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                            A SHORT HISTORY
                                   OF
                              FREETHOUGHT

                           ANCIENT AND MODERN



                                   BY
                           JOHN M. ROBERTSON



                  THIRD EDITION, REVISED AND EXPANDED

                             IN TWO VOLUMES

                                 Vol. I

        (ISSUED FOR THE RATIONALIST PRESS ASSOCIATION, LIMITED)

                                London:
                              WATTS & CO.,
                  JOHNSON'S COURT, FLEET STREET, E.C.

                                  1915







                                   TO
                          SYDNEY ANSELL GIMSON







CONTENTS


VOLUME I

                                                            PAGE

    Preface                                                   xi

    Chap. I--Introductory

        § 1. Origin and Meaning of the word Freethought        1
        § 2. Previous histories                               10
        § 3. The Psychology of Freethinking                   15

    Chap. II--Primitive Freethinking                          22

    Chap. III--Progress under Ancient Religions

        § 1. Early Association and Competition of Cults       44
        § 2. The Process in India                             48
        § 3. Mesopotamia                                      61
        § 4. Ancient Persia                                   65
        § 5. Egypt                                            69
        § 6. Phoenicia                                        78
        § 7. Ancient China                                    82
        § 8. Mexico and Peru                                  88
        § 9. The Common Forces of Degeneration                91

    Chap. IV--Relative Freethought in Israel

        § 1. The Early Hebrews                                97
        § 2. The manipulated prophetic literature            104
        § 3. The Post-Exilic Literature                      109

    Chap. V--Freethought in Greece                           120

        § 1. Beginnings of Ionic Culture                     123
        § 2. Homer, Stesichoros, Pindar, and Æschylus        126
        § 3. The Culture-Conditions                          134
        § 4. From Thales to the Eleatic School               136
        § 5. Pythagoras and Magna Graecia                    148
        § 6. Anaxagoras, Perikles, and Aspasia               152
        § 7. From Demokritos to Euripides                    157
        § 8. Sokrates, Plato, and Aristotle                  168
        § 9. Post-Alexandrian Greece: Ephoros, Pyrrho,
             Zeno, Epicurus, Theodorus, Diagoras, Stilpo,
             Bion, Strato, Evêmeros, Carneades, Clitomachos;
             The Sciences; Advance and Decline of Astronomy;
             Lucian, Sextus Empiricus, Polybius, Strabo;
             Summary                                         180

    Chap. VI--Freethought in ancient Rome

        § 1. Culture Beginnings, to Ennius and the Greeks    194
        § 2. Lucretius, Cicero, Cæsar                        201
        § 3. Decline under the Empire                        207
        § 4. The higher Pagan ethics                         215

    Chap. VII--Ancient Christianity and its Opponents

        § 1. Freethought in the Gospels: contradictory
             forces                                          218
        § 2. The Epistles: their anti-rationalism            224
        § 3. Anti-pagan rationalism. The Gnostics            224
        § 4. Rationalistic heresy. Arius. Pelagius.
             Jovinian. Aerius. Vigilantius. The religious
             wars                                            229
        § 5. Anti-Christian thought: its decline. Celsus.
             Last lights of critical thought. Macrobius.
             Theodore. Photinus. The expulsion of science.
             The appropriation of pagan endowments           235
        § 6. The intellectual and moral decadence. Boethius  243

    Chap. VIII--Freethought under Islam

        § 1. Mohammed and his contemporaries.
             Early "Zendekism"                               248
        § 2. The Influence of the Koran                      252
        § 3. Saracen freethought in the East. The
             Motazilites. The Spread of Culture.
             Intellectual Collapse                           253
        § 4. Al-Ma'arri and Omar Khayyám. Sufîism            261
        § 5. Arab Philosophy and Moorish freethought.
             Avempace. Abubacer. Averroës. Ibn Khaldun       266
        § 6. Rationalism in later Islam. Sufîism. Bâbism in
             contemporary Persia. Freethinking in Mohammedan
             India and Africa                                272

    Chap. IX--Christendom in the Middle Ages                 277

        § 1. Heresy in Byzantium. Iconoclasm. Leo. Photius.
             Michael. The early Paulicians                   277
        § 2. Critical Heresy in the West. Vergilius.
             Claudius. Agobard. John Scotus. The case of
             Gottschalk. Berengar. Roscelin. Nominalism and
             Realism. Heresy in Florence and in France       282
        § 3. Popular Anti-Clerical Heresy. The Paulicians
             (Cathari) in Western Europe: their anticipation
             of Protestantism. Abuses of the Church and
             papacy. Vogue of anti-clerical heresy. Peter
             de Brueys. Eudo. Paterini. Waldenses            291
        § 4. Heresy in Southern France. The crusade against
             Albigensian heresy. Arrest of Provençal
             civilization: Rise and character of the
             Inquisition                                     299
        § 5. Freethought in the Schools. The problem set to
             Anselm. Roscelin. Nominalism and Realism.
             Testimony of Giraldus Cambrensis: Simon of
             Tournay. William of Conches. Abailard. John of
             Salisbury                                       307
        § 6. Saracen and Jewish Influences. Maimonides. Ibn
             Ezra. Averroïsts. Amalrich. David of Dinant.
             Thomas Aquinas. Unbelief at Paris University.
             Suppressive action of the Church. Judicial
             torture                                         315
        § 7. Freethought in Italy. Anti-clericalism in
             Florence. Frederick II. Michael Scotus. Dante's
             views. Pietro of Abano. Brunetto Latini. Cecco
             Stabili. Boccaccio. Petrarch. Averroïsm         322
        § 8. Sects and Orders. Italian developments. The
             Brethren of the Free Spirit. Beghards, etc.
             Franciscans. Humiliati. Abbot Joachim.
             Segarelli and Dolcino                           331
        § 9. Thought in Spain. Arab influences. Heresy under
             Alfonso X. The first Inquisition. Arnaldo of
             Villanueva. Enrique IV. Pedro do Osma. The New
             Inquisition. The causes of Spanish evolution    337
       § 10. Thought in England. Roger Bacon. Chaucer.
             Items in Piers Ploughman. Lollardry. Wiclif     342
       § 11. Thought in France. François de Rues. Jean de
             Meung. Reynard the Fox. Paris university. The
             sects. The Templars. William of Occam. Marsiglio.
             Pierre Aureol. Nominalism and Realism. "Double
             truth." Unbelief in the Paris schools           351
       § 12. Thought in the Teutonic Countries. The
             Minnesingers. Walter der Vogelweide. Master
             Eckhart. Sects. The Imitatio Christi            361

    Chap. X--Freethought in the Renaissance

        § 1. The Italian Evolution. Saracen Sources.
             Anti-clericalism. Discredit of the Church.
             Lorenzo Valla. Masuccio. Pulci. Executions
             for blasphemy. Averroïsm. Nifo. Unbelief at
             Rome. Leonardo da Vinci. Platonism. Pico della
             Mirandola. Machiavelli. Guicciardini. Belief
             in witchcraft. Pomponazzi. Pomponio Leto. The
             survival of Averroïsm. Jewish freethought       365
        § 2. The French Evolution. Desperiers. Rabelais.
             Dolet. The Vaudois massacres. Unbelieving
             Churchmen. Marguerite of Navarre. Ronsard.
             Bodin. Vallée. Estienne. Pleas for tolerance.
             Revival of Stoicism                             379
        § 3. The English Evolution. Reginald Pecock. Duke
             Humphrey. Unbelief in immortality               393
        § 4. The Remaining European Countries. Nicolaus of
             Cusa. Hermann van Ryswyck. Astrology and
             science. Summary                                398

    Chap. XI--The Reformation Politically Considered

        § 1. The German Conditions. The New Learning.
             Economic Causation                              403
        § 2. The Problem in Italy, Spain, and the
             Netherlands. Savonarola. Catholic reaction.
             The New Inquisition. Heresy in Italy. Its
             suppression. The Index Expurgatorius. Italian
             and northern "character"                        407
        § 3. The Hussite Failure in Bohemia. Early
             anti-clericalism. Militz and his school. Huss
             and Jerome. The Taborite wars. Helchitsky       415
        § 4. Anti-Papalism in Hungary. Early
             anti-clericalism. Rapid success of the
             Reformation. Its decline. New heresy.
             Socinianism. Biandrata. Davides. Recovery
             of the Church                                   419
        § 5. Protestantism in Poland. Early anti-clericalism.
             Inroad of Protestantism. Growth of Unitarianism.
             Goniondzki. Pauli. Catholic reaction            422
        § 6. The Struggle in France. Attitude of King
             Francis. Economic issues. Pre-Lutheran
             Protestantism. Persecution. Berquin. Protestant
             violences. Fortunes of the cause in France      427
        § 7. The Political Process in Britain. England not
             specially anti-papal. The causation. Henry's
             divorce. Spoliation                             431

    Chap. XII--The Reformation and Freethought

        § 1. Germany and Switzerland. Mutianus. Crotus.
             Bebel. Rise of Unitarianism. Luther and
             Melanchthon. Their anti-democratic politics.
             Their dogmatism. Zwingli. Calvin and his
             victims. Gruet. The Libertini. Servetus.
             Gripaldi. Calvin's polity. Ochino. Anthoine.
             Moral failure of Protestantism                  434
        § 2. England. Henry and Wolsey. Advanced heresy.
             Persecution. Sir Thomas More                    458
        § 3. The Netherlands. Calvinism and Arminianism.
             Reaction towards Catholicism. Barneveldt.
             Grotius                                         461
        § 4. Conclusion. The intellectual failure. Indirect
             gains to freedom                                464

    Chap. XIII.--The Rise of Modern Freethought

        § 1. The Italian Influence. Deism. Unitarianism.
             Latitudinarianism. Aconzio. Nizolio. Pereira    466
        § 2. Spain. Huarte                                   470
        § 3. France. Treatises against atheism: De Mornay.
             New skepticism: Sanchez. Montaigne. Charron.
             The Satyre-Menippée. Garasse on the Beaux
             Esprits. Mersenne's attack                      473







PREFACE


This, the third edition, represents a considerable expansion of the
second (1906), which in its turn was a considerable expansion of the
first (1899). The book now somewhat approximates, in point of fullness,
to the modest ideal aimed at. Anything much fuller would cease to be a
"Short History."

The process of revision, carried on since the last issue, has,
I hope, meant some further advance towards correctness, and some
improvement in arrangement--a particularly difficult matter in such
a book. As before, the many critical excursus have been so printed
that they may be recognized and skipped by those readers who care
to follow only the narrative. The chapter on the nineteenth century,
though much expanded, like those on the eighteenth, remains, I fear,
open to objection on the score of scantiness. I can only plead that
the ample and excellent work of Mr. A. W. Benn has now substantially
met the need for a fuller survey of that period.

It is fitting that I should acknowledge the generous critical
reception given by most reviewers to the previous editions of a
book which, breaking as it did new ground, lacked the gain from
previous example that accrues to most historical writing. My many
debts to historians of culture are, I trust, indicated in the notes;
but I have to repeat my former acknowledgments as to the Biographical
Dictionary of Freethinkers of my dead friend, J. M. Wheeler, inasmuch
as the aid I have had from his manifold research does not thus appear
on the surface.

It remains to add my thanks to a number of friendly correspondents
who have assisted me by pointing out shortcomings and errors. Further
assistance of the same kind will be gratefully welcomed. It is still
my hope that the book may help some more leisured student in the
construction of a more massive record of the development of rational
thought on the side of human life with which it deals.

An apology is perhaps due to the purchasers of the second edition,
which is now superseded by a fuller record. I can but plead that I
have been unable otherwise to serve their need; and express a hope
that the low price of the present edition will be a compensation.


    J. M. R.

        September, 1914.







A SHORT HISTORY OF FREETHOUGHT


CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY


§ 1. ORIGIN AND MEANING OF THE WORD

The words "freethinking" and "freethinker" first appear in English
literature about the end of the seventeenth century, and seem to
have originated there and then, as we do not find them earlier in
French or in Italian, [1] the only other modern literatures wherein
the phenomena for which the words stand had previously arisen.


The title of "atheist" had been from time immemorial applied to every
shade of serious heresy by the orthodox, as when the early Christians
were so described by the image-adoring polytheists around them; and
in Latin Christendom the term infidelis, translating the apistos
of the New Testament, which primarily applied to Jews and pagans,
[2] was easily extensible, as in the writings of Augustine, to all
who challenged or doubted articles of ordinary Christian belief,
all alike being regarded as consigned to perdition. [3] It is by
this line of descent that the term "infidelity," applied to doubt
on such doctrines as that of the future state, comes up in England
in the fifteenth century. [4] It implied no systematic or critical
thinking. The label of "deist," presumably self-applied by the bearers,
begins to come into use in French about the middle of the sixteenth
century; [5] and that of "naturalist," also presumably chosen by
those who bore it, came into currency about the same time. Lechler
traces the latter term in the Latin form as far back as the MS. of
the Heptaplomeres of Bodin, dated 1588; but it was common before that
date, as De Mornay in the preface to his De la Vérité de la religion
chrétienne (1581) declaims "against the false naturalists (that is
to say, professors of the knowledge of nature and natural things)";
and Montaigne in one of his later essays (1588) has the phrase "nous
autres naturalistes." [6] Apart from these terms, those commonly
used in French in the seventeenth century were bel esprit (sometimes,
though not necessarily, connoting unbelief), esprit fort and libertin,
the latter being used in the sense of a religious doubter by Corneille,
Molière, and Bayle. [7]

It seems to have first come into use as one of the hostile names
for the "Brethren of the Free Spirit," a pantheistic and generally
heretical sect which became prominent in the thirteenth century,
and flourished widely, despite destructive persecution, till the
fifteenth. Their doctrine being antinomian, and their practice
often extravagant, they were accused by Churchmen of licentiousness,
so that in their case the name Libertini had its full latitude of
application. In the sixteenth century the name of Libertines is found
borne, voluntarily or otherwise, by a similar sect, probably springing
from some remnant of the first, but calling themselves Spirituales,
who came into notice in Flanders, were favoured in France by Marguerite
of Navarre, sister of Francis I, and became to some extent associated
with sections of the Reformed Church. They were attacked by Calvin
in the treatise Contre la sects fanatique et furieuse des Libertins
(1544 and 1545). [8] The name of Libertini was not in the sixteenth
century applied by any Genevese writer to any political party; [9]
but by later historians it was in time either fastened on or adopted
by the main body of Calvin's opponents in Geneva, who probably included
some members of the sect or movement in question. They were accused by
him of general depravity, a judgment not at all to be acquiesced in,
in view of the controversial habits of the age; though they probably
included antinomian Christians and libertines in the modern sense,
as well as orthodox lovers of freedom and orderly non-Christians. As
the first Brethren of the Free Spirit, so-called, seem to have
appeared in Italy (where they are supposed to have derived, like
the Waldenses, from the immigrant Paulicians of the Eastern Church),
the name Libertini presumably originated there. But in Renaissance
Italy an unbeliever seems usually to have been called simply ateo,
or infedele, or pagano. "The standing phrase was non aver fede." [10]

In England, before and at the Reformation, both "infidel" and
"faithless" usually had the theological force of "non-Christian." Thus
Tyndale says of the Turks that though they "knowledge one God," yet
they "have erred and been faithless these eight hundred years"; adding
the same of the Jews. [11] Throughout Elizabeth's reign, "infidel"
seems thus to have commonly signified only a "heathen" or Jew or
Mohammedan. Bishop Jewel, for instance, writes that the Anglo-Saxon
invaders of Britain "then were infidels"; [12] and the word appears to
be normally used in that sense, or with a playful force derived from
that, by the divines, poets, and dramatists, including Shakespeare,
as by Milton in his verse. [13] Ben Jonson has the phrase:


                                I did not expect
        To meet an infidel, much less an atheist,
        Here in Love's list. [14]


One or two earlier writers, [15] indeed, use "infidel" in the modern
sense; and it was at times so used by early Elizabethans. [16]
But Foxe brackets together "Jews, Turks, or infidels"; [17] and
Hooper, writing in 1547, speaks, like Jewel, of the heathen as
"the infidels." [18] Hooker (1553-1600), in his Fifth Sermon, § 9,
[19] uses the word somewhat indefinitely, but in his margin makes
"Pagans and Infidels" equivalent to "Pagans and Turks." So also,
in the Ecclesiastical Polity, [20] "infidels" means men of another
religion. On the title-page of Reginald Scot's Discoverie of Witchcraft
(1574), on the other hand, we have "the infidelitie of atheists";
but so late as 1600 we find "J. H." [John Healy], the translator of
Augustine's City of God, rendering infideles and homines infideles by
"unbelievers." [21] "Infidelity," in the modern sense, occurs in Sir
T. Browne. [22]


In England, as in the rest of Europe, however, the phenomenon of
freethought had existed, in specific form, long before it could express
itself in propagandist writings, or find any generic name save those of
atheism and infidelity; and the process of naming was as fortuitous
as it generally is in matters of intellectual evolution. Phrases
approximating to "free thought" occur soon after the Restoration. Thus
Glanvill repeatedly writes sympathetically of "free philosophers"
[23] and "free philosophy." [24] In 1667 we find Sprat, the historian
of the Royal Society, describing the activity of that body as having
arisen or taken its special direction through the conviction that in
science, as in warfare, better results had been obtained by a "free
way" than by methods not so describable. [25] As Sprat is careful to
insist, the members of the Royal Society, though looked at askance
by most of the clergy [26] and other pietists, were not as such to be
classed as unbelievers, the leading members being strictly orthodox;
but a certain number seem to have shown scant concern for religion;
[27] and while it was one of the Society's first rules not to debate
any theological question whatever, [28] the intellectual atmosphere of
the time was such that some among those who followed the "free way"
in matters of natural science would be extremely likely to apply it
to more familiar problems. [29] At the same period we find Spinoza
devoting his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670) to the advocacy of
libertas philosophandi; and such a work was bound to have a general
European influence. It was probably, then, a result of such express
assertion of the need and value of freedom in the mental life that
the name "freethinker" came into English use in the last quarter of
the century.


    Before "deism" came into English vogue, the names for unbelief,
    even deistic, were simply "infidelity" and "atheism"--e.g.,
    Bishop Fotherby's Atheomastix (1622), Baxter's Unreasonableness
    of Infidelity (1655) and Reasons of the Christian Religion (1667),
    passim. Bishop Stillingfleet's Letter to a Deist (1677) appears to
    be the first published attack on deism by name. His Origines Sacræ
    (1662) deals chiefly with deistic views, but calls unbelievers
    in general "atheists." Cudworth, in his True Intellectual System
    of the Universe (written 1671, published 1678), does not speak
    of deism, attacking only atheism, and was himself suspected of
    Socinianism. W. Sherlock, in his Practical Discourse of Religious
    Assemblies (2nd ed., 1682), attacks "atheists and infidels," but
    says nothing of "deists." That term, first coined, as we have
    seen, in French, seems first to have found common currency in
    France--e.g., on the title-pages of the apologetic works of Marin
    Mersenne, 1623 and 1624. The term "atheist" was often applied at
    random at this period; but atheism did exist.


When the orthodox Boyle pushed criticism in physical science under
such a title as The Sceptical Chemist, the principle could not well be
withheld from application to religion; and it lay in the nature of the
case that the name "freethinker," like that of "skeptic," should come
to attach itself specially to those who doubted where doubt was most
resented and most resisted. At length the former term became specific.

In the meantime the word "rationalist," which in English has latterly
tended to become the prevailing name for freethinkers, had made its
appearance, without securing much currency. In a London news-letter
dated October 14, 1646, it is stated, concerning the Presbyterians
and Independents, that "there is a new sect sprung up among them,
and these are the rationalists; and what their reason dictates to
them in Church or State stands for good until they be convinced
with better." [30] On the Continent, the equivalent Latin term
(rationalista) had been applied about the beginning of the century to
the Aristotelian humanists of the Helmstadt school by their opponents,
[31] apparently in the same sense as that in which Bacon used the
term rationales in his Redargutio Philosophiarum--"Rationales autem,
aranearum more, telas ex se conficiunt." Under this title he contrasts
(as spiders spinning webs out of themselves) the mere Aristotelean
speculators, who framed à priori schemes of Nature, with empiricists,
who, "like ants, collect something and use it," preferring to both the
"bees" who should follow the ideal method prescribed by himself. [32]
There is here no allusion to heterodox opinion on religion. [Bishop
Hurst, who (perhaps following the Apophthegms) puts a translation
of Bacon's words, with "rationalists" for rationales, as one of the
mottoes of his History of Rationalism, is thus misleading his readers
as to Bacon's meaning.] In 1661 John Amos Comenius, in his Theologia
Naturalis, applies the name rationalista to the Socinians and deists;
without, however, leading to its general use in that sense. Later
we shall meet with the term in English discussions between 1680 and
1715, applied usually to rationalizing Christians; but as a name
for opponents of orthodox religion it was for the time superseded,
in English, by "freethinker."

In the course of the eighteenth century the term was adopted in other
languages. The first French translation (1714) of Collins's Discourse
of Freethinking is entitled Discours sur la liberté de penser; and the
term "freethinkers" is translated on the title-page by esprit fort,
and in the text by a periphrasis of liberté de penser. Later in the
century, however, we find Voltaire in his correspondence frequently
using the substantive franc-pensant, a translation of the English term
which subsequently gave way to libre penseur. The modern German term
Freigeist, found as early as 1702 in the allusion to "Alten Quäcker
und neuen Frey-Geister" on the title-page of the folio Anabaptisticum
et Enthusiasticum Pantheon, probably derives from the old "Brethren
of the Free Spirit"; while Schöngeist arose as a translation of bel
esprit. In the middle of the eighteenth century Freidenker came into
German use as a translation of the English term.


    In a general sense "free thoughts" was a natural expression,
    and we have it in Ben Jonson: "Being free master of mine own free
    thoughts." [33] But not till about the year 1700 did the phrase
    begin to have a special application to religious matters. The
    first certain instance thus far noted of the use of the term
    "freethinker" is in a letter of Molyneux to Locke, dated April 6,
    1697, [34] where Toland is spoken of as a "candid freethinker." In
    an earlier letter, dated December 24, 1695, Molyneux speaks of
    a certain book on religion as somewhat lacking in "freedom of
    thought"; [35] and in Burnet's Letters [36] occurs still earlier
    the expression "men ... of freer thoughts." In the New English
    Dictionary a citation is given from the title-page of S. Smith's
    brochure, The Religious Impostor ... dedicated to Doctor S-l-m-n
    and the rest of the new Religious Fraternity of Freethinkers,
    near Leather-Sellers' Hall. Printed ... in the first year of
    Grace and Freethinking, conjecturally dated 1692. It is thought to
    refer to the sect of "Freeseekers" mentioned in Luttrell's Brief
    Historical Relation (iii, 56) under date 1693. In that case it is
    not unbelievers that are in question. So in Shaftesbury's Inquiry
    Concerning Virtue (first ed. 1699) the expression "freethought"
    has a general and not a particular sense; [37] and in Baker's
    Reflections upon Learning, also published in 1699, in the remark:
    "After the way of freethinking had been lai'd open by my Lord
    Bacon, it was soon after greedily followed"; [38] the reference
    is, of course, to scientific and not to religious thought.

    But in Shaftesbury's Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour
    (1709) the phrases "free-writers" and "a freethought" [39]
    have reference to "advanced" opinions, though in his letters to
    Ainsworth (May 10, 1707) he had written, "I am glad to find your
    love of reason and freethought. Your piety and virtue I know you
    will always keep." [40] Compare the Miscellaneous Reflections
    (v, 3) in the Characteristics [41] (1711), where the tendency to
    force the sense from the general to the special is incidentally
    illustrated. Shaftesbury, however, includes the term "free liver"
    among the "naturally honest appellations" that have become
    opprobrious.

    In Swift's Sentiments of a Church of England Man (1708) the
    specialized word is found definitely and abusively connoting
    religious unbelief: "The atheists, libertines, despisers
    of religion--that is to say, all those who usually pass under
    the name of freethinkers"; Steele and Addison so use it in the
    Tatler in 1709; [42] and Leslie so uses the term in his Truth of
    Christianity Demonstrated (1711). The anonymous essay, Réflexions
    sur les grands hommes qui sont morts en plaisantant, by Deslandes
    (Amsterdam, 1712), is translated in English (1713) as Reflections
    on the Death of Free-thinkers, and the translator uses the term
    in his prefatory Letter to the Author, beside putting it in the
    text (pp. 50, 85, 97, 102, 106, etc.), where the original had
    esprit fort.


It was not till 1713, however, that Anthony Collins's Discourse
of Freethinking, occasioned by the Rise and Growth of a Sect called
Freethinkers, gave the word a universal notoriety, and brought it into
established currency in controversy, with the normal significance of
"deist," Collins having entirely repudiated atheism. Even after this
date, and indeed in full conformity with the definition in Collins's
opening sentence, Ambrose Philips took The Freethinker as the title
of a weekly journal (begun in 1718) on the lines of the Spectator,
with no heterodox leaning, [43] the contributors including Boulter,
afterwards Archbishop of Dublin, and the son of Bishop Burnet. But
despite this attempt to keep the word "freethinking" as a name for
simple freedom from prejudice in secular affairs, the tendency to
specialize it as aforesaid was irresistible. As names go, it was on
the whole a good one; and the bitterness with which it was generally
handled on the orthodox side showed that its implicit claim was felt
to be disturbing, though some antagonists of course claimed from the
first that they were as "free" under the law of right reason as any
skeptic. [44] At this time of day the word may be allowed prescriptive
standing, as having no more drawbacks than most other names for schools
of thought or attitudes of mind, and as having been admitted into most
European languages. The question-begging element is not greater in this
than in many other terms of similar intention, such as "rationalism";
and it incurs no such charge of absurdity as lies against the invidious
religious term, "infidelity." The term "infidel" invites "fidel."

A plausible objection may, indeed, arise on the score that such a term
as "freethought" should not be set up by thinkers who almost invariably
reject the term "freewill"--the rationalistic succession having for two
hundred and fifty years been carried on mainly by determinists. But
the issues raised by the two terms are on wholly different planes;
and while in both cases the imperfection of the instrument of language
is apparent, it is not in the present case a cause of psychological
confusion, as it is in the discussion of the nature of will. The
freewill fallacy consists in applying universally to the process
of judgment and preference (which is a process of natural causation
like another) a conception relevant only to human or animal action,
as interfered with or unaffected by extraneous compulsion. To the
processes of nature, organic or inorganic, the concepts "free" and
"bond" are equally irrelevant: a tiger is no more "free" to crave
for grass and recoil from flesh than is water to flow uphill; while,
on the other hand, such "appetites" are not rationally to be described
as forms of bondage. Only as a mode distinguishable from its contrary
can "freedom" be predicated of any procedure, and it is so predicated
of actions; whereas the whole category of volitions is alleged and
denied by the verbal disputants to be "free." Some attempt to save the
case by distinguishing between free and alleged "unfree" volitions;
but the latter are found to be simply cases of choices dictated
by intense need, as in the case of deadly thirst. The difference,
therefore, is only one of degree of impulse, not in the fact of choice.

The term "freewill," therefore, is irrational, as being wholly
irrelevant to the conception of volition. But "freethought," on the
other hand, points to an actual difference in degree of employment of
the faculty of criticism. The proposition is that some men think more
"freely" than others in that they are (a) not terrorized by any veto
on criticism, and (b) not hampered, or less hampered, by ignorant
pre-suppositions. In both cases there is a real discrimination. There
is no allegation that, absolutely speaking, "thought is free" in
the sense of the orthodox formula; on the contrary, it is asserted
that the rationalist's critical course is specifically determined
by his intellectual structure and his preparation, and that it is
sometimes different structure, but more often different preparation,
that determines the anti-critical or counter-critical attitude of the
believer. Change in the preparation, it is contended, will put the
latter in fuller use of his potential resources; his inculcated fear
of doubt and docility of assent being simply acquiescences in vetoes
on his attention to certain matters for reflection--that is to say,
in arbitrary limitations of his action. It is further implied that the
instructed man, other things being equal, is "freer" to think than
the uninstructed, as being less obstructed; but for the purpose of
our history it is sufficient to posit the discriminations above noted.

The essential thing to be realized is the fact that from its earliest
stages humanity has suffered from conventional or traditionary
hindrances to the use of judgment. This holds good even as to the early
play of the simple inventive faculty, all innovations in implements
being met by the inertia of habit; and when men reached the stages
of ritual practice, social construction, and religious doctrine,
the forces of repression became powerful in proportion to the
seriousness of the problem. It is only in modern times that freedom
in these relations has come to be generally regarded as permissible;
and it has always been over questions of religion that the strife
has been keenest.

For practical purposes, then, freethought may be defined as a conscious
reaction against some phase or phases of conventional or traditional
doctrine in religion--on the one hand, a claim to think freely, in
the sense not of disregard for logic, but of special loyalty to it,
on problems to which the past course of things has given a great
intellectual and practical importance; on the other hand, the actual
practice of such thinking. This sense, which is substantially agreed
on, will on one or other side sufficiently cover those phenomena of
early or rudimentary freethinking which wear the guise of simple
concrete opposition to given doctrines or systems, whether by way
of special demur or of the obtrusion of a new cult or doctrine. In
either case, the claim to think in a measure freely is implicit in
the criticism or the new affirmation; and such primary movements
of the mind cannot well be separated, in psychology or in history,
from the fully conscious practice of criticism in the spirit of
pure truth-seeking, or from the claim that such free examination
is profoundly important to moral and intellectual health. Modern
freethought, specially so-called, is only one of the developments of
the slight primary capacity of man to doubt, to reason, to improve on
past thinking, to assert his personality as against sacrosanct and
menacing authority. Concretely considered, it has proceeded by the
support and stimulus of successive accretions of actual knowledge;
and the modern consciousness of its own abstract importance emerged
by way of an impression or inference from certain social phenomena, as
well as in terms of self-asserting instinct. There is no break in its
evolution from primitive mental states, any more than in the evolution
of the natural sciences from primitive observation. What particularly
accrues to the state of conscious and systematic discrimination, in
the one case as in the other, is just the immense gain in security
of possession.




§ 2. PREVIOUS HISTORIES

It is somewhat remarkable that in England this phenomenon has thus
far [45] had no general historic treatment save at the hands of
ecclesiastical writers, who, in most cases, have regarded it solely
as a form of more or less perverse hostility to their own creed. The
modern scientific study of religions, which has yielded so many
instructive surveys, almost of necessity excludes from view the
specific play of freethought, which in the religion-making periods
is to be traced rather by its religious results than by any record
of its expression. All histories of philosophy, indeed, in some
degree necessarily recognize it; and such a work as Lange's History
of Materialism may be regarded as part--whether or not sound in its
historical treatment--of a complete history of freethought, dealing
specially with general philosophic problems. But of freethought as a
reasoned revision or rejection of current religious doctrines by more
or less practical people, we have no regular history by a professed
freethinker, though there are many monographs and surveys of periods.


    The latest and freshest sketch of the kind is Professor
    J. B. Bury's brief History of Freedom of Thought (1913), notable
    for the force of its championship of the law of liberty. The useful
    compilation of the late Mr. Charles Watts, entitled Freethought:
    Its Rise, Progress, and Triumph (n. d.), deals with freethought
    in relation only to Christianity. Apart from treatises which
    broadly sketch the development of knowledge and of opinion,
    the nearest approaches to a general historic treatment are the
    Dictionnaire des Athées of Sylvain Maréchal (1800: 3e édit.,
    par J. B. L. Germond, 1853) and the Biographical Dictionary
    of Freethinkers by the late Joseph Mazzini Wheeler. The quaint
    work of Maréchal, expanded by his friend Lalande, exhibits much
    learning, but is made partly fantastic by its sardonic plan of
    including a number of typical religionists (including Job, John,
    and Jesus Christ!), some of whose utterances are held to lead
    logically to atheism. Mr. Wheeler's book is in every respect the
    more trustworthy.

    In excuse of Maréchal's method, it may be noted that the prevailing
    practice of Christian apologists had been to impute atheism to
    heterodox theistic thinkers of all ages. The Historia universalis
    Atheismi et Atheorum falso et merito suspectorum of J. F. Reimmann
    (Hildesiæ, 1725) exhibits this habit both in its criticism and
    in its practice, as do the Theses de Atheismo et Superstitione
    of Buddeus (Trajecti ad Rhenum, 1716). These were the standard
    treatises of their kind for the eighteenth century, and seem to
    be the earliest systematic treatises in the nature of a history
    of freethought, excepting a Historia Naturalismi by A. Tribbechov
    (Jenæ, 1700) and a Historia Atheismi breviter delineata by Jenkinus
    Thomasius (Altdorf, 1692; Basileæ, 1709; London, 1716). In the same
    year with Reimmann's Historia appeared J. A. Fabricius's Delectus
    Argumentorum et Syllabus scriptorum qui veritatem religionis
    Christianæ adversus Atheos, Epicureos, Deistas, seu Naturalistas
    ... asseruerunt (Hamburghi), in which it is contended (cap. viii)
    that many philosophers have been falsely described as atheists;
    but in the Freydenker Lexicon of J. A. Trinius (Leipzig, 1759),
    planned as a supplement to the work of Fabricius, are included
    such writers as Sir Thomas Browne and Dryden.

    The works of the late Rev. John Owen, Evenings with the Skeptics,
    Skeptics of the Italian Renaissance, and Skeptics of the French
    Renaissance, which, though not constituting a literary whole,
    collectively cover a great deal of historical ground, must be
    expressly excepted from the above characterization of clerical
    histories of freethought, in respect of their liberality of
    view. They deal largely, however, with general or philosophical
    skepticism, which is a special development of freethought, often by
    way of reasonings in which many freethinkers do not acquiesce. (All
    strict skeptics, that is to say--as distinguished from religionists
    who profess skepticism up to a certain point by way of making
    a surrender to orthodox dogmatism [46]--are freethinkers;
    but most freethinkers are not strictly skeptics.) The history
    of philosophic skepticism, again, is properly and methodically
    treated in the old work of Carl Friedrich Stäudlin, Geschichte
    und Geist des Skepticismus (2 Bde., Leipzig, 1794), the historic
    survey being divided into six periods: 1, Before Pyrrho; 2, from
    Pyrrho to Sextus; 3, from Sextus to Montaigne; 4, from Montaigne
    to La Mothe le Vayer; 5, from La Mothe le Vayer to Hume; 6, from
    Hume to Kant and Platner. The posthumous work of Émile Saisset,
    Le Scepticisme: Ænésidème--Pascal--Kant (1865), is a fragment of
    a projected complete history of philosophic skepticism.

    Stäudlin's later work, the Geschichte des Rationalismus und
    Supernaturalismus (1826), is a shorter but more general history
    of the strife between general freethought and supernaturalism
    in the Christian world and era. It deals cursorily with the
    intellectual attitude of the early Fathers, the early heretics,
    and the Scholastics; proceeding to a fuller survey of the
    developments since the Reformation, and covering Unitarianism,
    Latitudinarianism, English and French Deism, and German Rationalism
    of different shades down to the date of writing. Stäudlin may be
    described as a rationalizing supernaturalist.

    Like most works on religious and intellectual history written
    from a religious standpoint, those of Stäudlin treat the
    phenomena as it were in vacuo, with little regard to the
    conditioning circumstances, economic and political; critical
    thought being regarded purely as a force proceeding through
    its own proclivities. Saisset is at very much the same point of
    view. Needless to say, valuable work may be done up to a certain
    point on this method, which is seen in full play in Hegel; and
    high praise is due to the learned and thoughtful treatise of
    R. W. Mackay, The Progress of the Intellect as Exemplified in the
    Religious Development of the Greeks and Hebrews (2 vols. 1850),
    where it is partially but ably supplemented by the method of
    inductive science. That method, again, is freshly and forcibly
    applied to a restricted problem in W. A. Schmidt's Geschichte
    der Denk- und Glaubensfreiheit im ersten Jahrhundert der
    Kaiserherrschaft und des Christenthums (1847).

    Later come the Vorgeschichte des Rationalismus (1853-62) and
    Geschichte des Rationalismus (1865) of the theologian Tholuck. Of
    these the latter is unfinished, coming down only to the middle
    of the eighteenth century; while the former does not exactly
    fulfil its title, being composed of a volume (2 Abth. 1853, 1854)
    on Das akademische Leben des 17ten Jahrhunderts, and of one on
    Das kirchliche Leben des 17ten Jahrhunderts (2 Abth. 1861, 1862),
    both being restricted to German developments. They thus give much
    matter extraneous to the subject, and are not exhaustive as to
    rationalism even in Germany. Hagenbach's Die Kirchengeschichte
    des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts (2 Th. 1848, 1849), a series of
    lectures, translated in English, abridged, under the title German
    Rationalism in its Rise, Progress, and Decline (1865), conforms
    fairly to the latter title, save as regards the last clause.

    Of much greater scholarly merit is the Geschichte der religiösen
    Aufklärung im Mittelalter, vom Ende des achten Jahrhunderts bis
    zum Anfange des vierzehnten, by Hermann Reuter (1875, 1877). This
    is at once learned, judicious, and impartial. Its definition of
    "Aufklärung" is substantially in agreement with the working
    definition of Freethought given above.

    Among other surveys of periods of innovating thought, as
    distinguished from histories of ecclesiastical heresy, or
    histories of "religious" or theological thought which only
    incidentally deal with heterodox opinion, should be noted the
    careful Geschichte des englischen Deismus of G. F. Lechler
    (1841); the slighter sketch of E. Sayous, Les déistes anglais
    et le Christianisme (1882); the somewhat diffuse work of
    Cesare Cantù, Gli eretici d'Italia (3 tom. 1865-67); the very
    intelligent study of Felice Tocco, L'Eresia nel medio evo (1884);
    Schmidt's Histoire des Cathares (2 tom. 1849); Chr. U. Hahn's
    learned Geschichte der Ketzer im Mittelalter (3 Bde. 1845-50);
    and the valuable research of F. T. Perrens, Les Libertins en
    France au xviie siècle (1896). A similar scholarly research for
    the eighteenth century in France is still lacking, and the many
    monographs on the more famous freethinkers leave a good deal
    of literary history in obscurity. Such a research has been very
    painstakingly made for England in the late Sir Leslie Stephen's
    History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century (2 vols.,
    2nd ed., 1881), which, however, ignores scientific thought. One
    of the best monographs of the kind is La Critique des traditions
    religieuses chez les Grecs, des origines au temps de Plutarque,
    by Professor Paul Decharme (1904), a survey at once scholarly
    and attractive. The brilliant treatise of Mr. F. M. Cornford,
    From Religion to Philosophy (1912), sketches on more speculative
    lines the beginnings of Greek rationalism in Ionia. The Geschichte
    des Monismus im Altertum of Prof. Dr. A. Drews (1913) is a wide
    survey, of great synthetic value.

    Contributions to the general history of freethought, further,
    have been made in the works of J. W. Draper (A History of the
    Intellectual Development of Europe, 2 vols, 1861, many reprints;
    and History of the Conflict between Religion and Science, 1873,
    many reprints), both full of suggestion and stimulus, but requiring
    thorough revision as to detail; in the famous Introduction
    to the History of Civilization in England of H. T. Buckle (2
    vols. 1857-61; new ed. in 1 vol. with annotations by the present
    writer, 1904); in the History of the Rise and Influence of the
    Spirit of Rationalism in Europe of W. E. H. Lecky (2 vols. 1865;
    R. P. A. rep. 1910), who was of Buckle's school, but fell below
    him in point of coherence; in the comprehensive History of the
    Warfare of Science with Theology of Professor Andrew D. White (2
    vols. 1896--a great expansion of his earlier essay, The Warfare of
    Science, 2nd ed. 1877); and in the essay of Mr. E. S. P. Haynes,
    Religious Persecution: A Study in Political Psychology (1904;
    R. P. A. rep. 1906), as well as in many histories of philosophy
    and of sciences.

    The so-called History of Rationalism of the American Bishop
    J. F. Hurst, first published in 1865, and "revised" in 1901,
    is in the main a work of odium theologicum, dealing chiefly
    with the evolution of theology and criticism in Germany since
    the Reformation. Even to that purpose it is very inadequate. Its
    preface alleges that "happily the vital body of evangelical truth
    has received only comparatively weak and timorous attacks from the
    more modern representatives of the rank and rabid rationalism which
    reached its climax near the close of the eighteenth, and has had
    a continuous decline through the nineteenth, century." It urges,
    however, as a reason for defensive activity, the consideration that
    "the work of Satan is never planless"; and further pronounces that
    the work of rationalism "must determine its character. This work
    has been most injurious to the faith and life of the Church, and
    its deeds must therefore be its condemnation" (Introd. p. 3). Thus
    the latest approximation to a history of theological rationalism
    by a clerical writer is the most negligible.


In English, apart from studies of given periods and of the progress
of science and culture, the only other approaches to a history of
freethought are those of Bishop Van Mildert, the Rev. J. E. Riddle,
and the Rev. Adam Storey Farrar. Van Mildert's Historical View of the
Rise and Progress of Infidelity [47] constituted the Boyle Lectures for
1802-05; Mr. Riddle's Natural History of Infidelity and Superstition
in Contrast with Christian Faith formed part of his Bampton Lectures
for 1852; and Mr. Farrar produced his Critical History of Freethought
in reference to the Christian Religion as the Bampton Lectures for
1862. All three were men of considerable reading, and their works
give useful bibliographical clues; but the virulence of Van Mildert
deprives his treatise of rational weight; Mr. Riddle, who in any case
professes to give merely a "Natural History" or abstract argument, and
not a history proper, is only somewhat more constrainedly hostile to
"infidelity"; and even Mr. Farrar, the most judicial as well as the
most comprehensive of the three, proceeds on the old assumption that
"unbelief" (from which he charitably distinguishes "doubt") generally
arises from "antagonism of feeling, which wishes revelation untrue"--a
thesis maintained with vehemence by the others. [48]

Writers so placed, indeed, could not well be expected to contemplate
freethought scientifically as an aspect of mental evolution common
to all civilizations, any more than to look with sympathy on the
freethought which is specifically anti-Christian. The annotations to
all three works, certainly, show some consciousness of the need for
another temper and method than that of their text, [49] which is too
obviously, perhaps inevitably, composed for the satisfaction of the
ordinary orthodox animus of their respective periods; but even the best
remains not so much a history as an indictment. In the present sketch,
framed though it be from the rationalistic standpoint, it is proposed
to draw up not a counter indictment, but a more or less dispassionate
account of the main historical phases of freethought, viewed on the
one hand as expressions of the rational or critical spirit, playing on
the subject-matter of religion, and on the other hand as sociological
phenomena conditioned by social forces, in particular the economic
and political. The lack of any previous general survey of a scientific
character will, it is hoped, be taken into account in passing judgment
on its schematic defects as well as its inevitable flaws of detail.




§ 3. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FREETHINKING

Though it is no part of our business here to elaborate the psychology
of doubt and belief, it may be well to anticipate a possible criticism
on the lines of recent psychological speculation, and to indicate
at the outset the practical conception on which the present survey
broadly proceeds. To begin with, the conception of freethinking
implies that of hindrance, resistance, coercion, difficulty;
and as regards objective obstacles the type of all hindrance is
restraint upon freedom of speech or publication. In other words,
all such restraint is a check upon thinking. On reflection it soon
becomes clear that where men dare not say or write what they think,
the very power of thinking is at length impaired in the ablest, while
the natural stimulus to new thought is withdrawn from the rest. No
man can properly develop his mind without contact with other minds,
suggestion and criticism being alike factors in every fruitful mental
evolution; and though for some the atmosphere of personal intercourse
is but slightly necessary to the process of mental construction, even
for these the prospect of promulgation is probably essential to the
undertaking of the task; and the study of other writers is a condition
of useful ratiocination. In any case, it is certain that the exercise
of argument is a condition of intellectual growth. Not one man in
a million will or can argue closely with himself on issues on which
he knows he can say nothing and can never overtly act; and for the
average man all reasoning on great problems is a matter of prompting
from without. The simple fact that the conversation of uneducated
people runs so largely to citation of what "he says" makes clear this
dependence. Each brings something to the common store, and progress
is set up by "pooling" the mass of small intellectual variations or
originalities. Thus in the long run freedom of speech is the measure
of a generation's intellectual capacity; [50] and the promoters of
such freedom are typically the truest servants of progress.

On the other hand, there is still a common disposition to ascribe
to a species of intellectual malice the disturbance that criticism
causes to the holders of established beliefs. Recent writers have
pressed far the theorem that "will" enters as an element into every
mental act, thus giving a momentary appearance of support to the
old formula that unbelief is the result of an arbitrary or sinister
perversity of individual choice. Needless to say, however, the new
theorem--which inverts without refuting Spinoza's denial of the entity
of volition--applies equally to acts of belief; and it is a matter of
the simplest concrete observation that, in so far as will or wilfulness
in the ordinary sense operates in the sphere of religion, it is at
least as obvious and as active on the side of belief [51] as on the
other. A moment's reflection on the historic phenomena of orthodox
resistance to criticism will satisfy any student that, whatever may
have been the stimulus on the side of heresy, the antagonism it arouses
is largely the index of primary passion--the spontaneous resentment
of the believer whose habits are disturbed. His will normally decides
his action, without any process of judicial deliberation.

It is another way of stating the same fact to point out the fallacy
of the familiar assumption that freethinking represents a bias to
"negation." In the nature of the case, the believer has to do at least
as much negation as his opponents; and if again we scan history in
this connection, we shall see cause to conclude that the temperamental
tendency to negation--which is a form of variation like another--is
abundantly common on the side of religious conservatism. Nowhere
is there more habitual opposition to new ideas as such. At best the
believer, so-called, rejects a given proposition or suggestion because
it clashes with something he already believes. The new proposition,
however, has often been reached by way not of preliminary negation of
the belief in question, but of constructive explanation, undertaken to
bring observed facts into theoretic harmony. Thus the innovator has
only contingently put aside the old belief because it clashes with
something he believes in a more vital way; and he has done this with
circumspection, whereas his opponent too often repels him without a
second thought. The phenomena of the rise of the Copernican astronomy,
modern geology, and modern biology, all bear out this generalization.

Nor is the charge of negativeness any more generally valid against
such freethinking as directly assails current doctrines. There may
be, of course, negative-minded people on that side as on the other;
and such may fortuitously do something to promote freethought,
or may damage it in their neighbourhood by their atmosphere. But
everything goes to show that freethinking normally proceeds by way of
intellectual construction--that is, by way of effort to harmonize one
position with another; to modify a special dogma to the general run of
one's thinking. Rationalism stands not for "skepticism" in the strict
philosophic sense, but for a critical effort to reach certainties. The
attitude of pure skepticism on a wide scale is really very rare--much
rarer even than the philosophic effort. So far from freethinkers
being given to "destroying without building up," they are, as a rule,
unable to destroy a dogma either for themselves or for others without
setting a constructive belief in its place--a form of explanation,
that is; such being much more truly a process of construction than
would be the imposition of a new scheme of dogma. In point of fact,
they are often accused, and by the same critics, of an undue tendency
to speculative construction; and the early atheists of Greece and
of the modern period did so err. But that is only a proof the more
that their freethinking was not a matter of arbitrary volition or an
undue negativeness.

The only explanation which ostensibly countervails this is the old
one above glanced at--that the unbeliever finds the given doctrine
troublesome as a restraint, and so determines to reject it. It is
to be feared that this view has survived Mr. A. S. Farrar. Yet it
is very clear that no man need throw aside any faith, and least of
all Christianity, on the ground of its hampering his conduct. To say
nothing of the fact that in every age, under every religion, at every
stage of culture from that of the savage to that of the supersubtle
decadent or mystic, men have practised every kind of misconduct without
abandoning their supernatural credences--there is the special fact that
the whole Christian system rests on the doctrine of forgiveness of sins
to the believer. The theory of "wilful" disbelief on the part of the
reprobate is thus entirely unplausible. Such disbelief in the terms
of the case would be uneasy, as involving an element of incertitude;
and his fear of retribution could never be laid. On the other hand,
he has but inwardly to avow himself a sinner and a believer, and he
has the assurance that repentance at the last moment will outweigh
all his sins.

It is not, of course, suggested that such is the normal or frequent
course of believing Christians; but it has been so often enough to make
the "libertine" theory of unbelief untenable. Indeed, the singular
diversity between profession and practice among Christians has in
all periods called out declarations by the more fervid believers
that their average fellow-Christians are "practical atheists." More
judicial minds may be set asking instead how far men really "believe"
who do not act on their opinions. As one high authority has put it,
in the Middle Ages the normal opposition of theory and practice
"was peculiarly abrupt. Men's impulses were more violent, and their
conduct more reckless, than is often witnessed in modern society;
while the absence of a criticizing and measuring spirit made them
surrender their minds more unreservedly than they would do now to a
complete and imposing theory.... Resistance to God's Vicar might be,
and indeed was admitted to be, a deadly sin, but it was one which
nobody hesitated to commit." [52] And so with other sins, the sinner
having somewhere in the rear of his consciousness the reflection that
his sins could be absolved.

And, apart from such half-purposive forms of licence among Christians,
there have been countless cases of purposive licence. In all ages
there have been antinomian Christians, [53] whether of the sort that
simply rest on the "seventy times seven" of the Gospel, or of the more
articulately logical kind who dwell on the doctrine of faith versus
works. For the rest, as the considerate theologian will readily see,
insistence on the possibility of a sinister motive for the unbeliever
brings up the equal possibility of a sinister motive on the part of the
convert to Christianity, ancient or modern. At every turn, then, the
charge of perversity of the will recoils on the advocate of belief;
so that it would be the course of common prudence to abandon it,
even were it not in itself, as a rule, so plainly an expression of
irritated bias.

On the other hand, it need not be disputed that unbelief has been
often enough associated with some species of libertinism to give
a passing colour for the pretence of causal connection. The fact,
however, leads us to a less superficial explanation, worth keeping in
view here. Freethinking being taken to be normally a "variation" of
intellectual type in the direction of a critical demand for consistency
and credibility in beliefs, its social assertion will be a matter
on the one side of force of character or degree of recklessness,
and on the other hand of force of circumstances. The intellectual
potentiality and the propagandist purpose will be variously developed
in different men and in different surroundings. If we ask ourselves
how, in general, the critical tendency is to arise or to come into
play, we are almost compelled to suppose a special stimulus as
well as a special faculty. Critical doubt is made possible, broadly
speaking, by the accumulation of ideas or habits of certain kinds
which insensibly undo a previous state of homogeneity of thought. For
instance, a community subsiding into peace and order from a state of
warfare and plunder will at length find the ethic of its daily life
at variance with the conserved ethic of its early religion of human
sacrifice and special family or tribal sanctions; or a community
which has accumulated a certain amount of accurate knowledge of
astronomy will gradually find such knowledge irreconcilable with its
primitive cosmology. A specially gifted person will anticipate the
general movement of thought; but even for him some standing-ground
must be supposed; and for the majority the advance in moral practice
or scientific knowledge is the condition of any effective freethinking.

Between top and bottom, however, there are all grades of vivacity,
earnestness, and courage; and on the side of the normal resistance
there are all varieties of political and economic circumstance. It
follows, then, that the avowed freethinker may be so in virtue either
of special courage or of antecedent circumstances which make the
attitude on his part less courageous. And it may even be granted
to the quietist that the courage is at times that of ill-balanced
judgment or heady temperament; just as it may be conceded to the
conservative that it is at times that which goes with or follows on
disregard of wise ways of life. It is well that the full force of
this position be realized at the outset. When we find, as we shall,
some historic freethinkers displaying either extreme imprudence
or personal indiscipline, we shall be prepared, in terms of this
preliminary questioning, to realize anew that humanity has owed
a great deal to some of its "unbalanced" types; and that, though
discipline is nearly the last word of wisdom, indiscipline may at
times be the morbid accompaniment or excess of a certain openness of
view and spontaneity of action which are more favourable to moral and
intellectual advance than a cold prudence or a safe insusceptibility.

But cold or calm prudence in turn is not a vice; and it is hardly
possible to doubt that there have been in all ages varying numbers of
unbelievers who shrugged their shoulders over the follies of faith,
and declined to tilt against the windmills of fanaticism. There is much
reason for surmising that Shakespeare was a case in point. It is not
to be supposed, then, because some freethinkers who came out into the
open were unbalanced types, that their psychology is the psychology of
freethought, any more than that of General Gordon or Francis of Assisi
is to be reckoned typical on the side of belief. There must have been
myriads of quiet unbelievers, rational all round, whose unbelief was a
strictly intellectual process, undisturbed by temperament. In our own
day such types abound, and it is rather in them than in the abnormal
types of past freethought--the Brunos and the Voltaires--that the
average psychology of freethought is to be looked for and understood.

As for the case of the man who, already at odds with his fellows
in the matter of his conduct, may in some phases of society feel it
the easier to brave them in the matter of his avowed creed, we have
already seen that even this does not convict him of intellectual
dishonesty. And were such cases relatively as numerous as they are
scarce--were the debauched deists even commoner than the vinous Steeles
and Fieldings--the use of the fact as an argument would still be an
oblique course on the side of a religion which claims to have found
its first and readiest hearing among publicans and sinners. For the
rest, the harm done in the world's history by unbalanced freethinkers
is as dust in the balance against the immeasurable evil deliberately
wrought on serious religious motives, to say nothing of the constant
deviation of the mass of believers from their own professed code.

It may, finally, help a religious reader to a judicial view of the
phenomenon of freethought if he is reminded that every step forward in
the alleged historic evolution of his own creed would depend, in the
case put, on the existence of persons capable of rejecting a current
and prevailing code in favour of one either denounced as impious or
marked off by circumstances as dangerous. The Israelites in Egypt,
the prophets and their supporters, the Gospel Jesus and his adherents,
all ostensibly stand in some degree for positions of "negation,"
of hardy innovation, of disregard to things and persons popularly
venerated; wherefore Collins, in the Discourse above mentioned,
smilingly claimed at least the prophets as great freethinkers. On
that head it may suffice to say that some of the temperamental
qualifications would probably be very much the same for those who
of old brought about religious innovation in terms of supernatural
beliefs, and for those who in later times innovate by way of minimizing
or repudiating such beliefs, though the intellectual qualifications
might be different. Bruno and Dolet and Vanini and Voltaire, faulty
men all four, could at least be more readily conceived as prophets
in early Jewry, or reformers under Herod, than as Pharisees, or even
Sadducees, under either regimen.

Be that as it may, however, the issues between freethought and creed
are ultimately to be settled only in respect of their argumentative
bases, as appreciable by men in society at any given time. It is with
the notion of making the process of judicial appreciation a little
easier, by historically exhibiting the varying conditions under which
it has been undertaken in the past, that these pages are written.







CHAPTER II

PRIMITIVE FREETHINKING


To consider the normal aspects of primitive life, as we see them
in savage communities and trace them in early literature, is to
realize the enormous hindrance offered to critical thinking in the
primary stages of culture by the mere force of habit. "The savage,"
says our leading anthropologist, "by no means goes through life
with the intention of gathering more knowledge and framing better
laws than his fathers. On the contrary, his tendency is to consider
his ancestors as having handed down to him the perfection of wisdom,
which it would be impiety to make the least alteration in. Hence among
the lower races there is obstinate resistance to the most desirable
reforms, and progress can only force its way with a slowness and
difficulty which we of this century can hardly imagine." [54] Among
the Bantu of South Africa, before the spread of European rule, "any
person in advance of his fellows was specially liable to suspicion
[of sorcery], so that progress of any kind towards what we should
term higher civilization was made exceedingly difficult by this
belief." [55] The real or would-be sorcerer could thus secure the
elimination of the honest inventor; fear of sorcery being most potent
as against the supposed irregular practitioner. The relative obstinacy
of conservatism in periods and places of narrow knowledge is again
illustrated in Lane's account of the modern Egyptians in the first
half of the nineteenth century: "Some Egyptians who had studied for
a few years in France declared to me that they could not instil any
of the notions which they had there acquired even into the minds
of their most intimate friends." [56] So in modern Japan there were
many assassinations of reformers, and some civil war, before Western
ideas could gain a footing. [57] The less the knowledge, in short,
the harder to add to it.

It is hardly possible to estimate with any confidence the relative
rates of progress; but, though all are extremely slow, it would
seem that reason could sooner play correctively on errors of secular
practice [58] than on any species of proposition in religion--taking
that word to connote at once mythology, early cosmology, and ritual
ethic. Mere disbelief in a particular medicine-man or rain-maker
who failed would not lead to any reflective disbelief in all; any
more than the beating or renunciation of his fetish by a savage or
barbarian means rejection of his fetishism, or than the renunciation
of a particular saint by a modern Catholic [59] means abandonment of
prayer to saints for intercession.


    The question as to whether savages do beat their idols is a matter
    in some dispute. Sir A. B. Ellis, a high authority, offers a
    notable denial to the current belief that <DW64>s "beat their
    Gods if their prayers are unanswered." "After an experience
    of the Gold Coast extending over thirteen years," he writes,
    "I have never heard of, much less witnessed, anything of the
    kind, although I have made inquiries in every direction" (The
    Tshi-speaking Peoples, 1887, p. 194). Other anthropologists have
    collected many instances in other races--e.g., Fr. Schultze, Der
    Fetischismus, 1871, p. 130. In one case, a priest beats a fetish
    in advance, to secure his careful attention. (Id. pp. 90-91,
    citing the personal narrative of Bastian.) It seems to be a
    matter of psychic stage. The more primitive <DW64> is as it were
    too religious, too much afraid of his Gods, who are not for him
    "idols," but spirits residing in images or objects. Where the
    state of fear is only chronic another temper may arise. Among the
    Bataks of Sumatra disappointed worshippers often scold a God;
    and their legends tell of men who declared war on a deity and
    shot at him from a mountain. (Warneck, Die Religion des Batak,
    1909, p. 7. Cp. Gen. ii, 4-9.) A temper of defiance towards
    deity has been noted in an Aryan <DW5> of the Hindu-Kush. (Sir
    G. S. Robertson, The Káfirs of the Hindu-Kush, 1899, p. 182.) Some
    peoples go much further. Among the Polynesians, when a God failed
    to cure a sick chief or notable, he "was regarded as inexorable,
    and was usually banished from the temple and his image destroyed"
    (W. Ellis, Polynesian Researches, 2nd ed. 1831, i, 350). So among
    the Chinese, "if the God does not give rain they will threaten
    and beat him; sometimes they publicly depose him from the rank
    of deity" (Frazer, Lectures on the Early History of Kingship,
    1905, pp. 98-101. Cp. Ross, Pansebeia, 4th ed., 1672, p. 80).

    There are many analogous phenomena. In old Samoa, in the ritual
    of mourning for the dead, the family God was first implored to
    restore the deceased, and then fiercely abused and menaced. [60]
    See, too, the story of the people of Niue or Savage Island
    in the South Pacific, who in the time of a great pestilence,
    thinking the sickness was caused by a certain idol, broke it in
    pieces and threw it away (Turner, Samoa a Hundred Years Ago, 1884,
    p. 306). See further the cases cited by Constant, De la religion,
    1824, vol. i, ptie. ii, pp. 32-34; and by Peschel, The Races of
    Man, Eng. tr. 1876, pp. 247-8, in particular that of Rastus,
    the last pagan Lapp in Europe, who quarrelled with his fetish
    stone for killing his reindeer in revenge for the withholding
    of its customary offering of brandy, and "immediately embraced
    Christianity." (Compare E. Rae, The White Sea Peninsula, 1881,
    p. 276.) See again the testimony of Herman Melville in his Typee,
    ch. xxiv; and that of T. Williams, Fiji and the Fijians, ed. 1858,
    i, 236: "Sometimes the natives get angry with their deities, and
    abuse and even challenge them to fight." Herodotos has similar
    stories of barbarians who defy their own and other deities
    (iv, 172, 183, 184). Compare the case of King Rum Bahadur of
    Nepaul, who cannonaded his Gods. Spencer, Study of Sociology,
    pp. 301-2. Also the anecdote cited by Spencer (Id. p. 160)
    from Sir R. Burton's Goa, p. 167. Here there is no disbelief, no
    reflection, but simple resentment. Compare, too, the amusing story
    of a blasphemy by Rossini, told by Louis Viardot, Libre Examen,
    6e éd. pp. 166-67, note. That threats against the Gods are possible
    at a semi-civilized stage is proved by various passages in medieval
    literature. Thus in Caxton's Charles the Grete, a translation from
    an older French original, Charles is made to say: "O lord God,
    if ye suffre that Olyver be overcome and that my ryght at thys
    tyme be loste and defyled, I make a vowe that al Crystyante shal be
    destroyed. I shal not leve in Fraunce chirche ne monasterye, ymage
    ne aulter," etc. (Early Eng. Text Soc. rep. 1881, pp. 70-71.) Such
    language was probably used by not a few medieval kings in moments
    of fury; and there is even record that at the battle of Dunbar
    certain of the Scots Presbyterian clergy intimated to their deity
    that he would not be their God if he failed them on that day.

    If such flights be reckoned possible for Christian kings
    and clerics in the Christian era, there would seem to be no
    unlikelihood about the many stories of God-beating and God-defying
    among contemporary savages, though so good an observer as Sir
    A. B. Ellis may not have witnessed them in the part of Africa best
    known to him. The conclusion reached by Sir A. B. Ellis is that
    the <DW64>s of the Gold Coast are not properly to be described
    as fetishists. Fetishism, on his view, is a worship of objects as
    in themselves endowed with magical power; whereas the Gold Coast
    <DW64> ascribes no virtue to the object commonly called his fetish,
    regarding it simply as inhabited by a supernatural power. This
    writer sees "true fetishism" in the attitude of Italian peasants
    and fishermen who beat and ill-treat their images when prayers
    are not answered, and in that of Spaniards who cover the faces of
    their images or turn them to the wall when about to do anything
    which they think the saint or deity would disapprove of. On this
    view, fetishism is a later yet lower stage of religious evolution
    than that of the <DW64>. On the other hand, Miss Kingsley takes
    fetishism to be the proper name of the attitude of the <DW64>
    towards particular objects as divinely inhabited, and represents
    it as a kind of pantheism (West African Studies, 2nd ed. 1901,
    ch. v). And since, by her definition, "Gods of fetish" do not
    necessarily "require a material object to manifest themselves in"
    (p. 96), the term "fetish" is thus detached from all of its former
    meanings. It seems expedient, as a matter of terminology, to let
    fetishism mean both object- or image-worship and the belief in the
    special inhabiting of objects by deities, with a recognition that
    the beliefs may be different stages in an evolution, though, on the
    other hand, they are obviously likely to coalesce or concur. In
    the "Obeah" system of the <DW64>s of the West Indies the former
    belief in the indwelling spirit has become, or has coalesced with,
    belief in the magical powers of the object (Keane, Man, Past and
    Present, 1900, p. 57).

    As to defiance or contumely towards the Gods, finally, we have the
    testimony of the Swiss missionary Junod that the South African
    Thonga, whom he studied very closely, have in their ritual "a
    regular insulting of the Gods." (Life of a South African Tribe,
    ii, 1912, p. 384.) Why not? "Prayers to the ancestors ... are
    ... absolutely devoid of awe" (p. 385), though "the ancestor-Gods
    are certainly the most powerful spiritual agency acting on man's
    life" (p. 361); and "the spirits of the ancestors are the main
    objects of religious worship" (p. 344). The Thonga, again, use
    "neither idolatry nor fetishism," having no "idols" (p. 388),
    though they recognize "hidden virtues" in plants, animals, and
    stones (p. 345). They simply regard their ancestor-Gods very
    much as they do their aged people, whom they generally treat with
    little consideration. But the dead can do harm, and must therefore
    be propitiated--as savages propitiate, with fear or malice or
    derision in their hearts, as the case may be. (Cp. p. 379.) On the
    other hand, despite the denial of their "fetishism," they believe
    that ancestor-Gods may come in the shape of animals; and they so
    venerate a kind of palladium (made up like a medicine-man's amulet)
    as to raise the question whether this kind of belief is not just
    that which Miss Kingsley called "fetish." (Junod, pp. 358, 373-74.)


Whatever may be the essence, or the varieties, of fetishism, it
is clear that the beating of idols or threatening of Gods does not
amount to rational doubt concerning the supernatural. Some general
approach to that attitude may perhaps be inferred in the case of an
economic revolt against the burdens of a highly specialized religious
system, which may often have occurred in unwritten history. We shall
note a recorded instance of the kind in connection with the question
whether there are any savage tribes without religion. But it occurs
in the somewhat highly evolved barbarism of pre-Christian Hawaii;
and it can set up no inference as to any development of critical
unbelief at lower levels. In the long stage of lower savagery, then,
the only approach to freethinking that would seriously affect general
belief would presumably be that very credulity which gave foothold
to religious beliefs to begin with. That is to say, without anything
in the nature of general criticism of any story or doctrine, one such
might to some extent supersede another, in virtue of the relative gift
of persuasion or personal weight of the propounders. Up to a certain
point persons with a turn for myth or ritual-making would compete,
and might even call in question each other's honesty, as well as each
other's inspiration.

Since the rise of scientific hierology there has been a disposition
among students to take for granted the good faith of all early
religion-makers, and to dismiss entirely that assumption of fraud
which was so long made by Christian writers concerning the greater
part of every non-Christian system. The assumption had been passed
on from the freethinkers of antiquity who formulated the view that
all religious doctrine had been invented by politicians in order to
control the people. [61] Christian polemists, of course, applied it to
all systems but their own. When, however, all systems are seen to be
alike natural in origin, such charges are felt to recoil on the system
which makes them; and latterly [62] Christian writers, seeing as much,
have been fain to abandon the conception of "priestcraft," adroitly
representing it as an extravagance of rationalism. It certainly
served rationalistic purposes, and the title of the supposititious
medieval work on "The Three Impostors" points to its currency among
unbelievers long ago; but when we first find it popularly current in
the seventeenth century, it is in a Christian atmosphere. [63] Some
of the early deists and others have probably in turn exaggerated the
amount of deliberate deceit involved in the formation of religious
systems; but nevertheless "priestcraft" is a demonstrable factor in
the process. What is called the psychology of religion has been much
obscured in response to the demand of religious persons to have it so
presented as to flatter them in that capacity. [64] Such a claim cannot
be permitted to overrule the fair inductions of comparative science.

Anthropological evidence suggests that, while religion clearly
begins in primordial fear and fancy, wilful fraud must to some
extent have entered into all religious systems alike, even in the
period of primeval credulity, were it only because the credulity
was so great. One of the most judicial and sympathetic of the
Christian scholars who have written the history of Greece treats
as unquestionable the view that alike in pagan and Christian cults
"priestcraft" has been "fertile in profitable devices, in the invention
of legends, the fabrication of relics, and other modes of imposture";
[65] and the leading hierologist of the last generation pronounces
decisively as to an element of intentional deceit in the Koran-making
of Mohammed [66]--a judgment which, if upheld, can hardly fail to be
extended to some portions of all other sacred books. However that
may be, we have positive evidence that wilful and systematic fraud
enters into the doctrine of contemporary savages, and that among some
"primitives" known myths are deliberately propounded to the boys
and women by the male adults. [67] Indeed, the majority of modern
travellers among primitives seem to have regarded their priests
and sorcerers in the mass as conscious deceivers. [68] If, then, we
can point to deliberate imposture alike in the charm-mongering and
myth-mongering of contemporary savages and in the sacred-book-making
of the higher historical systems, it seems reasonable to hold that
conscious deceit, as distinguished from childlike fabrication, would
chronically enter into the tale-making of primitive men, as into their
simpler relations with each other. It is indeed impossible to conceive
how a copious mythology could ever arise without the play of a kind
of imaginativeness that is hardly compatible with veracity; and it is
probably only the exigencies of ecclesiastical life that cause modern
critics still to treat the most deliberate fabrications and forgeries
in the Hebrew sacred books as somehow produced in a spirit of the
deepest concern for truth. An all-round concern for truth is, in fact,
a late intellectual development, the product of much criticism and much
doubt; hence, perhaps, the lenity of the verdicts under notice. Certain
wild tribes here and there, living in a state of great simplicity, are
in our own day described as remarkably truthful; [69] but they are not
remarkable for range of supernatural belief; and their truthfulness is
to be regarded as a product of their special stability and simplicity
of life. The trickery of a primitive medicine-man, of course, is a
much more childlike thing than the frauds of educated priesthoods;
and it is compatible with so much of spontaneous pietism as is implied
in the common passing of the operator into the state of convulsion
and trance--a transition which comes easily to many savages. [70]
But even at that stage of psychosis, and in a community where simple
secular lying is very rare, the professional wizard-priest becomes
an adept in playing upon credulity. [71]

It belongs, in short, to the very nature of the priestly function,
in its earlier forms, to develop in a special degree the normal bias
of the undisciplined mind to intellectual fraud. Granting that there
are all degrees of self-consciousness in the process, we are bound to
recognize that in all of us there is "the sophist within," who stands
between us and candour in every problem either of self-criticism
or of self-defence. And, if the instructed man recognizes this
clearly and the uninstructed does not, none the less is the latter
an exemplification of the fact. His mental obliquities are not any
less real because of his indifference to them than are the acts of
the hereditary thief because he does them without shame. And if we
consider how the fetish-priest is at every turn tempted to invent
and prevaricate, simply because his pretensions are fundamentally
preposterous; and how in turn the priest of a higher grade, even
when he sincerely "believes" in his deity, is bound to put forward
as matters of knowledge or revelation the hypotheses he frames to
account for either the acts or the abstentions of the God, we shall
see that the priestly office is really as incompatible with a high
sincerity in the primitive stages as in those in which it is held
by men who consciously propound falsities, whether for their mere
gain or in the hope of doing good. It may be true that the priestly
claim of supernatural sanction for an ethical command is at times
motived by an intense conviction of the rightness of the course of
conduct prescribed; but none the less is such a habit of mind fatal
to intellectual sincerity. Either there is sheer hallucination or
there is pious fraud.

Given, however, the tendency to deceit among primitive folk, distrust
and detection in a certain number of cases would presumably follow,
constituting a measure of simple skepticism. By force partly of this
and partly of sheer instability of thought, early belief would be apt
to subsist for ages like that of contemporary African tribes, [72]
in a state of flux. [73] Comparative fixity would presumably arise
with the approach to stability of life, of industry, and of political
institutions, whether with or without a special priesthood. The
usages of early family worship would seem to have been no less rigid
than those of the tribal and public cults. For primitive man as for
the moderns definite organization and ritual custom must have been a
great establishing force as regards every phase of religious belief;
[74] and it may well have been that there was thus less intellectual
liberty of a kind in the long ages of what we regard as primitive
civilization than in those of savagery and barbarism which preceded
them. On that view, systems which are supposed to represent in the
fullest degree the primeval spontaneity of religion may have been in
part priestly reactions against habits of freedom accompanied by a
certain amount of skepticism. A modern inquirer [75] has in some such
sense advanced the theory that in ancient India, in even the earlier
period of collection of the Rig-Veda, which itself undermined the
monarchic character of the pre-Vedic religion, there was a decay of
belief, which the final redaction served to accelerate. Such a theory
can hardly pass beyond the stage of hypothesis in view of the entire
absence of history proper in early Indian literature; but we seem
at least to have the evidence of the Veda itself that while it was
being collected there were deniers of the existence of its Gods. [76]

The latter testimony alone may serve as ground for raising afresh
an old question which recent anthropology has somewhat inexactly
decided--that, namely, as to whether there are any savages without
religious beliefs.


    [For old discussions on the subject see Cicero, De natura
    deorum, i, 23; Cumberland, Disquisitio de legibus naturæ, 1672,
    introd. (rejecting negative view as resting on inadequate
    testimony); Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, Bk. I,
    ch. iii, § 9; ch. iv, § 8 (accepting negative view); protests
    against it by Vico (Scienza Nuova, 1725, as cited above, p. 26);
    by Shaftesbury (Letters to a Student, 1716, rep. in Letters, 1746,
    pp. 32-33); by Rev. John Milne, An Account of Mr. Lock's Religion
    (anon.), 1700, pp. 5-8; and by Sir W. Anstruther, Essays Moral
    and Divine, Edinburgh, 1701, p. 24; further protests by Lafitau
    (Moeurs des sauvages ameriquains comparées aux moeurs des premiers
    temps, 1724, i, 5), following Boyle, to the effect that the very
    travellers and missionaries who denied all religion to savages
    avow facts which confute them; and general view by Fabricius,
    Delectus argumentorum et Syllabus scriptorum, Hamburghi, 1725,
    ch. viii. Cp. also Swift, Discourse Concerning the Mechanical
    Operation of the Spirit, § 2.

    Büchner (Force and Matter, ch. on "The Idea of God"); Lord Avebury
    = Sir John Lubbock (Prehistoric Times, 5th ed., pp. 574-80;
    Origin of Civilization, 5th ed., pp. 213-17); and Mr. Spencer
    (Principles of Sociology, iii, § 583) have collected modern
    travellers' testimonies as to the absence of religious ideas in
    certain tribes. Cp. also J. A. St. John's (Bohn) ed. of Locke,
    notes on passages above cited, and on Bk. IV, ch. x, § 6. As Lord
    Avebury points out, the word "religion" is by some loosely or
    narrowly used to signify only a higher theology as distinct from
    lower supernaturalist beliefs. He himself, however, excludes from
    the field of "religion" a belief in evil spirits and in magic--here
    coinciding with the later anthropologists who represented magic
    and religion as fundamentally "opposed"--a view rejected even by
    some religionists. Cp. Avebury, Marriage, Totemism, and Religion,
    (1911), p. 116 sq.; Rev. E. Crawley, The Mystic Rose, 1902, p. 3;
    Prof. T. Witten Davies, Magic, Divination, and Demonology, 1898,
    pp. 18-24. The proved erroneousness of many of the negative
    testimonies has been insisted on by Benjamin Constant (De la
    Religion, 1824, i, 3-4); Theodore Parker (Discourse of Matters
    Pertaining to Religion, 1842 and 1855, ed. 1877, p. 16); G. Roskoff
    (Das Religionswesen der rohesten Naturvölker, 1880, Abschn. I
    and II); Dr. Tylor (Primitive Culture, 3rd ed., i, pp. 417-25);
    and Dr. Max Müller (Introd. to the Science of Religion, ed. 1882,
    p. 42 sq.; Hibbert Lectures, p. 91 sq.; Natural Religion, 1889,
    pp. 81-89; Anthropological Religion, 1892, pp. 428-35.)

    The Rev. H. A. Junod (Life of a South African Tribe, vol. ii,
    1913, p. 346) shows how easily misconception on the subject may
    arise. Galton (Narrative of an Explorer, ch. viii, ed. 1891,
    p. 138) writes: "I have no conception to this day whether or
    no the Ovampo have any religion, for Click was frightened and
    angry if the subject of death was alluded to." The context shows
    that the native regarded all questions on religious matters with
    suspicion. Schweinfurth, again, contradicts himself twice within
    three pages as to the beliefs of the Bongo in a "Supreme Being"
    and in a future state; and thus leaves us doubting his statement
    that the neighbouring race, the Dyoor, "put no faith at all in
    any witchcraft" (The Heart of Africa, 3rd ed. i, 143-45). Much
    of the confusion turns on the fact that savages who practise no
    worship have religious beliefs (cp. Max Müller, Hibbert Lectures,
    ed. 1878, p. 17, citing Monsignor Salvado; and Carl Lumholtz, Among
    Cannibals, 1889, p. 284). The dispute, as it now stands, mainly
    turns on the definition of religion (cp. Chantepie de la Saussaye,
    Manual of the Science of Religion, Eng. tr. 1891, pp. 16-18,
    where Lubbock's position is partly misunderstood). Dr. Tylor,
    while deciding that no tribes known to us are religionless,
    leaves open the question of their existence in the past.

    A notable example of the prolongation of error on this subject
    through orthodox assumptions is seen in Dr. A. W. Howitt's
    otherwise valuable work on The Native Tribes of South Australia
    (1904). Dr. Howitt produces (pp. 488-508) abundant evidence to show
    that a number of tribes believe in a "supernatural anthropomorphic
    being," variously named Nurrundere, Nurelli, Bunjil, Mungan-ngaua,
    Daramalun, and Baiame ("the same being under different names,"
    writes Dr. Howitt, p. 499). This being he describes as "the
    tribal All-Father," "a venerable kindly Headman of a tribe,
    full of knowledge and tribal wisdom, and all-powerful in magic,
    of which he is the source, with virtues, failings, and passions
    such as the aborigines regard them" (pp. 500-1). But he insists
    (p. 506) that "in this being, though supernatural, there is
    no trace of a divine nature," and, again, that "the Australian
    aborigines do not recognize any divinity, good or evil" (p. 756),
    though (p. 501) "it is most difficult for one of us to divest
    himself of the tendency to endow such a supernatural being [as
    the All-Father] with a nature quasi-divine, if not altogether
    so." Dr. Howitt does not name any European deity who satisfies
    him on the point of divinity! Obviously the Australian deities
    have evolved in exactly the same way as those of other peoples,
    Yahweh included. Dr. Howitt, indeed, admits (p. 507) that the
    Australian notions "may have been at the root of monotheistic
    beliefs." They certainly were; and when he adds that, "although
    it cannot be alleged that these aborigines have consciously any
    form of religion, it may be said that their beliefs are such that,
    under favourable conditions, they might have developed into an
    actual religion," he indicates afresh the confusion possible from
    unscientific definitions. The sole content of his thesis is,
    finally, that a "supernatural" being is not "divine" till the
    priests have somewhat trimmed him, and that a religion is not
    "actual" till it has been sacerdotally formulated. Dr. Howitt's
    negations are as untenable as Mr. Andrew Lang's magnification of
    the Australian All-Father into a perfect Supreme Being.

    The really important part of Dr. Howitt's survey of the problem
    is his conclusion that the kind of belief he has described exists
    only in a specified area of Australia, and that this area is "the
    habitat of tribes ... where there has been the advance from group
    marriage to individual marriage, from descent in the female line
    to that in the male line" (p. 500). Messrs. Spencer and Gillen's
    denial of the existence of any belief in a personal deity among
    the tribes of Central Australia (Northern Tribes, 1904, p. 491)
    appears to stand for actual fact.

    As to the "divinity" of the ancestor-gods of the primitives,
    see Pagan Christs, 2nd ed. p. 41 sq.]


The problem has been unduly narrowed to the question whether there are
any whole tribes so developed. It is obviously pertinent to ask whether
there may not be diversity of opinion within a given tribe. Such
testimonies as those collected by Sir John Lubbock [Lord Avebury]
and others, as to the existence of religionless savages, are held to
be disposed of by further proof that tribes of savages who had been
set down as religionless on the evidence of some of themselves had in
reality a number of religious beliefs. Travellers' questions had been
falsely answered, either on the principle that non-initiates must not
be told the mysteries, or from that sudden perception of the oddity
of their beliefs which comes even to some civilized people when they
try to state them to an unbelieving outsider. Questions, again, could
easily be misunderstood, and answers likewise. We find, for instance,
that savages who scout the idea that the dead can "rise again" do
believe in the continued disembodied existence of all their dead,
and even at times conceive of them as marrying and procreating! On
the whole, they conceive of a continuity of spirit-life on earth in
human shape. To speak of such people as having no idea of "a life
beyond the grave" would obviously be misleading, though they have no
notion of a judgment day or of future rewards or punishments. [77]

Undoubtedly, then, the negative view of savage religion had in a number
of cases been hastily taken; but there remains the question, as a
rule surprisingly ignored, whether some of the savages who disavowed
all belief in things supernatural may not have been telling the
simple truth about themselves, or even about their families and their
comrades. As one sympathetic traveller notes of the Samoyedes: "There
can be no such thing as strict accuracy of grammar or expression among
an illiterate people; nor can there be among these simple creatures
any consistent or fixed appreciation even of their own forms of
... belief.... Having no object in arriving at a common view of such
matters, each Samoyede, if questioned separately, will give more or
less his own disconnected impression of his faith." [78] And this holds
of unfaith. A savage asked by a traveller, "Do you believe" so-and-so,
might very well give a true negative answer for himself; [79] and the
traveller's resulting misconception would be due to his own arbitrary
assumption that all members of any tribe must think alike.


    A good witness expressly testifies: "In the tribe [of Australians]
    with which I was best acquainted, while the blacks had a term
    for ghost and believed that there were departed spirits who were
    sometimes to be seen among the foliage, individual men would tell
    you upon inquiry that they believed that death was the last of
    them" (Eaglehawk and Crow: A Study of the Australian Aborigines,
    by John Mathew, M.A., B.D., 1899, p. 146). As to the risk of
    wrong negative inferences, on the other hand, see pp. 145, 147.

    One of the best of our missionary witnesses, H. A. Junod, in his
    valuable study of the South African Thonga, testifies both to
    the commonness of individual variation in the way of religious
    fancy and the occurrence of sporadic unbelief, usually ended by
    fear. Individuals freely indulge in concrete speculations--e.g.,
    as to the existence of animal souls--which do not win vogue
    (Life of a South African Tribe, vol. ii, 1913, p. 342 sq.),
    though the reporter seems to overlook the possibility that
    such ideas may be adopted by a tribe. Freethinking ideas have,
    of course, by far the least chance of currency. "The young
    folks of Libombo used to blaspheme in their hearts, saying,
    'There are no Gods.' But," added the witness, "we very soon saw
    that there were some, when they killed one of us," who trod on
    a snake (work cited, pp. 354-55). That testimony illustrates
    well the difficulties of rational progress in a primitive
    community. But at times the process may be encouraged by the
    environment. The early missionary Ellis gives an instance of a
    community in Hawaii that had abandoned all religious practices:
    "We asked them who was their God. They said they had no God;
    formerly they had many: but now they had cast them all away. We
    asked them if they had done well in abolishing them. They said
    'Yes,' for tabu had occasioned much labour and inconvenience,
    and drained off the best of their property. We asked them if it
    was a good thing to have no God.... They said perhaps it was;
    for they had nothing to provide for the great sacrifices, and were
    under no fear of punishment for breaking tabu; that now one fire
    cooked their food, and men and women ate together the same kind
    of provisions." (W. Ellis, Tour Through Hawaii or Owhyhee, 1827,
    p. 100.) The community in question had in their own way reached
    the Lucretian verdict, Tantum relligio potuit suadere malorum.


Unless, again, such witnesses as Moffat be unfaithful reporters as
well as mistaken in their inferences, some of the natives with whom
they dealt were all but devoid of the ordinary religious notions [80]
which in the case of other natives have enabled the missionaries to
plant their doctrines. Nor is there anything hard of belief in the idea
that, just as special religious movements spread credence in certain
periods, a lack of active teachers in certain tribes may for a time
have let previously common beliefs pass almost out of knowledge. If
it be true that the Black Death wrought a great decline in the
ecclesiastical life of England in the fourteenth century, [81] a long
period of life-destroying conditions might eliminate from the life of
a savage tribe all lore save that of primary self-preservation. Moffat
incidentally notes the significant fact that rain-makers in his time
were usually foreigners to the tribes in which they operated. [82]

The explanation is partly that given by him later, that "a rain-maker
seldom dies a natural death," [83] most being executed as impostors
for their failures. To this effect there are many testimonies. [84]
Among the Bushmen, says Lichtenstein, when a magician "happens to
have predicted falsely several times in succession, he is thrust out
of the kraal, and very likely burned or put to death in some other
way." [85] "A celebrated magician," says Burton again, "rarely if
ever dies a natural death." [86] And it is told of the people of
Niue, or Savage Island, in the South Pacific, that "of old they had
kings; but as they were the high priests as well, and were supposed
to cause the food to grow, the people got angry with them in times
of scarcity, and killed them; and as one after the other was killed,
the end of it was that no one wished to be king." [87] So, in Uganda,
if a chief and his medicine-men cannot make rain, "his whole existence
is at stake in times of distress." One chief was actually driven out;
and the rain-doctors always live on sufferance. [88] In such a state
of things religion might well lose vogue.

Among some peoples of the Slave Coast, it appears, the regular
priests, despite their power and prestige, are always under suspicion
by reason of their frequent miscarriages; and they are--or were--not
unfrequently put to death. [89] Here there is disbelief in the priest
without disbelief in the God. But a disbelief in the priest which
tended to exterminate him might well diminish religion.

On the other hand, a relative indifference to religion in a given
tribe might result from the influence of one or more leading men who
spontaneously doubted the religious doctrine offered to them, as many
in Israel, on the face of the priestly records, disbelieved in the
whole theocratic polity. In modern times preachers are constantly
found charging "unbelief" on their own flocks, in respect not of
any criticism of religious narrative or dogma, but of simple lack
of ostensible faith in doctrines of prayer and Providence nominally
accepted. [90] Among peasants who have never seen a freethinking book
or heard a professed freethinker's arguments may be heard expressions
of spontaneous unfaith in current doctrines of Providence.

This is but a type of variations possible in primitive
societies. Despite the social potency of primitive custom, variation
may be surmised to occur in the mental as in the physical life at all
stages; and what normally happens in savagery and low civilization
appears to be a cancelment of the skeptical variation by the total
circumstances--the strength of the general lead to supernaturalism,
the plausibility of such beliefs to the average intelligence, and
the impossibility of setting up skeptical institutions to oppose
the others. In civilized ages skeptical movements are repeatedly
seen to dwindle for simple lack of institutions; which, however,
are spontaneously set up by and serve as sustainers of religious
systems. On the simpler level of savagery, skeptical personalities
would in the long run fail to affirm themselves as against the
institutions of ordinary savage religion--the seasonal feasts,
the ceremonies attending birth and death, the use of rituals,
images, charms, sorcery, all tending to stimulate and conserve
supernatural beliefs in general. Only the abnormally courageous would
dare outspokenly to doubt or deny at all; and their daring would put
them in special jeopardy. [91] The ancient maxim, Primus in orbe deos
fecit timor, is verified by all modern study of primitive life. [92]
It is a recent traveller who gives the definition: "Fetishism is the
result of the efforts of the savage intelligence seeking after a theory
which will account for the apparent hostility of nature to man." [93]
And this incalculable force of fear is constantly exploited by the
religious bias from the earliest stages of sorcery. [94]

The check to intellectual evolution would here be on all fours with
some of the checks inferribly at work in early moral evolution,
where the types with the higher ideals would seem often to be
positively endangered by their peculiarity, and would thus be the
less likely to multiply. And what happened as between man and man
would further tend to happen at times as between communities. Given
the possible case of a tribe so well placed as to be unusually little
affected by fear of enemies and the natural forces, the influence
of rationalistic chiefs or of respected tribesmen might set up for
a time a considerable anti-religious variation, involving at least
a minimizing of religious doctrine and practices. Such a case is
actually seen among the prosperous peoples of the Upper Congo, some of
whom, like the poorer tribes known to Moffat, have no "medicine-men"
of their own, and very vague notions of deity. [95] But when such a
tribe did chance to come into conflict with others more religious, it
would be peculiarly obnoxious to them; and, being in the terms of the
case unwarlike, its chance of survival on the old lines would be small.


    Such a possibility is suggested with some vividness by the familiar
    contrast between the modern communities of Fiji and Samoa--the
    former cruel, cannibalistic, and religious, the latter much less
    austerely religious and much more humane. The ferocious Fijians
    "looked upon the Samoans with horror, because they had no religion,
    no belief in any such deities [as the Fijians'], nor any of the
    sanguinary rites which prevailed in other islands" (Spencer,
    Study of Sociology, pp. 293-94, following J. Williams, Narrative
    of Missionary Enterprise in the South Sea Islands, ed. 1837,
    pp. 540-41; cp. the Rev. A. W. Murray, Forty Years' Mission Work,
    1876, p. 171). The "no religion" is, of course, only relatively
    true. Mr. Lang has noticed the error of the phrase "the godless
    Samoans" (cp. Turner, Samoa a Hundred Years Ago, 1884, pp. 16-17);
    but, while suggesting that the facts are the other way, he admits
    that in their creed "the religious sentiment has already become
    more or less self-conscious, and has begun to reason on its own
    practices" (Myth, Ritual, and Religion, ii, 34; 2nd ed., ii, 58).


Taking the phenomena all along the line of evolution, we are led to the
generalization that the rationalistic tendency, early or late, like
the religious tendency, is a variation which prospers at different
times in different degrees relatively to the favourableness of the
environment. This view will be set forth in some detail in the course
of our history.

It is not, finally, a mere surmise that individual savages
and semi-savages in our own time vary towards disbelief in the
supernaturalism of their fellows. To say nothing of the rational
skepticism exhibited by the Zulu converts of Bishop Colenso, which was
the means of opening his eyes to the incredibility of the Pentateuch,
[96] or of the rationalism of the African chief who debated with
Sir Samuel Baker the possibility of a future state, [97] we have the
express missionary record that the forcible suppression of idolatry and
tabu and the priesthood by King Rihoriho in the island of Hawaii, in
1819, was accomplished not only "before the arrival of any missionary,"
but on purely common-sense grounds, and with no thought of furthering
Christianity, though he had heard of the substitution of Christianity
for the native religion by Pomare in Tahiti. Rihoriho simply desired
to save his wives and other women from the cruel pressure of the tabu
system, and to divert the priests' revenues to secular purposes;
and he actually had some strong priestly support. [98] Had not the
missionary system soon followed, however, the old worship, which
had been desperately defended in battle at the instigation of the
conservative priests, would in all probability have grown up afresh,
though perhaps with modifications. The savage and semi-savage social
conditions, taken as a whole, are fatally unpropitious to rationalism.

A parallel case to that of Rihoriho is that of King Finow of the Tonga
Islands, described by Mariner, who was his intimate. Finow was noted
for his want of religion. "He used to say that the Gods would always
favour that party in war in which there were the greatest chiefs and
warriors"--the European mot strictly adapted to Fiji conditions. "He
did not believe that the Gods paid much attention in other respects
to the affairs of mankind; nor did he think that they could have any
reason for doing so--no more than men could have any reason or interest
in attending to the affairs of the Gods." For the rest, "it is certain
that he disbelieved most of the oracles delivered by the priests,"
though he carefully used them for political and military purposes;
and he acquiesced in the usage of human sacrifices--particularly on
his own account--while professing to deplore the taste of the Gods
in these matters. His own death seems to have been the result of
poisoning by a priest, whom the king had planned to strangle. The
king's daughter was sick, and the priest, instead of bringing about
her recovery by his prayers, hardily explained that the illness was
the act of the Gods in punishment of the king's frequent disrespect
to them. Daughter and father were alternately ill, till the former
died; and then it was that the king, by disclosing his resolve to
strangle the priest, brought on his own death (1810). A few warriors
were disposed to take revenge on the priest; but the majority, on
learning the facts, shuddered at the impious design of the late king,
and regarded his death as the natural vengeance of the Gods. But,
though such "impiety" as his was very rare, his son after him decided
to abolish the priestly office of "divine chieftain," on the score
that it was seen to avail for nothing, while it cost a good deal;
and the chiefs and common people were soon brought to acquiesce in
the policy. [99]

Such cases appear to occur in many barbarous communities. It is
recorded of the Kaffir chief Go that he was perfectly aware of the
hollowness of the pretensions of the magicians and rain-makers of his
tribe, though he held it impolitic to break with them, and called them
in and followed their prescriptions, as did his subjects. [100] Of the
Galeka chief Segidi it is similarly told that, while his medicine-men
went into trances for occult knowledge preparatory to a military
expedition, he carefully obtained real information through spies,
and, while liberally rewarding his wizards, sent his sons to school
at Blythswood. [101] Yet again, in Bede's Ecclesiastical History,
we have the story of King Edwin's priest, Coifi, naïvely avowing that
he saw no virtue in his religion, [102] inasmuch as many men received
more royal favours than he, who had been most diligent in serving the
Gods. [103] Such a declaration might very well have been arranged
for by the Christian Bishop Paulinus, who was converting the king,
and would naturally provide for Coifi; but on any view a process of
skepticism had taken place in the barbarian's mind. [104]

Other illustrations come from the history of ancient Scandinavia. Grimm
notes in several Norse sagas and songs expressions of contempt
for various Gods, which appear to be independent of Christian
influence; [105] and many warriors continued alike the Christian
and the Pagan deities. In the saga of King Olaf Tryggvason, who
enforced Christianity on Norway, it is declared by one chief that
he relied much more on his own arm than on Thor and Odin; while
another announced that he was neither Christian nor Pagan, adding:
"My companions and I have no other religion than the confidence of
our own strength and in the good success which always attends us in
war." Similar sentiments are recorded to have been uttered by Rolf
Krake, a legendary king of Denmark (circa 500); [106] and we have in
the Æneid the classic type--doubtless drawn from barbaric life--of
Mezentius, divum contemptor, who calls his right arm his God, and in
dying declares that he appeals to no deity. [107] Such utterances,
indeed, do not amount to rational freethinking; but, where some
could be thus capable of anti-theism, it is reasonable to surmise
that among the more reflective there were some capable of simple
atheism or non-belief, and of the prudence of keeping the fact to
themselves. Partial skepticism, of course, would be much more common,
as among the Aryan <DW5>s of the Hindu-Kush, with whom, before their
conquest by the Ameer of Afghanistan, a British agent found among
the younger men an inclination to be skeptical about some sacred
ceremonies, while very sincere in their worship of their favourite
deity, the God of war. [108]

It is thus seen to be inaccurate to say, as has been said by
an accomplished antagonist of apriorism, that "under the yoke of
tribal custom skepticism can hardly arise: there is no place for the
half-hearted: as all men feel alike, so all think alike: skepticism
arises when beliefs are put into formal propositions." [109] It is
broadly true that "there is no place for" the doubter as such in
the tribal society; but doubters do exist. Skepticism--in the sense
in which the term is here used, that of rational disbelief--may
even be commoner in some stages of the life of tribal customs than
in some stages of backward civilization loaded with formulated
creeds. What is true is that in the primitive life the rationalism
necessarily fails, for lack of culture and institutions, to diffuse
and establish itself, whereas superstition succeeds, being naturally
institution-making. Under such conditions skepticism is but a recurrent
variation. [110]

It is significant, further, that in the foregoing cases of unbelief
at the lower levels of civilization it is only the high rank of the
doubter that secures publication for the fact of the doubt. In Hawaii,
or Tonga, only a king's unbelief could make itself historically
heard. So in the familiar story of the doubting Inca of Peru, who
in public religious assembly is said to have avowed his conclusion
that the deified Sun was not really a living thing, it is the
status of the speaker that gives his words a record. The doubt had
in all likelihood been long current among the wise men of Peru;
it is indeed ascribed to two or three different Incas; [111] but,
save for the Incas' promulgation of it, history would bear no trace
of Peruvian skepticism. So again in the Acolhuan State of Tezcuco,
the most civilized in the New World before the Spanish conquest,
the great King Netzahualcoyotl is found opposing the cults of human
sacrifice and worshipping an "unknown God," without an image and with
only incense for offering. [112] Only the king in such an environment
could put on record such a conception. There is, in fact, reason to
believe that all ancient ameliorations of bloody rites were the work
of humane kings or chiefs, [113] as they are known to have been among
semi-savages in our own day. [114] In bare justice we are bound to
surmise that similar developments of rationalism have been fairly
frequent in unwritten history, and that there must have been much of
it among the common folk; though, on the other hand, the very position
of a savage king, and the special energy of character which usually
goes to secure it, may count for much in giving him the courage to
think in defiance of custom. In modern as in early Christian times,
it is always to the chief or king of a savage or barbarous tribe
that the missionary looks for permission to proceed against the
force of popular conservatism. [115] Apart from kings and chiefs,
the priesthood itself would be the likeliest soil for skepticism,
though, of course, not for the open avowal of it.

There are to be noted, finally, the facts collected as to marked
skeptical variation among children; [116] and the express evidence
that "it has not been found in a single instance that an uneducated
deaf-mute has had any conception of the existence of a Supreme
Being as the Creator and Ruler of the Universe." [117] These latter
phenomena do not, of course, entitle us to accept Professor Gruppe's
sweeping theorem that it is the religious variation that is abnormal,
and that religion can have spread only by way of the hereditary
imposition of the original insanity of one or two on the imagination
of the many. [118] Deaf-mutes are not normal organisms. But all
the facts together entitle us to decide that religion, broadly
speaking, is but the variation that has chiefly flourished, by
reason of its adaptation to the prevailing environment thus far;
and to reject as unscientific the formulas which, even in the face
of the rapidly-spreading rationalism of the more civilized nations,
still affirm supernaturalist beliefs to be a universal necessity of
the human mind.

On the same grounds, we must reject the claim--arbitrarily set up by
one historian in the very act of showing how religion historically
oppugns science--that all sacred books as such "are true because they
have been developed in accordance with the laws governing the evolution
of truth in human history; and because in poem, chronicle, code,
legend, myth, apologue, or parable, they reflect this development
of what is best in the onward march of humanity." [119] In this
proposition the opening words, "are true because" are strictly
meaningless. All literature whatever has been developed under the
same general laws. But if it be meant that sacred books were specially
likely to garner truth as such, the claim must be negated. In terms of
the whole demonstration of the bias of theology against new truth in
modern times, the irresistible presumption is that in earlier times
also the theological and theocratic spirit was in general hostile
to every process by which truth is normally attained. And if the
thesis be limited to moral truth, it is still less credible. It is,
in fact, inconceivable that literature so near the popular level as
to suit whole priesthoods should be morally the best of which even
the age producing it is capable; and nothing is more certain than
that enlightened ethic has always had to impeach or explain away the
barbarisms of some sacred books. The true summary is that in all cases
the accepted sacred books have of necessity fallen short not only of
scientific truth and of pure ethic, but even of the best speculation
and the best ethic of the time of their acceptance, inasmuch as they
excluded the criticism of the freethinking few on the sacred books
themselves. There is sociological as well as physical science, and
the former is flouted when the whole freethinking of the human race in
the period of Bible-making is either ignored or treated as worthless.

It is probable, for instance, that in all stages of primitive religion
there have been disbelievers in the value of sacrifice, who might or
might not dare to denounce the practice. The demurrers to it in the
Hebrew prophetic literature are probably late; but they were in all
likelihood anticipated in early times. Among the Fijians, for whom
cannibalism was an essentially religious act, and the privilege of
the males of the aristocracy, there were a number of the latter who,
before and apart from the entrance of Christianity, abominated and
denounced the practice, reasoning against it also on utilitarian
grounds, while the orthodox made it out to be a social duty. There
were even whole towns which revolted against it and made it tabu;
and it was by force mainly of this rationalistic reaction that the
missionaries succeeded so readily in putting down the usage. [120]
It is impossible to estimate how often in the past such a revolt of
reason against religious insanity has been overborne by the forces
of pious habit.







CHAPTER III

PROGRESS UNDER ANCIENT RELIGIONS


§ 1. EARLY ASSOCIATION AND COMPETITION OF CULTS

When religion has entered on the stage of quasi-civilized organization,
with fixed legends or documents, temples, and the rudiments of
hierarchies, the increased forces of terrorism and conservatism
are in nearly all cases seen to be in part countervailed by the
simple interaction of the systems of different communities. There
is no more ubiquitous force in the whole history of the subject,
operating as it does in ancient Assyria, in the life of Vedic India
and Confucian China, and in the diverse histories of progressive
Greece and relatively stationary Egypt, down through the Christian
Middle Ages to our own period of comparative studies.

In ages when any dispassionate comparative study was impossible,
religious systems appear to have been considerably modified by the
influence of those of conquered peoples on those of their conquerors,
and vice versâ. Peoples who while at arm's length would insult and
affect to despise each other's Gods, and would deride each other's
myths, [121] appear frequently to have altered their attitude when
one had conquered the other; and this not because of any special
growth of sympathy, but by force of the old motive of fear. In the
stage of natural polytheism no nation really doubted the existence
of the Gods of another; at most, like the Hebrews of the early
historic period, it would set its own God above the others, calling
him "Lord of Lords." But, every community having its own God, he
remained a local power even when his own worshippers were conquered,
and his cult and lore were respected accordingly. This procedure,
which has been sometimes attributed to the Romans in particular as
a stroke of political sagacity, was the normal and natural course
of polytheism. Thus in the Hebrew books the Assyrian conqueror is
represented as admitting that it is necessary to leave a priest who
knows "the manner of the God of the land" among the new inhabitants
he has planted there.


    See 2 Kings xvii, 26. Cp. Ruth i, 16, and Judges xvii, 13. The
    account by Herodotos (ii, 171) of the preservation of the
    Pelasgic rites of Dêmêtêr by the women of Arcadia points to the
    same principle. See also hereinafter, ch. vi, § 1; K. O. Müller,
    Introd. to a Sci. Study of Mythol., Eng. trans., p. 193; Adolf
    Bastian, Der Mensch in der Geschichte, 1860, i, 189; Rhys,
    Celtic Britain, 2nd ed., p. 69; Max Müller, Anthropological
    Religion, p. 164; Gibbon, ch. xxxiv--Bohn ed., iii, 554, note;
    Tylor, Primitive Culture, i, 113-15; and Dr. F. B. Jevons's
    Introd. to the Hist. of Relig., 1896, pp. 36-40, where the fear
    felt by conquering races for the occult powers of the conquered is
    limited to the sphere of "magic." But when Dr. Jevons so defines
    magic as to admit of his proposition (p. 38) that "the hostility
    from the beginning between religion and magic is universally
    admitted," he throws into confusion the whole phenomena of the
    early official-religious practice of magic, of which sacrifice
    and prayer are the type-forms that have best survived. And in
    the end he upsets his definition by noting (p. 40) how magic,
    "even where its relation to religion is one of avowed hostility,"
    will imitate religion. Obviously magic is a function or aspect or
    element of primitive religion (cp. Roskoff, Das Religionswesen der
    rohesten Naturvölker, 1880, p. 144; Sayce, pp. 315, 319, 327, and
    passim; and Tiele, Egyptian Rel., pp. 22, 32); and any "hostility,"
    far from being universal, is either a social or a philosophical
    differentiation. On the whole question compare the author's Pagan
    Christs, 2nd ed., pp. 11-38. In the opinion of Weber (Hist. of
    Ind. Lit., p. 264) the magic arts "found a more and more fruitful
    soil as the religious development of the Hindus progressed";
    "so that they now, in fact, reign almost supreme." See again
    Dr. Jevons's own later admission, p. 395, where the exception of
    Christianity is somewhat arbitrary. On this compare Kant, Religion
    innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, B. iv, Th. ii, § 3.


Similar cases have been noted in primitive cults still surviving. Fear
of the magic powers of "lower" or conquered races is in fact normal
wherever belief in wizardry survives; and to the general tendency may
be conjecturally ascribed such phenomena as that of the Saturnalia,
in which masters and slaves changed places, and the institution of the
Levites among the Hebrews, otherwise only mythically explained. But if
conquerors and conquered thus tended to amalgamate or associate their
cults, equally would allied tribes tend to do so; and, when particular
Gods of different groups were seen to correspond in respect of special
attributes, a further analysis would be encouraged. Hence, with every
extension of every State, every advance in intercourse made in peace
or through war, there would be a further comparison of credences,
a further challenge to the reasoning powers of thoughtful men.


    On the normal tendency to defer to local deities, compare Tylor,
    Primitive Culture, as last cited; B. Thomson, The Fijians,
    1908, p. 112; A. B. Ellis, The Tshi-Speaking Peoples of the Gold
    Coast, 1887, p. 147, and The Ewe-Speaking Peoples, 1890, p. 55;
    P. Wurm, Handbuch der Religionsgeschichte, 2te Aufl., p. 43 (as to
    Madagascar); Sir H. Johnston, The Uganda Protectorate, 1902, ii,
    589; Waitz, Anthropologie der Naturvölker, iii, 186; P. Kropotkin,
    Memoirs of a Revolutionist, ed. 1908, p. 191; W. W. Skeat, Malay
    Magic, 1900, pp. 56, 84; Thurston, Castes and Tribes of Southern
    India, 1909, i, 86-87, 94, 100; iii, 188; iv, 170; v, 467-68;
    W. H. R. Rivers, The Todas, 1906, p. 263; Rae, The White Sea
    Peninsula, 1881, p. 262; Élie Reclus, Primitive Folk, pp. 254-56;
    Grant Allen, Evolution of the Idea of God, 1897, pp. 289, 301-302;
    Castrén, Vorlesungen über die Finnische Mythologie, 1853, p. 281;
    Gummere, Germanic Origins, 1892, p. 140, citing Weinhold, Deutsche
    Frauen, i, 105; Gobineau, Les religions et les philosophies dans
    l'Asie centrale, 2e éd. p. 67; E. Higgins, Hebrew Idolatry and
    Superstition, 1893, pp. 20, 24; Robertson Smith, Religion of
    the Semites, 1889, p. 77; Wellhausen, Heidenthum, pp. 129, 183,
    cited by Smith, p. 79; Lang, Making of Religion, p. 65; Frazer,
    Golden Bough, 2nd ed. ii, 72. Above all, see the record in Old New
    Zealand, "by a Pakeha Maori" (2nd ed. Auckland, 1863, p. 154),
    of the believing resort of some white men to native wizards in
    New Zealand.

    Stevenson, again, is evidently proceeding upon observation
    when he makes his trader in The Beach of Falesà say: "We
    laugh at the natives and their superstitions; but see how many
    traders take them up, splendidly educated white men that have
    been bookkeepers (some of them) and clerks in the old country"
    (Island Nights' Entertainments, 1893, pp. 104-105). In Abyssinia,
    "Galla sorceresses are frequently called in by the Christians of
    Shoa to transfer sickness or to rid the house of evil spirits"
    (Major W. Cornwallis Harris, The Highlands of Aethiopia, 1844,
    iii, 50). On the other hand, some Sudanese tribes "believe in the
    virtue both of Christian and Moslem amulets, but have hitherto lent
    a deaf ear to the preachers of both these religions" (A. H. Keane,
    Man, Past and Present, 1900, p. 50).

    This tendency did not exclude, but would in certain cases
    conflict with, the strong primitive tendency to associate every
    God permanently with his supposed original locality. Tiele writes
    (Hist. of the Egypt. Relig., Eng. trans. introd. p. xvii) that in
    no case was a place given to the Gods of one nation in another's
    pantheon "if they did not wholly alter their form, character,
    appearance, and not seldom their very name." This seems an
    over-statement, and is inconsistent with Tiele's own statement
    (Hist. comparée des anc. relig. égyptiennes et sémitiques,
    French trans., 1882, pp. 174-80) as to the adoption of Sumerian
    and Akkadian Gods and creeds by the Semites. What is clear is
    that local cults resisted the removal of their Gods' images;
    and the attempt to deport such images to Babylon, thus affecting
    the monopoly of the God of Babylon himself, was a main cause of
    the fall of Nabonidos, who was driven out by Cyrus. (E. Meyer,
    Geschichte des Alterthums, i (1884), 599.) But the Assyrians
    invoked Bel Merodach of Babylon, after they had conquered Babylon,
    in terms of his own ritual; even as Israelites often invoked
    the Gods of Canaan (cp. Sayce, Hibbert Lectures, Relig. of the
    Anc. Babylonians, p. 123). And King Mardouk-nadinakhe of Babylon,
    in the twelfth century B.C., carried off statues of the Assyrian
    Gods from the town of Hekali to Babylon, where they were kept
    captive for 418 years (Maspero, Hist. anc. des peuples de l'orient,
    4e éd. p. 300). A God could migrate with his worshippers from city
    to city (Meyer, iii, 169; Sayce, p. 124); and the Assyrian scribe
    class maintained the worship of their special God Nebo wherever
    they went, though he was a local God to start with (Sayce, pp. 117,
    119, 121). And as to the recognition of the Gods of different
    Egyptian cities by politic kings, see Tiele's own statement,
    p. 36. Cp. his Outlines, pp. 73, 84, 207.


A concrete knowledge of the multiplicity of cults, then, was
obtruded on the leisured and travelled men of the early empires and
of such a civilization as that of Hellas; [122] and when to such
knowledge there was added a scientific astronomy (the earliest to be
constituted of the concrete sciences), a revision of beliefs by such
men was inevitable. [123] It might take the form either of a guarded
skepticism or of a monarchic theology, answering to the organization
of the actual earthly empire; and the latter view, in the nature of
the case, would much the more easily gain ground. The freethought of
early civilization, then, would be practically limited for a long time
to movements in the direction of co-ordinating polytheism, to the end
of setting up a supreme though not a sole deity; the chief God in any
given case being apt to be the God specially affected by the reigning
monarch. Allocation of spheres of influence to the principal deities
would be the working minimum of plausible adjustment, since only
in some such way could the established principle of the regularity
of the heavens be formally accommodated to the current worship; and
wherever there was monarchy, even if the monarch were polytheistic,
there was a lead to gradation among the Gods. [124] A pantheistic
conception would be the highest stretch of rationalism that could
have any vogue even among the educated class. All the while every
advance was liable to the ill-fortune of overthrow or arrest at the
hands of an invading barbarism, which even in adopting the system of an
established priesthood would be more likely to stiffen than to develop
it. Early rationalism, in short, would share in the fluctuations of
early civilization; and achievements of thought would repeatedly be
swept away, even as were the achievements of the constructive arts.




§ 2. THE PROCESS IN INDIA

The process thus deducible from the main conditions is found actually
happening in more than one of the ancient cultures, as their history
is now sketched. In the Rig-Veda, which if not the oldest is the least
altered of the Eastern Sacred Books, the main line of change is obvious
enough. It remains so far matter of conjecture to what extent the early
Vedic cults contain matter adopted from non-Aryan Asiatic peoples; but
no other hypothesis seems to account for the special development of the
cult of Agni in India as compared with the content and development of
the other early Aryan systems, in which, though there are developments
of fire worship, the God Agni does not appear. [125] The specially
priestly character of the Agni worship, and the precedence it takes
in the Vedas over the solar cult of Mitra, which among the kindred
Aryans of Iran receives in turn a special development, suggest some
such grafting, though the relations between Aryans and the Hindu
aborigines, as indicated in the Veda, seem to exclude the possibility
of their adopting the fire-cult from the conquered inhabitants, [126]
who, besides, are often spoken of in the Vedas as "non-sacrificers,"
[127] and at times as "without Gods." [128] But this is sometimes
asserted even of hostile Aryans. [129] In any case the carrying
on of the two main cults of Agni and Indra side by side points to
an original and marked heterogeneity of racial elements; while the
varying combination with them of the worship of other deities, the
old Aryan Varuna, the three forms of the Sun-God Aditya, the Goddess
Aditi and the eight Adityas, the solar Mitra, Vishnu, Rudra, and
the Maruts, imply the adaptation of further varieties of hereditary
creed. The outcome is a sufficiently chaotic medley, in which the
attributes and status of the various Gods are reducible to no code,
[130] the same feats being assigned to several, and the attributes
of all claimed for almost any one. Here, then, were the conditions
provocative of doubt among the critical; and while it is only in the
later books of the Rig-Veda that such doubt finds priestly expression,
it must be inferred that it was current in some degree among laymen
before the hymn-makers avowed that they shared it. The God Soma,
the personification of wine, identified with the Moon-God Chandra,
[131] "hurls the irreligious into the abyss." [132] This may mean that
his cult, like that of his congener Dionysos in Greece, was at first
forcibly resisted, and forcibly triumphed. At an earlier period doubt
is directed against the most popular God, Indra, perhaps on behalf of a
rival cult. [133] Later it seems to take the shape of a half-skeptical,
half-mystical questioning as to which, if any, God is real.


    From the Catholic standpoint, Dr. E. L. Fischer has argued that
    "Varuna is in the ontological, physical, and ethical relation
    the highest, indeed the unique, God of ancient India"; and that
    the Nature-Gods of the Veda can belong only to a later period in
    the religious consciousness (Heidenthum und Offenbarung, 1878,
    pp. 36-37). Such a development, had it really occurred, might
    be said to represent a movement of primitive freethought from
    an unsatisfying monotheism to a polytheism that seemed better
    to explain natural facts. A more plausible view of the process,
    however, is that of von Bradke, to the effect that "the old
    Indo-Germanic polytheism, with its pronounced monarchic apex, which
    ... constituted the religion of the pre-Vedic [Aryan] Hindus, lost
    its monarchic apex shortly before and during the Rig-Veda period,
    and set up for itself the so-called Henotheism [worship of deities
    severally as if each were the only one], which thus represented
    in India a time of religious decline; a decline that, at the end
    of the period to which the Rig-Veda hymns belong, led to an almost
    complete dissolution of the old beliefs. The earlier collection of
    the hymns must have promoted the decline; and the final redaction
    must have completed it. The collected hymns show only too plainly
    how the very deity before whom in one song all the remaining
    Gods bow themselves, in the next sinks almost in the dust before
    another. Then there sounds from the Rig-Veda (x, 121) the wistful
    question: Who is the God whom we should worship?" (Dyâus Asura,
    Ahuramazda, und die Asuras, Halle, 1885, p. 115; cp. note, supra,
    p. 30). On this view the growth of monotheism went on alongside
    of a growth of critical unbelief, but, instead of expressing that,
    provoked it by way of reaction. Dr. Muir more specifically argues
    (Sanskrit Texts, v, 116) that in the Vedic hymns Varuna is a God
    in a state of decadence; and, despite the dissent of M. Barth
    (Religions of India, p. 18), this seems true. But the recession
    of Varuna is only in the normal way of the eclipse of the old
    Supreme God by a nearer deity, and does not suffice to prove a
    growth of agnosticism. M. Fontane (Inde Védique, 1881, p. 305)
    asserts on other grounds a popular movement of negation in the
    Vedic period, but offers rather slender evidence. There is better
    ground for his account of the system as one in which different
    cults had the upper hand at different times, the devotees of
    Indra rejecting Agni, and so on (pp. 310-11).


To meet such a doubt, a pantheistic view of things would naturally
arise, and in the Vedas it often emerges. [134] Thus "Agni is all
the Gods"; and "the Gods are only a single being under different
names." [135] For ancient as for more civilized peoples such a doctrine
had the attraction of nominally reconciling the popular cult with the
skepticism it had aroused. Rising thus as freethought, the pantheistic
doctrine in itself ultimately became in India a dogmatic system, the
monopoly of a priestly caste, whose training in mystical dialectic
made them able to repel or baffle amateur criticism. Such fortifying
of a sophisticated creed by institutions--of which the Brahmanic caste
system is perhaps the strongest type--is one of the main conditions
of relative permanence for any set of opinions; yet even within
the Brahmanic system, by reason, presumably, of the principle that
the higher truth was for the adept and need not interfere with the
popular cult, there were again successive critical revisions of the
pantheistic idea.


    Prof. Garbe (Philosophy of Anc. India, sect. on Hindu Monism)
    argues that all monistic, and indeed all progressive, thinking in
    ancient India arose not among the Brahmans, who were conscienceless
    oppressors, but among the warrior caste; citing stories in the
    Upanishads in which Brahmans are represented as receiving such
    ideas from warriors. The thesis is much weakened by the Professor's
    acceptance of Krishna as primarily a historic character, of the
    warrior class. But there is ground for his general thesis, which
    recognizes (p. 78) that the Brahmans at length assimilated the
    higher thought of laymen. Max Müller puts it that "No nation was
    ever so completely priestridden as the Hindus were under the sway
    of the Brahmanic law. Yet, on the other side, the same people were
    allowed to indulge in the most unrestrained freedom of thought,
    and in the schools of their philosophy the very names of their
    Gods were never mentioned. Their existence was neither denied
    nor asserted...." (Selected Essays, 1881, ii, 244). "Sankhya
    philosophy" [on which Buddhism is supposed to be based], "in
    its original form, claims the name of an-îsvara, 'lordless' or
    'atheistic,' as its distinctive title" (ibid. p. 283).

    Of the nature of a freethinking departure, among the early
    Brahmanists as in other societies, was the substitution of
    non-human for human sacrifices--a development of peaceful
    life-conditions which, though not primitive, must have ante-dated
    Buddhism. See Tiele, Outlines, pp. 126-27 and refs.; Barth,
    Religions of India, pp. 57-59; and Müller, Physical Religion,
    p. 101. Prof. Robertson Smith (Religion of the Semites, p. 346)
    appears to hold that animal sacrifice was never a substitute
    for human; but his ingenious argument, on analysis, is found to
    prove only that in certain cases the idea of such a substitution
    having taken place may have been unhistorical. If it be granted
    that human sacrifices ever occurred--and all the evidence goes
    to show that they were once universal--substitution would be an
    obvious way of abolishing them. Historical analogy is in favour
    of the view that the change was forced on the priesthood from the
    outside, and only after a time accepted by the Brahmans. Thus
    we find the Khârvâkas, a school of freethinkers, rising in the
    Alexandrian period, making it part of their business to denounce
    the Brahmanic doctrine and practice of sacrifice, and to argue
    against all blood sacrifices; but they had no practical success
    (Tiele, p. 126) until Buddhism triumphed (Mitchell, Hinduism, 1885,
    p. 106; Rhys Davids, tr. of Dialogues of the Buddha, 1899, p. 165).


In the earliest Upanishads the World-Being seems to have been figured
as the totality of matter, [136] an atheistic view associated in
particular with the teaching of Kapila, [137] who himself, however, was
at length raised to divine status, [138] though his system continues
to pass as substantially atheistic. [139] This view being open to all
manner of anti-religious criticism, which it incurred even within the
Brahmanic pale, [140] there was evolved an ideal formula in which
the source of all things is "the invisible, intangible, unrelated,
colourless one, who has neither eyes nor ears, neither hands nor feet,
eternal, all-pervading, subtile, and undecaying." [141] At the same
time, the Upanishads exhibit a stringent reaction against the whole
content of the Vedas. Their ostensible object is "to show the utter
uselessness--nay, the mischievousness--of all ritual performances;
to condemn every sacrificial act which has for its motive a desire or
hope of reward; to deny, if not the existence, at least the exceptional
and exalted character of the Devas; and to teach that there is no hope
of salvation and deliverance except by the individual self recognizing
the true and universal self and finding rest there, where alone rest
can be found." [142]

And the critical development does not end there. "In the old
Upanishads, in which the hymns and sacrifices of the Veda are looked
upon as useless, and as superseded by the higher knowledge taught by
the forest-sages, they are not yet attacked as mere impositions. That
opposition, however, sets in very decidedly in the Sutra period. In
the Nirukta (i, 15) Yâska quotes the opinion of Kautsa, that the hymns
of the Veda have no meaning at all." [143] In short, every form of
critical revolt against incredible doctrine that has arisen in later
Europe had taken place in ancient India long before the Alexandrian
conquest. [144] And the same attitude continued to be common within the
post-Alexandrian period; for Panini, who must apparently be dated then,
[145] "was acquainted with infidels and nihilists"; [146] and the
teaching of Brihaspati, [147] on which was founded the system of the
Khârvâkas--apparently one of several sections of a freethinking school
called the Lokâyatas [148] or Lokâyatikas--is extremely destructive of
Vedic pretensions. "The Veda is tainted by the three faults of untruth,
self-contradiction, and tautology.... The impostors who call themselves
Vedic pandits are mutually destructive.... The three authors of the
Vedas were buffoons, knaves, and demons: All the well-known formulas
of the pandits, and all the horrid rites for the queen commanded
in the Asvamedha--these were invented by buffoons, and so all the
various kinds of presents to the priests; while the eating of flesh
was similarly commanded by night-prowling demons." [149]

To what extent such aggressive rationalism ever spread it is now
quite impossible to ascertain. It seems probable that the word
Lokâyata, defined by Sanskrit scholars as signifying "directed
to the world of sense," [150] originally, or about 500 B.C.,
signified "Nature-lore," and that this passed as a branch of Brahman
learning. [151] Significantly enough, while the lore was not extensive,
it came to be regarded as disposing men to unbelief, though it does
not seem to have suggested any thorough training. At length, in the
eighth century of our era, it is found applied as a term of abuse,
in the sense of "infidel," by Kumârila in controversy with opponents
as orthodox as himself; and about the same period Sankara connects
with it a denial of the existence of a separate and immortal soul;
[152] though that opinion had been debated, and not called Lokâyata,
long before, when the word was current in the broader sense. [153]
Latterly, in the fourteenth century, on the strength of some doggerel
verses which cannot have belonged to the early Brahmanic Lokâyata,
it stands for extreme atheism and a materialism not professed by any
known school speaking for itself. [154] The evidence, such as it is,
is preserved only in Sarva-darsana-samgraha, a compendium of all
philosophical systems, compiled in the fourteenth century by the
Vedantic teacher Mâdhavâchâra. [155] One source speaks of an early
text-book of materialism, the Sutras of Brihaspati; [156] but this has
not been preserved. Thus in Hindu as in later European freethought for
a long period we have had to rely for our knowledge of freethinkers'
ideas upon the replies made by their opponents. It is reasonable to
conclude that, save insofar as the arguments of Brihaspati were common
to the Khârvâkas and the Buddhists, [157] such doctrine as his or that
of the later Lokâyatikas cannot conceivably have been more than the
revolt of a thoughtful minority against official as well as popular
religion; and to speak of a time when "the Aryan settlers in India
had arrived at the conviction that all their Devas or Gods were mere
names" [158] is to suggest a general evolution of rational thought
which can no more have taken place in ancient India than it has done
to-day in Europe. The old creeds would always have defenders; and
every revolt was sure to incur a reaction. In the Hitopadesa or "Book
of Good Counsel" (an undated recension of the earlier Panchatantra,
"The Five Books," which in its first form may be placed about the fifth
century of our era) there occur both passages disparaging mere study
of the Sacred Books [159] and passages insisting upon it as a virtue
in itself [160] and otherwise insisting on ritual observances. [161]
They seem to come from different hands.


    The phenomenon of the schism represented by the two divisions
    of the Yazur Veda, the "White" and the "Black," is plausibly
    accounted for as the outcome of the tendencies of a new and an
    old school, who selected from their Brahmanas, or treatises of
    ritual and theology, the portions which respectively suited
    them. The implied critical movement would tend to affect
    official thought in general. This schism is held by Weber to
    have arisen only in the period of ferment set up by Buddhism;
    but other disputes seem to have taken place in abundance in the
    Brahmanical schools before that time. (Cp. Tiele, Outlines,
    p. 123; Weber, Hist. Ind. Lit., pp. 10, 27, 232; Max Müller,
    Anthropol. Relig., 1892, pp. 36-37; and Rhys Davids, Buddhism,
    p. 34.) Again, the ascetic and penance-bearing hermits, who were
    encouraged by the veneration paid them to exalt themselves above
    all save the highest Gods, would by their utterances of necessity
    affect the course of doctrine. Compare the same tendency as seen
    in Buddhism and Jainism (Tiele, pp. 135, 140).


But in the later form of the Vedânta, "the end of the Veda," a monistic
and pantheistic teaching holds its ground in our own day, after all
the ups and downs of Brahmanism, alongside of the aboriginal cults
which Brahmanism adopted in its battle with Buddhism; alongside,
too, of the worship of the Veda itself as an eternal and miraculous
document. "The leading tenets [of the Vedânta] are known to some
extent in every village." [162] Yet the Vedântists, again, treat
the Upanishads in turn as a miraculous and inspired system, [163]
and repeat in their case the process of the Vedas: so sure is the law
of fixation in religious thought, while the habit of worship subsists.

The highest activity of rationalistic speculation within the Brahmanic
fold is seen to have followed intelligibly on the most powerful
reaction against the Brahmans' authority. This took place when their
sphere had been extended from the region of the Punjaub, of which alone
the Rig-Veda shows knowledge, to the great kingdoms of Southern India,
pointed to in the Sutras, [164] or short digests of ritual and law
designed for general official use. In the new environment "there was a
well-marked lay-feeling, a widespread antagonism to the priests, a real
sense of humour, a strong fund of common sense. Above all there was
the most complete and unquestioned freedom of thought and expression
in religious matters that the world had yet witnessed." [165]

The most popular basis for rejection of a given system--belief in
another--made ultimately possible there the rise of a practically
atheistic system capable, wherever embraced, of annulling the
burdensome and exclusive system of the Brahmans, which had been
obtruded in its worst form, [166] though not dominantly, in the new
environment. Buddhism, though it cannot have arisen on one man's
initiative in the manner claimed in the legends, even as stripped of
their supernaturalist element, [167] was in its origin essentially
a movement of freethought, such as could have arisen only in the
atmosphere of a much mixed society [168] where the extreme Brahmanical
claims were on various grounds discredited, perhaps even within their
own newly-adjusted body. It was stigmatized as "the science of reason,"
a term equivalent to "heresy" in the Christian sphere; [169] and its
definite rejection of the Vedas made it anti-sacerdotal even while
it retained the modes of speech of polytheism. The tradition which
makes the Buddha [170] a prince suggests an upper-class origin for
the reaction; and there are traces of a chronic resistance to the
Brahmans' rule among their fellow-Aryans before the Buddhist period.


    "The royal families, the warriors, who, it may be supposed,
    strenuously supported the priesthood so long as it was a question
    of robbing the people of their rights, now that this was effected
    turned against their former allies, and sought to throw off the
    yoke that was likewise laid upon them. These efforts were, however,
    unavailing: the colossus was too firmly established. Obscure
    legends and isolated allusions are the only records left to us
    in the later writings of the sacrilegious hands which ventured
    to attack the sacred and divinely consecrated majesty of the
    Brahmans; and these are careful to note at the same time the
    terrible punishments which befel those impious offenders" (Weber,
    Hist. Ind. Lit., p. 19).


The circumstances, however, that the Buddhist writings were from the
first in vernacular dialects, not in Sanskrit, [171] and that the
mythical matter which accumulated round the story of the Buddha is
in the main aboriginal, and largely common to the myth of Krishna,
[172] go to prove that Buddhism spread specially in the non-Aryan
sphere. [173] Its practical (not theoretic) [174] atheism seems to
have rested fundamentally on the conception of Karma, the transition
of the soul, or rather of the personality, through many stages up to
that in which, by self-discipline, it attains the impersonal peace
of Nirvana; and of this conception there is no trace in the Vedas,
[175] though it became a leading tenet of Brahmanism.


    To the dissolvent influence of Greek culture may possibly be
    due some part of the success of Buddhism before our era, and
    even later. Hindu astronomy in the Vedic period was but slightly
    developed (Weber, Hist. Ind. Lit., pp. 246, 249, 250); and "it
    was Greek influence that first infused a real life into Indian
    astronomy" (Id. p. 251; cp. Letronne, Mélanges d'Érudition, 1860
    (?), p. 40; Narrien, Histor. Acc. of Orig. and Prog. of Astron.,
    p. 33, and Lib. Use. Kn. Hist. of Astron., c. ii). This implies
    other interactions. It is presumably to Greek stimulus that we must
    trace the knowledge by Aryabhata (Colebrooke's Essays, ed. 1873,
    ii, 404; cp. Weber, p. 257) of the doctrine of the earth's
    diurnal revolution on its axis; and the fact that in India as in
    the Mediterranean world the truth was later lost from men's hands
    may be taken as one of the proofs that the two civilizations alike
    retrograded owing to evil political conditions. In the progressive
    period (from about 320 B.C. onwards for perhaps some centuries)
    Greek ideas might well help to discredit traditionalism; and their
    acceptance at royal courts would be favourable to toleration
    of the new teaching. At the same time, Buddhism must have been
    favoured by the native mental climate in which it arose.


The main differentiation of Buddhism from Brahmanism, again, is its
ethical spirit, which sets aside formalism and seeks salvation in an
inward reverie and discipline; and this element in turn can hardly
be conceived as arising save in an old society, far removed from the
warlike stage represented by the Vedas. Whatever may have been its
early association with Brahmanism [176] then, it must be regarded
as essentially a reaction against Brahmanical doctrine and ideals;
a circumstance which would account for its early acceptance in the
Punjaub, where Brahmanism had never attained absolute power and was
jealously resisted by the free population. [177] And the fact that
Jainism, so closely akin to Buddhism, has its sacred books in a dialect
belonging to the region in which Buddhism arose, further supports the
view that the reaction grew out of the thought of a type of society
differing widely from that in which Brahmanism arose. Jainism, like
Buddhism, is substantially atheistic, [178] and like it has an ancient
monkish organization to which women were early admitted. The original
crypto-atheism or agnosticism of the Buddhist movement thus appears as
a product of a relatively high, because complex, moral and intellectual
evolution. It certainly never impugned the belief in the Gods; on
the contrary, the Buddha is often represented as speaking of their
existence, [179] and at times as approving of their customary worship;
[180] but he is never said to counsel his own order to pray to them;
he makes light of sacrifice; and above all he is made quite negative
as to a future life, preaching the doctrine of Karma in a sense which
excludes individual immortality. [181] "It cannot be denied that
if we call the old Gods of the Veda--Indra and Agni and Yama--Gods,
Buddha was an atheist. He does not believe in the divinity of these
deities. What is noteworthy is that he does not by any means deny
their bare existence.... The founder of Buddhism treats the old Gods
as superhuman beings." [182] Thus it is permissible to say both that
Buddhism recognizes Gods and that it is practically atheistic.


    "The fact cannot be disputed away that the religion of Buddha
    was from the beginning purely atheistic. The idea of the Godhead
    ... was for a time at least expelled from the sanctuary of the
    human mind, [183] and the highest morality that was ever taught
    before the rise of Christianity was taught by men with whom the
    Gods had become mere phantoms, without any altars, not even an
    altar to the unknown God" (Max Müller, Introd. to the Science of
    Religion, ed. 1882, p. 81. Cp. the same author's Selected Essays,
    1881, ii, 300.)

    "He [Buddha] ignores God in so complete a way that he does not even
    seek to deny him; he does not suppress him, but he does not speak
    of him either to explain the origin and anterior existence of man
    or to explain the present life, or to conjecture his future life
    and definitive deliverance. The Buddha knows God in no fashion
    whatever" (Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, Le Bouddha et sa Religion,
    1866, p. v).

    "Buddhism and Christianity are indeed the two opposite poles with
    regard to the most essential points of religion: Buddhism ignoring
    all feeling of dependence on a higher power, and therefore denying
    the very existence of a supreme deity" (Müller, Introd. to Sc. of
    Rel., p. 171).

    "Lastly, the Buddha declared that he had arrived at [his]
    conclusions, not by study of the Vedas, nor from the teachings
    of others, but by the light of reason and intuition alone"
    (Rhys Davids, Buddhism, p. 48). "The most ancient Buddhism
    despises dreams and visions" (Id., p. 177). "Agnostic atheism
    ... is the characteristic of his [Buddha's] system of philosophy"
    (Id., p. 207).

    "Belief in a Supreme Being, the Creator and Ruler of the Universe,
    is unquestionably a modern graft upon the unqualified atheism of
    Sákya Muni: it is still of very limited recognition. In none of
    the standard authorities ... is there the slightest allusion to
    such a First Cause, the existence of which is incompatible with
    the fundamental Buddhist dogma of the eternity of all existence"
    (H. H. Wilson, Buddha and Buddhism, in Essays and Lectures,
    ed. by Dr. R. Rost, 1862, ii, 361. Cp. p. 363).


On the other hand, the gradual colouring of Buddhism with popular
mythology, the reversion (if, indeed, this were not early) to
adoration and worship of the Buddha himself, and the final collapse
of the system in India before the pressure of Brahmanized Hinduism,
all prove the potency of the sociological conditions of success and
failure for creeds and criticisms. Buddhism took the monastic form
for its institutions, thus incurring ultimate petrifaction alike
morally and intellectually; and in any case the normal Indian social
conditions of abundant population, cheap food, and general ignorance
involved an overwhelming vitality for the popular cults. These the
orthodox Brahmans naturally took under their protection as a means
of maintaining their hold over the multitude; [184] and though their
own highest philosophy has been poetically grafted on that basis,
as in the epic of the Mahâbhârata and in the Bhagavat Gita, [185]
the ordinary worship of the deities of these poems is perforce
utterly unphilosophical, varying between a primitive sensualism
and an emotionalism closely akin to that of popular forms of
Christianity. Buddhism itself, where it still prevails, exhibits
similar tendencies. [186]


    It is disputed whether the Brahman influence drove Buddhism
    out of India by physical force, or whether the latter decayed
    because of maladaptation to its environment. Its vogue for some
    seven hundred years, from about 300 B.C. to about 400 A.C.,
    seems to have been largely due to its protection and final
    acceptance as a State religion by the dynasty of Chandragupta
    (the Sandracottos of the Greek historians), whose grandson
    Asoka showed it special favour. His rock-inscribed edicts (for
    which see Max Müller, Introd. to Science of Rel., pp. 5-6, 23;
    Anthrop. Relig., pp. 40-43; Rhys Davids, Buddhism, pp. 220-28;
    Wheeler's Hist. of India, vol. iii, app. 1; Asiatic Society's
    Journals, vols. viii and xii; Indian Antiquary, 1877, vol. vi)
    show a general concern for natural ethics, and especially for
    tolerance; but his mention of "The Terrors of the Future" among
    the religious works he specially honours shows (if genuine) that
    normal superstition, if ever widely repudiated (which is doubtful),
    had interpenetrated the system. The king, too, called himself
    "the delight of the Gods," as did his contemporary the Buddhist
    king of Ceylon (Davids, Buddhism, p. 84). Under Asoka, however,
    Buddhism was powerful enough to react somewhat on the West, then
    in contact with India as a result of the Alexandrian conquest
    (cp. Mahaffy, Greek World under Roman Sway, ch. ii; Weber's
    lecture on Ancient India, Eng. tr., pp. 25-26; Indische Skizzen,
    p. 28 [cited in the present writer's Christianity and Mythology,
    p. 165]; and Weber's Hist of Ind. Lit., p. 255 and p. 309, note);
    and the fact that after his time it entered on a long conflict
    with Brahmanism proves that it remained practically dangerous to
    that system. In the fifth and sixth centuries of our era Buddhism
    in India "rapidly declined"--a circumstance hardly intelligible
    save as a result of violence. Tiele, after expressly asserting the
    "rapid decline" (Outlines, p. 139), in the next breath asserts that
    there are no satisfactory proofs of such violence, and that, "on
    the contrary, Buddhism appears to have pined away slowly" (p. 140:
    contrast his Egypt. Rel., p. xxi). Rhys Davids, in his Buddhism,
    p. 246 (so also Max Müller, Anthrop. Rel., p. 43), argues for a
    process of violent extinction; but in his later work, Buddhist
    India, he retracts this view and decides for a gradual decline
    in the face of a Brahmanic revival. The evidences for violence
    and persecution are, however, pretty strong. (See H. H. Wilson,
    Essays, as cited, ii, 365-67.) Internal decay certainly appears
    to have occurred. Already in Gautama's own life, according to the
    legends, there were doctrinal disputes within his party (Müller,
    Anthrop. Rel., p. 38); and soon heresies and censures abounded
    (Introd. to Sc. of Rel., p. 23), till schisms arose and no fewer
    than eighteen sects took shape (Davids, Buddhism, pp. 213-18).


Thus early in our inquiry we may gather, from a fairly complete
historical case, the primary laws of causation as regards alike the
progress and the decadence of movements of rationalistic thought. The
fundamental economic dilemma, seen already in the life of the savage,
presses at all stages of civilization. The credent multitude, save
in the very lowest stages of savage destitution, always feeds and
houses those who furnish it with its appropriate mental food; and
so long as there remains the individual struggle for existence,
there will always be teachers ready. If the higher minds in any
priesthood, awaking to the character of their traditional teaching,
withdraw from it, lower minds, howbeit "sincere," will always take
their place. The innovating teacher, in turn, is only at the beginning
of his troubles when he contrives, on whatever bases, to set up a new
organized movement. The very process of organization, on the one hand,
sets up the call for special economic sustenance--a constant motive
to compromise with popular ignorance--and, on the other hand, tends to
establish merely a new traditionalism, devoid of the critical impulse
in which it arose. [187] And without organization the innovating
thought cannot communicate itself, cannot hold its own against the
huge social pressures of tradition.

In ancient society, in short, there could be no continuous progress
in freethinking: at best, there could but be periods or lines of
relative progress, the result of special conjunctures of social and
political circumstance. So much will appear, further, from the varying
instances of still more ancient civilizations, the evolution of which
may be the better understood from our survey of that of India.




§ 3. MESOPOTAMIA

The nature of the remains we possess of the ancient Babylonian and
Assyrian religions is not such as to yield a direct record of their
development; but they suffice to show that there, as elsewhere,
a measure of rationalistic evolution occurred. Were there no other
ground for the inference, it might not unreasonably be drawn from
the post-exilic monotheism of the Hebrews, who, drawing so much of
their cosmology and temple ritual from Babylon, may be presumed to
have been influenced by the higher Semitic civilizations in other
ways also. [188] But there is concrete evidence. What appears to
have happened in Babylonia and Assyria, whose religious systems were
grafted on that of the more ancient Sumer-Akkadian civilization,
is a gradual subordination of the numerous local Gods (at least in
the thought of the more philosophic, including some of the priests)
to the conception of one all-pervading power. This process would be
assisted by that of imperialism; and in the recently-recovered code of
Hammurabi we actually find references to Ilu "God" (as in the European
legal phrase, "the act of God") without any further God-name. [189]
On the other hand, the unifying tendency would be resisted by the
strength of the traditions of the Babylonian cities, all of which
had ancient cults before the later empires were built up. [190]
Yet, again, peoples who failed in war would be in some measure led
to renounce their God as weak; while those who clung to their faith
would be led, as in Jewry, to recast its ethic. The result was a
set of compromises in which the provincial and foreign deities were
either treated genealogically or grouped in family or other relations
with the chief God or Gods of the time being. [191] Certain cults,
again, were either kept always at a higher ethical level than the
popular one, or were treated by the more refined and more critical
worshippers in an elevated spirit; [192] and this tendency seems to
have led to conceptions of purified deities who underlay or transcended
the popular types, the names of the latter being held to point to one
who was misconceived under their grosser aspects. [193] Astronomical
knowledge, again, gave rise to cosmological theories which pointed to
a ruling and creating God, [194] who as such would have a specially
ethical character. In some such way was reached a conception of a
Creator-God as the unity represented by the fifty names of the Great
Gods, who lost their personality when their names were liturgically
given to him [195]--a conception which in some statements even had
a pantheistic aspect [196] among a "group of priestly thinkers," and
in others took the form of an ideal theocracy. [197] There is record
that the Babylonian schools were divided into different sects, [198]
and their science was likely to make some of these rationalistic. [199]
Professor Sayce even goes so far as to say that in the later cosmogony,
"under a thin disguise of theological nomenclature, the Babylonian
theory of the universe has become a philosophical materialism." [200]


    It might be taken for granted, further, that disbelief would
    be set up by such a primitive fraud as the alleged pretence of
    the priests of Bel Merodach that the God cohabited nightly with
    the concubine set apart for him (Herodotos, i, 181-82), as was
    similarly pretended by the priests of Amun at Thebes. Herodotos
    could not believe the story, which, indeed, is probably a late
    Greek fable; but there must have been some skeptics within the
    sphere of the Semitic cult of sacred prostitution.

    As regards freethinking in general, much would depend on the
    development of the Chaldæan astronomy. That science, growing out of
    primitive astrology (cp. Whewell, Hist. of the Induct. Sciences,
    3rd ed. i, 108), would tend to discredit, among its experts,
    much of the prevailing religious thought; and they seem to have
    carried it so far as to frame a scientific theory of comets
    (Seneca, citing Apollonius Myndius, Quaest. Nat., vii, 3;
    cp. Lib. Use. Kn. Hist. of Astron., c. 3; E. Meyer, Gesch. des
    Alterthums, i, 186; and Weber, Ind. Lit., p. 248). Such knowledge
    would greatly favour skepticism, as well as monotheism and
    pantheism. It was sought to be astrologically applied; but, as
    the horoscopes varied, this was again a source of unbelief (Meyer,
    p. 179). Medicine, again, made little progress (Herod., i, 197).

    It can hardly be doubted, finally, that in Babylonia and Assyria
    there were idealists who, like the Hebrew prophets, repudiated
    alike image-worship and the religion of sacrifices. The latter
    repudiation occurs frequently in later Greece and Rome. There,
    as in Jerusalem, it could make itself heard in virtue of the
    restrictedness of the power of the priests, who in imperial
    Babylonia and Assyria, on the other hand, might be trusted to
    suppress or override any such propaganda, as we have seen was
    done in Brahmanical India.

    Concerning image-worship, apart from the proved fact of pantheistic
    doctrine, and the parallels in Egypt and India, it is to be noted
    that Isaiah actually puts in the mouth of the Assyrian king
    a tirade against the "kingdoms of the idols" or "false gods,"
    including in these Jerusalem and Samaria (Isa. x, 10, 11). The
    passage is dramatic, but it points to the possibility that in
    Assyria just as in Israel a disbelief in idols could arise from
    reflection on the spectacle of their multitude.


The chequered political history of Babylon and Assyria, however, made
impossible any long-continued development of critical and philosophical
thought. Their amalgamations of creeds and races had in a measure
favoured such development; [201] and it was probably the setting up
of a single rule over large populations formerly at chronic war that
reduced to a minimum, if it did not wholly abolish, human sacrifice
in the later pre-Persian empires; [202] but the inevitably subject
state of the mass of the people, and the chronic military upset
of the government, were conditions fatally favourable to ordinary
superstition. The new universalist conceptions, instead of dissolving
the special cults in pantheism, led only to a fresh competition of
cults on cosmopolitan lines, all making the same pretensions, and
stressing their most artificial peculiarities as all-important. Thus,
when old tribal or local religions went proselytizing in the enlarged
imperial field, they made their most worthless stipulations--as Jewish
circumcision and abstinence from pork, and the self-mutilation of
the followers of Cybelê--the very grounds of salvation. [203] Culture
remained wholly in the hands of the priestly and official class, [204]
who, like the priesthoods of Egypt, were held to conservatism by their
vast wealth. [205] Accordingly we find the early religion of sorcery
maintaining itself in the literature of the advanced empires. [206]
The attitude of the Semitic priests and scribes towards the old Akkadic
as a sacred language was in itself, like the use of sacred books in
general, long a check upon new thought; [207] and though the Assyrian
life seems to have set this check aside, by reason of the lack of a
culture class in Assyria, the later Babylonian kingdom which rose on
the fall of Assyria was too short-lived to profit much by the gain,
being in turn overthrown in the second generation by Cyrus. It is
significant that the conqueror was welcomed by the Babylonian priests
as against their last king, the inquiring and innovating Nabonidos
[208] (Nabu-nahid), who had aimed at a monarchic polytheism or
quasi-monotheism. He is described as having turned away from Mardouk
(Merodach), the great Babylonian God, who accordingly accepted Cyrus
in his stead. It is thus clear that Cyrus, who restored the old
state of things, was no strict monotheist of the later Persian type,
but a schemer who relied everywhere on popular religious interests,
and conciliated the polytheists and henotheists of Babylon as he did
the Yahweh-worshipping Jews. [209] The Persian quasi-monotheism and
anti-idolatry, however, already existed, and it is conceivable that
they may have been intensified among the more cultured through the
peculiar juxtaposition of cults set up by the Persian conquest.


    Mr. Sayce's dictum (Hib. Lect., p. 314), that the later ethical
    element in the Akkado-Babylonian system is "necessarily" due
    to Semitic race elements, is seen to be fallacious in the light
    of his own subsequent admission (p. 353) as to the lateness of
    the development among the Semites. The difference between early
    Akkadian and later Babylonian was simply one of culture-stage. See
    Mr. Sayce's own remarks on p. 300; and compare E. Meyer (Gesch. des
    Alt., i, 178, 182, 183), who entirely rejects the claim made for
    Semitic ethics. See, again, Tiele, Outlines, p. 78, and Mr. Sayce's
    own account (Anc. Em. of the East, p. 202) of the Phoenician
    religion as "impure and cruel." Other writers take the line of
    arguing that the Phoenicians were "not Semites," and that they
    differed in all things from the true Semites (cp. Dr. Marcus
    Dods, Israel's Iron Age, 1874, p. 10, and Farrar, as there
    cited). The explanation of such arbitrary judgments seems to be
    that the Semites are assumed to have had a primordial religious
    gift as compared with "Turanians," and that the Hebrews in turn
    are assumed to have been so gifted above other Semites. We shall
    best guard against à priori injustice to the Semites themselves,
    in the conjunctures in which they really advanced civilization,
    by entirely discarding the unscientific method of explaining the
    history of races in terms of hereditary character (see below, §
    6, end).




§ 4. ANCIENT PERSIA

The Mazdean system, or worship of Ahura Mazda (Ormazd), of which we
find in Herodotos positive historical record as an anti-idolatrous
and nominally monotheistic creed [210] in the fifth century B.C., is
the first to which these aspects can be ascribed with certainty. As
the Jews are found represented in the Book of Jeremiah [211] (assumed
to have been written in the sixth century B.C.) worshipping numerous
Gods with images: and as polytheistic and idolatrous practices are
still described in the Book of Ezekiel [212] (assumed to have been
written during or after the Babylonian Captivity), it is inadmissible
to accept the unauthenticated writings of ostensibly earlier prophets
as proving even a propaganda of monotheism on their part, the so-called
Mosaic law being known to be in large part of late invention and of
Babylonian derivation. [213] In any case, the mass of the people were
clearly image-worshippers. The Persians, on the other hand, can be
taken with certainty to have had in the sixth century an imageless
worship (though images existed for other purposes), with a supreme
God set above all others. The Magian or Mazdean creed, as we have
seen, was not very devoutly held by Cyrus; but Dareios a generation
later is found holding it with zeal; and it cannot have grown in a
generation to the form it then bore. It must therefore be regarded as
a development of the religion of some section of the "Iranian" race,
centering as it does round some deities common to the Vedic Aryans.

The Mazdean system, as we first trace it in history, was the religion
of the Medes, a people joined with the Persians proper under Cyrus;
and the Magi or priests were one of the seven tribes of the Medes,
[214] as the Levites were one of the tribes of Israel. It may then be
conjectured that the Magi were the priests of a people who previously
conquered or were conquered by the Medes, who had then adopted their
religion, as did the Persians after their conquest by or union with
the Medes. Cyrus, a semi-Persian, may well have regarded the Medes
with some racial distrust, and, while using them as the national
priests, would naturally not be devout in his adherence at a time
when the two peoples were still mutually jealous. When, later,
after the assassination of his son Smerdis (Bardes or Bardija) by
the elder son, King Cambyses, and the death of the latter, the Median
and Magian interest set up the "false Smerdis," Persian conspirators
overthrew the pretender and crowned the Persian Dareios Hystaspis,
marking their sense of hostility to the Median and Magian element
by a general massacre of Magi. [215] Those Magi who survived would
naturally cultivate the more their priestly influence, the political
being thus for the time destroyed; though they seem to have stirred up
a Median insurrection in the next century against Dareios II. [216]
However that may be, Dareios I became a zealous devotee of their
creed, [217] doubtless finding that a useful means of conciliating
the Medes in general, who at the outset of his reign seem to have
given him much trouble. [218] The richest part of his dominions [219]
was East-Iran, which appears to have been the original home of the
worship of Ahura-Mazda. [220]


    Such is the view of the case derivable from Herodotos, who
    remains the main authority; but recent critics have raised some
    difficulties. That the Magians were originally a non-Median tribe
    seems clear; Dr. Tiele (Outlines, pp. 163, 165) even decides that
    they were certainly non-Aryan. Compare Ed. Meyer (Gesch. des Alt.,
    i, 530, note, 531, §§ 439, 440), who holds that the Mazdean system
    was in its nature not national but abstract, and could therefore
    take in any race. Several modern writers, however (Canon Rawlinson,
    ed. of Herodotos, i, 426-31; Five Great Monarchies, 2nd ed. ii,
    345-55, iii, 402-404; Lenormant, Chaldean Magic, Eng. tr. pp. 197,
    218-39; Sayce, Anc. Emp. of the East, p. 248), represent the
    Magians as not only anti-Aryan (= anti-Persian), but opposed to the
    very worship of Ormazd, which is specially associated with their
    name. It seems difficult to reconcile this view with the facts; at
    least it involves the assumption of two opposed sets of Magi. The
    main basis for the theory seems to be the allusion in the Behistun
    inscription of Dareios to some acts of temple-destruction by the
    usurping Magian Gomates, brother and controller of the pretender
    Smerdis. (See the inscription translated in Records of the Past,
    i, 111-15.) This Meyer sets aside as an unsettled problem, without
    inferring that the Magians were anti-Mazdean (cp. § 449 and §
    511, note). As to the massacre, however, Meyer decides (i, 613)
    that Herodotos blundered, magnifying the killing of "the Magus"
    into a slaughter of "the Magi." But this is one of the few points
    at which Herodotos is corroborated by Ktesias (cp. Grote, iii, 440,
    note). A clue to a solution may perhaps be found in the facts that,
    while the priestly system remained opposed to all image-worship,
    Dareios made emblematic images of the Supreme God (Meyer, i,
    213, 617) and of Mithra; and that Artaxerxes Mnemon later put an
    image of Mithra in the royal temple of Susa, besides erecting many
    images to Anaitis. (Rawlinson, Five Great Monarchies, iii, 320-21,
    360-61.) There may have been opposing tendencies; the conquest of
    Babylon being likely to have introduced new elements. The Persian
    art now arising shows the most marked Assyrian influences.


The religion thus imposed on the Persians seems to have been imageless
by reason of the simple defect of art among its cultivators; [221]
and to have been monotheistic only in the sense that its chief deity
was supreme over all others, including even the great Evil Power,
Ahriman (Angra Mainyu). Its God-group included Mithra, once the
equal of Ahura-Mazda, [222] and later more prominent than he; [223]
as well as a Goddess, Anahita, apparently of Akkadian origin. Before
the period of Cyrus, the eastern part of Persia seems to have been but
little civilized; [224] and it was probably there that its original
lack of images became an essential element in the doctrine of its
priests. As we find it in history, and still more in its sacred book,
the Zendavesta, which as we have it represents a late liturgical
compilation, [225] Mazdeism is a priest-made religion rather than
the work of one Zarathustra or any one reformer; and its rejection
of images, however originated, is to be counted to the credit of its
priests, like the pantheism or nominal monotheism of the Mesopotamian,
Brahmanic, and Egyptian religions. The original popular faith had
clearly been a normal polytheism. [226] For the rest, the Mazdean ethic
has the usual priestly character as regards the virtue it assigns to
sacrifice; [227] but otherwise compares favourably with Brahmanism.


    As to this cult being priest-made, see Meyer, i, 523, 540,
    541. Tiele (Outlines, pp. 167, 178) assumes a special reformation
    such as is traditionally associated with Zarathustra, holding
    that either a remarkable man or a sect must have established
    the monotheistic idea. Meyer (i, 537) holds with M. Darmesteter
    that Zarathustra is a purely mythical personage, made out of a
    Storm-God. Dr. Menzies (Hist. of Relig. p. 384) holds strongly
    by his historic actuality. The problem is analogous to those
    concerning Moses and Buddha; but though the historic case of
    Mohammed bars a confident decision in the negative, the balance
    of presumption is strongly against the traditional view. See the
    author's Pagan Christs, pp. 286-88.


There is no reason to believe, however, that among the Persian peoples
the higher view of things fared any better than elsewhere. [228] The
priesthood, however enlightened it may have been in its inner culture,
never slackened the practice of sacrifice and ceremonial; and the
worship of subordinate spirits and the propitiation of demons figured
as largely in their beliefs as in any other. In time the cult of the
Saviour-God Mithra came to the front very much as did that of Jesus
later; and in the one case as in the other, despite ethical elements,
superstition was furthered. When, still later, the recognition of
Ahriman was found to endanger the monotheistic principle, an attempt
seems to have been made under the Sassanian dynasty, in our own era,
to save it by positing a deity who was father of both Ahura-Mazda
and Angra-mainyu; [229] but this last slight effort of freethinking
speculation came to nothing. Social and political obstacles determined
the fate of Magian as of other ancient rationalism.


    According to Rawlinson, Zoroastrianism under the Parthian
    (Arsacide) empire was gradually converted into a complex system
    of idolatry, involving a worship of ancestors and dead kings
    (Sixth Orient. Mon. p. 399; Seventh Mon. pp. 8-9, 56). Gutschmid,
    however, following Justin (xli, 3, 5-6), pronounces the Parthians
    zealous followers of Zoroastrianism, dutifully obeying it in
    the treatment of their dead (Geschichte Irans von Alexander bis
    zum Untergang der Arsakiden, 1888, pp. 57-58)--a law not fully
    obeyed even by Dareios and his dynasty (Heeren, Asiatic Nations,
    Eng. tr. i, 127). Rawlinson, on the contrary, says the Parthians
    burned their dead--an abomination to Zoroastrians. Certainly
    the name of the Parthian King Mithradates implies acceptance of
    Mazdeism. At the same time Rawlinson admits that in Persia itself,
    under the Parthian dynasty, Zoroastrianism remained pure (Seventh
    Mon. pp. 9-10), and that, even when ultimately it became mixed
    up with normal polytheism, the dualistic faith and the supremacy
    of Ormazd were maintained (Five Monarchies, 2nd ed. iii, 362-63;
    cp. Darmesteter, Zendavesta, i, lxvi, 2nd ed.).




§ 5. EGYPT

The relatively rich store of memorials left by the Egyptian religions
yields us hardly any more direct light on the growth of religious
rationalism than do those of Mesopotamia, though it supplies much
fuller proof that such a growth took place. All that is clear is that
the comparison and competition of henotheistic cults there as elsewhere
led to a measure of relative skepticism, which took doctrinal shape in
a loose monism or pantheism. The language is often monotheistic, but
never, in the early period, is polytheism excluded; on the contrary,
it is affirmed in the same breath. [230] The alternate ascendancy
of different dynasties, with different Gods, forced on the process,
which included, as in Babylon, a priestly grouping of deities in
families and triads [231]--the latter arrangement, indeed, being only
a return to a primitive African conception. [232] It involved further
a syncretism or a combining of various Gods into one, [233] and also
an esoteric explanation of the God-myths as symbolical of natural
processes, or else of mystical ideas. [234] There are even evidences
of quasi-atheism in the shape of materialistic hymns on Lucretian
lines. [235] At the beginning of the New Kingdom (1500 B.C.) it had
been fully established for all the priesthoods that the Sun-God was
the one real God, and that it was he who was worshipped in all the
others. [236] He in turn was conceived as a pervading spiritual force,
of anthropomorphic character and strong moral bias. [237] This seems to
have been by way of a purification of one pre-eminent compound deity,
Amen-Ra, to begin with, whose model was followed in other cults. [238]
"Theocracies of this kind could not have been formed unconsciously. Men
knew perfectly well that they were taking a great step in advance of
their fathers." [239] There had occurred, in short, among the educated
and priestly class a considerable development, going on through
many centuries, alike in philosophical and in ethical thought; the
ethics of the Egyptian "Book of the Dead" being quite as altruistic
as those of any portion of the much later Christian Gospels. [240]
Such a development could arise only in long periods of peace and
law-abiding life; though it is found to be accelerated after the
Persian conquest, which would force upon the Egyptian priesthood
new comparisons and accommodations. [241] And yet all this was done
"without ever sacrificing the least particle of the beliefs of the
past." [242] The popular polytheism, resting on absolute ignorance,
was indestructible; and the most philosophic priests seem never to have
dreamt of unsettling it, though, as we shall see, a masterful king did.

An eminent Egyptologist has written that, "whatever literary treasures
may be brought to light in the future as the result of excavations
in Egypt, it is most improbable that we shall ever receive from
that country any ancient Egyptian work which can properly be classed
among the literature of atheism or freethought; the Egyptian might be
more or less religious according to his nature and temperament, but,
judging from the writings of his priests and teachers which are now
in our hands, the man who was without religion and God in some form
or other was most rare, if not unknown." [243] It is not clear what
significance the writer attaches to this statement. Unquestionably the
mass of the Egyptians were always naïf believers in all that was given
them as religion; and among the common people even the minds which,
as elsewhere, varied from the norm of credulity would be too much
cowed by the universal parade of religion to impugn it; while their
ignorance and general crudity of life would preclude coherent critical
thought on the subject. But to conclude that among the priesthood and
the upper classes there was never any "freethinking" in the sense
of disbelief in the popular and official religion, even up to the
point of pantheism or atheism, is to ignore the general lesson of
culture history elsewhere. Necessarily there was no "literature of
atheism or freethought." Such literature could have no public, and,
as a menace to the wealth and status of the priesthood, would have
brought death on the writer. But in such a multitudinous priesthood
there must have been, at some stages, many who realized the mummery
of the routine religion, and some who transcended the commonplaces
of theistic thought. From the former, if not from the latter, would
come esoteric explanations for the benefit of the more intelligent
of the laity of the official class, who could read; and it is idle
to decide that deeper unbelief was privately "unknown."

It is contended, as against the notion of an esoteric and an exoteric
doctrine, that the scribes "did not, as is generally supposed, keep
their new ideas carefully concealed, so as to leave to the multitude
nothing but coarse superstitions. The contrary is evident from a
number of inscriptions which can be read by anybody, and from books
which anyone can buy." [244] But the assumption that "anyone" could
read or buy books in ancient Egypt is a serious misconception. Even in
our own civilization, where "anyone" can presumably buy freethought
journals or works on anthropology and the history of religions,
the mass of the people are so placed that only by chance does such
knowledge reach them; and multitudes are so little cultured that they
would pass it by with uncomprehending indifference were it put before
them. In ancient Egypt, however, the great mass of the people could
not even read; and no man thought of teaching them.


    This fact alone goes far to harmonize the ancient Greek testimonies
    as to the existence of an esoteric teaching in Egypt with Tiele's
    contention to the contrary. See the pros and cons set forth and
    confusedly pronounced upon by Professor Chantepie de la Saussaye,
    Manual of the Science of Religion, Eng. tr. pp. 400-401. We
    know from Diodorus (i, 81), what we could deduce from our other
    knowledge of Egyptian conditions, that, apart from the priests
    and the official class, no one received any literary culture save
    in some degree the higher grades of artificers, who needed some
    little knowledge of letters for their work in connection with
    monuments, sepulchres, mummy-cases, and so forth. Cp. Maspero,
    Hist. anc. des peuples de l'orient, p. 285. Even the images of
    the higher Gods were shown to the people only on festival-days
    (Meyer Gesch. des Alterthums, i, 82).


The Egyptian civilization was thus, through all its stages, obviously
conditioned by its material basis, which in turn ultimately determined
its polity, there being no higher contemporary civilization to
lead it otherwise. An abundant, cheap, and regular food supply
maintained in perpetuity a dense and easily-exploited population,
whose lot through thousands of years was toil, ignorance, political
subjection, and a primitive mental life. [245] For such a population
general ideas had no light and no comfort; for them was the simple
human worship of the local natural Gods or the presiding Gods of the
kingdom, alike confusedly conceived as great powers, figured often
as some animal, which for the primeval mind signified indefinite
capacity and unknown possibility of power and knowledge. [246] Myths
and not theories, magic and not ethics, were their spiritual food,
albeit their peaceful animal lives conformed sufficiently to their
code. And the life-conditions of the mass determined the policy of
priest and king. The enormous priestly revenue came from the people,
and the king's power rested on both orders.


    As to this revenue see Diodorus Siculus, i, 73; and Erman, Handbook
    of Egyptian Religion, Eng. tr. 1907, p. 71. According to Diodorus,
    a third of the whole land of the kingdom was allotted to the
    priesthoods. About a sixth of the whole land seems to have been
    given to the Gods by Ramessu III alone, besides 113,000 slaves,
    490,000 cattle, and immense wealth of other kinds (Flinders
    Petrie, Hist. of Egypt, iii (1905), 154-55). The bulk of the
    possessions here enumerated seems to have gone to the temple
    of Amen at Thebes and that of the Sun-God at Heliopolis (Erman,
    as cited). It is to be noted, however, that the priestly order
    included all the physicians, lawyers, clerks, schoolmasters,
    sculptors, painters, land measurers, drug sellers, conjurers,
    diviners, and undertakers. Wilkinson, Ancient Egyptians,
    ed. Birch, 1878, i, 157-58; Sharpe, Egypt. Mythol. p. 26;
    Meyer, Gesch. des Alt. i, § 68. "The sacred domains included
    herds of cattle, birds, fishermen, serfs, and temple servants"
    (Flinders Petrie, as cited, iii, 42). When the revenues assigned
    for a temple of Seti I were found to be misappropriated, and the
    building stopped, his son, Ramessu II, assigned a double revenue
    for the completion of the work and the worship (id.). Like the
    later priesthood of Christendom, that of Egypt forged documents
    to establish claims to revenue (id. p. 69). Captured cattle in
    great quantities were bestowed on temples of Amen (id. p. 149),
    whose priests were especially grasping (id. p. 153). Thus in the
    one reign of Ramessu III they received fifty-six towns of Egypt
    and nine of Syria and 62,000 serfs (id. p. 155).


This was fully seen when King Akhunaton (otherwise Echnaton, or
Icheniton, or Akhunaton, or Akhunaten, or Chuenaten, or Khu-en-aten, or
Kku-n-aten, or Khouniatonou, or Khounaton!) = Amen-hetep or Amun-hotep
(or Amenophis) IV, moved by monotheistic zeal, departed so far from the
customary royal policy as to put under the ban all deities save that he
had chosen for himself, repudiating the God-name Amen in his own name,
and making one from that of his chosen Sun-God, Aten ("the sun's disk")
or Aton or Atonou [247] or Iton [248] (latterly held to be = the Syrian
Adon, "the Lord," symbolized by the sun's disk). There is reason to
think that his was not a mere Sun-worship, but the cult of a deity,
"Lord of the Disk," who looked through the sun's disk as through a
window. [249] In any interpretation, however, the doctrine was wholly
inacceptable to a priesthood whose multitudinous shrines its success
would have emptied. Of all the host of God-names, by one account only
that of the old Sun-God Ra-Harmachis was spared, [250] as being held
identical with that of Aten; and by one account [251] the disaffection
of priests and people rose to the point of open rebellion. At length
Akhunaton, "Glory of the Disk," as he elected to name himself, built
for himself and his God a new capital city in Middle Egypt, Akhet-Aten
(or Khut-Aten), the modern Tell-el-Amarna, where he assembled around
him a society after his own heart, and carried on his Aten-worship,
while his foreign empire was crumbling. The "Tell-el-Amarna tablets"
were found in the ruins of his city, which was deserted a generation
after his death. Though the king enforced his will while he lived,
his movement "bore no fruit whatever," his policy being reversed
after his family had died out, and his own monuments and capital city
razed to the ground by orthodox successors. [252] In the same way the
earlier attempt of the alien Hyksos to suppress the native polytheism
and image-worship had come to nothing. [253]


    The history of Akhunaton is established by the later
    Egyptology. Sharpe makes no mention of it, though the point had
    been discussed from 1839 onwards. Cp. Lepsius, Letters from Egypt,
    etc., Bohn trans. 1853, p. 27; and Nott and Gliddon's Types
    of Mankind, 1854, p. 147, and Indigenous Races of the Earth,
    1857, pp. 116-17, in both of which places will be found the
    king's portrait. See last reference for the idle theory that he
    had been emasculated, as to which the confutation by Wiedemann
    (Aegyptische Geschichte, p. 397, cited by Budge, Hist. of Egypt,
    1902, iv, 128) is sufficient. In point of fact, he figures in
    the monuments as father of three or seven children (Wiedemann,
    Rel. of Anc. Eg. p. 37; Erman, p. 69; Budge, iv, 123, 127).

