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 THE EVIDENCE
 IN THE CASE

 A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the
 War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic
 Records of England, Germany, Russia,
 France, Austria, Italy and Belgium.

 BY

 JAMES M. BECK, LL.D.
 Late Assistant Attorney-General of the U. S.
 Author of "The War and Humanity."

 With an Introduction by
 HON. JOSEPH H. CHOATE
 Late U. S. Ambassador to Great Britain

 "_Did these bones cost no more the breeding but to play at loggats
 with 'em? Mine ache to think on 't._"
          HAMLET--Act V., Sc. 1.

 _Revised Edition, with Additional Material_

 NEW YORK
 GROSSET & DUNLAP
 PUBLISHERS

 Published by Arrangement with G. P. Putnam's Sons




 COPYRIGHT, 1914, BY
 JAMES M. BECK

 COPYRIGHT, 1915, BY
 JAMES M. BECK

 (_For Revised Edition_)


 Thirteenth Impression


 BY JAMES M. BECK
 The Evidence in the Case.  The War and Humanity.


 This edition is issued under arrangement with the publishers,
 G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS, NEW YORK AND LONDON




 TO
 ALBERT, OF BELGIUM

 "EVERY INCH A KING"


 Justum, et tenacem propositi virum
 Non civium ardor prava jubentium,
 Non vultus instantis tyranni,
     Mente quatit solida, neque Auster

 Dux inquieti turbidus Adriae,
 Nec fulminantis magna manus Jovis.
 Si fractus illabatur orbis,
     Impavidum ferient ruinae.

          HORACE.




=Publishers' Note=


The volume _The Evidence in the Case_ is based upon an article by the
Hon. James M. Beck, which came into print in the "New York Times" of
October 25th. The article in question made so deep an impression with
thinking citizens on both sides of the Atlantic that it has been
translated into a number of European languages, and some 400,000
copies have been sold in England alone.

In making this acknowledgment, which is due for the courtesy of "The
Times" in permitting an article prepared for its columns to be
utilized as the basis for the book, it is in order for the publishers
to explain to the readers that the material in the article has itself
been rewritten and amplified, while the book contains, in addition to
this original paper, a number of further chapters comprising together
more than six times the material of the first article.

The present book is an independent work, and is deserving of
consideration on the part of all citizens who are interested in
securing authoritative information on the issues of the great European
contest.

     New York, December 12, 1914




INTRODUCTION

BY THE HON. JOSEPH H. CHOATE, FORMER AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO GREAT
BRITAIN[1]

[Footnote 1: Reprinted, by permission, from the N. Y. _Times_.]


For five months now all people who read at all have been reading about
the horrible war that is devastating Europe and shedding the best
blood of the people of five great nations. In fact, they have had no
time to read anything else, and everything that is published about it
is seized upon with great avidity. No wonder, then, that Mr. James M.
Beck's book, _The Evidence in the Case_, published by G. P. Putnam's
Sons, which has grown out of the article by him contributed to the New
York _Times_ Sunday Magazine, has been warmly welcomed both here and
in England as a valuable addition to the literature of the day.

An able and clear-headed lawyer and advocate, he presents the matter
in the unique form of a legal argument, based upon an analysis of the
diplomatic records submitted by England, Germany, Russia, France, and
Belgium, as "A Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization," and the
conclusions to be deduced as to the moral responsibility for the war.

The whole argument is founded upon the idea that there is such a thing
as a public conscience of the world, which must and will necessarily
pass final judgment upon the conduct of the parties concerned in this
infernal struggle. Many times in the course of the book he refers
emphatically to that "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" to
which Jefferson appealed in our Declaration of Independence as the
final arbiter upon our conduct in throwing off the British yoke and
declaring our right to be an independent nation. That this "public
opinion of the world" is the final tribunal upon all great
international contests is illustrated by the fact that all mankind,
including Great Britain herself, has long ago adjudged that our great
Declaration was not only just, but necessary for the progress of
mankind.

It is evident from his brief preface that Mr. Beck is a sincere
admirer of historic Germany, and on the eve of the war he was at
Weimar, after a brief visit to a little village near Erfurt, where one
of his ancestors was born, who had migrated at an early date to
Pennsylvania, a Commonwealth whose founder had made a treaty with the
Indians which, so far from being treated as a "mere scrap of paper,"
was never broken. Like many Americans, Mr. Beck is of mixed ancestry,
being in part English and in part Swiss-German. He has therefore
viewed the great question objectively, and without any racial
prejudice.

A careful study of the diplomatic correspondence that preceded the
outbreak of the war had convinced Mr. Beck that Germany was chiefly
responsible for it, and he proceeds _con amore_ to demonstrate the
truth of this conviction by the most earnest and forceful presentation
of the case.

Forensic lawyers in the cases they present are about half the time on
the wrong side, or what proves by the final judgment to have been the
wrong side, but it is always easy to tell from the manner of
presentation whether they themselves are thoroughly convinced of the
justice of the side which they advocate. It is evident that Mr. Beck
did not undertake to convince "the Supreme Court of Civilization"
until he was himself thoroughly persuaded of the justice of his cause,
that the invasion of Belgium by Germany was not only a gross breach of
existing treaties, but was in violation of settled international law,
and a crime against humanity never to be forgotten, a crime which
converted that peaceful and prosperous country into a human
slaughterhouse, reeking with the blood of four great nations. How any
intelligent lawyer could have come to any other conclusion it is not
easy to imagine, since Germany confessed its crime while in the very
act of committing it, for on the very day that the German troops
crossed the Belgian frontier and hostilities began, the Imperial
Chancellor at the great session of the Reichstag on August 4th
declared, to use his own words:

     Necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg,
     and have possibly already entered on Belgian soil. _That is
     a breach of international law.... We were forced to ignore
     the rightful protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and
     Belgium, and the injustice--I speak openly--the injustice we
     thereby commit, we will try to make good as soon as our
     military aims have been attained._ Anybody who is threatened
     as we are threatened and is fighting for his highest
     possessions can have only one thought--how he is to hack his
     way through.

Thank God, their military aims have not yet been attained, and from
present appearances are not likely to be, but, as Mr. Beck believes,
Germany will still be held by the judgment of mankind to make good the
damage done.

In reviewing the diplomatic correspondence published by Germany that
preceded the outbreak of the war, Mr. Beck lays great stress, and we
think justly, upon the obvious suppression of evidence by Germany, in
omitting substantially all the important correspondence on vital
points that passed between Germany and Austria, and the suppression of
important evidence in judicial proceedings always carries irresistible
weight against the party guilty of it. While England and France and
Russia were pressing Germany to influence and control Austria in the
interests of peace, not a word is disclosed of what, if anything, the
German Foreign Office said to Austria toward that end. To quote Mr.
Beck's own words:

     Among the twenty-seven communications appended to the German
     _White Paper_, it is most significant that not a single
     communication is given of the many which passed from the
     Foreign Office of Berlin to that of Vienna, and only two
     which passed from the German Ambassador in Vienna to the
     German Chancellor, and the purpose of this suppression is
     even more clearly indicated by the complete failure of
     Austria to submit any of its diplomatic records to the
     scrutiny of a candid world.

Notwithstanding the disavowal given by the German Ambassador at
Petrograd to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the German
Government had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before
it was handed in, and did not exercise any influence on its contents,
Mr. Beck establishes clearly by the admissions of the German Foreign
Office itself that it was consulted by Austria previous to the
ultimatum, and that it not only approved of its course, but literally
gave to Austria _carte blanche_ to proceed. And the German Ambassador
to the United States formally admitted in an article in _The
Independent_ of September 7, 1914, that "Germany had approved in
advance the Austrian ultimatum to Servia."

This brutal ultimatum by a great nation of fifty millions of people,
making impossible demands against a little one of four millions which
had itself just emerged from two conflicts and was still suffering
from exhaustion--an ultimatum which set all the nations of Europe in
agitation--is proved to have been jointly concocted by the two members
of the Triple Alliance, Germany and Austria. But the third member of
that Alliance, Italy, found it to be an act of aggression on their
part which brought on the war, and that the terms of the Triple
Alliance, therefore, did not bind her to take any part.

The peace parleys which passed between the several nations involved
are carefully reviewed by Mr. Beck, who concludes, as we think
justly, that up to the 28th of July, when the German Imperial
Chancellor sent for the English Ambassador and announced the refusal
of his Government to accept the conference of the Powers proposed by
Sir Edward Grey, every proposal to preserve peace had come from the
Triple Entente, and that every such proposal had met with an
uncompromising negative from Austria, and either that or obstructive
quibbles from Germany.

At this point, the sudden return of the Kaiser to Berlin from his
annual holiday in Norway, which his own Foreign Office regretted as a
step taken on his Majesty's own initiative and which they feared might
cause speculation and excitement, and his personal intervention from
that time until his troops invaded Luxemburg and he made his abrupt
demand upon the Belgian Government for permission to cross its
territory are reviewed with great force and effect by Mr. Beck, with
the conclusion on his part that the Kaiser, who by a timely word to
Austria might have prevented all the terrible trouble that followed,
was the supremely guilty party, and that such will be the verdict of
history.

Mr. Beck's review of the case of Belgium is extremely interesting, and
his conclusion that England, France, Russia, and Belgium can await
with confidence the world's final verdict that their quarrel was just,
rests safely upon the plea of "Guilty" by Germany, a conclusion which
seems to have been already plainly declared by most of the civilized
nations of the world.

We think that Mr. Beck's opinion that England and France were taken
unawares and were wholly unprepared for war is a little too strongly
expressed. France, certainly, had been making ready for war with
Germany ever since the great conflict of 1870 had resulted in her
loss of Alsace and Lorraine, and had had a fixed and unalterable
determination to get them back when she could, although it is evident
that she did not expect her opportunity to come just when and as it
did. That Great Britain had no present expectation of immediate war
with Germany is clearly obvious. That she had long been apprehending
the danger of it in the indefinite future is very clear, but that Sir
Edward Grey and the Government and the people that he represented did
all that they possibly could to prevent the war seems to be clearly
established.

Mr. Beck's book is so extremely interesting from beginning to end that
it is difficult when once begun to lay it down and break off the
reading, and we shall not be surprised to hear, not only that it has
had an immense sale in England and America, but that its translation
into the languages of the other nations of Europe has been demanded.

          JOSEPH H. CHOATE.

     NEW YORK, January 10, 1915.




FOREWORD


On the eve of the Great War I sat one evening in the reading room of
the Hotel Erbprinz in classic Weimar. I had spent ten happy days in
Thuringia, and had visited with deep interest a little village near
Erfurt, where one of my forbears was born. I had seen Jena, from whose
historic university this paternal ancestor had gone as a missionary
to North America in the middle of the eighteenth century. This
simple-minded German pietist had cherished the apparent delusion
that even the uncivilized Indians of the American wilderness
might be taught--the Bernhardis and Treitschkes to the contrary
notwithstanding--that to increase the political power of a nation by
the deliberate and highly systematized destruction of its neighbors
was not the truest political ideal, even of an Indian tribe.

This missionary had gone most fittingly to the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, where its enlightened founder had already given a
demonstration of the truth that a treaty of peace, even though not
formally expressed in a "scrap of paper," might be kept by white men
and so-called savages with scrupulous fidelity for at least three
quarters of a century, for even the cynical Voltaire said in sincerest
admiration that the compact between William Penn and the Indians was
the only treaty which was never reduced to parchment, nor ratified by
an oath and yet was never broken. When Penn, the great apostle of
peace, died in England, a disappointed, ruined, and heart-broken man,
and the news reached the Indians in their wigwams along the banks of
the Delaware, they had for him, whom they called the "white Truth
Teller" so deep a sense of gratitude that they sent to his widow a
sympathetic gift of valuable skins, in memory of the "man of unbroken
friendship and inviolate treaties."

These reflections in a time of broken friendships and violated
treaties are not calculated to fill the man of the twentieth century
with any justifiable pride.

My mind, however, as I spent the quiet evening in the historic inn
of Thackeray's Pumpernickel, did not revert to these far distant
associations but was full of other thoughts suggested by the most
interesting section of Germany, through which it had been my privilege
to pass.

I had visited Eisenach and reverentially stood within the room where
the great master of music, John Sebastian Bach, had first seen the
light of day, and as I saw the walls that he loved and which are
forever hallowed because they once sheltered this divine genius, the
question occurred to me whether he may not have done more for Germany
with his immortal harmonies, which are the foundation of all modern
music, than all the Treitschkes, and Bernhardis, with their gospel of
racial hatred, pseudo-patriotism, and imperial aggrandizement.

I had climbed the <DW72>s of the Wartburg and from Luther's room had
gazed with delight upon the lovely Thuringian forests. Quite apart
from any ecclesiastical considerations that room seemed to suggest
historic Germany in its best estate. It recalled that scene of undying
interest at the Diet of Worms, when the peaceful adherence to an ideal
was shown to be mightier than the power of the greatest empire
since the fall of Rome. The monk of Wittenburg, standing alone
in the presence of the great Emperor, Charles the Fifth, and the
representatives of the most powerful religious organization that the
world has ever known, with his simple, "_Hier stehe ich; ich kann
nicht anders,_" represented the truest soul and highest ideal of the
nobler Germany.

These and other glorious memories, suggested by Eisenach, Frankfort,
Erfurt, Weimar, Jena, and Leipzig, made this pilgrimage of intense
interest, and almost the only discord was the sight of the Leipzig
Voelkerschlacht Denkmal, probably the largest, and certainly the
ugliest monument in all the world. It has but one justification, in
that it commemorates war, and no monument ever more fully symbolized
by its own colossal crudity the moral ugliness of that most ghastly
phenomenon of human life. Let us pray that in the event of final
victory Prussia will not commission the architects of the Leipzig
monument, or the imperial designer of the Sieges-Allee to rebuild
that Gothic masterpiece, the Rheims Cathedral. That day in Leipzig
an Alsatian cartoonist, Hansi, had been sentenced to one year's
imprisonment for a harmless cartoon in a book for children, in which
the most supersensitive should have found occasion for nothing, except
a passing smile.

On the library table of the Erbprinz, I found a large book, which
proved to be a Bismarck memorial volume. It contained hundreds of
pictures glorifying and almost deifying the Iron Chancellor. One
particularly arrested my attention. It was the familiar picture of
the negotiations for peace between Bismarck and Jules Favre in the
terrible winter of 1871. The French statesman has sunk into a chair in
abject despair, struck speechless by the demands of the conqueror.
Bismarck stands triumphant and his proud bearing and arrogant manner
fail to suggest any such magnanimous courtesy as that with which Grant
accepted the sword of Lee at Appomattox. The picture breathed the very
spirit of "_vae victis_." Had a French artist painted this picture,
I could understand it, for it would serve effectively to stimulate
undying hatred in the French heart. It seemed strange that a German
artist should treat a subject, calling for a spirit of most delicate
courtesy, in a manner which represented Prussian militarism in its
most arrogant form.

This unworthy picture reminded me of a later scene in the Reichstag,
in which the Iron Chancellor, after reviewing with complacency the
profitable results of Germany's deliberately provoked wars against
Denmark, Austria, and France, added the pious ejaculation:

     _Wir Deutsche fuerchten Gott sonst nichts in der Welt._
     (We Germans fear God but nothing else in the world.)

It is not necessary to impeach the sincerity of this pious
glorification of the successful results of land grabbing. The mind in
moments of exaltation plays strange tricks with the soul. Bismarck may
have dissembled on occasion but he was never a hypocrite. It is the
spirit which inspired this boastful and arrogant speech, which has so
powerfully stimulated Prussian Junkerism, to which I wish to refer.

Had an American uttered these words we would have treated the boast as
a vulgar exhibition of provincial "spread-eagleism," such as
characterized certain classes in this country before the Civil War,
and which Charles Dickens somewhat over-caricatured in _Martin
Chuzzlewit_, but in the mouth of Bismarck, with his cynical
indifference to moral considerations in questions of statecraft, this
piece of rhetorical _spread double-eagleism_, manifests the spirit of
the Prussian military caste since its too easy triumph over France in
1870-1871, a triumph, which may yet prove the greatest calamity that
ever befell Germany, not only in the seeds of hatred which it sowed,
of which there is now a harvest of blood past precedent, but also in
the development of an arrogant pride which has profoundly affected to
its prejudice the noble Germany of Luther, Bach, Beethoven, Goethe,
Schiller, Kant, Humboldt, and Lessing.

To say that Germany "fears" nothing save God is contradicted by its
whole diplomatic history of the last half century. In this it is not
peculiar. The curse of modern statecraft is the largely unreasoning
fear which all nations have of their neighbors. England has feared
Germany only less than Germany has feared England and this nervous
apprehension has bred jealousy, hatred, suspicion, until to-day all
civilized nations are reaping a harvest horrible beyond expression.

The whole history of Germany since 1870 has shown a constant, and at
times an unreasoning fear, first of France, then of the Slav, and
latterly and in its most acute form, of England. I do not mean that
Germany has been or is now animated by any spirit of craven cowardice.
There has not been in recorded history a braver nation, and the
dauntless courage with which, even at this hour, thousands of Germans
are going with patriotic songs on their lips to "their graves as to
their beds," is worthy of all admiration.

The whole statecraft of Germany for over forty years has been inspired
by an exaggerated apprehension of the intentions of its great
neighbors. This fear followed swiftly upon the triumph of 1871, for
Germany early showed its apprehension that France might recover its
military strength. When that fallen but indomitable foe again
struggled to its feet in 1875, the Prussian military caste planned to
give the stricken gladiator the _coup de grace_ and was only prevented
by the intervention of England and Russia. Later this acute and
neurotic apprehension took the form of a hatred and fear of Russia,
and this notwithstanding the fact that the Kaiser had in the
Russo-Japanese War exalted the Czar as the "champion of Christianity"
and the "representative of the white race" in the Far East.

When the psychology of the present conflict is considered by future
historians, this neuropathic feature of Germany's foreign policy will
be regarded as a contributing element of first importance.

Latterly the _Furor Teutonicus_ was especially directed against
England, and although it was obvious to the dispassionate observer in
neutral countries that no nation was making less preparations or was
in point of fact so illy prepared for a conflict as England,
nevertheless Germany, with a completeness of preparation such as the
world has never witnessed, was constantly indulging in a very hysteria
of fear at the imaginary designs of England upon Germany's standing as
a world power.

Luther's famous saying, already quoted, and Bismarck's blustering
speech to the Reichstag measure the difference between the Germany of
the Reformation and the Prussia of to-day.

I refuse to believe that this Bismarckian attitude is that of the
German people. If a censored press permitted them to know the real
truth with respect to the present crisis, that people, still sound in
heart and steadfast in soul, would repudiate a policy of duplicity,
cunning, and arrogance, which has precipitated their great nation into
an abyss of disaster. The normal German is an admirable citizen,
quiet, peaceable, thrifty, industrious, faithful, efficient, and
affectionate to the verge of sentimentality. He, and not the Junker,
has made Germany the most efficient political State in the world. If
to his genius for organization could be added the individualism of the
American, the resultant product would be incomparable. A combination
of the German _fortiter in re_ with the American _suaviter in modo_
would make the most efficient republic in the world.

The Germany of Luther, that still survives and will survive when
"Junkerism" is a dismal memory of the past, believes that "the supreme
wisdom, the paramount vitality, is an abiding honesty, the doing of
right, because right is right, in scorn of consequence."

That the German people have rallied with enthusiastic unanimity to the
flag in this great crisis, I do not question. This is, in part, due to
the fact that the truth has never yet been disclosed to them, and is
not likely to be until the war is over. They have been taught that in
a time of profound peace England, France, and Russia deliberately
initiated a war of aggression to destroy the commercial power of
Germany. The documents hereinafter analyzed will show how utterly
baseless this fiction is. Even if the truth were known, no one can
blame the German, who now rallies to his flag with such superhuman
devotion, for whether the cause of his country is just or unjust, its
prestige, and perhaps its very existence, is at stake, and there
should be for the rank and file of the German people only a feeling of
profound pity and deep admiration. Edmund Burke once said, "We must
pardon something to the spirit of liberty." We can paraphrase it and
say in this crisis, "We must pardon something to the spirit of
patriotism." The whole-hearted devotion of this great nation to its
flag is worthy of the best traditions of the Teutonic race. Thor did
not wield his thunder hammer with greater effect than these
descendants of the race of Wotan. If the ethical question depended
upon relative bravery, who could decide between the German, "faithful
unto death"; the English soldier, standing like a stone wall against
fearful odds, the French or Russian not less brave or resolute, and
the Belgian, now as in Caesar's time the "bravest of all the tribes of
Gaul."

No consideration, either of sympathy, admiration, or pity, can in any
manner affect the determination of the great ethical question as to
the moral responsibility for the present crime against civilization.
That must be determined by the facts as they have been developed, and
the nations and individuals who are responsible for this world-wide
catastrophe must be held to a strict accountability. The truth of
history inexorably demands this.

To determine where this moral responsibility lies is the purpose of
these pages.

In determining this question Posterity will distinguish between the
military caste, headed by the Kaiser and the Crown Prince, which
precipitated this great calamity, and the German people.

The very secrecy of the plot against the peace of the world and the
failure to disclose to the German nation the diplomatic communications
hereinafter quoted, strongly suggest that this detestable war is not
merely a crime against civilization, _but also against the deceived
and misled German people_. They have a vision and are essentially
progressive and peace-loving in their national characteristics, while
the ideals of their military caste are those of the dark ages.

One day the German people will know the full truth and then there will
be a dreadful reckoning for those who have plunged a noble nation into
this unfathomable gulf of suffering.

     Though the mills of God grind slowly,
       Yet they grind exceeding small,
     Though with patience He stands waiting,
       With exactness grinds He all.

Or to put this ancient Greek proverb in its German form:

"_Gottes Muehle geht langsam aber die mahlt fein._"

          JAMES M. BECK.

     NEW YORK, November 30, 1914.




 The Witnesses


 ENGLAND

 HIS MAJESTY, KING GEORGE V.

 MR. ASQUITH                          Premier.
 MR. BEAUMONT                         Councilor of Embassy at
                                        Constantinople.
 SIR F. BERTIE                        Ambassador at Paris.
 SIR G. BUCHANAN                      Ambassador at St. Petersburg.
 SIR M. DE BUNSEN                     Ambassador at Vienna.
 SIR E. GOSCHEN                       Ambassador at Berlin.
 SIR EDWARD GREY                      Foreign Secretary.
 SIR A. JOHNSTONE                     Minister at Luxemburg.
 SIR ARTHUR NICHOLSON                 Under Secretary for Foreign
                                        Affairs.
 SIR R. RODD                          Ambassador to Italy.
 SIR H. RUMBOLD                       Councilor of Embassy at Berlin.
 SIR F. VILLIERS                      Minister to Belgium.


 GERMANY

 HIS MAJESTY, EMPEROR WILLIAM II.

 HERR VON BELOW (SALESKE[2])          Minister to Belgium.
 DR. VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG             Chancellor.
 HERR VON BUCH                        Minister at Luxemburg.
 HERR VON HEERINGEN                   Minister of War.
 HERR VON JAGOW                       Secretary of State.
 PRINCE LICHNOWSKY                    Ambassador at London.
 HERR VON MUELLER                     Minister at The Hague.
 COUNT POURTALES                      Ambassador at St. Petersburg.
 BARON VON SCHOEN                     Ambassador at Paris.
 HERR VON ZIMMERMANN                  Under Secretary of State.
 HERR VON TSCHIRSCHKY                 Ambassador at Vienna.

 [Footnote 2: Herr von Below Saleske is referred to in despatches as
 Herr von Below.]


 FRANCE

 PRESIDENT RAYMOND POINCARE

 M. VIVIANI                           Premier of France.
 M. BERTHELOT                         Of the French Ministry for Foreign
                                        Affairs.
 M. PAUL CAMBON                       Ambassador to England.
 M. KLOBUKOWSKI                       Minister to Belgium.
 M. DE MARGERIE                       Of the French Diplomatic Service.
 M. JULES CAMBON                      Ambassador to Germany.


 RUSSIA

 HIS MAJESTY, EMPEROR NICHOLAS II.

 M. SAZONOF                           Minister of Foreign Affairs.
 COUNT BENCKENDORFF                   Ambassador at London.
 M. BRONEWSKY                         Charge d'Affaires at Berlin.
 M. DE ETTER                          Councilor of Embassy at London.
 M. ISVOLSKY                          Ambassador to France.
 PRINCE KUDACHEF                      Councilor of Embassy at Vienna.
 M. SALVIATI                          Consul General at Fiume.
 M. SCHEBEKO                          Ambassador to Austria.
 M. SEVASTOPOULO                      Charge d'Affaires at Paris.
 M. STRANDTMAN                        Charge d'Affaires at Belgrade.
 M. SUCHOMLINOF                       Minister for War.
 M. DE SWERBEEW                       Ambassador to Germany.


 BELGIUM

 HIS MAJESTY, KING ALBERT

 M. DAVIGNON                          Minister of Foreign Affairs.
 BARON VON DER ELST                   Secretary General to Ministry
                                        of Foreign Affairs.
 COUNT ERREMBAULT DE DUDZEELE         Minister at Vienna.
 BARON FALLON                         Minister at The Hague.
 BARON GRENIER                        Minister at Madrid.
 BARON GUILLAUME                      Minister at Paris.
 COUNT DE LALAING                     Minister at London.


 SERVIA

 HIS MAJESTY, KING PETER

 M. PACHITCH                          Premier and Minister of Foreign
                                        Affairs.
 M. BOSCHKOVITCH                      Minister at London.
 DR. PATCHOU                          Minister of Finance.


 AUSTRIA

 HIS MAJESTY, EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH

 COUNT BERCHTOLD                      Minister of Foreign Affairs.
 COUNT CLARY UND ALDRINGEN            Minister at Brussels.
 BARON GIESL VON GIESLINGEN           Minister at Belgrade.
 BARON MACCHIO                        Councilor of Austrian Ministry of
                                        Foreign Affairs.
 COUNT MENSDORFF                      Ambassador to England.
 COUNT SZAPARY                        Ambassador to Russia.


 ITALY

 HIS MAJESTY, KING VICTOR EMMANUEL III.

 MARQUIS DI SAN GIULIANO              Minister of Foreign Affairs.




CONTENTS


                                                                    PAGE

INTRODUCTION                                                           v

FOREWORD                                                              xv

THE WITNESSES                                                      xxvii

CHAPTER I

THE SUPREME COURT OF CIVILIZATION

Existence of the Court--The conscience of mankind--The philosophy
of Bernhardi--The recrudescence of Machiavelliism--Treitschke
and Bernhardi's doctrine--Recent utterances of the Kaiser, Crown
Prince, and representative officials--George Bernard Shaw's
defense--Concrete illustration of Bernhardiism                         1

CHAPTER II

THE RECORD IN THE CASE

The issues stated--Proximate and underlying causes--A war of
diplomats--The masses not parties to the war--The official
defenses--The English _White Paper_--The German _White Paper_--The
Russian _Orange Paper_--The Belgian _Gray Paper_--Austria and
Italy still silent--Obligation of these nations to disclose facts     18

CHAPTER III

THE SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE

No apparent suppression by England, Russia, and Belgium--Suppression
by Germany of vital documents--Suppression by Austria of entire
record--Significance of such suppression                              27

CHAPTER IV

GERMANY'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AUSTRIAN
ULTIMATUM

Silence which preceded ultimatum--Europe's ignorance of impending
developments--Duty to civilization--Germany's prior knowledge of
ultimatum--Its disclaimer to Russia, France, and England of any
responsibility--Contradictory admission in its official defense--Further
confirmation in Germany's simultaneous threat to the Powers--Further
confirmation in its confidential notice to States of Germany to prepare
for eventualities                                                     31

CHAPTER V

THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA

Extreme brutality of ultimatum--Limited time given to Servia and Europe
for consideration--Ultimatum and Servia's reply contrasted in parallel
columns--Relative size of two nations--Germany's intimations to
Servia--Brutality of ultimatum shown by analogy--Disclaimer of intention
to take territory valueless                                           47

CHAPTER VI

THE PEACE PARLEYS

Possibility of peace not embarrassed by popular clamor--Difficulties
of peaceful solution not insuperable--Policy of Germany and
Austria--Russia's and England's request for time--Germany's
refusal to cooperate--Germany's and Austria's excuses for refusal
to give extension of time--Berchtold's absence from Vienna--Austria's
alleged disclaimer of territorial expansion--Sazonof's conference
with English and French Ambassadors--Their conciliatory counsel
to Servia--Servia's pacific reply to ultimatum--Austria, without
considering Servian reply, declares war--England proposes suspension
of hostilities for peace parleys--Germany refuses--Its specious
reasons--Germany's untenable position as to localization of
conflict--England's proposal for a conference--Germany's
refusal--Austria declines all intervention, refusing to discuss
Servian note--Germany supports her with a quibble as to name of
conference--Russia proposes further discussion on basis of Servian
note--Russia then again proposes European conference--Austria
and Germany decline                                                   61

CHAPTER VII

THE ATTITUDE OF FRANCE

The French _Yellow Book_--Its editors and contents--M. Jules
Cambon--The weakness of German diplomacy--Cambon's experience
and merits--Interview between the German Kaiser and the King of
Belgium--The Kaiser's change of attitude--The influence of the
Moroccan crisis--The condition of the German people in 1913--The
suppression of news in Austria--Attitude of the military
party--Servia's warning to Austria--Germany's knowledge of the Austrian
ultimatum before its issuance--Italy's ignorance of the Austrian
ultimatum--Significance of the fact--Germany's reasons for concealing
its intentions from Italy--The policy of secrecy--Prince Lichnowsky's
anxiety--Cambon's interview with von Jagow--The methods of
deception--Sazonof's frank offer--Germany's attempt to influence
France--Cambon's dramatic interview with von Jagow--His plea "In the
name of humanity"--The different attitudes of the two groups of
powers                                                               102

CHAPTER VIII

THE INTERVENTION OF THE KAISER

The Kaiser's return to Berlin--His inconsistent record and complex
personality--German Foreign Office deprecates his return--Its many
blunders--The Kaiser takes the helm--He telegraphs the Czar--The
Czar's reply--The Kaiser's second telegram--His untenable
position--The Czar's explanation of military preparations and pledge
that no provocative action would be taken by Russia--King George's
telegram proposing temporary occupation by Austria of Belgrade pending
further peace negotiations--The Kaiser's reply--The Kaiser's
telegram to the Czar demanding Russian discontinuance of military
preparations--His insistence upon unilateral conditions--Germany's
preparations for war--Its offer to England to insure its
neutrality--England's reply--Russia's offer to stop conditionally
military preparations--England requests Germany to suggest any peace
formula--Austria expresses willingness to discuss with Russia Servian
note--Motives of Austria for this reversal of policy--The Kaiser
sends ultimatum to Russia--The Czar's last appeal--The Kaiser's
reply--Russia's inability to recall mobilization--England's last
efforts for peace--Germany declares war--The Czar's telegram to King
George                                                               138

CHAPTER IX

THE CASE OF BELGIUM

The verdict of history not affected by result of war--Belgium
at outbreak of war--The Treaty of 1839--Its affirmation by
Bismarck--France's action in 1871--Reaffirmation by Germany of
Belgian neutrality in 1911-1914--The Hague Peace Conference of
1907--England asks Germany's and France's intentions with
respect to Belgium's neutrality--France replies--Germany's
refusal to reply--Germany's second offer to England--Germany's
ultimatum to Belgium--Belgium's reply--France's offer of five
army corps--Belgium refuses aid--Germany's declaration of war
against Belgium--The German Chancellor's explanation in the
Reichstag--The Belgian King appeals to England--England's ultimatum
to Germany--The "scrap of paper" incident--England declares war
against Germany--The apologies for Germany's action discussed--Belgium's
rights independent of Treaty of 1839 or The Hague Convention--Germany's
allegation that France had violated Belgium's neutrality an
afterthought--Von Mach's plea for the suspension of judgment--The
Brussels documents discussed--The negotiations between England
and Belgium--The German Chancellor's belated explanation of the
"scrap of paper" phrase--Invasion of Belgium a recrudescence of
Machiavelliism--The great blunder of Germany's diplomats and
soldiers                                                             196

CHAPTER X

THE JUDGMENT OF THE WORLD

The completeness of the evidence--The force of public opinion--The
judgment of neutral States--The United States as a moral arbiter--A
summary of the probable verdict of history                           246

EPILOGUE                                                             252




The Evidence in the Case




CHAPTER I

THE SUPREME COURT OF CIVILIZATION


Let us suppose that in this year of dis-Grace, 1914, there had
existed, as let us pray will one day exist, a Supreme Court of
Civilization, before which the sovereign nations could litigate their
differences without resort to the iniquitous arbitrament of arms and
that each of the contending nations had a sufficient leaven of
Christianity or shall we say commonplace, everyday morality, to have
its grievances adjudged not by the ethics of the cannon, but by the
eternal criterion of justice.

_What would be the judgment of that august tribunal?_

It may be suggested that the question is academic, as no such Supreme
Court exists or is likely to exist within the life of any living man.


Casuists of the Bernhardi school of moral philosophy will further
suggest that to discuss the ethical merits of the war is to start with
a false premise that such a thing as international morality exists,
and that when once the conventionalities of civilization are laid
aside the leading nations commence and make war in a manner that
differs only in degree and not in kind from the methods of Frederick
the Great and Napoleon, and that these in turn only differed in degree
from those of Alaric and Attila. According to this theory, the only
law of nations is that ascribed by the poet to Rob Roy:

                     "The good old rule
     Sufficeth them, the simple plan
     That they should take who have the power,
     And they should keep who can."

Does the Twentieth Century only differ from its predecessors in having
a thin veneering of hypocrisy, or has there developed in the progress
of civilization an international morality, by which, even though
imperfectly, the moral conduct of nations is judged?

The answer can be an unqualified affirmative. With the age of the
printing press, the steamship, the railroad, and the telegraph there
has developed _a conscience of mankind_.

When the founders of the American Republic severed the tie which bound
them to Great Britain, they stated that "_a decent respect to the
opinions of mankind requires_ that they should declare the causes
which impel them to the separation."

The Declaration assumed that there was a rule of right and wrong that
regulated the intercourse of nations as well as individuals; it
believed that there was a great human conscience, which rises higher
than the selfish interests and prejudices of nations and races, and
which approves justice and condemns injustice. It felt that this
approval is more to be desired than national advantage. It constituted
mankind a judge between contending nations and lest its judgment
should temporarily err it established posterity as a court of last
resort. It placed the tie of humanity above that of nationality. It
proclaimed the solidarity of mankind.

In the years that have intervened since this noble Declaration, the
world has so far progressed towards an enlightened sense of justice
that a "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" has proved an
efficient power in regulating peacefully and justly the intercourse
of nations. Each nation does at least in some measure fear to-day the
disapproval of civilization. The time gives this proof in the eager
desire of Germany to-day--despite its policy of "blood and iron"--to
gain the sympathetic approval of the American people, not with the
remotest hope of any practical cooperation but to avoid that state of
moral isolation, in which the land of Luther now finds itself.

_The Supreme Court of Civilization does exist._ It consists of
cosmopolitan men in every country, who put aside racial and national
prejudices and determine the right and wrong of every issue between
nations by that slowly forming system of international morality which
is the conscience of mankind.

To a certain class of German statesmen and philosophers this Court of
Public Opinion is a visionary abstraction. A group of distinguished
German soldiers, professors, statesmen, and even doctors of divinity,
pretending to speak in behalf of the German nation, have consciously
or unconsciously attempted to revive in the twentieth century the
cynical political morality of the sixteenth.

As Symonds, the historian of the Renaissance, says in his _Age of the
Despots_, Machiavelli was the first in modern times to formulate a
theory of government in which the interests of the ruler are alone
regarded, which assumes

     a separation between statecraft and morality, which
     recognizes force and fraud among the legitimate means of
     attaining high political ends, which makes success alone the
     test of conduct and which presupposes the corruption,
     baseness, and venality of mankind at large.

Even the age of Cesare Borgia revolted against this philosophy and the
name of Machiavelli became a byword. "Am I a Machiavel?" says the host
in _The Merry Wives of Windsor_, and the implication of this question
indirectly manifests the revolt of the seventeenth century against the
sinister philosophy of the great Florentine.

Nothing can be more amazing than that not only leading militarists of
Germany but many of its foremost philosophers and teachers have become
so intoxicated with the dream of Pan-Germanism that in the utmost
sincerity they have espoused and with a certain pride proclaimed the
vicious principles of Machiavelli in all their moral nudity. There is
an emotional and mystical element in the advanced German thinker,
which makes him capable of accepting in full sincerity intellectual
and moral absurdities of which the more robust common sense of other
nations would be incapable. The advanced German doctrinaire is the
"wisest fool in Christendom." The depth of his learning is generally
in the inverse ratio to the shallowness of his common sense.

Nothing better demonstrates this than the present negation by advanced
and doubtless sincere German thinkers of the very foundations of
public morality and indeed of civilization. They have been led with
Nietzsche to revile the Beatitudes and exalt the supremacy of cruelty
over mercy. Indeed Treitschke in his lectures on _Politik_, which have
become the gospel of Junkerdom, avowedly based his gospel of force
upon the teaching of Machiavelli, for he points out that it was
Machiavelli who first clearly saw that the State is power (_der Staat
ist Macht_). Therefore "to care for this power is the highest moral
duty of the State" and "of all political weaknesses that of feebleness
is the most abominable and despicable; it is the sin against the holy
spirit of politics." He therefore holds that the State as the ultimate
good "cannot bind its will for the future over against other States,"
and that international treaties are therefore only obligatory "for
such time as the State may find to be convenient."

To enforce the will of the nation contrary to its own solemn promises
and to increase its might, war is the appointed means. Both Treitschke
and Moltke conceived it as "an ordinance set by God" and "one of the
two highest functions" of the State. The doctrine is carried to the
blasphemous conclusion that war is an ordinance of a just and merciful
God; that, to quote Bernhardi, "it is a biological necessity" and
that "the living God will see to it that war shall always recur as
a terrible medicine for humanity." Therefore "might is at once the
supreme right and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the
arbitrament of war," which gives a "biologically just decision."

This means that the 42 centimeter howitzer is more moral than a gun
of smaller caliber and that the justice of God depends upon the
superiority of Krupp to other ordnance manufacturers.

Treitschke tells us, and the statement is quoted by Bernhardi with
approval, that "the end all and be all of a state is power, and he who
is not man enough to look this truth in the face should not meddle
with politics." To this Bernhardi adds that the State's highest moral
duty is to increase its power and in so doing "_the State is the sole
judge of the morality of its own action. It is in fact above morality
or, in other words whatever is necessary is moral._"

Again we learn that the State must not allow any conventional
sympathies to distract it from its object and that "conditions may
arise which are more powerful than the most honorable intentions."

All efforts directed towards the abolition of war are denominated as
not only "foolish but absolutely immoral." To indicate that in this
prosecution of war for the increase of dominion, chivalry would be a
weakness and magnanimity a crime, we are finally told that "the State
is a law unto itself" and that "weak nations have not the same right
to live as powerful and vigorous nations." Even as to weak nations, we
are further advised that the powerful and vigorous nation--which alone
apparently has the right to live--must not wait for some act of
aggression or legitimate _casus belli_, but that it is justified in
deliberately provoking a war, and that the happiest results have
always followed such "deliberately provoked wars," for "the prospects
of success are the greatest when the moment for declaring war can be
selected to suit the political and military situation."

