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[Illustration:

 _Photo, Cribb, Southsea._]

                      THE BRITISH SUBMARINE “E.2.”

  Displacement, 800 tons; Speed, 16·10 knots; Armament, 4 torpedo tubes
                            and 2 q.-f. guns.

     There are 17 vessels of this class, completed between 1912‒14.

]

------------------------------------------------------------------------




               SUBMARINES, MINES AND TORPEDOES IN THE WAR




                                   BY

                        CHARLES W. DOMVILLE-FIFE

             AUTHOR OF “SUBMARINES OF THE WORLD’S NAVIES”,
                “SUBMARINE ENGINEERING OF TO-DAY,” ETC.




                              ILLUSTRATED




                          HODDER AND STOUGHTON

                        LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO

                                 MCMXIV




------------------------------------------------------------------------




                                PREFACE


Warfare has become so largely a matter of science that in order to
arrive at an intelligent understanding of the _naval situation_ or of
the _military campaigns_ in the Great European War, a knowledge of the
scientific factors contributing to victory or defeat is essential. And
in this volume it has been my aim not only to review the actual fighting
underseas, but also to present a compendium of information relative to
the submarine fleets and arms of the great Naval Powers engaged; which I
venture to hope will prove of present interest on account of the
prominent part played by the under-water fighting ships and appliances,
and of permanent historic value as being the first work to describe the
vast preparations and curious events leading to the new “Submarine
Phase” in naval warfare.

                                                            C. W. D-F.

------------------------------------------------------------------------




                                CONTENTS

                                                                  PAGE

 INTRODUCTION—THE SUBMARINE PHASE OF THE NAVAL WAR                   9

                               CHAPTER I
 THE MODERN SUBMARINE TORPEDO-BOAT                                  40

                              CHAPTER II
 BRITISH SUBMARINES                                                 60

                              CHAPTER III
 FRENCH SUBMARINES                                                  79

                              CHAPTER IV
 RUSSIAN SUBMARINES                                                 94

                               CHAPTER V
 JAPANESE SUBMARINES                                               104

                              CHAPTER VI
 GERMAN SUBMARINES                                                 108

                              CHAPTER VII
 AUSTRIAN SUBMARINES                                               118
 TABLE SHOWING SUBMARINE FLOTILLAS OF THE NEUTRAL EUROPEAN POWERS  123

                             CHAPTER VIII
 SUBMARINES IN ACTION                                              124

                              CHAPTER IX
 ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS                                            146

                               CHAPTER X
 THE SUBMARINE TORPEDO                                             160

                              CHAPTER XI
 SUBMARINE MINES                                                   168

                              CHAPTER XII
 MINE-LAYING FLEETS                                                174

                             CHAPTER XIII
 MINE-SWEEPING FLEETS                                              179

                              CHAPTER XIV
 COMPARATIVE FIGHTING VALUE OF THE SUBMARINE FLEETS AT WAR         184

------------------------------------------------------------------------




                              INTRODUCTION

                  THE SUBMARINE PHASE OF THE NAVAL WAR


In the mist of war which envelops over half the entire world, no less
than 264 underwater fighting ships are engaged. They form the submarine
fleets of England, France, Russia, Japan, Germany and Austria; and the
highly-trained crews of these modern additions to the fighting navies
comprise nearly 20,000 men. But the conduct of submarine warfare on the
grand scale requires far more than flotillas of submergible warships and
their daring crews. This new branch of naval science is ever widening in
its scope, its means of offence, and in its attendant ramifications.
Every important naval base has its curious submarine floating docks,
ready for crippled members of its attached flotilla; every naval
construction department has its corps of submarine experts; each of the
1,500 surface warships engaged in this titanic struggle for the dominion
of Europe and the mastery of the seas carries the means for delivering
submarine attacks in its torpedoes and surface and submerged discharging
tubes. The oceans in the theatres of war have been strewn with German
and Austrian mines; then they have been either counter-mined or swept
clear and mined again. British seaplanes, with specially trained
observers, are continually searching from high in the air for the _dark
patches in the semi-transparent sea-green_ which denote the presence of
mines and submarines. Within signal-range or wireless call of the aërial
scouts and their attendant ships are destroyer flotillas to give battle
to the hostile submarines, while hundreds of trawlers and small
steamers, fitted with special apparatus, are continually sweeping up the
hundreds of submarine mines laid by the enemy’s vessels which are fitted
to enable them to sow like seeds over the pathways of the sea these
deadly perils to navigation. Submerged wire entanglements in conjunction
with boom-defences and observation and contact submarine mines protect
the seaward approaches to harbours in the same way as similar appliances
are used to protect the approaches to land fortifications; and every
harbour, waterway and channel of strategic importance is protected by
elaborate submarine mine defences. All this is part of the new warfare
underseas—that science which is daily rendering hazardous the life of
the greatest battleship and the smallest merchantman afloat in the zone
of war.

Before placing in review order the vast preparations made for submarine
attack and defence in the years which preceded the outbreak of war and
describing in detail the powerful submarine fleets engaged, it is
necessary to make clear to the reader the wonderful change which this
new mode of attack has made in all branches of naval warfare and its
influence on sea power. As indicative of this change we have only to
survey _in their submarine aspect_ the naval operations in the opening
phase of this, the greatest war in history.

In the domain of naval strategy we find reflected the altered
conditions caused by these invisible arms. Every battle on land and
sea teaches its lesson of concealment and sudden stealthy attack; and
even as the huge siege guns and devastating artillery fire of the land
forces is causing the extension of the battle-front and the rapid
burrowing under earth or entrenching of positions dearly won or with
difficulty retained—“approximating to siege warfare”—so are the
powerful 12 and 13.5-inch naval guns (weight of projectile 850 lbs.
and 1,400 lbs. respectively), combined with the rapidity and accuracy
of the modern warship’s secondary armament, necessitating the
reduction in numbers of the big surface ships of the opposing fleets
by frequent submarine and torpedo attacks prior to the decisive
engagements between the battle fleets. Hence we find, in the opening
phase of the naval war, the German and Austrian fleets, inferior in
numbers and gun power, skulking behind fortifications and waiting for
their submarine and surface torpedo-boats and light cruisers, in
conjunction with the hundreds of submerged mines strewn over the North
Sea, Baltic, Adriatic and elsewhere to reduce the number and power of
the British, French, Russian and Japanese fleets before the decisive
actions are fought; and in order that these tactics might be
frustrated, and the big British ships, as well as those of her allies,
costing several millions sterling each, should not be exposed to these
grave risks when no good could result, they have been compelled to
delay initiative, and meanwhile all their operations had to be
screened by smaller and faster vessels of the cruiser and destroyer
types, while they waited within call should the German Battle Fleet—in
the case of the North Sea—dare to come out to fight. The British
submarines of the large sea-going type were in the meantime employed
in watching the Frisian coast with the object of attacking any of the
enemy’s ships which ventured from behind the elaborate coast
fortifications. Not content with this _rôle_, however, several British
submarines made their way unseen through the dangerous waters of the
Heligoland Bight and succeeded in getting within reconnoitering
distance of the German submerged harbour defences, behind which lurk
their big ships.

With what degree of success this new opening or _submarine phase_ in
naval warfare has been attended is shown by the sinking, during the
first few weeks of the war, of the British cruiser _Amphion_, a vessel
of 3,440 tons displacement, completed in 1912, and carrying ten 4-inch
guns, with a loss of 131 men, by contact with a German mine; the
destruction of the German submarine U.15 by the British cruiser
_Birmingham_; the sinking of an Austrian torpedo-boat by a mine off
Pola; the torpedoing of H.M.S. _Pathfinder_, a fleet scout of about
3,000 tons displacement, completed in 1905‒6, by a German submarine; the
destruction of the Wilson liner _Runo_ by a mine; the sinking of the
German cruiser _Hela_, a vessel of 2,000 tons displacement, built in
1896, by the British submarine E 9, and the torpedoing of the British
armoured cruisers _Aboukir_, _Hogue_ and _Cressy_—vessels of 12,000 tons
displacement, carrying two 9.2-inch and twelve 6-inch guns besides
twelve 12-pounder quick-firing guns and two torpedo tubes—by German
submarines concealed behind a trawler engaged in laying mines, over
which the Dutch flag had been hoisted as a blind.

This is in addition to the lamentable destruction of much life and
property belonging to neutral powers caused by the laying of German
floating mines on the trade-routes.

To the Allies this _submarine phase_ did not come unexpected. The
British Naval yards in conjunction with the big shipbuilding and
engineering firms, such as Messrs. Vickers Ltd., Barrow-in-Furness;
Messrs. Armstrong, Whitworth and Co. Ltd., Newcastle-on-Tyne; the
Whitehead Torpedo Company Ltd., Weymouth; Messrs. Siebe, Gorman and Co.
Ltd., London; and Messrs. Scotts’ Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Ltd.,
as well as many other firms and individual submarine experts had been
engaged for many years in solving one after another the problems
continually arising in the practical application of all forms of
submarine warfare. The first British naval submarines were launched in
1901‒2 from Messrs. Vickers’ works at Barrow, and the subsequent growth
of our submarine flotillas has been rapid both in number of vessels and
in size and armament. The British submarine fleet now numbers 82
vessels. The original boats from which the British type has since been
evolved were built from the designs of Mr. John P. Holland, an American
inventor.

[Illustration: North Sea Coastlines]

To France belongs the honour of being the first naval power to adopt the
submarine torpedo-boat as a vessel of war; and the first vessel, the
_Gymnôte_, was launched in 1888, but it was not until 1893 that the
Republic commenced the construction of her now powerful submarine
flotilla, numbering 92 vessels.

The first Russian submarine was launched at Kronstadt in 1902, and since
that date the Russian flotilla has steadily increased until it now
numbers 37 vessels.

Japan commenced the construction of what is now a powerful and
up-to-date flotilla of seventeen vessels by the acquisition of a
British-Holland boat in 1904.

Turning to Germany we find at first a great reluctance on the part of
the Ministry of Marine to provide for the construction of submarines,
but in 1905‒6 this initial hesitation was overcome and the two vessels
U.1 and U.2 were launched. Since then the belief in a powerful submarine
flotilla steadily grew until at the moment when war was declared Germany
possessed no less than 30 to 36 submarines of a very efficient type. The
Austro-Hungarian Navy did not adopt submarines as units of the Fleet
until 1909, and now possess only six small vessels.

From this brief _resumé_ of the growth of the submarine fleets of the
six great naval Powers at war, it will be seen that in point of numbers
as well as in priority, bringing with it practical experience, Great
Britain and France have a very appreciable superiority. It must,
however, be left for succeeding chapters to describe in detail the
steady growth and present size and capabilities of the submarine fleets
at war.

The lessons taught by the Russo-Japanese war were not lost on the
British Admiralty, and special methods had been prepared to deal with
submarine attack in its various forms. Having in mind the destruction
caused to both Russian and Japanese warships by submarine
mines—especially those of the “offensive contact” type, which are moored
to the bottom, float just under the surface and explode immediately on
contact; and in the Russo-Japanese War were responsible for the sinking
of the Japanese battleships _Hatsuse_ and _Yashima_ as well as the
Russian battleship _Petropavlovsk_ and the cruiser _Boyarin_—the British
Admiralty foresaw the danger to which both warships and merchantmen
would be exposed in time of war if the seas strewn with these mines
could not be quickly cleared, and a new type of auxiliary came into
being. This was the mine-sweeper, and eight vessels of the old
torpedo-gunboat type were fitted out for the work. In addition to these,
however, the Admiralty purchased a considerable number of steam fishing
trawlers, and fitted them with mine-sweeping appliances, and made
arrangements for a large fleet of similar vessels to be placed at the
disposal of the navy in the event of war. In order to man this new
mine-sweeping fleet with experienced sailors on the outbreak of war, a
new section of the Royal Naval Reserve was created in 1911. This is
known as the “Trawler Section,” and consists of 142 _skippers_ and 1,136
men taken from the fishing fleet.

Realizing the value of the submarine mine in certain cases, the British
Admiralty went further and created a small mine-laying fleet from seven
old second-class cruisers, which had their aft-decks cleared and
provided with rails for a large number of mines to be run down and slid
over the stern into the water as the vessels steamed along, thus quickly
laying a mine-field. But as the laying of mines, speaking generally, is
a defensive mode of warfare and the policy of the British Navy—owing to
its supremacy—is attack and not defence, the mine-laying fleet is of
second importance to the sweeping fleet, the work of which, although
much augmented by additional small steamers pressed into service, was,
during the first few weeks of the war, of a nature more arduous and
dangerous than will ever be realised. Hundreds of German mines were
swept up, and hundreds more were exploded by being dragged into contact
with each other during the progress of sweeping operations.

What the clearance of these vast fields of floating and anchored mines
in the North Sea meant to the British Navy, engaged in blockading the
German Fleet, and to the Mercantile Marine not only of England, France,
Russia and Belgium, but also to that of the neutral countries, it is
perhaps a little difficult to realize until one remembers that several
hundred British and French warships were patrolling the North Sea and
Channel, and, at the opening of hostilities, there were hundreds of
merchantmen homeward bound whose course lay across this mine-infested
sea. Many of these vessels had on board not only valuable cargoes of
food, raw material for manufacture and gold and silver bullion, but also
officers and men returning from various parts of the world to rejoin
their regiments. Again, the Expeditionary Force had to be transported
across the Channel to France. This could not be attempted until a
guarantee had been given by the Navy that the seas were clear of hostile
warships, submarines and mines. The fleet blockading the Frisian coast
had to be supplied with coal and fresh food; and last but by no means
least it was of vital importance to the Allied Armies in the Field that
the whole coast-line from Bordeaux to Antwerp, forming the rear and
left-flank, should be accessible to friendly shipping. It is not
difficult to realize what would have been the effect had thousands of
these deadly German contact mines been allowed to float unhindered in
these narrow seas, for, notwithstanding the magnificent effort made by
thousands of seamen in hundreds of mine-sweepers assisted by seaplanes,
many vessels—some belonging to neutral powers and others to the enemy
themselves—were destroyed before the seas could be effectively swept
clear, the hostile mine-layers destroyed or chased into port and there
blockaded with their cowardly fleet.