    Dispute still reigns as to the origin of the cult to which
    he devoted himself. A theory of its nature and derivation,
    based on that of Mr. J. H. Breasted (History of Egypt, 1906,
    p. 396), is set forth in an article by Mr. A. E. P. Weigall
    on "Religion and Empire in Ancient Egypt" in the Quarterly
    Review, Jan. 1909. On this view Aten or Aton is simply Adon =
    "the Lord"--a name ultimately identified with Adonis, the Syrian
    Sun-God and Vegetation-God. The king's grandfather was apparently
    a Syrian, presumably of royal lineage; and Queen Tii or Thiy, the
    king's mother, who with her following had wrought a revolution
    against the priesthood of Amen, brought him up as a devotee of
    her own faith. On her death he became more and more fanatical,
    getting out of touch with people and priesthood, so that "his
    empire fell to pieces rapidly." Letters still exist (among the
    Tell-el-Amarna tablets) which were sent by his generals in Asia,
    vainly imploring help. He died at the age of twenty-eight; and
    if the body lately found, and supposed to be his, is really so,
    his malady was water on the brain.

    Mr. Breasted, finding that Akhunaton's God is described by him in
    inscriptions as "the father and the mother of all that he made,"
    ranks the cult very high in the scale of theism. Mr. Weigall
    (art. cited, p. 60; so also Budge, Hist. iv, 125) compares a hymn
    of the king's with Ps. civ, 24 sq., and praises it accordingly. The
    parallel is certainly close, but the document is not thereby
    certificated as philosophic. On the strength of the fact that
    Akhunaton "had dreamed that the Aton religion would bind the
    nations together," Mr. Weigall credits him with harbouring "an
    illusive ideal towards which, thirty-two centuries later, mankind
    is still struggling in vain" (p. 66). The ideal of subjugating
    the nations to one God, cherished later by Jews, and still later
    by Moslems, is hardly to be thus identified with the modern ideal
    of international peace. Brugsch, in turn, credits the king with
    having "willingly received the teaching about the one God of
    Light," while admitting that Aten simply meant the sun's disk
    (Hist. of Egypt, 1-vol. ed. p. 216).

    Maspero, again, declares Tii to have been an Egyptian of old
    stock, and the God "Atonou" to have been the deity of her
    tribe (Hist. anc., as cited, p. 249); and he pronounces the
    cult probably the most ancient variant of the religions of Ra
    (p. 250). Messrs. King and Hall, who also do not accept the theory
    of a Syrian derivation, coincide with Messrs. Breasted and Weigall
    in extolling Akhunaton's creed. In a somewhat summary fashion
    they pronounce (work cited, p. 383) that, "given an ignorance of
    the true astronomical character of the sun, we see how eminently
    rational a religion" was this. The conception of a moving window
    in the heavens, which appears to be the core of it, seems rather
    a darkening than a development of the "philosophical speculations
    of the priests of the Sun at Heliopolis," from which it is held by
    Messrs. King and Hall to have been derived. Similarly ill-warranted
    is the decision (id. p. 384) that in Akhunaton's heresy "we see
    ... the highest attitude [? altitude] to which religious ideas had
    attained before the days of the Hebrew prophets." Alike in India
    and in Egypt, pantheistic ideas of a larger scope than his or those
    of the Hebrew prophets had been attained before Akhunaton's time.

    Dr. E. A. Wallis Budge, on the other hand, points out that the cult
    of the Aten is really an ancient one in Egypt, and was carried
    on by Thothmes III, father of Amen-hetep II, a century before
    Akhunaton (Amen-hetep IV), its "original home" being Heliopolis
    (History of Egypt, 1902, iv, 48, 119). So also von Bissing,
    Gesch. Aeg. in Umriss, p. 52 (reading "Iton"). Rejecting the view
    that "Aten" is only a form of "Adon," Dr. Budge pronounces that
    "as far as can be seen now the worship of Aten was something
    like a glorified materialism"--whatever that may be--"which had
    to be expounded by priests who performed ceremonies similar
    to those which belonged to the old Heliopolitan sun-worship,
    without any connection whatsoever with the worship of Yahweh;
    and a being of the character of the Semitic God Adôn had no place
    in it anywhere." Further, he considers that it "contained no
    doctrines on the unity or oneness of Aten similar to those which
    are found in the hymns to Ra, and none of the beautiful ideas
    on the future life with which we are familiar from the hymns and
    other compositions in the Book of the Dead" (Ib. pp. 120-21).

    By Prof. Flinders Petrie Queen Tii or Thiy is surmised to have
    been of Armenian origin (see Budge, iv, 96-98, as to her being
    "Mesopotamian"); and Prof. Petrie, like Mr. Breasted, has
    inferred that she brought with her the cult of which her son
    became the devotee. (So also Brugsch, p. 214.) Messrs. King and
    Hall recognize that the cult had made some headway before Akhunaton
    took it up; but deny that there is any reason for supposing Queen
    Tii to have been of foreign origin; adding: "It seems undoubted
    that the Aten cult was a development of pure Egyptian religious
    thought." Certainty on such an issue seems hardly possible; but
    it may be said, as against the theory of a foreign importation,
    that there is no evidence whatever of any high theistic cult of
    Adonis in Syria at the period in question. Adonis was primarily
    a Vegetation-God; and the older view that Aten simply means
    "the sun's disk" is hardly disposed of. It is noteworthy that
    under Akhunaton's patronage Egyptian sculpture enjoyed a term
    of freedom from the paralyzing convention which reigned before
    and after (King and Hall, as cited, pp. 383-84). This seems to
    have been the result of the innovating taste of the king (Budge,
    Hist. iv, 124-26).


As the centuries lapsed the course of popular religion was rather
downward than upward, if it can be measured by the multiplication of
superstitions. [254] When under the Ramesside dynasty the high-priests
of Amen became by marriage with the royal family the virtual rulers,
sacerdotalism went from bad to worse. [255] The priests, who held the
allegorical key to mythology, seem to have been the main multipliers of
magic and fable, mummery, ceremonial, and symbol; and they jealously
guarded their specialty against lay competition. [256] Esoteric and
exoteric doctrine flourished in their degrees side by side, [257] the
instructed few apparently often accepting or acting upon both; and
primitive rites all the while flourished on the level of the lowest
savagery, [258] though the higher ethical teaching even improves,
as in India.

Conflicts, conquests, and changes of dynasties seem to have made
little difference in the life of the common people. [259] Religion was
the thread by which any ruler could lead them; and after the brief
destructive outbreak of Cambyses, [260] himself at first tolerant,
the Persian conquerors allowed the old faiths to subsist, caring only,
like their predecessors, to prevent strife between the cults which
would not tolerate each other. [261] The Ptolemies are found adopting
and using the native cults as the native kings had done ages before
them; [262] and in the learned Greek-speaking society created by their
dynasty at Alexandria there can have been at least as little concrete
belief as prevailed in the priesthood of the older civilization. It
developed a pantheistic philosophy which ultimately, in the hands
of Plotinus, compares very well with that of the Upanishads and of
later European systems. But this was a hot-house flower; and in the
open world outside, where Roman rule had broken the power of the
ancient priesthood and Greek immigration had overlaid the native
element, Christianity found an easy entrance, and in a declining
society flourished at its lowest level. [263] The ancient ferment,
indeed, produced many stirrings of relative freethought in the
form of Christian heresies to be noted hereafter; one of the most
notable being that of Arius, who, like his antagonist Athanasius,
was an Alexandrian. But the cast of mind which elaborated the dogma
of the Trinity is as directly an outcome of Egyptian culture-history
as that which sought to rationalize the dogma by making the popular
deity a created person; [264] and the long and manifold internecine
struggles of the sects were the due duplication of the older strifes
between the worshippers of the various sacred animals in the several
cities. [265] In the end the entire population was but so much clay
to take the impress of the Arab conquerors, with their new fanatic
monotheism standing for the minimum of rational thought.

For the rest, the higher forms of the ancient religion had been
able to hold their own till they were absolutely suppressed, with
the philosophic schools, by the Byzantine government, which at the
same time marked the end of the ancient civilization by destroying
or scattering the vast collection of books in the Serapeion,
annihilating at once the last pagan cult and the stored treasure
of pagan culture. With that culture too, however, there had been
associated to the last the boundless credulity which had so long kept
it company. In the second century of our era, under the Antonines,
we have Apuleius telling of Isis worshipped as "Nature, parent of
things, mistress of all elements, the primordial birth of the ages,
highest of divinities, queen of departed spirits, first of the heavenly
ones, the single manifestation of all Gods and Goddesses," who rules
all things in earth and heaven, and who stands for the sole deity
worshipped throughout the world under many names; [266] the while
her worshipper cherishes all manner of the wildest superstitions,
which even the subtle philosophy of the Alexandrian Neo-Platonic
school did not discard. All alike, with the machinery of exorcism,
were passed on to the worship of the Christian Queen of Heaven, leaving
out only the pantheism; and when that worship in turn was overthrown,
the One God of Islam enrolled in his train the same host of ancient
hallucinations. [267] The fatality of circumstance was supreme.




§ 6. PHOENICIA

Of the inner workings of thought in the Phoenician religion we know
even less, directly, than can be gathered as to any other ancient
system of similar notoriety, [268] so completely did the Roman conquest
of Carthage, and the Macedonian conquest of Tyre and Sidon, blot out
the literary remains of their peoples. Yet there are some indirect
clues of a remarkable sort.

It is hardly to be doubted, in the first place, that Punic speculation
took the same main lines as the early thought of Egypt and Mesopotamia,
whose cultures, mixing in Syria as early as the fifteenth century
B.C., had laid the basis of the later Phoenician civilization. [269]
The simple fact that among the Syro-Phoenicians was elaborated the
alphabet adopted by all the later civilizations of the West almost
implies a special measure of intellectual progress. We can indeed
trace the normal movement of syncretism in the cults, and the normal
tendency to improve their ethics. The theory of an original pure
monotheism [270] is no more tenable here than anywhere else; we
can see that the general designation of the chief God of any city,
usually recognizable as a Sun-God, by a title rather than a name,
[271] though it pointed to a general worship of a pre-eminent power,
in no sense excluded a belief in minor powers, ranking even as
deities. It did not do so in the admittedly polytheistic period;
and it cannot therefore be supposed to have done so previously.


    The chief Phoenician Gods, it is admitted, were everywhere called
    by one or several of the titles Baal (Lord), Ram or Rimmon
    (High), Melech or Molech (King), Melkarth (King of the City),
    Eliun (Supreme), Adonai (Lord), Bel-Samin (Lord of Heaven),
    etc. (Cp. Rawlinson, History of Phoenicia, p. 231; Tiele,
    Hist. comp. des anc. relig., etc., Fr. tr. 1882, ch. iii,
    pp. 281-87; Outlines, p. 82; Meyer, Gesch. des Alt. i, 246,
    and art. "Phoenicia" in Encyc. Biblica, iii, 3742-5; Sayce,
    Ancient Empires, p. 200.) The just inference is that the Sun-God
    was generally worshipped, the sun being for the Semitic peoples
    the pre-eminent Nature-power. "He alone of all the Gods is by
    Philo explained not as a deified man, but as the sun, who had
    been invoked from the earliest times" (Meyer, last cit.). (All
    Gods were not Baals: the division between them and lesser powers
    corresponded somewhat, as Tiele notes, to that between Theoi
    and Daimones with the Greeks, and Ases and Vanes with the old
    Scandinavians. So in Babylonia and India the Bels and Asuras
    were marked off from lesser deities.) The fact that the Western
    Semites thus carried with them the worship of their chief deities
    in all their colonies would seem to make an end of the assumption
    (Gomme, Ethnology of Folklore, p. 68; Menzies, History of Religion,
    pp. 284, 250) that there is something specially "Aryan" in the
    "conception of Gods who could and did accompany the tribes
    wheresoever they travelled." Cp. Meyer, Gesch. des Alt. iii, 169.

    The worship of the Baal, however, being that of a special
    Nature-power, cannot in early any more than in later times have
    been monotheistic. What happened was a preponderance of the
    double cult of the God and Goddess, Baal and Ashtoreth, as in
    the unquestionably polytheistic period (Rawlinson, p. 323; Tiele,
    Hist. Comp., as cited, p. 319).


Apart from this normal tendency to identify Gods called by the same
title (a state of things which, however, in ancient as in modern
Catholic countries, tended at the same time to set up special adoration
of a given image), there is seen in the later religion of Phoenicia
a spirit of syncretism which operated in a manner the reverse of that
seen in later Jewry. In the latter case the national God was ultimately
conceived, however fanatically, as universal, all others being negated:
in commercial Phoenicia, many foreign Gods were adopted, [272] the
tendency being finally to conceive them as all manifestations of one
Power. [273] And there is reason to suppose that in the cosmopolitan
world of the Phoenician cities the higher intelligence reached a yet
more subversive, though still fallacious, theory of religion. The
pretended ancient Phoenician cosmogony of Sanchoniathon, preserved
by Eusebius, [274] while worthless as a record of the most ancient
beliefs, [275] may be taken as representing views current not only in
the time and society of Philo of Byblos (100 C.E.), who had pretended
to translate it, but in a period considerably earlier. This cosmogony
is, as Eusebius complains, deliberately atheistic; and it further
systematically explains away all God stories as being originally true
of remarkable men.

Where this primitive form of atheistic rationalism originated we
cannot now tell. But it was in some form current before the time of
the Greek Evêmeros, who systematically developed it about 300 B.C.;
for in a monotheistic application it more or less clearly underlies
the redaction of much of the Hebrew Bible, where both patriarchal and
regal names of the early period are found to be old God-names; and
where the Sun-God Samson is made a "judge" [276]--having originally
been the Judge-God. In the Byblian writer, however, the purpose
is not monotheistic, but atheistic; and the problem is whether
this or that was the earlier development of the method. The natural
presumption seems to be that the Hebrew adaptors of the old mythology
used an already applied method, as the Christian Fathers later used
the work of Evêmeros; and the citation from Thallos by Lactantius
[277] suggests that the method had been applied in Chaldea, as it
was spontaneously applied by the Greek epic poets who made memorable
mortals out of the ancient deities Odysseus and Æneas, [278] Helen,
Castor and Pollux, Achilles, and many more. [279] It is in any case
credible enough that among the much-travelling Phoenicians, with their
open pantheon, an atheistic Evêmerism was thought out by the skeptical
types before Evêmeros; and that the latter really drew his principles
from Phoenicia. [280] At any rate, they were there received, doubtless
by a select few, as a means of answering the customary demand for
"something in place of" the rejected Gods. Concerning the tradition
that an ancient Phoenician, Moschus, had sketched an atomic theory,
we may again say that, though there is no valid evidence for the
statement, it counts for something as proof that the Phoenicians had
an old repute for rationalism.


    The Byblian cosmogony may be conceived as an atheistic refinement
    on those of Babylon, adopted by the Jews. It connects with
    the theogony ascribed to Hesiod (which has Asiatic aspects),
    in that both begin with Chaos, and the Gods of Hesiod are born
    later. But whereas in Hesiod Chaos brings forth Erebos and
    Night (Eros being causal force), and Night bears Æther and Day
    to Erebos, while Earth virginally brings forth Heaven (Uranos)
    and the Sea, and then bears the first Gods in union with Heaven,
    the Phoenician fragment proceeds from black chaos and wind, after
    long ages, through Eros or Desire, to a kind of primeval slime,
    from which arise first animals without intelligence, who in
    turn produce some with intelligence. The effort to expel Deity
    must have been considerable, for sun and moon and stars seem
    to arise uncreated, and the sun's action spontaneously produces
    further developments. The first man and his wife are created by
    male and female principles of wind, and their offspring proceed
    to worship the Sun, calling him Beel Samin. The other Gods are
    explained as eminent mortals deified after their death. See the
    details in Cory's Ancient Fragments, Hodges' ed. pp. 1-22. As to
    Moschus, cp. Renouvier, Manuel de philos. ancienne, 1844, i, 238;
    and Mosheim's ed. of Cudworth's Intellectual System, Harrison's
    tr. i, 20; also Cudworth's Eternal and Immutable Morality, same
    ed. iii, 548. On the general question of Phoenician rationalism,
    compare Pausanias's account (vii, 23) of his discussion with a
    Sidonian, who explained that Apollo was simply the sun, and his
    son Æsculapius simply the healing art.


At the same time there are signs even in Phoenician worship of an
effort after an ethical as well as an intellectual purification of the
common religion. To call "the" Phoenician religion "impure and cruel"
[281] is to obscure the fact that in all civilizations certain types
and cults vary from the norm. In Phoenicia as in Israel there were
humane anti-sensualists who either avoided or impugned the sensual
and the cruel cults around them; as well as ascetics who stood by
human sacrifice while resisting sexual licence. That the better types
remained the minority is to be understood in terms of the balance
of the social and cultural forces of their civilization, not of any
racial bias or defect, intellectual or moral.


    The remark of E. Meyer (Gesch. des Alt. i, 211, § 175), that
    an ethical or mystical conception of the God was "entirely
    alien" to "the Semite," reproduces the old fallacy of definite
    race-characters; and Mr. Sayce, in remarking that "the immorality
    performed in the name of religion was the invention of the Semitic
    race itself" (Anc. Emp. p. 203; contrast Tiele, Outlines, p. 83),
    after crediting the Semitic race with an ethical faculty alien to
    the Akkadian (above, p. 66), suggests another phase of the same
    error. There is nothing special to the Semites in the case save
    degree of development, similar phenomena being found in many savage
    religions, in Mexico, and in India. (Meyer in later passages and
    in his article on Ba'al in Boscher's Lexikon modifies his position
    as to Semitic versus other religions.) On the other hand, there
    was a chaste as well as an unchaste worship of the Phoenician
    Ashtoreth. Ashtoreth Karnaim, or Tanit, the Virgin, as opposed to
    Atergates and Annit, the Mother-Goddesses, had the characteristics
    of Artemis. Cp. Tiele, Religion comparée, as cited, pp. 318-19;
    Menzies, History of Religion, pp. 159, 168-71; Kuenen, Religion of
    Israel, i, 91; Smith, Religion of the Semites, pp. 292, 458. [In
    Rome, Venus Cloacina, sometimes ignorantly described as a Goddess
    of Vice, was anciently "the Goddess of chaste and holy matrimony"
    (Ettore Pais, Ancient Legends of Roman History, Eng. tr. 1906,
    p. 199)]. For the rest, the cruelty of the Phoenician cults,
    in the matter of human sacrifice, was fully paralleled among
    the early Teutons. See Tiele, Outlines, p. 199; and the author's
    Pagan Christs, Pt. ii, ch. i, § 4.




§ 7. ANCIENT CHINA

Of all the ancient Asiatic systems that of China yields us the
first clear biographical trace of a practical rationalist, albeit
a rationalist stamped somewhat by Chinese conservatism. Confucius
(Kung-fu-tse = Kung the Master) is a tangible person, despite some
mythic accretions, whereas Zarathustra and Buddha are at best but
doubtful possibilities, and even Lao-Tsze (said to have been born
604 B.C.) is somewhat elusive.

Before Confucius (551-478 B.C.), it is evident, there had been a
slackening in religious belief among the governing classes. It is
claimed for the Chinese, as for so many other races, that they had
anciently a "pure" monotheism; [282] but the ascription, as usual,
is misleading. They saw in the expanse of heaven the "Supreme"
Power, not as a result of reflection on the claims of other deities
among other races, but simply as expressing their primordial tribal
recognition of that special God, before contact with the God-ideas
of other peoples. Monotheistic in the modern sense they could not
be. Concerning them as concerning the Semites we may say that the
claim of a primary monotheism for them "is also true of all primitive
totemistic or clannish communities. A man is born into a community
with such a divine head, and the worship of that God is the only one
possible to him." [283] Beside the belief in the Heaven-God, there
stood beliefs in heavenly and earthly spirits, and in ancestors,
who were worshipped with altars. [284]


    The remark of Professor Legge (Religions of China, p. 11), that
    the relation of the names Shang-Ti = Supreme Ruler, and T'ien =
    the sky, "has kept the monotheistic element prominent in the
    religion proper of China down to the present time," may serve
    to avert disputation. It may be agreed that the Chinese were
    anciently "monotheists" in the way in which they are at present,
    when they worship spirits innumerable. When, however, Professor
    Legge further says (p. 16) that the ancient monotheism five
    thousand years ago was "in danger of being corrupted" by nature
    worship and divination, he puts in doubt the meaning of the other
    expression above cited. He states several times (pp. 46, 51, 52)
    that the old monotheism remains; but speaks (p. 84) of the mass of
    the people as "cut off from the worship of God for themselves." And
    see p. 91 as to ancestor-worship by the Emperor. Tiele (Outlines,
    p. 27) in comparison somewhat overstresses the polytheistic aspect
    of the Chinese religion in his opening definition; but he adds the
    essential facts. Dr. Legge's remark that "the idea of revelation
    did not shock" the ancient Chinese (p. 13) is obscure. He is
    dealing with the ordinary Akkado-Babylonian astrology. Pauthier,
    on the contrary (Chine Moderne, 1853, p. 250), asserts that in
    China "no doctrine has ever been put forth as revealed."


As regards ancestral worship, we have record of a display of disregard
for it by the lords of Lû in Confucius's time; [285] and the general
attitude of Confucius himself, religious only in his adherence to
old ceremonies, is incompatible with a devout environment. It has
been disputed whether he makes a "skeptic denial of any relation
between man and a living God"; [286] but an authority who disputes
this complains that his "avoiding the personal name of Tî, or God,
and only using the more indefinite term Heaven," suggests "a coldness
of temperament and intellect in the matter of religion." [287] He was,
indeed, above all things a moralist; and concerning the spirits in
general he taught that "To give one's self to the duties due to men,
and, while respecting spiritual beings, to keep aloof from them, may be
called wisdom." [288] He would never express an opinion concerning the
fate of souls, [289] or encourage prayer; [290] and in his redaction of
the old records he seems deliberately to have eliminated mythological
expressions. [291] "I would say," writes Dr. Legge (who never forgets
to be a missionary), "that he was unreligious rather than irreligious;
yet, by the coldness of his temperament and intellect in this matter,
his influence is unfavourable to the development of true religious
feeling among the Chinese people generally, and he prepared the way
for the speculations of the literati of medieval and modern times,
which have exposed them to the charge of atheism." [292]


    The view that there was a very early "arrest of growth" in
    the Chinese religion (Menzies, History of Religion, p. 108),
    "before the ordinary developments of mythology and doctrine,
    priesthood," etc., had "time to take place," is untenable as to
    the mythology. The same writer had previously spoken (p. 107) of
    the Chinese system before Confucius as having "already parted with
    all savage and irrational elements." That Confucius would seek
    to eliminate these seems likely enough, though the documentary
    fact is disputed.


In the elder contemporary of Confucius, Lao-Tsze ("Old Philosopher"),
the founder of Taouism, may be recognized another and more remarkable
early freethinker of a different stamp, in some essential respects
much less conservative, and in intellectual cast markedly more
original. Where Confucius was an admirer and student of antiquity,
Lao-Tsze expressly put such concern aside, [293] seeking a law of
life within himself, in a manner suggestive of much Indian and other
Oriental thought. So far as our records go, he is the first known
philosopher who denied that men could form an idea of deity, that
being the infinite; and he avowedly evolved, by way of makeshift,
the idea of a primordial and governing Reason (Tau), closely analogous
to the Logos of later Platonism. Since the same idea is traceable in
more primitive forms alike in the Babylonian and Brahmanic systems,
[294] it is arguable that he may have derived it from one of these
sources; but the problem is very obscure. In any case, his system is
one of rationalistic pantheism. [295]

His personal relation to Confucius was that of a self-poised sage,
impatient of the other's formalism and regard to prescription and
precedent. Where they compare is in their avoidance of supernaturalism,
and in the sometimes singular rationality of their views of social
science; in which latter respect, however, they were the recipients
and transmitters of an already classic tradition. [296] Thus both had
a strong bias to conservatism; and in Lao-Tsze it went the length of
prescribing that the people should not be instructed. [297] Despite
this, it is not going too far to say that no ancient people appears
to have produced sane thinkers and scientific moralists earlier than
the Chinese. The Golden Rule, repeatedly formulated by Confucius,
seems to be but a condensation on his part of doctrine he found in the
older classics; [298] and as against Lao-Tsze he is seen maintaining
the practical form of the principle of reciprocity. The older man,
like some later teachers, preached the rule of returning kindness for
evil, [299] without leaving any biographical trace of such practice on
his own part. Confucius, dealing with human nature as it actually is,
argued that evil should be met by justice, and kindness with kindness,
else the evil were as much fostered as the good. [300]


    It is to be regretted that Christian writers should keep up the
    form of condemning Confucius (so Legge, Religions of China,
    p. 144; Life and Teachings of Confucius, 4th ed. p. 111 sq.;
    Douglas, p. 144) for a teaching the practice of which is normally
    possible, and is never transcended in their own Church, where the
    profession of returning good for evil merely constitutes one of
    the great hypocrisies of civilization. Dr. Legge does not scruple
    to resort to a bad sophism in this connection. "If," he says,
    "we only do good to them that do good to us, what reward have
    we?" He thus insinuates that Confucius vetoed any spontaneous act
    of benevolence. The question is not of such acts, but of kind acts
    to those who seek to injure us. On the other hand, Mr. Chalmers,
    who dedicates his translation of Lao-Tsze to Dr. Legge,
    actually taunts Lao-Tsze (p. 38) with absurdity in respect of
    his doctrine. Such is the sincerity of orthodox polemic. How
    little effect the self-abnegating teaching of Lao-Tsze, in turn,
    has had on his followers may be gathered from their very legends
    concerning him (Douglas, p. 182). There is a fallacy, further,
    in the Christian claim that Confucius (Analects, v, 11; xv, 23)
    put the Golden Rule in a lower form than that of the Gospels, in
    that he gave it the negative form, "Do not that which ye would not
    have done unto you." This is really the rational and valid form of
    the Rule. The positive form, unless construed in the restrictive
    sense, would merely prescribe a non-moral doing of favours in
    the hope of receiving favours in return. It appears, further,
    from the passage in the Analects, v, 11, that the doctrine in
    this form was familiar before Confucius.


Lao-Tsze, on his part, had reduced religion to a minimum. "There is
not a word in the Tâo Têh King [by Lao-Tsze] of the sixth century
B.C. that savours either of superstition or religion." [301] But the
quietist and mystical philosophy of Lao-Tsze and the practicality
of Confucius alike failed to check the growth of superstition among
the ever-increasing ignorant Chinese population. Says our Christian
authority: "In the works of Lieh-Tsze and Chwang-Tsze, followers of
Lao-Tsze, two or three centuries later, we find abundance of grotesque
superstition, though we are never sure how far those writers really
believed the things they relate." In point of fact, Lieh-Tsze is now
commonly held by scholars to be an imaginary personage, whose name is
given to a miscellaneous collection of teachings and moral tales, much
interpolated and added to long after the date assigned to him--circa
400 B.C. [302] It contains a purely pantheistic statement of the cosmic
problem, [303] and among the apologues is one in which a boy of twelve
years is made tersely and cogently to rebut the teleological view of
things. [304] The writers of such sections are not likely to have held
the superstitions set forth in others. But that superstition should
supervene upon light where the means of light were dwindling was a
matter of course. It was but the old fatality, seen in Brahmanism,
in Buddhism, in Egypt, in Islam, and in Christianity.

Confucius himself was soon worshipped. [305] A reaction against him
set in after a century or two, doctrines of pessimism on the one hand,
and of universal love on the other, finding a hearing; [306] but the
influence of the great Confucian teacher Mencius (Meng-Tse) carried
his school through the struggle. "In his teaching, the religious
element retires still further into the background" [307] than in that
of Confucius; and he is memorable for his insistence on the remarkable
principle of Confucius, that "the people are born good"; that they are
the main part of the State; and that it is the ruler's fault if they
go astray. [308] Some rulers seem to have fully risen to this view
of things, for we have an account of a rationalistic duke, who lived
earlier than 250 B.C., refusing to permit the sacrifice of a man as
a scapegoat on his behalf; and in the year 166 B.C. such sacrifices
were permanently abolished by the Han Emperor Wen. [309] But Mencius,
who, as a sociologist, excels not only Lao-Tsze but Confucius, put his
finger on the central force in Chinese history when he taught that "it
is only men of education who, without a certain livelihood, are able to
maintain a fixed heart. As to the people, if they have not a certain
livelihood, it follows that they will not have a fixed heart." [310]
So clearly was the truth seen in China over two thousand years ago. But
whether under feudalism or under imperialism, under anarchy or under
peace--and the teachings of Lao-Tsze and Mencius combined to discredit
militarism [311]--the Chinese mass always pullulated on cheap food,
at a low standard of comfort, and in a state of utter ignorance. Hence
the cult of Confucius was maintained among them only by recognizing
their normal superstition; but on that basis it has remained secure,
despite competition, and even a term of early persecution. One
iconoclastic emperor, the founder of the Ch'in or Ts'in dynasty
(221 or 212 B.C.), sought to extirpate Confucianism as a means to a
revolution in the government; but the effort came to nothing. [312]

In the same way Lao-Tsze came to be worshipped as a God [313] under
the religion called Taouism, a title sometimes mistranslated as
rationalism, "a name admirably calculated to lead the mind astray as
to what the religion is." [314] It would seem as if the older notion
of the Tau, philosophically purified by Lao-Tsze, remained a popular
basis for his school, and so wrought its degradation. The Taoists or
Tao-sse "do their utmost to be as unreasonable as possible." [315]
They soon reverted from the philosophic mysticism of Lao-Tsze,
after a stage of indifferentism, [316] to a popular supernaturalism,
[317] which "the cultivated Chinese now regard with unmixed contempt";
[318] the crystallized common-sense of Confucius, on the other hand,
allied as it is with official ceremonialism, retaining its hold as
an esoteric code for the learned. The evolution has thus closely
resembled that which took place in India.

Nowhere, perhaps, is our sociological lesson more clearly to be
read than in China. Centuries before our era it had a rationalistic
literature, an ethic no less earnest and far more sane that that of
the Hebrews, and a line of known teachers as remarkable in their way
as those of ancient Greece who flourished about the same period. But
where even Greece, wrought upon by all the other cultures of antiquity,
ultimately retrograded, till under Christianity it stayed at a Chinese
level of unprogressiveness for a thousand years, isolated China,
helped by no neighbouring culture adequate to the need, has stagnated
as regards the main mass of its life, despite some political and other
fluctuations, till our own day. Its social problem, like that of India,
is now more or less dependent, unfortunately, on the solutions that
may be reached in Europe, where the problem is only relatively more
mature, not fundamentally different.




§ 8. MEXICO AND PERU

In the religions of pre-Christian Mexico and Peru we have peculiarly
interesting examples of "early" religious systems, flourishing at
some such culture-level as the ancient Akkadian, in full play at
the time of the European Renaissance. In Mexico a partly "high"
ethical code, as the phrase goes, went concurrently with the most
frightful indulgence in human sacrifice, sustained by the continuous
practice of indecisive war for the securing of captives, and by the
interest of a vast priesthood. In this system had been developed all
the leading features of those of the Old World--the identification
of all the Gods with the Sun; the worship of fire, and the annual
renewal of it by special means; the conception of God-sacrifice and of
communion with the God by the act of eating his slain representative;
the belief in a Virgin-Mother-Goddess; the connection of humanitarian
ethic with the divine command; the opinion that celibacy, as a state
of superior virtue, is incumbent on most priests and on all would-be
saints; the substitution of a sacramental bread for the "body and
blood" of the God-Man; the idea of an interceding Mother-Goddess;
the hope of a coming Saviour; the regular practice of prayer;
exorcism, special indulgences, confession, absolution, fasting, and
so on. [319] In Peru, also, many of those conceptions were in force;
but the limitation of the power and numbers of the priesthood by the
imperial system of the Incas, and the state of peace normal in their
dominions, prevented the Mexican development of human sacrifice.

It seems probable that the Toltecs, who either fled before or were
for the most part subdued or destroyed by the barbarian Chichimecs
(in turn subdued by the Aztecs) a few centuries before Cortes, were
on the whole a less warlike and more civilized people, with a less
bloody worship. [320] Their God, Quetzalcoatl, retained through fear
by the Aztecs, [321] was a comparatively benign deity opposed to
human sacrifice, apparently rather a late purification or partial
rationalization of an earlier God-type than a primitively harmless
conception. [322] Insofar as they were sundered by quarrels between
the sectaries of the God Quetzalcoatl and the God Votan, though
their religious wars seem to have been as cruel as those of the
early Christians of North Africa, there appears to have been at work
among them a movement towards unbloody religion. In any case their
overthrow seems to stand for the military inferiority of the higher
and more rational civilization [323] to the lower and more religious,
which in turn, however, was latterly being destroyed by its enormously
burdensome military and priestly system, and may even be held to have
been ruined by its own superstitious fears. [324]

Among the recognizable signs of normal progress in the ordinary Aztec
religion were (1) the general recognition of the Sun as the God really
worshipped in all the temples of the deities with special names;
[325] (2) the substitution in some cults of baked bread-images for a
crucified human victim. The question arises whether the Aztecs, but
for their overwhelming priesthood, might conceivably have risen above
their system of human sacrifices, as the Aryan Hindus had done in an
earlier age. Their material civilization, which carried on that of
the kindred Toltecs, was at several points superior to that which the
Spaniards put in its place; and their priesthood, being a leisured
and wealthy class, might have developed intellectually as did the
Brahmans, [326] if its economic basis had been changed. But only a
conquest or other great political convulsion could conceivably have
overturned the vast cultus of human sacrifice, which overran all life,
and cherished war as a means of procuring victims.

In the kindred State of Tezcuco, civilization seems to have gone
further than in Aztec Anahuac; and about the middle of the fifteenth
century one Tezcucan king, the conqueror Netzahualcoyotl, who has
left writings in both prose and verse, is seen attaining to something
like a philosophic creed, of a monotheistic stamp. [327] He is said
to have rejected all idol-worship, and erected, as aforesaid, an
altar "to the Unknown God," [328] forbidding all sacrifices of blood
in that worship. But among the Tezcucans these never ceased; three
hundred slaves were sacrificed at the obsequies of the conqueror's son,
Netzahualpilli; and the Aztec influence over the superior civilization
was finally complete.

In Peru, again, we find civilization advancing in respect of the
innovation of substituting statuettes for wives and slaves in the
tombs of the rich; and we have already noted [329] the remarkable
records of the avowed unbelief of several Incas in the divinity of
the nationally worshipped Sun. For the rest, there was the dubious
quasi-monotheistic cult of the Creator-God, Pachacamac, concerning
whom every fresh discussion raises fresh doubt. [330]


    Mr. Lang, as usual, leans to the view that Pachacamac
    stands for a primordial and "elevated" monotheism (Making of
    Religion, pp. 263-70), while admitting the slightness of the
    evidence. Garcilasso, the most eminent authority, who, however,
    is contradicted by others, represents that the conception
    of Pachacamac as Creator, needing no temple or sacrifice, was
    "philosophically" reached by the Incas and their wise men (Lang,
    p. 262). The historical fact seems to be that a race subdued
    by the Incas, the Yuncas, had one temple to this deity; and
    that the Incas adopted the cult. Garcilasso says the Yuncas had
    human sacrifices and idols, which the Incas abolished, setting up
    their monotheistic cult in that one temple. This is sufficiently
    unlikely; and it may very well have been the fact that the Yuncas
    had offered no sacrifices. But if they did not, it was because
    their material conditions, like those of the Australians and
    Fuegians, had not facilitated the practice; and in that case
    their "monotheism" likewise would merely represent the ignorant
    simplicity of a clan-cult. (Compare Tylor, Primitive Culture,
    ii, 335 sq.; Brinton, Myths of the New World, p. 52.) On the
    other hand, if the Incas had set up a cult without sacrifices
    to a so-called One God, their idea would be philosophical, as
    taking into account the multitude of clan-cults as well as their
    own national worships, and transcending these.


But the outstanding sociological fact in Incarial Peru was the
absolute subjection of the mass of the people; and though its material
development and political organization were comparable to those of
ancient Persia under the Akhamenidæ, so that the Spanish Conquest
stood here for mere destruction, there is no reason to think that at
the best its intellectual life could have risen higher than that of
pre-Alexandrian Egypt, to which it offers so many resemblances. The
Incas' schools were for the nobility only. [331] Rationalistic Incas
and high priests might have ruled over a docile, unlettered multitude,
gradually softening their moral code, in connection with their rather
highly-developed doctrine (resembling the Egyptian) of a future
state. But these seem the natural limits, in the absence of contact
with another civilization not too disparate for a fruitful union.

In Mexico, on the other hand, an interaction of native cultures had
already occurred to some purpose; and the strange humanitarianism of
the man-slaying priests, who made free public hospitals of part of
their blood-stained temples, [332] suggests a possibility of esoteric
mental culture among them. They had certainly gone relatively far in
their moral code, as apart from their atrocious creed of sacrifice,
even if we discount the testimony of the benevolent priest Sahagun;
[333] and they had the beginnings of a system of education for the
middle classes. [334] But unless one of the States which habitually
warred for captives should have conquered the others--in which case
a strong ruler might have put an end to the wholesale religious
slaughter of his own subjects, as appears to have been done anciently
in Mesopotamia--the priests in all likelihood would never have
transcended their hideous hallucination of sacrifice. Their murdered
civilization is thus the "great perhaps" of sociology; organized
religion being the most sinister factor in the problem.




§ 9. THE COMMON FORCES OF DEGENERATION

It is implied more or less in all the foregoing summaries that there
is an inherent tendency in all systematized and instituted religion to
degenerate intellectually and morally, save for the constant corrective
activity of freethought. It may be well, however, to note specifically
the forms or phases of the tendency.

1. Dogmatic and ritual religion being, to begin with, a more or
less general veto on fresh thinking, it lies in its nature that the
religious person is as such less intelligently alive to all problems of
thought and conduct than he otherwise might be--a fact which at least
outweighs, in a whole society, the gain from imposing a terrorized
conformity on the less well-biassed types. Wherever conduct is a matter
of sheer obedience to a superhuman code, it is ipso facto uncritical
and unprogressive. Thus the history of most religions is a record of
declines and reformations, each new affirmation of moral freethought
ad hoc being in turn erected into a set of sheer commands. To set
up the necessary ferment of corrective thought even for a time,
there seems to be needed (a) a provocation to the intelligence, as
in the spectacle of conflict of cults; and (b) a provocation to the
moral sense and to self-interest through a burdensome pressure of
rites or priestly exactions. An exceptional personality, of course,
may count for much in the making of a movement; though the accident
of the possession of kingly power by a reformer seems to count for
much more than does genius.

2. The fortunes of such reactions are determined by socio-economic or
political conditions. They are seen to be at a minimum, as to energy
and social effect, in the conditions of greatest social invariability,
as in ancient Egypt, where progress in thought, slow at best, was
confined to the priestly and official class, and never affected
popular culture.

3. In the absence of social conditions fitted to raise popular
levels of life and thought, every religious system tends to
worsen intellectually in the sense of adding to its range of
superstition--that is, of ignorant and unreasoning belief. Credulity
has its own momentum. Even the possession of limitary sacred books
cannot check this tendency--e.g., Hinduism, Judaism, Mohammedanism,
Mazdeism, Christianity up till the age of doubt and science, and the
systems of ancient Egypt, Babylon, and post-Confucian China. This
worsening can take place alongside of a theoretic purification of
belief within the sphere of the educated theological class.


    Christian writers have undertaken to show that such deterioration
    went on continuously in India from the beginning of the Vedic
    period, popular religion sinking from Varuna to Indra, from Indra
    to the deities of the Atharva Veda, and from these to the Puranas
    (cp. Dr. J. Murray Mitchell, Hinduism Past and Present, 1885,
    pp. 22, 25, 26, 54). The argument, being hostile in bias from the
    beginning, ignores or denies the element of intellectual advance in
    the Upanishads and other later literature; but it holds good of the
    general phenomena. It holds good equally, however, of the history
    of Christianity in the period of the supremacy of ignorant faith
    and absence of doubt and science; and is relatively applicable
    to the religion of the uneducated mass at any time and place.

    On the other hand, it is not at all true that religious
    history is from the beginning, in any case, a process of
    mere degeneration from a pure ideal. Simple statements as to
    primitive ideas are found to be misleading because of their
    simplicity. They can connote only the ethic of the life conditions
    of the worshipper. Now, we have seen (p. 28) that small primitive
    peoples living at peace and in communism, or in some respects well
    placed, may be on that account in certain moral respects superior
    to the average or mass of more civilized and more intelligent
    peoples. [As to the kindliness and unselfishness of some savages,
    living an almost communal life, and as to the scrupulous honesty
    of others, there is plenty of evidence--e.g., as to Andaman
    islanders, Max Müller, Anthrop. Relig., citing Colonel Cadell,
    p. 177; as to Malays and Papuans, Dr. Russel Wallace, Malay
    Archipelago, p. 595 (but cp. pp. 585, 587, 589); as to Esquimaux,
    Keane, Man, p. 374; Reclus, Primitive Folk, pp. 15, 37, 115 (but
    cp. pp. 41-42). In these and other cases unselfishness within the
    tribe is the concomitant of the communal life, and represents no
    conscious ethical volition, being concurrent with phases of the
    grossest tribal egoism, in some cases with cannibalism, and with
    the perpetual oppression of women. In the case of the preaching
    of unselfishness to the young by the old among the Australians,
    where Lubbock and his authorities see "the tyranny of the old"
    (Origin of Civilization, 5th ed. pp. 451-52) Mr. Lang sees a pure
    primeval ethic. Obviously the other is the true explanation. The
    closest and best qualified observers testify, as regards a number
    of tribes: "So far as anything like moral precepts are concerned
    in these tribes ... it appears to us to be most probable that
    they have originated in the first instance in association with
    the purely selfish ideas of the older men to keep all the best
    things for themselves, and in no case whatever are they supposed
    to have the sanction of a superior being" (Spencer and Gillen,
    North. Tribes of Cent. Australia, 1904, p. 504).]

    The transition from that state to one of war and individualism
    would be in a sense degeneration; but on the other hand
    the entirely communistic societies are unprogressive. Broadly
    speaking, it is by the path of social individuation that progress
    in civilization has been made, the early city States and the later
    large military States ultimately securing within themselves some
    of the conditions for special development of thought, arts, and
    knowledge. The residual truth is that the simple religion of the
    harmless tribe is pro tanto superior to the instituted religion
    of the more civilized nation with greater heights and lower depths
    of life, the popular religion in the latter case standing for the
    worse conditions. But the simple religion did not spring from any
    higher stage of knowledge. The old theorem revived by Mr. Lang
    (Making of Religion), as to religion having originally been a
    pure and highly ethical monotheism, from which it degenerated
    into animism and non-moral polytheism, is at best a misreading of
    the facts just stated. Mr. Lang never asks what "Supreme Being"
    and "monotheism" mean for savages who know nothing of other men's
    religions: he virtually takes all the connotations for granted. And
    as regards the most closely studied of contemporary savages
    our authorities come to an emphatic conclusion that they have
    no notion whatever of anything like a Supreme Being (Spencer and
    Gillen, North. Tribes of Cent. Austr. pp. 491-92. Cp. A. H. Keane,
    Man, p. 395, as to the "Great Spirit" of the Redskins). For the
    rest, Mr. Lang's theory is demonstrably wrong in its ethical
    interpretation of many anthropological facts, and as it stands
    is quite irreconcilable with the law of evolution, since it
    assumes an abstract monotheism as primordial. In general it
    approximates scientifically to the eighteenth-century doctrine of
    the superiority of savagery to civilization. (See it criticized
    in the author's Studies in Religious Fallacy, and Christianity
    and Mythology, 2nd ed. pp. 37-43, 46 sq.)


4. Even primary conditions of material well-being, if not reacted upon
by social science or a movement of freethought, may in a comparatively
advanced civilization promote religious degeneration. Thus abundance
of food is favourable to multiplication of sacrifice, and so to
priestly predominance. [335] The possession of domesticated animals,
so important to civilization, lends itself to sacrifice in a specially
demoralizing degree. But abundant cereal food-supply, making abundant
population, may greatly promote human sacrifice--e.g., Mexico.


    The error of Mr. Lang's method is seen in the use he makes
    (work cited, pp. 286-289, 292) of the fact that certain "low"
    races--as the Australians, Andamanese, Bushmen, and Fuegians--offer
    no animal sacrifice. He misses the obvious significance of the
    facts that these unwarlike races have as a rule no domesticated
    animals and no agriculture, and that their food supply is thus
    in general precarious. The Andamanese, sometimes described
    (Malthus, Essay on Population, ch. iii, and refs.; G. W. Earl,
    Papuans, 1853, pp. 150-51) as very ill-fed, are sometimes said
    to be well supplied with fish and game (Peschel, Races of Man,
    Eng. tr. 1876, p. 147; Max Müller, Anthrop. Rel. citing Cadell,
    p. 177); but in any case they have had no agriculture, and seem
    to have only occasional animal food in the shape of a wild hog
    (Colebrooke in Asiatic Researches, iv, 390). The Australians and
    Fuegians, again, have often great difficulty in feeding themselves
    (Peschel, pp. 148, 159, 334; Darwin, Voyage, ch. 10). It is argued
    concerning the Australian aborigines that "as a rule they have an
    abundance" (A. F. Calvert, The Aborigines of Western Australia,
    1894, p. 24); but this abundance is made out by cataloguing the
    whole edible fauna and flora of the coasts and the interior,
    and ignores the fact that for all hunting peoples food supply
    is precarious. For the Australian, "the difficulty of capturing
    game with his primitive methods compels him to give his whole
    time to the quest of food" (Keane, Man, p. 148). In the contrary
    case of the primitive Vedic Aryans, well supplied with animals,
    sacrifices were abundant, and tended to become more so (Müller,
    Nat. Relig. pp. 136, 185; Physical Relig. p. 105; but cp. pp. 98,
    101; Mitchell, Hinduism, p. 43; Lefmann, Geschichte des alten
    Indiens, in Oncken's series, 1890, pp. 49, 430-31). Of these
    sacrifices that of the horse seems to have been in Aryan use
    in a most remote period (cp. M. Müller, Nat. Rel. pp. 524-25;
    H. Böttger, Sonnencult der Indogermanen, Breslau, 1891, pp. 41-44;
    Preller, Römische Mythologie, ed. Köhler, pp. 102, 299, 323;
    Griechische Mythologie, 2te Aufg. i, 462; Frazer, Golden Bough,
    ii, 315). Max Müller's remark (Physical Religion, p. 106), that
    "the idea of sacrifice did not exist at a very early period,"
    because there is no common Aryan term for it, counts for nothing,
    as he admits (p. 107) that the Sanskrit word cannot be traced
    back to any more general root; and he concedes the antiquity
    of the practice. On this cp. Mitchell, Hinduism, pp. 37-38; and
    the author's Pagan Christs, 2nd ed. p. 122. The reform in Hindu
    sacrifice, consummated by Buddhism, has been noted above.


5. Even scientific knowledge, while enabling the thoughtful to correct
their religious conceptions, in some forms lends itself easily to
the promotion of popular superstition. Thus the astronomy of the
Babylonians, while developing some skepticism, served in general to
encourage divination and fortune-telling; and seems to have had the
same effect when communicated to the Chinese, the Hindus, and the
Hebrews, all of whom, however, practised divination previously on
other bases.

6. Finally, the development of the arts of sculpture and painting,
unaccompanied by due intellectual culture, tends to keep religion at
a low anthropomorphic level, and worsens its psychology by inviting
image-worship. [336] It is not that the earlier and non-artistic
religions are not anthropomorphic, but that they give more play
for intellectual imagination than does a cult of images. But where
the arts have been developed, idolatry has always arisen save when
resisted by a special activity or revival of freethought to that end;
and even in Protestant Christendom, where image-worship is tabooed,
religious pictures now promote popular credulity and ritualism as they
did in the Italian Renaissance. [337] So manifold are the forces of
intellectual degeneration--degeneration, that is, from an attained
ideal or stage of development, not from any primordial knowledge.







CHAPTER IV

RELATIVE FREETHOUGHT IN ISRAEL


The modern critical analysis of the Hebrew Sacred Books has made it
sufficiently clear that in Jewish as in all other ancient history
progress in religion was by way of evolving an ethical and sole deity
out of normal primitive polytheism. [338] What was special to the
Hebrews was the set of social conditions under which the evolution took
place. Through these conditions it was that the relative freethought
which rejected normal polytheism was so far favoured as to lead to a
pronounced monotheistic cultus, though not to a philosophic monotheism.




§ 1

As seen in their earliest historical documents (especially portions
of the Book of Judges), the Hebrews are a group of agricultural and
pastoral but warlike tribes of Semitic speech, with household Gods
and local deities, [339] living among communities at the same or a
higher culture stage. Their ancestral legends show similar religious
practice. [340] Of the Hebrew tribes some may have sojourned for
a time in Egypt; but this is uncertain, the written record being a
late and in large part deliberately fictitious construction. [341]
At one time twelve such tribes may have confederated, in conformity
with a common ancient superstition, seen in Arab and Greek history
as well as in the Jewish, as to the number twelve. As they advanced
in civilization, on a basis of city life existing among a population
settled in Canaan before them, parts of which they conquered, one
of their public cults, that of Yahu or Yahweh, finally fixed at
Jerusalem, became politically important. The special worshippers of
this God (supposed to have been at first a Thunder-God or Nature-God)
[342] were in that sense monotheists; but not otherwise than kindred
neighbouring communities such as the Ammonites and Moabites and
Edomites, each of which had its special God, like the cities of
Babylonia and Egypt. But that the earlier conceptions of the people
had assumed a multiplicity of Gods is clear from the fact that even
in the later literary efforts to impose the sole cult of Yahweh on the
people, the plural name Elohim, "Powers" or "Gods" (in general, things
to be feared), [343] is retained, either alone or with that of Yahweh
prefixed, though cosmology had previously been written in Yahweh's
name. The Yahwists did not scruple to combine an Elohistic narrative,
varying from theirs in cosmology and otherwise, with their own. [344]


    As to the original similarity of Hebraic and other Canaanite
    religions cp. E. Meyer, Gesch. des Alt. §§ 309-11 (i, 372-76);
    Kuenen, i, 223; Wellhausen, Israel, p. 440; Winckler,
    Gesch. Israels, passim; Réville, Prolég. de l'hist. des
    relig. 1881, p. 85. "Before being monotheistic, Israel was
    simply monolatrous, and even that only in its religious élite"
    (Réville). "Their [the Canaanites'] worship was the same in
    principle as that of Israel, but it had a higher organization"
    (Menzies, Hist. of Rel. p. 179; cp. Tiele, Outlines, pp. 85-89). On
    the side of the traditional view, Mr. Lang, while sharply
    challenging most of the propositions of the higher critics,
    affirms that "we know that Israel had, in an early age, the
    conception of the moral Eternal; we know that, at an early age,
    the conception was contaminated and anthropomorphized; and we
    know that it was rescued, in a great degree, from this corruption,
    while always retaining its original ethical aspect and sanction"
    (Making of Religion, p. 295). If "we know" this, the discussion
    is at an end. But Mr. Lang's sole documentary basis for the
    assertion is just the fabricated record, reluctantly abandoned
    by theological scholars as such. When this is challenged,
    Mr. Lang falls back on the position that such low races as
    the Australians and Fuegians have a "moral Supreme Being,"
    and that therefore Israel "must" have had one (p. 309). It will
    be found, however, that the ethic of these races is perfectly
    primitive, on Mr. Lang's own showing, and that his estimate is a
    misinterpretation. As to their Supreme Beings, it might suffice
    to compare Mr. Lang's Making of Religion, chs. ix, xii, with his
    earlier Myth, Ritual, and Religion, i, 168, 335; ii, 6, etc.;
    but, as we have seen (above, p. 93), the Supreme Being of the
    Australians eludes the closest search in a number of tribes; and
    the "moral" factor is equally intangible. Mr. Lang in his later
    reasoning has merely added the ambiguous and misleading epithet
    "Supreme," stressing it indefinitely, to the ordinary God-idea
    of the lower races. (Cp. Cox, Mythol. of Aryan Races, ed. 1882,
    p. 155; and K. O. Müller, Introd. to Sci. Mythol. Eng. tr. p. 184.)

    There being thus no highly imagined "moral Eternal" in the
    religion of primitive man, the Hebrews were originally in the
    ordinary position. Their early practice of human sacrifice is
    implied in the legend of Abraham and Isaac, and in the story of
    Jephthah. (Cp. Micah vi, 7, and Kuenen on the passage, i, 237.) In
    their reputed earliest prophetic books we find them addicted to
    divination (Hosea iv, 12; Micah v, 12. Cp. the prohibition in
    Lev. xx, 6; also 2 Kings xxiii, 24, and Isa. iii, 2; as to the
    use of the ephod, teraphim, and urim and thummim, see Kuenen,
    Relig. of Israel, Eng. tr. i, 97-100) and to polytheism. (Amos v,
    26, viii, 14; Hosea i, 13, 17, etc. Cp. Jud. viii, 27; 1 Sam. vii,
    3.) These things Mr. Lang seems to admit (p. 309, note), despite
    his previous claim; but he builds (p. 332) on the fact that
    the Hebrews showed little concern about a future state--that
    "early Israel, having, so far as we know, a singular lack of
    interest in the future of the soul, was born to give himself up
    to developing, undisturbed, the theistic conception, the belief
    in a righteous Eternal"--whereas later Greeks and Romans, like
    Egyptians, were much concerned about life after death. Mr. Lang's
    own general theory would really require that all peoples at a
    certain stage should act like the Israelites; but he suspends it
    in the interest of the orthodox view as to the early Hebrews. At
    the same time he omits to explain why the Hebrews failed to
    adopt the future-state creed when they were "contaminated"--a
    proposition hardly reconcilable, on any view, with the sentence
    just quoted. The solution, however, is simple. Israel was not
    at all "singular" in the matter. The early (Homeric) Greeks
    and Romans (cp. as to Hades the Iliad, passim; Odyssey, bk. xi,
    passim; Tiele, Outlines, p. 209, as to the myth of Persephone;
    and Preller, Römische Mythologie, ed. Köhler, 1865, pp. 452-55,
    as to the early Romans), like the early Vedic Aryans (Tiele,
    Outlines, p. 117; Müller, Anthropol. Relig. p. 269), and the
    early Babylonians and Assyrians (Meyer, Gesch. des Alt. i, 181-82;
    Sayce, Hib. Lect. p. 364) took little thought of a future state.

    "Homer knows no influence of the Psyche on the realm of the
    visible, and also no cult implying it.... A later poet, who made
    the last addition to the Odyssey, first introduced Hermes the
    'leader of souls' [perhaps taken from a popular belief in some part
    of Hellas].... Underneath, in the gloomy shades, the souls waver,
    unconscious or at the best in a glimmering half-consciousness,
    endowed with faint voices, feeble, indifferent.... To speak,
    as do many old and recent scholars, of the 'immortal life' of
    such souls, is erroneous. They live rather as the spectre of the
    living in a mirror.... If the Psyche outlives her visible mate (the
    body), she is powerless without him.... Thus is the Homeric world
    free from ghosts (for after the burning of the body the Psyche
    appears no more even in dream).... The living has peace from the
    dead.... No dæmonic power is at work apart from or against the
    Gods; and the night gives to the disembodied spirits no freedom"
    (Rohde, Psyche, 4te Aufl. 1907, pp. 9-11).

    This minimization of the normal primitive belief in spirits is
    one of the reasons for seeing in the Homeric poems the outcome
    of a period of loosened belief. It is not to be supposed that the
    pre-Homeric Greeks, like the easterns with whom the Greeks met in
    Ionia, had not the usual ghost-lore of savages and barbarians;
    and it may be that for all the early civilizations under notice
    the explanation is that primitive ghost-cults were abandoned by
    migrating and conquering races, who rejected the ghost-cults of
    the races whom they conquered, though they ostensibly accepted
    their Gods. In any case they made little religious account of a
    future state for themselves.

    This attitude has again been erroneously regarded (e.g.,
    Dickinson, The Greek View of Life, p. 35) as peculiar to the
    Greeks. Mr. Lang's assumption may, in fact, be overthrown by the
    single case of the Phoenicians, who showed no more concern about
    a future life than did the Hebrews (see Canon Rawlinson's History
    of Phoenicia, 1889, pp. 351-52), but who are not pretended to have
    given themselves up much to "developing, undisturbed, the belief
    in a righteous Eternal." The truth seems to be that in all the
    early progressive and combative civilizations the main concern
    was as to the continuance of this life. On that head the Hebrews
    were as solicitous as any (cp. Kuenen, i, 65); and they habitually
    practised divination on that score. Further, they attached the
    very highest importance to the continuance of the individual in
    his offspring. The idea of a future state is first found highly
    developed in the long-lived cults of the long-civilized but
    unprogressive Egyptians; and the Babylonians were developing in
    the same direction. Yet the Hebrews took it up (see the evidence
    in Schürer, Jewish People in the Time of Jesus, Eng. tr. <DW37>. II,
    vol. ii, p. 179) just when, according to Mr. Lang, their cult was
    "rescued, in a great degree, from corruption"; and, generally
    speaking, it was in the stage of maximum monotheism that they
    reached the maximum of irrationality. For the rest, belief in
    "immortality" is found highly developed in a sociologically
    "degenerate" and unprogressive people such as the Tasmanians
    (Müller, Anthrop. Rel. p. 433), who are yet primitively pure on
    Mr. Lang's hypothesis; and is normal among <DW64>s and Australian
    blackfellows.


This primary polytheism is seen to the full in that constant resort
of Israelites to neighbouring cults, against which so much of the
Hebrew doctrine is directed. To understand their practice the modern
reader has to get rid of the hallucination imposed on Christendom by
its idea of revelation. The cult of Yahweh was no primordial Hebrew
creed, deserted by backsliding idolaters, but a finally successful
tyranny of one local cult over others. It is probable that it was
originally not Palestinian, but Sinaitic, and that Yahweh became the
God of Caleb-Judah only under David. [345] Therefore, without begging
the question as to the moral sincerity of the prophets and others
who identified Yahwism with morality, we must always remember that
they were on their own showing devotees of a special local worship,
and so far fighting for their own influence. Similar prophesying may
conceivably have been carried on in connection with the same or other
God-names in other localities, and the extant prophets freely testify
that they had Yahwistic opponents; but the circumstance that Yahweh
was worshipped at Jerusalem without any image might be an important
cause of differentiation in the case of that cult. In any case it must
have been through simple "exclusivism" that they reached any form of
"monotheism." [346]

The inveterate usage, in the Bible-making period, of forging and
interpolating ancient or pretended writings, makes it impossible
to construct any detailed history of the rise of Yahwism. We can
but proceed upon data which do not appear to lend themselves to the
purposes of the later adaptors. In that way we see cause to believe
that at one early centre the so-called ark of Yahweh contained
various objects held to have supernatural virtue. [347] In the older
historic documents it has, however, no such sacredness as accrues
to it later, [348] and no great traditional prestige. This ark,
previously moved from place to place as a fetish, [349] is said to
have been transferred to Jerusalem by the early king David, [350]
whose story, like that of his predecessors Saul and his son Solomon,
is in part blended with myth.


    As to David, compare 1 Sam. xvi, 18, with xvii, 33, 42. Daoud
    (= Dodo = Dumzi = Tammuz = Adonis) was a Semitic deity (Sayce,
    Hib. Lec. pp. 52-57, and art. "The Names of the First Three Kings
    of Israel," in Modern Review, Jan. 1884), whom David resembles as
    an inventor of the lyre (Amos, vi, 5; cp. Hitzig, Die Psalmen,
    2 Theil, 1836, p. 3). But Saul and Solomon also were God-names
    (Sayce, as cited), as was Samuel (id. pp. 54, 181; cp. Lenormant,
    Chaldean Magic, Eng. tr. p. 120); and when we note these data,
    and further the plain fact that Samson is a solar myth, being a
    personage Evemerized from Samas, the Sun-God, we are prepared
    to find further traces of Evemeristic redaction in the Hebrew
    books. To say nothing of other figures in the Book of Judges,
    we find that Jacob and Joseph were old Canaanitish deities
    (Sayce, Lectures, p. 51; Records of the Past, New Series, v,
    48; Hugo Winckler, Geschichte Israels, ii, 57-77); and that
    Moses, as might be expected, was a name for more than one
    Semitic God (Sayce, pp. 46-47), and in particular stood for a
    Sun-God. Abraham and Isaac in turn appear to be ancient deities
    (Meyer, Gesch. des Alt. i, 374, § 309; Winckler, Gesch. Israels,
    ii, 20-49). Miriam was probably in similar case (cp. Pagan Christs,
    2nd ed. pp. 165-66). On an analysis of the Joshua myth as redacted,
    further, we may surmise another reduction of an ancient cult to
    the form of history, perhaps obscuring the true original of the
    worship of Mary and Jesus.

    It seems probable, finally, that such figures as Elijah, who
    ascends to heaven in a fiery chariot, and Elisha, the "bald head"
    and miracle-worker, are similar constructions of personages out
    of Sun-God lore. In such material lies part of the refutation of
    the thesis of Renan (Hist, des langues sémit. 2e édit. pp. 7,
    485) that the Semites were natural monotheists, devoid of
    mythology. [Renan is followed in whole or in part by Nöldeke,
    Sketches from Eastern Hist. Eng. tr. p. 6; Soury, Relig. of
    Israel, Eng. tr. pp. 2, 10; Spiegel, Erânische Alterthumskunde, i,
    389; also Roscher, Draper, Peschel, and Bluntschli, as cited by
    Goldziher, Mythology Among the Hebrews, Eng. tr. p. 4, note. On
    the other side compare Goldziher, ch. i; Steinthal's Prometheus
    and Samson, Eng. tr. (with Goldziher), pp. 391, 428, etc., and his
    Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und den Römern,
    1863, pp. 15-17; Kuenen, Rel. of Israel, i, 225; Smith, Rel. of the
    Semites, p. 49; Ewald, Hist. of Israel, Eng. tr. 4th ed. i, 38-40;
    Müller, Chips, i, 345 sq.; Selected Essays, 1881, ii, 402 sq.;
    Nat. Rel. p. 314.] Renan's view seems to be generally connected
    with the assumption that life in a "desert" makes a race for ever
    unimaginative or unitary in its thought. The Arabian Nights might
    be supposed a sufficient proof to the contrary. The historic truth
    seems to be that, stage for stage, the ancient Semites were as
    mythological as any other race; but that (to say nothing of the
    Babylonians and Assyrians) the mythologies of the Hebrews and
    of the Arabs were alike suppressed as far as possible in their
    monotheistic stage. Compare Renan's own admissions, pp. 27, 110,
    475, and Hist. du peuple d'Israël, i, 49-50.


At other places, however, Yahweh was symbolized and worshipped in the
image of a young bull, [351] a usage associated with the neighbouring
Semitic cult of Molech, but probably indigenous, or at least early,
in the case of Yahweh also. A God, for such worshippers, needed to be
represented by something, if he were to be individualized as against
others; and where there was not an ark or a sacred stone or special
temple or idol there could be no cult at all. "The practices of ancient
religion require a fixed meeting-place between the worshippers and
their God." [352] The pre-Exilic history of Yahweh-worship seems
to be in large part that of a struggle between the devotees of the
imageless worship fixed to the temple at Jerusalem, and other worships,
with or without images, at other and less influential shrines.

So far as can be gathered from the documents, it was long before
monotheistic pretensions were made in connection with Yahwism. They
must in the first instance have seemed not only tyrannical but
blasphemous to the devotees of the old local shrines, who in
the earlier Hebrew writings figure as perfectly good Yahwists;
and they clearly had no durable success before the period of the
Exile. Some three hundred years after the supposed period of David,
[353] and again eighty years later, we meet with ostensible traces
[354] of a movement for the special aggrandizement of the Yahweh
cult and the suppression of the others which competed with it, as
well as of certain licentious and vicious practices carried on in
connection with Yahweh worship. Concerning these, it could be claimed
by those who had adhered to the simpler tradition of one of the early
worships that they were foreign importations. They were, in fact,
specialties of a rich ancient society, and were either native to
Canaanite cities which the Hebrews had captured, or copied by them
from such cities. But the fact that they were thus, on the showing of
the later Yahwistic records, long associated with Yahwist practice,
proves that there was no special elevation about Yahwism originally.


    Even the epithet translated "Holy" (Kadosh) had originally no high
    moral significance. It simply meant "set apart," "not common"
    (cp. Kuenen, Religion of Israel, i, 43; Wellhausen, Israel, in
    Prolegomena vol. p. 499); and the special substantive (Kadesh and
    Kedeshah) was actually the name for the most degraded ministrants
    of both sexes in the licentious worship (see Deut. xxiii, 17,
    18, and marg. Rev. Vers. Cp. 1 Kings xiv, 25; xv, 12; 2 Kings
    xxiii, 7). On the question of early Hebrew ethics it is somewhat
    misleading to cite Wellhausen (so Lang, Making of Religion,
    p. 304) as saying (Israel, p. 437) that religion inspired law
    and morals in Israel with exceptional purity. In the context
    Wellhausen has said that the starting-point of Israel was normal;
    and he writes in the Prolegomena (p. 302) that "good and evil
    in Hebrew mean primarily nothing more than salutary and hurtful:
    the application of the words to virtue and sin is a secondary one,
    these being regarded as serviceable or hurtful in their effects."




§ 2

Given the co-existence of a multitude of local cults, and of
various local Yahweh-worships, it is conceivable that the Yahwists
of Jerusalem, backed by a priest-ridden king, should seek to limit
all worship to their own temple, whose revenues would thereby be
much increased. But insoluble perplexities are set up as to the
alleged movement by the incongruities in the documents. Passing over
for the moment the prophets Amos and Hosea and others who ostensibly
belong to the eighth century B.C., we find the second priestly reform,
[355] consequent on a finding or framing of "the law," represented as
occurring early in the reign of Josiah (641-610 B.C.). But later in
the same reign are placed the writings of Jeremiah, who constantly
contemns the scribes, prophets, and priests in mass, and makes
light of the ark, [356] besides declaring that in Judah [357] there
are as many Gods as towns, and in Jerusalem as many Baal-altars as
streets. The difficulty is reduced by recognizing the quasi-historical
narrative as a later fabrication; but other difficulties remain as to
the prophetic writings; and for our present purpose it is necessary
briefly to consider these.

1. The "higher criticism," seeking solid standing-ground at the
beginning of the tangible historic period, the eighth century,
singles out [358] the books of Amos and Hosea, setting aside,
as dubious in date, Nahum and Joel; and recognizing in Isaiah a
composite of different periods. If Amos, the "herdsman of Tekoa,"
could be thus regarded as an indubitable historical person, he would
be a remarkable figure in the history of freethought, as would his
nominal contemporary Hosea. Amos is a monotheist, worshipping not a
God of Israel but a Yahweh or Elohim of Hosts, called also by the name
Adon or Adonai, "the Lord," who rules all the nations and created the
universe. Further, the prophet makes Yahweh "hate and despise" the
feasts and burnt-offerings and solemn assemblies of his worshippers;
[359] and he meddles impartially with the affairs of the kingdoms
of Judah and Israel. In the same spirit Hosea menaces the solemn
assemblies, and makes Yahweh desire "mercy and not sacrifice." [360]
Similar doctrine occurs in the reputedly genuine or ancient parts of
Isaiah, [361] and in Micah. [362] Isaiah, too, disparages the Sabbath
and solemn meetings, staking all upon righteousness.

2. These utterances, so subversive of the priestly system, are yet held
to have been preserved through the ages--through the Assyrian conquest,
through the Babylonian Captivity, through the later period of priestly
reconstruction--by the priestly system itself. In the state of things
pictured under Ezra and Nehemiah, only the zealous adherents of the
priestly law can at the outset have had any letters, any literature;
it must have been they, then, who treasured the anti-priestly and
anti-ritual writings of the prophets--unless, indeed, the latter were
preserved by the Jews remaining at Babylon.

3. The perplexity thus set up is greatly deepened when we remember
that the period assigned to the earlier prophets is near the beginning
of the known age of alphabetic writing, [363] and before the known
age of writing on scrolls. A herdsman of Judea, with a classic and
flowing style, is held to have written out his hortatory addresses at
a time when such writing is not certainly known to have been practised
anywhere else; [364] and the pre-eminent style of Isaiah is held to
belong to the same period.


    "His [Amos's] language, with three or four insignificant
    exceptions, is pure, his style classical and refined. His
    literary power is shown in the regularity of structure which often
    characterizes his periods ... as well as in the ease with which
    he evidently writes.... Anything of the nature of roughness or
    rusticity is wholly absent from his writings" (Driver, Introd. to
    Lit. of Old Test. ch. vi, § 3, p. 297, ed. 1891). Isaiah, again,
    is in his own narrow field one of the most gifted and skilful
    writers of all antiquity. The difficulty is thus nearly as great
    as that of the proposition that the Hebrew of the Pentateuch is a
    thousand years older than that of the latest prophetical books,
    whose language is substantially the same. (Cp. Andrews Norton,
    The Pentateuch, ed. 1863, pp. 47-48; Renan, Hist. des langues
    sémit. 2e édit. p. 118.)


4. The specialist critics, all trained as clergymen, and mostly
loth to yield more than is absolutely necessary to skepticism,
have surrendered the antiquity claimed for Joel, recognizing that
the arguments for that are "equally consistent with a date after
the Captivity." [365] One of the conclusions here involved is that
"Egypt is probably mentioned only as the typical instance of a Power
hostile to Judah." Thus, when we remember the later Jewish practice of
speaking of Rome as "Babylon," or "Edom," allusions by Amos and Hosea
to "Assyria" have no evidential force. The same reasoning applies to
the supposed ancient portions of Isaiah.

5. Even on the clerical side, among the less conservative critics, it
is already conceded that there are late "insertions" in Amos. Some of
these insertions are among, or analogous to, the very passages relied
on by Kuenen to prove the lofty monotheism of Amos. If these passages,
however, suggest a late date, no less do the others disparaging
sacrifices. The same critics find interpolations and additions in
Hosea. But they offer no proof of the antiquity of what they retain.


    The principal passages in Amos given up as insertions by
    Dr. Cheyne, the most perspicacious of the English Hebraists, are:
    iv, 13; v, 8-9; ix, 5-6; and ix, 8-15. See his introduction to 1895
    ed. of Prof. Robertson Smith's Prophets of Israel, p. xv; and his
    art. on Amos in the Encyclopædia Biblica. Compare Kuenen, i, 46,
    48. Dr. Cheyne regards as insertions in Hosea the following: i,
    10-ii, 1; "and David their King" in iii, 5; viii, 14; and xiv,
    1-9 (as cited, pp. xviii-xix). Obviously these admissions entail
    others.


6. The same school of criticism, while adhering to the traditional
dating of Amos and Hosea, has surrendered the claim for the Psalms,
placing most of these in the same age with the books of Job,
Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Ecclesiasticus. [366] Now, the sentiment
of opposition to burnt-offerings is found in some of the Psalms in
language identical with that of the supposed early prophets. [367]
Instead of taking the former for late echoes of the latter, we may
reasonably suspect that they belong to the same culture-stage.


    The principle is in effect recognized by Dr. Cheyne when he writes:
    "Just as we infer from the reference to Cyrus in xliv, 28; xlv,
    1, that the prophecy containing it proceeds from the age of the
    conqueror, so we may infer from the fraternal feeling towards
    Egypt and Assyria (Syria) in xix, 23-25, that the epilogue was
    written when hopes of the union and fusion of Israelitish and
    non-Israelitish elements first became natural for the Jews--i.e.,
    in the early Jewish period" (Introd. to the Book of Isaiah, 1895,
    pp. 109-10).


7. From the scientific point of view, finally, the element of
historical prediction in the prophets is one of the strongest grounds
for presuming that they are in reality late documents. In regard
to similar predictions in the gospels (Mt. xxiv, 15; Mk. xiii, 2;
Lk. xxi, 20), rational criticism decides that they were written after
the event. No other course can consistently be taken as to early
Hebrew predictions of captivity and restoration; and the adherence
of many Biblical scholars at this point to the traditional view
is psychologically on a par with their former refusal to accept a
rational estimate of the Pentateuchal narrative.


    On some points, such as the flagrant pseudo-prediction in
    Isaiah xix, 18, all reasonable critics surrender. Thus "König
    sees rightly that xix, 18, can refer only to Jewish colonies in
    Egypt, and refrains from the arbitrary supposition that Isaiah
    was supernaturally informed of the future establishment of
    such colonies" (Cheyne, Introd. to Smith's Prophets of Israel,
    p. xxxiii). But in other cases Dr. Cheyne's own earlier positions
    appear to involve such an "arbitrary supposition," as do Kuenen's;
    and Smith explicitly posited it as to the prophets in general. And
    even as to Isaiah xix, 18, whereas Hitzig, as Havet later,
    rightly brings the date down to the actual historic time of the
    establishment of the temple at Heliopolis by Onias (Josephus,
    Ant. xiii, 3, 1; Wars, vii, 10, 2), about 160 B.C., Dr. Cheyne
    (Introd. to Isaiah, p. 108) compromises by dating it about 275 B.C.

    The lateness of the bulk of the prophetical writings has been
    ably argued by Ernest Havet (Le Christianisme et ses Origines,
    vol. iv, 1878, ch. vi; and in the posthumous vol., La Modernité
    des Prophètes, 1891), who supports his case by many cogent
    reasonings. For instance, besides the argument as to Isaiah xix,
    18, above noted: (1) The frequent prediction of the ruin of Tyre
    by Nebuchadnezzar (Isa. ch. xxiii; Jer. xxv, 22; Ezek. xxvi, 7;
    ch. xxvii), false as to him (a fact which might be construed as
    a proof of the fallibility of the prophets and the candour of
    their transcribers), is to be understood in the light of other
    post-predictions as referring to the actual capture of the city
    by Alexander. (2) Hosea's prediction of the fall of Judah as well
    as of Israel, and of their being united, places the passage after
    the Exile, and may even be held to bring it down to the period
    of the Asmoneans. So with many other details: the whole argument
    deserves careful study. M. Havet's views were, of course, scouted
    by the conservative specialists, as their predecessors scouted the
    entire hypothesis of Graf, now taken in its essentials as the basis
    of sound Biblical criticism. M. Scherer somewhat unintelligently
    objected to him (Études sur la litt. contemp. vii, 268) that he was
    not a Hebraist. There is no question of philology involved. It was
    non-Hebraists who first pointed out the practical incredibility
    of the central Pentateuchal narrative, on the truth of which
    Kuenen himself long stood with other Hebraists. (Cp. Wellhausen,
    Proleg. pp. 39, 347; also his (4th) ed. of Bleek's Einleit. in das
    alte Test. 1878, p. 154; and Kuenen, Hexateuch, Eng. tr. pp. xv,
    43.) Colenso's argument, in the gist of which he was long preceded
    by lay freethinkers, was one of simple common sense. The weak side
    of M. Havet's case is his undertaking to bring the prophets bodily
    down to the Maccabean period. This is claiming too much. But his
    negative argument is not affected by the reply (Darmesteter, Les
    Prophètes d'Israël, 1895, pp. 128-31) to his constructive theory.

    [Since the above was written, two French critics, MM. Dujardin
    and Maurice Vernes, have sought vigorously to reconstruct the
    history of the prophetic books upon new lines. I have been unable
    to acquiesce in their views at essential points, but would refer
    the reader to the lucid and interesting survey of the problem in
    Mr. T. Whittaker's Priests, Philosophers, and Prophets (Black,
    1911), ch. vi.]


It is true that where hardly any documentary datum is intrinsically
sure, it is difficult to prove a negative for one more than for
another. The historical narratives being systematically tampered with
by one writer after another, and even presumptively late writings being
interpolated by still later scribes, we can never have demonstrative
proof as to the original date of any one prophet. Thus it is arguable
that fragments of utterance from eighth-century prophets may have
survived orally and been made the nucleus of later documents. This
view would be reconcilable with the fact that the prophets Isaiah,
Hosea, Amos, and Micah are all introduced with some modification of
the formula that they prophesied "in the days of Uzziah, Jotham, Ahaz,
and Hezekiah, kings of Judah," Jeroboam's name being added in the cases
of Hosea and Amos. But that detail is also reconcilable with absolute
fabrication. To say nothing of sheer bad faith in a community whose
moral code said nothing against fraud save in the form of judicial
perjury, the Hebrew literature is profoundly compromised by the simple
fact that the religious development of the people made the prestige
of antiquity more essential there for the purposes of propaganda
than in almost any other society known to us. Hence an all-pervading
principle of literary dissimulation; and what freethinking there was
had in general to wear the guise of the very force of unreasoning
traditionalism to which it was inwardly most opposed. Only thus could
new thought find a hearing and secure its preservation at the hands
of the tribe of formalists. Even the pessimist Koheleth, wearied with
groping science, yet believing nothing of the doctrine of immortality,
must needs follow precedent and pose as the fabulous King Solomon,
son of the half-mythic David.




§ 3

We are forced, then, to regard with distrust all passages in the
"early" prophets which express either a disregard of sacrifice
and ritual, or a universalism incongruous with all that we know
of the native culture of their period. The strongest ground for
surmising a really "high" development of monotheism in Judah before
the Captivity is the stability of the life there as compared with
northern Israel. [368] In this respect the conditions might indeed be
considered favourable to priestly or other culture; but, on the other
hand, the records themselves exhibit a predominant polytheism. The
presumption, then, is strong that the "advanced" passages in the
prophets concerning sacrifice belong to an age when such ideas had
been reached in more civilized nations, with whose thought travelled
Jews could come in contact.


    It is true that some such ideas were current in Egypt many
    centuries before the period under notice--a fact which alone
    discounts the ethical originality claimed for the Hebrew
    prophets. E.g., the following passage from the papyrus of Ani,
    belonging to the Nineteenth Dynasty, not later than 1288 B.C.:
    "That which is detestable in the sanctuary of God is noisy feasts;
    if thou implore him with a loving heart of which all the words
    are mysterious, he will do thy matters, he hears thy words, he
    accepts thine offerings" (Religion and Conscience in Ancient Egypt,
    by Flinders Petrie, 1898, p. 160). The word rendered "mysterious"
    here may mean "magical" or "liturgical," or may merely prescribe
    privacy or silence; and this last is the construction put
    upon it by Renouf (Hibbert Lectures, 2nd ed. p. 102) and Erman
    (Handbook of Eg. Relig. Eng. tr. p. 84). The same doctrine is put
    in a hymn to Thoth (id.). But in any case we must look for later
    culture-contacts as the source of the later Hebrew radicalism under
    notice, though Egyptian sources are not to be wholly set aside. See
    Kuenen, i, 395; and Brugsch, as there cited; but cp. Wellhausen,
    Israel, p. 440.


It is clear that not only did they accept a cosmogony from the
Babylonians, but they were influenced by the lore of the Zoroastrian
Persians, with whom, as with the monotheists or pantheists of Babylon,
they would have grounds of sympathy. It is an open question whether
their special hostility to images does not date from the time of
Persian contact. [369] Concerning the restoration, it has been argued
that only a few Jewish exiles returned to Jerusalem "both under Cyrus
and under Dareios"; and that, though the temple was rebuilt under
Dareios Hystaspis, the builders were not the Gola or returned exiles,
but that part of the Judahite population which had not been deported
to Babylon. [370] The problem is obscure; [371] but, at least, the
separatist spirit of the redacted narratives of Ezra and Nehemiah
(which in any case tell of an opposite spirit) is not to be taken as
a decisive clue to the character of the new religion. For the rest,
the many Jews who remained in Babylon or spread elsewhere in the
Persian Empire, and who developed their creed on a non-local basis,
were bound to be in some way affected by the surrounding theology. And
it is tolerably certain that not only was the notion of angels derived
by the Jews from either the Babylonians or the Persians, but their
rigid Sabbath and their weekly synagogue meetings came from one or
both of these sources.


    That the Sabbath was an Akkado-Babylonian and Assyrian institution
    is now well established (G. Smith, Assyrian Eponym Canon, 1875,
    p. 20; Jastrow, Relig. of Bab. and Assyria, p. 377; Sayce,
    Hib. Lect. p. 76, and in Variorum Teacher's Bible, ed. 1885,
    Aids, p. 71). It was before the fact was ascertained that Kuenen
    wrote of the Sabbath (i, 245) as peculiar to Israel. The Hebrews
    may have had it before the Exile; but it was clearly not then a
    great institution; and the mention of Sabbaths in Amos (viii,
    5) and Isaiah (i, 13) is one of the reasons for doubting the
    antiquity of those books. The custom of synagogue meetings on
    the Sabbath is post-exilic, and may have arisen either in Babylon
    itself (so Wellhausen, Israel, p. 492) or in imitation of Parsee
    practice (so Tiele, cited by Kuenen, iii, 35). Compare E. Meyer,
    Gesch. des Alt. iii (1901), § 131. The same alternative arises
    with regard to the belief in angels, usually regarded as certainly
    Persian in origin (cp. Kuenen, iii, 37; Tiele, Outlines, p. 90;
    and Sack, Die altjüdische Religion, 1889, p. 133). This also could
    have been Babylonian (Sayce, in Var. Bible, as cited, p. 71); even
    the demon Asmodeus in the Book of Tobit, usually taken as Persian,
    being of Babylonian derivation (id.). Cp. Darmesteter's introd. to
    Zendavesta, 2nd ed. ch. v. On the other hand, the conception of
    Satan, the Adversary, as seen in 1 Chr. xxi, 1; Zech. iii, 1,
    2, seems to come from the Persian Ahriman, though the Satan of
    Job has not Ahriman's status. Such a modification would come of
    the wish to insist on the supremacy of the good God. And this
    quasi-monotheistic view, again, we are led to regard, in the
    case of the prophets, as a possible Babylonian derivation, or
    at least as a result of the contact of Yahwists with Babylonian
    culture. To a foreign influence, finally, must be definitely
    attributed the later Priestly Code, over-ruling Deuteronomy,
    lowering the Levites, setting up a high priest, calling the
    dues into the sanctuary, resting on the Torah the cultus which
    before was rested on the patriarchs, and providing cities and
    land for the Aaronidae and the Levites (Wellhausen, Prolegomena,
    pp. 123, 127, 147, 149, 347; Israel, pp. 495, 497)--the latter
    an arrangement impossible in mountainous Palestine, as regards
    the land-measurements (id. Proleg. p. 159, following Gramberg and
    Graf), and clearly deriving from some such country as Babylonia
    or Persia. As to the high-priest principle in Babylon and Assyria,
    see Sayce, Hibbert Lectures, pp. 59-61; Jastrow, as cited, p. 658.


Of the general effect of such contacts we have clear traces in two
of the most remarkable of the later books of the Old Testament, Job
and Ecclesiastes, both of which clearly belong to a late period in
religious development. The majority of the critics still confidently
describe Job as an original Hebrew work, mainly on the ground,
apparently, that it shows no clear marks of translation, though
its names and its local colour are all non-Jewish. In any case it
represents, for its time, a cosmopolitan culture, and contains the
work of more than one hand, the prologue and epilogue being probably
older than the rest; while much of the dialogue is obviously late
interpolation.


    Compare Cheyne, Job and Solomon, 1887, p. 72; Bradley,
    Lectures on Job, p. 171; Bleek-Wellhausen, Einleitung, § 268
    (291), ed. 1878, p. 542; Driver, Introd. pp. 405-8; Cornill,
    Einleit. in das alte Test. 2te. Aufl. 1892, §§ 38, 42; Sharpe,
    Hist. of the Hebrew Nation, 4th ed. p. 282 sq.; Dillon, Skeptics
    of the Old Test. 1895, pp. 36-39. Renan's dating of the book six
    or seven centuries before Ecclesiastes (L'Ecclésiaste, p. 26;
    Job, pp. xv-xliii) is oddly uncritical. It must clearly be dated
    after Jeremiah and Ezekiel (Dillon, as cited); and Cornill even
    ascribes it to the fourth or third century B.C. Dr. Cheyne notes
    that in the skeptical passages the name Yahweh is very seldom used
    (only once or twice, as in xii, 9; xxviii, 28); and Dr. Driver
    admits that the whole book not only abounds in Aramaic words,
    but has a good many "explicable only from the Arabic." Other
    details in the book suggest the possible culture-influence of
    the Himyarite Arabs, who had reached a high civilization before
    500 B.C. Dr. Driver's remark that "the thoughts are thoroughly
    Hebraic" burkes the entire problem as to the manifest innovation
    the book makes in Hebrew thought and literary method alike. Sharpe
    (p. 287) is equally arbitrary. Cp. Renan, Job, 1859, pp. xxv,
    where the newness of the whole treatment is admitted.

    Dr. Dillon (pp. 43-59), following Bickell, has pointed out more or
    less convincingly the many interpolations made in the book after,
    and even before, the making of the Septuagint translation, which
    originally lacked 400 lines of the matter in the present Hebrew
    version. The discovery of the Saidic version of the LXX text of
    Job decides the main fact. (See Professor Bickell's Das Buch Job,
    1894.) "It is quite possible even now to point out, by the help
    of a few disjointed fragments still preserved, the position, and
    to divine the sense, of certain spiteful and defiant passages,
    which, in the interest of 'religion and morals,' were remorselessly
    suppressed; to indicate others which were split up and transposed;
    and to distinguish many prolix discourses, feeble or powerful
    word-pictures, and trite commonplaces, which were deliberately
    inserted later on, for the sole purpose of toning down the most
    audacious piece of rationalistic philosophy which has ever yet
    been clothed in the music of sublime verse" (Dillon, pp. 45-46).

    "Besides the four hundred verses which must be excluded on the
    ground that they are wanting in the Septuagint version, and were
    therefore added to the text at a comparatively recent period, the
    long-winded discourse of Elihu must be struck out, most [? much]
    of which was composed before the book was first translated into
    Greek.... In the prologue in prose ... Elihu is not once alluded
    to; and in the epilogue, where all the [other] debaters are named
    and censured, he ... is absolutely ignored.... Elihu's style is
    toto coelo different from that of the other parts of the poem;
    ... while his doctrinal peculiarities, particularly his mention
    of interceding angels, while they coincide with those of the New
    Testament, are absolutely unknown to Job and his friends.... The
    confusion introduced into the text by this insertion is bewildering
    in the extreme; and yet the result is but a typical specimen of
    the ... tangle which was produced by the systematic endeavour of
    later and pious editors to reduce the poem to the proper level
    of orthodoxy" (id. pp. 55-57). Again: "Ch. xxiv, 5-8, 10-24,
    and ch. xxx, 3-7, take the place of Job's blasphemous complaint
    about the unjust government of the world."

    It need hardly be added here that not only the Authorized but
    the Revised Version is false in the text "I know that my redeemer
    liveth," etc. (xix, 25-27), that being a perversion dating from
    Jerome. The probable meaning is given in Dr. Dillon's version:--


        But I know that my avenger liveth;
        Though it be at the end upon my dust,
        My witness will avenge these things,
        And a curse alight upon mine enemies.


    The original expressed a complete disbelief in a future life
    (ch. xiv). Compare Dr. Dillon's rhythmic version of the restored
    text.


What marks off the book of Job from all other Hebrew literature
is its dramatic and reflective handling of the ethical problem of
theism, which the prophets either evade or dismiss by declamation
against Jewish sins. Not that it is solved in Job, where the rôle of
Satan is an inconclusive resort to the Persian dualistic solution,
and where the deity is finally made to answer Job's freethinking
by sheer literary thunder, much less ratiocinative though far more
artistic than the theistic speeches of the friends. But at least the
writer or writers of Job's speeches consciously grasped the issue;
and the writer of the epilogue evidently felt that the least Yahweh
could do was to compensate a man whom he had allowed to be wantonly
persecuted. The various efforts of ancient thought to solve the same
problem will be found to constitute the motive power in many later
heterodox systems, theistic and atheistic.

Broadly speaking, it is solved in practice in terms of the fortunes
of priests and worshippers. At all stages of religious evolution
extreme ill-fortune tends to detach men from the cults that have
failed to bring them succour. Be it in the case of African indigenes
slaying their unsuccessful rain-doctor, Anglo-Saxon priests welcoming
Christianity as a surer source of income than their old worship,
pagans turning Christian at the fall of Julian, or Christians going
over to Islam at the sight of its triumph--the simple primary motive
of self-interest is always potent on this as on other sides; and at
all stages of Jewish history, it is evident, there were many who held
by Yahweh because they thought he prospered them, or renounced him
because he did not. And the very vicissitude of things would breed
a general skepticism. [372] In Zephaniah (i, 12) there is a specific
allusion to those "that say in their heart, The Lord will not do good,
neither will he do evil."

Judaism is thus historically a series of socio-political selections
rather than a sequence of hereditary transmission. The first definite
and exclusive Yahwistic cult was an outcome of special political
conditions; and its priests would adhere to it in adversity insofar
as they had no other economic resort. Every return of sunshine, on the
other hand, would minister to faith; and while many Jews in the time of
Assyro-Babylonian ascendancy decided that Yahweh could not save, those
Yahwists who in the actual Captivity prospered commercially in the new
life would see in such prosperity a fresh proof of Yahweh's support,
[373] and would magnify his name and endow his priests accordingly. For
similar reasons, the most intense development of Judaism occurs after
the Maccabean revolt, when the military triumph of the racial remnant
over its oppressors inspired a new and enduring enthusiasm.

On the other hand, foreign influences would chronically tend to promote
doubt, especially where the foreigner was not a mere successful
votary exalting his own God, but a sympathetic thinker questioning
all the Godisms alike. This consideration is a reason the more for
surmising a partly foreign source for the book of Job, where, as in
the passage cited from Zephaniah, there is no thought of one deity
being less potent than another, but rather an impeachment of divine
rule in terms of a conceptual monotheism. In any case, the book stands
for more than Jewish reverie; and where it is finally turned to an
irrelevant and commonplace reaffirmation of the goodness of deity, a
certain number of sincerer thinkers in all likelihood fell back on an
"agnostic" solution of the eternal problem.

In certain aspects the book of Job speaks for a further reach of
early freethinking than is seen in Ecclesiastes (Koheleth), which,
however, at its lower level of conviction, tells of an unbelief that
could not be overborne by any rhetoric. It unquestionably derives
from late foreign influences. It is true that even in the book of
Malachi, which is commonly dated about 400 B.C., there is angry
mention of some who ask, "Where is the God of judgment?" and say,
"It is vain to serve God"; [374] even as others had said it in the
days of Assyrian oppression; [375] but in Malachi these sentiments
are actually associated with foreign influences, and in Koheleth such
influences are implicit. By an increasing number of students, though
not yet by common critical consent, the book is dated about 200 B.C.,
when Greek influence was stronger in Jewry than at any previous time.


    Grätz even puts it as late as the time of Herod the Great. But
    compare Dillon, p. 129; Tyler, Ecclesiastes, 1874, p. 31;
    Plumptre's Ecclesiastes, 1881, introd. p. 34; Renan, L'Ecclésiaste,
    1882, pp. 54-59; Kuenen, Religion of Israel, iii, 82; Driver,
    Introduction, pp. 446-47; Bleek-Wellhausen, Einleitung,
    p. 527. Dr. Cheyne and some others still put the date before
    332 B.C. Here again we are dealing with a confused and corrupted
    text. The German Prof. Bickell has framed an ingenious and highly
    plausible theory to the effect that the present incoherence of
    the text is mainly due to a misplacing of the leaves of the copy
    from which the current transcript was made. See it set forth by
    Dillon, pp. 92-97; cp. Cheyne, Job and Solomon, p. 273 sq. There
    has, further, been some tampering. The epilogue, in particular,
    is clearly the addition of a later hand--"one of the most timid
    and shuffling apologies ever penned" (Dillon, p. 118, note).


But the thought of the book is, as Renan says, profoundly fatigued;
and the sombre avowals of the absence of divine moral government
are ill-balanced by sayings, probably interpolated by other hands,
averring an ultimate rectification even on earth. What remains
unqualified is the deliberate rejection of the belief in a future
life, couched in terms that imply the currency of the doctrine; [376]
and the deliberate caution against enthusiasm in religion. Belief
in a powerful but remote deity, with a minimum of worship and vows,
is the outstanding lesson. [377]


    "To me, Koheleth is not a theist in any vital sense in
    his philosophic meditations" (Cheyne, Job and Solomon,
    p. 250). "Koheleth's pessimistic theory, which has its roots
    in secularism, is utterly incompatible with the spirit of
    Judaism.... It is grounded upon the rejection of the Messianic
    expectations, and absolute disbelief in the solemn promises of
    Jahveh himself.... It would be idle to deny that he had far more
    in common with the 'impious' than with the orthodox" (Dillon,
    pp. 119-20).


That there was a good deal of this species of tired or stoical
semi-rationalism among the Jews of the Hellenistic period may be
inferred from various traces. The opening verses of the thirtieth
chapter of the book of Proverbs, attributed to Agur, son of Jakeh,
are admittedly the expression of a skeptic's conviction that God
cannot be known, [378] the countervailing passages being plainly the
additions of a believer. Agur's utterances probably belong to the close
of the third century B.C. Here, as in Job, there are signs of Arab
influence; [379] but at a later period the main source of skepticism
for Israel was probably the Hellenistic civilization. It is told in the
Talmud that in the Maccabean period there came into use the formula,
"Cursed be the man that cherisheth swine; and cursed be the man that
teacheth his son the wisdom of the Greeks"; and there is preserved
the saying of Rabbi Simeon, son of Gamaliel, that in his father's
school five hundred learnt the law, and five hundred the wisdom of
the Greeks. [380] Before Gamaliel, the Greek influence had affected
Jewish philosophic thought; and it is very probable that among the
Sadducees who resisted the doctrine of resurrection there were some
thinkers of the Epicurean school. To that school may have belonged
the unbelievers who are struck at in several Rabbinical passages
which account for the sin of Adam as beginning in a denial of the
omnipresence of God, and describe Cain as having said: "There is
no judgment; there is no world to come, and there is no reward for
the just, and no punishment for the wicked." [381] But of Greek or
other atheism there is no direct trace in the Hebrew literature;
[382] and the rationalism of the Sadducees, who were substantially
the priestly party, [383] was like the rationalism of the Brahmans
and the Egyptian priests--something esoteric and withheld from the
multitude. In the apocryphal Wisdom of Solomon, which belongs to
the first century A.C., the denial of immortality, so explicit in
Ecclesiastes, is treated as a proof of utter immorality, though the
deniers are not represented as atheists. [384] They thus seem to have
been still numerous, and the imputation of wholesale immorality to
them is of course not to be credited; [385] but there is no trace of
any constructive teaching on their part.

So far as the literature shows, save for the confused Judaic-Platonism
of Philo of Alexandria, there is practically no rational progress in
Jewish thought after Koheleth till the time of contact with revived
Greek thought in Saracen Spain. The mass of the people, in the usual
way, are found gravitating to the fanatical and the superstitious
levels of the current creed. The book of Ruth, written to resist
the separatism of the post-Exilic theocracy, [386] never altered
the Jewish practice, though allowed into the canon. The remarkable
Levitical legislation providing for the periodical restoration of
the land to the poor never came into operation, [387] any more than
the very different provision giving land and cities to the children
of Aaron and the Levites. None of the more rationalistic writings
in the canon seems ever to have counted for much in the national
life. To conceive of "Israel," in the fashion still prevalent, as
being typified in the monotheistic prophets, whatever their date,
is as complete a misconception as it would be to see in Mr. Ruskin
the expression of the everyday ethic of commercial England. The
anti-sacrificial and universalist teachings in the prophets and in the
Psalms never affected, for the people at large, the sacrificial and
localized worship at Jerusalem; though they may have been esoterically
received by some of the priestly or learned class there, and though
they may have promoted a continual exodus of the less fanatical
types, who turned to other civilizations. Despite the resistance of
the Sadducees and the teaching of Job and Ecclesiastes, the belief
in a resurrection rapidly gained ground [388] in the two or three
centuries before the rise of Jesuism, and furnished a basis for
the new creed; as did the Messianic hope and the belief in a speedy
ending of the world, with both of which Jewish fanaticism sustained
itself under the long frustration of nationalistic faith before the
Maccabean interlude and after the Roman conquest. It was in vain that
the great teacher Hillel declared, "There is no Messiah for Israel";
the rest of the race persisted in cherishing the dream. [389] With the
major hallucination thus in full possession, the subordinate species of
superstition flourished as in Egypt and India; so that at the beginning
of our era the Jews were among the most superstitious peoples in the
world. [390] When their monotheism was fully established, and placed
on an abstract footing by the destruction of the temple, it seems
to have had no bettering influence on the practical ethics of the
Gentiles, though it may have furthered the theistic tendency of the
Stoic philosophy. Juvenal exhibits to us the Jew proselyte at Rome as
refusing to show an unbeliever the way, or guide him to a spring. [391]
Sectarian monotheism was thus in part on a rather lower ethical and
intellectual [392] plane than the polytheism, to say nothing of the
Epicureanism or the Stoicism, of the society of the Roman Empire.

It cannot even be said that the learned Rabbinical class carried on a
philosophic tradition, while the indigent multitude thus discredited
their creed. In the period after the fall of Jerusalem, the narrow
nationalism which had always ruled there seems to have been even
intensified. In the Talmud "the most general representation of the
Divine Being is as the chief Rabbi of Heaven; the angelic host being
his assessors. The heavenly Sanhedrim takes the opinion of living
sages in cases of dispute. Of the twelve hours of the day three are
spent by God in study, three in the government of the world (or rather
in the exercise of mercy), three in providing food for the world,
and three in playing with Leviathan. But since the destruction of
Jerusalem all amusements were banished from the courts of heaven,
and three hours were employed in the instruction of those who had
died in infancy." [393] So little can a nominal monotheism avail,
on the basis of a completed Sacred Book, to keep thought sane when
freethought is lacking.

Finally, Judaism played in the world's thought the great reactionary
and obscurantist part by erecting into a dogma the irrational
conception that its deity made the universe "out of nothing." At
the time of the redaction of the book of Genesis this dogma had not
been glimpsed: the Hebrew conception was the Babylonian--that of a
pre-existent Chaos put into shape. But gradually, in the interests of
monotheism, the anti-scientific doctrine was evolved [394] by way of
negative to that of the Gentiles; and where the great line of Ionian
thinkers passed on to the modern world the developed conception of
an eternal universe, [395] Judaism passed on through Christianity,
as well as in its own "philosophy," the contrary dogma, to bar the
way of later science.







CHAPTER V

FREETHOUGHT IN GREECE


The highest of all the ancient civilizations, that of Greece,
was naturally the product of the greatest possible complex of
culture-forces; [396] and its rise to pre-eminence begins after
the contact of the Greek settlers in Æolia and Ionia with the higher
civilizations of Asia Minor. [397] The great Homeric epos itself stands
for the special conditions of Æolic and Ionic life in those colonies;
[398] even Greek religion, spontaneous as were its earlier growths, was
soon influenced by those of the East; [399] and Greek philosophy and
art alike draw their first inspirations from Eastern contact. [400]
Whatever reactions we may make against the tradition of Oriental
origins, [401] it is clear that the higher civilization of antiquity
had Oriental (including in that term Egyptian) roots. [402] At no point
do we find a "pure" Greek civilization. Alike the "Mycenæan" and the
"Minoan" civilizations, as recovered for us by modern excavators,
show a composite basis, in which the East is implicated. [403] And
in the historic period the connection remains obvious. It matters
not whether we hold the Phrygians and Karians of history to have
been originally an Aryan stock, related to the Hellenes, and thus
to have acted as intermediaries between Aryans and Semites, or to
have been originally Semites, with whom Greeks intermingled. [404]
On either view, the intermediaries represented Semitic influences,
which they passed on to the Greek-speaking races, though they in turn
developed their deities in large part on psychological lines common
to them and the Semites. [405]


    As to the obvious Asiatic influences on historic Greek
    civilization, compare Winwood Reade, The Martyrdom of Man, 1872,
    p. 64; Von Ihering, Vorgeschichte der Indo-Europäer, Eng. tr. ("The
    Evolution of the Aryan"), p. 73; Schömann, Griech. Alterthümer,
    2te Aufl. 1861, i, 10; E. Meyer, Gesch. des Alterth. ii, 155;
    A. Bertrand, Études de mythol. et d'archéol. grecques, 1858,
    pp. 40-41; Bury, introd. p. 3. It seems clear that the Egyptian
    influence is greatly overstated by Herodotos (ii. 49-52, etc.),
    who indeed avows that he is but repeating what the Egyptians
    affirm. The Egyptian priests made their claim in the spirit
    in which the Jews later made theirs. Herodotos, besides, would
    prefer an Egyptian to an Asiatic derivation, and so would his
    audience. But it must not be overlooked that there was an Egyptian
    influence in the "Minoan" period.


A Hellenistic enthusiasm has led a series of eminent scholars to carry
so far their resistance to the tradition of Oriental beginnings [406]
as to take up the position that Greek thought is "autochthonous." [407]
If it were, it could not conceivably have progressed as it did. Only
the tenacious psychological prejudice as to race-characters and racial
"genius" could thus long detain so many students at a point of view so
much more nearly related to supernaturalism than to science. It is safe
to say that if any people is ever seen to progress in thought, art, and
life, with measurable rapidity, its progress is due to the reactions of
foreign intercourse. The primary civilizations, or what pass for such,
as those of Akkad and Egypt, are immeasurably slow in accumulating
culture-material; the relatively rapid developments always involve
the stimulus of old cultures upon a new and vigorous civilization,
well-placed for social evolution for the time being. There is no
point in early Greek evolution, so far as we have documentary trace
of it, at which foreign impact or stimulus is not either patent or
inferrible. [408] In the very dawn of history the Greeks are found
to be a composite stock, [409] growing still more composite; and the
very beginnings of its higher culture are traced to the non-Grecian
people of Thrace, [410] who worshipped the Muses. As seen by Herodotos
and Thucydides, "the original Hellenes were a particular conquering
tribe of great prestige, which attracted the surrounding tribes to
follow it, imitate it, and call themselves by its name. The Spartans
were, to Herodotos, Hellenic; the Athenians, on the other hand,
were not. They were Pelasgian, but by a certain time 'changed into
Hellenes and learnt their language.' In historical times we cannot
really find any tribe of pure Hellenes in existence." [411] The later
supremacy of the Greek culture is thus to be explained in terms not
of an abnormal "Greek genius," [412] but of the special evolution of
intelligence in the Greek-speaking stock, firstly through constant
crossing with others, and secondarily through its furtherance by the
special social conditions of the more progressive Greek city-states,
of which conditions the most important were their geographical
dividedness and their own consequent competition and interaction. [413]


    The whole problem of Oriental "influence" has been obscured, and
    the solution retarded, by the old academic habit of discussing
    questions of mental evolution in vacuo. Even the reaction against
    idolatrous Hellenism proceeded without due regard to historical
    sequence; and the return reaction against that is still somewhat
    lacking in breadth of inference. There has been too much on
    one side of assumption as to early Oriental achievement; and
    too much tendency on the other to assume that the positing of
    an "influence" on the Greeks is a disparagement of the "Greek
    mind." The superiority of that in its later evolution seems too
    obvious to need affirming. But that hardly justifies so able a
    writer as Professor Burnet in concluding (Early Greek Philosophy,
    2nd ed. introd. pp. 22-23) that "the" Egyptians knew no more
    arithmetic than was learned by their children in the schools;
    or in saying (id. p. 26) that "the" Babylonians "studied and
    recorded celestial phenomena for what we call astrological
    purposes, not from any scientific interest." How can we have
    the right to say that no Babylonians had a scientific interest
    in the data? Such interest would in the nature of the case miss
    the popular reproduction given to astrological lore. But it might
    very well subsist.

    Professor Burnet, albeit a really original investigator, has
    not here had due regard to the early usage of collegiate or
    corporate culture, in which arcane knowledge was reserved for the
    few. Thus he writes (p. 26) concerning the Greeks that "it was not
    till the time of Plato that even the names of the planets were
    known." Surely they must have been "known" to some adepts long
    before: how else came they to be accepted? As Professor Burnet
    himself notes (p. 34), "in almost every department of life we find
    that the corporation at first is everything and the individual
    nothing. The peoples of the East hardly got beyond this stage at
    all: their science, such as it is, is anonymous, the inherited
    property of a caste or guild, and we still see clearly in some
    cases that it was once the same among the Hellenes." Is it not then
    probable that astronomical knowledge was so ordered by Easterns,
    and passed on to Hellenes?

    There still attaches to the investigation of early Greek philosophy
    the drawback that the philosophical scholars do not properly posit
    the question: What was the early Ionic Greek society like? How did
    the Hellenes relate to the older polities and cultures which they
    found there? Professor Burnet makes justifiable fun (p. 21, note)
    of Dr. Gomperz's theory of the influence of "native brides"; but he
    himself seems to argue that the Greeks could learn nothing from the
    men they conquered, though he admits (p. 20) their derivation of
    "their art and many of their religious ideas from the East." If
    religion, why not religious speculation, leading to philosophy
    and science? This would be a more fruitful line of inquiry than
    one based on the assumption that "the" Babylonians went one way
    and "the" Greeks another. After all, only a few in each race
    carried on the work of thought and discovery. We do not say that
    "the English" wrote Shakespeare. Why affirm always that "the"
    Greeks did whatever great Greeks achieved?

    On the immediate issue Professor Burnet incidentally concedes what
    is required. After arguing that the East perhaps borrowed more
    from the West than did the West from the East, he admits (p. 21):
    "It would, however, be quite another thing to say that Greek
    philosophy originated quite independently of Oriental influence."




§ 1

By the tacit admission of one of the ablest opponents of the theory
of foreign influence, Hellenic religion as fixed by Homer for the
Hellenic world was partly determined by Asiatic influences. Ottfried
Müller decided not only that Homer the man (in whose personality he
believed) was probably a Smyrnean, whether of Æolic or Ionic stock,
[414] but that Homer's religion must have represented a special
selection from the manifold Greek mythology, necessarily representing
his local bias. [415] Now, the Greek cults at Smyrna, as in the other
Æolic and Ionic cities of Asia Minor, would be very likely to reflect
in some degree the influence of the Karian or other Asiatic cults
around them. [416] The early Attic conquerors of Miletos allowed
the worship of the Karian Sun-God there to be carried on by the old
priests; and the Attic settlers of Ephesos in the same way adopted the
neighbouring worship of the Lydian Goddess (who became the Artemis
or "Great Diana" of the Ephesians), and retained the ministry of
the attendant priests and eunuchs. [417] Smyrna was apparently not
like these a mixed community, but one founded by Achaians from the
Peloponnesos; but the genera] Ionic and Æolic religious atmosphere,
set up by common sacrifices, [418] must have been represented in an
epic brought forth in that region. The Karian civilization had at
one time spread over a great part of the Ægean, including Delos and
Cyprus. [419] Such a civilization must have affected that of the Greek
conquerors, who only on that basis became civilized traders. [420]

It is not necessary to ask how far exactly the influence may have
gone in the Iliad: the main point is that even at that stage of
comparatively simple Hellenism the Asiatic environment, Karian
or Phoenician, counted for something, whether in cosmogony or in
furthering the process of God-grouping, or in conveying the cult of
Cyprian Aphrodite, [421] or haply in lending some characteristics to
Zeus and Apollo and Athênê, [422] an influence none the less real
because the genius of the poet or poets of the Iliad has given to
the whole Olympian group the artistic stamp of individuality which
thenceforth distinguishes the Gods of Greece from all others. Indeed,
the very creation of a graded hierarchy out of the independent local
deities of Greece, the marrying of the once isolated Pelasgic Hêrê
to Zeus, the subordination to him of the once isolated Athênê and
Apollo--all this tells of the influence of a Semitic world in which
each Baal had his wife, and in which the monarchic system developed on
earth had been set up in heaven. [423] But soon the Asiatic influence
becomes still more clearly recognizable. There is reason to hold
with Schrader that the belief in a mildly blissful future state,
as seen even in the Odyssey [424] and in the Theogony ascribed to
Hesiod, [425] is "a new belief which is only to be understood in
view of oriental tales and teaching." [426] In the Theogony, again,
the Semitic element increases, [427] Kronos being a Semitic figure;
[428] while Semelê, if not Dionysos, appears to be no less so. [429]
But we may further surmise that in Homer, to begin with, the conception
of Okeanos, the earth-surrounding Ocean-stream, as the origin of all
things, [430] comes from some Semitic source; and that Hesiod's more
complicated scheme of origins from Chaos is a further borrowing of
oriental thought--both notions being found in ancient Babylonian lore,
whence the Hebrews derived their combination of Chaos and Ocean in
the first verses of Genesis. [431] It thus appears that the earlier
oriental [432] influence upon Greek thought was in the direction
of developing religion, [433] with only the germ of rationalism
conveyed in the idea of an existence of matter before the Gods, [434]
which we shall later find scientifically developed. But the case is
obscure. Insofar as the Theogony, for instance, partly moralizes the
more primitively savage myths, [435] it may be that it represents
the spontaneous need of the more highly evolved race to give an
acceptable meaning to divine tales which, coming from another race,
have not a quite sacrosanct prescription, though the tendency is to
accept them. On the other hand, it may have been a further foreign
influence that gave the critical impulse.


    "It is plain enough that Homer and Hesiod represent, both
    theologically and socially, the close of a long epoch, and
    not the youth of the Greek world, as some have supposed. The
    real signification of many myths is lost to them, and so is
    the import of most of the names and titles of the elder Gods,
    which are archaic and strange, while the subordinate personages
    generally have purely Greek names" (Professor Mahaffy, History
    of Classical Greek Literature, 1880, i, 17).




§ 2

Whatever be the determining conditions, it is clear that the Homeric
epos stands for a new growth of secular song, distinct from the earlier
poetry, which by tradition was "either lyrical or oracular." The
poems ascribed to the pre-Homeric bards "were all short, and they
were all strictly religious. In these features they contrasted
broadly with the epic school of Homer. Even the hexameter metre
seems not to have been used in these old hymns, and was called a new
invention of the Delphic priests. [436] Still further, the majority
of these hymns are connected with mysteries apparently ignored by
Homer, or with the worship of Dionysos, which he hardly knew." [437]
Intermediate between the earlier religious poetry and the Homeric
epic, then, was a hexametric verse, used by the Delphic priesthood;
and to this order of poetry belongs the Theogony which goes under
the name of Hesiod, and which is a sample of other and older works,
[438] probably composed by priests. And the distinctive mark of the
Homeric epos is that, framed as it was to entertain feudal chiefs and
their courts, it turned completely away from the sacerdotal norm and
purpose. "Thus epic poetry, from having been purely religious, became
purely secular. After having treated men and heroes in subordination
to the Gods, it came to treat the Gods in relation to men. Indeed,
it may be said of Homer that in the image of man created he God." [439]


    As to the non-religiousness of the Homeric epics, there is a
    division of critical opinion. Meyer insists (Gesch. des Alt. ii,
    395) that, as contrasted with the earlier religious poetry, "the
    epic poetry is throughout secular (profan); it aims at charming
    its hearers, not at propitiating the Gods"; and he further sees in
    the whole Ionian mood a certain cynical disillusionment (id. ii,
    723). Cp. Benn, Philos. of Greece, p. 40, citing Hegel. E. Curtius
    (G. G. i, 126) goes so far as to ascribe a certain irony to the
    portraiture of the Gods (Ionian Apollo excepted) in Homer, and to
    trace this to Ionian levity. To the same cause he assigns the lack
    of any expression of a sense of stigma attaching to murder. This
    sense he holds the Greek people had, though Homer does not
    hint it. (Cp. Grote, i, 24, whose inference Curtius implicitly
    impugns.) Girard (Le Sentiment religieux en Grèce, 1869), on the
    contrary, appears to have no suspicion of any problem to solve,
    treating Homer as unaffectedly religious. The same view is taken
    by Prof. Paul Decharme. "On chercherait vainement dans l'Iliade et
    dans l'Odyssée les premières traces du scepticisme grec à l'égard
    des fables des dieux. C'est avec une foi entière en la réalité
    des événements mythiques que les poètes chantent les légendes ...;
    c'est en toute simplicité d'âme aussi que les auditeurs de l'épopée
    écoutent...." (La critique des traditions religieuses chez les
    grecs, 1904, p. 1.) Thus we have a kind of balance of contrary
    opinions, German against French. Any verdict on the problem must
    recognize on the one hand the possibilities of naïve credulity in
    an unlettered age, and on the other the probability of critical
    perception on the part of a great poet. I have seen both among
    Boers in South Africa. On the general question of the mood of
    the Homeric poems compare Gilbert Murray, Four Stages of Greek
    Religion, 1912, p. 77, and Hist. of Anc. Greek Lit. pp. 34, 35;
    and A. Benn, The Philosophy of Greece in Relation to the Character
    of its People, 1898, pp. 29-30.


Still, it cannot be said that in the Iliad there is any clear hint of
religious skepticism, though the Gods are so wholly in the likeness of
men that the lower deities fight with heroes and are worsted, while
Zeus and Hêrê quarrel like any earthly couple. In the Odyssey there
is a bare hint of possible speculation in the use of the word atheos;
but it is applied only in the phrase ouk atheei, "not without a
God," [440] in the sense of similar expressions in other passages
and in the Iliad. [441] The idea was that sometimes the Gods directly
meddled. When Odysseus accuses the suitors of not dreading the Gods,
[442] he has no thought of accusing them of unbelief. [443] Homer
has indeed been supposed to have exercised a measure of relative
freethought in excluding from his song the more offensive myths about
the Gods, [444] but such exclusion may be sufficiently explained on
the score that the epopees were chanted in aristocratic dwellings,
in the presence of womenkind, without surmising any process of doubt
on the poet's part.

On the other hand, it was inevitable that such a free treatment of
things hitherto sacred should not only affect the attitude of the
lay listener towards the current religion, but should react on the
religious consciousness. God-legends so fully thrust on secular
attention were bound to be discussed; and in the adaptations of
myth for liturgical purposes by Stesichoros (fl. circa 600 B.C.) we
appear to have the first open trace of a critical revolt in the
Greek world against immoral or undignified myths. [445] In his
work, it is fair to say, we see "the beginning of rationalism":
"the decisive step is taken: once the understanding criticizes the
sanctified tradition, it raises itself to be the judge thereof;
no longer the common tradition but the individual conviction is the
ground of religious belief." [446] Religious, indeed, the process
still substantially is. It is to preserve the credit of Helena as
a Goddess that Stesichoros repudiates the Homeric account of her,
[447] somewhat in the spirit in which the framers of the Hesiodic
theogony manipulated the myths without rejecting them, or the Hebrew
redactors tampered with their text. But in Stesichoros there is a new
tendency to reject the myth altogether; [448] so that at this stage
freethought is still part of a process in which religious feeling,
pressed by an advancing ethical consciousness, instinctively clears
its standing ground.

It is in Pindar, however (518-442 B.C.), that we first find such a
mental process plainly avowed by a believer. In his first Olympic
Ode he expressly declares the need for bringing afterthought to bear
on poetic lore, that so men may speak nought unfitting of the Gods;
and he protests that he will never tell the tale of the blessed ones
banqueting on human flesh. [449] In the ninth Ode he again protests
that his lips must not speak blasphemously of such a thing as strife
among the immortals. [450] Here the critical motive is ethical, though,
while repudiating one kind of scandal about the Gods, Pindar placidly
accepts others no less startling to the modern sense. His critical
revolt, in fact, is far from thoroughgoing, and suggests rather a
religious man's partial response to pressure from others than any
independent process of reflection. [451]


    "He [Pindar] was honestly attached to the national religion and to
    its varieties in old local cults. He lived a somewhat sacerdotal
    life, labouring in honour of the Gods, and seeking to spread a
    reverence for old traditional beliefs. He, moreover, shows an
    acquaintance with Orphic rites and Pythagorean mysteries, which
    led him to preach the doctrine of immortality, and of rewards
    and punishments in the life hereafter. [Note.--The most explicit
    fragment (thrênoi, 3), is, however, not considered genuine by
    recent critics.]... He is indeed more affected by the advance of
    freethinking than he imagines; he borrows from the neologians the
    habit of rationalizing myths, and explaining away immoral acts
    and motives in the Gods; but these things are isolated attempts
    with him, and have no deep effect upon his general thinking"
    (Mahaffy, Hist. of Greek Lit. i, 213-14).


For such a development we are not, of course, forced to assume a
foreign influence: mere progress in refinement and in mental activity
could bring it about; yet none the less it is probable that foreign
influence did quicken the process. It is true that from the beginnings
of the literary period Greek thought played with a certain freedom on
myth, partly perhaps because the traditions visibly came from various
races, and there was no strong priesthood to ossify them. After Homer
and Hesiod, men looked back to those poets as shaping theology to
their own minds. [452] But all custom is conservative, and Pindar's
mind had that general cast. On the other hand, external influence was
forthcoming. The period of Pindar and Æschylus [525-455 B.C.] follows
on one in which Greek thought, stimulated on all sides, had taken
the first great stride in its advance beyond all antiquity. Egypt
had been fully thrown open to the Greeks in the reign of Psammetichos
[453] (650 B.C.); and a great historian, who contends that the "sheer
inherent and expansive force" of "the" Greek intellect, "aided but
by no means either impressed or provoked from without," was the true
cause, yet concedes that intercourse with Egypt "enlarged the range
of their thoughts and observations, while it also imparted to them
that vein of mysticism which overgrew the primitive simplicity of the
Homeric religion," and that from Asia Minor in turn they had derived
"musical instruments and new laws of rhythm and melody," as well as
"violent and maddening religious rites." [454] And others making
similar à priori claims for the Greek intelligence are forced likewise
to admit that the mental transition between Homer and Herodotos cannot
be explained save in terms of "the influence of other creeds, and the
necessary operation of altered circumstances and relations." [455]
In the Persae of Æschylus we even catch a glimpse of direct contact
with foreign skepticism; [456] and again in the Agamemnon there is
a reference to some impious one who denied that the Gods deigned
to have care of mortals. [457] It seems unwarrantable to read as
"ridicule of popular polytheism" the passage in the same tragedy:
[458] "Zeus, whosoever he be; if this name be well-pleasing to
himself in invocation, by this do I name him." It may more fitly be
read [459] as an echo of the saying of Herakleitos that "the Wise
[= the Logos?] is unwilling and willing to be called by the name of
Zeus." [460] But in the poet's thought, as revealed in the Prometheus,
and in the Agamemnon on the theme of the sacrifice of Iphigeneia, there
has occurred an ethical judgment of the older creeds, an approach to
pantheism, a rejection of anthropomorphism, and a growth of pessimism
that tells of their final insufficiency.


    The leaning to pantheism is established by the discovery that
    the disputed lines, "Zeus is sky, earth, and heaven: Zeus is all
    things, yea, greater than all things" (Frag. 443), belonged to the
    lost tragedy of the Heliades (Haigh, Tragic Drama of the Greeks,
    1896, p. 88). For the pessimism see the Prometheus, 247-51. The
    anti-anthropomorphism is further to be made out from the lines
    ascribed to Æschylus by Justin Martyr (De Monarchia, c. 2)
    and Clemens Alexandrinus (Stromata, v, 14). They are expressly
    pantheistic; but their genuineness is doubtful. The story that
    Æschylus was nearly killed by a theatre audience on the score
    that he had divulged part of the mysteries in a tragedy (Haigh,
    The Attic Theatre, 1889, p. 316; Tragic Drama, pp. 49-50)
    does not seem to have suggested to Aristotle, who tells it
    (Nicomachean Ethics, iii, 2), any heterodox intention on the
    tragedian's part; but it is hard to see an orthodox believer
    in the author either of the Prometheus, wherein Zeus is posed
    as brutal might crucifying innocence and beneficence, or of
    the Agamemnon, where the father, perplexed in the extreme, can
    but fall back helplessly on formulas about the all-sufficiency
    of Zeus when called upon to sacrifice his daughter. Cp. Haigh,
    Tragic Drama, p. 86 sq. "Some critics," says Mr. Haigh (p. 88),
    "have been led to imagine that there is in Æschylus a double
    Zeus--the ordinary God of the polytheistic religion and the one
    omnipotent deity in whom he really believed. They suppose that he
    had no genuine faith in the credibility of the popular legends,
    but merely used them as a setting for his tragedies; and that his
    own convictions were of a more philosophical type," as seen in
    the pantheistic lines concerning Zeus. To this Mr. Haigh replies
    that it is "most improbable that there was any clear distinction
    in the mind of Æschylus" between the two conceptions of Zeus;
    going on, however, to admit that "much, no doubt, he regarded
    as uncertain, much as false. Even the name 'Zeus' was to him a
    mere convention." Mr. Haigh in this discussion does not attempt
    to deal with the problem of the Prometheus.

    The hesitations of the critics on this head are noteworthy. Karl
    Ottfried Müller, who is least himself in dealing with fundamental
    issues of creed, evades the problem (Lit. of Anc. Greece, 1847,
    p. 329) with the bald suggestion that "Æschylus, in his own
    mind, must have felt how this severity [of Zeus], a necessary
    accompaniment of the transition from the Titanic period to the
    government of the Gods of Olympus, was to be reconciled with the
    mild wisdom which he makes an attribute of Zeus in the subsequent
    ages of the world. Consequently, the deviation from right ... would
    all lie on the side of Prometheus." This nugatory plea--which is
    rightly rejected by Burckhardt (Griech. Culturgesch. ii, 25)--is
    ineffectually backed by the argument that the friendly Oceanides
    recur to the thought, "Those only are wise who humbly reverence
    Adrasteia (Fate)"--as if the positing of a supreme Fate were not
    a further belittlement of Zeus.

    Other critics are similarly evasive. Patin (Eschyle, éd. 1877,
    p. 250 sq.), noting the vagaries of past criticism, hostile and
    other, avowedly leaves the play an unsolved enigma, affirming only
    the commonly asserted "piety" of Æschylus. Girard (Le sentiment
    religieux en Grèce, pp. 425-29) does no better, while dogmatically
    asserting that the poet is "the Greek faithful to the faith of his
    fathers, which he interprets with an intelligent and emotional
    (émue) veneration." Meyer (iii, §§ 257-58) draws an elaborate
    parallel between Æschylus and Pindar, affirming in turn the "tiefe
    Frömmigkeit" of the former--and in turn leaves the enigma of the
    Prometheus unsolved. Professor Decharme, rightly rejecting the
    fanciful interpretations of Quinet and others who allegorize
    Prometheus into humanity revolting against superstition,
    offers a very unsatisfying explanation of his own (p. 107),
    which practically denies that there is any problem to solve.

    Prof. Mahaffy, with his more vivacious habit of thought, comes
    to the evaded issue. "How," he asks, "did the Athenian audience,
    who vehemently attacked the poet for divulging the mysteries,
    tolerate such a drama? And still more, how did Æschylus, a pious
    and serious thinker, venture to bring such a subject on the
    stage with a moral purpose?" The answers suggested are: (1) that
    in all old religions there are tolerated anomalous survivals;
    (2) that "a very extreme distortion of their Gods will not
    offend many who would feel outraged at any open denial of them";
    (3) that all Greeks longed for despotic power for themselves,
    and that "no Athenian, however he sympathized with Prometheus,
    would think of blaming Zeus for ... crushing all resistance to his
    will." But even if these answers--of which the last is the most
    questionable--be accepted, "the question of the poet's intention
    is far more difficult, and will probably never be satisfactorily
    answered." Finally, we have this summing-up: "Æschylus was, indeed,
    essentially a theologian ... but, what is more honourable and
    exceptional, he was so candid and honest a theologian that he did
    not approach men's difficulties for the purpose of refuting them
    or showing them weak and groundless. On the contrary, though an
    orthodox and pious man, though clearly convinced of the goodness
    of Providence, and of the profound truth of the religion of
    his fathers, he was ever stating boldly the contradictions and
    anomalies in morals and in myths, and thus naturally incurring
    the odium and suspicion of the professional advocates of religion
    and their followers. He felt, perhaps instinctively, that a vivid
    dramatic statement of these problems in his tragedies was better
    moral education than vapid platitudes about our ignorance, and
    about our difficulties being only caused by the shortness of our
    sight" (Hist. of Greek Lit. i, 260-61, 273-74).

    Here, despite the intelligent handling, the enigma is merely
    transferred from the great tragedian's work to his character: it is
    not solved. No solution is offered of the problem of the pantheism
    of the fragment above cited, which is quite irreconcilable with
    any orthodox belief in Greek religion, though such sayings are
    at times repeated by unthinking believers, without recognition
    of their bearing. That the pantheism is a philosophical element
    imported into the Greek world from the Babylonian through the early
    Ionian thinkers seems to be the historical fact (cp. Whittaker,
    as last cited): that the importation meant the dissolution of
    the national faith for many thinking men seems to be no less
    true. It seems finally permissible, then, to suggest that the
    "piety" of Æschylus was either discontinuous or a matter of
    artistic rhetoric and public spirit, and that the Prometheus is
    a work of profound and terrible irony, unburdening his mind of
    reveries that religion could not conjure away. The discussion
    on the play has unduly ignored the question of its date. It is,
    in all probability, one of the latest of the works of Æschylus
    (K. O. Müller, Lit. of Anc. Greece, p. 327; Haigh, Tragic Drama,
    p. 109). Müller points to the employment of the third actor--a
    late development--and Haigh to the overshadowing of the choruses
    by the dialogue; also to the mention (ll. 366-72) of the eruption
    of Etna, which occurred in 475 B.C. This one circumstance goes
    far to solve the dispute. Written near the end of the poet's life
    the play belongs to the latest stages of his thinking; and if it
    departs widely in its tone from the earlier plays, the reasonable
    inference is that his ideas had undergone a change. The Agamemnon,
    with its desolating problem, seems to be also one of his later
    works. Rationalism, indeed, does not usually emerge in old age,
    though Voltaire was deeply shaken in his theism by the earthquake
    of Lisbon; but Æschylus is unique even among men of genius; and
    the highest flight of Greek drama may well stand for an abnormal
    intellectual experience.


In this primary entrance of critical doubt into drama we have one of
the sociological clues to the whole evolution of Greek thought. It
has been truly said that the constant action of the tragic stage, the
dramatic putting of arguments and rejoinders, pros and cons--which
in turn was a fruit of the actual daily pleadings in the Athenian
dikastery--was a manifold stimulus alike to ethical feeling and
to intellectual effort, such as no other ancient civilization ever
knew. "The appropriate subject-matter of tragedy is pregnant not only
with ethical sympathy, but also with ethical debate and speculation,"
to an extent unapproached in the earlier lyric and gnomic poetry
and the literature of aphorism and precept. "In place of unexpanded
results, or the mere communication of single-minded sentiment, we
have even in Æschylus, the earliest of the great tragedians, a large
latitude of dissent and debate--a shifting point of view--a case
better or worse--and a divination of the future advent of sovereign
and instructed reason. It was through the intermediate stage of
tragedy that Grecian literature passed into the Rhetoric, Dialectics,
and Ethical speculation which marked the fifth century B.C." [461]

This development was indeed autochthonous, save insofar as the
germ of the tragic drama may have come from the East in the cult
of Dionysos, with its vinous dithyramb: the "Greek intellect"
assuredly did wonderful things at Athens, being placed, for a time,
in civic conditions peculiarly fitted for the economic evocation of
certain forms of genius. But the above-noted developments in Pindar
and in Æschylus had been preceded by the great florescence of early
Ionian philosophy in the sixth century, a growth which constrains
us to look once more to Asia Minor for a vital fructification of the
Greek inner life, of a kind that Athenian institutions could not in
themselves evoke. For while drama flourished supremely at Athens,
science and philosophy grew up elsewhere, centuries before Athens
had a philosopher of note; and all the notable beginnings of Hellenic
freethought occurred outside of Hellas proper.




§ 3

The Greeks varied from the general type of culture-evolution seen
in India, Persia, Egypt, and Babylon, and approximated somewhat to
that of ancient China, in that their higher thinking was done not by
an order of priests pledged to cults, but by independent laymen. In
Greece, as in China, this line of development is to be understood as a
result of early political conditions--in China, those of a multiplicity
of independent feudal States; in Greece, those of a multiplicity of
City States, set up first by the geographical structure of Hellas,
and reproduced in the colonies of Asia Minor and Magna Graecia by
reason of the acquired ideal and the normal state of commercial
competition. To the last, many Greek cults exhibited their original
character as the sacra of private families. Such conditions prevented
the growth of a priestly caste or organization. [462] Neither China
nor Pagan Greece was imperialized till there had arisen enough of
rationalism to prevent the rise of a powerful priesthood; and the
later growth of a priestly system in Greece in the Christian period
is to be explained in terms first of a positive social degeneration,
accompanying a complete transmutation of political life, and secondly
of the imposition of a new cult, on the popular plane, specially
organized on the model of the political system that adopted it. Under
imperialism, however, the two civilizations ultimately presented a
singular parallel of unprogressiveness.

In the great progressive period, the possible gains from the absence of
a priesthood are seen in course of realization. For the Greek-speaking
world in general there was no dogmatic body of teaching, no written
code of theology and moral law, no Sacred Book. [463] Each local
cult had its own ancient ritual, often ministered by priestesses,
with myths, often of late invention, to explain it; [464] only
Homer and Hesiod, with perhaps some of the now lost epics, serving
as a general treasury of myth-lore. The two great epopees ascribed
to Homer, indeed, had a certain Biblical status; and the Homerids
or other bards who recited them did what in them lay to make the
old poetry the standard of theological opinion; but they too lacked
organized influence, and could not hinder higher thinking. [465] The
special priesthood of Delphi, wielding the oracle, could maintain
their political influence only by holding their function above all
apparent self-seeking or effort at domination. [466] It only needed,
then, such civic conditions as should evolve a leisured class, with
a bent towards study, to make possible a growth of lay philosophy.

Those conditions first arose in the Ionian cities; because there first
did Greek citizens attain commercial wealth, [467] as a result of
adopting the older commercial civilization whose independent cities
they conquered, and of the greater rapidity of development which
belongs to colonies in general. [468] There it was that, in matters
of religion and philosophy, the comparison of their own cults with
those of their foreign neighbours first provoked their critical
reflection, as the age of primitive warfare passed away. And there
it was, accordingly, that on a basis of primitive Babylonian science
there originated with Thales of Miletos (fl. 586 B.C.), a Phoenician by
descent, [469] the higher science and philosophy of the Greek-speaking
race. [470]


    It is historically certain that Lydia had an ancient and close
    historical connection with Babylonian and Assyrian civilization,
    whether through the "Hittites" or otherwise (Sayce, Anc. Emp. of
    the East, 1884, pp. 217-19; Curtius, Griech. Gesch. i, 63, 207;
    Meyer, Gesch. des Alterth. i, 166, 277, 299, 305-10; Soury,
    Bréviaire de l'hist. du matérialisme, 1881, pp. 30, 37 sq. Cp. as
    to Armenia, Edwards, The Witness of Assyria, 1893, p. 144); and in
    the seventh century the commercial connection between Lydia and
    Ionia, long close, was presumably friendly up to the time of the
    first attacks of the Lydian Kings, and even afterwards (Herodotos
    i, 20-23), Alyattes having made a treaty of peace with Miletos,
    which thereafter had peace during his long reign. This brings us
    to the time of Thales (640-548 B.C.). At the same time, the Ionian
    settlers of Miletos had from the first a close connection with the
    Karians (Herod. i, 146, and above pp. 120-21), whose near affinity
    with the Semites, at least in religion, is seen in their practice
    of cutting their foreheads at festivals (id. ii, 61; cp. Grote,
    ed. 1888, i, 27, note; E. Curtius, i, 36, 42; Busolt, i, 33;
    and Spiegel, Eranische Alterthumskunde, i, 228). Thales was thus
    in the direct sphere of Babylonian culture before the conquest
    of Cyrus; and his Milesian pupils or successors, Anaximandros
    and Anaximenes, stand for the same influences. Herakleitos in
    turn was of Ephesus, an Ionian city in the same culture-sphere;
    Anaxagoras was of Klazomenai, another Ionian city, as had been
    Hermotimos, of the same philosophic school; the Eleatic school,
    founded by Xenophanes and carried on by Parmenides and the elder
    Zeno, come from the same matrix, Elea having been founded by
    exiles from Ionian Phokaia on its conquest by the Persians; and
    Pythagoras, in turn, was of the Ionian city of Samos, in the same
    sixth century. Finally, Protagoras and Demokritos were of Abdera,
    an Ionian colony in Thrace; Leukippos, the teacher of Demokritos,
    was either an Abderite, a Milesian, or an Elean; and Archelaos,
    the pupil of Anaxagoras and a teacher of Sokrates, is said to
    have been a Milesian. Wellhausen (Israel, p. 473 of vol. of
    Prolegomena, Eng. tr.) has spoken of the rise of philosophy
    on the "threatened and actual political annihilation of Ionia"
    as corresponding to the rise of Hebrew prophecy on the menace
    and the consummation of the Assyrian conquest. As regards Ionia,
    this may hold in the sense that the stoppage of political freedom
    threw men back on philosophy, as happened later at Athens. But
    Thales philosophized before the Persian conquest.




§ 4

Thales, like Homer, starts from the Babylonian conception of a
beginning of all things in water; but in Thales the immediate motive
and the sequel are strictly cosmological and neither theological
nor poetical, though we cannot tell whether the worship of a God
of the Waters may not have been the origin of a water-theory of the
cosmos. The phrase attributed to him, "that all things are full of
Gods," [471] clearly meant that in his opinion the forces of things
inhered in the cosmos, and not in personal powers who spasmodically
interfered with it. [472] It is probable that, as was surmised by
Plutarch, a pantheistic conception of Zeus existed for the Ionian
Greeks before Thales. [473] To the later doxographists he "seems to
have lost belief in the Gods." [474] From the mere second-hand and
often unintelligent statements which are all we have in his case,
it is hard to make sure of his system; but that it was pantheistic
[475] and physicist seems clear. He conceived that matter not only
came from but was resolvable into water; that all phenomena were
ruled by law or "necessity"; and that the sun and planets (commonly
regarded as deities) were bodies analogous to the earth, which he
held to be spherical but "resting on water." [476] For the rest, he
speculated in meteorology and in astronomy, and is credited with having
predicted a solar eclipse  [477]--a fairly good proof of his knowledge
of Chaldean science [478]--and with having introduced geometry into
Greece from Egypt. [479] To him, too, is ascribed a wise counsel to
the Ionians in the matter of political federation, [480] which, had
it been followed, might have saved them from the Persian conquest;
and he is one of the many early moralists who laid down the Golden
Rule as the essence of the moral law. [481] With his maxim, "Know
thyself," he seems to mark a broadly new departure in ancient thought:
the balance of energy is shifted from myth and theosophy, prophecy
and poesy, to analysis of consciousness and the cosmic process.

From this point Greek rationalism is continuous, despite reactions,
till the Roman conquest, Miletos figuring long as a general source
of skepticism. Anaximandros (610-547 B.C.), pupil and companion
of Thales, was like him an astronomer, geographer, and physicist,
seeking for a first principle (for which he may or may not have
invented the name [482]); rejecting the idea of a single primordial
element such as water; affirming an infinite material cause, without
beginning and indestructible, [483] with an infinite number of worlds;
and--still showing the Chaldean impulse--speculating remarkably on
the descent of man from something aquatic, as well as on the form and
motion of the earth (figured by him as a cylinder [484]), the nature
and motions of the solar system, and thunder and lightning. [485]
It seems doubtful whether, as affirmed by Eudemus, he taught the
doctrine of the earth's motion; but that this doctrine was derived
from the Babylonian schools of astronomy is so probable that it may
have been accepted in Miletos in his day. Only by inferring a prior
scientific development of remarkable energy can we explain the striking
force of the sayings of Anaximandros which have come down to us. His
doctrine of evolution stands out for us to-day like the fragment of a
great ruin, hinting obscurely of a line of active thinkers. The thesis
that man must have descended from a different species because, "while
other animals quickly found food for themselves, man alone requires
a long period of suckling: had he been originally such as he is now,
he could never have survived," is a quite masterly anticipation of
modern evolutionary science. We are left asking, how came an early
Ionian Greek to think thus, outgoing the assimilative power of the
later age of Aristotle? Only a long scientific evolution can readily
account for it; and only in the Mesopotamian world could such an
evolution have taken place. [486]

Anaximenes (fl. 548 B.C.), yet another Milesian, pupil or at least
follower in turn of Anaximandros, speculates similarly, making his
infinite and first principle the air, in which he conceives the earth
to be suspended; theorizes on the rainbow, earthquakes, the nature
and the revolution of the heavenly bodies (which, with the earth, he
supposed to be broad and flat); and affirms the eternity of motion and
the perishableness of the earth. [487] The Ionian thought of the time
seems thus to have been thoroughly absorbed in problems of natural
origins, and only in that connection to have been concerned with the
problems of religion. No dogma of divine creation blocked the way:
the trouble was levity of hypothesis or assent. Thales, following a
Semitic lead, places the source of all things in water. Anaximandros,
perhaps following another, but seeking a more abstract idea, posited
an infinite, the source of all things; and Anaximenes in turn reduces
that infinite to the air, as being the least material of things. He
cannot have anticipated the chemical conception of the reduction
of all solids to gases: the thesis was framed either à priori or in
adaptation of priestly claims for the deities of the elements; and
others were to follow with the guesses of earth and fire and heat and
cold. Still, the speculation is that of bold and far-grasping thinkers,
and for these there can have been no validity in the ordinary God-ideas
of polytheism.

There is reason to think that these early "schools" of thought
were really constituted by men in some way banded together, [488]
thus supporting each other against the conservatism of religious
ignorance. The physicians were so organized; the disciples of
Pythagoras followed the same course; and in later Greece we shall
find the different philosophic sects formed into societies or
corporations. The first model was probably that of the priestly
corporation; and in a world in which many cults were chronically
disendowed it may well have been that the leisured old priesthoods,
philosophizing as we have seen those of India and Egypt and Mesopotamia
doing, played a primary part in initiating the work of rational
secular thought.


    The recent work of Mr. F. M. Cornford, From Philosophy to Religion
    (1912), puts forth an interesting and ingenious theory to the
    effect that early Greek philosophy is a reduction to abstract
    terms of the practice of totemistic tribes. On this view, when
    the Gods are figured in Homer as subject to Moira (Destiny),
    there has taken place an impersonation of Nomos, or Law; and just
    as the divine cosmos or polity is a reflection of the earthly,
    so the established conception of the absolute compulsoriness of
    tribal law is translated into one of a Fate which overrules the
    Gods (p. 40 sq.). So, when Anaximandros posits the doctrine of
    four elements [he did not use the word, by the way; that comes
    later; see Burnet, ch. i, p. 56, citing Diels], "we observe that
    this type of cosmic structure corresponds to that of a totemic
    tribe containing four clans" (p. 62). On the other hand, the
    totemistic stage had long before been broken down. The "notion
    of the group-soul" had given rise to the notion of God (p. 90);
    and the primitive "magical group" had dissolved into a system of
    families (p. 93), with individual souls. On this prior accumulation
    of religious material early philosophy works (p. 138).

    It does not appear why, thus recognizing that totemism was at
    least a long way behind in Thales's day, Mr. Cornford should
    trace the Ionian four elements straight back to the problematic
    four clans of the totemistic tribe. Dr. Frazer gives him no data
    whatever for Aryan totemism; and the Ionian cities, like those
    of Mesopotamia and Egypt, belong to the age of commerce and of
    monarchies. It would seem more plausible, on Mr. Cornford's own
    premises, to trace the rival theories of the four elements to
    religious philosophies set up by the priests of four Gods of water,
    earth, air, and fire. If the early philosophers "had nothing but
    theology behind them" (p. 138), why not infer theologies for the
    old-established deities of Mesopotamia? Mr. Cornford adds to the
    traditional factors that of "the temperaments of the individual
    philosophers, which made one or other of those schemes the more
    congenial to them." Following Dr. F. H. Bradley, he pronounces
    that "almost all philosophic arguments are invented afterwards, to
    recommend, or defend from attack, conclusions which the philosopher
    was from the outset bent on believing before he could think of
    any arguments at all. That is why philosophical reasonings are
    so bad, so artificial, so unconvincing."

    Upon this very principle it is much more likely that the
    philosophic cults of water, earth, air, and fire originated in
    the worships of Gods of those elements, whose priests would tend
    to magnify their office. It is hard to see how "temperament"
    could determine a man's bias to an air-theory in preference to a
    water-theory. But if the priests of Ea the Water-God and those
    of Bel the God of Air had framed theories of the kind, it is
    conceivable that family or tribal ties and traditions might set
    men upon developing the theory quasi-philosophically when the
    alien Gods came to be recognized by thinking men as mere names
    for the elements. [489] (Compare Flaubert's Salammbô as to the
    probable rivalry of priests of the Sun and Moon.) A pantheistic
    view, again, arose as we saw among various priesthoods in the
    monarchies where syncretism arose out of political aggregations.


What is clear is that the religious or theistic basis had ceased to
exist for many educated Greeks in that environment. The old God-ideas
have disappeared, and a quasi-scientific attitude has been taken
up. It is apparently conditioned, perhaps fatally, by prior modes of
thought; but it operates in disregard of so-called religious needs,
and negates the normal religious conception of earthly government
or providence. Nevertheless, it was not destined to lead to the
rationalization of popular thought; and only in a small number of
cases did the scientific thinkers deeply concern themselves with the
enlightenment of the mass.

In another Ionian thinker of that age, indeed, we find alongside of
physical and philosophical speculation on the universe the most direct
and explicit assault upon popular religion that ancient history
preserves. Xenophanes of Kolophon (? 570-470), a contemporary
of Anaximandros, was forced by a Persian invasion or by some
revolution to leave his native city at the age of twenty-five; and
by his own account his doctrines, and inferribly his life, had gone
"up and down Greece"--in which we are to include Magna Graecia--for
sixty-seven years at the date of writing of one of his poems. [490]
This was presumably composed at Elea (Hyela or Velia), founded
about 536 B.C., on the western Italian coast, south of Paestum, by
unsubduable Phokaians seeking a new home after the Persian conquest,
and after they had been further defeated in the attempt to live as
pirates in Corsica. [491] Thither came the aged Xenophanes, perhaps
also seeking freedom. He seems to have lived hitherto as a rhapsode,
chanting his poems at the courts of tyrants as the Homerids did the
Iliad. It is hard indeed to conceive that his recitations included the
anti-religious passages which have come down to us; but his resort in
old age to the new community of Elea is itself a proof of a craving
and a need for free conditions of life. [492]

Setting out on his travels, doubtless, with the Ionian predilection for
a unitary philosophy, he had somewhere and somehow attained a pantheism
which transcended the concern for a "first principle"--if, indeed,
it was essentially distinct from the doctrine of Anaximandros. [493]
"Looking wistfully upon the whole heavens," says Aristotle, [494]
"he affirms that unity is God." From the scattered quotations which
are all that remain of his lost poem, On Nature (or Natural Things),
[495] it is hard to deduce any full conception of his philosophy;
but it is clear that it was monistic; and though most of his later
interpreters have acclaimed him as the herald of monotheism, it is only
in terms of pantheism that his various utterances can be reconciled. It
is clearly in that sense that Aristotle and Plato [496] commemorate
him as the first of the Eleatic monists. Repeatedly he speaks of
"the Gods" as well as of "God"; and he even inculcates the respectful
worship of them. [497] The solution seems to be that he thinks of the
forces and phenomena of Nature in the early way as Gods or Powers, but
resolves them in turn into a whole which includes all forms of power
and intelligence, but is not to be conceived as either physically or
mentally anthropomorphic. "His contemporaries would have been more
likely to call Xenophanes an atheist than anything else." [498]


    The common verdict of the historians of philosophy, who find
    in Xenophanes an early and elevated doctrine of "Monotheism,"
    is closely tested by J. Freudenthal, Ueber die Theologie des
    Xenophanes, 1886. As he shows, the bulk of them (cited by him,
    pp. 2-7) do violence to Xenophanes's language in making him
    out the proclaimer of a monotheistic doctrine to a polytheistic
    world. That he was essentially a pantheist is now recognized by
    a number of writers. Cp. Windelband, as cited, p. 48; Decharme,
    as cited, p. 46 sq. Bréton, Poésie philos. en Grèce, pp. 47,
    64 sq., had maintained the point, against Cousin, in 1882,
    before Freudenthal. But Freudenthal in turn glosses part of the
    problem in ascribing to Xenophanes an acceptance of polytheism
    (cp. Burnet, p. 142), which kept him from molestation throughout
    his life; whereas Anaxagoras, who had never attacked popular
    belief with the directness of Xenophanes, was prosecuted for
    atheism. Anaxagoras was of a later age, dwelling in an Athens in
    which popular prejudice took readily to persecution, and political
    malice resorted readily to religious pretences. Xenophanes
    could hardly have published with impunity in Periklean Athens
    his stinging impeachments of current God-ideas; and it remains
    problematic whether he ever proclaimed them in face of the
    multitude. It is only from long subsequent students that we get
    them as quotations from his poetry; there is no record of their
    effect on his contemporaries. That his God-idea was pantheistic
    is sufficiently established by his attacks on anthropomorphism,
    taken in connection with his doctrine of the All.


Whether as teaching meant for public currency or as a philosophic
message for the few, the pantheism of Xenophanes expressed itself in
an attack on anthropomorphic religion, no less direct and much more
ratiocinative than that of any Hebrew prophet upon idolatry. "Mortals,"
he wrote, in a famous passage, "suppose that the Gods are born, and
wear man's clothing, [499] and have voice and body. But if cattle
or lions had hands, so as to paint with their hands and make works
of art as men do, they would paint their Gods and give them bodies
like their own--horses like horses, cattle like cattle." And again:
"Ethiopians make their Gods black and snub-nosed; the Thracians say
theirs have reddish hair and blue eyes; so also they conceive the
spirits of the Gods to be like themselves." [500] On Homer and Hesiod,
the myth-singers, his attack is no less stringent: "They attributed
to the Gods all things that with men are of ill-fame and blame;
they told of them countless nefarious things--thefts, adulteries,
and deception of each other." [501] It is recorded of him further
that, like Epicurus, he absolutely rejected all divination. [502]
And when the Eleans, perhaps somewhat shaken by such criticism, asked
him whether they should sacrifice and sing a dirge to Leukothea,
the child-bereft Sea-Goddess, he bade them not to sing a dirge if
they thought her divine, and not to sacrifice if she were human. [503]

Beside this ringing radicalism, not yet out of date, the physics of
the Eleatic freethinker is less noticeable. His resort to earth as a
material first principle was but another guess or disguised theosophy
added to those of his predecessors, and has no philosophic congruity
with his pantheism. It is interesting to find him reasoning from
fossil-marks that what was now land had once been sea-covered, and
been left mud; and that the moon is probably inhabited. [504] Yet,
with all this alertness of speculation, Xenophanes sounds the note
of merely negative skepticism which, for lack of fruitful scientific
research, was to become more and more common in Greek thought: [505]
"no man," he avows in one verse, "knows truly anything, and no man
ever will." [506] More fruitful was his pantheism or pankosmism. "The
All (oulos)" he declared, "sees, thinks, and hears." [507]
"It was thus from Xenophanes that the doctrine of Pankosmism first
obtained introduction into Greek philosophy, recognizing nothing real
except the universe as an indivisible and unchangeable whole." [508]
His negative skepticism might have guarded later Hellenes against
baseless cosmogony-making if they had been capable of a systematic
intellectual development. His sagacity, too, appears in his protest
[509] against that extravagant worship of the athlete which from
first to last kept popular Greek life-philosophy unprogressive. But
here least of all was he listened to.

It is after a generation of such persistent questioning of Nature
and custom by pioneer Greeks that we find in Herakleitos of Ephesus
(fl. 500 B.C.)--still in the Ionian culture-sphere--a positive and
unsparing criticism of the prevailing beliefs. No sage among the
Ionians (who had already produced a series of powerful thinkers) left
a deeper impression than he of massive force and piercing intensity:
above all of the gnomic utterances of his age, his have the ring of
character and the edge of personality; and the gossiping Diogenes,
after setting out by calling him the most arrogant of men, concedes
that the brevity and weight of his expression are not to be matched. It
was due rather to this, probably, than to his metaphysic--though that
has an arresting quality--that there grew up a school of Herakliteans
calling themselves by his name. And though doubt attaches to some of
his sayings, and even to his date, there can be small question that
he was mordantly freethinking, though a man of royal descent. He has
stern sayings about "bringing forth untrustworthy witnesses to confirm
disputed points," and about eyes and ears being "bad witnesses for
men, when their souls lack understanding." [510] "What can be seen,
heard, and learned, this I prize," is one of his declarations; and
he is credited with contemning book-learning as having failed to
give wisdom to Hesiod, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Hekataios. [511]
The belief in progress, he roundly insists, stops progress. [512] From
his cryptic utterances it maybe gathered that he too was a pantheist;
[513] and from his insistence on the immanence of strife in all things,
[514] as from others of his sayings, that he was of the Stoic mood. It
was doubtless in resentment of immoral religion that he said [515]
Homer and Archilochos deserved flogging; as he is severe on the
phallic worship of Dionysos, [516] on the absurdity of prayer to
images, and on popular pietism in general. [517] One of his sayings,
êthos anthrôpô daimôn, [518] "character is a man's dæmon," seems
to be the definite assertion of rationalism in affairs as against
the creed of special providences.


    A confusion of tradition has arisen between the early Herakleitos,
    "the Obscure," and the similarly-named writer of the first century
    of our era, who was either one Herakleides or one using the
    name of Herakleitos. As the later writer certainly allegorized
    Homer--reducing Apollo to the Sun, Athenê to Thought, and so
    on--and claimed thus to free him from the charge of impiety,
    it seems highly probable that it is from him that the scholiast
    on the Iliad, xv, 18, cites the passage scolding the atheists
    who attacked the Homeric myths. The theme and the tone do not
    belong to 500 B.C., when only the boldest--as Herakleitos--would
    be likely to attack Homer, and when there is no other literary
    trace of atheism. Grote, however (i, 374, note), cites the
    passages without comment as referring to the early philosopher,
    who is much more probably credited, as above, with denouncing
    Homer himself. Concerning the later Herakleitos or Herakleides,
    see Dr. Hatch's Hibbert Lectures on The Influence of Greek Ideas
    and Usages upon the Christian Church, 1890, pp. 61, 62.

    But even apart from the confusion with the late Herakleides,
    there is difficulty in settling the period of the Ephesian
    thinker. Diogenes Laërtius states that he flourished about
    the 69th Olympiad (504-500 B.C.). Another account, preserved by
    Eusebius, places him in the 80th or 81st Olympiad, in the infancy
    of Sokrates, and for this date there are other grounds (Ueberweg,
    i, 40); but yet other evidences carry us back to the earlier. As
    Diogenes notes five writers of the name--two being poets, one a
    historian, and one a "serio-comic" personage--and there is record
    of many other men named Herakleitos and several Herakleides,
    there is considerable room for false attributions. The statement
    of Diogenes that the Ephesian was "wont to call opinion the
    sacred disease" (i, 6, § 7) is commonly relegated to the spurious
    sayings of Herakleitos, and it suggests the last mentioned of his
    namesakes. But see Max Müller, Hibbert Lectures on Indian Religion,
    p. 6, for the opinion that it is genuine, and that by "opinion"
    was meant "religion." The saying, says Dr. Müller, "seems to me
    to have the massive, full, and noble ring of Herakleitos." It is
    hardly for rationalists to demur.


Much discussion has been set up by the common attribution
to Herakleitos in antiquity of the doctrine of the ultimate
conflagration of all things. But for this there is no ground in any
actual passage preserved from his works; and it appears to have
been a mere misconception of his doctrine in regard to Fire. His
monistic doctrine was, in brief, that all the opposing and contrasted
things in the universe, heat and cold, day and night, evil and good,
imply each other, and exist only in the relation of contrast; and he
conceived fire as something in which opposites were solved. [519]
Upon this stroke of mysticism was concentrated the discussion
which might usefully have been turned on his criticism of popular
religion; his negative wisdom was substantially ignored, and his
obscure speculation, treated as his main contribution to thought,
was misunderstood and perverted.

A limit was doubtless soon set to free speech even in Elea; and the
Eleatic school after Xenophanes, in the hands of his pupil Parmenides
(fl. 500 B.C.), Zeno (fl. 464), Melissos of Samos (fl. 444), and
their successors, is found turning first to deep metaphysic and
then to verbal dialectic, to discussion on being and not being,
the impossibility of motion, and the trick-problem of Achilles and
the tortoise. It is conceivable that thought took these lines because
others were socially closed. Parmenides, a notably philosophic spirit
(whom Plato, meeting him in youth, felt to have "an exceptionally
wonderful depth of mind," but regarded as a man to be feared as well
as reverenced), [520] made short work of the counter-sense of not
being, but does not seem to have dealt at close quarters with popular
creeds. Melissos, a man of action, who led a successful sally to
capture the Athenian fleet, [521] was apparently the most pronounced
freethinker of the three named, [522] in that he said of the Gods
"there was no need to define them, since there was no knowledge of
them." [523] Such utterance could not be carried far in any Greek
community; and there lacked the spirit of patient research which
might have fruitfully developed the notable hypothesis of Parmenides
that the earth is spherical in form. [524] But he too was a loose
guesser, adding categories of fire and earth and heat and cold to the
formative and material "principles" of his predecessors; and where he
divagated weaker minds could not but lose themselves. From Melissos
and Parmenides there is accordingly a rapid descent in philosophy
to professional verbalism, popular life the while proceeding on the
old levels.

It was in this epoch of declining energy and declining freedom that
there grew up the nugatory doctrine, associated with the Eleatic
school, [525] that the only realities are mental, [526] a formula
which eluded at once the problems of Nature and the crudities
of religion, and so made its fortune with the idle educated
class. Meant to support the cause of reason, it was soon turned,
as every slackly-held doctrine must be, to a different account. In
the hands of Plato it developed into the doctrine of ideas, which in
the later Christian world was to play so large a part, as "Realism,"
in checking scientific thought; and in Greece it fatally fostered
the indolent evasion of research in physics. [527] Ultimately this
made for supernaturalism, which had never been discarded by the main
body even of rationalizing thinkers. [528] Thus the geographer and
historian Hekataios of Miletos (fl. 500 B.C.), living at the great
centre of rationalism, while rejecting the mass of Greek fables as
"ridiculous," and proceeding in a fashion long popular to translate
them into historical facts, yet affected, in the poetic Greek fashion,
to be of divine descent. [529] At the same time he held by such fables
as that of the floating island in the Nile and that of the supernormal
Hyperboreans. This blending of old and new habits of mind is indeed
perhaps the strongest ground for affirming the genuineness of his
fragments, which has been disputed. [530] But from his time forward
there are many signs of a broad movement of criticism, doubt, inquiry,
and reconstruction, involving an extensive discussion of historical
as well as religious tradition. [531] There had begun, in short,
for the rapidly-developing Greeks, a "discovery of man" such as is
ascribed in later times to the age of the Italian Renaissance. In the
next generation came the father of humanists, Herodotos, who implicitly
carries the process of discrimination still further than did Hekataios;
while Sophocles [496-405 B.C.], without ever challenging popular faith,
whether implicitly as did Æschylus, or explicitly as did Euripides,
"brought down the drama from the skies to the earth; and the drama
still follows the course which Sophocles first marked out for it. It
was on the Gods, the struggles of the Gods, and on destiny that
Æschylus dwelt; it is with man that Sophocles is concerned." [532]

Still, there was only to be a partial enlightenment of the race,
such as we have seen occurring, perhaps about the same period, in
India. Sophocles, even while dramatizing the cruel consequences of
Greek religion, never made any sign of being delivered from the
ordinary Greek conceptions of deity, or gave any help to wiser
thought. The social difference between Greece and the monarchic
civilizations was after all only one of degree: there, as elsewhere,
the social problem was finally unsolved; and the limits to Greek
progress were soon approached. But the evolution went far in many
places, and it is profoundly interesting to trace it.




§ 5

Compared with the early Milesians and with Xenophanes, the elusive
Pythagoras (fl. 540-510 B.C.) is not so much a rationalistic as a
theosophic freethinker; but to freethought his name belongs insofar
as the system connected with it did rationalize, and discarded
mythology. If the biographic data be in any degree trustworthy,
it starts like Milesian speculation from oriental precedents. [533]
Pythagoras was of Samos in the Ægean; and the traditions have it that
he was a pupil of Pherekydes the Syrian, and that before settling at
Krôton, in Italy, he travelled in Egypt, and had intercourse with the
Chaldean Magi. Some parts of the Pythagorean code of life, at least,
point to an eastern derivation.


    The striking resemblance between the doctrine and practice of the
    Pythagoreans and those of the Jewish Essenes has led Zeller to
    argue (Philos. der Griechen, Th. iii, Abth. 2) that the latter were
    a branch of the former. Bishop Lightfoot, on the other hand, noting
    that the Essenes did not hold the specially prominent Pythagorean
    doctrines of numbers and of the transmigration of souls, traces
    Essenism to Zoroastrian influence (Ed. of Colossians, App. on
    the Essenes, pp. 150-51; rep. in Dissertations on the Apostolic
    Age, 1892, pp. 369-72). This raises the issue whether both
    Pythagoreanism and Essenism were not of Persian derivation; and
    Dr. Schürer (Jewish People in the Time of Jesus, Eng. tr. <DW37>. II,
    vol. ii, p. 218) pronounces in favour of an oriental origin for
    both. The new connection between Persia and Ionia just at or before
    the time of Pythagoras (fl. 530 B.C.) squares with this view;
    but it is further to be noted that the phenomenon of monasticism,
    common to Pythagoreans and Essenes, arises in Buddhism about the
    Pythagorean period; and as it is hardly likely that Buddhism
    in the sixth century B.C. reached Asia Minor, there remains
    the possibility of some special diffusion of the new ideal
    from the Babylonian sphere after the conquest by Cyrus, there
    being no trace of a Persian monastic system. The resemblances
    to Orphicism likewise suggest a Babylonian source, as does the
    doctrine of numbers, which is not Zoroastrian. As to Buddhism,
    the argument for a Buddhist origin of Essenism shortly before our
    era (cp. A. Lillie, Buddhism in Christendom and The Influence of
    Buddhism on Primitive Christianity; E. Bunsen, The Angel-Messiah;
    or, Buddhists, Essenes, and Christians--all three to be read
    with much caution) does not meet the case of the Pythagorean
    precedents for Essenism. Prof. Burnet (Early Greek Philos. 2nd
    ed. p. 102) notes close Indian parallels to Pythagoreanism,
    but overlooks the intermediate Persian parallels, and falls back
    very unnecessarily on the bald notion that "the two systems were
    independently evolved from the same primitive systems."


As regards the mystic doctrine that numbers are, as it were, the moving
principle in the cosmos--another thesis not unlikely to arise in that
Babylonian world whence came the whole system of numbers for the later
ancients [534]--we can but pronounce it a development of thought in
vacuo, and look further for the source of Pythagorean influence in
the moral and social code of the movement, in its science, in its
pantheism, [535] its contradictory dualism, [536] and perhaps in its
doctrine of transmigration of souls. On the side of natural science,
its absurdities [537] point to the fatal lack of observation which
so soon stopped progress in Greek physics and biology. [538] Yet in
the fields of astronomy, mathematics, and the science of sound the
school seems to have done good scientific work; being indeed praised
by the critical Aristotle for doing special service in that way. [539]
It is recorded that Philolaos, the successor of Pythagoras, was the
first to teach openly (about 460 B.C.) the doctrine of the motion
of the earth [540]--which, however, as above noted, was also said
to have been previously taught by Anaximandros [541] (from whom some
incline to derive the Pythagorean theory of numbers in general [542])
and by Hiketas or Iketas (or Niketas) of Syracuse. [543] Ekphantos,
of that city, is also credited with asserting the revolution of
the earth on its axis; and he too is grouped with the Pythagoreans,
though he seems to have had a pantheism of his own. [544] Philolaos
in particular is said to have been prosecuted for his teaching, [545]
which for many was a blasphemy; and it may be that this was the reason
of its being specially ascribed to him, though current in the East
long before his day. In the fragments ascribed to him is affirmed,
in divergence from other Pythagoreans, the eternity of the earth; and
in other ways he seems to have been an innovator. [546] In any case,
the Pythagorean conception of the earth's motion was a speculative
one, wide of the facts, and not identical with the modern doctrine,
save insofar as Pythagoras--or Philolaos--had rightly conceived the
earth as a sphere. [547]


    It is noteworthy, however, that in conjecturing that the whole
    solar system moves round a "central fire," Pythagoras carried his
    thought nearly as far as the moderns. The fanciful side of his
    system is seen in his hypothesis of a counter-earth (Anti-chthon)
    invented to bring up the number of celestial bodies in our system
    to ten, the "complete" number. (Berry, as cited.) Narrien (p. 163)
    misses this simple explanation of the idea.


As to politics, finally, it seems hard to solve the anomaly that
Pythagoras is pronounced the first teacher of the principle of
community of goods, [548] and that his adherents at Krôton formed an
aristocratic league, so detested by the people for its anti-democratism
that its members were finally massacred in their meeting-place,
their leader, according to one tradition, being slain with them,
while according to a better grounded account he had withdrawn
and died at Metapontion. The solution seems to be that the early
movement was in no way monastic or communistic; that it was, however,
a secret society; that it set up a kind of puritanism or "methodism"
which repelled conservative people; and that, whatever its doctrines,
its members were mostly of the upper class. [549] If they held by the
general rejection of popular religion attributed to Pythagoras, they
would so much the more exasperate the demos; for though at Krôton,
as in the other Grecian colonial cities, there was considerable
freedom of thought and speech, the populace can nowhere have been
freethinking. [550] In any case, it was after its political overthrow,
and still more in the Italian revival of the second century B.C.,
that the mystic and superstitious features of Pythagoreanism were
most multiplied; and doubtless the master's teachings were often much
perverted by his devotees. It was only too easy. He had laid down, as
so many another moralist, that justice consisted in reciprocity; but
he taught of virtue in terms of his theory of numbers [551]--a sure way
of putting conduct out of touch with reality. Thus we find some of the
later Pythagoreans laying it down as a canon that no story once fully
current concerning the Gods was to be disbelieved [552]--the complete
negation of philosophical freethought and a sharp contradiction of the
other view which represented the shade of Pythagoras as saying that he
had seen in Tartaros the shade of Homer hanged to a tree, and that of
Hesiod chained to a pillar of brass, for the monstrous things they had
ascribed to the Gods. [553] It must have taken a good deal of decadence
to bring an innovating sect to that pass; and even about 200 B.C. we
find the freethinking Ennius at Rome calling himself a Pythagorean;
[554] but the course of things in Magna Graecia was mostly downward
after the sixth century; the ferocious destruction of Sybaris by the
Krotoniates helping to promote the decline. [555] Intellectual life,
in Magna Graecia as in Ionia, obeyed the general tendency.


