING LEGITIMATE WARFARE

  I. _On Means in General of securing Legitimate Warfare_

      241. Legitimate and Illegitimate Warfare                       300
      242. How Legitimate Warfare is on the whole secured            301

  II. _Complaints, Good Offices and Mediation, Intervention_

      243. Complaints lodged with the Enemy                          302
      244. Complaints lodged with Neutrals                           303
      245. Good Offices and Mediation                                303
      246. Intervention on the part of Neutrals                      304

  III. _Reprisals_

      247. Reprisals between Belligerents in contradistinction to
               Reprisals in time of Peace                            305
      248. Reprisals admissible for every Illegitimate Act of
               Warfare                                               305
      249. Danger of Arbitrariness in Reprisals                      306
      250. Proposed Restriction of Reprisals                         308

  IV. _Punishment of War Crimes_

      251. Conception of War Crimes                                  309
      252. Different kinds of War Crimes                             310
      253. Violations of Rules regarding Warfare                     310
      254. Hostilities in Arms by Private Individuals                312
      255. Espionage and War Treason                                 313
      256. Marauding                                                 316
      257. Mode of Punishment of War Crimes                          316

  V. _Taking of Hostages_

      258. Former Practice of taking Hostages                        317
      259. Modern Practice of taking Hostages                        317

  VI. _Compensation_

      259_a_. How the Principle of Compensation for Violations of
               the Laws of War arose                                 319
      259_b_. Compensation for Violations of the Hague Regulations   320

CHAPTER VII--END OF WAR, AND POSTLIMINIUM

  I. _On Termination of War in General_

      260. War a Temporary Condition                                 322
      261. Three Modes of Termination of War                         322

  II. _Simple Cessation of Hostilities_

      262. Exceptional Occurrence of simple Cessation of
               Hostilities                                           323
      263. Effect of Termination of War through simple Cessation of
               Hostilities                                           324

  III. _Subjugation_

      264. Subjugation in contradistinction to Conquest              325
      265. Subjugation a formal End of War                           326

  IV. _Treaty of Peace_

      266. Treaty of Peace the most frequent End of War              327
      267. Peace Negotiations                                        328
      268. Preliminaries of Peace                                    329
      269. Form and Parts of Peace Treaties                          330
      270. Competence to conclude Peace                              330
      271. Date of Peace                                             331

  V. _Effects of Treaty of Peace_

      272. Restoration of Condition of Peace                         332
      273. Principle of _Uti Possidetis_                             334
      274. Amnesty                                                   334
      275. Release of Prisoners of War                               335
      276. Revival of Treaties                                       336

  VI. _Performance of Treaty of Peace_

      277. Treaty of Peace, how to be carried out                    337
      278. Breach of Treaty of Peace                                 338

  VII. _Postliminium_

      279. Conception of Postliminium                                339
      280. Postliminium according to International Law, in
               contradistinction to Postliminium according to
               Municipal Law                                         340
      281. Revival of the Former Condition of Things                 341
      282. Validity of Legitimate Acts                               342
      283. Invalidity of Illegitimate Acts                           343
      284. No Postliminium after Interregnum                         343


PART III--_NEUTRALITY_

CHAPTER I--ON NEUTRALITY IN GENERAL

  I. _Development of the Institution of Neutrality_

      285. Neutrality not practised in Ancient Times                 347
      286. Neutrality during the Middle Ages                         348
      287. Neutrality during the Seventeenth Century                 349
      288. Progress of Neutrality during the Eighteenth Century      350
      289. First Armed Neutrality                                    352
      290. The French Revolution and the Second Armed Neutrality     354
      291. Neutrality during the Nineteenth Century                  357
      292. Neutrality in the Twentieth Century                       359

  II. _Characteristics of Neutrality_

      293. Conception of Neutrality                                  361
      294. Neutrality an Attitude of Impartiality                    362
      295. Neutrality an Attitude creating Rights and Duties         363
      296. Neutrality an Attitude of States                          363
      297. No Cessation of Intercourse during Neutrality between
               Neutrals and Belligerents                             365
      298. Neutrality an Attitude during War (Neutrality in Civil
               War)                                                  365
      299. Neutrality to be recognised by the Belligerents           367

  III. _Different Kinds of Neutrality_

      300. Perpetual Neutrality                                      368
      301. General and Partial Neutrality                            369
      302. Voluntary and Conventional Neutrality                     369
      303. Armed Neutrality                                          369
      304. Benevolent Neutrality                                     370
      305. Perfect and Qualified Neutrality                          370
      306. Some Historical Examples of Qualified Neutrality          371

  IV. _Commencement and End of Neutrality_

      307. Neutrality commences with Knowledge of the War            373
      308. Commencement of Neutrality in Civil War                   374
      309. Establishment of Neutrality by Declarations               374
      310. Municipal Neutrality Laws                                 375
      311. British Foreign Enlistment Act                            375
      312. End of Neutrality                                         377

CHAPTER II--RELATIONS BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS AND NEUTRALS

  I. _Rights and Duties deriving from Neutrality_

      313. Conduct in General of Neutrals and Belligerents           378
      314. What Rights and Duties of Neutrals and of Belligerents
               there are                                             378
      315. Rights and Duties of Neutrals contested                   379
      316. Contents of Duty of Impartiality                          381
      317. Duty of Impartiality continuously growing more intense    382
      317_a_. Neutrality Conventions of the Second Peace Conference  383
      318. Contents of Duty of Belligerents to treat Neutrals in
               accordance with their Impartiality                    384
      319. Contents of Duty not to suppress Intercourse between
               Neutrals and the Enemy                                385

  II. _Neutrals and Military Operations_

      320. Hostilities by and against Neutrals                       386
      321. Furnishing Troops and Men-of-War to Belligerents          389
      322. Subjects of Neutrals fighting among Belligerent Forces    390
      323. Passage of Troops and War Material through Neutral
               Territory                                             391
      324. Passage of Wounded through Neutral Territory              392
      325. Passage of Men-of-War                                     393
      326. Occupation of Neutral Territory by Belligerents           394
      327. Prize Courts on Neutral Territory                         395
      328. Belligerent's Prizes in Neutral Ports                     395

  III. _Neutrals and Military Preparations_

      329. Depots and Factories on Neutral Territory                 397
      330. Levy of Troops, and the like                              398
      331. Passage of Bodies of Men intending to Enlist              399
      332. Organisation of Hostile Expeditions                       400
      333. Use of Neutral Territory as Base of Naval
               Operations                                            400
      334. Building and Fitting-out of Vessels intended for Naval
               Operations                                            405
      335. The _Alabama_ Case and the Three Rules of Washington      406

  IV. _Neutral Asylum to Land Forces and War Material_

      336. On Neutral Asylum in General                              409
      337. Neutral Territory and Prisoners of War                    410
      338. Fugitive Soldiers on Neutral Territory                    413
      339. Neutral Territory and Fugitive Troops                     413
      340. Neutral Territory and Non-combatant Members of
               Belligerent Forces                                    415
      341. Neutral Territory and War Material of Belligerents        415

  V. _Neutral Asylum to Naval Forces_

      342. Asylum to Naval Forces in contradistinction to Asylum to
               Land Forces                                           417
      343. Neutral Asylum to Naval Forces Optional                   417
      344. Asylum to Naval Forces in Distress                        418
      345. Exterritoriality of Men-of-War during Asylum              419
      346. Facilities to Men-of-War during Asylum                    420
      347. Abuse of Asylum to be prohibited                          420
      348. Neutral Men-of-War as an Asylum                           423
      348_a_. Neutral Territory and Shipwrecked Soldiers             424

  VI. _Supplies and Loans to Belligerents_

      349. Supply on the part of Neutrals                            426
      350. Supply on the part of Subjects of Neutrals                427
      351. Loans and Subsidies on the part of Neutrals               430
      352. Loans and Subsidies on the part of Subjects of
               Neutrals                                              430

  VII. _Services to Belligerents_

      353. Pilotage                                                  432
      354. Transport on the part of Neutrals                         433
      355. Transport on the part of Neutral Merchantmen and by
               neutral rolling stock                                 434
      356. Information regarding Military and Naval Operations       434

  VIII. _Violation of Neutrality_

      357. Violation of Neutrality in the narrower and in the wider
               sense of the Term                                     438
      358. Violation in contradistinction to End of Neutrality       439
      359. Consequences of Violations of Neutrality                  439
      360. Neutrals not to acquiesce in Violations of Neutrality
               committed by a Belligerent                            440
      361. Case of the _General Armstrong_                           442
      362. Mode of exacting Reparation from Belligerents for
               Violations of Neutrality                              442
      363. Negligence on the part of Neutrals                        444
      363_a_. Laying of Submarine Contact Mines by Neutrals          445

  IX. _Right of Angary_

      364. The Obsolete Right of Angary                              446
      365. The Modern Right of Angary                                447
      366. Right of Angary concerning Neutral Rolling Stock          448
      367. Right of Angary not deriving from Neutrality              449

CHAPTER III--BLOCKADE

  I. _Conception of Blockade_

      368. Definition of Blockade                                    450
      369. Blockade, Strategic and Commercial                        452
      370. Blockade to be Universal                                  452
      371. Blockade, Outwards and Inwards                            453
      372. What Places can be Blockaded                              453
      373. Blockade of International Rivers                          454
      374. Justification of Blockade                                 455

  II. _Establishment of Blockade_

      375. Competence to establish Blockade                          456
      376. Declaration and Notification of Blockade                  456
      377. Length of Time for Egress of Neutral Vessels              459
      378. End of Blockade                                           460

  III. _Effectiveness of Blockade_

      379. Effective in contradistinction to Fictitious Blockade     461
      380. Condition of Effectiveness of Blockade                    461
      381. Amount of Danger which creates Effectiveness              464
      382. Cessation of Effectiveness                                464

  IV. _Breach of Blockade_

      383. Definition of Breach of Blockade                          466
      384. No Breach without Notice of Blockade                      466
      385. The former practice as to what constitutes an Attempt to
               break Blockade                                        468
      385_a_. What constitutes an Attempt to break Blockade
               according to the Declaration of London                470
      386. When Ingress is not considered Breach of Blockade         472
      387. When Egress is not considered Breach of Blockade          473
      388. Passage through Unblockaded Canal no Breach of Blockade   474

  V. _Consequences of Breach of Blockade_

      389. Capture of Blockade-running Vessels                       475
      390. Penalty for Breach of Blockade                            476

CHAPTER IV--CONTRABAND

  I. _Conception of Contraband_

      391. Definition of Contraband of War                           480
      392. Absolute and conditional Contraband, and free Articles    481
      393. Articles absolutely Contraband                            483
      394. Articles conditionally Contraband                         485
      395. Hostile Destination essential to Contraband               490
      396. Free Articles                                             492
      396_a_. Articles destined for the use of the carrying Vessel,
               or to aid the Wounded                                 493
      397. Contraband Vessels                                        494

  II. _Carriage of Contraband_

      398. Carriage of Contraband Penal by the Municipal Law of
               Belligerents                                          495
      399. Direct Carriage of Contraband                             497
      400. Circuitous Carriage of Contraband                         499
      401. Indirect Carriage of Contraband (Doctrine of Continuous
               Transports)                                           500
      402. The Case of the _Bundesrath_                              502
      403. Continental support to the Doctrine of Continuous
               Transports                                            504
      403_a_. Partial Recognition by the Declaration of London of
               the Doctrine of Continuous Voyages                    505

  III. _Consequences of Carriage of Contraband_

      404. Capture for Carriage of Contraband                        506
      405. Penalty for Carriage of Contraband according to the
               Practice hitherto prevailing                          508
      406. Penalty according to the Declaration of London for
               Carriage of Contraband                                511
      406_a_. Seizure of Contraband without Seizure of the Vessel    513

CHAPTER V--UNNEUTRAL SERVICE

  I. _The Different Kinds of Unneutral Service_

      407. Unneutral Service in general                              515
      408. Carriage of Persons for the Enemy                         517
      409. Transmission of Intelligence to the Enemy                 521
      410. Unneutral Service creating Enemy Character                524

  II. _Consequences of Unneutral Service_

      411. Capture for Unneutral Service                             526
      412. Penalty for Unneutral Service                             527
      413. Seizure of Enemy Persons and Despatches without Seizure
               of Vessel                                             530

CHAPTER VI--VISITATION, CAPTURE, AND TRIAL OF NEUTRAL VESSELS

  I. _Visitation_

      414. Conception of Right of Visitation                         533
      415. Right of Visitation, by whom, when, and where exercised   534
      416. Only Private Vessels may be Visited                       535
      417. Vessels under Convoy                                      535
      418. No Universal Rules regarding Mode of Visitation           537
      419. Stopping of Vessels for the Purpose of Visitation         538
      420. Visit                                                     538
      421. Search                                                    539
      422. Consequences of Resistance to Visitation                  540
      423. What constitutes Resistance                               541
      424. Sailing under Enemy Convoy equivalent to Resistance       542
      425. Resistance by Neutral Convoy                              543
      426. Deficiency of Papers                                      543
      427. Spoliation, Defacement, and Concealment of Papers         544
      428. Double and False Papers                                   545

  II. _Capture_

      429. Grounds and Mode of Capture                               546
      430. Effect of Capture of Neutral Vessels, and their Conduct
               to Port                                               546
      431. Destruction of Neutral Prizes                             547
      432. Ransom and Recapture of Neutral Prizes                    551
      433. Release after Capture                                     551

  III. _Trial of captured Neutral Vessels_

      434. Trial of Captured Vessels a Municipal Matter              553
      435. Result of Trial                                           555
      436. Trial after Conclusion of Peace                           555
      437. Protests and Claims of Neutrals after Trial               557

CHAPTER VII--THE INTERNATIONAL PRIZE COURT

  I. _Proposals for International Prize Courts_

      438. Early Projects                                            559
      439. German Project of 1907                                    561
      440. British Project of 1907                                   562
      441. Convention XII. of the Second Peace Conference            563

  II. _Constitution and Competence of the International Prize Court_

      442. Personnel                                                 565
      443. Deciding Tribunal                                         566
      444. Administrative Council and International Bureau           569
      445. Agents, Counsel, Advocates, and Attorneys                 569
      446. Competence                                                569
      447. What Law to be applied                                    571

  III. _Procedure in the International Prize Court_

      448. Entering of Appeal                                        572
      449. Pleadings and Discussion                                  574
      450. Judgment                                                  575
      451. Expenses and Costs                                        576

  IV. _Action in Damages instead of Appeal_

      452. Reason for Action in Damages instead of Appeal            577
      453. Procedure if Action for Damages is brought                578


APPENDICES

  I. Declaration of Paris of 1856                                    583

  II. Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868                          584

  III. Declaration concerning Expanding Bullets of 1899              585

  IV. Declaration concerning the Diffusion of Asphyxiating Gases
      of 1899                                                        586

  V. Geneva Convention of 1906                                       587

  VI. Final Act of the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907         591

      I.    Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International
                Disputes                                             592
      II.   Convention respecting the Limitation of the Employment
                of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts          601
      III.  Convention relative to the Opening of Hostilities        602
      IV.   Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of War on
                Land                                                 603
      V.    Convention respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral
                Powers and Persons in War on Land                    609
      VI.   Convention relative to the Status of Merchantmen at the
                Outbreak of Hostilities                              612
      VII.  Convention relative to the Conversion of Merchantmen
                into Men-of-War                                      613
      VIII. Convention relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine
                Contact Mines                                        614
      IX.   Convention respecting Bombardment by Naval Forces in
                Time of War                                          616
      X.    Convention for the Adaptation of the Principles of the
                Geneva Convention to Maritime Warfare                617
      XI.    Convention relative to certain Restrictions on the
                 Exercise of the Right of Capture in Maritime War    621
      XII.   Convention concerning the Establishment of an
                 International Prize Court                           622
      XIII.  Convention concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral
                 Powers in Maritime War                              629
      XIV.   Declaration concerning the Prohibition of the Discharge
                 of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons         632
      XV.    Draft Convention concerning the Creation of a Judicial
                 Arbitration Court                                   632

  VII. Declaration of London of 1909 (including the Report of the
       Drafting Committee)                                           637

  VIII. Additional Protocol, of 1910, to the Hague Convention
        concerning the Establishment of an International Prize
        Court                                                        665

  IX. Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870                                   667

  X. The Naval Prize Act, 1864                                       674

  XI. The Prize Courts Act, 1894                                     682

  XII. Naval Prize Bill of 1911                                      683

  XIII. Geneva Convention Act, 1911                                  690


INDEX                                                                691




PART I

SETTLEMENT OF STATE DIFFERENCES




CHAPTER I

AMICABLE SETTLEMENT OF STATE DIFFERENCES


I

STATE DIFFERENCES AND THEIR AMICABLE SETTLEMENT IN GENERAL

  Twiss, II. [p][p] 1-3--Ullmann, [p][p] 148-150--Bulmerincq in
  Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 5-12--Heffter, [p][p] 105-107--Rivier, II. [p]
  57--Bonfils, No. 930--Despagnet, No. 469--Pradier-Fodere, IV. Nos.
  2580-2583--Calvo, III. [p][p] 1670-1671--Martens, II. [p][p]
  101-102--Fiore, II. Nos. 1192-1198, and Code, No. 1246--Wagner,
  _Zur Lehre von den Streiterledigungsmitteln des Voelkerrechts_
  (1900.)

[Sidenote: Legal and political International Differences.]

[p] 1. International differences can arise from a variety of grounds.
Between the extremes of a simple and comparatively unimportant act of
discourtesy committed by one State against another, on the one hand,
and, on the other, so gross an insult as must necessarily lead to war,
there are many other grounds varying in nature and importance. State
differences are correctly divided into legal and political. Legal
differences arise from acts for which States have to bear
responsibility, be it acts of their own or of their Parliaments,
judicial and administrative officials, armed forces, or individuals
living on their territory.[1] Political differences are the result of a
conflict of political interests. But although this distinction is
certainly theoretically correct and of practical importance, frequently
in practice a sharp line cannot be drawn. For in many cases States
either hide their political interests behind a claim for an alleged
injury, or make a positive, but comparatively insignificant, injury a
pretext for the carrying out of political ends. Nations which have been
for years facing each other armed to the teeth, waiting for a convenient
moment to engage in hostilities, are only too ready to obliterate the
boundary line between legal and political differences. Between such
nations a condition of continuous friction prevails which makes it
difficult, if not impossible, in every case which arises to distinguish
the legal from the political character of the difference.

[Footnote 1: See above, vol. I. [p] 149.]

[Sidenote: International Law not exclusively concerned with Legal
Differences.]

[p] 2. It is often maintained that the Law of Nations is concerned with
legal differences only, political differences being a matter not of law
but of politics. Now it is certainly true that only legal differences
can be settled by a juristic decision of the underlying juristic
question, whatever may be the way in which such decision is arrived at.
But although political differences cannot be the objects of juristic
decision, they can be settled short of war by amicable or compulsive
means. And legal differences, although within the scope of juristic
decision, can be of such kinds as to prevent the parties from submitting
them to such decision, without being of a nature that they cannot be
settled peaceably at all. Moreover, although the distinction between
legal and political differences is certainly correct in theory and of
importance in practice, nevertheless, in practice, a sharp line
frequently cannot be drawn, as has just been pointed out. Therefore the
Law of Nations is not exclusively concerned with legal differences, for
in fact all amicable means of settling legal differences are likewise
means of settling political differences, and so are two of the
compulsive means of settling differences--namely, pacific blockade and
intervention.

[Sidenote: Amicable in contradistinction to compulsive settlement of
Differences.]

[p] 3. Political and legal differences can be settled either by amicable
or by compulsive means. There are four kinds of amicable means--namely,
negotiation between the parties, good offices of third parties,
mediation, and arbitration.[2] And there are also four kinds of
compulsive means--namely, retorsion, reprisals (including embargo),
blockade, and intervention of third States. No State is allowed to make
use of compulsive means before negotiation has been tried, but there is
no necessity for the good offices or mediation of third States, and
eventually arbitration,[3] to be tried beforehand also. Frequently,
however, States nowadays make use of the so-called Compromise Clause[4]
in their treaties, stipulating thereby that any differences arising
between the contracting parties with regard to matters regulated by, or
to the interpretation of, the respective treaties shall be settled
through the amicable means of arbitration to the exclusion of all
compulsive means. And there are even a few examples of States which have
concluded treaties stipulating that all differences, without exception,
that might arise between them should be amicably settled by
arbitration.[5] These exceptions, however, only confirm the rule that no
international legal duty exists for States to settle their differences
amicably through arbitration, or even to try to settle them in this way,
before they make use of compulsive means.

[Footnote 2: Some writers (see Hall, [p] 118, and Heilborn, _System_, p.
404) refuse to treat negotiation, good offices, and mediation as means
of settling differences, because they cannot find that these means are
of any legal value, it being in the choice of the parties whether or not
they agree to make use of them. They forget, however, the enormous
political value of these means, which alone well justifies their
treatment; moreover, there are already some positive legal rules in
existence concerning these means--see Hague Arbitration Treaty, articles
2-7 and 9-36--and others will in time, no doubt, be established.]

[Footnote 3: Except in the case of contract debts claimed from the
Government of one country by the Government of another country as being
due to its nationals. See Convention II.; above, vol. I. [p] 135,
p. 192; and below, [p] 19.]

[Footnote 4: See above, vol. I. [p] 553.]

[Footnote 5: See below, [p] 17.]


II

NEGOTIATION

  Twiss, II. [p] 4--Lawrence, [p] 220--Moore, VII. [p] 1064--Taylor,
  [p][p] 359-360--Heffter, [p] 107--Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp.
  13-17--Ullmann, [p] 151--Bonfils, Nos. 931-932--Despagnet, Nos. 470
  and 477--Pradier-Fodere, VI. Nos. 2584-2587--Rivier, II. [p]
  57--Calvo, III. [p][p] 1672-1680--Martens, II. [p] 103--Nys, III. pp.
  56-58.

[Sidenote: In what Negotiation consists.]

[p] 4. The simplest means of settling State differences, and that to
which States always resort before they make use of other means, is
negotiation. It consists in such acts of intercourse between the parties
as are initiated and directed for the purpose of effecting an
understanding and thereby amicably settling the difference that has
arisen between them.[6] Negotiation as a rule begins by a State
complaining of a certain act, or lodging a certain claim with another
State. The next step is a statement from the latter making out its case,
which is handed over to the former. It may be that the parties come at
once to an understanding through this simple exchange of statements. If
not, other acts may follow according to the requirements of the special
case. Thus, for instance, other statements may be exchanged, or a
conference of diplomatic envoys, or even of the heads of the States at
variance, may be arranged for the purpose of discussing the differences
and preparing the basis for an understanding.

[Footnote 6: See above, vol. I. [p][p] 477-482, where the international
transaction of negotiation in general is discussed.]

[Sidenote: International Commissions of Inquiry.]

[p] 5. The contracting Powers of the Hague Convention for the peaceful
settlement of international differences deem it expedient and desirable
that, if the ordinary diplomatic negotiation has failed to settle such
differences as do not involve either honour or vital interests, the
parties should, so far as circumstances allow, institute an
International Commission of Inquiry[7] for the purpose of elucidating
the facts underlying the difference by an impartial and conscientious
investigation. The Convention of 1899 had only six articles (9-14) on
the subject. The Second Conference of 1907, profiting by the experience
gained by the Commission of Inquiry in the Dogger Bank[8] case, the
first and as yet only occasion on which a Commission of Inquiry was
instituted, remodelled the institution, and Convention I. treats of the
subject in twenty-eight articles (9-36). The more important stipulations
are the following:--

(1) The Commissions are to be constituted by a special treaty of the
parties, which is to determine the facts to be examined, the manner and
period within which the Commission is to be formed, the extent of the
powers of the Commissioners, the place where the Commission is to meet
and whether it may remove to another place, the languages to be used by
the Commission and parties, and the like (articles 9-10). If the treaty
does not determine the place where the Commission is to sit, it shall
sit at the Hague; if the treaty does not specify the languages to be
used, the question shall be decided by the Commission; and if the treaty
does not stipulate the manner in which the Commission is to be formed,
it shall be formed in the manner determined by articles 45 and 57 of
Convention I. (articles 11-12). The parties may appoint Assessors,
Agents, and Counsel (articles 10, 13, 14).

(2) The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration acts
as Registry for the Commissions which sit at the Hague; but if they sit
elsewhere, a Secretary-General is to be appointed whose office serves as
Registry (articles 15-16).

(3) The parties may agree upon the rules of procedure to be followed by
the Commission, but if they do not provide such rules themselves, the
rules of procedure, comprised in articles 19-32 are applicable (article
17), and, in any case, the Commission is to settle such details of the
procedure as are either not covered by the treaty of the parties or by
articles 19-32, and is to arrange all the formalities required for
dealing with the evidence (article 18).

(4) The Report of the Commission is to be signed by all its members; but
if a member refuses to sign, the fact is to be mentioned, and the
validity of the Report is not thereby affected (article 33). The Report
of the Commission is read in open Court, the Agents and Counsel of the
parties being present or duly summoned to attend; a copy of the Report
is furnished to each party (article 34). This Report is absolutely
limited to a statement of the facts, it has in no way the character of
an Arbitral Award, and it leaves to the parties entire freedom as to the
effect to be given to the statement of the facts (article 35).

(5) Each party pays its own expenses and an equal share of the expenses
of the Commission (article 36).

[Footnote 7: See Herr, _Die Untersuchungskommissionen der Haager
Friedenskonferenzen_ (1911); Meurer, I. pp. 129-165; Higgins, pp.
167-170; Lemonon, pp. 77-91: Wehberg, _Kommentar_, pp. 21-46; Nippold,
I. pp. 23-35; Scott, _Conferences_, pp. 265-273; Politis in _R.G._ XIX.
(1912), pp. 149-188.]

[Footnote 8: On October 24, 1904, during the Russo-Japanese war, the
Russian Baltic fleet, which was on its way to the Far East, fired into
the Hull fishing fleet off the Dogger Bank, in the North Sea, whereby
two fishermen were killed and considerable damage was done to several
trawlers. Great Britain demanded from Russia not only an apology and
ample damages, but also severe punishment of the officer responsible for
the outrage. As Russia maintained that the firing was caused by the
approach of some Japanese torpedo-boats, and that she could therefore
not punish the officer in command, the parties agreed upon the
establishment of an International Commission of Inquiry, which, however,
was charged not only to ascertain the facts of the incident but also to
pronounce an opinion concerning the responsibility for the incident and
the degree of blame attaching to the responsible persons. The Commission
consisted of five naval officers of high rank--namely, one British, one
Russian, one American, one French, and one Austrian, who sat at Paris in
February 1905. The report of the Commission states that no torpedo-boats
had been present, that the opening of fire on the part of the Baltic
fleet was not justifiable, that Admiral Rojdestvensky, the commander of
the Baltic fleet, was responsible for the incident, but that these facts
were "not of a nature to cast any discredit upon the military qualities
or the humanity of Admiral Rojdestvensky or of the _personnel_ of his
squadron." In consequence of the last part of this report Great Britain
could not insist upon any punishment to be meted out to the responsible
Russian Admiral, but Russia paid a sum of _l._65,000 to indemnify the
victims of the incident and the families of the two dead fishermen. See
Martens, _N.R.G._ 2nd Ser. XXXIII. (1906), pp. 641-716, And Mandelstam
in _R.G._ XII. (1905), pp. 161 and 351.]

[Sidenote: Effect of Negotiation.]

[p] 6. The effect of negotiation can be to make it apparent that the
parties cannot come to an amicable understanding at all. But frequently
the effect is that one of the parties acknowledges the claim of the
other party. Again, sometimes negotiation results in a party, although
it does not acknowledge the opponent's alleged rights, waiving its own
rights for the sake of peace and for the purpose of making friends with
the opponent. And, lastly, the effect of negotiation can be a compromise
between the parties. Frequently the parties, after having come to an
understanding, conclude a treaty in which they embody the terms of the
understanding arrived at through negotiation. The practice of everyday
life shows clearly the great importance of negotiation as a means of
settling international differences. The modern development of
international traffic and transport, the fact that individuals are
constantly travelling on foreign territories, the keen interest taken by
all powerful States in colonial enterprise, and many other factors, make
the daily rise of differences between States unavoidable. Yet the
greater number of such differences are settled through negotiation of
some kind or other.


III

GOOD OFFICES AND MEDIATION

  Maine, pp. 207-228--Phillimore, III. [p][p] 3-5--Twiss, II. [p]
  7--Lawrence, [p] 220--Moore, VII. [p][p] 1065-1068--Taylor, [p][p]
  359-360--Wheaton, [p] 73--Bluntschli, [p][p] 483-487--Heffter, [p][p]
  107-108--Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 17-30--Ullmann, [p][p]
  152-153--Bonfils, Nos. 932'1-943'1--Despagnet, Nos.
  471-476--Pradier-Fodere, VI. Nos. 2588-2593--Merignhac, I. pp.
  429-447--Rivier, II. [p] 58--Nys, III. pp. 59-61--Calvo, III. [p][p]
  1682-1705--Fiore, III. Nos. 1199-1201, and Code, Nos.
  1248-1293--Martens, II. [p] 103--Holls, _The Peace Conference at the
  Hague_ (1900), pp. 176-203--Zamfiresco, _De la mediation_
  (1911)--Politis in _R.G._ XVII. (1910), pp. 136-163.

[Sidenote: Occasions for Good Offices and Mediation.]

[p] 7. When parties are not inclined to settle their differences by
negotiation, or when they have negotiated without effecting an
understanding, a third State can procure a settlement through its good
offices or its mediation, whether only one or both parties have asked
for the help of the third State or the latter has spontaneously offered
it. There is also possible a collective mediation, several States acting
at the same time as mediators. It is further possible for a mediatorial
Conference or Congress to meet for the purpose of discussing the terms
of an understanding between the conflicting parties. And it must be
especially mentioned that good offices and mediation are not confined to
the time before the differing parties have appealed to arms; they can
also be offered and sought during hostilities for the purpose of
bringing the war to an end. It is during war in particular that good
offices and mediation are of great value, neither of the belligerents as
a rule being inclined to open peace negotiations on his own account.

[Sidenote: Right and duty of offering, requesting, and rendering Good
Offices and Mediation.]

[p] 8. As a rule, no duty exists for a third State to offer its good
offices or mediation, or to respond to a request of the conflicting
States for such, nor is it, as a rule, the duty of the conflicting
parties themselves to ask or to accept a third State's good offices and
mediation. But by special treaty such duty can be stipulated. Thus, for
instance, by article 8 of the Peace Treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856,
between Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and
Turkey, it was stipulated that, in case in the future such difference as
threatened peace should arise between Turkey and one or more of the
signatory Powers, the parties should be obliged,[9] before resorting to
arms, to ask for the mediation of the other signatory Powers. Thus,
further, article 12 of the General Act of the Berlin Congo Conference of
1885 stipulates that, in case a serious difference should arise between
some of the signatory Powers as regards the Congo territories, the
parties should, before resorting to arms, be obliged to ask the other
signatory Powers for their mediation. And lately the Hague Conventions
for the peaceful settlement of international differences have laid down
some stipulations respecting the right and duty of good offices and
mediation, which will be found below in [p] 10.

[Footnote 9: But Italy did not comply with this stipulation before she
declared war against Turkey in September 1911.]

[Sidenote: Good Offices in contradistinction to Mediation.]

[p] 9. Diplomatic practice frequently does not distinguish between good
offices and mediation. But although good offices can easily develop into
mediation, they must not be confounded with it. The difference between
them is that, whereas good offices consist in various kinds of action
tending to call negotiations between the conflicting States into
existence, mediation consists in a direct conduct of negotiations
between the differing parties on the basis of proposals made by the
mediator. Good offices seek to induce the conflicting parties, who are
either not at all inclined to negotiate with each other or who have
negotiated without effecting an understanding, to enter or to re-enter
into such negotiations. Good offices can also consist in advice, in
submitting a proposal of one of the parties to the other, and the like,
but they never take part in the negotiations themselves. On the other
hand, the mediator is the middleman who does take part in the
negotiations. He makes certain propositions on the basis of which the
States at variance may come to an understanding. He even conducts the
negotiations himself, always anxious to reconcile the opposing claims
and to appease the feeling of resentment between the parties. All the
efforts of the mediator may often, of course, be useless, the differing
parties being unable or unwilling to consent to an agreement. But if an
understanding is arrived at, the position of the mediator as a party to
the negotiation, although not a participator in the difference,
frequently becomes clearly apparent either by the drafting of a special
act of mediation which is signed by the States at variance and the
mediator, or by the fact that in the convention between the conflicting
States, which stipulates the terms of their understanding, the mediator
is mentioned.

[Sidenote: Good Offices and Mediation according to the Hague Arbitration
Convention.]

[p] 10. The Hague Convention for the peaceful settlement of
international differences[10] undertakes in articles 2-8 the task of
making the signatory Powers have recourse more frequently than hitherto
to good offices and mediation; it likewise recommends a new and
particular form of mediation. Its rules are the following:--

[Footnote 10: See Meurer, I. pp. 104-128; Higgins, p. 167; Barclay,
_Problems_, pp. 191-197; Lemonon, pp. 69-73; Wehberg, _Kommentar_, pp.
10-21; Nippold, I. pp. 21-22; Scott, _Conferences_, pp. 256-265.]

(1) The contracting Powers agree to have recourse, before they appeal to
arms, as far as circumstances allow, to good offices or mediation
(article 2). And independently of this recourse, they consider it
expedient and desirable that contracting Powers who are strangers to
the dispute should, on their own initiative, offer their good offices or
mediation (article 3). A real legal duty to offer good offices or
mediation is not thereby created; only the expediency and desirability
of such offer are recognised. In regard to the legal duty of conflicting
States to ask for good offices or mediation, it is obvious that,
although literally such duty is agreed upon, the condition "as far as
circumstances allow" makes it more or less illusory, as it is in the
discretion of the parties to judge for themselves whether or not the
circumstances of the special case allow their having recourse to good
offices and mediation.

(2) The contracting Powers agree that (article 3) a right to offer good
offices or mediation exists for those of them who are strangers to a
dispute, and that this right exists also after the conflicting parties
have appealed to arms. Consequently, every contracting Power, when at
variance with another, be it before or after the outbreak of
hostilities, is in duty bound to receive an offer made for good offices
or mediation, although it need not accept such offer. And it is
especially stipulated that the exercise of the right to offer good
offices or mediation may never be regarded by the conflicting States as
an unfriendly act (article 3). It is, further, stipulated that the
contracting Powers consider it their duty in a serious conflict to
remind the parties of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and that the
advice to have recourse to this Court may only be considered as an
exercise of good offices (article 48, paragraphs 1 and 2). And, finally,
in case of dispute between two Powers, one of them may always address to
the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration a note
containing a declaration that it would be ready to submit the dispute to
arbitration, whereupon the Bureau must at once inform the other Power of
this declaration (article 48, paragraphs 3 and 4).

(3) Mediation is defined (article 4) as reconciliation of the opposing
claims and appeasement of the feelings of resentment between the
conflicting States, and it is specially emphasised that good offices and
mediation have exclusively the character of advice.

(4) The acceptance of mediation--and, of course, of good offices, which
is not mentioned--does not (article 7) have the effect of interrupting,
delaying, or hindering mobilisation or other preparatory measures for
war, or of interrupting military operations when war has broken out
before the acceptance of mediation, unless there should be an agreement
to the contrary.

(5) The functions of the mediator are at an end (article 5) when once it
is stated, either by one of the conflicting parties or by the mediator
himself, that the means of reconciliation proposed by him are not
accepted.

(6) A new and particular form of mediation is recommended by article 8.
Before appealing to arms the conflicting States choose respectively a
State as umpire, to whom each intrusts the mission of entering into
direct communication with the umpire chosen by the other side for the
purpose of preventing the rupture of pacific relations. The period of
the mandate extends, unless otherwise stipulated, to thirty days, and
during such period the conflicting States cease from all direct
communication on the matter in dispute, which is regarded as referred
exclusively to the mediating umpires, who must use their best efforts to
settle the difference. Should such mediation not succeed in bringing the
conflicting States to an understanding, and should, consequently, a
definite rupture of pacific relations take place, the chosen umpires are
jointly charged with the task of taking advantage of any opportunity to
restore peace.

[Sidenote: Value of Good Offices and Mediation.]

[p] 11. The value of good offices and mediation for the amicable
settlement of international conflicts, be it before or after the parties
have appealed to arms, cannot be over-estimated. Hostilities have been
frequently prevented through the authority and the skill of mediators,
and furiously raging wars have been brought to an end through good
offices and mediation of third States.[11] Nowadays the importance of
these means of settlement of international differences is even greater
than in the past. The outbreak of war is under the circumstances and
conditions of our times no longer a matter of indifference to all except
the belligerent States, and no State which goes to war knows exactly how
far such war may affect its very existence. If good offices and
mediation are interposed at the right moment, they will in many cases
not fail to effect a settlement of the conflict. The stipulations of the
Hague Convention for the peaceful adjustment of differences have greatly
enhanced the value of good offices and mediation by giving a legal right
to Powers, strangers to the dispute, to offer their good offices and
mediation before and during hostilities.

[Footnote 11: See the important cases of mediation discussed by Calvo,
III. [p][p] 1684-1700, and Bonfils, Nos. 936-942. From our own days the
case of the Dogger Bank incident of 1904 may be quoted as an example,
for it was through the mediation of France that Great Britain and Russia
agreed upon the establishment of an International Commission of Inquiry.
(See p. 7, note 2.) And the good offices of the President of the United
States of America were the means of inducing Russia and Japan, in August
1905, to open the negotiations which actually led to the conclusion of
the Peace of Portsmouth on September 5, 1905.]


IV

ARBITRATION

  Grotius, II. c. 23, [p] 8--Vattel, II. [p] 329--Hall, [p]
  119--Westlake, I. pp. 332-356--Lawrence, [p] 221--Phillimore, III.
  [p][p] 3-5--Twiss, II. [p] 5--Taylor, [p][p] 357-358--Wharton,
  III. [p] 316--Moore, VII. [p][p] 1069-1080--Bluntschli, [p][p]
  488-498--Heffter, [p] 109--Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp.
  30-58--Ullmann, [p][p] 154-156--Bonfils, Nos. 944-969--Despagnet,
  Nos. 722-741--Pradier-Fodere, VI. Nos. 2602-2630--Merignhac,
  I. pp. 448-485--Rivier, II. [p] 59--Calvo, III. [p][p]
  1706-1806--Fiore, II. Nos. 1202-1215, and Code, Nos.
  1294-1380--Nys, III. pp. 65-80--Martens, II. [p] 104--Rouard de
  Card, _L'arbitrage international_ (1876)--Merignhac, _Traite
  theorique et pratique de l'arbitrage_ (1895)--Moore, _History and
  Digest of the Arbitrations to which the United States has been a
  Party_, 6 vols. (1898)--Darby, _International Arbitration_, 4th
  ed. (1904)--Dumas, _Les sanctions de l'arbitrage international_
  (1905), and in A.J. V. (1911), pp. 934-957--Nippold, Die
  _Fortbildung des Verfahrens in voelkerrechtlichen Streitigkeiten_
  (1907)--Reinsch in A.J. V. (1911), pp. 604-614--Scott,
  _Conferences_, pp. 188-253--Lapradelle et Politis, _Recueil des
  arbitrages internationaux_, I. (1798-1855), (1905)--Fried,
  _Handbuch der Friedensbewegung_, 2nd ed. (1911), pp.
  135-184--Morris, _International Arbitration and Procedure_
  (1911)--Balch, _International Courts of Arbitration_ (4th ed.,
  with an introduction and additional notes by Thomas Willing Balch,
  1912).

[Sidenote: Conception of Arbitration.]

[p] 12. Arbitration is the name for the determination of differences
between States through the verdict of one or more umpires chosen by the
parties. As there is no central political authority above the Sovereign
States, and no such International Court as could exercise jurisdiction
over them, State differences, unlike differences between private
individuals, cannot as a rule be obligatorily settled in courts of
justice. The only way in which a settlement of State differences through
a verdict may be arrived at is by the conflicting States voluntarily
consenting to submit themselves to a verdict of one or more umpires
chosen by themselves for that purpose.

[Sidenote: Treaty of Arbitration.]

[p] 13. It is, therefore, necessary for such conflicting States as
intend to have the conflict determined by arbitration to conclude a
treaty by which they agree to this course. Such treaty of arbitration
involves the obligation of both parties to submit in good faith to the
decision of the arbitrators. Frequently a treaty of arbitration will be
concluded after the outbreak of a difference, but it also frequently
happens that States concluding treaties stipulate therein by the
so-called Compromise Clause,[12] that any difference arising between the
parties respecting matters regulated by such treaty shall be determined
by arbitration. Two or more States can also conclude a so-called general
treaty of arbitration, or treaty of permanent arbitration, stipulating
that all or certain kinds of differences in future arising between them
shall be settled by this method. Thus article 7 of the Commercial Treaty
between Holland and Portugal[13] of July 5, 1894, contains such a
general treaty of arbitration, as it stipulates arbitration not only for
differences respecting matters of commerce, but for all kinds of
differences arising in the future between the parties, provided these
differences do not concern their independence or autonomy. Until the
Hague Peace Conference of 1899, however, general treaties of arbitration
were not numerous. But public opinion everywhere was aroused in favour
of general arbitration treaties through the success of this conference,
with the result that from 1900 to the present day many general
arbitration treaties have been concluded.[14]

[Footnote 12: See above, [p] 3.]

[Footnote 13: See Martens, _N.R.G._ 2nd Ser. XXII. p. 590.]

[Footnote 14: See below, [p] 17.]

[Sidenote: Who is to arbitrate?]

[p] 14. States which conclude an arbitration treaty have to agree upon
the arbitrators. If they choose a third State as arbitrator, they have
to conclude a treaty (_receptum arbitri_) with such State, by which they
appoint the chosen State and by which such State accepts the
appointment. The appointed State chooses on its own behalf those umpires
who actually serve as arbitrators. It can happen that the conflicting
States choose a head of a third State as arbitrator. But such head never
himself investigates the matter; he chooses one or more individuals,
who make a report and propose a verdict, which he pronounces. And,
further, the conflicting States may agree to entrust the arbitration to
any other individual or to a body of individuals, a so-called
Arbitration Committee or Commission. Thus the arbitration of 1900 in
regard to the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute between Great Britain,
Venezuela, and the United States was conducted by a Commission, sitting
at Paris, consisting of American and English members and the Russian
Professor von Martens as President. And the Alaska Boundary Dispute
between Great Britain and the United States was settled in 1903, through
the award of a Commission, sitting at London, consisting of American and
Canadian members, with Lord Alverstone, Lord Chief Justice of England,
as President.

[Sidenote: On what principles Arbitrators proceed and decide.]

[p] 15. The treaty of arbitration must stipulate the principles
according to which the arbitrators have to give their verdict. These
principles may be the general rules of International Law, but they may
also be the rules of any Municipal Law chosen by the conflicting States,
or rules of natural equity, or rules specially stipulated in the treaty
of arbitration for the special case.[15] And it can also happen that the
treaty of arbitration stipulates that the arbitrators shall compromise
the conflicting claims of the parties without resorting to special rules
of law. The treaty of arbitration, further, as a rule, stipulates the
procedure to be followed by the arbitrators who are investigating and
determining the difference. If a treaty of arbitration does not lay down
rules of procedure, the arbitrators themselves have to work out such
rules and to communicate them to the parties.

[Footnote 15: See below, [p] 335, concerning the "Three rules of
Washington."]

[Sidenote: Binding force of Arbitral Verdict.]

[p] 16. An arbitral verdict is final if the arbitration treaty does not
stipulate the contrary, and the verdict given by the arbitrators is
binding upon the parties. As, however, no such central authority exists
above the States as could execute the verdict against a State refusing
to submit, it is in such a case the right of the other party to enforce
the arbitral decision by compulsion. Yet it is obvious that an arbitral
verdict is binding only under the condition[16] that the arbitrators
have in every way fulfilled their duty as umpires and have been able to
find their verdict in perfect independence. Should they have been bribed
or not followed their instructions, should their verdict have been given
under the influence of coercion of any kind, or should one of the
parties have intentionally and maliciously led the arbitrators into an
essential material error, the arbitral verdict would have no binding
force whatever. Thus the award given in 1831 by the King of Holland in
the North-Eastern Boundary Dispute between Great Britain and the United
States of America was not considered binding by the parties because the
arbitrator had transgressed his powers.[17] For the same reason, Bolivia
refused in 1910 to submit to the award of the President of Argentina in
her boundary dispute with Peru.[18] And in October 1910, the Permanent
Court of Arbitration at the Hague, deciding the case of the United
States of America against the United States of Venezuela concerning the
claims of the Orinoco Steamship Company, annulled,[19] with regard to
certain points, a previous arbitration award given by Mr. Barge.

[Footnote 16: See Donker Curtius and Nys in _R.I._ 2nd Ser. XII. (1910),
pp. 5-34 and 595-641.]

[Footnote 17: See Moore, VII. [p] 1082, and Moore, _Arbitrations_, I.
pp. 81-161.]

[Footnote 18: See Fiore in _R.G._ XVII. (1910), pp. 225-256.]

[Footnote 19: See Martens, _N.R.G._ 3rd Ser. IV. (1911), p. 79.]

[Sidenote: What differences can be decided by Arbitration.]

[p] 17. It is often maintained that every possible difference between
States could not be determined by arbitration, and, consequently,
efforts are made to distinguish those groups of State differences which
are determinable by arbitration from others. Now although all States may
never consent to have all possible differences decided by arbitration,
theoretically there is no reason for a distinction between differences
decidable and undecidable through arbitration. For there can be no doubt
that, the consent of the parties once given, every possible difference
might be settled through arbitration, either by the verdict being based
on rules of International Law, or rules of natural equity, or by
opposing claims being compromised. But, differing from the theoretical
question as to what differences are and are not determinable by
arbitration, is the question as to what kind of State differences
_ought_ always to be settled in this manner. The latter question has
been answered by article 38 (formerly 16) of the Hague Convention for
the peaceful adjustment of international differences, the contracting
Powers therein recognising arbitration as the most efficacious, and at
the same time the most equitable, means of determining differences of a
judicial character in general, and in especial differences regarding the
interpretation or application of international treaties. But future
experience must decide whether the signatory Powers will in practice
always act according to this distinction.

However this may be, when, in 1903, Great Britain and France, following
the suggestion of this article 38 (formerly 16), concluded a treaty in
which they agreed to settle by arbitration all such differences of a
legal nature as do not affect their vital interests, their independence,
or their honour, many other States followed the lead. Great Britain, in
the same and the following years, entered into such arbitration treaties
with Spain, Italy, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland,
Austria-Hungary, Holland, Denmark, the United States of America,
Colombia, and Brazil. All these agreements were concluded for five
years only, but those which have since expired have all been renewed for
another period of five years.

Yet there is a flaw in all these treaties, because the decision as to
whether a difference is of a legal nature or not, is left to the
discretion of the parties. Cases have happened in which one of the
parties has claimed to have a difference settled by arbitration on
account of its legal nature, whereas the other party has denied the
legal nature of the difference and, therefore, refused to go to
arbitration. For this reason the arbitration treaties signed on August
3, 1911, between the United States of America and Great Britain and
between the United States of America and France are epoch making, since
article 3 provides that, in cases where the parties disagree as to
whether or not a difference is subject to arbitration under the treaty
concerned, the question shall be submitted to a joint High Commission of
Inquiry; and that, if all, or all but one, of the members of such
Commission decide the question in the affirmative, the case shall be
settled by arbitration. Article 3 has, however, been struck out by the
American Senate, with the consequence that these treaties have lost
their intrinsic value, even should they be ratified.

It should be mentioned that, whereas most arbitration treaties limit
arbitration in one or more ways, exempting cases which concern the
independence, the honour, or the vital interests of the parties,
Argentina[20] and Chili in 1902, Denmark and Holland in 1903, Denmark
and Holland in 1905, Denmark and Portugal in 1907, Argentina and Italy
in 1907, the Central American Republics of Costa Rica, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and San Salvador in 1907, Italy and Holland in
1907 entered into general arbitration treaties according to which all
differences without any exception shall be settled by arbitration.[21]

[Footnote 20: Earlier than this, on July 23, 1898--see Martens, _N.R.G._
2nd Ser. XXIX. p. 137--Argentina and Italy, and on November 9, 1899--see
Martens, _N.R.G._ 2nd Ser. XXXII. (1905), p. 404--Argentina and Paraguay
had concluded treaties according to which all differences without
exception shall be settled by arbitration. See also above, [p] 3,
concerning the Compromise Clause.]

[Footnote 21: A list of all the arbitration treaties which have been
entered into by the several States since the First Hague Peace
Conference of 1899, is to be found in Fried, _op. cit._ p. 185.]

[Sidenote: Value of Arbitration.]

[p] 18. There can be no doubt that arbitration is, and every day becomes
more and more, of great importance. History proves that in antiquity and
during the Middle Ages arbitration was occasionally[22] made use of as a
peaceable means of settling international differences. But, although an
International Law made its appearance in modern times, during the
sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries very few cases of
arbitration occurred. It was not until the end of the eighteenth century
that arbitration was frequently made use of. There are 177 cases from
1794 to the end of 1900.[23] This number shows that the inclination of
States to agree to arbitration has increased, and there can be no doubt
that arbitration has a great future. States and the public opinion of
the whole world become more and more convinced that there are a good
many international differences which may well be determined by
arbitration without any danger whatever to the national existence,
independence, dignity, and prosperity of the States concerned. A net of
so-called Peace Societies has spread over the whole world, and their
members unceasingly work for the promotion of arbitration. The
Parliaments of several countries have repeatedly given their vote in
favour of arbitration; and the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 created a
Permanent Court of Arbitration, a step by which a new epoch of the
development of International Law was inaugurated. It is certain that
arbitration will gradually increase its range, although the time is by
no means in sight when all international differences will find their
settlement by arbitration.

[Footnote 22: See examples in Calvo, III. [p][p] 1707-1712, and in Nys,
_Les origines du droit international_ (1894), pp. 52-61.]

[Footnote 23: See La Fontaine's _Histoire sommaire et chronologique des
arbitrages internationaux_ in _R.I._ 2nd Ser. IV. pp. 349, 558, 623. See
also Scott, _Conferences_, pp. 188-252.]

The novel institution of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague
stands at present in the cross-fire of impatient pacifists and cynical
pessimists. Because a number of wars have been fought since the
establishment of the Permanent Court, impatient pacifists are in despair
and consider the institution of the Court of Arbitration a failure,
whereas cynical pessimists triumphantly point to the fact that the
millennium would seem to be as far distant as ever. The calm observer of
the facts who possesses insight in the process of historical
development, has no cause to despair, for, compared with some
generations ago, arbitration is an established force which daily gains
more power and influence. And when once a real International Court[24]
of justice is established side by side with the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, the chances of arbitration will be greatly increased.

[Footnote 24: See above, vol. I. [p] 476_b_.]


V

ARBITRATION ACCORDING TO THE HAGUE CONVENTION

  Ullmann, [p][p] 155-156--Bonfils, Nos. 953'1-955'1--Despagnet, Nos.
  742-746_bis_--Merignhac, I. pp. 486-539--Holls, _The Peace
  Conference at the Hague_ (1900)--Martens, _La conference de la
  paix a la Haye_ (1900)--Merignhac, _La conference internationale
  de la paix_ (1900)--Fried, _Die zweite Haager Konferenz_
  (1908)--Meurer, I. pp. 299-372--Scott, _Conferences_, pp.
  286-385--Higgins, pp. 164-179--Lemonon, pp. 188-219--Nippold, I.
  pp. 36-231--Wehberg, _Kommentar_, pp. 46-164.

[Sidenote: Arbitral Justice in general.]

[p] 19. Of the 97 articles of the Hague Convention for the peaceful
adjustment of international differences, no fewer than 44--namely,
articles 37-90--deal with arbitration in three chapters, headed "On
Arbitral Justice," "On the Permanent Court of Arbitration," and "On
Arbitral Procedure." The first chapter, articles 37-40, contains rules
on arbitral justice in general, which, however, with one exception, are
not of a legal but of a merely doctrinal character. Thus the definition
in article 37, first paragraph, "International arbitration has for its
object the determination of controversies between States by judges of
their own choice and upon the basis of respect for law," is as doctrinal
as the assertion of article 38: "In questions of a judicial character,
and especially in questions regarding the interpretation or application
of International Treaties or Conventions, arbitration is recognised by
the contracting Powers as the most efficacious and at the same time the
most equitable method of deciding controversies which have not been
settled by diplomatic methods. Consequently it would be desirable that,
in disputes regarding the above-mentioned questions, the contracting
Powers should, if the case arise, have recourse to arbitration, in so
far as circumstances permit." And the provision of article 39, that an
agreement of arbitration may be made respecting disputes already in
existence or arising in the future and may relate to every kind of
controversy or solely to controversies of a particular character, is as
doctrinal as the reservation of article 40, which runs: "Independently
of existing general or special treaties imposing the obligation to have
recourse to arbitration on the part of any of the contracting Powers,
these Powers reserve to themselves the right to conclude, either before
the ratification of the present Convention or afterwards, new general or
special agreements with a view to extending obligatory arbitration to
all cases which they consider possible to submit to it." The only rule
of legal character is that of article 37 (second paragraph), enacting
the already existing customary rule of International Law, that "the
agreement of arbitration implies the obligation to submit in good faith
to the arbitral sentence."

On the signatory Powers no obligation whatever to submit any difference
to arbitration is imposed. Even differences of a judicial character, and
especially those regarding the interpretation or application of
treaties, for the settlement of which the signatory Powers, in article
38, acknowledge arbitration as the most efficacious and at the same time
the most equitable method, need not necessarily be submitted to
arbitration.

Yet the principle of compulsory arbitration for a limited number of
international differences was by no means negatived by the Hague Peace
Conferences, especially not by the Second Conference.

The principle found, firstly, indirect recognition by the Convention
respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of
Contract Debts.[25] Since article I of this Convention stipulates that
recourse to the employment of force for the recovery of contract debts
claimed from the Government of one country by the Government of another
country as being due to its nationals is not allowed unless the debtor
State refuses arbitration, compulsory arbitration has in this instance
been victorious.

[Footnote 25: See above, vol. I. [p] 135, p. 192, where the so-called
Drago doctrine is likewise discussed.]

Secondly, although it was not possible to agree upon some stipulation
embodying compulsory arbitration for a number of differences in
Convention I., the principle itself was fully recognised, and the Final
Act of the Second Peace Conference includes, therefore, the Declaration
that the Conference "is unanimous (1) in admitting the principle of
compulsory arbitration; (2) in declaring that certain disputes, in
particular those relating to the interpretation and application of
international agreements, may be submitted to compulsory arbitration
without any restriction."

The above shows reasonable grounds for the hope and expectation that one
of the future Peace Conferences will find a way out of the difficulty
and come to an agreement stipulating compulsory arbitration for a
limited number of international differences.[26]

[Footnote 26: See Scott, _Conferences_, pp. 319-385, where the
proceedings of both the First and Second Peace Conferences concerning
compulsory arbitration are sketched in a masterly and very lucid style.]

[Sidenote: Arbitration Treaty and appointment of Arbitrators.]

[p] 20. According to article 52 the conflicting States which resort to
arbitration shall sign a special Act, the _Compromis_, in which is
clearly defined: the subject of the dispute; the time allowed for
appointing the arbitrators; the form, order, and time in which the
communications referred to in article 63 of Convention I. must be made;
the amount of the sum which each party must deposit in advance to defray
the expenses; the manner of appointing arbitrators (if there be
occasion); any special powers which may eventually belong to the
Tribunal, where it shall meet, the languages to be used, and any special
conditions upon which the parties may agree. Should, however, the
conflicting States prefer it, the Permanent Court at the Hague is
competent to draw up and settle the _Compromis_, and the Court is
likewise in some other cases competent to settle the _Compromis_
(articles 53-54). The parties may agree to have recourse to the
Permanent Court of Arbitration which was instituted by the Hague
Convention and regarding which details have been given above, Vol. I.,
[p][p] 472-476, but they may also assign the arbitration to one or
several arbitrators chosen by them either from the members of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration or elsewhere (article 55). If they choose
a head of a State as arbitrator, the whole of the arbitral procedure is
to be determined by him (article 56). If they choose several
arbitrators, an umpire is to preside, but in case they have not chosen
an umpire, the arbitrators are to elect one of their own number as
president (article 57). If the _Compromis_ is settled by a Commission,
as contemplated by article 54 of Convention I., and in default of an
agreement to the contrary, the Commission itself shall form the
Arbitration Tribunal (article 58). In case of death, resignation, or
disability of one of the arbitrators from any cause, his place is to be
filled in accordance with the method of his appointment (article 59).
The place of session of the arbitrators is to be determined by the
parties; but if they fail to do it, the place of session is to be the
Hague, and the place of session may not be changed by the arbitrators
without the consent of the parties; the Tribunal may only sit in the
territory of a third State with the latter's consent (article 60). The
International Bureau of the Court at the Hague is authorised to put its
offices and its staff at the disposal of the contracting Powers in case
the parties have preferred to bring their dispute before arbitrators
other than the Permanent Court of Arbitration (article 47).

[Sidenote: Procedure of and before the Arbitral Tribunal.]

[p] 21. The parties may agree upon such rules of arbitral procedure as
they like. If they fail to stipulate special rules of procedure, the
following rules are valid, whether the parties have brought their case
before the Permanent Court of Arbitration or have chosen other
arbitrators (article 51):--

(1) The parties may appoint counsel or advocates for the defence of
their rights before the tribunal. They may also appoint delegates or
special agents to attend the tribunal for the purpose of serving as
intermediaries between them and the tribunal. The members of the
Permanent Court, however, may not act as agents, counsel, or advocates
except on behalf of the Power which has appointed them members of the
Court (article 62).

(2) The tribunal selects the languages for its own use and for use
before it, unless the _Compromis_ has specified the languages to be
employed (article 61).

(3) As a rule the arbitral procedure is divided into the two distinct
phases of written pleadings and oral discussions. The written pleadings
consist of the communication by the respective agents to the members of
the tribunal and to the opposite party of cases, counter-cases, and, if
necessary, replies; the parties must annex thereto all papers and
documents relied on in the case. This communication is to be made either
directly or through the intermediary of the International Bureau, in the
order and within the time fixed by the _Compromis_ (article 63). A duly
certified copy of every document produced by one party must be
communicated to the other party (article 64). Unless special
circumstances arise, the tribunal does not meet until the pleadings are
closed (article 65).

(4) Upon the written pleadings follows the oral discussion in Court; it
consists of the oral development of the pleas of the parties (article
63, last paragraph). The discussions are under the direction of the
president of the tribunal, and are public only if it be so decided by
the tribunal with the consent of the parties. Minutes with regard to the
discussion are to be drawn up by secretaries appointed by the president,
and only these official minutes, which are signed by the president and
one of the secretaries, are authentic (article 66). During the
discussion in Court the agents and counsel of the parties are authorised
to present to the tribunal orally all the arguments they may think
expedient in support of their case. They are likewise authorised to
raise objections and to make incidental motions, but the decisions of
the tribunal on these objections and motions are final and cannot form
the subject of any further discussion (articles 70, 71). Every member of
the tribunal may put questions to the agents and counsel of the parties
and demand explanations from them on doubtful points, but neither such
questions nor other remarks made by members of the tribunal may be
regarded as expressions of opinion by the tribunal in general or the
respective member in particular (article 72). The tribunal may always
require from the agents of the parties all necessary explanations and
the production of all acts, and in case of refusal the tribunal takes
note of it in the minutes (articles 69).

When the competence of the tribunal is doubted on one or more points,
the tribunal itself is authorised to decide whether it is or is not
competent, by means of interpretation of the _Compromis_ as well as the
other papers and documents which may be adduced in the matter, and by
means of the application of the principles of law (article 73).

During the discussion in Court--article 67 says, "After the close of the
pleadings"--the tribunal is competent to refuse admittance to all such
fresh acts and documents as one party may desire to submit to the
tribunal without the consent of the other party (article 67).
Consequently, the tribunal must admit fresh acts and documents when both
parties agree to their submission. On the other hand, the tribunal is
always competent to take into consideration fresh papers and documents
to which its attention is drawn by the agents or counsel of the parties,
and in such cases the tribunal may require production of the papers and
documents, but it is at the same time obliged to make them known to the
other party (article 68).

The parties must supply the tribunal, within the widest limits they may
think practicable, with all the information required for deciding the
dispute (article 75). For the service of all notices by the tribunal in
the territory of a third contracting Power, the tribunal applies direct
to the Government of such Power. The same rule is valid in the case of
steps being necessary in order to procure evidence on the spot. The
requests for this purpose are to be executed by the Power concerned with
the means at its disposal according to its Municipal Law; they may not
be rejected unless the Power concerned considers them of such a nature
as to impair its own sovereign rights or its safety. Instead, however,
of making a direct application to a third Power, the tribunal is always
entitled to have recourse to the intermediary of the Power on whose
territory it sits (article 76).

As soon as the agents and counsel of the parties have submitted all
explanations and evidence in support of their case, the president
declares the discussion closed (article 77).

[Sidenote: Arbitral Award.]

[p] 22. The arbitral award is given after a deliberation which has taken
place behind closed doors, and the proceedings remain secret (article
78). The members of the tribunal vote, and the majority of the votes
makes the decision of the tribunal. The decision, accompanied by a
statement of the considerations upon which it is based, is to be drawn
up in writing, to recite the names of the arbitrators, and to be signed
by the president and the registrar or the secretary acting as the
registrar (article 79). The verdict is read out at a public meeting of
the tribunal, the agents and counsel of the parties being present or
having been duly summoned to attend (article 80).

[Sidenote: Binding force of Awards.]

[p] 23. The award, when duly pronounced and notified to the agents of
the parties, decides the dispute finally and without appeal (article
81). Any dispute arising between the parties as to the interpretation or
execution of the award must, in default of an agreement to the
contrary, be submitted to the tribunal which pronounced it (article 82).
The parties may, however, beforehand stipulate in the _Compromis_ the
possibility of an appeal. In such case, and the _Compromis_ failing to
stipulate the contrary, the demand for a rehearing of the case must be
addressed to the tribunal which pronounced the award. The demand for a
rehearing of the case may only be made on the ground of the discovery of
some new fact such as may exercise a decisive influence on the award,
and which at the time when the discussion was closed was unknown to the
tribunal as well as to the appealing party. Proceedings for a rehearing
may only be opened after a decision of the tribunal expressly stating
the existence of a new fact of the character described, and declaring
the demand admissible on this ground. The treaty of arbitration must
stipulate the period of time within which the demand for a rehearing
must be made (article 83).--

The Hague Convention contains no stipulation whatever with regard to the
question whether the award is binding under all circumstances and
conditions, or whether it is only binding when the tribunal has in every
way fulfilled its duty and has been able to find its verdict in perfect
independence. But it is obvious that the award has no binding force
whatever if the tribunal has been bribed or has not followed the
parties' instructions given by the treaty of agreement; if the award was
given under the influence of undue coercion; or, lastly, if one of the
parties has intentionally and maliciously led the tribunal into an
essential material error. (See above, [p] 16).

[Sidenote: Award binding upon Parties only.]

[p] 24. The award[27] is binding only upon the parties to the
proceedings. But when there is a question of interpreting a convention
to which other States than the States at variance are parties, the
conflicting States have to inform all the contracting Powers of such
convention in good time. Each of these States has a right to intervene
in the case before the tribunal, and, if one or more avail themselves of
this right, the interpretation contained in the award is as binding upon
them as upon the conflicting parties (article 84).

[Footnote 27: The awards hitherto given are enumerated above, vol. I.
[p] 476, p. 521, but the case of Italy _v._ Peru (Canevaro claim, May 3,
1912) must now be added.]

[Sidenote: Costs of Arbitration.]

[p] 25. Each party pays its own expenses and an equal share of those of
the tribunal[28] (article 85).

[Footnote 28: See details in Wehberg, _Kommentar_, pp. 155-158.]

[Sidenote: Arbitration by Summary Procedure.]

[p] 25_a_. With a view to facilitating the working of arbitration in
disputes of minor importance admitting an abbreviated procedure, the
contracting Powers propose the following rules for a summary procedure
exclusively in writing:--

Each of the conflicting parties appoints an arbitrator, and these
arbitrators need not necessarily be members of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration. The two arbitrators thus appointed choose a third as
umpire, who need not be a member of the Permanent Court either. But if
they cannot agree upon an umpire, each of them proposes two candidates
taken from the general list of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
exclusive of such members as are either appointed by the conflicting
States or are their nationals, and it is to be determined by lot which
of the candidates shall be the umpire. This umpire presides over the
tribunal which gives its decisions by a majority of votes (article 87).
In the absence of an agreement concerning the matter, the tribunal
settles the time within which the two parties must submit their
respective cases to it (article 88). Each party is represented by an
agent who serves as intermediary between the tribunal and his party
(article 89). The proceedings are conducted exclusively in writing. Each
party, however, is entitled to ask that witnesses and experts should be
called, and the tribunal has the right to demand oral explanations from
the agents as well as from the experts and witnesses whose appearance in
Court it may consider useful (article 90). Articles 52 to 85 of
Convention I. apply so far as they are not inconsistent with the rules
laid down in articles 87 to 90 (article 80).




CHAPTER II

COMPULSIVE SETTLEMENT OF STATE DIFFERENCES


I

ON COMPULSIVE MEANS OF SETTLEMENT OF STATE DIFFERENCES IN GENERAL

  Lawrence, [p] 136--Westlake, II. p. 6--Phillimore, III. [p]
  7--Pradier-Fodere, VI. No. 2632--Despagnet, No. 483--Fiore, II.
  No. 1225, and Code, Nos. 1381-1385--Taylor, [p] 431--Nys, III. pp.
  83-94.

[Sidenote: Conception and kinds of Compulsive Means of Settlement.]

[p] 26. Compulsive means of settlement of differences are measures
containing a certain amount of compulsion taken by a State for the
purpose of making another State consent to such settlement of a
difference as is required by the former. There are four different kinds
of such means in use--namely, retorsion, reprisals (including embargo),
pacific blockade, and intervention. But it must be mentioned that,
whereas every amicable means of settling differences might find
application in every kind of difference, not every compulsive means is
applicable in every difference. For the application of retorsion is
confined to political, and that of reprisals to legal differences.

[Sidenote: Compulsive Means in contradistinction to War.]

[p] 27. War is very often enumerated among the compulsive means of
settling international differences. This is in a sense correct, for a
State might make war for no other purpose than that of compelling
another State to settle a difference in the way required before war was
declared. Nevertheless, the characteristics of compulsive means of
settling international differences make it a necessity to draw a sharp
line between these means and war. It is, firstly, characteristic of
compulsive means that, although they frequently consist of harmful
measures, they are neither by the conflicting nor by other States
considered as acts of war, and consequently all relations of peace, such
as diplomatic and commercial intercourse, the execution of treaties, and
the like, remain undisturbed. Compulsive means are in theory and
practice considered peaceable, although not amicable, means of settling
international differences. It is, further, characteristic of compulsive
means that they are even at their worst confined to the application of
certain harmful measures only, whereas belligerents in war may apply any
amount and any kinds of force, with the exception only of those methods
forbidden by International Law. And, thirdly, it is characteristic of
compulsive means that their application must cease as soon as their
purpose is realised by the compelled State declaring its readiness to
settle the difference in the way requested by the compelling State;
whereas, war once broken out, a belligerent is not obliged to lay down
arms if and when the other belligerent is ready to comply with the
request made before the war. As war is the _ultima ratio_ between
States, the victorious belligerent is not legally prevented from
imposing upon the defeated any conditions he likes.

[Sidenote: Compulsive Means in contradistinction to an Ultimatum and
Demonstrations.]

[p] 28. The above-described characteristics of compulsive means for the
settlement of international differences make it necessary to mention the
distinction between such means and an _ultimatum_. The latter is the
technical term for a written communication by one State to another which
ends amicable negotiations respecting a difference, and formulates, for
the last time and categorically, the demands to be fulfilled if other
measures are to be averted. An _ultimatum_ is, theoretically at least,
not a compulsion, although it can practically exercise the function of
a compulsion, and although compulsive means, or even war, can be
threatened through the same communication in the event of a refusal to
comply with the demand made.[29] And the same is valid with regard to
withdrawal of diplomatic agents, to military and naval demonstrations,
and the like, which some publicists[30] enumerate among the compulsive
means of settlement of international differences. Although these steps
may contrive, indirectly, the settlement of differences, yet they do not
contain in themselves any compulsion.

[Footnote 29: See Pradier-Fodere, VI. No. 2649, and below, [p] 95.]

[Footnote 30: See Taylor, [p][p] 431, 433, 441; Moore, VII. [p][p] 1089,
1091, 1099; Pradier-Fodere, VI. No. 2633.]


II

RETORSION

  Vattel, II. [p] 341--Hall, [p] 120--Westlake, II. p. 6--Phillimore,
  III. [p] 7--Twiss II. [p] 10--Taylor, [p] 435--Wharton, III. [p]
  318--Moore, VII. [p] 1090--Wheaton, [p] 290--Bluntschli, [p]
  505--Heffter, [p] 110--Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp.
  59-71--Ullmann, [p] 159--Bonfils, Nos. 972-974--Despagnet, Nos.
  484-486--Pradier-Fodere, VI. Nos. 2634-2636--Rivier, II. [p]
  60--Calvo, III. [p] 1807--Fiore, II. Nos. 1226-1227, and Code, Nos.
  1386-1390--Martens, II [p] 105.

[Sidenote: Conception and Character of Retorsion.]

[p] 29. Retorsion is the technical term for the retaliation of
discourteous or unkind or unfair and inequitable acts by acts of the
same or a similar kind. Retorsion has nothing to do with international
delinquencies, as it is not a means of compulsion in the case of legal
differences, but only in the case of certain political differences. The
act which calls for retaliation is not an illegal act; on the contrary,
it is an act that is within the competence of the doer.[31] But a State
can commit many legislative, administrative, or judicial acts which,
although they are not internationally illegal, contain a discourtesy or
unfriendliness to another State or are unfair and inequitable. If the
State against which such acts are directed considers itself wronged
thereby, a political difference is created which might be settled by
retorsion.

[Footnote 31: For this reason--see Heilborn, _System_, p. 352, and
Wagner, _Zur Lehre von den Streiterledigungsmitteln des Voelkerrechts_
(1900), pp. 53-60--it is correctly maintained that retorsion, in
contradistinction to reprisals, is not of legal, but only of political
importance. Nevertheless, a system of the Law of Nations must not omit
the matter of retorsion altogether, because retorsion is in practice an
important means of settling political differences.]

[Sidenote: Retorsion, when justified.]

[p] 30. The question when retorsion is and when it is not justified is
not one of law, and is difficult to answer. The difficulty arises from
the fact that retorsion is a means of settling such differences as are
created, not by internationally illegal, but by discourteous or
unfriendly or unfair and inequitable acts of one State against another,
and that naturally the conceptions of discourtesy, unfriendliness, and
unfairness cannot be defined very precisely. It depends, therefore,
largely upon the circumstances and conditions of the special cases
whether a State will or will not consider itself justified in making use
of retorsion. In practice States have frequently made use of retorsion
in cases of unfair treatment of their citizens abroad through rigorous
passport regulations, exclusion of foreigners from certain professions,
the levy of exorbitant protectionist or fiscal duties; further, in cases
of refusal of the usual mutual judicial assistance, refusal of
admittance of foreign ships to harbours, and in similar cases.

[Sidenote: Retorsion, how exercised.]

[p] 31. The essence of retorsion consists in retaliation for a noxious
act by an act of the same kind. But a State in making use of retorsion
is by no means confined to acts of the same kind as those complained of,
acts of a similar kind being equally admissible. However, acts of
retorsion are confined to acts which are not internationally illegal.
And, further, as retorsion is made use of only for the purpose of
compelling a State to alter its discourteous, unfriendly, or unfair
behaviour, all acts of retorsion ought at once to cease when such State
changes its behaviour.

[Sidenote: Value of Retorsion.]

[p] 32. The value of retorsion as a means of settling certain
international differences consists in its compulsory force, which has
great power in regulating the intercourse of States. It is a commonplace
of human nature, and by experience constantly confirmed, that evil-doers
are checked by retaliation, and that those who are inclined to commit a
wrong against others are often prevented by the fear of it. Through the
high tide of Chauvinism, Protectionism, and unfriendly feelings against
foreign nations, States are often tempted to legislative,
administrative, and judicial acts against other States which, although
not internationally illegal, nevertheless endanger friendly relations
and intercourse within the Family of Nations. The certainty of
retaliation is the only force which can make States resist the
temptation.


III

REPRISALS

  Grotius, III. c. 2--Vattel, II. [p][p] 342-354--Bynkershoek,
  _Quaestiones jur. publ._ I. c. 24--Hall, [p] 120--Lawrence, [p][p]
  136-137--Westlake, II. pp. 7-11--Twiss, II. [p][p] 11-22--Moore,
  VII. [p][p] 1095, 1096-1098--Taylor, [p][p] 436-437--Wharton, III.
  [p][p] 318-320--Wheaton, [p][p] 291-293--Bluntschli, [p][p]
  500-504--Heffter, [p][p] 111-112--Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV.
  pp. 72-116--Ullmann, [p] 160--Bonfils, Nos. 975-985--Despagnet,
  Nos. 487-495--Pradier-Fodere, VI. Nos. 2637-2647--Rivier, II. [p]
  60--Nys, III. pp. 84-91--Calvo, III. [p][p] 1808-1831--Fiore, II.
  Nos. 1228-1230, and Code, Nos. 1391-1399--Martens, II. [p]
  105--Lafargue, _Les represailles en temps de paix_
  (1899)--Ducrocq, _Represailles en temps de paix_ (1901), pp. 5-57,
  175-232--Westlake in _The Law Quarterly Review_, XXV. (1909), pp.
  127-137.

[Sidenote: Conception of Reprisals in contradistinction to Retorsion.]

[p] 33. Reprisals is the term applied to such injurious and otherwise
internationally illegal acts of one State against another as are
exceptionally permitted for the purpose of compelling the latter to
consent to a satisfactory settlement of a difference created by its own
international delinquency. Whereas retorsion consists in retaliation of
discourteous, unfriendly, unfair, and inequitable acts by acts of the
same or a similar kind, and has nothing to do with international
delinquencies, reprisals are acts, otherwise illegal, performed by a
State for the purpose of obtaining justice for an international
delinquency by taking the law into its own hands. It is, of course,
possible that a State retaliates in consequence of an illegal act
committed against itself by the performance of an act of a similar kind.
Such retaliation would be a retorsion in the ordinary sense of the term,
but it would not be retorsion in the technical meaning of the term as
used by those writers on International Law who correctly distinguish
between retorsion and reprisals.

[Sidenote: Reprisals admissible for all International Delinquencies.]

[p] 34. Reprisals are admissible not only, as some writers[32] maintain,
in case of denial or delay of justice, or of any other internationally
interdicted ill-treatment of foreign citizens, but in every case of an
international delinquency for which the injured State cannot get
reparation through negotiation,[33] be it ill-treatment of its subjects
abroad through denial or delay of justice or otherwise, or be it
non-compliance with treaty obligations, violation of the dignity of a
foreign State, violation of foreign territorial supremacy, or any other
internationally illegal act.

[Footnote 32: See, for instance, Twiss, II. [p] 19.]

[Footnote 33: As regards reprisals for the non-payment of
contract-debts, see below, [p] 41.]

Thus, to give an example, Great Britain, in the case of the Sicilian
Sulphur Monopoly, performed acts of reprisal against the Two Sicilies in
1840 for a violation of a treaty. By the treaty of commerce of 1816
between the Two Sicilies and Great Britain certain commercial advantages
were secured to Great Britain. When, in 1838, the Neapolitan Government
granted a Sulphur Monopoly to a company of French and other foreign
merchants, Great Britain protested against this violation of her treaty
rights, demanded the revocation of the monopoly, and, after the
Neapolitan Government had declined to comply with this demand, laid an
_embargo_ on Sicilian ships in the harbour of Malta and ordered her
fleet in the Mediterranean to seize Sicilian ships by way of reprisal. A
number of vessels were captured, but were restored after the Sicilies
had, through the mediation of France, agreed to withdraw the grant of
the Sulphur Monopoly.

Again, when in 1908 de Castro, the President of Venezuela, dismissed M.
de Reuss, the Dutch Minister Resident at Caracas, Holland considered
this step a violation of her dignity and sent cruisers into Venezuelan
waters with the intention of resorting to reprisals. These cruisers
captured the Venezuelan coast-guard ship _Alexis_ outside Puerto
Cabello, and another Venezuelan public vessel, both of which, however,
were restored in 1909, when de Castro was deposed, and the new President
opened negotiations with Holland and settled the conflict.

[Sidenote: Reprisals admissible for International Delinquencies only.]

[p] 35. Reprisals are admissible in the case of international
delinquencies only and exclusively. As internationally injurious
acts on the part of administrative and judicial officials, armed forces,
and private individuals are not _ipso facto_ international
delinquencies, no reprisals are admissible in the case of such
acts if the responsible State complies with the requirements of its
vicarious responsibility.[34] Should, however, a State refuse to comply
with these requirements, its vicarious responsibility would turn into
original responsibility, and thereby an international delinquency would
be created for which reprisals are indeed admissible.

[Footnote 34: See above, vol. I. [p][p] 149 and 150.]

The reprisals ordered by Great Britain in the case of Don Pacifico are
an illustrative example of unjustified reprisals, because no
international delinquency was committed. In 1847 a riotous mob, aided by
Greek soldiers and gendarmes, broke into and plundered the house of Don
Pacifico, a native of Gibraltar and an English subject living at Athens.
Great Britain claimed damages from Greece without previous recourse by
Don Pacifico to the Greek Courts. Greece refused to comply with the
British claim, maintaining correctly that Don Pacifico ought to
institute an action for damages against the rioters before the Greek
Courts. Great Britain continued to press her claim, and finally in 1850
blockaded the Greek coast and ordered, by way of reprisal, the capture
of Greek vessels. The conflict was eventually settled by Greece paying
_l._150 to Don Pacifico. It is generally recognised that England had no
right to act as she did in this case. She could have claimed damages
directly from the Greek Government only after the Greek Courts had
denied satisfaction to Don Pacifico.[35]

[Footnote 35: See above, vol. I. [p] 167. The case is reported with all
its details in Martens, _Causes Celebres_, V. pp. 395-531.]

[Sidenote: Reprisals, by whom performed.]

[p] 36. Acts of reprisal may nowadays be performed only by State organs
such as armed forces, or men-of-war, or administrative officials, in
compliance with a special order of their State. But in former times
private individuals used to perform acts of reprisal. Such private acts
of reprisal seem to have been in vogue in antiquity, for there existed a
law in Athens according to which the relatives of an Athenian murdered
abroad had, in case the foreign State refused punishment or extradition
of the murderer, the right to seize and to bring before the Athenian
Courts three citizens of such foreign State (so-called [Greek:
androlepsia]). During the Middle Ages, and even in modern times to the
end of the eighteenth century, States used to grant so-called "Letters
of Marque" to such of their subjects as had been injured abroad either
by a foreign State itself or its citizens without being able to get
redress. These Letters of Marque authorised the bearer to acts of
self-help against the State concerned, its citizens and their property,
for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction for the wrong sustained. In
later times, however, States themselves also performed acts of reprisal.
Thereby acts of reprisal on the part of private individuals fell more
and more into disuse, and finally disappeared totally with the end of
the eighteenth century. The distinction between general and special
reprisals, which used formerly to be drawn, is based on the fact that in
former times a State could either authorise a single private individual
to perform an act of reprisal (_special_ reprisals), or command its
armed forces to perform all kinds of such acts (_general_ reprisals).
The term "General Reprisals" is by Great Britain nowadays used for the
authorisation of the British fleet to seize in time of war all enemy
ships and goods. Phillimore (III. [p] 10) cites the following Order in
Council of March 27, 1854: "Her Majesty having determined to afford
active assistance to her ally, His Highness the Sultan of the Ottoman
Empire, for the protection of his dominions against the encroachments
and unprovoked aggression of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of All the
Russias, Her Majesty is therefore pleased, by and with the advice of Her
Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that general
reprisals be granted against the ships, vessels, and goods of the
Emperor of All the Russias, and of his subjects, or others inhabiting
within any of his countries, territories or dominions, so that Her
Majesty's fleets may lawfully seize all ships, vessels, and goods," &c.

[Sidenote: Objects of Reprisals.]

[p] 37. An act of reprisal may be performed against anything and
everything that belongs or is due to the delinquent State or its
citizens. Ships sailing under its flag may be seized, treaties concluded
with it may be suspended, a part of its territory may be militarily
occupied, goods belonging to it or to its citizens may be seized, and
the like. Thus in 1895 Great Britain ordered a fleet to land forces at
Corinto and to occupy the custom-house and other Government buildings as
an act of reprisal against Nicaragua; again, in 1901 France ordered a
fleet to seize the island of Mitylene as an act of reprisal against
Turkey; and in 1908 Holland ordered a squadron to seize two public
Venezuelan vessels as an act of reprisal against Venezuela.[36] The
persons of the officials and even of the private citizens of the
delinquent State are not excluded from the possible objects of
reprisals. Thus, when in 1740 the Empress Anne of Russia arrested
without just cause the Baron de Stackelberg, a natural-born Russian
subject, who had, however, become naturalised in Prussia by entering the
latter's service, Frederick II. of Prussia seized by way of reprisal two
Russian subjects and detained them until Stackelberg was liberated. But
it must be emphasised that the only act of reprisal admissible with
regard to foreign officials or citizens is arrest; they must not be
treated like criminals, but like hostages, and under no condition or
circumstance may they be executed or subjected to punishment of any
kind.

[Footnote 36: See above, [p] 34.]

The rule that anything and everything belonging to the delinquent State
may be made the object of reprisals has, however, exceptions; for
instance, individuals enjoying the privilege of exterritoriality while
abroad, such as heads of States and diplomatic envoys, may not be made
the object of reprisals, although this has occasionally been done in
practice.[37] In regard to another exception--namely, public debts of
such State as intends performing reprisals--unanimity does not exist
either in theory or in practice. When Frederick II. of Prussia in 1752,
by way of negative reprisals for an alleged injustice of British Prize
Courts against Prussian subjects, refused the payment of the Silesian
loan due to English creditors, Great Britain, in addition to denying the
question that there was at all a just cause for reprisals, maintained
that public debts may not be made the object of reprisals. English
jurists and others, as, for instance, Vattel (II. [p] 344), consent to
this, but German writers dissent.[38]

[Footnote 37: See the case reported in Martens, _Causes Celebres_, I. p.
35.]

[Footnote 38: See Phillimore, III. [p] 22, in contradistinction to
Heffter, [p] 111, note 5. The case is reported with all its details in
Martens, _Causes Celebres_, II. pp. 97-168. The dispute was settled in
1756--see below, [p] 437--through Great Britain paying an indemnity of
_l._20,000.]

[Sidenote: Positive and Negative Reprisals.]

[p] 38. Reprisals can be positive or negative. One speaks of positive
reprisals when such acts are performed as would under ordinary
circumstances involve an international delinquency. On the other hand,
negative reprisals consist of refusals to perform such acts as are under
ordinary circumstances obligatory; when, for instance, the fulfilment of
a treaty obligation or the payment of a debt is refused.

[Sidenote: Reprisals must be proportionate.]

[p] 39. Reprisals, be they positive or negative, must be in proportion
to the wrong done and to the amount of compulsion necessary to get
reparation. For instance, a State would not be justified in arresting by
way of reprisal thousands of foreign subjects living on its territory
whose home State had injured it through a denial of justice to one of
its subjects living abroad. But it would in such case be justified in
ordering its own Courts to deny justice to all subjects of such foreign
State, or in ordering its fleet to seize several vessels sailing under
the latter State's flag, or in suspending its commercial treaty with
such State.

[Sidenote: Embargo.]

[p] 40. A kind of reprisal, which is called _Embargo_, must be specially
mentioned. This term of Spanish origin means detention, but in
International Law it has the technical meaning of detention of ships in
port. Now, as by way of reprisal all acts, otherwise illegal, may be
performed, there is no doubt that ships of the delinquent State may be
prevented from leaving the ports of the injured State for the purpose of
compelling the delinquent State to make reparation for the wrong
done.[39]

[Footnote 39: Thus in 1840--see above, [p] 34--Great Britain laid an
embargo on Sicilian ships.]

The matter would not need special mention were it not for the fact that
_embargo_ by way of reprisal is to be distinguished from detention of
ships for other reasons. According to a now obsolete[40] rule of
International Law, conflicting States could, when war was breaking out
or impending, lay an _embargo_ on, and appropriate each other's
merchantmen. Another kind of _embargo_ is the so-called _arret de
prince_[41]--that is, a detention of foreign ships for the purpose of
preventing them from spreading news of political importance. And there
is, thirdly, an _embargo_ arising out of the so-called _jus
angariae_--that is, the right of a belligerent State to seize and make
use of neutral property in case of necessity, under the obligation to
compensate the neutral owner of such property. States have in the
past[42] made use of this kind of _embargo_ when they had not enough
ships for the necessary transport of troops, ammunition, and the like.

[Footnote 40: See, however, below, [p] 102_a_ and article 1 of
Convention VI., which only stipulates that it is _desirable_ that enemy
vessels in the port of a belligerent at the outbreak of war should be
allowed to depart freely; see also article 2 of Convention VI.]

[Footnote 41: See Steck, _Versuch ueber Handels- und Schiffahrts-
Vertraege_ (1782), p. 355; Caumont, _Dictionnaire universel
de droit maritime_ (1867), pp. 247-265; Calvo, III. [p] 1277;
Pradier-Fodere, V. p. 719; Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 98-104.]

[Footnote 42: See below, [p] 364.]

These kinds of international _embargo_ must not be confounded with the
so-called _civil embargo_ of English Municipal Law[43]--namely, the
order of the Sovereign to English ships not to leave English ports.

[Footnote 43: See Phillimore, III. [p] 26.]

[Sidenote: Reprisals to be preceded by Negotiations and to be stopped
when Reparation is made.]

[p] 41. Like all other compulsive means of settling international
differences, reprisals are admissible only after negotiations have been
conducted in vain for the purpose of obtaining reparation from the
delinquent State. In former times, when States used to authorise private
individuals to perform special reprisals, treaties of commerce and peace
frequently stipulated for a certain period of time, for instance three
or four months, to elapse after an application for redress before the
grant of Letters of Marque by the injured State.[44] Although with the
disappearance of special reprisals this is now antiquated, a reasonable
time for the performance of a reparation must even nowadays be given. On
the other hand, reprisals must at once cease when the delinquent State
makes the necessary reparation. Individuals arrested must be set free,
goods and ships seized must be handed back, occupied territory must be
evacuated, suspended treaties must again be put into force, and the
like.

[Footnote 44: See Phillimore, III. [p] 14.]

It must be specially mentioned that in the case of recovery of contract
debts claimed from the Government of one country by the Government of
another country as being due to its nationals, reprisals by means of
armed forces can, according to article 1 of Convention II., only be
resorted to in case the debtor State refuses to go to arbitration.

[Sidenote: Reprisals during Peace in contradistinction to Reprisals
during War.]

[p] 42. Reprisals in time of peace must not be confounded with reprisals
between belligerents. Whereas the former are resorted to for the purpose
of settling a conflict without going to war, the latter[45] are
retaliations to force an enemy guilty of a certain act of illegitimate
warfare to comply with the laws of war.

[Footnote 45: See below, [p] 247.]

[Sidenote: Value of Reprisals.]

[p] 43. The value of reprisals as a means of settling international
differences is analogous to the value of retorsion. States will have
recourse to reprisals for such international delinquencies as they think
insufficiently important for a declaration of war, but too important to
be entirely overlooked. That reprisals are rather a rough means for the
settlement of differences, and that the institution of reprisals can
give and has in the past given occasion to abuse in case of a difference
between a powerful and a weak State, cannot be denied. On the other
hand, as there is no Court and no central authority above the Sovereign
States which could compel a delinquent State to give reparation, the
institution of reprisals can scarcely be abolished. The influence in the
future of the existence of a Permanent Court of Arbitration remains to
be seen. If all the States would become parties to the Hague Convention
for the peaceful adjustment of international differences, and if they
would have recourse to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague
in all cases of an alleged international delinquency which affects
neither their national honour nor their vital interests and
independence, acts of reprisal would almost disappear.


IV

PACIFIC BLOCKADE

  Hall, [p] 121--Lawrence, [p] 138--Westlake, II. pp. 11-18--Taylor, [p]
  444--Moore, VII. [p] 1097--Bluntschli, [p][p] 506-507--Heffter, [p]
  112--Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 116-127--Ullmann, [p]
  162--Bonfils, Nos. 986-994--Despagnet, Nos.
  496-498--Pradier-Fodere, V. Nos. 2483-2489, VI. No. 2648--Rivier,
  II. [p] 60--Nys, III. pp. 91-94--Calvo, III. [p][p] 1832-1859--Fiore,
  II. No. 1231, and Code, Nos. 1404-1414--Martens, II. 105--Holland,
  _Studies_, pp. 151-167--Deane, _The Law of Blockade_ (1870), pp.
  45-48--Fauchille, _Du blocus maritime_ (1882), pp. 37-67--Falcke,
  _Die Hauptperioden der sogenannten Friedensblockade_ (1891), and
  in the _Zeitschrift fuer Internationales Recht_, XIX. (1909), pp.
  63-175--Bares, _Le blocus pacifique_ (1898)--Ducrocq,
  _Represailles en temps de paix_ (1901), pp. 58-174--Hogan,
  _Pacific Blockade_ (1908)--Soederquist, _Le Blocus Maritime_
  (1908)--Staudacher, _Die Friedensblockade_ (1909)--Westlake in
  _The Law Quarterly Review_, XXV. (1909), pp. 13-23.

[Sidenote: Development of practice of Pacific Blockade.]

[p] 44. Before the nineteenth century blockade was only known as a
measure between belligerents in time of war. It was not until the second
quarter of the nineteenth century that the first case occurred of a
so-called pacific blockade--that is, a blockade during time of peace--as
a compulsive means of settling international differences; and all such
cases are either cases of intervention or of reprisals.[46] The first
case, one of intervention, happened in 1827, when, during the Greek
insurrection, Great Britain, France, and Russia intervened in the
interest of the independence of Greece and blockaded those parts of the
Greek coast which were occupied by Turkish troops. Although this
blockade led to the battle of Navarino, in which the Turkish fleet was
destroyed, the Powers maintained, nevertheless, that they were not at
war with Turkey. In 1831, France blockaded the Tagus as an act of
reprisal for the purpose of exacting redress from Portugal for injuries
sustained by French subjects. Great Britain and France, exercising
intervention for the purpose of making Holland consent to the
independence of revolting Belgium, blockaded in 1833 the coast of
Holland. In 1838, France blockaded the ports of Mexico as an act of
reprisal, but Mexico declared war against France in answer to this
pacific blockade. Likewise as an act of reprisal, and in the same year,
France blockaded the ports of Argentina; and in 1845, conjointly with
Great Britain, France blockaded the ports of Argentina a second time. In
1850, in the course of her differences with Greece on account of the
case of Don Pacifico,[47] Great Britain blockaded the Greek ports, but
for Greek vessels only. Another case of intervention was the pacific
blockade instituted in 1860 by Sardinia, in aid of an insurrection
against the then Sicilian ports of Messina and Gaeta, but the following
year saw the conversion of the pacific blockade into a war blockade. In
1862 Great Britain by way of reprisal for the plundering of a wrecked
British merchantman, blockaded the Brazilian port of Rio de Janeiro. The
blockade of the island of Formosa by France during her differences with
China in 1884 and that of the port of Menam by France during her
differences with Siam in 1893 are likewise cases of reprisals. On the
other hand, cases of intervention are the blockade of the Greek coast in
1886 by Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Italy, and Russia, for
the purpose of preventing Greece from making war against Turkey; and
further, the blockade of the island of Crete in 1897 by the united
Powers. The last case occurred in 1902, when Great Britain, Germany,
and Italy blockaded, by way of reprisal, the coast of Venezuela.[48]

[Footnote 46: A blockade instituted by a State against such portions of
its own territory as are in revolt is not a blockade for the purpose of
settling international differences. It has, therefore, in itself nothing
to do with the Law of Nations, but is a matter of internal police. I
cannot, therefore, agree with Holland, who, in his _Studies in
International Law_, p. 138, treats it as a pacific blockade _sensu
generali_. Of course, necessity of self-preservation only can justify a
State that has blockaded one of its own ports in preventing the egress
and ingress of _foreign_ vessels. And the question might arise whether
compensation ought not to be paid for losses sustained by foreign
vessels so detained.]

[Footnote 47: See above, [p] 35.]

[Footnote 48: This blockade, although ostensibly a war blockade for the
purpose of preventing the ingress of foreign vessels, was nevertheless
essentially a pacific blockade. See Holland, in _The Law Quarterly
Review_, XIX. (1903), p. 133; Parliamentary Papers, Venezuela, No. 1
(Venezuela), Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Venezuela.]

[Sidenote: Admissibility of Pacific Blockade.]

[p] 45. No unanimity exists among international lawyers with regard to
the question whether or not pacific blockades are admissible according
to the principles of the Law of Nations. There is no doubt that the
theory of the Law of Nations forbids the seizure and sequestration of
vessels other than those of the blockaded State caught in an attempt to
break a pacific blockade. For even those writers who maintain the
admissibility of pacific blockade assert that vessels of third States
cannot be seized. What is controverted is the question whether according
to International Law the coast of a State may be blockaded at all in
time of peace. From the first recorded instance to the last, several
writers[49] of authority have negatived the question. On the other hand,
many writers have answered the question in the affirmative, differing
among themselves regarding the one point only whether or not vessels
sailing under the flag of third States could be prevented from entering
or leaving pacifically blockaded ports. The Institute of International
Law in 1887 carefully studied, and at its meeting in Heidelberg
discussed, the question, and finally voted a declaration[50] in favour
of the admissibility of pacific blockades. Thus the most influential
body of theorists has approved what had been established before by
practice. There ought to be no doubt that the numerous cases of pacific
blockade which have occurred during the nineteenth century have, through
tacit consent of the members of the Family of Nations, established the
admissibility of pacific blockades for the settlement of political as
well as of legal international differences.

[Footnote 49: The leader of these writers is Hautefeuille, _Des Droits
et des Devoirs des Nations Neutres_ (2nd ed. 1858, pp. 272-288).]

[Footnote 50: See _Annuaire_, IX. (1887), pp. 275-301.]

[Sidenote: Pacific Blockade and vessels of third States.]

[p] 46. It has already been stated that those writers who admit the
legality of pacific blockades are unanimous regarding the fact that no
right exists for the blockading State to seize and sequestrate such
ships of third States as try to break a pacific blockade. Apart from
this, no unanimity exists with regard to the question of the relation
between a pacific blockade and ships of third States. Some German
writers[51] maintain that such ships have to respect the blockade, and
that the blockading State has a right to stop such ships of third States
as try to break a pacific blockade. The vast majority of writers,
however, deny such right. There is, in fact, no rule of International
Law which could establish such a right, as pacific in contradistinction
to belligerent blockade is a mere matter between the conflicting
parties. The declaration of the Institute of International Law in favour
of pacific blockade contains, therefore, the condition: "Les navires de
pavillons neutres peuvent entrer librement malgre le blocus."

[Footnote 51: See Heffter, [p] 112; Perels, [p] 30.]

The practice of pacific blockade has varied with regard to ships of
third States. Before 1850 ships of third States were expected to respect
a pacific blockade, and such ships of these States as tried to break it
were seized, but were restored at the termination of the blockade, yet
without any compensation. When in 1850 Great Britain, and likewise when
in 1886 Great Britain, Austria, Germany, Italy, and Russia blockaded the
Greek ports, these ports were only closed for Greek ships, and others
were allowed to pass through. And the same was the case during the
blockade of Crete in 1897. On the other hand, in 1894, France, during a
conflict with China, blockaded the island of Formosa and tried to
enforce the blockade against ships of third States. But Great Britain
declared that a pacific blockade could not be enforced against ships of
third States, whereupon France had to drop her intended establishment of
a pacific blockade and had to consider herself at war with China. And
when in 1902 Great Britain, Germany, and Italy instituted a blockade
against Venezuela, they declared it a war blockade[52] because they
intended to enforce it against vessels of third States.

[Footnote 52: That this blockade was essentially a pacific blockade I
have already stated above, p. 50, note 1.]

[Sidenote: Pacific Blockade and vessels of the blockaded State.]

[p] 47. Theory and practice seem nowadays to agree upon the rule that
the ships of a pacifically blockaded State trying to break the blockade
may be seized and sequestrated. But they may not be condemned and
confiscated, as they have to be restored at the termination of the
blockade. Thus, although the Powers which had instituted a blockade
against Venezuela in 1902 declared it a war blockade, all Venezuelan
public and private ships seized were restored after the blockade was
raised.

[Sidenote: Manner of Pacific Blockade.]

[p] 48. Pacific blockade is a measure of such enormous consequences that
it can be justified only after the failure of preceding negotiations for
the purpose of settling the questions in dispute. And further, as
blockade, being a violation of the territorial supremacy of the
blockaded State, is _prima facie_ of a hostile character, it is
necessary for such State as intends in time of peace to blockade another
State to notify its intention to the latter and to fix the day and hour
for the establishment of the blockade. And, thirdly, although the
Declaration of Paris of 1856 enacting that a blockade to be binding must
be effective concerns blockades in time of war only, there can be no
doubt that pacific blockades ought to be likewise effective. The
declaration of the Institute of International Law in favour of pacific
blockade contains, therefore, the condition: "Le blocus pacifique doit
etre declare et notifie officiellement, et maintenu par une force
suffisante."

[Sidenote: Value of Pacific Blockade.]

[p] 49. As the establishment of a pacific blockade has in various
instances not prevented the outbreak of hostilities, the value of a
pacific blockade as a means of non-hostile settlement of international
differences is doubted and considered uncertain by many writers. But
others agree, and I think they are right, that the institution of
pacific blockade is of great value, be it as an act of reprisal or of
intervention. Every measure which is suitable and calculated to prevent
the outbreak of war must be welcomed, and experience shows that pacific
blockade is, although not universally successful, a measure of this
kind. That it can give, and has in the past given, occasion for abuse in
case of a difference between a strong and a weak Power is no argument
against it, as the same is valid with regard to reprisals and
intervention in general, and even to war. And although it is naturally a
measure which will scarcely be made use of in case of a difference
between two powerful naval States, it might nevertheless find
application with success against a powerful naval State if exercised by
the united navies of several Powers.[53]

[Footnote 53: The following is the full text of the declaration of the
Institute of International Law referred to above, [p] 45:

  "L'etablissement d'un blocus en dehors de l'etat de guerre ne doit
  etre considere comme permis par le droit de gens que sous les
  conditions suivantes:

  "1. Les navires de pavillon etranger peuvent entrer librement
  malgre le blocus.

  "2. Le blocus pacifique doit etre declare et notifie
  officiellement et maintenu par une force suffisante.

  "3. Les navires de la puissance bloquee qui ne respectent pas un
  pareil blocus, peuvent etre sequestres. Le blocus ayant cesse, ils
  doivent etre restitues avec leurs cargaisons a leurs
  proprietaires, mais sans dedommagement a aucun titre."]


V

INTERVENTION

  See the literature quoted above in vol. I. at the commencement of
  [p] 134.

[Sidenote: Intervention in contradistinction to Participation in a
difference.]

[p] 50. Intervention as a means of settling international differences is
only a special kind of intervention in general, which has already been
discussed.[54] It consists in the dictatorial interference of a third
State in a difference between two States for the purpose of settling the
difference in the way demanded by the intervening State. This
dictatorial interference takes place for the purpose of exercising a
compulsion upon one or both of the parties in conflict, and must be
distinguished from such attitude of a State as makes it a party to the
very conflict. If two States are in conflict and a third State joins one
of them out of friendship or from any other motive, such third State
does not exercise an intervention as a means of settling international
differences, but becomes a party to the conflict. If, for instance, an
alliance exists between one of two States in conflict and a third, and
if eventually, as war has broken out in consequence of the conflict,
such third State comes to the help of its ally, no intervention in the
technical sense of the term takes place. A State intervening in a
dispute between two other States does not become a party to their
dispute, but is the author of a new imbroglio, because such third State
dictatorially requests those other States to settle their difference in
a way to which both, or at any rate one of them, objects. An
intervention, for instance, takes place when, although two States in
conflict have made up their minds to fight it out in war, a third State
dictatorially requests them to settle their dispute through arbitration.

[Footnote 54: See above, vol. I. [p][p] 134-138.]

Intervention, in the form of dictatorial interference, must, further, be
distinguished from such efforts of a State as are directed to induce the
States in conflict to settle their difference amicably by proffering its
good offices or mediation, or by giving friendly advice. It is,
therefore, incorrect when some jurists[55] speak of good offices and the
like as an "amicable" in contradistinction to a "hostile" intervention.

[Footnote 55: Thus, for instance, Rivier, II. [p] 58. See also above,
vol. I. [p] 134.]

[Sidenote: Mode of Intervention.]

[p] 51. Intervention in a difference between two States is exercised
through a communication of the intervening State to one or both of the
conflicting States with a dictatorial request for the settlement of the
conflict in a certain way, for instance by arbitration or by the
acceptance of certain terms. An intervention can take place either on
the part of one State alone or of several States collectively. If the
parties comply with the request of the intervening State or States, the
intervention is terminated. If, however, one or both of the parties fail
to comply with the request, the intervening State will either withdraw
its intervention or proceed to the performance of acts more stringent
than a mere request, such as pacific blockade, military occupation, and
the like. Even war can be declared for the purpose of an intervention.
Of special importance are the collective interventions exercised by
several great Powers in the interest of the balance of power and of
humanity.[56]

[Footnote 56: See above, vol. I. [p][p] 136 and 137.]

[Sidenote: Time of Intervention.]

[p] 52. An intervention in a difference between two States can take
place at any time from the moment a conflict arises till the moment it
is settled, and even immediately after the settlement. In many cases
interventions have taken place before the outbreak of war between two
States for the purpose of preventing war; in other cases third States
have intervened during a war which had broken out in consequence of a
conflict. Interventions have, further, taken place immediately after the
peaceable settlement of a difference, or after the termination of war by
a treaty of peace or by conquest, on the grounds that the conditions of
the settlement or the treaty of peace were against the interests of the
intervening State, or because the latter would not consent to the
annexation of the conquered State by the victor.[57]

[Footnote 57: With regard to the question of the right of intervention,
the admissibility of intervention in default of a right, and to all
other details concerning intervention, the reader must be referred
above, vol. I. [p][p] 135-138.]




PART II

WAR




CHAPTER I

ON WAR IN GENERAL


I

CHARACTERISTICS OF WAR

  Grotius, I. c. 1, [p] 2--Vattel, III. [p][p] 1-4, 69-72--Hall,
  [p][p] 15-18--Westlake, II. pp. 1-6--Lawrence, [p] 135--Lorimer,
  II. pp. 18-28--Manning, pp. 131-133--Phillimore, III. [p]
  49--Twiss, II. [p][p] 22-29--Taylor, [p][p] 449-451--Wheaton, [p]
  295--Bluntschli, [p][p] 510-514--Heffter, [p][p] 113-114--Lueder
  in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 175-198--Klueber, [p][p] 235-237--G. F.
  Martens, II. [p] 263--Ullmann, [p] 165--Bonfils, Nos.
  1000-1001--Despagnet, Nos. 499-505--Pradier-Fodere, VI. Nos.
  2650-2660--Rivier, II. [p] 61--Nys, III. pp. 95-117--Calvo, IV.
  [p][p] 1860-1864--Fiore, III. Nos. 1232-1268--Martens, II. [p]
  106--Westlake, _Chapters_, pp. 258-264--Heilborn, _System_, pp.
  321-332--Rettich, _Zur Theorie und Geschichte des Rechts zum
  Kriege_ (1888), pp. 3-140--Wiesse, _Le Droit international
  applique aux guerres civiles_ (1898)--Rougier, _Les guerres
  civiles et le droit des gens_ (1903)--Higgins, _War and the
  Private Citizen_ (1912), pp. 3-72.

[Sidenote: War no illegality.]

[p] 53. As within the boundaries of the modern State an armed contention
between two or more citizens is illegal, public opinion has become
convinced that armed contests between citizens are inconsistent with
Municipal Law. Influenced by this fact, impatient pacifists, as well as
those innumerable individuals who cannot grasp the idea of a law between
Sovereign States, frequently consider war and law inconsistent. They
quote the fact that wars are frequently waged by States as a proof
against the very existence of an International Law. It is not difficult
to show the absurdity of this opinion. As States are Sovereign, and as
consequently no central authority can exist above them able to enforce
compliance with its demands, war cannot, under the existing conditions
and circumstances of the Family of Nations, always be avoided.
International Law recognises this fact, but at the same time provides
regulations with which belligerents have to comply. Although with the
outbreak of war peaceable relations between the belligerents cease,
there remain certain mutual legal obligations and duties. Thus war is
not inconsistent with, but a condition regulated by, International Law.
The latter at present cannot and does not object to States which are in
conflict waging war upon each other instead of peaceably settling their
difference. But if they choose to go to war they have to comply with the
rules laid down by International Law regarding the conduct of war and
the relations between belligerents and neutral States. That
International Law, if it could forbid war altogether, would be a more
perfect law than it is at present there is no doubt. Yet eternal peace
is an impossibility in the conditions and circumstances under which
mankind at present live and will have to live for a long time to come,
although eternal peace is certainly an ideal of civilisation which will
slowly and gradually be realised.

[Sidenote: Conception of War.]

[p] 54. War is the contention between two or more States through their
armed forces for the purpose of overpowering each other and imposing
such conditions of peace as the victor pleases. War is a fact
recognised, and with regard to many points regulated, but not
established, by International Law. Those writers[58] who define war as
the legal remedy of self-help to obtain satisfaction for a wrong
sustained from another State, forget that wars have often been waged by
both parties engaged for political reasons only; they confound a
possible but not at all necessary cause of war with the conception of
war. A State may be driven into war because it cannot otherwise get
reparation for an international delinquency, and such State may then
maintain that it exercises by war nothing else than legally recognised
self-help. But when States are driven into or deliberately wage war for
political reasons, no legally recognised act of self-help is in such
case performed by the war. And the same laws of war are valid, whether
wars are waged on account of legal or of political differences.

[Footnote 58: See, for instance, Vattel, III. [p] 1; Phillimore, III.
[p] 49; Twiss, II. [p] 26; Bluntschli, [p] 510; Bulmerincq, [p] 92.]

[Sidenote: War a contention.]

[p] 55. In any case, it is universally recognised that war is a
_contention_, which means, _a violent struggle through the application
of armed force_. For a war to be in existence, two or more States must
actually have their armed forces fighting against each other, although
the commencement of a war may date back to its declaration or some other
unilateral initiative act. Unilateral acts of force performed by one
State against another without a previous declaration of war may be a
cause of the outbreak of war, but are not war in themselves, as long as
they are not answered by similar hostile acts by the other side, or at
least by a declaration of the other side that it considers the
particular acts as acts of war. Thus it comes about that acts of force
performed by one State against another by way of reprisal or during a
pacific blockade in the case of an intervention are not necessarily
initiative acts of war. And even acts of force illegally performed by
one State against another, such, for instance, as occupation of a part
of its territory, are not acts of war so long as they are not met with
acts of force from the other side, or at least with a declaration from
the latter that it considers the particular acts as acts of war. Thus,
when Louis XIV. of France, after the Peace of Nimeguen, instituted the
so-called Chambers of Reunion and in 1680 and 1681 seized the territory
of the then Free Town of Strassburg and other parts of the German
Empire without the latter's offering armed resistance, these acts of
force, although doubtless illegal, were not acts of war.

[Sidenote: War a contention between States.]

[p] 56. To be considered war, the contention must be going on _between
States_. In the Middle Ages wars were known between private individuals,
so-called private wars, and wars between corporations, as the Hansa for
instance, and between States. But such wars have totally disappeared in
modern times. It may, of course, happen that a contention arises between
the armed forces of a State and a body of armed individuals, but such
contention[59] is not war. Thus the contention between the Raiders under
Dr. Jameson and the former South African Republic in January 1896 was
not war. Nor is a contention with insurgents or with pirates a war. And
a so-called civil war[60] need not be from the beginning nor become at
all a war in the technical sense of the term according to International
Law. On the other hand, to an armed contention between a suzerain and
its vassal[61] State the character of war ought not to be denied, for
both parties are States, although the fact that the vassal makes war
against the suzerain may, from the standpoint of Constitutional Law, be
considered rebellion. And likewise an armed contention between a full
Sovereign State and a State under the suzerainty of another State, as,
for instance, the contention between Servia and Bulgaria[62] in 1885, is
war. Again, an armed contention between one or more member-States of a
Federal State and the latter ought to be considered as war in the
technical sense of the term, according to International Law, although,
according to the constitution of Federal States, war between the
member-States as well as between any member-State and the Federal State
itself is illegal, and recourse to arms by a member-State may therefore
correctly, from the standpoint of the constitution, be called rebellion.
Thus the War of Secession within the United States between the Northern
and the Southern member-States in 1861-1865 was real war.

[Footnote 59: Some publicists maintain, however, that a contention
between a State and the armed forces of a party fighting for public
rights must be considered as war. See, for instance, Bluntschli, [p]
113, and Fiore, III. [p] 1265.]

[Footnote 60: See below, [p] 59.]

[Footnote 61: See below, [p] 75.]

[Footnote 62: Bulgaria was at that time still a vassal State under
Turkish suzerainty.]

[Sidenote: War a contention between States through armed forces.]

[p] 57. It must be emphasised that war nowadays is a contention of
States _through their armed forces_. Those private subjects of the
belligerents who do not directly or indirectly belong to the armed
forces do not take part in the armed contention: they do not attack and
defend, and no attack is therefore made upon them. This fact is the
result of an evolution of practices totally different from those in
vogue in former times. During antiquity and the greater part of the
Middle Ages war was a contention between the whole of the populations of
the belligerent States. In time of war every subject of one belligerent,
whether an armed and fighting individual or not, whether man or woman,
adult or infant, could be killed or enslaved by the other belligerent at
will. But gradually a milder and more discriminative practice grew up,
and nowadays the life and liberty of such private subjects of
belligerents as do not directly or indirectly belong to their armed
forces are safe, as is also, with certain exceptions, their private
property.

This is a generally admitted fact. But opinions disagree as to the
general position of such private subjects in time of war. The majority
of the European continental writers for the last three generations have
propagated the doctrine that no relation of enmity exists between
belligerents and such private subjects, or between the private subjects
of the respective belligerents. This doctrine goes back to Rousseau,
_Contrat Social_, I. c. 4. In 1801, on the occasion of the opening of
the French Prize Court, the famous lawyer and statesman Portalis adopted
Rousseau's[63] doctrine by declaring that war is a relation between
States and not between individuals, and that consequently the subjects
of the belligerents are only enemies as soldiers, not as citizens. And
although this new doctrine did not, as Hall ([p] 18) shows, spread at
once, it has since the second half of the nineteenth century been
proclaimed on the European continent by the majority of writers. British
and American-English writers, however, have never adopted this doctrine,
but have always maintained that the relation of enmity between the
belligerents extends also to their private citizens.

[Footnote 63: See Lassudrie-Duchene, _Jean Jacques Rousseau et le droit
des gens_ (1906).]

I think, if the facts of war are taken into consideration without
prejudice, there ought to be no doubt that the British and American view
is correct.[64] It is impossible to sever the citizens from their State,
and the outbreak of war between two States cannot but make their
citizens enemies. But the point is unworthy of dispute, because it is
only one of terms without any material consequences.[65] For, apart from
the terminology, the parties agree in substance upon the rules of the
Law of Nations regarding such private subjects as do not directly or
indirectly belong to the armed forces.[66] Nobody doubts that such
private individuals are safe as regards their life and liberty, provided
they behave peacefully and loyally; and that, with certain exceptions,
their private property must not be touched. On the other hand, nobody
doubts that, according to a generally recognised custom of modern
warfare, the belligerent who has occupied a part or the whole of his
opponent's territory, and who treats such private individuals leniently
according to the rules of International Law, may punish them for any
hostile act, since they do not enjoy the privileges of members of armed
forces. Although, on the one hand, International Law by no means
forbids, and, as a law between States, is not competent to forbid,
private individuals to take up arms against an enemy, it gives, on the
other hand, the right to the enemy to treat hostilities committed by
private[67] individuals as acts of illegitimate warfare. A belligerent
is under a duty to respect the life and liberty of private enemy
individuals, but he can carry out this duty under the condition only
that these private individuals abstain from hostilities against himself.
Through military occupation in war such private individuals fall under
the authority[68] of the occupant, and he may therefore demand that they
comply with his orders regarding the safety of his forces. The position
of private enemy individuals is made known to them through the
proclamations which the commander-in-chief of an army occupying the
territory usually publishes. Thus General Sir Redvers Buller, when
entering the territory of the South African Republic in 1900, published
the following proclamation:

"The troops of Queen Victoria are now passing through the Transvaal. Her
Majesty does not make war on individuals, but is, on the contrary,
anxious to spare them as far as may be possible the horrors of war. The
quarrel England has is with the Government, not with the people, of the
Transvaal. Provided they remain neutral, no attempt will be made to
interfere with persons living near the line of march; every possible
protection will be given them, and any of their property that it may be
necessary to take will be paid for. But, on the other hand, those who
are thus allowed to remain near the line of march must respect and
maintain their neutrality, and the residents of any locality will be
held responsible, both in their persons and property, if any damage is
done to railway or telegraph, or any violence done to any member of the
British forces in the vicinity of their home."

[Footnote 64: See Boidin, pp. 32-44.]

[Footnote 65: But many continental writers constantly make use of
Rousseau's _dictum_ in order to defend untenable positions. See
Oppenheim, _Die Zukunft des Voelkerrechts_ (1911), pp. 59-61.]

[Footnote 66: See Breton, _Les non-belligerants: Leurs devoirs, leurs
droits, et la question des otages_ (1904).]

[Footnote 67: See below, [p] 254.]

[Footnote 68: The first edition of this work was wrong in stating that
through military occupation private enemy individuals fall under the
_territorial supremacy_ of the occupant. Since military occupation by no
means vests sovereignty in the occupant, but only actual authority, this
authority may not be called _territorial supremacy_.]

It must be emphasised that this position of private individuals of the
hostile States renders it inevitable that commanders of armies which
have occupied hostile territory should consider and mark as criminals
all such private individuals of the enemy as commit hostile acts,
although such individuals may act from patriotic motives and may be
highly praised for their acts by their compatriots. The high-sounding
and well-meant words of Baron Lambermont, one of the Belgian delegates
at the Conference of Brussels of 1874--"Il y a des choses qui se font a
la guerre, qui se feront toujours, et que l'on doit bien accepter. Mais
il s'agit ici de les convertir en lois, en prescriptions positives et
internationales. Si les citoyens doivent etre conduits au supplice pour
avoir tente de defendre leur pays au peril de leur vie, il ne faut pas
qu'ils trouvent inscrits sur le poteau au pied duquel ils seront fusiles
l'article d'un traite signe par leur propre gouvernement qui d'avance
les condamnait a mort"--have no _raison d'etre_ in face of the fact that
according to a generally recognised customary rule of International Law
hostile acts on the part of private individuals are not acts of
legitimate warfare, and the offenders may be treated and punished as
war-criminals. Even those writers[69] who object to the term "criminals"
do not deny that such hostile acts by private individuals, in
contradistinction to hostile acts by members of the armed forces, may be
severely punished. The controversy whether or not such acts may be
styled "crimes" is again only one of terminology; materially the rule is
not at all controverted.[70]

[Footnote 69: See, for instance, Hall, [p] 18, p. 74, and Westlake,
_Chapters_, p. 262.]

[Footnote 70: It is of value to quote articles 20-26 of the
_Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the
Field_, which the War Department of the United States published in 1863
during the War of Secession with the Southern member-States:

(20) "Public war is a state of armed hostility between sovereign nations
or governments. It is a law and requisite of civil existence that men
live in political, continuous societies, forming organised units, called
States or nations, whose constituents bear, enjoy, and suffer, advance
and retrograde together, in peace and in war."

(21) "The citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an enemy as one
of the constituents of the hostile State or nation, and as such is
subjected to the hardships of war."

(22) "Nevertheless, as civilisation has advanced during the last
centuries, so has likewise advanced, especially in war on land, the
distinction between the private individual belonging to a hostile
country and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The
principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen
is to be spared in person, property, and honour as much as the
exigencies of war will admit."

(23) "Private citizens are no longer murdered, enslaved, or carried off
to distant parts, and the inoffensive individual is as little disturbed
in his private relations as the commander of the hostile troops can
afford to grant in the overruling demands of a vigorous war."

(24) "The almost universal rule in remote times was ... that the private
individual of the hostile country is destined to suffer every privation
of liberty and protection and every disruption of family ties.
Protection was ... the exception."

(25) "In modern regular wars ... protection of the inoffensive citizens
of the hostile country is the rule; privation and disturbance of private
relations are the exceptions."

(26) "Commanding generals may cause the magistrates and civil officers
of the hostile country to take the oath of temporary allegiance or an
oath of fidelity to their own victorious Government or rulers, and they
may expel every one who declines to do so. But, whether they do so or
not, the people and their civil officers owe strict obedience to them as
long as they hold sway over the district or country, at the peril of
their lives."]

[Sidenote: War a contention between States for the purpose of
overpowering each other.]

[p] 58. The last, and not the least important, characteristic of war is
its purpose. It is a contention between States for the purpose of
overpowering each other. This purpose of war is not to be confounded
with the ends[71] of war, for, whatever the ends of war may be, they can
only be realised by one belligerent overpowering the other. Such a
defeat as compels the vanquished to comply with any demand the victor
may choose to make is the purpose of war. Therefore war calls into
existence the display of the greatest possible power and force on the
part of the belligerents, rouses the passion of the nations in conflict
to the highest possible degree, and endangers the welfare, the honour,
and eventually the very existence of both belligerents. Nobody can
predict with certainty the result of a war however insignificant one
side may seem to be. Every war is a risk and a venture. Every State
which goes to war knows beforehand what is at stake, and it would never
go to war were it not for its firm, though very often illusory,
conviction of its superiority in strength over its opponent. Victory is
necessary in order to overpower the enemy; and it is this necessity
which justifies all the indescribable horrors of war, the enormous
sacrifice of human life and health, and the unavoidable destruction of
property and devastation of territory. Apart from special restrictions
imposed by the Law of Nations upon belligerents, all kinds and all
degrees of force may be, and eventually must be, made use of in war in
the interest and under the compulsion of its purpose, and in spite of
their cruelty and the utter misery they entail. As war is a struggle for
existence between States, no amount of individual suffering and misery
can be regarded; the national existence and independence of the
struggling State is a higher consideration than any individual
well-being.

[Footnote 71: See below, [p] 66.]

[Sidenote: Civil War.]

[p] 59. The characteristics of war as developed above must help to
decide the question whether so-called civil wars are war in the
technical meaning of the term. It has already been stated above (in [p]
56) that an armed contention between member-States of a Federal State
and the latter and between a suzerain and its vassal ought to be
considered as war because both parties are real States, although the
Federal State as well as the suzerain may correctly designate it as a
rebellion. Such armed contentions may be called civil wars in a wider
sense of the term. In the proper sense of the term a civil war exists
when two opposing parties within a State have recourse to arms for the
purpose of obtaining power in the State, or when a large portion of the
population of a State rises in arms against the legitimate Government.
As war is an armed contention between _States_, such a civil war need
not be from the beginning, nor become at all, war in the technical sense
of the term. But it may become war through the recognition of each of
the contending parties or of the insurgents as the case may be, as a
belligerent Power.[72] Through this recognition a body of individuals
receives an international position in so far as it is for some parts and
in some points treated as though it were a subject[73] of International
Law. Such recognition may be granted by the very State within the
boundaries of which the civil war broke out, and then other States will
in most cases, although they need not, likewise recognise a state of war
as existing and bear the duties of neutrality. But it may happen that
other States recognise insurgents as a belligerent Power before the
State on whose territory the insurrection broke out so recognises them.
In such case the insurrection is war in the eyes of these other States,
but not in the eyes of the legitimate Government.[74] Be that as it may,
it must be specially observed that, although a civil war becomes war in
the technical sense of the term by recognition, this recognition has a
lasting effect only when the insurgents succeed in getting their
independence established through the defeat of the legitimate Government
and a consequent treaty of peace which recognises their independence.
Nothing, however, prevents the State concerned, after the defeat of the
insurgents and reconquest of the territory which they had occupied, from
treating them as rebels according to the Criminal Law of the land, for
the character of a belligerent Power received through recognition is
lost _ipso facto_ by their defeat and the re-occupation by the
legitimate Government of the territory occupied by them.

[Footnote 72: See below, [p][p] 76 and 298.]

[Footnote 73: See above, vol. I. [p] 63.]

[Footnote 74: See below, [p] 298.]

[Sidenote: Guerilla War.]

[p] 60. The characteristics of war as developed above are also decisive
for the answer to the question whether so-called guerilla war is real
war in the technical sense of the term. Such guerilla war must not be
confounded with guerilla tactics during a war. It happens during war
that the commanders send small bodies of soldiers wearing their uniform
to the rear of the enemy for the purpose of destroying bridges and
railways, cutting off communications and supplies, attacking convoys,
intercepting despatches, and the like. This is in every way legal, and
the members of such bodies, when captured, enjoy the treatment due to
enemy soldiers. It happens, further, that hitherto private individuals
who did not take part in the armed contention take up arms and devote
themselves mainly to similar tactics. According to the former rules of
International Law such individuals, when captured, under no condition
enjoyed the treatment due to enemy soldiers, but could be treated as
criminals and punished with death. According to article 1 of the
Regulations concerning war on land adopted by the Hague Conferences of
1899 and 1907 such guerilla fighters enjoy the treatment of soldiers
under the four conditions that they (1) do not act individually, but
form a body commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, (2)
have a fixed distinctive emblem recognisable at a distance, (3) carry
arms openly, and (4) conduct their operations in accordance with the
laws of war.[75]

[Footnote 75: See also article 2 of the Hague Regulations.]

On the other hand, one speaks of guerilla war or petty war when, after
the defeat and the capture of the main part of the enemy forces, the
occupation of the enemy territory, and the downfall of the enemy
Government, the routed remnants of the defeated army carry on the
contention by mere guerilla tactics. Although hopeless of success in the
end, such petty war can go on for a long time thus preventing the
establishment of a state of peace in spite of the fact that regular war
is over and the task of the army of occupation is no longer regular
warfare. Now the question whether such guerilla war is real war in the
strict sense of the term in International Law must, I think, be answered
in the negative, for two reasons. First, there are no longer the forces
of two States in the field, because the defeated belligerent State has
ceased to exist through the military occupation of its territory, the
downfall of its established Government, the capture of the main part and
the routing of the remnant of its forces. And, secondly, there is no
longer in progress a contention between armed forces. For although the
guerilla bands are still fighting when attacked, or when attacking small
bodies of enemy soldiers, they try to avoid a pitched battle, and
content themselves with the constant harassing of the victorious army,
the destroying of bridges and railways, cutting off communications and
supplies, attacking convoys, and the like, always in the hope that some
event or events may occur which will induce the victorious army to
withdraw from the conquered territory. But if guerilla war is not real
war, it is obvious that in strict law the victor need no longer treat
the guerilla bands as a belligerent Power and the captured members of
those bands as soldiers. It is, however, not advisable that the victor
should cease such treatment as long as those bands are under responsible
commanders and observe themselves the laws and usages of war. For I can
see no advantage or reason why, although in strict law it could be done,
those bands should be treated as criminals. Such treatment would only
call for acts of revenge on their part, without in the least
accelerating the pacification of the country. And it is, after all, to
be taken into consideration that those bands act not out of criminal but
patriotic motives. With patience and firmness the victor will succeed in
pacifying these bands without recourse to methods of harshness.


II

CAUSES, KINDS, AND ENDS OF WAR

  Grotius, I. c. 3; II. c. 1; III. c. 3--Pufendorf, VIII. c. 6, [p]
  9--Vattel, III. [p][p] 2, 5, 24-50, 183-187--Lorimer, II. pp.
  29-48--Phillimore, III. [p][p] 33-48--Twiss, II. [p][p]
  26-30--Halleck, I. pp. 488-519--Taylor, [p][p] 452-454--Wheaton,
  [p][p] 295-296--Bluntschli, [p][p] 515-521--Heffter, [p]
  113--Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 221-236--Klueber, [p][p] 41,
  235, 237--G. F. Martens, [p][p] 265-266--Ullmann, [p]
  166--Bonfils, Nos. 1002-1005--Despagnet, No. 506--Pradier-Fodere,
  VI. Nos. 2661-2670--Rivier, II. p. 219--Nys, III. pp.
  106-114--Calvo, IV. [p][p] 1866-1896--Fichte, _Ueber den Begriff
  des wahrhaften Krieges_ (1815)--Rettich, _Zur Theorie und
  Geschichte des Rechts zum Kriege_ (1888), pp. 141-292--Peyronnard,
  _Des causes de la guerre_ (1901).

[Sidenote: Rules of Warfare independent of Causes of War.]

[p] 61. Whatever may be the cause of a war that has broken out, and
whether or no the cause be a so-called just cause, the same rules of
International Law are valid as to what must not be done, may be done,
and must be done by the belligerents themselves in making war against
each other, and as between the belligerents and neutral States. This
being the case, the question as to the causes of war is of minor
importance for the Law of Nations, although not for international
ethics. The matter need not be discussed at all in a treatise on
International Law were it not for the fact that many writers maintain
that there are rules of International Law in existence which determine
and define just causes of war. It must, however, be emphasised that this
is by no means the case. All such rules laid down by writers on
International Law as recognise certain causes as just and others as
unjust are rules of writers, but not rules of International Law based on
international custom or international treaties.

[Sidenote: Causes of War.]

[p] 62. The causes of war are innumerable. They are involved in the fact
that the development of mankind is indissolubly connected with the
national development of States. The millions of individuals who as a
body are called mankind do not face one another individually and
severally, but in groups as races, nations, and States. With the welfare
of the races, nations, and States to which they belong the welfare of
individuals is more or less identified. And it is the development of
races, nations, and States that carries with it the causes of war. A
constant increase of population must in the end force upon a State the
necessity of acquiring more territory, and if such territory cannot be
acquired by peaceable means, acquisition by conquest alone remains. At
certain periods of history the principle of nationality and the desire
for national unity gain such a power over the hearts and minds of the
individuals belonging to the same race or nation, but living within the
boundaries of several different States, that wars break out for the
cause of national unity and independence. And jealous rivalry between
two or more States, the awakening of national ambition, the craving for
rich colonies, the desire of a land-locked State for a sea coast, the
endeavour of a hitherto minor State to become a world-Power, the
ambition of dynasties or of great politicians to extend and enlarge
their influence beyond the boundaries of their own State, and
innumerable other factors, have been at work ever since history was
first recorded in creating causes of war, and these factors likewise
play their part in our own times. Although one must hope that the time
will come when war will entirely disappear, there is no possibility of
seeing this hope realised in the near future. The first necessities of
the disappearance of war are that the surface of the earth should be
shared between States of the same standard of civilisation, and that the
moral ideas of the governing classes in all the States of the world
should undergo such an alteration and progressive development as would
create the conviction that decisions of international courts of justice
and awards of arbitrators are alone adequate means for the settlement of
international disputes and international political aims. So long as
these first necessities are not realised, war will as heretofore remain
the _ultima ratio_ of international politics.

[Sidenote: Just Causes of War.]

[p] 63. However this may be, it often depends largely upon the
standpoint from which they are viewed whether or no causes of war are to
be called just causes. A war may be just or unjust from the standpoint
of both belligerents, or just from the standpoint of one and utterly
unjust from the standpoint of the other. The assertion that whereas all
wars waged for political causes are unjust, all wars waged for
international delinquencies are just, if there be no other way of
getting reparation and satisfaction, is certainly incorrect because too
sweeping. The evils of war are so great that, even when caused by an
international delinquency,[76] war cannot be justified if the
delinquency be comparatively unimportant and trifling. And, on the other
hand, under certain circumstances and conditions many political causes
of war may correctly be called just causes. Only such individuals as
lack insight into history and human nature can, for instance, defend the
opinion that a war is unjust which has been caused by the desire for
national unity or by the desire to maintain the balance of power which
under the present conditions and circumstances is the basis of all
International Law. Necessity for a war implies its justification,
whatever may be the cause. In the past many wars have undoubtedly been
waged which were unjust from whatever standpoint they may be viewed. Yet
the number of wars diminishes gradually every year, and the majority of
the European wars since the downfall of Napoleon I. were wars that were,
from the standpoint of at any rate one of the belligerents, necessary
and therefore just wars.

[Footnote 76: See above, vol. I. [p][p] 151-156.]

[Sidenote: Causes in contradistinction to Pretexts for War.]

[p] 64. Be that as it may, causes of war must not be confounded with
pretexts for war. A State which makes war against another will never
confess that there is no just cause for war, and it will therefore, when
it has made up its mind to make war for political reasons, always look
out for a so-called just cause. Thus frequently the apparent reason of a
war is only a pretext behind which the real cause is concealed. If two
States are convinced that war between them is inevitable, and if
consequently they face each other armed to the teeth, they will find at
the suitable time many a so-called just cause plausible and calculated
to serve as a pretext for the outbreak of the war which was planned and
resolved upon long ago. The skill of politics and diplomacy are nowhere
more needed than on the occasion of a State's conviction that it must go
to war for one reason or another. Public opinion at home and abroad is
often not ripe to appreciate the reason and not prepared for the scheme
of the leading politicians, whose task it is to realise their plans with
the aid of pretexts which appear as the cause of war, whereas the real
cause does not become apparent for some time.

[Sidenote: Different kinds of War.]

[p] 65. Such writers on International Law as lay great stress upon the
causes of war in general and upon the distinction between just causes
and others, also lay great stress upon the distinction between different
kinds of war. But as the rules of the Law of Nations are the same[77]
for the different kinds of war that may be distinguished, this
distinction is in most cases of no importance. Apart from that, there is
no unanimity respecting the kinds of war, and it is apparent that, just
as the causes of war are innumerable, so innumerable kinds of war can be
distinguished. Thus one speaks of offensive and defensive, or religious,
political, dynastic, national, civil wars; of wars of unity,
independence, conquest, intervention, revenge, and of many other kinds.
As the very name which each different kind of war bears always explains
its character no further details are necessary respecting kinds of war.

[Footnote 77: See above, [p] 61.]

[Sidenote: Ends of War.]

[p] 66. The cause or causes of a war determine at its inception the ends
of such war. The ends of war must not be confounded with the purpose of
war.[78] Whereas the purpose of war is always the same--namely, the
overpowering and utter defeat of the opponent--the ends of war may be
different in each case. Ends of war are those objects for the
realisation of which a war is made.[79] In the beginning of the war its
ends are determined by its cause or causes, as already said. But these
ends may undergo alteration, or at least modification, with the progress
and development of the war. No moral or legal duty exists for a
belligerent to stop the war when his opponent is ready to concede the
object for which war was made. If war has once broken out the very
national existence of the belligerents is more or less at stake. The
risk the belligerents run, the exertion they make, the blood and wealth
they sacrifice, the reputation they gain or lose through the changing
fortune and chances of war--all these and many other factors work or may
work together to influence the ends of a war so that eventually there is
scarcely any longer a relation between them and the causes of the war.
If war really were, as some writers maintain,[80] the legal remedy of
self-help to obtain satisfaction for a wrong sustained from another
State, no such alteration of the ends of war could take place without at
once setting in the wrong such belligerent as changes the ends for which
the war was initiated. But history shows that nothing of the kind is
really the case, and the existing rules of International Law by no means
forbid such alteration or modification of the ends of a war. This
alteration or modification of the ends is the result of an alteration or
modification of circumstances created during the progress of war through
the factors previously mentioned; it could not be otherwise, and there
is no moral, legal, or political reason why it should be otherwise. And
the natural jealousy between the members of the Family of Nations, their
conflicting interests in many points, and the necessity of a balance of
power, are factors of sufficient strength to check the political dangers
which such alteration of the ends of a war may eventually involve.

[Footnote 78: Ends of war must likewise not be confounded with aims of
land and sea warfare; see below, [p][p] 103 and 173.]

[Footnote 79: See Bluntschli, [p] 536; Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. p.
364; Rivier, II. p. 219.]

[Footnote 80: See above, [p] 54.]


III

THE LAWS OF WAR

  Hall, [p] 17--Westlake, _Chapters_, pp. 232-235--Maine, pp.
  122-159--Phillimore, III. [p] 50--Taylor, [p] 470--Walker, _History_,
  I. [p][p] 106-108--Heffter, [p] 119--Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp.
  253-333--Ullmann, [p][p] 167 and 170--Bonfils, Nos.
  1006-1013--Despagnet, Nos. 508-510--Pradier-Fodere, VIII. Nos.
  3212-3213--Rivier, II. pp. 238-242--Nys, III. pp. 160-164--Calvo,
  IV. [p][p] 1897-1898--Fiore, III. Nos. 1244-1260--Martens, II. [p]
  107--Longuet, p. 12--Bordwell, pp. 100-196--Spaight, pp.
  1-19--_Kriegsbrauch_, p. 2--_Land Warfare_, [p][p] 1-7--Holland,
  _Studies_, pp. 40-96.

[Sidenote: Origin of the Laws of War.]

[p] 67. Laws of War are the rules of the Law of Nations respecting
warfare. The roots of the present Laws of War are to be traced back to
practices of belligerents which arose and grew gradually during the
latter part of the Middle Ages. The unsparing cruelty of the war
practices during the greater part of the Middle Ages began gradually to
be modified through the influence of Christianity and chivalry. And
although these practices were cruel enough during the fifteenth,
sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, they were mild compared with those
of still earlier times. Decided progress was made during the eighteenth,
and again during the nineteenth century, after the close of the
Napoleonic wars, especially in the years from 1850 to 1900. The laws of
war evolved in this way: isolated milder practices became by-and-by
usages, so-called _usus in bello_, manner of warfare, _Kriegs-Manier_,
and these usages through custom and treaties turned into legal rules.
And this evolution is constantly going on, for, besides the recognised
Laws of War, there are usages in existence which have a tendency to
become gradually legal rules of warfare. The whole growth of the laws
and usages of war is determined by three principles. There is, first,
the principle that a belligerent should be justified in applying any
amount and any kind of force which is necessary for the realisation of
the purpose of war--namely, the overpowering of the opponent. There is,
secondly, the principle of humanity at work, which says that all such
kinds and degrees of violence as are not necessary for the overpowering
of the opponent should not be permitted to a belligerent. And, thirdly
and lastly, there is at work the principle of chivalry which arose in
the Middle Ages and introduced a certain amount of fairness in offence
and defence, and a certain mutual respect. And, in contradistinction to
the savage cruelty of former times, belligerents have in modern times
come to the conviction that the realisation of the purpose of war is in
no way hampered by indulgence shown to the wounded, the prisoners, and
the private individuals who do not take part in the fighting. Thus the
influence of the principle of humanity has been and is still enormous
upon the practice of warfare. And the methods of warfare, although by
the nature of war to a certain degree cruel and unsparing, become less
cruel and more humane every day. But it must be emphasised that the
whole evolution of the laws and usages of war could not have taken place
but for the institution of standing armies, which dates from the
fifteenth century. The humanising of the practices of war would have
been impossible without the discipline of standing armies; and the
important distinction between members of armed forces and private
individuals could not have arisen without the existence of standing
armies.

[Sidenote: The latest Development of the Laws of War.]

[p] 68. The latest and the most important development of the Laws of War
was produced through general treaties concluded between the majority of
States since the beginning of the second part of the nineteenth century.
The following are the treaties concerned:--

(1) The Declaration of Paris of April 16, 1856, respecting warfare on
sea. It abolishes privateering, recognises the principles that the
neutral flag covers enemy goods and that neutral goods under an enemy
flag cannot be seized, and enacts the rule that a blockade in order to
be binding must be effective. The Declaration is signed by seven States,
but eighteen others acceded in course of time.

(2) The Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864, for the amelioration of
the condition of wounded soldiers in armies in the field, which
originally was signed by only nine States, but to which in course of
time all the civilised States--except Costa-Rica, Lichtenstein, and
Monaco!--have acceded. A treaty containing a number of additional
articles to the Convention was signed at Geneva on October 20, 1868, but
was never ratified. A new Geneva Convention was signed on July 6, 1906,
by thirty-five States, and several others have already acceded. There is
no doubt that the whole civilised world will soon be a party to this new
Geneva Convention. The principles of the Geneva Convention were adapted
to maritime warfare by Conventions (see below, No. 8) of the First and
Second Hague Peace Conferences.

(3) The Declaration of St. Petersburg of December 11, 1868, respecting
the prohibition of the use in war of projectiles under 400 grammes (14
ounces) which are either explosive or charged with inflammable
substances. It is signed by seventeen States.

(4) The Convention enacting "Regulations respecting the Laws of War on
Land," agreed upon at the First Peace Conference of 1899.

The history of this Convention may be traced back to the _Instructions
for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field_ which
the United States published on April 14, 1863, during the War of
Secession. These instructions, which were drafted by Professor Francis
Lieber, of the Columbia College of New York, represent the first
endeavour to codify the Laws of War, and they are even nowadays of great
value and importance. In 1874 an International Conference, invited by
the Emperor Alexander II. of Russia, met at Brussels for the purpose of
discussing a draft code of the Laws of War on Land as prepared by
Russia. The body of the articles agreed upon at this Conference, and
known as the "Brussels Declarations," have, however, never become law,
as ratification was never given by the Powers. But the Brussels
Declarations were made the basis of deliberations on the part of the
Institute of International Law, which at its meeting at Oxford in 1880
adopted a Manual[81] of the Laws of War consisting of a body of 86 rules
under the title _Les Lois de la Guerre sur Terre_, and a copy of this
draft code was sent to all the Governments of Europe and America. It
was, however, not until the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 that the
Powers reassembled to discuss again the codification of the Laws of War.
At this Conference the Brussels Declarations were taken as the basis of
the deliberations; but although the bulk of its articles was taken over,
several important modifications were introduced in the Convention, which
was finally agreed upon and ratified, only a few Powers abstaining from
ratification.

[Footnote 81: See _Annuaire_, V. pp. 157-174.]

The Second Peace Conference of 1907 has revised this Convention, and its
place is now taken by Convention IV. of the Second Peace Conference. The
Convention,[82] as the preamble expressly states, does not aim at
giving a complete code of the Laws of War on Land, and cases beyond its
scope still remain the subject of customary rules and usages. Further,
it does not create universal International Law, as article 2 of the
Convention expressly stipulates that the Regulations shall be binding
upon the contracting Powers only in case of war between two or more of
them, and shall cease to be binding in case a non-contracting Power
takes part in the war. But, in spite of this express stipulation, there
can be no doubt that in time the Regulations will become universal
International Law. For all the Powers represented at the Second Peace
Conference signed the Convention, except China, Spain, and Nicaragua,
although some States made certain reservations. Nicaragua has since
acceded, and it is certain that the outstanding States will in time also
accede.

[Footnote 82: For brevity's sake the Hague Convention enacting
Regulations regarding the laws and customs of war on land will be
referred to in the following pages as the _Hague Regulations_. It is,
however, of importance to observe that the Hague Regulations, although
they are intended to be binding upon the belligerents, are only the
basis upon which the signatory Powers have to frame instructions for
their forces. Article 1 declares: "The high contracting parties shall
issue instructions to their armed land forces, which shall be in
conformity with the Regulations respecting the Laws of War on Land
annexed to the present Convention." The British War Office, therefore,
published in 1912, a guide, _Land Warfare: an Exposition of the Laws and
Usages of War on Land for the Guidance of Officers of His Majesty's
Army_, written by order of His Majesty's Secretary of War by Colonel
Edmonds and Professor Oppenheim, in which the Hague Regulations are
systematically set out; their full text is published in Appendix 6 of
the guide. But it should be mentioned that the British War Office had
already in 1903 published a manual, drafted with great precision and
clearness by Professor Holland, for the information of the British
forces, comprising "The Laws and Customs of War on Land, as defined by
the Hague Convention of 1899." See also Holland, _The Laws of War on
Land (Written and Unwritten)_, Oxford, 1908.]

(5) The Declaration concerning expanding (dumdum) bullets; see below,
[p] 112.

(6) The Declaration concerning projectiles and explosives launched from
balloons; see below, [p] 114.

(7) The Declaration concerning projectiles diffusing asphyxiating or
deleterious gases; see below, [p] 113.

(8) The Convention for the adaptation to sea warfare of the principles
of the Geneva Convention, produced by the First and revised by the
Second Peace Conference.

(9) The Convention of 1907 concerning the opening of hostilities (Second
Peace Conference).

(10) The Convention of 1907 concerning the status of enemy merchantmen
at the outbreak of hostilities (Second Peace Conference).

(11) The Convention of 1907 concerning the conversion of merchantmen
into men-of-war (Second Peace Conference).

(12) The Convention of 1907 concerning the laying of automatic submarine
contact mines (Second Peace Conference).

(13) The Convention of 1907 concerning bombardment by naval forces in
time of war (Second Peace Conference).

(14) The Convention of 1907 concerning certain restrictions on the
exercise of the right of capture in maritime war (Second Peace
Conference).

(15) The two Conventions of 1907 concerning the rights and duties of
neutral Powers and persons in land warfare and in sea warfare (Second
Peace Conference).

(16) The Declaration of London of February 26, 1909, concerning the Laws
of Naval War, which was signed at the Conference of London by Great
Britain, Germany, the United States of America, Austria-Hungary, Spain,
France, Italy, Japan, Holland, and Russia, but is not yet ratified. This
Declaration enacts rules concerning blockade, contraband, unneutral
service, destruction of neutral prizes, transfer of vessels to a neutral
flag, enemy character, convoy, and resistance to search.[83]

[Footnote 83: The United States of America (see above, vol. I. [p] 32),
published on June 27, 1900, a body of rules for the use of her navy
under the title _The Laws and Usages of War on Sea_--the so-called
"United States Naval War Code." This code, although withdrawn on
February 4, 1904, will undoubtedly be the starting-point of a movement
for a Naval War Code to be generally agreed upon by the Powers. See
below, [p] 179.]

[Sidenote: Binding force of the Laws of War.]

[p] 69. As soon as usages of warfare have by custom or treaty evolved
into laws of war, they are binding upon belligerents under all
circumstances and conditions, except in the case of reprisals[84] as
retaliation against a belligerent for illegitimate acts of warfare by
the members of his armed forces or his other subjects. In accordance
with the German proverb, _Kriegsraeson geht vor Kriegsmanier_
(_necessity in war overrules the manner of warfare_), many German
authors[85] and the Swiss-Belgian Rivier[86] maintain that the laws of
war lose their binding force in case of extreme necessity. Such case of
extreme necessity is said to have arisen when violation of the laws of
war alone offers either a means of escape from extreme danger or the
realisation of the purpose of war--namely, the overpowering of the
opponent. This alleged exception to the binding force of the Laws of
War, is, however, not at all generally accepted by German writers, for
instance, Bluntschli does not mention it. English, American, French, and
Italian writers do not, so far as I am aware, acknowledge it. The
protest of Westlake,[87] therefore, against such an exception is the
more justified, as a great danger would be involved by its admission.

[Footnote 84: See below, [p] 248.]

[Footnote 85: See, for instance, Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp.
254-257; Ullmann, [p] 170; Meurer, II. pp. 7-15. Liszt, who in former
editions agreed with these writers, deserts their ranks in the sixth
edition ([p] 24, IV. 3), and correctly takes the other side. See also
Nys, III. p. 202, and Holland, _War_, [p] 2, where the older literature
is quoted.]

[Footnote 86: See Rivier, II. p. 242.]

[Footnote 87: See Westlake, II. pp. 115-117, and Westlake, _Chapters_,
p. 238.]

The proverb dates very far back in the history of warfare. It originated
and found recognition in those times when warfare was not regulated by
laws of war--that is universally binding customs and international
treaties, but only by usages (_Manier, i.e. Brauch_), and it says that
necessity in war overrules usages of warfare. In our days, however,
warfare is no longer regulated by usages only, but to a greater extent
by laws, firm rules recognised either by international treaties or by
universal custom.[88] These conventional and customary rules cannot be
overruled by necessity, unless they are framed in such a way as not to
apply to a case of necessity in self-preservation. Thus, for instance,
the rules that poisoned arms and poison are forbidden, and that it is
not allowed treacherously to kill or wound individuals belonging to the
hostile army, do not lose their binding force even if escape from
extreme danger or the realisation of the purpose of war would result
from an act of this kind. Article 22 of the Hague Rules stipulates
distinctly that the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the
enemy is not unlimited, and this rule does not lose its binding force in
a case of necessity. What may be ignored in case of military necessity
are not the laws of war, but only the usages of war. _Kriegsraeson geht
vor Kriegsmanier_, but not _vor Kriegsrecht_!

[Footnote 88: Concerning the distinction between usage and custom, see
above, vol. I. [p] 17.]


IV

THE REGION OF WAR

  Taylor, [p][p] 471 and 498--Heffter, [p] 118--Lueder in Holtzendorff,
  IV. pp. 362-364--Klueber, [p] 242--Liszt, [p] 40, I.--Ullmann, [p]
  174--Pradier-Fodere, VI. No. 2733, and VIII. Nos.
  3104-3106--Rivier, II. pp. 216-219--Boeck, Nos. 214-230--Longuet,
  [p][p] 18-25--Perels, [p] 33--Rettich, _Zur Theorie und Geschichte des
  Rechts zum Kriege_ (1888), pp. 174-213.

[Sidenote: Region of War in contradistinction to Theatre of War.]

[p] 70. Region of war is that part of the surface of the earth in which
the belligerents may prepare and execute hostilities against each other.
In this meaning region of war ought[89] to be distinguished from theatre
of war. The latter is that part of a territory or the Open Sea on which
hostilities actually take place. Legally no part of the earth which is
not region of war may be made the theatre of war, but not every section
of the whole region of war is necessarily theatre of war. Thus, in the
war between Great Britain and the two South African Republics the whole
of the territory of the British Empire and the Open Sea, as well as the
territory of the Republics, was the region of war, but the theatre of
war was in South Africa only. On the other hand, in a war between Great
Britain and another great naval Power it might well happen that the
region of war is in many of its sections made the theatre of war.

[Footnote 89: This distinction, although of considerable importance,
does not appear to have been made by any other publicist.]

[Sidenote: Particular Region of every War.]

[p] 71. The region of war depends upon the belligerents. For this reason
every war has its particular region, so far at any rate as territorial
region is concerned. For besides the Open Sea[90] and all such
territories as are as yet not occupied by any State, which are always
within the region of war, the particular region of every war is the
whole of the territories and territorial waters of the belligerents. It
must, however, be specially observed that any part of the globe which is
permanently neutralised,[91] is always exempt from the region of war.

[Footnote 90: See above, vol. I. [p] 256.]

[Footnote 91: See below, [p] 72.]

Since colonies are a part of the territory of the mother country, they
fall within the region of war in the case of a war between the mother
country and another State, whatever their position may be within the
colonial empire they belong to. Thus in a war between Great Britain and
France the whole of Australia, of Canada, of India, and so on, would be
included with the British Islands as region of war. And, further, as
States under the suzerainty of another State are internationally in
several respects considered to be a portion of the latter's
territory,[92] they fall within the region of war in case of war between
the suzerain and another Power. Again, such parts of the territory of a
State as are under the _condominium_ or under the administration of
another State[93] fall within the region of war in case of war between
one of the _condomini_ and another Power and in case of war between the
administrating State and another State. Thus, in a war between Great
Britain and another Power, Cyprus would fall within the region of war;
and the Soudan, which is in the _condominium_ of England and Egypt,
would likewise do so. On the other hand, Cyprus would not fall within
the region of war in the case of war between Turkey and another Power,
Great Britain excepted.

[Footnote 92: See above, vol. I. [p][p] 91 and 169.]

[Footnote 93: See above, vol. I. [p] 171.]

Although as a rule the territories of both belligerents, together with
the Open Sea, fall within the region of war, and neutral territories do
not, exceptions to the rule may occur:--

(1) A belligerent can deliberately treat certain territories which
legally fall within the region of war, as well as parts of the Open Sea,
as though they were not parts of the region of war, provided that such
territories on their part fulfil the duties incumbent upon neutrals.
Thus during the Turco-Italian War in 1911 and 1912, Italy treated Crete
and Egypt as though they were not parts of the region of war.[94]

(2) Cases are possible in which a part or the whole of the territory of
a neutral State falls within the region of war. These cases arise in
wars in which such neutral territories are the very objects of the war,
as Korea, which was at that time an independent State, and the Chinese
province of Manchuria[95] were in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and
1905. Such a case may also occur if an army of one of the belligerents
crosses the frontier of a neutral State, but is not at once disarmed
and interned, and is, therefore, able at any moment to recross the
frontier and attack the other belligerent.[96] Since necessity of
self-preservation can compel the latter on his part also to cross the
neutral frontier and pursue and attack the enemy on neutral territory,
the part of such neutral territory concerned would for this reason
become part of the region of war.

[Footnote 94: There is no doubt that this attitude of Italy is explained
by the fact that Egypt, although legally under Turkish suzerainty, is
actually under British occupation, and that Crete is forcibly kept by
the Powers under Turkish suzerainty.]

[Footnote 95: See below, [p] 320.]

[Footnote 96: See below, [p] 339.]

[Sidenote: Exclusion from region of war through neutralisation.]

[p] 72. Although the Open Sea in its whole extent and the whole of the
territories of the belligerents are as a rule within the region of war,
certain parts can be excluded through neutralisation. Such
neutralisation can take place permanently through a general treaty of
the Powers or temporarily through a special treaty of the belligerents.
At present no part of the Open Sea is neutralised, as the neutralisation
of the Black Sea was abolished[97] in 1871. But the following are some
important instances[98] of permanent neutralisation of parts of
territories:--

(1) The former Sardinian, but since 1860 French, provinces of Chablais
and Faucigny[99] are permanently neutralised through article 92 of the
Act of the Vienna Congress, 1815.

(2) The Ionian Islands through article 2 of the Treaty of London of
November 14, 1863, are permanently neutralised since they merged in the
kingdom of Greece. But this neutralisation was restricted[100] to the
islands of Corfu and Paxo only by article 2 of the treaty of London of
March 24, 1864.

(3) The Suez Canal is permanently neutralised[101] since 1888.

(4) The Straits of Magellan[102] are permanently neutralised through
article 5 of the boundary treaty of Buenos Ayres of July 23, 1881. But
this treaty is not a general treaty of the Powers, since it is concluded
between Argentina and Chili only.

(5) The Panama[103] Canal is permanently neutralised through article 3
of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of November 18, 1901. But this treaty is
not a general treaty of the Powers either, being concluded between only
Great Britain and the United States.

(6) A piece of territory along the frontier between Sweden and Norway is
neutralised by the Convention of Stockholm of October 26, 1905, which
includes rules concerning a neutral zone.[104] But this is a
neutralisation agreed upon between Sweden and Norway only, no third
Power has anything to do with it, and even the contracting Powers
stipulate--see article 1, last paragraph--that the neutralisation shall
not be valid in the case of a war against a common enemy.

[Footnote 97: See above, vol. I. [p][p] 181 and 256.]

[Footnote 98: The matter is thoroughly treated in Rettich, _Zur Theorie
und Geschichte des Rechtes zum Kriege_ (1888), pp. 174-213, where also
the neutralisation of some so-called international rivers, especially
the Danube, Congo, and Niger, is discussed.]

[Footnote 99: See above, vol. I. [p] 207.]

[Footnote 100: See Martens, _N.R.G._ XVIII. p. 63.]

[Footnote 101: See above, vol. I. [p] 183.]

[Footnote 102: See Martens, _N.R.G._ 2nd Ser. XII. p. 491, and above,
vol. I. [p] 195, p. 267, note 2, and [p] 568, p. 592, note 2.]

[Footnote 103: See above, vol. I. [p] 184.]

[Footnote 104: See Martens, _N.R.G._ 2nd Ser. XXXIV. (1907), p. 703.]

As regards temporary neutralisation, it is possible for parts of the
territories of belligerents and certain parts of the Open Sea to become
neutralised through a treaty of the belligerents for the time of a
particular war only. Thus, when in 1870 war broke out between France and
Germany, the commander of the French man-of-war[105] _Dupleix_ arranged
with the commander of the German man-of-war _Hertha_--both stationed in
the Japanese and Chinese waters--that they should, through their
embassies in Yokohama, propose to their respective Governments the
neutralisation of the Japanese and Chinese waters for the time of the
war. Germany consented, but France refused the neutralisation. Again, at
the commencement of the Turco-Italian War in 1911, Turkey proposed the
neutralisation of the Red Sea, but Italy refused to agree to it.

[Footnote 105: See Perels, [p] 33, p. 160, note 2.]

[Sidenote: Asserted exclusion of the Baltic Sea from the Region of War.]

[p] 73. That there is at present no part of the Open Sea neutralised is
universally recognised, and this applies to the Baltic Sea, which is
admittedly part of the Open Sea. Some writers,[106] however, maintain
that the littoral States of the Baltic have a right to forbid all
hostilities within the Baltic in case of a war between other States than
themselves, and could thereby neutralise the Baltic without the consent
and even against the will of the belligerents. This opinion is based on
the fact that during the eighteenth century the littoral States of the
Baltic claimed that right in several conventions, but it appears
untenable, because it is opposed to the universally recognised principle
of the freedom of the Open Sea. As no State has territorial supremacy
over parts of the Open Sea, I cannot see how such a right of the
littoral States of the Baltic could be justified.[107]

[Footnote 106: See Perels, pp. 160-163, who discusses the question at
some length and answers it in the affirmative.]

[Footnote 107: See Rivier, II. p. 218; Bonfils, [p] 504; Nys, I. pp.
448-450.]


V

THE BELLIGERENTS

  Vattel, III. [p] 4--Phillimore, III. [p][p] 92-93--Taylor, [p][p]
  458-460--Wheaton, [p] 294--Bluntschli, [p][p] 511-514--Heffter, [p][p]
  114-117--Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 237-248--Klueber, [p]
  236--G. F. Martens, II. [p] 264--Gareis, [p] 83--Liszt, [p] 39,
  II.--Ullmann, [p][p] 168-169--Pradier-Fodere, VI. Nos.
  2656-2660--Rivier, II. pp. 207-216--Nys. III. pp. 114-118--Calvo,
  IV. [p][p] 2004-2038--Martens, II. [p] 108--Heilborn, _System_, pp.
  333-335.

[Sidenote: Qualification to become a Belligerent (_facultas bellandi_).]

[p] 74. As the Law of Nations recognises the status of war and its
effects as regards rights and duties between the two or more
belligerents on the one hand, and, on the other, between the
belligerents and neutral States, the question arises what kind of States
are legally qualified to make war and to become thereby belligerents.
Publicists who discuss this question at all speak mostly of a _right_ of
States to make war, a _jus belli_. But if this so-called right is
examined, it turns out to be no right at all, as there is no
corresponding duty in those against whom the right is said to
exist.[108] A State which makes war against another exercises one of its
natural functions, and the only question is whether such State is or is
not legally qualified to exercise such function. Now, according to the
Law of Nations full-Sovereign States alone possess the legal
qualification to become belligerents; half-and part-Sovereign States are
not legally qualified to become belligerents. Since neutralised States,
as Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxemburg, are full-Sovereign States, they
are legally qualified to become belligerents, although their
neutralisation binds them not to make use of their qualification except
for defence. If they become belligerents because they are attacked, they
do not lose their character as neutralised States, but if they become
belligerents for offensive purposes they _ipso facto_ lose this
character.

[Footnote 108: See Heilborn, _System_, p. 333.]

[Sidenote: Possibility in contradistinction to qualification to become a
Belligerent.]

[p] 75. Such States as do not possess the legal qualification to become
belligerents are by law prohibited from offensive or defensive warfare.
But the possession of armed forces makes it possible for them in fact to
enter into war and to become belligerents. History records instances
enough of such States having actually made war. Thus in 1876 Servia and
Montenegro, although at that time vassal States under Turkish
suzerainty, declared war against Turkey, and in March 1877, peace was
concluded between Turkey and Servia.[109] And when in April 1877 war
broke out between Russia and Turkey, the then Turkish vassal State
Roumania joined Russia, and Servia declared war anew against Turkey in
December 1877. Further in November 1885 a war was waged between Servia,
which had become a full-Sovereign State, and Bulgaria, which was at the
time still a vassal State under Turkish suzerainty; the war lasted
actually only a fortnight, but the formal treaty of peace was not signed
until March 3, 1886, at Bukarest.[110] And although Turkey is a party to
this treaty, Bulgaria appears as a party thereto independently and on
its own behalf.

[Footnote 109: See Martens, _N.R.G._ 2nd Ser. IV. pp. 12, 14, 172.]

[Footnote 110: See Martens, _N.R.G._ 2nd Ser. IV. p. 284.]

Whenever a case arises in which a State lacking the legal qualification
to make war nevertheless actually makes war, such State is a
belligerent, the contention is real war and all the rules of
International Law respecting warfare apply to it.[111] Therefore, an
armed contention between the suzerain and the vassal, between a
full-Sovereign State and a vassal State under the suzerainty of another
State, and, lastly, between a Federal State and one or more of its
members, is war[112] in the technical sense of the term according to the
Law of Nations.

[Footnote 111: This is quite apparent through the fact that Bulgaria by
accession became a party to the Geneva Convention at a time when she was
still a vassal State under Turkish suzerainty.]

[Footnote 112: See above, [p] 56, and Baty, _International Law in South
Africa_ (1900), pp. 66-68.]

[Sidenote: Insurgents as a Belligerent Power.]

[p] 76. The distinction between legal qualification and actual power to
make war explains the fact that insurgents may become a belligerent
Power. It is a customary rule of the Law of Nations that any State may
recognise insurgents as a belligerent Power, provided (1) they are in
possession of a certain part of the territory of the legitimate
Government; (2) they have set up a Government of their own; and (3) they
conduct their armed contention with the legitimate Government according
to the laws and usages of war.[113] Such insurgents in fact, although
not in law, form a State-like community, and practically they are making
war, although their contention is by International Law not considered as
war in the technical sense of the term as long as they have not received
recognition as a belligerent Power.

[Footnote 113: See above, [p] 59. See also Rougier, _Les guerres
civiles_, &c. (1903), pp. 372-447, and Westlake, I. pp. 50-57. The
Institute of International Law, at its meeting at Neuchatel in 1900,
adopted a body of nine articles concerning the rights and duties of
foreign States in case of an insurrection; articles 4-9 deal with the
recognition of the belligerency of insurgents. See _Annuaire_, XVIII. p.
227.]

[Sidenote: Principal and accessory Belligerent Parties.]

[p] 77. War occurs usually between two States, one belligerent party
being on each side. But there are cases in which there are on one or on
both sides several parties, and in some of such cases principal and
accessory belligerent parties are to be distinguished.

Principal belligerent parties are those parties to a war who wage it on
the basis of a treaty of alliance, whether such treaty was concluded
before or during the war. On the other hand, accessory belligerent
parties are such States as provide help and succour only in a limited
way to a principal belligerent party at war with another State; for
instance, by paying subsidies, sending a certain number of troops or
men-of-war to take part in the contention, granting a coaling station to
the men-of-war of the principal party, allowing the latter's troops a
passage through their territory, and the like. Such accessory party
becomes a belligerent through rendering help.

The matter need hardly be mentioned at all were it not for the fact that
the question was formerly discussed by publicists whether or not it
involved a violation of neutrality on the part of a neutral State in
case it fulfilled in time of war a treaty concluded in time of peace, by
the terms of which it had to grant a coaling station, the passage of
troops through its territory, and the like, to one of the belligerents.
This question is identical with the question, to be treated below in [p]
305, whether a qualified neutrality, in contradistinction to a perfect
neutrality, is admissible. Since the answer to this question is in the
negative, such State as fulfils a treaty obligation of this kind in time
of war may be considered by the other side an accessory belligerent
party to the war, and all doubt in the matter ought now to be removed
since article 2 of Convention V. of the Second Peace Conference[114]
categorically enacts that "belligerents are forbidden to move across the
territory of a neutral Power troops or convoys either of munitions of
war or of supplies."

[Footnote 114: See also article 3 of Convention V.]


VI

THE ARMED FORCES OF THE BELLIGERENTS

  Vattel, III. [p][p] 223-231--Hall, [p][p] 177-179, 181--Lawrence,
  [p][p] 148-150--Westlake, II. pp. 60-63--Manning, pp.
  206-210--Phillimore, III. [p] 94--Twiss, II. [p] 45--Halleck, I.
  pp. 555-562--Taylor, [p][p] 471-476--Moore, VII. [p]
  1109--Wheaton, [p][p] 356-358--Bluntschli, [p][p]
  569-572--Heffter, [p][p] 124-124A--Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp.
  371-385--Klueber, 267--G. F. Martens, II. [p] 271--Gareis, [p]
  83--Ullmann, [p] 175--Liszt, [p] 40, II.--Bonfils, Nos.
  1088-1098--Despagnet, Nos. 520-523--Pradier-Fodere, VI. Nos.
  2721-2732, and VIII. Nos. 3091-3102--Nys, III. pp.
  155-202--Rivier, II. pp. 242-259--Calvo, IV. [p][p]
  2044-2065--Fiore, III. Nos. 1303-1316, and Code, Nos.
  1455-1475--Martens, II. [p] 112--Longuet, [p][p] 26-36--Pillet,
  pp. 35-59--_Kriegsbrauch_, pp. 4-8--Perels, [p] 34--Boeck, Nos.
  209-213--Dupuis, Nos. 74-91--Lawrence, _War_, pp. 195-218--Zorn,
  pp. 36-73--Bordwell, pp. 228-236--_Land Warfare_, [p]
  17-38--Meurer, II. [p][p] 11-20--Spaight, pp. 34-72--Ariga, pp.
  74-91--Takahashi, pp. 89-93.

[Sidenote: Regular Armies and Navies.]

[p] 78. The chief part of the armed forces of the belligerents are their
regular armies and navies. What kinds of forces constitute a regular
army and a regular navy is not for International Law to determine, but a
matter of Municipal Law exclusively. Whether or not so-called Militia
and Volunteer corps belong to armies rests entirely with the Municipal
Law of the belligerents. There are several States whose armies consist
of Militia and Volunteer Corps exclusively, no standing army being
provided for. The Hague Regulations expressly stipulate in article 1
that in countries where Militia or Volunteer Corps constitute the army
or form part of it they are included under the denomination "Army." It
is likewise irrelevant to consider the composition of a regular army,
whether it is based on conscription or not, whether natives only or
foreigners also are enrolled, and the like.

[Sidenote: Non-combatant Members of Armed Forces.]

[p] 79. In the main, armed forces consist of combatants, but no army in
the field consists of combatants exclusively, as there are always
several kinds of other individuals, such as couriers, aeronauts,
doctors, farriers, veterinary surgeons, chaplains, nurses, official and
voluntary ambulance men, contractors, canteen-caterers, newspaper
correspondents,[115] civil servants, diplomatists, and foreign military
attaches[116] in the suite of the Commander-in-Chief.

[Footnote 115: See Rey in _R.G._ XVII. (1910), pp. 73-102, and Higgins,
_War and the Private Citizen_ (1912), pp. 91-114.]

[Footnote 116: See Rey in _R.G._ XVII. (1910), pp. 63-73.]

Writers on the Law of Nations do not agree as regards the position of
such individuals; they are not mere private individuals, but, on the
other hand, are certainly not combatants, although they may--as, for
instance, couriers, doctors, farriers, and veterinary surgeons--have the
character of soldiers. They may correctly be said to belong _indirectly_
to the armed forces. Article 3 of the Hague Regulations expressly
stipulates that the armed forces of the belligerents may consist of
combatants and non-combatants, and that both in case of capture must be
treated as prisoners of war, provided[117] they produce a certificate of
identification from the military authorities of the army they are
accompanying. However, when one speaks of armed forces generally,
combatants only are in consideration.

[Footnote 117: See below, [p] 127.]

[Sidenote: Irregular Forces.]

[p] 80. Very often the armed forces of belligerents consist throughout
the war of their regular armies only, but, on the other hand, it happens
frequently that irregular forces take part in the war. Of such irregular
forces there are two different kinds to be distinguished--first, such as
are authorised by the belligerents; and, secondly, such as are acting on
their own initiative and their own account without special
authorisation. Formerly it was a recognised rule of International Law
that only the members of authorised irregular forces enjoyed the
privileges due to the members of the armed forces of belligerents,
whereas members of unauthorised irregular forces were considered to be
war criminals and could be shot when captured. During the Franco-German
war in 1870 the Germans acted throughout according to this rule with
regard to the so-called "Franctireurs," requesting the production of a
special authorisation from the French Government from every irregular
combatant they captured, failing which he was shot. But according to
article 1 of the Hague Regulations this rule is now obsolete, and its
place is taken by the rule that irregulars enjoy the privileges due to
members of the armed forces of the belligerents, although they do not
act under authorisation, provided (1) that they are commanded by a
person responsible for his subordinates, (2) that they have a fixed
distinctive emblem recognisable at a distance,[118] (3) that they carry
arms openly,[119] and (4) that they conduct their operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war. It must, however, be
emphasised that this rule applies only to irregulars fighting in bodies,
however small. Such individuals as take up arms or commit hostile acts
singly and severally are still liable to be treated as war criminals,
and shot.[120]

[Footnote 118: The distance at which the emblem should be visible is
undetermined. See _Land Warfare_, [p] 23, where it is pointed out that
it is reasonable to expect that the silhouette of an irregular combatant
in the position of standing against the skyline should be at once
distinguishable from the outline of a peaceable inhabitant, and this by
the naked eye of ordinary individuals, at a distance at which the form
of an individual can be determined.--See Ariga, p. 87, concerning 120
irregulars who were treated as criminals and shot by the Japanese after
the occupation of Vladimirowka on the island of Sakhaline.]

[Footnote 119: See _Land Warfare_, [p] 26; individuals whose sole arm is
a pistol, hand-grenade, a dagger concealed about the person, or a
sword-stick, are not such as carry their arms openly.]

[Footnote 120: See below, [p] 254.]

[Sidenote: Levies _en masse_.]

[p] 81. It sometimes happens during war that on the approach of the
enemy a belligerent calls the whole population of the country to arms
and thus makes them a part, although a more or less irregular part, of
his armed forces. Provided they receive some organisation and comply
with the laws and usages of war, the combatants who take part in such a
levy _en masse_ organised by the State enjoy the privileges due to
members of armed forces.

It sometimes happens, further, during wars, that a levy _en masse_ takes
place spontaneously without organisation by a belligerent, and the
question arises whether or not those who take part in such levies _en
masse_ belong to the armed forces of the belligerents, and therefore
enjoy the privileges due to members of such forces. Article 2 of the
Hague Regulations stipulates that the population of a territory not yet
occupied who, on the enemy's approach, spontaneously take up arms to
resist the invading enemy, without having time to organise themselves
under responsible commanders and to procure fixed distinctive emblems
recognisable at a distance, shall nevertheless enjoy the privileges due
to armed forces, provided that they carry arms openly and act otherwise
in conformity with the laws and usages of war. But this case is totally
different from a levy _en masse_ of the population of a territory
already invaded by the enemy, for the purpose of freeing the country
from the invader. The stipulation of the Hague Regulations quoted above
does not cover this case, in which, therefore, the old customary rule of
International Law is valid, that those taking part in such a levy _en
masse_, if captured, are liable to be shot.[121]

[Footnote 121: See below, [p] 254. Article 85 of the American
_Instructions for the Government of Armies in the Field_ of 1863 has
enacted this rule as follows: "War rebels are persons within an occupied
territory who rise in arms against the occupying or conquering army, or
against the authorities established by the same. If captured, they may
suffer death, whether they rise singly, in small or large bands, and
whether called upon to do so by their own, but expelled Government or
not...."]

It is of particular importance not to confound invasion with occupation
in this matter. Article 2 distinctly speaks of the _approach_ of the
enemy, and thereby sanctions only such a levy _en masse_ as takes place
in territory not yet _invaded_ by the enemy. Once the territory is
invaded, although the invasion has not yet ripened into occupation,[122]
a levy _en masse_ is no longer legitimate. But, of course, the term
_territory_, as used by article 2, is not intended to mean[123] the
whole extent of the State of a belligerent, but refers only to such
parts of it as are not yet invaded. For this reason, if a town is
already invaded, but not a neighbouring town, the inhabitants of the
latter may, on the approach of the enemy, legitimately rise _en masse_.
And it matters not whether the individuals taking part in the levy _en
masse_ are acting in immediate combination with a regular army or
separately from it.[124]

[Footnote 122: Concerning the difference between invasion and
occupation, see below, [p] 167.]

[Footnote 123: See _Land Warfare_, [p][p] 31-32.]

[Footnote 124: See _Land Warfare_, [p] 34.]

[Sidenote: Barbarous Forces.]

[p] 82. As International Law grew up amongst the States of Christendom,
and as the circle of the members of the Family of Nations includes only
civilised, although not necessarily Christian, States, all writers on
International Law agree that in wars between themselves the members of
the Family of Nations should not make use of barbarous forces--that is,
troops consisting of individuals belonging to savage tribes and
barbarous races. But it can hardly be maintained that a rule of this
kind has customarily grown up in practice, nor has it been stipulated by
treaties, and the Hague Regulations overlook this point. This being the
fact, it is difficult to say whether the members of such barbarous
forces, if employed in a war between members of the Family of Nations,
would enjoy the privileges due to members of armed forces generally. I
see no reason why they should not, provided such barbarous forces would
or could comply with the laws and usages of war prevalent according to
International Law. But the very fact that they are barbarians makes it
probable that they could or would not do so, and then it would be
unreasonable to grant them the privileges generally due to members of
armed forces, and it would be necessary to treat them according to
discretion.[125] But it must be specially observed that the employment
of barbarous forces must not be confounded with the enrolling of
 individuals into the regular army and the employment of
regiments consisting of disciplined  soldiers. There is no
reason whatever why, for instance, the members of a regiment eventually
formed by the United States of America out of <DW64>s bred and educated
in America, or why members of Indian regiments under English commanders,
if employed in wars between members of the Family of Nations, should not
enjoy the privileges due to the members of armed forces according to
International Law.

[Footnote 125: As regards the limited use made of armed natives as
scouts, and the like, on the part of the British commanders during the
South-African War, see _The Times' History of the War in South Africa_,
pp. 249-251. The Boers refused quarter to any such armed natives as fell
into their hands.]

[Sidenote: Privateers.]

[p] 83. Formerly privateers were a generally recognised part of the
armed forces of the belligerents, private vessels being commissioned by
the belligerents through Letters of Marque to carry on hostilities at
sea, and particularly to capture enemy merchantmen.[126] From the
fifteenth century, when privateering began to grow up, down to the
eighteenth century, belligerents used to grant such Letters of Marque to
private ships owned by their subjects and by the subjects of neutral
States. But during the eighteenth century the practice grew up that
belligerents granted Letters of Marque to private ships of their own
subjects only.[127] However, privateering was abolished by the
Declaration of Paris in 1856 as between the signatory Powers and others
who joined it later. And although privateering would still be legal as
between other Powers, it will in future scarcely be made use of. In all
the wars that occurred after 1856 between such Powers, no Letters of
Marque were granted to private ships.[128]

[Footnote 126: See Martens, _Essai concernant les armateurs, les prises,
et surtout les reprises_ (1795).]

[Footnote 127: Many publicists maintain that nowadays a privateer
commissioned by another State than that of which he is a subject is
liable to be treated as a pirate when captured. With this, however, I
cannot agree; see above, vol. I. [p] 273, Hall, [p] 81, and below, [p]
330.]

[Footnote 128: See below, [p] 177. It is confidently to be hoped that
the great progress made by the abolition of privateering through the
Declaration of Paris will never be undone. But it is of importance to
note the fact that up to the present day endeavours have been made on
the part of freelances to win public opinion for a retrograde step. See,
for instance, Munro-Butler Johnstone, _Handbook of Maritime Rights; and
the Declaration of Paris Considered_ (1876), and Gibson Bowles, _The
Declaration of Paris of 1856_ (1900); see also Perels, pp. 177-179. The
Declaration of Paris being a law-making treaty which does not provide
the right of the several signatory Powers to give notice of withdrawal,
a signatory Power is not at liberty to give such notice, although Mr.
Gibson Bowles (_op. cit._ pp. 169-179) asserts that this could be done.
See above, vol. I. [p] 12.]

[Sidenote: Converted Merchantmen.]

[p] 84. A case which happened in 1870, soon after the outbreak of the
Franco-German war, gave occasion for the question whether converted
merchantmen could be considered a part of the armed naval forces of a
belligerent. As the North-German Confederation owned only a few
men-of-war, the creation of a volunteer fleet was intended. The King of
Prussia, as President of the Confederation, invited the owners of
private German vessels to make them a part of the German navy under the
following conditions: Every ship should be assessed as to her value, and
10 per cent. of such value should at once be paid in cash to the owner
as a price for the charter of the ship. The owner should engage the crew
himself, but the latter should become for the time of the war members of
the German navy, wear the German naval uniform, and the ship should sail
under the German war flag and be armed and adapted for her purpose by
the German naval authorities. Should the ship be captured or destroyed
by the enemy, the assessed value should be paid to her owners in full;
but should it be restored after the war undamaged, the owner should
retain the 10 per cent. received as charter price. All such vessels
should only try to capture or destroy French men-of-war, and if
successful the owner should receive a sum between _l._1500 and _l._7500
as premium. The French Government considered this scheme a disguised
evasion of the Declaration of Paris which abolished privateering, and
requested the intervention of Great Britain. The British Government
brought the case before the Law Officers of the Crown, who declared the
German scheme to be substantially different from the revival of
privateering, and consequently the British Government refused to object
to it. The scheme, however, was never put into practice.[129]

[Footnote 129: See Perels, [p] 34; Hall, [p] 182; Boeck, No. 211;
Dupuis, Nos. 81-84.]

Now, in spite of the opinion of the British Law Officers, writers on
International Law differ as to the legality of the above scheme; but, on
the other hand, they are unanimous that not every scheme for a voluntary
fleet is to be rejected. Russia,[130] in fact, since 1877, has possessed
a voluntary fleet. France[131] has made arrangements with certain
steamship companies according to which their mail-boats have to be
constructed on plans approved by the Government, have to be commanded by
officers of the French navy, and have to be incorporated in the French
navy at the outbreak of war. Great Britain from 1887 onwards has entered
into agreements with several powerful British steamship companies for
the purpose of securing their vessels at the outbreak of hostilities;
and the United States of America in 1892 made similar arrangements with
the American Line.[132]

[Footnote 130: See Dupuis, No. 85.]

[Footnote 131: See Dupuis, No. 86.]

[Footnote 132: See Lawrence, [p] 201, and Dupuis, Nos. 87-88. On the
whole question see Pradier-Fodere, VIII. Nos. 3102-3103.]

Matters were brought to a climax in 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War,
through the cases of the _Peterburg_ and the _Smolensk_.[133] On July 4
and 6 of that year, these vessels, which belonged to the Russian
volunteer fleet in the Black Sea, were allowed to pass the Bosphorus and
the Dardanelles, which are closed[134] to men-of-war of all nations,
because they were flying the Russian commercial flag. They likewise
passed the Suez Canal under their commercial flag, but after leaving
Suez they converted themselves into men-of-war by hoisting the Russian
war flag, and began to exercise over neutral merchantmen all rights of
supervision which belligerents can claim for their cruisers in time of
war. On July 13 the _Peterburg_ captured the British P. & O. steamer
_Malacca_ for alleged carriage of contraband, and put a prize-crew on
board for the purpose of navigating her to Libau. But the British
Government protested; the _Malacca_ was released at Algiers on her way
to Libau on July 27, and Russia agreed that the _Peterburg_ and the
_Smolensk_ should no longer act as cruisers, and that all neutral
vessels captured by them should be released.

[Footnote 133: See the details of the career of these vessels in
Lawrence, _War_, pp. 205 _seq._]

[Footnote 134: See above, vol. I. [p] 197.]

This case was the cause of the question of the conversion of merchantmen
into men-of-war being taken up by the Second Peace Conference in 1907,
which produced Convention VII. on the matter.[135] This Convention,
which is signed by all the States represented at the Conference except
the United States of America, China, San Domingo, Nicaragua, and
Uruguay--but Nicaragua acceded later--comprises twelve articles; its
more important stipulations are the following: No converted vessel can
have the status of a warship unless she is placed under the direct
authority, immediate control, and responsibility of the Power whose flag
she flies (article 1). Such a vessel must, therefore, bear the external
marks which distinguish the warships of her nationality (article 2); the
commander must be in the service of the State concerned, must be duly
commissioned, and his name must figure on the list of the officers of
the military fleet (article 3); and the crew must be subject to the
rules of military discipline (article 4). A converted vessel must
observe the laws and usages of war (article 5) and her conversion must
as soon as possible be announced by the belligerent concerned in the
list of the ships of his military fleet (article 6).

[Footnote 135: See Wilson in _A.J._ II. (1908), pp. 271-275; Lemonon,
pp. 607-622; Higgins, pp. 312-321; Dupuis, Nos. 48-58; Nippold, II. pp.
73-84; Scott, _Conferences_, pp. 568-576; Higgins, _War and the Private
Citizen_ (1912), pp. 115-168.]

The opinion, which largely prevails, that through this admittance of the
conversion of merchantmen into men-of-war privateering has been revived,
is absolutely unfounded, for the rules stipulated by Convention VII. in
no way abrogate the rule of the Declaration of Paris that privateering
is and remains abolished. But the Convention does not give satisfaction
in so far as it does not settle the questions where the conversion of a
vessel may be performed, and whether it is permitted to reconvert,
before the termination of the war, into a merchantman a vessel which
during the war had been converted into a warship. The fact is, the
Powers could not come to an agreement on these two points, the one party
claiming that conversion could only be performed within a harbour of the
converting Power, or an enemy harbour occupied by it, the other party
defending the claim to convert likewise on the High Seas. One must look
to the future for a compromise that will settle this vexed controversy.
It is, however, important to notice the fact that the preamble of
Convention VII. states expressly that the question of the place where a
conversion may be performed remains open. Those Powers which claim that
conversions[136] must not take place on the High Seas are not,
therefore, prevented from refusing to acknowledge the public character
of any vessel which had been converted on the High Seas, and from
upholding their view that a converted vessel may not alternately claim
the character and the privileges of a belligerent man-of-war and a
merchantman.

[Footnote 136: Concerning the question whether an enemy merchantman,
captured on the High Seas, may at once be converted into a warship, see
below, p. 231, _note_ 2.]

[Sidenote: The Crews of Merchantmen.]

[p] 85. In a sense the crews of merchantmen owned by subjects of the
belligerents belong to the latter's armed forces. For those vessels are
liable to be seized by enemy men-of-war, and if attacked for that
purpose they may defend themselves, may return the attack, and
eventually seize the attacking men-of-war. The crews of merchantmen
become in such cases combatants, and enjoy all the privileges of the
members of armed forces. But unless attacked they must not commit
hostilities, and if they do so they are liable to be treated as
criminals just as are private individuals who commit hostilities in land
warfare. Some writers[137] assert that, although merchantmen of the
belligerents are not competent to exercise the right of visit, search,
and capture towards neutral vessels, they may attack enemy
vessels--merchantmen as well as public vessels--not merely in
self-defence but even without having been previously attacked, and that,
consequently, the crews must in such case enjoy the privileges due to
members of the armed forces. But this opinion is absolutely without
foundation nowadays,[138] even in former times it was not generally
recognised.[139]

[Footnote 137: See Wheaton, [p] 357; Taylor, [p] 496; Walker, p. 135,
and _Science_, p. 268.]

[Footnote 138: See below, [p] 181, and Hall, [p] 183.]

[Footnote 139: See Vattel, III. [p] 226, and G. F. Martens, II. [p]
289.]

It should be mentioned in regard to the fate of the crews of captured
merchantmen that a distinction is to be made according as to whether or
no a vessel has defended herself against a legitimate attack. In the
first case the members of the crew become prisoners of war, for by
legitimately taking part in the fighting they have become members of the
armed forces of the enemy.[140] In the second case, articles 5 to 7 of
Convention XI. of the Second Peace Conference enact the following
rules:[141]--

(1) Such members of the crew as are subjects of neutral States may not
be made prisoners of war.

(2) The captain and the officers who are subjects of neutral States may
only be made prisoners if they refuse to give a promise in writing not
to serve on an enemy ship while the war lasts.

(3) The captain, officers, and such members of the crew who are enemy
subjects may only be made prisoners if they refuse to give a written
promise not to engage, while hostilities last, in any service connected
with the operations of war.

(4) The names of all the individuals retaining their liberty under
parole must be notified by the captor to the enemy, and the latter is
forbidden knowingly to employ the individuals concerned in any service
prohibited by the parole.

[Footnote 140: This follows indirectly from article 8 of Convention XI.]

[Footnote 141: See below, [p] 201.]

[Sidenote: Deserters and Traitors.]

[p] 86. The privileges of members of armed forces cannot be claimed by
members of the armed forces of a belligerent who go over to the forces
of the enemy and are afterwards captured by the former. They may be, and
always are, treated as criminals. And the like is valid with regard to
such treasonable subjects of a belligerent as, without having been
members of his armed forces, are fighting in the armed forces of the
enemy. Even if they appear under the protection of a flag of truce,
deserters and traitors may be seized and punished.[142]

[Footnote 142: See below, [p] 222; Hall, [p] 190; _Land Warfare_, [p]
36.]


VII

ENEMY CHARACTER

  Grotius, III. c. 4, [p][p] 6 and 7--Bynkershoek, _Quaestiones
  juris publici_, I. c. 3 _in fine_--Hall, [p][p] 167-175--Lawrence,
  [p][p] 151-159--Westlake, II. pp. 140-154--Phillimore, III. [p][p]
  82-86--Twiss, II. [p][p] 152-162--Taylor, [p][p] 468 and
  517--Walker, [p][p] 39-43--Wharton, III. [p][p] 352-353--Wheaton,
  [p][p] 324-341--Moore, VII. [p][p] 1185-1194--Geffcken in
  Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 581-588--Ullmann, [p] 192--Nys, III. pp.
  150-154--Pradier-Fodere, VIII. Nos. 3166-3175--Bonfils, Nos.
  1343-1349'1--Despagnet, Nos. 650-653 _quinto_--Calvo, IV. [p][p]
  1932-1952--Fiore, III. Nos. 1432-1436, and Code, Nos.
  1701-1709--Boeck, Nos. 156-190--Dupuis, Nos. 92-129, and _Guerre_,
  Nos. 59-73--Lemonon, pp. 426-467--Higgins, p. 593--Nippold, II.
  pp. 40-54--Scott, _Conferences_, pp. 541-555--Frankenbach, _Die
  Rechtsstellung von neutralen Staatsangehoerigen in kriegfuehrenden
  Staaten_ (1910)--Baty in _The Journal of the Society of
  Comparative Legislation_, New Series, IX. Part I. (1908), pp.
  157-166, and Westlake, _ibidem_, Part II. (1909), pp.
  265-268--Oppenheim in _The Law Quarterly Review_, XXV. (1909), pp.
  372-383.

[Sidenote: On Enemy Character in general.]

[p] 87. Since the belligerents, for the realisation of the purpose of
war, are entitled to many kinds of measures against enemy persons and
enemy property, the question must be settled as to what persons and what
property are vested with enemy character. Now it is, generally speaking,
correct to say that, whereas the subjects of the belligerents and the
property of such subjects bear enemy character, the subjects of neutral
States and the property of such subjects do not bear enemy character.
This rule has, however, important exceptions. For under certain
circumstances and conditions enemy persons and property of enemy
subjects may not bear, and, on the other hand, subjects of neutral
States and their property may bear, enemy character. And it is even
possible that a subject of a belligerent may for some parts bear enemy
character as between himself and his home State.