The torpedo has long been recognised as one of the most effective of
naval arms. It is carried by every modern warship afloat, but it is
essentially the arm of the submarine and of the small and fast surface
vessel. For a torpedo attack to be successful it is absolutely necessary
for the vessel carrying the weapon to get within about 1,000 yards of
the object of attack. The difficulty of accomplishing this manœuvre with
an enemy on the alert is easily apparent, but if the attacking vessel
can creep up to within torpedo range unobserved her chances of sinking
the enemy are decidedly good, and it is the quality possessed by the
submarine of making herself invisible by sinking beneath the surface and
approaching her enemy “seeing but unseen” that makes this type of vessel
the ideal torpedo-boat. But, like everything else, there are limits to
its use, for a submarine, although it can navigate on the surface like
an ordinary torpedo-boat, cannot deliver a submerged attack at night
owing to the periscopes, which are the “eyes” of these underwater
fighting ships, being useless in the dark. When night covers the sea,
however, the chances of the fast grey-painted surface torpedo-boat or
destroyer being able to approach the enemy unseen are more than doubled,
and in this way fleets become exposed to submarine torpedo attack by day
and surface torpedo attack by night. Further, a submarine will often
attack while a seaplane hovers over the enemy in order to draw
attention. It is this constant exposure to sudden and unseen submarine
attack which is primarily responsible for the terrible nerve strain
imposed on the crews of modern surface warships in time of war.

Owing to the ability of submarines to deliver stealthy attacks by day,
naval tacticians have designated this type of craft “Daylight
torpedo-boats,” but they are rapidly passing beyond the purely torpedo
and coastal defensive stage and are taking on to themselves the _rôle_
of the ocean cruiser. The size of these vessels has increased from 50 to
1,000 tons displacement in ten years. They now carry not only a
considerable number of the largest size torpedo but also quick-firing
guns for repelling attacks by small surface vessels, and are capable of
accompanying fleets to sea. The Australian naval submarines A.E.1 and
A.E.2 both made the voyage from Barrow to Sydney under their own power
and without convoy. The radius of action of the latest vessels both of
the British and French Navies amounts to several thousand miles. In the
case of the British “F” class the displacement has risen to 1,500 tons,
the speed to 20 knots and the armament to six torpedo tubes and four
12-pounder quick-firing guns, thus making them in every sense ocean
cruisers capable of keeping the sea in almost any weather and possessing
wide range of action and considerable offensive power. Hitherto British
submarines, like the ordinary surface torpedo-boats, have been known by
numbers only, but the latest vessels are to receive names which
indicates the increase in size and importance of these craft. They may
be termed the advance guards of the submarine battleships of the future.

The torpedo, which is the principal arm of the submarine boat, is itself
a submarine projectile. After being discharged from the firing tube it
sinks a short distance below the surface and is propelled by its own
engines at a high rate of speed in a straight line towards its object of
attack. Great improvements have been made during the past ten years in
the construction of these delicate weapons. The extreme effective range
and speed has risen from 4,000 yards at 18 knots to 7,000 yards at 45
knots or 11,000 yards at 30 knots. The “war-head” or front section of
the torpedo contains a charge of about 200 pounds of damp gun-cotton
which is fired by a detonator on the torpedo striking an object. This
very powerful explosive charge is capable of tearing open an enormous
hole in the unprotected under-water skin of the surface warship. The
type of weapon used in the British, French, Russian and Japanese Navies
is the _Whitehead_ torpedo (18-inch and 21-inch). The German Navy uses
the _Schwartzkopf_ torpedo (18-inch and 21-inch), which is very similar
to the Whitehead and is a very powerful weapon.

In the first phase of the naval war no less than eight warships have
been sunk by submarine torpedoes.

The activity of the British submarines _in the theatre of war_, from the
beginning of hostilities, is admirably set forth in the following
dispatch from Commodore Roger B. Keyes, C.B., which is the first
dispatch in the history of naval warfare to describe in detail submarine
attack and reconnaissance:—

                                                H.M.S. _Maidstone_,
                                                  _17th October, 1914_.

 “Sir,—In compliance with Their Lordships’ directions, I have the
 honour to report as follows upon the services performed by the
 Submarines since the commencement of hostilities:—

 “Three hours after the outbreak of war, Submarines E.6
 (Lieutenant-Commander Cecil P. Talbot), and E.8 (Lieutenant-Commander
 Francis H. H. Goodhart), proceeded unaccompanied to carry out a
 reconnaissance in the Heligoland Bight. These two vessels returned
 with useful information, and had the privilege of being the pioneers
 on a service which is attended by some risk.

 “During the transportation of the Expeditionary Force the _Lurcher_
 and _Firedrake_ and all the Submarines of the Eighth Submarine
 Flotilla occupied positions from which they could have attacked the
 High Sea Fleet, had it emerged to dispute the passage of our
 transports. This patrol was maintained day and night without relief,
 until the _personnel_ of our Army had been transported and all chance
 of effective interference had disappeared.

 “These Submarines have since been incessantly employed on the Enemy’s
 Coast in the Heligoland Bight and elsewhere, and have obtained much
 valuable information regarding the composition and movement of his
 patrols. They have occupied his waters and reconnoitred his
 anchorages, and, while so engaged, have been subjected to skilful and
 well executed anti-submarine tactics; hunted for hours at a time by
 Torpedo Craft and attacked by gun-fire and torpedoes.

 “At midnight on August 26th, I embarked in the _Lurcher_, and, in
 company with _Firedrake_ and Submarines D.2, D.8, E.4, E.5, E.6, E.7,
 E.8, and E.9 of the Eighth Submarine Flotilla, proceeded to take part
 in the operations in the Heligoland Bight arranged for August 28th.
 The Destroyers scouted for the Submarines until nightfall on the 27th,
 when the latter proceeded independently to take up various positions
 from which they could co-operate with the Destroyer Flotillas on the
 following morning.

 “At daylight on August 28th the _Lurcher_ and _Firedrake_ searched the
 area, through which the Battle Cruisers were to advance, for hostile
 Submarines, and then proceeded towards Heligoland in the wake of
 Submarines E.6, E.7, and E.8, which were exposing themselves with the
 object of inducing the enemy to chase them to the westward.

 “On approaching Heligoland, the visibility, which had been very good
 to seaward, reduced to 5,000 to 6,000 yards, and this added
 considerably to the anxieties and responsibilities of the Commanding
 Officers of Submarines, who handled their vessels with coolness and
 judgment in an area which was necessarily occupied by friends as well
 as foes.

 “Low visibility and calm sea are the most unfavourable conditions
 under which Submarines can operate, and no opportunity occurred of
 closing with the Enemy’s Cruisers to within torpedo range.

 “Lieutenant-Commander Ernest W. Leir, Commanding Submarine E.4,
 witnessed the sinking of the German Torpedo-Boat Destroyer V.187
 through his periscope, and, observing a Cruiser of the _Stettin_ class
 close, and open fire on the British Destroyers which had lowered their
 boats to pick up the survivors, he proceeded to attack the Cruiser,
 but she altered course before he could get within range. After
 covering the retirement of our Destroyers, which had had to abandon
 their boats, he returned to the latter, and embarked a Lieutenant and
 nine men of _Defender_, who had been left behind. The boats also
 contained two Officers and eight men of V.187, who were unwounded, and
 eighteen men who were badly wounded. As he could not embark the
 latter, Lieutenant-Commander Leir left one of the Officers and six
 unwounded men to navigate the British boats to Heligoland. Before
 leaving he saw that they were provided with water, biscuit, and a
 compass. One German Officer and two men were made prisoners of war.

 “Lieutenant-Commander Leir’s action in remaining on the surface in the
 vicinity of the enemy and in a visibility which would have placed his
 vessel within easy gun range of an enemy appearing out of the mist,
 was altogether admirable.

 “This enterprising and gallant Officer took part in the reconnaissance
 which supplied the information on which these operations were based,
 and I beg to submit his name, and that of Lieutenant-Commander Talbot,
 the Commanding Officer of E.6, who exercised patience, judgment, and
 skill in a dangerous position, for the favourable consideration of
 Their Lordships.

 “On September 13th, E.9 (Lieutenant-Commander Max K. Horton) torpedoed
 and sank the German Light Cruiser _Hela_ six miles South of
 Heligoland.

 “A number of Destroyers were evidently called to the scene after E.9
 had delivered her attack, and these hunted her for several hours.

 “On September 14th, in accordance with his orders,
 Lieutenant-Commander Horton examined the outer anchorage of
 Heligoland, a service attended by considerable risk.

 “On September 25th, Submarine E.6 (Lieutenant-Commander C. P. Talbot),
 while diving, fouled the moorings of a mine laid by the enemy. On
 rising to the surface she weighed the mine and sinker; the former was
 securely fixed between the hydroplane and its guard; fortunately,
 however, the horns of the mine were pointed outboard. The weight of
 the sinker made it a difficult and dangerous matter to lift the mine
 clear without exploding it. After half an hour’s patient work this was
 effected by Lieutenant Frederick A. P. Williams-Freeman and Able
 Seaman Ernest Randall Cremer, Official Number 214235, and the released
 mine descended to its original depths.

 “On October 6th, E.9 (Lieutenant-Commander Max K. Horton), when
 patrolling off the Ems, torpedoed and sank the enemy’s Destroyer
 S.126.

 “The enemy’s Torpedo Craft pursue tactics which, in connection with
 their shallow draft, make them exceedingly difficult to attack with
 torpedo, and Lieutenant-Commander Horton’s success was the result of
 much patient and skilful zeal. He is a most enterprising submarine
 officer, and I beg to submit his name for favourable consideration.

 “Lieutenant Charles M. S. Chapman, the Second in Command of E.9, is
 also deserving of credit.

 “Against an enemy whose capital vessels have never, and Light Cruisers
 have seldom, emerged from their fortified harbours, opportunities of
 delivering Submarine attacks have necessarily been few, and on one
 occasion only, prior to the 13th September, has one of our Submarines
 been within torpedo range of a Cruiser during daylight hours.

 “During the exceptionally heavy westerly gales which prevailed between
 the 14th and 21st September the position of the Submarines on a lee
 shore, within a few miles of the Enemy’s coast, was an unpleasant one.

 “The short steep seas which accompany westerly gales in the Heligoland
 Bight make it difficult to keep the conning tower hatches open. There
 was no rest to be obtained, and even when cruising at a depth of 60
 feet, the Submarines were rolling considerably, and pumping—_i.e._
 vertically moving about twenty feet.

 “I submit that it was creditable to the Commanding Officers that they
 should have maintained their stations under such conditions.

 “Service in the Heligoland Bight is keenly sought after by the
 Commanding Officers of the Eighth Submarine Flotilla, and they have
 all shown daring and enterprise in the execution of their duties.
 These Officers have unanimously expressed to me their admiration of
 the cool and gallant behaviour of the Officers and men under their
 command. They are however, of the opinion that it is impossible to
 single out individuals when all have performed their duties so
 admirably, and in this I concur.

 “The following Submarines have been in contact with the enemy during
 these operations:—

 D.1  (Lieutenant-Commander Archibald D. Cochrane).

 D.2  (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Jameson).

 D.3  (Lieutenant-Commander Edward C. Boyle).

 D.5  (Lieutenant-Commander Godfrey Herbert).

 E.4  (Lieutenant-Commander Ernest W. Leir).

 E.5  (Lieutenant-Commander Charles S. Benning).

 E.6  (Lieutenant-Commander Cecil P. Talbot).

 E.7  (Lieutenant-Commander Ferdinand E. B. Feilmann).

 E.9  (Lieutenant-Commander Max K. Horton).

  I have the honour to be, Sir,
      Your obedient servant,
        (Signed) ROGER KEYES,
                    Commodore (S).”

In conclusion, it must therefore be set on record that the opening phase
in the greatest naval war in history has been one of submarine attack
and counter-attack, mine-laying and destroying, warships and merchantmen
sunk in a few minutes by submarine torpedoes and mines, with sharp
engagements between the cruisers and destroyers acting in conjunction
with the under-water craft. The much-vaunted German Fleet, like that of
its ally Austria-Hungary, has not dared to show itself from behind the
forts and carefully-screened anchorages of the naval bases, suffering
rather the everlasting disgrace of having stood in cowardly idleness
while the 5,000 merchant ships it was built to protect hauled down the
flag of the “Fatherland” and German maritime commerce was swept from the
seas while the Allied fleets hold undisputed command of every ocean.

The First Lord of the British Admiralty has said that if the German
Fleet will not come out to fight it must be “dug out like rats in a
hole.” This, then, may be the second phase in the naval war, and out in
the grey mist of the North Sea, ready and eager for the work, lies the
great battle fleets of England.




                               CHAPTER I

                   THE MODERN SUBMARINE TORPEDO-BOAT


The submarine torpedo-boat is to most people a complete mystery, and
before describing the composition and strength of the submarine fleets
at war it may therefore be of interest to say something of the principal
features common to all types of submarine craft.