    An opposite view of the Pythagorean evolution is taken by
    Professor Burnet. He is satisfied that the long list of the
    Pythagorean taboos, which he rightly pronounces to be "of a
    thoroughly primitive type" (p. 105), and not at all the subtle
    "symbols" which they were latterly represented to be, were
    really the lore of Pythagoras. It is not easy thus to conceive a
    thinker of the great Ionian age as holding by thoroughly primitive
    superstitions. Perhaps the solution lies in Aristotle's statement
    that Pythagoras was first a mathematician, and only in later
    life a Pherekydean miracle-monger (Burnet, p. 107, note 3). He
    may actually have started the symbolic view of the taboos which
    he imposed.


Before the decadence comes, however, the phenomenon of rationalism
occurs on all sides in the colonial cities, older and younger alike;
and direct criticism of creed kept pace with the indirect. About
520 B.C. Theagenes of Rhegion, in Southern Italy, had begun for
the Greeks the process of reducing the unacceptable God-stories in
Homer and Hesiod--notably the battle of the Gods in the Iliad--to
mere allegories of the cosmic elements [556]--a device natural to
and practised by liberal conservatives in all religious systems
under stress of skeptical attack, and afterwards much employed in
the Hellenic world. [557] Soon the attack became more stringent. At
Syracuse we find the great comic dramatist Epicharmos, about 470
B.C., treating the deities on the stage in a spirit of such audacious
burlesque [558] as must be held to imply unbelief. Aristophanes, at
Athens, indeed, shows a measure of the same spirit while posing as
a conservative in religion; but Epicharmos was professedly something
of a Pythagorean and philosopher, [559] and was doubtless protected by
Hiero, at whose court he lived, against any religious resentment he may
have aroused. The story of Simonides's answer to Hiero's question as
to the nature of the Gods--first asking a day to think, then two days,
then four, then avowing that meditation only made the problem harder
[560]--points to the prevalent tone among the cultured.




§ 6

At last the critical spirit finds utterance, in the great Periklean
period, at Athens, but first by way of importation from Ionia,
where Miletos had fallen in the year 494. Anaxagoras of Klazomenai
(fl. 480-450 B.C.; d. 428) is the first freethinker historically
known to have been legally prosecuted and condemned [561] for his
freethought; and it was in the Athens of Perikles, despite Perikles's
protection, that the attack was made. Coming of the Ionian line
of thinkers, and himself a pupil of Anaximenes of Miletos, he held
firmly by the scientific view of the cosmos, and taught that the sun,
instead of being animated and a deity as the Athenians believed, was
"a red-hot mass many times larger than the Peloponnesos" [562]--and
the moon a fiery (or earthy) solid body having in it plains and
mountains and valleys--this while asserting that infinite mind was
the source and introducer of all the motion in the infinite universe;
[563] infinite in extent and infinitely divisible. This "materialistic"
doctrine as to the heavenly bodies was propounded, as Sokrates tells in
his defence, in books that in his day anyone could buy for a drachma;
and Anaxagoras further taught, like Theagenes, that the mythical
personages of the poets were mere abstractions invested with name
and gender. [564] Withal he was no brawler; and even in pious Athens,
where he taught in peace for many years, he might have died in peace
but for his intimacy with the most renowned of his pupils, Perikles.


    The question of the deity of the sun raised an interesting
    sociological question. Athenians saw no blasphemy in saying that
    Gê (Gaia) or Dêmêter was the earth: they had always understood as
    much; and the earth was simply for them a Goddess; a vast living
    thing containing the principle of life. They might similarly have
    tolerated the description of the sun as a kind of red-hot earth,
    provided that its divinity were not challenged. The trouble lay
    rather in the negative than in the positive assertion, though
    the latter must for many have been shocking, inasmuch as they had
    never been wont to think about the sun as they did about the earth.


It is told of Perikles (499-429 B.C.) by the pious Plutarch,
himself something of a believer in portents, that he greatly admired
Anaxagoras, from whom he "seems to have learned to despise those
superstitious fears which the common phenomena of the heavens produce
in those who, ignorant of their cause, and knowing nothing about
them, refer them all to the immediate action of the Gods." [565]
And even the stately eloquence and imperturbable bearing of the great
statesman are said to have been learned from the Ionian master, whom he
followed in "adorning his oratory with apt illustrations from physical
science." [566] The old philosopher, however, whom men called "Nous"
or Intelligence because of the part the name played in his teaching,
left his property to go to ruin in his devotion to ideas; and it is
told, with small probability, that at one time, old and indigent,
he covered his head with his robe and decided to starve to death;
till Perikles, hearing of it, hastened to beseech him to live to give
his pupil counsel. [567]

At length it occurred to the statesman's enemies to strike at him
through his guide, philosopher, and friend. They had already procured
the banishment of another of his teachers, Damon, as "an intriguer and
a friend of despotism"; [568] and one of their fanatics, Diopeithes,
a priest and a violent demagogue, [569] laid the way for an attack
on Anaxagoras by obtaining the enactment of a law that "prosecutions
should be laid against all who disbelieved in religion and held
theories of their own about things on high." [570] Anaxagoras was
thus open to indictment on the score alike of his physics and of his
mythology; though, seeing that his contemporary Diogenes of Apollonia
(who before Demokritos taught "nothing out of nothing: nothing
into nothing," and affirmed the sphericity of the earth) was also
in some danger of his life at Athens, [571] it is probable that the
prosecution was grounded on his physicist teaching. Saved by Perikles
from the death punishment, but by one account fined five talents,
[572] he either was exiled or chose to leave the intolerant city;
and he made his home at Lampsakos, where, as the story runs, he won
from the municipality the favour that every year the children should
have a holiday in the month in which he died. [573] It is significant
of his general originality that he was reputed the first Greek who
wrote a book in prose. [574]

Philosophically, however, he counted for less than he did as an
innovating rationalist. His doctrine of Nous amounted in effect to a
reaffirmation of deity; and he has been not unjustly described [575]
as the philosophic father of the dualistic deism or theism which,
whether from within or from without the Christian system, has been the
prevailing form of religious philosophy in the modern world. It was, in
fact, the only form of theistic philosophy capable of winning any wide
assent among religiously biassed minds; and it is the more remarkable
that such a theist should have been prosecuted because his notion of
deity was mental, and excluded the divinization of the heavenly bodies.

In the memorable episode of his expulsion from Athens we have a
finger-post to the road travelled later by Greek civilization. At
Athens itself the bulk of the free population was ignorant and bigoted
enough to allow of the law being used by any fanatic or malignant
partisan against any professed rationalist; and there is no sign
that Perikles dreamt of applying the one cure for the evil--the
systematic bestowal of rationalistic instruction on all. The fatal
maxim of ancient skepticism, that religion is a necessary restraint
upon the multitude, brought it about that everywhere, in the last
resort, the unenlightened multitude became a restraint upon reason and
freethought. [576] In the more aristocratically ruled colonial cities,
as we have seen, philosophic speech was comparatively free: it was
the ignorant Athenian democracy that brought religious intolerance
into Greek life, playing towards science, in form of law, the part
that the fanatics of Egypt and Palestine had played towards the
worshippers of other Gods than their own.

With a baseness of which the motive may be divided between the
instincts of faction and of faith, the anti-Periklean party carried
their attack yet further; and on their behalf a comic playwright,
Hermippos, brought a charge of impiety against the statesman's unwedded
wife, Aspasia. [577] There can be no doubt that that famous woman
cordially shared the opinions and ideals of her husband, joining as
she habitually did in the philosophic talk of his home circle. As a
Milesian she was likely enough to be a freethinker; and all that was
most rational in Athens acknowledged her culture and her charm. [578]
Perikles, who had not taken the risk of letting Anaxagoras come to
trial, himself defended Aspasia before the dikastery, his indignation
breaking through his habitual restraint in a passion of tears, which,
according to the jealous Æschines, [579] won an acquittal.

Placed as he was, Perikles could but guard his own head and heart,
leaving the evil instrument of a religious inquisition to subsist. How
far he held with Anaxagoras we can but divine. [580] There is probably
no truth in Plutarch's tale that "whenever he ascended the tribune
to speak he used first to pray to the Gods that nothing unfitted for
the occasion might fall from his lips." [581] But as a party leader
he, as a matter of course, observed the conventions; and he may have
reasoned that the prosecutions of Anaxagoras and Aspasia, like that
directed against Pheidias, stood merely for contemporary political
malice, and not for any lasting danger to mental freedom. However
that might be, Athens continued to remain the most aggressively
intolerant and tradition-mongering of Hellenic cities. So marked
is this tendency among the Athenians that for modern students
Herodotos, whose history was published in 445 B.C., is relatively
a rationalist in his treatment of fable, [582] bringing as he did
the spirit of Ionia into things traditional and religious. But even
Herodotos remains wedded to the belief in oracles or prophecies,
claiming fulfilment for those said to have been uttered by Bakis;
[583] and his small measure of spontaneous skepticism could avail
little for critical thought. To no man, apparently, did it occur to
resist the religious spirit by systematic propaganda: that, like the
principle of representative government, was to be hit upon only in a
later age. [584] Not by a purely literary culture, relating life merely
to poetry and myth, tradition and superstition, were men to be made
fit to conduct a stable society. And the spirit of pious persecution,
once generated, went from bad to worse, crowning itself with crime,
till at length the overthrow of Athenian self-government wrought a
forlorn liberty of scientific speech at the cost of the liberty of
political action which is the basis of all sound life.

Whatever may have been the private vogue of freethinking at Athens
in the Periklean period, it was always a popular thing to attack
it. Some years before or after the death of Perikles there came
to Athens the alien Hippo, the first specifically named atheist
[585] of Greek antiquity. The dubious tradition runs that his tomb
bore the epitaph: "This is the grave of Hippo, whom destiny, in
destroying him, has made the equal of the immortal Gods." [586] If,
as seems likely, he was the Hippo of Rhegion mentioned by Hippolytos,
[587] he speculated as to physical origins in the manner of Thales,
making water generate fire, and that in turn produce the world. [588]
But this is uncertain. Upon him the comic muse of Athens turned its
attacks very much as it did upon Socrates. The old comic poet Kratinos,
a notorious wine-bibber, produced a comedy called The Panoptai (the
"all-seers" or "all eyes"), in which it would appear that the chorus
were made to represent the disciples of Hippo, and to wear a mask
covered with eyes. [589] Drunkenness was a venial fault in comparison
with the presumption to speculate on physics and to doubt the sacred
lore of the populace. The end of the rule of ignorance was that a
theistic philosopher who himself discouraged scientific inquiry was
to pay a heavier penalty than did the atheist Hippo.




§ 7

While Athens was gaining power and glory and beauty without popular
wisdom, the colonial city of Abdera, in Thrace, founded by Ionians,
had like others carried on the great impulse of Ionian philosophy,
and had produced in the fifth century some of the great thinkers of
the race. Concerning the greatest of these, Demokritos, and the next
in importance, Protagoras, we have no sure dates; [590] but it is
probable that the second, whether older or younger, was influenced
by the first, who indeed has influenced all scientific philosophy
down to our own day. How much he learned from his master Leukippos
cannot now be ascertained. [591] The writings which went under
his name appear to have been the productions of the whole Abderite
school; [592] and Epicurus declared that Leukippos was an imaginary
person. [593] What passes for his teaching was constructive science
of cardinal importance; for it is the first clear statement of the
atomic theory; the substitution of a real for an abstract foundation of
things. Whoever were the originator of the theory, there is no doubt as
to the assimilation of the principle by Demokritos, who thus logically
continued the non-theistic line of thought, and developed one of the
most fruitful of all scientific principles. That this idea again is a
direct development from Babylonian science is not impossible; at least
there seems to be no doubt that Demokritos had travelled far and wide,
[594] whether or not he had been brought up, as the tradition goes,
by Persian magi; [595] and that he told how the cosmic views of
Anaxagoras, which scandalized the Athenians, were current in the
East. [596] But he stands out as one of the most original minds in
the whole history of thought. No Greek thinker, not Aristotle himself,
has struck so deep as he into fundamental problems; though the absurd
label of "the laughing philosopher," bestowed on him by some peculiarly
unphilosophic mind, has delayed the later recognition of his greatness,
clear as it was to Bacon. [597] The vital maxim, "Nothing from nothing:
nothing into nothing," derives substantially from him. [598]

His atomic theory, held in conjunction with a conception of
"mind-stuff" similar to that of Anaxagoras, may be termed the
high-water mark of ancient scientific thought; and it is noteworthy
that somewhat earlier in the same age Empedokles of Agrigentum,
another product of the freer colonial life, threw out a certain
glimmer of the Darwinian conception--perhaps more clearly attained
by Anaximandros--that adaptations prevail in nature just because the
adaptations fit organisms to survive, and the non-adapted perish. [599]
In his teaching, too, the doctrine of the indestructibility of
matter is clear and firm; [600] and the denial of anthropomorphic
deity is explicit. [601] But Empedokles wrought out no solid system:
"half-mystic and half-rationalist, he made no attempt to reconcile the
two inconsistent sides of his intellectual character"; [602] and his
explicit teaching of metempsychosis [603] and other Pythagoreanisms
gave foothold for more delusion than he ever dispelled. [604] On the
whole, he is one of the most remarkable personalities of antiquity,
moving among men with a pomp and gravity which made them think of
him as a God, denouncing their sacrifices, and no less their eating
of flesh; and checking his notable self-exaltation by recalling the
general littleness of men. But he did little to enlighten them; and
Aristotle passed on to the world a fatal misconception of his thought
by ascribing to him the notion of automatism where he was asserting a
"necessity" in terms of laws which he avowedly could not explain. [605]
Against such misconception he should have provided. Demokritos,
however, shunned dialectic and discussion, and founded no school;
[606] and although his atomism was later adopted by Epicurus, it was
no more developed on a basis of investigation and experiment than was
the biology of Empedokles. His ethic, though wholly rationalistic,
leant rather to quietism and resignation than to reconstruction,
[607] and found its application only in the later static message of
Epicurus. Greek society failed to set up the conditions needed for
progress beyond the point gained by its unguided forces.

Thus when Protagoras ventured to read, at the house of the freethinking
Euripides, a treatise of his own, beginning with the avowal that he
offered no opinion as to the existence of the Gods, life being too
short for the inquiry, [608] the remark got wind, and he had to fly
for his life, though Euripides and perhaps most of the guests were
very much of the same way of thinking. [609] In the course of his
flight, the tradition goes, the philosopher was drowned; [610] and
his book was publicly burned, all who possessed copies being ordered
by public proclamation to give them up--the earliest known instance
of "censorship of the press." [611] Partisan malice was doubtless
at work in his case as in that of Anaxagoras; for the philosophic
doctrine of Protagoras became common enough. It is not impossible,
though the date is doubtful, that the attack on him was one of the
results of the great excitement in Athens in the year 415 B.C. over
the sacrilegious mutilation of the figures of Hermes, the familial or
boundary-God, in the streets by night. It was about that time that the
poet Diagoras of Melos was proscribed for atheism, he having declared
that the non-punishment of a certain act of iniquity proved that
there were no Gods. [612] It has been surmised, with some reason,
that the iniquity in question was the slaughter of the Melians by
the Athenians in 416 B.C., [613] and the Athenian resentment in
that case was personal and political rather than religious. [614]
For some time after 415 the Athenian courts made strenuous efforts
to punish every discoverable case of impiety; and parodies of the
Eleusinian mysteries (resembling the mock Masses of Catholic Europe)
were alleged against Alkibiades and others. [615] Diagoras, who was
further charged with divulging the Eleusinian and other mysteries,
and with making firewood of an image of Herakles, telling the God thus
to perform his thirteenth labour by cooking turnips, [616] became
thenceforth one of the proverbial atheists of the ancient world,
[617] and a reward of a silver talent was offered for killing him,
and of two talents for his capture alive; [618] despite which he seems
to have escaped. But no antidote to the bane of fanaticism was found
or sought; and the most famous publicist in Athens was the next victim.

The fatality of the Athenian development is seen not only in
the direct hostility of the people to rational thought, but in
their loss of their hold even on their public polity. For lack
of political judgment, moved always by the passions which their
literary culture cherished, they so mishandled their affairs in the
long and demoralizing Peloponnesian war that they were at one time
cowed by their own aristocracy, on essentially absurd pretexts,
into abandoning the democratic constitution. Its restoration was
followed at the final crisis by another tyranny, also short-lived,
but abnormally bloody and iniquitous; and though the people at its
overthrow showed a moderation in remarkable contrast to the cruelty and
rapacity of the aristocrats, the effect of such extreme vicissitude
was to increase the total disposition towards civic violence and
coercion. And while the people menaced freethinking in religion,
the aristocracies opposed freethinking in politics. Thus under the
Thirty Tyrants all intellectual teaching was forbidden; and Kritias,
himself accused of having helped Alkibiades to parody the mysteries,
sharply interdicted the political rationalism of Sokrates, [619]
who according to tradition had been one of his own instructors.

It was a result of the general movement of mind throughout the
rest of the Hellenic world that freethinkers of culture were still
numerous. Archelaos of Miletos, the most important disciple of
Anaxagoras; according to a late tradition, the master of Sokrates;
and the first systematic teacher of Ionic physical science in Athens,
taught the infinity of the universe, grasped the explanation of
the nature of sound, and set forth on purely rationalistic lines
the social origin and basis of morals, thus giving Sokrates his
practical lead. [620] Another disciple of Anaxagoras, Metrodoros of
Lampsakos (not to be confounded with Metrodoros of Chios, and the
other Metrodoros of Lampsakos who was the friend of Epicurus, both
also freethinkers), carried out zealously his master's teaching as to
the deities and heroes of Homer, resolving them into mere elemental
combinations and physical agencies, and making Zeus stand for mind,
and Athenê for art. [621] And in the belles lettres of Athens itself,
in the dramas of Euripides [480-406 B.C.], who is said to have been
the ardent disciple of Anaxagoras, [622] to have studied Herakleitos,
[623] and to have been the friend of Sokrates and Protagoras, there
emerge traces enough of a rationalism not to be reconciled with the
old belief in the Gods. If Euripides has nowhere ventured on such
a terrific paradox as the Prometheus, he has in a score of passages
revealed a stress of skepticism which, inasmuch as he too uses all the
forms of Hellenic faith, [624] deepens our doubt as to the beliefs of
Æschylus. Euripides even gave overt proof of his unbelief, beginning
his Melanippe with the line: "Zeus, whoever Zeus be, for I know not,
save by report," an audacity which evoked a great uproar. In a later
production the passage was prudently altered; [625] but he never put
much check on his native tendency to analyse and criticize on all
issues--a tendency fostered, as we have seen, [626] by the constant
example of real and poignant dialectic in the Athenian dikastery, and
the whole drift of the Athenian stage. In his case the tendency even
overbalances the artistic process; [627] but it has the advantage of
involving a very bold handling of vital problems. Not satisfied with
a merely dramatic presentment of lawless Gods, Euripides makes his
characters impeach them as such, [628] or, again, declare that there
can be no truth in the "miserable tales of poets" which so represent
them. [629] Not content with putting aside as idle such a fable as
that of the sun's swerving from his course in horror at the crime of
Atreus, [630] and that of the Judgment of Paris, [631] he attacks
with a stringent scorn the whole apparatus of oracles, divination,
and soothsaying. [632] And if the Athenian populace cried out at
the hardy opening of the Melanippe, he nonetheless gave them again
and again his opinion that no man knew anything of the Gods. [633]
Of orthodox protests against freethinking inquiry he gives a plainly
ironical handling. [634] As regards his constructive opinions, we
have from him many expressions of the pantheism which had by his time
permeated the thought of perhaps most of the educated Greeks. [635]

Here again, as in the case of Æschylus, there arises the problem of
contradiction; for Euripides, too, puts often in the mouths of his
characters emphatic expressions of customary piety. The conclusion in
the two cases must be broadly the same--that whereas an unbelieving
dramatist may well make his characters talk in the ordinary way of
deity and of religion, it is unintelligible that a believing one should
either go beyond the artistic bounds of his task to make them utter an
unbelief which must have struck the average listener as strange and
noxious, or construct a drama of which the whole effect is to insist
on the odiousness of the action of the Supreme God. And the real
drift of Euripides is so plain that one modern and Christian scholar
has denounced him as an obnoxious and unbelieving sophist who abused
his opportunity as a producer of dramas under religious auspices to
"shake the ground-works of religion" [636] and at the same time of
morals; [637] while another and a greater scholar, less vehement in his
orthodoxy, more restrainedly condemns the dramatist for employing myths
in which he did not believe, instead of inventing fresh plots. [638]
Christian scholars are thus duly unready to give him credit for his
many-sided humanity, nobly illustrated in his pleas for the slave and
his sympathy with suffering barbarians. [639] Latterly the recognition
of Euripides's freethinking has led to the description of him as
"Euripides the Rationalist," in a treatise which represents him as a
systematic assailant of the religion of his day. Abating somewhat of
that thesis, which imputes more of system to the Euripidean drama than
it possesses, we may sum up that the last of the great tragedians of
Athens, and the most human and lovable of the three, was assuredly
a rationalist in matters of religion. It is noteworthy that he used
more frequently than any other ancient dramatist the device of a
deus ex machina to end a play. [640] It was probably because for him
the conception had no serious significance. [641] In the Alkestis its
[non-mechanical] use is one of the most striking instances of dramatic
irony in all literature. The dead Alkestis, who has died to save the
life of her husband, is brought back from the Shades by Herakles,
who figures as a brawling bully. Only the thinkers of the time could
realize the thought that underlay such a tragi-comedy.


    Dr. Verrall's Euripides the Rationalist, 1897, is fairly summed up
    by Mr. Haigh (Tragic Drama of the Greeks, pp. 262, 265, notes):
    "He considers that Euripides was a skeptic of the aggressive
    type, whose principal object in writing tragedy was to attack the
    State religion, but who, perceiving that it would be dangerous
    to pose as an open enemy, endeavoured to accomplish his ends by
    covert ridicule.... His plays ... contain in reality two separate
    plots--the ostensible and superficial plot, which was intended
    to satisfy the orthodox, and the rationalized modification which
    lay half concealed beneath it, and which the intelligent skeptic
    would easily detect." For objections to this thesis see Haigh, as
    cited; Jevons, Hist. of Greek Lit. p. 222, note; and Dr. Mozley's
    article in the Classical Review, Nov. 1895, pp. 407-13. As to the
    rationalism of Euripides in general see many of the passages cited
    by Bishop Westcott in his Essays in the Hist. of Relig. Thought
    in the West, 1891, pp. 102-27. And cp. Dickinson, The Greek View
    of Life, pp. 46-49; Grote, Hist. i, 346-48; Zeller, Socrates and
    the Socratic Schools, Eng. tr. 3rd ed. p. 231; Murray, Anc. Greek
    Lit. pp. 256, 264-66.

    Over the latest play of Euripides, the Bacchæ, as over one
    of the last plays of Æschylus, the Prometheus, there has been
    special debate. It was probably written in Macedonia (cp. ll.,
    408, 565), whither the poet had gone on the invitation of King
    Archelaos, when, according to the ancient sketch of his life,
    "he had to leave Athens because of the malicious exultation over
    him of nearly all the city." The trouble, it is conjectured, "may
    have been something connected with his prosecution for impiety,
    the charge on which Socrates was put to death a few years after"
    (Murray, Euripides translated into English Rhyming Verse, 1902,
    introd. essay, p. lii). Inasmuch as the play glorifies Dionysos,
    and the "atheist" Pentheus (l. 995) who resists him is slain by the
    maddened Bacchantes, led by his own mother, it is seriously argued
    that the drama "may be regarded as in some sort an apologia and
    an eirenicon, or as a confession on the part of the poet that
    he was fully conscious that in some of the simple legends of
    the popular faith there was an element of sound sense (!) which
    thoughtful men must treat with forbearance, resolved on using it,
    if possible, as an instrument for inculcating a truer morality,
    instead of assailing it with a presumptuous denial" (J. E. Sandys,
    The Bacchæ of Euripides, 1880, introd. pp. lxxv-vi). Here we have
    the conformist ethic of the average English academic brought to
    bear on, and ascribed to, the personality of the Greek dramatist.

    An academic of the same order, Prof. Mahaffy, similarly
    suggests that "among the half-educated Macedonian youth, with
    whom literature was coming into fashion, the poet may have
    met with a good deal of that insolent second-hand skepticism
    which is so offensive to a deep and serious thinker, and he
    may have wished to show them that he was not, as they doubtless
    hailed him, the apostle of this random speculative arrogance"
    (Euripides in Class. Writ. Ser. 1879, p. 85). As against the
    eminently "random" and "speculative arrogance" of this particular
    passage--a characteristic product of the obscurantist functions
    of some British university professors in matters of religion,
    and one which may fitly be pronounced offensive to honest men--it
    may be suggested on the other hand that, if Euripides got into
    trouble in Athens by his skepticism, he would be likely in
    Macedonia to encounter rather a greater stress of bigotry than
    a freethinking welcome, and that a non-critical presentment of
    the savage religious legend was forced on him by his environment.

    Much of the academic discussion on the subject betrays a singular
    slowness to accept the dramatic standpoint. Even Prof. Murray,
    the finest interpreter of Euripides, dogmatically pronounces
    (introd. cited p. lvii) that "there is in the Bacchæ real
    and heartfelt glorification of Dionysus," simply because of
    the lyrical exaltation of the Bacchic choruses. But lyrical
    exaltation was in character here above all other cases; and it
    was the dramatist's business to present it. To say that "again
    and again in the lyrics you feel that the Mænads are no longer
    merely observed and analysed: the poet has entered into them
    and they into him," is nothing to the purpose. That the words
    which fall from the Chorus or its Leader are at times "not the
    words of a raving Bacchante, but of a gentle and deeply musing
    philosopher," is still nothing to the purpose. The same could
    be said of Shakespeare's handling of Macbeth. What, in sooth,
    would the real words of a raving Bacchante be like? If Milton lent
    dignity to Satan in Puritan England, was Euripides to do less for
    Dionysos in Macedonia? That he should make Pentheus unsympathetic
    belongs to the plot. If he had made a noble martyr of the victim
    as well as an impassive destroyer of the God, he might have had
    to leave Macedonia more precipitately than he left Athens.

    Prof. Murray recognizes all the while that "Euripides never
    palliates things. He leaves this savage story as savage as he
    found it"; that he presents a "triumphant and hateful Dionysus,"
    who gives "a helpless fatalistic answer, abandoning the moral
    standpoint," when challenged by the stricken Agavê, whom the
    God has moved to dismember her own son; and that, in short,
    "Euripides is, as usual, critical or even hostile to the myth that
    he celebrates" (as cited, pp. liv-lvi). To set against these solid
    facts, as does Mr. Sandys (as cited, pp. lxxiii-iv), some passages
    in the choruses (ll. 395, 388, 427, 1002), and in a speech of
    Dionysos (1002), enouncing normal platitudes about the wisdom of
    thinking like other people and living a quiet life, is to strain
    very uncritically the elastic dramatic material. So far from being
    "not entirely in keeping" with the likely sentiments of a chorus of
    Asiatic women, the first-cited passages--telling that cleverness
    is not wisdom, and that true wisdom acquiesces in the opinions
    of ordinary people--are just the kind of mock-modest ineptitudes
    always current among the complacent ignorant; and the sage language
    ascribed to the heartless God is simply a presentment of deity
    in the fashion in which all Greeks expected to have it presented.

    The fact remains that the story of the Bacchæ, in which the
    frenzied mother helps to tear to pieces her own son, and the God
    can but say it is all fated, is as revolting to the rational moral
    sense as the story of the Prometheus. If this be an eirenicon,
    it is surely the most ironical in literary history. To see
    in the impassive delineation of such a myth an acceptance
    by the poet of popular "sound sense," and "a desire to put
    himself right with the public in matters on which he had been
    misunderstood," seems possible only to academics trained to a
    particular handling of the popular creed of their own day. This
    view, first put forward by Tyrwhitt (Conjecturæ in Æschylum,
    etc. 1822), was adopted by Schoone (p. 20 of his ed. cited
    by Sandys). Lobeck, greatly daring wherever rationalism was
    concerned, suggested that Euripides actually wrote against the
    rationalists of his time, in commendation of the Bacchic cult,
    and to justify the popular view in religious matters as against
    that of the cultured (Aglaophamus--passages quoted by Sandys,
    p. lxxvi). Musgrave, following Tyrwhitt, makes the play out
    to be an attack on Kritias, Alkibiades, and other freethinkers,
    including even Sokrates! K. O. Müller, always ineptly conventional
    in such matters, finds Euripides in this play "converted into a
    positive believer, or, in other words, convinced that religion
    should not be exposed to the subtilties of reasoning; that the
    understanding of man cannot subvert ancestral traditions which
    are as old as time," and so on; and in the Polonius-platitudes
    of Tiresias and the worldly-wise counsels of Cadmus he finds
    "great impressiveness" (Hist. Lit. Anc. Greece, p. 379).

    The bulk of the literature of the subject, in short, suggests
    sombre reflections on the moral value of much academic
    thinking. There are, however, academic suffrages on the side of
    common sense. Mr. Haigh (Tragic Drama of the Greeks, pp. 313-14)
    gently dismisses the "recantation" theory; Hartung points out
    (Euripides restitutus, 1844, ii, 542, cited by Sandys) that
    Euripides really treats the legend of Pentheus very much as
    he treats the myth of Hippolytos thirty years earlier, showing
    no change of moral attitude. E. Pfander (cited by Sandys) took
    a similar view; as did Mr. Tyrrell in his edition of the play
    (1871), though the latter persisted in taking the commonplaces
    of the chorus about true wisdom (395) for the judgments of
    the dramatist. Euripides could hardly have been called "the
    philosopher of the stage" (Athenæus, iv, 48) on the strength
    of sentiments which are common to the village wiseacres of all
    ages. The critical method which ascribes to Euripides a final
    hostility to rationalism would impute to Shakespeare the religion
    of Isabella in Measure for Measure, when the talk of the Duke as a
    friar counselling a condemned man is wholly "pagan" or unbelieving.

    In his admirable little book, Euripides and his Age (1913),
    Prof. Murray repeats his account of the Bacchæ with some additions
    and modifications. He adheres to the "heartfelt glorification
    of Dionysus," but adds (p. 188): "No doubt it is Dionysus
    in some private sense of the poet's own ... some spirit of
    ... inspiration and untrammelled life. The presentation is not
    consistent, however magical the poetry." As to the theory that
    "the veteran free-lance of thought ... now saw the error of his
    ways and was returning to orthodoxy," he pronounces that "Such
    a view strikes us now as almost childish in its incompetence"
    (p. 190). He also reminds us that "the whole scheme of the play
    is given by the ancient ritual.... All kinds of small details
    which seemed like ... rather fantastic invention on the part
    of Euripides are taken straight from Æschylus or the ritual,
    or both.... The Bacchæ is not free invention; it is tradition"
    (pp. 182-84). And in sum: "It is well to remember that, for all
    his lucidity of language, Euripides is not lucid about religion"
    (p. 190).

    In conclusion we may ask, How could he be? He wrote plays for the
    Greek stage, which had its very roots in religious tradition, and
    was run for the edification of a crudely believing populace. It is
    much that in so doing Euripides could a hundred times challenge
    the evil religious ethic given him for his subject-matter; and
    his lasting vogue in antiquity showed that he had a hold on the
    higher Greek conscience which no other dramatist ever possessed.


But while Euripides must thus have made a special appeal to the
reflecting minority even in his own day, it is clear that he was not
at first popular with the many; and his efforts, whatever he may have
hoped to achieve, could not suffice to enlighten the democracy. The
ribald blasphemies of his enemy, the believing Aristophanes,
[642] could avail more to keep vulgar religion in credit than the
tragedian's serious indictment could effect against it; and they served
at the same time to belittle Euripides for the multitude in his own
day. Aristophanes is the typical Tory in religion; non-religious
himself, like Swift, he hates the honestly anti-religious man; and
he has the crowd with him. The Athenian faith, as a Catholic scholar
remarks, [643] "was more disposed to suffer the buffooneries of a
comedian than the serious negation of a philosopher." The average
Greek seemed to think that the grossest comic impiety did no harm,
where serious negation might cause divine wrath. [644] And so there
came no intellectual salvation for Athens from the drama which was
her unique achievement. The balance of ignorance and culture was
not changed. Evidently there was much rationalism among the studious
few. Plato in the Laws [645] speaks both of the man-about-town type of
freethinker and of those who, while they believe in no Gods, live well
and wisely and are in good repute. But with Plato playing the superior
mind and encouraging his fellow-townsmen to believe in the personality
of the sun, moon, and planets, credulity could easily keep the upper
hand. [646] The people remained politically unwise and religiously
superstitious, the social struggle perpetuating the division between
leisure and toil, even apart from the life of the mass of slaves;
while the eternal pre-occupation of militarism left even the majority
of the upper class at the intellectual level natural to military life
in all ages. There came, however, a generation of great intellectual
splendour following on that of the supreme development of drama just
before the fall of Greek freedom. Athens had at last come into the
heritage of Greek philosophic thought; and to the utterance of that
crowning generation the human retrospect has turned ever since. This
much of renown remains inalienable from the most renowned democracy
of the ancient world.




§ 8

The wide subject of the teaching of Sokrates, Plato, and Aristotle must
here be noticed briefly, with a view only to our special inquiry. All
three must be inscribed in any list of ancient freethinkers; and
yet all three furthered freethought only indirectly, the two former
being in different degrees supernaturalists, while the last touched
on religious questions only as a philosopher, avoiding all question
of practical innovation.


    The same account holds good of the best of the so-called Sophists,
    as Gorgias the Sicilian (? 485-380), who was a nihilistic skeptic;
    Hippias of Elis, who, setting up an emphatic distinction between
    Nature and Convention, impugned the political laws and prejudices
    which estranged men of thought and culture; and Prodikos of Kos
    (fl. 435), author of the fable of Herakles at the Parting of
    the Ways, who seems to have privately criticized the current
    Gods as mere deifications of useful things and forces, and
    was later misconceived as teaching that the things and forces
    were Gods. Cp. Cicero, De nat. Deorum, i, 42; Sextus Empiricus,
    Adv. Mathematicos, ix, 52; Ueberweg, vol. i, p. 78; Renouvier, i,
    291-93. Cicero saw very well that if men came to see in Dêmêtêr
    merely a deification of corn or bread, in Dionysos wine, in
    Hephaistos fire, and in Poseidon only water, there was not much
    left in religion. On the score of their systematic skepticism,
    that is, their insistence on the subjectivity of all opinion,
    Prof. Drews pronounces the Sophists at once the "Aufklärer"
    and the Pragmatists of ancient Greece (Gesch. des Monismus,
    p. 209). But their thought was scarcely homogeneous.


1. Sokrates [468-399] was fundamentally and practically a freethinker,
insofar as in most things he thought for himself, definitely turning
away from the old ideal of mere transmitted authority in morals. [647]
Starting in all inquiries from a position of professed ignorance, he
at least repudiated all dogmatics. [648] Being, however, preoccupied
with public life and conduct, he did not carry his critical thinking
far beyond that sphere. In regard to the extension of solid science,
one of the prime necessities of Greek intellectual life, he was quite
reactionary, drawing a line between the phenomena which he thought
intelligible and traceable and those which he thought past finding
out. "Physics and astronomy, in his opinion, belonged to the divine
class of phenomena in which human research was insane, fruitless,
and impious." [649] Yet at the same time he formulated, apparently
of his own motion, the ordinary design argument. [650] The sound
scientific view led up to by so many previous thinkers was set forth,
even in religious phraseology, by his great contemporary Hippokrates,
[651] and he opposed it. While partially separating himself in practice
from the popular worships, he held by the belief in omens, though not
in all the ordinary ones; and in one of the Platonic dialogues he is
made to say he holds by the ordinary versions of all the myths, on
the ground that it is a hopeless task to find rational explanations
for them. [652] He hoped, in short, to rationalize conduct without
seeking to rationalize creed--the dream of Plato and of a thousand
religionists since.

He had indeed the excuse that the myth-rationalizers of the time
after Hekataios, following the line of least psychic resistance, like
those of England and Germany in the eighteenth century, explained
away myths by reducing them to hypothetical history, thus asking
credence for something no better verified than the myth itself. But
the rationalizers were on a path by which men might conceivably have
journeyed to a truer science; and Sokrates, by refusing to undertake
any such exploration, [653] left his countrymen to that darkening
belief in tradition which made possible his own execution. There
was in his cast of mind, indeed--if we can at all accept Plato's
presentment of him--something unfavourable to steady conviction. He
cannot have had any real faith in the current religion; yet he never
explicitly dissented. In the Republic he accepts the new festival
to the Thracian Goddess Bendis; and there he is made by Plato to
inculcate a quite orthodox acceptance of the Delphic oracle as the
source of all religious practice. But it is impossible to say how much
of the teaching of the Platonic Sokrates is Sokratic. And as to Plato
there remains the problem of how far his conformities were prudential,
after the execution of Sokrates for blasphemy.


    The long-debated issue as to the real personality of Sokrates
    is still open. It is energetically and systematically handled
    by Prof. August Döring in Die Lehre des Sokrates als sociales
    Reformsystem (1895), and by Dr. Hubert Röck in Der unverfälschte
    Sokrates (1903). See, in particular, Döring, pp. 51-79, and
    Röck, pp. 357-96. From all attempts to arrive at a conception
    of a consistent Sokrates there emerges the impression that the
    real Sokrates, despite a strong critical bent of mind, had no
    clearly established body of opinions, but was swayed in different
    directions by the itch for contradiction which was the driving
    power of his dialectic. For the so-called Sokratic "method" is
    much less a method for attaining truth than one for disturbing
    prejudice. And if in Plato's hands Sokrates seldom reaches a
    conclusion that his own method might not overthrow, we are not
    entitled to refuse to believe that this was characteristic of
    the man.


Concerning Sokrates we have Xenophon's circumstantial account [654]
of how he reasoned with Aristodemos, "surnamed the Little," who
"neither prayed nor sacrificed to the Gods, nor consulted any oracle,
and ridiculed those who did." Aristodemos was a theist, believing in
a "Great Architect" or "Artist," or a number of such powers--on this
he is as vague as the ancient theists in general--but does not think
the heavenly powers need his devotions. Sokrates, equally vague as
to the unity or plurality of the divine, puts the design argument in
the manner familiar throughout the ages, [655] and follows it up with
the plea, among others, that the States most renowned for wisdom and
antiquity have always been the most given to pious practices, and that
probably the Gods will be kind to those who show them respect. The
whole philosopheme is pure empiricism, on the ordinary plane of
polytheistic thought, and may almost be said to exhibit incapacity
for the handling of philosophic questions, evading as it does even
the elementary challenge of Aristodemos, against whom Sokrates parades
pious platitudes without a hint of "Sokratic" analysis. Unless such a
performance were regarded as make-believe, it is difficult to conceive
how Athenian pietists could honestly arraign Sokrates for irreligion
while Aristodemos and others of his way of thinking went unmolested.

Taken as illustrating the state of thought in the Athenian community,
the trial and execution of Sokrates for "blasphemy" and "corrupting
the minds of the young" go far to prove that there prevailed among the
upper class in Athens nearly as much hypocrisy in religious matters
as exists in the England of to-day. Doubtless he was liable to death
from the traditionally orthodox Greek point of view, [656] having
practically turned aside from the old civic creed and ideals; but
then most educated Athenians had in some degree done the same. [657]
Euripides, as we have seen, is so frequently critical of the old
theology and mythology in his plays that he too could easily have been
indicted; and Aristophanes, who attacked Euripides in his comedies
as scurrilously as he did Sokrates, would no doubt have been glad to
see him prosecuted. [658] The psychology of Aristophanes, who freely
ridiculed and blasphemed the Gods in his own comedies while reviling
all men who did not believe in them, is hardly intelligible save
in the light of parts of the English history of our own time, when
unbelieving indifferentists on the Conservative side have been seen
ready to join in turning the law against a freethinking publicist
for purely party ends. In the case of Sokrates the hostility was
ostensibly democratic, for, according to Æschines, Sokrates was
condemned because he had once given lessons to Kritias, [659] one
of the most savage and unscrupulous of the Thirty Tyrants. Inasmuch
as Kritias had become entirely alienated from Sokrates, and had even
put him to silence, such a ground of hostility would only be a fresh
illustration of that collective predilection of men to a gregarious
iniquity which is no less noteworthy in the psychology of groups
than their profession of high moral standards. And such proclivities
are always to be reckoned with in such episodes. Anytos, the leading
prosecutor, seems to have been a typical bigot, brainless, spiteful,
and thoroughly self-satisfied. Not only party malice, however, but
the individual dislikes which Sokrates so industriously set up,
[660] must have counted for much in securing the small majority
of the dikastery that pronounced him guilty--281 to 276; and his
own clear preference for death over any sort of compromise did the
rest. [661] He was old, and little hopeful of social betterment;
and the temperamental obstinacy which underlay his perpetual and
pertinacious debating helped him to choose a death that he could easily
have avoided. But the fact remains that he was not popular; that the
mass of the voters as well as of the upper class disliked his constant
cross-examination of popular opinion, [662] which must often have led
logical listeners to carry on criticism where he left off; and that
after all his ratiocination he left Athens substantially irrational, as
well as incapable of justice, on some essential issues. His dialectic
method has done more to educate the later world than it did for Greece.


    Upon the debate as to the legal punishability of Sokrates turns
    another as to the moral character of the Athenians who forced
    him to drink the hemlock. Professor Mahaffy, bent on proving
    the superiority of Athenian culture and civilization to those
    of Christendom, effectively contrasts the calm scene in the
    prison-chamber of Sokrates with the hideous atrocities of the
    death penalty for treason in the modern world and the "gauntness
    and horror of our modern executions" (Social Life in Greece,
    3rd. ed. pp. 262-69); and Mr. Bleeckly (Socrates and the Athenians,
    1884, pp. 55-63) similarly sets against the pagan case that of the
    burning of heretics by the Christian Church, and in particular the
    auto da fé at Valladolid in 1559, when fifteen men and women--the
    former including the conscientious priests who had proposed to
    meet the hostility of Protestant dissent in the Netherlands by
    reforms in the Church: the latter including delicately-nurtured
    ladies of high family--were burned to death before the eyes of
    the Princess Regent of Spain and the aristocracy of Castile. It
    is certainly true that this transaction has no parallel in the
    criminal proceedings of pagan Athens. Christian cruelty has been as
    much viler than pagan, culture for culture, as the modern Christian
    environment is uglier than the Athenian. Before such a test the
    special pleaders for the civilizing power of Christianity can
    but fall back upon alternative theses which are the negation of
    their main case. First we are told that "Christianity humanizes
    men"; next that where it does not do so it is because they are
    too inhuman to be made Christians.

    But while the orthodoxy of pagan Athens thus comes very well off
    as against the frightful crime-roll of organized Christianity,
    the dispassionate historian must nonetheless note the dehumanizing
    power of religion in Athens as in Christendom. The pietists of
    Athens, in their less brutish way, were as hopelessly denaturalized
    as those of Christian Europe by the dominion of a traditional
    creed, held as above reason. It matters not whether or not we
    say with Bishop Thirlwall (Hist. of Greece, 2nd ed. iv, 556) that
    "there never was a case in which murder was more clearly committed
    under the forms of legal procedure than in the trial of Socrates,"
    or press on the other side the same writer's admission that in
    religious matters in Athens "there was no canon, no book by which
    a doctrine could be tried; no living authority to which appeal
    could be made for the decision of religious controversies." The
    fact that Christendom had "authorities" who ruled which of two
    sets of insane dogmas brought death upon its propounder, does
    not make less abominable the slaying of Bruno and Servetus,
    or the immeasurable massacre of less eminent heretics. But the
    less formalized homicides sanctioned by the piety of Periklean
    Athens remain part of the proof that unreasoning faith worsens
    men past calculation. If we slur over such deeds by generalities
    about human frailty, we are but asserting the impossibility
    of rationally respecting human nature. If, putting aside all
    moral censure, we are simply concerned to trace and comprehend
    causation in human affairs, we have no choice but to note how
    upon occasion religion on one hand, like strong drink on another,
    can turn commonplace men into murderers.


In view of the limitations of Sokrates, and the mental measure of
those who voted for putting him to death, it is not surprising that
through all Greek history educated men (including Aristotle) continued
to believe firmly in the deluge of Deukalion [663] and the invasion of
the Amazons [664] as solid historical facts. Such beliefs, of course,
are on all fours with those current in the modern religious world
down till the present century: we shall, in fact, best appraise the
rationality of Greece by making such comparisons. The residual lesson
is that where Greek reason ended, modern social science had better
be regarded as only beginning. Thukydides, the greatest of all the
ancient historians, and one of the great of all time, treated human
affairs in a spirit so strictly rationalistic that he might reasonably
be termed an atheist on that score even if he had not earned the name
as a pupil of Anaxagoras. [665] But his task was to chronicle a war
which proved that the Greeks were to the last children of instinct for
the main purposes of life, and that the rule of reason which they are
credited with establishing [666] was only an intermittent pastime. In
the days of Demosthenes we still find them politically consulting the
Pythian oracle, despite the consciousness among educated men that the
oracle is a piece of political machinery. We can best realize the stage
of their evolution by first comparing their public religious practice
with that of contemporary England. No one now regards the daily prayers
of the House of Commons as more than a reverent formality. But Nikias
at Syracuse staked the fortunes of war on the creed of omens. We can
perhaps finally conceive with fair accuracy the subordination of Greek
culture and politics to superstition by likening the thought-levels
of pre-Alexandrian Athens to those of England under Cromwell.

2. The decisive measure of Greek accomplishment is found in the career
of Plato [429-347]. One of the great prose writers of the world, he
has won by his literary genius--that is, by his power of continuous
presentation as well as by his style--no less than by his service to
supernaturalist philosophy in general, a repute above his deserts as a
thinker. In Christian history he is the typical philosopher of Dualism,
[667] his prevailing conception of the universe being that of an
inert Matter acted on or even created by a craftsman-God, the "Divine
Artificer," sometimes conceived as a Logos or divine Reason, separately
personalized. Thus he came to be par excellence the philosopher of
theism, as against Aristotle and those of the Pythagoreans who affirmed
the eternity of the universe. [668] In the history of freethought
he figures as a man of genius formed by Sokrates and reflecting
his limitations, developing the Sokratic dialectic on the one hand
and finally emphasizing the Sokratic dogmatism to the point of utter
bigotry. If the Athenians are to be condemned for putting Sokrates to
death, it must not be forgotten that the spirit, if not the letter, of
the Laws drawn up by Plato in his old age fully justified them. [669]
That code, could it ever have been put in force, would have wrought
the death of every honest freethinker as well as most of the ignorant
believers within its sphere. Alone among the great serious writers of
Greece does he implicate Greek thought in the gospel of intolerance
passed on to modern Europe from antiquity. It is recorded of him [670]
that he wished to burn all the writings of Demokritos that he could
collect, and was dissuaded only on the score of the number of copies.

What was best in Plato, considered as a freethinker, was his early love
of ratiocination, of "the rendering and receiving of reasons." Even
in his earlier dialogues, however, there are signs enough of an
arbitrary temper, as well as of an inability to put science in place
of religious prejudice. The obscurantist doctrine which he put in
the mouth of Sokrates in the Phædrus was also his own, as we gather
from the exposition in the Republic. In that brilliant performance he
objects, as so many believers and freethinkers had done before him,
to the scandalous tales in the poets concerning the Gods and the sons
of Gods; but he does not object to them as being untrue. His position
is that they are unedifying. [671] For his own part he proposes that
his ideal rulers frame new myths which shall edify the young: in his
Utopia it is part of the business of the legislator to choose the right
fictions; [672] and the systematic imposition of an edifying body of
pious fable on the general intelligence is part of his scheme for the
regeneration of society. [673] Honesty is to be built up by fraud,
and reason by delusion. What the Hebrew Bible-makers actually did,
Plato proposed to do. The one thing to be said in his favour is that
by thus telling how the net is to be spread in the sight of the bird
he put the decisive obstacle--if any were needed--in the way of his
plan. It is, indeed, inconceivable that the author of the Republic
and the Laws dreamt that either polity as a whole would ever come
into existence. His plans of suppressing all undesirable poetry,
arranging community of women, and enabling children to see battles,
are the fancy-sketches of a dilettant. He had failed completely as a
statesman in practice; as a schemer he does not even posit the first
conditions of success.


    As to his practical failure see the story of his and his pupils'
    attempts at Syracuse (Grote, History, ix, 37-123). The younger
    Dionysios, whom they had vainly attempted to make a model ruler,
    seems to have been an audacious unbeliever to the extent of
    plundering the temple of Persephone at Lokris, one of Jupiter in
    the Peloponnesos, and one of Æsculapius at Epidaurus. Clement of
    Alexandria (Protrept. c. 4) states that he plundered "the statue
    of Jupiter in Sicily." Cicero (De nat. Deorum, iii, 33, 34) and
    Valerius Maximus (i, 1) tell the story of the elder Dionysios;
    but of him it cannot be true. In his day the plunder of the
    temples of Dêmêtêr and Persephone in Sicily by the Carthaginians
    was counted a deadly sin. See Freeman, History of Sicily, iv,
    125-47, and Story of Sicily, pp. 176-80. In Cicero's dialogue it
    is noted that after all his impieties Dionysios [the elder, of
    whom the stories are mistakenly told] died in his bed. Athenæus,
    however, citing the biographer Klearchos, tells that the younger
    Dionysios, after being reduced to the rôle of a begging priest
    of Kybelê, ended his life very miserably (xii, 60).


Nonetheless, the prescription of intolerance in the Laws [674] classes
Plato finally on the side of fanaticism, and, indeed, ranks him with
the most sinister figures on that side, since his earlier writing
shows that he would be willing to punish men alike for repeating
stories which they believed, and for rejecting what he knew to be
untruths. [675] By his own late doctrine he vindicated the slayers of
his own friend. His psychology is as strange as that of Aristophanes,
but strange with a difference. He seems to have practised "the will
to believe" till he grew to be a fanatic on the plane of the most
ignorant of orthodox Athenians; and after all that science had done
to enlighten men on that natural order the misconceiving of which had
been the foundation of their creeds, he inveighs furiously in his old
age against the impiety of those who dared to doubt that the sun and
moon and stars were deities, as every nurse taught her charges. [676]
And when all is said, his Gods satisfy no need of the intelligence;
for he insists that they only partially rule the world, sending the few
good things, but not the many evil [677]--save insofar as evil may be
a beneficent penalty and discipline. At the same time, while advising
the imprisonment or execution of heretics who did not believe in the
Gods, Plato regarded with even greater detestation the man who taught
that they could be persuaded or propitiated by individual prayer and
sacrifice. [678] Thus he would have struck alike at the freethinking
few and at the multitude who held by the general religious beliefs of
Greece, dealing damnation on all save his own clique, in a way that
would have made Torquemada blench. [679] In the face of such teaching
as this, it may well be said that "Greek philosophy made incomparably
greater advances in the earlier polemic period [of the Ionians]
than after its friendly return to the poetry of Homer and Hesiod"
[680]--that is, to their polytheistic basis. It is to be said for
Plato, finally, that his embitterment at the downward course of things
in Athens is a quite intelligible source for his own intellectual
decadence: a very similar spectacle being seen in the case of our own
great modern Utopist, Sir Thomas More. But Plato's own writing bears
witness that among the unbelievers against whom he declaimed there
were wise and blameless citizens; [681] while in the act of seeking to
lay a religious basis for a good society he admitted the fundamental
immorality of the religious basis of the whole of past Greek life.

3. Aristotle [384-322], like Sokrates, albeit in a very different way,
rendered rather an indirect than a direct service to Freethought. Where
Sokrates gave the critical or dialectic method or habit, "a process of
eternal value and of universal application," [682] Aristotle supplied
the great inspiration of system, partly correcting the Sokratic
dogmatism on the possibilities of science by endless observation and
speculation, though himself falling into scientific dogmatism only too
often. That he was an unbeliever in the popular and Platonic religion
is clear. Apart from the general rationalistic tenor of his works,
[683] there was a current understanding that the Peripatetic school
denied the utility of prayer and sacrifice; [684] and though the
essentially partisan attempt of the anti-Macedonian party to impeach
him for impiety may have turned largely on his hyperbolic hymn to his
dead friend Hermeias (who was a eunuch, and as such held peculiarly
unworthy of being addressed as on a level with semi-divine heroes),
[685] it could hardly have been undertaken at all unless he had given
solider pretexts. The threatened prosecution he avoided by leaving the
city, dying shortly afterwards. Siding as he did with the Macedonian
faction, he had put himself out of touch with the democratic instincts
of the Athenians, and so doubly failed to affect their thinking. But
nonetheless the attack upon him by the democrats was a political
stratagem. The prosecution for blasphemy had now become a recognized
weapon in politics for all who had more piety than principle, and
perhaps for some who had neither. And Aristotle, well aware of the
temper of the population around him, had on the whole been so guarded
in his utterance that a fantastic pretext had to be fastened on for
his undoing.


    Prof. Bain (Practical Essays, p. 273), citing Grote's remark on the
    "cautious prose compositions of Aristotle," comments thus: "That is
    to say, the execution of Sokrates was always before his eyes; he
    had to pare his expressions so as not to give offence to Athenian
    orthodoxy. We can never know the full bearings of such a disturbing
    force. The editors of Aristotle complain of the corruption of
    his text: a far worse corruption lies behind. In Greece Sokrates
    alone had the courage of his opinions. While his views as to a
    future life, for example, are plain and frank, the real opinion
    of Aristotle on the question is an insoluble problem." (See,
    however, the passage in the Metaphysics cited below.)

    The opinion of Grote and Bain as to Aristotle's caution is fully
    coincided in by Lange, who writes (Gesch. des Mater. i, 63):
    "More conservative than Plato and Sokrates, Aristotle everywhere
    seeks to attach himself as closely as possible to tradition, to
    popular notions, to the ideas embodied in common speech, and his
    ethical postulates diverge as little as may be from the customary
    morals and laws of Greek States. He has therefore been at all times
    the favourite philosopher of conservative schools and movements."


It is clear, nevertheless, if we can be sure of his writings,
that he was a monotheist, but a monotheist with no practical
religion. "Excluding such a thing as divine interference with Nature,
his theology, of course, excludes the possibility of revelation,
inspiration, miracles, and grace." [686] In a passage in the
Metaphysics, after elaborating his monistic conception of Nature,
he dismisses in one or two terse sentences the whole current religion
as a mass of myth framed to persuade the multitude, in the interest of
law and order. [687] His influence must thus have been to some extent,
at least, favourable to rational science, though unhappily his own
science is too often a blundering reaction against the surmises of
earlier thinkers with a greater gift of intuition than he, who was
rather a methodizer than a discoverer. [688] What was worst in his
thinking was its tendency to apriorism, which made it in a later age
so adaptable to the purposes of the Roman Catholic Church. Thus his
doctrines of the absolute levity of fire and of nature's abhorrence
of a vacuum set up a hypnotizing verbalism, and his dictum that the
earth is the centre of the universe was fatally helpful to Christian
obscurantism. For the rest, while guiltless of Plato's fanaticism,
he had no scheme of reform whatever, and was as far as any other
Greek from the thought of raising the mass by instruction. His own
science, indeed, was not progressive, save as regards his collation of
facts in biology; and his political ideals were rather reactionary;
his clear perception of the nature of the population problem leaving
him in the earlier attitude of Malthus, and his lack of sympathetic
energy making him a defender of slavery when other men had condemned
it. [689] He was in some aspects the greatest brain of the ancient
world; and he left it, at the close of the great Grecian period,
without much faith in man, while positing for the modern world its
vaguest conception of Deity. Plato and Aristotle between them had
reduced the ancient God-idea to a thin abstraction. Plato would not
have it that God was the author of evil, thus leaving evil unaccounted
for save by sorcery. Aristotle's God does nothing at all, existing
merely as a potentiality of thought. And yet upon those positions were
to be founded the theisms of the later world. Plato had not striven,
and Aristotle had failed, to create an adequate basis for thought in
real science; and the world gravitated back to religion.


    [In previous editions I remarked that "the lack of fresh science,
    which was the proximate cause of the stagnation of Greek thought,
    has been explained like other things as a result of race qualities:
    'the Athenians,' says Mr. Benn (The Greek Philosophers, i, 42),
    'had no genius for natural science: none of them were ever
    distinguished as savans.... It was, they thought, a miserable
    trifling [and] waste of time.... Pericles, indeed, thought
    differently....' On the other hand, Lange decides (i, 6) "that
    with the freedom and boldness of the Hellenic spirit was combined
    ... the talent for scientific deduction. These contrary views,"
    I observed, "seem alike arbitrary. If Mr. Benn means that other
    Hellenes had what the Athenians lacked, the answer is that only
    special social conditions could have set up such a difference,
    and that it could not be innate, but must be a mere matter of
    usage." Mr. Benn has explained to me that he does not dissent from
    this view, and that I had not rightly gathered his from the passage
    I quoted. In his later work, The Philosophy of Greece considered
    in relation to the character and history of its people (1898),
    he has pointed out how, in the period of Hippias and Prodikos,
    "at Athens in particular young men threw themselves with ardour
    into the investigation of" problems of cosmography, astronomy,
    meteorology, and comparative anatomy (p. 138). The hindering
    forces were Athenian bigotry (pp. 113-14, 171) and the mischievous
    influence of Sokrates (pp. 165, 173).

    Speaking broadly, we may say that the Chaldeans were forward in
    astronomy because their climate favoured it to begin with, and
    religion and their superstitions did so later. Hippokrates of Kos
    became a great physician because, with natural capacity, he had
    the opportunity to compare many practices. The Athenians failed
    to carry on the sciences, not because the faculty or the taste
    was lacking among them, but because their political and artistic
    interests, for one thing, preoccupied them--e.g., Sokrates and
    Plato; and because, for another, their popular religion, popularly
    supported, menaced the students of physics. But the Ionians,
    who had savans, failed equally to progress after the Alexandrian
    period; the explanation being again not stoppage of faculty, but
    the advent of conditions unfavourable to the old intellectual
    life, which in any case, as we saw, had been first set up by
    Babylonian contacts. (Compare, on the ethnological theorem of
    Cousin, G. Bréton, Essai sur la poésie philos. en Grèce, p. 10.) On
    the other hand, Lange's theory of gifts "innate" in the Hellenic
    mind in general is the old racial fallacy. Potentialities are
    "innate" in all populations, according to their culture stage,
    and it was their total environment that specialized the Greeks
    as a community.]




§ 9

The overthrow of the "free" political life of Athens was followed by
a certain increase in intellectual activity, the result of throwing
back the remaining store of energy on the life of the mind. By this
time an almost open unbelief as to the current tales concerning the
Gods would seem to have become general among educated people, the
withdrawal of the old risk of impeachment by political factions being
so far favourable to outspokenness. It is on record that the historian
Ephoros (of Cumæ in Æolia: fl. 350 B.C.), who was a pupil of Isocrates,
openly hinted in his work at his disbelief in the oracle of Apollo, and
in fabulous traditions generally. [690] In other directions there were
similar signs of freethought. The new schools of philosophy founded
by Zeno the Stoic (fl. 280: d. 263 or 259) and Epicurus (341-270),
whatever their defects, compare not ill with those of Plato and
Aristotle, exhibiting greater ethical sanity and sincerity if less
metaphysical subtlety. Of metaphysics there had been enough for the
age: what it needed was a rational philosophy of life. But the loss
of political freedom, although thus for a time turned to account,
was fatal to continuous progress. The first great thinkers had all
been free men in a politically free environment: the atmosphere of
cowed subjection, especially after the advent of the Romans, could
not breed their like; and originative energy of the higher order
soon disappeared. Sane as was the moral philosophy of Epicurus, and
austere as was that of Zeno, they are alike static or quietist, [691]
the codes of a society seeking a regulating and sustaining principle
rather than hopeful of new achievement or new truth. And the universal
skepticism of Pyrrho has the same effect of suggesting that what is
wanted is not progress, but balance. It is significant that he, who
carried the Sokratic profession of Nescience to the typical extreme of
doctrinal Nihilism, was made high-priest of his native town of Elis,
and had statues erected in his honour. [692]

Considered as freethinkers, all three men tell at once of the critical
and of the reactionary work done by the previous age. Pyrrho, the
universal doubter, appears to have taken for granted, with the whole
of his followers, such propositions as that some animals (not insects)
are produced by parthenogenesis, that some live in the fire, and that
the legend of the Phoenix is true. [693] Such credences stood for
the arrest of biological science in the Sokratic age, with Aristotle,
so often mistakenly, at work; while, on the other hand, the Sokratic
skepticism visibly motives the play of systematic doubt on the
dogmas men had learned to question. Zeno, again, was substantially a
monotheist; Epicurus, adopting but not greatly developing the science
of Demokritos, [694] turned the Gods into a far-off band of glorious
spectres, untroubled by human needs, dwelling for ever in immortal
calm, neither ruling nor caring to rule the world of men. [695] In
coming to this surprising compromise, Epicurus, indeed, probably did
not carry with him the whole intelligence even of his own school. His
friend, the second Metrodoros of Lampsakos, seems to have been the most
stringent of all the censors of Homer, wholly ignoring his namesake's
attempts to clear the bard of impiety. "He even advised men not to be
ashamed to confess their utter ignorance of Homer, to the extent of not
knowing whether Hector was a Greek or a Trojan." [696] Such austerity
towards myths can hardly have been compatible with the acceptance of
the residuum of Epicurus. That, however, became the standing creed of
the sect, and a fruitful theme of derision to its opponents. Doubtless
the comfort of avoiding direct conflict with the popular beliefs had
a good deal to do with the acceptance of the doctrine.

This strange retention of the theorem of the existence of
anthropomorphic Gods, with a flat denial that they did anything in the
universe, might be termed the great peculiarity of average ancient
rationalism, were it not that what makes it at all intelligible for
us is just the similar practice of modern non-Christian theists. The
Gods of antiquity were non-creative, but strivers and meddlers and
answerers of prayer; and ancient rationalism relieved them of their
striving and meddling, leaving them no active or governing function
whatever, but for the most part cherishing their phantasms. The God of
modern Christendom had been at once a creator and a governor, ruling,
meddling, punishing, rewarding, and hearing prayer; and modern theism,
unable to take the atheistic or agnostic plunge, relieves him of all
interference in things human or cosmic, but retains him as a creative
abstraction who somehow set up "law," whether or not he made all things
out of nothing. The psychological process in the two cases seems to
be the same--an erection of æsthetic habit into a philosophic dogma,
and an accommodation of phrase to popular prejudice.

Whatever may have been the logical and psychological crudities
of Epicureanism, however, it counted for much as a deliverance of
men from superstitious fears; and nothing is more remarkable in the
history of ancient philosophy than the affectionate reverence paid to
the founder's memory [697] on this score through whole centuries. The
powerful Lucretius sounds his highest note of praise in telling how
this Greek had first of all men freed human life from the crashing
load of religion, daring to pass the flaming ramparts of the world,
and by his victory putting men on an equality with heaven. [698]
The laughter-loving Lucian two hundred years later grows gravely
eloquent on the same theme. [699] And for generations the effect of the
Epicurean check on orthodoxy is seen in the whole intellectual life of
the Greek world, already predisposed in that direction. [700] The new
schools of the Cynics and the Cyrenaics had alike shown the influence
in their perfect freedom from all religious preoccupation, when they
were not flatly dissenting from the popular beliefs. Antisthenes,
the founder of the former school (fl. 400 B.C.), though a pupil of
Sokrates, had been explicitly anti-polytheistic, and an opponent of
anthropomorphism. [701] Aristippos of Cyrene, also a pupil of Socrates,
who a little later founded the Hedonic or Cyrenaic sect, seems to have
put theology entirely aside. One of the later adherents of the school,
Theodoros, was like Diagoras labelled "the Atheist" [702] by reason
of the directness of his opposition to religion; and in the Rome of
Cicero he and Diagoras are the notorious atheists of history. [703]
To Theodoros, who had a large following, is attributed an influence
over the thought of Epicurus, [704] who, however, took the safer
position of a verbal theism. The atheist is said to have been menaced
by Athenian law in the time of Demetrius Phalereus, who protected him;
and there is even a story that he was condemned to drink hemlock; [705]
but he was not of the type that meets martyrdom, though he might go
far to provoke it. [706] Roaming from court to court, he seems never
to have stooped to flatter any of his entertainers. "You seem to me,"
said the steward of Lysimachos of Thrace to him on one occasion,
"to be the only man who ignores both Gods and kings." [707]

In the same age the same freethinking temper is seen in Stilpo of
Megara (fl. 307), of the school of Euclides, who is said to have
been brought before the Areopagus for the offence of saying that
the Pheidian statue of Athênê was "not a God," and to have met
the charge with the jest that she was in reality not a God but a
Goddess; whereupon he was exiled. [708] The stories told of him make
it clear that he was an unbeliever, usually careful not to betray
himself. Euclides, too, with his optimistic pantheism, was clearly a
heretic; though his doctrine that evil is non-ens [709] later became
the creed of some Christians. Yet another professed atheist was the
witty Bion of Borysthenes, pupil of Theodoros, of whom it is told,
in a fashion familiar to our own time, that in sickness he grew pious
through fear. [710] Among his positions was a protest or rather satire
against the doctrine that the Gods punished children for the crimes of
their fathers. [711] In the other schools, Speusippos (fl. 343), the
nephew of Plato, leant to monotheism; [712] Strato of Lampsakos, the
Peripatetic (fl. 290), called "the Naturalist," taught sheer pantheism,
anticipating Laplace in declaring that he had no need of the action
of the Gods to account for the making of the world; [713] Dikaiarchos
(fl. 326-287), another disciple of Aristotle, denied the existence
of separate souls, and the possibility of foretelling the future;
[714] and Aristo and Cleanthes, disciples of Zeno, varied likewise in
the direction of pantheism; the latter's monotheism, as expressed in
his famous hymn, being one of several doctrines ascribed to him. [715]

Contemporary with Epicurus and Zeno and Pyrrho, too, was Evêmeros
(Euhemerus), whose peculiar propaganda against Godism seems to imply
theoretic atheism. As an atheist he was vilified in a manner familiar
to modern ears, the Alexandrian poet Callimachus labelling him an
"arrogant old man vomiting impious books." [716] His lost work, of
which only a few extracts remain, undertook to prove that all the
Gods had been simply famous men, deified after death; the proof,
however, being by way of a fiction about old inscriptions found in
an imaginary island. [717] As above noted, [718] the idea may have
been borrowed from skeptical Phoenicians, the principle having already
been monotheistically applied by the Bible-making Jews, [719] though,
on the other hand, it had been artistically and to all appearance
uncritically acted on in the Homeric epopees. It may or may not then
have been by way of deliberate or reasoning Evêmerism that certain
early Greek and Roman deities were transformed, as we have seen, into
heroes or hetairai. [720] In any case, the principle seems to have had
considerable vogue in the later Hellenistic world; but with the effect
rather of paving the way for new cults than of setting up scientific
rationalism in place of the old ones. Quite a number of writers like
Palaiphatos, without going so far as Evêmeros, sought to reduce myths
to natural possibilities and events, by way of mediating between the
credulous and the incredulous. [721] Their method is mostly the naïf
one revived by the Abbé Banier in the eighteenth century of reducing
marvels to verbal misconceptions. Thus for Palaiphatos the myth of
Kerberos came from the facts that the city Trikarenos was commonly
spoken of as a beautiful and great dog; and that Geryon, who lived
there, had great dogs called Kerberoi; Actæon was "devoured by his
dogs" in the sense that he neglected his affairs and wasted his time
in hunting; the Amazons were shaved men, clad as were the women in
Thrace, and so on. [722] Palaiphatos and the Herakleitos who also
wrote De Incredibilibus agree that Pasiphae's bull was a man named
Tauros; and the latter writer similarly explains that Scylla was a
beautiful hetaira with avaricious hangers-on, and that the harpies
were ladies of the same profession. If the method seems childish, it
is to be remembered that as regards the explanation of supernatural
events it was adhered to by German theologians of a century ago;
and that its credulity in incredulity is still to be seen in the
current view that every narrative in the sacred books is to be taken
as necessarily standing for a fact of some kind.

One of the inferrible effects of the Evêmerist method was to facilitate
for the time the adoption of the Egyptian and eastern usage of deifying
kings. It has been plausibly argued that this practice stands not
so much for superstition as for skepticism, its opponents being
precisely the orthodox believers, and its promoters those who had
learned to doubt the actuality of the traditional Gods. Evêmerism
would clinch such a tendency; and it is noteworthy that Evêmeros
lived at the court of Kassander (319-296 B.C.) in a period in which
every remaining member of the family of the deified Alexander had
perished, mostly by violence; while the contemporary Ptolemy I of
Egypt received the title of Sotêr, "Saviour," from the people of
Rhodes. [723] It is to be observed, however, that while in the next
generation Antiochus I of Syria received the same title, and his
successor Antiochus II that of Theos, "God," the usage passes away;
Ptolemy III being named merely Evergetês, "the Benefactor" (of the
priests), and even Antiochus III only "the Great." Superstition was
not to be ousted by a political exploitation of its machinery. [724]

In Athens the democracy, restored in a subordinate form by Kassander's
opponent, Demetrius Poliorkêtes (307 B.C.), actually tried to put
down the philosophic schools, all of which, but the Aristotelian in
particular, were anti-democratic, and doubtless also comparatively
irreligious. Epicurus and some of his antagonists were exiled within a
year of his opening his school (306 B.C.); but the law was repealed in
the following year. [725] Theophrastos, the head of the Aristotelian
school, was indicted in the old fashion for impiety, which seems to
have consisted in denouncing animal sacrifice. [726] These repressive
attempts, however, failed; and no others followed at Athens in that
era; though in the next century the Epicureans seem to have been
expelled from Lythos in Crete and from Messenê in the Peloponnesos,
nominally for their atheism, in reality probably on political
grounds. [727] Thus Zeno was free to publish a treatise in which,
besides far out-going Plato in schemes for dragooning the citizens into
an ideal life, he proposed a State without temples or statues of the
Gods or law courts or gymnasia. [728] In the same age there is trace of
"an interesting case of rationalism even in the Delphic oracle." [729]
The people of the island of Astypalaia, plagued by hares or rabbits,
solemnly consulted the oracle, which briefly advised them to keep
dogs and take to hunting. About the same time we find Lachares,
temporarily despot at Athens, plundering the shrine of Pallas of its
gold. [730] Even in the general public there must have been a strain of
surviving rationalism; for among the fragments of Menander (fl. 300),
who, in general, seems to have leant to a well-bred orthodoxy, [731]
there are some speeches savouring of skepticism and pantheism. [732]

It was in keeping with this general but mostly placid and non-polemic
latitudinarianism that the New Academy, the second birth, or rather
transformation, of the Platonic school, in the hands of Arkesilaos
and the great Carneades (213-129), and later of the Carthaginian
Clitomachos, should be marked by that species of skepticism thence
called Academic--a skepticism which exposed the doubtfulness of current
religious beliefs without going the Pyrrhonian length of denying that
any beliefs could be proved, or even denying the existence of the Gods.


    For the arguments of Carneades against the Stoic doctrine of
    immortality see Cicero, De natura Deorum, iii, 12, 17; and for
    his argument against theism see Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. ix,
    172, 183. Mr. Benn pronounces this criticism of theology "the most
    destructive that has ever appeared, the armoury whence religious
    skepticism ever since has been supplied" (The Philosophy of
    Greece, etc., p. 258). This seems an over-statement. But it is
    just to say, as does Mr. Whittaker (Priests, Philosophers, and
    Prophets, 1911, p. 60; cp. p. 86), that "there has never been
    a more drastic attack than that of Carneades, which furnished
    Cicero with the materials for his second book, On Divination";
    and, as does Prof. Martha (Études Morales sur l'antiquité, 1889,
    p. 77), that no philosophic or religious school has been able to
    ignore the problems which Carneades raised.


As against the essentially uncritical Stoics, the criticism of
Carneades is sane and sound; and he has been termed by judicious
moderns "the greatest skeptical mind of antiquity" [733] and "the Bayle
of Antiquity"; [734] though he seems to have written nothing. [735]
There is such a concurrence of testimony as to the victorious power
of his oratory and the invincible skill of his dialectic [736] that
he must be reckoned one of the great intellectual and rationalizing
forces of his day, triumphing as he did in the two diverse arenas
of Greece and Rome. His disciple and successor Clitomachos said of
him, with Cicero's assent, that he had achieved a labour of Hercules
"in liberating our souls as it were of a fierce monster, credulity,
conjecture, rash belief." [737] He was, in short, a mighty antagonist
of thoughtless beliefs, clearing the ground for a rational life;
and the fact that he was chosen with Diogenes the Peripatetic and
Critolaos the Stoic to go to Rome to plead the cause of ruined
Athens, mulcted in an enormous fine, proved that he was held
in high honour at home. Athens, in short, was not at this stage
"too superstitious." Unreasoning faith was largely discredited by
philosophy.

On this basis, in a healthy environment, science and energy might
have reared a constructive rationalism; and for a time astronomy, in
the hands of Aristarchos of Samos (third century B.C.), Eratosthenes
of Cyrene, the second keeper of the great Alexandrian library (2nd
cent. B.C.), and above all of Hipparchos of Nikaia, who did most of
his work in the island of Rhodes, was carried to a height of mastery
which could not be maintained, and was re-attained only in modern
times. [738] Thus much could be accomplished by "endowment of research"
as practised by the Ptolemies at Alexandria; and after science had
declined with the decline of their polity, and still further under
Roman rule, the new cosmopolitanism of the second century of the
empire reverted to the principle of intelligent evocation, producing
under the Antonines the "Second" School of Alexandria.

But the social conditions remained fundamentally bad; and the earlier
greatness was never recovered. "History records not one astronomer
of note in the three centuries between Hipparchos and Ptolemy"; and
Ptolemy (fl. 140 C.E.) not only retrograded into astronomical error,
but elaborated on oriental lines a baseless fabric of astrology. [739]
Other science mostly decayed likewise. The Greek world, already led
to lower intellectual levels by the sudden ease and wealth opened
up to it through the conquests of Alexander and the rule of his
successors, was cast still lower by the Roman conquest. Pliny,
extolling Hipparchos with little comprehension of his work, must
needs pronounce him to have "dared a thing displeasing to God" in
numbering the stars for posterity. [740] In the air of imperialism,
stirred by no other, original thought could not arise; and the mass
of the Greek-speaking populations, rich and poor, gravitated to the
level of the intellectual [741] and emotional life of more or less
well-fed slaves. In this society there rapidly multiplied private
religious associations--thiasoi, eranoi, orgeones--in which men and
women, denied political life, found new bonds of union and grounds of
division in cultivating worships, mostly oriental, which stimulated
the religious sense and sentiment. [742]

Such was the soil in which Christianity took root and flourished;
while philosophy, after the freethinking epoch following on the
fall of Athenian power, gradually reverted to one or other form
of mystical theism or theosophy, of which the most successful was
the Neo-Platonism of Alexandria. [743] When the theosophic Julian
rejoiced that Epicureanism had disappeared, [744] he was exulting in
a symptom of the intellectual decline that made possible the triumph
of the faith he most opposed. Christianity furthered a decadence
thus begun under the auspices of pagan imperialism; and "the fifth
century of the Christian era witnessed an almost total extinction of
the sciences in Alexandria" [745]--an admission which disposes of the
dispute as to the guilt of the Arabs in destroying the great library.

Here and there, through the centuries, the old intellectual flame burns
whitely enough: the noble figure of Epictetus in the first century of
the new era, and that of the brilliant Lucian in the second, in their
widely different ways remind us that the evolved faculty was still
there if the circumstances had been such as to evoke it. Menippos in
the first century B.C. had played a similar part to that of Lucian,
in whose freethinking dialogues he so often figures; but with less
of subtlety and intellectuality. Lucian's was indeed a mind of the
rarest lucidity; and the argumentation of his dialogue Zeus Tragædos
covers every one of the main aspects of the theistic problem. There
is no dubiety as to his atheistic conclusion, which is smilingly
implicit in the reminder he puts in the mouth of Hermes, that,
though a few men may adopt the atheistic view, "there will always be
plenty of others who think the contrary--the majority of the Greeks,
the ignorant many, the populace, and all the barbarians." But the
moral doctrine of Epictetus is one of endurance and resignation;
and the almost unvarying raillery of Lucian, making mere perpetual
sport of the now moribund Olympian Gods, was hardly better fitted
than the all-round skepticism of the school of Sextus Empiricus to
inspire positive and progressive thinking.

This latter school, described by Cicero as dispersed and extinct
in his day, [746] appears to have been revived in the first century
by Ænesidemos, who taught at Alexandria. [747] It seems to have been
through him in particular that the Pyrrhonic system took the clear-cut
form in which it is presented at the close of the second century by
the accomplished Sextus "Empiricus"--that is, the empirical (i.e.,
experiential) physician, [748] who lived at Alexandria and Athens
(fl. 175-205 C.E.). As a whole, the school continued to discredit
dogmatism without promoting knowledge. Sextus, it is true, strikes
acutely and systematically at ill-founded beliefs, and so makes for
reason; [749] but, like the whole Pyrrhonian school, he has no idea
of a method which shall reach sounder conclusions. As the Stoics
had inculcated the control of the passions as such, so the skeptics
undertook to make men rise above the prejudices and presuppositions
which swayed them no less blindly than ever did their passions. But
Sextus follows a purely skeptical method, never rising from the
destruction of false beliefs to the establishment of true. His aim is
ataraxia, a philosophic calm of non-belief in any dogmatic affirmation
beyond the positing of phenomena as such; and while such an attitude
is beneficently exclusive of all fanaticism, it unfortunately never
makes any impression on the more intolerant fanatic, who is shaken only
by giving him a measure of critical truth in place of his error. And
as Sextus addressed himself to the students of philosophy, not to
the simple believers in the Gods, he had no wide influence. [750]
Avowedly accepting the normal view of moral obligations while rejecting
dogmatic theories of their basis, the doctrine of the strict skeptics
had the effect, from Pyrrho onwards, of giving the same acceptance
to the common religion, merely rejecting the philosophic pretence
of justifying it. Taken by themselves, the arguments against current
theism in the third book of the Hypotyposes [751] are unanswerable;
but, when bracketed with other arguments against the ordinary belief
in causation, they had the effect of leaving theism on a par with
that belief. Against religious beliefs in particular, therefore,
they had no wide destructive effect.

Lucian, again, thought soundly and sincerely on life; his praise
of the men whose memories he respected, as Epicurus and Demonax (if
the Life of Demonax attributed to him be really his), is grave and
heartfelt; and his ridicule of the discredited Gods was perfectly
right so far as it went. It is certain that the unbelievers and the
skeptics alike held their own with the believers in the matter of
right living. [752] In the period of declining pagan belief, the maxim
that superstition was a good thing for the people must have wrought
a quantity and a kind of corruption that no amount of ridicule of
religion could ever approach. Polybius (fl. 150 B.C.) agrees with
his complacent Roman masters that their greatness is largely due
to the carefully cultivated superstition of their populace, and
charges with rashness and folly those who would uproot the growth;
[753] and Strabo, writing under Tiberius--unless it be a later
interpolator of his work--confidently lays down the same principle
of governmental deceit, [754] though in an apparently quite genuine
passage he vehemently protests the incredibility of the traditional
tales about Apollo. [755] So far had the doctrine evolved since Plato
preached it. But to countervail it there needed more than a ridicule
which after all reached only the class who had already cast off the
beliefs derided, leaving the multitude unenlightened. The lack of the
needed machinery of enlightenment was, of course, part of the general
failure of the Græco-Roman civilization; and no one man's efforts could
have availed, even if any man of the age could have grasped the whole
situation. Rather the principle of esoteric enlightenment, the ideal
of secret knowledge, took stronger hold as the mass grew more and more
comprehensively superstitious. Even at the beginning of the Christian
era the view that Homer's deities were allegorical beings was freshly
propounded in the writings of Herakleides and Cornutus (Phornutus);
but it served only as a kind of mystical Gnosis, on all fours with
Christian Gnosticism, and was finally taken up by Neo-Platonists,
who were no nearer rationalism for adopting it. [756]

So with the rationalism to which we have so many uneasy or hostile
allusions in Plutarch. We find him resenting the scoffs of Epicureans
at the doctrine of Providence, and recoiling from the "abyss of
impiety" [757] opened up by those who say that "Aphrodite is simply
desire, and Hermes eloquence, and the Muses the arts and sciences,
and Athênê wisdom, and Dionysos merely wine, Hephaistos fire, and
Dêmêtêr corn"; [758] and in his essay On Superstition he regretfully
recognizes the existence of many rational atheists, confessing that
their state of mind is better than that of the superstitious who abound
around him, with their "impure purifications and unclean cleansings,"
their barbaric rites, and their evil Gods. But the unbelievers, with
their keen contempt for popular folly, availed as little against it as
Plutarch himself, with his doctrine of a just mean. The one effectual
cure would have been widened knowledge; and of such an evolution the
social conditions did not permit.

To return to a state of admiration for the total outcome of Greek
thought, then, it is necessary to pass from the standpoint of
simple analysis to that of comparison. It is in contrast with the
relatively slight achievement of the other ancient civilizations
that the Greek, at its height, still stands out for posterity as a
wonderful growth. That which, tried by the test of ideals, is as a
whole only one more tragic chapter in the record of human frustration,
yet contains within it light and leading as well as warning; and
for long ages it was as a lost Paradise to a darkened world. It has
been not untruly said that "the Greek spirit is immortal, because
it was free": [759] free not as science can now conceive freedom,
but in contrast with the spiritual bondage of Jewry and Egypt, the
half-barbaric tradition of imperial Babylon, and the short flight
of mental life in Rome. Above all, it was ever in virtue of the
freedom that the high things were accomplished; and it was ever the
falling away from freedom, the tyranny either of common ignorance
or of mindless power, that wrought decadence. There is a danger,
too, of injustice in comparing Athens with later States. When a high
authority pronounces that "the religious views of the Demos were of
the narrowest kind," [760] he is not to be gainsaid; but the further
verdict that "hardly any people has sinned more heavily against the
liberty of science" is unduly lenient to Christian civilization. The
heaviest sins of that against science, indeed, lie at the door of
the Catholic Church; but to make that an exoneration of the modern
"peoples" as against the ancient would be to load the scales. And
even apart from the Catholic Church, which practically suppressed
all science for a thousand years, the attitude of Protestant leaders
and Protestant peoples, from Luther down to the second half of the
nineteenth century, has been one of hatred and persecution towards
all science that clashed with the sacred books. [761] In the Greek
world there was more scientific discussion in the three hundred
years down to Epicurus than took place in the whole of Christian
Europe in thirteen hundred; and the amount of actual violence used
towards innovators in the pagan period, though lamentable enough,
was trifling in comparison with that recorded in Christian history,
to say nothing of the frightful annals of witch-burning, to which
there is no parallel in civilized heathen history. The critic, too,
goes on to admit that, while "Sokrates, Anaxagoras, and Aristotle
fell victims in different degrees to the bigotry of the populace,"
"of course their offence was political rather than religious. They
were condemned not as heretics, but as innovators in the state
religion." And, as we have seen, all three of the men named taught in
freedom for many years till political faction turned popular bigotry
against them. The true measure of Athenian narrowness is not to be
reached, therefore, without keeping in view the long series of modern
outrages and maledictions against the makers and introducers of new
machinery, and the multitude of such episodes as the treatment of
Priestley in Christian Birmingham, little more than a century ago. On
a full comparison the Greeks come out not ill.

It was, in fact, impossible that the Greeks should either stifle
or persecute science or freethought as it was either stifled or
persecuted by ancient Jews (who had almost no science by reason of
their theology) or by modern Christians, simply because the Greeks
had no anti-scientific hieratic literature. It remains profoundly
significant for science that the ancient civilization which on the
smallest area evolved the most admirable life, which most completely
transcended all the sources from which it originally drew, and left a
record by which men are still charmed and taught, was a civilization
as nearly as might be without Sacred Books, without an organized
priesthood, and with the largest measure of democratic freedom that
the ancient world ever saw.







CHAPTER VI

FREETHOUGHT IN ANCIENT ROME


§ 1

The Romans, so much later than the Greeks in their intellectual
development, were in some respects peculiarly apt--in the case of
their upper class--to accept freethinking ideas when Greek rationalism
at length reached them. After receiving from their Greek neighbours
in Southern Italy, in the pre-historic period, the germs of higher
culture, in particular the alphabet, they rather retrograded than
progressed for centuries, the very alphabet degenerating for lack
of literary activity [762] in the absence of any culture class, and
under the one-idea'd rule of the landowning aristocracy, whose bent
to military aggression was correlative to the smallness of the Roman
facilities for commerce. In the earlier ages nearly everything in
the nature of written lore was a specialty of a few priests, and was
limited to their purposes, which included some keeping of annals. [763]
The use of writing for purposes of family records seems to have been
the first literary development among the patrician laity. [764]
In the early republican period, however, the same conditions of
relative poverty, militarism, and aristocratic emulation prevented
any development even of the priesthood beyond the rudimentary stage
of a primitive civic function; and the whole of these conditions in
combination kept the Roman Pantheon peculiarly shadowy, and the Roman
mythology abnormally undeveloped.


    The character of the religion of the Romans has been usually
    explained in the old manner, in terms of their particular "genius"
    and lack of genius. On this view the Romans primordially tended
    to do whatever they did--to be slightly religious in one period,
    and highly so in another. Teuffel quite unconsciously reduces
    the theorem to absurdity in two phrases: "As long as the peculiar
    character of the Roman nation remained unaltered" ... (Hist. of
    Roman Lit. ed. Schwabe, Eng. tr. 1900, i, 2): "the peculiar Roman
    character had now come to an end, and for ever" (id. p. 123). By
    no writer has the subject been more unphilosophically treated than
    by Mommsen, whose chapter on Roman religion (vol. i, ch. xii) is
    an insoluble series of contradictions. (See the present writer's
    Christianity and Mythology, pp. 115-17.) M. Boissier contradicts
    himself hardly less strangely, alternately pronouncing the Latin
    religion timid and confident, prostrate and dignified (La religion
    romaine d'Auguste aux Antonins, 4e édit. i, 7, 8, 26, 28). Both
    writers ascribe every characteristic of Roman religion to the
    character of "the Romans" in the lump--a method which excludes
    any orderly conception. It must be abandoned if there is to be
    any true comprehension of the subject.

    Other verdicts of this kind by Ihne, Jevons, and others, will no
    better bear examination. (See Christianity and Mythology, pt. i,
    ch. iii, § 3.) Dr. Warde Fowler, the latest English specialist
    to handle the question, confidently supports the strange thesis
    (dating from Schwartz) that the multitude of deities and daimons
    of the early Latins were never thought of as personal, or as
    possessing sex, until Greek mythology and sculpture set the
    fashion of such conceptions, whereupon "this later and foreign
    notion of divinity so completely took possession of the minds of
    the Romans of the cosmopolitan city that Varro is the only writer
    who has preserved the tradition of the older way of thinking"
    (The Religious Experience of the Roman People, 1911, p. 147). That
    is to say, the conception of the Gods in the imageless period was
    an "older way of thinking," in which deities called by male and
    female names, and often addressed as Pater and Mater, were not
    really thought of as anthropomorphic at all! How the early Romans
    conceived their non-imaged deities Dr. Fowler naturally does not
    attempt to suggest. We get merely the unreasoned and unexplained
    negative formula that "we may take it as certain that even the
    greater deities of the calendar, Janus, Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus,
    and Vesta, were not thought of as existing in any sense in human
    form, nor as personal beings having any human characteristics. The
    early Romans were destitute of mythological fancy...."

    Either, then, the early Romans were psychologically alien to
    every other primitive or barbaric people, as known to modern
    anthropology, or, by parity of reasoning, all anthropomorphism
    is the spontaneous creation of sculptors, who had no ground
    whatever in previous psychosis for making images of Gods. The
    Greeks, on this view, had no anthropomorphic notion of their
    deities until suddenly sculptors began to make images of them,
    whereupon everybody promptly and obediently anthropomorphized!

    The way out of this hopeless theorem is indicated for Dr. Fowler
    by his own repeated observation that the Roman jus divinum, in
    which he finds so little sign of normal "mythological fancy,"
    represented the deliberately restrictive action of an official
    priesthood for whom all religio was a kind of State magic or
    "medicine." He expressly insists (p. 24) on "the wonderful work
    done by the early authorities from the State in eliminating from
    their rule of worship (jus divinum) almost all that was magical,
    barbarous, or, as later Romans would have called it, superstitious"
    (Lect. ii, p. 24; cp. Lect. iii.). He even inclines to the view
    that the patrician religion "was really the religion of an
    invading race, like that of the Achæans in Greece, engrafted
    on the religion of a primitive and less civilized population"
    (pp. viii, 23). This thesis is not necessary to the rebuttal of
    his previous negation; but it obviously resists it, unless we are
    to make the word "Roman" apply only to patricians. An invading
    tribe might, in the case of Rome as in that of the Homeric Greeks,
    abandon ordinary and localized primitive beliefs which it had held
    in its previous home, and thereafter be officially reluctant to
    recognize the local superstitions of its conquered plebs.

    But the Roman case can be understood without assuming any
    continuity of racial divergence. Livy shows us that the Latin
    peasantry were, if possible, more given to superstitious fears and
    panics than any other, constantly reporting portents and prodigia
    which called for State ritual, and embarrassing military policy by
    their apprehensions. A patrician priesthood, concerned above all
    things for public polity, would in such circumstances naturally
    seek to minimize the personal side of the popular mythology,
    treating all orders of divinity as mere classes of powers to be
    appeased. The fact (id. p. 29) that among the early Romans, as
    among other primitives, women were rigidly excluded from certain
    sacra points to a further ground for keeping out of official
    sight the sex life of the Gods. But the very ritual formula of
    the Fratres Arvales, Sive deus sive dea (p. 149), proves that the
    deities were habitually thought of as personal, and male or female.

    Dr. Fowler alternately and inconsistently argues that the
    "vulgar mind was ready to think of God-couples" (p. 152), and
    that the conjunctions of masculine and feminine names in the
    Roman Pantheon "do not represent popular ideas of the deities,
    but ritualistic forms of invocation" (p. 153). The answer is that
    the popular mind is the matrix of mythology, and that if a State
    ritual given to minimizing mythology recognized a given habit
    of myth-making it was presumably abundant outside. In short,
    the whole academic process of reducing early Roman religion to
    something unparalleled in anthropology is as ill-founded in the
    data as it is repugnant to scientific thought.

    The differentiation of Greek and Roman religion is to be explained
    by the culture-history of the two peoples; and that, in turn,
    was determined by their geographical situation and their special
    contacts. Roman life was made systematically agricultural and
    militarist by its initial circumstances, where Greek life in
    civilized Asia Minor became industrial, artistic, and literary. The
    special "genius" of Homer, or of various members of an order of
    bards developed by early colonial-feudal Grecian conditions, would
    indeed count for much by giving permanent artistic definiteness
    of form to the Greek Gods, where the early Romans, leaving all
    the vocal arts mainly to the conservative care of their women
    and children as something beneath adult male notice, missed the
    utilization of poetic genius among them till they were long past
    the period of romantic simplicity (cp. Mommsen, bk. i, ch. 15;
    Eng. tr. 1894, vol. i, pp. 285-300). Hence the comparative
    abstractness of their unsung Gods (cp. Schwegler, Römische
    Geschichte, i, 225-28, and refs.; Boissier, La religion romaine,
    as cited, i, 8), and the absence of such a literary mythology as
    was evolved and preserved in Greece by local patriotisms under
    the stimulus of the great epopees and tragedies. The doctrine that
    "the Italian is deficient in the passion of the heart," and that
    therefore "Italian" literature has "never produced a true epos
    or a genuine drama" (Mommsen, ch. 15, vol. i, p. 284), is one of
    a thousand samples of the fallacy of explaining a phenomenon in
    terms of itself. Teuffel with equal futility affirms the contrary:
    "Of the various kinds of poetry, dramatic poetry seems after all
    to be most in conformity with the character of the Roman people"
    (as cited, p. 3; cp. p. 28 as to the epos). On the same verbalist
    method, Mommsen decides as to the Etruscan religion that "the
    mysticism and barbarism of their worship had their foundation
    in the essential character of the Etruscan people" (ch. 12,
    p. 232). Schwegler gives a more objective view of the facts, but,
    like other German writers whom he cites, errs in speaking of early
    deities like Picus as "only aspects of Mars," not realizing that
    Mars is merely the surviving or developed deity of that type. He
    also commits the conventional error of supposing that the early
    Roman religion is fundamentally monotheistic or pantheistic,
    because the multitudinous "abstract" deities are "only" aspects
    of the general force of Nature. The notion that the Romans did
    not anthropomorphize their deities like all other peoples is a
    surprising fallacy.


Thus when Rome, advancing in the career of conquest, had developed
a large aristocratic class, living a city life, with leisure for
intellectual interests, and had come in continuous contact with
the conquered Grecian cities of Southern Italy, its educated men
underwent a literary and a rationalistic influence at the same time,
and were the more ready to give up all practical belief in their
own slightly-defined Gods when they found Greeks explaining away
theirs. Here we see once more the primary historic process by which
men are led to realize the ill-founded character of their hereditary
creeds: the perception is indirectly set up by the reflective
recognition of the creeds of others, and all the more readily when the
others give a critical lead. Indeed, Greek rationalism was already old
when the Romans began to develop a written and artistic literature: it
had even taken on the popular form given to it by Evêmeros a century
before the Romans took it up. Doubtless there was skepticism among
the latter before Ennius: such a piece of religious procedure as the
invention of a God of Silver (Argentinus), son of the God of Copper
(Æsculanus), on the introduction of a silver currency, 269 B.C.,
must have been smiled at by the more intelligent. [765]


    Mommsen states (ii, 70) that at this epoch the Romans kept
    "equally aloof from superstition and unbelief," but this is
    inaccurate on both sides. The narrative of Livy exhibits among
    the people a boundless and habitual superstition. The records
    of absurd prodigies of every sort so throng his pages that he
    himself repeatedly ventures to make light of them. Talking oxen,
    skies on fire, showers of flesh, crows and mice eating gold, rivers
    flowing blood, showers of milk--such were the reports chronically
    made to the Roman government by its pious subjects, and followed
    by anxious religious ceremonies at Rome (cp. Livy, iii, 5, 10; x,
    27; xi, 28-35; xxiv, 44; xxvii, 4, 11, 23, etc., etc. In the index
    to Drakenborch's Livy there are over five columns of references
    to prodigia). On the other hand, though superstition was certainly
    the rule, there are traces of rationalism. On the next page after
    that cited, Mommsen himself admits that the faith of the people had
    already been shaken by the interference allowed to the priestly
    colleges in political matters; and in another chapter (bk. ii,
    ch. 13; vol. ii, 112) he recalls that a consul of the Claudian
    gens had jested openly at the auspices in the first Punic war,
    249 B.C. The story is told by Cicero, De natura Deorum, ii, 3,
    and Suetonius, Tiberius, c. 2. The sacred poultry, on being let
    out of their coop on board ship, would not feed, so that the
    auspices could not be taken; whereupon the consul caused them to
    be thrown into the water, etiam per jocum Deos inridens, saying
    they might drink if they would not eat. His colleague Junius in
    the same war also disregarded the auspices; and in both cases,
    according to Balbus the Stoic in Cicero's treatise, the Roman
    fleets were duly defeated; whereupon Claudius was condemned by
    the people, and Junius committed suicide. Cp. Valerius Maximus,
    l. i, c. iv, § 3.

    Such stories would fortify the age-long superstition as to auspices
    and omens, which was in full force among Greek commanders as late
    as Xenophon, when many cultured Greeks were rationalists. But it
    was mainly a matter of routine, in a sphere where freethought
    is slow to penetrate. There was probably no thought of jesting
    when, in the year 193 B.C., after men had grown weary alike of
    earthquakes and of the religious services prescribed on account
    of them; and after the consuls had been worn out by sacrifices and
    expiations, it was decreed that "if on any day a service had been
    arranged for a reported earthquake, no one should report another
    on that day" (Livy, xxxiv, 55). Cato, who would never have dreamt
    of departing from a Roman custom, was the author of the saying
    (Cicero, De <DW37>. ii, 24) that haruspices might well laugh in each
    other's faces. He had in view the Etruscan practice, being able to
    see the folly of that, though not of his own. Cp. Mommsen, iii,
    116. As to the Etruscan origin of the haruspices, in distinction
    from the augurs, see Schwegler, i, 276, 277; Ihne, Eng. ed. i,
    82-83, note; and O. Müller as there cited.


But it is with the translation of the Sacred History of Evêmeros
by Ennius, about 200 B.C., that the literary history of Roman
freethought begins. In view of the position of Ennius as a teacher
of Greek and belles lettres (he being of Greek descent, and born
in Calabria), it cannot be supposed that he would openly translate
an anti-religious treatise without the general acquiescence of his
aristocratic patrons. Cicero says of him that he "followed" as well
as translated Evêmeros; [766] and his favourite Greek dramatists
were the freethinking Euripides and Epicharmos, from both of whom
he translated. [767] The popular superstitions, in particular those
of soothsaying and divination, he sharply attacked. [768] If his
patrons all the while stood obstinately to the traditional usages
of official augury and ritual, it was in the spirit of political
conservatism that belonged to their class and their civic ideal,
and on the principle that religion was necessary for the control of
the multitude. In Etruria, where the old culture had run largely
to mysticism and soothsaying on quasi-oriental lines, the Roman
government took care to encourage it, by securing the theological
monopoly of the upper-class families, [769] and thus set up a standing
hot-bed of superstition. In the same spirit they adopted from time
to time popular cults from Greece, that of the Phrygian Mother of the
Gods being introduced in the year 204 B.C. The attempt (186 B.C.) to
suppress the Bacchic mysteries, of which a distorted and extravagant
account [770] is given by Livy, was made on grounds of policy and
not of religion; and even if the majority of the senate had not been
disposed to encourage the popular appetite for emotional foreign
worships, the multitude of their own accord would have introduced
the latter, in resentment of the exclusiveness of the patricians in
keeping the old domestic and national cults in their own hands. [771]
As now eastern conquests multiplied the number of foreign slaves
and residents in Rome, the foreign worships multiplied with them;
and with the worships came such forms of freethought as then existed
in Greece, Asia Minor, and Egypt. In resistance to these, as to the
orgiastic worships, political and religious conservatism for a time
combined. In 173 B.C. the Greek Epicurean philosophers Alkaios and
Philiskos were banished from the city, [772] a step which was sure to
increase the interest in Epicureanism. Twelve years later the Catonic
party carried a curt decree in the Senate against the Greek rhetors,
[773] uti Romae ne essent; and in 155 the interest aroused by Carneades
and the other Athenian ambassadors led to their being suddenly
sent home, on Cato's urging. [774] It seems certain that Carneades
made converts to skepticism, among them being the illustrious Scipio
Æmilianus. [775] In the sequel the Greeks multiplied, especially after
the fall of Macedonia, [776] and in the year 92 we find the censors
vetoing the practices of the Latin rhetors as an unpleasing novelty,
[777] thus leaving the Greeks in possession of the field. [778] But,
the general social tendency being downwards, it was only a question of
time when the rationalism should be overgrown by the superstition. In
137 there had been another vain edict against the foreign soothsayers
and the worshippers of Sabazius; [779] but it was such cults that
were to persist, while the old Roman religion passed away, [780]
save insofar as it had a non-literary survival among the peasantry.




§ 2

While self-government lasted, rationalism among the cultured classes
was fairly common. The great poem of Lucretius, On the Nature of
Things, with its enthusiastic exposition of the doctrine of Epicurus,
remains to show to what a height of sincerity and ardour a Roman
freethinker could rise. No Greek utterance that has come down to us
makes so direct and forceful an attack as his on religion as a social
institution. He is practically the first systematic freethinking
propagandist; so full is he of his purpose that after his stately
prologue to alma Venus, who is for him but a personification of the
genetic forces of Nature, he plunges straight into his impeachment of
religion as a foul tyranny from which thinking men were first freed
by Epicurus. The sonorous verse vibrates with an indignation such as
Shelley's in Queen Mab: religion is figured as horribili super aspectu
mortalibus instans; a little further on its deeds are denounced as
scelerosa atque impia, "wicked and impious," the religious term being
thus turned against itself; and a moving picture of the sacrifice of
Iphigeneia justifies the whole. "To so much of evil could religion
persuade." It is with a bitter consciousness of the fatal hold of the
hated thing on most men's ignorant imagination that he goes on to speak
of the fears [781] so assiduously wrought upon by the vates, and to
set up with strenuous speed the vividly-imagined system of Epicurean
science by which he seeks to fortify his friend against them. That
no thing comes from nothing, or lapses into nothing; that matter is
eternal; that all things proceed "without the Gods" by unchanging law,
are his insistent themes; and for nigh two thousand years a religious
world has listened with a reluctant respect. His influence is admitted
to have been higher and nobler than that of the religion he assailed.


    "Lucretius was the first not only to reveal a new power, beauty,
    and mystery in the world, but also to communicate to poetry a
    speculative impulse, opening up, with a more impassioned appeal
    than philosophy can do, the great questions underlying human
    life--such as the truth of all religious tradition, the position
    of man in the universe, and the attitude of mind and course of
    conduct demanded by that position." (Sellar, Roman Poets of the
    Republic: Virgil, 1877, p. 199.)

    "In the eyes of Lucretius all worship seemed prompted by fear
    and based on ignorance of natural law.... But it is nevertheless
    true that Lucretius was a great religious poet. He was a prophet,
    in deadly earnest, calling men to renounce their errors both of
    thought and conduct.... We may be certain that he was absolutely
    convinced of the truth of all that he wrote." (W. Warde Fowler,
    Social Life at Rome in the Age of Cicero, 1909, pp. 327-28.)


And yet throughout the whole powerful poem we have testimony to the
pupillary character of Roman thought in relation to Grecian. However
much the earnest student may outgo his masters in emphasis and zeal of
utterance, he never transcends the original irrationality of asserting
that "the Gods" exist; albeit it is their glory to do nothing. It is
in picturing their ineffable peace that he reaches some of his finest
strains of song, [782] though in the next breath he repudiates every
idea of their control of things cosmic or human. He swears by their
sacred breasts, proh sancta deum pectora, and their life of tranquil
joy, when he would express most vehemently his scorn of the thought
that it can be they who hurl the lightnings which haply destroy their
own temples and strike down alike the just and the unjust. It is a
survival of a quite primitive conception of deity, [783] alongside
of an advanced anti-religious criticism.

The explanation of the anomaly seems to be twofold. In the first
place, Roman thought had not lived long enough--it never did live
long enough--to stand confidently on its own feet and criticize
its Greek teachers. In Cicero's treatise On the Nature of the Gods,
the Epicurean and the Stoic in turn retail their doctrine as they
had it from their school, the Epicurean affirming the existence
and the inaction of the Gods with equal confidence, and repeating
without a misgiving the formula about the Gods having not bodies
but quasi-bodies, with not blood but quasi-blood; the Stoic, who
stands by most of the old superstitions, professing to have his
philosophical reasons for them. Each sectarian derides the beliefs
of the other; neither can criticize his own creed. It would seem
as if in the habitually militarist society, even when it turns to
philosophy, there must prevail a militarist ethic and psychosis in the
intellectual life, each man choosing a flag or a leader and fighting
through thick and thin on that side henceforth. On the other hand,
the argumentation of the high-priest Cotta in the dialogue turns to
similar purpose the kindred principle of civic tradition. He argues
in turn against the Epicurean's science and the Stoic's superstition,
contesting alike the claim that the Gods are indifferent and the
claim that they govern; and in the end he brazenly affirms that,
while he sees no sound philosophic argument for religious beliefs and
practices, he thinks it is justifiable to maintain them on the score
of prescription or ancestral example. Here we have the senatorial
or conservative principle, [784] availing itself of the skeptical
dialectic of Carneades. In terms of that ideal, which prevailed alike
with believers and indifferentists, [785] and mediated between such
rival schools as the Epicurean and Stoic, we may partly explain the
Epicurean theorem itself. For the rest, it is to be understood as an
outcome partly of surviving sentiment and partly of forced compromise
in the case of its Greek framers, and of the habit of partizan loyalty
in the case of its Roman adherents.

In the arguments of Cotta, the unbelieving high-priest, we presumably
have the doctrine of Cicero himself, [786] who in the Academica avows
his admiration of Carneades's reasoning, and in the De Divinatione
follows it, but was anchored by officialism to State usage. With
his vacillating character, his forensic habit, and his genius for
mere speech, he could not but betray his own lack of intellectual
conviction; and such weakness as his found its natural support in
the principle of use and wont, the practice and tradition of the
commonwealth. On that footing he had it in him to boast like any
pedigreed patrician of the historic religiousness of Rome, he himself
the while being devoid of all confident religious belief. His rhetoric
on the subject can hardly be otherwise estimated than as sheer hustings
hypocrisy. Doubtless he gave philosophic colour to his practice by
noting the hopeless conflict of the creeds of the positive sects,
very much as in our own day conservative dialectic finds a ground for
religious conformity in the miscarriages of the men of science. [787]
But Cicero does not seem even to have had a religious sentiment to
cover the nakedness of his political opportunism. Not only does he in
the Tusculan Disputations put aside in the Platonic fashion all the
Homeric tales which anthropomorphize and discredit the Gods; [788]
but in his treatise On Divination he shows an absolute disbelief in
all the recognized practices, including the augury which he himself
officially practised; and his sole excuse is that they are to be
retained "on account of popular opinion and of their great public
utility." [789] As to prodigies, he puts in germ the argument later
made famous by Hume: either the thing could happen (in the course of
nature) or it could not; if it could not, the story is false; if it
could, non esse mirandum--there is no miracle. [790] In his countless
private letters, again, he shows not a trace of religious feeling,
[791] or even of interest in the questions which in his treatises
he declares to be of the first importance. [792] Even the doctrine
of immortality, to which he repeatedly returns, seems to have been
for him, as for so many Christians since, only a forensic theme,
never a source of the private consolation he ascribed to it. [793]
In Cicero's case, in fine, we reach the conclusion that either the
noted inconstancy of his character pervaded all his thinking, or
that his gift for mere utterance, and his demoralizing career as an
advocate, overbore in him all sincere reflection. But, indeed, the
practical subversion of all rational ethic in the public life of late
republican Rome, wherein men claimed to be free and self-governing,
yet lived by oppressing the rest of the world, was on all hands fatal
to the moral rectitude which inspires a critical philosophy.


    Modern scholarship still clings to the long-established view that
    Cicero was practically right, and that Lucretius was practically
    wrong. Augustus, says Dr. Warde Fowler, was fortunate in finding
    in Virgil "one who was in some sense a prophet as well as a poet,
    who could urge the Roman by an imaginative example to return
    to a living pietas--not merely to the old religious forms,
    but to the intelligent sense of duty to God and man which
    had built up his character and his empire. In Cicero's day
    there was also a great poet, he too in some sense a prophet;
    but Lucretius could only appeal to the Roman to shake off the
    slough of his old religion, and such an appeal was at the time
    both futile and dangerous. Looking at the matter historically,
    and not theologically, we ought to sympathize with the attitude
    of Cicero and Scaevola towards the religion of the State. It was
    based on a statesmanlike instinct; and had it been possible for
    that instinct to express itself practically in a positive policy
    like that of Augustus, it is quite possible that much mischief
    might have been averted" (Social Life at Rome, pp. 325-26).

    It is necessary to point out (1) that the early Roman's "sense of
    duty to God and man" was never of a kind that could fitly be termed
    "intelligent"; and (2) that it was his character that made his
    creed, and not his creed his character, though creed once formed
    reacts on conduct. Further, it may be permitted to suggest that
    we might consider historical problems morally, and to deprecate
    the academic view that "statesmanship" is something necessarily
    divorced from veracity. The imperfect appeal of Lucretius to the
    spirit of truth in an ignorant and piratical community, living
    an increasingly parasitic life, was certainly "futile"; but it is
    a strange sociology that sees in it something "dangerous," while
    regarding the life of perpetual conquest and plunder as a matter
    of course, and the practice of systematic deceit as wholesome.

    The summary of the situation is that Cicero's policy of religious
    make-believe could no more have "saved" Rome than Plato's could
    have saved Athens, or than that of Augustus did save the empire. It
    went downhill about as steadily after as before him; and it
    continued to do so under Christianity as under paganism. The
    decline was absolutely involved in the policy of universal
    conquest; and neither creeds nor criticism of creeds could have
    "averted" the result while the cause subsisted. But there is
    something gratuitously anti-rational in the thesis that such
    a decay might have been prevented by a politic manipulation
    of beliefs known to be false, and that some regeneration
    was really worked in Rome by the tale of pious Æneas. In his
    Religious Experience of the Roman People (1911) Dr. Fowler is
    more circumspect.


In the upper-class Rome of Cicero's day his type seems to have been
predominant, [794] the women alone being in the mass orthodox, [795]
and in their case the tendency was to add new superstitions to the
old. Among public men there subsisted a clear understanding that public
religion should continue for reasons of State. When we find an eminent
politician like the elder M. Æmilius Scaurus prosecuted in the year 103
B.C. on a charge of neglecting certain religious ceremonies connected
with his offices, we know that there had been neither conscientious
abstention on his part nor sincere religious resentment on the other
side, but merely a resort by political enemies, after Greek precedent,
to a popular means of blackening an antagonist; for the same Scaurus,
who was a member of the college of augurs, had actually rebuilt or
restored the temple of Fides, said to have been founded by Numa, and
that of Mens (Prudence), which had been set up after the great defeat
of the Romans at the Trasimene lake; [796] the early and the late
procedure alike illustrating the political and pragmatic character
of the State religion. [797] In the supreme figure of Julius Cæsar
we see the Roman brain at its strongest; and neither his avowed
unbelief in the already popular doctrine of immortality, [798] nor
his repeatedly expressed contempt for the auspices, [799] withheld
him from holding and fulfilling the function of high pontiff. The
process of skepticism had been rapid among the men of action. The
illiterate Marius carried about with him a Syrian prophetess; of
Sulla, who unhesitatingly plundered the temple of Delphi, it was
said that he carried a small figure of Apollo as an amulet; [800]
of Cæsar, unless insofar as it may be true that in his last years,
like Napoleon, he grew to believe in omens as his powers failed,
under the stress of perpetual conflict, [801] it cannot be pretended
that he was aught but a convinced freethinker. [802] The greatest and
most intellectual man of action in the ancient world had no part in
the faith which was supposed to have determined the success of the
most powerful of all the ancient nations.


    Dean Merivale, noting that Cæsar "professed without reserve
    the principles of the unbelievers," observes that, "freethinker
    as he was, he could not escape from the universal thraldom of
    superstition in which his contemporaries were held" (Hist. of
    the Romans under the Empire, ed. 1865, ii, 424). The reproach,
    from a priest, is piquant, but misleading. All the stories
    on which it is founded apply to the last two or three years
    of Cæsar's life; and supposing them to be all true, which is
    very doubtful, they would but prove what has been suggested
    above--that the overstrained soldier, rising to the dizzy height
    of a tremendous career, partly lost his mental balance, like so
    many another. (Cp. Mackail, Latin Literature, 1895, p. 80.) Such
    is the bearing of the doubtful story (Pliny, Hist. Nat. xxviii,
    2) that after the breaking down of a chariot (presumably the
    casualty which took place in his fourfold triumph; see Dio
    Cassius, xlviii, 21) he never mounted another without muttering
    a charm. M. Boissier (i, 70) makes the statement of Pliny apply
    to Cæsar's whole life; but although Pliny gives no particulars,
    even Dean Merivale (p. 372) connects it with the accident in the
    triumph. To the same time belongs the less challengeable record
    (Dio Cassius, lx, 23) of his climbing on his knees up the steps of
    the Capitol to propitiate Nemesis. The very questionable legend,
    applied so often to other captains, of his saying, I have thee,
    Africa, when he stumbled on landing (Sueton. Jul. 59), is a
    proof not of superstition but of presence of mind in checking
    the superstitious fears of the troops, and was so understood by
    Suetonius; as was the rather flimsy story of his taking with him
    in Africa a man nicknamed Salutio (Sueton. ibid.) to neutralize the
    luck of the opposing Cornelii. The whole turn given to the details
    by the clerical historian is arbitrary and unjudicial. Nor is he
    accurate in saying that Cæsar "denied the Gods" in the Senate. He
    actually swore by them, per Deos immortales, in the next sentence
    to that in which he denied a future state. The assertion of
    the historian (p. 423), that in denying the immortality of the
    soul Cæsar denied "the recognized foundation of all religion,"
    is a no less surprising error. The doctrine never had been so
    recognized in ancient Rome. A Christian ecclesiastic might have
    been expected to remember that the Jewish religion, believed by
    him to be divine, was devoid of the "recognized foundation" in
    question, and that the canonical book of Ecclesiastes expressly
    discards it. Of course Cæsar offered sacrifices to Gods in whom
    he did not believe. That was the habitual procedure of his age.




§ 3

It is significant that the decay of rationalism in Rome begins and
proceeds with the Empire. Augustus, whose chosen name was sacerdotal
in its character, [803] made it part of his policy to restore as far
as possible the ancient cults, many of which had fallen into extreme
neglect, between the indifference of the aristocratic class [804]
and the devotion of the populace, itself so largely alien, to the
more attractive worships introduced from Egypt and the East. That
he was himself a habitually superstitious man seems certain; [805]
but even had he not been, his policy would have been natural from the
Roman point of view. A historian of two centuries later puts in the
mouth of Mæcenas an imagined counsel to the young emperor to venerate
and enforce the national religion, to exclude and persecute foreign
cults, to put down alike atheism and magic, to control divination
officially, and to keep an eye on the philosophers. [806] What
the empire sought above all things was stability; and a regimen of
religion, under imperial control, seemed one of the likeliest ways
to keep the people docile. Julius himself had seemed to plan such a
policy, [807] though he also planned to establish public libraries,
[808] which would hardly have promoted faith among the educated.

Augustus, however, aimed at encouraging public religion of every
description, repairing or rebuilding eighty-two temples at Rome
alone, giving them rich gifts, restoring old festivals and ceremonies,
reinstituting priestly colleges, encouraging special foreign worships,
and setting up new civic cults; himself playing high pontiff and
joining each new priesthood, to the end of making his power and
prestige so far identical with theirs; [809] in brief, anticipating
the later ruling principle of the Church of Rome. The natural upshot
of the whole process was the imperial apotheosis, or raising of each
emperor to Godhead at death. The usage of deifying living rulers was
long before common in Egypt and the east, [810] and had been adopted
by the conquering Spartan Lysander in Asia Minor as readily as by the
conquering Alexander. Julius Cæsar seems to have put it aside as a
nauseous flattery; [811] but Augustus wrought it into his policy. It
was the consummation at once of the old political conception of
religion and of the new autocracy.

In a society so managed, all hope of return to self-government having
ceased, the level of thought sank accordingly. There was practically
no more active freethought. Livy, indeed, speaks so often of the
contempt shown in his own day for tales of prodigies, and of what
he calls contempt for the Gods, [812] that there can be no question
of the lack of religion among the upper classes at the beginning
of the empire. But even in Livy's day unbelief had ceased to go
beyond a shrugging of the shoulders. Horace, with his credat Judæus
Apella, and his frank rejection of the fear of the Deos tristes,
[813] was no believer, but he was not one to cross the emperor,
[814] and he was ready to lend himself to the official policy of
religion. [815] Ovid could satirize [816] the dishonest merchant who
prayed to the Gods to absolve his frauds; but he hailed Augustus as
the sacred founder and restorer of temples, [817] prayed for him as
such, busied himself with the archæology of the cults, and made it,
not quite without irony, a maxim to "spare an accepted belief." [818]
Virgil, at heart a pantheist with rationalistic leanings, [819] but
sadly divided between Lucretius and Augustus, his poetical and his
political masters, [820] tells all the transition from the would-be
scientific to the newly-credulous age in the two wistful lines:--


      Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas ...
      Fortunatus et ille, Deos qui novit agrestes [821]


--"happy he who has been able to learn the causes of things;
fortunate also he who has known the rural Gods." The Gods, rural
and other, entered on their due heritage in a world of decadence;
Virgil's epic is a religious celebration of antiquity; and Livy's
history is written in the credulous spirit, or at least in the tone,
of an older time, with a few concessions to recent common sense. [822]
In the next generation Seneca's monotheistic aversion to the popular
superstitions is the high-water mark of the period, and represents
the elevating power of the higher Greek Stoicism. On this score he
belongs to the freethinking age, while his theistic apriorism belongs
to the next. [823] All the while his principle of conformity to all
legal observances [824] leaves him powerless to modify the environment.

As the empire proceeds, the echoes of the old freethought become
fewer and fewer. It is an entire misconception to suppose that
Christianity came into the Roman world as a saving counter-force to
licentious unbelief. Unbelief had in large part disappeared before
Christianity made any headway; and that creed came as one of many
popular cults, succeeding in terms of its various adaptations to
the special conditions, moral and economic. It was easy for the
populace of the empire to deify a ruler: as easy as for those of
the East to deify Jesus; or for the early Romans to deify Romulus;
at Rome it was the people, now so largely of alien stock, who had
most insisted on deifying Cæsar. [825] But the upper class soon kept
pace with them in the zest for religion. In the first century, the
elder Pliny recalls the spirit of Lucretius by the indignant eloquence
with which he protests against the burdensome belief in immortality;
[826] and the emphasis with which he scouts alike the polytheism of
the multitude, the universal worship of Fortune, and the idea that
man can know the infinite divinity which is the universe; [827]
but, though Seneca and others reject the fear of future torment,
Pliny is the last writer to repudiate with energy the idea of a
future state. [828] A number of epitaphs still chime with his view;
but already the majority are on the other side; [829] and the fear of
hell was normally as active as the hope of heaven; while the belief
in an approaching end of the world was proportionally as common as it
was later under Christianity. [830] And though Pliny, discussing the
bases of magic, of which he recognized the fraudulence, ranks among
them the influences of religion, as to which he declared mankind
to be still in extreme darkness, [831] we have seen how he in turn,
on theistic grounds, frowned upon Hipparchos for daring to number the
stars. [832] Thus, whatever may be the truth as to the persecutions of
the Christians in the first two centuries of the empire, the motive
was in all cases certainly political or moral, as in the earlier
case of the Bacchic mysteries, not rationalistic hostility to its
doctrines as apart from Christian attacks on the established worships.

Some unbelievers there doubtless were after Petronius, whose perdurable
maxim that "Fear first made Gods in the world," [833] adopted in
the next generation by Statius, [834] was too pregnant with truth
to miss all acceptance among thinking men. The fact that Statius in
his verse ranked Domitian with the Gods made its truth none the less
pointed. The Alexandrian rationalist Chaeremon, who had been appointed
one of the tutors of Nero, had explained the Egyptian religion as
a mere allegorizing of the physical order of the universe. [835]
It has been remarked too that in the next century the appointment of
the freethinking Greek Lucian by Marcus Aurelius to a post of high
authority in Egypt showed that his writings gave no great offence
at court, [836] where, indeed, save under the two great Antonines,
religious seriousness was rare. These, however, were the exceptions:
the whole cast of mind developed under the autocracy, whether in the
good or in the bad, made for belief and acquiescence or superstition
rather than for searching doubt and sustained reasoning.


    The statement of Mosheim or of his commentators (Eccles. Hist. 1
    Cent. Pt. I, ch. i, § 21, note; Murdock's trans. Reid's ed.) that
    Juvenal (Sat. xiii, 86) "complains of the many atheists at Rome" is
    a perversion of the passage cited. Juvenal's allusion to those who
    put all things down to fortune and deny a moral government of the
    world begins with the phrase "sunt qui," "there are (those) who";
    he makes far more account of the many superstitious, and never
    suggests that the atheists are numerous in his day. Neither does he
    "complain"; on the contrary, his allusion to the atheists as such
    is non-condemnatory as compared with his attacks on pious rogues,
    and is thus part of the ground for holding that he was himself
    something of a freethinker--one of the last among the literary
    men. In the tenth Satire (346 sqq.) he puts the slightly theistic
    doctrine, sometimes highly praised (ed. Ruperti, 1817, in loc.),
    that men should not pray for anything, but leave the decision to
    the Gods, to whom man is dearer than to himself. There too occurs
    the famous doctrine (356) that if anything is to be prayed for it
    should be the mens sana in corpore sano, and the strong soul void
    of the fear of death. The accompanying phrase about offering "the
    intestines and the sacred sausages of a whitish pig" is flatly
    contemptuous of religious ceremonial; and the closing lines,
    placing the source of virtue and happiness within, are strictly
    naturalistic. In the two last:--


        Nullum numen habes, si sit prudentia; nos [or sed] te
        Nos facimus, Fortuna, Deam, coeloque locamus,


    the frequent reading abest for habes seems to make the better
    sense: "No divinity is wanting, if there be prudence; but it
    is we, O fortune, who make thee a Goddess, and throne thee in
    heaven." In any case, the insistence is on man's lordship of
    himself. (The phrase occurs again in Sat. xiv, 315.) But the
    worship of Fortune--which Pliny declares to be the prevailing
    faith of his day (Hist. Nat. II, v (vii), 7)--was itself a cult
    like another, with temples and ritual; and the astrology which, he
    adds, is beginning to supersede Fortune-worship among the learned
    and the ignorant alike, was but a reversion to an older Eastern
    religion. His own preference is for sun-worship, if any; but he
    falls back on the conviction that the power of God is limited,
    and that God is thus seen to be simply Nature (id. 8).

    The erroneous notion that the Roman aristocracy ran mainly to
    atheism was widely propagated by Voltaire, who made it part
    of his argument against the atheism of his own day (Jenni;
    art. Athéisme, in the Dict. Philos., etc.). It will not bear
    examination. As regards the general tone of Roman literature
    from the first century onwards, the summing-up of Renan is
    substantially just: "The freethinkers ... diminish little by
    little, and disappear.... Juvenal alone continues in Roman
    society, down to the time of Hadrian, the expression of a frank
    incredulity.... Science dies out from day to day. From the death
    of Seneca, it may be said that there is no longer a thoroughly
    rationalistic scholar. Pliny the Elder is inquisitive, but
    uncritical. Tacitus, Pliny the Younger, Suetonius, avoid commenting
    on the inanity of the most ridiculous inventions. Pliny the Younger
    (Ep. vii, 27) believes in puerile stories of ghosts; Epictetus
    (xxxi, 5) would have all practise the established worship. Even
    a writer so frivolous as Apuleius feels himself bound to take
    the tone of a rigid conservative about the Gods (Florida, i,
    1; De Magia, 41, 55, 56, 63). A single man, about the middle of
    this century, seems entirely exempt from supernatural beliefs;
    that is Lucian. The scientific spirit, which is the negation of
    the supernatural, exists only in a few; superstition invades all,
    enfeebling all reason" (Les Évangiles, ed. 1877, pp. 406-407).


That the mental paralysis connects causally with the political
conditions will perhaps not now be denied. A censorship of
the written word belongs congenitally to autocracy; and only the
personal magnanimity of Cæsar and the prudence of Augustus delayed its
development in Rome. Soon it became an irresistible terrorism. Even
Cæsar, indeed, so far forgot one of the great rules of his life as
to impeach before the Senate the tribunes who had quite justifiably
prosecuted some of the people who had hailed him as king; [837]
and the fact that the Senate was already slavish enough to eject
them gives the forecast of the future. Augustus long showed a notable
forbearance to all manner of verbal opposition, and even disparagement;
but at length he also began to prosecute for private aspersions,
[838] and even to suppress histories of a too critical stamp. Tiberius
began his reign with the high-pitched sentiment that "in a free State
tongue and mind should be free"; [839] and for a time he bore himself
with an exemplary restraint; but he too, in turn, took the colour
of his place, and became murderously resentful of any semblance of
aspersion on himself. [840] The famous sentiment ascribed to him in
the Annals of Tacitus, Deorum injuriae diis curae [841]--"the Gods'
wrongs are the Gods' business"--is not noted by Suetonius, and has
an un-Roman sound. What Suetonius tells is [842] that he was "very
negligent concerning the Gods and religions," yet addicted to the
astrologers, and a believer in fate. The fact remains that while,
as aforesaid, there must have been still a number of unbelievers,
there is no sign after Lucretius of any Roman propaganda against
religion; and the presumption is that the Augustan policy of promoting
the old cults was extended to the maintenance of the ordinary Roman
view that disrespect to the Gods was a danger to the State. In the
reign of Nero we find trace of a treatise De religionis erroribus
by Fabricius Vejento, [843] wherein was ridiculed the zeal of the
priests to proclaim mysteries which they did not understand; but,
whether or not its author was exiled and the book burnt on their
protest, such literature was not further produced. [844]

There was, in fact, no spirit left for a Lucretian polemic against
false beliefs. Everything in the nature of a searching criticism
of life was menaced by the autocracy; Nero decreeing that no man
should philosophize at Rome, [845] after slaying or banishing
a series of philosophers; [846] Domitian crucifying the very
scribes who copied the work of Hermogenes of Tarsus, in which he was
obliquely criticized. [847] When men in the mass crouched before such
tyranny, helplessly beholding emperor after emperor overtaken by the
madness that accrues to absolute power, they were disabled for any
disinterested warfare on behalf of truth. All serious impeachment of
religion proceeds upon an ethical motive; and in imperial Rome there
was no room for any nobility of ethic save such as upbore the Stoics
in their austere pursuit of self-control, in a world too full of evil
to be delighted in.

Thus it came about that the Cæsars, who would doubtless have protected
their co-operating priesthoods from any serious attack on the official
religion, [848] had practically no occasion to do so. Lucian's jests
were cast at the Gods of Greece, not at those of the Roman official
cults; hence his immunity. What the Cæsars were concerned to do was
rather to menace any alien religion that seemed to undermine the
solidarity of the State; and of such religions, first the Jewish,
and later the Christian, were obvious examples. Thus we have it
that Tiberius "put down foreign religions" (externas ceremonias),
in particular the Egyptian and Judaic rites; pulling down the temple
of Isis, crucifying her priests, expelling from Rome all Jews and
proselytes, and forcing the Jewish youth to undergo military service
in unhealthy climates. [849] Even the astrologers, in whose lore he
believed, he expelled until they promised to renounce their art--a
precedent partly set up by Augustus, [850] and followed with varying
severity by all the emperors, pagan and Christian alike.

And still the old Italian religion waned, as it must. On the one
hand, the Italic population was almost wholly replaced or diluted by
alien stocks, slave or free, with alien cults and customs; on the
other, the utter insincerity of the official cults, punctiliously
conserved by well-paid, unbelieving priests, invited indifference. In
the nature of things, an unchanging creed is moribund; life means
adaptation to change; and it was only the alien cults that in Rome
adapted themselves to the psychic mutation. Among the educated,
who had read their Lucretius, the spectacle of the innumerable cults
of the empire conduced either to entire but tacit unbelief, or to a
species of vaguely rationalistic [851] yet sentimental monotheism,
in which Reason sometimes figured as universal Deity. [852] Among the
uneducated the progression was constant towards one or other of the
emotional and ritualistic oriental faiths, so much better adapted to
their down-trodden life.




§ 4

One element of betterment there was in the life of declining Rome,
until the Roman ideals were superseded by oriental. Even the Augustan
poets, Horace and Ovid, had protested like the Hebrew prophets, and
like Plato and like Cicero, against the idea that rich sacrifices
availed with the Gods above a pure heart; and such doctrine, while
paganism lasted, prevailed more and more. [853] At the same time,
Horace rejects the Judæo-Stoic doctrine, adopted in the gospels,
that all sins are equal, and lays down the rational moral test of
utility--Utilitas justi propè mater et aequi. [854] The better and
more thoughtful men who grew up under the autocracy, though inevitably
feebler and more credulous in their thinking than those of the later
commonwealth, developed at length a concern for conduct, public and
private, which lends dignity to the later philosophic literature,
and lustre to the imperial rule of the Antonines. This concern it
was that, linking Greek theory to Roman practice, produced a code
of rational law which could serve Europe for a thousand years. This
concern too it was, joined with the relatively high moral quality of
their theism, that ennobled the writing of Seneca [855] and Epictetus
and Maximus of Tyre; and irradiates the words as well as the rule
of Marcus Aurelius. In them was anticipated all that was good [856]
in the later Christian ethic, even as the popular faiths anticipated
the Christian dogmas; and they cherished a temper of serenity that
the Fathers fell far short of. To compare their pages with those
of the subsequent Christian Fathers--Seneca with Lactantius, "the
Christian Cicero"; Maximus with Arnobius; Epictetus with Tertullian;
the admirable Marcus, and his ideal of the "dear city of Zeus,"
with the shrill polemic of Augustine's City of God and the hysteria
of the Confessions--is to prove a rapid descent in magnanimity,
sanity, self-command, sweetness of spirit, and tolerance. What
figures as religious intolerance in the Cæsars was, as we have seen,
always a political, never a religious, animosity. Any prosecution of
Christians under the Antonines was certainly on the score of breach
of law, turbulence, or real or supposed malpractices, not on that of
heresy--a crime created only by the Christians themselves, in their
own conflicts.

The scientific account of the repellent characteristics of the Fathers,
of course, is not that their faith made them what they were, but that
the ever-worsening social and intellectual conditions assorted such
types into their ecclesiastical places, and secured for them their
influence over the types now prevailing among the people. They too
stand for the intellectual dissolution wrought by imperialism. When
all the higher forms of intellectual efficiency were at an end, it
was impossible that on any religious impulse whatever there should
be generated either a higher code of life or a saner body of thought
than those of the higher paganism of the past. Their very arguments
against paganism are largely drawn from old "pagan" sources. Those
who still speak of the rise of Christianity in the ancient world as
a process of "regeneration" are merely turning historical science
out of doors. The Christian Fathers had all the opportunity that
a life of quasi-intellectual specialism could supply; and their
liberty of criticism as regarded the moribund pagan creeds was a
further gymnastic; but nothing could countervail the insanity of
their intellectual presuppositions, which they could not transcend.

Inheriting the Judaic hypnotism of the Sacred Book, they could reason
only as do railers; and the moral readjustment which put them in revolt
against the erotic element in pagan mythology was a mere substitution
of an ascetic neurosis for the old disease of imagination. Strictly
speaking, their asceticism, being never rationalized, never rose
to the level of ethic as distinguished from mere taboo or sacrosanct
custom. As we shall see, they could not wholly escape the insurgence of
the spirit of reason; but they collectively scouted it with a success
attained by no other ostensibly educated priesthood of antiquity. They
intellectually represent, in fact, the consummation of the general
Mediterranean decadence.

For the rest, the "triumph" of the new faith was simply the
survival of the forms of thought, and, above all, of the form of
religious community, best fitted to the political and intellectual
environment. The new Church organization was above all things a
great economic endowment for a class of preachers, polemists, and
propagandists; and between the closing of the old spheres of public
life and the opening of the new, [857] the new faith was established
as much by political and economic conditions as by its intellectual
adaptation to an age of mental twilight.

Of the religion of the educated pagans in its last forms, then,
it is finally to be said that it was markedly rationalistic as
compared with the Christianity which followed, and has been on that
ground stigmatized by Christian orthodoxy down till our own day. The
religion of Marcus Aurelius is self-reverence, self-study, self-rule,
plus faith in Deity; and it is not to be gainsaid that, next to his
adoptive father Antoninus Pius, he remains the noblest monarch in
ancient history; the nearest parallel being the more superstitious but
still noble Julian, the last of the great pagan rulers. In such rulers
the antique philosophy was in a measure justified of its children;
and if it never taught them to grapple with the vast sociological
problem set up by the Empire, and so failed to preserve the antique
civilization, it at least did as much for them in that regard as the
new faith did for its followers.







CHAPTER VII

ANCIENT CHRISTIANITY AND ITS OPPONENTS


§ 1

The Christian gospels, broadly considered, stand for a certain
measure of freethinking reaction against the Jewish religion, and are
accordingly to be reckoned with in the present inquiry; albeit their
practical outcome was only an addition to the world's supernaturalism
and traditional dogma. To estimate aright their share of freethought,
we have but to consider the kind and degree of demand they made on the
reason of the ancient listener, as apart, that is, from the demand made
on their basis for the recognition of a new Deity. When this is done it
will be found that they express in parts a process of reflection which
outwent even critical common sense in a kind of ecstatic Stoicism,
an oriental repudiation of the tyranny of passions and appetites; in
other parts a mysticism that proceeds as far beyond the credulity of
ordinary faith. Socially considered, they embody a similar opposition
between an anarchistic and a partly orthodox or regulative ideal. The
plain inference is that they stand for many independent movements
of thought in the Græco-Roman world. It is actually on record that
the reduction of the whole law to love of one's neighbour [858] was
taught before the Christian era by the famous Rabbi Hillel; [859]
and the gospel itself [860] shows that this view was current. In
another passage [861] the reduction of the ten commandments to five
again indicates a not uncommon disregard for the ecclesiastical side
of the law. But the difference between the two passages points of
itself to various forces of relative freethought.

Any attentive study of the gospels discloses not merely much glossing
and piecing and interpolating of documents, but a plain medley
of doctrines, of ideals, of principles; and to accept the mass of
disconnected utterances ascribed to "the Lord," many of them associated
with miracles, as the oral teaching of any one man, is a proceeding
so uncritical that in no other study could it now be followed. The
simple fact that the Pauline Epistles (by whomsoever written) show
no knowledge of any Jesuine miracles or teachings whatever, except
as regards the Last Supper (1 Cor. xi, 24-25--a passage obviously
interpolated), admits of only three possible interpretations: (1)
the Jesus then believed in had not figured as a teacher at all; or
(2) the writer or writers gave no credit or attached no importance to
reports of his teachings. Either of these views (of which the first is
plainly the more plausible) admits of (3) the further conclusion that
the Pauline Jesus was not the Gospel Jesus, but an earlier one--a fair
enough hypothesis; but on that view the mass of Dominical utterances in
the gospels is only so much the less certificated. When, then, it is
admitted by all open-minded students that the events in the narrative
are in many cases fictitious, even when they are not miraculous,
it is wholly inadmissible that the sayings should be trustworthy,
as one man's teachings.

Analysing them in collation, we find even in the Synoptics, and without
taking into account the Fourth Gospel, such wide discrepancies as
the following:--


    1. The doctrine: "the Kingdom of God is among you" (Lk. xvii,
    21), side by side with promises of the speedy arrival of the Son
    of Man, whose coming = the Kingdom of God (cp. Mt. iii, 2, 3;
    iv, 17; Mk. i, 15).

    2. The frequent profession to supersede the Law (Mt. v, 21, 33,
    38, 43, etc.); and the express declaration that not one jot or
    tittle thereof is to be superseded (Mt. v, 17-20).

    3. Proclamation of a gospel for the poor and the enslaved (Lk. iv,
    18); with the tacit acceptance of slavery (Lk. xvii, 7, 9, 10;
    where the word translated "servant" in the A.V., and let pass
    by McClellan, Blackader, and other reforming English critics,
    certainly means "slave").

    4. Stipulation for the simple fulfilment of the Law as a passport
    to eternal life, with or without further self-denial (Mt. xix,
    16-21; Lk. x, 28; xviii, 22); on the other hand a stipulation
    for simple benevolence, as in the Egyptian ritual (Mt. xxv;
    cp. Lk. ix, 48); and yet again stipulations for blind faith
    (Mt. x, 15) and for blood redemption (Mt. xxvi, 28).

    5. Alternate promise (Mt. vi, 33; xix, 29) and denial (Mt. x,
    34-39) of temporal blessings.

    6. Alternate commands to secrecy (Mt. xii, 16; viii, 4; ix, 30;
    Mk. iii, 12; v, 43; vii, 36) and to publicity (Mt. vii, 7-8;
    Mk. v, 19) concerning miracles, with a frequent record of their
    public performance.

    7. Specific restriction of salvation to Israelites (Mt. x, 5, 6;
    xv, 24; xix, 28); equally specific declaration that the Kingdom of
    God shall be to another nation (Mt. xxii, 43); no less specific
    assurance that the Son of Man (not the Twelve as in Mt. xix,
    28) shall judge all nations, not merely Israel (Mt. xxv, 32;
    cp. viii, 11).

    8. Profession to teach all, especially the simple and the childlike
    (Mt. xviii, 3; xi, 25, 28-30; Mk. x, 15); on the contrary, a flat
    declaration (Mt. xiii, 10-16; Mk. iv, 11; Lk. viii, 10; cp. Mk. iv,
    34) that the saving teaching is only for the special disciples;
    yet again (Mt. xv, 16; Mk. vi, 52; viii, 17, 18) imputations of
    lack of understanding to them.

    9. Companionship of the Teacher with "publicans and sinners"
    (Mt. ix, 10); and, on the other hand, a reference to the publicans
    as falling far short of the needed measure of loving-kindness
    (Mt. v, 46).

    10. Explicit contrarieties of phrase, not in context (Mt. xii,
    30; Lk. xi, 50).

    11. Flat contradictions of narrative as to the Teacher's local
    success (Mt. xiii, 54-58; Lk. iv, 23).

    12. Insistence that the Messiah is of the Davidic line (Mt. i;
    xxi, 15; Lk. i, 27; ii, 4), and that he is not (Mt. xxii, 43-45;
    Mk. xii, 35-37; Lk. xx).

    13. Contradictory precepts as to limitation and non-limitation
    of forgiveness (Mt. xviii, 17, 22).


Such variously serious discrepancies count for more than even the
chronological and other divergences of the records concerning the
Birth, the Supper, the Crucifixion, and the Resurrection, as proofs
of diversity of source; and they may be multiplied indefinitely. The
only course for criticism is to admit that they stand for the ideas of
a variety of sects or movements, or else for an unlimited manipulation
of the documents by individual hands. Many of them may very well have
come from various so-called "Lords" and "Messiahs"; but they cannot
be from a single teacher.

There remains open the fascinating problem as to whether some if
not all of the more notable teachings may not be the utterances of
one teacher of commanding originality, whose sectaries were either
unable to appreciate or unable to keep separate his doctrine. [862]
Undoubtedly some of the better teachings came first from men of
superior capacity and relatively deep ethical experience. The veto
on revenge, and the inculcation of love to enemies, could not come
from commonplace minds; and the saying preserved from the Gospel
According to the Hebrews, "Unless ye cease from sacrificing the
wrath shall not cease from you," has a remarkable ring. [863] But
when we compare the precept of forgiveness with similar teachings in
the Hebrew books and the Talmud, [864] we realize that the capacity
for such thought had been shown by a number of Jewish teachers,
and that it was a specific result of the long sequence of wrong
and oppression undergone by the Jewish people at the hands of their
conquerors. The unbearable, consuming pain of an impotent hate, and
the spectacle of it in others--this experience among thoughtful men,
and not an unconditioned genius for ethic in one, is the source of a
teaching which, categorically put as it is in the gospels, misses its
meaning with most who profess to admire it; the proof being the entire
failure of most Christians in all ages to act on it. To say nothing of
similar teaching in Old Testament books and in the Talmud, we have it
in the most emphatic form in the pre-Christian "Slavonic Enoch." [865]

A superior ethic, then, stands not for one man's supernormal insight,
but for the acquired wisdom of a number of wise men. And it is now
utterly impossible to name the individual framers of the gospel
teachings, good or bad. The central biography dissolves at every
point before critical tests; it is a mythical construction. [866]
Of the ideas in the Sermon on the Mount, many are ancient; of the
parabolic and other teachings, some of the most striking occur only
in the third gospel, and are unquestionably late. And when we are
asked to recognize a unique personality behind any one doctrine, such
as the condemnation of sacrifice in the uncanonical Hebrew Gospel,
we can but answer (1) that on the face of the case this doctrine
appears to come from a separate circle; (2) that the renunciation
of sacrifice was made by many Greek and Roman writers, [867] and by
earlier teachers among the Hebrews; [868] and (3) that in the Talmud,
and in such a pre-Christian document as the "Slavonic Enoch," there
are teachings which, had they occurred in the gospels, would have been
confidently cited as unparalleled in ancient literature. The Talmudic
teachings, so vitally necessary in Jewry, that "it is better to be
persecuted than persecutor," and that, "were the persecutor a just
man and the persecuted an impious, God would still be on the side of
the persecuted," [869] are not equalled for practical purposes by any
in the Christian sacred books; and the Enochic beatitude, "Blessed
is he who looks to raise his own hand for labour," [870] is no less
remarkable. But it is impossible to associate these teachings with
any outstanding personality, or any specific movements; and to posit
a movement-making personality in the sole case of certain scattered
sayings in the gospels is critically inadmissible.

There is positively no ground for supposing that any selected set
of teachings constituted the basis or the original propaganda of
any single Christian sect, primary or secondary; and the whole known
history of the cult tells against the hypothesis that it ever centred
round those teachings which to-day specially appeal to the ethical
rationalist. Such teachings are more likely to be adventitious than
fundamental, in a cult of sacrificial salvation. When an essentially
rationalistic note is struck in the gospels, as in the insistence
[871] that a notable public catastrophe is not to be regarded in the
old Jewish manner as a punishment for sin, it is cancelled in the
next sentence by an interpolation which unintelligently reaffirms
the very doctrine denied. [872] So with the teaching [873] that the
coming worship is to be neither Judaic nor Samaritan: the next sentence
reaffirms Jewish particularism in the crudest way. The main movement,
then, was clearly superstitious.

It remains to note the so-far rationalistic character of such
teachings as the protests against ceremonialism and sabbatarianism,
the favouring of the poor and the outcast, the extension of the
future life to non-Israelites, and the express limitation of prayer
(Mt. vi, 9; Lk. xi, 2) to a simple expression of religious feeling--a
prescription which has been absolutely ignored through the whole
history of the Church, despite the constant use of the one prayer
prescribed--itself a compilation of current Jewish phrases.


    The expression in the Dominical prayer translated "Give us this
    day [or day by day] our daily bread" (Mt. vi, 11; Lk. xi, 3) is
    pointless and tautological as it stands in the English and other
    Protestant versions. In verse 8 is the assurance that the Father
    knows beforehand what is needed; the prayer is, therefore, to be a
    simple process of communion or advocation, free of all verbiage;
    then, to make it specially ask for the necessary subsistence,
    without which life would cease, and further to make the demand
    each day, when in the majority of cases there would be no need
    to offer such a request, is to stultify the whole. If the most
    obvious necessity is to be urged, why not all the less obvious? The
    Vulgate translation, "Give us to-day our super-substantial bread,"
    though it has the air of providing for the Mass, is presumptively
    the original sense; and is virtually supported by McClellan
    (N. T. 1875, ii, 645-47), who notes that the repeated use of the
    article, ton arton hêmôn ton epiousion, implies a special meaning,
    and remarks that of all the suggested translations "daily" is "the
    very one which is mostly manifestly and utterly condemned." Compare
    the bearing of the verses Mt. vi, 25-26, 31-34, which expressly
    exclude the idea of prayer for bread, and Lk. xi, 13. The idea of
    a super-substantial bread seems already established in Philo, De
    Legum Allegor. iii, 55-57, 59-61. Naturally the average theologian
    (e.g., Bishop Lightfoot, cited by McClellan) clings to the
    conception of a daily appeal to the God for physical sustenance;
    but in so doing he is utterly obscuring the original doctrine.

    Properly interpreted, the prayer forms a curious parallel to
    the close of the tenth satire of Juvenal, above cited, where all
    praying for concrete boons is condemned, on the ground that the
    Gods know best, and that man is dearer to them than to himself;
    but where there is permitted (of course, illogically) an appeal
    for soundness of mind and spiritual serenity. The documents would
    be nearly contemporary, and, though independent, would represent
    kindred processes of ethical and rational improvement on current
    religious practice. On the other hand, the prayer, "lead us not
    into temptation, but deliver us from evil"--which again rings alien
    to the context--would have been scouted by Juvenal as representing
    a bad survival of the religion of fear. Several early citations
    and early MSS., it should be noted, give a briefer version of the
    prayer, beginning, "Father, hallowed be thy name," and dropping the
    "Thy will be done" clause, as well as the "deliver us from evil,"
    though including the "lead us not into temptation."


It may or may not have been that this rationalization of religion
was originally preached by the same sect or school as gave the
exalted counsel to resist not evil and to love enemies--a line of
thought found alike in India and in China, and, in the moderate
form of a veto on retaliation, in Greece and Rome. [874] But it is
inconceivable that the same sect originally laid down the doctrines
of the blood sacrifice and the final damnation of those who did
not accept the Messiah (Mt. x). The latter dogmas, with the myths,
naturally became the practical creed of the later Church, for which
the counsel of non-solicitous prayer and the love of enemies were
unimaginable ideals. [875] Equally incapable of realization by a
State Church was the anti-Pharisaical and "Bohemian" attitude ascribed
to the founder, and the spirit of independence towards the reigning
powers. For the rest, the occult doctrine that a little faith might
suffice to move mountains--a development from the mysticisms of the
Hebrew prophets--could count for nothing save as an incitement to
prayer in general. The freethinking elements in the gospels, in short,
were precisely those which historic Christianity inevitably cast aside.




§ 2

Already in the Epistles the incompatibility of the original critical
spirit with sectarian policy has become clear. Paul--if the first
epistle to the Thessalonians be his--exhorts his converts to "prove
all things, hold fast what is good"; [876] and by way of making out
the Christist case against unpliable Jews he argues copiously in his
own way; but as soon as there is a question of "another Jesus" [877]
being set up, he is the sectarian fanatic pure and simple, and he no
more thinks of applying the counsel of criticism to his dogma [878]
than of acting on his prescription of love in controversy. "Reasonings"
(logismous) are specially stigmatized: they must be "cast down." [879]
The attitude towards slavery now becomes a positive fiat in its
support; [880] and all political freethinking is superseded by a
counsel of conformity. [881] The slight touch of rationalism in the
Judaic epistle of James, where the principle of works is opposed
to that of faith, is itself quashed by an anti-rational conception
of works. [882] From a sect so taught, freethinking would tend
to disappear. It certainly obtruded itself early, for we have the
Pauline complaint [883] that "some among you say there is no rising
from the dead"; but men of that way of thinking had no clear ground
for belonging to the community, and would soon be preached out of it,
leaving only so much of the spirit of criticism as produced heresies
within the sphere of supernaturalism.




§ 3

When the new creed, spreading through the Empire, comes actively in
contact with paganism, the rationalistic principle of anti-idolatry,
still preserved by the Jewish impulse, comes into prominence; and
insofar as they criticized pagan myths and pagan image-worship,
the early Christians may be said to have rationalized. [884]
Polytheists applied the term "atheistical" alike to them [885]
and the Jews. [886] As soon as the cult was joined by lettered men,
the primitive rationalism of Evêmeros was turned by them to account;
and a series of Fathers, including Clement of Alexandria, Arnobius,
Lactantius, and Augustine, pressed the case against the pagan creeds
with an unflagging malice which, if exhibited by later rationalists
towards their own creed, Christians would characterize in strong
terms. But the practice of criticism towards other creeds was,
with the religious as with the philosophical sects, no help to
self-criticism. The attitude of the Christian mass towards pagan
idols and the worship of the Emperor was rather one of frenzy [887]
than of intellectual superiority; [888] and the Fathers never seem
to have found a rationalistic discipline in their polemic against
pagan beliefs. Where the unbelieving Lucian brightly banters, they
taunt and asperse, in the temper of barbarians deriding the Gods
of the enemy. None of them seems to realize the bearing against his
own creed of the pagan argument that to die and to suffer is to give
proof of non-deity. [889] In the end, the very image-worship which
had been the main ground of their rational attack on paganism became
the universal usage of their own Church; and its worship of saints
and angels, of Father, Son, and Virgin Mother, made it more truly
a polytheism than the creed of the later pagans had been. [890]
It is therefore rather to the heresies within the Church than to
its attacks on the old polytheism that we are to look for early
Christian survivals of ancient rationalism; and for the most part,
after the practically rationalistic refusal of the early Ebionites
to accept the doctrine of the Virgin Birth, [891] these heresies were
but combinations of other theosophies with the Christian.

Already in the spurious Epistles to Timothy we have allusion to the
"antitheses of the gnosis" [892] or pretended occult knowledge; and
to early Gnostic influences may be attributed those passages in the
gospel, above cited, which affirm that the Messiah's teaching is not
for the multitude but for the adepts. [893] All along, Gnosticism
[894] stood for the influence of older systems on the new faith;
an influence which among Gentiles, untrained to the cult of sacred
books, must have seemed absolutely natural. In the third century
Ammonios Saccas, of Alexandria, said to have been born of Christian
parents, set up a school which sought to blend the Christian and the
pagan systems of religion and philosophy into a pantheistic whole,
in which the old Gods figured as subordinate dæmons or as allegorical
figures, and Christ as a reformer. [895] The special leaning of the
school to Plato, whose system, already in vogue among the scholars
of Alexandria, had more affinity than any of its rivals [896] to
Christianity, secured for it adherents of many religious shades,
[897] and enabled it to develop an influence which permanently
affected Christian theology; this being the channel through which the
doctrine of the Trinity entered. According to Mosheim, almost no other
philosophy was taught at Alexandria down to the sixth century. [898]
Only when the regulative zeal of the Church had begun to draw the
lines of creed definitely [899] on anti-philosophic lines did the
syncretic school, as represented by Plotinus, Porphyry, and Hierocles,
[900] declare itself against Christianity.

Among the Church sects, as distinguished from the philosophic, the
syncretic tendency was hardly less the vogue. Some of the leading
Fathers of the second century, in particular Clement of Alexandria
and Origen, show the Platonic influence strongly, [901] and are
given, the latter in particular, to a remarkably free treatment of
the sacred books, seeing allegory wherever credence had been made
difficult by previous science, [902] or inconvenient by accepted
dogma. But in the multiplicity of Gnostic sects is to be seen the
main proof of the effort of Christians, before the complete collapse
of the ancient civilization, to think with some freedom on their
religious problems. [903] In the terms of the case--apart from the
Judaizing of the Elcesaites and Clemens Romanus--the thought is an
adaptation of pagan speculation, chiefly oriental and Egyptian; and
the commonest characteristics are: (1) in theology, an explanation of
the moral confusion of the world by assuming two opposed Powers, [904]
or by setting a variety of good and bad subordinate powers between the
world and the Supreme Being; and (2) in ethics, an insistence either
on the inherent corruptness of matter or on the incompatibility of
holiness with physical pleasure. [905] The sects influenced chiefly
from Asia teach, as a rule, a doctrine of two great opposing Powers;
those influenced from Egypt seek rather the solution of gradation
of power under one chief God. All alike showed some hostility to the
pretensions of the Jews. Thus:--


    1. Saturninus of Antioch (second century) taught of a Good and
    an Evil Power, and that the world and man were made by the seven
    planetary spirits, without the knowledge or consent of either
    Power; both of whom, however, sought to take control, the Good God
    giving men rational souls, and subjecting them to seven Creators,
    one of whom was the God of the Jews. Christ was a spirit sent to
    bring men back to the Good God; but only their asceticism could
    avail to consummate the scheme. (Irenæus, Against Heresies, i,
    24; Epiphanius, Hæreses, xxiii.)

    2. Similarly, Marcion (son of a bishop of Pontus) placed between
    the good and bad Powers the Creator of the lower world, who was the
    God and Lawgiver of the Jews, a mixed nature, but just: the other
    nations being subjects of the Evil Power. Jesus, a divine spirit
    sent by the Supreme God to save men, was opposed by both the God of
    the Jews and the Evil Power; and asceticism is the way to carry out
    his saving purpose. Of the same cast were the sects of Bardesanes
    and Tatian. (Irenæus, Against Heresies, i, 27, 28; Epiphanius,
    Hæreses, c. 56; Eusebius, Eccles. Hist. iv, 30. Mosheim, E. H. 2
    Cent. pt. ii, ch. v, §§ 7-9. As to Marcion, see Harnack, Outlines,
    ch. v; Mackay, Rise and Progress of Christianity, pt. iii, §§ 7,
    12, 13; Irenæus, iv, 29, 30; Tertullian, Against Marcion.)

    3. The Manichean creed (attributed to the Persian Mani or
    Manichæus, third century) proceeded on the same dualistic
    lines. In this the human race had been created by the Power
    of Evil or Darkness, who is the God of the Jews, and hence the
    body and its appetites are primordially evil, the good element
    being the rational soul, which is part of the Power of Light. By
    way of combining Christism and Mithraism, Christ is virtually
    identified with Mithra, and Manichæus claims to be the promised
    Paraclete. Ultimately the Evil Power is to be overcome, and
    kept in eternal darkness, with the few lost human souls. Here
    again the ethic is extremely ascetic, and there is a doctrine of
    purgatory. (Milman, Hist. of Christianity, bk. iii, ch. i; Mosheim,
    E. H. 3 Cent. pt. ii, ch. v, §§ 2-11; Beausobre, Hist. Critique de
    Manichée et du Manichéisme, 1734; Lardner, Cred. of the Gospels,
    pt. ii, ch. lxiii.)

    4. Among the Egyptian Gnostics, again, Basilides taught that
    the one Supreme God produced seven perfect secondary Powers,
    called Æons (Ages), two of whom, Dynamis and Sophia (Power and
    Wisdom), procreated superior angels, who built a heaven, and in
    turn produced lower grades of angels, which produced others, till
    there were 365 grades, all ruled by a Prince named Abraxas (whose
    name yields the number 365). The lowest grades of angels, being
    close to eternal matter (which was evil by nature), made thereof
    the world and men. The Supreme God then intervened, like the Good
    Power in the oriental system, to give men rational souls, but left
    them to be ruled by the lower angels, of whom the Prince became God
    of the Jews. All deteriorated, the God of the Jews becoming the
    worst. Then the Supreme God sent the Prince of the Æons, Christ,
    to save men's souls. Taking the form of the man Jesus, he was
    slain by the God of the Jews. Despite charges to the contrary,
    this system too was ascetic, though lenient to paganism. Similar
    tenets were held by the sects of Carpocrates and Valentinus, all
    rising in the second century; Valentinus setting up Thirty Æons,
    male and female, in pairs, with four unmarried males, guardians
    of the Pleroma or Heaven--namely, Horus, Christ, the Holy Spirit,
    and Jesus. The youngest Æon, Sophia, brought forth a daughter,
    Achamoth (Scientia), who made the world out of rude matter,
    and produced Demiourgos, the Artificer, who further manipulated
    matter. (Irenæus, bk. i, chs. 24, 25; bk. ii.)

    These sects in turn split into others, with endless peculiarities.


Such was the relative freethought of credulous theosophic fantasy,
[906] turning fictitious data to fresh purpose by way of solving
the riddle of the painful earth. The problem was to account for evil
consistently with a Good God; and the orientals, inheriting a dualistic
religion, adapted that; while the Egyptians, inheriting a syncretic
monotheism, set up grades of Powers between the All-Ruler and men,
on the model of the grades between the Autocrat, ancient or modern,
and his subjects. The Manichæans, the most thoroughly organized of
all the outside sects, appear to have absorbed many of the adherents
of the great Mithraic religion, and held together for centuries,
despite fierce persecution and hostile propaganda, their influence
subsisting till the Middle Ages. [907] The other Gnosticisms fared
much worse. Lacking sacred books, often setting up a severe ethic
as against the frequently loose practice of the churches, [908] and
offering a creed unsuited to the general populace, all alike passed
away before the competition of the organized Church, which founded
on the Canon [909] and the concrete dogmas, with many pagan rites
and beliefs [910] and a few great pagan abracadabras added.




§ 4

More persistently dangerous to the ancient Church were the successive
efforts of the struggling spirit of reason within to rectify in some
small measure its most arbitrary dogmas. Of these efforts the most
prominent were the quasi-Unitarian doctrine of Arius (fourth century),
and the opposition by Pelagius and his pupil Cælestius (early in fifth
century) to the doctrine of hereditary sin and predestinate salvation
or damnation--a Judaic conception dating in the Church from Tertullian,
and unknown to the Greeks. [911]

The former was the central and one of the most intelligible conflicts
in the vast medley of early discussion over the nature of the Person
of the Founder--a theme susceptible of any conceivable formula, when
once the principle of deification was adopted. Between the Gnosticism
of Athenagoras, which made the Logos the direct manifestation of
Deity, and the Judaic view that Jesus was "a mere man," for stating
which the Byzantine currier Theodotos was excommunicated at Rome
by Bishop Victor [912] in the third century, there were a hundred
possible fantasies of discrimination; [913] and the record of them
is a standing revelation of the intellectual delirium in the ancient
Church. Theodotos the currier is said to have made disciples [914]
who induced one Natalius to become "a bishop of this heresy"; and
his doctrine was repeatedly revived, notably by Artemon. According
to a trinitarian opponent, they were much given to science, in
particular to geometry and medicine. [915] But such an approach to
rationalism could not prosper in the atmosphere in which Christianity
arose. Arianism itself, when put on its defence, pronounced Jesus to
be God, after beginning by declaring him to be merely the noblest of
created beings, and thus became merely a modified mysticism, fighting
for the conception homoiousios (of similar nature) as against that of
homoousios (of the same nature). [916] Even at that, the sect split up,
its chief dissenters ranking as semi-Arians, and many of the latter
at length drifting back to Nicene orthodoxy. [917] At first strong in
the east, where it persecuted when it could, it was finally suppressed,
after endless strifes, by Theodosius at the end of the fourth century;
only to reappear in the west as the creed of the invading Goths and
Lombards. In the east it had stood for ancient monotheism; in the
west it prospered by early missionary and military chance till the
Papal organization triumphed. [918] Its suppression meant the final
repudiation of rationalism; though it had for the most part subsisted
as a fanaticism, no less than did the Nicene creed.

More philosophical, and therefore less widespread, was the doctrine
associated in the second century with the name of Praxeas, in
the third with those of Sabellius and Paul of Samosata, and in the
fourth with that of Photinus. Of this the essence was the conception
of the triune deity as being not three persons but three modes or
aspects of one person--a theorem welcomed in the later world by such
different types of believer as Servetus, Hegel, and Coleridge. Far
too reasonable for the average believer, and far too unpropitious to
ritual and sacraments for the average priest, it was always condemned
by the majority, though it had many adherents in the east, until the
establishment of the Church made Christian persecution a far more
effective process than pagan persecution had ever been.

Pelagianism, which unlike Arianism was not an ecclesiastical but a
purely theological division, [919] fared better, the problem at issue
involving the permanent crux of religious ethics. Augustine, whose
supreme talent was for the getting up of a play of dialectic against
every troublesome movement in turn, without regard to his previous
positions, [920] undertook to confute Pelagius and Cælestius as he
did every other innovator; and his influence was such that, after
they had been acquitted of heresy by a church council in Palestine
and by the Roman pontiff, the latter was induced to change his ground
and condemn them, whereupon many councils followed suit, eighteen
Pelagian bishops being deposed in Italy. At that period Christendom,
faced by the portent of the barbarian conquest of the Empire, was
well adjusted to a fatalistic theology, and too uncritical in its
mood to realize the bearing of such doctrine either on conduct or on
sacerdotal pretensions. But though the movement in its first form was
thus crushed, and though in later forms it fell considerably short of
the measure of ethical rationalism seen in the first, it soon took
fresh shape in the form of so-called semi-Pelagianism, and so held
its ground while any culture subsisted; [921] while Pelagianism on the
theme of the needlessness of "prevenient grace," and the power of man
to secure salvation of his own will, has been chronic in the Church.


    For a concise view of the Pelagian tenets see Murdock's note
    on Mosheim, following Walch and Schlegel (Reid's edition,
    pp. 208-209). They included (1) denial that Adam's sin was
    inherited; (2) assertion that death is strictly natural, and not
    a mere punishment for Adam's sin; (3) denial that children and
    virtuous adults dying unbaptized are damned, a middle state being
    provided for them; (4) assertion that good acts come of a good
    will, and that the will is free; grace being an enlightenment of
    the understanding, and not indispensable to all men. The relative
    rationalism of these views is presumptively to be traced to
    the facts that Pelagius was a Briton and Cælestius an Irishman,
    and that both were Greek scholars. (When tried in Palestine they
    spoke Greek, like the council, but the accuser could speak only
    Latin.) They were thus bred in an atmosphere not yet laden with
    Latin dogma. In "confuting" them Augustine developed the doctrine
    (intelligible as that of an elderly polemist in a decadent society)
    that all men are predestined to salvation or damnation by God's
    "mere good pleasure"--a demoralizing formula which he at times
    hedged with illogical qualifications. (Cp. Murdock's note on
    Mosheim, as cited, p. 210; Gieseler, § 87.) But an orthodox
    champion of Augustine describes him as putting the doctrine without
    limitations (Rev. W. R. Clarke, St. Augustine, in "The Fathers
    for English Readers" series, p. 132). It was never adopted in the
    east (Gieseler, p. 387), but became part of Christian theology,
    especially under Protestantism. On the other hand, the Council of
    Trent erected several Pelagian doctrines into articles of faith;
    and the Protestant churches have in part since followed. See Sir
    W. Hamilton's Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, 1852,
    pp. 493-94, note; and Milman, Hist. of Latin Christianity, i,
    142, 149.