As the weak nations have no moral right to live it becomes important
to remember that in the economy of Prussian Junkerdom there is only
one strong race--his own. "_Wir sind die Weltrasse._" The ultimate
goal is the super-nation, and the premise upon which the whole policy
is based is that Germany is predestined to be that super-nation.
Bernhardi believes--and his belief is but the reflex of the
oft-repeated boast of the Kaiser--that history presents no other
possibility. "For us there are two alternatives and no third--world
power or ruin" (_Weltmacht oder Niedergang_). To assimilate Germany to
ancient Rome the Kaiser on occasion reminds himself of Caesar and
affects to reign, not by the will of the people, but by divine right.
No living monarch has said or done more to revive this mediaeval
fetich. To his soldiers he has recently said: "You think each day of
your Emperor. Do not forget God." _What magnanimity!_

At the outbreak of the present war he again illustrated his spirit of
fanatical absolutism, which at times inspires him, by saying to his
army:

     Remember that the German people are the chosen of God. On
     me, as German Emperor, the spirit of God has descended. I am
     His weapon; His sword; His Vicegerent. Woe to the
     disobedient! Death to cowards and unbelievers!

The modern world has had nothing like this since Mahomet and,
accepted literally, it claims for the Kaiser the divine attributes
attributed to the Caesars. Even the Caesars, in baser and more primitive
times, found posing as a divine superman somewhat difficult and
disconcerting. Shakespeare subtly suggests this when he makes his
Caesar talk like a god and act with the vacillation of a child.

When the war was precipitated as the natural result of such abhorrent
teachings, the world at large knew little either of Treitschke or
Bernhardi. Thoughtful men of other nations did know that the
successful political immoralities of Frederick the Great had
profoundly affected the policies of the Prussian Court to this day.
The German poet, Freiligrath, once said that "Germany is Hamlet," but
no analogy is less justified. There is nothing in the supersensitive,
introspective, and amiable dreamer of Elsinore to suggest the Prussia
of to-day, which Bebel has called "_Siegesbetrunken_." (Victory-drunk.)

Since the beginning of the present war, the world has become familiar
with these abhorrent teachings and as a result of a general revolt
against this recrudescence of Borgiaism attempts have been made by the
apologists for Prussia, especially in the United States, to suggest
that neither Treitschke nor Bernhardi fairly reflect the political
philosophy of official Germany. Treitschke's influence as an historian
and lecturer could not well be denied but attempts have been made
to impress America that Bernhardi has no standing to speak for his
country and that the importance of his teachings should therefore be
minimized.

Apart from the wide popularity of Bernhardi's writings in Germany, the
German Government has never repudiated Bernhardi's conclusions or
disclaimed responsibility therefor. While possibly not an officially
authorized spokesman, yet he is as truly a representative thinker in
the German military system as Admiral Mahan was in the Navy of the
United States. Of the acceptance by Prussia of Bernhardi's teachings
there is one irrefutable proof. It is Belgium. The destruction of that
unoffending country is the full harvest of this twentieth-century
Machiavelliism.

A few recent utterances from a representative physician, a prominent
journalist, and a distinguished retired officer of the German Army may
be quoted as showing how completely infatuated a certain class of
German thinkers has become with the gospel of force for the purpose of
attaining world power.

Thus a Dr. Fuchs, in a book on the subject of preparedness for war,
says:

     Therefore the German claim of the day must be: The family to
     the front. The State has to follow at first in the school,
     then in foreign politics. _Education to hate. Education to
     the estimation of hatred. Organization of hatred. Education
     to the desire for hatred. Let us abolish unripe and false
     shame before brutality and fanaticism._ We must not hesitate
     to announce: To us is given faith, hope, and hatred, _but
     hatred is the greatest among them_.

Maximilian Harden, one of the most influential German journalists,
says:

     Let us drop our miserable attempts to excuse Germany's
     action. Not against our will and as a nation taken by
     surprise did we hurl ourselves into this gigantic venture.
     _We willed it. We had to will it. We do not stand before
     the judgment seat of Europe. We acknowledge no such
     jurisdiction. Our might shall create a new law in Europe._
     It is Germany that strikes. When she has conquered new
     domains for her genius then the priesthoods of all the gods
     will praise the God of War.

Still more striking and morally repellent was the very recent
statement by Major-General von Disfurth, in an article contributed by
him to the _Hamburger Nachrichten_, which so completely illustrates
Bernhardiism in its last extreme of avowed brutality that it justifies
quotation _in extenso_.

     No object whatever is served by taking any notice of the
     accusations of barbarity leveled against Germany by our
     foreign critics. _Frankly, we are and must be barbarians, if
     by these we understand those who wage war relentlessly and
     to the uttermost degree...._

     _We owe no explanations to any one. There is nothing for
     us to justify and nothing to explain away. Every act of
     whatever nature committed by our troops for the purpose of
     discouraging, defeating, and destroying our enemies is a
     brave act and a good deed, and is fully justified....
     Germany stands as the supreme arbiter of her own methods,
     which in the time of war must be dictated to the world...._

     _They call us barbarians. What of it? We scorn them and
     their abuse. For my part I hope that in this war we have
     merited the title of barbarians._ Let neutral peoples and
     our enemies cease their empty chatter, which may well be
     compared to the twitter of birds. Let them cease their talk
     of the Cathedral at Rheims and of all the churches and all
     the castles in France which have shared its fate. These
     things do not interest us. Our troops must achieve victory.
     What else matters?

These hysterical vaporings of advanced Junkers no more make a case
against the German people than the tailors of Tooley Street had
authority to speak for England, but they do represent the spirit of
the ruling caste, to which unhappily the German people have committed
their destiny. It would not be difficult to quote both the Kaiser and
the Crown Prince, who on more than one occasion have manifested their
enthusiastic adherence to the gospel of brute force. The world is not
likely to forget the Crown Prince's congratulations to the brutal
military martinet of the Zabern incident, and still less the shameful
fact that when the Kaiser sent his punitive expedition to China, he
who once stood within sight of the Mount of Olives and preached a
sermon breathing the spirit of Christian humility, said to his
soldiers:

     When you encounter the enemy you will defeat him. _No
     quarter shall be given, no prisoners shall be taken. Let all
     who fall into your hands be at your mercy. Just as the Huns
     a thousand years ago under the leadership of Etzel (Attila),
     gained a reputation in virtue of which they still live in
     historical tradition, so may the name of Germany become
     known in such a manner in China that no Chinaman will ever
     again even dare to look askance at a German._

And this campaign of extermination--worthy of a savage Indian
chief--was planned for the most pacific and unaggressive race, the
Chinese, for it is sadly true that the one nation which has more than
any other been inspired for two thousand years by the spirit of "peace
on earth" is the hermit nation, into which until the nineteenth
century the light of Christianity never shone.

In a recent article, George Bernard Shaw, the Voltaire of the
twentieth century, with the intellectual brilliancy and moral
shallowness of the great cynic, attempts to justify Bernhardiism by
resort to the unconvincing "_et tu quoque_" argument. He contends that
England also has had its "Bernhardis," and refers to a few books which
he affects to think bear out his argument. That these books show that
there have been advocates of militarism in England is undoubtedly
true. The present war illustrates that there was need of such
literature, for a nation which faced so great a trial as the present,
with a standing army that was pitiful in comparison with that of
Germany and without any involuntary service law, certainly had need
of some literary stimulus to self-preparation. No one quarrels with
Bernhardi in his discussions of the problems of war as such. It is
only when the soldier ceases to be a strategist and becomes a moralist
that the average man with conventional ideas of morality revolts
against Bernhardiism. The books to which Mr. Shaw refers can be
searched in vain for any passages parallel to those which have been
quoted from Treitschke, Bernhardi, and other German writers. The
brilliant but erratic George Bernard Shaw cannot find in all English
literature any such Machiavelliisms as those of Treitschke and
Bernhardi.

Shaw's whole defense of Germany, betrays his characteristic desire to
be clever and audacious without regard to nice considerations of
truth. Much as we may admire his intellectual badinage under other
circumstances, it may be questioned whether in this supreme tragedy
of the world it was fitting for Shaw to daub himself anew with his
familiar vermilion and play the intellectual clown.

It was either courage of an extraordinary but unenviable character or
else crass stupidity that led Bernhardi to submit to the civilization
of the present day such a debasing gospel, for if his brain had not
been hopelessly obfuscated by his Pan-Germanic imperialism, he would
have seen that not only would this philosophy do his country
infinitely more harm than a whole park of artillery but would
inevitably carry his memory down to a wondering posterity, like
Machiavelli, detestable but, unlike Machiavelli, ridiculous.

Machiavelli gave to his _Prince_ a literary finish that placed his
treatise among the classics, while Bernhardi has gained recognition
chiefly because his book is a moral anachronism.

One concrete illustration from Bernhardi clearly shows that the
sentences above quoted are truly representative of his philosophy,
and not unfair excerpts. In explaining that it is the duty of every
nation to increase its power and territory without regard for the
rights of others, he alludes to the fact that England committed the
"_unpardonable blunder_ from her point of view of not supporting the
Southern States in the American War of Secession," and thus forever
severing in twain the American Republic. In this striking illustration
of applied Bernhardiism, there is no suggestion as to the moral side
of such intervention. Nothing is said with respect to the moral
question of slavery, or of the obligations of England to a friendly
Power. Nothing as to how the best hopes of humanity would have been
shattered if the American Republic--that "pillar of cloud by day and
pillar of fire by night" to struggling humanity--had been brought to
cureless ruin. All these considerations are completely disregarded,
and all Bernhardi can see in the situation, as it presented itself to
England in 1861, was its opportunity, by a cowardly stab in the back,
to remove forever from its path a great and growing nation.

Poor Bernhardi! He thought to serve his royal master. He has simply
damned him. As Machiavelli, as the eulogist of the Medicis, simply
emphasized their moral nudity, so Bernhardi has shown the world the
inner significance of this crude revival of Caesarism.




CHAPTER II

THE RECORD IN THE CASE


All morally sane men in this twentieth century are agreed that
war abstractly is an evil thing,--perhaps the greatest of all
indecencies,--and that while it may be one of the offenses which must
come, "woe to that man (or nation) by whom the offense cometh!"

They are of one mind in regarding this present war as a great
crime--perhaps the greatest crime--against civilization, and the only
questions which invite discussion are:

    Which of the two contending groups of Powers is morally
    responsible?

    Was Austria justified in declaring war against Servia?

    Was Germany justified in declaring war against Russia and
    France?

    Was Germany justified in declaring war against Belgium?

    Was England justified in declaring war against Germany?

Primarily and perhaps exclusively these ethical questions turn upon
the issues developed by the communications which passed between the
various chancelleries of Europe in the last week of July, for it is
the amazing feature of this greatest of wars that it was precipitated
by the ruling classes and, assuming that all the diplomats sincerely
desired a peaceful solution of the questions raised by the Austrian
ultimatum (which is by no means clear) the war is the result of
ineffective diplomacy.

I quite appreciate the distinction between the immediate causes of a
war and the anterior or underlying causes. The fundamental cause of
the Franco-German War of 1870 was not the incident at Ems nor even the
question of the Spanish succession. These were but the precipitating
pretexts or, as a lawyer would express it, the "proximate causes." The
underlying cause was unquestionably the rivalry between Prussia and
France for political supremacy in Europe.

Behind the Austrian ultimatum to Servia were also great questions
of State policy, not easily determinable upon any tangible ethical
principle, and which involved the hegemony of Europe. Germany's
domination of Europe had been established when by the rattling of its
saber it compelled Russia in 1908 to permit Austria to disturb the
then existing status in the Balkans by the forcible annexation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and behind the Austrian-Servian question of
1914, arising out of the murder of the Crown Prince of Austria at
Serajevo, was the determination of Germany and Austria to reassert
that dominant position by compelling Russia to submit to a further
humiliation of a Slav State.

The present problem is to inquire how far Germany and her ally
selected a just pretext to test this question of mastery.

The pretext was the work of diplomatists. It was not the case of a
nation rising upon some great cause which appealed to popular
imagination. The acts of the statesmen in that last fateful week of
July, 1914, were not the mere echo of the popular will.

The issues were framed by the statesmen and diplomats of Europe
and whatever efforts were made to preserve the peace and whatever
obstructive tactics were interposed were not the acts of any of the
nations now in arms but those of a small coterie of men who, in the
secrecy of their respective cabinets, made their moves and
countermoves upon the chessboard of nations.

The future of Europe in that last week of July was in the hands of a
small group of men, numbering not over fifty, and what they did was
never known to their respective nations in any detail until after the
fell Rubicon had been crossed and a world war had been precipitated.

If all of these men had sincerely desired to work for peace, there
would not have been any war.

So swiftly did events move that the masses of the people had time
neither to think nor to act. The suddenness of the crisis marks it as
a species of "mid-summer madness," a very "witches' sabbath" of
diplomatic demagoguery.

In a peaceful summer, when the nations now struggling to exterminate
each other were fraternizing in the holiday centers of Europe, an
issue was suddenly precipitated, made the subject of communications
between the various chancelleries, and almost in the twinkling of an
eye Europe found itself wrapped in a universal flame. The appalling
toll of death suggests the inquiry of Hamlet: "Did these bones cost
no more the breeding, but to play at loggats with 'em?" and if the
diplomatic "loggats" of 1914 were ineffectively played, some one must
accept the responsibility for such failure.

This sense of responsibility against the dread Day of Accounting has
resulted in a disposition beyond past experience to justify the
quarrel by placing before the world the diplomatic record.

The English Government commenced shortly after the outbreak of
hostilities by publishing the so-called _White Paper_, consisting of a
statement by the British Government and 160 diplomatic documents as an
appendix. This was preceded by Sir Edward Grey's masterly speech in
Parliament. That speech and all his actions in this fateful crisis may
rank him in future history with the younger Pitt.

On August 4th, the German Chancellor for the first time explained to
the representatives of his nation assembled in the Reichstag the
causes of the war, then already commenced, and there was distributed
among the members a statement of the German Foreign Office,
accompanied by 27 Exhibits in the form of diplomatic communications,
which have been erroneously called the German _White Paper_ and which
sets forth Germany's defense to the world.

Shortly thereafter Russia, casting aside all the traditional secrecy
of Muscovite diplomacy, submitted to a candid world its acts and deeds
in the form of the so-called Russian _Orange Paper_, with 79 appended
documents, and this was followed later by the publication by Belgium
of the so-called Belgian _Gray Paper_.

Late in November France published its _Yellow Book_, the most
comprehensive of these diplomatic records. Of the two groups of
powers, therefore, only Austria and Italy have failed to disclose
their diplomatic correspondence to the scrutiny of the world.

The former, as the originator of the controversy, should give
as a matter of "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" its
justification, if any, for what it did. So far, it has only given
its ultimatum to Servia and Servia's reply.

Italy, as a nation that has elected to remain neutral, is not under
the same moral obligation to disclose the secrets of its Foreign
Office, and while it remains on friendly terms with all the
Powers it probably feels some delicacy in disclosing confidential
communications, but as the whole world is vitally interested in
determining the justice of the quarrel and as it is wholly probable
that the archives of the Italian Foreign Office would throw an
illuminating searchlight upon the moral issues involved, Italy, in
a spirit of loyalty to civilization, should without further delay
disclose the documentary evidence in its possession.

While it is to be regretted that the full diplomatic record is not
made up, yet as we have the most substantial part of the record in
the communications which passed in those fateful days between Berlin,
St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, there is sufficient before the
court to justify a judgment, especially as there is reason to believe
that the documents as yet withheld would only confirm the conclusions
which the record already given to the world irresistibly suggests.

Thus we can reasonably assume that the Italian documentary evidence
would fairly justify the conclusion that the war was on the part of
Germany and Austria a war of aggression, for Italy, by its refusal to
act with its associates of the Triple Alliance, has in the most
significant manner thus adjudged it.

Under the terms of the Triple Alliance, Italy had obligated itself to
support Germany and Austria in any purely _defensive_ war, and if
therefore the communications, which undoubtedly passed between Vienna
and Berlin on the one hand, and Rome on the other, justified the
conclusion that Germany and Austria had been assailed by Russia,
England, and France or either of them, then we must assume that Italy
would have respected its obligation, especially as it would thus
relieve Italy from any possible charge of treachery to two allies,
whose support and protection it had enjoyed from the time that the
Triple Alliance was first made.

When Italy decided that it was under no obligation to support its
allies, it effectually affirmed the fact that they had commenced a war
of aggression, and until the contrary is shown, we must therefore
assume that the archives of the Foreign Office at Rome would merely
confirm the conclusions hereinafter set forth as to the moral
responsibility for the war.

Similarly upon considerations that are familiar to all who have had
any experience in the judicial investigation of truth, it must be
assumed that if Austria had in its secret archives any documentary
evidence that would justify it in its pretension that it had been
unjustly assailed by one or more of the Powers with which it is now at
war, it would have published such documents to the world in its own
exculpation. The moral responsibility for this war is too great
for any nation to accept it unnecessarily. Least of all could
Austria--which on the face of the record commenced the controversy by
its ultimatum to Servia--leave anything undone to acquit itself at the
bar of public opinion of any responsibility for the great crime that
is now drenching Europe with blood. The time is past when any nation
can ignore the opinions of mankind or needlessly outrage its
conscience. Germany has recognized this in publishing its defense and
exhibiting a part of its documentary proof, and if its ally, Austria,
continues to withhold from the knowledge of the world the documents in
its possession, there can be but one conclusion as to its guilt.

Upon the record thus made up in the Supreme Court of Civilization,
that tribunal need no more hesitate to proceed to judgment than would
an ordinary court hesitate to enter a decree because one of the
litigants has deliberately suppressed documents known to be in its
possession. It does not lie in the mouth of such a litigant to ask the
court to suspend judgment or withhold its sentence until the full
record is made up, when the incompleteness of that record is due to
its own deliberate suppression of vital documentary proofs.




CHAPTER III

THE SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE


The official defenses of England, Russia, France, and Belgium do not
apparently show any failure on the part of either to submit any
essential diplomatic document in their possession. They have
respectively made certain contentions as to the proposals that they
made to maintain the peace of the world, and in every instance have
supported these contentions by putting into evidence the letters and
communications in which such proposals were expressed.

When the German _White Paper_ is examined it discloses on its very
face the suppression of documents of vital importance. The fact that
communications passed between Berlin and Vienna, the text of which has
never been disclosed, is not a matter of conjecture. Germany asserts
as part of its defense that it faithfully exercised its mediatory
influence on Austria, but not only is such influence not disclosed by
any practical results, such as we would expect in view of her
dominating relations with Austria, but the _text_ of these vital
communications is still kept in the secret archives of Berlin and
Vienna. Germany has carefully selected a part of her diplomatic
records for publication but withheld others. Austria has withheld all.

Thus in the official apology for Germany it is stated that, in spite
of the refusal of Austria to accept the proposition of Sir Edward Grey
to treat the Servian reply "as a basis for further conversations,"

     we [Germany] continued our mediatory efforts to the utmost
     and _advised_ Vienna to make any possible compromise
     consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy.[3]

[Footnote 3: German _White Paper_.]

This would be more convincing if the German Foreign Office had added
the _text_ of the advice which it thus gave Vienna.

A like significant omission will be found when the same official
defense states that on July 29th the German Government advised Austria
"to begin the conversations with Mr. Sazonof." But here again the
_text_ is not found among the documents which the German Foreign
Office has given to the world. The communications, which passed
between that office and its ambassadors in St. Petersburg, Paris,
and London, are given _in extenso_, but among the twenty-seven
communications appended to the German _White Paper it is most
significant that not a single communication is given of the many which
passed from the Foreign Office of Berlin to that of Vienna and only
two which passed from the German Ambassador in Vienna to the German
Chancellor_. While the Kaiser has favored the world with his messages
to the Czar and King George, he has wholly failed to give us any
message that he sent in those critical days to the Austrian Emperor or
the King of Italy. We shall have occasion to refer hereafter to the
frequent failure to produce documents, the existence of which is
admitted by the exhibits which Germany appended to its _White Paper_.

This cannot be an accident. The German Foreign Office has seen fit to
throw the veil of secrecy over the text of its communications to
Vienna, although professing to give the purport of a few of them. The
purpose of this suppression is even more clearly indicated by the
complete failure of Austria to submit any of its diplomatic records to
the scrutiny of a candid world. Until Germany and Austria are willing
to put the most important documents in their possession in evidence,
they must not be surprised that the World, remembering Bismarck's
garbling of the Ems dispatch, which precipitated the Franco-Prussian
War, will be incredulous as to the sincerity of their pacific
protestations.


ADDENDUM

     The Austrian _Red Book_, published more than six months
     after the declaration of war, simply emphasizes the policy
     of suppression of vital documents, which we have already
     discussed. Of its 69 documentary exhibits, _there is not one
     which passed directly between the Cabinets of Berlin and
     Vienna_. The text of the communications, in which Germany
     claims to have exercised a mediatory and conciliatory
     influence with its ally, is still withheld. _Not a single
     document is produced which was sent between July the 6th and
     July the 21st_, the period when the great _coup_ was
     secretly planned by Berlin and Vienna.

     In the _Red Book_ we find eight communications from Count
     Berchtold to the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin and four
     replies from that official, but not a letter or telegram
     passing between Berchtold and von Bethmann-Hollweg or
     between the German and Austrian Kaisers. The Austrian _Red
     Book_ gives additional evidence that at the eleventh hour,
     and shortly before Germany issued its ultimatum to Russia,
     Austria did finally agree to discuss the Servian question
     with Russia; but the information, which Germany presumably
     gave to its ally of its intention to send the ultimatum
     to Russia, is carefully withheld. Notwithstanding this
     suppression of vital documents, the diplomatic papers of
     Germany and Austria, now _partially_ given to the world,
     disclose an unmistakable purpose, amounting to an open
     confession, that they intended to force their will upon
     Europe, even though this course involved the most stupendous
     war in the history of mankind.

          March 1, 1915.




CHAPTER IV

GERMANY'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM


On June 28, 1914, the Austrian Crown Prince was murdered at Serajevo.
For nearly a month thereafter there was no public statement by
Austria of its intentions, with the exception of a few semi-inspired
dispatches to the effect that it would act with the greatest
moderation and self-restraint. A careful examination made of the files
of two leading American newspapers, each having a separate news
service, from June 28, 1914, to July 23, 1914, has failed to disclose
a single dispatch from Vienna which gave any intimation as to the
drastic action which Austria was about to take.

The French Premier, Viviani, in his speech to the French Senate, and
House of Deputies, on August 4, 1914, after referring to the fact that
France, Russia, and Great Britain had cooperated in advising Servia to
make any reasonable concession to Austria, added:

     This advice was all the more valuable in view of the fact
     that Austria-Hungary's demands had been inadequately
     foreshadowed to the governments of the Triple Entente, _to
     whom during the three preceding weeks the Austro-Hungarian
     Government had repeatedly given assurance that its demands
     would be extremely moderate_.

The movements of the leading statesmen and rulers of the Triple
Entente clearly show that they, as well as the rest of the world, had
been lulled into false security either by the silence of Austria, or,
as Viviani avers, by its deliberate suggestion that its treatment of
the Serajevo incident would be conciliatory, pacific, and moderate.

Thus, on July 20th, the Russian Ambassador, obviously anticipating no
crisis, left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence. The President
of the French Republic and its Premier were far distant from Paris.
Pachitch, the Servian Premier, was absent from Belgrade, when the
ultimatum was issued.

The testimony of the British Ambassador to Vienna is to the same
effect. He reports to Sir Edward Grey:

     The delivery at Belgrade on the 23d of July of the note to
     Servia was preceded by a period of _absolute silence_ at the
     Ballplatz.

He proceeds to say that with the exception of the German Ambassador at
Vienna (note the significance of the exception) not a single member of
the Diplomatic Corps knew anything of the Austrian ultimatum and that
the French Ambassador, when he visited the Austrian Foreign Office on
July 23d (the day of its issuance), was not only kept in ignorance
that the ultimatum had actually been issued, but was given the
impression that its tone would be moderate. Even the Italian
Ambassador was not taken into Count Berchtold's confidence.[4]

[Footnote 4: Dispatch from Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, dated
September 1, 1914.]

The Servian Government had formally disclaimed any responsibility for
the assassination and had pledged itself to punish any Servian
citizen implicated therein. No word came from Vienna excepting the
semi-official intimations as to its moderate and conciliatory course,
and after the funeral of the Archduke, the world, then enjoying its
summer holiday, had almost forgotten the Serajevo incident. The whole
tragic occurrence simply survived in the sympathy which all felt with
Austria in its new trouble, and especially with its aged monarch, who,
like King Lear, was "as full of grief as age, wretched in both."
Never was it even hinted that Germany and Austria were about to apply
in a time of peace a match to the powder magazine of Europe.

Can it be questioned that loyalty to the highest interests of
civilization required that Germany and Austria, when they determined
to make the murder of the Archduke by an irresponsible assassin the
pretext for bringing up for final decision the long-standing troubles
between Austria and Servia, should have given all the European nations
some intimation of their intention, so that their _confreres_ in the
family of nations could cooperate to adjust this trouble, as they had
adjusted far more difficult questions after the close of the
Balko-Turkish War?

Whatever the issue of the present conflict, it will always be to the
lasting discredit of Germany and Austria that they were false to this
great duty, and that they precipitated the greatest of all wars in a
manner so underhanded as to suggest a trap. They knew, as no one else
knew, in those quiet mid-summer days of July, that civilization was
about to be suddenly and most cruelly torpedoed. The submarine was
Germany and the torpedo, Austria, and the work was most effectually
done.

This ignorance of the leading European statesmen (other than those of
Germany and Austria) as to what was impending is strikingly shown by
the first letter in the English _White Paper_ from Sir Edward Grey to
Sir H. Rumbold, dated July 20, 1914. When this letter was written it
is altogether probable that Austria's arrogant and unreasonable
ultimatum had already been framed and approved in Vienna and Berlin,
and yet Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Minister of a great and friendly
country, had so little knowledge of Austria's policy that he

     asked the German Ambassador to-day (July 20th) if he had any
     news of what was going on in Vienna. He replied that he had
     not, but Austria was certainly going to take some step.

Sir Edward Grey adds that he told the German Ambassador that he had
learned that Count Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister,

     in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had
     deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but
     had said that it should be cleared up.

The German Minister then replied that it would be desirable "if Russia
could act as a mediator with regard to Servia," so that the first
suggestion of Russia playing the part of the peacemaker came from the
German Ambassador in London. Sir Edward Grey then adds that he told
the German Ambassador that he

     assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything
     until they had first disclosed to the public their case
     against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had
     discovered at the trial,

and the German Ambassador assented to this assumption.[5]

[Footnote 5: English _White Paper_, No. 1.]

Either the German Ambassador was then deceiving Sir Edward Grey, or
the submarine torpedo was being prepared with such secrecy that even
the German Ambassador in England did not know what was then in
progress.

The interesting and important question here suggests itself whether
Germany had knowledge of and approved in advance the Austrian
ultimatum. If it did, it was guilty of duplicity, for the German
Ambassador at St. Petersburg gave to the Russian Minister of Foreign
Affairs an express assurance that

     _the German Government had no knowledge of the text of the
     Austrian note before it was handed in and had not exercised
     any influence on its contents. It is a mistake to attribute
     to Germany a threatening attitude._[6]

[Footnote 6: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 18.]

This statement is inherently improbable. Austria was the weaker of the
two allies, and it was Germany's saber that it was rattling in the
face of Europe. Obviously Austria could not have proceeded to extreme
measures, which it was recognized from the first would antagonize
Russia, unless it had the support of Germany, and there is a
probability, amounting to a moral certainty, that it would not have
committed itself and Germany to the possibility of a European war
without first consulting Germany.

Moreover, we have the testimony of Sir M. de Bunsen, the English
Ambassador in Vienna, who advised Sir Edward Grey that he had "private
information that the German Ambassador (at Vienna) knew the text of
the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was dispatched, and
telegraphed it to the German Emperor," and that the German Ambassador
himself "indorses every line of it."[7] As he does not disclose the
source of his "private information," this testimony would not by
itself be convincing, but when we examine Germany's official defense
in the German _White Paper_, we find that the German Foreign Office
admits that it was consulted by Austria previous to the ultimatum and
not only approved of Austria's course but literally gave that country
a carte blanche to proceed_.

[Footnote 7: English _White Paper_, No. 95.]

This point seems so important in determining the sincerity of
Germany's attitude and pacific protestations that we quote _in
extenso_. After referring to the previous friction between Austria
and Servia, the German _White Paper_ says:

     In view of these circumstances Austria had to admit that
     it would not be consistent either with the dignity or
     self-preservation of the Monarchy to look on longer at the
     operations on the other side of the border without taking
     action. _The Austro-Hungarian Government advised us of its
     view of the situation and asked our opinion in the matter.
     We were able to assure our Ally most heartily of our
     agreement with her view of the situation and to assure her
     that any action that she might consider it necessary to take
     in order to put an end to the movement in Servia directed
     against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
     would receive our approval._ We were fully aware in this
     connection that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary
     against Servia would bring Russia into the question and
     might draw us into a war in accordance with our duties as an
     Ally.

Sir M. de Bunsen's credible testimony is further confirmed by the fact
that the British Ambassador at Berlin in his letter of July 22d, to
Sir Edward Grey, states that _on the preceding night_ (July 21st) he
had met the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and an
allusion was made to a possible action by Austria.

     His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on
     Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted
     that the question at issue was one for settlement between
     Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no
     interference from outside in the discussions between those
     two countries.

He[8] adds that while he had regarded it as inadvisable that his
country should approach Austria in the matter, he had

[Footnote 8: von Jagow.]

     on several occasions, in conversation with the Servian
     Minister, emphasized the extreme importance that
     Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper
     footing.[9]

[Footnote 9: English _White Paper_, No. 2.]

Here we have the first statement of Germany's position in the matter,
a position which subsequent events showed to be entirely untenable,
but to which it tenaciously adhered to the very end, and which did
much to precipitate the war. Forgetful of the solidarity of European
civilization, and the fact that by policy and diplomatic intercourse
continuing through many centuries a united European State exists, even
though its organization be as yet inchoate, he took the ground that
Austria should be permitted to proceed to aggressive measures against
Servia without interference from any other Power, even though, as was
inevitable, the humiliation of Servia would destroy the status of
the Balkan States and threaten the European balance of power. The
inconsistency between Germany's claim that it could give Austria a
_carte blanche_ to proceed against Servia and agree to support its
action with the sword of Germany, and the other contention that
neither Russia nor any European State had any right to interfere on
behalf of Servia is obvious. It was the greatest blunder of Germany's
many blunders in this Tragedy of Errors.

No space need be taken in convincing any reasonable man that this
Austrian ultimatum to Servia was brutal in its tone and unreasonable
in its demands. It would be difficult to recall a more offensive
document, and its iniquity was enhanced by the short shriving time
which it gave either Servia or Europe. Servia had forty-eight hours to
answer whether it would compromise its sovereignty, and virtually
admit its complicity in a crime which it had steadily disavowed. The
other European nations had little more than a day to consider what
could be done to preserve the peace of Europe before that peace was
fatally compromised.[10]

[Footnote 10: English _White Paper_, No. 5; Russian _Orange Paper_,
No. 3.]

Further confirmation that the German Foreign Office did have advance
knowledge of at least the substance of the ultimatum is shown by the
fact that on the day the ultimatum was issued the Chancellor of the
German Empire instructed its Ambassadors in Paris, London, and St.
Petersburg to advise the English, French, and Russian governments that

     the acts as well as _the demands_ of the Austro-Hungarian
     Government cannot but be looked upon as justified.[11]

[Footnote 11: German _White Paper_, Annex 1 B.]

How could Germany thus indorse the "demands" if it did not know the
substance of the ultimatum? Is it probable that Germany would have
given in a matter of the gravest importance a blanket endorsement of
Austria's demands, unless the German Government had first been fully
advised as to their nature?

The hour when these instructions were sent is not given, so that it
does not follow that these significant instructions were necessarily
prior to the service of the ultimatum at Belgrade at 6 P.M.
Nevertheless, as the ultimatum did not reach the other capitals of
Europe until the following day, as the diplomatic correspondence
clearly shows, it seems improbable that the German Foreign Office
would have issued this very carefully prepared and formal warning to
the other Powers on July the 23d unless it had full knowledge not
only of Austria's intention to serve the ultimatum but also of the
substance thereof.

While it may be that Germany, while indorsing in blank the policy
of Austria, purposely refrained from examining _the text_ of the
communication, so that it could thereafter claim that it was not
responsible for Austria's action--a policy which would not lessen the
discreditable character of this iniquitous conspiracy against the
peace of Europe,--yet the more reasonable assumption is that the
simultaneous issuance of Austria's ultimatum at Belgrade and Germany's
warning to the Powers was the result of a concerted action and had
a common purpose. No court or jury, reasoning along the ordinary
inferences of human life, would question this conclusion.

The communication from the German Foreign Office last referred
to anticipates that Servia "will refuse to comply with these
demands"--why, if they were justified?--and Germany suggests
to France, England, and Russia that if, as a result of such
noncompliance, Austria has "recourse to military measures," that
"the choice of means must be left to it."

The German Ambassadors in the three capitals were instructed

     to lay particular stress on the view that the above question
     is one, the settlement of which devolves solely upon
     Austria-Hungary and Servia, and one which the Powers should
     earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned,

and the instruction added that Germany strongly desired

     that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of
     another Power, on account of the various alliance
     obligations, _would bring consequences impossible to
     measure_.

This is one of the most significant documents in the whole
correspondence. If the German Foreign Office were as ignorant as its
Ambassador at London affected to be of the Austrian policy and
ultimatum, and if Germany were not then instigating and supporting
Austria in its perilous course, why should the German Chancellor have
served this threatening notice upon England, France, and Russia, that
Austria "_must_" be left free to make war upon Servia, and that any
attempt to intervene in behalf of the weaker nation would "bring
consequences impossible to measure"?[12]

[Footnote 12: German _White Paper_, Annex 1 B.]

A still more important piece of evidence is the carefully prepared
confidential communication, which the Imperial Chancellor sent to the
Federated Governments of Germany shortly after the Servian reply was
given.

In this confidential communication, which was nothing less than a call
to arms to the entire German Empire, and which probably intended to
convey the intimation that without formal mobilization the constituent
states of Germany should begin to prepare for eventualities, von
Bethmann-Hollweg recognized the possibility that Russia might
feel it a duty "to take the part of Servia in her dispute with
Austria-Hungary." Why, again, if Austria's case was so clearly
justified?

The Imperial Chancellor added that

     if Russia feels constrained to take sides with Servia in
     this conflict, she certainly has a right to do it,

but added that if Russia did this it would in effect challenge the
integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that Russia would
therefore alone

     bear the responsibility if a European war arises from the
     Austro-Servian question, which all the rest of the great
     European Powers wish to localize.

In this significant confidential communication the German Chancellor
declares the strong interest which Germany had in the punishment of
Servia by Austria. He says, "_our closest interests therefore summon
us to the side of Austria-Hungary_," and he adds that

     if contrary to hope, the trouble should spread, owing to the
     intervention of Russia, then, true to our duty as an Ally,
     we should have to support the neighboring monarchy with the
     entire might of the German Empire.[13]

[Footnote 13: German _White Paper_, Annex 2.]

It staggers ordinary credulity to believe that this portentous warning
to the constituents of the German Empire to prepare for "the Day"
should not have been written with advance knowledge of the Austrian
ultimatum, which had only been issued on July 23d and only reached the
other capitals of Europe on July 24th. The subsequent naive disclaimer
by the German Foreign Office of any expectation that Austria's attack
upon Servia could possibly have any interest to other European Powers
is hardly consistent with its assertion that Germany's "closest
interests" were involved in the question, or the portentous warnings
to the States of the Empire to prepare for eventualities.

The German Ambassador to the United States who attempted early in the
controversy and with disastrous results, to allay the rising storm of
indignation in that country, formally admitted in an article in the
_Independent_ of September 7, 1914, that Germany "_did approve in
advance the Austrian ultimatum to Servia_."

Why then was Germany guilty of duplicity in disclaiming, concurrently
with its issuance, any such responsibility? The answer is obvious.
This was necessary to support its contention that the quarrel between
Austria and Servia was purely "local."

NOTE.--In Chapter VII it will appear from the French _Yellow Book_
that the Prime Minister of Bavaria had knowledge of the Austrian
ultimatum before its delivery in Belgrade.




CHAPTER V

THE ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA


To convince any reasonable man that this Austrian ultimatum to Servia
was brutal in its tone and unreasonable in its demands, and that the
reply of Servia was as complete an acquiescence as Servia could make
without a fatal compromise of its sovereignty and self-respect, it is
only necessary to print in parallel columns the demands of Austria and
the reply of Servia.

                    AUSTRIA'S ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA

     "To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government sees
     itself compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government
     a formal assurance that it condemns this dangerous
     propaganda against the Monarchy; in other words, the whole
     series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach
     from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that it
     undertakes to suppress by every means this criminal and
     terrorist propaganda.

     "In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the
     Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of
     its '_Official Journal_' of the 26th July, the following
     declaration:

     "'The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda
     directed against Austria-Hungary--_i.e._, the general
     tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the
     Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and
     it sincerely deplores the fatal consequence of these
     criminal proceedings.

     "'The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers
     and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned
     propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighborly
     relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly pledged
     by its declaration of the 31st March, 1909.

     "'The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all
     idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the
     destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of
     Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty formally to warn
     officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the
     kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with the
     utmost rigor against persons who may be guilty of such
     machinations, which it will use all its efforts to
     anticipate and suppress.'

     "This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to
     the Royal Army as an order of the day by His Majesty the
     King and shall be published in the '_Official Bulletin_' of
     the Army.

     "'The Royal Servian Government further undertakes:

     "1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and
     contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general
     tendency of which is directed against its territorial
     integrity;

     "2. To dissolve immediately the society styled Narodna
     Odbrana, to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to
     proceed in the same manner against other societies and their
     branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the
     Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take
     the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved
     from continuing their activity under another name and form;

     "3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in
     Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as
     regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves,
     or might serve, to foment the propaganda against
     Austria-Hungary:

     "4. To remove from the military service, and from the
     administration in general, all officers and functionaries
     guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
     whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government
     reserves to itself the right of communicating to the Royal
     Government;

     "5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives
     of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the
     subversive movement directed against the territorial
     integrity of the Monarchy;

     "6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the
     plot of the 28th June who are on Servian territory.
     Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part
     in the investigation relating thereto;

     "7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija
     Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a
     Servian State employe, who have been compromised by the
     results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo;

     "8. To prevent by effective measures the cooperation of the
     Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and
     explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish
     severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz
     and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of
     the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the
     frontier;

     "9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with
     explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high
     Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who,
     notwithstanding their official position, did not hesitate
     after the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in
     interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian
     Government; and finally,

     "10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without
     delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the
     preceding heads.

     "The Austro-Hungarian Government expects the reply of the
     Royal Government at the latest by six o'clock on Saturday
     evening, the 25th July."

     "The Royal Servian Government is of the opinion that it is
     mutually advantageous not to hinder the settlement of this
     question, and therefore, in case the Austro-Hungarian
     Government should not consider itself satisfied with this
     answer, it is ready as always to accept a peaceful solution,
     either by referring the decision of this question to the
     international tribunal at The Hague, or by leaving it to the
     great Powers who cooperated in the preparation of the
     explanation given by the Servian Government on the 17th-31st
     March, 1909."