                        _Method of Submergence_

It may sound ridiculous, in face of the many accidents which have
occurred, to say that one of the greatest difficulties is to make a
submarine sink sufficiently quickly, and one of the easiest of
operations to make her rise, and yet such is undeniably the case.[1]

It will be readily understood that any delay in disappearing beneath the
surface when attacking would be a great danger to a submarine in action.
For example, a number of hostile torpedo-boat destroyers are scouring
the sea in advance of a fleet, and are discovered at daybreak by the
submarines, which are waiting to attack the fleet behind, approaching at
a speed of 30 knots an hour. A hurried dive beneath the surface is
necessary if the waiting submarines would avoid detection, which would,
in all probability, mean destruction by the quick-firing guns of the
destroyers.

When a submarine is travelling on the surface she is in what is
technically called the _light condition_, that is to say, with her water
ballast tanks empty, but when it is required to sink her so that only
the tiny platform, or deck, and conning-tower are above the surface,
water is let into these ballast tanks, and the additional weight causes
her to sink into the sea until her _back_ is almost flush with the
surface—this is known as the _awash condition_.

It is not difficult to perceive that when travelling awash, a wave might
at any moment roll along the tiny unprotected deck of the submarine,
break over the mouth of the conning-tower, and descend like a waterspout
into the interior. Were this to happen a terrible disaster might result,
for it must be remembered that when travelling awash, a very little
additional weight would cause the submarine to plunge beneath the
surface. In order to obviate this risk it has become a rule that when
proceeding with this small margin of buoyancy, the hatch covering the
mouth of the conning-tower should be screwed down and the submarine
hermetically closed, ready to sink.

To many it may appear strange that total submergence is not accomplished
by letting still more water into the ballast tanks, but entirely with
the aid of the propellers and rudders. A submarine has two, and
sometimes three, pairs of rudders; one pair of ordinary vertical ones to
guide her to port or starboard, and a horizontal pair to cause her to
dive and rise. Two additional _fins_ are frequently placed on each side
of the forepart of the vessel to assist the diving and rising.

In order to make the submarine dive beneath the surface, the horizontal
rudders are deflected when the boat is proceeding at full speed. The
action of the water against the rudders is such that the bows are forced
down and the whole vessel slides under the surface. The principle is
much the same as that of steering an ordinary surface vessel, where the
force of the water against the rudder causes the vessel to swing to
right or left.

From this it will be seen that a submarine is only held below the
surface by the action of her rudders on the passing water; should the
propellers driving her along cease to revolve and the vessel slow down,
she automatically rises to the surface because the rudders have no
longer any effect.

Although the steering both on the vertical and horizontal plane is
controlled by hand, it would be quite beyond the strength of a man to
move the various rudders as required, so electric motors are installed
to perform the actual work. In fact, almost everything in a submarine is
operated by electricity.

In the earlier types of submarine boats, a considerable time was
required to open the valves and allow sufficient water to enter the
ballast tanks to make them sink to the awash condition. Some of the now
obsolete French naval boats took as long as fifteen to twenty minutes to
carry out this simple operation. The main reason for this was, that they
were designed with too much surface buoyancy, that is to say, they rode
too high in the water when floating in the light condition compared with
the inadequate means then employed for the inlet of water into the
ballast tanks, and were thus forced to let in an enormous quantity of
water at a very slow rate before they settled down sufficiently to
enable total submergence to be accomplished by the use of the horizontal
fins and rudders. This great drawback has now been completely overcome,
and the modern submarine can sink below the surface in about three
minutes.

When water is pumped into the ballast tanks in order to make the
submarine settle down, the air which normally fills these tanks is
compressed into a fraction of its proper space, and is therefore always
exerting a downward pressure which increases as more water is pumped in.
Therefore, when it is desired to bring the submarine to the surface
again, all that is necessary is to open the valves and allow the
compressed air to force the water out. It should, however, be remembered
that there is really no need to “blow out” the ballast tanks in order to
bring the submarine to the surface, for this can be much quicker
accomplished by simply elevating the horizontal rudders; but in this
case the submarine only rises just above the surface—to the awash
condition—whereas if the tanks are emptied of water she rises to the
light or cruising condition. This substantiates the assertion made at
the beginning of this chapter—that it is far more difficult to make a
submarine sink than it is to make her rise.

It has been said that a man walking from one end of a submarine to the
other would, in all probability, cause her to plunge dangerously, so
delicate is the state of equipoise when totally submerged. Whatever may
have been the case in the early types it is certainly not so now. So
steady are modern submarines when running below the surface, especially
those of the British, Russian, French, and Japanese and German Navies,
that the long up and down hill glides, which, with some boats, used to
amount to yaws of from 20 to 30 feet, have now been reduced to a few
feet in so many hundreds of yards. In fact, this switch-back motion is
almost unnoticeable except when the submarine is being swung round at a
sharp angle. In no case, however, is it sufficient materially to affect
the firing of the torpedoes.

The reserve buoyancy of a submarine in the awash condition—or
_diving-trim_, as it is called in the British flotillas—is necessarily
very small, amounting to little more than two or three pounds in a
thousand, which in a 300-ton vessel means a difference of only about 100
gallons of sea-water between the ability to float and the inevitability
of sinking. Any material increase in the small margin of what is known
as _positive-buoyancy_ must be accompanied by a corresponding increase
in the power of propulsion, otherwise it would be quite impossible to
drive her under, or, in other words, to overcome the vessel’s natural
tendency to float on the surface.

For these and other reasons, a submarine when running submerged is in
such a delicate state of equipoise that any sudden increase or loss of
weight would upset the balance and so cause the vessel to either dive or
rise with dangerous rapidity.

This would be the effect produced when a torpedo was discharged were
provision not made to counter-balance this sudden loss of weight by
means of _compensating-tanks_, into which sufficient water is pumped to
compensate for the loss of weight incurred by the discharge of _each_
torpedo.

Many submarines are also fitted with bow and stern _trimming-tanks_,
into which water can be pumped in such a manner as to correct any
tendency of the vessel to float too high or low at either extremity.


                             _Propulsion._

Of the many complicated problems surrounding submarine boat construction
the motive power and propelling engines have been in the past, and are
still, the most profound puzzles. Steam, compressed air, electricity,
petrol, and heavy oil have all been used with varying results since
first this type of vessel came into being; and many curious engines for
using these _prime movers_ in conjunction with each other and with
chemical compounds have been evolved by ingenious inventors.

About steam and compressed air little need be said, for although given a
good trial, especially by the French naval authorities, they were
abandoned some years ago in favour of a combination of petrol and
electric engines, which in turn have given place to more powerful
machines using heavy oil and electricity. Steam is, however, again being
used in conjunction with turbine engines for surface propulsion.

The carrying of large quantities of petrol, or heavy oil, is under all
circumstances attended with a certain amount of risk, and when many tons
have to be carried in a confined space, as in a submarine, this risk is
more than doubled, as the slightest leakage when the vessel is submerged
would mean that a powerful explosive mixture of petrol and air would be
made.

[Illustration:

 A modern submarine torpedo-boat (British type). _A._ Deck
 superstructure. _B._ Scuppers for filling superstructure. _D._ External
 connections. _E._ Conning-tower (4-inch armour). _F._ Periscope. _G._
 Periscope motor (for turning, &c.). _H._ Air cowls. _I._ Conning-tower
 cap (opening sideways). _J._ Mast stays. _K._ Mast (not part of service
 equipment). _L._ Torpedo-tube cap. _M._ Torpedo-tubes (twin), torpedoes
 in. _N._ Air-flask (for expelling torpedoes). _O._ Hydroplane engines.
 _X._ Double casing, with special vent for accumulators. _Y._ Spare
 torpedoes. _Z._ Petrol storage tanks (2). 1. Air flasks. 2. Centrifugal
 pumps. 3. Air-lock, with submarine escape dresses. 4. Commander’s
 platform. 5. Ladders. 6. Depth and deflection indicator, registering
 submarine’s deflection from horizontal. 7. Speed dials. 9. Petrol
 engines. 10. Electric engines. 11. Dynamo, for recharging batteries.
 12. Petrol engines—exhaust.

]

It being also quite impossible, for obvious reasons, to use a petrol
engine when running submerged, a second motive power, an engine, with
its additional space and weight, has to be carried to drive the
submarine when under water. For this purpose electricity is used in
almost all types. But electricity, again, has many drawbacks. It costs
in weight nearly thirty times more than other motive powers, and is
extremely dangerous, for should salt water in any way gain access to the
storage batteries, chlorine gas would be given off in large quantities,
although in the more recent vessels of the British, American, and French
Navies this danger has been minimised by enclosing the batteries in
air-tight cases. On account of the weight and the space required, it is
impossible to install a very powerful electric engine in a submarine
(compared with the size of the boat), and thus both the speed and radius
of action are curtailed.

If this division of power between the surface and submerged engines
could be overcome, and the whole space made available for one powerful
set of engines suitable for driving the vessel both on the surface and
when submerged, not only would the mechanism of submarines be
simplified, but a very considerable increase in both speed and range of
action would naturally result.

In the “D,” “E” and “F” classes of British submarines, and in the more
modern vessels of the French, Russian and German Navies, heavy oil is
being used in place of petrol on account of the increase in power
obtained with greater safety.

Arrangements are made in almost all modern submarines so that when the
vessel is using the oil engines for running on the surface the
electricity for use when submerged is being made by a dynamo and stored
in batteries. From this it will be seen that there are really three
separate engines in a submarine:—(1) the oil or petrol motor, which
drives the vessel when on the surface, and, at the same time, by a
suitable arrangement of gearing, operates a dynamo, (2) which makes the
electric current for storage, and (3) an electric engine which drives
the vessel when submerged, obtaining the necessary power from the
batteries.

It is, however, technically incorrect to say that there are two sources
of power in a submarine, for electricity is not, in itself, a source of
power, but merely a handy method of storing and transmitting it. The
only actual source being the oil or petrol.

There are also numerous small engines to add to the complexity of
machinery in a submarine, such as the air compressors used for charging
the torpedo tubes with compressed air for expelling the torpedoes and
for other purposes, and electric motors for operating the pumps,
steering mechanism, and periscopes. In addition to all this,
hand-mechanism is provided for use in case of a breakdown to operate
most of these important appliances. Then again there is, of course, the
armament mechanism for working the torpedo tubes and semi-automatic
quick-firing guns.

From the foregoing it may appear that the interior of a submarine
presents a picture of mechanical complexity utterly incomprehensible.
Yet such is not the case. The fanciful belief that the crew stand, boxed
up in these vessels, sweating with the heat, struggling for breath, and
with crank-shafts whirling uncomfortably close to the small of their
backs, electric motors buzzing within a few inches of their ears, and
nervous hands grasping one or other of the levers ranged in rows in
front of them, is, doubtless, most romantic, but quite unreal. Much of
the undoubtedly complicated machinery in a submarine is tucked away in
the conical extremities, under the interior decking, and fixed to the
arched steel sides. The centre is left almost entirely clear, so that
trestle-tables may be erected for meals, hammocks swung for sleeping,
and sufficient space allowed to make these small vessels as habitable as
possible. Not the least difficulty of the submarine designer is to
create order and leave space among the chaos of machinery which has to
be installed in these peculiar and deadly little torpedo craft.


                        _Vision When Submerged._

Perhaps the greatest difficulty which has beset both submarine
construction and navigation is the puzzle how to see when submerged.
This is now accomplished by means of periscopes, or tubes extending up
from the roof of the submarine to a height of several feet above the
surface—not unlike hollow masts. By a series of lenses and reflectors a
picture of the surface is thrown down these tubes on to reflectors
inside the submarine. A man with his eyes at the bottom of a periscope
can see the surface clearly. Although it projects above the surface when
the whole submarine is submerged, it is far too small an object to be
easily seen moving through the water, and extremely difficult to hit by
gun-fire.

The latest panoramic periscope—two of which are fitted in modern
submarines—has a field of vision of about 60 degrees. The range of
vision is, however, very short, owing to the periscopic tube projecting
only a few feet above the surface. On a moderately smooth and fairly
clear day steering by periscope is not altogether difficult, but at
night or in fog this instrument is useless, and for this reason it would
be almost impossible for a submarine to effect a submerged attack on an
enemy at night. Hence the name given to this type of craft—daylight
torpedo-boats—for in the brilliant light of day, when any attempt by
ordinary torpedo craft to get sufficiently close to hostile warships to
discharge a torpedo with reasonable hope of success would be foredoomed
to failure, there is every possibility that submarines would effect a
surprise attack.


                              _Armament._

The chief armament of all naval submarines is the torpedo, which is
expelled by a blast of compressed air from one of the tubes fitted in
the bow and stern. Several torpedoes are usually carried by each boat,
so that if one failed to strike the object of attack further attempts
can be made.

About the efficiency of torpedoes nothing need be said here, for they
now form an important weapon in every navy, and to this subject a future
chapter is devoted.

The latest submarines built are also fitted with quick-firing guns for
use when these vessels are cruising on the surface. The guns are
arranged so that when it is desired to sink they can be made to
disappear beneath the narrow deck of the submarine. The provision of
guns has been made with the object of giving these vessels a means of
defence should they be discovered by prowling hostile torpedo-boat
destroyers, or by air-craft.


                            _Habitability._

Many people imagine the interior of a submarine to resemble a stokehold,
hot, stifling, and semi-dark, whereas the exact contrary is the truth.
The temperature is but little above the normal for a ship’s engine-room,
the air-supply is amply sufficient, and the whole interior is well
illuminated by electric lamps.

The necessary supply of pure air is derived either from large steel
cylinders containing the air in a highly compressed state or from flasks
of oxylithe. The carbonic acid gas of the respired air being at the same
time chemically absorbed.