The Latin Church thus finally maintained in religion the tradition
of sworn adherence to sectarian formulas which has been already noted
in the Roman philosophic sects, and in so doing reduced to a minimum
the exercise of the reason, alike in ethics and in philosophy. Its
dogmatic code was shaped under the influence of (1) Irenæus and
Tertullian, who set scripture above reason and, when pressed by
heretics, tradition above even scripture, [922] and (2) Augustine,
who had the same tendencies, and whose incessant energy secured him
a large influence. That influence was used not only to dogmatize
every possible item of the faith, but to enforce in religion another
Roman tradition, formerly confined to politics--that of systematic
coercion of heretics. Before and around Augustine there had indeed been
abundant mutual persecution of the bitterest kind between the parties
of the Church as well as against pagans; the Donatists, in particular,
with their organization of armed fanatics, the Circumcelliones, had
inflicted and suffered at intervals all the worst horrors of civil
war in Africa during a hundred years; Arians and Athanasians came
again and again to mutual bloodshed; and the slaying of the pagan
girl-philosopher, Hypatia, [923] by the Christian monks of Alexandria
is one of the vilest episodes in the whole history of religion. On
the whole, it is past question that the amount of homicide wrought by
all the pagan persecution of the earlier Christians was not a tithe of
that wrought by their successors in their own quarrels. But the spirit
which had so operated, and which had been repudiated even by the bitter
Tertullian, was raised by Augustine to the status of a Christian dogma,
[924] which, of course, had sufficient support in the sacred books,
Judaic and Jesuist, and which henceforth inspired such an amount of
murderous persecution in Christendom as the ancient world had never
seen. When, the temple revenues having been already confiscated, the
pagan worships were finally overthrown and the temples appropriated
by the edict of Honorius in the year 408, Augustine, "though not
entirely consistent, disapproved of the forcible demolition of
the temples." [925] But he had nothing to say against the forcible
suppression of their worship, and of the festivals. Ambrose went
as far; [926] and such men as Firmicus Maternus would have had the
emperors go much further. [927]

Economic interest had now visibly become at least as potent in the
shaping of the Christian course as it had ever been in building up a
pagan cult. For the humble conditions in which the earlier priests
and preachers had gained a livelihood by ministering to scattered
groups of poor proselytes, there had been substituted those of a State
Church, adopted as such because its acquired range of organization
had made it a force fit for the autocrat's purposes when others had
failed. The sequent situation was more and more unfavourable to both
sincerity of thought and freedom of speech. Not only did thousands
of wealth-seekers promptly enter the priesthood to profit by the
new endowments allotted by Constantine to the great metropolitan
churches. Almost as promptly the ideal of toleration was renounced;
and the Christians began against the pagans a species of persecution
that proceeded on no higher motive than greed of gain. Not only were
the revenues of the temples confiscated as we have seen, but a number
of Christians took to the business of plundering pagans in the name
of the laws of Constantius forbidding sacrifice, and confiscating the
property of the temples. Libanius, in his Oration for the Temples [928]
(390), addressed to Theodosius, circumstantially avers that the bands
of monks and others who went about demolishing and plundering temples
were also wont to rob the peasants, adding:--


    They also seize the lands of some, saying "it is sacred"; and
    many are deprived of their paternal inheritance upon a false
    pretence. Thus those men thrive upon other people's ruin who say
    "they worship God with fasting." And if they who are wronged
    come to the pastor in the city ... he commends (the robbers)
    and rejects the others.... Moreover, if they hear of any land
    which has anything that can be plundered, they cry presently,
    "Such an one sacrificeth, and does abominable things, and
    a troop ought to be sent against him." And presently the
    self-styled reformers (sôphronistai) are there.... Some of these
    ... deny their proceedings.... Others glory and boast and tell
    their exploits.... But they say, "We have only punished those
    who sacrifice and thereby transgress the law which forbids
    sacrifice." O emperor, when they say this, they lie.... Can
    it be thought that they who are not able to bear the sight of a
    collector's cloak should despise the power of your government?... I
    appeal to the guardians of the law [to confirm the denial]. [929]


The whole testimony is explicit and weighty, [930] and, being
corroborated by Ammianus Marcellinus, is accepted by clerical
historians. [931] Ammianus declares that some of the courtiers of
the Christian emperors before Julian were "glutted with the spoils
of the temples." [932]

The official creed, with its principle of rigid uniformity and
compulsion, is now recognizable as the only expedient by which
the Church could be held together for its economic ends. Under the
Eastern Empire, accordingly, when once a balance of creed was attained
in the Church, the same coercive ideal was enforced, with whatever
differences in the creed insisted on. Whichever phase of dogma was in
power, persecution of opponents went on as a matter of course. [933]
Athanasians and Arians, Nestorians and Monophysites, used the same
weapons to the utmost of their scope; Cyril of Alexandria led his
fanatics to the pillage and expulsion of the Jews, as his underling
Peter led them to the murder of Hypatia; other bishops wrought the
destruction of temples throughout Egypt; [934] Theodosius, Marcian,
St. Leo, Zeno, Justinian, all used coercion against every heresy
without a scruple, affirming every verbal fantasy of dogma at the
point of the sword. It was due to no survival of the love of reason
that some of the more stubborn heresies, driven into communion with
the new civilization of the Arabs, were the means of carrying some
of the seeds of ancient thought down the ages, to fructify ultimately
in the mental soil of modern Europe.




§ 5

Against the orthodox creed, apart from social and official hostility,
there had early arisen critics who reasoned in terms of Jewish and
pagan beliefs, and in terms of such rationalism as survived. Of the two
former sorts some remains have been preserved, despite the tendency of
the Church to destroy their works. Of the latter, apart from Lucian,
we have traces in the Fathers and in the Neo-Platonists.

Thus Tertullian and Lactantius tell of the many who believe in a
non-active and passionless God, [935] and disdain those who turn
Christian out of fear of a hereafter; and again [936] of Stoics
who deride the belief in demons. A third-century author quoted by
Eusebius [937] speaks of apistoi who deny the divine authorship
of the holy scriptures, in such a fashion as to imply that this was
done by some who were not merely pagan non-Christians but deniers of
inspiration. Jamblichos, too, [938] speaks of opponents of the worship
of the Gods in his day (early in the fourth century). [939] In the
fifth century, again, Augustine complains bitterly of those impious
and reckless persons who dare to say that the evangelists differ among
themselves. [940] He argues no less bitterly against the increduli and
infideles who would not believe in immortality and the possibility of
eternal torment; [941] and he meets them in a fashion which constantly
recurs in Christian apologetics, pointing to natural anomalies, real
or alleged, and concluding that since we cannot understand all we see
we should believe all we hear--from the Church. Those who derided the
story of Jonah and the whale he meets by accusing them of believing
the story of Arion and the dolphin. [942] In the same way he meets
[943] their protest against the iniquity of eternal punishment by a
juggle over the ostensible anomaly of long punishments by human law
for short misdeeds. Whatever may have been his indirect value of his
habit of dialectic, he again and again declares for prone faith and
against the resort to reason; and to this effect may be cited a long
series of Fathers and ecclesiastics, all eager to show that only in
a blind faith could there be any moral merit. [944]

Such arguments were doubtless potent to stupefy what remained of
critical faculty in the Roman world. In the same period Salvian makes
a polemic against those who in Christian Gaul denied that God exercised
any government on earth. [945] They seem, however, to have been normal
Christians, driven to this view by the barbarian invasions. Fronto,
the tutor of Marcus Aurelius, again, seems to have attacked the
Christians partly as rationalist, partly as conservative. [946]

In general, the orthodox polemic is interesting only insofar as
it preserves that of the opposition. The Dialogue with Trypho by
Justin Martyr (about 150) is a mere documental discussion between a
Christian and a Jew, each founding on the Hebrew Scriptures, and the
Christian doing nearly all of the argument. There is not a scintilla
of independent rationalism in the whole tedious work. [947] Justin
was a type of the would-be "philosopher" who confessedly would take
no trouble to study science or philosophize, but who found his sphere
in an endless manipulation of the texts of sacred books. But the work
of the learned Origen Against Celsus preserves for us a large part of
the True Discourse of Celsus, a critical and extremely well-informed
argument against Christianity by a pagan of the Platonic [948] school
in the time of Marcus Aurelius, [949] on grounds to a considerable
extent rationalistic. [950] The line of rejoinder followed by Origen,
one of the most cultured of the Christian Fathers, is for the most
part otherwise. When Celsus argues that it makes no difference by what
name the Deity is called, Origen answers [951] that on the contrary
certain God-names have a miraculous or magical virtue for the casting
out of evil spirits; that this mystery is known and practised by
the Egyptians and Persians; and that the mere name of Jesus has been
proved potent to cast out many such demons. When, on the other hand,
Celsus makes a Jew argue against the Christist creed on the basis
of the Jewish story that the founder's birth was illegitimate, [952]
the Father's answer begins in sheer amiable ineptitude, [953] which
soon passes into shocked outcry. [954] In other passages he is more
successful, as when he convicts Celsus's Jew of arguing alternately
that the disciples were deceived, and that they were deceivers. [955]
This part of the discussion is interesting chiefly as showing how
educated Jews combated the gospels in detail, at a level of criticism
not always above that of the believers. Sometimes the Jew's case is
shrewdly put, as when he asks, [956] "Did Jesus come into the world
for this purpose, that we should not believe him?"--a challenge not to
be met by Origen's theology. One of the acutest of Celsus's thrusts
is the remark that Jesus himself declared that miracles would be
wrought after him by followers of Satan, and that the argument from
miracles is thus worthless. [957] To this the rejoinder of Origen
is suicidal; but at times the assailant, himself a believer in all
manner of miracles, gives away his advantage completely enough.

Of a deeper interest are the sections in which Celsus (himself a
believer in a Supreme Deity and a future state, and in a multitude of
lower Powers, open to invocation) rests his case on grounds of general
reason, arguing that the true Son of God must needs have brought home
his mission to all mankind; [958] and sweeps aside as foolish the
whole dispute between Jews and Christians, [959] of which he had given
a sample. Most interesting of all are the chapters [960] in which
the Christian cites the pagan's argument against the <DW25>-centric
theory of things. Celsus insists on the large impartiality of Nature,
and repudiates the fantasy that the whole scheme is adjusted to the
well-being and the salvation of man. Here the Christian, standing for
his faith, may be said to carry on, though in the spirit of a new
fanaticism, the anti-scientific humanism first set up by Sokrates;
while the pagan, though touched by religious apriorism, and prone to
lapse from logic to mysticism in his turn, approaches the scientific
standpoint of the elder thinkers who had set religion aside. [961]
Not for thirteen hundred years was his standpoint to be regained among
men. His protest against the Christian cultivation of blind faith,
[962] which Origen tries to meet on rationalistic lines, would in
a later age be regarded as conveying no imputation. Even the simple
defensive subtleties of Origen are too rationalistic for the succeeding
generations of the orthodox. The least embittered of the Fathers,
he is in his way the most reasonable; and in his unhesitating resort
to the principle of allegory, wherever his documents are too hard
for belief, we see the last traces of the spirit of reason as it
had been in Plato, not yet paralysed by faith. Henceforth, till a
new intellectual life is set up from without, Christian thought is
more and more a mere disputation over the unintelligible, in terms
of documents open always to opposing constructions.

Against such minds the strictest reason would be powerless; and it
was fitting enough that Lucian, the last of the great freethinkers of
the Hellenistic world, should merely turn on popular Christianity
some of his serene satire [963]--more, perhaps, than has come
down to us; though, on the other hand, his authorship of the De
Morte Peregrini, which speaks of the "crucified sophist," has been
called in question. [964] The forcible-feeble dialogue Philopatris,
falsely attributed to Lucian, and clearly belonging to the reign of
Julian, is the last expression of general skepticism in the ancient
literature. The writer, a bad imitator of Lucian, avows disbelief
alike in the old Gods and in the new, and professes to respect,
if any, the "Unknown God" of the Athenians; but he makes no great
impression of intellectual sincerity. Apart from this, and the lost
anti-Christian work [965] of Hierocles, Governor of Bithynia under
Diocletian, the last direct literary opponents of ancient Christianity
were Porphyry and Julian. As both were believers in many Gods, and
opposed Christianity because it opposed these, neither can well
rank on that score as a freethinker, even in the sense in which
the speculative Gnostics were so. The bias of both, like that of
Plutarch, seems to have been to the utmost latitude of religious
belief; and, apart from personal provocations and the ordinary temper
of religious conservatism, it was the exiguity of the Christian creed
that repelled them. Porphyry's treatise, indeed, was answered by four
Fathers, [966] all of whose replies have disappeared, doubtless in
fulfilment of the imperial edict for the destruction of Porphyry's
book--a dramatic testimony to the state of mental freedom under
Theodosius II. [967] What is known of his argument is preserved in the
incidental replies of Jerome, Augustine, Eusebius, and others. [968]
The answer of Cyril to Julian has survived, probably in virtue of
Julian's status. His argumentations against the unworthy elements, the
exclusiveness, and the absurdities of the Jewish and Christian faith
are often reasonable enough, as doubtless were those of Porphyry;
[969] but his own theosophic positions are hardly less vulnerable;
and Porphyry's were probably no better, to judge from his preserved
works. Yet it is to be said that the habitual tone and temper of the
two men compares favourably with that of the polemists on the other
side. They had inherited something of the elder philosophic spirit,
which is so far to seek in patristic literature, outside of Origen.

The latest expressions of rationalism among churchmen were to the
full as angrily met by the champions of orthodoxy as the attacks of
enemies; and, indeed, there was naturally something of bitterness
in the resistance of the last few critical spirits in the Church to
the fast-multiplying insanities of faith. Thus, at the end of the
fourth century, the Italian monk Jovinian fought against the creed
of celibacy and asceticism, and was duly denounced, vituperated,
ecclesiastically condemned, and banished, penal laws being at the
same time passed against those who adhered to him. [970] Contemporary
with him was the Eastern Aerius, who advocated priestly equality as
against episcopacy, and objected to prayers for the dead, to fasts,
and to the too significant practice of slaying a lamb at the Easter
festival. [971] In this case matters went the length of schism. With
less of practical effect, in the next century, Vigilantius of Aquitaine
made a more general resistance to a more manifold superstition,
condemning and ridiculing the veneration of tombs and bones of martyrs,
pilgrimages to shrines, the miracle stories therewith connected, and
the practices of fasting, celibacy, and the monastic life. He too
was promptly put down, largely by the efforts of his former friend
Jerome, the most voluble and the most scurrilous pietist of his age,
who had also denounced the doctrine of Jovinian. [972] For centuries
no such appeal was heard in the western Church.

The spirit of reason, however, is well marked at the beginning of
the fifth century in a pagan writer who belongs more truly to the
history of freethought than either Julian or Porphyry. Macrobius, a
Roman patrician of the days of Honorius, works out in his Saturnalia,
with an amount of knowledge and intelligence which for the time is
remarkable, the principle that all the Gods are but personifications
of aspects or functions of the Sun. But such doctrine must have been
confined, among pagans, to the cultured few; and the monotheism of
the same writer's treatise On the Dream of Scipio was probably not
general even among the remaining pagans of the upper class. [973]

After Julian, open rationalism being already extinct, anti-Christian
thought was simply tabooed; and though the leading historians for
centuries were pagans, they only incidentally venture to betray the
fact. It is told, indeed, that in the days of Valens and Valentinian
an eminent physician named Posidonius, son of a great physician and
brother of another, was wont to say, "that men do not grow fanatic by
the agency of evil spirits, but merely by the superfluity of certain
evil humours; and that there is no power in evil spirits to assail the
human race"; [974] but though that opinion may be presumed to have
been held by some other physicians, the special ascription of it to
Posidonius is a proof that it was rarely avowed. With public lecturing
forbidden, with the philosophic schools at Athens closed and plundered
by imperial force, [975] with heresy ostracized, with pagan worship,
including the strong rival cult of Mithraism, outwardly suppressed by
the same power, [976] unbelief was naturally little heard of after the
fifth century. About its beginning we find Chrysostom boasting [977]
that the works of the anti-Christian writers had persuaded nobody,
and had almost disappeared. As regarded open teaching, it was only too
true, though the statement clashes with Chrysostom's own complaint that
Porphyry had led many away from the faith. [978] Proclus was still to
come (410-485), with his eighteen Arguments against the Christians,
proceeding on the principle, still cherished from the old science,
that the world was eternal. But such teaching could not reach even
the majority of the more educated; and the Jewish dogma of creation
ex nihilo became sacrosanct truth for the darkening world. In the
east Eusebius, [979] and in the west Lactantius, [980] expressed for
the whole Church a boundless contempt of everything in the nature of
scientific research or discussion; and it was in fact at an end for
the Christian world for well-nigh a thousand years. For Lactantius,
the doctrine of a round earth and an antipodes was mere nonsense;
he discusses the thesis with the horse-laughter of a self-satisfied
savage. [981] Under the feet of arrogant and blatant ignorance we
see trampled the first form of the doctrine of gravitation, not to be
recovered for an æon. Proclus himself cherished some of the grossest
pagan superstitions; and the few Christians who had in them something
of the spirit of reason, as Cosmas "Indicopleustes," "the Indian
navigator," who belongs to the sixth century, were turned away from
what light they had by their sacred books. Cosmas was a Nestorian,
denying the divinity of Mary, and a rational critic as regards the
orthodox fashion of applying Old Testament prophecies to Jesus. [982]
But whereas pagan science had inferred that the earth is a sphere,
his Bible taught him that it is an oblong plain; and the great aim
of his Topographia Christiana, sive Christianorum opinio de mundo,
was to prove this against those who still cultivated science.

Such pleadings were not necessary for the general Christian public,
who knew nothing save what their priests taught them. In Chrysostom's
day this was already the case. There remained but a few rational
heresies. One of the most notable was that of Theodore of Mopsuestia,
the head of the school of Antioch and the teacher of Nestorius, who
taught that many of the Old Testament prophecies commonly applied
to Jesus had reference to pre-Christian events, and discriminated
critically among the sacred books. That of Job he pronounced to be
merely a poem derived from a pagan source, and the Song of Songs he
held to be a mere epithalamium of no religious significance. In his
opinion Solomon had the logos gnôseôs the love of knowledge, but not
the logos sophias the love of wisdom. [983] No less remarkable was
the heresy of Photinus, who taught that the Trinity was a matter not of
persons, but of modes of deity. [984] Such thinking must be pronounced
the high-water mark of rational criticism in the ancient Church; and
its occurrence in an age of rapid decay is memorable enough. But in
the nature of things it could meet with only the scantiest support;
and the only critical heresy which bulked at all largely was that of
the Unitarian Anomoeans or Eunomians, [985] who condemned the worship
of relics, [986] and made light of scriptural inspiration when texts,
especially from the Old Testament, were quoted against them. [987]
Naturally Chrysostom himself denounced them as unbelievers. Save
for these manifestations, the spirit of sane criticism had gone from
the Christian world, with science, with art, with philosophy, with
culture. But the verdict of time is given in the persistent recoil
of the modern spirit from the literature of the age of faith to that
of the elder age of nascent reason; and the historical outcome of the
state of things in which Chrysostom rejoiced was the re-establishment
of universal idolatry and practical polytheism in the name of the
creed he had preached. Every species of superstition known to paganism
subsisted, slightly transformed. While the emperors savagely punished
the pagan soothsayers, the Christians held by the same fundamental
delusion; and against the devices of pagan magic, in the reality
of which they unquestioningly believed, they professed triumphantly
to practise their own sorceries of holy water, relics, prayer, and
exorcism, no man daring to impugn the insanities of faith. [988]
On the face of religious life, critical reason was extinct.




§ 6

It might safely have been inferred, but it is a matter of proved fact,
that while the higher intellectual life was thus being paralysed,
the primary intellectual virtues were attained. As formerly in Jewry,
so now in Christendom, the practice of pious fraud became normal: all
early Christian literature, and most of the ecclesiastical history of
many succeeding centuries, is profoundly compromised by the habitual
resort to fiction, forgery, and interpolation. The mystical poetry
of the pagans, the Jewish history of Josephus, the gospels, the
Epistles, all were interpolated in the same spirit as had inspired
the production of new Gospels, new Epistles, new books of Acts, new
Sibylline verses. And even where to this tendency there was opposed
the growing demand of the organized Church for a faithful text, when
the documents had become comparatively ancient, the disposition to
invent and suppress, to reason crookedly, to delude and mislead, was
normal among churchmen. This is the verdict of orthodox ecclesiastical
history, a dozen times repeated. [989] It of course carries no surprise
for those who have noted the religious doctrine of Plato, of Polybius,
of Cicero, of Varro, of Strabo, of Dio Cassius.

While intelligence thus retrograded under the reign of faith, it
is impossible to maintain, in the name of historical science, the
conventional claim that the faith wrought a countervailing good. What
moral betterment there was in the decaying Roman world was a matter
of the transformed social conditions, and belongs at least as much
to paganism as to Christianity: even the asceticism of the latter,
which in reality had no reformative virtue for society at large,
was a pre-Christian as well as an anti-Christian phenomenon. It
is indeed probable that in the times of persecution the Christian
community would be limited to the more serious and devoted types
[990]--that is to say, to those who would tend to live worthily under
any creed. But that the normal Christian community was superior in
point of morals is a poetic hallucination, set up by the legends
concerning the martyrs and by the vauntings of the Fathers, which
are demonstrably untrustworthy. The assertion, still at times made
by professed Positivists, that the discredit of the marriage tie in
Roman life necessitated a new religion, and that the new religion
was regenerative, is only a quasi-scientific variation of the legend.


    The evidence as to the failure of the faith to reform its adherents
    is continuous from the first generation onwards. "Paul" complains
    bitterly of the sexual licence among his first Corinthian converts
    (1 Cor. v, 1, 2), and seeks to check it by vehement commands, some
    mystical (id. v. 5), some prescribing ostracism (vv. 9-13)--a
    plain confession of failure, and a complete reversal of the
    prescription in the gospel (Mt. xviii, 22). If that could be
    set aside, the command as to divorce could be likewise. Justin
    Martyr (Dial. with Trypho, ch. 141) describes the orthodox Jews
    of his day as of all men the most given to polygamy and arbitrary
    divorce. (Cp. Deut. xxiv, 1; Edersheim, History, p. 294.) Then
    the Christian assumption as to Roman degeneration and Eastern
    virtue cannot be sustained.

    At the beginning of the third century we have the decisive
    evidence of Tertullian that many of the charges of immorality
    made by serious pagans against Christians were in large part
    true. First he affirms (Ad Nationes, l. i, c. 5) that the pagan
    charges are not true of all, "not even of the greatest part
    of us." In regard to the charge of incest (c. 16), instead of
    denying it as the earlier apologist Minucius Felix had done in
    the age of persecution, he merely argues that the same offence
    occurs through ignorance among the pagans. The chapter concludes
    by virtually admitting the charge with regard to misconduct in
    "the mysteries." Still later, when he has turned Montanist,
    Tertullian explicitly charges his former associates with sexual
    licence (De Jejuniis, cc. 1, 17: De Virginibus Velandis, c. 14),
    pointing now to the heathen as showing more regard for monogamy
    than do the Christians (De Exhort. Castitatis, c. 13).

    From the fourth century onward the history of the Church reveals
    at every step a conformity on the part of its members to average
    pagan practice. The third canon of the Nicene Council forbids
    clerics of all ranks from keeping as companions or housekeepers
    women who are not their close blood relations. In the fifth
    century Salvian denounces the Christians alike of Gaul and Africa
    as being boundlessly licentious in comparison with the Arian
    barbarians (De Gubernatione Dei, lib. 5, 6, 7). They do not even,
    he declares, deny the charge, contenting themselves with claiming
    superior orthodoxy. (Cp. Bury, Hist. of the Later Roman Empire,
    i, 198-99, and Finlay, ii, 219, for another point of view.) On
    all hands heresy was reckoned the one deadly sin (Gieseler, § 74,
    p. 295, and refs.), and all real misdeeds came to seem venial by
    comparison. As to sexual vice and crime among the Christianized
    Germans, see Gieseler, § 125, vol. ii, 158-60.

    In the East the conditions were the same. The story of the
    indecent performances of Theodora on the stage (Gibbon, ch. xl),
    probably untrue of her, implies that such practices openly
    occurred. Milman (Hist. of Chr. bk. iv, ch. ii. ed. cited, ii,
    327) recognizes general indecency, and notes that Zosimus charged
    it on Christian rule. Salvian speaks of unlimited obscenity in the
    theatres of Christian Gaul (De Gub. Dei, l. 6). Cp. Gibbon as to
    the character of the devout Justinian's minister Trebonian; who,
    however, was called an atheist. (Suidas, s.v.) On the collapse
    of the iconoclastic movement, licence became general (Finlay,
    Hist. of Greece, ed. Tozer, ii, 162). But even in the fourth
    century Chrysostom's writings testify to the normality of all the
    vices, as well as the superstitions, that Christianity is supposed
    to have banished; the churches figuring, like the ancient temples,
    as places of assignation. (Cp. the extracts of Lavollée, Les
    Moeurs Byzantines, in Essais de littérature et d'histoire, 1891,
    pp. 48-62, 89; the S.P.C.K.'s St. Chrysostom's Picture of his Age,
    1875, pp. 6, 94, 96, 98, 100, 102-104, 108, 194; Chrysostom's
    Homilies, Eng. tr. 1839, Hom. xii on 1st Cor. pp. 159-64;
    Jerome, Adv. Vigilantium, cited by Gieseler, ii, 66, note 19,
    and in Gilly's Vigilantius and his Times, 1844, pp. 406-407.) The
    clergy were among the most licentious of all, and Chrysostom had
    repeatedly to preach against them (Lavollée, ch. iv; Mosheim, as
    last cited; Gibbon, ch. xlvii, Bohn ed. iv, 232). The position of
    women was practically what it had been in post-Alexandrian Greece
    and Asia-Minor (Lavollée, ch. v; cp. St. Chrysostom's Picture of
    his Age, pp. 180-82); and the practice corresponded. In short,
    the supposition that the population of Constantinople as we see
    it under Justinian, or that of Alexandria in the same age, could
    have been morally austere, is fantastic.


It would indeed be unintelligible that intellectual decline without
change of social system should put morals on a sound footing. The
very asceticism which seeks to mortify the body is an avowal of the
vice from which it recoils, and insofar as this has prevailed under
Christianity it has specifically hindered general temperance, [991]
inasmuch as the types capable of self-rule thus leave no offspring.

On the other hand, with the single exception of the case of the
gladiatorial combats (which had been denounced in the first century
by the pagan Seneca, [992] and in the fourth by the pagan Libanius,
but lasted in Rome long after Christianity had become the State
religion; [993] while the no less cruel combats of men with wild
beasts were suppressed only when the finances of the falling Empire
could no longer maintain them), [994] the vice of cruelty seems to
have been in no serious degree cast out. [995] Cruelty to slaves was
certainly not less than in the Rome of the Antonines; and Chrysostom
[996] denounces just such atrocities by cruel mistresses as had been
described by Horace and Juvenal. The story of the slaying of Hypatia,
indeed, is decisive as to Christian ferocity. [997]

In fine, the entire history of Christian Egypt, Asia, and Africa,
progressively decadent till their easy conquest by the Saracens,
and the entire history of the Christian Byzantine empire, at best
stagnant in mental and material life during the thousand years of its
existence, serve conclusively to establish the principle that in the
absence of freethought no civilization can progress. More completely
than any of the ancient civilizations to which they succeeded, they
cast out or were denuded of the spirit of free reason. The result was
strictly congruous. The process, of course, was one of socio-political
causation throughout; and the rule of dogma was a symptom or effect of
the process, not the extraneous cause. But that is only the clinching
of the sociological lesson.

Of a deep significance, in view of the total historical movement,
is the philosophical teaching of the last member of the ancient Roman
world who exhibited philosophical capacity--the long famous Boethius,
minister of the conqueror Theodoric, who put him to death in the
year 525. Ostensibly from the same hand we have the De Consolatione
Philosophiae, which is substantially non-Christian, and a number
of treatises expounding orthodox Christian dogma. In the former
"we find him in strenuous opposition ... to the Christian theory of
creation; and his Dualism is at least as apparent as Plato's. We find
him coquetting with the anti-Christian doctrine of the immortality
of the world, and assuming a position with regard to sin which is
ultra-Pelagian and utterly untenable by a Christian theologian. We
find him, with death before his eyes, deriving consolation not from
any hopes of a resurrection ... but from the present contempt of all
earthly pain and ill which his divine mistress, 'the perfect solace
of wearied souls,' has taught him." [998] Seeing that Theodoric,
though a professed admirer of the ancient life, had absolutely put
down, on pain of death, [999] every remaining religious practice of
paganism, it is certain that Boethius must have officially professed
Christianity; but his book seems to make it certain that he was
not a believer. The only theory on which the expounder of such an
essentially pagan philosophy can be conceived as really the author
of the Christian tractates ascribed to Boethius is that, under the
stroke of undeserved ruin and unjust doom, the thinker turned away
from the creed of his official life and sought healing in the wisdom
of the older world. [1000] Whether we accept this solution or, in
despite of the specific testimony, reject the theological tractates as
falsely ascribed--either by their writer or by others--to Boethius,
[1001] the significant fact remains that it was not the Christian
tracts but the pagan Consolation that passed down to the western
nations of the Middle Ages as the last great intellectual legacy from
the ancient world. It had its virtue for an age of mental bondage,
because it preserved some pulse of the spirit of free thought.







CHAPTER VIII

FREETHOUGHT UNDER ISLAM [1002]


§ 1

The freethinking of Mohammed may be justly said to begin and end with
his rejection of popular polytheism and his acceptance of the idea of
a single God. That idea he ostensibly held as a kind of revelation,
not as a result of any traceable process of reasoning; and he affirmed
it from first to last as a fanatic. One of the noblest of fanatics
he may be, but hardly more. Denouncing all idolatry, he anchored
his creed to the Ka'aba, the sacred black stone of the remote past,
which is to this day its most revered object.

That the monotheistic idea, in its most vivid form, reached him in
middle age by way of a vision is part of the creed of his followers;
and that it derived in some way from Jews, or Persians, or Christians,
as the early unbelievers declared, [1003] is probable enough. But
there is evidence that among his fellow-Arabs the idea had taken some
slight root before his time, even in a rationalistic form, and it is
clear that there were before his day many believers, though also many
unbelievers, in a future state. [1004] There is no good ground for the
oft-repeated formula about the special monotheistic and other religious
proclivities of "the Semite"; [1005] Semites being subject to religious
influences like other peoples, in terms of culture and environment. The
Moslems themselves preserved a tradition that one Zaid, who died
five years before the Prophet received his first inspiration, had
of his own accord renounced idolatry without becoming either Jew or
Christian; but on being told by a Jew to become a Hanyf, [1006] that
is to say, of the religion of Abraham, who worshipped nothing but God,
he at once agreed. [1007] In the oldest extant biography of Mohammed
an address of Zaid's has been preserved, of which six passages are
reproduced in the Koran; [1008] and there are other proofs [1009]
that the way had been partly made for Mohammedanism before Mohammed,
especially at Medina, to which he withdrew (the Hej'ra) with his
early followers when his fellow-tribesmen would not accept his
message. He uses the term Hanyf repeatedly as standing for his own
doctrine. [1010] In some of the Arab poetry of the generation before
Mohammed, again, there is "a deep conviction of the unity of God,
and of his elevation over all other beings," as well as a clearly
developed sense of moral responsibility. [1011] The doctrine of a
Supreme God was indeed general; [1012] and Mohammed's insistence on
the rejection of the lesser deities or "companions of God" was but
a preaching of unitarianism to half-professed monotheists who yet
practised polytheism and idolatry. The Arabs at his time, in short,
were on the same religious plane as the Christians, but with a good
deal of unbelief; "Zendekism" or rationalistic deism (or atheism)
being charged in particular on Mohammed's tribe, the Koreish;
[1013] and the Prophet used traditional ideas to bring them to
his unitary creed. In one case he even temporarily accepted their
polytheism. [1014] The several tribes were further to some extent
monolatrous, [1015] somewhat as were the Semitic tribes of Palestine;
and before Mohammed's time a special worshipper of the star Sirius
sought to persuade the Koreish to give up their idols and adore
that star alone. Thus between their partially developed monotheism,
their partial familiarity with Hanyf monotheism, and their common
intercourse with the nominally monotheistic Jews and Christians, many
Arabs were in a measure prepared for the Prophet's doctrine; which,
for the rest, embodied many of their own traditions and superstitions
as well as many orally received from Christians and Jews.


    "The Koran itself," says Palmer, "is, indeed, less the invention
    or conception of Mohammed than a collection of legends and moral
    axioms borrowed from desert lore and couched in the language
    and rhythm of desert eloquence, but adorned with the additional
    charm of enthusiasm. Had it been merely Mohammed's own invented
    discourses, bearing only the impress of his personal style, the
    Koran could never have appealed with so much success to every
    Arab-speaking race as a miracle of eloquence." [1016]

    Kuenen challenges Sprenger's conclusions and sums up: "We need
    not deny that Mohammed had predecessors; but we must deny that
    tradition gives us a faithful representation of them, or is correct
    in calling them hanyfs. [1017] On the other hand, he concedes that
    "Mohammed made Islam out of elements which were supplied to him
    very largely from outside, and which had a whole history behind
    them already, so that he could take them up as they were without
    further elaboration." [1018]

    "During the first century of Islam the forging of Traditions
    became a recognized political and religious weapon, of which
    all parties availed themselves. Even men of the strictest piety
    practised this species of fraud, and maintained that the end
    justified the means." [1019]


The final triumph of the religion, however, was due neither to the
elements of its Sacred Book nor to the moral or magnetic power of
the Prophet. This power it was that won his first adherents, who were
mostly his friends and relatives, or slaves to whom his religion was a
species of enfranchisement. [1020] From that point forward his success
was military--thanks, that is, to the valour of his followers--his
fellow citizens never having been won in mass to his teaching. [1021]
Such success as his might conceivably be gained by a mere military
chief. Nor could the spread of Islam after his death have taken place
save in virtue of the special opportunities for conquest lying before
its adherents--opportunities already seen by Mohammed, either with the
eye of statesmanship or with that of his great general, Omar. [1022]
It is an error to assume, as is still commonly done, that it was the
unifying and inspiring power of the religion that wrought the Saracen
conquests. Warlike northern barbarians had overrun the Western Empire
without any such stimulus; the prospect of booty and racial kinship
sufficed them for the conquest of a decadent community; and the same
conditions existed for the equally warlike Saracens, [1023] who also,
before Mohammed, had learned something of the military art from the
Græco-Romans. [1024] Their religious ardour would have availed them
little against the pagan legions of the unbelieving Cæsar; and as
a matter of fact they could never conquer, though they curtailed,
the comparatively weak Byzantine Empire; its moderate economic
resources and traditional organization sufficing to sustain it, despite
intellectual decadence, till the age of Saracen greatness was over. Nor
did their faith ever unify them save ostensibly for purposes of common
warfare against the racial foe--a kind of union attained in all ages
and with all varieties of religion. Fierce domestic strifes broke out
as soon as the Prophet was dead. It would be as true to say that the
common racial and military interest against the Græco-Roman and Persian
States unified the Moslem parties, as that Islam unified the Arab
tribes and factions. Apart from the inner circle of converts, indeed,
the first conquerors were in mass not at all deeply devout, and many of
them maintained to the end of their generation, and after his death,
the unbelief which from the first met the Prophet at Mecca. [1025]
Against the creed of Mohammed "the conservative and material instincts
of the people of the desert rose in revolt; and although they became
Moslems en masse, the majority of them neither believed in Islam nor
knew what it meant. Often their motives were frankly utilitarian:
they expected that Islam would bring them luck.... If things went ill,
they blamed Islam and turned their backs on it." [1026] It is told of
a Moslem chief of the early days that he said: "If there were a God,
I would swear by his name that I did not believe in him." [1027]
A general fanaticism grew up later. But had there been no Islam,
enterprising Arabs would probably have overrun Syria and Persia and
Africa and Spain all the same. [1028] Attila went further, and he is
not known to have been a monotheist or a believer in Paradise. Nor
were Jenghiz Khan and Tamerlane indebted to religious faith for
their conquests.

On the other hand, when a Khalifate was anywhere established
by military force, the faith would indeed serve as a nucleus of
administration, and further as a means of resisting the insidious
propaganda of the rival faith, which might have been a source of
political danger. It was their Sacred Book and Prophet that saved
the Arabs from accepting the religion of the states they conquered
as did the Goths and Franks. The faith thus so far preserved their
military polity when that was once set up; but it was not the faith
that made the polity possible, or gave the power of conquest, as is
conventionally held. At most, it partly facilitated their conquests
by detaching a certain amount of purely superstitious support from
the other side. And it never availed to unify the race, or the Islamic
peoples. On the fall of Othman "the ensuing civil wars rent the unity
of Islam from top to bottom, and the wound has never healed." [1029]
The feud between Northern and Southern Arabs "rapidly developed and
extended into a permanent racial enmity." [1030] And when, after
the Ommayade dynasty had totally failed to unify Semite and Aryan in
Persia, the task was partially accomplished by the Abassides, it was
not through any greater stress of piety, but by way of accepting the
inevitable, after generations of division and revolt. [1031]




§ 2

It may perhaps be more truly claimed for the Koran that it was the
basis of Arab scholarship; since it was in order to elucidate its
text that the first Arab grammars and dictionaries and literary
collections were made. [1032] Here again, however, the reflection
arises that some such development would have occurred in any case, on
the basis of the abundant pre-Islamic poetry, given but the material
conquests. The first conquerors were illiterate, and had to resort
to the services and the organization of the conquered [1033] for
all purposes of administrative writings, using for a time even the
Greek and Persian languages. There was nothing in the Koran itself
to encourage literature; and the first conquerors either despised or
feared that of the conquered. [1034]

When the facts are inductively considered, it appears that the Koran
was from the first rather a force of intellectual fixation than one
of stimulus. As we have seen, there was a measure of rationalism as
well as of monotheism among the Arabs before Mohammed; and the Prophet
set his face violently against all unbelief. The word "unbeliever"
or "infidel" in the Koran normally signifies merely "rejector of
Mohammed"; but a number of passages [1035] show that there were
specific unbelievers in the doctrine of a future state as well as in
miracles; and his opponents put to him challenges which showed that
they rationally disbelieved his claim to inspiration. [1036] Hence,
clearly, the scarcity of miracles in his early legend, on the Arab
side. On a people thus partly "refined, skeptical, incredulous,"
[1037] much of whose poetry showed no trace of religion, [1038]
the triumph of Islam gradually imposed a tyrannous dogma, entailing
abundance of primitive superstition under the ægis of monotheistic
doctrine. Some moral service it did compass, and for this the credit
seems to be substantially due to Mohammed; though here again he
was not an innovator. Like previous reformers, [1039] he vehemently
denounced the horrible practice of burying alive girl children; and
when the Koran became law his command took effect. His limitation of
polygamy too may have counted for something, despite the unlimited
practice of his latter years. For the rest, he prescribes, in the
traditional eastern fashion, liberal almsgiving; this, with normal
integrity and patience, and belief in "God and the Last Day, and the
Angels, and the Scriptures, and the Prophets," [1040] is the gist
of his ethical and religious code, with much stress on hell-fire
and the joys of Paradise, and at the same time on predestination,
and with no reasoning on any issue.




§ 3

The history of Saracen culture is the history of the attainment
of saner ideas and a higher plane of thought. Within a century of
the Hej'ra [1041] there had arisen some rational skepticism in the
Moslem schools, as apart from the chronic schisms and strifes of the
faithful. A school of theology had been founded by Hasan-al-Basri at
Bassorah; and one of his disciples, Wasil ibn Attâ, following some
previous heretics--Mabad al Jhoni, Ghailan of Damascus, and Jonas al
Aswari [1042]--rejected the predestination doctrine of the Koran as
inconsistent with the future judgment; arguing for freewill and at the
same time for the humane provision of a purgatory. From this beginning
dates the Motazileh or class of Motazilites (or Mu`tazilites), [1043]
the philosophic reformers and moderate freethinkers of Islam. Other
sects of a semi-political character had arisen even during the last
illness of the Prophet, and others soon after his death. [1044] One
party sought to impose on the faithful the "Sunna" or "traditions,"
which really represented the old Arabian ideas of law, but were
pretended to be unwritten sayings of Mohammed. [1045] To this the
party of Ali (the Prophet's cousin) objected; whence began the long
dispute between the Shiah or Shîites (the anti-traditionists), and
the Sunnites; the conquered and oppressed Persians tending to stand
with the former, and generally, in virtue of their own thought,
to supply the heterodox element under the later Khalifates. [1046]
Thus Shîites were apt to be Motazilites. [1047] On Ali's side, again,
there broke away a great body of Kharejites or Separatists, who claimed
that the Imaum or head of the Faith should be chosen by election,
while the Shîites stood for succession by divine right. [1048] All
this had occurred before any schools of theology existed.

The Motazilites, once started, divided gradually into a score of
sects, [1049] all more or less given to rationalizing within the
limits of monotheism. [1050] The first stock were named Kadarites,
because insisting on man's power (kadar) over his acts. [1051]
Against them were promptly ranged the Jabarites, who affirmed that
man's will was wholly under divine constraint (jabar). [1052] Yet
another sect, the Sifatites, opposed both of the others, some of them
[1053] standing for a literal interpretation of the Koran, which is
in part predestinationist, and in parts assumes freewill; while the
main body of orthodox, following the text, professed to respect as
insoluble mystery the contradictions they found in it. [1054] The
history of Islam in this matter is strikingly analogous to that of
Christianity from the rise of the Pelagian heresy.

It is to be noted that, while the heretics in time came under Greek
and other foreign influences, their criticism of the Koran was
at the outset their own. [1055] The Shîites, becoming broadly the
party of the Persians, admitted in time Persian, Jewish, Gnostic,
Manichæan, and other dualistic doctrines, and generally tended
to interpret the Koran allegorically. [1056] A particular school
of allegorists, the Bathenians, even tended to purify the idea of
deity in an agnostic direction. [1057] All of these would appear
to have ranked genetically as Motazilites; and the manifold play
of heretical thought gradually forced a certain habit of reasoning
on the orthodox, [1058] who as usual found their advantage in the
dissidences of the dissenters. On the other hand, the Motazilites
found new resources in the study and translation of Greek works,
scientific and philosophical. [1059] They were thus the prime factors,
on the Arab side, in the culture-evolution which went on under the
earlier of the Abasside Khalifs (750-1258). Greek literature reached
them mainly through the Syrian Christians, in whose hands it had been
put by the Nestorians, driven out of their scientific school at Edessa
and exiled by Leo the Isaurian (716-741); [1060] possibly also in part
through the philosophers who, on being exiled from Athens by Justinian,
settled for a time in Persia. [1061] The total result was that already
in the ninth century, within two hundred years of the beginning of
Mohammed's preaching, the Saracens in Persia had reached not only a
remarkable height of material civilization, their wealth exceeding
that of Byzantium, but a considerable though quasi-secret measure of
scientific knowledge and rational thought, [1062] including even some
measure of pure atheism. All forms of rationalism alike were called
zendekism by the orthodox, the name having the epithetic force of
the Christian terms "infidelity" and "atheism". [1063]

Secrecy was long imposed on the Motazilites by the orthodoxy
of the Khalifs, [1064] who as a rule atoned for many crimes and
abundant breaches of the law of the Koran by a devout profession
of faith. Freethinking, however, had its periods of political
prosperity. Even under the Ommayade dynasty, the Khalif Al Walid Ibn
Yazid (the eleventh of the race) was reputed to be of no religion,
but seems to have been rather a ruffian than a rationalist. [1065]
Under the Abassides culture made much more progress. The Khalif
Al Mansour, though he played a very orthodox part, [1066] favoured
the Motazilites (754-775), being generally a patron of the sciences;
and under him were made the first translations from the Greek. [1067]
Despite his orthodoxy he encouraged science; and it was as insurgents
and not as unbelievers that he destroyed the sect of Rewandites (a
branch of the anti-Moslem Ismailites), who are said to have believed
in metempsychosis. [1068] Partly on political but partly also on
religious grounds his successor Al Mahdi made war on the Ismailites,
whom he regarded as atheists, and who appear to have been connected
with the Motazilite "Brethren of Purity," [1069] destroying their
books and causing others to be written against them. [1070] They were
anti-Koranites; hardly atheists; but a kind of informal rationalism
approaching to atheism, and involving unbelief in the Koran and the
Prophet, seems to have spread considerably, despite the slaughter
of many unbelievers by Al Mahdi. Its source seems to have been
Persian aversion to the alien creed. [1071] The great philosophic
influence, again, was that of Aristotle; and though his abstract
God-idea was nominally adhered to, the scientific movement promoted
above all things the conception of a reign of law. [1072] Al Hadi,
the successor of Al Mahdi, persecuted much and killed many heretics;
and Haroun Al Raschid (Aaron the Orthodox) menaced with death those
who held the moderately rational tenet that "the Koran was created,"
[1073] as against the orthodox dogma (on all fours with the Brahmanic
doctrine concerning the Veda) that it was eternal in the heavens and
uncreated. One of the rationalists, Al Mozdar, accused the orthodox
party of infidelity, as asserting two eternal things; and there was
current among the Motazilites of his day the saying that, "had God
left men to their natural liberty, the Arabians could have composed
something not only equal but superior to the Koran in eloquence,
method, and purity of language." [1074]

Haroun's crimes, however, consisted little in acts of persecution. The
Persian Barmekides (the family of his first Vizier, surnamed Barmek)
were regarded as protectors of Motazilites; [1075] and one of the
sons, Jaafer, was even suspected of atheism, all three indeed being
charged with it. [1076] Their destruction, on other grounds, does not
seem to have altered the conditions for the thinkers; but Haroun's
incompetent son Emin was a devotee and persecutor. His abler brother
and conqueror Al Mamoun (813-833), on the other hand, directly favoured
the Motazilites, partly on political grounds, to strengthen himself
with the Persian party, but also on the ground of conviction. [1077]
He even imprisoned some of the orthodox theologians who maintained that
the Koran was not a created thing, though, like certain persecutors of
other faiths, he had expressly declared himself in favour of persuasion
as against coercion. [1078] In one case, following usage, he inflicted
a cruel torture. "His fatal error," says a recent scholar, "was that
he invoked the authority of the State in matters of the intellectual
and religious life." [1079] Compared with others, certainly, he did
not carry his coercion far, though, on being once publicly addressed
as "Ameer of the Unbelievers," he caused the fanatic who said it to
be put to death. [1080] In private he was wont to conduct meetings
for discussion, attended by believers and unbelievers of every shade,
at which the only restriction was that the appeal must be to reason,
and never to the Koran. [1081] Concerning his personal bias, it
is related that he had received from Kabul a book in old Persian,
The Eternal Reason, which taught that reason is the only basis for
religion, and that revelation cannot serve as a standing ground. [1082]
The story is interesting, but enigmatic, the origin of the book being
untraceable. Whatever were his views, his coercive policy against the
orthodox extremists had the usual effect of stimulating reaction on
that side, and preparing the ultimate triumph of orthodoxy. [1083]
The fact remains, however, that Mamoun was of all the Khalifs the
greatest promoter of science [1084] and culture; the chief encourager
of the study and translation of Greek literature; [1085] and, despite
his coercion of the theologians on the dogma of the eternity of the
Koran, tolerant enough to put a Christian at the head of a college
at Damascus, declaring that he chose him not for his religion but for
his science. In the same spirit he permitted the free circulation of
the apologetic treatise of the Armenian Christian Al Kindy, in which
Islam and the Koran are freely criticized. As a ruler, too, he ranks
among the best of his race for clemency, justice, and decency of life,
although orthodox imputations were cast on his subordinates. His
successors Motasim and Wathek were of the same cast of opinion, the
latter being, however, fanatical on behalf of his rationalistic view
of the Koran as a created thing. [1086]

A violent orthodox reaction set in under the worthless and Turk-ruled
Khalif Motawakkel [1087] (847-861), by whose time the Khalifate
was in a state of political decadence, partly from the economic
exhaustion following on its tyrannous and extortionate rule; partly
from the divisive tendencies of its heterogeneous sections; partly
from the corrupting tendency of all despotic power. [1088] Despite
the official restoration of orthodoxy, the private cultivation
of science and philosophy proceeded for a time; the study and
translation of Greek books continued; [1089] and rationalism of a
kind seems to have subsisted more or less secretly to the end. In
the tenth century it is said to have reached even the unlearned; and
though the Motazilites gradually drifted into a scholastic orthodoxy,
downright unbelief came up alongside, [1090] albeit secretly. Faith
in Mohammed's mission and law began again to shake; and the learned
disregarded its prescriptions. Mystics professed to find the way
to God without the Koran. Many decided that religion was useful for
regulating the people, but was not for the wise. On the other side,
however, the orthodox condemned all science as leading to unbelief,
[1091] and developed an elaborate and quasi-systematic theology. It
was while the scientific encyclopedists of Bassorah were amassing the
knowledge which, through the Moors, renewed thought in the West, that
Al Ashari built up the Kalâm or scholastic theology which thenceforth
reigned in the Mohammedan East; [1092] and the philosopher Al Gazzali
(or Gazel), on his part, employed the ancient and modern device of
turning a profession of philosophical scepticism to the account of
orthodoxy. [1093]

In the struggle between science and religion, in a politically
decadent State, the latter inevitably secured the administrative
power. [1094] Under the Khalifs Motamid (d. 892) and Motadhed (d. 902)
all science and philosophy were proscribed, and booksellers were put
upon their oath not to sell any but orthodox books. [1095] Thus, though
philosophy and science had secretly survived, when the political end
came the popular faith was in much the same state as it had been under
Haroun Al Raschid. Under Islam as under all the faiths of the world,
in the east as in the west, the mass of the people remained ignorant
as well as poor; and the learning and skill of the scholars served
only to pass on the saved treasure of Greek thought and science to
the new civilization of Europe. The fact that the age of military and
political decadence was that of the widest diffusion of rationalism
is naturally fastened on as giving the explanation of the decline;
but the inference is pure fallacy. The Bagdad Khalifate declined as
the Christianized Roman Empire declined, from political and external
causes; and the Turks who overthrew it proceeded to overthrow Christian
Byzantium, where rationalism never reared its head.


    The conventional view is thus set forth in a popular work (The
    Saracens, by Arthur Gilman, 1887, p. 385): "Unconsciously Mamun
    began a process by which that implicit faith which had been
    at once the foundation and the inspiration of Islam, which had
    nerved its warriors in their terrible warfare, and had brought
    the nation out of its former obscurity to the foremost position
    among the peoples of the world, was to be taken from them." We
    have seen that this view is entirely erroneous as regards the
    rise of the Saracen power; and it is no less so as regards
    the decline. At the outset there had been no "implicit faith"
    among the conquerors. The Eastern Saracens, further, had been
    decisively defeated by the Byzantines in the very first flush of
    their fanaticism and success; and the Western had been routed by
    Charles Martel long before they had any philosophy. There was
    no overthrow of faith among the warriors of the Khalifate. The
    enlistment of Turkish mercenaries by Mamoun and Motasim, by way of
    being independent of the Persian and Arab factions in the army and
    the State, introduced an element which, at first purely barbaric,
    became as orthodox as the men of Haroun's day had been. Yet the
    decadence, instead of being checked, was furthered.

    Nor were the strifes set up by the rationalistic view of the Koran
    nearly so destructive as the mere faction-fights and sectarian
    insurrections which began with Motawakkel. The falling-away
    of cities and provinces under the feeble Moktader (908-932)
    had nothing whatever to do with opinions, but was strictly
    analogous to the dissolution of the kingdom of Charlemagne under
    his successors, through the rise of new provincial energies;
    and the tyranny of the Turkish mercenaries was on all fours with
    that of the Pretorians of the Roman Empire, and with that of the
    Janissaries in later Turkey. The writer under notice has actually
    recorded (p. 408) that the warlike sect of Ismailitic Karmathians,
    who did more than any other enemy to dismember the Khalifate, were
    unbelievers in the Koran, deniers of revelation, and disregarders
    of prayer. The later Khalifs, puppets in the hands of the Turks,
    were one and all devout believers.

    On the other hand, fresh Moslem and non-Moslem dynasties arose
    alternately as the conditions and opportunities determined. Jenghiz
    Khan, who overran Asia, was no Moslem; neither was Tamerlane;
    but new Moslem conquerors did overrun India, as pagan Alexander
    had done in his day. Theological ideas counted for as little in
    one case as in the other. Sultan Mahmoud of Ghazni (997-1030), who
    reared a new empire on the basis of the province of Khorassan and
    the kingdom of Bokhara, and who twelve times successfully invaded
    India, happened to be of Turkish stock; but he is also recorded
    to have been in his youth a doubter of a future state, as well as
    of his personal legitimacy. His later parade of piety (as to which
    see Baron De Slane's tr. of Ibn Khallikan's Biog. Dict. iii, 334)
    is thus a trifle suspect (British India, in Edin. Cab. Lib. 3rd
    ed. i, 189, following Ferishta); and his avarice seems to have
    animated him to the full as much as his faith, which was certainly
    not more devout than that of the Brahmans of Somnauth, whose
    hold he captured. (Cp. Prof. E. G. Browne, A Literary History
    of Persia, ii (1906), 119.) During his reign, besides, unbelief
    was rife in his despite (Weil, Geschichte der Chalifen, iii, 72),
    though he burned the books of the Motazilites, besides crucifying
    many Ismaïlian heretics (Browne, p. 160). The conventional theorem
    as to the political importance of faith, in short, will not bear
    investigation. Even Freeman here sets it aside (Hist. and Conq. of
    the Saracens, p. 124).




§ 4

It is in the later and nominally decadent ages of the Bagdad Khalifate,
when science and culture and even industry relatively prospered by
reason of the personal impotence of the Khalifs, that we meet with
the most pronounced and the most perspicacious of the Freethinkers of
Islam. In the years 973-1057 there dwelt in the little Syrian town
of Marratun-Numan the blind poet Abu'l-ala-al-Ma'arri, who wrote a
parody of the Koran, [1096] and in his verse derided all religions as
alike absurd, and yet was for some reason never persecuted. He has
been pronounced "incomparably greater" than Omar Khayyám "both as
a poet and as an agnostic." [1097] One of his sayings was that "The
world holds two classes of men--intelligent men without religion, and
religious men without intelligence." [1098] He may have escaped on the
strength of a character for general eccentricity, for he was an ardent
vegetarian and an opponent of all parentage, declaring that to bring
a child into the world was to add to the sum of suffering. [1099]
The fact that he was latterly a man of wealth, yet in person an
ascetic and a generous giver, may be the true explanation. Whatever
be the explanation of his immunity, the frankness of his heterodoxy
is memorable. Nourished perhaps by a temper of protest set up in him
by the blindness which fell upon him in childhood after smallpox, the
spirit of reason seems to have been effectually developed in him by a
stay of a year and a-half at Bagdad, where, in the days of Al Mansour,
"Christians and Jews, Buddhists and Zoroastrians, Sabians and Sufis,
materialists and rationalists," met and communed. [1100] Before his
visit, his poems are substantially orthodox; later, their burden
changes. He denies a resurrection, and is "wholly incredulous of any
divine revelation. Religion, as he conceives it, is a product of the
human mind, in which men believe through force of habit and education,
never stopping to consider whether it is true." "His belief in God
amounted, as it would seem, to little beyond a conviction that all
things are governed by inexorable Fate." Concerning creeds he sings
in one stave:--


        Now this religion happens to prevail
          Until by that one it is overthrown;
          Because men will not live with men alone,
        But always with another fairy-tale [1101]--


a summing-up not to be improved upon here.

A century later still, and in another region, we come upon the (now)
most famous of all Eastern freethinkers, Omar Khayyám. He belonged to
Naishápúr in Khorassan, a province which had long been known for its
rationalism, [1102] and which had been part of the nucleus of the great
Asiatic kingdom created by Sultan Mahmoud of Ghazni at the beginning
of the eleventh century, soon after the rise of the Fatimite dynasty
in Egypt. Under that Sultan flourished Ferdusi (Firdausi), one of
the chief glories of Persian verse. After Mahmoud's death, his realm
and parts of the Khalifate in turn were overrun by the Seljuk Turks
under Togrul Beg; under whose grandson Malik it was that Omar Khayyám,
astronomer and poet, studied and sang in Khorassan. The Turk-descended
Shah favoured science as strongly as any of the Abassides; and when he
decided to reform the calendar, Omar was one of the eight experts he
employed to do it. Thus was set up for the East the Jaláli calendar,
which, as Gibbon has noted, [1103] "surpasses the Julian and approaches
the accuracy of the Gregorian style." Omar was, in fact, one of the
ablest mathematicians of his age. [1104]

His name, Omar ibn Ibrahim al-Khayyámi, seems to point to Arab
descent. "Al-Khayyámmi" means "the tent-maker"; but in no biographic
account of him is there the slightest proof that he or his father ever
belonged to that or any other handicraft. [1105] Always he figures
as a scholar and a man of science. Since, therefore, the patronymic
al-Khayyámi is fairly common now among Arabs, and also among the still
nomadic tribes of Khuzistan and Luristan, the reasonable presumption
is that it was in his case a patronymic also. [1106] His father being
a man of some substance, he had a good schooling, and is even described
in literary tradition as having become an expert Koran scholar, by the
admission of the orthodox Al Gazzali, who, however, is represented
in another record as looking with aversion on Omar's scientific
lore. [1107] The poet may have had his lead to freethought during his
travels after graduating at Naishapur, when he visited Samarkhand,
Bokhara, Ispahan, and Balk. [1108] He seems to have practised astrology
for a living, even as did Kepler in Europe five hundred years later;
and he perhaps dabbled somewhat in medicine. [1109] A hostile orthodox
account of him, written in the thirteenth century, represents him as
"versed in all the wisdom of the Greeks," and as wont to insist on
the necessity of studying science on Greek lines. [1110] Of his prose
works, two, which were of standard authority, dealt respectively with
precious stones and climatology. [1111]

Beyond question the poet-astronomer was undevout; and his astronomy
doubtless helped to make him so. One contemporary writes: "I did not
observe that he had any great belief in astrological predictions;
nor have I seen or heard of any of the great (scientists) who had such
belief." [1112] The biographical sketch by Ibn al Kifti, before cited,
declares that he "performed pilgrimages not from piety but from fear,"
having reason to dread the hostility of contemporaries who knew or
divined his unbelief; and there is a story of a treacherous pupil
who sought to bring him into public odium. [1113] In point of fact he
was not, any more than Abu' l-Ala, a convinced atheist, but he had no
sympathy with popular religion. "He gave his adherence to no religious
sect. Agnosticism, not faith, is the keynote of his works." [1114]
Among the sects he saw everywhere strife and hatred in which he could
have no part. His earlier English translators, reflecting the tone
of the first half of the last century, have thought fit to moralize
censoriously over his attitude to life; and the first, Prof. Cowell,
has austerely decided that Omar's gaiety is "but a risus sardonicus
of despair." [1115] Even the subtler Fitzgerald, who has so admirably
rendered some of the audacities which Cowell thought "better left in
the original Persian," has the air of apologizing for them when he
partly concurs in the same estimate. But despair is not the name for
the humorous melancholy which Omar, like Abu' l-Ala, weaves around
his thoughts on the riddle of the universe. Like Abu' l-Ala, again,
he talks at times of God, but with small signs of faith. In epigrams
which have seldom been surpassed for their echoing depth, he disposes
of the theistic solution and the lure of immortality; whereafter,
instead of offering another shibboleth, he sings of wine and roses,
of the joys of life and of their speedy passage; not forgetting
to add a stipulation for beneficence. [1116] It was his way of
turning into music the undertone of all mortality; and that it is
now preferable, for any refined intelligence, to the affectation of
zest for a "hereafter" on which no one wants to enter, would seem to
be proved by the remarkable vogue he has secured in modern England,
chiefly through the incomparable version of Fitzgerald. Much of the
attraction, certainly, is due to the canorous cadence and felicitous
phrasing of those singularly fortunate stanzas; and a similar handling
might have won as high a repute among us for Abu' l-Ala, whom, as we
have seen, some of our Orientalists set higher, and whose verse as
recently rendered into English has an indubitable charm. Fitzgerald,
on the other hand, has added much to Omar. But the thoughts of Omar
remain the kernels of Fitzgerald's verses; and whereas the counsel,
"Gather ye roses while ye may," is common enough, it must be the
weightier bearing of his deeper and more daring ideas that gives
the quatrains their main hold to-day. In the more exact rendering of
those translators who closely reproduce the original he remains beyond
question a freethinker, [1117] placing ethic above creed, though much
given to the praise of wine. Never popular in the Moslem world, [1118]
he has had in ours an unparalleled welcome; and it must be because
from his scientific vantage ground in the East, in the period of the
Norman Conquest, he had attained in some degree the vision and chimed
with the mood of a later and larger age.

That Omar in his day and place was not alone in his mood lies on
the face of his verse. Many quatrains ascribed to him, indeed,
are admittedly assignable to other Persian poets; and one of his
English editors notes that "the poetry of rebellion and revolt from
orthodox opinion, which is supposed to be peculiar to him, may be
traced in the works of his predecessor Avicenna, as well as in those
of Afdal-i-Káshí, and others of his successors." [1119] The allusions
to the tavern, a thing suspect and illicit for Islam, show that he
was in a society more Persian than Arab, one in which was to be found
nearly all of the free intellectual life possible in the Moslem East;
[1120] and doubtless Persian thought, always leaning to heresy, and
charged with germs of scientific speculation from immemorial antiquity,
prepared his rationalism; though his monism excludes alike dualism
and theism. "One for two I never did misread" is his summing up of
his philosophy. [1121]

But the same formula might serve for the philosophy of the sect of
Sufis, [1122] who in all ages seem to have included unbelievers as
well as devoutly mystical pantheists. Founded, it is said, by a woman,
Rabia, in the first century of the Hej'ra, [1123] the sect really
carries on a pre-Mohammedan mysticism, and may as well derive from
Greece [1124] as from Asia. Its original doctrine of divine love, as a
reaction against Moslem austerity, gave it a fixed hold in Persia, and
became the starting point of innumerable heterodox doctrines. [1125]
Under the Khalif Moktader, a Persian Sufi is recorded to have been
tortured and executed for teaching that every man is God. [1126] In
later ages, Sufiism became loosely associated with every species of
independent thinking; and there is reason to suspect that the later
poets Sadi (fl. thirteenth century) and Hafiz [1127] (fl. fourteenth
century), as well as hundreds of lesser status, held under the name of
Sufiism views of life not far removed from those of Omar Khayyám; who,
however, had bantered the Sufis so unmercifully that they are said to
have dreaded and hated him. [1128] In any case, Sufiism has included
such divergent types as Al Gazzali, [1129] the skeptical defender of
the faith; devout pantheistic poets such as Jâmi; [1130] and singers
of love and wine such as Hafiz, whose extremely concrete imagery is
certainly not as often allegorical as serious Sufis assert, though no
doubt it is sometimes so. [1131] It even became nominally associated
with the destructive Ismaïlitism of the sect of the Assassins, whose
founder, Hassan, had been the schoolfellow of Omar Khayyám. [1132]

Of Sufiism as a whole it may be said that whether as inculcating
quietism, or as widening the narrow theism of Islam into pantheism,
or as sheltering an unaggressive rationalism, it has made for freedom
and humanity in the Mohammedan world, lessening the evils of ignorance
where it could not inspire progress. [1133] It long anticipated
the semi-rationalism of those Christians who declare heaven and
hell to be names for bodily or mental states in this life. [1134]
On its more philosophic side too it connects with the long movement
of speculation which, passing into European life through the Western
Saracens, revived Greek philosophic thought in Christendom after the
night of the Middle Ages, at the same time that Saracen science passed
on the more precious seeds of real knowledge to the new civilization.




§ 5

There is the less need to deal at any length in these pages with the
professed philosophy of the eastern Arabs, seeing that it was from
first to last but little associated with any direct or practical
repudiation of dogma and superstition. [1135] What freethought there
was had only an unwritten currency, and is to be traced, as so often
happens in later European history, through the protests of orthodox
apologists. Thus the Persian Al Gazzali, in the preface to his work,
The Destruction of the Philosophers, declares of the subjects of
his attack that "the source of all their errors is the trust they
have in the names of Sokrates, Hippokrates, Plato, and Aristotle; the
admiration they profess for their genius and subtlety; and the belief,
finally, that those great masters have been led by the profundity of
their faculty to reject all religion, and to regard its precepts as
the product of artifice and imposture." [1136] This implies an abundant
rationalism, [1137] but, as always, the unwritten unbelief lost ground,
its non-publication being the proof that orthodoxy prevailed against
it. Movements which were originally liberal, such as that of the
Motecallemîn, ran at length to mere dialectic defence of the faith
against the philosophers. Fighting the Aristotelian doctrine of the
eternity of matter, they sought to found a new theistic creationism
on the atoms of Demokritos, making God the creator of the atoms, and
negating the idea of natural law. [1138] Eastern Moslem philosophy
in general followed some such line of reaction and petrifaction. The
rationalistic Al Kindi (fl. 850) seems to have been led to philosophize
by the Motazilite problems; but his successors mostly set them
aside, developing an abstract logic and philosophy on Greek bases,
or studying science for its own sake, though as a rule professing a
devout acceptance of the Koran. [1139] Such was Avicenna (Ibn Sina:
d. 1037), who taught that men should revere the faith in which they
were educated; though in comparison with his predecessor Al Farabi,
who leant to Platonic mysticism, he is a rationalistic Aristotelian,
[1140] with a strong leaning to pantheism. Of him an Arabic historian
writes that in his old age he attached himself to the court of the
heretical Ala-ud-Dawla at Ispahan, in order that he might freely
write his own heretical works. [1141] After Al Gazzali (d. 1111),
who attacked both Avicenna [1142] and Al Farabi somewhat in the spirit
of Cicero's skeptical Cotta attacking the Stoics and the Epicureans,
[1143] there seems to have been a further development of skepticism,
the skeptical defence of the faith having the same unsettling tendency
in his as in later hands. Ibn Khaldun seems to denounce in the name
of faith his mixture of pietism and philosophy; and Makrisi speaks
of his doctrines as working great harm to religion [1144] among the
Moslems. But the socio-political conditions were too unpropitious
to permit of any continuous advance on rational lines. Ere long an
uncritical orthodoxy prevailed in the Eastern schools, and it is
in Moorish Spain that we are to look for the last efforts of Arab
philosophy.

The course of culture-evolution there broadly corresponds with that
of the Saracen civilization in the East. In Spain the Moors came into
contact with the Roman imperial polity, and at the same time with the
different culture elements of Judaism and Christianity. To both of
these faiths they gave complete toleration, thus strengthening their
own in a way that no other policy could have availed to do. Whatever
was left of Græco-Roman art, handicraft, and science, saving the
arts of portraiture, they encouraged; and whatever of agricultural
science remained from Carthaginian times they zealously adopted and
improved. Like their fellow-Moslems in the East, they further learned
all the science that the preserved literature of Greece could give
them. The result was that under energetic and enlightened khalifs
the Moorish civilization became the centre of light and knowledge
as well as of material prosperity for medieval Europe. Whatever of
science the world possessed was to be found in their schools; and
thither in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries flocked students
from the Christian States of western and northern Europe. It was in
whole or in part from Saracen hands that the modern world received
astronomy, chemistry, mathematics, medicine, botany, jurisprudence,
and philosophy. They were, in fact, the revivers of civilization after
the age of barbarian Christianity. [1145] And while the preservation
of Greek science, lost from the hands of Christendom, would have been
a notable service enough, the Arabs did much more. Alhazen (d. 1038)
is said to have done the most original work in optics before Newton,
[1146] and in the same century Arab medicine and chemistry made
original advances. [1147]

While the progressive period lasted, there was of course an abundance
of practical freethought. But after a marvellously rapid rise, the
Moorish civilization was arrested and paralysed by the internal and the
external forces of anti-civilization--religious fanaticism within and
Christian hostility without. Everywhere we have seen culture-progress
depending more or less clearly on the failure to find solutions for
political problems. The most fatal defect of all Arab civilization--a
defect involved in its first departure by way of conquest, and in
its fixedly hostile relation to the Christian States, which kept it
constantly on a military basis--was the total failure to substitute any
measure of constitutional rule for despotism. It was thus politically
unprogressive, even while advancing in other respects. But in other
respects also it soon reached the limits set by the conditions.

Whereas in Persia the Arabs overran an ancient civilization,
containing many elements of rationalism which acted upon their own
creed, the Moors in Spain found a population only slightly civilized,
and predisposed by its recent culture, as well as by its natural
conditions, [1148] to fanatical piety. Thus when, under their tolerant
rule, Jews and Christians in large numbers embraced Islam, the new
converts became the most fanatical of all. [1149] All rationalism
existed in their despite, and, abounding as they did, they tended to
gain power whenever the Khalif was weak, and to rebel furiously when
he was hostile. When, accordingly, the growing pressure of the feudal
Christian power in Northern Spain at length became a menacing danger
to the Moorish States, weakened by endless intestine strife, the one
resource was to call in a new force of Moslem fanaticism in the shape
of the Almoravide [1150] Berbers, who, to the utmost of their power,
put down everything scientific and rationalistic, and established
a rigid Koranolatry. After a time they in turn, growing degenerate
while remaining orthodox, were overrun by a new influx of conquering
fanatics from Africa, the Almohades, who, failing to add political
science to their faith, went down in the thirteenth century before
the Christians in Spain, in a great battle in which their prince sat
in their sight with the Koran in his hand. [1151] Here there could
be no pretence that "unbelief" wrought the downfall. The Jonah of
freethought, so to speak, had been thrown overboard; and the ship
went down with the flag of faith flying at every masthead. [1152]

It was in the last centuries of Moorish rule that there lived the
philosophers whose names connect it with the history of European
thought, retaining thus a somewhat factitious distinction as compared
with the men of science, many of them nameless, who developed and
transmitted the sciences. The pantheistic Avempace (Ibn Badja:
d. 1138), who defended the reason against the theistic skepticism
of Al Gazzali, [1153] was physician, astronomer, and mathematician,
as well as metaphysician; as was Abubacer (Abu Bekr, also known as
Ibn Tophail: d. 1185), who regarded religious systems as "only a
necessary means of discipline for the multitude," [1154] and as being
merely symbols of the higher truth reached by the philosopher. Both
men, however, tended rather to mysticism than to exact thought;
and Abubacer's treatise, The Self-taught Philosopher, which has
been translated into Latin (by Pococke in 1671), English, Dutch,
and German, has had the singular fortune of being adopted by the
Quakers as a work of edification. [1155]

Very different was the part played by Averroës (Ibn Roshd), the
most famous of all Moslem thinkers, because the most far-reaching
in his influence on European thought. For the Middle Ages he was
pre-eminently the expounder of Aristotle, and it is as setting forth,
in that capacity, the pantheistic doctrine which affirms the eternity
of the material universe and makes the individual soul emanate from
and return to the soul of all, that he becomes important alike in
Moslem and Christian thought. Diverging from the asceticism and
mysticism of Avempace and Abubacer, and strenuously opposing the
anti-rationalism of Al Gazzali, against whose chief treatise he penned
his own Destruction of the Destruction of the Philosophers, Averroës is
the least mystical and the most rational of the Arab thinkers. [1156]
At nearly all vital points he oppugns the religious view of things,
denying bodily resurrection, which he treats (here following all his
predecessors in heretical Arab philosophy) as a vulgar fable; [1157]
and making some approach to a scientific treatment of the problem of
"Freewill" as against, on the one hand, the ethic-destroying doctrine
of the Motecallemîn, who made God's will the sole standard of right,
and affirmed predestination (Jabarism); and against, on the other hand,
the anti-determinism of the Kadarites. [1158] Even in his politics
he was original; and in his paraphrase of Plato's Republic he has
said a notable word for women, pointing out how small an opening is
offered for their faculties in Moslem society. [1159] Of all tyrannies,
he boldly declared, the worst is that of priests.

In time, however, a consciousness of the vital hostility of his
doctrine to current creeds, and of the danger he consequently ran,
made him, like so many of his later disciples, anxious to preserve
priestly favour. As regards religion he was more complaisant than
Abubacer, pronouncing Mohammedanism the most perfect of all popular
systems, [1160] and preaching a patriotic conformity on that score
to philosophic students.

From him derives the formula of a two-fold truth--one truth for
science or philosophy, and another for religion--which played so
large a part in the academic life of Christendom for centuries. [1161]
In two of his treatises, On the harmony of religion with philosophy
and On the demonstration of religious dogmas, he even takes up a
conservative attitude, proclaiming that the wise man never utters a
word against the established creed, and going so far as to say that
the freethinker who attacks it, inasmuch as he undermines popular
virtue, deserves death. [1162] Even in rebutting, as entirely absurd,
the doctrine of the creation of the world, and ascribing its currency
to the stupefying power of habit, he takes occasion to remark piously
that those whose religion has no better basis than faith are frequently
seen, on taking up scientific studies, to become utter zendeks. [1163]
But he lived in an age of declining culture and reviving fanaticism;
and all his conformities could not save him from proscription, at
the hands of a Khalif who had long favoured him, for the offence
of cultivating Greek antiquity to the prejudice of Islam. All study
of Greek philosophy was proscribed at the same time, and all books
found on the subject were destroyed. [1164] Disgraced and banished
from court, Averroës died at Morocco in 1198; other philosophers were
similarly persecuted; [1165] and soon afterwards the Moorish rule in
Spain came to an end in the odour of sanctity. [1166]

So complete was now the defeat of the intellectual life in Western
Islam that the ablest writer produced by the Arab race in the period
of the Renaissance, Ibn Khaldun of Tunis (1332-1406), writes as a
bigoted believer in revelation, though his writings on the science of
history were the most philosophic since the classic period, being out
of all comparison superior to those of the Christian chroniclers of
his age. [1167] So rationalistic, indeed, is his method, relatively
to his time, that it is permissible to suspect him of seeking to
propitiate the bigots. [1168] But neither they nor his race in general
could learn the sociological lessons he had it in him to teach. Their
development was arrested for that period.




§ 6

Of later freethought under Islam there is little to record as regards
literary output, but the phenomenon has never disappeared. Buckle,
in his haste, declared that he could write the history of Turkish
civilization on the back of his hand; [1169] but even in Turkey,
at a time of minimum friendly contact with other European life,
there have been traces of a spirit of freethinking nearly as active
as that astir in Christendom at the same period. Thus at the end of
the seventeenth century we have circumstantial testimony to the vogue
of a doctrine of atheistic Naturalism at Constantinople. The holders
of this doctrine were called Muserin, a term said to mean "The true
secret is with us." They affirmed a creative and all-sustaining
Nature, in which Man has his place like the plants and like the
planets; and they were said to form a very large number, including
Cadis and other learned as well as some renegade persons. [1170] But
Turkish culture-conditions in the eighteenth century were not such as
to permit of intellectual progress on native lines; and to this day
rationalism in that as in other Moslem countries is mainly a matter of
reflex action set up by the impact of European scientific knowledge,
or social contact. There is no modern rationalistic literature.

Motazilism, so-called, is still heard of in Arabia itself. [1171]
In the Ottoman Empire, indeed, it is little in evidence, standing
now as it does for a species of broad-church liberalism, analogous
to Christian Unitarianism; [1172] but in Persia the ancient leaning
to rationalism is still common. The old-world pantheism which we
have seen conserved in Omar Khayyám gave rise in later centuries to
similar developments among the Parsees both in Persia and in India;
and from the sixteenth century onwards there are clear traces among
them of a number of rationalizing heresies, varying from pantheism
and simple deism to atheism and materialism. [1173] In Persia to-day
there are many thinkers of these casts of thought. [1174] About 1830 a
British traveller estimated that, assuming there were between 200,000
and 300,000 Sufis in the country, those figures probably fell greatly
short of the number "secretly inclined to infidelity." [1175] Whatever
be the value of the figures, the statement is substantially confirmed
by later observers; [1176] missionaries reporting independently that
in Persia "most of the higher class, of the nobility, and of the
learned professions ... are at heart infidels or sceptics." [1177]
Persian freethought is of course, in large part, the freethought of
ignorance, and seems to co-exist with astrological superstition;
[1178] but there is obviously needed only science, culture, and
material development to produce, on such a basis, a renascence as
remarkable as that of modern Japan.

The verdict of Vambéry is noteworthy: "In all Asia, with the exception
of China, there is no land and no people wherein there is so little
of religious enthusiasm as in Persia; where freethinkers are so
little persecuted, and can express their opinions with so little
disturbance; and where, finally, as a natural consequence, the old
religious structure can be so easily shattered by the outbreak of new
enthusiasts. Whoever has read Khayyám's blasphemies against God and
the prophet, his jesting verses against the holiest ceremonies and
commandments of Islam; and whoever knows the vogue of this book and
other works directed against the current religion, will not wonder
that Bâb with the weapon of the Word won so many hearts in so short
a time." [1179]

The view that Bâbism affiliates to rationalism is to be understood in
the sense that the atmosphere of the latter made possible the growth of
the former, its adherents being apparently drawn rather from the former
orthodox. [1180] The young founder of the sect, Mirza-Ali-Mohammed,
declared himself "The Bâb," i.e. "the Gate" (to the knowledge of God),
as against the orthodox Moslem teachers who taught that "since the
twelve Imâms, the Gate of Knowledge is closed." Hence the name of
the sect. Mirza-Ali, who showed a strong tendency to intolerance,
quickly created an aggressive movement, which was for a time put down
by the killing of himself and many of his followers.

Since his execution the sect has greatly multiplied and its doctrines
have much widened. For a time the founder's intolerant teachings
were upheld by Ezél, the founder of one of the two divisions into
which the party speedily fell; while his rival Béha, who gave himself
out as the true Prophet, of whom the Bâb was merely the precursor,
developed a notably cosmopolitan and equalitarian doctrine, including a
vague belief in immortality, without heaven, hell, or purgatory. Ezél
eventually abandoned his claims, and his followers now number less
than two thousand; while the Béhaïtes number nearly three millions
out of the seven millions of the Persian population, and some two
millions in the adjacent countries. The son of Béha, Abbas Effendi,
who bears the title of "The Great Branch," now rules the cult, which
promises to be the future religion of Persia. [1181] One of the most
notable phenomena of the earlier movement was the entrance of a young
woman, daughter of a leading ulema, who for the first time in Moslem
history threw off the regulation veil and preached the equality of
the sexes. [1182] She was one of those first executed. Persecution,
however, has long ceased, and as a result of her lead the position
of woman in the cult is exceptionally good. Thus the last century
has witnessed within the sphere of Islam, so commonly supposed to
be impervious to change, one of the most rapid and radical religious
changes recorded in history. There is therefore no ground for holding
that in other Moslem countries progress is at an end.

Everything depends, broadly speaking, on the possibilities of
culture-contact. The changes in Persia are traceable to the element
of heretical habit which has persisted from pre-Moslem times; future
and more scientific development will depend upon the assimilation
of European knowledge. In Egypt, before the period of European
intervention, freethinking was at a minimum; and though toleration
was well developed as regarded Christians and Jews, freethinking
Moslems dared not avow themselves. [1183] Latterly rationalism tends to
spread in Egypt as in other Moslem countries; even under Mohammed Ali
the ruling Turks had begun to exhibit a "remarkable indifference to
religion," and had "begun to undermine the foundations of El-Islam";
and so shrewd and dispassionate an observer as Lane expected that
the common people would "soon assist in the work," and that "the
overthrow of the whole fabric may reasonably be expected to ensue at
a period not very remote." [1184] To evolve such a change there will
be required a diffusion of culture which is not at all likely to be
rapid under any Government; but in any case the ground that is being
lost by Islam in Egypt is not being retaken by Christianity.

In the other British dominions, Mohammedans, though less ready than
educated Hindus to accept new ideas, cannot escape the rationalizing
influence of European culture. Nor was it left to the British to
introduce the rationalistic spirit in Moslem India. At the end of
the sixteenth century the eclectic Emperor Akbar, [1185] himself a
devout worshipper of the Sun, [1186] is found tolerantly comparing
all religions, [1187] depreciating Islam, [1188] and arriving at
such general views on the equivalence of all creeds, and on the
improbability of eternal punishment, [1189] as pass for liberal
among Christians in our own day. If such views could be generated
by a comparison of the creeds of pre-British India they must needs
be encouraged now. The Mohammedan mass is of course still deeply
fanatical, and habitually superstitious; but not any more immovably so
than the early Saracens. In the eighteenth century arose the fanatical
Wahabi sect, which aims at a puritanic restoration of primeval Islam,
freed from the accretions of later belief, such as saint-worship; but
the movement, though variously estimated, has had small success, and
seems destined to extinction. [1190] Of the traditional seventy-three
sects in Islam only four to-day count as orthodox. [1191]

It may be worth while, in conclusion, to note that the comparative
prosperity or progressiveness of Islam as a proselytizing and
civilizing force in Africa--a phenomenon regarded even by some
Christians with satisfaction, and by some with alarm [1192]--is not
strictly or purely a religious phenomenon. Moslem civilization suits
with <DW64> life in Africa in virtue not of the teaching of the Koran,
but of the comparative nearness of the Arab to the barbaric life. He
interbreeds with the natives, fraternizes with them (when not engaged
in kidnapping them), and so stimulates their civilization; where
the European colonist, looking down on them as an inferior species,
isolates, depresses, and degrades them. It is thus conceivable that
there is a future for Islam at the level of a low culture-stage; but
the Arab and Turkish races out of Africa are rather the more likely
to concur in the rationalistic movement of the higher civilization.

Even in Africa, however, a systematic observer notes, and predicts the
extension of, "a strong tendency on the part of the Mohammedans towards
an easy-going rationalism, such as is fast making way in Algeria, where
the townspeople and the cultivators in the more settled districts,
constantly coming in contact with Europeans, are becoming indifferent
to the more inconvenient among their Mohammedan observances, and
are content to live with little more religion than an observance of
the laws, and a desire to get on well with their neighbours." [1193]
Thus at every culture-level we see the persistence of that force of
intellectual variation which is the subject of our inquiry.







CHAPTER IX

CHRISTENDOM IN THE MIDDLE AGES


It would be an error, in view of the biological generalization
proceeded on and the facts noted in this inquiry, to suppose that
even in the Dark Ages, so called, [1194] the spirit of critical
reason was wholly absent from the life of Christendom. It had simply
grown very rare, and was the more discountenanced where it strove
to speak. But the most systematic suppression of heresies could
not secure that no private heresy should remain. As Voltaire has
remarked, there was "nearly always a small flock separated from the
great." [1195] Apart too from such quasi-rationalism as was involved
in semi-Pelagianism, [1196] critical heresy chronically arose even
in the Byzantine provinces, which by the curtailment of the Empire
had been left the most homogeneous and therefore the most manageable
of the Christian States. It is necessary to note those survivals of
partial freethinking, when we would trace the rise of modern thought.




§ 1. HERESY IN BYZANTIUM

It was probably from some indirect influence of the new anti-idolatrous
religion of Islam that in the eighth century the soldier-emperor,
Leo the Isaurian, known as the Iconoclast, derived his aversion
to the image-worship [1197] which had long been as general in
the Christian world as ever under polytheism. So gross had the
superstition become that particular images were frequently selected
as god-parents; of others the paint was partly scratched off to be
mixed with the sacramental wine; and the bread was solemnly put in
contact with them. [1198] Leo began (726) by an edict simply causing
the images to be placed so high that they could not be kissed, but
on being met with resistance and rebellion he ordered their total
removal (730). One view is that he saw image-worship to be the
main hindrance to the spread of the faith among Jews and Moslems,
and took his measures accordingly. [1199] Save on this one point he
was an orthodox Christian and Trinitarian, and his long effort to
put down images and pictures was in itself rather fanatical [1200]
than rationalistic, though a measure of freethinking was developed
among the religious party he created. [1201] Of this spirit, as
well as of the aversion to image-worship, [1202] something must
have survived the official restoration of idolatry; but the traces
are few. The most zealous iconoclasts seem never to have risen above
the flat inconsistency of treating the cross and the written gospels
with exactly the same adoration that their opponents paid to images;
[1203] and their appeal to the scriptures--which was their first and
last argument--was accordingly met by the retort that they themselves
accepted the authority of tradition, as did the image-worshippers. The
remarkable hostility of the army to the latter is to be explained,
apparently, by the local bias of the eastern regions from which the
soldiers were mainly recruited.

In the ninth century, when Saracen rivalry had stung the Byzantines
into some partial revival of culture and science, [1204] the
all-learned Patriarch Photius (c. 820-891), who reluctantly accepted
ecclesiastical office, earned a dangerous repute for freethinking
by declaring from the pulpit that earthquakes were produced by
earthly causes and not by divine wrath. [1205] But this was an
almost solitary gleam of reason in a generation wholly given up to
furious strife over the worship of images, and Photius was one of
the image-worshippers. The battle swung from extreme to extreme. The
emperor Michael II, "the Stammerer" (820-828), held a medium position,
and accordingly acquired the repute of a freethinker. A general under
Leo V, "the Armenian," he had conspired against him, and when on the
verge of execution had been raised to the throne in place of Leo, who
was assassinated at the altar. The new emperor aimed above all things
at peace and quietness; but his methods were thoroughly Byzantine,
and included the castration of the four sons of Leo. Michael himself
is said to have doubted the future resurrection of men, to have
maintained that Judas was saved, and to have doubted the existence
of Satan because he is not named in the Pentateuch [1206]--a species
of freethinking not far removed from that of the Iconoclasts, whose
grounds were merely Biblical. A generation later came Michael IV, "the
Sot," bred a wastrel under the guardianship of his mother, Theodora
(who in 842 restored image-worship and persecuted the Paulicians),
and her brother Bardas, who ultimately put her in a convent. Michael,
repeatedly defeated by the Saracens, long held his own at home. Taking
into favour Basil, who married his (Michael's) mistress, he murdered
Bardas, and a year later (867) was about to murder Basil in turn,
when the latter anticipated him, murdered the emperor, and assumed the
purple. It was under Basil, who put down the Iconoclasts, that Photius,
after formally deposing and being deposed by the Pope of Rome (864-66)
was really deposed and banished (868), to be restored to favour and
office ten years later. In 886, on the death of Basil, he was again
deposed, dying about 891. In that kaleidoscope of plot and faction,
fanaticism and crime, there is small trace of sane thinking. Michael
IV, in his disreputable way, was something of a freethinker, and
could even with impunity burlesque the religious processions of
the clergy, [1207] the orthodox populace joining in the laugh;
but there was no such culture at Constantinople as could develop
a sober rationalism, or sustain it against the clergy if it showed
its head. Intelligence in general could not rise above the plane of
the wrangle over images. While the struggle lasted, it was marked by
all the ferocity that belonged from the outset to Christian strifes;
and in the end, as usual, the more irrational bias triumphed.

It was in a sect whose doctrine at one point coincided with iconoclasm
that there were preserved such rude seeds of oriental rationalism
as could survive the rule of the Byzantine emperors, and carry the
stimulus of heresy to the west. The rise of the Paulicians in Armenia
dates from the seventh century, and was nominally by way of setting
up a creed on the lines of Paul as against the paganized system of the
Church. Rising as they did on the borders of Persia, they were probably
affected from the first by Mazdean influences, as the dualistic
principle was always affirmed by their virtual founder, Constantine,
afterwards known as Sylvanus. [1208] Their original tenets seem to have
been anti-Manichean, anti-Gnostic (though partly Marcionite), opposed
to the worship of images and relics, to sacraments, to the adoration
of the Virgin, of saints, and of angels, and to the acceptance of the
Old Testament; and in an age in which the reading of the Sacred Books
had already come to be regarded as a privilege of monks and priests,
they insisted on reading the New Testament for themselves. [1209]
In this they were virtually founding on the old pagan conception
of religion, under which all heads of families could offer worship
and sacrifice without the intervention of a priest, as against the
Judæo-Christian sacerdotalism, which vetoed anything like a private
cultus. In the teaching of Sylvanus, further, there were distinct
Manichean and Gnostic characteristics--notably, hostility to Judaism;
the denial that Christ had a real human body, capable of suffering; and
the doctrine that baptism and the communion were properly spiritual and
not physical rites. [1210] In the ninth century, when they had become
a powerful and militant sect, often at war with the empire, they were
still marked by their refusal to make any difference between priests
and laymen. Anti-ecclesiasticism was thus a main feature of the whole
movement; and the Byzantine Government, recognizing in its doctrine
a particularly dangerous heresy, had at once bloodily attacked it,
causing Sylvanus to be stoned to death. [1211] Still it grew, even
to the length of exhibiting the usual phenomena of schism within
itself. One section obtained the protection of the first iconoclastic
emperor, who agreed with them on the subject of images; and a later
leader, Sergius or Tychicus, won similar favour from Nicephorus I;
but Leo the Armenian (suc. 813), fearing the stigma of their other
heresies, and having already trouble enough from his iconoclasm,
set up against them, as against the image-worshippers, a new and
cruel persecution. [1212] They were thus driven over to the Saracens,
whose advance-guard they became as against the Christian State; but the
iconoclast Constantine Copronymus sympathetically [1213] transplanted
many of them to Constantinople and Thrace, thus introducing their
doctrine into Europe. The Empress Theodora (841-855), who restored
image-worship, [1214] sought to exterminate those left in Armenia,
slaying, it is said, a hundred thousand. [1215] Many of the remnant
were thus forced into the arms of the Saracens; and the sect did the
empire desperate mischief during many generations. [1216]

Meantime those planted in Thrace, in concert with the main body,
carried propaganda into Bulgaria, and these again were further
reinforced by refugees from Armenia in the ninth century, and in the
tenth by a fresh colony transplanted from Armenia by the emperor
John Zimisces, who valued them as a bulwark against the barbarous
Slavs. [1217] Fresh persecution under Alexius I at the end of the
eleventh century failed to suppress them; and imperial extortion
constantly drove to their side numbers of fresh adherents, [1218]
while the Bulgarians for similar reasons tended in mass to adopt
their creed as against that of Constantinople. So greatly did the
cult flourish that at its height it had a regular hierarchy, notably
recalling that of the early Manicheans--with a pope, twelve magistri,
and seventy-two bishops, each of whom had a filius major and filius
minor as his assistants. Withal the democratic element remained strong,
the laying on of the hands of communicants on the heads of newcomers
being part of the rite of reception into full membership. Thus it
came about that from Bulgaria there passed into western Europe, [1219]
partly through the Slavonic sect called Bogomiles or Bogomilians [1220]
(=  Theophiloi, "lovers of God"), who were akin to the Paulicians,
partly by more general influences, [1221] a contagion of democratic
and anti-ecclesiastical heresy; so that the very name Bulgar became
the French bougre = heretic--and worse. [1222] It specified the most
obvious source of the new anti-Romanist heresies of the Albigenses,
if not of the Vaudois (Waldenses).




§ 2. CRITICAL HERESY IN THE WEST

In the west, meanwhile, where the variety of social elements was
favourable to new life, heresy of a rationalistic kind was not wholly
lacking. About the middle of the eighth century we find one Feargal
or Vergilius, an Irish priest in Bavaria, accused by St. Boniface,
his enemy, of affirming, "in defiance of God and his own soul,"
the doctrine of the antipodes, [1223] which must have reached him
through the ancient Greek lore carried to Ireland in the primary
period of Christianization of that province. Of that influence we
have already seen a trace in Pelagius and Coelestius; and we shall
see more later in John the Scot. After being deposed by the Pope,
Vergilius was reinstated; was made Bishop of Salzburg, and held the
post till his death; and was even sainted afterwards; but the doctrine
disappeared for centuries from the Christian world.

Other heresies, however, asserted themselves. Though image-worship
finally triumphed there as in the east, it had strong opponents,
notably Claudius, bishop of Turin (fl. 830) under the emperor Louis
the Pious, son of Charlemagne, and his contemporary Agobard, bishop
of Lyons. [1224] It is a significant fact that both men were born
in Spain; and either to Saracen or to Jewish influence--the latter
being then strong in the Moorish and even in the Christian [1225]
world--may fairly be in part attributed their marked bias against
image-worship. Claudius was slightly and Agobard well educated in
Latin letters, so that an early impression [1226] would seem to have
been at work in both cases. However that may be, they stood out as
singularly rationalistic theologians in an age of general ignorance
and superstition. Claudius vehemently resisted alike image-worship,
saint-worship, and the Papal claims, and is recorded to have termed a
council of bishops which condemned him "an assembly of asses." [1227]
Agobard, in turn, is quite extraordinary in the thoroughness of his
rejection of popular superstition, being not only an iconoclast but an
enemy to prayer for change in the weather, to belief in incantations
and the power of evil spirits, to the ordeal by fire, to the wager
of battle, [1228] and to the belief in the verbal inspiration of the
Sacred Books. In an age of enormous superstition and deep ignorance,
he maintained within the Church that Reason was the noble gift of
God. [1229] He was a rationalist born out of due time. [1230]

A grain of rationalism, as apart from professional self-interest,
may also have entered into the outcry made at this period by the
clergy against the rigidly predestinarian doctrine of the monk
Gottschalk. [1231] His enemy, Rabanus or Hrabanus (called "the
Moor"), seems again to represent some Saracen influence, inasmuch
as he reproduced the scientific lore of Isidore of Seville. [1232]
But the philosophic semi-rationalism of John Scotus (d. 875), later
known as Erigena (John the Scot = of Ireland--the original "Scots"
being Irish), seems to be traceable to the Greek studies which had
been cherished in Christianized Ireland while the rest of western
Europe lost them, and represents at once the imperfect beginning
of the relatively rationalistic philosophy of Nominalism [1233] and
the first western revival of the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle,
howbeit by way of accommodation to the doctrine of the Church. [1234]


    That John the Scot was an Irishman remains practically certain,
    even if we give up the term "Erigena," which, as has been shown by
    Floss, the most careful editor of his works, is not found in the
    oldest MSS. The reading there is Ierugena, which later shades into
    Erugena and Eriugena. (Cp. Ueberweg, i, 359; Poole, pp. 55-56,
    note; Dr. Th. Christlieb, Leben und Lehre des Johannes Scotus
    Erigena, 1860, p. 14 sq.; and Huber, Johannes Scotus Erigena:
    ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie im
    Mittelalter, 1861, pp. 38-40.) From this elusive cognomen no
    certain inference can be drawn, too many being open; though the
    fact that John had himself coined the term Graiugena for a late
    Greek writer makes it likely that he called himself Ierugena in
    the sense of "born in the holy (island)" = Ireland. But the name
    Scotus, occurring without the Ierugena, is common in old MSS.;
    and it is almost impossible that any save a Scot of Ireland should
    have possessed the scholarship of John in the ninth century. In
    the west, Greek scholarship and philosophy had been special to
    Ireland from the time of Pelagius; and it is from Greek sources
    that John draws his inspiration and cast of thought. M. Taillandier
    not unjustly calls the Ireland of that era "l'île des saints,
    mais aussi l'île des libres penseurs." (Scot Érigène et la
    philosophie scolastique, 1843, p. 64.) To the same effect Huber,
    pp. 40-41. In writing that Johannes "was of Scottish nationality,
    but was probably born and brought up in Ireland," Ueberweg (i,
    358) obscures the fact that the people of Ireland were the Scoti
    of that period. All the testimony goes to show "that Ireland
    was called Scotia, and its ruling people Scoti, from the first
    appearance of these names down to the eleventh century. But that
    [the] present Scotland was called Scotia, or its people Scoti,
    before the eleventh century, not so much as one single authority
    can be produced" (Pinkerton, Enquiry into the History of Scotland,
    1789, ii, 237). Irish Scots gave their name to Scotland, and it
    was adopted by the Teutonic settlers.

    While the land of John the Scot's birth is thus fairly certain, the
    place of his death remains a mystery. Out of a statement by Asser
    that King Alfred made one John, a priest, Abbot of Athelney, and
    that the said Abbot was murdered at the altar by hired assassins,
    there grew a later story that Alfred made John the Scot Abbot of
    Malmesbury, and that he was slain with the styli of two of his
    pupils. It is clear that the John of Asser was an "Old Saxon,"
    and not the philosopher; and it is difficult to doubt that the
    second story, which arises in the twelfth century, is a hearsay
    distortion of the first. Cp. Christlieb, who argues (p. 42 sq.) for
    two Johns, one of them Scotus, and both assassinated, with Huber,
    who sets forth (p. 108 sq.) the view here followed. There is really
    no adequate ground for believing that John the Scot was ever a
    priest. We know not where or when he died; but the presumption
    is that it was in France, and not long after the death of his
    patron Charles--877. (Huber, p. 121.)


Called in by Archbishop Hincmar of Rheims, himself a normally
superstitious believer, [1235] to answer Gottschalk, John Scotus in
turn was accused of heresy, as he well might be on many points of his
treatise, De Praedestinatione [1236] (851). He fiercely and not very
fairly condemned Gottschalk as a heretic, charging him with denying
both divine grace and freewill, but without disposing of Gottschalk's
positive grounds; and arguing that God could not be the cause of sin,
as if Gottschalk had not said the same thing. His superior speculative
power comes out in his undertaking to show that for the Divine Being
sin is non-ens; and that therefore that Being cannot properly be said
either to foreknow or to predestinate, or to punish. But the argument
becomes inconsistent inasmuch as it further affirms Deity to have
so constituted the order of things that sin punishes itself. [1237]
It is evident that in assimilating his pantheistic conceptions he
had failed to think out their incompatibility with any theistic
dogma whatever; his reasoning, on the whole, being no more coherent
than Gottschalk's. He had in fact set out from an arbitrary theistic
position that was at once Judaic, Christian, and Platonic, and went
back on one line to the Gnostics; while on another his argument
that sin has no real existence is a variant from an old thesis--made
current, as we saw, by Euclides of Megara--with which orthodoxy had
met the Manicheans. [1238] But to the abstract doctrine he gave a new
practical point by declaring that the doctrine of hell-fire was a mere
allegory; that heaven and hell alike were states of consciousness,
not places. [1239] And if such concrete freethinking were not enough
to infuriate the orthodox, they had from him the most explicit
declarations that authority is derivable solely from reason. [1240]

In philosophy proper he must be credited, despite his inconsistency,
with deep and original thought. [1241] Like every theologian of
philosophic capacity before and since, he passes into pantheism
as soon as he grapples closely with the difficulties of theism,
and "the expressions which he uses are identical with those which
were afterwards employed by Spinoza.... It was a tradition of the
fourth or fifth century transferred to the ninth, an echo from
Alexandria." [1242] Condemned by Pope Nicholas I and by two Church
Councils, [1243] his writings none the less availed to keep that echo
audible to later centuries.

The range and vigour of his practical rationalism may be gathered from
his attitude in the controversy begun by the abbot Paschasius Radbert
(831) on the nature of the Eucharist. Paschasius taught that there was
a real transformation of the bread and wine into the divine body and
blood; and the doctrine, thus nakedly put, startled the freer scholars
of the time, who were not yet habituated to Latin orthodoxy. Another
learned monk, Ratramnus, who had written a treatise on predestination
at the request of the rationalizing emperor, Charles the Bald
(discussing the problem in Gottschalk's sense [1244] without naming
him), produced on the same monarch's invitation a treatise in which
transubstantiation was denied, and the "real presence" was declared
to be spiritual [1245]--a view already known to Paschasius as being
held by some. [1246] John Scotus, also asked by the emperor to write
on the subject, went so far as to argue that the bread and wine were
merely symbols and memorials. [1247] As usual, the irrational doctrine
became that of the Church; [1248] but the other must have wrought for
reason in secret. For the rest, he set forth the old "modal" view of
the Trinity, resolving it into the different conceptual aspects of
the universe, and thus propounding one more vital heresy. [1249]

Nothing but a succession of rationalizing emperors could have secured
continuance for such teaching as that of Ratramnus and John the
Scot. For a time, the cruelty meted out to Gottschalk kept up feeling
in favour of his views; Bishop Remigius of Lyons condemned Hincmar's
treatment of him; and others sought to maintain his positions, with
modifications, though Hincmar carried resolutions condemning them at
the second Synod of Chiersy. On the other hand, Archbishop Wenilo of
Sens, Bishop Prudentius of Troyes, and Florus, a deacon of Lyons,
all wrote against the doctrines of John the Scot; and the second
Synod of Valence (855), while opposing Hincmar and affirming duplex
predestination, denounced with fury the reasonings of John the Scot,
ascribing them to his nation as a whole. [1250] The pope taking the
same line, the fortunes of the rationalistic view of the eucharist and
of hell-fire were soon determined for the Middle Ages, though in the
year 950 we find the Archbishop of Canterbury confronted by English
ecclesiastics who asserted that there was no transubstantiation, the
elements being merely a figure of the body and blood of Christ. [1251]

The economic explanation clearly holds alike as regards the attack
on John and the condemnation of Gottschalk for a doctrine which had
actually been established for centuries, on the authority of Augustine,
as strict orthodoxy. In Augustine's time, the determining pressures
were not economic: a bankrupt world was seeking to explain its fate;
and Augustine had merely carried a majority with him against Pelagius,
partly by his personal influence, partly by force of the fatalist
mood of the time. But in the renascent world of Gottschalk's day the
economic exploitation of fear had been carried several stages forward
by the Church; and the question of predestination had a very direct
financial bearing. The northern peoples, accustomed to compound for
crimes by money payments, had so readily played into the hands of
the priesthood by their eagerness to buy surcease of purgatorial
pain that masses for the dead and "penitential certificates" were
main sources of ecclesiastical revenue. Therefore the condemnations
of such abuses passed by the Councils, on the urging of the more
thoughtful clergy, were constantly frustrated by the plain pecuniary
interest of the priests. [1252] It even appears that the eucharist
was popularly regarded not as a process of religious "communion,"
but as a magical rite objectively efficacious for bodily preservation
in this life and the next. Thus it came about that often "priests
presented the offering of the mass alone and by themselves, without
any participation of the congregation." [1253]

If then it were to be seriously understood that the future lot of
all was foreordained, all expenditure on masses for the dead, or to
secure in advance a lightening of purgatorial penance, or even to buy
off penance on earth, was so much waste; and the Teutons were still
as ready as other barbarians to make their transactions with Church,
God, and the saints a matter of explicit bargain. [1254] Gottschalk,
accordingly, had to be put down, in the general interests of the
Church. It could not truthfully be pretended that he deviated from
Augustine, for he actually held by the "semi-Pelagian" inconsistency
that God predestinates good, but merely foreknows evil. [1255]
There was in fact no clear opposition between his affirmations and
those of Rabanus Maurus, who also professed to be an Augustinian;
but the latter laid forensic stress on the "desire" of God that all
men should be saved, and on the formula that Christ died for all;
while Gottschalk, more honestly, insisted that predestination is
predestination, and applied the principle not merely, as had been
customary, to the future state of the good, but to that of the bad,
[1256] insisting on a prædestinatio duplex. His own fate was thus
economically predestinate; and he was actually tortured by the scourge
till he cast into the fire his written defence, "a document which
contained nothing but a compilation of testimonies from Scripture,
and from the older church-teachers." [1257]


    Gottschalk later challenged a fourfold ordeal of "boiling water,
    oil, and pitch." His primary doctrine had been the immutability
    of the divine will; but he brought himself to the belief that
    God would work a miracle in his favour. His conception of
    "foreordination" was thus framed solely with regard to the
    conception of a future state. The ordeal was not granted, the
    orthodox party fearing to try conclusions, and he died without
    the sacraments, rather than recant. Then began the second reaction
    of feeling against his chief persecutor, Hincmar. Neander, vi, 190.

    A recent writer, who handles very intelligently and temperately
    the problem of persecution, urges that in that connection "one
    ought not to lay great stress on the old argument of the Hallam
    and Macaulay school as to the strength of vested interests, though
    it has a certain historical importance, because the priest must
    subsist somehow" (Religious Persecution: a Study in Psychology,
    by E. S. P. Haynes, 1904, p. 4). If the "certain importance" be in
    the ratio of the certainty of the last adduced fact, the legitimate
    "stress" on the argument in question would seem sufficient for most
    purposes. The writer adds the note: "It is not unfair, however,
    to quote the case of Dr. Middleton, who, writing to Lord Radnor
    in 1750 in respect of his famous work on Miracles, admits frankly
    enough that he would never have given the clergy any trouble, had
    he received some good appointment in the church." If the essayist
    has met with no other historic fact illustrative of the play of
    vested interests in ecclesiastical history, it is extremely candid
    of him to mention that one. Later on, however, he commits himself
    to the proposition that "the history of medieval persecution leads
    one to infer that the clergy as a whole were roused to much greater
    activity by menaces to their material comforts in this world than
    by an altruistic anxiety for the fate of lay souls in the next"
    (id. p. 60. Cp. p. 63). This amount of "stress" on vested interests
    will probably satisfy most members of the Hallam and Macaulay
    school; and is ample for the purposes of the present contention.


From this point onward, the slow movement of new ideas may for
a time be conveniently traced on two general lines--one that of
the philosophic discussion in the schools, reinforced by Saracen
influences, the other that of partially rationalistic and democratic
heresy among the common people, by way first of contagion from
the East. The latter was on the whole as influential for sane
thought as the former, apart from such ecclesiastical freethinking
as that of Berengar of Tours and Roscelin (Rousselin), Canon of
Compiègne. Berengar (c. 1050) was led by moral reflection [1258]
to doubt the priestly miracle of the Eucharist, and thenceforth he
entered into a stormy controversy on the subject, in the course of
which he twice recanted under bodily fear, but passionately returned
to his original positions. Fundamentally sincere, and indignantly
resentful of the gross superstition prevailing in the Church, he
struck fiercely in his writings at Popes Leo IX and Nicholas II and
Archbishop Lanfranc, [1259] all of whom had opposed him. At length,
after much strife, he threw up the contest, spending the latter part
of his long life in seclusion; Pope Gregory VII, who was personally
friendly to him, having finally shielded him from persecution. It
seems clear that, though accused, with others of his school, of
rejecting certain of the gospel miracles, [1260] he never became a
disbeliever; his very polemic testifying to the warmth of his belief
on his own lines. His teaching, however, which went far by reason of
the vividness of his style, doubtless had the effect of promoting not
only the rationalistic-Christian view of the Eucharist, [1261] but a
criticism which went further, inasmuch as his opponents forced on the
bystanders the question as to what reality there was in the Christian
creed if his view were true. [1262] All such influences, however, were
but slight in total mass compared with the overwhelming weight of the
economic interest of the priesthood; and not till the Reformation was
Berengar's doctrine accepted by a single organized sect. The orthodox
doctrine, in fact, was all-essential to the Catholic Church. Given the
daily miracle of the "real presence," the Church had a vital hold on
the Christian world, and the priest was above all lay rivalry. Seeing
as much, the Council of the Lateran (1059) met the new criticism by
establishing the technical doctrine of the real presence for the
first time as an article of faith; and as such it will doubtless
stand while there is a Catholic priesthood. Berengar's original view
must have been shared by thousands; but no Catholic carried on his
propaganda. The question had become one of life and death.


    Berengar's forced prevarications, which are unsympathetically
    set forth by Mosheim (11 Cent., pt. ii, ch. iii, §§ 13-18), are
    made much more intelligible in the sympathetic survey of Neander
    (vi, 225-60). See also the careful inquiry of Reuter, Gesch. der
    religiösen Aufklärung im Mittelalter, i, 91 sq. As to Berengar's
    writings, see further Murdock's note to Mosheim, last cit.,
    § 18. The formal compromise forced on him by Pope Hildebrand,
    who was personally friendly to him, consisted in adding to his
    denial of the change of the bread and wine into "body and blood"
    the doctrine that the body and blood were "superadded to the bread
    and wine in and by their consecration." This formula, of course,
    did not represent the spirit of Berengar's polemic. As to the
    disputes on the subject, which ran to the most unseemly length
    of physiological detail, see Voltaire, Essai sur les Moeurs,
    ch. xlv. It is noteworthy that Augustine had very expressly
    set forth a metaphorical interpretation of the Eucharist--De
    doctrina christiana, l. iii, c. 16. But just as the Church later
    set aside the verdict of Thomas Aquinas that the Virgin Mary was
    "born in sin," so did it reverse Augustine's judgment on the
    Eucharist. Always the more irrational view carried the day,
    as being more propitious to sacerdotal claims.


So far as the Church by her keenly self-regarding organization
could attain it, all opinion was kept within the strict bounds of her
official dogma, in which life in the Middle Ages so long stagnated. For
centuries, despite the turmoil of many wars--which, indeed, helped
to arrest thought--the life of the mind presented a uniformity hardly
now conceivable. The common expectation of the ending of the world, in
the year 1000, in particular had an immense prepotency of paralysing
men's spirits; and the grooves of habit thus fixed were hard to
alter. For most men, the notion of possible innovation in thought did
not exist: the usual was the sacred: the very ideal of an improvement
or reformation, when it arose, was one of reaching back to a far-away
perfection of the past, never of remoulding things on lines laid
down by reason. Yet even into this half-stifled world there entered,
by eastern ways, and first in the guise of rude demotic departures
from priestly prescription, the indestructible spirit of change.




§ 3. POPULAR ANTI-CLERICAL HERESY

The first Western traces of the imported Paulician heresy are about the
year 1000, [1263] when a rustic of Châlons is heard of as destroying a
cross and a religious picture, and asserting that the prophets are not
wholly to be believed. [1264] From this time forward, the world having
begun to breathe again after the passing of the year 1000 without any
sign of the Day of Judgment, heresy begins to multiply, the chief
movers being "distinguished by a tendency to rationalism." [1265]
In 1010 there is a trace of it in Aquitaine. [1266] In the year
1022 (or, as the date is sometimes put, in 1017) we hear of the
unveiling of a secret society of rationalizing mystics at Orleans,
ten canons of one church being members. [1267] An Italian woman
was said to be the founder, and thirteen were burned alive on their
refusal to recant. According to the records, they denied all miracles,
including the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection; rejected baptism and
the miracle of the Eucharist; took the old "Docetic" view of Jesus,
denying his actual humanity; and affirmed the eternity of matter and
the non-creation of the world. They were also accused, like the first
Christians, of promiscuous nocturnal orgies and of eating sacrificed
infants; but unless such charges are to be held valid in the other
case, they cannot be here. [1268] The stories told of the Manichean
community who lived in the castle of Monforte, near Asti in Lombardy,
in the years 1025-1040, and who at length were likewise burned alive,
are similarly mixed with fable. [1269] On this case it is recorded
that, while the Archbishop of Milan investigated the heresy, the
burning of the victims was the work of the fanatical populace of Milan,
and was done against his will.

A less savage treatment may have made possible the alleged success
of Gerhard, bishop of Cambray and Arras, in reconciling to the
Church at Arras, in 1025 or 1030, a number of laymen--also said to
have been taught by an Italian--who as a body rejected all external
worship, setting aside priestly baptism and the sacraments, penance
and images, funeral rites, holy oil, church bells, cross-worship,
altars, and even churches, and denied the necessity of an order
of priests. [1270] Few of the Protestants of a later age were so
thorough-going; but the fact that many of the sect stood to the old
Marcionite veto on marriage and the sexual instinct gives to their
propaganda its own cast of fanaticism. This last tenet it seemingly
was that gave the Paulicians their common Greek name of cathari,
[1271] "the pure," corrupted or assimilated in Italian to gazzari,
whence presumably the German word for heretic, Ketzer. [1272] Such
a doctrine had the double misfortune that if acted on it left the
sect without the normal recruitment of members' children, while if
departed from it brought on them the stigma of wanton hypocrisy; and
as a matter of fact every movement of the kind, ancient and modern,
seems to have contained within it the two extremes of asceticism and
licence, the former generating the latter.

It could hardly, however, have been the ascetic doctrine that won for
the new heresy its vogue in medieval Europe; nor is it likely that the
majority of the heretics even professed it. If, on the other hand, we
ask how it was that in an age of dense superstition so many uneducated
people were found to reject so promptly the most sacrosanct doctrines
of the Church, it seems hardly less difficult to account for the
phenomenon on the bare ground of their common sense. Critical common
sense there must have been, to allow of it at all; but it is reasonable
to suppose that then, as clearly happened later at the Reformation,
common sense had a powerful stimulus in pecuniary interest.

With the evidence as to Christian practice in the fourth century
on the one hand, and the later evidence as to clerical life on the
other, we are certain of a common play of financial motive throughout
the Middle Ages. And whereas it is intelligible that such rapacity
as we have seen described by Libanius should evoke a heresy which
rejected alike religious ceremonial and the claims of the priest,
it is further reasonable to surmise that resentment of priestly
rapacity and luxury helped men to similar heresy in Western Europe
when the doctrine reached them. If any centuries are to be singled
out as those of maximum profligacy and extortion among the clergy,
they are the ninth and the three following. [1273] It had been part of
the policy of Charlemagne everywhere to strengthen the hands of the
clergy by way of checking the power of the nobles; [1274] and in the
disorder after his death the conflicting forces were in semi-anarchic
competition. The feudal habit of appointing younger sons and underlings
to livings wherever possible; the disorders and strifes of the papacy;
and the frequent practice of dispossessing priests to reward retainers,
thereby driving the dispossessed to plunder on their own account, must
together have created a state of things almost past exaggeration. It
was a matter of course that the clergy on their part should make the
utmost possible use of their influence over men's superstitious fears
in order to acquire bequests of lands; [1275] and such bequests in
turn exasperated the heirs thus disinherited.

Thus orthodoxy and heterodoxy alike had strong economic motives;
and in these may be placed a main part of the explanation of the
gross savagery of persecution now normal in the Church. Such a heresy
as that of Gottschalk, we saw, by denying to the priest all power
of affecting the predestined course of things here or hereafter,
logically imperilled the very existence of the whole hierarchy, and
was by many resented accordingly. The same principle entered into
the controversies over the Eucharist. Still more would the clergy
resent the new Manichean heresy, of which every element, from the
Euchite tenet of the necessity of personal prayer and mortification,
as against the innate demon, to the rejection of all the rites of
normal worship and all the pretensions of priests, was radically
hostile to the entire organization of the Church. When the heretics
in due course developed a priestly system of their own, [1276] the
hostility was only the more embittered.

The crisis was the more acute, finally, because in the latter part of
the tenth century the common expectation that the world would end with
the year 1000 had inspired enormous donations to the Church, [1277]
with a proportionally oppressive effect on the general population,
moving them to economic self-defence. It is in fact clear that
an anti-clerical element entered largely into the beginnings of
the communal movement in France in the eleventh century. In 1024
we find the citizens of Cambrai forming a league to drive out the
canons; [1278] and though that beginning of revolt was crushed out
by massacre, the same spirit expressed itself in heresy. The result
was that religious persecution ere long eclipsed political. Bishop
Wazon of Lüttich (d. 1048) in vain protested against the universal
practice of putting the heretics to death. [1279] Manicheans who
were detected in 1052 at Goslar, in Germany, were hanged, [1280]
a precedent being thus established in the day of small things.

All this went on while the course of the papacy was so scandalous
to the least exacting moral sense that only the ignorance of the
era could sustain any measure of reverence for the Church as an
institution. In the year 963 the ablest of the emperors of that
age, Otto the Great, had the consent of the people of Rome to his
deposition of Pope John XII, a disorderly youth of twenty-five,
"the most profligate if not the most guilty of all who have worn
the tiara," [1281] and to his appointing the Pope in future; but
Teutonic administration soon drove the populace to repeated revolt,
quenched by massacre, till at length John returned, speedily to
be slain by a wronged husband. Economic interest entered largely
into the subsequent attempts of the Romans to choose their own
Pope and rule their own city, and into the contrary claim of the
emperors to do both; and in the nature of things the usually absent
emperors could only spasmodically carry their point. The result was
an epoch of riotous disorder in the papacy. Between John and Leo IX
(955-1048) six popes were deposed, two murdered, and one mutilated;
[1282] and the Church was a mere battle-ground of the factions of the
Roman and Italian nobility. [1283] At last, in 1047, "a disgraceful
contest between three claimants of the papal chair shocked even the
reckless apathy of Italy"; [1284] and the emperor Henry III deposed
them all and appointed a pope of his own choosing, the clergy again
consenting. Soon, however, as before, the local claim was revived;
and in the papacy of the powerful Gregory VII, known as Hildebrand,
the head of the Church determinedly asserted its autonomy and his own
autocracy. Then came the long "war of the investitures" between the
popes and the emperors, in which the former were substantially the
gainers. The result was, in addition to the endless miseries set up
by war, a systematic development of that financial corruption which
already had been scandalous enough. The cathedral chapters and the
nobles traded in bishoprics; the popes sold their ratifications for
great sums; the money was normally borrowed by the bishops from the
papal usurers; and there was witnessed throughout Europe the spectacle
of the Church denouncing all usury as sin, while its own usurers were
scrupulously protected, the bishops paying to them their interest
from the revenues they were able to extort. [1285] Satirical comment
naturally abounded wherever men had any knowledge of the facts; and
what current literature there was reflected the feeling on all sides.

The occurrence of the first and second crusades, the work
respectively of Peter the Hermit and St. Bernard, created a period
of new fanaticism, somewhat unfavourable to heresy; but even in that
period the new sects were at work, [1286] and in the twelfth century,
when crusading had become a mere feudal conspiracy of conquest and
plunder, [1287] heresy reappeared, to be duly met by slaughter. A
perfect ferment of anti-clerical heresy had arisen in Italy, France,
and Flanders. [1288] At Orvieto, in Italy, the heretics for a time
actually had the mastery, and were put down only after a bloody
struggle. [1289] In France, for a period of twenty years from 1106,
Peter de Brueys opposed infant baptism, the use of churches, holy
crosses, prayers for the dead (the great source of clerical income),
and the doctrine of the Real Presence in the eucharist (the main
source of their power), and so set up the highly heretical sect of
Petrobrussians. [1290] Driven from his native district of Vallonise,
he long maintained himself in Gascony, till at length he was seized
and burned (1126 or 1130). The monk Henry (died in prison 1148)
took a similar line, directly denouncing the clergy in Switzerland
and France; as did Tanquelin in Flanders (killed by a priest, 1125);
though in his case there seems to have been as much of religious
hallucination as of the contrary. [1291] A peasant, Eudo of Stella
(who died in prison), is said to have half-revolutionized Brittany
with his anti-ecclesiastical preaching. [1292] The more famous monk
Arnold of Brescia (strangled and burned in 1155), a pupil of Abailard,
but orthodox in his theology and austere in his life, simplified his
plan of reform (about 1139) into a proposal that the whole wealth of
the clergy, from the pope to the monks, should be transferred to the
civil power, leaving churchmen to lead a spiritual life on voluntary
offerings. [1293] For fifteen years the stir of his movement lasted
in Lombardy, till at length his formation of a republic at Rome forced
the papacy to combine with the Emperor Frederick II, who gave Arnold up
to death. But though his movement perished, anti-clericalism did not;
and heretical sects of some kind persisted here and there, in despite
of the Church, till the age of the Reformation. In Italy, during
the age of the Renaissance, all alike were commonly called paterini
or patarini--a nickname which seems to come from pataria, a Milanese
word meaning "popular faction" or "rowdies." [1294] Thus in the whole
movement of fresh popular thought there is a manifest connection with
the democratic movement in politics, though in the schools the spirit
of discussion and dialectic had no similar relationship.

During the first half of the century its warfare with the emperors,
and the frequent appointment of anti-popes, prevented any systematic
policy on the part of the Holy See, [1295] repression being mostly
left to the local ecclesiastical authorities. It was in 1139 that
Innocent II issued the first papal decree against Cathari, expelling
them from the Church and calling on the temporal power to give full
effect to their excommunication. [1296] In 1163 Pope Alexander III,
being exiled from Rome by Frederick I and the anti-pope Victor, called
a great council at Tours, where again a policy of excommunication was
decided on, the secular authorities being commanded to imprison the
excommunicated and confiscate their property, but not to slay them. In
the same year some Cathari arrested at Cologne had been sentenced to
be burned; but the Council did not go so far. As a result the decree
had little or no effect. [1297]

So powerless was the Church at this stage that in 1167 the Cathari held
a council of their own near Toulouse; a bishop of their order, Nicetas,
coming from Constantinople to preside; and a whole system of French
sees was set on foot. [1298] So numerous had the Cathari now become
that their highest grade, the perfecti, alone was reckoned to number
4,000; [1299] and from this time it is of Cathari that we read in the
rolls of persecution. About 1170 four more of them, from Flanders, were
burned at Cologne; and others, of the higher grade called bos homes
(= boni homines, "good men"), at Toulouse. In 1179, the heresy still
gaining ground, an oecumenical council (the Third Lateran) was held at
Rome under Pope Alexander III, decreeing afresh their excommunication,
and setting up a new machinery of extirpation by proclaiming a
crusade at once against the orderly heretics of southern France and
the companies of openly irreligious freebooters who had arisen as a
result of many wars and much misgovernment. To all who joined in the
crusade was offered an indulgence of two years. In the following year
Henry of Clairvaux, Cardinal of Albano, took the matter in hand as
papal plenipotentiary; and in 1181 he raised a force of horse and foot
and fell upon the ill-defended territory of the Viscount of Beziers,
where many heretics, including the daughter of Raymond of Toulouse,
had taken refuge. The chief stronghold was captured, with two Catharist
bishops, who renounced their heresy, and were promptly given prebends
in Toulouse. Many others submitted; but as soon as the terms for which
the crusaders had enlisted were over and the army disbanded, they
returned to their heretical practices. [1300] Two years later an army
collected in central France made a campaign against the freebooters,
slaying thousands in one battle, hanging fifteen hundred after another,
and blinding eighty more. But freebooting also continued. [1301]

The first crusade against heresy having failed, it was left by the
papacy for a number of years to itself; though anti-pope Lucius III in
1184 sought to set up an Inquisition; and in 1195 a papal legate held a
council at Montpellier, seeking to create another crusade. The zeal of
the faithful was mainly absorbed in Palestine; while the nobles at home
were generally at war with each other. Heresy accordingly continued to
flourish, though there was never any suspension of local persecution
outside of Provence, where the heretics were now in a majority,
having more theological schools and scholars than the Church. [1302]
In France in particular, in the early years of the reign of Philip
Augustus (suc. 1180), many paterini were put to death by burning;
[1303] and the clergy at length persuaded the king to expel the Jews,
the work being done almost as cruelly as it was two centuries later
in Spain. In England, where there was thus far little heresy, it
was repressed by Henry II. Some thirty rustics came from Flanders
in 1166, fleeing persecution, and vainly sought to propagate their
creed. Zealous to prove his orthodoxy in the period of his quarrel
with Becket, Henry presided over a council of bishops called by him
at Oxford to discuss the case; and the heretics were condemned to
be scourged, branded in the face, and driven forth--to perish in the
winter wilds. "England was not hospitable to heresy;" and practically
her orthodoxy was "unsullied until the rise of Wiclif." [1304]

In southern Europe and northern Italy in the last quarter of
the century a foremost place began to be taken by the sect of the
Waldenses, or Vaudois (otherwise the Poor Men of Lyons), which--whether
deriving from ancient dissent surviving in the Vaux or Valleys of
Piedmont, [1305] or taking its name and character from the teaching
of the Lyons merchant, Peter Waldus, or an earlier Peter of Vaux
or Valdis [1306]--conforms substantially to the general heretical
tendencies of that age, in that it rejected the papal authority,
contended for the reading of the Bible by the laity, condemned tithes,
disparaged fasting, stipulated for poverty on the part of priests
and denied their special status, opposed prayers for the dead,
and preached peace and non-resistance. In 1199, at Metz, they were
found in possession of a French translation of the New Testament,
the Psalms, and the book of Job--a new and startling invasion of the
priestly power in the west. Above all, their men and women alike went
about preaching in the towns, in the houses, and in the churches,
and administered the eucharist without priests. [1307] Thus Cathari,
Paterini, Manicheans, and non-Manichean Albigenses and Waldenses were
on all fours for the Church, as opponents of its economic claims;
and when at length, under Celestine III and Innocent III, the Holy
See began to be consolidated after a long period of incessant change,
[1308] desperate measures began to be contemplated. Organized heresy
was seen to be indestructible save by general extirpation; and on
economic grounds it was not to be tolerated. At Orvieto the heresy
stamped out with blood in 1125 was found alive again in 1150; was
again put down in 1163 by burning, hanging, and expulsion; and yet
was again found active at the close of the century. [1309] In 1198
Innocent III is found beginning a new Inquisition among the Albigenses;
and in 1199, while threatening them with exile and confiscation, [1310]
he made a last diplomatic attempt to force the obstinately heretical
people of Orvieto to take an oath of fidelity in the year 1199. It
ended in the killing of his representative by the people. [1311]
The papacy accordingly laid plans to destroy the enemy at its centre
of propagation.




§ 4. HERESY IN SOUTHERN FRANCE

In Provence and Languedoc, the scene of the first great papal crusade
against anti-clerical heresy, there were represented all the then
existing forces of popular freethought; and the motives of the crusade
were equally typical of the cause of authority.

1. In addition to the Paulician and other movements of religious
rationalism above noted, the Languedoc region was a centre of
semi-popular literary culture, which was to no small extent
anti-clerical, and by consequence somewhat anti-religious. The
Latin-speaking jongleurs or minstrels, known as Goliards, [1312]
possessing as they did a clerical culture, were by their way of
life committed to a joyous rather than an ascetic philosophy;
and though given to blending the language of devotion with that of
the drinking-table, very much after the fashion of Hafiz, they were
capable of burlesquing the mass, the creed, hymns to the Virgin, the
Lord's Prayer, confessions, and parts of the gospels, as well as of
keenly satirizing the endless abuses of the Church. [1313] "One is
astonished to meet, in the Middle Ages, in a time always represented
as crushed under the yoke of authority, such incredible audacities on
the papacy, the episcopacy, chivalry, on the most revered dogmas of
religion, such as paradise, hell, etc." [1314] The rhymers escaped
simply because there was no police that could catch them. Denounced
by some of the stricter clergy, they were protected by others. They
were, in fact, the minstrels of the free-living churchmen. [1315]

Of this type is Guiot of Provence, a Black Friar, the author of La
Bible Guiot, written between 1187 and 1206. He is a lover of good
living, a champion of aristocrats, a foe of popular movements, [1316]
and withal a little of a buffoon. But it is to be counted to him for
righteousness that he thought the wealth devoured by the clergy might
be more usefully spent on roads, bridges, and hospitals. [1317] He has
also a good word for the old pagans who lived "according to reason";
and as to his own time, he is sharply censorious alike of princes,
pope, and prelates. The princes are rascals who "do not believe in
God," and depress their nobility; and the breed of the latter has sadly
degenerated. The pope is to be prayed for; but he is ill counselled
by his cardinals, who conform to the ancient tendency of Rome to
everything evil; many of the archbishops and bishops are no better;
and the clergy in general are eaten up by greed and simony. [1318]
This is in fact the common note. [1319]

A kindred spirit is seen in much of the verse alike of the northern
Trouvères and the southern Troubadours. A modern Catholic historian
of medieval literature complains that their compositions "abound with
the severest ridicule of such persons and of such things as, in the
temper of the age, were highly estimated and most generally revered,"
and notes that in consequence they were ranked by the devout as
"lewd and impious libertines." [1320] In particular they satirized
the practice of excommunication and the use made by the Church of
hell and purgatory as sources of revenue. [1321] Their anti-clerical
poetry having been as far as possible destroyed by the Inquisition, its
character has to be partly inferred from the remains of the northern
trouvères--e.g., Ruteboeuf and Raoul de Houdan, of whom the former
wrote a Voya de Paradis, in which Sloth is a canon and Pride a bishop,
both on their way to heaven; while Raoul has a Songe d'enfer in which
hell is treated in a spirit of the most audacious burlesque. [1322]
In a striking passage of the old tale Aucassin et Nicolette there is
naïvely revealed the spontaneous revolt against pietism which underlay
all these flings of irreverence. "Into paradise," cries Aucassin,
"go none but ... those aged priests, and those old <DW36>s, and
the maimed, who all day long and all night cough before the altars,
and in the crypts beneath the churches; those ... who are naked and
barefoot and full of sores.... Such as these enter in paradise, and
with them have I nought to do. But in hell will I go. For to hell
go the fair clerks and the fair knights who are slain in the tourney
and the great wars, and the stout archer and the loyal man. With them
will I go. And there go the fair and courteous ladies [of many loves];
and there pass the gold and the silver, the ermine and all rich furs,
harpers and minstrels, and the happy of the world. With these will I
go...." [1323] It was such a temper, rather than reasoned unbelief,
that inspired the blasphemous parodies in Reynard the Fox and other
popular works of the Middle Ages.

The Provençal literature, further, was from the first influenced by
the culture of the Saracens, [1324] who held Sicily and Calabria in
the ninth and tenth centuries, and had held part of Languedoc itself
for a few years in the eighth. On the passing of the duchy of Provence
to Raymond Berenger, Count of Barcelona, at the end of the eleventh
century, not only were the half-Saracenized Catalans mixed with the
Provençals, but Raymond and his successors freely introduced the arts
and science of the Saracens into their dominion. [1325] In the Norman
kingdom of Sicily too the Saracen influence was great even before
the time of Frederick II; and thence it reached afresh through Italy
to Provence, [1326] carrying with it everywhere, by way of poetry, an
element of anti-clerical and even of anti-Christian rationalism. [1327]
Though this spirit was not that of the Cathari and Waldenses, yet the
fact that the latter strongly condemned the Crusades [1328] was a point
in common between them and the sympathizers with Saracen culture. And
as the tolerant Saracen schools of Spain or the Christian schools
of the same region, which copied their curriculum, [1329] were in
that age resorted to by youth from each of the countries of western
Europe for scientific teaching [1330]--all the latest medical and
most other scientific knowledge being in their hands--the influence
of such culture must have been peculiarly strong in Provence. [1331]

The medieval mystery-plays and moralities, already common in Provence,
mixed at times with the normal irreverence of illiterate faith [1332]
a vein of surprisingly pronounced skeptical criticism, [1333] which
at the least was a stimulus to critical thought among the auditors,
even if they were supposed to take it as merely dramatic. Inasmuch as
the drama was hereditarily pagan, and had been continually denounced
and ostracized by Fathers and Councils, [1334] it would be natural
that its practitioners, even when in the service of the Church,
should be unbelievers.

The philosophy and science of both the Arabs and the Spanish Jews
were specially cultivated in the Provence territory. The college of
Montpellier practised on Arab lines medicine, botany, and mathematics;
and the Jews, who had been driven from Spain by the Almohades, had
flourishing schools at Narbonne, Beziers, Nîmes, and Carcassonne,
as well as Montpellier, and spread alike the philosophy of Averroës
and the semi-rational theology of the Jewish thinker Maimonides,
[1335] whose school held broadly by Averroïsm.

For the rest, every one of the new literary influences that were
assailing the Church would tend to flourish in such a civilization as
that of Languedoc, which had been peaceful and prosperous for over two
hundred years. Unable to lay hold of the popular poets and minstrels
who propagated anti-clericalism, the papacy could hope to put down
by brute force the social system in which they flourished, crushing
the pious and more hated heretic with the scoffer. And Languedoc
was a peculiarly tempting field for such operations. Its relative
lack of military strength, as well as its pre-eminence in heresy,
led Innocent III, a peculiarly zealous assertor of the papal power,
[1336] to attack it in preference to other and remoter centres of
enmity. In the first year of his pontificate, 1198, he commenced a new
and zealous Inquisition [1337] in the doomed region; and in the year
1207, when as much persecution had been accomplished as the lax faith
of the nobility and many of the bishops would consent to--an appeal
to the King of France to interfere being disregarded--the scheme
of a crusade against the dominions of Raymond Count of Toulouse was
conceived and gradually matured. The alternate weakness and obstinacy
of Raymond, and the fresh provocation given by the murder, in 1208,
of the arrogant papal legate, Pierre de Castelnau, [1338] permitted
the success of the scheme in such hands. The crusade was planned
exactly on the conditions of those against the Saracens--the heretics
at home being declared far worse than they. [1339] The crusaders
were freed from payment of interest on their debts, exempted from
the jurisdiction of all law courts, and absolved from all their
sins past or future. [1340] To earn this reward they were to give
only forty days' service [1341]--a trifle in comparison with the
hardships of the crusades to Palestine. "Never therefore had the
cross been taken up with a more unanimous consent." [1342] Bishops
and nobles in Burgundy and France, the English Simon de Montfort,
the Abbot of Citeaux, and the Bernardine monks throughout Europe,
combined in the cause; and recruits came from Austria and Saxony, from
Bremen, even from Slavonia, as well as from northern France. [1343]
The result was such a campaign of crime and massacre as European
history cannot match. [1344] Despite the abject submission of the
Count of Toulouse, who was publicly stripped and scourged, and
despite the efforts of his nephew the Count of Albi to make terms,
village after village was fired, all heretics caught were burned, and
on the capture of the city and castle of Beziers (1209), every man,
woman, and child within the walls was slaughtered, many of them in the
churches, whither they had run for refuge. The legate, Arnold abbot
of Citeaux, being asked at an early stage how the heretics were to be
distinguished from the faithful, gave the never-to-be-forgotten answer,
"Kill all; God will know his own." [1345] Seven thousand dead bodies
were counted in the great church of St. Mary Magdalene. The legate
in writing estimated the total quarry at 15,000; others put the
number at sixty thousand. [1346] When all in the place were slain,
and all the plunder removed, the town was burned to the ground,
not one house being left standing. Warned by the fate of Beziers,
the people of Carcassonne, after defending themselves for many days,
secretly evacuated their town; but the legate contrived to capture
a number of the fugitives, of whom he burned alive four hundred, and
hanged fifty. [1347] Systematic treachery, authorized and prescribed
by the Pope, [1348] completed the success of the undertaking. The
Church had succeeded, in the name of religion, in bringing half of
Europe to the attainment of the ideal height of wickedness, in that
it had learned to make evil its good; and the papacy had on the whole
come nearer to destroying the moral sense of all Christendom [1349]
than any conceivable combination of other causes could ever have done
in any age.


    According to a long current fiction, it was the Pope who first
    faltered when "the whole of Christendom demanded the renewal of
    those scenes of massacre" (Sismondi, Crusades, p. 95); but this is
    disproved by the discovery of two letters in which, shortly before
    his death, he excitedly takes on himself the responsibility for
    all the bloodshed (Michelet, Hist. de France, vii, introd. note
    to § iv). Michelet had previously accepted the legend which
    he here rejects. The bishops assembled in council at Lavaur,
    in 1213, demanded the extermination of the entire population of
    Toulouse. Finally, the papal policy is expressly decreed in the
    third canon of the Fourth General Council of Lateran, 1215. On that
    canon see The Statutes of the Fourth General Council of Lateran,
    by the Rev. John Evans, 1843. On the crusade in general, cp. Lea,
    History of the Inquisition, bk. i, ch. iv; Gieseler, Per. III,
    <DW37>. iii, § 89.


The first crusade was followed by others, in which Simon de Montfort
reached the maximum of massacre, varying his procedure by tearing
out eyes and cutting off noses when he was not hanging victims
by dozens or burning them by scores or putting them to the sword
by hundreds [1350] (all being done "with the utmost joy") [1351];
though the "White Company" organized by the Bishop of Toulouse [1352]
maintained a close rivalry. The Church's great difficulty was that
as soon as an army had bought its plenary indulgence for all possible
sin by forty days' service, it disbanded. Nevertheless, "the greater
part of the population of the countries where heresy had prevailed
was exterminated." [1353] Organized Christianity had contrived to
murder the civilization of Provence and Languedoc [1354] while the
fanatics of Islam in their comparatively bloodless manner were doing
as much for that of Moorish Spain. Heresy indeed was not rooted out:
throughout the whole of the thirteenth century the Inquisition met with
resistance in Languedoc [1355]; but the preponderance of numbers which
alone could sustain freethinking had been destroyed, and in course
of time it was eliminated by the sleepless engines of the Church.

It was owing to no lack of the principle of evil in the Christian
system, but simply to the much greater and more uncontrollable
diversity of the political elements of Christendom, that the whole
culture and intelligence of Europe did not undergo the same fate. The
dissensions and mutual injuries of the crusaders ultimately defeated
their ideal [1356]; after Simon de Montfort had died in the odour of
sanctity [1357] the crusade of Louis VIII of France in 1226 seems to
have been essentially one of conquest, there being practically no
heretics left; and the disasters of the expedition, crowned by the
king's death, took away the old prestige of the movement. Meanwhile,
the heresy of the Albigenses, and kindred ideas, had been effectually
driven into other parts of Europe [1358]; and about 1231 we find
Gregory IX burning a multitude of them at the gates of the church of
Santa Maria Maggiore in Rome [1359] and compassing their slaughter
in France and Germany. [1360] In Italy the murderous pertinacity of
the Dominicans gradually destroyed organized heresy despite frequent
and desperate resistance. About 1230 we hear of one eloquent zealot,
chosen podestà by the people of Verona, using his power to burn in one
day sixty heretics, male and female. [1361] The political heterogeneity
of Europe, happily, made variation inevitable; though the papacy,
by making the detection and persecution of heresy a means of gain to
a whole order of its servants, had set on foot a machinery for the
destruction of rational thought such as had never before existed.


    It is still common to speak of the personnel of the Inquisition as
    disinterested, and to class its crimes as "conscientious." Buckle
    set up such a thesis, without due circumspection, as a support
    to one of his generalizations. (See the present writer's ed. of
    his Introduction to the History of Civilization in England,
    pp. 105-108, notes, and the passages in McCrie and Llorente
    there cited.) Dr. Lea, whose History of the Inquisition is
    the greatest storehouse of learning on the subject, takes up a
    similar position, arguing (i, 239): "That the men who conducted
    the Inquisition, and who toiled sedulously in its arduous,
    repulsive, and often dangerous labour, were thoroughly convinced
    that they were furthering the kingdom of God, is shown by the
    habitual practice of encouraging them with the remission of sins,
    similar to that offered for a pilgrimage to the Holy Land"--a
    somewhat surprising theorem. Parallel reasoning would prove that
    soldiers never plunder and are always Godly; that the crusaders
    were all conscientious men; and that policemen never take bribes
    or commit perjury. The interpretation of history calls for a
    less simple-minded psychology. That there were devoted fanatics
    in the Inquisition as in the Church is not to be disputed; that
    both organizations had economic bases is certain; and that the
    majority of office-bearers in both, in the ages of faith, had
    regard to gain, is demonstrated by all ecclesiastical history.

    Dr. Lea's own History shows clearly enough (i, 471-533) that the
    Inquisition, from the first generation of its existence, lived
    upon its fines and confiscations. "Persecution, as a steady and
    continuous policy, rested, after all, upon confiscation.... When
    it was lacking, the business of defending the faith lagged
    lamentably" (i, 529). "But for the gains to be made out of fines
    and confiscations its [the Inquisition's] work would have been
    much less thorough, and it would have sunk into comparative
    insignificance as soon as the first frantic zeal of bigotry
    had exhausted itself" (pp. 532-33). Why, in the face of these
    avowals, "it would be unjust to say that greed and thirst for
    plunder were the impelling motives of the Inquisition" (p. 532)
    is not very clear. See below, ch. x, § 3, as to the causation
    in Spain. Cp. Mocatta, The Jews and the Inquisition, pp. 37,
    44, 52. On the Inquisition in Portugal, in turn, Professor
    W. E. Collins sums up that "it was founded for reasons ostensibly
    religious but actually fiscal" (in the "Cambridge Modern History,"
    vol. ii, The Reformation, ch. xii, p. 415). Every charge of
    economic motive that Catholicism can bring against Protestantism is
    thus balanced by the equivalent charge against its own Inquisition.




§ 5. FREETHOUGHT IN THE SCHOOLS

The indestructibility of freethought, meanwhile, was being proved
even in the philosophic schools, under all their conformities to
faith. Already in the ninth century we have seen Scotus Erigena putting
the faith in jeopardy by his philosophic defence of it. Another
thinker, Roscelin (or Roussellin: fl. 1090), is interesting as
having made a critical approach to freethought in religion by way
of abstract philosophy. With him definitely begins the long academic
debate between the Nominalists and Realists so called. In an undefined
way, it had existed as early as the ninth century, [1362] the ground
being the Christian adoption of Plato's doctrine of ideas--that
individual objects are instances or images of an ideal universal,
which is a real existence, and prior to the individual thing:
"universalia ante rem." To that proposition Aristotle had opposed the
doctrine that the universal is immanent in the thing--"universalia
in re"--the latter alone being matter of knowledge; [1363] and in the
Middle Ages those who called Aristotle master carried his negation of
Plato to the extent of insisting that the "universal" or "abstract,"
or the "form" or "species," is a mere subjective creation, a name,
having no real existence. This, the Nominalist position--mistakenly
ascribed to Aristotle [1364]--was ultimately expressed in the formula,
"universalia post rem."

Such reasonings obviously tend to implicate theology; and Roscelin
was either led or helped by his Nominalist training to deny either
explicitly or implicitly the unity of the Trinity, arguing in effect
that, as only individuals are real existences, the actuality of the
persons of the Trinity involves their disunity. [1365] The thesis,
of course, evoked a storm, the English Archbishop Anselm and others
producing indignant answers. Of Roscelin's writing only one letter
is extant; and even Anselm, in criticizing his alleged doctrine,
admits having gathered it only from his opponents, whose language
suggests perversion. [1366] But if the testimony of his pupil Abailard
be truthful, [1367] he was at best a confused reasoner; and in his
theology he got no further than tritheism, then called ditheism. [1368]
Thus, though "Nominalism, by denying any objective reality to general
notions, led the way directly to the testimony of the senses and
the conclusions of experience," [1369] it did so on lines fatally
subordinate to the theology it sought to correct. Roscelin's thesis
logically led to the denial not only of trinity-in-unity but of the
Incarnation and transubstantiation; yet neither he nor his opponents
seem to have thought even of the last consequence, he having in fact
no consciously heretical intention. Commanded to recant by the Council
of Soissons in 1092, he did so, and resumed his teaching as before;
whereafter he was ordered to leave France. Coming to England, he showed
himself so little of a rebel to the papacy as to contend strongly for
priestly celibacy, arguing that all sons of priests and all born out of
wedlock should alike be excluded from clerical office. Expelled from
England in turn for these views, by a clergy still anti-celibate,
he returned to Paris, to revive the old philosophic issue, until
general hostility drove him to Aquitaine, where he spent his closing
years in peace. [1370]

Such handling of the cause of Nominalism gave an obvious advantage
to Realism. That has been justly described by one clerical scholar
as "Philosophy held in subordination to Church-Authority"; [1371]
and another has avowed that "the spirit of Realism was essentially
the spirit of dogmatism, the disposition to pronounce that truth
was already known," while "Nominalism was essentially the spirit
of progress, of inquiry, of criticism." [1372] But even a critical
philosophy may be made to capitulate to authority, as even à priori
metaphysic may be to a certain extent turned against it. Realism had
been markedly heretical in the hands of John Scotus; and in a later
age the Realist John Huss was condemned to death--perhaps on political
grounds, but not without signs of sectarian hate--by a majority of
Nominalists at the Council of Constance. Everything depended on the
force of the individual thinker and the degree of restraint put
upon him by the authoritarian environment. [1373] The world has
even seen the spectacle of a professed indifferentist justifying
the massacre of St. Bartholomew; and the Platonist Marsilio Ficino
vilified Savonarola, basely enough, after his execution, adjusting
a pantheistic Christianity to the needs of the political situation
in Medicean Florence. Valid freethinking is a matter of thoroughness
and rectitude, not of mere theoretic assents.

Tried by that test, the Nominalism of the medieval schools was no
very potent emancipator of the human spirit, no very clear herald of
freedom or new concrete truth. A doctrine which was so far adjusted
to authority as to affirm the unquestionable existence of three
deities, Father, Son, and Spirit, and merely disputed the not more
supra-rational theorem of their unity, yielded to the rival philosophy
a superiority in the kind of credit it sought for itself. Nominalism
was thus "driven to the shade of the schools," where it was "regarded
entirely in a logical point of view, and by no means in its actual
philosophic importance as a speculation concerning the grounds of
human knowledge." [1374] For Roscelin himself the question was one of
dialectics, not of faith, and he made no practical rationalists. The
popular heresies bit rather deeper into life. [1375]


    It is doubtless true of the Paulicians that "there was no principle
    of development in their creed: it reflected no genuine freedom
    of thought" (Poole, Illustrations, p. 95); but the same thing,
    as we have seen, is clearly true of scholasticism itself. It may
    indeed be urged that "the contest between Ratramn and Paschase on
    the doctrine of the Eucharist; of Lanfranc with Berengar on the
    same subject; of Anselm with Roscelin on the nature of Universals;
    the complaints of Bernard against the dialectical theology of
    Abelard; are all illustrations of the collision between Reason
    and Authority ... varied forms of rationalism--the pure exertions
    of the mind within itself ... against the constringent force
    of the Spiritual government" (Hampden, Bampton Lectures on The
    Scholastic Philosophy, 3rd ed. p. 37; cp. Hardwick, Church History:
    Middle Age, p. 203); but none of the scholastics ever professed
    to set Authority aside. None dared. John Scotus indeed affirmed
    the identity of true religion with true philosophy, without
    professing to subordinate the latter; but the most eminent of the
    later scholastics affirmed such a subordination. "The vassalage of
    philosophy consisted in the fact that an impassable limit was fixed
    for the freedom of philosophizing in the dogmas of the Church"
    (Ueberweg, i, 357); and some of the chief dogmas were not allowed
    to be philosophically discussed; though, "with its territory thus
    limited, philosophy was indeed allowed by theology a freedom which
    was rarely and only by exception infringed upon" (ib. Cp. Milman,
    Latin Christianity, 4th ed. ix, 151). "The suspicion of originality
    was fatal to the reputation of the scholastic divine" (Hampden,
    pp. 46-47). The popular heresy, indeed, lacked the intellectual
    stimulus that came to the schools from the philosophy of Averroës;
    but it was the hardier movement of the two.


Already in the eleventh century, however, the simple fact of the
production of a new argument for the existence of God by Anselm,
Archbishop of Canterbury, is a proof that, apart from the published
disputes, a measure of doubt on the fundamental issue had arisen in
the schools. It is urged [1376] that, though the argumentation of
Anselm seems alien to the thought of his time, there is no proof that
the idea of proving the existence of God was in any way pressed on him
from the outside. It is, however, inconceivable that such an argument
should be framed if no one had raised a doubt. And as a matter of fact
the question was discussed in the schools, Anselm's treatise being
a reproduction of his teaching. The monks of Bec, where he taught,
urged him to write a treatise wherein nothing should be proved by mere
authority, but all by necessity of reason or evidence of truth, and
with an eye to objections of all sorts. [1377] In the preface to his
Cur Deus <DW25>, again, he says that his first book is an answer to the
objections of infidels who reject Christianity as irrational. [1378]
Further, the nature of part of Anselm's theistic argument and the
very able but friendly reply of Gaunilo (a Count of Montigni, who
entered a convent near Tours, 1044-1083) show that the subject was
within the range of private discussion. Anselm substantially follows
St. Augustine; [1379] and men cannot have read the ancient books
which so often spoke of atheism without confronting the atheistic
idea. It is not to be supposed that Gaunilo was an unbeliever; but
his argumentation is that of a man who had pondered the problem. [1380]

Despite the ostensibly rationalistic nature of his argument, however,
Anselm stipulated for absolute submission of the intellect to the
creed of the Church; [1381] so that the original subtitle of his
Proslogium, Fides quaerens intellectum, in no way admits rational
tests. In the next century we meet with new evidence of sporadic
unbelief, and new attempts to deal with it on the philosophic
side. John of Salisbury (1120-1180) tells of having heard many
discourse on physics "otherwise than faith may hold"; [1382] and the
same vivacious scholar put in his list of "things about which a wise
man may doubt, so ... that the doubt extend not to the multitude," some
"things which are reverently to be inquired about God himself." [1383]
Giraldus Cambrensis (1147-1223), whose abundant and credulous gossip
throws so much light on the inner life of the Church and the laity in
his age, tells that the learned Simon of Tournay "thought not soundly
on the articles of the faith," saying privately, to his intimates,
things that he dared not utter publicly, till one day, in a passion,
he cried out, "Almighty God! how long shall this superstitious sect
of Christians and this upstart invention endure?"; whereupon during
the night he lost the power of speech, and remained helpless till
his death. [1384] Other ecclesiastical chroniclers represent Simon
as deriding alike Jesus, Moses, and Mahomet--an ascription to him
of the "three impostors" formula. [1385] Again, Giraldus tells how
an unnamed priest, reproved by another for careless celebration
of the mass, angrily asked whether his rebuker really believed in
transubstantiation, in the incarnation, in the Virgin Birth, and
in resurrection; adding that it was all carried on by hypocrites,
and assuredly invented by cunning ancients to hold men in terror and
restraint. And Giraldus comments that inter nos there are many who
so think in secret. [1386] As his own picture of the Church exhibits
a gross and almost universal rapacity pervading it from the highest
clergy to the lowest, the statement is entirely credible. [1387]
Yet again, in the Romance of the Holy Grail, mention is twice made
of clerical doubters on the doctrine of the Trinity; [1388] and on
that side, in the crusading period, both the monotheistic doctrine
of Islam and the Arab philosophy of Averroës were likely to set up a
certain amount of skepticism. In the twelfth century, accordingly,
we have Nicolas of Amiens producing his tractate De articulis (or
arte) catholicæ fidei in the hope of convincing by his arguments men
"who disdain to believe the prophecies and the gospel." [1389]

To meet such skepticism too was one of the undertakings of the
renowned Abailard (1079-1142), himself persecuted as a heretic for
the arguments with which he sought to guard against unbelief. Of the
details of his early life it concerns us here to note only that he
studied under Roscelin, and swerved somewhat in philosophy from his
master's theoretic Nominalism, which he partly modified on Aristotelian
lines, though knowing little of Aristotle. [1390] After his retirement
from the world to the cloister, he was induced to resume philosophic
teaching; and his pupils, like those of Anselm, begged their master to
give them rational arguments on the main points of the faith. [1391]
He accordingly rashly prepared a treatise, De Unitate et Trinitate
divina, in which he proceeded "by analogies of human reason," avowing
that the difficulties were great. [1392] Thereupon envious rivals,
of whom he had made many by his arrogance as well as by his fame, set
up against him a heresy hunt; and for the rest of his life he figured
as a dangerous person. While, however, he took up the relatively
advanced position that reason must prepare the way for faith, since
otherwise faith has no certitude, [1393] he was in the main dependent
on the authority either of second-hand Aristotle [1394] or of the
Scriptures, though he partly set aside that of the Fathers. [1395]
When St. Bernard accused him of Arianism and of heathenism he was
expressing personal ill-will rather than criticizing. Abailard himself
complained that many heresies were current in his time [1396]; and
as a matter of fact "more intrepid views than his were promulgated
without risk by a multitude of less conspicuous masters." [1397]
For instance, Bernard Sylvester (of Chartres), in his cosmology,
treated theological considerations with open disrespect [1398];
and William of Conches, who held a similar tone on physics, [1399]
taught, until threatened with punishment, that the Holy Ghost and
the Universal Soul were convertible terms. [1400] This remarkably
rational theologian further rejected the literal interpretation of
the creation of Eve; in science he adopted the Demokritean doctrine of
atoms; and in New Testament matters he revived the old rationalistic
heresy that the three Persons of the Trinity are simply three aspects
of the divine personality--power, wisdom, and will--which doctrine he
was duly forced to retract. It is clear from his works that he lived
in an atmosphere of controversy, and had to fight all along with the
pious irrationalists who, "because they know not the forces of nature,
in order that they may have all men comrades in their ignorance,
suffer not that others should search out anything, and would have us
believe like rustics and ask no reason." "If they perceive any man
to be making search, they at once cry out that he is a heretic." The
history of a thousand years of struggle between reason and religion
is told in those sentences.


    As to William's doctrines and writings see Poole, pp. 124-30,
    346-59. His authorship of one treatise is only latterly cleared
    up. In the work which under the title of Elementa Philosophiae
    is falsely ascribed to Bede, and under the title De Philosophia
    Mundi to Honorius of Autun (see Poole, pp. 340-42, 347 sq.), but
    which is really the production of William of Conches, there occurs
    the passage: "What is more pitiable than to say that a thing is,
    because God is able to do it, and not to show any reason why it
    is so; just as if God did everything that he is able to do! You
    talk like one who says that God is able to make a calf out of
    a log. But did he ever do it? Either, then, show a reason why a
    thing is so, or a purpose wherefore it is so, or else cease to
    declare it so." Migne, Patrolog. Latin. xc, 1139. It is thus an
    exaggeration to say of Abailard, as does Cousin, that "il mit
    de côté la vieille école d'Anselme de Laon, qui exposait sans
    expliquer, et fonda ce qu'on appelle aujourd'hui le rationalisme"
    (Ouvr. inédits d'Abélard, 1836, intr. p. ii).


Abailard was not more explicit on concrete issues than this
contemporary--who survived him, and studied his writings. If, indeed,
as is said, he wrote that "a doctrine is believed not because God has
said it, but because we are convinced by reason that it is so," [1401]
he went as far on one line as any theologian of his time; but his
main service to freethought seems to have lain in the great stimulus
he gave to the practice of reasoning on all topics. [1402] His enemy,
St. Bernard, on the contrary, gave an "immense impulse to the growth
of a genuinely superstitious spirit among the Latin clergy." [1403]


    Dr. Rashdall pronounces Abailard "incomparably the greatest
    intellect of the Middle Ages; one of the great minds which mark
    a period in the world's intellectual history"; and adds that
    "Abailard (a Christian thinker to the very heart's core, however
    irredeemable (sic) the selfishness and overweening vanity of his
    youth) was at the same time the representative of the principle of
    free though reverent inquiry in matters of religion and individual
    loyalty to truth." (The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages,
    1895, i, 56-57.) If the praise given be intended to exalt Abailard
    above John Scotus, it seems excessive.


On a survey of Abailard's theological teachings, a modern reader is
apt to see the spirit of moral reason most clearly in one set forth
in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, to the effect that
Jesus was not incarnate to redeem men from damnation, but solely to
instruct them by precept and example, and that he suffered and died
only to show his charity towards men. The thesis was implicit if not
explicit in the teaching of Pelagius; and for both men it meant the
effort to purify their creed from the barbaric taint of the principle
of sacrifice. In our own day, revived by such theologians as the
English Maurice, it seems likely to gain ground, as an accommodation
to the embarrassed moral sense of educated believers. But it is heresy
if heresy ever was, besides being a blow at the heart of Catholic
sacerdotalism; and Abailard on condemnation retracted it as he did
his other Pelagian errors. Retractation, however, is publication;
and to have been sentenced to retract such teaching in the twelfth
century is to leave on posterity an impression of moral originality
perhaps as important as the fame of a metaphysician. In any case,
it is a careful judge who thus finally estimates him: "When he is
often designated as the rationalist among the schoolmen, he deserves
the title not only on account of the doctrine of the Trinity, which
approaches Sabellianism in spite of all his polemics against it, and
not only on account of his critical attempts, but also on account of
his ethics, in which he actually completely agrees in the principal
point with many modern rationalists." [1404] And it is latterly his
singular fate to be valued at once by many sympathetic Catholics,
who hold him finally vindicated alike in life and doctrine, and by
many freethinkers.

How far the stir set up in Europe by his personal magnetism and his
personal record may have made for rational culture, it is impossible
to estimate; but some consequence there must have been. John of
Salisbury was one of Abailard's disciples and admirers; and, as
we saw, he not only noted skepticism in others but indicated an
infusion of it in his own mind--enough to earn for him from a modern
historian the praise of being a sincere skeptic, as against those
false skeptics who put forward universal doubt as a stalking horse for
their mysticism. [1405] But he was certainly not a universal skeptic
[1406]; and his denunciation of doubt as to the goodness and power
of God [1407] sounds orthodox enough. What he gained from Abailard
was a concern for earnest dialectic.

The worst side of scholasticism at all times was that it was more
often than not a mere logical expatiation in vacuo; this partly
for sheer lack of real knowledge. John of Salisbury probably did
not do injustice to the habit of verbiage it developed [1408]; and
the pupils of Abailard seem to have expressed themselves strongly to
him concerning the wordy emptiness of most of what passed current as
philosophic discourse; speaking of the teachers as blind leaders of
the blind. [1409] One version of the legend against Simon of Tournay is
to the effect that, after demonstrating by the most skilful arguments
the truth of the doctrine of the Trinity, he went on to say, when
enraptured listeners besought him to dictate his address so that
it might be preserved, that if he had been evilly minded he could
refute the doctrine by yet better arguments. [1410] Heresy apart,
this species of dialectical insincerity infected the whole life of
the schools, even the higher spirits going about their work with a
certain amount of mere logical ceremony.




§ 6. SARACEN AND JEWISH INFLUENCES

Even in the schools, however, over and above the influence of the more
original teachers, there rises at the close of the twelfth century and
the beginning of the thirteenth some measure of a new life, introduced
into philosophy through the communication of Aristotle to the western
world by the Saracens, largely by the mediation of the Jews. [1411]
The latter, in their free life under the earlier Moorish toleration,
had developed something in the nature of a school of philosophy,
in which the Judaic Platonism set up by Philo of Alexandria in the
first century was blended with the Aristotelianism of the Arabs. As
early as the eighth and ninth centuries, anti-Talmudic (the Karaïtes)
and pro-Talmudic parties professed alike to appeal to reason [1412];
and in the twelfth century the mere production of the Guide of the
Perplexed by the celebrated Moses Maimonides (1130-1205) [1413]
tells of a good deal of practical rationalism (of the kind that
reduced miracle stories to allegories), of which, however, there
is little direct literary result save of a theosophic kind. [1414]
Levi ben Gershom (1286-1344), commonly regarded as the greatest
successor of Maimonides, is like him guardedly rationalistic in his
commentaries on the Scriptures. [1415] But the doctrine which makes
Aristotle a practical support to rationalism, and which was adopted
not only by Averroës but by the Motazilites of Islam--the eternity
of matter--was rejected by Maimonides (as by nearly all other Jewish
teachers, with the partial exception of Levi ben Gershom), [1416]
on Biblical grounds; though his attempts to rationalize Biblical
doctrine and minimize miracles made him odious to the orthodox Jews,
some of whom, in France, did not scruple to call in the aid of the
Christian inquisition against his partisans. [1417] The long struggle
between the Maimonists and the orthodox is described as ending in the
"triumph of peripatetism" or Averroïsm in the synagogue [1418]; but
Averroïsm as modified by Maimonides is only a partial accommodation
of scripture to common sense. It would appear, in fact, that Jewish
thought in the Saracen world retrograded as did that of the Saracens
themselves; for we find Maimonides exclaiming over the apparent
disbelief in creatio ex nihilo in the "Chapters of Rabbi Eliezer the
Great," believed by him to be ancient, but now known to be a product
of the eighth century. [1419] The pantheistic teaching of Solomon
ben Gebirol or Ibn Gebirol, better known as Avicebron, [1420] who
in point of time preceded the Arab Avempace, and who later acquired
much Christian authority, was orthodox on the side of the creation
dogma even when many Jews were on that head rationalistic. [1421]
The high-water mark, among the Jews, of the critical rationalism of
the time, is the perception by Aben or Ibn Ezra (1119-1174) that the
Pentateuch was not written by Moses--a discovery which gave Spinoza
his cue five hundred years later; but Ibn Ezra, liberioris ingenii vir,
as Spinoza pronounced him, had to express himself darkly. [1422]

Thus the Jewish influence on Christian thought in the Middle Ages was
chiefly metaphysical, carrying on Greek and Arab impulses; and to call
the Jewish people, as does Renan, "the principal representative of
rationalism during the second half of the Middle Age" is to make too
much of the academic aspects of freethinking. On the side of popular
theology it is difficult to believe that they had much Unitarian
influence; though Joinville in his Life of Saint Louis tells how,
in a debate between Churchmen and Jews at the monastery of Cluny,
a certain knight saw fit to break the head of one of the Jews with
his staff for denying the divinity of Jesus, giving as his reason
that many good Christians, listening to the Jewish arguments, were
in a fair way to go home unbelievers. It was in this case that the
sainted king laid down the principle that when a layman heard anyone
blaspheme the Christian creed his proper course was not to argue,
but to run the blasphemer through with his sword. [1423] Such admitted
inability on the part of the laity to reason on their faith, however,
was more likely to accompany a double degree of orthodoxy than to
make for doubt; and the clerical debating at the Abbey of Cluny,
despite the honourable attitude of the Abbot, who condemned the
knight's outrage, was probably a muster of foregone conclusions.

For a time, indeed, in the energetic intellectual life of northern
France the spirit of freethought went far and deep. After the great
stimulus given in Abailard's day to all discussion, we find another
Breton teacher, Amaury or Amalrich of Bène or Bena (end of twelfth
century) and his pupil David of Dinant, partly under the earlier
Arab influence, [1424] partly under that of John the Scot, [1425]
teaching a pronounced pantheism, akin to that noted as flourishing
later among the Brethren of the Free Spirit [1426] and some of the
Franciscan Fraticelli. Such a movement, involving disregard for
the sacraments and ceremonies of the Church, was soon recognized as
a dangerous heresy, and dealt with accordingly. The Church caused
Amaury to abjure his teachings; and after his death, finding his party
still growing, dug up and burned his bones. At the same time (1209)
a number of his followers were burned alive; David of Dinant had to
fly for his life; [1427] and inasmuch as the new heresy had begun
to make much of Aristotle, presumably as interpreted by Averroës,
a Council held at Paris vetoed for the university the study alike of
the pagan master and his commentators, interdicting first the Physics
and soon after the Metaphysics. [1428] This veto held until 1237,
when the school which adapted the lore of Aristotle to Christian
purposes began to carry the day.

The heretical Aristotelianism and the orthodox system which was
to overpower it were alike radiated from the south, where the Arab
influence spread early and widely. There, as we shall see, the long
duel between the Emperor Frederick II and the papacy made a special
opportunity for speculative freethought; and though this was far
from meaning at all times practical enmity to Christian doctrine,
[1429] that was not absent. It is clear that before Thomas Aquinas
(1225-1274) a Naturalist and Averroïst view of the universe had
been much discussed, since he makes the remark that "God is by some
called Natura naturans" [1430]--Nature at work--an idea fundamental
alike to pantheism and to scientific naturalism. And throughout his
great work--a marvel of mental gymnastic which better than almost
any other writing redeems medieval orthodoxy from the charge of
mere ineptitude--Thomas indicates his acquaintance with unorthodox
thought. In particular he seems to owe the form of his work as well
as the subject-matter of much of his argument to Averroës. [1431]
Born within the sphere of the Saracen-Sicilian influence, and of
high rank, he must have met with what rationalism there was, and he
always presupposes it. [1432] "He is nearly as consummate a skeptic,
almost atheist, as he is a divine and theologian," says one modern
ecclesiastical dignitary; [1433] and an orthodox apologist [1434]
more severely complains that "Aquinas presented ... so many doubts
on the deepest points ... so many plausible reasons for unbelief
... that his works have probably suggested most of the skeptical
opinions which were adopted by others who were trained in the study
of them.... He has done more than most men to put the faith of his
fellow-Christians in peril." Of course he rejects Averroïsm. Yet he,
like his antagonist Duns Scotus, inevitably gravitates to pantheism
when he would rigorously philosophize. [1435]

What he did for his church was to combine so ingeniously the semblance
of Aristotelian method with constant recurrence to the sacred books
as to impose their authority on the life of the schools no less
completely than it dominated the minds of the unlearned. Meeting
method with method, and showing himself well aware of the lore he
circumvented, he built up a system quite as well fitted to be a
mere gymnastic of the mind; and he thereby effected the arrest for
some three centuries of the method of experimental science which
Aristotle had inculcated. He came just in time. Roger Bacon, trained
at Paris, was eagerly preaching the scientific gospel; and while he
was suffering imprisonment at the hands of his Franciscan superiors
for his eminently secular devotion to science, the freer scholars of
the university were developing a heresy that outwent his.