The matter of enemy character is, however, to a great extent in an
unsettled condition, since on many points connected with it there are no
universally recognised rules of International Law in existence. British
and American Courts have worked out a body of precise and clear rules on
the subject, but the practice of other countries, and especially of
France, follows different lines. The Second Peace Conference of 1907
produced three articles on the matter--16, 17, and 18--in Convention V.,
accepted by all the signatory Powers, except Great Britain which, upon
signing the Convention, entered a reservation against these three
articles, and although these articles are only of minor importance, they
have to be taken into consideration. On the other hand, the as yet
unratified Declaration of London comprises a number of rules which,
apart from two points, offer a common basis for the practice of all
maritime States. At the first glance it would seem that only the four
articles--57 to 60--of Chapter VI. headed "Enemy Character," treat of
the subject under survey, but a closer examination shows that article
46, dealing with a certain kind of unneutral service, articles 55 and
56, dealing with transfer to a neutral flag, and, lastly, article 63,
dealing with forcible resistance to the right of visitation, are also
concerned with enemy character. In spite of these stipulations, which
are accepted by all the Powers concerned, there remain two important
points unsettled, since neither the Second Hague Peace Conference of
1907 nor the Naval Conference of London of 1908-9 succeeded in agreeing
upon a compromise concerning the old controversy as to whether
nationality exclusively, or domicile also, should determine the neutral
or enemy character of individuals and their goods, and further, whether
or not neutral vessels acquire enemy character by embarking in time of
war, with permission of the enemy, upon such trade with the latter as
was closed to them in time of peace (Rule of 1756). According to article
7 of Convention XII. of the Second Hague Peace Conference, concerning
the establishment of an International Prize Court, likewise not yet
ratified, this Court would in time have to evolve a uniform practice of
all the maritime States on these two points.

For the consideration of enemy character in detail, it is convenient to
distinguish between individuals, vessels, goods, the transfer of enemy
vessels, and the transfer of enemy goods on enemy vessels.

[Sidenote: Enemy Character of Individuals.]

[p] 88. The general rule with regard to individuals is that subjects of
the belligerents bear enemy character, whereas subjects of neutral
States do not. In this sense article 16 of Convention V. stipulates:
"The nationals of a State which is not taking part in the war are
considered to be neutral." These neutral individuals can, however, lose
their neutral and acquire enemy character in several cases, just as
subjects of the belligerents can in other cases lose their enemy
character:--

(1) Since relations of peace obtain between either of the belligerents
and neutral States, the subjects of the latter can, by way of trade and
otherwise, render many kinds of service to either belligerent without
thereby losing their neutral character. On the other hand, if they enter
the armed forces of a belligerent, or if they commit other acts in his
favour, or commit hostile acts against a belligerent, they acquire
enemy character (article 17 of Convention V.). All measures that are
allowed during war against enemy subjects are likewise allowed against
such subjects of neutral Powers as have thus acquired enemy character.
For instance, during the late South African War hundreds of subjects of
neutral States, who were fighting in the ranks of the Boers, were
captured by Great Britain and retained as prisoners until the end of the
struggle. Such individuals must not, however, be more severely treated
than enemy subjects, and, in especial, no punitive measures are allowed
against them (article 17 of Convention V.). And article 18(_a_) of
Convention V. stipulates expressly that subjects of neutral States not
inhabiting the territory of the enemy or any territory militarily
occupied by him do not acquire enemy character by furnishing supplies or
making loans to the enemy, provided the supplies do not come from the
enemy territory or any territory occupied by him.[143]

[Footnote 143: Since Great Britain has entered a reservation against
articles 16, 17, and 18 of Convention V. she is not bound by them. It
is, however, of importance to state that articles 16, 17, and
18(_a_)--not 18(_b_)!--enact only such rules as were always customarily
recognised, _unless such an interpretation is to be put upon article 16
as prevents a belligerent from considering subjects of neutral States
inhabiting the enemy country as bearing enemy character_. The matter is
different with regard to article 18(_b_), which creates an entirely new
rule, for nobody has hitherto doubted that the members of the police
force and the administrative officials of the enemy bear enemy character
whether or no they are subjects of the enemy State.]

Article 18(_b_) of Convention V. stipulates that such subjects of
neutral States as render services to the enemy in matters of police and
administration, likewise do not acquire enemy character. This
stipulation must, however, be read with caution. It can only mean that
such individuals do not lose their neutral character to a greater degree
than other subjects of neutral States resident on enemy territory; it
cannot mean that they are in every way to be considered and treated
like subjects of neutral States not residing on enemy territory.

However that may be, it must be specially observed, that the acts by
which subjects of neutral States lose their neutral and acquire enemy
character need not necessarily be committed after the outbreak of war.
Such individuals can, even before the outbreak of war, identify
themselves to such a degree with a foreign State that, with the outbreak
of war against that State, enemy character devolves upon them _ipso
facto_ unless they at once sever their connection with such State. This,
for instance, is the case when a foreign subject in time of peace
enlists in the armed forces of a State and continues to serve after the
outbreak of war.

(2) From the time when International Law made its appearance down to our
own no difference has been made by a belligerent in the treatment
accorded to subjects of the enemy and subjects of neutral States
inhabiting the enemy country. Thus Grotius (III. c. 4, [p][p] 6 and 7)
teaches that foreigners must share the fate of the population living on
enemy territory, and Bynkershoek[144] distinctly teaches that foreigners
residing in enemy country bear enemy character. English[145] and
American practice assert, therefore, that foreigners, whether subjects
of the belligerents or of neutral States, acquire enemy character by
being domiciled (_i.e._ resident) in enemy country, because they have
thereby identified themselves with the enemy population and contribute,
by paying taxes and the like, to the support of the enemy Government.
For this reason, all measures which may legitimately be taken against
the civil population of the enemy territory, may likewise be taken
against them, unless they withdraw from the country or are expelled
therefrom. It must, however, be remembered that they acquire enemy
character _in a sense_ and _to a certain degree_ only, for their enemy
character is not as intensive as that of enemy subjects resident on
enemy territory. Such of them as are subjects of neutral States do not,
therefore, lose the protection of their home State against arbitrary
treatment inconsistent with the laws of war; and such of them as are
subjects of the other belligerent are handed over to the protection of
the Embassy of a neutral Power. However that may be, they are not exempt
from requisitions and contributions; from the restrictions which an
occupant imposes upon the population in the interest of the safety of
his troops and his military operations; from punishments for hostile
acts committed against the occupant; or from being taken into captivity,
if exceptionally necessary.

[Footnote 144: _Quaestiones juris publici_, I. c. 3 _in fine_.]

[Footnote 145: See the _Harmony_ (1800), 2 C. Rob. 322; the _Johanna
Emilie_, otherwise _Emilia_ (1854), Spinks, 12; the _Baltica_ (1857), 11
Moore, P.C. 141.]

This treatment of foreigners resident on occupied enemy territory is
generally recognised as legitimate by theory[146] and practice. The
proposal of Germany, made at the Second Peace Conference, to agree upon
rules which would have stipulated a more favourable treatment of
subjects of neutral States resident on occupied enemy territory was,
therefore, rejected. Not even France supported the German proposals,
although according to the French conception foreigners residing in enemy
country do not acquire enemy character, and therefore the German
proposals were only a logical consequence of the French conception. This
French conception of enemy character dates from the judgment of the
_Conseil des Prises_ in the case of _Le Hardy contre La
Voltigeante_[147] (1802), which laid down the rule that neutral subjects
residing in enemy country do not lose their neutral character, and enemy
subjects residing in neutral countries do not lose their enemy
character. But it must be emphasised that this French conception of
enemy character has been developed, not with regard to the treatment of
foreigners whom an occupant finds resident on occupied enemy territory,
but with regard to the exercise of the right of capture of enemy vessels
and goods in warfare at sea. France did not make an attempt to draw the
logical consequences from this conception and, therefore, to mete out to
foreigners resident on occupied enemy territory a treatment different
from that of enemy subjects resident there.

[Footnote 146: See Albrecht, _Requisitionen von neutralem
Privateigenthum_, &c. (1912), pp. 13-15.]

[Footnote 147: 1 Pistoye et Duverdy (1859), 321.]

(3) Since enemy subjects who reside in neutral countries, or are allowed
to remain resident on the territory of the other belligerent, have to a
great extent identified themselves with the local population and are not
under the territorial supremacy of the enemy, they lose their enemy
character according to English and American practice,[148] but according
to French practice they do not, a difference of practice which bears
upon many points, especially upon the character of goods.[149]

[Footnote 148: See the _Postilion_ (1779), Hay & Marriot, 245; the
_Danous_ (1802), 4 C. Rob. 255, note; the _Venus_ (1814), 8 Cranch,
253.]

[Footnote 149: See below, [p] 90.]

[Sidenote: Enemy Character of Vessels.]

[p] 89. The general rule with regard to vessels is that their character
is determined by their flag. Whatever may be the nationality of the
owner of a vessel--whether he be a subject of a neutral State, or of
either belligerent--she bears enemy character, if she be sailing under
the enemy flag. For this reason, the vessel of an enemy owner which
sails under a neutral flag does as little bear enemy character as the
vessel of the subject of a neutral State sailing under the flag of
another neutral State. But the flag is the deciding factor only when the
vessel is legitimately sailing under it. Should it be found that a
vessel sailing under the flag of a certain neutral State has, according
to the Municipal Law of such State, no right to fly the flag she shows,
the real character of the vessel must be determined in order to decide
whether or no she bears enemy character. On the other hand, it makes no
difference that the owner be the subject of a neutral non-littoral State
without a maritime flag and that the vessel is, therefore, compelled to
fly the flag of a maritime State: if the flag the vessel flies be the
enemy flag, she bears enemy character.

The general rule that the flag is the deciding factor has exceptions,
and it is convenient to expound the matter according to the rules of the
Declaration of London, although it is not yet ratified. The general rule
is laid down by article 57 of the Declaration which enacts that, subject
to the provisions respecting transfer to another flag, the character of
a vessel is determined by the flag she is entitled to fly. Nevertheless,
there are two exceptions to this rule:--

(1) According to article 46 of the Declaration[150] a neutral
merchantman acquires enemy character by taking a direct part in the
hostilities, by being in the exclusive employment of the enemy
government, and by being at the time exclusively intended either for the
transport of troops or for the transmission of intelligence for the
enemy. And it must be emphasised that the act by which a neutral
merchantman acquires enemy character need not necessarily be committed
_after_ the outbreak of war, for she can, even _before_ the outbreak of
war, to such a degree identify herself with a foreign State that, with
the outbreak of war against such State, enemy character devolves upon
her _ipso facto_, unless she severs her connexion with the State
concerned. This is, for instance, the case of a foreign merchantman
which in time of peace has been hired by a State for the transport of
troops or of war material, and is carrying out her contract in spite of
the outbreak of war.[151]

(2) According to article 63 of the Declaration a neutral merchantman
acquires enemy character _ipso facto_ by forcibly resisting the
legitimate exercise of the right of visitation and capture on the part
of a belligerent cruiser (see details below, [p] 422).

(3) According to British practice--adopted by America and
Japan[152]--neutral merchantmen likewise acquire enemy character by
violating the so-called rule of 1756,[153] in case they engage in time
of war in a trade which the enemy prior to the war reserved exclusively
for merchantmen sailing under his own flag. The Declaration of London
has neither rejected nor accepted this rule of 1756, for article 57
stipulates expressly that the case where a neutral vessel is engaged in
a trade which is closed in time of peace, remains unsettled. It would,
therefore, according to article 7 of Convention XII. of the Second Peace
Conference, be the task of the proposed International Prize Court to
settle this point.

Of whatever kind may be the case of the acquisition of enemy character
on the part of a neutral vessel, the following four rules apply to all
cases of such neutral vessels as have acquired enemy character:--(_a_)
all enemy goods on board may now be confiscated, although when they were
first shipped the vessels concerned were neutral; (_b_) all goods on
board will now be presumed to be enemy goods, and the owners of neutral
goods will have to prove the neutral character of the latter; (_c_) the
stipulations of articles 48 and 49 of the Declaration of London
concerning the sinking of neutral prizes do not apply, because these
vessels are now enemy vessels; (_d_) no appeal may be brought from the
national prize courts to the International Prize Court, except with
regard to the one question only, whether the vessel concerned has been
justly considered to have acquired enemy character (see article 4 of
Convention XII. of the Second Hague Peace Conference, concerning the
establishment of an International Prize Court).

[Footnote 150: See below, [p] 410.]

[Footnote 151: The case of the _Kow-shing_ ought here to be mentioned,
although it has now lost its former importance:--

On July 14, 1894, the _Kow-shing_, a British ship, was hired at Shanghai
by the Chinese Government to serve as a transport for eleven hundred
Chinese soldiers and also for arms and ammunition from Tien-tsin to
Korea. She was met on July 25 near the island of Phung-do, in Korean
waters, by the Japanese fleet; she was signalled to stop, was visited by
some prize officers, and, as it was apparent that she was a transport
for Chinese soldiers, she was ordered to follow the Japanese cruiser,
_Naniwa_. But although the British captain of the vessel was ready to
comply with these orders, the Chinese on board would not allow it.
Thereupon the Japanese opened fire and sank the vessel. As formerly
hostilities could be commenced without a previous declaration of war the
action of the Japanese was in accordance with the rules of International
Law existing at the time. But in consequence of Convention III. of the
Second Peace Conference which requires a declaration of war before the
opening of hostilities, such action nowadays would not be justifiable.
See Hall, [p] 168*; Takahashi, pp. 27-51; Holland, _Studies_, pp.
126-128.]

[Footnote 152: See the case of the _Montara_ in Takahashi, p. 633.]

[Footnote 153: See below, [p] 289, and Higgins, _War and the Private
Citizen_ (1912), pp. 169-192.]

[Sidenote: Enemy Character of Goods.]

[p] 90. It is an old customary rule that all goods found on board an
enemy merchantman are presumed to be enemy goods unless the contrary is
proved by the neutral owners concerned. It is, further, generally
recognised that the enemy character of goods depends upon the enemy
character of their owners. As, however, no universally recognised rules
exist as to the enemy character of individuals, there are likewise no
universally recognised rules in existence as to the enemy character of
goods.

(1) Since, according to British and American practice, domicile in enemy
country makes an individual bear enemy character, all goods belonging to
individuals domiciled in enemy country are enemy goods, and all goods
belonging to individuals not resident in enemy country are not, as a
rule, enemy goods. For this reason, goods belonging to enemy subjects
residing in neutral countries[154] do not, but goods belonging to
subjects of neutral States residing in enemy country[155] do bear enemy
character, although they may be the goods of a foreign consul appointed
and residing in enemy country.[156] Further, the goods of such subjects
of the belligerents as are domiciled on each other's territory and are
allowed to remain there after the outbreak of war, acquire enemy
character in the eyes of the belligerent whose subjects they are, but
lose their enemy character in the eyes of the belligerent on whose
territory they are allowed to remain.[157] Again, the produce of an
estate on enemy territory belonging to a subject of a neutral State who
resides abroad, does bear enemy character, for "_Nothing[158] can be
more decided and fixed than the principle ... that the possession of the
soil does impress upon the owner the character of the country, as far as
the produce of that plantation is concerned ... whatever the local
residence of the owner may be_." Lastly, all such property of a subject
of a neutral State residing abroad but having a house of trade within
the enemy country as is concerned in the commercial transactions of such
house of trade,[159] likewise bears enemy character, because the owner
of these goods has a "commercial domicile" in enemy country.

(2) On the other hand, according to French practice, the nationality of
the owner of the goods is exclusively the deciding factor, and it does
not matter where he resides. Hence only such goods on enemy merchantmen
bear enemy character as belong to subjects of the enemy, whether those
subjects are residing on enemy or neutral territory; and all such goods
on enemy merchantmen as belong to subjects of neutral States do not
bear enemy character, whether those subjects reside on neutral or enemy
country.[160]

(3) The Declaration of London does not purport to decide the
controversy, since the Powers represented at the Naval Conference of
London could not agree. Whereas Holland, Spain, and Japan approved of
the British and American practice, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Germany, and
Russia sided with France. For this reason, the Declaration, by articles
58 and 59, only enacts that the enemy character of goods on enemy
vessels is determined by the enemy character of their owner, and that
all goods on enemy vessels are presumed to be enemy goods unless the
contrary is proved. But the chief question, namely, what is the factor
that decides the enemy character of an owner, is deliberately left
unanswered. It would, therefore, according to article 7 of Convention
XII., be for the proposed International Prize Court to settle it.

[Footnote 154: The _Postilion_ (1779), Hay & Marriot, 245; the _Danous_
(1802), 4 C. Rob. 255, note.]

[Footnote 155: The _Baltica_ (1857), 11 Moore, P.C. 141.]

[Footnote 156: The _Indian Chief_ (1801), 3 C. Rob. 12.]

[Footnote 157: The _Venus_ (1814), 8 Cranch, 253.]

[Footnote 158: From the judgment of Sir William Scott in the case of the
_Phoenix_ (1803), 5 C. Rob. 41; see also _Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar_ v.
_Boyle_ (_Bentzen_ v. _Boyle_) (1815), 9 Cranch, 191.]

[Footnote 159: The _Portland_ (1800), 3 C. Rob. 41; the _Jonge Klassina_
(1803), 5 C. Rob. 297; the _Freundschaft_ (1819), 4 Wheaton, 105.]

[Footnote 160: See the French cases of:--_Le Hardy contre La
Voltigeante_ (1802) and _La Paix_ (1803), 1 Pistoye et Duverdy, pp. 321
and 486; _Le Joan_ (1871), _Le Nicolaues_ (1871), _Le Thalia_ (1871);
_Le Laura-Louise_ (1871), Barboux, pp. 101, 108, 116, 119.]

[Sidenote: Transfer of Enemy Vessels.]

[p] 91. The question of the transfer of enemy vessels to subjects of
neutral States, either shortly before or during the war, must be
regarded as forming part of the larger question of enemy character, for
the point to be decided is whether such transfer[161] divests these
vessels of their enemy character. It is obvious that, if this point is
answered in the affirmative, the owners of enemy vessels can evade the
danger of having their property seized and confiscated by selling their
vessels to subjects of neutral States. Before the Declaration of London,
which is, however, not yet ratified, the maritime Powers had not agreed
upon common rules concerning this subject. According to French[162]
practice no transfer of enemy vessels to neutrals could be recognised,
and a vessel thus transferred retained enemy character; but this
concerned only transfer after the outbreak of war, any legitimate
transfer anterior to the outbreak of war did give neutral character to a
vessel. According to British and American practice, on the other hand,
neutral vessels could well be transferred to a neutral flag before or
after the outbreak of war and lose thereby their enemy character,
provided that the transfer took place _bona fide_,[163] was not effected
either in a blockaded port[164] or while the vessel was _in
transitu_,[165] the vendor did not retain an interest in the vessel or
did not stipulate a right to recover or repurchase the vessel after the
conclusion of the war,[166] and the transfer was not made _in transitu_
in contemplation of war.[167]

The Declaration of London offers clear and decisive rules concerning the
transfer of enemy vessels, making a distinction between the transfer to
a neutral flag _before_ and _after_ the outbreak of hostilities:

(1) According to article 55 of the Declaration, the transfer of an enemy
vessel to a neutral flag, if effected _before_ the outbreak of
hostilities, is _valid_, unless the captor is able to prove that the
transfer was made in order to avoid capture. However, if the bill of
sale is not on board the transferred vessel, and if the transfer was
effected less than sixty days before the outbreak of hostilities, the
transfer is presumed to be void, unless the vessel can prove that such
transfer was not effected in order to avoid capture. To provide
commerce with a guarantee that a transfer should not easily be treated
as void on the ground that it was effected for the purpose of evading
capture, it is stipulated that, in case the transfer was effected more
than thirty days before the outbreak of hostilities, there is an
absolute presumption of its validity, provided the transfer was
unconditional, complete, and in conformity with the laws of the
countries concerned, and further, provided that neither the control of,
nor the profits arising from, the employment of the vessels remain in
the same hands as before the transfer. But even in this case a vessel is
suspect if the transfer took place less than sixty days before the
outbreak of hostilities, and if her bill of sale is not on board. Hence
she may be seized and brought into a port of a prize court for
investigation, and she cannot claim damages for the capture, even if the
Court releases her.

(2) According to article 56 of the Declaration, the transfer of an enemy
vessel to a neutral flag, if effected _after_ the outbreak of
hostilities, is _void_ unless the vessel can prove that the transfer was
not made in order to avoid capture. And such proof is excluded, and an
absolute presumption is established that the transfer is void, if the
transfer has been made in a blockaded port or while the vessel was _in
transitu_, further, if a right to repurchase or recover the vessel is
reserved to the vendor, and lastly, if the requirements of the Municipal
Law governing the right to fly the flag under which the vessel is
sailing have not been fulfilled.

[Footnote 161: See Holland, _Prize Law_, [p] 19; Hall, [p] 171; Twiss,
II. [p][p] 162-163; Phillimore, III. [p] 386; Boeck, Nos. 178-180;
Bonfils, Nos. 1344-1349'1; Dupuis, Nos. 117-129, and _Guerre_, Nos.
62-66.]

[Footnote 162: See Dupuis, No. 97.]

[Footnote 163: The _Vigilantia_ (1798), 1 C. Rob. 1; the _Baltica_
(1857), 11 Moore, P.C. 141; the _Benito Estenger_ (1899), 176 United
States, 568.]

[Footnote 164: The _General Hamilton_ (1805), 6 C. Rob. 61.]

[Footnote 165: The moment a vessel transferred _in transitu_ reaches a
port where the new owner takes possession of her, the voyage of the
vessel is considered to have terminated. The _Vrow Margaretha_ (1799), 1
C. Rob. 336; the _Jan Frederick_ (1804), 5 C. Rob. 128.]

[Footnote 166: The _Sechs Geschwistern_ (1801), 4 C. Rob. 100; the
_Jemmy_ (1801), 4 C. Rob. 31.]

[Footnote 167: The _Jan Frederick_ (1804), 5 C. Rob. 128.]

[Sidenote: Transfer of Goods on Enemy Vessels.]

[p] 92. The subject of the transfer of enemy goods on enemy vessels must
likewise be considered as forming part of the larger subject of enemy
character, for the question is here also whether such a transfer divests
these goods of their enemy character. And concerning this question[168]
there was likewise no unanimous practice in existence among the maritime
States before the agreement on the Declaration of London. British and
American practice refused to recognise a sale _in transitu_ under any
circumstances or conditions, if the vessel concerned was captured before
the neutral buyer had actually taken possession of the transferred
goods.[169] On the other hand, French practice recognised such a sale
_in transitu_, provided it could be proved that the transaction was made
_bona fide_.[170]

The Declaration of London now stipulates, by article 60, that enemy
goods on board an enemy vessel retain their enemy character until they
reach their destination, notwithstanding any transfer effected after the
outbreak of hostilities while the goods are _in transitu_. Hence if such
enemy vessel is captured before having reached her destination, goods
consigned to enemy subjects may be confiscated, although they have been
sold _in transitu_ to subjects of neutral States. A special rule is
provided for the case of the enemy consignee of goods on board an enemy
vessel becoming bankrupt while the goods are _in transitu_. In a number
of countries[171] an unpaid vendor has, in the event of the bankruptcy
of the buyer, a recognised legal right to recover such goods as have
already become the property of the buyer, but have not yet reached him
(right of stoppage _in transitu_). For this reason, article 60 of the
Declaration stipulates in the second paragraph, that if, prior to the
capture, the neutral consignor exercises, on the bankruptcy of the enemy
consignee, his right of stoppage _in transitu_, the goods regain their
neutral character and may not therefore be confiscated.

[Footnote 168: See Hall, [p] 172; Twiss, II. [p][p] 162 and 163;
Phillimore, III. [p][p] 387 and 388; Dupuis, No. 1421, and _Guerre_,
Nos. 68-73; Boeck, Nos. 182 and 183.]

[Footnote 169: The _Jan Frederick_ (1804), 5 C. Rob. 128; the _Ann
Green_ (1812), I Gallison, 274.]

[Footnote 170: See Boeck, No. 162; Dupuis, No. 142.]

[Footnote 171: Great Britain is one of them, see Section 44 of the Sale
of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71).]




CHAPTER II

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR


I

COMMENCEMENT OF WAR

  Grotius, c. 3, 5-14--Bynkershoek, _Quaestiones juris publici_, I.
  c. 2--Vattel, III. [p][p] 51-65--Hall, [p] 123--Westlake, II. pp.
  18-26, and 267--Lawrence, [p] 140--Manning, pp.
  161-163--Phillimore, III. [p][p] 51-56--Twiss, II. [p][p]
  31-40--Halleck, I. pp. 521-526--Taylor, [p][p] 455-456--Moore,
  VII. [p][p] 1106-1108--Walker, [p] 37--Wharton, III. [p][p]
  333-335--Wheaton, [p] 297--Bluntschli, [p][p] 521-528--Heffter,
  [p] 120--Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 332-347--Gareis, [p]
  80--Liszt, [p] 39, V.--Ullmann, [p] 171--Bonfils, Nos.
  1027-1031'2--Despagnet, Nos. 513-516--Pradier-Fodere, VI. Nos.
  2671-2693--Nys, III. pp. 118-133--Rivier, II. pp. 220-228--Calvo,
  IV. [p][p] 1899-1911--Fiore, III. Nos. 1272-1276, and Code,
  1422-1428--Martens, II. [p] 109--Longuet, [p][p] 1-7,
  15-16--Merignhac, pp. 29-41--Pillet, pp. 61-72--Lawrence, _War_,
  pp. 26-44--Barclay, pp. 53-58--Boidin, pp. 116-121--Bordwell, pp.
  198-200--Higgins, pp. 202-205--Holland, _War_, [p] 16--Lemonon,
  pp. 309-406--Nippold, II. pp. 6-10--Scott, _Conferences_, pp.
  516-522--Spaight, pp. 20-33--Ariga, [p][p] 11-12--Takahashi, pp.
  1-25--_Land Warfare_, [p][p] 8-10--Holland, _Studies_, p.
  115--Sainte-Croix, _La Declaration de guerre et ses effets
  immediats_ (1892)--Bruyas, _De la declaration de guerre_, etc.
  (1899)--Tambaro, _L'inizio della guerra et la 3'a convenzione
  dell' Aja del 1907_ (1911)--Maurel, _De la declaration de guerre_
  (1907)--Soughimoura, _De la Declaration de Guerre_ (1912)--Brocher
  in _R.I._ IV. (1872), p. 400; Ferand-Giraud in _R.I._ XVII.
  (1885), p. 19; Nagaoka in _R.I._ 2nd Ser. VI. p. 475--Rolin in
  _Annuaire_, XX. (1904), pp. 64-70--Ebren and Martens in _R.G._ XI.
  (1904), pp. 133 and 148--Dupuis in _R.G._ XIII. (1906), pp.
  725-735--Stowell in _A.J._ II. (1908), pp. 50-62.

[Sidenote: Commencement of War in General.]

[p] 93. According to the former practice of the States a condition of
war could _de facto_ arise either through a declaration of war; or
through a proclamation and manifesto of a State that it considered
itself at war with another State; or through the committal by one State
of certain hostile acts of force against another State. History presents
many instances of wars commenced in one of these three ways. Although
Grotius (III. c. 3, [p] 5) laid down the rule that a declaration of war
is necessary for its commencement, the practice of the States shows that
this rule was not accepted, and many wars have taken place between the
time of Grotius and our own without a previous[172] declaration of war.
Indeed many writers,[173] following the example of Grotius, have always
asserted the existence of a rule that a declaration is necessary for the
commencement of war, but it cannot be denied that until the Second Peace
Conference of 1907 such a rule was neither sanctioned by custom nor by a
general treaty of the Powers. Moreover many writers[174] distinctly
approved of the practice of the Powers. This does not mean that in
former times a State would have been justified in opening hostilities
without any preceding conflict. There was, and can be, no greater
violation of the Law of Nations than for a State to begin hostilities in
time of peace without previous controversy and without having
endeavoured to settle the conflict by negotiation.[175] But if
negotiation had been tried without success, a State did not act
treacherously in case it resorted to hostilities without a declaration
of war, especially after diplomatic intercourse had been broken off. The
rule, adopted by the First Peace Conference of 1899--see article 2 of
the Conventions for the peaceful settlement of international differences
of 1899 and 1907--which stipulates that, _as far as circumstances
allow_, before the appeal to arms recourse must be had to the good
offices or mediation of friendly Powers, did not essentially alter
matters, for the formula _as far as circumstances_ _allow_ leaves
practically everything to the discretion of the Power bent on making
war.

The outbreak of war between Russia and Japan in 1904 through Japanese
torpedo boats attacking Russian men-of-war at Port Arthur before a
formal declaration of war, caused a movement for the establishment of
some written rules concerning the commencement of war. The Institute of
International Law, at its meeting at Ghent in 1906, adopted three
principles[176] according to which war should not be commenced without
either a declaration of war or an ultimatum, and in either case a
certain delay sufficient to ensure against treacherous surprise must be
allowed before the belligerent can have recourse to actual hostilities.
The Second Peace Conference at the Hague in 1907 took the matter up and
produced the Convention (III.) relative to the commencement of
hostilities which comprises four articles and has been signed by all the
Powers represented at the Conference, except China and Nicaragua, both
of which, however, acceded later.

[Footnote 172: See Maurice, _Hostilities without Declaration of War_
(1883).]

[Footnote 173: See, for instance, Vattel, III. [p] 51; Calvo, IV. [p]
1907; Bluntschli, [p] 571; Fiore, III. No. 1274; Heffter, [p] 120.]

[Footnote 174: See, for instance, Bynkershoek, _Quaestiones juris
publici_, I. c. 2; Klueber, [p] 238; G. F. Martens, [p] 267; Twiss, II.
[p] 35: Phillimore, III. [p][p] 51-55; Hall, [p] 123; Ullmann (first
edition), [p] 145; Gareis, [p] 80.]

[Footnote 175: See above, [p] 3, where the rule is quoted that no State
is allowed to make use of compulsive means of settling differences
before negotiation has been tried.]

[Footnote 176: See _Annuaire_, XXI. (1906), p. 283.]

[Sidenote: Declaration of War.]

[p] 94. According to article 1 of Convention III. hostilities must not
commence without a previous and unequivocal warning, and one of the
forms which this warning may take is a declaration of war stating the
reasons why the Power concerned has recourse to arms.

A declaration of war is a communication of one State to another that the
condition of peace between them has come to an end and a condition of
war has taken its place. In former times declarations of war used to
take place under greater or lesser solemnities, but during the last few
centuries all these formalities have vanished, and a declaration of war
nowadays may take place through a simple communication. The only two
conditions with which, according to article 1, declarations of war must
comply are, that they must be unmistakable, and that they must state
the reason for the resort to arms. No delay between the declaration and
the actual commencement of hostilities is stipulated, and it is,
therefore, possible for a Power to open hostilities immediately after
the communication of the declaration of war to the enemy. All the more
is it necessary to emphasise that there could be no greater violation of
the Law of Nations than that which would be committed by a State which
sent a declaration to another without previously having tried to settle
the difference concerned by negotiation.

However this may be, the question as to the way in which the
communication of the declaration of war is to be made requires
attention. Since there is nowhere a rule expressly formulated according
to which the declaration must be communicated in writing, it might be
asserted that communication by any means, be it by a written document,
by telegraph or by telephone message, or by direct word of mouth, is
admissible. I believe that such an assertion cannot be supported. The
essential importance of the declaration of war and the fact that
according to article 1 of Convention III. it must be unmistakable and
must state the reason for the resort to arms, would seem to require a
written document which is to be handed over to the other party by an
envoy. Further, the fact that article 2 of Convention III. expressly
enacts that the notification of the outbreak of war to neutrals _may
even be made by telegraph_, points the same way, for the conclusion is
justified that the declaration of war stipulated as necessary by article
I may _not_ be made by telegraph. And if a telegraph message is
inadmissible, much more are telephone messages and communications by
word of mouth. Moreover, the practice of the States throughout the last
centuries has been to hand in a written declaration of war, when any
declaration has been made.

Particular attention must be paid to the fact that, in case of a
declaration of war, the war, as between the belligerents, is considered
to have commenced with the date of its declaration, although actual
hostilities may not have been commenced until a much later date. On the
other hand, as regards relations between the belligerents and neutrals,
a war is not considered to have commenced until its outbreak has either
been notified to the neutrals or has otherwise become unmistakably known
to them. For this reason, article 2 of Convention III. enacts that the
belligerents must at once after the outbreak of war notify[177] the
neutrals, even if only by telegraph, and that the state of war shall not
take effect with regard to neutrals until after they have received
notification, unless it be established beyond doubt that they were in
fact aware of the condition of war.

[Footnote 177: See below, [p] 307.]

[Sidenote: Ultimatum.]

[p] 95. The second form which the unequivocal warning, stipulated by
article 1 of Convention III. as necessary before the commencement of
hostilities, may take is an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of
war.

Ultimatum[178] is the technical term for a written communication of one
State to another which ends amicable negotiations respecting a
difference, and formulates, for the last time and categorically, the
demands to be fulfilled if other measures are to be averted. An
ultimatum may be simple or qualified. It is _simple_ in case it does not
include an indication of the measures contemplated by the Power sending
it; such measures may be acts of retorsion or reprisals, or hostilities.
It is _qualified_ if it includes an indication of the measures
contemplated by the Power sending it, for instance a pacific blockade,
occupation of a certain territory, or war. Now the ultimatum stipulated
by article 1 of Convention III. must be a qualified one, for it must be
so worded that the recipient can have no doubt about the commencement of
war in case he does not comply with the demands of the ultimatum. For
this reason, if a State has sent a simple ultimatum to another, or a
qualified ultimatum threatening a measure other than war, it is not, in
case of non-compliance, justified in at once commencing hostilities
without a previous declaration of war. For this reason, Italy sent a
declaration of war to Turkey in 1911, although an ultimatum threatening
the occupation of Tripoli had preceded it.

Nothing is enacted by article 1 of Convention III. concerning the
minimum length of time which an ultimatum must grant before the
commencement of hostilities; this period may, therefore, be only very
short, as, for instance, a number of hours. All the more is it necessary
here likewise to emphasise that there could be no greater violation of
the Law of Nations than that which would be committed by a State which
sent an ultimatum without previously having tried to settle the
difference concerned by negotiation.

It must be specially observed that the state of war following an
ultimatum must likewise be notified to neutrals, for article 2 of
Convention III. applies to this case also. And it must further be
observed that, for the same reason as in the case of a declaration of
war, an ultimatum containing a conditional declaration of war must be
communicated to the other party by a written document.

[Footnote 178: See above, [p] 28.]

[Sidenote: Initiative hostile Acts of War.]

[p] 96. There is no doubt that, in consequence of Convention III. of the
Second Peace Conference, the recourse to hostilities without a previous
declaration of war or qualified ultimatum is forbidden. But the fact
must not be overlooked that a war can nevertheless break out without
these preliminaries. Thus a State might deliberately order hostilities
to be commenced without a previous declaration of war or qualified
ultimatum. Further, the armed forces of two States having a grievance
against one another might engage in hostilities without having been
authorised thereto and without the respective Governments ordering them
to desist from further hostilities. Again, acts of force by way of
reprisals or during a pacific blockade or an intervention might be
forcibly resisted by the other party, hostilities breaking out in this
way.

It is certain that States which deliberately order the commencement of
hostilities without a previous declaration of war or qualified
ultimatum, commit an international delinquency, but they are
nevertheless engaged in war. Further, it is certain that States which
allow themselves to be dragged into a condition of war through
unauthorised hostile acts of their armed forces, commit an international
delinquency, but they are nevertheless engaged in war. Again, war is
actually in existence if the other party forcibly resists acts of force
undertaken by a State by way of reprisals, or during a pacific blockade
or an intervention. Now in all these and similar cases, although war has
broken out without a previous declaration or qualified ultimatum, all
the laws of warfare must find application, for a war is still war in the
eyes of International Law even though it has been illegally commenced,
or has automatically arisen from acts of force which were not intended
to be acts of war.

However that may be, article 2 of Convention III. also applies to wars
which have broken out without a previous declaration or qualified
ultimatum, and the belligerents must without delay send a notification
to neutral Powers so that these may be compelled to fulfil the duties of
neutrality. But, of course, neutral Powers must in this case likewise,
even without notification, fulfil the duties of neutrality if they are
unmistakably aware of the outbreak of war.


II

EFFECTS OF THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

  Vattel, III. [p] 63--Hall, [p][p] 124-126--Westlake, II. pp.
  29-32--Lawrence, [p][p] 143-146--Manning, pp. 163-165--Phillimore,
  III. [p][p] 67-91--Twiss, II. [p][p] 41-61--Halleck, I. pp.
  526-552, and II. pp. 124-140--Taylor, [p][p] 461-468--Walker,
  [p][p] 44-50--Wharton, III. [p][p] 336-337A--Wheaton, [p][p]
  298-319--Moore, V. [p] 779, and VII. [p][p] 1135-1142--Heffter,
  [p][p] 121-123--Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 347-363--Gareis,
  [p] 81--Liszt, [p] 39, V.--Ullmann, [p] 173--Bonfils, Nos.
  1044-1065--Despagnet, Nos. 517-519--Pradier-Fodere, VI. Nos.
  2694-2720--Nys, III. pp. 134-150--Rivier, II. pp. 228-237--Calvo,
  IV. [p][p] 1911-1931--Fiore, III. Nos. 1290-1301, and Code, Nos.
  1439-1445--Martens, II. [p] 109--Longuet, [p][p] 8-15--Merignhac,
  pp. 72-84--Pillet, pp. 42-59--Bordwell, pp. 200-211--Spaight, pp.
  25-33--Ariga, [p][p] 13-15--Takahashi, pp. 26-88--Lawrence, _War_,
  pp. 45-55--Sainte-Croix, _La Declaration de guerre et ses effets
  immediats_ (1892), pp. 166-207--Meyer, _De l'interdiction du
  commerce entre les belligerants_ (1902)--Jaconnet, _La guerre et
  les traites_ (1909)--Politis in _Annuaire_ XXIII. (1910), pp.
  251-282, and XXIV. (1911), pp. 200-223.

[Sidenote: General Effects of the Outbreak of War.]

[p] 97. When war breaks out, even if it be limited to only two members
of the Family of Nations, nevertheless the whole Family of Nations is
thereby affected, since the rights and duties of neutrality devolve upon
such States as are not parties to the war. And the subjects of neutral
States may feel the consequences of the outbreak of war in many ways.
War is not only a calamity to the commerce and industry of the whole
world, but also involves the alteration of the legal position of neutral
merchantmen on the Open Sea, and of the subjects of neutral States
within the boundaries of the belligerents. For the belligerents have the
right of visit, search, and eventually capture of neutral merchantmen on
the Open Sea, and foreigners who remain within the boundaries of the
belligerents, although subjects of neutral Powers, acquire in a degree
and to a certain extent enemy character.[179] However, the outbreak of
war tells chiefly and directly upon the relations between the
belligerents and their subjects. Yet it would not be correct to maintain
that all legal relations between the parties thereto and between their
subjects disappear with the outbreak of war. War is not a condition of
anarchy, indifferent or hostile to law, but a condition recognised and
ruled by International Law, although it involves a rupture of peaceful
relations between the belligerents.

[Footnote 179: See above, [p] 88.]

[Sidenote: Rupture of Diplomatic Intercourse and Consular Activity.]

[p] 98. The outbreak of war causes at once the rupture of diplomatic
intercourse between the belligerents, if such rupture has not already
taken place. The respective diplomatic envoys are recalled and ask for
their passports, or receive them without any previous request, but they
enjoy their privileges of inviolability and exterritoriality for the
period of time requisite for leaving the country. Consular activity
likewise comes to an end through the outbreak of war.[180]

[Footnote 180: See above, vol. I. [p][p] 413 and 436.]

[Sidenote: Cancellation of Treaties.]

[p] 99. The doctrine was formerly held, and a few writers[181] maintain
it even now, that the outbreak of war _ipso facto_ cancels all treaties
previously concluded between the belligerents, such treaties only
excepted as have been concluded especially for the case of war. The vast
majority of modern writers on International Law have abandoned this
standpoint,[182] and the opinion is pretty general that war by no means
annuls every treaty. But unanimity as to what treaties are or are not
cancelled by war does not exist. Neither does a uniform practice of the
States exist, cases having occurred in which States have expressly
declared[183] that they considered all treaties annulled through war.
Thus the whole question remains as yet unsettled. Nevertheless a
majority of writers agree on the following points:--

(1) The outbreak of war cancels all political treaties between the
belligerents which have not been concluded for the purpose of setting up
a permanent condition of things, for instance, treaties of alliance.

(2) On the other hand, it is obvious that such treaties as have been
especially concluded for the case of war are not annulled, such as
treaties in regard to the neutralisation of certain parts of the
territories of the belligerents.

(3) Such political and other treaties as have been concluded for the
purpose of setting up a permanent[184] condition of things are not _ipso
facto_ annulled by the outbreak of war, but nothing prevents the
victorious party from imposing upon the other party in the treaty of
peace any alterations in, or even the dissolution of, such treaties.

(4) Such non-political treaties as do not intend to set up a permanent
condition of things, as treaties of commerce for example, are not _ipso
facto_ annulled, but the parties may annul them or suspend them
according to discretion.

(5) So-called law-making[185] treaties, as the Declaration of Paris for
example, are not cancelled by the outbreak of war. The same is valid in
regard to all treaties to which a multitude of States are parties, as
the International Postal Union for example, but the belligerents may
suspend them, as far as they themselves are concerned, in case the
necessities of war compel them to do so.[186]

[Footnote 181: See, for instance, Phillimore, III. [p] 530, and Twiss,
I. [p] 252, in contradistinction to Hall, [p] 125.]

[Footnote 182: See Jaconnet, _op. cit._ pp. 113-128.]

[Footnote 183: As, for instance, Spain in 1898, at the outbreak of the
war with the United States of America, see Moore, V. pp. 375-380.]

[Footnote 184: Thus American and English Courts--see the cases of the
_Society for the Propagation of the Gospel_ v. _Town of Newhaven_
(1823), 8 Wheaton 464, and _Sutton_ v. _Sutton_ (1830), 1 Russel &
Mylne, 663--have declared that article IX. of the treaty of Nov. 19,
1794, between Great Britain and the United States was not annulled by
the outbreak of war in 1812. See Moore, V. [p] 779 and Westlake, II. p.
30; see also the foreign cases discussed by Jaconnet, _op. cit._ pp.
168-179.]

[Footnote 185: See above, vol. I. [p][p] 18, 492, 555-568_b_.]

[Footnote 186: The Institute of International Law is studying the whole
question of the effect of war on treaties; see Politis, _l.c._, and
especially _Annuaire_, XXIV. (1911), pp. 201-213, and 220-221.]

[Sidenote: Precarious position of Belligerents' subjects on Enemy
Territory.]

[p] 100. The outbreak of war affects likewise such subjects of the
belligerents as are at the time within the enemy's territory. In former
times they could at once be detained as prisoners of war, and many
States, therefore, concluded in time of peace special treaties for the
time of war expressly stipulating a specified period during which their
subjects should be allowed to leave each other's territory
unmolested.[187] Through the influence of such treaties, which became
pretty general during the eighteenth century, it became an international
practice that, as a rule, enemy subjects must be allowed to withdraw
within a reasonable period, and no instance of the former rule has
occurred during the nineteenth[188] century. Although some[189] writers
even nowadays maintain that according to strict law the old rule is
still in force, it may safely[190] be maintained that there is now a
customary rule of International Law, according to which all such
subjects of the enemy as have not according to the Municipal Law of
their country to join the armed forces of the enemy must be allowed a
reasonable period for withdrawal. On the other hand, such enemy subjects
as are active or reserve officers, or reservists, and the like, may be
prevented from leaving the country and detained as prisoners of war,
for the principle of self-preservation must justify belligerents in
refusing to furnish each other with resources which increase their means
of offence and defence.[191] However that may be, a belligerent need not
allow[192] enemy subjects to remain on his territory, although this is
frequently done. Thus, during the Crimean War Russian subjects in Great
Britain and France were allowed to remain there, as were likewise
Russians in Japan and Japanese in Russia during the Russo-Japanese War,
and Turks in Italy during the Turco-Italian War. On the other hand,
France expelled all Germans during the Franco-German war in 1870; the
former South African Republics expelled most British subjects when war
broke out in 1899; Russia, although during the Russo-Japanese War she
allowed Japanese subjects to remain in other parts of her territory,
expelled them from her provinces in the Far East; and in May 1912, eight
months after the outbreak of the Turko-Italian War, Turkey decreed the
expulsion of all Italians, certain classes excepted. In case a
belligerent allows the residence of enemy subjects on his territory, he
can, of course, give the permission under certain conditions only, such
as an oath to abstain from all hostile acts or a promise not to leave a
certain region, and the like. And it must be especially observed that an
enemy subject who is allowed to stay in the country after the outbreak
of war must not, in case the forces of his home State militarily occupy
the part of the country inhabited by him, join these forces or assist
them in any way. If, nevertheless, he does so, he is liable to be
punished for treason[193] by the local Sovereign after the withdrawal of
the enemy forces.

[Footnote 187: See a list of such treaties in Hall, [p] 126, p. 107,
note 1.]

[Footnote 188: With regard to the 10,000 Englishmen who were arrested in
France by Napoleon at the outbreak of war with England in 1803 and kept
as prisoners of war for many years, it must be borne in mind that
Napoleon did not claim a right to make such civilians prisoners of war
as were at the outbreak of war on French soil. He justified his act as
one of reprisals, considering it a violation of the Law of Nations on
the part of England to begin hostilities by capturing two French
merchantmen in the Bay of Audierne without a formal declaration of war.
See Alison, _History of Europe_, V. p. 277, and Bonfils, No. 1052.]

[Footnote 189: See Twiss, II. [p] 50; Rivier, II. p. 320; Liszt, [p] 39,
V.; Holland, _Letters upon War and Neutrality_ (1909), p. 39.]

[Footnote 190: See _Land Warfare_, [p] 12.]

[Footnote 191: See _Land Warfare_, [p] 13.]

[Footnote 192: See above, vol. I. [p] 324.]

[Footnote 193: See above, vol. I. [p] 317, p. 394, where the case of _De
Jager_ v. _Attorney General_ is discussed.]

[Sidenote: _Persona standi in judicio_ on Enemy Territory.]

[p] 100_a_. Formerly the rule prevailed everywhere that an enemy subject
has no _persona standi in judicio_ and is, therefore, _ipso facto_ by
the outbreak of war, prevented from either taking or defending
proceedings in the Courts. This rule dates from the time when war was
considered such a condition between belligerents as justified the
committing of hostilities on the part of all subjects of the one
belligerent against all subjects of the other, and, further, the killing
of all enemy subjects irrespective of sex and age, and, at any rate, the
confiscation of all private enemy property. War in those times used to
put enemy subjects entirely _ex lege_, and it was only a logical
consequence from this principle that enemy subjects could not sustain
_persona standi in judicio_. Since the rule that enemy subjects are
entirely _ex lege_ has everywhere vanished, the rule that they may not
take or defend proceedings in the Courts has in many countries, such as
Austria-Hungary, Germany, Holland, and Italy, likewise vanished. But in
Great Britain and the United States of America[194] enemy subjects are
still prevented from taking and defending legal proceedings,[195]
although there are six exceptions to the general rule. Firstly, enemy
subjects who do not bear enemy character because they are resident in
neutral country or have a licence to trade or are allowed[196] to remain
in the country of a belligerent, are therefore permitted to sue and be
sued in British and American Courts. Secondly, if during time of peace a
defendant obtains an opportunity to plead, and if subsequently war
breaks out with the country of the plaintiff, the defendant may not
plead that the plaintiff is prevented from suing.[197] Thirdly, if a
contract was entered into and executed before the war, and if an absent
enemy subject has property within the boundaries of a belligerent, he
may be sued.[198] Fourthly, a prisoner of war[199] may sue during war on
a contract for wages. Fifthly, if the parties, being desirous to obtain
a decision on the merits of the case, waive the objection, enemy
subjects may sue and be sued.[200] Lastly, a petition on the part of a
creditor who is an enemy subject, to prove a debt under a commission of
bankruptcy must be admitted[201] although the dividend will not be paid
till after the conclusion of peace.

[Footnote 194: In strict law also in France.]

[Footnote 195: The leading case is the _Hoop_ (1799), 1 C. Rob. 196.]

[Footnote 196: _Wells_ v. _Williams_ (1698), 1 Lord Raymond, 282.]

[Footnote 197: _Shepeler_ v. _Durand_ (1854), 14 P.C. 582.]

[Footnote 198: _Dorsey_ v. _Kyle_ (1869), 3 Maryland, 512. It would seem
that the American Courts are inclined to drop the rule that an enemy
subject cannot be sued; see _De Jarnett_ v. _De Giversville_ (1874), 56
Missouri, 440.]

[Footnote 199: _Maria_ v. _Hall_ (1800), 2 B. & P. 236.]

[Footnote 200: _Driefontein Consolidated Gold Mines Co._ v. _Janson_
(1910), 2 Q.B. 419; App. Cas. (1902), 484.]

[Footnote 201: _Ex parte Boussmaker_ (1806), 13 Vesey Jun. 71.]

It is asserted that, in consequence of article 23 (_h_) of the Hague
Regulations concerning land warfare enacting the injunction "to declare
extinguished, suspended, or unenforceable in a Court of Law the rights
and rights of action of the nationals of the adverse party," Great
Britain and the United States are compelled to abolish their rule that
enemy subjects may not sue. But the interpretation of article 23 (_h_)
is controversial, Great Britain and the United States of America--in
contradistinction to Germany and France--maintaining that the article
has nothing to do with their Municipal Law but concerns the conduct of
armies in occupied enemy territory.[202]

[Footnote 202: It is impossible here to discuss the details of this
controversy which the third Peace Conference must settle. See above,
vol. I. [p] 554, No. 10; Politis in _R.G._ XVIII. (1911), pp. 249-259,
and the literature there quoted; Kohler in _Z.V._ V. (1911), pp.
384-393; Holland in _The Law Quarterly Review_, XXVIII. (1912), pp.
94-98; Charteris in _The Juridical Review_, XXIII. (1911), pp. 307-323;
Oppenheim, _Die Zukunft des Voelkerrechts_ (1911), pp. 30-32.]

However this may be, it must be especially observed that, according to
British and American law, claims arising out of contracts concluded
before the war do not become extinguished through the outbreak of war,
but are only suspended during war, and the Statute of Limitations does
not, according to American[203] practice at any rate, run during war.

[Footnote 203: _Hanger_ v. _Abbot_ (1867), 6 Wallace, 532. The point is
not settled in English law, for the _obiter dictum_ in _De Wahl_ v.
_Browne_ (1856), 25 L.J. (N.S.) Ex. 343, "It may be that the effect
would ultimately be to bar the action by reason of the Statute of
Limitations is no answer...", is not decisive, although Anson,
_Principles of the English Law of Contract_ (11th ed. 1906), p. 122, and
other writers accept it as decisive.]

[Sidenote: Intercourse, especially Trading, between Subjects of
Belligerents.]

[p] 101. Following Bynkershoek,[204] all British and American writers
and cases, and also some French[205] and German[206] writers assert the
existence of a rule of International Law that all intercourse, and
especially trading, is _ipso facto_ by the outbreak of war prohibited
between the subjects of the belligerents, unless it is permitted under
the customs of war, as, for instance, ransom bills, or is allowed under
special licences, and that all contracts concluded between the subjects
of the belligerents before the outbreak of war become extinct or
suspended. On the other hand, most German, French, and Italian writers
deny the existence of such a rule, but assert the existence of another
according to which belligerents are empowered to prohibit by special
orders all trade between their own and enemy subjects.

[Footnote 204: _Quaestiones juris publici_, I. c. 3: "_quamvis autem
nulla specialis sit commerciorum prohibitio ipsa tamen jure belli
commercia sunt vetita_."]

[Footnote 205: For instance, Pillet, p. 74, and Merignhac, p. 57.]

[Footnote 206: For instance, Geffcken in his note 4 to Heffter, p. 265.]

These assertions are remnants of the time when the distinction[207]
between International and Municipal Law was not, or not clearly, drawn.
International Law, being a law for the conduct of States only and
exclusively, has nothing to do directly with the conduct of private
individuals, and both assertions are, therefore, nowadays untenable.
Their place must be taken by the statement that, States being sovereign
and the outbreak of war bringing the peaceful relations between
belligerents to an end, it is within the competence of every State to
enact by its Municipal Law such rules as it pleases concerning
intercourse, and especially trading, between its own and enemy subjects.
And if we look at the Municipal Laws of the several countries, we find
that they have to be divided into two groups. To the one group belong
those States--such as Austria-Hungary, Germany, Holland, and
Italy--whose Governments are empowered by their Municipal Laws to
prohibit by special order all trading with enemy subjects at the
outbreak of war. In these countries trade with enemy subjects is
permitted to continue after the outbreak of war unless special
prohibitive orders are issued. To the other group belong those
States--such as Great Britain, the United States of America, and, unless
_desuetudo_[208] has made an alteration, France--whose Municipal Laws
declare trade and intercourse with enemy subjects _ipso facto_ by the
outbreak of war prohibited, but empowers the Governments to allow by
special licences all or certain kinds of such trade.

[Footnote 207: See above, vol. I. [p] 20.]

[Footnote 208: See Meyer, _op. cit._ p. 91.]

As regards the law of Great Britain[209] and the United States of
America, it has been, since the end of the eighteenth century, an
absolutely settled[210] rule of the Common Law that, certain cases
excepted, all trading with alien enemies is _ipso facto_ by the outbreak
of war illegal unless it is allowed by special licences of the Crown.
From the general principle asserted in the leading cases,[211] the
Courts have drawn the following more important consequences:--

(1) All contracts, entered into _during_ a war,[212] with alien enemies
without a special licence are illegal, invalid, and can never be
enforced, unless the contract was one entered into in case of
necessity,[213] or in order to supply[214] an invading English army or
the English fleet, or by prisoners[215] of war concerning personal
services and requirements.

(2) Trading with the enemy does not become legal by the fact that goods
coming from the enemy country to Great Britain, or going from Great
Britain to the enemy country, are sent to their destination through a
neutral country.[216]

(3) As regards contracts entered into _before_[217] the outbreak of war,
a distinction must be drawn:--(_a_) Executory contracts are avoided,
both parties being released from performance. (_b_) Contracts executed
before the outbreak of war and not requiring to be acted upon during the
war are suspended until after the conclusion of peace. (_c_) Executed
contracts which require acting upon during the war are dissolved.

(4) Partnerships[218] with alien enemies are dissolved.

(5) No interest runs on debts[219] or mortgages.[220]

(6) A contract of affreightment[221] must not be fulfilled; therefore
English ships must not load or unload goods in an enemy port.

(7) Contracts of insurance of enemy vessels and goods are so to be
construed as to contain a proviso that the assurance shall not cover any
loss occurring during a war between the country of the assurer and the
country of the assured.[222]

(8) A life insurance policy,[223] entered into before the outbreak of
war conditioning the payment of yearly premiums on pain of forfeiture of
the policy, is forfeited _ipso facto_ by the outbreak of war because the
payment of the premium is now prohibited. After the conclusion of peace,
however, the insured may claim the equitable value of the policy
arising, at the time of the outbreak of war, from the premiums actually
paid.

[Footnote 209: See besides the English and American text-books quoted
above at the commencement of [p] 97, Pennant, Chadwick, and Gregory in
_The Law Quarterly Review_, XVIII. (1902), pp. 289-296, XX. (1904), pp.
167-185, XXV. (1909), pp. 297-316; Bentwich, _The Law of Private
Property in War_ (1907), pp. 46-61; Phillipson, _The Effect of War on
Contracts_ (1909); Latifi, _Effects of War on Property_ (1909), pp.
50-58.]

[Footnote 210: Whereas the Admiralty Court did at all times, the Common
Law Courts did not during the eighteenth century hold trading with enemy
subjects to be illegal, at any rate not in so far as insurance of enemy
vessels and goods against capture on the part of English cruisers was
concerned; see _Henkle_ v. _London Exchange Assurance Co._ (1749), 1
Vesey Sen. 320; _Planche_ v. _Fletcher_ (1779), 1 Dougl. 251; _Lavabre_
v. _Wilson_ (1779), 1 Dougl. 284; _Gist_ v. _Mason_ (1786), 1 T.R. 84.]

[Footnote 211: Besides the Admiralty case of the _Hoop_ (1799), 1 C.
Rob. 196, the following are the leading cases:--_Potts_ v. _Bell_
(1800), 8 D. & E. 548; _Furtado_ v. _Rodgers_ (1802), 3 P. & B. 191;
_Esposito_ v. _Bowden_ (1857), 7 E. & B. 763; the _Mashona_ (1900), 10
_Cape Times_ Law Reports, 170.]

[Footnote 212: _Willison_ v. _Paterson_ (1817), 7 Taunt, 439.]

[Footnote 213: _Antoine_ v. _Morshead_ (1815), 6 Taunt, 237.]

[Footnote 214: The _Madonna delle Gracie_ (1802), 4 C. Rob. 195.]

[Footnote 215: _Maria_ v. _Hall_ (1800), 2 B. & P. 236.]

[Footnote 216: The _Jonge Pieter_ (1801), 4 C. Rob. 79. But if the goods
have been bought by the subject of a neutral State _bona fide_ by
himself and are afterwards shipped through neutral country to the enemy,
it is not a case of trading with the enemy; see the _Samuel_ (1802), 4
C. Rob. 284, note.]

[Footnote 217: _Melville_ v. _De Wold_ (1855), 4 E. & B. 844; _Esposito_
v. _Bowden_ (1857), 7 E. & B. 763; _Ex parte Boussmaker_ (1806), 13 Ves.
Jun. 71; _Alcinous_ v. _Nygreu_ (1854), 4 E. & B. 217; the _Charlotta_
(1814), 1 Dodson, 390.]

[Footnote 218: _Griswold_ v. _Boddington_ (1819), 16 Johnson, 438;
_Esposito_ v. _Bowden_ (1857), 7 E. & B. 763.]

[Footnote 219: _Du Belloix_ v. _Lord Waterpark_ (1822), 1 Dowl. & R. 16;
_Mayer_ v. _Reed_ (1867), 37 Gallison, 482.]

[Footnote 220: _Hoare_ v. _Allan_ (1789), 2 Dallas, 102.]

[Footnote 221: _Esposito_ v. _Bowden_ (1857), 7 E. & B. 763. See also
the _Teutonia_ (1870), L. R. 4 Privy Council, 171.]

[Footnote 222: _Brandon_ v. _Curling_ (1803), 4 East, 410; but see also
_Potts_ v. _Bell_ (1800), 8 D. & E. 548; _Furtado_ v. _Rodgers_ (1802),
3 P. & B. 191; _Kellner_ v. _Le Mesurier_ (1803), 4 East, 396; _Gamba_
v. _Le Mesurier_ (1803), 4 East, 407.]

[Footnote 223: _New York Life Insurance Co._ v. _Stathem_, v. _Symes_,
and v. _Buck_ (1876), 93 United States, 24; _New York Life Insurance
Co._ v. _Davis_ (1877), 95 United States, 425.]

It must be specially observed that, if the continental interpretation of
article 23 (_h_) of the Hague Regulations--see above, [p] 100_a_--were
not contradicted by Great Britain and the United States of America, both
countries would be compelled to alter their Municipal Laws in so far as
these declare such contracts as have been entered into with alien
enemies before the outbreak of war dissolved, void, or suspended.
Article 23 (_h_) distinctly enacts that it is forbidden to declare
extinguished or suspended the rights of the nationals of the adverse
party. Since, however, as stated above in [p] 100_a_, Great Britain and
the United States of America uphold a different interpretation, this
article does not concern their Municipal Laws respecting trading with
alien enemies.

[Sidenote: Position of Belligerents' Property in the Enemy State.]

[p] 102. In former times all private and public enemy property,
immoveable or moveable, on each other's territory could be confiscated
by the belligerents at the outbreak of war, as could also enemy debts;
and the treaties[224] concluded between many States with regard to the
withdrawal of each other's subjects at the outbreak of war stipulated
likewise the unrestrained withdrawal of the private property of their
subjects. Through the influence of such treaties as well as of Municipal
Laws and Decrees enacting the same, an international usage and practice
grew up that belligerents should neither confiscate private enemy
property nor annul enemy debts on their territory. The last case of
confiscation of private property is that of 1793 at the outbreak of war
between France and Great Britain. No case of confiscation occurred
during the nineteenth century, and although several writers maintain
that according to strict law the old rule, in contradistinction to the
usage which they do not deny, is still valid, it may safely be
maintained that it is obsolete, and that there is now a customary rule
of International Law in existence prohibiting the confiscation of
private enemy property and the annulment of enemy debts on the territory
of a belligerent. This rule, however, does not prevent a belligerent
from seizing public enemy property on his territory, such as funds,
ammunition, provisions, rolling stock of enemy state-railways, and other
valuables; from preventing the withdrawal of private enemy property
which may be made use of by the enemy[225] for military operations, such
as arms and munitions; from seizing and making use of rolling stock
belonging to private enemy railway companies, other means of transport
of persons or goods which are private enemy property, and, further, all
appliances for the transmission of news, although they are private enemy
property, provided all these articles are restored and indemnities are
paid for them after the conclusion of peace;[226] and from suspending,
as a measure of self preservation, the payment of large enemy debts till
after the conclusion of peace in order to prevent the increase of
resources of the enemy.

[Footnote 224: See above, [p] 100; Moore, VII. [p] 1196; Scott,
_Conferences_, pp. 559-563.]

[Footnote 225: The indulgence granted to enemy merchantmen in Russian
and Japanese ports at the outbreak of the war in 1904, to leave those
ports unmolested within a certain period of time, was conditional upon
there being no contraband in the cargoes. See Lawrence, _War_, p. 52.]

[Footnote 226: As the seizure of all these articles is, according to
article 53 of the Hague Regulations, permissible in occupied enemy
country, provided they are restored and indemnities paid after the
conclusion of peace, seizure must likewise--under the same
conditions--be permissible in case these articles are on the territory
of a belligerent. As regards rolling stock belonging to private enemy
railway companies, see Nowacki, _Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege_ (1906), [p]
15.]

[Sidenote: Effect of the Outbreak of War on Merchantmen.]

[p] 102_a_. In former times International Law empowered States at the
outbreak of war to lay an embargo upon all enemy merchantmen in their
harbours in order to confiscate them. And enemy merchantmen on the sea
could at the outbreak of war be captured and confiscated although they
did not even know of the outbreak of war. As regards enemy merchantmen
in the harbours of the belligerents, it became, from the outbreak of the
Crimean War in 1854, a usage, if not a custom, that no embargo[227]
could be laid on them for the purpose of confiscating them, and that a
reasonable time must be granted them to depart unmolested; but no rule
was in existence until the Second Peace Conference of 1907 which
prescribed immunity from confiscation for such enemy merchantmen at sea
as did not know of the outbreak of war. This Conference took the matter
into consideration, and produced a Convention (VI.) relative to the
status of enemy merchantmen at the outbreak of hostilities[228] which is
signed by all the Powers represented at the Conference, except the
United States of America,[229] China, and Nicaragua; but Nicaragua
acceded later. In coming to an agreement on the subject, two facts had
to be taken into consideration. There is, firstly, the fact that in all
maritime countries numerous merchantmen are now built from special
designs in order that they may quickly, at the outbreak of or during
war, be converted into cruisers; it would therefore be folly on the part
of a belligerent to grant any lenient treatment to such vessels. There
is, secondly, the fact, that a belligerent fleet cannot nowadays remain
effective for long without being accompanied by a train of colliers,
transport vessels, and repairing vessels; it is, therefore, of the
greatest importance for a belligerent to have as many merchantmen as
possible at his disposal for the purpose of making use of them for such
assistance to the fleet. For this reason, Convention VI. represents a
compromise, and it distinguishes between vessels in the harbours of the
belligerents and vessels on the sea. Its provisions are the following:--

[Footnote 227: See above, [p] 40.]

[Footnote 228: See Lemonon, pp. 647-661; Higgins, pp. 300-307; Nippold,
II. pp. 146-153; Scott, _Conferences_, pp. 556-568; Dupuis, _Guerre_,
Nos. 74-81; Scott in _A.J._ II. (1908), pp. 260-269.]

[Footnote 229: The United States of America refused to sign the
Convention because she considers its stipulations retrogressive as they
are less liberal than the practice which has prevailed since 1854. But
circumstances have changed since that time, and the two facts explained
in the text would seem to have compelled the maritime Powers to adopt
rules somewhat less liberal. This was the more necessary since no
agreement could be arrived at concerning the question of the locality in
which belligerents should be allowed to convert merchantmen into
cruisers.]

(1) Article 1 of the Convention enacts that, in case an enemy
merchantman is at the beginning of the war in the port of a belligerent,
it is _desirable_ that she should be allowed freely to depart, either
immediately or after a sufficient term of grace, and, after being
furnished with a passport, to proceed either direct to her port of
destination or to such other port as may be determined. It is obvious
that, since only the desirability of free departure of such vessels is
stipulated, a belligerent is not compelled to grant free departure;
nevertheless there must be grave reasons for not acting in accordance
with what is considered desirable by article 1. And it must be specially
observed that a belligerent may make a distinction in the treatment of
several enemy vessels in his harbours, and may grant free departure to
one or more of them, and refuse it to others, according to his
discretion.

(2) The former usage that enemy merchantmen in the harbours of the
belligerents at the outbreak of war may not be confiscated, has been
made a _binding rule_ by article 2 which enacts that such vessels as
were not allowed to leave, or were by _force majeure_ prevented from
leaving during the term of grace, may not be confiscated, but may only
be detained under the obligation that they shall be restored, without
indemnity, after the conclusion of peace, or they may be requisitioned
on condition of indemnities to be paid to the owners.

(3) Enemy merchantmen which have left their last port of departure
before the outbreak of war and which, while ignorant of the outbreak of
war, are met at sea by cruisers of the belligerents, may, according to
article 3, be captured, but they may not be confiscated, for they must
be restored after the war is ended, although no indemnities need be
paid. Indemnities are only to be paid in case the vessels have been
requisitioned or destroyed, for a belligerent is empowered to
requisition or destroy such vessels provided he takes care to preserve
the ship papers and makes arrangements for the safety of the persons on
board.

It is obvious that, in case such vessels are not ignorant of the
outbreak of war--having, for instance, received the news by wireless
telegraphy--they may not any longer claim the privileges stipulated by
article 3. And this article stipulates expressly that after having
touched a port of their own or of a neutral country, such vessels are no
longer privileged.

(4) Enemy goods on board such enemy merchantmen as are in the harbour
of a belligerent at the outbreak of war or at sea and are in ignorance
of the outbreak of war are, according to article 4, privileged to the
same extent as the vessels concerned.

(5) Enemy merchantmen whose construction indicates that they are
intended to be converted into cruisers may be seized and confiscated in
the harbours of the belligerents, as well as at sea, although ignorant
of the outbreak of war, for article 5 stipulates expressly that
Convention VI. does not affect such vessels.




CHAPTER III

WARFARE ON LAND


I

ON LAND WARFARE IN GENERAL

  Vattel, III. [p][p] 136-138--Hall, [p][p] 184-185--Phillimore,
  III. [p] 94--Taylor, [p] 469--Wheaton, [p] 342--Bluntschli, [p][p]
  534-535--Heffter, [p] 125--Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp.
  388-389--Gareis, [p] 84--Bonfils, Nos. 1066-1067--Pradier-Fodere,
  VI. Nos. 2734-2741--Longuet, [p] 41--Merignhac, p. 146--Pillet,
  pp. 85-89--_Kriegsbrauch_, p. 9--_Land Warfare_, [p] 39--Holland,
  _War_, Nos. 1-15.

[Sidenote: Aims and Means of Land Warfare.]

[p] 103. The purpose of war, namely, the overpowering of the enemy, is
served in land warfare through two aims[230]--firstly, defeat of the
enemy armed forces on land, and, secondly, occupation and administration
of the enemy territory. The chief means by which belligerents try to
realise those aims, and which are always conclusively decisive, are the
different sorts of force applied against enemy persons. But besides such
violence against enemy persons there are other means which are not at
all unimportant, although they play a secondary part only. Such means
are: appropriation, utilisation, and destruction of enemy property;
siege; bombardment; assault; espionage; utilisation of treason; ruses.
All these means of warfare on land must be discussed in this chapter, as
must also occupation of enemy territory.

[Footnote 230: Aims of land warfare must not be confounded with ends of
war; see above, [p] 66.]

[Sidenote: Lawful and Unlawful Practices of Land Warfare.]

[p] 104. But--to use the words of article 22 of the Hague
Regulations--"the belligerents have not an unlimited right as to the
means they adopt for injuring the enemy." For not all possible practices
of injuring the enemy in offence and defence are lawful, certain
practices being prohibited under all circumstances and conditions, and
other practices being allowed only under certain circumstances and
conditions, or only with certain restrictions. The principles of
chivalry and of humanity have been at work[231] for many hundreds of
years to create these restrictions, and their work is not yet at an end.
However, apart from these restrictions, all kinds and degrees of force
and many other practices may be made use of in war.

[Footnote 231: See above, [p] 67.]

[Sidenote: Objects of the Means of Warfare.]

[p] 105. In a sense all means of warfare are directed against one object
only--namely, the enemy State, which is to be overpowered by all
legitimate means. Apart from this, the means of land warfare are
directed against several objects.[232] Such objects are chiefly the
members of the armed forces of the enemy, but likewise, although in a
lesser degree, other enemy persons; further, private and public
property, fortresses, and roads. Indeed, apart from certain
restrictions, everything may eventually be the object of a means of
warfare, provided the means are legitimate in themselves and are capable
of fostering the realisation of the purpose of war.

[Footnote 232: See Oppenheim, _Die Objekte des Verbrechens_ (1894), pp.
64-146, where the relation of human actions with their objects is fully
discussed.]

[Sidenote: Land Warfare in contradistinction to Sea Warfare.]

[p] 106. Land warfare must be distinguished from sea warfare chiefly for
two reasons. Firstly, their circumstances and conditions differ widely
from each other, and, therefore, their means and practices also differ.
Secondly, the law-making Conventions which deal with warfare rarely deal
with land and sea warfare at the same time, but mostly treat them
separately, for whereas some Conventions deal exclusively with warfare
on sea, the Hague Regulations (Convention IV.) deal exclusively with
warfare on land.


II

VIOLENCE AGAINST ENEMY PERSONS

  Grotius, III. c. 4--Vattel, III. [p][p] 139-159--Hall, [p][p] 128,
  129, 185--Westlake, II. pp. 72-76--Lawrence, [p][p] 161, 163,
  166-169--Maine, pp. 123-148--Manning, pp. 196-205--Phillimore,
  III. [p][p] 94-95--Halleck, II. pp. 14-18--Moore, VII. [p][p]
  1111, 1119, 1122, 1124--Taylor, [p][p] 477-480--Walker, [p]
  50--Wheaton, [p][p] 343-345--Bluntschli, [p][p] 557-563--Heffter,
  [p] 126--Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 390-394--Gareis, [p]
  85--Klueber, [p] 244--Liszt, [p] 40, III.--G. F. Martens, II. [p]
  272--Ullmann, [p] 176--Bonfils, Nos. 1068-1071, 1099,
  1141--Despagnet, Nos. 525-527--Pradier-Fodere, VI. Nos.
  2742-2758--Rivier, II. pp. 260-265--Nys, III. pp. 206-209--Calvo,
  IV. 2098-2105--Fiore, III. Nos. 1317-1320, 1342-1348, and Code,
  Nos. 1476-1483--Martens, II. [p] 110--Longuet, [p][p]
  42-49--Merignhac, pp. 146-165--Pillet, pp. 85-95--Holland, _War_,
  pp. 70-76--Zorn, pp. 127-161--Bordwell, pp. 278-283--Meurer, II.
  [p][p] 30-31--Spaight, pp. 73-156--_Kriegsbrauch_, pp. 9-11--_Land
  Warfare_, [p][p] 39-53.

[Sidenote: On Violence in general against Enemy Persons.]

[p] 107. As war is a contention between States for the purpose of
overpowering each other, violence consisting of different sorts of force
applied against enemy persons is the chief and decisive means of
warfare. These different sorts of force are used against combatants as
well as non-combatants, but with discrimination and differentiation. The
purpose of the application of violence against combatants is their
disablement so that they can no longer take part in the fighting. And
this purpose may be realised through either killing or wounding them, or
making them prisoners. As regards non-combatant members of armed forces,
private enemy persons showing no hostile conduct, and officials in
important positions, only minor means of force may as a rule be applied,
since they do not take part in the armed contention of the belligerents.

[Sidenote: Killing and Wounding of Combatants.]

[p] 108. Every combatant may be killed or wounded, whether a private
soldier or an officer, or even the monarch or a member of his family.
Some publicists[233] assert that it is a usage of warfare not to aim at
a sovereign or a member of his family. Be that as it may, there is in
strict law[234] no rule preventing the killing and wounding of such
illustrious persons. But combatants may only be killed or wounded if
they are able and willing to fight or to resist capture. Therefore, such
combatants as are disabled by sickness or wounds may not be killed.
Further, such combatants as lay down arms and surrender or do not resist
being made prisoners may neither be killed nor wounded, but must be
given quarter. These rules are universally recognised, and are now
expressly enacted by article 23 (_c_) of the Hague Regulations, although
the fury of battle frequently makes individual fighters[235] forget and
neglect them.

[Footnote 233: See Klueber, [p] 245; G. F. Martens, II. [p] 278;
Heffter, [p] 126.]

[Footnote 234: Says Vattel, III. [p] 159: "Mais ce n'est point une loi
de la guerre d'epargner en toute rencontre la personne du roi ennemi; et
on n'y est oblige que quand on a la facilite de le faire prisonnier."
The example of Charles XII. of Sweden (quoted by Vattel), who was
intentionally fired at by the defenders of the fortress of Thorn,
besieged by him, and who said that the defenders were within their
right, ought to settle the point.]

[Footnote 235: See Baty, _International Law in South Africa_ (1900), pp.
84-85.]

[Sidenote: Refusal of Quarter.]

[p] 109. However, the rule that quarter must be given has its
exceptions. Although it has of late been a customary rule of
International Law, and although the Hague Regulations now expressly
stipulate by article 23 (_d_) that belligerents are prohibited from
declaring that no quarter will be given, quarter may nevertheless be
refused[236] by way of reprisal for violations of the rules of warfare
committed by the other side; and, further, in case of imperative
necessity, when the granting of quarter would so encumber a force with
prisoners that its own security would thereby be vitally
imperilled.[237] But it must be emphasised that the mere fact that
numerous prisoners cannot safely be guarded and fed by the captors[238]
does not furnish an exceptional case to the rule, provided that no
vital danger to the captors is therein involved. And it must likewise be
emphasised that the former rule is now obsolete according to which
quarter could be refused to the garrison of a fortress carried by
assault, to the defenders of an unfortified place against an attack of
artillery, and to the weak garrison who obstinately and uselessly
persevered in defending a fortified place against overwhelming enemy
forces.

[Footnote 236: See Pradier-Fodere, VII. Nos. 2800-2801, who opposes this
principle but discusses the subject in a very detailed way.]

[Footnote 237: See Payrat, _Le Prisonnier de Guerre_ (1910), pp.
191-220, and _Land Warfare_, [p] 80.]

[Footnote 238: Accordingly, the Boers frequently during the South
African War set free British soldiers whom they had captured.]

[Sidenote: Lawful and Unlawful Means of killing and wounding
Combatants.]

[p] 110. Apart from such means as are expressly prohibited by treaties
or custom, all means of killing and wounding that exist or may be
invented are lawful. And it matters not whether the means used are
directed against single individuals, as swords and rifles, or against
large bodies of individuals, as, for instance, shrapnel, Gatlings, and
mines. On the other hand, all means are unlawful that render death
inevitable or that needlessly aggravate the sufferings of wounded
combatants. A customary rule of International Law, now expressly enacted
by article 23 (_e_) of the Hague Regulations, prohibits, therefore, the
employment of poison and of such arms, projectiles, and material as
cause unnecessary injury. Accordingly: wells, pumps, rivers, and the
like from which the enemy draws drinking water must not be poisoned;
poisoned weapons must not be made use of; rifles must not be loaded with
bits of glass, irregularly shaped iron, nails, and the like; cannons
must not be loaded with chain shot, crossbar shot, red-hot balls, and
the like. Another customary rule, now likewise enacted by article 23
(_b_) of the Hague Regulations, prohibits any treacherous way of killing
and wounding combatants. Accordingly: no assassin must be hired and no
assassination of combatants be committed; a price may not be put on the
head of an enemy individual; proscription and outlawing are prohibited;
no treacherous request for quarter must be made; no treacherous
simulation of sickness or wounds is permitted.

[Sidenote: Explosive Bullets.]

[p] 111. In 1868 a conference met at St. Petersburg for the examination
of a proposition made by Russia with regard to the use of explosive
projectiles in war. The representatives of seventeen Powers--namely,
Great Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Bavaria, Belgium, Denmark,
France, Greece, Holland, Italy, Persia, Portugal, Prussia and the North
German Confederation, Sweden-Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and
Wuerttemberg (Brazil acceded later) signed on December 11, 1868, the
so-called Declaration of St. Petersburg,[239] which stipulates that the
signatory Powers, and those who should accede later, renounce in case of
war between themselves the employment, by their military and naval
troops, of any projectile of a weight below 400 grammes (14 ounces)
which is either explosive or charged with fulminating or inflammable
substances. This engagement is obligatory only upon the contracting
Powers, and it ceases to be obligatory in case a non-contracting Power
takes part in a war between any of the contracting Powers.

[Footnote 239: See above, vol. I. [p] 562, and Martens, _N.R.G._ XVIII.
p. 474.]

[Sidenote: Expanding (Dum-Dum) Bullets.]

[p] 112. As Great Britain had introduced bullets manufactured at the
Indian arsenal of Dum-Dum, near Calcutta, the hard jacket of which did
not quite cover the core and which therefore easily expanded and
flattened in the human body, the First Hague Peace Conference adopted a
declaration signed on July 29, 1899, by fifteen Powers--namely, Belgium,
Denmark, Spain, Mexico, France, Greece, Montenegro, Holland, Persia,
Roumania, Russia, Siam, Sweden-Norway, Turkey, and Bulgaria--stipulating
that the contracting Powers should abstain, in case of war between two
or more of them, from the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily
in the human body, such as bullets with hard envelopes which do not
entirely cover the core or are pierced with incisions. Austria-Hungary,
China, Germany, Italy, Nicaragua, Portugal, Japan, Luxemburg, Servia,
Switzerland, and Great Britain acceded later.

[Sidenote: Projectiles diffusing Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases.]

[p] 113. The First Hague Peace Conference also adopted a Declaration,
signed on July 29, 1899, by sixteen States--namely, Belgium, Denmark,
Spain, Mexico, France, Greece, Montenegro, Holland, Persia, Portugal,
Roumania, Russia, Siam, Sweden-Norway, Turkey and Bulgaria--stipulating
that the signatory Powers should in a war between two or more of them
abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the
diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. Austria-Hungary, China,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Nicaragua, Servia, Switzerland, and
Great Britain acceded later.

[Sidenote: Violence directed from Air-Vessels.]

[p] 114. The First Hague Peace Conference adopted likewise a
Declaration, signed on July 29, 1899, prohibiting _for a term of five
years_ the launching of projectiles or explosives from balloons or other
kinds of aerial vessels. The Second Peace Conference, on October 18,
1907, renewed this Declaration _up to the close of the Third Peace
Conference_, but out of twenty-seven States which signed the Declaration
only seven--namely, Great Britain, the United States of America, China,
Holland, Bolivia, Salvador, Haiti (Nicaragua acceded later)--ratified
it, and Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Russia--not to mention smaller
Powers--did not even sign it. There is, therefore, no doubt that the
Third Peace Conference will not renew the Declaration. Although it is
very much to be regretted, the fact must be taken into consideration
that in future violence directed from air-vessels will play a great part
in war. For this reason, the question as to the conditions under which
such violence is admissible, is of importance,[240] but it is as yet
impossible to give a satisfactory answer. The Institute of International
Law, at its meeting at Madrid in 1911, adopted the principle[241] that
_aerial warfare must not comprise greater danger to the person and the
property of the peaceful population than land or sea warfare_. However
this may be, there can be no doubt that the general principles laid down
in the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868, in the two Declarations,
adopted by the First Peace Conference, concerning expanding bullets and
projectiles diffusing asphyxiating or deleterious gases, in the Hague
rules concerning land warfare, and the like, must find application as
regards violence directed from air vessels.

[Footnote 240: See, besides the literature quoted above, vol. I. p. 237,
note 1, Merignhac, pp. 198-209; Bonfils, Nos. 1440'4-1440'21; Despagnet,
No. 721 _bis_; Meyer, _Die Luftschiffahrt in kriegsrechtlicher
Beleuchtung_ (1909); Philet, _La guerre aerienne_ (1910); Nys,
Fauchille, and Bar in _Annuaire_, XIX. (1902), pp. 58-114, XXIV. (1911),
pp. 23-126; Fauchille in _R.G._ VIII. (1901), pp. 414-485.]

[Footnote 241: See _Annuaire_, XXIV. (1911), p. 346.]

[Sidenote: Violence against non-combatant Members of Armed Forces.]

[p] 115. It will be remembered from above, [p] 79, that numerous
individuals belong to armed forces without being combatants. Now, since
and in so far as these non-combatant members of armed forces do not take
part in the fighting, they may not directly be attacked and killed or
wounded. However, they are exposed to all injuries indirectly resulting
from the operations of warfare. And, with the exception of the
personnel[242] engaged in the interest of the wounded, such as doctors,
chaplains, persons employed in military hospitals, official ambulance
men, who, according to articles 9 and 10 of the Geneva Convention, are
specially privileged, such non-combatant members of armed forces may
certainly be made prisoners, since the assistance they give to the
fighting forces may be of great importance.

[Footnote 242: See below, [p] 121.]

[Sidenote: Violence against Private Enemy Persons.]

[p] 116. Whereas in former[243] times private enemy persons of either
sex could be killed or otherwise badly treated according to discretion,
and whereas in especial the inhabitants of fortified places taken by
assault used to be abandoned to the mercy of the assailants, in the
eighteenth century it became a universally recognised customary rule of
the Law of Nations that private enemy individuals should not be killed
or attacked. In so far as they do not take part in the fighting, they
may not be directly attacked and killed or wounded. They are, however,
like non-combatant members of the armed forces, exposed to all injuries
indirectly resulting from the operations of warfare. Thus, for instance,
when a town is bombarded and thousands of inhabitants are thereby
killed, or when a train carrying private individuals as well as soldiers
is wrecked by a mine, no violation of the rule prohibiting attack on
private enemy persons has taken place.

[Footnote 243: See Grotius, III. c. 4, [p][p] VI. and IX.]

As regards captivity, the rule is that private enemy persons may not be
made prisoners of war. But this rule has exceptions conditioned by the
carrying out of certain military operations, the safety of the armed
forces, and the order and tranquillity of occupied enemy territory.
Thus, for instance, influential enemy citizens who try to incite their
fellow-citizens to take up arms may be arrested and deported into
captivity. And even the whole population of a province may be imprisoned
in case a levy _en masse_ is threatening.[244]

[Footnote 244: Civilians who render assistance to the enemy as drivers,
or as labourers to construct fortifications or siege works, or in a
similar way, if captured while they are so engaged, may not be detained
as prisoners of war, whether they render these services voluntarily or
are requisitioned or hired. See _Land Warfare_, [p] 58 note (_a_).]

Apart from captivity, restrictions of all sorts may be imposed upon, and
means of force may be applied against, private enemy persons for many
purposes. Such purposes are:--the keeping of order and tranquillity on
occupied enemy territory; the prevention of any hostile conduct,
especially conspiracies; the prevention of intercourse with and
assistance to the enemy forces; the securing of the fulfilment of
commands and requests of the military authorities, such as those for the
provision of drivers, hostages, farriers; the securing of compliance
with requisitions and contributions, of the execution of public works
necessary for military operations, such as the building of
fortifications, roads, bridges, soldiers' quarters, and the like. What
kind of violent means may be applied for these purposes is in the
discretion of the respective military authorities, who on their part
will act according to expediency and the rules of martial law
established by the belligerents. But there is no doubt that, if
necessary, capital punishment and imprisonment[245] are lawful means for
these purposes. The essence of the position of private individuals in
modern warfare with regard to violence against them finds expression in
article 46 of the Hague Regulations, which lays down the rule that
"family honours and rights, individual lives and private property, as
well as religious convictions and liberty, must be respected."

[Footnote 245: That in case of general devastation the peaceful
population may be detained in so-called concentration camps, there is no
doubt; see below, [p] 154. And there is likewise no doubt that hostages
may be taken from the peaceful population; see below, [p] 170, p. 213,
and [p] 259, p. 319, note 2.]

[Sidenote: Violence against the Head of the Enemy State and against
Officials in Important Positions.]

[p] 117. The head of the enemy State and officials in important posts,
in case they do not belong to the armed forces, occupy, so far as their
liability to direct attack, death, or wounds is concerned, a position
similar to that of private enemy persons. But they are so important to
the enemy State, and they may be so useful to the enemy and so dangerous
to the invading forces, that they may certainly be made prisoners of
war. If a belligerent succeeds in obtaining possession of the head of
the enemy State or its Cabinet Ministers, he will certainly remove them
into captivity. And he may do the same with diplomatic agents and other
officials of importance, because by weakening the enemy Government he
may thereby influence the enemy to agree to terms of peace.


III

TREATMENT OF WOUNDED, AND DEAD BODIES

  Hall, [p] 130--Lawrence, [p] 165--Maine, pp. 156-159--Manning, p.
  205--Phillimore, III. [p] 95--Halleck, II. pp. 36-39--Moore, VII. [p]
  1134--Taylor, [p][p] 527-528--Bluntschli, [p][p] 586-592--Lueder in
  Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 289-319, 398-421--Liszt, [p] 40, V.--Ullmann,
  [p] 178 and in _R.G._ IV. (1897), pp. 437-447--Bonfils, Nos.
  1108-1118'7--Despagnet, Nos. 551-553--Pradier-Fodere, VI. No.
  2794, VII. Nos. 2849-2881--Rivier, II. pp. 268-273--Nys, III. pp.
  526-536--Calvo, IV. [p][p] 2161-2165--Fiore, III. Nos. 1363-1372, and
  Code, Nos. 1589-1604--Martens, II. [p] 114--Longuet, [p][p]
  85-90--Merignhac, pp. 114-142--Pillet, pp.
  165-192--_Kriegsbrauch_, p. 26--_Land Warfare_, [p][p] 174-220--Zorn,
  p. 122--Bordwell, pp. 249-277--Spaight, pp. 419-460--Higgins, pp.
  35-38--Holland, _Studies_, pp. 61-65--Holland, _War_, Nos.
  41-69--Gueret, _Zur Geschichte der internationalen und freiwilligen
  Krankenpflege_ (1873)--Lueder, _Die Genfer Convention_
  (1876)--Moynier, _La croix rouge, son passe et son avenir_ (1882);
  _La revision de la Convention de Geneve_ (1898); _La fondation de
  la croix rouge_ (1903)--Buzzati, _De l'emploi abusif ... de la
  croix rouge_ (1890)--Triepel, _Die neuesten Fortschritte auf dem
  Gebiet des Kriegsrechts_ (1894), pp. 1-41--Mueller,
  _Entstehungsgeschichte des rothen Kreuzes und der Genfer
  Konvention_ (1897)--Muenzel, _Untersuchungen ueber die Genfer
  Konvention_ (1901)--Roszkoroski in _R.I._ 2nd Ser. IV. (1902), pp.
  199, 299, 442--Gillot, _La revision de la Convention de Geneve,
  etc._ (1902)--Meurer, _Die Genfer Konvention und ihre Reform_
  (1906)--Delpech in _R.G._ XIII. (1906), pp. 629-724--Macpherson in
  _Z.V._ V. (1911), pp. 253-277.

[Sidenote: Origin of Geneva Convention.]

[p] 118. Although[246] since the seventeenth century several hundreds of
special treaties have been concluded between different States regarding
the tending of each other's wounded and the exemption of army surgeons
from captivity, no general rule of the Law of Nations on these points
was in existence until the second half of the nineteenth century other
than one prohibiting the killing, mutilation, or ill-treatment of the
wounded. A change for the better was initiated by Jean Henry Dunant, a
Swiss citizen from Geneva, who was an eye-witness of the battle of
Solferino in 1859, where many thousands of wounded died who could, under
more favourable circumstances, have been saved. When he published, in
1861 and 1863, his pamphlet, _Un Souvenir de Solferino_, the Geneva
_Societe d'utilite publique_, under the presidency of Gustave Moynier,
created an agitation in favour of better arrangements for the tending of
the wounded on the battlefield, and convoked an international congress
at Geneva in 1863, where thirty-six representatives of nearly all the
European States met and discussed the matter. In 1864 the Bundesrath,
the Government of the Federal State of Switzerland, took the matter in
hand officially, and invited all European and several American States to
send official representatives to a Congress at Geneva for the purpose of
discussing and concluding an international treaty regarding the wounded.
This Congress met in 1864, and sixteen States were represented. Its
result was the international "Convention[247] for the Amelioration of
the Condition of Soldiers wounded in Armies in the Field," commonly
called "Geneva Convention," signed on August 22, 1864. By-and-by States
other than the original signatories joined the Convention, and finally
the whole body of the civilised States of the world, with the exception
of Costa Rica, Monaco, and Lichtenstein, became parties. That the rules
of the Convention were in no wise perfect, and needed to be supplemented
regarding many points, soon became apparent. A second International
Congress met at the invitation of Switzerland in 1868 at Geneva, where
additional articles[248] to the original Convention were discussed and
signed. These additional articles have, however, never been ratified.
The First Hague Peace Conference in 1899 unanimously formulated the wish
that Switzerland should shortly take steps for the assemblage of another
international congress in order to revise the Geneva Convention. This
Congress assembled in June 1906, thirty-five States having sent
representatives, and on July 6, 1906, a new Geneva Convention[249] was
signed by Great Britain, Germany, Argentina, Austria-Hungary, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Chili, China, Congo Free State, Korea, Denmark, Spain, the
United States of America, Brazil, Mexico, France, Greece, Guatemala,
Honduras, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Montenegro, Norway, Holland, Peru,
Persia, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Servia, Siam, Sweden, Switzerland,
and Uruguay. Most of these States have already ratified, and Colombia,
Costa-Rica, Cuba, Nicaragua, Salvador, Turkey, and Venezuela, which were
not represented at the Congress, acceded later. There is no doubt that
in time all the civilised Powers will become parties.

[Footnote 246: See Macpherson, _loc. cit._ p. 254.]

[Footnote 247: See Martens, _N.R.G._ XVIII. p. 607, and above, vol. I.
[p] 560.]

[Footnote 248: See Martens, _N.R.G._ XVIII. p. 61.]

[Footnote 249: See Martens, _N.R.G._ 3rd. Ser. II. (1910), p. 620, and
_Treaty Series_, 1907, No. 15.]

The new Convention consists of thirty-three articles instead of the ten
articles of the old Convention, and provides rules for the treatment of
the wounded and the dead; further rules concerning military hospitals
and mobile medical units; the personnel engaged in the interest of the
wounded including army chaplains; the material belonging to mobile
medical units, military hospitals, and voluntary aid societies; the
convoys of evacuation; the distinctive emblem; the carrying out of the
Convention; and the prevention of abuses and infractions.

In the final protocol the Conference expresses the desire that, in order
to arrive at a unanimous interpretation of the Convention, the parties
should, so far as the cases and the circumstances permit, submit to
Hague Court Arbitration any differences which _in time of peace_ might
arise between them concerning the interpretation of the Convention, but
Great Britain and Japan refused to become parties to this.

[Sidenote: The Wounded and the Sick.]

[p] 119. According to articles 1-5 of the Geneva Convention,[250] the
sick and wounded persons belonging, or officially attached, to armies
must be respected and taken care of, without distinction of nationality,
by the belligerent in whose power they may be. Should, however, a
belligerent necessarily be compelled to abandon such sick and wounded
persons to the enemy, he must, so far as military exigencies permit,
leave behind with them a portion of his medical personnel to take care
of them, and the necessary material. The sick and wounded who have
fallen into the hands of the enemy are prisoners of war, but
belligerents may exchange or release them, or even hand them over to a
neutral State which has to intern them until after the conclusion of
peace. After each engagement the commander in possession of the field
must have search made for the wounded and must take measures to protect
them against pillage and maltreatment. A nominal roll of all wounded and
sick who have been collected must be sent as early as possible to the
authorities of the country or army to which they belong, and the
belligerents must keep each other mutually informed of any internments
and changes as well as of admissions into hospital. It is specially
stipulated by article 5 that, if a military authority finds it necessary
to appeal to the charitable zeal of the inhabitants to collect and take
care of, under his direction, the wounded and sick of armies, he can
grant to those who have responded to his appeal special protection and
certain immunities.

[Footnote 250: The stipulations of the Geneva Convention are for the
most part of a technical military character, and it is, therefore,
impossible in a general treatise of International Law to enter into any
details. Readers who take a deeper interest in the matter must be
referred to the most valuable article by Macpherson in _Z.V._ V. (1911),
pp. 253-277.]

[Sidenote: Medical Units and Establishments, and Material.]

[p] 120. In order that the wounded and sick may receive proper
treatment, mobile medical units as well as the fixed establishments of
the medical service must be respected and protected by the belligerents,
but this protection ceases if these units and establishments are made
use of to commit acts harmful to the enemy, for instance, to shelter
combatants, to carry on espionage, to conceal arms and ammunition
(articles 6 and 7). But article 8 expressly enacts that the units and
establishments do not forego protection:--(_a_) in case the personnel is
armed and use their arms for their own defence or for the defence of the
wounded and sick under their charge; (_b_) in case, in default of armed
orderlies, units or establishments are guarded by pickets or by
sentinels furnished with authority in due form; (_c_) in case weapons
and cartridges, taken from the wounded and not yet handed over to the
proper department, are found in units or establishments.

As regards the _material_, a distinction is drawn between the treatment
of the material of mobile medical units, of fixed medical
establishments, and of material belonging to Voluntary Aid Societies.

(_a_) Mobile medical units which fall into the hands of the enemy must
not be deprived of their material, including their teams, whatever may
be the means of transport and whoever may be the drivers employed
(article 14). The competent military authority is, however, permitted to
make use of the material in captured medical units for the treatment of
the wounded and the sick at hand, provided it is restored under the same
conditions, and so far as possible at the same time, as laid down for
the release of the medical personnel by article 12.

(_b_) The buildings and material of fixed medical establishments which,
because the locality where they are is militarily occupied, fall into
the hands of the enemy, remain, according to article 15, "subject to the
laws of war," that means they remain entirely in the power of the
captor, but they may not be diverted from their medical purpose so long
as they are necessary for the proper treatment of the wounded and the
sick. Should, however, urgent military necessity demand it, a commander
may dispose of them, provided he makes previous arrangements for the
welfare of the wounded and sick found in the fixed establishments.

(_c_) The material of Voluntary Aid Societies, which are duly
recognised, is, according to article 16, considered private property and
must, therefore, be respected as such under all circumstances, although
it may be requisitioned.

[Sidenote: Personnel.]

[p] 121. The personnel engaged exclusively in the collection, transport,
and treatment of the wounded and sick, as well as in the administration
of mobile medical units and establishments, the chaplains attached to
armies, and, lastly, pickets and sentinels guarding medical units and
establishments, must, according to article 9, under all circumstances be
respected and protected. If they fall into the hands of the enemy they
must not be treated as prisoners of war. According to article 12,
however, they are not free to act or move without let or hindrance, for,
if their assistance is indispensable, they may be called upon by the
captor to carry on their duties to the wounded and the sick. But when
their assistance is no longer indispensable, they must be sent back to
their army or to their country at such time and by such route as may be
compatible with military exigencies, and they must be allowed to take
with them such effects, instruments, arms, and horses as are their
private property. So long as they are detained by the enemy he must,
according to article 13, grant them the same allowances and the same pay
as are due to the personnel holding the same rank in his own army.

The personnel of Voluntary Aid Societies employed in the medical units
and establishments is, according to article 10, privileged to the same
extent as the official personnel, provided that the Voluntary Aid
Society concerned is duly recognised and authorised by its Government
and that the personnel of the Society is subject to military law and
regulations. Each State must notify to the other, either in time of
peace or at the commencement, or during the course, of hostilities, but
in every case before actually employing them, the names of societies
which it has authorised to render assistance to the regular medical
service of its armies. A recognised Voluntary Aid Society of a _neutral_
country cannot, according to article 11, afford the assistance of its
personnel and units to a belligerent unless it has previously received
the consent of its own Government and of the belligerent concerned. And
a belligerent who accepts such assistance from a Voluntary Aid Society
of a neutral country is bound, before making any use of it, to notify
the fact to the enemy.

[Sidenote: Convoys of Evacuation.]

[p] 122. Convoys used for evacuating the wounded and sick must, as
regards their personnel and material, be treated in the same way as
mobile medical units, but subject to the following special provisions
enacted by article 17:--

A belligerent intercepting a convoy may, if military exigencies demand,
break it up, provided he takes charge of the sick and wounded who are in
it. In this case, the obligation to send back the medical personnel,
provided for in article 12, must be extended to the whole of the
military personnel detailed for the transport or the protection of the
convoy and furnished with an authority in due form to that effect.

The obligation to restore the medical material, provided for in article
14, must apply to railway trains and boats used in internal navigation,
which are specially arranged for evacuation, as well as to the material
belonging to the medical service for fitting up ordinary vehicles,
trains, and boats. Military vehicles, other than those of the medical
service, however, may be captured with their teams; and the civilian
personnel and the various means of transport obtained by requisition,
including railway material and boats used for convoys, are subject to
the general rules of International Law concerning war.

[Sidenote: Distinctive Emblem.]

[p] 123. According to article 18 the Swiss heraldic device of the red
cross on a white ground, formed by reversing the federal colours, is
adopted as the emblem and distinctive sign of the medical service of
armies, but there is no objection to the adoption of another emblem on
the part of such non-Christian States as object to the cross on
religious grounds. Thus Turkey has substituted a red crescent, and
Persia a red sun for the cross.[251] The following are the rules
concerning the use of this emblem:--

(1) The emblem must be shown on the flags and the armlets (_brassards_)
as well as on all the material belonging to the medical service, but the
emblem cannot be recognised unless it is used with the permission of the
competent military authority (article 19).

(2) Medical units and establishments must hoist the red cross flag
accompanied by the national flag of the belligerent concerned (article
21), but medical units which have fallen into the hands of the enemy
must not, so long as they are in that situation, fly any other flag than
that of the red cross. The medical units belonging to neutral countries
which have, in accordance with article 11, been admitted to afford their
services, must fly, along with the red cross flag, the national flag of
the belligerent to whose army they are attached (article 22).

(3) All the personnel must, according to article 20, wear, fixed to the
left arm, an armlet (_brassard_) with a red cross on a white ground,
delivered and stamped by the competent military authority and
accompanied by a certificate of identity in the case of persons who are
attached to the medical service and armies without wearing the military
uniform.

(4) The employment of the red cross on a white ground and the words "Red
Cross" or "Geneva Cross" must not, according to article 23, be used,
either in time of peace or in time of war, except to indicate the
protected medical units, establishments, personnel, and material.

[Footnote 251: See below, [p] 207.]

[Sidenote: Treatment of the Dead.]

[p] 124. According to a customary rule of the Law of Nations
belligerents have the right to demand from one another that dead
soldiers shall not be disgracefully treated, especially not mutilated,
and shall be, so far as possible, collected and buried[252] or cremated
on the battlefield by the victor. The Geneva Convention does not
stipulate any rule concerning the collection and burial or cremation of
the dead, but article 3 enacts that after each engagement the commander
in possession of the field must take measures to ensure protection of
the dead against pillage and maltreatment, and that a careful
examination of the bodies, in order to see that life is really extinct,
must be made before the dead are buried or cremated. Each belligerent
must send as soon as possible to the authorities of the country or army
to which they belong the military identification marks or tokens found
on the dead (article 4). Pieces of equipment found upon the dead of the
enemy are public enemy property and may, therefore, be appropriated as
booty[253] by the victor. On the other hand, letters, money, jewellery,
and such other articles of value found upon the dead on the battlefield,
or on those who die in the medical units or fixed establishments, as are
apparently private property, are not booty, but must, according to
article 4 of the Geneva Convention and article 14 of the Hague rules
concerning warfare on land, be collected and handed over to the Bureau
of Information[254] concerning the prisoners of war, which has to
transmit them to the persons interested through the channel of the
authorities of their own country.

[Footnote 252: See Grotius, II. c. 19, [p][p] 1 and 3. Regarding a
valuable suggestion of Ullmann's concerning sanitary measures for the
purpose of avoiding epidemics, see above, vol. I. p. 621, note 1.]

[Footnote 253: See below, [p] 139.]

[Footnote 254: See below, [p] 130.]

[Sidenote: Application of the Geneva Convention, and Prevention of
Abuses.]

[p] 124_a_. The provisions of the Geneva Convention are only binding in
the case of war between two or more of the contracting parties, they
cease to be binding from the moment when one of the belligerent Powers
is not a party (article 24). The commanders-in-chief of the belligerent
armies must, in accordance with the instructions of their Governments
and in conformity with the general principles of the Geneva Convention,
arrange the details for carrying out the articles of the Geneva
Convention, as well as for cases not provided for in these articles
(article 25). The contracting parties must take the necessary measures
to instruct their troops, especially the personnel protected by the
Geneva Convention, in the provisions of the Convention, and to bring
these provisions to the notice of the civil population (article 26). In
countries whose legislation is not at the time of the signing of the
Convention adequate for the purpose, the contracting parties must adopt
such measures as may be necessary to prevent, at all times, the
employment of the emblem or the name of "Red Cross" or "Geneva Cross"
by private individuals or by Societies other than those which are
entitled to do so according to the Geneva Convention, and in particular
for commercial purposes as a trade mark or trading mark (article 27).
The contracting Governments must likewise adopt measures necessary for
the repression in time of war of individual acts of pillage and
maltreatment of the wounded and sick, as well as for the punishment of
the improper use of the Red Cross flag and armlet (_brassard_) by
officers and soldiers or private individuals not protected by the Geneva
Convention. They must, at the latest within five years from the
ratification of the Geneva Convention, communicate to one another
through the Swiss Federal Council, the provisions concerning these
measures of repression (article 28).[255]

[Footnote 255: By reason of the uncertainties of parliamentary
proceedings, Great Britain, in signing and ratifying the Geneva
Convention, entered a reservation against articles 23, 27, and 28, but
by the Geneva Convention Act, 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. V. ch. 20), Great Britain
is now able to carry out the stipulations of these three articles.]

[Sidenote: General provisions of the Geneva Convention.]

[p] 124_b_. The Geneva Convention comes into force for each contracting
Power six months after the date of the deposit of its ratification
(article 30). The new Geneva Convention replaces the old of 1864, but
the old Geneva Convention remains in force between such of its
contracting parties as do not become parties to the new Convention of
1906 (article 31). Such of the Powers as signed the old Convention of
1864, but did not sign the new Convention of December 31, 1906, are free
to accede to it at any time later by means of a written notification to
the Swiss Federal Council. Other Powers may likewise notify their
accession at any time to the Swiss Federal Council, but their accession
only takes effect in case, within a period of one year from such
notification, no objection to the accession reaches the Swiss Federal
Council from any of the previous contracting Powers (article 32). Each
of the contracting Powers is at liberty at any time to denounce the
Geneva Convention by a written notification to the Swiss Federal
Council, which must immediately indicate it to all the other contracting
Powers (article 33). The denunciation, however, does not take effect
until one year after it has come to the notice of the Swiss Federal
Council, and a denunciation only affects such Power as has notified it.


IV

CAPTIVITY

  Grotius, III. c. 14--Bynkershoek, _Quaest. jur. publ._ I. c.
  3--Vattel, III. [p][p] 148-154--Hall, [p][p] 131-134--Westlake,
  II. pp. 63-68--Lawrence, [p] 164--Maine, pp. 160-167--Manning, pp.
  210-222--Phillimore, III. [p] 95--Twiss, II. [p] 177--Halleck, II.
  pp. 19-30--Taylor, [p][p] 519-524--Moore, VII. [p][p]
  1127-1133--Wharton, III. [p][p] 348-348D--Wheaton, [p]
  344--Bluntschli, [p][p] 593-626--Heffter, [p][p] 127-129--Lueder
  in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 423-445--Ullmann, [p] 177--Bonfils, Nos.
  1119-1140--Despagnet, Nos. 544-550--Pradier-Fodere, VII. Nos.
  2796-2842, and VIII. No. 3208--Rivier, II. pp. 273-279--Nys, III.
  pp. 537-553--Calvo, IV. [p][p] 2133-2157--Fiore, III. Nos.
  1355-1362, and Code, Nos. 1567-1588--Martens, II. [p]
  113--Longuet, [p][p] 77-83--Merignhac, pp. 87-113--Pillet, pp.
  145-164--_Kriegsbrauch_, pp. 11-18--Zorn, pp. 73-123--Bordwell,
  pp. 237-248--_Land Warfare_, [p][p] 54-116--Spaight, pp.
  260-320--Holland, _War_, Nos. 24-40--Eichelmann, _Ueber die
  Kriegsgefangenschaft_ (1878)--Romberg, _Des belligerants et des
  prisonniers de guerre_ (1894)--Triepel, _Die neuesten Fortschritte
  auf dem Gebiet des Kriegsrechts_ (1894), pp. 41-55--Holls, _The
  Peace Conference at the Hague_ (1900), pp. 145-151--Cros,
  _Condition et traitement des prisonniers de guerre_
  (1900)--Beinhauer, _Die Kriegsgefangenschaft_ (1910)--Payrat, _Le
  prisonnier de guerre dans la guerre continentale_ (1910).

[Sidenote: Development of International Law regarding Captivity.]

[p] 125. During antiquity, prisoners of war could be killed, and they
were very often at once actually butchered or offered as sacrifices to
the gods. If they were spared, they were as a rule made slaves and only
exceptionally liberated. But belligerents also exchanged their prisoners
or liberated them for ransom. During the first part of the Middle Ages
prisoners of war could likewise be killed or made slaves. Under the
influence of Christianity, however, their fate in time became mitigated.
Although they were often most cruelly treated during the second part of
the Middle Ages, they were not as a rule killed and, with the
disappearance of slavery in Europe, they were no longer enslaved. By the
time modern International Law gradually came into existence, killing and
enslaving prisoners of war had disappeared, but they were still often
treated as criminals and as objects of personal revenge. They were not
considered in the power of the State by whose forces they were captured,
but in the power of those very forces or of the individual soldiers that
had made the capture. And it was considered lawful on the part of
captors to make as much profit as possible out of their prisoners by way
of ransom, provided no exchange of prisoners took place. So general was
this practice that a more or less definite scale of ransom became usual.
Thus, Grotius (III. c. 14, [p] 9) mentions that in his time the ransom
of a private was the amount of his one month's pay. And since the
pecuniary value of a prisoner as regards ransom rose in proportion with
his fortune and his position in life and in the enemy army, it became
usual for prisoners of rank and note not to belong to the capturing
forces but to the Sovereign, who had, however, to recompense the
captors. During the seventeenth century, the custom that prisoners were
considered in the power of their captors died away. They were now
considered to be in the power of the Sovereign by whose forces they were
captured. But rules of the Law of Nations regarding their proper
treatment were hardly in existence. The practice of liberating prisoners
in exchange, or for ransom only, continued. Special cartels were often
concluded at the outbreak of or during a war for the purpose of
stipulating a scale of ransom according to which either belligerent
could redeem his soldiers and officers from captivity. The last[256]
instance of such cartels is that between England and France in 1780,
stipulating the ransom for members of the naval and military forces of
both belligerents.

[Footnote 256: See Hall, [p] 134, p. 428, note 1.]

It was not until the eighteenth century, with its general tendencies to
mitigate the cruel practices of warfare, that matters changed for the
better. The conviction in time became general that captivity should only
be the means of preventing prisoners from returning to their corps and
taking up arms again, and should, as a matter of principle, be
distinguished from imprisonment as a punishment for crimes. The Treaty
of Friendship[257] concluded in 1785 between Prussia and the United
States of America was probably the first to stipulate (article 24) the
proper treatment of prisoners of war, prohibiting confinement in convict
prisons and the use of irons, and insisting upon their confinement in a
healthy place, where they may have exercise, and where they may be kept
and fed as troops. During the nineteenth century the principle that
prisoners of war should be treated by their captor in a manner analogous
to that meted out to his own troops became generally recognised, and the
Hague Regulations have now, by articles 4 to 20, enacted exhaustive
rules regarding captivity.

[Footnote 257: See Martens, _N.R._ IV. p. 37.]

[Sidenote: Treatment of Prisoners of War.]

[p] 126. According to articles 4-7 and 16-19 of the Hague Regulations
prisoners of war are not in the power of the individuals or corps who
capture them, but in the power of the Government of the captor. They
must be humanely treated. All their personal belongings remain their
property, with the exception of arms, horses, and military papers, which
are booty;[258] and in practice[259] personal belongings are understood
to include military uniform, clothing, and kit required for personal
use, although technically they are Government property. They may only be
imprisoned as an unavoidable matter of safety, and only while the
circumstances which necessitate the measure continue to exist. They may,
therefore, be detained in a town, fortress, camp, or any other locality,
and they may be bound not to go beyond a certain fixed boundary. But
they may not be kept in convict prisons. Except in the case of officers,
their labour may be utilised by the Government according to their rank
and aptitude, but their tasks must not be excessive and must have
nothing to do with military operations. Work done by them for the State
must be paid for in accordance with tariffs in force for soldiers of the
national army employed on similar tasks, or, in case there are no such
tariffs in force, at rates proportional to the work executed. But
prisoners of war may also be authorised to work for other branches of
the public service or for private persons under conditions of employment
to be settled by the military authorities, and they may likewise be
authorised to work on their own account. All wages they receive go
towards improving their position, and a balance must be paid to them at
the time of their release, after deducting the cost of their
maintenance. But whether they earn wages or not, the Government is bound
under all circumstances to maintain them, and provide quarters, food,
and clothing for them on the same footing as for its own troops. Officer
prisoners must receive the same pay as officers of corresponding rank in
the country where they are detained, the amount to be repaid by their
Government after the conclusion of peace. All prisoners of war must
enjoy every latitude in the exercise of their religion, including
attendance at their own church service, provided only they comply with
the regulations for order issued by the military authorities. If a
prisoner wants to make a will, it must be received by the authorities or
drawn up on the same conditions as for soldiers of the national army.
And the same rules are valid regarding death certificates and the burial
of prisoners of war, and due regard must be paid to their grade and
rank. Letters, money orders, valuables, and postal parcels destined for
or despatched by prisoners of war must enjoy free postage, and gifts and
relief in kind for prisoners of war must be admitted free from all
custom and other duties as well as payments for carriage by Government
railways (article 16).

[Footnote 258: See below, [p] 144.]

[Footnote 259: See _Land Warfare_, [p] 69.]

[Sidenote: Who may claim to be Prisoners of War.]

[p] 127. Every individual who is deprived of his liberty not for a crime
but for military reasons has a claim to be treated as a prisoner of war.
Article 13 of the Hague Regulations expressly enacts that
non-combatant[260] members of armed forces, such as newspaper
correspondents, reporters, sutlers, contractors, who are captured and
detained, may claim to be treated as prisoners of war, provided they can
produce a certificate from the military authorities of the army they
were accompanying. But although the Hague Regulations do not contain
anything regarding the treatment of private enemy individuals and enemy
officials whom a belligerent thinks it necessary[261] to make prisoners
of war, it is evident that they may claim all privileges of such
prisoners. Such individuals are not convicts; they are taken into
captivity for military reasons, and they are therefore prisoners of war.

[Footnote 260: See above, [p] 79.]

[Footnote 261: See above, [p][p] 116 and 117.]

[Sidenote: Discipline.]

[p] 128. Articles 8 and 9 of the Hague Regulations lay down the
discipline to be observed in the case of prisoners of war in the
following way:--Every prisoner who, if questioned, does not declare his
true name and rank is liable to a curtailment of the advantages
accorded to prisoners of his class. All prisoners are subject to the
laws, regulations, and orders in force in the army of the belligerent
that keeps them in captivity. Any act of insubordination on the part of
prisoners may be punished in accordance with these laws,[262] but apart
from these laws, all kinds of severe measures are admissible to prevent
a repetition of such acts. Escaped prisoners, who, after having rejoined
their national army, are again taken prisoners, are not liable to any
punishment for their flight. But if they are recaptured before they
succeed in rejoining their army, or before they have quitted the
territory occupied by the capturing forces, they are liable to
disciplinary punishment.

[Footnote 262: Concerning the question whether after conclusion of peace
such prisoners as are undergoing a term of imprisonment for offences
against discipline may be detained, see below, [p] 275.]

[Sidenote: Release on Parole.]

[p] 129. Articles 10 to 12 of the Hague Regulations deal with release on
parole in the following manner:--No belligerent is obliged to assent to
a prisoner's request to be released on parole, and no prisoner may be
forced to accept such release. But if the laws of his country authorise
him to do so, and if he acquiesces, any prisoner may be released on
parole. In such case he is in honour bound scrupulously to fulfil the
engagement he has contracted, both as regards his own Government and the
Government that released him. And his own Government is formally bound
neither to request, nor to accept, from him any service incompatible
with the parole given. Any prisoner released on parole and recaptured
bearing arms against the belligerent who released him, or against such
belligerent's allies, forfeits the privilege to be treated as a prisoner
of war, and may be tried by court-martial. The Hague Regulations do not
lay down the punishment for such breach of parole, but according to a
customary rule of International Law the punishment may be capital.

[Sidenote: Bureau of Information.]

[p] 130. According to articles 14 and 16 of the Hague Regulations every
belligerent[263] must institute on the commencement of war a Bureau of
Information relative to his prisoners of war. This Bureau is intended to
answer all inquiries about prisoners. It must be furnished by all the
services concerned with all the necessary information to enable it to
make out and keep up to date a separate return for each prisoner, and it
must, therefore, be kept informed of internments and changes as well as
of admissions into hospital, of deaths, releases on parole, exchanges,
and escapes. It must state in its return for each prisoner the
regimental number, surname and name, age, place of origin, rank, unit,
wounds, date and place of capture, of internment, of the wounds
received, date of death, and any observations of a special character.
This separate return must, after conclusion of peace, be sent to the
Government of the other belligerent.

[Footnote 263: And likewise such neutral States as receive and detain
members of the armed forces of the belligerents; see article 14.]

The Bureau must likewise receive and collect all objects of personal
use, valuables, letters, and the like, found on battlefields[264] or
left by prisoners who have been released on parole, or exchanged, or who
have escaped, or died in hospital or ambulances, and must transmit these
articles to those interested. The Bureau must enjoy the privilege of
free postage.

[Footnote 264: See above, [p] 124.]

[Sidenote: Relief Societies.]

[p] 131. A new and valuable rule, taken from the Brussels Declaration,
is that of article 15 of the Hague Regulations making it a duty of every
belligerent to grant facilities to Relief Societies to serve as
intermediaries for charity to prisoners of war. The condition of the
admission of such societies and their agents is that the former are
regularly constituted in accordance with the law of their country.
Delegates of such societies may be admitted to the places of internment
for the distribution of relief, as also to the halting-places of
repatriated prisoners, through a personal permit of the military
authorities, provided they give an engagement in writing that they will
comply with all regulations by the authorities for order and police.

[Sidenote: End of Captivity.]

[p] 132. Captivity can come to an end through different modes. Apart
from release on parole, which has already been mentioned, captivity
comes to an end--(1) through simple release without parole; (2) through
successful flight; (3) through liberation by the invading enemy to whose
army the respective prisoners belong; (4) through exchange for prisoners
taken by the enemy; (5) through prisoners[265] being brought into
neutral territory by captors who take refuge there; and, lastly (6),
through the war coming to an end. Release of prisoners for ransom is no
longer practised, except in the case of the crew of a captured
merchantman released on a ransom bill.[266] It ought, however, to be
observed that the practice of ransoming prisoners might be revived if
convenient, provided the ransom is to be paid not to the individual
captor but to the belligerent whose forces made the capture.

[Footnote 265: See below, [p] 337.]

[Footnote 266: See below, [p] 195.]

As regards the end of captivity through the war coming to an end, a
distinction must be made according to the different modes of ending war.
If the war ends by peace being concluded, captivity comes to an end at
once[267] with the conclusion of peace, and, as article 20 of the Hague
Regulations expressly enacts, the repatriation of prisoners must be
effected as speedily as possible. If, however, the war ends through
conquest and annexation of the vanquished State, captivity comes to an
end as soon as peace is established. It ought to end with annexation,
and it will in most cases do so. But as guerilla war may well go on
after conquest and annexation, and thus prevent a condition of peace
from being established, although real warfare is over, it is necessary
not to confound annexation with peace.[268] The point is of interest
regarding such prisoners only as are subjects of neutral States. For
other prisoners become through annexation subjects of the State that
keeps them in captivity, and such State is, therefore, as far as
International Law is concerned, unrestricted in taking any measure it
likes with regard to them. It can repatriate them, and it will in most
cases do so. But if it thinks that they might endanger its hold over the
conquered territory, it might likewise prevent their repatriation for
any definite or indefinite period.[269]

[Footnote 267: That, nevertheless, the prisoners remain under the
discipline of the captor until they have been handed over to the
authorities of their home State, will be shown below, [p] 275.]

[Footnote 268: See above, [p] 60.]

[Footnote 269: Thus, after the South African War, Great Britain refused
to repatriate those prisoners of war who were not prepared to take the
oath of allegiance.]


V

APPROPRIATION AND UTILISATION OF PUBLIC ENEMY PROPERTY

  Grotius, III. c. 5--Vattel, III. [p][p] 73, 160-164--Hall, [p][p]
  136-138--Westlake, II. pp. 102-107--Lawrence, [p] 171--Maine, pp.
  192-206--Manning, pp. 179-183--Twiss, II. [p][p] 62-71--Halleck,
  II. pp. 58-68--Moore, VII. [p] 1148--Taylor, [p][p]
  529-536--Wharton, III. [p] 340--Wheaton, [p][p] 346,
  352-354--Bluntschli, [p][p] 644-651A--Heffter, [p][p]
  130-136--Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 488-500--G. F. Martens,
  II. [p][p] 279-280--Ullmann, [p] 183--Bonfils, Nos.
  1176-1193--Despagnet, Nos. 592-596--Pradier-Fodere, VII. Nos.
  2989-3018--Rivier, II. pp. 306-314--Nys, III. pp. 296-308--Calvo,
  IV. [p][p] 2199-2214--Fiore, III. Nos. 1389, 1392, 1393, 1470, and
  Code, Nos. 1557-1560--Martens, II. [p] 120--Longuet, [p]
  96--Merignhac, pp. 299-316--Pillet, pp. 319-340--_Kriegsbrauch_,
  pp. 57-60--Holland, _War_, No. 113--_Land Warfare_, [p][p]
  426-432--Meurer, II. [p][p] 65-69--Spaight, pp. 410-418--Zorn, pp.
  243-270--Rouard de Card, _La guerre continentale et la propriete_
  (1877)--Bluntschli, _Das Beuterecht im Krieg, und das
  Seebeuterecht insbesondere_ (1878)--Depambour, _Des effets de
  l'occupation en temps de guerre sur la propriete et la jouissance
  des biens publics et particuliers_ (1900)--Wehberg, _Das
  Beuterecht im Land und Seekrieg_ (1909; an English translation
  appeared in 1911 under the title _Capture in War on Land and
  Sea_)--Latifi, _Effects of War on Property_ (1909).

[Sidenote: Appropriation of all the Enemy Property no longer
admissible.]

[p] 133. Under a former rule of International Law belligerents could
appropriate all public and private[270] enemy property they found on
enemy territory. This rule is now obsolete. Its place is taken by
several rules, since distinctions are to be made between moveable and
immoveable property, public and private property, and, further, between
different kinds of private and public property. These rules must be
discussed _seriatim_.

[Footnote 270: It is impossible for a treatise to go into historical
details, and to show the gradual disappearance of the old rule. But it
is of importance to state the fact, that even during the nineteenth
century--see, for instance, G. F. Martens, II. [p] 280; Twiss, II. [p]
64; Hall, [p] 139--it was asserted that in strict law all private enemy
moveable property was as much booty as public property, although the
growth of a usage was recognised which under certain conditions exempted
it from appropriation. In the face of articles 46 and 47 of the Hague
Regulations these assertions have no longer any basis, and all the
text-books of the nineteenth century are now antiquated with regard to
this matter.]

[Sidenote: Immoveable Public Property.]

[p] 134. Appropriation of public immoveables is not lawful so long as
the territory on which they are has not become State property of the
occupant through annexation. During mere military occupation of the
enemy territory, a belligerent may not sell or otherwise alienate public
enemy land and buildings, but only appropriate the produce of them.
Article 55 of the Hague Regulations expressly enacts that a belligerent
occupying enemy territory shall only be regarded as administrator and
usufructuary of the public buildings, real property, forests, and
agricultural works belonging to the hostile State and situated on the
occupied territory; that he must protect the stock and plant, and that
he must administer them according to the rules of usufruct. He may,
therefore, sell the crop from public land, cut timber in the public
forests and sell it, may let public land and buildings for the time of
his occupation, and the like. He is, however, only usufructuary, and he
is, therefore, prohibited from exercising his right in a wasteful or
negligent way that would decrease the value of the stock and plant.
Thus, for instance, he must not cut down a whole forest unless the
necessities of war compel him.

[Sidenote: Immoveable Property of Municipalities, and of Religious,
Charitable, and the like Institutions.]

[p] 135. It must, however, be observed that the produce of such public
immoveables only as belong to the State itself may be appropriated, but
not the produce of those belonging to municipalities or of those which,
although they belong to the hostile State, are permanently set aside for
religious purposes, for the maintenance of charitable and educational
institutions, and for the benefit of art and science. Article 56 of the
Hague Regulations expressly enacts that such property is to be treated
as private property.

[Sidenote: Utilisation of Public Buildings.]

[p] 136. So far as the necessities of war demand, a belligerent may make
use of public enemy buildings for all kinds of purposes. Troops must be
housed, horses stabled, the sick and wounded nursed. Public buildings
may in the first instance, therefore, be made use of for such purposes,
although they may thereby be considerably damaged. And it matters not
whether the buildings belong to the enemy State or to municipalities,
whether they are regularly destined for ordinary governmental and
municipal purposes, or for religious, educational, scientific, and the
like purposes. Thus, churches may be converted into hospitals, schools
into barracks, buildings used for scientific research into stables. But
it must be observed that such utilisation of public buildings as damages
them is justified only if it is necessary. A belligerent who turned a
picture gallery into stables without being compelled thereto would
certainly commit a violation of the Law of Nations.

[Sidenote: Moveable Public Property.]

[p] 137. Moveable public enemy property may certainly be appropriated by
a belligerent provided that it can directly or indirectly be useful for
military operations. Article 53 of the Hague Regulations unmistakably
enacts that a belligerent occupying hostile territory may take
possession of the cash, funds, realisable securities, depots of arms,
means of transport, stores, supplies, appliances on land or at sea or in
the air adapted for the transmission of news or for the transport of
persons or goods, and of all other moveable property of the hostile
State which may be used for military operations. Thus, a belligerent is
entitled to seize not only the money and funds of the hostile State on
the one hand, and, on the other, munitions of war, depots of arms,
stores and supplies, but also the rolling-stock of public railways[271]
and other means of transport and everything and anything he can directly
or indirectly make use of for military operations. He may, for
instance, seize a quantity of cloth for the purpose of clothing his
soldiers.

[Footnote 271: See Nowacki, _Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege_ (1906), [p][p]
15 and 19. Some writers--see, for instance, Bonfils, No. 1185, and
Wehberg, _op. cit._ p. 22--maintain that such rolling stock may not be
appropriated, but may only be made use of during war and must be
restored after the conclusion of peace. The assertion that article 53,
second paragraph, is to be interpreted in that sense, is unfounded, for
restoration is there stipulated for such means of transport and the like
as are _private_ property.]

[Sidenote: Moveable Property of Municipalities, and of Religious,
Charitable, and the like Institutions.]

[p] 138. But exceptions similar to those regarding the usufruct of
public immoveables are valid in the case of the appropriation of public
moveables. Article 56 of the Hague Regulations enumerates the property
of municipalities, of religious, charitable, educational institutions,
and of those of science and art. Thus the moveable property of churches,
hospitals, schools, universities, museums, picture galleries, even when
belonging to the hostile State, is exempt from appropriation by a
belligerent. As regards archives, they are no doubt institutions for
science, but a belligerent may nevertheless seize such State papers
deposited therein as are of importance to him in connection with the
war. The last instances of the former practice are presented by Napoleon
I., who seized works of art during his numerous wars and had them taken
to the galleries of Paris. But they had to be restored to their former
owners in 1815.

[Sidenote: Booty on the Battlefield.]

[p] 139. The case of moveable enemy property found by an invading
belligerent on enemy territory is different from the case of moveable
enemy property on the battlefield. According to a former rule of the Law
of Nations all enemy property, public or private, which a belligerent
could get hold of on the battlefield was booty and could be
appropriated. Although some modern publicists[272] who wrote before the
Hague Peace Conference of 1899 teach the validity of this rule, it is
obvious from articles 4 and 14 of the Hague Regulations that it is now
obsolete as regards _private_[273] enemy property except military
papers, arms, horses, and the like. But as regards _public_ enemy
property this customary rule is still valid. Thus weapons, munition,
and valuable pieces of equipment which are found upon the dead, the
wounded, and the prisoners, whether they are public or private property,
may be seized, as may also the war-chest and State papers in possession
of a captured commander, enemy horses, batteries, carts, and everything
else that is of value. To whom the booty ultimately belongs is not for
International but for Municipal Law[274] to determine, since
International Law simply states that public enemy property on the
battlefield can be appropriated by belligerents. And it must be
specially observed that the restriction of article 53 of the Hague
Regulations according to which only such moveable property may be
appropriated as can be used for the operations of war, does not find
application in the case of moveable property found on the battlefield,
for article 53 speaks of "an army of occupation" only. Such property may
be appropriated, whether it can be used for military operations or not;
the mere fact that it was seized on the battlefield entitles a
belligerent to appropriate it.

[Footnote 272: See, for instance, Halleck, II. p. 73, and Heffter, [p]
135.]

[Footnote 273: See above, [p] 124, and below, [p] 144.]

[Footnote 274: According to British law all booty belongs to the Crown.
See Twiss, II. [p][p] 64 and 71.]


VI

APPROPRIATION AND UTILISATION OF PRIVATE ENEMY PROPERTY

  Grotius, III. c. 5--Vattel, III. [p][p] 73, 160-164--Hall, [p][p]
  139, 141-144--Lawrence, [p][p] 172-175--Maine, pp.
  192-206--Manning, pp. 179-183--Twiss, II. [p][p] 62-71--Halleck,
  II. pp. 73-75--Moore, VII. [p][p] 1121, 1151, 1152, 1155--Taylor,
  [p][p] 529, 532, 537--Wharton, III. [p] 338--Wheaton, [p]
  355--Bluntschli, [p][p] 652, 656-659--Heffter, [p][p]
  130-136--Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 488-500--G.F. Martens,
  II. [p][p] 279-280--Ullmann, [p] 183--Bonfils, Nos.
  1194-1206--Despagnet, Nos. 597-604--Pradier-Fodere, VII. Nos.
  3032-3047--Rivier, II. pp. 318-329--Nys, III. pp. 296-308--Calvo,
  IV. [p][p] 2220-2229--Fiore, III. Nos. 1391, 1392, 1472, and Code,
  Nos. 1530-1531--Martens, II. [p] 120--Longuet, [p][p]
  97-98--Merignhac, pp. 263-268--Pillet, pp.
  319-340--_Kriegsbrauch_, pp. 53-56--Zorn, pp. 270-283--Meurer, II.
  [p] 64--Spaight, pp. 188-196--Holland, _War_, Nos. 106-107--_Land
  Warfare_, [p][p] 407-415--Bentwich, _The Law of Private Property
  in War_ (1907)--See also the monographs of Rouard de Card,
  Bluntschli, Depambour, Wehberg, and Latifi, quoted above at the
  commencement of [p] 133.

[Sidenote: Immoveable Private Property.]

[p] 140. Immoveable private enemy property may under no circumstances or
conditions be appropriated by an invading belligerent. Should he
confiscate and sell private land or buildings, the buyer would acquire
no right[275] whatever to the property. Article 46 of the Hague
Regulations expressly enacts that "private property may not be
confiscated." But confiscation differs from the temporary use of private
land and buildings for all kinds of purposes demanded by the necessities
of war. What has been said above in [p] 136 with regard to utilisation
of public buildings finds equal application[276] to private buildings.
If necessary they may be converted into hospitals, barracks, and stables
without indemnification of the proprietors, and they may also be
converted into fortifications. A humane belligerent will not drive the
wretched inhabitants into the street if he can help it. But under the
pressure of necessity he may be obliged to do this, and he is certainly
not prohibited from doing it.

[Footnote 275: See below, [p] 283.]

[Footnote 276: The Hague Regulations do not mention this; they simply
enact in article 46 that private property must be "respected," and may
not be confiscated.]

[Sidenote: Private War Material and Means of Transport.]

[p] 141. All kinds of private moveable property which can serve as war
material, such as arms, ammunition, cloth for uniforms, leather for
boots, saddles, and also all appliances, whether on land or at sea or in
the air, which are adapted for the transmission of news or for the
transportation of persons and goods, such as railway rolling-stock,[277]
ships, telegraphs, telephones, carts, and horses, may be seized and made
use of for military purposes by an invading belligerent, but they must
be restored at the conclusion of peace, and indemnities must be paid for
them. This is expressly enacted by article 53 of the Hague Regulations.
It is evident that the seizure of such material must be duly
acknowledged by receipt, although article 53 does not say so; for
otherwise how could indemnities be paid after the conclusion of peace?
As regards the question who is to pay the indemnities, Holland (_War_,
No. 113) correctly maintains that "the Treaty of Peace must settle upon
whom the burden of making compensation is ultimately to fall."

[Footnote 277: See Nowacki, _Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege_ (1906), [p] 15.]

[Sidenote: Works of Art and Science, Historical Monuments.]

[p] 142. On the other hand, works of art and science, and historical
monuments may not under any circumstances or conditions be appropriated
or made use of for military operations. Article 56 of the Hague
Regulations enacts categorically that "all seizure" of such works and
monuments is prohibited. Therefore, although the metal of which a statue
is cast may be of the greatest value for cannons, it must not be
touched.

[Sidenote: Other Private Personal Property.]

[p] 143. Private personal property which does not consist of war
material or means of transport serviceable to military operations may
not as a rule be seized.[278] Articles 46 and 47 of the Hague
Regulations expressly stipulate that "private property may not be
confiscated," and "pillage is formally prohibited." But it must be
emphasised that these rules have in a sense exceptions, demanded and
justified by the necessities of war. Men and horses must be fed, men
must protect themselves against the weather. If there is no time for
ordinary requisitions[279] to provide food, forage, clothing, and fuel,
or if the inhabitants of a locality have fled so that ordinary
requisitions cannot be made, a belligerent must take these articles
wherever he can get them, and he is justified[280] in so doing. And it
must further be emphasised that quartering[281] of soldiers who,
together with their horses, must be well fed by the inhabitants of the
houses concerned, is likewise lawful, although it may be ruinous to the
private individuals upon whom they are quartered.

[Footnote 278: See above, [p] 133, note.]

[Footnote 279: See below, [p] 147.]

[Footnote 280: The Hague Regulations do not mention this case.]

[Footnote 281: See below, [p] 147.]

[Sidenote: Booty on the Battlefield.]

[p] 144. Private enemy property on the battlefield is no longer in every
case an object of booty.[282] Arms, horses, and military papers may
indeed be appropriated,[283] even if they are private property, as may
also private means of transport, such as carts and other vehicles which
an enemy has made use of. But letters, cash, jewellery, and other
articles of value found upon the dead, wounded, and prisoners must,
according to article 14 of the Hague Regulations and article 4 of the
Geneva Convention, be handed over to the Bureau of Information regarding
prisoners of war, which must transmit them to those interested. Through
article 14 of the Hague Regulations and article 4 of the Geneva
Convention it becomes apparent that nowadays private enemy property,
except military papers, arms, horses, and the like, is no longer booty,
although, individual soldiers often take as much spoil as they can get.
It is impossible for the commanders to bring the offender to justice in
every case.[284]

[Footnote 282: See above, [p] 139.]

[Footnote 283: See above, [p] 139, and article 4 of the Hague
Regulations. This article only mentions arms, horses, and military
papers, but saddles, stirrups, and the like go with horses, as
ammunition goes with arms, and these may for this reason likewise be
appropriated; see _Land Warfare_, [p] 69, note (_e_).]

[Footnote 284: It is of interest to state the fact that, during the
Russo-Japanese War, Japan carried out to the letter the stipulation of
article 14 of the Hague Regulations. Through the intermediary of the
French Embassies in Tokio and St. Petersburg, all valuables found on the
Russian dead and seized by the Japanese were handed over to the Russian
Government.]

[Sidenote: Private Enemy Property brought into a Belligerent's
Territory.]

[p] 145. The case of private property found by a belligerent on enemy
territory differs from the case of such property brought during time of
war into the territory of a belligerent. That private enemy property on
a belligerent's territory at the time of the outbreak of war may not be
confiscated has already been stated above in [p] 102. Taking this fact
into consideration, as well as the other fact that private property
found on enemy territory is nowadays likewise as a rule exempt from
confiscation, there can be no doubt that private enemy property brought
into a belligerent's territory during time of war may not, as a rule, be
confiscated.[285] On the other hand, a belligerent may prohibit the
withdrawal of those articles of property which can be made use of by the
enemy for military purposes, such as arms, ammunition, provisions, and
the like. And in analogy with article 53 of the Hague Regulations there
can be no doubt that a belligerent may seize such articles and make use
of them for military purposes, provided that he restores them at the
conclusion of peace and pays indemnities for them.

[Footnote 285: The case of enemy merchantmen seized in a belligerent's
territorial waters is, of course, an exception.]


VII

REQUISITIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

  Vattel, III. [p] 165--Hall, [p] 140-140*--Lawrence, [p]
  180--Westlake, II. pp. 96-102--Maine, p. 200--Twiss, II. [p]
  64--Halleck, II. pp. 68-69--Taylor, [p][p] 538-539--Moore, VII.
  [p] 1146--Bluntschli, [p][p] 653-655--Heffter, [p] 131--Lueder in
  Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 500-510--Ullmann, [p] 183--Bonfils, Nos.
  1207-1226--Despagnet, Nos. 587-590--Pradier-Fodere, VII. Nos.
  3048-3064--Rivier, II. pp. 323-327--Nys, III. pp. 368-432--Calvo,
  IV. [p][p] 2231-2284--Fiore, III. Nos. 1394, 1473-1476--Martens,
  II. [p] 120--Longuet, [p][p] 110-114--Merignhac, pp.
  272-298--Pillet, pp. 215-235--Zorn, pp. 283-315--_Kriegsbrauch_,
  pp. 61-63--Holland, _War_, Nos. 111-112--Bordwell, pp.
  314-324--Meurer, II. [p][p] 56-60--Spaight, pp. 381-408--Ariga,
  [p][p] 116-122--_Land Warfare_, [p][p] 416-425--Thomas, _Des
  requisitions militaires_ (1884)--Keller, _Requisition und
  Kontribution_ (1898)--Pont, _Les requisitions militaires du temps
  de guerre_ (1905)--Albrecht, _Requisitionen von neutralem
  Privateigentum, etc._ (1912), pp. 1-24:--Risley in the _Journal of
  the Society of Comparative Legislation_, new series, vol. II.
  (1900), pp. 214-223.

[Sidenote: War must support War.]

[p] 146. Requisitions and contributions in war are the outcome of the
eternal principle that war must support war.[286] This means that every
belligerent may make his enemy pay as far as possible for the
continuation of the war. But this principle, though it is as old as war
and will only die with war itself, has not the same effect in modern
times on the actions of belligerents as it formerly had. For thousands
of years belligerents used to appropriate all private and public enemy
property they could obtain, and, when modern International Law grew up,
this practice found legal sanction. But after the end of the seventeenth
century this practice grew milder under the influence of the experience
that the provisioning of armies in enemy territory became more or less
impossible when the inhabitants were treated according to the old
principle. Although belligerents retained in strict law the right to
appropriate all private besides all public property, it became usual to
abstain from enforcing such right, and in lieu thereof to impose
contributions of cash and requisitions in kind upon the inhabitants of
the invaded country.[287] And when this usage developed, no belligerent
ever thought of paying in cash for requisitions, or giving a receipt for
them. But in the nineteenth century another practice became usual.
Commanders then often gave a receipt for contributions and requisitions,
in order to avoid abuse and to prevent further demands for fresh
contributions and requisitions by succeeding commanders without
knowledge of the former impositions. And there are instances of cases
during the nineteenth century on record in which belligerents actually
paid in cash for all requisitions they made. The usual practice at the
end of the nineteenth century was that commanders always gave a receipt
for contributions, and that they either paid in cash for requisitions or
acknowledged them by receipt, so that the respective inhabitants could
be indemnified by their own Government after conclusion of peace.
However, no restriction whatever was imposed upon commanders with regard
to the amount of contributions and requisitions, and with regard to the
proportion between the resources of a country and the burden imposed.
The Hague Regulations have now settled the matter of contributions and
requisitions in a progressive way by enacting rules which put the whole
matter on a new basis. That war must support war remains a principle
under these regulations also. But they are widely influenced by the
demand that the enemy State as such, and not the private enemy
individuals, should be made to support the war, and that only so far as
the necessities of war demand it should contributions and requisitions
be imposed. Although certain public moveable property and the produce
of public immoveables may be appropriated as heretofore, requisitions
must be paid for in cash or, if this is impossible, acknowledged by
receipt.

[Footnote 286: Concerning the controversy as to the justification of
Requisitions and Contributions, see Albrecht, _op. cit._ pp. 18-21.]

[Footnote 287: An excellent sketch of the historical development of the
practice of requisitions and contributions is given by Keller,
_Requisition und Kontribution_ (1898), pp. 5-26.]

[Sidenote: Requisitions in Kind, and Quartering.]

[p] 147. Requisition is the name for the demand for the supply of all
kinds of articles necessary for an army, such as provisions for men and
horses, clothing, or means of transport. Requisition of certain services
may also be made, but they will be treated below in [p] 170 together
with occupation, requisitions in kind only being within the scope of
this section. Now, what articles may be demanded by an army cannot once
for all be laid down, as they depend upon the actual need of an army.
According to article 52 of the Hague Regulations, requisitions may be
made from municipalities as well as from inhabitants, but they may be
made so far only as they are really necessary for the army. They may not
be made by individual soldiers or officers, but only by the commander in
the locality. All requisitions must be paid for in cash, and if this is
impossible, they must be acknowledged by receipt, and the payment of the
amount must be made as soon as possible. The principle that requisitions
must be paid for by the enemy is thereby absolutely recognised, but, of
course, commanders-in-chief may levy contributions--see below, [p]
148--in case they do not possess cash for the payment of requisitions.
However this may be, by the rule that requisitions must always be paid
for, it again becomes apparent and beyond all doubt that henceforth
private enemy property is as a rule exempt from appropriation by an
invading army.

A special kind of requisition is the quartering[288] of soldiers in the
houses of private inhabitants of enemy territory, by which each
inhabitant is required to supply lodging and food for a certain number
of soldiers, and sometimes also stabling and forage for horses.
Although the Hague Regulations do not specially mention quartering,
article 52 is nevertheless to be applied to it, since quartering is
nothing else than a special kind of requisition. If cash cannot be paid
at once for quartering, every inhabitant concerned must get a receipt
for it, stating the number of soldiers quartered and the number of days
they were catered for, and the payment of the amount must be made as
soon as possible.

[Footnote 288: See above, [p] 143.]

But it must be specially observed, that neither in the case of ordinary
requisitions nor in the case of quartering of troops is a commander
compelled to pay the prices asked by the inhabitants concerned. On the
contrary, he may fix the prices himself, although it is expected that
the prices paid shall be fair.

[Sidenote: Contributions.]

[p] 148. Contribution is a payment in ready money demanded either from
municipalities or from inhabitants, whether enemy subjects or foreign
residents. Whereas formerly no general rules concerning contributions
existed, articles 49 and 51 of the Hague Regulations now enact that
contributions may not be demanded extortionately, but exclusively[289]
for the needs of the army, in order, for instance, to pay for
requisitions or for the administration of the locality in question. They
may be imposed by a written order of a commander-in-chief only, in
contradistinction to requisitions which may be imposed by a mere
commander in a locality. They may not be imposed indiscriminately on the
inhabitants, but must so far as possible be assessed upon such
inhabitants in compliance with the rules in force of the respective
enemy Government regarding the assessment of taxes. And, finally, for
every individual contribution a receipt must be given. It is apparent
that these rules of the Hague Regulations try to exclude all
arbitrariness and despotism on the part of an invading enemy with regard
to contributions, and that they try to secure to the individual
contributors as well as to contributing municipalities the possibility
of being indemnified afterwards by their own Government, thus shifting,
so far as possible, the burden of supporting the war from private
individuals and municipalities to the State proper.[290]

[Footnote 289: As regards contributions as a penalty, see article 50 of
the Hague Regulations. See also Keller, _op. cit._ pp. 60-62.]

[Footnote 290: It is strange to observe that _Kriegsbrauch_, pp. 61-63,
does not mention the Hague Regulations at all.]


VIII

DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY PROPERTY

  Grotius, III. c. 5, [p][p] 1-3; c. 12--Vattel, III. [p][p]
  166-168--Hall, [p] 186--Lawrence, [p] 206--Manning, p. 186--Twiss,
  II. [p][p] 65-69--Halleck, II. pp. 63, 64, 71, 74--Taylor, [p][p]
  481-482--Wharton, III. [p] 349--Moore, VII. [p] 1113--Wheaton,
  [p][p] 347-351--Bluntschli, [p][p] 649, 651, 662, 663--Heffter,
  [p] 125--Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 482-485--Klueber, [p]
  262--G. F. Martens, II. [p] 280--Ullmann, [p] 176--Bonfils, Nos.
  1078, 1178-1180--Pradier-Fodere, VI. Nos. 2770-2774--Rivier, II.
  pp. 265-268--Nys, III. pp. 220-223--Calvo, IV. [p][p]
  2215-2222--Fiore, III. Nos. 1383-1388, and Code, Nos.
  1525-1529--Martens, II. [p] 110--Longuet, [p][p] 99,
  100--Merignhac, pp. 266-268--_Kriegsbrauch_, pp. 52-56--Holland,
  _War_, Nos. 3 and 76 (_g_)--Bordwell, p. 84--Spaight, pp.
  129-140--_Land Warfare_, [p][p] 414, 422, 426, 427, 434.

[Sidenote: Wanton destruction prohibited.]

[p] 149. In former times invading armies frequently used to fire and
destroy all enemy property they could not make use of or carry away.
Afterwards, when the practice of warfare grew milder, belligerents in
strict law retained the right to destroy enemy property according to
discretion, although they did not, as a rule, any longer make use of
such right. Nowadays, however, this right is obsolete. For in the
nineteenth century it became a universally recognised rule of
International Law that all useless and wanton destruction of enemy
property, be it public or private, is absolutely prohibited. And this
rule has now been expressly enacted by article 23 (_g_) of the Hague
Regulations, where it is categorically enacted that "to destroy ...
enemy's property, unless such destruction ... be imperatively demanded
by the necessities of war, is prohibited."

[Sidenote: Destruction for the purpose of Offence and Defence.]

[p] 150. All destruction of and damage to enemy property for the purpose
of offence and defence is _necessary_ destruction and damage, and
therefore lawful. It is not only permissible to destroy and damage all
kinds of enemy property on the battlefield during battle, but also in
preparation for battle or siege. To strengthen a defensive position a
house may be destroyed or damaged. To cover the retreat of an army a
village on the battlefield may be fired. The district around an enemy
fortress held by a belligerent may be razed, and, therefore, all private
and public buildings, all vegetation may be destroyed, and all bridges
blown up within a certain area. If a farm, a village, or even a town is
not to be abandoned but prepared for defence, it may be necessary to
damage in many ways or entirely destroy private and public property.
Further, if and where a bombardment is lawful, all destruction of
property involved in it becomes likewise lawful. When a belligerent
force obtains possession of an enemy factory for ammunition or
provisions for the enemy troops, if it is not certain that they can hold
it against an attack, they may at least destroy the plant, if not the
buildings. Or if a force occupies an enemy fortress, they may raze the
fortifications. Even a force intrenching themselves on a battlefield may
be obliged to resort to the destruction of many kinds of property.

[Sidenote: Destruction in marching, reconnoitring, and conducting
Transport.]

[p] 151. Destruction of enemy property in marching troops, conducting
military transport, and in reconnoitring, is likewise lawful if
unavoidable. A reconnoitring party need not keep on the road if they can
better serve their purpose by riding across the tilled fields. And
troops may be marched and transport may be conducted over crops when
necessary. A humane commander will not unnecessarily allow his troops
and transport to march and ride over tilled fields and crops. But if the
purpose of war necessitates it he is justified in so doing.

[Sidenote: Destruction of Arms, Ammunition, and Provisions.]

[p] 152. Whatever enemy property a belligerent may appropriate he may
likewise destroy. To prevent the enemy from making use of them a
retreating force may destroy arms, ammunition, provisions, and the like,
which they have taken from the enemy or requisitioned and cannot carry
away. But it must be specially observed that they may not destroy
provisions in the possession of private enemy inhabitants in order to
prevent the enemy from making use of them in the future.[291]

[Footnote 291: Nor is a commander allowed to requisition such provisions
in order to have them destroyed, for article 52 of the Hague Regulations
expressly enacts that requisitions are only admissible for the
necessities of the army.]

[Sidenote: Destruction of Historical Monuments, Works of Art, and the
like.]

[p] 153. All destruction of and damage to historical monuments, works of
art and science, buildings for charitable, educational, and
religious[292] purposes are specially prohibited by article 56 of the
Hague Regulations which enacts that the perpetrators of such acts must
be prosecuted (_poursuivie_), that is court-martialed. But it must be
emphasised that these objects enjoy this protection only during military
occupation of enemy territory. Should a battle be waged around an
historical monument on open ground, should a church, a school, or a
museum be defended and attacked during military operations, these
otherwise protected objects may be damaged or destroyed under the same
conditions as other enemy property.

[Footnote 292: It is of importance to state the fact that, according to
Grotius (III. c. 5, [p][p] 2 and 3), destruction of graves, tombstones,
churches, and the like is not prohibited by the Law of Nations, although
he strongly (III. c. 12, [p][p] 5-7) advises that they should be spared
unless their preservation is dangerous to the interests of the
invader.]

[Sidenote: General Devastation.]

[p] 154. The question must also be taken into consideration whether and
under what conditions general devastation of a locality, be it a town or
a larger part of enemy territory, is permitted. There cannot be the
slightest doubt that such devastation is as a rule absolutely prohibited
and only in exceptional cases permitted when, to use the words of
article 23 (_g_) of the Hague Regulations, it is "imperatively demanded
by the necessities of war." It is, however, impossible to define once
for all the circumstances which make a general devastation necessary,
since everything depends upon the merits of the special case. But the
fact that a general devastation can be lawful must be admitted. And it
is, for instance, lawful in case of a levy _en masse_ on already
occupied territory, when self-preservation obliges a belligerent to
resort to the most severe measures. It is also lawful when, after the
defeat of his main forces and occupation of his territory, an enemy
disperses his remaining forces into small bands which carry on guerilla
tactics and receive food and information, so that there is no hope of
ending the war except by a general devastation which cuts off supplies
of every kind from the guerilla bands. But it must be specially observed
that general devastation is only justified by imperative necessity and
by the fact that there is no better and less severe way open to a
belligerent.[293]

[Footnote 293: See Hall, [p] 186, who gives _in nuce_ a good survey of
the doctrine and practice of general devastation from Grotius down to
the beginning of the nineteenth century. See also Spaight, pp. 125-139.]

Be that as it may, whenever a belligerent resorts to general devastation
he ought, if possible, to make some provision for the unfortunate
peaceful population of the devastated tract of territory. It would be
more humane to take them away into captivity rather than let them perish
on the spot. The practice, resorted to during the South African war, to
house the victims of devastation in concentration camps, must be
approved. The purpose of war may even oblige a belligerent to confine a
population forcibly[294] in concentration camps.

[Footnote 294: See above, p. 153, note 1. As regards the devastation
resorted to during the South African War, and as regards the
concentration camps instituted in consequence of devastation during this
war, see Beak, _The Aftermath of War_ (1906), pp. 1-30, and _The Times'
History of the War in South Africa_, vol. V. pp. 250-252.]


IX

ASSAULT, SIEGE, AND BOMBARDMENT

  Vattel, III. [p][p] 168-170--Hall, [p] 186--Lawrence, [p]
  204--Westlake, II. pp. 76-79--Moore, VII. [p] 1112--Halleck, II.
  pp. 59, 67, 185--Taylor, [p][p] 483-485--Bluntschli, [p][p]
  552-554B--Heffter, [p] 125--Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp.
  448-457--G. F. Martens, II. [p] 286--Ullmann, [p] 181--Bonfils,
  Nos. 1079-1087--Despagnet, Nos. 528-535--Pradier-Fodere, VI. Nos.
  2779-2786--Rivier, II. pp. 284-288--Nys, III. pp. 210-219--Calvo,
  IV. [p][p] 2067-2095--Fiore, III. Nos. 1322-1330, and Code, Nos.
  1519-1524--Longuet, [p][p] 58-59--Merignhac, pp. 171-182--Pillet,
  pp. 101-112--Zorn, pp. 161-174--Holland, _War_, Nos.
  80-83--Rolin-Jaequemyns in _R.I._ II. (1870), pp. 659 and 674,
  III. (1871), pp. 297-307--Bordwell, pp. 286-288--Meurer, [p][p]
  32-34--Spaight, pp. 157-201--_Kriegsbrauch_, pp. 18-22--_Land
  Warfare_, [p][p] 117-138.

[Sidenote: Assault, Siege, and Bombardment, when lawful.]

[p] 155. Assault is the rush of an armed force upon enemy forces in the
battlefield, or upon intrenchments, fortifications, habitations,
villages, or towns, such rushing force committing every violence against
opposing persons and destroying all impediments. Siege is the
surrounding and investing of an enemy locality by an armed force,
cutting off those inside from all communication for the purpose of
starving them into surrender or for the purpose of attacking the
invested locality and taking it by assault. Bombardment is the throwing
by artillery of shot and shell upon persons and things. Siege can be
accompanied by bombardment and assault, but this is not necessary, since
a siege can be carried out by mere investment and starvation caused
thereby. Assault, siege, and bombardment are severally and jointly
perfectly legitimate means of warfare.[295] Neither bombardment nor
assault, if they take place on the battlefield, needs special
discussion, as they are allowed under the same circumstances and
conditions as force in general is allowed. The only question here is
under what circumstances assault and bombardment are allowed outside the
battlefield. The answer is indirectly given by article 25 of the Hague
Regulations, where it is categorically enacted that "the attack or
bombardment, by any means[296] whatever, of towns, villages,
habitations, or buildings, which are not defended, is prohibited." Siege
is not specially mentioned, because no belligerent would dream of
besieging an undefended locality, and because siege of an undefended
town would involve unjustifiable violence against enemy persons and
would, therefore, be unlawful. Be this as it may, the fact that defended
localities only may now be bombarded, involves a decided advance in the
view taken by International Law. For it was formerly asserted by many
writers[297] and military experts that, for certain reasons and
purposes, undefended localities also might in exceptional cases be
bombarded. But it must be specially observed that it matters not whether
the defended locality be fortified or not, since an unfortified place
can be defended.[298] And it must be mentioned that nothing prevents a
belligerent who has taken possession of an undefended fortified place
from destroying the fortifications by bombardment as well as by other
means.

[Footnote 295: The assertion of some writers--see, for instance, Pillet,
pp. 104-107, and Merignhac, p. 173--that bombardment is lawful only
after an unsuccessful attempt of the besiegers to starve the besieged
into surrender is not based upon a recognised rule of the Law of
Nations.]

[Footnote 296: The words _by any means whatever_ were inserted by the
Second Peace Conference in order to make it quite clear that the article
is likewise to refer to bombardment from air-vessels.]

[Footnote 297: See, for instance, Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 451.]

[Footnote 298: See Holls, _The Peace Conference at the Hague_ (1900), p.
152.]

[Sidenote: Assault, how carried out.]

[p] 156. No special rules of International Law exist with regard to the
mode of carrying out an assault. Therefore, only the general rules
respecting offence and defence find application. It is in especial
not[299] necessary to give notice of an impending assault to the
authorities of the respective locality, or to request them to surrender
before an assault is made. That an assault may or may not be preceded or
accompanied by a bombardment, need hardly be mentioned, nor that by
article 28 of the Hague Regulations pillage of towns taken by assault is
now expressly prohibited.

[Footnote 299: This becomes indirectly apparent from article 26 of the
Hague Regulations.]

[Sidenote: Siege, how carried out.]

[p] 157. With regard to the mode of carrying out siege without
bombardment no special rules of International Law exist, and here too
only the general rules respecting offence and defence find application.
Therefore, an armed force besieging a town may, for instance, cut off
the river which supplies drinking water to the besieged, but must not
poison[300] such river. And it must be specially observed that no rule
of law exists which obliges a besieging force to allow all
non-combatants, or only women, children, the aged, the sick and wounded,
or subjects of neutral Powers, to leave the besieged locality
unmolested. Although such permission[301] is sometimes granted, it is in
most cases refused, because the fact that non-combatants are besieged
together with the combatants, and that they have to endure the same
hardships, may, and very often does, exercise pressure upon the
authorities to surrender. Further, should the commander of a besieged
place expel the non-combatants in order to lessen the number of those
who consume his store of provisions, the besieging force need not allow
them to pass through its lines, but may drive them back.[302]

[Footnote 300: See above, [p] 110.]

[Footnote 301: Thus in 1870, during the Franco-German War, the German
besiegers of Strassburg as well as of Belfort allowed the women, the
children, and the sick to leave the besieged fortresses.]

[Footnote 302: See _Land Warfare_, [p] 129.]

That diplomatic envoys of neutral Powers may not be prevented from
leaving a besieged town is a consequence of their exterritoriality.
However, if they voluntarily remain, may they claim uncontrolled[303]
communication with their home State by correspondence and couriers? When
Mr. Washburne, the American diplomatic envoy at Paris during the siege
of that city in 1870 by the Germans, claimed the right of sending a
messenger with despatches to London in a sealed bag through the German
lines, Bismarck declared that he was ready to allow foreign diplomatists
in Paris to send a courier to their home States once a week, but only
under the condition that their despatches were open and did not contain
any remarks concerning the war. Although the United States and other
Powers protested, Bismarck did not alter his decision. The whole
question must be treated as open.[304]

[Footnote 303: The matter is discussed by Rolin-Jaequemyns in _R.I._
III. (1871), pp. 371-377.]

[Footnote 304: See above, vol. I. [p] 399, and Wharton, I. [p] 97.]

[Sidenote: Bombardment, how carried out.]

[p] 158. Regarding bombardment, article 26 of the Hague Regulations
enacts that the commander of the attacking forces shall do all he can to
notify his intention to resort to bombardment. But it must be emphasised
that a strict duty of notification for all cases of bombardment is not
thereby imposed, since it is only enacted that a commander _shall do all
he can_ to send notification. He cannot do it when the circumstances of
the case prevent him, or when the necessities of war demand an immediate
bombardment. Be that as it may, the purpose of notification is to enable
private individuals within the locality to be bombarded to seek shelter
for their persons and for their valuable personal property.

Article 27 of the Hague Regulations enacts the hitherto customary rule
that all necessary steps must be taken to spare as far as possible all
buildings devoted to religion, art, science, and charity; further,
historic monuments, hospitals, and all other places where the sick and
wounded are collected, provided these buildings, places, and monuments
are not used at the same time for military purposes. To enable the
attacking forces to spare these buildings and places, the latter must be
indicated by some particular signs, which must be previously notified to
the attacking forces and must be visible from the far distance from
which the besieging artillery carries out the bombardment.[305]

[Footnote 305: No siege takes place without the besieged accusing the
besiegers of neglecting the rule that buildings devoted to religion,
art, charity, the tending of the sick, and the like, must be spared
during bombardments. The fact is that in case of a bombardment the
destruction of such buildings cannot always be avoided, although the
artillery of the besiegers do not intentionally aim at them. That the
forces of civilised States intentionally destroy such buildings, I
cannot believe.]

It must be specially observed that no legal duty exists for the
attacking forces to restrict bombardment to fortifications only. On the
contrary, destruction of private and public buildings through
bombardment has always been and is still considered lawful, as it is one
of the means to impress upon the authorities the advisability of
surrender. Some writers[306] assert either that bombardment of the town,
in contradistinction to the fortifications, is never lawful, or that it
is only lawful when bombardment of the fortifications has not resulted
in inducing surrender. But this opinion does not represent the actual
practice of belligerents, and the Hague Regulations do not adopt it.

[Footnote 306: See, for instance, Pillet, pp. 104-107; Bluntschli [p]
554A; Merignhac, p. 180. Vattel (III. [p] 169) does not deny the right
to bombard the town, although he does not recommend such bombardment.]


X

ESPIONAGE AND TREASON

  Vattel, III. [p][p] 179-182--Hall, [p] 188--Westlake, II. pp. 79 and
  90--Lawrence, [p] 199--Phillimore, III. [p] 96--Halleck, I. pp.
  571-575, and in _A.J._ V.(1911), pp. 590-603--Taylor, [p][p] 490 and
  492--Wharton, III. [p] 347--Moore, VII. [p] 1132--Bluntschli, [p][p]
  563-564, 628-640--Heffter, [p] 125--Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp.
  461-467--Ullmann, [p] 176--Bonfils, Nos. 1100-1104--Despagnet, Nos.
  537-542--Pradier-Fodere, VI. Nos. 2762-2768--Rivier, II. pp.
  282-284--Nys, III. pp. 256-263--Calvo, IV. [p][p] 2111-2122--Fiore,
  III. Nos. 1341, 1374-1376, and Code, Nos. 1487-1490--Martens, II.
  [p] 116--Longuet, [p][p] 63-75--Merignhac, pp. 183-209--Pillet, pp.
  97-100--Zorn, pp. 174-195--Holland, _War_, Nos. 84-87--Bordwell,
  pp. 291-292--Meurer, [p][p] 35-38--Spaight, pp. 202-215,
  333-335--Ariga, [p][p] 98-100--Takahashi, pp. 185-194--Friedemann,
  _Die Lage der Kriegskundschafter und Spione_ (1892)--Violle,
  _L'espionage militaire en temps de guerre_ (1904)--Adler, _Die
  Spionage_ (1906)--_Kriegsbrauch_, pp. 30-31--_Land Warfare_, [p][p]
  155-173--Bentwich in _The Journal of the Society of Comparative
  Legislation_, New Series, X. (1909), pp. 243-299.

[Sidenote: Twofold Character of Espionage and Treason.]

[p] 159. War cannot be waged without all kinds of information about the
forces and the intentions of the enemy and about the character of the
country within the zone of military operations. To obtain the necessary
information, it has always been considered lawful, on the one hand, to
employ spies, and, on the other, to make use of the treason of enemy
soldiers or private enemy subjects, whether they were bribed[307] or
offered the information voluntarily and gratuitously. Article 24 of the
Hague Regulations enacts the old customary rule that the employment of
methods necessary to obtain information about the enemy and the country
is considered allowable. The fact, however, that these methods are
lawful on the part of the belligerent who employs them does not prevent
the punishment of such individuals as are engaged in procuring
information. Although a belligerent acts lawfully in employing spies and
traitors, the other belligerent, who punishes spies and traitors,
likewise acts lawfully. Indeed, espionage and treason bear a twofold
character. For persons committing acts of espionage or treason are--as
will be shown below in [p] 255--considered war criminals and may be
punished, but the employment of spies and traitors is considered lawful
on the part of the belligerents.

[Footnote 307: Some writers maintain, however, that it is not lawful to
bribe enemy soldiers into espionage; see below, [p] 162.]

[Sidenote: Espionage in contradistinction to Scouting and
Despatch-bearing.]

[p] 160. Espionage must not be confounded, firstly, with scouting, or
secondly, with despatch-bearing. According to article 29 of the Hague
Regulations, espionage is the act of a soldier or other individual who
clandestinely, or under false pretences, seeks to obtain information
concerning one belligerent in the zone of belligerent operations with
the intention of communicating it to the other belligerent.[308]
Therefore, soldiers not in disguise, who penetrate into the zone of
operations of the enemy, are not spies. They are scouts who enjoy all
privileges of the members of armed forces, and they must, if captured,
be treated as prisoners of war. Likewise, soldiers or civilians charged
with the delivery of despatches for their own army or for that of the
enemy and carrying out their mission openly are not spies. And it
matters not whether despatch-bearers make use of balloons or of other
means of communication. Thus, a soldier or civilian trying to carry
despatches from a force besieged in a fortress to other forces of the
same belligerent, whether making use of a balloon or riding or walking
at night, may not be treated as a spy. On the other hand, spying can
well be carried out by despatch-bearers or by persons in a balloon,
whether they make use of the balloon of a despatch-bearer or rise in a
balloon for the special purpose of spying.[309] The mere fact that a
balloon is visible does not protect the persons using it from being
treated as spies; since spying can be carried out under false pretences
quite as well as clandestinely. But special care must be taken really to
prove the fact of espionage in such cases, for an individual carrying
despatches is _prima facie_ not a spy and must not be treated as a spy
until proved to be such.

[Footnote 308: Assisting or favouring espionage or knowingly concealing
a spy are, according to a customary rule of International Law,
punishable as though they were themselves acts of espionage; see _Land
Warfare_, [p] 172.]

[Footnote 309: See below, [p] 356 (4), concerning wireless telegraphy.]

A remarkable case of espionage is that of Major Andre,[310] which
occurred in 1780 during the American War of Independence. The American
General Arnold, who was commandant of West Point, on the North River,
intended to desert the Americans and join the British forces. He opened
negotiations with Sir Henry Clinton for the purpose of surrendering West
Point, and Major Andre was commissioned by Sir Henry Clinton to make the
final arrangements with Arnold. On the night of September 21, Arnold and
Andre met outside the American and British lines, but Andre, after
having changed his uniform for plain clothes, undertook to pass the
American lines on his return, furnished with a passport under the name
of John Anderson by General Arnold. He was caught, convicted as a spy,
and hanged. As he was not seeking information,[311] and therefore was
not a spy according to article 29 of the Hague Regulations, a conviction
for espionage would not, if such a case occurred to-day, be justified.
But it would be possible to convict for war treason, for Andre was no
doubt negotiating treason. Be that as it may, George III. considered
Andre a martyr, and honoured his memory by granting a pension to his
mother and a baronetcy to his brother.[312]

[Footnote 310: See Halleck in _A.J._ V. (1911), p. 594.]

[Footnote 311: Halleck, _loc. cit._, p. 598, asserts the contrary.]

[Footnote 312: See Phillimore, III. [p] 106; Halleck, I. p. 575; Rivier,
II. p. 284.]

[Sidenote: Punishment of Espionage.]

[p] 161. The usual punishment for spying is hanging or shooting, but
less severe punishments are, of course, admissible and sometimes
inflicted. However this may be, according to article 30 of the Hague
Regulations a spy may not be punished without a trial before a
court-martial. And according to article 31 of the Hague Regulations a
spy who is not captured in the act but rejoins the army to which he
belongs, and is subsequently captured by the enemy, may not be punished
for his previous espionage and must be treated as a prisoner of war. But
it must be specially observed that article 31 concerns only such spies
as belong to the armed forces of the enemy; civilians who act as spies
and are captured later may be punished. Be that as it may, no regard is
paid to the status, rank, position, or motive of a spy. He may be a
soldier or a civilian, an officer or a private. He may be following
instructions of superiors or acting on his own initiative from patriotic
motives. A case of espionage, remarkable on account of the position of
the spy, is that of the American Captain Nathan Hale, which occurred in
1776. After the American forces had withdrawn from Long Island, Captain
Hale recrossed under disguise and obtained valuable information about
the English forces that had occupied the island. But he was caught
before he could rejoin his army, and he was executed as a spy.[313]

[Footnote 313: The case of Major Jakoga and Captain Oki, which, though
reported as a case of espionage, is really a case of treason, will be
discussed below in [p] 255.]

[Sidenote: Treason.]

[p] 162. Treason can be committed by a soldier or an ordinary subject of
a belligerent, but it can also be committed by an inhabitant of an
occupied enemy territory or even by the subject of a neutral State
temporarily staying there, and it can take place after an arrangement
with the favoured belligerent or without such an arrangement. In any
case a belligerent making use of treason acts lawfully, although the
Hague Regulations do not mention the matter at all. But many acts of
different sorts can be treasonable; the possible cases of treason and
the punishment of treason will be discussed below in [p] 255.

Although it is generally recognised that a belligerent acts lawfully who
makes use of the offer of a traitor, the question is controversial[314]
whether a belligerent acts lawfully who bribes a commander of an enemy
fortress into surrender, incites enemy soldiers to desertion, bribes
enemy officers for the purpose of getting important information, incites
enemy subjects to rise against the legitimate Government, and the like.
If the rules of the Law of Nations are formulated, not from doctrines of
book-writers, but from what is done by the belligerents in
practice,[315] it must be asserted that such acts, detestable and
immoral as they are, are not considered illegal according to the Law of
Nations.

[Footnote 314: See Vattel, III. [p] 180; Heffter, [p] 125; Taylor, [p]
490; Martens, II. [p] 110 (8); Longuet, [p] 52; Merignhac, p. 188, and
others. See also below, [p] 164.]

[Footnote 315: See _Land Warfare_, [p] 158.]


XI

RUSES

  Grotius, III. c. 1, [p][p] 6-18--Bynkershoek, _Quaest. jur. publ._ I.
  c. 1--Vattel, III. [p][p] 177-178--Hall, [p] 187--Lawrence, [p]
  207--Westlake, II. p. 73--Phillimore, III. [p] 94--Halleck, I. pp.
  566-571--Taylor, [p] 488--Moore, VII. [p] 1115--Bluntschli, [p][p]
  565-566--Heffter, [p] 125--Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp.
  457-461--Ullmann, [p] 176--Bonfils, Nos. 1073-1075--Despagnet, Nos.
  526-527--Pradier-Fodere, VI. Nos. 2759-2761--Rivier, II. p.
  261--Nys, III. pp. 252-255--Calvo, IV. [p][p] 2106-2110--Fiore, III.
  Nos. 1334-1339--Longuet, [p][p] 53-56--Merignhac, pp. 165-168--Pillet,
  pp. 93-97--_Kriegsbrauch_, pp. 23-24--Holland, _War_, Nos.
  78-79--Bordwell, pp. 283-286--Meurer, II pp. 151-152--Spaight, pp.
  152-156--_Land Warfare_, [p][p] 139-154--Brocher in _R.I._ V. (1873),
  pp. 325-329.

[Sidenote: Character of Ruses of War.]

[p] 163. Ruses of war or stratagems are deceit employed during military
operations for the purpose of misleading the enemy. Such deceit is of
great importance in war, and, just as belligerents are allowed to
employ all methods of obtaining information, so they are, on the other
hand, and article 24 of the Hague Regulations confirms this, allowed to
employ all sorts of ruses for the purpose of deceiving the enemy. Very
important objects can be attained through ruses of war, as, for
instance, the surrender of a force or of a fortress, the evacuation of
territory held by the enemy, the withdrawal from a siege, the
abandonment of an intended attack, and the like. But ruses of war are
also employed, and are very often the decisive factor, during battles.

[Sidenote: Different kinds of Stratagems.]

[p] 164. Of ruses there are so many kinds that it is impossible to
enumerate[316] and classify them. But in order to illustrate acts
carried out as ruses some instances may be given. It is hardly necessary
to mention the laying of ambushes and traps, the masking of military
operations such as marches or the erection of batteries and the like,
the feigning of attacks or flights or withdrawals, the carrying out of a
surprise, and other stratagems employed every day in war. But it is
important to know that, when useful, feigned signals and bugle-calls may
be ordered, the watchword of the enemy may be used, deceitful
intelligence may be disseminated,[317] the signals and the bugle-calls
of the enemy may be mimicked[318] to mislead his forces. And even such
detestable acts[319] as bribery of enemy commanders and officials in
high position, and secret seduction of enemy soldiers to desertion, and
of enemy subjects to insurrection, are frequently committed, although
many writers protest. As regards the use of the national flag, the
military ensigns, and the uniforms of the enemy, theory and practice
are unanimous in rejecting it during actual attack and defence, since
the principle is considered inviolable that during actual fighting
belligerent forces ought to be certain who is friend and who is foe. But
many[320] publicists maintain that until the actual fighting begins
belligerent forces may by way of stratagem make use of the national
flag, military ensigns, and uniforms of the enemy. Article 23 (_f_) of
the Hague Regulations does not prohibit any and every use of these
symbols, but only their _improper_ use, thus leaving the question
open,[321] what uses are proper and what are not. Those who have
hitherto taught the admissibility of the use of these symbols outside
actual fighting can correctly maintain that the quoted article 23 (_f_)
does not prohibit it.[322]

[Footnote 316: See _Land Warfare_, [p] 144, where a great number of
legitimate ruses are enumerated.]

[Footnote 317: See the examples quoted by Pradier-Fodere, VI. No. 2761.]

[Footnote 318: See Pradier-Fodere, VI. No. 2760.]

[Footnote 319: The point has been discussed above in [p] 162.]

[Footnote 320: See, for instance, Hall, [p] 187; Bluntschli, [p] 565;
Taylor, [p] 488; Calvo, IV. No. 2106; Pillet, p. 95; Longuet, [p] 54.
But, on the other hand, the number of publicists who consider it illegal
to make use of the enemy flag, ensigns, and uniforms, even before an
actual attack, is daily becoming larger; see, for instance, Lueder in
Holtzendorff, IV. p. 458; Merignhac, p. 166; Pradier-Fodere, VI. No.
2760; Bonfils, No. 1074; _Kriegsbrauch_, p. 24. As regards the use of
the enemy flag on the part of men-of-war, see below, in [p] 211.]

[Footnote 321: Some writers maintain that article 23 (_f_) of the Hague
Regulations has settled the controversy, but they forget that this
article speaks only of the _improper_ use of the enemy ensigns and
uniform. See _Land Warfare_, [p] 152.]

[Footnote 322: The use of the enemy uniform for the purpose of deceit is
different from the case when members of armed forces who are deficient
in clothes wear the uniforms of prisoners or of the enemy dead. If this
is done--and it always will be done if necessary--such distinct
alterations in the uniform ought to be made as will make it apparent to
which side the soldiers concerned belong (see _Land Warfare_, [p] 154).
Different again is the case where soldiers are, through lack of
clothing, obliged to wear the apparel of civilians, such as greatcoats,
hats, and the like. Care must then be taken that the soldiers concerned
do nevertheless wear a fixed distinctive emblem which marks them as
soldiers, since otherwise they lose the privileges of members of the
armed forces of the belligerents (see article 1, No. 2, of the Hague
Regulations). During the Russo-Japanese War both belligerents repeatedly
accused each other of using Chinese clothing for members of their armed
forces; the soldiers concerned apparently were obliged through lack of
proper clothing temporarily to make use of Chinese garments. See,
however, Takahashi, pp. 174-178.]

[Sidenote: Stratagems in contradistinction to Perfidy.]

[p] 165. Stratagems must be carefully distinguished from perfidy, since
the former are allowed, whereas the latter is prohibited. Halleck (I. p.
566) correctly formulates the distinction by laying down the principle
that, whenever a belligerent has expressly or tacitly engaged and is
therefore bound by a moral obligation to speak the truth to an enemy, it
is perfidy to betray the latter's confidence, because it contains a
breach of good faith.[323] Thus a flag of truce or the cross of the
Geneva Convention must never be made use of for a stratagem,
capitulations must be carried out to the letter, the feigning of
surrender for the purpose of luring the enemy into a trap is a
treacherous act, as is the assassination of enemy commanders or soldiers
or heads of States. On the other hand, stratagem may be met by
stratagem, and a belligerent cannot complain of the enemy who so
deceives him. If, for instance, a spy of the enemy is bribed to give
deceitful intelligence to his employer, or if an officer, who is
approached by the enemy and offered a bribe, accepts it feigningly but
deceives the briber and leads him to disaster, no perfidy is committed.

[Footnote 323: See _Land Warfare_, [p][p] 139-142, 146-150.]


XII

OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY

  Grotius, III. c. 6, [p] 4--Vattel, III. [p][p] 197-200--Hall,
  [p][p] 153-161--Westlake, II. pp. 83-106--Lawrence, [p][p]
  176-179--Maine, pp. 176-183--Halleck, II. pp. 432-466--Taylor,
  [p][p] 568-579--Wharton, III. [p][p] 354-355--Moore, VII. [p][p]
  1143-1155--Bluntschli, [p][p] 539-551--Heffter, [p][p]
  131-132--Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 510-524--Klueber, [p][p]
  255-256--G. F. Martens, II. [p] 280--Ullmann, [p] 183--Bonfils,
  Nos. 1156-1175--Despagnet, Nos. 567-578--Pradier-Fodere, VII. Nos.
  2939-2988, 3019-3028--Nys, III. pp. 309-351--Rivier, II. pp.
  299-306--Calvo, IV. [p][p] 2166-2198--Fiore, III. Nos. 1454-1481,
  and Code, Nos. 1535-1563--Martens, II. [p][p] 117-119--Longuet,
  [p][p] 115-133--Merignhac, pp. 241-262--Pillet, pp. 237-259--Zorn,
  pp. 213-243--_Kriegsbrauch_, pp. 45-50--Holland, _War_, Nos.
  102-106--Bordwell, pp. 312-330--Meurer, II. [p][p] 45-55--Spaight,
  pp. 320-380--_Land Warfare_, [p][p] 340-405--Waxel, _L'armee
  d'invasion el la population_ (1874)--Litta, _L'occupazione
  militare_ (1874)--Loening, _Die Verwaltung des
  General-Gouvernements im Elsass_ (1874), and in _R.I._ IV. (1872),
  p. 622, V. (1873), p. 69--Bernier, _De l'occupation militaire en
  temps de guerre_ (1884)--Corsi, _L'occupazione militare in tempo
  di guerra e le relazione internazionale che ne derivano_ (2nd
  edit. 1886)--Bray, _De l'occupation militaire en temps de guerre,
  etc._ (1891)--Magoon, _Law of Civil Government under Military
  Occupation_ (2nd edit. 1900)--Lorriot, _De la nature de
  l'occupation de guerre_ (1903)--Deherpe, _Essai sur le
  developpement de l'occupation en droit international_
  (1903)--Sichel, _Die kriegerische Besetzung feindlichen
  Staatsgebietes_ (1905)--Nowacki, _Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege_
  (1906), pp. 78-90--_Rolin-Jaequemyns_ in _R.I._ II. (1870), p.
  666, and III. (1871), p. 311.

[Sidenote: Occupation as an Aim of Warfare.]

[p] 166. If a belligerent succeeds in occupying a part or even the whole
of the enemy territory, he has realised a very important aim of warfare.
He can now not only make use of the resources of the enemy country for
military purposes, but can also keep it for the time being as a pledge
of his military success, and thereby impress upon the enemy the
necessity of submitting to terms of peace. And in regard to occupation,
International Law respecting warfare has progressed more than in any
other department. In former times enemy territory that was occupied by a
belligerent was in every point considered his State property, with which
and with the inhabitants therein he could do what he liked. He could
devastate the country with fire and sword, appropriate all public and
private property therein, kill the inhabitants, or take them away into
captivity, or make them take an oath of allegiance. He could, even
before the war was decided and his occupation was definitive, dispose of
the territory by ceding it to a third State, and an instance of this
happened during the Northern War (1700-1718), when in 1715 Denmark sold
the occupied Swedish territories of Bremen and Verden to Hanover. That
an occupant could force the inhabitants of the occupied territory to
serve in his own army and to fight against their legitimate sovereign,
was indubitable. Thus, during the Seven Years' War, Frederick II. of
Prussia repeatedly made forcible levies of thousands of recruits in
Saxony, which he had occupied. But during the second half of the
eighteenth century things gradually began to undergo a change. That the
distinction between mere temporary military occupation of territory, on
the one hand, and, on the other, real acquisition of territory through
conquest and subjugation, became more and more apparent, is shown by the
fact that Vattel (III. [p] 197) drew attention to it. However, it was
not till long after the Napoleonic wars in the nineteenth century that
the consequences of this distinction were carried to their full extent
by the theory and practice of International Law. So late as 1808, after
the Russian troops had militarily occupied Finland, which was at that
time a part of Sweden, Alexander I. of Russia made the inhabitants take
an oath of allegiance,[324] although it was only by article 4 of the
Peace Treaty of Frederikshamm[325] of September 17, 1809, that Sweden
ceded Finland to Russia. The first writer who drew all the consequences
of the distinction between mere military occupation and real acquisition
of territory was Heffter in his treatise _Das Europaeische Voelkerrecht
der Gegenwart_ ([p] 131), which made its appearance in 1844. And it is
certain that it took the whole of the nineteenth century to develop such
rules regarding occupation as are now universally recognised and in many
respects enacted by articles 42-56 of the Hague Regulations.

[Footnote 324: See Martens, _N.R._ I. p. 9.]

[Footnote 325: See Martens, _N.R._ I. p. 19.]

In so far as these rules touch upon the special treatment of persons and
property of the inhabitants of, and public property situated within,
occupied territory, they have already been taken into consideration
above in [p][p] 107-154. What concerns us here are the rights and duties
of the occupying belligerent in relation to his political administration
of the territory and to his political authority over its
inhabitants.[326] The principle underlying these modern rules is that,
although the occupant does in no wise acquire sovereignty over such
territory through the mere fact of having occupied it, he actually
exercises for the time being a military authority over it. As he thereby
prevents the legitimate Sovereign from exercising his authority and
claims obedience for himself from the inhabitants, he has to administer
the country not only in the interest of his own military advantage, but
also, so far as possible at any rate, for the public benefit of the
inhabitants. Thus the present International Law not only gives certain
rights to an occupant, but also imposes certain duties upon him.

[Footnote 326: The Hague Regulations (Section III. articles 42-56), and
all the French writers, but also many others, treat under the heading
"occupation" not only of the rights and duties of an occupant concerning
the political administration of the country and the political authority
over the inhabitants, but also of other matters, such as appropriation
of public and private property, requisitions and contributions, and
destruction of public and private property, violence against private
enemy subjects and enemy officials. These matters have, however, nothing
to do with occupation, but are better discussed in connection with the
means of land warfare; see above, [p][p] 107-154.]

[Sidenote: Occupation, when effected.]

[p] 167. Since an occupant, although his power is merely military, has
certain rights and duties, the first question to deal with is, when and
under what circumstances a territory must be considered occupied.

Now it is certain that mere invasion is not occupation. Invasion is the
marching or riding of troops--or the flying of a military air
vessel--into enemy country. Occupation is invasion _plus_ taking
possession of enemy country for the purpose of holding it, at any rate
temporarily. The difference between mere invasion and occupation becomes
apparent by the fact that an occupant sets up some kind of
administration, whereas the mere invader does not. A small belligerent
force can raid enemy territory without establishing any administration,
but quickly rush on to some place in the interior for the purpose of
reconnoitring, of destroying a bridge or depot of munitions and
provisions, and the like, and quickly withdraw after having realised its
purpose.[327] Although it may correctly be asserted that, so long and in
so far as such raiding force is in possession of a locality and sets up
a temporary administration therein, it occupies this locality, yet it
certainly does not occupy the whole territory, and even the occupation
of such locality ceases the moment the force withdraws.

[Footnote 327: See _Land Warfare_, [p] 343.]

However this may be, as a rule occupation will be coincident with
invasion. The troops march into a district, and the moment they get into
a village or town--unless they are actually fighting their way--they
take possession of the Municipal Offices, the Post Office, the Police
Stations, and the like, and assert their authority there. From the
military point of view such villages and towns are now "occupied."
Article 42 of the Hague Regulations enacts that territory is considered
occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile
army, and that such occupation applies only to the territory where that
authority is established and in a position to assert itself. This
definition of occupation is not at all precise, but it is as precise as
a legal definition of such kind of fact as occupation can be. If, as
some publicists[328] maintain, only such territory were actually
occupied, in which every part is held by a sufficient number of soldiers
to enforce immediately and on the very spot the authority of an
occupant, an effective occupation of a large territory would be
impossible, since then not only in every town, village, and railway
station, but also in every isolated habitation and hut the presence of a
sufficient number of soldiers would be necessary. Reasonably no other
conditions ought to be laid down as necessary to constitute effective
occupation in war than those under which in time of peace a Sovereign is
able to assert his authority over a territory. What these conditions are
is a question of fact which is to be answered according to the merits of
the special case. When the legitimate Sovereign is prevented from
exercising his powers and the occupant, being able to assert his
authority, actually establishes an administration over a territory, it
matters not with what means and in what ways his authority is exercised.
For instance, when in the centre of a territory a large force is
established from which flying columns are constantly sent round the
territory, such territory is indeed effectively occupied, provided there
are no enemy forces present, and, further, provided these columns can
really keep the territory concerned under control.[329] Again, when an
army is marching on through enemy territory, taking possession of the
lines of communication and the open towns, surrounding the fortresses
with besieging forces, and disarming the inhabitants in open places of
habitation, the whole territory left behind the army is effectively
occupied, provided some kind of administration is established, and
further provided that, as soon as it becomes necessary to assert the
authority of the occupant, a sufficient force can within reasonable time
be sent to the locality affected. The conditions vary with those of the
country concerned. When a vast country is thinly populated, a smaller
force is necessary to occupy it, and a smaller number of centres need be
garrisoned than in the case of a thickly populated country. Thus, the
occupation of the former Orange Free State and the former South African
Republic became effective in 1901 some time after their annexation by
Great Britain and the degeneration of ordinary war into guerilla war,
although only about 250,000 British soldiers had to keep up the
occupation of a territory of about 500,000 square miles. The fact that
all the towns and all the lines of communication were in the hands and
under the administration of the British army, that the inhabitants of
smaller places were taken away into concentration camps, that the enemy
forces were either in captivity or dispersed into comparatively small
guerilla bands, and finally, that wherever such bands tried to make an
attack, a sufficient British force could within reasonable time make its
appearance, was quite sufficient to assert British authority[330] over
that vast territory, although it was more than a year before peace was
finally established.

[Footnote 328: See, for instance, Hall, [p] 161. This was also the
standpoint of the delegates of the smaller States at the Brussels
Conference of 1874 when the Declaration of Brussels was drafted.]

[Footnote 329: This is not identical with so-called _constructive_
occupation, but is really _effective_ occupation. An occupation is
constructive only if an invader declares districts as occupied over
which he actually does not exercise control--for instance, when he
actually occupies only the capital of a large province, and proclaims
that he has thereby occupied the whole of the province, although he does
not take any steps to exercise control over it.]