                    THE SERVIAN REPLY

     "The Royal Government has received the notification of the
     Austro-Hungarian Government of the 10th inst., and is
     convinced that its answer will remove every misunderstanding
     that threatens to disturb the pleasant neighborly relations
     between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Servian
     Kingdom.

     "The Royal Government is certain that in dealing with the
     great neighboring monarchy these protests have under no
     pretexts been renewed which formerly were made both in the
     Skupshtina and in explanations and negotiations of
     responsible representatives of the State, and which, through
     the declaration of the Servian Government of March 18, 1909,
     were settled; furthermore, that since that time none of the
     various successive Governments of the kingdom, nor any of
     its officers, has made an attempt to change the political
     and legal conditions set up in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
     Royal Government is certain that the Austro-Hungarian
     Government has made no representations of any kind along
     this line except in the case of a textbook concerning which
     the Austro-Hungarian Government received an entirely
     satisfactory reply. Servia, during the Balkan crisis, gave
     evidence in numerous cases of her pacific and temperate
     policies, and it will be thanks to Servia alone and the
     sacrifices that she alone made in the interest of European
     peace if that peace continue.

     "The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for
     utterances of a private character such as newspaper articles
     and the peaceful work of societies, utterances which are
     quite ordinary in almost all countries, and which are not
     generally under State control, especially since the Royal
     Government, in the solution of a great number of questions
     that came up between Servia and Austria-Hungary, showed much
     consideration as a result of which most of these questions
     were settled in the best interests of the progress of the
     two neighboring countries.

     "The Royal Government was therefore painfully surprised to
     hear the contention that Servian subjects had taken part in
     the preparations for the murder committed in Serajevo. It
     had hoped to be invited to cooperate in the investigations
     following this crime, and was prepared, in order to prove
     the entire correctness of its acts, to proceed against all
     persons concerning whom it had received information.

     "In conformity with the wish of the Austro-Hungarian
     Government, the Royal Government is prepared to turn over to
     the court, regardless of station or rank, any Servian
     subject concerning whose participation in the crime at
     Serajevo proofs may be given to it. The Government pledges
     itself especially to publish on the first page of the
     official organ of July 26th the following declaration:

     "'The Royal Servian Government condemns every propaganda
     that may be directed against Austria-Hungary; that is to
     say, all efforts designed ultimately to sever territory from
     the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and it regrets sincerely the
     sad consequences of these criminal machinations.'

     "The Royal Government regrets that, in accordance with
     advices from the Austro-Hungarian Government, certain
     Servian officers and functionaries are taking an active part
     in the present propaganda, and that they have thereby
     jeopardized the pleasant neighborly relations to the
     maintenance of which the Royal Government was formally
     pledged by the declaration of March 31, 1909.

     "The Government (what follows here is similar to the text
     demanded).

     "The Royal Government further pledges itself:

     "1. To introduce a provision in the press law on the
     occasion of the next regular session of the Skupshtina,
     according to which instigations to hatred and contempt of
     the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as well as any publication
     directed in general against the territorial integrity of
     Austria-Hungary, shall be punished severely.

     "The Government pledges itself, on the occasion of the
     coming revision of the Constitution, to add to Article XXII.
     a clause permitting the confiscation of publications, the
     confiscation of which, under the present Article XXII. of
     the Constitution, would be impossible.

     "2. The Government possesses no proof--and the Note of the
     Austro-Hungarian Government provides it with none--that the
     'Narodna Odbrana' Society and other similar associations
     have up to the present committed any criminal acts through
     any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government
     will accept the demand of the Austro-Hungarian Government
     and dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society, as well as all
     societies that may work against Austria-Hungary.

     "3. The Royal Servian Government agrees to eliminate
     forthwith from public education in Servia everything that
     might help the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, provided
     that the Austro-Hungarian Government gives it actual proof
     of this propaganda.

     "4. The Royal Government is also ready to discharge from
     military and civil service such officers--provided it is
     proved against them by legal investigation--who have
     implicated themselves in acts directed against the
     territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; the
     Government expects that, for the purpose of instituting
     proceedings, the Austro-Hungarian Government will impart the
     names of these officers and employes and the acts of which
     they are accused.

     "5. The Royal Servian Government must confess that it is
     not quite clear as to the sense and scope of the desire
     of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the effect that the
     Royal Servian Government bind itself to allow the
     cooperation within its territory of representatives of the
     Austro-Hungarian Government, but it nevertheless declares
     itself willing to permit such cooperation as might be in
     conformity with international law and criminal procedure,
     as well as with friendly neighborly relations.

     "6. The Royal Government naturally holds itself bound to
     institute an investigation against all such persons as were
     concerned in the plot of June 15th-28th, or are supposed to
     have been concerned in it, and are on Servian soil. As to
     the cooperation of special delegates of the Austro-Hungarian
     Government in this investigation, the Servian Government
     cannot accept such cooperation, since this would be a
     violation of the laws and criminal procedure. However, in
     individual cases, information as to the progress of the
     investigation might be given to the Austro-Hungarian
     delegates.

     "7. On the very evening on which your Note arrived the Royal
     Government caused the arrest of Major Voislar Tankosic.
     But, regarding Milan Ciganovic, who is a subject of the
     Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and who was employed until June
     15th (as candidate) in the Department of Railroads it has
     not been possible to arrest this man up till now, for which
     reason a warrant has been issued against him.

     "The Austro-Hungarian Government is requested, in order that
     the investigation may be made as soon as possible, to make
     known in the specified form what grounds of suspicion exist,
     and the proofs of guilt collected at the investigation in
     Serajevo.

     "8. The Servian Government will increase the severity and
     scope of its measures against the smuggling of arms and
     explosives.

     "It goes without saying that it will at once start an
     investigation and mete out severe punishment to the frontier
     officials of the Sabac-Loznica line who failed in their duty
     and allowed those responsible for the crime to cross the
     frontier.

     "9. The Royal Government is willing to give explanations of
     the statements made in interviews by its officials in Servia
     and foreign countries after the crime, and which, according
     to the Austro-Hungarian Government, were anti-Austrian, as
     soon as the said Government indicates where these statements
     were made, and provides proofs that such statements were
     actually made by the said officials. The Royal Government
     will itself take steps to collect the necessary proofs and
     means of transmission for this purpose.

     "10. The Royal Government will, in so far as this has not
     already occurred in this Note, inform the Austro-Hungarian
     Government of the taking of the measures concerning the
     foregoing matters, as soon as such measures have been
     ordered and carried out.

It increases the ineffaceable discredit of this brutal ultimatum when
we consider the relative size of the two nations. Austria has a
population of over 50,000,000 and Servia about 4,000,000. Moreover,
Servia had just emerged from two terrible conflicts, from which it
was still bleeding to exhaustion. Austria's ultimatum was that of a
Goliath to David, and, up to the hour that this book goes to press,
the result has not been different from that famous conflict.

Germany itself had already given to Servia an intimation of its
intended fate. It had anticipated the Austrian ultimatum by some
pointed suggestions to Servia on its own account, for in the letter
already quoted from Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, we learn that
the German Secretary of State told the British Ambassador before the
ultimatum was issued that he

     on several occasions, in conversation with the Servian
     Minister, emphasized the extreme importance that
     Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper
     footing.[14]

[Footnote 14: In English _White Paper_, No. 2.]

This pointed intimation from Germany, thus preceding the formal
ultimatum from Austria, naturally gave Servia a quick appreciation
that within the short space allowed by the ultimatum, it must either
acquiesce in grossly unreasonable demands or perish as an independent
nation.

To appreciate fully the brutality of this ultimatum let us imagine a
precise analogy.

The relations of France and Germany--leaving aside the important
difference of relative size--are not unlike the relations that existed
between Servia and Austria. In 1908, Austria had forcibly annexed
Bosnia and Herzegovina, both of them Slav countries, and when Servia
had emerged from the Balko-Turkish War with signal credit to itself,
it was again Austria that had intervened and deprived it of the fruit
of its victories by denying it access to the sea.

Similarly, by the Treaty of Frankfort, Germany had forcibly annexed
Alsace and Lorraine from France. As there existed in Servia voluntary
organizations of men, which ceaselessly agitated for the recovery of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, so in France similar patriotic organizations
have for the last forty years continuously agitated for a war which
would lead to the ultimate recovery of Alsace and Lorraine. The statue
of Strassburg in the Place de la Concorde has been covered with the
emblems of mourning from the time that Bismarck wrung from Jules Favre
the cession of the Rhine territory. If Austria's grievance against
Servia were just, Germany has an equal and similar grievance against
France.

Under these circumstances let us suppose that on the occasion of the
visit of the German Crown Prince to Strassburg, that an Alsatian
citizen of German nationality, having strong French sympathies, had
assassinated the Crown Prince, and that France had formally disclaimed
any complicity in the assassination and expressed its sympathy and
regret.

_Mutatis mutandis_, let us suppose that Germany had thereupon issued
to France the same ultimatum that Austria issued to Servia, requiring
France to acknowledge moral responsibility for a crime, which it
steadily disavowed. The ultimatum to France in that event would have
included a peremptory demand that the government of France, a proud
and self-respecting country, should publish in the _Official Journal_,
and communicate as an "order of the day" to the army of France, a
statement that the French Government formally denounced all attempts
to recover Alsace and Lorraine; that it regretted the participation of
French officers in the murder of the German Crown Prince; that it
engaged to suppress in the Press of France any expressions of hatred
or contempt for Germany; that it would dissolve all patriotic
societies that have for their object the recovery of the "lost
provinces"; that it would eliminate from the public schools of France
all instruction which served to foment feeling against Germany; that
it would remove from its army all officers who had joined in the
agitation against Germany; that it would accept in the courts of
France the participation of German officials in determining who were
guilty, either of the Strassburg murder or of the propaganda for the
recovery of Alsace and Lorraine; that it would further proceed to
arrest and punish certain French officers, whom the German Government
charged with participating in the offensive propaganda, and that
it would furnish the German Government with full explanations and
information in reference to its execution of these peremptory demands.

Let us suppose that such an ultimatum having been sent, that France
had been given forty-eight hours to comply with conditions which were
obviously fatal to its self-respect and forever destructive of its
prestige as a great Power.

Can it be questioned what the reply of France or the judgment of the
world would be in such a quarrel?

_Every fair-minded man would say without hesitation that such an
ultimatum would be an unprecedented outrage upon the fine proprieties
of civilized life._

The only difference between the two cases is the fact that in the case
of Germany and France the power issuing the ultimatum would be less
than double the size of that nation which it sought to coerce, while
in the case of Austria and Servia, the aggressor was twelve times as
powerful as the power whose moral prestige and political independence
it sought to destroy.

In view of the nature of these demands, the assurance which Austria
subsequently gave Russia, that she would do nothing to lessen the
territory of Servia, goes for nothing. From the standpoint of Servia,
it would have been far better to lose a part of its territory and keep
its independence and self-respect as to the remainder, than to retain
all its existing land area, and by submitting to the ultimatum become
virtually a vassal state of Austria. Certainly if Servia had
acquiesced fully in Austria's demands without any qualification or
reservation (as for the sake of peace it almost did), then Austria
would have enjoyed a moral protectorate over all of Servia's
territory, and its ultimate fate might have been that of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which Austria first governed as a protectorate, and later
forcibly annexed.




CHAPTER VI

THE PEACE PARLEYS


The issuance of the Austrian ultimatum precipitated a grave crisis.
_It did not, however, present any insoluble problem._ Peace could and
should have been preserved. Its preservation is always possible when
nations, which may be involved in a controversy, are inspired by a
reasonably pacific purpose. Only when the masses of the people are
inflamed with a passionate desire for war, and in a time of popular
hysteria responsible statesmen are helplessly borne along the turgid
flow of events as bubbles are carried by the swift current of a
swollen river, is peace a visionary dream.

It is the peculiarity of the present crisis that no such popular
hysteria existed. No popular demand for war developed until after it
was virtually precipitated. Even then large classes of workingmen,
both in Germany and France, protested.

The peoples of the various countries had scant knowledge of the issues
which had been raised by their diplomats and had little, if any,
interest in the Servian trouble. The chief exception to this was in
Austria, where unquestionably popular feeling had been powerfully
excited by the murder of the Archduke and where there had been,
especially in Vienna, popular manifestations in favor of war. In
Russia also there was not unnaturally a strong undercurrent of popular
sympathy for Servia.

The writer was in the Engadine at the time referred to, and
cosmopolitan St. Moritz, although a little place, was, in its
heterogeneous population, Europe in microcosmic form. There the
average man continued to enjoy his mid-summer holiday and refused to
believe that so great a catastrophe was imminent until the last two
fateful days in July. The citizens of all nations continued to
fraternize, and were one in amazement that a war could be precipitated
on causes in which the average man took so slight an interest.

Unembarrassed by any popular clamor, this war could have been
prevented, and the important question presents itself to the Supreme
Court of Civilization as to the moral responsibility for the failure
of the negotiations.

Which of the two groups of powers sincerely worked for peace and which
obstructed those efforts?

In reaching its conclusion our imaginary Court would pay little
attention to mere professions of a desire for peace. A nation, like an
individual, can covertly stab the peace of another while saying, "Art
thou in health, my brother?" and even the peace of civilization can be
betrayed by a Judas-kiss. Professions of peace belong to the cant of
diplomacy and have always characterized the most bellicose of nations.

No war in modern times has been begun without the aggressor pretending
that his nation wished nothing but peace, and invoking divine aid for
its murderous policy. To paraphrase the words of Lady Teazle on a
noted occasion, when Sir Joseph Surface talked much of "honor," it
might be as well in such instances to leave the name of God out of the
question.

The writer will so far anticipate the conclusions, which he thinks
these records indisputably show, as to suggest the respective
attitudes of the different groups of diplomats and statesmen as
revealed by these papers. If the reader will realize fully the policy
which from the first animated Germany and Austria, then the documents
hereinafter quoted will acquire new significance.

Germany and Austria had determined to impose their will upon Servia,
even though it involved a European war. From the outset they clearly
recognized such a possibility and were willing to accept the
responsibility.

The object to be gained was something more than a neutralization of
the pro-Slav propaganda. It was to subject Servia to such severe
punitive measures that thereafter her independence of will and moral
sovereignty would be largely impaired, if not altogether destroyed.
To do this it was not enough to have Servia take measures to prevent
pro-Slav agitation within her borders. Austria neither wanted nor
expected the acceptance of her impossible ultimatum.

It planned to submit such an ultimatum as Servia could not possibly
accept and, to make this result doubly sure, it was thought desirable
to give not only Servia but Europe the minimum time to take any
preventive measures. Giving to Servia only forty-eight hours within
which to reach a decision and to Europe barely twenty-four hours to
protect the peace of the world, it was thought that Servia would do
one of two things, either of which would be of incalculable importance
to Germany and Austria.

If Servia accepted the ultimatum for lack of time to consider it, then
its self-respect was hopelessly compromised and its independence
largely destroyed. Thenceforth she would be, at least morally, a mere
vassal of Austria.

If, however, Servia declined to accept the ultimatum, then war would
immediately begin and Servia would be, as was thought, speedily
subjected to punitive measures of such a drastic character that the
same result would be attained.

From the commencement, both Germany and Austria recognized the
possibility that Russia might intervene to protect Servia. To prevent
this it was important that Russia and her allies of the Triple Entente
should be given as little time as possible to consider their action,
and it was thought that this would probably lead to Russia's
acquiescence in the punishment of Servia and, if so, France and
England, having no direct interest in Servia, would also undoubtedly
acquiesce.

If, however, slow-moving Russia, instead of acquiescing, as she did
in 1908 in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, should take up the
gauntlet which Germany and Austria had thrown down, _then it was all
important to Germany and Austria that Russia should seem to be the
aggressor_.

For this there were two substantial reasons: the one was Italy and the
other was England. Germany and Austria desired the cooperation of
Italy and could not claim it as of right under the terms of the
Triple Alliance, unless they were attacked. Upon the other hand, if
England believed that Russia and France had declared war upon Germany
and Austria, there was little probability of her intervention. For
these reasons it was important that Germany and Austria should impress
both England and Italy that their purposes were sincerely pacific and
that on the other hand they should so clearly provoke Russia and
France that those nations would declare war.

If the reader will keep this Janus-faced policy steadily in mind,
he will understand the apparent inconsistencies in the diplomatic
representations of the German Foreign Office. He will understand why
Germany and Austria, while at times flouting Russia in the most
flagrant manner and refusing her the common courtesies of diplomatic
intercourse, were at the same time giving to England the most emphatic
assurance of pacific intentions.

With this preliminary statement, let the record speak for itself. We
have seen that the first great, and as events proved, fatal obstacle
to peace which Germany interposed was practically contemporaneous with
the issuance of the ultimatum. Germany did not wait for any efforts at
conciliation. On the contrary, it attempted to bar effectually all
such efforts by serving notice upon France, England, and Russia almost
simultaneously with the issuance of the Austrian ultimatum,

     that the acts as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian
     Government cannot but be looked upon as justified;

and the communication concluded:

     We strongly desire that the dispute be localized, since any
     intervention of any Power on account of the various alliance
     obligations would bring consequences impossible to
     measure.[15]

[Footnote 15: German _White Paper_, Annex, 1 B.]

This had only one meaning. Austria was to be left to discipline
Servia at will, or there would be war. Germany did not even wait
for any suggestion of intervention, whether conciliatory or otherwise,
but sought to interpose to any plan of peace, short of complete
submission, an insuperable barrier by this threat of war. With this
pointed threat to Europe, the next move was that of Russia, and it may
be remarked that throughout the entire negotiations Russian diplomacy
was more than equal to that of Germany.

Russia contented itself in the first instance by stating on the
morning of July 24th, that Russia could not remain indifferent to the
Austro-Servian conflict. This attitude could not surprise any one, for
Russia's interest in the Balkans was well known and its legitimate
concern in the future of any Slav state was, as Sir Edward Grey had
said in Parliament in March, 1913, "a commonplace in European
diplomacy in the past."

With this simple statement of its legitimate interest in a matter
affecting the balance of power in Europe, Russia, instead of issuing
an ultimatum or declaring war, as Germany and Austria may have hoped,
joined with England in asking for a reasonable extension of time for
all the Powers to concert for the preservation of peace. On July 24th,
the very day that the Austrian ultimatum had reached St. Petersburg,
the Russian Foreign Minister transmitted to the Austrian Government
through its Charge in Vienna the following communication:

     The communication of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the
     Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum to
     Belgrade _leaves to the Powers a delay entirely insufficient
     to undertake any useful steps whatever for the straightening
     out of the complications that have arisen_. To prevent the
     incalculable consequences, equally disastrous for all the
     Powers, which can follow the method of action of the
     Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems indispensable to us
     that above all the delay given to Servia to reply should be
     extended. _Austria-Hungary, declaring herself disposed to
     inform the Powers of the results of the inquiry upon which
     the Imperial and Royal Government bases its accusations,
     should at least give them also the time to take note of them
     (de s'en rendre compte)._ In this case, if the Powers should
     convince themselves of the well-groundedness of certain of
     the Austrian demands _they would find themselves in a
     position to send to the Servian Government consequential
     advice_. A refusal to extend the terms of the ultimatum
     would deprive of all value the step taken by the
     Austro-Hungarian Government in regard to the Powers and
     would be in contradiction with the very bases of
     international relations.[16]

[Footnote 16: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 4.]

Could any court question the justice of this contention? The peace of
the world was at stake. Time only was asked to see what could be done
to preserve that peace and satisfy Austria's grievances to the
uttermost.

Germany had only to intimate to Austria that "a decent respect to the
opinions of mankind," as well as common courtesy to great and friendly
nations, required that sufficient time be given not only to Servia,
but to the other nations, to concert for the common good, especially
as the period was one of mid-summer dullness, and many of the leading
rulers and statesmen were absent from their respective capitals.

_If Germany made any communication to Austria in the interests of
peace the text has yet to be disclosed to the world._ A word from
Berlin to Vienna would have given the additional time which, with
sincerely pacific intentions, might have resulted in the preservation
of peace. Germany, so far as the record discloses, never spoke that
word.

England had already anticipated the request of Russia that a
reasonable time should be given to all interested parties. When the
Austrian Minister in London handed the ultimatum to Sir Edward Grey on
July the 24th, the following conversation took place, which speaks for
itself:

     In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency I (Sir
     Edward Grey) remarked that it seemed to me a matter for
     great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at
     that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the
     proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the
     circumstances respecting Servia quoted in the note aroused
     sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, _but at the same
     time I had never before seen one State address to another
     independent State a document of so formidable a character_.
     Count Mensdorff replied that the present situation might
     never have arisen if Servia had held out a hand after the
     murder of the Archduke. Servia had, however, shown no sign
     of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed
     since the murder; a time limit, said his Excellency, was
     essential, owing to the procrastination on Servia's part.

     I said that if Servia had procrastinated in replying a time
     limit could have been introduced later; _but, as things now
     stood, the terms of the Servian reply had been dictated by
     Austria, who had not been content to limit herself to a
     demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from
     its presentation_.

Unfortunately both Russia and England's requests for time were
refused, on the plea that they had reached the Austrian Foreign
Minister too late, although it has never yet been explained why, even
if Count Berchtold were unable to take up the requests before the
expiration of the ultimatum, the matter might not have been reopened
for a few days by a corresponding extension of the time limit.

In the absence of some explanation, which as yet remains to be
made, the absence of the Austrian Premier from Vienna at the time
intervening between the issuance of the _ultimatum_ and the expiration
of the time limit seems like an extraordinarily petty piece of
diplomatic finesse. He had without any warning to the great Powers of
Europe, launched a thunderbolt, and if there ever was a time when a
pacific foreign minister should have been at his post and open to
suggestions of peace, it was in those two critical days. And yet,
after issuing the ultimatum, he immediately takes himself beyond reach
of personal parleys by going to Ischl, and this was taken by the
German Foreign Office as a convenient excuse for an anticipated
failure to extend this courtesy to Russia and England. Upon this we
have the testimony of the English Ambassador at Berlin, who in his
report to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 25th, says:

     [The German] Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says
     that on receipt of a telegram at ten o'clock this morning
     from German Ambassador at London, he immediately instructed
     German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to the Austrian
     Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion, for an
     extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency
     about it. Unfortunately it appeared from the press that
     Count Berchtold is at Ischl, and Secretary of State thought
     that in these circumstances there would be delay and
     difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of
     State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had
     ready on the spot, _but he admitted quite freely that
     Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a
     lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also
     admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain
     of the Austro-Hungarian demands...._

A like excuse is found in a conversation with the Russian Charge at
Berlin, in which Bethmann-Hollweg expressed the fear "that in
consequence of the absence of Berchtold at Ischl, and seeing the lack
of time, his (Bethmann-Hollweg's telegrams suggesting delay) will
remain without result."[17]

[Footnote 17: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 14.]

These conversations are most illuminating. They refer to instructions
to the German Ambassador in Vienna, _which are not found in the German
White Paper_, although they would have thrown a searchlight upon the
sincerity with which Germany "passed on" the most important request of
England and Russia for a little time to save the peace of Europe, and
it strongly suggests the possibility that Count Berchtold's most
inopportune absence in Ischl was to be the excuse for the gross
discourtesy of refusing to give any extension of time.

Kudachef, the Russian Charge at Vienna, did not content himself with
submitting the request to the Acting Foreign Minister (Baron Macchio)
but to deprive Austria of the flimsy excuse of Berchtold's absence at
Ischl, the Russian Charge went over the head of the Austrian Acting
Foreign Minister and telegraphed the request for time to Count
Berchtold at Ischl. Let the record tell for itself how this most
reasonable request was made and refused.

The Russian Charge sent on July 25th the two following telegrams to
the Russian Foreign Minister:

     Count Berchtold is at Ischl. Seeing the impossibility of
     arriving there in time, I have telegraphed him our proposal
     to extend the delay of the ultimatum, and I have repeated it
     verbally to Baron Macchio. This latter promised me to
     communicate it in time to the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
     _but added that he could predict with assurance a
     categorical refusal_.[18]

[Footnote 18: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 11.]

     Sequel to my telegram of to-day. Have just received from
     Macchio the negative reply of the Austro-Hungarian
     Government to our proposal to prolong the delay of the
     note.[19]

[Footnote 19: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 12.]

It is evident from the Russian _Orange Paper_ that that country had no
illusions as to the possibility of a peaceful outcome. Germany has
contended that on July the 24th, before Count Berchtold made his
inopportune visit to Ischl, he sent for the Russian Charge at Vienna
and assured him that the punitive measures which Austria had
determined to take against Servia at all costs would not involve any
territorial acquisitions.

Of this interview the chief evidence comes indirectly from two
sources, which are not entirely in accord.

In a telegram from the German Ambassador at Vienna to the German
Chancellor, dated July 24th, it is said:

     Count Berchtold to-day summoned the Russian Charge
     d'Affaires in order to explain to him in detail and in
     friendly terms the position of Austria regarding Servia.
     After going over the historical developments of the last few
     years, he laid stress on the statement that the monarchy
     did not wish to appear against Servia in the role of a
     conqueror. He said that Austria-Hungary would demand no
     territory, that the step was merely a definitive measure
     against Servian machinations; that Austria-Hungary felt
     herself obliged to exact guarantees for the future friendly
     behavior of Servia toward the monarchy; that he had no
     intention of bringing about a shifting of the balance of
     power in the Balkans. The Charge d'Affaires, who as yet had
     no instructions from St. Petersburg, took the explanations
     of the Minister _ad referendum_ adding that he would
     immediately transmit them to Sazonof.[20]

[Footnote 20: German _White Paper_, No. 3.]

In a report of the same interview from the English Ambassador at
Vienna to Sir Edward Grey, it is said:

     Russian Charge d'Affaires was received this morning by
     Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own
     personal view, that Austrian note was drawn up in a form
     rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that
     it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister of
     Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under
     instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were
     accepted integrally by 4 P.M. to-morrow. His Excellency
     added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at
     stake; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction
     throughout the country. He did not think that objections to
     what had been done could be raised by any power.[21]

[Footnote 21: English _White Papers_, No. 7.]

It will be noted that in the report of the English Ambassador there is
no suggestion of any disclaimer of an intention to take Servian
territory.

In the Russian _Orange Paper_, we find no report from its
representative at Vienna of any such interview and Austria has never
produced any document or memorandum either of such an interview or of
such a concession to Russia. It is probable that such a concession was
made, as Germany contends, and if so, Russian diplomacy was far too
keen to be led upon a false trail by this empty promise and as the
evidences multiplied that Austria would not consider either an
extension of time or any modification of its terms and that Germany
was acting in complete accord and cooperated with her Ally, the
probability of war was unmistakable.

Sazonof at once sent for the English and French Ambassadors, and the
substance of the conference is embodied in the telegram from the
British Ambassador at St. Petersburg to Sir Edward Grey, dated July
24th, which throws a strong light upon the double effort of Russia and
France to preserve the peace and also as an obvious necessity to
prepare for the more probable issue of war:

     Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was
     both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken
     such action unless Germany had first been consulted; some of
     her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped
     that his Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim
     their solidarity with Russia and France.

     The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France
     would fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance
     with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia
     strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.

     I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what
     their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of
     course, speak in the name of his Majesty's Government, but
     personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of
     solidarity from his Majesty's Government that would entail
     an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia
     and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in
     Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would
     never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M.
     Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general
     European question was involved, the Servian question being
     but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not
     afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.

     In reply to these remarks I observed that I gathered from
     what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great
     Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to
     the effect that active intervention by her in the internal
     affairs of Servia could not be tolerated. But, supposing
     Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military
     measures against Servia in spite of our representations, was
     it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to
     declare war on Austria?

     M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian
     mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out; but
     a council of ministers was being held this afternoon to
     consider the whole question. A further council would be
     held, probably to-morrow, at which the Emperor would
     preside, when a decision would be come to....

Had England then followed the sagacious suggestion of Sazonof, would
war have been averted?

Possibly, perhaps probably. Germany's principal fear was the
intervention of England. In view of its supremacy on the seas this was
natural. It was England's intimation in the Moroccan crisis of 1911,
made in Lloyd George's Mansion House speech, which at that time
induced Germany to reverse the engines. Might not the same intimation
in 1914 have had a like effect upon the mad counsels of Potsdam? The
answer can only be a matter of conjecture. It depends largely upon how
deep-seated the purpose of Germany may have been to provoke a European
war at a time when Russia, France, or England were not fully prepared.

It does not follow that if Sazonof was right, Sir Edward Grey was
necessarily wrong in declining to align England definitely with Russia
and France at that stage. He was the servant of a democratic nation
and could not ignore the public opinion of his country as freely as
the Russian Foreign Minister. To take such a course, it would have
been necessary for Grey to submit the matter to Parliament, and while
with a large liberal majority his policy might have been endorsed, yet
it would have been after such an acrimonious discussion and such
vehement protests that England would have stood before the world "as
a house divided against itself."

Both Sazonof and Sir Edward Grey from their respective standpoints
were right. Neither made a single false step in the great controversy.

As a result of this interview, Russia, England, and France, after the
request for time had been abruptly refused, next proceeded in the
interests of peace to persuade Servia to make as conciliatory a reply
to the impossible ultimatum as was possible without a fatal compromise
of her political independence.

While the lack of time prevented France and Russia from making any
formal communication to Servia on the question, yet Sazonof had a
conference with the Servian Minister and discussed the wisdom of
avoiding an attack on Belgrade by having the Servian forces withdrawn
to the interior and then appealing to the Powers, and Russia thereupon
made the broad and magnanimous suggestion that if Servia should appeal
to the Powers, _Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave
the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy_.

This interview, as reported by the British Ambassador at St.
Petersburg to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 25th, is as follows:

     I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and
     communicated to his Excellency the substance of your
     telegram of to-day to Paris, and this afternoon, I discussed
     with him the communication which the French Ambassador
     suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as
     recorded in your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade....

     The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite
     ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved
     to be guilty, but that no independent State could be
     expected to accept the political demands which had been put
     forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a
     conversation which he had with the Servian Minister
     yesterday, that in the event of the Austrians attacking
     Servia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade and
     withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at
     the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His
     Excellency was in favor of their making this appeal. He
     would like to see the question placed on an international
     footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to
     which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were
     given not to Austria, but to the Powers.

     _If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be
     quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the
     hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was
     possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to
     submit the question to arbitration._

Pursuant to this policy of conciliation Sir Edward Grey in direct
communication with the Servian Minister at London, Mr. Crackenthorpe,
the British Ambassador at Belgrade, in direct communication with the
Servian Foreign Ministry, and Sazonof in interviews with the Servian
Minister at St. Petersburg, all brought direct influence upon Servia
to make a conciliatory reply.

Thus Sir Edward Grey instructed Crackenthorpe:

     Servia ought to promise that if it is proved that Servian
     officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices
     in the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give
     Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to
     express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government
     must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in
     Servian interests.

     It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria
     when time limit expires can be averted by anything but
     unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance
     appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying
     favorably to as many points as the time limit allows....

     I have urged upon the German Ambassador that Austria should
     not precipitate military action.[22]

[Footnote 22: English _White Paper_, No. 12.]

In response to these suggestions, Mr. Crackenthorpe communicated Sir
Edward Grey's pacific suggestions to the Servian Minister and received
the following reply, as reported in Crackenthorpe's report to Sir
Edward Grey, dated July 25th.

     The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to
     the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under Secretary of
     State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory
     and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as
     is possible....

     The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian
     Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content
     with the full satisfaction offered in the Servian reply.[23]

[Footnote 23: English _White Paper_, No. 21.]

These pacific suggestions to Servia met with complete success, and as
a result that country on July 25th, and before the expiration of the
ultimatum, made a reply to Austria which astonished the world with its
spirit of conciliation and for a short time gave rise to optimistic
hopes of peace.

At some sacrifice of its self-respect as a sovereign State, it
accepted substantially the demands of Austria, with a few minor
reservations, which it expressed its willingness to refer either to
arbitration at The Hague Tribunal or to a conference of the
Powers.[24]

[Footnote 24: English _White Paper_, No. 39.]

Neither Germany nor Austria seriously contended that the reply was not
on its face a substantial acquiescence in the extreme Austrian
demands. They contented themselves with impeaching the sincerity of
the assurances, calling the concessions "shams." Unless Austria, in
asking assurances from Servia, were content to accept them as made in
good faith and allow their sincerity to be determined by future deeds,
why should the ultimatum, calling for such assurances, have been made?
If Germany and Austria had accepted Servia's reply as sufficient, and
Servia had subsequently failed to fulfill its promises in the utmost
good faith, there would have been little sympathy for Servia, and no
general war. Russia and England pledged their influence to compel
Servia, if necessary, to meet fully any reasonable demand of Austria.
The principal outstanding question, which Servia agreed to arbitrate
or leave to the Powers, was the participation of Austrian officials in
the Servian courts. This did not present a difficult problem.
Austria's professed desire for an impartial investigation could have
been easily attained by having the Powers appoint a commission of
neutral jurists to make such investigation.

In any event, Austria could have accepted the very substantial
concessions of Servia and without prejudice to its rights proceeded to
The Hague Tribunal or to a concert of the Powers as to the few and
comparatively simple open points. When one recalls the infinite
treasure of property and life, which would thus have been saved the
world, had Germany and Austria accepted this reasonable and pacific
course, one can only exclaim, "_But oh, the pity of it!_"

It is significant that while the entire official German press gave
ample space to the Austrian ultimatum and rejoiced in Austria's
energetic attitude, it withheld from the German people any adequate
information as to the conciliatory nature of the Servian reply, for
the Russian Charge at Berlin telegraphed to Sazonof:

     The Wolff Bureau has not published the text of the Servian
     response which was communicated to it. Up to this moment
     this note has not appeared _in extenso_ in any of local
     journals, which according to all the evidence do not wish to
     give it a place in their columns, understanding the calming
     effect which this publication would produce upon the German
     readers.[25]

[Footnote 25: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 46.]

Instead of getting the truth, the Berlin populace proceeded to make
riotous demonstrations against the Russian and Servian Embassies.

The time limit on the ultimatum expired on July the 25th at six
o'clock in the evening.

There is no more significant and at the same time discreditable
feature of an infinitely discreditable chapter in history than that
the Austrian Government, _without giving the Servian answer the
consideration even of a single hour_, immediately severed all
diplomatic intercourse with Belgrade and at 6.30 P.M. the Minister
of Austria

     informed the Servian Government by note that, not having
     received within the delay fixed a satisfactory response, he
     is leaving Belgrade with the whole personnel of the
     legation.

On the same night Austria ordered the mobilization of a considerable
part of its army.

Notwithstanding these rebuffs, England, France, and Russia continued
to labor for peace, and made further pacific suggestions, all of which
fell upon deaf ears.

On July 25th, Sir Edward Grey proposed that the four Powers (England,
France, Italy, and Germany) should unite

     in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross
     the frontier and to give time for the four Powers, acting at
     Vienna and St. Petersburg, to try and arrange matters. If
     Germany will adopt this view I feel strongly that France and
     ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly
     cooperate.[26]

[Footnote 26: English _White Paper_, Nos. 24 and 25.]

To this reasonable request the German Chancellor replied:

     The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between the
     Austro-Servian and Austro-Russian conflict is quite correct.
     We wish as little as England to mix in the first, and, first
     and last, we take the ground that this question must be
     localized by the abstention of all the Powers from
     intervention in it. It is therefore our earnest hope that
     Russia will refrain from any active intervention, conscious
     of her responsibility and of the seriousness of the
     situation. If an Austro-Russian dispute should arise, we are
     ready, with the reservation of our known duties as Allies,
     to cooperate with the other great Powers in mediation
     between Russia and Austria.[27]

[Footnote 27: German _White Paper_, Exhibit 13.]

This distinction is hard to grasp. It attempts to measure the
difference between tweedledum and tweedledee. Russia's current
difference with Austria concerned the attempt of the latter to
crush Servia without interference. Russia claimed such right of
intervention. Germany would not interfere in the former matter, but
would abstractly but not concretely mediate between Russia and Austria
in the latter. Mediate about what? To refuse to mediate over the
Servian question was to refuse to mediate at all. For all practical
purposes the two things were indistinguishable.

All that Germany did on July 25th, so far as the record discloses,
was to "pass on" England's and Russia's requests for more time, but
subsequent events indicate that it was "passed on" without any
endorsement, for is it credible that Austria would have ignored its
ally's request for more time if it had ever been made? Here again we
note with disappointment the absence from the record of Germany's
message to Austria, "passing on" the reasonable request for an
extension of time. The result indicates that the request received,
if any endorsement, the "faint praise" which is said to "damn."

Was ever the peace of the world shattered upon so slight a pretext? A
little time, a few days, even a few hours, might have sufficed to
preserve the world from present horrors, but no time could be granted.
_A snap judgment was to be taken by these pettifogging diplomats._ The
peace of the world was to be torpedoed by submarine diplomacy. The
Austrian Government could wait nearly three months to try the
assassin, who admittedly slew the Austrian Archduke, but could not
wait even a few hours before condemning Servia to political death. It
could not grant Russia any time to consider a matter gravely affecting
its interests, even if the peace of Europe and the happiness of the
world depended on it. It would be difficult to find in recorded
history a greater discourtesy to a friendly Power, for Austria was not
at war with Russia.

Defeated in their effort to get an extension of time, England, France,
and Russia made further attempts to preserve peace by temporarily
arresting military proceedings until further efforts toward
conciliation could be made. Sir Edward Grey proposed to Germany,
France, Russia, and Italy that they should unite in asking Austria and
Servia not to cross the frontier "until we had had time to try and
arrange matters between them," but the German Ambassador read Sir
Edward Grey a telegram that he had received from the German Foreign
Office saying

     that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had no
     more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the
     Austrian note to Servia, but that once she had launched that
     note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky said,
     however, that if what I contemplated was mediation between
     Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to
     accept it. He expressed himself as personally favorable to
     this suggestion.

It will be noted that Germany thus gave to England, as it had
already given to Russia and France in the most unequivocal terms, a
disclaimer of any responsibility for the Austrian ultimatum, but we
have already seen that when the German Foreign Office prepared its
statement for the German nation, which was circulated in the Reichstag
on August 4th, Germany confessed the insincerity of these assurances
by admitting that before the ultimatum was issued the Austrian
Government had advised the German Foreign Office of its intentions and
asked its opinion and that

     we were able to assure our ally most heartily of our
     agreement with her view of the situation and to assure her
     that any action that she might consider it necessary to take
     ... would receive our approval.

Here again it is to be noted that the telegram, which the German
Foreign Office sent to Prince Lichnowsky, and which that diplomat
simply read to Sir Edward Grey, is not set forth in the exhibits to
the German _White Paper_.

As we have seen, Germany never, so far as the record discloses, sought
in any way to influence Austria to make this or any concession until
after the Kaiser's return from Norway and then only if we accept the
assurances of its Foreign Office which are not supported by official
documents. Its attitude was shown by the declaration of its
Ambassador at Paris to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, which,
while again disclaiming that Germany had countenanced the Austrian
ultimatum, yet added that Germany "approved" its point of view,

     and that certainly, the arrow once sent, Germany could not
     allow herself to be guided except by her duty as ally.[28]

[Footnote 28: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 19.]

This seemed to be the fatal error of Germany, that its duties to
civilization were so slight that it should support its ally, Austria,
whether the latter were right or wrong. Such was its policy, and it
carried it out with fatal consistency. To support its ally in actual
war without respect to the justice of the quarrel may be defensible,
but to support it in a time of peace in an iniquitous demand and a
policy of gross discourtesy to friendly States offends every sense of
international morality.