Now, however, began to be seen once for all the impossibility
of rational freedom in or under a church which depended for its
revenue on the dogmatic exploitation of popular credulity. For a
time the Aristotelian influence, as had been seen by the churchmen
who had first sought to destroy it, [1436] tended to be Averroïst
and rationalist. [1437] In 1269, however, there begins a determined
campaign, led by the bishop of Paris, against the current Averroïst
doctrines, notably the propositions "that the world is eternal";
"that there never was a first man"; "that the intellect of man
is one"; "that the mind, which is the form of man, constituting
him such, perishes with the body"; "that the acts of men are not
governed by divine providence"; "that God cannot give immortality or
incorruptibility to a corruptible or mortal thing." [1438] On such
doctrines the bishop and his coadjutors naturally passed an anathema
(1270); and at this period it was that Albertus Magnus and Thomas
Aquinas wrote their treatises against Averroïsm. [1439]

Still the freethinkers held out, and though in 1271 official commands
were given that the discussion of such matters in the university should
cease, another process of condemnation was carried out in 1277. This
time the list of propositions denounced includes the following:
"that the natural philosopher as such must deny the creation of
the world, because he proceeds upon natural causes and reasons;
while the believer (fidelis) may deny the eternity of the world,
because he argues from supernatural causes"; "that creation is not
possible, although the contrary is to be held according to faith";
"that a future resurrection is not to be believed by the philosopher,
because it cannot be investigated by reason"; "that the teachings of
the theologians are founded on fables"; "that there are fables and
falsities in the Christian religion as in others"; "that nothing more
can be known, on account of theology"; "that the Christian law prevents
from learning"; [1440] "that God is not triune and one, for trinity
is incompatible with perfect simplicity"; "that ecstatic states and
visions take place naturally, and only so." Such vital unbelief could
have only one fate; it was reduced to silence by a papal Bull, [1441]
administered by the orthodox majority; and the memory of the massacres
of the year 1209, and of the awful crusade against the Albigenses,
served to cow the thinkers of the schools into an outward conformity.

Henceforward orthodox Aristotelianism, placed on a canonical footing
in the theological system of Thomas Aquinas, ruled the universities;
and scholasticism counts for little in the liberation of European
life from either dogma or superstition. [1442] The practically
progressive forces are to be looked for outside. In the thirteenth
century in England we find the Franciscan friars in the school of
Robert Grosstête at Oxford discussing the question "Whether there
be a God?" [1443] but such a dispute was an academic exercise like
another; and in any case the authorities could be trusted to see
that it came to nothing. The work of Thomas himself serves to show
how a really great power of comprehensive and orderly thought can be
turned to the subversion of judgment by accepting the prior dominion
of a fixed body of dogma and an arbitrary rule over opinion. And yet,
so strong is the principle of ratiocination in his large performance,
and so much does it embody of the critical forces of antiquity and of
its own day, that while it served the Church as a code of orthodoxy
its influence can be seen in the skeptical philosophy of Europe
as late as Spinoza and Kant. It appears to have been as a result
of his argumentation that there became established in the later
procedure of the Church the doctrine that, while heretics who have
once received the faith and lapsed are to be coerced and punished,
other unbelievers (as Moslems and Jews) are not. This principle also,
it would appear, he derived from the Moslems, as he did their rule
that those of the true faith must avoid intimacy with the unbelievers,
though believers firm in the faith may dispute with them "when there
is greater expectation of the conversion of the infidels than of the
subversion of the fidels." And to the rule of non-inquisition into
the faith of Jews and Moslems the Church professed to adhere while the
Inquisition lasted, after having trampled it under foot in spirit by
causing the expulsion of the Jews and the Moriscoes from Spain. [1444]

We shall perhaps best understand the inner life of the schools in
the Middle Ages by likening it to that of the universities of our own
time, where there is unquestionably much unbelief among teachers and
taught, but where the economic and other pressures of the institution
suffice to preserve an outward acquiescence. In the Middle Ages it
was immeasurably less possible than in our day for the unbeliever to
strike out a free course of life and doctrine for himself. If, then,
to-day the scholarly class is in large measure tied to institutions
and conformities, much more so was it then. The cloister was almost
the sole haven of refuge for studious spirits, and to attain the haven
they had to accept the discipline and the profession of faith. We
may conclude, accordingly, that such works as Abailard's Sic et Non,
setting forth opposed views of so many doctrines and problems,
stood for and made for a great deal of quiet skepticism; [1445]
that the remarkable request of the monks of Bec for a ratiocinative
teaching which should meet even extravagant objections, covered a
good deal of resigned unfaith; and that in the Franciscan schools at
Oxford the disputants were not all at heart believers. Indeed, the
very existence of the doctrine of a "twofold truth"--one truth for
religion and another for philosophy--was from the outset a witness
for unbelief. But the unwritten word died, the litera scripta being
solely those of faith, and liberation had to come, ages later, from
without. Even when a bold saying won general currency--as that latterly
ascribed, no doubt falsely, to King Alfonso the Wise of Castile, that
"if he had been of God's council when he made the world he could have
advised him better"--it did but crystallize skepticism in a jest,
and supply the enemy with a text against impiety.

All the while, the Church was forging new and more murderous weapons
against reason. It is one of her infamies to have revived the use
in Christendom of the ancient practice of judicial torture, and this
expressly for the suppression of heresy. The later European practice
dates from the Bull of Innocent IV, Ad extirpanda, dated 1252. At
first a veto was put on its administration by clerical hands; but in
1256 Alexander IV authorized the inquisitors and their associates to
absolve one another for such acts. By the beginning of the fourteenth
century torture was in use not only in the tribunals of the Inquisition
but in the ordinary ecclesiastical courts, whence it gradually entered
into the courts of lay justice. [1446] It is impossible to estimate
the injury thus wrought at once to culture and to civilization, at
the hands of the power which claimed specially to promote both. [1447]




§ 7. FREETHOUGHT IN ITALY

Apart from the schools, there was a notable amount of hardy
freethinking among the imperialist nobles of northern Italy, in
the time of the emperors Henry IV and V, the attitude of enmity to
the Holy See having the effect of encouraging a rude rationalism. In
1115, while Henry V was vigorously carrying on the war of investitures
begun by his father, and formerly condemned by himself, the Countess
Matilda of Tuscany bequeathed her extensive fiefs to the papacy;
and in the following year Henry took forcible possession of them. At
this period the strife between the papal and the imperial factions in
the Tuscan cities was at its fiercest; and the Florentine chronicler
Giovanni Villani alleges that among many other heretics in 1115 and
1117 were some "of the sect of the Epicureans," who "with armed
hand defended the said heresy" against the orthodox. [1448] But
it is doubtful whether the heresy involved was anything more than
imperialist anti-papalism. Another chronicler speaks of the heretics
as Paterini; and even this is dubious. The title of Epicurean in the
time of Villani and Dante stood for an unbeliever in a future state;
[1449] but there was an avowed tendency to call all Ghibellines
Paterini; and other heretical aspersions were likely to be applied in
the same way. [1450] As the Averroïst philosophy had not yet risen,
and rationalistic opinions were not yet current among the western
Saracens, any bold heresy among the anti-papalists of Florence must
be assigned either to a spontaneous growth of unbelief or to the
obscure influence of the great poem of Lucretius, never wholly lost
from Italian hands. But the Lucretian view of things among men of
the world naturally remained a matter of private discussion, not of
propaganda; and it was on the less rationalistic but more organized
anti-clericalism that there came the doom of martyrdom. So with the
simple deism of which we find traces in the polemic of Guibert de
Nogent (d. 1124), who avowedly wrote his tract De Incarnatione adversus
Judæos rather as an apology against unbelievers among the Christians;
[1451] and again among the pilgrim community founded later in France
in commemoration of Thomas à Becket. [1452] Such doubters said little,
leaving it to more zealous reformers to challenge creed with creed.

Freethought in south-western Europe, however, had a measure of
countenance in very high places. In the thirteenth century the Emperor
Frederick II had the repute of being an infidel in the double sense of
being semi-Moslem [1453] and semi-atheist. By Pope Gregory IX he was
openly charged, in a furious afterthought, [1454] with saying that
the world had been deceived by three impostors (baratores)--Moses,
Jesus, and Mohammed; also with putting Jesus much below the other two,
and with delighting to call himself the forerunner of Antichrist.


    The Pope's letter, dated July 1, 1239, is given by Matthew Paris
    (extracts in Gieseler, vol. iii, § 55), and in Labbe's Concilia,
    t. xiii, col. 1157. Cp. the other references given by Renan,
    Averroès, 3e édit. pp. 296-97. As Voltaire remarks (Essai sur
    les Moeurs, ch. lii), the Pope's statement is the basis for the
    old belief that Frederick had written a treatise dealing with
    Moses, Jesus, and Mohammed as The Three Impostors. The story
    is certainly a myth; and probably no such book existed in his
    century. Cp. Maclaine's note to Mosheim, 13 Cent. pt. i, end;
    Renan, Averroès, pp. 280-81, 295. The authorship of such a book
    has nevertheless been ascribed by Catholic writers successively
    to Averroës, Simon of Tournay, Frederick, his Minister, Pierre
    des Vignes, Arnaldo de Villanueva, Boccaccio, Poggio, Pietro
    Aretino, Machiavelli, Symphorien, Champier, Pomponazzi, Cardan,
    Erasmus, Rabelais, Ochinus, Servetus, Postel, Campanella, Muret,
    Geoffroi Vallée, Giordano Bruno, Dolet, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Vanini
    (cp. Sentimens sur le traité des trois imposteurs in the French
    ed. of 1793; and Lea, Hist. of the Inquis. iii, 560); and the
    seventeenth-century apologist Mersenne professed to have seen it
    in Arabic (Lea, iii, 297). These references may be dismissed as
    worthless. In 1654 the French physician and mathematician Morin
    wrote an Epistola de tribus impostoribus under the name of Panurge,
    but this attacked the three contemporary writers Gassendi, Neure,
    and Bernier; and in 1680 Kortholt of Kiel published under the title
    De tribus impostoribus magnis an attack on Herbert, Hobbes, and
    Spinoza. The Three Impostors current later, dealing with Moses,
    Jesus, and Mohammed, may have been written about the same time,
    but, as we shall see later, is identical with L'Esprit de Spinoza,
    first published in 1719. A Latin treatise purporting to be written
    de tribus famosissimis deceptoribus, and addressed to an Otho
    illustrissimus (conceivably Otho Duke of Bavaria, 13th c.), came
    to light in MS. in 1706, and was described in 1716, but was not
    printed. The treatise current later in French cannot have been
    the same. On the whole subject see the note of R. C. Christie
    (reprinted from Notes and Queries) in his Selected Essays and
    Papers, 1902, pp. 309, 315; and the full discussion in Reuter's
    Geschichte der religiösen Aufklärung, ii, 251-96. The book De
    tribus impostoribus, bearing the date 1598, of which several copies
    exist, seems to have been really published, with its false date,
    at Vienna in 1753.


Frederick was in reality superstitious enough; he worshipped relics;
and he was nearly as merciless as the popes to rebellious heretics and
Manicheans; [1455] his cruelty proceeding, seemingly, on the belief
that insubordination to the emperor was sure to follow intellectual
as distinguished from political revolt against the Church. He was
absolutely tolerant to Jews and Moslems, [1456] and had trusted Moslem
counsellors, thereby specially evoking the wrath of the Church. Greatly
concerned to acquire the lore of the Arabs, [1457] he gave his favour
and protection to Michael Scotus, the first translator of portions
of Averroës into Latin, [1458] and presumptively himself a heretic
of the Averroïst stamp; whence the legend of his wizardry, adopted
by Dante. [1459] Thus the doubting and persecuting emperor assisted
at the birth of the philosophic movement which for centuries was
most closely associated with unbelief in Christendom. For the rest,
he is recorded to have ridiculed the doctrine of the Virgin Birth,
the viaticum, and other dogmas, "as being repugnant to reason and to
nature"; [1460] and his general hostility to the Pope would tend to
make him a bad Churchman. Indeed the testimonies, both Christian and
Moslem, as to his freethinking are too clear to be set aside. [1461]
Certainly no monarch of that or any age was more eagerly interested
in every form of culture, or did more, on tyrannous lines, to promote
it; [1462] and to him rather than to Simon de Montfort Europe owes
the admission of representatives of cities to Parliaments. [1463]
Of his son Manfred it is recorded that he was a thorough Epicurean,
believing neither in God nor in the saints. [1464] But positive
unbelief in a future state, mockery of the Christian religion, and
even denial of deity--usually in private, and never in writing--are
frequently complained of by the clerical writers of the time in France
and Italy; [1465] while in Spain Alfonso the Wise, about 1260, speaks
of a common unbelief in immortality, alike as to heaven and hell;
and the Council of Tarragona in 1291 decrees punishments against such
unbelievers. [1466] In Italy, not unnaturally, they were most commonly
found among the Ghibelline or imperial party, the opponents of the
papacy, despite imperial orthodoxy. "Incredulity, affected or real,
was for the oppressed Ghibellines a way among others of distinguishing
themselves from the Guelph oppressors." [1467]

The commonest form of rationalistic heresy seems to have been unbelief
in immortality. Thus Dante in the Inferno estimates that among
the heretics there are more than a thousand followers of Epicurus,
"who make the soul die with the body," [1468] specifying among them
the Emperor Frederick II, a cardinal, [1469] the Ghibelline noble
Farinata degli Uberti, and the Guelph Cavalcante Cavalcanti. [1470]
He was thinking, as usual, of the men of his own age; but, as we
have seen, this particular heresy had existed in previous centuries,
having indeed probably never disappeared from Italy. Other passages in
Dante's works [1471] show, in any case, that it was much discussed in
his time; [1472] and it is noteworthy that, so far as open avowal went,
Italian freethought had got no further two hundred years later. In the
period before the papacy had thoroughly established the Inquisition,
and diplomacy supervened on the tempestuous strifes of the great
factions, there was a certain hardihood of speech on all subjects,
which tended to disappear alongside of even a more searching unbelief.


    "Le 16e siècle n'a eu aucune mauvaise pensée que le 13e n'ait
    eue avant lui" (Renan, Averroès, p. 231). Renan, however,
    seems astray in stating that "Le Poème de la Descente de Saint
    Paul aux enfers parle avec terreur d'une société secrète qui
    avait juré la destruction de Christianisme" (id. p. 284). The
    poem simply describes the various tortures of sinners in hell,
    and mentions in their turn those who "en terre, à sainte Iglise
    firent guerre," and in death "Verbe Deu refusouent"; also those
    "Ki ne croient que Deu fust nez (né), ne que Sainte Marie l'eust
    portez, ne que por le peuple vousist (voulait) mourir, ne que
    peine deignast soffrir." See the text as given by Ozanam, Dante,
    ed. 6ième, Ptie. iv--the version cited by Renan.


So, with regard to the belief in magic, there was no general advance
in the later Renaissance on the skepticism of Pietro of Abano, a
famous Paduan physician and Averroïst, who died, at the age of 80,
in 1305. He appears to have denied alike magic and miracles, though
he held fast by astrology, and ascribed the rise and progress of all
religions to the influence of the stars. Himself accused of magic, he
escaped violent death by dying naturally before his trial was ended;
and the Inquisition burned either his body or his image. [1473] After
him, superstition seems to have gone step for step with skepticism.

Dante's own poetic genius, indeed, did much to arrest intellectual
evolution in Italy. Before his time, as we have seen, the trouvères
of northern France and the Goliards of the south had handled hell
in a spirit of burlesque; and his own teacher, Brunetto Latini, had
framed a poetic allegory, Il Tesoretto, in which Nature figures as
the universal power, behind which the God-idea disappeared. [1474] But
Dante's tremendous vision ultimately effaced all others of the kind;
and his intellectual predominance in virtue of mere imaginative art is
at once the great characteristic and the great anomaly of the early
Renaissance. Happily the inseparable malignity of his pietism was in
large part superseded by a sunnier spirit; [1475] but his personality
and his poetry helped to hold the balance of authority on the side
of faith. [1476] Within a few years of his death there was burned at
Florence (1327) one of the most daring heretics of the later Middle
Ages, Cecco Stabili d'Ascoli, a professor of philosophy and astrology
at Bologna, who is recorded to have had some intimacy with Dante, and
to have been one of his detractors. [1477] Cecco has been described as
"representing natural science, against the Christian science of Dante";
[1478] and though his science was primitive, the summing-up is not
unwarranted. Combining strong anti-Christian feeling with the universal
belief in astrology, he had declared that Jesus lived as a sluggard
(come un poltrone) with his disciples, and died on the cross, under
the compulsion of his star. [1479] In view of the blasphemer's fate,
such audacity was not often repeated.

As against Dante, the great literary influence for tolerance and
liberalism if not rationalism of thought was Boccaccio (1313-1375),
whose Decameron [1480] anticipates every lighter aspect of the
Renaissance--its levity, its licence, its humour, its anti-clericalism,
its incipient tolerance, its irreverence, its partial freethinking,
as well as its exuberance in the joy of living. On the side of
anti-clericalism, the key-note is struck so strongly and so defiantly
in some of the opening tales that the toleration of the book by the
papal authorities can be accounted for only by their appreciation of
the humour of the stories therein told against them, as that [1481] of
the Jew who, after seeing the utter corruption of the clergy at Rome,
turned Christian on the score that only by divine support could such
a system survive. No Protestant ever passed a more scathing aspersion
on the whole body of the curia than is thus set in the forefront of
the Decameron. Still more deeply significant of innovating thought,
however, is the famous story of The Three Rings, [1482] embodied later
by Lessing in his Nathan the Wise as an apologue of tolerance. Such a
story, introduced with whatever parade of orthodox faith, could not but
make for rational skepticism, summarizing as it does the whole effect
of the inevitable comparison of the rival creeds made by the men of
Italy and those of the east in their intercourse. The story itself,
centring on Saladin, is of eastern origin, [1483] and so tells of even
more freethinking than meets the eye in the history of Islam. [1484]
It is noteworthy that the Rabbi Simeon Duran (1360-1444), who follows
on this period, appears to be the first Jewish teacher to plead for
mutual toleration among the conflicting schools of his race. [1485]

Current in Italy before Boccaccio, the tale had been improved from
one Italian hand to another; [1486] and the main credit for its full
development is Boccaccio's. [1487] Though the Church never officially
attempted to suppress the book--leaving it to Savonarola to destroy as
far as possible the first edition--the more serious clergy naturally
resented its hostility, first denouncing it, then seeking to expurgate
all the anti-clerical passages; [1488] and the personal pressure
brought to bear upon Boccaccio had the effect of dispiriting and
puritanizing him; so that the Decameron finally wrought its effect
in its author's despite. [1489] So far as we can divine the deeper
influence of such a work on medieval thought, it may reasonably be
supposed to have tended, like that of Averroïsm, towards Unitarianism
or deism, inasmuch as a simple belief in deity is all that is normally
implied in its language on religious matters. On that view it bore
its full intellectual fruit only in the two succeeding centuries,
when deism and Unitarianism alike grew up in Italy, apparently from
non-scholastic roots.

It is an interesting problem how far the vast calamity of the Black
Death (1348-49) told either for skepticism or for superstition in this
age. In Boccaccio's immortal book we see a few refined Florentines who
flee the pest giving themselves up to literary amusement; but there
is also mention of many who had taken to wild debauchery, and there
are many evidences as to wild outbreaks of desperate licence all over
Europe. [1490] On the other hand, many were driven by fear to religious
practices; [1491] and in the immense destruction of life the Church
acquired much new wealth. At the same time the multitudes of priests
who died [1492] had as a rule to be replaced by ill-trained persons,
where the problem was not solved by creating pluralities, the result
being a general falling-off in the culture and the authority of the
clergy. [1493] But there seems to have been little or no growth of
such questioning as came later from the previously optimistic Voltaire
after the earthquake of Lisbon; and the total effect of the immense
reduction of population all over Europe seems to have been a lowering
of the whole of the activities of life. Certainly the students of
Paris in 1376 were surprisingly freethinking on scriptural points;
[1494] but there is nothing to show that the great pestilence had set
up any new movement of ethical thought. In some ways it grievously
deepened bigotry, as in regard to the Jews, who were in many regions
madly impeached as having caused the plague by poisoning the wells,
and were then massacred in large numbers.

Side by side with Boccaccio, his friend Petrarch (1304-1374), who
with him completes the great literary trio of the late Middle Ages,
belongs to freethought in that he too, with less aggressiveness but
also without recoil, stood for independent culture and a rational habit
of mind as against the dogmatics and tyrannies of the Church. [1495]
He was in the main a practical humanist, not in accord with the
verbalizing scholastic philosophy of his time, and disposed to
find his intellectual guide in the skeptical yet conservative
Cicero. The scholastics had become as fanatical for Aristotle or
Averroës as the churchmen were for their dogmas; [1496] and Petrarch
made for mental freedom by resisting all dogmatisms alike. [1497]
The general liberality of his attitude has earned him the titles of
"the first modern man" [1498] and "the founder of modern criticism"
[1499]--both somewhat high-pitched. [1500] He represented in reality
the sobering and clarifying influence of the revived classic culture
on the fanaticisms developed in the Middle Ages; and when he argued
for the rule of reason in all things [1501] it was not that he
was a deeply searching rationalist, but that he was spontaneously
averse to all the extremes of thought around him, and was concerned
to discredit them. For himself, having little speculative power, he
was disposed to fall back on a simple and tolerant Christianity. Thus
he is quite unsympathetic in his references to those scholars of his
day who privately indicated their unbelief. Knowing nothing of the
teaching of Averroës, he speaks of him, on the strength of Christian
fictions, as "that mad dog who, moved by an execrable rage, barks
against his Lord Christ and the Catholic faith." [1502] Apart from
such conventional odium theologicum, his judgment, like his literary
art, was clear and restrained; opening no new vistas, but bringing
a steady and placid light to bear on its chosen sphere.

Between such humanistic influences and that of more systematic and
scholastic thought, Italy in that age was the chief source of practical
criticism of Christian dogmas; and the extent to which a unitarian
theism was now connected with the acceptance of the philosophy of
Averroës brought it about, despite the respectful attitude of Dante,
who gave him a tranquil place in hell, [1503] that he came to figure
as Antichrist for the faithful. [1504] Petrarch in his letters speaks
of much downright hostility to the Christian system on the part of
Averroïsts; [1505] and the association of Averroïsm with the great
medical school of Padua [1506] must have promoted practical skepticism
among physicians. Being formally restricted to the schools, however,
it tended there to undergo the usual scholastic petrifaction; and
the common-sense deism it encouraged outside had to subsist without
literary discipline. In this form it probably reached many lands,
without openly affecting culture or life; since Averroïsm itself
was professed generally in the Carmelite order, who claimed for it
orthodoxy. [1507]

Alongside, however, of intellectual solvents, there were at work others
of a more widely effective kind, set up by the long and sinister
historic episode of the Great Papal Schism. The Church, already
profoundly discredited in the eleventh century by the gross disorders
of the papacy, continued frequently throughout the twelfth to exhibit
the old spectacle of rival popes; and late in the fourteenth (1378)
there broke out the greatest schism of all. Ostensibly beginning in
a riotous coercion of the electing cardinals by the Roman populace,
it was maintained on the one side by the standing interest of the
clergy in Italy, which called for an Italian head of the Church,
and on the other hand by the French interest, which had already
enforced the residence of the popes at Avignon from 1305 to 1376. It
was natural that, just after the papal chair had been replaced in
Italy by Gregory IX, the Romans should threaten violence to the
cardinals if they chose any but an Italian; and no less natural that
the French court should determine to restore a state of things in
which it controlled the papacy in all save its corruption. During
the seventy years of "the Captivity," Rome had sunk to the condition
of a poor country town; and to the Italian clergy the struggle for a
restoration was a matter of economic life and death. For thirty-nine
years did the schism last, being ended only by the prolonged action
of the great Council of Constance in deposing the rivals of the moment
and appointing Martin V (1417); and this was achieved only after there
had slipped into the chair of Peter "the most worthless and infamous
man to be found." [1508] During the schism every species of scandal had
flourished. Indulgences had been sold and distributed at random; [1509]
simony and venality abounded more than ever; [1510] the courts of Rome
and Avignon were mere rivals in avarice, indecorum, and reciprocal
execration; and in addition to the moral occasion for skepticism there
was the intellectual, since no one could show conclusively that the
administration of sacraments was valid under either pope. [1511]




§ 8. SECTS AND ORDERS

Despite, therefore, the premium put by the Church on devotion
to its cause and doctrine, and despite its success in strangling
specific forms of heresy, hostility to its own pretensions germinated
everywhere, [1512] especially in the countries most alien to Italy
in language and civilization. An accomplished Catholic scholar [1513]
sums up that "from about the middle of the twelfth century the whole
secular and religious literature of Europe grew more and more hostile
to the papacy and the curia." The Church's own economic conditions,
constantly turning its priesthood, despite all precautions, into a
money-making and shamelessly avaricious class, ensured it a perpetuity
of ill-will and denunciation. The popular literature which now began
to grow throughout Christendom with the spread of political order was
everywhere turned to the account of anti-clerical satire; [1514] and
only the defect of real knowledge secured by the Church's own policy
prevented such hostility from developing into rational unbelief. As
it was, a tendency to criticize at once the socio-economic code and
practice and the details of creed and worship is seen in a series
of movements from the thirteenth century onwards; and some of the
most popular literature of that age is deeply tinged with the new
spirit. After the overthrow of the well-organized anti-clericalism
of the Cathari and other heretics in Languedoc, however, no movement
equally systematic and equally heretical flourished on any large scale;
and as even those heresies on their popular side were essentially
supernaturalist, and tended to set up one hierarchy in place of
another, it would be vain to look for anything like a consistent or
searching rationalism among the people in the period broadly termed
medieval, including the Renaissance.

It would be a bad misconception to infer from the abundant signs of
popular disrespect for the clergy that the mass of the laity even
in Italy, for instance, were unbelievers. [1515] They never were
anything of the kind. At all times they were deeply superstitious,
easily swayed by religious emotion, credulous as to relics, miracles,
visions, prophecies, responsive to pulpit eloquence, readily passing
from derision of worldly priests to worship of austere ones. [1516]
When Machiavelli said that religion was gone from Italy, he was
thinking of the upper classes, among whom theism was normal, [1517] and
the upper clergy, who were often at once superstitious and corrupt. As
for the common people, it was impossible that they should be grounded
rationalists as regarded the great problems of life. They were merely
the raw material on which knowledge might work if it could reach them,
which it never did. And the common people everywhere else stood at
or below the culture level of those of Italy.

For lack of other culture than Biblical, then, even the popular heresy
tended to run into mysticisms which were only so far more rational than
the dogmas and rites of the Church that they stood for some actual
reflection. A partial exception, indeed, may be made in the case of
the Brethren of the Free Spirit, a sect set up in Germany in the early
years of the thirteenth century, by one Ortlieb, on the basis of the
pantheistic teachings of Amaury of Bène and David of Dinant. [1518]
Their doctrines were set forth in a special treatise or sacred book,
called The Nine Rocks. The Fratres liberi spiritus seem to have been
identical with the sect of the "Holy Spirit"; [1519] but their tenets
were heretical in a high degree, including as they did a denial of
personal immortality, and consequently of the notions of heaven,
hell, and purgatory. Even the sect's doctrine of the Holy Spirit was
heretical in another way, inasmuch as it ran, if its opponents can be
believed, to the old antinomian assertion that anyone filled with the
Spirit was sinless, whatever deeds he might do. [1520] As always, such
antinomianism strengthened the hands of the clergy against the heresy,
though the Brethren seem to have been originally very ascetic; and
inasmuch as their pantheism involved the idea that Satan also had in
him the divine essence, they were duly accused of devil-worship. [1521]
On general principles they were furiously persecuted; but all through
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and even in the fifteenth,
they are found in various parts of central and western Europe, [1522]
often in close alliance with the originally orthodox communities
known in France and Holland by the names of Turlupins and Beguins or
Beguines, and in Germany and Belgium as Beguttæ or Beghards, [1523]
akin to the Lollards.

These in turn are to be understood in connection with developments
which took place in the thirteenth century within the Church--notably
the rise of the great orders of Mendicant Friars, of which the
two chief were founded about 1216 by Francis of Assisi and the
Spanish Dominic, the latter a fierce persecutor in the Albigensian
crusade. Nothing availed more to preserve or restore for a time the
Church's prestige. The old criticism of priestly and monastic avarice
and worldliness was disarmed by the sudden appearance and rapid spread
of a priesthood and brotherhood of poverty; and the obvious devotion of
thousands of the earlier adherents went to the general credit of the
Church. Yet the descent of the new orders to the moral and economic
levels of the old was only a question of time; and no process could
more clearly illustrate the futility of all schemes of regenerating the
world on non-rational principles. Apart from the vast encouragement
given to sheer mendicancy among the poor, the orders themselves
substantially apostatized from their own rules within a generation.

The history of the Franciscans in particular is like that of the
Church in general--one of rapid lapse into furious schism, with a
general reversion to gross self-seeking on the part of the majority,
originally vowed to utter poverty. Elias, the first successor of
Francis, appointed by the Saint himself, proved an intolerable tyrant;
and in his day began the ferocious strife between the "Spirituals,"
who insisted on the founder's ideal of poverty, and the majority, who
insisted on accepting the wealth which the world either bestowed or
could be cajoled into bestowing on the order. The majority, of course,
ultimately overbore the Spirituals, the papacy supporting them. [1524]
They followed the practically universal law of monastic life. The
Humiliati, founded before the thirteenth century, had to be suppressed
by the Pope in the sixteenth, for sheer corruption of morals; and the
Franciscans and Dominicans, who speedily became bitterly hostile to
each other, were in large measure little better. Even in the middle
of the thirteenth century they were attacked by the Sorbonne doctor,
William of St. Amour, in a book on The Perils of the Latter Times;
[1525] and in England in the fourteenth century we find Wiclif
assailing the begging friars as the earlier satirists had assailed
the abbots and monks. That all this reciprocal invective was not
mere partizan calumny, but broadly true as against both sides, is
the conclusion forced upon a reader of the Philobiblon ascribed to
Richard de Bury, Bishop of Durham and Treasurer and Chancellor under
Edward III. In that book, written either by the bishop or by one
of his chaplains, Robert Holkot, [1526] the demerits of all orders
of the clergy from the points of view of letters and morals are set
forth with impartial emphasis; [1527] and the character of the bishop
in turn is no less effectively disposed of after his death by Adam
Murimuth, a distinguished lawyer and canon of St. Paul's. [1528]

The worst of the trouble for the Church was that the mendicants were
detested by bishops and the beneficed priests, whose credit they
undermined, and whose revenues they intercepted. That the Franciscans
and Dominicans remained socially powerful till the Reformation was
due to the energy developed by their corporate organization and the
measure of education they soon secured on their own behalf; not
to any general superiority on their part to the "secular" clergy
so-called. [1529] Indeed it was to the latter, within the Church,
that most pre-Reformation reformers looked for sympathy. At the outset,
however, the movement of the Mendicant Friars gave a great impulsion to
the lay communities of the type of the Beguines and Beghards who had
originated in the Netherlands, and who practised at once mendicancy
and charity very much on the early Franciscan lines; [1530] and the
spirit of innovation led in both cases to forms of heresy. That of the
Beguines and Beghards arose mainly through their association with the
Brethren of the Free Spirit; and they suffered persecution as did the
latter; while among the "Spiritual" Franciscans, who were despisers of
learning, there arose a species of new religion. At the beginning of
the century, Abbot Joachim, of Flora or Flores in Calabria (d. 1202),
who "may be regarded as the founder of modern mysticism," [1531]
had earned a great reputation by devout austerities, and a greater by
his vaticinations, [1532] which he declared to be divine. One of his
writings was condemned as heretical, thirteen years after his death,
by the Council of Lateran; but his apocalyptic writings, and others put
out in his name, had a great vogue among the rebellious Franciscans.

At length, in 1254, there was produced in Paris a book called The
Everlasting Gospel, consisting of three of his genuine works, with a
long and audacious Introduction by an anonymous hand, which expressed
a spirit of innovation and revolt, mystical rather than rational, that
seemed to promise the utter disruption of the Church. It declared
that, as the dispensation of the Son had followed on that of the
Father, so Christ's evangel in turn was to be superseded by that of
the "Holy Spirit." [1533] Adopted by the "Spiritual" section of the
Franciscans, it brought heresy within the organization itself, the
Introduction being by many ascribed--probably in error--to the head
of the order, John of Parma, a devotee of Joachim. On other grounds,
he was ultimately deposed; [1534] but the ferment of heresy was
great. And while the Franciscans are commonly reputed to have been led
by small-minded generals, [1535] their order, as Renan notes, [1536]
not only never lost the stamp of its popular and irregular origin,
but was always less orthodox in general than the Dominican. But its
deviations were rather ultra-religious than rational; and some of its
heresies have become orthodoxy. Thus it was the Franciscans, notably
Duns Scotus, who carried the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception
of the Virgin against the Dominicans, who held by the teaching of
Thomas Aquinas that she was conceived "in sin." [1537] Mary was thus
deified on a popular impulse, dating from paganism, at the expense
of Christism; and, considering that both Thomas and St. Bernard had
flatly rejected the Immaculate Conception, its ultimate adoption as
dogma is highly significant. [1538]

In the year 1260, when, according to the "Eternal Gospel," the new
dispensation of the Holy Spirit was to begin, there was an immense
excitement in northern Italy, marked by the outbreak of the order
of Flagellants, self-scourgers, whose hysteria spread to other
lands. Gherardo Segarelli, a youth of Parma, came forward as a new
Christ, had himself circumcised, swaddled, cradled, and suckled;
[1539] and proceeded to found a new order of "Apostolicals," after
the manner of a sect of the previous century, known by the same name,
who professed to return to primitive simplicity and to chastity, and
reproduced what they supposed to be the morals of the early Church,
including the profession of ascetic cohabitation. [1540] Some of
their missionaries got as far as Germany; but Segarelli was caught,
imprisoned, reduced to the status of a bishop's jester, and at length,
after saving his life for a time by abjuration, burned at Parma,
in the year 1300.

Despite much persecution of the order, one of its adherents,
Fra Dolcino, immediately began to exploit Segarelli's martyrdom,
and renewed the movement by an adaptation of the "Eternal Gospel,"
announcing that Segarelli had begun a new era, to last till the Day
of Judgment. Predicting the formation of native states, as well as
the forcible purification of the papacy, he ultimately set up an
armed movement, which held out in the southern Alps for two years,
till the Apostolicals were reduced to cannibalism. At length (1307)
they were overpowered and massacred, and Dolcino was captured, with
his beautiful and devoted companion, Margherita di Trank. She was
slowly burned to death before his eyes, refusing to abjure; and he
in turn was gradually tortured to death, uttering no cry. [1541]

The order subsisted for a time in secret, numbers cherishing Dolcino's
memory, and practising a priestless and riteless religion, prohibiting
oaths, and wholly repudiating every claim of the Church. [1542] Yet
another sect, called by the name of "The Spirit of Liberty"--probably
the origin of the name libertini, later applied to freethinkers in
France--was linked on the one hand to the Apostolicals and on the
other to the German Brethren of the Free Spirit, as well as to the
Franciscan Fraticelli. This sect is heard of as late as 1344, when
one of its members was burned. [1543] And there were yet others;
till it seemed as if the Latin Church were to be resolved into an
endless series of schisms. But organization, as of old, prevailed;
the cohesive and aggressive force of the central system, with the
natural strifes of the new movements, whether within or without
[1544] the Church, sufficed to bring about their absorption or their
destruction. It needed a special concurrence of economic, political,
and culture forces to disrupt the fabric of the papacy.




§ 9. THOUGHT IN SPAIN

Of all the chapters in the history of the Inquisition, the most
tragical is the record of its work in Spain, for there a whole
nation's faculty of freethought was by its ministry strangled for a
whole era. There is a prevalent notion that in Spain fanaticism had
mastered the national life from the period of the overthrow of Arianism
under the later Visigothic kings; and that there the extirpation of
heresy was the spontaneous and congenial work of the bulk of the
nation, giving vent to the spirit of intolerance ingrained in it
in the long war with the Moors. "Spain," says Michelet, "has always
felt herself more Catholic than Rome." [1545] But this is a serious
misconception. Wars associated with a religious cause are usually
followed rather by indifference than by increased faith; and the long
wars of the Moors and the Christians in Spain had some such sequel,
[1546] as had the Crusades, and the later wars of religion in France
and Germany. It is true that for a century after the (political)
conversion of the Visigothic king Recared (587) from Arianism to
Catholicism--an age of complete decadence--the policy of the Spanish
Church was extremely intolerant, as might have been expected. The
Jews, in particular, were repeatedly and murderously persecuted;
[1547] but after the fall of the Visigoths before the invading
Moors, the treatment of all forms of heresy in the Christian parts
of the Peninsula, down to the establishment of the second or New
Inquisition under Torquemada, was in general rather less severe than
elsewhere. [1548]

An exception is to be noted in the case of the edicts of 1194 and 1197,
by Alfonso II and Pedro II ("the Catholic") of Aragon, against the
Waldenses. [1549] The policy in the first case was that of wholesale
expulsion of the heretics anathematized by the Church; and, as this
laid the victims open to plunder all round, there is a presumption
that cupidity was a main part of the motive. Peter the Catholic, in
turn, who decreed the stake for the heretics that remained, made a
signally complete capitulation to the Holy See; but the nation did not
support him; and the tribute he promised to pay to the Pope was never
paid. [1550] In the thirteenth century, when the Moors had been driven
out of Castile, rationalistic heresy seems to have been as common
in Spain as in Italy. Already Arab culture had spread, Archbishop
Raymond of Toledo (1130-50) having caused many books to be translated
from Arabic into Latin; [1551] and inasmuch as racial warfare had
always involved some intercourse between Christians and Moors, [1552]
the Averroïst influence which so speedily reached Sicily from Toledo
through Michael Scot must have counted for something in Spain. About
1260 Alfonso X, "the Wise" king of Castile, describes the heresies of
his kingdom under two main divisions, of which the worse is the denial
of a future state of rewards and punishments. [1553] This heresy,
further, is proceeded against by the Council of Tarragona in 1291. And
though Alfonso was orthodox, and in his legislation a persecutor,
[1554] his own astronomic and mathematical science, so famous in the
after times, came to him from the Arabs and the Jews whom he actually
called in to assist him in preparing his astronomic tables. [1555]
Such science was itself a species of heresy in that age; and to it
the orthodox king owes his Catholic reputation as a blasphemer,
as Antichrist, [1556] and as one of the countless authors of the
fabulous treatise on the "Three Impostors." He would further rank
as a bad Churchman, inasmuch as his very laws against heresy took no
account of the Roman Inquisition (though it was nominally established
by a papal rescript in 1235), [1557] but provided independently for
the treatment of offenders. Needless to say, they had due regard to
finance, non-believers who listened to heresy being fined ten pounds
weight of gold, with the alternative of fifty lashes in public; while
the property of lay heretics without kin went to the fisc. [1558]
The law condemning to the stake those Christians who apostatized to
Islam or Judaism [1559] had also a financial motive.

Such laws, however, left to unsystematic application, were but slightly
operative; and the people fiercely resisted what attempts were made
to enforce them. [1560] At the end of the thirteenth century the
heresies of the French Beguines and the Franciscan "Spirituals" spread
in Aragon, both by way of books and of preaching, and even entered
Portugal. Against these, in the years 1314-1335, the Inquisitors
maintained a persecution. [1561] But it has been put on record by
the famous Arnaldo of Villanueva--astronomer, scholar, alchemist,
reformer, and occultist [1562] (d. 1314)--whose books were at that
period condemned by a council of friars because of his championship of
the Spirituals, that King Frederick II of Aragon had confessed to him
his doubts as to the truth of the Christian religion--doubts set up by
the misconduct of priests, abbots, and bishops; the malignities of the
heads of the friar orders; and the worldliness and political intrigues
of the Holy See. [1563] Such a king was not likely to be a zealous
inquisitor; and the famous Joachite Franciscan Juan de Pera-Tallada
(Jean de la Rochetaillade), imprisoned at Avignon for his apocalyptic
teachings about 1349, seems to have died in peace in Spain long
afterwards. [1564] It cannot even be said that the ordinary motive of
rapacity worked strongly against heresy in Spain in the Middle Ages,
since there the Templars, condemned and plundered everywhere else,
were acquitted; and their final spoliation was the work of the papacy,
the Spanish authorities resisting. [1565] We shall find, further, the
orthodox Spanish king of Naples in the fifteenth century protecting
anti-papal scholarship. And though Dominic, the primary type of the
Inquisitor, had been a Castilian, no Spaniard was Pope from the fourth
to the fourteenth century, and very few were cardinals. [1566]

As late as the latter half of the fifteenth century, within a
generation of the setting-up of the murderous New Inquisition,
Spain seems to have been on the whole as much given to freethinking
as France, and much more so than England. On the one hand, Averroïsm
tinged somewhat the intellectual life through the Moorish environment,
so that in 1464 we find revolted nobles complaining that King Enrique
IV is suspected of being unsound in the faith because he has about
him both enemies of Catholicism and nominal Christians who avow their
disbelief in a future state. [1567] On the other hand, it had been
noted that many were beginning to deny the need or efficacy of priestly
confession; and about 1478 a Professor at Salamanca, Pedro de Osma,
actually printed an argument to that effect, further challenging the
power of the Pope. So slight was then the machinery of inquisition
that he had to be publicly tried by a council, which merely ordered
him to recant in public; and he died peacefully in 1480. [1568]

It was immediately after this, in the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella,
that the Inquisition was newly and effectively established in Spain;
and the determining motive was the avarice of the king and queen,
not the Catholic zeal of the people. The Inquisitor-General of
Messina came to Madrid in 1477 in order to obtain confirmation of a
forged privilege, pretended to have been granted to the Dominicans
in Sicily by Frederick II in 1233--that of receiving one-third of
the property of every heretic they condemned. To such a ruler as
Ferdinand, such a system readily appealed; and as soon as possible a
new Inquisition was established in Spain, Isabella consenting. [1569]
From the first it was a system of plunder. "Men long dead, if they
were represented by rich descendants, were cited before the tribunal,
judged, and condemned; and the lands and goods that had descended to
their heirs passed into the coffers of the Catholic kings." [1570]
The solemn assertion by Queen Isabella, that she had never applied
such money to the purposes of the crown, has been proved from State
papers to be "a most deliberate and daring falsehood." [1571] The
revenue thus iniquitously obtained was enormous; and it is inferrible
that the pecuniary motive underlay the later expulsion of the Jews
and the Moriscoes as well as the average practice of the Inquisition.


    The error as to the original or anciently ingrained fanaticism of
    the Spanish people, first made current by Ticknor (Hist. Spanish
    Lit., 6th ed. i, 505), has been to some extent diffused by Buckle,
    who at this point of his inquiry reasoned à priori instead of
    inductively as his own principles prescribed. See the notes to the
    present writer's edition of his Introduction (Routledge, 1904),
    pp. 107, 534-50. The special atrocity of the Inquisition in Spain
    was not even due directly to the papacy (cp. Burke, ii, 78): it was
    the result first of the rapacity of Ferdinand, utilizing a papal
    institution; and later of the political fanaticisms of Charles V
    and Philip II, both of Teutonic as well as Spanish descent. Philip
    alleged that the Inquisition in the Netherlands was more severe
    than in Spain (ed. of Buckle cited, p. 107, note). In the words
    of Bishop Stubbs: "To a German race of sovereigns Spain finally
    owed the subversion of her national system and ancient freedom"
    (id. p. 550, note).


Such a process, however, would not have been possible in any country,
at any stage of the world's history, without the initiative and the
support of some such sacrosanct organization as the Catholic Church,
wielding a spell over the minds even of those who, in terror and
despair, fought against it. As in the thirteenth century, so at the end
of the fifteenth, [1572] the Inquisition in Spain was spasmodically
resisted in Aragon and Castile, in Catalonia, and in Valencia;
the first Inquisitor-General in Aragon being actually slain in the
cathedral of Saragossa in 1487, despite his precaution of wearing a
steel cap and coat of mail. [1573] Vigorous protests from the Cortès
even forced some restraint upon the entire machine; but such occasional
resistance could not long countervail the steady pressure of regal and
official avarice and the systematic fanaticism of the Dominican order.

It was thus the fate of Spain to illustrate once for all the power of
a dogmatic religious system to extirpate the spirit of reason from an
entire nation for a whole era. There and there only, save for a time
in Italy, did the Inquisition become all-powerful; and it wrought for
the evisceration of the intellectual and material life of Spain with
a demented zeal to which there is no parallel in later history. In
the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, after several random massacres
and much persecution of the "New Christians" or doubtful converts from
Judaism, [1574] the unconverted Jews of Spain were in 1489 penned into
Ghettos, and were in 1492 expelled bodily from the country, with every
circumstance of cruelty, so far as Church and State could compass their
plans. By this measure at least 160,000 subjects [1575] of more than
average value were lost to the State. Portugal and other Christian
countries took the same cruel step a few years later; but Spain
carried the policy much further. From the year of its establishment,
the Inquisition was hotly at work destroying heresy of every kind;
and the renowned Torquemada, the confessor of Isabella, is credited
with having burned over ten thousand persons in his eighteen years of
office as Grand Inquisitor, besides torturing many thousands. Close
upon a hundred thousand more were terrified into submission; and
a further six thousand burned in effigy in their absence or after
death. [1576] The destruction of books was proportionally thorough;
[1577] and when Lutheran Protestantism arose it was persistently killed
out; thousands leaving the country in view of the hopelessness of
the cause. [1578] At this rate, every vestige of independent thought
must soon have disappeared from any nation in the world. If she is
to be judged by the number of her slain and exiled heretics, Spain
must once have been nearly as fecund in reformative and innovating
thought as any State in northern Europe; but the fatal conjunction
of the royal and the clerical authority sufficed for a whole era to
denude her of every variety of the freethinking species. [1579]




§ 10. THOUGHT IN ENGLAND

Lying on the outskirts of the world of culture, England in the
later Middle Ages and the period of the Italian Renaissance lived
intellectually, even where ministered to by the genius of Chaucer, for
the most part in dependence on Continental impulses; yet not without
notable outcrops of native energy. There is indeed no more remarkable
figure in the Middle Ages than Roger Bacon (? 1214-1294), the English
Franciscan friar, schooled at Paris. His career remains still in parts
obscure. Born at or near Ilchester, in Somersetshire, he studied at
Oxford under Edmund Rich, Richard Fitzacre, Robert Grosstête, and Adam
de Marisco; and later, for a number of years, at Paris, where he is
supposed to have held a chair. On his return he was lionized; but a few
years afterwards, in 1257, we find him again in Paris, banished thither
by his Order. [1580] He was not absolutely imprisoned, but ordered to
live under official surveillance in a dwelling where he was forbidden
to write, to speak to novices, or observe the stars--rules which, it
is pretty clear, he broke, one and all. [1581] After some eight years
of this durance, Cardinal Guido Falcodi (otherwise Guy Foucaud or De
Foulques), who while acting as papal legate in England at the time
of the rising of Simon de Montfort may have known or heard of Bacon,
became interested in him through his chaplain, Raymond of Laon, who
spoke (in error) of the imprisoned friar as having written much on
science. The cardinal accordingly wrote asking to see the writings in
question. Bacon sent by a friend an explanation to the effect that he
had written little, and that he could not devote himself to composition
without a written mandate and a papal dispensation. About this time
the Cardinal was elevated to the papacy as Clement IV; and in that
capacity, a year later (1266), he wrote to Bacon authorizing him to
disobey his superior, but exhorting him to do it secretly. Bacon,
by his own account, had already spent in forty years of study 2,000
libri [1582] in addition to purchases of books and instruments and
teacher's fees; and it is not known whether the Pope furnished the
supplies he declared he needed. [1583] To work, however, he went with
an astonishing industry, and in the course of less than eighteen months
[1584] he had produced his chief treatise, the Opus Majus; the Opus
Minus, designed as a summary or sample of the former; and the later
Opus Tertium, planned to serve as a preamble to the two others. [1585]

Through all three documents there runs the same inspiration, the Opus
Tertium and the Majus constituting a complete treatise, which gives
at once the most vivid idea of the state of culture at the time,
and the most intimate presentment of a student's mind, that survive
from the thirteenth century. It was nothing less than a demand, such
as was made by Francis Bacon three hundred and fifty years later,
and by Auguste Comte in the nineteenth century, for a reconstruction
of all studies and all tuition. Neither pope nor emperor could have
met it; but Clement gave Roger his freedom, and he returned to Oxford,
papally protected, at the end of 1267. Four years later Clement died,
and was succeeded by Gregory X, a Franciscan.

At this stage of his life Bacon revealed that, whatever were his
wrongs, he was inclined to go halfway to meet them. In a new writing of
similar purport with the others, the Compendium Philosophiæ, written
in 1271, [1586] he not only attacked in detail the ecclesiastical
system, [1587] but argued that the Christians were incomparably
inferior to pagans in morals, and therefore in science; [1588] that
there was more truth in Aristotle's few chapters on laws than in the
whole corpus juris; [1589] that the Christian religion, as commonly
taught, was not free of errors; and that philosophy truly taught,
and not as in the schools, was perhaps the surer way to attain both
truth and salvation. [1590]

Again he was prosecuted; and this time, after much delay, it was
decided that the entire Order should deal with the case. Not till
1277 did the trial come off, under the presidency of the chief of the
Order, Jerome of Ascoli. Bacon was bracketed with another insubordinate
brother, Jean d'Olive; and both were condemned. In Bacon's case his
doctrine was specified as continentem aliquas novitates suspectas,
propter quas fuit idem Rogerius carceri condempnatus. [1591] This
time Bacon seems to have undergone a real imprisonment, which lasted
fourteen years. During that time four more popes held office, the
last of them being the said Jerome, elevated to the papal chair as
Nicholas IV. Not till his death in 1292 was Bacon released--to die
two years later.

He was in fact, with all his dogmatic orthodoxy, too essentially
in advance of his age to be otherwise than suspect to the typical
ecclesiastics of any time. The marvel is that with his radical
skepticism as to all forms of human knowledge; his intense perception
of the fatality of alternate credulity and indifference which kept
most men in a state of positive or negative error on every theme;
his insatiable thirst for knowledge; his invincible repugnance to all
acknowledgment of authority, [1592] and his insistence on an ethical
end, he should have been able to rest as he did in the assumption of
a divine infallibility vested in what he knew to be a corruptible
text. It was doubtless defect of strictly philosophic thought, as
distinguished from practical critical faculty, that enabled him to
remain orthodox in theology while anti-authoritarian in everything
else. As it was, his recalcitrance to authority in such an age sufficed
to make his life a warfare upon earth. And it is not surprising that,
even as his Franciscan predecessor Robert Grosstête, bishop of Lincoln,
came to be reputed a sorcerer on the strength of having written many
treatises on scientific questions--as well as on witchcraft--Roger
Bacon became a wizard in popular legend, and a scandal in the eyes
of his immediate superiors, for a zest of secular curiosity no less
uncommon and unpriestlike. [1593] "It is sometimes impossible to
avoid smiling," says one philosophic historian of him, "when one
sees how artfully this personified thirst for knowledge seeks to
persuade himself, or his readers, that knowledge interests him only for
ecclesiastical ends. No one has believed it: neither posterity ... nor
his contemporaries, who distrusted him as worldly-minded." [1594]

Worldly-minded he was in a noble sense, as seeking to know the
world of Nature; and perhaps the most remarkable proof of his
originality on this side is his acceptance of the theory of the
earth's sphericity. Peter de Alliaco, whose Imago Mundi was compiled
in 1410, transcribed from Roger Bacon's Opus Majus almost literally,
but without acknowledgment, a passage containing quotations from
Aristotle, Pliny, and Seneca, all arguing for the possibility of
reaching India by sailing westward. Columbus, it is known, was familiar
with the Imago Mundi; and this passage seems greatly to have inspired
him in his task. [1595] This alone was sufficient practical heresy
to put Bacon in danger; and yet his real orthodoxy can hardly be
doubted. [1596] He always protested against the scholastic doctrine
of a "twofold truth," insisting that revelation and philosophy were
at one, but that the latter also was divine. [1597] It probably
mattered little to his superiors, however, what view he took of the
abstract question: it was his zeal for concrete knowledge that they
detested. His works remain to show the scientific reach of which his
age was capable, when helped by the lore of the Arabs; for he seems
to have drawn from Averroës some of his inspiration to research;
[1598] but in the England of that day his ideals of research were as
unattainable as his wrath against clerical obstruction was powerless;
[1599] and Averroïsm in England made little for innovation. [1600]
The English Renaissance properly sets-in in the latter half of the
sixteenth century, when the glory of that of Italy is passing away.

In the fourteenth century, indeed, a remarkable new life is seen
arising in England in the poetry and prose of Chaucer, from contact
with the literature of Italy and France; but while Chaucer reflects
the spontaneous medieval hostility to the self-seeking and fraudulent
clergy, and writes of deity with quite medieval irreverence, [1601] he
tells little of the Renaissance spirit of critical unbelief, save when
he notes the proverbial irreligion of the physicians, [1602] or smiles
significantly over the problem of the potency of clerical cursing
and absolution, [1603] or shrugs his shoulders over the question of
a future state. [1604] In such matters he is noticeably undevout;
and though it is impossible to found on such passages a confident
assertion that Chaucer had no belief in immortality, it is equally
impossible in view of them to claim that he was a warm believer.


    Prof. Lounsbury, who has gone closely and critically into the
    whole question of Chaucer's religious opinions, asks concerning
    the lines in the Knight's Tale on the passing of Arcite:
    "Can modern agnosticism point to a denial more emphatic than
    that made in the fourteenth century of the belief that there
    exists for us any assurance of the life that is lived beyond
    the grave?" (Studies in Chaucer, 1892, ii, 514-15). Prof. Skeat,
    again, affirms (Notes to the Tales, Clar. Press Compl. Chaucer,
    v, 92) that "the real reason why Chaucer could not here describe
    the passage of Arcite's soul to heaven is because he had already
    copied Boccaccio's description, and had used it with respect
    to the death of Troilus" (see Troil. v, 1807-27; stanzas 7,
    8, 9 from the end). This evades the question as to the poet's
    faith. In point of fact, the passage in Troilus and Criseyde is
    purely pagan, and tells of no Christian belief, though that poem,
    written before the Tales, seems to parade a Christian contempt
    for pagan lore. (Cp. Lounsbury, as cited, p. 512.)

    The ascription of unbelief seems a straining of the evidence;
    but it would be difficult to gainsay the critic's summing-up:
    "The general view of all his [Chaucer's] production leaves upon
    the mind the impression that his personal religious history was
    marked by the dwindling devoutness which makes up the experience
    of so many lives--the fallings from us, the vanishings, we know
    not how or when, of beliefs in which we have been bred. One
    characteristic which not unusually accompanies the decline of
    faith in the individual is in him very conspicuous. This is
    the prominence given to the falsity and fraud of those who have
    professedly devoted themselves to the advancement of the cause of
    Christianity.... Much of Chaucer's late work, so far as we know
    it to be late, is distinctly hostile to the Church.... It is,
    moreover, hostile in a way that implies an utter disbelief in
    certain of its tenets, and even a disposition to regard them
    as full of menace to the future of civilization" (Lounsbury,
    vol. cited, pp. 519-20).

    Against this general view is to be set that which proceeds on
    an unquestioning acceptance of the "Retractation" or confession
    at the close of the Canterbury Tales, as to the vexed question
    of the genuineness of which see the same critic, work cited, i,
    412-15; iii, 40. The fact that the document is appended to the
    concluding "Parson's Tale" (also challenged as to authenticity),
    which is not a tale at all, and to which the confession refers
    as "this little treatise or rede," suggests strongly a clerical
    influence brought to bear upon the aging poet.


To infer real devotion on his part from his sympathetic account of the
good parson, or from the dubious Retractation appended to the Tales,
is as unwarrantable as is the notion, dating from the Reformation
period, that he was a Wicliffite. [1605] Even if the Retractation be
of his writing, under pressure in old age, it points to a previous
indifferentism; and from the great mass of his work there can be
drawn only the inference that he is essentially non-religious in
temper and habit of mind. But he is no disputant, no propagandist,
whether on ecclesiastical or on intellectual grounds; and after his
day there is social retrogression and literary relapse in England
for two centuries. That there was some practical rationalism in his
day, however, we gather from the Vision of Piers Ploughman, by the
contemporary poet Langland (fl. 1360-90), where there is a vivid
account of the habit among anti-clerical laymen of arguing against
the doctrine of original sin and the entailment of Adam's offence
on the whole human race. [1606] To this way of thinking Chaucer
probably gave a stimulus by his translation of the De Consolatione
Philosophiae of Boethius, where is cited the "not unskilful" dilemma:
"If God is, whence come wicked things? And if God is not, whence come
good things?" [1607] The stress of the problem is hard upon theism;
and to ponder it was to resent the doctrine of inherited guilt. The
Church had, in fact, visibly turned this dogma to its own ends,
insisting on the universal need of ghostly help even as it repelled
the doctrine of unalterable predestination. In both cases, of course,
the matter was settled by Scripture and authority; and Langland's
reply to the heretics is mere angry dogmatism.

There flourished, further, a remarkable amount of heresy of the
species seen in Provence and Northern Italy in the eleventh and twelfth
centuries, such sectaries being known in England under the generic name
of "Lollards," derived from the Flemish, in which it seems to have
signified singers of hymns. [1608] Lollards or "Beghards," starting
from the southern point of propagation, spread all over civilized
Northern Europe, meeting everywhere persecution alike from the parish
priests and the mendicant monks; and in England as elsewhere their
anti-clericalism and their heresy were correlative. In the formal
Lollard petition to Parliament in 1395, however, there is evident an
amount of innovating opinion which implies more than the mere stimulus
of financial pressure. Not only the papal authority, monasteries,
clerical celibacy, nuns' vows, transubstantiation, exorcisms, bought
blessings, pilgrimages, prayers for the dead, offerings to images,
confessions and absolutions, but war and capital punishment and
"unnecessary trades," such as those of goldsmiths and armourers,
are condemned by those early Utopists. [1609] In what proportion they
really thought out the issues they dealt with we can hardly ascertain;
but a chronicler of Wiclif's time, living at Leicester, testifies that
you could not meet two men in the street but one was a Lollard. [1610]
The movement substantially came to nothing, suffering murderous
persecution in the person of Oldcastle (Lord Cobham) and others,
and disappearing in the fifteenth century in the demoralization of
conquest and the ruin of the civil wars; but apart from Chaucer's
poetry it is more significant of foreign influences in England than
almost any other phenomenon down to the reign of Henry VIII.

It is still doubtful, indeed, whence the powerful Wiclif derived his
marked Protestantism as to some Catholic dogmas; but it would seem
that he too may have been reached by the older Paulician or other
southern heresy. [1611] As early as 1286 a form of heresy approaching
the Albigensian and the Waldensian is found in the province of
Canterbury, certain persons there maintaining that Christians
were not bound by the authority of the Pope and the Fathers, but
solely by that of the Bible and "necessary reason." [1612] It is
true that Wiclif never refers to the Waldenses or Albigenses, or
any of the continental reformers of his day, though he often cites
his English predecessor, Bishop Grosstête; [1613] but this may have
been on grounds of policy. To cite heretics could do no good; to
cite a bishop was helpful. The main reason for doubting a foreign
influence in his case is that to the last he held by purgatory and
absolute predestination. [1614] In any case, Wiclif's practical and
moral resentment of ecclesiastical abuses was the mainspring of his
doctrine; and his heresies as to transubstantiation and other articles
of faith can be seen to connect with his anti-priestly attitude. He,
however, was morally disinterested as compared with the would-be
plunderers who formed the bulk of the anti-Church party of John of
Gaunt; and his failure to effect any reformation was due to the fact
that on one hand there was not intelligence enough in the nation to
respond to his doctrinal common sense, while on the other he could
not so separate ecclesiastical from feudal tyranny and extortion as
to set up a political movement which should strike at clerical evils
without inciting some to impeach the nobility who held the balance of
political power. Charged with setting vassals against tyrant lords,
he was forced to plead that he taught the reverse, though he justified
the withholding of tithes from bad curates. [1615] The revolt led by
John Ball in 1381, which was in no way promoted by Wiclif, [1616]
showed that the country people suffered as much from lay as from
clerical oppression.

The time, in short, was one of common ferment, and not only were
there other reformers who went much farther than Wiclif in the matter
of social reconstruction, [1617] but we know from his writings
that there were heretics who carried their criticism as far as to
challenge the authority and credibility of the Scriptures. Against
these accusatores and inimici Scripturae he repeatedly speaks in
his treatise De veritate Scripturae Sacrae, [1618] which is thus one
of the very earliest works in defence of Christianity against modern
criticism. [1619] His position, however, is almost wholly medieval. One
qualification should perhaps be made, in respect of his occasional
resort to reason where it was least to be expected, as on the question
of restrictions on marriage. [1620] But on such points he wavered;
and otherwise he is merely scripturalist. The infinite superiority
of Christ to all other men, and Christ's virtual authorship of the
entire Scriptures, are his premisses--a way of begging the question so
simple-minded that it is clear the other side was not heard in reply,
though these arguments had formed part of his theological lectures,
[1621] and so pre-supposed a real opposition. Wiclif was in short a
typical Protestant in his unquestioning acceptance of the Bible as a
supernatural authority; and when his demand for the publication of
the Bible in English was met by "worldly clerks" with the cry that
it would "set Christians in debate, and subjects to rebel against
their sovereigns," he could only protest that they "openly slander
God, the author of peace, and his holy law." Later English history
proved that the worldly clerks were perfectly right, and Wiclif the
erring optimist of faith. For the rest, his essentially dogmatic
view of religion did nothing to counteract the spirit of persecution;
and the passing of the Statute for the Burning of Heretics in 1401,
with the ready consent of both Houses of Parliament, constituted the
due dogmatic answer to dogmatic criticism. Yet within a few years the
Commons were proposing to confiscate the revenues of the higher clergy:
[1622] so far was anti-clericalism from implying heterodoxy.




§ 11. THOUGHT IN FRANCE

As regards France, the record of intellectual history between the
thirteenth and the sixteenth centuries is hardly less scanty than
as regards England. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the
intellectual life of the French philosophic schools, as we saw,
was more vigorous and expansive than that of any other country;
so that, looking further to the Provençal literature and to the
French beginnings of Gothic architecture, France might even be said
to prepare the Renaissance. [1623] Outside of the schools, too, there
was in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries a notable dissemination
of partially philosophical thought among the middle-class laity. At
that period the anti-clerical tendency was strongest in France, where
in the thirteenth century lay scholarship stood highest. In the reign
of Philippe le Bel (end of thirteenth century) was composed the poem
Fauvel, by François de Rues, which is a direct attack on pope and
clergy; [1624] and in the famous Roman de la Rose, as developed by
Jean le Clopinel (= the Limper) of Meung-sur-Loire, there enters,
without any criticism of the Christian creed, an element of all-round
Naturalism which indirectly must have made for reason. Begun by
Guillaume de Lorris in the time of St. Louis in a key of sentiment and
lyricism, the poem is carried on by Jean de Meung under Philippe le Bel
in a spirit of criticism, cynicism, science, and satire, which tells
of many developments in forty years. The continuation can hardly have
been written, as some literary historians assume, about its author's
twenty-fifth year; but it may be dated with some certainty between
1270 and 1285. To the work of his predecessor, amounting to less than
5,000 lines, he added 18,000, pouring forth a medley of scholarship,
pedantry, philosophic reflection, speculation on the process of nature
and the structure and ills of society, on property, morals, marriage,
witchcraft, the characters of women, monks, friars, aristocrats--the
whole pageant of medieval knowledge and fancy.

The literary power of the whole is great, and may be recommended to the
general reader as comparing often with that shown in the satirical and
social-didactic poems of Burns, though without much of the breath of
poetry. Particularly noteworthy, in the historic retrospect, is the
assimilization of the ancient Stoic philosophy of "living according
to Nature," set forth in the name of a "Reason" who is notably free
from theological prepossessions. It is from this standpoint that
Jean de Meung assails the mendicant friars and the monks in general:
he would have men recognize the natural laws of life; and he carries
the principle to the length of insisting on the artificial nature of
aristocracy and monarchy, which are justifiable only as far as they
subserve the common good. Thus he rises above the medieval literary
prejudice against the common people, whose merit he recognizes as
Montaigne did later. On the side of science, he expressly denies
[1625] that comets carry any such message as was commonly ascribed
to them alike by popular superstition and by theology--a stretch of
freethinking perhaps traceable to Seneca, but nonetheless centuries in
advance of the Christendom of the time. [1626] On the side of religion,
again, he is one of the first to vindicate the lay conception of
Christian excellence as against the ecclesiastical. His Naturalism,
so far, worked consistently in making him at once anti-ascetic and
anti-supernaturalist.

It is not to be inferred, however, that Jean de Meung had learned
to doubt the validity of the Christian creed. His long poem, one of
the most popular books in Europe for two hundred years, could never
have had its vogue if its readers could have suspected it to be even
indirectly anti-Christian. He can hardly have held, as some historians
believe, [1627] the status of a preaching friar; but he claims that he
neither blames nor defames religion, [1628] respecting it in all forms,
provided it be "humble and loyal." He was in fact a man of some wealth,
much culture, and orderly in life, thus standing out from the earlier
"Goliard" type. When, then, he pronounces Nature "the minister of
this earthly state," "vicar and constable of the eternal emperor,"
he has no thought of dethroning Deity, or even of setting aside the
Christian faith. In his rhymed Testament he expresses himself quite
piously, and lectures monks and women in an edifying fashion.


    To say therefore that Jean de Meung's part of the Roman de la Rose
    is a "popular satire on the beliefs of Romanism" (Owen, Skeptics
    of Ital. Renais. p. 44) is to misstate the case. His doctrine is
    rather an intellectual expression of the literary reaction against
    asceticism (cp. Bartoli, Storia della letteratura italiana, i, 319,
    quoting Lenient) which had been spontaneously begun by the Goliards
    and Troubadours. At the same time the poem does stand for the new
    secular spirit alike in "its ingrained religion and its nascent
    freethought" (Saintsbury, p. 87); and with the Reynard epic it
    may be taken as representing the beginning of "a whole revolution,
    the resurgence and affirmation of the laity, the new force which is
    to transform the world, against the Church" (Bartoli, Storia, i,
    308; cp. Demogeot, Hist. de la litt. fr. 5e éd. pp. 130-31, 157;
    Lanson, pp. 132-36). The frequent flings at the clergy (cp. the
    partly Chaucerian English version, Skeat's ed. of Chaucer's Works,
    i, 234; Bell's ed. iv, 230) were sufficient to draw upon this
    as upon other medieval poems of much secular vogue the anger of
    "the Church" (Sismondi, Lit. of South. Europe, i, 216); but they
    were none the less relished by believing readers. "The Church"
    was in fact not an entity of one mind; and some of its sections
    enjoyed satire directed against the others.

    When, then, we speak of the anti-clerical character of much
    medieval poetry, we must guard against exaggerated implications. It
    is somewhat of a straining of the facts, for instance, to say of
    the humorous tale of Reynard the Fox, so widely popular in the
    thirteenth century, that it is essentially anti-clerical to the
    extent that "Reynard is laic: Isengrim [the wolf] is clerical"
    (Bartoli, Storia della letteratura italiana, i, 307; cp. Owen,
    Skeptics of the Italian Renaissance, p. 44). The Reynard epic,
    in origin a simple humorous animal-story, had various later
    forms. Some of these, as the Latin poem, and especially the version
    attributed to Peter of St. Cloud, were markedly anti-clerical, the
    latter exhibiting a spirit of all-round profanity hardly compatible
    with belief (cp. Gervinus, Geschichte der deutschen Dichtung, 5te
    Ausg. i, 227-28; Gebhart, Les Origines de la Renais. en Italie,
    1874, p. 39); but the version current in the Netherlands, which
    was later rendered into English prose by Caxton, is of a very
    different character (Gervinus, p. 229 sq.). In Caxton's version it
    is impossible to regard Reynard as laic and Isengrim as clerical;
    though in the Latin and other versions the wolf figures as monk or
    abbot. (See also the various shorter satires published by Grimm
    in his Reinhart Fuchs, 1834.) Often the authorship is itself
    clerical, one party or order satirizing another; sometimes the
    spirit is religious, sometimes markedly irreverent. (Gervinus,
    pp. 214-21). "La plupart de ces satires sont l'oeuvre des moines
    et des abbés" (Lenient, La Satire en France au moyen âge, 1859,
    préf. p. 4); and to say that these men were often irreligious is
    not to say that they were rationalists. It is to be remembered
    that nascent Protestantism in England under Henry VIII resorted
    to the weapons of obscene parody (Blunt, Ref. of Ch. of England,
    ed. 1892, i, 273, note).


"In fine," we may say with a judicious French historian, "one
cannot get out of his time, and the time was not come to be
non-Christian. Jean de Meung did not perceive that his thought put
him outside the Church, and upset her foundations. He is believing
and pious, like Rutebeuf.... The Gospel is his rule: he holds it; he
defends it; he disputes with those who seem to him to depart from it;
he makes himself the champion of the old faith against the novelties
of the Eternal Gospel.... His situation is that of the first reformers
of the sixteenth century, who believed themselves to serve Jesus Christ
in using their reason, and who very sincerely, very piously, hoped for
the reform of the Church through the progress of philosophy." [1629]
"Nevertheless," adds the same historian, "one cannot exaggerate the
real weight of the work. By his philosophy, which consists essentially
in the identity, the sovereignty, of Nature and Reason, he is the
first link in the chain which connects Rabelais, Montaigne, Molière;
to which Voltaire also links himself, and even in certain regards
Boileau." [1630]

Men could not then see whither the principle of "Nature" and Reason
was to lead, yet even in the age of Jean de Meung the philosophic
heads went far, and he can hardly have missed knowing as much, if,
as is supposed, he studied at Paris, as he certainly lived and died
there. In the latter part of the thirteenth century, as before noted,
rationalism at the Paris university was frequently carried in private
to a rejection of all the dogmas peculiar to Christianity. At that
great school Roger Bacon seems to have acquired his encyclopædic
learning and his critical habit; and there it was that in the
first half of the fourteenth century William of Occam nourished his
remarkable philosophic faculty. From about the middle of the fourteenth
century, however, there is a relative arrest of French progress for
some two centuries. [1631] Three main conditions served to check
intellectual advance: the civil wars which involved the loss of the
communal liberties which had been established in France between the
eleventh and thirteenth centuries; [1632] the exhaustion of the nation
by the English invasion under Edward III; the repressive power of the
Church; and the general devotion of the national energies to war. After
the partial recovery from the ruinous English invasion under Edward
III, civil strifes and feudal tyranny wrought new impoverishment,
making possible the still more destructive invasion under Henry V;
so that in the first half of the fifteenth century France was hardly
more civilized than England. [1633] It is from the French invasion
of Italy under Charles VIII that the enduring renascence in France
broadly dates. Earlier impulses had likewise come from Italy: Lanfranc,
Anselm, Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas, and others of lesser note,
[1634] had gone from Italy to teach in France or England; but it
needed the full contact of Italian civilization to raise monarchic
France to the stage of general and independent intellectual life.


    During the period in question, there had been established
    the following universities: Paris, 1200; Toulouse, 1220;
    Montpellier, 1289; Avignon, 1303; Orléans, 1312; Cahors, 1332;
    Angers, 1337; Orange, 1367; Dôle, 1422; Poitiers, 1431; Caen,
    1436; Valence, 1454; Nantes, 1460; Bourges, 1463; Bordeaux, 1472
    (Desmaze, L'Université de Paris, 1876, p. 2. Other dates for
    some of these are given on p. 31). But the militarist conditions
    prevented any sufficient development of such opportunities. In
    the fourteenth century, says Littré (Études sur les barbares,
    p. 419), "the university of Paris ... was more powerful than
    at any other epoch.... Never did she exercise such a power over
    men's minds." But he also decides that in that epoch the first
    florescence of French literature withered away (p. 387). The
    long location of the anti-papacy at Avignon (1305-1376)
    doubtless counted for something in French culture (V. Le
    Clerc, Hist. Litt. de la France au XIVe siècle, i, 37; Gebhart,
    pp. 221-26); but the devastation wrought by the English invasion
    was sufficient to countervail that and more. See the account of
    it by Petrarch (letter of the year 1360) cited by Littré, Études,
    pp. 416-17; and by Hallam, Middle Ages, i, 59, note. Cp. Michelet,
    Hist. de France, vi, ch. iii; Dunton, England in the Fifteenth
    Century, 1888, pp. 79-84. As to the consequences of the English
    invasion of the fifteenth century see Martin, Hist. de France,
    4e édit. vi, 132-33; Sismondi, Hist. des Français, 1831, xii,
    582; Hallam, Middle Ages, i, 83-87.


In northern France of the fourteenth century, as in Provence and Italy
and England, there was a manifold stir of innovation and heresy: there
as elsewhere the insubordinate Franciscans, with their Eternal Gospel,
the Paterini, the Beghards, fought their way against the Dominican
Inquisition. But the Inquisitors burned books as well as men; and much
anti-ecclesiastical poetry, some dating even from the Carlovingian
era, shared the fate of many copies of the Talmud, translations of
the Bible, and, à fortiori, every species of heretical writing. In
effect, the Inquisition for the time "extinguished freethought"
[1635] in France. As in England, the ferment of heresy was mixed
with one of democracy; and in the French popular poetry of the time
there are direct parallels to the contemporary English couplet,
"When Adam delved and Eve span, Where was then the gentleman?" [1636]
Such a spirit could no more prosper in feudal France than in feudal
England; and when France emerged from her mortal struggle with the
English, to be effectively solidified by Louis XI, there was left in
her life little of the spirit of free inquiry. It has been noted that
whereas the chronicler Joinville, in the thirteenth century, is full
of religious feeling, Froissart, in the fourteenth, priest as he is,
exhibits hardly any; and again Comines, in the fifteenth, reverts to
the orthodoxy of the twelfth and thirteenth. [1637] The middle period
was one of indifference, following on the killing out of heresy:
[1638] the fifteenth century is a resumption of the Middle Ages, and
Comines has the medieval cast of mind, [1639] although of a superior
order. There seems to be no community of thought between him and his
younger Italian contemporaries, Machiavelli and Guicciardini; though,
"even while Comines was writing, there were unequivocal symptoms of
a great and decisive change." [1640]

The special development in France of the spirit of "chivalry" had
joined the normal uncivilizing influence of militarism with that
of clericalism; the various knightly orders, as well as knighthood
pure and simple, being all under ecclesiastical sanctions, and
more or less strictly vowed to "defend the church," [1641] while
supremely incompetent to form an intelligent opinion. It is the more
remarkable that in the case of one of the crusading orders heresy
of the most blasphemous kind was finally charged against the entire
organization, and that it was on that ground annihilated (1311). It
remains incredible, however, that the order of the Templars can have
systematically practised the extravagances or held the tenets laid to
their charge. They had of course abused their power and departed from
their principles like every other religious order enabled to amass
wealth; and the hostility theirs aroused is perfectly intelligible
from what is known of the arrogance of its members and the general
ruffianism of the Crusaders. Their wealth alone goes far to explain
the success of their enemies against them; for, though the numbers of
the order were much smaller than tradition gives out, its possessions
were considerable. These were the true ground of the French king's
attack. [1642] But that its members were as a rule either Cathari
or anti-Christians, either disguised Moslems or deists, or that they
practised obscenity by rule, there is no reason to believe. What seems
to have happened was a resort by some unbelieving members to more or
less gross burlesque of the mysteries of initiation--a phenomenon
paralleled in ancient Greece and in the modern Catholic world, and
implying rather hardy irreligion than any reasoned heresy whatever.


    The long-continued dispute as to the guilt of the Knights Templars
    is still chronically re-opened. Hallam, after long hesitation,
    came finally to believe them guilty, partly on the strength of
    the admissions made by Michelet in defending them (Europe in
    the Middle Ages, 11th ed. i, 138-42--note of 1848). He attaches,
    however, a surprising weight to the obviously weak "architectural
    evidence" cited by Hammer-Purgstall. Heeren (Essai sur l'influence
    des croisades, 1808, pp. 221-22) takes a more judicial view. The
    excellent summing-up of Lea (Hist. of the Inquis. bk. iii,
    ch. v, pp. 263-76) perhaps gives too little weight to the mass
    of curious confirmatory evidence cited by writers on the other
    side (e.g., F. Nicolai, Versuch über die Beschuldigungen welche
    dem Tempelherrenorden gemacht worden, 1782); but his conclusion
    as to the falsity of the charges against the order as a whole
    seems irresistible.

    The solution that offensive practices occurred irregularly (Lea,
    pp. 276-77) is pointed to even by the earlier hostile writers
    (Nicolai, p. 17). It seems to be certain that the initiatory rites
    included the act of spitting on the crucifix--presumptively a
    symbolic display of absolute obedience to the orders of those in
    command (Jolly, Philippe le Bel, pp. 264-68). That there was no
    Catharism in the order seems certain (Lea, p. 249). The suggestion
    that the offensive and burlesque practices were due to the lower
    grade of "serving brethren," who were contemned by the higher,
    seems, however, without firm foundation. The courage for such
    freaks, and the disposition to commit them, were rather more likely
    to arise among the crusaders of the upper class, who could come
    in contact with Moslem-Christian unbelief through those of Sicily.

    For the further theory that the "Freemasons" (at that period really
    cosmopolitan guilds of masons) were already given to freethinking,
    there is again no evidence. That they at times deliberately
    introduced obscene symbols into church architecture is no proof
    that they were collectively unbelievers in the Church's doctrines;
    though it is likely enough that some of them were. Obscenity
    is the expression not of an intellectual but of a physical and
    unreasoning bias, and can perfectly well concur with religious
    feeling. The fact that the medieval masons did not confine
    obscene symbols to the churches they built for the Templars
    (Hallam, as cited, pp. 140-41) should serve to discredit alike
    the theory that the Templars were systematically anti-Christian,
    and the theory that the Freemasons were so. That for centuries
    the builders of the Christian churches throughout Europe formed
    an anti-Christian organization is a grotesque hypothesis. At
    most they indulged in freaks of artistic satire on the lines of
    contemporary satirical literature, expressing an anti-clerical
    bias, with perhaps occasional elements of blasphemy. (See Menzel,
    Gesch. der Deutschen, Cap. 252, note.) It could well be that
    there survived among the Freemasons various Gnostic ideas;
    since the architectural art itself came in a direct line from
    antiquity. Such heresy, too, might conceivably be winked at by the
    Church, which depended so much on the heretics' services. But their
    obscenities were the mere expression of the animal imagination and
    normal salacity of all ages. Only in modern times, and that only in
    Catholic countries, has the derivative organization of Freemasonry
    been identified with freethought propaganda. In England in the
    seventeenth century the Freemasonic clubs--no longer connected
    with any trade--were thoroughly royalist and orthodox (Nicolai,
    pp. 196-98), as they have always remained.


Some remarkable intellectual phenomena, however, do connect with
the French university life of the first half of the fourteenth
century. William of Occam (d. 1347), the English Franciscan, who
taught at Paris, is on the whole the most rationalistic of medieval
philosophers. Though a pupil of the Realist Duns Scotus, he became
the renewer of Nominalism, which is the specifically rationalistic
as opposed to the religious mode of metaphysic; and his anti-clerical
bias was such that he had to fly from France to Bavaria for protection
from the priesthood. His Disputatio super potestate ecclesiastica,
and his Defensorium directed against Pope John XXII (or XXI), were
so uncompromising that in 1323 the Pope gave directions for his
prosecution. What came of the step is not known; but in 1328 we find
him actually imprisoned with two Italian comrades in the papal palace
at Avignon. Thence they made their escape to Bavaria. [1643] To the
same refuge fled Marsiglio of Padua, author (with John of Jandun) of
the Defensor Pacis (1324), "the greatest and most original political
treatise of the Middle Ages," [1644] in which it is taught that,
though monarchy may be expedient, the sovereignty of the State rests
with the people, and the hereditary principle is flatly rejected; while
it is insisted that the Church properly consists of all Christians,
and that the clergy's authority is restricted to spiritual affairs
and moral suasion. [1645] Of all medieval writers on politics before
Machiavelli he is the most modern.

Only less original is Occam, who at Paris came much under Marsiglio's
influence. His philosophic doctrines apparently derive from Pierre
Aureol (Petrus Aureolus, d. 1321), who with remarkable clearness and
emphasis rejected both Realism and the doctrine that what the mind
perceives are not realities, but formæ speculares. Pierre it was who
first enounced the Law of Parsimony in philosophy and science--that
causes are not to be multiplied beyond mental necessity--which is
specially associated with the name of Occam. [1646] Both anticipated
modern criticism [1647] alike of the Platonic and the Aristotelian
philosophy; and Occam in particular drew so decided a line between
the province of reason and that of faith that there can be little
doubt on which side his allegiance lay. [1648] His dialectic is for
its time as remarkable as is that of Hume, four centuries later. The
most eminent orthodox thinker of the preceding century had been the
Franciscan John Duns Scotus (1265 or 1274-1308), who, after teaching
great crowds of students at Oxford, was transferred in 1304 to Paris,
and in 1308 to Cologne, where he died. A Realist in his philosophy,
Duns Scotus opposed the Aristotelian scholasticism, and in particular
criticized Thomas Aquinas as having unduly subordinated faith and
practice to speculation and theory. The number of matters of faith
which Thomas had held to be demonstrable by reason, accordingly, was by
Duns Scotus much reduced; and, applying his anti-rationalism to current
belief, he fought zealously for the dogma that Mary, like Jesus, was
immaculately conceived. [1649] But Occam, turning his predecessor's
tactic to a contrary purpose, denied that any matter of faith was
demonstrable by reason at all. He granted that on rational grounds
the existence of a God was probable, but denied that it was strictly
demonstrable, and rejected the ontological argument of Anselm. As to
matters of faith, he significantly observed that the will to believe
the indemonstrable is meritorious. [1650]

It is difficult now to recover a living sense of the issues at stake
in the battle between Nominalism and Realism, and of the social
atmosphere in which the battle was carried on. Broadly speaking, the
Nominalists were the more enlightened school, the Realists standing
for tradition and authority; and it has been alleged that "the books
of the Nominalists, though the art of printing tended strongly to
preserve them, were suppressed and destroyed to such a degree that
it is now exceedingly difficult to collect them, and not easy to
obtain copies even of the most remarkable." [1651] On the other hand,
while we have seen Occam a fugitive before clerical enmity, we shall
see Nominalists agreeing to persecute a Realist to the death in the
person of Huss in the following century. So little was there to choose
between the camps in the matter of sound civics; and so easily could
the hierarchy wear the colours of any philosophical system.

Contemporary with Occam was Durand de St. Pourçain, who became a bishop
(d. 1332), and, after ranking as of the school of Thomas Aquinas,
rejected and opposed its doctrine. With all this heresy in the air,
the principle of "double truth," originally put in currency by
Averroïsm, came to be held in France as in Italy, in a sense which
implied the consciousness that theological truth is not truth at
all. [1652] Occam's pupil, Buridan, rector of the University of
Paris (fl. 1340), substantially avoided theology, and dealt with
moral and intellectual problems on their own merits. [1653] It is
recorded by Albert of Saxony, who studied at Paris in the first half
of the century, that one of his teachers held by the theory of the
motion of the earth. [1654] Even a defender of Church doctrines,
Pierre d'Ailly, accepted Occam's view of theism, [1655] and it
appears to be broadly true that Occam had at Paris an unbroken line
of successors down to the Reformation. [1656] In a world in which the
doctrine of a two-fold truth provided a safety-valve for heresy, such
a philosophical doctrine as his could not greatly affect lay thought;
but at Paris University in the year 1376 there was a startling display
of freethinking by the philosophical students, not a little suggestive
of a parody of the Averroïst propositions denounced by the Bishop
of Paris exactly a century before. Under cover of the doctrine of
two-fold truth they propounded a list of 219 theses, in which they (1)
denied the Trinity, the divinity of Jesus, the resurrection, and the
immortality of the soul; (2) affirmed the eternity of matter and the
uselessness of prayer, but also posited the principles of astrology;
(3) argued that the higher powers of the soul are incapable of sin,
and that voluntary sexual intercourse between the unmarried is not
sinful; and (4) suggested that there are fables and falsehoods in the
gospels as in other books. [1657] The element of youthful gasconnade
in the performance is obvious, and the Archbishop sharply scolded the
students; but there must have been much free discussion before such a
manifesto could have been produced. Nevertheless, untoward political
conditions prevented any dissemination of the freethinking spirit
in France; and not for some two centuries was there such another
growth of it. The remarkable case of Nicolaus of Autricuria, who in
1348 was forced to recant his teaching of the atomistic doctrine,
[1658] illustrates at once the persistence of the spirit of reason
in times of darkness, and the impossibility of its triumphing in the
wrong conditions.




§ 12. THOUGHT IN THE TEUTONIC COUNTRIES

The life of the rest of Europe in the later medieval period has little
special significance in the history of freethought. France and Italy,
by German admission, were the lands of the medieval Aufklärung. [1659]
The poetry of the German Minnesingers, a growth from that of the
Troubadours, presented the same anti-clerical features; [1660] and the
story of Reynard the Fox was turned to anti-ecclesiastical purpose
in Germany as in France. The relative freethinking set up by the
crusaders' contact with the Saracens seems to be the source of doubt of
the Minnesinger Freidank concerning the doom of hell-fire on heretics
and heathens, the opinion of Walter der Vogelweide that Christians,
Jews, and Moslems all serve the same God, [1661] and still more
mordant heresy. But such bold freethinking did not spread. Material
prosperity rather than culture was the main feature of German
progress in the Middle Ages; architecture being the only art greatly
developed. Heresy of the anti-ecclesiastical order indeed abounded,
and was duly persecuted; but the higher freethinking developments were
in the theosophic rather than the rationalistic direction. Albert the
Great (fl. 1260), "the universal Doctor," the chief German teacher
of the Middle Ages, was of unimpeached orthodoxy. [1662]

The principal German figure of the period is Master Eckhart (d. 1329),
who, finding religious beliefs excluded from the sphere of reason by
the freer philosophy of his day, undertook to show that they were all
matters of reason. He was, in fact, a mystically reasoning preacher,
and he taught in the interests of popular religion. Naturally,
as he philosophized on old bases, he did not really subject his
beliefs to any skeptical scrutiny, but took them for granted and
proceeded speculatively upon them. This sufficed to bring him before
the Inquisition at Cologne, where he recanted conditionally on an
appeal to the Pope. Dying soon after, he escaped the papal bull
condemning twenty-eight of his doctrines. His school later divided
into a heretical and a Church party, of which the former, called the
"false free spirits," seems to have either joined or resembled the
antinomian Brethren of the Free Spirit, then numerous in Germany. The
other section became known as the "Friends of God," a species
of mystics who were "faithful to the whole medieval imaginative
creed, Transubstantiation, worship of the Virgin and Saints,
Purgatory." [1663] Through Tauler and others, Eckhart's pietistic
doctrine gave a lead to later Protestant evangelicalism; but the
system as a whole can never have been held by any popular body. [1664]


    Dr. Lasson pronounces (Ueberweg, i, 483) that the type of Eckhart's
    character and teaching "was derived from the innermost essence
    of the German national character." At the same time he admits
    that all the offshoots of the school departed more or less widely
    from Eckhart's type--that is, from the innermost essence of their
    own national character. It would be as plausible to say that the
    later mysticism of Fénelon derived from the innermost essence
    of the French character. The Imitatio Christi has been similarly
    described as expressing the German character, on the assumption
    that it was written by Thomas à Kempis. Many have held that the
    author was the Frenchman Gerson (Hallam, Lit. of Europe, ed. 1872,
    i, 139-40). It was in all probability, as was held by Suarez,
    the work of several hands, one a monk of the twelfth century,
    another a monk of the thirteenth, and the third a theologian of
    the fifteenth; neither Gerson nor Thomas à Kempis being concerned
    (Le Clerc, Hist. Litt. du XIVe Siècle, 2e édit. pp. 384-85;
    cp. Neale's Hist. of the so-called Jansenist Church of Holland,
    1858, pp. 97-98).


The Imitatio Christi (1471), the most popular Christian work
of devotion ever published, [1665] tells all the while of the
obscure persistence of the search for knowledge and for rational
satisfactions. Whatever be the truth as to its authorship, it belongs
to all Christendom in respect of its querulous strain of protest
against all manner of intellectual curiosity. After the first note of
world-renunciation, the call to absorption in the inner religious life,
there comes the sharp protest against the "desire to know." "Surely an
humble husbandman that serveth God is better than a proud philosopher
who, neglecting himself, laboureth to understand the course of the
heavens.... Cease from an inordinate desire of knowing." [1666]
No sooner is the reader warned to consider himself the frailest of
all men than he is encouraged to look down on all reasoners. "What
availeth it to cavil and dispute much about dark and hidden things,
when for being ignorant of them we shall not be so much as reproved
at the day of judgment? It is a great folly to neglect the things
that are profitable and necessary, and give our minds to that which
is curious and hurtful.... And what have we to do with genus and
species, the dry notions of logicians?" [1667] The homily swings
to and fro between occasional admissions that "learning is not to
be blamed," perhaps interpolated by one who feared to have religion
figure as opposed to knowledge, and recurrent flings--perhaps also
interpolated--at all who seek book-lore or physical science; but the
note of distrust of reason prevails. "Where are all those Doctors and
Masters whom thou didst well know whilst they lived and flourished
in learning? Now others have their livings, and perchance scarce ever
think of them. While they lived they seemed something, but now they are
not spoken of." [1668] It belongs to the whole conception of retreat
and aloofness that the devout man should "meddle not with curiosities,
but read such things as may rather yield compunction to his heart than
occupation to his head"; and the last chapter of the last book closes
on the note of the abnegation of reason. "Human reason is feeble and
may be deceived, but true faith cannot be deceived. All reason and
natural search ought to follow faith, not to go before it, nor to
break in upon it.... If the works of God were such that they might be
easily comprehended by human reason, they could not be justly called
marvellous or unspeakable." Thus the very inculcation of humility,
by its constant direction against all intellectual exercise, becomes
an incitement to a spiritual arrogance; and all manner of science
finds in the current ideal of piety its pre-ordained antagonist.







CHAPTER X

FREETHOUGHT IN THE RENAISSANCE


§ 1. THE ITALIAN EVOLUTION

What is called the Renaissance was, broadly speaking, an evolution
of the culture forces seen at work in the later "Middle Ages,"
newly fertilized by the recovery of classic literature; and we shall
have to revert at several points of our survey to what we have been
considering as "medieval" in order to perceive the "new birth." The
term is inconveniently vague, and is made to cover different periods,
sometimes extending from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century,
sometimes signifying only the fifteenth. It seems reasonable to apply
it, as regards Italy, to the period in which southern culture began to
outgo that of France, and kept its lead--that is, from the end of the
fourteenth century [1669] to the time of the Counter-Reformation. That
is a comparatively distinct sociological era.

Renascent Italy is, after ancient Greece, the great historical
illustration of the sociological law that the higher civilizations
arise through the passing-on of seeds of culture from older to newer
societies, under conditions that specially foster them and give them
freer growth. The straitened and archaic pictorial art of Byzantium,
unprogressive in the hidebound life of the Eastern Empire, developed
in the free and striving Italian communities till it paralleled the
sculpture of ancient Greece; and it is to be said for the Church
that, however she might stifle rational thought, she economically
elicited the arts of painting and architecture (statuary being
tabooed as too much associated with pagan worships), even as Greek
religion had promoted architecture and sculpture. By force, however,
of the tendency of the arts to keep religion anthropomorphic where
deeper culture is lacking, popular belief in Renaissance Italy was
substantially on a par with that of polytheistic Greece.

Before the general recovery of ancient literature, the main motives to
rationalism, apart from the tendency of the Aristotelian philosophy
to set up doubts about creation and Providence and a future state,
were (1) the spectacle of the competing creed of Islam, [1670]
made known to the Italians first by intercourse with the Moors,
later by the Crusades; and further and more fully by the Saracenized
culture of Sicily and commercial intercourse with the east; (2) the
spectacle of the strife of creeds within Christendom; [1671] and (3)
the spectacle of the worldliness and moral insincerity of the bulk
of the clergy. It is in that atmosphere that the Renaissance begins;
and it may be said that freethought stood veiled beside its cradle.

In such an atmosphere, even on the ecclesiastical side, demand for
"reforms" naturally made headway; and the Council of Constance
(1414-1418) was convened to enact many besides the ending of the
schism. [1672] But the Council itself was followed by seven hundred
prostitutes; [1673] and its relation to the intellectual life was
defined by its bringing about, on a charge of heresy, the burning
of John Huss, who had come under a letter of safe-conduct from the
emperor. The baseness of the act was an enduring blot on the Church;
and a hundred years later, in a Germany with small goodwill to Bohemia,
Luther made it one of his foremost indictments of the hierarchy. But
in the interim the spirit of reform had come to nothing. Cut off from
much of the force that was needed to effect any great moral revolution
in the Church, the reforming movement soon fell away, [1674] and the
Church was left to ripen for later and more drastic treatment.

How far, nevertheless, anti-clericalism could go among the scholarly
class even in Italy is seen in the career of one of the leading
humanists of the Renaissance, Lorenzo Valla (1406-1457). In the
work of his youth, De Voluptate et Vero Bono, a hardy vindication
of aggressive Epicureanism--at a time when the title of Epicurean
stood for freethinker [1675]--he plainly sets up a rationalist
standard, affirming that science is founded on reason and Nature,
and that Nature is God. Not content with a theoretic defiance of
the faith, he violently attacked the Church. It was probably to the
protection of Alfonso of Aragon, king of Naples, who though pious
was not pro-clerical, [1676] that Valla was able to do what he did,
above all to write his famous treatise, De falso credita et ementita
Constantini donatione, wherein he definitely proved once for all that
the "donation" in question was a fiction. [1677] Such an opinion had
been earlier maintained at the Council of Basle by Æneas Sylvius,
afterwards Pope Pius II, and before him by the remarkable Nicolaus of
Cusa; [1678] but when the existence of Valla's work was known he had
to fly from Rome afresh (1443) to Naples, where he had previously been
protected for seven years. Applying the same critical spirit to more
sacrosanct literature, he impugned the authenticity of the Apostles'
Creed, and of the letter of Abgarus to Jesus Christ, given by Eusebius;
proceeding further to challenge many of the mistranslations in the
Vulgate. [1679] For his untiring propaganda he was summoned before
the Inquisition at Naples, but as usual was protected by the king,
whom he satisfied by professing faith in the dogmas of the Church,
as distinguished from ecclesiastical history and philology.

It was characteristic of the life of Italy, hopelessly committed on
economic grounds to the Church, that Valla finally sought and found
reconciliation with the papacy. He knew that his safety at Naples
depended on the continued anti-papalism of the throne; he yearned for
the society of Rome; and his heart was all the while with the cause of
Latin scholarship rather than with that of a visionary reformation. In
his as in so many cases, accordingly, intellectual rectitude gave
way to lower interests; and he made unblushing offers of retractation
to cardinals and pope. In view of the extreme violence of his former
attacks, [1680] it is not surprising that the reigning Pope, Eugenius
IV, refused to be appeased; but on the election of Nicholas V (1447)
he was sent for; and he died secretary to the Curia and Canon of
St. John Lateran. [1681]

Where so much of anti-clericalism could find harbourage within the
Church, there was naturally no lack of it without; and from the period
of Boccaccio till the Catholic reaction after the Reformation a large
measure of anti-clerical feeling is a constant feature in Italian
life. It was so ingrained that the Church had on the whole to leave
it alone. From pope to monk the mass of the clergy had forfeited
respect; and gibes at their expense were household words, [1682]
and the basis of popular songs. Tommaso Guardati of Salerno, better
known as Masuccio, attacks all orders of clergy in his collection of
tales with such fury that only the protection of the court of Naples
could well have saved him; and yet he was a good Catholic. [1683]
The popular poetic literature, with certain precautions, carried
the anti-clerical spirit as far as to parade a humorous non-literary
skepticism, putting in the mouths of the questionable characters in
its romances all manner of anti-religious opinions which it would
be unsafe to print as one's own, but which in this way reached
appreciative readers who were more or less in sympathy with the
author's sentiments and stratagems. The Morgante Maggiore of Pulci
(1488) is the great type of such early Voltairean humour: [1684]
it revives the spirit of the Goliards, and passes unscathed in the
new Renaissance world, where the earlier Provençal impiety had gone
the way of the Inquisition bonfire, books and men alike. Beneath
its mockery there is a constant play of rational thought, and every
phase of contemporary culture is glanced at in the spirit of always
unembittered humour which makes Pulci "the most lovable among the
great poets of the Renaissance." [1685] It is noteworthy that Pulci is
found affirming the doctrine of an Antipodes with absolute openness,
and with impunity, over a hundred years before Galileo. This survival
of ancient pagan science seems to have been obscurely preserved all
through the Middle Ages. In the eighth century, as we have seen,
the priest Feargal or Vergilius, of Bavaria, was deposed from his
office by the Pope, on the urging of St. Boniface, for maintaining it;
but he was reinstated, died a bishop, and became a saint; and not
only that doctrine, but that of the two-fold motion of the earth,
was affirmed with impunity before Pulci by Nicolaus of Cusa [1686]
(d. 1464); though in the fourteenth century Nicolaus of Autricuria
had to recant his teaching of the atomistic theory. [1687] As Pulci
had specially satirized the clergy and ecclesiastical miracles,
his body was refused burial in consecrated ground; but the general
temper was such as to save him from clerical enmity up to that point.

The Inquisition too was now greatly enfeebled throughout central
and northern as well as southern Italy. In 1440 the materialist,
mathematician, and astrologer Amadeo de' Landi, of Milan, was
accused of heresy by the orthodox Franciscans. Not only was he
acquitted, but his chief accuser was condemned in turn to make public
retractation, which he however declined to do. [1688] Fifty years
later the Inquisition was still nearly powerless. In 1497 we find
a freethinking physician at Bologna, Gabriele de Salò, protected
by his patrons against its wrath, although he "was in the habit of
maintaining that Christ was not God, but the son of Joseph and Mary
...; that by his cunning he had deceived the world; that he may have
died on the cross on account of crimes which he had committed," [1689]
and so forth. Nineteen years before, Galeotto Marcio had come near
being burned for writing that any man who lived uprightly according
to his own conscience would go to heaven, whatever his faith; and it
needed the Pope, Sixtus IV, his former pupil, to save him from the
Inquisition. [1690] Others, who went further, ran similar risks; and
in 1500 Giorgio da Novara was burned at Bologna, presumptively for
denying the divinity of Jesus. [1691] A bishop of Aranda, however,
is said to have done the same with impunity, in the same year, [1692]
besides rejecting hell and purgatory, and denouncing indulgences as
a device of the popes to fill their pockets.

During this period too the philosophy of Averroës, as set forth in his
"Great Commentary" on Aristotle, was taught in North Italy with an
outspokenness not before known. Gaetano of Siena began to lecture on
the Commentary at Padua in 1436; it was in part printed there in 1472;
and from 1471 to 1499 Nicoletto Vernias seems to have taught, in the
Paduan chair of philosophy, the Averroïst doctrine of the world-soul,
thus virtually denying the Christian doctrine of immortality. Violent
opposition was raised when his pupil Niphus (Nifo) printed similar
doctrine in a treatise De Intellectu et Dæmonibus (1492); but the
professors when necessary disclaimed the more dangerous tenets of
Averroïsm. [1693] Nifo it was who put into print the maxim of his
tribe: Loquendum est ut plures, sententiendum ut pauci--"think with
the few; speak with the majority." [1694]

As in ancient Greece, humorous blasphemy seems to have fared better
than serious unbelief. [1695] As is remarked by Hallam, the number of
vindications of Christianity produced in Italy in the fifteenth century
proves the existence of much unbelief; [1696] and it is clear that,
apart from academic doubt, there was abundant freethinking among men
of the world. [1697] Erasmus was astonished at the unbelief he found
in high quarters in Rome. One ecclesiastic undertook to prove to him
from Pliny that there is no future state; others openly derided Christ
and the apostles; and many avowed to him that they had heard eminent
papal functionaries blaspheming the Mass. [1698] The biographer of Pope
Paul II has recorded how that pontiff found in his own court, among
certain young men, the opinion that faith rested rather on trickeries
of the saints (sanctorum astutiis) than on evidence; which opinion the
Pope eradicated. [1699] But in the career of Perugino (1446-1524),
who from being a sincerely religious painter became a skeptic in
his wrath against the Church which slew Savonarola, [1700] we have
evidence of a movement of things which no papal fiat could arrest.

As to the beliefs of the great artists in general we have little
information. Employed as they so often were in painting religious
subjects for the churches, they must as a rule have conformed
outwardly; and the artistic temper is more commonly credent than
skeptical. But in the case of one of the greatest, Leonardo da Vinci
(1452-1519), we have evidence of a continual play of critical scrutiny
on the world, and a continual revolt against mere authority, which
seem incompatible with any acceptance of Christian dogma. In his many
notes, unpublished till modern times, his universal genius plays
so freely upon so many problems that he cannot be supposed to have
ignored those of religion. His stern appraisement of the mass of men
[1701] carries with it no evangelical qualifications; his passion for
knowledge is not Christian; [1702] and his reiterated rejection of
the principle of authority in science [1703] and in literature [1704]
tells of a spirit which, howsoever it might practise reticence, cannot
have been inwardly docile to either priesthood or tradition. In all
his reflections upon philosophic and scientific themes he is, in
the scientific sense, materialistic--that is, inductive, studious
of experiment, insistent upon tangible data. [1705] "Wisdom is
daughter of experience"; [1706] "truth is the daughter of time";
[1707] "there is no effect in Nature without a reason"; [1708] "all
our knowledge originates in sensations" [1709]--such are the dicta he
accumulates in an age of superstition heightened by the mutability
of life, of ecclesiastical tyranny tempered only by indifferentism,
of faith in astrology and amulets, of benumbing tradition in science
and philosophy. On the problem of the phenomena of fossil shells
he pronounces with a searching sagacity of inference [1710] that
seems to reveal at once the extent to which the advance of science
has been blocked by pious obscurantism. [1711] In all directions we
see the great artist, a century before Bacon, anticipating Bacon's
protests and questionings, and this with no such primary bias to
religion as Bacon had acquired at his mother's knee. When he turns
to the problems of body and spirit he is as dispassionate, as keenly
speculative, as over those of external nature. [1712] Of magic he is
entirely contemptuous, not in the least on religious grounds, though
he glances at these, but simply for the folly of it. [1713] All that
tells of religious feeling in him is summed up in a few utterances
expressive of a vague theism; [1714] while he has straight thrusts at
religious fraud and absurdity. [1715] It is indeed improbable that a
mind so necessitated to discourse of its thought, however gifted for
prudent silence, can have subsisted without private sympathy from
kindred souls. Skepticism was admittedly abundant; and Leonardo of
all men can least have failed to reckon with its motives.

Perhaps the most fashionable form of quasi-freethinking in the Italy of
the fifteenth century was that which prevailed in the Platonic Academy
of Florence in the period, though the chief founder of the Academy,
Marsilio Ficino, wrote a defence of Christianity, and his most famous
adherent, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, planned another. Renaissance
Platonism began with the Greek Georgios Gemistos, surnamed Plethon
because of his devotion to Plato, which was such as to scandalize
common Christians and exasperate Aristotelians. The former had the
real grievance that his system ostensibly embodied polytheism and
logically involved pantheism; [1716] and one of his antagonists,
Gennadios Georgios Scolarios, who became patriarch of Constantinople,
caused his book On Laws to be burned; [1717] but the allegation of
his Aristotelian enemy and countryman, Georgios Trapezuntios, that
he prayed to the sun as creator of the world, [1718] is only one of
the polemical amenities of the period. Ostensibly he was a believing
Christian, stretching Christian love to accommodate the beliefs of
Plato; but it was not zeal for orthodoxy that moved Cosimo dei Medici,
at Florence, to embrace the new Platonism, and train up Marsilio
Ficino to be its prophet. The furor allegoricus which inspired the
whole school [1719] was much more akin to ancient Gnosticism than to
orthodox Christianity, and constantly points to pantheism [1720] as
the one philosophic solution of its ostensible polytheism. When, too,
Ficino undertakes to vindicate Christianity against the unbelievers in
his Della Religione Cristiana, "the most solid arguments that he can
find in its favour are the answers of the Sibyls, and the prophecies
of the coming of Jesus Christ to be found in Virgil, Plato, Plotinus,
and Porphyry." [1721]

How far such a spirit of expatiation and speculation, however visionary
and confused, tended to foster heresy is seen in the brief career
of the once famous young Pico della Mirandola, Ficino's wealthy
pupil. Parading a portentous knowledge of tongues [1722] and topics
at the age of twenty-four, he undertook (1486) to maintain a list of
nine hundred Conclusiones or propositions at Rome against all comers,
and to pay their expenses. Though he had obtained the permission of
the Pope, Innocent VIII, the challenge speedily elicited angry charges
of heresy against certain of the theses, and the Pope had to stop the
proceedings and issue an ecclesiastical commission of inquiry. Some
of the propositions were certainly ill adjusted to Catholic ideas,
in particular the sayings that "neither the cross of Christ nor
any image is to be adored adoratione latriæ"--with worship; that no
one believes what he believes merely because he wishes to; and that
Jesus did not physically descend into hell. [1723] Pico, retiring
to Florence, defended himself in an Apologia, which provoked fresh
outcry; whereupon he was summoned to proceed to Rome; and though the
powerful friendship of Lorenzo dei Medici procured a countermand of
the order, it was not till 1496 that he received, from Alexander VI,
a full papal remission.

Among the unachieved projects of his later life, which ended at the
age of thirty-one, was that of a treatise Adversus Hostes Ecclesiæ,
to be divided into seven sections, the first dealing with "The avowed
and open enemies of Christianity," and the second with "Atheists and
those who reject every religious system upon their own reasoning"; and
the others with Jews, Moslems, idolaters, heretics, and unrighteous
believers. [1724] The vogue of unbelief thus signified was probably
increased by the whole speculative habit of Pico's own school, [1725]
which tended only less than Averroïsm to a pantheism subversive of
the Christian creed. It is noteworthy that, while Ficino believed
devoutly in astrology, [1726] Pico rejected it, and left among his
confused papers a treatise against it which his nephew contrived to
transcribe and publish; [1727] but it does not appear that this served
either the cause of religion or that of science. The educated Italian
world, while political independence lasted, remained in various degrees
freethinking, pantheistic, and given to astrology, no school or teacher
combining rationalism in philosophy with sound scientific methods.

One of the great literary figures of the later Renaissance, Niccolò
Machiavelli (1469-1527), is the standing proof of the divorce of
the higher intelligence of Italy from the faith as well as the cause
of the Church before the Reformation. With this divorce he expressly
charges the Church itself, giving as the first proof of its malfeasance
that the peoples nearest Rome were the least religious. [1728] To
him the Church was the supreme evil in Italian politics, [1729] the
"stone in the wound." In a famous passage he gives his opinion that
"our religion, having shown us the truth and the true way, makes us
esteem less political honour (l'onore del mondo)"; and that whereas
the pagan religion canonized only men crowned with public honour,
as generals and statesmen, "our religion has glorified rather the
humble and contemplative men than the active," placing the highest
good in humility and abjection, teaching rather to suffer than
to do, and so making the world debile and ready to be a prey to
scoundrels. [1730] The passage which follows, putting the blame on
men for thus misreading their religion, is a fair sample of the grave
mockery with which the men of that age veiled their unfaith. [1731]
Machiavelli was reputed in his own world an atheist; [1732] and
he certainly was no religionist. He indeed never avows atheism, but
neither did any other writer of the epoch; [1733] and the whole tenour
of his writings is that of a man who had at least put aside the belief
in a prayer-answering deity; [1734] though, with the intellectual
arbitrariness which still affected all the thought of his age, he avows
a belief that all great political changes are heralded by prodigies,
celestial signs, prophecies, or revelations [1735]--here conforming
to the ordinary superstition of his troublous time.

It belongs, further, to the manifold self-contradiction of the
Renaissance that, holding none of the orthodox religious beliefs,
he argues insistently and at length for the value and importance of
religion, however untrue, as a means to political strength. Through
five successive chapters of his Discourses on Livy he presses and
illustrates his thesis, praising Numa as a sagacious framer of useful
fictions, and as setting up new and false beliefs which made for the
unification and control of the Roman people. The argument evolved
with such strange candour is, of course, of the nature of so much
Renaissance science, an à priori error: there was no lack of religious
faith and fear in primitive Rome before the age of Numa; and the legend
concerning him is a product of the very primordial mythopoiesis which
Machiavelli supposes him to have set on foot. It is in the spirit of
that fallacious theory of a special superinduced religiosity in Romans
[1736] that the great Florentine proceeds to charge the Church with
having made the Italians religionless and vicious (senza religione
e cattivi). Had he lived a century or two later he might have seen
in the case of zealously believing Spain a completer political and
social prostration than had fallen in his day on Italy, and this
alongside of regeneration in an unbelieving France. But indeed it
was the bitterness of spirit of a suffering patriot looking back
yearningly to an idealized Rome, rather than the insight of the author
of The Prince, [1737] that inspired his reasoning on the political
uses of religion; for at the height of his exposition he notes,
with his keen eye for fact, how the most strenuous use of religious
motive had failed to support the Samnites against the cool courage
of Romans led by a rationalizing general; [1738] and he notes, too,
with a sardonic touch of hopefulness, how Savonarola had contrived to
persuade the people of contemporary Florence that he had intercourse
with deity. [1739] Italy then had faith enough and to spare.

Such argument, in any case, even if untouched by the irony which tinges
Machiavelli's, could never avail to restore faith; men cannot become
believers on the motive of mere belief in the value of belief; and the
total effect of Machiavelli's manifold reasoning on human affairs,
with its startling lucidity, its constant insistence on causation,
its tacit negation of every notion of Providence, must have been, in
Italy as elsewhere, rather to prepare the way for inductive science
than to rehabilitate supernaturalism, even among those who assented to
his theory of Roman development. In his hands the method of science
begins to emerge, turned to the most difficult of its tasks, before
Copernicus had applied it to the simpler problem of the motion of the
solar system. After centuries in which the name of Aristotle had been
constantly invoked to small scientific purpose, this man of the world,
who knew little or nothing of Aristotle's Politics, [1740] exhibits
the spirit of the true Aristotle for the first time in the history of
Christendom; and it is in his land after two centuries of his influence
that modern sociology begins its next great stride in the work of Vico.

He is to be understood, of course, as the product of the moral
and intellectual experience of the Renaissance, which prepared his
audience for him. Guicciardini, his contemporary, who in comparison was
unblamed for irreligion, though an even warmer hater of the papacy,
has left in writing the most explicit avowals of incredulity as to
the current conceptions of the supernatural, and declares concerning
miracles that as they occur in every religion they prove none. [1741]
At the same time he professes firm faith in Christianity; [1742] and
others who would not have joined him there were often as inconsistent
in the ready belief they gave to magic and astrology. The time was,
after all, one of artistic splendour and scientific and critical
ignorance; [1743] and its freethought had the inevitable defects that
ignorance entails. Thus the belief in the reality of witchcraft,
sometimes discarded by churchmen, [1744] is sometimes maintained
by heretics. Rejected by John of Salisbury in the twelfth century,
and by the freethinking Pietro of Abano in 1303, it was affirmed
and established by Thomas Aquinas, asserted by Gregory IX, and
made a motive for uncounted slaughters by the Inquisition. In 1460
a theologian had been forced to retract, and still punished, for
expressing doubt on the subject; and in 1471 Pope Sixtus VI reserved
to the papacy the privilege of making and selling the waxen models
of limbs used as preservatives against enchantments. In the sixteenth
century a whole series of books directed against the belief were put
on the Index, and a Jesuit handbook codified the creed. Yet a Minorite
friar, Alfonso Spina, pronounced it a heretical delusion, and taught
that those burned suffered not for witchcraft but for heresy, [1745]
and on the other hand some men of a freethinking turn held it. Thus
the progress of rational thought was utterly precarious.

Of the literary freethinking of the later Renaissance the most famous
representative is Pomponazzi, or Pomponatius (1462-1525), for whom
it has been claimed that he "really initiated the philosophy of
the Italian Renaissance." [1746] The Italian Renaissance, however,
was in reality near its turning-point when Pomponazzi's treatise on
the Immortality of the Soul appeared (1516); and that topic was the
commonest in the schools and controversies of that day. [1747] He has
been at times spoken of as an Averroïst, on the ground that he denied
immortality; but he did so in reality as a disciple of Alexander of
Aphrodisias, a rival commentator to Averroës. What is remarkable in
his case is not the denial of immortality, which we have seen to be
frequent in Dante's time, and more or less implicit in Averroïsm,
but his contention that ethics could do very well without the belief
[1748]--a thing that it still took some courage to affirm, though
the spectacle of the life of the faithful might have been supposed
sufficient to win it a ready hearing. Presumably his rationalism, which
made him challenge the then canonical authority of the scholasticized
Aristotle, went further than his avowed doubts as to a future state;
since his profession of obedience to the Church's teaching, and his
reiteration of the old academic doctrine of two-fold truth--one truth
for science and philosophy, and another for theology [1749]--are as
dubious as any in philosophic history. [1750] Of him, or of Lorenzo
Valla, more justly than of Petrarch, might it be said that he is the
father of modern criticism, since Valla sets on foot at once historical
and textual analysis, while Pomponazzi anticipates the treatment given
to Biblical miracles by the rationalizing German theologians of the
end of the eighteenth century. [1751] He too was a fixed enemy of the
clergy; and it was not for lack of will that they failed to destroy
him. He happened to be a personal favourite of Leo X, who saw to
it that the storm of opposition to Pomponazzi--a storm as much of
anger on behalf of Aristotle, who had been shown by him to doubt
the immortality of the soul, as on behalf of Christianity--should
end in an official farce of reconciliation. [1752] He was however
not free to publish his treatises, De Incantationibus and De Fato,
Libero Arbitrio, et Prædestinatione. These, completed in 1520, were
not printed till after his death, in 1556 and 1557; [1753] and by
reason of their greater simplicity, as well as of their less dangerous
form of heresy, were much more widely read than the earlier treatise,
thus contributing much to the spread of sane thought on the subjects
of witchcraft, miracles, and special providences.

Whether his metaphysic on the subject of the immortality of the
soul had much effect on popular thought may be doubted. What the
Renaissance most needed in both its philosophic and its practical
thought was a scientific foundation; and science, from first to last,
was more hindered than helped by the environment. In the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries, charges of necromancy against physicians and
experimenters were frequently joined with imputations of heresy, and
on such charges not a few were burned. [1754] The economic conditions
too were all unfavourable to solid research.


    When Galileo in 1589 was made Professor of Mathematics at Pisa,
    his salary was only 60 scudi (= dollars), while the Professor
    of Medicine got 2,000. (Karl von Gebler, Galileo Galilei,
    Eng. tr. 1879, p. 9.) At Padua, later, Galileo had 520 florins,
    with a prospect of rising to as many scudi. (Letter given
    in The Private Life of Galileo, Boston, 1870, p. 61.) The
    Grand Duke finally gave him a pension of 1,000 scudi at
    Florence. (Id. p. 64.) This squares with Bacon's complaint
    (Advancement of Learning, bk. ii; De Augmentis, bk. ii,
    ch. i--Works, Routledge ed. pp. 76, 422-23) that, especially
    in England, the salaries of lecturers in arts and professions
    were injuriously small, and that, further, "among so many noble
    foundations of colleges in Europe ... they are all dedicated
    to professions, and none left free to the study of arts and
    sciences at large." In Italy, however, philosophy was fairly well
    endowed. Pomponazzi received a salary of 900 Bolognese lire when
    he obtained the chair of Philosophy at Bologna in 1509. (Christie,
    essay cited, p. 138.)


Medicine was nearly as dogmatic as theology. Even philosophy was in
large part shouldered aside by the financial motives which led men
to study law in preference; [1755] and when the revival of ancient
literature gained ground it absorbed energy to the detriment of
scientific study, [1756] the wealthy amateurs being ready to pay
high prices for manuscripts of classics, and for classical teaching;
but not for patient investigation of natural fact. The humanists,
so-called, were often forces of enlightenment and reform; witness
such a type as the high-minded Pomponio Leto (Pomponius Laetus),
pupil and successor of Lorenzo Valla, and one of the many "pagan"
scholars of the later Renaissance; [1757] but the discipline of mere
classical culture was insufficient to make them, as a body, qualified
leaders either of thought or action, [1758] in such a society as
that of decaying Italy. Only after the fall of Italian liberties,
the decay of the Church's wealth and power, the loss of commerce, and
the consequent decline of the arts, did men turn to truly scientific
pursuits. From Italy, indeed, long after the Reformation, came a new
stimulus to freethought which affected all the higher civilization
of northern Europe. But the failure to solve the political problem,
a failure which led to the Spanish tyranny, meant the establishment
of bad conditions for the intellectual as for the social life; and
an arrest of freethought in Italy was a necessary accompaniment of
the arrest of the higher literature. What remained was the afterglow
of a great and energetic period rather than a spirit of inquiry; and
we find the old Averroïst scholasticism, in its most pedantic form,
lasting at the university of Padua till far into the seventeenth
century. "A philosophy," remarks in this connection an esteemed
historian, "a mode of thought, a habit of mind, may live on in the
lecture-rooms of Professors for a century after it has been abandoned
by the thinkers, the men of letters, and the men of the world." [1759]
The avowal has its bearings nearer home than Padua.

While it lasted, the light of Italy had shone upon all the thought of
Europe. Not only the other nations but the scholars of the Jewish race
reflected it; for to the first half of the sixteenth century belongs
the Jew Menahem Asariah de Rossi, whose work, Meor Enayim, "Light of
the Eyes," is "the first attempt by a Jew to submit the statements
of the Talmud to a critical examination, and to question the value
of tradition in its historical records." And he did not stand alone
among the Jews of Italy; for, while Elijah Delmedigo, at the end of
the fifteenth century, was in a didactic Maimonist fashion doubtful of
literary tradition, his grandson, Joseph Solomon Delmedigo, flourishing
early in the seventeenth century, "wrote various pamphlets of a deeply
skeptical character." [1760] That this movement of Jewish rationalism
should be mainly limited to the south was inevitable, since there only
were Jewish scholars in an intellectual environment. There could be
no better testimony to the higher influence of the Italian Renaissance.




§ 2. THE FRENCH EVOLUTION

In the other countries influenced by Italian culture in the sixteenth
century the rationalist spirit had various fortune. France, as we saw,
had substantially retrograded at the time of the Italian new-birth, her
revived militarism no less than her depression by the English conquests
having deeply impaired her intellectual life in the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries. Thus the true renascence of letters in France
began late, and went on during the Reformation period; and all along
it showed a tincture of freethought. From the midst of the group who
laid the foundations of French Protestantism by translations of the
Bible there comes forth the most articulate freethinker of that age,
Bonaventure Desperiers, author of the Cymbalum Mundi (1537). Early
associated with Calvin and Olivetan in revising the translation of the
Bible by Lefèvre d'Etaples (rev. 1535), Desperiers turned away from
the Protestant movement, as did Rabelais and Étienne Dolet, caring as
little for the new presbyter as for the old priest; and all three were
duly accused by the Protestants of atheism and libertinage. [1761] In
the same year Desperiers aided Dolet, scholar and printer, to produce
his much-praised Commentarii linguæ latinæ; and within two years he
had printed his own satire, Cymbalum Mundi, [1762] wherein, by way of
pagan dialogues, are allegorically ridiculed the Christian scheme,
its miracles, Bible contradictions, and the spirit of persecution,
then in full fire in France against the Protestants. In the first
dialogue Mercury is sent to Athens by Zeus the Father to have the
"Book of the Destinies" rebound--an adaptation of an ancient sarcasm
against the Christians by Celsus. [1763] He, robbing others, is
robbed of the book, and another (= the New Testament) is put in
its place. In the second dialogue figure Rhetulus (= Lutherus) and
Cubercus (= Bucerus?), who suppose they have found the main pieces
of the philosopher's stone, which Mercury had broken and scattered
in the sand of the theatre arena. Protestants and Catholics are thus
alike ridiculed. The allegory is not always clear to modern eyes; but
there was no question then about its general bearing; and Desperiers,
though groom of the chamber (after Clement Marot) to Marguerite of
France (later of Navarre), had to fly for his life, as Marot did
before him. The first edition of his book, secretly printed at Paris,
was seized and destroyed; and the second (1538), printed for him at
Lyons, whither he had taken his flight, seems to have had a similar
fate. From that time he disappears, probably dying, whether or not
by suicide is doubtful, [1764] before 1544, when his miscellaneous
works were published. They include his OEuvres Diverses--many of them
graceful poems addressed to his royal mistress, Marguerite--which,
with his verse translation of the Andria of Terence and his Discours
non plus Melancoliques que Divers, make up his small body of work. In
the Discours may be seen applied to matters of history and scholarship
the same critical spirit that utters itself in the Cymbalum, and the
same literary gift; but for orthodoxy his name became a hissing and
a byword, and it is only in modern times that French scholarship has
recognized in Desperiers the true literary comrade and potential equal
of Rabelais and Marot. [1765] The age of Francis was too inclement
for such literature as his Cymbalum; and it was much that it spared
Gringoire (d. 1544), who, without touching doctrine, satirized in
his verse both priests and Protestants.

It is something of a marvel, further, that it spared Rabelais
(? 1493-1553), whose enormous raillery so nearly fills up the
literary vista of the age for modern retrospect. It has been said
by a careful student that "the free and universal inquiry, the
philosophic doubt, which were later to work the glory of Descartes,
proceed from Rabelais"; [1766] and it is indeed an impression of
boundless intellectual curiosity and wholly unfettered thinking that
is set up by his entire career. Sent first to the convent school of
La Baumette, near Angers, he had there as a schoolfellow Geoffroy
d'Estissac, afterwards his patron as Bishop of Maillezais. Sent later
to the convent school of Fontenay-le-Comte, he had the luck to have for
schoolfellows there the four famous brothers Du Bellay, so well able
to protect him in later life; and, forced to spend fifteen years of
his young life (1509-24) at Fontenay as a Franciscan monk, he turned
the time to account by acquiring an immense erudition, including a
knowledge of Greek, then rare. [1767] Naturally the book-lover was
not popular among his fellow-monks; and his Greek books were actually
confiscated by the chapter, who found in his cell certain writings
of Erasmus, [1768] to whom as a scholar he afterwards expressed the
deepest intellectual obligations. Thereafter, by the help of his
friend d'Estissac, now bishop of the diocese, Rabelais received papal
permission to join the order of the Benedictines and to enter the Abbey
of Maillezais as a canon regular (1524); but soon after, though he was
thus a fully-ordained priest, we find him broken loose, and living
for some six years a life of wandering freedom as a secular priest,
sometimes with his friend the bishop, winning friends in high places by
his learning and his gaiety, everywhere studying and observing. At the
bishop's priory of Ligugé he seems to have studied hard and widely. In
1530 he is found at Montpellier, extending his studies in medicine,
in which he speedily won distinction, becoming B.M. on December 1,
and a lecturer in the following year. He was later esteemed one of
the chief anatomists of his day, being one of the first to dissect the
human body and to insist on the need of such training for physicians;
[1769] and in 1532 [1770] we find him characterized as the "true great
universal spirit of this time." [1771] In the same year he published
at Lyons, where he was appointed physician to the chief hospital,
an edition of the Latin letters of the Ferrarese physician Manardi;
and his own commentaries on Galen and Hippocrates, which had a very
poor sale. [1772] At Lyons he made the acquaintance of Dolet, Marot,
and Desperiers; and his letter (of the same year) to Erasmus (printed
as addressed to Bernard de Salignac [1773]) showed afresh how his
intellectual sympathies went.

About 1532 he produced his Gargantua and Pantagruel, the first
two books of his great humoristic romance; and in 1533 began his
series of almanacks, continued till 1550, presumably as printer's
hack-work. From the fragments which have been preserved, they appear
to have been entirely serious in tone, one containing a grave theistic
protest against all astrological prediction. Along with the almanack of
1533, however, he produced a Pantagruelian Prognostication; and this,
which alone has been preserved entire, [1774] passes hardy ridicule on
astrology, [1775] one of the most popular superstitions of the day,
among high and low alike. Almost immediately the Sorbonne was on
his track, condemning his Pantagruel in 1533. [1776] A journey soon
afterwards to Rome, in the company of his friend Bishop Jean du Bellay,
the French ambassador, may have saved him some personal experience
of persecution. Two years later, when the Bishop went to Rome to
be made cardinal, Rabelais again accompanied him; and he appears to
have been a favourite alike with Pope Clement VII and Paul III. At
the end of 1535 we find him, in a letter to his patron, the bishop
of Maillezais, scoffing at the astrological leanings of the new Pope,
Paul III. [1777] Nonetheless, upon a formal Supplicatio pro apostasia,
he obtained from the Pope in 1536 an absolution for his breach of his
monastic vows, with permission to practise medicine in a Benedictine
monastery. Shortly before, his little son Théodule had died; [1778]
and it may have been grief that inspired such a desire: in any case,
the papal permission to turn monk again was never used, [1779] though
the pardon was doubtless serviceable. Taking his degree as doctor
at Montpellier in May, 1537, he there lectured for about a year on
anatomy; and in the middle of 1538 he recommenced a wandering life,
[1780] practising in turn at Narbonne, Castres, and Lyons. Then,
after becoming a Benedictine canon of St. Maur in 1540, we find him
in Piedmont from 1540 to 1543, under the protection of the viceroy,
Guillaume de Bellay. [1781]

During this period the frequent reprints of the first two books of
his main work, though never bearing his name, brought upon him the
denunciations alike of priests and Protestants. Ramus, perhaps in
revenge for being caricatured as Raminagrobis, pronounced him an
atheist. [1782] Calvin, who had once been his friend, had in his
book De Scandalis angrily accused him of libertinage, profanity, and
atheism; and henceforth, like Desperiers, he was about as little in
sympathy with Protestantism as with the zealots of Rome.

Thus assailed, Rabelais had seen cause, in an edition of 1542, to
modify a number of the hardier utterances in the original issues of the
first two books of his Pantagruel, notably his many epithets aimed at
the Sorbonne. [1783] In the reprints there are substituted for Biblical
names some drawn from heathen mythology; expressions too strongly
savouring of Calvinism are withdrawn; and disrespectful allusions
to the kings of France are elided. In his concern to keep himself
safe with the Sorbonne he even made a rather unworthy attack [1784]
(1542) on his former friend Étienne Dolet for the mere oversight of
reprinting one of his books without deleting passages which Rabelais
had expunged; [1785] but no expurgation could make his évangile,
as he called it, [1786] a Christian treatise, or keep for him an
orthodox reputation; and it was with much elation that he obtained in
1545 from King Francis--whose private reader was his friend Duchâtel,
Bishop of Tulle--a privilege to print the third book of Pantagruel,
which he issued in 1546, signed for the first time with his name, and
prefaced by a cry of jovial defiance to the "petticoated devils" of the
Sorbonne. They at once sought to convict him of fresh blasphemies; but
even the thrice-repeated substitution of an n for an m in âme, making
"ass" out of "soul," was carried off, by help of Bishop Duchâtel, as
a printer's error; and the king, having laughed like other readers,
maintained the imprimatur. But although it gave Rabelais formal leave
to reprint the first and second books, he was careful for the time
not to do so, leaving the increasing risk to be run by whoso would.

It was on the death of Francis in 1547 that Rabelais ran his greatest
danger, having to fly to Metz, where for a time he acted as salaried
physician of the city. About this time he seems to have written
the fourth and fifth books of Pantagruel; and to the treatment he
had suffered at Catholic hands has been ascribed the reversion
to Calvinistic ideas noted in the fifth book. [1787] In 1549,
however, on the birth of a son to Henri II, his friend Cardinal
Bellay returned to power, and Rabelais to court favour with him. The
derider of astrology did not scruple to cast a prosperous horoscope
for the infant prince--justifying by strictly false predictions his
own estimate of the art, since the child died in the cradle. There
was now effected the dramatic scandal of the appointment of Rabelais
in 1550 to two parish cures, one of which, Meudon, has given him his
most familiar sobriquet. He seems to have left both to be served by
vicars; [1788] but the wrath of the Church was so great that early
in 1552 he resigned them; [1789] proceeding immediately afterwards to
publish the fourth book of Pantagruel, for which he had duly obtained
official privilege. As usual, the Sorbonne rushed to the pursuit;
and the Parlement of Paris forbade the sale of the book despite
the royal permission. That permission, however, was reaffirmed; and
this, the most audacious of all the writings of Rabelais, went forth
freely throughout France, carrying the war into the enemies' camp,
and assailing alike Protestants and churchmen. In the following year,
his work done, he died.

It is difficult to estimate the intellectual effect of his performance,
which was probably much greater at the end of the century than
during his life. Patericke, the English translator of Gentillet's
famous Discours against Machiavelli (1576), points to Rabelais among
the French and Agrippa (an odd parallel) among the Germans as the
standard-bearers of the whole train of atheists and scoffers. "Little
by little, that which was taken in the beginning for jests turned to
earnest, and words into deeds." [1790] Rabelais's vast innuendoes by
way of jests about the people of Ruach (the Spirit) who lived solely on
wind; [1791] his quips about the "reverend fathers in devil," of the
"diabological faculty"; [1792] his narratives about the Papefigues
and Papimanes; [1793] and his gibes at the Decretals, [1794] were
doubtless enjoyed by many good Catholics otherwise placated by his
attacks on the "demoniacal Calvins, impostors of Geneva"; [1795] and
so careful was he on matters of dogma that it remains impossible to
say with confidence whether or not he finally believed in a future
state. [1796] That he was a deist or Unitarian seems the reasonable
inference as to his general creed; [1797] but there also he throws
out no negations--even indicates a genial contempt for the philosophe
ephectique et pyrrhonien [1798] who opposes a halting doubt to two
contrary doctrines. In any case, he was anathema to the heresy-hunters
of the Sorbonne, and only powerful protection could have saved him.

Dolet (1508-1546) was certainly much less of an unbeliever [1799]
than Rabelais; [1800] but where Rabelais could with ultimate impunity
ridicule the whole machinery of the Church, [1801] Dolet, after
several iniquitous prosecutions, in which his jealous rivals in the
printing business took part, was finally done to death in priestly
revenge [1802] for his youthful attack on the religion of inquisitorial
Toulouse, where gross pagan superstition and gross orthodoxy went hand
in hand. [1803] He certainly "lived a life of sturt and strife." Born
at Orléans, he studied in his boyhood at Paris; later at Padua, under
Simon Villanovanus, whom he heard converse with Sir Thomas More; then,
at 21, for a year at Venice, where he was secretary to Langeac, the
French Bishop of Limoges. It was at Toulouse, where he went in 1532 to
study law, that he began his quarrels and his troubles. In that year,
and in that town, the young Jean de Caturce, a lecturer in the school
of law, was burned alive on a trivial charge of heresy; and Dolet
witnessed the tragedy. [1804] Previously there had been a wholesale
arrest of suspected Lutherans--"advocates, procureurs, ecclesiastics
of all sorts, monks, friars, and curés." [1805] Thirty-two saved
themselves by flight; but among those arrested was Jean de Boysonne,
the most learned and the ablest professor in the university, much
admired by Rabelais, [1806] and afterwards the most intimate friend
of Dolet. It was his sheer love of letters that brought upon him the
charge of heresy; [1807] but he was forced publicly to abjure ten
Lutheran heresies charged upon him. The students of the time were
divided in the old fashion into "nations," and formed societies as
such; and Dolet, chosen in 1534 as "orator" of the "French" group,
as distinct from the Gascons and the Tolosans, in the course of
a quarrel of the societies delivered two Latin orations, in one
of which he vilipended alike the cruelty and the superstitions of
Toulouse. A number of the leading bigots of the place were attacked;
and Dolet was after an interval of some months thrown into prison,
charged with exciting a riot and with contempt of the Parlement of
Toulouse. His incarceration did not last long; but never thereafter
was he safe; and in the remaining thirteen years of his life he was
five more times in prison, for nearly five years in all. [1808]

After he had settled at Lyons, and produced his Commentaries, he had
the bad fortune to kill an enemy who drew sword upon him; and the
pardon he obtained from the king through the influence of Marguerite
of Navarre remained technically unratified for six years, during which
time he was only provisionally at liberty, being actually in prison
for a short time in 1537. Apart from this episode he showed himself
both quarrelsome and vainglorious, alienating friends who had done
much for him; but his enemies were worse spirits than he. The power
of the man drove him to perpetual production no less than to strife;
and his mere activity as a printer went far to destroy him.


    "No calling was more hateful to the friends of bigotry and
    superstition than that of a printer" (Christie, as cited,
    p. 387). Nearly all the leading printers of France and Germany
    were either avowedly in sympathy with Protestant heresy or
    suspected of being so (id. p. 388); and the issue of an edict
    by King Francis in 1535 for the suppression of printing was at
    the instance of the Sorbonne. We shall see that in Germany the
    support of the printers, and their hostility to the priests and
    monks, contributed greatly to the success of Lutheranism.


In 1542 he was indicted as a heretic, but really for publishing
Protestant books of devotion and French translations of the
Bible. Among the formal offences charged were: (1) his having in his
Cato Christianus cited as the second commandment the condemnation
of all images; (2) his use of the term "fate" in the sense of
predestination; (3) his substitution of habeo fidem for credo; (4) the
eating of flesh in Lent; and (5) the act of taking a walk during the
performance of mass. [1809] On this indictment the two inquisitors Orry
and Faye delivered him over to the secular arm for execution. Again
he secured the King's pardon (1543), through the mediation of Pierre
Duchâtel, the good Bishop of Tulle; but the ecclesiastical resistance
was such that, despite Dolet's formal recantation, it required a more
plenary pardon, the express orders of the King, and three official
letters to secure his release after a year's detention. [1810]

That was, however, swiftly followed by a final and successful
prosecution. By a base device two parcels were made of prohibited
books printed by Dolet and of Protestant books issued at Geneva;
and these, bearing his name in large, were forwarded to Paris. The
parcels were seized, and he was again arrested, early in January,
1544. He contrived to escape to Piedmont; but, returning secretly
after six months to print documents of defence, he was discovered
and sent to prison in Paris. The last pardon having covered all
previous writings, the prosecutors sought in his translation of the
pseudo-Platonic dialogues Axiochus and Hipparchus, printed with his
last vindication; and, finding a slight over-emphasis of Sokrates's
phrase describing the death of the body ("thou shalt no longer be,"
rendered by "thou shalt no longer be anything at all"), pronounced
this a wilful propounding of a heresy, though in fact there had
been no denial of the doctrine of immortality. [1811] This time the
prey was held. After Dolet had been in prison for twenty months the
Parlement of Paris ratified the sentence of death; and he was burned
alive on August 3, 1546. The utter wickedness of the whole process
[1812] at least serves to relieve by neighbourhood the darkness of
the stains cast on Protestantism by the crimes of Calvin.

The whole of the clerical opposition to the new learning at this
period is not unjustly to be characterized as a malignant cabal of
ignorance against knowledge. In Germany as in France real learning was
substantially on the side of the persecuted writers. When, in March
of 1537, Dolet was entertained at a banquet to celebrate the pardon
granted to him by the king for his homicide at Lyons on the last
day of the previous year, there came to it, by Dolet's own account,
the chief lights of learning in France--Budé, the chief Greek scholar
of his time; Berauld, his nearest compeer; Danès and Toussain, both
pupils of Budé and the first royal professors of Greek at Paris; Marot,
"the French Maro"; Rabelais, then regarded as a great new light in
medicine; Voulté, [1813] and others. The men of enlightenment at first
instinctively drew together, recognizing that on all hands they were
surrounded by rabid enemies, who were the enemies of knowledge. But
soon the stresses of the time drove them asunder. Voulté, who in this
year was praising Rabelais in Latin epigrams, was attacking him in
the next as an impious disciple of Lucian; [1814] and, after having
warmly befriended Dolet, was impeaching him, not without cause, as
an ingrate. It was an age of passion and violence; and Voulté was
himself assassinated in 1542 "by a man who had been unsuccessful in
a law-suit against him." [1815]

Infamous as was the cruelty with which Dolet was persecuted to
the death, his execution was but a drop in the sea of blood then
being shed in France by the Church. The king, sinking under his
maladies, had become the creature of the priests, who in defiance
of the Chancellor obtained his signature (1545) to a decree for a
renewed persecution of the heretics of the Vaudois; and an army,
followed by a Catholic mob and accompanied by the papal vice-legate
of Avignon, burst upon the doomed territory and commenced to burn and
slay. Women captured were violated and then thrown over precipices;
and twice over, when a multitude of fugitives in a fortified place
surrendered on the assurance that their lives and property would be
spared, the commander ordered that all should be put to death. When
old soldiers refused to enact such an infamy, others joyfully obeyed,
the mob aiding; and among the women were committed, as usual, "all
the crimes of which hell could dream." Three towns were destroyed,
3,000 persons massacred, 256 executed, six or seven hundred more
sent to the galleys, and many children sold as slaves. [1816] Thus
was the faith vindicated and safeguarded.

Of the freethought of such an age there could be no adequate
record. Its tempestuous energy, however, implies not a little of
private unbelief; and at a time when in England, two generations behind
France in point of literary evolution, there was, as we shall see,
a measure of rationalism among religionists, there must have been
at least as much in the land of Rabelais and Desperiers. The work
of Guillaume Postell, De causis seu principiis et originibus Naturæ
contra Atheos, published in 1552, testifies to kinds of unbelief that
outwent the doubt of Rabelais; though Postell's general extravagance
discounts all of his utterances. It is said of Guillaume Pellicier
(1527-1568), Bishop of Montpellier, who first turned Protestant and
afterwards, according to Gui Patin, atheist, that he would have been
burned but for the fact of his consecration. [1817] And the English
chroniclers preserve a scandal concerning an anonymous atheist, worded
as follows: "1539. This yeare, in October, died in the Universitie
of Parris, in France, a great doctor, which said their was no God,
and had bene of that opinion synce he was twentie yeares old, and was
above fouerscore yeares olde when he died. And all that tyme had kept
his error secrett, and was esteamed for one of the greatest clarkes
in all the Universitie of Parris, and his sentence was taken and
holden among the said studentes as firme as scripture, which shewed,
when he was asked why he had not shewed his opinion till his death,
he answered that for feare of death he durst not, but when he knew
that he should die he said their was no lief to come after this lief,
and so died miserably to his great damnation." [1818]

Among the eminent ones then surmised to lean somewhat to unbelief
was the sister of King Francis, Marguerite of Navarre, whom we have
noted as a protectress of the pantheistic Libertini, denounced by
Calvin. She is held to have been substantially skeptical until her
forty-fifth year; [1819] though her final religiousness seems also
beyond doubt. [1820] In her youth she bravely protected the Protestants
from the first persecution of 1523 onwards; and the strongly Protestant
drift of her Miroir de l'âme pécheresse exasperated the Catholic
theologians; but after the Protestant violences of 1546 she seems to
have sided with her brother against the Reform. [1821] The strange
taste of the Heptaméron, of which again her part-authorship seems
certain, [1822] constitutes a moral paradox not to be solved save by
recognizing in her a woman of genius, whose alternate mysticism and
bohemianism expressed a very ancient duality in human nature.

A similar mixture will explain the intellectual life of the poet
Ronsard. A persecutor of the Huguenots, [1823] he was denounced as an
atheist by two of their ministers; [1824] and the pagan fashion in
which he handled Christian things scandalized his own side, albeit
he was hostile to Rabelais. But though the spirit of the French
Renaissance, so eagerly expressed in the Défense et Illustration de
la langue françoise of Joachim du Bellay (1549), is at its outset
as emancipated as that of the Italian, we find Ronsard in his latter
years edifying the pious. [1825] Any ripe and consistent rationalism,
indeed, was then impossible. One of the most powerful minds of the age
was Bodin (1530-1596), whose République is one of the most scientific
treatises on government between Aristotle and our own age, and whose
Colloquium Heptaplomeres [1826] is no less original an outline of a
naturalist [1827] philosophy. It consists of six dialogues, in which
seven men take part, setting forth the different religious standpoints
of Jew, Christian, pagan, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Catholic, the whole
leading up to a doctrine of tolerance and universalism. Bodin was
repeatedly and emphatically accused of unbelief by friends and foes;
[1828] and his rationalism on some heads is beyond doubt; yet he not
only held by the belief in witchcraft, but wrote a furious treatise
in support of it; [1829] and he dismissed the system of Copernicus
as too absurd for discussion. [1830] He also formally vetoes all
discussion on faith, declaring it to be dangerous to religion;
[1831] and by these conformities he probably saved himself from
ecclesiastical attack. [1832] Nonetheless, he essentially stood for
religious toleration: the new principle that was to change the face
of intellectual life. A few liberal Catholics shared it with him to
some extent [1833] long before St. Bartholomew's Day; eminent among
them being L'Hopital, [1834] whose humanity, tolerance, and concern
for practical morality and the reform of the Church brought upon him
the charge of atheism. He was, however, a believing Catholic. [1835]
Deprived of power, his edict of tolerance repealed, he saw the long
and ferocious struggle of Catholics and Huguenots renewed, and crowned
by the massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day (1572). Broken-hearted,
and haunted by that monstrous memory, he died within six months.

Two years later there was put to death at Paris, by hanging
and burning, on the charge of atheism, Geoffroi Vallée, a man of
good family in Orléans. Long before, at the age of sixteen, he had
written a freethinking treatise entitled La Béatitude des Chrétiens,
ou le fléau de la foy--a discussion between a Huguenot, a Catholic,
a libertin, an Anabaptist and an atheist. He had been the associate
of Ronsard, who renounced him, and helped, it is said, to bring him
to execution. [1836] It is not unlikely that a similar fate would
have overtaken the famous Protestant scholar and lexicographer, Henri
Estienne (1532-1598), had he not died unexpectedly. His false repute of
being "the prince of atheists" [1837] and the "Pantagruel of Geneva"
was probably due in large part to his sufficiently audacious Apologie
pour Hérodote [1838] (1566) and to his having translated into Latin
(1562) the Hypotyposes of Sextus Empiricus, a work which must have made
for freethinking. But he was rather a Protestant than a rationalist. In
the former book he had spoken, either sincerely or ironically, of the
"detestable book" of Bonaventure Desperiers, calling him a mocker of
God; and impeached Rabelais as a modern Lucian, believing neither in
God nor immortality; [1839] yet his own performance was fully as well
fitted as theirs to cause scandal. It is in fact one of the richest
repertories ever formed of scandalous stories against priests, monks,
nuns, and popes. [1840]

One literary movement towards better things had begun before the
crowning infamy of the Massacre appalled men into questioning the
creed of intolerance. Castalio, whom we shall see driven from Geneva
by Calvin in 1544 for repugning to the doctrine of predestination,
published pseudonymously, in 1554, in reply to Calvin's vindication
of the slaying of Servetus, a tract, De Haereticis quomodo cum iis
agendum sit variorum Sententiæ, in which he contrived to collect
some passage from the Fathers and from modern writers in favour of
toleration. To these he prefaced, by way of a letter to the Duke
of Wirtemberg, an argument of his own, the starting-point of much
subsequent propaganda. [1841] Aconzio, another Italian, followed
in his steps; and later came Mino Celso of Siena, with his "long
and elaborate argument against persecution," De Haereticis capitali
supplicio non afficiendis (1584). [1842] Withal, Castalio died in
beggary, ostracized alike by Protestants and Catholics, and befriended
only by the Sozzini, whose sect was the first to earn collectively the
praise of condemning persecution. [1843] But in the next generation
there came to reinforce the cause of humanity a more puissant pen
than any of these; while at the same time the recoil from religious
cruelty was setting many men secretly at utter variance with faith.

In France in particular a generation of insane civil war for religion's
sake must have gone far to build up unbelief. Even among many who did
not renounce the faith, there went on an open evolution of stoicism,
generated through resort to the teaching of Epictetus. The atrocities
of Christian civil war and Christian savagery were such that Christian
faith could give small sustenance to the more thoughtful and sensitive
men who had to face them and carry on the tasks of public life the
while. The needed strength was given by the masculine discipline which
pagan thought had provided for an age of oppression and decadence,
and which had carried so much of healing even for the Christians
who saw decadence carried yet further, that in the fifth century
the Enchiridion of Epictetus had been turned by St. Nilus into a
monastic manual, even as Ambrose manipulated the borrowed Stoicism
of Cicero. [1844] With its devout theism, the book had appealed to
those northern scholars who had mastered Greek in the early years of
the sixteenth century, when the refugees of Constantinople had set
up Platonic studies in Italy. After 1520, Italian Hellenism rapidly
decayed; [1845] but in the north it never passed away; and from the
stronger men of the new learning in Germany the taste for Epictetus
passed into France. In 1558 the semi-Protestant legist Coras--later
slain in the massacre of St. Bartholomew--published at Toulouse a
translation of the apocryphal dialogue of Epictetus and Hadrian;
in 1566 the Protestant poet Rivaudeau translated the Enchiridion,
which thenceforth became a culture force in France. [1846]

The influence appears in Montaigne, in whose essays it is pervasive;
but more directly and formally in the book of Justus Lipsius,
De Constantia (1584), and the same scholar's posthumous dialogues
entitled Manducatio ad philosophiam stoïcam and Physiologia stoïcorum
(1604), which influenced all scholarly Europe. Thus far the Stoic
ethic had been handled with Christian bias and application; and
Guillaume Du Vair, who embodied it in his work La Sainte Philosophie
(1588), was not known as a heretic; but in his hands it receives no
Christian colouring, and might pass for the work of a deist. [1847]
And its popularity is to be inferred from his further production of a
fresh translation of the Enchiridion and a Traité de la philosophie
morale des stoïques. Under Henri IV he rose to high power; and his
public credit recommended his doctrine.

Such were the more visible fruits of the late spread of the Renaissance
ferment in France while, torn by the frantic passions of her pious
Catholics, she passed from the plane of the Renaissance to that of
the new Europe, in which the intellectual centre of gravity was to
be shifted from the south to the north, albeit Italy was still to
lead the way, in Galileo, for the science of the modern world.




§ 3. THE ENGLISH EVOLUTION

In England as in France the intellectual life undergoes visible
retrogression in the fifteenth century, while in Italy, with
the political problem rapidly developing towards catastrophe,
it flourished almost riotously. From the age of Chaucer, considered
on its intellectual side and as represented mainly by him, there is
a steep fall to almost the time of Sir Thomas More, around whom we
see as it were the sudden inrush of the Renaissance upon England. The
conquest of France by Henry V and the Wars of the Roses, between them,
brought England to the nadir of mental and moral life. But in the long
and ruinous storm the Middle Ages, of which Wiclif is the last powerful
representative, were left behind, and a new age begins to be prepared.

Of a very different type from Wiclif is the remarkable personality of
the Welshman Reginald (or Reynold) Pecock (1395?-1460?), who seems
divided from Wiclif by a whole era of intellectual development,
though born within about ten years of his death. It is a singular
fact that one of the most rationalistic minds among the serious
writers of the fifteenth century should be an English bishop,
[1848] and an Ultramontane at that. Pecock was an opponent at once
of popular Bibliolatry and of priestly persecution, declaring that
"the clergy would be condemned at the last day if they did not
draw men into consent to the true faith otherwise than by fire and
sword and hanging." [1849] It was as the rational and temperate
defender of the Church against the attacks of the Lollards in
general that he formulated the principle of natural reason as
against scripturalism. This attitude it is that makes his treatise,
the Repressor of Overmuch Blaming of the Clergy, the most modern of
theoretic books before More and Hooker and Bacon. That he was led to
this measure of rationalism rather by the exigencies of his papalism
than by a spontaneous skepticism is suggested by the fact that he
stands for the acceptance of miraculous images, shrines, and relics,
when the Lollards are attacking them. [1850] On the other hand, it
is hard to be certain that his belief in the shrines was genuine,
so ill does it consist with his attitude to Bibliolatry. In a series
of serenely argued points he urges his thesis that the Bible is not
the basis of the moral law, but merely an illustration thereof,
and that the natural reason is obviously presupposed in the bulk
of its teaching. He starts from the formulas of Thomas Aquinas, but
reaches a higher ground. It is the position of Hooker, anticipated by
a hundred years; and this in an age of such intellectual backwardness
and literary decadence that the earlier man must be pronounced by
far the more remarkable figure. In such a case the full influence of
the Renaissance seems to be at work; though in the obscurity of the
records we can do no more than conjecture that the new contacts with
French culture between the invasion of France by Henry V in 1415 and
the expulsion of the English in 1451 may have introduced forces of
thought unknown or little known before. If indeed there were English
opponents of scripture in Wiclif's day, the idea must have ripened
somewhat in Pecock's. Whether, however, the victories of Jeanne D'Arc
made some unbelievers as well as many dastards among the English is
a problem that does not seem to have been investigated.

Pecock's reply to the Lollards creates the curious situation of a
churchman rebutting heretics by being more profoundly heretical than
they. In his system, the Scriptures "reveal" only supernatural truths
not otherwise attainable, a way of safeguarding dogma not likely to
reassure believers. There is reason, indeed, to suspect that Pecock
held no dogma with much zeal; and when in his well-named treatise
(now lost), The Provoker, he denied the authenticity of the Apostles'
Creed, "he alienated every section of theological opinion in England."


    See Miss A. M. Cooke's art. Reginald Pecock in Dict. of
    Nat. Biog. This valuable notice is the best short account of
    Pecock; though the nature of his case is most fully made out by
    Hook, as cited below. It is characteristic of the restricted
    fashion in which history is still treated that neither in
    the Student's History of Professor Gardiner nor in the Short
    History of Green is Pecock mentioned. Earlier ideas concerning
    him were far astray. The notion of Foxe, the martyrologist,
    that Pecock was an early Protestant, is a gross error. He held
    not a single Protestant tenet, being a rationalizing <DW7>. A
    German ecclesiastical historian of the eighteenth century (Werner,
    Kirchengeschichte des 18ten Jahrhunderts, 1756, cited by Lechler)
    calls Pecock the first English deist. See a general view of
    his opinions in Lewis's Life of Dr. Reynold Pecock (rep. 1820),
    ch. v. The heresies charged on him are given on p. 160; also in
    the R. T. S. Writings and Examinations, 1831, pp. 200-201. While
    rejecting Bibliolatry, he yet argued that Popes and Councils
    could make no change in the current creed; and he thus offended
    the High Churchmen. Cp. Massingberd, The English Reformation,
    4th ed. pp. 206-209.


The main causes of the hostility he met from the English hierarchy
and Government appear to have been, on the one hand, his change of
political party, which put him in opposition to Archbishop Bourchier,
and on the other his zealous championship of the authority of the
papacy as against that of the Councils of the Church. It was expressly
on the score of his denunciation of the Councils that he was tried
and condemned. [1851] Thus the reward of his effort to reason down the
menacing Lollards and rebut Wiclif [1852] was his formal disgrace and
virtual imprisonment. Had he not recanted, he would have been burned:
as it was, his books were; and it is on record that they consisted
of eleven quartos and three folios of manuscript. Either because of
his papalism or as a result of official intrigue, Church and lords
and commons were of one mind against him; and the mob would fain have
burned him with his books. [1853] In that age of brutal strife, when
"neither the Church nor the opponents of the Church had any longer a
sway over men's hearts," [1854] he figures beside the mindless prelates
and their lay peers somewhat as does More later beside Henry VIII,
as Reason versus the Beast; and it was illustrative of his entire
lack of fanaticism that he made the demanded retractations--avowing
his sin in "trusting to natural reason" rather than to Scripture and
the authority of the Church--and went his way in silence to solitude
and death. The ruling powers disposed of Lollardism in their own way;
and in the Wars of the Roses every species of heretical thought seems
to disappear. The bribe held out to the nation by the invasion of
France had been fatally effectual to corrupt the spirit of moral
criticism which inspired the Lollard movement at its best; and the
subsequent period of rapine and strife reduced thought and culture
to the levels of the Middle Ages.

A hint of what was possible in the direction of freethought in
the England of Henry V and Henry VI emerges in some of the records
concerning Duke Humphrey of Gloucester, the youngest son of Henry
IV. Gifted but ill-balanced, Humphrey was the chief patron of learning
in England in his day; and he drank deeply of the spirit of Renaissance
scholarship. [1855] Sir Thomas More preserves the story--reproduced
also in the old play, The First Part of the Contention of the two
Famous Houses of York and Lancaster--of how he exposed the fraud of
a begging impostor who pretended to have recovered his sight through
the virtue of a saint's relics; and a modern pietistic historian
decides that the Duke "had long ceased to believe in miracles and
relics." [1856] But if this be true, it is the whole truth as to
Humphrey's freethinking. It was the highest flight of rationalism
permissible in his day and sphere.


    On the view that Humphrey was a freethinker, the pious Pauli,
    who says (as cited, p. 337) of the Renaissance of letters, "The
    weak and evil side of this revived form of literature is that
    its disciples should have elevated the morality, or rather the
    immorality, of classical antiquity above Christian discipline and
    virtue," sees fit further to pronounce that the bad account of
    Gloucester's condition of body drawn up eleven years before his
    death by the physician Kymer is a proof of the "wild unbridled
    passions by which the duke was swayed," and throws a lurid light
    upon "the tendencies and disposition of his mind." Humphrey lived
    till 55, and died suddenly, under circumstances highly suggestive
    of poisoning by his enemies. His brothers Henry and John died
    much younger than he; but in their case the religious historian
    sees no ground for imputation. But the historian's inference is
    overstrained. In reality Humphrey never indicated any lack of
    theological faith. The poet Lydgate, no unbeliever, described
    him as "Chose of God to be his owne knyghte," and so rigorous
    "that heretike dar not comen in his sihte" (verses transcribed in
    Furnivall's Early English Meals and Manners, 1868, pp. lxxxv-vi).

    His most comprehensive biographer decides that he was "essentially
    orthodox," despite his uncanonical marriage with his second wife
    and his general reputation for sexual laxity. "He was punctilious
    in the performance of his religious duties" and "a stern opponent
    of the Lollards"; he "countenanced the extinction of heresy
    by being present at the burning at Smithfield of an old priest
    who denied the validity of the sacraments of the Church"; and an
    Archbishop of Milan pronounced him to be "known everywhere as the
    chiefest friend and preserver of Holy Church" (K. H. Vickers,
    Humphrey, Duke of Gloucester: A Biography, 1907, pp. 223,
    321-23). Of such a personage no exegesis can make a rationalist.


Of other traces of critical thinking in England in that age there is
little to be said, so little literature is there to convey them. But
there are signs of the influence of the "pagan" thought of the
Renaissance in religious books. The old Revelation of the Monk of
Evesham, ostensibly dating from 1196, was first printed about 1482,
[1857] with a "prologe" explaining that it "was not shewed to hym only
for hym butte also for the confort and profetyng of all cristyn pepulle
that none man shuld dowte or mystruste of anothir life and world";
"and as for the trowthe of this reuelacyon no man nother woman ought
to dowte in any wise," seeing it is thus miraculously provided that
"alle resons and mocyons of infydelite the which risith often tymes of
man's sensualite shall utwardly be excluded and quenched." Evidently
the old problem of immortality had been agitated.




§ 4. THE REMAINING EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Not till late in the fifteenth century is the intellectual side of
the Renaissance influence to be seen bearing fruit in Germany, of
which the turbulent and semi-barbaric life in the medieval period
was little favourable to mental progress. Of political hostility
to the Church there was indeed an abundance, long before Luther;
[1858] but amid the many traces of "irreligion" there is practically
none of rational freethinking. What reasoned thought there was, as
we have seen, turned to Christian mysticism of a pantheistic cast,
as in the teaching of Tauler and Eckhart. [1859]

Another and a deeper current of thought is seen in the remarkable
philosophic work of Bishop Nicolaus of Kues or Cusa (1401-1464), who,
professedly by an independent movement of reflection, but really as
a result of study of Greek philosophy, reached a larger pantheism
than had been formulated by any Churchman since the time of John the
Scot. [1860] There is little or no trace, however, of any influence
attained by his teaching, which indeed could appeal only to a very few
minds of that day. Less remarkable than the metaphysic of Nicolaus,
though also noteworthy in its way, is his Dialogue "On Peace, or
Concordance of Faith," in which, somewhat in the spirit of Boccaccio's
tale of the Three Kings, he aims at a reconciliation of all religions,
albeit by way of proving the Christian creed to be the true one.

In the Netherlands and other parts of western Europe the popular
anti-ecclesiastical heresy of the thirteenth century spread in various
degrees; but there is only exceptional trace of literate or properly
rationalistic freethinking. Among the most notable developments
was the movement in Holland early in the fourteenth century, which
compares closely with that of the higher Paulicians and mystics
of the two previous centuries, its chief traits being a general
pantheism, a denial of the efficacy of the sacrament of the altar, an
insistence that all men are sons of God, and a general declaration for
"natural light." [1861] But this did not progressively develop. Lack
of leisured culture in the Low Countries, and the terrorism of the
Inquisition, would sufficiently account for the absence of avowed
unbelief, though everywhere, probably, some was set up by the contact
of travellers with the culture of Italy. It is fairly to be inferred
that in a number of cases the murderous crusade against witchcraft
which was carried on in the fifteenth century served as a means of
suppressing heresy, rationalistic or other. At Arras, for instance,
in 1460, the execution of a number of leading citizens on a charge of
sorcery seems to have been a blow at free discussion in the "chambers
of rhetoric." [1862] And that rationalism, despite such frightful
catastrophes, obscurely persisted, is to be gathered from the long
vogue of the work of the Spanish physician Raymund of Sebonde, [1863]
who, having taught philosophy at Toulouse, undertook (about 1435)
to establish Christianity on a rational foundation [1864] in his
Theologia Naturalis, made famous later by Montaigne.

To what length the suppressed rationalism of the age could on occasion
go is dramatically revealed in the case of Hermann van Ryswyck, a
Dutch priest, burned for heresy at the Hague in 1512. He was not only
a priest in holy orders, but one of the order of Inquisitors; and he
put forth the most impassioned denial and defiance of the Christian
creed of which there is any record down to modern times. Tried before
the inquisitors in 1502, he declared "with his own mouth and with
sane mind" that the world is eternal, and was not created as was
alleged by "the fool Moses" that there is no hell, and no future
life; that Christ, whose whole career was flatly contrary to human
welfare and reason, was not the son of Omnipotent God, but a fool,
a dreamer, and a seducer of ignorant men, of whom untold numbers had
been slain on account of him and his absurd evangel; that Moses had
not physically received the law from God; and that "our" faith was
shown to be fabulous by its fatuous Scripture, fictitious Bible,
and crazy Gospel. And to this exasperated testimony he added:
"I was born a Christian, but am no longer one: they are the chief
fools." Sentenced in 1502 to perpetual imprisonment, he was again
brought forward ten years later, and, being found unbroken by that
long durance, was as an unrepentant heretic sentenced to be burned on
December 14, 1512, the doom being carried out on the same day. The
source of his conviction can be gathered from his declaration that
"the most learned Aristotle and his commentator Averroës were nearest
the truth"; but his wild sincerity and unyielding courage were all
his own. "Nimis infelix quidam" is the estimate of an inquisitor of
that day. [1865] Not so, unless they are most unhappy who die in
battle, fighting for the truth they prize. But it has always been
the Christian way to contemn all save Christian martyrs.


    There is a tolerably full account of Ryswyck's case in a nearly
    contemporary document, which evidently copies the official
    record. Ryswyck is described as "sacre theologie professorem
    ordinis predicatorum et inquisitorum"; and his declaration runs:
    "Quod mundum fuit ab eterna et non incipit per creationem
    fabricatum a stulto Mose, ut dicit Biblia indistincta.... Nec
    est infernus, ut nostri estimant. Item post hanc vitam nulla
    erit vita particularis.... Item doctissimus Aristoteles et
    ejus commentator Auerrois fuerunt veritati propinquissimi. Item
    Christum fuit stultus et simplex fantasticus et seductor simplicium
    hominum.... Quot enim homines interfecti sunt propter ipsum et suum
    Euangelium fatuum! Item quod omnia que Christus gessit, humano
    generi et rationi recte sunt contraria. Item Christum filium Dei
    omnipotentem aperte nego. Et Mosen legem a Deo visibiliter et
    facialiter suscepisse recuso. Item fides nostra fabulosa est,
    ut probat nostra fatua Scriptura et ficta Biblia et Euangelium
    delirum.... Omnes istos articulos et consimilos confessus est
    proprio ore et sana mente coram inquisitore et notario et testibus,
    addens: Ego Christianus natus, sed iam non sum Christianus,
    quoniam illi stultissimi sunt." Paul Frédéricq, Corpus documentorum
    Inquisitionis haereticae pravitatis Neerlandicae, Gent, 1889, i,
    494, 501-502.


Thus the Renaissance passed on to the age of the Reformation the
seeds of a rationalism which struck far deeper than the doctrine
of Luther, but at the same time left a social soil in which such
seeds could ill grow. Its own defeat, social and intellectual, may
be best realized in terms of its failure to reach either political or
physical science. Lack of the former meant political retrogression and
bondage; and lack of the latter a renewed dominion of superstition
and Bibliolatry--two sets of conditions of which each facilitated
the other.

Nothing is more significant of the intellectual climate of the
Renaissance than the persistence at all its stages of the belief
in astrology, of which we find some dregs even in Bacon. That
pseudo-science indeed stands, after all, for the spirit of science,
and is not to be diagnosed as mere superstition; being really
an à priori fallacy fallen into in the deliberate search for some
principle of coördination in human affairs. Though adhered to by many
prominent Catholics, including Charles V, and by many Protestants,
including Melanchthon, it is logically anti-Christian, inasmuch as it
presupposes in the moral world a reign of natural law, independent of
the will or caprice of any personal power. Herein it differs deeply
from magic; [1866] though in the Renaissance the return to the lore
of antiquity often involved an indiscriminate acceptance and blending
of both sorts of occult pagan lore. [1867] Magic subordinates Nature
to Will: astrology, as apart from angelology, subordinates Will
to Cosmic Law. For many perplexed and thoughtful men, accordingly,
it was a substitute, more or less satisfying, for the theory, grown
to them untenable, of a moral government of the universe. It was in
fact a primary form of sociology proper, as it had been the primary
form of astronomy; to which latter science, even in the Renaissance,
it was still for many the introduction.