[Footnote 330: The annexation of the Orange Free State dates from May
24, 1900, and that of the South African Republic from September 1, 1900.
It may well be doubted whether at these dates the occupation of the
territories concerned was already so complete as to be called effective.
The British Government ought not, therefore, to have proclaimed the
annexation at such early dates. But there ought to be no doubt that the
occupation became effective some time afterwards, in 1901. See, however,
Sir Thomas Barclay in _The Law Quarterly Review_, XXI. (1905), p. 307,
who asserts the contrary; see also, below, [p] 264, p. 326, note 2, and
[p] 265, p. 327, note 1. _The Times' History of the War in South Africa_
(vol. V. p. 251) estimates the number of Boer fighters in May 1901 to be
about 13,000. These armed men were dispersed into a very large number of
guerilla bands, and they were in a great many cases men who seemingly
had submitted to the British authorities, but afterwards had taken up
arms.]

It must be emphasised that the rules regarding effective occupation must
be formulated on the basis of actual practice quite as much as rules
regarding other matters of International Law. Those rules are not
authoritative which are laid down by theorists, but only those which are
abstracted from the actual practice of warfare and are unopposed by the
Powers.[331]

[Footnote 331: The question is so much controverted that it is
impossible to enumerate the different opinions. Readers who want to
study the question must be referred to the literature quoted above at
the commencement of [p] 166.]

[Sidenote: Occupation, when ended.]

[p] 168. Occupation comes to an end when an occupant withdraws from a
territory or is driven out of it. Thus, occupation remains only over a
limited area of a territory if the forces in occupation are drawn into a
fortress on that territory and are there besieged by the re-advancing
enemy, or if the occupant concentrates his forces in a certain place of
the territory, withdrawing before the re-advancing enemy. But occupation
does not cease because the occupant, after having disarmed the
inhabitants and having made arrangements for the administration of the
country, is marching on to overtake the retreating enemy, leaving only
comparatively few soldiers behind.

[Sidenote: Rights and Duties in General of the Occupant.]

[p] 169. As the occupant actually exercises authority, and as the
legitimate Government is prevented from exercising its authority, the
occupant acquires a temporary right of administration over the
respective territory and its inhabitants. And all steps he takes in the
exercise of this right must be recognised by the legitimate Government
after occupation has ceased. This administration is in no wise to be
compared with ordinary administration, for it is distinctly and
precisely military administration. In carrying it out the occupant is,
on the one hand, totally independent of the Constitution and the laws
of the respective territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare, and
since the maintenance and safety of his forces and the purpose of war
stand in the foreground of his interest and must be promoted under all
circumstances and conditions. But, although as regards the safety of his
army and the purpose of war the occupant is vested with an almost
absolute power, he is not the Sovereign of the territory, and therefore
has no right to make changes in the laws or in the administration except
those which are temporarily necessitated by his interest in the
maintenance and safety of his army and the realisation of the purpose of
war. On the contrary, he has the duty of administrating the country
according to the existing laws and the existing rules of administration;
he must insure public order and safety, must respect family honour and
rights, individual lives, private property, religious convictions and
liberty. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations enacts the following rule
which is of fundamental importance: "The authority of the legitimate
Power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter
shall take all steps in his power to re-establish and insure, as far as
possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country."

[Sidenote: Rights of the Occupant regarding the Inhabitants.]

[p] 170. An occupant having authority over the territory, the
inhabitants are under his sway and have to render obedience to his
commands. However, the power of the occupant over the inhabitants is not
unrestricted, for articles 23, 44, and 45 of the Hague Regulations
expressly enact, that he is prohibited from compelling the inhabitants
to take part in military operations against the legitimate Government,
to give information concerning the army of the other belligerent or
concerning the latter's means of defence, or to take an oath of
allegiance. On the other hand, he may compel them to take an
oath--sometimes called an "oath of neutrality"--to abstain from taking
up a hostile attitude against the occupant and willingly to submit to
his legitimate commands; and he may punish them severely for breaking
this oath. He may make requisitions and demand contributions[332] from
them, may compel them to render services as drivers, farriers, and the
like.[333] He may compel them to render services for the repair or the
erection of such roads, buildings, or other works as are necessary for
military operations.[334] He may also collect the ordinary taxes, dues,
and tolls imposed for the benefit of the State by the legitimate
Government. But in such case he is, according to article 48 of the Hague
Regulations, obliged to make the collection, as far as possible, in
accordance with the rules in existence and the assessment in force, and
he is, on the other hand, bound to defray the expenses of the
administration of the occupied territory on the same scale as that by
which the legitimate Government was bound.

[Footnote 332: See above, [p][p] 147 and 148.]

[Footnote 333: Formerly he could likewise compel them to render services
as guides, but this is now prohibited by the wording which article 44
received from the Second Peace Conference. It should, however, be
mentioned that Germany, Austria-Hungary, Japan, Montenegro, and Russia
have signed Convention IV. with a reservation against article 44, and
that in a war with these Powers the old rule is valid that inhabitants
may be compelled to serve as guides.]

[Footnote 334: See article 52 of the Hague regulations, and _Land
Warfare_, [p][p] 388-392.]

Whoever does not comply with his commands, or commits a prohibited act,
may be punished by him; but article 50 of the Hague Regulations
expressly enacts the rule that _no general penalty, pecuniary or
otherwise, may be inflicted on the population on account of the acts of
individuals for which it cannot be regarded as collectively
responsible_. It must, however, be specially observed that this rule
does not at all prevent[335] reprisals on the part of belligerents
occupying enemy territory. In case acts of illegitimate warfare are
committed by enemy individuals not belonging to the armed forces,
reprisals may be resorted to, although practically innocent individuals
are thereby punished for illegal acts for which they are neither legally
nor morally responsible--for instance, when a village is burned by way
of reprisal for a treacherous attack committed there on enemy soldiers
by some unknown individuals.[336] Nor does this new rule prevent an
occupant from taking hostages[337] in the interest of the safety of the
line of communication threatened by guerillas not belonging to the armed
forces, or for other purposes,[338] although the hostage must suffer for
acts or omissions of others for which he is neither legally nor morally
responsible.

[Footnote 335: See Holland, _War_, No. 110, and _Land Warfare_, [p][p]
385-386. See also Zorn, pp. 239-243, where an important interpretation
of article 50 is discussed.]

[Footnote 336: See below, [p] 248.]

[Footnote 337: But this is a moot point; see below, [p] 259.]

[Footnote 338: Belligerents sometimes take hostages for the purpose of
securing compliance with demands for contributions, requisitions, and
the like. As long as such hostages obtain the same treatment as
prisoners of war, the practice does not seem to be illegal, although the
Hague Regulations do not mention and many publicists condemn it; see
above, [p] 116, p. 153, note 1, and below, [p] 259, p. 319, note 2.]

It must be particularly noted that in the treatment of the inhabitants
of enemy territory the occupant need not make any difference between
such as are subjects of the enemy and such as are subjects of neutral
States.[339]

[Footnote 339: See above,[p] 88, and Frankenbach, _Die Rechtsstellung
von neutralen Staatsangehoerigen in kriegfuehrenden Staaten_ (1910), pp.
46-50.]

And it must be further observed that, according to British and American
views--see above, [p] 100_a_--article 23 (_h_) of the Hague Regulations
prohibits an occupant of enemy territory from declaring extinguished,
suspended, or unenforceable in a Court of Law the rights and the rights
of action of the inhabitants.

[Sidenote: Position of Government Officials and Municipal Functionaries
during Occupation.]

[p] 171. As through occupation authority over the territory actually
passes into the hands of the occupant, he may for the time of his
occupation depose all Government officials and municipal functionaries
that have not withdrawn with the retreating enemy. On the other hand, he
must not compel them by force to carry on their functions during
occupation, if they refuse to do so, except where a military necessity
for the carrying on of a certain function arises. If they are willing to
serve under him, he may make them take an oath of obedience, but not of
allegiance, and he may not compel them to carry on their functions in
his name, but he may prevent them from doing so in the name of the
legitimate Government.[340] Since, according to article 43 of the Hague
Regulations, he has to secure public order and safety, he must
temporarily appoint other functionaries in case those of the legitimate
Government refuse to serve under him, or in case he deposes them for the
time of the occupation.

[Footnote 340: Many publicists assert that in case an occupant leaves
officials of the legitimate Government in office, he "must" pay them
their ordinary salaries. But I cannot see that there is a customary or
conventional rule in existence concerning this point. But it is in an
occupant's own interest to pay such salaries. and he will as a rule do
this. Only in the case of article 48 of the Hague Regulations is he
compelled to do it.]

[Sidenote: Position of Courts of Justice during Occupation.]

[p] 172. The particular position which Courts of Justice have nowadays
in civilised countries, makes it necessary to discuss their position
during occupation.[341] There is no doubt that an occupant may suspend
the judges as well as other officials. However, if he does suspend them,
he must temporarily appoint others in their place. If they are willing
to serve under him, he must respect their independence according to the
laws of the country. Where it is necessary, he may set up military
Courts instead of the ordinary Courts. In case and in so far as he
admits the administration of justice by the ordinary Courts, he may
nevertheless, so far as it is necessary for military purposes or for the
maintenance of public order and safety, temporarily alter the laws,
especially the Criminal Law, on the basis of which justice is
administered, as well as the laws regarding procedure. He has, however,
no right to constrain the Courts to pronounce their verdicts in his
name, although he need not allow them to pronounce verdicts in the name
of the legitimate Government. A case that happened during the
Franco-German War may serve as an illustration. In September 1870, after
the fall of the Emperor Napoleon and the proclamation of the French
Republic, the Court of Appeal at Nancy pronounced its verdicts under the
formula "In the name of the French Government and People." Since Germany
had not yet recognised the French Republic, the Germans ordered the
Court to use the formula "In the name of the High German Powers
occupying Alsace and Lorraine," but gave the Court to understand that,
if the Court objected to this formula, they were disposed to admit
another, and were even ready to admit the formula "In the name of the
Emperor of the French," as the Emperor had not abdicated. The Court,
however, refused to pronounce its verdict otherwise than "In the name of
the French Government and People," and, consequently, suspended its
sittings. There can be no doubt that the Germans had no right to order
the formula, "In the name of the High German Powers, &c.," to be used,
but they were certainly not obliged to admit the formula preferred by
the Court; and the fact that they were disposed to admit another formula
than that at first ordered ought to have made the Court accept a
compromise. Bluntschli ([p] 547) correctly maintains that the most
natural solution of the difficulty would have been to use the neutral
formula "In the name of the Law."

[Footnote 341: See Petit, _L'Administration de la justice en territoire
occupe_ (1900).]




CHAPTER IV

WARFARE ON SEA


I

ON SEA WARFARE IN GENERAL

  Hall, [p] 147--Lawrence, [p][p] 193-194--Westlake, II. pp.
  120-132--Maine, pp. 117-122--Manning, pp. 183-184--Phillimore,
  III. [p] 347--Twiss, II. [p] 73--Halleck, II. pp. 80-82--Taylor,
  [p] 547--Wharton, III. [p][p] 342-345--Wheaton, [p]
  355--Bluntschli, [p][p] 665-667--Heffter, [p] 139--Geffcken in
  Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 547-548, 571-581--Ullmann, [p][p]
  187-188--Bonfils, Nos. 1268, 1294-1338--Despagnet, Nos.
  647-649--Pradier-Fodere, VIII. Nos. 3066-3090, 3107-3108--Nys,
  III. pp. 433-466--Rivier, II. pp. 329-335--Calvo, IV. [p][p] 2123,
  2379-2410--Fiore, III. Nos. 1399-1413--Pillet, pp.
  118-120--Perels, [p] 36--Testa, pp. 147-157--Boeck, Nos.
  3-153--Lawrence, _Essays_, pp. 278-306--Westlake, _Chapters_, pp.
  245-253--Ortolan, I. pp. 35-50--Hautefeuille, I. pp.
  161-167--Gessner, Westlake, Lorimer, Rolin-Jaequemyns, Laveleye,
  Alberic Rolin, and Pierantoni in _R.I._ VII. (1875), pp. 256-272
  and 558-656--Twiss, in _R.I._ XVI. (1884), pp. 113-137--See also
  the authors quoted below, [p] 178, p. 223, note 1.

[Sidenote: Aims and Means of Sea Warfare.]

[p] 173. The purpose of war is the same in the case of warfare on land
or on sea--namely, the overpowering of the enemy. But sea warfare serves
this purpose by attempting the accomplishment of aims different from
those of land warfare. Whereas the aims of land warfare are defeat of
the enemy army and occupation of the enemy territory, the aims[342] of
sea warfare are: defeat of the enemy navy; annihilation of the enemy
merchant fleet; destruction of enemy coast fortifications, and of
maritime as well as military establishments on the enemy coast; cutting
off intercourse with the enemy coast; prevention of carriage of
contraband and of rendering unneutral service to the enemy; all kinds
of support to military operations on land, such as protection of a
landing of troops on the enemy coast; and lastly, defence of the home
coast and protection to the home merchant fleet.[343] The means by which
belligerents in sea warfare endeavour to realise these aims are: attack
on and seizure of enemy vessels, violence against enemy individuals,
appropriation and destruction of enemy vessels and goods carried by
them, requisitions and contributions, bombardment of the enemy coast,
cutting of submarine cables, blockade, espionage, treason, ruses,
capture of neutral vessels carrying contraband or rendering unneutral
service.

[Footnote 342: Aims of sea warfare must not be confounded with ends of
war; see above, [p] 66.]

[Footnote 343: Article 1 of the U.S. Naval War Code enumerates the
following as aims of sea warfare:--The capture or destruction of the
military and naval forces of the enemy, of his fortifications, arsenals,
dry docks, and dockyards, of his various military and naval
establishments, and of his maritime commerce; to prevent his procuring
war material from neutral sources; to aid and assist military operations
on land; to protect and defend the national territory, property, and
sea-borne commerce.]

[Sidenote: Lawful and Unlawful Practices of Sea Warfare.]

[p] 174. As regards means of sea warfare, just as regards means of land
warfare, it must be emphasised that not every practice capable of
injuring the enemy in offence and defence is lawful. Although no
regulations regarding the laws of war on sea have as yet been enacted by
a general law-making treaty as a pendant to the Hague Regulations, there
are treaties concerning special points--such as submarine mines,
bombardment by naval forces, and others--and customary rules of
International Law in existence which regulate the matter. Be that as it
may, the rules concerning sea warfare are in many points identical with,
but in many respects differ from, the rules in force regarding warfare
on land. Therefore, the means of sea warfare must be discussed
separately in the following sections. But blockade and capture of
vessels carrying contraband and rendering unneutral service to the
enemy, although they are means of warfare against an enemy, are of such
importance as regards neutral trade that they will be discussed below in
Part III. [p][p] 368-413.

[Sidenote: Objects of the Means of Sea Warfare.]

[p] 175. Whereas the objects against which means of land warfare may be
directed are innumerable, the number of the objects against which means
of sea warfare are directed is very limited, comprising six objects
only. The chief object is enemy vessels, whether public or private; the
next, enemy individuals, with distinction between those taking part in
fighting and others; the third, enemy goods on enemy vessels; the
fourth, the enemy coast; the fifth and sixth, neutral vessels attempting
to break blockade, carrying contraband, or rendering unneutral service
to the enemy.

[Sidenote: Development of International Law regarding Private Property
on Sea.]

[p] 176. It is evident that in times when a belligerent could destroy
all public and private enemy property he was able to seize, no special
rule existed regarding private enemy ships and private enemy property
carried by them on the sea. But the practice of sea warfare frequently
went beyond the limits of even so wide a right, treating neutral goods
on enemy ships as enemy goods, and treating neutral ships carrying enemy
goods as enemy ships. It was not until the time of the _Consolato del
Mare_ in the fourteenth century that a set of clear and definite rules
with regard to private enemy vessels and private enemy property on sea
in contradistinction to neutral ships and neutral goods was adopted.
According to this famous collection of maritime usages observed by the
communities of the Mediterranean, there is no doubt that a belligerent
may seize and appropriate all private enemy ships and goods. But a
distinction is made in case of either ship or goods being neutral.
Although an enemy ship may always be appropriated, neutral goods thereon
have to be restored to the neutral owners. On the other hand, enemy
goods on neutral ships may be appropriated, but the neutral ships
carrying such goods must be restored to their owners. However, these
rules of the _Consolato del Mare_ were not at all generally recognised,
although they were adopted by several treaties between single States
during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Neither the communities
belonging to the Hanseatic League, nor the Netherlands and Spain during
the War of Independence, nor England and Spain during their wars in the
sixteenth century, adopted these rules. And France expressly enacted by
Ordinances of 1543 (article 42) and 1583 (article 69) that neutral goods
on enemy ships as well as neutral ships carrying enemy goods should be
appropriated.[344] Although France adopted in 1650 the rules of the
_Consolato del Mare_, Louis XIV. dropped them again by the Ordinance of
1681 and re-enacted that neutral goods on enemy ships and neutral ships
carrying enemy goods should be appropriated. Spain enacted the same
rules in 1718. The Netherlands, in contradistinction to the _Consolato
del Mare_, endeavoured by a number of treaties to foster the principle
that the flag covers the goods, so that enemy goods on neutral vessels
were exempt from, whereas neutral goods on enemy vessels were subject
to, appropriation. On the other hand, throughout the eighteenth and
during the nineteenth century down to the beginning of the Crimean War
in 1854, England adhered to the rules of the _Consolato del Mare_. Thus,
no generally accepted rules of International Law regarding private
property on sea were in existence.[345] Matters were made worse by
privateering, which was generally recognised as lawful, and by the fact
that belligerents frequently declared a coast blockaded without having a
sufficient number of men-of-war on the spot to make the blockade
effective. It was not until the Declaration of Paris in 1856 that
general rules of International Law regarding private property on sea
came into existence.

[Footnote 344: _Robe d'ennemy confisque celle d'amy. Confiscantur ex
navibus res, ex rebus naves._]

[Footnote 345: Boeck, Nos. 3-103, and Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp.
572-578, give excellent summaries of the facts.]

[Sidenote: Declaration of Paris.]

[p] 177. Things began to undergo a change with the outbreak of the
Crimean War in 1854, when all the belligerents proclaimed that they
would not issue Letters of Marque, and when, further, Great Britain
declared that she would not seize enemy goods on neutral vessels, and
when, thirdly, France declared that she would not appropriate neutral
goods on enemy vessels. Although this alteration of attitude on the part
of the belligerents was originally intended for the Crimean War only and
exceptionally, it led after the conclusion of peace in 1856 to the
famous and epoch-making Declaration of Paris,[346] which enacted the
four rules--(1) that privateering is abolished, (2) that the neutral
flag covers enemy goods[347] with the exception of contraband of war,
(3) that neutral goods, contraband of war excepted, are not liable to
capture under the enemy flag, (4) that blockades, in order to be
binding, must be effective, which means maintained by a force sufficient
really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy. Since, with the
exception of a few States such as the United States of America,
Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Uruguay, all members of the Family of
Nations are now parties to the Declaration of Paris, it may well be
maintained that the rules quoted are general International Law, the more
so as the non-signatory Powers have hitherto in practice always acted
in accordance with those rules.[348]

[Footnote 346: See Martens, _N.R.G._ XV. p. 767, and above, vol. I. [p]
559.]

[Footnote 347: It has been asserted--see, for instance, Rivier, II. p.
429--that the neutral flag covers only private, not public, enemy
property, and therefore that such goods on neutral vessels as belong to
the State of the enemy may be seized and appropriated. This opinion
would seem, however, to be untenable in face of the fact that the
Declaration of Paris speaks of _marchandise neutre_ without any
qualification, only excepting contraband goods, thus protecting the
whole of the cargo under the neutral flag, contraband excepted. See
below, [p] 319, p. 385, note 3.]

[Footnote 348: That there is an agitation for the abolition of the
Declaration of Paris has been mentioned above, [p] 83, p. 100, note 3.]

[Sidenote: The Principle of Appropriation of Private Enemy Vessels and
Enemy Goods thereon.]

[p] 178. The Declaration of Paris did not touch upon the old rule that
private enemy vessels and private enemy goods thereon may be seized and
appropriated, and this rule is, therefore, as valid as ever, although
there is much agitation for its abolition. In 1785 Prussia and the
United States of America had already stipulated by article 23 of their
Treaty of Friendship[349] that in case of war between the parties each
other's merchantmen shall not be seized and appropriated. Again, in 1871
the United States and Italy, by article 12 of their Treaty of
Commerce,[350] stipulated that in case of war between the parties each
other's merchantmen, with the exception of those carrying contraband of
war or attempting to break a blockade, shall not be seized and
appropriated. In 1823 the United States had already made the proposal to
Great Britain, France, and Russia[351] for a treaty abrogating the rule
that enemy merchantmen and enemy goods thereon may be appropriated; but
Russia alone accepted the proposal under the condition that all other
naval Powers should consent. Again, in 1856,[352] on the occasion of the
Declaration of Paris, the United States endeavoured to obtain the
victory of the principle that enemy merchantmen shall not be
appropriated, making it a condition of their accession to the
Declaration of Paris that this principle should be recognised. But again
the attempt failed, owing to the opposition of Great Britain.

[Footnote 349: See Martens, _R._ IV. p. 37. Perels (p. 198) maintains
that this article has not been adopted by the Treaty of Commerce between
Prussia and the United States of May 1, 1828; but this statement is
incorrect, for article 12 of this treaty--see Martens, _N.R._ VII. p.
615--adopts it expressly.]

[Footnote 350: See Martens, _N.R.G._ 2nd Ser. I. p. 57.]

[Footnote 351: See Wharton, III. [p] 342, pp. 260-261, and Moore, VII.
[p] 1198, p. 465.]

[Footnote 352: See Wharton, III. [p] 342, pp. 270-287, and Moore, VII.
[p] 1198, p. 466.]

At the outbreak of war in 1866, Prussia and Austria expressly declared
that they would not seize and appropriate each other's merchantmen. At
the outbreak of the Franco-German War in 1870, Germany declared French
merchantmen exempt from capture, but she changed her attitude when
France did not act upon the same lines. It should also be mentioned that
already in 1865 Italy, by article 211 of her Marine Code, enacted that,
in case of war with any other State, enemy merchantmen not carrying
contraband of war or breaking a blockade shall not be seized and
appropriated, provided reciprocity be granted. And it should further be
mentioned that the United States of America made attempts[353] in vain
to secure immunity from capture to enemy merchantmen and goods on sea at
the First as well as at the Second Hague Peace Conference.

[Footnote 353: See Holls, _The Peace Conference at the Hague_, pp.
306-321, and Scott, _Conferences_, pp. 699-707.]

It cannot be denied that the constant agitation, since the middle of the
eighteenth century, in favour of the abolition of the rule that private
enemy vessels and goods may be captured on the High Seas, might, during
the second half of the nineteenth century, have met with success but for
the decided opposition of Great Britain. Public opinion in Great Britain
was not, and is not, prepared to consent to the abolition of this rule.
And there is no doubt that the abolition of the rule would involve a
certain amount of danger to a country like Great Britain whose position
and power depend chiefly upon her navy. The possibility of annihilating
an enemy's commerce by annihilating his merchant fleet is a powerful
weapon in the hands of a great naval Power. Moreover, if enemy
merchantmen are not captured, they can be fitted out as cruisers, or at
least be made use of for the transport of troops, munitions, and
provisions. Have not several maritime States made arrangements with
their steamship companies to secure the building of their Transatlantic
liners according to plans which make these merchantmen easily
convertible into men-of-war?

The argument that it is unjust that private enemy citizens should suffer
through having their property seized has no weight in face of the
probability that fear of the annihilation of its merchant fleet in case
of war may well deter a State intending to go to war from doing so. It
is a matter for politicians, not for jurists, to decide whether Great
Britain must in the interest of self-preservation oppose the abolition
of the rule that sea-borne private enemy property may be confiscated.

However this may be, since the end of the nineteenth century it has not
been the attitude of Great Britain alone which stands in the way of the
abolition of the rule. Since the growth of navies among continental
Powers, these Powers have learnt to appreciate the value of the rule in
war, and the outcry against the capture of merchantmen has become less
loud. To-day, it may perhaps be said that, even if Great Britain were to
propose the abolition of the rule, it is probable that a greater number
of the maritime States would refuse to accede. For it should be noted
that at the Second Peace Conference, France, Russia, Japan, Spain,
Portugal, Mexico, Colombia, and Panama, besides Great Britain, voted
against the abolition of the rule. And there is noticeable a slow, but
constant, increase in the number of continental publicists[354] who
oppose the abolition of the once so much objected to practice of
capturing enemy merchantmen.

[Footnote 354: See, for instance, Perels, [p] 36, pp. 195-198; Roepcke,
_Das Seebeuterecht_ (1904), pp. 36-47; Dupuis, Nos. 29-31; Pillet, p.
119; Giordana, _La proprieta privata nelle guerre maritime, etc._
(1907); Niemeyer, _Prinzipien des Seekriegsrechts_ (1909); Boidin, pp.
144-167. On the other hand, the Institute of International Law has
several times voted in favour of the abolition of the rule; see _Tableau
General de l'Institut de droit International_ (1893), pp. 190-193. The
literature concerning the question of confiscation of private enemy
property on sea is abundant. The following authors, besides those
already quoted above at the commencement of [p] 173, may be
mentioned:--Upton, _The Law of Nations affecting Commerce during War_
(1863); Cauchy, _Du respect de la propriete privee dans la guerre
maritime_ (1866); Vidari, _Del rispetto della proprieta privata fra gli
stati in guerra_ (1867); Gessner, _Zur Reform des Kriegsseerechts_
(1875); Klobukowski, _Die Seebeute oder das feindliche Privateigenthum
zur See_ (1877); Bluntschli, _Das Beuterecht im Kriege und das
Seebeuterecht insbesondere_ (1878); Boeck, _De la propriete privee
ennemie sous pavillon ennemi_ (1882); Dupuis, _La guerre maritime et les
doctrines anglaises_ (1899); Leroy, _La guerre maritime_ (1900);
Roepcke, _Das Seebeuterecht_ (1904); Hirst, _Commerce and Property in
Naval Warfare: A Letter of the Lord Chancellor_ (1906); Hamman, _Der
Streit um das Seebeuterecht_ (1907); Wehberg, _Das Beuterecht im Land
und Seekrieg_ (1909); Cohen, _The Immunity of Enemy's Property from
Capture at Sea_ (1909); Macdonell, _Some plain Reasons for Immunity from
Capture of Private Property at Sea_ (1910). See also the literature
quoted by Bonfils, No. 1281, Pradier-Fodere, VIII. Nos. 3070-3090, and
Boeck, Nos. 382-572, where the arguments of the authors against and in
favour of the present practice are discussed.]

[Sidenote: Impending Codification of Law of Sea Warfare.]

[p] 179. Be that as it may, the time is not very far distant when the
Powers will perforce come to an agreement on this as on other points of
sea warfare, in a code of regulations regarding sea warfare as a pendant
to the Hague Regulations regarding warfare on land. An initiative step
was taken by the United States of America by her Naval War Code[355]
published in 1900, although she withdrew[356] the Code in 1904.
Meanwhile, the Second Peace Conference has produced a number of
Conventions dealing with some parts of Sea Warfare, namely: (1) the
Convention (VI.) concerning the status of enemy merchantmen at the
outbreak of hostilities; (2) the Convention (VII.) concerning the
conversion of merchantmen into warships; (3) the Convention (VIII.)
concerning the laying of automatic submarine contact mines; (4) the
Convention (IX.) concerning the bombardment by naval forces; (5) the
Convention (XI.) concerning restrictions on the exercise of the right of
capture in maritime war.

[Footnote 355: See above, vol. I. [p] 32.]

[Footnote 356: See above, [p] 68, p. 83, note 1.]


II

ATTACK AND SEIZURE OF ENEMY VESSELS

  Hall, [p][p] 138 and 148--Lawrence, [p] 182--Westlake, II. pp.
  133-140, 307-331--Phillimore, III. [p] 347--Twiss, II. [p]
  73--Halleck, II. pp. 105-108--Taylor, [p][p] 545-546--Moore, VII.
  [p][p] 1175-1183, &c.,--Walker, [p] 50, p. 147--Wharton, III. [p]
  345--Bluntschli, [p][p] 664-670--Heffter, [p][p] 137-139--Ullmann,
  [p] 188--Bonfils, Nos. 1269-1271, 1350-1354, 1398-1400--Despagnet,
  Nos. 650-659--Rivier, [p] 66--Nys, III. pp.
  467-478--Pradier-Fodere, VIII. Nos. 3155-3165, 3176-3178--Calvo,
  IV. [p][p] 2368-2378--Fiore, III. Nos. 1414-1424, and Code, Nos.
  1643-1649--Pillet, pp. 120-128--Perels, [p] 35--Testa, pp.
  155-157--Lawrence, _War_, pp. 48-55, 93-111--Ortolan, II. pp.
  31-34--Boeck, Nos. 190-208--Dupuis, Nos. 150-158, and _Guerre_,
  Nos. 74-112--U.S. Naval War Code, articles 13-16--Bernsten, [p][p]
  7-8.

[Sidenote: Importance of Attack and Seizure of Enemy Vessels.]

[p] 180. Whereas in land warfare all sorts of violence against enemy
individuals are the chief means, in sea warfare attack and seizure of
enemy vessels are the most important means. For together with enemy
vessels, a belligerent takes possession of the enemy individuals and
enemy goods thereon, so that he can appropriate vessels and goods, as
well as detain those enemy individuals who belong to the enemy armed
forces as prisoners of war. For this reason, and compared with attack
and seizure of enemy vessels, violence against enemy persons and the
other means of sea warfare play only a secondary part, although such
means are certainly not unimportant. For a weak naval Power can even
restrict the operations of her fleet to mere coast defence, and thus
totally refrain from directly attacking and seizing enemy vessels.

[Sidenote: Attack when legitimate.]

[p] 181. All enemy men-of-war and other public vessels, which are met by
a belligerent's men-of-war on the High Seas or within the territorial
waters of either belligerent,[357] may at once be attacked, and the
attacked vessel may, of course, defend herself by a counter-attack.
Enemy merchantmen may be attacked only if they refuse to submit to visit
after having been duly signalled to do so. And no duty exists for an
enemy merchantman to submit to visit; on the contrary, she may refuse
it, and defend herself against an attack. But only a man-of-war is
competent to attack men-of-war as well as merchantmen, provided the war
takes place between parties to the Declaration of Paris, so that
privateering is prohibited. Any merchantman of a belligerent attacking a
public or private vessel of the enemy would be considered and treated as
a pirate, and the members of the crew would be liable to be treated as
war criminals[358] to the same extent as private individuals committing
hostilities in land warfare. However, if attacked by an enemy vessel, a
merchantman is competent to deliver a counter-attack and need not
discontinue her attack because the vessel which opened hostilities takes
to flight, but may pursue and seize her.

[Footnote 357: But not, of course, in territorial waters of neutral
States; see the _De Fortuyn_ (1760), Burrell 175.]

[Footnote 358: See above, [p] 85, and below, [p] 254. Should a
merchantman, legitimately--after having been herself attacked--or
illegitimately, attack an enemy vessel, and succeed in capturing her,
the prize, on condemnation, becomes _droits_ of Admiralty and,
therefore, the property of the British Government; see article 39 of the
Naval Prize Act, 1864, and article 44 of the Naval Prize Bill introduced
in 1911.]

It must be specially mentioned that an attack upon enemy vessels on the
sea may be made by forces on the shore. For instance, this is done when
coast batteries fire upon an enemy man-of-war within reach of their
guns. Enemy merchantmen, however, may not be attacked in this way, for
they may only be attacked by men-of-war after having been signalled in
vain to submit to visit.

[Sidenote: Attack how effected.]

[p] 182. One mode of attack which was in use at the time of sailing
ships, namely, boarding and fighting the crew, which can be described as
a parallel to assault in land warfare, is no longer used, but if an
instance occurred, it would be perfectly lawful. Attack is nowadays
effected by cannonade, torpedoes, and, if opportunity arises, by
ramming; and nothing forbids an attack on enemy vessels by launching
projectiles and explosives from air-vessels, provided the belligerents
are not parties to the Declaration--see above, [p] 114--which prohibits
such attacks. As a rule attacks on merchantmen will be made by cannonade
only, as the attacking vessel aims at seizing her on account of her
value. But, in case the attacked vessel not only takes to flight, but
defends herself by a counter-attack, all modes of attack are lawful
against her, just as she herself is justified in applying all modes of
attack by way of defence.

As regards attack by torpedoes, article 1 No. 3 of Convention VIII. of
the Second Peace Conference enacts that it is forbidden to use torpedoes
which do not become harmless if they miss their mark.

[Sidenote: Submarine Contact Mines.]

[p] 182_a_. A new mode of attack which requires special attention[359]
is that by means of floating mechanical, in contradistinction to
so-called electro-contact, mines. The latter need not specially be
discussed, because they are connected with a battery on land, can
naturally only be laid within territorial waters, and present no danger
to neutral shipping except on the spot where they are laid. But floating
mechanical mines can be dropped as well in the Open Sea as in
territorial waters; they can, moreover, drift away to any distance from
the spot where they were dropped and thus become a great danger to
navigation in general. Mechanical mines were for the first time used,
and by both parties, in the Russo-Japanese War during the blockade of
Port Arthur in 1904, and the question of their admissibility was at
once raised in the press of all neutral countries, the danger to neutral
shipping being obvious. The Second Peace Conference took the matter up
and, in spite of the opposing views of the Powers, was able to produce
the Convention (VIII.) concerning the laying of automatic submarine
contact mines. This Convention comprises thirteen articles and was
signed, although by some only with reservations, by all the Powers
represented at the Conference, except China, Montenegro, Nicaragua,
Portugal, Russia, Spain, and Sweden. Most of the signatory States have
already ratified, and Nicaragua has since acceded. The more important
stipulations of this Convention are the following:--

(1) Belligerents[360] are forbidden to lay _unanchored_ automatic
contact mines, unless they be so constructed as to become harmless one
hour at most after those who laid them have lost control over them, and
it is forbidden to lay _anchored_ automatic contact mines which do not
become harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings
(article 1).

(2) It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the coasts and
ports of the enemy, with the sole object of intercepting commercial
navigation (article 2).[361]

(3) When anchored automatic contact mines are employed, every possible
precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful navigation. The
belligerents must provide, as far as possible, for these mines becoming
harmless after a limited time has elapsed, and, where the mines cease to
be under observation, to notify the danger zones as soon as military
exigencies permit, by notice to mariners, which must also be
communicated to the Governments through the diplomatic channel (article
3).

(4) At the close of the war, each Power must remove the mines laid by
it. As regards anchored automatic contact mines laid by one of the
belligerents off the coasts of the other, their position must be
notified to the other party by the Power which laid them, and each Power
must proceed with the least possible delay to remove the mines in its
own waters (article 5).

(5) The Convention remains in force for seven years, but, unless
denounced, it continues in force afterwards (article 11). According to
article 12, however, the contracting Powers agree to reopen the question
of the employment of automatic contact mines after six and a half years
unless the Third Peace Conference has already taken up and settled the
matter.

[Footnote 359: See Lawrence, _War_, pp. 93-111; Wetzstein, _Die
Seeminenfrage im Voelkerrecht_ (1909); Rocholl, _Die Frage der Minen im
Seekrieg_ (1910); Barclay, pp. 59 and 158; Lemonon, pp. 472-502;
Higgins, pp. 328-345; Boidin, pp. 216-235; Dupuis, _Guerre_, Nos.
331-358; Scott, _Conferences_, pp. 576-587; Martitz in the _Report of
the 23rd Conference (1906) of the International Law Association_, pp.
47-74; Stockton in _A.J._ II. (1908), pp. 276-284.]

[Footnote 360: As regards neutrals, see below, [p] 363_a_.]

[Footnote 361: France and Germany have signed with reservations against
article 2.]

There is no doubt that the stipulations of Convention VIII. are totally
inadequate to secure the safety of neutral shipping, and it is for this
reason that Great Britain added the following reservation in signing the
Convention:--"In placing their signatures to this Convention the British
plenipotentiaries declare that the mere fact that the said Convention
does not prohibit a particular act or proceeding must not be held to
debar His Britannic Majesty's Government from contesting its
legitimacy." It is to be hoped that the Third Peace Conference will
produce a more satisfactory settlement of the problem. The Institute of
International Law studied the matter at its meetings at Paris in 1910
and at Madrid in 1911, and produced a _Reglementation_[362]
_internationale de l'usage des mines sous-marines et torpilles_,
comprising nine articles, of which the more important are the
following:--

(1) It is forbidden to place anchored or unanchored automatic mines in
the Open Sea (the question of the laying of electric contact mines in
the Open Sea being reserved for future consideration).

(2) Belligerents may lay mines in their own and in the enemy's
territorial waters, but it is forbidden (_a_) to lay unanchored
automatic contact mines which do not become harmless one hour at most
after those who laid them have lost control over them; (_b_) to lay
anchored automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as soon as
they have broken loose from their moorings.

(3) A belligerent is only allowed to lay mines off the coasts and ports
of the enemy for naval and military purposes, he is not allowed to lay
them there in order to establish or maintain a commercial blockade.

(4) If mines are laid, all precautions must be taken for the safety of
peaceful navigation, and belligerents must, in especial, provide that
mines become harmless after a limited time has elapsed. In case mines
cease to be under observation the belligerents must, as soon as military
exigencies permit, notify the danger zones to mariners and also to the
Governments through the diplomatic channel.

(5) The question as to the laying of mines in straits is reserved for
future consideration.

(6) At the end of the war each Power must remove the mines laid by it.
As regards anchored automatic contact mines laid by one of the
belligerents off the coasts of the other, their position must be
notified to the other party by the Power which laid them, and each Power
must proceed with the least possible delay to remove the mines in its
own waters. The Power whose duty it is to remove the mines after the war
must make known the date at which the removal of the mines is complete.

(7) A violation of these rules involves responsibility on the part of
the guilty State. The State which has laid the mines is presumed to be
guilty unless the contrary is proved, and an action may be brought
against the guilty State, even by individuals who have suffered damage,
before the competent International Tribunal.

[Footnote 362: See _Annuaire_, XXIV. (1911), p. 301.]

[Sidenote: Duty of giving Quarter.]

[p] 183. As soon as an attacked or counter-attacked vessel hauls down
her flag and, therefore, signals that she is ready to surrender, she
must be given quarter and seized without further firing. To continue an
attack although she is ready to surrender, and to sink her and her crew,
would constitute a violation of customary International Law, and would
only as an exception be admissible in case of imperative necessity or of
reprisals.

[Sidenote: Seizure.]

[p] 184. Seizure is effected by securing possession of the vessel
through the captor sending an officer and some of his own crew on board
the captured vessel. But if for any reason this is impracticable, the
captor orders the captured vessel to lower her flag and to steer
according to his orders.

[Sidenote: Effect of Seizure.]

[p] 185. The effect of seizure is different with regard to private enemy
vessels, on the one hand, and, on the other, to public vessels.

Seizure of _private_ enemy vessels may be described as a parallel to
occupation of enemy territory in land warfare. Since the vessel and the
individuals and goods thereon are actually placed under the captor's
authority, her officers and crew, and any private individuals on board,
are for the time being submitted to the discipline of the captor, just
as private individuals on occupied enemy territory are submitted to the
authority of the occupant.[363] Seizure of private enemy vessels does
not, however, vest the property finally in the hands of the
belligerent[364] whose forces effected the capture. The prize has to be
brought before a Prize Court, and it is the latter's confirmation of
the capture through adjudication of the prize which makes the
appropriation by the capturing belligerent final.[365]

[Footnote 363: Concerning the ultimate fate of the crew, see above, [p]
85.]

[Footnote 364: It is asserted that a captured enemy merchantman may at
once be converted by the captor into a man-of-war, but the cases of the
_Ceylon_ (1811) and the _Georgina_ (1814), 1 Dodson 105 and 397, which
are quoted in favour of such a practice, are not decisive. See Higgins,
_War and the Private Citizen_ (1912), pp. 138-142.]

[Footnote 365: See below, [p] 192.]

On the other hand, the effect of seizure of _public_ enemy vessels is
their immediate and final appropriation. They may be either taken into a
port or at once destroyed. All individuals on board become prisoners of
war, although, if perchance there should be on board a private enemy
individual of no importance, he would probably not be kept for long in
captivity, but liberated in due time.

As regards goods on captured public enemy vessels, there is no doubt
that the effect of seizure is the immediate appropriation of such goods
on the vessels concerned as are enemy property, and these goods may
therefore be destroyed at once, if desirable. Should, however, neutral
goods be on board a captured enemy public vessel, it is a moot point
whether or no they share the fate of the captured ship. According to
British practice they do, but according to American practice they do
not.[366]

[Footnote 366: See, on the one hand, the _Fanny_ (1814), 1 Dodson, 443,
and, on the other, the _Nereide_ (1815), 9 Cranch, 388. See also below,
[p] 424, p. 542 note 2.]

[Sidenote: Immunity of Vessels charged with Religious, Scientific, or
Philanthropic Mission.]

[p] 186. Enemy vessels engaged in scientific discovery and exploration
were, according to a general international usage in existence before the
Second Peace Conference of 1907, granted immunity from attack and
seizure in so far and so long as they themselves abstained from
hostilities. The usage grew up in the eighteenth century. In 1766, the
French explorer Bougainville, who started from St. Malo with the vessels
_La Boudeuse_ and _L'Etoile_ on a voyage round the world, was furnished
by the British Government with safe-conducts. In 1776, Captain Cook's
vessels _Resolution_ and _Discovery_, sailing from Plymouth for the
purpose of exploring the Pacific Ocean, were declared exempt from
attack and seizure on the part of French cruisers by the French
Government. Again, the French Count Laperouse, who started on a voyage
of exploration in 1785 with the vessels _Astrolabe_ and _Boussole_, was
secured immunity from attack and seizure. During the nineteenth century
this usage became quite general, and had almost ripened into a custom;
examples are the Austrian cruiser _Novara_ (1859) and the Swedish
cruiser _Vega_ (1878). No immunity, however, was granted to vessels
charged with religious or philanthropic missions. A remarkable case
occurred during the Franco-German war. In June, 1871, the _Palme_, a
vessel belonging to the Missionary Society of Basle, was captured by a
French man-of-war, and condemned by the Prize Court of Bordeaux. The
owners appealed and the French Conseil d'Etat set the vessel free, not
because the capture was not justified but because equity demanded that
the fact that Swiss subjects owning sea-going vessels were obliged to
have them sailing under the flag of another State, should be taken into
consideration.[367]

[Footnote 367: See Rivier, II. pp. 343-344; Dupuis, No. 158; and Boeck,
No. 199.]

The Second Peace Conference embodied the previous usage concerning
immunity of vessels of discovery and exploration in a written rule and
extended the immunity to vessels with a religious or philanthropic
mission, for article 4 of Convention XI. enacts that vessels charged
with religious, scientific, or philanthropic missions are exempt from
capture.

It must be specially observed that it matters not whether the vessel
concerned is a private or a public vessel.[368]

[Footnote 368: See U.S. Naval War Code, article 13. The matter is
discussed at some length by Kleen, II. [p] 210, pp. 503-505. Concerning
the case of the English explorer Flinders, who sailed with the vessel
_Investigator_ from England, but exchanged her for the _Cumberland_,
which was seized in 1803 by the French at Port Louis, in Mauritius, as
she was not the vessel to which a safe-conduct was given, see Lawrence,
[p] 185.]

[Sidenote: Immunity of Fishing-boats and small boats employed in local
Trade.]

[p] 187. Coast fishing-boats, in contradistinction to boats engaged in
deep-sea fisheries, were, according to a general, but not universal,
custom in existence during the nineteenth century, granted immunity from
attack and seizure so long and in so far as they were unarmed and were
innocently employed in catching and bringing in fish.[369] As early as
the sixteenth century treaties were concluded between single States
stipulating such immunity to each other's fishing-boats for the time of
war. But throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there were
instances of a contrary practice, and Lord Stowell refused[370] to
recognise in strict law any such exemption, although he recognised a
rule of comity to that extent. Great Britain has always taken the
standpoint that any immunity granted by her to fishing-boats was a
relaxation[371] of strict right in the interest of humanity, but
revocable at any moment, and that her cruisers were justified in seizing
enemy fishing-boats unless prevented therefrom by special instructions
on the part of the Admiralty.[372] But at the Second Peace Conference
she altered her attitude, and agreed to the immunity not only of fishing
vessels, but also of small boats employed in local trade. Article 3 of
Convention XI. enacts, therefore, that vessels employed exclusively in
coast fisheries, and small boats employed in local trade, are, together
with appliances, rigging, tackle, and cargo, exempt from capture.

[Footnote 369: The _Paquette Habana_ (1899), 175, United States, 677.
See U.S. Naval War Code, article 14; Japanese Prize Law, article 3 (1).]

[Footnote 370: The _Young Jacob and Joanna_ (1798), 1 C. Rob, 20.]

[Footnote 371: See Hall, [p] 148.]

[Footnote 372: See Holland, _Prize Law_, [p] 36.]

It must be specially observed that boats engaged in deep-sea fisheries
and large boats engaged in local trade do not enjoy the privilege of
immunity from capture, and that the fishing vessels and small boats
employed in local trade lose that privilege in case they take any part
whatever in hostilities. And article 3 expressly stipulates that
belligerents must not take advantage of the harmless character of the
said boats in order to use them for military purposes while preserving
their peaceful appearance.

[Sidenote: Immunity of Merchantmen at the Outbreak of War on their
Voyage to and from a Belligerent's Port.]

[p] 188. Several times at the outbreak of war during the nineteenth
century belligerents decreed that such enemy merchantmen as were on
their voyage to one of the former's ports at the outbreak of war, should
not be attacked and seized during the period of their voyage to and from
such port. Thus, at the outbreak of the Crimean War, Great Britain and
France decreed such immunity for Russian vessels, Germany did the same
with regard to French vessels in 1870,[373] Russia with regard to
Turkish vessels in 1877, the United States with regard to Spanish
vessels in 1898, Russia and Japan with regard to each other's vessels in
1904. But there is no rule of International Law which compels a
belligerent to grant such days of grace, and it is probable that in
future wars days of grace will not be granted. The reason is that the
steamboats of many countries are now built, according to an arrangement
with the Government of their home State, from special designs which make
them easily convertible into cruisers, and that a belligerent fleet
cannot nowadays remain effective for long without being accompanied by a
train of transport-vessels, colliers, repairing-vessels, and the
like.[374]

[Footnote 373: See, however, above, [p] 178, p. 222.]

[Footnote 374: This point is ably argued by Lawrence, _War_, pp 54-55.]

In case, however, merchantmen, other than those constructed on special
lines in order to make them easily convertible into cruisers, are, at
the outbreak of war, on their voyage to an enemy port and are ignorant
of the outbreak of hostilities, article 3 of Convention VI.[375] of the
Second Peace Conference must find application. They may not, therefore,
be confiscated, but may only be captured on condition that they shall
be restored after the conclusion of peace, or that indemnities shall be
paid for them if they have been requisitioned or destroyed.

[Footnote 375: See above, [p] 102_a_, Nos. 3 and 4.]

[Sidenote: Vessels in Distress.]

[p] 189. Instances have occurred when enemy vessels which were forced by
stress of weather to seek refuge in a belligerent's harbour were granted
exemption from seizure.[376] Thus, when in 1746, during war with Spain,
the _Elisabeth_, a British man-of-war, was forced to take refuge in the
port of Havanna, she was not seized, but was offered facility for
repairing damages, and furnished with a safe-conduct as far as the
Bermudas. Thus, further, when in 1799, during war with France, the
_Diana_, a Prussian merchantman, was forced to take refuge in the port
of Dunkirk and seized, she was restored by the French Prize Court. But
these and other cases have not created any rule of International Law
whereby immunity from attack and seizure is granted to vessels in
distress, and no such rule is likely to grow up, especially not as
regards men-of-war and such merchantmen as are easily convertible into
cruisers.

[Footnote 376: See Ortolan, II. pp. 286-291; Kleen, II. [p] 210, pp.
492-494.]

[Sidenote: Immunity of Hospital and Cartel Ships.]

[p] 190. According to the Hague Convention, which adapted the principles
of the Geneva Convention to warfare on sea, hospital ships are
inviolable, and therefore may be neither attacked nor seized; see below
in [p][p] 204-209. Concerning the immunity of cartel ships, see below in
[p] 225.

[Sidenote: Immunity of Mail-boats and of Mail-bags.]

[p] 191. No general rule of International Law exists granting enemy
mail-boats immunity from attack and seizure, but the several States have
frequently stipulated such immunity in the case of war by special
treaties.[377] Thus, for instance, Great Britain and France by article 9
of the Postal Convention of August 30, 1860, and Great Britain and
Holland by article 7 of the Postal Convention of October 14, 1843,
stipulated that all mail-boats navigating between the countries of the
parties shall continue to navigate in time of war between these
countries without impediment or molestation until special notice be
given by either party that the service is to be discontinued.

[Footnote 377: See Kleen, II. [p] 210, pp. 505-507.]

Whereas there is no general rule granting immunity from capture to enemy
mail-boats, enemy _mail-bags_ do, according to article 1 of Convention
XI., enjoy the privilege of such immunity, for it is there enacted that
the postal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents, whether official
or private in character, which may be found on board a neutral[378] or
enemy ship at sea, is inviolable, and that, in case the ship is
detained, the correspondence is to be forwarded by the captor with the
least possible delay. There is only one exception to this rule of
article 1, for correspondence destined to or proceeding from a blockaded
port does not enjoy the privilege of immunity.

[Footnote 378: See below, [p][p] 319 and 411.]

It must be specially observed that postal correspondence, and not
parcels sent by parcel post, are immune from capture.


III

APPROPRIATION AND DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY MERCHANTMEN

  Hall, [p][p] 149-152, 171, 269--Lawrence, [p][p]
  183-191--Westlake, II. pp. 156-160--Phillimore, III. [p][p]
  345-381--Twiss, II. [p][p] 72-97--Halleck, II. pp. 362-431,
  510-526--Taylor, [p][p] 552-567--Wharton, III. [p] 345--Wheaton,
  [p][p] 355-394--Moore, VII. [p][p] 1206-1214--Bluntschli, [p][p]
  672-673--Heffter, [p][p] 137-138--Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV.
  pp. 588-596--Ullmann, [p] 189--Bonfils, Nos. 1396-1440--Despagnet,
  Nos. 670-682--Pradier-Fodere, VIII. Nos. 3179-3207--Rivier, II.
  [p] 66--Calvo, IV. [p][p] 2294-2366, V. [p][p] 3004-3034--Fiore,
  III. Nos. 1426-1443, and Code, Nos. 1693-1706--Martens, II. [p][p]
  125-126--Pillet, pp. 342-352--Perels, [p][p] 36, 55-58--Testa, pp.
  147-160--Valin, _Traite des prises_, 2 vols. (1758-60), and
  _Commentaire sur l'ordonnance de 1681_, 2 vols. (1766)--Pistoye et
  Duverdy, _Traite des prises maritimes_, 2 vols.
  (1854-1859)--Upton, _The Law of Nations affecting Commerce during
  War_ (1863)--Boeck, Nos. 156-209, 329-380--Dupuis, Nos. 96-149,
  282-301--Bernsten, [p] 8--Marsden, _Early Prize Jurisdiction and
  Prize Law in England_ in _The English Historical Review_, XXIV.
  (1909), p. 675; XXV. (1910), p. 243; XXVI. (1911) p. 34--Roscoe,
  _The Growth of English Law_ (1911), pp. 92-140. See also the
  literature quoted by Bonfils at the commencement of No. 1396.

[Sidenote: Prize Courts.]

[p] 192. It has already been stated above, in [p] 185, that the capture
of a private enemy vessel has to be confirmed by a Prize Court, and that
it is only through the latter's adjudication that the vessel becomes
finally appropriated. The origin[379] of Prize Courts is to be traced
back to the end of the Middle Ages. During the Middle Ages, after the
Roman Empire had broken up, a state of lawlessness established itself on
the High Seas. Piratical vessels of the Danes covered the North Sea and
the Baltic, and navigation of the Mediterranean Sea was threatened by
Greek and Saracen pirates. Merchantmen, therefore, associated themselves
for mutual protection and sailed as a merchant fleet under a specially
elected chief, the so-called Admiral. They also occasionally sent out a
fleet of armed vessels for the purpose of sweeping pirates from certain
parts of the High Seas. Piratical vessels and goods which were captured
were divided among the captors according to a decision of their Admiral.
During the thirteenth century the maritime States of Europe themselves
endeavoured to keep order on the Open Sea. By-and-by armed vessels were
obliged to be furnished with Letters Patent or Letters of Marque from
the Sovereign of a maritime State and their captures submitted to the
official control of such State as had furnished them with their Letters.
A board, called the Admiralty, was instituted by maritime States, and
officers of that Board of Admiralty exercised control over the armed
vessels and their captures, inquiring in each case[380] into the
legitimation of the captor and the nationality of the captured vessel
and her goods. And after modern International Law had grown up, it was a
recognised customary rule that in time of war the Admiralty of maritime
belligerents should be obliged to institute a Court[381] or Courts
whenever a prize was captured by public vessels or privateers in order
to decide whether the capture was lawful or not. These Courts were
called Prize Courts. This institution has come down to our times, and
nowadays all maritime States either constitute permanent Prize Courts,
or appoint them specially in each case of an outbreak of war. The whole
institution is essentially one in the interest of neutrals, since
belligerents want to be guarded by a decision of a Court against claims
of neutral States regarding alleged unjustified capture of neutral
vessels and goods. The capture of any private vessel, whether _prima
facie_ belonging to an enemy or a neutral, must, therefore, be submitted
to a Prize Court. Article 1 of Convention XII. (as yet unratified) of
the Second Peace Conference now expressly enacts the old customary rule
that "the validity of the capture of a merchantman or its cargo, when
neutral or enemy property is involved, is decided before a Prize Court."
It must, however, be emphasised that the ordinary Prize-Courts are not
International Courts, but National Courts instituted by Municipal Law,
and that the law they administer is Municipal Law,[382] based on custom,
statutes, or special regulations of their State. Every State is,
however, bound by International Law to enact only such statutes and
regulations[383] for its Prize Courts as are in conformity with
International Law. A State may, therefore, instead of making special
regulations, directly order its Prize Courts to apply the rules of
International Law, and it is understood that, when no statutes are
enacted or regulations are given, Prize Courts have to apply
International Law. Prize Courts may be instituted by belligerents in any
part of their territory or the territories of allies, but not on neutral
territory. It would nowadays constitute a breach of neutrality on the
part of a neutral State to allow the institution on its territory of a
Prize Court.[384]

[Footnote 379: I follow the excellent summary of the facts given by
Twiss, II. [p][p] 74-75, but Marsden's articles in _The English
Historical Review_, XXIV. (1909), p. 675, XXV. (1910), p. 243, XXVI.
(1911), p. 34, must likewise be referred to.]

[Footnote 380: The first case that is mentioned as having led to
judicial proceedings before the Admiral in England dates from 1357; see
Marsden, _loc. cit._ XXIV. (1909), p. 680.]

[Footnote 381: In England an Order in Council, dated July 20, 1589,
first provided that all captures should be submitted to the High Court
of Admiralty; see Marsden, _loc. cit._ XXIV. (1909), p. 690.]

[Footnote 382: See below, [p] 434.]

[Footnote 383: The constitution and procedure of Prize Courts in Great
Britain are governed by the Naval Prize Act, 1864 (27 and 28 Vict. ch.
25), and the Prize Courts Act, 1894 (57 and 58 Vict. ch. 39). The Naval
Prize Bill introduced by the British Government in 1911, although
accepted by the House of Commons, was thrown out by the House of
Lords.--It should be mentioned that the Institute of International Law
has in various meetings occupied itself with the whole matter of
capture, and adopted a body of rules in the _Reglement international des
Prises Maritimes_, which represent a code of Prize Law; see _Annuaire_,
IX. pp. 218-243, but also XVI. pp. 44 and 311.]

[Footnote 384: See below, [p] 327, and article 4 of Convention XIII. of
the Second Peace Conference.]

Whereas the ordinary Prize Courts are national courts, Convention
XII.--as yet unratified--of the Second Peace Conference, provides for
the establishment of an International[385] Prize Court at the Hague,
which, in certain matters, is to serve as a Court of Appeal in prize
cases. In these cases jurisdiction in matters of prize is exercised, in
the first instance, by the Prize Courts of belligerents (article 2),
but, according to article 6, the national Prize Courts may not deal with
any case in which there is a second appeal; since such cases necessarily
come before the International Prize Court at the second appeal. This
means that belligerents, besides Prize Courts of the first instance, may
set up a Prize Court of Appeal, but they may not set up a second Court
of Appeal above the first, except in cases in which the International
Prize Court has no jurisdiction.

[Footnote 385: See above, vol. I. [p] 476_a_, and below, [p][p]
442-447.]

It must be specially observed that the proposed International Prize
Court--see articles 3 and 4--is, in the main, a Court to decide between
belligerents and neutrals, and not between two belligerents.

[Sidenote: Conduct of Prize to port of Prize Court.]

[p] 193. As soon as a vessel is seized she must be conducted to a port
where a Prize Court is sitting. As a rule the officer and the crew sent
on board the prize by the captor will navigate the prize to the port.
This officer can ask the master and crew of the vessel to assist him,
but, if they refuse, they may not be compelled thereto. The captor need
not accompany the prize to the port. In the exceptional case, however,
where an officer and crew cannot be sent on board and the captured
vessel is ordered to lower her flag and to steer according to orders,
the captor must conduct the prize to the port. To which port a prize is
to be taken is not for International Law to determine; the latter says
only that the prize must be taken straight to a port of a Prize Court,
and only in case of distress or necessity is delay allowed. If the
neutral State concerned gives permission,[386] the prize may, in case
of distress or in case she is in such bad condition as prevents her from
being taken to a port of a Prize Court, be taken to a near neutral port,
and, if admitted, the capturing man-of-war as well as the prize enjoy
there the privilege of exterritoriality. But as soon as circumstances
allow, the prize must be conducted from the neutral port to that of the
Prize Court, and only if the condition of the prize does not at all
allow this, may the Prize Court give its verdict in the absence of the
prize after the ship papers of the prize and witnesses have been
produced before it.

[Footnote 386: See below, [p] 328, and articles 21-23 of Convention
XIII. of the Second Peace Conference.]

The whole of the crew of the prize are, as a rule, to be kept on board
and to be brought before the Prize Court. But if this is impracticable,
several important members of the crew, such as the master, mate, or
supercargo, must be kept on board, whereas the others may be removed and
forwarded to the port of the Prize Court by other means of transport.
The whole of the cargo is, as a rule, also to remain on board the prize.
But if the whole or part of the cargo is in a condition which prevents
it from being sent to the port of the Prize Court, it may, according to
the needs of the case, either be destroyed or sold in the nearest port,
and in the latter case an account of the sale has to be sent to the
Prize Court. All neutral goods amongst the cargo are also to be taken to
the port of adjudication, although they have now, according to the
Declaration of Paris, to be restored to their neutral owners. But if
such neutral goods are not in a condition to be taken to the port of
adjudication, they may likewise be sold or destroyed, as the case may
require.

[Sidenote: Destruction of Prize.]

[p] 194. Since through adjudication by the Prize Courts the ownership of
captured private enemy vessels becomes finally transferred to the
belligerent whose forces made the capture, it is evident that after
transfer the captured vessel as well as her cargo may be destroyed. On
the other hand, it is likewise evident that, since a verdict of a Prize
Court is necessary before the appropriation of the prize becomes final,
a captured merchantman must not as a rule be destroyed instead of being
conducted to the port of a Prize Court. There are, however, exceptions
to the rule, but no unanimity exists in theory or practice as regards
those exceptions. Whereas some[387] consider the destruction of a prize
allowable only in case of imperative necessity, others[388] allow it in
nearly every case of convenience. Thus, the Government of the United
States of America, on the outbreak of war with England in 1812,
instructed the commanders of her vessels to destroy at once all
captures, the very valuable excepted, because a single cruiser, however
successful, could man a few prizes only, but by destroying each capture
would be able to continue capturing, and thereby constantly diminish the
enemy merchant fleet.[389] During the Civil War in America the cruisers
of the Southern Confederated States destroyed all enemy prizes because
there was no port open for them to bring prizes to. And during the
Russo-Japanese War, Russian cruisers destroyed twenty-one captured
Japanese merchantmen.[390] According to British practice,[391] the
captor is allowed to destroy the prize in only two cases--namely, first,
when the prize is in such a condition as prevents her from being sent to
any port of adjudication; and, secondly, when the capturing vessel is
unable to spare a prize crew to navigate the prize into such a port.
The _Reglement international des prises maritimes_ of the Institute of
International Law enumerates in [p] 50 five cases in which destruction
of the capture is allowed--namely (1) when the condition of the vessel
and the weather make it impossible to keep the prize afloat; (2) when
the vessel navigates so slowly that she cannot follow the captor and is
therefore exposed to an easy recapture by the enemy; (3) when the
approach of a superior enemy force creates the fear that the prize might
be recaptured by the enemy; (4) when the captor cannot spare a prize
crew; (5) when the port of adjudication to which the prize might be
taken is too far from the spot where the capture was made. Be that as it
may,[392] in every case of destruction of the vessel the captor must
remove crew, ship papers, and, if possible, the cargo, before the
destruction of the prize, and must afterwards send crew, papers, and
cargo to a port of a Prize Court for the purpose of satisfying the
latter that both the capture and the destruction were lawful.

[Footnote 387: See, for instance, Bluntschli, [p] 672.]

[Footnote 388: See, for instance, Martens, [p] 126, who moreover makes
no difference between the prize being an enemy or a neutral ship.]

[Footnote 389: U.S. Naval War Code (article 14) allows the destruction
"in case of military or other necessity."]

[Footnote 390: See Takahashi, pp. 284-310.]

[Footnote 391: The _Actaeon_ (1815), 2 Dod. 48; the _Felicity_ (1819), 2
Dod. 381; the _Leucade_ (1855), Spinks, 217. See also Holland, _Prize
Law_, [p][p] 303-304.]

[Footnote 392: The whole matter is thoroughly discussed by Boeck, Nos.
268-285; Dupuis, Nos. 262-268; and Calvo, V. [p][p] 3028-3034. As
regards destruction of a neutral prize, see below, [p] 431.]

But if destruction of a captured enemy merchantman can as an exception
be lawful, the question as to indemnities to be paid to the neutral
owners of goods carried by the destroyed vessel requires attention. It
seems to be obvious that, if the destruction of the vessel herself was
lawful, and if it was not possible to remove her cargo, no indemnities
need be paid. An illustrative case happened during the Franco-German
War. On October 21, 1870, the French cruiser _Dessaix_ seized two German
merchantmen, the _Ludwig_ and the _Vorwaerts_, but burned them because
she could not spare a prize crew to navigate the prizes into a French
port. The neutral owners of part of the cargo claimed indemnities, but
the French Conseil d'Etat refused to grant indemnities on the ground
that the action of the captor was lawful.[393]

[Footnote 393: See Boeck, No. 146; Barboux, p. 153; Calvo, V. [p] 3033;
Dupuis, No. 262; Hall, [p] 269. Should the International Prize Court at
the Hague be established, article 3 of Convention XII. of the Second
Peace Conference would enable the owners of neutral goods destroyed with
the destroyed enemy merchantmen that carried them to bring the question
as to whether they may claim damages before this Court.]

[Sidenote: Ransom of Prize.]

[p] 195. Although prizes have as a rule to be brought before a Prize
Court, International Law nevertheless does not forbid the ransoming of
the captured vessel either directly after the capture or after she has
been conducted to the port of a Prize Court, but before the Court has
given its verdict. However, the practice of accepting and paying ransom,
which grew up in the seventeenth century, is in many countries now
prohibited by Municipal Law. Thus, for instance, Great Britain by
section 45 of the Naval Prize Act, 1864, prohibits ransoming except in
such cases as may be specially provided for by an Order of the King in
Council.[394] Where ransom is accepted, a contract of ransom is entered
into by the captor and the master of the captured vessel; the latter
gives a so-called ransom bill to the former, in which he promises the
amount of the ransom. He is given a copy of the ransom bill for the
purpose of a safe-conduct to protect his vessel from again being
captured, under the condition that he keeps the course to such port as
is agreed upon in the ransom bill. To secure the payment of ransom, an
officer of the captured vessel can be detained as hostage, otherwise the
whole of the crew is to be liberated with the vessel, ransom being an
equivalent for both the restoration of the prize and the release of her
crew from captivity. So long as the ransom bill is not paid, the hostage
can be kept in captivity. But it is exclusively a matter for the
Municipal Law of the State concerned to determine whether or no the
captor can sue upon the ransom bill, if the ransom is not voluntarily
paid.[395] Should the capturing vessel, with the hostage or the ransom
bill on board, be captured herself and thus become a prize of the enemy,
the hostage is liberated, the ransom bill loses its effect, and need not
be paid.[396]

[Footnote 394: Article 40 of the Naval Prize Bill of 1911 runs as
follows:--

  (1) His Majesty in Council may, in relation to any war, make such
  orders as may seem expedient according to circumstances for
  prohibiting or allowing, wholly or in certain cases or subject to
  any conditions or regulations or otherwise as may from time to
  time seem meet, the ransoming or the entering into any contract or
  agreement for the ransoming of any ship or goods belonging to any
  of His Majesty's subjects, and taken as prize by any of His
  Majesty's enemies.

  (2) Any contract or agreement entered into, and any bill, bond, or
  other security given for ransom of any ship or goods, shall be
  under the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court as a Prize
  Court (subject to appeal to the Supreme Prize Court) and if
  entered into or given in contravention to any such Order in
  Council shall be deemed to have been entered into or given for an
  illegal consideration.

  (3) If any person ransoms or enters into any contract or agreement
  for ransoming any ship or goods, in contravention of any such
  Order in Council, he shall for every such offence be liable to be
  proceeded against in the High Court at the suit of His Majesty in
  his office of Admiralty, and on conviction to be fined, in the
  discretion of the Court, any sum not exceeding five hundred
  pounds.]

[Footnote 395: See Hall, [p] 151, p. 479:--"The English Courts refuse to
accept such arrangements (for ransom) from the effect of the rule that
the character of an alien enemy carries with it a disability to sue, and
compel payment of the debt indirectly through an action brought by the
imprisoned hostage for the recovery of his freedom." The American
Courts, in contradistinction to the British, recognise ransom bills. See
on the one hand, the case of _Cornu_ v. _Blackburne_ (1781), 2 Douglas,
640, _Anthon_ v. _Fisher_ (1782), 2 Douglas, 649 note, the _Hoop_, 1 C.
Rob. 201; and, on the other, _Goodrich_ and _De Forest_ v. _Gordon_
(1818), 15 Johnson, 6.]

[Footnote 396: The matter of ransom is treated with great lucidity by
Twiss, II. [p][p] 180-183; Boeck, Nos. 257-267; Dupuis, Nos. 269-277.]

[Sidenote: Loss of Prize, especially Recapture.]

[p] 196. A prize is lost--(1) when the captor intentionally abandons
her, (2) when she escapes through being rescued by her own crew, or (3)
when she is recaptured. Just as through capture the prize becomes,
according to International Law, the property of the belligerent whose
forces made the capture, provided a Prize Court confirms the capture, so
such property is lost when the prize vessel becomes abandoned, or
escapes, or is recaptured. And it seems to be obvious, and everywhere
recognised by Municipal Law, that as soon as a captured enemy
merchantman succeeds in escaping, the proprietorship of the former
owners revives _ipso facto_. But the case is different when a captured
vessel, whose crew has been taken on board the capturing vessel, is
abandoned and afterwards met and taken possession of by a neutral vessel
or by a vessel of her home State. It is certainly not for International
Law to determine whether or not the original proprietorship revives
through abandonment. This is a matter for Municipal Law. The case of
recapture is different from escape. Here too Municipal Law has to
determine whether or no the former proprietorship revives, since
International Law lays down the rule only that recapture takes the
vessel out of the property of the enemy and brings her into the property
of the belligerent whose forces made the recapture. Municipal Law of the
individual States has settled the matter in different ways. Thus, Great
Britain, by section 40 of the Naval Prize Act, 1864, enacted that the
recaptured vessel, except when she has been used by the captor as a ship
of war, shall be restored to her former owner on his paying one-eighth
to one-fourth, as the Prize Court may award, of her value as prize
salvage, no matter if the recapture was made before or after the enemy
Prize Court had confirmed the capture.[397] Other States restore a
recaptured vessel only when the recapture was made within twenty-four
hours[398] after the capture occurred, or before the captured vessel was
conducted into an enemy port, or before she was condemned by an enemy
Prize Court.

[Footnote 397: Article 30 of the Naval Prize Bill introduced in 1911
simply enacts that British merchantmen or goods captured by the enemy
and recaptured by a British man-of-war shall be restored to the owner by
a decree of the Prize Court.]

[Footnote 398: So, for instance, France; see Dupuis, Nos. 278-279.]

[Sidenote: Fate of Prize.]

[p] 197. Through being captured and afterwards condemned by a Prize
Court, a captured enemy vessel and captured enemy goods become the
property of the belligerent whose forces made the capture. What becomes
of the prize after the condemnation is not for International, but for
Municipal Law to determine. A belligerent can hand the prize over to the
officers and crew who made the capture, or can keep her altogether for
himself, or can give a share to those who made the capture. As a rule,
prizes are sold after they are condemned, and the whole or a part of the
net proceeds is distributed among the officers and crew who made the
capture. For Great Britain this distribution is regulated by the "Royal
Proclamation as to Distribution of Prize Money" of August 3, 1886.[399]
There is no doubt whatever that, if a neutral subject buys a captured
ship after her condemnation, she may not be attacked and captured by the
belligerent to whose subject she formerly belonged, although, if she is
bought by an enemy subject and afterwards captured, she might be
restored[400] to her former owner.

[Footnote 399: See Holland, _Prize Law_, pp. 142-150.]

[Footnote 400: See above, [p] 196.]

[Sidenote: Vessels belonging to Subjects of Neutral States, but sailing
under Enemy Flag.]

[p] 198. It has been already stated above in [p] 89 that merchantmen
owned by subjects of neutral States but sailing under enemy flag are
vested with enemy character. It is, therefore, evident that they may be
captured and condemned. As at present no non-littoral State has a
maritime flag, vessels belonging to subjects of such States are forced
to navigate under the flag of another State,[401] and they are,
therefore, in case of war exposed to capture.

[Footnote 401: See above, vol. I. [p] 261.]

[Sidenote: Effect of Sale of Enemy Vessels during War.]

[p] 199. Since enemy vessels are liable to capture, the question must be
taken into consideration whether the fact that an enemy vessel has been
sold during the war to a subject of a neutral or to a subject of the
belligerent State whose forces seized her, has the effect of excluding
her appropriation. It is obvious that, if the question is answered in
the affirmative, the owners of enemy vessels can evade the danger of
having their property captured by selling their vessels. The question
of transfer of enemy vessels must, therefore, be regarded as forming
part of the larger questions of enemy character and has consequently
been treated in detail above, [p] 91.

[Sidenote: Goods sold by and to Enemy Subjects during War.]

[p] 200. If a captured enemy vessel carries goods consigned by enemy
subjects to subjects of neutral States, or to subjects of the
belligerent whose forces captured the vessel, they may not be
appropriated, provided the consignee can prove that he is the owner. As
regards such goods found on captured enemy merchantmen as are consigned
to enemy subjects but have been sold _in transitu_ to subjects of
neutral States, no unanimous practice of the different States is in
existence. The subject of goods sold _in transitu_ must--in the same way
as the question of transfer of enemy vessels--be considered as forming
part of the larger question of enemy character. It has, for this reason,
been treated above, [p] 92.


IV

VIOLENCE AGAINST ENEMY PERSONS

  See the literature quoted above at the commencement of [p] 107. See
  also Bonfils, Nos. 1273-1273'3.

[Sidenote: Violence against Combatants.]

[p] 201. As regards killing and wounding combatants in sea warfare and
the means used for the purpose, customary rules of International Law are
in existence according to which only those combatants may be killed or
wounded who are able and willing to fight or who resist capture. Men
disabled by sickness or wounds, or such men as lay down arms and
surrender or do not resist capture, must be given quarter, except in a
case of imperative necessity or of reprisals. Poison, and such arms,
projectiles, and materials as cause unnecessary injury, are prohibited,
as is also killing and wounding in a treacherous way.[402] The
Declaration of St. Petersburg[403] and the Hague Declaration prohibiting
the use of expanding (Dum-Dum)[404] bullets, apply to sea warfare as
well as to land warfare, as also do the Hague Declarations concerning
projectiles and explosives launched from balloons, and projectiles
diffusing asphyxiating or deleterious gases.[405]

[Footnote 402: See the corresponding rules for warfare on land, which
are discussed above in [p][p] 108-110. See also U.S. Naval War Code,
article 3.]

[Footnote 403: See above,[p] 111.]

[Footnote 404: See above, [p] 112.]

[Footnote 405: See above, [p][p] 113 and 114.]

All combatants, and also all officers and members of the crews of
captured merchantmen, could formerly[406] be made prisoners of war.
According to articles 5 to 7 of Convention XI. of the Second Peace
Conference--see above in [p] 85--such members of the crews as are
subjects of neutral States may never be made prisoners of war; but the
captain, officers, and members of the crews who are enemy subjects, and,
further, the captain and officers who are subjects of neutral States may
be made prisoners of war in case they refuse to be released on parole.
As soon as such prisoners are landed, their treatment falls under
articles 4-20 of the Hague Regulations; but as long as they are on
board, the old customary rule of International Law, that prisoners must
be treated humanely,[407] and not like convicts, must be complied with.
The Hague Convention for the adaptation of the Geneva Convention to sea
warfare enacts, however, some particular rules concerning the
shipwrecked, the wounded, and the sick who, through falling into the
hands of the enemy, become prisoners of war.[408]

[Footnote 406: This was almost generally recognised, but was refused
recognition by Count Bismarck during the Franco-German War (see below,
[p] 249) and by some German publicists, as, for instance, Lueder in
Holtzendorff, IV. p. 479, note 6.]

[Footnote 407: See Holland, _Prize Law_, [p] 249, and U.S. Naval War
Code, articles 10, 11.]

[Footnote 408: See below, [p] 205.]

[Sidenote: Violence against Non-combatant Members of Naval Forces.]

[p] 202. Just as military forces consist of combatants and
non-combatants, so do the naval forces of belligerents. Non-combatants,
as, for instance, stokers, surgeons, chaplains, members of the hospital
staff, and the like, who do not take part in the fighting, may not be
attacked directly and killed or wounded.[409] But they are exposed to
all injuries indirectly resulting from attacks on or by their vessels.
And they may certainly be made prisoners of war, with the exception of
members of the religious, medical, and hospital staff, who are
inviolable according to article 10 of the Hague Convention for the
adaptation to maritime warfare of the principles of the Geneva
Convention.[410]

[Footnote 409: See U.S. Naval War Code, article 3.]

[Footnote 410: See below, [p] 209.]

[Sidenote: Violence against Enemy Individuals not belonging to the Naval
Forces.]

[p] 203. Since and so far as enemy individuals on board an attacked or
seized enemy vessel who do not belong to the naval forces do not take
part in the fighting, they may not directly be attacked and killed or
wounded, although they are exposed to all injury indirectly resulting
from an attack on or by their vessel. If they are mere private
individuals, they may as an exception only and under the same
circumstances as private individuals on occupied territory be made
prisoners of war.[411] But they are nevertheless, for the time they are
on board the captured vessel, under the discipline of the captor. All
restrictive measures against them which are necessary are therefore
lawful, as are also punishments, in case they do not comply with lawful
orders of the commanding officer. If they are enemy officials in
important positions,[412] they may be made prisoners of war.

[Footnote 411: See U.S. Naval War Code, article 11, and above, [p] 116.]

[Footnote 412: See above, [p] 117.]


V

TREATMENT OF WOUNDED AND SHIPWRECKED

  Perels, [p] 37--Pillet, pp. 188-191--Westlake, II. pp.
  275-280--Moore, VII. [p] 1178--Bernsten, [p] 12--Bonfils, Nos.
  1280-1280'9--Pradier-Fodere, VIII. No. 3209--U.S. Naval War Code,
  articles 21-29--Ferguson, _The Red Cross Alliance at Sea_
  (1871)--Houette, _De l'extension des principes de la Convention de
  Geneve aux victimes des guerres maritimes_ (1892)--Cauwes,
  _L'extension des principes de la Convention de Geneve aux guerres
  maritimes_ (1899)--Holls, _The Peace Conference at the Hague_
  (1900), pp. 120-132--Boidin, pp. 248-262--Dupuis, _Guerre_, Nos.
  82-105--Meurer, II. [p][p] 74-87--Higgins, pp. 382-394--Lemonon, pp.
  526-554--Nippold, II. [p] 33--Scott, _Conferences_, pp.
  599-614--Takahashi, pp. 375-385--Fauchille in _R.G._ VI. (1899),
  pp. 291-302--Bayer, in _R.G._ VIII. (1901), pp. 225-230--Renault
  in _A.J._ II. pp. 295-306--Higgins, _War and the Private Citizen_
  (1912), pp. 73-90, and in _The Law Quarterly Review_, XXVI (1910),
  pp. 408-414. See also the literature quoted above at the
  commencement of [p] 118.

[Sidenote: Adaptation of Geneva Convention to Sea Warfare.]

[p] 204. Soon after the ratification of the Geneva Convention the
necessity of adapting its principles to naval warfare was generally
recognised, and among the non-ratified Additional articles to the Geneva
Convention of 1868 were nine which aimed at such an adaptation. But it
was not until the Hague Peace Conference in 1899 that an adaptation came
into legal existence. This adaptation was contained in the
"Convention[413] for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the
Principles of the Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864," which comprised
fourteen articles. It has, however, been replaced by the "Convention
(X.) for the Adaptation of the Principles of the Geneva Convention to
Maritime War," of the Second Hague Peace Conference. This new convention
comprises twenty-eight articles and was signed, although with some
reservations, by all the Powers represented at the Conference, except
Nicaragua which acceded later, and it has already been ratified by most
of the signatory Powers. It provides rules concerning the wounded,
sick, shipwrecked, and dead; hospital ships; sickbays on men-of-war; the
distinctive colour and emblem of hospital ships; neutral vessels taking
on board belligerent wounded, sick, or shipwrecked; the religious,
medical, and hospital staff of captured ships; the carrying out of the
convention, and the prevention of abuses and infractions.

[Footnote 413: Martens, _N.R.G._ 2nd Ser. XXVI. p. 979.]

[Sidenote: The Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked.]

[p] 205. Soldiers, sailors, and other persons officially attached to
fleets or armies, whatever their nationality, who are taken on board
when sick or wounded, must be respected and tended by the captors
(article 11). All enemy shipwrecked, sick, or wounded who fall into the
power of a belligerent are prisoners of war. It is left to the captor to
determine whether they are to be kept on board, or to be sent to a port
of his own country, or a neutral port, or even a hostile port; and in
the last case such repatriated prisoners must be prevented by their
Government from again serving in the war (article 14). The shipwrecked,
wounded, or sick, who are landed at a neutral port with the consent of
the local authorities, must, unless there is an arrangement to the
contrary between the neutral State concerned and the belligerent States,
be guarded by the neutral State so as to prevent them from again taking
part in the war;[414] the expenses of tending and interning them must be
borne by the State to whom they belong (article 15). After each
engagement, both belligerents must, so far as military interests permit,
take measures to search for the shipwrecked, wounded, and sick, and to
ensure them protection against pillage and maltreatment (article 16).
Each belligerent must, as early as possible, send to the authorities of
their country, navy, or army, a list of the names of the sick and
wounded picked up by him; and the belligerents must keep each other
informed as to internments and transfers as well as to admissions into
hospital and deaths which have occurred amongst the sick and wounded in
their hands. And they must collect all objects of personal use,
valuables, letters, &c., that are found in the captured ships in order
to have them forwarded to the persons concerned by the authorities of
their own country (article 17).

[Footnote 414: See below, [p] 348_a_.]

[Sidenote: Treatment of the Dead.]

[p] 205_a_. After each engagement both belligerents must, so far as
military interests permit, take measures to ensure the dead protection
against pillage and maltreatment, and they must see that the burial,
whether by land or sea, or cremation of the dead is preceded by a
careful examination of the corpses in order to determine that life is
really extinct (article 16). Each belligerent must, as early as
possible, send to the authorities of their country, navy, or army, the
military identification marks or tokens found on the dead; they must
also collect all the objects of personal use, valuables, letters, &c.,
which have been left by the wounded and sick who die in hospital, in
order that they may be forwarded to the persons concerned by the
authorities of their own country (article 17).

[Sidenote: Hospital Ships.]

[p] 206. Three different kinds of hospital ships must be
distinguished--namely, military hospital ships, hospital ships equipped
by private individuals or relief societies of the belligerents, and
hospital ships equipped by private neutral individuals and neutral
relief societies.

(1) Military hospital ships (article 1) are ships constructed or
assigned by States specially and solely for the purpose of assisting the
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked. Their names must be communicated to the
belligerents at the commencement of or during hostilities, and in any
case before they are employed. They must be respected by the
belligerents, they may not be captured while hostilities last, and they
are not on the same footing as men-of-war during their stay in a
neutral port.

(2) Hospital ships equipped wholly or in part at the cost of private
individuals or officially recognised relief societies of the
belligerents must be respected by either belligerent (article 2), and
are exempt from capture, provided their home State has given them an
official commission and has notified their names to the other
belligerent at the commencement of or during hostilities, and in any
case before they are employed. They must, further, be furnished with a
certificate from the competent authorities declaring that they had been
under the latter's control while fitting out and on final departure.

(3) Hospital ships, equipped wholly or in part at the cost of private
individuals or officially recognised relief societies of neutral States
(article 3), must likewise be respected, and are exempt from capture,
provided that they are placed under the control of one of the
belligerents, with the previous consent of their own Government and with
the authorisation of the belligerent himself, and that the latter has
notified their names to his adversary at the commencement of, or during,
hostilities, and in any case before they are employed.

According to article 4 all military and other hospital ships must afford
relief and assistance to the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked of either
belligerent. The respective Governments are prohibited from using these
ships for any military purpose. The commanders of these vessels must not
in any way hamper the movements of the combatants, and during and after
an engagement they act at their own risk and peril. Both belligerents
have a right to control and visit all military and other hospital ships,
to refuse their assistance, to order them off, to make them take a
certain course, to put a commissioner on board, and, lastly, to detain
them temporarily, if important circumstances require this. In case a
hospital ship receives orders from a belligerent, these orders must, as
far as possible, be inscribed in the ship papers.

The protection to which hospital ships are entitled ceases if they are
made use of to commit acts harmful to the enemy[415] (article 8). But
the fact of the staff being armed for the purpose of maintaining order
and defending the wounded and sick, and the fact of the presence of
wireless telegraphic apparatus on board, are not sufficient reasons for
withdrawing protection.

[Footnote 415: An interesting case of this kind occurred during the
Russo-Japanese war. The _Aryol_ (also called the _Orel_), a hospital
ship of the Russian Red Cross Society, was captured, and afterwards
condemned by the Prize Court on the following grounds:--(_a_) For having
communicated the orders of the commander-in-chief of the Russian
squadron with which she was sailing to other Russian vessels; (_b_) for
carrying, by order of the commander-in-chief of the squadron, in order
to take them to Vladivostock, the master and some members of the crew of
the British steamship _Oldhamia_, which had been captured by the
Russians; (_c_) for having been instructed to purchase in Cape Town, or
its neighbourhood, 11,000 ft. of conducting wire of good insulation;
(_d_) for having navigated at the head of the squadron in the position
usually occupied by reconnoitring vessels.--See Takahashi, pp. 620-625,
and Higgins, _op. cit._ p. 74, and in _The Law Quarterly Review_, XXVI.
(1910), p. 408.]

It must be specially observed that any man-of-war of either belligerent
may, according to article 12, demand the surrender of the wounded, sick,
or shipwrecked who are on board hospital ships of any kind. According to
a reservation by Great Britain, article 12 is understood "to apply only
to the case of combatants rescued during or after a naval engagement in
which they have taken part."

[Sidenote: Hospital Ships in Neutral Ports.]

[p] 206_a_. For the purpose of defining the status of hospital ships
when entering neutral ports an International Conference met at the Hague
in 1904, where Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, China, Korea, Denmark,
Spain, the United States of America, France, Greece, Guatemala, Italy,
Japan, Luxemburg, Mexico, Holland, Persia, Portugal, Roumania, Russia,
Servia, and Siam, were represented. Great Britain, however, did not
take part. The following is the text of the six articles of the
Convention signed by all the representatives:--

  Article 1.--Hospital ships fulfilling the conditions prescribed in
  articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Convention concluded at the Hague on
  July 27, 1899, for the adaptation of the principles of the Geneva
  Convention of August 22, 1864, to naval warfare shall in time of
  war be exempt in the ports of the contracting parties from all
  dues and taxes imposed on vessels for the benefit of the State.

  Article 2.--The provision contained in the preceding article shall
  not prevent the exercise of the right of search and other
  formalities demanded by the fiscal and other laws in force in the
  said ports.

  Article 3.--The regulation laid down in article 1 is binding only
  upon the contracting Powers in case of war between two or more of
  themselves. The said rule shall cease to be obligatory as soon as
  in a war between any of the contracting Powers a non-contracting
  Power shall join one of the belligerents.

  Article 4.--The present Convention, which bears date of this day
  and may be signed up to October 1, 1905, by any Power which shall
  have expressed a wish to do so, shall be ratified as speedily as
  possible. The ratifications shall be deposited at the Hague. On
  the deposit of the ratifications, a _proces-verbal_ shall be drawn
  up, of which a certified copy shall be conveyed by diplomatic
  channels, after the deposit of each ratification, to all the
  contracting Powers.

  Article 5.--Non-signatory Powers will be allowed to adhere to the
  present convention after October 1, 1905. For that purpose they
  will have to make known the fact of their adhesion to the
  contracting Powers by means of a written notification addressed to
  the Government of the Netherlands, which will be communicated by
  that Government to all the other contracting Powers.

  Article 6.--In the event of any of the high contracting parties
  denouncing the present Convention, the denunciation shall only
  take effect after notification has been made in writing to the
  Government of the Netherlands and communicated by that Government
  at once to all the other contracting Powers. Such denunciation
  shall be effective only in respect of the Power which shall have
  given notice of it.

[Sidenote: Sick-Bays.]

[p] 206_b_. According to article 7, in case of a fight on board a
man-of-war, the sick-bays must, as far as possible, be respected and
spared. These sick-bays, and the material belonging to them, remain
subject to the laws of war; they may not, however, be used for any
purpose other than that for which they were originally intended so long
as they are required for the wounded and sick. But should the military
situation require it, a commander into whose power they have fallen may
nevertheless apply them to other purposes, under the condition that he
previously makes arrangements for proper accommodation for the wounded
and sick on board. The protection to which sick-bays are entitled ceases
if they are made use of to commit acts harmful to the enemy (article 8).
But the fact that the staff of sick-bays is armed in order to defend the
wounded and sick is not sufficient reason for withdrawing protection.

[Sidenote: Distinctive Colour and Emblem of Hospital Ships.]

[p] 207. All military hospital ships must be painted white outside with
a horizontal band of green about one metre and a half in breadth. Other
hospital ships must also be painted white outside, but with a horizontal
band of red. The boats and small craft of hospital ships used for
hospital work must likewise be painted white. And besides being painted
in this distinguishing colour, all military and other hospital ships
(article 5) must hoist, together with their national flag, the white
flag with a red cross stipulated by the Geneva Convention. If they
belong to a neutral State, they must also fly at the main mast the
national flag of the belligerent under whose control they are placed.
Hospital ships which, under the terms of article 4, are detained by the
enemy, must haul down the national flag of the belligerent to whom they
belong. All hospital ships which wish to ensure by night the freedom
from interference to which they are entitled, must, subject to the
assent of the belligerent they are accompanying, take the necessary
measures to render their special painting sufficiently plain. According
to article 6 the distinguishing signs mentioned in article 5 may only be
used, whether in time of peace or war, for protecting or indicating the
ships therein mentioned.

Although in this connection the red cross is especially stipulated as
the distinctive emblem, there is no objection to the use by
non-Christian States, who object to the cross on religious grounds, of
another emblem. Thus Turkey reserved the right to use a red crescent,
and Persia to use a red sun.

[Sidenote: Neutral Vessels assisting the Wounded, Sick, or Shipwrecked.]

[p] 208. A distinction must be made between neutral men-of-war and
private vessels assisting the sick, wounded, and shipwrecked.

(1) If men-of-war take on board wounded, sick, or shipwrecked persons,
precaution must be taken, so far as possible, that they do not again
take part in the operations of war (article 13). Such individuals must
not, however, be handed over to the adversary but must be detained till
the end of the war.[416]

(2) Neutral merchantmen,[417] yachts, or boats which have of their own
accord rescued sick, wounded, or shipwrecked men, or who have taken such
men on board at the appeal of the belligerent, must, according to
article 9, enjoy special protection and certain immunities. In no case
may they be captured for the sole reason of having such persons on
board. But, subject to any undertaking that may have been given to them,
they remain liable to capture for any violation of neutrality they may
have committed.

[Footnote 416: See below, [p] 348.]

[Footnote 417: See below, [p] 348_a_.]

It must be specially observed that, according to article 12, any
man-of-war of either belligerent may demand from merchant ships, yachts,
and boats, whatever the nationality of such vessels, the surrender of
the wounded, sick, or shipwrecked who are on board.

According to the reservation of Great Britain, mentioned above in [p]
206, article 12 is understood "to apply only to the case of combatants
rescued during or after a naval engagement in which they have taken
part."

[Sidenote: The Religious, Medical, and Hospital Staff.]

[p] 209. The religious, medical, and hospital staff of any captured
vessel is inviolable, and the members may not be made prisoners of war,
but they must continue to discharge their duties while necessary. If
they do this, the belligerent into whose hands they have fallen has to
give them the same allowances and the same pay as are granted to persons
holding the same rank in his own navy. They may leave the ship, when the
commander-in-chief considers it possible, and on leaving they are
allowed to take with them all surgical articles and instruments which
are their private property (article 10).

[Sidenote: Application of Convention X., and Prevention of Abuses.]

[p] 209_a_. The provisions of Convention X. are only binding in the case
of war between contracting Powers, they cease to be binding the moment a
non-contracting Power becomes one of the belligerents (article 18). In
the case of operations of war between land and sea forces of
belligerents, the provisions of Convention X. only apply to forces on
board ship (article 22). The commanders-in-chief of the belligerent
fleets must, in accordance with the instructions of their Governments
and in conformity with the general principles of the Convention, arrange
the details for carrying out the articles of Convention X., as well as
for cases not provided for in these articles (article 19). The
contracting parties must take the necessary measures to instruct their
naval forces, especially the personnel protected by Convention X., in
the provisions of the Convention, and to bring these provisions to the
notice of the public (article 20). The contracting Powers must, in case
their criminal laws are inadequate, enact measures necessary for
checking, in time of war, individual acts of pillage or maltreatment of
the wounded and sick in the fleet, as well as for punishing, as
unjustifiable adoption of military or naval marks, the unauthorised use
of the distinctive signs mentioned in article 5 on the part of vessels
not protected by the present Convention; they must communicate to each
other, through the Dutch Government, the enactments for preventing such
acts at the latest within five years of the ratification of Convention
X.[418] (article 21).

[Footnote 418: Great Britain has entered a reservation against articles
6 and 21, but see above, [p] 124_b_, p. 164, note 1.]

[Sidenote: General Provisions of Convention X.]

[p] 209_b_. Convention X. comes into force sixty days after ratification
or accession on the part of each Power concerned (article 26). It
replaces the Convention of 1899 for the adaptation to naval warfare of
the principles of the Geneva Convention, but this latter Convention
remains in force between such of its contracting parties as do not
become parties to Convention X. (article 25). Such non-signatory Powers
of Convention X. as are parties to the Geneva Convention of 1906 are
free to accede at any time, and a Power desiring to accede must notify
its intention in writing to the Dutch Government which must communicate
the accession to all the contracting Powers (article 24). Each of the
contracting Powers is at any time at liberty to denounce Convention X.
by a written notification to the Dutch Government which must immediately
communicate the notification to all the other contracting Powers; the
denunciation, however, does not take effect until one year after the
notification has reached the Dutch Government, and a denunciation only
affects the Power making the notification (article 27). A register kept
by the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs must record the dates of the
deposit of ratifications, as well as the dates of accessions or of
denunciations; each contracting Power is entitled to have access to
this register and to be supplied with duly certified extracts from it
(article 28).


VI

ESPIONAGE, TREASON, RUSES

  See, besides the literature quoted above at the commencement of [p][p]
  159 and 163, Pradier-Fodere, VIII. No. 3157, and Bentwich in _The
  Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation_, New Series, X.
  (1909), pp. 243-249.

[Sidenote: Espionage and Treason.]

[p] 210. Espionage[419] and treason do not play as large a part in sea
warfare as in land warfare;[420] still they may be made use of by
belligerents. But it must be specially observed that, since the Hague
Regulations deal only with land warfare, the legal necessity of trying a
spy by court-martial according to article 30 of these Regulations does
not exist for sea warfare, although such trial by court-martial is
advisable.

[Footnote 419: As regards the case of the _Haimun_, see below, [p] 356.]

[Footnote 420: See above, [p][p] 159-162.]

[Sidenote: Ruses.]

[p] 211. Ruses are customarily allowed in sea warfare within the same
limits as in land warfare, perfidy being excluded. As regards the use of
a false flag, it is by most publicists considered perfectly lawful for a
man-of-war to use a neutral's or the enemy's flag (1) when chasing an
enemy vessel, (2) when trying to escape, and (3) for the purpose of
drawing an enemy vessel into action.[421] On the other hand, it is
universally agreed that immediately before an attack a vessel must fly
her national flag. Halleck (I. p. 568) relates the following instance:
In 1783 the _Sybille_, a French frigate of thirty-eight guns, enticed
the British man-of-war _Hussar_ by displaying the British flag and
intimating herself to be a distressed prize of a British captor. The
_Hussar_ approached to succour her, but the latter at once attacked the
_Hussar_ without showing the French flag. She was, however, overpowered
and captured, and the commander of the _Hussar_ publicly broke the sword
of the commander of the _Sybille_, whom he justly accused of perfidy,
although the French commander was acquitted when subsequently brought to
trial by the French Government. Again, Halleck (I. p. 568) relates: In
1813 two merchants of New York carried out a plan for destroying the
British man-of-war _Ramillies_ in the following way. A schooner with
some casks of flour on deck was expressly laden with several casks of
gunpowder having trains leading from a species of gunlock, which, by the
action of clockwork, went off at a given time after it had been set. To
entice the _Ramillies_ to seize her, the schooner came up, and the
_Ramillies_ then sent a boat with thirteen men and a lieutenant to cut
her off. Subsequently the crew of the schooner abandoned her and she
blew up with the lieutenant and his men on board.

[Footnote 421: The use of a false flag on the part of a belligerent
man-of-war is analogous to the use of the enemy flag and the like in
land warfare; see above, [p] 164. British practice--see Holland, _Prize
Law_, [p] 200--permits the use of false colours. U.S. Naval War Code,
article 7, forbids it altogether, whereas as late as 1898, during the
war with Spain in consequence of the Cuban insurrection, two American
men-of-war made use of the Spanish flag (see Perels, p. 183). And during
the war between Turkey and Russia, in 1877, Russian men-of-war in the
Black Sea made use of the Italian flag (see Martens, II. [p] 103, p.
566). The question of the permissibility of the use of a neutral or
enemy flag is answered in the affirmative, among others, by Ortolan, II.
p. 29; Fiore, III. No. 1340; Perels, [p] 35, p. 183; Pillet, p. 116;
Bonfils, No. 1274; Calvo, IV. 2106; Hall, [p] 187. See also Pillet in
_R.G._ V. (1898), pp. 444-451. But see the arguments against the use of
a false flag in Pradier-Fodere, VI. No. 2760.]

Vattel (III. [p] 178) relates the following case of perfidy: In 1755,
during war between Great Britain and France, a British man-of-war
appeared off Calais, made signals of distress for the purpose of
soliciting French vessels to approach to her succour, and seized a sloop
and some sailors who came to bring her help. Vattel is himself not
certain whether this case is a fact or fiction. But be that as it may,
there is no doubt that, if the case be true, it is an example of
perfidy, which is not allowed.


VII

REQUISITIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, BOMBARDMENT

  Hall, [p] 140*--Lawrence, [p] 204--Westlake, II. pp. 315-318--Moore,
  VII. [p][p] 1166-1174--Taylor, [p] 499--Bonfils, Nos.
  1277-1277'1--Despagnet, Nos. 618-618 _bis_--Fiore, Code, Nos.
  1633-1642--Pradier-Fodere, VIII. Nos. 3153-3154--Nys, III. pp.
  430-432--Pillet, p. 117--Perels, [p] 35, p. 181--Holland, _Studies_,
  pp. 96-111--Dupuis, Nos. 67-73, and _Guerre_, Nos. 42-47--Barclay,
  _Problems_, p. 51--Higgins, pp. 352-357--Lemonon, pp.
  503-525--Bernsten, [p] 7, III.--Boidin, pp. 201-215--Nippold, II. [p]
  28--Scott, _Conferences_, pp. 587-598, and in _A.J._ II. (1908),
  pp. 285-294.

[Sidenote: Requisitions and Contributions upon Coast Towns.]

[p] 212. No case has to my knowledge occurred in Europe[422] of
requisitions or contributions imposed by naval forces upon enemy coast
towns. The question whether or not such requisitions and contributions
would be lawful became of interest through an article on naval warfare
of the future, published in 1882 by the French Admiral Aube in the
_Revue des Deux Mondes_ (vol. 50, p. 331). Aube pointed out that one of
the tasks of the fleet in sea warfare of the future would be to attack
and destroy by bombardment fortified and unfortified military and
commercial enemy coast towns, or at least to compel them mercilessly to
requisitions and contributions. As during the British naval manoeuvres
of 1888 and 1889 imaginary contributions were imposed upon several coast
towns, Hall ([p] 140*) took into consideration the question under what
conditions requisitions and contributions would be lawful in sea
warfare. He concluded, after careful consideration and starting from the
principles regarding requisitions and contributions in land warfare,
that such requisitions and contributions may be levied, provided a force
is landed which actually takes possession of the respective coast town
and establishes itself there, although only temporarily, until the
imposed requisitions and contributions have been complied with; that,
however, no requisitions or contributions could be demanded by a single
message sent on shore under threatened penalty of bombardment in case of
refusal. There is no doubt that Hall's arguments are, logically,
correct; but it was not at all certain that the naval Powers would adopt
them, since neither the Institute of International Law nor the U.S.
Naval War Code had done so.[423] The Second Hague Peace Conference has
now settled the matter through the Convention (IX.) concerning
bombardment by naval forces in time of war which amongst its thirteen
articles includes two--3 and 4--dealing with requisitions and
contributions. This Convention has been signed, although with some
reservations, by all the Powers represented at the Conference except
Spain, China, and Nicaragua, but China and Nicaragua acceded later. Many
States have already ratified.

[Footnote 422: Holland, _Studies_, p. 101, mentions a case which
occurred in South America in 1871.]

[Footnote 423: The Institute of International Law has touched upon the
question of requisitions and contributions in sea warfare in article 4,
No. 1, of its rules regarding the bombardment of open towns by naval
forces; see below, [p] 213, p. 267. U.S. Naval War Code, article 4,
allows "reasonable" requisitions, but no contributions since "ransom" is
not allowed.]

According to article 3 undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or
other buildings may be bombarded by a naval force, if the local
authorities, on a formal summons being made to them, decline to comply
with requisitions for provisions or supplies _necessary_ for the
_immediate_ use of the naval force concerned. These requisitions must be
proportional to the resources of the place; they can only be demanded by
the commander of the naval force concerned; they must be paid for in
cash, and, if this is not possible for want of sufficient ready money,
their receipt must be acknowledged.

As regards contributions, Convention IX. does not directly forbid the
demand for them, but article 4 expressly forbids bombardment of
undefended places by a naval force on account of non-payment of money
contributions; in practice, therefore, the demand for contributions will
not occur in naval warfare.

[Sidenote: Bombardment of the Enemy Coast.]

[p] 213. There is no doubt whatever that enemy coast towns which are
defended may be bombarded by naval forces, acting either independently
or in co-operation with a besieging army. But before the Second Peace
Conference of 1907 the question was not settled as to whether or not
_open and undefended_ coast places might be bombarded by naval forces.
The Institute of International Law in 1895, at its meeting at Cambridge,
appointed a committee to investigate the matter. The report[424] of this
committee, drafted by Professor Holland with the approval of the Dutch
General Den Beer Portugael, and presented in 1896 at the meeting at
Venice,[425] is of such interest that it is advisable to reproduce here
a translation of the following chief parts:--

  When the Prince de Joinville recommended in 1844, in case of war,
  the devastation of the great commercial towns of England, the Duke
  of Wellington wrote:--"What but the inordinate desire of
  popularity could have induced a man in his station to write and
  publish such a production, an invitation and provocation to war,
  to be carried on in a manner such as has been disclaimed by the
  civilised portions of mankind?" (Raikes, _Correspondence_, p.
  367). The opinion of the Prince de Joinville has been taken up by
  Admiral Aube in an article which appeared in the _Revue des Deux
  Mondes_ in 1882. After having remarked that the ultimate object of
  war is to inflict the greatest possible damage to the enemy and
  that "La richesse est le nerf de la guerre," he goes on as
  follows:--"Tout ce qui frappe l'ennemi dans sa richesse devient
  non seulement legitime, mais s'impose comme obligatoire. Il faut
  donc s'attendre a voir les flottes cuirassees, maitresses de la
  mer, tourner leur puissance d'attaque et destruction, a defaut
  d'adversaires se derobant a leurs coups, contre toutes les villes
  du littoral, fortifiees ou non, pacifiques ou guerrieres, les
  incendier, les ruiner, et tout au moins les ranconner sans merci.
  Cela s'est fait autrefois; cela ne se fait plus; cela se fera
  encore: Strasbourg et Peronne en sont garants...."

  The discussion was opened again in 1888, on the occasion of
  manoeuvres executed by the British Fleet, the enemy part of which
  feigned to hold to ransom, under the threat of bombardment, great
  commercial towns, such as Liverpool, and to cause unnecessary
  devastation to pleasure towns and bathing-places, such as
  Folkestone, through throwing bombs. One of your reporters observed
  in a series of letters addressed to the _Times_ that such acts are
  contrary to the rules of International Law as well as to the
  practice of the present century. He maintained that bombardment of
  an open town ought to be allowed only for the purpose of obtaining
  requisitions in kind necessary for the enemy fleet and
  contributions instead of requisitions, further by the way of
  reprisal, and in case the town defends itself against occupation
  by enemy troops approaching on land.... Most of the admirals and
  naval officers of England who took part in the lively
  correspondence which arose in the _Times_ and other journals
  during the months of August and September 1880 took up a contrary
  attitude....

[Footnote 424: See _Annuaire_, XV. (1896), pp. 148-150.]

[Footnote 425: See _Annuaire_, XV. (1896), p. 313.]

On the basis of this report the Institute, at the same meeting, adopted
a body of rules regarding the bombardment of open towns by naval forces,
declaring that the rules of the law of war concerning bombardment are
the same in the case of land warfare and sea warfare. Of special
interest are articles 4 and 5 of these rules, which run as follows:--

  Article 4. In virtue of the general principles above, the
  bombardment by a naval force of an open town, that is to say one
  which is not defended by fortifications or by other means of
  attack or of resistance for immediate defence, or by detached
  forts situated in proximity, for example of the maximum distance
  of from four to ten kilometres, is inadmissible except in the
  following cases:--

  (1) For the purpose of obtaining by requisitions or contributions
  what is necessary for the fleet. These requisitions or
  contributions must in every case remain within the limits
  prescribed by articles 56 and 58 of the Manual of the Institute.

  (2) For the purpose of destroying sheds, military erections,
  depots of war munitions, or of war vessels in a port. Further, an
  open town which defends itself against the entrance of troops or
  of disembarked marines can be bombarded for the purpose of
  protecting the disembarkation of the soldiers and of the marines,
  if the open town attempts to prevent it, and as an auxiliary
  measure of war to facilitate the result made by the troops and the
  disembarked marines, if the town defends itself. Bombardments of
  which the object is only to exact a ransom are specially
  forbidden, and, with the stronger reason, those which are intended
  only to bring about the submission of the country by the
  destruction, for which there is no other motive, of the peaceful
  inhabitants or of their property.

  Article 5. An open town cannot be exposed to a bombardment for the
  only reasons:--

  (_a_) That it is the capital of the State or the seat of the
  Government (but naturally these circumstances do not guarantee it
  in any way against a bombardment).

  (_b_) That it is actually occupied by troops, or that it is
  ordinarily the garrison of troops of different arms intended to
  join the army in time of war.

The First Peace Conference did not settle the matter, but expressed the
desire "that the proposal to settle the question of bombardment of
ports, towns, and villages by a naval force may be referred to a
subsequent Conference for consideration." The Second Peace Conference,
however, by Convention IX.--see above, [p] 212, p. 265--has provided
detailed rules concerning all the points in question, and the following
is now the law concerning bombardment by naval forces:--

(1) The bombardment of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or
other buildings is under all circumstances and conditions prohibited
(article 1). To define the term "undefended," article 1 expressly enacts
that "a place cannot be bombarded solely because automatic submarine
contact mines are anchored off the harbour," but Great Britain, France,
Germany, and Japan entered a reservation against this, since they
correctly consider such a place to be "defended."

(2) Although undefended places themselves are exempt, nevertheless
military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms or war
material, workshops or plant which could be utilised for the needs of
the hostile fleet or army, and men-of-war in the harbour of undefended
places may be bombarded. And no responsibility is incurred for any
unavoidable damage caused thereby to the undefended place or its
inhabitants. As a rule, however, the commander must, before resorting to
bombardment of these works, ships, and the like, give warning to the
local authorities so that they can destroy the works and vessels
themselves. Only if, for military reasons, immediate action is necessary
and no delay can be allowed to the enemy, may bombardment be resorted to
without previous warning, the commander being compelled to take all due
measures in order that the undefended place itself may suffer as little
harm as possible (article 2).

The first case in which naval forces acted according to these rules
occurred during the Turco-Italian war. On February 25, 1912, Admiral
Faravelli, the commander of an Italian squadron, surprised, at dawn, the
Turkish gunboat _Awni-Illa_ and a torpedo-boat in the port of Beirut.
These vessels were called upon to surrender, they were given until nine
o'clock a.m. to comply with the demand, and the demand was communicated
to the Governor and the Consular authorities. At nine o'clock the
Turkish vessels were again, by signal, summoned to surrender, and as no
reply was received, they were fired at and destroyed, but not without
first having vigorously answered the fire of the Italians. Shells
missing the vessels and bursting on the quay killed and wounded a number
of individuals and damaged several buildings. The Turkish Government
protested against this procedure as a violation of Convention IX. of the
Second Peace Conference, but, provided the official report of Admiral
Faravelli corresponds with the facts, the Turkish protest is unfounded.

(3) In case undefended places do not comply with legitimate
requisitions, they likewise may be bombarded; see details above, [p]
212.

(4) In case of bombardments, all necessary steps must be taken to spare
buildings devoted to public worship, art, science, or charitable
purposes; historical monuments; hospitals, and places where the sick or
wounded are collected, provided they are not at the time used for
military purposes. To enable the attacking force to carry out this
injunction, the privileged buildings, monuments, and places must be
indicated by visible signs, which shall consist of large stiff
rectangular panels, divided diagonally into two  triangular
portions, the upper portion black, the lower portion white (article 5).
Unless military exigencies render it impossible the commander of an
attacking naval force must, before commencing the bombardment, do all in
his power to warn the authorities (article 6).

(5) The giving over to pillage of a town or place, even when taken by
assault, is forbidden (article 7).


VIII

INTERFERENCE WITH SUBMARINE TELEGRAPH CABLES

  Moore, VII. [p] 1176--Westlake, II. pp. 280-283--Liszt, [p] 41,
  III.--Bonfils, No. 1278--Pradier-Fodere, VI. No. 2772--Fiore, III.
  No. 1387, and Code, Nos. 1650-1655--Perels, [p] 35, p. 185--Perdrix,
  _Les cables sousmarines et leur protection internationale_
  (1902)--Kraemer, _Die unterseeischen Telegraphenkabel in
  Kriegszeiten_ (1903)--Scholz, _Krieg und Seekabel_
  (1904)--Zuculin, _I cavi sottomarini e il telegrafo senza fili nel
  diritto di guerra_ (1907)--Holland, in _Journal de Droit
  International Prive et de la Jurisprudence comparee_ (Clunet),
  XXV. (1898), pp. 648-652, and _War_, No. 114--Goffin, in _The Law
  Quarterly Review_, XV. (1899), pp. 145-154--Bar, in the _Archiv
  fuer Oeffentliches Recht_, XV. (1900), pp. 414-421--Rey, in _R.G._
  VIII. (1901), pp. 681-762--Dupuis, in _R.G._ X. (1903), pp.
  532-547--Nordon in _The Law Magazine and Review_, XXXII. (1907),
  pp. 166-188. See also the literature quoted above, vol. I., at the
  commencement of [p] 286.

[Sidenote: Uncertainty of Rules concerning Interference with Submarine
Telegraph Cables.]

[p] 214. As the "International Convention[426] for the Protection of
Submarine Telegraph Cables" of 1884 expressly stipulates by article 15
that freedom of action is reserved to belligerents, the question is not
settled how far belligerents are entitled to interfere with submarine
telegraph cables. The only conventional rule concerning this question is
article 54 of the Hague Regulations, inserted by the Second Peace
Conference, which enacts that submarine cables connecting occupied enemy
territory with a neutral territory shall not be seized or destroyed, and
that, if a case of absolute necessity has compelled the occupant to
seize or destroy such cable, it must be restored after the conclusion of
peace and indemnities paid. There is no rule in existence which deals
with other possible cases of seizure and destruction.

[Footnote 426: See above, vol. I. [p][p] 286 and 287.]

The Institute of International Law has studied the matter and
adopted,[427] at its meeting at Brussels in 1902, the following five
rules:--

  (1) Le cable sousmarin reliant deux territoires neutres est
  inviolable.

  (2) Le cable reliant les territoires de deux belligerants ou deux
  parties du territoire d'un des belligerants peut etre coupe
  partout, excepte dans la mer territoriale et dans les eaux
  neutralisees dependant d'un territoire neutre.

  (3) Le cable reliant un territoire neutre au territoire d'un des
  belligerants ne peut en aucun cas etre coupe dans la mer
  territoriale ou dans les eaux neutralisees dependant d'un
  territoire neutre. En haute mer, ce cable ne peut etre coupe que
  s'il y a blocus effectif et dans les limites de la ligne du
  blocus, sauf retablissement du cable dans le plus bref delai
  possible. Le cable peut toujours etre coupe sur le territoire et
  dans la mer territoriale dependant d'un territoire ennemi jusqu'a
  d'une distance de trois milles marins de la laisse de basse-maree.

  (4) Il est entendu que la liberte de l'Etat neutre de transmettre
  des depeches n'implique pas la faculte d'en user ou d'en permettre
  l'usage manifestement pour preter assistance a l'un des
  belligerants.

  (5) En ce qui concerne l'application des regles precedentes, il
  n'y a de difference a etablir ni entre les cables d'Etat et les
  cables appartenant a des particuliers, ni entre les cables de
  propriete ennemie et ceux qui sont de propriete neutre.

[Footnote 427: See _Annuaire_, XIX. (1902), p. 331.]

The U.S. Naval War Code, article 5, laid down the following rules:--

  (1) Submarine telegraphic cables between points in the territory
  of an enemy, or between the territory of the United States and
  that of an enemy, are subject to such treatment as the necessities
  of war may require.

  (2) Submarine telegraphic cables between the territory of an enemy
  and neutral territory may be interrupted within the territorial
  jurisdiction of the enemy.

  (3) Submarine telegraphic cables between two neutral territories
  shall be held inviolable and free from interruption.[428]

[Footnote 428: It is impossible for a treatise to discuss the details of
the absolutely unsettled question as to how far belligerents may
interfere with submarine telegraph cables. Readers who take a particular
interest in it may be referred to the excellent monograph of Scholz,
_Krieg und Seekabel_ (1904), which discusses the matter thoroughly and
ably.]




CHAPTER V

NON-HOSTILE RELATIONS OF BELLIGERENTS


I

ON NON-HOSTILE RELATIONS IN GENERAL BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS

  Grotius, III. c. 19--Pufendorf, VIII. c. 7, [p][p]
  1-2--Bynkershoek, _Quaest. jur. publ._ I. c. 1--Vattel, III.
  [p][p] 174-175--Hall, [p] 189--Lawrence, [p] 210--Phillimore, III.
  [p] 97--Halleck, I. pp. 310-311--Taylor, [p] 508--Wheaton, [p]
  399--Bluntschli, [p] 679--Heffter, [p] 141--Lueder in
  Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 525-527--Ullmann, [p] 185--Bonfils, Nos.
  1237-1238--Despagnet, No. 555--Pradier-Fodere, VII. Nos.
  2882-2887--Rivier, II. p. 367--Calvo, IV. [p][p] 2411-2412--Fiore,
  III. No. 1482, and Code, Nos. 1721-1723--Martens, II. [p]
  127--Longuet, [p][p] 134-135--Merignhac, pp. 218-220--Pillet, pp.
  355-356--_Kriegsbrauch_, p. 38--_Land Warfare_, [p][p]
  221-223--Emanuel, _Les conventions militaires dans la guerre
  continentale_ (1904).

[Sidenote: _Fides etiam hosti servanda._]

[p] 215. Although the outbreak of war between States as a rule brings
non-hostile intercourse to an end, necessity of circumstances,
convenience, humanity, and other factors call, or may call, some kinds
of non-hostile relations of belligerents into existence. And it is a
universally recognised principle of International Law that, where such
relations arise, belligerents must carry them out in good faith. _Fides
etiam hosti servanda_ is a rule which was adhered to in antiquity, when
no International Law in the modern sense of the term existed. But it had
then a religious and moral sanction only. Since in modern times war is
not a condition of anarchy and lawlessness between belligerents, but a
contention in many respects regulated, restricted, and modified by law,
it is obvious that, where non-hostile relations between belligerents
occur, they are protected by law. _Fides etiam hosti servanda_ is,
therefore, a principle which nowadays enjoys as well a legal as a
religious and moral sanction.

[Sidenote: Different kinds of Non-hostile Relations.]

[p] 216. As through the outbreak of war all diplomatic intercourse and
other non-hostile relations come to an end, it is obvious that
non-hostile relations between belligerents must originate either from
special rules of International Law or from special agreements between
the belligerents.

No special rules of International Law which demanded non-hostile
relations between belligerents existed in former times, but of late a
few rules of this kind have arisen. Thus, for instance, release on
parole[429] of prisoners of war creates an obligation on the part of the
enemy not to re-admit the individuals concerned into the forces while
the war lasts. And, to give another example, by article 4 of the Geneva
Convention of 1906, and article 14 of the Hague Regulations--see also
article 17 of Convention X. of the Second Peace Conference--it is the
duty of either belligerent to return to the enemy, by his
prisoner-of-war bureau, all objects of personal use, letters, jewellery,
and the like found on the battlefield or left by those who died in
hospital.[430] Non-hostile relations of this kind, however, need not be
considered in this chapter, since they have already been discussed on
several previous pages.

[Footnote 429: See above, [p] 129.]

[Footnote 430: See above, [p] 144.]

Non-hostile relations originating from special agreements of
belligerents, so-called _commercia belli_, may either be concluded in
time of peace for the purpose of creating certain non-hostile relations
between the parties in case war breaks out, or they may be concluded
during the actual time of war. Such non-hostile relations are created
through passports, safe-conducts, safeguards, flags of truce, cartels,
capitulations, and armistices. Non-hostile relations can also be
created by peace negotiations.[431] Each of these non-hostile relations
must be discussed separately.

[Footnote 431: See below, [p] 267.]

[Sidenote: Licences to Trade.]

[p] 217. Several writers[432] speak of non-hostile relations between
belligerents created by licences to trade granted by a belligerent to
enemy subjects either within certain limits or generally. It has been
explained above, in [p] 101, that it is for Municipal Law to determine
whether or not through the outbreak of war all trade and the like is
prohibited between the subjects of belligerents. If the Municipal Law of
one or both belligerents does contain such a prohibition, it is of
course within the discretion of one or both of them to grant exceptional
licences to trade to their own or the other belligerent's subjects, and
such licences naturally include certain privileges. Thus, for instance,
if a belligerent allows enemy subjects to trade with his own subjects,
enemy merchantmen engaged in such trade are exempt from capture and
appropriation by the grantor. Yet it is not International Law which
creates this exemption, but the very licence to trade granted by the
belligerent and revocable at any moment; and no non-hostile
international relations between the belligerents themselves originate
from such licences. The matter would be different if, either in time of
peace for the time of war, or, during war, the belligerents agreed to
allow certain trade between their subjects; but non-hostile relations
originating from such an agreement would not be relations arising from a
licence to trade, but from a cartel.[433]

[Footnote 432: See, for instance, Hall, [p] 196; Halleck, II. pp.
343-363; Lawrence, [p] 214; Manning, p. 168; Taylor, [p] 512; Wheaton,
[p][p] 409-410; Fiore, III. No. 1500; Pradier-Fodere, VII. No. 2938.]

[Footnote 433: See below, [p] 224.]


II

PASSPORTS, SAFE-CONDUCTS, SAFEGUARDS

  Grotius, III. c. 21, [p][p] 14-22--Vattel, III. [p][p]
  265-277--Hall, [p][p] 191 and 195--Lawrence, [p] 213--Phillimore,
  III. [p][p] 98-102--Halleck, II. pp. 323-328--Taylor, [p]
  511--Wheaton, [p] 408--Moore, VII. [p][p] 1158-1159--Bluntschli,
  [p][p] 675-678--Heffter, [p] 142--Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp.
  525-527--Ullmann, [p] 185--Bonfils, Nos. 1246-1247--Despagnet,
  Nos. 558-561--Pradier-Fodere, VII. Nos. 2884, 2932-2938--Nys, III.
  pp. 504-505--Calvo, IV. [p][p] 2413-2418--Fiore, III. No. 1499,
  and Code, Nos. 1742-1749--Longuet, [p][p] 142-143--Merignhac, pp.
  239-240--Pillet, pp. 359-360--_Kriegsbrauch_, p. 41--Holland,
  _War_, No. 101--_Land Warfare_, [p][p] 326-337.

[Sidenote: Passports and Safe-conducts.]

[p] 218. Belligerents on occasions arrange between themselves that
passports and safe-conducts shall be given to certain of each other's
subjects. Passports are written permissions given by a belligerent to
enemy subjects, or others, allowing them to travel within that
belligerent's territory or enemy territory occupied by him.
Safe-conducts are written permissions given by a belligerent to enemy
subjects, or others, allowing them to proceed to a particular place for
a defined object, for instance, to a besieged town for conducting
certain negotiations; but safe-conducts may also be given for goods, and
they then comprise permission to carry such goods without molestation to
a certain place. Passports as well as safe-conducts make the grantee
inviolable so long and in so far as he complies with the conditions
specially imposed upon him or made necessary by the circumstances of the
special case. Passports and safe-conducts are not transferable, and they
may be granted to enemy subjects for a limited or an unlimited period;
in the former case their validity ceases with the expiration of the
period. Both may be withdrawn, not only when the grantee abuses the
protection, but also for military expediency. It must, however, be
specially observed that passports and safe-conducts are only a matter
of International Law when the granting of them has been arranged between
the belligerents or their responsible commanders, or between
belligerents and neutral Powers. If they are granted without such an
arrangement, unilaterally on the part of one of the belligerents, they
fall outside the scope of International Law.[434]

[Footnote 434: The distinction between passports and the like arranged
between the belligerents to be granted, on the one hand, and, on the
other, such as are granted unilaterally, would seem to be necessary,
although it is not generally made.]

[Sidenote: Safeguards.]

[p] 219. Belligerents on occasions arrange between themselves that they
shall grant protection to certain of each other's subjects or property
against their own forces in the form of safeguards, of which there are
two kinds. One consists in a written order given to an enemy subject or
left with enemy property and addressed to the commander of armed forces
of the grantor, in which the former is charged with the protection of
the respective individual or property, and by which both become
inviolable. The other kind of safeguard is given by detailing one or
more soldiers to accompany enemy subjects or to guard the spot where
certain enemy property is, for the purpose of protection. Soldiers on
this duty are inviolable on the part of the other belligerent; they must
neither be attacked nor made prisoners, and they must, on falling into
the hands of the enemy, be fed, well kept, and eventually safely sent
back to their corps. As in the case of passports and safe-conducts, it
must be specially observed that safeguards are only a matter of
International Law when the granting of them has been arranged by the
belligerents, and not otherwise; except in the case of the safeguards
mentioned by article 8, No. 2, of the Geneva Convention of 1906, who,
according to articles 9 and 12 of that Convention, are inviolable.


III

FLAGS OF TRUCE

  Hall, [p] 190--Lawrence, [p] 211--Westlake, II. p. 81--Moore, VII.
  [p] 1157--Phillimore, III. [p] 115--Halleck, II. pp. 333,
  334--Taylor, [p] 510--Bluntschli, [p][p] 681-684--Heffter, [p]
  126--Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 421-423--Ullmann, [p]
  180--Bonfils, Nos. 1239-1245--Despagnet, Nos.
  556-557--Pradier-Fodere, VII. Nos. 2927-2931--Rivier, II. pp.
  279-280--Calvo, IV. [p][p] 2430-2432--Fiore, III. No. 1378, and
  Code, Nos. 1495-1500--Martens, II. [p] 127--Longuet, [p][p]
  136-138--Merignhac, pp. 220-225--Pillet, pp. 356-358--Zorn, pp.
  195-199--Meurer, II. [p][p] 39-40--Bordwell, p. 293--Spaight, pp.
  216-231--_Kriegsbrauch_, pp. 26-29--Holland, _War_, Nos.
  88-91--_Land Warfare_, [p][p] 224-255.

[Sidenote: Meaning of Flags of Truce.]

[p] 220. Although the outbreak of war brings all negotiations between
belligerents to an end, and although no negotiations are as a rule
conducted during war, certain circumstances and conditions make it
necessary or convenient for the armed forces of belligerents to enter
into negotiations with each other for various purposes. Since time
immemorial a white flag has been used as a symbol by an armed force
wishing to negotiate with the enemy, and always and everywhere it has
been considered a duty of the enemy to respect this symbol. In land
warfare the flag of truce is made use of in the following manner.[435]
An individual--soldier or civilian--charged by his force with the task
of negotiating with the enemy, approaches the latter either carrying the
flag himself, or accompanied by a flag-bearer and, often, also by a
drummer, a bugler, or a trumpeter, and an interpreter. In sea warfare
the individual charged with the task of negotiating approaches the enemy
in a boat flying the white flag. The Hague Regulations have now by
articles 32 to 34 enacted most of the customary rules of International
Law regarding flags of truce without adding any new rule. These rules
are the same for land warfare as for sea warfare, although their
validity for land warfare is now grounded on the Hague Regulations,
whereas their validity for sea warfare is still based on custom only.

[Footnote 435: See Hague Regulations, article 32.]

[Sidenote: Treatment of Unadmitted Flag-bearers.]

[p] 221. As a commander of an armed force is not, according to article
33 of the Hague Regulations, compelled to receive a bearer of a flag of
truce, a flag-bearer who makes his appearance may at once be signalled
to withdraw. Yet even then he is inviolable from the time he displays
the flag to the end of the time necessary for withdrawal. During this
time he may neither be intentionally attacked nor made prisoner.
However, an armed force in battle is not obliged to stop its military
operations on account of the approach of an enemy flag-bearer who has
been signalled to withdraw. Although the latter may not be fired upon
intentionally, should he be wounded or killed accidentally, during the
battle, no responsibility or moral blame would rest upon the belligerent
concerned. In former times the commander of an armed force could inform
the enemy that, within a certain defined or indefinite period, he would
under no circumstances or conditions receive a flag-bearer; if, in spite
of such notice, a flag-bearer approached, he did not enjoy any
privilege, and he could be attacked and made prisoner like any other
member of the enemy forces. But this rule is now obsolete, and its place
is taken by the rule that a commander must never, except in a case of
reprisals, declare beforehand, even only for a specified period, that he
will not receive a bearer of a flag of truce.[436]

[Footnote 436: This becomes quite apparent from the discussion of the
subject at the First Peace Conference; see Martens, _N.R.G._ 2nd Ser.
XXVI. p. 465; and _Land Warfare_, [p] 234.]

[Sidenote: Treatment of Admitted Flag-bearers.]

[p] 222. Bearers of flags of truce and their parties, when admitted by
the other side, must be granted the privilege of inviolability. They may
neither be attacked nor taken prisoners, and they must be allowed to
return safely in due time to their own lines. On the other hand, the
forces admitting enemy flag-bearers need not allow them to acquire
information about the receiving forces and to carry it back to their own
corps. Flag-bearers and their parties may, therefore, be blindfolded by
the receiving forces, or be conducted by roundabout ways, or be
prevented from entering into communication with individuals other than
those who confer officially with them, and they may even temporarily be
prevented from returning till a certain military operation of which they
have obtained information is carried out. Article 33 of the Hague
Regulations specifically enacts that a commander to whom a flag of truce
is sent "may take all steps necessary to prevent the envoy taking
advantage of his mission to obtain information." Bearers of flags of
truce are not, however, prevented from reporting to their corps any
information they have gained by observation in passing through the enemy
lines and in communicating with enemy individuals. But they are not
allowed to sketch maps of defences and positions, to gather information
secretly and surreptitiously, to provoke or to commit treacherous acts,
and the like. If nevertheless they do any of these acts, they may be
court-martialed. Articles 33 and 34 of the Hague Regulations
specifically enact that a flag-bearer may temporarily be detained in
case he abuses his mission for the purpose of obtaining information, and
that he loses all privileges of inviolability "if it is proved beyond
doubt that he has taken advantage of his privileged position to provoke
or commit an act of treachery." Bearers of white flags and their party,
who approach the enemy and are received, must carry[437] some
authorisation with them to show that they are charged with the task of
entering into negotiations (article 32), otherwise they may be detained
as prisoners, since it is his mission and not the white flag itself
which protects the flag-bearer. This mission protects every one who is
charged with it, notwithstanding his position in his corps and his
status as a civilian or a soldier, but it does not protect a deserter.
The latter may be detained, court-martialed, and punished, notice being
given to his principal of the reason of punishment.[438]

[Footnote 437: Article 32 of the Hague Regulations confirms this
customary rule by speaking of an individual who is "authorised" by one
of the belligerents to enter into communication with the other.]

[Footnote 438: See Hall, [p] 190.]

[Sidenote: Abuse of Flag of Truce.]

[p] 223. Abuse of his mission by an authorised flag-bearer must be
distinguished from an abuse of the flag of truce itself. Such abuse is
possible in two different forms:--

(1) The force which sends an authorised flag-bearer to the enemy has to
take up a corresponding attitude; the ranks which the flag-bearer leaves
being obliged to halt and to cease fire. Now it constitutes an abuse of
the flag of truce if such attitude corresponding with the sending of a
flag of truce is intentionally not taken up by the sending force. The
case is even worse when a flag-bearer is intentionally sent on a feigned
mission in order that military operations may be carried out by the
sender under the protection due from the enemy to the flag-bearer and
his party.

(2) The second form of a possible abuse appears in the case in which a
white flag is made use of for the purpose of making the enemy believe
that a flag of truce is about to be sent, although it is not sent, and
of carrying out operations under the protection granted by the enemy to
this pretended flag of truce.

It need hardly be specially mentioned that both forms of abuse are gross
perfidy and may be met with reprisals, or with punishment of the
offenders in case they fall into the hands of the enemy. The following
case of abuse is related by Sir Sherston Baker in Halleck (II. p.
315):--"On July 12, 1882, while the British fleet was lying off
Alexandria, in support of the authority of the Khedive of Egypt, and the
rebels under Arabi Pasha were being driven to great straits, a rebel
boat, carrying a white flag of truce, was observed approaching H.M.S.
_Invincible_ from the harbour, whereupon H.M. ships _Temeraire_ and
_Inflexible_, which had just commenced firing, were ordered to suspend
fire. So soon as the firing ceased, the boat, instead of going to the
_Invincible_, returned to the harbour. A flag of truce was
simultaneously hoisted by the rebels on the Ras-el-Tin fort. These
deceits gave the rebels time to leave the works and to retire through
the town, abandoning the forts, and withdrawing the whole of their
garrison under the flag of truce."


IV

CARTELS

  Grotius, III. c. 21, [p][p] 23-30--Vattel, III. [p][p]
  278-286--Hall, [p] 193--Lawrence, [p] 212--Westlake, II. p.
  139--Phillimore, III. [p][p] 111-112--Halleck, II. pp.
  326-329--Taylor, [p] 599--Bluntschli, [p][p] 679-680--Heffter, [p]
  142--Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 525-529--Ullmann, [p]
  185--Bonfils, Nos. 827 and 1280--Despagnet, No.
  658--Pradier-Fodere, VII. Nos. 2832-2837, 2888--Rivier, II. p.
  360--Nys, III. pp. 521-525--Calvo, IV. [p][p] 2419-2429--Longuet,
  [p][p] 140, 141--Pillet, p. 359--_Kriegsbrauch_, p. 38--Holland,
  _War_, No. 100, and _Prize Law_, [p][p] 32-35--_Land Warfare_,
  [p][p] 338-339.

[Sidenote: Definition and Purpose of Cartels.]

[p] 224. Cartels are conventions between belligerents concluded for the
purpose of permitting certain kinds of non-hostile intercourse between
one another such as would otherwise be prevented by the condition of
war. Cartels may be concluded during peace in anticipation of war, or
during the time of war, and they may provide for numerous purposes.
Thus, communication by post, telegraph, telephone, and railway, which
would otherwise not take place, can be arranged by cartels, as can also
the exchange of prisoners, or a certain treatment of wounded, and the
like. Thus, further, intercourse between each other's subjects through
trade[439] can, either with or without limits, be agreed upon by
belligerents. All rights and duties originating from cartels must be
complied with in the same manner and good faith as rights and duties
arising from other treaties.

[Footnote 439: See above, [p] 217. But arrangements for granting
passports, safe-conducts, and safeguards--see above, [p][p] 218 and
219--are not a matter of cartels.]

[Sidenote: Cartel Ships.]

[p] 225. Cartel ships[440] are vessels of belligerents which are
commissioned for the carriage by sea of exchanged prisoners from the
enemy country to their own country, or for the carriage of official
communications to and from the enemy. Custom has sanctioned the
following rules regarding these cartel ships for the purpose of securing
protection for them on the one hand, and, on the other, their exclusive
employment as a means for the exchange of prisoners: Cartel ships must
not do any trade or carry any cargo or despatches;[441] they are
especially not allowed to carry ammunition or instruments of war, except
one gun for firing signals. They have to be furnished with a document
from an official belonging to the home State of the prisoners and
stationed in the country of the enemy declaring that they are
commissioned as cartel ships. They are under the protection of both
belligerents and may neither be seized nor appropriated. They enjoy this
protection not only when actually carrying exchanged prisoners or
official communications, but also on their way home after such carriage
and on their way to fetch prisoners or official communications.[442]
They lose the protection at once, and may consequently be seized and
eventually be appropriated, in case they do not comply, either with the
general rules regarding cartel ships, or with the special conditions
imposed upon them.

[Footnote 440: See above, [p] 190.]

[Footnote 441: The _La Rosina_ (1800), 2 C. Rob. 372; the _Venus_
(1803), 4 C. Rob. 355.]

[Footnote 442: The _Daifje_ (1800), 3 C. Rob. 139; the _La Gloire_
(1804), 5 C. Rob. 192.]


V

CAPITULATIONS

  Grotius, III. c. 22, [p] 9--Vattel, III. [p][p] 261-264--Hall, [p]
  194--Lawrence, [p] 215--Westlake, II. p. 81--Phillimore, III.
  [p][p] 122-127--Halleck, II. pp. 319-322--Taylor, [p][p]
  514-516--Wheaton, [p] 405--Moore, VII. [p] 1160--Bluntschli,
  [p][p] 697-699--Heffter, [p] 142--Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. p.
  527--Ullmann, [p] 185--Bonfils, Nos. 1259-1267--Despagnet, No.
  562--Pradier-Fodere, VII. Nos. 2917-2926--Rivier, II. pp.
  361-362--Nys, III. pp. 514-517--Calvo, IV. [p][p]
  2450-2452--Fiore, III. Nos. 1495-1497, and Code, Nos.
  1733-1740--Martens, II. [p] 127--Longuet, [p][p]
  151-154--Merignhac, pp. 225-230--Pillet, pp. 361-364--Bordwell, p.
  294--Meurer, II. [p][p] 41-42--Spaight, pp.
  249-259--_Kriegsbrauch_, pp. 38-41--Holland, _War_, No. 92--_Land
  Warfare_, [p][p] 301-325.

[Sidenote: Character and Purpose of Capitulations.]

[p] 226. Capitulations are conventions between armed forces of
belligerents stipulating the terms of surrender of fortresses and other
defended places, or of men-of-war, or of troops. It is, therefore,
necessary to distinguish between a _simple_ and a _stipulated_
surrender. If one or more soldiers lay down their arms and surrender, or
if a fortress or a man-of-war surrenders without making any terms
whatever, there is no capitulation, for capitulation is a convention
stipulating the terms of surrender.

Capitulations are military conventions only and exclusively; they must
not, therefore, contain arrangements other than those of a local and
military character concerning the surrendering forces, places, or
ships. If they do contain such arrangements, the latter are not valid,
unless they are ratified by the political authorities of both
belligerents.[443] The surrender of a certain place or force may, of
course, be arranged by some convention containing other than military
stipulations, but then such surrender would not originate from a
capitulation. And just as is their character, so the purpose of
capitulations is merely military--namely, the abandonment of a hopeless
struggle and resistance which would only involve useless loss of life on
the part of a hopelessly beset force. Therefore, whatever may be the
indirect consequences of a certain capitulation, its direct consequences
have nothing to do with the war at large, but are local only and concern
the surrendering force exclusively.

[Footnote 443: See Phillimore, III. [p] 123, who discusses the promise
of Lord William Bentinck to Genoa, in 1814, regarding its independence,
which was disowned by the British Government. Phillimore himself
disapproves of the attitude of Great Britain, and so do some foreign
publicists, as, for instance, Despagnet (No. 562); but the rule that
capitulations are military conventions, and that, therefore, such
stipulations are not valid as are not of a local military character, is
indubitable.]

[Sidenote: Contents of Capitulations.]

[p] 227. If special conditions are not agreed upon in a capitulation, it
is concluded under the obvious condition that the surrendering force
become prisoners of war, and that all war material and other public
property in their possession or within the surrendering place or ship
are surrendered in the condition they were at the time when the
signature was given to the capitulation. Nothing prevents a force
fearing surrender from destroying their provisions, munitions, their
arms and other instruments of war which, when falling into the hands of
the enemy, would be useful to him. Again, nothing prevents a commander,
even after negotiations regarding surrender have begun, from destroying
such articles. But when once a capitulation has been signed,[444] such
destruction is no longer lawful, and, if carried out, constitutes
perfidy which may be punished by the other party as a war crime.

[Footnote 444: When, during the Russo-Japanese War, in January 1905,
General Stoessel, the Commander of Port Arthur, had fortifications blown
up and vessels sunk, during negotiations for surrender, but before the
capitulation was signed, the Press undeservedly accused him of perfidy.
U.S. Naval War Code, article 52, enacted the right principle, that
"_after agreeing upon or signing_ a capitulation, the capitulator must
neither injure nor destroy the vessels, property, or stores in his
possession that he is to deliver up, unless the right to do so is
expressly reserved to him in the agreement or capitulation."]

But special conditions may be agreed upon between the forces concerned,
and they must then be faithfully adhered to by both parties. The only
rule which article 35 of the Hague Regulations enacts regarding
capitulations is that the latter must be in accordance with the demands
of military honour, and that, when once settled, they must be
scrupulously observed. It is instructive to give some instances of
possible conditions:--A condition of a capitulation may be the provision
that the convention shall be valid only if within a certain period
relief troops are not approaching. Provision may, further, be made that
the surrendering forces shall not in every detail be treated like
ordinary prisoners of war. Thus it may be stipulated that the officers
or even the soldiers shall be released on parole, that officers
remaining prisoners shall retain their swords. Whether or not a
belligerent will grant or even offer such specially favourable
conditions depends upon the importance of the force, place, or ship to
be surrendered, and upon the bravery of the surrendering force. There
are even instances of capitulations which stipulated that the
surrendering forces should leave the place with full honours, carrying
their arms and baggage away and joining their own army unmolested by the
enemy through whose lines they had to march.[445]

[Footnote 445: During the Franco-German War the Germans granted these
most favourable conditions to the French forces that surrendered Belfort
on February 15, 1871.]

[Sidenote: Form of Capitulations.]

[p] 228. No rule of International Law exists regarding the form of
capitulations, which may, therefore, be concluded either orally or in
writing. But they are usually concluded in writing. Negotiations for
surrender, from whichever side they emanate, are usually sent under a
flag of truce, but a force which is ready to surrender without special
conditions can indicate their intention by hoisting a white flag as a
signal that they abandon all and every resistance. The question whether
the enemy must at once cease firing and accept the surrender, is to be
answered in the affirmative, provided he is certain that the white flag
was hoisted by order or with the authority of the commander of the
respective force. As, however, such hoisting may well have taken place
without the authority of the commander and may, therefore, be disowned
by the latter, no duty exists for the enemy to cease his attack until he
is convinced that the white flag really indicates the intention of the
commander to surrender.

[Sidenote: Competence to conclude Capitulations.]

[p] 229. The competence to conclude capitulations is vested in the
commanders of the forces opposing each other. Capitulations entered into
by unauthorised subordinate officers may, therefore, be disowned by the
commander concerned without breach of faith. As regards special
conditions of capitulations, it must be particularly noted that the
competence of a commander to grant them is limited[446] to those the
fulfilment of which depends entirely upon the forces under his command.
If he grants conditions against his instructions, his superiors may
disown such conditions. And the same is valid if he grants conditions
the fulfilment of which depends upon forces other than his own and upon
superior officers. The capitulation in El Arish[447] on January 24,
1800, arranged between the French General Kleber and the Turkish Grand
Vizier, and approved by the British Admiral, Sir Sidney Smith, presents
an illustrative example of this rule. As General Kleber, who was
commanding the French army in Egypt, thought that he could not remain in
Egypt, he proposed surrender under the condition that his army should be
safely transported to France, carrying away their arms and baggage. The
Grand Vizier accepted these conditions. The British Admiral, Sir Sidney
Smith, who approved of these conditions, was the local commander on the
coast of Egypt, but was an officer inferior to Lord Keith, the commander
of the British Mediterranean fleet. The latter had, on January 8, 1800,
received secret orders, dated December 15, 1799, from the British
Government instructing him not to agree to any capitulation which
stipulated the free return of Kleber's army to France. Sir Sidney Smith
did not, however, receive instructions based on these orders until
February 22, 1800, and, therefore, when he approved of the capitulation
of El Arish in January, was not aware that he acted against orders of
the British Government.[448] Lord Keith, after having received the above
orders on January 8, 1800, wrote at once to General Kleber, pointing out
that he was not allowed to grant the return of the French army to
France.[449] On the other hand, the British Government, after having
been informed that Sir Sidney Smith had approved of the return of the
French army, sent, on March 28, 1800, fresh orders[450] to Lord Keith,
received by him at the end of April, advising him, although Sir Sidney
Smith had exceeded his competence, to allow the capitulation to be
carried out and the French army to be safely transported to France.
Meanwhile, however, circumstances had entirely changed. When General
Kleber had on March 17, 1800, received Lord Keith's letter of January 8,
he addressed a proclamation,[451] in which Lord Keith's letter was
embodied, to his troops asking them to prepare themselves for battle and
actually began hostilities again on March 20. He was assassinated on
June 14, and General Menou took over the command, and it was the latter
who received, on June 20, 1800, information of the changed attitude of
the British Government regarding the capitulation of El Arish.
Hostilities having been renewed as far back as March, General Menou
refused,[452] on his part, to consent to the carrying out of the
capitulation, and continued hostilities.

[Footnote 446: See U.S. Naval War Code, article 51.]

[Footnote 447: Martens, _R._ VII. p. 1.]

[Footnote 448: Martens, _R._ VII. pp. 8 and 9.]

[Footnote 449: Martens, _R._ VII. p. 10.]

[Footnote 450: Martens, _R._ VII. p. 11.]

[Footnote 451: Martens, _R._ VII. p. 15.]

[Footnote 452: Martens, _R._ VII. p. 16.]

It is obvious that Sir Sidney Smith, in approving the capitulation,
granted a condition which did not depend entirely upon himself and the
forces under him, but which depended upon Lord Keith and his fleet. Lord
Keith as well as the British Government could have lawfully disowned
this condition. That the British Government did not do so, but was ready
to ratify Sir Sidney Smith's approval, was due to the fact that it did
not want to disavow the promises of Sir Sidney Smith, who was not at the
time aware of the orders of his Government to Lord Keith. On the other
hand, the French Generals were not wrong in resuming hostilities after
having received Lord Keith's first information, as thereby the
capitulation fell to the ground.

[Sidenote: Violation of Capitulations.]

[p] 230. That capitulations must be scrupulously adhered to is an old
customary rule, now enacted by article 35 of the Hague Regulations. Any
act contrary to a capitulation would constitute an international
delinquency if ordered by the belligerent Government concerned, and a
war crime if committed without such order. Such violation may be met
with reprisals or punishment of the offenders as war criminals.


VI

ARMISTICES

  Grotius, III. c. 21, [p][p] 1-13, c. 22, [p] 8--Pufendorf, VIII.
  c. 7, [p][p] 3-12--Vattel, III. [p][p] 233-260--Hall, [p]
  192--Lawrence, [p] 216--Westlake, p. 82--Phillimore, III. [p][p]
  116-121--Halleck, II. pp. 311-319--Moore, VII. [p] 1162--Taylor,
  [p][p] 513 and 516--Wheaton, [p][p] 400-404--Bluntschli, [p][p]
  688-699--Heffter, [p] 142--Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp.
  531-544--Ullmann, [p] 186--Bonfils, Nos. 1248-1258--Despagnet,
  Nos. 563-566--Pradier-Fodere, VII. Nos. 2889-2918--Rivier, II. pp.
  362-368--Nys, III. pp. 518-520--Calvo, IV. [p][p]
  2433-2449--Fiore, III. Nos. 1484-1494, and Code, Nos.
  1750-1763--Martens, II. [p] 127--Longuet, [p][p]
  145-149--Merignhac, pp. 230-239--Pillet, pp. 364-370--Zorn. pp.
  201-206--Bordwell, p. 291--Meurer, II. [p][p] 43-44--Spaight, pp.
  232-248--_Kriegsbrauch_, pp. 41-44--Holland, _War_, Nos.
  93-99--_Land Warfare_, [p][p] 256-300.

[Sidenote: Character and Kinds of Armistices.]

[p] 231. Armistices or truces, in the wider sense of the term, are all
agreements between belligerent forces for a temporary cessation of
hostilities. They are in no wise to be compared with peace, and ought
not to be called temporary peace, because the condition of war remains
between the belligerents themselves, and between the belligerents and
neutrals on all points beyond the mere cessation of hostilities. In
spite of such cessation the right of visit and search over neutral
merchantmen therefore remains intact, as does likewise the right to
capture neutral vessels attempting to break a blockade, and the right to
seize contraband of war. However, although all armistices are
essentially alike in so far as they consist of cessation of hostilities,
three different kinds must be distinguished--namely, (1) suspensions of
arms, (2) general armistices, and (3) partial armistices.[453] It must
be emphasised that the Hague Regulations deal with armistices in
articles 36 to 41 very incompletely, so that the gaps need filling up
from old customary rules.

[Footnote 453: Although, as will be seen from the following sections,
this distinction is absolutely necessary, it is not made by several
publicists. Holland, _War_, No. 93, even says: "There is no difference
of meaning, according to British usage at least, between a 'truce,' an
'armistice,' and a 'suspension of arms.'" _Land Warfare_, [p] 256--see
in especial note (_a_)--accepts the distinction as indispensable.]

[Sidenote: Suspensions of Arms.]

[p] 232. Suspensions of arms, in contradistinction to armistices in the
narrower sense of the term, are such cessations of hostilities as are
agreed upon between large or small military or naval forces for a very
short time and regarding momentary and local military purposes only.
Such purposes may be--collection of the wounded; burial of the dead;
negotiation regarding surrender or evacuation of a defended place, or
regarding an armistice in the narrower sense of the term; but may also
be the creation of a possibility for a commander to ask for and receive
instructions from a superior authority,[454] and the like. Suspensions
of arms have nothing to do with political purposes, or with the war
generally, since they are of momentary and local importance only. They
concern exclusively those forces and that spot which are the object of
the suspension of arms. The Hague Regulations do not specially mention
suspensions of arms, since article 37 speaks of local armistices only,
apparently comprising suspensions of arms among local armistices.

[Footnote 454: An instructive example of a suspension of arms for such
purposes is furnished by the Convention between the German forces
besieging Belfort and the French forces holding this fortress during the
Franco-German War, signed on February 13, 1871; see Martens, _N.R.G._
XIX. p. 646.]

[Sidenote: General Armistices.]

[p] 233. A general armistice is such a cessation of hostilities as, in
contradistinction to suspensions of arms with their momentary and local
military purposes, is agreed upon between belligerents for the whole of
their forces and the whole region of war. General armistices are always
conventions of vital political importance affecting the whole of the
war. They are as a rule, although not necessarily, concluded for a
political purpose. It may be that negotiations of peace have ripened so
far that the end of the war is in sight and that, therefore, military
operations appear superfluous; or that the forces of either belligerent
are exhausted and need rest; or that the belligerents have to face
domestic difficulties, the settlement of which is more pressing than the
continuation of the war; or any other political purpose. Thus article 2
of the general armistice agreed upon at the end of the Franco-German War
on January 28, 1871,[455] expressly declared the purpose of the
armistice to be the creation of the possibility for the French
Government to convoke a Parliamentary Assembly which could determine
whether or not the war was to be continued or what conditions of peace
should be accepted.

[Footnote 455: Martens, _N.R.G._ XIX. p. 626.]

It is of importance to note that, for particular reasons, small parts of
the belligerent forces and small parts of the theatre of war may be
specially excluded without detracting from the general character of the
armistice, provided the bulk of the forces and the greater part of the
region of war are included. Thus, article 1 of the above-mentioned
general armistice at the end of the Franco-German war specially excluded
all military operations in the Departements du Doubs, du Jura, de la
Cote d'Or, and likewise the siege of Belfort. It should also be
mentioned that in the practice of belligerents the terms "suspension of
arms" and "general armistice" are sometimes not sufficiently
distinguished, but are interchangeable. Thus, for instance, the
above-mentioned general armistice between France and Germany is entitled
"Convention entre l'Allemagne et la France pour la suspension des
hostilites, ..." whereas the different articles of the Convention always
speak correctly of an armistice, and whereas, further, an annexe to the
Convention signed on January 29 is entitled[456] "Annexe a la Convention
d'armistice."

[Footnote 456: Martens, _N.R.G._ XIX. p. 636.]

[Sidenote: Partial Armistices.]

[p] 234. Partial armistices are agreements for cessations of hostilities
which are not concluded by belligerents for their whole forces and the
whole region of war, but do not merely serve, like suspensions of arms,
momentary and local military purposes. They are armistices concluded by
belligerents for a considerable part of their forces and front; they are
always of political importance affecting the war in general; and they
are very often, although they need not be, agreed upon for political
purposes. Article 37 of the Hague Regulations apparently includes
partial armistices together with suspensions of arms under the term
"local" armistices. A partial armistice may be concluded for the
military or the naval forces only; for cessation of hostilities in the
colonies only; for cessation of hostilities between two of the
belligerents in case more than two are parties to the war, and the like.
But it is always a condition that a considerable part of the forces and
region of war must be included, and that the purpose is not only a
momentary one.

[Sidenote: Competence to conclude Armistices.]

[p] 235. As regards the competence to conclude armistices, a distinction
is necessary between suspensions of arms and general and partial
armistices.

(1) Since the character and purpose of suspensions of arms are military,
local, and momentary only, every commander is supposed to be competent
to agree upon a suspension of arms, and no ratification on the part of
superior officers or other authorities is required. Even commanders of
the smallest opposing detachments may arrange a suspension of arms.

(2) On the other hand, since general armistices are of vital political
importance, only the belligerent Governments themselves or their
commanders-in-chief are competent to conclude them, and ratification,
whether specially stipulated or not, is necessary. Should a
commander-in-chief conclude a general armistice which would not find
ratification, hostilities may at once be recommenced without breach of
faith, it being a matter of common knowledge that a commander-in-chief
is not authorised to agree upon exclusion of ratification, unless he
received special powers thereto.

(3) Partial armistices may be concluded by the commanders-in-chief of
the respective forces, and ratification is not necessary, unless
specially stipulated; the commanders being responsible to their own
Governments in case they agree upon a partial armistice without being
specially authorised thereto.

[Sidenote: Form of Armistices.]

[p] 236. No legal rule exists regarding the form of armistices, which
may therefore be concluded either orally or in writing. However, the
importance of general as well as partial armistices makes it advisable
to conclude them by signing written documents containing all items which
have been agreed upon. No instance is known of a general or partial
armistice of modern times concluded otherwise than in writing. But
suspensions of arms are often only orally concluded.

[Sidenote: Contents of Armistices.]

[p] 237. That hostilities must cease is the obvious content of all kinds
of armistices. Usually, although not at all necessarily, the parties
embody special conditions in the agreement instituting an armistice. If
and so far as this has not been done, the import of armistices is for
some parts much controverted. Everybody agrees that belligerents during
an armistice may, outside the line where the forces face each other, do
everything and anything they like regarding defence and preparation of
offence; for instance, they may manufacture and import munitions and
guns, drill recruits, build fortresses, concentrate or withdraw troops.
But no unanimity exists regarding such acts as must be left undone or
may be done within the very line where the belligerent forces face each
other. The majority of writers, led by Vattel (III. [p] 245), maintain
that in the absence of special stipulations it is essentially implied in
an armistice that within such line no alteration of the _status quo_
shall take place which the other party, were it not for the armistice,
could by application of force, for instance by a cannonade or by some
other means, prevent from taking place. These writers consider it a
breach of faith for a belligerent to make such alterations under the
protection of the armistice. On the other hand, a small minority of
writers, but led by Grotius (III. c. 21, [p] 7) and Pufendorf (VIII. 7,
[p] 7), assert that cessation of hostilities and of further advance only
are essentially implied in an armistice; all other acts, such as
strengthening of positions by concentration of more troops on the spot,
erection and strengthening of defences, repairing of breaches of
besieged fortresses, withdrawing of troops, making of fresh batteries on
the part of besiegers without advancing, and the like, being allowed. As
the Hague Regulations do not mention the matter, the controversy still
remains unsettled. I believe the opinion of the minority to be correct,
since an armistice does not mean anything else than a cessation of
actual hostilities, and it is for the parties who agree upon an
armistice to stipulate such special conditions as they think necessary
or convenient. This applies particularly to the other controversial
questions as to revictualling of besieged places and as to intercourse,
commercial and otherwise, of the inhabitants of the region where actual
fighting was going on before the armistice. As regards revictualling, it
has been correctly maintained that, if it were not allowed, the position
of the besieged forces would thereby be weakened by the action of the
armistice. But I cannot see why this should be an argument to hold
revictualling permissible. The principle _vigilantibus jura sunt
scripta_ applies to armistices as well as to all other legal
transactions. It is for the parties to prepare such arrangements as
really suit their needs and wants. Thus, during the Franco-German War an
armistice for twenty-five days proposed in November 1870 fell to the
ground on the Germans refusing to grant the revictualling of Paris.[457]
It seems to be the intention of the Hague Regulations that the parties
should always stipulate those special conditions which they need.
Article 39 pronounces this intention regarding intercourse, commercial
and otherwise, during armistices, by the following words:--"It is for
the contracting parties to settle in the terms of the armistice what
communications may be held within the theatre of war with the population
and with each other."

[Footnote 457: See Pradier-Fodere, VII. No. 2908, where the question of
revictualling during an armistice is discussed at some length, and the
opinions of many publicists from Grotius to our own days are quoted.]

It must be specially mentioned that for the purpose of preventing the
outbreak of hostilities during an armistice it is usual to agree upon
so-called lines of demarcation[458]--that is, a small neutral zone
between the forces facing each other which must not be entered by
members of either force. But such lines of demarcation do not exist, if
they are not specially stipulated by the armistice concerned.

[Footnote 458: See Pradier-Fodere, VII. No. 2901.]

[Sidenote: Commencement of Armistices.]

[p] 238. In case the contrary is not stipulated, an armistice commences
the very moment the agreement upon it is complete. But often the parties
stipulate in the agreement the time from which the armistice shall
begin. If this is done in so detailed a manner that the very hour of the
commencement is mentioned, no cause for controversy is given. But
sometimes the parties fix only the date by stipulating that the
armistice shall last from one certain day to another, _e.g._ from June
15 to July 15. In such case the actual commencement is controversial.
Most publicists maintain that in such case the armistice begins at 12
o'clock of the night between the 14th and the 15th of June, but Grotius
(III. c. 21, [p] 4) maintains that it begins at 12 o'clock of the night
between the 15th and the 16th of June.[459] Therefore, to avoid
difficulties, agreements concerning armistices ought always to stipulate
whether the first day is to be included in the armistice. Be that as it
may, when the forces included in an armistice are dispersed over a very
large area, the parties very often stipulate different dates of
commencement for the different parts of the front, because it is not
possible to announce the armistice at once to all the forces included.
Thus, for instance, article 1 of the general armistice at the end of the
Franco-German War[460] stipulated its immediate commencement for the
forces in and around Paris, but that with regard to the other forces its
commencement should be delayed three days. Article 38 of the Hague
Regulations enacts that an armistice must be notified officially and in
good time to the competent authorities and the troops, and that
hostilities are suspended immediately after the ratification or at a
fixed date, as the case may be.

[Footnote 459: See Pradier-Fodere, VII. No. 2897. The controversy occurs
again with regard to the end of an armistice; see below, [p] 240.]

[Footnote 460: Martens, _N.R.G._ XIX. p. 626.]

It sometimes happens that hostilities are carried on after the
commencement of an armistice by forces which did not know of its
commencement. In such cases the _status quo_ at the date of the
commencement of armistice has to be re-established so far as possible,
prisoners made and enemy vessels seized being liberated, capitulations
annulled, places occupied evacuated, and the like; but the parties may,
of course, stipulate the contrary.

[Sidenote: Violation of Armistices.]

[p] 239. Any violation of armistices is prohibited, and, if ordered by
the Governments concerned, constitutes an international delinquency. In
case an armistice is violated by members of the forces on their own
account, the individuals concerned may be punished by the other party in
case they fall into its hands. Be that as it may, the question must be
answered, what general attitude is to be taken by one party, if the
other violates the armistice? No unanimity regarding this point exists
among the writers on International Law, many[461] asserting that in case
of violation the other party may at once, without giving notice, re-open
hostilities; others[462] maintaining that such party may not do this,
but has only the right to denounce the armistice. The Hague Regulations
endeavour to settle the controversy, article 40 enacting that any
serious violation of an armistice by one of the parties gives the other
the right to denounce it, and even, in case of urgency, to recommence
hostilities at once. Three rules may be formulated from this--(1)
violations which are not serious do not even give the right to denounce
an armistice; (2) serious violations do as a rule empower the other
party to denounce only the armistice, but not to recommence hostilities
at once without notice; (3) only in case of urgency is a party justified
in recommencing hostilities without notice, when the other party has
broken an armistice. But since the terms "serious violation" and
"urgency" lack precise definition, it is practically left to the
discretion of the injured party.

It must be specially observed that violation of an armistice committed
by private individuals acting on their own initiative is to be
distinguished from violation by members of the armed forces. In the
former case the injured party has, according to article 41 of the Hague
Regulations, only the right of demanding punishment of the offenders,
and, if necessary, indemnity for losses sustained.

[Footnote 461: See, for instance, Grotius, III. c. 21, [p] 11;
Pufendorf, VIII. c. 7, [p] 11; Vattel, III. [p] 242; Phillimore, II. [p]
121; Bluntschli, [p] 695; Fiore, III. No. 1494.]

[Footnote 462: See, for instance, Calvo, IV. [p] 2436; Despagnet, No.
566; Pradier-Fodere, VII. No. 2913.]

[Sidenote: End of Armistices.]

[p] 240. In case an armistice has been concluded for an indefinite
period, the parties having made no stipulations regarding notice to
recommence hostilities, notice may be given at any time, and hostilities
recommenced at once after notification. In most cases, however,
armistices are agreed upon for a definite period, and then they expire
with such period without special notice, unless notification has been
expressly stipulated. If, in case of an armistice for a definite period,
the exact hour of the termination has not been agreed upon, but only the
date, the armistice terminates at twelve o'clock midnight of such date.
In case an armistice has been arranged to last from one certain day to
another, _e.g._ from June 15 to July 15, it is again[463] controversial
whether July 15 is excluded or included. An armistice may, lastly, be
concluded under a resolutive condition, in which case the occurrence of
the condition brings the armistice to an end.

[Footnote 463: See above, [p] 238.]




CHAPTER VI

MEANS OF SECURING LEGITIMATE WARFARE


I

ON MEANS IN GENERAL OF SECURING LEGITIMATE WARFARE

  Bonfils, Nos. 1014-1017--Spaight, p. 460--_Land Warfare_, [p][p]
  435-438.

[Sidenote: Legitimate and Illegitimate Warfare.]

[p] 241. Since war is not a condition of anarchy and lawlessness,
International Law requires that belligerents shall comply with its rules
in carrying on their military and naval operations. So long and in so
far as belligerents do this, their warfare is legitimate; if they do not
comply with the rules, their warfare is illegitimate. Now, illegitimate
acts and omissions can be committed by belligerent Governments
themselves, by the commanders or members of their forces, and by their
subjects not belonging to the forces. Experience teaches that, on the
whole, omissions and the committal of illegitimate acts on the part of
individual soldiers are unavoidable during war, since the passions which
are aroused by and during war will always carry away some individuals.
But belligerents bear a vicarious responsibility for internationally
illegal acts of their soldiers, which turns into original responsibility
if they refuse to repair the wrong done by punishing the offenders and,
if necessary, indemnifying the sufferers.[464] Cases in which
belligerent Governments themselves commit illegitimate acts, as well as
cases in which they refuse to punish their soldiers for illegitimate
acts constitute international delinquencies.[465] Now, if in time of
peace an international delinquency is committed, the offended State can,
if the worst comes to the worst, make war against the offender to compel
adequate reparation.[466] But if an international delinquency is
committed during warfare itself, no means whatever exist of compelling
reparation.

[Footnote 464: See above, vol. I. [p][p] 149-150.]

[Footnote 465: See above, vol. I. [p] 151.]

[Footnote 466: See above, vol. I. [p] 156.]

[Sidenote: How Legitimate Warfare is on the whole secured.]

[p] 242. Yet legitimate warfare is, on the whole at any rate, secured
through several means recognised by International Law. These means of
securing legitimate warfare may be divided into three classes. The first
class comprises measures of self-help:--reprisals; punishment of war
crimes committed by enemy soldiers and other enemy subjects; the taking
of hostages. The second class comprises:--complaints lodged with the
enemy; complaints lodged with neutral States; good offices, mediation,
and intervention on the part of neutral States. And there is, thirdly,
the fact that, according to article 3 of Convention IV. of the Second
Peace Conference, belligerents are responsible for all acts committed by
persons forming part of their forces, and are liable to make
compensation, if the case demands it, for any violation of the Hague
Regulations. These means, as I have said, do on the whole secure the
legitimacy of warfare, because it is to the interest of either
belligerent to prevent the enemy from getting a justifiable opportunity
of making use of them. On the other hand, isolated illegitimate acts of
individual enemy soldiers will always occur; but they will in many cases
meet with punishment either by one party to the war or the other. As
regards hostile acts of private enemy individuals not belonging to the
armed forces, belligerents have a right[467] to consider and punish them
severely as acts of illegitimate warfare.

[Footnote 467: See below, [p] 254.]


II

COMPLAINTS, GOOD OFFICES AND MEDIATION, INTERVENTION

  _Land Warfare_, [p][p] 439-440.

[Sidenote: Complaints lodged with the Enemy.]

[p] 243. Commanders of forces engaged in hostilities frequently lodge
complaints with each other regarding single acts of illegitimate warfare
committed by members of their forces, such as abuses of the flag of
truce, violations of such flag or of the Geneva Convention, and the
like. The complaint is sent to the enemy under the protection of a flag
of truce, and the interest which every commander takes in the legitimate
behaviour of his troops will always make him attend to complaints and
punish the offenders, provided the complaints concerned are found to be
justified. Very often, however, it is impossible to verify the
statements in the complaint, and then certain assertions by one party,
and their denial by the other, face each other without there being any
way of solving the difficulty. It also often happens during war that the
belligerent Governments lodge with each other mutual complaints of
illegitimate acts and omissions. Since diplomatic intercourse is broken
off during war, such complaints are either sent to the enemy under the
protection of a flag of truce or through a neutral[468] State which
lends its good offices. But here too indignant assertion and emphatic
denial frequently face each other without there being a way of solving
the conflict.

[Footnote 468: Thus, in October 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War,
Japan sent a complaint concerning the alleged use of Chinese clothing on
the part of Russian troops to the Russian Government, through the
intermediary of the United States of America; see Takahashi, pp.
174-178.]

[Sidenote: Complaints lodged with Neutrals.]

[p] 244. If certain grave illegitimate acts or omissions of warfare
occur, belligerents frequently lodge complaints with neutral States,
either asking their good offices, mediation, or intervention to make the
enemy comply with the laws of war, or simply drawing their attention to
the facts. Thus, at the beginning of the Franco-German War, France
lodged a complaint with Great Britain and asked her intervention on
account of the intended creation of a volunteer fleet on the part of
Germany, which France considered a violation of the Declaration of
Paris.[469] Conversely, in January 1871, Germany, in a circular
addressed to her diplomatic envoys abroad, and to be communicated to the
respective neutral Governments, complained of twenty-one cases in which
the French forces had, deliberately and intentionally it was alleged,
fired on bearers of a flag of truce. Again, in November 1911, and in
February 1912, during the Turco-Italian War, Turkey lodged a complaint
with the Powers on account of the execution of Arabs in Tripoli as war
criminals, and on account of the bombardment of Turkish war vessels in
the harbour of Beirut.[470]

[Footnote 469: See above, [p] 84.]

[Footnote 470: See above, [p] 213.]

[Sidenote: Good Offices and Mediation.]

[p] 245. Complaints lodged with neutral States may have the effect of
one or more of the latter lending their offices or their mediation to
the belligerents for the purpose of settling such conflict as arose out
of the alleged illegitimate acts or omissions of warfare, thus
preventing them from resorting to reprisals. Such good offices and
mediation do not differ from those which settle a difference between
States in time of peace and which have been discussed above in [p][p]
7-11; they are friendly acts in contradistinction to intervention, which
is dictatorial interference for the purpose of making the respective
belligerents comply with the laws of war.

[Sidenote: Intervention on the part of Neutrals.]

[p] 246. There can be no doubt that neutral States, whether a complaint
has been lodged with them or not, may either singly, or jointly and
collectively, exercise intervention in cases of illegitimate acts or
omissions of warfare being committed by belligerent Governments, or
committed by members of belligerent forces if the Governments concerned
do not punish the offenders. It will be remembered that it has been
stated above in Vol. I. [p] 135, No. 4, that other States have a right
to intervene in case a State violates in time of peace or war those
principles of the Law of Nations which are universally recognised. There
is not the slightest doubt that such principles of International Law are
endangered in case a belligerent Government commits acts of illegitimate
warfare or does not punish the offenders in case such acts are committed
by members of its armed forces. But apart from this, the Hague
Regulations make illegitimate acts of warfare on land now appear as by
right the affair of all signatory States to the Convention, and
therefore, in case of war between signatory States, the neutral
signatory States certainly would have a right of intervention if acts of
warfare were committed which are illegitimate according to the Hague
Regulations. It must, however, be specially observed that any such
intervention, if it ever occurred, would have nothing to do with the war
in general and would not make the intervening State a party to the war,
but would concern only the international delinquency committed by the
one belligerent through acts of illegitimate warfare.


III

REPRISALS

  Vattel, III. p. 142--Hall, [p] 135--Westlake, II. pp. 112-115, and
  _Chapters_, pp. 253-258--Taylor, [p][p] 487 and 507--Wharton, III. [p]
  348B--Moore, VII. [p] 1114--Bluntschli, [p][p] 567, 580, 654,
  685--Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 392--Pradier-Fodere, VIII.
  Nos. 3214-3221--Bonfils, Nos. 1018-1026--Despagnet, No.
  543--Rivier, II. pp. 298-299--Calvo, IV. [p][p] 2041-2043--Martens,
  II. [p] 121--Merignhac, pp. 210-218--Holland, _War_, Nos.
  119-120--Bordwell, p. 305--Spaight, pp. 462-465--_Land Warfare_,
  [p][p] 452-460--Halleck in _A.J._ VI. (1912), pp. 107-118.

[Sidenote: Reprisals between Belligerents in contradistinction to
Reprisals in time of Peace.]

[p] 247. Whereas reprisals in time of peace are to be distinguished from
retorsion and are injurious acts committed for the purpose of compelling
a State to consent to a satisfactory settlement of a difference created
through an international delinquency,[471] reprisals between
belligerents are retaliation of an illegitimate act of warfare, whether
constituting an international delinquency or not, for the purpose of
making the enemy comply in future with the rules of legitimate warfare.
Reprisals between belligerents are terrible means, because they are in
most cases directed against innocent enemy individuals, who must suffer
for real or alleged offences for which they are not responsible. But
reprisals cannot be dispensed with, because without them illegitimate
acts of warfare would be innumerable. As matters stand, every
belligerent and every member of his forces knows for certain that
reprisals are to be expected in case they violate the rules of
legitimate warfare. And when nevertheless an illegal act occurs and is
promptly met with reprisals as a retaliation, human nature would not be
what it is if such retaliation did not act as a deterrent against a
repetition of illegitimate acts.

[Footnote 471: See above, [p][p] 33 and 42.]

[Sidenote: Reprisals admissible for every Illegitimate Act of Warfare.]

[p] 248. Whereas reprisals in time of peace are admissible for
international delinquencies only, reprisals between belligerents are at
once admissible for every and any act of illegitimate warfare, whether
the act constitutes an international delinquency or not. It is for the
consideration of the injured belligerent as to whether he will at once
resort to reprisals, or, before doing so, will lodge complaints with the
enemy or with neutral States. Practically, however, a belligerent will
rarely resort at once to reprisals, provided the violation of the rules
of legitimate warfare is not very grave and the safety of his troops
does not require prompt and drastic measures. Thus, the Germans during
the Franco-German War frequently by way of reprisal, bombarded and fired
undefended open villages where their soldiers were treacherously killed
by enemy individuals in ambush who did not belong to the armed forces.
And Lord Roberts, during the South African War, ordered[472] by way of
reprisal the destruction of houses and farms in the vicinity of the
place where damage was done to the lines of communication.[473]

[Footnote 472: See section 4 of the Proclamation of June 19, 1900
(Martens, _N.R.G._ 2nd Ser., XXXII. p. 147), and Beak, _The Aftermath of
War_ (1906), p. 11.]

[Footnote 473: That prisoners of war may be made the objects of
reprisals for acts of illegitimate warfare committed by the enemy, there
is hardly any doubt; see Beinhauer, _Die Kriegsgefangenschaft_ (1910),
p. 74.]

[Sidenote: Danger of Arbitrariness in Reprisals.]

[p] 249. The right to exercise reprisals carries with it great danger of
arbitrariness, for often the alleged facts which make belligerents
resort to reprisals are not sufficiently verified, or the rules of war
which they consider the enemy has violated are sometimes not generally
recognised, or the act of reprisal performed is often excessive compared
with the precedent act of illegitimate warfare. Three cases may
illustrate this danger.

(1) In 1782 Joshua Huddy, a captain in the army of the American
insurgents, was taken prisoner by loyalists and handed over to a Captain
Lippencott for the ostensible purpose of being exchanged, but was
arbitrarily hanged. The commander of the British troops had Lippencott
arrested, and ordered him to be tried for murder. Lippencott was,
however, acquitted by the court-martial, as there was evidence to show
that his command to execute Huddy was in accordance with orders of a
Board which he was bound to obey. Thereupon some British officers who
were prisoners of war in the hands of the Americans were directed to
cast lots to determine who should be executed by way of reprisal for the
execution of Huddy. The lot fell on Captain Asgill, a young officer only
nineteen years old, and he would have been executed but for the
mediation of the Queen of France, who saved his life.[474]

(2) "The British Government, having sent to England, early in 1813, to
be tried for treason, twenty-three Irishmen, naturalised in the United
States, who had been captured on vessels of the United States, Congress
authorised the President to retaliate. Under this act, General Dearborn
placed in close confinement twenty-three prisoners taken at Fort George.
General Prevost, under express directions of Lord Bathurst, ordered the
close imprisonment of double the number of commissioned and
non-commissioned United States' officers. This was followed by a threat
of 'unmitigated severity against the American citizens and villages' in
case the system of retaliation was pursued. Mr. Madison having retorted
by putting in confinement a similar number of British officers taken by
the United States, General Prevost immediately retorted by subjecting to
the same discipline all his prisoners whatsoever.... A better temper,
however, soon came over the British Government, by whom this system had
been instituted. A party of United States' officers, who were prisoners
of war in England, were released on parole, with instructions to state
to the President that the twenty-three prisoners who had been charged
with treason in England had not been tried, but remained on the usual
basis of prisoners of war. This led to the dismissal on parole of all
the officers of both sides."[475]

(3) During the Franco-German War the French had captured forty German
merchantmen, and made their captains and crews prisoners of war. Count
Bismarck, who considered it against International Law to detain these
men as prisoners, demanded their liberation, and when the French refused
this, ordered by way of reprisal forty French private individuals of
local importance to be arrested and to be sent as prisoners of war to
Bremen, where they were kept until the end of the war. Count Bismarck
was decidedly wrong,[476] since France had, as the law then stood, in no
way committed an illegal act by detaining the German crews as prisoners
of war.[477]

[Footnote 474: See the case reported in Martens, _Causes Celebres_, III,
pp. 311-321. See also Phillimore, III. [p] 105.]

[Footnote 475: See Wharton, III. [p] 348B.]

[Footnote 476: That Bismarck's standpoint was wrong has been pointed out
above in [p] 201. Some German writers, however, take his part; see, for
instance, Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 479, note 6. As regards the
present law on the subject, see above, [p][p] 85 and 201.]

[Footnote 477: The case is one of reprisals, and has nothing to do with
the taking of hostages; see below, [p] 258.]

[Sidenote: Proposed Restriction of Reprisals.]

[p] 250. The Hague Regulations do not mention reprisals at all because
the Brussels Conference of 1874, which accepted the unratified Brussels
Declaration, had struck out several sections of the Russian draft code
regarding reprisals. These original sections[478] (69-71)
stipulated--(1) that reprisals should be admitted only in extreme cases
of absolutely certain violations of the rules of legitimate warfare; (2)
that the acts performed by way of reprisal must not be excessive, but in
proportion to the respective violation; (3) that reprisals should be
ordered by commanders-in-chief only. Articles 85 and 86 of the Manual of
the Laws of War, adopted by the Institute of International Law,[479]
propose the following rules:--(1) Reprisals are to be prohibited in
case reparation is given for the damage done by an illegal act; (2) in
grave cases, in which reprisals are an imperative necessity, they must
never exceed the degree of the violation committed by the enemy; (3)
they may only be resorted to with the authorisation of the
commander-in-chief; (4) they must in every case respect the laws of
humanity and of morality. In face of the arbitrariness with which,
according to the present state of International Law, reprisals may be
exercised, it cannot be denied that an agreement upon some precise rules
regarding reprisals is an imperative necessity.

[Footnote 478: See Martens, _N.R.G._ 2nd Ser. IV. pp. 14, 139, 207.]

[Footnote 479: See _Annuaire_, V. p. 174.]


IV

PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMES

  Hall, [p] 135--Bluntschli, [p][p] 627-643A--Spaight, p. 462--Holland,
  _War_, Nos. 117-118--Ariga, [p][p] 96-99--Takahashi, pp.
  166-184--Landa in _R.I._ X. (1878), pp. 182-184--_Land Warfare_,
  [p][p] 441-451.

[Sidenote: Conception of War Crimes.]

[p] 251. In contradistinction to hostile acts of soldiers by which the
latter do not lose their privilege of being treated as members of armed
forces who have done no wrong, war crimes are such hostile or other acts
of soldiers or other individuals as may be punished by the enemy on
capture of the offenders. It must, however, be emphasised that the term
war crime is used, not in the moral sense of the term crime, but only in
a technical legal sense, on account of the fact that perpetrators of
these acts may be punished by the enemy. For, although among the acts
called war crimes are many which are crimes in the moral sense of the
term, such, for instance, as the abuse of a flag of truce or
assassination of enemy soldiers; there are others which may be highly
praiseworthy and patriotic acts, such as taking part in a levy _en
masse_ on territory occupied by the enemy. But because every belligerent
may, and actually must, in the interest of his own safety punish these
acts, they are termed war crimes, whatever may be the motive, the
purpose, and the moral character of the respective act.[480]

[Footnote 480: See above, [p] 57.]

[Sidenote: Different kinds of War Crimes.]

[p] 252. In spite of the uniform designation of these acts as war
crimes, four different kinds of war crimes must be distinguished on
account of the essentially different character of the acts. Violations
of recognised rules regarding warfare committed by members of the armed
forces belong to the first kind; all hostilities in arms committed by
individuals who are not members of the enemy armed forces constitute the
second kind; espionage and war treason belong to the third; and all
marauding acts belong to the fourth kind.

[Sidenote: Violations of Rules regarding Warfare.]

[p] 253. Violations of rules regarding warfare are war crimes only when
committed without an order of the belligerent Government concerned. If
members of the armed forces commit violations _by order_ of their
Government, they are not war criminals and may not be punished by the
enemy; the latter may, however, resort to reprisals. In case members of
forces commit violations ordered by their commanders, the members may
not be punished, for the commanders are alone responsible, and the
latter may, therefore, be punished as war criminals on their capture by
the enemy.

The following are the more important violations that may occur:

(1) Making use of poisoned or otherwise forbidden arms and ammunition.

(2) Killing or wounding soldiers disabled by sickness or wounds, or who
have laid down arms and surrendered.

(3) Assassination, and hiring of assassins.

(4) Treacherous request for quarter, or treacherous feigning of sickness
and wounds.

(5) Ill-treatment of prisoners of war, of the wounded and sick.
Appropriation of such of their money and valuables as are not public
property.

(6) Killing or attacking harmless private enemy individuals. Unjustified
appropriation and destruction of their private property, and especially
pillaging. Compulsion of the population of occupied territory to furnish
information about the army of the other belligerent or about his means
of defence.

(7) Disgraceful treatment of dead bodies on battlefields. Appropriation
of such money and other valuables found upon dead bodies as are not
public property, nor arms, ammunition, and the like.

(8) Appropriation and destruction of property belonging to museums,
hospitals, churches, schools, and the like.

(9) Assault, siege, and bombardment of undefended open towns and other
habitations. Unjustified bombardment of undefended places on the part of
naval forces.

(10) Unnecessary bombardment of historical monuments, and of such
hospitals and buildings devoted to religion, art, science, and charity,
as are indicated by particular signs notified to the besiegers
bombarding a defended town.

(11) Violations of the Geneva Convention.

(12) Attack on or sinking of enemy vessels which have hauled down their
flags as a sign of surrender. Attack on enemy merchantmen without
previous request to submit to visit.

(13) Attack or seizure of hospital ships, and all other violations of
the Hague Convention for the adaptation to naval warfare of the
principles of the Geneva Convention.

(14) Unjustified destruction of enemy prizes.[481]

(15) Use of enemy uniforms and the like during battle, use of the enemy
flag during attack by a belligerent vessel.

(16) Violation of enemy individuals furnished with passports or
safe-conducts, violation of safeguards.

(17) Violation of bearers of flags of truce.

(18) Abuse of the protection granted to flags of truce.

(19) Violation of cartels, capitulations, and armistices.

(20) Breach of parole.

[Footnote 481: Unjustified destruction of neutral prizes--see below, [p]
431--is not a war crime, but is nevertheless an international
delinquency, if ordered by the belligerent government.]

[Sidenote: Hostilities in Arms by Private Individuals.]

[p] 254. Since International Law is a law between States only and
exclusively, no rules of International Law can exist which prohibit
private individuals from taking up arms and committing hostilities
against the enemy. But private individuals committing such acts do not
enjoy the privileges of members of armed forces, and the enemy has
according to a customary rule of International Law the right to consider
and punish such individuals as war criminals. Hostilities in arms
committed by private individuals are not war crimes because they really
are violations of recognised rules regarding warfare, but because the
enemy has the right to consider and punish them as acts of illegitimate
warfare. The conflict between praiseworthy patriotism on the part of
such individuals and the safety of the enemy troops does not allow of
any solution. It would be unreasonable for International Law to impose
upon belligerents the duty to forbid the taking up of arms by their
private subjects, because such action may occasionally be of the
greatest value to a belligerent, especially for the purpose of freeing a
country from the enemy who has militarily occupied it. Nevertheless the
safety of his troops compels the enemy to consider and punish such
hostilities as acts of illegitimate warfare, and International Law gives
him a right to do so.

It is usual to make a distinction between hostilities in arms on the
part of private individuals against an invading or retiring enemy on the
one hand, and, on the other, hostilities in arms committed on the part
of the inhabitants against an enemy occupying a conquered territory. In
the latter case one speaks of war rebellion, whether inhabitants take up
arms singly or rise in a so-called levy _en masse_. Articles 1 and 2 of
the Hague Regulations make the greatest possible concessions regarding
hostilities committed by irregulars.[482] Beyond the limits of these
concessions belligerents will never be able to go without the greatest
danger to their troops.

[Footnote 482: See above, [p][p] 80 and 81.]

It must be particularly noted that merchantmen of belligerents, which
attack enemy vessels without previously having been attacked by them,
commit a war crime,[483] and that the captains, officers, and members of
the crews may, therefore, be punished as war criminals to the same
extent as private individuals who commit hostilities in land warfare.

[Footnote 483: See above, [p][p] 85 and 181.]

[Sidenote: Espionage and War Treason.]

[p] 255. Article 24 of the Hague Regulations now enacts the old
customary rule that a belligerent has a right to employ all methods
necessary to obtain information, and these methods include espionage and
treason. But this right stands face to face with the right to consider
and punish as war criminals enemy individuals, whether soldiers or not,
committing acts of espionage or treason. There is an irreconcilable
conflict between the necessity of obtaining information on the one hand,
and self-preservation on the other; and accordingly espionage and
treason, as has been explained above in [p] 159, bear a twofold
character. On the one hand, International Law gives a right to
belligerents to make use of espionage and treason. On the other hand,
the same law gives a right to belligerents to consider espionage and
treason, committed by enemy soldiers or enemy private individuals within
their lines, as acts of illegitimate warfare, and consequently
punishable.

Espionage has already been treated above in [p][p] 159-161. War treason
may be committed in different ways. The following are the chief cases of
war treason that may occur:--

(1) Information of any kind given to the enemy.

(2) Voluntary supply of money, provisions, ammunition, horses, clothing,
and the like, to the enemy.

(3) Any voluntary assistance to military operations of the enemy, be it
by serving as guide in the country, by opening the door of a defended
habitation, by repairing a destroyed bridge, or otherwise.

(4) Attempt to induce soldiers to desert, to surrender, to serve as
spies, and the like, and negotiating desertion, surrender, and espionage
offered by soldiers.

(5) Attempt to bribe soldiers or officials in the interest of the enemy,
and negotiating such bribe.

(6) Liberation of enemy prisoners of war.

(7) Conspiracy against the armed forces or against individual officers
and members of them.

(8) Wrecking of military trains, destruction of the lines of
communication or of the telegraphs or telephones in the interest of the
enemy, and the destruction of any war material for the same purpose.

(9) Circulation of enemy proclamations dangerous to the interests of the
belligerent concerned.

(10) Intentional false guidance of troops by a hired guide or by one who
offered his services voluntarily.

(11) Rendering courier or similar services to the enemy.

It must be specially observed that enemy soldiers--in contradistinction
to private enemy individuals--may only be punished for war treason when
they have committed the act of treason during their stay within a
belligerent's lines under disguise. If, for instance, two soldiers in
uniform are sent into the rear of the enemy for the purpose of
destroying a bridge, they may not, when caught by the enemy, be punished
for war treason, because their act was one of legitimate warfare. But if
they exchange their uniforms for plain clothes and thereby appear as
members of the peaceful private population, they may be punished for war
treason. A remarkable case of this kind occurred in the summer of 1904,
during the Russo-Japanese War. Two Japanese disguised in Chinese clothes
were caught in the attempt to destroy, with the aid of dynamite, a
railway bridge in Manchuria, in the rear of the Russian forces. Brought
before a court-martial, they confessed themselves to be Shozo Jakoga,
forty-three years of age, a Major on the Japanese General Staff, and
Teisuki Oki, thirty-one years of age, a Captain on the Japanese General
Staff. They were convicted, and condemned to be hanged, but the mode of
punishment was changed and they were shot. All the newspapers which
mentioned this case reported it as a case of espionage, but it is in
fact one of war treason. Although the two officers were in disguise,
their conviction for espionage was impossible according to article 29 of
the Hague Regulations, provided, of course, they were court-martialed
for no other act than the attempt to destroy a bridge.

It must be particularly noted that there are many acts of inhabitants
which a belligerent may forbid and punish in the interests of order and
the safety of his army, although these acts do not fall under the
category of war treason, and are not therefore punished as war crimes.
To this class belong all acts which violate the orders legitimately
decreed by an occupant of enemy territory.[484]

[Footnote 484: See _Land Warfare_, [p] 446.]

[Sidenote: Marauding.]

[p] 256. Marauders are individuals roving either singly or collectively
in bands over battlefields, or following advancing or retreating forces
in quest of booty. They have nothing to do with warfare in the strict
sense of the term, but they are an unavoidable accessory to warfare and
frequently consist of soldiers who have left their corps. Their acts are
considered acts of illegitimate warfare, and their punishment takes
place in the interest of the safety of either belligerent.

[Sidenote: Mode of Punishment of War Crimes.]

[p] 257. All war crimes may be punished with death, but belligerents
may, of course, inflict a more lenient punishment, or commute a sentence
of death into a more lenient penalty. If this be done and imprisonment
take the place of capital punishment, the question arises whether such
convicts must be released at the end of the war, although their term of
imprisonment has not yet expired. Some publicists[485] answer this
question in the affirmative, maintaining that it could never be lawful
to inflict a penalty extending beyond the duration of the war. But I
believe that the question has to be answered in the negative. If a
belligerent has a right to pronounce a sentence of capital punishment,
it is obvious that he may select a more lenient penalty and carry the
latter out even beyond the duration of the war. And it would in no wise
be in the interest of humanity to deny this right, for otherwise
belligerents would have always to pronounce and carry out sentence of
capital punishment in the interest of self-preservation.

[Footnote 485: See, for instance, Hall, [p] 135, p. 432.]


V

TAKING OF HOSTAGES

  Hall, [p][p] 135 and 156--Taylor, [p] 525--Bluntschli, [p]
  600--Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 475-477--Klueber, [p][p] 156
  and 247--G. F. Martens, II. 277--Ullmann, [p] 183--Bonfils, Nos.
  1145 and 1151--Pradier-Fodere, VII. Nos. 2843-2848--Rivier, II. p.
  302--Calvo, IV. [p][p] 2158-2160--Fiore, III. Nos.
  1363-1364--Martens, II. [p] 119--Longuet, [p] 84--Bordwell, p.
  305--Spaight, pp. 465-470--_Kriegsbrauch_, pp. 49, 50--_Land
  Warfare_, [p][p] 461-464.