On the following day Russia proposed to Austria that they should enter
into an exchange of private views, with the object of an alteration in
common of some clauses of the Austrian ultimatum. _To this Austria
never even replied._

The Russian Minister communicated this suggestion to the German
Minister for Foreign Affairs and expressed the hope that he would
"find it possible to advise Vienna to meet our proposal," but this did
not accord with German policy, for on that day the German Ambassador
in Paris called upon the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and
submitted the following formal declaration:

     "Austria has declared to Russia that she does not seek
     territorial acquisitions, and that she does not threaten the
     integrity of Servia. Her only object is to insure her own
     tranquillity. Consequently it rests with Russia to avoid
     war. Germany feels herself at one with France in her keen
     desire to preserve the peace, and strongly hopes that France
     will use her influence at St. Petersburg in the direction of
     moderation." _The [French] Minister observed that Germany
     could on her side take similar steps at Vienna, especially
     in view of the conciliatory spirit which Servia had shown.
     The Ambassador answered that that was not possible, in
     view of the resolution taken not to interfere in the
     Austro-Servian conflict._ Thereupon the Minister asked if
     the four Powers--England, Germany, Italy, and France--were
     not able to take steps at St. Petersburg and Vienna, since
     the affair reduced itself in essentials to a conflict
     between Russia and Austria. The Ambassador pleaded the
     absence of instructions. Finally, the Minister refused to
     adhere to the German proposal.[29]

[Footnote 29: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 28.]

This significant interview states the consistent attitude of Germany.
The burden is put upon France to induce its ally to desist from any
intervention and thus give Austria a free hand, while Germany
emphatically declines to promote the same pacific object by suggesting
to Austria a more conciliatory course.

On the same day England asked France, Italy, and Germany to meet in
London for an immediate conference to preserve the peace of Europe,
and to this fruitful suggestion, which might have saved that peace,
the German Secretary of State, after conferring with the British
Ambassador at Berlin, replied that the conference

     would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could
     not, in his opinion, be called together except at the
     request of Austria and Russia. He could not, therefore, fall
     in with your [Sir Edward Grey's] suggestion, desirous though
     he was to cooperate for the maintenance of peace. I [Sir E.
     Goschen] said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do
     with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four
     nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest
     means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He [von Jagow]
     maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed
     was not practicable.[30]

[Footnote 30: English _White Paper_, No. 43.]

Germany's refusal to have Servia's case submitted to the Powers even
for their consideration is the more striking when it is recalled that
on the same day the German Ambassador at London quoted the German
Secretary of State as saying

     that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia
     could hardly be expected to accept,

thus recognizing that Austria's ultimatum was, at least in part,
unjust. Sir Edward Grey then called the German Ambassador's attention
to the fact that if Austria refused the conciliatory reply of Servia
and marched into that country

     it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all
     costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be
     involved.

He added that the Servian reply

     should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and
     pause,

and asked that the German Government should urge this at Vienna but,
as we have already seen, the German Secretary of State had already
replied that such a conference "was not practicable," and that it
"would practically amount to a court of arbitration," and could not,
in his opinion, be called together "except at the request of Austria
and Russia."[31]

[Footnote 31: English _White Paper_, No. 16.]

That this was a mere evasion is perfectly plain. Germany already knew
that Austria would not ask for such a conference, for Austria had
already refused Russia's request for an extension of time and had
actually commenced its military operations.

Germany's attitude is again clearly indicated by the letter of the
Russian Minister in Germany to the Russian Foreign Office in which he
states that on July 27th he called at the German Foreign Office and
asked it,

     to urge upon Vienna in a more pressing fashion to take up
     this line of conciliation. Von Jagow replied that he could
     not advise Austria to yield.[32]

[Footnote 32: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 38.]

Why not? Russia and its allies had advised Servia to yield and Servia
had conceded nearly every claim. Why could not the German Foreign
Office advise Vienna to meet conciliation by conciliation, if its
desire for peace were sincere?

Before this interview took place, the French Ambassador had called at
the German Foreign Office on a similar errand and urged the English
suggestion that action should at once be taken by England, Germany,
Russia, and France at St. Petersburg and Vienna, to the effect that
Austria and Servia

     should abstain from any act which might aggravate the
     situation at the present hour.

By this was meant that there should be, pending further parleys, no
invasion of Servia by Austria and none of Austria by Russia. _To this
the German Foreign Minister opposed a categorical refusal._

On the same day the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had "a long and
earnest conversation" with the Austrian Under-Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs. He expressed the earnest hope that

     something would be done before Servia was actually invaded.
     Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a
     skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the
     Servians had been aggressors.

The Russian Ambassador then said that his country would do all it
could to keep the Servians quiet, "and even to fall back before an
Austrian advance in order to gain time."

He urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be
furnished with full powers to continue discussions with the Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs,

     who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that
     could be fairly asked of her as an independent Power.

The only reply to this reasonable suggestion was that it would be
submitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.[33]

[Footnote 33: English _White Paper_, No. 56.]

On the same day the German Ambassador at Paris called upon the
French Foreign Office and "_strongly insisted on the exclusion
of all possibility of mediation or a conference_"[34]; and yet
contemporaneously the Imperial German Chancellor was advising London
that he had

     started the efforts towards mediation in Vienna, immediately
     in the way desired by Sir Edward Grey, and had further
     communicated to the Austrian Foreign Minister the wish of
     the Russian Foreign Minister for a direct talk in Vienna.

[Footnote 34: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 34.]

What hypocrisy! In the formal German defense, the German Foreign
Office, after stating its conviction

     that an act of mediation could not take into consideration
     the Austro-Servian conflict, which was purely an
     Austro-Hungarian affair,

claimed that Germany had transmitted Sir Edward Grey's further
suggestion to Vienna, in which Austro-Hungary was urged

     either to agree to accept the Servian answer as sufficient
     or to look upon it as a basis for further conversations;

but the Austro-Hungarian Government--playing the role of the wicked
partner of the combination--"in full appreciation of our mediatory
activity" (so says the German _White Paper_ with sardonic humor),
replied to this proposition that, coming after the opening of
hostilities, "_it was too late_."

Can it be fairly questioned that if Germany had done something more
than merely "transmit" these wise and pacific suggestions, Austria
would have complied with the suggestions of its powerful ally or that
Austria would have suspended its military operations if Germany had
given any intimation of such a wish?

On the following day, July 28th, the door was further closed on any
possibility of compromise, when the Austrian Minister for Foreign
Affairs

     said, quietly, but firmly, _that no discussion could be
     accepted on the basis of the Servian note_; that war would
     be declared to-day, and that the well-known pacific
     character of the Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own,
     might be accepted as a guarantee that the war was both just
     and inevitable; that this was a matter that must be settled
     directly between the two parties immediately concerned.

To this arrogant and unreasonable contention that Europe must accept
the guarantee of the Austrian Foreign Minister as to the righteousness
of Austria's quarrel, the British Ambassador suggested "the larger
aspect of the question," namely, the peace of Europe, and to this
"larger aspect," which should have given any reasonable official some
ground for pause, the Austrian Foreign Minister replied that he

     had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to
     oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at
     territorial aggrandizement, and which could no longer be
     postponed.[35]

[Footnote 35: English _White Paper_, No. 62.]

The private conversations between Russia and Austria having thus
failed, Russia returned to the proposition of a European conference to
preserve its peace. Its Ambassador in Vienna on July 28th had a
further conference with Berchtold and again earnestly pleaded for
peace on the basis of friendly relations not only between Austria and
Servia but between Austria and Russia. The conversation in the light
of present developments is so significant that it bears quotation _in
extenso_:

     I pointed out to him in the most friendly terms how much it
     was desirable to find a solution which, while consolidating
     the good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia,
     should give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy serious
     guarantees for its future relations with Servia.

     _I called the attention of Count Berchtold to all the
     dangers to the peace of Europe_ which would be brought about
     by an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

     Count Berchtold replied that he understood perfectly well
     the seriousness of the situation and the advantages of a
     frank explanation with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. _He
     told me that on the other hand the Austro-Hungarian
     Government, which had only reluctantly decided upon the
     energetic measures which it had taken against Servia, could
     now neither withdraw nor enter upon any discussion of the
     terms of the Austro-Hungarian note._

     Count Berchtold added that the crisis had become so acute
     and that public opinion had been excited to such a degree
     that the Government, even if it desired, could no longer
     consent to it, all the less, he said to me, because the very
     reply of Servia gave proof of the lack of sincerity in its
     promises for the future.

On the same day, July 28th, the German Imperial Chancellor sent for
the English Ambassador and excused his failure to accept the proposed
conference of the neutral Powers, on the ground that he did not think
it would be effective,

     because such a conference would, in his opinion, have the
     appearance of an "Areopagus" consisting of two Powers of
     each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining
     Powers.

After engaging in this narrow and insincere quibble, and, being
reminded of Servia's conciliatory reply,

     his Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss the
     Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he
     agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely
     Austrian concern, _with which Russia had nothing to do_.[36]

[Footnote 36: English _White Paper_, No. 71.]

At this stage of the controversy it will be noted that every proposal
to preserve peace had come from the Triple Entente and that every such
proposal had met with an uncompromising negative from Austria, and
either that or obstructive quibbles from Germany.




CHAPTER VII

THE ATTITUDE OF FRANCE


Before proceeding to record the second and final stage in the peace
parleys, in which the German Kaiser became the protagonist, it is
desirable to interpolate the additional data, which the French _Yellow
Book_ has given to the world since the preceding chapter was written
and the first editions of this book were printed. This can be done
with little sacrifice to the chronological sequence of this narrative.

The evidence of the _Yellow Book_ is fuller in scope and greater in
detail than the other governmental publications, and while largely
cumulative in its character, it serves to bring into a sharper light
certain phases of this extraordinary controversy.

It has been prepared with great care by M. Jules Cambon, who was
the French Ambassador at Berlin during the controversy, and MM. de
Margerie and Berthelot, experienced and influential diplomats in the
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It consists of 160 documents,
classified into seven chapters, each dealing with different periods
of time in the great controversy. The delay in its presentation is
somewhat compensated by the exceptional fullness of the data which is
thus submitted to the scrutiny of a candid world.

The French _Yellow Book_ confirms the impression that France was most
fortunate in having entrusted its interests at the difficult post of
Berlin in this great crisis to so distinguished and experienced a
diplomat as M. Jules Cambon.

Throughout the whole controversy the impartial reader is deeply
impressed with the fact, which the more candid apologists for Germany
are themselves disposed to admit, that Germany's chief weakness lay in
its incapable diplomatic representatives. An interesting subject for
conjecture suggests itself as to what would have happened if Prince
Bismarck had been at the helm at this critical juncture. His guiding
principles of statecraft with reference to foreign relations were to
isolate the enemy, make him the apparent aggressor, and then crush him
as effectually and speedily as possible. He never would have initiated
this war. His nature was that of the fox as well as the lion.

In the years that have succeeded his dismissal, a certain dry rot, due
to the tendency of the Prussian Government to distribute its
diplomatic offices among highborn but incompetent Junkers,--_une
petite gentilhommerie pauvre et stupide_, as Bismarck once described
them--had affected the efficiency of German diplomacy. Feebly
attempting to walk in the steps of the Iron Chancellor, they wittingly
or unwittingly reversed Bismarck's policy by almost isolating Germany,
consolidating its enemies, and then proceeding to attack them
simultaneously. This may have been magnificent courage, but it was not
wise statecraft. The might of the German sabre was supposed to offset
these blundering disciples of Machiavelli.

Russia, England, and France were more fortunate and of their
representatives few, if any, shone with greater intellectual
distinction or moral courage than M. Jules Cambon. This distinguished
diplomat had had exceptional experience in representing his country in
various capitals of the world, and the author, who enjoyed the honor
of his acquaintance, when he was accredited to Washington, already
knew, what the documents in the French _Yellow Book_ so clearly
reveal, that Cambon was a diplomat of great intellectual ability.
With acute sagacity he grasped the significance of the fateful
events, in which he was a participant. To his calm and well-poised
intellectuality he added a moral force, resulting from the clear
integrity of his purpose and the broad humanity of his aims.

On more than one occasion he spoke "in the name of humanity," and in
his constant attempt to convince the German Foreign Office as to its
clear duty to civilization to preserve the peace of the world, he
became the representative, not merely of France, but of civilization
itself.

In this great diplomatic controversy, one of the greatest in the
history of the world, the three representatives, who stand out with
the greatest intellectual and moral distinction, are Sazonof, Grey,
and Cambon.

The first displayed the greatest sagacity in divining from the very
outset the real purposes of Germany and Austria and in checkmating the
diplomatic moves, which sought to make Russia apparently the
aggressor.

Sir Edward Grey's chief merit lay in his unwearying but ineffectual
efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the problem and also in
the absolute candor--so unusual in diplomacy--with which he dealt on
the one hand with the efforts of Russia and France to align England
on their side at the beginning of the quarrel, and on the other, to
continue friendly negotiations with Germany and Austria, without in
any respect unfairly misleading them as to England's possible ultimate
action.

The French Ambassador will justly receive the approval of posterity
for the high courage and moral earnestness with which he pressed upon
the German Foreign Office the inevitable consequences of its acts.

The first chapter of the French _Yellow Book_ consists largely of
communications written from Berlin by M. Jules Cambon in the year
1913. Its most interesting document is his report from Berlin under
date November 22, 1913, as to a conversation between the Kaiser and
the King of Belgium, with reference to a change in the pacific
attitude, which Cambon had previously imputed to the Kaiser.

To the world at large this statement would be more convincing if the
source of the information had been disclosed. Those who know M. Jules
Cambon, however, will have a reasonable confidence that when he states
that he received the record of this conversation "from an absolutely
sure source," more than usual credence can be given to the statement.
Reading between the lines, the implication is not unreasonable that
the source of Cambon's authority was King Albert himself, but this
rests only on a plausible conjecture.

The fact that so trained an observer as the French Ambassador had seen
in the Kaiser a marked change as early as 1913 is significant, and
history may justify Cambon in his shrewd conjecture that "the
impatience of the soldiers," meaning thereby the German General Staff,
and the growing popularity of his chauvinistic son, the Crown Prince,
had appreciably modified the pacific attitude of the Kaiser, which had
served the cause of peace so well in the Moroccan crisis. Cambon's
recital of the incident in question, written on November 22, 1913,
justifies quotation _in extenso_.

     I have received from an absolutely sure source a record of a
     conversation which is reported between the Emperor and the
     King of the Belgians, in the presence of the Chief of the
     General Staff, General von Moltke, a fortnight ago--a
     conversation which would appear greatly to have struck King
     Albert. I am in no way surprised by the impression created,
     which corresponds with that made on me some time ago.
     Hostility against us is becoming more marked, and the
     Emperor has ceased to be a partisan of peace. The German
     Emperor's interlocutor thought up to the present, as did
     everybody, that William II., whose personal influence has
     been exerted in many critical circumstances in favor of the
     maintenance of peace, was still in the same state of mind.
     This time, it appears, he found him completely changed. The
     German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of
     peace against the bellicose tendencies of certain German
     parties. William II. has been brought to think that war with
     France is inevitable, and that it will have to come one day
     or the other. The Emperor, it need hardly be said, believes
     in the crushing superiority of the German army and in its
     assured success.

     General von Moltke spoke in exactly the same sense as his
     sovereign. He also declared that war was necessary and
     inevitable, but he showed himself still more certain of
     success. "For," said he to the King, "this time we must put
     an end to it" (_cette fois il faut en finir_), "and your
     Majesty can hardly doubt the irresistible enthusiasm which
     on that day will carry away the whole German people."

     The King of the Belgians protested that to interpret the
     intentions of the French Government in this manner was to
     travesty them, and to allow oneself to be misled as to the
     feelings of the French nation by the manifestations of a few
     hotheads, or of conscienceless intriguers.

     The Emperor and his Chief of General Staff none the less
     persisted in their point of view.

     During this conversation the Emperor, moreover, appeared
     overwrought, and irritable. As the years begin to weigh upon
     William II. the family traditions, the retrograde feelings
     of the Court, and, above all, _the impatience of the
     soldiers_, are gaining more ascendency over his mind.
     Perhaps he may feel I know not what kind of jealousy of the
     popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of
     the Pan-Germans, and perhaps he may find that the position
     of the Empire in the world is not commensurate with its
     power. Perhaps, also, the reply of France to the last
     increase in the German army, the object of which was to
     place Germanic superiority beyond question, may count for
     something in these bitternesses, for whatever one may say it
     is felt here that the Germans cannot do much more. One may
     ask what lay behind the conversation. The Emperor and his
     Chief of General Staff may have intended to impress the King
     of the Belgians, and _to lead him not to resist in case a
     conflict with us should arise_[37]....

[Footnote 37: French _Yellow Book_, No. 6.]

This picture of the Kaiser is interesting and significant.

Germany's loss of prestige in the Moroccan controversy, due to the
Kaiser's unwillingness to precipitate a war at that time and his
somewhat diminished popularity with his people, not only accentuated
the desire of his military camarilla to find another pretext for a
war, but may have modified the Kaiser's resistance to this bellicose
policy. Until that time he had been quite content to _play_ the part
of Caesar. It may be questioned whether he had previously a real desire
to _be_ a Caesar. To describe himself metaphorically as "clad in
shining armor" and to shake the "mailed fist" was his constant pose.
"And so he played his part." As long as the world was content to take
this imperial fustian in a Pickwickian sense, the imperial
_impresario_ found the same enjoyment as when he staged Sardanapalus
on the boards of the Berlin Theater.

The Kaiser was destined to stage a greater spectacle than the burning
of a Babylonian palace. His crowning achievement was to apply the
torch to civilization itself.

Prior to 1913 neither his wishes nor plans carried him further than
the congenial art of imperial posing. Behind his natural preference
for peace was ever the lurking fear that a disastrous war might cost
him his throne. The experience of Napoleon the Third was quite too
recent to be ignored.

In the Moroccan controversy, the unwillingness of France to assent to
all demands and the resolute purpose of England to support its ally,
presented a crisis, which could not be met with rhetorical phrases,
and the Kaiser found himself confronted with a situation, in which a
very considerable number of thoughtful and influential Germans
favored an immediate appeal to arms, and as to which only his word
was wanted to precipitate hostilities in 1911.

The Kaiser at that time failed to meet the expectations of those who
had expected a more warlike attitude from the knight "clad in shining
armor," and the expression "William the Peaceful" was bandied about
with increasing contempt by the war party in Germany, whose passions
the Crown Prince--not unwilling to push his royal father prematurely
from the pedestal of popularity--was assiduously fanning.

While the fact cannot yet be regarded as established, the writer
believes that the future may indubitably show that the Kaiser did have
full knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum in advance of its issuance
and gave his consent to the policy of that _coup_ in the hope that it
would somewhat restore his diminished prestige. He probably followed
this policy in the confident expectation that Russia would yield, as
it had yielded in 1908 in the Bosnian incident, and when he discovered
in Norway that Russia, while willing to maintain peace upon any
reasonable terms, was not disposed to surrender all its legitimate
interests in the Servian question, he, as will be more fully narrated
in the next chapter, hurried back to Berlin and for a time attempted
to reverse the policy and bring about a peaceful adjustment.

Unfortunately this attempt came too late. His military camarilla had
determined upon war. Preparations were then being feverishly made, and
the German and Austrian chancelleries were steadily and deliberately
shutting the door upon any possibility of peace.

To withdraw under these circumstances from an untenable position meant
a substantial impairment of his already diminished prestige. A
Washington would have saved the situation, but the Kaiser was not a
Washington.

Another most illuminating feature of this chapter of the _Yellow Book_
is a report from the French Embassy in Berlin to its Foreign Office on
the public opinion of Germany in the summer of 1913, as disclosed by
the reports of the French consular representatives in Germany. It
gives an extraordinary analysis of conditions in Germany prior to the
war, and it describes in great fullness the many causes which were
contributory to the creation of a powerful war party in Germany. As
it is not in strictness a part of the diplomatic record, it is not
embodied in the text of this book, but its value as an acute analysis
of conditions in Germany--made before the passions of the war had
clouded the judgment--will repay the reader's careful consideration.

The second chapter of the French _Yellow Book_ deals with the events
which took place between the murder of the Archduke and the Austrian
ultimatum and presents new and cumulative evidence of substantial
value.

The French Consul General at Budapest, in a report to his Foreign
Office under date July 11, 1914, after showing that the Hungarian
Premier, Count Tisza, had refused to disclose, even to the Hungarian
Chamber, the results of the judicial inquiry into the Serajevo murder
and the decision taken by the Austrian Cabinet, proceeds to show how
the suppression of the news in Austria was a part of the scheme to
make the ultimatum to Servia so abrupt and speedy that no course would
be open to Servia and Europe other than an immediate and unconditional
surrender.

     Everything is for peace in the newspapers, but the mass of
     the public believes in war and fears it.... The Government,
     whether it be seriously desirous of peace, or whether it be
     _preparing a coup_, is now doing everything it can to allay
     this anxiety. That is why the tone of the Government
     newspapers has been lowered first, by one note and then by
     two, until now it has become almost optimistic. But the
     Government newspapers themselves have carefully spread the
     alarm. Their optimism to order is really without an echo.
     The nervousness of the Bourse, a barometer one cannot
     neglect, is a sure proof of that. Stocks, without exception,
     have fallen to improbably low prices. The Hungarian four per
     cent. was yesterday quoted at 79.95, a price which has never
     been quoted since the first issue.[38]

[Footnote 38: French _Yellow Book_, No. 11.]

Simultaneously a very different note was sounded by the organ of the
military party in Vienna. The _Militaerische Rundschau_, a few days
before the ultimatum to Servia, said:

     "The moment is still favorable for us. If we do not decide
     upon war, the war we shall have to make in two or three
     years at the latest will be begun in circumstances much less
     propitious; now the initiative belongs to us. Russia is not
     ready, the moral factors are for us, might as well as right.
     _Since some day we shall have to accept the struggle, let us
     provoke it at once._"[39]

[Footnote 39: _Ibid._, No. 12.]

Before the Austrian ultimatum was issued there had been some
preliminary informal negotiations between Austria and Servia and the
latter had expressed its willingness to give to Austria the most ample
reparation "provided that she did not demand judiciary cooperation,"
and the Servian Minister at Berlin warned "the German Government that
it would be dangerous to endeavor by this inquiry (_i.e._, by the
participation of Austrian officials in the courts of Servia) to damage
the prestige of Servia."[40]

[Footnote 40: French _Yellow Book_, No. 15.]

It thus appears that Austria and Germany had warning in advance of the
issuance of the ultimatum that if this humiliating demand were
included it would meet with refusal. Their intention to precipitate
this war or impose their will upon Europe may therefore be measured by
the fact that, with full knowledge that that particular demand would
not be accepted, it was made a leading feature of the ultimatum, and
finally became the principal outstanding difference after Servia had
accepted substantially all the other demands of Austria. This was
reported by Cambon to his Foreign Office two days before the ultimatum
was issued and at that time Germany was fully advised as to the one
demand, which Servia could not in justice to its sovereignty accept.
In the same letter, Cambon advises his Foreign Office that Germany had
already issued the "preliminary warning of mobilization, which places
Germany in a sort of _garde-a-vous_ during periods of tension."[41]

[Footnote 41: _Ibid._, No. 15.]

A further corroboration of Germany's knowledge of the Austrian
ultimatum before its issuance is found in a report of the French
Minister at Munich to the French Foreign Office, written on the day
when the Austrian ultimatum was issued, and a full day before it
reached any capital except Berlin and Belgrade. He writes:

     The Bavarian Press appears to believe that a peaceful
     solution of the Austro-Servian incident is not only possible
     but even probable. Official circles, on the contrary, for
     some time past, have displayed with more or less sincerity
     positive pessimism.

     _The Prime Minister notably said to me to-day that the
     Austrian note, of which he had cognizance, was in his
     opinion drawn up in terms acceptable to Servia, but that the
     present situation appeared to him none the less to be very
     grave._[42]

[Footnote 42: French _Yellow Book_, No. 21.]

As it is unlikely that the Austrian Government would have dealt
directly with the Bavarian Government without similar communications
to the German Foreign Office, it follows as a strong probability that
the German Foreign Office and probably each of the constituent States
of Germany knew on July the 23d that Austria intended to demand that
which Servia had previously indicated its unalterable determination
to refuse. Under these circumstances the repeated and insistent
assurances that the German Foreign Office gave to England, France,
and Russia that it "_had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note
before it was handed in and had not exercised any influence on its
contents_"[43] presents a policy of deception unworthy of a great
nation or of the twentieth century.

[Footnote 43: _Ante_, p. 36.]

It regarded this policy of submarine diplomacy as necessary, not only
to throw the other nations off their guard while Germany was arming,
but also to support its contention that the quarrel between Servia
and Austria was a local quarrel. If it appeared that Germany had
instigated Austria in its course, it could not have supported its
first contention that the quarrel was a local one and it could not
reasonably dispute the right of Russia to intervene. For this purpose
the fable was invented. It deceived no one.

The French _Yellow Book_ discloses another even more amazing feature
of this policy of deception, for it shows on the authority of the
Italian Foreign Minister that Germany and Austria did not even take
their own ally into their confidence. The significance of this fact
cannot be overestimated. Nothing in the whole record more clearly
demonstrates the purpose of the German and Austrian diplomats to set
a trap for the rest of Europe.

Under the terms of the Triple Alliance it was the duty of each member
to submit to its associates all matters which might involve the
possibility of joint cooperation. Even if this had not been written
in the very terms of the Alliance, it would follow as a necessary
implication, for when each member obligated itself to cooperate
with its allies in any attack upon either of them, but not in any
_aggressive_ war, it necessarily followed that each ally had the right
to the fullest information as to any controversy which might involve
such action, so that it might determine whether it fell within the
terms of the obligation.

Neither the German nor the Austrian Foreign Office have ever submitted
any documentary proof that they discharged this obligation to their
ally and it may be added they have never pretended that they did so.

If further proof were needed, we find in the French _Yellow Book_ a
report from the French Minister at Rome to his Foreign Office, under
date July the 27th, reporting a conversation between the French
Minister and the Italian Foreign Minister, the Marquis di San
Giuliano, on that day, in which the latter spoke of the

     contents of the Austrian note, _and assured me that he had
     had no previous knowledge of them whatever_.

     He was well aware that the note was to be vigorous and
     energetic in character, but he had no idea that it could
     take such a form. I asked him if it was true, as is stated
     in certain newspapers, that in this connection he had
     expressed in Vienna approval of Austrian action, and had
     given the assurance that Italy would fulfill her duties as
     an ally towards Austria. He replied, "_In no way have we
     been consulted; we have been told nothing whatever._ We have
     therefore had no reason to make any communication of this
     nature in Vienna."[44]

[Footnote 44: French _Yellow Book_, No. 72.]

The reason for this secrecy is not far to seek. Almost a year before
the Archduke's death, Austria had sounded Italy as to its willingness
to acquiesce or participate in a war by Austria against Servia, and
Italy had refused. For this reason and also because an Austrian war
against Servia was not to the interests of Italy, Austria and Germany
both recognized, without even consulting their ally, that they could
not count upon its cooperation in such a war. To submit their proposed
action to Italy was to invite a deliberate expression of disapproval,
and this would make it more difficult for them to demand its
cooperation, if they could carry out their policy of so flouting
Russia as to compel it to initiate an aggressive war, as they clearly
hoped to do.

There was, however, another and very practical reason for this failure
to consult their ally. We have seen that the whole policy of the
Austrian ultimatum was founded upon secrecy. The plan was to give to
Europe no possible intimation of the intended action until it was
accomplished and then to give to Europe only twenty-four hours within
which to deliberate or act. If as a matter of courtesy Austria and
Germany submitted to their ally their proposed course of action,
Italy, being wholly opposed to any such unprovoked attack upon Servia,
might find a way, either by open and public protest or by dropping a
confidential intimation, to advise the other countries as to what was
in preparation. This would defeat the principal purpose of Germany and
Austria, to force a quick decision and to prepare for eventualities
before any other country could make ready. Germany and Austria
therefore wholly ignored their ally and pursued their stealthy policy
to its discreditable end.

When their diplomatic communications are disclosed in full, this
feature of their policy may disclose some significant admissions.

We have already seen (_ante_, p. 35) that when on July the 20th, three
days before the Austrian ultimatum was issued, Sir Edward Grey asked
Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in London, as to what news
he had from Vienna with reference to the intentions of his country,
Prince Lichnowsky affected to be ignorant. But it appears from a
letter, which M. Paul Cambon[45] wrote to his Foreign Office on July
the 24th, 1914, that Prince Lichnowsky had returned to London from
Berlin about a month before and had "displayed pessimistic views as to
the relations between St. Petersburg and Berlin." Cambon adds that the
English Foreign Office and his other diplomatic colleagues had all
been struck "by the anxious appearance of Prince Lichnowsky since his
return from Berlin."[46]

[Footnote 45: The French Ambassador at London.]

[Footnote 46: French _Yellow Book_, No. 32.]

So designedly was the Austrian ultimatum withheld from the
chancelleries of Europe, other than Vienna and Berlin, that on the day
following its issuance at Belgrade, the only information which M.
Jules Cambon had of its issuance were the extracts in the press, and
he thereupon saw the German Secretary of State and asked him whether
such an ultimatum had been sent.

     Herr von Jagow replied affirmatively, adding that the note
     was energetic, and that he approved it, the Servian
     Government having long since exhausted Austrian patience. He
     considers, moreover, that for Austria the question is one of
     a domestic nature, and he hopes that it will be localized. I
     then said to him that, not having received any instructions,
     I only wished to have with him an entirely personal exchange
     of views. I then asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really
     been in complete ignorance of the Austrian claims before
     they were communicated to Belgrade, _and as he replied that
     this was so_, I expressed my surprise that he should thus
     undertake to support pretensions, the limit and nature of
     which he ignored.

     "It is only," said Herr von Jagow, interrupting me, "because
     we are talking personally between ourselves that I allow you
     to say that to me."

     "Certainly," I replied, "but if Peter I. humiliates himself
     Servia will probably be given over to internal troubles.
     That will open the door to fresh possibilities, and do you
     know where Vienna will lead you?" I added that the language
     of the German Press was not that of a people who were
     indifferent and foreign to the affair, but told of active
     support. Finally, I remarked that the shortness of the time
     given to Servia in which to yield would make a bad
     impression upon Europe.

     Herr von Jagow replied that he expected "_un peu
     d'emotion_," on the part of Servia's friends, but that he
     counted upon their giving Servia good advice.

     "I do not doubt," I then said, "that Russia will make an
     effort in Belgrade to bring the Cabinet to make what
     concessions are acceptable, but if you ask something of one,
     why not ask it of the other? And if it be expected that
     advice will be given in Belgrade, is it not legitimate to
     expect that on the other hand advice will also be tendered
     to Vienna?"

     The Secretary of State allowed himself to say that that
     would depend on circumstances, but, recovering himself
     immediately, declared that the matter must be localized. He
     asked me if really I considered the situation serious.
     "Assuredly," I replied, "for, if what is going on has been
     pondered over, I do not understand why people have cut their
     bridges behind them."[47]

[Footnote 47: French _Yellow Book_, No. 30.]

The _Yellow Book_ throws further light upon the extraordinarily petty
finesse, with which the chancelleries of Berlin and Vienna attempted
to take a snap judgment upon the rest of Europe. We learn from Exhibit
No. 55 that Count Berchtold had given to the Russian Ambassador at
Vienna, prior to the issuance of the ultimatum, an express assurance
"that the claims against Servia would be thoroughly acceptable," and
that upon this assurance Count Schebeko had left Vienna on a leave of
absence. During his absence and at a time when the President of the
French Republic, the French Premier, and its Minister of Foreign
Affairs were far distant from Paris and on the high seas, the
ultimatum was issued, and, as we have seen, Count Berchtold
immediately betook himself to Ischl and remained there until the
expiration of the brief time limit in the ultimatum.

The same policy was pursued with reference to other Ambassadors, for
when France instructed its representative in Vienna "to call the
attention of the Austrian Government to the anxiety aroused in Europe,
Baron Macchio stated to our Ambassador that the tone of the Austrian
note and the demands formulated by it permitted one to count upon a
pacific denouement."[48]

[Footnote 48: French _Yellow Book_, No. 20.]

In the same communication, in which this information is embodied, we
gain the important information that "in the Vienna Diplomatic Corps
the German Ambassador recommends violent resolutions whilst declaring
ostensibly that the Imperial Chancellery is not _wholly_ in agreement
with him on this point."

Pursuant to the same ostrich policy, the German Secretary of State, as
we have previously seen (_ante_, pp. 71-75), gave to both the French
and English Ambassadors the absence of Count Berchtold at Ischl as an
excuse for the failure of Germany to get any extension of the time
limit, and not only did he assure them repeatedly and in the most
unequivocal way that the German Foreign Office had no knowledge of,
or responsibility for, the Austrian ultimatum, but when on July the
25th the Russian Charge requested a personal appointment with von
Jagow in order to present his country's request for such an extension,
the German Secretary of State only gave "him an appointment at the end
of the afternoon, that is to say, _at the moment when the ultimatum
will expire_," and in view of this illusory appointment the Russian
Charge (M. Bronewsky)

     sent, with all speed, a written note to the Secretary of
     State, in which he pointed out that the delay of the
     communication made by Austria to the Powers rendered the
     effect of the communication illusory, since it did not give
     the Powers time to become acquainted with the facts alleged
     before the expiry of the ultimatum. He insisted very
     urgently on the necessity of extending it, if one had not in
     view the creation of a great crisis.[49]

[Footnote 49: French _Yellow Book_, No. 42.]

Thus in Berlin and Vienna by concerted action the representatives of
England, France, and Russia were evaded until the time limit for
Servia had expired.

Contrast with this petty finesse the spirit with which Sazonof
attempted to reach an agreement with the Austrian Ambassador at St.
Petersburg on July 26th, as set forth in the report of the French
Ambassador at St. Petersburg, under that date. He says:

     The Minister for Foreign Affairs continues with praiseworthy
     perseverance to seek means to bring about a peaceful
     solution. "I shall show myself ready to negotiate up to the
     last instant," he said to me.

     It is in this spirit that he has asked Count Szapary[50] to
     come and see him for a "frank and loyal explanation." In his
     presence M. Sazonof discussed the Austro-Hungarian
     ultimatum, article by article, showing clearly the insulting
     character of the different clauses. "The intention which
     inspired this document," he said, "is legitimate if you
     pursue no other aim but the protection of your territory
     against the agitation of Servian anarchists, but the step to
     which you have had recourse is not defensible." He
     concluded, "Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, _and
     I will guarantee the result_."[51]

[Footnote 50: The Austrian Ambassador.]

[Footnote 51: French _Yellow Book_, No. 54.]

Upon one phase of Germany's foreign policy in this crisis the French
_Yellow Book_ naturally throws more light than the other publications.
I refer to the attempt of Germany to coerce France into a position of
neutrality, or possibly to secure from it some definition of its
attitude, which would compromise its relations with Russia. The
_Yellow Book_ charges that the German Ambassador, under the pretext
of securing an authorized statement to the press to allay public
excitement, thus attempted to compromise France. The documents go far
to suggest this possibility but are not wholly convincing.

The German Ambassador on July the 24th, the very day that the
ultimatum reached the chancelleries of Europe, and on the day when von
Jagow untruthfully claimed that it had first reached Berlin, called
upon the French Minister for Foreign Affairs and read to him a formal
note, _of which he was unwilling to leave a copy_, although he
characterized it as a note of importance.

It may be here noted that on more than one occasion in this diplomatic
crisis the German representatives were unwilling to leave a copy of
the diplomatic messages which they orally communicated.

In his memorandum the French Minister for Foreign Affairs says:

     The German Ambassador especially directed my attention to
     the last two paragraphs of his note before he read it. He
     indicated that in them lay the chief point. I took note of
     the actual text, which is as follows: "The German Government
     considers that the present question is a matter to be
     settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and
     that the Powers have the greatest interest in restricting
     it to the two interested parties. The German Government
     ardently desires the localization of the conflict, since by
     the natural play of alliances any intervention by another
     Power would have incalculable consequences."

     I remarked to the German Ambassador that just as it appeared
     to be legitimate to call for the punishment of all those
     concerned in the crime of Serajevo, on the other hand it
     seemed difficult to require measures which could not be
     accepted, having regard to the dignity and sovereignty of
     Servia; the Servian Government, even if it was willing to
     submit to them, would risk being carried away by a
     revolution.

     I also pointed out to Herr von Schoen[52] that his note
     only took into account two hypotheses: that of a pure and
     simple refusal or that of a provocative attitude on the
     part of Servia. The third hypothesis (which would leave
     the door open for an arrangement) should also be taken
     into consideration; that of Servia's acceptance and of
     her agreeing at once to give full satisfaction for the
     punishment of the accomplices and full guarantees for the
     suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda so far as they
     were compatible with her sovereignty and dignity.

[Footnote 52: The German Ambassador.]

     I added that if within these limits the satisfaction desired
     by Austria could be admitted, the means of obtaining it
     could be examined; if Servia gave obvious proof of goodwill
     it could not be thought that Austria would refuse to take
     part in the conversation.

     Perhaps they should not make it too difficult for third
     party Powers, who could not either morally or sentimentally
     cease to take interest in Servia, to take an attitude which
     was in accord with the wishes of Germany to localize the
     dispute.

     Herr von Schoen recognized the justice of these
     considerations and vaguely stated that hope was always
     possible. When I asked him if we should give to the Austrian
     note the character of a simple _mise en demeure_, which
     permitted a discussion, or an ultimatum, he answered that
     personally he had no views.[53]

[Footnote 53: French _Yellow Book_, No. 28.]

On the following day the German Ambassador again called at the French
Foreign Office and protested against an article, which had appeared in
a Paris newspaper and which had characterized his communication of the
preceding day as the "German menace." The German Ambassador again gave
an unequivocal assurance

     that there was no agreement between Austria and Germany over
     the Austrian note, _of which the German Government was
     ignorant_, although the German Government had subsequently
     approved it on receiving communication of it _at the same
     time as the other Powers_.[54]

[Footnote 54: _Ibid._, No. 36.]

The hardihood of this statement, in view of the fact that on the
preceding day, simultaneously with the service of the ultimatum, the
threatening demand had been delivered by Germany to the leading
European chancelleries that the quarrel between Austria and Servia
must be localized, is apparent. Baron von Schoen, the German
Ambassador, then denied that his suggestion of "incalculable
consequences," if the dispute were not localized, was a "menace." This
statement, repeated by German diplomats in other capitals, approaches
the ludicrous. The first military power of Europe formally advises
other nations that unless they waive their legitimate claims and
interests, "incalculable consequences" will follow, and it is gravely
suggested that this is not a "menace."

On the following day Baron von Schoen made two visits at the French
Foreign Office and assured the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs
that

     Germany _was on the side of France in the ardent desire for
     the maintenance of peace_, and she earnestly hoped that
     France would use her influence in a soothing manner in St.
     Petersburg.

     I replied to this suggestion that Russia was moderate, that
     she had committed no act throwing doubt upon her moderation,
     and that we were in agreement with her in seeking for a
     peaceful solution of the struggle. It therefore appeared to
     me that in counterpart Germany should act in Vienna, _where
     the efficacy of her action was sure_, with a view to
     avoiding military operations tending to the occupation of
     Servia.