It flourished, above all things, on the insecurity inseparable
from the turbulent Italian life of the Renaissance, even as it had
flourished on the appalling vicissitude of the drama of imperial
Rome; and it is conceivable that the inclination to true science
which is seen in such men as Galileo, after the period of Italian
independence, was nourished by the greater stability attained for a
time under absolutist rule. And though Protestantism, on the other
hand, adhered in the main unreasoningly to the theory of a moral
control, that dogma at least served to countervail the dominion of
astrology, which was only a dogmatism with a difference, and as such
inevitably hindered true science. [1868] On the whole, Protestantism
tended to make more effectual that veto on pagan occultism which had
been ineffectually passed from time to time by the Catholic Church;
albeit the motive was stress of Christian superstition, and the
veto was aimed almost as readily at inductive and true science as
at the deductive and false. We shall find the craze of witchcraft,
in turn, dominating Protestant countries at a time when freethinkers
and liberal Catholics elsewhere were setting it at naught.

There can be little doubt that, broadly speaking, the new interest
in Scripture study and ecclesiastical history told against the free
play of thought on scientific and scholarly problems; we shall find
Bacon realizing the fact a hundred years after Luther's start; and
the influence has operated down to our own day. In this resistance
Catholics played their part. The famous Cornelius Agrippa [1869]
(1486-1535) never ceased to profess himself a Catholic, and had small
sympathy with the Reformers, though always at odds with the monks;
and his long popular treatise De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum
et artium, atque excellentia verbi Dei declamatio (1531) is a mere
polemic for scripturalism against alike false science and true,
monkish superstition and reason. Vilified as a magician by the monks,
and as an atheist and a scoffer by angry humanists, [1870] he did
but set error against error, being himself a believer in witchcraft,
a hater of anatomy, and as confident in his contempt of astronomy as
of astrology. And his was a common frame of mind for centuries.

Still, the new order contained certain elements of help for a new life,
as against its own inclement principles of authority and dogma; and
the political heterogeneity of Europe, seconded by economic pressures
and by new geographic discovery, sufficed further to prevent any
far-reaching organization of tyranny. Under these conditions,
new knowledge could incubate new criticism. But it would be an
error-breeding oversight to forget that in the many- world
before the Reformation there was not only a certain artistic and
imaginative sunlight which the Reformation long darkened, but even,
athwart the mortal rigours of papal rule, a certain fitful play of
intellectual insight to which the peoples of the Reformation became
for a time estranged.







CHAPTER XI

THE REFORMATION, POLITICALLY CONSIDERED


§ 1. THE GERMAN CONDITIONS

In a vague and general sense the ecclesiastical revolution known as
the Reformation was a phenomenon of freethought. To be so understood,
indeed, it must be regarded in contrast to the dominion of the Catholic
Church, not to the movement which we call the Renaissance. That
movement it was that made the Reformation possible; and if we have
regard to the reign of Bibliolatry which Protestantism set up, we seem
to be contemplating rather a superimposing of Semitic darkness upon
Hellenic light than an intellectual emancipation. Emancipation of
another kind the Reformation doubtless brought about. In particular
it involved, to an extent not generally realized, a secularization
of life, through the sheer curtailment, in most Protestant countries,
of the personnel and apparatus of clericalism, and the new disrepute
into which, for a time, these fell. Alike in Germany and in England
there was a breaking-up of habits of reverence and of self-prostration
before creed and dogma and ritual. But this liberation was rather
social than intellectual, and the product was rather licence and
irreverence than ordered freethought. On the other hand, when the
first unsettlement was over, the new growth of Bibliolatry tended
rather to deepen the religious way of feeling and make more definite
the religious attitude. Tolerance did not emerge until after a whole
era of embittered strife. The Reformation, in fact, was much more
akin to a revolt against a hereditary king than to the process of
self-examination and logical scrutiny by which men pass from belief
to disbelief in a theory of things, a dogma, or a document.

The beginning of such a process had indeed taken place in Germany
before Luther, insofar as the New Learning represented by such
humanists as Erasmus, such scholars as Reuchlin, [1871] and such
satirists as Ulrich von Hutten, set up a current of educated hostility
to the ignorance and the grosser superstitions of the churchmen. For
Germany, as for England, this movement was a contagion from the new
scholarship and Platonism of Italy; [1872] and the better minds in the
four universities founded in the pre-Lutheran generation (Tübingen,
1477; Mayence, 1482; Frankfort-on-the-Oder, 1506; Wittemberg, 1502)
necessarily owed much to Italian impulses, which they carried on,
though the universities as a whole were bitterly hostile to the
new learning. [1873] The Dutch freethinker Ryswyck, as we saw, was
fundamentally an Averroïst; and Italy was the stronghold of Averroïsm,
of which the monistic bias probably fostered the Unitarianism of
the sixteenth century. But it was not this literary and scholarly
movement that effected the Reformation so-called, which was rather
an economic and political than a mental revolution.


    The persistence of Protestant writers in discussing the early
    history of the Reformation without a glance at the economic
    causation is one of the great hindrances to historic science. From
    such popular works as those of D'Aubigné and Häusser it is
    practically impossible to learn what socially took place in
    Germany; and the general Protestant reader can learn it only--and
    imperfectly--from the works on the Catholic side, as Audin's
    Histoire de la vie de Luther (Eng. tr. 1853) and Döllinger's Die
    Reformation, and the more scientific Protestant studies, such as
    those of Ranke and Bezold (even there not at any great length),
    to neither of which classes of history will he resort. In England
    the facts are partially realized, in the light of an ecclesiastical
    predilection, through High Church histories such as that of Blunt,
    which proceed upon a Catholic leaning. Cobbett's intemperate
    exposure of the economic causation has found an audience chiefly
    among Catholics.

    Bezold admits that "with perfect justice have recent historians
    commented on the former underrating of an economic force which
    certainly played its part in the spread and establishment of the
    Reformation" (Gesch. der deutschen Reformation, 1890, p. 563). The
    broad fact is that in not a single country could the Reformation
    have been accomplished without enlisting the powerful classes
    or corporations, or alternatively the de facto governments, by
    proffering the plunder of the Church. Only in a few Swiss cantons,
    and in Holland, does the confiscation seem to have been made to
    the common good (cp. the present writer's Evolution of States,
    pp. 311, 343). But even in Holland needy nobles had finally turned
    Protestant in the hope of getting Church lands. (See Motley, Rise
    of the Dutch Republic, ed. 1863, p. 131.) Elsewhere appropriation
    of Church lands by princes and nobles was the general rule.

    Even as to Germany, it is impossible to accept Michelet's
    indulgent statement that most of the confiscated Church property
    "returned to its true destination, to the schools, the hospitals,
    the communes; to its true proprietors, the aged, the child, the
    toiling family" (Hist. de France, x, 333; see the same assertion
    in Henderson, Short History of Germany, 1902, i, 344). Plans
    to that effect were drawn up; but, as the princes were left to
    carry out the arrangement, they took the lion's share. Ranke
    (Hist. of the Ref. bk. iv, ch. v; Eng. tr. 1-vol. ed. 1905,
    pp. 466-67) admits much grabbing of Church lands as early as 1526;
    merely contending, with Luther, that <DW7> nobles had begun the
    spoliation. (Cp. Bezold, pp. 564-65; Menzel, Gesch. der Deutschen,
    cap. 393.) In Saxony, when monks broke away from their monasteries,
    the nobles at once appropriated the lands and buildings (Ranke,
    p. 467). Luther made a warm appeal to the Elector against the
    nobles in general (Ranke, p. 467; Luther's letter, Nov. 22, 1526,
    in Werke, ed. De Wette, iii, 137; letter to Spalatin, Jan. 1, 1527,
    id. p. 147; also p. 153). See too his indignant protests against
    the rapine of the princes and nobles and the starvation of the
    ministers in the Table Talk, chs. 22, 60. Even Philip of Hesse did
    not adhere to his early and disinterested plans of appropriation
    (Ranke, pp. 468-69, 711-12). All that Ranke can claim is that "some
    great institutions were really founded"--to wit, two homes for
    "young ladies of noble birth," four hospitals, and the theological
    school of Marburg. And this was in the most hopeful region.

    There is positive evidence, further, that not only ecclesiastical
    but purely charitable foundations were plundered by the Protestants
    (Witzel, cited by Döllinger, Die Reformation, ihre innere
    Entwickelung und ihre Wirkungen, 1846, i, 46, 47, 51, 62); and,
    as school foundations were confiscated equally with ecclesiastical
    in England, there is no reason to doubt the statement. Practically
    the same process took place in Scotland, where the share of Church
    property proposed to be allotted to the Protestant ministers
    was never given, and their protests were treated with contempt
    (Burton, History of Scotland, iv, 37-41). Knox's comments were
    similar to Luther's (Works, Laing's ed. ii, 310-12).

    Dr. Gardiner, a fairly impartial historian, sums up that, after
    the German settlement of 1552, "The princes claimed the right of
    continuing to secularize Church lands within their territories as
    inseparable from their general right of providing for the religion
    of their subjects.... About a hundred monasteries are said to have
    fallen victims in the Palatinate alone; and an almost equal number,
    the gleanings of a richer harvest which had been reaped before the
    Convention of Passau, were taken possession of in Northern Germany"
    (The Thirty Years' War, 8th ed. p. 11).


The credit of bringing the various forces to a head, doubtless,
remains with Luther, though ground was further prepared by literary
predecessors such as John of Wesel and John Wessel, Erasmus, Reuchlin,
and Ulrich von Hutten. But even the signal courage of Luther could
not have availed to fire an effectual train of action unless a
certain number of nobles had been ready to support him for economic
reasons. Even the shameless sale of indulgences by Tetzel was resented
most keenly on the score that it was draining Germany of money; [1874]
and nothing is more certain than that Luther began his battle not as
a heretic but as an orthodox Catholic Reformer, desiring to propitiate
and not to defy the papacy. Economic forces were the determinants. This
becomes the more clear when we note that the Reformation was only the
culmination or explosion of certain intellectual, social, and political
forces seen at work throughout Christendom for centuries before. In
point of mere doctrine, the Protestants of the sixteenth century
had been preceded and even distanced by heretics of the eleventh,
and by teachers of the ninth. The absurdity of relic-worship, the
folly of pilgrimages and fastings, the falsehood of the doctrine
of transubstantiation, the heresy of prayers to the saints, the
unscripturalness of the hierarchy--these and a dozen other points of
protest had been raised by Paulicians, by Paterini, by Beghards, by
Apostolicals, by Lollards, long before the time of Luther. As regards
his nearer predecessors, indeed, this is now a matter of accepted
Protestant history. [1875] What is not properly realized is that the
conditions which wrought political success where before there had
been political failure were special political conditions; and that
to these, and not to supposed differences in national character,
is due the geographical course of the Reformation.




§ 2. THE PROBLEM IN ITALY, SPAIN, AND THE NETHERLANDS

We have seen that the spirit of reform was strong in Italy
three hundred years before Luther; and that some of the strongest
movements within the Church were strictly reformatory, and originally
disinterested in a high degree. In less religious forms the same
spirit abounded throughout the Renaissance; and at the end of
the fifteenth century Savonarola was preaching reform religiously
enough at Florence. His death, however, was substantially due to
the perception that ecclesiastical reform, as conducted by him,
was a socio-political process, [1876] whence the reformer was a
socio-political disturber. Intellectually he was no innovator; on
the contrary, he was a hater of literary enlightenment, and he was
as ready to burn astrologers as were his enemies to burn him. [1877]
His claim, in his Triumph of the Cross, to combat unbelievers by
means of sheer natural reason, indicates only his inability to
realize any rationalist position--a failure to be expected in his
age, when rationalism was denied argumentative utterance, and when
the problems of Christian evidences were only being broached. The
very form of the book is declamatory rather than ratiocinative,
and every question raised is begged. [1878] That he failed in his
crusade of Church reform, and that Luther succeeded in his, was due
to no difference between Italian and German character, but to the vast
difference in the political potentialities of the two cases. The fall
of public liberty in Florence, which must have been preceded as it
was accompanied by a relative decline in popular culture, [1879] and
which led to the failure of Savonarola, may be in a sense attributed
to Italian character; but that character was itself the product of
peculiar social and political conditions, and was not inferior to
that of any northern population. [1880]


    The Savonarolan movement had all the main features of the
    Puritanism of the northern "Reform." Savonarola sent organized
    bodies of boys, latterly accompanied by bodies of adults, to
    force their way into private houses and confiscate things thought
    suitable for the reformatory bonfire. Burckhardt, p. 477; Perrens,
    Jérome Savonarole, 2e édit. pp. 140-41. The things burned included
    pictures and busts of inestimable artistic value, and manuscripts
    of exquisite beauty. Perrens, p. 229. Compare Villari, as cited;
    George Eliot's Romola, bk. iii, ch. xlix; and Merejkowski's The
    Forerunner (Eng. tr.), bk. vii. Previous reformers had set up
    "bonfires of false hair and books against the faith" (Armstrong, as
    cited, p. 167); and Savonarola's bands of urchins were developments
    from previous organizations, bent chiefly on blackmail. (Id.) But
    he carried the tyranny furthest, and actually proposed to put
    obstinate gamblers to the torture. Perrens, p. 132. Villari in
    his sentimental commemoration lecture on Savonarola (Studies
    Historical and Critical, Eng. tr. 1907) ignores these facts.


When, a generation later, the propaganda of the Lutheran movement
reached Italy, it was more eagerly welcomed than in any of the
Teutonic countries outside of the first Lutheran circle, though
a vigilant system was at once set on foot for the destruction of
the imported books. [1881] It had made much headway at Milan and
Florence in 1525; [1882] and we have the testimony of Pope Clement
VII himself that before 1530 the Lutheran heresy was widely spread
not only among the laity but among priests and friars, both mendicant
and non-mendicant, many of whom propagated it by their sermons. [1883]
The ruffianism and buffoonery of the German Lutheran soldiers in the
army of Charles V at the sack of Rome in 1529 was hardly likely to
win adherents to their sect; [1884] yet the number increased all over
Italy. In 1541-45 they were numerous and audacious at Bologna, [1885]
where in 1537 a commission of cardinals and prelates, appointed by
Pope Paul III, had reported strongly on the need for reformation in
the Church. In 1542 they were so strong at Venice as to contemplate
holding public assemblies; in the neighbouring towns of Vicentino,
Vicenza, and Trevisano they seem to have been still more numerous;
[1886] and Cardinal Caraffa reported to the Pope that all Italy was
infected with the heresy. [1887]

Now began the check. Among the Protestants themselves there had
gone on the inevitable strifes over the questions of the Trinity
and the Eucharist; the more rational views of Zwingli and Servetus
were in notable favour; [1888] and the Catholic reaction, fanned
by Caraffa, was the more facile. Measures were first taken against
heretical priests and monks; Ochino and Peter Martyr had to fly;
and many monks in the monastery of the latter were imprisoned. At
Rome was founded, in 1543, the Congregation of the Holy Office, a new
Inquisition, on the deadly model of that of Spain; and thenceforth
the history of Protestantism in Italy is but one of suppression. The
hostile force was all-pervading, organized, and usually armed with
the whole secular power; and though in Naples the old detestation
of the Inquisition broke out anew so strongly that even the Spanish
tyranny could not establish it, [1889] the papacy elsewhere carried
its point by explaining how much more lenient was the Italian than
the Spanish Inquisition. Such a pressure, kept up by the strongest
economic interest in Italy, no movement could resist; and it would
have suppressed the Reformation in any country or any race, as a
similar pressure did in Spain.


    Prof. Gebhart (Orig. de la Renais. en Italie, p. 68) writes that
    "Italy has known no great national heresies: one sees there no
    uprising of minds which resembles the profound popular movements
    provoked by Waldo, Wiclif, John Huss, or Luther." The decisive
    answer to this is soon given by the author himself (p. 74): "If
    the Order of Franciscans has had in the peninsula an astonishing
    popularity; if it has, so to speak, formed a Church within the
    Church, it is that it responded to the profound aspirations of
    an entire people." (Cp. p. 77.) Yet again, after telling how
    the Franciscan heresy of the Eternal Gospel so long prevailed,
    M. Gebhart speaks (p. 78) of the Italians as a people whom
    "formal heresy has never seduced." These inconsistencies derive
    from the old fallacy of attributing the course of the Reformation
    to national character. (See it discussed in the present writer's
    Evolution of States, pp. 237-38, 302-307, 341-44.) Burckhardt,
    while recognizing--as against the theory of "something lacking in
    the Italian mind"--that the Italian movements of Church reformation
    "failed to achieve success only because circumstances were
    against them," goes on to object that the course of "mighty
    events like the Reformation ... eludes the deductions of the
    philosophers," and falls back on "mystery." (Renaissance in
    Italy, Eng. tr. p. 457.) There is really much less "mystery"
    about such movements than about small ones; and the causes of the
    Reformation are in large part obvious and simple. Baur, even in
    the act of claiming special credit for the personality of Luther
    as the great factor in the Reformation, admits that only in the
    peculiar political conditions in which he found himself could he
    have succeeded. (Kirchengeschichte der neueren Zeit, 1863, p. 23.)

    The broad explanation of the Italian failure is that in Italy
    reform could not for a moment be dreamt of save as within the
    Church, where there was no economic leverage such as effected the
    Reformation from the outside elsewhere. It was a relatively easy
    matter in Germany and England to renounce the Pope's control
    and make the Churches national or autonomous. To attempt
    that in Italy would have meant creating a state of universal
    and insoluble strife. (Symonds, Renaissance in Italy, vol. i,
    ed. 1897, p. 369. Symonds, however, omits to note the financial
    dependence of Italian society on the papal system; and his verdict
    that Luther and the nations of the north saw clearly "what the
    Italians could not see" is simply the racial fallacy over again.)

    Apart from that, the Italians, as we have seen, were as much
    bent on reformation as any other people in mass; and the earlier
    Franciscan movement was obviously more disinterested than either
    the later German or the English, in both of which plunder was
    the inducement to the leading adherents, as it was also in
    Switzerland. There the wholesale bestowal of Church livings on
    Italians was the strongest motive to ecclesiastical revolution;
    and in Zürich, the first canton which adopted the Reformation,
    the process was made easy by the State guaranteeing posts
    and pensions for life to the whole twenty-four canons of the
    chapter. (Vieusseux, History of Switzerland, 1840, pp. 120,
    128; cp. Zschokke, Schweizerland's Geschichte, 9te Ausg. ch. 32,
    and Jackson, Huldreich Zwingli, 1901, pp. 222-25, 295-96.) The
    Protestants had further the support of the unbelieving soldiery,
    made anti-religious in the Italian wars, who rejoiced in the
    process of priest-baiting and plunder (Vieusseux, p. 130).


The process of suppression in Italy was prolonged through sixty
years. In 1543 numbers of Protestants began to fly; hundreds more
were cast into prison; and, save in a few places, public profession of
the heresy was suppressed. In 1546 the papacy persuaded the Venetian
senate to put down the Protestant communities in their dominions, and
in 1548 there began in Venice a persecution in which many were sent to
the galleys. To reach secret Protestantism, the papacy dispersed spies
throughout Italy, Ferrara being particularly attended to, as a known
hotbed. [1890] After the death of the comparatively merciful Paul III
(1550), Julius III authorized new severities. A Ferrarese preacher was
put to death; and the Duchess Renée, the daughter of Louis XII, who
had notoriously favoured the heretics, was made virtually a prisoner
in her own palace, secluded from her children. At Faenza, a nobleman
died under torture at the hands of the inquisitors, and a mob in turn
killed some of these; [1891] but the main process went on throughout
the country. An old Waldensian community in Calabria having reverted
to its former opinions under the new stimulus, it was warred upon by
the inquisitors, who employed for the purpose outlaws; and multitudes
of victims, including sixty women, were put to the torture. [1892] At
Montalto, in 1560, another Waldensian community were taken captive;
eighty-eight men were slaughtered, their throats being cut one by
one; many more were tortured; the majority of the men were sent
to the Spanish galleys; and the women and children were sold into
slavery. [1893] In Venice many were put to death by drowning. [1894]

Of individual executions there were many. In a documented list of
seventy-eight persons burned alive or hanged and burned at Rome from
1553 to 1600, [1895] only a minority are known to have been Lutherans,
the official records being kept on such varying principles that it is
impossible to tell how many of the victims were Catholic criminals;
[1896] while some heretics are represented--it would seem falsely--as
having died in the communion of the Church. But probably more than half
were Lutherans or Calvinists. The first in the list (1553) are Giovanni
Mollio, [1897] a Minorite friar of Montalcino, who had been a professor
at Brescia and Bologna, and Giovanni Teodori [1898] of Perugia; and
the former is stated in the official record to have recommended his
soul to God, the Virgin Mary, St. Francis, and St. Anthony of Padua,
though he had been condemned as an obstinate Lutheran. The next victims
(1556) are the Milanese friar Ambrogio de Cavoli, who dies "firm in his
false opinion," and Pomponio Angerio or Algieri of Nola, a student aged
twenty-four, who, "as being obstinate, was burned alive." [1899] These
were the first victims of Caraffa after his elevation to the papal
chair as Paul IV. Under Pius IV three were burned in 1560; under Pius
V two in 1566, six in 1567, six in 1568, and so on. Francesco Cellario,
an ex-Franciscan friar, living as a refugee and Protestant preacher in
the Grisons, was kidnapped, taken to Rome, and burned [1900] (1569). A
Neapolitan nobleman, Pompeo de Monti, caught in Rome, was officially
declared to have "renounced head by head all the errors he had held,"
and accordingly was benignantly beheaded. [1901] Quite a number,
including the learned protonotary Carnesecchi (1567), are alleged
to have died "in the bosom of the Church." [1902] On the other hand,
some of the inquisitors themselves came under the charge of heresy,
two cardinals and a bishop being actually prosecuted [1903]--whether
for Lutheranism or for other forms of private judgment does not appear.

Simple Lutheranism, however, seems to have been the usual limit of
heresy among those burned. Aonio Paleario (originally Antonio della
Paglia or de' Pagliaricci) of Veroli [1904]--poet and professor of
rhetoric at Milan, hanged in 1570 (in his seventieth year) either for
denouncing the Inquisition or for Lutheranism--was an extreme heretic
from the Catholic point of view. His Actio in Romanos Pontificos et
eorum asseclas is still denounced by the Church. [1905] If, however,
he was the author of the Trattato utilissimo del beneficio di Giesu
Crocifisso verso I Christiani, he was simply an evangelical of the
school of Luther, exalting faith and making light of works; and its
"remedies against the temptation of doubt" deal solely with theological
difficulties, not with critical unbelief. [1906] This treatise,
immensely popular in the sixteenth century, was so zealously destroyed
by the Church that when Ranke wrote no copy was known to exist. [1907]
The Trattato was placed on the first papal Index Expurgatorius in
1549; and the nearly complete extinction of the book is an important
illustration of the Church's faculty of suppressing literature.

The Index, anticipated by Charles V in the Netherlands several years
earlier, was established especially to resist the Reformation; and its
third class contained a prohibition of all anonymous books published
since 1519. The destruction of books in Italy in the first twenty years
of the work of the Congregation of the Index was enormous, nearly
every library being decimated, and many annihilated. All editions
of the classics, and even of the Fathers, annotated by Protestants,
or by Erasmus, were destroyed; the library of the Medicean College at
Florence, despite the appeals of Duke Cosmo, was denuded of many works
of past generations, now pronounced heretical; and many dead writers
who had passed for good Catholics were put on the Index. Booksellers,
plundered of their stocks, were fain to seek another calling; and
printers, seeing that any one of them who printed a condemned work
had every book printed by him put on the Index, were driven to refuse
all save works officially accredited. It was considered a merciful
relaxation of the procedure when, after the death of Paul IV (1555),
certain books, such as Erasmus's editions of the Fathers, were allowed
to be merely mutilated. [1908] The effect of the whole machinery
in making Italy in the seventeenth century relatively unlearned and
illiterate cannot easily be overstated.

In fine, the Reformation failed in Italy because of the economic and
political conditions, as it failed in Spain; as it failed in a large
part of Germany; as it would have failed in Holland had Philip II made
his capital there (in which case Spain might very well have become
Protestant); and as it would have failed in England had Elizabeth been
a Catholic, like her sister. During the sixty years from 1520 to 1580,
thousands of Italian Protestants left Italy, as thousands of Spanish
Protestants fled from Spain, and thousands of English Protestants from
England in the reign of Mary. [1909] To make the outcome in Italy and
Spain a basis for a theory of racial tendency in religion, or racial
defect of "public spirit," is to explain history in a fashion which, in
physical science, has long been discredited as an argument in a circle.


    McCrie, at the old standpoint, says of the Inquisition that "this
    iniquitous and bloody tribunal could never obtain a footing either
    in France or in Germany"; that "the attempt to introduce it in
    the Netherlands was resisted by the adherents of the old as well
    as the disciples of the new religion; and it kindled a civil war
    which ... issued in establishing civil and religious liberty";
    and that "the ease with which it was introduced into Italy showed
    that, whatever illumination there was among the Italians ... they
    were destitute of that public spirit and energy of principle which
    were requisite to shake off the degrading yoke by which they were
    oppressed." The ethical attitude of the Christian historian is
    noteworthy; but we are here concerned with his historiography. A
    little reflection will make it clear that the non-establishment
    of the Inquisition in France and Germany was due precisely to the
    fact that the papacy was not in these countries as it was in Italy,
    and that the native Governments resented external influence.

    As to the Netherlands, the statement is misleading in the
    extreme. The Inquisition set up by Charles V was long and fully
    established in the Low Countries; and Motley recognizes that it
    was there more severe even than in Spain. It was Charles V who,
    in 1546, gave orders for the establishment of the Inquisition
    in Naples, when the people so effectually resisted. The view,
    finally, that the attempt to suppress heresy caused the Dutch
    revolt is merely part of the mythology of the Reformation. Charles
    V, at the outset of his reign, stood to Spain in the relation
    of a foreign king who, with his Flemish courtiers, exploited
    Spanish revenues. Only by making Madrid his capital and turning
    semi-Spanish did he at all reverse that relation between the two
    parts of his dominions. So late as 1550 he set up an exceptionally
    merciless form of the Inquisition in the Low Countries, and this
    without losing any of the loyalty of the middle and upper classes,
    Protestantism having made its converts only among the poor. In
    1546 too he had set up an Index Expurgatorius with the assistance
    of the theological faculty at Louvain; and there was actually
    a Flemish Index in print before the papal one (McCrie, Ref. in
    Italy, p. 184; Ticknor, Hist. of Spanish Lit. 6th ed. i, 493).

    What set up the breach between the Netherlands and Spain was
    the failure of Philip II to adjust himself to Dutch interests
    as his father had adjusted himself to Spanish. The sunderance
    was on lines of economic interest and racial jealousy; and
    Dutch Protestantism was not the cause but the effect. In the
    war, indeed, multitudes of Dutch Catholics held persistently
    with their Protestant fellow-countrymen against Spain, as many
    English Catholics fought against the Armada. As late as 1600
    the majority of the people of Groningen were still Catholics,
    as the great majority are now in North Brabant and Limburg; and
    in 1900 the Catholics in the Netherlands were nearly a third of
    the whole. From first to last too the Dutch Protestant creed and
    polity were those set up by Calvin, a Frenchman.


To those accustomed to the conventional view, the case may become
clearer on a survey of the course of anti-papalism in other countries
than those mentioned. The political determination of the process in
the sixteenth century, indeed, cannot be properly realized save in
the light of kindred movements of earlier date, when the "Teutonic
conscience" made, not for reform, but for fixation.




§ 3. THE HUSSITE FAILURE IN BOHEMIA

That the causal forces in the Reformation were neither racial religious
bias nor special gift on the part of any religious teachers is made
tolerably clear by the pre-Lutheran episode of the Hussites in Bohemia
a century before the German movement. In Bohemia as elsewhere clerical
avarice, worldliness, and misconduct had long kept up anti-clerical
feeling; and the adoption of Wiclif's teaching by Huss [1910] at
the end of the fourteenth century was the result, and not the cause,
of Bohemian anti-papalism. [1911] The Waldensians, whose doctrines
were closely akin to those of Huss, were represented in Bohemia as
early as the twelfth century; and so late as 1330 their community
was a teaching centre, able to send money help to the Waldensians of
Italy. So apparent was the heredity that Æneas Sylvius, afterwards
Pope Pius II, maintained that the Hussites were a branch of the
Waldenses. [1912]

Before Huss too a whole series of native reformers, beginning
with the Moravian Militz, Archdeacon of Prague, had set up a partly
anti-clerical propaganda. Militz, who gave up his emoluments (1363) to
become a wandering preacher, actually wrote a Libellus de Anti-christo,
affirming that the Church was already in Anti-christ's power, or nearly
so. [1913] It was written while he was imprisoned by the Inquisition
at Rome at the instance of the mendicant orders, whom he censured. As,
however, the later hostility he incurred, up to his death, was on the
score of his influence with the people, the treatise cannot well have
been current in his lifetime. A contemporary, Conrad of Waldhausen,
holding similar views, joined Militz in opposing the mendicant friars
as Wiclif was doing at the same period; and the King of Bohemia (the
emperor Charles IV) gave zealous countenance to both. A follower of
Militz, Matthias of Janow, a prebendary of Prague, holding the same
views as to Anti-christ, wrote a book on The Abomination of Desolation
of Priests and Monks, and yet another to similar effect.

There was thus a considerable movement in the direction of Church
reform before either Huss or Wiclif was heard in Bohemia; and a
Bohemian king had shown a reforming zeal, apparently not on financial
motives, before any other European potentate. And whereas racial
jealousy of the dominant Italians was a main factor in the movement of
Luther, the much more strongly motived jealousy of the Czechs against
the Germans who exploited Bohemia was a main element in the salient
movement of the Hussites. [1914] Called in to work the silver mines,
and led further by the increasing field for commerce and industry,
[1915] the more civilized Germans secured control of the Czech church
and monasteries, appropriating most of the best livings. As they
greatly predominated also at the University of Prague, Huss, whose
inspiration was largely racial patriotism, wrought with his colleague
Jerome to have the university made strictly national. [1916] When,
accordingly, the German heads of the university still (1403 and 1408)
condemned the doctrines of Wiclif as preached by Huss, the motives
of the censors were as much racial and economic as theological; that
is to say, the "Teutonic conscience" operated in its own interest to
the exaltation of papal rule against the Czech conscience.

The first crisis in the racial struggle ended in Huss's obtaining a
royal decree (1409) giving three votes in university affairs (wherein,
according to medieval custom, the voting was by nations) to the
Bohemians, and only one to the Germans, though the latter were the
majority. Thereupon a multitude of the German students marched back to
Germany, where there was founded for them the university of Leipzig;
[1917] and the racial quarrel was more envenomed than ever.

At the same time the ecclesiastical authorities, closely allied
with the German interest, took up the cause of the Church against
heresy; and Archbishop Sbinko of Prague, having procured a papal bull,
caused a number of Wiclifian and other manuscripts to be burned [1918]
(1410), soon after excommunicating Huss. The now nationalist university
protested, and the king sequestrated the estates of the archbishop
on his refusal to indemnify the owners of the manuscripts. In 1411,
further, Huss denounced the proposed papal crusade against Naples,
and in 1412 the sale of indulgences by permission of Pope John XXIII,
exactly as Luther denounced those of Leo X a century later, calling the
Pope Antichrist in the Lutheran manner, while his partizans burned the
papal bulls. [1919] For the rest, he preached against image-worship,
auricular confession, ceremonialism, and clerical endowments. [1920]
At the Council of Constance (1415), accordingly, there was arrayed
against him a solid mass of German churchmen, including the ex-rector
of Prague University, now bishop of Misnia. Further, the Germans
were scholastically, as a rule, Nominalists, and Huss a Realist;
and as Gerson, the most powerful of the French prelates, was zealous
for the former school, he threw his influence on the German side,
[1921] as did the Bishop of London on the part of England. [1922] The
forty-five Wiclifian heresies, therefore, were re-condemned; Huss was
sentenced to imprisonment, though he had gone to the Council under a
letter of safe-conduct from the emperor; [1923] and on his refusal to
retract he was burned alive (July 6, 1415). Jerome, taking flight,
was caught, and, being imprisoned, recanted; but later revoked the
recantation and was burned likewise (May 30, 1416).

The subsequent fortunes of the Hussite party were determined as usual
by the political and economic forces. The King of Bohemia had joyfully
accepted Huss's doctrine that the tithes were not the property of the
churchmen; and had locally protected him as his "fowl with the golden
eggs," proceeding to plunder the Church as did the German princes
in the next age. [1924] When, later, the revolutionary Hussites
began plundering churches and monasteries, the Bohemian nobles in
their turn profited, [1925] and became good Hussites accordingly;
while yet another aristocracy was formed in Prague by the citizens
who managed the confiscations there. [1926] As happened earlier in
Hungary and later in Germany, again, there followed a revolt of the
peasants against their extortionate masters; [1927] and there resulted
a period of ferocious civil war and exacerbated fanaticism. Ziska,
the Hussite leader, had been a strong anti-German; [1928] and when
the emperor entered into the struggle the racial hatred grew more
intense than ever. On the Hussite side the claim for "the cup" (that
is, the administration of the eucharist with wine as well as bread,
in the original manner, departed from by the Church in the eleventh
century) indicated the nature of the religious feeling involved. More
memorable was the communistic zeal of the advanced section of the
Taborites (so called from the town of Tabor, their headquarters),
who anticipated the German movement of the Anabaptists, [1929] a small
minority of them seeking to set up community of women. For the rest,
all the other main features of later Protestantism came up at the
same time--the zealous establishment of schools for the young; [1930]
the insistence on the Bible as the sole standard of knowledge and
practice; inflexible courage in warfare and good military organization,
with determined denial of sacerdotal claims. [1931]

The ideal collapsed as similar ideals did before and afterwards. First
the main body of the Hussites, led by Ziska, though at war with the
Catholics in general and the Germans in particular, warred murderously
also on the extremer communists, called the Adamites, and destroyed
them (1421). Then, as the country became more and more exhausted
by the civil war, the common people gradually fell away from the
Taborites, who were the prime fanatics of the period. The zeal of
the communist section, too, itself fell away; and at length, in 1434,
the Taborites, betrayed by one of their generals, were defeated with
great slaughter by the nobles in the battle of Lipan. Meanwhile, the
upper aristocracy had reaped the economic fruits of the revolution at
the expense of townsmen, small proprietors, and peasants; [1932] and,
just as the lot of the German peasants in Luther's day was worse after
their vain revolt than before, so the Bohemian peasantry at the close
of the fifteenth century had sunk back to the condition of serfdom
from which they had almost completely emerged at the beginning. It is
doubtful, indeed, whether the material lot of the poor was bettered
in any degree at any stage of the Protestant revolution, in any
country. So little efficacy for social betterment has a movement
guided by a light set above reason.

That there was in the period some Christian freethinking of a finer
sort than the general Taborite doctrine is proved by the recovery
of the unprinted work of the Czech Peter Helchitsky (Chelcicky),
The Net of Faith, which impeached the current orthodoxy and the
ecclesiastico-political system on the lines of the more exalted
of the Paulicians and the Lollards, very much to the same effect
as the modern gospel of Tolstoy. In the midst of a party of warlike
fanatics Helchitsky denounced war as mere wholesale murder, taught the
sinfulness of wealth, declaimed against cities as the great corrupters
of life, and preached a peaceful and non-resistant anarchism, ignoring
the State. But his party in turn developed into that of the Bohemian
Brethren, an intensely Puritan sect, opposed to learning, and ashamed
of the memory of the communism in which their order began. [1933]
Of permanent gain to culture there is hardly a trace in the entire
evolution.




§ 4. ANTI-PAPALISM IN HUNGARY

As in Bohemia, so in Hungary, there was a ready popular inclination
to religious independence of Rome before the Lutheran period. The
limited sway of the Hungarian monarchy left the nobles abnormally
powerful, and their normal jealousy of the wealth of the Church
made them in the thirteenth century favourable to the Waldenses and
recalcitrant to the Inquisition. [1934] In the period of the Hussite
wars a similar protection was long given to the thousands of refugees
led by Ziska from Bohemia into Hungary in 1424. [1935] The famous
king Matthias Corvinus, who put severe checks on clerical revenue,
had as his favourite court poet the anti-papal bishop of Wardein,
John, surnamed Pannonicus, who openly derided the Papal Jubilee as a
financial contrivance. [1936] Under Matthias's successor, the ill-fated
Uladislaus II, began a persecution, pushed on by his priest-ruled queen
(1440), which drove many Hussites into Wallachia; and at the date
of Luther's movement the superior clergy of Hungary were a powerful
body of feudal nobles, living mainly as such, wielding secular power,
and impoverishing the State. [1937] As the crusade got up by the
papacy against the Turks (1514) drew away many serfs, and ended in a
peasant war against the nobility, put down with immense slaughter, and
followed by oppression both of peasants and small landholders, there
was a ready hearing for the Lutheran doctrines in Hungary. Nowhere,
probably, did so many join the Reformation movement in so short
a time. [1938] As elsewhere, a number of the clergy came forward;
and the resistance of the rest was proportionally severe, though
Queen Mary, the wife of King Louis II, was pro-Lutheran. [1939] Books
were burned by cartloads; and the diet was induced to pass a general
decree for the burning of all Lutherans. [1940] The great Turkish
invasion under Soliman (1526) could not draw the priests from their
heresy-hunt; but the subsequent division of sovereignty between John
Zapoyla and Ferdinand I, and above all the disdainful tolerance of the
Turkish Sultan in the parts under his authority, [1941] permitted of a
continuous spread of the anti-papal doctrine. About 1546 four bishops
joined the Lutheran side, one getting married; and in Transylvania
in particular the whole Church property was ere long confiscated to
"the State"; so that in 1556, when only two monasteries remained,
the Bishop withdrew. Of the tithes, it is said, the Protestant clergy
held three-fourths, and retained them till 1848. [1942] In 1559,
according to the same authority, only three families of magnates still
adhered to the pope; the lesser nobility were nearly all Protestant;
and the Lutherans among the common people were as thirty to one. [1943]

As a matter of course, Church property had been confiscated on
all hands by the nobles, Ferdinand having been unable to hinder
them. Soon after the battle of Mohäcs (1526) the nobles in diet
decided not to fill up the places of deceased prelates, but to make
over the emoluments of the bishoprics to "such men as deserved well
of their country." Within a short time seven great territories were
so accorded to as many magnates and generals, "nearly all of whom
separated from the Church of Rome, and became steady supporters
of the Reformation." [1944] The Hungarian "Reformation" was thus
remarkably complete.

Its subsequent decadence is one of the proofs that, even as the
Reformation movement had succeeded by secular force, so it was only to
be maintained on the same footing by excluding Catholic propaganda. In
Hungary, as elsewhere, strife speedily arose among Reformers on
the two issues on which reason could play within the limits of
Scripturalism--the doctrine of the eucharist and the divinity of
Jesus. On the former question the majority took the semi-rationalist
view of Zwingli, making the eucharist a simple commemoration;
and a strong minority in Transylvania became Socinian. The Italian
Unitarian Giorgio Biandrata (or Blandrata [1945]), driven to Poland
from Switzerland for his anti-trinitarianism, and called from Poland to
be the physician of the Prince of Transylvania, organized a ten days'
debate between Trinitarians and Unitarians at Weissenberg in 1568;
and at the close the latter obtained from the nobles present all the
privileges enjoyed by the Lutherans, even securing control of the
cathedral and schools of Clausenburg. [1946] It is remarkable that
this, the most advanced movement of Protestantism, has practically
held its ground in Transylvania to modern times. [1947]

The advance, however, meant desperate schism, and disaster to the
main Protestant cause. The professors of Wittemberg appealed to the
orthodox authorities to suppress the heresy, with no better result
than a public repudiation of the doctrine of the Trinity at the Synod
of Wardein, [1948] and an organization of the Unitarian Churches. In
due course these in turn divided. In 1578 Biandrata's colleague,
Ferencz Davides, contended for a cessation of prayers to Christ,
whereupon Biandrata invited Fausto Sozzini from Basel to confute him;
and the confutation finally took the shape of a sentence of perpetual
imprisonment on Davides in 1579 by the Prince of Transylvania, to
whom Biandrata and Sozzini referred the dispute. The victim died
in a few days--by one account, in a state of frenzy. [1949] Between
the Helvetic and Augsburg confessionalists, meanwhile, the strife was
equally bitter; and it needed only free scope for the new organization
of the Jesuits to secure the reconquest of the greater part of Hungary
for the Catholic Church.

The course of events had shown that the Protestant principle of private
judgment led those who would loyally act on it further and further from
the historic faith; and there was no such general spirit of freethought
in existence as could support such an advance. In contrast with the
ever-dividing and mutually anathematizing parties of the dissenters,
the ostensible solidity of the Catholic Church had an attraction which
obscured all former perception of her corruptions; and the fixity of
her dogma reassured those who recoiled in horror from Zwinglianism and
Socinianism, as the adherents of these systems recoiled in turn from
that of Davides. Only the absolute suppression of the Jesuits, as in
Elizabethan England, could have saved the situation; and the political
circumstances which had facilitated the spread of Protestantism were
equally favourable to the advent of the reaction. As the Huguenot
nobles in France gradually withdrew from their sect in the seventeenth
century, so the Protestant nobles in Hungary began to withdraw from
theirs towards the end of the sixteenth. What the Jesuits could not
achieve by propaganda was compassed by imperial dragonnades; and
in 1601 only a few Protestant congregations remained in all Styria
and Carinthia. [1950] Admittedly, however, the Jesuits wrought much
by sheer polemic, the pungent writings of their Cardinal Pazmány
having the effect of converting a number of nobles; [1951] while the
Protestants, instead of answering the most effective of Pazmány's
attacks, The Guide to Truth, spent their energies in fighting each
other. [1952]

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there ensued enough of
persecution by the Catholic rulers to have roused a new growth of
Protestantism, if that could longer avail; but the balance of forces
remained broadly unchanged. Orthodox Protestantism and orthodox
Unitarianism, having no new principle of criticism as against those
turned upon themselves by the Jesuits, and no new means of obtaining an
economic leverage, have made latterly no headway against Catholicism,
which is to-day professed by more than half the people of Hungary,
while among the remainder the Greek Catholics and Greek Orientals
respectively outnumber the Helvetic and Lutheran Churches. The future
is to some more searching principle of thought.




§ 5. PROTESTANTISM IN POLAND

The chief triumph of the Jesuit reaction was won in Poland; and
there, perhaps, is to be found the best illustration of the failure
of mere Protestantism, on the one hand, to develop a self-maintaining
intellectual principle, and the worse failure, on the other hand,
of an organized and unresisted Catholicism to secure either political
or intellectual vitality.

Opposition to the papacy on nationalist as well as on general grounds
is nearly as well marked in Polish history as in Bohemian, from the
pagan period onwards, the first Christian priesthood being chiefly
foreign, [1953] while, as in Bohemia, the people clung to vernacular
worship. In 1078 we find King Boleslav the Dauntless (otherwise
the Cruel) executing the Bishop of Cracow, taxing the lands of the
Church, and vetoing the bestowal of posts on foreigners. [1954] He in
turn was driven into exile by a combination of clergy and nobles. A
century later a Polish diet vetoes the confiscation of the property
of deceased bishops by the sovereign princes of the various provinces;
and a generation later still the veto is seen to be disregarded. [1955]
In the middle of the thirteenth century there are further violent
quarrels between dukes and clergy over tithes, the former successfully
ordering and the latter vainly resisting a money commutation; till in
1279 Duke Boleslav of Cracow is induced to grant the bishops almost
unlimited immunities and powers. [1956] Under Casimir the Great
(1333-1370) further strifes occur on similar grounds between the
equestrian order and the clergy, the king sometimes supporting the
latter against the former, as in the freeing of serfs, and sometimes
enforcing taxation of Church lands with violence. [1957] In the next
reign the immunities granted by Boleslav in 1279 are cancelled by the
equestrian order, acting in concert. And while these strifes had all
been on economic grounds, we meet in 1341 with a heretical movement,
set up by John Pirnensis, who denounced the pope as Antichrist in
the fashion of the Bohemian reformers of the next generation. The
people of Breslau seem to have gone over bodily to the heresy; and
when the Inquisition of Cracow attempted forcible repression the
Chief Inquisitor was murdered in a riot. [1958]

It was thus natural that in the fourteenth century the Hussite movement
should spread greatly in Poland, and the papacy be defied in matters
of nomination by the king. [1959] The Poles had long frequented
the university of Prague; and Huss's colleague Jerome was called
in to organize the university of Cracow in 1413. Against the Hussite
doctrines the Catholic clergy had to resort largely to written polemic,
[1960] their power being small; though the king confirmed their
synodical decree making heresy high treason. In 1450 Poland obtained
its law of Habeas Corpus, [1961] over two centuries before England;
and under that safeguard numbers of the nobility declared themselves
Hussites. In 1435 some of the chief of these formed a confederation
against Church and crown; and in 1439 they proclaimed an abolition of
tithes, and demanded, on the lines of the earlier English Lollards,
that the enormous estates of the clergy should be appropriated to
public purposes. In the diet of 1459, again, a learned noble, John
Ostrorog, who had studied at Padua, delivered an address, afterwards
expanded into a Latin book, denouncing the revenue exactions of the
papacy, and proposing to confiscate the annates, or first fruits of
ecclesiastical offices so exacted; proceeding further to bring against
the Polish clergy in general all the usual charges of simony, avarice,
and fraud, and indicting the mendicant orders as having demoralized
the common people. [1962]

The Poles having no such nationalist motive in their Hussitism as had
the Bohemians, who were fighting German domination, there took place
in Poland no such convulsions as followed the Bohemian movement; but,
when the Lutheran impulse came in the next century, the German element
which had been added to Poland by the incorporation of the order
and territory of the Teutonic knights in 1466 made an easy way for
the German heresy. In Dantzic the Lutheran inhabitants in 1524 took
the churches from the Catholics, and, terrorizing the town council,
shut up and secularized the monasteries and convents. [1963] In 1526,
with due bloodshed, the king effected a counter-revolution in the
Catholic interest; but still the heresy spread, the law of Habeas
Corpus thwarting all clerical attempts at persecution, and the king
being at heart something of an indifferentist in religion. [1964] In
the province of Great Poland was formed (1530-40) a Lutheran church,
protected by a powerful family; and in Cracow a group of scholars
formed a non-sectarian organization to evangelize the country. Among
them, about 1546, occurred the first expression of Polish Unitarianism,
the innovator being Adam Pastoris, a Dutch or Belgian priest, who
seems to have used at times the name of Spiritus. [1965]

On lines of simple Protestantism the movement was rapid, many
aristocrats and clergy declaring for it; [1966] and in the Diets of
1550 and 1552 was shown an increasingly strong anti-Catholic feeling,
which the Church was virtually powerless to punish. In 1549 a parish
priest publicly married a wife, and the bishop of Cracow abandoned the
attempt to displace him. The next bishop, Zebrzydowski, a favourite
pupil of Erasmus, was said by a Socinian writer of the period to have
openly expressed disbelief in immortality and other dogmas; [1967]
but when in 1552 a noble refused to pay tithes, he ecclesiastically
condemned him to death, and declared his property confiscated. The
sentence, however, could not be put in force; and when the other
heads of the Church, seeing their revenues menaced and their clergy in
large part tending to heresy, [1968] attempted a general and severe
prosecution of backsliding priests, the resistance of the magistracy
brought the effort to nothing. [1969] The Diet of 1552 practically
abrogated the ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and despite much intrigue
the economic interest of the landowners continued to maintain the
Protestant movement, which was rapidly organized on German and Swiss
models. It was by the play of its own elements of strife that its
ascendancy was undermined.

On the one hand, an influential cleric, Orzechowski, who had married
and turned Protestant, reconciled himself to Rome on the death of his
wife, having already begun a fierce polemic against the Unitarian
tendencies appearing on the Protestant side in the teaching of the
Italian Stancari (1550); on the other hand, those tendencies gained
head till they ruptured the party, of which the Trinitarian majority
further quarrelled violently among themselves till, as in Hungary,
many were driven back to the arms of Catholicism. In a Synod held in
1556, one Peter Goniondzki [1970] (Gonesius)--who as a Catholic had
violently opposed Stancari in 1550, but in the interim had studied in
Switzerland and turned Protestant--took up a more anti-Trinitarian
position than Stancari's, affirming three Gods, of whom the Son
and the Spirit were subordinate to the Father. A few years later
he declared against infant baptism--here giving forth opinions he
had met with in Moravia; and he rapidly drew to him a considerable
following alike of ministers and of wealthy laymen. [1971]

It was thus not the primary influence of Lelio Sozzini, who had visited
Poland in 1551 and did not return till 1558, that set up the remarkable
growth of Unitarianism in that country. It would seem rather that in
the country of Copernicus the relative weakness of the Church had
admitted of a more common approach to freedom of thought than was
seen elsewhere; [1972] and the impunity of the new movements brought
many heterodox fugitives (as it did Jews) from other lands. One of the
newcomers, the learned Italian, George Biandrata, whose Unitarianism
had been cautiously veiled, was made one of the superintendents of
the "Helvetic" Church of Little Poland, and aimed at avoidance of
dogmatic strifes; but after his withdrawal to Transylvania Gregorius
Pauli, a minister of Cracow, of Italian descent, went further than
Gonesius had done, and declared Jesus to be a mere man. [1973] He
further preached community of goods, promised a speedy millennium,
and condemned the bearing of arms. [1974] After various attempts
at suppression and compromise by the orthodox majority, a group of
Unitarian ministers and nobles formally renounced the doctrine of
the Trinity at the Conference of Petrikov in 1562; and, on a formal
condemnation being passed by an orthodox majority at Cracow in 1563,
there was formed a Unitarian Church, with forty-two subscribing
ministers, Zwinglian as to the eucharist, and opposed to infant
baptism. [1975] Ethically, its doctrine was humane and pacificatory,
its members being forbidden to go to law or to take oaths; and for
a time the community made great progress, the national Diet being,
by one account, "filled with Arians" for a time. [1976]

Meantime the Calvinist, Zwinglian, and Lutheran Protestant Churches
quarrelled as fiercely in Poland as elsewhere, every compromise
breaking down, till the abundant relapses of nobles and common people
to Catholicism began to rebuild the power of the old Church, which
found in "the Great Cardinal," Hosius, a statesman and controversialist
unequalled on the Protestant side. Backed by the Jesuits, he gained
by every Protestant dispute, the Jesuit order building itself up with
its usual skill. And the course of politics told conclusively in the
same direction. King Stephen Battory favoured the Jesuits; and King
Sigismund III, who had been educated as a Catholic by his mother,
systematically gave effect to his personal leanings by the use of his
peculiar feudal powers. Under the ancient constitution the king had
the bestowal of a number of life-tenures of great estates, called
starosties; and the granting of these Sigismund made conditional
on the acceptance of Catholicism. [1977] Thus the Protestantism of
the nobles, which had been in large part originally determined by
economic interests, was dissolved by a reversal of the same force,
very much in the fashion in which it was disintegrated in France by the
policy of Richelieu at the same period. At the close of Sigismund's
reign Protestantism was definitively broken up; and the Jesuit
ascendancy permitted even of frequent persecutions of heresy. From
these Unitarians could not escape; and at length, in 1658, they were
expelled from the country, now completely subject to Jesuitism. In
the country in which Protestantism and Unitarianism in turn had spread
most rapidly under favouring political and social conditions, the rise
of contrary conditions had most rapidly and decisively overthrown them.

The record of the heresy of Poland, Bohemia, and Hungary, in fine,
is very much a reduplication of that of early Christianity. Men
presented with an obscure and self-contradictory "revelation" set
themselves zealously to extract from it a body of certain truth,
and in that hopeless undertaking did but multiply strife, till the
majority, wearied with the fruitless quest, resigned themselves like
their ancient prototypes to a rule of dogma under which the reasoning
faculty became inert. Sane rationalism had to find another path,
in a more enlightened day.




§ 6. THE STRUGGLE IN FRANCE

The political and economic conditioning of the Reformation may perhaps
best be understood by following the fortunes of Protestantism in
France. When Luther began his schism, France might reasonably have been
held a much more likely field for its extension than England. While
King Henry was still to earn from the papacy the title of "Defender
of the Faith" as against Luther, King Francis had exacted from the
Pope (1516) a Concordat by which the appointment of all abbots and
bishops in France was vested in the crown, the papacy receiving only
the annates, or first year's revenue. For centuries too the French
throne and the papacy had been chronically at strife; for seventy
years a French pope, subservient to the king, had sat at Avignon;
and before the Concordat the "Pragmatic Sanction," first enacted in
1268 by the devout St. Louis, had since the reign of Charles VII, who
reinforced it (1438), kept the Gallican Church on a semi-independent
footing towards Rome. By the account of the chancellor Du Prat in
1517, the "Pragmatic," then superseded by the Concordat, had isolated
France among the Catholic peoples, causing her to be regarded as
inclined to heresy. [1978] In 1512 the Council of Pisa, convoked by
Louis XII, had denounced Pope Julius II as a dangerous schismatic,
and he had retaliated by placing France under interdict. In the
previous year the French king had given his protection to a famous
farce by Pierre Gringoire, in which, on Shrove Tuesday, the Pope was
openly ridiculed. [1979] Nowhere, in short, was the papacy as such
less respected.

The whole strife, however, between the French kings and the popes had
been for revenue, not on any question of doctrine. In the three years
(1461-64) during which Louis XI had for his own purposes suspended
the Pragmatic Sanction, it was found that 2,500,000 crowns had
gone from France to Rome for "expetatives" and "dispensations,"
besides 340,000 crowns for bulls for archbishoprics, bishoprics,
abbeys, priories, and deaneries. [1980] This drain was naturally
resisted by Church and Crown alike. Louis XI restored the Pragmatic
Sanction. Louis XII re-enacted it in 1499 with new severity; and the
effect of the Concordat of Francis I was merely to win over the Pope
by dividing between the king and him the power of plunder by the sale
of ecclesiastical offices. [1981] It was accordingly much resented by
the Parlement, the University, the clergy, and the people of Paris;
but the king overbore all opposition. Though, therefore, he had at
times some disposition to make a "reform" on the Lutheran lines, he
had no such motive thereto as had the kings and nobles of the other
northern countries; and he had further no such personal motive as had
Henry VIII of England. Under the existing arrangement he was as well
provided for as might be, since "the patronage of some six hundred
bishoprics and abbeys furnished him with a convenient and inexpensive
method of providing for his diplomatic service, and of rewarding
literary merit." [1982] The troubles in Germany, besides, were a
warning against letting loose a movement of popular fanaticism. [1983]

When, therefore, Protestantism and Lutheranism began to show head
in France, they had no friends at once powerful and zealous. Before
Luther, in 1512, Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples laid down in the commentary
on his Latin translation of the Pauline Epistles the Lutheran
doctrine of grace, and in effect denied the received doctrine of
transubstantiation. [1984] In 1520 his former pupil, Guillaume
Briçonnet, Bishop of Meaux, invited him and some younger reformers,
among them Guillaume Farel, to join him in teaching in his diocese;
and in 1523 appeared Lefèvre's translation of and commentary on
the gospels, which effectually began the Protestant movement in
France. [1985]

Persecution soon began. The king's adoring sister, Margaret, Duchess
of Alençon (afterwards Queen of Navarre), was the friend of Briçonnet,
but was powerless to help at home even her own intimates. [1986] At
first the king and his mother encouraged the movement at Meaux while
sending out a dozen preachers through France to combat the Lutheran
teaching; [1987] but in 1524, setting out on his Italian campaign,
the king saw fit to conciliate his clergy, and his clerical chancellor
Du Prat began measures of repression, the queen-mother assenting, and
Briçonnet's own brother assisting. Already, in 1521, the Sorbonne had
condemned Luther's writings, and the Parlement of Paris had ordered
the surrender of all copies. In 1523 the works of Louis de Berquin,
the anti-clerical friend of Erasmus, were condemned, and himself
imprisoned; and Briçonnet consented to issue synodal decrees against
Luther's books and against certain Lutheran doctrines preached in
his own diocese. Only by the king's intervention was Berquin at this
time released.

The first man slain was Jean Chastellain, a shoemaker of Tournay,
burned at Vic in Lorraine on January 12, 1525. The next was a
wool-carder of Meaux, [1988] who was first whipped and branded
for a fanatical outrage, then burned to death, with slow tortures,
for a further outrage against an image of the Virgin at Metz (July,
1525). Later, an ecclesiastic of the Meaux group, Jacques Banvan
of Picardy, was prosecuted at Paris for anti-Lutheran heresy, and
publicly recanted; but repented, retracted his abjuration, and was
burned on the Place de Grève, in August, 1526; a nameless "hermit
of Livry" suffering the same death about the same time beside the
cathedral of Notre Dame. [1989] Meantime Lefèvre had taken refuge
in Strasburg, and, despite a letter of veto from the king, now in
captivity at Madrid, his works were condemned by the Sorbonne. When
released, the king not only recalled him but made him tutor to his
children. Ecclesiastical pressures, however, forced him finally to
take refuge under the Queen of Navarre at Nérac, in Gascony, where
he mourned his avoidance of martyrdom. [1990]

So determined had been the persecution that in 1526 Berquin was
a second time imprisoned, and with difficulty saved from death
by the written command of the captive king, sent on his sister's
appeal. [1991] And when the released king, to secure the deliverance
of his hostage sons, felt bound to conciliate the Pope, and to secure
funds had to conciliate the clergy, Marguerite, compelled to marry the
king of Navarre, could do nothing more for Protestantism, [1992] being
herself openly and furiously denounced by the Catholic clergy. [1993]
Bought by a clerical subsidy, the king, on the occasion of a new
outrage on a statue of the Virgin (1528), [1994] associated himself
with the popular indignation; and when the audacious Berquin, despite
the dissuasions of Erasmus, resumed his anti-Catholic polemic, and in
particular undertook to prove that Béda, the chief of the Sorbonne,
was not a Christian, [1995] he was re-arrested, tried, and condemned
to be publicly branded and imprisoned for life. On his announcing an
appeal to the absent king, and to the pope, a fresh sentence, this
time of death, was hurriedly passed; and he was strangled and burned
(1529) within two hours of the sentence, [1996] to the intense joy
of the ecclesiastical multitude.

After various vacillations, the king in 1534 had the fresh pretext
of Protestant outrage--the affixing of an anti-Catholic placard in
all of the principal thoroughfares of Paris, and to the door of the
king's own room [1997]--for permitting a fresh persecution after
he had refused the Pope's request that he should join in a general
extermination of heresy, [1998] and there began at Paris a series of
human sacrifices. It will have been observed that Protestant outrages
had provoked previous executions; and there is some ground for the view
that, but for the new and exasperating outrage of 1534, the efforts
which were being officially made for a modus vivendi might have met
with success. [1999] This hope was now frustrated. In November, 1534,
seven men were condemned to be burned alive, one of them for printing
Lutheran books. In December others followed; and in January, 1535,
on the occasion of a royal procession "to appease the wrath of God,"
six Lutherans (by one account, three by another) were burned alive
by slow fires, one of the victims being a school-mistress. [2000]
It was on this occasion that the king, in a public speech, declared:
"Were one of my arms infected with this poison, I would cut it
off. Were my own children tainted, I should immolate them." [2001]

Under such circumstances religious zeal naturally went far. In six
months there were passed 102 sentences of death, of which twenty-seven
were executed, the majority of the condemned having escaped by
flight. Thereafter the individual burnings are past counting. On an
old demand of the Sorbonne, the king actually sent to the Parlement
an edict abolishing the art of printing; [2002] which he duly recalled
when the Parlement declined to register it. But the French Government
was now committed to persecution. The Sorbonne's declaration against
Luther in 1521 had proclaimed as to the heretics that "their impious
and shameless arrogance must be restrained by chains, by censures--nay,
by fire and flame, rather than confuted by argument"; [2003] and in
that spirit the ruling clergy proceeded, the king abetting them. In
1543 he ordained that heresy should be punished as sedition; [2004] and
in 1545 occurred the massacres of the Vaudois, before described. The
result of this and further savageries was simply the wider diffusion of
heresy, and a whole era of civil war, devastation, and demoralization.

Meantime Calvin had been driven abroad, to found a Protestant polity at
Geneva and give a lead to those of England and Scotland. The balance
of political forces prevented a Protestant polity in France; but
nowhere else in the sixteenth century did Protestantism fight so long
and hard a battle. That the Reformation was a product of "Teutonic
conscience" is an inveterate fallacy. [2005] The country in which
Protestantism was intellectually most disinterested and morally most
active was France. "The main battle of erudition and doctrine against
the Catholic Church," justly contends Guizot, "was sustained by the
French reformers; it was in France and Holland, and always in French,
that most of the philosophic, historical, and polemic works on that
side were written; neither Germany nor England, certainly, employed
in the cause at that epoch more intelligence and science." [2006] Nor
was there in France--apart from the provocative insults to Catholics
above mentioned--any such licence on the Protestant side as arose in
Germany, though the French Protestants were as violently intolerant
as any. Their ultimate decline, after long and desperate wars ending
in a political compromise, was due to the play of socio-economic
causes under the wise and tolerant administration of Richelieu, who
opened the royal services to the Protestant nobles. [2007] The French
character had proved as unsubduable in Protestantism as any other; and
the generation which in large part gradually reverted to Catholicism
did but show that it had learned the lesson of the strifes which had
followed on the Reformation--that Protestantism was no solution of
either the moral or the intellectual problems of religion and politics.




§ 7. THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN BRITAIN

It was thus by no predilection or faculty of "race" that the
Reformation so-called came to be associated historically with the
northern or "Teutonic" nations. They simply succeeded in making
permanent, by reason of more propitious political circumstances,
a species of ecclesiastical revolution in which other races led the
way. As Hussitism failed in Bohemia, Lollardism came to nothing
in England in the same age, after a period of great vogue and
activity. [2008] The designs of Parliament on the revenues of the
Church at the beginning of the fifteenth century [2009] had failed by
reason of the alliance knit between Church and Crown in the times when
the latter needed backing; and at the accession of Henry VIII England
was more orthodox than any of the other leading States of Northern
Europe. [2010] Henry was himself passionately orthodox, and was much
less of a reformer in his mental attitude than was Wolsey, who had
far-reaching schemes for de-Romanizing the Church alike in England and
France, and who actually gave the king a handle against him by his
plans for turning Church endowments to educational purposes. [2011]
The personal need of the despotic king for a divorce which the pope
dared not give him was the first adequate lead to the rejection of the
papal authority. On this the plunder of the monasteries followed, as
a forced measure of royal finance, [2012] of precaution against papal
influence, and for the creation of a body of new interests vitally
hostile to a papal restoration. The king and the mass of the people
were alike Catholics in doctrine; the Protestant nobles who ruled
under Edward VI were for the most part mere cynical plunderers,
appropriating alike Church goods, lands, and school endowments
more shamelessly than even did the potentates of Germany; and on
the accession of Queen Mary the nation gladly reverted to Romish
usages, though the spoil-holders would not surrender a yard of Church
lands. [2013] Had there been a succession of Catholic sovereigns,
Catholicism would certainly have been restored. Protestantism was
only slowly built up by the new clerical and heretical propaganda,
and by the state of hostility set up between England and the Catholic
Powers. It was the episode of the Spanish Armada that, by identifying
Catholicism with the cause of the great national enemy, made the
people grow definitely anti-Catholic. Even in Shakespeare's dramas
the old state of things is seen not yet vitally changed.

In Scotland, though there the priesthood had fewer friends than almost
anywhere else, the act of Reformation was mainly one of pure and
simple plunder of Church property by the needy nobility, in conscious
imitation of the policy of Henry VIII, at a time when the throne
was vacant; and there too Protestant doctrine was only gradually
established by the new race of preachers, trained in the school of
Calvin. In Ireland, on the other hand, Protestantism became identified
with the cause of the oppressor, just as for England Romanism was
the cause of the enemy-in-chief. "Race" and "national character,"
whatever they may be understood to mean, had nothing whatever to do
with the course of events, and doctrinal enlightenment had just as
little. [2014] In the words of a distinguished clerical historian:
"No truth is more certain than this, that the real motives of
religious action do not work on men in masses; and that the enthusiasm
which creates Crusaders, Inquisitors, Hussites, Puritans, is not
the result of conviction, but of passion provoked by oppression or
resistance, maintained by self-will, or stimulated by the mere desire
of victory." [2015] To this it need only be added that the desire of
gain is also a factor, and that accordingly the anti-papal movement
succeeded where the balance of political forces could be turned against
the clerical interest, and failed where the latter predominated.







CHAPTER XII

THE REFORMATION AND FREETHOUGHT


§ 1. GERMANY AND SWITZERLAND

In the circumstances set forth in the last chapter, the Reformation
could stand for only the minimum of freethought needed to secure
political action. Some decided unbelief there was within its
original sphere; [2016] the best known instance being the private
latitudinarianism of such humanist teachers as Mutianus (Mudt) and
Crotus (Jäger), of the Erfurt University, in the closing years of the
fifteenth century. Trained in Italy, Mutianus, after his withdrawal
to private life at Gotha, in his private correspondence [2017]
avowed the opinion that the sacred books contained many designed
fables; that the books of Job and Jonah were such; and that there
was a secret wisdom in the Moslem opinion that Christ himself was
not crucified, his place being taken by someone resembling him. To
his young friend Spalatin he propounded the question: "If Christ
alone be the way, the truth, and the life, how went it with the men
who lived so many centuries before his birth? Had they had no part
in truth and salvation?" And he hints the answer that "the religion
of Christ did not begin with his incarnation, but is as old as the
world, as his birth from the Father. For what is the real Christ,
the only Son of God, save, as Paul says, the Wisdom of God, with
which he endowed not only the Jews in their narrow Syrian land, but
also the Greeks, the Romans, and the Germans, however different might
be their religious usages." Though some such doctrine could be found
in Eusebius, [2018] it was remarkable enough in the Germany of four
hundred years ago. But Mutianus went still further. To his friend
Heinrich Urban he wrote that "there is but one God and one Goddess"
under the many forms and names of Jupiter, Sol, Apollo, Moses, Christ,
Luna, Ceres, Proserpina, Tellus, Maria. "But," he prudently added,
"heed that you do not spread it abroad. One must hide it in silence,
like Eleusinian mysteries. In religious matters we must avail ourselves
of the cloak of fable and enigma. Thou, with the grace of Jupiter--that
is, the best and greatest God--shouldst silently despise the little
Gods. When I say Jupiter, I mean Christ and the true God. But enough
of these all too high things." Such language hints of much current
rationalism that can now only be guessed at, since it was unsafe even
to write to friends as Mutianus did. On concrete matters of religion he
is even more pronounced, laughing at the worship of the coat and beard
and foreskin of Jesus, calling Lenten food fool's food, contemning
the begging monks, rejecting confession and masses for the dead,
and pronouncing the hours spent in altar-service lost time. In his
house at Gotha, behind the Cathedral, his friend Crotus burlesqued
the Mass, called the relics of saints bones from the gallows, and
otherwise blasphemed with his host. [2019]

But such esoteric doctrine and indoors unbelief can have had no part
in the main movement; and though at the same period we see among
the common people the satirist Heinrich Bebel, a Swabian peasant's
son, jesting for them over the doctrines of trinity in unity, the
resurrection, doomsday, and the sacraments, [2020] it is certain that
that influence counted for little in the way of serious thinking. It
was only as separate and serious heresies that such doctrines could
long propagate themselves; and Luther in his letter to the people
of Antwerp [2021] speaks of one sect or group as rejecting baptism,
another the eucharist, another the divinity of Jesus, and yet another
affirming a middle state between the present life and the day of
judgment. One teacher in Antwerp he describes as saying that every
man has the Holy Ghost, that being simply reason and understanding,
that there is no hell, and that doing as we would be done by is
faith; but this heretic does not seem to have founded a sect. The
most extensive wave of really innovating thought was that set up by
the social and anti-sacerdotal revolt of the Anabaptists, among whom
occurred also the first popular avowals of Unitarianism.

In the way of literature, Unitarian doctrine came from John Campanus,
of Jülich; Ludwig Hetzer, a priest of Zürich; and (in a minor degree)
Johann Denk, school-rector in Nüremberg in 1524, [2022] and afterwards
one of the earlier leaders of the Anabaptist movement. All three
were men of academic training; and Hetzer, who wrote explicitly
against the divinity of Christ, had previously made with the aid of
Denk a German translation, which was used by Luther, of the Hebrew
prophets (1527). He was beheaded at Constance in 1529, nominally on
the charge of practising free-love. [2023] Campanus, who published a
book attacking the doctrine of the Trinity and the teaching of Luther,
had to leave Wittemberg in consequence, and finally died after a long
imprisonment in Cleve. Denk--an amiable and estimable man [2024]--is
said, on very scant grounds, to have recanted before he died.

Not only from such thoroughgoing heresy, but from the whole Anabaptist
secession, and no less from the rising of the peasants, the main
Lutheran movement kept itself utterly aloof; and, though the Catholics
naturally identified the extremer parties with the Reformation, its
official or "Centre" polity made little for intellectual or political
as distinct from ecclesiastical innovation. Towards the Peasants'
Revolt, which at first he favoured, inasmuch as the peasants, whom
he had courted, came to him for counsel, Luther's final attitude was
so brutal that it has to-day almost no apologist; and in this as in
some of his other evil departures the "mild" Melanchthon went with
him. [2025] Their doctrine was the very negation of all democracy,
and must be interpreted as an absolute capitulation to the nobles,
without whose backing they knew themselves to be ecclesiastically
helpless. In the massacres to which Luther gave his eager approval a
hundred thousand men were destroyed. [2026] "From this time onwards,"
pronounces Baur, "Luther ceases to be the representative of the
spirit of his time; he represents only one side of it.... Thenceforth
his writings have no more the universal bearing they once had,
but only a particular.... In the political connection we must date
from Luther's attitude to the Peasants' War the Lutheran theory of
unconditional obedience. Christianity, as Luther preached it, has
given to princes unlimited power of despotism and tyranny; while the
poor man, who, without right of protest, must submit to everything,
will be compensated for his earthly sufferings in heaven." [2027]
Naturally the princes henceforth grew more and more Lutheran.

As naturally the crushed peasantry turned away from the Reformation in
despair. Luther had in the first instance approached them, not they
him. Before the revolt the reformers had made the peasant a kind of
hero in their propaganda; [2028] and when in the first and moderate
stage of the rising its motives were set forth in sixty-two articles,
these were purely agrarian. "There is no trace of a religious element
in them, no indication that their authors had ever heard of Luther
or of the Gospel." [2029] Then it was that Luther commended them;
and thereafter "a religious element began to obtrude." [2030] When
the overthrow began, doubtless sincerely reprobating the violences of
the insurgents, he hounded on the princes in their work of massacre,
Melanchthon chiming in. Thereafter, as Melanchthon admitted, the
people showed a detestation of the Lutheran clergy; [2031] and among
many there was even developed a kind of "materialistic atheism." [2032]

The political outcome, as aforesaid, was a thoroughly undemocratic
organization of Protestantism in Germany; and, though the
ecclesiastical tyranny which resulted from the more democratic system
of Calvin was not more favourable to progress or happiness, the final
German system of cujus regio, ejus religio--every district taking
the religion of its ruler--must be summed up as a mere negation of
the right of private judgment. Save for the attempt of a Frenchman,
François Lambert of Avignon, to organize a self-governing church,
German Protestantism showed almost no democratic feeling. [2033] The
one poor excuse for Luther was that the peasants had never recognized
the need or duty of maintaining their clergy. [2034] And seeing how
the wealth of the Church went to the nobles and the well-to-do, and
how downtrodden were the peasants all along, it would be surprising
indeed if they had. They were not the workers of the ecclesiastical
Reformation, and it wrought little or nothing for them.

The side on which the whole movement made for new light was its
promotion of common schools, which enabled many of the people for
the first time to read. [2035] This tendency had been seen among
the Waldenses, the Lollards, and the Hussites, and for the same
reasons. Such movements depended for their existence on the reading
of the sacred books by the people for themselves; and to make readers
was their first concern. In this connection, of course, note must
be taken of the higher educational revival before the Reformation,
[2036] without which the ecclesiastical revolution could not have
taken place even in Germany. As we saw, a literary expansion preceded
the Hussite movement in Bohemia; and the stir of concern for written
knowledge, delightedly acclaimed by Ulrich von Hutten, is recognized by
all thoughtful historians in Germany before the rise of Luther. Such
enlightenment as that of Mutianus was far in advance of Luther's own;
and enlightenment of a lower degree cannot have been lacking. The
ability to read, indeed, must have been fairly general in the middle
class in Germany, for it appears that the partisan favour shown
everywhere to Luther's writings by the printers and booksellers gave
him an immense propagandist advantage over his Catholic opponents,
who could secure for their replies only careless or bad workmanship,
and were thus made to seem actually illiterate in the eyes of the
reading public. [2037]

As regards Switzerland, again, it is the admitted fact that "the
educational movement began before the religious revival, and was a
cause of the Reformation rather than a result." [2038] So in Holland,
the Brethren of the Common Lot (Fratres Vitæ Communis), a partially
communistic but orthodox order of learned and unlearned laymen which
lasted from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century, did much for
the schooling of the common people, and passed on their impulse to
Germany. [2039] Similarly in Scotland the schools seem to have been
fairly numerous even in the later Catholic period. [2040] There, and
in some other countries, it was the main merit of the Reformation to
carry on zealously the work so begun, setting up common schools in
every parish. In Lutheran Germany this work was for a long period much
more poorly done, as regarded the peasantry. These had been trodden
down after their revolt into a state of virtual slavery. "The broad
midlands and the entire eastern part of Germany were filled with
slaves, who had neither status nor property nor education"; [2041]
and it was long before any large number of the people were taught to
read and write, [2042] the schooling given at the best being a scanty
theological drill. [2043]

But indeed for two-thirds of its adherents everywhere the Reformation
meant no other reading than that of the Bible and catechisms and
theological treatises. Coming as it did within one or two generations
of the invention of printing, it stood not for new ideas, but for
the spread of old. That invention had for a time positively checked
the production of new books, the multiplication of the old having
in a measure turned attention to the past; [2044] and the diffusion
of the Bible in particular determined the mental attitude of the
movement in mass. The thinking of its more disinterested promoters
began and ended in Bibliolatry: Luther and Calvin alike did but
set up an infallible book and a local tyranny against an infallible
pope and a tyranny centring at Rome. Neither dreamt of toleration;
and Calvin, the more competent mind of the two, did but weld the
detached irrationalities of the current theology into a system which
crushed reason and stultified the morality in the name of which he
ruled Geneva with a rod of iron. [2045] It is remarkable that both
men reverted to the narrowest orthodoxies of the earlier Church, in
defiance of whatever spirit of reasonable inquiry had been on the
side of their movement. "It is a quality of faith," wrote Luther,
"that it wrings the neck of reason and strangles the beast"; [2046]
and he repeatedly avowed that it was only by submitting his mind
absolutely to the Scriptures that he could retain his faith. [2047]
"He despised reason as heartily as any papal dogmatist could despise
it. He hated the very thought of toleration or comprehension." [2048]
And when Calvin was combated by the Catholic Pighius on the question of
predestination and freewill, his defence was that he followed Christ
and the Apostles, while his opponents resorted to human thoughts and
reasonings. [2049] On the same principle he dealt with the Copernican
theory. After once breaking away from Rome both leaders became typical
anti-freethinkers, never even making Savonarola's pretence to resort
to rationalist methods, though of course not more anti-rationalist
than he. The more reasonable Zwingli, who tried to put an intelligible
aspect on one or two of the mysteries of the faith, was scouted by
both, as they scouted each other.

It is noteworthy that Zwingli, the most open-minded of the Reformers,
owed his relative enlightenment to his general humanist culture,
[2050] and in particular to the influence of Pico della Mirandola
and of Erasmus. It has even been argued that his whole theological
system is derived from Pico, [2051] but it appears to have been from
Erasmus that he drew his semi-rationalistic view of the eucharist,
[2052] a development of that of Berengar, representing it as
a simple commemoration. Such thinking was far from the "spirit
of the Reformation"; and Luther, after the Colloquy of Marburg
(1529), in which he and Melanchthon debated against Zwingli and
Oecolampadius, spoke of those "Sacramentarians" as "not only liars,
but the very incarnation of lying, deceit, and hypocrisy." [2053]
Zwingli's language is less ferocious; but it is confessed of him
that he too practised coercion against minorities in the case alike
of the Anabaptists and of the monasteries and nunneries, and even
in the establishment of his reformed eucharist. [2054] The expulsion
of the nuns of St. Katherinenthal in particular was an act of sheer
tyranny; and the outcome of the methods enforced by him at Zürich
was the bitter hostility of the five Forest Cantons, which remained
Catholic. In war with them he lost his life; and after his death
(1531) his sacramental doctrine rapidly disappeared from Swiss and
Continental Protestantism, [2055] even as it failed to make headway
in England. [2056] At his fall "the words of triumph and cursing used
by Lutherans and others were shameful and almost inhuman." [2057]
In the sequel, for sheer lack of a rational foundation, the other
Protestant sects in turn fell to furious dissension and persecution,
some apparently finding their sole bond of union in hatred of the rest.


    See Menzel, Geschichte der Deutschen, 3te Aufl. Cap. 431, for a
    sample of Lutheran popery; and as to the strifes cp. C. Beard, The
    Reformation, as cited, pp. 182-83; Dunham, History of the Germanic
    Empire, 1835, iii, 115-20, 153, 169; Strype, Memorials of Cranmer,
    ed. 1848, iii, 155-62; A. F. Pollard, in "The Cambridge Modern
    History," vol. ii, The Reformation, ch. viii, pp. 277-79. In the
    last-cited compilation, however, the strifes of the Protestant
    sects are barely indicated.

    As to Luther's attitude towards new science, see his derision of
    Copernicus, on scriptural grounds, in the Table Talk, ch. lxix,
    Of Astronomy and Astrology. (The passage is omitted from
    the English translation in the Bohn Library, p. 341; and the
    whole chapter is dropped from the German abridgment published
    by Reclam.) Melanchthon was equally unteachable, and actually
    proposed to suppress the new teachings by punitive methods. (Initia
    Doctrinæ Physicæ, cited by White, Warfare of Science and Theology,
    1896, i, 127.) It has been loosely claimed for Luther that he was
    "an enemy to religious persecution" (Lieber, Manual of Political
    Ethics, 1839, pt. i, p. 329), when the only evidence offered is
    (id. p. 205) that he declared against killing for heresy, because
    innocent men were likely to be slain--"Quare nullo modo possum
    admittere, falsos doctores occidi." As early as 1524, renouncing
    his previous doctrine of non-coercion, he invoked the intervention
    of the State to punish blasphemy, declaring that the power of the
    sword was given by God for such ends (Bezold, p. 563). Melanchthon
    too declared that "Our commands are mere Platonic laws when the
    civil power does not give its support" (id. p. 565).

    A certain intellectual illusion is set up even by Bezold when he
    writes that in Luther's resort to physical force "the hierarchical
    principle had triumphed over one of the noblest principles of the
    Reformation." "The Reformation" had no specific principles. Among
    its promoters were professed all manner of principles. The
    Reformation was the outcome of all their activities, and to make
    of it an entity or even a distinct set of theories is to obscure
    the phenomena.

    Such flaws of formulation, however, are trifling in comparison
    with the mis-statement of the historic fact which is still normal
    in academic as in popular accounts of the Reformation. It would
    be difficult, for instance, to give seriously a more misleading
    account of the Lutheran reformation than the proposition of
    Dr. Edward Caird that, "in thrusting aside the claim of the
    Church to place itself between the individual and God, Luther
    had proclaimed the emancipation of men not only from the leading
    strings of the Church, but, in effect, from all external authority
    whatever, and even, in a sense, from all merely external teaching
    or revelation of the truth" (Hegel, 1883, p. 18). Luther thrust
    his own Church precisely where the Catholic Church had been;
    bitterly denounced new heresies; and put the Bible determinedly
    "between the individual and God." In Luther's own day Sebastian
    Franck unanswerably accused him of setting up a paper pope in place
    of the human pope he had rejected. Luther's declaration was that
    "the ungodly <DW7>s prefer the authority of the Church far above
    God's Word, a blasphemy abominable and not to be endured, wherewith
    ... they spit in God's face. Truly God's patience is exceeding
    great, in that they be not destroyed" (Table Talk, ch. i).

    Another misconception is set up by Pattison, who seems to have been
    much concerned to shield Calvin from the criticism of the civilized
    conscience (see below, p. 452). He pronounces that Calvin's "great
    merit lies in his comparative neglect of dogma. He seized the idea
    of reformation as a real renovation of human character" (Essays,
    ii, 23). If so, the reformer can have had little satisfaction,
    for he never admitted having regenerated Geneva. But the claim
    that he "comparatively" neglected dogma is true only in the sense
    that he was more inquisitorially zealous about certain forms of
    private conduct than was Luther. Gruet, indeed, he helped to
    slay upon political charges, taking a savage vengeance upon a
    personal opponent. But even in Gruet's case he sought later to
    add a religious justification to his crime. And it was in the
    name of dogma that he put Servetus to death, exiled Castalio,
    imprisoned Bolsec, broke with old friends, and imperilled the
    entire Genevan polity. Pattison's praise would be much more
    appropriate to Zwingli.


Luther, though he would probably have been ready enough to punish
Copernicus as a heretic, was saved the evil chance which befel
Calvin of being put in a place of authority where he could in God's
name commit judicial murder. It is by acts so describable that
the name of Calvin is most directly connected with the history of
freethought. In nowise entitled to rank with its furtherers, he is
to be enrolled in the evil catalogue of its persecutors. In the case
of Jacques Gruet on a mixture of political and religious charges,
in that of Michael Servetus on grounds of dogma pure and simple, he
cast upon the record of Genevan Protestantism and upon his own memory
an ineffaceable stain of blood. Gruet, an adherent of the Perrinist
faction of Geneva, a party opposed to Calvin, on being arrested for
issuing a placard against the clerical junto in power, was found,
by the accounts of the Calvinist historians, to have among his papers
some revealing his disbelief in the Christian religion. [2058] This,
however, proves to be a partisan account of the matter, and is hardly
even in intention truthful. In the first place, it was admitted by
Calvin that the placard, affixed by night to the chair of St. Peter
in Geneva, was not in Gruet's handwriting; yet he was arrested,
imprisoned, and put to the torture with the avowed object of making
him confess "that he had acted at the instigation of François Favre,
of the wife of Perrin, and of other accomplices of the same party whom
he must have had." Perrin was the former Captain-General of Geneva,
a popular personage, opposed to Calvin and detested by him. No match
for the vigilant Reformer, Perrin had been through Calvin's intrigues
deprived of his post; and there was a standing feud between his
friends and the Calvinistic party in power.

The main part of the charges against Gruet was political; and the
most circumstantial was based upon a draft, found among his papers,
of a speech which he had ostensibly proposed to make in the General
Council calling for reform of abuses. The speech contained nothing
seditious, but the intention to deliver it without official permission
was described as lèse-majesté--a term now newly introduced into
Genevan procedure. The other documentary proofs were trivial. In
one fragment of a letter there was an ironical mention of "notre
galant Calvin"; and in a note on a margin of Calvin's book against
the Anabaptists he had written in Latin "All trifles." For the rest,
he was accused of writing two pages in Latin "in which are comprised
several errors," and of being "inclined (plutôt enclin) to say,
recite and write false opinions and errors as to the true words of
Our Saviour." [2059] Concerning his errors the only documentary proof
preserved is from an alleged scrap of his writing in corrupt Latin,
cited by Calvin as a sample of his inability to write Latin correctly:
Omnes tam humane quam divine que dicantur leges factae sunt ad placitum
hominum, which may be rendered, "All so-called laws, divine as well
as human, are made at the will of men." In the act of sentence, he is
declared further to have written obscene verses justifying free love;
to have striven to ruin the authority of the consistory, menaced the
ministers, and abused Calvin; and to have "conspired with the king
of France against the safety of Calvin and the State."

To make out these charges, for the last of which there seems to be
no evidence whatever, Gruet was put to the torture many times during
many days "according to the manner of the time," says one of Calvin's
biographers. [2060] In reality such unmeasured use of torture was
in Geneva a Calvinistic innovation. Gruet, refusing under the worst
stress of torture to incriminate anyone else, at length, in order to
end it, pleaded guilty to the charges against him, praying in his
last extremity for a speedy death. On July 26, 1547, his half-dead
body was beheaded on the scaffold, the torso being tied and the
feet nailed thereto. Such were the judicial methods and mercies of
a reformed Christianity, guided by a chief reformer.


    The biographer Henry "cannot repress a sigh" over the thirty
    days of double torture of Gruet (ii, 66), but goes on to make a
    most disingenuous defence of Calvin, first asserting that he was
    not responsible, and then arguing that it would be as unjust to
    try Calvin by modern standards as to blame him for not wearing a
    perruque à la Louis XIV, or proceeding by the Code Napoléon! The
    same moralist declares (p. 68) that "it is really inspiriting to
    hear how Calvin stormed in his sermons against the opposite party":
    and is profoundly impressed by the "deep religious earnestness"
    with which Calvin in 1550 claimed that "The council ought again
    to declare aloud that this blasphemer has been justly condemned,
    that the wrath of God may be averted from the city." Finally
    (p. 69), recording how Gruet's "book" was burned in 1550, the
    biographer pronounces that "The Gospel thus gained a victory over
    its enemies; in the same manner as in Germany freedom triumphed
    when Luther burnt the pope's bull."


As to the alleged anti-religious writings of Gruet, they were not
produced or even specified till 1550, three years after his execution,
when they were said to have been found partly in the roof of what
had been his house (now occupied by the secretary of the consistory),
partly behind a chimney, and partly in a dustbin. Put together, they
amounted to thirteen leaves, in a handwriting which was declared by
Calvin to be "juridically, by good examination of trustworthy men,
recognized to be that of Gruet." The time and the singular manner of
their discovery raises the question whether the papers had not been
placed by the finders. The execution of Gruet, the first bloodshed
under Calvin's régime, had roused new hatred against him; the slain
man figured as a martyr in the eyes of the party to which he belonged;
and it had become necessary to discredit him and them if the ascendancy
of Calvin was to be secure. It is solely upon Calvin's account that
we have to depend for our knowledge of Gruet's alleged anti-Christian
doctrine; for the document, after being described and condemned, was
duly burned by the common hangman. If genuine, it was a remarkable
performance. According to the act of condemnation, which is in the
handwriting of Calvin, it derided all religions alike, blasphemed
God, Jesus, the Holy Ghost, the Virgin Mary, Moses, the Patriarchs,
the Prophets, the Apostles, the disciples, the gospels, the Old and
New Testaments, the gospel miracles, and the resurrection. [2061]
Not a single phrase is quoted; we have mere general description,
execration, and sentence.

Whether the document was a planned forgery, or part of a copy by
Gruet of an anti-Christian treatise theretofore secretly circulated,
will never be known. The story of Gruet soon swelled into a
legend. According to one narrative, he had copied with his own hand and
circulated in Geneva the mysterious treatise, De Tribus Impostoribus,
the existence of which, at that period, is very doubtful. [2062]
On the strength of this and other cases [2063] the Libertines have
been sometimes supposed to be generally unbelievers; but there is
no more evidence for this than for the general ascription to them
of licentious conduct. It appears certain indeed that at that time
the name Libertine was not recognized as a label for all of Calvin's
political opponents, but was properly reserved for the sect so-called;
[2064] but even a vindicator of Calvin admits that "it is undeniable
that the Libertines [i.e. the political opponents of Calvin, so-called
by modern writers] of 1555 were the true political representatives of
the patriots of 1530." [2065] The presumption is that the political
opposition included the more honest and courageous men of liberal and
tolerant tendencies, as Calvin's own following included men of "free"
life. [2066] The really antinomian Libertini of the period were to
be found among the pantheistic-Christian sect or school so-called,
otherwise known as Spirituals, who seem to have been a branch of
the Brethren of the Free Spirit, or fraternity of the "Spirit of
Liberty." These Calvin denounced in his manner; but in 1544 he had also
forced into exile his former friend, Sebastian Castalio (or Castalion;
properly Chatillon), master of the public school at Geneva, for simply
rejecting his doctrine of absolute predestination, striving to have him
driven in turn from Basel; and in 1551 he had caused to be imprisoned
and banished a physician and ex-Carmelite, Jerome Bolsec, for publicly
denying the same dogma. Bolsec, being prevented by Calvin's means
from settling in any neighbouring Protestant community, returned to
Catholicism, [2067] as did many others. After Calvin's death Bolsec
took his revenge in an attack on the reformer in his public and
private character, [2068] which has been treated as untrustworthy
by the more moderate Catholic scholars who deal with the period;
[2069] and which, as regards its account of his private morals, is
probably on all fours with Calvin's own unscrupulous charges against
the "Libertines" and others who opposed him.


    The tenets of the Libertini are somewhat mystifying, as handled
    by Calvin and his biographer Henry, both alike animated by
    the odium theologicum in the highest degree. By Calvin's own
    account they were mystical Christians, speaking of Christ as "the
    spirit which is in the world and in us all," and of the devil
    and his angels as having no proper existence, being identical
    with the world and sin. Further, they denied the eternity of
    the human soul and the freedom of the will; and Calvin charges
    them with subverting alike belief in God and morality (Henry,
    Life of Calvin, Eng. tr. ii, 45-46). The last charge could
    just as validly be brought against his own predestinarianism;
    and as regards ethics we find Calvin alternately denouncing the
    Libertines for treating all sin as unpardonable, and for stating
    that in Christ none could sin. Apparently he gives his inferences
    as their doctrines; and the antinomianism which, in the case of
    the trial of Madame Ameaux, Henry identifies with pantheism, was
    by his own showing of a Christian cast. Little credit, accordingly,
    can be given to his summing up that among the Libertines of Geneva
    there exhibited itself "a perfectly-formed anti-Christianity,"
    which he calls "a true offspring of hell" (ii, 49). The residuum
    of truth appears to be that in the pantheism of this sect,
    as Neander says concerning the Brethren of the Free Spirit
    among the Beghards, there were "the foretokens of a thoroughly
    anti-Christian tendency, hostile to everything supernatural, every
    sentiment of a God above the world; a tendency which contained
    ... the germ of absolute rationalism" (Hist. of the Chr. Church,
    Torrey's tr. ix, 536). Pantheism, logically extended, obviously
    reduces the supernatural and the natural to unity, and is thus
    atheistic. But that the pantheists of Geneva in Calvin's day
    reached logical consistency is incredible. The Libertine sect,
    in all likelihood, was only partially antinomian, and only in
    very small part consciously anti-Christian.


At this period (1552), on the same issue of predestination, Calvin
broke utterly with one of his closest friends, Jacques de Bourgogne,
Sieur de Falais. [2070] It seemed as if the Protestant polity
were disrupting in a continuous convulsion of dogmatic strife; and
Melanchthon wrote to Bucer in despair over the madness and misery of
a time in which Geneva was returning to the fatalism of the Stoics,
and imprisoning whosoever would not agree with Zeno. [2071] By this
time it must have been clear to some that behind the strifes of
raging theologians there lay a philosophic problem which they could
not sound. It is therefore not surprising to learn that already Basel
University, as fifty years before at Erfurt, there was a latitudinarian
group of professors who aimed at a universal religion, and came near
"naturalism" in the attempt; [2072] while elsewhere in Switzerland,
as we shall see later, there grew up the still freer way of thought
which came to be known as Deism.

A great impulse to that development, as well as to simple Unitarianism,
must have been given by the execution of Michael Servetus. [2073]
That ill-starred heretic, born of Spanish stock in France, brought
to the propaganda of Unitarianism, of which he may be reckoned the
inaugurator, a determination as strong as Calvin's own. Sent by his
father to study civil law at Toulouse, he began there to study the
Bible, doubtless under the stimulus of the early Protestant discussions
of the time. The result was a prompt advance beyond the Protestant
standpoint. Leaving Toulouse after two or three years' residence, he
visited Bologna and Augsburg in the train of the confessor of Charles
V. Thereafter he visited Lyons and Geneva, and had some intercourse
with Oecolampadius at Basel, where he put in the hands of a bookseller
the signed manuscript of his first book, De Trinitatis erroribus libri
septem. The bookseller sent it on to Hagenau, in Alsace, which as an
"imperial city" seems to have had special freedom in the matter of
book-publishing; and thither, after visiting Bucer and Capito at
Strasburg, Servetus went to have it printed in 1531. [2074] In this
treatise, produced in his twenty-first year, he definitely rejects
Trinitarianism, while putting somewhat obscurely his own idea of
the nature of Jesus Christ--whom, it should be noted, he held in
high reverence. In the following year he produced at the same place
another small treatise, Dialogorum de Trinitate libri duo, wherein
he recasts his first work, "retracting" it and apologizing for its
crudity, but standing substantially to its positions. It was not
till 1553 that he printed at Vienne in Dauphiné, without his name,
his Christianismi Restitutio. [2075] In the interval he had been
doing scientific work as an editor of Ptolemy (1535, Lyons), and as a
student of and lecturer on anatomy and medicine at Paris, where (1536)
he met Calvin on his last visit to France. In 1538 he is found studying
at Louvain; and, after practising medicine at Avignon and Charlieu,
he again studies medicine at Montpellier. The Archbishop of Vienne,
who had heard him lecture at Paris, established him at Vienne as his
confidential physician (1541-53), and there it was that he produced
the book for which he died. About 1545-46 he had rashly written to
Calvin, sending him the MS. of the much-expanded recast of his books
which later appeared as the Restitutio. Calvin sent a hostile reply,
and on the same day wrote to Farel: "If he come, and my influence can
avail, I shall not suffer him to depart alive." Servetus had denounced
the papacy as fiercely as any Protestant could wish, yet his heresy on
the question of the Trinity [2076] was enough to doom him to instant
death at Calvin's hands. Servetus could not get back his MS., and
wrote to a friend about 1547 that he felt sure the affair would bring
him to his death. [2077] When in 1552-53 he had the book privately
printed at Vienne, and the bulk of the edition was sent to Lyons and
Frankfort, the toils closed around him, the ecclesiastical authorities
at Lyons being apprised of the facts by de Trie, a Genevan Protestant,
formerly of Lyons. The whole Protestant world, in fact, was of one
opinion in desiring to suppress Servetus's anti-Trinitarian books,
and the wonder is that he had so long escaped both Protestant and
Catholic fury. Luther had called his first book horribly wicked; and
Melanchthon, who in 1533 foresaw from the second much dangerous debate,
wrote in 1539 to the Venetian Senate to warn them against letting
either be sold. [2078] It is significant of the random character of
Protestant as of Catholic thought that Servetus, like Melanchthon,
was a convinced believer in astrology, [2079] while Luther on Biblical
grounds rejected astrology and the Copernican astronomy alike, and
held devoutly by the belief in witchcraft. The superiority of Servetus
consists in his real scientific work--he having in part given out the
true doctrine of the circulation of the blood [2080]--and his objection
to all persecution of heresy. [2081] Philosophically, he was more than
a mere Scripturist. Though pantheism was not charged upon him, we have
Calvin's testimony that he propounded it in the strongest form. [2082]

Calvin's guilt in the matter begins with his devices to have
Servetus seized by the Catholic authorities of Lyons [2083]--to set
misbelievers, as he regarded them, to slay the misbeliever--and his
use of Servetus's confidential letters against him. [2084] He was
not repelling a heresy from his own city, but heretic-hunting far
away in sheer malignity. The Catholics were the less cruel gaolers,
and let their prisoner escape, condemning him to death at Vienne
in absence. After some months of wandering he had the temerity to
seek to pass into Italy by way of Geneva, and was there at length
recognized, and arrested. After a long trial he was sentenced to be
burned alive (Oct. 27, 1553). The trial at Geneva is a classic document
in the records of the cruelties committed in honour of chimeras; and
Calvin's part is the sufficient proof that the Protestant could hold
his own with the Catholic Inquisitor in the spirit of hate. [2085]
It has been urged, in his excuse, that the doctrines of Servetus were
blasphemously put; but in point of fact Calvin passed some of his
bitterest denunciation on the statement, cited (from Lorenz Friese)
in a note in Servetus's edition of Ptolemy's Geography, that Judea is
actually a barren and meagre country, and not "flowing with milk and
honey." Despite the citation of ample proof, and the plea that the
passage was drawn from a previous edition, it was by Calvin adjudged
blasphemous in that it "necessarily inculpated Moses and grievously
outraged the Holy Spirit." [2086] The language of Calvin against
Servetus at this point is utterly furious. Had Servetus chanced to
maintain the doctrine of the earth's motion, he would certainly have
been adjudged a blasphemer on that score also; for in the Argument
to his Commentary on Genesis (1563) Calvin doggedly maintains the
Ptolemaic theory. His language tells of much private freethinking
around him on the Mosaic doctrine, and his tone leaves no doubt as
to how he would treat published heresy on that theme. The audacity of
Servetus in suggesting that the 53rd chapter of Isaiah had historical
reference to Cyrus is for him anathema. [2087]

Even before this hideous episode, Calvin's passion of malevolence
against his theological opponents in his own sect is such as to
shock some of his adoring biographers. [2088] All the Protestant
leaders, broadly speaking, grew more intolerant as they grew in
years--a fair test as between the spirit of dogma and the spirit of
freethought. Calvin had begun by pleading for tolerance and clemency;
Luther, beginning as a humanitarian, soon came to be capable
of hounding on the German nobility against the unhappy peasants;
Melanchthon, tolerant in his earlier days, applauded the burning of
Servetus; [2089] Beza laboriously defended the act. Erasmus stood
for tolerance; and Luther accordingly called him godless, an enemy
of true religion, a slanderer of Christ, a Lucian, an Epicurean, and
(by implication) the greatest knave alive. [2090]

The burning of Servetus in 1553, however, marked a turning point in
Protestant theological practice on the Continent. There were still
to come the desperate religious wars in France, in which more than
300,000 houses were destroyed, abominable savageries were committed,
and all civilization was thrown back, both materially and morally;
and there was yet to come the still more appalling calamity of the
Thirty Years' War in Germany--a result of the unstable political
conditions set up at the Reformation; but theological human sacrifices
were rapidly discredited. Servetus was not the first victim, but he
was nearly the last.

The jurist Matthieu Gripaldi (or Gribaldo) lectured on law at
Toulouse, Cahors, Valence, and Padua successively, and, finding his
anti-Trinitarian leanings everywhere a source of danger to him, had
sought a retreat at Fargias near Geneva, then in the jurisdiction
of Berne. Venturing to remonstrate with Calvin against the sentence
on Servetus, he brought upon himself the angry scrutiny of the
heretic-hunter, and was banished from the neighbourhood. For a time
he found refuge in a new professorship at Tübingen; but there too the
alarm was raised, and he was expelled. Coming back to Fargias, he gave
refuge to the heretic Valentinus Gentilis on his escape from Geneva;
and again Calvin attacked him, delivering him to the authorities of
Berne. An abjuration saved him for the time; but he would probably
have met the martyr's fate in time had not his death by the plague,
in 1564, guaranteed him, as Bayle remarks, against any further trial
for heresy. [2091]


    The effect of theological bias on moral judgment is
    interestingly exemplified in the comment of Mosheim on the case
    of Servetus. Unable to refer to the beliefs of deists or atheists
    without vituperation, Mosheim finds it necessary to add to his
    account of Servetus as a highly-gifted and very learned man the
    qualification: "Yet he laboured under no small moral defects,
    for he was beyond all measure arrogant, and at the same time
    ill-tempered, contentious, unyielding, and a semi-fanatic." Every
    one of these characterizations is applicable in the highest
    degree to Calvin, and in a large degree to Luther; yet for them
    the historian has not a word of blame.

    Even among rationalists it has not been uncommon to make light
    of Calvin's crimes on the score that his energy maintained a
    polity which alone sustained Protestantism against the Catholic
    Reaction. This is the verdict of Michelet: "The Renaissance,
    betrayed by the accident of the mobilities of France, turning
    to the wind of light volitions, would assuredly have perished,
    and the world would have fallen into the great net of the fishers
    of men, but for that supreme concentration of the Reformation on
    the rock of Geneva by the bitter genius of Calvin." And again:
    "Against the immense and darksome net into which Europe fell by the
    abandonment of France nothing less than this heroic seminary could
    avail" (Hist. de France, vol. x, La Réforme: end of pref. and end
    of vol.). Though this verdict has been accepted by such critical
    thinkers as Pattison (Essays, ii, 30-32) and Lord Morley (Romanes
    Lecture on Machiavelli, 1877, p. 47), it is difficult to find
    for it any justification in history.

    The nature of the proposition is indeed far from clear. Michelet
    appears to mean that Geneva saved Europe as constituting a
    political rallying-point, a nucleus for Protestantism. Pattison,
    pronouncing that "Calvinism saved Europe" (Essays, ii, 32),
    explains that it was by "a positive education of the individual
    soul"; and that "this, and this alone, enabled the Reformation to
    make head against the terrible repressive forces brought to bear
    by Spain--the Inquisition and the Jesuits" (p. 32). The thesis
    thus vanishes in rhetoric, for it is quite impossible to give
    such a formula any significance in the light of the history of
    Protestantism in Britain, Scandinavia, Germany, and Holland. It
    implies that where Protestantism finally failed--as in Italy,
    France, Bohemia, Hungary, Poland, Belgium, parts of Germany,
    and parts of Switzerland--it was because the individual spirit
    had not been educated enough, which is a mere omission to note
    the real economic and political causation. Neither Michelet nor
    Pattison had any scientific notion of the nature of the process.

    If we revert to Michelet's claim, we get no more satisfaction. The
    very fact that Calvin's polity could subsist without any special
    military protection is the proof that it could have subsisted
    without the gross cruelty and systematic persecution which marked
    it out from the rest of the world, making Geneva "a kind of frozen
    hell of austerity and retribution and secret sin." To say otherwise
    is to say that freedom and toleration are less attractive to men
    than ferocity, tyranny, and gloom. Calvin drove many men back to
    Catholicism, and had his full share in the mortal schism which
    set Calvinists and Lutherans at daggers drawn for a century,
    while Catholicism re-conquered Poland and Bohemia and Hungary,
    held France, and nearly re-conquered Lutheran Germany. There
    is no reason to suppose that the Reformation would have gone
    otherwise in Britain, Scandinavia, and Holland had Geneva gone as
    far in tolerance as it actually did in intolerance. To call it,
    as Michelet does, an "asylum," in view of Calvin's expulsion or
    execution of every man who dared to differ from him, is courageous.

    At the close of his argument (p. 41) Pattison sums up that,
    "Greatly as the Calvinistic Churches have served the cause of
    political liberty, they have contributed nothing to the cause of
    knowledge." The admission is in the main valid; but the claim will
    not stand, unless "political liberty" is to be newly defined. The
    Calvinistic rule at Geneva was from the first a class tyranny,
    which became more and more narrow in its social basis. The
    Calvinist clergy and populace of Holland turned their backs on
    republican institutions, and became violent monarchists. The
    Calvinists of England and Scotland were as determined persecutors
    as ever lived. And, indeed, how should liberty anywhere flourish
    when knowledge is trodden under foot?


The treatment of Bernardino Ochino, who had turned Protestant after
being vicar-general of the Capuchin order, shows the slackening of
ferocity after the end of Servetus. Ochino in a late writing ventured
guardedly to suggest certain relaxations of the law of monogamy--a
point on which some Lutherans went much further than he--and
was besides mildly heretical about the Trinity. [2092] He was in
consequence expelled with his family from the canton of Zürich (1563),
at the age of seventy-six. Finding Switzerland wholly inhospitable,
and being driven by the Catholics from Poland, where he had sought
to join the Socinians, he went to die in Moravia. [2093] This was no
worse treatment than Lutherans and Calvinists normally meted out to
each other; [2094] and several of the Italian Protestants settled at
Geneva who leant to Unitarian views--among them Gribaldo, Biandrata,
and Alciati--found it prudent to leave that fortress of orthodoxy,
where they were open to official challenge. [2095] Finally, when
the Italian Valentinus Gentilis, or Gentile, the anti-Trinitarian,
variously described as Tritheist, Deist, and Arian, uttered his
heresies at Geneva, he contrived, after an imprisonment, a forced
recantation, and a public degradation (1558), to escape thence with
his life, but was duly beheaded at Berne in 1566, refusing this time
to recant. [2096]

This ends the main Swiss era of theological murder; but a century
was to pass before sectarian hatreds subsided, or the spirit of
persecution was brought under control of civilization. In 1632, indeed,
a Protestant minister, Nicholas Anthoine, was burned at Geneva on
the charge of apostasy to Judaism. As he had been admittedly insane
for a time, and had repeatedly shown much mental excitement, [2097]
his execution tells of a spirit of cruelty worthy of the generation
of Calvin. The Protestant Bibliolatry, in short, was as truly the
practical negation of freethought and tolerance as was Catholicism
itself; and it was only their general remoteness from each other
that kept the different reformed communities from absolute war where
they were not, as in Switzerland, held in check by the dangers around
them. [2098] As it was, they had their full share in the responsibility
for the furious civil wars which so long convulsed France, and for
those which ultimately reduced Germany to the verge of destruction,
arresting her civilization for over a hundred years.

To sum up. In Germany Protestantism failed alike as a moral and
as an intellectual reform. The lack of any general moral motive in
the ecclesiastical revolution is sufficiently proved by the general
dissolution of conduct which, on the express admission of Luther,
followed upon it. [2099] This was quite apart from the special
disorders of the Anabaptist movement, which, on the other hand,
contained elements of moral and religious rationalism, as against
Bibliolatry, that have been little recognized. [2100] Of that movement
the summing-up is that, like the Lutheran, it turned to evil because
of sheer lack of rationalism. Among its earlier leaders were men
such as Denk, morally and temperamentally on a higher plane than any
of the Lutherans. But Anabaptism too was fundamentally scriptural
and revelationist, not rational; and it miscarried in its own way
even more hopelessly than the theological "reform." Lutheranism,
renouncing the rational and ethical hope of social betterment, ran
to insane dissension over irrational dogma; Anabaptism, ignorantly
attaching the hope of social betterment to religious delusion,
ran to irrational social schemes, ending in anarchy, massacre, and
extinction. But the Lutheran failure was intellectually and morally
no less complete. Luther was with good reason ill at ease about his
cause when he died in 1546; and Melanchthon, dying in 1560, declared
himself glad to be set free from the rabies theologorum. [2101]

The test of the new regimen lay, if anywhere, in the University of
Wittemberg; and there matters were no better than anywhere else. [2102]
German university life in general went from bad to worse till a
new culture began slowly to germinate after the Thirty Years' War;
[2103] and the germs came mainly from the neighbouring nations. German
Switzerland exhibited similar symptoms, the Reformation being followed
by no free intellectual life, but by a tyranny identical in spirit
and method with that of Rome. [2104] It rests, finally, on the express
testimony of leading Reformers that the main effect of the Reformation
in the intellectual life of Germany was to discredit all disinterested
learning and literature. Melanchthon in particular, writing at dates
as far apart as 1522 and 1557, repeatedly and emphatically testifies
to the utter disregard of erudition and science in the interests
of pietism, corroborating everything said to the same effect by
Erasmus. [2105]

On the social and political side the rule of the Protestant princes
was not only as tyrannous but as indecorous as that of their
Catholic days, each playing pope in his own dominions; [2106] and
their clergy were not in a position to correct them. Menzel notes
that the normal drunkenness of the Protestant aristocracy at this
period made current in Europe the expression "a German swine." And
whereas Germany before the Reformation was at various points a culture
force for Europe--whence the readiness in other nations at first to
follow the Lutheran lead--it progressively became more and more of an
object-lesson of the evils of heresy, thus fatally weakening the cause
of Protestantism in France, where its fortunes hung in the balance.

Even in the matter of theology, Protestantism did not hold its own
against Catholic criticism. Both began by discriminating in the
scriptural canon, rejecting some books and depreciating others,
all the while professing to make the Word of God their sole or
final standard. When the Catholics pressed the demand as to how
they could settle what was the true Word of God, their followers
and successors could make no answer, and had to fall back on an
indiscriminate acceptance of the Canon. Again, Luther and Calvin
alike maintained the doctrine of "Assurance," and this was one
of the points in Calvinism accepted by Arminius. The Catholics,
naturally making the most of the admitted increase of sexual and
other licence in Germany and elsewhere under Lutheranism, dwelt upon
Luther's predestinarianism in general, and the doctrine of Assurance
in particular, as the source of the demoralization; and at the Council
of Trent it was expressly condemned. Thereafter, though it was "part
and parcel of the Confessions of all the Churches of the Reformation
down to the Westminster Assembly," it was in the last-named conclave
(1643) declared not to be of the essence of faith; and the Scottish
General Assembly subsequently deposed and condemned holders of this,
the original Protestant doctrine. Similar modifications took place
elsewhere. Thus the Protestant world drifted back to a Catholic
position, affirmed at the Council of Trent against Protestantism;
[2107] and in Holland we shall see, in the rise of Arminianism,
a similar surrender on the Protestant side to the general pressure
of Catholicism upon the ethical weaknesses of Predestinarianism. On
that point, however, the original Catholic doctrine of predestination
was revived by the Spanish Jesuit Luis Molina (1535-1600; not to be
confused with the later Quietist, Miguel de Molinos), who in his
treatise Liberi Arbitrii concordia cum gratiæ donis (1588) set it
forth as consequent upon God's foreknowledge of man's free use of his
will. As a result of the dispute between the Thomists and Molina's
followers, known as the Molinists, the Pope in 1607 pronounced that
the views of both sides were permissible--a course which had already
been taken twenty years before with the controversy on predestination
aroused by the doctrines of Michael Baius at the University of
Louvain. [2108] Thus the dissensions of Catholics in a manner kept
in countenance the divided Protestants; but the old confidence of
affirmation and formulation was inevitably sapped by the constant play
of controversy; and from this Protestantism necessarily suffered most.

Intellectually, there was visible retrogression in the Protestant
world. It is significant that throughout the sixteenth century most of
the great scientific thinkers and the freethinkers with the strongest
bent to new science lived in the Catholic world. Rabelais and Bruno
were priests; Copernicus a lay canon; Galileo had never withdrawn
from the Church which humiliated him; even Kepler returned to the
Catholic environment after professing Protestantism. He was in fact
excommunicated by the Tübingen Protestant authorities in 1612 [2109]
for condemning the Lutheran doctrine that the body of Christ could be
in several places at once. The immunity of such original spirits as
Gilbert and Harriott from active molestation is to be explained only
by the fact that they lived in the as yet un-Puritanized atmosphere
of Elizabethan England, before the age of Bibliolatry. It would
seem as if the spirit of Scripturalism, invading the very centres
of thought, were more fatal to original intellectual life than the
more external interferences of Catholic sacerdotalism. [2110] In
the phrase of Arnold, Protestantism turned the key on the spirit,
where Catholicism was normally content with an outward submission to
its ceremonies, and only in the most backward countries, as Spain,
destroyed entirely the atmosphere of free mental intercourse. It was
after a long reaction that Bruno and Galileo were arraigned at Rome.

The clerical resistance to new science, broadly speaking, was more
bitter in the Protestant world than in the Catholic; and it was merely
the relative lack of restraining power in the former that made possible
the later scientific progress. The history of Lutheranism upon this
side is an intellectual infamy. At Wittemberg, during Luther's life,
Reinhold did not dare to teach the Copernican astronomy; Rheticus
had to leave the place in order to be free to speak; and in 1571
the subject was put in the hands of Peucer, who taught that the
Copernican theory was absurd. Finally, the rector of the university,
Hensel, wrote a text-book for schools, entitled The Restored Mosaic
System of the World, showing with entire success that the new doctrine
was unscriptural. [2111] A little later the Lutheran superintendent,
Pfeiffer, of Lübeck, published his Pansophia Mosaica, insisting on the
literal truth of the entire Genesaic myth. [2112] In the next century
Calovius (1612-1686), who taught successively at Königsberg, Dantzic,
and Wittemberg, maintained the same position, contending that the
story of Joshua's staying the sun and moon refuted Copernicus. [2113]
When Pope Gregory XIII, following an impulse abnormal in his world,
took the bold step of rectifying the Calendar (1584), the Protestants
in Germany and Switzerland vehemently resisted the reform, and in some
cities would not tolerate it, [2114] thus refusing, on theological
grounds, the one species of co-operation with Catholicism that lay
open to them. And the anti-scientific attitude persisted for over
a century in Switzerland as in Scotland. At Geneva, J.-A. Turretin
(1671-1737), writing after Kepler and Newton had done their work,
laboriously repeated the demonstration of Calovius, and reaffirmed
the positions of Calvin. So far as its ministers could avail, the
Sacred Book was working the old effect.




§ 2. ENGLAND

Freethought gained permanently as little in England as elsewhere
in the process of substituting local tyranny for that of Rome. The
secularizing effect of the Reformation, indeed, was even more
marked there than elsewhere. What Wolsey had aimed at doing with
moderation and without revolution was done after him with violence
on motives of sheer plunder, and a multitude not only of monasteries
but of churches were disendowed and destroyed. The monastic churches
were often magnificent, and "when the monasteries were dissolved,
divine service altogether ceased in ninety out of every hundred of
these great churches, and the remaining ten were left ... without any
provision whatever" for public worship. [2115] All this must have had
a secularizing effect, which was accentuated by the changes in ritual;
and by the middle of the century it was common to treat both churches
and clergy with utter irreverence, which indeed the latter often
earned by their mode of life. [2116] Riots in churches, especially in
London, were common; there was in fact a habit of driving mules and
horses through them; [2117] and buying and selling and even gaming
were often carried on. But with all this there was no intellectual
enlightenment, and in high places there was no toleration. Under Henry
VIII anti-Romanist heretics were put to death on the old Romanist
principles. In 1532, again, was burned James Bainham, who not only
rejected the specially Catholic dogmas, but affirmed the possible
salvation of unbelievers.

Under the Protectorate which followed there was indeed much religious
semi-rationalism, evidently of continental derivation, which is
discussed in the theological literature of the time. Roger Hutchinson,
writing about 1550, repeatedly speaks of contemporary "Sadducees and
Libertines" who say (1) "that all spirits and angels are no substances,
but inspirations, affections, and qualities"; (2) "that the devil
is nothing but nolitum, or a filthy affection coming of the flesh";
(3) "that there is neither place of rest nor pain after this life;
that hell is nothing else but a tormenting and desperate conscience;
and that a joyful, quiet, and merry conscience is heaven."


    See The Image of God, or Layman's Book, 1550, ch. xxiv: Parker
    Society's rep. 1842, pp. 134, 138, 140. Cp. p. 79 and Sermon
    II, on The Lord's Supper (id. p. 247), as to "Julianites" who
    "do think mortal corpo, mortal anima." To the period 1550-60
    is also assigned the undated work of John Veron, A Frutefull
    Treatise of Predestination and of the Divine Providence of God,
    with an Apology of the same against the swynishe gruntinge of
    the Epicures and Atheystes of oure time. There was evidently a
    good deal of new rationalism, which has been generally ignored
    in English historiography. Its foreign source is suggested by
    the use of the term "Libertines," which derives from France and
    Geneva. See below, p. 473. The above-cited tenets are, in fact,
    partly identical with those of the libertins denounced at Geneva
    by Calvin.


Such doctrine, which we shall find in vogue fifty years later, cannot
have been printed, and probably can have been uttered only by men
of good status, as well as culture; and even by them only because of
the weakness of the State Church in its transition stage. Yet heresy
went still further among some of the sects set up by the Anabaptist
movement, which in England as in Germany involved some measure
of Unitarianism. A letter of Hooper to Bullinger in 1549 tells of
"libertines and wretches who are daring enough in their conventicles
not only to deny that Christ is the Messiah and Saviour of the world,
but also to call that blessed Seed a mischievous fellow and deceiver
of the world." [2118] This must have been said with locked doors, for
much milder heresy was heavily punished, the worst penalties falling
upon that which stood equally with orthodoxy on Biblical grounds.


    In 1541, under Henry VIII, were burned three persons "because they
    denied transubstantiation, and had not received the sacrament at
    Easter." See the letter of Hilles to Bullinger, Original Letters,
    as cited, i, 200. The case of Jean Bouchier or Bocher, burned in
    1550, is well known. It is worth noting that the common charge
    against Cranmer, of persuading the young king to sign her death
    warrant, is false, being one of the myths of Foxe. The warrant
    was passed by the whole Privy Council, Cranmer not being even
    present. See the Parker Society's reprint of Roger Hutchinson,
    1812, introd. pp. ii-5. Hutchinson apparently approved; and it
    is significant of the clerical attitude of the time that he calls
    (Image of God, ch. xxx, p. 201) for the punishment of Anabaptists
    by death if necessary, but does not suggest it for "Sadducees
    and Libertines."


The Elizabethan archbishops and the Puritans were equally intolerant;
and the idea of free inquiry was undreamt of. That there had been much
private discussion in clerical circles, however, is plain from the 13th
and 18th of the Thirty-nine Articles (1562), which repudiate natural
morality and hold "accursed" those who say that men can be saved
under any creed. [2119] This fulmination would not have occurred had
the heresy not been pressing; but the "curse" would thenceforth set
the key of clerical and public utterance. The Reformation, in fact,
speedily over-clouded with fanaticism what new light of freethought
had been glimmering before; turning into Bibliolaters those who had
rationally doubted some of the Catholic mysteries, and forcing back,
either into silence or, by reaction, into Catholic bigotry, those more
refined spirits who, like Sir Thomas More, had before been really
in advance of their age intellectually and morally, and desired a
transmutation of the old system rather than its overthrow. Nothing
so nearly rational as the Utopia (1515-16) appeared again in English
literature for a century; it is indeed, in some respects, a lead
to social science in our own day. More, with all his spontaneous
turn for pietism, had evidently drunk in his youth or prime [2120]
at some freethinking source, for his book recognizes the existence
of unbelievers in deity and immortality; and though he pronounces
them unfit for political power, as did Milton, Locke, and Voltaire
long after him, he stipulates that they be tolerated. [2121] Broadly
speaking, the book is simply deistic. "From a world," says a popular
historian, clerically trained--"from a world where fifteen hundred
years of Christian teaching had produced social injustice, religious
intolerance, and political tyranny, the humorist philosopher turns to a
'Nowhere' in which the efforts of mere natural human virtue realized
those ends of security, equality, brotherhood, and freedom, for which
the very institution of society seems to have been framed." [2122]
In his own case, however, we see the Nemesis of the sway of feeling
over judgment, for, beginning by keeping his prejudice above the
reason of whose teaching he is conscious, he ends by becoming a blind
religious polemist and a bitter persecutor.


    Cp. Isaac Disraeli's essay, "The Psychological Character of Sir
    Thomas More," in the Amenities of Literature, and the present
    writer's essay, "Culture and Reaction," in Essays in Sociology,
    vol. i. Lord Acton, vindicating More as against Wolsey, pleads
    (Histor. Essays and Studies, 1907, p. 64) that More before his
    death protested that no Protestant perished by his act. This seems
    to be true in the bare sense that he did not exceed his ostensible
    legal duties, and several times restrained the execution of the
    law (Archdeacon Hutton, Sir Thomas More, 1895, pp. 215-22). But
    the fact remains that More expressly justified and advocated the
    burning of heretics as "lawful, necessary, and well done." Title of
    ch. xiii of Dialogue, The Supper of the Lord. Cp. title of ch. xv.


It is in the wake, then, of the overthrow of Catholicism in the
second generation that a far-reaching freethought begins to be heard
of in England; and this clearly comes by way of new continental and
literary contact, which would have occurred in at least as great a
degree under Catholicism, save insofar as unbelief was facilitated by
the irreverence developed by the ecclesiastical revolution, or by the
state of indifference which among the upper classes was the natural
sequel of the shameless policy of plunder and the oscillation between
Protestant and Catholic forms. And it was finally in such negative
ways only that Protestantism furthered freethought anywhere.




§ 3. THE NETHERLANDS

Hardly more fortunate was the earlier course of things intellectual
after the Reformation in the Netherlands, where by the fifteenth
century remarkable progress had been made alike in science and the
arts, and where Erasmus acquired his culture and did his service to
culture's cause. The fact that Protestantism had to fight for its
life against Philip was of course not the fault of the Protestants;
and to that ruinous struggle is to be attributed the arrest of the
civilization of Flanders. But it lay in the nature of the Protestant
impulse that, apart from the classical culture which in Holland was
virtually a successful industry, providing editions for all Europe,
it should turn all intellectual life for generations into vain
controversy. The struggle between reform and popery was followed by
the struggle between Calvinism and Arminianism; and the second was
no less bitter if less bloody than the first, [2123] the religious
strife passing into civil feud.

The secret of the special bitterness of Calvinist resentment
towards the school of Arminius lay in the fact that the latter
endorsed some of the most galling of the Catholic criticisms of
Calvinism. Arminius [Latinized name of Jacob Harmensen or van Harmin,
1560-1609, professor of theology at Leyden] was personally a man of
great amiability, averse to controversy, but unable to reconcile the
Calvinist view of predestination with his own quasi-rational ethic,
and concerned to secure that the dogma should not be fastened upon
all Dutch Protestants. In his opinion, no effective answer could be
made on Calvinist lines to the argument of Cardinal Bellarmin [2124]
that from much Calvinist doctrine there flowed the consequences: "God
is the author of sin; God really sins; God is the only sinner; sin
is no sin at all." [2125] This was substantially true; and Arminius,
like Bellarmin, unable to see that the Calvinist position was simply
a logical reduction to moral absurdity of all theistic ethic, sought
safety in fresh dogmatic modifications. Of these the Calvinists, in
turn, could easily demonstrate the logical incoherence; and in a ring
of dilemmas from which there was no logical exit save into Naturalism
there arose an exacerbated strife, as of men jostling each other in a
prison where some saw their nominal friends in partial sympathy with
their deadly enemies, who jeered at their divisions.

The wonder is that the chaos of dispute and dogmatic tinkering which
followed did not more rapidly disintegrate faith. Calvinists sought
modifications under stress of dialectic, like their predecessors;
and the high "Supralapsarian" doctrine--the theory of the certain
regeneration or "perseverance" of "the saints"--shaded into
"the Creabilitarian opinion" [2126] and yet another; while the
"Sublapsarian" view claimed also to safeguard predestination. So long
as men remained in the primary Protestant temper, convinced that they
possessed in their Bibles an infallible revelation, such strife could
but generate new passion, even as it had done on the other irrational
problem of the eucharist. For men of sane and peaceful disposition,
the only modes of peace were resignation and doubt; and in the case
of the doubters the first intellectual movements would be either
back towards Rome [2127] or further on towards deism. The former
course would be taken by some who had winced under the jeers of the
Catholics; the latter by the hardier spirits who judged Catholicism for
themselves. As most of the fighting had been primed by and transacted
over texts, the surrender of the belief in an inspired scripture
greatly reduced the friction; and in Holland as elsewhere deism would
be thus spontaneously generated in the Protestant atmosphere. A few
went even further. "I have no doubt that many persons have secretly
revolted from the Reformed Church to the <DW7>s," wrote Uitenbogaert
to Vorstius in 1613. "I firmly believe," he added, "that Atheism is
creeping by degrees into the minds of some." [2128]

Where mere Arminianism could bring Barneveldt to the block, even deism
could not be avowed; and generations had to pass before it could have
the semblance of a party; but the proof of the new vogue of unbelief
lies in the labour spent by Grotius (Hugo or Huig van Groot, 1583-1645)
on his treatise De Veritate Religionis Christianæ (1627)--a learned and
strenuous defence of the faith which had so lacerated his fatherland,
first through the long struggle with Spain, and again in the feud of
Arminians and Calvinists. When Barneveldt was put to death, Grotius had
been sentenced to imprisonment for life; and it was only after three
years of the dungeon that, by the famous stratagem of his wife, he
escaped in 1621. The fact that he devoted his freedom in France first
to his great treatise On the Law of War and Peace (1625), seeking to
humanize the civil life of the world, and next to his defence of the
Christian religion, is the proof of his magnanimity; but the spectacle
of his life must have done as much to set thinkers against the whole
creed as his apologetic did to reconcile them to it. He, the most
distinguished Dutch scholar and the chief apologist of Christianity in
his day, had to seek refuge, on his escape from prison, in Catholic
France, whose king granted him a pension. The circumstance which in
Holland chiefly favoured freethought, the freedom of the press, was,
like the great florescence of the arts in the seventeenth century,
a result of the whole social and political conditions, not of any
Protestant belief in free discussion. That there were freethinkers
in Holland in and before Grotius's time is implied in the pains he
took to defend Christianity; but that they existed in despite and not
by grace of the ruling Protestantism is proved by the fact that they
did not venture to publish their opinions. In France, doubtless, he
found as much unbelief as he had left behind. In the end, Grotius and
Casaubon alike recoiled from the narrow Protestantism around them,
which had so sadly failed to realize their hopes. [2129] "In 1642
Grotius had become wholly averse to the Reformation. He thought it
had done more harm than good"; and had he lived a few years longer
he would probably have become a Catholic. [2130]




§ 4. CONCLUSION

Thus concerning the Reformation generally "we are obliged to confess
that, especially in Germany, it soon parted company with free learning;
that it turned its back upon culture; that it lost itself in a maze
of arid theological controversy; that it held out no hand of welcome
to awakening science. Presently we shall see that the impulse to an
enlightened study and criticism of the Scriptures came chiefly from
heretical quarters; that the unbelieving Spinoza and the Arminian Le
Clerc pointed the way to investigations which the great Protestant
systematizers thought neither necessary nor useful. Even at a later
time it has been the divines who have most loudly declared their
allegiance to the theology of the Reformation who have also looked
most askance at science, and claimed for their statements an entire
independence of modern knowledge." [2131] In fine, "to look at
the Reformation by itself, to judge it only by its theological and
ecclesiastical development, is to pronounce it a failure"; and the
claim that "to consider it as part of a general movement of European
thought ... is at once to vindicate its past and to promise it the
future"--this amounts merely to avowing the same thing. Only as an
eddy in the movement of freethought is the Reformation intellectually
significant. Politically it is a great illustration of the potency
of economic forces.

While, however, the Reformation in itself thus did little for the
spirit of freethought, substituting as it did the arbitrary standard of
"revelation" for the not more arbitrary standard of papal authority,
it set up outside its own sphere some new movements of rational
doubt which must have counted for much in the succeeding period. It
was not merely that, as we shall see, the bloody strifes of the two
Churches, and the quarrels of the Protestant sects among themselves,
sickened many thoughtful men of the whole subject of theology; but that
the disputes between Romanists and anti-Romanists raised difficult
questions as to the bases of all kinds of belief. As always happens
when established beliefs are long attacked, the subtler spirits in the
conservative interest after a time begin putting in doubt beliefs of
every species; a method often successful with those who cannot carry
an argument to its logical conclusions, and who are thus led to seek
harbour in whatever credence is on the whole most convenient; but
one which puts stronger spirits on the reconsideration of all their
opinions. Thus we shall find, not only in the skepticism of Montaigne,
which is historically a product of the wars of religion in France,
but in the more systematic and more cautious argumentation of the
abler Protestants of the seventeenth century, a measure of general
rationalism much more favourable alike to natural science and to
Biblical and ethical criticism than had been the older environment
of authority and tradition, brutal sacerdotalism, and idolatrous
faith. Men continued to hate each other religiously for trifles,
to quarrel over gestures and vestures, and to wrangle endlessly over
worn-out dogmas; but withal new and vital heresies were set on foot;
new science generated new doubt; and under the shadow of the aging
tree of theology there began to appear the growths of a new era. As
Protestantism had come outside the "universal" Church, rearing its
own tabernacles, so freethought came outside both, scanning with a
deepened intentness the universe of things. And thus began a more vital
innovation than that dividing the Reformation from the Renaissance,
or even that dividing the Renaissance from the Middle Ages.







CHAPTER XIII

THE RISE OF MODERN FREETHOUGHT


§ 1. THE ITALIAN INFLUENCE

The negative bearing of the Reformation on freethought is made clear by
the historic fact that the new currents of thought which broadly mark
the beginning of the "modern spirit" arose in its despite, and derive
originally from outside its sphere. It is to Italy, where the political
and social conditions thus far tended to frustrate the Inquisition,
that we trace the rise alike of modern deism, modern Unitarianism,
modern pantheism, modern physics, and the tendency to rational
atheism. The deistic way of thinking, of course, prevailed long
before it got that name; and besides the vogue of Averroïsm we have
noted the virtual deism of More's Utopia (1516). The first explicit
mention of deism noted by Bayle, however, is in the epistle dedicatory
to the second and expanded edition of the Instruction Chrétienne of
the Swiss Protestant Viret (1563), where professed deists are spoken
of as a new species bearing a new name. On the admission of Viret,
who was the friend and bitter disciple of Calvin, they rejected all
revealed religion, but called themselves deists by way of repudiating
atheism; some keeping a belief in immortality, some rejecting it. In
the theological manner he goes on to call them all execrable atheists,
and to say that he has added to his treatise on their account an
exposition of natural religion grounded on the "Book of Nature";
stultifying himself by going on to say that he has also dealt with
the professed atheists. [2132] Of the deists he admits that among
them were men of the highest repute for science and learning. Thus
within ten years of the burning of Servetus we find privately avowed
deism and atheism in the area of French-speaking Protestantism.

Doubtless the spectacle of Protestant feuds and methods would go
far to foster such unbelief; but though, as we have seen, there were
aggressive Unitarians in Germany before 1530, who, being scholars,
may or may not have drawn on Italian thought, thereafter there is
reason to look to Italy as the source of the propaganda. Thence came
the two Sozzini, the founders of Socinianism, of whom Lelio, the uncle
of Fausto, travelled much in northern Europe (including England)
between 1546 and 1552. [2133] As the earlier doctrine of Servetus
shows clear affinities to that of the Sozzini, and his earlier books
were much read in Italy between 1532 and 1540, he may well have given
them their impulse. [2134] It is evidently to Servetus that Zanchi
referred when he wrote to Bullinger in 1565 that "Spain bore the hens,
Italy hatched the eggs, and we now hear the chickens piping." [2135]
Before Socinianism had taken form it was led up to, as we have seen, in
the later writings of the ex-monk Bernardino Ochino (1487-1564), who,
in the closing years of a much chequered career, combined mystical
and Unitarian tendencies with a leaning to polygamy and freedom
of divorce. [2136] His influence was considerable among the Swiss
Protestants, though they finally expelled him for his heresies. From
Geneva or from France, in turn, apparently came some of the English
freethought of the middle period of the sixteenth century; [2137]
for in 1562 Speaker Williams in the House of Commons, in a list of
misbelievers, speaks of "Pelagians, Libertines, <DW7>s, and such
others, leaving God's commandments to follow their own traditions,
affections, and minds" [2138]--using theologically the foreign term,
which never became naturalized in English in its foreign sense. It was
about the year 1563, again, that Roger Ascham wrote his Scholemaster,
wherein are angrily described, as a species new in England, men who,
"where they dare," scorn both Protestant and <DW7>, "rejecting
scripture, and counting the Christian mysteries as fables." [2139]
He describes them as "atheoi in doctrine"; adding, "this last word is
no more unknowne now to plane Englishe men than the Person was unknown
somtyme in England, untill some Englishe man took peines to fetch that
develish opinion out of Italie." [2140] The whole tendency he connects
in a general way with the issue of many new translations from the
Italian, mentioning in particular Petrarch and Boccaccio. Among good
Protestants his view was general; and so Lord Burghley in his Advice to
his Son writes: "Suffer not thy sons to pass the Alps, for they shall
learn nothing there but pride, blasphemy, and atheism." As it happened,
his grandson the second Earl of Exeter, and his great-grandson Lord
Roos, went to Rome, and became not atheists but Roman Catholics.

Such episodes should remind us that in that age of ignorance and
superstition the Church had always an immense advantage. Those
who, like Gentillet in his raging Discours, commonly known as the
Contre-Machiavel (1576), ascribed to "atheism" and the teaching of
Machiavelli all the crimes and oppressions wrought by Catholics,
[2141] were ludicrously perverting the facts. Massacres in churches,
which are cited by Gentillet as impossible to believing Catholics,
were wrought, as we have seen, on the largest scale by the Church
in the thirteenth century. So, when Scaliger calls the Italians
of his day "a set of atheists," we are to understand it rather of
"the hypocrisy than of the professed skepticism of the time." [2142]
But rationalism and semi-rationalism did prevail in Italy more than
in any other country. [2143]

Like the old Averroïsm, the new pietistic Unitarianism persisted
in Italy and radiated thence afresh when it had flagged in other
lands. The exploded Unitarian tradition [2144] runs that the doctrine
arose in the year 1546 among a group of more than forty learned men who
were wont to assemble in secret at Vicenza, near Venice. Claudius of
Savoy, however, emphatically gave out his anti-Trinitarian doctrine at
Berne in 1534, after having been imprisoned at Strasburg and banished
thence; [2145] and Ochino and Lelio Sozzini left Italy in 1543. But
there seems to have been a continuous evolution of Unitarian heresy
in the south after the German movement had ceased. Giorgio Biandrata,
whom we have seen flying to Poland from Geneva, had been seized by the
Inquisition at Pavia for such opinion. Still it persisted. In 1562
Giulio Guirlando of Treviso, and in 1566 Francesco Saga of Rovigo,
were burned at Venice for anti-Trinitarianism. Giacomo Aconzio too,
who dedicated his Stratagems of Satan (Basel, 1565) to Queen Elizabeth,
and who pleaded notably for the toleration of heresy, [2146] was a
decided latitudinarian. [2147]

It is remarkable that the whole ferment occurs in the period of the
Catholic Reaction, the Council of Trent, and the subjection of Italy,
when the papacy was making its great effort to recover its ground. It
would seem that in the compulsory peace which had now fallen on
Italian life men's thoughts turned more than ever to mental problems,
as had happened in Greece after the rise of Alexander's empire. The
authority of the Church was outwardly supreme; the Jesuits had
already begun to do great things for education; [2148] the revived
Inquisition was everywhere in Italy; its prisons, as we have seen,
were crowded with victims of all grades during a whole generation;
Pius V and the hierarchy everywhere sought to enforce decorum in life;
the "pagan" academies formed on the Florentine model were dissolved;
and classic culture rapidly decayed with the arts, while clerical
learning flourished, [2149] and a new religious music began with
Palestrina. Yet on the death of Paul IV the Roman populace burned the
Office of the Inquisition to the ground and cast the pope's statue
into the Tiber; [2150] and in that age (1548) was born Giordano Bruno,
one of the types of modern freethought.

The great service of Italy to modern freethought, however, was to come
later, in respect of the impulse given to the scientific spirit by
Bruno, Vanini, and Galileo. On the philosophical or critical side, the
Italy of the middle of the sixteenth century left no enduring mark on
European thought, though her serious writers were numerous. Aconzio had
published, before his De Stratagematibus Satanæ, a treatise De Methodo,
sive recta investigandarum tradendarumque scientiarum ratione (Basel,
1558), wherein he pleads strenuously for a true logical method as the
one way to real knowledge of things. In this he anticipates Bacon, as
did, still earlier, Mario Nizolio in his Antibarbarus sive de veris
principiis et vera ratione philosophandi contra pseudo-philosophos
(Parma, 1553). Nizolio's main effort is towards the discrediting of
Aristotle, whom, like so many in the generation following, he regarded
as the great bulwark of scholastic obscurantism. He insists that
all knowledge must proceed from sensation, which alone has immediate
certainty; and thus stands for direct scientific observation as against
tradition and verbalism. But Ludovicus Vives had before him (in his
De causis corruptarum artium, Antwerp, 1531) claimed that the true
Aristotelian went direct to nature, as Aristotle himself had done;
and Nizolio did nothing in practical science to substantiate his
polemic against the logic-choppers.

He and Aconzio in effect cancel each other. Each had glimpsed a
truth, one seeing the need for a right method in inference, the
other protesting against the idea that abstract reasoning could lead
to knowledge; but neither made good his argument by any treasure
trove of fact. Another writer of the same decade, Gomez Pereira,
joined in the revolt against Aristotelianism, publishing in 1554 his
Margarita Antoniana, wherein, in advance of Descartes, he maintained
the absence of sensation in brutes. [2151] For the rest, he championed
freedom in speculation, denying that authority should avail save in
matters of faith. But he too failed to bring forth fruits meet for
freedom. Neither by abstract exposition of right methods of reasoning,
nor by abstract attacks on wrong methods, could any vital impulse
yet be given to thought. What was lacking was the use of reason
upon actual problems, whether of human or of natural science. All
the while Europe was anchored to ancient delusion, historical and
scientific. Even as the horrors of age-long religious war could alone
drive men to something like toleration in the religious life, there
was needed the impact of actual discovery to win them to science as
against scholasticism. And rational thinking on the religion which
resisted all new science was to be still later of attainment, save
for the nameless men who throughout the ages of faith rejected the
creeds without publishing their unbelief. Of these Italy had always
a large sprinkling.




§ 2. SPAIN

The fact that sixteenth-century Spain could be charged, on the
score of Servetus, with producing the "hen" of Socinianism, is an
important reminder of the perpetuity of variation and of the fatality
of environment. The Portuguese Sanchez, whom we shall find laying new
potential foundations of skepticism in France alongside of Montaigne,
could neither have acquired nor propounded his philosophy in his
native land. But it is to be noted that an elder contemporary of
Sanchez, living and dying in Spain, was able, in the generation after
Servetus, to make a real contribution to the revival of freethought,
albeit under shelter of a firm profession of orthodoxy.

No book of the kind, perhaps, had a wider European popularity than
the Examen de Ingenios para las ciencias of Huarte de San Juan,
otherwise Juan Huarte y Navarro (c. 1530-1592). Like Servetus and
Sanchez and many another, Huarte had his bias to reason fostered by a
medical training; and it is as a "natural philosopher" that he stands
for a rational study of causation. As a pioneer of exact science,
indeed, he counts for next to nothing. Taking as his special theme
the divergences of human faculty, he does but found himself on the à
priori system of "humours" and "temperatures" passed on by Aristotle
to Galen and Hippocrates, inconsistently affirming on the one hand
that the "characters" not only of whole nations but of the inhabitants
of provinces are determined by their special climates and aliments,
and on the other hand that individual faculty is determined by the
proportions of hot and cold, moist and dry "temperatures" in the
parents. Apart from his insistence on the functions of the brain,
and from broadly rational deliverances as to the kinds of faculty
which determine success in theology and law, arms and arts, his
"science" is naught. Dealing with an obscure problem, he brought
to it none of the exact inductiveness which alone had yielded true
knowledge in the simpler field of astronomy. In virtue, however,
either of his confidence in affirmation or of his stand for rational
inquiry, or of both, Huarte's book, published in 1575, went the
round of Europe. Translated into Italian in 1582 (or earlier; new
rendering 1600), it was thence rendered into English by Richard Carew
in 1594. [2152] A French version appeared in 1598, and two others
in 1661 and 1671. A later English translation, from the original,
was produced in 1698; and Lessing thought the book worth putting into
German in 1785.

The rationalistic importance of Huarte lies in his insistence on the
study of "second causes" and his protest against the burking of all
inquiry by a reference to deity. On this head he anticipates much of
the polemic of Bacon. The explanation of all processes and phenomena
by the will of God, he observes, "is so ancient a manner of talk, and
the natural philosophers have so often refuted it, that the seeking to
take the same away were superfluous, neither is it convenient.... But
I have often gone about to consider the reason and the cause whence
it may grow that the vulgar sort is so great friend to impute all
things to God, and to reave them from Nature, and do so abhor the
natural means." [2153] His solution is the impatience of men over the
complexity of Nature, their spiritual arrogance, their indolence,
and their piety. For himself, he pronounces, as Middleton did in
England nearly two centuries later, that "God doth no longer those
unwonted things of the New Testament; and the reason is, for that on
his behalf he hath performed all necessary diligence that men might
not pretend ignorance. And to think that he will begin anew to do
the like miracles ... is an error very great.... God speaks once
(saith Job) and turns not to a second replial." [2154]

Only thus could the principle of natural causation be affirmed in the
Spain of Philip II. Huarte is careful to affirm miracles while denying
their recurrence; and throughout he writes as a good Scripturist and
Catholic. But he sticks to his naturalist thesis that "Nature makes
able," and avows that "natural philosophers laugh at such as say,
This is God's doing, without assigning the order and discourse of
the particular causes whence they may spring." [2155] The fact that
the book was dedicated to Philip tells of royal protection, without
which the author could hardly have escaped the Inquisition. Years
after, we shall find Lilly in England protesting on the stage against
the conception of Natura naturans; and Bacon powerfully reaffirming
Huarte's doctrine, with the same reservations. The Spaniard must have
counted for something as a pleader for elementary reason, if Bacon did.

But this is practically the only important contribution from Spain to
the intellectual renascence then going on in Europe. As we have seen,
it was not that Spaniards had any primordial bias to dogmatism and
persecution: it was simply that their whole socio-political evolution,
largely determined by Spanish discovery and dominion in the New World,
set up institutions and forces which became specially powerful to stamp
out freethought. The work of progress was done in lands where lack
of external dominion left on the one hand a greater fund of variant
energy, and on the other made for a lesser power of repression on
the part of Church and State.




§ 3. FRANCE

While Italy continues to be reputed throughout the sixteenth century
a hotbed of freethinking, styled "atheism," it appears to have been
in France, alongside of the wars of religion, that positive unbelief,
as distinct from scripturalist Unitarianism, made most new headway
among laymen. It was in France that the forces of change had greatest
play. The mere contact with Italy which began with the invasion of
Charles VII in 1494 meant a manifold moral and mental influence,
affecting French literature and life alike; and the age of strife and
destruction which set in with the first Huguenot wars could not but
be one of disillusionment for multitudes of serious men. We have seen
as much in the work of Bonaventure des Periers and Rabelais; but the
spread of radical unbelief is to be traced, as is usual in the ages
of faith, by the books written against it. Already in 1552 we have
seen Guillaume Postell publishing his book, Contra Atheos. [2156]
Unbelief increasing, there is published in 1564 an Atheomachie by
one De Bourgeville; but the Massacre must have gone far to frustrate
him. In 1581 appears another Atheomachie, ou réfutation des erreurs
et impiétés des Athéistes, Libertins, etc., issued at Geneva, but
bearing much on French life; and in the same year is issued the
long-time popular work of the Huguenot Philippe de Mornay, De la
vérité de la religion Chrestienne, Contre les Athées, Epicuriens,
Payens, Juifs, Mahumedistes, et autres Infidèles. [2157] In both the
Epistle Dedicatory (to Henry of Navarre) and the Preface the author
speaks of the great multiplication of unbelief, the refutation of
which he declares to be more needful among Christians than it ever
had been among the heathen. But, like most of the writers against
atheism in that age, he declares [2158] that there are no atheists
save a few young fools and utterly bad men, who turn to God as soon as
they fall sick. The reputed atheists of antiquity are vindicated as
having denied not the principle of deity but the false Gods of their
age--this after the universality of a belief in Gods in all ages had
been cited as one of the primary proofs of God's existence. In this
fashion is compiled a book of nine hundred pages, ostensibly for
the confutation of a few fools and knaves, described as unworthy of
serious consideration. Evidently the unbelief of de Mornay's day was
a more vigorous growth than he affected to think; and his voluminous
performance was followed by others. In 1586, Christophe Cheffontaines
published his Epitome novæ illustrationis Christianae Fidei adversus
Impios, Libertinos et Atheos; and still skepticism gained ground,
having found new abettors.

First came the Portuguese Francisco Sanchez (1552-1623?), born in
Portugal, but brought as a child to Bordeaux, which seems to have
been a place of refuge for many fugitive heretics from both sides of
the Peninsula. Sanchez has recorded that in his early youth he had no
bias to incredulity of any kind; but at some stage of his adolescence
he travelled in Italy and spent some time at Rome. The result was not
that special disbelief in Christianity which was proverbially apt
to follow, but a development on his part of philosophic skepticism
properly so-called, which found expression in a Latin treatise entitled
Quod Nihil Scitur--"That Nothing is Known." Composed as early as 1576,
in the author's twenty-fourth year, the book was not published till
1581, a year after the first issue of the Essais of Montaigne. It is
natural to surmise that while Sanchez was at Bordeaux he may have known
something of his famous contemporary; but though Montaigne is likely
to have read the Quod Nihil Scitur in due course, he nowhere speaks of
it; and in 1576 Sanchez was a Professor of Medicine at Montpellier,
then a town of Huguenot leanings. Soon he left it for Toulouse, the
hotbed of Catholic fanaticism, where he contrived to live out his
long life in peace, despite his production of a Pyrrhonist treatise
and of a remarkable Latin poem (1578) on the comet of 1577. The Quod
Nihil Scitur is a skeptical flank attack on current science, in no
way animadverting on religion, as to which he professed orthodoxy:
the poem is a frontal attack on the whole creed of astrology, then
commonly held by Averroïsts and Aristotelians, as well as by orthodox
Catholics. Yet he seems never to have been molested. It would seem as
if a skepticism which ostensibly disallowed all claims to "natural"
knowledge, while avowedly recognizing "spiritual," was then as later
thought to make rather for faith than against it. That such virtual
Pyrrhonism as that of Sanchez can ever have ministered to religious
zeal is not indeed to be supposed: it is rather as a weapon against
the confidence of the "Naturalist" that the skeptical method has
always recommended itself to the calculating priest. And inasmuch as
astrology could be, and was, held by a non-religious theory, though
many Christians added it to their creed, a polemic against that was
the least dangerous form of rationalizing then possible. At all times
there had been priests who so reasoned, though, as we have seen in
dealing with the men of the Protestant Reformation, the belief in
astral influences is too closely akin to the main line of religious
tradition to be capable of ejection on religious grounds.

With his hostility to credulous hopes and fears in the sphere of
Nature, Sanchez is naturally regarded as a forerunner and helper
of freethought. But there is nothing to show that his work had
any effect in undermining the most formidable of all the false
beliefs of Christendom. [2159] Like so many others of his age,
he flouted Aristotelean scholasticism, but was perforce silent as
to the verbalisms and sophistries of simple theology. It may fairly
be inferred that his poem on the comet of 1577 helped to create that
current of reasoned disbelief [2160] which we find throwing up almost
identical expressions in Montaigne, Shakespeare, and Molière, [2161]
concerning the folly of connecting the stars with human affairs. But
a skepticism which left untouched the main matter of the creeds could
not affect conduct in general; and while Sanchez passed unchecked the
watchdogs of the Inquisition, the fiery Bruno and Vanini were in his
day to meet their fiery death at its hands--the latter in Toulouse,
perhaps under the eyes of Sanchez. Having resigned his professorship
of medicine, he seems to have lived to a ripe age, dying in 1623.

Probably those very deaths availed more for the rousing of critical
thought than did the dialectic of the Pyrrhonist. To the life of
the reason may with perfect accuracy be applied the claim so often
made for that of religion--that it feeds on feeling and is rooted in
experience. Revolt from the cruelties and follies of faith plays a
great part in the history of freethought. In the greatest French writer
of that age, a professed Catholic, but in mature life averse alike
to Catholic and to Protestant bigotry, the shock of the Massacre of
Saint Bartholomew can be seen disintegrating once for all the spirit
of faith. Montaigne typifies the kind of skepticism produced in an
unscientific age by the practical demonstration that religion can
avail immeasurably more for evil than for good. [2162] A few years
before the Massacre he had translated for his dying father [2163] the
old Theologia Naturalis of Raymond of Sebonde; and we know from the
later Apology in the Essays that freethinking contemporaries declared
the argument of Raymond to be wholly insufficient. [2164] It is clear
from the same essay that Montaigne felt as much; though the gist of
his polemic is a vehement attack upon all forms of confident opinion,
religious and anti-religious alike. "In replying to arguments of so
opposite a tenour, Montaigne leaves Christianity, as well as Raimond
Sebonde, without a leg to stand upon. He demolishes the arguments of
Sebonde with the rest of human presumption, and allows Christianity,
neither held by faith nor provable by reason, to fall between
the two stools." [2165] The truth is that Montaigne's skepticism
was the product of a mental evolution spread over at least twenty
years. In his youth his vivid temperament kept him both credulous
and fanatical, so much so that in 1562 he took the reckless oath
prescribed by the Catholic Parlement of Paris. As he avows with
his incomparable candour, he had been in many things peculiarly
susceptible to outside influences, being always ready to respond to
the latest pressure; [2166] and the knowledge of his susceptibility
made him self-distrustful. But gradually he found himself. Beginning
to recoil from the ferocities and iniquities of the League, he yet
remained for a time hotly anti-Protestant; and it seems to have
been his dislike of Protestant criticism that led him to run amuck
against reason, at the cost of overthrowing the treatise he had set
out to defend. The common end of such petulant skepticism is a plunge
into uneasy yet unreasoning faith; but, though Montaigne professed
Catholicism to the end, the sheer wickedness of the Catholic policy
made it impossible for him to hold sincerely to the creed any more
than to the cause. [2167] Above all things he hated cruelty. [2168]
It was the Massacre that finally made Montaigne renounce public life;
[2169] it must have affected likewise his working philosophy.

That philosophy was not, indeed, an original construction: he found
it to his hand partly in the deism of his favourite Seneca; partly in
the stoical ethic of Epictetus, then so much appreciated in France;
and partly in the Hypotyposes of Sextus Empiricus, of which the Latin
translation is known to have been among his books; from which he took
several of the mottoes inscribed on his library ceiling, [2170] and
from which he frequently quotes towards the end of his Apology. The
body of ideas compacted on these bases cannot be called a system: it
was not in Montaigne's nature to frame a logical scheme of thought;
and he was far from being the philosophic skeptic he set out to be
[2171] by way of confounding at once the bigots and the atheists. He
was essentially ondoyant et divers, as he freely admitted. As he put
it in a passage added to the later editions of the Essais, [2172]
he was a kind of métis, belonging neither to the camp of ignorant
faith nor to that of philosophic conviction, whether believing or
unbelieving. He early avows that, had he written what he thought and
knew of the affairs of his times, he would have published judgments "à
mon gré mesme et selon raison," in his opinion true and reasonable, but
"illégitimes et punissables." [2173] Again, "whatsoever is beyond the
compass of custom, we deem likewise to be beyond the compass of reason,
God knows how unreasonably, for the most part." [2174] Yet in the next
breath he will exclaim at those who demand changes. Often he comments
keenly on the incredible readiness of men to go to war over trifles;
but in another mood he accuses the nobility of his day of unwillingness
to take up arms "except upon some urgent and extreme necessity." [2175]
In the same page he will tell us that he is "easily carried away by
the throng," and that he is yet "not very easy to change, forsomuch
as I perceive a like weakness in contrary opinions." [2176] "I am
very easily to be directed by the world's public order," [2177] is
the upshot of his easy meditations. And a conformist he remained in
practice to the last, always bearing himself dutifully towards Mother
Church, and generally observing the proprieties, though he confesses
that he "made it a conscience to eat flesh upon a fish day." [2178]


    His conformities, verbal and practical, have set certain
    Catholics upon proving his orthodoxy, though his Essays are
    actually prohibited by the Church. A Benedictine, Dom Devienne,
    published in 1773 a Dissertation sur la Religion de Montaigne,
    of which the main pleas are that the Essais often affirm the
    divinity of the Christian faith; that the essayist received
    the freedom of the city of Rome under the eyes of the pope; and
    that his epitaph declared his orthodoxy! A generation later, one
    Labouderie undertook to set forth Le Christianisme de Montaigne
    in a volume of 600 pages (1819). This apologist has the courage
    to face the protest of Pascal: "Montaigne puts everything in a
    doubt so universal and so general that, doubting even whether
    he doubts, his uncertainty turns upon itself in a perpetual and
    unresting circle.... It is in this doubt which doubts of itself,
    and in this ignorance which is ignorant of itself, that the essence
    of his opinion consists.... In a word, he is a pure Pyrrhonist"
    (Pensées, supp. to Pt. i, art. 11). The reply of the apologist
    is that Montaigne never extends his skepticism to "revelation,"
    but on the contrary declares that revelation alone gives man
    certainties (work cited, p. 127).

    That is of course merely the device of a hundred skeptics of the
    Middle Ages; the old shibboleth of a "twofold truth" modified
    by a special disparagement of reason, with no attempt to meet
    the rejoinder that, if reason has no certainties, there can be
    no certainty that revelation is what it claims to be. When the
    apologist concludes that Montaigne's aim en froissant la raison
    humaine is to "oblige men to recognize the need of a revelation
    to fix his incertitudes," it suffices to answer that Montaigne in
    so many words declares at the outset of the Apologie de Raimond
    Sebonde that he knows nothing of theology, which is equivalent
    to saying that he is not a student of the Bible. As a matter of
    fact he never quotes it!


In the last and most characteristic essay of all, discoursing at large
Of Experience, he makes the most daring attack on laws in general,
as being always arbitrary and often irrational, and not seldom more
criminal than the offences they punish. After a planless discourse
of diseases and diets, follies of habit and follies of caprice, the
wisdom of self-rule and the wisdom of irregularity, he contrives to
conclude at once that we should make the best of everything and that
"only authority is of force with men of common reach and understanding,
and is of more weight in a strange language"--a plea for Catholic
ritual. Yet in the same page he pronounces that "Supercelestial
opinions and under-terrestrial manners are things that amongst us I
have ever seen to be of singular accord."

There is no final recognition here of religion as even a useful
factor in life. In point of fact Montaigne's whole habit of mind
is perfectly fatal to orthodox religion; and it is clear that,
despite his professions of conformity, he did not hold the Christian
beliefs. [2179] He was simply a deist. Again and again he points to
Sokrates as the noblest and wisest of men; there is no reference to
Jesus or any of the saints. Whatever he might say in the Apology, in
the other essays he repeatedly reveals a radical unbelief. The essay
on Custom strikes at the root of all orthodoxy, with its thrusts
at "the gross imposture of religions, wherewith so many worthy and
sufficient men have been besotted and drunken," and its terse avowal
that "miracles are according to the ignorance wherein we are by
nature, and not according to nature's essence." [2180] Above all, he
rejected the great superstition of the age, the belief in witchcraft;
and, following the lead of Wier, [2181] suggested a medical view of
the cases of those who professed wizardry. [2182] This is the more
remarkable because his rubber-ball fashion of following impulsions
and rebounding from certainty made him often disparage other men's
certainties of disbelief just because they were certainties. Declaring
that he prefers above all things qualified and doubtful propositions,
[2183] he makes as many confident assertions of his own as any man
ever did. But the effect of the whole is a perpetual stimulus to
questioning. His function in literature was thus to set up a certain
mental atmosphere, [2184] and this the extraordinary vitality of
his utterance enabled him to do to an incalculable extent. He had
the gift to disarm or at least to baffle hostility, to charm kings,
[2185] to stand free between warring factions. No book ever written
conveys more fully the sensation of a living voice; and after three
hundred years he has as friendly an audience as ever.


    Owen notes (French Skeptics, p. 446; cp. Champion, pp. 168-69)
    that, though the papal curia requested Montaigne to alter certain
    passages in the Essays, "it cannot be shown that he erased or
    modified a single one of the points." Sainte-Beuve, indeed, has
    noted many safeguarding clauses added to the later versions of
    the essay on Prayers (i, 56): but they really carry further the
    process of doubt. M. Champion has well shown how the profession of
    personal indecision and mere self-portraiture served as a passport
    for utterances which would have brought instant punishment on an
    author who showed any clear purpose. As it was, nearly a century
    passed before the Essais were placed upon the Roman Index Librorum
    Prohibitorum (1676).

    To the orthodox of his own day Montaigne seems to have given entire
    satisfaction. Thus Florimond de Boemond, in his Antichrist (2e
    éd. 1599, p. 4), begins his apologetic with a skeptical argument,
    which he winds up by referring the reader with eulogy to the
    Apologie of Montaigne. The modern resort to the skeptical method
    in defence of traditional faith seems to date from this time. See
    Prof. Fortunat Strowski, Histoire du sentiment religieux en France
    au xviie siècle; 1907, i, 55, note. (De Montaigne à Pascal.)


The momentum of such an influence is seen in the work of Charron
(1541-1603), Montaigne's friend and disciple. The Essais had
first appeared in 1580; the expanded and revised issue in 1588;
and in 1601 there appeared Charron's De la Sagesse, which gives
methodic form and as far as was permissible a direct application to
Montaigne's naturalistic principles. Charron's is a curious case of
mental evolution. First a lawyer, then a priest, he became a highly
successful popular preacher and champion of the Catholic League;
and as such was favoured by the notorious Marguerite (the Second
[2186]) of Navarre. On the assassination of the Duke of Guise by
order of Henri III he delivered an indignant protest from the pulpit,
of which, however, he rapidly repented. [2187] Becoming the friend
of Montaigne in 1586, he shows already in 1593, in his Three Truths,
the influence of the essayist's skepticism, [2188] though Charron's
book was expressly framed to refute, first, the atheists; second,
the pagans, Jews, Mohammedans; and, third, the Christian heretics
and schismatics. The Wisdom, published only eight years later, is a
work of a very different cast, proving a mental change. Even in the
first work "the growing teeth of the skeptic are discernible beneath
the well-worn stumps of the believer"; [2189] but the second almost
testifies to a new birth. Professedly orthodox, it was yet recognized
at once by the devout as a "seminary of impiety," [2190] and brought
on its author a persecution that lasted till his sudden death from
apoplexy, which his critics pronounced to be a divine dispensation. In
the second and rearranged edition, published a year after his death,
there are some modifications; but they are so far from essential [2191]
that Buckle found the book as it stands a kind of pioneer manual of
rationalism. [2192] Its way of putting all religions on one level,
as being alike grounded on bad evidence and held on prejudice, is
only the formal statement of an old idea, found, like so many others
of Charron's, in Montaigne; but the didactic purpose and method
turn the skeptic's shrug into a resolute propaganda. So with the
formal and earnest insistence that true morality cannot be built on
religious hopes and fears--a principle which Charron was the first to
bring directly home to the modern intelligence, [2193] as he did the
principle of development in religious systems. [2194] Attempting as it
does to construct a systematic practical philosophy of life, the book
puts aside so positively the claims of the theologians, [2195] and
so emphatically subordinates religion to the rule of natural reason,
[2196] that it constitutes a virtual revolution in public doctrine
for Christendom. As Montaigne is the effective beginner of modern
literature, so is Charron the beginner of modern secular teaching. He
is a Naturalist, professing theism; and it is not surprising to find
that for a time his book was even more markedly than Montaigne's the
French "freethinker's breviary."


    Strowski, as cited, pp. 164-65, 183 sq., founding on Garasse and
    Mersenne. Strowski at first pronounces Charron "in reality only a
    collector of commonplaces" (p. 166); but afterwards obliviously
    confesses (p. 191) that "his audacities are astonishing,"
    and explains that "he formulates, perhaps without knowing
    it, a whole doctrine of irreligion which outgoes the man and
    the time--a thought stronger than the thinker!" And again he
    forgetfully speaks of "cette critique hardie et méthodique,
    j'allais écrire scientifique" (p. 240). All this would be a new
    form of commonplace.


It was only powerful protection that could save such a book from
proscription; but Charron and his book had the support at once of Henri
IV and the President Jeannin--the former a proved indifferentist to
religious forms; the latter the author of the remark that a peace with
two religions was better than a war which had none. Such a temper had
become predominant even among professed Catholics, as may be gathered
from the immense popularity of the Satyre Menippée (1594). Ridiculing
as it did the insensate fanaticism of the Catholic League, that
composition was naturally described as the work of atheists; but there
seems to have been no such element in the case, the authors being
all Catholics of good standing, and some of them even having a record
for zeal. [2197] The Satyre was in fact the triumphant revolt of the
humorous common sense of France against the tyranny of fanaticism,
which it may be said to have overthrown at one stroke, [2198] inasmuch
as it made possible the entry of Henri into Paris. By a sudden appeal
to secular sanity and the sense of humour it made the bulk of the
Catholic mass ashamed of its past course. [2199] On the other hand,
it is expressly testified by the Catholic historian De Thou that all
the rich and the aristocracy held the League in abomination. [2200]
In such an atmosphere rationalism must needs germinate, especially
when the king's acceptance of Catholicism dramatized the unreality
of the grounds of strife.

After the assassination of the king in 1610, the last of the bloody
deeds which had kept France on the rack of uncertainty in religion's
name for three generations, the spirit of rationalism naturally did
not wane. In the Paris of the early seventeenth century, doubtless, the
new emancipation came to be associated, as "libertinism," with licence
as well as with freethinking. In the nature of the case there could be
no serious and free literary discussion of the new problems either of
life or belief, save insofar as they had been handled by Montaigne and
Charron; and, inasmuch as the accounts preserved of the freethought
of the age are almost invariably those of its worst enemies, it is
chiefly their side of the case that has been presented. Thus in 1623
the Jesuit Father François Garasse published a thick quarto of over
a thousand pages, entitled La Doctrine Curieuse des Beaux Esprits
de ce temps, ou prétendus tels, in which he assails the "libertins"
of the day with an infuriated industry. The eight books into which
he divides his treatise proceed upon eight alleged maxims of the
freethinkers, which run as follows:--


    I. There are very few good wits [bons Esprits] in the world;
    and the fools, that is to say, the common run of men, are not
    capable of our doctrine; therefore it will not do to speak freely,
    but in secret, and among trusting and cabalistic souls.

    II. Good wits [beaux Esprits] believe in God only by way of form,
    and as a matter of public policy (par Maxime d'Etat).

    III. A bel Esprit is free in his belief, and is not readily to
    be taken in by the quantity of nonsense that is propounded to
    the simple populace.

    IV. All things are conducted and governed by Destiny, which
    is irrevocable, infallible, immovable, necessary, eternal, and
    inevitable to all men whomsoever.

    V. It is true that the book called the Bible, or the Holy
    Scripture, is a good book (un gentil livre), and contains a lot of
    good things; but that a bon esprit should be obliged to believe
    under pain of damnation all that is therein, down to the tail of
    Tobit's dog, does not follow.

    VI. There is no other divinity or sovereign power in the world but
    Nature, which must be satisfied in all things, without refusing
    anything to our body or senses that they desire of us in the
    exercise of their natural powers and faculties.

    VII. Supposing there be a God, as it is decorous to admit, so
    as not to be always at odds with the superstitious, it does not
    follow that there are creatures which are purely intellectual
    and separated from matter. All that is in Nature is composite,
    and therefore there are neither angels nor devils in the world,
    and it is not certain that the soul of man is immortal.