[Sidenote: Former Practice of taking Hostages.]

[p] 258. The practice of taking hostages as a means of securing
legitimate warfare prevailed in former times much more than nowadays. It
was frequently resorted to in cases in which belligerent forces depended
more or less upon each other's good faith, such as capitulations and
armistices for instance. To make sure that no perfidy was intended,
officers or prominent private individuals were taken as hostages and
could be held responsible with their lives for any perfidy committed by
the enemy. This practice has totally disappeared, and is hardly likely
to be revived. But this former practice must not be confounded with the
still existing practice of seizing enemy individuals for the purpose of
making them the object of reprisals. Thus, when in 1870, during the
Franco-German War, Count Bismarck ordered forty French notables to be
seized and to be taken away into captivity as a retaliation upon the
French for refusing to liberate the crews of forty captured merchantmen,
these forty French notables were not taken as hostages, but were made
the object of reprisals.[486]

[Footnote 486: The case has been discussed above in [p] 249. All the
French writers who comment upon this case make the mistake of referring
to it as an instance of the taking of hostages.]

[Sidenote: Modern Practice of taking Hostages.]

[p] 259. A new practice of taking hostages was resorted to by the
Germans in 1870 during the Franco-German War for the purpose of securing
the safety of forces against possible hostile acts on the part of
private inhabitants of occupied enemy territory. Well-known men were
seized and detained in the expectation that the population would refrain
from hostile acts out of regard for the fate of the hostages. Thus, when
unknown people frequently wrecked the trains transporting troops, the
Germans seized prominent enemy citizens and put them on the engines of
trains to prevent the latter from being wrecked, a means which always
proved effective and soon put a stop to further train-wrecking. The same
practice was resorted to, although for a short time only, by Lord
Roberts[487] in 1900 during the South African War. This practice has
been condemned by the majority of publicists. But, with all due
deference to the authority of so many prominent men who oppose the
practice, I cannot agree with their opinion. Matters would be different
if hostages were seized and exposed to dangers for the purpose of
preventing legitimate hostilities on the part of members of the armed
forces of the enemy.[488] But no one can deny that train-wrecking on
occupied enemy territory by private enemy individuals is an act which a
belligerent is justified in considering and punishing as war
treason.[489] It is for the purpose of guarding against an act of
illegitimate warfare that these hostages are put on the engines. The
danger they are exposed to comes from their fellow-citizens, who are
informed of the fact that hostages are on the engines and who ought
therefore to refrain from wrecking the trains. It cannot, and will not,
be denied that the measure is a harsh one, and that it makes individuals
liable to suffer for acts for which they are not responsible. But the
safety of his troops and lines of communication is at stake for the
belligerent concerned, and I doubt, therefore, whether even the most
humane commanders will be able to dispense with this measure, since it
alone has proved effective. And it must further be taken into
consideration that the amount of cruelty connected with it is no greater
than in reprisals where also innocent individuals must suffer for
illegitimate acts for which they are not responsible. And is it not more
reasonable to prevent train-wrecking by putting hostages on the engines
than to resort to reprisals for wreckage of trains? For there is no
doubt that a belligerent is justified in resorting to reprisals[490] in
each case of train-wrecking by private enemy individuals.[491]

[Footnote 487: See section 3 of the Proclamation of Lord Roberts, dated
Pretoria, June 19, 1900, but this section was repealed by the
Proclamation of July 29, 1900. See Martens, _N.R.G._ 2nd Ser. XXXII.
(1905), pp. 147 and 149.]

[Footnote 488: _Land Warfare_, [p] 463, does not consider the practice
commendable, because innocent citizens are thereby exposed to legitimate
acts of train-wrecking on the part of raiding parties of armed forces of
the enemy.]

[Footnote 489: See above, [p] 255, No. 8.]

[Footnote 490: See above, [p] 248.]

[Footnote 491: Belligerents sometimes take hostages to secure compliance
with requisitions, contributions, ransom bills, and the like, but such
cases have nothing to do with illegitimate warfare: see above, [p] 116,
p. 153, note 1, and [p] 170, p. 213, note 3. The Hague Regulations do
not mention the taking of hostages for any purpose.]


VI

COMPENSATION

  Bonfils, No. 1026'1--Despagnet, No. 510 _bis_--Lemonon, pp.
  344-346--Higgins, pp. 260-261--Scott, _Conferences_, p.
  528--Nippold, II. [p] 24--Boidin, pp. 83-84--Spaight, p.
  462--Holland, _War_, No. 19--_Land Warfare_, [p] 436.

[Sidenote: How the Principle of Compensation for Violations of the Laws
of War arose.]

[p] 259_a_. There is no doubt that, if a belligerent can be made to pay
compensation for all damage done by him in violating the laws of war,
this will be an indirect means of securing legitimate warfare. In former
times no rule existed which stipulated such compensation, although, of
course, violation of the laws of war was always an international
delinquency. On the contrary, it was an established customary rule[492]
that claims for reparation of damages caused by violations of the rules
of legitimate warfare could not be raised after the conclusion of peace,
unless the contrary was expressly stipulated. It was not until the
Second Hague Peace Conference that matters underwent a change. In
revising the Convention concerning the laws and customs of war on land,
besides other alterations, a new article (3) was adopted which enacts
that a belligerent who violates the provisions of the Hague Regulations,
shall, if the case demand, be liable to make compensation, and that he
shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of
his armed forces.

[Footnote 492: See below, [p] 274, p. 335.]

Attention should be drawn to the fact that Germany, on whose initiative
this principle was adopted, proposed two articles concerning the matter,
the one dealing with the payment of compensation for violations of the
Hague Regulations with regard to subjects of neutral States,[493] and
the other for violations of these Regulations with regard to enemy
subjects. The conference, however, preferred to make no distinction
between the different cases of violation but to adopt the general
principle.

[Footnote 493: See below, [p] 357.]

[Sidenote: Compensation for Violations of the Hague Regulations.]

[p] 259_b_. It is apparent that article 3 of Convention IV. enacts two
different rules: firstly, that a belligerent who violates the Hague
Regulations shall, if the case demand, pay compensation; and secondly,
that a belligerent is responsible for all acts committed by any person
forming part of his armed forces.

To take this second rule first, the responsibility of a State for
internationally illegal acts on the part of members of its armed forces
is, provided the acts have not been committed by the State's command or
authorisation, only a vicarious responsibility, but nevertheless the
State concerned must, as was pointed out above, Vol. I. [p] 163, pay
damages for these acts when required. For this reason, article 3 does
not create a new rule in so far as it enacts that belligerents must pay
for damage caused by members of their forces.

On the other hand, the rule that compensation must be paid by
belligerents for damage done through violations of the Hague
Regulations, is a new rule, at any rate in so far as it is laid down in
a general way. If interpreted according to the letter, article 3 of
Convention IV. establishes the rule for payment of compensation for
violations of the Hague Regulations only, and not for violations of
other rules of International Law concerning land warfare or even
concerning sea warfare. I have, however, no doubt that the Powers would
recognise that the principle of article 3 must find application to any
rule of the laws of war, if by the violation of such rule subjects of
the enemy, or of neutral States, suffer damage. For instance, if the
commander of a naval force, in contravention of Convention IX. of the
Second Peace Conference, were to bombard an undefended place,
compensation could be claimed for such subjects of the enemy and
subjects of neutral States as suffered damage through the bombardment.

A point, however, to be kept in view is that article 3, although it
establishes the obligation to pay compensation, does not stipulate
anything concerning the time or the way in which claims for compensation
are to be settled. This is clearly a case for arbitration, and it is to
be hoped that the Third Peace Conference will make arbitration
obligatory in cases of claims for compensation arising from violations,
on the part of a belligerent, of the Hague Regulations as well as of
other laws of war.




CHAPTER VII

END OF WAR, AND POSTLIMINIUM


I

ON TERMINATION OF WAR IN GENERAL

  Hall, [p] 197--Lawrence, [p] 217--Phillimore, III. [p]
  510--Taylor, [p] 580--Moore, VII. [p] 1163--Heffter, [p]
  176--Kirchenheim in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 791-792--Ullmann, [p]
  198--Bonfils, No. 1692--Despagnet, No. 605--Calvo, V. [p]
  3115--Fiore, III. No. 1693--Martens, II. [p] 128--Longuet, [p]
  155.

[Sidenote: War a Temporary Condition.]

[p] 260. The normal condition between two States being peace, war can
never be more than a temporary condition; whatever may have been the
cause or causes of a war, the latter cannot possibly last for ever. For
either the purpose of war will be realised and one belligerent will be
overpowered by the other, or both will sooner or later be so exhausted
by their exertions that they will desist from the struggle. Nevertheless
wars may last for many years, although of late European wars have
gradually become shorter. The shortening of European wars in recent
times has resulted from several causes, the more important of which
are:--conscription, the foundation of the armies of all the great
European Powers, Great Britain excepted; the net of railways which
extends over all European countries, and which enables a much quicker
transport of troops on enemy territory; and lastly, the vast numbers of
the opposing forces which usually hasten a decisive battle.

[Sidenote: Three Modes of Termination of War.]

[p] 261. Be that as it may, a war may be terminated in three different
ways. Belligerents may, first, abstain from further acts of war and
glide into peaceful relations without expressly making peace through a
special treaty. Or, secondly, belligerents may formally establish the
condition of peace through a special treaty of peace. Or, thirdly, a
belligerent may end the war through subjugation of his adversary.[494]

[Footnote 494: That a civil war may come to an end through simple
cessation of hostilities or through a treaty of peace need hardly be
mentioned. But it is of importance to state the fact that there is a
difference between civil war and other war concerning the third mode of
ending war, namely subjugation. For to terminate a civil war, conquest
_and_ annexation, which together make subjugation, is unnecessary (see
below, [p] 264), but conquest alone is sufficient.]


II

SIMPLE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

  Hall, [p] 203--Phillimore, III. [p] 511--Halleck, II. p. 468--Taylor,
  [p] 584--Bluntschli, [p] 700--Heffter, [p] 177--Kirchenheim in
  Holtzendorff, IV. p. 793--Ullmann, [p] 198--Bonfils, No.
  1693--Despagnet, No. 605--Rivier, II. pp. 435-436--Calvo, V. [p]
  3116--Fiore, III. No. 1693--Martens, II. [p] 128--Longuet, [p]
  155--Merignhac, p. 323--Pillet, p. 370.

[Sidenote: Exceptional Occurrence of simple Cessation of Hostilities.]

[p] 262. The regular modes of termination of war are treaties of peace
or subjugation, but cases have occurred in which simple cessation of all
acts of war on the part of both belligerents has actually and informally
brought the war to an end. Thus ended in 1716 the war between Sweden and
Poland, in 1720 the war between Spain and France, in 1801 the war
between Russia and Persia, in 1867 the war between France and Mexico.
And it may also be mentioned that, whereas the war between Prussia and
several German States in 1866 came to an end through subjugation of some
States and through treaties of peace with others, Prussia has never
concluded a treaty of peace with the Principality of Lichtenstein, which
was also a party to the war. Although such termination of war through
simple cessation of hostilities is for many reasons inconvenient, and
is, therefore, as a rule avoided, it may nevertheless in the future as
in the past occasionally occur.

[Sidenote: Effect of Termination of War through simple Cessation of
Hostilities.]

[p] 263. Since in the case of termination of war through simple
cessation of hostilities no treaty of peace embodies the conditions of
peace between the former belligerents, the question arises whether the
_status_ which existed between the parties before the outbreak of war,
the _status quo ante bellum_, should be revived, or the _status_ which
exists between the parties at the time when they simply ceased
hostilities, the _status quo post bellum_ (the _uti possidetis_), can be
upheld. The majority of publicists[495] correctly maintain that the
_status_ which exists at the time of cessation of hostilities becomes
silently recognised through such cessation, and is, therefore, the basis
of the future relations of the parties. This question is of the greatest
importance regarding enemy territory militarily occupied by a
belligerent at the time hostilities cease. According to the correct
opinion such territory can be annexed by the occupier, the adversary
through the cessation of hostilities having dropped all rights he
possessed over such territory. On the other hand, this termination of
war through cessation of hostilities contains no decision regarding such
claims of the parties as have not been settled by the actual position of
affairs at the termination of hostilities, and it remains for the
parties to settle them by special agreement or to let them stand over.

[Footnote 495: See, however, Phillimore, III. [p] 511, who maintains
that the _status quo ante bellum_ has to be revived.]


III

SUBJUGATION

  Vattel, III. [p][p] 199-203--Hall, [p][p] 204-205--Lawrence, [p]
  77--Phillimore, III. [p] 512--Halleck, I. pp. 467-498--Taylor,
  [p][p] 220, 585-588--Moore, I. [p] 87--Walker, [p] 11--Wheaton,
  [p] 165--Bluntschli, [p][p] 287-289, 701-702--Heffter, [p]
  178--Kirchenheim in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 792--Liszt, [p]
  10--Ullmann, [p][p] 92, 97, and 197--Bonfils, Nos. 535 and
  1694--Despagnet, Nos. 387-390, 605--Rivier, II. pp.
  436-441--Calvo, V. [p][p] 3117-3118--Fiore, II. Nos. 863, III. No.
  1693, and Code, Nos. 1078-1089--Martens. I. [p] 91, II. [p]
  128--Longuet, [p] 155--Merignhac, p. 324--Pillet, p.
  371--Holtzendorff, _Eroberung und Eroberungsrecht_
  (1871)--Heimburger, _Der Erwerb der Gebietshoheit_ (1888), pp.
  121-132--Westlake, in _The Law Quarterly Review_, XVII. (1901), p.
  392.

[Sidenote: Subjugation in contradistinction to Conquest.]

[p] 264. Subjugation must not be confounded with conquest, although
there can be no subjugation without conquest. Conquest is taking
possession of enemy territory by military force. Conquest is completed
as soon as the territory concerned is effectively[496] occupied. Now it
is obvious that conquest of a part of enemy territory has nothing to do
with subjugation, because the enemy may well reconquer it. But even the
conquest of the whole of the enemy territory need not necessarily
include subjugation. For, first, in a war between more than two
belligerents the troops of one of them may evacuate their country and
join the army of allies, so that the armed contention is continued,
although the territory of one of the allies is completely conquered.
Again, a belligerent, although he has annihilated the forces, conquered
the whole of the territory of his adversary, and thereby actually
brought the armed contention to an end,[497] may nevertheless not choose
to exterminate the enemy State by annexing the conquered territory, but
may conclude a treaty of peace with the expelled or imprisoned head of
the defeated State, re-establish the latter's Government, and hand the
whole or a part of the conquered territory over to it. Subjugation takes
place only when a belligerent, after having annihilated the forces and
conquered the territory of his adversary, destroys his existence by
annexing the conquered territory. Subjugation may, therefore, correctly
be defined as _extermination in war of one belligerent by another
through annexation_[498] _of the former's territory after conquest, the
enemy forces having been annihilated_.[499]

[Footnote 496: The conditions of effective occupation have been
discussed above in [p] 167. Regarding subjugation as a mode of
acquisition of territory, see above, vol. I. [p][p] 236-241.]

[Footnote 497: The continuation of guerilla war after the termination of
a real war is discussed above in [p] 60.]

[Footnote 498: That conquest alone is sufficient for the termination of
civil wars has been pointed out above, [p] 261, p. 323, note 1.]

[Footnote 499: It should be mentioned that a premature annexation can
become valid through the occupation in question becoming soon afterwards
effective. Thus, although the annexation of the South African Republic,
on September 1, 1900, was premature, it became valid through the
occupation becoming effective in 1901. See above, [p] 167, p. 209, note
1.]

[Sidenote: Subjugation a formal End of War.]

[p] 265. Although complete conquest, together with annihilation of the
enemy forces, brings the armed contention, and thereby the war, actually
to an end, the formal end of the war is thereby not yet realised, as
everything depends upon the resolution of the victor regarding the fate
of the vanquished State. If he be willing to re-establish the captive or
expelled head of the vanquished State, it is a treaty of peace concluded
with the latter which terminates the war. But if he desires to acquire
the whole of the conquered territory for himself, he annexes it, and
thereby formally ends the war through subjugation. That the expelled
head of the vanquished State protests and keeps up his claims, matters
as little eventually as protests on the part of neutral States. These
protests may be of political importance for the future, legally they are
of no importance at all.

History presents numerous instances of subjugation. Although no longer
so frequent as in former times, subjugation is not at all of rare
occurrence. Thus, modern Italy came into existence through the
subjugation by Sardinia in 1859 of the Two Sicilies, the Grand Dukedom
of Tuscany, the Dukedoms of Parma and Modena, and in 1870 the Papal
States. Thus, further, Prussia subjugated in 1866 the Kingdom of
Hanover, the Dukedom of Nassau, the Electorate of Hesse-Cassel, and the
Free Town of Frankfort-on-the-Main. And Great Britain annexed in 1900
the Orange Free State and the South African Republic.[500]

[Footnote 500: Since Great Britain annexed these territories in 1900,
the agreement of 1902, regarding "Terms of Surrender of the Boer Forces
in the Field"--see _Parliamentary Papers_, South Africa, 1902, Cd.
1096--is not a treaty of peace, and the South African War came formally
to an end through subjugation, although--see above, [p] 167, p. 209,
note 1--the proclamation of the annexation was somewhat premature. The
agreement embodying the terms of surrender of the routed remnants of the
Boer forces has, therefore, no internationally legal basis (see also
below, [p] 274, p. 334, note 2). The case would be different if the
British Government had really--as Sir Thomas Barclay asserts in _The Law
Quarterly Review_, XXI. (1905), pp. 303 and 307--recognised the
existence of the Government of the South African Republic down to May
31, 1902.]


IV

TREATY OF PEACE

  Grotius, III. c. 20--Vattel, IV. [p][p] 9-18--Phillimore, III.
  [p][p] 513-516--Halleck, I. pp. 306-324--Taylor, [p][p]
  590-592--Moore, VII. [p] 1163--Wheaton, [p][p]
  538-543--Bluntschli, [p][p] 703-707--Heffter, [p] 179--Kirchenheim
  in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 794-804--Ullmann, [p] 198--Bonfils, Nos.
  1696-1697, 1703-1705--Despagnet, Nos. 606-611--Rivier, II. pp.
  443-453--Nys, III. pp. 719-734--Calvo, V. [p][p] 3119-3136--Fiore,
  III. Nos. 1694-1700, and Code, Nos. 1931-1941--Martens, II. [p]
  128--Longuet, [p][p] 156-164--Merignhac, pp. 324-329--Pillet, pp.
  372-375.

[Sidenote: Treaty of Peace the most frequent End of War.]

[p] 266. Although occasionally war ends through simple cessation of
hostilities, and although subjugation is not at all rare or irregular,
the most frequent end of war is a treaty of peace. Many publicists
correctly call a treaty of peace the normal mode of terminating war. On
the one hand, simple cessation of hostilities is certainly an irregular
mode. Subjugation, on the other hand, is in most cases either not
within the scope of the intention of the victor or not realisable. And
it is quite reasonable that a treaty of peace should be the normal end
of war. States which are driven from disagreement to war will, sooner or
later, when the fortune of war has given its decision, be convinced that
the armed contention ought to be terminated. Thus a mutual understanding
and agreement upon certain terms is the normal mode of ending the
contention. And it is a treaty of peace which embodies such
understanding.

[Sidenote: Peace Negotiations.]

[p] 267. However, as the outbreak of war interrupts all regular
non-hostile intercourse between belligerents, negotiations for peace are
often difficult of initiation. Each party, although willing to
negotiate, may have strong reasons for not opening negotiations. Good
offices and mediation on the part of neutrals, therefore, always are of
great importance, as thereby negotiations are called into existence
which otherwise might have been long delayed. But it must be emphasised
that neither formal nor informal peace negotiations do _ipso facto_
bring hostilities to a standstill, although a partial or general
armistice may be concluded for the purpose of such negotiations. The
fact that peace negotiations are going on directly between belligerents
does not create any non-hostile relations between them apart from those
negotiations themselves. Such negotiations can take place by the
exchange of letters between the belligerent Governments, or through
special negotiators who may meet on neutral territory or on the
territory of one of the belligerents. In case they meet on belligerent
territory, the enemy negotiators are inviolable and must be treated on
the same footing as bearers of flags of truce, if not as diplomatic
envoys. For it can happen that a belligerent receives an enemy
diplomatic envoy for the purpose of peace negotiations. Be that as it
may, negotiations, wherever taking place and by whomsoever conducted,
may always be broken off before an agreement is arrived at.

[Sidenote: Preliminaries of Peace.]

[p] 268. Although ready to terminate the war through a treaty of peace,
belligerents are frequently not able to settle all the terms of peace at
once. In such cases hostilities are usually brought to an end through
so-called preliminaries of peace, the definite treaty, which has to take
the place of the preliminaries, being concluded later on. Such
preliminaries are a treaty in themselves, embodying an agreement of the
parties regarding such terms of peace as are essential. Preliminaries
are as binding as any other treaty, and therefore they need
ratification. Very often, but not necessarily, the definitive treaty of
peace is concluded at a place other than that at which the preliminaries
were settled. Thus, the war between Austria, France, and Sardinia was
ended by the Preliminaries of Villafranca of July 11, 1859, yet the
definitive treaty of peace was concluded at Zurich on November 10, 1859.
The war between Austria and Prussia was ended by the Preliminaries of
Nickolsburg of July 26, 1866, yet the definitive treaty of peace was
concluded at Prague on August 23. In the Franco-German War the
Preliminaries of Versailles of February 26, 1871, were the precursor of
the definitive treaty of peace concluded at Frankfort on May 10,
1871.[501]

[Footnote 501: No preliminaries of peace were agreed upon at the end of
the Russo-Japanese war. After negotiations at Portsmouth (New Hampshire)
had led to a final understanding on August 29, 1905, the treaty of peace
was signed on September 5, and ratified on October 16.]

The purpose for which preliminaries of peace are agreed upon makes it
obvious that such essential terms of peace as are stipulated by the
Preliminaries are the basis of the definitive treaty of peace. It may
happen, however, that neutral States protest for the purpose of
preventing this. Thus, when the war between Russia and Turkey had been
ended through the Preliminaries of San Stefano of March 3, 1878, Great
Britain protested, a Congress met at Berlin, and Russia had to be
content with less favourable terms of peace than those stipulated at San
Stefano.

[Sidenote: Form and Parts of Peace Treaties.]

[p] 269. International Law does not contain any rules regarding the form
of peace treaties; they may, therefore, be concluded verbally or in
writing. But the importance of the matter makes the parties always
conclude a treaty of peace in writing, and there is no instance of a
verbally concluded treaty of peace.

According to the different points stipulated, it is usual to distinguish
different parts within a peace treaty. Besides the preamble, there are
general, special, and separate articles. General articles are those
which stipulate such points as are to be agreed upon in every treaty of
peace, as the date of termination of hostilities, the release of
prisoners of war, and the like. Special articles are those which
stipulate the special terms of the agreement of peace in question.
Separate articles are those which stipulate points with regard to the
execution of the general and special articles, or which contain
reservations and other special remarks of the parties. Sometimes
_additional_ articles occur. Such are stipulations agreed upon in a
special treaty following the treaty of peace and comprising stipulations
regarding such points as have not been mentioned in the treaty of peace.

[Sidenote: Competence to conclude Peace.]

[p] 270. As the treaty-making Power is according to the Law of Nations
in the hands of the head[502] of the State, it is he who is competent to
conclude peace. But just as constitutional restrictions imposed upon
heads of States regarding their general power of concluding
treaties[503] are of importance for International Law, so constitutional
restrictions imposed upon heads of States regarding their competence to
make peace are of similar importance. And, therefore, such treaties of
peace concluded by heads of States as violate constitutional
restrictions are not binding upon the States concerned, because the
heads have exceeded their powers. The Constitutions of the several
States settle the matter differently, and it is not at all necessary
that the power of declaring war and that of making peace should be
vested by a Constitution in the same hands. In Great Britain the power
of the Crown to declare war and to make peace is indeed unrestricted.
But in the German Empire, for instance, it is different; for whereas the
Emperor, the case of an attack on German territory excepted, may declare
war only with the consent of the Bundesrath, his power of making peace
is unrestricted.[504]

[Footnote 502: See above, vol. I. [p] 495.]

[Footnote 503: See above, vol. I. [p] 497.]

[Footnote 504: See more examples in Rivier, II. p. 445.]

The controverted question as to whether the head of a State who is a
prisoner of war is competent to make peace ought to be answered in the
negative. The reason is that the head of a constitutional State,
although he does not by becoming a prisoner of war lose his position, he
nevertheless thereby loses the power of exercising the rights connected
with his position.[505]

[Footnote 505: See Vattel, IV. [p] 13.]

[Sidenote: Date of Peace.]

[p] 271. Unless the treaty provides otherwise, peace commences with the
signing of the peace treaty. Should the latter not be ratified,
hostilities may be recommenced, and the unratified peace treaty is
considered as an armistice. Sometimes, however, the peace treaty fixes a
future date for the commencement of peace, stipulating that hostilities
must cease on a certain future day. This is the case when war is waged
in several or widely separated parts of the world, and when, therefore,
it is impossible at once to inform the opposing forces of the conclusion
of peace.[506] It may even occur that different dates are stipulated
for the termination of hostilities in different parts of the world.

[Footnote 506: The ending of the Russo-Japanese war was quite peculiar.
Although the treaty of peace was signed on September 5, 1905, the
agreement concerning an armistice pending ratification of the peace
treaty was not signed until September 14, and hostilities went on till
September 16.]

The question has arisen as to whether, in case a peace treaty provides a
future date for the termination of hostilities in distant parts, and in
case the forces in these parts hear of the conclusion of peace before
such date, they must abstain at once from further hostilities. Most
publicists correctly answer this question in the affirmative. But the
French Prize Courts in 1801 condemned as a good prize the English vessel
_Swineherd_ which was captured by the French privateer _Bellona_ in the
Indian Seas within the period of five months fixed by the Peace of
Amiens for the termination of hostilities in these seas.[507]

[Footnote 507: The details of this case are given by Hall, [p] 199; see
also Phillimore, III. [p] 521.]


V

EFFECTS OF TREATY OF PEACE

  Grotius, III. c. 20--Vattel, IV. [p][p] 19-23--Hall, [p][p]
  198-202--Lawrence, [p] 218--Phillimore, III. [p][p]
  518-528--Halleck, I. pp. 312-324--Taylor, [p][p] 581-583--Wheaton,
  [p][p] 544-547--Bluntschli, [p][p] 708-723--Heffter, [p][p]
  180-183, 184A--Kirchenheim in Holtzendorff, IV. pp.
  804-817--Ullmann, [p] 199--Bonfils, Nos. 1698-1702--Despagnet, No.
  607--Rivier, II. pp. 454-461--Calvo, V. [p][p] 3137-3163--Fiore,
  III. Nos. 1701-1703, and Code, Nos. 1942-1962--Martens, II. [p]
  128--Longuet, [p][p] 156-164--Merignhac, pp. 330-336--Pillet, pp.
  375-377.

[Sidenote: Restoration of Condition of Peace.]

[p] 272. The chief and general effect of a peace treaty is restoration
of the condition of peace between the former belligerents. As soon as
the treaty is ratified, all rights and duties which exist in time of
peace between the members of the family of nations are _ipso facto_ and
at once revived between the former belligerents.

On the one hand, all acts legitimate in warfare cease to be legitimate.
Neither contributions and requisitions, nor attacks on members of the
armed forces or on fortresses, nor capture of ships, nor occupation of
territory are any longer lawful. If forces, ignorant of the conclusion
of peace, commit such hostile acts, the condition of things at the time
peace was concluded must as far as possible be restored.[508] Thus,
ships captured must be set free, territory occupied must be evacuated,
members of armed forces taken prisoners must be liberated, contributions
imposed and paid must be repaid.

[Footnote 508: The _Mentor_ (1799), 1 C. Rob. 179. Matters are, of
course, different in case a future date--see above, [p] 271--is
stipulated for the termination of hostilities.]

On the other hand, all peaceful intercourse between the former
belligerents as well as between their subjects is resumed as before the
war. Thus diplomatic intercourse is restored, and consular officers
recommence their duties.[509]

[Footnote 509: The assertion of many writers, that such contracts
between subjects of belligerents as have been suspended by the outbreak
of war revive _ipso facto_ by the conclusion of peace is not the outcome
of a rule of International Law. But just as Municipal Law may suspend
such contracts _ipso facto_ by the outbreak of war, so it may revive
them _ipso facto_ by the conclusion of peace. See above, [p] 101.]

Attention must be drawn to the fact that the condition of peace created
by a peace treaty is legally final in so far as the order of things set
up and stipulated by the treaty of peace is the settled basis of future
relations between the parties, however contentious the matters concerned
may have been before the outbreak of war. In concluding peace the
parties expressly or implicitly declare that they have come to an
understanding regarding such settled matters. They may indeed make war
against each other in future on other grounds, but they are legally
bound not to go to war over such matters as have been settled by a
previous treaty of peace. That the practice of States does not always
comply with this rule is a well-known fact which, although it discredits
this rule, cannot shake its theoretical validity.

[Sidenote: Principle of _Uti Possidetis_.]

[p] 273. Unless the parties stipulate otherwise, the effect of a treaty
of peace is that conditions remain as at the conclusion of peace. Thus,
all moveable State property, as munitions, provisions, arms, money,
horses, means of transport, and the like, seized by an invading
belligerent remain his property, as likewise do the fruits of immoveable
property seized by him. Thus further, if nothing is stipulated regarding
conquered territory, it remains in the hands of the possessor, who may
annex it. But it is nowadays usual, although not at all legally
necessary, for the conqueror desirous of retaining conquered territory
to stipulate cession of such territory in the treaty of peace.

[Sidenote: Amnesty.]

[p] 274. Since a treaty of peace is considered a final settlement of the
war, one of the effects of every peace treaty is the so-called
amnesty--that is, an immunity for all wrongful acts done by the
belligerents themselves, the members of their forces, and their subjects
during the war, and due to political motives.[510] It is usual, but not
at all necessary, to insert an amnesty clause in a treaty of peace.
So-called war crimes[511] which were not punished before the conclusion
of peace may no longer be punished after its conclusion. Individuals
who have committed such war crimes and have been arrested for them must
be liberated.[512] International delinquencies committed intentionally
by belligerents through violation of the rules of legitimate warfare are
considered condoned. Formerly even claims for reparation of damages
caused by such acts could not be raised after the conclusion of peace,
unless the contrary was expressly stipulated, but the matter is
different now in accordance with article 3 of Convention IV. of the
Second Peace Conference.[513] On the other hand, the amnesty has nothing
to do with ordinary crimes or with debts incurred during war. A prisoner
of war who commits murder during captivity may be tried and punished
after the conclusion of peace, just as a prisoner who runs into debt
during captivity may be sued after the conclusion of peace, or an action
may be brought on ransom bills after peace has been restored.

[Footnote 510: Stress must be laid on the fact that this immunity is
only effective in regard to the other party to the war. For instance,
the occupant of enemy territory may not, after the conclusion of peace,
punish war criminals. Nothing, however, prevents a belligerent from
punishing members of his own forces or any of his own subjects who
during war committed violations of the laws of war, _e.g._ killed
wounded enemy soldiers and the like.]

[Footnote 511: See above, [p][p] 251-257. Clause 4 of the "Terms of
Surrender of the Boer Forces in the Field"--see _Parliamentary Papers_,
South Africa, 1902, Cd. 1096--seems to contradict this assertion, as it
expressly excludes from the amnesty "certain acts, contrary to usages of
war, which have been notified by the Commander-in-Chief to the Boer
Generals, and which shall be tried by court-martial immediately after
the close of hostilities." But it will be remembered--see above, [p]
265, p. 327, note 1--that the agreement embodying these terms of
surrender does not bear the character of a treaty of peace, the Boer War
having been terminated through subjugation.]

[Footnote 512: This applies to such individuals only as have not yet
been convicted. Those who are undergoing a term of imprisonment need not
be liberated at the conclusion of peace; see above, [p] 257.]

[Footnote 513: See above, [p] 259_a_.]

But it is important to remember here again that the amnesty grants
immunity only for wrongful acts done by the subjects of one belligerent
against the other. Such wrongful acts as have been committed by the
subjects of a belligerent against their own Government are not covered
by the amnesty. Therefore treason, desertion, and the like committed
during the war by his own subjects may be punished by a belligerent
after the conclusion of peace, unless the contrary has been expressly
stipulated in the treaty of peace.[514]

[Footnote 514: Thus Russia stipulated by article 17 of the Preliminaries
of San Stefano, in 1878--see Martens, _N.R.G._ 2nd Ser. III. p.
252--that Turkey must accord an amnesty to such of her own subjects as
had compromised themselves during the war.]

[Sidenote: Release of Prisoners of War.]

[p] 275. A very important effect of a treaty of peace is termination of
the captivity of prisoners of war.[515] This, however, does not mean
that with the conclusion of peace all prisoners of war must at once be
released. It only means--to use the words of article 20 of the Hague
Regulations--that "After the conclusion of peace, the repatriation of
prisoners of war shall take place as speedily as possible." The instant
release of prisoners at the very place where they were detained, would
be inconvenient not only for the State which kept them in captivity, but
also for themselves, as in most cases they would not possess means to
pay for their journey home. Therefore, although with the conclusion of
peace they cease to be captives in the technical sense of the term,
prisoners of war remain as a body under military discipline until they
are brought to the frontier and handed over to their Government. That
prisoners of war may be detained after the conclusion of peace until
they have paid debts incurred during captivity seems to be an almost
generally[516] recognised rule. But it is controversial whether such
prisoners of war may be detained as are undergoing a term of
imprisonment imposed upon them for offences against discipline. After
the Franco-German War in 1871 Germany detained such prisoners,[517]
whereas Japan after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 released them.

[Footnote 515: See above, [p] 132.]

[Footnote 516: See, however, Pradier-Fodere, VII. No. 2839, who objects
to it.]

[Footnote 517: See Pradier-Fodere, VII. No. 2840; Beinhauer, _Die
Kriegsgefangenschaft_ (1910), p. 79; Payrat, _Le prisonnier de Guerre_
(1910), pp. 364-370.]

[Sidenote: Revival of Treaties.]

[p] 276. The question how far a peace treaty has the effect of reviving
treaties concluded between the parties before the outbreak of war is
much controverted. The answer depends upon the other question, how far
the outbreak of war cancels existing treaties between belligerents.[518]
There can be no doubt that all such treaties as have been cancelled by
the outbreak of war do not revive. On the other hand, there can likewise
be no doubt that such treaties as have only become suspended by the
outbreak of war do revive. But no certainty or unanimity exists
regarding such treaties as do not belong to the above two classes, and
it must, therefore, be emphasised that no rule of International Law
exists concerning these treaties. It is for the parties to make such
special stipulations in the peace treaty as will settle the matter.

[Footnote 518: See the very detailed discussion of the question in
Phillimore, III. [p][p] 529-538; see also above, [p] 99.]


VI

PERFORMANCE OF TREATY OF PEACE

  Grotius, III. c. 20--Vattel, IV. [p][p] 24-34--Phillimore, III.
  [p] 597--Halleck, I. pp. 322-324--Taylor, [p][p] 593-594--Wheaton,
  [p][p] 548-550--Bluntschli, [p][p] 724-726--Heffter, [p]
  184--Kirchenheim in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 817-822--Ullmann, [p]
  199--Bonfils, Nos. 1706-1709--Despagnet, Nos. 612 and 613--Rivier,
  II. pp. 459-461--Calvo, V. [p][p] 3164-3168--Fiore, III. Nos.
  1704-1705--Martens, II. [p] 128--Longuet, [p][p]
  156-164--Merignhac, pp. 336-337.

[Sidenote: Treaty of Peace, how to be carried out.]

[p] 277. The general rule, that treaties must be performed in good
faith, applies to peace treaties as well as to others. The great
importance, however, of a treaty of peace and its special circumstances
and conditions make it necessary to draw attention to some points
connected with the performance of treaties of peace. Occupied territory
may have to be evacuated, a war indemnity to be paid in cash, boundary
lines of ceded territory may have to be drawn, and many other tasks
performed. These tasks often necessitate the conclusion of numerous
treaties for the purpose of performing details of the peace treaty
concerned, and the appointment of commissioners who meet in conference
to inquire into details and prepare a compromise. Difficulties may arise
in regard to the interpretation[519] of certain stipulations of the
peace treaty which arbitration will settle if the parties cannot agree.

[Footnote 519: See above, vol. I. [p][p] 553-554.] Arrangements may
have to be made for the case in which a part or the whole of the
territory occupied during the war remains, according to the peace
treaty, for some period under military occupation, such occupation to
serve as a means of securing the performance of the peace treaty.[520]
One can form an idea of the numerous points of importance to be dealt
with during the performance of a treaty of peace if one takes into
consideration the fact that, after the Franco-German War was terminated
in 1871 by the Peace of Frankfort, more than a hundred Conventions were
successively concluded between the parties for the purpose of carrying
out this treaty of peace.

[Footnote 520: See above, vol. I. [p] 527.]

[Sidenote: Breach of Treaty of Peace.]

[p] 278. Just as is the performance, so is the breach of peace treaties
of great importance. A peace treaty can be violated in its entirety or
in one of its stipulations only. Violation by one of the parties does
not _ipso facto_ cancel the treaty, but the other party may cancel it on
the ground of violation. Just as in connection with violation of
treaties in general, so in violations of treaties of peace, some
publicists maintain that a distinction must be drawn between essential
and non-essential stipulations, and that violation of essential
stipulations only creates a right of cancelling the treaty of peace. It
has been shown above, Vol. I. [p] 547, that the majority of publicists
rightly oppose the distinction.

But a distinction must be made between violation during the period in
which the conditions of the peace treaty have to be fulfilled, and
violation after such period. In the first case, the other party may at
once recommence hostilities, the war being considered not to have
terminated through the violated peace treaty. The second case, which
might happen soon or several years after the period for the fulfilment
of the peace conditions, is in no way different from violation of any
treaty in general. And if a party cancels the peace treaty and wages war
against the offender who violated it, this war is a new war, and in no
way a continuation of the previous war which was terminated by the
violated treaty of peace. It must, however, be specially observed that,
just as in case of violation of a treaty in general, so in case of
violation of a peace treaty, the offended party who wants to cancel the
treaty on the ground of its violation must do this in reasonable time
after the violation has taken place, otherwise the treaty remains valid,
or at least the non-violated parts of it. A mere protest neither
constitutes a cancellation nor reserves the right of cancellation.[521]

[Footnote 521: See above, vol. I. [p] 547.]


VII

POSTLIMINIUM

  Grotius, III. c. 9--Bynkershoek, _Quaest. jur. publ._ I. c. 15 and
  16--Vattel, III. [p][p] 204-222--Hall, [p][p] 162-166--Manning, pp.
  190-195--Phillimore, III. [p][p] 568-590--Halleck, II. pp.
  500-526--Taylor, [p] 595--Wheaton, [p] 398--Bluntschli, [p][p]
  727-741--Heffter, [p][p] 188-192--Kirchenheim in Holtzendorff, IV. pp.
  822-836--Bonfils, No. 1710--Despagnet, No. 611--Nys, III. pp.
  738-739--Rivier, II. pp. 314-316--Calvo, V. [p][p] 3169-3226--Fiore,
  III. Nos. 1706-1712--Martens, II. [p] 128--Pillet, p. 377.

[Sidenote: Conception of Postliminium.]

[p] 279. The term "postliminium" is originally one of Roman Law derived
from _post_ and _limen_ (_i.e._ boundary). According to Roman Law the
relations of Rome with a foreign State depended upon the fact whether or
not a treaty of friendship[522] existed. If such a treaty was not in
existence, Romans entering the foreign State concerned could be
enslaved, and Roman goods taken there could be appropriated. Now, _jus
postliminii_ denoted the rule, firstly, that such an enslaved Roman,
should he ever return into the territory of the Roman Empire, became
_ipso facto_ a Roman citizen again with all the rights he possessed
previous to his capture, and, secondly, that Roman property,
appropriated after entry into the territory of a foreign State, should
at once upon being taken back into the territory of the Roman Empire
_ipso facto_ revert to its former Roman owner. Modern International and
Municipal Law have adopted the term for the purpose of indicating the
fact that territory, individuals, and property, after having come in
time of war under the sway of the enemy, return either during the war or
with the end of the war under the sway of their original Sovereign. This
can occur in different ways. An occupied territory can voluntarily be
evacuated by the enemy and then at once be reoccupied by the owner. Or
it can be reconquered by the legitimate Sovereign. Or it can be
reconquered by a third party and restored to its legitimate owner.
Conquered territory can also be freed through a successful levy _en
masse_. Property seized by the enemy can be retaken, but it can also be
abandoned by the enemy and subsequently revert to the belligerent from
whom it was taken. And, further, conquered territory can in consequence
of a treaty of peace be restored to its legitimate Sovereign. In all
cases concerned, the question has to be answered what legal effects the
postliminium has in regard to the territory, the individuals thereon, or
the property concerned.

[Footnote 522: See above, vol. I. [p] 40.]

[Sidenote: Postliminium according to International Law, in
contradistinction to Postliminium according to Municipal Law.]

[p] 280. Most writers confound the effects of postliminium according to
Municipal Law with those according to International Law. For instance:
whether a private ship which is recaptured reverts _ipso facto_ to its
former owner;[523] whether the former laws of a reconquered State revive
_ipso facto_ by the reconquest; whether sentences passed on criminals
during the time of an occupation by the enemy should be annulled--these
and many similar questions treated in books on International Law have
nothing at all to do with International Law, but have to be answered
exclusively by the Municipal Law of the respective States. International
Law can deal only with such effects of postliminium as are
international. These international effects of postliminium may be
grouped under the following heads: revival of the former condition of
things, validity of legitimate acts, invalidity of illegitimate acts.

[Footnote 523: See above, [p] 196.]

[Sidenote: Revival of the Former Condition of Things.]

[p] 281. Although a territory and the individuals thereon come through
military occupation in war under the actual sway of the enemy, neither
such territory nor such individuals, according to the rules of
International Law of our times, fall under the sovereignty of the
invader. They rather remain, if not acquired by the conqueror through
subjugation, under the sovereignty of the other belligerent, although
the latter is in fact prevented from exercising his supremacy over them.
Now, the moment the invader voluntarily evacuates such territory, or is
driven away by a levy _en masse_, or by troops of the other belligerent
or of his ally, the former condition of things _ipso facto_ revives; the
territory and individuals concerned being at once, so far as
International Law is concerned, considered to be again under the sway of
their legitimate Sovereign. For all events of international importance
taking place on such territory the legitimate Sovereign is again
responsible towards third States, whereas during the time of occupation
the occupant was responsible for such events.

But it must be specially observed that the case in which the occupant of
a territory is driven out of it by the forces of a third State not
allied with the legitimate Sovereign of such territory is not a case of
postliminium, and that consequently the former state of things does not
revive, unless the new occupant hands the territory over to the
legitimate Sovereign. If this is not done, the military occupation of
the new occupant takes the place of that of the previous occupant.

[Sidenote: Validity of Legitimate Acts.]

[p] 282. Postliminium has no effect upon such acts of the former
military occupant connected with the occupied territory and the
individuals and property thereon as were legitimate acts of warfare. On
the contrary, the State into whose possession such territory has
reverted must recognise all such legitimate acts of the former occupant,
and the latter has by International Law a right to demand such
recognition. Therefore, if the occupant has collected the ordinary
taxes, has sold the ordinary fruits of immoveable property, has disposed
of such moveable state property as he was competent to appropriate, or
has performed other acts in conformity with the laws of war, this may
not be ignored by the legitimate Sovereign after he has again taken
possession of the territory.

However, only those consequences of such acts must be recognised which
have occurred during the occupation. A case which illustrates this
happened after the Franco-German War. In October 1870, during occupation
by German troops of the _Departements de la Meuse_ and _de la Meurthe_,
a Berlin firm entered into a contract with the German Government to fell
15,000 oak trees in the State forests of these _departements_, paying in
advance _l._2250. The Berlin firm sold the contract rights to others,
who felled 9000 trees and sold, in March 1871, their right to fell the
remaining 6000 trees to a third party. The last-named felled a part of
these trees during the German occupation, but, when the French
Government again took possession of the territory concerned, the
contractors were without indemnity prevented from further felling of
trees.[524] The question whether the Germans had a right at all to enter
into the contract is doubtful. But even if they had such right, it
covered the felling of trees during their occupation only, and not
afterwards.

[Footnote 524: The Protocol of Signature added to the Additional
Convention to the Peace Treaty of Frankfort, signed on December 11,
1871--see Martens, _N.R.G._ XX. p. 868--comprises a declaration stating
the fact that the French Government does not recognise any liability to
pay indemnities to the contractors concerned.]

[Sidenote: Invalidity of Illegitimate Acts.]

[p] 283. If the occupant has performed acts which are not legitimate
acts of warfare, postliminium makes their invalidity apparent.
Therefore, if the occupant has sold immoveable State property, such
property may afterwards be claimed from the acquirer, whoever he is,
without any indemnity. If he has given office to individuals, they may
afterwards be dismissed. If he has appropriated and sold such private or
public property as may not legitimately be appropriated by a military
occupant, it may afterwards be claimed from the acquirer without payment
of damages.

[Sidenote: No Postliminium after Interregnum.]

[p] 284. Cases of postliminium occur only when a conquered territory
comes either during or at the end of the war again into the possession
of the legitimate Sovereign. No case of postliminium arises when a
territory, ceded to the enemy by the treaty of peace or conquered and
annexed without cession at the end of a war which was terminated through
simple cessation of hostilities,[525] later on reverts to its former
owner State, or when the whole of the territory of a State which was
conquered and subjugated regains its liberty and becomes again the
territory of an independent State. Such territory has actually been
under the sovereignty of the conqueror; the period between the conquest
and the revival of the previous condition of things was not one of mere
military occupation during war, but one of interregnum during time of
peace, and therefore the revival of the former condition of things is
not a case of postliminium. An illustrative instance of this is
furnished by the case of the domains of the Electorate of
Hesse-Cassel.[526] This hitherto independent State was subjugated in
1806 by Napoleon and became in 1807 part of the Kingdom of Westphalia
constituted by Napoleon for his brother Jerome, who governed it up to
the end of 1813, when, with the downfall of Napoleon, the Kingdom of
Westphalia fell to pieces and the former Elector of Hesse-Cassel was
reinstated. Jerome had during his reign sold many of the domains of
Hesse-Cassel. The Elector, however, on his return, did not recognise
these contracts, but deprived the owners of their property without
indemnification, maintaining that a case of postliminium had arisen, and
that Jerome had no right to sell the domains. The Courts of the
Electorate pronounced against the Elector, denying that a case of
postliminium had arisen, since Jerome, although a usurper, had been King
of Westphalia during an interregnum, and since the sale of the domains
was therefore no wrongful act. But the Elector, who was absolute in the
Electorate, did not comply with the verdict of his own courts, and the
Vienna Congress, which was approached in the matter by the unfortunate
proprietors of the domains, refused its intervention, although Prussia
strongly took their part. It is generally recognised by all writers on
International Law that this case was not one of postliminium, and the
attitude of the Elector cannot therefore be defended by appeal to
International Law.

[Footnote 525: See above, [p] 263.]

[Footnote 526: See Phillimore, III. [p][p] 568-574, and the literature
there quoted.]




PART III

NEUTRALITY




CHAPTER I

ON NEUTRALITY IN GENERAL


I

DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSTITUTION OF NEUTRALITY

  Hall, [p][p] 208-214--Lawrence, [p] 223--Westlake, II. pp.
  169-177--Phillimore, III. [p][p] 161-226--Twiss, II. [p][p]
  208-212--Taylor, [p][p] 596-613--Walker, _History_, pp. 195-203, and
  _Science_, pp. 374-385--Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp.
  614-634--Ullmann, [p] 190--Bonfils, Nos. 1494-1521--Despagnet, No.
  687--Rivier, II. pp. 370-375--Nys, III. pp. 558-567--Calvo, IV. [p][p]
  2494-2591--Fiore, III. Nos. 1503-1535--Martens, II. [p] 130--Dupuis,
  Nos. 302-307--Merignhac, pp. 339-342--Boeck, Nos. 8-153--Kleen, I.
  pp. 1-70--Cauchy, _Le droit maritime international_ (1862), vol.
  II. pp. 325-430--Gessner, pp. 1-69--Bergbohm, _Die bewaffnete
  Neutralitaet 1780-1783_ (1884)--Fauchille, _La diplomatie francaise
  et la ligue des neutres 1780_ (1893)--Schweizer, _Geschichte der
  schweizerischen Neutralitaet_ (1895), I. pp. 10-72.

[Sidenote: Neutrality not practised in Ancient Times.]

[p] 285. Since in antiquity there was no notion of an International
Law,[527] it is not to be expected that neutrality as a legal
institution should have existed among the nations of old. Neutrality did
not exist even in practice, for belligerents never recognised an
attitude of impartiality on the part of other States. If war broke out
between two nations, third parties had to choose between the
belligerents and become allies or enemies of one or other. This does not
mean that third parties had actually to take part in the fighting.
Nothing of the kind was the case. But they had, if necessary, to render
assistance; for example, to allow the passage of belligerent forces
through their country, to supply provisions and the like to the party
they favoured, and to deny all such assistance to the enemy. Several
instances are known of efforts[528] on the part of third parties to take
up an attitude of impartiality, but belligerents never recognised such
impartiality.

[Footnote 527: See above, vol. I. [p] 37.]

[Footnote 528: See Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 614-615.]

[Sidenote: Neutrality during the Middle Ages.]

[p] 286. During the Middle Ages matters changed in so far only as, in
the latter part of this period, belligerents did not exactly force third
parties to a choice; but legal duties and rights connected with
neutrality did not exist. A State could maintain that it was no party to
a war, although it furnished one of the belligerents with money, troops,
and other kinds of assistance. To prevent such assistance, which was in
no way considered illegal, treaties were frequently concluded, during
the latter part of the Middle Ages, for the purpose of specially
stipulating that the parties were not to assist each other's enemies in
any way during time of war, and were to prevent their subjects from
rendering such assistance. Through the influence of such treaties the
difference between a really and feigned impartial attitude of third
States during war became recognised, and neutrality, as an institution
of International Law, gradually developed during the sixteenth century.

Of great importance was the fact that the Swiss Confederation, in
contradistinction to her policy during former times, made it a matter of
policy from the end of the sixteenth century always to remain neutral
during wars between other States. Although this former neutrality of the
Swiss can in no way be compared with modern neutrality, since Swiss
mercenaries for centuries afterwards fought in all European wars, the
Swiss Government itself succeeded in each instance in taking up and
preserving such an attitude of impartiality as complied with the current
rules of neutrality.

It should be mentioned that the collection of rules and customs
regarding Maritime Law which goes under the name of _Consolato del Mare_
made its appearance about the middle of the fourteenth century. One of
the rules there laid down, that in time of war enemy goods on neutral
vessels may be confiscated, but that, on the other hand, neutral goods
on enemy vessels must be restored, became of great importance, since
Great Britain acted accordingly from the beginning of the eighteenth
century until the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854.[529]

[Footnote 529: See above, [p] 176.]

[Sidenote: Neutrality during the Seventeenth Century.]

[p] 287. At the time of Grotius, neutrality was recognised as an
institution of International Law, although such institution was in its
infancy only and needed a long time to reach its present range. Grotius
did not know, or at any rate did not make use of, the term
neutrality.[530] He treats neutrality in the very short seventeenth
chapter of the Third Book on the Law of War and Peace, under the head
_De his, qui in bello medii sunt_, and establishes in [p] 3 two doubtful
rules only. The first is that neutrals shall do nothing which may
strengthen a belligerent whose cause is unjust, or which may hinder the
movements of a belligerent whose cause is just. The second rule is that
in a war in which it is doubtful whose cause is just, neutrals shall
treat both belligerents alike, in permitting the passage of troops, in
supplying provisions for the troops, and in not rendering assistance to
persons besieged.

[Footnote 530: That the term was known at the time of Grotius may be
inferred from the fact that Neumayr de Ramsla in 1620 published his work
_Von der Neutralitaet und Assistenz ... in Kriegszeiten_; see Nys in
_R.I._ XVII. (1885), p. 78.]

The treatment of neutrality by Grotius shows, on the one hand, that
apart from the recognition of the fact that third parties could remain
neutral, not many rules regarding the duties of neutrals existed, and,
on the other hand, that the granting of passage to troops of
belligerents and the supply of provisions to them was not considered
illegal. And the practice of the seventeenth century furnishes numerous
instances of the fact that neutrality was not really an attitude of
impartiality, and that belligerents did not respect the territories of
neutral States. Thus, although Charles I. remained neutral, the Marquis
of Hamilton and six thousand British soldiers were fighting in 1631
under Gustavus Adolphus. "In 1626 the English captured a French ship in
Dutch waters. In 1631 the Spaniards attacked the Dutch in a Danish port;
in 1639 the Dutch were in turn the aggressors, and attacked the Spanish
Fleet in English waters; again, in 1666 they captured English vessels in
the Elbe...; in 1665 an English fleet endeavoured to seize the Dutch
East India Squadron in the harbour of Bergen, but were beaten off with
the help of the forts; finally, in 1693, the French attempted to cut
some Dutch ships out of Lisbon, and on being prevented by the guns of
the place from carrying them off, burnt them in the river."[531]

[Footnote 531: See Hall, [p] 209, p. 604.]

[Sidenote: Progress of Neutrality during the Eighteenth Century.]

[p] 288. It was not until the eighteenth century that theory and
practice agreed upon the duty of neutrals to remain impartial, and the
duty of belligerents to respect the territories of neutrals. Bynkershoek
and Vattel formulated adequate conceptions of neutrality.
Bynkershoek[532] does not use the term "neutrality," but calls neutrals
_non hostes_, and he describes them as those who are of neither
party--_qui neutrarum partium sunt_--in a war, and who do not, in
accordance with a treaty, give assistance to either party. Vattel (III.
[p] 103), on the other hand, makes use of the term "neutrality," and
gives the following definition:--"Neutral nations, during a war, are
those who take no one's part, remaining friends common to both parties,
and not favouring the armies of one of them to the prejudice of the
other." But although Vattel's book appeared in 1758, twenty-one years
after that of Bynkershoek, his doctrines are in some ways less advanced
than those of Bynkershoek. The latter, in contradistinction to Grotius,
maintained that neutrals had nothing to do with the question as to which
party to a war had a just cause; that neutrals, being friends to both
parties, have not to sit as judges between these parties, and,
consequently, must not give or deny to one or other party more or less
in accordance with their conviction as to the justice or injustice of
the cause of each. Vattel, however, teaches (III. [p] 135) that a
neutral, although he may generally allow the passage of troops of the
belligerents through his territory, may refuse this passage to such
belligerent as is making war for an unjust cause.

[Footnote 532: _Quaest. jur. publ._ I. c. 9.]

Although the theory and practice of the eighteenth century agreed upon
the duty of neutrals to remain impartial, the impartiality demanded was
not at all a strict one. For, firstly, throughout the greater part of
the century a State was considered not to violate neutrality in case it
furnished one of the belligerents with such limited assistance as it had
previously promised by treaty.[533] In this way troops could be supplied
by a neutral to a belligerent, and passage through neutral territory
could be granted to his forces. And, secondly, the possibility existed
for either belligerent to make use of the resources of neutrals. It was
not considered a breach of neutrality on the part of a State to allow
one or both belligerents to levy troops on its territory, or to grant
Letters of Marque to vessels belonging to its commercial fleet. During
the second half of the eighteenth century, theory and practice became
aware of the fact that neutrality was not consistent with these and
other indulgences. But this only led to the distinction between
neutrality in the strict sense of the term and an imperfect neutrality.

[Footnote 533: See examples in Hall, [p] 211.]

As regards the duty of belligerents to respect neutral territory,
progress was also made in the eighteenth century. Whenever neutral
territory was violated, reparation was asked and made. But it was
considered lawful for the victor to pursue the vanquished army into
neutral territory, and, likewise, for a fleet to pursue[534] the
defeated enemy fleet into neutral territorial waters.

[Footnote 534: See below, [p][p] 320 and 347 (4).]

[Sidenote: First Armed Neutrality.]

[p] 289. Whereas, on the whole, the duty of neutrals to remain impartial
and the duty of belligerents to respect neutral territory became
generally recognised during the eighteenth century, the members of the
Family of Nations did not come to an agreement during this period
regarding the treatment of neutral vessels trading with belligerents. It
is true that the right of visit and search for contraband of war and the
right to seize the latter was generally recognised, but in other
respects no general theory and practice was agreed upon. France and
Spain upheld the rule that neutral goods on enemy ships as well as
neutral ships carrying enemy goods could be seized by belligerents.
Although England granted from time to time, by special treaties with
special States, the rule "Free ship, free goods," her general practice
throughout the eighteenth century followed the rule of the _Consolato
del Mare_, according to which enemy goods on neutral vessels may be
confiscated, whereas neutral goods on enemy vessels must be restored.
England, further, upheld the principle that the commerce of neutrals
should in time of war be restricted to the same limits as in time of
peace, since most States in time of peace reserved cabotage and trade
with their colonies to vessels of their own merchant marine. It was in
1756 that this principle first came into question. In this year, during
war with England, France found that on account of the naval superiority
of England she was unable to carry on her colonial trade by her own
merchant marine, and she, therefore, threw open this trade to vessels of
the Netherlands, which had remained neutral. England, however, ordered
her fleet to seize all such vessels with their cargoes on the ground
that they had become incorporated with the French merchant marine, and
had thereby acquired enemy character. From this time the above principle
is commonly called the "rule[535] of 1756." England, thirdly, followed
other Powers in the practice of declaring enemy coasts to be blockaded
and condemning captured neutral vessels for breach of blockade, although
the blockades were by no means always effective.

[Footnote 535: See Phillimore, III. [p][p] 212-222; Hall, [p] 234;
Manning, pp. 260-267; Westlake, II. p. 254; Moore, VII. [p] 1180; Boeck,
No. 52: Dupuis, Nos. 131-133. Stress must be laid on the fact that the
original meaning of the rule of 1756 is different from the meaning it
received by its extension in 1793. From that year onwards England not
only considered those neutral vessels which embarked upon the French
coasting and colonial trade thrown open to them during the war with
England, as having acquired enemy character, but likewise those neutral
vessels which carried neutral goods from neutral ports to ports of a
French colony. This extension of the rule of 1756 was clearly
unjustified, and it is not possible to believe that it will ever be
revived.]

As privateering was legitimate and in general use, neutral commerce was
considerably disturbed during every war between naval States. Now in
1780, during war between Great Britain, her American colonies, France,
and Spain, Russia sent a circular[536] to England, France, and Spain, in
which she proclaimed the following five principles: (1) That neutral
vessels should be allowed to navigate from port to port of belligerents
and along their coasts; (2) that enemy goods on neutral vessels,
contraband excepted, should not be seized by belligerents; (3) that,
with regard to contraband, articles 10 and 11 of the treaty of 1766
between Russia and Great Britain should be applied in all cases; (4)
that a port should only be considered blockaded if the blockading
belligerent had stationed vessels there, so as to create an obvious
danger for neutral vessels entering the port; (5) that these principles
should be applied in the proceedings and judgments on the legality of
prizes. In July and August 1780, Russia[537] entered into a treaty,
first with Denmark and then with Sweden, for the purpose of enforcing
those principles by equipping a number of men-of-war. Thus the "Armed
Neutrality" made its appearance. In 1781, the Netherlands, Prussia, and
Austria, in 1782 Portugal, and in 1783 the Two Sicilies joined the
league. France, Spain, and the United States of America accepted the
principles of the league without formally joining. The war between
England, the United States, France, and Spain was terminated in 1783,
and the war between England and the Netherlands in 1784, but in the
treaties of peace the principles of the "Armed Neutrality" were not
mentioned. This league had no direct practical consequences, since
England retained her former standpoint. Moreover, some of the States
that had joined the league acted contrary to some of its principles when
they themselves went to war--as did Sweden during her war with Russia
1788-1790, and France and Russia in 1793--and some of them concluded
treaties in which were stipulations at variance with those principles.
Nevertheless, the First Armed Neutrality has proved of great importance,
because its principles have furnished the basis of the Declaration of
Paris of 1856.

[Footnote 536: Martens, _R._ III. p. 158.]

[Footnote 537: Martens, _R._ III. pp. 189 and 198.]

[Sidenote: The French Revolution and the Second Armed Neutrality.]

[p] 290. The wars of the French Revolution showed that the time was not
yet ripe for the progress aimed at by the First Armed Neutrality.
Russia, the very same Power which had initiated the Armed Neutrality in
1780 under the Empress Catharine II. (1762-1796), joined Great Britain
in 1793 in order to interdict all neutral navigation into ports of
France, with the intention of subduing France by famine. Russia and
England justified their attitude by the exceptional character of their
war against France, which country had proved to be the enemy of the
security of all other nations. The French Convention answered with an
order to the French fleet to capture all neutral ships carrying
provisions to enemy ports or carrying enemy goods.

But although Russia herself had acted in defiance of the principles of
the First Armed Neutrality, she called a second into existence in 1800,
during the reign of the Emperor Paul. The Second Armed Neutrality was
caused by the refusal of England to concede immunity from visit and
search to neutral merchantmen under convoy.[538] Sweden was the first to
claim in 1653, during war between Holland and Great Britain, that the
belligerents should not visit and search Swedish merchantmen under
convoy of Swedish men-of-war, provided a declaration was made by the
men-of-war that the merchantmen had no contraband on board. Other States
later raised the same claim, and many treaties were concluded which
stipulated the immunity from visit and search of neutral merchantmen
under convoy. But Great Britain refused to recognise the principle, and
when, in July 1800, a British squadron captured a Danish man-of-war and
her convoy of several merchantmen for having resisted visit and search,
Russia invited Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia to renew the "Armed
Neutrality," and to add to its principles the further one, that
belligerents should not have a right of visit and search in case the
commanding officer of the man-of-war, under whose convoy neutral
merchantmen were sailing, should declare that the convoyed vessels did
not carry contraband of war. In December 1800 Russia concluded treaties
with Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia consecutively, by which the "Second
Armed Neutrality" became a fact.[539] But it lasted only a year on
account of the assassination of the Emperor Paul of Russia on March 23,
and the defeat of the Danish fleet by Nelson on April 2, 1801, in the
battle of Copenhagen. Nevertheless, the Second Armed Neutrality likewise
proved of importance, for it led to a compromise in the "Maritime
Convention" concluded by England and Russia under the Emperor Alexander
I. on June 17, 1801, at St. Petersburg.[540] By article 3 of this
treaty, England recognised, as far as Russia was concerned, the rules
that neutral vessels might navigate from port to port and on the coasts
of belligerents, and that blockades must be effective. But in the same
article England enforced recognition by Russia of the rule that enemy
goods on neutral vessels may be seized, and she did not recognise the
immunity of neutral vessels under convoy from visit and search,
although, by article 4, she conceded that the right of visit and search
should be exercised only by men-of-war, and not by privateers, in case
the neutral vessels concerned sailed under convoy.

[Footnote 538: See below, [p] 417.]

[Footnote 539: Martens, _R._ VII. pp. 127-171. See also Martens, _Causes
Celebres_, IV. pp. 218-302.]

[Footnote 540: Martens, _R._ VII. p. 260.]

But this compromise did not last long. When in November 1807 war broke
out between Russia and England, the former in her declaration of
war[541] annulled the Maritime Convention of 1801, proclaimed again the
principles of the First Armed Neutrality, and asserted that she would
never again drop these principles. Great Britain proclaimed in her
counter-declaration[542] her return to those principles against which
the First and the Second Armed Neutrality were directed, and she was
able to point out that no Power had applied these principles more
severely than Russia under the Empress Catharine II. after the latter
had initiated the First Armed Neutrality.

[Footnote 541: Martens, _R._ VIII. p. 706.]

[Footnote 542: Martens, _R._ VIII. p. 710.]

Thus all progress made by the Maritime Convention of 1801 fell to the
ground. Times were not favourable to any progress. After Napoleon's
Berlin decrees in 1806 ordering the boycott of all English goods,
England declared all French ports and all the ports of the allies of
France blockaded, and ordered her fleet to capture all ships destined to
these ports. And Russia, which had in her declaration of war against
England in 1807 solemnly asserted that she would never again drop the
principles of the First Armed Neutrality, by article 2 of the Ukase[543]
published on August 1, 1809, violated one of the most important of these
principles by ordering that neutral vessels carrying enemy (English)
goods were to be stopped, the enemy goods seized, and the vessels
themselves seized if more than the half of their cargoes consisted of
enemy goods.

[Footnote 543: Martens, _N.R._ I. p. 484.]

[Sidenote: Neutrality during the Nineteenth Century.]

[p] 291. The development of the rules of neutrality during the
nineteenth century was due to four factors.

(1) The most prominent and influential factor is the attitude of the
United States of America towards neutrality from 1793 to 1818. When in
1793 England joined the war which had broken out in 1792 between the
so-called First Coalition and France, Genet, the French diplomatic envoy
accredited to the United States, granted Letters of Marque to American
merchantmen manned by American citizens in American ports. These
privateers were destined to cruise against English vessels, and French
Prize Courts were set up by the French Minister in connection with
French consulates in American ports. On the complaint of Great Britain,
the Government of the United States ordered these privateers to be
disarmed and the French Prize Courts to be disorganised.[544] As the
trial of Gideon Henfield,[545] who was acquitted, proved that the
Municipal Law of the United States did not prohibit the enlistment of
American citizens in the service of a foreign belligerent, Congress in
1794 passed an Act temporarily forbidding American citizens to accept
Letters of Marque from a foreign belligerent and to enlist in the army
or navy of a foreign State, and forbidding the fitting out and arming of
vessels intended as privateers for foreign belligerents. Other Acts were
passed from time to time. Finally, on April 20, 1818, Congress passed
the Foreign Enlistment Act, which deals definitely with the matter, and
is still in force,[546] and which afforded the basis of the British
Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819. The example of the United States
initiated the present practice, according to which it is the duty of
neutrals to prevent the fitting out and arming on their territory of
cruisers for belligerents, to prevent enlistment on their territory for
belligerents, and the like.

[Footnote 544: See Wharton, III. [p][p] 395-396.]

[Footnote 545: Concerning this trial, see Taylor, [p] 609.]

[Footnote 546: See Wheaton, [p][p] 434-437; Taylor, [p] 610; Lawrence,
[p] 223.]

(2) Of great importance for the development of neutrality during the
nineteenth century became the permanent neutralisation of Switzerland
and Belgium. These States naturally adopted and retained throughout
every war an exemplary attitude of impartiality towards the
belligerents. And each time war broke out in their vicinity they took
effectual military measures for the purpose of preventing belligerents
from making use of their neutral territory and resources.

(3) The third factor is the Declaration of Paris of 1856, which
incorporated into International Law the rule "Free ship, free goods,"
the rule that neutral goods on enemy ships cannot be appropriated, and
the rule that blockade must be effective.

(4) The fourth and last factor is the general development of the
military and naval resources of all members of the Family of Nations. As
all the larger States were, during the second half of the nineteenth
century, obliged to keep their armies and navies at every moment ready
for war, it followed as a consequence that, whenever war broke out, each
belligerent was anxious not to injure neutral States in order to avoid
their taking the part of the enemy. On the other hand, neutral States
were always anxious to fulfil the duties of neutrality for fear of being
drawn into the war. Thus the general rule, that the development of
International Law has been fostered by the interests of the members of
the Family of Nations, applies also to the special case of neutrality.
But for the fact that it is to the interest of belligerents to remain
during war on good terms with neutrals, and that it is to the interest
of neutrals not to be drawn into war, the institution of neutrality
would never have developed so favourably as it actually did during the
nineteenth century.

[Sidenote: Neutrality in the Twentieth Century.]

[p] 292. And this development has continued during the first decade of
the twentieth century. The South African and Russo-Japanese wars
produced several incidents which gave occasion for the Second Peace
Conference of 1907 to take the matter of neutrality within the range of
its deliberations and to agree upon the Convention (V.) concerning the
rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in war on land, as well
as upon the Convention (XIII.) concerning the rights and duties of
neutral Powers in maritime war. And some of the other Conventions agreed
upon at this Conference, although they do not directly concern neutral
Powers, are indirectly of great importance to them. Thus the Convention
(VII.) respecting the conversion of merchantmen into men-of-war
indirectly concerns neutral trade as well as the Convention (VIII.)
respecting the laying of submarine mines, and the Convention (XI.)
concerning restrictions on the exercise of the right of capture. Of the
greatest importance, however, is the fact that by the as yet unratified
Convention XII. the Conference agreed upon the establishment of an
International Prize Court to serve as a Court of Appeal in such prize
cases decided by the Prize Courts of either belligerent as concern the
interests of neutral Powers or their subjects. To enable this proposed
Court to find its verdicts on the basis of a generally accepted prize
law the Naval Conference of London met in 1908 and produced, in 1909,
the Declaration of London concerning the laws of naval war, which
represents a code comprising the rules respecting blockade, contraband,
unneutral service, destruction of neutral prizes, transfer to neutral
flag, enemy character, convoy, resistance to search, and compensation.
Although the Declaration of London has been signed by only ten Powers,
none of which has as yet ratified,[547] there is no doubt that sooner or
later, perhaps with some slight modifications, it will either be
_expressly_ ratified, or become customary law by the fact that maritime
Powers which go to war will carry out its rules.[548] Be that as it may,
the Declaration of London is a document of epoch-making character and
the future historian of International Law will reckon its development
from the Declaration of Paris (1856) to the Declaration of London[549]
(1909).

[Footnote 547: See Smith, _International Law_, 4th ed. by Wylie (1911),
pp. 353-371, where the chief points against ratification, and the
answers made thereto, are impartially set forth.]

[Footnote 548: Thus both Italy and Turkey, although the latter is not
even a signatory Power, during the Turco-Italian War, complied with the
rules of the Declaration of London.]

[Footnote 549: As regards the literature in favour and against the
ratification, on the part of Great Britain, of the Declaration of
London, see above, vol. I. [p] 568_b_, p. 595, note 1, and as regards
the value of the Report of the Drafting Committee of the Naval
Conference of London, see above, vol. I. [p] 554, No. 7.]


II

CHARACTERISTICS OF NEUTRALITY

  Grotius, III. c. 17, [p] 3--Bynkershoek, _Quaest. jur. publ._ I.
  c. 9--Vattel, III. [p][p] 103-104--Hall, [p][p] 19-20--Lawrence,
  [p] 222--Westlake, II. pp. 161-169--Phillimore, III. [p][p]
  136-137--Halleck, II. p. 141--Taylor, [p] 614--Moore, VII. [p][p]
  1287-1291--Walker, [p] 54--Wheaton, [p] 412--Bluntschli, [p][p]
  742-744--Heffter, [p] 144--Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp.
  605-606--Gareis, [p] 87--Liszt, [p] 42--Ullmann, [p] 190--Bonfils,
  Nos. 1441 and 1443--Despagnet, No. 686--Rivier, II. pp.
  368-370--Pradier-Fodere, VIII. Nos. 3222-3224, 3232-3233--Nys,
  III. pp. 570-581--Calvo, IV. [p][p] 2491-2493--Fiore, III. Nos.
  1536-1541, and Code, Nos. 1768-1775--Martens, II. [p] 129--Dupuis,
  No. 316--Merignhac, pp. 349-351--Pillet, pp. 272-274--Heilborn,
  _System_, pp. 336-351--Perels, [p] 38--Testa, pp. 167-172--Kleen,
  I. [p][p] 1-4--Hautefeuille, I. pp. 195-200--Gessner, pp.
  22-23--Schopfer, _Le principe juridique de la neutralite et son
  evolution dans l'histoire de la guerre_ (1894).

[Sidenote: Conception of Neutrality.]

[p] 293. Such States as do not take part in a war between other States
are neutrals.[550] The term "neutrality" is derived from the Latin
_neuter_. Neutrality may be defined as _the attitude of impartiality
adopted by third States towards belligerents and recognised by
belligerents, such attitude creating rights and duties between the
impartial States and the belligerents_. Whether or not a third State
will adopt and preserve an attitude of impartiality during war is not a
matter for International Law but for International Politics. Therefore,
unless a previous treaty stipulates it expressly, no duty exists for a
State, according to International Law, to remain neutral in war. On the
other hand, it ought not to be maintained, although this is done by some
writers,[551] that every State has by the Law of Nations a right not to
remain neutral. The fact is that every Sovereign State, as an
independent member of the Family of Nations, is master of its own
resolutions, and that the question of remaining neutral or not is, in
absence of a treaty stipulating otherwise, one of policy and not of law.
However, all States which do not expressly declare the contrary by word
or action, are supposed to be neutral, and the rights and duties arising
from neutrality come into and remain in existence through the mere fact
that a State takes up and preserves an attitude of impartiality and is
not drawn into the war by the belligerents themselves. A special
assertion of intention to remain neutral is not therefore legally
necessary on the part of neutral States, although they often expressly
and formally proclaim[552] their neutrality.

[Footnote 550: Grotius (III. c. 17) calls them _medii in bello_;
Bynkershoek (I. c. 9) _non hostes qui neutrarum partium sunt_.]

[Footnote 551: See, for instance, Vattel, III. [p] 106, and Bonfils, No.
1443.]

[Footnote 552: See below, [p] 309.]

[Sidenote: Neutrality an Attitude of Impartiality.]

[p] 294. Since neutrality is an attitude of impartiality, it excludes
such assistance and succour to one of the belligerents as is detrimental
to the other, and, further, such injuries to the one as benefit the
other. But it requires, on the other hand, active measures from neutral
States. For neutrals must prevent belligerents from making use of their
neutral territories and of their resources for military and naval
purposes during the war. This concerns not only actual fighting on
neutral territories, but also transport of troops, war materials, and
provisions for the troops, the fitting out of men-of-war and privateers,
the activity of Prize Courts, and the like.

But it is important to remember that the necessary attitude of
impartiality is not incompatible with sympathy with one and antipathy
against the other belligerent, so long as such sympathy and antipathy
are not realised in actions violating impartiality. Thus, not only
public opinion and the Press of a neutral State, but also the
Government,[553] may show their sympathy to one party or another
without thereby violating neutrality. And it must likewise be specially
observed that acts of humanity on the part of neutrals and their
subjects, such as the sending of doctors, medicine, provisions, dressing
material, and the like, to military hospitals, and the sending of
clothes and money to prisoners of war, can never be construed as acts of
partiality, although these comforts are provided for the wounded and the
prisoners of one of the belligerents only.

[Footnote 553: See, however, Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 656, and
Frankenbach, _Die Rechtsstellung von neutralen Staatsangehoerigen in
kriegfuehrenden Staaten_ (1910), p. 53, who assert the contrary.]

[Sidenote: Neutrality an Attitude creating Rights and Duties.]

[p] 295. Since neutrality is an attitude during the condition of war
only, this attitude calls into existence special rights and duties which
do not generally obtain. They come into existence by the fact that the
outbreak of war has been notified or has otherwise[554] unmistakably
become known to third States who take up an attitude of impartiality,
and they expire _ipso facto_ by the termination of the war.

[Footnote 554: See article 2 of Convention III. of the Second Peace
Conference.]

Rights and duties deriving from neutrality do not exist before the
outbreak of war, although such outbreak may be expected every moment.
Even so-called neutralised States, as Switzerland and Belgium, have
during time of peace no duties connected with neutrality, although as
neutralised States they have even in time of peace certain duties. These
duties are not duties connected with neutrality, but duties imposed upon
the neutralised States as a condition of their neutralisation. They
include restrictions for the purpose of safeguarding the neutralised
States from being drawn into war.[555]

[Footnote 555: See above, vol. I. [p] 96.]

[Sidenote: Neutrality an Attitude of States.]

[p] 296. As International Law is a law between States only and
exclusively, neutrality is an attitude of impartiality on the part of
States, and not on the part of individuals.[556] Individuals derive
neither rights nor duties, according to International Law, from the
neutrality of those States whose subjects they are. Neutral States are
indeed obliged by International Law to prevent their subjects from
committing certain acts, but the duty of these subjects to comply with
such injunctions of their Sovereigns is a duty imposed upon them by
Municipal, not by International Law. Belligerents, on the other hand,
are indeed permitted by International Law to punish subjects of neutrals
for breach of blockade, for carriage of contraband and for rendering
unneutral service to the enemy; but the duty of subjects of neutrals to
comply with these injunctions of belligerents is a duty imposed upon
them by these very injunctions of the belligerents, and not by
International Law. Although as a rule a State has no jurisdiction over
foreign subjects on the Open Sea,[557] either belligerent has,
exceptionally, by International Law, the right to punish foreign
subjects by confiscation of cargo, and eventually of the vessel itself,
in case their vessels break blockade, carry contraband, or render
unneutral service to the enemy; but punishment is threatened and
executed by the belligerents, not by International Law. Therefore, if
neutral merchantmen commit such acts, they neither violate neutrality
nor do they act against International Law, but they simply violate
injunctions of the belligerents concerned. If they choose to run the
risk of punishment in the form of losing their property, this is their
own concern, and their neutral home State need not prevent them from
doing so. But to the right of belligerents to punish subjects of
neutrals for the acts specified corresponds the duty of neutral States
to acquiesce on their part in the exercise of this right by either
belligerent.

[Footnote 556: It should be specially observed that it is an inaccuracy
of language to speak (as is commonly done in certain cases) of
individuals as being neutral. Thus, article 16 of Convention V. of the
Second Peace Conference designates the nationals of a State which is not
taking part in a war as "neutrals." Thus, further, belligerents
occupying enemy territory frequently make enemy individuals who are not
members of the armed forces of the enemy take a so-called oath of
neutrality.]

[Footnote 557: See above, vol. I. [p] 146.]

Moreover, apart from carriage of contraband, breach of blockade, and
unneutral service to the enemy, which a belligerent may punish by
capturing and confiscating the vessels or goods concerned, subjects of
neutrals are perfectly unhindered in their movements, and neutral States
have in especial no duty to prevent their subjects from selling arms,
munitions, and provisions to a belligerent, from enlisting in his
forces, and the like.

[Sidenote: No Cessation of Intercourse during Neutrality between
Neutrals and Belligerents.]

[p] 297. Neutrality as an attitude of impartiality involves the duty of
abstaining from assisting either belligerent either actively or
passively, but it does not include the duty of breaking off all
intercourse with the belligerents. Apart from certain restrictions
necessitated by impartiality, all intercourse between belligerents and
neutrals takes place as before, a condition of peace prevailing between
them in spite of the war between the belligerents. This applies
particularly to the working of treaties, to diplomatic intercourse, and
to trade. But indirectly, of course, the condition of war between
belligerents may have a disturbing influence upon intercourse between
belligerents and neutrals. Thus the treaty-rights of a neutral State may
be interfered with through occupation of enemy territory by a
belligerent; its subjects living on such territory bear in a sense enemy
character; its subjects trading with the belligerents are hampered by
the right of visit and search, and the right of the belligerents to
capture blockade-runners and contraband of war.

[Sidenote: Neutrality an Attitude during War (Neutrality in Civil War).]

[p] 298. Since neutrality is an attitude during war, the question arises
as to the necessary attitude of foreign States during civil war. As
civil war becomes real war through recognition[558] of the insurgents as
a belligerent Power, a distinction must be made as to whether
recognition has taken place or not. There is no doubt that a foreign
State commits an international delinquency by assisting insurgents in
spite of its being at peace with the legitimate Government. But matters
are different after recognition. The insurgents are now a belligerent
Power, and the civil war is now real war. Foreign States can either
become a party to the war or remain neutral, and in the latter case all
duties and rights of neutrality devolve upon them. Since, however,
recognition may be granted by foreign States independently of the
attitude of the legitimate Government, and since recognition granted by
the latter is not at all binding upon foreign Governments, it may happen
that insurgents are granted recognition on the part of the legitimate
Government, whereas foreign States refuse it, and _vice versa_.[559] In
the first case, the rights and duties of neutrality devolve upon foreign
States as far as the legitimate Government is concerned. Men-of-war of
the latter may visit and search merchantmen of foreign States for
contraband; a blockade declared by the legitimate Government is binding
upon foreign States, and the like. But no rights and duties of
neutrality devolve upon foreign States as regards the insurgents. A
blockade declared by them is not binding, their men-of-war may not visit
and search merchantmen for contraband. On the other hand, if insurgents
are recognised by a foreign State but not by the legitimate Government,
such foreign State has all rights and duties of neutrality so far as the
insurgents are concerned, but not so far as the legitimate Government is
concerned.[560] In practice, however, recognition of insurgents on the
part of foreign States will, if really justified, always have the effect
of causing the legitimate Government to grant its recognition also.

[Footnote 558: See above, [p][p] 59 and 76, and Rougier, _Les guerres
civiles et le droit des gens_ (1903), pp. 414-447.]

[Footnote 559: See above, [p] 59.]

[Footnote 560: See the body of nine rules regarding the position of
foreign States in case of an insurrection, adopted by the Institute of
International Law at its meeting at Neuchatel in 1900 (_Annuaire_,
XVIII. p. 227). The question as to whether, in case foreign States
refuse recognition to insurgents, although the legitimate Government has
granted it, the legitimate Government has a right of visit and search
for contraband is controversial; see _Annuaire_, XVIII. pp. 213-216.]

[Sidenote: Neutrality to be recognised by the Belligerents.]

[p] 299. Just as third States have no duty to remain neutral in a war,
so they have no right[561] to demand that they be allowed to remain
neutral. History reports many cases in which States, although they
intended to remain neutral, were obliged by one or both belligerents to
make up their minds and choose the belligerent with whom they would
throw in their lot. For neutrality to come into existence it is,
therefore, not sufficient for a third State at the outbreak of war to
take up an attitude of impartiality, but it is also necessary that the
belligerents recognise this attitude by acquiescing in it and by not
treating such third State as a party to the war. This does not mean, as
has been maintained,[562] that neutrality is based on a contract
concluded either _expressis verbis_ or by unmistakable actions between
the belligerents and third States, and that, consequently, a third State
might at the outbreak of war take up the position of one which is
neither neutral nor a party to the war, reserving thereby for itself
freedom in its future resolutions and actions. Since the normal relation
between members of the Family of Nations is peace, the outbreak of war
between some of the members causes the others to become neutrals _ipso
facto_ by their taking up an attitude of impartiality and by their not
being treated by the belligerents as parties to the war. Thus, it is not
a contract that calls neutrality into existence, but this condition is
rather a legal consequence of a certain attitude on the part of third
States at the outbreak of war, on the one hand, and, on the other, on
the part of the belligerents themselves.

[Footnote 561: But many writers assert the existence of such a right;
see, for instance, Vattel, III. [p] 106; Wheaton, [p] 414; Kleen, I. [p]
2; Bonfils, No. 1443.]

[Footnote 562: See Heilborn, _System_, pp. 347 and 350.]


III

DIFFERENT KINDS OF NEUTRALITY

  Vattel, III. [p][p] 101, 105, 107, 110--Phillimore, III. [p][p]
  138-139--Halleck, II. p. 142--Taylor, [p] 618--Wheaton, [p][p]
  413-425--Bluntschli, [p][p] 745-748--Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp.
  634-636--Ullmann, [p] 190--Despagnet, No. 685--Pradier-Fodere, VIII.
  Nos. 3225-3231--Rivier, II. pp. 370-379--Calvo, IV. [p][p]
  2592-2642--Fiore, III. Nos. 1542-1545--Merignhac, pp.
  347-349--Pillet, pp. 277-284--Kleen, I. [p][p] 6-22.

[Sidenote: Perpetual Neutrality.]

[p] 300. The very first distinction to be made between different kinds
of neutrality is that between perpetual or other neutrality. Perpetual
or permanent is the neutrality of States which are neutralised by
special treaties of the members of the Family of Nations, as at the
present time that of Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxemburg. Apart from
duties arising from the fact of their neutralisation which are to be
performed in time of peace as well as in time of war, the duties and
rights of neutrality are the same for neutralised as for other States.
It must be specially observed that this concerns not only the obligation
not to assist either belligerent, but likewise the obligation to prevent
them from making use of the neutral territory for their military
purposes. Thus, Switzerland in 1870 and 1871, during the Franco-German
War, properly prevented the transport of troops, recruits, and war
material of either belligerent over her territory, disarmed the French
army which had saved itself by crossing the Swiss frontier, and detained
the members of this army until the conclusion of peace.[563]

[Footnote 563: See below, [p] 339.]

[Sidenote: General and Partial Neutrality.]

[p] 301. The distinction between general and partial neutrality derives
from the fact that a part of the territory of a State may be
neutralised,[564] as are, for instance, the Ionian Islands of Corfu and
Paxo, which are now a part of the territory of the Kingdom of Greece.
Such State has the duty to remain always partially neutral--namely, as
far as its neutralised part is concerned. In contradistinction to such
partial neutrality, general neutrality is the neutrality of States no
part of whose territory is neutralised by treaty.

[Footnote 564: See above, [p] 72.]

[Sidenote: Voluntary and Conventional Neutrality.]

[p] 302. A third distinction is that between voluntary and conventional
neutrality. Voluntary (or simple or natural) is the neutrality of such
State as is not bound by a general or special treaty to remain neutral
in a certain war. Neutrality is in most cases voluntary, and States
whose neutrality is voluntary may at any time during the war give up
their attitude of impartiality and take the part of either belligerent.
On the other hand, the neutrality of such State as is by treaty bound to
remain neutral in a war is conventional. Of course, the neutrality of
neutralised States is in every case conventional. Yet not-neutralised
States can likewise by treaty be obliged to remain neutral in a certain
war, just as in other cases they can by treaty of alliance be compelled
not to remain neutral, but to take the part of one of the belligerents.

[Sidenote: Armed Neutrality.]

[p] 303. One speaks of an armed neutrality when a neutral State takes
military measures for the purpose of defending its neutrality against
possible or probable attempts of either belligerent to make use of the
neutral territory. Thus, the neutrality of Switzerland during the
Franco-German War was an armed neutrality. In another sense of the term,
one speaks of an armed neutrality when neutral States take military
measures for the purpose of defending the real or pretended rights of
neutrals against threatening infringements on the part of either
belligerent. The First and Second Armed Neutrality[565] of 1780 and 1800
were armed neutralities in the latter sense of the term.

[Footnote 565: See above, [p][p] 289 and 290.]

[Sidenote: Benevolent Neutrality.]

[p] 304. Treaties stipulating neutrality often stipulate a "benevolent"
neutrality of the parties regarding a certain war. The term is likewise
frequently used during diplomatic negotiations. However, at present
there is no distinction between benevolent neutrality and neutrality
pure and simple. The idea dates from earlier times, when the obligations
imposed by neutrality were not so stringent, and neutral States could
favour one of the belligerents in many ways without thereby violating
their neutral attitude. If a State remained neutral in the then lax
sense of the term, but otherwise favoured a belligerent, its neutrality
was called benevolent.

[Sidenote: Perfect and Qualified Neutrality.]

[p] 305. A distinction of great practical importance was in former times
that between perfect, or absolute, and qualified, or imperfect,
neutrality. The neutrality of a State was qualified if it remained
neutral on the whole, but actively or passively, directly or indirectly,
gave some kind of assistance to one of the belligerents in consequence
of an obligation entered into by a treaty previous to the war, and not
for the special war exclusively. On the other hand, a neutrality was
termed perfect if a neutral State neither actively nor passively, and
neither directly nor indirectly, favoured either belligerent. There is
no doubt that in the eighteenth century, when it was recognised that a
State could be considered neutral, although it was by a previous treaty
bound to render more or less limited assistance to one of the
belligerents, this distinction between neutrality perfect and qualified
was justified. But during the second half of the nineteenth century it
became controversial whether a so-called qualified neutrality was
neutrality at all, and whether a State, which, in fulfilment of a treaty
obligation, rendered some assistance to one of the belligerents,
violated its neutrality. The majority of modern writers[566] maintained,
correctly I think, that a State was either neutral or not, and that a
State violated its neutrality in case it rendered any assistance
whatever to one of the belligerents from any motive whatever. For this
reason, a State which had entered into such obligations as those just
mentioned would in time of war frequently be in a conflict of duties.
For, in fulfilling its treaty obligations, it would frequently be
obliged to violate its duty of neutrality, and _vice versa_. Several
writers,[567] however, maintained that such fulfilment of treaty
obligations would not contain a violation of neutrality. All doubt in
the matter ought now to be removed, since article 2 of Convention V. of
the Second Peace Conference categorically enacts that "belligerents are
forbidden to move across the territory of a neutral Power troops or
convoys either of munitions of war or of supplies." The principle at the
back of this enactment no doubt is that a qualified neutrality has no
longer any _raison d'etre_, and that neutrality must in every case be
perfect.[568]

[Footnote 566: See, for instance, Ullmann, [p] 190; Despagnet, No. 685;
Rivier, II. p. 378; Calvo, IV. [p] 2594; Taylor, [p] 618; Fiore, III.
No. 1541; Kleen, I. [p] 21; Hall, [p] 215 (see also Hall, [p] 219,
concerning passage of troops). Phillimore, III. [p] 138, goes with the
majority of publicists, but in [p] 139 he thinks that it would be too
rigid to consider acts of "minor" partiality which are the result of
conventions previous to the war as violations of neutrality.]

[Footnote 567: See, for instance, Heffter, [p] 144; Manning, p. 225;
Wheaton, [p][p] 425-426; Bluntschli, [p] 746; Halleck, II. p. 142.]

[Footnote 568: See above, [p] 77, where it has been pointed out that a
neutral who takes up an attitude of qualified neutrality may nowadays be
considered as an accessory belligerent party to the war.]

[Sidenote: Some Historical Examples of Qualified Neutrality.]

[p] 306. For the purpose of illustration the following instances of
qualified neutrality may be mentioned:--

(1) By a treaty of amity and commerce concluded in 1778 between the
United States of America and France, the former granted for the time of
war to French privateers and their prizes the right of admission to
American ports, and entered into the obligation not to admit the
privateers of the enemies of France. When subsequently, in 1793, war was
waged between England and France, and England complained of the
admission of French privateers to American ports, the United States met
the complaint by advancing their treaty obligations.[569]

(2) Denmark had by several treaties, especially by one of 1781,
undertaken the obligation to furnish Russia with a certain number of
men-of-war and troops. When, in 1788, during war between Russia and
Sweden, Denmark fulfilled her obligations towards Russia, she
nevertheless declared herself neutral. And although Sweden protested
against the possibility of such qualified neutrality, she acquiesced in
the fact and did not consider herself to be at war with Denmark.[570]

(3) In 1848, during war between Germany and Denmark, Great Britain,
fulfilling a treaty obligation towards Denmark, prohibited the
exportation of arms to Germany, whereas such exportation to Denmark
remained undisturbed.[571]

(4) In 1900, during the South African War, Portugal, for the purpose of
complying with a treaty obligation[572] towards Great Britain regarding
the passage of British troops through Portuguese territory in South
Africa, allowed such passage to an English force which had landed at
Beira[573] and was destined for Rhodesia.

[Footnote 569: See Wheaton, [p] 425, and Phillimore, III. [p] 139.]

[Footnote 570: See Phillimore, III. [p] 140.]

[Footnote 571: See Geffcken in Holtzendorff, VI. p. 610, and Rivier, II.
p. 379.]

[Footnote 572: Article 11 of the treaty between Great Britain and
Portugal concerning the delimitation of spheres of influence in Africa.
(Martens, _N.R.G._ 2nd Ser. XVIII. p. 185.)]

[Footnote 573: See below, [p] 323; Baty, _International Law in South
Africa_ (1900), p. 75; and _The Times' History of the War in South
Africa_, vol. IV. p. 366.]


IV

COMMENCEMENT AND END OF NEUTRALITY

  Hall, [p] 207--Phillimore, I. [p][p] 392-392A, III. [p][p]
  146-149--Taylor, [p][p] 610-611--Wheaton, [p][p] 437-439, and
  Dana's note 215--Heffter, [p] 145--Bonfils, Nos.
  1445-1446--Despagnet, No. 689--Pradier-Fodere, VIII. Nos.
  3234-3237--Rivier, II. pp. 379-381--Martens, II. [p] 138--Kleen,
  I. [p][p] 5, 36-42.

[Sidenote: Neutrality commences with Knowledge of the War.]

[p] 307. Since neutrality is an attitude of impartiality deliberately
taken up by a State not implicated in a war, neutrality cannot begin
before the outbreak of war becomes known. It is only then that third
States can make up their minds whether or not they intend to remain
neutral. They are supposed to remain neutral, and the duties deriving
from neutrality are incumbent upon them so long as they do not
_expressis verbis_ or by unmistakable acts declare that they will be
parties to the war. It had long been the usual practice on the part of
belligerents to notify the outbreak of war to third States for the
purpose of enabling them to take up the necessary attitude of
impartiality, but such notification was not formerly in strict law
necessary. The mere fact of the knowledge of the outbreak of war which
had been obtained in any way gave a third State an opportunity of making
up its mind regarding the attitude which it intended to take up, and, if
it remained neutral, its neutrality was to be dated from the time of its
knowledge of the outbreak of war. But it is apparent that an immediate
notification of the war on the part of belligerents is of great
importance, as thereby all doubt and controversy regarding the knowledge
of the outbreak of war are excluded. For the fact must always be
remembered that a neutral State may in no way be made responsible for
acts of its own or of its subjects which have been performed before it
knew of the war, although the outbreak of war might be expected. For
this reason article 2 of Convention III. of the Second Peace Conference
enacts that belligerents must without delay send a notification of the
outbreak of war, which may even be made by telegraph, to neutral Powers,
and that the condition of war shall not take effect in regard to neutral
Powers until after receipt of a notification, unless it be established
beyond doubt that they were in fact aware of the outbreak of war.[574]

[Footnote 574: See above, [p][p] 94 and 95.]

[Sidenote: Commencement of Neutrality in Civil War.]

[p] 308. As civil war becomes real war through recognition of the
insurgents as a belligerent Power, neutrality during a civil war begins
for every foreign State from the moment recognition is granted. That
recognition might be granted or refused by foreign States independently
of the attitude of the legitimate Government has been stated above in
[p] 298, where also an explanation is given of the consequences of
recognition granted either by foreign States alone or by the legitimate
Government alone.

[Sidenote: Establishment of Neutrality by Declarations.]

[p] 309. Neutrality being an attitude of States creating rights and
duties, active measures on the part of a neutral state are required for
the purpose of preventing its officials and subjects from committing
acts incompatible with its duty of impartiality. Now, the manifesto by
which a neutral State orders its organs and subjects to comply with the
attitude of impartiality adopted by itself is called a declaration of
neutrality in the special sense of the term. Such declaration of
neutrality must not, however, be confounded, on the one hand, with
manifestoes of the belligerents proclaiming to neutrals the rights and
duties devolving upon them through neutrality, or, on the other hand,
with the assertions made by neutrals to belligerents or _urbi et orbi_
that they will remain neutral, although these manifestoes and assertions
are often also called declarations of neutrality.[575]

[Footnote 575: See above, [p] 293.]

[Sidenote: Municipal Neutrality Laws.]

[p] 310. International Law leaves the provision of necessary measures
for the establishment of neutrality to the discretion of each State.
Since in constitutional States the powers of Governments are frequently
so limited by Municipal Law that they may not take adequate measures
without the consent of their Parliaments, and since it is, so far as
International Law is concerned, no excuse for a Government if it is by
its Municipal Law prevented from taking adequate measures, several
States have once for all enacted so-called Neutrality Laws, which
prescribe the attitude to be taken up by their officials and subjects in
case the States concerned remain neutral in a war. These Neutrality Laws
are latent in time of peace, but their provisions become operative _ipso
facto_ by the respective States making a declaration of neutrality to
their officials and subjects.

[Sidenote: British Foreign Enlistment Act.]

[p] 311. After the United States of America had on April 20, 1818,
enacted[576] a Neutrality Law, Great Britain followed the example in
1819 with her Foreign Enlistment Act,[577] which was in force till 1870.
As this Act did not give adequate powers to the Government, Parliament
passed on August 9, 1870, a new Foreign Enlistment Act,[578] which is
still in force. This Act, in the event of British neutrality,
prohibits--(1) The enlistment by a British subject in the military or
naval service of either belligerent, and similar acts (sections 4-7);
(2) the building, equipping,[579] and despatching[580] of vessels for
employment in the military or naval service of either belligerent
(sections 8-9); (3) the increase, on the part of any individual living
on British territory, of the armament of a man-of-war of either
belligerent being at the time in a British port (section 10); (4) the
preparing or fitting out of a naval or military expedition against a
friendly State (section 11).

[Footnote 576: Printed in Phillimore, I. pp. 667-672.]

[Footnote 577: 59 Geo. III. c. 69.]

[Footnote 578: 33 and 34 Vict. c. 90. See Sibley in the _Law Magazine
and Review_, XXIX. (1904), pp. 453-464, and XXX. (1905), pp. 37-53.]

[Footnote 579: According to section 30, the Interpretation Clause of the
Act, "equipping" includes "the furnishing of a ship with any tackle,
apparel, furniture, provisions, arms, munitions, or stores, or any other
thing which is used in or about a ship for the purpose of fitting or
adapting her for the sea or for naval service." It is, therefore, not
lawful for British ships, in case Great Britain is neutral, to supply a
belligerent fleet direct with coal, a point which became of interest
during the Russo-Japanese War. German steamers laden with coal followed
the Russian fleet on her journey to the Far East, and British shipowners
were prevented from doing the same by the Foreign Enlistment Act. And it
was in application of this Act that the British Government ordered, in
1904, the detention of the German steamer _Captain W. Menzel_, which
took in Welsh coal at Cardiff for the purpose of carrying it to the
Russian fleet _en route_ to the Far East. See below, [p] 350.]

[Footnote 580: An interesting case which ought here to be mentioned
occurred in October 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War. Messrs. Yarrow
& Co., the shipbuilders, possessed a partly completed vessel, the
_Caroline_, which could be finally fitted up either as a yacht or as a
torpedo-boat. In September 1904, a Mr. Sinnet and the Hon. James Burke
Roche called at the shipbuilding yard of Messrs. Yarrow, bought the
_Caroline_, and ordered her to be fitted up as a high-speed yacht. The
required additions were finished on October 3. On October 6 the vessel
left Messrs. Yarrow's yard and was navigated by a Captain Ryder, _via_
Hamburg, to the Russian port of Libau, there to be altered into a
torpedo-boat. That section 8 of the Foreign Enlistment Act applies to
this case there is no doubt. But there is no doubt either that it is
this Act, and not the rules of International Law, which required the
prosecution of Messrs. Sinnet and Roche on the part of the British
Government. For, if viewed from the basis of International Law, the case
is merely one of contraband. See below, [p][p] 321, 334, and 397.]

It must be specially observed that the British Foreign Enlistment Act
goes beyond the requirements of International Law in so far as it tries
to prohibit and penalises a number of acts which, according to the
present rules of International Law, a neutral State is not required to
prohibit and penalise. Thus, for instance, a neutral State need not
prohibit its private subjects from enlisting in the service of a
belligerent; from supplying coal, provisions, arms, and ammunition
direct to a belligerent fleet, provided such fleet is not within or just
outside the territorial waters of the neutral concerned; from selling
ships to a belligerent although it is known that they will be converted
into cruisers or used as transport ships. For article 7 of Convention
VII. as well as of Convention XIII. of the Second Peace Conference
categorically enacts that "a neutral Power is not bound to prevent the
export or transit, on behalf of either belligerent, of arms, munitions
of war, or, in general, of anything which could be of use to an army or
fleet."

[Sidenote: End of Neutrality.]

[p] 312. Neutrality ends with the war, or through the commencement of
war by a hitherto neutral State against one of the belligerents, or
through one of the belligerents commencing war against a hitherto
neutral State. Since, apart from a treaty obligation, no State has by
International Law the duty to remain neutral in a war between other
States,[581] or, if it is a belligerent, to allow a hitherto neutral
State to remain neutral,[582] it does not constitute a violation of
neutrality on the part of a hitherto neutral to declare war against one
of the belligerents, and on the part of a belligerent to declare war
against a neutral. Duties of neutrality exist so long only as a State
remains neutral. They come to an end _ipso facto_ by a hitherto neutral
State throwing up its neutrality, or by a belligerent beginning war
against a hitherto neutral State. But the ending of neutrality must not
be confounded with violation of neutrality. Such violation does not
_ipso facto_ bring neutrality to an end, as will be shown below in [p]
358.

[Footnote 581: See above, [p] 293.]

[Footnote 582: See above, [p] 299.]




CHAPTER II

RELATIONS BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS AND NEUTRALS


I

RIGHTS AND DUTIES DERIVING FROM NEUTRALITY

  Vattel, III. [p] 104--Hall, [p] 214--Phillimore, III. [p][p]
  136-138--Twiss, II. [p] 216--Heffter, [p] 146--Geffcken in
  Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 656-657--Gareis, [p] 88--Liszt, [p] 42--Ullmann,
  [p] 191--Bonfils, Nos. 1441-1444--Despagnet, Nos. 684 and
  690--Rivier, II. pp. 381-385--Nys, III. pp. 582-639--Calvo, IV. [p][p]
  2491-2493--Fiore, III. Nos. 1501, 1536-1540, and Code, Nos.
  1776-1778, 1784--Martens, II. [p] 131--Kleen, I. [p][p]
  45-46--Merignhac, pp. 339-342--Pillet, pp. 273-275.

[Sidenote: Conduct in General of Neutrals and Belligerents.]

[p] 313. Neutrality can be carried out only if neutrals as well as
belligerents follow a certain line of conduct in their relations with
one another. It is for this reason that from neutrality derive rights
and duties, as well for belligerents as for neutrals, and that,
consequently, neutrality can be violated as well by belligerents as by
neutrals. These rights and duties are correspondent: the duties of
neutrals correspond to the rights of either belligerent, and the duties
of either belligerent correspond to the rights of the neutrals.

[Sidenote: What Rights and Duties of Neutrals and of Belligerents there
are.]

[p] 314. There are two rights and two duties deriving from neutrality
for neutrals, and likewise two for belligerents.

Duties of neutrals are, firstly, to act toward belligerents in
accordance with their attitude of impartiality; and, secondly, to
acquiesce in the exercise of either belligerent's right to punish
neutral merchantmen for breach of blockade, carriage of contraband, and
rendering unneutral service to the enemy, and, accordingly, to visit,
search, and eventually capture them.

The duties of either belligerent are, firstly, to act towards neutrals
in accordance with their attitude of impartiality; and, secondly, not to
suppress their intercourse, and in especial their commerce, with the
enemy.[583]

[Footnote 583: All writers on International Law resolve the duty of
impartiality incumbent upon neutrals into many several duties, and they
do the same as regards the duty of belligerents--namely, to act toward
neutrals in accordance with the latter's impartiality. In this way quite
a large catalogue of duties and corresponding rights are produced, and
the whole matter is unnecessarily complicated.]

Either belligerent has a right to demand impartiality from neutrals,
whereas, on the other hand, neutrals have a right to demand such
behaviour from either belligerent as is in accordance with their
attitude of impartiality. Neutrals have a right to demand that their
intercourse, and in especial their commerce, with the enemy shall not be
suppressed; whereas, on the other hand, either belligerent has the right
to punish subjects of neutrals for breach of blockade, carriage of
contraband, and unneutral service, and, accordingly, to visit, search,
and capture neutral merchantmen.

[Sidenote: Rights and Duties of Neutrals contested.]

[p] 315. Some writers[584] maintain that no rights derive from
neutrality for neutrals, and, consequently, no duties for belligerents,
because everything which must be left undone by a belligerent regarding
his relations with a neutral must likewise be left undone in time of
peace. But this opinion has no foundation. Indeed, it is true that the
majority of the acts which belligerents must leave undone in consequence
of their duty to respect neutrality must likewise be left undone in time
of peace in consequence of the territorial supremacy of every State.
However, there are several acts which do not belong to this class--for
instance, the non-appropriation of enemy goods on neutral vessels. And
those acts which do belong to this class fall nevertheless at the same
time under another category. Thus, a violation of neutral territory on
the part of a belligerent for military and naval purposes of the war is
indeed an act prohibited in time of peace, because every State has to
respect the territorial supremacy of other States; but it is at the same
time a violation of neutrality, and therefore totally different from
other violations of foreign territorial supremacy. This becomes quite
apparent when the true inwardness of such acts is regarded. For every
State has a right to demand reparation for an ordinary violation of its
territorial supremacy, but it need not take any notice of it, and it has
no duty to demand reparation. Yet in case a violation of its territorial
supremacy constitutes at the same time a violation of its neutrality,
the neutral State has not only a right to demand reparation, but has a
duty[585] to do so. For, if it did not, this would contain a violation
of its duty of impartiality, because it would be favouring one
belligerent to the detriment of the other.[586]

[Footnote 584: Heffter, [p] 149; Gareis, [p] 88; Heilborn, _System_, p.
341.]

[Footnote 585: See, for instance, article 3 of Convention XIII. of the
Second Peace Conference, which enacts:--"When a ship has been captured
in the territorial waters of a neutral Power, such Power must, if the
prize is still within its jurisdiction, employ the means at its disposal
to release the prize with its officers and crew, and to intern the prize
crew. If the prize is not within the jurisdiction of the neutral Power,
the captor Government, on the demand of that Power, must liberate the
prize with its officers and crew."]

[Footnote 586: See below, [p] 360.]

On the other hand, it has been asserted[587] that, apart from
conventional neutrality, from which treaty obligations arise, it is
incorrect to speak of duties deriving from neutrality, since at any
moment during the war neutrals could throw up neutrality and become
parties to the war. I cannot agree with this opinion either. That a
hitherto neutral can at any moment throw up neutrality and take part in
the war, is just as true as that a belligerent can at any moment during
the war declare war against a hitherto neutral State. Yet this only
proves that there is no duty to remain neutral, and no duty for a
belligerent to abstain from declaring war against a hitherto neutral
State. This is a truism which ought not to be doubted, and is totally
different from the question as to what duties derive from neutrality so
long as a certain State remains neutral at all. The assertion that such
duties derive from neutrality is in no way inconsistent with the fact
that neutrality itself can at any moment during the war come to an end
through the beginning of war by either a neutral or a belligerent. This
assertion only states the fact that, so long as neutrals intend
neutrality and so long as belligerents intend to recognise such
neutrality of third States, duties derive from neutrality for both
belligerents and neutrals.

[Footnote 587: See Gareis, [p] 88.]

[Sidenote: Contents of Duty of Impartiality.]

[p] 316. It has already been stated above, in [p] 294, that impartiality
_excludes_ such assistance and succour to one of the belligerents as is
detrimental to the other, and, further, such injuries to one of the
belligerents as benefit the other, and that it _includes_ active
measures on the part of neutrals for the purpose of preventing
belligerents from making use of neutral territories and neutral
resources for their military and naval purposes. But all this does not
exhaust the contents of the duty of impartiality.

It must, on the one hand, be added that according to the present strict
conception of neutrality the duty of impartiality of a neutral
_excludes_ all facilities whatever for military and naval operations of
the belligerents, even if granted to both belligerents alike. In former
times assistance was not considered a violation of neutrality, provided
it was given to both belligerents in the same way, and States were
considered neutral although they allowed an equal number of their troops
to fight on the side of each belligerent. To-day this could no longer
happen. From Conventions V. and XIII. of the Second Peace Conference,
which deal with neutrality in land and sea warfare respectively, it
becomes quite apparent that any facility whatever directly concerning
military or naval operations, even if it consists only in granting
passage over neutral territory to belligerent forces, is illegal,
although granted to both belligerents alike. _The duty of impartiality
to-day comprises abstention from any active or passive co-operation with
belligerents._

On the other hand, it must be added that the duty of impartiality
_includes_ the equal treatment of both belligerents regarding such
facilities as do not directly concern military or naval operations, and
which may, therefore, be granted or not to belligerents, according to
the discretion of a neutral. If a neutral grants such facilities to one
belligerent, he must grant them to the other in the same degree. If he
refuses them to the one, he must likewise refuse them to the other.[588]
Thus, since it does not, according to the International Law of the
present day, constitute a violation of neutrality if a neutral allows
his subjects to supply either belligerent with arms and ammunition in
the ordinary way of trade, it would constitute a violation of neutrality
to prohibit the export of arms destined for one of the belligerents
only. Thus, further, if a neutral allows men-of-war of one of the
belligerents to bring their prizes into neutral ports, he must grant the
same facility to the other belligerent.

[Footnote 588: See articles 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, of Convention V., and
articles 7, 9, 11, 17, 19, 21, 23 of Convention XIII. of the Second
Peace Conference.]

[Sidenote: Duty of Impartiality continuously growing more intense.]

[p] 317. Although neutrality has already for centuries been recognised
as an attitude of impartiality, it has taken two hundred years for the
duty of impartiality to attain its present range and intensity. Now this
continuous development has by no means ceased. It is slowly and
gradually going on, and there is no doubt that during the twentieth
century the duty of impartiality will become much more intense than it
is at present. The fact that the intensity of this duty is the result of
gradual development bears upon many practical questions regarding the
conduct of neutrals. It is therefore necessary to discuss separately the
relations between neutrals and belligerents in order to ascertain what
line of conduct must be followed by neutrals.

[Sidenote: Neutrality Conventions of the Second Peace Conference.]

[p] 317_a_. The Second Peace Conference has produced two Conventions
concerning neutrality:--

(1) The Convention (V.) respecting the rights and duties of neutral
Powers and persons in war on land,[589] which comprises twenty-five
articles and has been signed by all the Powers represented at the
Conference, except China and Nicaragua; both, however, acceded later.
Many Powers have already ratified. Great Britain entered a
reservation[590] against articles 16-18, and Argentina against article
18.

[Footnote 589: See Lemonon, pp. 407-425; Higgins, pp. 290-294; Boidin,
pp. 121-134; Nippold, [p] 25; Scott, _Conferences_, pp. 541-555;
Bustamente in _A.J._ II. (1908), pp. 95-120.]

[Footnote 590: See above, [p] 88.]

(2) The Convention (XIII.) respecting the rights and duties of neutral
Powers in maritime war,[591] which comprises thirty-three articles and
has been signed by all the Powers represented at the Conference, except
the United States of America, China, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Spain; but
America, China, and Nicaragua acceded later. Many Powers have already
ratified, but there are a number of reservations; they will be dealt
with in due course when the points concerned are being discussed.

[Footnote 591: See Lemonon, pp. 555-606; Higgins, pp. 459-483; Bernsten,
[p] 13; Boidin, pp. 236-247; Dupuis, _Guerre_, Nos. 277-330; Nippold,
[p] 34; Scott, _Conferences_, pp. 620-648; Hyde in _A.J._ II. (1908),
pp. 507-527.]

Both Conventions deal comprehensively with the rights and duties of
neutrals, but it is not convenient in a treatise on International Law
either to treat separately of the duties of neutrals in war on land and
on sea, or to dispense with any distinction in the treatment of the
several points concerned. The arrangement of topics in the sections of
this chapter will, therefore, be independent of the arrangement of
topics in the two Conventions, and will be as follows:--Neutrals and
Military Operations ([p][p] 320-328); Neutrals and Military Preparations
([p][p] 329-335); Neutral Asylum to Soldiers and War Materials ([p][p]
336-341); Neutral Asylum to Naval Forces ([p][p] 342-348); Supplies and
Loans to Belligerents ([p][p] 349-352); Services to Belligerents ([p][p]
353-356).

[Sidenote: Contents of Duty of Belligerents to treat Neutrals in
accordance with their Impartiality.]

[p] 318. Whereas the relations between neutrals and belligerents require
detailed discussion with regard to the duty of impartiality incumbent
upon neutrals, the contents of the duty of belligerents to treat
neutrals in accordance with their impartiality are so manifest that
elaborate treatment is unnecessary. Such duty _excludes_, firstly, any
violation of neutral territory for military or naval purposes of the
war;[592] and, secondly, the appropriation of neutral goods, contraband
excepted, on enemy vessels.[593] On the other hand, such duty
_includes_, firstly, due treatment of neutral diplomatic envoys
accredited to the enemy and found on occupied enemy territory; and,
secondly, due treatment of neutral subjects and neutral property on
enemy territory. A belligerent who conquers enemy territory must at
least grant to neutral envoys accredited to the enemy the right to quit
the occupied territory unmolested.[594] And such belligerent must
likewise abstain from treating neutral subjects and property
established on enemy territory more harshly than the laws of war allow;
for, although neutral subjects and property have, by being established
on enemy territory, acquired enemy character, they have nevertheless not
lost the protection of their neutral home State.[595] And such
belligerent must, lastly, pay full damages in case he makes use of his
right of angary[596] against neutral property in course of transit
through enemy territory.

[Footnote 592: See articles 1-4 of Convention V., and articles 1-5 of
Convention XIII. of the Second Peace Conference.]

[Footnote 593: This is stipulated by the Declaration of Paris of 1856.]

[Footnote 594: The position of foreign envoys found by a belligerent on
occupied enemy territory is not settled as regards details. But there is
no doubt that a certain consideration is due to them, and that they must
at least be granted the right to depart. See above, vol. I. [p] 399.]

[Footnote 595: See above, [p] 88.]

[Footnote 596: See below, [p][p] 364-367.]

[Sidenote: Contents of Duty not to suppress Intercourse between Neutrals
and the Enemy.]

[p] 319. The duty of either belligerent not to suppress intercourse of
neutrals with the enemy requires no detailed discussion either. It is a
duty which is in accordance with the development of the institution of
neutrality. It is of special importance with regard to commerce of
subjects of neutrals with belligerents, since formerly attempts were
frequently made to intercept all neutral trade with the enemy. A
consequence of the now recognised freedom of neutral commerce with
either belligerent is, firstly, the rule, enacted by the Declaration of
Paris of 1856, that enemy goods, with the exception of contraband, on
neutral vessels on the Open Sea or in enemy territorial waters may not
be appropriated by a belligerent,[597] and, secondly, the rule, enacted
by article 1 of Convention XI. of the Second Peace Conference, that the
postal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents, except correspondence
destined for or proceeding from a blockaded port, which may be found on
a neutral or enemy vessel, is inviolable.[598] But the recognised
freedom of neutral commerce necessitates, on the other hand, certain
measures on the part of belligerents. It would be unreasonable to impose
on a belligerent a duty not to prevent the subjects of neutrals from
breaking a blockade, from carrying contraband, and, lastly, from
rendering unneutral service to the enemy. International Law gives,
therefore, a right to either belligerent to forbid all such acts to
neutral merchantmen, and, accordingly, to visit, search, capture, and
punish them.[599]

[Footnote 597: That not only goods owned by enemy individuals but also
goods owned by the enemy State are exempt from appropriation when on
neutral vessels, has been pointed out above, [p] 177, p. 220, note 2.]

[Footnote 598: See above, [p] 191, and below, [p] 411.]

[Footnote 599: That a subject of a neutral State who tries to break a
blockade, or carries contraband to the enemy, or renders the enemy
unneutral service, violates injunctions of the belligerents, but not
International Law, has been shown above in [p] 296; see also below,
[p][p] 383 and 398.]


II

NEUTRALS AND MILITARY OPERATIONS

  Vattel, III. [p][p] 105, 118-135--Hall, [p][p] 215, 219, 220,
  226--Westlake, II. pp. 179-183--Lawrence, [p][p] 229,
  234-240--Manning, pp. 225-227, 245-250--Twiss, II. [p][p] 217,
  218, 228--Halleck, II. pp. 146, 165, 172--Taylor, [p][p] 618, 620,
  632, 635--Walker, [p][p] 55, 57, 59-61--Wharton, III. [p][p]
  397-400--Moore, VII. [p][p] 1293-1303--Wheaton, [p][p]
  426-429--Bluntschli, [p][p] 758, 759, 763, 765, 769-773--Heffter,
  [p][p] 146-150--Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp.
  657-676--Ullmann, [p] 191--Bonfils, Nos. 1449-1457, 1460, 1469,
  1470--Despagnet, Nos. 690-692--Rivier, II. pp. 395-408--Calvo, IV.
  [p][p] 2644-2664, 2683--Fiore, III. Nos. 1546-1550, 1574-1575,
  1582-1584--Martens, II. [p][p] 131-134--Kleen, I. [p][p] 70-75,
  116-122--Merignhac, pp. 352-380--Pillet, pp. 284-289--Perels, [p]
  39--Testa, pp. 173-180--Heilborn, _Rechte_, pp. 4-12--Dupuis, Nos.
  308-310, 315-317, and _Guerre_, Nos. 277-294--_Land Warfare_,
  [p][p] 465-471.

[Sidenote: Hostilities by and against Neutrals.]

[p] 320. The duty of impartiality incumbent upon a neutral must
obviously prevent him from committing hostilities against either
belligerent. This would need no mention were it not for the purpose of
distinction between hostilities on the one hand, and, on the other,
military or naval acts of force by a neutral for the purpose of
repulsing violations of his neutrality committed by either belligerent.
Hostilities of a neutral are acts of force performed for the purpose of
attacking a belligerent. They are acts of war, and they create a
condition of war between such neutral and the belligerent concerned.
If, however, a neutral does not attack a belligerent, but only repulses
him by force when he violates or attempts to violate the neutrality of
the neutral, such repulse does not comprise hostilities. Thus, if
men-of-war of a belligerent attack an enemy vessel in a neutral port and
are repulsed by neutral men-of-war, or if belligerent forces try to make
their way through neutral territory and are forcibly prevented by
neutral troops, no hostilities have been committed by the neutral, who
has done nothing else than fulfil his duty of impartiality. Article 10
of Convention V. enacts categorically that "the fact of a neutral Power
repelling, even by force, attacks on its neutrality, cannot be
considered as a hostile act." And stress must be laid on the fact that
it is no longer legitimate for a belligerent to pursue[600] military or
naval forces who take refuge on neutral territory; should, nevertheless,
a belligerent do this, he must, if possible, be repulsed by the neutral.

[Footnote 600: See above, [p] 288, p. 352, and below, [p] 347 (4), p.
422.]

It is, on the other hand, likewise obvious that hostilities against a
neutral on the part of either belligerent are acts of war, and not mere
violations of neutrality. If, however, belligerent forces attack enemy
forces which have taken refuge on neutral territory or which are there
for other purposes, such acts are not hostilities against the neutral,
but mere violations of neutrality which must be repulsed or for which
reparation must be made, as the case may be.

Quite a peculiar condition arose at the outbreak of and during the
Russo-Japanese War. The ends for which Japan went to war were the
expulsion of the Russian forces from the Chinese Province of Manchuria
and the liberation of Korea, which was at the time an independent State,
from the influence of Russia. Manchuria and Korea became therefore the
theatre of war, although both were neutral territories and although
neither China nor Korea became parties to the war. The hostilities which
occurred on these neutral territories were in no wise directed against
the neutrals concerned. This anomalous condition of matters arose out of
the inability of both China and Korea to free themselves from Russian
occupation and influence. And Japan considered her action, which must be
classified as an intervention, justified on account of her vital
interests. The Powers recognised this anomalous condition by influencing
China not to take part in the war, and by influencing the belligerents
not to extend military operations beyond the borders of Manchuria.
Manchuria and Korea having become the theatre of war,[601] the
hostilities committed there by the belligerents against one another
cannot be classified as a violation of neutrality. The case of the
_Variag_ and the _Korietz_ on the one hand, and, on the other, the case
of the _Reshitelni_, may illustrate the peculiar condition of affairs:--

(1) On February 8, 1904, a Japanese squadron under Admiral Uriu entered
the Korean harbour of Chemulpo and disembarked Japanese troops. The next
morning Admiral Uriu requested the commanders of two Russian ships in
the harbour of Chemulpo, the _Variag_ and the _Korietz_, to leave the
harbour and engage him in battle outside, threatening attack inside the
harbour in case they would not comply with his request. But the Russian
ships did comply, and the battle took place outside the harbour, but
within Korean territorial waters.[602] The complaint made by Russia,
that in this case the Japanese violated Korean neutrality, would seem to
be unjustified, since Korea fell within the region and the theatre of
war.

(2) The Russian destroyer _Reshitelni_, one of the vessels that escaped
from Port Arthur on August 10, 1904, took refuge in the Chinese harbour
of Chifu. On August 12, two Japanese destroyers entered the harbour,
captured the _Reshitelni_, and towed her away.[603] There ought to be no
doubt that this act of the Japanese comprises a violation of
neutrality,[604] since Chifu does not belong to the part of China which
fell within the region of war.

[Footnote 601: See above, [p] 71, p. 87; Lawrence, _War_, pp. 268-294;
Ariga, [p][p] 16-22.]

[Footnote 602: See Lawrence, _War_, pp. 279-289, and Takahashi, pp.
462-466.]

[Footnote 603: See Lawrence, _War_, pp. 291-294, and Takahashi, pp.
437-444.]

[Footnote 604: See below, [p] 361, where the case of the _General
Armstrong_ is discussed.]

[Sidenote: Furnishing Troops and Men-of-War to Belligerents.]

[p] 321. If a State remains neutral, it violates its impartiality by
furnishing a belligerent with troops or men-of-war. And it matters not
whether a neutral renders such assistance to one of the belligerents or
to both alike. Whereas Convention V. does not mention the furnishing of
troops to belligerents on the part of neutrals, article 6 of Convention
XIII. enacts that "the supply, in any manner, directly or indirectly, by
a neutral Power to a belligerent Power, of warships, ammunition, or war
material of any kind whatever, is forbidden."

However, the question is controversial as to whether a neutral State,
which in time of peace concluded a treaty with one of the belligerents
to furnish him in case of war with a limited number of troops, would
violate its neutrality by fulfilling its treaty obligation. Several
writers[605] have answered the question in the negative, and there is no
doubt that during the eighteenth century such cases happened. But no
case happened during the nineteenth century, and there ought to be no
doubt that nowadays the answer must be in the affirmative, since a
qualified neutrality[606] is no longer admissible.

[Footnote 605: See, for instance, Bluntschli, [p] 759, and Heffter, [p]
144. See above, [p] 306 (2), where the case is quoted of Denmark
furnishing troops to Russia in 1788 during a Russo-Swedish war.]

[Footnote 606: See above, [p] 305.]

As regards furnishing men-of-war to belligerents, the question arose
during the Russo-Japanese War as to whether a neutral violates his duty
of impartiality by not preventing his national steamship companies from
selling to a belligerent such of their liners as are destined in case of
war to be incorporated as cruisers in the national navy. The question
was discussed on account of the sale to Russia of the _Augusta Victoria_
and the _Kaiserin Maria Theresia_ by the North German Lloyd, and the
_Fuerst Bismarck_ and the _Columbia_ by the Hamburg-American Line,
vessels which were at once enrolled in the Russian Navy as second-class
cruisers, re-named as the _Kuban_, _Ural_, _Don_, and _Terek_. Had these
vessels, according to an arrangement with the German Government, really
been auxiliary cruisers to the German Navy, and had the German
Government given its consent to the transaction, a violation of
neutrality would have been committed by Germany. But the German Press
maintained that these vessels had not been auxiliary cruisers to the
Navy, and Japan did not lodge a protest with Germany on account of the
sale. If these liners were not auxiliary cruisers to the German Navy,
their sale to Russia was a legitimate sale of articles of
contraband.[607]

[Footnote 607: See below, [p] 397.]

[Sidenote: Subjects of Neutrals fighting among Belligerent Forces.]

[p] 322. Although several States, as Great Britain[608] and the United
States of America, by their Municipal Law prohibit their subjects from
enlisting in the military or naval service of belligerents, the duty of
impartiality incumbent upon neutrals does not at present include any
necessity for such prohibition, provided the individuals concerned cross
the frontier singly[609] and not in a body. But a neutral must recall
his military and naval officers who may have been serving in the army or
navy of either belligerent before the outbreak of war. A neutral must,
further, retain military and naval officers who want to resign their
commissions for the obvious purpose of enlisting in the service of
either belligerent. Therefore, when in 1877, during war between Turkey
and Servia, Russian officers left the Russian and entered the Servian
Army as volunteers with permission of the Russian Government, there was
a violation of the duty of impartiality on the part of neutral Russia.

[Footnote 608: See Section 4 of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870.]

[Footnote 609: See article 6 of Convention V.]

On the other hand, there is no violation of neutrality in a neutral
allowing surgeons and such other non-combatant members of his army as
are vested with a character of inviolability according to the Geneva
Convention to enlist or to remain in the service of either belligerent.

[Sidenote: Passage of Troops and War Material through Neutral
Territory.]

[p] 323. In contradistinction to the practice of the eighteenth
century,[610] it is now generally recognised that a violation of the
duty of impartiality is involved when a neutral allows a belligerent the
passage of troops or the transport of war material over his
territory.[611] And it matters not whether a neutral gives such
permission to one of the belligerents only, or to both alike. The
practice of the eighteenth century was a necessity, since many German
States consisted of parts distant one from another, so that their troops
had to pass through other Sovereigns' territories for the purpose of
reaching outlying parts. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the
passing of belligerent troops through neutral territory still occurred.
Prussia, although she at first repeatedly refused it, at last entered in
1805 into a secret convention with Russia granting Russian troops
passage through Silesia during war with France. On the other hand, even
before Russia had made use of this permission, Napoleon ordered
Bernadotte to march French troops through the then Prussian territory
of Anspach without even asking the consent of Prussia. In spite of the
protest of the Swiss Government, Austrian troops passed through Swiss
territory in 1813, and when in 1815 war broke out again through the
escape of Napoleon from the Island of Elba and his return to France,
Switzerland granted to the allied troops passage through her
territory.[612] But since that time it has become universally recognised
that all passage of belligerent troops through neutral territory must be
prohibited, and the Powers declared _expressis verbis_ in the Act of
November 20, 1815, which neutralised Switzerland, and was signed at
Paris,[613] that "no inference unfavourable to the neutrality and
inviolability of Switzerland can and must be drawn from the facts which
have caused the passage of the allied troops through a part of the
territory of the Swiss Confederation." The few instances[614] in which
during the nineteenth century States pretended to remain neutral, but
nevertheless allowed the troops of one of the belligerents passage
through their territory, led to war between the neutral and the other
belligerent.

[Footnote 610: See Vattel, III. [p][p] 119-132.]

[Footnote 611: See Dumas in _R.G._ XVI. (1909), pp. 289-316.]

[Footnote 612: See Wheaton, [p][p] 418-420.]

[Footnote 613: See Martens, _N.R._ II. p. 741.]

[Footnote 614: See Heilborn, _Rechte_, pp. 8-9.]

[Sidenote: Passage of Wounded through Neutral Territory.]

However, just as in the case of furnishing troops so in the case of
passage, it is a moot point whether passage of troops can be granted
without thereby violating the duty of impartiality incumbent upon a
neutral, in case a neutral is required to grant it in consequence of an
existing State-servitude or of a treaty previous to the war. There ought
to be no doubt that, since nowadays a qualified neutrality is no longer
admissible, the question must be answered in the negative.[615]

[Footnote 615: See above, [p][p] 305 and 306, and also above, vol. I.
[p] 207. Clauss, _Die Lehre von den Staatsdienstbarkeiten_ (1894), pp.
212-217, must likewise be referred to. See also Dumas in _R.G._ XVI.
(1909), pp. 286-316.]

[p] 324. The passage of wounded soldiers is different from that of
troops. If a neutral allows the passage of wounded soldiers, he
certainly does not render direct assistance to the belligerent
concerned. But it may well be that indirectly it is of assistance on
account of the fact that a belligerent, thereby relieved from transport
of his wounded, can now use the lines of communication for the transport
of troops, war material, and provisions. Thus, when in 1870 after the
battles of Sedan and Metz, Germany applied to Belgium and Luxemburg to
allow her wounded to be sent through their territories, France protested
on the ground that the relief thereby created to the lines of
communication in the hands of the Germans would be an assistance to the
military operations of the German Army. Belgium, on the advice of Great
Britain, did not grant the request made by Germany, but Luxemburg
granted it.[616]

[Footnote 616: See Hall, [p] 219, and Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. p.
664.]

According to article 14 of Convention V. a neutral Power _may_ grant the
passage of wounded or sick to a belligerent. If he does grant it, the
trains bringing them must carry neither combatants nor war material, and
those of the wounded and sick who belong to the army of the other
belligerent must remain on the neutral territory concerned, must there
be guarded by the neutral Government, and must, after having recovered,
be prevented from returning to their home State and rejoining their
corps. By the stipulation of article 14 it is left to the consideration
of a neutral whether or no he will allow the passage of wounded and sick
to a belligerent; he will, therefore, have to investigate every case and
come to a conclusion according to its merits. It should be stated that,
according to article 15 of Convention V., the "Geneva Convention applies
to the sick and wounded interned in neutral territory."

[Sidenote: Passage of Men-of-War.]

[p] 325. In contradistinction to passage of troops through his
territory, the duty of impartiality incumbent upon a neutral does not
require him to forbid the passage of belligerent men-of-war through the
maritime belt forming part of his territorial waters. Article 10 of
Convention XIII. categorically enacts that "the neutrality of a Power is
not violated (_n'est pas compromise_) by the mere passage of belligerent
men-of-war and their prizes." Since, as stated above in Vol. I. [p] 188,
every littoral State may even in time of peace prohibit the passage of
foreign men-of-war through its maritime belt provided such belt does not
form a part of the highways for international traffic, it may certainly
prohibit the passage of belligerent men-of-war in time of war. However,
no duty exists for a neutral to prohibit such passage in time of war,
and he need not exclude belligerent men-of-war from his ports either,
although he may do this likewise. The reason is that such passage and
such admittance into ports contain very little assistance indeed, and
are justified by the character of the sea as an international high road.
But it is, on the other hand, obvious that belligerent men-of-war must
not commit any hostilities against enemy vessels during their passage,
and must not use the neutral maritime belt and neutral ports as a basis
for their operations against the enemy.[617]

[Footnote 617: See below, [p] 333.]

[Sidenote: Occupation of Neutral Territory by Belligerents.]

[p] 326. In contradistinction to the practice of the eighteenth
century,[618] the duty of impartiality must nowadays prevent a neutral
from permitting belligerents to occupy a neutral fortress or any other
part of neutral territory. If a treaty previously entered into
stipulates such occupation, it cannot be granted without violation of
neutrality.[619] On the contrary, the neutral must even use force to
prevent belligerents from occupying any part of his neutral territory.
The question as to whether such occupation on the part of a belligerent
would be excusable in case of extreme necessity on account of the
neutral's inability to prevent the other belligerent from making use of
the neutral territory as a base for his military operations must, I
think, be answered in the affirmative, since an extreme case of
necessity in the interest of self-preservation must be considered as an
excuse.[620]

[Footnote 618: See Kleen, I. [p] 116.]

[Footnote 619: See Klueber, [p] 281, who asserts the contrary.]

[Footnote 620: See Vattel, III. [p] 122; Bluntschli, [p] 782; Calvo, IV.
[p] 2642. Kleen, I. [p] 116, seems not to recognise an extreme necessity
of the kind mentioned above as an excuse.--There is a difference between
this case and the case which arose at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese
War, when both belligerents invaded Korea, for, as was explained above
in [p] 320, Korea and Manchuria fell within the region and the theatre
of war.]

[Sidenote: Prize Courts on Neutral Territory.]

[p] 327. It has long been universally recognised that the duty of
impartiality must prevent a neutral from permitting a belligerent to set
up Prize Courts on neutral territory. The intention of a belligerent in
setting up a court on neutral territory can only be to facilitate the
plundering by his men-of-war of the commerce of the enemy. A neutral
tolerating such Prize Courts would, therefore, indirectly assist the
belligerent in his naval operations. During the eighteenth century it
was not considered illegitimate on the part of neutrals to allow the
setting up of Prize Courts on their territory. The _Reglement du Roi de
France concernant les prises qui seront conduites dans les ports
etrangers, et des formalites que doivent remplir les Consuls de S.M. qui
y sont etablis_ of 1779, furnishes a striking proof of it. But since in
1793 the United States of America disorganised the French Prize Courts
set up by the French envoy Genet on her territory,[621] it became
recognised that such Prize Courts are inconsistent with the duty of
impartiality incumbent upon a neutral, and article 4 of Convention XIII.
enacts this formerly customary rule.

[Footnote 621: See above, [p] 291 (1.)]

[Sidenote: Belligerent's Prizes in Neutral Ports.]

[p] 328. It would, no doubt, be an indirect assistance to the naval
operations of a belligerent if a neutral allowed him to organise on
neutral territory the safekeeping of prizes or their sale.

But the case of a temporary stay of a belligerent man-of-war with her
prize in a neutral port is different. Neutral Powers may--although most
maritime States no longer do it--allow prizes to be brought temporarily
into their ports. Articles 21 and 22 of Convention XIII. lay down the
following rules in the matter: A prize may only be brought into a
neutral port on account of unseaworthiness, stress of weather, or want
of fuel or provisions; it must leave as soon as the circumstances which
justified its entry are at an end, and if it does not, the neutral Power
must order it to leave at once and must, in case of disobedience, employ
the means at disposal to release the prize with its officers and crew,
and to intern the prize-crew; a prize brought into a neutral port for
reasons other than unseaworthiness, stress of weather, or want of fuel
or provisions, must forthwith be released by the respective neutral
Power.

The question requires attention as to whether a prize whose
unseaworthiness is so great that it cannot be repaired, may be allowed
to remain in the neutral port and be there sold[622] after the competent
Prize Court has condemned it. Since article 21 enacts that an admitted
prize must leave the neutral port as soon as the circumstances which
justified its entry are at an end, there is no doubt that it may remain
if it cannot by repair be made seaworthy. And there ought, consequently,
to be no objection to its sale in the neutral port, provided it has
previously been condemned by the proper Prize Court.

[Footnote 622: See Kleen, vol. I. [p] 115.]

While the stipulation of article 21 cannot meet with any objection, the
stipulation of article 23 of Convention XIII. is of a very doubtful
character. This article enacts that a neutral Power may allow prizes to
enter its ports, whether under convoy or not, when they are brought
there to be sequestrated pending the decision of a Prize Court. And it
is of importance to state the fact that the restriction of article 21
does not apply to prizes brought into a neutral port under the rule of
article 23. This rule actually enables a belligerent to safeguard all
his prizes against recapture, and a neutral Power which allows
belligerent prizes access to its ports under the rule of article 23
would indirectly render assistance to the naval operations of the
belligerent concerned. For this reason, Great Britain as well as Japan
and Siam entered a reservation against article 23. Be that as it may,
those Powers which have accepted article 23 will not, I believe, object
to the sale in the neutral port concerned of such sequestrated prizes,
provided they have previously been condemned by the proper Prize Court.


III

NEUTRALS AND MILITARY PREPARATIONS

  Hall, [p][p] 217-218, 221-225--Lawrence, [p][p] 234-240--Westlake,
  II. pp. 181-198--Manning, pp. 227-244--Phillimore, III. [p][p]
  142-151B--Twiss, II. [p][p] 223-225--Halleck, II. pp.
  152-163--Taylor, [p][p] 616, 619, 626-628--Walker, [p][p]
  62-66--Wharton, III. [p][p] 392, 395-396--Wheaton, [p][p]
  436-439--Moore, VII. [p][p] 1293-1305--Heffter, [p][p]
  148-150--Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 658-660,
  676-684--Ullmann, [p] 191--Bonfils, Nos. 1458-1459,
  1464-1466--Despagnet, Nos. 692-693--Rivier, II. pp.
  395-408--Calvo, IV. [p][p] 2619-2627--Fiore, III. Nos.
  1551-1570--Kleen, I. [p][p] 76-89, 114--Merignhac, pp.
  358-360--Pillet, pp. 288-290--Dupuis, Nos. 322-331, and _Guerre_,
  Nos. 290-294--_Land Warfare_, [p][p] 472-476.

[Sidenote: Depots and Factories on Neutral Territory.]

[p] 329. Although according to the present intense conception of the
duty of impartiality neutrals need not[623] prohibit their subjects from
supplying belligerents with arms and the like in the ordinary way of
trade, a neutral must[624] prohibit belligerents from erecting and
maintaining on his territory depots and factories of arms, ammunition,
and military provisions. However, belligerents can easily evade this by
not keeping depots and factories, but contracting with subjects of the
neutral concerned in the ordinary way of trade for any amount of arms,
ammunition, and provisions.[625]

[Footnote 623: See below, [p] 350.]

[Footnote 624: See Bluntschli, [p] 777, and Kleen, I. [p] 114.]

[Footnote 625: The distinction made by some writers between an
occasional supply on the one hand, and, on the other, an organised
supply in large proportions by subjects of neutrals, and the assertion
that the latter must be prohibited by the neutral concerned, is not
justified. See below, [p] 350.]

[Sidenote: Levy of Troops, and the like.]

[p] 330. In former centuries neutrals were not required to prevent
belligerents from levying troops on their neutral territories, and a
neutral often used to levy troops himself on his territory for
belligerents without thereby violating his duty of impartiality as
understood in those times. In this way the Swiss Confederation
frequently used to furnish belligerents, and often both parties, with
thousands of recruits, although she herself always remained neutral. But
at the end of the eighteenth century a movement was started which tended
to change this practice. In 1793 the United States of America
interdicted the levy of troops on her territory for belligerents, and
by-and-by many other States followed the example. During the nineteenth
century the majority of writers maintained that the duty of impartiality
must prevent a neutral from allowing the levy of troops. The few[626]
writers who differed made it a condition that a neutral, if he allowed
such levy at all, must allow it to both belligerents alike. The
controversy is now finally settled, for articles 4 and 5 of Convention
V. lay down the rules that corps of combatants may not be formed, nor
recruiting offices opened, on the territory of a neutral Power, and that
neutral Powers must not allow these acts.

[Footnote 626: See, for instance, Twiss, II. [p] 225, and Bluntschli,
[p] 762.]

The duty of impartiality must likewise prevent a neutral from allowing
a belligerent man-of-war reduced in her crew to enrol sailors in his
ports, with the exception of such few men as are absolutely necessary to
navigate the vessel to the nearest home port.[627]

[Footnote 627: See article 18 of Convention XIII. and below, [p] 333
(3), and [p] 346.]

A pendant to the levy of troops on neutral territory was the granting of
Letters of Marque to vessels belonging to the merchant marine of
neutrals. Since privateering has practically disappeared, the question
as to whether neutrals must prohibit their subjects from accepting
Letters of Marque from a belligerent,[628] need not be discussed.

[Footnote 628: See above, [p] 83. With the assertion of many writers
that a subject of a neutral who accepts Letters of Marque from a
belligerent may be treated as a pirate, I cannot agree. See above, vol.
I. [p] 273.]

[Sidenote: Passage of Bodies of Men intending to Enlist.]

[p] 331. A neutral is not obliged by his duty of impartiality to
interdict passage through his territory to men either singly or in
numbers who intend to enlist. Thus in 1870 Switzerland did not object to
Frenchmen travelling through Geneva for the purpose of reaching French
corps or to Germans travelling through Basle for the purpose of reaching
German corps, under the condition, however, that these men travelled
without arms and uniform. On the other hand, when France during the
Franco-German War organised an office[629] in Basle for the purpose of
sending bodies of Alsatian volunteers through Switzerland to the South
of France, Switzerland correctly prohibited this on account of the fact
that this _official_ organisation of the passage of whole bodies of
volunteers through her neutral territory was more or less equal to a
passage of troops.

[Footnote 629: See Bluntschli, [p] 770.]

The Second Peace Conference has sanctioned this distinction, for article
6 of Convention V. enacts that "the responsibility of a neutral Power is
not involved by the mere fact that persons cross the frontier
individually (_isolement_) in order to offer their services to one of
the belligerents." An _argumentum e contrario_ justifies the conclusion
that the responsibility of a neutral _is_ involved in case it does allow
men to cross the frontier in a body in order to enlist in the forces of
a belligerent.

[Sidenote: Organisation of Hostile Expeditions.]

[p] 332. If the levy and passage of troops, and the forming of corps of
combatants, must be prevented by a neutral, he is all the more required
to prevent the organisation of a hostile expedition from his territory
against either belligerent. Such organisation takes place when a band of
men combine under a commander for the purpose of starting from the
neutral territory and joining the belligerent forces. The case, however,
is different, if a number of individuals, not organised into a body
under a commander, start in company from a neutral State for the purpose
of enlisting with one of the belligerents. Thus in 1870, during the
Franco-German War, 1200 Frenchmen started from New York in two French
steamers for the purpose of joining the French Army. Although the
vessels carried also 96,000 rifles and 11,000,000 cartridges, the United
States did not interfere, since the men were not organised in a body,
and since, on the other hand, the arms and ammunition were carried in
the way of ordinary commerce.[630]

[Footnote 630: See Hall, [p] 222.]

[Sidenote: Use of Neutral Territory as Base of Naval Operations.]

[p] 333. Although a neutral is not required by his duty of impartiality
to prohibit[631] the passage of belligerent men of-war through his
maritime belt, or the temporary stay of such vessels in his ports, it is
universally recognised that he must not allow admitted vessels to make
the neutral maritime belt and neutral ports the base of their naval
operations against the enemy. And article 5 of Convention XIII. enacts
that "belligerents are forbidden to use neutral ports and waters as a
base of naval operations against their adversaries." The following rules
may be formulated as emanating from the principle:--

(1) A neutral must, so far as is in his power, prevent belligerent
men-of-war from cruising within his portion of the maritime belt for the
purpose of capturing enemy vessels as soon as they leave this belt. It
must, however, be specially observed that a neutral is not required to
prevent this beyond his power. It is absolutely impossible to prevent
such cruising under all circumstances and conditions, especially in the
case of neutrals who own possessions in distant parts of the globe. How
many thousands of vessels would be necessary, if Great Britain, for
instance, were unconditionally obliged to prevent such cruising in every
portion of the maritime belt of all her numerous possessions scattered
over all parts of the globe?

(2) A neutral must prevent a belligerent man-of-war from leaving a
neutral port at the same time as an enemy man-of-war or an enemy
merchantman, or must make other arrangements which prevent an attack so
soon as both reach the Open Sea.[632] Article 16 of Convention XIII.
enacts that there must be an interval of at least twenty-four hours
between the departure of a belligerent warship and a ship of the other
belligerent.

(3) A neutral must prevent a belligerent man-of-war, whose crew is
reduced from any cause whatever, from enrolling sailors in his neutral
ports, with the exception of such few hands as are necessary for the
purpose of safely navigating the vessel to the nearest port of her home
State.[633]

(4) A neutral must prevent belligerent men-of-war admitted to his ports
or maritime belt from taking in such a quantity of provisions and coal
as would enable them to continue their naval operations, for otherwise
he would make it possible for them to cruise on the Open Sea near his
maritime belt for the purpose of attacking enemy vessels.

There is, however, no unanimity of the Powers concerning the quantity of
provisions and coal which belligerent men-of-war may be allowed to take
in. Articles 19 and 20 of Convention XIII. of the Second Peace
Conference enact the following:--

Article 19: "Belligerent war-ships may only revictual in neutral ports
or roadsteads to bring up their supplies to the peace standard.
Similarly these vessels may only ship sufficient fuel to enable them to
reach the nearest port in their own country. They may, on the other
hand, fill up their bunkers built to carry fuel, when in neutral
countries which have adopted this method of determining the amount of
fuel to be supplied. If in accordance with the law of the neutral Power,
the ships are not supplied with coal within twenty-four hours of their
arrival, the duration of their permitted stay is extended by twenty-four
hours."

Article 20: "Belligerent war-ships which have shipped fuel in a port
belonging to a neutral Power may not within the succeeding three months
replenish their supply in a port of the same Power."

Great Britain, Japan, and Siam, while they have accepted article
20,[634] have entered a reservation against article 19. Great Britain
upholds her rule that belligerent warships shall not be allowed to take
in more provisions and fuel in neutral ports than is necessary to bring
them safely to the nearest port of their own country.

While, therefore, the matter is not settled, it is agreed that it makes
no difference whether the man-of-war concerned intends to buy provisions
and coal on land or to take them in from transport vessels which
accompany or meet her in neutral waters.

(5) A neutral must prevent belligerent men-of-war admitted into his
ports or maritime belt from replenishing with ammunition and armaments,
and from adding to their armaments, as otherwise he would indirectly
assist them in preparing for hostilities (article 18 of Convention
XIII.). And it makes no difference whether the ammunition and armaments
are to come from the shore or are to be taken in from transport vessels.

Similarly a neutral must prevent belligerent men-of-war in his ports and
roadsteads from carrying out such repairs as would add in any manner
whatever to their fighting force. The local authorities of the neutral
Power must decide what repairs are absolutely necessary to make these
vessels seaworthy, and such repairs are allowed, but they must be
carried out with the least possible delay (article 17 of Convention
XIII.).

(6) A neutral must prevent belligerent men-of-war admitted into his
ports from remaining there longer than is necessary for ordinary and
legitimate purposes.[635] It cannot be said that the rule adopted in
1862 by Great Britain, and followed by some other maritime States, not
to allow a longer stay than twenty-four hours, is a rule of
International Law. It is left to the consideration of neutrals to adopt
by their Municipal Law any rule they think fit so long as the admitted
men-of-war do not prolong their stay for any other than ordinary and
legitimate purposes. Article 12 of Convention XIII. prescribes the
twenty-four hours rule only for those neutral countries which have not
special provisions to the contrary in their Municipal Laws.[636] But it
is agreed--and article 14 of Convention XIII. enacts it--that
belligerent men-of-war, except those exclusively for the time devoted to
religious, scientific, or philanthropic purposes, must not prolong their
stay in neutral ports and waters beyond the time permitted, except on
account of damage or stress of weather. A neutral would certainly
violate his duty of impartiality if he were to allow belligerent
men-of-war to winter in his ports or to stay there for the purpose of
waiting for other vessels of the fleet or transports.

The rule that a neutral must prevent belligerent men-of-war from staying
too long in his ports or waters, became of considerable importance
during the Russo-Japanese War, when the Russian Baltic Fleet was on its
way to the Far East. Admiral Rojdestvensky is said to have stayed in the
French territorial waters of Madagascar from December 1904 till March
1905, for the purpose of awaiting there a part of the Baltic Fleet that
had set out at a later date. The Press likewise reported a prolonged
stay by parts of the Baltic Fleet during April 1905 at Kamranh Bay and
Hon-kohe Bay in French Indo-China. Provided the reported facts be true,
France would seem to have violated her duty of impartiality by not
preventing such an abuse of her neutral ports.

(7) A neutral must prevent more than three men-of-war belonging to the
same belligerent from being simultaneously in one of his ports or
roadsteads unless his Municipal Law provides the contrary (article 15 of
Convention XIII.).

(8) At the outbreak of war a neutral must warn all belligerent
men-of-war which were in his ports or roadsteads or in his territorial
waters before the outbreak of war, to depart within twenty-four hours or
within such time as the local law prescribes (article 13[637] of
Convention XIII.).

[Footnote 631: See Curtius, _Des navires de guerre dans les eaux
neutres_ (1907).]

[Footnote 632: See below, [p] 347 (1).]

[Footnote 633: See article 18 of Convention XIII. and above, [p] 330.]

[Footnote 634: But Germany has entered a reservation against article
20.]

[Footnote 635: See below, [p] 347.]

[Footnote 636: Germany, Domingo, Siam, and Persia have entered a
reservation against article 12.]

[Footnote 637: Germany has entered a reservation against article 13.]

[Sidenote: Building and Fitting-out of Vessels intended for Naval
Operations.]

[p] 334. Whereas a neutral is in no[638] wise obliged by his duty of
impartiality to prevent his subjects from selling armed vessels to the
belligerents, such armed vessels being merely contraband of war, a
neutral is bound to employ the means at his disposal to prevent his
subjects from building, fitting out, or arming, to the order of either
belligerent, vessels intended to be used as men-of-war, and to prevent
the departure from his jurisdiction of any vessel which, by order of
either belligerent, has been adapted to warlike use.[639] The difference
between selling armed vessels to belligerents, on the one hand, and
building them to order, on the other hand, is usually defined in the
following way:--

An armed ship, being contraband of war, is in no wise different from
other kinds of contraband, provided she is not manned in a neutral port
so that she can commit hostilities at once after having reached the Open
Sea. A subject of a neutral who builds an armed ship or arms a
merchantman, not to order of a belligerent but intending to sell her to
a belligerent, does not differ from a manufacturer of arms who intends
to sell them to a belligerent. There is nothing to prevent a neutral
from allowing his subjects to sell armed vessels, and to deliver them to
belligerents, either in a neutral port or in a port of the belligerent.
In the case of the _La Santissima Trinidad_[640] (1822), as in that of
the _Meteor_[641] (1866), American courts have recognised this.[642]

[Footnote 638: See below, [p][p] 350 and 397.]

[Footnote 639: See article 8 of Convention XIII.]

[Footnote 640: 7 Wheaton, [p] 340.]

[Footnote 641: See Wharton, III. [p] 396, p. 561.]

[Footnote 642: See Phillimore, III. [p] 151B, and Hall, [p] 224.]

On the other hand, if a subject of a neutral builds armed ships to order
of a belligerent, he prepares the means of naval operations, since the
ships on sailing outside the territorial waters of the neutral and
taking in a crew and ammunition can at once commit hostilities. Thus,
through carrying out the order of the belligerent, the neutral territory
concerned has been made the base of naval operations. And as the duty
of impartiality includes the obligation of the neutral to prevent either
belligerent from making neutral territory the base of military or naval
operations, a neutral violates his neutrality by not preventing his
subjects from carrying out an order of a belligerent for the building
and fitting out of men-of-war.

This distinction, although of course logically correct, is
hair-splitting. It only shows that neutral States ought[643] to be
required to prevent their subjects from supplying arms, ammunition, and
the like, to belligerents. But so long as this progress is not made, the
above distinction will probably continue to be drawn, in spite of its
hair-splitting character.

[Footnote 643: See below, [p] 350.]

[Sidenote: The _Alabama_ Case and the Three Rules of Washington.]

[p] 335. The movement for recognition of the fact that the duty of
impartiality requires a neutral to prevent his subjects from building
and fitting out to order of belligerents vessels intended for naval
operations, began with the famous case of the _Alabama_. It is not
necessary to go into all the details[644] of this case. It suffices to
say that in 1862, during the American Civil War, the attention of the
British Government was drawn by the Government of the United States to
the fact that a vessel for warlike purposes was built in England to
order of the insurgents. This vessel, afterwards called the _Alabama_,
left Liverpool in July 1862 unarmed, but was met at the Azores by three
other vessels, also coming from England, which supplied her with guns
and ammunition, so that she could at once begin to prey upon the
merchantmen of the United States. On the conclusion of the Civil War,
the United States claimed damages from Great Britain for the losses
sustained by her merchant marine through the operations of the
_Alabama_ and other vessels likewise built in England. Negotiations went
on for several years, and finally the parties entered, on May 8, 1871,
into the Treaty of Washington[645] for the purpose of having their
difference settled by arbitration, five arbitrators to be
nominated--Great Britain, the United States, Brazil, Italy, and
Switzerland, each choosing one. The treaty contained three rules, since
then known as "The Three Rules of Washington," to be binding upon the
arbitrators, namely:[646]--

"A neutral Government is bound--

"_Firstly._ To use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or
equipping within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has reasonable
ground to believe is intended to cruise or carry on war against a Power
with which it is at peace, and also to use like diligence to prevent the
departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or
carry on war as above, such vessel having been specially adapted in
whole or in part, within such jurisdiction, to warlike use.

"_Secondly._ Not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of
its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other,
or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies
or arms, or the recruitment of men.

"_Thirdly._ To exercise due diligence in its waters, and as to all
persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violations of the
foregoing obligations and duties."

[Footnote 644: See Mountague Bernard, _Neutrality of Great Britain
during the American Civil War_ (1870), pp. 338-496; Geffcken, _Die
Alabama Frage_ (1872); Pradier-Fodere, _La Question de l'Alabama_
(1872); Caleb Cushing, _Le Traite de Washington_ (1874); Bluntschli in
_R.I._ II. (1870), pp. 452-485; Balch, _L'Evolution de l'arbitrage
international_ (1908), pp. 43-70.]

[Footnote 645: Martens, _N.R.G._ XX. p. 698.]

[Footnote 646: See Moore, VII. [p] 1330.]

In consenting that these rules should be binding upon the arbitrators,
Great Britain expressly declared that, in spite of her consent, she
maintained that these rules were not recognised rules of International
Law at the time when the case of the _Alabama_ occurred, and the treaty
contains also the stipulation that the parties--

"Agree to observe these rules as between themselves in future, and to
bring them to the knowledge of other Maritime Powers, and to invite them
to accede to them."

The appointed arbitrators[647] met at Geneva in 1871, held thirty-two
conferences there, and gave decision[648] on September 14, 1872,
according to which England had to pay 15,500,000 dollars damages to the
United States.

[Footnote 647: See Moore, _Arbitrations_, I. pp. 495-682.]

[Footnote 648: The award is printed in full in Moore, _Arbitrations_, I.
pp. 653-659, and in Phillimore, III. [p] 151.]

The arbitrators put a construction upon the term _due diligence_[649]
and asserted other opinions in their decision which are very much
contested and to which Great Britain never consented. Thus, Great
Britain and the United States, although they agreed upon the three
rules, did not at all agree upon the interpretation thereof, and they
could, therefore, likewise not agree upon the contents of the
communication to other maritime States stipulated by the Treaty of
Washington. It ought not, therefore, to be said that the Three Rules of
Washington[650] have literally become universal rules of International
Law. Nevertheless, they were the starting-point of the movement for the
universal recognition of the fact that the duty of impartiality obliges
neutrals to prevent their subjects from building and fitting out, to
order of belligerents, vessels intended for warlike purposes, and to
prevent the departure from their jurisdiction of any vessel, which, by
order of a belligerent, has been adapted to warlike use. Particular
attention must be paid to the fact that, although article 8 of
Convention XIII. in other respects copies almost verbally the first of
the Three Rules of Washington, it differs from it in so far as it
replaces the words "to use due diligence" by "to employ the means at its
disposal." For this reason the construction put by the Geneva
arbitrators upon the term _due diligence_ cannot find application to the
rule of article 8, the employment of the means at the disposal of a
neutral to prevent the acts concerned being a mere question of fact.

[Footnote 649: See below, [p] 363.]

[Footnote 650: As regards the seven rules adopted by the Institute of
International Law, at its meeting at the Hague in 1875, as emanating
from the Three Rules of Washington, see _Annuaire_, I. (1877), p. 139.]


IV

NEUTRAL ASYLUM TO LAND FORCES AND WAR MATERIAL

  Vattel, III. [p][p] 132-133--Hall, [p][p] 226 and 230--Halleck, II. p.
  150--Taylor, [p] 621--Wharton, III. [p] 394--Moore, VII. [p][p]
  1314-1318--Bluntschli, [p][p] 774, 776-776A, 785--Heffter, [p]
  149--Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 662-665--Ullmann, [p]
  191--Bonfils, Nos. 1461-1462--Rivier, II. pp. 395-398--Calvo, IV.
  [p][p] 2668-2669--Fiore, III. Nos. 1576, 1582, 1583--Martens, II. [p]
  133--Merignhac, pp. 370-376--Pillet, pp. 286-287--Kleen, II. [p][p]
  151-157--Holland, War, Nos. 131-133--Zorn, pp. 316-352--Heilborn,
  _Rechte und Pflichten der neutralen Staaten in Bezug auf die
  waehrend des Krieges auf ihr Gebiet uebertretenden Angehoerigen einer
  Armee und das dorthingebrachte Kriegsmaterial der kriegfuehrenden
  Parteien_ (1888), pp. 12-83--Rolin-Jaequemyns in _R.I._ III.
  (1871), pp. 352-366--_Land Warfare_, [p][p] 485-501.

[Sidenote: On Neutral Asylum in general.]

[p] 336. Neutral territory, being outside the region of war,[651] offers
an asylum to members of belligerent forces, to the subjects of the
belligerents and their property, and to war material of the
belligerents. Since, according to the present rules of International
Law, the duty of either belligerent to treat neutrals according to their
impartiality must--the case of extreme necessity for self-preservation
excepted--prevent them from violating the territorial supremacy of
neutrals, enemy persons as well as enemy goods are perfectly safe on
neutral territory. It is true that neither belligerent has a right to
demand from a neutral[652] such asylum for his subjects, their property,
and his State property. But neither has he, on the other hand, any right
to demand that a neutral refuse such asylum to the enemy. The
territorial supremacy of the neutral enables him to use his discretion,
and either to grant or to refuse asylum. However, the duty of
impartiality incumbent upon him must induce a neutral granting asylum to
take all such measures as are necessary to prevent his territory from
being used as a base of hostile operations.

[Footnote 651: See above, [p][p] 70 and 71.]

[Footnote 652: The generally recognised usage for a neutral to grant
temporary hospitality in his ports to vessels in distress of either
belligerent is an exception to be discussed below in [p] 344.]

Now, neutral territory may be an asylum, first, for private enemy
property; secondly, for public enemy property, especially war material,
cash, and provisions; thirdly, for private subjects of the enemy;
fourthly, for enemy land forces; and, fifthly, for enemy naval forces.
Details, however, need only be given with regard to asylum to land
forces, war material, and naval forces. For with regard to private
property and private subjects it need only be mentioned that private war
material brought into neutral territory stands on the same footing as
public war material of a belligerent brought there, and, further, that
private enemy subjects are safe on neutral territory even if they are
claimed by a belligerent for the committal of war crimes.

Only asylum to land forces and war material will be discussed here in
[p][p] 337-341, asylum to naval forces being reserved for separate
discussion in [p][p] 342-348. As regards asylum to land forces, a
distinction must be made between (1) prisoners of war, (2) single
fugitive soldiers, and (3) troops or whole armies pursued by the enemy
and thereby induced to take refuge on neutral territory.

[Sidenote: Neutral Territory and Prisoners of War.]

[p] 337. Neutral territory is an asylum to prisoners of war of either
belligerent in so far as they become free _ipso facto_ by their coming
into neutral territory. And it matters not in which way they come there,
whether they escape from a place of detention and take refuge on neutral
territory, or whether they are brought as prisoners into such territory
by enemy troops who themselves take refuge there.[653]

[Footnote 653: The case of prisoners on board a belligerent man-of-war
which enters a neutral port is different; see below, [p] 345.]

The principle that prisoners of war regain their liberty by coming into
neutral territory has been generally recognised for centuries. An
illustration occurred in 1558, when several Turkish and Barbary captives
escaped from one of the galleys of the Spanish Armada which was wrecked
near Calais, and, although the Spanish Ambassador claimed them, France
considered them to be freed by the fact of their coming on her
territory, and sent them to Constantinople.[654] But has the neutral on
whose territory a prisoner has taken refuge the duty to retain such
fugitives and thereby prevent them from rejoining the enemy army?
Formerly this question was not settled. In 1870, during the
Franco-German War, Belgium answered the question in the affirmative, and
detained a French non-commissioned officer who had been a prisoner in
Germany and had escaped into Belgian territory with the intention of
rejoining at once the French forces. Whereas this case was
controversial,[655] all writers agreed that the case was different if
escaped prisoners wanted to remain on the neutral territory. As such
refugees might at any subsequent time wish to rejoin their forces, the
neutral was by his duty of impartiality considered to be obliged to take
adequate measures to prevent their so doing. There was likewise no
unanimity regarding prisoners brought into neutral territory by enemy
forces taking refuge there. It was agreed that such prisoners became
free by being brought into neutral territory; but whereas some
writers[656] maintained that they could not be detained in case they
intended at once to leave the neutral territory, others asserted that
they must always be detained and that they must comply with such
measures as the neutral considers necessary to prevent them from
rejoining their forces.

[Footnote 654: See Hall, [p] 226, p. 641, note 1.]

[Footnote 655: See Rolin-Jaequemyns in _R.I._ III. (1871), p. 556;
Bluntschli, [p] 776; Heilborn, _Rechte_, pp. 32-34.]

[Footnote 656: For instance, Heilborn, _Rechte_, pp. 51-52.]

Article 13 of Convention V. settles the controversy by enacting that a
neutral who receives prisoners of war who have escaped or who are
brought there by troops of the enemy taking refuge on neutral territory,
shall leave them at liberty, but that, if he allows them to remain on
his territory, he _may_--he need not!--assign them a place of residence
so as to prevent them from rejoining their forces. Since, therefore,
everything is left to the discretion of the neutral, he will have to
take into account the merits and needs of every case and to take such
steps as he thinks adequate. But so much is certain that a belligerent
may not in every case categorically demand from a neutral who receives
escaped prisoners, or such as have been brought there by troops who take
refuge, that he should detain them.

The case of prisoners who, with the consent of the neutral, are
transported through neutral territory is different. Such prisoners do
not become free on entering the neutral territory, but there is no doubt
that a neutral, by consenting to the transport, violates his duty of
impartiality, because such transport is equal to passage of troops
through neutral territory (article 2 of Convention V.).

Attention must, lastly, be drawn to the case where enemy soldiers are
amongst the wounded whom a belligerent is allowed by a neutral to
transport through neutral territory. Such wounded prisoners become
free, but they must, according to article 14 of Convention V., be
guarded by the neutral so as to insure their not again taking part in
military operations.[657]

[Footnote 657: See also article 15 of Convention X. and below, [p]
348_a_.]

[Sidenote: Fugitive Soldiers on Neutral Territory.]

[p] 338. A neutral may grant asylum to single soldiers of belligerents
who take refuge on his territory, although he need not do so, and may at
once send them back to the place they came from. If he grants such
asylum, his duty of impartiality obliges him to disarm the fugitives and
to take such measures as are necessary to prevent them from rejoining
their forces. But it must be emphasised that it is practically
impossible for a neutral to be so watchful as to detect every single
fugitive who enters his territory. It will always happen that such
fugitives steal into neutral territory and leave it again later on to
rejoin their forces without the neutral being responsible. And, before
he can incur responsibility for not doing so, a neutral must actually be
in a position to detain such fugitives. Thus Luxemburg, during the
Franco-German War, could not prevent hundreds of French soldiers, who,
after the capitulation of Metz, fled into her territory, from rejoining
the French forces; because, according to the condition[658] of her
neutralisation, she is not allowed to keep an army, and therefore, in
contradistinction to Switzerland and Belgium, was unable to mobilise
troops for the purpose of fulfilling her duty of impartiality.

[Footnote 658: See above, vol. I. [p] 100.]

[Sidenote: Neutral Territory and Fugitive Troops.]

[p] 339. On occasions during war large bodies of troops, or even a whole
army, are obliged to cross the neutral frontier for the purpose of
escaping captivity. A neutral need not permit this, and may repulse them
on the spot, but he may also grant asylum. It is, however, obvious that
the presence of such troops on neutral territory is a danger for the
other party. The duty of impartiality incumbent upon a neutral obliges
him, therefore, to disarm such troops at once, and to guard them so as
to insure their not again performing military acts against the enemy
during the war. Convention V. enacts the following rules:--

Article 11: "A neutral Power which receives in its territory troops
belonging to the belligerent armies shall detain them, if possible, at
some distance from the theatre of war. It may keep them in camps, and
even confine them in fortresses or localities assigned for the purpose.
It shall decide whether officers are to be left at liberty on giving
their parole that they will not leave the neutral territory without
authorisation."

Article 12: "In the absence of a special Convention, the neutral Power
shall supply the interned with the food, clothing, and relief which the
dictates of humanity prescribe. At the conclusion of peace, the expenses
caused by internment shall be made good."

It is usual for troops who are not actually pursued by the enemy--for if
pursued they have no time for it--to enter through their commander into
a convention with the representative of the neutral concerned,
stipulating the conditions upon which they cross the frontier and give
themselves into the custody of the neutral. Such conventions are valid
without needing ratification, provided they contain only such
stipulations as do not disagree with International Law and as concern
only the requirements of the case.

Stress must be laid on the fact that, although the detained troops are
not prisoners of war captured by the neutral, they are nevertheless in
his custody, and therefore under his disciplinary power, just as
prisoners of war are under the disciplinary power of the State which
keeps them in captivity. They do not enjoy the exterritoriality--see
above, Vol. I. [p] 445--due to armed forces abroad because they are
disarmed. As the neutral is required to prevent them from escaping, he
must apply stern measures, and he may punish severely every member of
the detained force who attempts to frustrate such measures or does not
comply with the disciplinary rules regarding order, sanitation, and the
like.

The most remarkable instance known in history is the asylum granted by
Switzerland during the Franco-German War to a French army of 85,000 men
with 10,000 horses which crossed the frontier on February 1, 1871.[659]
France had, after the conclusion of the war, to pay about eleven million
francs for the maintenance of this army in Switzerland during the rest
of the war.

[Footnote 659: See the Convention regarding this asylum between the
Swiss General Herzog and the French General Clinchant in Martens,
_N.R.G._ XIX. p. 639.]

[Sidenote: Neutral Territory and Non-combatant Members of Belligerent
Forces.]

[p] 340. The duty of impartiality incumbent upon a neutral obliges him
to detain in the same way as soldiers such non-combatant[660] members of
belligerent forces as cross his frontier. He may not, however, detain
army surgeons and other non-combatants who are privileged according to
article 2 of the Geneva Convention.

[Footnote 660: See Heilborn, _Rechte_, pp. 43-46. Convention V. does not
mention any rule concerning this matter.]

[Sidenote: Neutral Territory and War Material of Belligerents.]

[p] 341. It can happen during war that war material belonging to one of
the belligerents is brought into neutral territory for the purpose of
saving it from capture by the enemy. Such war material can be brought by
troops crossing the neutral frontier for the purpose of evading
captivity, or it can be purposely sent there by order of a commander.
Now, a neutral is by no means obliged to admit such material, just as he
is not obliged to admit soldiers of belligerents. But if he admits it,
his duty of impartiality obliges him to seize and retain it till after
the conclusion of peace. War material includes, besides arms,
ammunition, provisions, horses, means of military transport such as
carts and the like, and everything else that belongs to the equipment
of troops. But means of military transport belong to war material only
so far as they are the property of a belligerent. If they are hired or
requisitioned from private individuals, they may not be detained by the
neutral.

It can likewise happen during war that war material, originally the
property of one of the belligerents but seized and appropriated by the
enemy, is brought by the latter into neutral territory. Does such
material, through coming into neutral territory, become free, and must
it be restored to its original owner, or must it be retained by the
neutral and after the war be restored to the belligerent who brought it
into the neutral territory? In analogy with prisoners of war who become
free through being brought into neutral territory, it is maintained[661]
that such war material becomes free and must be restored to its original
owner. To this however, I cannot agree.[662] Since war material becomes
through seizure by the enemy his property and remains his property
unless the other party re-seizes and thereby re-appropriates it, there
is no reason for its reverting to its original owner upon transportation
into neutral territory.[663]

[Footnote 661: See Hall, [p] 226.]

[Footnote 662: See Heilborn, _Rechte_, p. 60, and _Land Warfare_, [p]
492. The Dutch Government at the Second Peace Conference proposed a rule
according to which captured war material brought by the captor into
neutral territory should be restored, after the war, to its original
owner, but--see _Deuxieme Conference, Actes_, vol. i. p. 145--this
proposal was not accepted.]

[Footnote 663: See Heilborn, _Rechte_, pp. 61-65, where the question is
discussed as to whether a neutral may claim a lien on war material
brought into his territory for expenses incurred for the maintenance of
detained troops belonging to the owner of the war material.]


V

NEUTRAL ASYLUM TO NAVAL FORCES

  Vattel, III. [p] 132--Hall, [p] 231--Twiss, II. [p] 222--Halleck,
  II. p. 151--Taylor, [p][p] 635, 636, 640--Wharton, III. [p]
  394--Wheaton, [p] 434--Moore, VII. [p][p] 1314-1318--Bluntschli,
  [p][p] 775-776B--Heffter, [p] 149--Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV.
  pp. 665-667, 674--Ullmann, [p] 191--Bonfils, No. 1463--Despagnet,
  No. 692 _ter_--Rivier, II. p. 405--Calvo, IV. [p][p]
  2669-2684--Fiore, III. Nos. 1576-1581, 1584, and Code, Nos.
  1788-1792--Martens, II. [p] 133--Kleen, II. [p] 155--Pillet, pp.
  305-307--Perels, [p] 39, p. 231--Testa, pp. 173-187--Dupuis, Nos.
  308-314, and _Guerre_, Nos. 304-328--Ortolan, II. pp.
  247-291--Hautefeuille, I. pp. 344-405--Takahashi, pp.
  418-484--Bajer in _R.I._ 2nd Ser. II. (1900), pp.
  242-244--Lapradelle in _R.G._ XI. (1904), p. 531.

[Sidenote: Asylum to Naval Forces in contradistinction to Asylum to Land
Forces.]

[p] 342. Whereas asylum granted by a neutral to land forces and single
members of them is conditioned by the obligation of the neutral to
disarm such forces and to detain them for the purpose of preventing them
from joining in further military operations, a neutral may grant
temporary asylum to men-of-war of belligerents without being obliged to
disarm and detain them.[664] The reason is that the sea is considered an
international highway, that the ports of all nations serve more or less
the interests of international traffic on the sea, and that the
conditions of navigation make a certain hospitality of ports to vessels
of all nations a necessity. Thus the rules of International Law
regarding asylum of neutral ports to men-of-war of belligerents have
developed on somewhat different lines from the rules regarding asylum to
land forces. But the rule, that the duty of impartiality incumbent upon
a neutral must prevent him from allowing belligerents to use his
territory as a base of operations of war, is nevertheless valid
regarding asylum granted to their men-of-war.

[Footnote 664: See, however, below, [p] 347, concerning the abuse of
asylum, which must be prohibited.]

[Sidenote: Neutral Asylum to Naval Forces optional.]

[p] 343. Although a neutral may grant asylum to belligerent men-of-war
in his ports, he has no duty to do so. He may prohibit all belligerent
men-of-war from entering any of his ports, whether these vessels are
pursued by the enemy or desire to enter for other reasons. However, his
duty of impartiality must prevent him from denying to the one party what
he grants to the other, and he may not, therefore, allow entry to
men-of-war of one belligerent without giving the same permission to
men-of-war of the other belligerent (article 9 of Convention XIII.).
Neutrals as a rule admit men-of-war of both parties, but they frequently
exclude all men-of-war of both parties from entering certain ports. Thus
Austria prohibited during the Crimean War all belligerent men-of-war
from entering the port of Cattaro. Thus, further, Great Britain
prohibited during the American Civil War the access of all belligerent
men-of-war to the ports of the Bahama Islands, the case of stress of
weather excepted.

Be that as it may, since a neutral must prevent belligerents from making
his territory the base of military operations, he must not allow an
unlimited number of men-of-war belonging to one of the belligerents to
stay simultaneously in one of his ports. Article 15 of Convention XIII.
limits the number of such men-of-war to three, unless there are special
provisions to the contrary in the Municipal Law of the neutral
concerned.

[Sidenote: Asylum to Naval Forces in Distress.]

[p] 344. To the rule that a neutral need not admit men-of-war of the
belligerents to neutral ports there is no exception in strict law.
However, there is an international usage that belligerent men-of-war in
distress should never be prevented from making for the nearest port. In
accordance with this usage vessels in distress have always been allowed
entry even to such neutral ports as were totally closed to belligerent
men-of-war. There are even instances known of belligerent men-of-war in
distress having asked for and been granted asylum by the enemy in an
enemy port.[665]

[Footnote 665: See above, [p] 189.]

[Sidenote: Exterritoriality of Men-of-War during Asylum.]

[p] 345. The exterritoriality, which according to a universally
recognised rule of International Law men-of-war must enjoy[666] in
foreign ports, obtains even in time of war during their stay in neutral
ports. Therefore, prisoners of war on board do not become free by coming
into the neutral port[667] so long as they are not brought on shore, nor
do prizes[668] brought into neutral ports by belligerents. On the other
hand, belligerent men-of-war are expected to comply with all orders
which the neutral makes for the purpose of preventing them from making
his ports the base of their operations of war, as, for instance, with
the order not to leave the ports at the same time as vessels of the
other belligerent. And, if they do not comply voluntarily, they may be
made to do so through application of force, for a neutral has the duty
to prevent by all means at hand the abuse of the asylum granted.

[Footnote 666: See above, vol. I. [p] 450.]

[Footnote 667: See above, [p] 337.]

[Footnote 668: See articles 21-23 of Convention XIII.]

Special provision is made by article 24 of Convention XIII. for the case
of a belligerent man-of-war which refuses to leave a neutral port. This
article enacts:--"If, notwithstanding the notification of the neutral
Power, a belligerent ship of war does not leave a port where it is not
entitled to remain, the neutral Power is entitled to take such measures
as it considers necessary to render the ship incapable of putting to sea
so long as the war lasts, and the commanding officer of the ship must
facilitate the execution of such measures. When a belligerent ship is
detained by a neutral Power, the officers and crew are likewise
detained. The officers and crew so detained may be left in the ship or
kept either on another vessel or on land, and may be subjected to such
measures of restriction as it may appear necessary to impose upon them.
A sufficient number of men must, however, be always left on board for
looking after the vessel. The officers may be left at liberty on giving
their word not to quit neutral territory without permission."

If a vessel is granted asylum for the whole time of the war--see below,
[p] 347 (3 and 4)--and is, therefore, dismantled, she loses the
character of a man-of-war, no longer enjoys the privilege of
exterritoriality due to men-of-war in foreign waters, and prisoners on
board become free, although they must be detained by the neutral
concerned.

[Sidenote: Facilities to Men-of-War during Asylum.]

[p] 346. A belligerent man-of-war, to which asylum is granted in a
neutral port, is not only not disarmed and detained, but facilities may
even be rendered to her as regards slight repairs, and the supply of
provisions and coal. However, a neutral may only allow small repairs of
the vessel herself and not of her armaments;[669] for he would render
assistance to one of the belligerents, to the detriment of the other, if
he were to allow the damaged armaments of a belligerent man-of-war to be
repaired in a neutral port. And, further, a neutral may only allow a
limited amount of provisions and coal to be taken in by a belligerent
man-of-war in neutral ports;[670] for, if he did otherwise, he would
allow the belligerent to use the neutral ports as a base for operations
of war. And, lastly, a neutral may allow a belligerent man-of-war in his
ports to enrol only such a small number of sailors as is necessary to
navigate her safely to the nearest port of her home State.[671]

[Footnote 669: See above, [p] 333 (5), and below, [p] 347 (3).]

[Footnote 670: See above, [p] 333 (4).]

[Footnote 671: See above, [p][p] 330 and 333 (3).]

[Sidenote: Abuse of Asylum to be prohibited.]

[p] 347. It would be easy for belligerent men-of-war to which asylum is
granted in neutral ports to abuse such asylum if neutrals were not
required to prohibit such abuse.

(1) A belligerent man-of-war can abuse asylum, firstly, by ascertaining
whether and what kind of enemy vessels are in the same neutral port,
accompanying them when they leave, and attacking them immediately they
reach the Open Sea. To prevent such abuse, in the eighteenth century
several neutral States arranged that, if belligerent men-of-war or
privateers met enemy vessels in a neutral port, they were not to be
allowed to leave together, but an interval of at least twenty-four hours
was to elapse between the sailing of the vessels. During the nineteenth
century this so-called twenty-four hours rule was enforced by the
majority of States, and the Second Peace Conference, by article 16 of
Convention XIII., has made it a general rule[672] by enacting:--"When
war-ships belonging to both belligerents are present simultaneously in a
neutral port or roadstead, a period of not less than twenty-four hours
must elapse between the departure of the ship belonging to one
belligerent and the departure of the ship belonging to the other. The
order of departure is determined by the order of arrival, unless the
ship which arrived first is so circumstanced that an extension of its
stay is permissible. A belligerent war-ship may not leave a neutral port
or roadstead until twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant
ship flying the flag of its adversary."

(2) Asylum can, secondly, be abused by wintering in a port in order to
wait for other vessels of the same fleet, or by similar intentional
delay. There is no doubt that neutrals must prohibit this abuse by
ordering such belligerent men-of-war to leave the neutral ports.
Following the example set by Great Britain in 1862,[673] several
maritime States have adopted the rule of not allowing a belligerent
man-of-war to stay in their neutral ports for more than twenty-four
hours, except on account of damage or stress of weather. Other States,
such as France, do not, however, object to a more prolonged stay in
their ports. Article 12 of Convention XIII. prescribes the twenty-four
hours rule only for those neutral countries which have not special
provisions to the contrary in their Municipal Laws.[674]

(3) Asylum can, thirdly, be abused by repairing a belligerent man-of-war
which has become unseaworthy. Although small repairs are allowed,[675] a
neutral would violate his duty of impartiality by allowing such repairs
as would make good the unseaworthiness of a belligerent man-of-war.
During the Russo-Japanese War this was generally recognised, and the
Russian men-of-war _Askold_ and _Grossovoi_ in Shanghai, the _Diana_ in
Saigon, and the _Lena_ in San Francisco had therefore to be disarmed and
detained. The crews of these vessels had likewise to be detained for the
time of the war.

(4) Asylum can, lastly, be abused by remaining in a neutral port an
undue length of time in order to escape attack and capture by the other
belligerent. Neutral territorial waters are in fact an asylum for
men-of-war which are pursued by the enemy, but, since nowadays a right
of pursuit into neutral waters, as asserted by Bynkershoek,[676] is no
longer recognised, it would be an abuse of asylum if the escaped vessel
were allowed to make a prolonged stay in the neutral waters. A neutral
who allowed such abuse of asylum would violate his duty of impartiality,
for he would assist one of the belligerents to the disadvantage of the
other.[677] Therefore, when after the battle off Port Arthur in August
1904 the Russian battleship _Cesarewitch_, the cruiser _Novik_, and
three destroyers escaped, and took refuge in the German port of
Tsing-Tau in Kiao-Chau, the _Novik_, which was uninjured, had to leave
the port after a few hours,[678] whereas the other vessels, which were
too damaged to leave the port, were disarmed and, together with their
crews, detained till the conclusion of peace. And when, at the end of
May 1905, after the battle of Tsu Shima, three injured Russian
men-of-war, the _Aurora_, _Oleg_, and _Jemchug_, escaped into the
harbour of Manila, the United States of America ordered them to be
disarmed and, together with their crews, to be detained during the war.

[Footnote 672: See above, [p] 333 (2), and Hall, [p] 231, p. 651.]

[Footnote 673: See Hall, [p] 231, p. 653.]

[Footnote 674: See above, [p] 333 (6)--Germany, Domingo, Siam, and
Persia have entered a reservation against article 12.]

[Footnote 675: See above, [p] 333 (5) and [p] 346.]

[Footnote 676: _Quaest. jur. publ._ I. c. 8. See also above, [p] 288, p.
352, and [p] 320, p. 387.]

[Footnote 677: It was only during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 that
this became generally recognised, and article 24 of Convention XIII.
places it beyond all doubt. Until the Russo-Japanese War it was still a
controverted question whether a neutral is obliged either to dismiss or
to disarm and detain such men-of war as had fled into his ports for the
purpose of escaping attack and capture. See Hall, [p] 231, p. 651, and
Perels, [p] 39, p. 213, in contradistinction to Fiore, III. No. 1578.
The "Reglement sur le regime legal des navires et de leurs equipages
dans les ports etrangers," adopted by the Institute of International Law
in 1898 at its meeting at the Hague--see _Annuaire_, XVII. (1898), p.
273--answers (article 42) the question in the affirmative.]

[Footnote 678: This case marks the difference between the duties of
neutrals as regards asylum to land and naval forces. Whereas land forces
crossing neutral frontiers must either be at once repulsed or detained,
men-of-war may be granted the right to stay for some limited time within
neutral harbours and to leave afterwards unhindered; see above, [p] 342.
The supply of a small quantity of coal to the _Novik_ in Tsing-Tau was
criticised by writers in the Press, but unjustly. For--see above, [p]
346--a neutral may allow a belligerent man-of-war in his port to take in
so much coal as is necessary to navigate her to her nearest home port.]

[Sidenote: Neutral Men-of-War as an Asylum.]

[p] 348. It can happen during war that neutral men-of-war pick up and
save from drowning soldiers and sailors of belligerent men-of-war sunk
by the enemy, or that they take belligerent marines on board for other
reasons. Such neutral men-of-war being an asylum for the rescued
marines, the question has arisen whether such rescued marines must be
given up to the enemy, or must be detained during the war, or may be
brought to their home country. Two cases are on record which illustrate
this matter.

(1) At the beginning of the Chino-Japanese War, on July 25, 1894, after
the Japanese cruiser _Naniwa_ had sunk the British ship _Kow-shing_,
which served as transport carrying Chinese troops,[679] forty-five
Chinese soldiers who clung to the mast of the sinking ship were rescued
by the French gunboat _Lion_ and brought to the Korean harbour of
Chemulpo. Hundreds of others saved themselves on some islands near the
spot where the incident occurred, and 120 of these were taken on board
the German man-of-war _Iltis_ and brought back to the Chinese port of
Tientsin.[680]

(2) At the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, on February 9, 1904,
after the Russian cruisers _Variag_ and _Korietz_ had accepted the
challenge[681] of a Japanese fleet, fought a battle outside the harbour
of Chemulpo, and returned, crowded with wounded, to Chemulpo, the
British cruiser _Talbot_, the French _Pascal_, and the Italian _Elba_
received large numbers of the crews of the disabled Russian cruisers.
The Japanese demanded that the neutral ships should give up the rescued
men as prisoners of war, but the neutral commanders demurred, and an
arrangement was made according to which the rescued men were handed over
to the Russians under the condition that they should not take part in
hostilities during the war.[682]

[Footnote 679: See above, [p] 89, p. 114, note 1.]

[Footnote 680: See Takahashi, _Cases on International Law during the
Chino-Japanese War_ (1899), pp. 36 and 51.]

[Footnote 681: See above, [p] 320 (1).]

[Footnote 682: See Lawrence, _War_, pp. 63-75, and Takahashi, pp.
462-466.]

The Second Peace Conference has settled the question, for article 13 of
Convention X. enacts:--"If wounded, sick, or shipwrecked are taken on
board a neutral man-of-war, precaution must be taken, so far as
possible, that they do not again take part in the operations of the
war."

[Sidenote: Neutral Territory and Shipwrecked Soldiers.]

[p] 348_a_. Just as in war on land members of the belligerent forces may
find themselves on neutral territory, so in war on sea shipwrecked or
wounded or sick belligerent soldiers can be brought into neutral
territory. Two cases of this kind must be distinguished:--

(1) According to article 14 of Convention X. it is left to the
belligerent man-of-war who captures shipwrecked, wounded, or sick enemy
soldiers to send them to a neutral port. The neutral Power concerned
need not receive them, but, on the other hand, may grant them asylum. If
asylum is granted, the neutral Power is, according to article 15 of
Convention X., obliged--unless there is an arrangement to the contrary
between the neutral Power and both belligerents--to guard them so as to
prevent them from again taking part in the war,[683] the expenses for
tending and interning them to be paid by the belligerent to whom they
belong.

(2) Neutral merchantmen[684] can either of their own accord have rescued
wounded, sick, or shipwrecked men, or they can have taken them on board
on appeal by belligerent men-of-war. The surrender of these men may,
according to article 12 of Convention X., be demanded at any time by any
belligerent man-of-war. But if such demand be not made and the men be
brought into a neutral port, they need not be detained by the neutral
concerned.

[Footnote 683: See above, [p] 205.]

[Footnote 684: See above, [p] 208 (2).]


VI

SUPPLIES AND LOANS TO BELLIGERENTS

  Vattel, III. [p] 110--Hall, [p][p] 216-217--Lawrence, [p]
  235--Westlake, II. pp. 217-219--Phillimore, III. [p] 151--Twiss,
  II. [p] 227--Halleck, II. p. 163--Taylor, [p][p] 622-625--Walker,
  [p] 67--Wharton, III. [p][p] 390-391--Moore, VII. [p][p]
  1307-1312--Bluntschli, [p][p] 765-768--Heffter, [p] 148--Geffcken
  in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 687-700--Ullmann, [p][p]
  191-192--Bonfils, Nos. 1471-1474--Despagnet, Nos. 693-694--Rivier,
  II. pp. 385-411--Calvo, IV. [p][p] 2624-2630--Fiore, III. Nos.
  1559-1563--Martens, II. [p] 134--Kleen, I. [p][p] 66-69,
  96-97--Merignhac, pp. 360-364--Pillet, pp. 289-293--Dupuis, Nos.
  317-319--_Land Warfare_, [p][p] 477-480.