     The Ambassador having pointed out to me that that was
     irreconcilable with the position adopted by Germany, "that
     the question only concerned Austria and Servia," I said to
     him that mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg might be
     made by the four Powers who were less directly interested in
     the matter.

     Baron von Schoen then sheltered himself behind his lack of
     instructions on this point, and I told him that in these
     circumstances I did not feel able to act in St. Petersburg
     alone.

     Our conversation concluded with the renewed assurance by the
     Ambassador as to the peaceful intentions of Germany, who, he
     declared, was with France on this point.[55]

[Footnote 55: French _Yellow Book_, No. 56.]

The incident now followed, which suggested to the French Foreign
office a subtle attempt of Germany to compromise the relations of
France with Russia by imputing disloyalty to the former. On his second
visit a few hours later, Baron von Schoen desired the French Foreign
Office to give to the public a statement with reference to the
preceding interview, and suggested the following, which he dictated to
the French official:

     "The German Ambassador and the Minister of Foreign Affairs
     had a further interview in the course of the afternoon,
     during which they examined, _in_ _the most friendly spirit
     and with a feeling of pacific solidarity, the means which
     might be employed for the maintenance of general peace_."

     The Acting Political Director at once replied: "Then, in
     your mind, everything is settled, and you give us the
     assurance that Austria accepts the Servian note, or will be
     willing to converse with the Powers with regard to it?"

     The Ambassador appeared to be taken aback, and made a
     vigorous denial. It was therefore pointed out to him that if
     nothing had changed in the negative attitude of Germany, the
     terms of the suggested "note to the Press" were excessive,
     and likely to give French opinion a false feeling of
     security by creating illusions as to the actual situation,
     the dangers of which were but too evident.[56]

[Footnote 56: French _Yellow Book_, No. 57.]

It is not surprising that the French Foreign Office looked askance at
these German suggestions of "pacific solidarity" with France, which
contrasted so strangely with Germany's refusal to work for peace and
its sinister menaces to other countries. France's suspicion that Baron
von Schoen was thus attempting to compromise its loyalty in the eyes
of Russia cannot be said to be without some foundation, although
it is as reasonable to assume that these professions of the German
Ambassador were only an incident to the general plan of lulling France
and its allies into a false sense of security. Here again the full
truth can only be ascertained when Germany is willing to submit to the
scrutiny of the world the records of its Foreign Office.

On July 26th, M. Jules Cambon had an interview with the German
Secretary of State and earnestly supported Sir Edward Grey's
suggestion that a conference be called in which England, France,
Germany, and Italy should participate for the preservation of peace.
This interview is at once so dramatic, and almost prophetic, that it
justifies quotation _in extenso_:

     To Cambon's proposition, von Jagow replied, as he did to the
     British Ambassador, that he could not accept a proposal to
     charge the Italian, French, and German Ambassadors with the
     task of seeking, with Sir Edward Grey, a means of solving
     the present difficulties, for that would be to establish a
     regular conference to deal with the affairs of Austria and
     Russia. I replied to Herr von Jagow that I regretted his
     response, but that the great object, which Sir Edward Grey
     had in view, _was above a question of form_, and what was
     important was the association of England and France with
     Germany and Italy in laboring for peace; that this
     association could show itself in common action in St.
     Petersburg and Vienna; that he had frequently expressed to
     me his regret at seeing the two groups of alliances always
     opposed to each other in Europe, and that here he had an
     opportunity of proving that there was a European spirit, by
     showing four Powers belonging to the two groups acting in
     common agreement to prevent a struggle. Herr von Jagow
     evaded the matter by saying that Germany had her engagements
     with Austria. _I pointed out that the relations of Germany
     with Vienna were no more close than those of France with
     Russia, and that it was he himself who raised the question
     of the two opposed groups of alliances._

     The Secretary of State then said that he did not refuse to
     act with a view to avoiding an Austro-Russian conflict, but
     that he could not intervene in the Austro-Servian conflict.
     "One is the consequence of the other," I said, "and it would
     be well to prevent the creation of any new state of affairs
     calculated to bring about the intervention of Russia."

     As the Secretary of State persisted in saying that he was
     obliged to observe his engagements with regard to Austria,
     _I asked him if he had pledged himself to follow Austria
     everywhere blindfold_, and if he had made himself acquainted
     with the Servian reply to Austria, which had been handed to
     him that morning by the Servian Charge d'Affaires. "_I have
     not yet had time_," he said. "I regret it," I replied. "You
     will see that except on points of detail Servia has yielded
     completely. It would seem, however, that since Austria has
     obtained the satisfaction, which your support procured her,
     you might to-day advise her to be content, or to examine
     with Servia the terms of the Servian reply."

     As Herr von Jagow did not answer me clearly, I asked him if
     Germany wanted war. He protested energetically, saying that
     he knew that that was my idea but that it was completely
     incorrect. "You must then," I replied, "act in consequence.
     _When you read the Servian reply, weigh the terms with your
     conscience, I beg you in the name of humanity, and do not
     personally assume a portion of the responsibility for the
     catastrophe, whose preparation you are allowing._" Herr von
     Jagow protested again, adding that he was ready to join
     England and France in any common effort, but that some form
     must be found for this intervention which he could accept
     and that the Cabinets should agree among themselves upon the
     matter. "Moreover," he added, "direct conversations between
     Vienna and St. Petersburg are begun and are proceeding. I
     expect much good of them, and I have hope."[57]

[Footnote 57: French _Yellow Book_, No. 74.]

In his solemn injunction to von Jagow "_in the name of humanity_" _to
weigh the terms in his conscience_, Cambon struck a loftier note than
any of the diplomatic disputants. Macaulay has said that the "French
mind has always been the interpreter between national ideas and those
of universal mankind," and at least since the French Revolution the
tribute has been deserved.

He, who carefully and dispassionately reads the diplomatic
correspondence which preceded the war, must be impressed with the
different point of view of the two groups of disputants. Both the
written and oral communications of the German and Austrian
representatives failed to suggest at any time a note other than
one of selfish nationalism. We search in vain for the most distant
recognition of the fact that the world at large had any legitimate
interest in the controversy. The insistent note, which Austria
sounded, was that its interests required its punitive action against
Servia, even though the peace of the world were thereby sacrificed,
and that of Germany repeated with equal insistence that its "closest
interests" summoned it to the side of Austria.

In marked contrast to this spirit of national selfishness is the
repeated admonition of Sir Edward Grey that the whole question should
be considered in its "larger aspects," thereby meaning the peace and
welfare of Europe; while the Czar, with evident sincerity, suggested
to the Kaiser that "with the aid of God it must be possible to our
long tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood," and proposed
a reference of the question to the Hague. Similarly the appeal of
Jules Cambon to von Jagow, "in the name of humanity" was more than the
ordinary exchange of diplomatic views. Von Jagow's conception of his
duty is shown by the fact that he had taken a position involving
"incalculable consequences" without even reading the Servian reply.

Cambon approved himself a worthy "yoke fellow in equity" with Sir
Edward Grey, and no loftier tone was sounded by any participant in
this great controversy, unless we except Goschen's solemn statement
to von Bethmann-Hollweg in the equally dramatic interview, which
succeeded the rupture of relations between England and Germany, when
Goschen stated that "it was so to speak a matter of life and death for
the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement
to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked," and
added, "that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an
excuse for breaking solemn promises."




CHAPTER VIII

THE INTERVENTION OF THE KAISER


The Kaiser now appears upon the scene with a fatal result to the peace
of Europe. One fact in this controversy is too clear for dispute.
When peace proposals were still under consideration and some slight
progress had been made by the eleventh-hour consent of Austria on July
31 to discuss with Russia the merits of the Servian question, the
Kaiser--like Brennus with his _vae victis_--threw his sword into the
trembling scales and definitely turned the balance against the peace
of the world.

Was it a reluctant Caesar who thus crossed the Rubicon, at whose
fateful margin he had stood at other crises of his peaceful reign
without destroying that peace?

Our information is still too meager to justify a satisfactory answer
at this time. Not only are the premises in dispute, but the inferences
from admitted premises are too conflicting.

At the time the Austrian Archduke was murdered the Kaiser was in
Berlin, and he at once showed an intense interest in the event and in
all that it portended. It was officially announced that he planned to
attend the funeral in Vienna, but later the world was advised that he
had suffered a "chill," which would prevent such attendance. Perhaps
it was a diplomatic chill. He then left for Norway, where he remained
in the enjoyment of his annual holiday until the evening of July 26th,
when he suddenly returned to his Capitol.

Evidently his return was unexpected, for we learn from a telegram from
Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 26th, that,

     the Emperor returned suddenly to-night and [the German]
     Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that the
     Foreign Office _regrets this step which was taken on His
     Majesty's own initiative_. They fear that His Majesty's
     sudden return may cause speculation and excitement.

As the refusal of Austria to accept the Servian reply and its
severance of all diplomatic relations with that country had already
thrown the entire world into a state of feverish anxiety, it is
difficult to understand why the German Foreign Office should have felt
that the very natural return of the Kaiser to his Capitol at one of
the greatest crises in the history of his country and of the world
should be regarded as giving rise to "speculation and excitement,"
especially as the President of the French Republic was hastening back
to Paris.

The Under-Secretary of State's deprecation of the Kaiser's return
suggests the possibility that the German Foreign Office, which had
already made substantial progress in precipitating the crisis, did not
wish the Kaiser's return for fear that he might again exert, as in the
Moroccan crisis, his great influence in the interests of peace.

It felt that it had the matter well in hand, but never before did a
foreign office blunder so flagrantly and with such disastrous results.
From beginning to end every anticipation that the German Chancellor
had was falsified by events. This discreditable and blundering chapter
of German diplomacy is enough to make the bones of the sagacious
Bismarck turn in his grave.

As appears from Sir M. de Bunsen's dispatch to Sir Edward Grey, dated
July 26th, it was the confident belief of the German diplomats that
"Russia will keep quiet during the chastisement of Servia," and that
"France too was not at all in a position for facing the war."[58]

[Footnote 58: English _White Paper_, No. 32.]

When the full history of this imbroglio is written, it will probably
be found that the extensive labor troubles in St. Petersburg, the
military unpreparedness of Russia and France, and the political schism
in England, then verging to civil war, had deeply impressed both
Vienna and Berlin that the dual alliance could impose its will upon
Europe with reference to Servia without any serious risk of a European
war.

While for these reasons Germany and Austria may not have regarded such
a war or the intervention of England therein as probable, yet the dual
alliance recognized from the outset such a possibility. The
uncertainty as to the Kaiser's attitude with respect to such a war may
therefore explain the "regret," with which the German Foreign Office
witnessed his sudden and uninvited return.

On his return the diplomatic negotiations, which had commenced with an
_allegro con brio_, for a time changed under the baton of the Imperial
Conductor into a more peaceful _andante_, until the Kaiser made one of
his characteristically sudden changes of purpose and precipitated the
war by an arrogant ultimatum to Russia, which that country could not
possibly accept without a fatal sacrifice of its self-respect and
prestige as a nation.

If it be true--and the future may demonstrate it--that this war was
planned by Germany at least as far back as the Moroccan crisis, then
the Kaiser's responsibility for the commencement of the quarrel cannot
be doubted. It is inconceivable that the German Foreign Office could
pursue for three years the policy of precipitating a European war
without the knowledge and consent of the "Over War Lord."

When full data are accessible as to the importations by Germany in
advance of the war, as to its withdrawal of foreign credits and
placing of foreign loans, its sales of stocks by influential
investors, and its importations on the eve of the war of horses and
foodstuffs, a strong circumstantial case may be developed of a
deliberate purpose to retrieve the Moroccan fiasco by an audacious
_coup_ which would determine the mastery of Europe. The levy in 1913
of an extraordinary tax upon capital, which virtually confiscated the
earnings of the German people for military purposes, adds much support
to this contention. According to Giolitti, the former Italian Premier,
Austria sounded Italy in August, 1913, as to its willingness to
participate in a war against Servia.[59]

[Footnote 59: Giolitti Speech, Italian Chamber, Dec. 5, 1914.]

The inferences to be drawn from the Kaiser's personality are
somewhat conflicting. Like all self-centered and highly neurotic
personalities, his nature is essentially a dual one. This does not
mean that he is in any sense a hypocrite, for one of the engaging
features of his attractive personality has been the candor and
sincerity which have marked nearly all his public acts. He has shown
himself to be a man of opposite moods, and conflicting purposes,
having almost as many public poses as he has costumes, and a strong
desire to play as many varied _roles_ as possible on the stage of the
world. Like Bottom in the _Midsummer Night's Dream_, he would play
all parts from the "roaring lion" to the shrinking Thisbe.

The ruler who sent a sympathetic message to Kruger as an insult to
England is he who shortly thereafter gratuitously submitted to Queen
Victoria military plans for the subjugation of the Boers.

The ruler, who sent the _Panther_ to Agadir, later restrained his
country from declaring war against England, when Lloyd George threw
down the gauntlet in his Mansion House speech in the Moroccan crisis.

As preacher, the Kaiser exalted within sight of the Mount of Olives
the precepts of Christian humility, and yet advised his soldiers, on
their departure to China, to "take no prisoners and give no quarter."
The most affable and democratic monarch on occasion will in another
mood assume the outworn toggery of mediaeval absolutism. A democratic
business monarch, and as such the advance agent of German prosperity,
he yet shocks the common sense and awakens the ridicule of the world
by posing as a combination of Caesar and Mahomet.

The avowed champion of Christianity, who has preached with the fervor
of Peter the Hermit against the Yellow Race, he has nevertheless,
since this war began, instigated the Sultan of Turkey to proclaim in
the Moslem world a "holy war" against his Christian enemies.

Pacific and bellicose by turns the monarch, who throughout his whole
reign has hitherto kept the peace of the world, has yet on slight
pretext given utterance to the most warlike and incendiary statements.

How is it possible to draw any inference from such a personality, of
whom it could be said, as Sydney Smith once said of Lord John Russell,
that

     there is nothing he would not undertake. I believe he would
     perform an operation for stone, build St. Peter's, assume
     (with or without ten minutes' notice) the command of the
     Channel Fleet, and no one would discover from his manner
     that the patient had died, that St. Peter's had tumbled
     down, and that the Channel Fleet had been knocked to atoms.

We should therefore dismiss all inferences suggested by his complex
personality and should judge him by what he did from the time that he
suddenly arrived in Berlin on July 26th, until the issuance by his
direct order of the fatal ultimatum to Russia.

Before proceeding to analyze the very interesting and dramatic
correspondence, which passed between the rulers of Germany, England,
and Russia--doubly interesting because of the family relationship and
the unusual personal and cousinly intimacy of these dispatches--it is
well to inquire what the Kaiser could have done that would have
immediately avoided the crisis and saved the situation. So far as the
published record goes, he did not send a single telegram in the
interests of peace to his illustrious ally, the Emperor Francis
Joseph.

Let us suppose that he had sent the following:

     I have just returned to Berlin and find Europe on the verge
     of war. I sympathize entirely with you and your country in
     its demands upon Servia. I agree with you that the Servian
     reply is not satisfactory. In accordance with the
     obligations of our alliance, I shall in any event support
     with the full power of the German sword the cause of
     Austria. Servia has by its reply admitted its responsibility
     for the murder of the Archduke and has unreservedly accepted
     certain of your demands, and as to others has agreed to
     submit them either to The Hague Tribunal for arbitration, or
     to a concert of Powers. You will decide whether Austria is
     satisfied to accept either of these suggestions, but as
     England, France, and Russia have asked that time be granted
     to consider a peaceful and satisfactory solution of the
     difficulty, and as the questions reserved by Servia can be
     used as the basis for further discussion without prejudice
     to the rights of Austria, and as it is to the interest of
     every country and the entire world that its peace should not
     be broken unnecessarily, I shall be gratified if you can
     agree that a reasonable time shall be granted as a matter of
     courtesy to Russia, England, and France, in order that it
     may be determined upon due consideration whether it is not
     possible to preserve peace without sacrificing in any
     respect the legitimate demands of Austria, which have my
     full sympathy and support.

          WILHELM.

Would the Austrian Emperor, himself a noble-minded and peace-loving
monarch, have refused this reasonable request? A little time, a little
patience and some forbearance for the rights of other States and the
youth of Europe need not have perished. Again, "the pity of it."

In its place the following correspondence took place between the
Kaiser on the one hand and the Czar and King George on the other. It
is so dramatic that it justifies quotation _in extenso_.

On the night of July 28th, the Kaiser sent the following dispatch to
the Czar:

     I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression
     which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against
     Servia. The unscrupulous agitation which has been going on
     for years in Servia has led to the revolting crime of which
     Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit
     which made the Servians murder their own King and his
     consort still dominates that country. Doubtless You will
     agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, and all
     other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all
     those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall
     suffer their deserved punishment.

     On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty
     encountered by You and Your Government to stem the tide of
     public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has
     joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use
     my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a
     frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope
     confidently that You will support me in my efforts to
     overcome all difficulties which may yet arise.[60]

[Footnote 60: German _White Paper_, No. 20. The Capitals to the
pronouns follow the original correspondence.]

This telegram rings true, and fairly suggests a pacific attitude on
the part of the Kaiser when he first took the helm on his return from
Norway. Its weakness lies in the fact that the record, as presented by
the German Government, does not disclose any communication which he
sent to his Austrian ally in the interests of peace. We have the
frequent assurances of the Kaiser to the Czar that he was exerting
all his influence to induce his ally to come to a satisfactory
understanding with Russia, _but neither over the signature of the
Kaiser nor over that of his Foreign Minister does the record show a
single communication addressed to Vienna in the interests of peace_.

The Czar did not fail to appreciate this, and his reply to the Kaiser
rings quite as true and suggests the crux of the whole problem. It
reads:

     I am glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious
     moment I ask You earnestly to help me. An ignominious war
     has been declared against a weak country, and in Russia the
     indignation, which I fully share, is tremendous. I fear that
     very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised
     upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures which
     will lead to war. To prevent such a calamity as a European
     war would be, I urge You in the name of our old friendship
     to do all in Your power _to restrain Your ally from going
     too far_.[61]

[Footnote 61: German _White Paper_, No. 21.]

Who can deny the force of the sentence thus italicized? It was Austria
which was the provocative factor. It was then bombarding Belgrade and
endeavoring to cross the Danube into Servia. It had declared war, and
brusquely refused even to discuss the question with Russia. It was
mobilizing its army, and making every effort to make a speedy
subjugation of Servia. If peace was to be preserved, the pressure must
begin with Austria. If any question remained for peace parleys, the
_status quo_ must be preserved. Russia could not permit Austria to
destroy Servia first and then discuss its justice.

Thereupon the Kaiser telegraphed the Czar as follows:

     I have received Your telegram and I share Your desire for
     the conservation of peace. However I cannot--as I told You
     in my first telegram--consider the action of Austria-Hungary
     as an "ignominious war." Austria-Hungary knows from
     experience that the promises of Servia as long as they are
     merely on paper are entirely unreliable.

     According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to
     be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that
     the promises of Servia are effectively translated into
     deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the explanation
     of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no
     territorial gain at the expense of Servia. I am therefore
     of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to
     remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing
     Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I
     believe that a direct understanding is possible and
     desirable between Your Government and Vienna, an
     understanding which--as I have already telegraphed You--my
     Government endeavors to aid with all possible effort.
     Naturally military measures by Russia, which might be
     construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a
     calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would
     undermine my position as mediator which--upon Your appeal to
     my friendship and aid--I willingly accepted.[62]

[Footnote 62: German _White Paper_, No. 22. See note, _post._, p.
189.]

The Kaiser's fatal error lies in the concluding paragraph of this
telegram, in claiming that Russia should not take any military
measures pending the Kaiser's mediation, _although Austria should be
left free not merely to make such preparations against Russia, but to
pursue its aggressive war then already commenced against Servia_. If
the belligerents were expected to desist from military preparations,
should not the obligation be reciprocal?

Later that night the Kaiser again telegraphed the Czar:

     My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of
     Your Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a
     mobilization; I have told You the same in my last telegram.
     Austria-Hungary has mobilized only against Servia, and only
     a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case
     according to Your advice and that of Your Government,
     mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator,
     with which You have entrusted me in such friendly manner
     and which I have accepted upon Your express desire, is
     threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of
     decision now rests upon Your shoulders. You have to bear the
     responsibility for war or peace.[63]

[Footnote 63: German _White Paper_, No. 23.]

To which the Czar replied as follows:

     I thank You from my heart for Your quick reply. I am sending
     to-night Tatisheff (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser)
     with instructions. The military measures now taking form
     were decided upon five days ago, and for the reason of
     defense against the preparations of Austria. I hope with all
     my heart that these measures will not influence in any
     manner Your position as mediator which I appraise very
     highly. _We need Your strong pressure upon Austria so that
     an understanding can be arrived at with us._[64]

[Footnote 64: German _White Paper_, No. 23 A.]

Later the Czar again telegraphed the Kaiser:

     I thank You cordially for Your mediation which permits the
     hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is
     technically impossible to discontinue our military
     preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian
     mobilization. It is far from us to want war. _As long as the
     negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my troops
     will undertake no provocative action. I give You my solemn
     word thereon._ I confide with all my faith in the grace of
     God, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna
     for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe.

What more could the Kaiser reasonably ask? Here was an assurance from
the ruler of a great nation, and his royal cousin, that on his "solemn
word" no provocative action would be taken by Russia "as long as
the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue" and this
notwithstanding the fact that Austria had flouted and ignored Russia,
had declared war against Servia and was then endeavoring to subjugate
it quickly by bombarding its capital and invading its territory with
superior forces.

It is true that the Czar did not order demobilization, and apart from
his unquestioned right to prepare for eventualities in the event of
the failure of the peace parleys, the Kaiser himself recognized in a
later telegram that in the case of Germany when mobilization had once
been started it could not be immediately arrested.

Simultaneously King George had telegraphed the Kaiser through Prince
Henry as follows:

     Thanks for Your telegram; so pleased to hear of William's
     efforts to concert with Nicky to maintain peace. Indeed I am
     earnestly desirous that such an irreparable disaster as a
     European war should be averted. My Government is doing its
     utmost suggesting to Russia and France to suspend further
     military preparations if Austria will consent to be
     satisfied with occupation of Belgrade and neighboring
     Servian territory as a hostage for satisfactory settlement
     of her demands; other countries meanwhile suspending their
     war preparations. Trust William will use his great influence
     to induce Austria to accept this proposal, thus proving that
     Germany and England are working together to prevent what
     would be an international catastrophe. Pray assure William I
     am doing and shall continue to do all that lies in my power
     to preserve peace of Europe.[65]

[Footnote 65: Second German _White Paper_.]

The fairness of this proposal can hardly be disputed. It conceded to
Austria the right to occupy the capital of Servia and hold it as a
hostage for a satisfactory adjustment of her demands and even to
continue her military preparations, while all other nations, including
Russia, were to suspend their military preparations. As the Kaiser
precipitated the war because Russia would not cease its preparations
for eventualities, King George's proposal, upon which neither the
Kaiser nor his government ever acted, fully met his demands.

To this the Kaiser replied on July 31st:

     Many thanks for kind telegram. Your proposals coincide with
     My ideas and with the statements I got this night from
     Vienna which I have had forwarded to London. I just received
     news from Chancellor that official notification has just
     reached him that this night Nicky has ordered the
     mobilization of his whole army and fleet. He has not even
     awaited the results of the mediation I am working at, and
     left Me without any news. I am off for Berlin to take
     measures for ensuring safety of My eastern frontiers where
     strong Russian troops are already posted.[66]

[Footnote 66: Second German _White Paper_.]

On its face this reply seems not unreasonable, but it must not be
forgotten that Austria continued not only to bombard Belgrade but to
mobilize its armies against Russia as well as Servia. Russia agreed to
stop all military preparations, if Austria would consent to discuss
the Servian question with a view to peace. Austria until the eleventh
hour--when it was too late--refused even to discuss the Servian
question and never offered either to demobilize or to cease its attack
upon Servia. Germany upheld her in this unwarrantable course.

While in principle the Kaiser agreed with the King as to the method of
adjustment, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Kaiser
ever made any suggestion to his ally that it should stop its
operations against Servia after capturing Belgrade, and await the
adjustment of the questions through diplomatic channels.

Thereupon King George sent a brief telegram, stating that he had sent
an urgent telegram to the Czar urging this course. Later on July 31st
the Kaiser sent the following telegram to the Czar:

     Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my
     aid I have engaged in mediation between Your Government and
     the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was
     taking place, Your troops were being mobilized against my
     ally, Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already
     communicated to You, my mediation has become almost
     illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I
     receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are
     going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the
     security of my country forces me to measures of defense. I
     have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts
     for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I
     who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now
     threatens the entire civilized world. It rests in Your hand
     to avert it. No one threatens the honor and peace of Russia
     which might well have awaited the success of my mediation.
     The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me
     by my grandfather on his death-bed, has always been sacred
     to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in
     serious affliction, especially during its last war. _The
     peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia
     decides to discontinue those military preparations which
     menace Germany and Austria-Hungary._

In this fair-spoken message we unhappily find no suggestion that
Austria would stop its mobilization, or its military operations
against Servia. The untenable position of the Kaiser, to which he
adhered with fatal consistency to the end, was that Austria should be
given the full right to mobilize against Russia as well as Servia, and
that his ally should even be permitted to press its aggressive
operations against Servia by taking possession of its capital and
holding it as a ransom. In the meantime Russia should not make any
military preparations, either to move effectually against Austria in
the event of the failure of negotiations, or even to defend itself.

The Kaiser's suggestion did not even carry with it the implication
that Germany would stop the military preparations that it was then
carrying on in feverish haste, so that the contention of the Kaiser,
however plausibly it was veiled in his telegram, was that _Germany and
Austria_ _should have full freedom to prepare for war against Russia,
while Russia was to tie its hands and await the outcome of further
parleys, with Austrian cannon bombarding Belgrade_.

In this correspondence the Kaiser displayed his recognized ability as
a writer and speaker, for in this rapid-fire exchange of telegrams the
Kaiser was easily the better controversialist.

He assumed the role of a disinterested party, who, at the request of a
litigant, agrees to become an impartial mediator. He was neither. The
Czar had not asked him to be a mediator, although in the later
telegrams the Russian monarch accepted that term. The Czar in his
first telegram had asked the Kaiser as a party to the quarrel "to
restrain your ally from going too far." The Kaiser, having adroitly
accepted a very different role, promptly shifts the responsibility
upon the Czar of embarrassing the so-called "mediation." This enabled
him to assume the attitude of "injured innocence" and very skillfully
he played that part.

This at least is clear that in this correspondence the Kaiser was
either guilty of insincerity or he betrayed a fatal incapacity to
grasp the essentials of the quarrel. I prefer the latter construction
of his conduct. Against the bellicose efforts of his Foreign Office
and his General Staff, I believe that for dynastic reasons he strove
for a time to adjust the difficulty, but his egomania and his
life-long habit of personal absolutism blinded him to the fact that he
was taking an untenable, indeed an impossible, position, in contending
that Russia should effectually tie its hands while Germany and Austria
should be left free to prepare for eventualities. Had there been a
breathing spell and the Kaiser had had more time for reflection,
possibly the unreasonableness of his contention would have suggested
itself, but he found on his sudden return from Norway that his
country, through the fatuous folly of its military party, was almost
irrevocably committed to war. Probably he did not dare to reverse
openly and formally its policy. His popularity had already suffered in
the Moroccan crisis. This consideration and the histrionic side to his
complex personality betrayed him into his untenable and fatal
position.

The Kaiser has hitherto been regarded as a man of exceptional ability.
Time and the issue of this war will tell. The verdict of history may
be to the contrary. The world for a time may easily confuse restless
energy and habitual meddling with real ability, but its final verdict
will go far deeper. Since the Kaiser dropped his sagacious pilot,
Germany's real position in the world has steadily weakened. Then it
was the first power in Europe with its rivals disunited. The Kaiser
has united his enemies with "hoops of steel," driven Russia and
England into a close alliance, forced Italy out of the Triple
Alliance, and as the only compensation for these disastrous results,
he has gained the doubtful cooperation of moribund Turkey, of which he
is likely to say before many months are over: "Who shall deliver me
from the body of this death?"

In the meantime, Germany was not idle in its preparations for
eventualities.

The Kaiser and his counsellors were already definitely planning for
the war, and were taking steps to alienate England from her Allies and
secure her neutrality. To insure this, the German Chancellor, having
visited the Kaiser at Potsdam, sent for the British Ambassador, and
made the following significant offer:

     [67]I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His
     Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

[Footnote 67: Sir E. Goschen.]

     He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European
     conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to
     Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his
     continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to
     make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He
     said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the
     main principle which governed British policy, that Great
     Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed
     in any conflict there might be. _That, however, was not the
     object at which Germany aimed._ Provided that neutrality of
     Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given
     to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed
     at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France,
     should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

     I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and
     he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in
     that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency
     said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the
     integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was
     ready to give his Majesty's Government an assurance that she
     would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France
     what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in
     Belgium, but when the war was over Belgian integrity would
     be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

     His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been
     Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were
     aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he
     trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that
     understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a
     general neutrality agreement between England and Germany,
     though it was, of course, at the present moment too early to
     discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in
     the conflict which the present crisis might possibly
     produce, would enable him to look forward to a realization
     of his desire.

     In reply to his Excellency's inquiry how I thought his
     request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it
     probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind
     yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion
     that you would desire to retain full liberty.[68]

[Footnote 68: English _White Paper_, No. 85.]

While the German Foreign Office was thus endeavoring to keep England
neutral, its army was on the move against France. This does not rest
upon vague allegation, but upon the detailed specifications in a
communication from the French Foreign Office, which the French
Ambassador in London submitted to Sir Edward Grey on July 31st. Its
significance is apparent when it is remembered that simultaneously
the Kaiser was invoking the Czar to demobilize his armies, and cease
military preparations.

     The German army had its advance posts on our frontiers
     yesterday (Friday). German patrols twice penetrated on to
     our territory. Our advance posts are withdrawn to a distance
     of 10 kilometers from the frontier. The local population is
     protesting against being thus abandoned to the attack of the
     enemy's army, but the Government wishes to make it clear to
     public opinion and to the British Government that in no case
     will France be the aggressor. The whole 16th Corps from
     Metz, reinforced by a part of the 8th from Treves and
     Cologne, is occupying the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg
     side. The 15th Army Corps from Strassburg has closed up on
     the frontier. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are
     prevented by the threat of being shot from crossing the
     frontier. Reservists have been called back to Germany by
     tens of thousands. This is the last stage before
     mobilization, whereas we have not called out a single
     reservist.

     As you see, Germany has done it. _I would add that all my
     information goes to show that the German preparations began
     on Saturday, the very day on which the Austrian note was
     handed in._[69]

[Footnote 69: English _White Paper_, No. 105 "Austrian" obviously
means "Servian."]

In reply to the suggestion of the German Chancellor as to the
neutrality of England, Sir Edward Grey advised the English Ambassador
on July 30th, as follows:

     His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the
     Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to
     neutrality on such terms.

     What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while
     French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as
     Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the
     colonies.

     From the material point of view such a proposal is
     unacceptable, for France, without further territory in
     Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose
     her position as a great Power, and become subordinate to
     German policy.

     Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to
     make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a
     disgrace from which the good name of this country would
     never recover.

     The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away
     whatever obligations or interest we have as regards the
     neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain
     either.

     Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether
     the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement
     between England and Germany offered positive advantages
     sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must
     preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem
     to us to require in any such unfavorable and regrettable
     development of the present crisis as the Chancellor
     contemplates.

     You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and
     add most earnestly that one way of maintaining good
     relations between England and Germany is that they should
     continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe;
     if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of
     Germany and England will, I believe, be _ipso facto_
     improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's
     Government will work in that way with all sincerity and
     goodwill.

     _And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be
     preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own
     endeavor will be to promote some arrangement, to which
     Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that
     no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her
     or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or
     separately._

This letter will give Sir Edward Grey lasting glory in the history of
civilization. Its chivalrous fairness to France needs no comment, but
its most significant feature is the concluding portion, in which the
English Foreign Minister suggested to Germany that if peace could be
preserved, England stood ready to join with Germany in an alliance
which would have insured all the great European nations against any
aggressive war on the part of either of them.

It was, in fact, the "United States of Europe" in embryo. It
was the one solution possible for these long-continued European
wars--essentially civil wars--namely an alliance by the six
great Powers,--a merger of the Triple Alliance and the Triple
Entente,--whereby any aggressive act on the part of any one of them
would be prevented by the others. What an infinite pity that the
imprudent act of the Kaiser, and the mad folly of his advisers
probably made a fair trial of this most hopeful plan for the
unification of Europe an impossibility for another century!

In order that Germany should have no excuse whatever to declare war on
account of Russia's preparations, the Russian Foreign Minister saw the
German Ambassador in St. Petersburg on July 30th, _and then offered on
behalf of Russia to stop all military preparations_, provided that
Austria would simply recognize as an abstract principle that the
Servian question had assumed the character of a question of European
interest. As this proposal fully met the demands of the Kaiser with
respect to the cessation by Russia of military preparations, the
conversation as reported by the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg
to Sir Edward Grey on July 30th deserves quotation _in extenso_:

     French Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs
     this morning. His Excellency said that German Ambassador had
     told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were
     willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be
     respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this might
     be so, but nevertheless Servia would become an Austrian
     vassal, just as, in similar circumstances, Bokhara had
     become a Russian vassal. There would be a revolution in
     Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.

     M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of
     Russian Government, that Germany was making military and
     naval preparations against Russia--more particularly in the
     direction of the Gulf of Finland.

     German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for
     Foreign Affairs at 2 A.M., when former completely broke down
     on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof
     to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German
     Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up
     and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French, of
     which the following is a translation:

     "_If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has
     assumed character of question of European interest, declares
     herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which
     violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages
     to stop all military preparations._"

Later in the day, at the suggestion of Sir Edward Grey, the Russian
Foreign Minister still further modified in the interests of peace the
proposition upon which Russia was willing to cease all military
preparations.

     If Austria consents to stay the march of her armies upon
     Servian territory, and if, recognizing that the
     Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a
     question of European interest, she admits that the great
     Powers examine _the reparation which Servia could accord to
     the Government of Austria-Hungary without injury to her
     rights as a sovereign State_ and to her independence--Russia
     undertakes to maintain her expectant attitude.

It will be noted that this formula implied that Servia owed some
reparation to Austria, and it did not bind Austria to accept the
judgment of the Powers as to the character of such reparation.

It simply conceded to the Powers the opportunity to "examine"--not
the original controversy between Austria and Servia--but what
reparation could be made without a compromise of sovereignty and
independence. Austria did not bind itself to do anything except to
stay the advance of her army into Servia, while Russia agreed to
desist from further preparations or mobilization.

Could the offer have been more liberal? In face of this assurance, how
can the Kaiser or Germany reasonably contend that it was the
mobilization of the Russian army which precipitated the war.

In the meantime Sir Edward Grey was working tirelessly to suggest some
peace formula, upon which the Powers could agree. His suggestions for
a conference of the four leading Powers of Europe, other than Russia
and Austria, had been negatived by Germany on the frivolous pretext
that such a conference was "too formal a method," quite ignoring the
fact that its very formality would have necessarily given a "cooling
time" to the would-be belligerents. Thereupon Sir Edward Grey urged
that,

     _the German Government should suggest any method by which
     the influence of the four Powers could be used together to
     prevent war between Austria and Russia_. France agreed.
     Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating
     influence was ready to be put into operation _by any method
     that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable_. In
     fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any
     method that Germany thought possible _if only Germany would
     "press the button" in the interests of peace_.[70]

[Footnote 70: English _White Paper_, No. 84.]

Later in the day Sir Edward again repeated his suggestion to the
German Ambassador in London and urged that Germany should,

     _propose some method_ by which the four Powers should be
     able to work together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed
     out, however, that the Russian Government, while desirous of
     mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military
     operations against Servia should be suspended, as otherwise
     a mediation would only drag on matters _and give Austria
     time to crush Servia_. It was of course too late for all
     military operations against Servia to be suspended. In a
     short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in
     Belgrade, and in occupation of some Servian territory. But
     even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into
     existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the
     occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from
     Servia, stated that she would not advance further, pending
     an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and Russia.

The only reply that England received to this reiterated request that
Germany take the lead in suggesting some acceptable peace formula was
set forth in a dispatch from Sir E. Goschen from Berlin to Sir Edward
Grey:

     I was informed last night that they (the German Foreign
     Office) had not had time to send an answer yet. To-day, in
     reply to an inquiry from the French Ambassador as to whether
     the Imperial Government had proposed any course of action,
     _the [German] Secretary of State said that he felt that time
     would be saved by communicating with Vienna direct, and that
     he had asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what would
     satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been returned._

     The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the
     button" as hard as he could, and that he was not sure
     whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at
     Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than
     otherwise.[71]

[Footnote 71: See English _White Paper_, No. 84.]

The Court of Public Opinion unfortunately is not favored in the German
_White Paper_ with the text of its communication on this subject to
Vienna, nor is it given any specifications as to the manner in which
the German Chancellor "pressed the button."

What the world knows without documentary proof is that Austria
continued its military preparations and operations and that Russia
then ordered a general mobilization. The only assurance which Russia
received from Austria as a result of the alleged "pressing of the
button" is set forth in the following dispatch from the Russian
Ambassador at Vienna to Sazonof, dated July 31st:

     In spite of the general mobilization I continue to exchange
     views with Count Berchtold and his collaborators. All insist
     on the absence of aggressive intentions on the part of
     Austria against Russia and of ambitions of conquest in
     regard to Servia, _but all equally insist on the necessity
     for Austria of pursuing to the very end the action begun and
     of giving to Servia a serious lesson which would constitute
     a certain guarantee for the future_.

This was in effect a flat refusal of all mediatory or otherwise
pacific suggestions, for the right of Austria to crush Servia by
giving it "a serious lesson"--what such a lesson is let Louvain,
Liege, and Rheims witness!--was the crux of the whole question.

Concurrently Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that
Germany had declared that day the "_Kriegsgefahr_" and that the German
Chancellor had expressed the opinion that "all hope of a peaceful
solution of the crisis" was at an end. The British Ambassador then
asked the Chancellor,--

     whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities
     at Vienna to do something in the general interests to
     reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue
     discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night
     he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and
     that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian
     Minister for Foreign Affairs would take the wishes of the
     Emperor this morning in the matter.[72]

[Footnote 72: English _White Paper_, No. 112.]

Here again the world is not favored with the text of the message, in
which the Chancellor "begged Austria to reply," nor with that of the
Austrian Foreign Minister's reply.

While these events were happening in Berlin and London, the Russian
Ambassador in Vienna advised Sazonof "that Austria has determined not
to yield to the intervention of the powers and that she is moving
troops against Russia as well as Servia."[73]

[Footnote 73: English _White Paper_, No. 113.]

Russia thereupon, on July 31, ordered a general mobilization of her
army.

Concurrently with these interviews, the English Ambassador in Vienna
had a conversation with the Austrian Under-Secretary of State and

     called his attention to the fact that during the discussion
     of the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of
     Ambassadors the Russian Government had stood behind Servia,
     and that a compromise between the views of Russia and
     Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line.
     Although he[74] spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not
     regard the situation as desperate, _I could not get from him
     any suggestion for a similar compromise in the present
     case_. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the
     Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above
     conversation.[75]

[Footnote 74: The Austrian Under-Secretary of State.]

[Footnote 75: English _White Paper_, No. 118.]