    VIII. It is true that to live happily it is necessary to extinguish
    and drown all scruples; but all the same it does not do to appear
    impious and abandoned, for fear of offending the simple or losing
    the support of the superstitious.


This is obviously neither candid [2201] nor competent writing; and as
it happens there remains proof, in the case of the life of La Mothe le
Vayer, that "earnest freethought in the beginning of the seventeenth
century afforded a point d'appui for serious-minded men, which neither
the corrupt Romanism nor the narrow Protestantism of the period could
furnish." [2202] Garasse's own doctrine was that "the true liberty
of the mind consists in a simple and docile (sage) belief in all that
the Church propounds, indifferently and without distinction." [2203]
The later social history of Catholic France is the sufficient comment
on the efficacy of such teaching to regulate life. In any case the
new ideas steadily gained ground; and on the heels of the treatise of
Garasse appeared that of Marin Mersenne, L'impieté des Déistes, Athées
et Libertins de ce temps combattue, avec la refutation des opinions
de Charron, de Cardan, de Jordan Brun, et des quatraines du Déiste
(1624). In a previous treatise, Quæstiones celeberrimæ in Genesim
... in quo volumine Athei et Deisti impugnantur et expugnantur (1623),
Mersenne set agoing the often-quoted assertion that, while atheists
abounded throughout Europe, they were so specially abundant in France
that in Paris alone there were some fifty thousand. Even taking the
term "atheist" in the loosest sense in which such writers used it,
the statement was never credited by any contemporary, or by its author;
but neither did anyone doubt that there was an unprecedented amount of
unbelief. The Quatraines du Déiste, otherwise L'Antibigot, was a poem
of one hundred and six stanzas, never printed, but widely circulated
in manuscript in its day. It is poor poetry enough, but its doctrine
of a Lucretian God who left the world to itself sufficed to create
a sensation, and inspired Mersenne to write a poem in reply. [2204]
Such were the signs of the times when Pascal was in his cradle.


    Mersenne's statistical assertion was made in two sheets of the
    Quæstiones Celeberrimæ, "qui ont été supprimé dans la plupart
    des exemplaires, à cause, sans doute, de leur exagération"
    (Bouillier, Hist. de la philos. cartésienne, 1854, i, 28, where
    the passage is cited). The suppressed sheets included a list of
    the "atheists" of the time, occupying five folio columns. (Julian
    Hibbert, Plutarchus and Theophrastus on Superstition, etc., 1828;
    App. Catal. of Works written against Atheism, p. 3; Prosper
    Marchand, Lettre sur le Cymbalum Mundi, in éd. Bibliophile
    Jacob, 1841, p. 17, note; Prof. Strowski, De Montaigne à Pascal,
    1907, p. 138 sq.) Mersenne himself, in the preface to his book,
    stultifies his suppressed assertion by declaring that the impious
    in Paris boast falsely of their number, which is really small,
    unless heretics be reckoned as atheists. Garasse, writing against
    them, all the while professed to know only five atheists, three
    of them Italians (Strowski, as cited).



                             END OF VOL. I.







NOTES


[1] Cp. Lechler, Geschichte des englischen Deismus, 1841, p. 458;
A. S. Farrar, Critical History of Freethought, 1862, p. 588; Larousse's
Dictionnaire, art. Libre Pensée; Sayous, Les déistes anglais et le
Christianisme, 1882, p. 203.

[2] Jesus is made to apply it either to his disciples or to willing
followers in Matt. xvii, 17, where the implication seems to be that
lack of faith alone prevents miraculous cures. So with apistia in
Matt. xiii, 58. In the Epistles, a pagan as such is apistos--e.g.,
1 Cor. vi, 6. Here the Vulgate has infideles: in Matt. xiii, 58,
the word is incredulitatem.

[3] Cp. Luke xii, 46; Tit. i, 15; Rev. xxi, 8.

[4] In the prologue to the first print of the old (1196) Revelation
of the Monk of Evesham, 1482.

[5] Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. Viret, Note D.

[6] Essais, liv. iii. ch. 12. Édit. Firmin-Didot, 1882, ii, 518.

[7] See F. T. Perrens, Les Libertins en France au xviie Siècle, 1896,
Introd. § 11, for a good general view of the bearings of the word. It
stood at times for simple independence of spirit, apart from religious
freethinking. Thus Madame de Sevigné (Lettre à Mme. de Grignan,
28 juin, 1671) writes: "Je suis libertine, plus que vous."

[8] Stähelin, Johannes Calvin, 1863, i, 383 sq.; Perrens as cited,
pp. 5-6; Mosheim, Eccles. Hist., 13 Cent., part ii, ch. v, §§ 9-12,
and notes; 14 Cent., part ii, ch. v, §§ 3-5; 16 Cent., § 3, part ii,
ch. ii. §§ 38-42.

[9] A. Bossert, Calvin, 1906. p. 151.

[10] Burckhardt, Renaissance in Italy, Eng. tr. ed. 1892, p. 542, note.

[11] Answer to Sir T. More, Parker Soc. rep. 1850, pp. 53-54.

[12] Controversy with Harding, Parker Soc. rep. of Works, 1845, i, 305.

[13] Paradise Lost, i, 582; Samson Agonistes, 221.

[14] The New Inn, 1628-9, Act iii. Sc. 2.

[15] The New English Dictionary gives instances in 1526 and 1552.

[16] If Mr. Froude's transcript of a manuscript can here be relied
on. History, ed. 1870, x, 545. (Ed. 1872, xi, 199.)

[17] Four Questions Propounded (pref. to Acts and Monuments).

[18] Answer to the Bishop of Winchester, Parker Soc. rep., p. 129.

[19] Works, ed. 1850, ii, 752.

[20] B. V, ch. i, § 3. Works, i, 429.

[21] De civitate Dei, xx, 30, end; xxi, 5, beginn., etc.

[22] Religio Medici, 1642, pt. i. §§ 19, 20.

[23] Essay II, Of Scepticism and Certainty (rep. of reply to Thomas
White, app. to Scepsis Scientifica in 1665) in Glanvill's collected
Essays on Several Important Subjects in Philosophy and Religion,
1676, pp. 38, 44.

[24] Plus Ultra: or, The Progress and Advancement of Knowledge since
the Days of Aristotle, 1668, p. 146.

[25] History of the Royal Society, 1667, p. 73. Describing the
beginnings of the Society, Sprat remarks that Oxford had at that time
many members "who had begun a free way of reasoning" (p. 53).

[26] Buckle, Introd. to Hist. of Civ. in Eng., 1-vol. ed. p. 211.

[27] Sprat, p. 375 (printed as 367).

[28] Id., p. 83. The French Academy had the same rule.

[29] Some of Sprat's uses of the term have a very general sense, as
when he writes (p. 87) that "Amsterdam is a place of Trade without the
mixture of men of freer thoughts." The latter is an old application,
as in "the free sciences" or "the liberal arts."

[30] Cited by Archbishop Trench, The Study of Words, 19th ed., p. 230,
from the Clarendon State Papers, App. Vol. III, p. 40.

[31] Art. Rationalismus and Supernaturalismus in Herzog and Plitt's
Real-Encyk. für prot. Theol. und Kirche, 1883. xii, 509.

[32] Philosophical Works of Bacon, ed. Ellis and Spedding, iii,
583. See the same saying quoted among the Apophthegms given in
Tenison's Baconiana (Routledge's ed. of Works, p. 895).

[33] Every Man in his Humour (1598), Act iii, sc. 3.

[34] Some Familiar Letters between Mr. Locke and Several of his
Friends, 1708, p. 190.

[35] Id. p. 133.

[36] Ed. Rotterdam, 1686. p. 195.

[37] B. II, pt. ii, § 1.

[38] Ch. on Logic, cited by Professor Fowler in his ed. of the Novum
Organum, 1878, introd. p. 118.

[39] §§ 3 and 4.

[40] Letters, 1746, p. 5.

[41] Orig. ed. iii, 305, 306, 311; ed. J. M. R., 1900, ii, 349, 353.

[42] Nos. 12, 111, 135.

[43] Cp. Johnson on A. Philips in Lives of the Poets. Swift, too,
issued his Free Thoughts upon the Present State of Affairs in 1714.

[44] Thus Bentley, writing as Phileleutherus Lipsiensis against
Collins, claims to have been "train'd up and exercis'd in Free Thought
from my youth." Dr. Samuel Clarke somewhere makes a similar statement;
and the point is raised by Berkeley in his Minute Philosopher,
Dial. i, § 10. One of the first replies to Collins, A Letter to the
Free-thinkers, By a Layman, dated February 24, 1712-13, likewise
insists on the right of believers to the title, declaring that
"a free-thinker may be the best or worst of men." Shaftesbury on
the other side protests that the passion of orthodoxy "holds up the
intended chains and fetters and declares its resolution to enslave"
(Characteristics, iii. 305; ed. 1900, ii, 345). Later, the claim of
Bentley and Clarke became common; and one tract on Christian evidences,
A Layman's Faith, 1732, whose author shows not a grain of the critical
spirit, professes to be written "by a Freethinker and a Christian."

[45] Written in 1898.

[46] Cp. Hauréau, Histoire de la philosophie scolastique,
ed. 1870-1872, i, 543-46.

[47] Second ed. with enlarged Appendix (of authorities and references),
1808, 2 vols.

[48] Farrar, pref., p. x; Riddle, p. 99; Van Mildert, i, 105, etc.

[49] Van Mildert even recast his first manuscript. See the Memoir of
Joshua Watson, 1863, p. 35.

[50] Cp. W. A. Schmidt, Geschichte der Denk- und Glaubensfreiheit im
ersten Jahrhundert der Kaiserherrschaft und des Christenthums, 1847,
pp. 12-13.

[51] Its legitimacy on that side is expressly contended for by
Professor William James in his volume The Will to Believe (1897),
the positions of which were criticized by the present writer in the
University Magazine, April and June, 1897.

[52] Bryce, The Holy Roman Empire, 8th ed., p. 135.

[53] A religious basis for sexual licence is of course a common feature
in non-Christian religions also. Classic instances are well known. As
to sexual promiscuity in an "intensely religious" savage community,
see Turner, Samoa a Hundred Years Ago, 1884, p. 290.

[54] E. B. Tylor, Anthropology, 1881, p. 439. Cp. Lang, Custom and
Myth, ed. 1893, p. 72; J. G. Frazer, Lectures on the Early History
of the Kingship, 1905, pp. 85-87.

[55] Theal, The Beginning of South African History, 1902, p. 57. See
also the Rev. J. Macdonald, Light in Africa, 1890, p. 192.

[56] Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians,
5th ed. 1871, i, 280, note.

[57] Life of Mr. Yukichi Fukuzawa, Tokyo, 1902, pp. 48-53, 56-69.

[58] See Tylor, Primitive Culture, 3rd ed. i, 71, as to savage
conservatism in handicraft; but compare his Researches into the Early
History of Mankind, 1865, p. 160, as to countervailing forces.

[59] E.g., in the first chapter of Saint-Simon's Mémoires, the account
of the French soldiers who at the siege of Namur burned and broke
the images of Saint Médard for sending so much rain. Cp. Irvine,
Letters on Sicily, 1813, p. 72; and Ramage, Wanderings through Italy,
ed. 1868, p. 113. Constant, De la religion, 1824, vol. i, ptie. ii,
p. 34, gives a number of Christian instances.

[60] Rev. J. B. Stair, Old Samoa, 1897, pp. 181-82.

[61] Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Mathematicos, ix, 14, 29; Pseudo-Plutarch,
De placitis philosophorum, i, 7; Lactantius, De ira Dei, x, 47;
Cicero, De natura Deorum, i, 42; Augustine, De civitate Dei, iv,
32. It is noteworthy that the skeptic Sextus rejects the opinion as
absurd, even as does the high-priest Cotta in Cicero.

[62] Vico was one of the first, after Sextus Empiricus and his modern
commentator Fabricius, to insist (following the saying of Petronius,
Primus in orbe deos fecit timor) that "False religions were founded
not by the imposture of some, but by the credulity of all" (Scienza
Nuova [1725], lib. i, prop. 40). Yet when denying (id., De' Principii,
ed. 1852, p. 114) the assertions of travellers as to tribes without
religion, he insisted that they were mere fictions planned to sell
the authors' books--here imputing fraud as lightly as others had done
in the case of the supposed founders of religions.

[63] E.g., the Elizabethan play Selimus (Huth Lib. ed. of Greene,
vol. xiv, ed. Grosart), dated 1594, vv. 258-262. (In "Temple
Dramatists" ed., vv. 330-334.) See also below, vol. ii, ch. xiii.

[64] On the principle of self-expression in religion, cp. Feuerbach,
Das Wesen der Religion, in Werke, ed. 1846-1849, i, 413, 445, 498, etc.

[65] Bishop Thirlwall, History of Greece, ed. 1839, i, 186,
204. Cp. Curtius, Griechische Geschichte, 1858, i, 389.

[66] Tiele, Outlines of the Hist. of Religions, Eng. tr.,
p. 96. Cp. Robertson Smith, The Old Testament in the Jewish Church,
2nd ed., p. 141, note.

[67] Spencer and Gillen, The Northern Tribes of Central Australia,
1904, pp. 258, 347, 366, 373, 492.

[68] See the article by E. J. Glave, of Stanley's force, on
"Fetishism in Congoland," in the Century Magazine, April, 1891,
p. 836. Compare F. Schultze, Der Fetischismus, 1871, pp. 137, 141,
142, 144, etc.; Theal, The Beginning of South African History, 1902,
pp. 49, 52; Kranz, Natur- und Kulturleben der Zulus, 1880, pp. 110,
113-14; Moffat, Missionary Labours, 35th thous., pp. 69, 81-84;
A. B. Ellis, The Tshi-Speaking Peoples, 1887, pp. 125-29, 137-39, 142;
Sir G. S. Robertson, The Káfirs of the Hindu-Kush, ed. 1899, pp. 405,
417; E. Rae, The White Sea Peninsula, 1881, p. 149; Turner, Samoa,
1884, p. 272. It is certain that the wizards of contemporary savage
races are frequently killed as impostors by their own people. See
below, p. 35.

[69] Tylor, Anthropology, p. 406; Primitive Culture, 3rd ed., i, 38.

[70] The fact that this phenomenon occurs everywhere among primitives,
from the South Seas to Lapland, should be noted in connection with
the latterly revived claims of so-called "Mysticism."

[71] Cp. E. Rae, The White Sea Peninsula, 1881, pp. 149, 263.

[72] Glave, article cited, pp. 835-36.

[73] Cp. Max Müller, Natural Religion, 1889, p. 133; Anthropological
Religion, 1892, p. 150; Lang, Myth, Ritual, and Religion, 2nd ed. ii,
358 sq.

[74] Compare Bishop Butler's Charge to the Clergy of Durham, and Bishop
Wordsworth On Religious Restoration in England, 1854, p. 75, etc.

[75] P. von Bradke, Dyâus Asura, Ahura Mazda, und die Asuras,
Halle. 1885, p. 115.

[76] Rig-Veda, x, 121 (as translated by Muir, Müller, Dutt, and von
Bradke); and x, 82 (Dutt's rendering). It is to be noted that the
refrain "Who is the God whom we should worship?" is entirely different
in Ludwig's rendering of x, 121. [Bertholet's Religionsgeschichtliches
Lesebuch (1908) compiled on the principle that "the best translations
are good enough for us," follows the rendering of Muir, Müller, Dutt,
and von Bradke (p. 165).] Cp. Max Müller, Hibbert Lectures, p. 302,
and Natural Religion, pp. 227-229, citing R. V., viii, 100, 3, etc.,
for an apparently undisputed case of skepticism. See again Langlois's
version of vi, 7, iii, 3 (p. 459). He cannot diverge much more from
the German and English translators than they do from each other.

[77] Junod, as above cited, pp. 341, 343, 350, 388. Cp. Dalton,
as cited, p. 115.

[78] E. Rae, The White Sea Peninsula, 1881, pp. 146-7.

[79] On the other hand, there might be genuine defect of knowledge of
the religion of others of the tribe. This is said to occur in thousands
of cases in Christian countries: why not also among savages? See the
express testimony of Sir G. S. Robertson, The Káfirs of the Hindu-Kush,
ed. 1899, pp. 377, 409.

[80] E.g., Moffat, Missionary Labours, end of ch. xvi and beginning
of ch. xix.

[81] See Dr. Gasquet, The Great Pestilence, 1893.

[82] Missionary Labours, ch. xix: stereo. ed. pp. 81, 82. It is
noteworthy that the women were the first to avow unbelief in an
unsuccessful rainmaker (Id. p. 84).

[83] Missionary Labours, as cited, p. 85.

[84] Cp. Schultze, Der Fetischismus, 1871, pp. 155-56; A. H. Keane,
Man, Past and Present, 1900, p. 49; Thurston, Castes and Tribes of
Southern India, 1909, i, 86.

[85] Travels in Southern Africa in the Years 1803-1806, 1815, ii,
61. Cp. Rev. J. Macdonald, Light in Africa, 1890, p. 192, as to
the compulsion on men of superior intelligence to play the wizard,
by reason of the common connection of wizardry with any display of
mental power. There is no more tragical aspect in the life-conditions
of primitive peoples.

[86] The Lake Regions of Central Africa, 1860, ii, 351.

[87] Turner, Samoa a Hundred Years Ago, 1884,
pp. 304-305. Cp. Herodotos, iv, 68, as to the slaying of "false
prophets" among the Scythians; and i, 128, as to the impaling of the
Magi by Astyages.

[88] Paul Kollmann, The Victoria Nyanza, 1899, p. 168.

[89] Sir A. B. Ellis, The Tshi-Speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast,
1887, p. 127.

[90] E.g., an aged female relative of the writer, quite orthodox
in all her habits, and devout to the extent of calling the Book of
Esther "Godless" because the word "God" does not occur in it, yet
at a pinch declared that she had "never heard of Providence putting
a boll of meal inside anybody's door." Her daughter-in-law, also of
quite religious habits, quoted the saying with a certain sense of its
audacity, but endorsed it, as she had cause to do. Yet both regularly
practised prayer and asserted divine beneficence.

[91] See B. Seeman, "Fiji and the Fijians," in Galton's Vacation
Tourists, 1862, pp. 275-76, as to the terrorism resorted to by Fijian
priests against unbelievers. "Punishment was sure to overtake the
skeptic, let his station in life be what it might"--i.e., supernatural
punishment was threatened, and the priests were not likely to let it
fail. Cp. Basil Thomson, The Fijians: A Study of the Decay of Custom,
1909, introd., p. xi: "The reformers of primitive races never lived
long: if they were low-born they were clubbed, and that was the end of
them and their reforms; if they were chiefs, and something happened
to them, either by disease or accident, men saw therein the figure
of an offended deity; and obedience to the existing order of things
became stronger than before." Cp. Pagan Christs, 2nd ed., pp. 60-62,
as to kings who wished to put down human sacrifices.

[92] See Pagan Christs, 2nd ed., pp. 1-2.

[93] E. J. Glave, art. cited, p. 825. Cp. Lubbock, Prehistoric Times,
pp. 582, 594.

[94] Cp. the Rev. J. Macdonald, Light in Africa, 1890, pp. 222-23,
as to the "universal suspicion" which falls upon tribesmen of
rationalistic and anti-superstitious tendencies, making them "almost
doubt their own sanity."

[95] Sir H. H. Johnston, The River Congo, ed. 1805, p. 289. Cp. Moffat,
as cited above.

[96] Colenso, The Pentateuch, vol. i, pref. p. vii; introd. p. 9.

[97] Spencer, Principles of Sociology, iii, § 583.

[98] W. Ellis, Polynesian Researches, 1831, iv, 30-31, 126-28.

[99] Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands, compiled from the
communications of W. Mariner, by John Martin, M.D., 3rd ed. 1827,
i, 289-300, 306-307, 338-39; ii, 27-28, 83-86, 134. Mariner, who saw
much of the priests, found no reason to suspect them of any systematic
deception. See ii, 129. But his narrative leaves small room for doubt
as to the procedure of the priest of Toobo Totai.

[100] Dr. A. Kropf, Das Volk der Xosa-Kaffern in östlichen Südafrika,
Berlin, 1899, pp. 203-204. Dr. Kropf, a missionary of forty years'
experience, states that many of the Kaffirs latterly disbelieve
in their sorcerers; but this may be partly a result of missionary
teaching--not so much the religious as the scientific. See the
testimony of the Rev. J. Macdonald, Life in Africa, 1890, pp. 47-48.

[101] Rev. J. Macdonald, Life in Africa, pp. 225-26.

[102] It is clear that in the Christianization of Europe much use
was made of the argument that the best lands had fallen to the
Christian peoples. See the epistle of Bishop Daniel of Winchester
to St. Boniface (Ep. lxvii) cited in Schlegel's note to Mosheim,
Reid's ed. of Murdock's translation, p. 262.

[103] Bede, Eccles. Hist., ii, 13.

[104] Cp. A. H. Mann in Social England, illustr. ed., i, 217.

[105] Teutonic Mythology, Eng. trans. 1882, i, 7.

[106] Crichton and Wheaton, Scandinavia, 1837, i, 198, note. Compare
Dr. Ph. Schweitzer, Geschichte der Skandinavischen Litteratur, i, 25:
"In the higher circles [in the pagan period] from an early date (schon
lange) unbelief and even contempt of religion flourished ... probably
never reaching the lower grades of the people." See also C. F. Allen,
Histoire de Danemark, French trans., Copenhagen, 1878, i, 55.

[107] Æneid, vii, 648; x, 773, 880. Mezentius does not deny that Gods
exist: see x, 743.

[108] Sir G. S. Robertson, The Káfirs of the Hindu-Kush, ed. 1899,
p. 379.

[109] Professor T. Clifford Allbutt, Harveian Oration on Science and
Medieval Thought, 1901, p. 82.

[110] Mr. Basil Thomson, in the able introduction to his excellent work
on The Fijians, speaks of primitive reformers (p. xi) as "rare souls
born before their time." But there is no special "time" for reformers,
who, as such, must be in advance of their average contemporaries.

[111] Garcilasso, 1. viii, c. 8; 1. ix, c. 10; Herrera, Dec. v, 1. iv,
c. 4. See the passages in Réville's Hibbert Lectures, pp. 162-65.

[112] Prescott, Conquest of Mexico, Kirk's ed., pp. 81 sq., 91-93,
97; H. H. Bancroft, Native Races of the Pacific States, v, 427-29;
Clavigero, History of Mexico, Eng. tr. ed. 1807, B. iv, §§ 4, 15;
vii. § 42.

[113] See the author's Pagan Christs, 2nd ed. pp. 60-62,
361. Cp. Lafcadio Hearn, Japan, 1904, pp. 313-14.

[114] Cp. T. Williams, Fiji and the Fijians, ed. 1870, i, 231; Turner,
Samoa a Hundred Years Ago, 1884, p. 202.

[115] "A long time elapses between each step that their [missionaries']
stations advance: and when they do it invariably is under the influence
of some chief that they are even then led on." Dalton, Narrative of
an Explorer in Tropical South Africa, ed. 1891, p. 102.

[116] See Professor Sully's Studies of Childhood, 1895.

[117] Rev. S. Smith, Church Work among the Deaf and Dumb, 1875, cited
by Spencer, Principles of Sociology, iii, § 583. Cp. the testimony
cited there from Dr. Kitto, Lost Senses, p. 200.

[118] Die griechischen Culte und Mythen, 1887, pp. 263, 276, 277,
etc. What is true as regards the thesis is that some of the central
insanities of religion, such as the cult of human sacrifice, seem to
have been propagated in all directions from an Asiatic centre. See
the author's Pagan Christs, 2nd ed. pp. 273, 292, 343, 354, 362,
etc. Cp. the Rev. D. Macdonald's Asiatic Origin of the Oceanic
Languages, Luzac & Co., 1894; the Nubische Grammatik of Lepsius,
1880; and Terrien de Lacouperie, Western Origin of the Early Chinese
Civilization, 1894, pp. 134, 362-63.

[119] Dr. Andrew White, A History of the Warfare of Science with
Theology in Christendom, 1896, i, 23.

[120] Dr. B. Seeman, Viti, 1862, pp. 179-82.

[121] Cp. Lang (Myth, Ritual, and Religion, i, 91) as to the
contemptuous disbelief of savages in Christian myths. Mr. Lang
observes that this shows savages and civilized men to have "different
standards of credulity." That, however, does not seem to be the true
inference. Each order of believer accepts the myths of his own creed,
and derides others.

[122] Cp. Decharme, La Critique des trad. relig. chez les Grecs,
1904, p. 121.

[123] The same process will be recorded later in the case of the
intercourse of Crusaders and Saracens; and in the seventeenth century
it is noted by La Bruyère (Caractères, ch. xvi, Des esprits forts,
par. 3) as occurring in his day. The anonymous English author of an
essay on The Agreement of the Customs of the East Indians with those of
the Jews (1705, pp. 152-53) naïvely endorses La Bruyère. Macaulay's
remark to the Edinburgh electors, on the view taken of sectarian
strifes by a man who in India had seen the worship of the cow, is
well known.

[124] Cp. Sayce, Hibbert Lectures, pp. 96, 121-22; Robertson Smith,
Religion of the Semites, p. 74; Tiele, Egyptian Religion, p. 36;
and Outlines, p. 52.

[125] Cp. Tiele, Outlines, pp. 109-110, and Fischer, Heidenthum und
Offenbarung, p. 59. Professor Max Müller's insistence that the lines of
Vedic religion could not have been "crossed by trains of thought which
started from China, from Babylon, or from Egypt" (Physical Religion,
p. 251), does not affect the hypothesis put above. The Professor
admits (p. 250) the exact likeness of the Babylonian fire-cult to
that of Agni.

[126] But cp. Müller, Anthropolog. Relig., p. 164, as to possible
later developments; and see above, pp. 45-47, as to the many cases in
which conquering races have actually adopted the Gods of the conquered.

[127] Muir, Original Sanskrit Texts, ii (2nd ed.), 372, 379, 384.

[128] Id. p. 395.

[129] Max Müller, Selected Essays, 1881, ii, 207-208.

[130] Cp. Oldenberg, Die Religion des Veda, 1894, pp. 94, 98-99;
Ghosha, Hist. of Hindu Civ. as illust. in the Vedas, Calcutta, 1889,
pp. 190-91; Max Müller, Phys. Relig., 1891, pp. 197-98.

[131] Max Müller, Selected Essays, ii, 237.

[132] Muir, Original Sanskrit Texts, v, 268.

[133] Max Müller, Hibbert Lectures, p. 302, citing R. V., viii, 100,
3; and ii, 12, 5. The first passage runs: "If you wish for strength,
offer to Indra a hymn of praise: a true hymn, if Indra truly exist;
for some one says, Indra does not exist! Who has seen him? Whom shall
we praise?" The hymn of course asseverates his existence.

[134] Cp. Rig-Veda, i, 164, 46; x, 90 (cited by Ghosa, pp. 191,
198); viii, 10 (cited by Müller, Natural Religion, pp. 227-29);
and x, 82, 121, 129 (cited by Romesh Chunder Dutt, Hist. of Civ. in
Anc. India, ed. 1893, i, 95-97); Muir, Sanskrit Texts, v, 353 sq.;
Tiele, Outlines, p. 125; Weber, Hist. of Ind. Lit., Eng. trans.,
p. 5; Max Müller, Hibbert Lectures, ed. 1880, pp. 298-304, 310, 315;
Phys. Relig., p. 187; Barth, Religions of India, Eng. trans., p. 8;
Tylor, Primitive Culture, ii, 354.

[135] Barth, Religions of India, pp. 26, 31, citing Rig-Veda, v, 3,
1; i, 164, 46; viii, 68, 2. The phrase as to Agni is common in the
Brâhmanas, but is not yet so in the Vedas. The second text cited is
rendered by Müller: "That which is one the sages speak of in many
ways--they call it Agni, Yama, Mâtarisvan" (Selected Essays, 1881,
ii, 240).

[136] Colebrooke's Miscellaneous Essays, ed. 1873, i, 375-76. Weber
(Ind. Lit., pp. 27, 137, 236, 284-85) has advanced the view that
the adherents of this doctrine, who gradually became stigmatized as
heretics, were the founders or beginners of Buddhism. But the view
that the universe is a self-existent totality appears to enter into the
Brahmans' Sankhya teaching, which is midway between the popular Nyaya
system and the esoteric Vedânta (Ballantyne, Christianity Contrasted
with Hindu Philosophy, 1859, pp. xviii, 59, 61). As to the connection
between the Sankhya system and Buddhism, see Oldenberg, Der Buddha,
sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde, 3te Aufl., Excurs, pp. 443.

[137] H. H. Wilson, Works, 1862-71, ii, 346.

[138] Weber, Hist. Ind. Lit., p. 236.

[139] Ballantyne, pp. 58, 61; Major Jacob, Manual of Hindu Pantheism,
1881, p. 13.

[140] Cp. Max Müller, Chips from a German Workshop, ed. 1880, i,
228-232, and Banerjea's Dialogues on the Hindu Philosophy, p. 73,
cited by Major Jacob, Hindu Pantheism, p. 13.

[141] Jacob, as cited, p. 3.

[142] Max Müller, Hibbert Lectures, pp. 340-41. Cp. Barth, Religions
of India, p. 81.

[143] Müller, Hibbert Lectures, p. 139.

[144] Cp. Weber, Hist. Ind. Lit., p. 28.

[145] Id. pp. 28, 220-22.

[146] Max Müller, Hibbert Lectures, p. 139, note, citing Panini, iv,
4, 60.

[147] Apparently belonging to the later or middle Buddhist
period. Müller, Hibbert Lectures, p. 141.

[148] On these cp. Müller, p. 139, note; Garbe, Philos. of Anc. India,
Eng. tr. 2nd ed. Chicago, 1899, p. 25; and Weber, Ind. Lit. p. 246,
note, with the very full research of Professor Rhys Davids, Dialogues
of the Buddha, 1899, pp. 166-72.

[149] Müller, Hibbert Lectures, pp. 140-41. Cp. Garbe. p. 28.

[150] Garbe, as cited.

[151] Rhys Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha, p. 171.

[152] Id. pp. 169-71.

[153] Id. p. 172.

[154] Id. ib.

[155] Trans. in English by Cowell and Gough, 1882.

[156] Garbe, as cited, p. 25.

[157] See Müller, Hibbert Lectures, pp. 141-42, citing Burnouf.

[158] Müller, Hibbert Lectures, p. 310.

[159] Bk. I, Stories ii, 7, 8, 16; vii. 180.

[160] Bk. I, 11, 40; St. ii, 32.

[161] St. vi. 162.

[162] Major Jacob, as cited, preface.

[163] Müller, Psychol. Relig., pp. 95, 97, 126; Lect. on the Vedânta
Philos., 1894, p. 32.

[164] Chunder Dutt, Hist. of Civ. in Anc. India, as cited, i, 112-13.

[165] Rhys Davids, trans. of Dialogues of the Buddha, p. 166. Cp. his
Buddhism, p. 143, as to Buddhist censures of an extravagant skepticism
which denied every religious theory. In one of the Dialogues (ii,
25, p. 74) a contemporary sophist is cited as flatly denying a future
state. Mr. Lillie, however (Buddhism in Christendom, 1887, p. 187),
contends as against Professor Rhys Davids that the Upanishads were only
"whispered to pupils who had gone through a severe probation."

[166] Prof. Weber (Hist. Ind. Lit., p. 4) says the peoples of the
Punjaub never at all submitted to the Brahmanical rule and caste
system. But the subject natives there must at the outset have been
treated as an inferior order. Cp. Tiele, Outlines, p. 120 and refs.;
and Rhys Davids, Buddhism, p. 23.

[167] Cp. Weber, Hist. Ind. Lit., pp. 236, 284-85; Max Müller,
Chips, i, 228-32; Kuenen, Hibbert Lectures, pp. 258-64; and the
general discussion of the problem in the author's Pagan Christs,
2nd ed. pp. 239-63.

[168] Brahmanism had itself been by this time influenced by aboriginal
elements, even to the extent of affecting its language. Weber, as
cited, p. 177. Cp. Müller, Anthrop. Relig., p. 164.

[169] Major Jacob, as cited, p. 12.

[170] I.e., "the enlightened," a title given to sages in
general. Weber, p. 284.

[171] Weber, Hist. Ind. Lit., pp. 179, 299; Müller, Natural Religion,
p. 299.

[172] See Senart, Essai sur la légende de Buddha, 2e édit., p. 297 ff.

[173] Cp. Weber, pp. 286-87, 303.

[174] See Weber, pp. 301, 307; also Rhys Davids, Buddhism, pp. 43,
83, etc.

[175] Tiele, Outlines, p. 117.

[176] Cp. Weber, Hist. Ind. Lit., pp. 27, 284-87; Max Müller, Natural
Religion, p. 555; Jacobi, as there cited; Tiele, Outlines, pp. 135-36;
Rhys Davids, American Lectures on Buddhism, pp. 115-16; Buddhism,
p. 84; and the author's Pagan Christs, pt. ii, ch. ii, §§ 8-13.

[177] Weber, Hist. Ind. Lit., pp. 4, 39.

[178] Barth, Religions of India, p. 146.

[179] Rhys Davids, Buddhism, pp. 35, 79, 99.

[180] Cp. Pagan Christs, pp. 248-50.

[181] Rhys Davids, trans. of Dialogues, pp. 188-89; Amer. Lec. on
Buddhism, 1896, pp. 127-34; Hibbert Lectures, 1881, p. 109; Buddhism,
pp. 95, 98-99.

[182] Max Müller, Selected Essays, 1881, ii, 295.

[183] As the context in Professor Müller's work shows, these phrases
are inaccurate.

[184] Cp. Weber, Ind. Lit., p. 289, note; and Banerjea, Dialogues on
the Hindu Philosophy, p. 520, cited by Major Jacob, pp. 29-30.

[185] See Muir, Sanskrit Texts, iv, 50 (cited by Jacob, pp. 30-31),
as to the Brahman view of the licence ascribed to Krishna. And see
iii, 32 (cited by Jacob, p. 14), as to a remarkable disparagement of
Vedism in the Bhagavat Gita.

[186] Müller, Selected Essays, ii, 363: H. H. Wilson, as last cited,
ii, 368 sq.

[187] See this brought out in a strikingly dramatic way in Mr. Dennis
Hird's novel, The Believing Bishop.

[188] Cp. Dr. A. Jeremias, Monotheistische Strömungen innerhalb der
Babylonischen Religion, 1904, p. 44--a very candid research.

[189] The Hammurabi Code, by Chilperic Edwards, 1904, pp. 67, 68, 70
(§§ 240, 249, 266). The invocations of named Gods by Hammurabi at the
close of the code, however, suggest that the force of the word was
"a God." Cp. p. 76 with what follows; and see note on p. 93. On this
question compare Jeremias, as cited, pp. 39, 43.

[190] Maspero, Hist. anc. des peup. de l'orient, 4e éd. p. 139; Sayce,
Hib. Lect., pp. 121, 213, 215; E. Meyer, Gesch. des Alt., i (1884),
161 (§ 133); iii (1901), 167 sq. (§ 103).

[191] Sayce, pp. 219, 344; Lenormant, Chaldean Magic, Eng. ed. p. 127.

[192] Jastrow, Religions of Babylonia and Assyria, 1898, p. 318.

[193] Jastrow, p. 187; Sayce, pp. 128, 267-68. Cp. Kuenen, Religion of
Israel, Eng. tr., i, 91; Menzies, History of Religion, 1895, p. 171;
Gunkel, Israel und Babylonien, 1903, p. 30; Jeremias, as cited,
pp. 5-6.

[194] Meyer, iii, 168; Jastrow, p. 79; Sayce, p. 331 sq., 367 sq.;
Lenormant, Chaldean Magic, p. 112; Jeremias, pp. 7-23.

[195] Sayce, p. 305. Cp. Robertson Smith, Religion of the Semites,
p. 452.

[196] Jastrow, p. 190, note, p. 319; Sayce, pp. 191-92, 367; Lenormant,
pp. 112, 113, 119, 133; Jeremias, p. 26.

[197] Tiele, Outlines, p. 78; Sayce, Ancient Empires of the East,
pp. 152-53; Rawlinson, Five Great Monarchies, 2nd ed. iii, 13; Maspero,
p. 139.

[198] Strabo, xvi, c. 1, § 6.

[199] Cp. Rawlinson, Five Great Monarchies, i, 110; iii, 12-13.

[200] Hibbert Lectures, p. 385.

[201] Meyer, iii, § 103; Sayce, pp. 192, 345.

[202] Cp. Jastrow, p. 662; Sayce, p. 78; and Tiele, Hist. Comparée,
p. 209. It seems probable that human sacrifice was latterly restricted
to the case of criminals.

[203] Cp. Meyer, iii, 173.

[204] Meyer, i, 187, and note.

[205] Cp. T. G. Pinches, The Old Testament in the Light of the
Hist. Records of Assyria and Babylonia, 1902, pp. 161-63.

[206] Jastrow, pp. 187, 256; Sayce, pp. 316, 320, 322, 327; Meyer,
i, 183; Lenormant, p. 110; Jeremias, p. 5.

[207] Sayce, pp. 326, 341; cp. Jastrow, p. 317.

[208] Meyer, i, 599; Sayce, Hib. Lect., pp. 85-91; Anc. Emp. of the
East, p. 245.

[209] Meyer, iii, § 57.

[210] Herod. i, 131.

[211] Jer. xi, 13, etc.

[212] Ezek. chs. vi, viii.

[213] Cp. the recent literature on the recovered Code of Hammurabi.

[214] Herod. i, 101.

[215] Id. iii, 79.

[216] Cp. Grote, History of Greece, pt. ii, ch. 33 (ed. 1888, iii,
442), note.

[217] Meyer, Gesch. des Alt., i, 505 (§ 417), 542 (§ 451), 617 (§
515); Tiele, Outlines, p. 164.

[218] Herod. i, 130.

[219] Cp. Herod. iii, 94, 98; Grote, vol. iii, p. 448.

[220] Meyer, as cited, i, 505, 530 (§ 439); Tiele, Outlines, pp. 163,
165.

[221] Meyer, i, 528 (§ 438).

[222] Darmesteter, The Zendavesta (S. B. E. ser.), vol. i, introd.,
p. lx (1st ed.).

[223] Rawlinson, Religions of the Anc. World, p. 105; Meyer, §§
417, 450-51.

[224] Meyer, i, 507 (§ 418).

[225] Cp. Meyer, i, 506-508; Renan, as cited by him, p. 508;
Darmesteter, as cited, cc. iv-ix, 2nd ed.; Tiele, Outlines, p. 165.

[226] Meyer, i, 520 (§ 428).

[227] Meyer, i, 524 (§ 433); Tiele, Outlines, p. 178; Darmesteter,
Ormazd et Ahriman, 1877, pp. 7-18.

[228] Meyer, i, § 450 (p. 541).

[229] Tiele, Outlines, p. 167. Cp. Lenormant (Chaldean Magic, p. 229),
who attributes the heresy to immoral Median Magi; and Spiegel (Avesta,
1852, i, 271), who considers it a derivation from Babylon.

[230] Le Page Renouf, Hibbert Lectures on Relig. of Anc. Egypt,
2nd ed. p. 92; Wiedemann, Religion of the Ancient Egyptians,
Eng. tr. 1897, p. 109. Cp. p. 260. Renouf (pp. 93-103) supplies an
interesting analysis.

[231] Meyer, Gesch. des Alt. i, 83; Wiedemann, as cited, p. 103 sq.

[232] Cp. Major Glyn Leonard, The Lower Niger and its Tribes, 1906,
pp. 354, 417, 433.

[233] Wiedemann, as cited, p. 136.

[234] Meyer, p. 81 (§ 66); Tiele, Hist. of the Egypt. Relig. Eng. tr.,
pp. 119, 154.

[235] Le Page Renouf, Hibbert Lectures, 2nd ed. p. 240.

[236] Meyer, Geschichte des Alten Egyptens, in Oncken's series,
1877, B. iii, Kap. 3, p. 249; Gesch. des Alt. i. 109; Tiele,
Egypt. Relig. pp. 149, 151, 157; Maspero, Hist. anc. des peuples de
l'orient, 4é ed., pp. 278-80; Le Page Renouf, as cited, pp. 215-30;
Wiedemann, pp. 12, 13, 301; Erman, Handbook of Egyptian Religion,
Eng. tr. 1907, p. 57.

[237] Erman, pp. 59, 60.

[238] Tiele, Egypt. Rel. pp. 153, 155, 156.

[239] Tiele, p. 157.

[240] Brugsch, Religion und Mythologie der alten Aegypter, 1884;
1 Hälfte, pp. 90-91; Kuenen, Religion of Israel, Eng. trans. i,
395-97; Tiele, pp. 226-30; Erman, pp. 71, 103-105.

[241] Cp. Wiedemann, p. 302.

[242] Tiele, pp. 114, 118, 154. Cp. Meyer, Geschichte des Alterthums,
i, 101-102 (§ 85). Wiedemann, p. 260.

[243] Dr. Wallis Budge, Egyptian Magic, 1899, end.

[244] Tiele, p. 157. Cp. p. 217.

[245] Cp. Maspero, as cited, pp. 274-76.

[246] Meyer, i, 72.

[247] Maspero's spelling.

[248] Von Bissing's spelling.

[249] De Garis Davies, The Tombs of Amarna.

[250] Maspero (Hist. anc. des peuples de l'orient, ed. 1905, p. 251)
says he respected also Osiris and Horus.

[251] Brugsch, Egypt under the Pharaohs, ed. 1891, p. 216. Maspero
(as cited, p. 250) recognizes no such revolt.

[252] Maspero, Hist. anc. de l'orient, 7e éd. pp. 248-54; Brugsch,
Hist. of Egypt under the Pharaohs, Eng. trans. ed. 1891, ch. x;
Meyer, Geschichte des alten Aegyptens, B. iii, Kap. 4, 5; Gesch. des
Alterthums, i, 271-74; Tiele, pp. 161-65; Flinders Petrie, History
of Egypt, iii (1905), 10; Wiedemann, pp. 35-39; Erman, pp. 61-70;
L. W. King and H. H. Hall, Egypt and Western Asia in the Light of
Recent Discoveries, 1907, pp. 383-87; F. W. von Bissing, Geschichte
Aegyptens in Umriss, 1904, pp. 52-53.

[253] Tiele, p. 144; Meyer, Gesch. des Alt. i, 135.

[254] "We do not find magic predominant [in the tales] until the
Ptolemaic age. At that time the physical magic of the early times
reappears in full force" (Petrie, Religion and Conscience in Ancient
Egypt, 1898, p. 29. Cp. Maspero, p. 286; Budge, Egyptian Magic,
pp. 64, 233).

[255] Petrie, Hist. iii, 174-75, 180.

[256] Tiele, pp. 180-82; Meyer, Gesch. des Alt. i, 140-43.

[257] Tiele, pp. 184-85, 196, 217.

[258] Herodotos, ii, 48, 60-64, etc. Cp. Maspero, p. 286.

[259] "The Osiride and Cosmic Gods rose in importance as time went
on, while the Abstract Gods continually sank on the whole. This
agrees with the general idea that the imported Gods have to yield
their position gradually to the older and more deeply-rooted faiths"
(Petrie, as last cited, p. 95).

[260] The familiar narrative of Herodotos is put in doubt by the
monuments. Sayce, Ancient Empires, p. 246. But cp. Meyer, i, 611
(§ 508).

[261] Tiele, p. 158.

[262] See figures 209, 212, 221, 235, 242, 249, 250, in Sharpe's
Hist. of Egypt, 7th ed.

[263] Cp. Sharpe, ii, 287-95; Budge, Egyptian Magic, p. 64.

[264] Compare the orthodox view of Bishop Westcott, Essays in the
History of Religious Thought in the West, 1891, pp. 197-200.

[265] These fights had not ceased even in the time of Julian (Sharpe,
ii, 280). Cp. Juvenal, Sat. xv, 33 sq.

[266] Metamorphoses, B., xi.

[267] Cp. Lane, Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians, passim.

[268] Cp. Meyer, Gesch. des Alt. i, 232-33.

[269] Meyer, i, 237.

[270] Put by Canon Rawlinson, History of Phoenicia, 1889, p. 321.

[271] As to the universality of this tendency, see Meyer, ii, 97.

[272] Meyer, Geschichte des Alterthums, i, 251, § 209; Tiele, Outlines,
p. 84; Histoire comparée des anciennes religions, Fr. tr. pp. 320-21.

[273] Rawlinson, Phoenicia, p. 340; Sayce, Anc. Emp. p. 204; Menzies,
Hist. of Relig. p. 168.

[274] Præparatio Evangelica, B. i, c. 9-10.

[275] Meyer, i, 249.

[276] Cp. Sayce, Hibbert Lectures, p. 159, as to Persian methods of
the same kind.

[277] <DW37>. Inst. i, 23.

[278] E. Meyer, Geschichte des Alterthums, ii, 104, 105.

[279] As to Greek instances, cp. Bury, Hist. of Greece, ed. 1906,
pp. 53, 55, 65, 92, 104; and as to Roman, see Ettore Pais, Ancient
Legends of Roman History, Eng. trans. 1906, ch. x, where it is shown
that Virginia and Lucretia are primarily ancient Latin divinities; and
(ch. vii) that both Numa and Servius Tullius are probably in the same
case, Servius Rex being in all likelihood the servus rex Nemorensis of
the Arician grove, round whom turns the research of Dr. J. G. Frazer's
Golden Bough; while tullius is an old Latin word for a spring. See also
ch. iv as to Acca Larentia, another Goddess reduced by the historians
to the status of a hetaira, as was Flora. Horatius Cocles (id. p. 157)
is also a God reduced to a hero.

[280] So Sayce, Ancient Empires, p. 204.

[281] Sayce, Ancient Empires, p. 202.

[282] Legge, Religions of China, 1880, pp. 11, 16; Douglas,
Confucianism and Taouism, 1879, pp. 12, 82.

[283] Menzies, History of Religion, p. 158.

[284] Legge, pp. 12, 19, 23, 25, 26; Tiele, Outlines, p. 27; Douglas,
p. 79.

[285] Legge, Religions of China, p. 142.

[286] See the citations made by Legge, p. 5.

[287] Id. p. 139; cp. Menzies, p. 109.

[288] Legge, p. 140; cp. p. 117; Douglas, p. 81.

[289] Legge, Religions, p. 117; Life and Teachings of Confucius,
4th ed. p. 101; Douglas, p. 68; Tiele, Outlines, p. 29.

[290] Tiele, p. 31; Legge, Religions, p. 143.

[291] Tiele, pp. 31-32; Douglas, pp. 68, 84. But cp. Legge, Religions,
pp. 123, 127.

[292] Legge, Life and Teachings, pp. 100-101.

[293] Douglas, pp. 179, 184.

[294] See the author's Pagan Christs, pp. 214-22.

[295] Pauthier, Chine Moderne, p. 351. There is a tradition that
Lao-Tsze took his doctrine from an ancient sage who flourished
before 1120 B.C.; and he himself (Tau Teh King, trans. by Chalmers,
The Speculations of Lao-Tsze, 1868, ch. 41) cites doctrine as to Tau
from "those who have spoken (before me)." Cp. cc. 22, 41, 62, 65, 70.

[296] Cp. E. J. Simcox, Primitive Civilizations, 1894, ii, 18.

[297] Pauthier, p. 358; Chalmers, pp. 14, 37.

[298] Legge, Religions, p. 137.

[299] Tau Teh King, as cited, pp. 38. 49, ch. 49, 63; Pauthier,
p. 358; Legge, p. 223.

[300] Analects, xxv, 36; Legge, Religions, p. 143; Life and Teachings,
p. 113; Douglas, p. 144.

[301] Legge, Religions, p. 164. We do find, however, an occasional
allusion to deity, as in the phrase "the Great Architect" (Chalmers'
trans. 1868. ch. lxxiv, p. 57), and "Heaven" is spoken of in a somewhat
personalized sense. Still, Mr. Chalmers complains (p. xv) that Lao-Tsze
did not recognize a personal God, but put "an indefinite, impersonal,
and unconscious Tau" above all things (ch. iv).

[302] F. H. Balfour, Art. "A Philosopher who Never Lived," in Leaves
from my Chinese Scrap-book, 1887, p. 83 sq.

[303] Id. pp. 86-90.

[304] Id. p. 134.

[305] Legge, Religions of China, p. 147; Tiele, Outlines, p. 33.

[306] Legge, Life and Works of Mencius, 1875, pp. 29, 50, 77, etc.

[307] Tiele, p. 33.

[308] Legge, Life and Works of Mencius, pp. 44, 47, 56, 57, etc.

[309] Miss Simcox, Primitive Civilizations, ii, 36-37, following
Chavannes.

[310] Legge's Mencius, p. 49; cp. p. 48.

[311] Cp. Legge's Mencius, pp. 47, 131; Chalmers' Lao-Tsze, pp. 23,
28, 53, 58 (chs. xxx, xxxi, xxxvi, lxvii, lxxiv); Douglas, Taouism,
chs. ii, iii.

[312] Legge, Religions of China, p. 147. The ruler in question seems
to have been of non-Chinese descent. E. H. Parker, China, 1901, p. 18.

[313] Legge, Religions of China, p. 159.

[314] Id. p. 60.

[315] Tiele, p. 37.

[316] Douglas, p. 222.

[317] Id. p. 239.

[318] Tiele, p. 35; Douglas, p. 287. Taouism, however, has a rather
noteworthy ethical code. See Douglas, ch. vi. It has to be noted that
the translations of the Tâo Têh King have varied to a disquieting
degree. Cp. Drews, Gesch. des Monismus, p. 121.

[319] Details are given in the author's Pagan Christs, pt. iv.

[320] Nadaillac (L'Amérique préhistorique, 1883, pp. 273-84) gives
them little of this credit, pronouncing them at once cruel and
degenerate. He credits them, however, with being the first makers of
roads and aqueducts in Central America, and cites the record of their
free public hospitals, maintained by the sacerdotal kings. Prescott,
on the other hand, overstated the bloodlessness of their religion
(Conquest of Mexico, Kirk's ed. 1890, p. 41 and ed. note).

[321] Réville, Hibbert Lectures, On the Native Religions of Mexico
and Peru, 1884, pp. 62-67.

[322] J. G. Müller, Geschichte der Amerikanischen Urreligionen,
ed. 1867, pp. 577-90; H. H. Bancroft, Native Races of the Pacific
States, iii, 279. (Passage cited in author's Pagan Christs,
pp. 402-403; where is also noted Dr. Tylor's early view, discarded
later, that Quetzalcoatl was a real personage.)

[323] Cp. Prescott, as cited.

[324] Réville, p. 66.

[325] J. G. Müller, as cited, pp. 473-74; Réville, p. 46. Dr. Réville
speaks of the worship of the unifying deity as pretty much "effaced"
by that of the lower Gods. It seems rather to have been a priestly
effort to syncretize these. Still, such an effacement did take place,
as we have seen, in Central Asia in ancient times, after a syncretic
idea had been reached (above, p. 45). As to the alleged monotheism of
King Netzahuatl (or Netzahualcoyotl), of Tezcuco, mentioned above,
p. 39, see Lang, Making of Religion, p. 270, note, and p. 282;
Prescott, Conquest of Mexico, as cited, p. 92; and J. G. Müller,
as cited, pp. 473-74, 480.

[326] As to the capabilities of the Aztec language, see Bancroft,
Native Races, ii, 727-28 (quoted in Pagan Christs, p. 416, note).

[327] Refs. above, p. 41. Cp. Lang, Making of Religion, p. 270,
note, and p. 282; J. G. Müller, as cited, pp. 473-74; and Nadaillac,
as cited, p. 289.

[328] The Christianized descendant of the Tezcucan kings, Ixtilxochitl,
who wrote their history, adds the words, "Cause of Causes"--a very
unlikely formula in the place and circumstances.

[329] Above, p. 41. Cp. Lang, as last cited, pp. 263, 282.

[330] Cp. Kirk's ed. of Prescott's Conquest of Peru, 1889, p. 44;
Réville, p. 189-90; Lang, as cited below.

[331] Réville, p. 152, citing Garcilasso. See same page for a story
of resistance to the invention of an alphabet.

[332] Réville, p. 50. citing Torquemada, 1. viii, c. 20. end.

[333] History of the Affairs of New Spain, French trans. 1880,
1. vi, ch. 7, pp. 342-43. Cp. Prescott, Conquest of Mexico, Kirk's
ed. pp. 31, 33.

[334] Prescott, p. 34.

[335] "The priest says, 'the spirit is hungry.' the fact being that he
himself is hungry. He advises the killing of an animal" (Max Müller,
Anthropological Religion, p. 307).

[336] On the general tendency cp. Chantepie de la Saussaye, Manual
of the Science of Religion, pp. 77-84.

[337] In the windows of the shop of the S. P. C. K., in London,
may be often seen large displays of reproduced Madonna-pictures,
by Catholic artists, at popular prices.

[338] Compare the author's Pagan Christs, pp. 66-95.

[339] Jud. xvii, xviii.

[340] Gen. xxxi, 19, 34, 35.

[341] Compare Hugo Winckler, Geschichte Israels, i, 56-58.

[342] Compare Tiele, Outlines, p. 87; Hist. comp. des
anc. relig. p. 342 sq.; Kuenen, Relig. of Israel, iii, 35, 44,
398. Winckler (Gesch. Israels, i, 34-38) pronounces the original
Semitic Yahu, and the Yahweh evolved from him, to have been each a
"Wetter-Gott."

[343] The word is applied to the apparition of Samuel in the story
of the Witch of Endor (1 Sam. xxviii, 13).

[344] The unlearned reader may here be reminded that in Gen. i the
Hebrew word translated "God" is "Elohim" and that the phrase in
Gen. ii rendered "the Lord God" in our versions is in the original
"Yah-weh-Elohim." The first chapter, with its plural deity, is,
however, probably the later as well as the more dignified narrative,
and represents the influence of Babylonian quasi-science. See,
for a good general account of the case, The Witness of Assyria, by
C. Edwards, 1893, ch. ii. Cp. Wellhausen, Proleg. to Hist. of Israel,
Eng. tr. pp. 196-308; E. J. Fripp, Composition of the Book of Genesis,
1892, passim; Driver, Introd. to the Lit. of the Old Test. 1891,
pp. 18-19.

[345] Winckler, Gesch. Isr. i, 29-30.

[346] Cp. Meyer, Gesch. des Alt. i, 398.

[347] See the myth of the offerings put in it by the Philistines
(1 Sam. vi).

[348] 1 Sam. iii, 3. Cp. ch. ii, 12-22. Contrast Lev. xvi, 2, ff.

[349] 1 Sam. iv, 3-11. Cp. v. vii, 2.

[350] 2 Sam. vi.

[351] 1 Kings xii, 28; Hosea viii, 4-6. Cp. Jud. viii. 27; Hosea
viii, 5.

[352] Smith, Religion of the Semites, p. 196. But see above, p. 79.

[353] 11th cent. B.C.

[354] 2 Kings xviii, 4, 22; xxiii, 48.

[355] 2 Kings xxiii.

[356] Jer. i, 18; iii, 16; vi, 13; vii, 4-22; viii, 8; xviii, 18;
xx, 1, 2; xxiii, 11.

[357] Jer. ii, 28; xi, 13.

[358] So Kuenen, vol. i. App. i to Ch. 1.

[359] Amos v, 21, 22.

[360] Hosea ii, 11; vi, 6.

[361] Isa. i, 11-14.

[362] Mic. vi, 6-8.

[363] Cp. M. Müller, Nat. Rel. pp. 560-61; Psychol. Rel. pp. 30-32;
Wellhausen, Israel, p. 465. If the Moabite Stone be genuine--and it
is accepted by Stade (Gesch. des Volkes Israel, in Oncken's Series,
1881, i, 86) and by most contemporary scholars--the Hebrew alphabetic
writing is carried back to the ninth century B.C. An account of the
Stone is given in The Witness of Assyria, by C. Edwards, ch. xi. See
again Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, bk. i, ch. 14, Eng. tr. 1894, i, 280,
for a theory of the extreme antiquity of the alphabet.

[364] Dr. Cheyne (Art. Amos in Encyc. Biblica) gives some good reasons
for attaching little weight to such objections, but finally joins in
calling Amos "a surprising phenomenon."

[365] Driver, Introd. to Lit. of Old Test. ch. vi, § 2 (p. 290,
ed. 1891). Cp. Kuenen, Relig. of Israel, i, 86; and Robertson Smith,
art. Joel, in Encyc. Brit.

[366] Cp. Wellhausen, Israel, p. 501; Driver, ch. vii (1st ed. pp. 352
sq., esp. pp. 355, 361, 362, 365); Stade, Gesch. des Volkes Israel,
i, 85.

[367] E.g. Ps. l, 8-15; li, 16-17, where v. 19 is obviously a priestly
addition, meant to countervail vv. 16, 17.

[368] Cp. Kuenen, i, 156; Wellhausen, Prolegomena, p. 139; Israel,
p. 478.

[369] As to a possible prehistoric connection of Hebrews and
Perso-Aryans, see Kuenen, i, 254, discussing Tiele and Spiegel, and
iii, 35, 44, treating of Tiele's view, set forth in his Godsdienst
van Zarathustra, that fire-worship was the original basis of
Yahwism. Cp. Land's views, discussed by Kuenen, p. 398; and Renan,
Hist. des langues sémit. p. 473.

[370] Cheyne, Introd. to Isaiah, Prol. pp. xxx, xxxviii, following
Kosters.

[371] There is a cognate dispute as to the condition of the Samaritans
at the time of the Return. Stade (Gesch. den Volkes Israel,
i, 602) holds that they were numerous and well-placed. Winckler
(Alttestamentliche Untersuchungen, 1892, p. 107) argues that, on the
contrary, they were poor and unorganized, and looked to the Jews for
help. So also E. Meyer, Gesch. des Alt. iii (1901), 214.

[372] Cp. Rowland Williams, The Hebrew Prophets, ii (1871), 38. This
translator's rendering of the phrase cited by Zephaniah runs:
"Neither good does the eternal nor evil."

[373] Cp. E. Meyer, Geschichte des Alterthums, iii, 216.

[374] Mal. ii, 17; iii, 13. Cp. ii, 8, 11.

[375] Cp. Jer. xxxiii, 24; xxxviii, 19.

[376] Eccles. iii, 19-21.

[377] Ch. v. Renan's translation lends lucidity.

[378] Driver, Introduction, p. 378. Prof. Dillon (Skeptics of the
Old Testament, p. 155) goes so far as to pronounce Agur a "Hebrew
Voltaire," which is somewhat of a straining of the few words he has
left. Cp. Dr. Moncure Conway, Solomon and Solomonic Literature, 1899,
p. 55. In any case, Agur belongs to an age of "advanced religious
reflection" (Cheyne, Job and Solomon, p. 152).

[379] Driver, Introduction, p. 378.

[380] Biscoe, Hist. of the Acts of the Apostles, ed. 1829, p. 80,
following Selden and Lightfoot.

[381] S. Schechter, Studies in Judaism, 1896, p. 189, citing Sanhedrin,
386, and Pseudo-Jonathan to Gen. iv, 8. Cp. pp. 191-92, citing a
mention of Epicurus in the Mishna.

[382] The familiar phrase in the Psalms (xiv, i; liii, 1), "The fool
hath said in his heart, there is no God," supposing it to be evidence
for anything, clearly does not refer to any reasoned unbelief. Atheism
could not well be quite so general as the phrase, taken literally,
would imply.

[383] Cp. W. R. Sorley, Jewish Christians and Judaism, 1881,
p. 9; Robertson Smith, Old Test. in the Jewish Ch. ed. 1892,
pp. 48-49. These writers somewhat exaggerate the novelty of the view
they accept. Cp. Biscoe, History of the Acts, ed. 1829, p. 101.

[384] Wisdom, c. 2.

[385] Cp. the implications in Ecclesiasticus, vi, 4-6; xvi, 11-12,
as to the ethics of many believers.

[386] Kuenen, ii, 242-43.

[387] Kalisch, Comm. on Leviticus, xxv, 8, pt. ii, p. 548.

[388] In the Wisdom of Solomon, iii, 13; iv, 1, the old desire for
offspring is seen to be in part superseded by the newer belief in
personal immortality.

[389] Schechter, Studies in Judaism, 1896, p. 216. Compare pp. 193-94.

[390] See Supernatural Religion, 6th ed. i, 97-100, 103-21; Mosheim,
Comm. on Christ. Affairs before Constantine, Vidal's tr. i, 70;
Schürer, Jewish People in the Time of Jesus, Eng. tr. <DW37>. II,
vol. iii, p. 152.

[391] Sat. xiv, 96-106.

[392] Cp. Horace, 1 Sat. v, 100.

[393] Rev. A. Edersheim, History of the Jewish Nation after the
Destruction of Jerusalem, 1856, p. 462, citing the Avoda Sara, a
treatise directed against idolatry! Other Rabbinical views cited by
Dr. Edersheim as being in comparison "sublime" are no great improvement
on the above--e.g., the conception of deity as "the prototype of
the high priest, and the king of kings,"--"who created everything
for his own glory." With all this in view, Dr. Edersheim thought
it showed "spiritual decadence" in Philo Judæus to speak of Persian
magi and Indian gymnosophists in the same laudatory tone as he used
of the Essenes, and to attend "heathenish theatrical representations"
(p. 372).

[394] See Ps. xc, 2; Prov. viii, 22, 26.

[395] This is seen persisting in the lore of the Neo-Platonist writer
Sallustius Philosophus (4th c.), De Diis et Mundo, c. 7, though quite
unscientifically held.

[396] Cp. Tiele, Outlines, pp. 205, 207, 212.

[397] Cp. E. Meyer, Geschichte des Alterthums, ii, 533.

[398] Cp. K. O. Müller, Literature of Ancient Greece, ed. 1847, p. 77.

[399] Duncker, Gesch. des Alterth. 2 Aufl. iii, 209-10, 252-54,
319 sq.; E. Meyer, Gesch. des Alterth. ii, 181, 365, 369, 377, 380,
535 (see also ii, 100, 102, 105, 106, 115 note, etc.); W. Christ,
Gesch. der griech. Lit. 3te Aufl. p. 12; Gruppe, Die griech. Culte
und Mythen, 1887, p. 165 sq.

[400] E. Curtius, Griech. Gesch. i, 28, 29, 35, 40, 41, 101, 203,
etc.; Meyer, ii, 369.

[401] See the able and learned essay of S. Reinach, Le Mirage
Orientate, reprinted from L'Anthropologie, 1893. I do not find that
its arguments affect any of the positions here taken up. See pp. 40-41.

[402] Meyer, ii. 369; Benn, The Philosophy of Greece, 1898, p. 42.

[403] Cp. Bury, History of Greece, ed. 1906, pp. vi, 10, 27, 32-34,
40, etc.; Burrows, The Discoveries in Crete, 1907, ch. ix; Maisch,
Manual of Greek Antiquities, Eng. tr. §§ 8, 9, 10, 60; H. R. Hall,
The Oldest Civilization of Greece, 1901, pp. 31, 32.

[404] Cp. K. O. Müller, Hist. of the Doric Race, Eng. tr. 1830, i,
8-10; Busolt, Griech. Gesch. 1885, i, 33; Grote, Hist. of Greece,
10-vol. ed. 1888, iii, 3-5, 35-44; Duncker, iii, 136, n.; E. Meyer,
Gesch. des Alterthums, i, 299-310 (§§ 250-58); E. Curtius, i, 29;
Schömann, Griech. Alterthümer, as cited, i, 2-3, 89; Burrows, ch. ix.

[405] Cp. Meyer, ii, 97; and his art. "Baal" in Roscher's
Ausführl. Lex. Mythol. i, 2867.

[406] The fallacy of this tradition, as commonly put, was well shown
by Renouvier long ago--Manuel de philosophie ancienne, 1844, i,
3-13. Cp. Ritter, as cited below.

[407] Cp. on one side, Ritter, Hist. of Anc. Philos. Eng. tr. i,
151; Renan, Études d'hist. religieuse, pp. 47-48; Zeller, Hist. of
Greek Philos. Eng. tr. 1881, i, 43-49; and on the other, Ueberweg,
Hist. of Philos. Eng. tr. i, 31, and the weighty criticism of Lange,
Gesch. des Materialismus, i, 126-27 (Eng. tr. i, 9, note 5).

[408] Cp. Curtius, i, 125; Bury, introd. and ch. i.

[409] Cp. Bury, as cited.

[410] As to the primary mixture of "Pelasgians" and Hellenes,
cp. Busolt, i, 27-32; Curtius, i, 27; Schömann, i, 3-4; Thirlwall,
Hist. of Greece, ed. 1839, i, 51-52, 116. K. O. Müller (Doric Race,
Eng. tr. i, 10) and Thirlwall, who follows him (i, 45-47), decide
that the Thracians cannot have been very different from the Hellenes
in dialect, else they could not have influenced the latter as they
did. This position is clearly untenable, whatever may have been
the ethnological facts. It would entirely negate the possibility of
reaction between Greeks, Kelts, Egyptians, Semites, Romans, Persians,
and Hindus.

[411] Murray, Four Stages of Greek Religion, 1912, p. 59.

[412] Cp. Meyer, Gesch. des Alt. ii, 583.

[413] The question is discussed at some length in the author's
Evolution of States, 1912.

[414] Lit. of Anc. Greece, pp. 41-47. The discussion of the Homeric
problem is, of course, alien to the present inquiry.

[415] Introd. to Scientif. Mythol. Eng. tr. pp. 180, 181,
291. Cp. Curtius, i, 126.

[416] Cp. Curtius, i, 107, as to the absence in Homer of any
distinction between Greeks and barbarians; and Grote, 10-vol. ed. 1888,
iii, 37-38, as to the same feature in Archilochos.

[417] Duncker, Gesch. des Alt., as cited, iii. 209-10; pp. 257,
319 sq. Cp. K. O. Müller, as last cited, pp. 181, 193; Curtius, i,
43-49, 53, 54, 107, 365, 373, 377, etc.; Grote, iii, 39-41; and Meyer,
ii, 104.

[418] Duncker, iii, 214; Curtius, i, 155, 121; Grote, iii, 279-80.

[419] Busolt, Griech. Gesch. 1885, i, 171-72. Cp. pp. 32-34; and
Curtius, i, 42.

[420] On the general question cp. Gruppe, Die griechischen Culte und
Mythen, pp. 151 ff., 157, 158 ff., 656 ff., 672 ff.

[421] Preller, Griech. Mythol. 2 Aufl. i, 260; Tiele, Outlines, p. 211;
R. Brown, Jr., Semit. Influ. in Hellenic Mythol. 1898, p. 130; Murray,
Hist. of Anc. Greek Lit. p. 35; H. R. Hall, Oldest Civilization of
Greece, 1901, p. 290.

[422] See Tiele, Outlines, pp. 210, 212. Cp., again, Curtius,
Griech. Gesch. i, 95, as to the probability that the "twelve Gods"
were adjusted to the confederations of twelve cities; and again p. 126.

[423] "Even the title 'king' (Anax) seems to have been borrowed by the
Greek from Phrygian.... It is expressly recorded that tyrannos is a
Lydian word. Basileus ('king') resists all attempts to explain it as a
purely Greek formation, and the termination assimilates it to certain
Phrygian words." (Prof. Ramsay, in Encyc. Brit. art. Phrygia). In
this connection note the number of names containing Anax (Anaximenes,
Anaximandros, Anaxagoras, etc.) among the Ionian Greeks.

[424] iv, 561 sq.

[425] It is now agreed that this is merely a guess. The document,
further, has been redacted and interpolated.

[426] Prehist. Antiq. of the Aryan Peoples, Eng. tr. p. 423. Wilamowitz
holds that the verses Od. xi, 566-631, are interpolations made later
than 600 B.C.

[427] Tiele, Outlines, p. 209; Preller, p. 263.

[428] Meyer says on the contrary (Gesch. des Alt. ii, 103, Anm.) that
"Kronos is certainly a Greek figure"; but he cannot be supposed to
dispute that the Greek Kronos cult is grafted on a Semitic one.

[429] Sayce, Hibbert Lectures, pp. 54, 181. Cp. Cox, Mythol. of the
Aryan Nations, p. 260, note. It has not, however, been noted in the
discussions on Semelê that Semlje is the Slavic name for the Earth
as Goddess. Ranke, History of Servia, Eng. tr. p. 43.

[430] Iliad, xiv, 201, 302.

[431] Sayce, Hibbert Lectures, p. 367 sq.; Ancient Empires,
p. 158. Note p. 387 in the Lectures as to the Assyrian influence,
and p. 391 as to the Homeric notion in particular. Cp. W. Christ,
Gesch. der griech. Literatur, § 68.

[432] It is unnecessary to examine here the view of Herodotos that
many of the Greek cults were borrowed from Egypt. Herodotos reasoned
from analogies, with no exact historical knowledge. But cp. Renouvier,
Manuel, i, 67, as to probable Egyptian influence.

[433] Cp. Meyer, ii, §§ 453-60, as to the eastern initiative of
Orphic theology.

[434] It is noteworthy that the traditional doctrine associated with
the name of Orpheus included a similar materialistic theory of the
beginning of things. Athenagoras, Apol. c. 19. Cp. Renouvier, Manuel
de philos. anc. i, 69-72; and Meyer, ii, 743.

[435] Cp. Meyer, ii, 726. As to the oriental elements in Hesiod see
further Gruppe, Die griechischen Culte und Mythen, 1887, pp. 577,
587, 589, 593.

[436] Cp. however, Bury (Hist. of Greece, pp. 6, 65), who assumes that
the Greeks brought the hexameter with them to Hellas. Contrast Murray,
Four Stages, p. 61.

[437] Mahaffy, History of Classical Greek Literature, 1880, i, 15.

[438] Id. p. 16. Cp. W. Christ, as cited, p. 79.

[439] Mahaffy, pp. 16-17.

[440] Od. xviii, 352.

[441] Od. vi, 240; Il. v, 185.

[442] Od. xxii, 39.

[443] In Od. xiv, 18, antitheoi means not "opposed to the Gods,"
but "God-like," in the ordinary Homeric sense of noble-looking
or richly attired, as men in the presence of the Gods. Cp. vi,
241. Yet a Scholiast on a former passage took it in the sense
of God-opposing. Clarke's ed. in loc. Liddell and Scott give no
use of atheos, in the sense of denying the Gods, before Plato
(Apol. 26 C. etc.), or in the sense of ungodly before Pindar
(P. iv, 288) and Æschylus (Eumen. 151). For Sophocles it has the
force of "God-forsaken"--Oedip. Tyr. 254 (245), 661 (640), 1360
(1326). Cp. Electra, 1181 (1162). But already before Plato we find the
terms apistos and atheos, "faithless" or "infidel" and "atheist,"
used as terms of moral aspersion, quite in the Christian manner
(Euripides, Helena, 1147), where there is no question of incredulity.

[444] Cp. Lang, Myth, Ritual, and Religion, 2nd ed. i, 14-15. and
cit. there from Professor Jebb.

[445] Cp. Meyer, Gesch. des Alterthums, ii, 724-27; Grote, as cited,
i, 279-81.

[446] Meyer, ii, 724, 727.

[447] The tradition is confused. Stesichoros is said first to have
aspersed Helen, whereupon she, as Goddess, struck him with blindness:
thereafter he published a retractation, in which he declared that she
had never been at Troy, an eidolon or phantasm taking her name; and
on this his sight was restored. We can but divine through the legend
the probable reality, the documents being lost. See Grote, as cited,
for the details. For the eulogies of Stesichoros by ancient writers,
see Girard, Sentiment religieux en Grèce, 1869, pp. 175-79.

[448] Cp. Meyer (1901), iii. § 244.

[449] Ol. i, 42-57, 80-85.

[450] Ol. ix, 54-61.

[451] He dedicated statues to Zeus, Apollo, and Hermes. Pausanias,
ix, 16, 17.

[452] Herodot. ii. 53.

[453] A ruler of Libyan stock, and so led by old Libyan connections to
make friends with Greeks. He reigned over fifty years, and the Greek
connection grew very close. Curtius, i, 344-45. Cp. Grote, i, 144-55.

[454] Grote, 10-vol. ed. 1888, i, 307, 326, 329, 413. Cp. i, 27-30;
ii, 52; iii, 39-41, etc.

[455] K. O. Müller, Introd. to Mythology, p. 192.

[456] "Then one [of the Persians] who before had in nowise believed
in [or, recognized the existence of] the Gods, offered prayer and
supplication, doing obeisance to Earth and Heaven" (Persae, 497-99).

[457] Agamemnon, 370-372. This is commonly supposed to be a reference
to Diagoras the Melian (below, p. 159).

[458] Agam. 170-72 (160-62).

[459] So Whittaker, Priests, Philosophers, and Prophets, 1911,
pp. 42-43.

[460] So Buckley, in Bohn trans. of Æschylus, p. 100. He characterizes
as a "skeptical formula" the phrase "Zeus, whoever he may be"; but
goes on to show that such formulas were grounded on the Semitic notion
that the true name of God was concealed from man.

[461] Grote, ed. 1888, vii, 8-21. See the whole exposition of the
exceptionally interesting 67th chapter.

[462] Cp. Meyer, ii, 431; K. O. Müller, Introd. to Mythol. pp. 189-92;
Duncker, p. 340; Curtius, i, 384; Thirlwall, i, 200-203; Burckhardt,
Griech. Culturgesch. 1898, ii. 19. As to the ancient beginnings of a
priestly organization, see Curtius, i, 92-94, 97. As to the effects of
its absence, see Heeren, Polit. Hist. of Anc. Greece, Eng. tr. 1829,
pp. 59-63; Burckhardt, as cited, ii, 31-32; Meyer, as last cited;
Zeller, Philos. der Griechen, 3te Aufl. i, 44 sq. Lange's criticism
of Zeller's statement (Gesch. des Materialismus, 3te Aufl. i, 124-26,
note 2) practically concedes the proposition. The influence of a
few powerful priestly families is not denied. The point is that they
remained isolated.

[463] Cp. K. O. MÜller, Introd. to Mythol. p. 195; Curtius, i, 387,
389, 392; Duncker, iii, 519-21, 563; Thirlwall, i, 204; Barthélemy
St. Hilaire, préf. to tr. of Metaphys. of Aristotle, p. 14. Professor
Gilbert Murray, noting that Homer and Hesiod treated the Gods as
elements of romance, or as facts to be catalogued, asks: "Where is
the literature of religion: the literature which treated the Gods as
Gods? It must," he adds, "have existed"; and he holds that we "can
see that the religious writings were both early and multitudinous"
(Hist. of Anc. Greek Lit. p. 62; cp. Meyer and Mahaffy as cited
above, pp. 125-26. "Writings" is not here to be taken literally;
the early hymns were unwritten). The priestly hymns and oracles
and mystery-rituals in question were never collected; but perhaps
we may form some idea of their nature from the "Homeridian" and
Orphic hymns to the Gods, and those of the Alexandrian antiquary
Callimachus. It is further to be inferred that they enter into the
Hesiodic Theogony. (Decharme, p. 3, citing Bergk.)

[464] Meyer, ii, 426; Curtius, i, 390-91, 417; Thirlwall, i, 204;
Grote, i, 48-49.

[465] Meyer, ii, 410-14.

[466] Cp. Curtius, i, 392-400, 416; Duncker, iii, 529.

[467] Curtius, i, 112; Meyer, ii, 366.

[468] Curtius, i, 201, 204, 205, 381; Grote, iii, 5; Lange, Gesch. des
Materialismus, 3te Aufl. i, 23 (Eng. tr. i, 23).

[469] Herodotos, i, 170; Diogenes Laërtius, Thales, ch. i.

[470] On the essentially anti-religious rationalism of the whole
Ionian movement, cp. Meyer, ii, 753-57.

[471] The First Philosophers of Greece, by A. Fairbanks, 1898, pp. 2,
3, 6. This compilation usefully supplies a revised text of the ancient
philosophic fragments, with a translation of these and of the passages
on the early thinkers by the later, and by the epitomists. A good
conspectus of the remains of the early Greek thinkers is supplied
also in Grote's Plato and the other Companions of Sokrates, ch. i;
and a valuable critical analysis of the sources in Prof. J. Burnet's
Early Greek Philosophy.

[472] Cp. Lange, Gesch. des Mat. i, 126 (Eng. tr. i, 8, n.). Mr. Benn
(The Greek Philosophers, i, 8) and Prof. Decharme (p. 39) seem to read
this as a profession of belief in deities in the ordinary sense. But
cp. R. W. Mackay, The Progress of the Intellect, 1850, i, 338. Burnet
(ch. i, § 11) doubts the authenticity of this saying, but thinks it
"extremely probable that Thales did say that the magnet and amber
had souls."

[473] Mackay, as cited, p. 331.

[474] Fairbanks, p. 4.

[475] Diogenes Laërtius, Thales, ch. 9.

[476] Fairbanks, pp. 3, 7.

[477] Herodotos, i, 74.

[478] Cp. Burnet, Early Greek Philos. 2nd. ed. introd. § 3. To Thales
is ascribed by the Greeks the "discovery" of the constellation Ursus
Major. Diog. ch. 2. As it was called "Phoenike" by the Greeks, his
knowledge would be of Phoenician derivation. Cp. Humboldt, Kosmos,
Bohn tr. iii, 160.

[479] Diog. Laërt. ch. 3. On this cp. Burnet, introd. § 6.

[480] Herod. i, 170. Cp. Diog. Laërt. ch. 3.

[481] Diog. Laërt. ch. 9.

[482] Cp. Burnet, p. 57.

[483] Fairbanks, pp. 9-10. Mr. Benn (Greek Philosophers, i, 9)
decides that the early philosophers, while realizing that ex nihilo
nihil fit, had not grasped the complementary truth that nothing can be
annihilated. But even if the teaching ascribed to Anaximandros be set
aside as contradictory (since he spoke of generation and destruction
within the infinite), we have the statement of Diogenes Laërtius
(bk. ix, ch. 9, § 57) that Diogenes of Apollonia, pupil of Anaximenes,
gave the full Lucretian formula.

[484] Diogenes Laërtius, however (ii, 2), makes him agree with Thales.

[485] Fairbanks, pp. 9-16. Diogenes makes him the inventor of
the gnomon and of the first map and globe, as well as a maker of
clocks. Cp. Grote, i, 330, note.

[486] See below, p. 158, as to Demokritos' statement concerning the
Eastern currency of scientific views which, when put by Anaxagoras,
scandalized the Greeks.

[487] Fairbanks, pp. 17-22.

[488] See Windelband, Hist. of Anc. Philos. Eng. tr. 1900, p. 25,
citing Diels and Wilamowitz-Möllendorf. Cp. Burnet, introd. § 14.

[489] It will be observed that Mr. Cornford's book, though somewhat
loosely speculative is very freshly suggestive. It is well worth
study, alongside of the work of Prof. Burnet, by those interested in
the scientific presentation of the evolution of thought.

[490] Diog. Laërt. ix, 19; Fairbanks, p. 76.

[491] Herodotos, i, 163-67; Grote, iii, 421; Meyer, ii, § 438.

[492] Cp. Guillaume Bréton, Essai sur la poésie philosophique
en Grèce, 1882, pp. 23-25. The life period of Xenophanes is
still uncertain. Meyer (ii, § 466) and Windelband (Hist. of
Anc. Philos. Eng. tr. p. 47) still adhere to the chronology which puts
him in the century 570-470, making him a young man at the foundation
of Elea.

[493] Cousin, developed by G. Bréton, work cited, p. 31 sq., traces
Xenophanes's doctrine of the unity of things to the school of
Pythagoras. It clearly had antecedents. But Xenophanes is recorded
to have argued against Pythagoras as well as Thales and Epimenides
(Diog. Laërt. ix, 2, §§ 18, 20).

[494] Metaphysics, i, 5; cp. Fairbanks, pp. 79-80.

[495] One of several so entitled in that age. Cp. Burnet, introd. § 7.

[496] Metaph., as cited; Plato, Soph. 242 D.

[497] Long fragment in Athenæus, xi, 7; Burnet, p. 130.

[498] Burnet, p. 141.

[499] Cp. Burnet, p. 131.

[500] Fairbanks, p. 67, Fr. 5, 6; Clem. Alex. Stromata, bk. v,
Wilson's tr. ii, 285-86. Cp. bk. vii, c. 4.

[501] Fairbanks, Fr. 7.

[502] Cicero, De divinatione, i, 3, 5; Aetius, De placitis reliquiæ,
in Fairbanks, p. 85.

[503] Aristotle, Rhetoric, ii, 23, § 27. A similar saying is attributed
to Herakleitos, on slight authority (Fairbanks, p. 54).

[504] Cicero, Academica, ii, 39; Lactantius, <DW37>. Inst. iii,
23. Anaxagoras and Demokritos held the same view. Diog. Laërt, bk. ii,
ch. iii, iv (§ 8); Pseudo-Plutarch, De placitis philosoph. ii, 25.

[505] Cp. Mackay, Progress of the Intellect, i, 340.

[506] Diog. Laërt. in life of Pyrrho, bk. ix, ch. xi, 8 (§ 72). The
passage, however, is uncertain. See Fairbanks, p. 70.

[507] Fairbanks. Fr. 1. Fairbanks translates with Zeller: "The whole
[of God]." Grote: "The whole Kosmos, or the whole God." It should
be noted that the original in Sextus Empiricus (Adv. Math. ix, 144)
is given without the name of Xenophanes, and the ascription is modern.

[508] Grote, as last cited, p. 18.

[509] Fairbanks, Fr. 19. In Athenæus, x, 413.

[510] Polybius, iv, 40; Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos,
viii, 126; Fairbanks, pp. 25, 27; Frag. 4, 14. Cp. 92, 111, 113.

[511] Diog. Laërt. ix, i, 2.

[512] Fairbanks, Fr. 134.

[513] Id. Frag. 36, 67.

[514] Id. Frag. 43, 44, 46, 62.

[515] Diog. Laërt. last cited. This saying is by some ascribed to the
later Herakleides (see Fairbanks, Fr. 119 and note); but it does not
seem to be in his vein, which is wholly pro-Homeric.

[516] Clem. Alex. Protrept. ch. 2, Wilson's tr. p. 41. The passage is
obscure, but Mr. Fairbanks's translation (Fr. 127) is excessively so.

[517] Clemens, as cited, p.32; Fairbanks, Fr. 124, 125,
130. Cp. Burnet, p. 139.

[518] Fairbanks, Fr. 21.

[519] Cp. Burnet, pp. 175-90.

[520] Theaetetus, 180 D. See good estimates of Parmenides in Benn's
Greek Philosophers, i, 17-19, and Philosophy of Greece in Relation to
the Character of its People, pp. 83-95; in J. A. Symonds's Studies of
the Greek Poets, 3rd ed. 1893, vol. i, ch. 6; and in Zeller, i, 580 sq.

[521] Plutarch, Perikles, ch. 26.

[522] Mr. Benn finally gives very high praise to Melissos
(Philos. of Greece, pp. 91-92); as does Prof. Burnet (Early
Gr. Philos. p. 378). He held strongly by the Ionian conception of
the eternity of matter. Fairbanks, p. 125.

[523] Diog. Laërt. bk. ix, ch. iv, 3 (§ 24).

[524] Diog. Laërt. ix, 3 (§ 21).

[525] As to this see Windelband, Hist. Anc. Philos. pp. 91-92.

[526] Cp. Mackay, Progress of the Intellect, i. 340.

[527] "The difference between the Ionians and Eleatæ was this:
the former endeavoured to trace an idea among phenomena by aid
of observation; the latter evaded the difficulty by dogmatically
asserting the objective existence of an idea" (Mackay, as last cited).

[528] Cp. Mackay, i, 352-53, as to the survival of veneration of the
heavenly bodies in the various schools.

[529] Grote, i, 350.

[530] Meyer, ii, 9, 759 (§§ 5, 465).

[531] Id. §§ 6, 466.

[532] Jevons, Hist. of Greek Lit. 1886, p. 210.

[533] Compare Meyer, ii, § 502, as to the close resemblances between
Pythagoreanism and Orphicism.

[534] Meyer, i, 186; ii, 635.

[535] Fairbanks, pp. 145, 151, 155, etc.

[536] Id. p. 143.

[537] Id. p. 154.

[538] Prof. Burnet insists (introd. p. 30) that "the" Greeks must
be reckoned good observers because their later sculptors were so. As
well say that artists make the best men of science.

[539] Metaph. i, 5; Fairbanks, p. 136. "It is quite safe to attribute
the substance of the First Book of Euclid to Pythagoras." Burnet,
Early Greek Philos. 2nd ed. p. 117.

[540] Diog. Laërt. Philolaos (bk. viii, ch. 7).

[541] L. U. K. Hist. of Astron. p. 20; A. Berry's Short Hist. of
Astron. 1898, p. 25; Narrien's Histor. Acc. of the Orig. and Prog. of
Astron. 1850, p. 163.

[542] See Benn, Greek Philosophers, i, 11.

[543] Diog. Laërt. in life of Philolaos; Cicero, Academica, ii,
39. Cicero, following Theophrastus, is explicit as to the teaching
of Hiketas.

[544] Hippolytos, Ref. of all Heresies, i, 13. Cp. Renouvier, Manuel
de la philos. anc. i, 201, 205, 238-39.

[545] Pseudo-Plutarch, De Placitis Philosoph. iii, 13, 14.

[546] Ueberweg, i, 49. Cp. Tertullian (Apol. ch. 11), who says
Pythagoras taught that the world was uncreated; and the contrary
statement of Aetius (in Fairbanks, pp. 146-47).

[547] Berry, Short Hist. of Astron. pp. 22, 25. The question is ably
handled by Renouvier, Manuel, i, 199-205.

[548] Diog. Laërt., viii, i, 8.

[549] The whole question is carefully sifted by Grote, iv,
76-94. Prof. Burnet (Early Greek Philos. 2nd ed. pp. 96-98) sums up
that the Pythagorean Order was an attempt to overrule or supersede
the State.

[550] Cp. Burnet, p. 97, note 3. Prof. Burnet speaks of the Pythagorean
Order as a "new religion" appealing to the people rather than the
aristocrats, who were apt to be "freethinking." But on the next page he
pictures the "plain man" as resenting precisely the religious neology
of the movement. The evidence for the adhesion of aristocrats seems
pretty strong.

[551] Fairbanks, p. 143.

[552] Grote, Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates, ed. 1885,
iv, 163.

[553] Diog. Laërt. bk. viii, ch. i, 19 (§ 21).

[554] Ennius, Fragmenta, ed. Hesselius, 1707, pp. 1, 4-7; Horace,
Epist. ii, 1, 52; Persius, Sat. vi.

[555] Grote, History, iv, 97.

[556] Scholiast on Iliad, xx, 67; Tatian, Adv. Græcos, c. 48 (31);
W. Christ, Gesch. der griech. Literatur, 3te Aufl. p. 63; Grote,
ch. xvi (i, 374).

[557] See above, p. 145.

[558] K. O. Müller, Dorians, Eng. tr. ii, 365-68; Mommsen, Hist. of
Rome, Eng. tr. ed. 1894, iii, 113.

[559] Grote. i, 338, note.

[560] Cicero, De natura Deorum, i, 22.

[561] Philolaos, as we saw, is said to have been prosecuted, but is
not said to have been condemned.

[562] Fairbanks, pp. 245, 255, 261; Diog. Laërt. bk. ii, ch. iii, 4
(§ 8).

[563] Fairbanks, pp. 230-45. Cp. Grote, Plato, i, 54, and Ueberweg,
i, 66, as to nature of the Nous of Anaxagoras.

[564] Grote, i, 374; Hesychius, s.v. Agamemnona;
cp. Diog. Laërt. bk. ii, ch. iii, 7 (§ 11); Tatian, Adv. Græcos,
c. 37 (21).

[565] Plutarch, Perikles, ch. 6.

[566] Id. chs. 5, 8.

[567] Id. c. 16. The old man is said to have uttered the reproach:
"Perikles, those who want to use a lamp supply it with oil."

[568] Plutarch, Perikles, ch. 4.

[569] Cp. Meyer, Gesch. des Alt. iv, 277.

[570] Plutarch, Perikles, ch. 32.

[571] Diog. Laërt. bk. ix, ch. ix (§ 57), citing the Defence of
Sokrates by Demetrius Phalereus.

[572] Id. bk. ii, ch. iii, 9 (§ 12), citing Sotion. Another writer of
philosophers' lives, Hermippus (same cit.), said he had been thrown
into prison; and yet a third, Hieronymus, said he was released out
of pity because of his emaciated appearance when produced in court
by Perikles.

[573] Diog. Laërt. last cit. 10 (§ 14).

[574] Id. 8 (§ 11).

[575] Drews, Gesch. des Monismus im Altertum, p. 205.

[576] Even in the early progressive period "the same time which
set up rationalism developed a deep religious influence in the
masses." (Meyer, Gesch. des Alt. ii, 728. Cp. iii, 425; also Grote,
vii, 30; and Benn, Philosophy of Greece, 1898, pp. 69-70.)

[577] Plutarch, Perikles, ch. 32.

[578] Cp. Grote, v, 24; Curtius, ii, 208-209.

[579] Plutarch, as cited. Plutarch also states, however, that the
only occasion on which Perikles gave way to emotion in public was
that of the death of his favourite son.

[580] Holm (Griechische Geschichte, ii, 335) decides that Perikles
sought to Ionise his fellow Athenians; and Dr. Burnet, coinciding
(Early Greek Philosophy, 1892, p. 277), suggests that he and Aspasia
brought Anaxagoras to Athens with that aim.

[581] Perikles, ch. 8.

[582] "Der Kleinasiatische Rationalist Herodot" is the exaggerated
estimate of A. Bauer, in Ilberg's Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische
Altertum, ix (1902), 235, following Eduard Meyer (iv, § 448), who,
however (§ 447), points to the lack of scientific thought or training
in Herodotos as in Thukydides. Ignorance of Nature remained a Greek
characteristic.

[583] Bk. viii, ch. 77. Cp. viii, 20, 96; ix, 43.

[584] Cp. Meyer, iv, § 446, as to the inadequacy of Athenian culture,
and the unchanging ignorance of the populace on matters of physical
science.

[585] Plutarch, Against the Stoics, ch. 31; Simplicius, Physica, i, 6.

[586] Clem. Alex. Protrept. c. 4.

[587] Refutation of all Heresies, i, 14.

[588] Cp. Aristotle, Metaphysics, i, 3; De anima, i, 2.

[589] Decharme, Critique des trad. relig. p. 137, citing scholiast
on Aristoph., Clouds, 96.

[590] See the point discussed by Lange, Geschichte des Materialismus,
3te Aufl. i, 128-29, 131-32, notes 10 and 31 (Eng. tr. i, 15,
39). Ritter and Preller say "Protagoras floret circa a. 450-430";
"Democritus natus circa a. 460 floret a. 430-410, obit. circa a. 357."

[591] Cp. Ueberweg, i, 68-69; Renouvier, Manuel de la philos. anc. i,
238.

[592] Burnet, p. 381.

[593] Diog. Laërt. x, 13.

[594] Lange, i, 10-11 (tr. p. 17); Clem. Alex. Stromata, i, 15;
Diog. Laërt. bk. ix, § 35.

[595] On this also see Lange, i, 128 (tr. p. 15, note).

[596] Diog. Laërt. bk. ix, ch. vii, 2 (§ 34). Cp. Renouvier, i, 239-41.

[597] See in particular the De principiis atque originibus (Works,
Routledge's 1-vol. ed. 1905, pp. 649-50).

[598] Meyer, who dwells on his scientific shortcomings (Gesch. des
Alt. v. § 910), makes no account of this, his vital doctrine.

[599] Fairbanks, pp. 189-91. The idea is not put by Empedokles with any
such definiteness as is suggested by Lange, i, 23-25 (tr. pp. 33-35),
and Ueberweg, Hist. of Philos. Eng. tr. i, 62, n. But Ueberweg's
exposition is illuminating.

[600] Fairbanks, pp. 136, 169.

[601] Id. p. 201.

[602] Benn, i, 28.

[603] Fairbanks, p. 205.

[604] See a good study of Empedokles in J. A. Symonds' Studies of the
Greek Poets, 3rd ed. 1893, vol. i, ch. 7; and another in Renouvier,
Manuel, i, 163-82.

[605] Cp. Grote, Plato, i, 73, and note.

[606] Cp. Renouvier, i, 239-62; Lange, p. 11 (tr. p. 17).

[607] Cp. Meyer, § 911.

[608] Diogenes Laërtius, bk. ix, ch. viii, § 3 (51); cp. Grote, vii,
49, note.

[609] For a defence of Protagoras against Plato, see Grote, vii, 43-54.

[610] Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, ix, 56.

[611] Beckmann, History of Inventions, Eng. tr. 1846, ii, 513.

[612] Diod. Sic. xiii, 6; Hesychius, cit. in Cudworth, ed. Harrison,
i, 131.

[613] Ueberweg, i, 80; Thukydides, v, 116. The bias of Sextus
Empiricus is further shown in his account of Diagoras as moved in
his denunciation by an injury to himself.

[614] It is told by Sextus Empiricus (Adv. Math. ix, 53) that Diagoras
is said to have invented the dithyramb (in praise of Iacchos), and
to have begun a poem with the words, "All things come by the daimon
and fortune." But Sextus writes with a fixed skeptical bias.

[615] Grote, vi, 13, 32, 33, 42-45.

[616] Athenagoras, Apol., ch. 4; Clem. Alex., Protrept. ch. 2. See
the documentary details in Meyer, iv, 105.

[617] Cicero, De natura Deorum, i, 1, 23, 42; iii, 37 (the last
reference gives proof of his general rationalism); Lactantius, De irâ
Dei, c. 9. In calling Sokrates "the Melian," Aristophanes (Clouds,
830) was held to have virtually called him "the atheist."

[618] Diod. xiii, 6; Suidas, s.v. Diagoras; Aristophanes, Birds,
1073. It is noteworthy that in their fury against Diagoras the
Athenians put him on a level of common odium with the "tyrants"
of past history. Cp. Burckhardt, Griechische Culturgeschichte, i, 355.

[619] Grote, vi, 476-77. As to the freethinking of Kritias, see Sextus
Empiricus, Adv. Math. ix, 54. According to Xenophon (Memorabilia, i,
2), Kritias made his decree in revenge for Sokrates's condemnation
of one of his illicit passions. Prof. Decharme (pp. 122-24) gives a
good account of him.

[620] Diog. Laërt. bk. ii, ch. iv; Hippolytos, Refutation of all
Heresies, i, 8; Renouvier, Manuel, i, 233-37.

[621] Cp. Cudworth, Intellectual System, ed. Harrison, i, 32;
Renouvier, Manuel, i, 233, 289; ii, 268, 292; Tatian, Adv. Græcos,
c. 48 (31); Diog. Laërt. bk. ii, ch. iii, 7 (§ 11); Grote, i, 374,
395, note; Hatch, Infl. of Greek Ideas, p. 60.

[622] Haigh, Tragic Drama of the Greeks, p. 206. Cp. Burnett, p. 278.

[623] Diog. Laërt. bk. ii (§ 22).

[624] "He never so utterly abandoned the religion of his country as to
find it impossible to acquiesce in at least some part of traditional
religion." Jevons, Hist. of Greek Lit. 1886. p. 222.

[625] Haigh, The Attic Theatre, 1889, p. 316.

[626] Above, p. 133.

[627] "He had also acquired in no small degree that love of dexterous
argumentation and verbal sophistry which was becoming fashionable in
the Athens of the fifth century. Not unfrequently he exhibits this
dexterity when it is clearly out of place." Haigh, Tragic Drama of
the Greeks, p. 235. Cp. Jevons, Hist. of Greek Lit. p. 223. Schlegel
is much more censorious.

[628] Ion., 436-51, 885-922; Andromache, 1161-65; Electra, 1245-46;
Hercules Furens, 339-47; Iphigenia in Tauris, 35, 711-15.

[629] Hercules Furens, 344, 1341-46; Iphigenia in Tauris, 380-91.

[630] Electra, 737-45.

[631] Troades, 969-90.

[632] Ion, 374-78, 685; Helena, 744-57; Iphigenia in Tauris, 570-75;
Electra, 400; Phoenissæ, 772; Fragm. 793; Bacchæ, 255-57; Hippolytus,
1059. It is noteworthy that even Sophocles (OEd. Tyr., 387) makes a
character taunt Tiresias the soothsayer with venality.

[633] Philoctetes, fr. 793; Helena, 1137-43; Bellerophon, fr. 288.

[634] Bacchæ, 200-203.

[635] Helena, 1013; Fragm. 890, 905, 935; Troades, 848-88.

[636] A. Schlegel, Lectures on Dramatic Literature, Bohn tr. p. 117.

[637] This charge is on a par with that of Hygiainon, who accused
Euripides of impiety on the score that one of his characters makes
light of oaths. Aristotle, Rhetoric, iii, 15.

[638] K. O. Müller, Hist. of the Lit. of Anc. Greece, 1847, p. 359. The
complaint is somewhat surprising from such a source. The only play
with an entirely invented plot mentioned by Aristotle is Agathon's
Flower (Aristotle, Poetic, ix); and such plays would not have been
eligible for representation at the great festivals.

[639] Cp. Jevons, Hist. of Greek Lit. pp. 223-24.

[640] Haigh. The Attic Theatre, p. 191. Cp. Müller, pp. 362-64.

[641] See, however, the æsthetic theorem of Prof. Murray, Euripides
and his Age, pp. 221-27.

[642] It seems arguable that the aversion of Aristophanes to Euripides
was primarily artistic, arising in dislike of some of the features of
his style. On this head his must be reckoned an expert judgment. The
old criticism found in Euripides literary vices; the new seems to
ignore the issue. But a clerical scholar pronounces that "Aristophanes
was the most unreasoning laudator temporis acti. Genius and poet as he
was, he was the sworn foe to intellectual progress." Hence his hatred
of Euripides and his championship of Æschylus. (Rev. Dr. W. W. Merry,
introd. to Clar. Press ed. of The Frogs, 1892.)

[643] Girard, Essai sur Thucydide, 1884, pp. 258-59.

[644] Cp. Haigh, The Attic Theatre, p. 315. In the same way
Ktesilochos, the pupil of Apelles, could with impunity make Zeus
ridiculous by exhibiting him pictorially in child-bed, bringing forth
Dionysos (Pliny, Hist. Nat. xxxv, 40. § 15).

[645] Bk. x, ad init.

[646] Cp. Benn, Philos. of Greece, p. 171.

[647] Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic Schools, Eng. tr. 3rd
ed. p. 227: Hegel, as there cited Grote, Plato, ed. 1885, i, 423.

[648] Cp. Owen, Evenings with the Skeptics, i, 181 sq., 291, 293,
299, etc.

[649] Grote, History, i, 334; Xenophon, Memorabilia, i, 1, §§ 6-9.

[650] Cp. Benn. The Philosophy of the Greeks, 1898, p. 160.

[651] Grote, i, 334-35; Hippocrates, De Aeribus, Aquis, Locis, c. 22
(49).

[652] Plato, Phædrus, Jowett's tr. 3rd ed. i. 434; Grote, History,
i, 393.

[653] Compare, however, the claim made for him, as promoting
"objectivity," by Prof. Drews, Gesch. des Monismus im Altertum,
1913. P. 213.

[654] Memorabilia, i, 4.

[655] "The predominatingly theistic character of philosophy ever since
has been stamped on it by Socrates, as it was stamped on Socrates by
Athens" (Benn, Philos. of Greece, p. 168).

[656] Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic Schools, as cited, p. 231. The
case against Sokrates is bitterly urged by Forchhammer, Die Athenen und
Sokrates, 1837; see in particular pp. 8-11. Cp. Grote, Hist. vii, 81.

[657] "Had not all the cultivated men of the time passed through
a school of rationalism which had entirely pulled to pieces the
beliefs and the morals of their ancestors?" Zeller, as last cited,
pp. 231-33. Cp. Haigh, Tragic Drama, p. 261.

[658] See Aristophanes's Frogs, 888-94.

[659] Æschines, Timarchos, cited by Thirlwall, iv, 277. Cp. Xenophon,
Mem. i, 2.

[660] "Nothing could well be more unpopular and obnoxious than
the task which he undertook of cross-examining and convicting of
ignorance every distinguished man whom he could approach." Grote,
vii. 95. Cp. pp. 141-44. Cp. also Trevelyan's Life of Macaulay,
ed. 1881, p. 316: and Renouvier, Manuel de la philos. anc. 1, iv,
§ iii. See also, however, Benn, Phil. of Greece, pp. 162-63. For a
view of Sokrates's relations to his chief accuser, which partially
vindicates or whitewashes the latter, see Prof. G. Murray's Anc. Greek
Lit. pp. 176-77. There is a good monograph by H. Bleeckly, Socrates
and the Athenians: An Apology, 1884, which holds the balances fairly.

[661] On the desire of Sokrates to die see Grote, vii, 152-64.

[662] The assertion of Plutarch that after his death the prosecutors of
Sokrates were socially excommunicated, and so driven to hang themselves
(Moralia: Of Envy and Hatred), is an interesting instance of moral
myth-making. It has no historic basis; though Diogenes (ii, 23 §
43) and Diodorus Siculus (xiv, 37), late authorities both, allege
an Athenian reaction in Sokrates' favour. Probably the story of the
suicide of Judas was framed in imitation of Plutarch's.

[663] Grote, History, i, 94.

[664] Id. i, 194. Not till Strabo do we find this myth disbelieved;
and Strabo was surprised to find most men holding by the old story
while admitting that the race of Amazons had died out. Id. p. 197.

[665] Life of Thukydides, by Marcellinus, ch. 22, citing
Antyllas. Cp. Girard, Essai sur Thucydide, p. 239; and the prefaces
of Hobbes and Smith to their translations.

[666] Girard, p. 3.

[667] "His writings," remarks Dr. Hatch, "contain the seeds of nearly
all that afterwards grew up on Christian soil" (Influence of Greek
Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church, 1890, p. 182).

[668] Clem. Alex. Stromata, v, 14; Fairbanks, pp. 146-47; Grote,
Plato, ch. 38.

[669] Cp. Grote, Plato, iv, 162, 381. Professor Bain, however
(Practical Essays, 1884, p. 273), raises an interesting question by
his remark, as to the death of Sokrates: "The first person to feel
the shock was Plato. That he was affected by it to the extent of
suppressing his views on the higher questions we can infer with the
greatest probability. Aristotle was equally cowed."

[670] Diog. Laër. bk. ix, ch. vii, § 8 (40).

[671] Republic, bk. ii, 377, to iii, 393; Jowett's tr. 3rd ed. iii,
60 sq., 68 sq. In bk. x, it is true, he does speak of the poets as
unqualified by knowledge and training to teach truth (Jowett's tr. iii,
311 sq.); but Plato's "truth" is not objective, but idealistic,
or rather fictitious-didactic.

[672] Id. Jowett. pp. 59, 69, etc.

[673] Id. bk. iii; Jowett, pp. 103-105.

[674] Laws, x; Jowett, v, 295-98.

[675] Received myths are forbidden; and the preferred fictions are
to be city law. Cp. the Laws, ii, iii; Jowett, v, 42, 79.

[676] Laws, Jowett's tr. 3rd ed. v, 271-72. Cp. the comment of Benn,
i, 271-72.

[677] Republic, bk. ii, 379; Jowett, iii, 62.

[678] Laws, x, 906-907, 910; Jowett, v, 293-94, 297-98.

[679] On the inconsistency of the whole doctrine see see Grote's Plato,
iv, 379-97.

[680] Ueberweg, Hist. of Philos. Eng. tr. i, 25. Cp. Lange, Geschichte
des Materialismus, i, 38-39 (tr. i, 52-54), and the remarkable verdict
of Bacon (De Augmentis, bk. iii, ch. 4; Works, 1-vol. ed. 1905, p. 471;
cp. Advancement of Learning, bk. ii, p. 96) as to the superiority
of the natural philosophy of Demokritos over those of Plato and
Aristotle. Bacon immediately qualifies his verdict; but he repeats
it, as regards both Aristotle and Plato, in the Novum Organum, bk. i,
aph. 96. See, however, Mr. Benn's final eulogy of Plato as a thinker,
i, 273, and Murray's Anc. Greek Lit. pp. 311-13.

[681] Laws, x, 908; Jowett, v, 295.

[682] Grote, History, vii, 168.

[683] Cp. Grote, Aristotle, 2nd ed. p. 10.

[684] Origen, Against Celsus, ii, 13; cp. i, 65; iii, 75; vii, 3.

[685] Grote, Aristotle, p. 13.

[686] Benn, Greek Philosophers, i, 352. Mr. Benn refutes Sir A. Grant's
view that Aristotle's creed was a "vague pantheism"; but that phrase
loosely conveys the idea of its non-religiousness. It might be called a
Lucretian monotheism. Cp. Benn, i, 294; and Drews, Gesch. des Monismus,
p. 257.

[687] Metaphysics, xi (xii), 8, 13 (p. 1074, b). The passage is so
stringent as to raise the question how he came to run the risk in this
one case. It was probably a late writing, and he may have taken it
for granted that the Metaphysics would never be read by the orthodox.

[688] Cp. the severe criticisms of Benn, vol. i, ch. vi; Berry,
Short Hist. of Astron. p. 33; and Lange, Ges. des Mater. i, 61-68,
and notes, citing Eucken and Cuvier. Aristotle's science is very
much on a par with that of Bacon, who saw his imperfections, but fell
into the same kinds of error. Both insisted on an inductive method;
and both transgressed from it. See, however, Lange's summary, p. 69,
also p. 7, as to the unfairness of Whewell; and ch. v of Soury's
Bréviaire de l'histoire du Matérialisme, 1881, especially end.

[689] Politics, i, 2.

[690] Strabo, bk. ix, ch. iii, § 11. Strabo reproaches Ephoros with
repeating the current legends all the same; but it seems clear that
he anticipated the critical tactic of Gibbon.

[691] As to the Stoics, cp. Zeller, § 34, 4; Benn, The Philosophy of
Greece, pp. 255-56. As to Epicurus, cp. Benn, p. 261.

[692] Diog. Laërt. bk. ix, ch. xi, 5, § 64. The lengthy notice given
by Diogenes shows the impression Pyrrho's teaching made. See a full
account of it, so far as known, in the Rev. J. Owen's Evenings with
the Skeptics, 1881, i, 287 sq., and the monograph of Zimmerman,
there cited.

[693] These propositions occur in the first of the ten Pyrrhonian
tropoi or modes (Diog. Laërt. bk. ix, ch. xi, 9), of which the
authorship is commonly assigned to Ænesidemos (fl. 80-50). Cp. Owen,
Evenings with the Skeptics, i, 290, 322-23. But as given by Diogenes
they seem to derive from the early Pyrrhonian school.

[694] Thus, where Democritos pronounced the sun to be of vast size,
Epicurus held it to be no larger than it seemed (Cicero, De Finibus, i,
6)--a view also loosely ascribed to Herakleitos (Diog. Laërt. bk. ix,
ch. i, 6, § 7). See, however, Wallace's Epicureanism ("Ancient
Philosophies" series), 1889, pp. 176 sq., 186 sq., 266, as to the
scientific merits of the system.

[695] The Epicurean doctrine on this and other heads is chiefly to be
gathered from the great poem of Lucretius. Prof. Wallace's excellent
treatise gives all the clues. See p. 202 as to the Epicurean God-idea.

[696] Grote, History, i, 395, note; Plutarch, Non posse suaviter vivi
sec. Epicur.

[697] Compare Wallace, Epicureanism, pp. 64-71, and ch. xi; and
Mackintosh, On the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, 4th ed. p. 29.

[698] De rerum natura, i, 62-79.

[699] Alexander seu Pseudomantis, cc. 25, 38, 47, 61, cited by Wallace,
pp. 249-50.

[700] The repute of the Epicureans for irreligion appears in the
fact that when Romanized Athens had consented to admit foreigners
to the once strictly Athenian mysteries of Eleusis, the Epicureans
were excluded.

[701] Cicero, De natura Deorum, i, 13; Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata,
v, 14; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Mathematicos, ix, 51, 55.

[702] Diog. Laërt. bk ii, ch. viii, §§ 7, 11-14 (86, 97-100). He was
also nicknamed "the God." Id. and ch. xii, 5 (§ 116).

[703] Cicero, De natura Deorum, i, 1, 23, 42.

[704] Diogenes, as last cited, § 12 (97).

[705] Id. §§ 15, 16 (101-102).

[706] Professor Wallace's account of the court of Lysimachos of Thrace
as a "favourite resort of emancipated freethinkers" (Epicureanism,
p. 42) is hardly borne out by his authority, Diogenes Laërtius, who
represents Lysimachos as unfriendly towards Theodoros. Hipparchia
the Cynic, too, opposed rather than agreed with the atheist.

[707] Diog., last cit. Cp. Cicero, Tusculans, ii, 43. Philo Judæus
(Quod Omnis Probus Liber, c. 18; cp. Plutarch, De Exilio, c. 16) has
a story of his repelling taunts about his banishment by comparing
himself to Hercules, who was put ashore by the alarmed Argonauts
because of his weight. But he is further made to boast extravagantly,
and in doing so to speak as a believer in myths and deities. The
testimony has thus little value.

[708] Diog. bk. ii, ch. xii, § 5 (116).

[709] Id. ch. x, § 2 (106).

[710] Id. ch. xii, § 5 (117) and bk. iv, ch. vii, §§ 4, 9, 10 (52,
54, 55).

[711] Plutarch, De defectu orac. ch. 19. Bion seems to have made an
impression on Plutarch, who often quotes him, though it be but to
contradict him.

[712] Cicero, De natura Deorum, i, 13.

[713] Id. ib.; Academics, iv, 38.

[714] Cicero, Tusculans, i, 10, 31; Academics, ii, 39; and refs. in
ed. Davis.

[715] Sir A. Grant's tr. of the hymn is given in Capes's Stoicism
("Chief Ancient Philosophies" series), 1880, p. 41; and the Greek
text by Mahaffy, Greek Life and Thought, p. 262. Cp. Cicero, De
nat. Deor. i, 14.

[716] Pseudo-Plutarch, De placitis philosoph. i, 7.

[717] Eusebius, Præp. Evang. bk. ii, ch. 2; Plutarch, Isis and Osiris,
ch. 23.

[718] P. 80.

[719] It may be noted that Diogenes of Babylon, a follower of
Chrysippos, applied the principle to Greek mythology. Cicero, De
nat. Deor. i, 15.

[720] Above, p. 80, note 4.

[721] See Grote, i, 371-74 and notes.

[722] Palaiphatos, De Incredibilibus: De Actæone, De Geryone, De
Cerbero, De Amazonibus, etc.

[723] E. R. Bevan (art. "The Deification of Kings in the Greek Cities"
in Eng. Histor. Rev. Oct. 1901, p. 631) argues that the practice was
not primarily eastern, but Greek. See, however, Herodotos, vii, 136;
Arrian, Anabas. Alexand. iv, 11; Q. Curtius, viii, 5-8; and Plutarch,
Artaxerxes, ch. 22, as to the normal attitude of the Greeks, even as
late as Alexander.

[724] See Plutarch, Isis and Osiris, chs. 22, 23, for the later
Hellenistic tone on the subject of apotheosis apart from the official
practice of the empire.

[725] Gibbon, ch. xl. Bohn ed. iv, 353, and note.

[726] Mahaffy, Greek Life, pp. 133-35; Diog. Laërt. bk. ii, ch. v,
5 (§ 38).

[727] Wallace, Epicureanism (pp. 245-46), citing Suidas, s.v. Epicurus.

[728] Diogenes Laërtius, bk. vii, ch. i, 28 (§ 33); cp. Origen,
Against Celsus, bk. i, ch. 5; Clemens Alex, Stromata, bk. v, ch. ii.

[729] Mahaffy, as cited, p. 135, n.; Athenæus, ix, 63 (p. 400).

[730] (297 B.C.) Burckhardt, Griechische Culturgeschichte, i, 213;
Pausanias, i, 29.

[731] Cp. G. Guizot, Ménandre, 1855, pp. 324-27, and App.

[732] Cp. Guizot, pp. 327-31, and the fragments cited by Justin Martyr,
De Monarchia, ch. 5.

[733] Whittaker, as cited, p. 85.

[734] Martha, as cited, p. 78.

[735] Diog. Laërt. bk. iv, ch. ix, 8 (§ 65).

[736] Diog. Laërt. bk. iv, ch. ix, 4, 5 (§ 63); Noumenios in
Euseb. Præp. Evang. xiv, 8; Cicero, De Oratore, ii, 38; Lucilius,
cited by Lactantius, <DW37>. Inst.

[737] Cicero, Academics, ii, 34.

[738] Berry, Short Hist. of Astron. pp. 34-62; Narrien,
Histor. Account, as cited, ch. xi; L. U. K. Hist. of Astron. ch. vi. It
is noteworthy that Hipparchos, like so many of his predecessors,
had some of his ideas from Babylonia. Strabo, prooem., § 9.

[739] Ptolemy normally lumps unbelief in religion with all the vices
of character. Cp. the Tetrabiblos, iii, 18 (paraphrase of Proclus).

[740] Hist. Nat. ii, 26.

[741] Lucian's dialogue Philopseudes gives a view of the superstitions
of average Greeks in the second century of our era. Cp. Mr. Williams's
note to the first Dialogue of the Dead, in his tr. p. 87.

[742] See M. Foucart's treatise, Des assoc. relig. chez les Grecs,
1873, 2e ptie.

[743] On the early tendency to orthodox conformity among the
unbelieving Alexandrian scholars, see Mahaffy, Greek Life and Thought,
pp. 260-61.

[744] Frag. cited by Wallace, p. 258.

[745] Rev. Baden Powell, Hist. of Nat. Philos. 1834, p. 79.

[746] De Oratore, iii, 17; De Finibus, ii, 12, 13.

[747] See Saisset, Le Scepticisme, 1865, pp. 22-27, for a careful
discussion of dates.

[748] His own claim was to be of the "methodical" school. Hypotyp. i,
34.

[749] See his doctrine expounded by Owen, Evenings with the Skeptics,
i, 332 sq.

[750] Cp. Owen, p. 349.

[751] These seem to be derived from Carneades. Cp. Ueberweg, i, 217.

[752] "The general character of the Greek Skeptics from Sokrates to
Sextos is quite unexceptionable" (Owen, Evenings, i, 352).

[753] Polybius, bk. vi, ch. lvi. Cp. bk. xvi, Frag. 5 (12), where
he speaks impatiently of the miracle-stories told of certain cults,
and, repeating his opinion that some such stories are useful for
preserving piety among the people, protests that they should be kept
within bounds.

[754] Bk. i, ch. ii, § 8. Plutarch (Isis and Osiris, ch. 8) puts the
more decent principle that all the apparent absurdities have good
occult reasons.

[755] Bk. ix, ch. iii, § 12. Cp. bk. x, ch. iii, § 23. The hand of
an interpolator frequently appears in Strabo (e.g., bk. ix, ch. ii,
§ 40; ch. iii, § 5); and the passage cited in bk. i is more in the
style of the former than of the latter.

[756] See Dr. Hatch, Influence of Greek Ideas upon the Christian
Church, 1890, pp. 60-64, notes; also above, pp. 143 and 161, note.

[757] De defect. orac. c. 19; Isis and Osiris, ch. 67.

[758] De Amore, c. 13; Isis and Osiris, chs. 66, 67; and De
defect. orac. c. 13.

[759] Schmidt, Gesch. der Denk- und Glaubensfreiheit im erst. Jahr.,
1847, p. 22.

[760] Burnet, Early Greek Philos. 1892, p. 276. Cp. 2nd ed. p. 294.

[761] It is to be presumed that Dr. Burnet, when penning his estimate,
had not in memory such a record as Dr. A. D. White's History of the
Warfare between Science and  Theology.

[762] Mommsen, History of Rome, bk. i, ch. 14 (Eng. tr. 1894,
vol. i, pp. 282-83). Mommsen's view of the antiquity of writing
among the Latins (p. 280) is highly speculative. He places its
introduction about or before 1000 B.C.; yet he admits that they got
their alphabet from the Greeks, and he can show no Greek contacts
for that period. Cp. pp. 167-68 (ch. x). Schwegler (Römische
Geschichte, 1853, i, 36) more reasonably places the period after
that of the Etruscan domination, while recognizing the Greek origin
of the script. Cp. Ettore Pais, Ancient Legends of Roman History,
Eng. tr. 1906, pp. 26-28; Pelham, Outlines of Roman History, 1893,
p. 32.

[763] Schwegler, i, ch. i, § 12; Teuffel, Hist. of Roman
Lit. ed. Schwabe, Eng. tr. 1900, i, 100-101, 104-10.

[764] Teuffel, i, 110-11.

[765] Mommsen, bk. ii, ch. 8. Eng. tr. ii, 70. Such creation of deities
by mere abstraction of things and functions had been the rule in the
popular as distinguished from the civic religion. Cp. Augustine, De
civitate Dei, iv, 16, 23; vi, 9, etc. It was the concomitant of the
tendency noted by Livy: adeo minimis etiam rebus prava religio inserit
deos (xxvii, 23). But the practice was not peculiar to the Romans,
for among the Greeks were Gods or Goddesses of Wealth, Peace, Mercy,
Shame, Fortune, Rumour, Energy, Action, Persuasion, Consolation,
Desire, Yearning, Necessity, Force, etc. See Pausanias passim. The
inference is that the more specific deities in all religions, with
personal names, are the product of sacerdotal institutions or of
poetic or other art. M. Boissier (i, 5), like Ihne, takes it for
granted that the multitude of deified abstractions had no legends;
but this is unwarranted. They may have had many; but there were no
poets to sing, or priests to preserve and ritualize them.

[766] De natura Deorum, i, 42.

[767] Mr. Schuckburgh (History of Rome, 1894, p. 401, note) cites
a translated passage in his fragments (Cicero, De <DW37>. ii, 50; De
nat. Deorum, iii, 32), putting the Epicurean view that the Gods clearly
did not govern human affairs, "which he probably would have softened
if he had not agreed with it." Cp. Mommsen, iii, 113 (bk. ii, ch. 13).

[768] Fragmenta, ed. Hesselius, p. 226; Cicero, De Divinatione, i, 58.

[769] Mommsen, i, 301; ii, 71; iii, 117 (bk. i, ch. 15; bk. ii, ch. 8;
bk. iii, ch. 13). Cicero, De <DW37>. i, 41.

[770] Livy, xxix, 18. Dr. Warde Fowler (Religious Experience of the
Roman People, p. 346) censures Mr. Heitland for calling Livy's story
"an interesting romance" (Hist. of Rom. Rep. ii, 229 note); remarking
that "it is the fashion now to reject as false whatever is surprising,"
and adding (p. 347): "It is certain, from the steps taken by the
government  ... that it is in the main a true account." It may suffice
to ask whether Dr. Fowler believes in all or any of the prodigia
mentioned by Livy because the government "took steps" about them.

[771] Cp. Boissier, La religion romaine, i, 39, 346.

[772] Teuffel, i, 122.

[773] Aulus Gellius (xv, 11) says the edict was de philosophis et de
rhetoribus Latinis, but the senatus-consultum, as given by him, does
not contain the adjective; and he goes on to tell that aliquot deinde
annis post--really sixty-nine years later--the censors fulminated
against homines qui NOVUM genus disciplinæ instituerunt ... eos sibi
nomen imposuisse Latinas rhetoras. The former victims, then, were
presumably Greek. Cp. Shuckburgh, p. 520; and Long, Decline of the
Roman Republic, 1866, ii, 146. Professor Pelham (Outlines of Roman
History, 1893, p. 179, note) mistakenly cites the senatus-consultum
as containing the word "Latini." The reading Latinis in Gellius's
own phrase has long been suspected. See ed. Frederic and Gronov, 1706.

[774] Plutarch, Cato, c. 22.

[775] Cicero, De. Repub., passim, ed. Halm.

[776] Polybius, xxxii, 10.

[777] Suetonius, De claris rhetoribus.

[778] See in Cicero, De Oratore, iii, 24, the account by the censor
Crassus of his reasons for preferring the Greek rhetors.

[779] Valerius Maximus, i, 3, 1.

[780] The culture history of the republican period, as partially
recovered by recent archæology, shows a process of dissolution and
replacement from a remote period. Cp. Ettore Pais, Ancient Legends
of Roman History, Eng. tr. 1906, ch. ii, notably p. 18.

[781] De rerum natura, i, 50-135; cp. v, 1166.

[782] ii, 646-50 (the passage cited by Mr. Gladstone in the House
of Commons in one of the Bradlaugh debates, with a confession of its
noble beauty); and again ii, 1090-1105, and iii, 18-22.

[783] See Christianity and Mythology, pp. 52-57.

[784] See the account of the doctrine of the high-priest Scaevola,
preserved by Augustine, De civ. Dei, iv, 27. He and Varro (id. iv,
31; vi, 5-7) agreed in rejecting the current myths, but insisted on
the continued civic acceptance of them. On the whole question compare
Boissier, La religion romaine, i, 47-63.

[785] Thus the satirist Lucilius, who ridiculed the popular beliefs,
was capable, in his capacity of patriot, of crying out against the lack
of respect shown to religion and the Gods (Boissier, pp. 51-52). The
purposive insincerity set up in their thinking by such men must,
of course, have been injurious to character.

[786] Cp. the De Divinatione, i, 2.

[787] E.g., Mr. A. J. Balfour's Foundations of Belief.

[788] Tusc. Disp. i, 26.

[789] De Divinatione, ii, 33, 34, cp. ii, 12; and De nat. Deorum,
i, 22. It is not surprising that in a later age, when the remaining
pagans had no dialectic faculty left, the Christian Fathers, by using
Cicero as a weapon against the cults, could provoke them into calling
him impious (Arnobius, Adv. Gentes, iii, 6, 7).

[790] De Divinatione, ii, 22.

[791] Boissier, i, 58.

[792] De nat. Deorum, ii, 1.

[793] Boissier, p. 59.

[794] "It seems to me that, on the whole, among the educated and
the rich, the indifferent must have been in the majority" (Boissier,
p. 61).

[795] Id. p. 59.

[796] Cp. Long, Decline of Roman Republic, i, 438; ii, 38-40. Long
remarks that Domitius, the accuser of Scaurus (who had prevented his
election to the college of augurs), "used the name of religion for the
purpose of damaging a political enemy; and the trick has been repeated,
and is repeated, up to the present day. The Romans must have kept
records of many of these trials. They were the great events of the
times ...; and so we learn that three tribes voted against Scaurus,
and thirty-two voted for him; but in each of these thirty-two tribes
there was only a small majority of votes (pauca puncta) in favour
of Scaurus."

[797] See Long, i, 56, for a cynical estimate of the mode of
manipulation of the Sibylline and other sacred books.

[798] Sallust, Bellum Catilin. c. 51.

[799] Suetonius, Julius, cc. 59, 77; Cicero, De Divinatione, ii,
24. Cp. Merivale, History of the Romans under the Empire, ed. 1865,
ii, 424.

[800] Plutarch, Sulla, c. 29; Marius, c. 16. Long (Decline of Roman
Republic, ii, 369) says of Sulla that, "though he could rob a temple
when he wanted money, he believed in the religion of his time. We
should call him superstitious; and a man who is superstitious is
capable of any crime, for he believes that the Gods can be conciliated
by prayers and presents."

[801] Compare the fears which grew upon Cromwell in his last days.

[802] Pompeius, on the other hand, had many seers in his camp; but
after his overthrow expressed natural doubts about Providence. Cicero,
De <DW37>. ii, 24, 47; Plutarch, Pompeius, c. 75.

[803] Boissier, i, 73.

[804] See Augustine's citation from Varro, De civ. Dei, vi,
2. Cp. Sueton. Aug. 29.

[805] The only record to the contrary is the worthless scandal as
to his "suppers of the Twelve Gods" (Sueton. Aug. 70). The statement
of W. A. Schmidt that "none of the Julians was orthodox" (Geschichte
der Denk- und Glaubensfreiheit im ersten Jahrhundert, 1847, p. 175)
is somewhat overstrained.

[806] Dio Cassius, lii, 36.

[807] E.g., his encouragement of a new college of priests founded in
his honour. Dio, xliv, 6.

[808] Sueton. Julius, 44, 56. The first public library actually
opened in Rome was founded by Asinius Pollio under Augustus, and was
placed in the forecourt of the temple of Liberty: Augustus founded
two others; Tiberius a fourth, in his palace; Vespasian a fifth, in
the temple of Peace; Domitian a sixth, on the Capitol. W. A. Schmidt,
Gesch. der Denk- und Glaubensfreiheit, pp. 151-52, and refs.

[809] Boissier, pp. 67-108; Suetonius, Aug. xxix-xxxi.

[810] L'Abbé Beurlier, Le Culte Impérial, 1891, introd. and ch. 1;
Boissier, ch. 2. Cp. p. 185, note, above.

[811] It would seem that the occasion on which he enraged the Senate
by not rising to receive them (Sueton. Jul. 78) was that on which
they came to announce that they had made him a God, Jupiter Julius,
with a special temple and a special priest. See Long, Decline of the
Roman Republic, v, 418. He might very well have intended to rebuke
their baseness. But cp. Boissier, i, 122, citing Dio, xlvi, 6.

[812] iii, 46; x, 40; xliii, 13.

[813] 1 Sat. v, 98-103.

[814] As to the conflict between Horace's bias and his policy,
cp. Boissier, i. 193-201.

[815] E.g., Carm. iii, 6.

[816] Fasti, v, 673-92.

[817] Fasti, ii, 61-66.

[818] Fasti, iv, 204. The preceding phrase, pro magno teste vetustas
creditur, certainly has an ironic ring.

[819] Æneid, vi, 724-27.

[820] Cp. Boissier, i, 228-29.

[821] Georgics, ii, 490, 493. Diderot originated the idea that
the first of these lines and the two which follow it in Virgil had
reference to Lucretius. Grimm, Correspondance Littéraire, ed. 1829-30,
vi, 21-25. It is acquiesced in by W. Warde Fowler, Social Life at
Rome in the Age of Cicero, 1909, p. 327. Sellar (Roman Poets of the
Augustan Age: Virgil, 1877. p. 201) is doubtful on the point.

[822] Cp. Boissier, i, 193.

[823] Boissier, ii, 84-92.

[824] Ep. xcv.

[825] Suetonius, Jul. 88.

[826] The same note occurs in Virgil, Æneid, vi, 719-21.

[827] Hist. Nat. ii, 1, 5 (7). Pliny identifies nature and deity:
"Per quæ declaratur haud dubie naturæ potentia, idque esse quod Deum
vocamus" (last cit., end).

[828] Hist. nat. vii, 55 (56). Cp. Boissier, i, 300.

[829] Id. pp. 301-303.

[830] See the praiseworthy treatise of Mr. J. A. Farrer, Paganism
and Christianity, 1891, chs. 5, 6, and 7.

[831] "... vires religionis, ad quas maxime etiamnum caligat humanum
genus." Hist. nat. xxx, 1.

[832] Above, p. 188.

[833] Primus in orbe deos fecit timor. Frag. 22, ed. Burmanni. The
whole passage is noteworthy. See also his Satyricon, c. 137, as to
his estimate of sacerdotal sincerity.

[834] Thebaid, iii, 661.

[835] Porphyry, Epistle to Anebo (with Jamblichus). Chaeremon, however,
is said to have regarded comets as divine portents. Origen, Ag. Celsus,
bk. i, ch. 59.

[836] Prof. C. Martha, Les moralistes sous l'empire romain, ed. 1881,
p. 341.

[837] W. A. Schmidt, who cites this act (Geschichte der Denk- und
Glaubensfreiheit, pp. 31-33) as the beginning of the end of free
speech in Rome, does not mention the detail given by Dio (xliv,
10), that Cæsar suspected the tribunes of having set on some of
the people to hail him as king. But the unproved suspicion does not
justify his course, which was a bad lapse of judgment, even if the
suspicion were just. From this point a conspiracy against his life
was natural. Cp. Long, Decline of the Roman Republic, v, 432-33. as
to the facts.

[838] See W. A. Schmidt, pp. 34-108, for a careful analysis of the
evolution. As to the book-censure, see pp. 101-104.

[839] Suetonius, Tiberius, c. 28.

[840] Id. c. 61.

[841] Annals, i, 73. That such a phrase should have been written by an
emperor in an official letter, and yet pass unnoticed through antiquity
save in one historical work, recovered only in the Renaissance, is
one of the minor improbabilities that give colour to the denial of
the genuineness of the Annals.

[842] Tiberius, c. 69.

[843] Petronius, Satyricon, ad init.

[844] In the Annals (xiv, 50) it is stated that the book attacked
senators and pontiffs; that it was condemned to be burned, and
Vejento to be exiled; and that the book was much sought and read
while forbidden; but that it fell into oblivion when all were free
to read it. Here, again, there is no other ancient testimony. Vejento
is heard of, however, in Juvenal, iv, 113, 123-29.

[845] Philostratus, Life of Apollonius, iv. 47.

[846] Cp. Schmidt, pp. 346-47.

[847] Suetonius, Domitian, c. 10.

[848] Cp. Schmidt, p. 157.

[849] Suetonius, Tiberius, c. 36; Josephus, Antiquities, xviii, 3,
§§ 4, 5. Josephus specifies isolated pretexts, which Suetonius does
not mention. They are not very probable.

[850] Who destroyed 2,000 copies of prophetical books. Suetonius,
Aug. c. 31.

[851] See, in the next chapter, as to the rationalistic mythology
of Macrobius.

[852] Cp. Propertius, ii, 14, 27 sqq.; iii, 23, 19-20; iv, 3, 38;
Tibullus, iv, 1, 18-23; Juvenal, as before cited, and xv, 133, 142-46.

[853] Plato, 2 Alcib.; Cicero, Pro Cluentio, c. 68; Horace, Carm. iii,
23, 17; Ovid, Heroides, Acont. Cydipp. 191-92; Persius, Sat. ii,
69; Seneca, De Beneficiis, i, 6. Cp. Diod. Sic. xii, 20; Varro,
in Arnobius, Adv. Gentes, vii, 1.

[854] 1 Sat. iii, 96-98. Cp. Cicero, De Finibus, iv, 19, 27, 28;
Matt. v. 19-28; James, ii, 10. Lactantius, again (<DW37>. Inst. iii,
23). denounces the doctrine of the equality of offences as laid down
by Zeno, giving no sign of knowing that it is also set forth in his
own sacred books.

[855] On Seneca's moral teaching, cp. Martha, Les Moralistes sous
l'empire romain, pp. 57-66; Boissier, La religion romaine, ii,
80-82. M. Boissier further examines fully the exploded theory that
Seneca received Christian teaching. On this compare Bishop Lightfoot,
Dissertations on the Apostolic Age, pp. 237-92.

[856] Seneca was so advanced in his theoretic ethic as to consider
all war on a level with homicide. Epist. xcv, 30.

[857] It is to be noted that preaching had begun among the moralists
of Rome in the first century, and was carried on by the priests
of Isis in the second; and that in Egypt monasticism had long been
established. Martha, as cited, p. 67; Boissier, i, 356-59. Cp. Mosheim,
2 Cent. pt. ii, c. iii, §§ 13, 14, as to monasticism.

[858] Mt. xxii, 39; Mk. xii, 31.

[859] Talmud, tract. Sabbath, 306.

[860] Mk. xii, 32.

[861] Lk. xviii, 20.

[862] See the impressive argument of Dr. Moncure Conway in his Solomon
and Solomonic Literature, 1899, ch. xviii.

[863] See Dr. Nicholson's The Gospel According to the Hebrews, 1879,
p. 77. Cp. Conway, p. 222. Dr. Nicholson insists that at least the word
"sacrificing" must be spurious, because "it is surely impossible that
Jesus ever uttered this threat"!

[864] Cp. the author's Christianity and Mythology, pt. iii. <DW37>. ii,
§ 6.

[865] The Book of the Secrets of Enoch, known as the "Slavonic Enoch,"
ch. xliv, 1 (Eng. tr. 1896, pp. 60, 67).

[866] See the author's Pagan Christs, pt. ii.

[867] Above, p. 215.

[868] Hosea, vi, 6; Psalms, xl, 6, 7; Ecclesiastes, v, 1.

[869] Talmud, Yoma-Derech Eretz; Midrash, Vayikra-Rabba, xxvii,
11 and 12.

[870] Ch. lii (p. 69).

[871] Luke xiii, 4.

[872] Cp. Conway, Solomon and Solomonic Literature, 1899, pp. 57,
201, 219.

[873] John iv, 21.

[874] E.g., Plato, Crito, Jowett's tr. 3rd ed. ii, 150; Seneca, De
Ira, ii, 32. Valerius Maximus (iv, 2, 4) even urges the returning of
benefits for injuries.

[875] It is impossible to find in the whole patristic literature a
single display of the "love" in question. In all early Christian
history there is nothing to represent it save the attitude of
martyrs towards their executioners--an attitude seen often in pagan
literature. (E.g., Ælian, Var. Hist. xii, 49.)

[876] 1 Thess. v, 21.

[877] 2 Cor. xi, 4; Gal. i, 6.

[878] Cp. Rom. ix, 14-21.

[879] 2 Cor. x, 5. Needless to say, such an expression savours strongly
of late invention; but in any case it tells of the attitude of the
Christian teachers of the second century.

[880] 1 Cor. vii, 20-24 (where the phrase translated in English
"use it rather" unquestionably means "rather continue" = remain a
slave. Cp. Eph. vi, 5, and Variorum Teacher's Bible in loc.).

[881] Rom. xiii, 1. Cp. 1 Peter ii, 13-14; Tit. iii, 1. The anti-Roman
spirit in the Apocalypse is Judaic, not Gentile-Christian; the book
being of Jewish origin.

[882] James ii, 21.

[883] 1 Cor. xv, 12.

[884] The Apology of Athenagoras (2nd c.) is rather a defence of
monotheism than a Christian document; hence, no doubt, its speedy
neglect by the Church.

[885] Justin Martyr, 1 Apol. c. 5; Min. Felix, Octavius, c. 10.

[886] "The inhabitants of Coelesyria, Idumea, and Judea are principally
influenced by Aries and Ares, and are generally audacious, atheistical,
and treacherous" (Ptolemy, Tetrabiblos, ii, 3--Paraphrase of Proclus).

[887] Cp. Tertullian, De Idolatria, passim, and Ad Scapulam, c. 5.

[888] For the refusal to worship men as Gods they had, of course,
abundant pagan precedent. See above, p. 186, note.

[889] E.g., Tertullian, De Testimonio Animæ, c. 1; Arnobius,
Adversus Gentes, i, 41, etc.; Lactantius, Divine Institutes, c. xv;
Epit. c. vii.

[890] Cp. J. A. Farrer, Paganism and Christianity, ch. vii.

[891] Irenæus, Against Heresies, i, 26. Cp. Hagenbach, Lehrbuch der
Dogmengeschichte, 3te Aufl. § 23, 4 (p. 37), as to Cerinthus.

[892] 1 Tim. vi, 20. The word persistently translated "oppositions"
is a specific term in Gnostic lore. Cp. R. W. Mackay, Rise and Progress
of Christianity, 1854, p. 115, note.

[893] Cp. Harnack, Outlines of the History of Dogma, Mitchell's
trans. p. 77 (ch. vi), p. 149 (bk. ii, ch. vi); Gieseler, Comp. of
Eccles. Hist. i, § 63, Eng. tr. i, 234, as to the attitude of Origen.

[894] The term "Gnostic," often treated as if applicable only to
heretical sects, was adopted by Clemens of Alexandria as an honourable
title. Cp. Gieseler, p. 241, as cited.

[895] Mosheim, Eccles. Hist. 2 Cent. pt. ii, ch. i, §§ 4-12. Cp.,
however, Abbé Cognat, Clément d'Alexandrie, 1859, pp. 421-23, and
Ueberweg, i, 239, as to the obscurity resting on the original teaching
of Ammonios.

[896] Cp. Gieseler, Compendium, i, § 52 (tr. vol. i, p. 162).

[897] Id. §§ 54, 55, pp. 186-90.

[898] E. H. 3 Cent. pt. ii, ch. i, §§ 2-4.

[899] As to the earlier latitudinarianism, cp. Gieseler, as cited,
p. 166.

[900] Gieseler, § 55.

[901] Mosheim, E. H. 3 Cent. pt. ii, ch. iii, §§ 1-7; Gieseler,
as cited, § 53, pp. 162-65; Eusebius, Eccles. Hist. vi, 19;
B. Saint-Hilaire, De l'école d'Alexandrie, 1845, p. 7; Baur,
Ch. Hist. Eng. tr. ii, 3-8. But cp. Cognat, Clément d'Alexandrie,
l. v, ch. v.

[902] Cp. Mosheim on Origen, Comm. de rebus Christ. ante Const. §§ 27,
28, summarized in Schlegel's note to Ec. Hist. Reid's ed. pp. 100-101;
Gieseler, § 63; Renan, Marc-Aurèle, pp. 114, 140. Dr. Hatch (Influence
of Greek Ideas on the Christian Church, pp. 82-83) notes that the
allegorical method, which began in a tendency towards rationalism,
came later to be typically orthodox.

[903] "Gnosis was an attempt to convert Christianity into philosophy;
to place it in its widest relation to the universe, and to incorporate
with it the ideas and feelings approved by the best intelligence of
the times." Mackay, Rise and Progress of Christianity, p. 109. But
cp. the per contra on p. 110: "it was but a philosophy in fetters,
an effort of the mind to form for itself a more systematic belief in
its own prejudices." Again (p. 115): "a reaction towards freethought
was the essence of Gnosis." So also Robins, A Defence of the Faith,
1862, pt. i, pp. 4-5, 153.

[904] This view could be supported by the Platonists from Plato, Laws,
bk. x. Cp. Chaignet, La vie et les écrits de Platon, 1871, p. 422;
and Milman, Hist. of Christianity, bk. ii, ch. v, ed. Paris, 1840,
i, 288. It is explicitly set forth by Plutarch, I. and O., cc. 45-49.

[905] On the subject in general cp. Mosheim, E. H. 2 Cent. pt. ii,
ch. v; also his Commentaries on the Affairs of the Christians before
Constantine, Eng. tr. vol. ii; Harnack, Outlines of the Hist. of Dogma,
ch. iv; King, The Gnostics and their Remains; Mackay, Rise and Progress
of Christianity, pt. iii, §§ 10, 11, 12; Renan, L'Église Chrétienne,
chs. ix, x; Milman, Hist. of Christianity, bk. ii, ch. v; Lardner,
Hist. of Heretics, in Works, ed. 1835, vol. viii; Baur, Church History,
pt. iii; Jeremie, Hist. of the Chr. Church in 2nd and 3rd Cent.,
ch. v (in Encyc. Metropolitana).

[906] "Mysticism itself is but an insane rationalism" (Hampden,
Bampton Lect. on Scholastic Philosophy, 3rd ed. intr. p. liii). It may
be described as freethought without regard to evidence--that "lawless
thought" which Christian polemists are wont to ascribe to rationalists.

[907] Gieseler, §§ 61, 86 (pp. 228, 368, 370).

[908] In the fourth century and later, however, the gospel of
asceticism won great orthodox vogue through the writings of the
so-called Dionysius the Areopagite. Cp. Mosheim, 4 Cent. pt. ii,
c. iii, § 12; Westcott, Religious Thought in the West, 1891,
pp. 190-91.

[909] Compare the process by which the Talmudic system unified
Judaism. Wellhausen, Israel, as cited, pp. 541-42; Milman, History
of Christianity, bk. ii, ch. 4, ed. Paris, 1840, i, 276.

[910] "There is good reason to suppose that the Christian bishops
multiplied sacred rites for the sake of rendering the Jews and the
pagans more friendly to them" (Mosheim, E. H. 2 Cent. pt. ii,
ch. iv. Cp. ch. iii, § 17; ch. iv, §§ 3-7; 4 Cent. pt. ii,
ch. iii, §§ 1-3; ch. iv, §§ 1-2; 5 Cent. pt. ii, ch. iii, §
2). This generalization is borne out by nearly every other Church
historian. Cp. Harnack, Outlines, pt. ii, bk. i, ch. i; Milman, bk. iv,
ch. 5, pp. 367-74; Gieseler. §§ 98, 99, 101, 104; Renan, Marc-Aurèle,
3e edit. p. 630. Baur, Church History, Eng. tr. ii, 285-89.

[911] Gieseler, § 87, p. 373; Hagenbach, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte,
3te Aufl. § 108.

[912] Eusebius, v, 28; Gieseler, § 60, p. 218.

[913] Cp. Gieseler, §§ 80-83, pp. 328-53; Harnack, Outlines, pt. ii,
bk. i, esp. pp. 201-202.

[914] One being another Theodotos, a money-changer.

[915] Eusebius, as last cited. The sect was accused of altering the
gospels to suit its purposes. The charge could probably be made with
truth against every sect in turn, as against the Church in general.

[916] In the end the doctrine declared orthodox was the opposite
of what had been declared orthodox in the Sabellian and other
controversies (Mosheim, 4 Cent. pt. ii, ch. v, § 9); and all the while
"the Arians and the orthodox embraced the same theology in substance"
(Murdock, note on Mosheim, Reid's ed. p. 161). An eminent modern
Catholic, however, has described Arianism as "a deistic doctrine which
had not the courage to bury itself in the fecund obscurities of dogma"
(Ozanam, La Civilisation chrétienne chez les Francs, 1849, p. 35).

[917] Gieseler, § 83. p. 345.

[918] Cp. the author's Short History of Christianity, 2nd
ed. pp. 176-81.

[919] "Pelagianism is Christian rationalism" (Harnack, Outlines,
pt. ii, bk. ii, ch. iv, § 3, p.364).

[920] He was first a Manichean; later an anti-Manichean, denying
predestination; later, as an opponent of the Pelagians, an assertor
of predestination. Cp. Mackay, Rise and Progress of Christianity,
pt. v, § 15. As to his final Manicheanism, see Milman, Hist. of Latin
Christianity, 3rd ed. i, 152.

[921] Cp. Harnack, Outlines, pt. ii, bk. ii, ch. v, § 1 (p. 386).

[922] Cp. Hampden, Bampton Lectures on The Scholastic Philosophy,
1848, pp. xxxv-xxxvi, and refs.

[923] Sokrates, Eccles. Hist. bk. vii, ch. 15.

[924] Epist. 93. Cp. Schlegel's notes on Mosheim, in Reid's
ed. pp. 159, 198; Rev. W. R. Clarke, Saint Augustine, pp. 86-87
(a defence); Milman, History of Latin Christianity, bk. ii,
ch. ii, 3rd. ed. i, 163; Boissier, La fin du paganisme, 2e édit. i,
69-79. Harnack's confused and contradictory estimate of Augustine
(Outlines, pt. ii, bk ii, chs. iii, iv) ignores this issue. He
notes, however (pp. 362-63), some of Augustine's countless
self-contradictions.

[925] Milman, Hist. of Christianity, bk. iii, ch. viii; ed. cited,
ii, 182, 188, and note. For the views of Ambrose see p. 184. In Gaul,
St. Martin put down the old shrines by brute force. Id. p. 179.

[926] Cp. Beugnot, Histoire de la destruction du paganisme en Occident,
1835, i, 430.

[927] De errore profanarum religionum, end.

[928] See it translated in full by Lardner in his Testimonies of
Ancient Heathens, ch. xlix. Works, ed. 1835, vol. viii.

[929] Lardner, as cited, pp. 25-27.

[930] As to the high character of Libanius, who used his influence
to succour his Christian friends in the reign of Julian, see Lardner,
pp. 15-17.

[931] Milman, Hist. of Christianity, bk. iii, ch. vi; vol. ii,
p. 131. See the passage there cited from the Funeral Oration of
Libanius On Julian, as to Christians building houses with temple
stones; also the further passages, pp. 129, 161, 212, of Mr. King's
tr. of the Oration in his Julian the Emperor (Bohn Lib.).

[932] Ammianus, xxii, 4.

[933] Gibbon, ch. xlvii. Bohn ed. v, 211-52, 264, 268, 272. Mosheim,
passim.

[934] Milman, as cited, p. 178.

[935] De Testimonio Animæ, c. 2; De Ira Dei.

[936] Tertullian, as cited, c. 3.

[937] B. vi, ch. 28.

[938] On the Mysteries, bk. x, ch. 2.

[939] Cp. Minucius Felix (2nd c.), Octavius, c. 5.

[940] De consensu evangelistarum, i, 10.

[941] De civ. Dei, xxi, 2, 5-7.

[942] Id. i, 14.

[943] Id. xxi, 11.

[944] See the citations in Abailard's Sic et non, § 1. Quod fides
humanis rationibus sit adstruenda, et contra.

[945] De Gubernatione Dei, l. 4.

[946] See Renan, L'Église Chrétienne, p. 493. As to Crescens, the
enemy of Justin Martyr (2 Apol. c. 3), see id. p. 492. Cp. Arnobius,
Adversus Gentes, passim, as to pagan objections. What remains of
Porphyry will be found in Lardner's Testimonies of the Heathen,
ch. xxxvii. Cp. Baur, Church History, Eng. tr. ii, 179-87.

[947] The Controversy between Jason and Papiscus regarding Christ,
mentioned by Origen (Ag. Celsus, bk. iv, ch. 4), seems to have been
of the same nature.

[948] Origen repeatedly calls him an Epicurean; but this is obviously
false. The Platonizing Christian would not admit that a Platonist
was anti-Christian.

[949] Origen places him in the reign of Hadrian; but the internal
evidence is all against that opinion. Kain dates the treatise 177-78.

[950] Cp. Renan, Marc-Aurèle, 3e édit. pp. 346-71.

[951] B. i, cc. 24, 25.

[952] B. i, cc. 28, 32.

[953] c. 32.

[954] cc. 37, 39.

[955] B. ii, c. 26.

[956] B. ii, c. 78.

[957] B. ii, c. 49.

[958] B. ii, c. 30.

[959] B. iii, c. 1.

[960] B. iv, cc. 23-30, 54-60, 74.

[961] Cp. A. Kind, Teleologie und Naturalismus in der altchristlichen
Zeit, 1875; Soury, Bréviaire de l'histoire du Matérialisme, pp. 331-40.

[962] B. i, chs. 9-11; iii, 44.

[963] Cp. Renan, Marc-Aurèle, pp. 373-77.

[964] Christian excisions have been suspected in the Peregrinus,
§ 11 (Bernays, Lucian und die Kyniker, 1879, p. 107). But see
Mr. J. M. Cotterill's Peregrinus Proteus, Edinburgh, 1879, for a
theory of the spuriousness of the treatise, which is surmised to be
a fabrication of Henri Etienne.

[965] Logoi Philaletheis, known only from the reply of Eusebius, Contra
Hiroclem. Hierocles made much of Apollonius of Tyana, as having greatly
outdone Jesus in miracles, while ranking simply as a God-beloved man.

[966] Methodius, Eusebius, Apollinaris, and Philostorgius.

[967] Cod. Justin. De Summa Trinitate. l. I, tit. i, c. 3.

[968] Citations are given by Baur, Ch. Hist. ii, 180 sq.

[969] Cp. Mackay, Rise and Progress of Christianity, p. 160. Chrysostom
(De Mundi Creatione, vi, 3) testifies that Porphyry "led many away
from the faith." He ably anticipated the "higher criticism" of the
Book of Daniel. See Baur, as cited. Porphyry, like Celsus, powerfully
retorted on the Old Testament the attacks made by Christians on the
immorality of pagan myths, and contemned the allegorical explanations
of the Christian writers as mere evasions. The pagan explanations of
pagan myths, however, were of the same order.

[970] Gieseler, § 106, ii, 75. Cp. Mosheim, 4 Cent. pt. ii, ch. iii,
§ 22.

[971] Gieseler, § 106, vol. ii, p. 74; Mosheim, 4 Cent. pt. ii,
ch. iii, § 2; and Schlegel's note in Reid's ed. p. 152.

[972] Milman, Hist. of Chr. bk. iii, ch. xi (ii, 268-70); Mosheim,
5 Cent. pt. ii, ch. iii, § 14; Gilly, Vigilantius and his Times,
1844, pp. 8, 389 sq., 470 sq. As to Jerome's persecuting ferocity
see also Gieseler, ii, 65 note. For a Catholic polemic on Jerome's
side see Amedée Thierry, Saint Jérome, 2e édit. pp. 141, 363-66.

[973] See a good account of the works of Macrobius in Prof. Dill's
Roman Society in the last Century of the Western Empire, bk. i, ch. iv.

[974] Philostorgius, Eccles. Hist. Epit. bk. viii, ch. x.

[975] By Justinian in 529. The banished thinkers were protected by
Chosroes in Persia, who secured them permission to return (Gibbon,
Bohn ed. iv. 355-56; Finlay, Hist. of Greece, ed. Tozer, i, 277,
287). Theodosius II had already forbidden all public lectures by
independent teachers (id. pp. 282-83).

[976] Theodosius I, Arcadius, and Theodosius II (379-450) successively
passed laws forbidding and persecuting paganism (Finlay. i,
286; Beugnot. Hist. de la destr. du paganisme en occident, i, 350
sq.). Mithraism was suppressed in the same period (Jerome, Epist. cvii,
ad Laetam, Sokrates, Eccles. Hist. bk. v, ch. xvi). It is to be
remembered that Constans and Constantius, the sons of Constantine,
had commenced, at least on paper, to persecute paganism as soon as
their father's new creed was sufficiently established (Cod. Theod. xvi,
10, 2, 4), and this with the entire approval of the whole Church. It
was not their fault that it subsisted till the time of Theodosius II
(cp. Gieseler, § 75, pp. 306-308; and Beugnot, i, 138-48). On the
edict of Theodosius I see Milman, bk. iii, ch. viii; ed. cited, p. 186.

[977] In S. Babylam, contra Julianum, c. ii. Cp. his Hom. iv on 1st
Cor. Eng. tr. 1839, p. 42.

[978] There is also a suggestion in one passage of Chrysostom (Hom. in
1 Cor. vi, 2, 3) that some Christians tended to doubt the actuality
of apostolic miracles, seeing that no miracles took place in their
own day.

[979] Præparatio Evangelica, xv, 61.

[980] <DW37>. Inst. iii, 3.

[981] Id. iii, 24.

[982] Topographia, lib. v, cited by Murdock in note on Mosheim. 5
Cent. pt. ii, ch. iii, § 5, Reid's ed. p. 192. Cp. same ed. p. 219,
note; and Gibbon, Bohn ed. iv, 259; v, 319.

[983] , ii, 65, 71.

[984] See Schlegel's note on Mosheim. 4 Cent. pt. ii, ch. v, § 19.

[985] The first name came from Anomoios, "unlike-natured (to
the Father)," that being their primary doctrinal heresy concerning
Jesus. The second seems to have been a euphemism of their own making,
with the sense of "holding the good law."

[986] Jerome, Adv. Vigilantium, cc. 9, 11.

[987] Epiphanius, Adv. Hæres. lxx, § 6.

[988] Cp. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, viii, 15-19; xxi, 6; De
Trinitate, iii, 12, 13 (7, 8); Epist. cxxxviii, 18-20; Sermo cc,
in Epiph. Dom. ii; Jerome, Vita S. Hilarion, cc. 6, 37.

[989] Mosheim, E. H. 2 Cent. pt. ii, ch. iii, §§ 8, 15; 3 Cent. pt. i,
ch. i, § 5; pt. ii, ch. iii, §§ 10, 11; 4 Cent. pt. ii, ch. iii,
§§ 3, 16; Gieseler, § 63, p. 235; Waddington, Hist. of the Church,
1833, pp. 38-39; Milman, Hist. of Chr. bk. iv, ch. iii, ed. cited,
ii, 337. Cp. Mackay, Rise and Progress of Christianity, pp. 11-12.

[990] Cp. the explicit admissions of Mosheim, E. H. 2 Cent. pt. ii,
ch. iii, § 16; 3 Cont. pt. ii, ch. ii, §§ 4, 6; 4 Cent. pt. ii,
ch. ii, § 8; ch. iii, § 17; Gieseler, § 103, vol. ii, p. 56. It is to
be noted, however, that even the martyrs were at times bad characters
who sought in martyrdom remission for their sins (Gieseler, § 74,
p. 206; De Wette, as there cited).

[991] Cp. Gieseler, ii, 67-68.

[992] Epist. vii, 5; xcv, 33. Cp. Cicero, Tusculans, ii, 17.

[993] Cp. the Bohn ed. of Gibbon, note by clerical editor, iii, 359.

[994] The express declaration of Salvian, De Gubernatione Dei,
l. 6. On the general question compare Mr. Farrer's Paganism and
Christianity, ch. x; Milman, as last cited, p. 331; and Gieseler,
ii, 71, note 6. The traditional view that the games were suppressed
by Honorius, though accepted by Gibbon and by Professor Dill (Roman
Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire, 2nd ed. p. 56),
appears to be an error. Cp. Beugnot, Destr. du Paganisme, ii, 25;
Finlay, Hist. of Greece, i, 236.

[995] As to the specially cruel use of judicial torture by the later
Inquisition, see H. C. Lea, Superstition and Force, 3rd ed. p. 452.

[996] Lavollée, as cited, p. 92. Cp. St. Chrysostom's Picture of his
Age, p. 112, and the admissions of Milman, bk. iv, ch. i.

[997] As to the spirit of hatred roused by controversy among believers,
see Gieseler, § 104, vol. ii, pp. 64-67; and Ullmann's Gregory of
Nazianzum, Eng. tr. 1851, pp. 177-80.

[998] H. Fraser Stewart, Boethius: An Essay, 1891, pp. 100-101.

[999] Cp. Beugnot, Destruction du Paganisme, ii, 282-83.

[1000] Id. p. 159. Mr. Stewart in another passage (p. 106) argues that
"The Consolation is intensely artificial"--this by way of explaining
that it was a deliberate exercise, not representing the real or normal
state of its author's mind. Yet he has finally to avow (p. 107) that
"it remains a very noble book"--a character surely incompatible with
intense artificiality.

[1001] This is the view of Maurice (Medieval Philosophy, 2nd ed. 1859,
pp. 14-16), who decides that Boethius was neither a Christian nor a
"pagan"--i.e., a believer in the pagan Gods. This is simply to say that
he was a rationalist--a "pagan philosopher," like Aristotle. But, as
is noted by Prof. Bury (ed. of Gibbon, iv. 199), Boethius's authorship
of a book, De sancta trinitate, et capita quædam dogmatica, et librum
contra Nestorium, is positively asserted in the Anecdoton Holderi
(ed. by Usener, Leipzig, 1877, p. 4), a fragment found in a 10th
century MS.

[1002] The strict meaning of this term, given by Mohammed ("the true
religion with God is Islam"; Sura, iii, 17), is "submission"--such
being the attitude demanded by the Prophet. "Moslem" or "Muslim"
means one who accepts Islam. Koran means strictly, not "book," but
"reading" or recitation.

[1003] Rodwell's tr. of the Koran, ed. 1861, pref. p. xv.

[1004] Sale, Preliminary Discourse to tr. of the Koran, ed. 1833, i,
42; Muir's Life of Mohammad, ed. Weir, 1912, p. 78. Cp. Freeman,
History and Conquests of the Saracens, 1856, p. 35. The late
Prof. Palmer, in introd. to his tr. of the Koran (Sacred Books of
the East series), i, p. xv, says that "By far the greater number had
ceased to believe in anything at all"; but this is an extravagance,
confuted by himself in other passages--e.g. p. xi.

[1005] These generalizations are always matched, and cancelled, by
others from the same sources. Thus Prof. D. B. Macdonald writes of
"the always flighty and skeptical Arabs," and, a few pages later, of
the God-fearing fatalism "of all Muslim thought, the faith to which
the Semite ever returns in the end." Development of Muslim Theology,
etc. (in "Semitic Series"), New York, 1903, pp. 122, 126.

[1006] The word means either convert or pervert; in Heb. and
Syr. "heretic"; in Arabic, "orthodox." It must not be confounded with
Hanyfite, the name of an orthodox sect, founded by one Hanyfa.

[1007] See Rodwell's tr. of the Koran, ed. 1861, pref. pp. xvi,
xvii; and Sura, xvi (lxxiii in Rodwell's chron. arrangement), v. 121,
p. 252, note 2.

[1008] Sprenger, Das Leben und die Lehre des Mohammad, 1861-65, i,
83 sq. Cp. p. 60 sq.

[1009] Rodwell, p. 497, note to Sura iii (xcvii) 19; and pref. p. xvi;
Caussin de Perceval, Essai sur l'histoire des Arabes avant l'Islamisme,
1847, i, 321-26; Nicholson, Lit. Hist. of the Arabs, pp. 69, 149. "To
the great mass of the citizens of Mecca the new doctrine was simply
the Hanyfism to which they had become accustomed; and they did not at
first trouble themselves at all about the matter." Palmer, introd. to
tr. of Koran, i, p. xxiv. Cp. Sprenger, as cited, i, 46-60, 65.

[1010] The word Hanyf or Hanif recurs in Sura ii, 129; iii,
60, 89; iv, 124; vi, 79, 162; x, 105, xvi, 121; xxii, 32; xxx,
29. Cp. H. Derenbourg, La science des religions et l'Islamisme, 1886,
pp. 42-43. Palmer's translation, marred as it unfortunately is by
slanginess, is on such points specially trustworthy. Rodwell's does
not always indicate the use of the word Hanyf; but the German version
of Ullmann, the French of Kanimirski, and Sale's, do not indicate
it at all. Sprenger (p. 43) derives the Hanyfs from Essenes who had
almost lost all knowledge of the Bible. Cp. p. 67. Prof. Macdonald
writes that the word "is of very doubtful derivation. But we have
evidence from heathen Arab poetry that these Hanifs were regarded as
much the same as Christian monks, and that the term hanif was used
as a synonym for rahib, monk." Work cited, p. 125.

[1011] Sprenger, as cited, p. 13.

[1012] Cp. Sale's Prelim. Discourse, as cited, i, 38; and Palmer,
introd. p. xv; and Nicholson, pp. 139-40.

[1013] Al Mostaraf, cited by Pococke, Specimen Histor. Arab. p. 136;
Sale, Prelim. Disc. as cited, p. 45.

[1014] Cp. Nicholson, pp. 155-56 and refs.

[1015] Sale, as cited, pp. 39-41.

[1016] Palmer, introd. to his Haroun Alraschid, 1882,
p. 14. Cp. Derenbourg, La science des religions et l'Islamisme, p. 44,
controverting Kuenen.

[1017] Hibbert Lectures, On National and Universal Religions, ed. 1901,
p. 21 and Note II.

[1018] Id. p. 31.

[1019] Nicholson, Lit. Hist. of the Arabs, p. 145.

[1020] Rodwell, note to Sura xcvi (R. i), 10.

[1021] Sprenger estimates that at his death the number really converted
to his doctrine did not exceed a thousand. Cp. Nicholson, pp. 153-58.

[1022] Renan ascribes the idea wholly to Omar. Études d'histoire
et de critique, ed. 1862, p. 250. The faithful have preserved a sly
saying that "Omar was many a time of a certain opinion, and the Koran
was then revealed accordingly." Nöldeko, Enc. Brit. art. on Koran,
in Sketches from Eastern History, 1892, p. 28. On the other hand,
Sedillot decides (Histoire des Arabes, 1854. p. 60) that "in Mohammed
it is the political idea that dominates." So Nicholson (p. 169): "At
Medina the days of pure religious enthusiasm have passed away for ever,
and the prophet is overshadowed by the statesman." Cp. pp. 173, 175.

[1023] On the measure of racial unity set up by Abyssinian attacks
as well as by the pretensions of the Byzantine and Persian empires,
see Sedillot, pp. 30, 38. Cp. Van Vloten, Recherches sur la domination
arabe, Amsterdam, 1894. pp. 1-4. 7.

[1024] Professor Stanilas Guyard, La Civilisation Musulmane, 1884,
p. 22.

[1025] Cp. Renan, Études, pp. 257-66; Hauri, Der Islam in seinem
Einfluss auf das Leben seiner Bekenner, 1882, pp. 64-65; Nicholson,
p. 235. It was at Medina that a strict Mohammedanism first arose.

[1026] Nicholson, pp. 178-79, and ref.

[1027] Hauri, Der Islam, p. 64.

[1028] Cp. Montesquieu, Grandeur et décadence des Romains, ch. 22.

[1029] Nicholson, p 190.

[1030] Id. p. 199.

[1031] Van Vloten, p. 70 and passim.

[1032] Prof. Guyard, as cited, pp. 16, 51; C. E. Oelsner, Des effets
de la religion de Mohammed, etc., 1810, p. 130.

[1033] Guyard, p. 21; Palmer, Haroun Alraschid, introd. p. 19.

[1034] The alleged destruction of the library of Alexandria by Omar
is probably a myth, arising out of a story of Omar's causing some
Persian books to be thrown into the water. See Prof. Bury's notes in
his ed. of Gibbon, v, 452-54. Cp. Oelsner, as cited, pp. 142-43.

[1035] Sura, vi, 25, 29; xix, 67; xxvii, 68-70; liv, 2; lxxxiii,
10-13. According to lviii, 28, however, some polytheists denied the
future state.

[1036] Cp. Renan, Études d'histoire et de critique, pp. 232-34.

[1037] Renan, as cited, p. 232.

[1038] Id. p. 235. Renan and Sprenger conflict on this point, the
former having regard, apparently, to the bulk of the poetry, the
latter to parts of it.

[1039] Sedillot, p. 39. One of these was Zaid. Nicholson, p. 149.

[1040] See the passage (Sura ii) cited with praise by the sympathetic
Mr. Bosworth Smith in his Mohammed and Mohammedanism, 2nd ed. p. 181;
where also delighted praise is given to the "description of
Infidelity" in Sura xxiv, 39-40. The "infidels" in question were
simply non-Moslems.

[1041] The Flight (of the Prophet to Medina from Mecca, in 622),
from which begins the Mohammedan era.

[1042] Sale, as cited, p. 160.

[1043] Weil, Geschichte der Chalifen, ii, 261-64; Dugat, Histoire des
philosophes et des théologiens Mussulmans, 1878, pp. 48-55; H. Steiner,
Die Mu`taziliten, oder die Freidenker im Islam, 1865, pp. 49-50;
Guyard, p. 36; Sale, p. 161 (sec. viii); Nicholson, p. 222 sq. The
term Motazila broadly means "dissenter," or "belonging to a sect."

[1044] Steiner, p. 1.

[1045] Palmer, Introd. to Haroun Alraschid, p. 14.