[Sidenote: Supply on the part of Neutrals.]

[p] 349. The duty of impartiality must prevent a neutral from supplying
belligerents with arms, ammunition, vessels, and military
provisions.[685] And it matters not whether such supply takes place for
money or gratuitously. A neutral who sold arms and ammunition to a
belligerent at a profit would violate his duty of impartiality as also
would one who transferred such arms and ammunition to a belligerent as a
present. This is a settled rule so far as direct transactions regarding
such supply between belligerents and neutrals are concerned. The case is
different where a neutral does not directly and knowingly deal with a
belligerent, although he may, or ought to, be aware that he is
indirectly supplying a belligerent. Different States have during
neutrality taken up different attitudes regarding such cases. Thus in
1825, during the War of Independence which the Spanish South American
Colonies waged against their mother country, the Swedish Government sold
three old men-of-war, the _Foersigtigheten_, _Euridice_, and _Camille_
to two merchants, who on their part sold them to English merchants,
representatives of the Government of the Mexican insurgents. When Spain
complained, Sweden rescinded the contract.[686] Further, the British
Government in 1863, during the American Civil War, after selling an old
gunboat, the _Victor_, to a private purchaser and subsequently finding
that the agents of the Confederate States had obtained possession of
her, gave the order that during the war no more Government ships should
be sold.[687] On the other hand, the Government of the United States of
America, in pursuance of an Act passed by Congress in 1868 for the sale
of arms which the end of the Civil War had rendered superfluous, sold in
1870, notwithstanding the Franco-German War, thousands of arms and other
war material which were shipped to France.[688] This attitude of the
United States is now generally condemned, and article 6 of Convention
XIII. may be quoted against a repetition of such a practice on the part
of a neutral State. This article prohibits the supply in any manner,
directly or _indirectly_, by a neutral to a belligerent, of warships,
ammunition, or war material of any kind whatever.

[Footnote 685: See article 6 of Convention XIII.]

[Footnote 686: See Martens, _Causes Celebres_, V. pp. 229-254.]

[Footnote 687: See Lawrence, [p] 235.]

[Footnote 688: See Wharton, III. [p] 391, and Moore, VII. [p] 1309.]

[Sidenote: Supply on the part of Subjects of Neutrals.]

[p] 350. In contradistinction to supply to belligerents by neutrals,
such supply by subjects of neutrals is lawful, and neutrals are not,
therefore, obliged according to their duty of impartiality to prevent
such supply. Article 7 of Convention V. and article 7 of Convention
XIII. concur in enacting the old customary rule that "A neutral Power is
not bound to prevent the export or transit, on behalf of one or other of
the belligerents, of arms, munitions of war, or, in general, of anything
which can be of use to an army or fleet." And article 18[689] of
Convention V. recognises the fact that the furnishing of supplies to a
belligerent by such subjects of neutrals as do not live on the territory
of the other party, or on the territory occupied by that party, does
not invest these individuals with enemy character. When in August 1870,
during the Franco-German War, Germany lodged complaints with the British
Government for not prohibiting its subjects from supplying arms and
ammunition to the French Government, Great Britain correctly replied
that she was not by International Law under the obligation to prevent
her subjects from committing such acts. Of course, such neutral as is
anxious to avoid all controversy and friction can by his Municipal Law
order his subjects to abstain from such acts, as for instance
Switzerland and Belgium did during the Franco-German War. But such
injunctions arise from political prudence, and not from any obligation
imposed by International Law.

[Footnote 689: That Great Britain has entered a reservation against
article 18, and the portent of this reservation, has been pointed out
above, in [p] 88, p. 109, note 1.]

The endeavour to make a distinction between supply in single cases and
on a small scale on the one hand, and, on the other, supply on a large
scale, and to consider only the former lawful,[690] has neither in
theory nor in practice found recognition. As International Law stands,
belligerents may make use of visit, search, and seizure to protect
themselves against conveyance of contraband by sea to the enemy by
subjects of neutrals. But so far as their neutral home State is
concerned, such subjects may, at the risk of having their property
seized during such conveyance, supply either belligerent with any amount
of arms, ammunition, coal, provisions, and even with armed ships,[691]
provided always that they deal with the belligerents in the ordinary way
of commerce.

[Footnote 690: See Bluntschli, [p] 766.]

[Footnote 691: See above, [p] 334, and below, [p] 397.]

The case is different when there is no ordinary commerce with a
belligerent Government and when subjects of neutrals directly supply a
belligerent army or navy, or parts of them. If, for instance, a
belligerent fleet is cruising outside the maritime belt of a neutral,
the latter must prevent vessels of his subjects from bringing coal,
arms, ammunition, and provisions to that fleet, for otherwise he would
allow the belligerent to make use of neutral resources for naval
operations.[692] But he need not prevent vessels of his subjects from
bringing coal, arms, ammunition, and provisions to belligerent ports,
although the supply is destined for the navy and the army of the
belligerent. He need not prevent belligerent merchantmen from coming
into his ports and carrying arms and the like, bought from his subjects,
over to the ports of their home State. And he need not prevent vessels
of his subjects from following a belligerent fleet and supplying it _en
route_[693] with coal, ammunition, provisions, and the like, provided
such supply does not take place in the neutral maritime belt.

[Footnote 692: See above, [p] 333 (4).]

[Footnote 693: See above, [p] 311, p. 375, note 4.]

There is no doubt that, as the law stands at present, neutrals need not
prevent their subjects from supplying belligerents with arms and
ammunition. Yet, on the other hand, there is no doubt either that such
supply is apt to prolong a war which otherwise would come to an end at
an earlier date. But it will be a long time, if ever it happens, before
it is made a duty of neutrals to prevent such supply as far as is in
their power, and to punish such of their subjects as engage in it. The
profit derived from such supply being enormous, the members of the
Family of Nations are not inclined to <DW36> the trade of their
subjects by preventing it. And belligerents want to have the opportunity
of replenishing with arms and ammunition if they run short of them
during war. The question is merely one of the standard of public
morality.[694] If this standard rises, and it becomes the conviction of
the world at large that supply of arms and ammunition by subjects of
neutrals is apt to lengthen wars, the rule will appear that neutrals
must prevent such supply.

[Footnote 694: See above, vol. I. [p] 51 (6) p. 83.]

[Sidenote: Loans and Subsidies on the part of Neutrals.]

[p] 351. His duty of impartiality must prevent a neutral from granting a
loan to either belligerent. Vattel's (III. [p] 110) distinction between
such loans as are granted on interest and such as are not so granted,
and his assertion that loans on the part of neutrals are lawful if they
are granted on interest with the pure intention of making money, have
not found favour with other writers. Nor do I know any instance of such
loan on interest having occurred during the nineteenth century.

What is valid regarding a loan is all the more valid regarding subsidies
in money granted to a belligerent on the part of a neutral. Through the
granting of subsidies a neutral becomes as much the ally of the
belligerent as he would by furnishing him with a number of troops.[695]

[Footnote 695: See above, [p][p] 305, 306, 321.]

[Sidenote: Loans and Subsidies on the part of Subjects of Neutrals.]

[p] 352. It was formerly a moot point in the theory of International Law
whether a neutral is obliged by his duty of impartiality to prevent his
subjects from granting subsidies and loans to belligerents for the
purpose of enabling them to continue the war. Several writers[696]
maintained either that a neutral was obliged to prevent such loans and
subsidies altogether, or at least that he must prohibit a public
subscription on neutral territory for such loans and subsidies. On the
other hand, a number of writers asserted that, since money is just as
much an article of commerce as goods, a neutral was in no wise obliged
to prevent on his territory public subscription by his subjects to loans
for the belligerents. In contradistinction to the theory of
International Law, the practice of the States has beyond doubt
established the fact that neutrals need not prevent on their territory
subscription to loans for belligerents. Thus in 1854, during the Crimean
War, France protested in vain against a Russian loan being raised in
Amsterdam, Berlin, and Hamburg. In 1870, during the Franco-German War, a
French loan was raised in London. In 1877, during the Russo-Turkish War,
no neutral prevented his subjects from subscribing to the Russian loan.
Again, in 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese loans were
raised in London and Berlin, and Russian loans in Paris and Berlin. The
Second Peace Conference, by enacting in article 7 of Convention V. that
a neutral is not bound to prevent the export ... of anything which can
be of use to an army or fleet, has indirectly recognised that a neutral
need not prevent the subscription on his territory to loans for
belligerents.

[Footnote 696: See Phillimore, III. [p] 151; Bluntschli, [p] 768;
Heffter, [p] 148; Kleen, I. [p] 68. The case of _De Wuetz_ v.
_Hendricks_ (9 Moore, 586) quoted by Phillimore in support of his
assertion that neutrals must prevent their subjects from subscribing to
a loan for belligerents, is not decisive, for Lord Chief Justice Best
declared only "that it was contrary to the Law of Nations for persons
residing in this country to enter into any agreements to raise money by
way of a loan for the purpose of _supporting subjects of a foreign State
in arms against a Government in alliance with our own_."]

But matters differ somewhat in regard to subsidies to belligerents by
subjects of neutrals. A neutral is not indeed obliged to prevent
individual subjects from granting subsidies to belligerents, just as he
is not obliged to prevent them from enlisting with either belligerent.
But if he were to allow on his territory a public appeal for
subscriptions to such subsidy, he would certainly violate his duty of
impartiality; for loans are a matter of commerce, subsidies are not. It
must, however, be emphasised that public appeals for subscriptions of
money for charitable purposes in favour of the wounded, the prisoners,
and the like, need not be prevented, even if they are only made in
favour of one of the belligerents.

The distinction between loans and subsidies is certainly correct as the
law stands at present. But there is no doubt that the fact of
belligerents having the opportunity of getting loans from subjects of
neutrals is apt to lengthen wars. The Russo-Japanese War, for instance,
would have come to an end much sooner if either belligerent could have
been prevented from borrowing money from subjects of neutrals.
Therefore, what has been said above in [p] 350 with regard to the supply
of arms and ammunition on the part of subjects of neutrals applies
likewise to loans: they will no longer be considered lawful when the
standard of public morality rises.


VII

SERVICES TO BELLIGERENTS

  Westlake, II. pp. 219-220--Despagnet, No. 696 _bis_--Bonfils, No.
  1475[1]--Ullmann, [p] 192--Rivier, II. pp. 388-391--Calvo, IV. [p][p]
  2640-2641--Martens, II. [p] 134--Perels, [p] 43--Kleen, I. [p][p]
  103-108--Lawrence, _War_, pp. 83-92, 218-220--Scholz, _Drahtlose
  Telegraphie und Neutralitaet_ (1905), _passim_, and _Krieg und
  Seekabel_ (1904), pp. 122-133--_Land Warfare_, [p][p]
  481-484--Kebedgy, in _R.I._ 2nd Ser. IV. (1904), pp. 445-451.

[Sidenote: Pilotage.]

[p] 353. Since pilots are in the service of littoral States the question
as to whether neutrals may permit their pilots to render services to
belligerent men-of-war and transport vessels, is of importance. Article
11[697] of Convention XIII. enacts that "a neutral Power may allow
belligerent war-ships to employ its licensed pilots." Since, therefore,
everything is left to the discretion of neutrals, they will have to take
the merits and needs of every case into account. There would certainly
be no objection to a neutral allowing belligerent vessels to which
asylum is legitimately granted, to be piloted into his ports, and
likewise such vessels to be piloted through his maritime belt if their
passage is not prohibited. But a belligerent might justly object to the
men-of-war of his adversary being piloted on the Open Sea by pilots of a
neutral Power, except in a case of distress.

[Footnote 697: Germany has entered a reservation against article 11.]

It is worth mentioning that Great Britain during the Franco-German War
in 1870, prohibited her pilots from conducting German and French
men-of-war which were outside the maritime belt, except when in
distress.

[Sidenote: Transport on the part of Neutrals.]

[p] 354. It is generally recognised that the duty of impartiality
incumbent upon a neutral obliges him to prevent his men-of-war and other
public vessels from rendering transport services to either belligerent.
Therefore, such vessels must neither carry soldiers nor sailors
belonging to belligerent forces, nor their prisoners of war, nor
ammunition, military or naval provisions, nor despatches. The question
as to how far such vessels are prevented from carrying enemy subjects
other than members of the forces depends upon the question whether by
carrying those individuals they render such service to one of the
belligerents as is detrimental to the other. Thus, when the Dutch
Government in 1901, during the South African War, intended to send a
man-of-war, the _Gelderland_, to President Kruger for the purpose of
conveying him to Europe, they made sure in advance that Great Britain
did not object.

The question has been raised[698] as to whether a neutral whose rolling
stock runs on the railway lines of a belligerent, may continue to leave
such rolling stock there although it is being used for the transport of
troops, war material, and the like. The answer, I believe, ought to be
in the negative, for there is no doubt that, if the rolling stock
remains on the railway lines of a belligerent, the neutral concerned is
indirectly rendering transport services to the belligerent. It is for
this reason that article 19 of Convention V. enacts that railway
material coming from the territory of neutrals shall not be
requisitioned or used by a belligerent except in the case and to the
extent required by absolute necessity.[699]

[Footnote 698: See Nowacki, _Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege_ (1906), p. 126.]

[Footnote 699: See below, [p] 365.]

[Sidenote: Transport on the part of Neutral Merchantmen and by neutral
rolling stock.]

[p] 355. Just as a neutral is not obliged to prevent his merchantmen
from carrying contraband, so he is not obliged to prevent them from
rendering services to belligerents by carrying in the way of trade enemy
troops, and the like, and enemy despatches. Neutral merchantmen
rendering such services to belligerents do so at their own risk, for
these are unneutral services for which the merchantmen may be
punished[700] by the belligerents, but for which the neutral State under
whose flag such merchantmen sail bears no responsibility whatever.

[Footnote 700: See below, [p][p] 407-413.]

And the same is valid with regard to rolling stock belonging to private
railway companies of a neutral State. That such rolling stock may not,
without the consent of the companies owning it, be made use of by a
belligerent for the transport of troops, war material, and the like,
except in the case of and to the extent required by absolute necessity,
follows from article 19 of Convention V. But, if a private railway
company gives its consent, and if its rolling stock is made use of for
warlike purposes, it acquires enemy character, article 19 of Convention
V. does not apply, and the other belligerent may seize and appropriate
it as though it were the property of the enemy State.[701]

[Footnote 701: See Nowacki, _Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege_ (1906), p. 128.]

[Sidenote: Information regarding Military and Naval Operations.]

[p] 356. Information regarding military and naval operations may be
given and obtained in so many various ways that several cases must be
distinguished:--

(1) It is obvious that the duty of impartiality incumbent upon a neutral
obliges him to prevent his men-of-war from giving any information to a
belligerent concerning naval operations of the other party. But a
neutral bears no responsibility whatever for private vessels sailing
under his flag which give such information. Such vessels run, however,
the risk of being punished for rendering unneutral service.[702]

[Footnote 702: See below, [p][p] 409 and 410, and articles 45, Nos. 1
and 2, and 46, No. 4, of the Declaration of London.]

(2) It is likewise obvious that his duty of impartiality must prevent a
neutral from giving information concerning the war to a belligerent
through his diplomatic envoys, couriers, and the like. But the question
has been raised as to whether a neutral is obliged to prevent
couriers[703] from carrying despatches for a belligerent over his
neutral territory. I believe the answer must be in the negative, at
least so far as those couriers in the service of diplomatic envoys and
such agents as carry despatches from a State to its head or to
diplomatic envoys abroad are concerned. Since they enjoy--as stated
above, Vol. I. [p][p] 405 and 457--inviolability for their persons and
official papers, a neutral cannot interfere and find out whether these
individuals carry information to the disadvantage of the enemy.

[Footnote 703: See Calvo, [p] 2640.]

(3) According to article 8 of Convention V. "a neutral Power is not
bound to forbid or restrict the employment, on behalf of belligerents,
of telegraph or telephone cables, or of wireless telegraphy apparatus
whether belonging to it, or to companies, or to private individuals."
Since, therefore, everything is left to the discretion of the neutral
concerned, he will have to take the merits and needs of every case into
consideration, and act accordingly. But so much is certain that a
belligerent may not categorically request neutrals to forbid or restrict
such employment of their telegraph wires and the like on the part of his
adversary.

The case is different when a belligerent intends to arrange the
transmitting of messages through a submarine cable purposely laid over
neutral territory or through telegraph and telephone wires purposely
erected on neutral territory. This would seem to be an abuse of neutral
territory, and the neutral must prevent it. Accordingly, when in 1870,
during the Franco-German War, France intended to lay a telegraph cable
from Dunkirk to the North of France, the cable to go across the Channel
to England and from there back to France, Great Britain refused her
consent on account of her neutrality. And again in 1898, during war
between Spain and the United States of America, when the latter intended
to land at Hong Kong a cable proposed to be laid from Manila, Great
Britain refused her consent.[704]

[Footnote 704: See Lawrence, _War_, p. 219.]

The case is likewise different when a belligerent intends to erect in a
neutral country, or in a neutral port or neutral waters, a wireless
telegraphy station or any apparatus intended as a means of communication
with belligerent forces on land or sea, or to make use of any
installation of this kind established by him before the outbreak of war
for purely military purposes, and not previously opened for the service
of the public generally. According to articles 3 and 5 of Convention V.
and article 5 of Convention XIII., a neutral is bound to prohibit this.
The case which occurred in 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War and the
siege of Port Arthur, when the Russians installed an apparatus for
wireless telegraphy in Chifu and communicated thereby with the besieged,
constituted a violation of neutrality.

(4) It is obvious that his duty of impartiality must prevent a neutral
from allowing belligerents to establish intelligence bureaux on his
territory. On the other hand, a neutral is not obliged to prevent his
subjects from giving information to belligerents, be it by letter,
telegram, telephone, or wireless telegraphy. In especial a neutral is
not obliged to prevent his subjects from giving information to
belligerents by wireless telegraphy apparatus installed on a neutral
merchantman. Such individuals run, however, the risk of being punished
as spies, provided they act clandestinely or under false pretences, and
the vessel concerned is subject to the risk of being captured and
confiscated for rendering unneutral service.

Stress must be laid on the fact that newspaper correspondents making use
of wireless telegraphy from on board neutral merchantmen for the purpose
of sending news to their papers,[705] may not be treated as spies, and
the merchantmen concerned may not be confiscated, although belligerents
need by no means allow the presence of such vessels at the seat of war.
Thus, during the Russo-Japanese War, the _Haimun_, a vessel fitted with
a wireless telegraphy apparatus for the service of the _Times_, was
ordered away by the Japanese. But, of course, an individual can at the
same time be a correspondent for a neutral newspaper and a spy, and he
may then be punished for espionage.

[Footnote 705: See Lawrence, _War_, pp. 84-88. On newspaper
correspondents generally in naval warfare, see Higgins, _War and the
Private Citizen_ (1912), pp. 91-114, and in _Z.V._ VI. (1912), pp.
19-28, and the literature and cases there cited.]


VIII

VIOLATION OF NEUTRALITY

  Hall, [p][p] 227-229--Lawrence, [p][p] 233, 238, 239--Phillimore,
  III. [p][p] 151A-151B--Taylor, [p][p] 630 and 642--Wharton, III.
  [p][p] 402, 402A--Wheaton, [p][p] 429-433--Moore, VII. [p][p]
  1319-1328, 1334-1335--Bluntschli, [p][p] 778-782--Heffter, [p]
  146--Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 667-676, 700-709--Ullmann,
  [p] 191--Bonfils, No. 1476--Despagnet, No. 697--Pradier-Fodere,
  No. 3235--Rivier, II. pp. 394-395--Calvo, IV. [p][p]
  2654-2666--Fiore, III. Nos. 1567-1570--Martens, II. [p]
  138--Kleen, I. [p] 25--Dupuis, Nos. 332-337.

[Sidenote: Violation of Neutrality in the narrower and in the wider
sense of the Term.]

[p] 357. Many writers who speak of violation of neutrality treat under
this head only of violations of the duty of impartiality incumbent upon
neutrals. And indeed such violations only are meant, if one speaks of
violation of neutrality in the narrower sense of the term. However, it
is necessary for obvious reasons to discuss not only violations of the
duty of impartiality of neutrals, but violations of all duties deriving
from neutrality, whether they are incumbent upon neutrals or upon
belligerents. In the wider sense of the term violation of neutrality
comprises, therefore, every performance or omission of an act contrary
to the duty of a neutral towards either belligerent as well as contrary
to the duty of either belligerent towards a neutral. Everywhere in this
treatise the term is used in its wider sense.

It is important to remember that violations of neutrality on the part of
belligerents must not be confounded with violations of the laws of war
by which subjects of neutral States suffer damage. If, for instance, an
occupant levies excessive contributions from subjects of neutral States
domiciled in enemy country in contravention of article 49 of the Hague
Regulations, this is a violation of the Laws of War, for which,
according to article 3 of Convention IV., the belligerent concerned
must pay compensation, but it is not a violation of neutrality.

[Sidenote: Violation in contradistinction to End of Neutrality.]

[p] 358. Violation of neutrality must not be confounded with the ending
of neutrality,[706] for neither a violation on the part of a
neutral[707] nor a violation on the part of a belligerent brings _ipso
facto_ neutrality to an end. If correctly viewed, the condition of
neutrality continues to exist between a neutral and a belligerent in
spite of a violation of neutrality. It must be emphasised that a
violation of neutrality contains nothing more than a breach of a duty
deriving from the condition of neutrality. This applies not only to
violations of neutrality by negligence, but also to those by intention.
Even in an extreme case in which the violation of neutrality is so great
that the offended party considers war the only adequate measure in
answer to it, it is not the violation which brings neutrality to an end,
but the determination of the offended party. For there is no violation
of neutrality so great as to oblige the offended party to make war in
answer to it, such party having always the choice whether it will keep
up the condition of neutrality or not.

[Footnote 706: See above, [p] 312.]

[Footnote 707: But this is almost everywhere asserted, as the
distinction between the violation of the duty of impartiality incumbent
upon neutrals on the one hand, and on the other, the ending of
neutrality, is usually not made.]

But this applies only to mere violations of neutrality, and not to
hostilities. The latter are acts of war and bring neutrality to an end;
they have been characterised in contradistinction to mere violations
above in [p] 320.

[Sidenote: Consequences of Violations of Neutrality.]

[p] 359. Violations of neutrality, whether committed by a neutral
against a belligerent or by a belligerent against a neutral, are
international delinquencies.[708] They may at once be repulsed, the
offended party may require the offender to make reparation, and, if this
is refused, it may take such measures as it thinks adequate to exact
the necessary reparation.[709] If the violation is only slight and
unimportant, the offended State will often merely complain. If, on the
other hand, the violation is very substantial and grave, the offended
State will perhaps at once declare that it considers itself at war with
the offender. In such case it is not the violation of neutrality which
brings neutrality to an end, but the declaration of the offended State
that it considers the violation of so grave a character as to oblige it
to regard itself at war with the offender.

[Footnote 708: See above, vol. I. [p] 151.]

[Footnote 709: See above, vol. I. [p] 156.]

That a violation of neutrality can only, like any other international
delinquency, be committed by malice or culpable negligence,[710] and
that it can be committed through a State's refusing to comply with the
consequences of its "vicarious" responsibility for acts of its agents or
subjects,[711] is a matter of course. Thus, if a belligerent fleet
attacks enemy vessels in neutral territorial waters without an order
from its Government, the latter bears "vicarious" responsibility for
this violation of neutral territory on the part of its fleet. If the
Government concerned refuses to disown the act of its fleet and to make
the necessary reparation, this "vicarious" responsibility turns into
"original" responsibility, for a case of violation of neutrality and an
international delinquency has then arisen. And the same is valid if an
agent of a neutral State without an order of his Government commits such
an act as would constitute a violation of neutrality in case it were
ordered by the Government; for instance, if the head of a province of a
neutral, without thereto being authorised by his Government, allows
forces of a belligerent to march through this neutral territory.

[Footnote 710: See above, vol. I. [p] 154.]

[Footnote 711: See above, vol. I. [p] 150.]

[Sidenote: Neutrals not to acquiesce in Violations of Neutrality
committed by a Belligerent.]

[p] 360. It is entirely within the discretion of a belligerent whether
he will acquiesce in a violation of neutrality committed by a neutral
in favour of the other belligerent. On the other hand, a neutral may not
exercise the same discretion regarding a violation of neutrality
committed by one belligerent and detrimental to the other. His duty of
impartiality rather obliges him in the first instance to prevent, with
the means at his disposal, the belligerent concerned from committing
such violation; for instance, to repulse an attack of men-of-war of a
belligerent on enemy vessels in neutral ports. Thus article 3 of
Convention XIII. enacts:--"When a ship has been captured in the
territorial waters of a neutral Power, such Power must, if the prize is
still within its jurisdiction, employ the means at its disposal to
release the prize with its officers and crew, and to intern the prize
crew." And in case he could not prevent and repulse a violation of his
neutrality, the same duty obliges him to exact due reparation from the
offender,[712] for otherwise he would favour the one party to the
detriment of the other. If a neutral neglects this obligation, he is
thereby committing a violation of neutrality on his part for which he
may be made responsible by such belligerent as has suffered through the
violation of neutrality committed by the other belligerent and
acquiesced in by the neutral. For instance, if belligerent men-of-war
seize enemy vessels in ports of a neutral, and if the neutral, who could
not or did not prevent this, exacts no reparation from the belligerent
concerned, the other party may make the neutral responsible for the
losses sustained.

[Footnote 712: See articles 25 and 26 of Convention XIII. This duty is
nowadays universally recognised, but before the nineteenth century it
did not exist, although the rule that belligerents must not commit
hostilities on neutral territory, and in especial in neutral ports and
waters, was well recognised. That in spite of its recognition this rule
was in the eighteenth century frequently infringed by commanders of
belligerent fleets, may be illustrated by many cases. Thus, for
instance, in 1793, the French frigate _Modeste_ was captured in the
harbour of Genoa by two British men-of-war (see Hall, [p] 220). And in
1801, during war against Sweden, a British frigate captured the _Freden_
and three other Swedish vessels in the Norwegian harbour of Oster-Risoer
(see Ortolan, II. pp. 413-418).]

[Sidenote: Case of the _General Armstrong_.]

[p] 361. Some writers[713] maintain that a neutral is freed from
responsibility for a violation of neutrality through a belligerent
attacking enemy forces in neutral territory, in case the attacked
forces, instead of trusting for protection or redress to the neutral,
defend themselves against the attack. This rule is adopted from the
arbitral award in the case of the _General Armstrong_. In 1814, during
war between Great Britain and the United States of America, the American
privateer _General Armstrong_, lying in the harbour of Fayal, an island
belonging to the Portuguese Azores, defended herself against an attack
of an English squadron, but was nevertheless captured. The United States
claimed damages from Portugal because the privateer was captured in a
neutral Portuguese port. Negotiations went on for many years, and the
parties finally agreed in 1851 upon arbitration to be given by Louis
Napoleon, then President of the French Republic. In 1852 Napoleon gave
his award in favour of Portugal, maintaining that, although the attack
on the privateer in neutral waters comprised a violation of neutrality,
Portugal could not be made responsible, on account of the fact that the
attacked privateer chose to defend herself instead of demanding
protection from the Portuguese authorities.[714] It is, however, not at
all certain that the rule laid down in this award will find general
recognition in theory and practice.[715]

[Footnote 713: See, for instance, Hall, [p] 228, and Geffcken in
Holtzendorff, IV. p. 701.]

[Footnote 714: See Moore, _Arbitrations_, II. pp. 1071-1132; Calvo, IV.
[p] 2662; and Dana's note 208 in Wheaton, [p] 429.]

[Footnote 715: The case of the _Reshitelni_, which occurred in 1904,
during the Russo-Japanese War, and is somewhat similar to that of the
_General Armstrong_, is discussed above in [p] 320 (2). That no
violation of neutrality took place in the case of the _Variag_ and
_Korietz_, is shown above in [p] 320 (1).]

[Sidenote: Mode of exacting Reparation from Belligerents for Violations
of Neutrality.]

[p] 362. It is obvious that the duty of a neutral not to acquiesce in
violations of neutrality committed by one belligerent to the detriment
of the other obliges him to repair, so far as he can, the result of such
wrongful acts. Thus, he must liberate[716] a prize taken in his neutral
waters, or prisoners made on his territory, and the like. In so far,
however, as he cannot, or not sufficiently, undo the wrong done, he must
exact reparation from the offender. Now, no general rule can be laid
down regarding the mode of exacting such reparation, since everything
depends upon the merits of the individual case. Only as regards capture
of enemy vessels in neutral waters has a practice grown up, which must
be considered binding, and according to which the neutral must claim the
prize, and eventually damages, from the belligerent concerned, and must
restore her to the other party. Thus in 1800, during war between Great
Britain and the Netherlands, Prussia claimed before the British Prize
Court the _Twee Gebroeders_,[717] a Dutch vessel captured by the British
cruiser _L'Espiegle_ in the neutral maritime belt of Prussia. Sir
William Scott ordered restoration of the vessel, yet he refused costs
and damages, because the captor had not violated Prussian neutrality
intentionally but only by mistake and misapprehension. Thus again, in
1805, during war between Great Britain and Spain, the United States
claimed before the British Prize Court the _Anna_,[718] a Spanish vessel
captured by the English privateer _Minerva_ within their neutral
maritime belt. Thus, further, in 1864, during the American Civil War,
when the Confederate cruiser _Florida_ was captured by the Federal
cruiser _Wachuset_ in the neutral Brazilian port of Bahia, Brazil
claimed the prize. As the latter had sunk while at anchor in Hampton
Roads, she could not be restored, but the United States expiated the
violation of neutrality committed by her cruiser by court-martialing
the commander; further, by dismissing her Consul at Bahia for having
advised the capture; and, finally, by sending a man-of-war to the spot
where the violation of neutrality had taken place for the special
purpose of delivering a solemn salute to the Brazilian flag.[719]

[Footnote 716: See article 3 of Convention XIII.]

[Footnote 717: 3 C. Rob. 162.]

[Footnote 718: 5 C. Rob. 373. See above, vol. I. [p] 234.]

[Footnote 719: See Moore, VII. [p] 1334, p. 1090.]

[Sidenote: Negligence on the part of Neutrals.]

[p] 363. Apart from intentional violations of neutrality, a neutral can
be made responsible only for such acts favouring or damaging a
belligerent as he could by due diligence have prevented, and which by
culpable negligence he failed to prevent. It is by no means obligatory
for a neutral to prevent such acts under all circumstances and
conditions. This is in fact impossible, and it becomes more obviously so
the larger a neutral State, and the longer its boundary lines. So long
as a neutral exercises due diligence for the purpose of preventing such
acts, he is not responsible in case they are nevertheless performed.
However, the term _due diligence_ has become controversial through the
definition proffered by the United States of America in interpreting the
Three Rules of Washington, and through the Geneva Court of Arbitration
adopting such interpretation.[720] According to this interpretation the
_due diligence_ of a neutral _must be in proportion to the risks to
which either belligerent may be exposed from failure to fulfil the
obligations of neutrality on his part_. Had this interpretation been
generally accepted, the most oppressive obligations would have become
incumbent upon neutrals. But no such general acceptance has taken place.
The fact is that _due diligence_ in International Law can have no other
meaning than it has in Municipal Law. It means _such diligence as can
reasonably be expected when all the circumstances and conditions of the
case are taken into consideration_.

[Footnote 720: See above, [p] 335.]

Be that as it may, the Second Peace Conference has taken a step which
certainly excludes for the future the continuation of the controversy
regarding the interpretation of _due diligence_, for articles 8 and 25
of Convention XIII., instead of stipulating due diligence on the part of
neutrals, stipulate _the employment of the means at their disposal_.

[Sidenote: Laying of Submarine Contact Mines by Neutrals.]

[p] 363_a_. In order to defend themselves against possible violations of
their neutral territory, neutrals may lay automatic contact mines off
their coasts. If they do this, they must, according to article 4 of
Convention VIII., observe the same rules and take the same precautions
as are imposed upon belligerents, and as have been expounded above, [p]
182_a_. Moreover they must, according to paragraph 2 of article 4 of
Convention VIII., give notice in advance to mariners of the place where
automatic contact mines have been laid, and this notice must be
communicated at once to the Governments through the diplomatic channels.

Convention VIII. is quite as unsatisfactory in its rules concerning
mines laid by neutrals as in its rules concerning mines laid by
belligerents, and the danger to neutral shipping created by mines laid
by neutrals is very great, all the more as the laying of mines by
neutrals is not restricted to their maritime belt. For article 4 of
Convention VIII. speaks of the laying of contact mines on the part of
neutral Powers _off their coasts_, without limiting the laying within
the three-mile wide maritime belt as was proposed at the Second Peace
Conference, and as article 6[721] of the _Reglementation internationale
de l'Usage des Mines sous-marines et torpilles_ of the Institute of
International Law likewise proposes.

[Footnote 721: See _Annuaire_, XXIV. (1911), p. 302.]


IX

RIGHT OF ANGARY

  Hall, [p] 278--Lawrence, [p] 233--Westlake, II. p.
  119--Phillimore, III. [p] 29--Halleck, I. p. 485--Taylor, [p]
  641--Walker, [p] 69--Bluntschli, [p] 795A--Heffter, [p]
  150--Bulmerincq in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 98-103--Geffcken in
  Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 771-773--Ullmann, [p] 192--Bonfils, No.
  1440--Despagnet, No. 494--Rivier, II. pp. 327-329--Kleen, II.
  [p][p] 165 and 230--Perels, [p] 40--Hautefeuille, III. pp.
  416-426--Holland, _War_, Nos. 139-140--_Land Warfare_, [p][p]
  507-510--Albrecht, _Requisitionen von neutralem Privateigenthum,
  insbesondere von Schiffen_ (1912), pp. 24-66.

[Sidenote: The Obsolete Right of Angary.]

[p] 364. Under the term _jus angariae_[722] many writers on
International Law place the right, often claimed and practised in former
times, of a belligerent deficient in vessels to lay an _embargo_ on and
seize neutral merchantmen in his harbours, and to compel them and their
crews to transport troops, ammunition, and provisions to certain places
on payment of freight in advance.[723] This practice arose in the Middle
Ages,[724] and was made much use of by Louis XIV. of France. To save the
vessels of their subjects from seizure under the right of angary, States
began in the seventeenth century to conclude treaties by which they
renounced such right with regard to each other's vessels. Thereby the
right came into disuse during the eighteenth century. Many writers[725]
assert, nevertheless, that it is not obsolete, and might be exercised
even to-day. But I doubt whether the Powers would concede to one another
the exercise of such a right. The facts that no case happened in the
nineteenth century and that International Law with regard to rights and
duties of neutrals has become much more developed during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, would seem to justify the opinion that such
angary is now probably obsolete,[726] although some writers[727] deny
this.

[Footnote 722: The term _angaria_, which in medieval Latin means _post
station_, is a derivation from the Greek term [Greek: angaros] for
messenger. _Jus angariae_ would therefore literally mean a right of
transport.]

[Footnote 723: See above, [p] 40.]

[Footnote 724: On the origin and development of the _jus angariae_, see
Albrecht, _op. cit._ pp. 24-37.]

[Footnote 725: See, for instance, Phillimore, III. [p] 29; Calvo, III.
[p] 1277; Heffter, [p] 150; Perels, [p] 40.]

[Footnote 726: See Article 39 of the "Reglement sur le regime legal des
navires ... dans les ports etrangers" adopted by the Institute of
International Law (_Annuaire_, XVII. 1898, p. 272): "Le droit d'angarie
est supprime, soit en temps de paix, soit en temps de guerre, quant aux
navires neutres."]

[Footnote 727: See Albrecht, _op. cit._ pp. 34-37.]

[Sidenote: The Modern Right of Angary.]

[p] 365. In contradistinction to this probably obsolete right to compel
neutral ships and their crews to render certain services, the modern
right of angary consists in the right of belligerents to make use of, or
destroy in case of necessity, _for the purpose of offence and defence_,
neutral property on their own or on enemy territory or on the Open Sea.
In case property of subjects of neutral States is vested with enemy
character,[728] it is not neutral property in the strict sense of the
term neutral, and all rules respecting appropriation, utilisation, and
destruction of enemy property obviously apply to it. The object of the
right of angary is _such property of subjects of neutral States as
retains its neutral character from its temporary position on belligerent
territory and which therefore is not vested with enemy character_. All
sorts of neutral property, whether it consists of vessels or other[729]
means of transport, or arms, ammunition, provisions, or other personal
property, may be the object of the right of angary, provided the
articles concerned are serviceable to military ends and wants. The
conditions under which the right may be exercised are the same as those
under which private enemy property may be utilised or destroyed, but in
every case the neutral owner must be fully indemnified.[730]

[Footnote 728: See above, [p] 90.]

[Footnote 729: Thus in 1870, during the Franco-German War, the Germans
seized hundreds of Swiss and Austrian railway carriages in France and
made use of them for military purposes.]

[Footnote 730: See article 6 of U.S. Naval War Code:--"If military
necessity should require it, neutral vessels found within the limits of
belligerent authority may be seized and destroyed, or otherwise used for
military purposes, but in such cases the owners of the neutral vessels
must be fully recompensed. The amount of the indemnity should, if
practicable, be agreed upon in advance with the owner or master of the
vessel; due regard must be had for treaty stipulations upon these
matters." See also Holland, _War_, No. 140.]

A remarkable case[731] happened in 1871 during the Franco-German War.
The Germans seized some British coal-vessels lying in the river Seine at
Duclair, and sank them for the purpose of preventing French gunboats
from running up the river. On the intervention of the British
Government, Count Bismarck refused to recognise the duty of Germany to
indemnify the owners of the vessels sunk, although he agreed to pay
indemnities.

[Footnote 731: See Albrecht, _op. cit._ pp. 45-48.]

However, it may safely be maintained that a duty to pay indemnities for
any damage done by exercising the right of angary must nowadays be
recognised. Article 53 of the Hague Regulations stipulates the payment
of indemnities for the seizure and utilisation of all appliances adapted
to the transport of persons or goods which are the private property of
inhabitants of occupied enemy territory, and article 52 of the Hague
Regulations stipulates payment for requisitions; if, thus, the immunity
from confiscation of private property of inhabitants is recognised, all
the more must that of private neutral property temporarily on occupied
enemy territory be recognised also.

[Sidenote: Right of Angary concerning Neutral Rolling Stock.]

[p] 366. A special case of the right of angary has found recognition by
article 19 of Convention V. of the Second Peace Conference enacting that
railway material coming from the territory of a neutral Power, whether
belonging to the neutral State or to companies or private persons, shall
not be requisitioned or utilised by a belligerent, _except in the case
of and to the extent required by absolute necessity_, that it shall as
soon as possible be sent back to the country of origin, and that
compensation shall be paid for its use.[732] But it must be mentioned
that article 19 gives a right to a neutral Power, whose railway
material has been requisitioned by a belligerent, to retain and make use
of, to a corresponding extent, railway material coming from the
territory of the belligerent concerned.

[Footnote 732: See Nowacki, _Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege_ (1906), pp.
115-126, and Albrecht, _op. cit._ pp. 22-24.]

[Sidenote: Right of Angary not deriving from Neutrality.]

[p] 367. Whatever the extent of the right of angary may be, it does not
derive from the law of neutrality. The correlative duty of a belligerent
to indemnify the neutral owner of property appropriated or destroyed by
the exercise of the right of angary does indeed derive from the law of
neutrality. But the right of angary itself is rather a right deriving
from the law of war. As a rule this law gives, under certain
circumstances and conditions, the right to a belligerent to seize, make
use of, or destroy private property of inhabitants only of occupied
enemy territory, but under other circumstances and conditions, and very
exceptionally, it likewise gives a belligerent the right to seize, use,
or destroy such neutral property as is temporarily on occupied enemy
territory.




CHAPTER III

BLOCKADE


I

CONCEPTION OF BLOCKADE

  Grotius, III. c. 1, [p] 5--Bynkershoek, _Quaest. jur. publ._ I. c.
  2-15--Vattel, III. [p] 117--Hall, [p][p] 233, 237-266--Lawrence,
  [p][p] 246-252--Westlake, II. pp. 228-239--Maine, pp.
  107-109--Manning, pp. 400-412--Phillimore, III. [p][p]
  285-321--Twiss, II. [p][p] 98-120--Halleck, II. pp.
  182-213--Taylor, [p][p] 674-684--Walker, [p][p] 76-82--Wharton,
  III. [p][p] 359-365--Moore, VII. [p][p] 1266-1286--Wheaton, [p][p]
  509-523--Bluntschli, [p][p] 827-840--Heffter, [p][p]
  154-157--Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 738-771--Ullmann, [p]
  182--Bonfils, Nos. 1608-1659--Despagnet, Nos.
  620-640--Pradier-Fodere, VI. Nos. 2676-2679, and VIII. Nos.
  3109-3152--Nys, III. pp. 224-244, 693-694--Rivier, II. pp.
  288-298--Calvo, V. [p][p] 2827-2908--Fiore, III. Nos.
  1606-1629--Martens, II. [p] 124--Pillet, pp. 129-144--Kleen, I.
  [p][p] 124-139--Ortolan, II. pp. 292-336--Hautefeuille, II. pp.
  189-288--Gessner, pp. 145-227--Perels, [p][p] 48-51--Testa, pp.
  221-229--Dupuis, Nos. 159-198, and _Guerre_, Nos. 113-136--Boeck,
  Nos. 670-726--Holland, _Prize Law_, [p][p] 106-140--U.S. Naval War
  Code, articles 37-43--Bernsten, [p] 10--Nippold, II. [p]
  32--Bargrave Deane, _The Law of Blockade_ (1870)--Fauchille, _Du
  blocus maritime_ (1882)--Carnazza-Amari, _Del blocco maritimo_
  (1897)--Fremont, _De la saisie des navires en cas de blocus_
  (1899)--Guynot-Boissiere, _Du blocus maritime_ (1899)--[p][p]
  35-44 of the "Reglement international des prises maritimes"
  (_Annuaire_, IX. 1887, p. 218), adopted by the Institute of
  International Law--Atherley-Jones, _Commerce in War_ (1906) pp.
  92-252--Soederquist, _Le Blocus Maritime_ (1908)--Hansemann, _Die
  Lehre von der einheitlichen Reise im Rechte der Blockade und
  Kriegskonterbande_ (1910)--Gueldenagel, _Verfolgung und
  Rechtsfolgen des Blockadebruches_ (1911)--Hirschmann, _Das
  internationale Prisenrecht_ (1912) [p][p] 17-23--Kennedy in _The
  Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation_, New Series,
  IX. (1908), pp. 239-251--Myers in _A.J._ IV. pp. 571-595--General
  Report presented to the Naval Conference of London by its Drafting
  Committee, articles 1-21.

[Sidenote: Definition of Blockade.]

[p] 368. Blockade is the blocking by men-of-war[733] of the approach to
the enemy coast or a part of it for the purpose of preventing ingress
and egress of vessels of all nations. Blockade must not be confounded
with siege, although it may take place concurrently with siege. Whereas
siege aims at the capture of the besieged place, blockade endeavours
merely to intercept all intercourse, and especially commercial
intercourse, by sea between the coast and the world at large. Although
blockade is, as shown above in [p][p] 173 and 174, a means of warfare
against the enemy, it concerns neutrals as well, because the ingress and
egress of neutral vessels are thereby interdicted and may be punished.

[Footnote 733: When in 1861, during the American Civil War, the Federal
Government blocked the harbour of Charleston by sinking ships laden with
stone, the question arose whether a so-called stone-blockade is lawful.
There ought to be no doubt--see below, [p] 380--that such a
stone-blockade is not a blockade in the ordinary sense of the term, and
that neutral ships may not be seized and confiscated for having
attempted egress or ingress. But, on the other hand, there ought to be
no doubt either that this mode of obstructing an enemy port is as lawful
as any other means of sea warfare, provided the blocking of the harbour
is made known so that neutral vessels can avoid the danger of being
wrecked. See Wharton, III. [p] 361A; Fauchille, _Blocus_, pp. 143-145;
Perels, [p] 35, p. 187.]

Blockade in the modern sense of the term is an institution which could
not develop until neutrality was in some form a recognised institution
of the Law of Nations, and until the freedom of neutral commerce was in
some form guaranteed. The institution of blockade dates from the
sixteenth century,[734] but it has taken several hundred years for the
institution to reach its present condition, since, until the beginning
of the nineteenth century, belligerents frequently made use of so-called
paper blockades, which are no longer valid, a blockade now being binding
only if effective.

[Footnote 734: See Fauchille, _Blocus_, pp. 2-6.]

It is on account of the practical importance of blockade for the
interests of neutrals that the matter is more conveniently treated with
neutrality than with war. And it must be noted that blockade as a means
of warfare must not be confounded with so-called pacific blockade, which
is a means of compulsive settlement of State differences.

Apart from the stipulation of the Declaration of Paris that a blockade
to be binding must be effective, no conventional rules concerning
blockade were in existence until the Declaration of London, nor was the
practice of the States governed by common rules covering all the points
concerned. But articles 1-21 of the Declaration of London now offer a
code of the law of blockade and will, should this Declaration be
ratified, in time produce a common practice of all maritime States.

[Sidenote: Blockade, Strategic and Commercial.]

[p] 369. A blockade is termed strategic if it forms part of other
military operations directed against the coast which is blockaded, or if
it be declared in order to cut off supply to enemy forces on shore. In
contradistinction to blockade strategic, one speaks of a commercial
blockade, when a blockade is declared simply in order to cut off the
coast from intercourse with the outside world, although no military
operations take place on shore. That blockades commercial are, according
to the present rules of International Law, as legitimate as blockades
strategic, is not generally denied. But several writers[735] maintain
that blockades purely commercial ought to be abolished as not in
accordance with the guaranteed freedom of neutral commerce during war.

[Footnote 735: See Hall, [p] 233.]

[Sidenote: Blockade to be Universal.]

[p] 370. A blockade is really in being when vessels of all nations are
interdicted and prevented from ingress or egress. Blockade as a means of
warfare is admissible only in the form of a _universal_ blockade, that
is--as article 5 of the Declaration of London stipulates--it "must be
applied impartially to the vessels of all nations." If the blockading
belligerent were to allow the ingress or egress of vessels of one
nation, no blockade would exist.[736]

[Footnote 736: The _Rolla_ (1807), 6 C. Rob. 364; the _Franciska_
(1855), Spinks, 287. See also below, [p] 382.]

On the other hand, provided a blockade is universal, a special licence
of ingress or egress may be given to a special vessel and for a
particular purpose,[737] and men-of-war of all neutral nations may be
allowed to pass to and fro unhindered.[738] Thus, when during the
American Civil War the Federal Government blockaded the coast of the
Confederate States, neutral men-of-war were not prevented from ingress
and egress. But it must be specially observed that a belligerent has a
right to prevent neutral men-of-war from passing through the line of
blockade, and it is entirely within his discretion whether or not he
will admit or exclude them; nor is he compelled to admit them all, even
though he has admitted one or more of them.

[Footnote 737: This exception to the general rule is not mentioned by
the Declaration of London, but I have no doubt that the International
Prize Court would recognise it.]

[Footnote 738: Recognised by article 6 of the Declaration of London.]

[Sidenote: Blockade, Outwards and Inwards.]

[p] 371. As a rule a blockade is declared for the purpose of preventing
ingress as well as egress. But sometimes only ingress or only egress is
prevented. In such cases one speaks of "Blockade inwards" and of
"Blockade outwards" respectively. Thus the blockade of the mouth of the
Danube declared by the Allies in 1854 during the Crimean War was a
"blockade inwards," since the only purpose was to prevent supply
reaching the Russian Army from the sea.[739]

[Footnote 739: The _Gerasimo_ (1857), 11 Moore, P.C. 88.]

[Sidenote: What Places can be Blockaded.]

[p] 372. In former times it was sometimes asserted that only ports, or
even only fortified[740] ports, could be blockaded, but the practice of
the States has always shown that single ports and portions of an enemy
coast as well as the whole of the enemy coast may be blockaded. Thus
during the American Civil War the whole of the coast of the Confederate
States to the extent of about 2500 nautical miles was blockaded. And
attention must be drawn to the fact, that such ports of a belligerent
as are in the hands of the enemy may be the object of a blockade. Thus
during the Franco-German War the French blockaded[741] their own ports
of Rouen, Dieppe, and Fecamp, which were occupied by the Germans.
Article 1 of the Declaration of London indirectly sanctions the practice
of the States by enacting that "a blockade must not extend beyond the
ports and coasts belonging to or occupied by the enemy."

[Footnote 740: Napoleon I. maintained in his Berlin Decrees: "Le droit
de blocus, d'apres la raison et l'usage de tous les peuples polices,
n'est applicable qu'aux places fortes."]

[Footnote 741: See Fauchille, _Blocus_, p. 161.]

[Sidenote: Blockade of International Rivers.]

[p] 373. It is a moot question whether the mouth of a so-called
international river may be the object of a blockade, in case the
riparian States are not all belligerents. Thus, when in 1854, during the
Crimean War, the allied fleets of Great Britain and France blockaded the
mouth of the Danube, Bavaria and Wuerttemberg, which remained neutral,
protested. When in 1870 the French blockaded the whole of the German
coast of the North Sea, they exempted the mouth of the river Ems,
because it runs partly through Holland. And when in 1863, during the
blockade of the coast of the Confederate States, the Federal cruiser
_Vanderbilt_ captured the British vessel _Peterhoff_[742] destined for
Matamaros, on the Mexican shore of the Rio Grande, the American Courts
released the vessel on the ground that trade with Mexico, which was
neutral, could not be prohibited.

[Footnote 742: 5 Wallace, 49. See Fauchille, _Blocus_, pp. 171-183;
Phillimore, III. [p] 293A; Hall, [p] 266; Rivier, II. p. 291.]

The Declaration of London would seem to settle the controversy only as
regards one point. By enacting that "the blockading forces must not bar
access to neutral ports or coasts," article 18 certainly prohibits the
blockade of the whole mouth of a boundary river between a neutral and a
belligerent State, as, for instance, the River Rio Grande in case of war
with the United States of America, provided Mexico remained neutral. But
no provision is made for the case of the blockade of the mouths of
rivers, such as the Danube or the Rhine, for example, which pass through
several States between their sources and their mouths at the sea coast,
if one or more upper riparian States remain neutral.

[Sidenote: Justification of Blockade.]

[p] 374. The question has been raised in what way blockade, which vests
a belligerent with a certain jurisdiction over neutral vessels and which
has detrimental consequences for neutral trade, could be justified.[743]
Several writers, following Hautefeuille,[744] maintain that the
establishment of a blockade by a belligerent stationing a number of
men-of-war so as to block the approach to the coast includes conquest of
that part of the sea, and that such conquest justifies a belligerent in
prohibiting ingress and egress of vessels of all nations. In
contradistinction to this artificial construction of a conquest of a
part of the sea, some writers[745] try to justify blockade by the
necessity of war. I think, however, no special justification of blockade
is necessary at all. The fact is that the detrimental consequences of
blockade to neutrals stand in the same category as the many other
detrimental consequences of war to neutrals. Neither the one nor the
other need be specially justified. A blockade interferes indeed with the
recognised principle of the freedom of the sea, and, further, with the
recognised freedom of neutral commerce. But all three have developed
together, and when the freedom of the sea in time of peace and war, and,
further, when the freedom of neutral commerce became generally
recognised, the exceptional restrictions of blockade became at the same
time recognised as legitimate.

[Footnote 743: The matter is thoroughly treated by Fauchille, _Blocus_,
pp. 13-36, and Gueldenagel, _op. cit._ pp. 39-86.]

[Footnote 744: See Hautefeuille, II. pp. 190-191.]

[Footnote 745: See Gessner, p. 151; Bluntschli, [p] 827; Martens, II.
[p] 124.]


II

ESTABLISHMENT OF BLOCKADE

  See the literature quoted above at the commencement of [p] 368.

[Sidenote: Competence to establish Blockade.]

[p] 375. A declaration of blockade being "a high[746] act of
sovereignty" and having far-reaching consequences upon neutral trade, it
is generally recognised not to be in the discretion of a commander of a
naval force to establish blockade without the authority of his
Government. Article 9 of the Declaration of London precisely enacts that
"a Declaration of blockade is made by the blockading Power or by the
naval authorities acting in its name." The authority of his Government
to establish a blockade can be granted to a commander of a naval force
purposely for a particular blockade, the Government ordering the
commander of a squadron to blockade a certain port or coast. Or a
Government can expressly delegate its power to blockade to a commander
for use at his discretion. And if operations of war take place at great
distance[747] from the seat of Government and a commander finds it
necessary to establish a blockade, the latter can become valid through
his Government giving its immediate consent after being informed of the
act of the commander. And, further, the powers vested in the hands of
the supreme commander of a fleet are supposed to include the authority
to establish a blockade in case he finds it necessary, provided that his
Government acquiesces as soon as it is informed of the establishment of
the blockade.[748]

[Footnote 746: The _Henrik_ and _Maria_ (1799), 1 C. Rob. 146.]

[Footnote 747: The _Rolla_ (1807), 6 C. Rob. 364.]

[Footnote 748: As regards the whole matter, see Fauchille, _Blocus_, pp.
68-73.]

[Sidenote: Declaration and Notification of Blockade.]

[p] 376. A blockade is not in being _ipso facto_ by the outbreak of war.
And even the actual blocking of the approach to an enemy coast by
belligerent men-of-war need not by itself mean that the ingress and
egress of _neutral_ vessels are to be prohibited, since it can take
place for the purpose of preventing the egress and ingress of _enemy_
vessels only. Continental writers, therefore, have always considered
notification to be essential for the establishment of a blockade.
English, American, and Japanese writers, however, have not hitherto held
notification to be essential, although they considered knowledge on the
part of a neutral vessel of an existing blockade to be necessary for her
condemnation for breach of blockade.[749]

[Footnote 749: See below, [p] 384.]

But although Continental writers have always held notification to be
essential for the establishment of blockade, they differed with regard
to the kind of notification that is necessary. Some writers[750]
maintained that three different notifications must take place--namely,
first, a local notification to the authorities of the blockaded ports or
coast; secondly, a diplomatic or general notification to all maritime
neutral States by the blockading belligerent; and, thirdly, a special
notification to every approaching neutral vessel. Other writers[751]
considered only diplomatic and special notification essential. Others
again[752] maintained that special notification to every approaching
neutral vessel is alone required, although they recommended diplomatic
notification as a matter of courtesy.

[Footnote 750: See, for instance, Kleen, I. [p] 131.]

[Footnote 751: See, for instance, Bluntschli, 831-832; Martens, II. [p]
124, Gessner, p. 181.]

[Footnote 752: See, for instance, Hautefeuille, II. pp. 224 and 226;
Calvo, V. [p] 2846; Fauchille, pp. 219-221.]

As regards the practice of States, it has always been usual for the
commander who established a blockade to send a notification of the
blockade to the authorities of the blockaded ports or coast and the
foreign consuls there. It has, further, always been usual for the
blockading Government to notify the fact diplomatically to all neutral
maritime States. And some States, as France and Italy, have always
ordered their blockading men-of-war to board every approaching neutral
vessel and notify her of the establishment of the blockade. But Great
Britain, the United States of America, and Japan did not formerly
consider notification to be essential for the institution of a blockade.
They held the simple fact that the approach was blocked, and egress and
ingress of neutral vessels actually prevented, to be sufficient to make
the existence of a blockade known, and when no diplomatic notification
had taken place, they did not seize a vessel for breach of blockade
whose master had no actual notice of the existence of the blockade.
English,[753] American,[754] and Japanese[755] practice, accordingly,
made a distinction between a so-called _de facto_ blockade on the one
hand, and, on the other, a notified blockade.

[Footnote 753: The _Vrouw Judith_ (1799), 1 C. Rob. 150.]

[Footnote 754: See U.S. Naval War Code, articles 39-40.]

[Footnote 755: See Japanese Prize Law, article 30.]

The Declaration of London, when ratified, will create a common practice,
for articles 8 to 12 represent an agreement of the Powers on the
following points:--

(1) There must be a _declaration_ as well as a _notification_ in order
to make a blockade binding (article 8). If there is either no proper
declaration or no proper notification, the blockade is not binding.

(2) A _declaration_ of blockade is made either by the blockading Power
or by the naval authorities acting in its name. The declaration of
blockade must specify (_a_) the date when the blockade begins; (_b_) the
geographical limits of the coastline under blockade; and (_c_) the
period within which neutral vessels may come out (article 9). If the
commencement of the blockade or its geographical limits are given
inaccurately in the declaration, or if no mention is made of the period
within which neutral vessels may come out, or if this period is given
inaccurately, the declaration is void, and a new declaration is
necessary in order to make the blockade binding (article 10).

(3) _Notification_ of the declaration of blockade must at once be made.
Two notifications are necessary (article 11):--

The first notification must be made by the Government of the blockading
fleet to all neutral Governments either through the diplomatic channel,
or otherwise, for instance by telegraph. The purpose of this
notification is to enable neutral Governments to inform merchantmen
sailing under their flag of the establishment of a blockade.

The second notification must be made to the local authorities by the
officer commanding the blockading force; these authorities have on their
part to notify, as soon as possible, the foreign consuls at the
blockaded port or coastline. The purpose of this notification is to
enable neutral merchantmen in the blockaded port or ports to receive
knowledge of the establishment of the blockade and to prepare themselves
to leave the port within the period specified in the declaration of
blockade.

(4) The rules as to declaration and notification of blockade apply to
cases where the limits of a blockade have been extended, or where a
blockade is re-established after having been raised (article 12).

[Sidenote: Length of Time for Egress of Neutral Vessels.]

[p] 377. As regards _ingress_, a blockade becomes valid the moment it is
established; even vessels in ballast have no right of ingress. As
regards _egress_, it has always been usual for the blockading commander
to grant a certain length of time within which neutral vessels might
leave the blockaded ports unhindered, but no rule existed respecting the
length of such time, although fifteen days were frequently
granted.[756] This usage of granting to neutral vessels a period within
which they may leave the blockaded port, has been made a binding rule by
the Declaration of London. For, since article 9 enacts that a
declaration of blockade must specify the period within which neutral
vessels may come out, it implicitly enacts that the granting of such a
period is compulsory, although it may only be long enough to enable
neutral vessels to make their way out as quickly as possible.

[Footnote 756: According to U.S. Naval War Code, article 43, thirty days
are allowed "unless otherwise specially ordered."]

[Sidenote: End of Blockade.]

[p] 378. Apart from the conclusion of peace, a blockade can come to an
end in three different ways.

It may, firstly, be raised, or restricted in its limits, by the
blockading Power for any reason it likes. In such a case it has always
been usual to notify the end of blockade to all neutral maritime States,
and article 13 of the Declaration of London turns this usage into a
binding rule by enacting that the voluntary raising of a blockade, as
also any restrictions in its limits, must, in the same way as the
declaration of a blockade, be notified to all neutral Governments by the
blockading Power, as well as to the local authorities by the officer
commanding the blockading fleet.

A blockade can, secondly, come to an end through an enemy force driving
off the blockading squadron or fleet. In such case the blockade ends
_ipso facto_ by the blockading squadron being driven away, whatever
their intention as to returning may be. Should the squadron return and
resume the blockade, it must be considered as new, and not simply the
continuation of the former blockade, and another declaration and
notification are necessary (article 12 of the Declaration of London).

The third ground for the ending of a blockade is its failure to be
effective, a point which will be treated below in [p] 382.


III

EFFECTIVENESS OF BLOCKADE

  See the literature quoted above at the commencement of [p] 368.

[Sidenote: Effective in contradistinction to Fictitious Blockade.]

[p] 379. The necessity for effectiveness in a blockade by means of the
presence of a blockading squadron of sufficient strength to prevent
egress and ingress of vessels became gradually recognised during the
first half of the nineteenth century; it became formally enacted as a
principle of the Law of Nations through the Declaration of Paris in
1856, and the Declaration of London enacts it by article 2. Effective
blockade is the contrast to so-called fictitious or paper blockade,
which was frequently practised during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and
at the beginning of the nineteenth century.[757] Fictitious blockade
consists in the declaration and notification that a port or a coast is
blockaded without, however, posting a sufficient number of men-of-war on
the spot to be really able to prevent egress and ingress of every
vessel. It was one of the principles of the First and of the Second
Armed Neutrality that a blockade should always be effective, but it was
not till after the Napoleonic wars that this principle gradually found
universal recognition. During the second half of the nineteenth century
even those States which had not acceded to the Declaration of Paris did
not dissent regarding the necessity for effectiveness of blockade.

[Footnote 757: See Fauchille, _Blocus_, pp. 74-109.]

[Sidenote: Condition of Effectiveness of Blockade.]

[p] 380. The condition of effectiveness of blockade, as defined by the
Declaration of Paris, is its maintenance _by such a force as is
sufficient really to prevent access to the coast_. But no unanimity
exists respecting what is required to constitute an effective blockade
according to this definition. Apart from differences of opinion
regarding points of minor interest, it may be stated that in the main
there are two conflicting opinions.

According to one opinion, the definition of an effective blockade
pronounced by the First Armed Neutrality of 1780 is valid, and a
blockade is effective only when the approach to the coast is barred by a
chain of men-of-war anchored on the spot and so near to one another that
the line cannot be passed without obvious danger to the passing
vessel.[758] This corresponds to the practice hitherto followed by
France.

[Footnote 758: See Hautefeuille, II. p. 194; Gessner, p. 179; Kleen, I.
[p] 129; Boeck, Nos. 676-681; Dupuis, Nos. 173-174; Fauchille, _Blocus_,
pp. 110-142. Phillimore, III. [p] 293, takes up the same standpoint in
so far as a blockade _de facto_ is concerned:--"A blockade _de facto_
should be effected by stationing a number of ships, and forming as it
were an arch of circumvallation round the mouth of the prohibited port,
where, if the arch fails in any one part, the blockade itself fails
altogether."]

According to another opinion, a blockade is effective when the approach
is watched--to use the words of Dr. Lushington[759]--"by a force
sufficient to render the egress and ingress dangerous, or, in other
words, save under peculiar circumstances, as fogs, violent winds, and
some necessary absences, sufficient to render the capture of vessels
attempting to go in or come out most probable." According to this
opinion there need be no chain of anchored men-of-war to expose any
vessels attempting to break the blockade to a cross fire, but a real
danger of capture suffices, whether the danger is caused by cruising or
anchored men-of-war. This is the standpoint of theory and practice of
Great Britain and the United States, and it seems likewise to be that of
Germany and several German writers.[760] The blockade during the
American War of the whole coast of the Confederate States to the extent
of 2500 nautical miles by four hundred Federal cruisers could, of
course, only be maintained by cruising vessels; and the fact that all
neutral maritime States recognised it as effective shows that the
opinion of dissenting writers has more theoretical than practical
importance.

[Footnote 759: In his judgment in the case of the _Franciska_ (1855),
Spinks, 287.]

[Footnote 760: See Perels, [p] 49; Bluntschli, [p] 829; Liszt, [p] 41,
III.]

The Declaration of London has settled the controversy in so far as
article 3 enacts that "the question whether a blockade is effective, is
a question of fact." Each case must, therefore, be judged according to
its merits, and the before mentioned decision of Dr. Lushington would
seem to have found implied recognition by article 3.

The question of effectiveness being one of fact, and the real danger to
passing vessels being the characteristic of effectiveness of blockade,
it must be recognised that in certain cases and in the absence of a
sufficient number of men-of-war a blockade may be made effective through
planting land batteries within range of any vessel attempting to
pass,[761] provided there be at least one man-of-war on the spot. But a
stone blockade,[762] so called because vessels laden with stones are
sunk in the channel to block the approach, is not an effective blockade.

[Footnote 761: The _Nancy_ (1809), 1 Acton, 63; the _Circassian_ (1864),
2 Wallace, 135; the _Olinde Rodrigues_ (1898), 174, United States, 510.
See also Bluntschli, [p] 829; Perels, [p] 49; Geffcken in Holtzendorff,
IV. p. 750; Walker, _Manual_, [p] 78.]

[Footnote 762: See above, [p] 368, p. 450, note 1. It ought to be
mentioned here also that according to article 2 of Convention VIII. "it
is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the ports and coasts of
the enemy, with the sole object of intercepting commercial navigation."]

And it must, lastly, be mentioned that the distance of the blockading
men-of war from the blockaded port or coast is immaterial so long as the
circumstances and conditions of the special case justify such distance.
Thus during the Crimean War the port of Riga was blockaded by a
man-of-war stationed at a distance of 120 miles from the town, in the
Lyser Ort, a channel three miles wide forming the only approach to the
gulf.[763]

[Footnote 763: The _Franciska_ (1855), Spinks, 287. See Hall, [p] 260,
and Holland, _Studies_, pp. 166-167.]

[Sidenote: Amount of Danger which creates Effectiveness.]

[p] 381. It is impossible to state exactly what degree of danger to a
vessel attempting to pass is necessary to prove an effective blockade.
It is recognised that a blockade does not cease to be effective in case
now and then a vessel succeeds in passing the line unhindered, provided
there was so much danger as to make her capture probable. Dr. Lushington
strikingly dealt with the matter in the following words:[764]--"The
maintenance of a blockade must always be a question of degree--of the
degree of danger attending ships going into or leaving a port. Nothing
is further from my intention, nor indeed more opposed to my notions,
than any relaxation of the rule that a blockade must be sufficiently
maintained; but it is perfectly obvious that no force could bar the
entrance to absolute certainty; that vessels may get in and get out
during the night, or fogs, or violent winds, or occasional absence; that
it is most difficult to judge from numbers alone. Hence, I believe that
in every case the inquiry has been, whether the force was competent and
present, and, if so, the performance of the duty was presumed; and I
think I may safely assert that in no case was a blockade held to be void
when the blockading force was on the spot or near thereto on the ground
of vessels entering into or escaping from the port, where such ingress
or egress did not take place with the consent of the blockading
squadron."

[Footnote 764: In his judgment in the case of the _Franciska_ (1855),
Spinks, 287.]

[Sidenote: Cessation of Effectiveness.]

[p] 382. A blockade is effective so long as the danger lasts which makes
probable the capture of such vessels as attempt to pass the approach. A
blockade, therefore, ceases _ipso facto_ by the absence of such danger,
whether the blockading men-of-war are driven away, or are sent away for
the fulfilment of some task which has nothing to do with the blockade,
or voluntarily withdraw, or allow the passage of vessels in other cases
than those which are exceptionally admissible. Thus, when in 1861,
during the American Civil War, the Federal cruiser _Niagara_, which
blockaded Charleston, was sent away and her place was taken after five
days by the _Minnesota_, the blockade ceased to be effective, although
the Federal Government refused to recognise this.[765] Thus, further,
when during the Crimean War Great Britain allowed Russian vessels to
export goods from blockaded ports, and accordingly the egress of such
vessels from the blockaded port of Riga was permitted, the blockade of
Riga ceased to be effective, because it tried to interfere with neutral
commerce only; therefore, the capture of the Danish vessel
_Franciska_[766] for attempting to break the blockade was not upheld.

[Footnote 765: See Mountague Bernard, _Neutrality of Great Britain
during the American Civil War_ (1870), pp. 237-239.]

[Footnote 766: Spinks, 287. See above, [p] 370.]

On the other hand, practice[767] and the majority of writers have always
recognised the fact that a blockade does not cease to be effective in
case the blockading force is driven away for a short time through stress
of weather, and article 4 of the Declaration of London precisely enacts
that "a blockade is not regarded as raised if the blockading force is
temporarily withdrawn on account of stress of weather." English[768]
writers, further, have hitherto denied that a blockade loses
effectiveness through a blockading man-of-war being absent for a short
time for the purpose of chasing a vessel which succeeded in passing the
approach unhindered,[769] but the Declaration of London does not
recognise this.[770]

[Footnote 767: The _Columbia_ (1799), 1 C. Rob. 154.]

[Footnote 768: See Twiss, II. [p] 103, p. 201, and Phillimore, III. [p]
294.]

[Footnote 769: See article 37 of U.S. Naval War Code.]

[Footnote 770: See the Report of the Drafting Committee on article 4 of
the Declaration of London.]


IV

BREACH OF BLOCKADE

  See the literature quoted above at the commencement of [p] 368.

[Sidenote: Definition of Breach of Blockade.]

[p] 383. Breach or violation of blockade is the unallowed ingress or
egress of a vessel in spite of the blockade. The attempted breach is, so
far as punishment is concerned, treated in the same way as the
consummated breach, but the practice of States has hitherto differed
with regard to the question at what time and by what act an attempt to
break a blockade commences.

It must be specially observed that the blockade-runner violates
International Law as little as the contraband carrier. Both (see below,
[p] 398) violate injunctions of the belligerent concerned.

[Sidenote: No Breach without Notice of Blockade.]

[p] 384. Since breach of blockade is, from the standpoint of the
blockading belligerent, a criminal act, knowledge on the part of a
vessel of the existence of a blockade is essential for making her egress
or ingress a breach of blockade.

It is for this reason that Continental theory and practice have never
considered a blockade established without local and diplomatic
notification, so that every vessel might have, or might be supposed to
have, notice of the existence of a blockade. And for the same reason
some States, as France and Italy, have never considered a vessel to have
committed a breach of blockade unless a special warning was given her
before her attempted ingress by one of the blockading cruisers stopping
her and recording the warning upon her log-book.[771]

[Footnote 771: See above, [p] 376.]

British, American, and Japanese practice regarding the necessary
knowledge of the existence of a blockade on the part of a vessel has
always made a distinction between actual and constructive notice, no
breach of blockade having been held to exist without either the one or
the other.[772] Actual notice has been considered knowledge acquired by
a direct warning from one of the blockading men-of-war or knowledge
acquired from any other public or private source of information.
Constructive knowledge has been presumed knowledge of the blockade on
the part of a vessel on the ground either of notoriety or of diplomatic
notification. The existence of a blockade has always been presumed to be
notorious to vessels within the blockaded ports, but it has been a
question of fact whether it was notorious to other vessels. And
knowledge of the existence of a blockade has always been presumed on the
part of a vessel in case sufficient time had elapsed after the home
State of the vessel had received diplomatic notification of the
blockade, so that it could inform thereof all vessels sailing under its
flag, whether or no they had actually received, or taken notice of, the
information.[773]

[Footnote 772: See Holland, _Prize Law_, [p][p] 107, 114-127; U.S. Naval
War Code, article 39; Japanese Prize Law, article 30.]

[Footnote 773: The _Vrouw Judith_ (1799), 1 C. Rob. 150; the _Neptunus_
(1799), 2 C. Rob. 110; the _Calypso_ (1799), 2 C. Rob. 298; the
_Neptunus_ (1800), 3 C. Rob. 173; the _Hoffnung_ (1805), 6 C. Rob. 112.]

The Declaration of London follows, to a certain extent, British,
American, and Japanese practice, but differs chiefly in the presumption
that knowledge of a blockade is never absolute, but may in every case be
rebutted. Article 14 enacts that "the liability of a neutral vessel to
capture for breach of blockade is contingent on her knowledge, actual or
presumptive, of the blockade." Knowledge of the blockade is presumed,
_failing proof to the contrary_, in case the vessel has left a neutral
port subsequent to the notification of the blockade to the Power to
which such port belongs, and provided that the notification was made in
sufficient time (article 15). But in case a neutral vessel _approaching_
a blockaded port has neither actual nor presumptive knowledge of the
blockade, she is not considered _in delicto_, and notification must be
made to her by recording a warning on her log-book, stating the day and
hour and the geographical position of the vessel at the time (article
16, first paragraph). Further, if a neutral vessel is _coming out_ of a
blockaded port, she must be allowed to pass free, in case, through the
negligence of the officer commanding the blockading fleet, no
declaration of blockade was notified to the local authorities, or in
case, in the declaration as notified, no period was mentioned within
which neutral vessels might come out (article 16, second paragraph).

[Sidenote: The former practice as to what constitutes an Attempt to
break Blockade.]

[p] 385. The practice of States as well as the opinions of writers have
hitherto differed much regarding such acts of a vessel as constitute an
attempt to break blockade.

(1) The Second Armed Neutrality of 1800 intended to restrict an attempt
to break blockade to the employment of force or ruse by a vessel on the
line of blockade for the purpose of passing through. This was, on the
whole, the practice of France, which moreover, as stated before,
required that the vessel should previous to the attempt have received
special warning from one of the blockading men-of-war. Many writers[774]
took the same standpoint.

(2) The practice of other States, as Japan, approved by many
writers,[775] went beyond this and considered it an attempt to break
blockade when a vessel, with or without force or ruse, endeavoured to
pass the line of blockade. This practice frequently saw an attempt
complete in the fact that a vessel destined for a blockaded place was
found anchoring or cruising near the line of blockade.

(3) The practice of Great Britain and the United States of America went
furthest, since it considered it an attempted breach of blockade when a
vessel, not destined according to her ship papers for a blockaded port,
was found near it and steering for it; and, further, when a vessel
destined for a port, the blockade of which was diplomatically notified,
started on her journey knowing that the blockade had not been raised,
except when the port from which the vessel sailed was so distant from
the scene of war as to justify her master in starting for a destination
known to be blockaded, on the chance of finding that the blockade had
been removed, and with an intention of changing her destination should
that not prove to be the case.[776] This practice, further, applied the
doctrine of continuous voyages[777] to blockade, for it considered an
attempt of breach of blockade to have been committed by such vessel as,
although ostensibly destined for a neutral or an unblockaded port, is in
reality intended, after touching there, to go on to a blockaded
port.[778]

(4) During the Civil War the American Prize Courts carried the practice
further by condemning such vessels for breach of blockade as knowingly
carried to a neutral port cargo ultimately destined for a blockaded
port, and by condemning for breach of blockade such cargo, but not the
vessel, as was ultimately destined for a blockaded port, when the
carrying vessel was ignorant of this ulterior destination of the cargo.
Thus the _Bermuda_,[779] a British vessel with a cargo, part of which
was, in the opinion of the American Courts, ultimately destined for the
blockaded ports of the Confederate States, was seized on her voyage to
the neutral British port of Nassau, in the Bahama Islands, and condemned
for breach of blockade by the American Courts. The same happened to the
British vessel _Stephen Hart_,[780] which was seized on her voyage to
the neutral port of Cardenas, in Cuba. And in the famous case of the
_Springbok_,[781] a British vessel also destined for Nassau, in the
Bahama Islands, which was seized on her voyage to this neutral British
port, the cargo alone was finally condemned for breach of blockade,
since, in the opinion of the Court, the vessel was not cognisant that
the cargo was intended to reach a blockaded port. The same happened to
the cargo of the British vessel _Peterhoff_[782] destined for the
neutral port of Matamaros, in Mexico. The British Government declined to
intervene in favour of the British owners of the respective vessels and
cargoes.[783]

[Footnote 774: See Hautefeuille, II. p. 134; Kleen, I. [p] 137; Gessner,
p. 202; Dupuis, No. 185; Fauchille, _Blocus_, p. 322.]

[Footnote 775: See Bluntschli, [p] 835; Perels, [p] 51; Geffcken in
Holtzendorff, IV. p. 763; Rivier, II. p. 431. See also [p] 25 of the
Prussian Regulations (1864) concerning Naval Prizes, and article 31 of
the Japanese Naval Prize Law.]

[Footnote 776: See Holland, _Prize Law_, [p] 133, and U.S. Naval War
Code, article 42; the _Betsey_ (1799), 1 C. Rob. 332.]

[Footnote 777: On this doctrine, see below, [p] 400, p. 499, note 1.]

[Footnote 778: See Holland, _Prize Law_, [p] 134, and the case of the
_James Cook_ (1810), Edwards, 261.]

[Footnote 779: 3 Wallace, [p] 14.]

[Footnote 780: 3 Wallace, 559.]

[Footnote 781: 5 Wallace, 1.]

[Footnote 782: 5 Wallace, 28.]

[Footnote 783: See _Parliamentary Papers_, Miscellaneous, N. 1 (1900),
"Correspondence regarding the Seizure of the British Vessels _Springbok_
and _Peterhoff_ by the United States Cruisers in 1863."]

It is true that the majority of authorities[784] assert the illegality
of these judgments of the American Prize Courts, but it is a fact that
Great Britain at the time recognised as correct the principles which are
the basis of these judgments.

[Footnote 784: See, for instance, Holland, _Prize Law_, p. 38, note 2;
Phillimore, III. [p] 298; Twiss, _Belligerent Right on the High Seas_
(1884), p. 19; Hall, [p] 263; Gessner, _Kriegfuehrende und neutrale
Maechte_ (1877), pp. 95-100; Bluntschli, [p] 835; Perels, [p] 51;
Fauchille, pp. 333-344; Martens, II. [p] 124. See also Wharton, III. [p]
362, p. 401, and Moore, VII. [p] 1276.]

[Sidenote: What constitutes an Attempt to break Blockade according to
the Declaration of London.]

[p] 385_a_. The Declaration of London proposes a settlement of this
controversial matter by enacting in article 17 that "neutral vessels may
not be captured for breach of blockade except within the area of
operations of the men-of-war detailed to render the blockade
effective," and in article 19 that "whatever may be the ulterior
destination of a vessel or of her cargo, she may not be captured for
breach of blockade, if, at the moment, she is on the way to a
non-blockaded port."

Accordingly, a neutral vessel, to be guilty of an attempt to break
blockade, must actually have entered the _area of operations_ (_rayon
d'action_) of the blockading fleet. This _area of operations_ is a
question of fact in each case of a blockade. "When a Government decides
to undertake blockading operations against some part of the enemy coast
it details a certain number of men-of-war to take part in the blockade,
and entrusts the command to an officer whose duty it is to use them for
the purpose of making the blockade effective. The commander of the naval
force thus formed posts the vessels at his disposal according to the
line of the coast and the geographical position of the blockaded places,
and instructs each vessel as to the part which she has to play, and
especially as to the zone which she is to watch. All the zones watched
taken together and so organised as to make the blockade effective, form
the area of operations of the blockading force."[785]

[Footnote 785: Report of the Drafting Committee on article 17.]

But the fact alone that a neutral vessel has entered the area of
operations is not sufficient to justify her capture, she must also be
destined and be on her way to the blockaded port. If she passes through
the area of operations without being destined and on her way to the
blockaded port, she is not attempting to break the blockade. Even should
the ulterior destination of a vessel or her cargo be the blockaded port,
she is not considered to attempt to break the blockade, if, at the
moment of the visitation, she is really on her way to a non-blockaded
port (article 19). However, she must really, and not only apparently, be
on her way to a non-blockaded port; if it can be proved that in reality
her immediate destination is the blockaded port and that she only feigns
to be destined for a non-blockaded port, she may be captured, for she is
actually attempting to break the blockade.[786]

[Footnote 786: See the Report of the Drafting Committee on article 19.]

From these stipulations of the Declaration of London it becomes quite
apparent that the application to blockade of the doctrine of continuous
voyage in any form is not admissible.

[Sidenote: When Ingress is not considered Breach of Blockade.]

[p] 386. Although blockade inwards interdicts ingress to all vessels, if
not especially licensed,[787] necessity makes exceptions to the rule.

[Footnote 787: See above, [p] 370.]

According to the practice which has hitherto been quite general,
whenever a vessel either by need of repairs,[788] stress of
weather,[789] want of water[790] or provisions, or upon any other ground
was absolutely obliged to enter a blockaded port, such ingress did not
constitute a breach of blockade. On the other hand, according to the
British practice at any rate, ingress did not cease to be breach of
blockade if caused by intoxication of the master,[791] ignorance[792] of
the coast, loss of compass,[793] endeavour to get a pilot,[794] and the
like, or an attempt to ascertain[795] whether the blockade was
raised.[796]

[Footnote 788: The _Charlotta_ (1810), Edwards, 252.]

[Footnote 789: The _Fortuna_ (1803), 5 C. Rob. 27.]

[Footnote 790: The _Hurtige Hanne_ (1799), 2 C. Rob. 124.]

[Footnote 791: The _Shepherdess_ (1804), 5 C. Rob. 262.]

[Footnote 792: The _Adonis_ (1804), 5 C. Rob. 256.]

[Footnote 793: The _Elizabeth_ (1810), Edwards, 198.]

[Footnote 794: The _Neutralitet_ (1805), 6 C. Rob. 30.]

[Footnote 795: The _Spes_ and _Irene_ (1804), 5 C. Rob. 76.]

[Footnote 796: See Holland, _Prize Law_, [p][p] 135-136.]

The Declaration of London recognises that necessity makes exceptions to
the rule that vessels may not enter a blockaded port. Article 7 enacts
that "in circumstances of distress, acknowledged by an officer of the
blockading force, a neutral vessel may enter a place under blockade, and
subsequently leave it, provided that she has neither discharged nor
shipped any cargo there." It has, however, to be kept in view that
article 7, firstly, does not define the term _circumstances of
distress_, and, secondly, makes it a condition that the circumstances
concerned must be acknowledged by an officer of the blockading force.
Everything is, therefore, _prima facie_ at any rate, left to the
consideration of the respective officer. A vessel in distress will have
to signal to the man-of-war of the blockading force which she meets
within the area of operations that she intends to enter the blockaded
port, and the commander of the man-of-war will have to convince himself
that circumstances of distress really exist, and that no fraud is
intended. The commander may deny the condition of distress, and then the
vessel may not proceed, although the State whose flag she flies may ask
for indemnities in case there really was distress and the vessel was
lost or damaged by not being allowed to enter the blockaded port. On the
other hand, when once the commander of the man-of-war has acknowledged
that the respective vessel is in a condition of distress, it is not in
his discretion, but he is in duty bound,[797] to allow her to enter the
blockaded port.

[Footnote 797: See Report of the Drafting Committee on article 7.]

[Sidenote: When Egress is not considered Breach of Blockade.]

[p] 387. There are a few cases of egress which, according to the
hitherto prevailing practice of Great Britain and most other States,
were not considered breaches of blockade outwards.[798] Thus, a vessel
that was in a blockaded port before the commencement of the
blockade[799] was allowed to sail from this port in ballast, as was also
a vessel that had entered during a blockade either in ignorance of it or
with the permission of the blockading squadron.[800] Thus, further, a
vessel the cargo of which was put on board before the commencement of
the blockade was allowed to leave the port afterwards unhindered.[801]
Thus, again, a vessel obliged by absolute necessity to enter a blockaded
port was afterwards allowed to leave it unhindered. And a vessel
employed by the diplomatic envoy of a neutral State for the exclusive
purpose of sending home from a blockaded port distressed seamen of his
nationality was also allowed to pass unhindered.[802]

[Footnote 798: See Holland, _Prize Law_, [p] 130; Twiss, II. [p] 113;
Phillimore, III. [p] 313.]

[Footnote 799: The _Frederick Moltke_ (1798), 1 C. Rob. 86.]

[Footnote 800: The _Juno_ (1799), 2 C. Rob. 116.]

[Footnote 801: The _Vrouw Judith_ (1799), 1 C. Rob. 150.]

[Footnote 802: The _Rose in Bloom_ (1811), 1 Dodson, 55.]

The Declaration of London recognises by article 7--see above, [p]
386--that a vessel which, on account of distress, entered a blockaded
port, must be allowed to leave it afterwards, provided she has neither
discharged nor shipped cargo there. And article 16, second
paragraph--see above, [p] 384--enacts that a vessel coming out of a
blockaded port must be allowed to pass free, if, through the negligence
of the commander of the blockading fleet, no declaration of blockade has
been notified to the local authorities, or if, in the declaration as
notified, no period has been mentioned within which neutral vessels
might come out. But beyond these the Declaration of London does not
specify any cases in which egress is not considered breach of blockade.
The International Prize Court will, if established, have to develop a
more detailed practice concerning the matter.

[Sidenote: Passage through Unblockaded Canal no Breach of Blockade.]

[p] 388. A breach of blockade can only be committed by passing through
the blockaded approach. Therefore, if the maritime approach to a port is
blockaded whilst an inland canal leads to another unblockaded port of
the enemy or to a neutral port, no breach of blockade is committed by
the egress or the ingress of a vessel passing such canal for the purpose
of reaching the blockaded port.[803]

[Footnote 803: The _Stert_ (1801), 4 C. Rob. 65. See Phillimore, III.
[p] 314.]

Although the Declaration of London does not mention this point, the
International Prize Court would surely decide it as stated, since this
decision is based on common sense.


V

CONSEQUENCES OF BREACH OF BLOCKADE

  See the literature quoted above at the commencement of [p] 368.

[Sidenote: Capture of Blockade-running Vessels.]

[p] 389. It is universally recognised that a vessel may be captured for
a breach of blockade _in delicto_ only, that means, during the time of
an attempt to break it, or of the breach itself. But here again practice
as well as theory hitherto have differed much, since there has been no
unanimity with regard to the extent of time during which an attempt of
breach and the breach itself could be said to be actually continuing.

It has already been stated above in [p] 385 that it has been a moot
point from what moment a breach of blockade could be said to have been
attempted, and that according to the practice of Great Britain and the
United States an attempt was to be found in the fact that a vessel
destined for a blockaded port was starting on her voyage. It is obvious
that the controversy bore upon the question from what point of time a
blockade-running vessel must be considered _in delicto_.

But it has been likewise a moot point as to when the period of time
during which a blockade-running vessel might be said to be _in delicto_
came to an end. According to Continental theory and practice, such
vessel was considered to be _in delicto_ only so long as she was
actually on the line of blockade, or, having fled from there, so long as
she was pursued by one of the blockading cruisers. On the other hand,
according to the practice of Great Britain[804] and the United
States,[805] a blockade-running vessel was held to be _in delicto_ so
long as she _had not completed her voyage from the blockaded port to the
port of her destination and back to the port from which she started
originally_, the voyage out and home being considered one voyage. But a
vessel was held to be _in delicto_ so long only as the blockade
continued, capture being no longer admissible in case the blockade had
been raised or had otherwise come to an end.

[Footnote 804: The _Welvaart van Pillaw_ (1799), 2 C. Rob. 128; _General
Hamilton_ (1805), 6 C. Rob. 61.]

[Footnote 805: See U.S. Naval War Code, article 44.]

The Declaration of London, when ratified, will settle the controversy,
for, according to article 20, a vessel is _in delicto_ so long only as
she is pursued by a man-of-war of the blockading force, and she may no
longer be captured if the pursuit is abandoned or if the blockade is
raised. Stress must be laid on two points. Firstly, the pursuit must be
carried out by a man-of-war belonging to the blockading force, and not
by any other cruiser. Secondly, a blockade-breaking vessel is liable to
capture so long as the pursuit lasts, whether or no she is still within
the area of operations; even if for a while she has taken refuge in a
neutral port, she may, on coming out, be captured, provided the captor
is one of the men-of-war of the blockading force which pursued her and
waited for her outside the port of refuge.[806]

[Footnote 806: See the Report of the Drafting Committee on article 20.]

[Sidenote: Penalty for Breach of Blockade.]

[p] 390. Capture being effected, the blockade-runner must be sent to a
port to be brought before a Prize Court. For this purpose the crew may
be temporarily detained, as they will have to serve as witnesses. In
former times the crew could be imprisoned, and it is said that even
capital[807] punishment could have been pronounced against them. But
since the eighteenth century this practice of imprisoning the crew has
been abandoned, and nowadays the crew may not even be made prisoners of
war, but must be released as soon as the Prize Court has pronounced its
verdict.[808] The only penalty which may be pronounced is confiscation
of the vessel and the cargo. But the practice[809] of the several States
has hitherto differed much concerning the penalty for breach of
blockade. According to British and American practice, confiscation of
both vessel and cargo used to take place in case the owners of the
vessel were identical with those of the cargo. In case vessel and cargo
had not the same owners, confiscation of both took place only when the
cargo consisted of contraband of war or the owners knew of the blockade
at the time the cargo was shipped for the blockaded port.[810] And it
mattered not whether the captured vessel which carried the cargo had
herself actually passed through the blockaded line, or the breach of
blockade was effected through a combined action of lighters and the
vessel, the lighters passing the line and discharging the cargo into the
vessel near the line, or _vice versa_.[811] The cargo alone was
confiscated according to the judgments of the American Prize Courts
during the Civil War in the case of the _Springbok_ and in similar
cases[812] when goods ultimately destined for a blockaded port were sent
to a neutral port on a vessel whose owners were ignorant of this
ulterior destination of the goods.

[Footnote 807: See Bynkershoek, _Quaest. jur. publ._ I. c. 11.]

[Footnote 808: See Calvo, V. [p][p] 2897-2898. U.S. Naval War Code,
article 45.]

[Footnote 809: See Fauchille, _Blocus_, pp. 357-394: Gessner, pp.
210-214; Perels, [p] 51, pp. 276-278.]

[Footnote 810: The _Mercurius_ (1798), 1 C. Rob. 80; the _Columbia_
(1799), 1 C. Rob. 154; the _Alexander_ (1801), 4 C. Rob. 93; the
_Adonis_ (1804), 5 C. Rob. 256; the _Exchange_ (1808), Edwards, 39; the
_Panaghia Rhomba_ (1858), 12 Moore, P.C. 168--See Phillimore, III.
[p][p] 318-319.]

[Footnote 811: The _Maria_ (1805), 6 C Rob. 201.]

[Footnote 812: See above, [p] 385 (4).]

The Declaration of London settles the matter by a very simple rule, for
according to article 21 the penalty for blockade-breaking is
condemnation of the vessel in all cases, and condemnation of the cargo
also, unless the owner proves that at the time of the shipment of the
goods the shipper _neither knew nor could have known_ of the intention
of the vessel to break the blockade. The case in which the whole or part
of the cargo consists of contraband, is not mentioned by article 21, but
its condemnation is a matter of course.




CHAPTER IV

CONTRABAND


I

CONCEPTION OF CONTRABAND

  Grotius, III. c. 1, [p] 5--Bynkershoek, _Quaest. jur. publ._ I.
  cc, IX-XII--Vattel, III. [p][p] 111-113--Hall, [p][p]
  236-247--Lawrence, [p][p] 253-259--Westlake, II. pp.
  240-265--Maine, pp. 96-122--Manning, pp. 352-399--Phillimore, III.
  [p][p] 226-284--Twiss, II. [p][p] 121-151--Halleck, II. pp.
  214-238--Taylor, [p][p] 653-666--Walker, [p][p] 73-75--Wharton,
  III. [p][p] 368-375--Moore, VII. [p][p] 1249--1263--Wheaton,
  [p][p] 476-508 --Bluntschli, [p][p] 801-814--Heffter, [p][p]
  158-161--Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 713-731--Gareis, [p]
  89--Liszt, [p] 42--Ullmann, [p][p] 193-194--Bonfils, No.
  1537-1588'15--Despagnet, Nos. 705-715 _ter_ --Rivier, II pp.
  416-423--Calvo, V. [p][p] 2708-2795--Fiore, III. Nos. 1591-1601,
  and Code, Nos. 1827-1835--Martens, II. [p] 136--Kleen, I. [p][p]
  70-102--Boeck, Nos. 606-659--Pillet, pp. 315-330--Gessner, pp.
  70-144--Perels, [p][p] 44-46--Testa, pp. 201-220--Lawrence, _War_,
  pp. 140-174--Ortolan, II. pp. 165-213--Hautefeuille, II. pp.
  69-172 --Dupuis, Nos. 199-230, and _Guerre_, Nos.
  137-171--Bernsten, [p] 9--Nippold, II. [p] 35--Takahashi, pp.
  490-526--Holland, _Prize Law_, [p][p] 57-87--U.S. Naval War Code,
  articles 34-36--Heineccius, _De navibus ob vecturam vetitarum
  mercium commissis dissertatio_ (1740)--Huebner, _De la saisie des
  batiments neutres_, 2 vols. (1759)--Valin, _Traite des prises_, 2
  vols. (1763)--Martens, _Essai sur les armateurs, les prises, et
  surtout les reprises_ (1795)--Lampredi, _Del commercio dei populi
  neutrali in tempo di guerra_ (1801)--Tetens, _Considerations sur
  les droits reciproques des puissances belligerantes et des
  puissances neutres sur mer_ (1805)--Pistoye et Duverdy, _Traite
  des prises maritimes_, 2 vols. (1855)--Pratt, _The Law of
  Contraband of War_ (1856)--Moseley, _What is Contraband and what
  is not?_ (1861)--Upton, _The Law of Nations affecting Commerce
  during War_ (1863)--Lehmann, _Die Zufuhr von
  Kriegskonterbandewaren, etc._ (1877)--Kleen, _De contrebande de
  guerre et des transports interdits aux neutres_ (1893)--Vossen,
  _Die Konterbande des Krieges_ (1896)--Manceaux, _De la contrebande
  de guerre_ (1899)--Brochet, _De la contrebande de guerre_
  (1900)--Hirsch, _Kriegskonterbande und verbotene Transporte in
  Kriegszeiten_ (1901)--Pincitore, _Il contrabbando di guerra_
  (1902)--Remy, _Theorie de la continuaute du voyage en matiere de
  blocus et de contrebande de guerre_ (1902)--Knight, _Des etats
  neutres au point de vue de la contrebande de guerre_
  (1903)--Wiegner, _Die Kriegskonterbande_ (1904)--Atherley-Jones,
  _Commerce in War_ (1906), pp. 1-91 and 253-283--Hold, _Die
  Kriegskonterbande_ (1907)--Hansemann, _Die Lehre von der
  einheitlichen Reise im Rechte der Blockade und Kriegskonterbande_
  (1910)--Hirschmann, _Das internationale Prisenrecht_ (1912),
  [p][p] 24-30--Westlake in _R.I._ II. (1870), pp. 614-655--Kleen in
  _R.I._ XXV. (1893), pp. 7, 124, 209, 389, and XXVI. pp. 214-217
  (1894)--Bar in _R.I._ XXVI. (1894), pp. 401-414--Brocher de la
  Flechere, in _R.I._ 2nd Ser. I. (1899), pp. 337-353--Fauchille in
  _R.G._ IV. (1897), pp. 297-323--Kleen in _R.G._ XI. (1904), pp.
  353-362--Gover in _The Journal of the Society of Comparative
  Legislation_, new series, II. (1900), pp. 118-130--Kennedy and
  Randall in _The Law Quarterly Review_, XXIV (1908), pp. 59-75,
  316-327, and 449-464--General Report presented to the Naval
  Conference of London by its Drafting Committee, articles 22-44.

[Sidenote: Definition of Contraband of War.]

[p] 391. The term contraband is derived from the Italian "contrabbando,"
which, itself deriving from the Latin "contra" and "bannum" or "bandum,"
means "in defiance of an injunction." Contraband of war[813] is the
designation of such goods as by either belligerent are forbidden to be
carried to the enemy on the ground that they enable the latter to carry
on the war with greater vigour. But this definition is only a formal
one, as it does not state what kinds of goods belong to the class of
contraband. This point was much controverted before the Declaration of
London. Throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries
the matter stood as Grotius had explained it. Although he does not
employ the term contraband, he treats of the matter. He[814]
distinguishes three different kinds of articles. Firstly, those which,
as arms for instance, can only be made use of in war, and which are,
therefore, always contraband. Secondly, those, as for example articles
of luxury, which can never be made use of in war and which, therefore,
are never contraband. Thirdly, those which, as money, provisions, ships,
and articles of naval equipment, can be made use of in war as well as in
peace, and which are on account of their ancipitous use contraband or
not according to the circumstances of the case. In spite of
Bynkershoek's decided opposition[815] to this distinction by Grotius,
the practice of most belligerents until the beginning of the twentieth
century has been in conformity with it. A great many treaties have from
the beginning of the sixteenth century been concluded between many
States for the purpose of fixing what articles belonging to the class of
ancipitous use should, and what should not, be regarded between the
parties as contraband, but these treaties disagree with one another.
And, so far as they were not bound by a treaty, belligerents formerly
exercised their discretion in every war according to the special
circumstances and conditions in regarding or not regarding certain
articles of ancipitous use as contraband. The endeavour of the First and
the Second Armed Neutrality of 1780 and 1800 to restrict the number and
kinds of articles that could be regarded as contraband failed, and the
Declaration of Paris of 1856 uses the term contraband without any
attempt to define it.

[Footnote 813: Although--see above, [p][p] 173-174--prevention of
carriage of contraband is a means of sea warfare against the enemy, it
chiefly concerns neutral commerce and is, therefore, more conveniently
treated with neutrality.]

[Footnote 814: See Grotius, III. c. I, [p] 5:--"Sunt res quae in bello
tantum usum habent, ut arma: sunt quae in bello nullum habent usum, ut
quae voluptati inserviunt: sunt quae et in bello et extra bellum usum
habent, ut pecuniae, commeatus, naves, et quae navibus adsunt.... In
tertio illo genere usus ancipitis, distinguendus erit belli status...."]

[Footnote 815: See Bynkershoek, _Quaest. jur. publici._ I. c. X.]

It is by the Declaration of London that the Powers have, for the first
time in history, come to an agreement concerning what articles are
contraband. The distinction which Grotius made between three classes of
goods, while still recognised, has been merged by the Declaration of
London into the distinction between articles of absolute contraband,
articles of conditional contraband, and such articles as may under no
circumstances or conditions be considered contraband. This Declaration,
moreover, has put the whole matter of contraband upon a new basis, since
the Powers have by articles 22 to 44 agreed upon a common code of rules
concerning contraband.

[Sidenote: Absolute and conditional Contraband, and free Articles.]

[p] 392. Apart from the distinction between articles which can be made
use of only in war and those of ancipitous use, two different classes
of contraband must be distinguished.

There are, firstly, articles which by their very character are destined
to be made use of in war. In this class are to be reckoned not only arms
and ammunition, but also such articles of ancipitous use as military
stores, naval stores, and the like. They are termed absolute contraband.

There are, secondly, articles which by their very character are not
destined to be made use of in war, but which under certain circumstances
and conditions can be of the greatest use to a belligerent for the
continuation of the war. To this class belong, for instance, provisions,
coal, gold, and silver. These articles are termed conditional or
relative contraband.

Although hitherto not all the States have made this distinction,
nevertheless they did make a distinction in so far as they varied the
list of articles which they declared contraband in their different wars;
certain articles, as arms and ammunition, have always been on the list,
whilst other articles were only considered contraband when the
circumstances of a particular war made it necessary. The majority of
writers have always approved of the distinction between absolute and
conditional contraband, although several insisted that arms and
ammunition only and exclusively could be recognised as contraband, and
that conditional contraband did not exist.[816] The distinction would
seem to have been important not only regarding the question whether or
no an article was contraband, but also regarding the consequences of
carrying contraband.[817]

[Footnote 816: See, for instance, Hautefeuille, II. p. 157, and Kleen,
I. [p] 90.]

[Footnote 817: See below, [p] 405, p. 510.]

The Declaration of London has adopted (articles 22 and 24) the
distinction between absolute and conditional contraband, but it
distinguishes, besides these two classes of articles, a third class
(article 27). To this class belong all articles which are either not
susceptible of use in war, or the possibility of the use of which in war
is so remote as practically to make them not susceptible of use in war.
These articles are termed _free articles_.[818]

[Footnote 818: But there are a number of other free articles, although
they do not belong to the articles characterised above; see below, [p]
396_a_.]

[Sidenote: Articles absolutely Contraband.]

[p] 393. That absolute contraband cannot and need not be restricted to
arms and ammunition only and exclusively becomes obvious, if the fact is
taken into consideration that other articles, although of ancipitous
use, can be as valuable and essential to a belligerent for the
continuance of the war as arms and ammunition. The necessary machinery
and material for the manufacture of arms and ammunition are almost as
valuable as the latter themselves, and warfare on sea can as little be
waged without vessels and articles of naval equipment as without arms
and ammunition. But formerly no unanimity existed with regard to such
articles of ancipitous use as had to be considered as absolute
contraband, and States, when they went to war, increased or restricted,
according to the circumstances of the particular war, the list of
articles they considered absolute contraband.

According to the British practice[819] which has hitherto
prevailed--subject, however, to the prerogative of the Crown to order
alterations of the list during a war--the following articles were
considered absolute contraband:--

  Arms of all kinds, and machinery for manufacturing arms;
  ammunition, and materials for ammunition, including lead, sulphate
  of potash, muriate of potash (chloride of potassium), chlorate of
  potash, and nitrate of soda; gunpowder and its materials,
  saltpetre and brimstone, also guncotton; military equipments and
  clothing; military stores; naval stores, such as masts, spars,
  rudders, ship timbers, hemp and cordage, sail-cloth, pitch and
  tar, copper for sheathing vessels, marine engines and the
  component parts thereof (including screw propellers,
  paddle-wheels, cylinders, cranks, shafts, boilers, tubes for
  boilers, boiler-plates and fire bars), maritime cement and the
  materials used for its manufacture (as blue lias and Portland
  cement), iron in any of the following forms: anchors, rivet-iron,
  angle-iron, round bars of from 3/4 to 5/8 of an inch diameter,
  rivets, strips of iron, sheet plate-iron exceeding 1/4 of an inch,
  and Low Moor and Bowling plates.

[Footnote 819: See Holland, _Prize Law_, [p] 62.]

By articles 22 and 23 of the Declaration of London an agreement has been
reached according to which two classes of absolute contraband must be
distinguished. Article 22 enumerates eleven groups of articles which may
_always_, without special declaration and notice, be treated as absolute
contraband. These constitute the first class. The second--see article
23--consists of such articles exclusively used for war as are not
enumerated[820] amongst the eleven groups of the first class; these may
be treated as absolute contraband also, but only _after special
declaration and notification_. Such declaration may be published during
time of peace, and notification thereof must then be addressed to all
other Powers; but if the declaration is published after the outbreak of
hostilities, a notification need only be addressed to the neutral
Powers. Should a Power--see article 26--waive, so far as itself is
concerned, the right to treat as absolute contraband an article
comprised in the first class, notification thereof must be made to the
other Powers. The following are the groups of articles comprised in the
first class:--

  (1) Arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, and
  their distinctive component parts.

  (2) Projectiles, charges, and cartridges of all kinds, and their
  distinctive component parts.

  (3) Powder and explosives specially prepared for use in war.

  (4) Gun-mountings, limber boxes, limbers, military waggons, field
  forges, and their distinctive component parts.

  (5) Clothing and equipment of a distinctively military character.

  (6) All kinds of harness of a distinctively military character.

  (7) Saddle, draught, and pack animals suitable for use in war.

  (8) Articles of camp equipment, and their distinctive component
  parts.

  (9) Armour plates.

  (10) Warships, including boats, and their distinctive component
  parts of such a nature that they can only be used on a vessel of
  war.

  (11) Implements and apparatus designed exclusively for the
  manufacture of munitions of war, for the manufacture or repair of
  arms, or war material for use on land or sea.

[Footnote 820: The Report of the Drafting Committee on article 23
recognises that at present it would be difficult to mention any articles
which could under article 23 be declared absolute contraband, but since
future contingencies cannot be foreseen, it was considered necessary to
stipulate the possibility of increasing the list of absolute contraband.
That only such additional articles could be declared absolute contraband
as by their very character are destined to be made use of in war, is a
matter of course.]

It is apparent that this list embodies a compromise, for it includes
several articles--such as saddle, draught, and pack animals suitable for
use in war--which Great Britain and other Powers formerly only
considered as conditional contraband.

[Sidenote: Articles conditionally Contraband.]

[p] 394. There are many articles which are not by their character
destined to be made use of in war, but which are nevertheless of great
value to belligerents for the continuance of war. Such articles are
conditionally contraband, which means that they are contraband when it
is clearly apparent--see below, [p] 395--that they are intended to be
made use of for military or naval purposes. This intention becomes
apparent on considering either the destination of the vessel carrying
the articles concerned, or the consignee of the articles.

Before the Declaration of London neither the practice of States nor the
opinion of writers agreed upon the matter, and it was in especial
controversial[821] whether or no foodstuffs, horses and other beasts of
burden, coal and other fuel, money and the like, and cotton could
conditionally be declared contraband.

(1) That _foodstuffs_ should not under ordinary circumstances be
declared contraband there ought to be no doubt. There are even
several[822] writers who emphatically deny that foodstuffs could ever be
conditional contraband. But the majority of writers has always admitted
that foodstuffs destined for the use of the enemy army or navy might be
declared contraband. This has been the practice of Great Britain,[823]
the United States of America, and Japan. But in 1885, during her
hostilities against China, France declared rice in general as
contraband, on the ground of the importance of this article to the
Chinese population. And Russia in 1904, during the Russo-Japanese war,
declared rice and provisions in general as contraband; on the protest of
Great Britain and the United States of America, however, she altered her
decision and declared these articles conditional contraband only.

(2) The importance of _horses and other beasts of burden_ for cavalry,
artillery, and military transport explains their frequently being
declared as contraband by belligerents. No argument against their
character as conditional contraband can have any basis. But they were
frequently declared absolute contraband, as, for instance, by article 36
of the United States Naval War Code of 1900. Russia, which during the
Russo-Japanese War altered the standpoint taken up at first by her, and
recognised the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband,
nevertheless maintained her declaration of horses and beasts of burden
as absolute contraband. The Declaration of London, by article 22, No. 7,
declares them as absolute contraband.

(3) Since men-of-war are nowadays propelled by steam power, the
importance of _coal_, and eventually other fuel for waging war at sea is
obvious. For this reason, Great Britain has ever since 1854 maintained
that coal, if destined for belligerent men-of-war or belligerent naval
ports, is contraband. But in 1859 France and Italy did not take up the
same standpoint. Russia, although in 1885 she declared that she would
never consent to coal being regarded as contraband, in 1904 declared
coal, naphtha, alcohol, and every other kind of fuel, absolute
contraband. And she adhered to this standpoint, although she was made to
recognise the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband.

(4) As regards _money_, unwrought precious metals which may be coined
into money, bonds and the like, the mere fact that a neutral is
prohibited by his duty of impartiality from granting a loan to a
belligerent ought to bring conviction that these articles are contraband
if destined for the enemy State or its forces. However, the case seldom
happens that these articles are brought by neutral vessels to
belligerent ports, since under the modern conditions of trade
belligerents can be supplied in other ways with the necessary funds.

(5) As regards _raw cotton_, it is asserted[824] that in 1861, during
the Civil War, the United States declared it absolute contraband under
quite peculiar circumstances, since it took the place of money sent
abroad for the purpose of paying for vessels, arms, and ammunition. But
this assertion is erroneous.[825] Be that as it may, raw cotton should
not, under ordinary circumstances, be able to be considered absolute
contraband. For this reason Great Britain protested when Russia, in 1904
during the Russo-Japanese War, declared cotton in general as contraband;
Russia altered her standpoint and declared cotton conditional contraband
only.[826]

[Footnote 821: See Perels, [p] 45, and Hall, [p][p] 242-246, who give
bird's-eye views of the controversy.]

[Footnote 822: See, for instance, Bluntschli, [p] 807.]

[Footnote 823: The _Jonge Margaretha_ (1799), 1 C. Rob. 189.]

[Footnote 824: See Hall, [p] 246, p. 690, note 2; Taylor, [p] 662;
Wharton, III. [p] 373.]

[Footnote 825: See Moore, VII. [p] 1254, and Holland, _Letters to the
"Times" upon War and Neutrality_ (1909) pp. 108-112.]

[Footnote 826: According to the British practice which has hitherto
prevailed--see Holland, _Prize Law_, [p] 64--the list of conditional
contraband comprises:--Provisions and liquors for the consumption of
army and navy; money, telegraphic materials, such as wire, porous cups,
platina, sulphuric acid, and zinc; materials for the construction of a
railway, as iron bars, sleepers, and the like; coal, hay, horses, rosin,
tallow, timber. But it always was in the prerogative of the Crown to
extend or reduce this list during a war according to the requirements of
the circumstances.]

By articles 24 to 28 of the Declaration of London an agreement has been
reached by the Powers according to which two classes of conditional
contraband must be distinguished. Article 24 enumerates fourteen groups
of articles which may _always_, without special declaration and notice,
be treated as conditional contraband; these constitute the first class.
The second--see article 25--consists of articles which are not
enumerated either amongst the eleven groups of absolute contraband
contained in article 22 or amongst the fourteen groups of conditional
contraband contained in article 24, but which are nevertheless
susceptible of use in war as well as for purposes of peace; these may be
treated as conditional contraband also, but _only after special
declaration and notification_. Such declaration may be published during
time of peace, and notification thereof must then be addressed to all
other Powers; but if the declaration is published after the outbreak of
hostilities a notification need be addressed to the neutral Powers only.
Should a Power--see article 26--waive, so far as itself is concerned,
the right to treat as conditional contraband an article comprised in the
first class, notification thereof must be made to the other Powers. But
it is of course obvious, although not specially stated in article 26,
that a Power may treat as conditional contraband any article belonging
either to the first or second class of absolute contraband; in such a
case, however, special declaration and notification would seem to be
necessary. The following are the groups of articles comprised in the
first class of conditional contraband:--

  (1) Foodstuffs.

  (2) Forage and grain, suitable for feeding animals.

  (3) Clothing, fabrics for clothing, and boots and shoes, suitable
  for use in war.

  (4) Gold and silver in coin or bullion; paper money.

  (5) Vehicles of all kinds available for use in war, and their
  component parts.

  (6) Vessels, craft, and boats of all kinds; floating docks, parts
  of docks and their component parts.

  (7) Railway material, both fixed and rolling-stock, and material
  for telegraphs, wireless telegraphs, and telephones.

  (8) Balloons and flying machines and their distinctive component
  parts, together with accessories and articles recognisable as
  intended for use in connection with balloons and flying machines.

  (9) Fuel; lubricants.

  (10) Powder and explosives not specially prepared for use in war.

  (11) Barbed wire and implements for fixing and cutting the same.

  (12) Horseshoes and shoeing materials.

  (13) Harness and saddlery.

  (14) Field glasses, telescopes, chronometers, and all kinds of
  nautical instruments.

This list represents a compromise, just as does the list of absolute
contraband of article 22. Those opponents of the Declaration of London
who object to foodstuffs being on the list of conditional contraband
forget that several times in the past--see above, p. 486
(1)--belligerents have declared foodstuffs absolute contraband.

[Sidenote: Hostile Destination essential to Contraband.]

[p] 395. Whatever may be the nature of articles, they are never
contraband unless they are destined for the use of a belligerent in war.
Arms and ammunition destined for a neutral are as little contraband as
other goods with the same destination. As this hostile destination is
essential even for articles which are obviously used in war, such
hostile destination is all the more important for such articles of
ancipitous use as are only conditionally contraband. Thus, for instance,
provisions and coal are perfectly innocent and not at all contraband if
they are not purposely destined for enemy troops and naval forces, but
are destined for use by a neutral. However, the destination of the
articles must not be confounded with the destination of the vessel which
carries them. For, on the one hand, certain articles with a hostile
destination are considered contraband although the carrying vessel is
destined for a neutral port, and, on the other hand, certain articles,
although they are without a hostile destination, are considered
contraband because the carrying vessel is to touch at an intermediate
enemy port and is, therefore, destined for such port, although her
ultimate destination is a neutral port.

The Declaration of London, by articles 30 to 36, enacts very detailed
rules with regard to hostile destination, distinguishing clearly between
the characteristics of hostile destination of absolute contraband and
those of hostile destination of conditional contraband.

(1) The destination of articles of _absolute_ contraband is, according
to article 30, to be considered hostile if it be shown that they are
being sent either to enemy territory, or to territory occupied by the
enemy, or, further, to the armed forces of the enemy. And, according to
article 31, hostile destination of absolute contraband is considered to
be completely proved, firstly, when the goods are consigned to an enemy
port or to the armed forces of the enemy, and, secondly, when the
vessel is to call either at enemy ports only, or when she is to touch at
an enemy port or meet the armed forces of the enemy before reaching the
neutral port to which the cargo concerned is consigned.

(2) The destination of articles of _conditional_ contraband, on the
other hand, is, according to article 33, considered to be hostile if
they are intended for the use of the armed forces or of a government
department of the enemy State, unless in this latter case the
circumstances show that the articles concerned cannot in fact be used
for warlike purposes. Gold and silver in coin or bullion and paper
money, however, are in every case considered to have a hostile
destination if intended for a government department of the enemy State.
And, according to article 34, hostile destination of articles of
conditional contraband is, if the contrary be not proved, presumed when
the articles are consigned, firstly, to enemy authorities or to an enemy
contractor[827] established in the enemy country, who as a matter of
common knowledge supplies articles of this kind to the enemy, or,
secondly, to a fortified place of the enemy or to another place serving
as a base[828]--whether of operations or supply--for the armed forces of
the enemy. On the other hand, if the articles are not so consigned and
if the contrary be not proved, their destination is presumed to be
non-hostile. And in the case of a merchantman which can herself be
conditional contraband if bound to a fortified place of the enemy or to
another place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy, there
is no presumption of a hostile destination, but a direct proof is
necessary that she is destined for the use of the armed forces or of a
government department of the enemy State.

[Footnote 827: The French text of article 34 contains the words _a un
commercant etabli en pays ennemi et lorsqu'il est notoire que ce
commercant fournit a l'ennemi des objets et materiaux de cette nature_.
The translation _to an enemy contractor_ has been objected to by
opponents of the Declaration of London, but it is absolutely correct
because it meets the meaning of the French text.]

[Footnote 828: The Report of the Drafting Committee on article 34 states
that the base concerned may be one of operations or supply. Opponents of
the Declaration of London object to article 34 on account of the alleged
ambiguity of the words _place serving as a base for the armed forces of
the enemy_, and assert that all seaports of Great Britain might be
treated as bases of supply for the armed forces because railways connect
them with other places which actually serve as bases of supply or
operations. This is surely erroneous, because the doctrine of continuous
voyages is not--see article 35 in contradistinction to article 30, and
below, [p] 403_a_--to be applied to conditional contraband.]

[Sidenote: Free Articles.]

[p] 396. It is obvious that such articles as are not susceptible of use
in war may never be declared contraband, whether their destination be
hostile or not.

The Declaration of London, by article 27, expressly recognises this and,
in article 28--the so-called _free list_--enumerates seventeen groups of
articles which may never be declared contraband in spite of their
hostile destination, namely:--

  (1) Raw cotton, wool, silk, jute, flax, hemp, and other raw
  materials of the textile industries, and yarns of the same.

  (2) Oil seeds and nuts; copra.

  (3) Rubber, resins, gums, and lacs; hops.

  (4) Raw hides and horns, bones, and ivory.

  (5) Natural and artificial manures, including nitrates and
  phosphates for agricultural purposes.

  (6) Metallic ores.

  (7) Earths, clays, lime, chalk, stone, including marble, bricks,
  slates, and tiles.

  (8) Chinaware and glass.

  (9) Paper and paper-making materials.

  (10) Soap, paint and colours, including articles exclusively used
  in their manufacture, and varnish.

  (11) Bleaching powder, soda, ash, caustic soda, salt cake,
  ammonia, sulphate of ammonia, and sulphate of copper.

  (12) Agricultural, mining, textile, and printing machinery.

  (13) Precious and semi-precious stones, pearls, mother-of-pearl,
  and coral.

  (14) Clocks and watches, other than chronometers.

  (15) Fashion and fancy goods.

  (16) Feathers of all kinds, hairs, and bristles.

  (17) Articles of household furniture and decoration, office
  furniture and requisites.

This free list is of great importance to neutral trade, more
particularly as it not only comprises such articles as are not
susceptible of use in war, but likewise a number of articles, the
possibility of the use of which in war is so remote as practically to
make them not susceptible of use in war. The list guarantees to a number
of industries and trades of neutral States freedom from interference on
the part of belligerents, and it is to be expected that in time the list
will be increased.

[Sidenote: Articles destined for the use of the carrying Vessel, or to
aid the Wounded.]

[p] 396_a_. Besides the seventeen groups of articles contained in the
free list, there are two other groups of free articles.

Firstly, those articles which serve exclusively to aid the sick and
wounded. They, according to article 29, No. 1, of the Declaration of
London, may never be treated as contraband even if their destination is
hostile. They may, however, in case of urgent military necessity and,
subject to the payment of compensation, be requisitioned if they are
destined to territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy or to the
armed forces of the enemy.

Secondly, articles intended for the use of the vessel in which they are
found or for the use of her crew and passengers during the voyage.
Hostile destination being essential before any kinds of articles may be
considered contraband, those articles which are carried by a vessel
evidently for her own use or for the use of her crew and passengers can
never be contraband, as is now specially stipulated by article 29, No.
2, of the Declaration of London. Merchantmen frequently carry a gun and
a certain amount of ammunition for the purpose of signalling, and, if
they navigate in parts of the sea where there is danger of piracy, they
frequently carry a certain amount of arms and ammunition for defence
against an attack by pirates. It will not be difficult either for the
searching belligerent man-of-war or for the Prize Court to ascertain
whether or no such arms and ammunition are carried _bona fide_.

[Sidenote: Contraband Vessels.]

[p] 397. A neutral vessel, whether carrying contraband or not, can
herself be contraband. Such is the case when she has been built or
fitted out for use in war and is on her way to the enemy. Although it is
the duty of neutrals--see article 8 of Convention XIII., and above
[p][p] 334 and 350--to employ the means at their disposal to prevent the
fitting out, arming, or the departure of any vessel within their
jurisdiction, which they have reason to believe is intended to cruise or
to engage in hostile operations against a belligerent, their duty of
impartiality does not compel them to prevent their subjects from
supplying a belligerent with vessels fit for use in war except where the
vessel concerned has been built or fitted out by order of a belligerent.
Subjects of neutrals may therefore--unless prevented from so doing by
Municipal Law, as, for instance, subjects of the British Crown by [p][p]
8 and 9 of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870--by way of trade supply
belligerents with vessels of any kind, provided these vessels have not
been built or fitted out by order of the belligerent concerned.
According to the practice which has hitherto prevailed, such vessels,
being equivalent to arms, used to be considered as absolute
contraband.[829] And it made no difference whether or no they were fit
for use as men-of-war, it sufficed that they were fit to be used for the
transport of troops and the like.

[Footnote 829: The _Richmond_ (1804), 5 C. Rob. 325. See also Twiss, II.
[p] 148, and Holland, _Prize Law_, [p] 86.]

According to article 22, No. 10, article 24, No. 6, and article 34 of
the Declaration of London the law concerning contraband vessels will be
the following:--A distinction is made between warships on the one hand,
and, on the other, vessels and the like generally. According to article
22, No. 10, warships, including their boats and their distinctive
component parts of such a nature that they can only be used on a vessel
of war, may be treated as absolute contraband without notice. On the
other hand, according to article 24, No. 6, vessels, craft, and boats of
all kinds, and, further, floating docks, parts of docks and their
component parts may only be treated as conditional contraband, but may
be so treated without notice. And it must be specially observed that
whereas with regard to articles of conditional contraband generally,
there is a legal presumption established as to their hostile destination
in case they are consigned to enemy authorities or to a contractor
established in the enemy country, who, as a matter of common knowledge,
supplies articles of this kind to the enemy, article 34 expressly
exempts merchant vessels from this presumption in case it is sought to
prove that they themselves are contraband.


II

CARRIAGE OF CONTRABAND

  See the literature quoted above at the commencement of [p] 391.

[Sidenote: Carriage of Contraband Penal by the Municipal Law of
Belligerents.]

[p] 398. The guaranteed freedom of commerce making the sale of articles
of all kinds to belligerents by subjects of neutrals legitimate,
articles of conditional as well as absolute contraband may be supplied
by sale to either belligerent by these individuals. And the carriage of
such articles by neutral merchantmen on the Open Sea is, as far as
International Law is concerned, quite as legitimate as their sale. The
carrier of contraband by no means violates an injunction of the Law of
Nations. But belligerents have by the Law of Nations the right to
prohibit and punish the carriage of contraband by neutral merchantmen,
and the carrier of contraband violates, for this reason, an injunction
of the belligerent concerned. It is not International Law, but the
Municipal Law of the belligerents, which makes carriage of contraband
illegitimate and penal.[830] The question why the carriage of contraband
articles may nevertheless be prohibited and punished by the
belligerents, although it is quite legitimate so far as International
Law is concerned, can only be answered by a reference to the historical
development of the Law of Nations. In contradistinction to former
practice, which interdicted all trade between neutrals and the enemy,
the principle of freedom of commerce between subjects of neutrals and
either belligerent has gradually become universally recognised; but this
recognition included from the beginning the right of either belligerent
to punish carriage of contraband on the sea. And the reason obviously is
the necessity for belligerents in the interest of self-preservation to
prevent the import of such articles as may strengthen the enemy, and to
confiscate the contraband cargo, and eventually the vessel also, as a
deterrent to other vessels.

[Footnote 830: See above, [p] 296.]

The present condition of the matter of carriage of contraband[831] is
therefore a compromise. In the interest of the generally recognised
principle of freedom of commerce between belligerents and subjects of
neutrals, International Law does not require neutrals to prevent their
subjects from carrying contraband; on the other hand, International Law
empowers either belligerent to prohibit and punish carriage of
contraband just as it--see above, [p] 383--empowers either belligerent
to prohibit and punish breach of blockade.

[Footnote 831: The same applies to blockade-running and rendering
unneutral service.]

The Declaration of London has in no way altered the existing condition
of the matter. The fact that articles 22 and 24 give a list of articles
which, without special declaration and notice, may always be treated as
absolute and conditional contraband respectively, does not involve the
forbidding by International Law of the carriage of the articles.
Articles 22 and 24 are certainly part of International Law, yet they
merely embody an agreement as to what goods may--but they need not--be
treated as contraband.

[Sidenote: Direct Carriage of Contraband.]

[p] 399. Carriage of contraband commonly occurs where a vessel is
engaged in carrying to an enemy port such goods as are contraband when
they have a hostile destination. In such cases it makes no difference
whether the fact that the vessel is destined for an enemy port becomes
apparent from her papers, she being bound to such port, or whether she
is found at sea sailing on a course for an enemy port, although her
papers show her to be bound to a neutral port. And, further, it makes no
difference, according to the hitherto prevailing practice of Great
Britain and the United States of America at any rate, that she is bound
to a neutral port and that the articles concerned are, according to her
papers, destined for a neutral port, if only she is to call at an
intermediate enemy port or is to meet enemy naval forces at sea in the
course of her voyage to the neutral port of destination;[832] for
otherwise the door would be open to deceit, and it would always be
pretended that goods which a vessel is engaged in carrying to such
intermediate enemy places were intended for the neutral port of ultimate
destination. For the same reason a vessel carrying such articles as are
contraband when they have a hostile destination is considered to be
carrying contraband if her papers show that her destination is dependent
upon contingencies under which she may have to call at an enemy port,
unless she proves that she has abandoned the intention of eventually
calling there.[833]

[Footnote 832: See Holland, _Prize Law_, [p] 69.]

[Footnote 833: The _Imina_ (1800), 3 C. Rob. 167; and the _Trende
Sostre_ (1800), cited in the _Lisette_ (1806), 6 C. Rob. 391, note. See
also Holland, _Prize Law_, [p] 70.]

The Declaration of London distinguishes between carriage of absolute and
conditional contraband:--

As regards _absolute_ contraband, a vessel is, according to article 32,
considered to be carrying contraband whether the fact that she is
destined for an enemy port becomes evident from her papers, she being
bound for such port, or whether she is found at sea sailing for an enemy
port, although her papers show her to be bound for a neutral port. And,
according to article 31, No. 2, it makes no difference that the vessel
is bound for a neutral port and that the articles concerned are,
according to her papers, destined for a neutral port, if only she is to
touch at an intermediate enemy port or is to meet armed forces of the
enemy before reaching the neutral port for which the goods in question
are consigned.

As regards _conditional_ contraband, a vessel is, according to article
35, considered to be carrying contraband whether her papers show her to
be destined to an enemy port, or, being clearly found out of the course
to a neutral port indicated by her papers, she is unable to give
adequate reasons to justify such deviation.

Article 32 as well as article 35 stipulates that ship papers are
conclusive proof as to the destination of the vessel and of the cargo,
unless the vessel is clearly found out of the course indicated by her
papers, but the Report of the Drafting Committee of the Naval Conference
of London emphasises the fact that the rule of the conclusiveness of
ship papers must not be interpreted too literally, since otherwise fraud
would be made easy. Ship papers are conclusive proof--says the
Report--_unless facts show their evidence to be false_.

[Sidenote: Circuitous Carriage of Contraband.]

[p] 400. On occasions a neutral vessel carrying such articles as are
contraband if they have a hostile destination is, according to her
papers, ostensibly bound for a neutral port, but is intended, after
having called and eventually having delivered her cargo there, to carry
the same cargo from there to an enemy port. There is, of course, no
doubt that such vessels are carrying contraband whilst engaged in
carrying the articles concerned from the neutral to the enemy port. But
during the American Civil War the question arose whether they may
already be considered to be carrying contraband when on their way from
the port of starting to the neutral port from which they are afterwards
to carry the cargo to an enemy port, since they are really intended to
carry the cargo from the port of starting to an enemy port, although not
directly, but circuitously, by a roundabout way. The American Prize
Courts answered the question in the affirmative by applying to the
carriage of contraband the principle of _dolus non purgatur circuitu_
and the so-called doctrine of continuous voyages.[834] This attitude of
the American Prize Courts has called forth protests from many
authorities,[835] British as well as foreign, but Great Britain has not
protested, and from the attitude of the British Government in the case
of the _Bundesrath_ and other vessels in 1900 during the South African
War it could safely, although indirectly only, be concluded that Great
Britain considered the practice of the American Prize Courts correct and
just, and that, when a belligerent, she intended to apply the same
principles. This could also be inferred from [p] 71 of Holland's _Manual
of Naval Prize Law_, which established the rule: "The ostensible
destination of a vessel is sometimes a neutral port, while she is in
reality intended, after touching, and even landing and colourably
delivering over her cargo there, to proceed with the same cargo to an
enemy port. In such a case the voyage is held to be 'continuous,' and
the destination is held to be hostile throughout." And provided that the
intention of the vessel is really to carry the cargo circuitously, by a
roundabout way, to an enemy port, and further provided, that a mere
suspicion is not held for a proof of such intention, I cannot see why
this application of the doctrine of continuous voyages should not be
considered reasonable, just, and adequate.

[Footnote 834: The so-called doctrine of continuous voyages dates from
the time of the Anglo-French wars at the end of the eighteenth century,
and is connected with the application of the so-called rule of 1756.
(See above, [p] 289.) Neutral vessels engaged in French and Spanish
colonial trade, thrown open to them during the war, sought to evade
seizure by British cruisers and condemnation by British Prize Courts,
according to the rule of 1756, by taking their cargo to a neutral port,
landing it and paying import duties there, and then re-lading it and
carrying it to the mother country of the respective colony. Thus in the
case of the _William_ (1806), 5 C. Rob. 385, it was proved that this
neutral vessel took a cargo from the Spanish port La Guira to the port
of Marblehead in Massachusetts--the United States being neutral--landed
the cargo, paid import duties there, then took in the chief part of this
cargo besides other goods, and sailed after a week for the Spanish port
of Bilbao. In all such cases the British Prize Courts considered the
voyages from the colonial port to the neutral port and from there to the
enemy port as one continuous voyage and confirmed the seizure of the
ships concerned. See Remy, _Theorie de la continuaute du voyage en
matiere de blocus et de contrebande_ (1902); Hansemann, _Die Lehre von
der einheitlichen Reise im Rechte der Blockade und Kriegskonterbande_
(1910), and Fauchille in _R.G._ IV. (1897), pp. 297-323. The American
Courts have applied the doctrine of continuous voyages not only to
carriage of contraband but also to blockade; see above, [p] 385 (4),
where the cases of the _Bermuda_ and the _Stephen Hart_ are quoted.]

[Footnote 835: See, for instance, Hall, [p] 247. But Phillimore, III.
[p] 227, p. 391, says of the judgments of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the cases of the _Bermuda_ and the _Peterhoff_, that
they "contain very valuable and sound expositions of the law,
professedly, and for the most part really, in harmony with the earlier
decisions of English Prize Courts." On the other hand, Phillimore, III.
[p] 298, p. 490, disagrees with the American Courts regarding the
application of the doctrine of continuous voyages to breach of blockade,
and reprobates the decision in the case of the _Springbok_.]

[Sidenote: Indirect Carriage of Contraband (Doctrine of Continuous
Transports).]

[p] 401. It also happens in war that neutral vessels carry to neutral
ports such articles as are contraband if bound for a hostile
destination, the vessel being cognisant or not of the fact that
arrangements have been made for the articles to be afterwards brought by
land or sea into the hands of the enemy. And the question has arisen
whether such vessels on their voyage to the neutral port may be
considered to be carrying contraband of war.[836] As early as 1855,
during the Crimean War, the French Conseil-General des Prises, in
condemning the cargo of saltpetre of the Hanoverian neutral vessel _Vrow
Houwina_, answered the question in the affirmative;[837] but it was not
until the American Civil War that the question was decided on principle.
Since from the British port of Nassau, in the Bahamas, and from other
neutral ports near the coast of the Confederate States, goods, first
brought to these nearer neutral ports by vessels coming from more
distant neutral ports were carried to the blockaded coast of the
Southern States, Federal cruisers seized several vessels destined and
actually on their voyage to Nassau and other neutral ports because all
or parts of their cargoes were ultimately destined for the enemy. And
the American Courts considered those vessels to be carrying contraband,
although they were sailing from one neutral port to another, on clear
proof that the goods concerned were destined to be transported by land
or sea from the neutral port of landing into the enemy territory. The
leading cases are those of the _Springbok_ and _Peterhoff_, which have
been mentioned above in [p] 385 (4), for the Courts found the seizure of
these and other vessels justified on the ground of carriage of
contraband as well as on the ground of breach of blockade. Thus, another
application of the doctrine of continuous voyages came into existence,
since vessels whilst sailing between two neutral ports could only be
considered to be carrying contraband when the transport first from one
neutral port to another and afterwards from the latter to the enemy
territory had been regarded as one continuous voyage. This application
of the doctrine of continuous voyages is fitly termed "doctrine of
continuous transports."

[Footnote 836: The question is treated with special regard to the case
of the _Bundesrath_, in two able articles in _The Law Quarterly Review_,
XVII. (1901), under the titles "The Seizure of the _Bundesrath_" (Mr. I.
Dundas White) and "Contraband Goods and Neutral Ports" (Mr. E. L. de
Hart). See also Baty, _International Law in South Africa_ (1900), pp.
1-44.]

[Footnote 837: See Calvo, V. [p] 2767, p. 52. The case of the Swedish
neutral vessel _Commercen_, which occurred in 1814, and which is
frequently quoted with that of the _Vrow Houwina_ (1 Wheaton, 382), is
not a case of indirect carriage of contraband. The _Commercen_ was on
her way to Bilbao, in Spain, carrying a cargo of provisions for the
English army in Spain, and she was captured by a privateer commissioned
by the United States of America, which was then at war with England.
When the case, in 1816, came before Mr. Justice Story, he reprobated the
argument that the seizure was not justified because a vessel could not
be considered to be carrying contraband when on her way to a neutral
port, and he asserted that the hostile destination of goods was
sufficient to justify the seizure of the vessel.]

[Sidenote: The Case of the _Bundesrath_.]

[p] 402. This application of the doctrine of continuous voyages under
the new form of continuous transports has likewise been condemned by
many British and foreign authorities; but Great Britain did not protest
in this case either--on the contrary, as was mentioned above in [p] 385
(4), she declined to interfere in favour of the British owners of the
vessels and cargoes concerned. And that she really considered the
practice of the American Courts just and sound became clearly apparent
by her attitude during the South African War. When, in 1900, the
_Bundesrath_, _Herzog_, and _General_, German vessels sailing from
German neutral ports to the Portuguese neutral port of Lorenzo Marques
in Delagoa Bay, were seized by British cruisers under the suspicion of
carrying contraband, Germany demanded their release, maintaining that no
carriage of contraband could be said to take place by vessels sailing
from one neutral port to another. But Great Britain refused to admit
this principle, maintaining that articles ultimately destined for the
enemy were contraband, although the vessels carrying them were bound for
a neutral port.[838]

[Footnote 838: See _Parliamentary Papers_, Africa, No. 1 (1900);
Correspondence respecting the action of H.M.'s naval authorities with
regard to certain foreign vessels.]

There is no doubt that this attitude of the British Government was
contrary to the opinion of the prominent English[839] writers on
International Law. Even the _Manual of Naval Prize Law_, edited by
Professor Holland[840] in 1888, and "issued by authority of the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty," reprobated the American practice, for
in [p] 72 it lays down the following rule: "... If the destination of
the vessel be neutral, then the destination of the goods on board should
be considered neutral, notwithstanding it may appear from the papers or
otherwise that the goods themselves have an ulterior destination by
transhipment, overland conveyance, or otherwise." And the practice of
British Prize Courts in the past would seem to have been in accordance
with this rule. In 1798, during war between England and the Netherlands,
the neutral ship _Imina_,[841] which had left the neutral port of
Dantzig for Amsterdam carrying ship's timber, but on hearing of the
blockade of Amsterdam by the British had changed her course for the
neutral port of Emden, was seized on her voyage to Emden by a British
cruiser; she was, however, released by Sir William Scott because she had
no intention of breaking blockade, and because a vessel could only be
considered as carrying contraband whilst on a voyage to an enemy port.
"The rule respecting contraband, as I have always understood it, is that
the articles must be taken _in delicto_, in the actual prosecution of
the voyage to an enemy port," said Sir William Scott.[842]

[Footnote 839: See, for instance, Hall, [p] 247, and Twiss in _The Law
Magazine and Review_, XII. (1877), pp. 130-158.]

[Footnote 840: In a letter to the _Times_ of January 3, 1900, Professor
Holland points out that circumstances had so altered since 1888 that the
attitude of the British Government in the case of the _Bundesrath_ was
quite justified; see Holland, _Letters to the "Times" upon War and
Neutrality_ (1909), pp. 114-119.]

[Footnote 841: 3 C. Rob. 167.]

[Footnote 842: It is frequently maintained--see Phillimore, III. [p]
227, pp. 397-403--that in 1864, in the case of _Hobbs_ v. _Henning_,
Lord Chief Justice Erle repudiated the doctrine of continuous
transports, but Westlake shows that this is not the case. See Westlake's
Introduction in Takahashi, _International Law during the Chino-Japanese
War_ (1899), pp. xx-xxiii, and in _The Law Quarterly_ _Review_, XV.
(1899), pp. 23-30. See also Hart, _ibidem_, XXIII. (1907), p. 199, who
discusses the case of _Seymour_ v. _London and Provincial Marine
Insurance Co._ (41 L.J.C.P. 193) in which the Court recognised the
doctrine of continuous transports.]

[Sidenote: Continental support to the Doctrine of Continuous
Transports.]

[p] 403. Although the majority of Continental writers condemn the
doctrine of continuous transports, several eminent Continental
authorities support it. Thus, Gessner (p. 119) emphatically asserts that
the destination of the carrying vessel is of no importance compared with
the destination of the carried goods themselves. Bluntschli, although he
condemns in [p] 835 the American practice regarding breach of blockade
committed by a vessel sailing from one neutral port to another,
expressly approves in [p] 813 of the American practice regarding
carriage of contraband by a vessel sailing between two neutral ports,
yet carrying goods with a hostile destination. Kleen (I. [p] 95, p. 388)
condemns the rule that the neutral destination of the vessel makes the
goods appear likewise neutral, and defends seizure in the case of a
hostile destination of the goods on a vessel sailing between two neutral
ports; he expressly states that such goods are contraband from the
moment the carrying vessel leaves the port of loading. Fiore (III. No.
1649) reprobates the theory of continuous voyages as applied by British
and American Courts, but he asserts nevertheless that the hostile
destination of certain goods carried by a vessel sailing to a neutral
port justifies the vessel being regarded as carrying contraband, and the
seizure thereof. Bonfils (No. 1569) takes up the same standpoint as
Bluntschli, admitting the application of the theory of continuous
voyages to carriage of contraband, but reprobating its application to
breach of blockade. And the Institute of International Law adopted the
rule:[843] "_La destination pour l'ennemi est presumee lorsque le
transport va a l'un de ses ports, ou bien a un port neutre qui,
d'apres_ _des preuves evidentes et de fait incontestable, n'est qu'une
etape pour l'ennemi, comme but final de la meme operation commerciale._"
Thus this representative body of authorities of all nations has fully
adopted the American application of the doctrine of continuous voyages
to contraband, and thereby recognised the possibility of circuitous as
well as indirect carriage of contraband.

[Footnote 843: See [p] 1 of the _Reglementation internationale de la
contrebande de guerre_, _Annuaire_, XV. (1896), p. 230.]

And it must be mentioned that the attitude of several Continental States
has hitherto been in favour of the American practice. Thus, according to
[p][p] 4 and 6 of the Prussian Regulations of 1864 regarding Naval
Prizes, it was the hostile destination of the goods or the destination
of the vessel to an enemy port which made a vessel appear as carrying
contraband and which justified her seizure. In Sweden the same was
valid.[844] Thus, further, an Italian Prize Court during the war with
Abyssinia in 1896 justified the seizure in the Red Sea of the Dutch
vessel _Doelwijk_,[845] which sailed for the neutral French port of
Djibouti, carrying a cargo of arms and ammunition destined for the
Abyssinian army and to be transported to Abyssinia after having been
landed at Djibouti.

[Footnote 844: See Kleen, I. p. 389, note 2.]

[Footnote 845: See Martens, _N.R.G._ 2nd Ser. XXVIII. p. 66. See also
below, [p] 436.]

[Sidenote: Partial Recognition by the Declaration of London of the
Doctrine of Continuous Voyages.]

[p] 403_a_. The Declaration of London offers a compromise in order to
settle the controversy respecting the application of the doctrine of
continuous voyages to the carriage of contraband, whether circuitous or
indirect carriage be concerned.

(1) On the one hand, article 30 recognises with regard to _absolute_
contraband the application of the doctrine of continuous voyages--both
to circuitous and indirect carriage of contraband--by enacting that:
"absolute contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined
to territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy or to the armed
forces of the enemy. _It is_ _immaterial whether the carriage of the
goods is direct or entails transhipment or a subsequent transport by
land._"

(2) On the other hand, article 35 categorically rejects the doctrine of
continuous voyages with regard to _conditional_ contraband by enacting
that "conditional contraband is not liable to capture except when found
on board a vessel bound for territory belonging to or occupied by the
enemy, or for the armed forces of the enemy,[846] and when it is not to
be discharged in an intervening neutral port."

(3) However, in cases where the enemy country has no seaboard, article
36--in contradistinction to the provisions of article 35--expressly
recognises the doctrine of continuous voyages for _conditional_
contraband also by enacting that "notwithstanding the provisions of
article 35, conditional contraband, if shown to have the destination
referred to in article 33, is liable to capture in cases where the enemy
country has no seaboard."

[Footnote 846: The rule of article 35 came into question for the first
time during the Turco-Italian war. In January 1912, the _Carthage_, a
French mail-steamer plying between Marseilles and Tunis, was captured
for carriage of contraband by an Italian torpedo-boat and taken to
Cagliari, because she had an aeroplane destined for Tunis on board. As
the destination of the vessel was neutral, and as, according to article
24, No. 8, of the Declaration of London aeroplanes are conditional
contraband, France protested against the capture of the vessel, Italy
agreed to release her, and the parties arranged to have the question as
to whether the capture of the vessel was justified settled by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague.]


III

CONSEQUENCES OF CARRIAGE OF CONTRABAND

  See the literature quoted above at the commencement of [p] 391.

[Sidenote: Capture for Carriage of Contraband.]

[p] 404. It has always been universally recognised by theory and
practice that a vessel carrying contraband may be seized by the cruisers
of the belligerent concerned. But seizure is allowed only so long as a
vessel is _in delicto_, which commences when she leaves the port of
starting and ends when she has deposited the contraband goods, whether
with the enemy or otherwise. The rule is generally recognised,
therefore, that a vessel which has deposited her contraband may not be
seized on her return voyage. British and American practice, however, has
hitherto admitted one exception to this rule--namely, in the case in
which a vessel has carried contraband on her outward voyage with
simulated and false papers.[847] But no exception has been admitted by
the practice of other countries. Thus, when in 1879, during war between
Peru and Chili, the German vessel _Luxor_, after having carried a cargo
of arms and ammunition from Monte Video to Valparaiso, was seized in the
harbour of Callao, in Peru, and condemned by the Peruvian Prize Courts
for carrying contraband, Germany interfered and succeeded in getting the
vessel released.

[Footnote 847: The _Nancy_ (1800), 3 C. Rob. 122; the _Margaret_ (1810),
1 Acton, 333. See Holland, _Prize Law_, [p] 80. Wheaton, I. [p] 506,
note 2, condemns this practice; Hall, [p] 247, p. 696, calls it
"undoubtedly severe"; Halleck, II. p. 220, defends it. See also Calvo,
V. [p][p] 2756-2758.]

It must be specially observed that seizure for carriage of contraband is
only admissible on the Open Sea and in the maritime territorial belts of
the belligerents. Seizure within the maritime belt of neutrals would be
a violation of neutrality.

The Declaration of London entirely confirms these old customary rules,
but does not recognise the above-mentioned British exception. Article 37
enacts that a vessel carrying goods liable to capture as absolute or
conditional contraband may be captured on the high seas or in the
territorial waters of the belligerents throughout the whole of her
voyage even if she is to touch at a port of call before reaching the
hostile destination. Article 38 enacts that a vessel may not be captured
on the ground that she has carried contraband on a previous occasion if
such carriage is in point of fact at an end.

[Sidenote: Penalty for Carriage of Contraband according to the Practice
hitherto prevailing.]

[p] 405. In former times neither in theory nor in practice have similar
rules been recognised with regard to the penalty of carriage of
contraband. The penalty was frequently confiscation not only of the
contraband cargo itself, but also of all other parts of the cargo,
together with the vessel. Only France made an exception, since according
to an _ordonnance_ of 1584 she did not even confiscate the contraband
goods themselves, but only seized them against payment of their value,
and it was not until 1681 that an _ordonnance_ proclaimed confiscation
of contraband, but with exclusion of the vessel and the innocent part of
the cargo.[848] During the seventeenth century this distinction between
contraband on the one hand, and, on the other, the innocent goods and
the vessel was clearly recognised by Zouche and Bynkershoek, and
confiscation of the contraband only became more and more the rule,
certain cases excepted. During the eighteenth century the right to
confiscate contraband was frequently contested, and it is remarkable as
regards the change of attitude of some States that by article 13 of the
Treaty of Friendship and Commerce[849] concluded in 1785 between Prussia
and the United States of America all confiscation was abolished. This
article provided that the belligerent should have the right to stop
vessels carrying contraband and to detain them for such length of time
as might be necessary to prevent possible damage by them, but such
detained vessels should be paid compensation for the arrest imposed upon
them. It further provided that the belligerent could seize all
contraband against payment of its full value, and that, if the captain
of a vessel stopped for carrying contraband should deliver up all
contraband, the vessel should at once be set free. I doubt whether any
other treaty of the same kind was entered into by either Prussia or the
United States.[850] And it is certain that, if any rule regarding
penalty for carriage of contraband was generally recognised at all, it
was the rule that contraband goods could be confiscated. But there
always remained the difficulty that it was controversial what articles
were contraband, and that the practice of States varied much regarding
the question as to whether the vessel herself and innocent cargo carried
by her could be confiscated. For beyond the rule that absolute
contraband could be confiscated, there was no unanimity regarding the
fate of the vessel and the innocent part of the cargo. Great Britain and
the United States of America hitherto confiscated the vessel when the
owner of the contraband was also the owner of the vessel; they also
confiscated such part of the innocent cargo as belonged to the owner of
the contraband goods; they, lastly, confiscated the vessel, although her
owner was not the owner of the contraband, provided he knew of the fact
that his vessel was carrying contraband, or provided the vessel sailed
with false or simulated papers for the purpose of carrying
contraband.[851] Some States allowed such vessel carrying contraband as
was not herself liable to confiscation to proceed with her voyage on
delivery of her contraband goods to the seizing cruiser,[852] but Great
Britain[853] and other States insisted upon the vessel being brought
before a Prize Court in every case.

[Footnote 848: See Wheaton, _Histoire des Progres du Droit des gens en
Europe_ (1841), p. 82.]

[Footnote 849: Martens, _R._ IV. p. 42. The stipulation was renewed by
article 12 of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation concluded between
the two States in 1828; Martens, _N.R._ VII. p. 619.]

[Footnote 850: Article 12 of the Treaty of Commerce, between the United
States of America and Italy, signed at Florence on February 26,
1871--see Martens, _N.R.G._ 2nd Ser. I. p. 57--stipulates immunity from
seizure of such private property only as does not consist of contraband:
"The high contracting parties agree that in the unfortunate event of war
between them, the private property of their respective citizens and
subjects, with the exception of contraband of war, shall be exempt from
capture, or seizure, on the high seas or elsewhere, by the armed vessels
or by the military forces of either party; it being understood that this
exemption shall not extend to vessels and their cargoes which may
attempt to enter a port blockaded by the naval forces of either party."
See above, [p] 178.]

[Footnote 851: See Holland, _Prize Law_, [p][p] 82-87.]

[Footnote 852: See Calvo, V. [p] 2779.]

[Footnote 853: See Holland, _Prize Law_, [p] 81.]

As regards conditional contraband, those States which made any
distinction at all between absolute and conditional contraband, as a
rule confiscated neither the conditional contraband nor the carrying
vessel, but seized the former and paid for it. According to British
practice[854] hitherto prevailing, freight was paid to the vessel, and
the usual compensation for the conditional contraband was the cost price
plus 10 per cent. profit. States acting in this way asserted a right to
confiscate conditional contraband, but exercised pre-emption in
mitigation of such a right. Those Continental writers who refused to
recognise the existence of conditional contraband, denied, consequently,
that there was a right to confiscate articles not absolutely contraband,
but they maintained that every belligerent had, according to the
so-called right of angary,[855] a right to stop all such neutral vessels
as carried provisions and other goods with a hostile destination of
which he might have made use and to seize such goods against payment of
their full value.

[Footnote 854: See Holland, _Prize Law_, [p] 84. Great Britain likewise
exercised pre-emption instead of confiscation with regard to such
absolute contraband as was in an unmanufactured condition and was at the
same time the produce of the country exporting it.]

[Footnote 855: See above, [p] 365.]

The Institute of International Law, whose rules regarding contraband,
adopted at its meeting at Venice in 1896, restrict contraband to arms,
ammunition, articles of military equipment, vessels fitted for naval
operations, and instruments for the immediate fabrication of ammunition,
proposed a compromise regarding articles of ancipitous use. Although the
rules state that those articles may not be considered contraband, they
nevertheless give the choice to a belligerent of either exercising
pre-emption or seizing and temporarily retaining such articles against
payment of indemnities.[856]

[Footnote 856: It is of value to print here the _Reglementation
internationale de la contrebande de guerre_ adopted by the Institute of
International Law (_Annuaire_, XV. [1896] p. 230):--

[p] 1. Sont articles de contrebande de guerre: (1) les armes de toute
nature; (2) les munitions de guerre et les explosifs; (3) le materiel
militaire (objets d'equipement, affuts, uniformes, etc.); (4) les
vaisseaux equipes pour la guerre; (5) les instruments specialement faits
pour la fabrication immediate des munitions de guerre; lorsque ces
divers objets sont transportes par mer pour le compte ou a la
destination d'un belligerant.

La destination pour l'ennemi est presumee lorsque le transport va a l'un
de ses ports, ou bien a un port neutre qui, d'apres des preuves
evidentes et de fait incontestable, n'est qu'une etape pour l'ennemi,
comme but final de la meme operation commerciale.

[p] 2. Sous la denomination de _munitions de guerre_ doivent etre
compris les objets qui, pour servir immediatement a la guerre, n'exigent
qu'une simple reunion ou juxtaposition.

[p] 3. Un objet ne saurait etre qualifie de contrebande a raison de la
seule intention de l'employer a aider ou favoriser un ennemi, ni par
cela seul qu'il pourrait etre, dans un but militaire, utile a un ennemi
ou utilise par lui, ou qu'il est destine a son usage.

[p] 4. Sont et demeurent abolies les pretendues contrebandes designees
sous les noms soit de contrebande _relative_, concernant des articles
(_usus ancipitis_) susceptibles d'etre utilises par un belligerant dans
un but militaire, mais dont l'usage est essentiellement pacifique, soit
de contrebande _accidentelle_, quand lesdits articles ne servent
specialement aux buts militaires que dans une circonstance particuliere.

[p] 5. Neanmoins le belligerant a, a son choix et a charge d'une
equitable indemnite, le droit de sequestre ou de preemption quant aux
objets qui, en chemin vers un port de son adversaire, peuvent egalement
servir a l'usage de la guerre et a des usages pacifiques.

       *       *       *       *       *

[p] 9. En cas de saisies ou repressions non justifiees pour cause de
contrebande ou de transport, l'Etat du capteur sera tenu aux
dommages-interets et a la restitution des objets.

[p] 10. Un transport parti avant la declaration de la guerre et sans
connaissance obligee de son imminence n'est pas punissable.]

[Sidenote: Penalty according to the Declaration of London for Carriage
of Contraband.]

[p] 406. The Declaration of London offers by articles 39 to 44 a
settlement of the controversy respecting the penalty for carriage of
contraband which represents a fair compromise.

The chief rule is (article 39) that contraband goods, whether absolute
or conditional contraband, may be confiscated. The carrying vessel may
(article 40) likewise be confiscated if the contraband reckoned either
by value, weight, volume, or freight, forms more than half the cargo. If
the latter be not the case, and if the carrying vessel be therefore
released, she may (article 41) be condemned to pay the costs and
expenses incurred by the captor in respect of the proceedings in the
national Prize Court and the custody of the ship and cargo during the
proceedings. But whatever be the proportion between contraband and
innocent goods on a vessel, innocent goods (article 42) which belong to
the owner of the contraband and are on board the same carrying vessel,
may be confiscated.

If a vessel carrying contraband sails before the outbreak of war
(article 43), or is unaware of a declaration of contraband which applies
to her cargo, or has no opportunity of discharging her cargo after
receiving such knowledge, the contraband may only be confiscated on
payment of compensation, and the vessel herself and her innocent cargo
may not be confiscated nor may the vessel be condemned to pay any costs
and expenses incurred by the captor.[857] But there is a presumption
which is not rebuttable with regard to the _mens rea_ of the vessel. For
according to the second paragraph of article 43 a vessel is considered
to have knowledge of the outbreak of war or of a declaration of
contraband if she leaves an enemy port after the outbreak of
hostilities, or if she leaves a neutral port subsequent to the
notification of the outbreak of hostilities or of the declaration of
contraband to the Power to which such port belongs, provided such
notification was made in sufficient time.

[Footnote 857: It is obvious that the vessel must be brought into a port
and before a Prize Court if the captor desires to seize the contraband
against compensation. The question as to whether article 44 applies to
such a case, and whether, therefore, the neutral vessel may be allowed
to continue her voyage if the master is willing to hand over the
contraband to the captor, must be answered in the affirmative, provided
that the contraband, reckoned either by value, weight, volume, or
freight, forms less than half the cargo. For article 44 precisely treats
of a case in which the vessel herself is not liable to condemnation _on
account of the proportion of the contraband on board_ (see article 40).]

The question of pre-emption of conditional contraband is not mentioned
by the Declaration of London. There is, however, nothing to prevent the
several maritime Powers from exercising pre-emption in mitigation of
their right of confiscation; the future must show whether or no they
will be inclined to do this.

[Sidenote: Seizure of Contraband without Seizure of the Vessel.]

[p] 406_a_. Hitherto the practice of the several States has
differed--see above, [p] 405--with regard to the question as to whether
a vessel which was not herself liable to condemnation might be allowed
to proceed on her voyage on condition that she handed over the
contraband carried by her to the captor. Great Britain and some other
States answered it in the negative, but several States in the
affirmative. The Declaration of London, although it upholds the general
rule that, whatever may be the ultimate fate of the vessel, she must be
taken into a port of a Prize Court, admits two exceptions to the rule:--

(1) According to article 44, a vessel which has been stopped for
carrying contraband and which is not herself liable to be confiscated on
account of the proportion of contraband on board, may--not must--when
the circumstances permit it, be allowed to continue her voyage in case
she hands over the contraband cargo to the captor. In such a case the
captor is at liberty to destroy the contraband handed over to him. But
the matter must in any case be brought before a Prize Court. The captor
must therefore enter the delivery of the contraband on the log-book of
the vessel so stopped, and the master of the latter must give duly
certified copies of all relevant papers to the captor.

(2) According to article 54, the captor may--see below, [p]
431--exceptionally, in case of necessity, demand the handing over, or
may proceed himself to the destruction, of any absolute or conditional
contraband goods found on a vessel which is not herself liable to
condemnation, if the taking of the vessel into the port of a Prize Court
would involve danger to the safety of the capturing cruiser or to the
success of the operations in which she is engaged at the time. But the
captor must, nevertheless, bring the case before a Prize Court. He must,
therefore, enter the captured goods on the log-book of the stopped
vessel, and must obtain duly certified copies of all relevant papers. If
the captor cannot establish the fact before the Prize Court that he was
really compelled to abandon the intention of bringing in the carrying
vessel, he must be condemned (see article 51) to pay the value of the
goods to their owners if the goods were contraband or if they were not.
And the same is valid in case (article 52) the seizure or destruction of
the goods is held by the Prize Court to have been justifiable, but not
the capture itself of the carrying vessel.




CHAPTER V

UNNEUTRAL SERVICE


I

THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF UNNEUTRAL SERVICE

  Hall, [p][p] 248-253--Lawrence, [p][p] 260-262--Westlake, II. pp.
  261-265--Phillimore, III. [p][p] 271-274--Halleck, II. pp.
  289-301--Taylor, [p][p] 667-673--Walker, [p] 72--Wharton, III. [p]
  374--Wheaton, [p][p] 502-504 and Dana's note No. 228--Moore, VII.
  [p][p] 1264-1265--Bluntschli, [p][p] 815-818--Heffter, [p]
  161A--Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 731-738--Ullmann, [p]
  192--Bonfils, Nos. 1584-1588--Despagnet, Nos. 716-716
  _bis_--Rivier, II. pp. 388-391--Nys, III. pp. 675-681--Calvo, V.
  [p][p] 2796-2820--Fiore, III. Nos. 1602-1605, and Code, Nos.
  1836-1840--Martens, II. [p] 136--Kleen, I. [p][p] 103-106--Boeck,
  Nos. 660-669--Pillet, p. 330--Gessner, pp. 99-111--Perels, [p]
  47--Testa, p. 212--Dupuis, Nos. 231-238, and _Guerre_, Nos.
  172-188--Bernsten, [p] 9--Nippold, II. [p] 35--Holland, _Prize
  Law_, [p][p] 88-105--U.S. Naval War Code, articles 16 and
  20--Hautefeuille, II. pp. 173-188--Ortolan, II. pp.
  209-213--Mountague Bernard, _Neutrality of Great Britain during
  the American Civil War_ (1870), pp. 187-205--Marquardsen, _Der
  Trent-Fall_ (1862), pp. 58-71--Hirsch, _Kriegskonterbande und
  verbotene Transporte in Kriegszeiten_ (1897), pp.
  42-55--Takahashi, _International Law during the Chino-Japanese
  War_ (1899), pp. 52-72--Vetzel, _De la contrebande par analogie en
  droit maritime internationale_ (1901)--Atherley-Jones, _Commerce
  in War_ (1906), pp. 304-315--Hirschmann, _Das internationale
  Prisenrecht_ (1912), [p][p] 31-32--See also the monographs quoted
  above at the commencement of [p] 391, and the General Report
  presented to the Naval Conference of London on behalf of the
  Drafting Committee, articles 45-47.

[Sidenote: Unneutral service in general.]

[p] 407. Before the Declaration of London the term _unneutral service_
was used by several writers with reference to the carriage of certain
persons and despatches for the enemy on the part of neutral vessels. The
term has been introduced in order to distinguish the carriage of persons
and despatches for the enemy from the carriage of contraband, as these
were often confounded with each other. Since contraband consists of
certain goods only and never of persons or despatches, a vessel carrying
persons and despatches for the enemy is not thereby actually carrying
contraband.[858] And there is another important difference between the
two. Carriage of contraband need not necessarily, and in most cases
actually does not, take place in the direct service of the enemy. On the
other hand, carriage of persons and despatches for the enemy always
takes place in the direct service of the enemy, and, consequently,
represents a much more intensive assistance of, and a much more intimate
connection with, the enemy than carriage of contraband. For these
reasons a distinct treatment of carriage of contraband, on the one hand,
and carriage of persons and despatches, on the other, was certainly
considered desirable by many publicists. Those writers who did not adopt
the term _unneutral service_, on account of its somewhat misleading
character, preferred[859] the expression _analogous of contraband_,
because in practice maritime transport for the enemy was always treated
in analogy with, although not as, carriage of contraband.

[Footnote 858: This was recognised in the case of the _Yangtsze
Insurance Association_ v. _Indemnity Mutual Marine Assurance Company_,
L.R. (1908), 1 K.B. 910 and 2 K.B. 504.]

[Footnote 859: It was also preferred in the first edition of this work.
But it was necessary to abandon further resistance on account of the
fact that after the official adoption, in the translation of the
Declaration of London, of the term _unneutral service_ it was useless to
oppose it.]

The Declaration of London puts the whole matter upon a new and very much
enlarged basis, for Chapter III. treats in articles 45 to 47, under the
heading _De l'assistance hostile_--the official English translation of
which is _unneutral service_--not only of the carriage of persons for
the enemy on the part of a neutral vessel, but also of the transmission
of intelligence in the interest of the enemy, the taking of a direct
part in the hostilities, and a number of other acts on the part of a
neutral vessel. Accordingly the Declaration of London makes a
distinction between two kinds of unneutral service, meting out for the
one a treatment analogous in a general way to contraband, and for the
other a treatment analogous to that of enemy merchant vessels. Carriage
of individual members of the armed forces of the enemy and a certain
case of transmission of intelligence in the interest of the enemy
constitute the first kind, and four groups of acts creating enemy
character for the vessel concerned constitute the second kind.[860]

[Footnote 860: Although--see above, [p][p] 173 and 174--prevention of
unneutral service to the enemy is a means of sea warfare, it chiefly
concerns neutral commerce, and is, therefore, more conveniently treated
with neutrality.]

[Sidenote: Carriage of Persons for the Enemy.]

[p] 408. Either belligerent may punish neutral vessels for carrying, in
the service of the enemy, certain persons.

Such persons included, according to the customary rules of International
Law hitherto prevailing, not only members of the armed forces of the
enemy, but also individuals who were not yet members of the armed forces
but who would have become so as soon as they reached their place of
destination, and, thirdly, non-military individuals in the service of
the enemy either in such a prominent position that they could be made
prisoners of war, or who were going abroad as agents for the purpose of
fostering the cause of the enemy. Thus, for instance, if the head of the
enemy State or one of his cabinet ministers fled the country to avoid
captivity, the neutral vessel that carried him could have been punished,
as could also the vessel carrying an agent of the enemy sent abroad to
negotiate a loan and the like. However, the mere fact that enemy persons
were on board a neutral vessel did not in itself prove that these
persons were carried by the vessel for the enemy and in his service.
This was the case only when either the vessel knew of the character of
the persons and nevertheless carried them, thereby acting in the service
of the enemy, or when the vessel was directly hired by the enemy for
the purpose of transport of the individuals concerned. Thus, for
instance, if able-bodied men booked their passages on a neutral vessel
to an enemy port with the secret intention of enlisting in the forces of
the enemy, the vessel could not be considered as carrying persons for
the enemy; but she could be so considered if an agent of the enemy
openly booked their passages. Thus, further, if the fugitive head of the
enemy State booked his passage under a false name, and concealed his
identity from the vessel, she could not be considered as carrying a
person for the enemy; but she could be so considered if she knew whom
she was carrying, because she was then aware that she was acting in the
service of the enemy. As regards a vessel directly hired by the enemy,
there could be no doubt that she was acting in the service of the enemy.
Thus the American vessel _Orozembo_[861] was in 1807, during war between
England and the Netherlands, captured and condemned, because, although
chartered by a merchant in Lisbon ostensibly to sail in ballast to Macao
and to take from there a cargo to America, she received by order of the
charterer three Dutch officers and two Dutch civil servants, and sailed,
not to Macao, but to Batavia. And the American vessel _Friendship_[862]
was likewise in 1807, during war between England and France, captured
and condemned, because she was hired by the French Government to carry
ninety shipwrecked officers and sailors home to a French port.

[Footnote 861: 6 C. Rob. 430.]

[Footnote 862: 6 C. Rob. 420.]

According to British practice hitherto prevailing, a neutral vessel was
considered as carrying persons in the service of the enemy even if she
were, through the application of force, constrained by the enemy to
carry the persons, or if she were in _bona-fide_ ignorance of the status
of her passengers. Thus, in 1802, during war between Great Britain and
France, the Swedish vessel _Carolina_[863] was condemned by Sir William
Scott for having carried French troops from Egypt to Italy, although the
master endeavoured to prove that the vessel was obliged by force to
render the transport service. And the above-mentioned vessel _Orozembo_
was condemned[864] by Sir William Scott, although her master was
ignorant of the service for the enemy on which he was engaged: "... In
cases of _bona-fide_ ignorance there may be no actual delinquency; but
if the service is injurious, that will be sufficient to give the
belligerent a right to prevent the thing from being done or at least
repeated," said Sir William Scott.[865]

[Footnote 863: 4 C. Rob. 256.]

[Footnote 864: See Phillimore, III. [p] 274, and Holland, _Prize Law_,
[p][p] 90-91. Hall, [p] 249, p. 700, note 2, reprobates the British
practice. During the Russo-Japanese War only one case of condemnation of
a neutral vessel for carrying persons for the enemy is recorded, that of
the _Nigretia_, a vessel which endeavoured to carry into Vladivostock
the escaped captain and lieutenant of the Russian destroyer
_Ratzoporni_; see Takahashi, pp. 639-641.]

[Footnote 865: It should be mentioned that, according to the customary
law hitherto prevailing, the case of diplomatic agents sent by the enemy
to neutral States was an exception to the rule that neutral vessels may
be punished for carrying agents sent by the enemy. The importance of
this exception became apparent in the case of the _Trent_ which occurred
during the American War. On November 8, 1861, the Federal cruiser _San
Jacinto_ stopped the British mail steamer _Trent_ on her voyage from
Havana to the British port of Nassau, in the Bahamas, forcibly took off
Messrs. Mason and Slidell, together with their secretaries, political
agents sent by the Confederate States to Great Britain and France, and
then let the vessel continue her voyage. Great Britain demanded their
immediate release, and the United States at once granted this, although
the ground on which release was granted was not identical with the
ground on which release was demanded. The Government of the United
States maintained that the removal of these men from the vessel without
bringing her before a Prize Court for trial was irregular, and,
therefore, not justified, whereas release was demanded on the ground
that a neutral vessel could not be prevented from carrying diplomatic
agents sent by the enemy to neutrals. Now diplomatic agents in the
proper sense of the term these gentlemen were not, because although they
were sent by the Confederate States, the latter were not recognised as
such, but only as a belligerent Power. Yet these gentlemen were
political agents of a quasi-diplomatic character, and the standpoint of
Great Britain was for this reason perhaps correct. The fact that the
Governments of France, Austria, and Prussia protested through their
diplomatic envoys in Washington shows at least that neutral vessels may
carry unhindered diplomatic agents sent by the enemy to neutrals,
however doubtful it may be whether the same is valid regarding agents
with a quasi-diplomatic character. See _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862,
North America, N. 5; Marquardsen, _Der Trent Fall_ (1862); Wharton, [p]
374; Moore, VII. [p] 1265; Phillimore, II. [p][p] 130-130A; Mountague
Bernard, _Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil War_
(1870), pp. 187-205; Harris, _The Trent Affair_ (1896).]

According to the Declaration of London neutral merchantmen may, apart
from the case of the carriage of persons who in the course of the voyage
directly assist the operations of the enemy, only be considered to
render unneutral service by carrying such enemy persons as are actually
already members of the armed forces of the enemy. Article 45 makes it
quite apparent, through using the words "_embodied_ in the armed
forces," that reservists and the like who are on their way to the enemy
country for the purpose of there joining the armed forces, do not belong
to such enemy persons as a neutral vessel may not carry without exposing
herself to punishment for rendering unneutral service to the enemy. And
four different cases of carrying enemy persons must be distinguished
according to the Declaration of London, namely: that of a neutral vessel
exclusively engaged in the transport of enemy troops; that of a vessel
transporting a military detachment of the enemy; that of a vessel
transporting one or more persons who in the course of the voyage
directly assist the operations of the enemy; that of a vessel
transporting, on a voyage specially undertaken, individual members of
the armed forces of the enemy.

(1) According to article 46, No. 4, a neutral vessel exclusively
intended at the time for the transport of enemy troops acquires thereby
enemy character. This case will be considered with others of the same
kind below in [p] 410.

(2) In case a vessel, although she is not exclusively therefor destined,
and although she is not on a voyage specially undertaken for that
purpose, transports, to the knowledge of either the owner or the
charterer or the master, a military detachment of the enemy, she is,
according to article 45, No. 2, considered to render unneutral service
for which she may be punished. Accordingly, if to the knowledge of
either the owner or the charterer or the master, a neutral vessel _in
the ordinary course of her voyage_ carries a military detachment of the
enemy, she is liable to be seized for unneutral service.

(3) In case a neutral vessel, to the knowledge of either the owner or
the charterer or the master, carries one or more persons--subjects of
one of the belligerents or of a neutral Power--who in the course of the
voyage directly assist the operations of the enemy in any way, for
instance by signalling or sending message by wireless telegraphy, she
is, according to article 45, No. 2, likewise liable to seizure for
rendering unneutral service.

(4) In case a neutral vessel carries individual members of the armed
forces of the enemy, she is, according to article 45, No. 1, then only
liable to seizure if she is on a voyage specially undertaken for such
transport, that means, if she has been turned from her ordinary course
and has touched at a port outside her ordinary course for the purpose of
embarking, or is going to touch at a port outside her ordinary course
for the purpose of disembarking, the enemy persons concerned. A liner,
therefore, carrying individual members of the armed forces of the enemy
in the ordinary course of her voyage may not be considered to be
rendering unneutral service and may not be seized. However, according to
article 47, a neutral vessel carrying members of the armed forces of the
enemy while pursuing her ordinary course, may be stopped for the purpose
of taking off such enemy persons and making them prisoners of war (see
below, [p] 413).

[Sidenote: Transmission of Intelligence to the Enemy.]

[p] 409. Either belligerent may punish neutral merchantmen for
transmission of intelligence to the enemy.

According to customary rules hitherto in force, either belligerent might
punish neutral vessels for the carriage of political despatches from or
to the enemy, and especially for such despatches as were in relation to
the war. But to this rule there were two exceptions. Firstly, on the
ground that neutrals have a right to demand that their intercourse with
either belligerent be not suppressed: a neutral vessel might not,
therefore, be punished for carrying despatches from the enemy to neutral
Governments, and _vice versa_,[866] and, further, despatches from the
enemy Government to its diplomatic agents and consuls abroad in neutral
States, and _vice versa_.[867] Secondly, on account of article 1 of
Convention XI., by which postal correspondence is inviolable, except in
the case of violation of blockade, the correspondence destined for, or
proceeding from, the blockaded port. However, the mere fact that a
neutral vessel had political despatches to or from the enemy on board
did not by itself prove that she was carrying them _for and in the
service of the enemy_. Just as in the case of certain enemy persons on
board, so in the case of despatches, the vessel was only considered to
be carrying them in the service of the enemy if either she knew of their
character and had nevertheless taken them on board, or if she was
directly hired for the purpose of carrying them. Thus, the American
vessel _Rapid_,[868] which was captured in 1810 during the war between
Great Britain and the Netherlands, on her voyage from New York to
Tonningen, for having on board a despatch for a Cabinet Minister of the
Netherlands hidden under a cover addressed to a merchant at Tonningen,
was released by the Prize Court. On the other hand, the _Atalanta_,[869]
which carried despatches in a tea chest hidden in the trunk of a
supercargo, was condemned.[870]

[Footnote 866: The _Caroline_ (1808), 6 C. Rob. 461.]

[Footnote 867: The _Madison_ (1810), Edwards, 224.]

[Footnote 868: Edwards, 228.]

[Footnote 869: 6 C. Rob. 440.]

[Footnote 870: British practice seems unsettled on the question as to
whether the vessel must know of the character of the despatch which she
is carrying. In spite of the case of the _Rapid_, quoted above, Holland,
_Prize Law_, [p] 100, maintains that ignorance of the master of the
vessel is no excuse, and Phillimore, III. [p] 272, seems to be of the
same opinion.]

According to the Declaration of London the carriage of despatches for
the enemy may only be punished in case it falls under the category of
transmitting intelligence to the enemy on the part of a neutral vessel.
Two kinds of such transmission of intelligence must be distinguished:--

Firstly, according to article 46, No. 4, a neutral vessel exclusively
intended for the transmission of intelligence to the enemy acquires
thereby enemy character; this will be considered with other cases of the
same kind below in [p] 410.

Secondly, according to article 45, No. 1, a neutral vessel may be seized
for transmitting intelligence to the enemy if she is on a voyage
specially undertaken for such transmission, that is to say, if she has
been turned from her ordinary course and has touched or is going to
touch at a port outside her ordinary course for the purpose of
transmitting intelligence to the enemy. A liner, therefore, transmitting
intelligence to the enemy in the ordinary course of her voyage may not
be considered to be rendering unneutral service and may not be punished.
However, self-preservation would in a case of necessity justify a
belligerent in temporarily detaining such a liner for the purpose of
preventing the intelligence from reaching the enemy.[871]

[Footnote 871: See below, [p] 413.]

The conception "transmission of intelligence" is not defined by the
Declaration of London. It certainly means not only oral transmission of
intelligence, but also the transmission of despatches containing
intelligence. The transmission of any political intelligence of value to
the enemy, whether or no the intelligence is in relation to the war,
must be considered unneutral service, the case excepted in which
intelligence is transmitted from the enemy to neutral Governments, and
vice versa, and, further, from the enemy Government to its diplomatic
agents and consuls abroad in neutral States. And it must be emphasised
that, although a vessel may be seized and punished for unneutral
service, according to article 1 of Convention XI. of the Second Hague
Peace Conference the postal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents,
whatever its character, found on board is inviolable.

[Sidenote: Unneutral Service creating Enemy Character.]

[p] 410. In contradistinction to cases of unneutral service which are
similar to carriage of contraband, the Declaration of London enumerates
in article 46 four cases of such kinds of unneutral service as vest
neutral vessels with enemy character.[872]

(1) There is, firstly, the case of a neutral merchantman taking a direct
part in the hostilities. This may occur in several ways, but such vessel
in every case loses her neutral and acquires enemy character, just as a
subject of a neutral Power who enlists in the ranks of the enemy armed
forces. But a distinction must be made between taking a direct part in
the hostilities, for instance rendering assistance to the enemy fleet
during battle, on the one hand, and, on the other, acts of a piratical
character. If a neutral merchantman--see above, [p][p] 85, 181, and
254--without Letters of Marque during war and from hatred of one of the
belligerents, were to attack and sink merchantmen of such belligerent,
she would have to be considered, and could therefore be treated as, a
pirate.

(2) There is, secondly, the case of a neutral vessel which sails under
the orders or the control of an agent placed on board by the enemy
Government. The presence of such agent, and the fact that the vessel
sails under his orders or control shows clearly that she is really for
all practical purposes part and parcel of the enemy forces.

(3) There is, thirdly, the case of a neutral vessel in the exclusive
employment of the enemy. This may occur in two different ways: either
the vessel may be rendering a specific service in the exclusive
employment of the enemy, as, for instance, did those German merchantmen
during the Russo-Japanese War which acted as colliers for the Russian
fleet _en route_ for the Far East; or the vessel may be chartered by the
enemy so that she is entirely at his disposal for any purpose he may
choose, whether such purpose is or is not connected with the war.[873]

(4) There is, fourthly and lastly, the case of a neutral merchantman
exclusively intended at the time either for the transport of enemy
troops or for the transmission of intelligence for the enemy. This case
is different from the case--provided for by article 45, No. 1--of a
vessel on a voyage specially undertaken with a view to the carriage of
individual members of the armed forces of the enemy. Whereas the latter
is a case of unneutral service rendered by a vessel which turns from her
course for the purpose of rendering specific service, the former is a
case in which the vessel is exclusively and for the time being
permanently intended and devoted to the rendering of unneutral service.
For the time being she is, therefore, actually part and parcel of the
enemy marine. For this reason she is considered to be rendering
unneutral service, and to have lost her neutral character, even if, at
the moment an enemy cruiser searches her, she is engaged neither in the
transport of troops nor in the transmission of intelligence. The fact is
decisive that she is for the time being exclusively intended for such
unneutral service, whether or no she is at every moment really engaged
in rendering such service. And it makes no difference, whether the
vessel is engaged by the enemy and paid for the transport of troops or
the transmission of intelligence, or whether she renders the
service[874] gratuitously.

[Footnote 872: See above, [p] 89 (1), p. 113.]

[Footnote 873: Two cases of interest occurred in 1905, during the
Russo-Japanese War. The _Industrie_, a German vessel, and the
_Quang-nam_, a French vessel, were captured and condemned by the
Japanese for being in the employ of Russia as reconnoitring vessels,
although the former pretended to collect news in the service of the
Chefoo _Daily News_, and the latter pretended to be a cargo vessel
plying between neutral ports. See Takahashi, pp. 732 and 735.]

[Footnote 874: As regards the meaning of the term transmission of
intelligence, see above, [p] 409.]


II

CONSEQUENCES OF UNNEUTRAL SERVICE

  See the literature quoted above at the commencement of [p] 407.

[Sidenote: Capture for Unneutral Service.]

[p] 411. According to customary rules hitherto prevailing, as well as
according to the Declaration of London, a neutral vessel may be captured
if visit or search establish the fact, or grave suspicion of the fact,
that she is rendering unneutral service to the enemy. And such capture
may take place anywhere throughout the range of the Open Sea and the
territorial maritime belt of either belligerent.

Stress must be laid on the fact that mail steamers are on principle not
exempt from capture for unneutral service. Although, according to
article 1 of Convention XI., the postal correspondence of belligerents
as well as of neutrals, whatever its official or private character,
found on board a vessel on the sea is inviolable,[875] and a vessel may
never, therefore, be considered to be rendering unneutral service by
carrying amongst her postal correspondence despatches containing
intelligence for the enemy, a mail steamer is nevertheless--see article
2 of Convention XI.--not exempt from the laws and customs of naval war
respecting neutral merchantmen. A mail boat is, therefore, quite as much
as any other merchantman, exposed to capture for rendering unneutral
service.

[Footnote 875: See above, [p][p] 191 and 319.]

However this may be, capture is allowed only so long as the vessel is
_in delicto_, that is during the time in which she is rendering the
unneutral service concerned or immediately afterwards while she is being
chased for having rendered unneutral service. A neutral vessel may not,
therefore, be captured after the completion of a voyage specially
undertaken for the purpose of transporting members of the armed forces
of the enemy, or of transmitting intelligence for the enemy, or after
having disembarked the military detachment of the enemy and the persons
directly assisting the operations of the enemy in the course of the
voyage whom she was transporting. And it must be specially emphasised
that even such neutral vessel as had acquired--see article 46 of the
Declaration of London--enemy character by rendering unneutral service,
ceases to be _in delicto_ after her unneutral service has come to an
end. Thus, for instance, a neutral vessel which took a direct part in
hostilities[876] may not afterwards be captured, nor may a vessel which
has disembarked the agent of the enemy Government under whose orders or
control she was navigating.

[Footnote 876: Provided she did not--see above, [p] 410 (1)--commit acts
of a piratical character; for such acts she may always be punished.]

[Sidenote: Penalty for Unneutral Service.]

[p] 412. According to the practice hitherto prevailing, a neutral vessel
captured for carriage of persons or despatches in the service of the
enemy could be confiscated. Moreover, according to British[877]
practice, such part of the cargo as belonged to the owner of the vessel
was likewise confiscated.[878] And if the vessel was not found guilty of
carrying persons or despatches in the service of the enemy, and was not
therefore condemned, the Government of the captor could nevertheless
detain the persons as prisoners of war and confiscate the despatches,
provided the persons and despatches concerned were in any way of such a
character as to make a vessel, which was cognisant of this character,
liable to punishment for transporting them for the enemy.

[Footnote 877: The _Friendship_ (1807), 6 C. Rob. 420; the _Atalanta_
(1808), 6 C. Rob. 440. See Holland, _Prize Law_, [p][p] 95 and 105.]

[Footnote 878: See, however, the _Hope_ (1808), 6 C. Rob. 463, note.]

The Declaration of London recognises these three rules. Articles 45 and
46 declare any vessel rendering any kind of unneutral service to the
enemy liable to confiscation, and likewise declare such part of the
cargo as belongs to the owner of the confiscated vessel liable to
confiscation. And article 47 enacts that, although a neutral vessel may
not be condemned because there are no grounds for her capture, the
capturing State may nevertheless detain as prisoners of war any members
of the armed forces of the enemy who were found on board the vessel. The
case of despatches found on board is not mentioned by article 47, but
there ought to be no doubt--see below, [p] 413--that the old customary
rule that, although the vessel may not be condemned because there is no
ground for capture, any despatches for the enemy found on board may, in
analogy with article 47, be confiscated, provided such despatches are
not part of the postal correspondence carried on board.

It must be emphasised that the mere fact that a neutral vessel is
rendering unneutral service, is not sufficient for her condemnation; for
in addition _mens rea_ is required. Now as regards the four kinds of
unneutral service which create enemy character, _mens rea_ is obviously
always in existence, and therefore always presumed to be present. For
this reason article 46, in contradistinction to article 45, does not
mention anything concerning the knowledge by the vessel of the outbreak
of hostilities. But as regards the other cases of unneutral service,
article 45 provides that the vessel may not be confiscated if the vessel
is encountered at sea while unaware of the outbreak of hostilities, or
if the master, after becoming aware of the outbreak of hostilities, has
had no opportunity of disembarking the passengers concerned. On the
other hand, a vessel is deemed, according to article 45, to be aware of
the existence of a state of war if she left an enemy port subsequent to
the outbreak of hostilities, or a neutral port subsequent to the
notification of the outbreak of hostilities to the Power to which such
port belongs, provided that such notification was made in sufficient
time.

Although the Declaration of London metes out the same punishment for the
several kinds of unneutral service which it enumerates, it nevertheless
makes a distinction, apart from the penalty, with regard to the
treatment of the vessels captured for rendering unneutral service.

Article 45 provides for a neutral vessel captured for having rendered
either of the two kinds of unneutral service mentioned in this article a
treatment which is, in a general way, the same as that for a neutral
vessel captured for the carriage of contraband. This means that the
vessel does not lose her neutral character, and must under all
circumstances and conditions be taken before a Prize Court, unless--see
article 49 of the Declaration of London--the taking of her into a port
of the capturing State would involve danger to the safety of the
capturing vessel or to the success of the military operations in which
she is engaged at the time. And an appeal from the national Prize Courts
may be brought to the International Prize Court.

Article 46, on the other hand, provides, apart from the penalty, a
treatment for a vessel captured for having rendered any of the four
kinds of unneutral service enumerated in this article which, in a
general way, is the same as that for a captured enemy merchantman. This
means that such vessel acquires enemy character. Accordingly (see above,
[p] 89) all enemy goods on the vessel may be seized, all goods on board
will be presumed to be enemy goods, and the owners of neutral goods on
board will have to prove the neutral character of their goods. Further,
the rules of articles 48 and 49 of the Declaration of London concerning
the destruction of neutral vessels do not apply. Again, no appeal may be
brought from the national Prize Courts to the International Prize Court
by the owner of the ship except concerning the one question only,
namely, whether the act of which she is accused has the character of
unneutral service.[879]

[Footnote 879: The question as to whether, if the vessel has been
destroyed by the captor, the innocent owners of the neutral goods on
board may claim compensation, has to be decided in the same way as the
question as to whether the owners of neutral goods on a destroyed enemy
merchantman have a claim to compensation; see above, [p] 194.]

[Sidenote: Seizure of Enemy Persons and Despatches without Seizure of
Vessel.]

[p] 413. According to the British[880] and American practice, as well as
that of some other States, which has hitherto prevailed, whenever a
neutral vessel was stopped for carrying persons or despatches for the
enemy, these could not be seized unless the vessel were seized at the
same time. The release, in 1861, during the American Civil War, of
Messrs. Mason[881] and Slidell, who had been forcibly taken off the
_Trent_, while the ship herself was allowed to continue her voyage, was
based, by the United States, on the fact that the seizure of these men
without the seizure of the vessel was illegal. Since, according to the
Declaration of London, a neutral vessel rendering unneutral service of
any kind is liable to be confiscated, it is evident that in such a case
the enemy persons and despatches concerned may not be taken off the
vessel unless the vessel herself is seized and brought into a port of a
Prize Court. However, article 47 provides that any member of the armed
forces of the enemy found on board a neutral merchant vessel may be
taken off and made a prisoner of war, although there may be no ground
for the capture of the vessel. Therefore, if a vessel carries individual
members of the armed forces of the enemy in the ordinary course of her
voyage,[882] or if she transports a military detachment of the enemy and
the like without being aware of the outbreak of hostilities, the members
of the armed forces of the enemy on board may be seized, although the
vessel herself may not be seized, as she is not rendering unneutral
service.

[Footnote 880: See Holland, _Prize Law_, [p] 104.]

[Footnote 881: See above, [p] 408, p. 519, note 3.]

[Footnote 882: Accordingly, in January 1912, during the Turco-Italian
War, the Italian gunboat _Volturno_, after having overhauled, in the Red
Sea, the British steamer _Africa_ going from Hodeida to Aden, took off
and made prisoners of war Colonel Riza Bey and eleven other Turkish
officers. Although the Declaration of London is not yet ratified by
Great Britain, she did not protest. The case of the _Manouba_ ought
likewise to be mentioned here. This French steamer, which plies between
Marseilles and Tunis, was stopped on January 16, 1912, by an Italian
cruiser in the Mediterranean, and twenty-nine Turkish passengers, who
were supposed to be Turkish officers on their way to the theatre of war,
were forcibly taken off and made prisoners. On the protest of France,
the captives were handed over to her in order to ascertain whether they
were members of the Turkish forces, and it was agreed between the
parties that the case should be settled by an arbitral award of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, Italy asserting that she
had only acted in accordance with article 47 of the Declaration of
London.]

The Declaration of London does not mention the case of enemy despatches
embodying intelligence found on board such a neutral vessel as may not
herself be captured for such carriage. For instance, in the case of a
mail steamer pursuing her ordinary course and carrying a despatch of the
enemy not in her mail bags but separately, the vessel may not, according
to article 45, be seized. In this, and similar cases, may despatches be
seized without the seizure of the vessel? It has been pointed out above,
[p] 409, that, in a case of necessity, self-preservation would justify a
belligerent in temporarily detaining such a liner for the purpose of
preventing the intelligence from reaching the enemy. This certainly fits
the case of a vessel transmitting oral intelligence. But if a vessel
carried despatches, the necessity of detaining her ceases through
seizure of the despatches themselves. The question--see above, [p]
412--as to whether in such cases the despatches may be seized without
seizure of the vessel ought, therefore, in analogy with article 47 of
the Declaration of London, to be answered in the affirmative.