Food is cooked for the crew by electricity, and drinking water obtained
from special tanks. Notwithstanding these arrangements, however, it is
almost impossible for the crew to live on board for many weeks at a
time, owing to the small free space in the interior and to the cramped
deck; but as the size and radius of action of these boats increase, so
also does the space available for exercise, and thus the habitability.




                               CHAPTER II

                           BRITISH SUBMARINES


The British Fleet at the moment when war was declared possessed 82
submarine torpedo-boats built and 22 building. Some of these were,
however, stationed at the oversea naval bases. The composition and
distribution of the submarine flotillas at the outbreak of hostilities
were as follows:—


                       SUBMARINES IN HOME WATERS.

                          _Patrol Flotillas._

 1st Flotilla. Devonport.
     Depôt ship: _Onyx_.
   Submarines: A.8 and A.9.

 2nd Flotilla. Portsmouth.
     Depôt ship: _Dolphin_.
   Submarines: A.5, A.6, A.13 and B.1.

 3rd Flotilla. Devonport.
     Depôt ship: _Forth_.
   Submarines: B.3, B.4, B.5, C.14,
     C.15 and C.16.

 4th Flotilla. Portsmouth.
     Depôt ships: _Arrogant_ and _Hazard_.
   Submarines: C.17, C.18, C.31, C.32, C.33, C.34, C.35.

 5th Flotilla. Chatham.
     Depôt ship: _Thames_.
   Submarines: C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4, C.5, C.6.

 6th Flotilla. Chatham.
     Depôt ships: _Bonaventure_ and _Hebe_.
   Submarines: C.7, C.8, C.9, C.10, C.12, C.13.

 7th Flotilla. Chatham.
     Depôt ships: _Vulcan_ and _Alecto_.
   Submarines: C.19, C.20, C.21, C.22, C.23, C.24, C.25, C.26, C.27,
      C.28, C.29, C.30.

 8th Flotilla. Portsmouth.
     Depôt ships: _Maidstone_ and _Adamant_.
   Submarines: D.1, D.2, D.3, D.4, D.5, D.6, D.7, D.8, E.1, E.2, E.3,
      E.4, E.5, E.6, E.7, E.8, E.9.

 9th Flotilla. Devonport.
     Depôt ship: _Pactolus_.
   Submarines: A.10, A.11, A.12.


                    SUBMARINES ON FOREIGN STATIONS.

    Attached to Mediterranean Fleet.—Submarines B.9, B.10, and B.11.

    At Gibraltar.—Submarines B.6, B.7, and B.8.

    Attached to China Squadron.—Submarines C.36, C.37, and C.38.

    With Australian Fleet.—Submarines A.E.1[2] and A.E.2.

The statement that the headquarters of the various submarine flotillas
in home waters are at Chatham, Portsmouth, and Devonport, must not be
taken as indicating that these are the only points along the coast
protected by submarines. These places are merely the chief bases of the
_Patrol Flotillas_. The wide range of action of modern submarines
enables them to operate several hundred miles from any base or depôt,
and consequently Chatham becomes merely the _general store_, or
head-depôt, of what should be termed the North Sea Flotillas, which not
only patrol the whole East, North-East and South-East Coasts of England
and Scotland, but also have their floating secondary bases in the form
of _Depôt Ships_, which, with their attached submarines, are often at
Harwich, Newcastle, Rosyth, etc. In the same way Portsmouth is merely
the headquarters of the submarines patrolling the Channel; and Dover,
Portland, etc., are seldom without strong flotillas of submarines with
their Depôt ships. The Devonport Flotillas have the longest coast-line
to patrol, for their area covers not only the West Coast of England,
Wales and Scotland, but also the Irish Coast. They are, however,
furthest removed from the zone of war.

Considerable alterations have taken place in the composition and
distribution of the British submarine flotillas since the outbreak of
war, with the object of materially strengthening the Fleet in the main
theatre of operations, but the addition to the flotillas of new vessels
of the latest “E” type—nearly completed when war broke out—has made this
rearrangement possible without materially weakening the flotillas
guarding the more distant coasts of Great Britain or recalling vessels
from overseas.

[Illustration:

 _Photo, Cribb, Southsea._]

                      THE BRITISH SUBMARINE “D.7.”

 Displacement, 620 tons; Speed, 16·10 knots; Armament, 2 bow and 1 stern
                              torpedo tube.

      There are 8 vessels of this class, completed between 1908‒12.

]

The first submarine torpedo-boat built for the British Navy was launched
from the yard of Messrs. Vickers Ltd., Barrow-in-Furness in 1901, and
was designated the No. 1. It was constructed from the designs of the
famous American inventor, Mr. John P. Holland, and was one of the most
successful boats afloat at that time. A series of exhaustive trials with
this and the succeeding five vessels, all of the same type and launched
during 1901‒2, proved conclusively the fighting value of this type of
craft, and a further order was given by the British Admiralty for four
new vessels embodying the improvements suggested by the trials of the
first five. These vessels were the first of the “A” class, and were
designated the “A’s 1, 2, 3, and 4.” They had a submerged displacement
of 180 tons, a length of 100 feet and a beam of 10 feet. They were
propelled by petrol motors of 190 H.-P. on the surface and by electric
motors of about 80 H.-P. when submerged. Their speed ranged from 8 knots
an hour on the surface to 5 knots when travelling submerged, and their
maximum surface endurance (or fuel capacity) was only 400 knots at 8
knots. Their armament consisted of three 18-inch Whitehead torpedoes and
one bow tube.

All these vessels were, however, obsolete and therefore scrapped before
the opening of hostilities, hence information concerning them is only of
interest as showing the rapid growth in size, power and armament of
British submarines. The next batch of vessels were the A’s 5 to 13,
launched at Barrow in 1904, but these, as will have been seen from the
table showing the composition and distribution of the submarine
flotillas at the outbreak of war, are still on the effective list. All
the following British submarines are now in the fighting line.


                               “A” CLASS.

                           (Completed 1904.)

                    A’s 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13.

These vessels are the oldest British submarines in commission. They were
built at Messrs. Vickers’ works at Barrow, and have a submerged
displacement of 204 tons. Their length is 150 feet. They are propelled
on the surface by petrol motors of 600 H.-P. and by electric engines of
100 H.-P. when submerged. Their surface and submerged speed is 11 knots
and 7 knots respectively. The cruising range, or maximum surface
endurance on the fuel carried, is 400 knots at 10 knots an hour, and the
endurance submerged three hours at full speed. Their armament consists
of two bow tubes with four 18-inch Whitehead torpedoes. Complement:
Eleven officers and men.

These vessels, which are now used almost entirely for harbour defence,
can be distinguished from later types by their high conning-towers and
single short periscopes. The A.7 was lost off Plymouth early in 1914,
and was never raised.


                               “B” CLASS.

                          (Completed 1904‒6.)

                  B’s 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.

These are submarines of the improved Holland type, and are in every way
superior to their predecessors. They may be considered the first of the
sea-going type. Their submerged displacement is 316 tons; length 135
feet, and beam 13 ½ feet. The motive power is the same as in the
“A’s”—petrol for surface propulsion and electricity for use when
submerged. The horse-power of the petrol engines is 600, and that of the
electric engines 189. As in most submarines the supply of current for
driving the electric engines is derived from storage batteries charged
by dynamos driven from the petrol engines while the vessels are running
on the surface. In the “B” class a special system of encasing these
storage batteries was introduced. Their speed averages 12 knots on the
surface and 8 knots when submerged. The surface cruising range is 1,300
knots at 10 knots per hour, and the maximum submerged endurance 80‒100
knots at 5 knots per hour. Their armament consists of two bow tubes with
4‒6 18-inch Whitehead torpedoes. Complement: Sixteen officers and men.

The “B” type are vessels about 50 per cent. larger than the “A” type
which preceded them. The “B’s” have superstructures extending from the
bow to the conning-tower, forming a narrow deck which tends to disperse
the wave which heaped around the blunt noses of the “A’s” and original
Hollands. Vision when submerged is obtained by two panoramic periscopes,
each having an arc of vision of 60 degrees. In the more modern vessels
three periscopes are fitted. The twin screws of the “B’s” are placed
below the centre line of the vessel and consequently operate in deeper
water when the vessels are cruising on the surface. This gives them
better surface cruising qualities, as in a sea-way the propellers are
liable to race if worked too near the surface. The increase in the speed
of these vessels over that of the “A’s” was of great importance, as in
this respect lies the weakness of the submarine. The tactical advantages
derived from high speed in actual warfare cannot be over-estimated. The
speed of a fleet is governed by that of its slowest unit.

The distinguishing feature of the “B” type is the straight bow, the
forward superstructure, and the _two_ periscopes. The B.2 was run down
by the liner _Amerika_ in the Straits of Dover in October, 1912, and was
never recovered.


                               “C” CLASS.

                          (Completed 1906‒10.)

  C’s 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,
 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38.

This class of submarines is composed of vessels of the improved “B”
type. They have a submerged displacement of 320 tons and are 135 feet
long and 13 ½ feet broad. The petrol motors develop 600 H.-P. and give
to these vessels a speed of 14 knots an hour on the surface. The power
of the electric engines was increased to 300 H.-P., giving a submerged
speed of just over 9 knots an hour. The surface cruising range is 2,000
knots at the most economical speed, and the submerged endurance 100
knots at 5 knots an hour. Their armament consists of two bow tubes with
six 18-inch Whitehead torpedoes; and their complement sixteen officers
and men.

In the later vessels of the “C” class heavy oil is used instead of
petrol, giving a great increase in power without the comparative
additional weight; enabling a wider radius of action. The vessels of
both the “B” and “C” classes are fitted with air-traps and
safety-helmets, giving the crew a possible means of escape in the event
of disaster while submerged.

The distinguishing feature of the “C” class is the sloping bow. The C.11
collided with the steamer _Eddystone_ in the North Sea in 1909 and was
irretrievably lost.


                               “D” CLASS.

                          (Completed 1908‒11.)

                      D’s 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.

These are all modern vessels of the sea-going type, and are of
considerable fighting value. They, however, differ slightly from each
other: D.1 has a submerged displacement of 595 tons; D.2 of 600 tons;
and the remaining vessels of this class of 620 tons. They have an
approximate length of 150 feet and a beam of 15 feet. Heavy-oil engines
of 1,200 H.-P. drive them at a maximum speed of 16 knots an hour on the
surface, and electric motors of 550 H.-P. give them a submerged speed of
just over 10 knots an hour. All these vessels have twin-screws situated
below the centre line. Their cruising range on the surface is 4,000
miles, and when submerged 120 knots at 7 knots an hour. These vessels
were the first to be fitted with a special and more efficient pattern of
electric storage battery and a safer type of electric motor. The
armament of the “D’s” consists of two bow and one stern tube with six
18-inch Whitehead torpedoes. D’s 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 are also fitted with
a small quick-firing, high-angle gun for defence against air-craft. This
gun is fixed on a disappearing mounting, enabling it to be quickly and
almost automatically lowered into a watertight cavity in the
superstructure before the submarine dives below the surface. The
complement of these vessels is twenty-one officers and men.

[Illustration:

 _Photo, Cribb, Southsea._]

                      THE BRITISH SUBMARINE “C.34.”

   Displacement, 320 tons; Speed, 14·9 knots; Armament, 2 bow torpedo
                                 tubes.

     There are 37 vessels of this class, completed between 1906‒12.

]


                               “E” CLASS.

                          (Completed 1912‒14.)

   E’s 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18.

These fine ocean-going submarines are the latest additions to the
British Flotillas. They have a submerged displacement of 800 tons, are
176 feet long and 22 ½ feet in beam. The heavy-oil engines of nearly
2,000 H.-P. give them a surface speed of over 16 knots, while the
electric engines of 800 H.-P. drive them at a maximum speed of 10 knots
an hour when submerged. Their surface cruising range is 5,000 miles at
economical speed, and the submerged endurance 140 knots at 8 knots an
hour. In point of armament the “E’s” are far more powerful than their
predecessors, being fitted with four tubes and carrying six of the
largest and most powerful Whitehead torpedoes. They are also equipped
with two 3-inch quick-firing guns on high-angle disappearing mountings
for defence against air-craft and hostile torpedo-boats and destroyers.
They have wireless telegraphic apparatus; and, like the vessels of the
“B,” “C” and “D” classes, have armoured conning towers and decks. Three
tall panoramic periscopes are fitted, and their high superstructures and
increased buoyancy when travelling on the surface enable them to keep
the sea in almost any weather.


                         AUSTRALIAN SUBMARINES:

                            A.E.1 and A.E.2.

These vessels are exactly the same as the “E” class. The fact that they
both accomplished the 13,000-mile voyage from Barrow to Sydney under
their own power and without convoy is practical proof of the wide range,
seaworthiness and general efficiency of the latest British Naval
Submarines. The A.E.1 mysteriously disappeared in Australian waters in
October, 1914, and has not been recovered.


                      BRITISH SUBMARINES BUILDING.

At the commencement of the great war there were 22 British submarines in
course of construction at the various shipbuilding works and naval
dockyards. Up to 1909 Messrs. Vickers Ltd., had constructed all the
British submarines, but in that year the vessels C.17 and C.18 were laid
down at Chatham Dockyard. Since then several other boats have been
constructed there, and of those now in hand some are being built by
Messrs. Vickers Ltd. at Barrow, others at Messrs. Scott’s shipbuilding
yards at Greenock, and a few by Messrs. Armstrong, Whitworth and Co.
Ltd. at Newcastle-on-Tyne, and at H.M. Dockyard at Chatham.