Notwithstanding all these discouragements and rebuffs, Sir Edward
Grey, that unwearying friend of peace, still continued to make a last
attempt to preserve peace by instructing the British Ambassador in
Berlin to sound the German Foreign Office, as he would sound the
Russian Foreign Office,

     whether it would be possible for the four disinterested
     Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see
     that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on
     Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian
     sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your
     Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her
     willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the
     four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian
     demands from going the length of impairing Servian
     sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course
     suspend further military operations or preparations.

He further instructed Sir Edward Goschen to advise the German Foreign
Office that he, Sir Edward Grey, had that morning proposed to the
German Ambassador in London,

     _that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put
     forward, which made it clear that Germany and Austria were
     striving to preserve European peace_, and that Russia and
     France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, _I would
     support it at St. Petersburg and Paris_, and go the length
     of saying that, if Russia and France would not accept it,
     _his Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with
     the consequences_; that, otherwise, I told the German
     Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn
     in.[76]

[Footnote 76: English _White Paper_, No. 111.]

What, then, was the position when the last fatal step was taken? The
Czar had pledged his personal honor that no provocative action should
be taken by Russia, while peace parleys were in progress, and the
Russian Foreign Minister had agreed to cease all military
preparations, provided that Austria would recognize that the question
of Servia had become one of European interest, and that its
sovereignty would be respected.

On July 31st, Austria _for the first time_ in the negotiations agreed
to discuss with the Russian Government the merits of the Servian note.
Until this eleventh hour Austria had consistently contended that her
difficulty with Servia was her own question, in which Russia had no
right to intervene, and which it would not under any circumstances
even discuss with Russia. For this reason it had refused any time for
discussion, abruptly declared war against Servia, commenced its
military operations, and repeatedly declined to discuss even the few
questions left open in the Servian reply as a basis for further peace
parleys.

As recently as July 30th, the Austrian Government had declined or
refused any "direct exchange of views with the Russian Government."

But late on July 31st, a so-called "conversation" took place at Vienna
between Count Berchtold and the Russian Ambassador, and as a result,
the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed to "converse"
with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. This important
concession of Austria was conveyed to Sazonof by the Austrian
Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who expressed

     the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of
     the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by
     expressing his satisfaction and said it was desirable that
     the discussions should take place in London with the
     participation of the Great Powers.

     M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume
     the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe
     would be thankful to them. It would be very important that
     Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her
     military action on Servian territory.[77]

[Footnote 77: English _White Paper_, No. 133.]

_It is important to note that Austria's change of heart preceded by
some hours the Kaiser's ultimatum to Russia._ The former took place
some time during the day on July 31st. The latter was sent to St.
Petersburg on the midnight of that day. It must also be noted that
while Austria thus agreed at the eleventh hour to "discuss the
substance of the ultimatum," it did not offer to suspend military
preparations or operations and this obviously deprived the concession
of its chief value.[78]

[Footnote 78: _See_ Addendum, p. 191-2.]

The cause and purpose of Austria's partial reversal of its policy at
present writing can be only a matter of conjecture. When Austria
publishes its correspondence with Germany, we may know the truth.

Two theories are equally plausible:

Austria may have taken alarm at the steadfast purpose of Russia to
champion the cause of Servia with the sword. If so, its qualified
reversal of its bellicose attitude may have induced the war party at
Berlin to precipitate the war by the ultimatum to Russia. In that
event, Germany's mad policy of war at any cost is even more
iniquitous.[79]

[Footnote 79: _See_ Addendum, p. 190, _et seq._]

The supposition is equally plausible that Austria had been advised
from Berlin that that night Germany would end all efforts to preserve
the peace of Europe by an ultimatum to Russia, which would make war
inevitable. The case of Germany and Austria at the bar of the world
would be made morally stronger if, at the outbreak of hostilities, the
attitude of Austria had become more conciliatory. This would make more
plausible their contention that the mobilization of Russia and not
Austria's flat rejection of all peace overtures had precipitated the
conflict.

_This much is certain that the Kaiser, with full knowledge that
Austria had consented to renew its conferences with Russia_, and that
a ray of light had broken through the lowering war clouds, either on
his own initiative or yielding to the importunities of his military
camarilla, directed the issuance of the ultimatum to Russia and thus
blasted the last hope of peace.

On midnight of July 31st, the German Chancellor sent the following
telegram to the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg:

     In spite of still pending mediatory negotiations, and
     although we ourselves have up to the present moment taken no
     measures for mobilization, Russia has mobilized her entire
     army and navy; in other words, mobilized against us also.
     By these Russian measures we have been obliged, for the
     safeguarding of the Empire, to announce that danger of war
     threatens us, which does not yet mean mobilization.
     Mobilization, however, must follow _unless Russia ceases
     within twelve hours all warlike measures against us and
     Austria-Hungary_ and gives us definite assurance thereof.
     Kindly communicate this at once to M. Sazonof and wire hour
     of its communication to him.

At midnight the fateful message was delivered. As Sazonof reports the
interview:

     At midnight the Ambassador of Germany declared to me, by
     order of his Government, that if within twelve hours,
     that is at midday of Saturday, we did not commence
     demobilization, _not only in regard to Germany but also in
     regard to Austria_, the German Government would be forced to
     give the order of mobilization. To my question if this was
     war the Ambassador replied in the negative, but added that
     we were very near it.

It will be noted by the italicized portion that Germany did not
restrict its demand that Russia cease its preparations against
Germany, but it should also desist from any preparations to defend
itself or assert its rights against Austria, although Austria had
made no offer to suspend either its preparations for war or recall its
general mobilization order.

The twelve hours elapsed and Russia, standing upon its dignity as a
sovereign nation of equal standing with Germany, declined to answer
this unreasonable and most arrogant demand, which under the
circumstances was equivalent to a declaration of war.

Simultaneously a like telegram was sent to the Ambassador at Paris,
requiring the French Government to state in eighteen hours whether it
would remain neutral in the event of a Russian-German war.

The reasons given for this double ultimatum are as disingenuous as the
whole course of German diplomacy in this matter. The statement that
Germany had pursued any mediatory negotiations was as untrue as its
statement that it had taken no measures for mobilization. Equally
disingenuous was the statement with respect to the _Kriegsgefahr_
(state of martial law), for when that was declared on July 31st,
the railroad, telegraph, and other similar public utilities were
immediately taken over by Germany and the movement of troops to the
frontier began.

After the fateful ultimatum had thus been given by Germany to Russia,
the British Ambassador, pursuant to the instructions of his home
office, saw the German Secretary of State on July 31st, and urged him

     most earnestly to accept your [Sir Edward Grey's] proposal
     and make another effort to prevent the terrible catastrophe
     of a European war.

     He [von Jagow] expressed himself very sympathetically toward
     your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to
     maintain peace _but said it was impossible for the Imperial
     Government to consider any proposal until they had received
     an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day_;
     this communication, which he admitted had the form of an
     ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the
     Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would
     immediately countermand her mobilization against Germany and
     Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilize at
     once.

     I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even
     more difficult for Russia to accept _by asking them to
     demobilize in the south as well_. He replied that it was in
     order to prevent Russia from saying that all her
     mobilization was only directed against Austria.[80]

[Footnote 80: English _White Paper_, No. 121.]

The German Secretary of State also stated to Sir E. Goschen that both
the Emperor William and the German Foreign Office

     had even up till last night been urging Austria to show
     willingness to continue discussions, and telegraphic and
     telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a
     promising nature, but Russia's mobilization had spoiled
     everything.

Here again it must be noted that the telegraphic communications from
Vienna have not yet been published by the Austrian Government, nor by
the German Foreign Office in its official defense.

Sir Edward Grey's last attempt to preserve peace was on August 1st,
when he telegraphed to Sir E. Goschen:

     I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if
     only a little respite in time can be gained before any great
     power begins war.

     The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness
     of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of
     Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to
     the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia
     originally suggested.

     Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and
     Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that the German
     Government may be able to make use of the Russian
     communications referred to above in order to avoid tension.
     His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any
     act which may precipitate matters.[81]

[Footnote 81: English _White Paper_, No. 131.]

At that time the twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia had already expired,
but the British Ambassador saw the German Secretary of State on August
1st, and, after submitting to him the substance of Sir Edward Grey's
telegram last quoted,

     spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute
     was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only
     drawn in as Austria's ally. _If, therefore, Austria and
     Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and
     Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to
     me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and
     continue to work for a peaceful settlement._ Secretary of
     State for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's readiness to
     discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and,
     had not Russia mobilized against Germany, all would have
     been well. But Russia, by abstaining from answering
     Germany's demand that she should demobilize, had caused
     Germany to mobilize also. Russia had said that her
     mobilization did not necessarily imply war, and that she
     could perfectly well remain mobilized for months without
     making war. _This was not the case with Germany. She had the
     speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the
     German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time
     to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide
     dominions _. The situation now was that, though the
     Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the
     specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had,
     therefore, ordered mobilization, and the German
     representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within
     a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the
     Imperial Government must regard their refusal to answer as
     creating a state of war.[82]

[Footnote 82: English _White Paper_, No. 138.]

It will thus be seen that although Germany was urged to the very last
to await the result of the conferences, which had just commenced with
some slight promise of success between Austria and Russia, it
nevertheless elected to declare war against Russia and thus blast
beyond possible recall any possibility of peace. Its justification for
this course, as stated in the interview with the German Secretary of
State last quoted, was that it did not propose to forego its advantage
of speed as against the advantage of Russia's numerical superiority.
For this there might be some justification, if Russia had shown an
unyielding and bellicose attitude, but apart from the fact that
Russia had consistently worked in the interests of peace, Germany
had the express assurance of the Czar that no provocative action
would be taken while peace conferences continued. To disregard these
assurances and thus destroy the pacific efforts of other nations, in
order not to lose a tactical advantage, was the clearest disloyalty to
civilization. In any aspect, Germany could have fully kept its
advantage of speed by inducing its ally to suspend its aggressive
operations against Servia, for in that event Russia had expressly
obligated itself to suspend all military preparations.

As the final document in this shameful chapter of diplomacy, there
need only be added the telegram, sent by the German Chancellor to his
Ambassador at St. Petersburg on August 1, 1914, in which war was
declared by Germany against Russia on the ground that while Germany
and Austria should be left free to pursue their aggressive military
preparations, Russia should, on the peremptory demand of another
nation, cease the mobilization of its armies even for self-defense. It
reads:

     The Imperial Government has endeavored from the opening of
     the crisis to lead it to a pacific solution. In accordance
     with a desire which had been expressed to him by His Majesty
     the Emperor of Russia, His Majesty the Emperor of Germany
     in accord with England had applied himself to filling a
     mediatory role with the Cabinets of Vienna and St.
     Petersburg, when Russia, without awaiting the result of
     this, proceeded to the complete mobilization of her forces
     on land and sea. As a consequence of this threatening
     measure, motived by no military "_presage_" on the part of
     Germany, the German Empire found itself in face of a grave
     and imminent danger. If the Imperial Government had failed
     to safeguard herself against this peril it would have
     compromised the safety and the very existence of Germany.
     Consequently the German Government saw itself forced to
     address to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of all
     the Russias, an insistence on the cessation of the said
     military acts. Russia, having refused to accede to (not
     having thought it should reply to), this demand, and having
     manifested by this refusal (this attitude) that its action
     was directed against Germany, I have the honor to make known
     to your Excellency the following:

     His Majesty the Emperor, My August Sovereign, in the name of
     the Empire, taking up the challenge, considers himself in a
     state of war with Russia.

The feverish haste with which this fatal step was taken, is shown by
the fact that the German Ambassador could not even wait to state
whether Russia had refused to answer or answered negatively. This
war--thus begun in such mad haste--is likely to be repented of at
leisure.

A few hours before this rash and most iniquitous declaration was made
the Czar made his last appeal for peace. With equal solemnity and
pathos he telegraphed the Kaiser:

     _I have received your telegram. I comprehend that you are
     forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from you the
     same guaranty which I have given you, viz., that these
     measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to
     negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the
     universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid
     of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship to
     prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence
     your urgent reply._

This touching and magnanimous message does infinite credit to the
Czar. Had the Kaiser been as pacific, had he been inspired by the same
enlightened spirit in the interests of peace, had he been as truly
mindful of the God of nations, whom the Czar thus invoked, it would
have been possible to prevent the "shedding of blood," which has now
swept away after only three months of war the very flower of the youth
of Europe.

To this the Kaiser replied:

     I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to
     Your Government the way through which _alone_ war may yet be
     averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no
     telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of
     Your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my
     army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable reply of Your
     Government is the _sole_ way to avoid endless misery. Until
     I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to
     enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most
     earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to
     commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of
     our frontiers.

In this is no spirit of compromise; only the repeated insistence of
the unreasonable and in its consequences iniquitous demand that Russia
should by demobilizing make itself "naked to its enemies," while
Germany and Austria, without making any real concession in the
direction of peace, should be permitted to arm both for offense and
defense.

There were practical reasons which made the Kaiser's demand
unreasonable. Mobilization is a highly developed and complicated piece
of governmental machinery, and even where transportation facilities
are of the best, as in Germany and France, the mobilization ordinarily
takes about two weeks to complete. In Russia, with limited means of
transportation, it was impossible to recall immediately a mobilization
order that had gone forward to the remotest corners of the great
Empire. The record shows that the Kaiser himself recognized this fact,
for in a telegram which he sent on August 1st to King George, with
respect to the possible neutralization of England, the Kaiser said:

     I just received the communication from Your Government
     offering French neutrality under the guarantee of Great
     Britain. Added to this offer was the inquiry whether under
     these conditions Germany would refrain from attacking
     France. _On technical grounds My mobilization, which had
     already been proclaimed this afternoon, must proceed against
     two fronts east and west as prepared; this cannot be
     countermanded because, I am sorry, Your telegram came so
     late._ But if France offers Me neutrality which must be
     guaranteed by the British fleet and army, I shall of course
     refrain from attacking France and employ My troops
     elsewhere. I hope that France will not become nervous. The
     troops on My frontier are in the act of being stopped by
     telegraph and telephone from crossing into France.[83]

[Footnote 83: No such offer had been made. The Kaiser's error was due
to a misunderstanding, which had arisen quite honestly between Sir
Edward Grey and the German Ambassador in London. King George promptly
corrected this misapprehension of the Kaiser.

See also Addendum, p. 192.]

If it were impossible for the Kaiser, with all the exceptional
facilities of the German Empire, to arrest his mobilization for
"technical" reasons, it was infinitely more difficult for the Czar to
arrest immediately his military preparations. The demand of Germany
was not that Russia should simply cancel the mobilization order. It
was that Russia should "cease within twelve hours all warlike
measures," and it demanded a physical impossibility.

In any event, mobilization does not necessarily mean aggression, but
simply preparation, as the Czar had so clearly pointed out to the
Kaiser in the telegram already quoted. It is the right of a sovereign
State and by no code of ethics a _casus belli_. Germany's demand that
Russia should not arm to defend itself, when its prestige as a great
European power was at stake and when Austria was pushing her
aggressive preparations, treated Russia as an inferior, almost a
vassal, State. Its rejection must have been recognized by the Kaiser
and his advisers as inevitable, and, on the theory that a man intends
the natural consequences of his acts, it must be assumed that the
Kaiser in this mad demand at that time desired and intended war,
however pacific his purposes may have been when he first took the
helm.

Such will be his awful responsibility "to the last syllable of
recorded time."

How well prepared Germany was, the sequel developed only too surely.
_On the following day_--August 2d--its troops invaded Luxemburg and an
abrupt demand was made upon Belgium for permission to cross its
territory.

Upon the declaration of war, the Czar telegraphed to King George of
England as follows:

"In this solemn hour, I wish to assure you once more I have done all
in my power to avert war."

_Such will be the verdict of history._


ADDENDUM

I

THE SUPPRESSED TELEGRAM FROM THE CZAR

It is a curious and suggestive fact that the German Foreign Office in
publishing the correspondence between the Kaiser and the Czar omitted
one of the most important telegrams.

The Russian Government on January 31, 1915, therefore, made public the
following telegram which the Czar sent to the Kaiser on July 29, 1914:

     "Thanks for your conciliatory and friendly telegram.
     Inasmuch as the official message presented to-day by your
     Ambassador to my Minister was conveyed in a very different
     tone, I beg you to explain this divergency. It would be
     right to give over the Austro-Servian problem to The Hague
     Conference. I trust in your wisdom and friendship."

The German Foreign Office has since explained that they regarded this
telegram as too "_unimportant_" for publication. Comment is
unnecessary.

It thus appears that the Czar at the beginning of his correspondence
with the Kaiser suggested that the whole dispute be submitted to The
Hague Tribunal for adjustment. Servia had already made the same
suggestion.

As the world owes the first Hague Convention to the Czar's initiative,
it can justly be said to his lasting credit that he at least was loyal
to the pacific ideal of that great convention of the nations.


II

THE AUSTRIAN OFFER OF JULY 31, 1914

The author has noted (_ante_, p. 175) that as the belated offer of
Austria on July the 31st "to discuss [with Russia] the substance of
the Austrian ultimatum to Servia" did not offer to suspend military
preparations or operations, the concession was more nominal than real.
The Austrian _Red Book_ converts this inference into a certainty, and
makes clear that Austria's pretended change of policy was only
diplomatic finesse, as it contained no substantial modification of its
uncompromising attitude.

Russia had proposed on July the 30th (_ante_, p. 166) that "if Austria
consents to stay the march of her armies upon Servian territory" and
further agreed that the question of "the reparation which Servia could
accord to the Government of Austria-Hungary" could be examined by the
Great Powers, Russia would suspend her military preparations. As the
underlying question was whether Austria should be permitted to
subjugate Servia without interference, it was vital that that
subjugation should not proceed pending an examination by all
interested powers into its justice and ultimate ends.

Sir Edward Grey had previously requested Germany on July the 28th "to
use its influence" with the Austrian Government "to the effect that
the latter either consider the reply from Belgrade satisfactory or
else accept it as a basis for discussion between the Cabinets." The
German Foreign Office then instructed the German Ambassador at Vienna
"to submit the British proposal to the Vienna Cabinet for its
consideration" (Austrian _Red Book_, No. 43). As a result of this
suggestion, Count Berchtold on July the 29th (Austrian _Red Book_, No.
44) again shut the door upon any compromise by the contention that
Austria

     "no longer is in a position to meet the Servian reply in the
     spirit of the British suggestions, since at the time when
     the German request was presented here, a state of war
     already existed between the Dual Monarchy and Servia, _and
     thus the Servian reply had been superseded by events_."

The only counter-suggestion which Austria then made was as follows:

     "Should the British Cabinet be prepared to exert its
     influence upon the Russian Government for the maintenance of
     peace among the Great Powers, and for a localization of the
     war, which had been forced upon us by the Servian agitation
     of many years' standing, such efforts would meet with the
     Imperial and Royal Government's appreciation." (Austrian
     _Red Book_, No. 44.)

On July 31st the German Ambassador at Vienna, acting on instructions
(which instructions are again not disclosed in the German _White
Book_) informed Count Berchtold "of a conversation between Sir Edward
Grey and Prince Lichnowsky," in the course of which the British
Secretary of State declared to the German Ambassador that Russia felt
unable "to treat directly with Austria-Hungary and therefore requested
Great Britain to resume her mediation" and that "as a condition of
this mediation, however, the Russian Government stipulates the
suspension of hostilities in the meanwhile." (Austrian _Red Book_, No.
51.)

Thereupon Count Berchtold made the eleventh hour offer in question by
instructing the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg

     "to express our readiness to consider Sir Edward Grey's
     proposition to mediate between us and Servia despite the
     changes brought about in the situation by Russia's
     mobilization. _Our acceptance, however, is subject to the
     condition that our military action against Servia shall
     nevertheless proceed and that the British Cabinet shall
     induce the Russian Government to stop the mobilization
     directed against us. It is understood that in this case we
     would at once cancel our defensive military counter-measures
     in Galicia, which had been forced upon us by Russia's
     mobilization._" (Austrian _Red Book_, No. 51.)

This suggestion was fatally objectionable in that it required Russia
to suspend its preparations to defend its interests while permitting
Austria to proceed with the subjugation of Servia. As the "bone
of contention" was this subjugation of Servia, this belated and
ostensibly conciliatory proposal of Austria amounted to an absurdity.
In that classic of nonsense, _Alice in Wonderland_, the unreasonable
and violent Queen announced in the trial of the Knave the similar
procedure of "sentence first, verdict afterwards," and Austria's final
proposal was essentially a like folly, for, stripped of diplomatic
pretense, it amounted to this, that Austria, while tying Russia's
hands, should proceed not merely to sentence but even to execute
Servia and subsequently discuss the justice of its action when it had
become irremediable.

The possible theory which we suggested (_ante_, p. 175), that Austria
at the eleventh hour may have experienced a change of heart and had
adopted a more conciliatory course, is apparently untenable.


III

THE INVASION OF FRANCE ON AUGUST 1ST

It has been Germany's contention that not only did the mobilization of
Russia cause the war, but that its eastern and western frontiers were
violated by Russian and French soldiers at a time when Germany's
intentions were sincerely pacific.

At 7 P.M. on July the 31st, Germany had given France until 1 P.M. of
the following day to declare whether it would remain neutral in the
event of a Russian-German war, and at that hour Viviani advised the
German Ambassador that France "would do that which her interests
dictated." (German _White Paper_, No. 27.) Notwithstanding France's
virtual refusal to meet the demand of Germany, the latter did not
declare war on France on that day, and this is the more significant as
it immediately declared war on Russia. The German Ambassador remained
in Paris until August the 3d, and only then demanded his passports
when his position in the French Capitol had become untenable.

In the meantime Germany was awaiting some act of aggression on the
part of France, that would enable it under the terms of the Triple
Alliance to demand as of right the cooperation of Italy, while
France, determined for this and other reasons not to be the aggressor,
had withdrawn its troops ten kilometers from the frontier and refused
to take any offensive step either before or after the expiration of
the ultimatum.

The confidential telegram of the Kaiser to King George suggests
the possibility that on August the 1st, about the time that the
eighteen-hour ultimatum had expired, Germany was ready and intended to
commence an immediate invasion of France, for on that day the Kaiser
telegraphs to King George:

     "_I hope that France will not become nervous. The troops on
     my frontier are in the act of being stopped by telegraph and
     telephone from crossing into France._" (_Ante_, p. 187.)

The exact hour when the Kaiser sent the King this message is
conjectural. We know from the German _White Paper_ that at 11 A.M.
on that day Sir Edward Grey inquired of Prince Lichnowsky over the
telephone whether Germany was "in a position to declare that we would
not attack France in a war between Germany and Russia in case France
should remain neutral."

This message prompted the Kaiser's telegram to King George. How soon
thereafter the Kaiser sent his telegram we do not know, but as the
impossibility of France's neutrality was recognized in Berlin on
receipt of Lichnowsky's telegram by 5 P.M. on that day, it is
altogether probable that the Kaiser's telegram was sent between those
hours.

If the telegram in question is now analyzed and the fair natural
import is given to the Kaiser's language, it would seem that the
invasion of France, either before or in any event simultaneously with
the expiration of the eighteen-hour ultimatum, had been determined
upon by the Kaiser and his military staff, for the Kaiser's intimation
that he has "stopped by telegraph and telephone [his army] from
crossing into France" fairly implies that previous orders had been
given to commence such invasion and that these orders had been
hurriedly recalled in the most expeditious way, upon the supposed
intimation of Sir Edward Grey that England might guarantee the
neutrality of France.

Under these circumstances, with the German Ambassador still at Paris
and ostensibly preserving friendly relations, it is evident that the
invasion was either to precede or to follow immediately upon the
severance of diplomatic relations. This in itself may not be
indefensible under international law, but it throws a searchlight upon
the contention of Germany that its intentions were pacific and that it
had been surprised by a sudden and treacherous attack on the part of
Russia, France, and England.

The difficulty, however, is to reconcile this apparent intention of
the Kaiser's military staff to invade France on August the 1st and the
action of his Foreign Office in failing to make any declaration of war
against France and in retaining its Ambassador at Paris and permitting
the French Ambassador to remain at Berlin. The diplomatic records
abundantly show that this latter policy of the German Foreign Office
was followed in the hope that France would become the aggressor, but
its inconsistency with the policy of the War Office implied in the
Kaiser's telegram is obvious.

Possibly the Kaiser's soldiers and diplomats were not working in
complete harmony. It may be true that the many blunders of German
diplomats were in part due to the reckless impetuosity of the War
Office and it is possible that some of von Bethmann-Hollweg's and von
Jagow's diplomatic blunders are more properly attributable to the
Kaiser and Moltke.

It is also possible that the natural inference from the Kaiser's
language above quoted is misleading and that the telegram to King
George did not mean to imply that any orders for an invasion had been
cancelled but simply that the army leaders on the Western frontier had
been cautioned not to cross the frontier until further orders.

Another possible theory is that the Kaiser for political reasons may
have exaggerated the extent of his concession, and magnified the
urgency of the situation to induce prompt and favorable action by
Great Britain.

But the readiness of Germany to strike a quick and fatal blow at Paris
cannot be gainsaid and strangely contrasts with the "injured
innocence" protestations that it was treacherously surprised by an
unexpected attack. Always with Prussia, "the readiness is all."


IV

THE USE OF THE WORD "ENGLAND"

In making these scattered _addenda_, I take this occasion to make the
_amende honorable_ to some of my readers, who since the first editions
of this book appeared have taken exception to my use of the word
"England" and "English," where obviously "Great Britain" and "British"
were meant. These critics are technically correct, but I hope that
they will acquit me of any intention of ignoring any part of the
British Empire in using a term, which by common and immemorial usage
has been applied throughout the world as synonymous with the great
Empire. I should deeply regret it, if any other intention were imputed
to me, for in the magnificent struggle which Great Britain has made
for the highest ideals of civilization and the basic rights of
humanity, no one now or hereafter can ever ignore the heroic part
which has been played by Scotland, Ireland, Canada, and the over-sea
dominions

May I not plead that the word "England," has to common intent a
broader as well as a more restricted meaning and that when the poet,
the historian or--as in my case--the student uses the word "England"
in reference to a world-wide controversy, no one is likely to
misapprehend his meaning. Such use is certainly as common and as
generally understood as that of the word "American" as applied to a
Citizen of the United States, although in both cases the
characterization is not strictly accurate. To my critics in Scotland
and Ireland who have made this criticism of my book, I can only say:

     "Let my disclaiming from a purposed evil
     Free me so far in your most generous thoughts,
     That I have shot mine arrow o'er the house,
     And hurt my brother."




CHAPTER IX

THE CASE OF BELGIUM


The callous disregard by Germany of the rights of Belgium is one of
the most shocking exhibitions of political iniquity in the history of
the world.

That it has had its parallel in other and less civilized ages may be
freely admitted, but until German scientists, philosophers, educators,
and even doctors of divinity attempted to justify this wanton outrage,
it had been hoped that mankind had made some progress since the times
of Wallenstein and Tilly.

The verdict of Civilization in this respect will be little affected by
the ultimate result of the war, for even if Germany should emerge
from this titanic conflict as victor, and become, as it would then
undoubtedly become, the first power in the world, it would none the
less be a figure for the "time of scorn to point his slow unmoving
finger at." To the eulogists of Alexander the Great, Seneca was wont
to say, "Yes, but he murdered Callisthenes," and to the eulogists of
victorious Germany, if indeed it shall prove victorious, the wise and
just of all future ages will say, "Yes, but it devastated Belgium."

The fact that many distinguished and undoubtedly sincere partisans of
Germany have attempted to justify this atrocious rape, suggests a
problem of psychology rather than of logic or ethics. It strongly
illustrates a too familiar phenomenon that great intellectual and
moral astigmatism is generally incident to any passionate crisis in
human history. It shows how pitifully unstable the human intellect is
when a great man like Dr. Haeckel, a scholar and historian like Dr.
von Mach, or a doctor of divinity like Dr. Dryander, can be so warped
with the passions of the hour as to ignore the clearest considerations
of political morality.

At the outbreak of the present war Belgium had taken no part whatever
in the controversy and was apparently on friendly relations with all
the Powers. It had no interest whatever in the Servian question. A
thrifty, prosperous people, inhabiting the most densely populated
country of Europe, and resting secure in the solemn promises, not
merely of Germany, but of the leading European nations that its
neutrality should be respected, it calmly pursued the even tenor of
its way, and was as unmindful of the disaster, which was so suddenly
to befall it, as the people of Pompeii were on the morning of the
great eruption when they thronged the theatre in the pursuit of
pleasure and disregarded the ominous curling of the smoke from the
crater of Vesuvius.

On April 19, 1839, Belgium and Holland signed a treaty which provided
that "Belgium forms an independent state of perpetual neutrality." To
insure that neutrality, Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria, and
Russia on the same date signed a treaty, by which it was provided that
these nations jointly "became the guarantors" of such "perpetual
neutrality."

In his recent article on the war, George Bernard Shaw, who is
inimitable as a farceur but not quite convincing as a jurist, says:

     As all treaties are valid only _rebus sic stantibus_, and
     the state of things which existed at the date of the Treaty
     of London (1839) had changed so much since then ... that in
     1870 Gladstone could not depend on it, and resorted to a
     special temporary treaty not now in force, the technical
     validity of the 1839 treaty is extremely doubtful.

Unfortunately for this contention, the Treaty of 1870, to which Mr.
Shaw refers, provided for its own expiration after twelve months and
then added:

     And on the expiration of that time the independence and
     neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the high contracting
     parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as
     heretofore on the 1st Article of the Quintuple Treaty of the
     19th of April, 1839.

Much has been made by Mr. Shaw and others of an excerpt from a speech
of Mr. Gladstone in 1870. In that speech, Mr. Gladstone, as an
abstract proposition, declined to accept the broad statement that
under all circumstances the obligations of a treaty might continue,
but there is nothing to justify the belief that Mr. Gladstone in any
respect questioned either the value or the validity of the Treaty of
1839 with respect to Belgium.

Those who invoke the authority of Gladstone should remember that he
also said:

     We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is
     wider than that which we may have in the literal operation
     of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question
     whether, under the circumstances of the case, this country,
     endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly
     stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime
     that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become
     participators in the sin.

These words of the great statesman read as a prophecy.

While these treaties were simply declaratory of the rights, which
Belgium independently enjoyed as a sovereign nation, yet this
solemn guarantee of the great Powers of Europe was so effective that
even in 1870, when France and Germany were locked in vital conflict,
and the question arose whether Prussia would disregard her treaty
obligation, the Iron Chancellor, who ordinarily did not permit moral
considerations to warp his political policies, wrote to the Belgian
minister in Berlin on July 22, 1870:

     In confirmation of my verbal assurance, I have the honor to
     give in writing a declaration, which, in view of the
     treaties in force, _is quite superfluous_, that the
     Confederation of the North and its allies (Germany) will
     respect the neutrality of Belgium on the understanding of
     course that it is respected by the other belligerent.

At that time, Belgium had so fine a sense of honor, that although it
was not inconsistent with the principles of international law, yet in
order to discharge her obligations of neutrality in the spirit as well
as the letter, she restricted the clear legal right of her people to
supply arms and ammunition to the combatants, thus construing the
treaty to her own disadvantage.

It can be added to the credit of both France and Prussia that in
their great struggle of 1870-71, each scrupulously respected that
neutrality, and France carried out her obligations to such an extreme
that although Napoleon and his army could have at one time escaped
from Sedan into Belgium, and renewed the attack and possibly--although
not probably--saved France, if they had seen fit to violate that
neutrality, rather than break the word of France the Emperor Napoleon
and his army consented to the crowning humiliation of Sedan.

In the year 1911, in the course of a discussion in Belgium in respect
to the fortifications at Flushing, certain Dutch newspapers asserted
that in the event of a Franco-German war, the neutrality of Belgium
would be violated by Germany. It was then suggested that if a
declaration were made to the contrary in the Reichstag, that such a
declaration, "would be calculated to appease public opinion and to
calm its suspicions."

This situation was communicated to the present German Chancellor, von
Bethmann-Hollweg, who instructed the German Ambassador at Brussels to
assure the Belgian Foreign Minister,

     that he was most appreciative of the sentiment which had
     inspired our [Belgium's] action. _He declared that Germany
     had no intention of violating our neutrality_, but he
     considered that by making a declaration publicly, Germany
     would weaken her military preparation with respect to
     France, and being reassured in the northern quarter would
     direct her forces to the eastern quarter.[84]

[Footnote 84: Belgian _Gray Book_, enclosure No. 12.]

Germany's recognition of the continuing obligation of this treaty was
also shown when the question of Belgium's neutrality was suggested at
a debate in the Reichstag on April 29, 1913. In the course of that
debate a member of the Social Democratic Party said:

     In Belgium the approach of a Franco-German war is viewed
     with apprehension, because it is feared that Germany will
     not respect Belgian neutrality.[85]

[Footnote 85: _Idem._]

     Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
     replied: "The neutrality of Belgium is determined by
     international conventions, and Germany is resolved to
     respect these conventions."

     This declaration did not satisfy another member of the
     Social Democratic Party. Herr von Jagow observed that he had
     nothing to add to the clear statement which he had uttered
     with reference to the relations between Germany and Belgium.

     In reply to further interrogations from a member of the
     Social Democratic Party, Herr von Heeringen, Minister of
     War, stated: "Belgium does not play any part in the
     justification of the German scheme of military
     reorganization; the scheme is justified by the position of
     matters in the East. Germany will not lose sight of the fact
     that Belgian neutrality is guaranteed by international
     treaties."

     A member of the same party, having again referred to
     Belgium, Herr von Jagow again pointed out that his
     declaration regarding Belgium was sufficiently clear.[86]

[Footnote 86: Belgian _Gray Book_, No. 12.]

On July 31, 1914, the Belgian Foreign Minister, in a conversation with
Herr von Below, the German Minister at Brussels, asked him whether he
knew of the assurance which, as above stated, had been given by von
Bethmann-Hollweg through the German Ambassador at Brussels to the
Government at Belgium in 1911, and Herr von Below replied that he did,
and added, "that he was certain that the sentiments to which
expression was given at that time had not changed."

Thus _on July 31, 1914_, Germany, through its accredited
representative at Brussels, repeated the assurances contained in the
treaty of 1839, as reaffirmed in 1870, and again reaffirmed in 1911
and 1913.

Germany's moral obligation had an additional express confirmation.

The second International Peace Conference was held at The Hague in
1907. There were present the representatives of forty-four nations,
thus making as near an approach to the poet's dream of the "federation
of the world" and the "parliament of man" as has yet been possible in
the slow progress of mankind.

That convention agreed upon a certain declaration of principles, and
among the signatures appended to the document was the representative
of His Majesty, the German Emperor.

They agreed upon certain principles of international morality, most
of them simply declaratory of the uncodified international law then
existing, and these were subsequently ratified by formal treaties of
the respective governments, including Germany, which were deposited in
the archives of The Hague. While this treaty _as an express covenant_
was not binding, unless all belligerents signed it, yet, it recognized
an existing _moral_ obligation. The Hague Peace Conference proceeded
to define the rights of neutral powers, and in so doing simply
reaffirmed the existing international law.

The pertinent parts of this great compact, with reference to the
sanctity of neutral territory, are as follows:

                    _CONVENTION V_

     _CHAPTER I.--"THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRAL POWERS_"

                    ARTICLE I.

     _The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable._

                    ARTICLE II.

     _Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of
     either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of
     a neutral Power._

                    ARTICLE X.

     _The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force,
     attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a
     hostile act._

Notwithstanding these assurances, it had been from time to time
intimated by German military writers, and notably by Bernhardi, that
Germany would, in the event of a future war, make a quick and possibly
a fatal blow at the heart of France by invading Belgium upon the first
declaration of hostilities, and it was probably these intimations that
led the Belgian Government on July 24, 1914, to consider:

     Whether in the existing circumstances, it would not be
     proper to address to the Powers, who had guaranteed
     Belgium's independence and its neutrality, a communication
     for the purpose of confirming to them its resolution to
     carry out the international duties which are imposed upon
     it by treaties in the event of war breaking out on the
     Belgian frontiers.

Confiding in the good faith of France and Germany, the Belgian
Government concluded that any such declaration was premature.

On August 2, 1914, the war having already broken out, the Belgian
Foreign Minister took occasion to tell the German Ambassador that
France had reaffirmed its intention to respect the neutrality of
Belgium, and Herr von Below, the German Ambassador, after thanking
Davignon for his information, added that up to the present he had not
been

     instructed to make us any official communication, but we
     were aware of his personal opinion respecting the security
     with which we had the right to regard our eastern neighbors.
     I [Davignon] replied at once that all we knew of the
     intentions of the latter, intentions set forth in many
     former interviews, did not allow us to doubt their
     [Germany's] perfectly correct attitude toward Belgium.

It thus appears that as late as _August 2, 1914_, Germany had not
given to Belgium any intimation as to its intention, _and, what is
more important, it had not either on that day or previously made any
charge that Belgium had in any way violated its obligations of
neutrality, or that France had committed any overt act in violation
thereof_.

On July 31, 1914, England, not unreasonably apprehensive as to the
sincerity of Germany's oft-repeated protestations of good faith,
directed the English Ambassadors at Paris and Berlin to ask the
respective governments of those countries "whether each is prepared to
respect the neutrality of Belgium, provided it is violated by no other
Power."

This question was communicated by Sir Edward Grey to the Belgian
Government, with the addition that he (Sir Edward Grey) asked that
"the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of her power her
neutrality which I desire, and expect other Powers to uphold and
observe."

Pursuant to these instructions, the English Ambassador to Paris, on
the night of July 31, 1914, called upon Viviani, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, and on the same night received a reply which is
reported by Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, as follows:

     French Government is resolved to respect the neutrality of
     Belgium, and it would be only in the event of some other
     Power violating that neutrality that France might find
     herself under the necessity, in order to assure defense of
     her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been
     given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of
     it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister to
     Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the
     Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day.[87]

[Footnote 87: English _White Paper_, No. 125.]

Confirming this, the French Minister at Brussels, on August 1st, made
to the Belgian Foreign Minister the following declaration:

     I am authorized to declare that in the event of an
     international conflict, the government of the Republic will,
     as it has always declared, respect the neutrality of
     Belgium. In the event of this neutrality not being respected
     by another Power, the French Government, in order to insure
     its own defense, might be led to modify its attitude.[88]

[Footnote 88: Belgian _Gray Paper_, No. 15.]

On July 31, 1914, the English Ambassador at Berlin saw the German
Secretary of State, and submitted Sir Edward Grey's pointed
interrogation, and the only reply that was given was that "he must
consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly
answer," and the German Secretary of State very significantly added
that for strategic reasons it was "very doubtful whether they would
return any answer at all."

Goschen also submitted the matter to the German Chancellor, who also
evaded the question by stating that "Germany would in any case desire
to know the reply returned to you [the English Ambassador] by the
French Government."

That these were mere evasions the events on the following day
demonstrated.

On August 1st, Sir Edward Grey saw the German Ambassador in London,
and the following significant conversation took place:

     I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply of the
     German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium
     was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of
     Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could
     see her way to give the same assurance as that which had
     been given by France it would materially contribute to
     relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if
     there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one
     combatant, while the other respected it, it would be
     extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this
     country. I said that we had been discussing this question at
     a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorized to tell him this
     I gave him a memorandum of it.

     He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to
     violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain
     neutral.

     I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still
     free, and we were considering what our attitude should be.
     All I could say was that our attitude would be determined
     largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of
     Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here.
     I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality
     on that condition alone.[89]

[Footnote 89: English _White Paper_, No. 123.]