Quite different from the case of seizure of such enemy persons and
despatches as a vessel cannot carry without exposing herself to
punishment, is the case[883] where a vessel has such enemy persons and
despatches on board as she is allowed to carry, but whom a belligerent
believes it to be necessary in the interest of self-preservation to
seize. Since necessity in the interest of self-preservation is,
according to International Law, an excuse[884] for an illegal act, a
belligerent may seize such persons and despatches, provided that such
seizure is not merely desirable, but absolutely necessary[885] in the
interest of self-preservation, as, for instance, in the case where an
Ambassador of the enemy on board a neutral vessel is on the way to
submit to a neutral a draft treaty of alliance injurious to the other
belligerent.

[Footnote 883: See Hall, [p] 253; Rivier, II. p. 390.]

[Footnote 884: See above, vol. I. [p] 129.]

[Footnote 885: See above, vol. I. [p] 130.]




CHAPTER VI

VISITATION, CAPTURE, AND TRIAL OF NEUTRAL VESSELS


I

VISITATION

  Bynkershoek, _Quaest. jur. pub._ I. c. 14--Vattel, III. [p]
  114--Hall, [p][p] 270-276--Manning, pp. 433-460--Phillimore, III.
  [p][p] 322-344--Twiss, II. [p][p] 91-97--Halleck, II. pp.
  255-271--Taylor, [p][p] 685-689--Wharton, III. [p][p] 325 and
  346--Wheaton, [p][p] 524-537--Moore, VII. [p][p]
  1199-1205--Bluntschli, [p][p] 819-826--Heffter, [p][p]
  167-171--Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 773-781--Klueber,
  [p][p] 293-294--G. F. Martens, II. [p][p] 317 and 321--Ullmann,
  [p] 196--Bonfils, Nos. 1674-1691--Despagnet, Nos. 717-721--Rivier,
  II. pp. 423-426--Nys, III. pp. 682-692--Calvo, V. [p][p]
  2939-2991--Fiore, III. Nos. 1630-1641, and Code, Nos.
  1853-1877--Martens, II. [p] 137--Kleen, II. [p][p] 185-199,
  209--Gessner, pp. 278-332--Boeck, Nos. 767-769--Dupuis, Nos.
  239-252, and _Guerre_, Nos. 189-204--Bernsten, [p] 11--Nippold,
  II. [p] 35--Perels, [p][p] 52-55--Testa, pp. 230-242--Ortolan, II.
  pp. 214-245--Hautefeuille, III. pp. 1-299--Holland, _Prize Law_,
  [p][p] 1-17, 155-230--U.S. Naval War Code, articles
  30-33--Schlegel, _Sur la visite des vaisseaux neutres sous convoi_
  (1800)--Mirbach, _Die voelkerrechtlichen Grundsaetze des
  Durchsuchungsrechts zur See_ (1903)--Loewenthal, _Das
  Untersuchungsrecht des internationalen Seerechts im Krieg und
  Frieden_ (1905)--Atherley-Jones, _Commerce in War_ (1906), pp.
  299-360--Hirschmann, _Das internationale Prisenrecht_ (1912),
  [p][p] 33-34--Duboc in _R.G._ IV. (1897), pp 382-403--See also the
  monographs quoted above at the commencement of [p] 391,
  Bulmerincq's articles on _Le droit des prises maritimes_ in _R.I._
  X-XIII. (1878-1881), and the General Report presented to the Naval
  Conference of London on behalf of the Drafting Committee, article
  63.

[Sidenote: Conception of Right of Visitation.]

[p] 414. Right of visitation[886] is the right of belligerents to visit
and eventually search neutral merchantmen for the purpose of
ascertaining whether these vessels really belong to the merchant marine
of neutrals, and, if this is found to be the case, whether they are
attempting to break a blockade, or carry contraband, or render unneutral
service to the enemy. The right of visit and search was already
mentioned in the _Consolato del Mare_, and although it has often[887]
been contested, its _raison d'etre_ is so obvious that it has long been
universally recognised in practice. It is indeed the only means by which
belligerents are able to ascertain whether neutral merchantmen intend to
bring assistance to the enemy and to render him unneutral services.[888]

[Footnote 886: It must be borne in mind that this right of visitation is
not an independent right but is involved in the right of either
belligerent--see above, [p] 314--to punish neutral vessels breaking
blockade, carrying contraband, and rendering unneutral service.]

[Footnote 887: See, for instance, Huebner, _De la saisie des batiments
neutres_ (1759), I. p. 227.]

[Footnote 888: Attention should be drawn to the _Reglement international
des prises maritimes_, adopted at Heidelberg in 1887 by the Institute of
International Law; [p][p] 1-29 regulate visit and search. See
_Annuaire_, IX. (1888), p. 202.]

[Sidenote: Right of Visitation, by whom, when, and where exercised.]

[p] 415. The right of visit and search may be exercised by all
warships[889] of belligerents. But since it is a belligerent right, it
may, of course, only be exercised after the outbreak and before the end
of war. The right of visitation on the part of men-of-war of all nations
in time of peace in a case of suspicion of piracy--see above, vol. I.
[p] 266 (2)--has nothing to do with the right of visit and search on the
part of belligerents. And since an armistice does not bring war to an
end, and since, on the other hand, the exercise of the right of
visitation is not an act of warfare, this right may be exercised during
the time of a partial as well as of a general armistice.[890] The region
where the right may be exercised is the maritime territorial belt of
either belligerent, and, further, the Open Sea, but not the maritime
territorial belt of neutrals. Whether the part of the Open Sea in which
a belligerent man-of-war meets with a neutral merchantman is near or far
away from that part of the world where hostilities are actually taking
place makes no difference so long as there is suspicion against the
vessel. The question as to whether the men-of-war of a belligerent may
exercise the right of visitation in the maritime territorial belt of an
ally is one between the latter and the belligerent exclusively, provided
such an ally is already a belligerent.

[Footnote 889: It should be mentioned that privateers could also
exercise the right of visit and search. But since even such States as
have not acceded to the Declaration of Paris in practice no longer issue
Letters of Marque, such a case will no longer occur.]

[Footnote 890: But this is not universally recognised. Thus,
Hautefeuille, III. p. 91, maintains that during a general armistice the
right of visitation may not be exercised, and [p] 5 of the _Reglement
international des prises maritimes_ of the Institute of International
Law takes up the same attitude. It ought, likewise, to be mentioned that
in strict law the right of visit and search may be exercised even after
the conclusion of peace before the treaty of peace is ratified. But the
above-mentioned [p] 5 of the _Reglement international des prises
maritimes_ declares this right to cease "avec les preliminaires de la
paix." See below, [p] 436.]

[Sidenote: Only Private Vessels may be Visited.]

[p] 416. During the nineteenth century it became universally recognised
that neutral men-of-war are not objects of the right of visit and search
of belligerents.[891] And the same is valid regarding public neutral
vessels which sail in the service of armed forces, such as transport
vessels, for instance. Doubt exists as to the position of public neutral
vessels which do not sail in the service of armed forces, but sail for
other purposes, as, for instance, mail-boats belonging to a neutral
State. It is asserted[892] that, if commanded by an officer of the Navy,
they must be treated in the same way as men-of-war, but that it is
desirable to ask the commanders to give their word of honour assuring
the absence of contraband and unneutral service.

[Footnote 891: In former times Great Britain tried to extend visitation
to neutral men-of-war. See Manning, p. 455.]

[Footnote 892: See, for instance, Gessner, p. 297, and Perels, [p] 52,
IV.]

[Sidenote: Vessels under Convoy.]

[p] 417. Sweden in 1653, during war between Great Britain and the
Netherlands, claimed that the belligerents ought to waive their right of
visitation over Swedish merchantmen if the latter sailed under the
convoy of a Swedish man-of-war whose commander asserted the absence of
contraband on board the convoyed vessels. The Peace of Westminster in
1654 brought this war to an end, and in 1756 the Netherlands, then
neutral, claimed the right of convoy. But it was not until the last
quarter of the eighteenth century that the right of convoy was more and
more insisted upon by Continental neutrals. During the American War of
Independence in 1780, the Netherlands again claimed that right, and when
they themselves in 1781 waged war against Great Britain, they ordered
their men-of-war and privateers to respect the right of convoy. Between
1780 and 1800 treaties were concluded, in which Russia, Austria,
Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, France, the United States of America, and
other States recognised that right. But Great Britain always refused to
recognise it, and in July 1800 the action of a British squadron in
capturing a Danish man-of-war and her convoy of six merchantmen for
resistance to visitation called the Second Armed Neutrality into
existence. Yet Great Britain still resisted, and by article 4 of the
"Maritime Convention" of St. Petersburg of June 17, 1801, she conceded
to Russia only that vessels under convoy should not be visited by
privateers. During the nineteenth century more and more treaties
stipulating the right of convoy were concluded, but this right was not
mentioned in the Declaration of Paris of 1856, and Great Britain refused
to recognise it throughout the century. However, Great Britain abandoned
her opposition at the Naval Conference of London of 1908-9, and the
Declaration of London proposes to settle the matter by articles 61 and
62 in the following way:--

Neutral vessels under the convoy of a man-of-war flying the same flag
are exempt from search and may not be visited if the commander of the
convoy, at the request of the commander of the belligerent cruiser which
desires to visit, gives, in writing, all information as to the character
of the convoyed vessels and their cargoes which could be obtained by
search. Should the commander of the belligerent man-of-war have reason
to suspect that the confidence of the commander of the convoy has been
abused, he may not himself resort to visit and search, but must
communicate with the commander of the convoy. The latter must
investigate the matter, and must record the result of his investigation
in a report, a copy of which must be given to the commander of the
belligerent cruiser. Should, in the opinion of the commander of the
convoy, the facts stated in the report justify the capture of one or
more of the convoyed vessels, he must withdraw protection from the
offending vessels, and the belligerent cruiser may then capture them.

In case a difference of opinion arises between the commander of the
convoy and the commander of the belligerent cruiser--for instance, with
regard to the question as to whether certain goods are absolute or
conditional contraband or as to whether the port of destination of a
convoyed vessel is an ordinary commercial port or a port which serves as
a base of supply for the armed forces of the enemy and the like--the
commander of the belligerent cruiser has no power of overruling the
decision of the commander of the convoy. He can only protest and report
the case to his Government, which will settle the matter by means of
diplomacy.

[Sidenote: No Universal Rules regarding Mode of Visitation.]

[p] 418. There are no rules of International Law which lay down all the
details of the formalities of the mode of visitation. A great many
treaties regulate them as between the parties, and all maritime nations
have given instructions to their men-of-war regarding these formalities.
Thereby uniform formalities are practised with regard to many points,
but regarding others the practice of the several States differs. Article
17 of the Peace Treaty of the Pyrenees of 1659 has served as a model of
many of the above-mentioned treaties regulating the formalities of
visitation: "Les navires d'Espagne, pour eviter tout desordre,
n'approcheront pas de plus pres les Francais que la portee du canon, et
pourront envoyer leur petite barque ou chaloupe a bord des navires
francais et faire entrer dedans deux ou trois hommes seulement, a qui
seront montres les passeports par le maitre du navire francais, par
lesquels il puisse apparoir, non seulement de la charge, mais aussi du
lieu de sa demeure et residence, et du nom tant du maitre ou patron que
du navire meme, afin que, par ces deux moyens, on puisse connaitre, s'il
porte des marchandises de contrebande; et qu'il apparaisse suffisamment
tant de la qualite du dit navire que de son maitre ou patron; auxquelles
passeports on devra donner entiere foi et creance."

[Sidenote: Stopping of Vessels for the Purpose of Visitation.]

[p] 419. A man-of-war which wishes to visit a neutral vessel must stop
her or make her bring to. Although the chasing of vessels may take place
under false colours, the right colours must be shown when vessels are
stopped.[893] The order for stopping can be given[894] by hailing or by
firing one or two blank cartridges from the so-called affirming gun,
and, if necessary, by firing a shot across the bows of the vessel. If
nevertheless the vessel does not bring to, the man-of-war is justified
in using force to compel her to bring to. Once the vessel has been
brought to, the man-of-war also brings to, keeping a reasonable
distance. With regard to this distance, treaties very often stipulate
either the range of a cannon shot or half such width or even a range
beyond a cannon shot; but all this is totally impracticable.[895] The
distance must vary according to the requirements of the case, and
according to wind and weather.

[Footnote 893: See above, [p] 211.]

[Footnote 894: See above, vol. I. [p] 268.]

[Footnote 895: See Ortolan, II. p. 220, and Perels, [p] 53, pp. 284,
285.]

[Sidenote: Visit.]

[p] 420. The vessel, having been stopped or brought to, is visited[896]
by one or two officers sent in a boat from the man-of-war. These
officers examine the papers of the vessel to ascertain her nationality,
the character of her cargo and passengers, and, lastly, the ports from
and to which she is sailing. Instead of visiting the merchantman and
inspecting her papers on board, the practice is followed, by the
men-of-war of some States, of summoning the master of the merchantman
with his papers on board the former and examining the papers there.

[Footnote 896: See above, vol. I. [p] 268, and Holland, _Prize Law_,
[p][p] 195-216.]

If everything is found in order and there is no suspicion of fraud, the
vessel is allowed to continue her course, a memorandum of the visit
having been entered in her log-book. On the other hand, if the
inspection of the papers shows that the vessel is carrying contraband or
rendering unneutral service, or that she is for another reason liable to
capture, she is at once seized. But it may be that, although ostensibly
everything is in order, there is nevertheless grave suspicion of fraud
against the vessel. In such case she may be searched.

[Sidenote: Search.]

[p] 421. Search is effected[897] by one or two officers, and eventually
a few men, in presence of the master of the vessel. Care must be taken
not to damage the vessel or the cargo, and no force whatever must be
applied. No lock must be forcibly broken open by the search party, but
the master is to be required to unlock it. If he fails to comply with
the demand he is not to be forced thereto, since the master's refusal to
assist the search in general, or that of a locked part of the vessel or
of a locked box in particular, is at once sufficient cause for seizing
the vessel. Search being completed, everything removed has to be
replaced with care. If the search has satisfied the searching officers
and dispelled all suspicion, a memorandum is entered in the log-book of
the vessel, and she is allowed to continue her voyage. On the other
hand, if search brought contraband or another cause for capture to
light, the vessel is seized. But since search can never take place so
thoroughly on the sea as in a harbour, it may be that, although search
has disclosed no proof to bear out the suspicion, grave suspicion still
remains. In such case she may be seized and brought into a port for the
purpose of being searched there as thoroughly as possible. But the
commander of a man-of-war seizing a vessel in such case must bear in
mind that full indemnities must be paid to the vessel for loss of time
and other losses sustained if finally she is found innocent. Therefore,
after a search at sea has brought nothing to light against the vessel,
seizure should take place only in case of grave suspicion.

[Footnote 897: See above, vol. I. [p] 269, and Holland, _Prize Law_,
[p][p] 217-230.]

[Sidenote: Consequences of Resistance to Visitation.]

[p] 422. If a neutral merchantman resists visit or search, she is at
once captured, and may be confiscated. The question as to whether the
vessel only, or also her cargo, could be confiscated for resistance has
hitherto been controversial. According to British[898] and American
theory and practice, the cargo as well as the vessel was liable to
confiscation. But Continental[899] writers emphatically argued against
this and maintained that the vessel only was liable to confiscation.

[Footnote 898: The _Maria_ (1799), 1 C. Rob. 340.]

[Footnote 899: See Gessner, pp. 318-321.]

According to article 63 of the Declaration of London, resistance to the
legitimate exercise of the right of visit, search, and capture involves
in all cases the confiscation of the vessel, which by her forcible
resistance has acquired enemy character (see above, [p] 89). For this
reason such goods on board as belong to the master or owner of the
vessel are treated as enemy goods and may be confiscated. Enemy goods on
board may now likewise be confiscated, although when they were first
shipped the vessel bore neutral character. Further, all goods on board
are now presumed to be enemy goods, and the owners of neutral goods on
board will have to prove the neutral character of their goods. Lastly,
no appeal may be brought from the National Prize Courts to the
International Prize Court by the owner of the ship except concerning the
one question only, namely, as to whether there was justification for
capturing her on the grounds of forcible resistance.

It must be emphasised that visit and search do not take place after a
vessel has been captured for resistance, for the mere fact of resisting
has imposed enemy character upon her, and the question is now irrelevant
whether visit and search would show her to be guilty or innocent.

[Sidenote: What constitutes Resistance.]

[p] 423. According to the practice hitherto prevailing,[900] and also
according to the Declaration of London, a mere attempt on the part of a
neutral merchantman to escape visitation does not in itself constitute
resistance. Such vessel may be chased and compelled by force to bring
to, and she cannot complain if, in the endeavour forcibly to compel her
to bring to, she is damaged or accidentally sunk. If, after the vessel
has been compelled to bring to, visit and search show her to be
innocent, she must be allowed to proceed on her course.

[Footnote 900: The _Maria_ (1799), 1 C. Rob. 340.]

Resistance to be penal must be _forcible_ resistance. It constitutes
resistance, therefore, if a vessel applies force in resisting any
legitimate action by the belligerent cruiser which requires her to stop
and to be visited and searched. The term _forcible resistance_ is not
defined in detail by article 63 of the Declaration of London. It is,
consequently, not certain whether the actual application of force only,
or also the refusal, on the part of the master, to show the ship papers
or to open locked parts of the vessel or locked boxes, and similar acts,
constitutes forcible resistance. The International Prize Court, if
established, would have to develop a practice which would decide these
points.

[Sidenote: Sailing under Enemy Convoy equivalent to Resistance.]

[p] 424. Wheaton excepted, all writers would seem to agree that the fact
of neutral merchantmen sailing under a convoy of enemy men-of-war is
equivalent to forcible resistance on their part, whether they themselves
intend to resist by force or not. But the Government of the United
States of America in 1810 contested this principle. In that year, during
war between Great Britain and Denmark, many American vessels sailing
from Russia used to seek protection under the convoy of British
men-of-war, whereupon Denmark declared all such American vessels to be
good and lawful prizes. Several were captured without making any
resistance whatever, and were condemned by Danish Prize Courts. The
United States protested, and claimed indemnities from Denmark, and in
1830 a treaty between the parties was signed at Copenhagen,[901]
according to which Denmark had to pay 650,000 dollars as indemnity. But
in article 5 of this treaty the parties "expressly declare that the
present convention is only applicable to the cases therein mentioned,
and, having no other object, may never hereafter be invoked by one party
or the other as a precedent or a rule for the future."[902]

[Footnote 901: Martens, _N.R._ VIII. p. 350.]

[Footnote 902: See Wheaton, [p][p] 530-537, and Taylor, [p] 693, p. 790.
Wheaton was the negotiator of this treaty on the part of the United
States.--With the case of neutral merchantmen sailing under enemy
convoy, the other case--see above, [p] 185--in which neutral goods are
placed on board an armed enemy vessel is frequently confused. In the
case of the _Fanny_ (1814), 1 Dodson, 443, Sir William Scott condemned
neutral Portuguese property on the ground that placing neutral property
on board an armed vessel was equal to resistance against visitation. But
the Supreme Court of the United States of America, in the of the
_Nereide_ (1815), 9 Cranch, 388, held the contrary view. The Court was
composed of four judges, of whom Story was one, and the latter dissented
from the majority and considered the British practice correct. See
Phillimore, III. [p] 341, and Wheaton, [p] 529.]

Article 63 of the Declaration of London does not--as was pointed out
above in [p] 423--define the term forcible resistance, but it is to be
expected that the practice of the International Prize Court would
consider the sailing under enemy convoy equivalent to forcible
resistance.

[Sidenote: Resistance by Neutral Convoy.]

[p] 425. Since Great Britain did not, before agreeing to the Declaration
of London, recognise the right of convoy and had always insisted upon
the right of visitation to be exercised over neutral merchantmen sailing
under the convoy of neutral men-of-war, the question has arisen as to
whether such merchantmen are considered resisting visitation in case the
convoying men-of-war only, and not the convoyed vessels themselves,
offer resistance. British practice has answered the question in the
affirmative. The rule was laid down in 1799[903] and in 1804[904] by Sir
William Scott in the cases of Swedish vessels captured while sailing
under the convoy of a Swedish man-of-war.

[Footnote 903: The _Maria_, 1 C. Rob. 340.]

[Footnote 904: The _Elsebe_, 5 C Rob. 173.]

Since Great Britain--see above, [p] 417--has abandoned her opposition to
the right of convoy and has agreed to articles 61 and 62 of the
Declaration of London which lay down rules concerning the matter, the
resistance by a neutral convoy to visitation may not, under ordinary
circumstances, be considered to be resistance on the part of the
convoyed neutral merchantman. If, however, the commander of a convoy,
after having refused to give the written information mentioned in
article 61 or to allow the investigation mentioned in article 62,
forcibly resists visitation of the convoyed merchantmen by a belligerent
cruiser, the question as to whether resistance by a convoy is equivalent
to resistance by a convoyed vessel, may even under the Declaration of
London arise.

[Sidenote: Deficiency of Papers.]

[p] 426. Since the purpose of visit is to ascertain the nationality of a
vessel, the character of her cargo and passengers, and the ports from
and to which she is sailing, it is obvious that this purpose cannot be
realised in case the visited vessel is deficient in her papers. As
stated above in Vol. I. [p] 262, every merchantman ought to carry the
following papers: (1) A certificate of registry or a sea-letter
(passport); (2) the muster-roll; (3) the log-book; (4) the manifest of
cargo; (5) bills of lading, and (6) if chartered, the charter-party.
Now, if a vessel is visited and cannot produce one or more of the papers
mentioned, she is suspect. Search is, of course, admissible for the
purpose of verifying the suspicion, but it may be that, although search
has not produced any proof of guilt, the suspicion is not dispelled. In
such case she may be seized and brought to a port for thorough
examination. But, with the exception of the case that she cannot produce
either certificate of registry or a sea-letter (passport), she ought not
to be confiscated for deficiency in papers only. Yet, if the cargo is
also suspect, or if there are other circumstances which increase the
suspicion, confiscation would be, I believe, in the discretion of the
Prize Court.

The Declaration of London does not mention the point, and the
International Prize Court would, therefore, have to evolve a system of
rules to be applied in cases concerned.

[Sidenote: Spoliation, Defacement, and Concealment of Papers.]

[p] 427. Mere deficiency of papers does not arouse the same suspicion
which a vessel incurs if she destroys[905] or throws overboard any of
her papers, defaces them or conceals them, and in especial in case the
spoliation of papers takes place at the time when the visiting vessel
comes in sight. Whatever her cargo may be, a vessel may at once be
seized without further search so soon as it becomes apparent that
spoliation, defacement, or concealment of papers has taken place. The
practice of the several States has hitherto differed with regard to
other consequences of spoliation, and the like, of papers, but
confiscation is certainly admissible in case other circumstances
increase the suspicion.[906]

[Footnote 905: The _Hunter_ (1815), 1 Dodson, 480.]

[Footnote 906: See the case of the _Apollo_ in Calvo, V. [p] 2989.]

The Declaration of London does not mention the case of spoliation of
papers, and it would therefore be the task of the International Prize
Court to evolve a uniform practice concerning the subject.

[Sidenote: Double and False Papers.]

[p] 428. The highest suspicion is aroused through the fact that a
visited vessel carries double papers, or false[907] papers, and such
vessel may certainly be seized. But the practice of the several States
has hitherto differed with regard to the question whether confiscation
is admissible for the mere fact of carrying double or false papers.
Whereas the practice of some States, as Russia and Spain, answered the
question in the affirmative, British[908] and American[909] practice
took a more lenient view, and condemned such vessels only on a clear
inference that the false or double papers were carried for the purpose
of deceiving the belligerent by whom the capture was made, but not in
other cases.[910]

[Footnote 907: The _Sarah_ (1801), 3 C. Rob. 330.]

[Footnote 908: The _Eliza and Katy_ (1805), 6 C. Rob. 192.]

[Footnote 909: The _St. Nicholas_ (1816), 1 Wheaton, 417.]

[Footnote 910: See Halleck, II. p. 271; Hall, [p] 276; Taylor, [p] 690.]

Since the Declaration of London does not mention the case of double or
false papers, it would likewise be the task of the International Prize
Court to evolve a uniform practice.


II

CAPTURE

  Hall, [p] 277--Lawrence, [p] 191--Phillimore, III. [p][p]
  361-364--Twiss, II. [p][p] 166-184--Halleck, II. pp.
  362-391--Taylor, [p] 691--Moore, VII. [p][p]
  1206-1214--Bluntschli, [p] 860--Heffter, [p][p] 171, 191,
  192--Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 777-780--Ullmann, [p]
  196--Rivier, II. pp. 426-428--Nys, III. pp. 697-709--Calvo, V.
  [p][p] 3004-3034--Fiore, III. Nos. 1644-1657, and Code, Nos.
  1878-1889--Martens, II. [p][p] 126-137--Kleen, II. [p][p]
  203-218--Gessner, pp. 333-356--Boeck, Nos. 770-777--Dupuis, Nos.
  253-281, and _Guerre_, Nos. 205-217--Bernsten, [p] 11--Nippold,
  II. [p] 35--Perels, [p] 55--Testa, pp. 243-244--Hautefeuille, III.
  pp. 214-299--Holland, _Prize Law_, [p][p] 231-314--U.S. Naval War
  Code, articles 46-50--Atherley-Jones, _Commerce in War_ (1906),
  pp. 361-646--Hirschmann, _Das internationale Prisenrecht_ (1912),
  [p][p] 35-37--See also the monographs quoted above at the
  commencement of [p] 391, Bulmerincq's articles on _Le droit des
  prises maritimes_ in _R.I._ X-XIII. (1878-1881), and the General
  Report presented to the Naval Conference of London on behalf of
  its Drafting Committee, articles 48-54.

[Sidenote: Grounds and Mode of Capture.]

[p] 429. From the statements given above in [p][p] 368-428 regarding
blockade, contraband, unneutral service, and visitation, it is obvious
that capture may take place either because the vessel, or the cargo, or
both, are liable to confiscation, or because grave suspicion demands a
further inquiry which can be carried out in a port only. Both cases are
alike so far as all details of capture are concerned, and in the latter
case Prize Courts may pronounce capture to be justified, although no
ground for confiscation of either vessel or cargo, or both, has been
detected.

The mode of capture is the same as described above in [p] 184 regarding
capture of enemy vessels.[911]

[Footnote 911: The _Reglement international des prises maritimes_,
adopted by the Institute of International Law at its meeting at
Heidelberg in 1887, regulates capture in [p][p] 45-62; see _Annuaire_,
IX. (1888), p. 204.]

[Sidenote: Effect of Capture of Neutral Vessels, and their Conduct to
Port.]

[p] 430. The effect of capture of neutral vessels is in every way
different from the effect of capture of enemy vessels,[912] since the
purpose of capture differs in these two cases. Capture of enemy vessels
is made for the purpose of appropriating them in the exercise of the
right of belligerents to appropriate all enemy property found on the
Open Sea or in the maritime territorial belt of either belligerent. On
the other hand, neutral merchantmen are captured for the purpose of
confiscation of vessel or cargo, or both, as punishment for certain
special acts, the punishment to be pronounced by a Prize Court after a
thorough investigation into all the circumstances of the special case.
Therefore, although the effect of capture of neutral vessels is that the
vessels, the individuals, and the goods thereon are placed under the
captor's authority, her officers and crew never become prisoners of war.
They are indeed to be detained as witnesses for the trial of the vessel
and cargo, but nothing stands in the way of releasing such of them as
are not wanted for that purpose. As regards passengers, if any, they
have to be released as soon as possible, with the exception of those
enemy persons who may be made prisoners of war.

[Footnote 912: See above, [p] 185.]

Regarding the conduct of captured neutral vessels to a port of a Prize
Court, the same is valid as regards conduct of captured enemy
vessels[913] to such port.

[Footnote 913: See above, [p] 193.]

[Sidenote: Destruction of Neutral Prizes.]

[p] 431. That as a rule captured neutral vessels may not be sunk,
burned, or otherwise destroyed has always been universally recognised
just as that captured enemy merchantmen may not as a rule be destroyed.
But up to the time of the agreement on the Declaration of London it was
a moot question whether the destruction of captured neutral vessels was
likewise exceptionally allowed instead of bringing them before a Prize
Court. British[914] practice did not, as regards the neutral owner of
the vessel, hold the captor justified in destroying a vessel, however
exceptional the case may have been, and however meritorious the
destruction of the vessel may have been from the point of view of the
Government of the captor. For this reason, should a captor, for any
motive whatever, have destroyed a neutral prize, full indemnities had to
be paid to the owner, although, if brought into a port of a Prize Court,
condemnation of vessel and cargo would have been pronounced beyond
doubt. The rule was, that a neutral prize must be abandoned in case it
could not, for any reason whatever, be brought to a port of a Prize
Court. But the practice of other States did not recognise this British
rule. The question became of great importance in 1905, during the
Russo-Japanese War, when Russian cruisers sank the British vessels
_Knight Commander_, _Oldhamia_, _Icona_, _St. Kilda_, and _Hipsang_, the
German vessels _Thea_, and _Tetardos_, and the Danish vessel _Princesse
Marie_. Russia paid damages to the owners of the vessels _Icona_, _St.
Kilda_, _Thea_, _Tetardos_, and _Princesse Marie_, because her Prize
Courts declared that the capture of these vessels was not justified, but
she refused to pay damages to the owners of the other vessels destroyed,
because her Prize Courts considered them to have been justly captured.

[Footnote 914: The _Actaeon_ (1815), 2 Dodson, 48; the _Felicity_
(1819), 2 Dodson, 381; the _Leucade_ (1855), Spinks, 217. See
Phillimore, III. [p] 333; Twiss, II. [p] 166; Hall, [p] 77; Holland,
_Letters to the "Times" upon War and Neutrality_ (1909), pp. 140-150.]

The Declaration of London proposes to settle the matter by a compromise.
Recognising that neutral prizes may not as a rule be destroyed, and
admitting only one exception to the rule, it empowers the captor under
certain circumstances and conditions to demand the handing over, or to
proceed himself to the destruction, of contraband carried by a neutral
prize which he is compelled to abandon.

The very first rule of Chapter IV. of the Declaration of London, headed
"Destruction of Neutral Prizes," is that of article 48, according to
which, as a matter of principle, captured neutral vessels may not be
destroyed, but must be taken into a port of a Prize Court. However,
article 49 permits, as an exception to the rule, the destruction of such
a captured neutral vessel as would herself be liable to condemnation, if
the taking of the vessel into a port of a Prize Court would involve
danger to the safety of the capturing cruiser, or to the success of the
operations in which she is at the time of capture engaged.

There is, therefore, no doubt that a neutral prize may no longer be
destroyed because the captor cannot spare a prize crew or because a port
of a Prize Court is too far distant, or the like. The only justification
for destruction of a neutral prize is danger to the captor or his
operations at the time of capture. As regards the degree of danger
required, it cannot be denied that the wording of article 49 does not
provide any clue for a restrictive interpretation. But considering that
article 51 speaks of an "exceptional necessity," it is hoped and to be
expected that the International Prize Court would give such an
interpretation to article 49 as would permit a resort to the sinking of
neutral prizes in cases of absolute necessity only. Be that as it may,
according to article 49 only such neutral prizes may be sunk as would be
liable to confiscation if brought before a Prize Court. Sinking of
captured neutral vessels--apart from neutral vessels which have acquired
enemy character and may for this reason be sunk under the same
conditions as enemy vessels--is, therefore, chiefly admitted in
three[915] cases, namely: (1) When--see article 40 of the Declaration of
London--the vessel carries contraband the value of which forms more
than half the value of the cargo; (2) when a vessel has been captured
for rendering those kinds of unneutral service which are enumerated by
article 45 of the Declaration of London; (3) when--see article 21 of the
Declaration of London--a vessel has been captured for breach of
blockade. In no case, however, in which she is not liable to
confiscation, may a neutral vessel under any circumstances and
conditions be destroyed; she must always be abandoned if the capturing
cruiser cannot take her into a port of a Prize Court.

[Footnote 915: Only such cases of possible confiscation of a neutral
vessel are mentioned in the text as are in accordance with the
Declaration of London. The practice of some States has hitherto admitted
confiscation in other cases also, for instance, in case of deficiency,
spoliation, or defacement of ship papers, and in case of double and
false papers; see above, [p][p] 426-428. It will be the task of the
International Prize Court to evolve a uniform practice with regard to
such cases. Likewise the text does not enumerate the cases in which the
sinking of a neutral vessel is permissible because she previously
acquired enemy character; concerning this, see above, [p] 89.]

However this may be, when the captor feels compelled to resort to the
destruction of a neutral prize, he must place in safety all persons
found on the captured vessel, and he must take on board all the captured
ship's papers which are relevant for the purpose of deciding the
validity of the capture (article 50). And (article 51) if the captor
fails to establish the fact before the Prize Court that he destroyed the
prize in the face of an exceptional necessity, the owners of the vessel
and cargo must receive full compensation without any examination of, and
any regard to, the question as to whether or no the capture itself was
justifiable. Compensation must likewise be paid in case the capture is
held by the Prize Court to be invalid, although the act of destruction
has been held to be justifiable (article 52). And in any case, the
owners of neutral goods not liable to condemnation which have been
destroyed with the vessel, may always and under all circumstances and
conditions claim damages (article 53).

Thus many safeguards have been established against arbitrariness in
resorting to the destruction of neutral prizes. On the other hand, it
would seem to be going too far to insist on the captor letting the prize
go with her contraband on board, if he be compelled to abandon the
prize. For this reason article 54 empowers the captor of a neutral
vessel herself not liable to confiscation, to demand the handing over,
or to proceed himself to the destruction, of any goods liable to
confiscation found on board, if the taking of the vessel into a port of
a Prize Court would involve danger to the captor or to the success of
the operations in which he is at the time of capture engaged. Details
concerning such destruction have been given above in [p] 406_a_ (2).

[Sidenote: Ransom and Recapture of Neutral Prizes.]

[p] 432. Regarding ransom of captured neutral vessels, the same is valid
as regards ransom of captured enemy vessels.[916]

[Footnote 916: See above, [p] 195.]

As regards recapture of neutral prizes,[917] the rule ought to be that
_ipso facto_ by recapture the vessel becomes free without payment of any
salvage. Although captured, she was still the property of her neutral
owners, and if condemnation had taken place at all, it would have been a
punishment, and the recapturing belligerent has no interest whatever in
the punishment of a neutral vessel by the enemy.

[Footnote 917: See Hautefeuille, III. pp. 366-406; Gessner, pp. 344-356;
Kleen, II. [p] 217; Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 778-780; Calvo, V.
[p][p] 3210-3216.]

But the matter of recapture of neutral prizes is not settled, no rule of
International Law and no uniform practice of the several States being
formulated regarding it. Very few treaties touch upon it, and the
municipal regulations of the different States regarding prizes seldom
mention it. According to British practice,[918] the recaptor of a
neutral prize is entitled to salvage, in case the recaptured vessel
would have been liable to condemnation if brought into an enemy port.

[Footnote 918: The _War Onskan_ (1799), 2 C. Rob. 299. See Holland,
_Prize Law_, [p] 270.]

[Sidenote: Release after Capture.]

[p] 433. Besides the case in which captured vessels must be abandoned,
because they cannot for some reason or another be brought into a port,
there are cases in which they are released without a trial. The rule is
that a captured neutral vessel is to be tried by a Prize Court in case
the captor asserts her to be suspicious or guilty. But it may happen
that all suspicion is dispelled even before the trial, and then the
vessel is to be released at once. For this reason article 246 of
Holland's _Prize Law_ lays down the rule: "If, after the detention of
the vessel, there should come to the knowledge of the commander any
further acts tending to show that the vessel has been improperly
detained, he should immediately release her...." Even after she has been
brought into the port of a Prize Court, release can take place without a
trial. Thus the German vessels _Bundesrath_ and _Herzog_, which were
captured in 1900 during the South African War and taken to Durban, were,
after search had dispelled all suspicion, released without trial.

That the released vessel may claim damages is a matter of course, and
article 64 of the Declaration of London precisely enacts it. But it
should be mentioned that, since Convention XII. stipulates only appeals
against judgments of National Prize Courts, the International Prize
Court would not have jurisdiction in a case of the release of a vessel
without trial, and that the question of compensation could, therefore,
be settled through the diplomatic channel only.


III

TRIAL OF CAPTURED NEUTRAL VESSELS

  Lawrence, [p][p] 188-190--Maine, p. 96--Manning, pp.
  472-483--Phillimore, III. [p][p] 433-508--Twiss, II. [p][p]
  169-170--Halleck, II. pp. 393-429--Taylor, [p][p]
  563-567--Wharton, III. [p][p] 328-330--Moore, VII. [p][p]
  1222-1248--Wheaton, [p][p] 389-397--Bluntschli, [p][p]
  841-862--Heffter, [p][p] 172-173--Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV.
  pp. 781-788--Ullmann, [p] 196--Bonfils, Nos. 1676-1691--Despagnet,
  Nos. 677-682 _bis_--Rivier, II. pp. 353-356--Nys, III. pp.
  710-718--Calvo, V. [p][p] 3035-3087--Fiore, III. Nos. 1681-1691,
  and Code, Nos. 1890-1929--Martens, II. [p][p] 125-126--Kleen, II.
  [p][p] 219-234--Gessner, pp. 357-427--Boeck, Nos. 740-800--Dupuis,
  Nos. 282-301, and _Guerre_, Nos. 218-223--Nippold, II. [p]
  35--Perels, [p][p] 56-57--Testa, pp. 244-247--Hautefeuille, III.
  pp. 299-365--Atherley-Jones, _Commerce in War_ (1906), pp.
  361-594--Hirschmann, _Das internationale Prisenrecht_ (1912), [p]
  38--See also the monographs quoted above at the commencement of
  [p] 391, and Bulmerincq's articles on _Le droit des prises
  maritimes_ in _R.I._ X.-XIII. (1878-1881).

[Sidenote: Trial of Captured Vessels a Municipal Matter.]

[p] 434. Although belligerents have, under certain circumstances,
according to International Law, the right to capture neutral vessels,
and although they have the duty to bring these vessels for trial before
a Prize Court, such trials are in no way an international matter. Just
as Prize Courts--apart from the proposed International Prize Court--are
municipal[919] institutions, so trials of captured neutral vessels by
these Prize Courts are municipal matters. The neutral home States of the
vessels are not represented and, directly at any rate, not concerned in
the trial. Nor is, as commonly maintained, the law administered by Prize
Courts International Law. These Courts apply the law of their country.
The best proof of this is the fact that the practice of the Prize Courts
of the several countries has hitherto differed in many points. Thus, for
instance, the question what is and what is not contraband, and,
further, the question when an attempt to break blockade begins and when
it ends, have hitherto been differently answered by the practice of
different States.

[Footnote 919: See above, [p] 192. The matter is regulated so far as
Great Britain is concerned by the Naval Prize Act, 1864 (27 and 28 Vict.
ch. 25) and the Prize Courts Act, 1894 (57 and 58 Vict. ch. 39). The
_Reglement international des prises maritimes_, adopted in 1887 at
Heidelberg by the Institute of International Law, provides in [p][p]
63-118 detailed rules concerning the organisation of Prize Courts and
the procedure before them; see _Annuaire_, IX. (1888), p. 208.]

Many writers, however, maintain that Prize Courts are International
Courts, and that the law administered by these courts is International
Law. Lord Stowell again and again[920] emphatically asserted it, and the
vast majority of English and American writers[921] follow him. But it is
to be expected that the recognition of the difference between Municipal
and International Law, as expounded above, Vol. I., [p][p] 20-25, and of
the fact that States only, and neither their Courts nor officials nor
citizens, are subjects of International Law, will lead to the general
recognition of the fact that the law applied by National Prize Courts is
not and cannot be International Law.

[Footnote 920: The _Maria_ (1799), 1 C. Rob. 340; the _Recovery_ (1807),
6 C. Rob. 341; the _Fox and others_ (1811), Edwards, 311.]

[Footnote 921: See, for instance, Halleck, II. p. 411; Maine, p. 96;
Manning, p. 472; Phillimore, III. [p][p] 433-436; Hall, [p] 277. On the
other hand, Holland, _Studies_, p. 199; Westlake, II. p. 289; and Scott,
_Conferences_, p. 467, distinctly agree with me.]

And matters will remain as they are even after the establishment of the
International Prize Court and ratification of the Declaration of London.
The law of this Declaration is certainly International Law, but it will
be binding only upon the States, and they, on their part, must embody it
in their Municipal Law so that their Prize Courts are obliged to
administer such a law in prize cases as is in conformity with the
Declaration of London. It will be the task of the International Prize
Court[922] to control the National Prize Courts in that direction. A
State which is a party to the Declaration and would nevertheless order
its Prize Courts to apply a law which is in opposition to the
Declaration of London, would commit an international delinquency, but
its Prize Courts would be obliged to apply such law.

[Footnote 922: Trial before this Court is, of course, an international
matter.]

[Sidenote: Result of Trial.]

[p] 435. The trial of a captured neutral ship can have one or more of
five results:--vessel and cargo can be condemned,[923] or the vessel
alone, or the cargo alone; and the vessel and cargo can be released
either with or without costs and damages. Costs and damages must be
allowed when capture was not justified, and, after the ratification of
the Declaration of London and the establishment of the International
Prize Court, an appeal may, according to article 64 of the Declaration
of London and article 4 of Convention XII., be brought before the
International Prize Court if costs and damages are refused or
inadequately allowed by a Prize Court. But it must be emphasised that
capture might be justified, as, for instance, in the case of spoliation
of papers, although the Prize Court did not condemn the vessel, and,
further, that costs and damages are never allowed in case a part only of
the cargo is condemned, although the vessel herself and the greater part
of the cargo are released. That, in case the captor is unable to pay the
costs and damages allowed to a released neutral vessel, his Government
has to indemnify the vessel, there ought to be no doubt, for a State
bears "vicarious" responsibility[924] for internationally injurious acts
of its naval forces.

[Footnote 923: It would seem to be obvious that condemnation of the
vessel involves the loss of the vessel at the date of capture; see
_Andersen_ v. _Marten_, L.R. (1907) 2 K.B. 248.]

[Footnote 924: See above, vol. I. [p] 163.]

[Sidenote: Trial after Conclusion of Peace.]

[p] 436. It is a moot question whether neutral vessels captured before
conclusion of peace may be tried after the conclusion of peace.[925] I
think that the answer must be in the affirmative, even if a special
clause is contained in the Treaty of Peace, which stipulates that
captured but not yet condemned vessels of the belligerents shall be
released. A trial of neutral prizes is in any case necessary for the
purpose of deciding the question whether capture was justified or not,
and whether, should condemnation not be justified, the neutral vessels
may claim costs and indemnities. Thus, after the conclusion of the
Abyssinian War, in December 1896, the Italian Prize Commission, in the
case of the _Doelwijk_,[926] claimed the right to try the vessel in
spite of the fact that peace had been concluded between the time of
capture and trial, declared the capture of the vessel and cargo to have
been justified, but pronounced that, peace having been concluded,
confiscation of vessel and cargo would no longer be lawful.

[Footnote 925: See Perels, [p] 57, p. 309, in contradistinction to
Bluntschli, [p] 862. But there is, of course, no doubt that a
belligerent can exercise an act of grace and release such prizes. Thus,
in November 1905, at the end of the Russo-Japanese War, the Mikado
proclaimed the unconditional release of all neutral prizes captured
after the signing but before the ratification of the Peace of
Portsmouth. Thereby, three German vessels, two English, and one
Norwegian escaped confiscation, which in strict law--see above, p. 534,
note 4--would have been justified.]

[Footnote 926: See Martens, _N.R.G._ 2nd Ser. XXVIII. pp. 66-90.]

Different from the question whether neutral prizes may be tried after
the conclusion of peace is the other question whether they may be
condemned to be confiscated. In the above-mentioned case of the
_Doelwijk_ the question was answered in the negative, but I believe it
ought to have been answered in the affirmative. Confiscation of vessel
and cargo having the character of a punishment, it would seem that the
punishment may be inflicted after the conclusion of peace provided the
criminal act concerned was consummated before peace was concluded. But
nothing, of course, stands in the way of a belligerent taking a more
lenient view and ordering his Prize Courts not to pronounce confiscation
of neutral vessels after the conclusion of peace.

The Declaration of London does not settle either the former or the
latter question, and it would therefore be the task of the
International Prize Court to evolve a uniform practice in the cases
concerned.

[Sidenote: Protests and Claims of Neutrals after Trial.]

[p] 437. Hitherto, if a trial led to condemnation, and if the latter was
confirmed by the Court of Appeal, the matter as between the captor and
the owner of the captured vessel and cargo was finally settled. But the
right of protection,[927] which a State exercises over its subjects and
their property abroad, may nevertheless have been the cause of
diplomatic protests and claims on the part of the neutral home State of
a condemned vessel or cargo, in case the verdict of the Prize Courts was
considered to be not in accordance with International Law or formally or
materially unjust. It is through such protests and claims that the
matter, which was hitherto a mere municipal one, became of
_international_ importance. And history records many instances of cases
of interposition of neutral States after trials of vessels which had
sailed under their flags. Thus, for instance, in the famous case of the
Silesian Loan,[928] it was the fact that Frederick II. of Prussia
considered the procedure of British Prize Courts regarding a number of
Prussian merchantmen captured during war between Great Britain and
France in 1747 and 1748 as unjust, which made him in 1752 resort to
reprisal and cease the payment of the interest of the Silesian Loan. The
matter was settled[929] in 1756, through the payment of _l._20,000 as
indemnity by Great Britain. Thus, further, after the American Civil War,
articles 12-17 of the Treaty of Washington[930] provided the appointment
of three Commissioners for the purpose, amongst others, of deciding all
claims against verdicts of the American Prize Courts. And when in 1879,
during war between Peru and Chili, the German vessel _Luxor_ was
condemned by the Peruvian Courts, Germany interposed and the vessel was
released.[931]

[Footnote 927: See above, vol. I. [p] 319.]

[Footnote 928: See above, [p] 37.]

[Footnote 929: See Martens, _Causes Celebres_, II. p. 167.]

[Footnote 930: See Martens, _N.R.G._ XX. p. 698.]

[Footnote 931: See above, [p] 404.]

The ratification of the Declaration of London and the establishment of
the International Prize Court would finally do away with such grave
international disputes.




CHAPTER VII

THE INTERNATIONAL PRIZE COURT


I

PROPOSALS FOR INTERNATIONAL PRIZE COURTS

  Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 785-788--Boeck, Nos.
  743-764--Dupuis, No. 289, and _Guerre_, Nos. 224-231--Higgins, pp.
  432-435--Lemonon, pp. 280-293--Nippold, I. [p] 15--Trendelenburg,
  _Luecken im Voelkerrecht_ (1870), pp. 49-53--Gessner, _Kriegfuehrende
  und neutrale Maechte_ (1877), pp. 52-58--Bulmerincq and Gessner in
  _R.I._ XI. (1879), pp. 173-191, and XIII. (1881), pp. 260-267.

[Sidenote: Early Projects.]

[p] 438. Numerous inconveniences must naturally result from a condition
of International Law which has hitherto prevailed and according to which
the Courts of the belligerent whose forces had captured neutral vessels
exercised jurisdiction without any control by neutrals. Although, as
shown above in [p] 437, neutrals frequently interfered after a trial and
succeeded in obtaining recognition for their claims in face of the
verdicts of Prize Courts, great dissatisfaction has long been felt at
the condition of matters hitherto obtaining, and proposals have been
made for so-called mixed Prize Courts.

The first proposal of this kind was made in 1759 by Huebner,[932] who
suggested a Prize Court composed of judges nominated by the belligerent
and of consuls or councillors nominated by the home State of the
captured neutral merchantmen.

[Footnote 932: _De la saisie des batiments neutres_ (1759), vol. II. p.
21.]

A somewhat similar proposal was made by Tetens[933] in 1805.

[Footnote 933: _Considerations sur les droits reciproques des puissances
belligerantes et des puissances neutres sur mer, avec les principes du
droit de guerre en general_ (1805), p. 163.]

Other proposals followed until the Institute of International Law took
up the matter in 1875, appointing, on the suggestion of Westlake, at its
meeting at the Hague, a Commission for the purpose of drafting a _Projet
d'organisation d'un tribunal international des prises maritimes_. In the
course of time there were mainly two proposals before the Institute,
Westlake's and Bulmerincq's.

Westlake proposed[934] that Courts of Appeal should be instituted in
each case of war, and each Court should consist of three judges--one to
be nominated by the belligerent concerned, another by the home State of
the neutral prizes concerned, and the third by a neutral Power not
interested in the case. According to Westlake's proposal there would
therefore have to be instituted in every war as many Courts of Appeal as
neutrals concerned.

[Footnote 934: See _Annuaire_, II. (1878), p. 114.]

Bulmerincq proposed[935] that two Courts should be instituted in each
war for all prize cases, the one to act as Prize Court of the First
Instance, the other to act as Prize Court of Appeal; each Court to
consist of three judges, one judge to be appointed by each belligerent,
the third judge to be appointed in common by all neutral maritime
Powers.

[Footnote 935: See _R.I._ XI. (1879), pp. 191-194.]

Finally, the Institute agreed, at its meeting at Heidelberg in 1887,
upon the following proposal, which is embodied in [p][p] 100-109 of the
_Reglement international des prises maritimes_:[936]--At the beginning
of a war each belligerent institutes a Court of Appeal consisting of
five judges, the president and one of the other judges to be appointed
by the belligerent, the three remaining to be nominated by three neutral
Powers, and this Court to be competent for all prize cases.

[Footnote 936: _Annuaire_, IX. (1887), p. 239.]

No further step was taken in the matter during the nineteenth century.
But, during the South African War, the conviction became general that
the exclusive jurisdiction of belligerents over captured neutral vessels
is incompatible with the modern condition of the oversea commerce of
neutrals. At the Second Peace Conference of 1907, therefore, Germany, as
well as Great Britain, brought forward a project for real International
Prize Courts.

[Sidenote: German Project of 1907.]

[p] 439. The German project[937] was embodied in a draft of thirty-one
articles dealing in three chapters with "Competence in Prize Cases,"
"Organisation of the International Prize Court," and "Procedure
before the International Prize Court," and made the following
proposals:--National Prize Courts should only be competent in the first
instance, every appeal to go to the International Prize Court, and the
latter to be competent not only in case of capture of neutral vessels,
but in every case of capture of merchantmen. At the beginning of every
war an International Prize Court should be established, but, in case
there were more than two parties to a war, as many International Prize
Courts should be established as there were couples of States fighting
against each other. Each Court every time it sat should consist of five
judges, three of whom should be members of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration at the Hague, and two should be admirals. The admirals
should belong to the navies of the belligerents, but the three members
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration should be chosen by neutral
Powers, each belligerent authorising one neutral Power to select one
member, and these two neutrals to appoint a third neutral Power which
would select the third member. The Court should sit at the Hague, have
its first meeting when the first appeal case arose, and be dissolved
after the conclusion of peace. The International Bureau of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration should serve as the Registry of every International
Prize Court. Each belligerent and the owners of the captured vessels or
cargoes should have the right to bring an appeal before the
International Prize Court.

[Footnote 937: _Deuxieme Conference, Actes_, II. p. 1071.]

[Sidenote: British Project of 1907.]

[p] 440. The British project[938] was embodied in a draft of sixteen
articles, and made the following proposals:--The International Prize
Court should be competent in such cases only as directly concerned a
neutral Power or its subjects, an appeal to be brought before the
International Court only after the case had been decided by the highest
National Prize Court of the belligerent concerned. Neutral Powers only,
and not their subjects, should have the right to enter an appeal, and
each neutral Power should represent its subjects concerned in a prize
case. In contradistinction to the German project, the British draft
proposed the establishment once for all of a Permanent International
Prize Court, each Power whose mercantile marine at the date of the
signature of the proposed convention exceeded a total of 800,000 tons,
should, within three months from the date of ratification, nominate a
prominent jurist as a member of the Court, and another as his deputy.
The President of the Court should be nominated by the signatory Powers
in their alphabetical order, should remain in office one year only, and
should have a casting vote. If a legal question were to be decided which
had already been provided for in a convention between the parties in
dispute, the Court should base its decision on such convention. In the
absence of such a convention, and if all civilised nations were agreed
on a point of legal interest, the Court should base its decision
thereon, otherwise the Court should decide according to the principles
of International Law.

[Footnote 938: _Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, Actes_, II. p. 1076.]

[Sidenote: Convention XII. of the Second Peace Conference.]

[p] 441. The Second Peace Conference, after having studied and discussed
the German and the British projects, produced the "Convention (XII.)
respecting the establishment of an International Prize Court" which, on
the whole, follows more closely the lines of the British project, but
includes several features of the German, and others which originate
neither with the British nor the German project. It comprises
fifty-seven articles and is divided into four parts headed respectively
"General Provisions" (articles 1-9), "Constitution of the International
Prize Court" (articles 10-27), "Procedure in the International Prize
Court" (articles 28-50), and "Final Provisions" (articles 51-57). The
Convention was signed by all the Powers represented at the Conference,
except Brazil, China, Domingo, Greece, Luxemburg, Montenegro, Nicaragua,
Roumania, Russia, Servia, and Venezuela. Ten States--namely, Chili,
Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Persia, Salvador, Siam, Turkey, and
Uruguay--entered a reservation against article 15 of the Convention
because they did not agree with the principle of the composition of the
Court embodied in this article.

As eleven States did not sign the Convention and ten of the signatory
States refused to accept the composition of the Court as regulated by
article 15, it cannot be said that the Convention is based on universal
agreement. Yet the fact that, with the exception of Russia, all the
Great Powers and a great number of the minor Powers have signed it
without a reservation, offers sufficient guarantee for the success of
the Court when once established. Nothing prevents a future Peace
Conference from making such alterations in the Convention as would meet
the wishes of the Powers which at present refuse to sign the Convention
or to accept article 15.

It should be mentioned that, according to article 55, the Convention
remains in force for twelve years from the date it comes into force, and
is to be tacitly renewed for six years, unless denounced one year at
least before the expiry of the period for which it is in force. And
article 57 stipulates that two years before the expiration of the period
for which it is in force, any contracting Power may demand a
modification of the provisions concerning its own participation in the
composition of the Court. The demand must be addressed to the
Administrative Council which, on its part, must examine it and submit
proposals as to the measures to be adopted to all the contracting
Powers. These Powers must, with the least possible delay, inform the
Administrative Council of their decision. The result is at once, or at
any rate one year and thirty days before the expiry of the period of two
years, to be communicated to the Power which made the demand for a
modification of the provisions concerning its participation in the
composition of the Court.


II

CONSTITUTION AND COMPETENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRIZE COURT

  Westlake, II. pp. 288-297--Lawrence, [p] 192--Ullmann, [p]
  196--Bonfils, Nos. 1440'1-1440'3--Despagnet, Nos. 683-683
  _bis_--Fiore, Code, Nos. 1897-1901--Dupuis, _Guerre_, Nos.
  232-276--Bernsten, [p] 14--Lemonon, pp. 293-335--Higgins, pp.
  435-444--Barclay, _Problems_, pp. 105-108--Scott, _Conferences_,
  pp. 466-511--Nippold, I. [p][p] 16-19--Fried, _Die zweite Haager
  Konferenz_ (1908), pp. 121-130--Lawrence, _International Problems_
  (1908), pp. 132-159--Hirschmann, _Das internationale Prisenrecht_
  (1912), [p][p] 39-41--Gregory, White, and Scott in _A.J._ II. (1908),
  pp. 458-475, and 490-506, and V. (1911), pp. 302-324--Donker
  Curtius in _R.I._ 2nd Ser. XI. (1909), pp. 5-36.

[Sidenote: Personnel.]

[p] 442. The International Prize Court consists of judges and deputy
judges, a judge who is absent or prevented from sitting being replaced
by a deputy (article 14). The judges and the deputies are appointed by
the contracting Powers from among jurists of known proficiency in
maritime International Law, and of the highest moral reputation, each
Power appointing one judge and one deputy for a period of six years
(articles 10 and 11). The judges are all of equal rank and have
precedence according to the date of the notification of their
appointment to the Administrative Council of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration at the Hague, but, if they sit by rota in conformity with
article 15, paragraph 2, they have precedence according to the date on
which they entered upon their duties, and, when the date is the same,
the senior takes precedence; deputies rank after the judges (article
12). The judges--and the deputies when taking the places of
judges--must, when outside their own country, be granted diplomatic
privileges and immunities in the performance of their duties; they must,
before taking their seats, take an oath, or make a solemn affirmation,
before the Administrative Council, that they will discharge their
duties impartially and conscientiously (article 13). No judge or deputy
judge may, during the tenure of his office, appear as agent or advocate
before the International Prize Court, nor act for one of the parties in
any capacity whatever (article 17).

Attention should be drawn to the fact that the Court, if once
established, will be permanent, and the judges, if once appointed, will
always be at hand, although in time of peace they will not sit.

[Sidenote: Deciding Tribunal.]

[p] 443. The judges appointed by the contracting Powers do not, as a
body, decide the appeal cases brought before the Court. From among the
great number of judges appointed, a deciding tribunal is formed which is
composed of fifteen judges, nine of whom constitute a quorum; and a
judge who is absent or prevented from sitting is replaced by a deputy
(article 14). The judges appointed by Great Britain, Germany, the United
States of America, Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, Japan, and Russia are
always summoned to sit, but the judges appointed by the remaining
contracting Powers are only in rotation summoned to sit, and their
duties may successively be performed by the same person, since the same
individual may be appointed as judge by several of these Powers (article
15). If a belligerent Power has, according to the rota, no judge sitting
in the deciding tribunal, it has a right to demand that the judge
appointed by it shall take part in the settlement of all cases arising
from the war, and lots shall then be drawn to decide which of the judges
entitled to sit by rota shall withdraw, but the judge of the other
belligerent party does not take part in the drawing of lots (article
16). No judge may sit who has been a party, in any way whatever, to the
sentence pronounced by the National Prize Court against which the appeal
has been made, or who has taken part in the case as counsel or advocate
for one of the parties (article 17). The summoning by rota of the
judges appointed by the minor Powers takes place according to the
following list:--

         JUDGES      DEPUTY JUDGES

              _First Year_

      1. Argentina     Paraguay
      2. Colombia      Bolivia
      3. Spain         Spain
      4. Greece        Roumania
      5. Norway        Sweden
      6. Holland       Belgium
      7. Turkey        Persia

             _Second Year_

      1. Argentina     Panama
      2. Spain         Spain
      3. Greece        Roumania
      4. Norway        Sweden
      5. Holland       Belgium
      6. Turkey        Luxemburg
      7. Uruguay       Costa Rica

              _Third Year_

      1. Brazil        Domingo
      2. China         Turkey
      3. Spain         Portugal
      4. Holland       Switzerland
      5. Roumania      Greece
      6. Sweden        Denmark
      7. Venezuela     Haiti

             _Fourth Year_

      1. Brazil        Guatemala
      2. China         Turkey
      3. Spain         Portugal
      4. Peru          Honduras
      5. Roumania      Greece
      6. Sweden        Denmark
      7. Switzerland   Holland

             _Fifth Year_

      1. Belgium       Holland
      2. Bulgaria      Montenegro
      3. Chili         Nicaragua
      4. Denmark       Norway
      5. Mexico        Cuba
      6. Persia        China
      7. Portugal      Spain

             _Sixth Year_

      1. Belgium       Holland
      2. Chili         Salvador
      3. Denmark       Norway
      4. Mexico        Ecuador
      5. Portugal      Spain
      6. Servia        Bulgaria
      7. Siam          China

The deciding tribunal elects its President and Vice-President by an
absolute majority of the votes cast, but after two ballots the election
is made by a bare majority, and, in case the votes are equal, by lot
(article 19).

The judges--as well as the deputies when they sit--receive, while
carrying out their duties, a salary of one hundred Netherland florins
(about _l._8, 4s.) _per diem_, besides travelling expenses. The salaries
and travelling expenses are to be paid by the International Bureau of
the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and the judges must not receive any
other remuneration either from their own Government or from any other
Power (article 20).

The belligerent captor, as well as a neutral Power which is herself, or
whose national is, a party, may appoint a naval officer of high rank to
sit as _Assessor_, but he has no voice in the decision. If more than one
neutral Power is concerned in a case, they must agree among themselves,
if necessary by lot, on the naval officer to be appointed as Assessor
(article 18).

The seat[939] of the deciding tribunal is at the Hague, and it may not,
except in the case of _force majeure_, be transferred elsewhere without
the consent of both belligerents (article 21). When the Court is not
sitting, the duties conferred on it by certain articles of Convention
XII. are discharged by a delegation of three judges appointed by the
Court; this delegation comes to a decision by a majority of votes, and
its members must, of course, reside at the Hague while they fulfil their
duties (article 48).

[Footnote 939: The working-order (_ordre interieur_) of the
International Prize Court is to be drawn up by the Court itself; see
details in article 49.]

The deciding tribunal determines what language it will itself use and
what languages may be used before it, but in all cases the official
language of the National Courts which have had cognisance of the case
may be used before it (article 24).

For all notices to be served, in particular on the parties, witnesses,
or experts, the deciding tribunal may apply direct to the Government of
the State on whose territory the service is to be carried out. The same
rule applies in the case of steps to be taken to procure evidence. The
Court is equally entitled to act through the Power on whose territory it
holds its sitting. Notices to be given to parties in the place where
the Court sits may be served through the International Bureau (article
27).

[Sidenote: Administrative Council and International Bureau.]

[p] 444. The Administrative Council of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration at the Hague serves at the same time as the Administrative
Council of the International Prize Court, but only representatives of
the Powers who are parties to Convention XII. shall be members of it
(article 22).

The International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration acts as
Registry of the International Prize Court and must place its offices and
staff at the disposal of the Court. This Bureau has the custody of the
archives and carries out the administrative work, and its General
Secretary acts as Registrar of the International Prize Court. The
secretaries necessary to assist the Registrar, translators, and
shorthand writers are appointed by the International Prize Court
(article 23).

[Sidenote: Agents, Counsel, Advocates, and Attorneys.]

[p] 445. Belligerent as well as neutral Powers concerned in a case may
appoint special Agents to act as intermediaries between themselves and
the International Prize Court, and they may also engage Counsel or
Advocates to defend their rights and interests (article 25).

Private individuals concerned in a case are compelled to be represented
before the Court by an Attorney, who must either be an Advocate
qualified to plead before a Court of Appeal or a High Court of one of
the contracting States, or a lawyer practising before a similar Court,
or, lastly, a Professor of Law at one of the higher teaching centres of
those countries (article 26).

[Sidenote: Competence.]

[p] 446. The general principle underlying the rules of Convention XII.
concerning the competence of the International Prize Court is that on
the whole, _although not exclusively_, the Court is competent in cases
where neutrals are directly or indirectly concerned. The International
Prize Court is, as a rule, a Court of Appeal, all prize cases must, in
the first instance, be decided by a National Prize Court of the captor,
although the Municipal Law of the country concerned may provide that a
first appeal must likewise be decided by a National Prize Court. The
second appeal may never by decided by a National, but must always be
decided by the International Prize Court. However, should the National
Court of the First Instance or the National Court of Appeal fail to give
final judgment within two years from the date of capture, the case may
be carried direct to the International Prize Court (articles 2 and 6).

An appeal against the judgments of National Prize Courts may be brought
before the International Court: (1) when the judgment concerns the
property of a neutral Power or a neutral individual;[940] (2) when the
judgment concerns enemy property and relates to (_a_) cargo on board a
neutral vessel, (_b_) an enemy vessel captured in the territorial waters
of a neutral Power, provided such Power has not made the capture the
subject of diplomatic claim, and (_c_) a claim based upon the allegation
that the seizure has been effected in violation, either of the
provisions of a convention in force between the belligerent Powers, or
of an enactment issued by the belligerent captor. In any case, the
appeal may be based on the ground that the judgment was wrong either in
fact or in law (article 3).

[Footnote 940: Since the question of enemy or neutral character of
individuals--see above, [p] 88--is for some parts controversial, the
International Prize Court would have to decide the controversy.]

The following Powers and individuals are entitled[941] to bring an
appeal before the International Prize Court:--

(1) Neutral Powers, if the judgment injuriously affects their property
or the property of their subjects, or if the capture is alleged to have
taken place in the territorial waters of such Powers (article 4, No. 1).

(2) Neutral individuals,[942] if the judgment injuriously affects their
property. But the home State of such an individual may intervene and
either forbid him to bring the appeal before the International Prize
Court, or itself undertake the proceedings in his place (article 4, No.
2).

(3) Subjects of the enemy, if the judgment injuriously affects their
cargoes on neutral vessels, or if it injuriously affects their property
in case the seizure is alleged to have been effected in violation,
either of the provisions of a convention in force between the
belligerent Powers, or of an enactment issued by the belligerent captor
(article 4, No. 3).

(4) Subjects of neutral Powers or of the enemy deriving rights from the
rights of such individuals as are themselves qualified to bring an
appeal before the International Prize Court, provided they have
intervened in the proceedings of the National Court or Courts concerned.
Individuals so entitled may appeal separately to the extent of their
interests (article 5, first paragraph).

(5) Subjects of neutral Powers or of the enemy deriving rights from the
rights of a neutral Power whose property was the subject of the
judgment. Individuals so entitled may likewise appeal separately to the
extent of their interest, provided they have intervened in the
proceedings of the National Court or Courts concerned (article 5, second
paragraph).

[Footnote 941: But note article 51 of Convention XII.] [Footnote 942:
See above, vol. I. [p] 289, p. 365.]

[Sidenote: What Law to be applied.]

[p] 447. As regards the law to be applied by the International Prize
Court, article 7 of Convention XII. contains the following provisions
and distinctions:--

(1) If a question of law to be decided be covered by a treaty in force
between the belligerent captor and a Power which is itself, or whose
subject is, a party to the proceedings, the Court must apply the
provisions of such treaty.

(2) In absence of such provisions, the Court must apply the rules of
International Law.

(3) If there be no generally recognised rules of International Law which
could be applied, the Court must base its decision on the general
principles of justice and equity.

(4) If--see article 3, No. 2 (_c_) of Convention XII.--the ground of
appeal be the violation of an enactment issued by the belligerent
captor, the Court must apply such enactment.

(5) The Court is empowered to disregard failure, on the part of an
appellant, to comply with the procedure laid down by the Municipal Law
of the belligerent captor, if it is of opinion that the consequences of
such Municipal Law are unjust or inequitable.

The very wide powers of the International Prize Court with regard to the
law to be applied by it, have been considerably narrowed down by the
fact that the Declaration of London provides a code of Prize Law, which
in time will be universally accepted, but those powers are still very
wide.


III

PROCEDURE IN THE INTERNATIONAL PRIZE COURT

  See the literature quoted above at the commencement of [p] 442.

[Sidenote: Entering of Appeal.]

[p] 448. As a rule there are two ways of entering an appeal against the
judgment of a National Prize Court, namely, either by a written
declaration made in the National Court against whose judgment the
appeal is directed, or by a written or telegraphic declaration
addressed to the International Bureau. In either case the appeal must be
entered within one hundred and twenty days from the day the judgment was
delivered or notified (article 28). But the appeal must be addressed to
the International Bureau only, if a party intends to carry a case direct
to the International Prize Court on account of the National Courts
having failed to give final judgment within two years from the date of
capture, and in such case the appeal must be entered within thirty days
from the expiry of the period of two years (article 30).

If the appeal has been entered in the National Court, this Court must,
without considering the question as to whether the appeal was entered in
time, transmit within seven days the record of the case to the
International Bureau. On the other hand, if the declaration of appeal
has been sent to the International Bureau, this Bureau must immediately,
if possible by telegraph, send information to the National Court
concerned which must within seven days transmit the record of the case
to the Bureau. And should the appeal be entered by a neutral individual,
the International Bureau must immediately by telegraph inform the
Government of the respective individual in order to enable such
Government to come to a decision as to whether it will--see article 4,
No. 2--prevent the individual from going on with the appeal, or will
undertake proceedings in his stead (article 29).

If the appeal has not been entered in time, the Court must reject it
without discussion of the merits of the case. But the Court may grant
relief from the effect of this rule and admit the appeal, if the
appellant is able to show that he was prevented by _force majeure_ from
entering the appeal in time, and that he has entered the appeal within
sixty days after the circumstances which prevented him from entering it
earlier ceased to operate (article 31).

If the appeal has been entered in time, a certified copy of the notice
of appeal must officially be transmitted to the respondent by the Court;
if the Court is not sitting, its delegation of three judges must act for
it (articles 32 and 48). If in addition to the parties who are before
the Court through an appeal having been entered, there are other parties
concerned who are entitled to appeal, or if in the case referred to in
article 29, third paragraph, the Government which has received notice of
an appeal has not announced its decision, the Court may not deal with
the case until either the period of one hundred and twenty days from the
day the judgment of the National Prize Court has been delivered or
notified, or the period of thirty days from the expiry of two years from
the date of capture has expired (article 31).

[Sidenote: Pleadings and Discussion.]

[p] 449. The procedure, which follows the entry of an appeal and the
preliminary steps in consequence thereof, comprises two distinct phases,
namely, written pleadings and oral discussion.

(1) The written _pleadings_ consist of the deposit and exchange of
cases, counter-cases, and, if necessary, of replies, the order of which,
as also the periods within which they must be delivered, must be fixed
by the Court or its delegation of three judges (article 48), and to
which all papers and documents the parties intend to make use of must be
annexed. The Court must communicate a certified copy of every document
produced by one party to the other party (article 34).

(2) After the close of the pleadings the Court must fix a day for a
public sitting on which the _discussion_ is to take place (article 35).
The discussion is under the direction of the President or
Vice-President, or, in case both of these are absent or cannot act, of
the senior judge present; but the judge appointed by a belligerent
party may never preside (article 38). The discussion takes place with
open doors, but a Government which is a party may demand that the
discussion take place with closed doors. In any case minutes must be
taken and must be signed by the President and Registrar, and these
minutes alone have an authentic character (article 39). During the
discussion the parties state their views of the case both as to the law
and as to the facts, but the Court may at any stage suspend the speeches
of counsel in order that supplementary evidence may be obtained (article
35). The Court may order the supplementary evidence to be taken, either
in the manner provided for by article 27, or before itself, or before
one or more members of the Court provided it can be done without
compulsion or intimidation; if steps are taken by members of the Court
outside the territory where it is sitting, the consent of the foreign
Government must be obtained (article 36). The parties must be summoned
to take part in all stages of the taking of supplementary evidence, and
they must receive certified copies of the minutes (article 37). If a
party does not appear in spite of having been duly summoned, or if a
party fails to comply with some step within the period fixed by the
Court, the case proceeds without that party and the Court makes its
decision on the basis of the material at its disposal, but the Court
must officially notify to the parties all decisions or orders made in
their absence (article 40).

[Sidenote: Judgment.]

[p] 450. After the discussion follows the judgment of the Court.

The deliberation of the Court in order to agree upon the judgment takes
place in private and must remain secret. The Court must take into
consideration all the documents, evidence, and oral statements. All
questions are decided by a majority of the judges present; if the number
of the judges is even and is equally divided, the vote of the junior
judge in the order of precedence is not counted (articles 42 and 43).
The judgment must be taken down in writing, state the reasons upon which
it is based, give the names of the judges taking part in it and of the
assessors, if any, and must be signed by the President and Registrar.

The pronouncement of the judgment of the Court takes place in public,
the parties being present or having been duly summoned to attend. The
judgment must be officially communicated to the parties. After this
communication has been made, the Court must transmit to the National
Prize Court concerned the record of the case, together with copies of
the various decisions arrived at and of the minutes of the proceedings
(article 45).

If the Court pronounces the capture of a vessel or cargo to be valid,
they may be disposed of in accordance with the Municipal Law of the
belligerent captor. If the Court pronounces the capture to be invalid,
restitution of the vessel or cargo must be ordered, and the amount of
damages, if any, must be fixed, especially in case the vessel or cargo
has been sold or destroyed. If the National Prize Court has already
declared the capture to be invalid, the International Prize Court must
decide on an appeal concerning the damages due to the owner of the
captured vessel or cargo (article 8).

[Sidenote: Expenses and Costs.]

[p] 451. The _general expenses_ of the International Prize Court are
borne by the contracting Powers in proportion to their share in the
composition of the Court as laid down in article 15 of Convention XII.;
the appointment of deputy judges does not involve any contribution
(article 47).

As regards _costs_, each party pays its own, but the party against whom
the Court has given its decision, must bear the costs of the trial and,
in addition, must pay one per cent. of the value of the subject matter
of the case as a contribution to the general expenses of the
International Prize Court. The amount of the payments must be fixed in
the judgment of the Court (article 46, first and second paragraphs). If
the appeal is brought by an individual, he must, after having entered
the appeal, furnish the International Bureau with security to an amount
fixed by the Court or--see article 48--by its delegation (article 46,
third paragraph).


IV

ACTION IN DAMAGES INSTEAD OF APPEAL

  Scott in _A.J._ V. (1911), pp. 302-324.

[Sidenote: Reason for Action in Damages instead of Appeal.]

[p] 452. According to the Constitution of the United States of America,
and probably that of some other States, no appeal may be brought against
a judgment of their Highest Courts. These States could not, therefore,
ratify Convention XII. and take part in the establishment of the
International Prize Court without previously having altered their
Constitution. As such alteration would be a very complicated and
precarious matter, the Naval Conference of London of 1908-9 included in
the Final Protocol of the Conference the following _voeu_:--"The
Delegates of the Powers represented at the Naval Conference and which
have signed or have expressed their intention to sign the Hague
Convention of October 18, 1907, concerning the establishment of an
International Prize Court, considering the constitutional difficulties
which, in certain States, stand in the way of the ratification of that
Convention in its actual form, agree to call the attention of their
Governments to the advantage of concluding an arrangement according to
which the said States would, in depositing their ratifications, have the
power to add thereto a reservation to the effect that the right of
recourse to the International Prize Court in connection with decisions
of their National Courts, shall take the form of a direct action for
damages, provided, however, that the effect of this reservation shall
not be such as to impair the rights guaranteed by the said Convention to
private individuals as well as to Governments, and that the terms of the
reservation shall form the subject of a subsequent understanding between
the signatory Powers of the same Convention."

To carry out this recommendation, Great Britain, Germany, the United
States of America, Argentina, Austria-Hungary, Chili, Denmark, Spain,
France, Japan, Norway, Holland, and Sweden signed on September 19, 1910,
at the Hague the "Additional Protocol to the Convention relative to the
establishment of an International Prize Court" which comprises nine
articles, is (article 8) considered to be an integral part of that
Convention, and which will be ratified at the same time as the
Convention, accession to the Convention being subordinated (article 9)
to accession to the Protocol.[943]

[Footnote 943: There is no doubt that, should the International Prize
Court be established, all the contracting Powers of Convention XII.
would accede to this additional protocol.]

[Sidenote: Procedure if Action for Damages is brought.]

[p] 453. According to article 1 of the Protocol, those signatory or
acceding Powers of Convention XII. which are prevented by difficulties
of a constitutional nature from accepting the Convention in its
unaltered form, have, in ratifying the Convention or acceding to it, the
right to declare that in prize cases over which their National Courts
have jurisdiction, recourse to the International Prize Court may only be
had in the form of an action in damages for the injury caused by the
capture. In consequence thereof the procedure in the International
Prize Court, as described above, [p][p] 448-451, takes place with the
following modifications:--

(1) The action for damages may only be brought before the International
Prize Court by means of a written or telegraphic declaration addressed
to the International Bureau (article 5). This Bureau must directly
notify, if possible by telegraph, the Government of the belligerent
captor, which, without considering whether the prescribed periods of
time have been observed, must within seven days of the receipt of the
notification, transmit to the International Bureau the case and a
certified copy of the decision, if any, rendered by the National Prize
Court (article 6).

(2) The International Prize Court does not, as in Appeal Cases,
pronounce upon the validity or nullity of the capture concerned, nor
confirm or reverse the judgment of the National Prize Court, but simply
fixes the amount of damages to be allowed, if any, to the plaintiff, if
the capture is considered to be illegal (article 3).

(3) After having delivered judgment, the International Prize Court does
not transmit the record of the case, the various decisions arrived at,
and the minutes, to the National Prize Court, but directly to the
Government of the belligerent captor (article 7).




APPENDICES




APPENDIX I

      DECLARATION OF PARIS OF 1856


Les Plenipotentiaires qui ont signe le Traite de Paris du trente mars,
mil huit cent cinquante-six, reunis en Conference,--

Considerant:

Que le droit maritime, en temps de guerre, a ete pendant longtemps
l'objet de contestations regrettables;

Que l'incertitude du droit et des devoirs en pareille matiere, donne
lieu, entre les neutres et les belligerants, a des divergences d'opinion
qui peuvent faire naitre des difficultes serieuses et meme des conflits;

Qu'il y a avantage, par consequent, a etablir une doctrine uniforme sur
un point aussi important;

Que les Plenipotentiaires assembles au Congres de Paris ne sauraient
mieux repondre aux intentions, dont leurs Gouvernements sont animes,
qu'en cherchant a introduire dans les rapports internationaux des
principes fixes a cet egard;

Dument autorises, les susdits Plenipotentiaires sont convenus de se
concerter sur les moyens d'atteindre ce but; et etant tombes d'accord
ont arrete la Declaration solennelle ci-apres:--

1. La course est et demeure abolie;

2. Le pavillon neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie, a l'exception de la
contrebande de guerre;

3. La marchandise neutre, a l'exception de la contrebande de guerre,
n'est pas saisissable sous pavillon ennemi;

4. Les blocus, pour etre obligatoires, doivent etre effectifs,
c'est-a-dire, maintenus par une force suffisante pour interdire
reellement l'acces du littoral de l'ennemi.

Les Gouvernements des Plenipotentiaires soussignes s'engagent a porter
cette Declaration a la connaissance des Etats, qui n'ont pas ete appeles
a participer au Congres de Paris, et a les inviter a y acceder.

Convaincus qui les maximes qu'ils viennent de proclamer ne sauraient
etre accueillies qu'avec gratitude par le monde entier, les
Plenipotentiaires soussignes ne doutent pas, que les efforts de leurs
Gouvernements pour en generaliser l'adoption ne soient couronnes d'un
plein succes.

La presente Declaration n'est et ne sera obligatoire qu'entre les
Puissances, qui y ont, ou qui y auront accede.

Fait a Paris, le seize avril, mil huit cent cinquante-six.




APPENDIX II

      DECLARATION OF ST. PETERSBURG OF 1868


Sur la proposition du Cabinet Imperial de Russie, une Commission
Militaire Internationale ayant ete reunie a Saint-Petersbourg, afin
d'examiner la convenance d'interdire l'usage de certains projectiles en
temps de guerre entre les nations civilisees, et cette Commission ayant
fixe d'un commun accord les limites techniques ou les necessites de la
guerre doivent s'arreter devant les exigences de l'humanite, les
Soussignes sont autorises par les ordres de leurs Gouvernements a
declarer ce qui suit:

Considerant que les progres de la civilisation doivent avoir pour effet
d'attenuer autant que possible les calamites de la guerre;

Que le seul but legitime que les Etats doivent se proposer durant la
guerre est l'affaiblissement des forces militaires de l'ennemi;

Qu'a cet effet, il suffit de mettre hors de combat le plus grand nombre
d'hommes possible;

Que ce but serait depasse par l'emploi d'armes qui aggraveraient
inutilement les souffrances des hommes mis hors de combat, ou rendraient
leur mort inevitable;

Que l'emploi de pareilles armes serait des lors contraire aux lois de
l'humanite;

Les Parties Contractantes s'engagent a renoncer mutuellement, en cas de
guerre entre elles, a l'emploi par leurs troupes de terre ou de mer, de
tout projectile d'un poids inferieur a 400 grammes, qui serait ou
explosible ou charge de matieres fulminantes ou inflammables.

Elles inviteront tous les Etats, qui n'ont pas participe par l'envoi de
Delegues aux deliberations de la Commission Militaire Internationale
reunie a Saint-Petersbourg, a acceder au present engagement.

Cet engagement n'est obligatoire que pour les Parties Contractantes ou
Accedantes en cas de guerre entre deux ou plusieurs d'entre elles: il
n'est pas applicable vis-a-vis de Parties non-Contractantes ou qui
n'auraient pas accede.

Il cesserait egalement d'etre obligatoire du moment ou, dans une guerre
entre Parties Contractantes ou Accedantes, une partie non-Contractante,
ou qui n'aurait pas accede, se joindrait a l'un des belligerants.

Les Parties Contractantes ou Accedantes se reservent de s'entendre
ulterieurement toutes les fois qu'une proposition precise serait
formulee en vue des perfectionnements a venir que la science pourrait
apporter dans l'armement des troupes, afin de maintenir les principes,
qu'elles ont poses et de concilier les necessites de la guerre avec les
lois de l'humanite.

Fait a Saint-Petersbourg, le vingt-neuf novembre onze decembre, mil huit
cent soixante-huit.




APPENDIX III

      DECLARATION CONCERNING EXPANDING (DUM-DUM) BULLETS
      _Signed at the Hague, July 29, 1899_


Les Soussignes, Plenipotentiaires des Puissances representees a la
Conference Internationale de la Paix a La Haye, dument autorises a cet
effet par leurs Gouvernements, s'inspirant des sentiments qui ont trouve
leur expression dans la Declaration de Saint-Petersbourg du 29 novembre
(11 decembre) 1868,

Declarent:

Les Puissances Contractantes s'interdisent l'emploi de balles qui
s'epanouissent ou s'aplatissent facilement dans le corps humain, telles
que les balles a enveloppe dure dont l'enveloppe ne couvrirait pas
entierement le noyau ou serait pourvue d'incisions.

La presente Declaration n'est obligatoire que pour les Puissances
Contractantes, en cas de guerre entre deux ou plusieurs d'entre elles.

Elle cessera d'etre obligatoire du moment ou dans une guerre entre des
Puissances Contractantes, une Puissance non-Contractante se joindrait a
l'un des belligerants.

La presente Declaration sera ratifiee dans le plus bref delai possible.

Les ratifications seront deposees a La Haye.

Il sera dresse du depot de chaque ratification un proces-verbal, dont
une copie, certifiee conforme, sera remise par la voie diplomatique a
toutes les Puissances Contractantes.

Les Puissances non-Signataires pourront adherer a la presente
Declaration. Elles auront, a cet effet, a faire connaitre leur adhesion
aux Puissances Contractantes, au moyen d'une notification ecrite,
adressee au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et communiquee par celui-ci a
toutes les autres Puissances Contractantes.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes denoncat la
presente Declaration, cette denonciation ne produirait ses effets qu'un
an apres la notification faite par ecrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et
communiquee immediatement par celui-ci a toutes les autres Puissances
Contractantes.

Cette denonciation ne produira ses effets qu'a l'egard de la Puissance
qui l'aura notifiee.

En foi de quoi, les Plenipotentiaires ont signe la presente Declaration
et l'ont revetue de leurs cachets.

Fait a La Haye, le 29 juillet 1899, en un seul exemplaire, qui restera
depose dans les archives du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et dont des
copies, certifiees conformes, seront remises par la voie diplomatique
aux Puissances Contractantes.




APPENDIX IV

      DECLARATION CONCERNING THE DIFFUSION OF ASPHYXIATING GASES
      _Signed at the Hague, July 29, 1899_


Les Soussignes, Plenipotentiaires des Puissances representees a la
Conference Internationale de la Paix a La Haye, dument autorises a cet
effet par leurs Gouvernements, s'inspirant des sentiments qui ont trouve
leur expression dans la Declaration de Saint-Petersbourg du 29 novembre
(11 decembre) 1868,

Declarent:

Les Puissances Contractantes s'interdisent l'emploi de projectiles qui
ont pour but unique de repandre des gaz asphyxiants ou deleteres.

La presente Declaration n'est obligatoire que pour les Puissances
Contractantes, en cas de guerre entre deux ou plusieurs d'entre elles.

Elle cessera d'etre obligatoire du moment ou dans une guerre entre des
Puissances Contractantes une Puissance non-Contractante se joindrait a
l'un des belligerants.

La presente Declaration sera ratifiee dans le plus bref delai possible.

Les ratifications seront deposees a La Haye.

Il sera dresse du depot de chaque ratification un proces-verbal, dont
une copie, certifiee conforme, sera remise par la voie diplomatique a
toutes les Puissances Contractantes.

Les Puissances non-Signataires pourront adherer a la presente
Declaration. Elles auront, a cet effet, a faire connaitre leur adhesion
aux Puissances Contractantes, au moyen d'une notification ecrite,
adressee au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et communiquee par celui-ci a
toutes les autres Puissances Contractantes.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes denoncat la
presente Declaration, cette denonciation ne produirait ses effets qu'un
an apres la notification faite par ecrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et
communiquee immediatement par celui-ci a toutes les autres Puissances
Contractantes.

Cette denonciation ne produira ses effets qu'a l'egard de la Puissance
qui l'aura notifiee.

En foi de quoi, les Plenipotentiaires ont signe la presente Declaration
et l'ont revetue de leurs cachets.

Fait a La Haye, le 29 juillet 1899, en un seul exemplaire, qui restera
depose dans les archives du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et dont des
copies, certifiees conformes, seront remises par la voie diplomatique
aux Puissances Contractantes.




APPENDIX V

      GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1906


CHAPITRE PREMIER.--_Des Blesses et Malades._

Article premier.

Les militaires et les autres personnes officiellement attachees aux
armees, qui seront blesses ou malades, devront etre respectes et
soignes, sans distinction de nationalite, par le belligerant qui les
aura en son pouvoir.

Toutefois, le belligerant, oblige d'abandonner des malades ou des
blesses a son adversaire, laissera avec eux, autant que les
circonstances militaires le permettront, une partie de son personnel et
de son materiel sanitaires pour contribuer a les soigner.

Article 2.

Sous reserve des soins a leur fournir en vertu de l'article precedent,
les blesses ou malades d'une armee tombes au pouvoir de l'autre
belligerant sont prisonniers de guerre et les regles generales du droit
des gens concernant les prisonniers leur sont applicables.

Cependant, les belligerants restent libres de stipuler entre eux, a
l'egard des prisonniers blesses ou malades, telles clauses d'exception
ou de faveur qu'ils jugeront utiles; ils auront, notamment, la faculte
de convenir:

De se remettre reciproquement, apres un combat, les blesses laisses sur
le champ de bataille;

De renvoyer dans leur pays, apres les avoir mis en etat d'etre
transportes ou apres guerison, les blesses ou malades qu'ils ne voudront
pas garder prisonniers;

De remettre a un Etat neutre, du consentement de celui-ci, des blesses
ou malades de la partie adverse, a la charge par l'Etat neutre de les
interner jusqu'a la fin des hostilites.

Article 3.

Apres chaque combat, l'occupant du champ de bataille prendra des mesures
pour rechercher les blesses et pour les faire proteger, ainsi que les
morts, contre le pillage et les mauvais traitements.

Il veillera a ce que l'inhumation ou l'incineration des morts soit
precedee d'un examen attentif de leurs cadavres.

Article 4.

Chaque belligerant enverra, des qu'il sera possible, aux autorites de
leur pays ou de leur armee les marques ou pieces militaires d'identite
trouvees sur les morts et l'etat nominatif des blesses ou malades
recueillis par lui.

Les belligerants se tiendront reciproquement au courant des internements
et des mutations, ainsi que des entrees dans les hopitaux et des deces
survenus parmi les blesses et malades en leur pouvoir. Ils recueilleront
tous les objets d'un usage personnel, valeurs, lettres, etc., qui seront
trouves sur les champs de bataille ou delaisses par les blesses ou
malades decedes dans les etablissements et formations sanitaires, pour
les faire transmettre aux interesses par les autorites de leur pays.

Article 5.

L'autorite militaire pourra faire appel au zele charitable des habitants
pour recueillir et soigner, sous son controle, des blesses ou malades
des armees, en accordant aux personnes ayant repondu a cet appel une
protection speciale et certaines immunites.


CHAPITRE II.--_Des Formations et Etablissements Sanitaires._

Article 6.

Les formations sanitaires mobiles (c'est-a-dire celles qui sont
destinees a accompagner les armees en campagne) et les etablissements
fixes du service de sante seront respectes et proteges par les
belligerants.

Article 7.

La protection due aux formations et etablissements sanitaires cesse si
l'on en use pour commettre des actes nuisibles a l'ennemi.

Article 8.

Ne sont pas consideres comme etant de nature a priver une formation ou
un etablissement sanitaire de la protection assuree par l'article 6:

1'o. Le fait que le personnel de la formation ou de l'etablissement est
arme et qu'il use de ses armes pour sa propre defense ou celle de ses
malades et blesses;

2'o. Le fait qu'a defaut d'infirmiers armes, la formation ou
l'etablissement est garde par un piquet ou des sentinelles munis d'un
mandat regulier;

3'o. Le fait qu'il est trouve dans la formation ou l'etablissement des
armes et cartouches retirees aux blesses et n'ayant pas encore ete
versees au service competent.


CHAPITRE III.--_Du Personnel._

Article 9.

Le personnel exclusivement affecte a l'enlevement, au transport et au
traitement des blesses et des malades, ainsi qu'a l'administration des
formations et etablissements sanitaires, les aumoniers attaches aux
armees, seront respectes et proteges en toute circonstance; s'ils
tombent entre les mains de l'ennemi, ils ne seront pas traites comme
prisonniers de guerre.

Ces dispositions s'appliquent au personnel de garde des formations et
etablissements sanitaires dans le cas prevu a l'article 8, n'o 2.

Article 10.

Est assimile au personnel vise a l'article precedent le personnel des
Societes de secours volontaires dument reconnues et autorisees par leur
Gouvernement, qui sera employe dans les formations et etablissements
sanitaires des armees, sous la reserve que ledit personnel sera soumis
aux lois et reglements militaires.

Chaque Etat doit notifier a l'autre soit des le temps de paix, soit a
l'ouverture ou au cours des hostilites, en tout cas avant tout emploi
effectif, les noms des Societes qu'il a autorisees a preter leur
concours, sous sa responsabilite, au service sanitaire officiel de ses
armees.

Article 11.

Une Societe reconnue d'un pays neutre ne peut preter le concours de ses
personnels et formations sanitaires a un belligerant qu'avec
l'assentiment prealable de son propre Gouvernement et l'autorisation du
belligerant lui-meme.

Le belligerant qui a accepte le secours est tenu, avant tout emploi,
d'en faire la notification a son ennemi.

Article 12.

Les personnes designees dans les articles 9, 10 et 11 continueront,
apres qu'elles seront tombees au pouvoir de l'ennemi, a remplir leurs
fonctions sous sa direction.

Lorsque leur concours ne sera plus indispensable, elles seront renvoyees
a leur armee ou a leur pays dans les delais et suivant l'itineraire
compatibles avec les necessites militaires.

Elles emporteront, alors, les effets, les instruments, les armes et les
chevaux qui sont leur propriete particuliere.

Article 13.

L'ennemi assurera au personnel vise par l'article 9, pendant qu'il sera
en son pouvoir, les memes allocations et la meme solde qu'au personnel
des memes grades de son armee.


CHAPITRE IV.--_Du Materiel._

Article 14.

Les formations sanitaires mobiles conserveront, si elles tombent au
pouvoir de l'ennemi, leur materiel, y compris les attelages, quels que
soient les moyens de transport et le personnel conducteur.

Toutefois, l'autorite militaire competente aura la faculte de s'en
servir pour les soins des blesses et malades; la restitution du materiel
aura lieu dans les conditions prevues pour le personnel sanitaire, et,
autant que possible, en meme temps.

Article 15.

Les batiments et le materiel des etablissements fixes demeurent soumis
aux lois de la guerre, mais ne pourront etre detournes de leur emploi,
tant qu'ils seront necessaires aux blesses et aux malades.

Toutefois, les commandants des troupes d'operations pourront en
disposer, en cas de necessites militaires importantes, en assurant au
prealable le sort des blesses et malades qui s'y trouvent.

Article 16.

Le materiel des Societes de secours, admises au benefice de la
Convention conformement aux conditions determinees par celle-ci, est
considere comme propriete privee et, comme tel, respecte en toute
circonstance, sauf le droit de requisition reconnu aux belligerants
selon les lois et usages de la guerre.


CHAPITRE V.--_Des Convois d'Evacuation._

Article 17.

Les convois d'evacuation seront traites comme les formations sanitaires
mobiles, sauf les dispositions speciales suivantes:

1'o. Le belligerant interceptant un convoi pourra, si les necessites
militaires l'exigent, le disloquer en se chargeant des malades et
blesses qu'il contient.

2'o. Dans ce cas, l'obligation de renvoyer le personnel sanitaire,
prevue a l'article 12, sera etendue a tout le personnel militaire
prepose au transport ou a la garde du convoi et muni a cet effet d'un
mandat regulier.

L'obligation de rendre le materiel sanitaire, prevue a l'article 14,
s'appliquera aux trains de chemins de fer et bateaux de la navigation
interieure specialement organises pour les evacuations, ainsi qu'au
materiel d'amenagement des voitures, trains et bateaux ordinaires
appartenant au service de sante.

Les voitures militaires, autres que celles du service de sante, pourront
etre capturees avec leurs attelages.

Le personnel civil et les divers moyens de transport provenant de la
requisition, y compris materiel de chemin de fer et les bateaux utilises
pour les convois, seront soumis aux regles generales du droit des gens.


CHAPITRE VI.--_Du Signe Distinctif._

Article 18.

Par hommage pour la Suisse, le signe heraldique de la croix rouge sur
fond blanc, forme par interversion des couleurs federales, est maintenu
comme embleme et signe distinctif du service sanitaire des armees.

Article 19.

Cet embleme figure sur les drapeaux, les brassards, ainsi que sur tout
le materiel se rattachant au service sanitaire, avec la permission de
l'autorite militaire competente.

Article 20.

Le personnel protege en vertu des articles 9, alinea 1'er, 10 et 11
porte, fixe au bras gauche, un brassard avec croix rouge sur fond blanc,
delivre et timbre, par l'autorite militaire competente, accompagne d'un
certificat d'identite pour les personnes rattachees au service de sante
des armees et qui n'auraient pas d'uniforme militaire.

Article 21.

Le drapeau distinctif de la Convention ne peut etre arbore que sur les
formations et etablissements sanitaires qu'elle ordonne de respecter et
avec le consentement de l'autorite militaire. Il devra etre accompagne
du drapeau national du belligerant dont releve la formation ou
l'etablissement.

Toutefois, les formations sanitaires tombees au pouvoir de l'ennemi
n'arboreront pas d'autre drapeau que celui de la Croix-Rouge, aussi
longtemps qu'elles se trouveront dans cette situation.

Article 22.

Les formations sanitaires des pays neutres qui, dans les conditions
prevues par l'article 11, auraient ete autorisees a fournir leurs
services, doivent arborer, avec le drapeau de la Convention, le drapeau
national du belligerant dont elles relevent.

Les dispositions du deuxieme alinea de l'article precedent leur sont
applicables.

Article 23.

L'embleme de la Croix-Rouge sur fond blanc et les mots _Croix-Rouge_ ou
_Croix de Geneve_ ne pourront etre employes, soit en temps de paix, soit
en temps de guerre, que pour proteger ou designer les formations et
etablissements sanitaires, le personnel et le materiel proteges par la
Convention.


CHAPITRE VII.--_De l'Application et de l'Execution de la Convention._

Article 24.

Les dispositions de la presente Convention ne sont obligatoires que pour
les Puissances contractantes, en cas de guerre entre deux ou plusieurs
d'entre elles. Ces dispositions cesseront d'etre obligatoires du moment
ou l'une des Puissances belligerantes ne serait pas signataire de la
Convention.

Article 25.

Les commandants en chef des armees belligerantes auront a pourvoir aux
details d'execution des articles precedents, ainsi qu'aux cas non
prevus, d'apres les instructions de leurs Gouvernements respectifs et
conformement aux principes generaux de la presente Convention.

Article 26.

Les Gouvernements signataires prendront les mesures necessaires pour
instruire leurs troupes, et specialement le personnel protege, des
dispositions de la presente Convention et pour les porter a la
connaissance des populations.


CHAPITRE VIII.--_De la Repression des Abus et des Infractions._

Article 27.

Les Gouvernements signataires, dont la legislation ne serait pas des a
present suffisante, s'engagent a prendre ou a proposer a leurs
legislatures les mesures necessaires pour empecher en tout temps
l'emploi, par des particuliers ou par des societes autres que celles y
ayant droit en vertu de la presente Convention, de l'embleme ou de la
denomination de _Croix-Rouge_ ou _Croix de Geneve_, notamment, dans un
but commercial, par le moyen de marques de fabrique ou de commerce.

L'interdiction de l'emploi de l'embleme ou de la denomination dont il
s'agit produira son effet a partir de l'epoque determinee par chaque
legislation et, au plus tard, cinq ans apres la mise en vigueur de la
presente Convention. Des cette mise en vigueur, il ne sera plus licite
de prendre une marque de fabrique ou de commerce contraire a
l'interdiction.

Article 28.

Les Gouvernements signataires s'engagent egalement a prendre ou a
proposer a leurs legislatures, en cas d'insuffisance de leurs lois
penales militaires, les mesures necessaires pour reprimer, en temps de
guerre, les actes individuels de pillage et de mauvais traitements
envers des blesses et malades des armees, ainsi que pour punir, comme
usurpation d'insignes militaires, l'usage abusif du drapeau et du
brassard de la Croix-Rouge par des militaires ou des particuliers non
proteges par la presente Convention.

Ils se communiqueront, par l'intermediaire du Conseil federal suisse,
les dispositions relatives a cette repression, au plus tard dans les
cinq ans de la ratification de la presente Convention.


_Dispositions Generales._

Article 29.

La presente Convention sera ratifiee aussitot que possible.

Les ratifications seront deposees a Berne.

Il sera dresse du depot de chaque ratification un proces-verbal dont une
copie, certifiee conforme, sera remise par la voie diplomatique a
toutes les Puissances contractantes.

Article 30.

La presente Convention entrera en vigueur pour chaque Puissance six mois
apres la date du depot de sa ratification.

Article 31.

La presente Convention, dument ratifiee, remplacera la Convention du 22
aout 1864 dans les rapports entre les Etats contractants.

La Convention de 1864 reste en vigueur dans les rapports entre les
Parties qui l'ont signee et qui ne ratifieraient pas egalement la
presente Convention.

Article 32.

La presente Convention pourra, jusqu'au 31 decembre prochain, etre
signee par les Puissances representees a la Conference qui s'est ouverte
a Geneve le 11 juin 1906, ainsi que par les Puissances non representees
a cette Conference qui ont signe la Convention de 1864.

Celles de ces Puissances qui, au 31 decembre 1906, n'auront pas signe la
presente Convention, resteront libres d'y adherer par la suite. Elles
auront a faire connaitre leur adhesion au moyen d'une notification
ecrite adressee au Conseil federal suisse et communiquee par celui-ci a
toutes les Puissances contractantes.

Les autres Puissances pourront demander a adherer dans la meme forme,
mais leur demande ne produira effet que si, dans le delai d'un an a
partir de la notification au Conseil federal, celui-ci n'a recu
d'opposition de la part d'aucune des Puissances contractantes.

Article 33.

Chacune des Parties contractantes aura la faculte de denoncer la
presente Convention. Cette denonciation ne produira ses effets qu'un an
apres la notification faite par ecrit au Conseil federal suisse;
celui-ci communiquera immediatement la notification a toutes les autres
Parties contractantes.

Cette denonciation ne vaudra qu'a l'egard de la Puissance qui l'aura
notifiee.

En foi de quoi, les Plenipotentiaires ont signe la presente Convention
et l'ont revetue de leurs cachets.

Fait a Geneve, le six juillet mil neuf cent six, en un seul exemplaire,
qui restera depose dans les archives de la Confederation suisse, et dont
des copies, certifiees conformes, seront remises par la voie
diplomatique aux Puissances contractantes.




APPENDIX VI

      FINAL ACT OF THE SECOND PEACE CONFERENCE
      _Signed at the Hague, October 18, 1907_


La Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, proposee d'abord par
Monsieur le President des Etats-Unis d'Amerique, ayant ete, sur
l'invitation de Sa Majeste l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies, convoquee
par Sa Majeste la Reine des Pays-Bas, s'est reunie le 15 juin 1907 a La
Haye, dans la Salle des Chevaliers, avec la mission de donner un
developpement nouveau au principes humanitaires qui ont servi de base a
l'oeuvre de la Premiere Conference de 1899.

Les Puissances, dont l'enumeration suit, ont pris part a la Conference,
pour laquelle Elles avaient designe les Delegues nommes ci-apres:

[Here follow names.]

Dans une serie de reunions, tenues du 15 juin au 18 octobre 1907, ou les
Delegues precites ont ete constamment animes du desir de realiser, dans
la plus large mesure possible, les vues genereuses de l'Auguste
Initiateur de la Conference et les intentions de leurs Gouvernements, la
Conference a arrete, pour etre soumis a la signature des
Plenipotentiaires, le texte des Conventions et de la Declaration
enumerees ci-apres et annexees au present Acte:

I. Convention pour le reglement pacifique des conflits internationaux.

II. Convention concernant la limitation de l'emploi de la force pour le
recouvrement de dettes contractuelles.

III. Convention relative a l'ouverture des hostilites.

IV. Convention concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre.

V. Convention concernant les droits et les devoirs des Puissances et des
personnes neutres en cas de guerre sur terre.

VI. Convention relative au regime des navires de commerce ennemis au
debut des hostilites.

VII. Convention relative a la transformation des navires de commerce en
batiments de guerre.

VIII. Convention relative a la pose de mines sous-marines automatiques
de contact.

IX. Convention concernant le bombardement par des forces navales en
temps de guerre.

X. Convention pour l'adaptation a la guerre maritime des principes de la
Convention de Geneve.

XI. Convention relative a certaines restrictions a l'exercice du droit
de capture dans la guerre maritime.

XII. Convention relative a l'etablissement d'une Cour internationale des
prises.

XIII. Convention concernant les droits et les devoirs des Puissances
neutres en cas de guerre maritime.

XIV. Declaration relative a l'interdiction de lancer des projectiles et
des explosifs du haut de ballons.

Ces Conventions et cette Declaration formeront autant d'actes separes.
Ces actes porteront la date de ce jour et pourront etre signes jusqu'au
30 juin 1908 a La Haye par les Plenipotentiaires des Puissances
representees a la Deuxieme Conference de la Paix.

La Conference, se conformant a l'esprit d'entente et de concessions
reciproques qui est l'esprit meme de ses deliberations, a arrete la
declaration suivante qui, tout en reservant a chacune des Puissances
representees le benefice de ses votes, leur permet a toutes d'affirmer
les principes qu'Elles considerent comme unanimement reconnus:

  Elle est unanime,

  1'o. A reconnaitre le principe de l'arbitrage obligatoire;

  2'o. A declarer que certains differends, et notamment ceux
  relatifs a l'interpretation et a l'application des stipulations
  conventionnelles internationales, sont susceptibles d'etre soumis
  a l'arbitrage obligatoire sans aucune restriction.

Elle est unanime enfin a proclamer que, s'il n'a pas ete donne de
conclure des maintenant une Convention en ce sens, les divergences
d'opinion qui se sont manifestees n'ont pas depasse les limites d'une
controverse juridique, et qu'en travaillant ici ensemble pendant quatre
mois, toutes les Puissances du monde, non seulement ont appris a se
comprendre et a se rapprocher davantage, mais ont su degager, au cours
de cette longue collaboration, un sentiment tres eleve du bien commun de
l'humanite.

En outre, la Conference a adopte a l'unanimite la Resolution suivante:

La Deuxieme Conference de la Paix confirme la Resolution adoptee par la
Conference de 1899 a l'egard de la limitation des charges militaires;
et, vu que les charges militaires se sont considerablement accrues dans
presque tous les pays depuis ladite annee, la Conference declare qu'il
est hautement desirable de voir les Gouvernements reprendre l'etude
serieuse de cette question.

Elle a, de plus, emis les Voeux suivants:

  1'o. La Conference recommande aux Puissances signataires
  l'adoption du projet ci-annexe de Convention pour l'etablissement
  d'une Cour de Justice arbitrale, et sa mise en vigueur des qu'un
  accord sera intervenu sur le choix des juges et la constitution de
  la Cour.

  2'o. La Conference emet le voeu qu'en cas de guerre, les autorites
  competentes, civiles et militaires, se fassent un devoir tout
  special d'assurer et de proteger le maintien des rapports
  pacifiques et notamment des relations commerciales et
  industrielles entre les populations des Etats belligerants et les
  pays neutres.

  3'o. La Conference emet le voeu que les Puissances reglent, par
  des Conventions particulieres, la situation, au point de vue des
  charges militaires, des etrangers etablis sur leurs territoires.

  4'o. La Conference emet le voeu que l'elaboration d'un reglement
  relatif aux lois et coutumes de la guerre maritime figure au
  programme de la prochaine Conference et que, dans tous les cas,
  les Puissances appliquent, autant que possible, a la guerre sur
  mer, les principes de la Convention relative aux lois et coutumes
  de la guerre sur terre.

Enfin, la Conference recommande aux Puissances la reunion d'une
troisieme Conference de la Paix qui pourrait avoir lieu, dans une
periode analogue a celle qui s'est ecoulee depuis la precedente
Conference, a une date a fixer d'un commun accord entre les Puissances,
et elle appelle leur attention sur la necessite de preparer les travaux
de cette troisieme Conference assez longtemps a l'avance pour que ses
deliberations se poursuivent avec l'autorite et la rapidite
indispensables.

Pour atteindre a ce but, la Conference estime qu'il serait tres
desirable que environ deux ans avant l'epoque probable de la reunion,
un Comite preparatoire fut charge par les Gouvernements de recueillir
les diverses propositions a soumettre a la Conference, de rechercher les
matieres susceptibles d'un prochain reglement international et de
preparer un programme que les Gouvernements arreteraient assez tot pour
qu'il put etre serieusement etudie dans chaque pays. Ce Comite serait,
en outre, charge, de proposer un mode d'organisation et de procedure
pour la Conference elle-meme.

En foi de quoi, les Plenipotentiaires ont signe le present acte et y ont
appose leurs cachets.

Fait a La Haye, le dix-huit octobre mil neuf cent sept, en un seul
exemplaire qui sera depose dans les archives du Gouvernement des
Pays-Bas et dont les copies, certifiees conformes, seront delivrees a
toutes les Puissances representees a la Conference.


CONVENTION I.

      CONVENTION FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
      DISPUTES.[944]

[Footnote 944: Only the texts of this and the other Conventions of the
Second Peace Conference are here printed; the preambles, reservations,
and special declarations made in signing the Conventions are omitted.]

_Titre I.--Du maintien de la paix generale._

Article premier.

En vue de prevenir autant que possible le recours a la force dans les
rapports entre les Etats, les Puissances contractantes conviennent
d'employer tous leurs efforts pour assurer le reglement pacifique des
differends internationaux.

_Titre II.--Des bons offices et de la mediation._

Article 2.

En cas de dissentiment grave ou de conflit, avant d'en appeler aux
armes, les Puissances contractantes conviennent d'avoir recours, en tant
que les circonstances le permettront, aux bons offices ou a la mediation
d'une ou de plusieurs Puissances amies.

Article 3.

Independamment de ce recours, les Puissances contractantes jugent utile
et desirable qu'une ou plusieurs Puissances etrangeres au conflit
offrent de leur propre initiative, en tant que les circonstances s'y
pretent, leurs bons offices ou leur mediation aux Etats en conflit.

Le droit d'offrir les bons offices ou la mediation appartient aux
Puissances etrangeres au conflit, meme pendant le cours des hostilites.

L'exercice de ce droit ne peut jamais etre considere par l'une ou
l'autre des Parties en litige comme un acte peu amical.

Article 4.

Le role du mediateur consiste a concilier les pretentions opposees et a
apaiser les ressentiments qui peuvent s'etre produits entre les Etats en
conflit.

Article 5.

Les fonctions du mediateur cessent du moment ou il est constate, soit
par l'une des Parties en litige, soit par le mediateur lui-meme, que les
moyens de conciliation proposes par lui ne sont pas acceptes.

Article 6.

Les bons offices et la mediation, soit sur le recours des Parties en
conflit, soit sur l'initiative des Puissances etrangeres au conflit, ont
exclusivement le caractere de conseil et n'ont jamais force obligatoire.

Article 7.

L'acceptation de la mediation ne peut avoir pour effet, sauf convention
contraire, d'interrompre, de retarder ou d'entraver la mobilisation et
autres mesures preparatoires a la guerre.

Si elle intervient apres l'ouverture des hostilites, elle n'interrompt
pas, sauf convention contraire, les operations militaires en cours.

Article 8.

Les Puissances contractantes sont d'accord pour recommander
l'application, dans les circonstances qui le permettent, d'une mediation
speciale sous la forme suivante.

En cas de differend grave compromettant la paix, les Etats en conflit
choisissent respectivement une Puissance a laquelle ils confient la
mission d'entrer en rapport direct avec la Puissance choisie d'autre
part, a l'effet de prevenir la rupture des relations pacifiques.

Pendant la duree de ce mandat dont le terme, sauf stipulation contraire,
ne peut exceder trente jours, les Etats en litige cessent tout rapport
direct au sujet du conflit, lequel est considere comme defere
exclusivement aux Puissances mediatrices. Celles-ci doivent appliquer
tous leurs efforts a regler le differend.

En cas de rupture effective des relations pacifiques, ces Puissances
demeurent chargees de la mission commune de profiter de toute occasion
pour retablir la paix.

_Titre III.--Des Commissions internationales d'enquete._

Article 9.

Dans les litiges d'ordre international n'engageant ni l'honneur ni des
interets essentiels et provenant d'une divergence d'appreciation sur des
points de fait, les Puissances contractantes jugent utile et desirable
que les Parties qui n'auraient pu se mettre d'accord par les voies
diplomatiques instituent, en tant que les circonstances le permettront,
une Commission internationale d'enquete chargee de faciliter la solution
de ces litiges en eclaircissant, par un examen impartial et
consciencieux, les questions de fait.

Article 10.

Les Commissions internationales d'enquete sont constituees par
convention speciale entre les Parties en litige.

La convention d'enquete precise les faits a examiner; elle determine le
mode et le delai de formation de la Commission et l'etendue des pouvoirs
des commissaires.

Elle determine egalement, s'il y a lieu, le siege de la Commission et la
faculte de se deplacer, la langue dont la Commission fera usage et
celles dont l'emploi sera autorise devant elle, ainsi que la date a
laquelle chaque Partie devra deposer son expose des faits, et
generalement toutes les conditions dont les Parties sont convenues.

Si les Parties jugent necessaire de nommer des assesseurs, la convention
d'enquete determine le mode de leur designation et l'etendue de leurs
pouvoirs.

Article 11.

Si la convention d'enquete n'a pas designe le siege de la Commission,
celle-ci siegera a La Haye.

Le siege une fois fixe ne peut etre change par la Commission qu'avec
l'assentiment des Parties.

Si la convention d'enquete n'a pas determine les langues a employer, il
en est decide par la Commission.

Article 12.

Sauf stipulation contraire, les Commissions d'enquete sont formees de la
maniere determinee par les articles 45 et 57 de la presente Convention.

Article 13.

En cas de deces, de demission ou d'empechement, pour quelque cause que
ce soit, de l'un des commissaires, ou eventuellement de l'un des
assesseurs, il est pourvu a son remplacement selon le mode fixe pour sa
nomination.

Article 14.

Les Parties ont le droit de nommer aupres de la Commission d'enquete des
agents speciaux avec la mission de Les representer et de servir
d'intermediaires entre Elles et la Commission.

Elles sont, en outre, autorisees a charger des conseils ou avocats
nommes par elles, d'exposer et de soutenir leurs interets devant la
Commission.

Article 15.

Le Bureau International de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage sert de greffe
aux Commissions qui siegent a La Haye, et mettra ses locaux et son
organisation a la disposition des Puissances contractantes pour le
fonctionnement de la Commission d'enquete.

Article 16.

Si la Commission siege ailleurs qu'a La Haye, elle nomme un Secretaire
General dont le bureau lui sert de greffe.

Le greffe est charge, sous l'autorite du President, de l'organisation
materielle des seances de la Commission, de la redaction des
proces-verbaux et, pendant le temps de l'enquete, de la garde des
archives qui seront ensuite versees au Bureau International de La Haye.

Article 17.

En vue de faciliter l'institution et le fonctionnement des Commissions
d'enquete, les Puissances contractantes recommandent les regles
suivantes qui seront applicables a la procedure d'enquete en tant que
les Parties n'adopteront pas d'autres regles.

Article 18.

La Commission reglera les details de la procedure non prevus dans la
convention speciale d'enquete ou dans la presente Convention, et
procedera a toutes les formalites que comporte l'administration des
preuves.

Article 19.

L'enquete a lieu contradictoirement.

Aux dates prevues, chaque Partie communique a la Commission et a l'autre
Partie les exposes des faits, s'il y a lieu, et, dans tous les cas, les
actes, pieces et documents qu'Elle juge utiles a la decouverte de la
verite, ainsi que la liste des temoins et des experts qu'elle desire
faire entendre.

Article 20.

La Commission a la faculte, avec l'assentiment des Parties, de se
transporter momentanement sur les lieux ou elle juge utile de recourir a
ce moyen d'information ou d'y deleguer un ou plusieurs de ses membres.
L'autorisation de l'Etat sur le territoire duquel il doit etre procede a
cette information devra etre obtenue.

Article 21.

Toutes constatations materielles, et toutes visites des lieux doivent
etre faites en presence des agents et conseils des Parties ou eux dument
appeles.

Article 22.

La Commission a le droit de solliciter de l'une ou l'autre Partie telles
explications ou informations qu'elle juge utiles.

Article 23.

Les Parties s'engagent a fournir a la Commission d'enquete, dans la plus
large mesure qu'Elles jugeront possible, tous les moyens et toutes les
facilites necessaires pour la connaissance complete et l'appreciation
exacte des faits en question.

Elles s'engagent a user des moyens dont Elles disposent d'apres leur
legislation interieure, pour assurer la comparution des temoins ou des
experts se trouvant sur leur territoire et cites devant la Commission.

Si ceux-ci ne peuvent comparaitre devant la Commission, Elles feront
proceder a leur audition devant leurs autorites competentes.

Article 24.

Pour toutes les notifications que la Commission aurait a faire sur le
territoire d'une tierce Puissance contractante, la Commission
s'adressera directement au Gouvernement de cette Puissance. Il en sera
de meme s'il s'agit de faire proceder sur place a l'etablissement de
tous moyens de preuve.

Les requetes adressees a cet effet seront executees suivant les moyens
dont la Puissance requise dispose d'apres Sa legislation interieure.
Elles ne peuvent etre refusees que si cette Puissance les juge de nature
a porter atteinte a Sa souverainete ou a Sa securite.

La Commission aura aussi toujours la faculte de recourir a
l'intermediaire de la Puissance sur le territoire de laquelle elle a son
siege.

Article 25.

Les temoins et les experts sont appeles a la requete des Parties ou
d'office par la Commission, et, dans tous les cas, par l'intermediaire
du Gouvernement de l'Etat sur le territoire duquel ils se trouvent.

Les temoins sont entendus, successivement et separement, en presence des
agents et des conseils et dans un ordre a fixer par la Commission.

Article 26.

L'interrogatoire des temoins est conduit par le President.

Les membres de la Commission peuvent neanmoins poser a chaque temoin les
questions qu'ils croient convenables pour eclaircir ou completer sa
deposition, ou pour se renseigner sur tout ce qui concerne le temoin
dans les limites necessaires a la manifestation de la verite.

Les agents et les conseils des Parties ne peuvent interrompre le temoin
dans sa deposition, ni lui faire aucune interpellation directe, mais
peuvent demander au President de poser au temoin telles questions
complementaires qu'ils jugent utiles.

Article 27.

Le temoin doit deposer sans qu'il lui soit permis de lire aucun projet
ecrit. Toutefois, il peut etre autorise par le President a s'aider de
notes ou documents si la nature des faits rapportes en necessite
l'emploi.

Article 28.

Proces-verbal de la deposition du temoin est dresse seance tenante et
lecture en est donnee au temoin. Le temoin peut y faire tels changements
et additions que bon lui semble et qui seront consignes a la suite de sa
deposition.

Lecture faite au temoin de l'ensemble de sa deposition, le temoin est
requis de signer.

Article 29.

Les agents sont autorises, au cours ou a la fin de l'enquete, a
presenter par ecrit a la Commission et a l'autre Partie tels dires,
requisitions ou resumes de fait, qu'ils jugent utiles a la decouverte de
la verite.

Article 30.

Les deliberations de la Commission ont lieu a huis clos et restent
secretes.

Toute decision est prise a la majorite des membres de la Commission.

Le refus d'un membre de prendre part au vote doit etre constate dans le
proces-verbal.

Article 31.

Les seances de la Commission ne sont publiques et les proces-verbaux et
documents de l'enquete ne sont rendus publics qu'en vertu d'une decision
de la Commission, prise avec l'assentiment des Parties.

Article 32.

Les Parties ayant presente tous les eclaircissements et preuves, tous
les temoins ayant ete entendus, le President prononce la cloture de
l'enquete et la Commission s'ajourne pour deliberer et rediger son
rapport.

Article 33.

Le rapport est signe par tous les membres de la Commission.

Si un des membres refuse de signer, mention en est faite; le rapport
reste neanmoins valable.

Article 34.

Le rapport de la Commission est lu en seance publique, les agents et les
conseils des Parties presents ou dument appeles.

Un exemplaire du rapport est remis a chaque Partie.

Article 35.

Le rapport de la Commission, limite a la constatation des faits, n'a
nullement le caractere d'une sentence arbitrale. Il laisse aux Parties
une entiere liberte pour la suite a donner a cette constatation.

Article 36.

Chaque Partie supporte ses propres frais et une part egale des frais de
la Commission.

_Titre IV.--De l'arbitrage international._

CHAPITRE I.--_De la Justice arbitrale._

Article 37.

L'arbitrage international a pour objet le reglement de litiges entre les
Etats par des juges de leur choix et sur la base du respect du droit.

Le recours a l'arbitrage implique l'engagement de se soumettre de bonne
foi a la sentence.

Article 38.

Dans les questions d'ordre juridique, et en premier lieu, dans les
questions d'interpretation ou d'application des Conventions
internationales, l'arbitrage est reconnu par les Puissances
contractantes comme le moyen le plus efficace et en meme temps le plus
equitable de regler les litiges qui n'ont pas ete resolus par les voies
diplomatiques.

En consequence, il serait desirable que, dans les litiges sur les
questions susmentionnees, les Puissances contractantes eussent, le cas
echeant, recours a l'arbitrage, en tant que les circonstances le
permettraient.

Article 39.

La Convention d'arbitrage est conclue pour des contestations deja nees
ou pour des contestations eventuelles.

Elle peut concerner tout litige ou seulement les litiges d'une categorie
determinee.

Article 40.

Independamment des Traites generaux ou particuliers qui stipulent
actuellement l'obligation du recours a l'arbitrage pour les Puissances
contractantes, ces Puissances se reservent de conclure des accords
nouveaux, generaux ou particuliers, en vue d'etendre l'arbitrage
obligatoire a tous les cas qu'Elles jugeront possible de lui soumettre.

CHAPITRE II.--_De la Cour permanente d'arbitrage._

Article 41.

Dans le but de faciliter le recours immediat a l'arbitrage pour les
differends internationaux qui n'ont pu etre regles par la voie
diplomatique, les Puissances contractantes s'engagent a maintenir, telle
qu'elle a ete etablie par la Premiere Conference de la Paix, la Cour
permanente d'arbitrage, accessible en tout temps et fonctionnant, sauf
stipulation contraire des Parties, conformement aux regles de procedure
inserees dans la presente Convention.

Article 42.

La Cour permanente est competente pour tous les cas d'arbitrage, a moins
qu'il n'y ait entente entre les Parties pour l'etablissement d'une
juridiction speciale.

Article 43.

La cour permanente a son siege a La Haye.

Un Bureau International sert de greffe a la Cour; il est l'intermediaire
des communications relatives aux reunions de celle-ci; il a la garde des
archives et la gestion de toutes les affaires administratives.

Les Puissances contractantes s'engagent a communiquer au Bureau,
aussitot que possible, une copie certifiee conforme de toute stipulation
d'arbitrage intervenue entre Elles et de toute sentence arbitrale Les
concernant et rendue par des juridictions speciales.

Elles s'engagent a communiquer de meme au Bureau les lois, reglements
et documents constatant eventuellement l'execution des sentences rendues
par la Cour.

Article 44.

Chaque Puissance contractante designe quatre personnes au plus, d'une
competence reconnue dans les questions de droit international, jouissant
de la plus haute consideration morale et disposees a accepter les
fonctions d'arbitre.

Les personnes ainsi designees sont inscrites, au titre de Membres de la
Cour, sur une liste qui sera notifiee a toutes les Puissances
contractantes par les soins du Bureau.

Toute modification a la liste des arbitres est portee, par les soins du
Bureau, a la connaissance des Puissances contractantes.

Deux ou plusieurs Puissances peuvent s'entendre pour la designation en
commun d'un ou de plusieurs Membres.

La meme personne peut etre designee par des Puissances differentes.

Les Membres de la Cour sont nommes pour un terme de six ans. Leur mandat
peut etre renouvele.

En cas de deces ou de retraite d'un Membre de la Cour, il est pourvu a
son remplacement selon le mode fixe pour sa nomination, et pour une
nouvelle periode de six ans.

Article 45.

Lorsque les Puissances contractantes veulent s'adresser a la Cour
permanente pour le reglement d'un differend survenu entre Elles, le
choix des arbitres appeles a former le Tribunal competent pour statuer
sur ce differend, doit etre fait dans la liste generale des Membres de
la Cour.

A defaut de constitution du Tribunal arbitral par l'accord des Parties,
il est procede de la maniere suivante:

Chaque Partie nomme deux arbitres, dont un seulement peut etre son
national ou choisi parmi ceux qui ont ete designes par Elle comme
Membres de la Cour permanente. Ces arbitres choisissent ensemble un
surarbitre.

En cas de partage des voix, le choix du surarbitre est confie a une
Puissance tierce, designee de commun accord par les Parties.

Si l'accord ne s'etablit pas a ce sujet, chaque Partie designe une
Puissance differente et le choix du surarbitre est fait de concert par
les Puissances ainsi designees.

Si, dans un delai de deux mois, ces deux Puissances n'ont pu tomber
d'accord, chacune d'Elles presente deux candidats pris sur la liste des
Membres de la Cour permanente, en dehors des Membres designes par les
Parties et n'etant les nationaux d'aucune d'Elles. Le sort determine
lequel des candidats ainsi presentes sera le surarbitre.

Article 46.

Des que le Tribunal est compose, les Parties notifient au Bureau leur
decision de s'adresser a la Cour, le texte de leur compromis, et les
noms des arbitres.

Le Bureau communique sans delai a chaque arbitre le compromis et les
noms des autres Membres du Tribunal.

Le Tribunal se reunit a la date fixee par les Parties. Le Bureau
pourvoit a son installation.

Les Membres du Tribunal, dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions et en dehors
de leur pays, jouissent des privileges et immunites diplomatiques.

Article 47.

Le Bureau est autorise a mettre ses locaux et son organisation a la
disposition des Puissances contractantes pour le fonctionnement de toute
juridiction speciale d'arbitrage.

La juridiction de la Cour permanente peut etre etendue, dans les
conditions prescrites par les reglements, aux litiges existant entre des
Puissances non contractantes ou entre des Puissances contractantes et
des Puissances non contractantes, si les Parties sont convenues de
recourir a cette juridiction.

Article 48.

Les Puissances contractantes considerent comme un devoir, dans le cas ou
un conflit aigu menacerait d'eclater entre deux ou plusieurs d'entre
Elles, de rappeler a celles-ci que la Cour permanente leur est ouverte.

En consequence, Elles declarent que le fait de rappeler aux Parties en
conflit les dispositions de la presente Convention, et le conseil donne,
dans l'interet superieur de la paix, de s'adresser a la Cour permanente,
ne peuvent etre consideres que comme actes de bons offices.

En cas de conflit entre deux Puissances, l'une d'Elles pourra toujours
adresser au Bureau International une note contenant sa declaration
qu'Elle serait disposee a soumettre le differend a un arbitrage.

Le Bureau devra porter aussitot la declaration a la connaissance de
l'autre Puissance.

Article 49.

Le Conseil administratif permanent, compose des Representants
diplomatiques des Puissances contractantes accredites a La Haye et du
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas, qui remplit les fonctions
de President, a la direction et le controle du Bureau International.

Le Conseil arrete son reglement d'ordre ainsi que tous autres reglements
necessaires.

Il decide toutes les questions administratives qui pourraient surgir
touchant le fonctionnement de la Cour.

Il a tout pouvoir quant a la nomination, la suspension ou la revocation
des fonctionnaires et employes du Bureau.

Il fixe les traitements et salaires, et controle la depense generale.

La presence de neuf membres dans les reunions dument convoquees suffit
pour permettre au Conseil de deliberer valablement. Les decisions sont
prises a la majorite des voix.

Le Conseil communique sans delai aux Puissances contractantes les
reglements adoptes par lui. Il Leur presente chaque annee un rapport sur
les travaux de la Cour, sur le fonctionnement des services
administratifs et sur les depenses. Le rapport contient egalement un
resume du contenu essentiel des documents communiques au Bureau par les
Puissances en vertu de l'article 43 alineas 3 et 4.

Article 50.

Les frais du Bureau seront supportes par les Puissances contractantes
dans la proportion etablie pour le Bureau international de l'Union
postale universelle.

Les frais a la charge des Puissances adherentes seront comptes a partir
du jour ou leur adhesion produit ses effets.

CHAPITRE III.--_De la procedure arbitrale._

Article 51.

En vue de favoriser le developpement de l'arbitrage, les Puissances
contractantes ont arrete les regles suivantes qui sont applicables a la
procedure arbitrale, en tant que les Parties ne sont pas convenues
d'autres regles.

Article 52.

Les Puissances qui recourent a l'arbitrage signent un compromis dans
lequel sont determines l'objet du litige, le delai de nomination des
arbitres, la forme, l'ordre et les delais dans lesquels la communication
visee par l'article 63 devra etre faite, et le montant de la somme que
chaque Partie aura a deposer a titre d'avance pour les frais.

Le compromis determine egalement, s'il y a lieu, le mode de nomination
des arbitres, tous pouvoirs speciaux eventuels du Tribunal, son siege,
la langue dont il fera usage et celles dont l'emploi sera autorise
devant lui, et generalement toutes les conditions dont les Parties sont
convenues.

Article 53.

La Cour permanente est competente pour l'etablissement du compromis, si
les Parties sont d'accord pour s'en remettre a elle.

Elle est egalement competente, meme si la demande est faite seulement
par l'une des Parties, apres qu'un accord par la voie diplomatique a ete
vainement essaye, quand il s'agit:

1'o. d'un differend rentrant dans un Traite d'arbitrage general conclu
ou renouvele apres la mise en vigueur de cette Convention et qui prevoit
pour chaque differend un compromis et n'exclut pour l'etablissement de
ce dernier ni explicitement ni implicitement la competence de la Cour.
Toutefois, le recours a la Cour n'a pas lieu si l'autre Partie declare
qu'a son avis le differend n'appartient pas a la categorie des
differends a soumettre a un arbitrage obligatoire, a moins que le Traite
d'arbitrage ne confere au Tribunal arbitral le pouvoir de decider cette
question prealable;

2'o. d'un differend provenant de dettes contractuelles reclamees a une
Puissance par une autre Puissance comme dues a ses nationaux, et pour la
solution duquel l'offre d'arbitrage a ete acceptee. Cette disposition
n'est pas applicable si l'acceptation a ete subordonnee a la condition
que le compromis soit etabli selon un autre mode.

Article 54.

Dans les cas prevus par l'article precedent, le compromis sera etabli
par une commission composee de cinq membres designes de la maniere
prevue a l'article 45 alineas 3 a 6.

Le cinquieme membre est de droit President de la commission.

Article 55.

Les fonctions arbitrales peuvent etre conferees a un arbitre unique ou a
plusieurs arbitres designes par les Parties a leur gre, ou choisis par
Elles parmi les Membres de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage etablie par la
presente Convention.

A defaut de constitution du Tribunal par l'accord des Parties, il est
procede de la maniere indiquee a l'article 45 alineas 3 a 6.

Article 56.

Lorsqu'un Souverain ou un Chef d'Etat est choisi pour arbitre, la
procedure arbitrale est reglee par Lui.

Article 57.

Le surarbitre est de droit President du Tribunal.

Lorsque le Tribunal ne comprend pas de surarbitre, il nomme lui-meme son
President.

Article 58.

En cas d'etablissement du compromis par une commission, telle qu'elle
est visee a l'article 54, et sauf stipulation contraire, la commission
elle-meme formera le Tribunal d'arbitrage.

Article 59.

En cas de deces, de demission ou d'empechement, pour quelque cause que
ce soit, de l'un des arbitres, il est pourvu a son remplacement selon le
mode fixe pour sa nomination.

Article 60.

A defaut de designation par les Parties, le Tribunal siege a La Haye.

Le Tribunal ne peut sieger sur le territoire d'une tierce Puissance
qu'avec l'assentiment de celle-ci.

Le siege une fois fixe ne peut etre change par le Tribunal qu'avec
l'assentiment des Parties.

Article 61.

Si le compromis n'a pas determine les langues a employer, il en est
decide par le Tribunal.

Article 62.

Les Parties ont le droit de nommer aupres du Tribunal des agents
speciaux, avec la mission de servir d'intermediaires entre Elles et le
Tribunal.

Elles sont en outre autorisees a charger de la defense de leurs droits
et interets devant le Tribunal, des conseils ou avocats nommes par Elles
a cet effet.

Les Membres de la Cour permanente ne peuvent exercer les fonctions
d'agents, conseils ou avocats, qu'en faveur de la Puissance qui les a
nommes Membres de la Cour.

Article 63.

La procedure arbitrale comprend en regle generale deux phases
distinctes: l'instruction ecrite et les debats.

L'instruction ecrite consiste dans la communication faite par les agents
respectifs, aux membres du Tribunal et a la Partie adverse, des
memoires, des contre-memoires et, au besoin, des repliques; les Parties
y joignent toutes pieces et documents invoques dans la cause. Cette
communication aura lieu, directement ou par l'intermediaire du Bureau
International, dans l'ordre et dans les delais determines par le
compromis.

Les delais fixes par le compromis pourront etre prolonges de commun
accord par les Parties, ou par le Tribunal quand il le juge necessaire
pour arriver a une decision juste.

Les debats consistent dans le developpement oral des moyens des Parties
devant le Tribunal.

Article 64.

Toute piece produite par l'une des Parties doit etre communiquee, en
copie certifiee conforme, a l'autre Partie.

Article 65.

A moins de circonstances speciales, le Tribunal ne se reunit qu'apres la
cloture de l'instruction.

Article 66.

Les debats sont diriges par le President.

Ils ne sont publics qu'en vertu d'une decision du Tribunal, prise avec
l'assentiment des Parties.

Ils sont consignes dans des proces-verbaux rediges par des secretaires
que nomme le President. Ces proces-verbaux sont signes par le President
et par un des secretaires; ils ont seuls caractere authentique.

Article 67.

L'instruction etant close, le Tribunal a le droit d'ecarter du debat
tous actes ou documents nouveaux qu'une des Parties voudrait lui
soumettre sans le consentement de l'autre.

Article 68.

Le Tribunal demeure libre de prendre en consideration les actes ou
documents nouveaux sur lesquels les agents ou conseils des Parties
appelleraient son attention.

En ce cas, le Tribunal a le droit de requerir la production de ces actes
ou documents, sauf l'obligation d'en donner connaissance a la Partie
adverse.

Article 69.

Le Tribunal peut, en outre, requerir des agents des Parties la
production de tous actes et demander toutes explications necessaires. En
cas de refus, le Tribunal en prend acte.

Article 70.

Les agents et les conseils des Parties sont autorises a presenter
oralement au Tribunal tous les moyens qu'ils jugent utiles a la defense
de leur cause.

Article 71.

Ils ont le droit de soulever des exceptions et des incidents. Les
decisions du Tribunal sur ces points sont definitives et ne peuvent
donner lieu a aucune discussion ulterieure.

Article 72.

Les membres du Tribunal ont le droit de poser des questions aux agents
et aux conseils des Parties et de leur demander des eclaircissements sur
les points douteux.

Ni les questions posees, ni les observations faites par les membres du
Tribunal pendant le cours des debats ne peuvent etre regardees comme
l'expression des opinions du Tribunal en general ou de ses membres en
particulier.

Article 73.

Le Tribunal est autorise a determiner sa competence en interpretant le
compromis ainsi que les autres Traites qui peuvent etre invoques dans la
matiere, et en appliquant les principes du droit.

Article 74.

Le Tribunal a le droit de rendre des ordonnances de procedure pour la
direction du proces, de determiner les formes, l'ordre et les delais
dans lesquels chaque Partie devra prendre ses conclusions finales, et de
proceder a toutes les formalites que comporte l'administration des
preuves.

Article 75.

Les Parties s'engagent a fournir au Tribunal, dans la plus large mesure
qu'Elles jugeront possible, tous les moyens necessaires pour la decision
du litige.

Article 76.

Pour toutes les notifications que le Tribunal aurait a faire sur le
territoire d'une tierce Puissance contractante, le Tribunal s'adressera
directement au Gouvernement de cette Puissance. Il en sera de meme s'il
s'agit de faire proceder sur place a l'etablissement de tous moyens de
preuve.

Les requetes adressees a cet effet seront executees suivant les moyens
dont la Puissance requise dispose d'apres sa legislation interieure.
Elles ne peuvent etre refusees que si cette Puissance les juge de nature
a porter atteinte a sa souverainete ou a sa securite.

Le Tribunal aura aussi toujours la faculte de recourir a l'intermediaire
de la Puissance sur le territoire de laquelle il a son siege.

Article 77.

Les agents et les conseils des Parties ayant presente tous les
eclaircissements et preuves a l'appui de leur cause, le President
prononce la cloture des debats.

Article 78.

Les deliberations du Tribunal ont lieu a huis clos et restent secretes.

Toute decision est prise a la majorite de ses membres.

Article 79.

La sentence arbitrale est motivee. Elle mentionne les noms des arbitres;
elle est signee par le President et par le greffier ou le secretaire
faisant fonctions de greffier.

Article 80.

La sentence est lue en seance publique, les agents et les conseils des
Parties presents ou dument appeles.

Article 81.

La sentence, dument prononcee et notifiee aux agents des Parties, decide
definitivement et sans appel la contestation.

Article 82.

Tout differend qui pourrait surgir entre les Parties, concernant
l'interpretation et l'execution de la sentence, sera, sauf stipulation
contraire, soumis au jugement du Tribunal qui l'a rendue.

Article 83.

Les Parties peuvent se reserver dans le compromis de demander la
revision de la sentence arbitrale.

Dans ce cas, et sauf stipulation contraire, la demande doit etre
adressee au Tribunal qui a rendu la sentence. Elle ne peut etre motivee
que par la decouverte d'un fait nouveau qui eut ete de nature a exercer
une influence decisive sur la sentence et qui, lors de la cloture des
debats, etait inconnu du Tribunal lui-meme et de la Partie qui a demande
la revision.

La procedure de revision ne peut etre ouverte que par une decision du
Tribunal constatant expressement l'existence du fait nouveau, lui
reconnaissant les caracteres prevus par le paragraphe precedent et
declarant a ce titre la demande recevable.

Le compromis determine le delai dans lequel la demande de revision doit
etre formee.

Article 84.

La sentence arbitrale n'est obligatoire que pour les Parties en litige.

Lorsqu'il s'agit de l'interpretation d'une convention a laquelle ont
participe d'autres Puissances que les Parties en litige, celles-ci
avertissent en temps utile toutes les Puissances signataires. Chacune de
ces Puissances a le droit d'intervenir au proces. Si une ou plusieurs
d'entre Elles ont profite de cette faculte, l'interpretation contenue
dans la sentence est egalement obligatoire a leur egard.

Article 85.

Chaque Partie supporte ses propres frais et une part egale des frais du
Tribunal.

CHAPITRE IV.--_De la procedure sommaire d'arbitrage._

Article 86.

En vue de faciliter le fonctionnement de la justice arbitrale, lorsqu'il
s'agit de litiges de nature a comporter une procedure sommaire, les
Puissances contractantes arretent les regles ci-apres qui seront suivies
en l'absence de stipulations differentes, et sous reserve, le cas
echeant, de l'application des dispositions du chapitre III. qui ne
seraient pas contraires.

Article 87.

Chacune des Parties en litige nomme un arbitre. Les deux arbitres ainsi
designes choisissent un surarbitre. S'ils ne tombent pas d'accord a ce
sujet, chacun presente deux candidats pris sur la liste generale des
Membres de la Cour permanente, en dehors des Membres indiques par
chacune des Parties Elles-memes et n'etant les nationaux d'aucune
d'Elles; le sort determine lequel des candidats ainsi presentes sera le
surarbitre.

Le surarbitre preside le Tribunal, qui rend ses decisions a la majorite
des voix.

Article 88.

A defaut d'accord prealable, le Tribunal fixe, des qu'il est constitue,
le delai dans lequel les deux Parties devront lui soumettre leurs
memoires respectifs.

Article 89.

Chaque Partie est representee devant le Tribunal par un agent qui sert
d'intermediaire entre le Tribunal et le Gouvernement qui l'a designe.

Article 90.

La procedure a lieu exclusivement par ecrit. Toutefois, chaque Partie a
le droit demander la comparution de temoins et d'experts. Le Tribunal a,
de son cote, la faculte de demander des explications orales aux agents
des deux Parties, ainsi qu'aux experts et aux temoins dont il juge la
comparution utile.

_Titre V.--Dispositions finales._

Article 91.

La presente Convention dument ratifiee remplacera, dans les rapports
entre les Puissances contractantes, la Convention pour le reglement
pacifique des conflits internationaux du 29 juillet 1899.

Article 92.

La presente Convention sera ratifiee aussitot que possible.

Les ratifications seront deposees a La Haye.

Le premier depot de ratifications sera constate par un proces-verbal
signe par les representants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas.

Les depots ulterieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une
notification ecrite, adressee au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et
accompagnee de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiee conforme du proces-verbal relatif au premier depot de
ratifications, des notifications mentionnees a l'alinea precedent, ainsi
que des instruments de ratification, sera immediatement remise, par les
soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux
Puissances conviees a la Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux
autres Puissances qui auront adhere a la Convention. Dans les cas vises
par l'alinea precedent, ledit Gouvernement Leur fera connaitre en meme
temps la date a laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 93.

Les Puissances non signataires qui ont ete conviees a la Deuxieme
Conference de la Paix pourront adherer a la presente Convention.

La Puissance qui desire adherer notifie par ecrit son intention au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhesion qui sera
depose dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immediatement a toutes les autres Puissances
conviees a la Deuxieme Conference de la Paix copie certifiee conforme de
la notification ainsi que l'acte d'adhesion, en indiquant la date a
laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 94.

Les conditions auxquelles les Puissances qui n'ont pas ete conviees a la
Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, pourront adherer a la presente
Convention formeront l'objet d'une entente ulterieure entre les
Puissances contractantes.

Article 95.

La presente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront
participe au premier depot de ratifications, soixante jours apres la
date du proces-verbal de ce depot et, pour les Puissances qui
ratifieront ulterieurement ou qui adhereront, soixante jours apres que
la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhesion aura ete recue
par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 96.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulut denoncer la
presente Convention, la denonciation sera notifiee par ecrit au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immediatement copie certifiee
conforme de la notification a toutes les autres Puissances en leur
faisant savoir la date a laquelle il l'a recue.

La denonciation ne produira ses effets qu'a l'egard de la Puissance qui
l'aura notifiee et un an apres que la notification en sera parvenue au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 97.

Un registre tenu par le Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas
indiquera la date du depot de ratifications effectue en vertu de
l'article 92 alineas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date a laquelle auront ete
recues les notifications d'adhesion (article 93 alinea 2) ou de
denonciation (article 96 alinea 1).

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise a prendre connaissance de ce
registre et a en demander des extraits certifies conformes.


CONVENTION II.

      CONVENTION RESPECTING THE LIMITATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF
      FORCE FOR THE RECOVERY OF CONTRACT DEBTS.

Article premier.

Les Puissances contractantes sont convenues de ne pas avoir recours a la
force armee pour le recouvrement de dettes contractuelles reclamees au
Gouvernement d'un pays par le Gouvernement d'un autre pays comme dues a
ses nationaux.

Toutefois, cette stipulation ne pourra etre appliquee quand l'Etat
debiteur refuse ou laisse sans reponse une offre d'arbitrage, ou, en cas
d'acceptation, rend impossible l'etablissement du compromis, ou, apres
l'arbitrage, manque de se conformer a la sentence rendue.

Article 2.

Il est de plus convenu que l'arbitrage, mentionne dans l'alinea 2 de
l'article precedent, sera soumis a la procedure prevue par le titre IV
chapitre 3 de la Convention de La Haye pour le reglement pacifique des
conflits internationaux. Le jugement arbitral determine, sauf les
arrangements particuliers des Parties, le bien-fonde de la reclamation,
le montant de la dette, le temps et le mode de paiement.

Article 3.

La presente Convention sera ratifiee aussitot que possible.

Les ratifications seront deposees a La Haye.

Le premier depot de ratifications sera constate par un proces-verbal
signe par les representants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas.

Les depots ulterieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une
notification ecrite, adressee au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et
accompagnee de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiee conforme du proces-verbal relatif au premier depot de
ratifications, des notifications mentionnees a l'alinea precedent, ainsi
que des instruments de ratification, sera immediatement remise, par les
soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique, aux
Puissances conviees a la Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux
autres Puissances qui auront adhere a la Convention. Dans les cas vises
par l'alinea precedent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaitre en meme
temps la date a laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 4.

Les Puissances non signataires sont admises a adherer a la presente
Convention.

La Puissance qui desire adherer notifie par ecrit son intention au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhesion qui sera
depose dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immediatement a toutes les autres Puissances
conviees a la Deuxieme Conference de la Paix copie certifiee conforme de
la notification ainsi que de l'acte d'adhesion, en indiquant la date a
laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 5.

La presente Convention produira effet pour les Puissances qui auront
participe au premier depot de ratifications, soixante jours apres la
date du proces-verbal de ce depot, pour les Puissances qui ratifieront
ulterieurement ou qui adhereront, soixante jours apres que la
notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhesion aura ete recue par
le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 6.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulut denoncer la
presente Convention, la denonciation sera notifiee par ecrit au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immediatement copie certifiee
conforme de la notification a toutes les autres Puissances en leur
faisant savoir la date a laquelle il l'a recue.

La denonciation ne produira ses effets qu'a l'egard de la Puissance qui
l'aura notifiee et un an apres que la notification en sera parvenue au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 7.

Un registre tenu par le Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas
indiquera la date du depot de ratifications effectue en vertu de
l'article 3 alineas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date a laquelle auront ete
recues les notifications d'adhesion (article 4 alinea 2) ou de
denonciation (article 6 alinea 1).

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise a prendre connaissance de ce
registre et a en demander des extraits certifies conformes.


CONVENTION III.

      CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE OPENING OF HOSTILITIES.

Article premier.

Les Puissances contractantes reconnaissent que les hostilites entre
elles ne doivent pas commencer sans un avertissement prealable et non
equivoque, qui aura, soit la forme d'une declaration de guerre motivee,
soit celle d'un ultimatum avec declaration de guerre conditionnelle.

Article 2.

L'etat de guerre devra etre notifie sans <DW44> aux Puissances neutres
et ne produira effet a leur egard qu'apres reception d'une notification
qui pourra etre faite meme par voie telegraphique. Toutefois les
Puissances neutres ne pourraient invoquer l'absence de notification,
s'il etait etabli d'une maniere non douteuse qu'en fait elles
connaissaient l'etat de guerre.

Article 3.

L'article 1 de la presente Convention produira effet en cas de guerre
entre deux ou plusieurs des Puissances contractantes.

L'article 2 est obligatoire dans les rapports entre un belligerant
contractant et les Puissances neutres egalement contractantes.

Article 4.

La presente Convention sera ratifiee aussitot que possible.

Les ratifications seront deposees a La Haye.

Le premier depot de ratifications sera constate par un proces-verbal
signe par les representants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas.

Les depots ulterieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une
notification ecrite adressee au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnee
de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiee conforme du proces-verbal relatif au premier depot de
ratifications, des notifications mentionnees a l'alinea precedent ainsi
que des instruments de ratification, sera immediatement remise par les
soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux
Puissances conviees a la Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux
autres Puissances qui auront adhere a la Convention. Dans les cas vises
par l'alinea precedent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaitre en meme
temps la date a laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 5.

Les Puissances non signataires sont admises a adherer a la presente
Convention.

La Puissance qui desire adherer notifie par ecrit son intention au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhesion qui sera
depose dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immediatement a toutes les autres Puissances
copie certifiee conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte
d'adhesion, en indiquant la date a laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 6.

La presente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront
participe au premier depot de ratifications, soixante jours apres la
date du proces-verbal de ce depot, et, pour les Puissances qui
ratifieront ulterieurement ou qui adhereront, soixante jours apres que
la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhesion aura ete recue
par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 7.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Hautes Parties contractantes voulut denoncer la
presente Convention, la denonciation sera notifiee par ecrit au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immediatement copie certifiee
conforme de la notification a toutes les autres Puissances en leur
faisant savoir la date a laquelle il l'a recue.

La denonciation ne produira ses effets qu'a l'egard de la Puissance qui
l'aura notifiee et un an apres que la notification en sera parvenue au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 8.

Un registre tenu par le Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas
indiquera la date du depot de ratifications effectue en vertu de
l'article 4 alineas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date a laquelle auront ete
recues les notifications d'adhesion (article 5 alinea 2) ou de
denonciation (article 7 alinea 1).

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise a prendre connaissance de ce
registre et a en demander des extraits certifies conformes.


CONVENTION IV.

      CONVENTION CONCERNING THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON LAND.

Article premier.

Les Puissances contractantes donneront a leurs forces armees de terre
des instructions qui seront conformes au Reglement concernant les lois
et coutumes de la guerre sur terre, annexe a la presente Convention.

Article 2.

Les dispositions contenues dans le Reglement vise a l'article 1'er ainsi
que dans la presente Convention, ne sont applicables qu'entre les
Puissances contractantes et seulement si les belligerants sont tous
parties a la Convention.

Article 3.

La Partie belligerante qui violerait les dispositions dudit Reglement
sera tenue a indemnite, s'il y a lieu. Elle sera responsable de tous
actes commis par les personnes faisant partie de sa force armee.

Article 4.

La presente Convention dument ratifiee remplacera, dans les rapports
entre les Puissances contractantes, la Convention du 29 juillet 1899
concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre.

La Convention de 1899 reste en vigueur dans les rapports entre les
Puissances qui l'ont signee et qui ne ratifieraient pas egalement la
presente Convention.

Article 5.

La presente Convention sera ratifiee aussitot que possible.

Les ratifications seront deposees a La Haye.

Le premier depot de ratifications sera constate par un proces-verbal
signe par les representants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas.

Les depots ulterieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une
notification ecrite adressee au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnee
de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiee conforme du proces-verbal relatif au premier depot de
ratifications, des notifications mentionnees a l'alinea precedent ainsi
que des instruments de ratification, sera immediatement remise par les
soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux
Puissances conviees a la Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux
autres Puissances qui auront adhere a la Convention. Dans les cas vises
par l'alinea precedent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaitre en meme
temps la date a laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 6.

Les Puissances non signataires sont admises a adherer a la presente
Convention.

La Puissance qui desire adherer notifie par ecrit son intention au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhesion qui sera
depose dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immediatement a toutes les autres Puissances
copie certifiee conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte
d'adhesion, en indiquant la date a laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 7.

La presente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront
participe au premier depot de ratifications, soixante jours apres la
date du proces-verbal de ce depot et, pour les Puissances qui
ratifieront ulterieurement ou qui adhereront, soixante jours apres que
la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhesion aura ete recue
par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 8.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulut denoncer la
presente Convention, la denonciation sera notifiee par ecrit au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immediatement copie certifiee
conforme de la notification a toutes les autres Puissances en leur
faisant savoir la date a laquelle il l'a recue.

La denonciation ne produira ses effets qu'a l'egard de la Puissance qui
l'aura notifiee et un an apres que la notification en sera parvenue au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 9.

Un registre tenu par le Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas
indiquera la date du depot de ratifications effectue en vertu de
l'article 5 alineas 3 et 4 ainsi que la date a laquelle auront ete
recues les notifications d'adhesion (article 6 alinea 2) ou de
denonciation (article 8 alinea 1).

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise a prendre connaissance de ce
registre et a en demander des extraits certifies conformes.

ANNEXE A LA CONVENTION.

_Reglement concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre._

SECTION I.--DES BELLIGERANTS.

CHAPITRE I.--_De la qualite de belligerant._

Article premier.

Les lois, les droits et les devoirs de la guerre ne s'appliquent pas
seulement a l'armee, mais encore aux milices et aux corps de volontaires
reunissant les conditions suivantes:

1'o. d'avoir a leur tete une personne responsable pour ses subordonnes;

2'o. d'avoir un signe distinctif fixe et reconnaissable a distance;

3'o. de porter les armes ouvertement et

4'o. de se conformer dans leurs operations aux lois et coutumes de la
guerre.

Dans les pays ou les milices ou des corps de volontaires constituent
l'armee ou en font partie, ils sont compris sous la denomination
d'_armee_.

Article 2.

La population d'un territoire non occupe qui, a l'approche de l'ennemi,
prend spontanement les armes pour combattre les troupes d'invasion sans
avoir eu le temps de s'organiser conformement a l'article premier, sera
consideree comme belligerante si elle porte les armes ouvertement et si
elle respecte les lois et coutumes de la guerre.

Article 3.

Les forces armees des parties belligerantes peuvent se composer de
combattants et de non-combattants. En cas de capture par l'ennemi, les
uns et les autres ont droit au traitement des prisonniers de guerre.

CHAPITRE II.--_Des prisonniers de guerre._

Article 4.

Les prisonniers de guerre sont au pouvoir du Gouvernement ennemi, mais
non des individus ou des corps qui les ont captures.

Ils doivent etre traites avec humanite.

Tout ce qui leur appartient personnellement, excepte les armes, les
chevaux et les papiers militaires, reste leur propriete.

Article 5.

Les prisonniers de guerre peuvent etre assujettis a l'internement dans
une ville, forteresse, camp ou localite quelconque, avec obligation de
ne pas s'en eloigner au dela de certaines limites determinees; mais ils
ne peuvent etre enfermes que par mesure de surete indispensable, et
seulement pendant la duree des circonstances qui necessitent cette
mesure.

Article 6.

L'Etat peut employer, comme travailleurs, les prisonniers de guerre,
selon leur grade et leurs aptitudes, a l'exception des officiers. Ces
travaux ne seront pas excessifs et n'auront aucun rapport avec les
operations de la guerre.

Les prisonniers peuvent etre autorises a travailler pour le compte
d'administrations publiques ou de particuliers, ou pour leur propre
compte.

Les travaux faits pour l'Etat sont payes d'apres les tarifs en vigueur
pour les militaires de l'armee nationale executant les memes travaux,
ou, s'il n'en existe pas, d'apres un tarif en rapport avec les travaux
executes.

Lorsque les travaux ont lieu pour le compte d'autres administrations
publiques ou pour des particuliers, les conditions en sont reglees
d'accord avec l'autorite militaire.

Le salaire des prisonniers contribuera a adoucir leur position, et le
surplus leur sera compte au moment de leur liberation, sauf defalcation
des frais d'entretien.

Article 7.

Le Gouvernement au pouvoir duquel se trouvent les prisonniers de guerre
est charge de leur entretien.

A defaut d'une entente speciale entre les belligerants, les prisonniers
de guerre seront traites pour la nourriture, le couchage et
l'habillement, sur le meme pied que les troupes du Gouvernement qui les
aura captures.

Article 8.

Les prisonniers de guerre seront soumis aux lois, reglements et ordres
en vigueur dans l'armee de l'Etat au pouvoir duquel ils se trouvent.
Tout acte d'insubordination autorise, a leur egard, les mesures de
rigueur necessaires.

Les prisonniers evades, qui seraient repris avant d'avoir pu rejoindre
leur armee ou avant de quitter le territoire occupe par l'armee qui les
aura captures, sont passibles de peines disciplinaires.

Les prisonniers qui, apres avoir reussi a s'evader, sont de nouveau
faits prisonniers, ne sont passibles d'aucune peine pour la fuite
anterieure.

Article 9.

Chaque prisonnier de guerre est tenu de declarer, s'il est interroge a
ce sujet, ses veritables noms et grade et, dans le cas ou il
enfreindrait cette regle, il s'exposerait a une restriction des
avantages accordes aux prisonniers de guerre de sa categorie.

Article 10.

Les prisonniers de guerre peuvent etre mis en liberte sur parole, si les
lois de leur pays les y autorisent, et, en pareil cas, ils sont obliges,
sous la garantie de leur honneur personnel, de remplir scrupuleusement,
tant vis-a-vis de leur propre Gouvernement que vis-a-vis de celui qui
les a faits prisonniers, les engagements qu'ils auraient contractes.

Dans le meme cas, leur propre Gouvernement est tenu de n'exiger ni
accepter d'eux aucun service contraire a la parole donnee.

Article 11.

Un prisonnier de guerre ne peut etre contraint d'accepter sa liberte sur
parole; de meme le Gouvernement ennemi n'est pas oblige d'acceder a la
demande du prisonnier reclamant sa mise en liberte sur parole.

Article 12.

Tout prisonnier de guerre, libere sur parole et repris portant les armes
contre le Gouvernement envers lequel il s'etait engage d'honneur, ou
contre les allies de celui-ci, perd le droit au traitement des
prisonniers de guerre et peut etre traduit devant les tribunaux.

Article 13.

Les individus qui suivent une armee sans en faire directement partie,
tels que les correspondants et les reporters de journaux, les
vivandiers, les fournisseurs, qui tombent au pouvoir de l'ennemi et que
celui-ci juge utile de detenir, ont droit au traitement des prisonniers
de guerre, a condition qu'ils soient munis d'une legitimation de
l'autorite militaire de l'armee qu'ils accompagnaient.

Article 14.

Il est constitue, des le debut des hostilites, dans chacun des Etats
belligerants, et, le cas echeant, dans les pays neutres qui auront
recueilli des belligerants sur leur territoire, un bureau de
renseignements sur les prisonniers de guerre. Ce bureau, charge de
repondre a toutes les demandes qui les concernent, recoit des divers
services competents toutes les indications relatives aux internements et
aux mutations, aux mises en liberte sur parole, aux echanges, aux
evasions, aux entrees dans les hopitaux, aux deces, ainsi que les autres
renseignements necessaires pour etablir et tenir a jour une fiche
individuelle pour chaque prisonnier de guerre. Le bureau devra porter
sur cette fiche le numero matricule, les nom et prenom, l'age, le lieu
d'origine, le grade, le corps de troupe, les blessures, la date et le
lieu de la capture, de l'internement, des blessures et de la mort, ainsi
que toutes les observations particulieres. La fiche individuelle sera
remise au Gouvernement de l'autre belligerant apres la conclusion de la
paix.

Le bureau de renseignements est egalement charge de recueillir et de
centraliser tous les objets d'un usage personnel, valeurs, lettres,
etc., qui seront trouves sur les champs de bataille ou delaisses par des
prisonniers liberes sur parole, echanges, evades ou decedes dans les
hopitaux et ambulances, et de les transmettre aux interesses.

Article 15.

Les societes de secours pour les prisonniers de guerre, regulierement
constituees selon la loi de leur pays et ayant pour objet d'etre les
intermediaires de l'action charitable, recevront, de la part des
belligerants, pour elles et pour leurs agents dument accredites, toute
facilite, dans les limites tracees par les necessites militaires et les
regles administratives, pour accomplir efficacement leur tache
d'humanite. Les delegues de ces societes pourront etre admis a
distribuer des secours dans les depots d'internement, ainsi qu'aux lieux
d'etape des prisonniers rapatries, moyennant une permission personnelle
delivree par l'autorite militaire, et en prenant l'engagement par ecrit
de se soumettre a toutes les mesures d'ordre et de police que celle-ci
prescrirait.

Article 16.

Les bureaux de renseignements jouissent de la franchise de port. Les
lettres, mandats et articles d'argent, ainsi que les colis postaux
destines aux prisonniers de guerre ou expedies par eux, seront
affranchis de toutes les taxes postales, aussi bien dans les pays
d'origine et de destination que dans les pays intermediaires.

Les dons et secours en nature destines aux prisonniers de guerre seront
admis en franchise de tous droits d'entree et autres, ainsi que des
taxes de transport sur les chemins de fer exploites par l'Etat.

Article 17.

Les officiers prisonniers recevront la solde a laquelle ont droit les
officiers de meme grade du pays ou ils sont retenus, a charge de
remboursement par leur Gouvernement.

Article 18.

Toute latitude est laissee aux prisonniers de guerre pour l'exercice de
leur religion, y compris l'assistance aux offices de leur culte, a la
seule condition de se conformer aux mesures d'ordre et de police
prescrites par l'autorite militaire.

Article 19.

Les testaments des prisonniers de guerre sont recus ou dresses dans les
memes conditions que pour les militaires de l'armee nationale.

On suivra egalement les memes regles en ce qui concerne les pieces
relatives a la constatation des deces, ainsi que pour l'inhumation des
prisonniers de guerre, en tenant compte de leur grade et de leur rang.

Article 20.

Apres la conclusion de la paix, le rapatriement des prisonniers de
guerre s'effectuera dans le plus bref delai possible.

CHAPITRE III.--_Des malades et des blesses._

Article 21.

Les obligations des belligerants concernant le service des malades et
des blesses sont regies par la Convention de Geneve.

SECTION II.--DES HOSTILITES.

CHAPITRE I.--_Des moyens de nuire a l'ennemi, des sieges et des
bombardements._

Article 22.

Les belligerants n'ont pas un droit illimite quant au choix des moyens
de nuire a l'ennemi.

Article 23.

Outre les prohibitions etablies par des conventions speciales, il est
notamment interdit:

  (_a_) d'employer du poison ou des armes empoisonnees;

  (_b_) de tuer ou de blesser par trahison des individus appartenant
  a la nation ou a l'armee ennemie;

  (_c_) de tuer ou de blesser un ennemi qui, ayant mis bas les armes
  ou n'ayant plus les moyens de se defendre, s'est rendu a
  discretion;

  (_d_) de declarer qu'il ne sera pas fait de quartier;

  (_e_) d'employer des armes, des projectiles ou des matieres
  propres a causer des maux superflus;

  (_f_) d'user indument du pavillon parlementaire, du pavillon
  national ou des insignes militaires et de l'uniforme de l'ennemi,
  ainsi que des signes distinctifs de la Convention de Geneve;

  (_g_) de detruire ou de saisir des proprietes ennemies, sauf les
  cas ou ces destructions ou ces saisies seraient imperieusement
  commandees par les necessites de la guerre;

  (_h_) de declarer eteints, suspendus ou non recevables en justice,
  les droits et actions des nationaux de la Partie adverse.

Il est egalement interdit a un belligerant de forcer les nationaux de la
Partie adverse a prendre part aux operations de guerre dirigees contre
leur pays, meme dans le cas ou ils auraient ete a son service avant le
commencement de la guerre.

Article 24.

Les ruses de guerre et l'emploi des moyens necessaires pour se procurer
des renseignements sur l'ennemi et sur le terrain sont consideres comme
licites.

Article 25.

Il est interdit d'attaquer ou de bombarder, par quelque moyen que ce
soit des villes, villages, habitations ou batiments qui ne sont pas
defendus.

Article 26.

Le commandant des troupes assaillantes, avant d'entreprendre le
bombardement, et sauf le cas d'attaque de vive force, devra faire tout
ce qui depend de lui pour en avertir les autorites.

Article 27.

Dans les sieges et bombardements, toutes les mesures necessaires doivent
etre prises pour epargner, autant que possible, les edifices consacres
aux cultes, aux arts, aux sciences et a la bienfaisance, les monuments
historiques, les hopitaux et les lieux de rassemblement de malades et de
blesses, a condition qu'ils ne soient pas employes en meme temps a un
but militaire.

Le devoir des assieges est de designer ces edifices ou lieux de
rassemblement par des signes visibles speciaux qui seront notifies
d'avance a l'assiegeant.

Article 28.

Il est interdit de livrer au pillage une ville ou localite meme prise
d'assaut.

CHAPITRE II.--_Des espions._

Article 29.

Ne peut etre considere comme espion que l'individu qui, agissant
clandestinement ou sous de faux pretextes, recueille ou cherche a
recueillir des informations dans la zone d'operations d'un belligerant,
avec l'intention de les communiquer a la partie adverse.

Ainsi les militaires non deguises qui ont penetre dans la zone
d'operations de l'armee ennemie, a l'effet de recueillir des
informations, ne sont pas consideres comme espions. De meme, ne sont pas
consideres comme espions: les militaires et les non militaires,
accomplissant ouvertement leur mission, charges de transmettre des
depeches destinees, soit a leur propre armee, soit a l'armee ennemie. A
cette categorie appartiennent egalement les individus envoyes en ballon
pour transmettre les depeches, et, en general, pour entretenir les
communications entre les diverses parties d'une armee ou d'un
territoire.

Article 30.

L'espion pris sur le fait ne pourra etre puni sans jugement prealable.

Article 31.

L'espion qui, ayant rejoint l'armee a laquelle il appartient, est
capture plus tard par l'ennemi, est traite comme prisonnier de guerre et
n'encourt aucune responsabilite pour ses actes d'espionnage anterieurs.

CHAPITRE III.--_Des parlementaires._

Article 32.

Est considere comme parlementaire l'individu autorise par l'un des
belligerants a entrer en pourparlers avec l'autre et se presentant avec
le drapeau blanc. Il a droit a l'inviolabilite ainsi que le trompette,
clairon ou tambour, le porte-drapeau et l'interprete qui
l'accompagneraient.

Article 33.

Le chef auquel un parlementaire est expedie n'est pas oblige de le
recevoir en toutes circonstances.

Il peut prendre toutes les mesures necessaires afin d'empecher le
parlementaire de profiter de sa mission pour se renseigner.

Il a le droit, en cas d'abus, de retenir temporairement le
parlementaire.

Article 34.

Le parlementaire perd ses droits d'inviolabilite, s'il est prouve, d'une
maniere positive et irrecusable, qu'il a profite de sa position
privilegiee pour provoquer ou commettre un acte de trahison.

CHAPITRE IV.--_Des capitulations._

Article 35.

Les capitulations arretees entre les parties contractantes doivent tenir
compte des regles de l'honneur militaire.

Une fois fixees, elles doivent etre scrupuleusement observees par les
deux parties.

CHAPITRE V.--_De l'armistice._

Article 36.

L'armistice suspend les operations de guerre par un accord mutuel des
parties belligerantes. Si la duree n'en est pas determinee, les parties
belligerantes peuvent reprendre en tout temps les operations, pourvu
toutefois que l'ennemi soit averti en temps convenu, conformement aux
conditions de l'armistice.

Article 37.

L'armistice peut etre general ou local. Le premier suspend partout les
operations de guerre des Etats belligerants; le second, seulement entre
certaines fractions des armees belligerantes et dans un rayon determine.

Article 38.

L'armistice doit etre notifie officiellement et en temps utile aux
autorites competentes et aux troupes. Les hostilites sont suspendues
immediatement apres la notification ou au terme fixe.

Article 39.

Il depend des parties contractantes de fixer, dans les clauses de
l'armistice, les rapports qui pourraient avoir lieu, sur le theatre de
la guerre, avec les populations et entre elles.

Article 40.

Toute violation grave de l'armistice, par l'une des parties, donne a
l'autre le droit de le denoncer et meme, en cas d'urgence, de reprendre
immediatement les hostilites.

Article 41.

La violation des clauses de l'armistice, par des particuliers agissant
de leur propre initiative, donne droit seulement a reclamer la punition
des coupables et, s'il y a lieu, une indemnite pour les pertes
eprouvees.

SECTION III.--DE L'AUTORITE MILITAIRE SUR LE TERRITOIRE DE L'ETAT
ENNEMI.

Article 42.

Un territoire est considere comme occupe lorsqu'il se trouve place de
fait sous l'autorite de l'armee ennemie.

L'occupation ne s'etend qu'aux territoires ou cette autorite est etablie
et en mesure de s'exercer.

Article 43.

L'autorite du pouvoir legal ayant passe de fait entre les mains de
l'occupant, celui-ci prendra toutes les mesures qui dependent de lui en
vue de retablir et d'assurer, autant qu'il est possible, l'ordre et la
vie publics en respectant, sauf empechement absolu, les lois en vigueur
dans le pays.

Article 44.

Il est interdit a un belligerant de forcer la population d'un territoire
occupe a donner des renseignements sur l'armee de l'autre belligerant ou
sur ses moyens de defense.

Article 45.

Il est interdit de contraindre la population d'un territoire occupe a
preter serment a la Puissance ennemie.

Article 46.

L'honneur et les droits de la famille, la vie des individus et la
propriete privee, ainsi que les convictions religieuses et l'exercice
des cultes, doivent etre respectes.

La propriete privee ne peut pas etre confisquee.

Article 47.

Le pillage est formellement interdit.

Article 48.

Si l'occupant preleve, dans le territoire occupe, les impots, droits et
peages etablis au profit de l'Etat, il le fera, autant que possible,
d'apres les regles de l'assiette et de la repartition en vigueur, et il
en resultera pour lui l'obligation de pourvoir aux frais de
l'administration du territoire occupe dans la mesure ou le Gouvernement
legal y etait tenu.

Article 49.

Si, en dehors des impots vises a l'article precedent, l'occupant preleve
d'autres contributions en argent dans le territoire occupe, ce ne pourra
etre que pour les besoins de l'armee ou de l'administration de ce
territoire.

Article 50.

Aucune peine collective, pecuniaire ou autre, ne pourra etre edictee
contre les populations a raison de faits individuels dont elles ne
pourraient etre considerees comme solidairement responsables.

Article 51.

Aucune contribution ne sera percue qu'en vertu d'un ordre ecrit et sous
la responsabilite d'un general en chef.

Il ne sera procede, autant que possible, a cette perception que d'apres
les regles de l'assiette et de la repartition des impots en vigueur.

Pour toute contribution, un recu sera delivre aux contribuables.

Article 52.

Des requisitions en nature et des services ne pourront etre reclames des
communes ou des habitants, que pour les besoins de l'armee d'occupation.
Ils seront en rapport avec les ressources du pays et de telle nature
qu'ils n'impliquent pas pour les populations l'obligation de prendre
part aux operations de la guerre contre leur patrie.

Ces requisitions et ces services ne seront reclames qu'avec
l'autorisation du commandant dans la localite occupee.

Les prestations en nature seront, autant que possible, payees au
comptant; sinon, elles seront constatees par des recus, et le paiement
des sommes dues sera effectue le plus tot possible.

Article 53.

L'armee qui occupe un territoire ne pourra saisir que le numeraire, les
fonds et les valeurs exigibles appartenant en propre a l'Etat, les
depots d'armes, moyens de transport, magasins et approvisionnements et,
en general, toute propriete mobiliere de l'Etat de nature a servir aux
operations de la guerre.

Tous les moyens affectes sur terre, sur mer et dans les airs a la
transmission des nouvelles, au transport des personnes ou des choses, en
dehors des cas regis par le droit maritime, les depots d'armes et, en
general, toute espece de munitions de guerre, peuvent etre saisis, meme
s'ils appartiennent a des personnes privees, mais devront etre restitues
et les indemnites seront reglees a la paix.

Article 54.

Les cables sous-marins reliant un territoire occupe a un territoire
neutre ne seront saisis ou detruits que dans le cas d'une necessite
absolue. Ils devront egalement etre restitues et les indemnites seront
reglees a la paix.

Article 55.

L'Etat occupant ne se considerera que comme administrateur et
usufruitier des edifices publics, immeubles, forets et exploitations
agricoles appartenant a l'Etat ennemi et se trouvant dans le pays
occupe. Il devra sauvegarder le fonds de ces proprietes et les
administrer conformement aux regles de l'usufruit.

Article 56.

Les biens des communes, ceux des etablissements consacres aux cultes, a
la charite et a l'instruction, aux arts et aux sciences, meme
appartenant a l'Etat seront traites comme la propriete privee.

Toute saisie, destruction ou degradation intentionnelle de semblables
etablissements, de monuments historiques, d'oeuvres d'art et de science,
est interdite et doit etre poursuivie.


CONVENTION V.

      CONVENTION RESPECTING THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRAL POWERS
      AND PERSONS IN WAR ON LAND.

CHAPITRE I.--_Des Droits et des Devoirs des Puissances neutres._

Article premier.

Le territoire des Puissances neutres est inviolable.

Article 2.

Il est interdit aux belligerants de faire passer a travers le territoire
d'une Puissance neutre des troupes ou des convois, soit de munitions,
soit d'approvisionnements.

Article 3.

Il est egalement interdit aux belligerants:

  (_a_) d'installer sur le territoire d'une Puissance neutre une
  station radiotelegraphique ou tout appareil destine a servir comme
  moyen de communication avec des forces belligerantes sur terre ou
  sur mer;

  (_b_) d'utiliser toute installation de ce genre etablie par eux
  avant la guerre sur le territoire de la Puissance neutre dans un
  but exclusivement militaire, et qui n'a pas ete ouverte au service
  de la correspondance publique.

Article 4.

Des corps de combattants ne peuvent etre formes, ni des bureaux
d'enrolement ouverts, sur le territoire d'une Puissance neutre au profit
des belligerants.

Article 5.

Une Puissance neutre ne doit tolerer sur son territoire aucun des actes
vises par les articles 2 a 4.

Elle n'est tenue de punir des actes contraires a la neutralite que si
ces actes ont ete commis sur son propre territoire.

Article 6.

La responsabilite d'une Puissance neutre n'est pas engagee par le fait
que des individus passent isolement la frontiere pour se mettre au
service de l'un des belligerants.

Article 7.

Une Puissance neutre n'est pas tenue d'empecher l'exportation ou le
transit, pour le compte de l'un ou de l'autre des belligerants, d'armes,
de munitions, et, en general, de tout ce qui peut etre utile a une armee
ou a une flotte.

Article 8.

Une Puissance neutre n'est pas tenue d'interdire ou de restreindre
l'usage, pour les belligerants, des cables telegraphiques ou
telephoniques, ainsi que des appareils de telegraphie sans fil, qui
sont, soit sa propriete, soit celle de compagnies ou de particuliers.

Article 9.

Toutes mesures restrictives ou prohibitives prises par une Puissance
neutre a l'egard des matieres visees par les articles 7 et 8 devront
etre uniformement appliquees par elle aux belligerants.

La Puissance neutre veillera au respect de la meme obligation par les
compagnies ou particuliers proprietaires de cables telegraphiques ou
telephoniques ou d'appareils de telegraphie sans fil.

Article 10.

Ne peut etre considere comme un acte hostile le fait, par une Puissance
neutre, de repousser, meme par la force, les atteintes a sa neutralite.

CHAPITRE II.--_Des belligerants internes et des blesses soignes chez les
neutres._

Article 11.

La Puissance neutre qui recoit sur son territoire des troupes
appartenant aux armees belligerantes, les internera, autant que
possible, loin du theatre de la guerre.

Elle pourra les garder dans des camps, et meme les enfermer dans des
forteresses ou dans des lieux appropries a cet effet.

Elle decidera si les officiers peuvent etre laisses libres en prenant
l'engagement sur parole de ne pas quitter le territoire neutre sans
autorisation.

Article 12.

A defaut de convention speciale, la Puissance neutre fournira aux
internes les vivres, les habillements et les secours commandes par
l'humanite.

Bonification sera faite, a la paix, des frais occasionnes par
l'internement.

Article 13.

La Puissance neutre qui recoit des prisonniers de guerre evades les
laissera en liberte. Si elle tolere leur sejour sur son territoire, elle
peut leur assigner une residence.

La meme disposition est applicable aux prisonniers de guerre amenes par
des troupes se refugiant sur le territoire de la Puissance neutre.

Article 14.

Une Puissance neutre pourra autoriser le passage sur son territoire des
blesses ou malades appartenant aux armees belligerantes, sous la reserve
que les trains qui les ameneront ne transporteront ni personnel, ni
materiel de guerre. En pareil cas, la Puissance neutre est tenue de
prendre les mesures de surete et de controle necessaires a cet effet.

Les blesses ou malades amenes dans ces conditions sur le territoire
neutre par un des belligerants, et qui appartiendraient a la partie
adverse, devront etre gardes par la Puissance neutre de maniere qu'ils
ne puissent de nouveau prendre part aux operations de la guerre. Cette
Puissance aura les memes devoirs quant aux blesses ou malades de l'autre
armee qui lui seraient confies.

Article 15.

La Convention de Geneve s'applique aux malades et aux blesses internes
sur territoire neutre.

CHAPITRE III.--_Des personnes neutres._

Article 16.

Sont consideres comme neutres les nationaux d'un Etat qui ne prend pas
part a la guerre.

Article 17.

Un neutre ne peut pas se prevaloir de sa neutralite:

  (_a_) s'il commet des actes hostiles contre un belligerant;

  (_b_) s'il commet des actes en faveur d'un belligerant, notamment
  s'il prend volontairement du service dans les rangs de la force
  armee de l'une des Parties.

En pareil cas, le neutre ne sera pas traite plus rigoureusement par le
belligerant contre lequel il s'est departi de la neutralite que ne
pourrait l'etre, a raison du meme fait, un national de l'autre Etat
belligerant.

Article 18.

Ne seront pas consideres comme actes commis en faveur d'un des
belligerants, dans le sens de l'article 17, lettre b:

  (_a_) les fournitures faites ou les emprunts consentis a l'un des
  belligerants, pourvu que le fournisseur ou le preteur n'habite ni
  le territoire de l'autre Partie, ni le territoire occupe par elle,
  et que les fournitures ne proviennent pas de ses territoires;

  (_b_) les services rendus en matiere de police ou d'administration
  civile.

CHAPITRE IV.--_Du materiel des chemins de fer._

Article 19.

Le materiel des chemins de fer provenant du territoire de Puissances
neutres, qu'il appartienne a ces Puissances ou a des societes ou
personnes privees, et reconnaisable comme tel, ne pourra etre
requisitionne et utilise par un belligerant que dans le cas et la mesure
ou l'exige une imperieuse necessite. Il sera renvoye aussitot que
possible dans le pays d'origine.

La Puissance neutre pourra de meme, en cas de necessite, retenir et
utiliser, jusqu'a due concurrence, le materiel provenant du territoire
de la Puissance belligerante.

Une indemnite sera payee de part et d'autre, en proportion du materiel
utilise et de la duree de l'utilisation.

CHAPITRE V.--_Dispositions finales._

Article 20.

Les dispositions de la presente Convention ne sont applicables qu'entre
les Puissances contractantes et seulement si les belligerants sont tous
parties a la Convention.

Article 21.

La presente Convention sera ratifiee aussitot que possible.

Les ratifications seront deposees a La Haye.

Le premier depot de ratifications sera constate par un proces-verbal
signe par les representants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas.

Les depots ulterieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une
notification ecrite, adressee au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et
accompagnee de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiee conforme du proces-verbal relatif au premier depot de
ratifications, des notifications mentionnees a l'alinea precedent, ainsi
que des instruments de ratification sera immediatement remise par les
soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux
Puissances conviees a la Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux
autres Puissances qui auront adhere a la Convention. Dans les cas vises
par l'alinea precedent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaitre en meme
temps la date a laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 22.

Les Puissances non signataires sont admises a adherer a la presente
Convention.

La Puissance qui desire adherer notifie par ecrit son intention au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhesion qui sera
depose dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immediatement a toutes les autres Puissances
copie certifiee conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte
d'adhesion, en indiquant la date a laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 23.

La presente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront
participe au premier depot de ratifications, soixante jours apres la
date du proces-verbal de ce depot et, pour les Puissances qui
ratifieront ulterieurement ou qui adhereront, soixante jours apres que
la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhesion aura ete recue
par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 24.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulut denoncer la
presente Convention, la denonciation sera notifiee par ecrit au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immediatement copie certifiee
conforme de la notification a toutes les autres Puissances, en leur
faisant savoir la date a laquelle il l'a recue.

La denonciation ne produira ses effets qu'a l'egard de la Puissance qui
l'aura notifiee et un an apres que la notification en sera parvenue au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 25.

Un registre tenu par le Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas
indiquera la date du depot des ratifications effectue en vertu de
l'article 21 alineas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date a laquelle auront ete
recues les notifications d'adhesion (article 22 alinea 2) ou de
denonciation (article 24 alinea 1).

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise a prendre connaissance de ce
registre et a en demander des extraits certifies conformes.


CONVENTION VI.

      CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE STATUS OF MERCHANTMEN AT THE
      OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.

Article premier.

Lorsqu'un navire de commerce relevant d'une des Puissances belligerantes
se trouve, au debut des hostilites, dans un port ennemi, il est
desirable qu'il lui soit permis de sortir librement, immediatement ou
apres un delai de faveur suffisant, et de gagner directement, apres
avoir ete muni d'un laissez-passer, son port de destination ou tel autre
port qui lui sera designe.

Il en est de meme du navire ayant quitte son dernier port de depart
avant le commencement de la guerre et entrant dans un port ennemi sans
connaitre les hostilites.

Article 2.

Le navire de commerce qui, par suite de circonstances de force majeure
n'aurait pu quitter le port ennemi pendant le delai vise a l'article
precedent, ou auquel la sortie n'aurait pas ete accordee, ne peut etre
confisque.

Le belligerant peut seulement le saisir moyennant l'obligation de le
restituer apres la guerre sans indemnite, ou le requisitionner
moyennant indemnite.

Article 3.

Les navires de commerce ennemis, qui ont quitte leur dernier port de
depart, avant le commencement de la guerre et qui sont rencontres en mer
ignorants des hostilites, ne peuvent etre confisques. Ils sont seulement
sujets a etre saisis, moyennant l'obligation de les restituer apres la
guerre sans indemnite, ou a etre requisitionnes, ou meme a etre
detruits, a charge d'indemnite et sous l'obligation de pourvoir a la
securite des personnes ainsi qu'a la conservation des papiers de bord.

Apres avoir touche a un port de leur pays ou a un port neutre, ces
navires sont soumis aux lois et coutumes de la guerre maritime.

Article 4.

Les marchandises ennemies se trouvant a bord des navires vises aux
articles 1 et 2 sont egalement sujettes a etre saisies et restituees
apres la guerre sans indemnite, ou a etre requisitionnees moyennant
indemnite, conjointement avec le navire ou separement.

Il en est de meme des marchandises se trouvant a bord des navires vises
a l'article 3.

Article 5.

La presente Convention ne vise pas les navires de commerce dont la
construction indique qu'ils sont destines a etre transformes en
batiments de guerre.

Article 6.

Les dispositions de la presente Convention ne sont applicables qu'entre
les Puissances contractantes et seulement si les belligerants sont tous
parties a la Convention.

Article 7.

La presente Convention sera ratifiee aussitot que possible.

Les ratifications seront deposees a La Haye.

Le premier depot de ratifications sera constate par un proces-verbal
signe par les representants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas.

Les depots ulterieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une
notification ecrite, adressee au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et
accompagnee de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiee conforme du proces-verbal relatif au premier depot de
ratifications, des notifications mentionnees a l'alinea precedent, ainsi
que des instruments de ratifications, sera immediatement remise par les
soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux
Puissances conviees a la Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux
autres Puissances qui auront adhere a la Convention. Dans les cas vises
par l'alinea precedent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaitre en meme
temps la date a laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 8.

Les Puissances non signataires sont admises a adherer a la presente
Convention.

La Puissance qui desire adherer notifie par ecrit son intention au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhesion qui sera
depose dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immediatement a toutes les autres Puissances
copie certifiee conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte
d'adhesion, en indiquant la date a laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 9.

La presente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront
participe au premier depot de ratifications, soixante jours apres la
date du proces-verbal de ce depot et, pour les Puissances qui
ratifieront ulterieurement ou qui adhereront, soixante jours apres que
la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhesion aura ete recue
par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 10.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulut denoncer la
presente Convention, la denonciation sera notifiee par ecrit au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immediatement copie certifiee
conforme de la notification a toutes les autres Puissances en leur
faisant savoir la date a laquelle il l'a recue.

La denonciation ne produira ses effets qu'a l'egard de la Puissance qui
l'aura notifiee et un an apres que la notification en sera parvenue au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 11.

Un registre tenu par le Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas
indiquera la date du depot de ratifications effectue en vertu de
l'article 7 alineas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date a laquelle auront ete
recues les notifications d'adhesion (article 8 alinea 2) ou de
denonciation (article 10 alinea 1).

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise a prendre connaissance de ce
registre et a en demander des extraits certifies conformes.


CONVENTION VII.

      CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE CONVERSION OF MERCHANTMEN INTO
      MEN-OF-WAR.

Article premier.

Aucun navire de commerce transforme en batiment de guerre ne peut avoir
les droits et les obligations attaches a cette qualite, s'il n'est place
sous l'autorite directe, le controle immediat et la responsabilite de la
Puissance dont il porte le pavillon.

Article 2.

Les navires de commerce transformes en batiments de guerre doivent
porter les signes exterieurs distinctifs des batiments de guerre de leur
nationalite.

Article 3.

Le commandant doit etre au service de l'Etat et dument commissionne par
les autorites competentes. Son nom doit figurer sur la liste des
officiers de la flotte militaire.

Article 4.

L'equipage doit etre soumis aux regles de la discipline militaire.

Article 5.

Tout navire de commerce transforme en batiment de guerre est tenu
d'observer dans ses operations, les lois et coutumes de la guerre.

Article 6.

Le belligerant, qui transforme un navire de commerce en batiment de
guerre, doit, le plus tot possible, mentionner cette transformation sur
la liste des batiments de sa flotte militaire.

Article 7.

Les dispositions de la presente Convention ne sont applicables qu'entre
les Puissances contractantes et seulement si les belligerants sont tous
parties a la Convention.

Article 8.

La presente Convention sera ratifiee aussitot que possible.

Les ratifications seront deposees a La Haye.

Le premier depot de ratifications sera constate par un proces-verbal
signe par les representants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas.

Les depots ulterieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une
notification ecrite, adressee au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et
accompagnee de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiee conforme du proces-verbal relatif au premier depot de
ratifications, des notifications mentionnees a l'alinea precedent, ainsi
que des instruments de ratification, sera immediatement remise, par les
soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, et par la voie diplomatique, aux
Puissances conviees a la Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux
autres Puissances qui auront adhere a la Convention. Dans les cas vises
par l'alinea precedent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaitre en meme
temps la date a laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 9.

Les Puissances non signataires sont admises a adherer a la presente
Convention.

La Puissance qui desire adherer notifie par ecrit son intention au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhesion qui sera
depose dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immediatement a toutes les autres Puissances
copie certifiee conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte
d'adhesion, en indiquant la date a laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 10.

La presente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront
participe au premiere depot de ratifications, soixante jours apres la
date du proces-verbal de ce depot, et pour les Puissances qui
ratifieront ulterieurement ou qui adhereront, soixante jours apres que
la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhesion aura ete recue
par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 11.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulut denoncer la
presente Convention, la denonciation sera notifiee par ecrit au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immediatement copie certifiee
conforme de la notification a toutes les autres Puissances en leur
faisant savoir la date a laquelle il l'a recue.

La denonciation ne produira ses effets qu'a l'egard de la Puissance qui
l'aura notifiee et un an apres que la notification en sera parvenue au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 12.

Un registre tenu par le Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas
indiquera la date du depot de ratifications effectue en vertu de
l'article 8 alineas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date a laquelle auront ete
recues les notifications d'adhesion (article 9 alinea 2) ou de
denonciation (article 11 alinea 1).

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise a prendre connaissance de ce
registre et a en demander des extraits certifies conformes.


CONVENTION VIII.

      CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE LAYING OF AUTOMATIC SUBMARINE
      CONTACT MINES.