[1046] As to the Persian influence on Arab thought, cp. A. Müller,
Der Islam, i, 469; Palmer, as last cited; Weil, Geschichte der
Chalifen, ii, 114 ff.; Nicholson, p. 220; Van Vloten, Recherches sur
la domination arabe, p. 43. Van Vloten's treatise is a lucid sketch of
the socio-political conditions set up in Persia by the Arab conquest.

[1047] Weil, ii, 261.

[1048] G. Dugat, Histoire des philosophes et des théologiens
Mussulmans, p. 44; Sale, pp. 161, 174-78.

[1049] Dugat, p. 55; Steiner, p. 4; Sale, p. 162.

[1050] "Motazilism represents in Islam a Protestantism of the
shade of Schleiermacher" (Renan, Averroès et l'Averroïsme, 3e
ed. p. 104). Cp. Syed Ameer Ali, Crit. Exam. of Life of Mohammed,
pp. 300-308; Sale, p. 161.

[1051] Dugat, pp. 28, 44; Guyard, p. 36; Steiner, pp. 24-25; Renan,
Averroès, p. 101. The Kadarites, as Sale notes (pp. 164-65), are really
an older group than the Motazilites, so-called, their founder having
rejected predestination before Wasil did. Kuenen (Hibbert Lect. p. 47)
writes as if all the Motazilites were maintained of freewill, but
they varied. See Prof. Macdonald, as cited, p. 135 sq.

[1052] Sale, pp. 165, 172-73.

[1053] For a view of the various schools of Sifatites see Sale,
pp. 166-74.

[1054] Guyard, pp. 37-38; G. D. Osborn, The Khalifs of Baghdad, 1878,
p. 134.

[1055] Steiner, p. 16. Major Osborn (work cited, p. 136) attributes
their rise to the influence of Eastern Christianity, but gives
no proof.

[1056] Guyard, p. 40. Cp. Sale, p. 176; Van Vloten, p. 43.

[1057] Dugat, p. 34. Thus the orthodox sect of Hanyfites were called
by one writer followers of reason, since they relied rather on their
judgment than on tradition.

[1058] Steiner, p. 5; Nicholson, p. 370.

[1059] Steiner, pp. 5, 9, 88-89; Sale, p. 161; Macdonald, p. 140.

[1060] Sedillot, Hist. des Arabes, p. 335; Prof. A. Müller, Der Islam
(in Oncken's series), i, 470; Ueberweg, i, 402.

[1061] Ueberweg, p. 403; Weil, Gesch. der Chalifen, ii, 281.

[1062] For an orthodox account of the beginnings of freethinking
(called zendekism) see Weil, ii, 214. Cp. p. 261; also Tabari's
Chronicle, pt. v, ch. xcvii; and Renan, Averroès, p. 103. Already,
among the Ommayade Khalifs, Yezid III held the Motazilite tenet of
freewill. Weil, p. 260.

[1063] Nicholson, pp. 372, 375. The name zendek (otherwise spelt
zindiq) seems to have originally meant a Manichæan. Browne,
Literary History of Persia, ii (1906), 295; Nicholson, p. 375 and
ref. Macdonald, p. 134, thinks it literally meant "initiate."

[1064] Steiner, p. 8. An association called "Brethren of Purity"
or "Sincere Brethren" seem to have carried Motazilism far, though
they aimed at reconciling philosophy with orthodoxy. They were
in effect the encyclopedists of Arab science. Ueberweg, i, 411;
Nicholson, p. 370 sq. See Dr. F. Dieterici, Die Naturanschauung und
Naturphilosophie der Araber im 10ten Jahrhundert, aus den schriften
der lautern Brüder, 1861, Vorrede, p. viii, and Flügel, as there
cited. Flügel dates the writings of the Brethren about 970; but the
association presumably existed earlier. Cp. Renan, Averroès, p. 104;
and S. Lane-Poole's Studies in a Mosque, 1893, ch. vi, as to their
performance. Prof. Macdonald is disposed to regard them as "part of
the great Fatimid propaganda which honeycombed the ground everywhere
under the Sunnite Abassids," but admits that the Fatimid movement is
"the great mystery of Muslim history" (pp. 165-70).

[1065] Sale, pp. 82-83, note.

[1066] He made five pilgrimages to Mecca, and died on the last,
thus attaining to sainthood.

[1067] Weil, Gesch. der Chalifen, ii, 81; Dugat, pp. 59-61; A. Müller,
Der Islam, i. 470; Macdonald, p. 134. In Mansour's reign was born Al
Allaf, "Sheikh of the Motazilites."

[1068] Dugat, p. 62. The Hâyetians, who had Unitarian Christian
leanings, also held by metempsychosis. Sale, p. 163.

[1069] Nicholson, p. 371 and refs.

[1070] Dugat, p. 71. He persecuted Zendeks in general. Nicholson,
pp. 373-74.

[1071] Id. p. 72; Sale, pp. 184-85; Tabari's Chronicle, pt. v,
ch. xcvii, Zotenberg's tr. 1874, iv, 447-53. Tabari notes (p. 448)
that all the Moslem theologians agree in thinking zendekism much worse
than any of the false religions, since it rejects all and denies God
as well as the Prophet.

[1072] Cp. Steiner, pp. 55 sq., 66 sq.; Ueberweg, Hist. of Philos.,
i, 405.

[1073] Dugat, p. 76. See Sale, pp. 82-83, 162-63, as to the champions
of this principle.

[1074] Sale, p. 83; Macdonald, p. 150.

[1075] Dugat, p. 79; Osborn, The Khalifs of Baghdad, p. 195.

[1076] Palmer, Haroun Alraschid, p. 82. They were really theists.

[1077] Weil, Geschichte der Chalifen, ii, 215, 261, 280; A. Müller,
Der Islam, pp. 514-15. "It was believed that he was at heart a
zindiq." Nicholson, p. 368.

[1078] Dugat, pp. 85-96.

[1079] Prof. Macdonald, as cited, p. 154.

[1080] Dugat, p. 83.

[1081] See extract by Major Osborn, Khalifs, p. 250.

[1082] Osborn, Khalifs, p. 249.

[1083] Macdonald, pp. 154-58, 167.

[1084] Nicholson, pp. 358-59. He it was who first caused to be measured
a degree of the earth's surface. The attempt was duly denounced as
atheistic by a leading theologian, Takyuddin. Montucla, Hist. des
Mathématiques, éd. Lalande, i, 355 sq.; Draper, Conflict of Religion
and Science, p. 109.

[1085] A. Müller, Der Islam, i, 509 sq.; Weil, Gesch. der Chalifen,
ii, 280 ff.

[1086] Dugat, pp. 105-11; Sale, p. 82. Apart from this one issue,
general tolerance seems to have prevailed. Osborn, Khalifs, p. 265.

[1087] Dugat, p. 112; Steiner, p. 79. According to Abulfaragius,
Motawakkel had the merit of leaving men free to believe what they
would as to the creation of the Koran. Sale, p. 82.

[1088] A good analysis is given by Dugat, pp. 337-48.

[1089] The whole of Aristotle, except, apparently, the Politics,
had been translated in the time of the philosopher Avicenna (fl. 1000).

[1090] Macdonald, pp. 200, 205-206.

[1091] Steiner, Die Mu'taziliten, pp. 10-11, following Gazzali (Al
Gazel); Weil, Gesch. der Chalifen, iii, 72.

[1092] Guyard, pp. 41-42; Renan, Averroès, pp. 104-5; Macdonald,
p. 186 sq. The cultivators of Kalâm were called Motecallemîn.

[1093] Ueberweg, i, 405, 414; Steiner, p. 11; Whewell, Hist. of the
Inductive Sciences, 3rd ed. i, 193-94. Compare the laudatory account
of Al Gazzali by Prof. Macdonald (pt. iii, ch. iv), who pronounces
him "certainly the most sympathetic figure in the history of Islam"
(p. 215).

[1094] Hence, among other things, a check on the practice of
anatomy, religious feeling being opposed to it under Islam as under
Christianity. Dugat, pp. 62-63.

[1095] Dugat, pp. 123-28.

[1096] Browne, Literary History of Persia, ii (1906), 290, 293;
R. A. Nicholson, Literary History of the Arabs, 1907, p. 318.

[1097] Browne, as cited, p. 292. Cp. Von Kremer, Culturgeschichte
des Orients, 1875-77, ii, 386-95; Macdonald, p. 199.

[1098] Dugat, p. 167; Weil, iii, 72.

[1099] Dugat, pp. 164-68.

[1100] Nicholson, pp. 314-15.

[1101] The Diwan of Abu'l-Ala, by Henry Baerlein, 1908, st. 36. Cp. 1,
37, 41, 42, 53, 81, 86, 94, and the extracts given by Nicholson,
pp. 316-23.

[1102] Weil, ii, 215.

[1103] Decline and Fall, ch. lvii. Bohn ed. vi, 382, and
note. Cp. E. H. Whinfield, The Quatrains of Omar Khayyám, 1882, p. 4.

[1104] See the preface to Fitzgerald's translation of the Rubáiyát.

[1105] In one quatrain, of doubtful authenticity, is the line "Khayyám,
who longtime stitched the tents of learning" (Whinfield, xxxviii),
which excludes the idea of literal handicraft.

[1106] J. K. M. Shirazi, Life of Omar Al-Khayyámi, ed. 1895, pp. 30-41.

[1107] Id. pp. 51, 58.

[1108] Id. p. 54.

[1109] Id. p. 56.

[1110] Id. p. 59.

[1111] Id. pp. 62-63.

[1112] Id. p. 93.

[1113] Id. pp. 59-61.

[1114] Id. pp. 69-76, 86-88.

[1115] Cited in introd. to Dole's variorum ed. of the Rubáiyát, 1896,
i, p. xix. Cp. Macdonald, p. 199.

[1116] "Dost thou desire to taste eternal bliss?
        Vex thine own heart, but never vex another." (Whinfield, vi.)

            "Seek not the Kaaba, rather seek a heart." (Id. vii.)

This note is often repeated. E.g. xxxii, li.

[1117] See in the very competent translation of Mrs. H. M. Cadell
(who remarked that "Fitzgerald has rather written a poem upon Omar
than translated him"), quatrains 12, 14, 15, 20, 28, 29, 42, 45, 48,
51d, 85, 88b, 133, 141, 143. etc.; in the artistically turned version
of Mr. A. H. Talbot, which follows very faithfully the literal prose
translation of Mr. Heron-Allen, Nos. 1, 3, 15, 18, 19, 24, 33, 41,
45, 59, 72, 91, 115, 123, 148; and in Whinfield's version, Nos. 10,
25, 32, 41, 45, 46, 62, 68, 77, 84, 87, 104, 105, 111, 113, 118, 142,
144, 148, 151, 157, 161, 179, 195, 200, 201, 203, 216.

[1118] Shirazi, pp. 102-108. Early in the thirteenth century he
was denounced by a Sufi mystic as an "unhappy philosopher, atheist,
and materialist." Browne, Lit. Hist. of Persia, ii, 250. Abu'l-Ala,
of course, was similarly denounced.

[1119] Whinfield, cited by Browne, pp. 109-110.

[1120] Cp. Mrs. Cadell, The Rub'yat of Omar Khayam, 1899. Garnett's
introd. pp. xvii, xviii-xxi, xxiv, and Shirazi, as cited, pp. 79-80.

[1121] Fitzgerald's pref. 4th ed. p. xiii; Whinfield,
No. 147. Cp. quatrains cited in art. Sufiism, in Relig. Systems of
the World, 2nd ed. pp. 325-26.

[1122] Cp. Whinfield, p. 86, note on No. 147.

[1123] Guyard, as cited, p. 42. But cp. Ueberweg, i, 411; Nicholson,
pp. 233-34.

[1124] It is not impossible, Max Müller notwithstanding, that the
name may have come originally from the Greek sophoi, "the wise,"
though it is usually connected with sufi = the woollen robe worn
by the Sufite. There are other etymologies. Cp. Fraser, Histor. and
Descrip. Account of Persia, 1834, p. 323, note; Dugat, p. 326; and
art. Sufiism in Relig. Systems of the World, 2nd ed. p. 315. On the
Sufi system in general see also Max Müller, Psychol. Relig. Lect. vi.

[1125] Cp. Renan, Averroès, p. 293, as to Sufi latitudinarianism.

[1126] Guyard, p. 44; Relig. Systems, p. 319.

[1127] Hafiz in his own day was reckoned impious by many. Cp. Malcolm,
Sketches of Persia, 1827, ii, 100.

[1128] Fitzgerald's pref. p. x.

[1129] Yet he was disposed to put to death those who claimed mystic
intercourse with Deity. Sale, pp. 177-78.

[1130] Whose Salaman and Absal, tr. by Fitzgerald, is so little
noticed in comparison with the Rubáiyát of Omar.

[1131] E. C. Browne, in Religious Systems, as cited, p. 321; Dugat,
p. 331.

[1132] Shirazi, pp. 22-28; Fitzgerald's pref. following Mirkhond;
Fraser, Persia, p. 329.

[1133] Cp. Dugat, p. 336; Syed Ameer Ali, pp. 311-15; Gobineau,
Les religions et les philosophies dans l'Asie centrale, 2e édit. p. 68.

[1134] Sale, p. 176. The same doctrine is fairly ancient in
India. (Muir, Original Sanskrit Texts, v, 313, note.) A belief that
hell-fire will not be eternal was held among the Motazilite sect of
Jâhedhians. Sale, p. 164. The Thamamians, again, held that at the
resurrection all infidels, idolaters, atheists, Jews, Christians,
Magians, and heretics, shall be reduced to dust. Id. ib.

[1135] Cp. Renan, Averroès, p. 101. Cp. p. 172.

[1136] Renan's tr. in Averroès, p. 166. The wording of the last phrase
suggests a misconstruction.

[1137] Cp. p. 172.

[1138] Renan, Averroès, pp. 104-107.

[1139] Steiner, Die Mu'taziliten, p. 6.

[1140] Ueberweg, i, 412; Renan, Averroès, pp. 44, 96.

[1141] E. G. Browne, Lit. Hist. of Persia, ii, 107.

[1142] Whom he pronounced a pagan and an infidel. Hauréau, II, i, 29.

[1143] Cp. Renan, Averroès, pp. 57, 96-98; Whewell, Hist. of the
Inductive Sciences, 3rd. ed. I, 193. Renan, following Degenerando
(cp. Whewell, as cited), credits Gazzali with anticipating Hume's
criticism of the idea of causation; but Gazzali's position is that
of dogmatic theism, not of naturalism. See Lewes, Hist. of Philos.,
4th ed. ii, 57.

[1144] Hauréau, Hist. de la philos. scolastique, Ptie II, i, 35.

[1145] Cp. Seignobos, Hist. de la Civ. ii, 58; Stanley Lane-Poole, The
Moors in Spain, pref.; Milman, Latin Christianity, 4th ed. ix. 108-18;
U. R. Burke, History of Spain, i, ch. 16; Baden Powell, as cited,
pp. 94-104; Gebhart, Origines de la Renaissance en Italie, 1879,
pp. 185-89; and post, ch. x.

[1146] Baden Powell, Hist. of Nat. Philos. 1834, p. 97; Whewell,
Hist. of the Induct. Sciences, 3rd ed. ii. 273-74.

[1147] Dr. L. Leclerc, Hist. de la Médecine Arabe, 1876, i, 462;
Dr. E. von Meyer, Hist. of Chemistry, Eng. tr. 2nd ed. p. 28.

[1148] Cp. Buckle, Introd. to Hist. of Civ. in England,
1-vol. ed. p. 70.

[1149] Lane-Poole, The Moors in Spain, p. 73.

[1150] Properly Morabethin--men of God or of religion; otherwise
known as "Marabouts."

[1151] Sedillot, p. 298.

[1152] Cp. Dozy, Hist. des Musulmans d'Espagne, iii, 248-86; Ueberweg,
i, 415.

[1153] Renan, Averroès, pp. 98-99.

[1154] Ueberweg. i. 415; Renan, Averroès, pp. 32, 99.

[1155] Renan, Averroès, p. 99.

[1156] Renan, Averroès, p. 145.

[1157] Id. pp. 156-58.

[1158] Id. pp. 159-60.

[1159] Renan, Averroès, pp. 160-62.

[1160] Ueberweg, i, 416; Steiner, p. 6; Renan, Averroès, p. 162 sq.

[1161] Ueberweg, i, 460; Renan, pp. 258, 275.

[1162] Renan, Averroès, p. 169, and references.

[1163] Id. pp. 165-66.

[1164] Id. p. 5. Cp. the Avertissement, p. iii.

[1165] Renan, Averroès, pp. 31-36. Renan surmises that the popular
hostility to the philosophers, which was very marked, was largely
due to the element of the conquered Christians, who were noted for
their neglect of astronomy and natural science.

[1166] Cp. Ueberweg. i. 415-17.

[1167] Cp. Flint, History of the Philosophy of History, ed. 1893,
vol. i, p. 169.

[1168] Cp. Flint, p. 129, as to their hostility to him.

[1169] Huth, Life and Writings of Buckle, ii, 171.

[1170] Ricaut, Present State of the Ottoman Empire, 1686, p. 245.

[1171] Dugat, p. 59. The Ameer Ali Syed, Moulvi, M.A., LL.B., whose
Critical Examination of the Life and Teachings of Mohammed appeared
in 1873, writes as a Motazilite of a moderate type.

[1172] Macdonald, pp. 120, 196, 286.

[1173] A. Franck, Études Orientales, 1861, pp. 241-48, citing the
Dabistan.

[1174] Gobineau, Les religions et les philosophies dans l'Asie
centrale, 2e édit. ch. v; J. K. M. Shirazi, Life of Omar Khayyámi,
ed. 1905, p. 102. The latter writer notes, however, that "the cultured
classes, who ought to know better, are at no pains to dissipate the
existing religious prejudice against one [Omar] of whose reputation
every Persian may well feel proud." "At the present time ... the
name of Omar is no less execrated by the Shi-ite mob in Persia than
it was in his own day." Id. p. 108.

[1175] Fraser, Persia, p. 330. This writer (p. 239) describes Sufiism
as "the superstition of the freethinker," and as "often assumed as
a cloak to cover entire infidelity."

[1176] E.g., Dr. Wills, The Land of the Lion and the Sun, ed. 1891,
p. 339.

[1177] Smith and Dwight, Missionary Researches in Armenia, 1834,
p. 340. Cp. Rev. H. Southgate, Tour through Armenia, etc. 1840, ii,
153; and Morier's Hadji Baba of Ispahan (1824), ch. xlvii, near end.

[1178] Fraser, Persia, p. 331; Malcolm, Sketches of Persia, ii, 108;
Gobineau, as cited, ch. v.

[1179] H. Vambéry, Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert,
1875, pp. 32-33. Vambéry further remarks: "The half-fanatical,
half-freethinking tone of Persians has often surprised me in my
controversies with the most zealous Schiites."

[1180] As to the rise of this sect see Gobineau, as cited, pp. 141-358;
E. G. Browne's The Episode of the Bâb; and his lecture on Bâbism in
Religious Systems of the World. Cp. Renan, Les Apôtres, pp. 378-81.

[1181] H. Arakélian, Mémoire sur Le Bâbisme en Perse, in the Actes
du Premier Congrès International d'Histoire des Religions, Paris,
1902, 2 Ptie. Fasc. i.

[1182] Gobineau, pp. 167 sq.; 180 sq.; Arakélian, p. 94.

[1183] Lane, Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians, 5th ed. 1871,
i, 349, 356. "There are, I believe," says Lane (writing originally
in 1836), "very few professed Muslims who are really unbelievers;
and these dare not openly avow their unbelief through fear of losing
their heads for their apostacy. I have heard of two or three such who
have been rendered so by long and intimate intercourse with Europeans;
and have met with one materialist, who has often had long discussions
with me."

[1184] Id. ii, 309. (Suppl. III, "Of Late Innovations in Egypt.")

[1185] See the documents reproduced by Max Müller, Introd. to the
Science of Religion, ed. 1882, App. 1.

[1186] Id. pp. 214, 216.

[1187] Id. pp. 210, 217, 224, 225.

[1188] Id. pp. 224, 226.

[1189] Id. pp. 226, 229.

[1190] Guyard, p. 45; Steiner, p. 5, note; Lane, The Modern Egyptians,
ed. 1871, i. 137-38. Cp. Spencer, Study of Sociology, ch. xii, p. 292;
Bosworth Smith, Mohammed and Mohammedanism, 2nd ed. pp. 315-19.

[1191] Derenbourg, p. 72; Steiner, p. 1; Lane, i, 79.

[1192] Cp. Bosworth Smith, Mohammed and Mohammedanism, Lectures I and
IV; Canon Isaac Taylor, address to Church Congress at Wolverhampton,
1887, and letters to Times, Oct. and Nov. 1887. On the other or
anti-Mohammedan side see Canon Robinson, Hausaland, 3rd ed. 1900,
p. 186 sq.--a somewhat obviously prejudiced argument. See pp. 190-91.

[1193] Sir Harry H. Johnston, History of the Colonization of Africa
by Alien Races, 1899, p. 283.

[1194] This label has been applied by scholars to the seventh,
eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries. One writer, who supposes it to
cover the period from 500 to 1400, and protests, is attacking only
a misconception. (M. A. Lane, The Level of Social Motion, New York,
1902., p. 232.) The Renaissance is commonly reckoned to begin about
the end of the fourteenth century (cp. Symonds, Age of the Despots,
ch. i). But the whole period from the fall of the Roman Empire to the
fall of Constantinople, or to the Reformation, is broadly included
in the "Middle Ages."

[1195] Essai sur les Moeurs, ch. xlv.

[1196] According to which God predestinated good, but merely foreknew
evil.

[1197] For Leo's contacts with the Saracens see Finlay, Hist. of
Greece, ed. Tozer, ii, 14-20, 24, 31-32, 34-35, 37, etc., and compare
p. 218. See also Hardwick, Church History: Middle Age, 1833, p. 78,
note 2; and Waddington, History of the Church, 1833, p. 187, note.

[1198] Kurtz, Hist. of the Chr. Church, Eng. tr. i, 252.

[1199] Kurtz, p. 253.

[1200] As to his hostility to letters see Gibbon, ch. liii--Bohn
ed. vi, 228. Of course the other side were not any more
liberal. Cp. Finlay, ii, 222.

[1201] Gieseler, ii, 202. Per. III, <DW37>. I, pt. i, § 1. In the next
century this was said to have gone in some churches to the point of
rejection of Christ. Id. p. 207, note 28.

[1202] Id. pp. 205, 207; Finlay, ii, 195.

[1203] Neander, Hist. of Chr. Church, Bohn tr. v, 289; vi, 266.

[1204] On their connection at this time with the culture-movement of
the Khalifate of Mamoun, see Finlay, ii, 224-25; Gibbon, ch. liii--Bohn
ed. vi, 228-29.

[1205] Finlay, ii, 181, note. The enemies of Photius accused him
of lending himself to the emperor's buffooneries. Neander, vi,
303-304. Cp. Mosheim, 9 Cent. pt. ii, ch. iii, § 7; and Gibbon,
ch. xxxiii--ed. cited, vi, 229. Finlay declares (p. 222) that no
Greek of the intellectual calibre of Photius, John the Grammarian,
and Leo the Mathematician, has since appeared.

[1206] Neander, vi, 280.

[1207] Finlay, ii, 174-75, 180.

[1208] Hardwick, Church History: Middle Age, 1853, p. 85. It is
noteworthy that the "heathen" Magyars held the Mazdean dualistic
principle, and that their evil power was named Armanyos (=
Ahrimanes). Mailáth, Geschichte der Magyaren, 1828, i, 25-26.

[1209] Gibbon, ch. liv; Mosheim, 9 Cent. pt. ii, ch. 5; Gieseler,
Per. III, <DW37>. I, pt. i, § 3; G. S. Faber, The Ancient Vallenses
and Waldenses, 1838, pp. 32-60. Some fresh light is thrown on the
Paulician doctrines by the discovery of the old Armenian book,
The Key of Truth, edited and translated by F. C. Conybeare, Oxford,
1898. It belonged to the Armenian sect of Thonraki, or Thonrakians,
or Thondrakians--people of the village of Thondrac (Neander, vi,
347)--founded by one Sembat, originally a Paulician, in the ninth
century (Hardwick, Church History: Middle Age, p. 201; Neander, last
cit.). For a criticism of Mr. Conybeare's theories see the Church
Quarterly Review, Jan. 1899, Art. V.

[1210] Gieseler, Per. III, §§ 45, 46, vol. ii, pp. 489, 492; Hardwick,
p. 86. The sect of Euchites, also anti-priestly, seem to have joined
them. Faber denies any Manichean element.

[1211] Gibbon, as cited, vi, 241.

[1212] Gibbon, vi, 242; Hardwick, pp. 88-90.

[1213] Gibbon, vi, 245, and note; Finlay, ii, 60.

[1214] Despite the express decision, the use of statues proper
(agalmata) gradually disappeared from the Greek Church, the disuse
finally creating a strong antipathy, while pictures and ikons remained
in reverence (Tozer's note to Finlay, ii, 165; cp. Waddington, History
of the Church, 1833, p. 190, note). It is probable that the sheer loss
of artistic skill counted for much in the change. Cp. Milman, Latin
Christianity, bk. xiv, ch. ix; 4th ed. ix, 308-12. It is noteworthy
that, whereas in the struggle over images their use was for two long
periods legally abolished, it was in both cases restored by empresses
Irene and Theodora.

[1215] Hardwick, p. 80, note; Neander, vi, 340.

[1216] Cp. Kurtz, His. of the Chr. Church, Eng. tr. i, 271.

[1217] Gibbon, vi, 246; Finlay, iii, 64; Mosheim, 10 Cent. pt. ii,
ch. v.

[1218] Finlay, iii, 66.

[1219] Gibbon, as cited; R. Lane Poole, Illustrations of the History
of Medieval Thought, 1884, pp. 91-96; Mosheim, 11 Cent. pt. ii, ch. v.

[1220] Finlay, iii, 67-68; Mosheim, 12 Cent. pt. ii, ch. v, §
2. Hardwick, pp. 302-305; Kurtz, i, 270-73.

[1221] Gieseler, Per. III, <DW37>. II, pt. iii, § 46.

[1222] Gibbon, vi, 249, note; Poole, p. 91, note; De Potter, L'Esprit
de L'Église, 1821, vi, 16, note.

[1223] Boniface, Ep. lxvi, cited by Poole, p. 23; Reid's Mosheim,
p. 263, note 3; Neander, Hist. of the Christian Church, Bohn tr. v,
86-67; Hardwick, p. 23.

[1224] For excellent accounts of both see Mr. Poole's Illustrations,
pp. 28-50. As to Claudius cp. Monastier, Hist. of the Vaudois Church,
Eng. tr. 1848, pp. 13-42, and Faber, The Ancient Vallenses, bk. iii,
ch. iv.

[1225] See Mr. Poole's Illustrations, pp. 46-48, for an account of
the privileges then accorded to Jews.

[1226] This is not incompatible with their having opposed both Saracens
(Claudius in actual war) and Jews, as Christian bishops.

[1227] Poole, Illustrations, p. 37.

[1228] This when the Church found its account in adopting all such
usages. Lea, Superstition and Force, pp. 242, 280, etc. It is to be
noted, however, that one Council, that of Valence, 855, perhaps under
the influence of Agobard's teaching, published a canon prohibiting all
duels, and praying the emperor to abolish them. Cited by Waddington,
History of the Church, 1833, p. 242, note, from Fleury.

[1229] De Grandine et tonitruis, c. 3; and De imaginibus, c. 13,
cited by Reuter.

[1230] "He had the clearest head in the whole ninth century; and as an
influence (Mann der Tendenz) is above comparison" (Reuter, Gesch. der
religiösen Aufklärung im Mittelalter, i, 24). As to his acute handling
of the thorny question of reason and authority see Reuter, i, 40-41.

[1231] Poole, pp. 50-52.

[1232] Noack, Philosophie-Geschichtliches Lexikon, s. v. Rabanus. As
to the doubtful works in which Rabanus coincides with Scotus Erigena,
cp. Poole, p. 336; Noack, as cited; Ueberweg, i, 367-68.

[1233] Ueberweg, pp. 366, 371; Poole, pp. 99, 101, 336.

[1234] Ueberweg, pp. 356-65. That there was, however, an Irish
scholasticism as early as the eighth century is shown by Mosheim,
8 Cent. pt. ii, ch. iii, § 6, note 3. Cp. Huber, Johannes Scotus
Erigena, 1861, p. 428 sq.; Taillandier, Scot Erigène et la philosophie
scolastique, 1843, p. 198.

[1235] Lea, as cited, p. 280.

[1236] "The learned and freethinking guest of Charles le Chauve,"
Hardwick calls him, p. 176. It needed the protection of Charles to
save him from the orthodox, Hincmar included. See Ampère, Histoire
littéraire de la France, 1840, iii, 94-95, as to the anger against him.

[1237] See the whole argument summarized by Huber, p. 59 sq.

[1238] Cp. Poole, Illustrations, pp. 61, 63, 65; Neander, Bohn
tr. vi, 198 sq.; and the present writer's introd. to Shaftesbury's
Characteristics, ed. 1900, p. xxxiv. And see above, p. 184.

[1239] De divisione Naturæ, l. v; De Prædestinatione, c. 17; Poole,
pp. 71-72; Neander, vi, 198-99; Huber, as cited, p. 405.

[1240] In the treatise On the Division of Nature. See the extracts
given in the Cabinet Cyclopædia survey of Europe in the Middle Ages,
ii, 266-68. They prove, says the author of the survey, "that John
Erigena had none of the spirit of Christianity."

[1241] Poole, pp. 64, 76.

[1242] S. Robins, A Defence of the Faith, 1862, pp. 25-26.

[1243] Huber, pp. 435-40.

[1244] Cp. Neander, Hist. of the Chr. Church, Bohn tr. vi, 192.

[1245] De Corpore et Sanguine Domini, rep. Oxford, 1838, cc. 8-16,
29, 56, 72-76, etc.

[1246] C. 19: "Non sicut quidam volunt, anima sola hoc mysterio
pascitur." Neander, vi, 210.

[1247] Hardwick, pp. 178, 181; Neander, vi, 217.

[1248] Cp. Neander, vi, 219.

[1249] Poole, p. 69.

[1250] C. 6: "Ineptas quæstiunculas et aniles pæne fabulas Scotorumque
pultes." Neander, vi, 207.

[1251] Neander, vi, 219, citing Mabillon, Analecta, i, 207.

[1252] Compare the Gemma Ecclesiastica of Giraldus Cambrensis for an
inside view of the avarice of the clergy in his day.

[1253] Neander, Hist. of the Chr. Church, v, 187. See the whole section
for a good account of the general economic and moral evolution. Neander
repeatedly (pp. 186-87) insists on the "magical" element in the
doctrine of the mass, as established by Gregory the Great.

[1254] See Neander, as cited, v, 183. The point was well put some
centuries later by the Italian story-teller Masuccio, an orthodox
Catholic but a vehement anti-clericalist, in a generalization
concerning the monks: "The best punishment for them would be for
God to abolish Purgatory; they would then receive no more alms, and
would be forced to go back to their spades." Cited by Burckhardt,
The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, Eng. tr. 1892, p. 461.

[1255] Neander, vi, 182. Rabanus Maurus distinctly belied him on this
score. (Id. p. 183.)

[1256] Formerly, only the saved had been spoken of as prædestinati,
the reprobate being called præsciti. Neander, vi, 181.

[1257] Neander, vi, 187. Cp. Hampden, Bampton Lectures on The
Scholastic Philosophy, 3rd ed. p. 418; and Ampère, Histoire littéraire
de France, 1840, iii, 92.

[1258] Poole, p. 103. Cp. Neander, vi, 225.

[1259] Neander, vi, 237-38.

[1260] Id. pp. 255-56.

[1261] Id. p. 257.

[1262] Id. p. 258. As to the wide extent of the discussion see Reuter,
Geschichte der religiösen Aufklärung im Mittelalter, i, 112.

[1263] In 945, however, Atto, Bishop of Verceil, is found complaining
that some people from the Italian border had introduced heresies.

[1264] Mosheim, 10 Cent. pt. ii, ch. v, § 3; Poole, Illustrations,
p. 91.

[1265] Hardwick, p. 203.

[1266] Kurtz, History of the Christian Church, Eng. tr. 1868, i, 435.

[1267] Hénault, Abrégé chronologique, ann. 1022; Neander, Hist. of
the Chr. Relig. and Church, Eng. tr. Bohn ed. vi, 349 sq.; Mosheim, 10
Cent. pt. ii, ch. v, § 3; De Potter, L'Esprit de l'Église, vi, 18-19;
Poole, pp. 96-98; Lea, History of the Inquisition, i, 104, 108-109,
218; Gieseler, Per. III, <DW37>. ii, § 46. The contemporary accounts
say nothing as to the heretics being Manicheans. Neander, p. 350, note.

[1268] Cp. Murdock's note on Mosheim, Reid's ed. p. 386; Monastier,
Hist. of the Vaudois Church, p. 33; Waddington, p. 356; Hardwick,
p. 203, note, and p. 207.

[1269] De Potter, pp. 20-21; Gieseler, as cited, p. 497; Lea, i,
104, 109.

[1270] Mosheim, as last cited, § 4; Gieseler, ii, 496 (§ 46); Hardwick,
pp. 203, 204.

[1271] Mosheim. 11 Cent. pt. ii, ch. v, § 2, and Murdock's notes;
12 Cent. pt. ii, ch. v, §§ 4, 5.

[1272] Hardwick, p. 306; Kurtz, i, 433. The derivation through
the Italian is however disputed. Cp. Murdock's note to Mosheim,
Reid's ed. p. 385, and Gieseler, ii, 486. The Chazari, a Turkish
(Crimean) people, partly Christian and partly Moslem in the ninth
century (Gieseler, as cited), may have given the name of Gazzari, as
Bulgar gave Bougre; and the German Ketzer may have come directly from
Chazar. The Christianity of the Chazars, influenced by neighbourhood
with Islam, seems to have been a very free syncretism.

[1273] Cp. Gieseler, Per. III, §§ 24, 34; Abbé Queant, Gerbert, ou
Sylvestre II, 1868, pp. 3-5, citing Chevé, Histoire des papes, t. ii,
and Baronius, Annales, ad ann. 900, n. 1; Mosheim, 9 Cent. pt. ii,
ch. ii, §§ 1-4; with his and Murdock's refs.; 10 Cent. pt. ii,
ch. ii, §§ 1, 2; 11 Cent. pt. ii, ch. ii, § 1; ch. iii, §§ 1-3;
12 Cent. pt. ii, ch. ii, § 1; 13 Cent. pt. ii, ch. ii, §§ 1-7. The
authorities are often eminent Churchmen, as Agobard, Ratherius,
Bernard, and Gregory VIII.

[1274] See Mosheim, 8 Cent. pt. ii, ch. ii, § 5, note z. Cp. Duruy,
Hist. de France, ii, 170.

[1275] Cp. Prof. Abdy, Lectures on Feudalism, 1890, p. 72.

[1276] Mosheim, 12 Cent. pt. ii, ch. v, § 6.

[1277] Cp. Morin, Origines de la démocratie, 3e éd. pp. 164-65;
Mosheim, 10 Cent. pt. ii, ch. iii, § 3.

[1278] Morin, p. 168. Compare, on the whole communal movement, Duruy,
Hist. de France, ch. xxi, and Michelet.

[1279] Gieseler, Per. III, § 46, end; Lea, i, 109, 218.

[1280] Monastier, Hist. of the Vaudois Ch., p. 32; Lea, i, 110.

[1281] Bryce, The Holy Roman Empire, 8th ed. p. 134. See p. 135 for a
list of John's offences; and cp. p. 85 as to other papal records. For
a contemporary account of Pope Honorius II (d. 1130) see Milman,
Latin Christianity, iii, 448-49.

[1282] Hallam, Middle Ages, 11th ed. ii, 174.

[1283] Cp. Müller, Allgemeine Geschichte, B. xiv, Cap. 17.

[1284] Bryce, p. 152.

[1285] "Janus," The Pope and the Councils, Eng. tr. pp. 178-79.

[1286] Cp. Heeren, Essai sur l'influence des Croisades, 1808, p. 172.

[1287] Sir G. Cox, The Crusades, p. 111.

[1288] Cp. Lea, i, 111.

[1289] Id. p. 115.

[1290] Hardwick, p. 310; Lea, i, 68; Reuter, Gesch. der religiösen
Aufklärung im Mittelalter, i, 148-49; Mosheim, as last cited, § 7.

[1291] Cp. Motley, Rise of the Dutch Republic, ed. 1863, p. 36.

[1292] Mosheim, 12 Cent. pt. ii, ch. v, §§ 7-9, and varior. notes;
Monastier, pp. 38-41, 43-47; Milman, Latin Christianity, v, 384-90.

[1293] Hardwick, p. 267; Mosheim, as last cited, § 10; Monastier,
p. 49.

[1294] Hardwick, p. 204, note; Kurtz, i, 433. Cp. the Transactions
of the New Shakespeare Society, 1875-76, pt. ii, p. 313; Mosheim, 11
Cent. pt. ii, ch. ii, § 13, and note; Milman, Latin Christianity, v,
401. On the sects in general see De Potter, vi, 217-310; and Cantù,
Gli Eretici d'Italia, 1865, i, 149-53.

[1295] Lea, i, 115.

[1296] Id. pp. 117-18.

[1297] Id. p. 119.

[1298] Kurtz, i, 435; Lea, i, 119.

[1299] Hardwick, p. 308, note; Murdock's note to Mosheim, p. 426;
Monastier, pp. 106-107.

[1300] Lea, i, 124.

[1301] Id. p. 126.

[1302] Id. pp. 127-28.

[1303] Kitchin, History of France, 4th ed. 1889, i, 286; citing
Chron. de St. Denis, p. 350. The Annales Victoriani at Philip's death
(1223) pronounce him ecclesiarum et religionarum personarum amator
et fautor (Hénault's Abrégé Chronologique). Among the many Cathari
put to death in his reign was Nicholas, the most famous painter in
France--burned at Braine in 1204. Lea, i, 131.

[1304] Lea, i, 113-14. Cp. Ranke, Hist. of the Popes,
Eng. tr. 1-vol. ed. p. 13.

[1305] Cp. Hardwick, p. 312; Mosheim, 12 Cent. pt. ii, ch. v, §
11, and notes in Reid's ed.; Monastier, Hist. of the Vaudois Church,
Eng. tr. 1848, pp. 12-29; Faber, The Ancient Vallenses and Albigenses,
pp. 28, 284, etc. As Vigilantius took refuge in the Cottian Alps,
his doctrine may have survived there, as argued by Monastier (p. 10)
and Faber (p. 290). The influence of Claudius of Turin, as they further
contend, might also come into play. On the whole subject see Gieseler,
Per. III, <DW37>. iii, § 88.

[1306] Cp. Mosheim with Faber, bk. iii, chs. iii, viii; Hardwick,
as cited; and Monastier, pp. 53-82. Waddington, p. 353, holds Mosheim
to be in error; and there are some grounds for dating the Waldensian
heresy before Waldus, who flourished 1170-1180 (id. p. 354). Waldus had
to flee from France, and finally died in Bohemia, 1197 (Kurtz, i, 439).

[1307] Cp. Lea, Hist. of the Inquisition, i, 73-88. Waldensian theology
varied from time to time.

[1308] Between 1153 and 1191 there were ten popes, three of them
anti-popes. Celestine III held the chair from 1191 to 1198; and
Innocent III from the latter year to 1216.

[1309] De Potter, vi, 26; Lea, i, 115.

[1310] Lea, i, 290.

[1311] De Potter, vi, 28.

[1312] See Bartoli, Storia della Letteratura Italiana, 1878, i,
262, note, also his I Precursori del Renascimento, 1877, p. 37. In
this section and in the next chapter I am indebted for various clues
to the Rev. John Owen's Skeptics of the Italian Renaissance. As to
the Goliards generally, see that work, pp. 38-45; Bartoli, Storia,
cap. viii; Milman, Latin Christianity, bk. xiv, ch. iv; and Gebhart,
Les Origines de la Renaissance en Italie, 1879, pp. 125-26. The name
Goliard came from the type-name Golias, used by many satirists.

[1313] Bartoli, Storia, i, 271-79. Cp. Schlegel's note to Mosheim,
Reid's ed. p. 332, following Ratherius; and Gebhart, as cited. Milman
(4th ed. ix, 189) credits the Goliards with "a profound respect for
sacred things, and freedom of invective against sacred persons." This
shows an imperfect knowledge of much of their work.

[1314] C. Lenient, La Satire en France au moyen âge, 1859, pp. 38-39.

[1315] Owen, as cited, pp. 43, 45; Bartoli, Storia, i, 293.

[1316] Disparagement of the serf is a commonplace of medieval
literature. Langlois, La Vie en France au moyen âge, 1908, p. 169,
and note; Lanson, Hist. de la litt. française, p. 96. At this point
the semi-aristocratic jongleurs and the writers of bourgeois bias, such
as some of the contributors to Reynard the Fox, coincided. The Renart
stories are at once anti-aristocratic, anti-clerical, and anti-demotic.

[1317] C. Lenient, La Satire en France, p. 115. Lenient cites from
Erasmus's letters (Sept. 1, 1528) a story of a German burned alive
in his time for venting the same idea.

[1318] Langlois, as cited, pp. 30-68.

[1319] Cp. Langlois, pp. 107, 129, 263, etc. C. Lenient, as cited,
p. 115.

[1320] Rev. Joseph Berington, Literary History of the Middle Ages,
ed. 1846, p. 229. Cp. Owen, p. 43.

[1321] Owen, p. 43; Bartoli, Storia, i, 295, as to the French fabliaux.

[1322] Labitte, La divine comédie avant Dante, in Charpentier ed. of
Dante, pp. 133-34.

[1323] Aucassin and Nicolette, tr. by Eugene Mason, p. 6.

[1324] Sismondi, Literature of Southern Europe, Eng. tr. i, 74-95.

[1325] Id. p. 76.

[1326] Zeller, Histoire d'Italie, 1853, p. 152; Renan, Averroès,
p. 184.

[1327] "The Troubadours in truth were freethinkers" (Owen, Italian
Skeptics, p. 48). Cp. Lea, Hist. of the Inquisition, ii, 2; and
Hardwick, p. 274, note 4, as to the common animus against the papacy.

[1328] Heeren, Essai sur l'influence des Croisades, French tr. 1808,
p. 174, note; Owen, Italian Skeptics, p. 44, note.

[1329] Abbé Queant, Gerbert, ou Sylvestre II, 1868, pp. 30-31.

[1330] Sismondi, as cited, p. 82; Owen, pp. 66, 68; Mosheim, 11
Cent. pt. ii, ch. i, § 4; 12 Cent. pt. ii, ch. i, § 9, and Reid's
note to § 8; Hampden, Bampton Lectures, p. 446. The familiar record
that Gerbert, afterwards Pope Sylvester II, studied in Spain among
the Arabs (Ueberweg, i, 369) has of late years been discredited
(Olleris, Vie de Gerbert, 1867, chs. ii and xxv; Ueberweg, p. 430;
Poole, Illustrations, p. 88); but its very currency depended on
the commonness of some such proceeding in his age. In any case,
the teaching he would receive at the Spanish monastery of Borel
would owe all its value to Saracen culture. Cp. Abbé Queant, Gerbert,
pp. 26-32. The greatness of the service he rendered to northern Europe
in introducing the Arabic numerals is expressed in the legend of his
magical powers. Compare the legends as to Roger Bacon.

[1331] Sismondi, p. 83.

[1332] Cp. G. H. Lewes, The Spanish Drama, 1846, pp. 11-14; Littré,
Études sur les barbares et le moyen âge, 3e édit. p. 356.

[1333] See the passages cited by Owen, p. 58.

[1334] Cp. Bartoli, Storia, pp. 200-202.

[1335] Gebhart, Les Origines de la Renaissance, pp. 4, 17; Renan,
Averroès et l'Averroïsme, pp. 145, 183, 185; Libri, Hist. des
sciences mathématiques en Italie, i, 153; Michelet, Hist. de France,
t. vii, Renaissance, introd. note du § vii; Hauréau, Hist. de la
philos. scolastique, i, 382. Cp. Franck, Études Orientales, 1861,
p. 357.

[1336] As to the Pope's character compare Sismondi, Hist. of the
Crusades against the Albigenses (Eng. tr. from vols. vi and vii of his
Histoire des Français), p. 10; Hallam, Europe during the Middle Ages,
11th ed. ii, 198; Mosheim, 13 Cent. pt. ii, ch. ii, §§ 6-8.

[1337] As to previous acts of inquisition and persecution by
Pope Alexander III (noted above) see Llorente, Hist. Crit. de
l'Inquisition en Espagne, French tr. 2e édit. i, 27-30, and Lea,
History of the Inquisition, i, 118. Cp. Gieseler, Per. III, <DW37>. iii,
§ 89 (Amer. ed. ii, 564).

[1338] Hardwick, p. 309; Lea, i, 145.

[1339] Sismondi, Crusades against the Albigenses, p. 21.

[1340] On the previous history of indulgences see Lea, History of the
Inquisition, i, 41-47; De Potter, Esprit de l'Église, vii, 22-39. For
the later developments cp. Lea's Studies in Church History, 1869,
p. 450; Vieusseux, History of Switzerland, 1840, pp. 121, 125.

[1341] Sismondi, Crusades, pp. 28-29.

[1342] Id. p. 23.

[1343] Lea, i, 149.

[1344] For a modern Catholic defence of the whole proceedings see
the Comte de Montalembert's Histoire de Sainte Elisabeth de Hongrie,
13e édit. intr. pp. 35-40.

[1345] Sismondi, Crusades, p. 35, and refs.; Lea, i, 154.

[1346] Sismondi, pp. 36-37, and refs.

[1347] Id. pp. 37-43.

[1348] Id. pp. 21, 41. Cp. p. 85 as to later treachery towards
Saracens; and p. 123 as to the deeds of the Bishop of Toulouse. See
again pp. 140-42 as to the massacre of Marmande.

[1349] As to the international character of the crusade see Sismondi,
Crusades, p. 53.

[1350] Sismondi, p. 62 sq.

[1351] Pp. 77, 78.

[1352] Pp. 74, 75.

[1353] P. 87. "The worship of the reformed Albigenses had everywhere
ceased" (p. 115). Cp. p. 116 as to the completeness of the final
massacres. It is estimated (Monastier, p. 115, following De la
Mothe-Langon) that a million Albigenses were slain in the first half
of the thirteenth century. The figures are of course speculative.

[1354] Cp. Lea, ii, 159; Lenient, La Satire en France an moyen âge,
1859, p. 43.

[1355] Lea, vol. ii, ch. i.

[1356] Sismondi, pp. 115, 117.

[1357] Id. p. 133.

[1358] Id. pp. 235-39; Lea, ii, 247, 259, 319, 347, 429, etc.

[1359] Sismondi, p. 236; Llorente, as cited, i, 60-64; Lea, ii, 200.

[1360] Matthew Paris records that in 1249 four hundred and forty-three
heretics were burned in Saxony and Pomerania. Previously multitudes
had been burned by the Inquisitor Conrad, who was himself finally
murdered in revenge. He was the confessor of Saint Elizabeth of
Hungary, and he taught her among other things, "Be merciful to your
neighbour," and "Do to others whatsoever you would that they should do
to you." See his praises recorded by Montalembert, as cited, vol. i,
ch. x. Cp. Gieseler, Per. III, <DW37>. iii, § 89 (ii, 567).

[1361] Lea, ii, 204. This was the "peace-maker" described by Dr. Lea
as--in that capacity--"so worthy a disciple of the Great Teacher of
divine love" (i, 240).

[1362] Ueberweg, i, 366; Poole, pp. 99, 100.

[1363] As to the verbal confusion of Aristotle's theory see Ueberweg.

[1364] Id. i, 160.

[1365] Id. i, 375.

[1366] Cp. Mosheim's note, Reid's ed. p. 388.

[1367] Ueberweg, i, 374.

[1368] Poole, p. 104, note; Milman, Latin Christianity, 4th ed. i, 54.

[1369] Hampden, Bampton Lectures, On the Scholastic Philosophy, 1848,
p. 71.

[1370] Mosheim, as cited, and refs.

[1371] Hampden, p. 70.

[1372] A. S. Farrar, Crit. Hist. of Freethought, 1862, p. 111. Farrar
adds: "'Neque enim quaero intelligere ut credam, set credo ut
intelligam' are the words of the Realist Anselm (Prolog. i, 43,
ed. Gerberon): 'Dubitando ad inquisitionem venimus; inquirendo
veritatem percipimus' are those of the Nominalist Abailard (Sic et Non,
p. 16, ed. Cousin)."

[1373] Cp. Hauréau, Hist. de la philos. scolastique, i, ch. 19,
as to orthodoxy among both Nominalists and Realists.

[1374] Hampden, pp. 70, 449.

[1375] Cp. Lea, Hist. of the Inquisition, iii, 550.

[1376] Poole, Illustr. of the Hist. of Medieval Thought, pp. 104-105.

[1377] Præfatio in Monologium.

[1378] As to the various classes of doubters known to Anselm see
Reuter, Gesch. der religiösen Aufklärung im Mittelalter, i, 129-31,
and refs. Anselm writes: Fides enim nostra contra impios ratione
defenda est. Epist. ii, 41.

[1379] Ueberweg, i, 381.

[1380] See it in Ueberweg, i, 384-85; cp. Ch. de Rémusat, Saint
Anselme, 1853, pp. 61-62; Dean Church, Saint Anselm, ed. 1888,
pp. 86-87. As to previous instances of Anselm's argument cp. Poole,
Illustrations, p. 338 sq.

[1381] Cp. Ueberweg, i, 379-80.

[1382] Cited by Hampden, Bampton Lect. p. 443.

[1383] Metalogicus, vii, 2; Poole, p. 223.

[1384] Gemma Ecclesiastica, Distinctio i, c. 51; Works, ed. Brewer,
Rolls Series, ii, 148-49; pref. p. xxxv.

[1385] Cp. Hauréau, Hist. de la philos. scolastique, Ptie. II (1880),
i, 61. Hauréau points out that Simon's writings are strictly orthodox,
whatever his utterances may have been.

[1386] Distinctio, ii, c. 24; pp. liv, 285.

[1387] Cp. Pearson, Hist. of England during the Early and Middle Ages,
ii, 504.

[1388] The Saynt Graal, ed. Furnivall, 1861, pp. 7, 84; History of
the Holy Grail, ed. Furnivall, 1874, pp. 5-7; Pearson, as cited,
i, 606-607.

[1389] Hauréau, Hist. de la philos. scolastique, i, 1870, p. 502.

[1390] Poole, pp. 141-42.

[1391] "Humanas ac philosophicas rationes requirebant; et plus quæ
intelligi quam quæ dici possent efflagitabant" (Historia calamitatum
mearum, ed. Gréard, p. 36).

[1392] Id. ib.

[1393] Ueberweg, i, 387.

[1394] Ueberweg, i, 391. Cp. Milman, Latin Christianity, ix, 111.

[1395] Ueberweg, i, 394-95.

[1396] Hampden, Bampton Lect. pp. 420-21.

[1397] Poole, p. 175. It is not impossible that, as Sismondi suggests
(Histoire des Français, ed. 1823, v, 294-96), Abailard was persecuted
mainly because of the dangerous anti-papal movement maintained in Italy
for fifteen years (1139-1155) by his doctrinally orthodox pupil, Arnold
of Brescia. But Hampden (p. 40), agreeing with Guizot (Hist. de Civ. en
Europe; Hist. mod. Leçon 6), pronounces that "there was no sympathy
between the efforts of the Italian Republics to obtain social liberty,
and those within the Church to recover personal freedom of thought."

[1398] Poole, pp. 117-23, 169.

[1399] Ueberweg, i, 398.

[1400] Poole, p. 173.

[1401] Cp. Poole, p. 153. It is difficult to doubt that the series
of patristic deliverances against reason in the first section of Sic
et Non was compiled by Abailard in a spirit of dissent.

[1402] Cp. Hardwick, p. 279; and see p. 275, note, for Bernard's
dislike of his demand for clearness: "Nihil videt per speculum et in
aenigmate, sed facie ad faciem omnia intuetur."

[1403] Poole, p. 161. Cp. Dr. Hastings Rashdall on the "pious
scurrility" of Bernard. The Universities of Europe in the Middle
Ages, 1895, i, 57, note. Contrast the singularly laudatory account
of St. Bernard given by two contemporary Positivists, Mr. Cotter
Morison in his Life and Times of St. Bernard, and Mr. F. Harrison
in his essay on that work in his Choice of Books. The subject is
discussed in the present writer's paper on "The Ethics of Propaganda"
in Essays in Ethics.

[1404] Erdmann, History of Philosophy, Eng. tr. 3rd ed. i, 325.

[1405] Hauréau, Hist. de la philos. scolastique, i (1872), 534-46.

[1406] Id. citing the Polycraticus, l. vii, c. 2.

[1407] Polycraticus, l. vii, c. 7.

[1408] Cp. Poole, pp. 220-22; the extracts of Hampden, pp. 438-43;
and the summing-up of Hauréau. Hist. de la philos. scolastique, i
(1870), 357.

[1409] Historia calamitatum, as cited. Cp. p. 10 for Abailard's own
opinion of Anselm of Laon, whom he compares to a leafy but fruitless
tree.

[1410] Matthew Paris, sub. ann. 1201. There is a somewhat
circumstantial air about this story, Simon's reply being made to begin
humorously with a Jesule. Jesule! Matthew, however, tells on this
item the story of Simon's miraculous punishment which Giraldus tells
on a quite different text. Matthew is indignant with the scholastic
arrogance which has led many to "suppress" the miracle.

[1411] Ueberweg, i, 419, 430; Hampden, p. 443 sq. Cp. Renan, Averroès,
p. 173 sq.

[1412] Ueberweg, i, 418. The Karaïtes may be described as Jewish
Protestants or Puritans. Cp. Schechter, Studies in Judaism, 1896,
pp. 252-54.

[1413] Schechter (as cited, pp. 197, 417) gives two sets of dates,
the second being 1135-1204.

[1414] For a good survey of the medieval Hebrew thought in general
see Joel, Beiträge zur Gesch. der Philos. 1876; and as to Maimonides
see A. Franck's Études Orientales, 1861; Hauréau, Hist. de la
philos. scolastique, Ptie II, i, 41-46; and Renan, Averroès,
pp. 177-82.

[1415] Schechter, Studies in Judaism, pp. 422-23.

[1416] Id. p. 208.

[1417] Ueberweg, i, 428; Schechter, p. 424.

[1418] Renan, Averroès, p. 183.

[1419] Schechter, pp. 83-85.

[1420] Hauréau pronounces (II, i, 29-34) that Avicebron should be
ranked among the most sincere and resolute of pantheists. His chief
work was the Fons vitæ.

[1421] Renan, Averroès, pp. 100, 175.

[1422] Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, c. 8, ad init.

[1423] Mémoires de Joinville, ed. 1871, ii, 16.

[1424] Renan, Averroès, pp. 222-24.

[1425] Huber, Johannes Scotus Erigena, p. 435; Christlieb, Leben und
Lehre des Johannes Scotus Erigena, 1860, p. 438. Copies of John's
writings were found in the hands of the sectaries of Amalrich and
David; and in 1226 the writings in question were condemned and burnt
accordingly. Hauréau, Hist. de la philos. scolastique, i, 175.

[1426] Ueberweg, i, 388, 431; Milman, Latin Christianity, ix, 112-14;
Renan, p. 223; Hahn, Geschichte der Ketzer im Mittelalter, 1845-50,
iii, 176-92.

[1427] Mosheim, 13 Cent. pt. ii, ch. v, § 12.

[1428] Poole, p. 225; Ueberweg, i, 431.

[1429] Lecky's description (Rationalism in Europe, ed. 1887, i, 48)
of Averroïsm as a "stern and uncompromising infidelity" is hopelessly
astray.

[1430] Summa Theologica, Prima Secundae, Quæst. LXXXV, Art. 6. Compare
Hauréau, Hist. de la philos. scolastique, i, 189, for a trace of
the idea of natura naturans in John Scotus and Heiric, in the ninth
century.

[1431] Renan, p. 236 sq.

[1432] Cp. Reuter, Gesch. der religiösen Aufklärung im Mittelalter,
ii, 130.

[1433] Milman, Latin Christianity, 4th ed. ix, 133.

[1434] Robins. A Defence of the Faith, 1862, pt. i, pp. 38-39. Compare
Rashdall, Universities in the Middle Ages, i, 264; and Maurice,
Medieval Philosophy, 2nd ed. pp. 188-90. It is noteworthy that the
Summa of Thomas was a favourite study of Descartes, who read hardly
any other theologian.

[1435] Cp. Milman, ix, 143.

[1436] See the comments of Giraldus Cambrensis in the proem to
his Speculum Ecclesiæ Brewer's ed. in Rolls Series, i. 9; and
pref. pp. xii-xiii.

[1437] Cp. Renan. Averroès, p. 267, as to the polemic of William
of Auvergne.

[1438] Renan, pp. 567-68.

[1439] Id. pp. 269-71, and refs.

[1440] Renan, pp. 273-75, and refs.; Ueberweg, i, 460, and refs.;
Maywald, Die Lehre von der zweifachen Wahrheit, 1871, p. 11; Lange,
i, 182 (tr. i, 218).

[1441] Of John XXI, who had in 1276 condemned the doctrine of a
twofold truth.

[1442] Cp. Gebhart, Origines de la Renaissance, pp. 29-44. And see
above, p. 308.

[1443] Berington, Lit. Hist. of the Middle Ages, p. 245. See above,
p. 310.

[1444] See the Summa of the Inquisitor Bartholomæus Fumus, Venet. 1554,
s.v. Infidelitas, fol. 261, § 5; and the Summa of Thomas, Secunda
Secundæ, Quæst. X, Art. 2.

[1445] It is sometimes described as a formidable product of doubt;
and again by M. de Rémusat as "consecrated to controversy rather than
to skepticism." Cp. Pearson, Hist. of England in the Early and Middle
Ages, 1867, i. 609. The view in the text seems the just mean. Cp. Lea,
Hist. of the Inquisition, i. 57. In itself the book is for a modern
reader a mere collection of the edifying contradictions of theologians;
but such a collection must in any age have been a perplexity to faith;
and it is not surprising that it remained unpublished until edited
by Cousin (see the Ouvrages inédits, intr. pp. clxxxv-ix). That
writer justly sums up that such antinomies "condamnent l'esprit à un
doute salutaire." The Rev. A. S. Farrar pronounces that "the critical
independence of Nominalism, in a mind like that of Abailard, represents
the destructive action of freethought, partly as early Protestantism,
partly as skepticism" (Crit. Hist. of Freethought, p. 12).

[1446] Lea, Hist. of the Inquisition, i, 421-22, 556-58, 575; U. Burke,
Hist. of Spain, Hume's ed. 1900, ii, 351-52. For a detailed description
of the methods of ecclesiastical torture, Burke refers to the treatise,
De Catholicis Institutionibus, by Simancas, Bishop of Beja, Rome,
1575, tit. lxv, De Tormentis, p. 491 sq.

[1447] Torture was inflicted on witnesses in England in 1311, by
special inquisitors, under the mandate of Clement V, in defiance of
English law; and under Edward II it was used in England as elsewhere
against the Templars.

[1448] Istorie fiorentine, iv, 29.

[1449] See below, p. 325.

[1450] Villari, Two First Centuries of Florentine History,
Eng. tr. 1901, pp. 110-12.

[1451] Reuter, Gesch. der religiösen Aufklärung im Mittelalter, i, 167.

[1452] Id. i, 164-66.

[1453] The Moslems were inclined to regard him as of their creed
"because educated in Sicily." Cantù, Gli Eretici d'Italia, 1865, i, 66.

[1454] See Gieseler, as cited below; and Reid's Mosheim, p. 437, note.

[1455] Milman, Latin Christianity, vi, 150; Lea, Hist. of the
Inquisition, i, 221.

[1456] Milman, vi, 150, 158.

[1457] Renan, Averroès, p. 289.

[1458] Renan, Averroès, pp. 205-10. Michael Scotus may have been, like
John Scotus, an Irishman, but his refusal to accept the archbishopric
of Cashel, on the ground that he did not know the native language,
makes this doubtful. The identification of him with a Scottish knight,
Sir Michael Scott, still persisted in by some scholars on the strength
of Sir Walter Scott's hasty note to The Lay of the Last Minstrel,
is destitute of probability. See the Rev. J. Wood Brown's Inquiry
into the Life and Legend of Michael Scot, 1897, pp. 160-61, 175-76.

[1459] Inferno, xx, 515-17.

[1460] Cantù, Gli Eretici d'Italia, i, 65-66; the Pope's letter,
as cited; Renan, Averroès, pp. 287-91, 296.

[1461] See the verdict of Gieseler, Eng. tr. iii (1853), p. 103, note.

[1462] Milman, vi, 158-59.

[1463] Id. p. 154. Cp. the author's Evolution of States, 1912, p. 382.

[1464] G. Villani, Istorie fiorentine, vi, 46.

[1465] Mosheim, 13 Cent. pt. i, ch. ii, § 2, citing in particular
Moneta's Summa contra Catharos et Valdenses, lib. V, cc. 4, 11, 15;
Tempier (bishop of Paris), Indiculum Errorum (1272) in the Bibliotheca
Patrum Maxima, t. xxv; Bulæus, Hist. Acad. Paris, iii, 433--as to the
Averroïsts at Paris, described above, p. 319. Cp. Renan, Averroès,
pp. 230-31, citing William of Auvergne, and pp. 283, 285; Ozanam,
Dante, 6e édit. pp. 86, 101, 111-12; Gebhart, Origines de la Renais,
pp. 79-81; Lange, i, 182 (tr. i, 218); Sharon Turner, Hist. of England
during the Middle Ages, 2nd ed. v, 136-38.

[1466] Lea, Hist. of the Inquisition, iii, 560-61.

[1467] Perrens, La civilisation florentine du 13e au 16e siècle,
1892, p. 101. Above, p. 322.

[1468] Inferno, Canto x, 14-15, 118.

[1469] Ottavio Ubaldini, d. 1273, of whom the commentators tell that
he said that if there were such a thing as a soul he had lost his
for the cause of the Ghibellines.

[1470] As to whom see Renan, Averroès, p. 285, note; Gebhart,
Renaissance, p. 81. His son Guido, "the first friend and the companion
of all the youth of Dante," was reputed an atheist (Decameron, vi,
9). Cp. Cesare Balbo, Vita di Dante, ed. 1853, pp. 48-49. But see Owen,
Skeptics of the Ital. Renais., p. 138, note.

[1471] In the Convito, ii, 9, he writes that, "among all the
bestialities, that is the most foolish, the most vile, the most
damnable, which believes no other life to be after this life." Another
passage (iv, 5) heaps curses on the "most foolish and vile beasts
... who presume to speak against our Faith."

[1472] Cp. Ozanam, Dante, 6e édit. pp. 111-12, as to anti-Christian
movements.

[1473] Lecky, Rationalism in Europe, i, 83, note; Renan, Averroès,
pp. 326-27; Cantù, Gli Eretici d'Italia, i, 177. and note 13 on p. 196.

[1474] Cp. Labitte, La Divine Comédie avant Dante, as cited, p. 139.

[1475] Michelet argues that Italy was "anti-Dantesque" in the
Renaissance (Hist. de France, vii, Intr. § 9 and App.), but he
exaggerates the common disregard of the Commedia.

[1476] As to an element of doubt, even in Dante, concerning Divine
government, see Burckhardt, p. 497. But the attempt made by some
critics to show that the "sins" to which Dante confessed had been
intellectual--i.e., heresies--falls to the ground. See Döllinger,
Studies in European History, Eng. tr. 1890, pp. 87-90; and cp. Cantù,
Gli Eretici d'Italia, i, 144 sq. on the whole question.

[1477] Cesare Balbo, Vita di Dante, ed. 1853, pp. 416-17, 433.

[1478] Cantù. Eretici d' Italia, i, 153. Cantù gives an account of
the trial process.

[1479] G. Villani, x, 39. It is to be noted that the horoscope of Jesus
was cast by several professed believers, as Albertus Magnus and Pierre
d'Ailli, Cardinal and Bishop of Cambrai, as well as by Cardan. See
Bayle, art. Cardan, note Q; and cp. Renan, Averroès, p. 326.

[1480] Cp. Owen, pp. 128, 135-42; Hallam, Lit. Hist., i, 141-42;
Milman, bk. xiv, ch. v, end.

[1481] Decam., Gior. i, nov. 2.

[1482] Gior. i, nov. 3.

[1483] Dr. Marcus Landau, Die Quellen des Dekameron, 2te Aufl. 1884,
p. 182.

[1484] The story is recorded to have been current among the
Motecallemîn--a party kindred to the Motazilites--in Bagdad. Renan,
Averroès, p. 293, citing Dozy. Renan thinks it may have been of Jewish
origin. Id. p. 294, note.

[1485] Schechter, Studies in Judaism, 1896, pp. 207-208.

[1486] It is found some time before Boccaccio in the Cento Novelle
antiche (No. 72 or 73) in a simpler form; but Landau (p. 183) thinks
Boccaccio's immediate source was the version of Busone da Gubbio
(b. 1280), who had improved on the version in the Cento Novelle,
while Boccaccio in turn improved on him by treating the Jew more
tolerantly. Bartoli (I Precursori del Boccaccio, 1876, pp. 26-28)
disputes any immediate debt to Busone; as does Owen, Skeptics of the
Ital. Renais., p. 29, note.

[1487] Burckhardt (Renaissance in Italy, p. 493, note) points out that
Boccaccio is the first to name the Christian religion, his Italian
predecessors avoiding the idea; and that in one eastern version the
story is used polemically against the Christians.

[1488] Owen, p. 142, and refs.

[1489] Id. pp. 143-45. He was even so far terrorized by the menaces
of a monk (who appeared to him to have occult knowledge of some of
his secrets) as to propose to give up his classical studies; and
would have done so but for Petrarch's dissuasion. Petrarch's letter
(Epist. Senil., i, 5) is translated (Lett. xii) by M. Develay,
Lettres de Péttrarque à Boccace.

[1490] Gasquet, The Great Pestilence, 1893, pp. 28, 32, 37, and refs.

[1491] Id. pp. 11, 41.

[1492] Probably 25,000 in England alone, including monks. Id. p. 204.

[1493] Id. pp. 205-208, 213, 216.

[1494] Below, § 11.

[1495] As to his anti-clericalism, cp. Gebhart, Orig. de la Renais.,
p. 71, and ref.; Owen, p. 113.

[1496] Cp. Rashdall, Universities in the Middle Ages, i, 264.

[1497] See the exposition of Owen, pp. 109-28. and refs. on p. 113.

[1498] Renan, Averroès, p. 328.

[1499] Méziéres, Pétrarque, 1868, p. 362.

[1500] It is to be noted that in his opposition to the scholastics
he had predecessors. Cp. Gebhart, Orig. de la Renais., p. 65.

[1501] Owen, p. 113. It is to be remembered that Dante also (Convito,
ii, 8, 9; iii, 14; iv, 7) exalts Reason; but he uses the word in the
old sense of mere mentality--the thinking as distinguished from the
sensuous element in man; and he was fierce against all resort to reason
as against faith. Petrarch was of course more of a rationalist. As to
his philosophic skepticism, see Owen, p. 120. He drew the line only
at doubting those things "in which doubt is sacrilege." Nevertheless
he grounded his belief in immortality not on the Christian creed,
but on the arguments of the pagans (Burckhardt, p. 546).

[1502] Epist. sine titulo, cited by Renan, Averroès, p. 299. For the
phrases put in Averroës' mouth by Christians, see pp. 294-98.

[1503] Inferno, iv, 144.

[1504] Renan, Averroès, pp. 301-15.

[1505] Id. pp. 333-37; Cantù, Gli Eretici d'ltalia, i, 176 and refs.

[1506] Renan, pp. 326-27.

[1507] Id. pp. 318-20.

[1508] Justinger, cited in The Pope and the Council, Eng. tr. p. 298.

[1509] Hardwick, p. 357, note.

[1510] Cp. Bonnechose, Reformers before the the Reformation,
Eng. tr. 1844, i, 40-43.

[1511] "Janus" (i.e. Döllinger), The Pope and the Council, Eng. tr. 2nd
ed. 1869, pp. 292-95. This weighty work, sometimes mistakenly ascribed
to Huber, who collaborated in it, was recast by commission and
posthumously published as Das Papstthum, by J. Friedrich, München,
1892.

[1512] Hallam, Middle Ages, 11th ed. ii, 218; Lea, Hist. of the
Inquis., i, 5-34; Gieseler, § 90 (ii, 572); Freytag, Bilder aus der
deutschen Vergangenheit, 4te aufl. ii, 318-19.

[1513] The Pope and the Council, p. 220. For proofs see same work,
pp. 220-34.

[1514] "La satire est la plus complète manifestation de la pensée
libre au moyen âge. Dans ce monde ou le dogmatisme impitoyable au
sein de l'Église et de l'école frappe comme hérétique tout dissident,
l'esprit critique n'a pas trouvé de voie plus sûre, plus rapide et plus
populaire, que la parodie" (Lenient, La Satire en France au moyen âge,
1859, p. 14).

[1515] Cp. Lenient, as cited, p. 21.

[1516] See in Symonds's Renaissance in Italy, vol. i (Age of the
Despots), ed. 1897, pp. 361-69, and Appendix IV, on "Religious
Revivals in Medieval Italy." Those revivals occurred from time to
time after Savonarola.

[1517] Cp. Villari, Machiavelli, i, 138.

[1518] Gieseler, Per. III. <DW37>. iii, § 90; Lea, Hist. of Inquis.,
ii, 319-20.

[1519] Kurtz, i, 435-36.

[1520] Lea, i, 320-21. Cp. Ullmann, Reformers before the Reformation,
Eng. tr. ii, 15-22; and Mosheim, 13 Cent. pt. ii, ch. v, § 11, and
notes. The doctrine of the treatise De Novem Rupibus is that of an
educated thinker, and is in parts strongly antinomian, but always on
pantheistic grounds.

[1521] Lea, i, 323-24.

[1522] Cp. Reuter, Gesch. der religiösen Aufklärung, ii, 240-49.

[1523] Mosheim, 13 Cent. pt. ii, ch. ii, §§ 40-43, and notes; ch. v,
§ 9. The names Beguin and Beghard seem to have been derived from the
old German verb beggan, to beg. In the Netherlands, Beguine was a
name for women; and Beghard for men.

[1524] See the record in Lea, Hist. of the Inquisition, bk. iii,
chs. i-iii.

[1525] Praised in the Roman de la Rose, Eng. vers. in Skeat's Chaucer,
i, 244; Bell's ed. iv, 228. William was answered by the Dominican
Thomas Aquinas.

[1526] See Biog. Introd. to ed. of the Philobiblon by E. C. Thomas,
1888, pp. xliii-xlvii.

[1527] C. 4, Querimonia librorum contra clericos jam promotos; C. 5,
... contra religiosos possessionatos; C. 6, ... contra religiosos
mendicantes.

[1528] Ed. Thomas, as cited, pp. xlvi-vii.

[1529] Cp. Mosheim, 13 C. pt. ii, ch. ii, §§ 18-40; Hallam, Middle
Ages, ch. vii, pt. 2; Gebhart, Origines de la Renais., p. 42;
Berington, Lit. Hist. of the Middle Ages, p. 244; Lea, Hist. of
Inq., bk. iii, ch. i. The special work of the Dominicans was the
establishment everywhere of the Inquisition. Mosheim, as last cited,
ch. v, §§ 3-6, and notes; Lea, ii, 200-201; Milman, Latin Christianity,
ix, 155-56; Llorente, Hist. Crit. de l'Inquis. en Espagne, as cited,
i, 49-55, 68, etc.

[1530] As to the development of the Beguines from an original basis of
charitable co-operation see Ullmann, Reformers before the Reformation,
ii, 13; Lea, ii, 351.

[1531] Lea, iii, 10.

[1532] See the thirteenth-century memoirs of Fra Salimbene, Eng. tr. in
T. K. L. Oliphant's The Duke and the Scholar, 1875, pp. 98, 103-104,
108-10, 116, 130.

[1533] The Introduction to the book, probably written by the Franciscan
Gerhard, made St. Francis the angel of Rev. xiv, 6; and the ministers
of the new order were to be his friars. Mosheim, 13 Cent. pt. ii,
ch. ii, §§ 33-36, and notes. Cp. Lea, as cited; and Hahn, Gesch. der
Ketzer im Mittelalter, 1845-50, iii, 72-175--a very full account of
Joachim's teaching.

[1534] Lea, iii, 20-25.

[1535] Le Clerc, Hist. Litt. de la France, xx, 230; Milman, Latin
Christianity, ix, 155.

[1536] Averroès, pp. 259-60.

[1537] Cp. Mosheim, 14 Cent. pt. ii, ch. iii, § 5; and Burnet's
Letters, ed. Rotterdam, 1686, p. 31.

[1538] Cp. Milman, Latin Christianity, ix, 75-76.

[1539] Lea, iii, 104.

[1540] Hardwick, p. 316; Lea, iii, 109; Mosheim, 12 Cent. pt. ii,
ch. v, §§ 14-16. A sect of Apostolici had existed in Asia Minor in
the fourth century. Kurtz, i, 242. Cp. Lea, i, 109, note. Those of
the twelfth century were vehemently opposed by St. Bernard.

[1541] Lea, iii, 109-19.

[1542] Lea, p. 121; Kurtz, i, 437; Hardwick, p. 315, note; Mosheim,
13 Cent. pt. ii, ch. v, § 14, and note. See Dante, Inferno, xxviii,
55-60, as to Dolcino.

[1543] Lea, p. 125.

[1544] As to the external movements connected with Joachim's Gospel
see Mosheim, 13 Cent. pt. ii, ch. v, §§ 13-15. They were put down by
sheer bloodshed. Cp. Ueberweg, i, 431; Lea, pp. 25-26, 86.

[1545] Hist. de France, vol. x; La Réforme, ed. 1884, p. 333.

[1546] See the author's notes to his ed. of Buckle (Routledge), 1904,
pp. 539, 547.

[1547] U. R. Burke, History of Spain, Hume's ed. i, 109-10.

[1548] McCrie, Reformation in Spain, ed. 1856, p. 41; Burke, as cited,
ii, 55-56.

[1549] Lea, Hist. of the Inquisition, i, 81.

[1550] Burke, i, 218.

[1551] Hauréau, Hist. de la philos. scolastique, ii, 54-55.

[1552] Id. ii, 58.

[1553] Lea, iii, 560.

[1554] Personally he discouraged heresy-hunting. Burke, ii, 66.

[1555] Burke, i, 268-73; Dunham, Hist. of Spain and Portugal, 1832,
iv, 260.

[1556] Lea, iii, 24.

[1557] Burke, ii, 65.

[1558] Lea, ii, 183.

[1559] Id. i, 221.

[1560] Burke, ii, 66-67.

[1561] Lea, iii, 85-86.

[1562] Id. pp. 52-53; McCrie, Reformation in Spain, p. 20.

[1563] Bonet-Maury, Les Précurseurs de la Réforme, 1904, pp. 114-19.

[1564] Lea, iii, 86.

[1565] Burke, ii, 57.

[1566] Id. ii, 62-63.

[1567] Lea, iii, 564.

[1568] Id. ii, 187-88.

[1569] Lea, ii, 287; Burke, ii, 67-69.

[1570] Burke, ii, 77, citing Lafuente, ix, 233.

[1571] Id. citing Bergenroth, Calendar, etc. i, 37.

[1572] Even as late as 1591, in Aragon, when in a riot against the
Inquisition the Inquisitors barely escaped with their lives. Burke,
ii, 80, note.

[1573] Id. pp. 81-82.

[1574] There had previously been sharp social persecution by the
Cortès, in 1480, on "anti-Semitic" grounds, the Jews being then
debarred from all the professions, and even from commerce. They were
thus driven to usury by Christians, who latterly denounce the race for
usuriousness. Cp. Michelet, Hist. de France, x, ed. 1884, p. 15, note.

[1575] The number has been put as high as 800,000. Cp. F. D. Mocatta,
The Jews and the Inquisition, 1877, p. 54; E. La Rigaudière,
Hist. des Perséc. Relig. en Espagne, 1860, pp. 112-14; Prescott,
Hist. of Ferdinand and Isabella, Kirk's ed. 1889, p. 323; and refs. in
ed. of Buckle cited, p. 541.

[1576] Llorente, Hist. Crit. de l'Inquis. en Espagne, ed. 1818, i,
280. As to Llorente's other estimates, which are of doubtful value,
cp. Prescott's note, ed. cited, p. 746. But as to Llorente's general
credit, see the vindication of U. R. Burke, ii, 85-87.

[1577] Llorente, i, 281.

[1578] McCrie, Reformation in Spain, ch. viii.

[1579] Cp. La Rigaudière, pp. 309-14; Buckle, as cited, pp. 514, 570;
U. R. Burke, i, 59, 85.

[1580] Cp. Émile Charles, Roger Bacon, Paris, 1861, p. 23.

[1581] Cp. Hauréau, Hist. de la philos. scolastique, Ptie. ii, 1880,
vol. ii, p. 79.

[1582] This sum of libri has been taken by English writers to stand
for English "pounds." It may however have represented Parisian livres.

[1583] Prof. Brewer, Introd. to Opera Inedita of Roger Bacon, 1859,
pp. xiv-xxiii.

[1584] Id. p. xlvi.

[1585] Id. p. xxx, sq.

[1586] Id. pp. liv-lv.

[1587] Compendium Philosophiæ, cap. i, in Op. Ined., pp. 398-401.

[1588] Id. p. 401. Cp. p. 412 as to the multitude of theologians at
Paris banished for sodomy.

[1589] Id. p. 422.

[1590] Id. cc. ii-v, pp. 404-32.

[1591] Brewer, p. xciii, note, cites this in an extract from
the Chronicle of Antoninus, Archbishop of Florence, a late
writer of the fifteenth century, who "gives no authority for his
statement." Dr. Bridges, however, was enabled by M. Sabatier to
trace the passage back to the MS. Chronica xxiv Generalium Ordinis
Minorum, which belongs to the first half of the fourteenth century;
and the passage, as M. Sabatier remarks, has all the appearance of
being an extract from the official journal of this Order. (Bridges,
The "Opus Majus" of Roger Bacon, Suppl. vol. 1900, p. 158.)

[1592] "Il etait né rebelle." "Le mépris systématique de l'autorité,
voilà vraiment ce qu'il professe." (Hauréau, Ptie. II, ii, 76, 85.)

[1593] See the sympathetic accounts of Baden Powell, Hist. of
Nat. Philos. 1834, pp. 100-12; White, Warfare of Science with Theology,
i, 379-91.

[1594] Erdmann, History of Philosophy, Eng. tr. 3rd ed. i, 476.

[1595] Humboldt, Examen Crit. de l'hist. de la Géographie, 1836-39,
i, 64-70, gives the passages in the Opus Majus and the Imago Mundi,
and paraphrase of the latter in Columbus's letter to Ferdinand
and Isabella from Jamaica (given also in P. L. Ford's Writings of
Christopher Columbus, 1892, p. 199 sq.). Cp. Ellis's note to Francis
Bacon's Temporis Partus Masculus, in Ellis and Spedding's ed. of
Bacon's Works, iii, 534. It should be remembered in this connection
that Columbus found believers, in the early stage of his undertaking,
only in two friars, one a Franciscan and one a Dominican. See Ford's
ed. of the Writings, p. 107.

[1596] Cp. Hauréau, Ptie. II, ii, 95.

[1597] Opus Majus, Pars ii, cap. 5.

[1598] Renan, Averroès, p. 263. Bacon mentions Averroës in the Opus
Majus, P. i, cc. 6, 15; P. ii, c. 13; ed. Bridges, iii (1900), 14, 33,
67. In the passage last cited he calls him "<DW25> solidae sapientiae,
corrigens multa priorum et addens multa, quamvis corrigendus sit in
aliquibus, et in multis complendus."

[1599] See the careful notice by Prof. Adamson in Dict. of
Nat. Biog. Cp. Milman, Latin Christianity, ix, 152-60; Lewes, Hist. of
Philos. ii, 77-87.

[1600] Two Englishmen, the Carmelite John of Baconthorpe (d. 1346)
and Walter Burleigh, were among the orthodox Averroïsts; the latter
figuring as a Realist against William of Occam.

[1601] Legend of Good Women, ll. 1039-43; Parliament of Fowls,
ll. 199-200.

[1602] Prologue to the Canterbury Tales, 438 (440).

[1603] Id. 653-61 (655-63). Cp. Tale of the Wife of Bath; 1-25.

[1604] Legend of Good Women, prol. ll. 1-9; Knight's Tale, ll. 1951-56
(2809-14 of MS. group A).

[1605] The notion connects with the spurious Ploughman's Tale and
Pilgrim's Tale, as to which see Lounsbury, as cited, i, 460-73;
ii, 460-69.

[1606] Vision of Piers Ploughman, ll. 5809 sq. Wright's ed. i, 179-80.

[1607] Chaucer's Boece, B. I. Prose iv. ll. 223-26, in Skeat's
Student's Chaucer.

[1608] Mosheim, 14 Cent. Pt. ii, ch. ii, § 36, and note. Cp. Green,
Short History of the English People, ch. v, § 3, ed. 1881, p. 235.

[1609] Cp. Green, Short Hist. ch. v, § 5; Massingberd, The English
Reformation, p. 171.

[1610] Cited by Lechler, Wycliffe and his English Precursors,
Eng. tr. 1-vol. ed. p. 440.

[1611] Cp. Prof. Montagu Burrows, Wiclif's Place in History, 1884,
p. 49. Maitland (Eight Essays, 1852) suggested derivation from the
movement of Abbot Joachim and others of that period.

[1612] Wilkins' Concilia, ii, 124.

[1613] Cp. Vaughan, as cited by Hardwick, Church History: Middle Age,
p. 402.

[1614] Hardwick, pp. 417, 418. The doctrine of purgatory was, however,
soon renounced by the Lollards (id. p. 420).

[1615] See the passages cited in Lewis's Life of Wiclif, ed. 1820,
pp. 224-25. Cp. Burrows, as cited, p. 19; Le Bas, Life of Wiclif,
1832, pp. 357-59.

[1616] Lechler, Wycliffe and his Eng. Precursors, pp. 371-76; Hardwick,
p. 412.

[1617] Cp. Green, Short History, ch. v, § 4.

[1618] Lechler, p. 236. It forms bk. vi of Wiclif's theological Summa.

[1619] Baxter, in his address "To the doubting and unbelieving
readers" prefixed to his Reasons of the Christian Religion, 1667,
names Savonarola, Campanella, Ficinus, Vives, Mornay, Grotius,
Cameron, and Micraelius as defenders of the faith, but no writer of
the fourteenth century.

[1620] Cp. Le Bas, pp. 342-43; and Hardwick, Church Hist.: Middle Age,
p. 415.

[1621] Lechler, p. 236.

[1622] Blunt, Reformation of the Church of England, 1892, i, 284,
and refs.

[1623] It is noteworthy that French culture affected the very
vocabulary of Dante, as it did that of his teacher, Brunetto
Latini. Cp. Littré, Etudes sur les barbares et le moyen âge, 3e
édit. pp. 399-400. The influence of French literature is further seen
in Boccaccio, and in Italian literature in general from the thirteenth
to the fifteenth century. Gebhart, pp. 209-21.

[1624] Saintsbury, Short Hist. of French Lit. 1882, p. 57.

[1625] Passage not translated in the old Eng. version.

[1626] Cp. Lenient, pp. 159-60.

[1627] Lenient, p. 169.

[1628] This declaration, as it happens, is put in the mouth of
"False-Seeming," but apparently with no ironical intention.

[1629] Lanson, Hist. de la litt. française, p. 132.

[1630] Id. p. 135.

[1631] Duruy, Hist. de France, ed. 1880, i, 440-41; Gebhart, Orig. de
la Renais. pp. 2, 19, 24-29, 32-35, 41-50; Le Clerc and Renan,
Hist. Litt. de la France au XIVe Siècle, i, 4; ii, 123; Littré,
Études, as cited, pp. 424-29.

[1632] Duruy, i, 409 sq., 449; Gebhart, pp. 35-41; Morin, Origines
de la Démocratie: La France au moyen âge, 3e édit. 1865, p. 304 sq.

[1633] Cp. Michelet, Hist. de France, vii, Renaissance, Introd. §
ii. Between the thirteenth and the fifteenth centuries, he insists,
"le jour baisse horriblement."

[1634] Ozanam, Dante, 6e édit. pp. 47, 78, 108-10.

[1635] Littré, Études, as cited, pp. 411-13.

[1636] Le Clerc, as cited, p. 259; Gebhart, pp. 48-49.

[1637] Sir James F. Stephen, Horæ Sabbaticæ, 1892, i, 42.

[1638] The Italians said of the French Pope Clement VI (1342-52)
that he had small religion. M. Villani, Cronica, iii, 43 (ed. 1554).

[1639] Cp. Dr. T. Arnold, Lect. on Mod. Hist. 4th ed. pp. 111-18;
Buckle, 3 vol. ed. i, 326-27 (1-vol. ed. p. 185); Stephen, as cited,
i, 121. "It is hardly too much to say that Comines's whole mind was
haunted at all times and at every point by a belief in an invisible
and immensely powerful and artful man whom he called God" (last cited).

[1640] Buckle, i, 329 (1-vol. ed. p. 186).

[1641] Buckle, ii, 133 (1-vol. ed. p. 361); Hallam, Middle Ages, iii,
395-96. Religious ceremonies were attached to the initiation of knights
in the 13th century. Seignobos, Hist. de la Civilisation, ii, 15.

[1642] Duruy, i, 368, 373-74. Cp. J. Jolly, Philippe le Bel, 1869,
l. iii, ch. iv, p. 249. It is to be remembered that Philippe had
for years been sorely pressed for money to retrieve his military
disasters. See H. Hervieu, Recherches sur les premiers états généraux,
1879, pp. 89 sq., 99 sq. He used his ill-gotten gains to restore the
currency, which he had debased. Id. pp. 101-102.

[1643] Hauréau, Hist. de la philos. scolastique, Ptie II, vol. ii,
359-60.

[1644] Poole, Illustrations, p. 265. Cp. Villari, Life and Times
of Machiavelli, ii, 64-67; Tullo Massarani, Studii di politica e di
storia, 2a ed. 1899, pp. 112-13; Neander, Ch. Hist. Eng. tr. 1855,
ix, 33.

[1645] Poole, pp. 266-76. Cp. Hardwick, Church History, Middle Age,
1853, pp. 346-47.

[1646] Ueberweg, i, 461-62.

[1647] "His (Occam's) philosophy is that of centuries later." (Milman,
Latin Christianity, ix, 148. Cp. pp. 150-51.)

[1648] Cp. Hardwick, p. 377, and Rettberg, as there cited.

[1649] Milman, Latin Christianity, ix, 75-76; Mosheim, 14 C. pt. ii,
ch. iii, § 5. As to his religious bigotry, see Milman, p. 142, notes.

[1650] Ueberweg, i, 460-64; cp. Poole, Illustrations, pp. 275-81.

[1651] James Mill, Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind,
ed. 1869, i, 250-51.

[1652] Cp. Ueberweg, p. 464. Mr. Poole's judgment (p. 280) that
Occam "starts from the point of view of a theologian" hardly does
justice to his attitude towards theology. Occam had indeed to profess
acceptance of theology; but he could not well have made less account
of its claims.

[1653] Ueberweg, pp. 465-66.

[1654] Id. p. 466.

[1655] Id. ib.

[1656] Poole, p. 281.

[1657] Ullmann, Reformers before the Reformation, i, 37, citing John
of Goch, De libertate Christiana, lib. i, cc. 17, 18. Compare the
Averroïst propositions of 1269-1277, given above, pp. 319-20.

[1658] Lange, Gesch. des Materialismus, i, 187-88 (Eng. tr. i, 225-26).

[1659] Reuter, Gesch. der religiösen Aufklärung im Mittelalter, i, 164.

[1660] Gervinus, Gesch. der deutschen Dichtung, 5te Ausg. i,
489-99. Even in the period before the Minnesingers the clerical
poetry had its anti-clerical side. Id. p. 194. Towards the end of the
12th century Nigellus Wireker satirized the monks in his Brunellus,
seu speculum stultorum. Menzel, Gesch. der Deutschen, Cap. 252. See
Menzel's note, before cited, for a remarkable outbreak of anti-clerical
if not anti-Christian satire, in the form of sculpture in an ancient
carving in the Strasburg Cathedral.

[1661] Reuter, Gesch. der relig. Aufklärung, ii, 62-63; Gervinus, i,
523; ii, 69; Kurtz, Gesch. der deutschen Litteratur, 1853, i, 428,
col. 2.

[1662] Milman, Latin Chr., ix, 125. Albert was an Aristotelian--a
circumstance which makes sad havoc of Menzel's proposition (Geschichte,
Cap. 251) that the "German spirit" did not take naturally to
Aristotle. Menzel puts the fact and the theory on opposite pages.

[1663] Milman, Latin Christianity, ix, 258. Cp. p. 261.

[1664] For a full account of Eckhart's teaching see Dr. A. Lasson's
monograph (§ 106) in Ueberweg's Hist. of Philos., i, 467-84; also
Ullmann, Reformers before the Ref., ii, 23-31. Cp. Lea, Hist. of
Inquis., ii, 354-59, 362-69, as to the sects. As to Tauler, see
Milman, ix, 255-56. He opposed the more advanced pantheism of the
Beghards. Id. p. 262.

[1665] In the 400 years following its publication there were published
over 6,000 separate editions.

[1666] Bk. i, ch. ii, 1, 2.

[1667] Bk. i, ch. iii. 1, 2.

[1668] Id. § 5.

[1669] J. A. Symonds writes that in the age of Dante, Petrarch,
and Boccaccio "what we call the Renaissance had not yet arrived"
(Renaissance in Italy: Age of the Despots, ed. 1897, p. 9).

[1670] Cp. Renan, Averroès, 3e édit. pp. 280-82, 295; Lewes, Hist. of
Philos., 4th ed. ii, 67; Reuter, Gesch. der relig. Aufklärung im
Mittelalter, i, 139-41. It is noteworthy that the troubadour, Austore
d'Orlac, in cursing the crusades and the clergy who promoted them,
suggests that the Christians should turn Moslems, seeing that God is
on the side of the unbelievers (Gieseler, Per. III. <DW37>. III, § 58,
note 1).

[1671] Cp. Burckhardt, Civ. of the Renais. in Italy, Eng. tr. ed. 1892,
pp. 490, 492.

[1672] Id. p. 333.

[1673] Hardwick, p. 354, note.

[1674] Cp. Hardwick, p. 361; "Janus," The Pope and the Council, p. 308.

[1675] Burckhardt, p. 497, note.

[1676] Villari, Life and Times of Machiavelli, Eng. tr. 3rd ed. vol. i,
introd. p. 115. Cp. Burckhardt, pp. 35, 226.

[1677] As to its history see "Janus," The Pope and the Council,
p. 131 sq.

[1678] Villari, as last cited, pp. 98, 108.

[1679] It is noteworthy, however, that he did not detect, or at least
did not declare, the spuriousness of the text of the three witnesses
(Hallam, Lit. of Europe, iii, 58, note). Here the piety of Alfonso,
who knew his Bible by heart, may have restrained him.

[1680] See the passages transcribed by Hallam, Lit. of Europe, i, 148.

[1681] Villari, as last cited, pp. 98-101.

[1682] Cp. Gebhart, Renaissance en Italie, pp. 72-73; Burckhardt,
pp. 458-65; Lea, Hist. of the Inquisition, i, 5-4. "The authors of
the most scandalous satires were themselves mostly monks or benficed
priests." (Burckhardt, p. 465.)

[1683] Burckhardt, pp. 451-61; J. A. Symonds, Renaissance in Italy:
The Age of the Despots, ed. 1897, p. 359; Villari, Life of Machiavelli,
i, 153.

[1684] See it well analysed by Owen, pp. 147-60. Cp. Hallam,
Lit. of Europe, i, 199. M. Perrens describes Pulci as "emancipated
from all belief"; but holds that he "bantered the faith without the
least design of attacking religion" (La Civilisation florentine,
p. 151). But cp. Villari, Life of Machiavelli, i, 159-60.

[1685] Owen, p. 160. So also Hunt, and the editor of the Parnaso
Italiano, there cited.

[1686] Below, § 4.

[1687] Above, p. 361.

[1688] Lea, ii, 271-72. Cp. pp. 282-84.

[1689] Burckhardt, p. 502.

[1690] Id. p. 500.

[1691] Id. p. 502.

[1692] Id. p. 503, note.

[1693] Cp. R. C. Christie's essay, "Pomponatius--a Skeptic," in
his Selected Essays and Papers, 1902, pp. 131-32; Renan, Averroès,
pp. 345-352.

[1694] Comm. in Aristot. de Gen. et Corr., lib. i, fol. 29 G. cited
by Ellis in note on Bacon, who quotes a version of the phrase in the
De Augmentis, B. v, end. As to Nifo see Nourrisson, Machiavel, 1875,
ch. xii.

[1695] As to ribald blasphemies by the Roman clergy see Erasmus,
Epist. xxvi, 34 (ed. le Clerc), cited by Hardwick, Church History:
Middle Age, p. 378, note.

[1696] Lit. Hist. of Europe, i, 142. Following Eichhorn, Hallam notes
vindications by Marsilio Ficino, Alfonso de Spina (a converted Jew),
Æneas Sylvius, and Pico di Mirandola; observing that the work of the
first-named "differs little from modern apologies of the same class."

[1697] Cp. Ranke, History of the Popes, Bohn tr. ed. 1908, i, 58.

[1698] Epist. above cited; Burigni, Vie d'Erasme, 1757, i, 148-49.

[1699] Paul Canensius, cited by Ranke.

[1700] This view seems to solve the mystery as to Perugino's
creed. Vasari (ed. Milanesi, iii, 589) calls him "persona di assai poca
religione." Mezzanotte (Della vita di P. Vanucci, etc. 1836, p. 172
sq.) indignantly rejects the statement, but notes that in Ciatti's
MS. annals of Perugia, ad ann. 1524, the mind of the painter is said to
have been come una tavola rasa in religious matters. Mezzanotte holds
that Pietro has been there confounded with a later Perugian painter.

[1701] Leonardo da Vinci, Frammenti letterari e filosofici, trascelti
par Dr. Edmondo Solmi. Firenze, 1900. Pensieri sulla scienza, 19, 20.

[1702] Ib. 14, 22, 23, 24, 92.

[1703] Ib. 36-38, 41.

[1704] Some of the humanists called him unlettered (omo senza lettere),
and he calls them gente stolta, a foolish tribe.

[1705] Ib. 44, 46, 47, 48, 58, 60, 63, etc.

[1706] Ib. 45.

[1707] Ib. 30.

[1708] Ib. 57.

[1709] Ib. 66. Cp. 67-69.

[1710] Id. Pensieri sulla natura. 80-86.

[1711] Shortly after Leonardo we find Girolamo Fracastorio (1483-1553)
developing the criticism further, and in particular disposing of the
futile formula, resorted to by the scientific apriorists of the time,
that the "plastic force of nature" created fossils like other things.

[1712] Id. Pensieri sulla morale, passim.

[1713] Ib. 7.

[1714] Ib. 44, 45.

[1715] Ib. 46, 47.

[1716] Cp. Burckhardt, pp. 524, 541, notes; Villari, Life of
Machiavelli, i, 124. "It was easy to see by his words that he hoped
for the restoration of the pagan religion" (Id. Life of Savonarola,
Eng. tr. p. 51).

[1717] Only a few fragments of it survive. Villari, Life of Savonarola,
p. 51.

[1718] Carriere, Philos. Weltanschauung der Reformationszeit, 1847,
p. 13.

[1719] Cp. Villari, Life of Machiavelli, i, 128-34.

[1720] Cp. Perrens, Hist. de Florence (1434-1531), i, 258.

[1721] Id. p. 257. Cp. Villari, Machiavelli, i, 132; Savonarola, p. 60.

[1722] "Of the majority of the twenty-two languages he was supposed to
have studied, he knew little more than the alphabet and the elements
of grammar" (Villari, Machiavelli, i, 135). As to Pico's character,
which was not saintly, see Perrens, Histoire, as cited, i, 561-62.

[1723] Cp. Greswell, Memoirs of Politianus, Picus, etc. 2nd ed. 1805,
235; McCrie, The Reformation in Italy, ed. 1856, p. 33, note.

[1724] Greswell, pp. 330-31.

[1725] Cp. K. M. Sauer, Gesch. der italien. Litteratur, 1883, p. 109;
Villari, Machiavelli, i, 138.

[1726] Villari, Machiavelli, i, 133.

[1727] Greswell, pp. 331-32.

[1728] Discorsi sopra Tito Livio, i, 12.

[1729] Istorie fiorentine, liv. i; Discorsi, i, 12.

[1730] Discorsi, ii, 2.

[1731] For another point of view see Owen, as cited, p. 167.

[1732] In the Italian translation of Bacon's essays, made for Bacon
in 1618 by an English hand, Machiavelli is branded in one passage as
an impio, and in another his name is dropped. See Routledge ed. of
Bacon's Works, pp. 749, 751. The admiring Paolo Giovio called him
irrisor et atheos; and Cardinal Pole said the Prince was so full of
every kind of irreligion that it might have been written by the hand
of Satan (Nourrisson, Machiavel, 1875, p. 4).

[1733] Burckhardt, pp. 499-500. Cp. Owen, pp. 165-68. It is thus
impossible to be sure of the truth of the statement of Gregorovius
(Lucrezia Borgia, Eng. tr. 1904, p. 25) that "There were no women
skeptics or freethinkers; they would have been impossible in the
society of that day." Where dissimulation of unbelief was necessarily
habitual, there may have been some women unbelievers as well as
many men.

[1734] Owen's characterization of Machiavelli's Asino d'oro as a
"satire on the freethought of his age" (p. 177) will not stand
investigation. See his own note, p. 178.

[1735] Discorsi, i, 56.

[1736] As we saw, Polybius in his day took a similar view, coming
as he did from Greece, where military failure had followed on a
certain growth of unbelief. Machiavelli was much influenced by
Polybius. Villari, ii, 9.

[1737] Cp. Tullo Massarani, Studii di letteratura e d'arte, 1809,
p. 96.

[1738] Discorsi, i, 15.

[1739] Id. i, 11, end.

[1740] Villari, ii, 93-94.

[1741] Burckhardt, p. 464; Owen, p. 180, and refs.

[1742] Owen, p. 181. See the whole account of Guicciardini's rather
confused opinions.

[1743] Though Italy had most of what scientific knowledge
existed. Burckhardt, p. 292.

[1744] "A man might at the same time be condemned as a heretic in Spain
for affirming, and in Italy for denying, the reality of the witches'
nightly rides" (The Pope and the Council, p. 258).

[1745] The Pope and the Council, pp. 249-61. It was another Spina
who wrote on the other side.

[1746] F. Fiorentino, Pietro Pomponazzi, 1868, p. 30.

[1747] Owen, pp. 197-98; Renan, Averroès, pp. 353-62; Christie,
as cited, p. 133.

[1748] Cp. Owen, pp. 201, 218; Lange, i, 183-87 (tr. i, 220-25). He,
however, granted that the mass of mankind, "brutish and materialized,"
needed the belief in heaven and hell to moralize them (Christie,
pp. 140-41).

[1749] This principle, though deriving from Averroïsm, and condemned,
as we have seen, by Pope John XXI, had been affirmed by so high
an orthodox authority as Albertus Magnus. Cp. Owen, pp. 211-12,
note. While thus officially recognized, it was of course denounced
by the devout when they saw how it availed to save heretics from
harm. Mr. Owen has well pointed out (p. 238) the inconsistency of
the believers who maintain that faith is independent of reason, and
yet denounce as blasphemous the profession to believe by faith what
is not intelligible by philosophy.

[1750] Owen, pp. 209, note. "Son école est une école de laïques. de
médecins, d'esprits forts, de libres penseurs" (Bouillier, Hist. de
la philos. cartèsienne, 1854, i, 3).

[1751] Owen. p. 210; Christie, p. 151.

[1752] Christie, pp. 141-47.

[1753] Id. p. 149.

[1754] Burckhardt, p. 291.

[1755] Gebhart, pp. 59-63; Burckhardt, p. 211.

[1756] Cp. Burckhardt, p. 291.

[1757] Burckhardt, pp. 279-80; Villari, Life of Machiavelli,
pp. 106-107.

[1758] Burckhardt, pt. iii, ch. xi.

[1759] Dr. Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages,
1895, i, 265. Cp. Renan, Averroès, Avert.

[1760] Schechter, Studies in Judaism, pp. 213, 420-21.

[1761] Notice of Bonaventure Desperiers, by Bibliophile Jacob
[i.e. Lacroix], in 1841 ed. of Cymbalum Mundi, etc.

[1762] For a solution of the enigma of the title see the Clef of Eloi
Johanneau in ed. cited, p. 83. Cymbalum mundi was a nickname given
in antiquity to (among others) an Alexandrian grammarian called
Didymus--the name of doubting Thomas in the gospel. The book is
dedicated by Thomas Du Clevier à son ami Pierre Tyrocan, which is
found to be, with one letter altered (perhaps by a printer's error),
an anagram for Thomas Incrédule à son ami Pierre Croyant, "Unbelieving
Thomas to his friend Believing Peter." Clef cited, pp. 80-85.

[1763] Origen, Against Celsus, vi, 78.

[1764] The readiness of piety in all ages to invent frightful deaths
for unbelievers must be remembered in connection with this and other
records. Cp. Notice cited, p. xx, and note. The authority for this is
Henri Estienne, Apologie pour Hérodote, liv. i, chs. 18, end, and 26.

[1765] So Charles Nodier, cited in the Notice by Bibliophile Jacob,
pp. xxiii-xxiv. The English translator of 1723 professed to see no
unbelief in the book.

[1766] Perrens, Les Libertins en France au XVIIe siècle, 1896, p. 41.

[1767] Notice historique in Bibliophile Jacob's ed. of Rabelais,
1841; Stapfer, Rabelais, pp. 6, 10; W. F. Smith, biog. not. to his
trans. of Rabelais, 1893, i, p. xxii.

[1768] Rathery, notice biog. to ed. of Burgaud des Marets, i,
12. Jacob's account of his relations with his friends Budé and Amy
at this stage is erroneous. See Rathery, p. 14.

[1769] Le Double, Rabelais anatomiste et physiologiste, 1889, pp. 12,
425; and pref. by Professor Duval, p. xiii; Stapfer, p. 42; A. Tilley,
François Rabelais, 1907, pp. 74-76.

[1770] In the same year he was induced to publish what turned out to
be two spurious documents purporting to be ancient Roman remains. See
Heulhard, Rabelais légiste, and Jacob, Notice, p. xviii.

[1771] Rathery, p. 23.

[1772] Jacob, p. xix.

[1773] As to this see Tilley, p. 53.

[1774] See it at the end of the ed. of Bibliophile Jacob.

[1775] Cp. Stapfer, pp. 24-25; Rathery, p. 26.

[1776] Rathery, p. 30.

[1777] Cp. Jacob, Notice, p. xxxviii; Smith, ii, 524.

[1778] Rathery, p. 71; Stapfer, pp. 42-43.

[1779] Stapfer, p. 53.

[1780] Jacob, p. xxxix.

[1781] Rathery, pp. 44-49. The notion of Lacroix, that Rabelais
visited England, has no evidence to support it. Cp. Rathery, p. 49,
and Smith, p. xxiii.

[1782] Cp. Jacob, p. lx. Ramus himself, for his attacks on the
authority of Aristotle, was called an atheist. Cp. Waddington, Ramus,
sa vie, etc., 1855, p. 126.

[1783] See the list in the avertissement of M. Burgaud des Marets
to éd. Firmin Didot. Cp. Stapfer, pp. 63, 64. For example, the
"theologian" who makes the ludicrous speech in Liv. i, ch. xix, becomes
(chs. 18 and 20) a "sophist"; and the sorbonistes, sorbonicoles,
and sorbonagres of chs. 20 and 21 become mere maistres, magistres,
and sophistes likewise.

[1784] It is doubtful whether Rabelais wrote the whole of the notice
prefixed to the next edition, in which this attack was made; but it
seems clear that he "had a hand in it" (Tilley, François Rabelais,
p. 87).

[1785] R. Christie, Étienne Dolet, pp. 369-72. Christie, in his
vacillating way, severely blames Dolet, and then admits that the
book may have been printed while Dolet was in prison, and that in
any case there was no malice in the matter. This point, and the
persistent Catholic calumnies against Dolet, are examined by the
author in art. "The Truth about Étienne Dolet," in National Reformer,
June 2 and 9, 1889.

[1786] Epistre, pref. to Liv. iv. Ed. Jacob, p. 318.

[1787] Cp. W. F. Smith's trans. of Rabelais, 1893, ii, p. x. In this
book, however, other hands have certainly been at work. Rabelais left
it unfinished.

[1788] Jacob, Notice, p. lxiii; Stapfer, p. 76.

[1789] So Rathery, p. 60; and Stapfer, p. 78. Jacob, p. lxii, says
he resigned only one. Rathery makes the point clear by giving a copy
of the act of resignation as to Meudon.

[1790] A Discourse ... against Nicholas Machiavel, Eng. tr. (1577),
ed. 1608, Epist. ded. p. 2.

[1791] Liv. iv, ch. xliii.

[1792] Liv. iii, ch. xxiii.

[1793] Liv. iv, ch. xlv-xlviii.

[1794] Liv. iv, ch. xlix sq.

[1795] Liv. iv, ch. xxxii.

[1796] Prof. Stapfer, Rabelais, sa personne, son génie, son oeuvre,
1889, pp. 365-68. Cp. the Notice of Bibliophile Jacob, ed. 1841 of
Rabelais, pp. lvii-lviii; and Perrens, Les Libertins, p. 39. In his
youth he affirmed the doctrine. Stapfer, p. 23.

[1797] Cp. René Millet, Rabelais, 1892, pp. 172-80.

[1798] Liv. iii, ch. xxxvi.

[1799] The description of him by one French biographer, M. Boulmier
(Estienne Dolet, 1857), as "le Christ de la pensée libre" is a
gross extravagance. Dolet was substantially orthodox, and even
anti-Protestant, though he denounced the cruel usage of Protestants.

[1800] Wallace (Antitrinitarian Biography, 1850, ii. 2) asserts
that Dolet "not only became a convert to the opinions of Servetus,
but a zealous propagator of them." For this there is not a shadow
of evidence.

[1801] Cp. Voltaire, Lettres sur Rabelais, etc. i.

[1802] Cp. author's art. above cited; R. C. Christie, Étienne Dolet,
2nd ed. 1890, p. 100; Octave Galtier, Étienne Dolet (N.D.), pp. 66,
94, etc.

[1803] Christie, as cited, pp. 50-58, 105-106; Galtier, p. 26 sq.

[1804] It is to this that Rabelais alludes (ii, 5) when he tells
how at Toulouse they "stuck not to burn their regents alive like
red herrings."

[1805] Christie, p. 80.

[1806] Liv. iii, ch. xxix.

[1807] Christie, p. 86.

[1808] One of his enemies wrote of him that prison was his
country--patria Doleti.

[1809] Procès d'Estienne Dolet, Paris, 1836, p. 11; Galtier, pp. 65-70;
Christie, pp. 389-90.

[1810] Procès, p. viii.; Galtier, p. 78.

[1811] Galtier, p. 101 sq.; Christie, p. 461.

[1812] A modern French judge, the President Baudrier, was found to
affirm that the laws, though "unduly severe," were "neither unduly
nor unfairly pressed" against Dolet! Christie, p. 471.

[1813] Concerning whom see Christie, as cited, pp. 29 01.

[1814] Tilley, as last cited, p. 69.

[1815] Christie, p. 317.

[1816] Christie, as cited, pp. 465-67; Lutteroth, La Reformation en
France pendant sa première période, 1850, pp. 39-40; Prof. H. M. Baird,
Rise of the Huguenots, 1880, i, 240 sq.

[1817] Perrens, Les Libertins, p. 43; Patin, Lettres,
ed. Reveillé-Parise, 1846, i, 210.

[1818] Wriothesley's Chronicle (Camden Society, 1875), pp. 107-108.

[1819] Nodier, quoted by Bibliophile Jacob in ed. of Cymbalum Mundi,
as cited, p. xviii.

[1820] Cp. Brantome, Des dames illustres, OEuvres, ed. 1838, ii, 186.

[1821] Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. Marguerite de Navarre (the First),
notes F and G.

[1822] Bayle, note N. Cp. Nodier, as cited, p. xix, as to the
collaboration of Desperiers and others.

[1823] Bayle, art. Ronsard, note D.

[1824] Garasse, La Doctrine Curieuse des Beaux Esprits de ce Temps,
1623, pp. 126-27. Ronsard replied to the charge in his poem, Des
misères du temps.

[1825] Bayle, art. Ronsard, note O. Cp. Perrens, Les Libertins, p. 43.

[1826] MS. 1588. First printed in 1841 by Guhrauer, again in 1857 by
L. Noack.

[1827] As before noted, he was one of the first to use the
word. Cp. Lechler, Geschichte des englischen Deismus, pp. 31, 455,
notes.

[1828] Bayle, art. Bodin, note O. Cp. Renan, Averroès, 3e édit. p. 424;
and the Lettres de Gui Patin, iii, 679 (letter of 27 juillet, 1668),
cited by Perrens, Les Libertins, p. 43. Leibnitz, in an early
letter to Jac. Thomasius, speaks of the MS. of the Colloquium,
then in circulation, as proving its writer to be "the professed
enemy of the Christian religion," adding: "Vanini's dialogues are a
trifle in comparison." (Philosophische Schriften, ed. Gerhardt, i,
26; Martineau, Study of Spinoza, p. 77.) Carriere, however, notes
(Weltanschauung, p. 317) that in later years Leibnitz learned to
prize Bodin's treatise highly.

[1829] Cp. Lecky, Rationalism in Europe, i, 66, 87-91. In the
République too he has a chapter on astrology, to which he leans
somewhat.

[1830] République, Liv. iv, ch. ii.

[1831] Id. Liv. iv, ch. vii. "Bodin in this sophistry was undoubtedly
insincere" (Hallam, Lit. of Europe, ii, 159).

[1832] Cp. Perrens, Les Libertins. p. 43.

[1833] Cp. Villemain, Vie de L'Hopital, in Études de l'hist. moderne,
1846. pp. 363-68, 428.

[1834] Buckle (3-vol. ed. ii, 10; 1-vol. ed. p. 291) errs in
representing L'Hopital as the only statesman of the time who dreamt of
toleration. It is to be noted, on the other hand, that the Huguenots
themselves protested against any toleration of atheists or Anabaptists;
and even the reputed freethinker Gabriel Naudé, writing his Science
des Princes, ou Considérations politiques sur les Coups d'état, in
1639, defended the massacre on political grounds (Owen, Skeptics of
the French Renaissance, p. 470, note). Bodin implicitly execrated
it. Cp. Hallam, Lit. of Europe, ii, 162.

[1835] Villemain, p. 429.

[1836] Garasse, Doctrine Curieuse, pp. 125~26; Mémoires de Garasse,
ed. Ch. Nisard, 1860, pp. 77-78; Perrens, p. 43.

[1837] Bibliophile Jacob, Introd. to Beroalde de Verville.

[1838] Estienne's full title is: L'Introduction au traité de la
conformité des merveilles, anciennes avec les modernes: ou, Traité
préparatif à l'Apologie pour Hérodote.

[1839] Apologie pour Hérodote, ed. 1607, pp. 97, 249 (liv. i, chs. xiv,
xviii.) Cymbalum Mundi, ed. Bibliophile Jacob, pp. xx, 13.

[1840] The index was specially framed to call attention to these
items. The entry, "Fables des dieux des payens cousines germaines
des legendes des saints," is typical.

[1841] Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. Castalion; Hallam, Lit. of Europe, ii,
81; Lecky, Rationalism in Europe, ii, 46-49. Hallam finds Castalio's
letter to the Duke of Wirtemberg "cautious"; but Lecky quotes some
strong expressions from what he describes as the preface of Martin
Bellius (Castalio's pseudonym) to Cluten's De Haereticis persequendis,
ed. 1610. Castalio died in 1563. As to his translations from the Bible,
see Bayle's note.

[1842] Hallam, ii, 83; McCrie, Reformation in Italy, ed. 1856, p. 231.

[1843] Even Stähelin (Johannes Calvin, ii, 303) condemns Calvin's
action and tone towards Castalio, though he makes the significant
remark that the latter "treated the Bible pretty much as any other
book."

[1844] Hatch, Hibbert Lectures, p. 169.

[1845] Burckhardt, p. 195.

[1846] Prof. Fortunat Strowski, Histoire du sentiment religieux en
France au 17e siècle, Ptie i, De Montaigne à Pascal, 1907, pp. 19-23.

[1847] "Du Vair ne songe pas au Médiateur; s'il y a dans son traité
des allusions à Notre Seigneur, le nom de Jésus-Christ ne s'y trouve,
je crois bien, pas une fois. Il songe encore moins aux pieux adjuvants
qui excitent l'imagination; pas un mot de l'invocation des saints,
pas un mot des sacrements" (Strowski, as cited, p. 78).

[1848] Cp. Prof. Thorold Rogers, Economic Interpretation of History,
p. 83.

[1849] In 1387 the Lollards were denounced under that name by the
Bishop of Worcester as "eternally damned sons of Antichrist."

[1850] See the Repressor, Babington's ed. in the Rolls Series, 1860,
Part ii.

[1851] Hook, Lives of the Archbishops (Life of Bourchier), 1867,
v, 294-306.

[1852] He repels, e.g., Wiclif's argument that a priest's misconduct
sufficed to destroy his right to his endowments. Repressor, Babington's
ed. as cited, ii, 413.

[1853] Hook, as cited, v, 309.

[1854] Gardiner, Student's History, p. 330. Cp. Green, ch. vi, § i,
2, pp. 267, 275; Stubbs Const. Hist., iii, 631-33.

[1855] Cp. Pauli, Pictures of Old England, Eng. tr. Routledge's
rep. pp. 332-36.

[1856] Pauli, p. 332.

[1857] See Arber's reprint.

[1858] Cp. Souchay, Gesch. der deutschen Monarchie, 1861-62, iii,
230-31.

[1859] On this cp. Souchay, pp. 234-39.

[1860] See a good synopsis in Pünjer's History of the Christian
Philosophy of Religion, Eng. tr. pp. 68-89; and another in Moritz
Carriere's Die philosophische Weltanschauung der Reformationszeit,
1847, pp. 16-25, which, however, is open to Pünjer's criticism that
it is  by modern Hegelianism.

[1861] Dr. Paul Frédéricq, Geschiedenis der Inquisitie in de
Nederlanden, 1025-1520, Gent, 1892-1897, ii, 4-9.

[1862] Michelet, Hist. de France, vii--éd. 1857, pp. 125, 172.

[1863] This name has many forms; and it is contended that Sabieude is
the correct one. See Owen, Evenings with the Skeptics, 1881, ii, 423.

[1864] Cp. Hallam, Introd. to Lit. of Europe, ed. 1872, i, 142-44,
and the analysis in Prof. Dowden's Montaigne, 1905, p. 127 sq.

[1865] Van Hoogstraten, in Frédéricq, as cited below.

[1866] Dr. Frazer's assumption (Golden Bough, 3rd ed. pt. i, i, 224)
that magic assumes an invariable order of nature, is unsubstantiated
even by his vast anthropological erudition. Magic varies arbitrarily,
and the idea of a fixed "order" does not belong to the magician's
plane of thought.

[1867] Maury, La Magie et l'Astrologie, 4e éd. pp. 214-16.

[1868] "Judicial astrology ... which supplanted and degraded the art
of medicine" (Prof. Clifford Allbutt, Harveian Oration on Science and
Medieval Thought, 1901, App. p. 113). There is a startling survival
of it in the physiology of Harvey. Id. p. 45.

[1869] Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim.

[1870] Above, p. 385.

[1871] Who, however, was no rationalist, but an orientalizing
mystic. Cp. Carriere, Die philos. Weltanschauung der Reformationszeit,
1846, pp. 36-38.

[1872] Cp. Ranke, Hist. of the Ref. in Germany, bk. ii, ch. i
(Eng. tr. Routledge's 1-vol. ed. 1905, p. 129). The point is fairly put
by Audin in the introduction to his Histoire de Luther. Compare Green:
"The awakening of a rational Christianity, whether in England or in
the Teutonic world at large, begins with the Florentine studies of Sir
John Colet" (Short Hist. ch. vi, § iv). Colet, however, was strictly
orthodox. Ulrich von Hutten spent five of the formative years of his
life in Italy.

[1873] Hamilton, Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, 1852,
p. 205.

[1874] As to the general resentment of the money drain cp. Strauss,
Gespräche von Ulrich von Hutten, 1860, Vorrede, p. xiv, and the
dialogues, pp. 159. 363. Cp. Ranke, bk. ii, ch. i (Eng. tr. as cited,
pp. 123-26).

[1875] See Ullmann, Reformers before the Reformation, passim. Even
the Peasants' Rising was adumbrated in the movement of Hans Böheim
of Nikleshausen (fl. 1476), whose doctrine was both democratic
and anti-clerical. (Work cited, ii, 380-81; cp. Bezold, Gesch. der
deutschen Reform. 1890, ch. vii.)

[1876] See Guicciardini's analysis of the parties, cited by
E. Armstrong in the "Cambridge Modern History," vol. i, The
Renaissance, p. 170.

[1877] Burckhardt, Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy,
Eng. tr. pp. 476-77.

[1878] See the sympathetic analysis of the book by Villari, Life of
Savonarola, Eng. tr. pp. 582-94, where it is much overrated.

[1879] As to the education of the Florentine common people in the
fourteenth century cp. Burckhardt, pp. 203-204; Symonds, Age of the
Despots, p. 202.

[1880] Cp. Armstrong, as cited, pp. 150-51.

[1881] McCrie, Reformation in Italy, ed. 1856, pp. 28-30, 41.

[1882] Id. pp. 54, 68.

[1883] Id. p. 45, citing Reynald's Annales, ad. ann. 1530; Trechsel,
Lelio Sozzini und die Anti-trinitarier seiner Zeit, 1844, pp. 19-35.

[1884] McCrie reasons otherwise, from the fact that the sack of Rome
was by many Catholics regarded as a divine judgment on the papacy;
but he omits to mention the pestilence which followed and destroyed the
bulk of the conquering army (Menzel, Gesch. der Deutschen, Cap. 390).

[1885] McCrie, pp. 59-60.

[1886] Id. p. 66.

[1887] Id. pp. 112, 115.

[1888] Id. pp. 89, 98, 215. McCrie thinks it useful to suggest
(p. 95) that anti-trinitarianism seems to have begun at Siena, "whose
inhabitants were proverbial among their countrymen for levity and
inconstancy of mind"--citing Dante, Inferno, canto xxix, 121-23. Thus
does theology illumine sociology. In a note on the same page the
historian cites the testimony of Melanchthon (Epist. coll. 852, 941)
as to the commonness of "Platonic and skeptical theories" among his
Italian correspondents in general; and quotes further the words of
Calvin, who for once rises above invective to explain as to heresy
(Opera, viii, 510) that "In Italis, propter rarum acumen, magis
eminet." The historian omits, further, to trace German Unitarianism
to the levity of a particular community in Germany.

[1889] A. von Reumont, The Carafas of Maddaloni, Eng. tr. 1854,
pp. 33-37; McCrie, p. 122. It was not Protestantism that made the
revolt. The contemporary historian Porzios states that the Lutherans
were so few that they could easily be counted. Von Reumont, as cited,
p. 33. It was not heresy that moved the Neapolitans, but the knowledge
that perjurers could be found in Naples to swear to anything, and
that the machine would thus be made one of pecuniary extortion.

[1890] McCrie, Reformation in Italy, p. 131.

[1891] McCrie, pp. 143-44.

[1892] Id. pp. 158-61.

[1893] Id. pp. 161-63. This seems to have been one of the latest
instances of enslavement in Italy. As to the selling of many Capuan
women in Rome after the capture of Capua in 1501, see Burckhardt,
p. 279, note.

[1894] McCrie, pp. 140-43.

[1895] Domenico Orano, Liberi Pensatori bruciati in Roma dal XVI
al XVIII Secolo, Roma, 1904. Giordano Bruno is 77th in the list;
and there are only eight more. The 85th case was in 1642; and the
last--the burning of a dead body--in 1761.

[1896] Orano, p. 13.

[1897] Signor Orano gives the name as Buzio, citing the 1835 Italian
translation of McCrie, and pronouncing Cantù (ii, 338) wrong in making
it Mollio. But in the 1856 ed. of McCrie's work the name is given
(pp. 57-58, 168-69) as John Mollio. Cantù then appears to have been
right; but the date he gives, 1533, seems to be a blunder.

[1898] McCrie gives this name as Tisserano.

[1899] Orano, p. 6; McCrie, pp. 169-70.

[1900] McCrie, p. 212; Orano, p. 33.

[1901] Orano, pp. 15-16. McCrie, p. 165, says he was strangled;
but the official record is "fu mozza la testa."

[1902] Orano, p. 22. As to Carnesecchi's career see McCrie, pp. 173-79;
and Babington's ed. of Paleario, 1855, Introd. pp. lxv-lxvi.

[1903] McCrie, p. 164. See Trechsel, Lelio Sozzini, p. 35, as to
Baldo Lupetino.

[1904] As to whom see McCrie, pp. 81-84, 179-82, and the copious Life
and Times of Aonio Paleario, by M. Young. 2 vols. 1860.

[1905] Marini, Galileo e l'Inquisizione, Roma, 1850, p. 37, note.

[1906] Babington's ed. p. 46 sq.

[1907] It was afterwards unearthed, however; and Babington's ed. (1855)
is an almost facsimile reprint, with old French and English versions.

[1908] Cp. McCrie, pp. 114-17.

[1909] Cp. McCrie, Ref. in Italy, ch. v; Ref. in Spain, ch. viii;
Green, Short Hist. pp. 358, 362.

[1910] Huss, in his youth, at first turned from Wiclif's writings
with horror. Bonnechose, The Reformers before the Reformation,
Eng. tr. 1844, i, 72.

[1911] Cp. Krasinski, Histor. Sketch of the Reformation in Poland,
1838, i, 58.

[1912] Krasinski, Sketch of Relig. Hist. of Slav. Nations, ed. 1851,
pp. 26-27.

[1913] Neander, ix, 242 sq.; Hardwick, pp. 426-27. Militz effected
a remarkable reformation of life in Prague. Neander, p. 241.

[1914] See the very intelligent survey of the situation in Kautsky's
Communism in Central Europe in the Time of the Reformation,
Eng. tr. 1897, p. 35 sq.

[1915] Kautsky, p. 42.

[1916] K. Raumer, Contrib. to the Hist. of the German Universities,
New York, 1859, p. 19; Dr. Rashdall, Universities of Europe in the
Middle Ages, vol. ii, pt. i, 223-26; Bonnechose, i, 78; Mosheim,
15 Cent. pt. ii, ch. ii, § 6; Gieseler, Per. iii, <DW37>. v, § 150;
Krasinski, as cited, pp. 31-33.

[1917] Krasinski, Sketch, p. 33; Kautsky, p. 43; Maclaine's note to
Mosheim, as last cited; Rashdall, pp. 225-26, 254. The exodus has
been much exaggerated. Only 602 were enrolled at Leipzig.

[1918] Many of these were of great beauty and value, and must have
been owned by rich men. Krasinski, Sketch, p. 34.

[1919] Hardwick. p. 433. Jerome caused the bull to be "fastened to
an immodest woman," and so paraded through the town before being
burnt. Gieseler, iv, 114, note 15.

[1920] Bonnechose, ii, 122; Gieseler, as cited.

[1921] See Mosheim's very interesting note; and Gieseler, iv, 104-105.

[1922] Krasinski, p. 51.

[1923] For an account of the devices of Catholic historians to explain
away the Council's treachery see Bonnechose, note E. to vol. i,
p. 270. The Council itself simply declared that faith was not to be
kept with a heretic. Id. p. 271; Gieseler, p. 121.

[1924] Bonnechose, ii, 118-20. Cp. Krasinski, p. 37.

[1925] Kautsky, pp. 48-49.

[1926] Id. p. 51.

[1927] Id. p. 52.

[1928] Krasinski, p. 65.

[1929] See their principles stated in Kautsky, p. 59.

[1930] Æneas Sylvius, who detested the Taborites, declared them to
have only one good quality, the love of letters. Letter to Carvajal,
cited by Krasinski, p. 93, note.

[1931] Kautsky, pp. 59-67.

[1932] Id. p. 76.

[1933] Kautsky, pp. 78-82. See further the account of Helchitsky's
book in Tolstoy's The Kingdom of God is Within You, ch. i.

[1934] Hist. of the Prot. Church in Hungary (anon.), Eng. tr. 1854,
p. 17.

[1935] Id. p. 19.

[1936] Id. pp. 23, 28.

[1937] Id. pp. 24, 32, citing the chronicler Thurnschwamm.

[1938] Id. pp. 29-31.

[1939] Hist. of the Prot. Church in Hungary, p. 34.

[1940] Id. p. 37.

[1941] Id. p. 58.

[1942] Id. pp. 69-70.

[1943] Id. pp. 45, 73.

[1944] Id. p. 45.

[1945] Called Blandvater in the History above cited, which is copied
in this error by Hardwick.

[1946] Schlegel's note to Mosheim, Reid's ed. p. 708.

[1947] Cp. Mosheim, last cit.

[1948] Hist. of the Prot. Church in Hungary, p. 86.

[1949] Wallace, Antitrinitarian Biog. ii, 257-60. Schlegel, as
cited. Biandrata later gave up his Unitarianism, turning either Jesuit
or Protestant. He was murdered by his nephew for his money. Wallace,
ii, 144.

[1950] History cited, p. 109. As to the persecutions see pp. 108-15.

[1951] Id. pp. 128-29, 132.

[1952] Id. p. 134.

[1953] Krasinski, Hist. of the Reformation in Poland, 1838, i, 29-30.

[1954] Id. pp. 30-34.

[1955] Hist. of the Reformation in Poland, p. 38.

[1956] Id. i. 40-42.

[1957] Id. p. 45.

[1958] Id. pp. 55-56.

[1959] Id. pp. 47-50.

[1960] Id. pp. 65-66.

[1961] Id. p. 67.

[1962] Hist. of the Reformation in Poland, i, 91-98.

[1963] Id. pp. 111-16.

[1964] Id. p. 134.

[1965] Id. pp. 139, 345, following Wengierski; Wallace,
Antitrin. Biog. ii, Art. 41.

[1966] Krasinski, pp. 143, 344, note.

[1967] Id. i, 163.

[1968] Id. p. 173, note.

[1969] Id. pp. 176-77.

[1970] I.e., Peter of Goniond, a small town in Podlachia.

[1971] Krasinski, i, 346-48; Mosheim. 16 Cent. sect. III, pt. ii,
ch. iv, § 7; and Schlegel's and Reid's notes.

[1972] Cp. Mosheim, chapter last cited, § 15 sq.

[1973] Krasinski, i, 357.

[1974] Wallace, Antitrin. Biog. ii, 181-82.

[1975] Krasinski, pp. 357-60.

[1976] Id. p. 363.

[1977] Krasinski, Ref. in Poland, ii, 93-94; Rel. Hist. of
Slav. Nations, p. 188.

[1978] Lutteroth, La Reformation en France pendant sa première période,
p. 2.

[1979] A. A. Tilley, in vol. ii of Camb. Mod. Hist. The Reformation,
ch. ix. p. 281.

[1980] Prof. H. M. Baird, Hist. of the Rise of the Huguenots, 1880,
i, 33.

[1981] Id. i, 35.

[1982] Tilley, as cited, p. 281.

[1983] Lutteroth, pp. 14-16.

[1984] Tilley, p. 282. The translation was notable as a revision of
the Vulgate version, which was printed side by side with it.

[1985] Lutteroth, pp. 3-4; Baird, i, 79.

[1986] Michelet, Hist. de France, tom. x, La Réforme, ch. viii.

[1987] Lutteroth, p. 9.

[1988] Michelet. éd. 1884, x, 308; Baird, i, 80, note.

[1989] See Baird, i, 91, note, as to the dates, which are usually
put a year too early.

[1990] Baird, i, 95-96, and note.

[1991] Id. p. 132.

[1992] Michelet, x, 314; Baird, i, 133-37.

[1993] Lutteroth, p. 15; Michelet. x, 337.

[1994] Other such outrages followed, and did much to intensify
persecution.

[1995] Erasmus had said that one pamphlet of Béda's contained "eighty
lies, three hundred calumnies, and forty-seven blasphemies" (Michelet,
x, 320).

[1996] Baird, i, 143-44; Michelet, x, 321-26.

[1997] Michelet, x, 338-39.

[1998] Baird, i, 149.

[1999] Cp. Tilley, p. 285.

[2000] Lutteroth, p. 17; Michelet, x, 340 (giving the text of a
contemporary record); Baird, i, 173-78--a very full account.

[2001] See Baird, i, 176, note, as to the authenticity of the
utterance, which was doubted by Voltaire.

[2002] Michelet, x, 342; Baird, i, 169.

[2003] Cit. by Baird, i, 24, note.

[2004] Baird, i, 221-22.

[2005] It is endorsed by Professor Clifford, Lectures and Essays,
2nd ed. p. 335.

[2006] Hist. de la Civ. en France, 13e édit. i, 18.

[2007] See the case well made out by Buckle,
ch. viii--1-vol. ed. pp. 311-13.

[2008] See above, p. 348.

[2009] Stubbs, Const. Hist., 3rd ed. ii, 469, 471, 510.

[2010] Cp. Froude, Hist. of England, ed. 1872, i, 173; Burnet,
Hist. of the Reformation, Nares' ed. i, 17-18. Henry, says Burnet,
"cherished Churchmen more than any king in England had ever
done." Compare further Shaftesbury, Miscellaneous Reflections, in
the Characteristics, Misc. iii, ch. i, ed. 1733, vol. iii, p. 151;
Lea, Hist. of the Inquisition, as cited above, p. 316.

[2011] Rev. Dr. J. H. Blunt, The Reformation of the Church of England,
ed. 1892, i, 72-100. Wolsey was more patient with Protestant heresy
than Henry ever was, though on his death-bed he counselled the king
to put down the Lutherans.

[2012] Cp. Burnet, as cited, pref. p. xl, and p. 3; Heylyn, Hist. of
the Ref. pref.; Blunt, i, 293-94. In 1530 the king had actually
repudiated his debts, cancelling borrowings made under the Privy
Seal, and thus setting an example to the Catholic King Philip II in
a later generation.

[2013] Heylyn, as cited, and i, 123-27, ed. 1849; A. F. Leach, English
Schools at the Reformation, 1896, pp. 5-6; J. E. G. De Montmorency,
State Intervention in English Education, 1902, pp. 62-65.

[2014] The subject is treated at some length in The Dynamics of
Religion, by "M. W. Wiseman" (J. M. R.), 1897, pp. 3-46; and in The
Saxon and the Celt, pp. 92-97.

[2015] Bishop Stubbs, Const. Hist. of England, 3rd ed. iii,
638. Cp. Bishop Creighton, The Age of Elizabeth, p. 6; Hallam,
Lit. of Europe, i, 366.

[2016] Ranke, History of the Popes, Bohn tr. 1908, p. 60; Hardwick,
Church History: Reformation, ed. 1886, p. 250.

[2017] Much of this has never been published. Most of it is in a
MS. Codex of the City Library at Frankfurt. Extracts in Tentzel's
Supplementum Historiæ Gothanæ, 1701, in the Narratio de Eobano Hesso
of J. Camerarius, 1553, etc. See Strauss's Ulrich von Hutten, 2te
Aufl. 1871, p. 32, n. (ed. 1858, i, 44) et seq.

[2018] Eccles. Hist., bk. i, ch. iv.

[2019] Strauss, Ulrich von Hutten, as cited, pp. 33-35; Bezold,
Gesch. der deutschen Reformation, 1890, p. 226. Bezold describes
Mutianus as "der freigeistige Kanonikus zu Gotha," and points out,
concerning his universalism, that "the historic Christ thus slips
through his fingers."

[2020] Bezold, as last cited. "Here is the skepticism kept in the
background by Mutianus and Celtis, popularized in the rudest way."

[2021] Briefe, ed. De Wette, iii, 60.

[2022] Karl Hagen, Deutschlands lit. u. relig. Verhältnisse im
Reformations-zeitalter, 1868, ii, 110; letter of Capito to Zwingli,
Ep. Zwinglii i, 47; F. C. Baur, Kirchengeschichte, iv, 450; Trechsel,
Die protestantischen Antitrinitarier vor Faustus Socinus, 1839-44, i,
13-16, 33; Wallace, Antitrinitarian Biography, 1850, i, art. 3, 4, 5.

[2023] Schlegel's note to Mosheim, Reid's ed. p. 689; Baur, iv, 450;
Trechsel, i, 13-16.

[2024] See a good account of him by Beard, Hibbert Lectures on The
Reformation, p. 204 sq.

[2025] For an impartial criticism of their language see Henderson's
Short Hist. of Germany, i, 321-23. Cp. Baur, Kirchengeschichte, iv,
73-76; A. F. Pollard in Camb. Mod. Hist. ii, 192-95; Beard, Hibbert
Lect. on The Reformation, p. 200; and Kautsky, Communism in Central
Europe in the Time of the Reformation, Eng. tr. 1897, pp. 117-28.

[2026] Kohlrausch, Hist. of Germany, Eng. tr. p. 397.

[2027] To the same effect Menzel, Gesch. der Deutschen, Capp. 391, 492.

[2028] Pollard, as cited, p. 175.

[2029] Id. p. 178.

[2030] Id. pp. 179, 193.

[2031] Id. p. 193.

[2032] Id. p. 192.

[2033] Ranke, as cited, pp. 459-64.

[2034] Id. p. 461.

[2035] Cp. Michelet, Hist. de France, x, La Réforme, ed. 1882,
pp. 104, 332.

[2036] Cp. Burckhard, De Ulrichi Hutteni Vita Commentarius, 1717, i,
65. For a general view see Ranke, pp. 126-39.

[2037] Jakob Marx, Die Ursachen der schnellen Verbreitung der
Reformation, 1847, § 12.

[2038] Prof. J. M. Vincent, in Prof. S. M. Jackson's Huldreich Zwingli,
1901, p. 37.

[2039] Cp. Ullmann, Reformers before the Reformation, i, 19; ii,
passim; Mosheim, 15 Cent. Pt. ii, ch. ii, § 22; and Bonet-Maury's
thesis, De Opera Scholastica Fratrum Vitæ Communis, 1889.

[2040] Burton, History of Scotland, iii, 399-401. But the end in
view was probably, as Burton half admits, the recruiting of the
Church. Cp. Cosmo Innes, Sketches of Early Scotch History, p. 134 sq.,
and Scottish Legal Antiquities, pp. 129-30.

[2041] Menzel, Cap. 492.

[2042] Menzel, Cap. 492 (ed. 1837, p. 762).

[2043] Ranke (p. 466) becomes positively lyrical over the happy lot
of the peasant who received Luther's Catechism (1529). "It contains
enduring comfort in every affliction, and, under a slight husk,
the kernel of truths able to satisfy the wisest of the wise." Such
declamation holds the place that ought to have been filled by an
account of economic conditions.

[2044] Bishop Stubbs, Const. Hist. of England, iii. 627. The bishop,
however, holds that in the time of Lollard prosperity the ability to
read was widely diffused in England (p. 628); and it seems certain
that in the first half of the sixteenth century printing multiplied
enormously. Cp. Michelet. Hist. de France, x, ed. 1884. p. 103 sq.

[2045] Cp. Willis, Servetus and Calvin, 1877, bk. ii. ch. i;
Audin, Histoire de Calvin, éd. abrég. ch. xxiv-xxvii; and essay on
"Machiavelli and Calvin" in the present writer's Essays in Sociology,
1903. vol. i.

[2046] Werke., ed. Walch. viii. 2043 (On Ep. to Galat.), cited
by Beard.

[2047] Id. viii, 1181 (On 1 Cor. xv). Cp. other citations in Beard,
pp. 161-65.

[2048] Green, Short History, ch. vi, § v, p. 315.

[2049] Cp. Stäbelin, Johannes Calvin, 1863. ii, 282-83.

[2050] He was educated at Basel and Berne and at Vienna University,
and of all the leading reformers he seems to have had most knowledge
of classical literature. Hess, Life of Zwingle, Eng. tr. 1812, pp. 2-7,
following Myconius and Hottinger.

[2051] Chr. Sigwart, Ulrich Zwingli, der Charakter seiner
Theologie, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Pico von Mirandula, 1855,
pp. 14-26. Prof. Jackson, Huldreich Zwingli, p. 85, note, states that
Sigwart later modified his views.

[2052] So states Melanchthon, cited by Jackson, p. 85,
note. Cp. pp. 201, 390-92.

[2053] Cited by Jackson, p. 316.

[2054] Id. p. 295.

[2055] Id. p. 361.

[2056] Id. p. 361, note.

[2057] Id. According to Heylyn, the Earl of Warwick countenanced
the Zwinglians in his intrigues against the Protector Somerset; and
their views were further welcomed by other nobles as making for the
plundering of rich altars. Hist. of the Reform. of the Ch. of Eng.,
ed. 1849. pref. p. vii. But Heylyn appears to identify the Zwinglians
at this stage with the Calvinists. Cp. p. x.

[2058] Henry, Das Leben Calvins, ii, Kap. 13, and Beilage 16 (Appendix
not given in the English translation); Stähelin, Johannes Calvin,
1863, i, 399-400.

[2059] Cp. Calvin's letter to Viret, July 2, 1547 (Letters of Calvin,
ed. Bonnet, Eng. tr. 1857, ii, 109), where it is alleged that in the
two pages "the whole of Scripture is laughed at, Christ aspersed,
the immortality of the soul called a dream and a fable, and finally
the whole of religion torn in pieces. I do not think he is the author
of it," adds Calvin; "but as it is in his handwriting he will be
compelled to appear in his defence."

[2060] Stähelin, i, 400. Henry avows that Gruet was "subjected
to the torture morning and evening during a whole month"
(Eng. tr. ii. 66). Other biographers dishonestly exclude the fact
from their narratives.

[2061] Cp. Calvin's letter to the Seigneury of Geneva, in Letters,
ii. 254-56.

[2062] Henry, Life of Calvin, Eng. tr. ii, 47-48. Gruet's fragment can
hardly have been the De Tribus Impostoribus, inasmuch as Calvin makes
no mention of any reference to Mohammed in his fragment, whereas the
title of the other book proceeded on the specification of Mohammed
as well as Jesus and Moses. The existing treatise of that name,
in any case, is of later date. Of the famous treatise in question,
which was not published till long afterwards, Henry admits that it
"professes to show tranquilly, and with regret, but without abuse,"
the fraudulent character of the three revealed religions. Concerning
Gruet's essay he asks: "What are all the anti-Christian writings of the
French Revolution compared with the hellish laughter which seemed to
peal from its pages?" For this description he has not a line to cite.

[2063] For instance, one man was accused of having blasphemed against
a storm which terrified the pious.

[2064] Dändliker, Geschichte der Schweiz, 1884-87, ii, 559; above,
p. 2.

[2065] Mark Pattison, Essays, 1889, ii, 37.

[2066] Dändliker, as cited, endorsing Roget. Cp. Hallam, Lit. of
Europe, i, 306, and Hamilton, Discus. on Philos. and Lit., 2nd
ed. p. 497, as to the "dissolution of morals" in the Lutheran world.

[2067] Mosheim, 14 Cent. sec. iii, Pt. ii, ch. ii, §§ 38-41; Audin,
Histoire de Calvin, chs. xxix, xxx.

[2068] Histoire de la vie, moeurs, actes, doctrine, constance et mort
de Iean Calvin, jadis ministre de Geneue, receuilly par M. Hierosme
Hermes Bolsec, docteur médecin à Lyon. Lyon, 1577.

[2069] The reprint of Bolsec's book prepared by M. L. F. Chastel
(Lyon, 1875) appears to be faithful; but the Catholic animus shown
deprives the annotations of critical value.

[2070] Stähelin, ii, 293-301.

[2071] Stähelin, ii, 293. Arminius pointed to this letter as a proof
that Melanchthon had abandoned his early predestinarianism (Declaratio
of 1608, xx. 2; Works of Arminius, ed. Nichols, i. 578). But of course
Melanchthon had previously guarded himself in his Loci Communes (1545)
and elsewhere. (Id. pp. 597-98.)

[2072] Stähelin, ii. 304.

[2073] Latinized name of Miguel Servedo, alias Reves, born at Tudela in
Navarre in 1511, son of Hernando Villanueva, a notary of an Aragonese
family, of which Villanueva had been the seat. The statement of
De la Roche that Servetus was born in Aragon, though long current,
is now exploded.

[2074] De la Roche, Mémoires de Littérature, cited in An Impartial
History of Servetus, 1724, p. 27.

[2075] Christianismi Restitutio, h.e. Totius ecclesiæ apostolicæ
ad sua limina vocatio in integrum, restituta cognitione Dei, fidei
christianæ, justificationis nostræ, regenerationis, baptismi, Coenæ
Domini manducationis. Restituto denique nobis regno coelesti, Babylonis
impia captivitate solutâ, et antichristo cum suis penitus destructo,
1553. Of this book De la Roche (1711) knew of no printed copy, having
read it solely in MS. Perfect copies, however, are preserved in Vienna
and Paris; and an imperfect one in Edinburgh University Library has
been completed from the original draft, which has matter not in the
printed copy. It has been pointed out that the book is not absolutely
anonymous, inasmuch as it has at the end the initials M. S. V.--the
V. standing for the name Villanova or Villanovanus, which he bore
as a student at Louvain and put on the title-pages of his scientific
works; and Servetus is actually introduced as an interlocutor in one
of the dialogues.

[2076] It is to be remembered, however, that he pronounced all
Trinitarians to be "veros Atheos." History of Servetus, p. 131.

[2077] "Mihi ob eam rem moriendum esse certo scio."

[2078] Melanchthon, Epist., lib. i, ep. 3; McCrie, Reformation in
Italy, p. 96; Trechsel, Lelio Sozini, 1844, pp. 38-41.

[2079] Willis, Servetus and Calvin, 1877, p. 117.

[2080] See the careful account of Dr. Austin Flint, of Now York, in
his pamphlet, Rabelais as a Physiologist, rep. from New York Medical
Journal of June 29, 1901.

[2081] Willis, p. 53.

[2082] Letter to Farel, Aug. 20. 1553 (Letters, Eng. tr. ii,
399). Cp. Henry, ii, 195-96.

[2083] Id. ch. xix. See the letter of Trie, given in Henry's Life
of Calvin (Eng. tr. ii, 181-85), with the admission that Trie was in
Calvin's counsels. Henry vainly endeavours to make light (pp. 181-82)
of Calvin's written words to Farel concerning Servetus: "Si venerit,
modo valeat mea autoritas, vivum exire nunquam patiar." Still,
it must in fairness be remembered that Trie, by his own account,
persuaded Calvin, who was reluctant, to his act of complicity with
the inquisitors of Lyons. Cp. Bossert, Calvin, pp. 160-64.

[2084] Willis, ch. xx. Cp. pp. 457, 503. The defence of Calvin in
Mackenzie's Life (1809, p. 79) on the score that he was not likely
to communicate with Catholic officials does not meet the case as to
Trie. And cp. p. 83.

[2085] Ten years after the death of Servetus, Calvin calls him a
"dog and wicked scoundrel" (Willis, p. 530; cp. Hist. of Servetus,
p. 214, citing Calvin's Comm. on Acts xx); and in his Commentary on
Genesis (i, 3, ed. 1838, p. 9) he says of him: "Latrat hic obscoenus
canis." And Servetus had asked his pardon at the end.

[2086] White, Warfare of Science with Theology, 1896, i, 113; History
of Servetus, 1724, p. 93 sq.: Willis, Servetus and Calvin, p. 325.

[2087] Wallace, Antitrinitarian Biography, i, 430.

[2088] See Stähelin, Johannes Calvin, ii, 300-308.

[2089] F. A. Cox. Life of Melanchthon, 1815, pp. 523-24; Willis,
pp. 47, 511.

[2090] Table Talk, ch. 43. Cp. Michelet's Life of Luther,
Eng. tr. 1846, pp. 195-96; and Hallam, Lit. of Europe, i,
360-65. Michelet's later enthusiasm for Luther (Hist. de France, x,
ch. v, ed. 1884, pp. 96-97) is oblivious of many of the facts noted
in his earlier studies.

[2091] Bayle, Art. Gribaud; Christie, Étienne Dolet, 2nd
ed. pp. 303-305. Wallace, Antitrinitarian Biography, ii, Art. 18.

[2092] Benrath, Bernardino Ochino of Siena, Eng. tr. 1876. pp. 268-72,
287-92.

[2093] McCrie, p. 230; Audin, ch. xxxv; Benrath, Bernardino Ochino,
p. 297.

[2094] Cp. Pusey, Histor. Enquiry into Ger. Rationalism, 1828, p. 14
sq.; Beard, p. 183.

[2095] Stähelin, ii. 337. Biandrata went to Hungary, where, as we saw
(p. 421), he turned persecutor, and then Protestant.

[2096] Mosheim, 16 Cent. sec. iii, pt. ii, ch. iv, § 6; Audin,
pp. 394-99; Aretius, Short Hist. of Valentinus Gentilis, Eng. tr. 1696;
Stähelin, ii, 338-45; Wallace, Antitrinitarian Biography, ii, Art. 20.

[2097] See the Historical Account of his life and trial in the Harleian
Miscellany, iv, 168 sq.

[2098] See Stähelin, ii, 293, 304, etc.

[2099] Cp. Menzel, Geschichte der Deutschen, 3te Aufl. Cap. 417;
A. F. Pollard, in Cam. Mod. Hist., vol. ii, ch. vii, p. 223; The
Dynamics of Religion, pp. 6-8.

[2100] See Beard, Hibbert Lectures, pp. 189-90, 196. The same avowal
was made in the eighteenth century by Mosheim (16 Cent. sec. iii,
pt. ii, § 5).

[2101] F. A. Cox, Life of Melanchthon, 1815, p. 544, citing Adam,
Vitæ philosophorum (p. 934). Cp. pp. 528-29.

[2102] K. von Raumer, as cited, pp. 32-37.

[2103] Id. pp. 42-52; Pusey, as cited, p. 112.

[2104] Dändliker, Geschichte der Schweiz, ii, 556-59, 622 sq., 728-29.

[2105] See the extracts in Beard's Hibbert Lectures, pp. 340-41.

[2106] Menzel, Geschichte der Deutschen, Cap. 417.

[2107] Cp. Hamilton, Discussions in Philosophy and Literature, 1852,
pp. 493-94, note.

[2108] Mosheim, Reid's ed. pp. 625-26. Such solutions were common in
papal polity. Id. p. 767.

[2109] Bishop Schuster, Johann Kepler und die grossen kirchlichen
Streitfragen seiner Zeit, 1888, p. 178 sq. It is noteworthy that
Kepler's mother was sentenced for witchcraft, and saved by the
influence of her son. Johann Keppler's Leben und Werken nach neuerlich
aufgefundenen MSS., von G. L. C. Freiherrn von Breitschwert, 1831,
p. 97 sq.

[2110] "There is much reason to believe that the fetters upon
scientific thought were closer under the strict interpretation of
Scripture by the early Protestants than they had been under the older
church" (White, Warfare of Science with Theology, i, 212). Concerning
the Protestant hostility to the Copernican system and to Kepler,
see Schuster, as cited, pp. 87 sq., 191 sq.

[2111] White, as cited, i, 129.

[2112] Id. i, 213.

[2113] Id. p. 147.

[2114] Menzel, Cap. 431; Dändliker, Geschichte der Schweiz, 1884,
ii, 743. The cantons of Glarus, Outer Appenzell, St. Gall, and the
Grisons formally rejected the Gregorian Calendar. Id. ib. Zschokke
(Des Schweizerlands Geschichte, 9te Ausg. 1853, p. 179) implies that
the Protestants in general ignored it. Ranke (Hist. of the Popes,
Bohn tr. 1908, i, 337) mentions that "all Catholic nations took part
in this reform."

[2115] Blunt, Ref. of the Church of England, ed. 1892, ii, 76. Of the
twenty-six cathedrals in the reign of Henry VIII, thirteen had been
monastic churches, and these were "razed to the smallest possible
dimensions as to number and endowments." Id. p. 77.

[2116] Strype's Memorials of Cranmer, ed. 1848, ii, 89.

[2117] Blunt, i, 160-61.

[2118] Original Letters relative to the English Reformation, Parker
Society, 1816, i, 66.

[2119] Bishop Burnet (Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles, Art. 18)
has given currency to the pretence that the words "saved by the
law" are meant to exclude the sense "saved in the law," the latter
salvation being allowed as possible. That there was no such thought on
the part of the framers of the Article is shown by the Latin version,
where the expression is precisely "in lege." Burnet prints the Latin,
yet utterly ignores its significance.

[2120] Book II of the Utopia was written at Antwerp, during his six
months' stay there on an embassy.

[2121] Bk. ii, sec. "Of the Religions" (Arber's ed. pp. 143-47;
Morley's ed. pp. 151-53).

[2122] Green, Short History, ch. vi, § 4; 1881 ed. p. 311. Compare
Green's whole estimate. Michelet's hostile criticism (x, 356) is
surprisingly inept. For the elements of naturalism in the Utopia see
bk. ii, sections "Of their Journeying" and "Of the Religions."

[2123] Cp. T. C. Grattan, The Netherlands, 1830, pp. 231-43.

[2124] Who, as it happened, avowed that "religion was almost extinct"
in Europe at the time of the rise of the Lutheran and Calvinistic
heresies. Concio xxviii. Opera, vi, 296, ed. 1617, cited by Blunt,
Ref. of Church of England, ed. 1892, i, 4, note.

[2125] Cp. The Works of Arminius, ed. by James Nichols, 1825, i,
580, note.

[2126] Id. p. 581 note.

[2127] Cp. Schuster, as cited, pp. 191 sq., 202 sq.

[2128] Nichols's Arminius, i, p. 233.

[2129] Hallam, Lit. of Europe, ii, 406-416; Pattison, Isaac Casaubon,
2nd ed. pp. 447-48. As to Casaubon's own intolerance, however, see
p. 446.

[2130] Hallam, ii, 411, 416.

[2131] Beard, Hibbert Lectures, p. 298.

[2132] Bayle, Dictionnaire, art. Viret, note D.

[2133] Calvin, scenting his heresy, warned him in 1552 (Bayle,
art. Marianus Socin, the first, note B); but they remained on
surprisingly good terms till Lelio's death in 1562. Cp. Stähelin,
Johannes Calvin, ii. 321-28.

[2134] Cp. the English History of Servetus, 1724, p. 39, and Trechsel,
Lelio Sozzini und die Antitrinitarier seiner Zeit (Bd. ii. of Die
protestantischen Antitrinitarier), 1844, pp. 38-41.

[2135] Cited by Trechsel, p. 42, note.

[2136] Cp. Bayle, art. Ochin; Miss Lowndes, Michel de Montaigne,
p. 266; Owen, French Skeptics, p. 588; Benrath, Bernardino Ochino
of Siena, Eng. tr. 1876, pp. 268-72. McCrie mentions (Ref. in Italy,
p. 228, note) that Ochino's dialogue on polygamy has been translated
and published in England "by the friends of that practice." (In
1657. Rep. 1732.)

[2137] Above, pp. 458-59, Sermons (orthodox) by Ochino were published
in English in 1548, and often reprinted.

[2138] D'Ewes, Journals of Parliament in the Reign of Elizabeth,
1682, p. 65.

[2139] See above, p. 459.

[2140] The Scholemaster, Arber's rep. p. 82.

[2141] E.g., work cited, pt. ii, Max. 1, and Max. 6,
end. Eng. tr. 1608, pp. 93, 128.

[2142] Mark Pattison, Essay on Joseph Scaliger, in Essays, Routledge's
ed. i, 114.

[2143] When Pattison declares that Italian curiosity had bred "not
secret unbelief but callous acquiescence" he sets up a spurious
antithesis; and when he generalizes that in Italy "men did not
disbelieve the truths of the Christian religion," he understates
the case. He errs equally in the opposite direction when he alleges
(ib. p. 141) that in the France of Montaigne "a philosophical
skepticism had become the creed of all thinking men." Such a difference
between France and Italy was impossible.

[2144] See McCrie, Reformation in Italy, ed. 1856, pp. 96-99.

[2145] Trechsel, Die protestantischen Antitrinitarier vor Faustus
Socinus, i (1839), 56; Mosheim, 16 Cent. 3rd sec. pt. ii, ch. iv, § 3.

[2146] Hallam, Lit. of Europe, ii, 82.

[2147] Art. Acontius, in Dict. of National
Biog. Cp. J. J. Tayler. Retrospect of the Religious Life of England,
2nd ed. pp. 205-206. As to the attack on latitudinarianism in the
Thirty-nine Articles, see above, p. 460.

[2148] Bacon, Adv. of Learning, bk. i; Filum Labyrinthi, § 7 (Routledge
ed. pp. 50, 63, 200).

[2149] Cp. Zeller, Hist. de l'Italie, pp. 400-12; Green, Short
Hist. ch. viii, § 2.

[2150] McCrie, p. 164. It was said by Scaliger that "in the time
of Pius IV [between Paul IV and Pius V] people talked very freely
in Rome." Id. ib. note. "It was even considered characteristic
of good society in Rome to call the principles of Christianity in
question. 'One passes,' says P. Ant. Bandino, 'no longer for a man
of cultivation unless one put forth heterodox opinions concerning the
Christian faith.'" Ranke, Hist. of the Popes, Bohn, tr. ed. 1908, i,
58, citing Caracciolo's MS. Life of Paul IV.

[2151] Hallam, ii, 116.

[2152] Under the alternative titles of The Examination of Men's Wits
and A Trial of Wits. Rep. 1596, 1604, 1616.

[2153] Carew's tr. ed. 1596, p. 15.

[2154] Id. p. 17.

[2155] Id. p. 19.

[2156] According to Henri Estienne, Postell himself vended strange
heresies, one being to the effect that to make a good religion there
were needed three--the Christian, the Jewish, and the Turkish. Apologie
pour Hérodote, liv. i, ed. 1607, pp. 98-100.

[2157] Published at Antwerp. It was reprinted in 1582, 1583, and 1590;
translated into Latin in 1583, and frequently reprinted in that form;
translated into English (begun by Sir Philip Sidney and completed by
Arthur Golding) in 1587, and in that form at least thrice reprinted
in blackletter.

[2158] Ed. 1582, p. 18. Eng. tr. 1601, p. 10.

[2159] Or even in modifying philosophic doctrine, save perhaps
as regards Descartes, later. Cp. Bartholmess, Hist. crit. des
doctr. relig. de la philos. moderne, 1855, i, 21-22.

[2160] See Owen, Skeptics of the French Renaissance, pp. 631-36--a
fairer and more careful estimate, than that of Hallam, Lit. of Europe,
ii, 111-13.

[2161] Essais, bk. ii, ch. xiii, ed. Firmin-Didot, vol. ii, 2-3;
King Lear, i, 2, near end; Les Amants Magnifiques, i, 2; iii,
1. Montaigne echoes Pliny (Hist. Nat. ii, 8), as Molière does Cicero,
De Divinatione, ii, 43.

[2162] "Our religion," he writes, "is made to extirpate vices; it
protects, nourishes, and incites them" (Essais, liv. ii, ch. xii;
éd. Firmin-Didot, ii, 464). "There is no enmity so extreme as the
Christian." (I quote in general Florio's translation for the flavour's
sake; but it should be noted that he makes many small slips.)

[2163] Owen was mistaken (Skeptics of the French Renaissance,
p. 414) in supposing that Montaigne spent several years over this
translation. By Montaigne's own account at the beginning of the
Apologie, it was done in a few days. Cp. Miss Lowndes's excellent
monograph, Michel de Montaigne, pp. 103, 106.

[2164] Éd. Firmin-Didot, ii, 469.

[2165] Miss Lowndes, p. 145. Cp. Champion, Introd. aux Essais de
Montaigne, 1900.

[2166] Essais, liv. ii, ch. xii; liv. iii, ch. v. Ed. cited, i, 65;
ii, 309.

[2167] For a view of Montaigne's development see M. Champion's
excellent Introduction--a work indispensable to a full understanding
of the Essais.

[2168] Liv. ii, ch. xi.

[2169] Cp. the Essais, liv. iii, ch. i (ed. cited, ii, 208). Owen gives
a somewhat misleading idea of the passage (French Skeptics, p. 486).

[2170] Miss Lowndes, Michel de Montaigne, p. 131. Cp. Owen, p. 414.

[2171] He was consistent enough to doubt the new cosmology of
Copernicus (Essais, as cited, i, 615); and he even made a rather
childish attack on the reform of the Calendar (liv. iii, chs. x, xi);
but he was a keen and convinced critic of the prevailing abuses in
law and education. Owen's discussion of his opinions is illuminating;
but that of Champion makes a still more searching analysis as regards
the conflicting tendencies in Montaigne.

[2172] Liv. i, ch. liv.

[2173] Liv. i, ch. xx, end.

[2174] Liv. i, ch. xxii.

[2175] Liv. ii, ch. ix.

[2176] Liv. ii, ch. xvii. Ed. cited, ii, 58.

[2177] Id. p. 59.

[2178] Liv. iii, ch. xiii. Ed. cited, ii, 572.

[2179] Cp. the clerical protests of Sterling (Lond. and
Westm. Rev. July, 1838, p. 346) and Dean Church (Oxford Essays, p. 279)
with the judgment of Champion, pp. 159-73. Sterling piously declares
that "All that we find in him [Montaigne] of Christianity would be
suitable to apes and dogs...."

[2180] Liv. i, ch. xxii. Cp. liv. iii, ch. xi.

[2181] Below, § 5.

[2182] Liv. iii, ch. xi.

[2183] Liv. iii, ch. xi.

[2184] Cp. citations in Buckle, 3-vol. ed. ii, 18, note 42
(1-vol. ed. p. 296); Locky. Rationalism, i, 92-95; and Perrens,
Les Libertins, p. 44.

[2185] As to Henri IV see Perrens, p. 53.

[2186] Not, as Owen states (French Skeptics, p. 569), the sister of
Francis I, who died when Charron was eight years old, but the daughter
of Henri II, and first wife of Henri of Navarre, afterwards Henri IV.

[2187] Cp. Prof. Strowski, De Montaigne à Pascal, as cited, p. 170
sq., and the Discours Chrétien of Charron--an extract from a letter
of 1589--published with the 1609 ed. of the Sagesse.

[2188] Cp. Sainte-Beuve, as cited by Owen, p. 571, note, and Owen's
own words, p. 572.

[2189] Owen, p. 571. Cp. pp. 573, 574.

[2190] Bayle, art. Charron. "A brutal atheism" is the account of
Charron's doctrine given by the Jesuit Garasse. Cp. Perrens, p. 57.

[2191] Owen (p. 570) comes to this conclusion after carefully collating
the editions. Cp. p. 587, note. The whole of the alterations, including
those proposed by President Jeannin, will be found set forth in the
edition of 1607, and the reprints of that. One of the modified passages
(first ed. p. 257; ed. 1609, p. 785) is the Montaignesque comment
(noted by Prof. Strowski, p. 195) on the fashion in which men's
religion is determined by their place of birth. "C'est du Montaigne
aggravé," complains M. Strowski. And it is left unchanged in substance.

[2192] "The first ... attempt made in a modern language to construct
a system of morals without the aid of theology" (3-vol. ed. ii, 19;
1-vol. ed. p. 296).

[2193] Cp. Owen, pp. 580-85.

[2194] Buckle, 3-vol. ed. ii, 21; 1-vol. ed. p. 297.

[2195] E.g., the preface to the first edition, ad init.

[2196] E.g., liv. ii, ch. xxviii of revised ed. (ed. 1609, p. 399).

[2197] See the biog. pref. of Labitte to the Charpentier edition,
p. xxv. The Satyre in its own turn freely charges atheism and
incest on Leaguers; e.g., the Harangue de M. de Lyon, ed. cited,
pp. 79, 86. This was by Rapin, whom Garasse particularly accuses of
libertinage. See the Doctrine Curieuse, as cited, p. 124.

[2198] It had to be four times reprinted in a few weeks; and the
subsequent editions are innumerable. Ever since its issue it has been
an anti-fanatical force in France.

[2199] Cp. Ch. Read's introd. to ed. 1886 of the Satyre, p. iii. (An
exact reprint.) The Satyre anticipates (ed. Read, p. 281; ed. Labitte,
p. 227) the modern saying that the worst peace is better than the
best war.

[2200] De Thou, T. v, liv. 98, p. 63, cited in ed. 1699 of the
Satyre, p. 489. De Thou was one of the Catholics who loathed the
savagery of the Church; and was accordingly branded by the pope as
a heretic. Buckle, 1-vol. ed. pp. 291, 300, notes.

[2201] M. Labitte, himself a Catholic, speaks of Garasse's "forfanterie
habituelle" and "ton d'insolence sincère qui déguise tant de mensonges"
(Pref. cited, p. xxxi.). Prof. Strowski (p. 130) admits too that "Il
ne faut pas trop s'attacher aux révélations sensationelles du père
Garasse: les maximes qu'il prête aux beaux esprits, il les leur prête
en effet, elles ne leur appartient pas toutes. La société secrète,
la Confrérie des Bouteilles, ou il les dit engagés, est un invention
de sa verve bouffonne." But the Professor, with a "N'importe!",
forgives him, and trades on his matter.

[2202] Owen, French Skeptics, p. 659. Cp. Lecky, Rationalism, i, 97,
citing Maury, as to the resistance of libertins to the superstition
about witchcraft.

[2203] Doctrine Curieuse des Beaux Esprits, as cited, p. 208. This is
one of the passages which fully explain the opinion of the orthodox of
that age that Garasse "helped rather than hindered atheism" (Reimmann,
Hist. Atheismi, 1725, p. 408).

[2204] Mersenne ascribed the quatrains to a skilled
controversialist. Quæstiones, pref.






End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of A Short History of Freethought Ancient
and Modern, Volume 1 of 2, by John M. Robertson

*** 