On the following day, August 2d, the German Minister at Brussels
handed to the Belgian Foreign Office the following "highly
confidential" document. After stating that "the German Government has
received _reliable information_, according to which the French forces
intend to march on the Meuse, by way of Givet and Namur," and after
suggesting a "fear that Belgium, in spite of its best will, will be in
no position to repulse such a largely developed French march without
aid," the document adds:

     It is an imperative duty for the preservation of Germany to
     forestall this attack of the enemy. The German Government
     would feel keen regret if Belgium should regard as an act of
     hostility against herself the fact that the measures of the
     enemies of Germany oblige her on her part to violate Belgian
     territory.[90]

[Footnote 90: Belgian _Gray Book_, No. 20.]

Some hours later, at 1.30 A.M. on August 3d, the German Minister
aroused the Belgian Secretary General for the Minister of Foreign
Affairs from his slumbers and,

     asked to see Baron von der Elst. He told him that he was
     instructed by his Government to inform us that French
     dirigibles had thrown bombs, and that a patrol of French
     cavalry, violating international law, seeing that war was
     not declared, had crossed the frontier.

     The Secretary General asked Herr von Below where these
     events had taken place; _in Germany, he was answered_. Baron
     von der Elst observed that in that case he could not
     understand the object of his communication. Herr von Below
     said that these acts, contrary to international law, _were
     of a nature to make one expect that other acts contrary to
     international law would be perpetrated by France_.[91]

[Footnote 91: Belgian _Gray Paper_, No. 21.]

As to these last communications, it should be noted that the German
Government, neither then nor at any subsequent time, ever disclosed to
the world the "reliable information," which it claimed to have of the
intentions of the French Government, and the event shows beyond a
possibility of contradiction that at that time France was unprepared
to make any invasion of Belgium or even to defend its own
north-eastern frontier.

It should further be noted that the alleged aggressive acts of France,
which were made the excuse for the invasion of Belgium, according to
the statement of the German Ambassador himself, _did not take place in
Belgium but in Germany_.

On August 3d, at 7 o'clock in the morning, Belgium served upon the
German Ambassador at Brussels the following reply to the German
ultimatum, which, after quoting the substance of the German demand,
continued:

     This note caused profound and painful surprise to the King's
     Government.

     The intentions which it attributed to France are in
     contradiction with the express declarations which were made
     to us on the 1st August in the name of the Government of the
     Republic.

     Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, a violation of
     Belgian neutrality were to be committed by France, Belgium
     would fulfill all her international duties, and her army
     would offer the most vigorous opposition to the invader.

     The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870,
     establish the independence and the neutrality of Belgium
     under the guarantee of the Powers, and particularly of the
     Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia.

     Belgium has always been faithful to her international
     obligations; she has fulfilled her duties in a spirit of
     loyal impartiality; she has neglected no effort to maintain
     her neutrality or to make it respected.

     The attempt against her independence, with which the German
     Government threatens her, would constitute a flagrant
     violation of international law. No strategic interest
     justifies the violation of that law.

     _The Belgian Government would, by accepting the propositions
     which are notified to her, sacrifice the honor of the nation
     while at the same time betraying her duties toward Europe._

     Conscious of the part Belgium has played for more than
     eighty years in the civilization of the world, she refuses
     to believe that her independence can be preserved only at
     the expense of the violation of her neutrality.

     If this hope were disappointed the Belgian Government has
     firmly resolved to repulse by every means in her power any
     attack upon her rights.

In the records of diplomacy there are few nobler documents than this.
Belgium then knew that she was facing possible annihilation. Every
material interest suggested acquiescence in the peremptory demands of
her powerful neighbor. In the belief that then so generally prevailed,
but which recent events have somewhat modified, the success of Germany
seemed probable, and if so, Belgium, by facilitating the triumph of
Germany, would be in a position to participate in the spoils of the
victory.

If Belgium had regarded her honor as lightly as Germany and felt that
the matter of self-preservation would excuse any moral dereliction,
she would have imitated the example of Luxemburg, also invaded, and
permitted free passage to the German army without essential loss of
her material prosperity, but with a fatal sacrifice to her national
honor.

Even under these conditions Belgium evidently entertained a hope that
Germany at the last moment would not, in view of its promises and the
protest of Belgium, commit this foul outrage.

The military attache of the French Government, being apprised of
Germany's virtual declaration of war, offered "the support of five
French army corps to the Belgian Government," and in reply Belgium,
still jealously regardful of her obligation of neutrality, replied:

     We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for
     offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances,
     however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the
     Powers. The Belgian Government will decide later on the
     action which they think it necessary to take.

As in Caesar's time, the Belgae, of all the tribes of Gaul, are in truth
"the bravest."

Later in the evening, the King of Belgium met his Ministers, and the
offer of France was communicated to them, and again the Belgian
Government, still reposing some confidence in the Punic faith of
Prussia, decided not to appeal to the guaranteeing Powers, or to
avail itself of the offers of France.

On the following morning at 6 o'clock the German Minister handed this
formal declaration of war to the Belgian Government:

     I have been instructed, and have the honor to inform your
     Excellency, that in consequence of the Government of His
     Majesty the King having declined the well-intentioned
     proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the
     latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry
     out--if necessary by force of arms--the measures of security
     which have been set forth as indispensable in view of the
     French menaces.

Here again, no active violation of Belgium's neutrality by France is
alleged, only "French menaces."

The conjecture is plausible that in the case of the Prussian General
Staff, it was their "own hard dealings" which thus taught them to
"suspect the thoughts of others."

On that day the German troops crossed the Belgian frontier and
hostilities began.

On the same day, at the great session of the Reichstag, when the
Imperial Chancellor attempted to justify to the world the hostile acts
of Germany, and especially the invasion of Belgium, the pretended
defense was thus bluntly stated by the German Premier:

     We are now in a state of necessity and necessity knows no
     law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are
     already on Belgian soil. _Gentlemen, that is contrary to the
     dictates of international law._ It is true that the French
     Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing
     to respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as her
     opponent respects it. We knew, however, that France stood
     ready for invasion. _France could wait, but we could not
     wait._ A French movement upon our flank upon the lower Rhine
     might have been disastrous. So we were compelled to override
     the _just protest_ of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments.
     _The wrong--I speak openly--that we are committing_ we will
     endeavor to make good as soon as our military goal has been
     reached. Anybody who is threatened, as we are threatened,
     and is fighting for his highest possessions, can only have
     one thought--how he is to hack his way through.

It will be noted that on this occasion, when above all other occasions
it was not only the duty, but to the highest interests of Germany, to
give to the world any substantial reason for violating the neutrality
of Belgium, the defense of Germany is rested upon the ground of
self-interest,--euphemistically called "necessity,"--_and upon none
other_.

While von Bethmann-Hollweg's statement does state that "France held
herself in readiness to invade Belgium," there was no intimation that
France had done so, or had any immediate intention of doing so. On the
contrary, it was added, "_France could wait, we (Germany) could not._"
If Belgium had forfeited its rights by undue favors to France or
England, _why did the Chancellor characterize its protest as "just"?_

How Germany fulfilled the promise of its Chancellor, to "make good"
the admitted wrong which it did Belgium, subsequent events have shown.

It may be questioned whether, since the Thirty Years' War, any country
has been subjected to such general devastating horrors. So little
effort has been taken by the conqueror to lessen the inevitable
suffering, that fines have been levied upon this impoverished people,
which would be oppressive even in a period of prosperity. It is
announced from Holland, as this book goes to press, that Germany has
imposed upon this war-desolated country a fine of $7,000,000 per month
and an especial fine of $75,000,000, for its "violation of
neutrality."

Were this episode not a tragedy, the sardonic humor, which caused the
German General Staff to impose this monstrous fine upon Belgium for
its "violation of neutrality," would have the tragi-comical aspects of
Bedlam. It recalls the fable of the wolf who complained that the lamb
was muddying the stream and when the lamb politely called the wolf's
attention to the fact that it stood lower down on the river side than
the wolf, the latter announced its intention to devour the lamb in
any event. Such is probably the intention of Prussia. If it prevail
Belgium as an independent State will cease to exist and it will be
mourned as Poland is. Like Poland, it may have a resurrection.

The war having thus commenced between Germany and Belgium, the brave
ruler of the latter country--"every inch a King"--addressed to the
King of England the following appeal:

     Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship
     and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of
     England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just
     given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic
     intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the
     integrity of Belgium.[92]

[Footnote 92: Belgian _Gray Paper_, No. 25.]

In reply to that appeal, which no chivalrous nation could have
disregarded, Sir Edward Grey immediately, on August 4th, advised the
British Ambassador in Berlin as follows:

     We hear that Germany has addressed a note to Belgian
     Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government
     will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of
     arms, the measures considered indispensable.

     We are also informed that Belgian territory has been
     violated at Gemmenich.

     In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany
     declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as
     France gave last week in reply to our request made
     simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that
     request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my
     telegram of this morning be received here by 12 o'clock
     to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your
     passports, and to say that his Majesty's Government feel
     bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the
     neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to
     which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.[93]

[Footnote 93: English _White Paper_. No. 159.]

Thereupon Sir Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador in Berlin, called
upon the Secretary of State and stated in the name of His Majesty's
Government that unless the Imperial Government

     could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they
     would proceed no further with their violation of the
     Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been
     instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial
     Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take
     all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium
     and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much
     a party as themselves.

     Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could
     give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier
     in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered
     it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should
     advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written
     summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had
     mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's
     Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in
     view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily
     ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that
     their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the
     time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer
     must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to
     demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7
     o'clock....

     I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor,
     as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an
     opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found
     the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a
     harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said
     that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible
     to a degree; just for a word--"neutrality," a word which in
     war time had so often been disregarded--_just for a scrap of
     paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred
     nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with
     her._ All his efforts in that direction had been rendered
     useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which,
     as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to
     office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had
     done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind
     while he was fighting for his life against two assailants.
     He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible
     events that might happen. I protested strongly against that
     statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von
     Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons
     it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance
     through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, _so I
     would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a
     matter of "life and death" for the honor of Great Britain
     that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost
     to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked_. That solemn
     compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could any
     one have in engagements given by Great Britain in the
     future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that
     compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought
     of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could
     that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an
     excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency
     was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our
     action, and so little disposed to hear reason, that I
     refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further
     argument....[94]

[Footnote 94: British _White Paper_, No. 160.]

Here again it is most significant, in view of the subsequent clumsily
framed defense by German apologists, to note that the German Secretary
of State, Herr von Jagow, and his superior, the German Chancellor, did
not pretend to suggest that the invasion of Belgium was due to any
overt act of France.

With even greater frankness von Jagow stated the real purpose, which
was, "to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way," and to
"avoid the more Southern route," which, "in view of the paucity of
roads and the strength of the fortresses," would have entailed "great
loss of time."

The damning conclusion as to the guilt of Germany, which irresistibly
follows from these admitted facts, is sought to be overborne by a
pamphlet entitled "_The Truth about Germany_," and subscribed to by a
number of distinguished Germans, who are in turn vouched for in
America by Professor John W. Burgess of Columbia College. He tells
us that they are the "salt of the earth," and "among the greatest
thinkers, moralists, and philanthropists of the age." To overbear the
doubter with the weight of such authority we are told that this
defense has the support of the great theologian, Harnack, the sound
and accomplished political scientist and economist, von Schmoller, the
distinguished philologian, von Wilamowitz, the well-known historian,
Lamprecht, the profound statesman, von Posadowsky, the brilliant
diplomatist, von Buelow, the great financier, von Gwinner, the great
promoter of trade and commerce, Ballin, the great inventor, Siemens,
the brilliant preacher of the Gospel, Dryander, and the indispensable
Director in the Ministry of Education, Schmidt. (The adjectives are
those of Professor Burgess.)

The average American, as indeed the average citizen of any country,
when his natural passions are not unduly aroused, is apt to take a
very prosaic and dispassionate view of such matters, and when he has
reached his conclusion based upon everyday, commonplace morality, he
is not apt to be shaken even by an imposing array of names, fortified
by an enthusiastic excess of grandiloquent adjectives. The aristocracy
of brains has no monopoly of truth, which is often best grasped by the
democracy of common sense.

The defense of these notable representatives of German thought seems
to be based upon the wholly unsupported assertion that "England and
France were resolved not to respect the neutrality of Belgium."

They say:

     It would have been a crime against the German people if the
     German General Staff had not anticipated this intention. The
     inalienable right of self-defense gives the individual,
     whose very existence is at stake, the moral liberty to
     resort to weapons which would be forbidden except in times
     of peril. As Belgium would, nevertheless, not acquiesce in a
     friendly neutrality, which would permit the unobstructed
     passage of German troops through small portions of her
     territory, although her integrity was guaranteed, the German
     General Staff was obliged to force the passage in order to
     avoid the necessity of meeting the enemy on the most
     unfavorable ground.

In other words, it seemed preferable to the German General Staff that
it should fight in France rather than in Germany, and for this reason
Belgium must be ruined.

Notwithstanding this and similar propositions, which are so abhorrent
in their political immorality, it is yet gravely suggested by Dr.
Dernberg and others that Bernhardi's philosophy does not reflect the
true thought of the Prussian ruling classes. Here are representative
theologians, economists, historians, statesmen, diplomatists,
financiers, inventors, and educators, who, in invoking the support of
the educated classes in the United States, deliberately subscribe to
a proposition at which even Machiavelli might have gagged.

We are further told that "the German troops, with their iron
discipline will respect the personal property and liberty of the
individual in Belgium just as they did in France in 1870," and these
scientists, philosophers, and doctors of divinity add that "Belgium
would have been wise, if it had permitted the passage of the German
troops," for the Belgian people "_would have fared well from the
business point of view, for the army would have proved a good customer
and paid well._"

To this defense we are led in the last analysis, that Belgium should
have preferred cash to her honor, just as the German General Staff
preferred dishonor to the sacrifice of an immediate military
advantage.

The possibilities of moral casuistry have been severely tested in the
attempt of these apologists for Germany to defend the forcible
invasion of Belgium.

The ethical question has been made quite unnecessarily to pivot upon
the express contractual obligations of England, Germany, and France
with respect to the neutrality of Belgium. The indictment of Germany
has been placed upon the sound but too narrow ground that by the
Treaty of 1839, and The Hague Convention of 1907, Germany had
obligated itself by a solemn pledge to respect the neutrality both
of Luxemburg and Belgium.

If, however, there had been no Hague Convention and no Treaty of 1839,
and if Germany, England, and France had never entered into reciprocal
obligations in the event of war to respect Belgium's neutrality,
nevertheless upon the broadest considerations of international law the
invasion without its consent would be without any justification
whatever.

It is a fundamental axiom of international law that each nation is the
sole and exclusive judge of the conditions under which it will permit
an alien to cross its frontiers. Its territory is _sacrosanct_. No
nation may invade the territory of another without its consent. To do
so by compulsion is an act of war. Each nation's land is its castle of
asylum and defense. This fundamental right of Belgium should not be
confused or obscured by balancing the subordinate equities between
France, Germany, and England with respect to their formal treaty
obligations.

Belgium's case has thus been weakened in the forum of public opinion
by too insistent reference to the special treaties. The right of
Belgium and of its citizens as individuals, to be secure in their
possessions rests upon the sure foundation of inalienable right and
is guarded by the immutable principle of moral law, "Thou shalt not
steal." It was well said by Alexander Hamilton:

     The sacred rights of man are not to be searched for in old
     parchments and musty records; they are written as with a
     sunbeam in the whole volume of human nature by the hand of
     Divinity itself and can never be erased by mortal power.

This truth can be illustrated by an imaginary instance. Let us suppose
that the armies of the Kaiser had made the progress which they so
confidently anticipated, and had not simply captured Paris, but had
also invaded England, and that, in an attempt to crush the British
Empire, the German General Staff planned an invasion of Canada. Let us
further suppose that Germany thereupon served upon the United States
such an arrogant demand as it made upon Belgium, requiring the United
States to permit it to land an army in New York, with the accompanying
assurance that neither its territory nor independence would be
injured, and that Germany would generously reimburse it for any
damage.

Let us further suppose--and it is not a very fanciful
supposition--that the United States would reply to the German demand
that under no circumstances should a German force be landed in New
York or its territory be used as a base of hostile operations against
Canada. To carry out the analogy in all its details, let us then
suppose that the German fleet should land an army in the city of New
York, arrest its Mayor, and check the first attempt of its outraged
inhabitants to defend the city by demolishing the Cathedral, the
Metropolitan Art Gallery, the City Hall and other structures, and
shooting down remorselessly large numbers of citizens, because a few
non-combatants had not accepted the invasion with due humility.

Although Germany had not entered into any treaty to respect the
territory of the United States, no one would seriously contend that
Germany would be justified in such an invasion.

The alleged invalidation of the treaty of 1839 being thus unimportant,
Dr. Dernberg and Professor von Mach fall back upon the only remaining
defense, that France had already violated the neutrality of Belgium
with the latter's consent. _Of this there is no evidence whatever._ We
have, on the contrary, the express assurance, which France gave on the
eve of the German invasion both to Belgium and England, that it would
not violate the rights of Belgium, and in addition we have the
significant fact that when Belgium was invaded, and it was vitally
necessary that the French Army should go with all possible speed to
its relief and thus stop the invasion and save France itself from
invasion, it was ten days before France could send any adequate
support. Unhappily it was then too late.

If it were true that France intended to invade Belgium, then of all
the blunders that the German Foreign Office has made, the greatest was
that it did not permit France to carry out this step, for it would
have palliated the action of Germany in meeting such violation by a
similar invasion, and it would thus have been an immeasurable gain for
Germany and a greater injury to France.

Germany's greatest weakness to-day is its moral isolation. It stands
condemned by the judgment of the civilized world. No physical power it
can exercise can compensate for this loss of moral power. Even success
will be too dearly bought at such a price. There are things which
succeed better than success. Truth is one of them.

Under the plea of necessity, which means Germany's desire to minimize
its losses of life, Germany has turned Belgium into a shambles,
trampled a peaceful nation under foot and almost crushed its soul
beneath the iron tread of its mighty armies.

Almost wounded unto death, and for a time prostrate under the heel of
the conqueror, the honor of Belgium shines unsullied by any selfish
interests, personal dishonor, or lack of courage.

It is claimed that there were officers of the French Army in Liege and
Namur before the war broke out. Neither names nor dates have been
given, and the allegation might be fairly dismissed because of the
very vagueness of the charge. But even if it were true, international
law does not forbid the officers of one nation serving with the armies
of another. German officers have for many years been thus employed in
Turkey and engaged in training and developing the Turkish Army, but no
one has ever contended that the employment by that country of German
military officers was a violation of neutrality, or gave rise to a
_casus belli_.

It is wholly probable that there were some German officers in Belgium
before the war commenced, and if not, there were certainly hundreds
of spies, of whose pernicious activities the Belgian people were to
learn later to their infinite sorrow, but because Germany employed an
elaborate system of espionage in Belgium, it could not justify France
in invading its territory without its permission.

To a lawyer, who has had experience in the judicial ascertainment of
truth, there is one consideration that justifies him in disposing
of all these vague allegations with respect to French activities in
Belgium on the eve of the war, and that is that Germany has not only
failed to give any testimony in support of the charges, _but it never
suggested this defense until the judgment of the civilized world had
branded it with an ineffaceable stain_.

Professor von Mach, a former educator of Harvard University and an
apologist for Germany, feels this poverty of evidence and has rather
naively suggested an adjournment of the case. He says:

     Did French officers remain in Liege or in any other Belgian
     fortress after hostilities had begun, and did France plan to
     go through Belgium? Germany has officially made both claims.
     The first can easily be substantiated by The Supreme Court
     of Civilization by an investigation of the prisoners of war
     taken in Belgium. Until an impartial investigation becomes
     possible no further proof than the claim made by the German
     Government can be produced.

As the French officers taken in Belgium are presumably in German
detention camps, it would seem that Germany should first substantiate
its defense by names, dates, and places, although even then the mere
capture of French officers in Belgium after the invasion had begun
does not necessarily indicate that they were in Belgium before the
invasion.

Dr. von Mach adds in the reply, which he made in the New York _Times_
to an article contributed by the writer to that journal:

     _It is impossible to say here exactly what these proofs are
     which Germany possesses, and which for military reasons it
     has not yet been able to divulge...._ This is an important
     question, and the answer must be left to The Supreme Court
     of Civilization. The weight of the evidence would seem to
     point to a justification of Germany. Yet no friend of
     Germany can find fault with those who would wish to defer
     a verdict until such time when Germany can present her
     complete proof to the world, and this may be when the war is
     over.

This naive suggestion, that the vital question of fact should be
postponed, and in the meantime judgment should be entered for Germany,
is refreshing in its novelty. Its only parallel was the contention of
the celebrated Dr. Cook, who contended that the world should accept
his claim as to the discovery of the North Pole and await the proofs
later.

Professor von Mach, in his book, "_What Germany Wants_," further
explains this dilatory defense and amplifies it in a manner that is
certainly unusual in an historian. He recognizes that the speech of
the German Chancellor in the Reichstag on August 4th, in which von
Bethmann-Hollweg admitted that the action of Germany in invading
Belgium was wrong and only justified it on the ground of
self-preservation, was a virtual plea of guilty by Prussia of the
crime, of which it stands indicted at the bar of the civilized world.

Germany's scholarly apologist, as _amicus curiae_, then suggests that
in criminal procedure, when a defendant pleads guilty, the Court often
refuses to accept his plea, enters a plea of not guilty for him, and
assigns counsel to defend the case. He therefore suggests that the
Chancellor's plea of guilty should be disregarded and the Court should
assign counsel.

One difficulty with the analogy is that courts do not ordinarily
refuse to accept a plea of guilty. On the contrary, they accept it
almost invariably, for why try the guilt of a man when he himself in
the most formal way acknowledges it?

The only instance in which a court does show such consideration to a
prisoner is when the defendant is both poor and ignorant. Then, and
only then, with a fine regard for human right, is the procedure
suggested by Prof. von Mach followed.

To this humiliating position, Professor von Mach as _amicus curiae_
consigns his great nation. For myself, as one who admires Germany and
believes it to be much greater and truer than its ruling caste or its
over-zealous apologists, I refuse to accept the justification of such
an absurd and degrading analogy.

The blunt acknowledgment of the German Chancellor in the Reichstag,
already quoted, is infinitely preferable to the disingenuous defenses
of Germany's ardent but sophistical apologists. Fully recognizing
the import of his words, von Bethmann-Hollweg, addressing the
representatives of the German nation, put aside with admirable candor
all these sophistical artifices and rested the defense of Germany upon
the single contention that Germany was beset by powerful enemies and
that it was a matter of necessity for her to perpetrate this "wrong"
and in this manner to "hack her way through."

This defense is not even a plea of confession and avoidance. It is a
plea of "Guilty" at the bar of the world. It has one merit. It does
not add to the crime the aggravation of hypocrisy.

After the civilized world had condemned the invasion of Belgium with
an unprecedented approach to unanimity, the German Chancellor rather
tardily discovered that public opinion was still a vital force in the
world and that the strategic results of the occupation of Belgium had
not compensated for the moral injury. For this reason he framed five
months after this crime against civilization a belated defense, which
proved so unconvincing that the Bernhardi plea of military necessity
is clearly preferable, as at least having the merit of candor.

After proclaiming to the world that the German Foreign Office had
discovered in Brussels certain secret documents, which disclosed the
fact that the neutrality of Belgium at the time of the invasion was a
sham and after the civilized world had refused to accept this bald and
unsupported assertion, as it had also refused to accept the spurious
evidence of a well-known Arctic explorer, the German Foreign Office in
December, 1914 published its alleged proofs.

The first purported to be a report of the Chief of the Belgian General
Staff to the Minister of War and reported his conversations in 1906
with a military attache of the British Legation in Brussels.

The second purported to be a report of similar conversations in 1912
between the same officials.

In an authorized statement, published on January 27, 1915, Sir Edward
Grey states that there is no record of either of these negotiations in
the English Foreign Office or the War Office; but this fact is not in
itself conclusive and as there is no evidence that the documents were
forged, their genuineness should be assumed in the absence of some
more specific denial.

The documents, however, do not appreciably advance the cause of
Germany, for they disclose on their face that the conversations were
not binding on the Governments of England or Belgium but were simply
an informal exchange of view between the officials, and what is far
more to the purpose, the whole of the first conversation of April 10,
1906, was expressly based upon the statement that "_the entry of the
English into Belgium would take place only after the violation of our
neutrality by Germany_."

The second document also shows that the Belgian Chief of Staff
expressly stated that any invasion of Belgium by England, made to
repel a prior German invasion, could not take place without the
express consent of Belgium, to be given when the occasion arose, and
it is further evident that the statement of the English military
attache--clearly a subordinate official to define the foreign policy
of a great Empire--expressly predicated his assumption, that England
might disembark troops in Belgium, upon the statement that its object
would be to repel a German invasion of Belgian territory.

If it be asked why England and Belgium were thus in 1906 and 1912
considering the contingency of a German invasion of Belgium and the
method of effectually repelling it, the reply is obvious that such
invasion, in the event of a war between Germany and France, was a
commonplace of German military strategists. Of this purpose they made
little, if any, concealment. The construction by Germany of numerous
strategic railway lines on the Belgian frontier, which were out of
proportion to the economic necessity of the territory, gave to Europe
some indication of Germany's purpose and there could have been little
doubt as to such intention, if Germany had not, through its Foreign
Office, given, as previously shown, repeated and continuous assurances
to Belgium that such was not its intention.

The German Chancellor--whose stupendous blunders of speech and action
in this crisis will be the marvel of posterity--has further attempted
to correct his record by two equally disingenuous defenses. Speaking
to the Reichstag on December 2, 1914, he said:

     When on the 4th of August I referred to the wrong which we
     were doing in marching through Belgium, it was not yet known
     for certain whether the Brussels Government in the hour of
     need would not decide after all to spare the country and to
     retire to Antwerp under protest. You remember that, after
     the occupation of Liege, at the request of our army leaders
     I repeated the offer to the Belgian Government. For military
     reasons it was absolutely imperative that at the time, about
     the 4th of August, the possibility for such a development
     should be kept open. _Even then the guilt of the Belgian
     Government was apparent from many a sign, although I had not
     yet any positive documentary proofs at my disposal._

This is much too vague to excuse a great crime. The guilt of Belgium
is said to be "apparent from many a sign," but what these signs are
the Chancellor still fails to state. He admits that they were not
documentary in character. If the guilt of Belgium had been so apparent
to the Chancellor on August the 4th, when he made his confession of
wrong doing in the Reichstag, then it is incredible that he would have
made such an admission.

As to the overt acts of France, all that the Chancellor said in his
speech of December 2 was "that France's plan of campaign was known to
us and that it compelled us for reasons of self-preservation to march
through Belgium." But it is again significant that, speaking nearly
five months after his first public utterance on the subject and with a
full knowledge that the world had visited its destructive condemnation
upon Germany for its wanton attack upon Belgium, _the Chancellor can
still give no specific allegation of any overt act by France which
justified the invasion_. All that is suggested is a supposed "plan of
campaign."

Following this unconvincing and plainly disingenuous speech, the
Chancellor proceeded in an authorized newspaper interview on January
25, 1915 to state that his now famous--or infamous--remark about "the
scrap of paper" had been misunderstood.

After stating that he felt a painful "surprise to learn that my
phrase, 'a scrap of paper,' should have caused such an unfavorable
impression on the United States," he proceeds to explain that in his
now historic interview with the British Ambassador,

     he (von Bethmann-Hollweg) had spoken of the treaty not as a
     "scrap of paper" for Germany, but as an instrument which
     had become obsolete through Belgium's forfeiture of its
     neutrality and that Great Britain had quite other reasons
     for entering into the war, compared with which the
     neutrality treaty appeared to have only the value of a scrap
     of paper.

Let the reader here pause to note the twofold character of this
defense.

It suggests that Germany's guaranty of Belgium's neutrality had become
for Germany "a scrap of paper" because of Belgium's alleged forfeiture
of its rights as a neutral nation, although at the time referred to
the German Chancellor had not only asked the permission of Belgium to
cross its territory but immediately before his interview with the
British Ambassador he had publicly testified in his speech in the
Reichstag to the justice of Belgium's protest.

The other and inconsistent suggestion is that, without respect to
Belgium's rights under the treaty of 1839, the violation of its
territory by Germany was not the cause of England's intervention; but
obviously this hardly explains the German Chancellor's contemptuous
reference to the long standing and oft repeated guaranty of Belgium's
neutrality as merely a "scrap of paper."

Having thus somewhat vaguely suggested a twofold defense, the
Chancellor, without impeaching the accuracy of Goschen's report of the
interview, then proceeded to state that the conversation in question
took place immediately after his speech in the Reichstag, in which, as
stated, he had admitted the justice of Belgium's protest against the
violation of its territory, and he adds that,

     when I spoke, I already had _certain indications but no
     absolute proof_ upon which to base a public accusation
     that Belgium long before had abandoned its neutrality in
     its relations with England. Nevertheless I took Germany's
     responsibilities toward the neutral States so seriously that
     I spoke frankly of the wrong committed by Germany.

If the German Chancellor is truthful in his statement that on August
the 4th, when he spoke in the Reichstag and an hour later had his
conversation with Goschen, he had "certain indications" that Belgium
had forfeited its rights as an independent nation by hostile acts,
then the German Chancellor took such a serious view of "Germany's
responsibilities" that, without any necessity or justification, he
indicted his country at the bar of the whole world of a flagrant
wrong. If he could not at that time justify the act of the German
General Staff, he should at least have been silent, but, according to
his incredible statement, although he had these "certain indications"
and thus _knew_ that Germany, in invading Belgium, was simply
attacking an already hostile country, he deliberately explains, not
only to his nation but to the whole world, that such invasion was a
wrong and had no justification in international law. How can any
reasonable man, whose eyes are not blinded with the passions of the
hour, accept this explanation?

It is even more remarkable that immediately following the session of
the Reichstag, when he had his interview with Goschen, the German
Chancellor never suggested in his own defense or that of his country,
that he had "certain indications," which justified the action that day
taken, although he then knew that, unless he could justify it, England
would immediately join the already powerful foes of Germany.

The reader need only reread Goschen's report of that interview
(_ante_, p. 214) to know how disingenuous this belated explanation
is. With the whole world ringing with the infamous phrase, the German
Chancellor, after five months of reflection, can only make this
pitiful defense. Its acceptance subjects even the most credulous to
a severe strain. It exhausts the limit of gullibility.

The defense wholly ignores the fact that the Chancellor had previously
sought to bribe England to condone in advance the invasion of Belgium
by Germany, and that Germany had also coerced Luxemburg into a passive
acquiescence in a similar invasion, and there is as yet no pretense
that Luxemburg had failed in its obligation of neutrality.

Should the judgment of the civilized world turn from the terrible fate
of Belgium and consider the wrong that was done to Luxemburg, then the
German Chancellor may, unless better advised, frame further maladroit
excuses with reference to that country.

All these explanations, as senseless as they are false, and savoring
more of the tone of a criminal court then that of an imperial
chancellery, should shock those who admire historic Germany. They are
unworthy of so great a nation. Bismarck would never have stooped to
such pitiful and transparent deception. The blunt candor of Maximilian
Harden, which we have already quoted on page 12, is infinitely
preferable and the position of Germany at the bar of the civilized
world will improve, when its maladroit Chancellor has the courage and
the candor to say, as Harden did, that all this was done because
Germany regarded it as for its vital interests and because "we willed
it."

Unless our boasted civilization is the thinnest veneering of
barbarism; unless the law of the world is in fact only the ethics of
the rifle and the conscience of the cannon; unless mankind, after
uncounted centuries, has made no real advance in political morality
beyond that of the cave dweller, then this answer of Germany cannot
satisfy the "decent respect to the opinions of mankind." It is the
negation of all that civilization stands for.

Belgium has been crucified in the face of the world. Its innocence of
any offense, until it was attacked, is too clear for argument. Its
voluntary immolation to preserve its solemn guarantee of neutrality
will "plead like angels, trumpet-tongued, against the deep damnation
of its taking off."

It may be questioned whether, since the fall of Poland, Civilization
has been stirred to more profound pity and intense indignation than by
this wanton outrage. Pity, radiating to the utmost corners of the
world by the "sightless couriers of the air,"

     "Shall blow the horrid deed in every eye
     That tears shall drown the wind."

Was it also, as with Macbeth, a case of

     "Vaulting ambition which o'erleaps itself
     And falls on the other"?

Time will tell.

Had Germany not invaded Belgium, it is an even chance that England
would not have intervened, at least at the beginning of the war.

Germany could have detached a relatively small part of its army to
defend its highly fortified Western frontier, and leaving France to
waste its strength on frontal attacks on that almost impregnable line
of defense, Germany with the bulk of its army and that of Austria
could have made a swift drive at Russia.

Is it not possible that that course would have yielded better results
than the fiasco, which followed the fruitless drive at Paris?

If Germany succeeds, it will claim that "nothing succeeds like
success," and to the disciples of Treitschke and Bernhardi this will
be a sufficing answer.

If it fail, posterity will be at a loss to determine which blundered
the worst, the German Foreign Office or its General Staff, its
diplomats or its generals.




CHAPTER X

THE JUDGMENT OF THE WORLD


The record has now been laid before the reader in all its essential
details. The witnesses for the different countries have taken the
stand and we have their respective contentions in their own words.
Czar, Emperor, and King, as well as Prime Minister, Chancellor, and
Ambassador, have testified as to the fateful events, which preceded
the outbreak of the war, with a fullness of detail, to which history
presents few parallels. The evidence which Germany and Austria have
suppressed does not prevent the determination of the issue.

It is a great tribute to the force of public opinion and a clear
recognition that the conscience of mankind does exist as something
more than a visionary abstraction, that the secrets of diplomacy have
been laid bare by most of the contending nations, and that there is an
earnest desire on the part of all of them to justify their conduct
respectively at the bar of the civilized world.

Even more impressive to the sincere friends of peace is the
significant fact that concurrently with the most amazing display of
physical force that the world has ever known has come a direct appeal
by the belligerent nations to the neutral States, and especially to
the United States, not for practical cooperation in the hostilities
but for moral sympathy.

All past wars are insignificant in dimensions in comparison with this.
The standing army of the Roman Empire, according to the estimate of
Gibbon, did not exceed 400,000, and guarded that mighty Empire from
the Euphrates to the Thames. The grand army of Napoleon, which was
supposed to mark the maximum of human effort in the art of war and
with which he crossed a century ago the Niemen, did not exceed
700,000. To-day at least fifteen millions of men are engaged in a
titanic struggle, with implements of destruction, to which all past
devices in the science of destruction are insignificant.

Apparently, therefore, the ideals of the pacificist are little better
than a rainbow, a rainbow of promise, perhaps, but still a rainbow,
formed by the rays of God's justice shining through the tears of human
pity.

But when, in contrast to this amazing display of physical power,
there is contrasted an equally unprecedented desire on the part of the
contending nations to justify their case at the bar of public opinion
and to gain the moral sympathy of the neutral States, then it is seen
that the "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" is still a mighty
factor in human affairs, and the question as to the judgment of the
world, upon the moral issues raised by this great controversy, becomes
not merely of academic but of great practical interest.

What that judgment will be it is not difficult to determine, for the
evidence in the case can admit of but one conclusion. It may be, as
Mr. George Bernard Shaw says, that in the contending nations, the ears
are too greatly deafened by the roar of the cannon and the eyes too
blinded by the smoke of battle, to reach a dispassionate conclusion.
But in the neutral States of the world, and especially in that
greatest of all the neutral Powers, the United States of America, a
judgment has been pronounced that is unmistakable.

The great Republic is more free than any other nation to reach a just
conclusion "without fear, favor, or affection." Without alliances with
any Power and with no practical interest in the European balance of
power, itself composed of men of all the contending nations, it can,
above every other people, proceed to judgment, "with malice toward
none and with charity for all."

It is a tribute to its unique position among the nations of the world
that from the beginning of the war each of the contending Powers
has invoked its judgment. The Kaiser, the President of the French
Republic, and the King of Belgium have each in an especial way sought
its moral support, while to the other nations the question of the
attitude of the United States has been one of practical and recognized
importance.

If the United States is thus a moral arbiter in the greatest war of
history, its judgment is now, and may hereafter increasingly become, a
potential factor of great significance.

The nature of that judgment is already apparent to all men. The people
of the United States, numbering nearly one hundred millions, have
reached, with an amazing approach to unanimity, certain clear and
definite conclusions.

These conclusions maybe summarized as follows:

     1. That Germany and Austria in a time of profound peace
     secretly concerted to impose their will upon Europe in a
     matter affecting the balance of power. Whether in so doing
     they intended to precipitate a European war to determine the
     hegemony of Europe is not satisfactorily established,
     although their whole course of conduct suggests this as a
     possibility. They made war almost inevitable by (_a_)
     issuing an ultimatum that was grossly unreasonable and
     disproportionate to any grievance that Austria may have had,
     and (_b_) in giving to Servia and Europe insufficient time
     to consider the rights and obligations of all interested
     nations.

     2. That Germany had at all times the power to induce Austria
     to preserve a reasonable and conciliatory course, but at no
     time effectively exerted its influence. On the contrary, it
     certainly abetted, and possibly instigated, Austria in its
     unreasonable course.

     3. That England, France, Italy, and Russia throughout the
     diplomatic controversy sincerely worked for peace, and in
     this spirit not only overlooked the original misconduct of
     Austria but made every reasonable concession in the hope of
     preserving peace.

     4. That Austria, having mobilized its army, Russia was
     reasonably justified in mobilizing its forces. Such act of
     mobilization is the right of any sovereign State, and as
     long as the Russian armies did not cross the border or take
     any aggressive action, no other nation had any just right to
     complain, each having the same right to make similar
     preparations.

     5. That Germany, in abruptly declaring war against Russia
     for failure to demobilize, when the other Powers had offered
     to make any reasonable concession and peace parleys were
     still in progress, precipitated the war.

     6. That the invasion of Belgium by Germany was without any
     provocation and in violation of Belgium's inherent rights as
     a sovereign State. The sanctity of its territory does not
     depend exclusively upon the Treaty of 1839 or The Hague
     Convention, but upon fundamental and axiomatic principles of
     international law. These treaties were simply declaratory of
     Belgium's rights as a sovereign nation and simply reaffirmed
     by a special covenant the duty of Germany and the other
     Powers to respect the neutrality of Belgium.

     7. England was justified in its declaration of war upon
     Germany, not only because of its direct interests in the
     neutrality of Belgium, but also because of the ethical duty
     of the strong nations to protect the weak upon adequate
     occasion from indefensible wrong. Apart from this general
     ethical justification, England was, under the Treaty of
     1839, under an especial obligation to defend the neutrality
     of Belgium, and had it failed to respect that obligation it
     would have broken its solemn covenant.

If they are "thrice armed" who have their "quarrel just," then
England, France, Russia, and Belgium can await with confidence, not
merely the immediate issue of the titanic conflict, but also the
equally important judgment of history.




EPILOGUE


On the evening of July 31, 1914, the author reached Basle. The rapid
progress of events, narrated in this volume, suggested the wisdom of
continuing the journey to Paris that night, but as I wanted to see the
tomb of Erasmus in the Basle Cathedral I determined to break my long
journey from St. Moritz.