Article premier.

Il est interdit:

1'o. de placer des mines automatiques de contact non amarrees, a moins
qu'elles ne soient construites de maniere a devenir inoffensives une
heure au maximum apres que celui qui les a placees en aura perdu le
controle;

2'o. de placer des mines automatiques de contact amarrees, qui ne
deviennent pas inoffensives des qu'elles auront rompu leurs amarres;

3'o. d'employer des torpilles, qui ne deviennent pas inoffensives
lorsqu'elles auront manque leur but.

Article 2.

Il est interdit de placer des mines automatiques de contact devant les
cotes et les ports de l'adversaire, dans le seul but d'intercepter la
navigation de commerce.

Article 3.

Lorsque les mines automatiques de contact amarrees sont employees,
toutes les precautions possibles doivent etre prises pour la securite de
la navigation pacifique.

Les belligerants s'engagent a pourvoir, dans la mesure du possible, a ce
que ces mines deviennent inoffensives apres un laps de temps limite, et,
dans le cas ou elles cesseraient d'etre surveillees, a signaler les
regions dangereuses, aussitot que les exigences militaires le
permettront, par un avis a la navigation, qui devra etre aussi
communique aux Gouvernements par la voie diplomatique.

Article 4.

Toute Puissance neutre qui place des mines automatiques de contact
devant ses cotes, doit observer les memes regles et prendre les memes
precautions que celles qui sont imposees aux belligerants.

La Puissance neutre doit faire connaitre a la navigation, par un avis
prealable, les regions ou seront mouillees des mines automatiques de
contact. Cet avis devra etre communique d'urgence aux Gouvernements par
voie diplomatique.

Article 5.

A la fin de la guerre, les Puissances contractantes s'engagent a faire
tout ce qui depend d'elles pour enlever, chacune de son cote, les mines
qu'elles ont placees.

Quant aux mines automatiques de contact amarrees, que l'un des
belligerants aurait posees le long des cotes de l'autre, l'emplacement
en sera notifie a l'autre partie par la Puissance qui les a posees et
chaque Puissance devra proceder dans le plus bref delai a l'enlevement
des mines qui se trouvent dans ses eaux.

Article 6.

Les Puissances contractantes, qui ne disposent pas encore de mines
perfectionnees telles qu'elles sont prevues dans la presente Convention,
et qui, par consequent, ne sauraient actuellement se conformer aux
regles etablies dans les articles 1 et 3, s'engagent a transformer,
aussitot que possible, leur materiel de mines, afin qu'il reponde aux
prescriptions susmentionnees.

Article 7.

Les dispositions de la presente Convention ne sont applicables qu'entre
les Puissances contractantes et seulement si les belligerants sont tous
parties a la Convention.

Article 8.

La presente Convention sera ratifiee aussitot que possible.

Les ratifications seront deposees a La Haye.

Le premier depot de ratifications sera constate par un proces-verbal
signe par les representants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas.

Les depots ulterieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une
notification ecrite, adressee au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et
accompagnee de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiee conforme du proces-verbal relatif au premier depot de
ratifications, des notifications mentionnees a l'alinea precedent, ainsi
que des instruments de ratification, sera immediatement remise, par les
soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique, aux
Puissances conviees a la Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux
autres Puissances qui auront adhere a la Convention. Dans les cas vises
par l'alinea precedent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaitre en meme
temps la date a laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 9.

Les Puissances non signataires sont admises a adherer a la presente
Convention.

La Puissance qui desire adherer notifie par ecrit son intention au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhesion qui sera
depose dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immediatement a toutes les autres Puissances
copie certifiee conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte
d'adhesion, en indiquant la date a laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 10.

La presente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront
participe au premier depot de ratifications, soixante jours apres la
date du proces-verbal de ce depot, et pour les Puissances qui
ratifieront ulterieurement ou qui adhereront, soixante jours apres que
la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhesion aura ete recue
par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 11.

La presente Convention aura une duree de sept ans a partir du
soixantieme jour apres la date du premier depot de ratifications.

Sauf denonciation, elle continuera d'etre en vigueur apres l'expiration
de ce delai.

La denonciation sera notifiee par ecrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui
communiquera immediatement copie certifiee conforme de la notification a
toutes les Puissances, en leur faisant savoir la date a laquelle il l'a
recue.

La denonciation ne produira ses effets qu'a l'egard de la Puissance qui
l'aura notifiee et six mois apres que la notification en sera parvenue
au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 12.

Les Puissances contractantes s'engagent a reprendre la question de
l'emploi des mines automatiques de contact six mois avant l'expiration
du terme prevu par l'alinea premier de l'article precedent, au cas ou
elle n'aurait pas ete reprise et resolue a une date anterieure par la
troisieme Conference de la Paix.

Si les Puissances contractantes concluent une nouvelle Convention
relative a l'emploi des mines, des son entree en vigueur, la presente
Convention cessera d'etre applicable.

Article 13.

Un registre tenu par le Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas
indiquera la date du depot de ratifications effectue en vertu de
l'article 8 alineas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date a laquelle auront ete
recues les notifications d'adhesion (article 9 alinea 2) ou de
denonciation (article 11 alinea 3).

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise a prendre connaissance de ce
registre et a en demander des extraits certifies conformes.


CONVENTION IX.

      CONVENTION RESPECTING BOMBARDMENT BY NAVAL FORCES IN TIME OF
      WAR.

CHAPITRE I'er.--_Du bombardement des ports, villes, villages,
habitations ou batiments non defendus._

Article premier.

Il est interdit de bombarder, par des forces navales, des ports, villes,
villages, habitations ou batiments, qui ne sont pas defendus.

Une localite ne peut pas etre bombardee a raison du seul fait que,
devant son port, se trouvent mouillees des mines sous-marines
automatiques de contact.

Article 2.

Toutefois, ne sont pas compris dans cette interdiction les ouvrages
militaires, etablissements militaires ou navals, depots d'armes ou de
materiel de guerre, ateliers et installations propres a etre utilises
pour les besoins de la flotte ou de l'armee ennemie, et les navires de
guerre se trouvant dans le port. Le commandant d'une force navale
pourra, apres sommation avec delai raisonnable, les detruire par le
canon, si tout autre moyen est impossible et lorsque les autorites
locales n'auront pas procede a cette destruction dans le delai fixe.

Il n'encourt aucune responsabilite dans ce cas pour les dommages
involontaires, qui pourraient etre occasionnes par le bombardement.

Si des necessites militaires, exigeant une action immediate, ne
permettaient pas d'accorder de delai, il reste entendu que
l'interdiction de bombarder la ville non defendue subsiste comme dans le
cas enonce dans l'alinea 1'er et que le commandant prendra toutes les
dispositions voulues pour qu'il en resulte pour cette ville le moins
d'inconvenients possible.

Article 3.

Il peut, apres notification expresse, etre procede au bombardement des
ports, villes, villages, habitations ou batiments non defendus, si les
autorites locales, mises en demeure par une sommation formelle, refusent
d'obtemperer a des requisitions de vivres ou d'approvisionnements
necessaires au besoin present de la force navale qui se trouve devant la
localite.

Ces requisitions seront en rapport avec les ressources de la localite.
Elles ne seront reclamees qu'avec l'autorisation du commandant de ladite
force navale et elles seront, autant que possible, payees au comptant;
sinon elles seront constatees par des recus.

Article 4.

Est interdit le bombardement, pour le non paiement des contributions en
argent, des ports, villes, villages, habitations ou batiments, non
defendus.

CHAPITRE II.--_Dispositions generales._

Article 5.

Dans le bombardement par des forces navales, toutes les mesures
necessaires doivent etre prises par le commandant pour epargner, autant
que possible, les edifices consacres aux cultes, aux arts, aux sciences
et a la bienfaisance, les monuments historiques, les hopitaux et les
lieux de rassemblement de malades ou de blesses, a condition qu'ils ne
soient pas employes en meme temps a un but militaire.

Le devoir des habitants est de designer ces monuments, ces edifices ou
lieux de rassemblement, par des signes visibles, qui consisteront en
grands panneaux rectangulaires rigides, partages, suivant une des
diagonales, en deux triangles de couleur, noire en haut et blanche en
bas.

Article 6.

Sauf le cas ou les exigences militaires ne le permettraient pas, le
commandant de la force navale assaillante doit, avant d'entreprendre le
bombardement, faire tout ce qui depend de lui pour avertir les
autorites.

Article 7.

Il est interdit de livrer au pillage une ville ou localite meme prise
d'assaut.

CHAPITRE III.--_Dispositions finales._

Article 8.

Les dispositions de la presente Convention ne sont applicables qu'entre
les Puissances contractantes et seulement si les belligerants sont tous
parties a la Convention.

Article 9.

La presente Convention sera ratifiee aussitot que possible.

Les ratifications seront deposees a La Haye.

Le premier depot de ratifications sera constate par un proces-verbal
signe par les representants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas.

Les depots ulterieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une
notification ecrite, adressee au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et
accompagnee de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiee conforme du proces-verbal relatif au premier depot de
ratifications, des notifications, mentionnees a l'alinea precedent,
ainsi que des instruments de ratification, sera immediatement remise,
par les soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique,
aux Puissances conviees a la Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, ainsi
qu'aux autres Puissances qui auront adhere a la Convention. Dans les cas
vises par l'alinea precedent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaitre en
meme temps la date a laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 10.

Les Puissances non signataires sont admises a adherer a la presente
Convention.

La Puissance qui desire adherer notifie par ecrit son intention au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhesion qui sera
depose dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immediatement a toutes les autres Puissances
copie certifiee conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte
d'adhesion, en indiquant la date a laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 11.

La presente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront
participe au premier depot de ratifications, soixante jours apres la
date du proces-verbal de ce depot et, pour les Puissances qui
ratifieront ulterieurement ou qui adhereront, soixante jours apres que
la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhesion aura ete recue
par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 12.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances Contractantes voulut denoncer la
presente Convention, la denonciation sera notifiee par ecrit au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immediatement copie certifiee
conforme de la notification a toutes les autres Puissances en leur
faisant savoir la date a laquelle il l'a recue.

La denonciation ne produira ses effets qu'a l'egard de la Puissance qui
l'aura notifiee et un an apres que la notification en sera parvenue au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 13.

Un registre tenu par le Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas
indiquera la date du depot de ratifications effectue en vertu de
l'article 9 alineas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date a laquelle auront ete
recues les notifications d'adhesion (article 10 alinea 2) ou de
denonciation (article 12 alinea 1).

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise a prendre connaissance de ce
registre et a en demander des extraits certifies conformes.


CONVENTION X.

      CONVENTION FOR THE ADAPTATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE GENEVA
      CONVENTION TO MARITIME WARFARE.

Article premier.

Les batiments-hopitaux militaires, c'est-a-dire les batiments construits
ou amenages par les Etats specialement et uniquement en vue de porter
secours aux blesses, malades et naufrages, et dont les noms auront ete
communiques, a l'ouverture ou au cours des hostilites, en tout cas avant
toute mise en usage, aux Puissances belligerantes, sont respectes et ne
peuvent etre captures pendant la duree des hostilites.

Ces batiments ne sont pas non plus assimiles aux navires de guerre au
point de vue de leur sejour dans un port neutre.

Article 2.

Les batiments hospitaliers, equipes en totalite ou en partie aux frais
des particuliers ou des societes de secours officiellement reconnues,
sont egalement respectes et exempts de capture, si la Puissance
belligerante dont ils dependent, leur a donne une commission officielle
et en a notifie les noms a la Puissance adverse a l'ouverture ou au
cours des hostilites, en tout cas avant toute mise en usage.

Ces navires doivent etre porteurs d'un document de l'autorite competente
declarant qu'ils ont ete soumis a son controle pendant leur armement et
a leur depart final.

Article 3.

Les batiments hospitaliers, equipes en totalite ou en partie aux frais
des particuliers ou des societes officiellement reconnues de pays
neutres, sont respectes et exempts de capture, a condition qu'ils se
soient mis sous la direction de l'un des belligerants, avec
l'assentiment prealable de leur propre Gouvernement et avec
l'autorisation du belligerant lui-meme et que ce dernier en ait notifie
le nom a son adversaire des l'ouverture ou dans le cours des hostilites,
en tout cas, avant tout emploi.

Article 4.

Les batiments qui sont mentionnes dans les articles 1, 2 et 3, porteront
secours et assistance aux blesses, malades et naufrages des belligerants
sans distinction de nationalite.

Les Gouvernements s'engagent a n'utiliser ces batiments pour aucun but
militaire.

Ces batiments ne devront gener en aucune maniere les mouvements des
combattants.

Pendant et apres le combat, ils agiront a leurs risques et perils.

Les belligerants auront sur eux le droit de controle et de visite; ils
pourront refuser leur concours, leur enjoindre de s'eloigner, leur
imposer une direction determinee et mettre a bord un commissaire, meme
les detenir, si la gravite des circonstances l'exigeait.

Autant que possible, les belligerants inscriront sur le journal de bord
des batiments hospitaliers les ordres qu'ils leur donneront.

Article 5.

Les batiments-hopitaux militaires seront distingues par une peinture
exterieure blanche avec une bande horizontale verte d'un metre et demi
de largeur environ.

Les batiments qui sont mentionnes dans les articles 2 et 3, seront
distingues par une peinture exterieure blanche avec une bande
horizontale rouge d'un metre et demi de largeur environ.

Les embarcations des batiments qui viennent d'etre mentionnes, comme les
petits batiments qui pourront etre affectes au service hospitalier, se
distingueront par une peinture analogue.

Tous les batiments hospitaliers se feront reconnaitre en hissant, avec
leur pavillon national, le pavillon blanc a croix-rouge prevu par la
Convention de Geneve et, en outre, s'ils ressortissent a un Etat neutre,
en arborant au grand mat le pavillon national du belligerant sous la
direction duquel ils se sont places.

Les batiments hospitaliers qui, dans les termes de l'article 4, sont
detenus par l'ennemi, auront a rentrer le pavillon national du
belligerant dont ils relevent.

Les batiments et embarcations ci-dessus mentionnes, qui veulent
s'assurer la nuit le respect auquel ils ont droit, ont, avec
l'assentiment du belligerant qu'ils accompagnent, a prendre les mesures
necessaires pour que la peinture qui les caracterise soit suffisamment
apparente.

Article 6.

Les signes distinctifs prevus a article 5 ne pourront etre employes,
soit en temps de paix, soit en temps de guerre, que pour proteger ou
designer les batiments qui y sont mentionnes.

Article 7.

Dans le cas d'un combat a bord d'un vaisseau de guerre, les infirmeries
seront respectees et menagees autant que faire se pourra.

Ces infirmeries et leur materiel demeurent soumis aux lois de la guerre,
mais ne pourront etre detournes de leur emploi, tant qu'ils seront
necessaires aux blesses et malades.

Toutefois le commandant, qui les a en son pouvoir, a la faculte d'en
disposer, en cas de necessite militaire importante, en assurant au
prealable le sort des blesses et malades qui s'y trouvent.

Article 8.

La protection due aux batiments hospitaliers et aux infirmeries des
vaisseaux cesse si l'on en use pour commettre des actes nuisibles a
l'ennemi.

N'est pas considere comme etant de nature a justifier le retrait de la
protection le fait que le personnel de ces batiments et infirmeries est
arme pour le maintien de l'ordre et pour la defense des blesses ou
malades, ainsi que le fait de la presence a bord d'une installation
radio-telegraphique.

Article 9.

Les belligerants pourront faire appel au zele charitable des commandants
de batiments de commerce, yachts ou embarcations neutres, pour prendre a
bord et soigner des blesses ou des malades.

Les batiments qui auront repondu a cet appel ainsi que ceux qui
spontanement auront recueilli des blesses, des malades ou des naufrages,
jouiront d'une protection speciale et de certaines immunites. En aucun
cas, ils ne pourront etre captures pour le fait d'un tel transport;
mais, sauf les promesses qui leur auraient ete faites, ils restent
exposes a la capture pour les violations de neutralite qu'ils pourraient
avoir commises.

Article 10.

Le personnel religieux, medical et hospitalier de tout batiment capture
est inviolable et ne peut etre fait prisonnier de guerre. Il emporte, en
quittant le navire, les objets et les instruments de chirurgie qui sont
sa propriete particuliere.

Ce personnel continuera a remplir ses fonctions tant que cela sera
necessaire et il pourra ensuite se retirer, lorsque le commandant en
chef le jugera possible.

Les belligerants doivent assurer a ce personnel tombe entre leurs mains,
les memes allocations et la meme solde qu'au personnel des memes grades
de leur propre marine.

Article 11.

Les marins et les militaires embarques, et les autres personnes
officiellement attachees aux marines ou aux armees, blesses ou malades,
a quelque nation qu'ils appartiennent, seront respectes et soignes par
les capteurs.

Article 12.

Tout vaisseau de guerre d'une partie belligerante peut reclamer la
remise des blesses, malades ou naufrages, qui sont a bord de
batiments-hopitaux militaires, de batiments hospitaliers de societe de
secours ou de particuliers, de navires de commerce, yachts et
embarcations, quelle que soit la nationalite de ces batiments.

Article 13.

Si des blesses, malades ou naufrages sont recueillis a bord d'un
vaisseau de guerre neutre, il devra etre pourvu, dans la mesure du
possible, a ce qu'ils ne puissent pas de nouveau prendre part aux
operations de la guerre.

Article 14.

Sont prisonniers de guerre les naufrages, blesses ou malades d'un
belligerant, qui tombent au pouvoir de l'autre. Il appartient a celui-ci
de decider, suivant les circonstances, s'il convient de les garder, de
les diriger sur un port de sa nation, sur un port neutre ou meme sur un
port de l'adversaire. Dans ce dernier cas, les prisonniers ainsi rendus
a leur pays ne pourront servir pendant la duree de la guerre.

Article 15.

Les naufrages, blesses ou malades, qui sont debarques dans un port
neutre, du consentement de l'autorite locale, devront, a moins d'un
arrangement contraire de l'Etat neutre avec les Etats belligerants, etre
gardes par l'Etat neutre de maniere qu'ils ne puissent pas de nouveau
prendre part aux operations de la guerre.

Les frais d'hospitalisation et d'internement seront supportes par l'Etat
dont relevent les naufrages, blesses ou malades.

Article 16.

Apres chaque combat, les deux Parties belligerantes, en tant que les
interets militaires le comportent, prendront des mesures pour rechercher
les naufrages, les blesses et les malades et pour les faire proteger,
ainsi que les morts, contre le pillage et les mauvais traitements.

Elles veilleront a ce que l'inhumation, l'immersion ou l'incineration
des morts soit precedee d'un examen attentif de leurs cadavres.

Article 17.

Chaque belligerant enverra, des qu'il sera possible, aux autorites de
leur pays, de leur marine ou de leur armee, les marques ou pieces
militaires d'identite trouvees sur les morts et l'etat nominatif des
blesses ou malades recueillis par lui.

Les belligerants se tiendront reciproquement au courant des internements
et des mutations, ainsi que des entrees dans les hopitaux et des deces
survenus parmi les blesses et malades en leur pouvoir. Ils recueilleront
tous les objets d'un usage personnel, valeurs, lettres, etc. qui seront
trouves dans les vaisseaux captures, ou delaisses par les blesses ou
malades decedes dans les hopitaux, pour les faire transmettre aux
interesses par les autorites de leur pays.

Article 18.

Les dispositions de la presente Convention ne sont applicables qu'entre
les Puissances contractantes et seulement si les belligerants sont tous
parties a la Convention.

Article 19.

Les commandants en chef des flottes des belligerants auront a pourvoir
aux details d'execution des articles precedents, ainsi qu'aux cas non
prevus, d'apres les instructions de leurs Gouvernements respectifs et
conformement aux principes generaux de la presente Convention.

Article 20.

Les Puissances signataires prendront les mesures necessaires pour
instruire leurs marines, et specialement le personnel protege, des
dispositions de la presente Convention et pour les porter a la
connaissance des populations.

Article 21.

Les Puissances signataires s'engagent egalement a prendre ou a proposer
a leurs legislatures, en cas d'insuffisance de leurs lois penales, les
mesures necessaires pour reprimer en temps de guerre, les actes
individuels de pillage et de mauvais traitements envers des blesses et
malades des marines, ainsi que pour punir, comme usurpation d'insignes
militaires, l'usage abusif des signes distinctifs designes a l'article 5
par des batiments non proteges par la presente Convention.

Ils se communiqueront, par l'intermediaire du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas,
les dispositions relatives a cette repression, au plus tard dans les
cinq ans de la ratification de la presente convention.

Article 22.

En cas d'operations de guerre entre les forces de terre et de mer des
belligerants, les dispositions de la presente Convention ne seront
applicables qu'aux forces embarquees.

Article 23.

La presente Convention sera ratifiee aussitot que possible.

Les ratifications seront deposees a La Haye.

Le premier depot de ratifications sera constate par un proces-verbal
signe par les representants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas.

Les depots ulterieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une
notification ecrite, adressee au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et
accompagnee de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiee conforme du proces-verbal relatif au premier depot de
ratifications, des notifications mentionnees a l'alinea precedent, ainsi
que des instruments de ratification, sera immediatement remise par les
soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux
Puissances conviees a la Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux
autres Puissances qui auront adhere a la Convention. Dans les cas vises
par l'alinea precedent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaitre en meme
temps la date a laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 24.

Les Puissances non signataires qui auront accepte la Convention de
Geneve du 6 juillet 1906, sont admises a adherer a la presente
Convention.

La Puissance qui desire adherer, notifie par ecrit son intention au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhesion qui sera
depose dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immediatement a toutes les autres Puissances
copie certifiee conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte
d'adhesion, en indiquant la date a laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 25.

La presente Convention, dument ratifiee, remplacera dans les rapports
entre les Puissances contractantes, la Convention du 29 juillet 1899
pour l'adaptation a la guerre maritime des principes de la Convention de
Geneve.

La Convention de 1899 reste en vigueur dans les rapports entre les
Puissances qui l'ont signee et qui ne ratifieraient pas egalement la
presente Convention.

Article 26.

La presente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront
participe au premier depot de ratifications, soixante jours apres la
date du proces-verbal de ce depot, et, pour les Puissances qui
ratifieront ulterieurement ou qui adhereront, soixante jours apres que
la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhesion aura ete recue
par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 27.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulut denoncer la
presente Convention, la denonciation sera notifiee par ecrit au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas, qui communiquera immediatement copie
certifiee conforme de la notification a toutes les autres Puissances en
leur faisant savoir la date a laquelle il l'a recue.

La denonciation ne produira ses effets qu'a l'egard de la Puissance qui
l'aura notifiee et un an apres que la notification en sera parvenue au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 28.

Un registre tenu par le Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas
indiquera la date du depot des ratifications effectue en vertu de
l'article 23 alineas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date a laquelle auront ete
recues les notifications d'adhesion (article 24 alinea 2) ou de
denonciation (article 27 alinea 1).

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise a prendre connaissance de ce
registre et a en demander des extraits certifies conformes.


CONVENTION XI.

      CONVENTION RELATIVE TO CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF
      THE RIGHT OF CAPTURE IN MARITIME WAR.

CHAPITRE I.--_De la Correspondance postale._

Article premier.

La correspondance postale des neutres ou des belligerants, quel que soit
son caractere officiel ou prive, trouvee en mer sur un navire neutre ou
ennemi, est inviolable. S'il y a saisie du navire, elle est expediee
avec le moins de <DW44> possible par le capteur.

Les dispositions de l'alinea precedent ne s'appliquent pas, en cas de
violation de blocus, a la correspondance qui est a destination ou en
provenance du port bloque.

Article 2.

L'inviolabilite de la correspondance postale ne soustrait pas les
paquebots-poste neutres aux lois et coutumes de la guerre sur mer
concernant les navires de commerce neutres en general. Toutefois, la
visite n'en doit etre effectuee qu'en cas de necessite, avec tous les
menagements et toute la celerite possibles.

CHAPITRE II.--_De l'exemption de capture pour certains bateaux._

Article 3.

Les bateaux exclusivement affectes a la peche cotiere ou a des services
de petite navigation locale sont exempts de capture, ainsi que leurs
engins, agres, apparaux et chargement.

Cette exemption cesse de leur etre applicable des qu'ils participent
d'une facon quelconque aux hostilites.

Les Puissances contractantes s'interdisent de profiter du caractere
inoffensif desdits bateaux pour les employer dans un but militaire en
leur conservant leur apparence pacifique.

Article 4.

Sont egalement exempts de capture les navires charges de missions
religieuses, scientifiques ou philanthropiques.

CHAPITRE III.--_Du regime des equipages des navires de commerce ennemis
captures par un belligerant._

Article 5.

Lorsqu'un navire de commerce ennemi est capture par un belligerant, les
hommes de son equipage, nationaux d'un Etat neutre, ne sont pas faits
prisonniers de guerre.

Il en est de meme du capitaine et des officiers, egalement nationaux
d'un Etat neutre, s'ils promettent formellement par ecrit de ne pas
servir sur un navire ennemi pendant la duree de la guerre.

Article 6.

Le capitaine, les officiers et les membres de l'equipage, nationaux de
l'Etat ennemi, ne sont pas faits prisonniers de guerre, a condition
qu'ils s'engagent, sous la foi d'une promesse formelle ecrite, a ne
prendre, pendant la duree des hostilites, aucun service ayant rapport
avec les operations de la guerre.

Article 7.

Les noms des individus laisses libres dans les conditions visees a
l'article 5 alinea 2 et a l'article 6, sont notifies par le belligerant
capteur a l'autre belligerant. Il est interdit a ce dernier d'employer
sciemment lesdits individus.

Article 8.

Les dispositions des trois articles precedents ne s'appliquent pas aux
navires qui prennent part aux hostilites.

CHAPITRE IV.--_Dispositions finales._

Article 9.

Les dispositions de la presente Convention ne sont applicables qu'entre
les Puissances contractantes et seulement si les belligerants sont tous
Parties a la Convention.

Article 10.

La presente Convention sera ratifiee aussitot que possible.

Les ratifications seront deposees a La Haye.

Le premier depot de ratifications sera constate par un proces-verbal
signe par les representants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas.

Les depots ulterieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une
notification ecrite adressee au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et accompagnee
de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiee conforme du proces-verbal relatif au premier depot de
ratifications, des notifications mentionnees a l'alinea precedent ainsi
que des instruments de ratification, sera immediatement remise par les
soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux
Puissances conviees a la Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux
autres Puissances qui auront adhere a la Convention. Dans les cas vises
par l'alinea precedent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaitre en meme
temps la date a laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 11.

Les Puissances non signataires sont admises a adherer a la presente
Convention.

La Puissance qui desire adherer notifie par ecrit son intention au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhesion qui sera
depose dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immediatement a toutes les autres Puissances
copie certifiee conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte
d'adhesion, en indiquant la date a laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 12.

La presente Convention produira effet, pour les Puissances qui auront
participe au premier depot de ratifications, soixante jours apres la
date du proces-verbal de ce depot et, pour les Puissances qui
ratifieront ulterieurement ou qui adhereront, soixante jours apres que
la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhesion aura ete recue
par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 13.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulut denoncer la
presente Convention, la denonciation sera notifiee par ecrit au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immediatement copie certifiee
conforme de la notification a toutes les autres Puissances en leur
faisant savoir la date a laquelle il l'a recue.

La denonciation ne produira ses effets qu'a l'egard de la Puissance qui
l'aura notifiee et un an apres que la notification en sera parvenue au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 14.

Un registre tenu par le Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas
indiquera la date du depot des ratifications effectue en vertu de
l'article 10 alineas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date a laquelle auront ete
recues les notifications d'adhesion (article 11 alinea 2) ou de
denonciation (article 13 alinea 1).

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise a prendre connaissance de ce
registre et a en demander des extraits certifies conformes.


CONVENTION XII.

      CONVENTION CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL
      PRIZE COURT.

TITRE I.--_Dispositions generales._

Article premier.

La validite de la capture d'un navire de commerce ou de sa cargaison
est, s'il s'agit de proprietes neutres ou ennemies, etablie devant une
juridiction des prises conformement a la presente Convention.

Article 2.

La juridiction des prises est exercee d'abord par les tribunaux de
prises du belligerant capteur.

Les decisions de ces tribunaux sont prononcees en seance publique ou
notifiees d'office aux parties neutres ou ennemies.

Article 3.

Les decisions des tribunaux de prises nationaux peuvent etre l'objet
d'un recours devant la Cour internationale des prises:

1'o. lorsque la decision des tribunaux nationaux concerne les proprietes
d'une Puissance ou d'un particulier neutres;

2'o. lorsque ladite decision concerne des proprietes ennemies et qu'il
s'agit:

  (_a_) de marchandises chargees sur un navire neutre,

  (_b_) d'un navire ennemi, qui aurait ete capture dans les eaux
  territoriales d'une Puissance neutre, dans le cas ou cette
  Puissance n'aurait pas fait de cette capture l'objet d'une
  reclamation diplomatique,

  (_c_) d'une reclamation fondee sur l'allegation que la capture
  aurait ete effectuee en violation, soit d'une disposition
  conventionnelle en vigueur entre les Puissances belligerantes,
  soit d'une disposition legale edictee par le belligerant capteur.

Le recours contre la decision des tribunaux nationaux peut etre fonde
sur ce que cette decision ne serait pas justifiee, soit en fait, soit en
droit.

Article 4.

Le recours peut etre exerce:

  1'o. par une Puissance neutre, si la decision des tribunaux
  nationaux a porte atteinte a ses proprietes ou a celles de ses
  ressortissants (article 3--1'o) ou s'il est allegue que la capture
  d'un navire ennemi a eu lieu dans les eaux territoriales de cette
  Puissance (article 3--2'o _b_);

  2'o. par un particulier neutre, si la decision des tribunaux
  nationaux a porte atteinte a ses proprietes (article 3--1'o), sous
  reserve toutefois du droit de la Puissance dont il releve, de lui
  interdire l'acces de la Cour ou d'y agir elle-meme en ses lieu et
  place;

  3'o. par un particulier relevant de la Puissance ennemie, si la
  decision des tribunaux nationaux a porte atteinte a ses proprietes
  dans les conditions visees a l'article 3--2'o, a l'exception du
  cas prevu par l'alinea _b_.

Article 5.

Le recours peut aussi etre exerce, dans les memes conditions qu'a
l'article precedent, par les ayants-droit, neutres ou ennemis, du
particulier auquel le recours est accorde, et qui sont intervenus devant
la juridiction nationale. Ces ayants-droit peuvent exercer
individuellement le recours dans la mesure de leur interet.

Il en est de meme des ayants-droit, neutres ou ennemis, de la Puissance
neutre dont la propriete est en cause.

Article 6.

Lorsque, conformement a l'article 3 ci-dessus, la Cour internationale
est competente, le droit de juridiction des tribunaux nationaux ne peut
etre exerce a plus de deux degres. Il appartient a la legislation du
belligerant capteur de decider si le recours est ouvert apres la
decision rendue en premier ressort ou seulement apres la decision rendue
en appel ou en cassation.

Faute par les tribunaux nationaux d'avoir rendu une decision definitive
dans les deux ans a compter du jour de la capture, la Cour peut etre
saisie directement.

Article 7.

Si la question de droit a resoudre est prevue par une Convention en
vigueur entre le belligerant capteur et la Puissance qui est elle-meme
partie au litige ou dont le ressortissant est partie au litige, la Cour
se conforme aux stipulations de ladite Convention.

A defaut de telles stipulations, la Cour applique les regles du droit
international. Si des regles generalement reconnues n'existent pas, la
Cour statue d'apres les principes generaux de la justice et de l'equite.

Les dispositions ci-dessus sont egalement applicables en ce qui concerne
l'ordre des preuves ainsi que les moyens qui peuvent etre employes.

Si, conformement a l'article 3--2'o c, le recours est fonde sur la
violation d'une disposition legale edictee par le belligerant capteur,
la Cour applique cette disposition.

La Cour peut ne pas tenir compte des decheances de procedure edictees
par la legislation du belligerant capteur, dans les cas ou elle estime
que les consequences en sont contraires a la justice et a l'equite.

Article 8.

Si la Cour prononce la validite de la capture du navire ou de la
cargaison, il en sera dispose conformement aux lois du belligerant
capteur.

Si la nullite de la capture est prononcee, la Cour ordonne la
restitution du navire ou de la cargaison et fixe, s'il y a lieu, le
montant des dommages-interets. Si le navire ou la cargaison ont ete
vendus ou detruits, la Cour determine l'indemnite a accorder de ce chef
au proprietaire.

Si la nullite de la capture avait ete prononcee par la juridiction
nationale, la Cour n'est appelee a statuer que sur les dommages et
interets.

Article 9.

Les Puissances contractantes s'engagent a se soumettre de bonne foi aux
decisions de la Cour internationale des prises et a les executer dans le
plus bref delai possible.

TITRE II.--_Organisation de la Cour internationale des prises._

Article 10.

La Cour internationale des prises se compose de juges et de juges
suppleants nommes par les Puissances contractantes et qui tous devront
etre des jurisconsultes d'une competence reconnue dans les questions de
droit international maritime et jouissant de la plus haute consideration
morale.

La nomination de ces juges et juges suppleants sera faite dans les six
mois qui suivront la ratification de la presente Convention.

Article 11.

Les juges et juges suppleants sont nommes pour une periode de six ans, a
compter de la date ou la notification de leur nomination aura ete recue
par le Conseil administratif institue par la Convention pour le
reglement pacifique des conflits internationaux du 29 juillet 1899. Leur
mandat peut etre renouvele.

En cas de deces ou de demission d'un juge ou d'un juge suppleant, il est
pourvu a son remplacement selon le mode fixe pour sa nomination. Dans ce
cas, la nomination est faite pour une nouvelle periode de six ans.

Article 12.

Les juges de la Cour internationale des prises sont egaux entre eux et
prennent rang d'apres la date ou la notification de leur nomination aura
ete recue (article 11 alinea 1), et, s'ils siegent a tour de role
(article 15 alinea 2), d'apres la date de leur entree en fonctions. La
preseance appartient au plus age, au cas ou la date est la meme.

Les juges suppleants sont, dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, assimiles
aux juges titulaires. Toutefois ils prennent rang apres ceux-ci.

Article 13.

Les juges jouissent des privileges et immunites diplomatiques dans
l'exercice de leurs fonctions et en dehors de leur pays.

Avant de prendre possession de leur siege, les juges doivent, devant le
Conseil administratif, preter serment ou faire une affirmation
solennelle d'exercer leurs fonctions avec impartialite et en toute
conscience.

Article 14.

La Cour fonctionne au nombre de quinze juges; neuf juges constituent le
quorum necessaire.

Le juge absent ou empeche est remplace par le suppleant.

Article 15.

Les juges nommes par les Puissances contractantes dont les noms suivent:
l'Allemagne, les Etats-Unis d'Amerique, l'Autriche-Hongrie, la France,
la Grande-Bretagne, l'Italie, le Japon et la Russie sont toujours
appeles a sieger.

Les juges et les juges suppleants nommes par les autres Puissances
contractantes siegent a tour de role d'apres le tableau annexe a la
presente Convention; leurs fonctions peuvent etre exercees
successivement par la meme personne. Le meme juge peut etre nomme par
plusieurs desdites Puissances.

Article 16.

Si une Puissance belligerante n'a pas, d'apres le tour de role, un juge
siegeant dans la Cour, elle peut demander que le juge nomme par elle
prenne part au jugement de toutes les affaires provenant de la guerre.
Dans ce cas, le sort determine lequel des juges siegeant en vertu du
tour de role doit s'abstenir. Cette exclusion ne saurait s'appliquer au
juge nomme par l'autre belligerant.

Article 17.

Ne peut sieger le juge qui, a un titre quelconque, aura concouru a la
decision des tribunaux nationaux ou aura figure dans l'instance comme
conseil ou avocat d'une partie.

Aucun juge, titulaire ou suppleant, ne peut intervenir comme agent ou
comme avocat devant la Cour internationale des prises ni y agir pour une
partie en quelque qualite que ce soit, pendant toute la duree de ses
fonctions.

Article 18.

Le belligerant capteur a le droit de designer un officier de marine d'un
grade eleve qui siegera en qualite d'assesseur avec voix consultative.
La meme faculte appartient a la Puissance neutre, qui est elle-meme
partie au litige, ou a la Puissance dont le ressortissant est partie au
litige; s'il y a, par application de cette derniere disposition,
plusieurs Puissances interessees, elles doivent se concerter, au besoin
par le sort, sur l'officier a designer.

Article 19.

La Cour elit son President et son Vice-President a la majorite absolue
des suffrages exprimes. Apres deux tours de scrutin, l'election se fait
a la majorite relative et, en cas de partage des voix, le sort decide.

Article 20.

Les juges de la Cour internationale des prises touchent une indemnite de
voyage fixee d'apres les reglements de leur pays et recoivent, en outre,
pendant la session ou pendant l'exercice de fonctions conferees par la
Cour, une somme de cent florins neerlandais par jour.

Ces allocations, comprises dans les frais generaux de la Cour prevus par
l'article 47, sont versees par l'entremise du Bureau international
institue par la Convention du 29 juillet 1899.

Les juges ne peuvent recevoir de leur propre Gouvernement ou de celui
d'une autre Puissance aucune remuneration comme membres de la Cour.

Article 21.

La Cour internationale des prises a son siege a La Haye et ne peut, sauf
le cas de force majeure, le transporter ailleurs qu'avec l'assentiment
des parties belligerantes.

Article 22.

Le Conseil administratif, dans lequel ne figurent que les representants
des Puissances contractantes, remplit, a l'egard de la Cour
internationale des prises, les fonctions qu'il remplit a l'egard de la
Cour permanente d'arbitrage.

Article 23.

Le Bureau international sert de greffe a la Cour internationale des
prises et doit mettre ses locaux et son organisation a la disposition de
la Cour. Il a la garde des archives et la gestion des affaires
administratives.

Le secretaire general du Bureau international remplit les fonctions de
greffier.

Les secretaires adjoints au greffier, les traducteurs et les
stenographes necessaires sont designes et assermentes par la Cour.

Article 24.

La Cour decide du choix de la langue dont elle fera usage et des langues
dont l'emploi sera autorise devant elle.

Dans tous les cas, la langue officielle des tribunaux nationaux, qui ont
connu de l'affaire, peut etre employee devant la Cour.

Article 25.

Les Puissances interessees ont le droit de nommer des agents speciaux
ayant mission de servir d'intermediaires entre Elles et la Cour. Elles
sont, en outre, autorisees a charger des conseils ou avocats de la
defense de leurs droits et interets.

Article 26.

Le particulier interesse sera represente devant la Cour par un
mandataire qui doit etre soit un avocat autorise a plaider devant une
Cour d'appel ou une Cour supreme de l'un des Pays contractants, soit un
avoue exercant sa profession aupres d'une telle Cour, soit enfin un
professeur de droit a une ecole d'enseignement superieur d'un de ces
pays.

Article 27.

Pour toutes les notifications a faire, notamment aux parties, aux
temoins et aux experts, la Cour peut s'adresser directement au
Gouvernement de la Puissance sur le territoire de laquelle la
notification doit etre effectuee. Il en est de meme s'il s'agit de faire
proceder a l'etablissement de tout moyen de preuve.

Les requetes adressees a cet effet seront executees suivant les moyens
dont la Puissance requise dispose d'apres sa legislation interieure.
Elles ne peuvent etre refusees que si cette Puissance les juge de
nature a porter atteinte a sa souverainete ou a sa securite. S'il est
donne suite a la requete, les frais ne comprennent que les depenses
d'execution reellement effectuees.

La Cour a egalement la faculte de recourir a l'intermediaire de la
Puissance sur le territoire de laquelle elle a son siege.

Les notifications a faire aux parties dans le lieu ou siege la Cour
peuvent etre executees par le Bureau international.

TITRE III.--_Procedure devant la Cour internationale des prises._

Article 28.

Le recours devant la Cour internationale des prises est forme au moyen
d'une declaration ecrite, faite devant le tribunal national qui a
statue, ou adressee au Bureau international; celui-ci peut etre saisi
meme par telegramme.

Le delai du recours est fixe a cent vingt jours a dater du jour ou la
decision a ete prononcee ou notifiee (article 2 alinea 2).

Article 29.

Si la declaration de recours est faite devant le tribunal national,
celui-ci, sans examiner si le delai a ete observe, fait, dans les sept
jours qui suivent, expedier le dossier de l'affaire au Bureau
international.

Si la declaration de recours est adressee au Bureau international,
celui-ci en previent directement le tribunal national, par telegramme
s'il est possible. Le tribunal transmettra le dossier comme il est dit a
l'alinea precedent.

Lorsque le recours est forme par un particulier neutre, le Bureau
international en avise immediatement par telegramme la Puissance dont
releve le particulier, pour permettre a cette Puissance de faire valoir
le droit que lui reconnait l'article 4--2'o.

Article 30.

Dans le cas prevu a l'article 6 alinea 2, le recours ne peut etre
adresse qu'au Bureau international. Il doit etre introduit dans les
trente jours qui suivent l'expiration du delai de deux ans.

Article 31.

Faute d'avoir forme son recours dans le delai fixe a l'article 28 ou a
l'article 30, la partie sera, sans debats, declaree non recevable.

Toutefois, si elle justifie d'un empechement de force majeure et si
elle a forme son recours dans les soixante jours qui ont suivi la
cessation de cet empechement, elle peut etre relevee de la decheance
encourue, la partie adverse ayant ete dument entendue.

Article 32.

Si le recours a ete forme en temps utile, la Cour notifie d'office et
sans delai a la partie adverse une copie certifiee conforme de la
declaration.

Article 33.

Si, en dehors des parties qui se sont pourvues devant la Cour, il y a
d'autres interesses ayant le droit d'exercer le recours, ou si, dans le
cas prevu a l'article 29 alinea 3, la Puissance qui a ete avisee, n'a
pas fait connaitre sa resolution, la Cour attend, pour se saisir de
l'affaire, que les delais prevus a l'article 28 ou a l'article 30 soient
expires.

Article 34.

La procedure devant la Cour internationale comprend deux phases
distinctes: l'instruction ecrite et les debats oraux.

L'instruction ecrite consiste dans le depot et l'echange d'exposes, de
contre-exposes et, au besoin, de repliques dont l'ordre et les delais
sont fixes par la Cour. Les parties y joignent toutes pieces et
documents dont elles comptent se servir.

Toute piece, produite par une partie, doit etre communiquee en copie
certifiee conforme a l'autre partie par l'intermediaire de la Cour.

Article 35.

L'instruction ecrite etant terminee, il y a lieu a une audience
publique, dont le jour est fixe par la Cour.

Dans cette audience, les parties exposent l'etat de l'affaire en fait et
en droit.

La Cour peut, en tout etat de cause, suspendre les plaidoiries, soit a
la demande d'une des parties, soit d'office, pour proceder a une
information complementaire.

Article 36.

La Cour internationale peut ordonner que l'information complementaire
aura lieu, soit conformement aux dispositions de l'article 27, soit
directement devant elle ou devant un ou plusieurs de ses membres en tant
que cela peut se faire sans moyen coercitif ou comminatoire.

Si des mesures d'information doivent etre prises par des membres de la
Cour en dehors du territoire ou elle a son siege, l'assentiment du
Gouvernement etranger doit etre obtenu.

Article 37.

Les parties sont appelees a assister a toutes mesures d'instruction.
Elles recoivent une copie certifiee conforme des proces-verbaux.

Article 38.

Les debats sont diriges par le President ou le Vice-President et, en cas
d'absence ou d'empechement de l'un et de l'autre, par le plus ancien des
juges presents.

Le juge nomme par une partie belligerante ne peut sieger comme
President.

Article 39.

Les debats sont publics sauf le droit pour une Puissance en litige de
demander qu'il y soit procede a huis clos.

Ils sont consignes dans des proces-verbaux, que signent le President et
le greffier et qui seuls ont caractere authentique.

Article 40.

En cas de non comparution d'une des parties, bien que regulierement
citee, ou faute par elle d'agir dans les delais fixes par la Cour, il
est procede sans elle et la Cour decide d'apres les elements
d'appreciation qu'elle a a sa disposition.

Article 41.

La Cour notifie d'office aux parties toutes decisions ou ordonnances
prises en leur absence.

Article 42.

La Cour apprecie librement l'ensemble des actes, preuves et declarations
orales.

Article 43.

Les deliberations de la Cour ont lieu a huis clos et restent secretes.

Toute decision est prise a la majorite des juges presents. Si la Cour
siege en nombre pair et qu'il y ait partage des voix, la voix du dernier
des juges dans l'ordre de preseance etabli d'apres l'article 12 alinea 1
n'est pas comptee.

Article 44.

L'arret de la Cour doit etre motive. Il mentionne les noms des juges qui
y ont participe, ainsi que les noms des assesseurs, s'il y a lieu; il
est signe par le President et par le greffier.

Article 45.

L'arret est prononce en seance publique, les parties presentes ou dument
appelees; il est notifie d'office aux parties.

Cette notification une fois faite, la Cour fait parvenir au tribunal
national des prises le dossier de l'affaire en y joignant une expedition
des diverses decisions intervenues ainsi qu'une copie des proces-verbaux
de l'instruction.

Article 46.

Chaque partie supporte les frais occasionnes par sa propre defense.

La partie qui succombe supporte, en outre, les frais causes par la
procedure. Elle doit, de plus, verser un centieme de la valeur de
l'objet litigieux a titre de contribution aux frais generaux de la Cour
internationale. Le montant de ces versements est determine par l'arret
de la Cour.

Si le recours est exerce par un particulier, celui-ci fournit au Bureau
international un cautionnement dont le montant est fixe par la Cour et
qui est destine a garantir l'execution eventuelle des deux obligations
mentionnees dans l'alinea precedent. La Cour peut subordonner
l'ouverture de la procedure au versement du cautionnement.

Article 47.

Les frais generaux de la Cour internationale des prises sont supportes
par les Puissances contractantes dans la proportion de leur
participation au fonctionnement de la Cour telle qu'elle est prevue par
l'article 15 et par le tableau y annexe. La designation des juges
suppleants ne donne pas lieu a contribution.

Le Conseil administratif s'adresse aux Puissances pour obtenir les fonds
necessaires au fonctionnement de la Cour.

Article 48.

Quand la Cour n'est pas en session, les fonctions qui lui sont conferees
par l'article 32, l'article 34 alineas 2 et 3, l'article 35 alinea 1 et
l'article 46 alinea 3, sont exercees par une Delegation de trois juges
designes par la Cour. Cette Delegation decide a la majorite des voix.

Article 49.

La Cour fait elle-meme son reglement d'ordre interieur qui doit etre
communique aux Puissances contractantes.

Dans l'annee de la ratification de la presente Convention, elle se
reunira pour elaborer ce reglement.

Article 50.

La Cour peut proposer des modifications a apporter aux dispositions de
la presente Convention qui concernent la procedure. Ces propositions
sont communiquees, par l'intermediaire du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas,
aux Puissances contractantes qui se concerteront sur la suite a y
donner.

TITRE IV.--_Dispositions finales._

Article 51.

La presente Convention ne s'applique de plein droit que si les
Puissances belligerantes sont toutes parties a la Convention.

Il est entendu, en outre, que le recours devant la Cour internationale
des prises ne peut etre exerce que par une Puissance contractante ou le
ressortissant d'une Puissance contractante.

Dans les cas de l'article 5, le recours n'est admis que si le
proprietaire et l'ayant-droit sont egalement des Puissances
contractantes ou des ressortissants de Puissances contractantes.

Article 52.

La presente Convention sera ratifiee et les ratifications en seront
deposees a La Haye des que toutes les Puissances designees a l'article
15 et dans son annexe seront en mesure de le faire.

Le depot des ratifications aura lieu en tout cas, le 30 juin 1909, si
les Puissances pretes a ratifier peuvent fournir a la Cour neuf juges et
neuf juges suppleants, aptes a sieger effectivement. Dans le cas
contraire, le depot sera ajourne jusqu'au moment ou cette condition sera
remplie.

Il sera dresse du depot des ratifications un proces-verbal dont une
copie, certifiee conforme, sera remise par la voie diplomatique a
chacune des Puissances designees a l'alinea premier.

Article 53.

Les Puissances designees a l'article 15 et dans son annexe sont admises
a signer la presente Convention jusqu'au depot des ratifications prevu
par l'alinea 2 de l'article precedent.

Apres ce depot, elles seront toujours admises a y adherer, purement et
simplement. La Puissance qui desire adherer notifie par ecrit son
intention au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant, en meme
temps, l'acte d'adhesion qui sera depose dans les archives dudit
Gouvernement. Celui-ci enverra, par la voie diplomatique, une copie
certifiee conforme de la notification et de l'acte d'adhesion a toutes
les Puissances designees a l'alinea precedent, en leur faisant savoir la
date ou il a recu la notification.

Article 54.

La presente Convention entrera en vigueur six mois a partir du depot
des ratifications prevu par l'article 52 alineas 1 et 2.

Les adhesions produiront effet soixante jours apres que la notification
en aura ete recue par le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et, au plus tot, a
l'expiration du delai prevu par l'alinea precedent.

Toutefois, la Cour internationale aura qualite pour juger les affaires
de prises decidees par la juridiction nationale a partir du depot des
ratifications ou de la reception de la notification des adhesions. Pour
ces decisions, le delai fixe a l'article 28 alinea 2, ne sera compte que
de la date de la mise en vigueur de la Convention pour les Puissances
ayant ratifie ou adhere.

Article 55.

La presente Convention aura une duree de douze ans a partir de sa mise
en vigueur, telle qu'elle est determinee par l'article 54 alinea 1, meme
pour les Puissances ayant adhere posterieurement.

Elle sera renouvelee tacitement de six ans en six ans sauf denonciation.

La denonciation devra etre, au moins un an avant l'expiration de chacune
des periodes prevues par les deux alineas precedents, notifiee par ecrit
au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui en donnera connaissance a toutes les
autres Parties contractantes.

La denonciation ne produira ses effets qu'a l'egard de la Puissance qui
l'aura notifiee. La Convention subsistera pour les autres Puissances
contractantes, pourvu que leur participation a la designation des juges
soit suffisante pour permettre le fonctionnement de la Cour avec neuf
juges et neuf juges suppleants.

Article 56.

Dans le cas ou la presente Convention n'est pas en vigueur pour toutes
les Puissances designees dans l'article 15 et le tableau qui s'y
rattache, le Conseil administratif dresse, conformement aux dispositions
de cet article et de ce tableau, la liste des juges et des juges
suppleants pour lesquels les Puissances contractantes participent au
fonctionnement de la Cour. Les juges appeles a sieger a tour de role
seront, pour le temps qui leur est attribue par le tableau susmentionne,
repartis entre les differentes annees de la periode de six ans, de
maniere que, dans la mesure du possible, la Cour fonctionne chaque annee
en nombre egal. Si le nombre des juges suppleants depasse celui des
juges, le nombre de ces derniers pourra etre complete par des juges
suppleants designes par le sort parmi celles des Puissances qui ne
nomment pas de juge titulaire.

La liste ainsi dressee par le Conseil administratif sera notifiee aux
Puissances contractantes. Elle sera revisee quand le nombre de celles-ci
sera modifie par suite d'adhesions ou de denonciations.

Le changement a operer par suite d'une adhesion ne se produira qu'a
partir du 1'er janvier qui suit la date a laquelle l'adhesion a son
effet, a moins que la Puissance adherente ne soit une Puissance
belligerante, cas auquel elle peut demander d'etre aussitot representee
dans la Cour, la disposition de l'article 16 etant du reste applicable,
s'il y a lieu.

Quand le nombre total des juges est inferieur a onze, sept juges
constituent le quorum necessaire.

Article 57.

Deux ans avant l'expiration de chaque periode visee par les alineas 1 et
2 de l'article 55, chaque Puissance contractante pourra demander une
modification des dispositions de l'article 15 et du tableau y annexe,
relativement a sa participation au fonctionnement de la Cour. La demande
sera adressee au Conseil administratif qui l'examinera et soumettra a
toutes les Puissances des propositions sur la suite a y donner. Les
Puissances feront, dans le plus bref delai possible, connaitre leur
resolution au Conseil administratif. Le resultat sera immediatement, et
au moins un an et trente jours avant l'expiration dudit delai de deux
ans, communique a la Puissance qui a fait la demande.

Le cas echeant, les modifications adoptees par les Puissances entreront
en vigueur des le commencement de la nouvelle periode.

_Annexe de l'article 15._

      DISTRIBUTION DES JUGES ET JUGES SUPPLEANTS PAR PAYS POUR
      CHAQUE ANNEE DE LA PERIODE DE SIX ANS.

      Juges.          Juges Suppleants.

      _Premiere Annee._

      1 Argentine    Paraguay
      2 Colombie     Bolivie
      3 Espagne      Espagne
      4 Grece        Roumanie
      5 Norvege      Suede
      6 Pays-Bas     Belgique
      7 Turquie      Perse

      _Deuxieme Annee._

      1 Argentine    Panama
      2 Espagne      Espagne
      3 Grece        Roumanie
      4 Norvege      Suede
      5 Pays-Bas     Belgique
      6 Turquie      Luxembourg
      7 Uruguay      Costa Rica

      _Troisieme Annee._

      1 Bresil      Dominicaine
      2 Chine       Turquie
      3 Espagne     Portugal
      4 Pays-Bas    Suisse
      5 Roumanie    Grece
      6 Suede       Danemark
      7 Venezuela   Haiti

      _Quatrieme Annee._

      1 Bresil      Guatemala
      2 Chine       Turquie
      3 Espagne     Portugal
      4 Perou       Honduras
      5 Roumanie    Grece
      6 Suede       Danemark
      7 Suisse      Pays-Bas

      _Cinquieme Annee._

      1 Belgique    Pays-Bas
      2 Bulgarie    Montenegro
      3 Chili       Nicaragua
      4 Danemark    Norvege
      5 Mexique     Cuba
      6 Perse       Chine
      7 Portugal    Espagne

      _Sixieme Annee._

      1 Belgique    Pays-Bas
      2 Chili       Salvador
      3 Danemark    Norvege
      4 Mexique     Equateur
      5 Portugal    Espagne
      6 Serbie      Bulgarie
      7 Siam        Chine


CONVENTION XIII.

      CONVENTION CONCERNING THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRAL POWERS
      IN MARITIME WAR.

Article premier.

Les belligerants sont tenus de respecter les droits souverains des
Puissances neutres et de s'abstenir, dans le territoire ou les eaux
neutres, de tous actes qui constitueraient de la part des Puissances qui
les tolereraient un manquement a leur neutralite.

Article 2.

Tous actes d'hostilite, y compris la capture et l'exercice du droit de
visite, commis par des vaisseaux de guerre belligerants dans les eaux
territoriales d'une Puissance neutre, constituent une violation de la
neutralite et sont strictement interdits.

Article 3.

Quand un navire a ete capture dans les eaux territoriales d'une
Puissance neutre, cette Puissance doit, si la prise est encore dans sa
juridiction, user des moyens dont elle dispose pour que la prise soit
relachee avec ses officiers et son equipage, et pour que l'equipage mis
a bord par le capteur soit interne.

Si la prise est hors de la juridiction de la Puissance neutre, le
Gouvernement capteur, sur la demande de celle-ci, doit relacher la prise
avec ses officiers et son equipage.

Article 4.

Aucun tribunal des prises ne peut etre constitue par un belligerant sur
un territoire neutre ou sur un navire dans des eaux neutres.

Article 5.

Il est interdit aux belligerants de faire des ports et des eaux neutres
la base d'operations navales contre leurs adversaires, notamment d'y
installer des stations radio-telegraphiques ou tout appareil destine a
servir comme moyen de communication avec des forces belligerantes sur
terre ou sur mer.

Article 6.

La remise a quelque titre que ce soit, faite directement ou
indirectement par une Puissance neutre a une Puissance belligerante, de
vaisseaux de guerre, de munitions, ou d'un materiel de guerre
quelconque, est interdite.

Article 7.

Une Puissance neutre n'est pas tenue d'empecher l'exportation ou le
transit, pour le compte de l'un ou de l'autre des belligerants, d'armes,
de munitions, et, en general, de tout ce qui peut etre utile a une armee
ou a une flotte.

Article 8.

Un Gouvernement neutre est tenu d'user des moyens dont il dispose pour
empecher dans sa juridiction l'equipement ou l'armement de tout navire,
qu'il a des motifs raisonnables de croire destine a croiser ou a
concourir a des operations hostiles contre une Puissance avec laquelle
il est en paix. Il est aussi tenu d'user de la meme surveillance pour
empecher le depart hors de sa juridiction de tout navire destine a
croiser ou a concourir a des operations hostiles, et qui aurait ete,
dans ladite juridiction, adapte en tout ou en partie a des usages de
guerre.

Article 9.

Une Puissance neutre doit appliquer egalement aux deux belligerants les
conditions, restrictions ou interdictions, edictees par elle pour ce qui
concerne l'admission dans ses ports, rades ou eaux territoriales, des
navires de guerre belligerants ou de leurs prises.

Toutefois, une Puissance neutre peut interdire l'acces de ses ports et
de ses rades au navire belligerant qui aurait neglige de se conformer
aux ordres et prescriptions edictes par elle ou qui aurait viole la
neutralite.

Article 10.

La neutralite d'une Puissance n'est pas compromise par le simple passage
dans ses eaux territoriales de navires de guerre et des prises des
belligerants.

Article 11.

Une Puissance neutre peut laisser les navires de guerre des belligerants
se servir de ses pilotes brevetes.

Article 12.

A defaut d'autres dispositions speciales de la legislation de la
Puissance neutre, il est interdit aux navires de guerre des belligerants
de demeurer dans les ports et rades ou dans les eaux territoriales de
ladite Puissance, pendant plus de 24 heures, sauf dans les cas prevus
par la presente Convention.

Article 13.

Si une Puissance avisee de l'ouverture des hostilites apprend qu'un
navire de guerre d'un belligerant se trouve dans un de ses ports et
rades ou dans ses eaux territoriales, elle doit notifier audit navire
qu'il devra partir dans les 24 heures ou dans le delai prescrit par la
loi locale.

Article 14.

Un navire de guerre belligerant ne peut prolonger son sejour dans un
port neutre au dela de la duree legale que pour cause d'avaries ou a
raison de l'etat de la mer. Il devra partir des que la cause du <DW44>
aura cesse.

Les regles sur la limitation du sejour dans les ports, rades et eaux
neutres, ne s'appliquent pas aux navires de guerre exclusivement
affectes a une mission religieuse, scientifique ou philanthropique.

Article 15.

A defaut d'autres dispositions speciales de la legislation de la
Puissance neutre, le nombre maximum des navires de guerre d'un
belligerant qui pourront se trouver en meme temps dans un de ses ports
ou rades, sera de trois.

Article 16.

Lorsque des navires de guerre des deux parties belligerantes se trouvent
simultanement dans un port ou une rade neutres, il doit s'ecouler au
moins 24 heures entre le depart du navire d'un belligerant et le depart
du navire de l'autre.

L'ordre des departs est determine par l'ordre des arrivees, a moins que
le navire arrive le premier ne soit dans le cas ou la prolongation de la
duree legale du sejour est admise.

Un navire de guerre belligerant ne peut quitter un port ou une rade
neutres moins de 24 heures apres le depart d'un navire de commerce
portant le pavillon de son adversaire.

Article 17.

Dans les ports et rades neutres, les navires de guerre belligerants ne
peuvent reparer leurs avaries que dans la mesure indispensable a la
securite de leur navigation et non pas accroitre, d'une maniere
quelconque, leur force militaire. L'autorite neutre constatera la nature
des reparations a effectuer qui devront etre executees le plus
rapidement possible.

Article 18.

Les navires de guerre belligerants ne peuvent pas se servir des ports,
rades et eaux territoriales neutres, pour renouveler ou augmenter leurs
approvisionnements militaires ou leur armement ainsi que pour completer
leurs equipages.

Article 19.

Les navires de guerre belligerants ne peuvent se ravitailler dans les
ports et rades neutres que pour completer leur approvisionnement normal
du temps de paix.

Ces navires ne peuvent, de meme, prendre du combustible que pour gagner
le port le plus proche de leur propre pays. Ils peuvent, d'ailleurs,
prendre le combustible necessaire pour completer le plein de leurs
soutes proprement dites, quand ils se trouvent dans les pays neutres qui
ont adopte ce mode de determination du combustible a fournir.

Si, d'apres la loi de la Puissance neutre, les navires ne recoivent du
charbon que 24 heures apres leur arrivee, la duree legale de leur sejour
est prolongee de 24 heures.

Article 20.

Les navires de guerre belligerants, qui ont pris du combustible dans le
port d'une Puissance neutre, ne peuvent renouveler leur
approvisionnement qu'apres trois mois dans un port de la meme Puissance.

Article 21.

Une prise ne peut etre amenee dans un port neutre que pour cause
d'innavigabilite, de mauvais etat de la mer, de manque de combustible
ou de provisions.

Elle doit repartir aussitot que la cause qui en a justifie l'entree a
cesse. Si elle ne le fait pas, la Puissance neutre doit lui notifier
l'ordre de partir immediatement; au cas ou elle ne s'y conformerait pas,
la Puissance neutre doit user des moyens dont elle dispose pour la
relacher avec ses officiers et son equipage et interner l'equipage mis a
bord par le capteur.

Article 22.

La Puissance neutre doit, de meme, relacher la prise qui aurait ete
amenee en dehors des conditions prevues par l'article 21.

Article 23.

Une Puissance neutre peut permettre l'acces de ses ports et rades aux
prises escortees ou non, lorsqu'elles y sont amenees pour etre laissees
sous sequestre en attendant la decision du tribunal des prises. Elle
peut faire conduire la prise dans un autre de ses ports.

Si la prise est escortee par un navire de guerre, les officiers et les
hommes mis a bord par le capteur sont autorises a passer sur le navire
d'escorte.

Si la prise voyage seule, le personnel place a son bord par le capteur
est laisse en liberte.

Article 24.

Si, malgre la notification de l'autorite neutre, un navire de guerre
belligerant ne quitte pas un port dans lequel il n'a pas le droit de
rester, la Puissance neutre a le droit de prendre les mesures qu'elle
pourra juger necessaires pour rendre le navire incapable de prendre la
mer pendant la duree de la guerre et le commandant du navire doit
faciliter l'execution de ces mesures.

Lorsqu'un navire belligerant est retenu par une Puissance neutre, les
officiers et l'equipage sont egalement retenus.

Les officiers et l'equipage ainsi retenus peuvent etre laisses dans le
navire ou loges, soit sur un autre navire, soit a terre, et ils peuvent
etre assujettis aux mesures restrictives qu'il paraitrait necessaire de
leur imposer. Toutefois, on devra toujours laisser sur le navire les
hommes necessaires a son entretien.

Les officiers peuvent etre laisses libres en prenant l'engagement sur
parole de ne pas quitter le territoire neutre sans autorisation.

Article 25.

Une Puissance neutre est tenue d'exercer la surveillance, que
comportent les moyens dont elle dispose, pour empecher dans ses ports
ou rades et dans ses eaux toute violation des dispositions qui
precedent.

Article 26.

L'exercice par une Puissance neutre des droits definis par la presente
Convention ne peut jamais etre considere comme un acte peu amical par
l'un ou par l'autre belligerant qui a accepte les articles qui s'y
referent.

Article 27.

Les Puissances contractantes se communiqueront reciproquement, en temps
utile, toutes les lois, ordonnances et autres dispositions reglant chez
elles le regime des navires de guerre belligerants dans leurs ports et
leurs eaux, au moyen d'une notification adressee au Gouvernement des
Pays-Bas et transmise immediatement par celui-ci aux autres Puissances
contractantes.

Article 28.

Les dispositions de la presente Convention ne sont applicables qu'entre
les Puissances contractantes et seulement si les belligerants sont tous
parties a la Convention.

Article 29.

La presente Convention sera ratifiee aussitot que possible.

Les ratifications seront deposees a La Haye.

Le premier depot de ratifications sera constate par un proces-verbal
signe par les representants des Puissances qui y prennent part et par le
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas.

Les depots ulterieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une
notification ecrite, adressee au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et
accompagnee de l'instrument de ratification.

Copie certifiee conforme du proces-verbal relatif au premier depot de
ratifications, des notifications mentionnees a l'alinea precedent, ainsi
que des instruments de ratification, sera immediatement remise par les
soins du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et par la voie diplomatique aux
Puissances conviees a la Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, ainsi qu'aux
autres Puissances qui auront adhere a la Convention. Dans les cas vises
par l'alinea precedent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaitre en meme
temps la date a laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 30.

Les Puissances non signataires sont admises a adherer a la presente
Convention.

La Puissance qui desire adherer notifie par ecrit son intention au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhesion qui sera
depose dans les archives dudit Gouvernement.

Ce Gouvernement transmettra immediatement a toutes les autres Puissances
copie certifiee conforme de la notification ainsi que de l'acte
d'adhesion, en indiquant la date a laquelle il a recu la notification.

Article 31.

La presente Convention produira effet pour les Puissances qui auront
participe au premier depot des ratifications, soixante jours apres la
date du proces-verbal de ce depot et, pour les Puissances qui
ratifieront ulterieurement ou qui adhereront, soixante jours apres que
la notification de leur ratification ou de leur adhesion aura ete recue
par la Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 32.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances contractantes voulut denoncer la
presente Convention, la denonciation sera notifiee par ecrit au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui communiquera immediatement copie certifiee
conforme de la notification a toutes les autres Puissances en leur
faisant savoir la date a laquelle il l'a recue.

La denonciation ne produira ses effets qu'a l'egard de la Puissance qui
l'aura notifiee et un an apres que la notification en sera parvenue au
Gouvernement des Pays-Bas.

Article 33.

Un registre tenu par le Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas
indiquera la date du depot de ratifications effectue en vertu de
l'article 29 alineas 3 et 4, ainsi que la date a laquelle auront ete
recues les notifications d'adhesion (article 30 alinea 2) ou de
denonciation (article 32 alinea 1).

Chaque Puissance contractante est admise a prendre connaissance de ce
registre et a en demander des extraits certifies conformes.


XIV.

      DECLARATION CONCERNING THE PROHIBITION OF THE DISCHARGE OF
      PROJECTILES AND EXPLOSIVES FROM BALLOONS.

Les soussignes, Plenipotentiaires des Puissances conviees a la Deuxieme
Conference Internationale de la Paix a La Haye, dument autorises a cet
effet par leurs Gouvernements,

s'inspirant des sentiments qui ont trouve leur expression dans la
Declaration de St. Petersbourg du 29 novembre/11 decembre 1868, et
desirant renouveler la declaration de La Haye du 29 juillet 1899,
arrivee a expiration,

Declarent:

Les Puissances contractantes consentent, pour une periode allant jusqu'a
la fin de la troisieme Conference de la Paix, a l'interdiction de lancer
des projectiles et des explosifs du haut de ballons ou par d'autres
modes analogues nouveaux.

La presente Declaration n'est obligatoire que pour les Puissances
contractantes, en cas de guerre entre deux ou plusieurs d'entre elles.

Elle cessera d'etre obligatoire du moment ou, dans une guerre entre des
Puissances contractantes, une Puissance non contractante se joindrait a
l'un des belligerants.

La presente Declaration sera ratifiee dans le plus bref delai possible.

Les ratifications seront deposees a La Haye.

Il sera dresse du depot des ratifications un proces-verbal, dont une
copie, certifiee conforme, sera remise par la voie diplomatique a toutes
les Puissances contractantes.

Les Puissances non signataires pourront adherer a la presente
Declaration. Elles auront, a cet effet, a faire connaitre leur adhesion
aux Puissances contractantes, au moyen d'une notification ecrite,
adressee au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et communiquee par celui-ci a
toutes les autres Puissances contractantes.

S'il arrivait qu'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes denoncat la
presente Declaration, cette denonciation ne produirait ses effets qu'un
an apres la notification faite par ecrit au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et
communiquee immediatement par celui-ci a toutes les autres Puissances
contractantes.

Cette denonciation ne produira ses effets qu'a l'egard de la Puissance
qui l'aura notifiee.


ANNEX TO THE FIRST VOEU OF THE SECOND PEACE CONFERENCE

XV.

      DRAFT CONVENTION CONCERNING THE CREATION OF A JUDICIAL
      ARBITRATION COURT.

TITRE I.--_Organisation de la Cour de justice arbitrale._

Article premier.

Dans le but de faire progresser la cause de l'arbitrage, les Puissances
contractantes conviennent d'organiser, sans porter atteinte a la Cour
permanente d'arbitrage, une Cour de justice arbitrale, d'un acces libre
et facile, basee sur l'egalite juridique des Etats, reunissant des juges
representant les divers systemes juridiques du monde, et capable
d'assurer la continuite de la jurisprudence arbitrale.

Article 2.

La Cour de justice arbitrale se compose de juges et de juges suppleants
choisis parmi les personnes jouissant de la plus haute consideration
morale et qui tous devront remplir les conditions requises, dans leurs
pays respectifs, pour l'admission dans la haute magistrature ou etre des
jurisconsultes d'une competence notoire en matiere de droit
international.

Les juges et les juges suppleants de la Cour sont choisis, autant que
possible, parmi les membres de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage. Le choix
sera fait dans les six mois qui suivront la ratification de la presente
Convention.

Article 3.

Les juges et les juges suppleants sont nommes pour une periode de douze
ans a compter de la date ou la nomination aura ete notifiee au Conseil
administratif institue par la Convention pour le reglement pacifique des
conflits internationaux. Leur mandat peut etre renouvele.

En cas de deces ou de demission d'un juge ou d'un juge suppleant, il est
pourvu a son remplacement selon le mode fixe pour sa nomination. Dans ce
cas, la nomination est faite pour une nouvelle periode de douze ans.

Article 4.

Les juges de la Cour de justice arbitrale sont egaux entre eux et
prennent rang d'apres la date de la notification de leur nomination. La
preseance appartient au plus age, au cas ou la date est la meme.

Les juges suppleants sont, dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, assimiles
aux juges titulaires. Toutefois, ils prennent rang apres ceux-ci.

Article 5.

Les juges jouissent des privileges et immunites diplomatiques dans
l'exercice de leurs fonctions et en dehors de leurs pays.

Avant de prendre possession de leur siege, les juges et les juges
suppleants doivent, devant le Conseil administratif, preter serment ou
faire une affirmation solennelle d'exercer leurs fonctions avec
impartialite et en toute conscience.

Article 6.

La Cour designe annuellement trois juges qui forment une Delegation
speciale et trois autres destines a les remplacer en cas d'empechement.
Ils peuvent etre reelus. L'election se fait au scrutin de liste. Sont
consideres comme elus ceux qui reunissent le plus grand nombre de voix.
La Delegation elit elle-meme son President, qui, a defaut d'une
majorite, est designe par le sort.

Un membre de la Delegation ne peut exercer ses fonctions quand la
Puissance qui l'a nomme, ou dont il est le national, est une des
Parties.

Les membres de la Delegation terminent les affaires qui leur ont ete
soumises, meme au cas ou la periode pour laquelle ils ont ete nommes
juges serait expiree.

Article 7.

L'exercice des fonctions judiciaires est interdit au juge dans les
affaires au sujet desquelles il aura, a un titre quelconque, concouru a
la decision d'un Tribunal national, d'un Tribunal d'arbitrage ou d'une
Commission d'enquete, ou figure dans l'instance comme conseil ou avocat
d'une Partie.

Aucun juge ne peut intervenir comme agent ou comme avocat devant la Cour
de justice arbitrale ou la Cour permanente d'arbitrage, devant un
Tribunal special d'arbitrage ou une Commission d'enquete, ni y agir pour
une Partie en quelque qualite que ce soit, pendant toute la duree de son
mandat.

Article 8.

La Cour elit son President et son Vice-President a la majorite absolue
des suffrages exprimes. Apres deux tours de scrutin, l'election se fait
a la majorite relative et, en cas de partage des voix, le sort decide.

Article 9.

Les juges de la Cour de justice arbitrale recoivent une indemnite
annuelle de six mille florins neerlandais. Cette indemnite est payee a
l'expiration de chaque semestre a dater du jour de la premiere reunion
de la Cour.

Pendant l'exercice de leurs fonctions au cours des sessions ou dans les
cas speciaux prevus par la presente Convention, ils touchent une somme
de cent florins par jour. Il leur est alloue, en outre, une indemnite de
voyage fixee d'apres les reglements de leur pays. Les dispositions du
present alinea s'appliquent aussi aux juges suppleants remplacant les
juges.

Ces allocations, comprises dans les frais generaux de la Cour, prevus
par l'article 33, sont versees par l'entremise du Bureau international
institue par la Convention pour le reglement pacifique des conflits
internationaux.

Article 10.

Les juges ne peuvent recevoir de leur propre Gouvernement ou de celui
d'une autre Puissance aucune remuneration pour des services rentrant
dans leurs devoirs comme membres de la Cour.

Article 11.

La Cour de justice arbitrale a son siege a La Haye et ne peut, sauf le
cas de force majeure, le transporter ailleurs.

La Delegation peut, avec l'assentiment des Parties, choisir un autre
lieu pour ses reunions si des circonstances particulieres l'exigent.

Article 12.

Le Conseil administratif remplit a l'egard de la Cour de justice
arbitrale les fonctions qu'il remplit a l'egard de la Cour permanente
d'arbitrage.

Article 13.

Le Bureau international sert de greffe a la Cour de justice arbitrale et
doit mettre ses locaux et son organisation a la disposition de la Cour.
Il a la garde des archives et la gestion des affaires administratives.

Le Secretaire General du Bureau remplit les fonctions de greffier.

Les secretaires adjoints au greffier, les traducteurs et les
stenographes necessaires sont designes et assermentes par la Cour.

Article 14.

La Cour se reunit en session une fois par an. La session commence le
troisieme mercredi de juin et dure tant que l'ordre du jour n'aura pas
ete epuise.

La Cour ne se reunit pas en session, si la Delegation estime que cette
reunion n'est pas necessaire. Toutefois, si une Puissance est partie a
un litige actuellement pendant devant la Cour et dont l'instruction est
terminee ou va etre terminee, elle a le droit d'exiger que la session
ait lieu.

En cas de necessite, la Delegation peut convoquer la Cour en session
extraordinaire.

Article 15.

Un compte-rendu des travaux de la Cour sera dresse chaque annee par la
Delegation. Ce compte-rendu sera transmis aux Puissances contractantes
par l'intermediaire du Bureau international. Il sera communique aussi a
tous les juges et juges suppleants de la Cour.

Article 16.

Les juges et les juges suppleants, membres de la Cour de justice
arbitrale, peuvent aussi etre nommes aux fonctions de juge et de juge
suppleant dans la Cour internationale des prises.

TITRE II.--_Competence et procedure._

Article 17.

La Cour de justice arbitrale est competente pour tous les cas qui sont
portes devant elle, en vertu d'une stipulation generale d'arbitrage ou
d'un accord special.

Article 18.

La Delegation est competente:

  1. pour juger les cas d'arbitrage vises a l'article precedent, si
  les Parties sont d'accord pour reclamer l'application de la
  procedure sommaire, reglee au Titre IV Chapitre 4 de la Convention
  pour le reglement pacifique des conflits internationaux;

  2. pour proceder a une enquete en vertu et en conformite du Titre
  III de ladite Convention en tant que la Delegation en est chargee
  par les Parties agissant d'un commun accord. Avec l'assentiment
  des Parties et par derogation a l'article 7 alinea 1, les membres
  de la Delegation ayant pris part a l'enquete peuvent sieger comme
  juges, si le litige est soumis a l'arbitrage de la Cour ou de la
  Delegation elle-meme.

Article 19.

La Delegation est, en outre, competente pour l'etablissement du
compromis vise par l'article 52 de la Convention pour le reglement
pacifique des conflits internationaux, si les Parties sont d'accord pour
s'en remettre a la Cour.

Elle est egalement competente, meme si la demande est faite seulement
par l'une des Parties, apres qu'un accord par la voie diplomatique a ete
vainement essaye, quand il s'agit:

  1'o. d'un differend rentrant dans un traite d'arbitrage general
  conclu ou renouvele apres la mise en vigueur de cette Convention
  et qui prevoit pour chaque differend un compromis, et n'exclut
  pour l'etablissement de ce dernier ni explicitement ni
  implicitement la competence de la Delegation. Toutefois, le
  recours a la Cour n'a pas lieu si l'autre Partie declare qu'a son
  avis le differend n'appartient pas a la categorie des questions a
  soumettre a un arbitrage obligatoire, a moins que le traite
  d'arbitrage ne confere au tribunal arbitral le pouvoir de decider
  cette question prealable.

  2'o. d'un differend provenant de dettes contractuelles reclamees a
  une Puissance par une autre Puissance comme dues a ses nationaux,
  et pour la solution duquel l'offre d'arbitrage a ete acceptee.
  Cette disposition n'est pas applicable si l'acceptation a ete
  subordonnee a la condition que le compromis soit etabli selon un
  autre mode.

Article 20.

Chacune des Parties a le droit de designer un juge de la Cour pour
prendre part, avec voix deliberative, a l'examen de l'affaire soumise a
la Delegation.

Si la Delegation fonctionne en qualite de Commission d'enquete, ce
mandat peut etre confie a des personnes prises en dehors des juges de la
Cour. Les frais de deplacement et la retribution a allouer auxdites
personnes sont fixes et supportes par les Puissances qui les ont
nommees.

Article 21.

L'acces de la Cour de justice arbitrale, instituee par la presente
Convention, n'est ouvert qu'aux Puissances contractantes.

Article 22.

La Cour de justice arbitrale suit les regles de procedure edictees par
la Convention pour le reglement pacifique des conflits internationaux,
sauf ce qui est prescrit par la presente Convention.

Article 23.

La Cour decide du choix de la langue dont elle fera usage, et des
langues dont l'emploi sera autorise devant elle.

Article 24.

Le Bureau international sert d'intermediaire pour toutes les
communications a faire aux juges au cours de l'instruction prevue a
l'article 63 alinea 2 de la Convention pour le reglement pacifique des
conflits internationaux.

Article 25.

Pour toutes les notifications a faire, notamment aux Parties, aux
temoins et aux experts, la Cour peut s'adresser directement au
Gouvernement de la Puissance sur le territoire de laquelle la
notification doit etre effectuee. Il en est de meme s'il s'agit de
faire proceder a l'etablissement de tout moyen de preuve.

Les requetes adressees a cet effet ne peuvent etre refusees que si la
Puissance requise le juge de nature a porter atteinte a sa souverainete
ou a sa securite. S'il est donne suite a la requete, les frais ne
comprennent que les depenses d'execution reellement effectuees.

La Cour a egalement la faculte de recourir a l'intermediaire de la
Puissance sur la territoire de laquelle elle a son siege.

Les notifications a faire aux Parties dans le lieu ou siege la Cour
peuvent etre executees par le Bureau international.

Article 26.

Les debats sont diriges par le President ou le Vice-President et, en cas
d'absence ou d'empechement de l'un et de l'autre, par le plus ancien des
juges presents.

Le juge nomme par une des Parties ne peut sieger comme President.

Article 27.

Les deliberations de la Cour ont lieu a huis clos et restent secretes.

Toute decision est prise a la majorite des juges presents. Si la Cour
siege en nombre pair et qu'il y ait partage des voix, la voix du dernier
des juges, dans l'ordre de preseance etabli d'apres l'article 4 alinea
1, ne sera pas comptee.

Article 28.

Les arrets de la Cour doivent etre motives. Ils mentionnent les noms des
juges qui y ont participe; ils sont signes par le President et par le
greffier.

Article 29.

Chaque Partie supporte ses propres frais et une part egale des frais
speciaux de l'instance.

Article 30.

Les dispositions des articles 21 a 29 sont appliquees par analogie dans
la procedure devant la Delegation.

Lorsque le droit d'adjoindre un membre a la Delegation n'a ete exerce
que par une seule Partie, la voix du membre adjoint n'est pas comptee,
s'il y a partage de voix.

Article 31.

Les frais generaux de la Cour sont supportes par les Puissances
contractantes.

Le Conseil administratif s'adresse aux Puissances pour obtenir les fonds
necessaires au fonctionnement de la Cour.

Article 32.

La Cour fait elle-meme son reglement d'ordre interieur qui doit etre
communique aux Puissances contractantes.

Apres la ratification de la presente Convention, la Cour se reunira
aussitot que possible, pour elaborer ce reglement, pour elire le
President et le Vice-President ainsi que pour designer les membres de la
Delegation.

Article 33.

La Cour peut proposer des modifications a apporter aux dispositions de
la presente Convention qui concernent la procedure. Ces propositions
sont communiquees par l'intermediaire du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas aux
Puissances contractantes qui se concerteront sur la suite a y donner.

TITRE III.--_Dispositions finales._

Article 34.

La presente Convention sera ratifiee dans le plus bref delai possible.

Les ratifications seront deposees a La Haye.

Il sera dresse du depot de chaque ratification un proces-verbal, dont
une copie, certifiee conforme, sera remise par la voie diplomatique a
toutes les Puissances signataires.

Article 35.

La Convention entrera en vigueur six mois apres sa ratification.

Elle aura une duree de douze ans, et sera renouvelee tacitement de douze
ans en douze ans, sauf denonciation.

La denonciation devra etre notifiee, au moins deux ans avant
l'expiration de chaque periode, au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas qui en
donnera connaissance aux autres Puissances.

La denonciation ne produira effet qu'a l'egard de la Puissance qui
l'aura notifiee. La Convention restera executoire dans les rapports
entre les autres Puissances.




APPENDIX VII

      DECLARATION OF LONDON OF 1909 (Not yet ratified)
      With the Report[945] of the Drafting Committee on each Article


[Footnote 945: The several articles of the Declaration of London are
printed in italics, whereas the Report of the Drafting Committee on each
article is printed in roman type.]


Disposition Preliminaire.

_Les Puissances Signataires sont d'accord pour constater que les regles
contenues dans les Chapitres suivants repondent, en substance, aux
principes generalement reconnus du droit international._

Cette disposition domine toutes les regles qui suivent. L'esprit en a
ete indique dans les considerations generales placees en tete de ce
Rapport. La Conference a eu surtout en vue de constater, de preciser, de
completer au besoin, ce qui pouvait etre considere comme un droit
coutumier.


CHAPITRE PREMIER.--_Du blocus en temps de guerre._

Le blocus est envisage ici uniquement comme operation de guerre, et l'on
n'a entendu en rien toucher a ce qu'on appelle le _blocus pacifique_.

Article 1.

_Le blocus doit etre limite aux ports et aux cotes de l'ennemi ou
occupes par lui._

Le blocus, operation de guerre, ne peut etre dirige par un belligerant
que contre son adversaire. C'est la regle tres simple qui est posee tout
d'abord. Elle n'a toute sa portee que si on la rapproche de l'article
18.

Article 2.

_Conformement a la Declaration de Paris de 1856, le blocus, pour etre
obligatoire, doit etre effectif, c'est-a-dire maintenu par une force
suffisante pour interdire reellement l'acces du littoral ennemi._

La premiere condition pour qu'un blocus soit obligatoire est qu'il soit
effectif. Il y a longtemps que tout le monde est d'accord a ce sujet.
Quant a la definition du blocus effectif, nous avons pense que nous
n'avions qu'a nous approprier celle qui se trouve dans la Declaration de
Paris du 16 avril 1856, qui lie conventionnellement un grand nombre
d'Etats et qui est acceptee de fait par les autres.

Article 3.

_La question de savoir si le blocus est effectif est une question de
fait._

On comprend que souvent des difficultes s'elevent sur le point de savoir
si un blocus est ou non effectif; il y a en jeu des interets opposes. Le
belligerant bloquant veut limiter son effort, et les neutres desirent
que leur commerce soit le moins gene possible. Des protestations
diplomatiques ont ete parfois formulees a ce sujet. L'appreciation peut
etre delicate, parce qu'il n'y a pas de regle absolue a poser sur le
nombre et la situation des navires de blocus. Tout depend des
circonstances de fait, des conditions geographiques. Suivant les cas, un
navire suffira pour bloquer un port aussi efficacement que possible,
alors qu'une flotte pourra etre insuffisante pour empecher reellement
l'acces d'un ou de plusieurs ports declares bloques. C'est donc
essentiellement une _question de fait_, a trancher dans chaque espece,
et non d'apres une formule arretee a l'avance. Qui la tranchera?
L'autorite judiciaire. Ce sera d'abord le tribunal national appele a
statuer sur la validite de la prise, et auquel le navire capture pour
violation de blocus pourra demander de declarer la nullite de la prise,
parce que le blocus, n'ayant pas ete effectif, n'etait pas obligatoire.
Ce recours a toujours existe; il pouvait ne pas donner une satisfaction
suffisante aux Puissances interessees, parce qu'elles pouvaient estimer
que le tribunal national etait assez naturellement porte a considerer
comme effectif le blocus declare tel par son Gouvernement. Mais, quand
la Convention sur la Cour Internationale des Prises entrera en vigueur,
il y aura une juridiction absolument impartiale a laquelle les neutres
pourront s'adresser et qui decidera si, dans tel cas, le blocus etait
effectif ou non. La possibilite de ce recours, outre qu'elle permettra
de reparer certaines injustices, aura vraisemblablement un effet
preventif, en ce qu'un Gouvernement se preoccupera d'etablir ses blocus
de telle facon que l'effet ne puisse pas en etre annule par des
decisions qui lui causeraient un grand prejudice. L'article 3 a donc
toute sa portee, si on l'entend en ce sens que la question prevue doit
etre tranchee judiciairement. C'est pour ecarter toute equivoque que
l'explication precedente est inseree dans le Rapport a la demande de la
Commission.

Article 4.

_Le blocus n'est pas considere comme leve si, par suite du mauvais
temps, les forces bloquantes se sont momentanement eloignees._

Il ne suffit pas que le blocus soit etabli; il faut qu'il soit maintenu.
S'il vient a etre leve, il pourra etre repris, mais alors il exigera les
memes formalites que s'il etait etabli pour la premiere fois.
Traditionnellement, on ne considere pas le blocus comme leve, lorsque
c'est par suite du mauvais temps que les forces bloquantes se sont
momentanement eloignees. C'est ce que dit l'article 4. Il doit etre tenu
pour limitatif en ce sens que le mauvais temps est le seul cas de force
majeure qui puisse etre allegue. Si les forces bloquantes s'eloignaient
pour toute autre cause, le blocus serait considere comme leve, et, au
cas ou il viendrait a etre repris, les articles 12 _in fine_ et 13
seraient applicables.

Article 5.

_Le blocus doit etre impartialement applique aux divers pavillons._

Le blocus, operation de guerre legitime, doit etre respecte par les
neutres en tant qu'il reste vraiment une operation de guerre ayant pour
but d'interrompre toutes les relations commerciales du port bloque. Ce
ne peut etre un moyen pour un belligerant de favoriser certains
pavillons en les laissant passer. C'est ce qu'indique l'article 5.

Article 6.

_Le commandant de la force bloquante peut accorder a des navires de
guerre la permission d'entrer dans le port bloque et d'en sortir
ulterieurement._

L'interdiction qui s'applique a tous les navires de commerce,
s'applique-t-elle aussi aux navires de guerre? Il n'y a pas de reponse
absolue a faire. Le commandant des forces de blocus peut estimer qu'il a
avantage a intercepter toute communication de la place bloquee, et
refuser l'acces aux navires de guerre neutres; rien ne lui est impose.
S'il accorde l'entree, c'est affaire de courtoisie. Si on a consacre une
regle pour dire simplement cela, c'est pour qu'on ne puisse pas
pretendre que le blocus a cesse d'etre effectif par suite de la
permission accordee a tels et tels navires de guerre neutres.

Le commandant du blocus doit agir impartialement, comme il est dit dans
l'article 5. Toutefois, par cela seul qu'il a laisse entrer un navire de
guerre, il ne peut etre oblige de laisser passer tous les navires de
guerre neutres qui se presenteront. C'est une question d'appreciation.
La presence d'un navire de guerre neutre dans un port bloque peut ne pas
avoir les memes consequences a toutes les phases du blocus, et le
commandant doit etre laisse maitre de juger s'il peut etre courtois sans
rien sacrifier de ses interets militaires.

Article 7.

_Un navire neutre, en cas de detresse constatee par une autorite des
forces bloquantes, peut penetrer dans la localite bloquee et en sortir
ulterieurement a la condition de n'y avoir laisse ni pris aucun
chargement._

La detresse peut expliquer l'entree d'un navire neutre dans la localite
bloquee. C'est, par exemple, un navire qui manque de vivres ou d'eau,
qui a besoin d'une reparation immediate. Sa detresse une fois constatee
par une autorite de la force bloquante, il _peut_ franchir la ligne de
blocus; ce n'est pas une faveur qu'il ait a solliciter de l'humanite ou
de la courtoisie de l'autorite bloquante. Celle-ci peut contester l'etat
de detresse, mais, l'etat une fois verifie, la consequence suit
d'elle-meme. Le navire qui aura ainsi penetre dans le port bloque ne
sera pas oblige d'y rester tout le temps que durera le blocus; il pourra
en sortir quand il sera en etat de le faire, quand il se sera procure
les vivres ou l'eau qui lui sont necessaires, quand il aura ete repare.
Mais la permission qui lui a ete accordee n'a pu servir de pretexte a
des operations commerciales; c'est pour cela qu'on exige qu'il n'ait
laisse ou pris aucun chargement.

Il va sans dire que l'escadre de blocus, qui voudrait absolument
empecher de passer, pourrait le faire, si elle mettait a la disposition
du navire en detresse les secours dont il a besoin.

Article 8.

_Le blocus, pour etre obligatoire, doit etre declare conformement a
l'article 9 et notifie conformement aux articles 11 et 16._

Independamment de la condition d'effectivite formulee par la
Declaration de Paris, un blocus, pour etre obligatoire, doit etre
_declare_ et _notifie_. L'article 8 se borne a poser le principe qui est
applique par les articles suivants.

Il suffit, pour eviter toute equivoque, d'indiquer nettement le sens des
deux expressions qui vont etre frequemment employees. La _declaration de
blocus_ est l'acte de l'autorite competente (Gouvernement ou chef
d'escadre), constatant qu'un blocus est etabli ou va l'etre dans des
conditions qui doivent etre precisees (article 9). La _notification_ est
le fait de porter a la connaissance des Puissances neutres ou de
certaines autorites la declaration de blocus (article 11).

Le plus souvent, ces deux choses--la declaration et la
notification--auront lieu prealablement a l'application des regles du
blocus, c'est-a-dire, a l'interdiction reelle du passage. Toutefois,
comme on le verra plus loin, il est parfois possible que le passage soit
interdit a raison du fait meme du blocus qui est porte a la connaissance
d'un navire approchant d'un port bloque, au moyen d'une _notification_
qui est _speciale_, tandis que la notification qui vient d'etre definie,
et dont il est parle a l'article 11, a un caractere general.

Article 9.

_La declaration de blocus est faite, soit par la Puissance bloquante,
soit par les autorites navales agissant en son nom._

_Elle precise:_

  1'o _La date du commencement du blocus;_

  2'o _Les limites geographiques du littoral bloque;_

  3'o _Le delai de sortie a accorder aux navires neutres._

La declaration de blocus emane le plus souvent du Gouvernement
belligerant lui-meme. Le Gouvernement peut avoir laisse au commandant de
ses forces navales la faculte de declarer lui-meme un blocus selon les
circonstances. Cette latitude aura peut-etre lieu de s'appliquer moins
souvent qu'autrefois a raison de la facilite et de la rapidite des
communications. Cela importe peu: il y a la une question d'ordre
interieur.

La declaration de blocus doit preciser certains points que les neutres
ont interet a connaitre pour se rendre compte de l'etendue de leurs
obligations. Il faut que l'on sache exactement quand commence
l'interdiction de communiquer avec la localite bloquee. Il importe, pour
l'obligation du bloquant comme pour l'obligation des neutres, qu'il n'y
ait pas d'incertitude sur les points reellement bloques. Enfin, depuis
longtemps, s'est etabli l'usage de laisser sortir les navires neutres
qui sont dans le port bloque. On confirme ici cet usage en ce sens que
le bloquant _doit accorder_ un delai de sortie; on ne fixe pas la duree
de ce delai, parce que cette duree est evidemment subordonnee aux
circonstances tres variables. Il a ete seulement entendu qu'il y aurait
un delai _raisonnable_.

Article 10.

_Si la Puissance bloquante ou les autorites navales agissant en son nom
ne se conforment pas aux mentions qu'en execution de l'article 9--1'o et
2'o, elles ont du inscrire dans la declaration de blocus, cette
declaration est nulle, et une nouvelle declaration est necessaire pour
que le blocus produise ses effets._

Cet article a pour but d'assurer l'observation de l'article 9. La
declaration de blocus contient des mentions qui ne correspondent pas a
la realite des faits; elle indique que le blocus a commence ou
commencera tel jour, et, en fait, il n'a commence que plusieurs jours
apres. Les limites geographiques sont exactement tracees; elles sont
plus etendues que celles dans lesquelles operent les forces de blocus.
Quelle sera la sanction? La nullite de la declaration de blocus, ce qui
fait que cette declaration ne produira aucun effet. Si, donc, en pareil
cas, un navire neutre est saisi pour violation de blocus, il pourra
opposer la nullite de la saisie en se fondant sur la nullite de la
declaration de blocus; si son moyen est repousse par le tribunal
national, il pourra se pourvoir devant la Cour Internationale.

Il faut remarquer la portee de la disposition pour qu'il n'y ait pas de
surprise. La declaration porte que le blocus commence le 1'er fevrier;
en fait, il n'a commence que le 8. Il va sans dire que la declaration
n'a produit aucun effet du 1'er au 8, puisqu'a ce moment-la, il n'y
avait pas de blocus du tout; la declaration constate un fait, mais n'en
tient pas lieu. La regle va plus loin: la declaration ne produira pas
meme effet a partir du 8; elle est nulle definitivement, et il faut en
faire une autre.

Il n'est pas parle ici du cas ou l'article 9 aurait ete meconnu, en ce
qu'aucun delai de sortie n'aurait ete accorde aux navires neutres se
trouvant dans le port bloque. La sanction ne saurait etre la meme. Il
n'y a pas de raison d'annuler la declaration en ce qui touche les
batiments neutres voulant penetrer dans le porte bloque. Il faut une
sanction speciale, qui est indiquee dans l'article 16, alinea 2.

Article 11.

_La declaration de blocus est notifiee_:

  1'o _Aux Puissances neutres, par la Puissance bloquante, au moyen
  d'une communication adressee aux Gouvernements eux-memes ou a
  leurs representants accredites aupres d'elle;_

  2'o _Aux autorites locales, par le commandant de la force
  bloquante. Ces autorites, de leur cote, en informeront, aussitot
  que possible, les consuls etrangers qui exercent leurs fonctions
  dans le port ou sur le littoral bloques._

La declaration de blocus ne vaut que si elle est notifiee. On ne peut
exiger l'observation d'une regle que de ceux qui ont ete en mesure de la
connaitre.

Il y a deux notifications a faire:

  1. La premiere est adressee aux Puissances neutres par la
  Puissance belligerante, qui la communique aux Gouvernements
  eux-memes ou a leurs representants accredites aupres d'elle. La
  communication aux Gouvernements se fera le plus souvent au moyen
  des agents diplomatiques: il pourrait arriver qu'un belligerant ne
  fut pas en rapports diplomatiques avec un pays neutre; il
  s'adressera directement au Gouvernement de ce pays, ordinairement
  par la voie telegraphique. C'est aux Gouvernements neutres avises
  de la declaration de blocus a prendre les mesures necessaires pour
  en faire parvenir la nouvelle sur les divers points de leur
  territoire, specialement dans leurs ports.

  2. La seconde notification est faite par le commandant de la force
  bloquante aux autorites locales. Celles-ci doivent informer,
  aussitot que possible, les consuls etrangers qui resident dans la
  place ou sur le littoral bloques. Ces autorites engageraient leur
  responsabilite en ne s'acquittant pas de cette obligation. Les
  neutres pourraient eprouver un prejudice du fait de n'avoir pas
  ete prevenus du blocus en temps utile.

Article 12.

_Les regles relatives a la declaration et a la notification de blocus
sont applicables dans le cas ou le blocus serait etendu ou viendrait a
etre repris apres avoir ete leve._

Un blocus est etendu au-dela de ses limites primitives; c'est, pour la
partie nouvelle, un blocus nouveau et, par suite, les regles de la
declaration et de la notification doivent s'y appliquer. Il en est de
meme dans le cas ou, apres avoir ete leve, un blocus est repris; il n'y
a pas a tenir compte du fait qu'un blocus a deja existe pour la meme
localite.

Article 13.

_La levee volontaire du blocus, ainsi que toute restriction qui y serait
apportee, doit etre notifiee dans la forme prescrite par l'article 11._

S'il est indispensable de connaitre l'etablissement d'un blocus, il
serait utile que le public fut renseigne sur la levee du blocus,
puisqu'elle fait cesser l'entrave apportee aux relations des neutres
avec le port bloque. Aussi a-t-on juge a propos de demander a la
Puissance qui leve un blocus de le faire savoir dans la forme ou elle a
notifie l'etablissement du blocus (article 11). Seulement, il y a lieu
de remarquer que la sanction ne saurait etre la meme dans les deux cas.
Pour la notification de la declaration de blocus, il y a une sanction
directe, adequate: le blocus non notifie n'est pas obligatoire. Pour la
levee, il ne saurait y avoir rien d'analogue. Le public profitera, en
fait, de cette levee, quand meme on ne la lui aurait pas fait connaitre
officiellement. La Puissance bloquante qui n'aurait pas notifie la levee
s'exposerait a des reclamations diplomatiques motivees par
l'inaccomplissement d'un devoir international. Cet inaccomplissement
aura des consequences plus ou moins graves suivant les circonstances.
Parfois, la levee du blocus aura ete, en fait, immediatement connue, et
la notification officielle n'ajouterait rien a cette publicite
effective.

Il va sans dire qu'il ne s'agit que de la levee _volontaire_ du blocus;
si le bloquant a ete chasse par l'arrivee de forces ennemies, il ne peut
etre tenu de faire connaitre sa defaite, que son adversaire se chargera
d'annoncer sans <DW44>. Au lieu de lever un blocus, un belligerant peut
se contenter de le restreindre; il ne bloque plus qu'un port au lieu de
deux. Pour le port qui cesse d'etre compris dans le blocus, c'est comme
s'il y avait levee volontaire; en consequence, la meme regle s'applique.

Article 14.

_La saisissabilite d'un navire neutre pour violation de blocus est
subordonnee a la connaissance reelle ou presumee du blocus._

Pour qu'un navire soit saisissable pour violation de blocus, la premiere
condition est qu'il ait eu connaissance du blocus, parce qu'il n'est pas
juste de punir quelqu'un pour inobservation d'une regle qu'il aurait
ignoree. Toutefois, il est des circonstances ou, meme en l'absence d'une
connaissance reelle prouvee, on peut presumer cette connaissance, sauf a
reserver a l'interesse la faculte de dementir la presomption (article
15).

Article 15.

_La connaissance du blocus est, sauf preuve contraire, presumee, lorsque
le navire a quitte un port neutre posterieurement a la notification, en
temps utile, du blocus a la Puissance dont releve ce port._

Un navire a quitte un port neutre posterieurement a la notification du
blocus faite a la Puissance dont releve le port. Cette notification
avait-elle ete faite en temps utile, c'est-a-dire de maniere a parvenir
dans le port meme ou elle a du etre divulguee par les autorites du port?
C'est une question de fait a examiner. Si elle est resolue
affirmativement, il est naturel de supposer que le navire avait eu, lors
de son depart, connaissance du blocus. Cette presomption n'est pourtant
pas absolue et la preuve contraire est reservee. Ce sera au navire
inculpe a la fournir, en justifiant de l'existence de circonstances qui
expliquent son ignorance.

Article 16.

_Si le navire qui approche du port bloque n'a pas connu ou ne peut etre
presume avoir connu l'existence du blocus, la notification doit etre
faite au navire meme par un officier de l'un des batiments de la force
bloquante. Cette notification doit etre portee sur le livre de bord avec
indication de la date et de l'heure, ainsi que de la position
geographique du navire a ce moment._

_Le navire neutre qui sort du port bloque, alors que, par la negligence
du commandant de la force bloquante, aucune declaration de blocus n'a
ete notifiee aux autorites locales ou qu'un delai n'a pas ete indique
dans la declaration notifiee, doit etre laisse libre de passer._

On suppose un navire approchant du port bloque sans qu'on puisse dire
qu'il connait ou qu'il est presume connaitre l'existence du blocus; il
n'a ete touche par aucune notification dans le sens de l'article 11.
Dans ce cas, une notification speciale est necessaire pour faire
connaitre regulierement le fait du blocus au navire. Cette notification
est faite au navire meme par un officier de l'un des batiments de la
force bloquante et portee sur le livre de bord; elle peut etre faite aux
navires d'une flotte convoyee par un vaisseau de guerre neutre, grace a
l'intermediaire du commandant du convoi qui en donne recu et qui prend
les mesures necessaires pour l'inscription de la notification sur le
livre de bord de chaque navire. Elle mentionne les circonstances de
temps et de lieu dans lesquelles elle est faite, ainsi que les lieux
bloques. Le navire est empeche de passer, ce qui fait que le blocus est
_obligatoire_ pour lui, bien que n'ayant pas ete _prealablement_
notifie; c'est pour cela que cet adverbe a ete omis dans l'article 8. Il
n'est pas admissible qu'un navire de commerce ait la pretention de ne
pas tenir compte d'un blocus reel et de forcer le blocus, par cette
seule raison qu'il n'en avait pas personnellement connaissance.
Seulement, s'il peut etre empeche de passer il ne peut etre saisi que
lorsqu'il essaie de forcer le blocus apres avoir recu la notification.
Comme on le voit, cette notification speciale joue un role tres
restreint, et ne doit pas etre confondue avec la notification speciale
exigee d'une maniere absolue dans la pratique de certaines marines.

Ce qui vient d'etre dit se refere au navire venant du large. Il faut
aussi s'occuper du navire sortant du port bloque. Si une notification
reguliere du blocus a ete faite aux autorites locales (article 11--2'o),
la situation est simple: le navire connait, ou est presume connaitre, le
blocus, et s'expose donc a la saisie dans le cas ou il n'a pas observe
le delai donne par le bloquant. Mais il peut arriver qu'aucune
declaration de blocus n'ait ete notifiee aux autorites locales ou que
cette declaration ait ete muette au sujet du delai de sortie, malgre la
prescription de l'article 9--3'o. La sanction de la faute du bloquant
est que le navire doit etre laisse libre de passer. C'est une sanction
energique qui correspond exactement a la nature de la faute commise, et
sera le meilleur moyen d'empecher de la commettre.

Il va sans dire que cette disposition ne concerne que les navires
auxquels le delai de sortie avait du profiter--c'est-a-dire, les navires
neutres qui etaient dans le port au moment de l'etablissement du blocus;
elle est absolument etrangere aux navires qui seraient dans le port
apres avoir force le blocus.

Le commandant de l'escadre de blocus est toujours a meme de reparer son
omission ou son erreur, de faire une notification du blocus aux
autorites locales ou de completer celle qu'il aurait deja faite.

Comme on le voit par ces explications, on suppose le cas le plus
ordinaire, celui ou l'absence de notification implique une negligence du
commandant des forces de blocus. La situation se trouve evidemment tout
a fait changee, si le commandant a fait tout ce qui dependait de lui
pour faire la notification et s'il en a ete empeche par le mauvais
vouloir des autorites locales qui ont intercepte toute communication
avec le dehors. Dans ce cas, il ne peut etre force de laisser passer les
navires qui veulent sortir et qui, en l'absence de la notification
exigee et de la connaissance presumee du blocus, sont dans une situation
analogue a celle qui est prevue par l'article 16, alinea 1'er.

Article 17.

_La saisie des navires neutres pour violation de blocus ne peut etre
effectuee que dans le rayon d'action des batiments de_ _guerre charges
d'assurer l'effectivite du blocus._

L'autre condition de la saisissabilite du navire est que celui-ci se
trouve dans le rayon d'action des batiments de guerre charges d'assurer
l'effectivite du blocus: il ne suffit pas qu'il soit en route pour le
port bloque.

Quant a ce qui constitue le _rayon d'action_, il a ete fourni une
explication qui a ete universellement acceptee, et qui est reproduite
ici comme le meilleur commentaire de la regle de l'article 17:

  "Lorsqu'un Gouvernement decide d'entreprendre une operation de
  blocus contre une partie quelconque de cote ennemie, il designe un
  certain nombre de navires de guerre qui devront participer au
  blocus, et il en confie le commandement a un officier qui aura
  pour mission d'assurer par leur moyen l'effectivite du blocus. Le
  commandant de la force navale ainsi constituee repartit les
  navires mis a sa disposition suivant la configuration de la cote
  et la situation geographique des points bloques, et donne a chacun
  d'eux des instructions sur le role qu'il aura a remplir, et en
  particulier sur la zone confiee a sa surveillance. C'est
  l'ensemble de ces zones de surveillance, organisees de telle
  maniere que le blocus soit effectif, qui forme le rayon d'action
  de la force navale bloquante.

  "Le rayon d'action ainsi compris est etroitement lie a
  l'effectivite du blocus et aussi au nombre des batiments qui y
  sont affectes.

  "Il peut se presenter des cas ou un seul navire suffira pour
  maintenir un blocus effectif--par exemple, a l'entree d'un port ou
  a l'embouchure d'un fleuve dont l'estuaire est peu etendu--a la
  condition que les circonstances permettent au bloqueur de se tenir
  suffisamment rapproche de l'entree. Dans ce cas, le rayon d'action
  est lui-meme rapproche de la cote. Mais, si les circonstances le
  forcent, au contraire, a se tenir eloigne, il pourra se faire que
  le navire soit insuffisant pour assurer l'effectivite, et il
  deviendra alors necessaire de lui adjoindre d'autres navires pour
  la maintenir. De ce fait le rayon d'action devient plus etendu et
  plus eloigne de la cote. Il pourra donc varier suivant les
  circonstances et suivant le nombre des navires bloqueurs, mais
  sera toujours limite par la condition que l'effectivite soit
  assuree.

  "Il ne semble pas possible d'assigner au rayon d'action des
  limites en chiffres fixes et invariables, pas plus qu'il n'est
  possible de fixer a l'avance et invariablement le nombre des
  batiments necessaires pour assurer l'effectivite de tout blocus.
  Ces elements doivent etre determines, suivant les circonstances,
  pour chaque cas particulier de blocus; peut-etre pourrait-on le
  faire au moment de la declaration.

  "Il est evident qu'un blocus ne sera pas etabli de la meme facon
  pour une cote sans defense et pour une cote possedant tous les
  moyens modernes de defense. Il ne saurait etre question dans ce
  dernier cas d'appliquer une regle telle que celle qui exigeait
  autrefois des vaisseaux arretes et suffisamment proches des points
  bloques; la situation serait trop dangereuse pour les navires de
  la force bloquante qui, par ailleurs, possedent aujourd'hui des
  moyens plus puissants leur permettant de surveiller d'une facon
  effective une zone beaucoup plus etendue que jadis.

  "Le rayon d'action d'une force navale bloquante pourra s'etendre
  assez loin, mais, comme il depend du nombre des batiments
  concourant a l'effectivite du blocus, et comme il reste toujours
  limite par la condition d'effectivite, il n'atteindra jamais des
  mers eloignees sur lesquelles naviguent des navires de commerce,
  peut-etre destines aux ports bloques, mais dont la destination est
  subordonnee aux modifications que les circonstances sont
  susceptibles d'apporter au blocus au cours du voyage. En resume,
  l'idee de rayon d'action liee a celle d'effectivite telle que nous
  avons essaye de la definir, c'est-a-dire, comprenant la zone
  d'operations des forces bloquantes, permet au belligerant
  d'exercer d'une maniere efficace le droit de blocus qui lui est
  reconnu, et, d'un autre cote, elle evite aux neutres d'etre
  exposes a grande distance aux inconvenients du blocus, tout en
  leur laissant courir les dangers auxquels ils s'exposent sciemment
  en s'approchant des points dont l'acces est interdit par le
  belligerant."

Article 18.

_Les forces bloquantes ne doivent pas barrer l'acces aux ports et aux
cotes neutres._

Cette regle a ete jugee necessaire pour mieux sauvegarder les interets
commerciaux des pays neutres; elle complete l'article 1'er, d'apres
lequel un blocus doit etre limite aux ports et cotes de l'ennemi, ce qui
implique que, puisque c'est une operation de guerre, il ne saurait etre
dirige contre un port neutre, malgre l'interet que pourrait y avoir un
belligerant a raison du role de ce port neutre pour le ravitaillement de
son adversaire.

Article 19.

_La violation du blocus est insuffisamment caracterisee pour autoriser
la saisie du navire, lorsque celui-ci est actuellement dirige vers un
port non bloque, quelle que soit la destination ulterieure du navire ou
de son chargement._

C'est la destination reelle du navire qui doit etre envisagee, quand il
s'agit de violation de blocus, et non la destination ulterieure de la
cargaison. Cette destination prouvee ou presumee ne peut donc suffire a
autoriser la saisie, pour violation de blocus, d'un navire actuellement
destine a un port non bloque. Mais le croiseur pourrait toujours etablir
que cette destination a un port non bloque est apparente et qu'en
realite, la destination immediate du navire est bien le port bloque.

Article 20.

_Le navire qui, en violation du blocus, est sorti du port bloque ou a
tente d'y entrer, reste saisissable tant qu'il est poursuivi par un
batiment de la force bloquante. Si la chasse en est abandonnee ou si le
blocus est leve, la saisie n'en peut plus etre pratiquee._

Un navire est sorti du port bloque ou a tente d'y entrer. Sera-t-il
indefiniment saisissable? L'affirmative absolue serait excessive. Ce
navire doit rester saisissable tant qu'il est poursuivi par un batiment
de la force bloquante; il ne suffirait pas qu'il fut rencontre par un
croiseur de l'ennemi bloquant qui ne ferait pas partie de l'escadre de
blocus. La question de savoir si la chasse est ou non abandonnee est une
question de fait; il ne suffit pas que le navire se soit refugie dans un
port neutre. Le navire qui le poursuit peut attendre sa sortie, de telle
sorte que la chasse est forcement suspendue, mais non abandonnee. La
saisie n'est plus possible quand le blocus a ete leve.

Article 21.

_Le navire reconnu coupable de violation de blocus est confisque. Le
chargement est egalement confisque, a moins qu'il soit prouve qu'au
moment ou la marchandise a ete embarquee, le chargeur n'a ni connu ni pu
connaitre l'intention de violer le blocus._

Le navire est confisque dans tous les cas. Le chargement est aussi
confisque en principe, mais on laisse a l'interesse la possibilite
d'exciper de sa bonne foi, c'est-a-dire, de prouver que, lors de
l'embarquement de la marchandise, le chargeur ne connaissait pas et ne
pouvait connaitre l'intention de violer le blocus.


CHAPITRE II.--_De la contrebande de guerre._

Ce chapitre est l'un des plus importants, sinon le plus important, de la
Declaration. Il traite d'une matiere qui a parfois provoque de graves
conflits entre les belligerants et les neutres. Aussi a-t-on souvent
reclame d'une maniere pressante un reglement qui etablirait d'une
maniere precise les droits et devoirs de chacun. Le commerce pacifique
pourra etre reconnaissant de la precision qui, pour la premiere fois,
est apportee a ce sujet, qui l'interesse au plus haut point.

La notion de contrebande de guerre comporte deux elements: il s'agit
d'objets d'une certaine espece et d'une certaine destination. Des
canons, par exemple, sont transportes sur un navire neutre. Sont-ils de
la contrebande? Cela depend: non, s'ils sont destines a un Gouvernement
neutre; oui, s'ils sont destines a un Gouvernement ennemi. Le commerce
de certains objets n'est nullement interdit d'une maniere generale
pendant la guerre; c'est le commerce de ces objets avec l'ennemi qui est
illicite et contre lequel le belligerant, au detriment duquel il se
fait, peut se proteger par les mesures qu'admet le droit des gens.

Les articles 22 et 24 enumerent les objets et materiaux qui sont
susceptibles de constituer de la contrebande de guerre et qui en
constituent effectivement, quand ils ont une certaine destination, qui
est determinee par les articles 30 et 33. La distinction traditionnelle
de la contrebande _absolue_ et de la contrebande _conditionnelle_ est
maintenue: a la premiere se referent les articles 22 et 30, a la seconde
les articles 24 et 33.

Article 22.

_Sont de plein droit consideres comme contrebande de guerre les objets
et materiaux suivants, compris sous le nom de contrebande absolue,
savoir:_

  1'o _Les armes de toute nature, y compris les armes de chasse, et
  les pieces detachees caracterisees._

  2'o _Les projectiles, gargousses, et cartouches de toute nature,
  et les pieces detachees caracterisees._

  3'o _Les poudres et les explosifs specialement affectes a la
  guerre._

  4'o _Les affuts, caissons, avant-trains, fourgons, forges de
  campagne, et les pieces detachees caracterisees._

  5'o _Les effets d'habillement et d'equipement militaires
  caracterises._

  6'o _Les harnachements militaires caracterises de toute nature._

  7'o _Les animaux de selle, de trait et de bat, utilisables pour la
  guerre._

  8'o _Le materiel de campement et les pieces detachees
  caracterisees._

   9'o _Les plaques de blindage._

  10'o _Les batiments et embarcations de guerre et les pieces
  detachees specialement caracterisees comme ne pouvant etre
  utilisees que sur un navire de guerre._

  11'o _Les instruments et appareils exclusivement faits pour la
  fabrication des munitions de guerre, pour la fabrication et la
  reparation des armes et du materiel militaire, terrestre ou
  naval._

Cette liste est celle qui avait ete arretee a la Deuxieme Conference de
la Paix par le Comite charge d'etudier specialement la question de la
contrebande. Elle etait le resultat de concessions mutuelles, et il n'a
pas paru sage de rouvrir les discussions a ce sujet, soit pour
retrancher, soit pour ajouter des articles.

Les mots _sont de plein droit_ veulent dire que la disposition produit
son effet, par le fait meme de la guerre, et qu'aucune declaration des
belligerants n'est necessaire. Le commerce est averti des le temps de
paix.

Article 23.

_Les objets et materiaux qui sont exclusivement employes a la guerre
peuvent etre ajoutes a la liste de contrebande absolue au moyen d'une
declaration notifiee._

_La notification est adressee aux Gouvernements des autres Puissances ou
a leurs representants accredites aupres de la Puissance qui fait la
declaration. La notification faite apres l'ouverture des hostilites
n'est adressee qu'aux Puissances neutres._

Certaines decouvertes ou inventions pourraient rendre insuffisante la
liste de l'article 22. Une addition pourra y etre faite a condition
qu'il s'agisse d'objets et materiaux _qui sont exclusivement employes a
la guerre_. Cette addition doit etre notifiee aux autres Puissances, qui
prendront les mesures necessaires pour la faire connaitre a leurs
nationaux. Theoriquement, la notification peut se faire en temps de paix
ou en temps de guerre. Sans doute, le premier cas se presentera
rarement, parce qu'un Etat faisant une pareille notification pourrait
etre soupconne de songer a une guerre; cela aurait neanmoins l'avantage
de renseigner le commerce a l'avance. Il n'y avait pas de raison d'en
exclure la possibilite.

On a trouve excessive la faculte accordee a une Puissance de faire une
addition a la liste en vertu de sa simple declaration. Il est a
remarquer que cette faculte ne presente pas les dangers qu'on lui
suppose. D'abord, bien entendu, la declaration ne produit d'effet que
pour celui qui la fait, en ce sens que l'article ajoute ne sera de la
contrebande que pour lui, en tant que belligerant; les autres Etats
pourront d'ailleurs faire une declaration analogue. L'addition ne peut
concerner que des objets _exclusivement employes a la guerre_;
actuellement il serait difficile d'indiquer de tels objets ne rentrant
pas dans la liste. L'avenir est reserve. Si une Puissance avait la
pretention d'ajouter a la liste de contrebande absolue des articles non
exclusivement employes a la guerre, elle pourrait s'attirer des
reclamations diplomatiques, puisqu'elle meconnaitrait une regle
acceptee. De plus, il y aurait un recours eventuel devant la Cour
Internationale des Prises. On peut supposer que la Cour estime que
l'objet mentionne dans la declaration de contrebande absolue y figure a
tort, parce qu'il n'est pas exclusivement employe a la guerre, mais
qu'il aurait pu rentrer dans une declaration de contrebande
conditionnelle. La confiscation pourra se justifier si la saisie a ete
faite dans les conditions prevues pour cette espece de contrebande
(articles 33 a 35), qui different de celles qu'on applique a la
contrebande absolue (article 30).

Il avait ete suggere que, dans l'interet du commerce neutre, un delai
devrait s'ecouler entre la notification et son application. Mais cela
aurait ete tres prejudiciable au belligerant qui veut precisement se
proteger, puisque, pendant le delai, le commerce des articles juges par
lui dangereux aurait ete libre, et que l'effet de sa mesure aurait ete
manque. Il a ete tenu compte, sous une autre forme, des considerations
d'equite qui avaient ete invoquees (voir article 43).

Article 24.

_Sont de plein droit consideres comme contrebande de guerre les objets
et materiaux susceptibles de servir aux usages de la guerre comme a des
usages pacifiques, et compris sous le nom de contrebande conditionnelle,
savoir:_

  1'o _Les vivres._

  2'o _Les fourrages et les graines propres a la nourriture des
  animaux._

  3'o _Les vetements et les tissus d'habillement, les chaussures,
  propres a des usages militaires._

  4'o _L'or et l'argent monnayes et en lingots, les papiers
  representatifs de la monnaie._

  5'o _Les vehicules de toute nature pouvant servir a la guerre,
  ainsi que les pieces detachees._

  6'o _Les navires, bateaux et embarcations de tout genre, les docks
  flottants, parties de bassins, ainsi que les pieces detachees._

  7'o _Le materiel fixe ou roulant des chemins de fer, le materiel
  des telegraphes, radiotelegraphes et telephones._

  8'o _Les aerostats et les appareils d'aviation, les pieces
  detachees caracterisees ainsi que les accessoires, objets_ _et
  materiaux caracterises comme devant servir a l'aerostation ou a
  l'aviation._

  9'o _Les combustibles; les matieres lubrifiantes._

  10'o _Les poudres et les explosifs qui ne sont pas specialement
  affectes a la guerre._

  11'o _Les fils de fer barbeles, ainsi que les instruments servant
  a les fixer ou a les couper._

  12'o _Les fers a cheval et le materiel de marechalerie._

  13'o _Les objets de harnachement et de sellerie._

  14'o _Les jumelles, les telescopes, les chronometres et les divers
  instruments nautiques._

Sur l'expression _sont de plein droit_, il faut faire la meme
observation qu'a propos de l'article 22. Les objets enumeres ne
constituent de la contrebande conditionnelle que s'ils ont la
destination prevue par l'article 33.

Les _vivres_ comprennent les produits necessaires ou utiles a
l'alimentation de l'homme, solides ou liquides.

Les _papiers representatifs de la monnaie_ ne comprennent que le
papier-monnaie, les billets de banque ayant ou non cours legal. Les
lettres de change et les cheques n'y rentrent pas.

Les machines et chaudieres rentrent dans l'enumeration du 6'o.

Le materiel des chemins de fer comprend le materiel fixe, comme les
rails, les traverses, les plaques tournantes, les pieces destinees a la
construction des ponts, et le materiel roulant, comme les locomotives,
les wagons.

Article 25.

_Les objets et materiaux susceptibles de servir aux usages de la guerre
comme a des usages pacifiques, et autres que ceux vises aux articles 22
et 24, peuvent etre ajoutes a la liste de contrebande conditionnelle au
moyen d'une declaration qui sera notifiee de la maniere prevue a
l'article 23, deuxieme alinea._

Cette disposition correspond, pour la contrebande conditionnelle, a la
disposition de l'article 23 pour la contrebande absolue.

Article 26.

_Si une Puissance renonce, en ce qui la concerne, a considerer comme
contrebande de guerre des objets et materiaux qui rentrent dans une des
categories enumerees aux articles 22 et 24, elle fera connaitre son
intention par une declaration notifiee de la maniere prevue a l'article
23, deuxieme alinea._

Un belligerant peut vouloir ne pas user du droit de considerer comme
contrebande de guerre les articles rentrant dans les listes ci-dessus.
Il peut lui convenir ou de faire rentrer dans la contrebande
conditionnelle un article compris dans la contrebande absolue ou de
declarer libre, en ce qui le concerne, le commerce de tel article
rentrant dans l'une ou dans l'autre categorie. Il est a desirer qu'il
fasse connaitre son intention a ce sujet, et il est probable qu'il le
fera pour avoir le merite de la mesure. S'il ne le fait pas, et s'il se
contente de donner des instructions a ses croiseurs, les navires visites
seront agreablement surpris si le visiteur ne leur reproche pas de
transporter ce qu'eux-memes consideraient comme de contrebande. Rien
n'empeche une Puissance de faire une pareille declaration en temps de
paix. Voir ce qui est dit a propos de l'article 23.

Article 27.

_Les objets et materiaux qui ne sont pas susceptibles de servir aux
usages de la guerre, ne peuvent pas etre declares contrebande de
guerre._

L'existence d'une liste dite _libre_ (article 28) rend utile cette
affirmation que les objets qui ne sont pas susceptibles de servir aux
usages de la guerre ne peuvent etre declares contrebande de guerre. On
aurait pu croire que les objets ne rentrant pas dans cette liste peuvent
etre declares au moins de contrebande conditionnelle.

Article 28.

_Ne peuvent pas etre declares contrebande de guerre les articles
suivants, savoir:_

  1'o _Le coton brut, les laines, soies, jutes, lins, chanvres
  bruts, et les autres matieres premieres des industries textiles,
  ainsi que leurs files._

  2'o _Les noix et graines oleagineuses; le coprah._

  3'o _Les caoutchoucs, resines, gommes et laques; le houblon._

  4'o _Les peaux brutes, les cornes, os et ivoires._

  5'o _Les engrais naturels et artificiels, y compris les nitrates
  et phosphates pouvant servir a l'agriculture._

  6'o _Les minerais._

  7'o _Les terres, les argiles, la chaux, la craie, les pierres y
  compris les marbres, les briques, ardoises et tuiles._

  8'o _Les porcelaines et verreries._

  9'o _Le papier et les matieres preparees pour sa fabrication._

  10'o _Les savons, couleurs, y compris les matieres exclusivement
  destinees a les produire, et les vernis._

  11'o _L'hypochlorite de chaux, les cendres de soude, la soude
  caustique, le sulfate de soude en pains, l'ammoniaque, le sulfate
  d'ammoniaque et le sulfate de cuivre._

  12'o _Les machines servant a l'agriculture, aux mines, aux
  industries textiles et a l'imprimerie._

  13'o _Les pierres precieuses, les pierres fines, les perles, la
  nacre et les coraux._

  14'o _Les horloges, pendules, et montres autres que les
  chronometres._

  15'o _Les articles de mode et les objets de fantaisie._

  16'o _Les plumes de tout genre, les crins et soies._

  17'o _Les objets d'ameublement ou d'ornement; les meubles et
  accessoires de bureau._

C'est pour diminuer les inconvenients de la guerre pour le commerce
qu'il a ete juge utile de dresser cette _liste_ dite _libre_, ce qui ne
veut pas dire, comme il a ete explique plus haut, que tous les objets
restes en dehors pourraient etre declares contrebande de guerre.

Les _minerais_ sont les produits des mines servant a obtenir des metaux
(_metallic ores_).

On avait demande de faire rentrer dans le 10'o les _produits
tinctoriaux_; cela a paru trop general; il y a des matieres d'ou on tire
des couleurs, comme le charbon, mais qui servent aussi a d'autres
usages. Les produits qui ne sont utilises que pour obtenir des couleurs
beneficient de l'exemption.

Les "articles de Paris" dont tout le monde comprend la signification
rentrent dans le 15'o.

Dans le 16'o, il s'agit des soies de certains animaux comme les porcs et
les sangliers.

Les tapis et les nattes rentrent dans les objets d'ameublement et
d'ornement (17'o).

Article 29.

_Ne peuvent non plus etre consideres comme contrebande de guerre:_

  1'o _Les objets et materiaux servant exclusivement a soigner les
  malades et les blesses. Toutefois, ils peuvent, en cas de
  necessite militaire importante, etre requisitionnes, moyennant une
  indemnite, lorsqu'ils ont la destination prevue a l'article 30._

  2'o _Les objets et materiaux destines a l'usage du navire ou ils
  sont trouves, ainsi qu'a l'usage de l'equipage et des passagers de
  ce navire pendant la traversee._

Si les objets enumeres dans l'article 29 ne sont pas non plus consideres
comme contrebande de guerre, c'est pour des motifs autres que ceux qui
ont fait admettre la liste de l'article 28.

Des raisons d'humanite ont fait ecarter les objets et materiaux servant
exclusivement a soigner les malades et les blesses, ce qui comprend
naturellement les drogues et les divers medicaments. Il ne s'agit pas
des bateaux hospitaliers, pour lesquels une immunite speciale est
assuree par la Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907, mais de navires
de commerce ordinaires dont le chargement comprendrait des objets de la
nature indiquee. Le croiseur a toutefois le droit, en cas de necessite
importante, de requisitionner ces objets pour les besoins de son
equipage ou de sa flotte; cette requisition ne peut etre faite que
moyennant indemnite. Mais il faut remarquer que ce droit de requisition
ne peut s'exercer dans tous les cas. Les objets dont il s'agit doivent
avoir la destination prevue a l'article 30, c'est-a-dire, la destination
ennemie. Autrement le droit commun reprend son empire: un belligerant ne
saurait avoir le droit de requisition a l'egard des navires neutres en
pleine mer.

On ne peut non plus considerer comme contrebande les objets et materiaux
destines a l'usage du navire et qui pourraient, en eux-memes et par leur
nature, constituer de la contrebande de guerre, par exemple les armes
destinees a defendre le navire contre les pirates ou a faire des
signaux. Il en est de meme de ce qui est destine a l'usage de l'equipage
et des passagers pendant la traversee; l'equipage comprend ici tout le
personnel du navire en general.

_De la destination de la contrebande._--Comme il a ete dit, le deuxieme
element de la notion de contrebande est _la destination_. De grandes
difficultes se sont produites a ce sujet et se symbolisent dans la
_theorie du voyage continu_, souvent combattue ou invoquee sans que l'on
se rende bien compte de son exacte signification. Il faut envisager
simplement les situations en elles-memes et voir comment elles doivent
etre reglees de maniere a ne pas tracasser inutilement les neutres et a
ne pas sacrifier les droits legitimes des belligerants.

Pour amener un rapprochement entre des theories et des pratiques
contraires, on a separe, a ce point de vue, la contrebande absolue de la
contrebande conditionnelle.

A la contrebande absolue se rapportent les articles 30 a 32, a la
contrebande conditionnelle les articles 33 a 36.

Article 30.

_Les articles de contrebande absolue sont saisissables, s'il est etabli
qu'ils sont destines au territoire de l'ennemi ou a un territoire occupe
par lui ou a ses forces armees. Peu importe que le transport de ces
objets se fasse directement ou exige, soit un transbordement, soit un
trajet par terre._

Les objets compris dans la liste de l'article 22 constituent de la
contrebande absolue, quand ils sont destines a un territoire de l'ennemi
ou a un territoire occupe par lui ou a ses forces armees de terre ou de
mer. Ces objets sont saisissables, du moment qu'une pareille
destination finale peut etre etablie par le capteur. Ce n'est donc pas
la destination du navire qui est decisive, c'est la destination de la
marchandise. Celle-ci a beau etre a bord d'un navire qui doit la
debarquer dans un port neutre; du moment que le capteur est a meme
d'etablir que cette marchandise doit, de la, etre transportee en pays
ennemi par voie maritime ou terrestre, cela suffit pour justifier la
saisie et ensuite la confiscation de la cargaison. C'est le principe
meme du voyage continu qui est ainsi consacre, pour la contrebande
absolue, par l'article 30. On regarde comme ne faisant qu'un tout le
trajet suivi par la marchandise.

Article 31.

_La destination prevue a l'article 30 est definitivement prouvee dans
les cas suivants:_

  1'o _Lorsque la marchandise est documentee pour etre debarquee
  dans un port de l'ennemi ou pour etre livree a ses forces armees._

  2'o _Lorsque le navire ne doit aborder qu'a des ports ennemis, ou
  lorsqu'il doit toucher a un port de l'ennemi ou rejoindre ses
  forces armees, avant d'arriver au port neutre pour lequel la
  marchandise est documentee._

Comme il a ete dit, c'est au capteur qu'incombe l'obligation de prouver
que la marchandise de contrebande a bien la destination prevue par
l'article 30. Dans certains cas prevus par l'article 31, cette
destination est _definitivement_ prouvee, c'est-a-dire que la preuve
contraire n'est pas admise.

_Premier Cas._--La marchandise est _documentee_ pour etre debarquee dans
un port ennemi, c'est-a-dire que, d'apres les papiers de bord qui se
referent a cette marchandise, elle doit bien y etre debarquee. Il y a
alors un veritable aveu, de la part des interesses eux-memes, de la
destination ennemie.

_Deuxieme Cas._--Le navire ne doit aborder qu'a des ports ennemis ou
bien il doit toucher a un port ennemi avant d'arriver au port neutre
pour lequel la marchandise est documentee. Ainsi cette marchandise doit
bien, d'apres les papiers qui la concernent, etre debarquee dans un port
neutre, mais le navire qui la porte doit, avant d'arriver a ce port,
toucher a un port ennemi. Elle sera saisissable et on ne reserve pas la
possibilite de prouver que la destination neutre est reelle et conforme
aux intentions des interesses. La circonstance que, avant de parvenir a
cette destination, le navire touchera a un port ennemi, ferait naitre un
trop grand risque pour le belligerant dont le croiseur visite le navire.
Sans supposer meme une fraude premeditee, il pourrait y avoir, pour le
capitaine du navire de commerce, une forte tentation de debarquer la
contrebande dont il trouverait un prix avantageux, et, pour l'autorite
locale, la tentation de requisitionner cette marchandise.

Le cas ou le navire, avant d'arriver au port neutre, doit rejoindre les
forces armees de l'ennemi, est identique.

Pour simplifier, la disposition ne parle que d'un _port ennemi_; il va
de soi qu'il faut lui assimiler le _port occupe par l'ennemi_, comme
cela resulte de la regle generale de l'article 30.

Article 32.

_Les papiers de bord font preuve complete de l'itineraire du navire
transportant de la contrebande absolue, a moins que le navire soit
rencontre ayant manifestement devie de la route qu'il devrait suivre
d'apres ses papiers de bord et sans pouvoir justifier d'une cause
suffisante de cette deviation._

Les papiers de bord font donc preuve complete de l'itineraire du navire,
a moins que ce navire soit rencontre dans des circonstances qui montrent
que l'on ne peut se fier a leurs allegations. Voir, d'ailleurs, les
explications donnees a propos de l'article 35.

Article 33.

_Les articles de contrebande conditionnelle sont saisissables, s'il est
etabli qu'ils sont destines a l'usage des forces armees ou des
administrations de l'Etat ennemi, a moins, dans ce dernier cas, que les
circonstances etablissent qu'en fait ces articles ne peuvent etre
utilises pour la guerre en cours; cette derniere reserve ne s'applique
pas aux envois vises par l'article 24--4'o._

Les regles qui concernent la contrebande conditionnelle different de
celles qui ont ete posees pour la contrebande absolue, a un double point
de vue: 1'o il ne s'agit pas d'une destination a l'ennemi en general,
mais d'une destination a l'usage de ses forces armees ou de ses
administrations; 2'o la doctrine du voyage continu est ecartee. A la
premiere idee correspondent les articles 33 et 34; a la seconde
correspond l'article 35.

Les objets compris dans la liste de la contrebande conditionnelle
peuvent servir a des usages pacifiques comme a des emplois hostiles. Si,
d'apres les circonstances, l'emploi pacifique est certain, la saisie ne
se justifie pas; il en est autrement si l'emploi hostile doit se
supposer, ce qui arrive, par exemple, s'il s'agit de vivres destines a
une armee ou a une flotte de l'ennemi, de charbon destine a une flotte
ennemie. En cas pareil, il n'y a evidemment pas de doute. Mais que
faut-il decider quand c'est a l'usage des administrations civiles
d'Etat ennemi que les objets sont destines? C'est de l'argent qui est
envoye a une administration civile et qui doit etre employe au paiement
du salaire de ses agents, des rails de chemin de fer qui sont expedies a
une administration des travaux publics. Il y aura, dans ces cas,
_destination ennemie_ rendant la marchandise saisissable d'abord et
confiscable ensuite. Cela s'explique pour des raisons a la fois
juridiques et pratiques. L'Etat est un, quoique les fonctions
necessaires a son action soient confiees a diverses administrations. Si
une administration civile peut recevoir librement des vivres ou de
l'argent, cela ne profite pas a elle seule, mais a l'Etat tout entier, y
compris l'administration militaire, puisque les ressources generales de
l'Etat augmentent ainsi. Il y a plus: ce que recoit une administration
civile peut etre juge plus necessaire a l'administration militaire et
attribue directement a celle-ci. L'argent ou les vivres reellement
destines a une administration civile peuvent se trouver ainsi
directement employes aux besoins de l'armee. Cette possibilite, qui
existe toujours, explique pourquoi la destination aux administrations de
l'Etat ennemi est assimilee a la destination aux forces armees.

Il s'agit des _administrations de l'Etat_, qui sont des dependances du
pouvoir central, et non de toutes les administrations qui peuvent
exister dans l'Etat ennemi; les administrations locales, municipales,
par exemple, n'y rentrent pas, et ce qui serait destine a leur usage ne
constituerait pas de la contrebande.

La guerre peut se poursuivre dans des circonstances telles que la
destination a l'usage d'une administration civile ne puisse etre
suspectee et ne puisse, par consequent, donner a la marchandise le
caractere de contrebande. Par exemple, une guerre existe en Europe et
les colonies des pays belligerants ne sont pas, en fait, atteintes par
la guerre. Les vivres ou autres objets de la liste de contrebande
conditionnelle qui seraient destines a l'usage d'une administration
civile coloniale ne seraient pas reputes contrebande de guerre, parce
que les considerations invoquees plus haut ne s'appliquent pas dans
l'espece; il ne peut y avoir emprunt pour les besoins de la guerre des
ressources de l'administration civile. Exception est faite pour l'or et
l'argent ou les papiers representatifs de la monnaie, parce qu'une somme
d'argent peut facilement se transmettre d'un bout du monde a l'autre.

Article 34.

_Il y a presomption de la destination prevue a l'article 33, si l'envoi
est adresse_ _aux autorites ennemies, ou a un commercant etabli en pays
ennemi et lorsqu'il est notoire que ce commercant fournit a l'ennemi des
objets et materiaux de cette nature. Il en est de meme si l'envoi est a
destination d'une place fortifiee ennemie, ou d'une autre place servant
de base aux forces armees ennemies; toutefois, cette presomption ne
s'applique point au navire de commerce lui-meme faisant route vers une
de ces places et dont on entend etablir le caractere de contrebande._

_A defaut des presomptions ci-dessus, la destination est presumee
innocente._

_Les presomptions etablies dans le present article admettent la preuve
contraire._

Ordinairement les articles de contrebande ne seront pas expressement
adresses aux autorites militaires ou aux administrations de l'Etat
ennemi. On dissimulera plus ou moins la destination veritable; c'est au
capteur a l'etablir pour justifier la saisie. Mais on a cru raisonnable
d'etablir des presomptions, soit a raison de la qualite du destinataire,
soit a raison du caractere de la place a laquelle sont destines les
objets. C'est une autorite ennemie ou un commercant etabli en pays
ennemi, qui est le fournisseur notoire du Gouvernement ennemi pour les
articles dont il s'agit. C'est une place fortifiee ennemie ou une place
servant de base aux forces armees ennemies, que ce soit une base
d'operations ou une base de ravitaillement.

Cette presomption generale ne saurait s'appliquer au navire de commerce
lui-meme qui se dirigerait vers une place fortifiee et qui peut bien,
par lui-meme, constituer de la contrebande relative, mais a la condition
que sa destination a l'usage des forces armees ou des administrations de
l'Etat ennemi soit directement prouvee.

A defaut des presomptions precedentes, la destination est presumee
innocente. C'est le droit commun, d'apres lequel le capteur doit prouver
le caractere illicite de la marchandise qu'il pretend saisir.

Enfin, toutes les presomptions ainsi etablies dans l'interet du capteur
ou contre lui admettent la preuve contraire. Les tribunaux nationaux
d'abord, la Cour Internationale ensuite, apprecieront.

Article 35.

_Les articles de contrebande conditionnelle ne sont saisissables que sur
le navire qui fait route vers le territoire de l'ennemi ou vers un
territoire occupe par lui ou vers ses forces armees et que ne doit pas
les decharger dans un port intermediaire neutre._

_Les papiers de bord font preuve complete de l'itineraire du navire
ainsi que du lieu de dechargement des marchandises, a moins que ce
navire soit rencontre ayant manifestement devie de la route_ _qu'il
devrait suivre d'apres ses papiers de bord et sans pouvoir justifier
d'une cause suffisante de cette deviation._

Comme il a ete dit plus haut, la doctrine du voyage continu a ete
ecartee pour la contrebande conditionnelle. Celle-ci n'est donc
saisissable que si elle doit etre debarquee dans un port ennemi. Du
moment que la marchandise est documentee pour etre debarquee dans un
port neutre, elle ne peut constituer de la contrebande, et il n'y a pas
a rechercher si, de ce port neutre, elle doit etre expediee a l'ennemi
par mer ou par terre. C'est la difference essentielle avec la
contrebande absolue.

Les papiers de bord font preuve complete de l'itineraire du navire et du
lieu de dechargement de la cargaison; il en serait autrement si le
navire etait rencontre ayant manifestement devie de la route qu'il
devrait suivre d'apres ses papiers et sans pouvoir justifier d'une cause
suffisante de cette deviation.

Cette regle sur la preuve fournie par les papiers de bord a pour but
d'ecarter des pretentions elevees a la legere par un croiseur et amenant
des saisies injustifiees. Elle ne doit pas etre entendue d'une maniere
trop absolue qui faciliterait toutes les fraudes. Ainsi elle n'est pas
maintenue quand le navire est rencontre en mer ayant manifestement devie
de la route qu'il aurait du suivre et sans pouvoir justifier de cette
deviation. Les papiers de bord sont alors contredits par la realite des
faits et perdent toute force probante; le croiseur se decidera librement
suivant les cas. De meme, la visite du navire peut permettre de
constater des faits qui prouvent d'une maniere irrefutable que la
destination du navire ou le lieu de dechargement de la marchandise sont
faussement indiques dans les papiers de bord. Le croiseur apprecie alors
librement les circonstances et saisit ou non le navire suivant cette
appreciation. En resume, les papiers de bord font preuve, a moins que la
faussete de leurs indications ne soit demontree par les faits. Cette
restriction de la force probante des papiers de bord a paru aller de soi
et ne pas avoir besoin d'etre expressement mentionnee. On n'a pas voulu
avoir l'air de diminuer la force de la regle generale, qui est une
garantie pour le commerce neutre.

De ce qu'une indication est reconnue fausse, il ne resulte pas que la
force probante des papiers de bord soit infirmee dans son ensemble. Les
indications pour lesquelles aucune allegation de faussete ne peut etre
verifiee conservent leur valeur.

Article 36.

_Par derogation a l'article 35, si le territoire de l'ennemi n'a pas de
frontiere_ _maritime, les articles de contrebande conditionnelle sont
saisissables, lorsqu'il est etabli qu'ils ont la destination prevue a
l'article 33._

Le cas prevu est assurement rare, mais cependant il s'est presente dans
des guerres recentes. Pour la contrebande absolue, il n'y a pas de
difficulte, puisque la destination a l'ennemi peut toujours etre
prouvee, quel que soit l'itineraire a suivre par la marchandise (article
30). Il en est autrement pour la contrebande conditionnelle, et une
derogation doit etre apportee a la regle generale de l'article 35,
alinea 1'er, de maniere a permettre au capteur d'etablir que la
marchandise suspecte a bien la destination speciale prevue a l'article
33, sans qu'on puisse objecter le fait du dechargement dans un port
neutre.

Article 37.

_Le navire transportant des articles, qui sont saisissables comme
contrebande absolue ou conditionnelle, peut etre saisi, en haute mer ou
dans les eaux des belligerants, pendant tout le cours de son voyage,
meme s'il a l'intention de toucher a un port d'escale avant d'atteindre
la destination ennemie._

Le navire peut etre saisi pour cause de contrebande pendant tout le
cours de son voyage, pourvu qu'il soit dans des eaux ou un acte de
guerre est licite. Le fait qu'il aurait l'intention de toucher a un port
d'escale avant d'atteindre la destination ennemie n'empeche pas la
saisie, du moment que, dans l'espece, la destination ennemie est etablie
conformement aux regles etablies par les articles 30 a 32 pour la
contrebande absolue, par les articles 33 a 35 pour la contrebande
conditionnelle, et sous la reserve de l'exception de l'article 36.

Article 38.

_Une saisie ne peut etre pratiquee en raison d'un transport de
contrebande anterieurement effectue et actuellement acheve._

Un navire est saisissable quand il transporte de la contrebande, mais
non pour en avoir transporte.

Article 39.

_Les articles de contrebande sont sujets a confiscation._

Cela ne presente aucune difficulte.

Article 40.

_La confiscation du navire transportant de la contrebande est permise,
si cette contrebande forme, soit par sa valeur, soit par son poids, soit
par son volume, soit par son fret, plus de la moitie de la cargaison._

Tout le monde admettait bien que, dans certains cas, la confiscation de
la contrebande ne suffit pas et que la confiscation doit atteindre le
navire lui-meme, mais les opinions differaient sur la determination de
ces cas. On s'est arrete a une certaine proportion a etablir entre la
contrebande et l'ensemble de la cargaison. Mais la question se
subdivise: 1'o Quelle sera cette proportion? La solution adoptee tient
le milieu entre les solutions proposees, qui allaient du quart aux trois
quarts. 2'o Comment sera calculee cette proportion? La contrebande
devra-t-elle former plus de la moitie de la cargaison en volume, en
poids, en valeur, en fret? L'adoption d'un criterium determine prete a
des objections theoriques et facilite aussi des pratiques destinees a
eviter la confiscation du navire malgre l'importance de la cargaison. Si
on prend le volume ou le poids, le capitaine prendra des marchandises
licites assez volumineuses ou pesantes pour que le volume ou le poids de
la contrebande soit inferieur. Une observation analogue peut etre faite
en ce qui concerne la valeur ou le fret. La consequence est qu'il
suffit, pour justifier la confiscation, que la contrebande forme plus de
la moitie de la cargaison a l'un quelconque des points de vue indiques.
Cela peut paraitre severe; mais, d'une part, en procedant autrement, on
faciliterait des calculs frauduleux, et d'autre part, il est permis de
dire que la confiscation du navire est justifiee, lorsque le transport
de la contrebande etait une partie notable de son trafic, ce qui est
vrai pour chacun des cas prevus.

Article 41.

_Si le navire transportant de la contrebande est relache, les frais
occasionnes au capteur par la procedure devant la juridiction nationale
des prises ainsi que par la conservation du navire et de sa cargaison
pendant l'instruction sont a la charge du navire._

Il n'est pas juste que, d'une part, le transport de contrebande au-dela
d'une certaine proportion entraine la confiscation du navire, tandis
qu'au-dessous de cette proportion, il n'y a que la confiscation de la
contrebande, ce qui souvent n'est pas une perte pour le capitaine, le
fret de cette contrebande ayant ete paye a l'avance. N'y a-t-il pas la
un encouragement a la contrebande, et ne conviendrait-il pas de faire
subir une certaine peine pour le transport inferieur a la proportion
requise pour la confiscation? On avait propose une espece d'amende qui
aurait pu etre en rapport avec la valeur des articles de contrebande.
Des objections d'ordre divers ont ete formulees contre cette
proposition, bien que le principe d'une perte pecuniaire infligee a
raison du transport de la contrebande eut paru justifie. On est arrive
au meme but d'une autre facon en disposant que les frais occasionnes au
capteur par la procedure devant la juridiction nationale des prises,
comme par la conservation du navire et de sa cargaison pendant
l'instruction, sont a la charge du navire; les frais de conservation du
navire comprennent, le cas echeant, les frais d'entretien du personnel
du navire capture. Il convient d'ajouter que le dommage cause au navire
par sa conduite et son sejour dans un port de prise est de nature a
produire l'effet preventif le plus serieux en ce qui concerne le
transport de la contrebande.

Article 42.

_Les marchandises qui appartiennent au proprietaire de la contrebande et
qui se trouvent a bord du meme navire sont sujettes a confiscation._

Le proprietaire de la contrebande est puni d'abord par la confiscation
de sa propriete illicite; il l'est ensuite par la confiscation des
marchandises, meme licites, qu'il peut avoir sur le meme navire.

Article 43.

_Si un navire est rencontre en mer naviguant dans l'ignorance des
hostilites ou de la declaration de contrebande applicable a son
chargement, les articles de contrebande ne peuvent etre confisques que
moyennant indemnite; le navire et le surplus de la cargaison sont
exempts de la confiscation et des frais prevus par l'article 41. Il en
est de meme si le capitaine, apres avoir eu connaissance de l'ouverture
des hostilites ou de la declaration de contrebande, n'a pu encore
decharger les articles de contrebande._

_Le navire est repute connaitre l'etat de guerre ou la declaration de
contrebande, lorsqu'il a quitte un port neutre, apres que la
notification de l'ouverture des hostilites ou de la declaration de
contrebande a ete faite, en temps utile, a la Puissance dont releve ce
port. L'etat de guerre est, en outre, repute connu par le navire
lorsqu'il a quitte un port ennemi apres l'ouverture des hostilites._

La disposition a pour but de menager les neutres qui, en fait,
transporteraient de la contrebande, mais auxquels on ne pourrait rien
reprocher, ce qui peut se presenter dans deux cas. Le premier est celui
ou ils ne connaissent pas l'ouverture des hostilites; le second est
celui ou, tout en connaissant cette ouverture, ils ignorent la
declaration de contrebande qu'a faite un belligerant conformement aux
articles 23 et 25, et qui est precisement applicable a tout ou partie du
chargement. Il serait injuste de saisir le navire et de confisquer la
contrebande; d'autre part, le croiseur ne peut etre oblige de laisser
aller a l'ennemi des produits propres a la guerre et dont celui-ci peut
avoir grand besoin. Les interets en presence sont concilies en ce sens
qu'alors la confiscation ne peut avoir lieu que moyennant indemnite
(voir, dans un ordre d'idees analogue, la Convention du 18 octobre 1907,
sur le regime des navires de commerce ennemis au debut des hostilites).

Article 44.

_Le navire arrete pour cause de contrebande et non susceptible de
confiscation a raison de la proportion de la contrebande peut etre
autorise, suivant les circonstances, a continuer sa route, si le
capitaine est pret a livrer la contrebande au batiment belligerant._

_La remise de la contrebande est mentionnee par le capteur sur le livre
de bord du navire arrete, et le capitaine de ce navire doit remettre au
capteur copie certifiee conforme de tous papiers utiles._

_Le capteur a la faculte de detruire la contrebande qui lui est ainsi
livree._

Un navire neutre est arrete pour cause de contrebande. Il n'est pas
susceptible de confiscation, parce que la contrebande n'atteint pas la
proportion prevue par l'article 40. Il peut neanmoins etre conduit dans
un port de prise pour qu'il y ait un jugement relatif a la contrebande.
Ce droit du capteur parait excessif dans certains cas, si on compare le
peu d'importance que peut avoir la contrebande (une caisse de fusils ou
de revolvers, par exemple) et le grave prejudice qu'entrainent pour le
navire ce detournement de sa route et sa retenue pendant le temps de
l'instruction. Aussi s'est-on demande s'il n'etait pas possible de
reconnaitre au navire neutre le droit de continuer sa route moyennant la
remise des objets de contrebande au capteur qui, de son cote, n'aurait
pu les refuser que pour des motifs suffisants, par exemple, le mauvais
etat de la mer, qui rend le transbordement impossible ou difficile, des
soupcons fondes au sujet de la quantite veritable de contrebande que
porte le navire de commerce, la difficulte de loger les objets a bord du
navire de guerre, etc. Cette proposition n'a pas reuni les suffrages
suffisants. On a pretendu qu'il etait impossible d'imposer une pareille
obligation au croiseur pour lequel cette remise presenterait presque
toujours des inconvenients. Si, par hasard, il n'y en a pas, le croiseur
ne la refusera pas, parce qu'il aura lui-meme avantage a ne pas etre
detourne de sa route par la necessite de conduire le navire dans un
port. Le systeme de l'obligation etant ainsi ecarte, on a decide de
reglementer la remise facultative qui, espere-t-on, sera pratiquee
toutes les fois que ce sera possible, au grand avantage des deux
parties. Les formalites prevues sont tres simples et n'exigent pas
d'explication.

Un jugement du tribunal des prises devra intervenir au sujet de la
marchandise ainsi remise. C'est pour cela que le capteur doit se munir
des papiers necessaires. On pourrait concevoir qu'il y eut doute sur le
caractere de certains objets que le croiseur pretend etre de
contrebande; le capitaine du navire de commerce conteste, mais il
prefere les livrer pour avoir la faculte de continuer sa route. Il n'y a
la qu'une saisie devant etre confirmee par la juridiction des prises.

La contrebande livree par le navire de commerce peut embarrasser le
croiseur qui doit etre laisse libre de la detruire au moment meme de la
remise ou posterieurement.


CHAPITRE III.--_De l'assistance hostile._

D'une maniere generale, on peut dire que le navire de commerce qui
manque a la neutralite, soit en transportant de la contrebande de
guerre, soit en violant un blocus, fournit une assistance a l'ennemi, et
c'est a ce titre que le belligerant au prejudice duquel il agit peut lui
faire subir certaines pertes. Mais il y a des cas ou cette assistance
hostile est particulierement caracterisee et qu'on a juge necessaire de
prevoir specialement. On en a fait deux categories d'apres la gravite du
fait reproche au navire neutre.

Dans les cas qui rentrent dans la premiere categorie (article 45), le
navire est confisque, et on lui applique le traitement du navire sujet a
confiscation pour transport de contrebande. Cela signifie que le navire
ne perd pas sa qualite de neutre et a droit aux garanties admises pour
les navires neutres; par exemple, il ne pourrait etre detruit par le
capteur que dans les conditions etablies pour les navires neutres
(articles 48 et suivants); la regle _le pavillon couvre la marchandise_
s'applique en ce qui concerne la marchandise qui se trouve a bord.

Dans les cas plus graves qui appartiennent a la seconde categorie
(article 46), le navire est encore confisque; de plus, il n'est pas
traite seulement comme un navire confiscable comme porteur de
contrebande, mais comme un navire de commerce ennemi, ce qui entraine
certaines consequences. Le reglement sur la destruction des prises
neutres ne s'applique pas au navire, et, celui-ci devenant navire
ennemi, ce n'est plus la seconde, mais c'est la troisieme regle de la
Declaration de Paris qui est applicable. La marchandise qui sera a bord
sera presumee ennemie; les neutres auront le droit de reclamer leur
propriete en justifiant de leur neutralite (article 59). Il ne faut
cependant pas exagerer jusqu'a penser que le caractere neutre originaire
du navire est completement efface, de telle sorte qu'il doive etre
traite comme s'il avait toujours ete ennemi. Le navire peut soutenir que
la pretention elevee contre lui n'est pas fondee, que l'acte qui lui est
reproche n'a pas le caractere d'une assistance hostile. Il a donc le
droit de recourir a la juridiction internationale en vertu des
dispositions qui protegent les proprietes neutres.

Article 45.

_Un navire neutre est confisque et, d'une maniere generale, passible du
traitement que subirait un navire neutre sujet a confiscation pour
contrebande de guerre:_

  1'o _Lorsqu'il voyage specialement en vue du transport de
  passagers individuels incorpores dans la force armee de l'ennemi,
  ou en vue de la transmission de nouvelles dans l'interet de
  l'ennemi._

  2'o _Lorsqu'a la connaissance soit du proprietaire, soit de celui
  qui a affrete le navire en totalite, soit du capitaine, il
  transporte un detachement militaire de l'ennemi ou une ou
  plusieurs personnes qui, pendant le voyage, pretent une assistance
  directe aux operations de l'ennemi._

_Dans les cas vises aux numeros precedents, les marchandises appartenant
au proprietaire du navire sont egalement sujettes a confiscation._

_Les dispositions du present article ne s'appliquent pas si, lorsque le
navire est rencontre en mer, il ignore les hostilites, ou si le
capitaine, apres avoir appris l'ouverture des hostilites, n'a pu encore
debarquer les personnes transportees. Le navire est repute connaitre
l'etat de guerre lorsqu'il a quitte un port ennemi apres l'ouverture des
hostilites ou un port neutre posterieurement a la notification en temps
utile de l'ouverture des hostilites a la Puissance dont releve ce port._

Le premier cas suppose des passagers voyageant _individuellement_; le
cas d'un _detachement militaire_ est vise ci-apres. Il s'agit
d'individus _incorpores_ dans la force armee de terre ou de mer de
l'ennemi. Il y a eu quelque hesitation sur le sens de l'_incorporation_
qui est prevue. Comprend-elle seulement les individus qui, appeles a
servir en vertu de la loi de leur pays, ont effectivement rejoint le
corps dont ils doivent faire partie? ou comprend-elle meme ces individus
des qu'ils sont appeles et avant qu'ils aient rejoint leur corps? La
question a une grande importance pratique. Que l'on suppose des
individus originaires d'un pays de l'Europe continentale et etablis en
Amerique; ces individus sont tenus a des obligations militaires envers
leur pays d'origine; ils doivent, par exemple, faire partie de la
reserve de l'armee active de ce pays. Leur patrie etant en guerre, ils
s'embarquent pour aller faire leur service. Seront-ils consideres comme
_incorpores_ pour l'application de la disposition dont nous nous
occupons? Si on s'attachait a la legislation interieure de certains
pays, l'affirmation pourrait etre soutenue. Mais, independamment des
raisons purement juridiques, l'opinion contraire a paru plus conforme
aux necessites pratiques et, dans un esprit de conciliation, elle a ete
acceptee par tous. Il serait difficile, ou peut-etre meme impossible, de
distinguer, sans des mesures vexatoires que les Gouvernements neutres
n'accepteraient pas, entre les passagers d'un navire, ceux qui sont
tenus d'un service militaire, et qui voyagent pour y satisfaire.

La transmission de nouvelles dans l'interet de l'ennemi est assimilee au
transport de passagers incorpores dans sa force armee. On parle du
navire qui voyage _specialement_ pour indiquer qu'il ne s'agit pas du
service normal du navire. Il s'est detourne de sa route; il a relache
dans un port ou il ne s'arrete pas ordinairement, pour effectuer le
transport en question. Il n'est pas necessaire qu'il soit
_exclusivement_ affecte au service de l'ennemi; ce dernier cas
rentrerait dans la seconde categorie, article 56, 4'o.

Dans les deux hypotheses dont il vient d'etre parle, il s'agit d'une
operation isolee faite par le navire; il a ete charge d'effectuer tel
transport ou de transmettre telles nouvelles; il n'est pas attache d'une
maniere continue au service de l'ennemi. Il en resulte qu'il peut bien
etre saisi pendant le voyage ou il se livre a l'operation qui lui est
confiee; ce voyage termine, tout est fini en ce sens qu'il ne pourrait
etre saisi pour avoir fait l'operation prevue; c'est analogue a ce qui
est admis en matiere de contrebande (article 38).

Le deuxieme cas se subdivise egalement.

Transport d'un detachement militaire de l'ennemi ou transport d'une ou
de plusieurs personnes qui, pendant le voyage, pretent une assistance
directe aux operations de l'ennemi, par exemple en faisant des signaux.
S'il s'agit de militaires ou de marins en uniforme, il n'y a pas de
difficulte: le navire est evidemment confiscable. S'il s'agit de
militaires ou de marins en costume civil pouvant etre pris pour des
passagers ordinaires, on exige la connaissance du capitaine ou du
proprietaire, celui qui a affrete le navire en totalite etant assimile
au proprietaire. La regle est la meme pour l'hypothese des personnes
pretant une assistance directe a l'ennemi pendant le voyage.

Dans ces cas, si le navire est confisque a raison de son assistance
hostile, l'on doit confisquer egalement les marchandises appartenant au
proprietaire du navire.

Ces dispositions supposent que l'etat de guerre etait connu du navire
qui se livre aux operations prevues; cette connaissance motive et
justifie la confiscation. La situation est tout autre lorsque le navire
ignore l'ouverture des hostilites, de telle sorte qu'il s'est charge de
l'operation en temps normal. Il a pu apprendre en mer l'ouverture des
hostilites, mais sans pouvoir debarquer les personnes transportees. La
confiscation serait alors injuste, et la regle equitable qui a ete
adoptee est d'accord avec les dispositions deja acceptees dans d'autres
matieres. Si le navire a quitte un port ennemi apres l'ouverture des
hostilites, ou un port neutre apres que l'ouverture des hostilites avait
ete notifiee a la Puissance d'ou releve ce port, la connaissance de
l'etat de guerre sera presumee.

Il n'est question ici que d'empecher la confiscation du navire. Les
personnes trouvees a bord et qui font partie des forces armees de
l'ennemi pourront etre prises par le croiseur comme prisonniers de
guerre.

Article 46.

_Un navire neutre est confisque et, d'une maniere generale, passible du
traitement qu'il subirait s'il etait un navire de commerce ennemi:_

  1'o _Lorsqu'il prend une part directe aux hostilites._

  2'o _Lorsqu'il se trouve sous les ordres ou sous le controle d'un
  agent place a bord par le Gouvernement ennemi._

  3'o _Lorsqu'il est affrete en totalite par le Gouvernement
  ennemi._

  4'o _Lorsqu'il est actuellement et exclusivement affecte, soit au
  transport de troupes ennemies, soit a la transmission de nouvelles
  dans l'interet de l'ennemi._

_Dans les cas vises par le present article, les marchandises appartenant
au proprietaire du navire sont egalement sujettes a confiscation._

Les cas prevus ici sont plus graves que ceux de l'article 45, ce qui
justifie le traitement plus severe inflige au navire, ainsi qu'il a ete
explique plus haut.

_Premier cas._--Le navire prend une part directe aux hostilites. Cela
peut se presenter sous diverses formes. Il va sans dire que, s'il y a
lutte armee, le navire est expose a tous les risques d'une pareille
lutte. On suppose qu'il est tombe au pouvoir de l'ennemi qu'il
combattait, et qui est autorise a le traiter comme un navire de commerce
ennemi.

_Deuxieme cas._--Le navire est sous les ordres ou sous le controle d'un
agent place a bord par le Gouvernement ennemi. Cette presence
caracterise le lien qui existe entre l'ennemi et le navire. Dans
d'autres circonstances, le navire peut bien avoir un lien avec l'ennemi;
mais pour etre sujet a la confiscation, il faudrait alors qu'il rentrat
dans le troisieme cas.

_Troisieme cas._--Le navire est affrete en totalite par le Gouvernement
ennemi. Il est donc completement a la disposition de ce Gouvernement,
qui peut s'en servir pour des buts divers se rattachant plus ou moins
directement a la guerre, notamment pour effectuer des transports; c'est
la situation de navires charbonniers qui accompagnent une flotte
belligerante. Souvent il y aura une charte-partie entre le Gouvernement
belligerant et le proprietaire ou le capitaine du navire; mais il n'y a
la qu'une question de preuve. Le fait de l'affretement en totalite
suffit, de quelque facon qu'il soit etabli.

_Quatrieme cas._--Le navire est actuellement et exclusivement affecte,
soit au transport de troupes ennemies, soit a la transmission de
nouvelles dans l'interet de l'ennemi. A la difference des cas vises dans
l'article 45, il s'agit ici d'un service permanent auquel est affecte le
navire. Aussi faut-il decider que, tant que l'affectation dure, le
navire est saisissable, encore qu'au moment ou un croiseur ennemi visite
le navire, celui-ci ne transporte pas de troupes ou ne serve pas a la
transmission de nouvelles.

Comme pour les cas de l'article 45, et par les memes raisons, les
marchandises appartenant au proprietaire du navire, et qui pourraient se
trouver a bord, sont egalement sujettes a confiscation.

On avait propose de considerer comme navire de commerce ennemi le navire
neutre faisant actuellement et avec l'autorisation du Gouvernement
ennemi un trajet auquel il n'a ete autorise qu'apres l'ouverture des
hostilites ou dans les deux mois qui l'ont precedee. Cela se serait
applique notamment aux navires de commerce neutres qui seraient admis
par un belligerant a une navigation reservee en temps de paix a la
marine nationale de ce belligerant--par exemple, au cabotage. Plusieurs
Delegations ont repousse formellement cette proposition, de sorte que
la question ainsi soulevee est restee entiere.

Article 47.

_Tout individu incorpore dans la force armee de l'ennemi et qui sera
trouve a bord d'un navire de commerce neutre, pourra etre fait
prisonnier de guerre, quand meme il n'y aurait pas lieu de saisir ce
navire._

Des individus incorpores dans les forces armees de terre ou de mer d'un
belligerant peuvent se trouver a bord d'un navire de commerce neutre
visite. Si le navire est sujet a confiscation, le croiseur le saisira et
le conduira dans un de ses ports avec les personnes qui se trouvent a
bord. Evidemment les militaires ou marins de l'Etat ennemi ne seront pas
laisses libres, mais seront consideres comme prisonniers de guerre. Il
peut arriver que l'on ne soit pas dans le cas de saisir le navire--par
exemple, parce que le capitaine ne connaissait pas la qualite d'un
individu qui s'etait presente comme un simple passager. Faut-il alors
laisser libre le ou les militaires qui sont sur le navire? Cela n'a pas
paru admissible. Le croiseur belligerant ne peut etre contraint de
laisser libres des ennemis actifs qui sont materiellement en son pouvoir
et qui sont plus dangereux que tels et tels articles de contrebande;
naturellement il doit agir avec une grande discretion, et c'est sous sa
responsabilite qu'il exige la remise de ces individus, mais son droit
existe; aussi a-t-il ete juge necessaire de s'expliquer sur ce point.


CHAPITRE IV.--_De la destruction des prises neutres._

La destruction des prises neutres etait a l'ordre du jour de la Deuxieme
Conference de la Paix et n'a pu y etre reglee. Elle se retrouve a
l'ordre du jour de la presente Conference et, cette fois, un accord a
ete possible. Il y a lieu de s'applaudir d'un pareil resultat qui
temoigne d'un sincere desir d'entente de la part de tous. On a constate
ici, une fois de plus, que des formules tranchantes et opposees ne
repondent pas toujours a la realite et que, si on veut descendre dans le
detail et arriver aux applications precises, on aura souvent a peu pres
la meme maniere de faire, quoiqu'on ait paru se reclamer d'opinions tout
a fait contraires. Pour s'accorder, il faut d'abord se bien comprendre,
ce qui n'est pas toujours le cas. Ainsi, on a constate que ceux qui
proclamaient le droit de detruire les prises neutres, ne pretendaient
pas user de ce droit capricieusement et a tout propos, mais seulement
d'une maniere exceptionnelle, et qu'a l'inverse, ceux qui affirmaient
le principe de l'interdiction de la destruction, admettaient que ce
principe devait ceder dans des cas exceptionnels. Il s'agissait donc de
s'entendre sur ces cas exceptionnels auxquels, dans les deux opinions,
devait se borner le droit de destruction. Ce n'etait pas tout: il
fallait aussi une garantie contre les abus dans l'exercice de ce droit;
l'arbitraire dans l'appreciation des cas exceptionnels devait etre
diminue au moyen d'une responsabilite effective imposee au capteur.
C'est ici qu'est intervenu, dans le reglement de l'affaire, un element
nouveau, grace auquel l'accord a pu se faire. L'intervention possible de
la justice fera reflechir le capteur en meme temps qu'elle assurera une
reparation dans le cas d'une destruction sans motif.

Tel est l'esprit general des dispositions de ce chapitre.

Article 48.

_Un navire neutre saisi ne peut etre detruit par le capteur, mais il
doit etre conduit dans tel port qu'il appartiendra pour y etre statue ce
que de droit sur la validite de la capture._

Le principe general est tres simple. Un navire neutre saisi ne peut etre
detruit par le capteur; cela peut etre admis par tout le monde, quelle
que soit la maniere dont on envisage l'effet de la saisie. Le navire
doit etre conduit dans un port pour y etre statue sur la validite de la
prise. Il sera ou non amarine suivant les cas.

Article 49.

_Par exception, un navire neutre, saisi par un batiment belligerant et
qui serait sujet a confiscation, peut etre detruit, si l'observation de
l'article 48 peut compromettre la securite du batiment de guerre ou le
succes des operations dans lesquelles celui-ci est actuellement engage._

La premiere condition pour que le navire saisi puisse etre detruit est
qu'il soit susceptible de confiscation d'apres les circonstances. Si le
capteur ne peut pas meme songer a obtenir la confiscation du navire,
comment pourrait-il avoir la pretention de le detruire?

La seconde est que l'observation du principe general soit de nature a
compromettre la securite du batiment de guerre ou le succes des
operations dans lesquelles il est actuellement engage. C'est la formule
a laquelle on s'est arrete apres quelques tatonnements. Il a ete entendu
que _compromettre la securite_ etait synonyme de mettre en danger la
navire, et pourrait etre traduit en anglais par _involve danger_. C'est
naturellement au moment ou a lieu la destruction qu'il faut se placer
pour voir si les conditions sont ou non remplies. Le danger qui
n'existait pas au moment meme de la saisie peut s'etre manifeste quelque
temps apres.

Article 50.

_Avant la destruction, les personnes qui se trouvent a bord devront etre
mises en surete, et tous les papiers de bord et autres pieces, que les
interesses estimeront utiles pour le jugement sur la validite de la
capture, devront etre transbordes sur le batiment de guerre._

La disposition prevoit des precautions a prendre dans l'interet des
personnes et dans celui de l'administration de la justice.

Article 51.

_Le capteur qui a detruit un navire neutre doit, prealablement a tout
jugement sur la validite de la capture, justifier en fait n'avoir agi
qu'en presence d'une necessite exceptionnelle, comme elle est prevue a
l'article 49. Faute par lui de ce faire, il est tenu a indemnite
vis-a-vis des interesses, sans qu'il y ait a rechercher si la capture
etait valable ou non._

Ce texte donne une garantie contre la destruction arbitraire des prises
par l'etablissement d'une responsabilite effective du capteur qui a
opere la destruction. Ce capteur doit, en effet, avant tout jugement sur
la validite de la prise, justifier en fait qu'il etait bien dans un des
cas exceptionnels qui sont prevus. La justification sera faite
contradictoirement avec le neutre qui, s'il n'est pas content de la
decision du tribunal national des prises, pourra se pourvoir devant la
juridiction internationale. Cette justification est donc une condition
prealable a remplir par le capteur. S'il ne le fait pas, il doit
indemniser les interesses au navire et au chargement, sans qu'il y ait a
rechercher si la prise etait valable ou nulle. Il y a donc la une
sanction serieuse de l'obligation de ne detruire la prise que dans des
cas determines, c'est une peine pecuniaire qui frappe le capteur. Si, au
contraire, la justification est faite, le proces de prise se suit comme
a l'ordinaire; lorsque la prise est declaree valable, aucune indemnite
n'est due; quand elle est declaree nulle, les interesses ont droit a
etre indemnises. Le recours devant la Cour Internationale ne peut etre
forme que quand la decision du tribunal des prises est intervenue sur le
fond et non pas aussitot apres que la question prealable a ete jugee.

Article 52.

_Si la capture d'un navire neutre, dont la destruction a ete justifiee,
est ensuite declaree nulle, le capteur doit indemniser les interesses en
remplacement de la restitution a laquelle ils auraient droit._

Article 53.

_Si des marchandises neutres qui n'etaient pas susceptibles de
confiscation ont ete detruites avec le navire, le proprietaire de ces
marchandises a droit a une indemnite._

Le navire detruit contenait des marchandises neutres non susceptibles de
confiscation; le proprietaire de ces marchandises a, en tout cas, droit
a une indemnite, c'est-a-dire sans qu'il y ait a distinguer suivant que
la destruction etait ou non justifiee. C'est equitable et c'est une
garantie de plus contre une destruction arbitraire.

Article 54.

_Le capteur a la faculte d'exiger la remise ou de proceder a la
destruction des marchandises confiscables trouvees a bord d'un navire
qui lui-meme n'est pas sujet a confiscation, lorsque les circonstances
sont telles que, d'apres l'article 49, elles justifieraient la
destruction d'un navire passible de confiscation. Il mentionne les
objets livres ou detruits sur le livre de bord du navire arrete et se
fait remettre par le capitaine copie certifiee conforme de tous papiers
utiles. Lorsque la remise ou la destruction a ete effectuee et que les
formalites ont ete remplies, le capitaine doit etre autorise a continuer
sa route._

_Les dispositions des articles 51 et 52 concernant la responsabilite du
capteur qui a detruit un navire neutre sont applicables._

Un croiseur rencontre un navire de commerce neutre portant de la
contrebande dans une proportion inferieure a celle qui est prevue par
l'article 40. Il peut amariner le navire et le conduire dans un port
pour y etre juge. Il peut, conformement a ce qui est regle par l'article
44, accepter la remise de la contrebande qui lui est offerte par le
navire arrete. Mais, qu'arrivera-t-il si aucune de ces solutions
n'intervient? Le navire arrete n'offre pas de remettre la contrebande et
le croiseur n'est pas en situation de conduire le navire dans un de ses
ports. Le croiseur est-il oblige de laisser aller un navire neutre avec
la contrebande qu'il porte? Cela a paru excessif, au moins dans
certaines circonstances exceptionnelles. Ce sont celles-la memes qui
justifieraient la destruction du navire, s'il etait susceptible de
confiscation. En pareil cas, le croiseur pourra exiger la remise ou
proceder a la destruction des marchandises confiscables. Les raisons qui
ont fait admettre la destruction du navire pourront justifier la
destruction des marchandises de contrebande, d'autant plus que les
considerations d'humanite qui peuvent etre invoquees en cas de
destruction du navire sont ecartees ici. Contre une exigence arbitraire
du croiseur, il y a les memes garanties qui ont permis de reconnaitre
la faculte de detruire le navire. Le croiseur doit prealablement
justifier qu'il se trouvait bien dans les circonstances exceptionnelles
prevues; sinon, il est condamne a la valeur des marchandises livrees ou
detruites, sans qu'il y ait a rechercher si elles constituaient ou non
de la contrebande de guerre.

La disposition prescrit des formalites qui sont necessaires pour
constater le fait meme et pour mettre la juridiction des prises a meme
de statuer.

Naturellement, une fois que la remise a ete effectuee ou que la
destruction a ete operee et que les formalites ont ete remplies, le
navire arrete doit etre laisse libre de continuer sa route.


CHAPITRE V.--_Du transfert de pavillon._

Un navire de commerce ennemi est sujet a capture, tandis qu'un navire de
commerce neutre est respecte. On comprend, des lors, qu'un croiseur
belligerant, rencontrant un navire de commerce qui se reclame d'une
nationalite neutre, ait a rechercher si cette nationalite a ete
legitimement acquise ou si elle n'a pas eu pour but de soustraire le
navire aux risques auxquels il aurait ete expose s'il avait garde son
ancienne nationalite. La question se presente naturellement quand le
transfert est de date relativement recente, au moment ou a lieu la
visite, que ce transfert soit, du reste, anterieur ou posterieur a
l'ouverture des hostilites. Elle est resolue differemment suivant qu'on
se place plutot au point de vue de l'interet du commerce ou plutot au
point de vue de l'interet des belligerants. Il est heureux que l'on se
soit entendu sur un reglement qui concilie les deux interets dans la
mesure du possible et qui renseigne les belligerants et le commerce
neutre.

Article 55.

_La transfert sous pavillon neutre d'un navire ennemi, effectue avant
l'ouverture des hostilites, est valable a moins qu'il soit etabli que ce
transfert a ete effectue en vue d'eluder les consequences qu'entraine le
caractere de navire ennemi. Il y a neanmoins presomption de nullite si
l'acte de transfert ne se trouve pas a bord, alors que le navire a perdu
la nationalite belligerante moins de soixante jours avant l'ouverture
des hostilites; la preuve contraire est admise._

_Il y a presomption absolue de validite d'un transfert effectue plus de
trente jours avant l'ouverture des hostilites, s'il est absolu, complet,
conforme a la legislation des pays interesses, et s'il a cet effet que_
_le controle du navire et le benefice de son emploi ne restent pas entre
les memes mains qu'avant le transfert. Toutefois, si le navire a perdu
la nationalite belligerante moins de soixante jours avant l'ouverture
des hostilites et si l'acte de transfert ne se trouve pas a bord, la
saisie du navire ne pourra donner lieu a des dommages et interets._

La regle generale, posee par l'alinea 1'er, est que le transfert sous
pavillon neutre d'un navire ennemi est valable, en supposant, bien
entendu, que les conditions juridiques ordinaires de validite ont ete
remplies. C'est au capteur, s'il veut faire annuler ce transfert, a
etablir que le transfert a eu pour but d'eluder les consequences de la
guerre que l'on prevoyait. Il y a un cas considere comme suspect, celui
dans lequel l'acte de transfert ne se trouve pas a bord, alors que le
navire a change de nationalite moins de soixante jours avant l'ouverture
des hostilites. La presomption de validite etablie au profit du navire
par l'alinea 1'er est renversee au profit du capteur. Il y a presomption
de nullite du transfert, mais la preuve contraire est admise. Il peut
etre prouve, pour l'ecarter, que le transfert n'a pas ete opere en vue
d'eluder les consequences de la guerre; il va sans dire que les
conditions juridiques ordinaires de validite doivent avoir ete remplies.

On a voulu donner au commerce cette garantie que le droit de faire
considerer un transfert comme nul pour ce motif qu'il aurait eu pour but
d'eluder les consequences de la guerre ne s'etendrait pas trop loin et
ne comprendrait pas une periode trop etendue. En consequence, si le
transfert a ete effectue plus de trente jours avant l'ouverture des
hostilites, il ne peut etre attaque pour cette seule cause, et il est
considere comme absolument valable, s'il a ete fait dans des conditions
qui en demontrent le caractere serieux et definitif et qui sont les
suivantes: le transfert doit etre absolu, complet, et conforme a la
legislation des pays interesses et il a pour effet de mettre le controle
et les benefices du navire entre d'autres mains. Ces conditions
etablies, le capteur n'est pas admis a pretendre que le vendeur
prevoyait la guerre dans laquelle son pays allait etre engage et
voulait, par la vente, se soustraire aux risques qu'elle lui aurait fait
courir pour les navires dont il operait le transfert. Si, meme dans
cette hypothese, le navire est rencontre par un croiseur et qu'il n'ait
pas l'acte de transfert a bord, il pourra etre saisi lorsque le
changement de nationalite a eu lieu moins de soixante jours avant
l'ouverture des hostilites; cette circonstance le rend suspect. Mais
si, devant la juridiction des prises, il fait les justifications
prevues par l'alinea 2, il doit etre relache; seulement il ne pourra
obtenir des dommages et interets, attendu qu'il y avait eu motif
suffisant pour saisir le navire.

Article 56.

_Le transfert sous pavillon neutre d'un navire ennemi, effectue apres
l'ouverture des hostilites, est nul, a moins qu'il soit etabli que ce
transfert n'a pas ete effectue en vue d'eluder les consequences
qu'entraine le caractere de navire ennemi._

_Toutefois, il y a presomption absolue de nullite:_

  1'o _Si le transfert a ete effectue pendant que le navire est en
  voyage ou dans un port bloque._

  2'o _S'il y a faculte de remere ou de retour._

  3'o _Si les conditions, auxquelles est soumis le droit de pavillon
  d'apres la legislation du pavillon arbore, n'ont pas ete
  observees._

Pour le _transfert posterieur a l'ouverture des hostilites_, la regle
est plus simple: le transfert n'est valable que s'il est etabli qu'il
n'a pas eu pour but d'eluder les consequences qu'entraine le caractere
de navire ennemi. C'est la solution inverse de celle qui est admise pour
le transfert anterieur a l'ouverture des hostilites; presomption de
validite dans ce dernier, presomption de nullite dans celui dont il
s'agit maintenant, sauf la possibilite de faire la preuve contraire. Il
pourrait etre etabli, par exemple, que le transfert est la suite d'une
transmission hereditaire.

L'article 56 indique des cas dans lesquels la presomption de nullite est
absolue pour des motifs qui se comprennent aisement: dans le premier, le
lien entre le transfert et le risque de guerre couru par le navire
apparait clairement; dans le second, l'acquereur se presente comme un
prete-nom devant etre considere comme proprietaire du navire pendant une
periode dangereuse, apres laquelle le vendeur reprendra son navire;
enfin, le troisieme cas aurait pu a la rigueur etre sous-entendu, le
navire qui se reclame d'une nationalite neutre devant naturellement
justifier qu'il a droit a cette nationalite.

On avait d'abord prevu le cas ou le navire est, apres le transfert,
maintenu dans le service auquel il etait affecte auparavant. Il y a la
une circonstance suspecte au plus haut point; le transfert parait
fictif, puisque rien n'est change dans le service du navire. Cela
s'applique, par exemple, au cas d'une meme ligne de navigation desservie
par le navire apres et avant le transfert. On a objecte que, parfois, la
presomption absolue serait trop rigoureuse, que certains navires, comme
les navires petroliers, ne pouvaient, a raison de leur construction,
etre affectes qu'a un service determine. Pour tenir compte de cette
observation, le mot _trajet_ avait ete ajoute, de sorte qu'il aurait
fallu que le navire eut ete maintenu _dans les memes service et trajet_;
il semblait que l'on donnait, de cette facon, une satisfaction
suffisante a la reclamation. Neanmoins, sur une insistance en vue de la
suppression du cas dans l'enumeration, cette suppression a ete admise.
Il en resulte que le transfert rentre alors dans l'application de la
regle generale; il est bien presume nul, mais la preuve contraire est
admise.


CHAPITRE VI.--_Du caractere ennemi._

La regle inscrite dans la Declaration de Paris, "le pavillon neutre
couvre la marchandise ennemie, a l'exception de la contrebande de
guerre," repond trop au progres des moeurs, a trop penetre l'opinion
publique pour qu'en presence d'une application si generale, on n'y voie
pas un principe de droit commun, qu'il n'est plus meme question de
discuter. Aussi le caractere neutre ou ennemi des navires de commerce
n'a-t-il pas seulement pour consequence de decider de la validite de
leur capture, mais encore du sort des marchandises, autres que la
contrebande, qui sont trouvees a leur bord. Une remarque generale
analogue peut etre faite au sujet du caractere neutre ou ennemi de la
marchandise. Personne ne songe a contester aujourd'hui le principe
d'apres lequel, "la marchandise neutre, a l'exception de la contrebande
de guerre, n'est pas saisissable sous pavillon ennemi." Ce n'est donc
que dans le cas ou elle est trouvee a bord d'un navire ennemi, que se
pose la question de savoir si une marchandise est neutre ou ennemie.

La determination du caractere neutre ou ennemi apparait ainsi comme le
developpement des deux principes consacres en 1856, ou mieux comme le
moyen d'en assurer la juste application pratique.

L'utilite de degager, a cet egard, des pratiques des differents pays des
regles claires et simples n'a, pour ainsi dire, pas besoin d'etre
demontree. Pour le commerce, l'incertitude des risques de capture, si
elle n'est pas une cause d'arret total, est tout au moins la pire des
entraves. Le commercant doit savoir les risques qu'il court en chargeant
sur tel ou tel navire; l'assureur, s'il ignore la gravite de ces
risques, est force d'exiger des primes de guerre souvent exorbitantes ou
insuffisantes.

Les regles qui forment ce chapitre ne sont malheureusement pas
completes; quelques points importants ont du etre laisses de cote,
comme on l'a deja vu par ce qui a ete dit dans les explications
preliminaires et comme cela sera precise plus loin.

Article 57.

_Sous reserve des dispositions relatives au transfert de pavillon, le
caractere neutre ou ennemi du navire est determine par le pavillon qu'il
a le droit de porter._

_Le cas ou le navire neutre se livre a une navigation reservee en temps
de paix reste hors de cause et n'est nullement vise par cette regle._

Le principe est donc que _le caractere neutre ou ennemi du navire est
determine par le pavillon qu'il a le droit de porter_. C'est une regle
simple qui parait bien repondre a la situation speciale des navires, si
on les compare aux autres biens meubles et notamment aux marchandises. A
plus d'un point de vue, ils ont une sorte d'individualite; notamment ils
ont une nationalite, un _caractere_ national. Cette nationalite est
manifestee par le droit de pavillon; elle place les navires sous la
protection et le controle de l'Etat dont ils relevent; elle les soumet a
la souverainete et aux lois de cet Etat et, le cas echeant, a ses
requisitions. C'est la le criterium le plus sur que le navire est bien
un des elements de la force maritime marchande d'un pays et, par
consequent, le meilleur criterium pour determiner s'il est neutre ou
ennemi. Aussi convient-il de s'y attacher exclusivement et d'ecarter ce
qui se rattache a la personnalite du proprietaire.

Le texte dit: le pavillon que le navire a le _droit de porter_; cela
s'entend naturellement du pavillon que le navire est, s'il ne l'a fait,
en droit d'arborer, conformement aux lois qui regissent le port de ce
pavillon.

L'article 57 reserve les dispositions relatives au transfert de pavillon
pour lesquelles il suffit de renvoyer aux articles 55 et 56; il pourra
se faire qu'un navire ait bien le droit de porter un pavillon neutre, au
point de vue de la legislation du pays dont il se reclame, mais soit
considere comme ennemi par un belligerant, parce que le transfert a la
suite duquel il a porte le pavillon neutre tombe sous le coup de
l'article 55 ou de l'article 56.

Enfin, la question de savoir si un navire perd son caractere neutre,
lorsqu'il effectue une navigation que l'ennemi reservait avant la guerre
aux seuls navires nationaux a ete soulevee. Une entente n'a pu avoir
lieu, comme cela a ete explique plus haut a propos du chapitre sur
_l'Assistance hostile_, et la question est restee absolument entiere,
comme l'alinea 2 de l'article 57 prend soin de le dire.

Article 58.

_Le caractere neutre ou ennemi des marchandises trouvees a bord d'un
navire ennemi est determine par le caractere neutre ou ennemi de leur
proprietaire._

A la difference des navires, les marchandises n'ont pas une
individualite propre; on fait dependre leur caractere neutre ou ennemi
de la personnalite de leur proprietaire. C'est ce qui a prevalu apres un
examen approfondi de diverses opinions tendant a s'attacher a l'origine
des marchandises, a la personne du porteur de risques, du reclamateur ou
de l'expediteur. Le criterium adopte par l'article 58 parait,
d'ailleurs, conforme aux termes de la Declaration de Paris comme a ceux
de la Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907, sur l'etablissement
d'une Cour Internationale des prises, ou il est parle des _proprietes
neutres ou ennemies_ (articles 1, 3, 4 et 8).

Mais il ne faut pas se dissimuler que l'article 58 ne resout qu'une
partie du probleme, la plus simple; c'est le caractere neutre ou ennemi
du proprietaire qui determine le caractere des marchandises, mais a quoi
s'attachera-t-on pour determiner le caractere neutre ou ennemi du
proprietaire? On ne le dit pas, parce qu'il a ete impossible d'arriver a
une entente sur ce point. Les opinions ont ete partagees entre le
_domicile_ et la _nationalite_; il est inutile de reproduire ici les
arguments invoques dans les deux sens. On avait pense a une sorte de
transaction ainsi formulee:

  "Le caractere neutre ou ennemi des marchandises trouvees a bord
  d'un navire ennemi est determine par la nationalite neutre ou
  ennemie de leur proprietaire et, en cas d'absence de nationalite
  ou en cas de double nationalite neutre et ennemie de leur
  proprietaire, par le domicile de celui-ci en pays neutre ou
  ennemi."