Hitherto, British submarines, although divided into classes—each of
which has shown a marked improvement on the preceding class—have been
all of one type—the “Improved Holland.” Among the vessels being
constructed at the opening of hostilities they were, however, no less
than three different types. Those being built at Barrow and Chatham were
of the original design with modern improvements, but the submarines
under construction at Greenock were of the _Laurenti_, or Italian type,
and those at Newcastle-on-Tyne of the _Laubeuf_, or French type. In
addition to this wise departure from previous practice, two of the new
vessels have been given the names of _Nautilus_ and _Swordfish_.

The haze of war has obscured these vessels, and it is impossible to say
definitely which of them have taken their place in the active flotillas,
and further the necessity for observing the very strictest secrecy
regarding new types of warships at a time like the present makes it
advisable to give here only the briefest particulars and not to discuss
too freely the peculiarities of their design or their probable
capabilities.


                               “F” CLASS.

There are several vessels of this class now being constructed. They are
the latest improvement of the original Holland design and are sea-going
submarines of wide range, high speed and great fighting power. The F.1,
which was built at Chatham Dockyard, has a submerged displacement of
1,500 tons. Heavy-oil engines of about 5,000 H.-P. give her a maximum
speed of 20 knots an hour on the surface, and electric motors of 2,000
H.-P. drive her at 12 knots when submerged. The armament consists of six
torpedo tubes, ten torpedoes, and two quick-firing, high-angle guns.


                   “V” CLASS.  “W” CLASS.  “S” CLASS.

                      _Nautilus_ and _Swordfish_.

These three classes include the vessels of entirely different design to
those now forming the British flotillas. The “V,” or Vickers’ type, of
which four were under construction at the beginning of the war, are
large sea-going submarines with a submerged displacement of over 1,000
tons, and a probable surface speed of 20 knots. The “W” Class, of which
four are being built at Elswick, comprise vessels of the French
_Laubeuf_ type. The “S” Class, building at Greenock, and four in number,
are of the Italian, or F.I.A.T.—_Laurenti_ type. The two named
vessels—_Nautilus_ and _Swordfish_—are large sea-going submarines of
wide range and high speed. Their submerged displacement is about 1,000
tons, and their speed 20 knots on the surface and 12 knots when
submerged. The armament is six tubes, with eight torpedoes, and two
quick-firing guns. The complement of all these large submarines is about
25 officers and men.

-----

Footnote 1:

  “Submarine Engineering of To-day.” By Charles W. Domville-Fife.
  (London: Seeley, Service & Co. Ltd. 1914.)

Footnote 2:

  Sunk October, 1914.




                              CHAPTER III

                           FRENCH SUBMARINES


France possessed 92 submarines in active service when war was declared.
In addition to these, nine large and powerful vessels were in various
stages of construction. The flotillas of the French Navy are composed of
two different types of vessels: _Submarines Defensive_ and
_Submersibles_. The former are intended, as their name implies, solely
for coast and harbour defence; their radii of action is very small, and
they are incapable of action independent of a naval base. The
submersibles are like the large sea-going submarines of England and
Germany, and have a wide radius of action, high speed, and great
offensive power.

The first naval submarine (_Gymnôte_) was launched in 1888, giving to
France the honour of being the first Naval Power to adopt the submarine
torpedo-boat as a vessel of war. The pioneers of submarine construction
in France were Captain Burgeoise, Engineer Brun, M. Dupuy de Lome, M.
Gustave Zédé, and Admiral Aube. The second submarine ordered for the
French Navy was the _Gustave Zédé_, launched in 1893. So successful did
this vessel prove that another of the same type, and named the _Morse_,
was launched at Cherbourg Dockyard in 1899. In the same year four
vessels of a new type were laid down in the dockyard at Rochefort, and
named _Lutin_, _Farfâdet_ (re-named _Follet_), _Korrigan_, and _Gnôme_.
These, with the exception of the ill-fated _Lutin_, are still in the
active flotillas.


                              LUTIN CLASS.

                          (Completed 1901‒2.)

                   _Follet_.  _Korrigan_.  _Gnôme_.

These are the oldest submarines in the French Navy, and are all of the
defensive type. They have a displacement of about 185 tons, with
electric engines for propulsion both on the surface and when submerged.
Their speed is 12 knots on the surface and 8 knots when submerged. Their
range of action is about 200 miles at 7 knots. The armament consists of
one bow tube and two holders, with four 18-inch Whitehead torpedoes. The
complement is nine officers and men.

[Illustration:

 _Photos, M. Bar._]

          A FRENCH SUBMARINE OF THE HARBOUR DEFENCE TYPE. (top)

         A FRENCH SUBMARINE OF THE COAST DEFENCE TYPE.  (bottom)

]


                            FRANÇAISE CLASS.

                          (Completed 1901‒2.)

                       _Française._  _Algérien._

These two vessels are of the improved _Morse_ type, and are intended
solely for coast and harbour defence. Their surface displacement is 146
tons, and they have electric engines of 350 H.-P. for both surface and
submerged propulsion, giving them a speed of 12 knots and 8 knots an
hour, respectively. Their surface radius is about 80 miles at 8 knots.
They have one bow tube and two holders, with four torpedoes. The
complement is nine officers and men.


                            TRITON CLASS.[3]

                          (Completed 1901‒2.)

              _Triton._  _Sirene._  _Espadon._  _Silure._

These four vessels were the first of the submersible type and were
designed by M. Laubeuf, who has since designed many vessels for both
France and other countries (_Laubeuf_ type). They have a submerged
displacement of 200 tons, and are 111 feet long and 12 ½ feet in beam.
Steam is used for surface propulsion (217 H.-P.) and electricity when
submerged. Their speed is 11 knots on the surface and 8 knots when
submerged, with a cruising radius of 600 miles at 8 knots. They are
armed with four holders fitted with 18-inch Whitehead torpedoes, and
have a complement of ten officers and men.


                             NAIADE CLASS.

                          (Completed 1902‒4.)

     _Naiade._  _Loutre._  _Protée._  _Lynx._  _Perle._  _Truite._
   _Castor._  _Oursin._  _Meduse._  _Otarie._  _Phoque._  _Ludion._
  _Alose._  _Anguille._  _Grondin._  _Dorade._  _Souffleur._  _Thon._
                        _Bonite._  _Esturgeon._

Twenty small harbour defence submarines, having a displacement of about
67 tons. They have petrol and electric motors, giving them a speed of
8 ½ knots on the surface and 5 knots when submerged. Their armament
consists of one bow tube and two holders; four torpedoes are carried.
Their complement is six officers and men.


                            AIGRETTE CLASS.

                           (Completed 1904.)

                        _Aigrette._  _Cicogne._

These two vessels are submersibles of the _Laubeuf_ type, and were great
improvements on their predecessors, the Triton Class. Their submerged
displacement is 351 tons, and their dimensions 118 × 12 × 12 feet. A
triple expansion steam engine of 200 H.-P. is used for surface
propulsion and an electric motor of 150 H.-P. when submerged. Their
speed is 10 knots and 8 ½ knots. Their maximum surface endurance is 700
miles at 8 knots, and submerged 60 miles at 6 knots. Their armament
consists of one bow tube with four 18-inch torpedoes. Their complement
is about fifteen officers and men.


                               ARGONAUTE.

                           (Completed 1905.)

A submersible designed by M. Bertin (late Chief Constructor French
Navy). This vessel, which was first named _Omega_, has a displacement of
about 300 tons. She is driven by steam and electricity, and has a speed
of 11 knots and 9 knots. Her armament consists of two bow tubes and two
holders, with six 18-inch Whitehead torpedoes. The complement is about
seventeen officers and men.


                            EMERAUDE CLASS.

                          (Completed 1906‒8.)

  _Emeraude._  _Saphir._  _Opale._  _Topaz._  _Rubis._  _Turquoise._

These six vessels are of the _Maugas_ type and are sea-going submarines
with a submerged displacement of over 400 tons. They have petrol and
electric motors of 600 H.-P. and 450 H.-P., respectively. Their surface
speed is 12 knots and submerged 8 ½ knots. Their surface cruising radius
is just over 1,000 miles at economical speed. Their armament consists of
two tubes and four holders with 8 torpedoes of the usual pattern. Their
complement is seventeen officers and men.


                              CIRCE CLASS.

                           (Completed 1907.)

                         _Circe._  _Calypso._

These two vessels are of the _Laubeuf_ type, and are improvements on the
_Aigrette_ class. They have a submerged displacement of about 450 tons
and are 160 feet in length. They are driven by a steam engine of 440
H.-P. (flash boiler and oil fuel) when on the surface, and by electric
motors when submerged. Their speed is 11 knots and 8 knots; and the
range of action 1,000 miles. Their armament comprises two tubes and four
holders with eight torpedoes. The complement is 21 officers and men.


                            PLUVIÔSE CLASS.

                          (Completed 1907‒12.)

     _Pluviôse._  _Nivôse._  _Ventôse._  _Messidor._  _Thermidor._
    _Fructidor._  _Brumaire._  _Frimaire._  _Florèal._  _Prairial._
                              _Germinal._

Submarines of the _Laubeuf_ type with a submerged displacement of nearly
600 tons. All built at Cherbourg. The _Brumaire_ and _Frimaire_ are
driven by petrol motors of 700 H.-P. when cruising on the surface, but
all the others have small steam turbines with a special type of
flash-boiler. Electric motors are used for submerged propulsion. Their
speed is 12 knots above and 9 knots below. The armament is seven 18-inch
torpedoes. Their complement is 22 officers and men.


                             FRESNEL CLASS.

                          (Completed 1908‒12.)

 _Fresnel._  _Berthelot._  _Papin._  _Monge._  _Ampère._  _Gay-Lussac._
 _Cagnot._  _Faraday._  _Giffard._  _Montgolfier._  _Newton._  _Volta._
  _Watt._  _Euler._  _Faucault._  _Franklin._  _Arago._  _Permouilli._
              _Joule._  _Coulomb._  _Curie._  _Le Verrier._

Twenty-two submarines of the largest sea-going _Laubeuf_ type. Only
three of these are steam driven, the others using heavy-oil engines for
surface propulsion. They are in all respects similar to vessels of the
_Pluviôse_ class, and have a displacement of about 600 tons. Their speed
is 12 knots above, and 9 knots below, and the armament seven 18-inch
torpedoes. These vessels are fitted with stern as well as bow tubes.
Their surface cruising range is over 2,000 miles.


                           AMIRAL BOURGEOISE.

                           (Completed 1912.)

An experimental boat of the _Bourdelle_ type, built at Cherbourg. The
submerged displacement is just under 800 tons and the length 190 feet.
She is driven on the surface by heavy-oil engines of 1,600 H.-P., which
give a speed of 15 knots. The electric motors for submerged propulsion
are of 700 H.-P., giving a speed of 10 knots. The armament consists of
seven 18-inch torpedoes, and the cruising range is 3,500 miles.


                               ARCHIMÈDE.

                           (Completed 1912.)

Another experimental boat built at Cherbourg. The submerged displacement
is about 810 tons, and the length and beam 212 feet and 22 feet
respectively. Steam turbines are used for surface propulsion and
electric motors when submerged. Her speed is 15 knots above and 10 knots
below. The armament is seven 18-inch torpedoes, and the complement 24
officers and men.

[Illustration:

 _Photo, M. Bar._]

                A FRENCH SUBMARINE OF THE SEA-GOING TYPE.

]


                               MARIOTTE.

                           (Completed 1912.)

The third experimental boat, of the _Rodiquet_ type, built at Cherbourg.
The displacement when submerged is 650 tons and the length about 200
feet. Petrol motors of 1,500 H.-P. drive her at 15 knots an hour on the
surface and electric motors of 550 H.-P. at 10 knots when submerged. Her
radius of action is 3,000 miles, and her armament seven 18-inch
torpedoes, which can be fired from both bow and stern tubes. The
complement is about 25 officers and men.


                             CHARLES BRUN.

                           (Completed 1912.)

The fourth experimental vessel, built at Cherbourg during 1909‒12. The
submerged displacement is 450 tons and the length 145 feet. Steam
turbines of 1,300 H.-P. drive her at 15 ½ knots an hour on the surface,
and electric motors of 500 H.-P. at 10 knots when submerged. Her
armament consists of six 18-inch torpedoes. The complement is 22
officers and men.


                            CLORINDE CLASS.

                          (Completed 1913‒14.)

    _Clorinde._  _Cornélie._  _Amphritrite._  _Astree._  _Artémis._
   _Aréthuse._  _Atalante._  _Amaranthe._  _Ariane._  _Andromaque._

These ten vessels are the very latest additions to the French Submarine
flotillas. They have a submerged displacement of about 550 tons, a
length of 177 feet and a beam of 16 feet. Heavy-oil engines of 1,300
H.-P. give them a speed of 15 knots on the surface, and electric motors
of 550 H.-P. enable them to travel at 9 ½ knots an hour when submerged.
They carry eight torpedoes, and have a complement of 25 officers and
men.


                          GUSTAVE ZEDE CLASS.

                          (Completed 1913‒14.)

                      _Gustave Zede._  _Néréide._

These two vessels are the largest submarines in the French flotillas.
They have a submerged displacement of 1,000 tons, a length of 240 feet,
and a beam of 20 feet. Heavy-oil engines give them a surface speed of 16
knots and electric motors a submerged speed of 10 knots. Their armament
consists of two bow and two stern tubes with eight 18-inch torpedoes.
They are also equipped with two 14-pdr. quick-firing guns on high-angle,
disappearing mountings. The cruising range is 4,000 miles, and the
complement 27 officers and men.