It seemed a fitting time to make a pilgrimage to the last
resting-place of the great humanist philosopher of Rotterdam and
Louvain, for in that prodigious upheaval of the sixteenth century,
which has passed into history as the Reformation, Erasmus was the one
noble spirit who looked with a tolerant and philosophical mind upon
both parties to the great controversy. He suffered the fate of the
conservative in a radical time, and as the great storm convulsed
Europe the author of the _Praise of Folly_ probably said on more than
one occasion: "A plague o' both your houses." Nearly four centuries
have passed since he joined the "silent majority," between whom is no
quarreling, and the desolated Louvain, which he loved, is to-day in
its ruins a standing witness that immeasurable folly still rules the
darkened counsels of men.

As I reached Basle and saw the spires of the Cathedral rising above
the Rhine, it seemed to me that the great convulsion, which was then
rocking all Europe with seismic violence, was the greatest since that
of the French Revolution and might have as lasting results as the
great schism of the sixteenth century.

I was not fated to see the tomb, for when I reached my hotel the
facilities of civilization had broken down so abruptly that if I did
not wish to be interned in Switzerland I must leave early on the
following morning for Paris. Transportation had almost entirely
collapsed, communication was difficult, and credit itself was so
strained that "mine host" of the Three Kings was disposed to look
askance even at gold.

Our journey took us to France by way of Delle. Twenty-four hours after
we passed that frontier town, German soldiers entered and blew out the
brains of a French custom-house officer, thus the first victim in the
greatest war that the world has ever known.

As we journeyed from Basle to Paris on that last day of July the fair
fields of France never looked more beautiful. In the gleaming summer
sun they made a new "field of the cloth of gold," and the hayricks
looked like the aureate tents of a mighty army. It was harvest time,
but already the laborers had deserted their fields which, although
"white unto the harvest," seemed bereft of the tillers. Some had left
the bounty of nature to join in the harvest of death. From the high
pasture lands of the Alps the herdsmen at the ringing of the village
church bells had left their herds and before night had fallen were on
their way to the front.

At Belfort the station was crowded with French troops and an elderly
French couple came into our compartment. The eyes of the wife were red
with weeping, while the man sank into his seat and with his head upon
his breast gazed moodily into vacancy. They had just parted with their
son, who had joined the colors. I stood for a time with this French
gentleman in the corridor of the train, but as he could not speak
English or German and I could not speak French, it was impossible for
us to communicate the intense and tragical thoughts that were passing
through our minds. Suddenly he pointed to the smiling harvest fields,
by which we passed so swiftly, and said "_Perdu! perdu!_" This word
of tragical import could have been applied to all civilization as well.

The night of our arrival in Paris I fully expected to see a half a
million Frenchmen parading the streets and enthusiastically cheering
for war and crying, as in 1870, "a Berlin!" I was to witness an
extraordinary transformation of a great nation. An unusual silence
brooded over the city. A few hundred people paraded the chief avenues,
crying "down with war!", while a separate crowd of equal size sang
the national hymn. With these exceptions there was no cheering or
enthusiasm, such as I would have expected from my preconceived idea of
French excitability. Men spoke in undertones, with a quiet but subdued
intensity of feeling rather than with frenzied enthusiasm.

With a devotion that was extraordinary and a pathetically brave
submission to a possible fate, they seemed to be sternly resolved to
die to the last man, if necessary, in defense of their noble nation.
Although I subsequently saw in the thrilling days of mobilization many
thousands of soldiers pass through the railroad stations on their way
to the front, I never heard the rumble of a drum or saw the waving of
regimental colors.

No sacrifice seemed to be too great, whether it was asked of man,
woman, or child. The spirit of materialism for the time being
vanished. The newspapers shrunk to a single sheet and all commercial
advertisements disappeared. Theaters, art galleries, museums,
libraries, closed their doors. Upon some streets nearly every shop
was closed, with the simple but eloquent placard "Gone to join the
colors." The French people neither exulted, boasted, nor complained.
The only querulous element was a small minority of the large body of
American tourists, so suddenly caught in a terrific storm of human
passions, who seemed to feel that this Red Sea of blood should part
until they could walk dry-shod to the shore of safety.

In Germany similar scenes were enacted and a like spirit of courage
and self-sacrifice was shown.

It is a reflection upon civilization that two nations, each so brave,
heroic, and self-sacrificing, should, without their consent and by the
miserable and iniquitous folly of scheming statesmen and diplomats, be
plunged into a war, of which no man can see the end and which has
already swept away the flower of their manhood.

One great lesson of this conflict may be that no aggressive war ought
to be initiated unless the policy of that war is first submitted to
the masses of the people, upon whom the burdens in the last analysis
fall and who must pay the dreadful penalty with their treasure and
their lives.

If the policy of this war had been submitted by a referendum to the
Austrian and German peoples with a full statement of the facts of
the Servian controversy, would they not have rejected a form of
arbitrament, which creates but does not settle questions, convinces no
one, and only sows the seeds of greater hatred for future and richer
harvests of death? If the be-ribboned diplomats and decorated generals
of the General Staffs at Berlin and Vienna had been without power to
precipitate this war, unless they themselves were willing to occupy
the trenches on the firing line, this war might never have been.

       *       *       *       *       *

Nearly five months have passed since that summer day, when I passed
through smiling harvest fields from the mountains to the Seine. The
trenches, in which innumerable brave men are writing with their blood
the records of their statesmen's follies, are filled with snow. The
blackest Christmas Eve within the memory of living man has come and
gone, perhaps the blackest, since in the stillness of the night there
fell upon the wondering ears of the shepherds the gracious refrain of
"Peace on earth, good will among men." On that night devout German
soldiers sang in their trenches in Flanders and along the Vistula the
hymn of Christmas Eve, "_Stille Nacht, heilige Nacht_."

Was this unconscious mockery, an expression of invincible faith, or a
reversion from habit to the gentler associations of childhood? The
spirit of Christmas was not wholly dead, for it is narrated that these
brave men in English and German trenches on this saddest of Christmas
Eves declared for a few hours of their own volition a Christmas truce.

     "Some say that ever 'gainst that season comes
     Wherein our Saviour's birth is celebrated
     The bird of dawning singeth all night long,
     And then, they say, no spirit dare stir abroad,
     The nights are wholesome, then no planets strike,
     So hallowed and so gracious is the time."

There is not between the men in one trench and those in another, each
seeking the speediest opportunity to kill the other, any personal
quarrel. On occasion they even fraternize, only to resume the work
of mutual extermination. They would not have quarreled, if the
Berchtolds, the von Bethmann-Hollwegs, and the von Jagows had had
sufficient loyalty to civilization to submit any possible grievance,
which either had, to the judgment of Europe.

A spectacle more ghastly than this "far-flung battle line" has never
been witnessed since the world began, for these soldiers in gray or
khaki are not savages but are beings of an advanced civilization.
Their fighting can have in method none of the old-time chivalry, such
as was witnessed at Fontenoy when the French commander courteously
invited his English rival to fire first. The present is a chemical,
mechanical war, than which no circle in Dante's _Inferno_ is more
horribly repellent.

When was better justified the terrible but beautiful imagery in
Milton's poem of _The Nativity_, when he says of Nature:

     "Only with speeches fair
     She woos the gentle air
     To hide her guilty front with innocent snow,
     And on her naked shame
     Pollute with sinful blame
     The saintly veil of maiden white to throw;
     _Confounded that her Maker's eyes
     Should look so near upon her foul deformities._"

The snow cannot hide the horrors of the present conflict. Even night,
in other wars more merciful, no longer throws its sable mantle of
mercy over the dying and the dead. By the use of powerful searchlights
the work of destruction continues. As though the surface of the earth
were no longer sufficient for this malignant exercise of the genius
of man, the heavens above and the waters under the earth have become
at length the battlefields of the nations. Even from the infinite
azure falls

     "....                            a ghastly dew
     From the nations' airy navies, grappling in the central blue."

Can all history afford a parallel in malignity to the submarine,
which, having sunk one vessel with all its human lives, calmly awaits,
with its periscope projecting above the water like the malignant eye
of a devil fish, the arrival of rescuing ships to sink them also?

Was the gracious refrain of "Peace on earth, good will among men,"
merely a mockery of man's hope, making of his civilization a mere
mirage? Will

     "Caesar's spirit ranging for revenge
     With Ate from his side come hot from Hell"--

forever crucify afresh and put to an open shame the gentle Galilean?

The angelic song of Bethlehem was neither the statement of a fact nor
even a prophecy. In its true translation it was the statement of a
profound moral truth, upon which in the last analysis the pacification
of humanity must depend. The great promise was "Peace on earth _to men
of good will_."

_Peace to the pacific_, that was the great message. For all others the
great Teacher had but one prediction and that was "the distress of
nations, ... men's hearts failing them for fear." Until civilization
can grasp the truth that there can be no peace until there is among
all nations a spirit of conciliation and a common desire of justice,
the cause of peace can be little more than a beautiful dream. Hague
conventions, international tribunals, and agreements to arbitrate,
while minimizing the causes of war and affording the machinery for the
pacific adjustment of justiciable questions, will yet prove altogether
ineffectual, irrespective of the size of the parchment, the imposing
character of the seals, or the length of the red tape, unless the
nations which execute them have sufficient loyalty to civilization to
ask only that which seems just and to submit any disputable question
to the pacific adjustment of an impartial tribunal.

I appreciate that some questions are not justiciable and cannot be
arbitrated. The historic movements of races, like those of glaciers,
cannot be stopped by mortal hands, and yet even these slow-moving
masses of ice are stayed by an Invisible Hand and melt at length into
gentle and fructifying streams. To create the universal state and to
develop a spirit of paramount loyalty to it affords the only solution
of this seemingly insoluble problem.

History affords no more striking illustration of this fact than the
present war. Each of the contending nations was pledged to peace. All
of the greater ones were signatories to the Hague Convention, but as
the chain can never be stronger than its weakest link, the pacific
efforts of England, France, and Russia to adjust a purely justiciable
question by negotiation and mediation wholly failed because Austria
and Germany had determined to test the mastery of Europe by an appeal
to the sword. The fundamental cause of the conflict was their lack of
loyalty to civilization, due to a misguided and perverted spirit of
excessive nationalism.

Until with the slow-moving progress of mankind the greater unit of the
Universal State can be created, it should be the common and equal
concern of all nations, not merely to defeat this primitive appeal
to brute force but to make impossible the recurrence of such an
iniquitous reversion to barbarism. To do this, while any nation
unjustly appeals to force, force is unhappily necessary, but there
would be few occasions to repel force by force if there were
sufficient solidarity in mankind to make it the common concern of the
civilized world to suppress promptly and effectually any disturber of
its peace.

If the present wanton attack upon the very foundations of civilization
had been regarded as the common concern of all nations, it would
never have taken place and might never occur again. To prevent such
recurrence, thoughtful men of all nations should cooperate, so that
when the present titanic struggle is over, an earnest and universal
effort can be made to create such a compact between the civilized
nations as will insure cooperative effort when any nation attempts to
apply the torch of war to the stately edifice of civilization. May not
this great war prove the supreme travail of humanity, whereof this
nobler era will be born?

It should be the especial duty of the United States to lead in this
onward movement. It has been in no small measure the liberator of
mankind. Let it now be its pacificator! Can it do so in any better
spirit than that voiced by one of the noblest of its Presidents at the
close of another gigantic conflict, of which he was to be the last and
greatest martyr, when he said:

     With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness
     in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us
     strive to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's
     wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and
     for his widow and orphan; _and to do all which may achieve
     and cherish a just and lasting peace_.




INDEX


                    A

Albert, King of the Belgians, conversation of, with Kaiser, 107 ff.;
  appeal of, to England, 218

Attila, Kaiser's reference to, quoted, 14

Austria, given _carte blanche_, x;
  refuses peace proposals, xi;
  underlying causes of her ultimatum to Servia, 19 ff.;
  annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20;
  keeps secret diplomatic correspondence, 23;
  Crown Prince of, assassinated, 20, 31;
  silence of, proves guilt, 25, 26;
  refuses England's propositions, 28;
  Germany's communications to, withheld from public, 28, 29;
  _Red Book_ of, analyzed, 30;
  attitude of, false, 34;
  ignorance of ultimatum of, among diplomatic corps, 33;
  insists situation will "be cleared up," 35;
  of necessity supported by Germany before ultimatum, 36, 37;
  would not have sent ultimatum without Germany's backing, 36 ff.;
  ultimatum of, examined and characterized, 40, 41;
  ultimatum of, to Servia quoted in full, 47 _et seq._;
  population of, 55;
  Austria-Servian relations, 56;
  promises to respect Servian territory, 59, 60;
  effect of ultimatum of, 61;
  attitude of, towards Servia's reply, 83, 84;
  most discreditable action of, 86;
  mobilizes, 86;
  not urged by Germany to consider peace proposals, 88;
  does not reply to Russian proposal, 91;
  claims Servia to be aggressor in first skirmish, 96;
  refuses discussion of Servian note, 98;
  again refuses Russia's pleas for peace, 99, 100;
  suppression of news in, 113;
  offered reparation by Servia, 114;
  knew that Servia would refuse demand of "judiciary cooperation," 115;
  sounds Italy regarding war on Servia, 119;
  ultimatum designedly withheld from powers, 121;
  petty finesse of, 123;
  ultimatum issued when foreign diplomats were out of the way, 123, 124;
  avoids foreign diplomats, 125;
  believes its interests require punishment of Servia, 136;
  national selfishness, 136;
  bombards Belgrade, 149;
  insists upon pursuing action against Servia, 170;
  at last agrees to discuss Servian note with Russia, 173;
  causes of partial reversal of policy, 175 ff.;
  offer of July 31, 1914, 190 _et seq._;
  offer to discuss ultimatum merely nominal, 190;
  refuses Russia's stipulation concerning mediation, 191;
  counter suggestions of, to British Government, 191;
  proposal of, absurd, 192;
  signs "neutrality of Belgium" treaty, 198;
  suppression of evidence by, useless, 246;
  conclusions concerning actions of, 249 _et seq._;
  see Berchtold, Szapary, Triple Alliance


                    B

Balkans, existing status of, upset, 20

Balko-Turkish War, 34

Ballin, 223

Beck, James M., ancestry of, vii

Belgium, invasion of, a crime, vii;
  German demand on, xi;
  the proof of Germany's belief in von Bernhardi, 11;
  publishes _Gray Paper_, 23;
  Germany's disregard of rights of, 196 ff.;
  took no part in preliminary war controversy, 197;
  held no interest in Servian question, 197;
  treaty of neutrality signed, 198;
  restricts sale of munitions of war in 1870, 200;
  Bismarck's letter to, 200;
  feared invasion by Germany, 201;
  Germany professes intention of respecting neutrality of, 201 ff.;
  government fears German invasion, 205, 206;
  requests further assurance of Germany's intentions to respect
    neutrality, 206;
  reassured by France, 208;
  advised by Germany of intended invasion, 210;
  reply of, to German ultimatum, 212;
  hopes that Germany would respect neutrality, 213, 214;
  offered military support by France, 214;
  refuses French aid, 214;
  fined by Germany, 217, 218;
  compared to Poland, 218;
  appeal of, to England, 218;
  effect of German invasion, 229, 230;
  French officers in, 230;
  German officers and spies in, 230;
  Germany claims neutrality of, a sham, 235;
  anticipating German invasion, 236 ff.;
  German railroads on frontier of, 237;
  "guilt of," 238;
  conclusions concerning actions of, 249 _et seq._;
  _see_ Albert, Davignon, Von der Elst

Berchtold, Count, removes himself beyond reach of personal parleys,
    70, 71;
  conversation of, with Russian Ambassador, 99, 100;
  assures Russia that "claim against Servia would be acceptable," 123;
  contends that British suggestions for peace came too late, 190;
  offer of, concerning mediation, 191;
  _see_ Austria

Bernhardi, doctrines of, xvii;
  opinions of, on war quoted, 7 ff.;
  influence of, 10, 11;
  indictment of, 15, 16;
  failure of, 17;
  opinion of, concerning England's attitude to America during Civil
    War, 17, 205

Berthelot, M., prepares _Yellow Book_, 102

Bertie, Sir F., 207

Bethmann-Hollweg, Dr. von, quoted, viii;
  message of, to Federated Governments of Germany quoted, 44, 45;
  blunders of, 194;
  declares Germany will respect Belgian neutrality, 202;
  attempts to justify Germany's actions toward Belgium, 215, 216;
  "scrap of paper" speech quoted, 220, 221;
  speech of, concerning invasion of Belgium, 238;
  discusses "scrap of paper" remark, 239 ff.;
  _see_ Germany

Bismarck, and militarism, xix ff.;
  attitude of, during peace negotiations, xix;
  and "spread eagleism," xix, xx;
  respects neutrality of Belgium, 200; 103

Bosnia annexed by Austria, 20

Brussels, secret documents in, 235

Bunsen, Sir M. de, report of, to Sir Edward Grey regarding ignorance
    of Diplomatic Corps concerning Austria's ultimatum, 32, 33;
  quoted regarding Germany's knowledge of Austrian ultimatum, 37

Burgess, Prof. John W., supports Germany, 222


                    C

Cambon, Jules, prepares _Yellow Book_, 102;
  an estimate of his abilities, 104, 105;
  advises France of Germany's early mobilization, 120;
  interviews von Jagow on Austrian ultimatum, 121 ff.;
  urges peace conference, 133;
  _see_ France

Cook, Dr., Germany compared to, 232

Crackenthorpe, Mr., British Ambassador at Belgrade, instructions to,
    82 ff.

Crown Prince of Germany, the, an adherent of brute force, 13

Czar, "the champion of Christianity," xxii;
  despatch to, from Kaiser regarding murder of Archduke, 147;
  reply of, to Kaiser, 148;
  reply to third message of Kaiser, 151;
  last message of, to Kaiser, 184, 185;
  telegram of, to King George, 189;
  telegram of, to Kaiser, suppressed by German Foreign Office, 189;
  "not guilty," 189


                    D

Davignon, M., conversation of, with von Below quoted, 206

"Decent respect to the opinions of mankind," vi

Declaration of Independence cited, 3

Dernberg, Dr., 224;
  claims France violated Belgian neutrality, 228

Disfurth, Major-General von, on Germany's war policy, quoted, 12, 13

Dryander, Dr., 197, 223


                    E

England, anticipation of war in, xii;
  fear of, for Germany, xxi;
  has also had its "Bernhardis," 15;
  Bernhardi's opinion of attitude during Civil War, 17;
  publishes _White Paper_, 22;
  testimony of British Ambassador at Vienna cited, 32, 33;
  probability of intervention of, 66;
  requests time, 70, 71;
  assured of French and Russian alliance, 77;
  refuses to align definitely with Russia and France, 79;
  suggests peace conference in London, 93;
  assures Germany of her desire for peace, 153;
  requested to act as mediator, 191;
  reason for use of word instead of "Great Britain," 195;
  signs "neutrality of Belgium" treaty, 198;
  inquires as to German and French intentions toward Belgium, 207;
  requests Belgium to maintain her neutrality, 207;
  questions Germany as to intentions concerning Belgium, 208;
  ultimatum of, to Germany, 218;
  reply of, to Belgian appeal, 219;
  anticipating German invasion of Belgium, 236 ff.;
  entered war because of invasion of Belgium, 245;
  conclusions concerning actions of, 249 _et seq._;
  _see_ Bertie, Bunsen, George, King, Goschen, Grey, Triple Entente


                    F

France, preparation in, for war, xii;
  fear of Germany for, xxi;
  publishes _Yellow Book_, 23;
  French Premier quoted on Austrian Servian troubles, 31, 32;
  relations of, with Germany, 56;
  assures Russia and England of her support, 77;
  refuses Germany's request to influence Russia, 92;
  urges Germany to join Powers in preventing invasion of Servia, 95;
  assured that Germany wishes peace, 131;
  suspicion of, toward Germany, 132;
  supports England's request for conference, 133;
  declaration of war on, delayed, 192; ultimatum to, 192;
  invasion of, 192 _et seq._
  reason of, for not assuming aggressive, 193;
  invasion of, to follow immediately or to precede severance of
    diplomatic relations, 194;
  signs "neutrality of Belgium" treaty, 198;
  respects Belgium neutrality, 200;
  reaffirms intention of respecting Belgian neutrality, 206;
  reply of, to England's query regarding Belgian neutrality, 207;
  declares to Belgium intention of respecting neutrality, 208;
  cited by Germany as cause for violation of Belgian neutrality, 210,
    211;
  offers military support to Belgium, 214;
  "overt acts of," 238, 239;
  first death in war, 253; attitude of people in, 254 ff.;
  _see_ Berthelot, Cambon, Triple Entente, Viviani

Franco-German War, cause of, 19

Frederick the Great, 2;
  effect of, on Germany to-day, 10

Fuchs, Dr., on hatred, quoted, 11;
  on preparedness for war, quoted, 11

_Furor Teutonicus_ directed against England, xxii


                    G

George, King of England, message of, to Kaiser, 153;
  telegram of, to Czar, 155;
  message to, from Kaiser regarding neutrality of France, 187

Germany, confesses its crime, viii;
  suppression of evidence by, ix;
  gives Austria _carte blanche_, x;
  refuses to accept peace proposals, xi;
  invades Luxemburg, xi;
  "fears God but nothing else," xix ff.;
  attitude of, toward rest of
  world, xix _et seq._;
  foreign policy of, xxii;
  real attitude of people, xxiii;
  German people misled, xxvi;
  endeavors to gain approval of America, 4;
  espouses visions of Machiavelli, 5 ff.;
  attitude of, toward war, 6 ff.;
  avowed attitude of, towards world, 6 _et seq._;
  doctrine of, 11 _et seq._;
  war policies of, shown by quotations, 11 _et seq._;
  spirit of the ruling classes, 13;
  domination of Europe established, 19, 20;
  attitude of, on the Balkans, 19 _et seq._;
  publishes _White Paper_, 22;
  suppression of facts by, 27;
  communications of, to Austria withheld from _White Paper_,
    28, 29;
  advance knowledge of Austria's ultimatum, 32 _et seq._;
  only power to know of Austria's ultimatum, 33;
  attitude of, false, 34;
  Ambassador to England suggests Russia as "mediator with regard to
    Servia," 35;
  Ambassador to England denies knowledge of Austria's actions, 35;
  disclaims knowledge of Austria's ultimatum, 36;
  guilty of duplicity regarding Austria's ultimatum, 36;
  unquestionably had previous knowledge of Austria's ultimatum, 37;
  sincerity of attitude examined, 38 ff.;
  pacific protestations of, insincere, 38;
  first statement of Germany's position regarding Austro-Servian
    problem, 39 ff.;
  greatest diplomatic blunder, 39, 40;
  further proof of her knowledge of Austrian ultimatum, 41;
  supports Austria, 41;
  anticipates Servia's refusal, 42;
  instructions to Ambassador, 43;
  Ambassador to U. S. admits advance knowledge of Austrian ultimatum,
    46;
  takes steps to allay indignation of U. S., 46;
  warnings of, to Servia, 56;
  relations of, with France, 56;
  reason for actions of, 65 ff.;
  fails to move for peace, 69, 70;
  excuses for not granting time extension, 71 ff.;
  refuses Russia's request for time extension, 73 ff.;
  fear of, for England's, 79;
  principal fear of, 79;
  attitude of, toward Servia's reply, 83, 84;
  withholds from people adequate information on Servia's reply, 85;
  reply to England's further requests for time, 87;
  disclaims any responsibility for Austrian ultimatum, 89, 90;
  willing to have England mediate between Austria and Russia, 89;
  states that Austria cannot draw back in Servian matter, 89;
  fatal policy of, 91;
  declares Russia responsible for war, 92;
  requests France to influence Russia, 92;
  refuses to attend peace conference in London, 93;
  refuses Russia's request to urge conciliation in Austria, 95;
  refuses France's request to prevent invasion of Servia, 96;
  insists on "exclusion of all possibility of mediation," 97;
  claims efforts for mediation came too late, 98;
  excuse of, for not assenting to peace conference, 100, 101;
  incapable diplomats of, 103;
  attitude of people toward Kaiser, 109 ff.;
  knew that Servia would refuse demand of "judiciary cooperation", 115;
  further proof of Germany's advance knowledge of Austria's ultimatum,
    116;
  petty finesse of, 123;
  excuse of, for not getting extension of time, 124;
  avoids foreign diplomats, 125;
  diplomats reluctant to leave copies of notes, 127 ff.;
  Ambassador to France denies agreement with Austria over note to
    Servia, 129;
  assures France that she is for peace, 130;
  refuses France's request for peace conference, 133;
  "closest interests" of, 136;
  national selfishness, 136;
  believes Russia will keep out, 140;
  believes France "in no position for war," 140;
  belief of, regarding war preparedness and action of other nations,
    140, 141;
  ultimatum to Russia, 141;
  preparedness for war, 142;
  assured of no provocative action on part of Russia, 152;
  offer of, to England, 159 ff.;
  advances upon France, 161;
  French report of army movements, 161, 162;
  evades England's request for peace suggestion, 169;
  declaration of war by, quoted, 183, 184;
  proof of preparedness of, 188, 189;
  declares war on Russia, 192;
  ultimatum of, to France, 192;
  delays declaration of war upon France, 192;
  awaits French act of aggression, 192;
  Ambassador leaves Paris, 192;
  ready for invasion of France, 193;
  pacific intentions of, false, 193, 194;
  inconsistency in policies of, 194;
  diplomats and army not in harmony, 194;
  disregard of, for rights of Belgium, 196;
  respected neutrality of Belgium in 1870, 200;
  professes intention of respecting Belgian neutrality, 201 ff.;
  recognizes obligations of neutrality treaty, 202;
  Foreign Office suppresses telegram of Czar, 189;
  places responsibility for war upon Russia, 192;
  evades England's question concerning Belgian neutrality, 208;
  insists she is forced to invade Belgium, 210;
  declares France will invade Belgium, 210;
  excuses of, for invasion of Belgium, 210 ff.;
  declares war upon Belgium, 215;
  invades Belgium, 215;
  invasion of Belgium considered and analyzed, 217 ff.;
  imposes fines upon Belgium, 217 ff.;
  reply of, to English ultimatum, 220;
  declares necessity forces invasion of Belgium, 220;
  defense of, for invasion of Belgium, 224;
  moral isolation of, 229;
  compared to Dr. Cook, 232;
  plea of guilty, 233 ff.;
  claims discovery of secret documents in Brussels, 235;
  strategic railroads of, 237;
  campaign which should have been followed, 245;
  suppression of evidence by, useless, 246;
  conclusions concerning actions of, 249 _et seq._;
  attitude of people in, 256;
  _see_ Kaiser, Lichnowsky, Prussia, Triple Alliance, von Below,
    Bethmann-Hollweg, von Heeringen, von Jagow, von Schoen

Gladstone, did not rely on "neutrality of Belgium" treaty, 198;
  speech of, concerning Belgium, quoted, 199;
  speech of, cited by Shaw, 199

Goschen, Sir E., on Germany's position in Austro-Servian trouble,
    quoted, 39;
  report of, regarding England's request for time, 72;
  conversation of, with von Jagow preceding England's declaration of
    war, 220 ff.;
  instructions to, August 4th, 219

_Gray Paper_ (Belgium), Belgium publishes, 23;
  quoted, 202, 208, 210, 211, 218

Great Britain, _see_ England

Grey, Sir Edward, compared to Pitt, 22;
  conversation of, with German Ambassador regarding Austro-Servian
    trouble, 35 ff.;
  advised that Germany had knowledge of Austrian ultimatum, 37;
  report to, from British Ambassador at Berlin, July 22d, 38, 39, 28;
  did not anticipate Austrian ultimatum;
  deceived by Germany, 36;
  conversation of, with Austrian Minister, quoted, 70, 71;
  restrictions binding actions of, 79, 80;
  instructions of, to British Ambassador at Belgrade, 82;
  further plea for time, 86;
  further proposals of, for peace, 89;
  suggests peace conference of Powers in London, 93;
  chief merit of, 105;
  report of, by France, of German army movements, 161, 162;
  replies to Germany on neutrality of England, 162;
  that Germany suggest means of preventing Austro-Servian war, 167;
  continues his efforts for peace, 172, 173;
  last attempt of, to preserve peace, 180, 181;
  conversation of, cited by Germany, 191;
  inquiry of, concerning results of England's neutrality, 193;
  conversations of, with German Ambassador concerning Belgian
    neutrality, 209;
  instructions to British Ambassador at Berlin, August 4th, 219;
  refutes statement concerning secret documents, 236;
  _see_ Bunsen; England; George, King; Goschen


                    H

Haeckel, Ernst, 197

Hague Tribunal, due to Czar's initiative, 189;
  Russia desires Austro-Servian problem referred to, 189;
  actions taken by, in 1907, 204 ff.; 226; 251

_Hamburger Nachrichten_, quoted, 12, 13

Hamilton, Alexander, quoted, 227

Harden, Maximilian, on Germany's war policies, quoted, 12; 243

Harnack, 222

Herzegovina annexed by Austria, 20


                    I

Italy, not bound by Triple Alliance, x;
  attitude of, 23 ff.;
  as affected by Triple Alliance, 24;
  attitude of, 24, 25;
  German messages to, suppressed, 29;
  told that situation would "be cleared up," 35;
  cooperation of, dependent upon Russia's actions, 65;
  not advised of intended actions of Germany and Austria, 117;
  previously sounded by Austria, 119;
  Germany schemes to acquire support of, 191, 192;
  _see_ San Giuliano


                    J

Jefferson, Thomas, quoted, vi

Junkerdom, _see_ Prussia


                    K

Kaiser, returns to Berlin from Norway, xi;
  extols the Czar, xxii;
  spirit of absolutism of, 9;
  "divine right" of, 9;
  quoted, 9;
  fanatic absolutism of, 9;
  an adherent of brute force, 13;
  "China speech" of, quoted, 14;
  "Hun" speech, quoted, 14;
  Cambon 1913 report concerning, 107;
  position of, 109 _et seq._;
  attitude and actions of, in early part of trouble, 138 _et seq._;
  ultimatum of, to Russia, 141;
  responsibility of, for war, 141, 142;
  character of, 142 ff.;
  does not act in interests of peace, 145 ff.;
  despatch of, to Czar regarding murder of Archduke, quoted, 147;
  second message to Czar, 149;
  fatal error of, 150;
  third message to Czar, 151;
  reply of, to King George, 154;
  message of, to Czar regarding Russia's mobilization, 155;
  estimate and discussion of actions of, 157;
  preparing for war, 159;
  taking steps to alienate England from Allies, 159 ff.;
  issues ultimatum to Russia, 176;
  reply of, to last message of Czar, 185, 186;
  message of, to England regarding neutrality of France, 187;
  "awful responsibility of," 188;
  telegram of, to King George, quoted, 193;
  reason of, for telegram to King George, 193;
  telegram of, analyzed, 193;
  blunders of, 194;
  _see_ Germany

Kudachef, Prince, action of, regarding time extension, 73


                    L

Lamprecht, 223

Lichnowsky, Prince, affects ignorance, 121;
  conversation with, cited, 191;
  query to, regarding results of England's neutrality, 193;
  conversation of, with Sir Edward Grey concerning Belgian neutrality,
    209; 89, 90;
  _see_ Germany

Liege, French officers at, 230

Luxemburg, invaded, xi;
  wrong done to, 243


                    M

Machiavelli, vicious principles of, 4;
  Bernhardi compared to, 16

Mahan, Admiral, 11

Margerie, M. de, prepares _Yellow Book_, 102

_Militaerische Rundschau_, quoted, 114

Moltke, von, opinion of, cited, 6, 7

Morocco controversy, 109 ff.


                    N

Namur, French officers at, 230

Napoleon III., honor of, 201

Newspapers, American, lack of Austrian dispatches to, before war, 31

Nietzsche, 6


                    O

_Orange Paper_ (Russia), Russia publishes, 22;
  quoted regarding Germany's knowledge of Austrian ultimatum, 36;
  quoted, 36, 68, 69, 73, 74, 85, 91, 92, 95, 97


                    P

Pachitch, Servian Premier, absent from Belgrade, 32

Penn, William, treaty of, compared to the "scrap of paper," xvi

Poland, compared to Belgium, 218

Prussia, Prussian Junkerdom, 8 ff.;
  signs "neutrality of Belgium," treaty, 198


                    R

_Red Book_, analyzed, 30;
  discloses true Austrian policy, 190;
  quoted, 190, 191

Reichstag, debate in, quoted, 201, 202, 240, 241

Rumbold, Sir H., letter to, quoted in _White Paper_, 35

Russia, intimidated by Germany, 20;
  forced to submit in Balkans, 20;
  publishes _Orange Paper_, 22;
  suggested by Germany as mediator between Austria and Servia, 35;
  assured of Germany's ignorance of Austrian ultimatum, 36;
  assured that Austria will not seize Servian territory, 59, 60;
  possibility of intervention of, 65;
  attitude of, 67 ff.;
  message of, to Austria, quoted, 68, 69;
  request for time refused, 71;
  assured that Austria contemplates no acquisition of Servian territory,
    74, 75;
  confers with France and England, 77;
  suggestions of, to avoid conflict, 77, 78;
  willing to leave Austro-Servian trouble in hands of the Powers, 80,
    81,;
  proposal of, to Austria, 91;
  requests Germany to urge conciliation with Austria, 95;
  proposes its services in keeping Servia quiet, 96;
  again proposes peace conference, 99;
  assured that Austria's claims would be acceptable, 123;
  charge put off until too late, 125;
  ultimatum of Germany to, 141,;
  assures Germany of no provocative action upon her part, 152;
  offers to stop all military preparations, 164 ff;
  orders general mobilization, 171;
  refuses to reply to Germany's ultimatum, 178;
  suggests referring Austro-Servian problem to Hague, 189;
  "not guilty," 189;
  offer of, to suspend military preparations, 190;
  cannot treat direct with Austria, 191;
  requests England to act as mediator, 191;
  stipulates suspension of hostilities during mediation, 191;
  signs "neutrality of Belgium" treaty, 198;
  _see_ Czar, Kudachef, Sazonof;
  _see also_ Triple Entente

Russo-Japanese war, xxii


                    S

San Giuliano, Marquis di, Italian Foreign Minister, quoted, 119

Sazonof, suggestion of, to avoid conflict, 77, 78;
  good work of, 105;
  message of, to Austria regarding ultimatum, 126, 28

Schmidt, 223

"Scrap of Paper," vi; xvi;
  Bethmann-Hollweg's remark, quoted, 220, 221;
  discusses his remark, 239 ff.;
  defense for, use of phrase, 239 ff.;
  "Secret Documents," contents of supposed, 235 ff.

Sedan, battle of, result of Belgium neutrality, 201

Serajevo, murder of Crown Prince of Austria at, 20, 31

Servia, ultimatum to, 19;
  advised by France, Russia, and Great Britain, 31;
  formally disclaims responsibility for murder of Archduke, 33;
  probable effect of humiliation of, 40;
  refusal of Austrian demands anticipated, 42;
  reply to Austrian ultimatum quoted in full, 47 _et seq._;
  population of, 55;
  warned by Germany, 56;
  Austro-Servian relations, 56;
  result of acquiescence to Austria, 60;
  requested by Triple Entente to make conciliatory reply, 80;
  reply of, in accord with requests of Triple Entente, 83;
  offers Austria ample reparation, 114;
  subjugation of, the "bone of contention," 192

Shaw, George Bernard, opinions of, cited, 14, 15;
  defense of Germany, 14 ff.;
  quoted regarding "neutrality of Belgium" treaty, 198;
  quoted, 248

Siemens, 223

Slav, the, fear of Germany for, xxi

Symonds, John Addington, quoted, 4, 5

Szapary, Count, 126


                    T

Tisza, Count, refuses to disclose results of judicial inquiry into
    murder of Archduke, 113

Treitschke, doctrines of, xvii;
  _Politik_, cited, 6;
  doctrines of, based on Machiavelli, 6;
  influence of, 10

Treaty of 1870, 198 ff.

Treaty of 1839, 198 ff.; 225; 251

Triple Alliance, x;
  as affecting Italy, 24;
  terms of, 24; 192;
  _see_ Austria, Germany, Italy

Triple Entente, proposes peace, xi;
  lulled into false security, 32 ff.;
  movements and reports of leading statesmen of, just previous to
    declaration of war, 32 ff.;
  ignorant of Austria's ultimatum, 33, 65;
  still labors for peace, 86;
  _see also_, France, Great Britain, Russia

Turkey, German officers in, 230


                    U

United States, supposititious invasion of, by Germany, 225 ff.;
  position of, 248 ff.


                    V

Viviani, Premier, quoted regarding Austro-Servian trouble, 31, 32;
  reply of, to Germany, 192;
  reply of, to England's query regarding Belgian neutrality, 207;
  _see_ France

Voltaire, quoted, xvi

Von Below, declares Germany will respect Belgian neutrality, 203; 206;
  _see_ Germany

Von Buelow, 223

Von der Elst, Baron, 210, 211;
  _see_ Belgium

Von Gwinner, 223

Von Heeringen, declares Belgian neutrality will be respected, 203;
  _see_ Germany

Von Jagow, Herr, conversation of, cited, 38, 39;
  representations of, on Germany's position in Austro-Servian matter,
    39;
  refuses to attend peace conference in London, 93;
  on Austrian ultimatum, quoted, 94;
  conversations of, with Cambon, 122 ff.;
  refuses peace conference, 133;
  blunders of, 194;
  declares Germany will respect Belgian neutrality, 202;
  conversations with Sir Edward Goschen preceding England's declaration
    of war, 219 ff.;
  states real purpose of Germany's invasion of Belgium, 222;
  _see_ Germany

Von Mach, claims France violated Belgian neutrality, 228;
  on French officers in Belgium, quoted, 231, 232;
  _What Germany Wants_, 233;
  arguments of, in defense of Germany, 233 ff.; 197

Von Moltke, General, blunders of, 194

Von Posadowsky, 223

Von Schmoller, 223

Von Schoen, Baron, assures France that Germany is for peace, 130;
  makes public statement through French Foreign Office, 131 ff.

Von Wilamowitz, 223


                    W

_What Germany Wants_, cited, 233

_White Paper_ (English), published, 22;
  analyzed, 27 ff.;
  quoted, 34 ff.; 36; 37; 38; 39; 41; 56; 76; 82, 83; 86; 93; 94; 97;
    99; 159 ff.; 167, 168, 169; 207, 208; 209; 219 _et seq._;
  _see_ England

_White Paper_ (German), published, 22;
  suppression of facts in, 27 ff.;
  suppresses instructions to Ambassador, 191;
  quoted, 28; 38; 41; 43, 44; 45; 67; 75; 87; 147; 149 ff.; ix; 192;
    193;
  _see_ Germany


                    Y

_Yellow Book_ (France), published, 23;
  additional data in, 102 ff.;
  contents of first chapter of, 106 ff.;
  throws light on petty finesse of Germany and Austria, 123;
  cited, 46;
  quoted, 107 ff.;
  second chapter of, 113 _et seq._;
  quoted, 113, 114, 115; 116, 117; 122, 123; 125; 129; 133 ff.;
  _see_ France


                    Z

Zabern incident, the, attitude of Crown Prince toward, 14




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TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES:

1. Changes have been made to correct obvious typesetters' errors;
otherwise, every effort has been made to remain true to the author's
words and intent.

2. On some pages in this book, titles were underlined; this has been
indicated by the equals sign (=) before and
after the title.





End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Evidence in the Case, by
James M. Beck and Joseph H. Choate

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