  "Toutefois, les marchandises appartenant a une societe anonyme ou
  par actions sont considerees comme neutres ou ennemies selon que
  la societe a son siege social en pays neutre ou ennemi."

L'unanimite n'a pu etre obtenue.

Article 59.

_Si le caractere neutre de la marchandise trouvee a bord d'un navire
ennemi n'est pas etabli, la marchandise est presumee ennemie._

L'article 59 formule la regle traditionnelle d'apres laquelle la
marchandise trouvee a bord d'un navire ennemi est presumee ennemie sauf
la preuve contraire; ce n'est qu'une presomption simple laissant au
revendiquant le droit, mais la charge de prouver ses droits.

Article 60.

_Le caractere ennemi de la marchandise chargee a bord d'un navire ennemi
subsiste jusqu'a l'arrivee a destination, nonobstant un transfert
intervenu pendant le cours de l'expedition, apres l'ouverture des
hostilites._

_Toutefois, si, anterieurement a la capture, un precedent proprietaire
neutre exerce, en cas de faillite du proprietaire ennemi actuel, un
droit de revendication legale sur la marchandise, celle-ci reprend le
caractere neutre._

Cette disposition envisage le cas ou une marchandise, etant propriete
ennemie au moment de son depart, a ete l'objet d'une vente ou d'un
transfert pendant le cours du voyage. La facilite qu'il y aurait a
garantir, au moyen d'une vente, la marchandise ennemie contre l'exercice
du droit de capture, sauf a s'en faire retroceder la propriete a
l'arrivee, a toujours conduit a ne pas tenir compte de ces transferts;
le caractere ennemi subsiste.

Au point de vue du moment a partir duquel une marchandise doit etre
consideree comme devant prendre et conserver le caractere ennemi de son
proprietaire, le texte est inspire du meme esprit d'equite qui a preside
a la Convention de La Haye sur le regime des batiments de commerce au
debut des hostilites, et du meme desir de garantir les operations
entreprises dans la confiance du temps de paix. C'est seulement lorsque
le transfert a lieu apres l'ouverture des hostilites qu'il est, jusqu'a
l'arrivee, inoperant au point de vue de la perte du caractere ennemi. Ce
qu'on considere ici, c'est la date du transfert, et non la date du
depart du navire. Car, bien que le navire parti avant la guerre, et
reste peut-etre dans l'ignorance de l'ouverture des hostilites, jouisse
de ce chef d'une certaine exemption, la marchandise peut cependant avoir
le caractere ennemi; le proprietaire ennemi de cette marchandise est a
meme de connaitre la guerre, et c'est precisement pour cela qu'il
cherchera a echapper a ses consequences.

On a cru, toutefois, devoir ajouter sinon une restriction, du moins un
complement juge necessaire. Dans un grand nombre de pays, le vendeur non
paye a, en cas de faillite de l'acheteur, un droit de revendication
legale (_stoppage in transitu_) sur les marchandises deja devenues la
propriete de l'acheteur, mais non encore parvenues jusqu'a lui. En
pareil cas la vente est resolue, et, par l'effet de sa revendication, le
vendeur reprend sa marchandise, sans etre repute avoir jamais cesse
d'etre proprietaire. Il y a la pour le commerce neutre, en cas de
faillite non simulee, une garantie trop precieuse pour etre sacrifiee,
et le deuxieme alinea de l'article 60 a pour but de la sauvegarder.


CHAPITRE VII.--_Du convoi._

La pratique du convoi a, dans le passe, souleve parfois de graves
difficultes et meme des conflits. Aussi peut-on constater avec
satisfaction l'accord intervenu pour la regler.

Article 61.

_Les navires neutres sous convoi de leur pavillon sont exempts de
visite. Le commandant du convoi donne par ecrit, a la demande du
commandant d'un batiment de guerre belligerant, sur le caractere des
navires et sur leur chargement, toutes informations que la visite
servirait a obtenir._

Le principe pose est simple: un navire neutre convoye par un navire de
guerre de sa nation est exempt de visite. Le motif en est que le
croiseur belligerant doit trouver dans les affirmations du commandant du
convoi la garantie que lui procurerait l'exercice meme du droit de
visite; il ne peut, en effet, revoquer en doute ces affirmations,
donnees par l'agent officiel d'un Gouvernement neutre, sans manquer a la
courtoisie internationale. Si les Gouvernements neutres laissent les
belligerants visiter les navires portant leur pavillon, c'est qu'ils ne
veulent pas prendre la charge de la surveillance de ces navires, et
qu'alors ils permettent aux belligerants de se proteger eux-memes. La
situation change quand un Gouvernement neutre entend prendre cette
charge; le droit de visite n'a plus la meme raison d'etre.

Mais il resulte de l'explication de la regle donnee pour le convoi que
le Gouvernement neutre s'engage a donner aux belligerants toute garantie
que les navires convoyes ne profitent pas de la protection qui leur est
assuree pour agir contrairement a la neutralite--par exemple, pour
transporter de la contrebande de guerre, pour fournir a un belligerant
une assistance hostile, pour tenter de violer un blocus. Il faudra donc
une surveillance serieuse exercee au depart sur les navires devant etre
convoyes, et cette surveillance devra se poursuivre au cours du voyage.
Le Gouvernement devra proceder avec vigilance pour empecher tout abus du
convoi, et il donnera en ce sens des instructions precises a l'officier
charge de commander un convoi.

Un croiseur belligerant rencontre un convoi: il s'adresse au commandant
de ce convoi, qui doit, sur sa demande, lui donner par ecrit toutes les
informations utiles sur les navires qui sont sous sa protection. On
exige une declaration ecrite, parce qu'elle empeche les equivoques et
les malentendus, qu'elle engage plus la responsabilite du commandant.
Cette declaration a pour but de rendre la visite inutile par le fait
meme qu'elle procure au croiseur les renseignements que la visite
elle-meme lui aurait fournis.

Article 62.

_Si le commandant du batiment de guerre belligerant a lieu de soupconner
que la religion du commandant du convoi a ete surprise, il lui
communique ses soupcons. C'est au commandant du convoi seul qu'il
appartient en ce cas de proceder a une verification. Il doit constater
le resultat de cette verification par un proces-verbal dont une copie
est remise a l'officier du batiment de guerre. Si des faits ainsi
constates justifient, dans l'opinion du commandant du convoi, la saisie
d'un ou de plusieurs navires, la protection du convoi doit leur etre
retiree._

Le plus souvent le croiseur s'en tiendra a la declaration que lui aura
donnee le commandant du convoi, mais il peut avoir de serieuses raisons
de croire que la religion de ce commandant a ete surprise, qu'un navire
convoye dont les papiers paraissent en regle, et ne presentent rien de
suspect, transporte, en fait, de la contrebande adroitement dissimulee.
Le croiseur peut communiquer ses soupcons au commandant du convoi. Une
verification peut etre jugee necessaire. Elle est faite par le
commandant du convoi; c'est lui seul qui exerce l'autorite sur les
navires places sous sa protection. Il a paru toutefois que l'on
eviterait souvent bien des difficultes, s'il etait permis au belligerant
d'assister a cette verification; autrement il lui serait toujours
possible de suspecter, sinon la bonne foi, du moins la vigilance ou la
perspicacite du visiteur. Mais on n'a pas cru devoir imposer au
commandant du convoi l'obligation de laisser l'officier du croiseur
assister a la verification. Il agira comme il le jugera bon: s'il
accepte l'assistance d'un officier du croiseur, ce sera un acte de
courtoisie ou de bonne politique. Il devra, dans tous les cas, dresser
un proces-verbal de la verification et en donner une copie a l'officier
du croiseur.

Des divergences peuvent s'elever entre les deux officiers, specialement
a propos de la contrebande conditionnelle. Le caractere du port auquel
sont destines des bles peut etre conteste; est-ce un port de commerce
ordinaire? est-ce un port qui sert de base de ravitaillement pour les
forces armees? La situation de fait produite par le convoi doit etre, en
ce cas, maintenue. Il pourra seulement y avoir une protestation de la
part de l'officier du croiseur, et la difficulte sera reglee par la voie
diplomatique.

La situation est tout autre si un navire convoye est trouve porteur de
contrebande sans qu'une contestation puisse s'elever. Le navire n'a plus
droit a la protection, parce que la condition a laquelle cette
protection etait subordonnee n'a pas ete remplie. Il a trompe son propre
Gouvernement d'abord et essaye de tromper un belligerant. Il doit alors
etre traite comme un navire de commerce neutre qui, dans les
circonstances ordinaires, rencontre un croiseur belligerant et est
visite par lui. Il ne peut se plaindre d'etre ainsi traite
rigoureusement, parce qu'il y a dans son cas une aggravation de la faute
commise par un transporteur de contrebande.


CHAPITRE VIII.--_De la resistance a la visite._

Le sujet traite dans ce chapitre n'est pas mentionne dans le programme
soumis en fevrier 1908 par le Gouvernement Britannique; il se rattache
etroitement a plusieurs des questions de ce programme, aussi s'est-il
naturellement presente a l'esprit au cours des discussions, et il a paru
necessaire de poser une regle sur laquelle on s'est facilement accorde.

Un croiseur belligerant rencontre un navire de commerce et le somme de
s'arreter pour qu'il soit procede a la visite. Le navire somme ne
s'arrete pas et essaie de se soustraire a la visite par la fuite. Le
croiseur peut employer la force pour l'arreter, et le navire de
commerce, s'il est avarie ou coule, n'a pas le droit de se plaindre,
puisqu'il a contrevenu a une obligation imposee par le droit des gens.
S'il est arrete et s'il est etabli que c'est seulement pour eviter les
ennuis de la visite qu'il avait recouru a la fuite, qu'il n'avait
d'ailleurs commis aucun acte contraire a la neutralite, il ne sera pas
puni pour sa tentative. S'il est constate, au contraire, que le navire a
de la contrebande a bord ou qu'il a, d'une facon quelconque, viole ses
devoirs de neutre, il subira les consequences de son infraction a la
neutralite, mais il ne subira non plus aucune peine pour avoir tente la
fuite. Certains pensaient, au contraire, que le navire devrait etre puni
pour une tentative de fuite caracterisee comme pour une resistance
violente. La possibilite de la confiscation engagerait, disait-on, le
croiseur a menager, dans la mesure du possible, le navire en fuite. Mais
cette idee n'a pas prevalu.

Article 63.

_La resistance opposee par la force a l'exercice legitime du droit
d'arret, de visite et de saisie, entraine, dans tous les cas, la
confiscation du navire. Le chargement est passible du meme traitement
que subirait le chargement d'un navire ennemi; les marchandises
appartenant au capitaine ou au proprietaire du navire sont considerees
comme marchandises ennemies._

La situation est differente s'il y a resistance violente a l'action
legitime du croiseur. Le navire commet un acte d'hostilite et doit, des
lors, etre traite en ennemi; il sera donc soumis a confiscation, quand
meme la visite ne revelerait aucun fait contraire a la neutralite, et
cela semble ne pouvoir soulever aucune difficulte.

Que faut-il decider du chargement? La formule qui a semble la meilleure
est celle d'apres laquelle ce chargement sera traite comme celui qui
serait a bord d'un navire ennemi. Cette assimilation entraine les
consequences suivantes: le navire neutre qui a resiste devenant navire
ennemi, la marchandise se trouvant a bord est presumee ennemie. Les
neutres interesses pourront reclamer leur propriete, conformement a la
3'e regle de la Declaration de Paris, mais la marchandise ennemie sera
confisquee parce que la regle _le pavillon couvre la marchandise_ ne
peut plus etre invoquee, le navire saisi sur lequel elle se trouve etant
considere comme ennemi. On remarquera que le droit de reclamer la
marchandise est reconnu a tous les neutres, meme a ceux qui ont la
nationalite du navire saisi; il paraitrait excessif de les faire
souffrir de l'acte du capitaine. Il y a toutefois une exception a
l'egard des marchandises appartenant au proprietaire du navire. Il
semble naturel qu'il supporte les consequences des actes de son agent.
Sa propriete a bord du navire sera donc traitee en marchandise ennemie.
A plus forte raison, en est-il de meme de la marchandise appartenant au
capitaine.


CHAPITRE IX.--_Des dommages et interets._

Ce chapitre a une portee tres generale, puisque la disposition qu'il
contient trouve son application dans les cas nombreux ou un croiseur
peut saisir un navire ou des marchandises.

Article 64.

_Si la saisie du navire ou des marchandises n'est pas validee par la
juridiction des prises ou si, sans qu'il y ait eu de mise en jugement,
la saisie n'est pas maintenue, les interesses ont droit a des dommages
et interets, a moins qu'il y ait eu des motifs suffisants de saisir le
navire ou les marchandises._

Un croiseur a saisi un navire neutre, par exemple, pour transport de
contrebande ou violation de blocus. Le tribunal des prises relache le
navire en annulant la saisie. Cela ne suffit evidemment pas a dedommager
les interesses de la perte eprouvee par suite de la saisie, et cette
perte a pu etre considerable, puisque le navire a ete, pendant un temps
souvent tres long, empeche de se livrer a son trafic ordinaire.
Peuvent-ils demander a etre indemnises de ce prejudice? Rationnellement
il faut admettre l'affirmative, si ce prejudice est immerite,
c'est-a-dire si la saisie n'a pas ete amenee par leur faute. Il peut
arriver, en effet, que la saisie ait ete motivee, parce que le capitaine
du navire visite n'a pas produit des justifications qui devaient se
trouver normalement a sa disposition et qui ont ete fournies plus tard.
Dans ce cas, il serait injuste que des dommages et interets fussent
accordes. A l'inverse, s'il y a eu vraiment faute du croiseur, s'il a
saisi dans un cas ou il n'y avait pas de motifs suffisants de le faire,
il est juste que des dommages et interets soient alloues.

Il peut arriver aussi qu'un navire saisi et conduit dans un port ait ete
relaxe par voie administrative sans intervention d'un tribunal de
prises. En pareil cas, la pratique varie: dans certains pays, la
juridiction des prises n'intervient que dans le cas d'une capture et ne
pourrait statuer sur une demande de dommages-interets fondee sur ce que
la saisie aurait ete injustifiee; dans d'autres, la juridiction des
prises serait competente pour une demande de ce genre. Il y a la une
inegalite peu equitable et il convient d'etablir une regle qui produise
le meme effet dans tous les pays. Il est raisonnable que toute saisie
pratiquee sans motifs suffisants donne droit a des dommages-interets au
profit des interesses, sans qu'il y ait a distinguer suivant que la
saisie a ete ou non suivie d'une decision du tribunal des prises, et
d'autant plus que c'est quand la saisie aura ete le moins justifiee, que
le navire pourra etre relaxe par voie administrative. On a donc employe
une formule generale pouvant comprendre tous les cas de saisie.

Il convient de remarquer que la question de savoir si les tribunaux
nationaux de prises sont competents pour statuer sur les
dommages-interets n'est pas visee dans le texte. En tant qu'il y a un
proces sur les proprietes saisies, aucun doute n'est possible. Dans la
procedure engagee sur la validite de la capture, les interesses auront
l'occasion de faire valoir leur droit a une indemnite, et, si la
decision du tribunal national ne leur donne pas satisfaction, ils
pourront se pourvoir devant la Cour Internationale des prises. Si, au
contraire, l'action du belligerant s'est bornee a une saisie, la
legislation du belligerant capteur decide si des tribunaux sont
competents pour connaitre d'une demande en indemnite et, en cas
d'affirmative, quels tribunaux sont competents dans l'espece; la Cour
Internationale n'a, dans ce cas, aucune competence d'apres la Convention
de La Haye. Au point de vue international, la voie diplomatique est la
seule ouverte pour faire valoir la reclamation, qu'il s'agisse de se
plaindre d'une decision effectivement rendue ou de suppleer a l'absence
de juridiction.

On a pose la question de savoir s'il y avait lieu de distinguer les
dommages directs et les dommages indirects subis par le navire ou la
marchandise. Il a semble qu'il valait mieux laisser la juridiction des
prises libre d'apprecier le dedommagement du, qui variera suivant les
circonstances et dont le montant ne peut etre determine a l'avance par
des regles trop minutieuses.

Il n'a ete parle que du navire pour simplifier; mais ce qui a ete dit
s'applique naturellement a la cargaison saisie, puis relachee. Ainsi la
marchandise innocente, se trouvant a bord du navire saisi, subit tous
les inconvenients de la saisie du navire. S'il y a eu des motifs
suffisants de saisir le navire, que cette saisie soit maintenue ou non,
les proprietaires de la cargaison n'ont aucun droit a des dommages et
interets.

Il peut etre utile d'indiquer certains cas dans lesquels la saisie du
navire serait justifiee, quelle que put etre la decision du tribunal des
prises. C'est notamment celui de jet, de suppression ou de destruction
volontaire de tout ou partie des papiers de bord, provenant du fait du
capitaine, de quelqu'un de l'equipage ou des passagers. Il y a la
quelque chose qui justifie tous les soupcons et qui explique que le
navire soit saisi, sauf au capitaine a rendre compte de sa conduite
devant le tribunal des prises. Meme si ce tribunal acceptait les
explications donnees et ne trouvait pas de causes suffisantes de
confiscation, les interesses ne pourraient songer a reclamer des
dommages-interets.

Un cas analogue serait celui ou l'on trouverait a bord des papiers
doubles, faux, ou falsifies, alors que cette irregularite se rattache a
des circonstances de nature a influer sur la saisie du navire.

Il a semble suffisant que ces cas ou la saisie s'expliquerait
raisonnablement fussent mentionnes dans le Rapport sans faire l'objet
d'une disposition expresse, et cela parce que l'indication de deux cas
particuliers aurait pu faire croire que c'etaient les seuls dans
lesquels la saisie se justifierait.

Tels sont les principes de droit international que la Conference Navale
s'est efforcee de reconnaitre comme propres a regir pratiquement les
rapports des peuples dans d'importantes matieres pour lesquelles des
regles precises faisaient jusqu'a present defaut. Elle a continue ainsi
l'oeuvre de codification commencee par la Declaration de Paris de 1856.
Elle a travaille dans le meme esprit que la Deuxieme Conference de la
Paix et, profitant des travaux faits a La Haye, elle a pu resoudre un
certain nombre de problemes que, faute de temps, cette Conference avait
du laisser sans solution. Souhaitons que l'on puisse dire que ceux qui
ont elabore la Declaration de Londres de 1909 n'ont pas ete trop
indignes de leurs predecesseurs de 1856 et de 1907.


DISPOSITIONS FINALES.

Ces dispositions ont trait a diverses questions qui touchent a l'effet
de la Declaration, a sa ratification, a sa mise en vigueur, a sa
denonciation, a l'adhesion des Puissances non representees.

Article 65.

_Les dispositions de la presente Declaration forment un ensemble
indivisible._

Cet article est tres important et conforme a ce qui avait ete admis pour
la Declaration de Paris.

Les regles contenues dans la presente Declaration touchent a des points
tres importants et tres differents. Elles n'ont pas toutes ete acceptees
avec le meme empressement par toutes les Delegations; des concessions
ont ete faites sur un point en vue de concessions obtenues sur un autre.
L'ensemble a ete, tout balance, reconnu satisfaisant. Une attente
legitime serait trompee, si une Puissance pouvait faire des reserves a
propos d'une regle a laquelle une autre Puissance attache une importance
particuliere.

Article 66.

_Les Puissances Signataires s'engagent a s'assurer, dans le cas d'une
guerre ou les belligerants seraient tous parties a la presente
Declaration, l'observation reciproque des regles contenues dans cette
Declaration. Elles donneront, en consequence, a leurs autorites et a
leurs forces armees les instructions necessaires et prendront les
mesures qu'il conviendra pour en garantir l'application par leurs
tribunaux, specialement par leurs tribunaux de prises._

D'apres l'engagement qui resulte de cet article, la Declaration
s'applique dans les rapports entre les Puissances Signataires, quand les
belligerants sont egalement parties a la Declaration.

Ce sera a chaque Puissance a prendre les mesures necessaires pour
assurer l'observation de la Declaration. Ces mesures pourront varier
suivant les pays, exiger ou non l'intervention du pouvoir legislatif.
C'est une affaire d'ordre interieur.

Il faut remarquer que les Puissances neutres peuvent etre aussi dans le
cas de donner des instructions a leurs autorites, specialement aux
commandants des convois, comme on l'a vu plus haut.

Article 67.

_La presente Declaration sera ratifiee aussitot que possible._

_Les ratifications seront deposees a Londres._

_Le premier depot de ratifications sera constate par un proces-verbal
signe par les Representants des Puissances qui y prennent part, et par
le Principal Secretaire d'Etat de Sa Majeste Britannique au Departement
des Affaires Etrangeres._

_Les depots ulterieurs de ratifications se feront au moyen d'une
notification ecrite adressee au Gouvernement Britannique et accompagnee
de l'instrument de ratification._

_Copie certifiee conforme du proces-verbal relatif au premier depot de
ratifications, des notifications mentionnees a l'alinea precedent, ainsi
que des instruments de ratification qui les accompagnent, sera
immediatement, par les soins du Gouvernement Britannique et par la voie
diplomatique, remise aux Puissances Signataires. Dans les cas vises par
l'alinea precedent, ledit Gouvernement leur fera connaitre en meme temps
la date a laquelle il a recu la notification._

Cette disposition toute de protocole n'a pas besoin d'explication. On a
emprunte la formule admise a La Haye par la Deuxieme Conference de la
Paix.

Article 68.

_La presente Declaration produira effet, pour les Puissances qui
auront_ _participe au premier depot de ratifications, soixante jours
apres la date du proces-verbal de ce depot et, pour les Puissances qui
ratifieront ulterieurement, soixante jours apres que la notification de
leur ratification aura ete recue par le Gouvernement Britannique._

Article 69.

_S'il arrivait qu'une des Puissances Signataires voulut denoncer la
presente Declaration, elle ne pourra le faire que pour la fin d'une
periode de douze ans commencant a courir soixante jours apres le premier
depot de ratifications et, ensuite, pour la fin de periodes successives
de six ans, dont la premiere commencera a l'expiration de la periode de
douze ans._

_La denonciation devra etre, au moins un an a l'avance, notifiee par
ecrit au Gouvernement Britannique, qui en donnera connaissance a toutes
les autres Puissances. Elle ne produira ses effets qu'a l'egard de la
Puissance qui l'aura notifiee._

Il resulte implicitement de l'article 69 que la Declaration a une duree
indefinie. Les periodes apres lesquelles la denonciation peut se faire
ont ete fixees par analogie de ce qui est admis dans la Convention pour
l'etablissement d'une Cour Internationale des prises.

Article 70.

_Les Puissances representees a la Conference Navale de Londres,
attachant un prix particulier a la reconnaissance generale des regles
adoptees par elles, expriment l'espoir que les Puissances qui n'y
etaient pas representees adhereront a la presente Declaration. Elles
prient le Gouvernement Britannique de vouloir bien les inviter a le
faire._

_La Puissance qui desire adherer notifie par ecrit son intention au
Gouvernement Britannique en lui transmettant l'acte d'adhesion, qui sera
depose dans les archives dudit Gouvernement._

_Ce Gouvernement transmettra immediatement a toutes les autres
Puissances copie certifiee conforme de la notification, ainsi que de
l'acte d'adhesion, en indiquant la date a laquelle il a recu la
notification. L'adhesion produira effet soixante jours apres cette
date._

_La situation des Puissances adherentes sera, en tout ce qui concerne
cette Declaration, assimilee a la situation des Puissances Signataires._

La Declaration de Paris contenait deja une invitation adressee aux
Puissances non representees, a l'effet d'adherer a la Declaration.
L'invitation officielle, au lieu d'etre faite individuellement par
chacune des Puissances representees a la Conference, sera plus aisement
faite par la Grande-Bretagne agissant au nom de toutes.

Les formes de l'adhesion sont tres simples. L'assimilation des
Puissances adherentes aux Puissances Signataires entraine naturellement
pour les premieres l'observation de l'article 65; on ne peut adherer a
une partie de la Declaration, mais seulement a l'ensemble.

Article 71.

_La presente Declaration, qui portera la date du 26 fevrier 1909, pourra
etre signee a Londres, jusqu'au 30 juin 1909, par les Plenipotentiaires
des Puissances representees a la Conference Navale._

Comme a La Haye, on a tenu compte des convenances de certaines
Puissances dont les Representants peuvent ne pas etre en situation de
signer des a present la Declaration et qui cependant veulent etre
considerees comme des Puissances Signataires, non comme des Puissances
adherentes.

Il va sans dire que les _Plenipotentiaires des Puissances_ dont il est
parle a l'article 71 ne sont pas necessairement ceux qui avaient ete
delegues comme tels a la Conference Navale.

_En foi de quoi, les Plenipotentiaires ont revetu la presente
Declaration de leurs signatures et y ont appose leurs cachets._

_Fait a Londres, le vingt-six fevrier mil neuf cent neuf, en un seul
exemplaire, qui restera depose dans les archives du Gouvernement
Britannique et dont des copies, certifiees conformes, seront remises par
la voie diplomatique aux Puissances representees a la Conference
Navale._




APPENDIX VIII

      ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE CONVENTION CONCERNING THE
      ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL PRIZE COURT
      _Signed at the Hague, September 19, 1910_


Article premier.

Les puissances signataires de la convention de La Haye du 18 octobre
1907, relative a l'etablissement d'une Cour Internationale des prises ou
y adherant, pour lesquelles des difficultes d'ordre constitutionnel
s'opposent a l'acceptation, sous sa forme actuelle, de ladite
convention, ont la faculte de declarer, dans l'acte de ratification ou
d'adhesion, que, dans les affaires de prises rentrant dans la competence
de leurs tribunaux nationaux, le recours devant la Cour Internationale
des prises ne pourra etre exerce contre elles que sous la forme d'une
action en indemnite du prejudice cause par la capture.

Article 2.

Dans le cas de recours exerce devant la Cour Internationale des prises
sous la forme d'une action en indemnite, l'article 8 de la convention
est sans application; la Cour n'a pas a prononcer la validite ou la
nullite de la capture, non plus qu'a infirmer ou confirmer la decision
des tribunaux nationaux.

Article 3.

Les conditions auxquelles est subordonne par la convention l'exercice du
recours devant la Cour Internationale des prises sont applicables a
l'exercice de l'action en indemnite.

Article 4.

Sous reserve des dispositions ci-apres, les regles de procedure etablies
par la convention pour le recours devant la Cour Internationale des
prises seront observees pour l'action en indemnite.

Article 5.

Par derogation a l'article 28, [p] 1, de la convention, l'instance en
indemnite ne peut etre introduite devant la Cour Internationale des
prises qu'au moyen d'une declaration ecrite, adressee au Bureau
International de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage. Le Bureau peut etre
saisi meme par telegramme.

Article 6.

Par derogation a l'article 29 de la convention, le Bureau International
notifie directement et par telegramme, s'il est possible, au
Gouvernement du belligerant capteur la declaration d'instance dont il
est saisi. Le Gouvernement du belligerant capteur, sans examiner si les
delais prescrits ont ete observes, fait, dans les sept jours de la
reception de la notification, transmettre au Bureau International le
dossier de l'affaire en y joignant, le cas echeant, une copie certifiee
conforme de la decision rendue par le tribunal national.

Article 7.

Par derogation a l'article 45, [p] 2, de la convention, la Cour, apres
le prononce et la notification de son arret aux parties en cause, fait
parvenir directement au Gouvernement du belligerant capteur le dossier
de l'affaire qui lui a ete soumise, en y joignant l'expedition des
diverses decisions intervenues ainsi que la copie des proces-verbaux de
l'instruction.

Article 8.

Le present protocole additionnel sera considere comme faisant partie
integrante de la convention et sera ratifie en meme temps que celle-ci.
Si la declaration prevue a l'article 1 ci-dessus est faite dans l'acte
de ratification, une copie certifiee conforme en sera inseree dans le
proces-verbal de depot des ratifications vise a l'article 52, [p] 3, de
la convention.

Article 9.

L'adhesion a la convention est subordonnee a l'adhesion au present
protocole additionnel.

En foi de quoi les Plenipotentiaires ont signe le present protocole
additionnel.

Fait a La Haye le 19 septembre 1910, en un seul exemplaire qui sera
depose dans les archives du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas et dont des
copies, certifiees conformes, seront remises, par la voie diplomatique,
aux Puissances designees dans l'article 15 de la convention relative a
l'etablissement d'une Cour Internationale des prises du 18 octobre 1907
et dans son Annexe.




APPENDIX IX

      FOREIGN ENLISTMENT ACT, 1870
      33 & 34 VICT., CHAPTER 90
      An Act to regulate the conduct of Her Majesty's Subjects
      during the existence of hostilities between foreign states
      with which Her Majesty is at peace.
      [9 August 1870.]


Whereas it is expedient to make provision for the regulation of the
conduct of Her Majesty's subjects during the existence of hostilities
between foreign states with which Her Majesty is at peace:

Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the
advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in
this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as
follows:


_Preliminary._

[Sidenote: Short Title of Act.]

1. This Act may be cited for all purposes as "The Foreign Enlistment
Act, 1870."

[Sidenote: Application of Act.]

2. This Act shall extend to all the dominions of Her Majesty, including
the adjacent territorial waters.

[Sidenote: Commencement of Act.]

3. This Act shall come into operation in the United Kingdom immediately
on the passing thereof, and shall be proclaimed in every British
possession by the governor thereof as soon as may be after he receives
notice of this Act, and shall come into operation in that British
possession on the day of such proclamation, and the time at which this
Act comes into operation in any place is, as respects such place, in
this Act referred to as the commencement of this Act.


_Illegal Enlistment._

[Sidenote: Penalty on enlistment in service of foreign state.]

4. If any person, without the license of Her Majesty, being a British
subject, within or without Her Majesty's dominions, accepts or agrees to
accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of
any foreign state at war with any foreign state at peace with Her
Majesty, and in this Act referred to as a friendly state, or whether a
British subject or not within Her Majesty's dominions, induces any other
person to accept or agree to accept any commission or engagement in the
military or naval service of any such foreign state as aforesaid,--

  He shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be
  punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such punishments
  at the discretion of the court before which the offender is
  convicted; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or
  without hard labour.

[Sidenote: Penalty on leaving Her Majesty's Dominions with intent to
serve a Foreign State.]

5. If any person, without the license of Her Majesty, being a British
subject, quits or goes on board any ship with a view of quitting Her
Majesty's dominions, with intent to accept any commission or engagement
in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with a
friendly state, or, whether a British subject or not, within Her
Majesty's dominions, induces any other person to quit or to go on board
any ship with a view of quitting Her Majesty's dominions with the like
intent,--

  He shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be
  punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such
  punishments, at the discretion of the court before which the
  offender is convicted; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either
  with or without hard labour.

[Sidenote: Penalty on embarking Persons under False Representations as
to Service.]

6. If any person induces any other person to quit Her Majesty's
dominions or to embark on any ship within Her Majesty's dominions under
a misrepresentation or false representation of the service in which such
person is to be engaged, with the intent or in order that such person
may accept or agree to accept any commission or engagement in the
military or naval service of any foreign state at war with a friendly
state,--

  He shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be
  punishable by fine and imprisonment or either of such punishments,
  at the discretion of the court before which the offender is
  convicted; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or
  without hard labour.

[Sidenote: Penalty on taking illegally enlisted Persons on board Ship.]

7. If the master or owner of any ship, without the license of Her
Majesty, knowingly either takes on board, or engages to take on board,
or has on board such ship within Her Majesty's dominions any of the
following persons, in this Act referred to as illegally enlisted
persons; that is to say,--

  (1) Any person who, being a British subject within or without the
  dominions of Her Majesty, has, without the license of Her Majesty,
  accepted or agreed to accept any commission or engagement in the
  military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any
  friendly state:

  (2) Any person, being a British subject, who, without the license
  of Her Majesty, is about to quit Her Majesty's dominions with the
  intent to accept any commission or engagement in the military or
  naval service of any foreign state at war with a friendly state:

  (3) Any person who has been induced to embark under a
  misrepresentation or false representation of the service in which
  such person is to be engaged, with the intent or in order that
  such person may accept or agree to accept any commission or
  engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign state
  at war with a friendly state:

Such master or owner shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and
the following consequences shall ensue; that is to say,--

  (1) The offender shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or
  either of such punishments, at the discretion of the court before
  which the offender is convicted; and imprisonment, if awarded, may
  be either with or without hard labour: and

  (2) Such ship shall be detained until the trial and conviction or
  acquittal of the master or owner, and until all penalties
  inflicted on the master or owner have been paid, or the master or
  owner has given security for the payment of such penalties to the
  satisfaction of two justices of the peace, or other magistrate or
  magistrates having the authority of two justices of the peace: and

  (3) All illegally enlisted persons shall immediately on the
  discovery of the offence be taken on shore, and shall not be
  allowed to return to the ship.


_Illegal Shipbuilding and Illegal Expeditions._

[Sidenote: Penalty on illegal Shipbuilding and illegal Expeditions.]

8. If any person within Her Majesty's dominions, without the license of
Her Majesty, does any of the following acts; that is to say,--

  (1) Builds or agrees to build, or causes to be built any ship with
  intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe that
  the same shall or will be employed in the military or naval
  service of any foreign state at war with any friendly state: or

  (2) Issues or delivers any commission for any ship with intent or
  knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe that the same
  shall or will be employed in the military or naval service of any
  foreign state at war with any friendly state: or

  (3) Equips any ship with intent or knowledge, or having reasonable
  cause to believe that the same shall or will be employed in the
  military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any
  friendly state: or

  (4) Despatches, or causes or allows to be despatched, any ship
  with intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe
  that the same shall or will be employed in the military or naval
  service of any foreign state at war with any friendly state:

Such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence against this
Act, and the following consequences shall ensue:

  (1) The offender shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment or
  either of such punishments, at the discretion of the court before
  which the offender is convicted; and imprisonment, if awarded, may
  be either with or without hard labour.

  (2) The ship in respect of which any such offence is committed,
  and her equipment, shall be forfeited to Her Majesty.

Provided that a person building, causing to be built, or equipping a
ship in any of the cases aforesaid, in pursuance of a contract made
before the commencement of such war as aforesaid, shall not be liable to
any of the penalties imposed by this section in respect of such building
or equipping if he satisfies the conditions following; (that is to say,)

  (1) If forthwith upon a proclamation of neutrality being issued by
  Her Majesty he gives notice to the Secretary of State that he is
  so building, causing to be built, or equipping such ship, and
  furnishes such particulars of the contract and of any matters
  relating to, or done, or to be done under the contract as may be
  required by the Secretary of State:

  (2) If he gives such security, and takes and permits to be taken
  such other measures, if any, as the Secretary of State may
  prescribe for ensuring that such ship shall not be despatched,
  delivered, or removed without the license of Her Majesty until the
  termination of such war as aforesaid.

[Sidenote: Presumption as to Evidence in case of Illegal Ship.]

9. Where any ship is built by order of or on behalf of any foreign state
when at war with a friendly state, or is delivered to or to the order of
such foreign state, or any person who to the knowledge of the person
building is an agent of such foreign state, or is paid for by such
foreign state or such agent, and is employed in the military or naval
service of such foreign state, such ship shall, until the contrary is
proved, be deemed to have been built with a view to being so employed,
and the burden shall lie on the builder of such ship of proving that he
did not know that the ship was intended to be so employed in the
military or naval service of such foreign state.

[Sidenote: Penalty on aiding the Warlike Equipment of Foreign ships.]

10. If any person within the dominions of Her Majesty, and without the
license of Her Majesty,--

By adding to the number of guns, or by changing those on board for other
guns, or by the addition of any equipment for war, increases or
augments, or procures to be increased or augmented, or is knowingly
concerned in increasing or augmenting the warlike force of any ship
which at the time of her being within the dominions of Her Majesty was a
ship in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with
any friendly state,--

  Such person shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and
  shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such
  punishments, at the discretion of the court before which the
  offender is convicted; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either
  with or without hard labour.

[Sidenote: Penalty on fitting out Naval or Military Expeditions without
License.]

11. If any person within the limits of Her Majesty's dominions, and
without the license of Her Majesty,--

Prepares or fits out any naval or military expedition to proceed against
the dominions of any friendly state, the following consequences shall
ensue:

  (1) Every person engaged in such preparation or fitting out, or
  assisting therein, or employed in any capacity in such expedition,
  shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be
  punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such
  punishments, at the discretion of the court before which the
  offender is convicted; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either
  with or without hard labour.

  (2) All ships, and their equipments, and all arms and munitions of
  war, used in or forming part of such expedition, shall be
  forfeited to Her Majesty.

[Sidenote: Punishment of Accessories.]

12. Any person who aids, abets, counsels, or procures the commission of
any offence against this Act shall be liable to be tried and punished as
a principal offender.

[Sidenote: Limitation of Term of Imprisonment.]

13. The term of imprisonment to be awarded in respect of any offence
against this Act shall not exceed two years.


_Illegal Prize._

[Sidenote: Illegal Prize brought into British Ports restored.]

14. If during the continuance of any war in which Her Majesty may be
neutral, any ship, goods, or merchandize captured as prize of war within
the territorial jurisdiction of Her Majesty, in violation of the
neutrality of this realm, or captured by any ship which may have been
built, equipped, commissioned, or despatched, or the force of which may
have been augmented, contrary to the provisions of this Act are brought
within the limits of Her Majesty's dominions by the captor, or any agent
of the captor, or by any person having come into possession thereof with
the knowledge that the same was prize of war so captured as aforesaid,
it shall be lawful for the original owner of such prize, or his agent,
or for any person authorised in that behalf by the Government of the
foreign state to which such owner belongs, to make application to the
Court of Admiralty for seizure and detention of such prize, and the
court shall, on due proof of the facts, order such prize to be restored.

Every such order shall be executed and carried into effect in the same
manner, and subject to the same right of appeal as in the case of any
order made in the exercise of the ordinary jurisdiction of such court;
and in the meantime and until a final order has been made on such
application the court shall have power to make all such provisional and
other orders as to the care or custody of such captured ship, goods, or
merchandize, and (if the same be of perishable nature, or incurring risk
of deterioration) for the sale thereof, and with respect to the deposit
or investment of the proceeds of any such sale, as may be made by such
court in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction.


_General Provision._

[Sidenote: License by Her Majesty, how granted.]

15. For the purpose of this Act, a license by Her Majesty shall be under
the sign manual of Her Majesty, or be signified by Order in Council or
by proclamation of Her Majesty.


_Legal Procedure._

[Sidenote: Jurisdiction in respect of Offences by Persons against Act.]

16. Any offence against this Act shall, for all purposes of and
incidental to the trial and punishment of any person guilty of any such
offence, be deemed to have been committed either in the place in which
the offence was wholly or partly committed, or in any place within Her
Majesty's dominions in which the person who committed such offence may
be.

[Sidenote: Venue in respect of Offences by Persons. 24 & 25 Vict. c.
97.]

17. Any offence against this Act may be described in any indictment or
other document relating to such offence, in cases where the mode of
trial requires such a description, as having been committed at the place
where it was wholly or partly committed, or it may be averred generally
to have been committed within Her Majesty's dominions, and the venue or
local description in the margin may be that of the county, city, or
place in which the trial is held.

[Sidenote: Power to remove Offenders for Trial.]

18. The following authorities, that is to say, in the United Kingdom any
judge of a superior court, in any other place within the jurisdiction of
any British court of justice, such court, or, if there are more courts
than one, the court having the highest criminal jurisdiction in that
place, may, by warrant or instrument in the nature of a warrant in this
section included in the term "warrant," direct that any offender charged
with an offence against this Act shall be removed to some other place in
Her Majesty's dominions for trial in cases where it appears to the
authority granting the warrant that the removal of such offender would
be conducive to the interests of justice, and any prisoner so removed
shall be triable at the place to which he is removed, in the same manner
as if his offence had been committed at such place.

Any warrant for the purposes of this section may be addressed to the
master of any ship or to any other person or persons, and the person or
persons to whom such warrant is addressed shall have power to convey the
prisoner therein named to any place or places named in such warrant, and
to deliver him, when arrived at such place or places, into the custody
of any authority designated by such warrant.

Every prisoner shall, during the time of his removal under any such
warrant as aforesaid, be deemed to be in the legal custody of the person
or persons empowered to remove him.

[Sidenote: Jurisdiction in respect of Forfeiture of Ships for Offences
against Act.]

19. All proceedings for the condemnation and forfeiture of a ship, or
ship and equipment, or arms and munitions of war, in pursuance of this
Act shall require the sanction of the Secretary of State or such chief
executive authority as is in this Act mentioned, and shall be had in the
Court of Admiralty, and not in any other court; and the Court of
Admiralty shall, in addition to any power given to the court by this
Act, have in respect of any ship or other matter brought before it in
pursuance of this Act all powers which it has in the case of a ship or
matter brought before it in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction.

[Sidenote: Regulations as to Proceedings against the Offender and the
Ship.]

20. Where any offence against this Act has been committed by any person
by reason whereof a ship, or ship and equipment, or arms and munitions
of war, has or have become liable to forfeiture, proceedings may be
instituted contemporaneously or not, as may be thought fit, against the
offender in any court having jurisdiction of the offence, and against
the ship, or ship and equipment, or arms and munitions of war, for the
forfeiture in the Court of Admiralty; but it shall not be necessary to
take proceedings against the offender because proceedings are instituted
for the forfeiture, or to take proceedings for the forfeiture because
proceedings are taken against the offender.

[Sidenote: Officer authorised to seize offending Ships.]

21. The following officers, that is to say,--

  (1) Any officer of customs in the United Kingdom, subject
  nevertheless to any special or general instructions from the
  Commissioners of Customs or any officer of the Board of Trade,
  subject nevertheless to any special or general instructions from
  the Board of Trade;

  (2) Any officer of customs or public officer in any British
  possession, subject nevertheless to any special or general
  instructions from the governor of such possession;

  (3) Any commissioned officer on full pay in the military service
  of the Crown, subject nevertheless to any special or general
  instructions from his commanding officer;

  (4) Any commissioned officer on full pay in the naval service of
  the Crown, subject nevertheless to any special or general
  instructions from the Admiralty or his superior officer, may seize
  or detain any ship liable to be seized or detained in pursuance of
  this Act, and such officers are in this Act referred to as the
  "local authority"; but nothing in this Act contained shall
  derogate from the power of the Court of Admiralty to direct any
  ship to be seized or detained by any officer by whom such court
  may have power under its ordinary jurisdiction to direct a ship to
  be seized or detained.

[Sidenote: Powers of Officers authorised to seize Ships.]

22. Any officer authorised to seize or detain any ship in respect of any
offence against this Act may, for the purpose of enforcing such seizure
or detention, call to his aid any constable or officers of police, or
any officers of Her Majesty's army or navy or marines, or any excise
officer or officers of customs, or any harbour-master or dock-master, or
any officers having authority by law to make seizures of ships, and may
put on board any ship so seized or detained any one or more of such
officers to take charge of the same, and to enforce the provisions of
this Act, and any officer seizing or detaining any ship under this Act
may use force, if necessary, for the purpose of enforcing seizure or
detention, and if any person is killed or maimed by reason of his
resisting such officer in the execution of his duties, or any person
acting under his orders, such officer so seizing or detaining the ship,
or other person, shall be freely and fully indemnified as well against
the Queen's Majesty, Her heirs and successors, as against all persons so
killed, maimed, or hurt.

[Sidenote: Special Power of Secretary of State or Chief Executive
Authority to detain Ship.]

23. If the Secretary of State or the chief executive authority is
satisfied that there is a reasonable and probable cause for believing
that a ship within Her Majesty's dominions has been or is being built,
commissioned, or equipped contrary to this Act, and is about to be taken
beyond the limits of such dominions, or that a ship is about to be
despatched contrary to this Act, such Secretary of State or chief
executive authority shall have power to issue a warrant stating that
there is reasonable and probable cause for believing as aforesaid, and
upon such warrant the local authority shall have power to seize and
search such ship, and to detain the same until it has been either
condemned or released by process of law, or in manner herein-after
mentioned.

The owner of the ship so detained, or his agent, may apply to the Court
of Admiralty for its release, and the court shall as soon as possible
put the matter of such seizure and detention in course of trial between
the applicant and the Crown.

If the applicant establish to the satisfaction of the court that the
ship was not and is not being built, commissioned, or equipped or
intended to be despatched contrary to this Act, the ship shall be
released and restored.

If the applicant fail to establish to the satisfaction of the court that
the ship was not and is not being built, commissioned, or equipped, or
intended to be despatched contrary to this Act, then the ship shall be
detained till released by order of the Secretary of State or chief
executive authority.

The court may in cases where no proceedings are pending for its
condemnation release any ship detained under this section on the owner
giving security to the satisfaction of the court that the ship shall not
be employed contrary to this Act, notwithstanding that the applicant may
have failed to establish to the satisfaction of the court that the ship
was not and is not being built, commissioned, or intended to be
despatched contrary to this Act. The Secretary of State or the chief
executive authority may likewise release any ship detained under this
section on the owner giving security to the satisfaction of such
Secretary of State or chief executive authority that the ship shall not
be employed contrary to this Act, or may release the ship without such
security if the Secretary of State or chief executive authority think
fit so to release the same.

If the court be of opinion that there was not reasonable and probable
cause for the detention, and if no such cause appear in the course of
the proceedings, the court shall have power to declare that the owner is
to be indemnified by the payment of costs and damages in respect of the
detention, the amount thereof to be assessed by the court, and any
amount so assessed shall be payable by the Commissioners of the Treasury
out of any moneys legally applicable for that purpose. The Court of
Admiralty shall also have power to make a like order for the indemnity
of the owner, on the application of such owner to the court, in a
summary way, in cases where the ship is released by the order of the
Secretary of State or the chief executive authority, before any
application is made by the owner or his agent to the court for such
release.

Nothing in this section contained shall affect any proceedings
instituted or to be instituted for the condemnation of any ship detained
under this section where such ship is liable to forfeiture subject to
this provision, that if such ship is restored in pursuance of this
section all proceedings for such condemnation shall be stayed; and where
the court declares that the owner is to be indemnified by the payment of
costs and damages for the detainer, all costs, charges, and expenses
incurred by such owner in or about any proceedings for the condemnation
of such ship shall be added to the costs and damages payable to him in
respect of the detention of the ship.

Nothing in this section contained shall apply to any foreign
non-commissioned ship despatched from any part of Her Majesty's
dominions after having come within them under stress of weather or in
the course of a peaceful voyage, and upon which ship no fitting out or
equipping of a warlike character has taken place in this country.

[Sidenote: Special Power of Local Authority to detain Ship.]

24. Where it is represented to any local authority, as defined by this
Act, and such local authority believes the representation, that there is
a reasonable and probable cause for believing that a ship within Her
Majesty's dominions has been or is being built, commissioned, or
equipped contrary to this Act, and is about to be taken beyond the
limits of such dominions, or that a ship is about to be despatched
contrary to this Act, it shall be the duty of such local authority to
detain such ship, and forthwith to communicate the fact of such
detention to the Secretary of State or chief executive authority.

Upon the receipt of such communication the Secretary of State or chief
executive authority may order the ship to be released if he thinks there
is no cause for detaining her, but if satisfied that there is reasonable
and probable cause for believing that such ship was built, commissioned,
or equipped or intended to be despatched in contravention of this Act,
he shall issue his warrant stating that there is reasonable and probable
cause for believing as aforesaid, and upon such warrant being issued
further proceedings shall be had as in cases where the seizure or
detention has taken place on a warrant issued by the Secretary of State
without any communication from the local authority.

Where the Secretary of State or chief executive authority orders the
ship to be released on the receipt of a communication from the local
authority without issuing his warrant, the owner of the ship shall be
indemnified by the payment of costs and damages in respect of the
detention upon application to the Court of Admiralty in a summary way in
like manner as he is entitled to be indemnified where the Secretary of
State having issued his warrant under this Act releases the ship before
any application is made by the owner or his agent to the court for such
release.

[Sidenote: Power of Secretary of State or Executive Authority to grant
Search Warrant.]

25. The Secretary of State or the chief executive authority may, by
warrant, empower any person to enter any dockyard or other place within
Her Majesty's dominions and inquire as to the destination of any ship
which may appear to him to be intended to be employed in the naval or
military service of any foreign state at war with a friendly state, and
to search such ship.

[Sidenote: Exercise of Powers of Secretary of State or Chief Executive
Authority.]

26. Any powers or jurisdiction by this Act given to the Secretary of
State may be exercised by him throughout the dominions of Her Majesty,
and such powers and jurisdiction may also be exercised by any of the
following officers, in this Act referred to as the chief executive
authority, within their respective jurisdictions; that is to say,

  (1) In Ireland by the Lord Lieutenant or other the chief governor
  or governors of Ireland for the time being, or the chief
  secretary to the Lord Lieutenant:

  (2) In Jersey by the Lieutenant Governor:

  (3) In Guernsey, Alderney, and Sark, and the dependent islands by
  the Lieutenant Governor:

  (4) In the Isle of Man by the Lieutenant Governor:

  (5) In any British possession by the Governor:

A copy of any warrant issued by a Secretary of State or by any officer
authorised in pursuance of this Act to issue such warrant in Ireland,
the Channel Islands, or the Isle of Man shall be laid before Parliament.

[Sidenote: Appeal from Court of Admiralty.]

27. An appeal may be had from any decision of a Court of Admiralty under
this Act to the same tribunal and in the same manner to and in which an
appeal may be had in cases within the ordinary jurisdiction of the court
as a Court of Admiralty.

[Sidenote: Indemnity to Officers.]

28. Subject to the provisions of this Act providing for the award of
damages in certain cases in respect of the seizure or detention of a
ship by the Court of Admiralty no damages shall be payable, and no
officer or local authority shall be responsible, either civilly or
criminally, in respect of the seizure or detention of any ship in
pursuance of this Act.

[Sidenote: Indemnity to Secretary of State or Chief Executive
Authority.]

29. The Secretary of State shall not, nor shall the chief executive
authority, be responsible in any action or other legal proceedings
whatsoever for any warrant issued by him in pursuance of this Act, or be
examinable as a witness, except at his own request, in any court of
justice in respect of the circumstances which led to the issue of the
warrant.


_Interpretation Clause._

[Sidenote: Interpretation of Terms.]

30. In this Act, if not inconsistent with the context, the following
terms have the meanings herein-after respectively assigned to them; that
is to say,

[Sidenote: "Foreign State:"]

  "Foreign state" includes any foreign prince, colony, province, or
  part of any province or people, or any person or persons
  exercising or assuming to exercise the powers of government in or
  over any foreign country, colony, province, or part of any
  province or people:

[Sidenote: "Military Service:"]

  "Military service" shall include military telegraphy and any other
  employment whatever, in or in connection with any military
  operation:

[Sidenote: "Naval Service:"]

  "Naval service" shall, as respects a person, include service as a
  marine, employment as a pilot in piloting or directing the course
  of a ship of war or other ship when such ship of war or other ship
  is being used in any  military or naval operation, and any
  employment whatever on board a ship of war, transport, store ship,
  privateer or ship under letters of marque; and as respects a ship,
  include any user of a ship as a transport, store ship, privateer
  or ship under letters of marque:

[Sidenote: "United Kingdom:"]

  "United Kingdom" includes the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands,
  and other adjacent islands:

[Sidenote: "British Possessions:"]

  "British possession" means any territory, colony, or place being
  part of Her Majesty's dominions, and not part of the United
  Kingdom, as defined by this Act:

[Sidenote: "The Secretary of State:"]

  "The Secretary of State" shall mean any one of Her Majesty's
  Principal Secretaries of State:

[Sidenote: "Governor:"]

  "The Governor" shall as respects India mean the Governor General
  or the Governor of any presidency, and where a British possession
  consists of several constituent colonies, mean the Governor
  General of the whole possession or the Governor of any of the
  constituent colonies, and as respects any other British possession
  it shall mean the officer for the time being administering the
  government of such possession; also any person acting for or in
  the capacity of a governor shall be included under the term
  "Governor":

[Sidenote: "Court of Admiralty:"]

  "Court of Admiralty" shall mean the High Court of Admiralty of
  England or Ireland, the Court of Session of Scotland, or any
  Vice-Admiralty Court within Her Majesty's dominions:

[Sidenote: "Ship:"]

  "Ship" shall include any description of boat, vessel, floating
  battery, or floating craft; also any description of boat, vessel,
  or other craft or battery, made to move either on the surface of
  or under water, or sometimes on the surface of and sometimes under
  water:

[Sidenote: "Building:"]

  "Building" in relation to a ship shall include the doing any act
  towards or incidental to the construction of a ship, and all words
  having relation to building shall be construed accordingly:

[Sidenote: "Equipping:"]

  "Equipping" in relation to a ship shall include the furnishing a
  ship with any tackle, apparel, furniture, provisions, arms,
  munitions, or stores, or any other thing which is used in or about
  a ship for the purpose of fitting or adapting her for the sea or
  for naval service, and all words relating to equipping shall be
  construed accordingly:

[Sidenote: "Ship and Equipment:"]

  "Ship and equipment" shall include a ship and everything in or
  belonging to a ship:

[Sidenote: "Master:"]

  "Master" shall include any person having the charge or command of
  a ship.

_Repeal of Acts, and Saving Clauses._

[Sidenote: Repeal of Foreign Enlistment Act. 59 G. 3, c. 69.]

31. From and after the commencement of this Act, an Act passed in the
fifty-ninth year of the reign of His late Majesty King George the Third,
chapter sixty-nine, intituled "An Act to prevent the enlisting or
engagement of His Majesty's subjects to serve in foreign service, and
the fitting out or equipping, in His Majesty's dominions, vessels for
warlike purposes, without His Majesty's license," shall be repealed:
Provided that such repeal shall not affect any penalty, forfeiture, or
other punishment incurred or to be incurred in respect of any offence
committed before this Act comes into operation, nor the institution of
any investigation or legal proceeding, or any other remedy for enforcing
any such penalty, forfeiture, or punishment as aforesaid.

[Sidenote: Saving as to Commissioned Foreign Ships.]

32. Nothing in this Act contained shall subject to forfeiture any
commissioned ship of any foreign state, or give to any British court
over or in respect of any ship entitled to recognition as a commissioned
ship of any foreign state any jurisdiction which it would not have had
if this Act had not passed.

[Sidenote: Penalties not to extend to Persons entering into Military
Service in Asia. 59 G. 3, c. 69, s. 12.]

33. Nothing in this Act contained shall extend or be construed to extend
to subject to any penalty any person who enters into the military
service of any prince, state, or potentate in Asia, with such leave or
license as is for the time being required by law in the case of subjects
of Her Majesty entering into the military services of princes, states,
or potentates of Asia.




APPENDIX X

      THE NAVAL PRIZE ACT, 1864
      27 & 28 VICT., CHAPTER 25
      An Act for regulating Naval Prize of War.
      [_23rd June 1864._]


Whereas it is expedient to enact permanently, with Amendments, such
Provisions concerning Naval Prize, and Matters connected therewith, as
have heretofore been usually passed at the Beginning of a War:

Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and
Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of
the same, as follows:

_Preliminary._

[Sidenote: Short Title.]

1. This Act may be cited as the Naval Prize Act, 1864.

2. In this Act--

[Sidenote: Interpretation of Terms.]

  The Term "the Lords of the Admiralty" means the Lord High Admiral
  of the United Kingdom, or the Commissioners for executing the
  Office of Lord High Admiral:

  The Term "the High Court of Admiralty" means the High Court of
  Admiralty of _England_:

  The Term "any of Her Majesty's Ships of War" includes any of Her
  Majesty's Vessels of War, and any hired armed Ship or Vessel in
  Her Majesty's Service:

  The Term "Officers and Crew" includes Flag Officers, Commanders,
  and other Officers, Engineers, Seamen, Marines, Soldiers, and
  others on board any of Her Majesty's Ships of War:

  The Term "Ship" includes Vessel and Boat, with the Tackle,
  Furniture, and Apparel of the Ship, Vessel, or Boat:

  The Term "Ship Papers" includes all Books, Passes, Sea Briefs,
  Charter Parties, Bills of Lading, Cockets, Letters, and other
  Documents and Writings delivered up or found on board a captured
  Ship:

  The Term "Goods" includes all such Things as are by the Course of
  Admiralty and Law of Nations the Subject of Adjudication as Prize
  (other than Ships).


I.--Prize Courts.

[Sidenote: High Court of Admiralty and other Courts to be Prize Courts
for Purposes of Act.]

3. The High Court of Admiralty, and every Court of Admiralty or of
Vice-Admiralty, or other Court exercising Admiralty Jurisdiction in Her
Majesty's Dominions, for the Time being authorised to take cognizance of
and judicially proceed in Matters of Prize, shall be a Prize Court
within the Meaning of this Act.

Every such Court, other than the High Court of Admiralty, is comprised
in the Term "Vice-Admiralty Prize Court," when hereafter used in this
Act.

_High Court of Admiralty._

[Sidenote: Jurisdiction of High Court of Admiralty.]

4. The High Court of Admiralty shall have Jurisdiction throughout Her
Majesty's Dominions as a Prize Court.

The High Court of Admiralty as a Prize Court shall have Power to enforce
any Order or Decree of a Vice-Admiralty Prize Court, and any Order or
Decree of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in a Prize Appeal.

_Appeal; Judicial Committee._

[Sidenote: Appeal to Queen in Council, in what Cases.]

5. An Appeal shall lie to Her Majesty in Council from any Order or
Decree of a Prize Court, as of Right in case of a Final Decree, and in
other Cases with the Leave of the Court making the Order or Decree.

Every Appeal shall be made in such Manner and Form and subject to such
Regulations (including Regulations as to Fees, Costs, Charges, and
Expenses) as may for the Time being be directed by Order in Council, and
in the Absence of any such Order, or so far as any such Order does not
extend, then in such Manner and Form and subject to such Regulations as
are for the Time being prescribed or in force respecting Maritime Causes
of Appeal.

[Sidenote: Jurisdiction of Judicial Committee in Prize Appeals.]

6. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council shall have Jurisdiction
to hear and report on any such Appeal, and may therein exercise all such
Powers as for the Time being appertain to them in respect of Appeals
from any Court of Admiralty Jurisdiction, and all such Powers as are
under this Act vested in the High Court of Admiralty, and all such
Powers as were wont to be exercised by the Commissioners of Appeal in
Prize Causes.

[Sidenote: Custody of Processes, Papers, &c.]

7. All Processes and Documents required for the Purposes of any such
Appeal shall be transmitted to and shall remain in the Custody of the
Registrar of Her Majesty in Prize Appeals.

[Sidenote: Limit of Time for Appeal.]

8. In every such Appeal the usual Inhibition shall be extracted from the
Registry of Her Majesty in Prize Appeals within Three Months after the
Date of the Order or Decree appealed from if the Appeal be from the High
Court of Admiralty, and within Six Months after that Date if it be from
a Vice-Admiralty Prize Court.

The Judicial Committee may, nevertheless, on sufficient Cause shown,
allow the Inhibition to be extracted and the Appeal to be prosecuted
after the Expiration of the respective Periods aforesaid.

_Vice-Admiralty Prize Courts._

[Sidenote: Enforcement of Orders of High Court, &c.]

9. Every Vice-Admiralty Prize Court shall enforce within its
Jurisdiction all Orders and Decrees of the Judicial Committee in Prize
Appeals and of the High Court of Admiralty in Prize Causes.

[Sidenote: Salaries of Judges of Vice-Admiralty Prize Courts.]

10. Her Majesty in Council may grant to the Judge of any Vice-Admiralty
Prize Court a Salary not exceeding Five Hundred Pounds a Year, payable
out of Money provided by Parliament, subject to such Regulations as seem
meet.

A Judge to whom a Salary is so granted shall not be entitled to any
further Emolument, arising from Fees or otherwise, in respect of Prize
Business transacted in his Court.

An Account of all such Fees shall be kept by the Registrar of the Court,
and the Amount thereof shall be carried to and form Part of the
Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.

[Sidenote: Retiring Pensions of Judges, as in 22 & 23 Vict. c. 26.]

11. In accordance, as far as Circumstances admit, with the Principles
and Regulations laid down in the Superannuation Act, 1859, Her Majesty
in Council may grant to the Judge of any Vice-Admiralty Prize Court an
annual or other Allowance, to take effect on the Termination of his
Service, and to be payable out of Money provided by Parliament.

[Sidenote: Returns from Vice-Admiralty Prize Courts.]

12. The Registrar of every Vice-Admiralty Prize Court shall, on the
First Day of _January_ and First Day of _July_ in every year, make out a
Return (in such Form as the Lords of the Admiralty from Time to Time
direct) of all cases adjudged in the Court since the last half-yearly
Return, and shall with all convenient Speed send the same to the
Registrar of the High Court of Admiralty, who shall keep the same in the
Registry of that Court, and who shall, as soon as conveniently may be,
send a Copy of the Returns of each Half Year to the Lords of the
Admiralty, who shall lay the same before both Houses of Parliament.

_General._

[Sidenote: General Orders for Prize Courts.]

13. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, with the Judge of the
High Court of Admiralty, may from Time to Time frame General Orders for
regulating (subject to the Provisions of this Act) the Procedure and
Practice of Prize Courts, and the Duties and Conduct of the Officers
thereof and of the Practitioners therein, and for regulating the Fees to
be taken by the Officers of the Courts, and the Costs, Charges, and
Expenses to be allowed to the Practitioners therein.

Any such General Orders shall have full Effect, if and when approved by
Her Majesty in Council, but not sooner or otherwise.

Every Order in Council made under this Section shall be laid before both
Houses of Parliament.

Every such Order in Council shall be kept exhibited in a conspicuous
Place in each Court to which it relates.

[Sidenote: Prohibition of Officer of Prize Court acting as Proctor, &c.]

14. It shall not be lawful for any Registrar, Marshal, or other Officer
of any Prize Court, or for the Registrar of Her Majesty in Prize
Appeals, directly or indirectly to act or be in any manner concerned as
Advocate, Proctor, Solicitor, or Agent, or otherwise, in any Prize Cause
or Appeal, on pain of Dismissal or Suspension from Office, by Order of
the Court or of the Judicial Committee (as the Case may require).

[Sidenote: Prohibition of Proctors being concerned for adverse Parties
in a Cause.]

15. It shall not be lawful for any Proctor or Solicitor, or Person
practising as a Proctor or Solicitor, being employed by a Party in a
Prize Cause or Appeal, to be employed or concerned, by himself or his
Partner, or by any other Person, directly or indirectly by or on behalf
of any adverse Party in that Cause or Appeal, on pain of Exclusion or
Suspension from Practice in Prize Matters, by Order of the Court or of
the Judicial Committee (as the Case may require).


II.--PROCEDURE IN PRIZE CAUSES.

_Proceedings by Captors._

[Sidenote: Custody of Prize Ship.]

16. Every Ship taken as Prize, and brought into Port within the
Jurisdiction of a Prize Court, shall forthwith and without Bulk broken,
be delivered up to the Marshal of the Court.

If there is no such Marshal, then the Ship shall be in like Manner
delivered up to the Principal Officer of Customs at the Port.

The Ship shall remain in the Custody of the Marshal, or of such Officer,
subject to the Orders of the Court.

[Sidenote: Bringing in of Ship Papers.]

17. The Captors shall, with all practicable Speed after the Ship is
brought into Port, bring the Ship Papers into the Registry of the Court.

The Officer in Command, or One of the Chief Officers of the Capturing
Ship, or some other Person who was present at the Capture, and saw the
Ship Papers delivered up or found on board, shall make Oath that they
are brought in as they were taken, without Fraud, Addition, Subduction,
or Alteration, or else shall account on Oath to the Satisfaction of the
Court for the Absence or altered Condition of the Ship Papers or any of
them.

Where no Ship Papers are delivered up or found on board the captured
Ship, the Officer in Command, or One of the Chief Officers of the
capturing Ship, or some other Person who was present at the Capture,
shall make Oath to that Effect.

[Sidenote: Issue of Monition.]

18. As soon as the Affidavit as to Ship Papers is filed, a Monition
shall issue, returnable within Twenty Days from the Service thereof,
citing all Persons in general to show Cause why the captured Ship should
not be condemned.

[Sidenote: Examinations on Standing Interrogatories.]

19. The Captors shall, with all practicable Speed after the captured
Ship is brought into Port, bring Three or Four of the Principal Persons
belonging to the captured Ship before the Judge of the Court or some
Person authorised in this behalf, by whom they shall be examined on Oath
on the Standing Interrogatories.

The Preparatory Examinations on the Standing Interrogatories shall, if
possible, be concluded within Five Days from the Commencement thereof.

[Sidenote: Adjudication by Court.]

20. After the Return of the Monition, the Court shall, on Production of
the Preparatory Examinations and Ship Papers, proceed with all
convenient Speed either to condemn or to release the captured Ship.

[Sidenote: Further Proof.]

21. Where, on Production of the Preparatory Examinations and Ship
Papers, it appears to the Court doubtful whether the captured Ship is
good Prize or not, the Court may direct further Proof to be adduced,
either by Affidavit or by Examination of Witnesses, with or without
Pleadings, or by Production of further Documents; and on such further
Proof being adduced the Court shall with all convenient Speed proceed to
Adjudication.

[Sidenote: Custody, &c. of Ships of War.]

22. The foregoing Provisions, as far as they relate to the Custody of
the Ship, and to Examination on the Standing Interrogatories, shall not
apply to Ships of War taken as Prize.

_Claim._

[Sidenote: Entry of Claim; Security for Costs.]

23. At any Time before Final Decree made in the Cause, any Person
claiming an Interest in the Ship may enter in the Registry of the Court
a Claim, verified on Oath.

Within Five Days after entering the Claim, the Claimant shall give
Security for Costs in the Sum of Sixty Pounds; but the Court shall have
Power to enlarge the Time for giving Security, or to direct Security to
be given in a larger Sum, if the Circumstances appear to require it.

_Appraisement._

[Sidenote: Power to Court to direct Appraisement.]

24. The Court may, if it thinks fit, at any Time direct that the
captured Ship be appraised.

Every Appraisement shall be made by competent Persons sworn to make the
same according to the best of their Skill and Knowledge.

_Delivery on Bail._

[Sidenote: Power to Court to direct Delivery to Claimant on Bail.]

25. After Appraisement, the Court may, if it thinks fit, direct that the
captured Ship be delivered up to the Claimant, on his giving Security to
the Satisfaction of the Court to pay to the Captors the appraised Value
thereof in case of Condemnation.

_Sale._

[Sidenote: Power to Court to order Sale.]

26. The Court may at any Time, if it thinks fit, on account of the
Condition of the captured Ship, or on the Application of a Claimant,
order that the captured Ship be appraised as aforesaid (if not already
appraised), and be sold.

[Sidenote: Sale on Condemnation.]

27. On or after Condemnation the Court may, if it thinks fit, order that
the Ship be appraised as aforesaid (if not already appraised), and be
sold.

[Sidenote: How Sales to be made.]

28. Every Sale shall be made by or under the Superintendence of the
Marshal of the Court or of the Officer having the Custody of the
captured Ship.

[Sidenote: Payment of Proceeds to Paymaster General or Official
Accountant.]

29. The Proceeds of any Sale, made either before or after Condemnation,
and after Condemnation the appraised Value of the captured Ship, in case
she has been delivered up to a Claimant on Bail, shall be paid under an
Order of the Court either into the Bank of _England_ to the Credit of
Her Majesty's Paymaster General, or into the Hands of an Official
Accountant (belonging to the Commissariat or some other Department)
appointed for this Purpose by the Commissioners of Her Majesty's
Treasury or by the Lords of the Admiralty, subject in either case to
such Regulations as may from Time to Time be made, by order in Council,
as to the Custody and Disposal of Money so paid.

_Small armed Ships._

[Sidenote: One Adjudication as to several small Ships.]

30. The Captors may include in One Adjudication any Number, not
exceeding Six, of armed Ships not exceeding One hundred Tons each, taken
within Three Months next before Institution of Proceedings.

_Goods._

[Sidenote: Application of foregoing Provisions to Prize Goods.]

31. The foregoing Provisions relating to Ships shall extend and apply,
_mutatis mutandis_, to goods taken as Prize on board Ship; and the Court
may direct such goods to be unladen, inventoried, and warehoused.

_Monition to Captors to proceed._

[Sidenote: Power to Court to call on Captors to proceed to
Adjudication.]

32. If the Captors fail to institute or to prosecute with Effect
Proceedings for Adjudication, a Monition shall, on the Application of a
Claimant, issue against the Captors, returnable within Six Days from the
Service thereof, citing them to appear and proceed to Adjudication; and
on the Return thereof the Court shall either forthwith proceed to
Adjudication or direct further Proof to be adduced as aforesaid and then
proceed to Adjudication.

_Claim on Appeal._

[Sidenote: Person intervening on Appeal to enter Claim.]

33. Where any Person, not an original Party in the Cause, intervenes on
Appeal, he shall enter a Claim, verified on Oath, and shall give
Security for Costs.


III.--SPECIAL CASES OF CAPTURE.

_Land Expeditions._

[Sidenote: Jurisdiction of Prize Court in case of Capture in Land
Expedition.]

34. Where, in an Expedition of any of Her Majesty's Naval or Naval and
Military Forces against a Fortress or Possession on Land, Goods
belonging to the State of the Enemy or to a Public Trading Company of
the Enemy exercising Powers of Government are taken in the Fortress or
Possession, or a Ship is taken in Waters defended by or belonging to the
Fortress or Possession, a Prize Court shall have Jurisdiction as to the
Goods or Ship so taken, and any Goods taken on board the Ship as in case
of Prize.

_Conjunct Capture with Ally._

[Sidenote: Jurisdiction of Prize Court in case of Expedition with Ally.]

35. Where any Ship or Goods is or are taken by any of Her Majesty's
Naval or Naval and Military Forces while acting in conjunction with any
Forces of any of Her Majesty's Allies, a Prize Court shall have
Jurisdiction as to the same as in the case of Prize, and shall have
Power, after Condemnation, to apportion the due share of the Proceeds to
Her Majesty's Ally, the proportionate Amount and the Disposition of
which Share shall be such as may from Time to Time be agreed between Her
Majesty and Her Majesty's Ally.

_Joint Capture._

[Sidenote: Restriction on Petitions by asserted joint Captors.]

36. Before Condemnation, a Petition on behalf of asserted joint Captors
shall not (except by special Leave of the Court) be admitted, unless and
until they give Security to the Satisfaction of the Court to contribute
to the actual Captors a just Proportion of any Costs, Charges, and
Expenses or Damages that may be incurred by or awarded against the
actual Captors on account of the Capture and Detention of the Prize.

After Condemnation, such a Petition shall not (except by special Leave
of the Court) be admitted unless and until the asserted joint Captors
pay to the actual Captors a just Proportion of the Costs, Charges, and
Expenses incurred by the actual Captors in the Case, and give such
Security as aforesaid, and show sufficient Cause to the Court why their
Petition was not presented before Condemnation.

Provided, that nothing in the present Section shall extend to the
asserted Interest of a Flag Officer claiming to share by virtue of his
Flag.

_Offences against Law of Prize._

[Sidenote: In case of Offence by Captors, Prize to be reserved for
Crown.]

37. A Prize Court, on Proof of any Offence against the Law of Nations,
or against this Act, or any Act relating to Naval Discipline, or against
any Order in Council or Royal Proclamation, or of any Breach of Her
Majesty's Instructions relating to Prize, or of any Act of Disobedience
to the Orders of the Lords of the Admiralty, or to the Command of a
Superior Officer, committed by the Captors in relation to any Ship or
Goods taken as Prize, or in relation to any Person on Board any such
Ship, may, on Condemnation, reserve the Prize to Her Majesty's Disposal,
notwithstanding any Grant that may have been made by Her Majesty in
favour of Captors.

_Pre-emption._

[Sidenote: Purchase by Admiralty for Public Service of Stores on board
Foreign Ships.]

38. Where a Ship of a Foreign Nation passing the Seas laden with Naval
or Victualling Stores intended to be carried to a Port of any Enemy of
Her Majesty is taken and brought into a Port of the United Kingdom, and
the Purchase for the Service of Her Majesty of the Stores on board the
Ship appears to the Lords of the Admiralty expedient without the
Condemnation thereof in a Prize Court, in that Case the Lords of the
Admiralty may purchase, on the Account or for the Service of Her
Majesty, all or any of the Stores on board the Ship; and the
Commissioners of Customs may permit the Stores purchased to be entered
and landed within any Port.

_Capture by Ship other than a Ship of War._

[Sidenote: Prizes taken by Ships other than Ships of War to be Droits of
Admiralty.]

39. Any Ship or Goods taken as Prize by any of the Officers and Crew of
a Ship other than a Ship of War of Her Majesty shall, on Condemnation,
belong to Her Majesty in Her Office of Admiralty.


IV.--PRIZE SALVAGE.

[Sidenote: Salvage to Re-captors of British Ship or Goods from Enemy.]

40. Where any Ship or Goods belonging to any of Her Majesty's Subjects,
after being taken as Prize by the Enemy, is or are retaken from the
Enemy by any of Her Majesty's Ships of War, the same shall be restored
by Decree of a Prize Court to the Owner, on his paying as Prize Salvage
One Eighth Part of the Value of the Prize to be decreed and ascertained
by the Court, or such Sum not exceeding One Eighth Part of the estimated
Value of the Prize as may be agreed on between the Owner and the
Re-captors, and approved by Order of the Court; Provided, that where the
Re-capture is made under circumstances of Special Difficulty or Danger,
the Prize Court may, if it thinks fit, award to the Re-captors as Prize
Salvage a larger Part than One Eighth Part, but not exceeding in any
Case One Fourth Part, of the Value of the Prize.

Provided also, that where a Ship after being so taken is set forth or
used by any of Her Majesty's Enemies as a Ship of War, this Provision
for Restitution shall not apply, and the Ship shall be adjudicated on as
in other Cases of Prize.

[Sidenote: Permission to re-captured Ship to proceed on Voyage.]

41. Where a Ship belonging to any of Her Majesty's Subjects, after being
taken as Prize by the Enemy, is retaken from the Enemy by any of Her
Majesty's Ships of War, she may, with the Consent of the Re-captors,
prosecute her Voyage, and it shall not be necessary for the Re-captors
to proceed to Adjudication till her Return to a Port of the United
Kingdom.

The Master or Owner, or his Agent, may, with the Consent of the
Re-captors, unload and dispose of the Goods on board the Ship before
Adjudication.

In case the Ship does not, within Six Months, return to a Port of the
United Kingdom, the Re-captors may nevertheless institute Proceedings
against the Ship or Goods in the High Court of Admiralty, and the Court
may thereupon award Prize Salvage as aforesaid to the Re-captors, and
may enforce Payment thereof, either by Warrant of Arrest against the
Ship or Goods, or by Monition and Attachment against the Owner.


V.--PRIZE BOUNTY.

[Sidenote: Prize Bounty to Officers and Crew present at Engagement with
an Enemy.]

42. If, in relation to any War, Her Majesty is pleased to declare, by
Proclamation or Order in Council, Her Intention to grant Prize Bounty to
the Officers and Crews of Her Ships of War, then such of the Officers
and Crew of any of Her Majesty's Ships of War as are actually present at
the taking or destroying of any armed Ship of any of Her Majesty's
Enemies shall be entitled to have distributed among them as Prize Bounty
a Sum calculated at the Rate of Five Pounds for each Person on board the
Enemy's Ship at the Beginning of the Engagement.

[Sidenote: Ascertainment of Amount of Prize Bounty by Decree of Prize
Court.]

43. The Number of the Persons so on board the Enemy's Ship shall be
proved in a Prize Court, either by the Examinations on Oath of the
Survivors of them, or of any Three or more of the Survivors, or if there
is no Survivor by the Papers of the Enemy's Ship, or by the Examinations
on Oath of Three or more of the Officers and Crew of Her Majesty's Ship,
or by such other Evidence as may seem to the Court sufficient in the
Circumstances.

The Court shall make a Decree declaring the Title of the Officers and
Crew of Her Majesty's Ship to the Prize Bounty, and stating the Amount
thereof.

The Decree shall be subject to Appeal as other Decrees of the Court.

[Sidenote: Payment of Prize Bounty awarded.]

44. On Production of an official Copy of the Decree the Commissioners of
Her Majesty's Treasury shall, out of Money provided by Parliament, pay
the Amount of Prize Bounty decreed, in such Manner as any Order in
Council may from Time to Time direct.


VI.--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS.

_Ransom._

[Sidenote: Power for regulating Ransom by Order in Council.]

45. Her Majesty in Council may from Time to Time, in relation to any
War, make such Orders as may seem expedient, according to Circumstances,
for prohibiting or allowing, wholly or in certain Cases, or subject to
any Conditions or Regulations or otherwise, as may from Time to Time
seem meet, the ransoming or the entering into any contract or Agreement
for the ransoming of any Ship or Goods belonging to any of Her Majesty's
Subjects, and taken as Prize by any of Her Majesty's Enemies.

Any Contract or Agreement entered into, and any Bill, Bond, or other
Security given for Ransom of any Ship or Goods, shall be under the
exclusive Jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty as a Prize Court
(subject to Appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council), and
if entered into or given in contravention of any such Order in Council
shall be deemed to have been entered into or given for an illegal
Consideration.

If any Person ransoms or enters into any Contract or Agreement for
Ransoming any Ship or Goods, in contravention of any such Order in
Council, he shall for every such Offence be liable to be proceeded
against in the High Court of Admiralty at the Suit of Her Majesty in Her
Office of Admiralty, and on Conviction to be fined, in the Discretion of
the Court, any Sum not exceeding Five hundred Pounds.

_Convoy._

[Sidenote: Punishment of Masters of Merchant Vessels under Convoy
disobeying Orders or deserting Convoy.]

46. If the Master or other Person having the Command of any Ship of any
of Her Majesty's Subjects, under the Convoy of any of Her Majesty's
Ships of War, wilfully disobeys any lawful Signal, Instruction, or
Command of the Commander of the Convoy, or without Leave deserts the
Convoy, he shall be liable to be proceeded against in the High Court of
Admiralty at the Suit of Her Majesty in Her Office of Admiralty, and
upon Conviction to be fined, in the Discretion of the Court, any Sum not
exceeding Five hundred Pounds, and to suffer Imprisonment for such Time,
not exceeding One Year, as the Court may adjudge.

_Customs Duties and Regulations._

[Sidenote: Prize Ships and Goods liable to Duties and Forfeiture.]

47. All Ships and Goods taken as Prize and brought into a Port of the
United Kingdom shall be liable to and be charged with the same Rates and
Charges and Duties of Customs as under any Act relating to the Customs
may be chargeable on other Ships and Goods of the like Description; and

All Goods brought in as Prize which would on the voluntary Importation
thereof be liable to Forfeiture or subject to any Restriction under the
Laws relating to the Customs, shall be deemed to be so liable and
subject, unless the Commissioners of Customs see fit to authorise the
Sale or Delivery thereof for Home Use or Exportation, unconditionally or
subject to such Conditions and Regulations as they may direct.

[Sidenote: Regulations of Customs to be observed as to Prize Ships and
Goods.]

48. Where any Ship or Goods taken as Prize is or are brought into a Port
of the United Kingdom, the Master or other Person in charge or command
of the Ship which has been taken or in which the Goods are brought
shall, on Arrival at such Port, bring to at the proper Place of
Discharge, and shall, when required by any Officer of Customs, deliver
an Account in Writing under his Hand concerning such Ship and Goods,
giving such Particulars relating thereto as may be in his Power, and
shall truly answer all Questions concerning such Ship or Goods asked by
any such Officer, and in default shall forfeit a Sum not exceeding One
hundred Pounds, such Forfeiture to be enforced as Forfeitures for
Offences against the Laws relating to the Customs are enforced, and
every such Ship shall be liable to such Searches as other Ships are
liable to, and the Officers of the Customs may freely go on board such
Ship and bring to the Queen's Warehouse any Goods on board the same,
subject, nevertheless, to such Regulations in respect of Ships of War
belonging to Her Majesty as shall from Time to Time be issued by the
Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury.

[Sidenote: Power for Treasury to remit Customs Duties in certain cases.]

49. Goods taken as Prize may be sold either for Home Consumption or for
Exportation; and if in the former Case the Proceeds thereof, after
payment of Duties of Customs, are insufficient to satisfy the just and
reasonable claims thereon, the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury
may remit the whole or such Part of the said Duties as they see fit.

_Perjury._

[Sidenote: Punishment of Persons guilty of Perjury.]

50. If any Person wilfully and corruptly swears, declares, or affirms
falsely in any Prize Cause or Appeal, or in any Proceeding under this
Act, or in respect of any Matter required by this Act to be verified on
Oath, or suborns any other Person to do so, he shall be deemed guilty of
Perjury, or of Subornation of Perjury (as the Case may be), and shall be
liable to be punished accordingly.

_Limitation of Actions, &c._

[Sidenote: Actions against Persons executing Act not to be brought
without Notice, &c.]

51. Any Action or Proceeding shall not lie in any Part of Her Majesty's
Dominions against any Person acting under the Authority or in the
Execution or intended Execution or in pursuance of this Act for any
alleged Irregularity or Trespass, or other Act or Thing done or omitted
by him under this Act, unless Notice in Writing (specifying the Cause of
the Action or Proceeding) is given by the intending Plaintiff or
Prosecutor to the intended Defendant One Month at least before the
Commencement of the Action or Proceeding, nor unless the Action or
Proceeding is commenced within Six Months next after the Act or Thing
complained of is done or omitted, or, in case of a Continuation of
Damage, within Six Months next after the doing of such Damage has
ceased.

In any such action the Defendant may plead generally that the Act or
Thing complained of was done or omitted by him when acting under the
authority or in the Execution or intended Execution or in pursuance of
this Act, and may give all special Matter in Evidence; and the Plaintiff
shall not succeed if Tender of sufficient Amends is made by the
Defendant before the Commencement of the Action; and in case no Tender
has been made, the Defendant may, by Leave of the Court in which the
Action is brought, at any Time pay into Court such Sum of Money as he
thinks fit, whereupon such Proceeding and Order shall be had and made in
and by the Court as may be had and made on the Payment of Money into
Court in an ordinary Action; and if the Plaintiff does not succeed in
the Action, the Defendant shall receive such full and reasonable
Indemnity as to all Costs, Charges, and Expenses incurred in and about
the Action as may be taxed and allowed by the proper Officer, subject to
Review; and though a Verdict is given for the Plaintiff in the Action he
shall not have Costs against the Defendant, unless the Judge before whom
the Trial is had certifies his Approval of the Action.

Any such Action or Proceeding against any Person in Her Majesty's Naval
Service, or in the Employment of the Lords of the Admiralty, shall not
be brought or instituted elsewhere than in the United Kingdom.

_Petitions of Right._

[Sidenote: Jurisdiction of High Court of Admiralty on Petitions of Right
in certain Cases, as in 23 & 24 Vict. c. 34.]

52. A Petition of Right, under The Petitions of Right Act, 1860, may, if
the Suppliant thinks fit, be intituled in the High Court of Admiralty,
in case the Subject Matter of the Petition or any material part thereof
arises out of the Exercise of any Belligerent Right on behalf of the
Crown, or would be cognizable in a Prize Court within Her Majesty's
Dominions if the same were a Matter in dispute between private Persons.

Any Petition of Right under the last-mentioned Act, whether intituled in
the High Court of Admiralty or not, may be prosecuted in that Court, if
the Lord Chancellor thinks fit so to direct.

The Provisions of this Act relative to Appeal, and to the framing and
Approval of General Orders for regulating the Procedure and Practice of
the High Court of Admiralty, shall extend to the Case of any such
Petition of Right intituled or directed to be prosecuted in that Court;
and, subject thereto, all the Provisions of The Petitions of Right Act,
1860, shall apply, _mutatis mutandis_, in the Case of any such Petition
of Right; and for the Purposes of the present Section the Terms "Court"
and "Judge" in that Act shall respectively be understood to include and
to mean the High Court of Admiralty and the Judge thereof, and other
Terms shall have the respective Meanings given to them in that Act.

_Orders in Council._

[Sidenote: Power to make Orders in Council.]

53. Her Majesty in Council may from Time to Time make such Orders in
Council as seem meet for the better Execution of this Act.

[Sidenote: Order in Council to be gazetted, &c.]

54. Every Order in Council under this Act shall be published in the
_London Gazette_, and shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament
within Thirty Days after the making thereof, if Parliament is then
sitting, and, if not, then within Thirty Days after the next Meeting of
Parliament.

_Savings._

[Sidenote: Not to affect Rights of Crown; Effect of Treaties, &c.]

55. Nothing in this Act shall--

  (1) give to the Officers and Crew of any of Her Majesty's Ships of
  War any Right or Claim in or to any Ship or Goods taken as Prize
  or the Proceeds thereof, it being the intent of this Act that such
  Officers and Crews shall continue to take only such Interest (if
  any) in the Proceeds of Prizes as may be from Time to Time granted
  to them by the Crown; or

  (2) affect the Operation of any existing Treaty or Convention with
  any Foreign Power; or

  (3) take away or abridge the Power of the Crown to enter into any
  Treaty or Convention with any Foreign Power containing any
  Stipulation that may seem meet concerning any Matter to which
  this Act relates; or

  (4) take away, abridge, or control, further or otherwise than as
  expressly provided by this Act, any Right, Power, or Prerogative
  of Her Majesty the Queen in right of Her Crown, or in right of Her
  Office of Admiralty, or any Right or Power of the Lord High
  Admiral of the United Kingdom, or of the Commissioners for
  executing the Office of Lord High Admiral; or

  (5) take away, abridge, or control, further or otherwise than as
  expressly provided by this Act, the Jurisdiction or Authority of
  a Prize Court to take cognizance of and judicially proceed upon
  any Capture, Seizure, Prize, or Reprisal of any Ship or Goods, or
  to hear and determine the same, and, according to the Course of
  Admiralty and the Law of Nations, to adjudge and condemn any Ship
  or Goods, or any other Jurisdiction or Authority of or
  exerciseable by a Prize Court.

_Commencement._

[Sidenote: Commencement of Act.]

56. This Act shall commence on the Commencement of The Naval Agency and
Distribution Act, 1864.




APPENDIX XI

      THE PRIZE COURTS ACTS, 1894
      57 & 58 VICT., CHAPTER 39
      An Act to make further provision for the establishment of
      Prize Courts, and for other purposes connected therewith.
      [_17th August 1894._]


Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the
advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in
this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as
follows:

[Sidenote: Short Title.]

1. This Act may be cited as the Prize Courts Act, 1894.

[Sidenote: Constitution of Prize Courts in British Possessions.]

2.--(1) Any commission, warrant, or instructions from Her Majesty the
Queen or the Admiralty for the purpose of commissioning or regulating
the procedure of a prize court at any place in a British possession may,
notwithstanding the existence of peace, be issued at any time, with a
direction that the court shall act only upon such proclamation as
herein-after mentioned being made in the possession.

(2) Where any such commission, warrant, or instructions have been
issued, then, subject to instructions from Her Majesty, the Vice-Admiral
of such possession may, when satisfied, by information from a Secretary
of State or otherwise, that war has broken out between Her Majesty and
any foreign State, proclaim that war has so broken out, and thereupon
the said commission, warrant, and instructions shall take effect as if
the same had been issued after the breaking out of such war and such
foreign State were named therein.

[Sidenote: 53 & 54 Vict. c. 27.]

(3) The said commission and warrant may authorise either a
Vice-Admiralty Court or a Colonial Court of Admiralty, within the
meaning of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, to act as a prize
court, and may establish a Vice-Admiralty Court for that purpose.

(4) Any such commission, warrant, or instructions may be revoked or
altered from time to time.

(5) A court duly authorised to act as a prize court during any war
shall after the conclusion of the war continue so to act in relation to,
and finally dispose of, all matters and things which arose during the
war, including all penalties and forfeitures incurred during the war.

[Sidenote: Rules of Court for and Fees in Prize Courts. 27 & 28 Vict. c.
25.]

3.--(1) Her Majesty the Queen in Council may make rules of court for
regulating, subject to the provisions of the Naval Prize Act, 1864, and
this Act, the procedure and practice of prize courts within the meaning
of that Act, and the duties and conduct of the officers thereof, and of
the practitioners therein, and for regulating the fees to be taken by
the officers of the courts, and the costs, charges, and expenses to be
allowed to the practitioners therein.

(2) Every rule so made shall, whenever made, take effect at the time
therein mentioned, and shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament,
and shall be kept exhibited in a conspicuous place in each court to
which it relates.

[Sidenote: 27 & 28 Vict. c. 25.]

(3) This section shall be substituted for section thirteen of the Naval
Prize Act, 1864, which section is hereby repealed.

[Sidenote: 53 & 54 Vict c. 27.]

(4) If any Colonial Court of Admiralty within the meaning of the
Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, is authorised under this Act or
otherwise to act as a prize court, all fees arising in respect of prize
business transacted in the court shall be fixed, collected, and applied
in like manner as the fees arising in respect of the Admiralty business
of the court under the said Act.

[Sidenote: As to Vice-Admiralty Courts.]

4. Her Majesty the Queen in Council may make rules of court for
regulating the procedure and practice, including fees and costs, in a
Vice-Admiralty Court, whether under this Act or otherwise.

[Sidenote: Repeal of 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 79, s. 25.]

5. Section twenty-five of the Government of India Act, 1800, is hereby
repealed.




APPENDIX XII

      NAVAL PRIZE BILL OF 1911
      _Passed by the House of Commons, but thrown out by the House
      of Lords_
      A Bill to Consolidate, with Amendments, the Enactments
      relating to Naval Prize of War.


Whereas at the Second Peace Conference held at The Hague in the year
nineteen hundred and seven a Convention, the English translation whereof
is set forth in the First Schedule to this Act, was drawn up, but it is
desirable that the same should not be ratified by His Majesty until such
amendments have been made in the law relating to naval prize of war as
will enable effect to be given to the Convention:

And whereas for the purpose aforesaid it is expedient to consolidate the
law relating to naval prize of war with such amendments as aforesaid and
with certain other minor amendments:

Be it therefore enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and
with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and
Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of
the same, as follows:--


PART I.--COURTS AND OFFICERS.

_The Prize Court in England._

[Sidenote: The High Court. [54 & 55 Vict. c. 53, s. 4.]]

1.--(1) The High Court shall, without special warrant, be a prize court,
and shall, on the high seas, and throughout His Majesty's Dominions, and
in every place where His Majesty has jurisdiction, have all such
jurisdiction as the High Court of Admiralty possessed when acting as a
prize court, and generally have jurisdiction to determine all questions
as to the validity of the capture of a ship or goods, the legality of
the destruction of a captured ship or goods, and as to the payment of
compensation in respect of such a capture or destruction.

For the purposes of this Act the expression "capture" shall include
seizure for the purpose of the detention, requisition, or destruction of
any ship or goods which, but for any convention, would be liable to
condemnation, and the expressions "captured" and "taken as prize" shall
be construed accordingly, and where any ship or goods have been so
seized the court may make an order for the detention, requisition, or
destruction of the ship or goods and for the payment of compensation in
respect thereof.

(2) Subject to rules of court, all causes and matters within the
jurisdiction of the High Court as a prize court shall be assigned to the
Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the Court.

[Sidenote: Power of High Court to enforce decrees of other courts. [27 &
28 Vict. c. 25. s. 4.]]

2. The High Court as a prize court shall have power to enforce any order
or decree of a prize court in a British possession, and any order of the
Supreme Prize Court constituted under this Act in a prize appeal.

_Prize Courts in British Possessions._

[Sidenote: Prize courts in British possessions. [57 & 58 Vict. c. 39. s.
2 (1) and (3). 53 & 54 Vict. c. 27, s. 2 (3) and s. 9.] 53 & 54 Vict. c.
27.]

3. His Majesty may, by commission addressed to the Admiralty, empower
the Admiralty to authorise, and the Admiralty may thereupon by warrant
authorise, either a Vice-Admiralty court or a Colonial Court of
Admiralty, within the meaning of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act,
1890, to act as a prize court in a British possession, or may in like
manner establish a Vice-Admiralty court for the purpose of so acting;
and any court so authorised shall, subject to the terms of the warrant
from the Admiralty, have all such jurisdiction as is by this Act
conferred on the High Court as a prize court.

Commissions. [57 & 58 Vict. c. 39, s. 2 (1), (2).]

4.--(1) Any commission, warrant, or instructions from His Majesty the
King or the Admiralty for the purpose of commissioning a prize court at
any place in a British possession may, notwithstanding the existence of
peace, be issued at any time, with a direction that the court shall act
only upon such proclamation as herein-after mentioned being made in the
possession.

(2) Where any such commission, warrant, or instructions have been
issued, then, subject to instructions from His Majesty the Vice-Admiral
of such possession may, when satisfied by information from a Secretary
of State or otherwise that war has broken out between His Majesty and
any foreign State, proclaim that war has so broken out, and thereupon
the said commission, warrant, and instructions shall take effect as if
the same had been issued after the breaking out of such war and such
foreign State were named therein.

(3) Any such commission, warrant, or instructions may be revoked or
altered from time to time.

[Sidenote: Enforcement of orders.]

5. Every prize court in a British possession shall enforce within its
jurisdiction all orders and decrees of the High Court and of any other
prize court in a British possession in prize causes, and all orders of
the Supreme Prize Court constituted under this Act in prize appeals.

[Sidenote: Remuneration of certain judges of prize courts in a British
possession. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, ss. 10, 11.] 53 & 54 Vict. c. 27.]

6.--(1) His Majesty in Council may, with the concurrence of the
Treasury, grant to the judge of any prize court in a British possession,
other than a Colonial Court of Admiralty within the meaning of the
Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, remuneration, at a rate not
exceeding five hundred pounds a year, payable out of money provided by
Parliament, subject to such regulations as seem meet.

(2) A judge to whom remuneration is so granted shall not be entitled to
any further emolument, arising from fees or otherwise, in respect of
prize business transacted in his court.

(3) An account of all such fees shall be kept by the registrar of the
court, and the amount thereof shall be carried to and form part of the
Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.

[Sidenote: Returns from prize courts in British possessions. [27 & 28
Vict. c. 25, s. 12.]]

7. The registrar of every prize court in a British possession shall, on
the first day of January and first day of July in every year, make out a
return (in such form as the Admiralty from time to time direct) of all
cases adjudged in the court since the last half-yearly return, and shall
with all convenient speed send the same to the Admiralty registrar of
the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the High Court, who
shall keep the same in the Admiralty registry of that Division, and who
shall as soon as conveniently may be, send a copy of the returns of each
half year to the Admiralty, and the Admiralty shall lay the same before
both houses of Parliament.

[Sidenote: Fees. [57 & 58 Vict. c. 39 s. 3 (4).] 53 & 54 Vict. c. 27.]

8. If any Colonial Court of Admiralty within the meaning of the Colonial
Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, is authorised under this Act or otherwise
to act as a prize court, all fees arising in respect of prize business
transacted in the court shall be fixed, collected, and applied in like
manner as the fees arising in respect of the Admiralty business of the
court under the first-mentioned Act.

_Appeals._

[Sidenote: Appeals to Supreme Prize Court. [54 & 55 Vict. c. 53, s. 4
(3).]]

9.--(1) Any appeal from the High Court when acting as a prize court, or
from a prize court in a British possession, shall lie only to a court
(to be called the Supreme Prize Court) consisting of such members for
the time being of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as may be
nominated by His Majesty for that purpose.

(2) The Supreme Prize Court shall be a court of record with power to
take evidence on oath, and the seal of the court shall be such as the
Lord Chancellor may from time to time direct.

(3) Every appeal to the Supreme Prize Court shall be heard before not
less than three members of the court sitting together.

(4) The registrar and other officers for the time being of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council shall be registrar and officers of the
Supreme Prize Court.

[Sidenote: Procedure on, and conditions of, appeals. [27 & 28 Vict. c.
25, s. 5.]]

10.--(1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Prize Court from any order
or decree of a prize court, as of right in case of a final decree, and
in other cases with the leave of the court making the order or decree or
of the Supreme Prize Court.

(2) Every appeal shall be made in such manner and form and subject to
such conditions and regulations (including regulations as to fees,
costs, charges, and expenses) as may for the time being be directed by
order in Council.

[Sidenote: Jurisdiction of the Supreme Prize Court in prize appeals. [27
& 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 6; 54 & 55 Vict. c. 53, s. 4 (3).]]

11. The Supreme Prize Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and
determine any such appeal, and may therein exercise all such powers as
are under this Act vested in the High Court, and all such powers as were
wont to be exercised by the Commissioners of Appeal or by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in prize causes.

_Rules of Court._

[Sidenote: Rules of court. [57 & 58 Vict c. 39, s. 3.]]

12. His Majesty in Council may make rules of court for regulating,
subject to the provisions of this Act, the procedure and practice of the
Supreme Prize Court and of the Prize Courts within the meaning of this
Act, and the duties and conduct of the officers thereof, and of the
practitioners therein, and for regulating the fees to be taken by the
officers of the courts, and the costs, charges, and expenses to be
allowed to the practitioners therein.

_Officers of Prize Courts._

[Sidenote: Prohibition of officer of prize court acting as advocate, &c.
[27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, ss. 14, 15.]]

13. It shall not be lawful for any registrar, marshal, or other officer
of the Supreme Prize Court or of any other prize court, directly or
indirectly to act or be in any manner concerned as advocate, proctor,
solicitor, or agent, or otherwise, in any prize appeal or cause.

[Sidenote: Protection of persons acting in execution of Act. [27 & 28
Vict. c. 25, s. 51.]]

14. The Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, shall apply to any
action, prosecution, or other proceeding against any person for any act
done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of this Act or in
respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of this Act
whether commenced in the United Kingdom or elsewhere within His
Majesty's dominions.

_Continuance of Proceedings._

[Sidenote: Continuance of proceedings after conclusion of war. [57 & 58
Vict. c. 39, s. 2 (5).]]

15. A court duly authorised to act as a prize court during any war shall
after the conclusion of the war continue so to act in relation to, and
finally dispose of, all matters and things which arose during the war,
including all penalties, liabilities and forfeitures incurred during the
war.


Part II.--PROCEDURE IN PRIZE CAUSES.

[Sidenote: Custody of ships taken as prize. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s.
16.]]

16. Where a ship (not being a ship of war) is taken as prize, and is or
is brought within the jurisdiction of a prize court, she shall forthwith
be delivered up to the marshal of the court, or, if there is no such
marshal, to the principal officer of customs at the port, and shall
remain in his custody, subject to the orders of the court.

[Sidenote: Bringing in of ship papers. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 17.]]

17.--(1) The captors shall in all cases, with all practicable speed,
bring the ship papers into the registry of the court.

(2) The officer in command, or one of the chief officers of the
capturing ship, or some other person who was present at the capture and
saw the ship papers delivered up or found on board, shall make oath that
they are brought in as they were taken, without fraud, addition,
subduction, or alteration, or else shall account on oath to the
satisfaction of the court for the absence or altered condition of the
ship papers or any of them.

(3) Where no ship papers are delivered up or found on board the captured
ship, the officer in command, or one of the chief officers of the
capturing ship, or some other person who was present at the capture,
shall make oath to that effect.

[Sidenote: Examination of persons from captured ship. [27 & 28 Vict. c.
25, s. 19.]]

18. The captors shall also, unless the court otherwise directs, with all
practicable speed after the captured ship is brought into port, bring a
convenient number of the principal persons belonging to the captured
ship before the judge of the court or some person authorised in this
behalf, by whom they shall be examined on oath.

[Sidenote: Delivery of ship on bail. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 25.]]

19. The court may, if it thinks fit, at any time after a captured ship
has been appraised direct that the ship be delivered up to the claimant
on his giving security to the satisfaction of the court to pay to the
captors the appraised value thereof in case of condemnation.

[Sidenote: Power to order sale. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, ss. 26 & 27.]]

20. The court may at any time, if it thinks fit, on account of the
condition of the captured ship, or on the application of a claimant, or
on or after condemnation, order that the captured ship be appraised (if
not already appraised), and be sold.

[Sidenote: Power to award compensation notwithstanding release of ship.]

21. Where a ship has been taken as prize, a prize court may award
compensation in respect of the capture notwithstanding that the ship has
been released, whether before or after the institution of any
proceedings in the court in relation to the ship.

[Sidenote: Application and effect of Part II. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s.
31.]]

22.--(1) The provisions of this Part of this Act relating to ships shall
extend and apply, with the necessary adaptations, to goods taken as
prize.

(2) The provisions of this Part of this Act shall have effect subject to
any rules of court dealing with the subject-matter thereof.


Part III.--INTERNATIONAL PRIZE COURT.

[Sidenote: Appointment of British judge and deputy judge of
International Court. [_See_ 39 & 40 Vict. c. 59, s. 6.]]

23.--(1) In the event of an International Prize Court being constituted
in accordance with the said Convention or with any Convention entered
into for the purpose of enabling any power to become a party to the said
Convention or for the purpose of amending the said Convention in matters
subsidiary or incidental thereto (hereinafter referred to as the
International Prize Court), it shall be lawful for His Majesty from time
to time to appoint a judge and deputy judge of the court.

(2) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed by His Majesty a
judge or deputy judge of the court unless he has been, at or before the
time of his appointment, the holder, for a period of not less than two
years, of some one or more of the offices described as high judicial
offices by the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, as amended by any
subsequent enactment.

[Sidenote: Payment of contribution towards expenses of International
Prize Court.]

24. Any sums required for the payment of any contribution towards the
general expenses of the International Prize Court payable by His Majesty
under the said Convention shall be charged on and paid out of the
Consolidated Fund and the growing proceeds thereof.

[Sidenote: Appeals to International Prize Court.]

25. In cases to which this Part of this Act applies an appeal from the
Supreme Prize Court shall lie to the International Prize Court.

[Sidenote: Transfer of cases to the International Prize Court.]

26. If in any case to which this Part of this Act applies final judgment
is not given by the prize court, or on appeal by the Supreme Prize
Court, within two years from the date of the capture, the case may be
transferred to the International Prize Court.

[Sidenote: Rules as to appeals and transfers to International Prize
Court.]

27. His Majesty in Council may make rules regulating the manner in which
appeals and transfers under this Part of this Act may be made and with
respect to all such matters (including fees, costs, charges, and
expenses) as appear to His Majesty to be necessary for the purpose of
such appeals and transfers, or to be incidental thereto or consequential
thereon.

[Sidenote: Enforcement of orders of International Prize Court.]

28. The High Court and every prize court in a British possession shall
enforce within its jurisdiction all orders and decrees of the
International Prize Court in appeals and cases transferred to the Court
under this Part of this Act.

[Sidenote: Application of Part III.]

29. This part of this Act shall apply only to such cases and during such
period as may for the time being be directed by Order in Council, and
His Majesty may by the same or any other Order in Council apply this
Part of this Act subject to such conditions, exceptions and
qualifications as may be deemed expedient.


Part IV.--PRIZE SALVAGE AND PRIZE BOUNTY.

_Prize Salvage._

[Sidenote: Salvage to re-captors of British ship or goods from enemy.]

30. Where any ship or goods belonging to any of His Majesty's subjects,
after being taken as prize by the enemy, is or are retaken from the
enemy by any of His Majesty's ships of war, the same shall be restored
by decree of a prize court to the owner.

[Sidenote: Permission to recaptured ship to proceed on voyage and
postponement of proceedings. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 41.]]

31.--(1) Where a ship belonging to any of his Majesty's subjects, after
being taken as prize by the enemy, is retaken from the enemy by any of
His Majesty's ships of war, she may, with the consent of the
re-captors, prosecute her voyage, and it shall not be necessary for the
re-captors to proceed to adjudication till her return to a port of His
Majesty's dominions.

(2) The master or owner, or his agent, may, with the consent of the
re-captors, unload and dispose of the goods on board the ship before
adjudication.

(3) If the ship does not, within six months, return to a port of His
Majesty's dominions, the re-captors may nevertheless institute
proceedings against the ship or goods in the High Court, or in any prize
court in a British possession, and the court may thereupon award prize
salvage as aforesaid to the re-captors, and may enforce payment thereof,
either by warrant of arrest against the ship or goods, or in the same
manner as a judgment of the court in which the proceedings are
instituted may be enforced.

_Prize Bounty._

[Sidenote: Prize bounty to officers and crew present in case of capture
or destruction of enemy's ship. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 42.]]

32. If, in relation to any war, His Majesty is pleased to declare, by
proclamation or Order in Council, his intention to grant prize bounty to
the officers and crews of his ships of war, then such of the officers
and crew of any of His Majesty's ships of war as are actually present at
the taking or destroying of any armed ship of any of His Majesty's
enemies shall be entitled to have distributed among them as prize bounty
a sum calculated at such rates and in such manner as may be specified in
the proclamation or Order in Council.

[Sidenote: Ascertainment of amount of prize bounty. [27 & 28 Vict. c.
25, s. 43.]]

33.--(1) A prize court shall make a decree declaring the title of the
officers and crew of His Majesty's ship to the prize bounty, and stating
the amount thereof.

(2) The decree shall be subject to appeal as other decrees of the court.


Part V.--SPECIAL CASES OF JURISDICTION.

[Sidenote: Jurisdiction in case of capture in land expedition. [27 & 28
Vict. c. 25, s. 34.]]

34. Where, in an expedition of any of His Majesty's naval or naval and
military forces against a fortress or possession on land goods belonging
to the state of the enemy, or to a public trading company of the enemy
exercising powers of government, are taken in the fortress or
possession, or a ship is taken in waters defended by or belonging to the
fortress or possession, a prize court shall have jurisdiction as to the
goods or ships so taken, and any goods taken on board the ship, as in
case of prize.

[Sidenote: Jurisdiction in case of prize taken in expedition with ally.
[27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 35.]]

35. Where any ship or goods is or are taken by any of His Majesty's
naval or naval and military forces while acting in conjunction with any
forces of any of His Majesty's allies, a prize court shall have
jurisdiction as to the same as in case of prize, and shall have power,
after condemnation, to apportion the due share of the proceeds to His
Majesty's ally, the proportionate amount and the disposition of which
share shall be such as may from time to time be agreed between His
Majesty and His Majesty's ally.

[Sidenote: Jurisdiction of High Court on petitions of right as under 23
& 24 Vict. c. 34. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 52.]]

36.--(1) In any case where a petition of right under the Petitions of
Right Act, 1860, is presented and the subject-matter of the petition or
any material part thereof arises out of the exercise of any belligerent
right on behalf of the Crown, or would be cognizable in a prize court
within His Majesty's dominions if the same were a matter in dispute
between private persons, the petition may, if the subject thinks fit, be
intituled in the High Court as a prize court.

(2) Any petition of right under the last-mentioned Act, whether
intituled in the High Court or not, may be prosecuted in that court if
the Lord Chancellor thinks fit so to direct.

(3) The provisions of this Act relative to appeal, and to the making of
orders for regulating the procedure and practice of the High Court as a
prize court, shall extend to the case of any such petition of right
intituled or directed to be prosecuted in that court; and, subject
thereto, all the provisions of the Petitions of Right Act, 1860, shall
apply with such adaptations as may be necessary in the case of any such
petition of right; and for the purposes of this section the terms
"court" and "judge" in that Act shall respectively be understood to
include the High Court as a prize court and the judges thereof, and
other terms shall have the respective meanings given to them in that
Act.


Part VI.--OFFENCES.

[Sidenote: Offences by captors. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 37.]]

37. A prize court, on proof of any offence against the law of nations,
or against this Act, or any Act relating to naval discipline, or against
any Order in Council or royal proclamation, or of any breach of His
Majesty's instructions relating to prize, or of any act of disobedience
to the orders of the Admiralty, or to the command of a superior officer,
committed by the captors in relation to any ship or goods taken as
prize, or in relation to any person on board any such ship, may, on
condemnation, reserve the prize to His Majesty's disposal,
notwithstanding any grant that may have been made by His Majesty in
favour of captors.

[Sidenote: Perjury. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 50.]]

38. If any person wilfully and corruptly swears, declares, or affirms
falsely in any prize cause or appeal, or in any proceeding under this
Act, or in respect of any matter required by this Act to be verified on
oath, or suborns any other person to do so, he shall be deemed guilty of
perjury, or of subornation of perjury (as the case may be), and shall be
liable to be punished accordingly.

[Sidenote: Disobedience to, or desertion of, convoy. [27 & 28 Vict. c.
25, s. 46.]]

39. If the master or other person having the command of any British ship
under the convoy of any of His Majesty's ships of war, wilfully disobeys
any lawful signal, instruction, or command of the commander of the
convoy, or without leave deserts the convoy, he shall be liable to be
proceeded against in the High Court at the suit of His Majesty in His
Office of Admiralty, and upon conviction to be fined, in the discretion
of the Court, any sum not exceeding five hundred pounds, and to suffer
imprisonment for such time, not exceeding one year, as the Court may
adjudge.


Part VII.--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS.

_Ransom._

[Sidenote: Power for regulating ransom by Order in Council. [27 & 28
Vict. c. 25, s. 45.]]

40.--(1) His Majesty in Council may, in relation to any war, make such
orders as may seem expedient according to circumstances for prohibiting
or allowing, wholly or in certain cases or subject to any conditions or
regulations or otherwise as may from time to time seem meet, the
ransoming or the entering into any contract or agreement for the
ransoming of any ship or goods belonging to any of His Majesty's
subjects, and taken as prize by any of His Majesty's enemies.

(2) Any contract or agreement entered into, and any bill, bond, or other
security given for ransom of any ship or goods, shall be under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court as a prize court (subject to
appeal to the Supreme Prize Court), and if entered into or given in
contravention of any such Order in Council shall be deemed to have been
entered into or given for an illegal consideration.

(3) If any person ransoms or enters into any contract or agreement for
ransoming any ship or goods, in contravention of any such Order in
Council, he shall for every such offence be liable to be proceeded
against in the High Court at the suit of His Majesty in His Office of
Admiralty, and on conviction to be fined, in the discretion of the
Court, any sum not exceeding five hundred pounds.

_Customs Duties and Regulations._

[Sidenote: Prize ships and goods liable to customs duties and
forfeiture. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 47.]]

41.--(1) All ships and goods taken as prize and brought into a port of
His Majesty's dominions shall be liable to and be charged with the same
rates and charges and duties of customs as under any Act relating to the
customs in force at the port may be chargeable on other ships and goods
of the like description.

(2) All goods brought in as prize which would on the voluntary
importation thereof be liable to forfeiture, or subject to any
restriction, under the laws relating to the customs, shall be deemed to
be so liable and subject, unless the Customs authority see fit to
authorise the sale or delivery thereof for home use or exportation,
unconditionally or subject to such conditions and regulations as they
may direct.

[Sidenote: Regulations of customs as to prize ships and goods. [27 & 28
Vict. c. 25, s. 48.]]

42. Where any ship or goods taken as prize is or are brought into a port
of His Majesty's dominions, the master or other person in charge or
command of the ship which has been taken or in which the goods are
brought shall, on arrival at such port, bring to at the proper place of
discharge, and shall, when required by any officer of customs, deliver
an account in writing under his hand concerning such ship and goods,
giving such particulars relating thereto as may be in his power, and
shall truly answer all questions concerning such ship or goods asked by
any such officer, and in default shall forfeit a sum not exceeding one
hundred pounds, such forfeiture to be enforced as forfeitures for
offences against the laws relating to the customs in force at the port
are enforced, and every such ship shall be liable to such searches as
other ships are liable to, and the officers of the customs may freely go
on board such ship and bring to the King's or other warehouse any goods
on board the same, subject, nevertheless, to such regulations in respect
of ships of war belonging to His Majesty as shall from time to time be
issued by His Majesty.

[Sidenote: Sale of prize goods and power to remit customs duties. [27 &
28 Vict. c. 25, s. 49.]]

43. Goods taken as prize may be sold either for home consumption or for
exportation; and if in the former case the proceeds thereof, after
payment of duties of customs, are insufficient to satisfy the just and
reasonable claims thereon, the Customs authority may remit the whole or
such part of the said duties as they see fit.

_Capture by Ship other than a Ship of War._

[Sidenote: Prizes taken by Ships other than ships of war to be droits of
Admiralty. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 39.]]

44. Any ship or goods taken as prize by any of the officers and crew of
a ship other than a ship of war of His Majesty shall, on condemnation,
belong to His Majesty in His office of Admiralty.

_Supplemental._

[Sidenote: Saving for rights of Crown; effect of treaties, &c. [27 & 28
Vict. c. 25, s. 55.]]

45. Nothing in this Act shall--

  (1) give to the officers and crew of any of His Majesty's ships of
  war any right or claim in or to any ship or goods taken as prize
  or the proceeds thereof, it being the intent of this Act that such
  officers and crews shall continue to take only such interest (if
  any) in the proceeds of prizes as may be from time to time granted
  to them by the Crown; or

  (2) affect the operation of any existing treaty or convention with
  any foreign power; or

  (3) take away or abridge the power of the Crown to enter into any
  treaty or convention with any foreign power containing any
  stipulation that may seem meet concerning any matter to which this
  Act relates; or

  (4) take away, abridge, or control, further or otherwise than as
  expressly provided by this Act, any right, power, or prerogative
  of His Majesty the King in right of His Crown, or in right of His
  office of Admiralty, or any right or power of the Admiralty; or

  (5) take away, abridge, or control, further or otherwise than as
  expressly provided by this Act, the jurisdiction or authority of a
  prize court to take cognizance of and judicially proceed upon any
  capture, seizure, prize, or reprisal of any ship or goods, and to
  hear and determine the same, and, according to the course of
  Admiralty and the law of nations, to adjudge and condemn any ship
  or goods, or any other jurisdiction or authority of or
  exerciseable by a prize court.

[Sidenote: Power to make Orders in Council. [27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, ss.
53, 54.]]

46.--(1) His Majesty in Council may from time to time make such Orders
in Council as seem meet for the better execution of this Act.

(2) Every Order in Council under this Act and all rules made in
pursuance of this Act shall be notified in the _London Gazette_, and
shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament within thirty days after
the making thereof, if Parliament is then sitting, and, if not, then
within thirty days after the next meeting of Parliament, and shall have
effect as if enacted in this Act.

[Sidenote: Definitions. 27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 2.]

47. In this Act unless the context otherwise requires--

  The expression "the High Court" means the High Court of Justice in
  England:

  The expression "any of His Majesty's ships of war" includes any of
  His Majesty's vessels of war, and any hired armed ship or vessel
  in His Majesty's service:

  The expression "officers and crew" includes flag officers,
  commanders, and other officers, engineers, seamen, marines,
  soldiers, and others on board any of His Majesty's ships of war:

  The expression "ship" includes vessel and boat, with the tackle,
  furniture, and apparel of the ship, vessel, or boat:

  The expression "ship papers" includes all books, papers, and
  other documents and writings delivered up or found on board a
  captured ship, and, where certified copies only of any papers are
  delivered to the captors, includes such copies:

  The expression "goods" includes all such things as are by the
  course of Admiralty and law of nations the subject of adjudication
  as prize (other than ships):

  The expression "Customs authority" means the Commissioners or
  other authority having control of the administration of the law
  relating to customs.

[Sidenote: Short title and repeal.]

48.--(1) This Act may be cited as the Naval Prize Act, 1911.

(2) The enactments mentioned in the second Schedule to this Act are
hereby repealed to the extent specified in the third column of that
Schedule.




APPENDIX XIII

      GENEVA CONVENTION ACT, 1911
      1 & 2 GEO. 5, CHAPTER 20
      An Act to make such amendments in the Law as are necessary to
      enable certain reserved provisions of the Second Geneva
      Convention to be carried into effect.
      [_18th August 1911._]


Whereas His Majesty has ratified, with certain reservations, the
Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick
of armies in the field, drawn up in Geneva in the year one thousand nine
hundred and six, and it is desirable, in order that those reservations
may be withdrawn, that such amendments should be made in the law as are
in this Act contained:

Be it therefore enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and
with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and
Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of
the same, as follows:--

[Sidenote: Prohibition of use of emblem of red cross on white ground,
&c.]

1.--(1) As from the commencement of this Act it shall not be lawful for
any person to use for the purposes of his trade or business, or for any
other purpose whatsoever, without the authority of the Army Council, the
heraldic emblem of the red cross on a white ground formed by reversing
the Federal colours of Switzerland, or the words "Red Cross" or "Geneva
Cross," and, if any person acts in contravention of this provision, he
shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be liable on
summary conviction to a fine not exceeding ten pounds, and to forfeit
any goods upon or in connection with which the emblem or words were
used.

(2) Where a company or society is guilty of any such contravention,
without prejudice to the liability of the company or society, every
director, manager, secretary, and other officer of the company or
society who is knowingly a party to the contravention shall be guilty of
an offence against this Act and liable to the like penalty.

(3) Nothing in this section shall affect the right (if any) of the
proprietor of a trade mark registered before the passing of this Act,
and containing any such emblem or words, to continue to use such trade
mark for a period of four years from the passing of this Act, and, if
the period of the registration or of the renewal of registration of any
such trade mark expires during those four years, the registration
thereof may be renewed until the expiration of those four years, but
without payment of any fee.

(4) Proceedings under this Act shall not in England or Ireland be
instituted without the consent of the Attorney-General.

(5) This Act shall extend to His Majesty's possessions outside the
United Kingdom, subject to such necessary adaptations as may be made by
Order in Council.

[Sidenote: Short title.]

2. This Act may be cited as the Geneva Convention Act, 1911.




INDEX


This Index does not refer to Conventions, &c., printed in the
Appendices.


A

      Abuse of flag of truce, 281
        of neutral asylum, 419, 420-423

      Abyssinian War, referred to on:
        hostile destination of goods, 505
        trial of neutral vessels after conclusion of peace, 556

      Acts of force initiative of war, 126-128

      Admiralty, origin of Board of, 239

      Aerial warfare. _See_ Air-vessels

      Aeroplanes, conditional contraband, 506

      Africa, case of the, 531

      Air-vessels:
        invasion by, 207
        violence directed from, 150, 192, 227

      Alabama, case of the, 406-409

      Alaska Boundary dispute (1903), 18

      Alexander I. of Russia exacts oath of allegiance in Finland,
          205

      Alexander II. of Russia, and laws of war, 81

      Alexis, case of the, 40

      Allegiance, oath of, 173, 205, 212

      Alverstone, Lord, 18

      Ambulances, _See_ Convoys of Evacuation

      American Civil War, referred to on:
        blockade, 453, 454, 463, 465, 469
          ingress and egress of neutral warships during, 453
        contraband, 487, 499, 501
        neutral asylum during, 418, 443
        political agents on neutral vessel, 519, 530
        real war, 63 sale of vessels during, 427
        stone-blockade, 450
        treatment of prizes in, 243, 557

      American-English War (1812), referred to on:
        capture in neutral port, 442
        destruction of neutral prizes, 243
        reprisals, 307

      American War of Independence, referred to on:
        convoy, vessels under, 536
        espionage, 198
        reprisals, 306
        treatment of prizes during, 243

      Amicable settlement of State differences. _See_ State
          differences

      Amiens, Peace of (1802), 332

      Amnesty, 334

      Analogous of contraband. _See_ Unneutral service

      Andersen _v._ Marten, case of, 555

      Andre, Major, case of, 198

      Angary:
        derivation of right of, 449
        exercise of right of, 385, 510
        modern right of, 447
        obsolete right of, 446
        pre-emption of neutral goods under right of, 449

      Anna, case of the, 443

      Anne, Empress of Russia, 43

      Anspach, troops marched through, 392

      Arbitration:
        a means of settling State differences, 5
        appointment of arbitrator, 17, 26
        award, 18, 19, 30
          appeal against, 31
          binding force of, 18, 25, 30
        competence of tribunal of, 29
        compulsory, 25
        conception of, 16
        costs of, 32
        early use of, 22
        efficacy of, 25
        Hague Convention, stipulations concerning, 24
        language to be used during, 26, 28
        minutes concerning, 28
        Permanent International Court of, 22, 23, 26, 27-31, 561
        preliminary proceedings in, 27
        procedure of tribunal in, 27
        rules governing, 27
        scope of, 20-21
        summary procedure in, 32
        treaties of, 16, 18, 20, 26
          obligations under, 16, 25
          stipulations of, 18
        tribunal of Court of, 27
        value of, 22, 25

      Arbitration Treaties, 16, 20, 21, 26

      Area of operations during blockade, 471

      Argentina, blockades of (1838) and (1845), 49

      Armed Neutrality. _See_ Neutrality

      Armistices:
        character of, 290
        commencement of, 296
        competence to conclude, 293
        contents of, 294-296
        end of, 299
        form of, 294
        general, 291, 293
        hostilities, cessation of, during, 290, 295
        kinds of, 290, 291
        lines of demarcation during, 296
        partial, 293
        permissible acts during, 294-296
        purpose of, 291
        re-victualling during, 295
        suspension of arms during, 291
        violation of, 297
          by private individual, 298
        visitation of neutral vessels during, 290, 534

      Arnold, General, at West Point, 198

      Arret de prince, 45

      Aryol (or Orel), case of the, 256

      Asgill, Captain, case of, 307

      Askold, case of the, 422

      Assault, 191-193

      Asylum. _See_ Neutral Asylum

      Atalanta, case of the, 522

      Athens, ancient law of, concerning reprisals, 41

      Attack on enemy vessels, 225-237. _See also_ Enemy vessels

      Aube, Admiral, on naval warfare, 264, 266

      Augusta Victoria, case of the, 390

      Aurora, case of the, 423

      Awni Illa, case of the, 269


B

      Bahama Islands, access refused to belligerent warships at, 418

      Baker, Sir Sherston, 281

      Baltic Sea, asserted neutralisation of, 90

      Baltica, case of the, 110, 116

      Barbarous forces, 98

      Barge, arbitration award of Mr., 19

      Basle, office for volunteers at, 399

      Bathurst, Lord, reprisal by, 307

      Beasts of burden as contraband, 486

      Belfort:
        capitulation of, 286
        siege of, 193, 292
        suspension of arms during siege of, 291

      Belgium, neutralisation of, 91, 358, 363, 368, 393, 411, 413, 428

      Belligerents:
        accessory, 93
        angary, right of,
        exercised by, 446-449
        appropriation of property by, 174-187
        armed forces of, 94-106
        asylum granted to, 409-425
        barbarous forces as, 98
        capture of neutral vessels by, 546-552
        complaints of illegitimate warfare by, 302
        conduct in general of, 378
        deserters, treatment of, by, 105, 335
        duties of, 378-386
        impartiality of neutrals towards, 362, 381-383
        insurgents as, 62, 92
        intercourse between subjects of, 135-138, 275, 333
          and neutrals, 117, 365, 385, 428
        irregular forces of, 96
        levies _en masse_ of, 97, 152, 190, 313
        loans to, by neutrals, 430
        merchantmen of. _See_ Merchantmen
        military operations by and against, neutrals, 386-397
        military preparations by and against 397-409
        navies of, 94, 99-105
        neutralised States as, 91
        neutrality to be recognised by, 367
        non-combatants with armed forces of, 95, 151, 169, 250
        non-hostile relations of, 273-299
        occupation of neutral territory by, 394
        principal, 93
        prisoners of, treatment, 167-171
        private enemy property, 139. _See also_ Private enemy
        property privateers of, 99, 103, 357, 372, 534
        Prize Courts of, 395. _See also_ Prize Courts
        property in enemy State of subjects of, 139, 182
        qualification to become, 62, 90
        regular armies of, 94
        representation at International Prize Court, 569
        rights of, 378-386
        services to, 153, 181, 212, 432-437
        subjects of, on enemy territory, 131-135
        supplies to, by neutrals, 375, 405-409, 426-430
        trade between subjects of, 135-138, 275, 333
        traitors. _See_ War criminals
        vassal States as, 91
        violation of neutrality by, 426, 438-445
        visitation of neutral vessels by, 428, 533-545
        volunteer fleets of, 100-104
        war rebels, treatment of, by, 98

      Bellona, case of the, 332

      Bentinck, promise of, to Genoa, 284

      Berlin:
        Congo Conference of (1885), 11
        Decrees of (1806), 357, 453
        Treaty of (1878), 330

      Bermuda, case of the, 470, 500

      Bernadotte, 391

      Bismarck:
        act of reprisal by, 317
        on diplomatic envoys in besieged town, 194
        on crews of captured merchantmen, prisoners of war, 250, 308,
            317
        on right of angary, 448

      Black Sea, neutralisation of, 88

      Blockade:
        area of operations in, 471
        breach of: attempt at, 468-472
          canals, unblockaded and, 474
          capture on account of, 475
          consequences of, 475-478
          definition of, 466
          during armistice, 290
          egress and, 473
          ingress and, 472
          penalty for, 476
          practice of nations regarding, 386, 468-475
          what constitutes a, 468-475
        commercial, 452
        competence to establish, 456
        conception of, 450-455
        continuous voyage and, 469, 472
        contraband, seizure of, during, 290
        declaration of, 456, 458
        definition of, 450
        effectiveness of: 356, 461-466
          cessation of, 464 condition of, 461
          danger necessary to create, 464
          distinguished from fictitious, 461
        end of, 460 establishment of, 456-461
        existence of, 466
        fictitious, 461
        international rivers and, 454
        inward, 453
        justification for, 455
        knowledge of, necessary for breach, 466
        neutral vessels, time for egress of, 459
        notification of, 456, 459, 466
          former practice of nations regarding, 457
        outward, 453 pacific. _See_ Pacific blockade
        places liable to, 453
        postal correspondence during, 237, 385
        stone, 450, 463
        strategic, 452
        universality of, 452

      Bluntschli:
        on continuous voyage, 504
        on courts of justice during occupation, 215

      Bolivia-Peruvian Boundary Dispute (1910), 19

      Bombardment: by land forces, 191, 194 by naval forces, 266-270

      Bonfils, on carriage of contraband, 504

      Booty on battlefield, 163, 177, 181

      Bosphorus and Dardanelles, 102

      Bougainville, safe-conduct granted to, 232

      Boundary disputes:
        between Bolivia and Peru, 19
        between Great Britain and U.S.A., 18, 19
        between Great Britain and Venezuela, 18

      Boundary treaty of Buenos Ayres (1881) between Argentina and
          Chili, 89

      Bowles, Mr. Gibson, on withdrawal from Declaration of Paris, 100

      Bribery, 196, 201

      British Foreign Enlistment Act, 358, 375, 494

      Brussels: Conference of (1874), 208, 308 Declaration of (1874),
          81, 171

      Buenos Ayres, Boundary treaty of (1881), between Argentina and
          Chili, 89

      Bukarest, treaty of (1886), 92

      Bulgaria as a belligerent while under Turkish suzerainty, 62, 92

      Buller, Sir Redvers, proclamation by during the South African
          War, 65

      Bullets, expanding and explosive, 149, 250

      Bulmerincq, proposal regarding Prize Courts, 560

      Bundesrath, case of the, 500, 502, 552

      Bureau of Information in war, 163, 171, 181

      Bynkershoek:
        on contraband, 481, 508
        on intercourse during war, 135
        on neutrality, 350, 361, 422


C

      Cabinet Ministers, capture of, 153

      Camille, case of the, 426

      Cancellation of treaties on account of:
        violation by one party, 338
        war, 129

      Capitulations:
        character and purpose of, 284
        competence to conclude, 287
        contents of, 285
        flag of truce and, 286
        form of, 286
        violation of, 289

      Captain W. Menzel, case of the, 376

      Captivity:
        detention in, after peace, 170, 336
        discipline in, 169-170
        effect of treaty of peace on, 335
        end of, 172, 335
        law regarding, development of, 165-167
        parole, release on, 170
        relief societies assisting those in, 171
        treatment of prisoners of war in, 167, 306
        who may be taken into, 151, 152, 153, 169, 250, 308

      Capture of neutral vessels:
        abandonment after, 551
        conduct to port after, 547
        destruction after, 547-551
        effect of, 546
        grounds of, 546
        mode of, 546
        ransom after, 551
        recapture after, 551
        release after, 551
        trial after, 240, 553-558
          after conclusion of peace, 555
          by International Prize Court, 572-579
          claims after, 557
          municipal matter, a, 553
          protests after, 557
          result of, 555

      Carolina, case of the, 519

      Caroline, case of the, 376

      Carriage of contraband. _See_ Contraband of war

      Cartel ships:
        rules regarding, 283
        seizure of, 236

      Cartels:
        definition and purpose of, 275, 282
        ransom of soldiers arranged by, 166

      Carthage, case of the, 506

      Castro, de, 40

      Catharine, Empress of Russia, 355, 357

      Cattaro, access refused to belligerent warships at, 418

      Cesarewitch, case of the, 423

      Cessation of hostilities, simple, 323, 324

      Chablais and Faucigny, neutralisation of, 88

      Chambers of Reunion, the so-called, 61

      Charles XII. of Sweden, dictum of, 147

      Charleston, blockade of, 450, 465

      Chauvinism, 38

      Chino-Japanese War (1894), referred to on:
        asylum on neutral man-of-war, 423

      Citizens. _See_ Private individuals

      Civil war:
        commencement of, 374
        neutrality during, 365
        termination of, 323

      Clinton, Sir Henry, 198

      Coal as contraband, 487

      Columbia, case of the, 390

      Commerce during war:
        between belligerents' subjects, 135, 275
        between subjects of belligerents and neutrals, 352, 365,
            385, 428

      Commercen, case of the, 501

      _Commercia belli_, 274

      Commercial blockade, 452

      Commercial treaty. _See_ Treaties

      Commission: of Arbitration, 18 of Inquiry, 7

      Compensation for violations of the Laws of War, 319-321, 439

      Complaints of belligerents, 302, 303

      Compromis, 26-31

      Compromise clause, 5, 17

      Compulsive settlement of State differences. _See_ State
          differences

      Concentration camps, 153, 190

      Conference of Berlin (1885), 11

      _Confiscantur ex navibus res, ex rebus naves_, 219

      Confiscation: at outbreak of war, 139, 140, 174-182, 204, 218
        for carrying contraband, 508-514

      Congo Conference of Berlin, 11

      Congress of Vienna (1815), 88

      Conquest, 325. _See also_ Subjugation

      _Consolato del mare_, 218, 219, 349, 352, 534

      Consular activity, rupture of, 129

      Continuous voyage, doctrine of, 469, 472, 491, 499-506

      Continuous transport:
        doctrine of, 499-506
        partial recognition of, by Declaration of London, 505

      Contraband of war:
        absolute, 481, 483, 490, 498, 505
        analogous of. _See_ Unneutral Service
        articles for use of carrying vessel not considered, 493
        beasts of burden as, 486
        carriage of, 386, 495-514
          capture for, 506
          circuitous, 499-506
          consequences of, 506-514
          Continental opinion on, 504
          direct, 497
          indirect, 500-506
          penal by municipal law, 495
          penalty for, 508-514
          without knowledge of war, 140, 235, 512
        coal as, 487
        conception of, 480-495
        conditional, 481, 485, 491, 498, 506
          pre-emption of, 510, 512
        continuous transports, doctrine of, 499-506
        cotton as, 487
        definition of, 480
        foodstuffs as, 486
        horses as, 486
        hostile destination essential to, 490
        money as, 487
        seizure of, during blockade, 290
        seizure of, without seizure of vessel, 513

      Contraband vessels, 390, 494

      Contract debts, 25, 46

      Contracts between subjects of belligerents, 137, 138, 333

      Contributions, 183-187, 264, 267

      Convoy: vessels under enemy, 542
        vessels under neutral, 535-537, 543

      Convoy of evacuation, 160

      Cook, Captain, safe-conduct granted to, 232

      Copenhagen:
        Battle of (1801), 356
        Treaty of (1830), 542

      Corfu, neutralisation of, 88, 369

      Cotton as contraband, 487

      Court of Arbitration at the Hague. _See_ Permanent Court of
          Arbitration

      Courts of Justice, during occupation of country, 214

      Crete:
        blockade of, 49, 51
        during the Turco-Italian War, 87

      Crimean War, referred to on:
        asylum to men-of-war, 418
        blockade, 453, 454, 464, 465
        contraband, 501
        enemy property at sea under neutral flag, 220
        enemy subjects on belligerent's territory, 132
        letters of marque, 220
        loans, flotation of, 431
        merchantmen at outbreak of war, 140, 235


D

      Danous, case of the, 112

      Danube, blockade of the, 453, 454

      Dardanelles, 102

      Dead, treatment of the, 162, 254

      Dearborn, General, reprisal by, 307

      Declaration concerning:
        diffusion of asphyxiating gases, 82, 150, 250
        expanding (Dum-Dum) bullets, 82, 149, 250
        launching of projectiles from balloons, 82, 150, 250

      Declaration of:
        Brussels (1874), 81, 171
        London (1909), 83, 360, 554
          referred to on: blockade, 452-478
          capture of neutral vessels, 547-552
          contraband, 480-514
          enemy character, 107, 113, 117
          free articles, 492
          transfer of enemy vessels, 118
          transfer of enemy goods, 120
          trial of neutral vessels, 555-558
          unneutral service, 435, 515-532
          visitation of vessels, 536, 537, 540-545
        Paris (1856), 52, 79, 100, 101, 103, 130, 220, 221, 226,
            242, 303, 354, 358, 384, 385, 452, 461, 481, 536
        St. Petersburg (1868), 80, 149, 250

      Declarations of:
        blockade, 456-459
        contraband, 484, 488
        neutrality, 374
        war, 122-125

      Delagoa Bay, case of, 502

      Den Beer Portugael, General, and rules on bombardment, 266

      Denmark, treaty by, affecting neutrality, 372, 389
        Swedish territory sold by, 205

      Deserters, 105, 335

      Despatches:
        bearers of, 197
        carriage of, for enemy, 435, 515, 516, 521-524, 525, 526,
            528, 531
        right of sending, 194

      Dessaix, case of the, 244

      Destruction of enemy property:
        arms and ammunition, 189
        during bombardment, 195
        merchantmen, 242-245
        monuments, 189
        necessary, 188
        provisions, 189
        wanton, 187
        works of art, 189

      Devastation, general, 190

      De Wuetz _v._ Hendricks, 430

      Diana, case of the, 236, 422

      Dieppe, blockade of, 454

      Diplomacy, 75

      Diplomatic envoys:
        capture of, 154
        carriage of, by neutrals, 517-521
        despatches of, 435
        found on enemy territory by a belligerent, 384
        in besieged towns, 194
        letters of marque granted by, 357

      Diplomatic intercourse, rupture of, 129

      Discovery, case of the, 232

      Distress, vessels in circumstances of, 418, 472

      Distribution of Prize Money Proclamation (1866), 248

      Doelwijk, case of the, 505, 556

      Dogger Bank, case of, 7, 15

      _Dolus non purgatur circuitu_, 499

      Domicile of owner determines character of goods, 115

      Drago doctrine, 25

      Duclair, British coal-vessels at, 448

      Dum-Dum bullets, 149, 250

      Dunant, Jean Henry, on treatment of wounded, 155

      Dupleix, case of the, 89

      Dutch East India squadron, attempted seizure of, 350


E

      Edmonds, Colonel, 82

      Effects of outbreak of war on:
        belligerents' property on enemy territory, 139
        belligerents' subjects in enemy State, 131
        diplomatic relations, 129
        merchantmen, 140-143
        _persona standi in judicio_, 133
        States in general, 128
        trade between belligerents' subjects, 135
        treaties, 129

      El Arish, capitulation of, 287-289

      Elba, case of the, 424

      Elisabeth, case of the, 236

      Embargo:
        conception of, 44-46
        different kinds of, 45
        instance of, 40
        practice of, 140, 446

      Emblems of: hospital ships, 258 medical service of armies, 161

      Emilia, case of the, 110

      Ems, exclusion of the river, from blockade, 454

      Enemy character:
        conception of, 106
        of goods, 115-117
          when transferred, 119
        of individuals:
          enemy subjects domiciled in enemy country, 110-112
          enemy subjects in neutral countries, 112
          neutral subjects domiciled in enemy country, 109-112, 385
          neutral subjects serving in armed forces of belligerents,
              109
          neutral subjects serving in police and administration of
              belligerents, 109
        of vessels, 112-115
          when transferred, 117
        unneutral service creating, 524-526

      Enemy convoy, 542

      Enemy property. _See_ Public enemy property; Private enemy
          property

      Enemy territory, occupation of:
        an aim of warfare, 204
        constructive, 208
        courts of justice, position of during, 214
        duties arising from, 210
        end of, 210
        envoys' position during, 384
        neutral property during, 384
        officials' position during, 213
        rights arising from, 210-213
        treatment of inhabitants during, 210-213
        treatment of subjects of neutrals during, 213, 384
        when effected, 98, 206

      Enemy vessels:
        appropriation of, 238-249
        attack and seizure of, 225-237
        effect of seizure of, 231
        furnishing of, by neutrals, 358, 372, 375, 389, 405-409
        immunity from attack granted to, 232-237
        in neutral waters, 395-397, 400-404
        legitimate attack on, 225
        medical and hospital staff of, 260
        neutral goods on, 232, 542
        postal correspondence on, 237, 385
        religious staff on, 260
        sick bays on, 257

      Enlistment Act, Foreign: American, 358, 375 British, 358, 375,
          494

      Escape from captivity, 170, 172

      Espionage, 196-199, 262, 313

      Euridice, case of the, 426

      Explosive bullets, 149, 250


F

      _Facultas bellandi_, 90

      Fanny, case of the, 542

      Faravelli, bombardment of Turkish vessels in the harbour of
          Beirut by Italian naval forces under Admiral, 269

      Faucigny, neutralisation of, 88

      Fecamp, blockade of, 454

      Federal States, wars by members of, 63, 68, 92

      Fictitious blockade, 461

      _Fides etiam hosti servanda_, 273

      Fiore, 504

      First Armed Neutrality, 354-356, 370, 461, 462, 481

      First Coalition, 357

      Fishing-boats, immunity from seizure, 234

      Flag:
        character of vessel determined by, 112
        transfer of vessels to neutral, 117
        use of false, 201, 262

      Flags of truce:
        abuse of, 203, 281
        bearers, treatment of, 279
        capitulations and, 286
        land warfare and, 278
        meaning of, 278
        naval warfare and, 278
        occasions when used, 278-282, 287, 302

      Flight. _See_ Escape

      Flinders, safe-conduct granted to, 233

      Florida, case of the, 443

      Foodstuffs as contraband, 486

      Foraging, 181

      Foreign Enlistment Act. _See_ Enlistment Act

      Formosa, blockade of, 49, 52

      Forsigtigheten, case of the, 426

      Franciska, case of the, 465

      Franco-British wars referred to on:
        (1793), property in enemy State of belligerents, 139
        (1803), subjects of belligerents on enemy territory, 131
        (1793), treaty obligations, 372

      Franco-German War, referred to on:
        angary, 447, 448
        armistices, 291, 292, 296, 297
        asylum to belligerents, 411, 415
        belligerents' subjects on enemy territory, 132
        blockade, 454 cable laying, 436
        capitulation, 286
        courts of justice, 215
        diplomatic envoys in besieged towns, 194
        Franctireurs, 96 hostages, 317
        loans, flotation of, 431
        merchantmen, 222, 235, 236, 244
        neutral asylum, 411, 415
        neutrality, 89, 368, 369, 400, 413, 415
        passage of volunteers through neutral territory, 399
        peace treaty, 329, 338
        pilotage, 433
        postliminium, 342
        prisoners of war, 250, 336
        prizes, 244
        reprisals, 306, 308
        sieges, 193
        supplies by neutrals, 427, 428
        suspension of arms, 291
        train-wrecking, 318
        unorganised hostile expedition, 400
        vessels sailing under flag of another State, 233
        volunteer fleet, 100, 303

      Franctireurs, 96

      Frankfort, Treaty of (1871), 329, 338, 343

      Frankfort-on-the-Main, subjugation of, 327

      Freden, case of the, 441

      Frederick II. of Prussia: forcible levies by, 205 reprisals
          by, 43, 44

      Frederikshamm, Peace treaty of (1809), 205

      Free articles, 481, 483, 492-494

      French Prize Courts set up in America, 357, 395

      Friendship and Commerce, treaties of, 167, 221, 371, 508

      Fuerst Bismarck, case of the, 390


G

      Gaeta, blockade of, 49

      Gelderland, case of the, 433

      General, case of the, 502

      General Armstrong, case of the, 442

      Genet, letters of marque granted by, 357, 395

      Geneva: Court of Arbitration, 444 Societe d'utilite publique, 155

      Geneva Convention:
        adaptation of the principles of, to naval warfare, 80, 82,
            252-262
        application of the, 163
        general provisions of the, 164
        non-combatants and the, 415
        origin of the, 154
        prisoners and the, 151, 250
        wounded and dead and the, 80, 154-165, 181

      Geneva Cross, 161, 162, 164, 203, 258

      Genoa, capitulation of, 284

      German coast, blockade of, 454

      German contract for felling trees in French forests, 342

      Gessner on carriage of contraband, 504

      Good offices:
          complaints by belligerents to neutrals settled by, 303
          duty of asking for, 13
          duty of offering, 10, 13
          duty of receiving offer of, 13
          Hague Convention, rules regarding, 12-14
          mediation compared with, 11
          purpose of, 10, 328
          Russo-Japanese War and, 15
          value of, 14

      Goods sold by and to enemy subjects, enemy character of, 115,
          119, 135-138, 249

      Government officials, deposition by enemy of, 214

      Greece, blockades of, 48, 49, 51

      Grossovoi, case of the, 422

      Grotius, cited on:
        armistices, 295, 297
        captivity, 166
        contraband, 480, 481
        enemy subjects on belligerent's territory, 110
        declaration of war, 121
        destruction of enemy property, 189
        neutrality, 349, 361

      Guerilla war, 70, 190, 209


H

      Hague Conventions concerning:
        bombardment by naval forces in time of war (IX.), 83, 265,
            268-270
        capture in maritime war, restrictions on the exercise of the
            right of (XI.), 83, 105, 233, 234, 237, 250, 360, 385,
            522-524, 526
        commencement of hostilities (III.), 82, 123-127, 363, 374
        debts, employment of force for the recovery of contract
            (II.), 25, 46
        disputes, pacific settlement of (I.), 6, 12-14, 20, 23-33,
            122
        Geneva Convention, adaptation of the principles of (X.), 82,
            236, 250, 251, 252-262, 274, 413, 424, 425
        International Prize Court, establishment of an (XII.), 108,
            114, 117, 240, 241, 245, 360, 552, 555, 563, 565-579
        merchant ships at the outbreak of hostilities, status of
            enemy (VI.), 83, 140-143, 235
        merchant ships, conversion of, into war-ships (VII.), 83,
            103, 360, 376
        mines, laying of automatic submarine contact (VIII.), 83,
            227-229, 360, 445, 463
        neutral Powers and persons in war on land, rights and duties
            of (V.), 83, 94, 107, 108-110, 359, 364, 371, 382, 383,
            384, 387, 389, 390, 393, 398, 399, 412, 414, 427, 431,
            434, 435, 448
        neutral Powers in maritime war, rights and duties of
            (XIII.), 83, 359, 376, 380, 382, 383, 384, 389, 394,
            395, 396, 400, 401-404, 408, 418-423, 427, 432, 436,
            441, 443, 445, 494
        war on land, laws and customs of (IV.), referred to on:
          angary, exercise of right of, 448
          armistices, 290, 291, 293, 296, 297, 298
          assault, bombardment and siege, 192-195
          booty, 177
          Bureau of Information, 171
          capitulations, 286, 289
          compensation, 320, 438
          espionage, treason, ruses, 196-199, 201, 202, 313, 315
          flags of truce, 278-281
          Geneva Convention, 80
          irregular forces, guerilla bands and levies _en masse_,
              70, 96, 97, 313
          killing and wounding, 147, 148
          means of land warfare, 145, 148
          means of securing legitimate warfare, 301, 304, 308, 319,
              321
          non-combatants, 95
          occupation of enemy territory, 206, 207, 211, 214
          parole, 170
          _persona standi in judicio_, 134
          prisoners of war, 167, 169, 172, 250, 336
          private individuals, 153, 298
          property in enemy State, 140, 174-182, 188-190
          property of the dead, 163, 274
          quarter, 147
          relief societies, 171
          requisitions and contributions, 184, 185, 186, 438, 448
          telegraph cables, 271

      Hague Court of Arbitration. _See_ Permanent Court of Arbitration

      Hague Declarations concerning:
        asphyxiating gases, prohibition of use of, 82, 150, 250
        bullets, expanding, prohibition of use of, 82, 149, 250
        projectiles, prohibition of discharge of certain, 82, 150,
            227, 250

      Hague Peace Conferences:
        of 1899: 17, 81, 149, 150, 156, 222, 252;
        of 1907: 81, 108, 123, 140, 222, 223, 224, 233, 234, 252,
            320, 383

      Haimun, case of the, 437

      Hale, case of Captain Nathan, 199

      Hall, on requisitions and contributions in naval warfare, 264

      Halleck, on:
        abuse of flag of truce, 281
        ruses, 263
        stratagems and perfidy, 202

      Hanover, subjugation of, 327

      Hansa, the, 62, 219

      Harmony, case of the, 110

      Hautefeuille, on:
        justification of blockade, 455
        right of visitation of neutral vessels, 534

      Hay-Pauncefote Treaty (1901), 89

      Heads of States:
        power of making treaties when prisoner, 331
        violence against, 147, 153

      Heffter on occupation of enemy territory, 205

      Heilborn, on war material on neutral territory, 416

      Henfield, Gideon, case of, 358

      Hertha, case of the, 89

      Herzog, case of the, 502, 552

      Hesse-Cassel:
        case of the Domains of, 344
        subjugation of, 327

      Hipsang, case of the, 548

      Hobbs _v._ Henning, 503

      Holland, blockade of, 49

      Holland on:
        armistices, 290
        bombardment, 266
        contraband, 522
        doctrine of continuous voyage, 500, 503
        indemnities, 180
        pacific blockade, 48
        release of neutral prize, 552

      Hon-kohe Bay, Russian fleet in, 404

      Horses as contraband, 486

      Hospital ships, 236, 254-257 emblem of, 258

      Hostages, 153, 213, 246, 317-319

      Hostilities:
        between belligerents. _See_ War
        by and against neutrals, 386, 387
        effect of simple cessation of, 323, 324
        instances of simple cessation of, 323

      Huebner, proposal regarding Prize Courts, 559

      Huddy, Joshua, case of, 306

      Hussar, case of the, 263


I

      Icona, case of the, 548

      Iltis, case of the, 424

      Imina, case of the, 503

      Indemnities for:
        neutral cargo on destroyed enemy vessels, 244, 245
        neutral innocent cargo on destroyed neutral vessels, 550
        private property, 142, 180, 182, 184

      Indians, as members of regular forces, 99

      Industrie, case of the, 525

      Inflexible, case of the, 282

      Information regarding military and naval operations, 211, 434

      Inquiry Commissions, 7

      Institute of International Law on:
        aerial warfare, 151
        angary, 447
        bombardment, 266-268
        capture, 546
        carriage of contraband, 504, 510
        commencement of war, 123
        contributions and requisitions, 265
        effect of war on treaties, 131
        insurrection, 92, 366
        laws of war, 81
        mines, sub-marine, 229, 445
        neutrality, 408
        pacific blockade, 50, 53
        Prize Courts, 553, 560
        prizes, 244
        reprisals, 308-309
        submarine cables, 271, 272
        visitation, 534

      Insurgents as belligerents, 69, 92

      Intercourse:
        between subjects of belligerents, 135-138, 275, 333
        between subjects of neutrals and belligerents, 117, 352,
            365, 385, 428

      International Bureau of the International Court of
          Arbitration, 27
        acts as registry for Commissions at the Hague, 8
        acts as registry for the International Prize Court, 562,
            569, 573, 579

      International Commission of Inquiry:
        in the Dogger Bank case, 7, 15
        procedure at an, 7-9

      International Conference at the Hague (1904), 256, 257

      International Convention for the Protection of Submarine
          Telegraph Cables, 271

      International Court of Arbitration. _See_ Permanent Court of
          Arbitration

      International Postal Union, in time of war, 130

      International Prize Court:
        action in damages in the, 577-579
        Administrative Council of the, 569
        competence of the, 529, 541, 569-571
        constitution of the, 565-569
        Convention (XII.) for the establishment of an, 563
        costs of parties before the, 576
        expenses of the, 576
        law to be applied by the, 571
        personnel of the, 565
        procedure of the, 572-577, 578
        projects for an, 360, 559-563
        registry of the, 569, 573, 579
        seat of the, 568
        tasks for the, 542, 543, 544, 545, 554, 557

      International Rivers, blockade of, 454

      Intervention:
        conception of, 54
        distinguished from participation, 54
        illegitimate warfare and, 302
        instance of, 388
        mode of, 55
        right of, 304
        time of, 55

      Invasion in contradistinction to occupation, 98, 206

      Invincible, case of the, 282

      Ionian Islands, neutrality of, 88, 369

      Irregular forces, definition of, 96

      Italian Marine Code (1865), 222

      Italian Prize Commission, 556


J

      Jakoga, Major, case of, 199, 315

      Jameson raid, 62

      Jemchug, case of the, 423

      Johanna Emilie, case of the, 110

      Joinville, Prince de, on bombardment, 266

      Jus: angariae, 45, 446 belli, 91 postliminii, 339 _See also_ Right


K

      Kaiserin Maria Theresia, case of the, 390

      Kamranh Bay, Russian fleet in, 404

      Keith, Lord, and capitulation of El Arish, 288

      Kleber, General, and capitulation of El Arish, 287

      Kleen, on carriage of contraband, 504

      Knight Commander, case of the, 548

      Korea, 87 as theatre of war, 387, 395

      Korietz, case of the, 388, 424, 442

      Kow-shing, case of the, 114, 424

      _Kriegs-manier_, 84

      Kruger, President, conveyance to Europe, 433


L

      La Santissima Trinidad, case of the, 405

      Lambermont, Baron, cited on private individuals who commit
          hostile acts, 66

      Land warfare:
        aims of, 144
        assault, 191-193
        asylum during. _See_ Neutral asylum bombardment, 191-195
        captivity. _See_ Captivity
        contributions, 153, 186, 212
        convoys of evacuation, 160
        dead, treatment of the, 162
        distinguished from sea warfare, 145
        emblems denoting medical establishments and personnel, 161,
            203
        enemy property. _See_ Public enemy property; Private enemy
            Property
        espionage, 196-199
        expanding bullets, 149
        explosive bullets, 149
        explosives from balloons, 150
        flags of truce, 278
        killing of combatants, 146
        lawful practices in, 144, 148
        means of, 144
        medical establishments, units, and material, 158, 195, 493
        medical personnel, 159
        objects of means of, 145
        occupation. _See_ Enemy territory, occupation of
        prisoners, who may be made, 151, 152, 153, 169. _See also_
            Prisoners of War
        projectiles:
        from balloons, 150
        diffusing noxious gases, 150
        quarter, refusal of, 147
        requisitions, 153, 183-186, 212
        ruses, 200-203
        sick, treatment of, 154-165
        siege, 191-194
        stratagems, 200-203
        treason, 199
        unlawful practices in, 144, 148, 192, 193
        violence against enemy persons, 146, 151, 153
        wounded, treatment of, 154-165
        wounding of combatants, 146, 148

      Laperouse, Count, granted safe-conduct, 233

      Laws of war: binding force of, 83
        development of, 79-83
        origin of, 78, 79
        treaties regarding, 79-83

      Legitimate warfare, means of securing, 300-321

      Le Hardy contre La Voltigeante, 111

      Lena, case of the, 422

      L'Espiegle, case of the, 443

      Letters of marque, 42, 46, 100, 220, 239, 351, 357, 399, 534

      Levies:
        _en masse_, 97, 152, 190, 313
        forcible, 205, 211
        on neutral territories forbidden, 398

      Licences:
        special, of ingress and egress during blockade, 453
        to trade, 275

      Lichtenstein, war with Prussia, 323

      Lieber, on rules of war, 80

      Lien on war material, 416

      Lion, case of the, 424

      Lippencott, Captain, case of, 307

      Loans, 430-432

      London: Declaration of. _See_ Declaration of London
        Naval Conference of (1908-9), 108, 360, 536, 577
        Treaty of (1863), 88

      Louis XIV.:
        Ordinance of 1681, concerning neutral property, 219
        practice of embargo, 446

      Louis Napoleon, award of, in the case of the General
          Armstrong, 442

      Ludwig, case of the, 244

      Lushington, on blockade, 462, 463, 464

      Luxemburg, neutrality of, 91, 368, 393, 413

      Luxor, case of the, 507, 558


M

      Madison, Mr., reprisal by, 307

      Magellan, Straits of, neutralisation of, 89

      Mailbags during war, 237, 385, 524

      Mailboats during war, 236, 526, 531, 535

      Malacca, case of the, 102

      Manchuria, 87, 387, 395

      Man-of-war, neutral, as an asylum, 423

      Manouba, case of the, 531

      Marauding, 316

      Maritime Convention of St. Petersburg (1801), 356, 536

      Martens, von, 18

      Mason, Mr., case of seizure of, 519, 530

      Mediation, 10-15
        difference between good offices and, 11
        duty of asking for, 13
        duty of offering, 10, 13
        duty of receiving, 13
        Hague Convention, rules regarding, 12-14
        legal value of, 5
        occasions for, 10, 303, 328
        particular form of, 14
        right of offering, 10, 15
        value of, 14

      Mediatorial Conference possible, 10

      Medical establishments, &c. _See_ Land Warfare, _also_ Naval
          warfare

      Menam, blockade of, 49

      Menou, General, and capitulation of El Arish, 288

      Merchantmen, enemy:
        appropriation of, 218-224, 238-249
        attacking, 313
        attack on, 104, 225, 226
        conversion into men-of-war, 100-104
        conversion into men-of-war after capture, 104, 231
        crews of, 104, 250
        destruction of, 242-245
        immunity from seizure of, 234, 235
        neutral goods on, 218-220, 244, 384
        ransom of, 245
        restoration of, 247
        sale of, 117, 248
        sale of goods on, _in transitu_, 119, 249
        seizure of, 231
        status of, at outbreak of war, 140-143
        voyage of, at outbreak of war, 235

      Merchantmen, neutral:
        crews of, 250
        enemy goods on, 115, 218-224, 356, 385
        giving transport to belligerents, 433, 525
        rendering unneutral service, 386, 434, 524
        rescuing wounded, &c., 259
        under convoy, 355, 535, 543
        under enemy flag, 112-115, 233, 248

      Messina, blockade of, 49

      Meteor, case of the, 405

      Metz, battle of, 393, 413

      Mexico, blockade of, 49

      Military operations and neutrals, 386-397

      Military preparations and neutrals, 397-409

      Militia, 94

      Mines:
        Convention concerning the laying of, 228, 463
        floating mechanical, 227-231
        submarine contact, 227-231, 445, 463

      Mitylene, seizure of the island of, 43

      Modena, subjugation of, 327

      Modeste, case of the, 441

      Money as contraband, 487

      Montara, case of the, 114

      Moynier, Gustave, 155

      Municipal neutrality laws, 364, 375, 418, 422

      Municipal officials, deposition by enemy, 214


N

      Nancy Court of Appeal, case of, 215

      Naniwa, case of the, 114, 423

      Napoleon I.:
        act of reprisals by, 131
        Berlin decrees of (1806), 357, 453
        seizure of works of art by, 177
        troops ordered by, to march through neutral territory, 391

      Nassau, subjugation of, 327

      Nationality of owner determines character of goods, 116

      Naval Code: Italian, 222 United States. _See_ United States

      Naval Conference of London. _See_ London

      Naval Prize Act (1864), 245, 247

      Naval Prize Bill (1911), 240, 245, 247

      Naval warfare:
        aims of, 216
        asylum during. _See_ Neutral asylum
        bombardment of enemy coast, 266-270
        cables, interference with submarine, 271
        contributions, 264
        dead, treatment of, 254
        enemy merchantmen. _See_ Merchantmen; Prizes
        espionage, 262
        flags of truce, 278
        French Ordinances relating to, 219
        hospital ships, 236, 254-257
        hospital staff on ships, 260
        law of, impending codification, 224
        lawful practices, 217
        means of, 216, 225
        medical staff on ship, 260
        objects of, 218
        prisoners, who may be made, 250
        private property at sea during, 218-223
        prizes. _See_ Prizes; Prize Courts
        religious staff on ship, 260
        requisitions, 264
        restrictions on the right of capture, 232-237
        ruses, 262
        shipwrecked, treatment of, 253
        sick, treatment of, 253
        treason, 262
        unlawful practices, 217
        violence:
          against combatants, 249
          against non-combatants, 250
          against enemy civilians, 251
        wounded:
          articles destined for the, 493
          treatment of, 253
          neutral ships assisting, 259, 423-425

      Navarino, battle of, 48

      Negotiation:
        conception of, 6
        effect of, 9
        importance of, 9
        legal value of, 5
        peace, 328
        procedure during, 6

      <DW64>s, as members of regular forces, 99

      Nelson, 356

      Nereide, case of the, 542

      Netherlands, right of convoy claimed by the, 535

      Neumayr de Ramsla, 349

      Neutral asylum:
        abuse of, 420-423
        exterritoriality of men-of-war in, 419
        facilities rendered to vessels in, 402, 404, 420, 422, 423
        fugitive soldiers and, 413-415
        in general, 409
        land and naval forces distinguished as regards, 417
        land forces and, 409-416
        naval forces and, 417-425
        neutral men-of-war as, 423
        non-combatants of belligerent forces and, 415
        option of State to grant, 417
        prisoners of war and, 410, 419
        vessels in distress in, 418
        war material in, 415

      Neutral goods:
        innocent, on destroyed neutral vessels, 550
        on enemy men-of-war, 232, 542
        on such enemy merchantmen as are being destroyed, 244

      Neutralisation, temporary, 89

      Neutralised States as belligerents, 91, 93, 386-389

      Neutrality:
        angary, right of, 446-449
        armed, definition of, 369
          the First and the Second. _See_ First Armed Neutrality;
              Second Armed Neutrality
        asylum, to land forces, 409-416
          naval forces, 417-425
          war material, 415
        belligerents to recognise, 367
        benevolent, 370
        blockade. _See_ Blockade characteristics of, 361-368
        civil war and, 365
        commencement of, 373-377
        conception of, 361
        contraband. _See_ Contraband of war Conventions, 383
        conventional, 369
        declarations of, 374
        definition of, 361
        development and institution of, 347-360
        different kinds of, 368-372
        end of, 377
        in general, 369
        impartiality, contents of duty of, 362, 381, 383
        instances of, 350
        intercourse during, no cessation of, 365, 385
        knowledge of war necessary for, 373
        laws prescribing attitude of, 375-377
        military operations and, 386-397
        military preparations and, 397-409
        oath of, 212, 364
        partial, 369
        perfect, 370
        perpetual, 368
        qualified, 370-372, 389, 392
        rights and duties derived from, 363, 378-386
        rule of 1756, 114, 353, 499
        treaties affecting, 371-372
        violation of. _See_ Violation of neutrality
        voluntary, 369

      Neutrals:
        asylum. _See_ Neutral asylum
        belligerents occupying territory of, 394
        conduct in general of, 362, 378
        depots and factories of belligerents on territory of, 397
        fugitive soldiers in custody of, 413-415
        hostilities by and against, 386-389
        impartiality of, 362, 381-383, 386
        intercourse between enemy and, 365, 385
        loans by, to belligerents, 430
          on the part of subjects of, 430-432
        men-of-war, built and fitted out by, 405-409
          passage of, through waters of, 393
          rescuing wounded, &c., 259, 424
          supplied by, 389
        military operations and, 386-397
          information regarding, 434-437
        military preparations and, 397-409
        mines, laying of, by, 445
        naval operations and, 400-409
          information regarding, 434-437
        organisation of hostile expeditions by, 400
        pilotage by, 432
        Prize Courts on territory of, 395
        prizes of belligerents and, 395
        relations of, with belligerents, 378-449
        representation at International Prize Court, 569
        rights and duties of, 363, 378-386
        services by, to belligerents, 389, 432-437
        subjects of, fighting for belligerents, 390
        supplies by, to belligerents, 375, 405-409, 426-430
          on part of subjects of, 427-430
        transport by, 424, 433-434
        troops, levy of, by, 398
          supplied by, 389, 398
        vessels of, rescuing wounded, 259, 424

      Neutral territory:
        as a base of naval operations forbidden, 400-404
        as an asylum, 410-416, 425
        despatches carried over, 435
        other uses made of, by belligerents, 394-399, 400
        passage through, 372, 382, 391-394, 399
        shipwrecked, the, on, 424

      Newspaper correspondents in naval warfare, 437

      Niagara, case of the, 465

      Nickolsburg, Preliminaries of, 329

      Nigretia, case of the, 519

      Nimeguen, Peace of (1678), 61

      Non-combatants:
        attached to armies, 95, 151, 158-161, 169
        attached to naval forces, 250, 254-257, 415

      Non-hostile relations, 273-299

      North-Eastern Boundary Dispute between U.S.A. and Great
          Britain, 19

      North-German Confederation, 100

      North Sea outrage. _See_ Dogger Bank

      Northern war, selling of territories during, 205

      Notification:
        of blockade, 457-459
        of bombardment, 194
        of contraband, 484, 488
        of outbreak of war, 125, 374

      Novara, case of the, 233

      Novik, case of the, 423


O

      Occupation of enemy territory. _See_ Enemy territory

      Oki, Captain Teisuki, 199, 315

      Oldhamia, case of the, 548

      Oleg, case of the, 423

      Open Sea:
        angary, right of, on, 447
        belligerents in neutral ports leaving for, 401, 402, 421
        capture on the, 526
        contraband on, 495
        despatch carriers on, 526, 528, 531
        enemy property found on, by belligerents, 547
        goods on neutral vessels on, 495-514
        jurisdiction over foreign subjects on, 364
        mechanical mines in, 227
        neutral merchantmen on, 128
        neutralisation of parts of, 88-90
        order on the, in thirteenth century, 239
        region of war, 85
        telegraph cables in, 271, 272
        visitation on, 534

      Orange Free State, annexation of, 327
        effective occupation of, 209

      Ordinances by France on neutral ships and goods, 219

      Orinoco Steamship Company, case of, 19

      Orozembo, case of the, 518

      Outbreak of war:
          after declaration, 123
          after initiative hostile acts, 126
          after ultimatum, 125
          effects of. _See_ Effects of outbreak of war
          in general, 121
          notification of, 125


P

      Pacific blockade:
        admissibility of, 50, 52
        development of, 48
        disposal of vessels seized during, 52
        instances of, 48, 49, 51, 52
        mode of, 52
        third States and, 51
        value of, 53
        variations of practice in, 51
        war not necessarily caused by, 53

      Pacifico, Don, case of, 41, 49

      Palme, case of the, 233

      Panama Canal, neutralisation of the, 89

      Papal States, 327

      Paris:
        Act of November (1815), 392
        Declaration of (1856). _See_ Declaration of Paris
        Peace treaty of. _See_ Peace treaty

      Parma, subjugation of, 327

      Parole, release on, 170, 172

      Pascal, case of the, 424

      Passage through neutral territory:
        of individuals intending to enlist, 399
        of prisoners of war and wounded, 412
        of troops, 372, 382, 391
        of wounded, 392

      Passports, 276

      Paul, Emperor, armed neutrality in reign of, 355, 356

      Paxo, neutralisation of, 88, 369

      Peace:
        negotiations for, 328
        preliminaries of, 329
        restoration of condition of, 332

      Peace Conferences. _See_ Hague Peace Conferences

      Peace Societies, so-called, 22

      Peace treaty of:
        Amiens (1802), 332
        Berlin (1878), 330
        Bukarest (1886), 92
        Frankfort (1871), 329, 338, 343
        Frederikshamm (1809), 205
        London (1863), 88; (1864), 88
        Nimeguen (1678), 61
        Paris (1856), 11
        Portsmouth (1905), 15, 329, 331, 555
        Prague (1866), 329
        Pyrenees (1659), 537
        San Stefano (1878), 330, 335
        Westminster (1654), 535
        Zuerich (1859), 329

      Perfidy, instances of, 202, 263, 281, 285

      Permanent Court of Arbitration, 13, 22, 23, 26, 157, 561
        Administrative Council of the, 565, 569
        International Bureau of the, 8, 27, 562, 569, 573, 579
        procedure of the, 27-31

      Persia, emblem of medical service, 161, 259

      _Persona standi in judicio_ of alien enemies, 133

      Peterburg, case of the, 102

      Peterhoff, case of the, 454, 470, 500, 501

      Phillimore on:
        blockade, 462
        continuous voyage, 500
        reprisals, 42
        violations of neutrality, 371

      Pillage, 181

      Pilotage by neutrals, 432

      Poison in warfare, 85, 148, 193, 249

      Port Arthur, battle of, 423
        blockade of, 227, 436
        surrender of, 285

      Portalis, declaration by, 64

      Portsmouth, Peace treaty of (1905), 15, 329, 331, 555

      Portugal, treaty affecting neutrality of, 372

      Postal Convention:
        between Great Britain and Holland (1843), 237
        between Great Britain and France (1860), 236

      Postal correspondence during war 236, 385, 524

      Postilion, case of the, 112, 115

      Postliminium:
        conception of, 339
        effects of, 340
        illegitimate acts and, 343
        interregnum debars, 343
        legitimate acts unaffected by, 342
        revival of former state of things, 341

      Prague, Treaty of (1866), 329

      Preliminaries of peace, 329

      Prevost, General, reprisal by, 307

      Princesse Marie, case of the, 548

      Prisoners of war, 134, 151, 152, 153, 165-173, 250, 306, 308,
          316, 335, 411, 419, 420

      Private enemy property:
        appropriation of, 174, 179-182
        at sea, 218, 221-224
        booty on battlefield, 163, 177, 181
        conveyed into belligerents' territory, 182
        destruction of, 187-191
        during bombardment, 194, 195
        immovable, 179
        on enemy territory, 139-143
        personal, 180
        transport, means of, 180
        utilisation of, 179
        war material, 180
        works of art and science, 180, 195

      Private individuals:
        during siege and bombardment, 193, 194
        hostility in arms of, 97, 152, 312
        intercourse and trade with enemy subjects, 135, 405,
            427-432, 434-437
        of neutral States, treatment of, 363-365
        _persona standi in judicio_, 133
        position at outbreak of war, 131
        position in general as regards war, 63-67
        property of, on enemy territory, 139
        requisitions in kind and service from, 152, 184-187, 211-213
        violence against, 151, 251

      Privateering, 103, 219, 353

      Privateers, 99, 357, 372, 534

      Prize Courts:
        adjudication by, 231, 240
        appeal against judgment of, 241, 529, 530, 555, 557
        blockade runners, adjudication of, 476
        captured neutral vessel to be tried by, 510-514, 529, 530,
            544, 547-552
        claims after judgment of, 557
        conduct of neutral vessels to, 547
        continuous voyage and, 499
        discretion of, as to confiscation, 544
        origin of, 238
        practice of, 553
        purpose of, 239
        reform projects for, 559
        territory on which instituted, 240, 395

      Prizes:
        abandonment of, 246
        cargo of, 242
        conduct of, to Prize Court, 241, 546
        crew of, 105, 231, 242, 547
        destruction of, 242, 547
        distribution of prize money, 248
        fate of, 231, 247
        hostage for ransom, 246
        loss of, 246
        neutral goods on, 242, 244, 530
        ransom of, 245
        recapture of, 246, 551
        safe keeping on neutral territory, 395
        sale of, 396
          effect of, 248

      Property. _See_ Private enemy property; Public enemy property

      Prussian Regulations regarding Naval Prizes, 505

      Public enemy property:
        appropriation of, 174-178, 183
        at sea, 218
        booty on battlefield, 163, 177
        destruction of. _See_ Destruction of enemy
        property during bombardment, 195
        immoveable, 174-175
        moveable, 176-177
        on enemy territory, 139
        utilisation of, 175, 176

      Pufendorf, 295

      Pursuit, right of. _See_ Right of pursuit

      Pyrenees, Peace treaty of (1659), 537


Q

      Qualification of belligerents, 90-92

      Qualified neutrality, 370-372, 389, 392

      Quarter:
        duty of giving, 147, 231, 249
        refusal of, 147

      Quartering of soldiers, 181, 185


R

      Railways, use of, in war, 139, 176, 180, 447, 448

      Ramillies, case of the, 263

      Ransom of prize, 245

      Rapid, case of the, 522

      Ras-el-Tin Fort, case of, 282

      Rebellion contrasted with war, 62

      Rebels, 70

      Recapture of prizes, 246, 551

      _Receptum arbitri_, 17

      Recognition as a belligerent Power, 69

      Red Cross, 161, 164, 203, 258

      Red Sea, proposed neutralisation of, 90

      Region of war, 85-90
        exclusion from, through neutralisation, 88

      Relief Societies, 171

      Reparation for:
        exercise of right of angary, 385
        violation of neutrality, 352, 380, 442

      Repatriation, 172, 173

      Reprisals:
        admissibility of, 40, 46, 281, 305
        arbitrariness in, danger of, 306
        by whom performed, 41
        cessation of, 46
        conception of, 38
        embargo, 40, 44. _See also_ Embargo
        inception of, 46
        instances of, 131, 147, 306-308
        kinds of, 42, 44
        laws of war not binding in case of, 84
        objects of, 42
        peace, distinguished from war, 46, 305
        proportionate to wrong done, 44
        restriction of, proposed, 308
        value of, 46, 305

      Requisitions, 153, 181, 183-186, 212, 264, 267

      Reshitelni, case of the, 389, 442

      Resistance to visitation, forcible, 540-543

      Retorsion:
        conception and characteristics of, 36
        exercise of, 37
        importance of, 36
        justification for, 37
        reprisals contrasted with, 38
        value of, 38

      Reuss, M. de, 40

      Riga, blockade of, 464

      Right:
        of angary, 446-449, 510
        of convoy, 535
        of pursuit of a vanquished army into neutral territory, 352,
            387
        of pursuit of a defeated fleet into neutral waters, 352,
            387, 422
        of stoppage _in transitu_, 120
        of visit and search, 290, 533
        _See also_ Jus

      Rio de Janeiro, blockade of, 49

      Rio Grande, blockade of the, 454

      Rivier, 84

      Riza Bey, Colonel, made prisoner, 531

      Roberts, Lord:
        action concerning train wrecking, 318
        proclamations during South African War, 318
        reprisal by, 306

      _Robe d'ennemy confisque celle d'amy_, 219

      Roche, Hon. J. B., case of, 376

      Rojdestvensky, Admiral, in territorial waters, 404
        North Sea outrage and, 7

      Rouen, blockade of, 454

      Rule of 1756, 114, 353, 499

      Ruses:
        characteristics of, 200
        distinguished from perfidy, 202
        kinds of, 201, 262

      Russo-Japanese War referred to on:
        armistice, 331
        asylum to men-of-war, 422, 423
        booty on battlefield, 182
        capitulation, 285
        contraband, 486, 488
        declaration of war, 123
        destruction of enemy merchantmen, 243
        destruction of neutral prizes, 548
        Dogger Bank case, 7
        disguised soldiery, 202, 302
        enemy subjects on belligerent's territory, 132
        hospital ships, 256
        intervention, 388
        irregular forces, 96
        loans, flotation of, 431, 432
        mechanical mines, 227
        merchantmen at outbreak of war, 235
        neutrality, 87, 359, 375, 387, 390, 422
        peace negotiations, 329, 331
        prisoners of war, 336, 424
        prizes, destruction of, 243
        region of war, 87, 387, 395
        release of neutral prizes, 555
        telegraphic facilities, 436
        unneutral service, 519, 525
        volunteer fleets, 102
        warships in neutral waters, 404
        war treason, 315

      Russo-Swedish War (1788), referred to on neutrality, 372, 389

      Russo-Turkish War (1877), referred to on:
        flag, use of false, 262
        loans, 431
        merchantmen at outbreak of war, 235
        peace negotiations, 330


S

      Safe-conducts, granting of, 232, 276

      Safeguards, 277

      St. Kilda, case of the, 548

      St. Petersburg:
        Declaration of. _See_ Declaration of St. Petersburg
        Maritime Convention of (1801), 356, 536

      Sale of vessels in time of war, 117, 248, 390, 426

      San Stefano, Peace treaty of, 330, 335

      Sardinia, subjugation of States by, 327

      Scott, Sir William:
        neutral property on armed enemy vessels condemned by, 542
        on capture of enemy vessels in neutral waters, 443
        on contraband, 503
        on unneutral service, 519
        on vessels under neutral convoy, 543
        _See also_ Stowell, Lord

      Scouting, 197

      Scouts, use of armed natives as, 99

      Sea warfare. _See_ Naval warfare

      Search:
        resistance to, 540-545
        right of, over merchantmen, 533-540
        during armistice, 290

      Second Armed Neutrality, 355-357, 370, 461, 468, 481, 536

      Sedan, battle of, 393

      Seizure, immunity of vessels from, 232-237
        _See also_ Enemy vessels

      Servia, 62, 91

      Seven Years' War, forcible levies in, 205

      Ship. _See_ Enemy vessels; Merchantmen

      Ship papers, 543-545

      Shipwrecked, treatment of the, 252-262, 424

      Sicilian sulphur monopoly, 39, 45

      Sicilies, subjugation of the Two, 327

      Sick-bays, 257

      Siege, 191, 193

      Silesia, passage of troops through, 391

      Silesian loan, case of the, 44, 557

      Sinnet, Mr., case of, 376

      Slidell, Mr., case of seizure of, 519, 530

      Smith, Sir Sidney, and capitulation of El Arish, 287

      Smolensk, case of the, 102

      Solferino, battle of, 155

      South African Republic:
        annexation of, 326, 327
        effective occupation of, 209

      South African War referred to on:
        amnesty, 334
        concentration camps, 190
        devastation, 190
        enemy character, 109
        enemy subjects on belligerent's territory, 132
        hostages, 318
        natives as scouts, 99
        need of an International Prize Court, 561
        neutrality, 359
        neutrals' subjects fighting in the, 109
        passage of troops, 372
        prisoners, 147
        repatriation, 173
        reprisals during, 306
        subjugation, 327
        transport, 433
        vessel, release of, 552

      Spanish-American War referred to on:
        cable laying, 436
        cancellation of treaties, 129
        flag, use of false, 262
        merchantmen at outbreak of war, 235

      Spanish Armada, prisoners from, on neutral territory, 411

      Spanish Colonies' War of Independence, sale of vessels in
          (1825), 426

      Spies, 196, 262

      Springbok, case of the, 470, 500, 501

      Stackelburg, Baron de, case of, 43

      State differences:
        amicable settlement of, 3-33
          four ways, 5
        compulsive settlement of, 34-56
          conception, 34
          four ways, 5, 34
          ultimatums and demonstrations, 35
          war distinguished from, 34
        Law of Nations and, 4
        legal, 3-5
          causes of, 3
          settlement of, 4
        political, 3-5
          causes of, 3
          settlement of, 4

      States:
        duty of, in neutrality, 363
        qualification to make war, 90-93

      Stephen Hart, case of the, 470

      Stockholm, Convention of (1905), 89

      Stoessel, General accused of perfidy, 285

      Stone-blockade, 450, 463

      Stoppage _in transitu_, right of, 120

      Story, Mr. Justice, 501, 542

      Stowell, Lord:
        on immunity of fishing-boats, 234
        on Prize Courts, 554
        _See also_ Scott, Sir William

      Strassburg, 61, 193

      Stratagems. _See_ Ruses

      Strategic blockade, 452

      Subjugation:
        definition of, 326
        formal end of war, 326
        instances of, 326

      Submarine cables, 271, 436

      Submarine mines. _See_ Mines

      Subsidies, 430-432

      Suez Canal, neutralisation of, 88, 102

      Suspension of arms, 291

      Swineherd, case of the, 332

      Swiss Bundesrath, on treatment of wounded, 155

      Swiss Federal Council and the Geneva Convention, 164

      Switzerland, neutralisation of, 91, 348, 358, 363, 368, 369,
          392, 413, 415, 428
        troops marched through, 392

      Sybille, case of the, 263


T

      Tagus, blockade of the, 49

      Talbot, case of the, 424

      Telegraph cable, interference with submarine, 271-272
        use of, by belligerents, 435-437

      Telegraphy, wireless, 436, 437

      Temeraire, case of the, 282

      Tetardos, case of the, 548

      Tetens, proposal regarding Prize Courts, 560

      Thea, case of the, 548

      Theatre of war, 85

      Torpedoes, 227

      Trading between belligerent's subjects. _See_ Intercourse

      Train-wrecking, 318

      Traitors, 105

      Transfer: of enemy goods, 119
        of enemy vessels, 117

      Transmission of intelligence for the enemy, 521

      Transport on the part of neutrals, 424, 433, 434

      Transvaal. _See_ South African Republic

      Treason, 199, 262, 313-316, 318

      Treaties:
        cancellation of, at outbreak of war, 129
        cancellation through violation by one party, 339
        interpretation of, 20, 26
        of Arbitration, 16, 20, 21
        of Commerce (1871), 221, 509
          (1894), 17
        of Friendship and Commerce (1785), 167, 221, 508
          (1778), 371

      Treaty of:
        Buenos Ayres (1881), 89
        Copenhagen (1830), 542
        Washington (1871), 557
        Westminster (1654), 535

      Treaty of peace:
        amnesty under, 334
        breach of, 338
        competence to conclude, 330
        contracts, suspended, and, 333
        date of, 331
        effects of, 332-337
        forces in distant parts, effect on, 332
        form of, 330
        interpretation of stipulations of, 337
        negotiations for, 328
        normal end of war, 327
        parts of, 330
        performance of, 337
        preliminaries of, 329
        principle of _uti possidetis_, 334
        prisoners of war, release of, 335
        revival of treaties, 336

      Trent, case of the, 519, 530

      Trial of captured neutral vessels, 553-558

      Tripoli, ultimatum threatening occupation of, 126

      Tsu Shima, battle of, 423

      Turco-Italian War (1911), referred to on:
        bombardment by naval forces, 269, 303
        carriage of contraband, 506
        complaints to neutral Powers during, 303
        mediation, 11
        Red Sea, proposed neutralisation of, 90
        region of war, 87, 89
        rules of the Declaration of London, 360
        subjects of belligerent expelled from enemy territory, 132
        subjects of belligerent on enemy territory, 132
        unneutral service, 531

      Turco-Servian War (1877), violation of neutrality during, 391

      Turkey, emblem of medical service of, 161, 259

      Tuscany, subjugation of, 327

      Twee Gebroeders, case of the, 443


U

      Ukase of 1809, 357

      Ultimatum, 35, 125

      Umpire in arbitration, 16, 32

      United States of North America:
        Foreign Enlistment Act of, 358, 375
        Instructions for the Government of Armies of the, in the
            Field (1863), 67, 80, 98
        International Prize Court and the, 577
        neutrality of, 371, 398, 400
        War code: land, 67, 80, 98
          naval 83, 217, 224, 233, 243, 262, 265, 272, 285, 447,
              460, 486

      Unneutral service, 386, 434
        capture for, 526
        carriage of despatches, 515, 521-524, 528, 531, 532
        consequences of, 526-532
        diplomatic personages, carriage of, for enemy, 519, 532
        enemy character created by, 524
        enemy persons, carriage of, 515, 517-521
        kinds of, 515
        mailboats carrying despatches, 526, 531
        penalty for, 527
        seizure of despatches, 530, 531
        seizure of enemy persons, 530, 531
        transmission of intelligence, 521

      Uriu, Admiral, in Korean neutral waters, 388

      _Uti possidetis_, principle of, 324, 334

      _Usus in bello_, 78


V

      Variag, case of the, 388, 424, 442

      Vassal States, wars by, 62, 68, 91, 92

      Vattel on:
        armistices, 295
        loans to belligerents, 430
        neutrality, 350
        occupation of territory, 205
        perfidy, 263
        reprisals, 44

      Vega, case of the, 233

      Venezuela:
        blockade of, 50, 52
        boundary dispute (1900), 18

      Venus, case of the, 112

      Versailles, Preliminaries of Peace of, 329

      Vessels. _See_ Enemy vessels; Contraband vessels

      Victor, case of the, 427

      Vienna Congress, Act of 1815, 88

      _Vigilantibus jura sunt scripta_, 295

      Villafranca, preliminaries of Peace Treaty of, 329

      Violation of: armistices, 297
        capitulations, 289
        neutral territory, 384
        neutrality, 93, 438-445, 371, 380, 507
          conception of, 438
          consequences of, 439
          distinguished from end of, 439
          mines laid to prevent, 445
          negligence by neutrals conducive to, 444
          neutrals and, 440
          reparation from belligerents for, 352, 380, 442
          what constitutes, 389-409, 412, 422, 426, 429, 430, 433,
              435-437
        peace treaties, 338
        rules of war, 310

      Violence:
        in land warfare, 146-154
        in naval warfare, 249-251

      Visitation of neutral vessels:
        armistice and, 534
        conception of right of, 533
        convoyed vessels, 355, 535-537, 542
        exercise of, 534
        mailboats, 535
        men-of-war, 535
        papers and, 543-545
        private vessels, 535
        procedure, 538
        resistance to, 540-543
          by neutral convoy, 543
          consequences of, 540
        rules regarding, no universal, 537
        search, 539
        stopping vessels for purpose of, 538
        what constitutes, 541

      Vladimirowka, occupation by the Japanese, 96

      Voluntary Aid Societies, 158-160

      Volunteer corps, 94

      Volunteer fleet, 100-104

      Vorwaerts, case of the, 244

      Vrow Houwina, case of the, 501


W

      War:
        aerial warfare, 150, 192, 207, 227
        armed forces in, 63
        belligerents. _See_ Belligerents
        causes of, 72-75
        just, 74
        pretexts distinct from, 75
        cessation of hostilities, simple, 290, 323-324
        characteristics of, 59-72
        civil, 68, 323
        commencement of, 121
        conception of, 60-63
        declaration of, 122-125
        diminution of, 75
        effects of the outbreak of, 128-143
        ends of, 67, 76
        enemy character. _See_ Enemy character
        guerilla, 70-72
        illegitimate, 300
        initiative hostile acts, 126-128
        kinds of, 76
        land. _See_ Land warfare
        laws of. _See_ Laws of war
        legality of, 59
        legitimate, 300
        means of securing, 300-321
        manifestoes of, 121
        naval. _See_ Naval warfare
        non-hostile relations of belligerents during, 273-299
        outbreak of, 121-128. _See also_
        Effects of outbreak of war participants in, 62
        poison and poisoned arms in, 85, 148, 193, 249
        _postliminium._ _See_ Postliminium
        pretexts for, 75
        private individuals:
          status during, 63-67
          hostilities by, 97, 152, 298, 312
        purpose of, 67
        region of, 85-90
        right to make, 91
        sea. _See_ Naval warfare
        subjugation. _See_ Subjugation
        temporary condition, a, 322
        termination of, 322-332
        territory neutralised in case of, 88-90
        theatre of, 85
        treaty of peace. _See_ Treaty of peace
        ultimatum, 125
        violation of rules of, 310

      War crimes:
        conception of, 309
        kinds of, 310-316
        punishment for committing, 316
          effect of treaty of peace on, 335

      War criminals:
        in land warfare, 66, 96, 97, 197, 289, 303, 334
        in naval warfare, 226

      War of Secession (1861), 63

      Washburne, case of Mr., 194

      Washington: Three Rules of, 18, 406, 444 Treaty of, 557

      Wellington, Duke of, on bombardment, 266

      Westlake, proposition for Court of Appeal in prize cases, 560

      Westminster, Treaty of (1654), 535

      Wheaton, on resistance to visitation, 542

      William, case of the, 499

      Wireless telegraphy, use of by belligerents, 435-437

      Wounded:
        articles for the use of, 493
        treatment of, 154-165, 252-262, 393


Z

      Zouche, on contraband, 508

      Zuerich, Peace of (1859), 329




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End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of International Law. A Treatise. Volume
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