                             BELLONE CLASS.

                           (Completed 1914.)

                  _Bellone._  _Hermione._  _Gorgone._

Fast sea-going submarines with a submerged displacement of 610 tons.
They have heavy-oil engines of about 2,000 H.-P., which give them a
surface speed of 17 ½ knots. Electric motors of 950 H.-P. drive them at
12 knots when submerged. Their surface cruising range is 4,000 miles.
Their armament consists of eight 18-inch torpedoes and two 14-pdr.
quick-firing, high-angle guns. The complement is 30 officers and men.


                      FRENCH SUBMARINES BUILDING.

On the day when war was declared nine submarines were in the early
stages of construction. The two most advanced of these were the _Diane_
and _Daphne_. These vessels have a submerged displacement of about 800
tons, and the anticipated speed is 18 knots and 10 knots. Their armament
will consist of ten torpedoes and four 9-pdr. guns. The complement will
be 30 officers and men.

The other seven vessels are of the improved _Gustave Zede_ Class. They
will have a submerged displacement of over 1,000 tons and a speed of 20
knots on the surface and 12 knots when submerged. Their armament will
consist of ten torpedoes and four 9-pdr. guns. The complement will be
about 35 officers and men.

-----

Footnote 3:

  The _Narval_, the first of this type, has been removed from the
  effective list.




                               CHAPTER IV

                           RUSSIAN SUBMARINES


The Imperial Russian Navy at the commencement of hostilities included 37
submarines in active service, and 19 in various stages of construction.
The composition and distribution of the submarine flotillas was as
follows:—

BALTIC FLOTILLA: 14 Submarines with depôt ships in commission, and 12
vessels building. _Bases_: Kronstadt, Port Peter the Great (Reval) and
Port Alexander III. (Libau) (ice free).

BLACK SEA FLOTILLA: 11 Submarines with depôt ships in commission, and
several new vessels building. _Bases_: Sevastopol and Nikolaieff.

SIBERIAN FLOTILLA: 12 Submarines with depôt ships in commission, and 6
vessels building. _Base_: Vladivostok.

The first Russian naval submarine was completed at Kronstadt in 1902,
and named the _Petr Kochka_. She was built in sections to facilitate
transport over the Siberian Railway, being intended for the defence of
Port Arthur, and had a surface displacement of only 20 tons. Her
armament consisted of two holders, or Darzewiecki launching apparatus,
containing two small Whitehead torpedoes. The maximum speed was 8 knots
on the surface and 4 knots when submerged. The second submarine ordered
for the Russian Navy was the _Delphin_, which foundered off Kronstadt,
but was subsequently raised and is now used as a training ship for the
submarine service. These two vessels have been removed from the active
flotillas, but the third vessel to be built for the Russian Navy—the
_Graf Cheremetieve_—is still in commission.


                        GRAF CHEREMETIEVE CLASS.

                          (Completed 1904‒5.)

          _Graf Cheremetieve._  _Kasatka._  _Nalim._  _Skat._

These are the oldest submarines in the Russian Navy, and are small
vessels of the Holland-Bubnoff type. They have a submerged displacement
of 200 tons. Petrol and electric engines drive them at 9 knots on the
surface and 6 knots when submerged. Their armament consists of one bow
torpedo tube and two exterior holders, with four 18-inch Whitehead
torpedoes.


                              OSTR CLASS.

                          (Completed 1904‒6.)

         _Ostr._  _Byts-chok._  _Kefal._  _Platus._  _Plotva._

These five submarines are of the American Lake type. The _Ostr_ was
originally the American Lake Co.’s boat _Protector_. They have a
submerged displacement of 175 tons, are 65 feet in length and 11 feet in
breadth. Have petrol engines of 250 H.-P. for surface propulsion and
electric motors for use when submerged. Their speed is 11 knots above
and 7 knots below. The surface cruising radius is 450 knots at full
speed. The armament consists of two bow and one stern tube with four
18-inch Whitehead torpedoes. The _special_ characteristics of the
American Lake type will be seen on pages 119‒120.


                               SOM CLASS.

                          (Completed 1904‒6.)

                          _Som._  _Shtshuka._

These two vessels, which are of the Holland-Bubnoff type, have a
submerged displacement of about 150 tons. Petrol and electric motors are
used for surface and submerged propulsion, and the speed is 9 ½ knots
and 7 knots, above and below, respectively. Their armament consists of
two bow tubes with four 18-inch Whitehead torpedoes. Their complement is
about fifteen officers and men.


                            STERLIAD CLASS.

                          (Completed 1905‒6.)

                  _Sterliad._  _Bialuga._  _Peskar._

These three vessels are also of the Holland-Bubnoff type. They have a
submerged displacement of 150 tons. The petrol motors for surface
propulsion are of 160 H.-P. The speed is 9 ½ knots and 7 knots, above
and below, respectively. Their armament consist of two bow tubes with
four 18-inch Whitehead torpedoes. Their complement is eleven to fifteen
officers and men.


                                  SIG.

                           (Completed 1906.)

A submarine of the Lake type; similar in almost every respect to vessels
of the _Ostr_ class.


                             MAKREL CLASS.

                           (Completed 1907.)

                          _Makrel._  _Okun._

Two vessels of the _Improved_ Holland-Bubnoff type. They have a
submerged displacement of about 200 tons. The petrol motors are of 300
H.-P., and the electric engines of 150 H.-P. Their speed is 10 knots on
the surface and 8 knots when submerged. They are fitted with two bow
tubes and two stern _holders_, and carry six 18-inch Whitehead
torpedoes. Their complement is fifteen officers and men.


                             LOSSOS CLASS.

                           (Completed 1907.)

                          _Lossos._  _Ludak._

Two somewhat smaller submarines of the Holland type. Intended either for
the Black Sea or Far Eastern Flotilla. Similar to those of the
_Sterliad_ class.


                              KARP CLASS.

                          (Completed 1907‒8.)

                           _Karp._  _Karas._

These two submarines are of the Germania, or Krupp type, and have a
submerged displacement of 250 tons. They have Krupp-Nuremburg heavy-oil
engines of 400 H.-P., and electric motors of 160 H.-P. Their speed on
the surface is 12 knots, and 8 knots when submerged. The surface range
of action is about 1,000 miles, and the submerged endurance about three
hours at full speed. Their armament consists of two bow torpedo tubes
and four torpedoes are carried. Their complement is fifteen officers and
men.


                            ALLIGATOR CLASS.

                          (Completed 1908‒9.)

            _Alligator._  _Kaiman._  _Drakon._  _Krokodil._

Four submarines of the improved Lake type. They have a submerged
displacement of 500 tons. Their speed is 15 knots on the surface and 10
knots when submerged. They are fitted with two bow and two stern tubes,
and carry six 18-inch Whitehead torpedoes. Their complement is seventeen
officers and men. (See also page 96.)


                             MINOGA CLASS.

                           (Completed 1908.)

                        _Minoga._  _Potschovy._

Two small submarines of the Holland-Bubnoff type, which were built in
sections to facilitate transport by rail. They have a submerged
displacement of about 150 tons, and a speed of 12 knots and 9 knots,
above and below, respectively. Their complement is eleven officers and
men.


                                 AKULA.

                           (Completed 1909.)

A large submarine of the Holland-Bubnoff type. Her displacement is about
570 tons, and her speed 16 knots on the surface and 10 knots when
submerged. The armament consists of two bow and one stern tube, with six
18-inch Whitehead torpedoes. The complement is 20 officers and men.


                            KASCHALOT CLASS.

                          (Completed 1909‒12.)

 _Kaschalot._  _Kit._  _Krab._  _Morsh._  _Narval._  _Nerpa._  _Tinlen._

These seven vessels are among the most modern submarines in the Russian
flotillas. They are of the Holland-Bubnoff type, and have a submerged
displacement of about 500 tons. Heavy-oil engines of over 1,000 H.-P.
drive them at a maximum surface speed of 16 knots, and electric motors
of 550 H.-P. give them a submerged speed of just over 10 knots an hour.
Their surface cruising range is about 3,000 miles. Their armament
consists of two bow and one stern tube with six 18-inch Whitehead
torpedoes. They are also fitted with a small, quick-firing, high-angle
gun for defence against air-craft. Their complement is 21 officers and
men.


                      RUSSIAN SUBMARINES BUILDING.

At the commencement of the war there were nineteen Russian submarines in
course of construction. Very little information concerning these boats
can be obtained, except that their submerged displacement ranges from
800 to 1,500 tons, and their _anticipated_ surface speed is 20 knots.
Some of the 800-ton vessels have already been completed, and the first
twelve will be named: _Svitza_, _Leopard_, _Pantera_, _Ruis_, _Kaguar_,
_Tiqr_, _Yaguar_, _Vepr_, _Wolk_, _Baro_, _Gepard_, and _Tur_. These
vessels have a speed of 16 knots on the surface and 10 knots when
submerged. Their complement is 25 officers and men.




                               CHAPTER V

                          JAPANESE SUBMARINES


The Imperial Japanese Navy includes a submarine flotilla of seventeen
vessels, all except two of which are of the British Holland or Vickers
type. Japan commenced the construction of what is now a rapidly
increasing and powerful flotilla in 1904 by the purchase of five
elementary Holland boats. These, however, are still in the active
flotilla and are designated Nos. 1‒5. They have a submerged displacement
of 120 tons, and are 65 feet in length and 12 feet in beam. Petrol
motors of 160 H.-P. drive them at 9 knots on the surface and electric
motors of 70 H.-P. at 7 knots when submerged. Their armament consists of
one bow expulsion tube with three 18-inch Whitehead torpedoes.


                             NOS. 6 AND 7.

                           (Completed 1906.)

These two vessels were the first submarine boats to be built in Japan,
but are of the same type as Nos. 1‒5, only larger and faster. They have
a submerged displacement of 180 tons, a length of 100 feet and a beam of
10 feet. The petrol engines are of 300 H.-P. and the electric motors of
100 H.-P. The surface and submerged speed is 10 knots and 8 knots an
hour, respectively. Their armament consists of one torpedo tube with
three 18-inch Whitehead torpedoes.


                             NOS. 8 AND 9.

                          (Completed 1907‒8.)

These two vessels are very similar to the British “C” class, and were
built by Messrs. Vickers Ltd. They have a submerged displacement of 320
tons; petrol motors of 600 H.-P., and a surface and submerged speed of
13 knots and 8 knots an hour, respectively. Their armament consists of
two bow tubes with four to six 18-inch Whitehead torpedoes. Their
complement is sixteen officers and men.


                              Nos. 10‒15.

                          (Completed 1909‒12.)

These six vessels are the same in almost every respect as the later “C”
class of British submarines (pages 70‒71).


                             Nos. 16‒17[4].

                          (Completed 1912‒14.)

These two vessels are of the _Schneider-Laubeuf_ or French type.
(British “W” class.) Their submerged displacement is about 500 tons, and
the horse-power of their surface engines 2,500. The surface and
submerged speed is 18 knots and 9 knots respectively. Their armament
consists of six torpedo tubes with eight _Schneider_ torpedoes. The
complement is about 30 officers and men.

The natural adroitness with which Japanese sailors manipulate
complicated machinery, combined with their absolute fearlessness, make
them ideal for torpedo work.

-----

Footnote 4:

  It is very doubtful if these two boats were delivered before the
  outbreak of war.




                               CHAPTER VI

                           GERMAN SUBMARINES


On “The Day”—August 4th, 1914—Germany possessed 30 submarine
torpedo-boats. These were divided into three flotillas, with their
headquarters at Kiel, the largest and most modern vessels being attached
to the Heligoland or North Sea Flotilla. During 1913, although 24
submarines were stated as being in commission, only about 15 were
actively employed, and these mostly in training reserves, the older
boats being docked and modernized where possible. But during the year
six new vessels were added to the flotilla and the _personnel_ of the
submarine service was largely increased. At the same time the inspection
of submarines was separated from that of the other torpedo-boats and a
flag-officer was appointed as head of the submarine branch of the Naval
Service, with headquarters at Kiel. Thus when the hour came for the
great struggle which was to decide the mastery of the seas the whole
German Flotilla of 30 vessels, _with a reserve of six new boats which
had been secretly hurried forward and were rapidly nearing completion_,
was ready to put to sea.

The German Naval Law provided for the construction of 72 submarines by
the end of 1917. All the vessels built up to the present time have been
known as the “U” class and numbered in rotation. They are painted a
brownish-grey colour and have high collier-like bows with massive
armoured conning-towers and long superstructures amounting to narrow
decks. They have all been built at either Kiel or Dantzig.

Although the first submarine boats built for the German Navy were two
vessels of the Nordenfeldt type, launched in 1890, they were never
actively employed with the fleet and have long since been reduced to
scrap-iron, and the first vessel which can now be reckoned as a fighting
unit of the German torpedo-boat flotilla was a vessel designated the
“U.1.” This was built at the Germania Shipyard, Kiel, and launched on
August 30th, 1905. This was the forerunner of the “U” class, which in
most of the essential features resembles the British Improved Holland
type.


                                  U.1.

                           (Completed 1905.)

This U.1 was built as an experimental boat by the famous firm of Krupps.
She has a surface displacement of 197 tons, a submerged displacement of
236 tons, and her heavy-oil surface engines are of 250 H.-P. The
electric motors for submerged use develop just over 100 H.-P. The speed
ranges from 10 knots an hour on the surface to 7 knots when submerged,
and her surface range of action is about 700 to 800 miles. The armament
consists of one bow torpedo tube and three (17.7) Schwartzkopf torpedoes
are carried. The complement is nine officers and men.

The trials of the U.1 extended over a period of a year and a half, and
all proved remarkably satisfactory. During the tests which took place in
Eckernforder Bay she succeeded, twice in succession, in torpedoing a
moving target while travelling submerged at full speed.

The uncertainty displayed for some years previous by the German Naval
Authorities regarding the value of submarine boats gave place to a
thorough sense of the important part these “mighty atoms” would play in
future naval warfare, and to a strong determination that the German Navy
should include a powerful submarine flotilla.


                                U.2-U.8.

                          (Completed 1907‒10.)

These seven vessels were great improvements on the U.1. Their
displacement is 210 tons on the surface and about 250 tons when
submerged. They are fitted with Krupp-Nuremburg heavy-oil engines of 400
H.-P. and electric motors of 160 H.-P. Their speed on the surface is 12
knots and 8 knots when submerged. The surface range of action is 1,000
miles and the submerged endurance about three hours at full speed. Their
armament consists of two bow torpedo tubes and four torpedoes are
carried. The complement is eleven officers and men.


                              U.9-U.18.[5]

                          (Completed 1910‒12.)

These ten vessels are of increased size and power, their submerged
displacement being 300 tons, and the horse-power of their heavy oil
surface engines is 600. The electric motors develop 200 H.-P. The
surface and submerged speeds are 13 knots and 8 knots respectively. The
surface range of action is 1,500 miles, and the armament consists of two
bow and one stern torpedo tube with five torpedoes. The U.13 and
subsequent vessels of this class are provided with a quick-firing,
high-angle gun for defence against aircraft, and have sleeping
accommodation for the crew. They may be termed the first German
sea-going submarines. Their complement is twenty officers and men.


                             U.19 AND U.20.

                          (Completed 1912‒13.)

There are only two vessels in this class owing to the adoption of
certain improvements with the aid of which a partly new type has been
evolved. These two vessels have a displacement when submerged of 450
tons. Their oil engines of 650 H.-P. give a speed of 13 ½ knots an hour
on the surface, and their electric motors of 300 H.-P. give 8 knots an
hour when submerged. Their surface range of action is 2,000 miles, and
their armament consists of two bow and one stern torpedo tube with six
torpedoes, and two 14-pdr. quick-firing, high-angle guns on disappearing
mountings. The complement is seventeen officers and men.


                               U.21-U.24.

                          (Completed 1912‒13.)

These four vessels are the first of the new type of large sea-going
submarines for the German Navy. Their submerged displacement is 800
tons. They are propelled on the surface by heavy-oil engines of 1,200
H.-P., and when submerged by electric motors of 500 H.-P. Their speed
above water is 14 knots an hour and below the surface 9 knots. The
surface range of action is 3,000 miles and the submerged endurance 120
miles at economical speed. Their armament consists of two bow and two
stern torpedo tubes with eight torpedoes, and one 14-pdr. quick-firing
gun and two 1-pdr. high-angle guns, all on disappearing mountings, for
defence against hostile destroyers and aircraft. Their complement is
twenty-five officers and men.


                               U.25-U.30.

                          (Completed 1913‒14.)

These six vessels are the latest additions to the German submarine
flotilla. They are vessels of 900 tons submerged displacement with
heavy-oil engines of 2,000 H.-P., and electric motors of 900 H.-P. Their
surface and submerged speed is 18 knots and 10 knots, respectively. The
surface cruising range is 4,000 miles. Their armament consists of two
bow and two stern torpedo tubes, with eight large size torpedoes, and,
in addition, two 14-pdr. quick-firing guns and two 1-pdr. high-angle
guns. They have wireless telegraphic apparatus on board, and are
specially constructed with long superstructures and high _collier-like_
bows to enable them to keep at sea in almost any weather. They are
fitted with two or three periscopes, and also possess a small _look-out_
cap on the top of the lofty conning-tower to facilitate an “awash”
attack in the half-lights of dawn and dusk, when the periscope is almost
useless. The conning-towers and decks are armoured. Their complement is
30 to 35 officers and men.


                               U.31-U.36.

                              (Building.)

These are the six vessels which are rapidly nearing completion, and
which were in a much more advanced state, at the opening of hostilities,
than was generally known in foreign naval circles. They are the same in
almost every respect as the vessels U.25 to U.30. There is, however,
another submarine being built for Germany of a totally different design.
This is the F.I.A.T. or _Laurenti_ boat (Italian), laid down at the
beginning of 1914. This vessel is very similar to the four “S” boats
being built at Greenock for the British Navy.

No German submarines have in the past been sent to any Colonial or
oversea station. Therefore, the whole flotilla of 30 to 36 vessels was
immediately available for operations in the North Sea and Baltic when
war began. The _personnel_ of the whole torpedo service is very
efficient, great attention having been paid to this branch of the Navy.
The three German Submarine flotillas have their headquarters at Kiel,
Wilhelmshaven, and Heligoland.

-----

Footnote 5:

  The U.18 was sunk by a British patrol in November, 1914.




                              CHAPTER VII

                          AUSTRIAN SUBMARINES


At the commencement of the War the Austro-Hungarian Navy included six
submarines in the active flotilla and five others were being _completed_
at the Germania Yard, Kiel, but it is doubtful if they had been
delivered. In which event they must be added to the strength of the
German flotilla. In addition to these, several larger vessels, mostly of
the latest “U” or Krupp design, had been ordered, but were not expected
to take their place in the active flotillas before the end of 1915.

Austria commenced the formation of a submarine flotilla in 1908 by the
acquisition of two vessels of the _Improved Holland type_ from Messrs.
Vickers Ltd., and two others of the American _Lake type_. In the
following year two more submarines were ordered, this time from Krupp’s
Germania Yard. All these vessels were delivered during 1910, and
Austria’s first submarine flotilla came into being.


                              U.1 AND U.2.

                           (Completed 1910.)

These two vessels are of the American Lake type. They have a submerged
displacement of 250 tons and petrol surface motors of 720 H.-P. Their
speed is 12 knots on the surface and 8 knots when submerged. The
armament consists of two bow and one stern torpedo tube. This type of
submarine has three special features which distinguish it from all
others. It is fitted with a kind of underframe and wheels, and is
designed to travel in four different positions: (1) on the surface; (2)
semi-submerged, with only a look-out cowl above water; (3) submerged,
with nothing but the periscope showing; (4) totally submerged and
running along the sea-bed on wheels, like a submarine motor car. It is
drawn down from the surface to the sea-bed by an ingenious system of
wire-hawsers and drop-weights, which can be released in the event of
accident. A “diving chamber” enables members of the crew to don
diving-dresses and leave the submarine when on the sea-bed, for the
purpose of laying or destroying submerged mines. The Lake type of
submarine is also used in the Russian Navy.[6]


                              U.3 AND U.4.

                           (Completed 1910.)

These two vessels are of the Krupp design, and have a submerged
displacement of 300 tons. The horse-power of their heavy-oil surface
engines is 600. The electric motors develop 200 H.-P. The surface and
submerged speeds are 13 knots and 8 knots respectively. The surface
range of action is 1,500 miles, and the armament consists of two bow and
one stern tube with five 18-inch torpedoes. Their complement is fifteen
officers and men.


                              U.5 AND U.6.

                           (Completed 1910.)

These are submarines of the Improved Holland type. Their submerged
displacement is about 316 tons; length 135 feet, and beam 13 ½ feet. The
horse-power of the petrol engines is 600 and that of the electric
engines 189. The speed averages 12 knots on the surface and 8 knots when
submerged. The surface cruising range is 1,300 knots at 10 knots an
hour. Their armament consists of two bow tubes with four to six 18-inch
Whitehead torpedoes. Their complement is sixteen officers and men.


                               U.7-U.11.

                  (Completed 1914. Delivery doubtful.)

These five vessels are of the Krupp-Germania type, and are similar to
those completed for the German Navy in 1912‒13. They are large sea-going
submarines with a submerged displacement of 800 tons. They are propelled
on the surface by heavy-oil engines of 1,200 H.-P., and when submerged,
by electric motors of 500 H.-P. Their speed is 14 knots and 9 knots,
above and below, respectively. The surface range of action is 3,000
miles, and the submerged endurance 120 miles at economical speed.

Their armament consists of two bow and two stern torpedo tubes, with
eight torpedoes, and one 14-pdr. quick-firing gun and two 1-pdr.
high-angle guns, for defence against hostile destroyers and air-craft.
Their complement is twenty-five officers and men.

One or two Austrian submarines are supposed to have been sunk by the
Allied Fleet during the first few weeks of the war, but exactly which
vessels they were is not known.

Several other submarines have been ordered in foreign countries for the
Austrian Navy, but cannot be delivered while the war lasts.


            SUBMARINE FLOTILLAS OF NEUTRAL EUROPEAN POWERS.

          COUNTRY. │    VESSELS BUILT.   │ VESSELS BUILDING.
         ──────────┬─────────────────────┬────────────────────
         Italy     │ 20 (100‒300 tons)   │ 8 (large size)
         Denmark   │  9 (100‒300 tons)   │ several
         Holland   │  6 (100‒300 tons)   │ 4 (large)
         Sweden    │  7 (150‒300 tons)   │ 3 (large)
         Greece    │  2 (Laubeuf)        │     ――
         Norway    │  1    ――            │ 4 (Germania)
         Portugal  │  1    ――            │ 3   ――
         Turkey    │ ――                  │ 3   ――
         Spain     │ ――                  │ 3   ――
         ──────────┴─────────────────────┴────────────────────

-----

Footnote 6:

  “Submarine Engineering of To-day.” By Charles W. Domville-Fife.
  (London: Seeley, Service & Co. Ltd. 1914).




                              CHAPTER VIII

                          SUBMARINES IN ACTION


Submarines have two great advantages over all types of surface warships;
they can become invisible at will—or sufficiently invisible to make gun
or torpedo-practice, except at very close quarters, almost entirely
useless—and they can, by sinking, cover themselves with armour-plate of
sufficient thickness to be absolutely shell-proof. These are the two
main points in favour of the submarine. There are, however, many minor
features. Although submarines are known in the naval services as
“daylight torpedo-boats,” for their _greatest_ value lies in their
ability to perform the same task in the “light” as the ordinary surface
torpedo-boats and destroyers can do under cover of darkness or fog—that
of creeping up close to an enemy, and launching a torpedo
unobserved—they have been given, during recent years, so much greater
speed, armament, and range of action, that they can no longer be looked
upon as small boats just suitable for daylight torpedo attack in
favourable circumstances. Their surface speed has been increased from 10
to 20 knots, making them almost as fast as the surface torpedo-boat.
This, combined with manœuvering powers and general above-water
invisibility, has enabled them to take over the duty of the surface
torpedo-boat—that of delivering night-attacks on the surface. After
nightfall a submarine attack is almost impossible owing to the
periscope—the eyes of the submarine—being useless in the dark.

The increase in the armament of the submarine—from the single bow
torpedo tube with two torpedoes of short range and weak explosive
charge, to the four bow and two stern tubes with eight or ten torpedoes
of long range and high explosive charge—has greatly increased their
chances of successful attack on surface warships, first, by giving them
four or six shots ahead, then the possibility, in the event of all these
torpedoes missing, of a dive under the object of attack, and two more
shots at close range from the stern tubes (still retaining two
torpedoes); and, secondly, by increasing the distance from which the
first projectile can be launched, owing to the increased range of the
modern torpedo. There are also the advantages derived from the battery
of quick-firing guns installed on the decks of modern submarines.
Although at the present time these guns are only of small power they
nevertheless afford a means of defence—and even of attack under
favourable circumstances—against hostile surface torpedo-boats,
destroyers, and air-craft. In fact, a flotilla of submarines could
undoubtedly now give a very good account of itself if attacked either on
the surface or when submerged by one or two prowling destroyers. The
increase in the power of the guns carried by submarines, which will
certainly come soon, will enable this type of craft to take up the
additional duties of the destroyer—that of clearing the seas of hostile
torpedo-boats and carrying out advanced scouting—for which work their
ability to travel submerged and in a state of invisibility for distances
of over 100 miles makes them eminently suitable.

The enormous increase in the size and range of action of submarines,
combined with the improvements effected in the surface cruising
qualities, have enabled these vessels to be taken from the “nursery” of
harbour and coast defence and placed with the sea-going flotillas and
battle-fleets. In the short period of ten years the tonnage of
submarines has risen from 100 to over 1,000 tons, and the range of
action from 400 miles at economical speed to 5,000 miles. Exactly what
this means is more easily realized when it is stated that the earlier
types of submarines could scarcely cross the English Channel and return
without taking in supplies of fuel, and in rough weather were forced to
remain in harbour, whereas the modern vessel can go from England to
Newfoundland _and back_ without assistance, and can remain at sea in
almost any weather, as was first demonstrated by the successful voyage
of the British submarines A.E.1 and A.E.2 to Australia, and has since
been proved by the operations of the British submarine flotilla in the
North Sea.

In addition to the cruising range there is, however, the question of
habitability. In this respect the progress has been equally as rapid. In
the older boats no sleeping accommodation was provided for the crew, and
food supplies and fresh water sufficient only for a few days were
carried. In the latest British, French and German vessels proper
sleeping and messing accommodation is provided, and supplies of all
kinds and in sufficient quantity to last a month are carried. Although
work on these craft is still very cramping for the crew, the increase in
the deck space and in the surface buoyancy has greatly minimised the
discomforts of service in the submarine flotilla.

With regard to safety, it has already been shown that a submarine is
only held below the surface by the power of her engines and the action
of the water on her diving-rudders. This means that in the event of
anything going wrong _inside_ the vessel she would automatically rise to
the surface; but should the hull be pierced in any way, either by shot
or by collision, and an overwhelming inrush of water result—overcoming
the buoyancy quickly obtained by blowing out the water-ballast
tanks—then the vessel must inevitably sink, and the question of whether
or not the crew can save themselves becomes a problem to which no
definite answer can be given, although a special means is provided in
all modern vessels belonging to the British Navy. Speaking generally, it
may, however, be said that if the disaster occurs suddenly, and the
vessel sinks into very deep water rapidly, the chances of life-saving
are extremely small; but if the water is comparatively shallow, as along
the coast (100 to 150 feet), the likelihood of many of the crew being
able to save themselves with the aid of the _special escape helmets and
air-locks_ is fairly good.

We now come to the most important improvement made in the fighting
qualities of these vessels since first they came into being, viz. the
wonderful increase in the surface and submerged speed. In the older
craft the surface speed did not exceed 8 to 10 knots an hour, whereas it
now amounts to 16 to 20 knots, and the submerged speed has risen from 5
knots to 10 to 12 knots. It is a little difficult for any but a naval
man to realize exactly what this increase in the speed of submarines
really means, and it is equally as difficult to adequately describe it
here in non-technical language. It is a mere platitude to say that in
order to attack a surface warship the submarine must first get within
torpedo range of it; and yet it is on this very point that the strategy
and tactics of submarine warfare revolve. A clever naval tactician once
described the submarine as a “handicapped torpedo-boat.” The two points
on which he based this opinion were—the (then) slow speed of these
vessels compared with that of the surface warship, and its almost total
blindness when submerged. These two defects were for some years the
principal drawbacks of all the submarines afloat; but since that naval
expert pronounced submarines to be “handicapped torpedo-boats,” great
changes, great improvements have been made. The speed of the submarine
has increased by over 100 per cent., and they have been given longer and
wider range of vision by the introduction of two and three improved
periscopes instead of one elementary instrument. Nevertheless, the speed
difficulty is still a very real one, as will readily be seen when it is
taken into consideration that the speed of a submarine when attacking
submerged is frequently only half, or even a third, of that of her
enemy. In order to more clearly illustrate this and lift for a moment
the veil of secrecy which enshrouds the methods of attack adopted by
this type of craft, it will be necessary to describe what is known as
the_ right-angle attack_.


                       ATTACKING AT RIGHT ANGLES.

The difficulty of attacking a surface warship steaming at right angles
to the course of the submarine will be clearly understood by referring
to the following diagrams. The first shows an attack on a warship
travelling at 20 miles an hour, such as a big battleship or a cruiser
Any increase in the speed of the surface vessel not only adds to the
difficulty of the attacking submarine, but also the direction from which
the attack must be made. This feature is shown in the second diagram,
which illustrates a submarine attack on a vessel steaming at 30 miles an
hour, such as a fast destroyer or fleet scout. On the other hand, a
decrease in the speed of the on-coming surface vessel tends to either
make easier the task of the attacking submarine, or else to increase the
distance from which the attack can be delivered. This is shown in the
third diagram, which assumes the speed of the surface vessel to be only
15 miles an hour, such as a merchantman, troopship, food-ship, collier,
or old warship.

[Illustration:

  RIGHT-ANGLE ATTACK BY SUBMARINES.
]

FIG. 1 represents a submarine attacking a hostile warship (or fleet)
steaming at 20 (statute) miles an hour. “A” is the line of vision. The
submarine sights the warship at a distance of just over 11 miles on her
port bow. “B” shows the hostile vessel’s course, which is 10 miles to
point marked “C,” and each division beyond equals 1 mile.

Directly the submarine, which is assumed to be lying in an _awash
condition_, sights the object of attack, she totally submerges and
steers forward at a speed of 10 miles an hour. The loss, and gain, of
the submarine on the different courses, can be seen in the table above
the chart.[7]

The spaces between the black dots show the most favourable points of
attack. It will be noticed in the table that both vessels are equal at
point “C,” but for many reasons this is not the best point of attack.
The gain of about six minutes on the longer course enables the submarine
not only to manœuvre into the best possible position for the attack, but
also to discharge more than one torpedo if necessary.

FIG. 2 shows the extreme limit at which a submarine could, with
reasonable chances of success, attack a destroyer, or other vessel,
steaming at 30 (statute) miles an hour, having sighted her at a distance
of 16 miles in the position shown by the line of vision “A.”

The distance to “C” is 15 miles for the surface vessel, and 5 miles for
the submarine. Here, again, the two vessels would be equal; but the most
favourable point of attack is shown by the two black dots—where the
submarine has gained two minutes.

FIG. 3.—The submarine sights the object of attack at a distance of 14 ¼
miles, in the position shown by the line of vision “A.” The surface
vessel has a speed of only 15 miles an hour (merchantman). In this case
the surface vessel accomplishes the 10-mile journey along course
“B”—arriving at point “C” 20 minutes in advance of the submarine. The
table shows how the submarine, by changing her course and “throwing” the
surface vessel on her beam, gradually reduces the loss, until, at the
point marked with the two black dots, she is but 4 ½ minutes behind. At
this distance she could fire her torpedoes at long range, with some
likelihood of success.

Although these charts show approximately the extreme limits of the
right-angle attack, a submarine could, of course, proceed for some
distance on the surface at a much faster speed; but considering the rate
at which the two vessels would be approaching each other, the submarine
which attempted it would run considerable risk of being detected, and
thus destroy her chances of a successful attack. Considering also the
time lost in sinking from the “light” to the totally submerged
condition, in coming to close quarters, the gain in speed would not
amount to as much as may at first seem probable.[8]

These charts are drawn and calculations made assuming the following
points:—

 (1)  The weather—fine and bright.

 (2)  Not taking into consideration strong tides, currents, etc.

 (3)  The enemy on the alert.

 (4)  Submarine waits at point “D” in an awash condition.

 (5)  Owing to 1, 2, and 3 above, the submarine travels from point “D”
        in all courses in a submerged condition.

The most favourable position for a submarine flotilla is to manœuvre
close up to a fleet at anchor, or to get within 1,000 yards of a
fleet—steaming across its course; but both of these ideal positions for
attack are extremely difficult to obtain, and consequently in all the
less favourable positions speed is the deciding factor. Strategems will
undoubtedly play an important part in submarine warfare. An example of
this has already been afforded when the German submarines resorted to
the dishonest trick of laying in wait behind a trawler engaged in laying
mines, over which _the flag of a neutral state_ had been hoisted as a
blind. This resulted in the loss of three British cruisers with over
1,000 lives. It would, however, be quite in accord with the rules of
_civilised_ warfare for a submarine to shelter behind a “decoy”; to
attack simultaneously with a seaplane; or to approach an enemy behind
one of its own merchant ships.


                           THE PORPOISE DIVE.

The manœuvre known as the “Porpoise Dive” is merely the sudden rising of
a submarine in order to enable her commander to get a better view of the
surface than that afforded by the periscope. The submarine on
approaching the object of attack rises quickly to the surface by the
action of her horizontal rudders, then dives again, only remaining above
water for a few seconds to enable her commander to get a glimpse of the
enemy, and to take bearings. The submarine can then get within
torpedo-range, with simply the tiny periscope projecting from the
surface. This manœuvre is now seldom necessary, owing to the long and
wide range of vision of the two or three periscopes fitted in modern
submarines.


                 DIFFICULTY OF THE FIXED TORPEDO TUBE.

With the exception of one or two vessels, which it would be unwise to
specify, all the submarines engaged in the present war have what are
called _fixed submerged tubes_. This means that the tubes from which the
torpedoes are discharged are fitted _inside_ the submarine _on a line
with the centre of the boat_, and cannot be moved or aimed in any way
apart from the boat itself. It therefore becomes necessary for the
submarine to be _aligned_ by the steering rudders on the object of
attack before the torpedoes can be discharged. In simpler vein,
torpedoes can only be fired by a submarine straight ahead or straight
astern. Hence a submarine, with a hostile warship coming up on its beam,
is compelled to turn and face its opponent (or turn its stern towards
her) before delivering an attack.


                 SUBMARINE FLOTILLA _v._ SURFACE FLEET.

It is absolutely necessary for submarines acting in company to have each
its allotted task; and for a wide space of water to be left between each
boat; as it is impossible, at present, for one submarine to know the
exact position of another when both vessels are submerged. Therefore, if
each boat was not previously instructed how to act, there would not only
be the likelihood of the greater portion of an attacking flotilla firing
their torpedoes at one or two vessels of the hostile fleet and allowing
the remainder either to escape or to keep up a heavy and dangerous fire
unmolested, but also of collision and of torpedoeing each other by
accident. There is no means of inter-communication between submarines
when submerged, and a battle between submarines is almost impossible.


                            SURPRISE ATTACK.

In this case invisibility is the element of success. Admiral Sir Cyprian
Bridge, G.C.B., in a letter to the Author once said: “When submerged the
concealment of the submarine is practically perfect. If she has not been
sighted up to the moment of diving, she will almost certainly reach,
unobserved, the point at which she can make her attack.” And this
opinion—shared for many years by all experts—has been amply proved in
the present war.

A submarine must, however, blend with the surrounding sea in its
ever-varying colours, lights and shades, in order that she may be as
invisible as possible when cruising on the surface. The French Naval
Authorities experimented off Toulon with a luminous paint of a sea-green
colour; but this, although causing the hull to be almost totally
invisible in certain weather, was found to be useless, as, on a bright
day with a blue sky, the green showed up clear against the bluish tint
of the surrounding sea. After many months of experimenting, a pale,
sea-green, non-luminous paint was chosen as the best colour for French
submarines. The British Admiralty also carried out a few experiments in
this direction, and came to the conclusion that a dull grey was the most
invisible shade. The German authorities decided in favour of a
grey-brown.

When travelling submerged, with only the thin periscopic tube above the
surface, it is almost impossible to detect the approach of a submarine
_before_ she gets within torpedo range; and when cruising on the surface
she is equally as invisible at a distance of a few miles. These
qualities enable the submarine in nearly all cases where her speed
permits, to effect a surprise attack on a hostile battleship or cruiser
_when not closely screened by fast destroyers_, whose duty it is to be
ever on the watch for submarines.

As to the tactics which would be employed by a submarine (or flotilla)
in attacking a hostile warship (or fleet), it is impossible to say, for,
like the impromptu attacks of all “mosquito craft,” the exact method, or
manœuvre, is arranged to suit the circumstances, and it is very seldom
that two such attacks are carried out alike. Generally speaking,
however, a hostile warship could be easily sighted, on a fairly clear
day, from the flying-bridge of a submarine at a distance of 10 miles;
but it would be practically impossible to detect the submarine from the
deck of a warship at that distance. On sighting her object of attack the
submarine would sink to the “awash” condition, and proceed for from 2 ½
to 5 miles, as might be deemed expedient. She would then submerge and
steer by her periscopes, each of which has a field of vision of 60
degrees. He would be a very keen look-out who would be able to detect
the few square inches of periscopic tube at a distance of three miles.
As this distance lessened, it might be advisable, if the sea was _very_
calm and if the object of attack was stationary, for the submarine to
slacken speed, so as to prevent any spray being thrown off by the
periscopic tube. Assuming, however, that the optical tube was seen by
the enemy, it would be extremely difficult to hit it with gun-fire at a
distance of one or two miles, or to damage the boat itself, which would
probably be immersed to a depth of 12 or 15 feet. At a distance of about
2,000 yards, or just over one mile, the submarine would discharge her
first torpedo, following it up with another at closer range from the
second bow tube. A rapid dive would then probably be necessary in order
to avoid the hail of shot which would plough up the waters around her.
If the first two torpedoes missed their mark the submarine might either
dive completely under the object of attack and then fire her stern tubes
at close range, or else manœuvre below the surface for an attack from
some other point.

One of the effects produced on fleets or individual warships in war time
by the ever present possibility of submarine attack is, however, that
they never remain at anchor or even stationary in an exposed position,
and seldom—if wise—proceed without destroyers as advance and flank
guards. These precautions double the difficulties of a successful
submarine attack.

-----

Footnote 7:

  As it is almost impossible for a submarine, when totally submerged, to
  steer a _perfectly_ straight course, the table above each chart shows
  the approximate average loss and gain on each mile. It must also be
  remembered that the submarine in actual practice need only reach the
  torpedo firing line.

Footnote 8:

  “Submarines of the World’s Navies.” By Charles W. Domville-Fife.
  (London: Francis Griffiths.)




                               CHAPTER IX

                         ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS


In all warfare, new weapons of attack are, sooner or later, met by new
methods of defence. The submarine and the aeroplane are at present the
only weapons against which there is no true means of defence, and yet
one is being used as an antidote for the other without, however, any
very striking success so far. The seaplane may be able to distinguish
the dark patch in the sea caused by the hull of the submarine _in clear
water_, but she cannot destroy it, neither can she signal the _exact_
locality to an accompanying destroyer flotilla, owing to the speed with
which seaplane and submarine pass over and under each other;
furthermore, in rough weather or in shallow muddy water no sign of the
submarine when submerged is visible from above. The great value of the
seaplane as an antidote for submarines lies, however, first in the fact
that the water of the open sea is usually clear, and the _submarine
shadow_ is visible from above, and, secondly, in the great speed of
these aircraft which enables them to quickly cover miles of sea in their
search for hostile submarines and to report their presence in a given
locality by wireless to all ships operating within range.

When the enormous superficial area of a zone of war, such as the North
Sea and English Channel, is duly considered, however, the difficulty in
quickly and reliably locating from the air the few scattered “submarine
shadows” will be easily realized. To make this method of locating
submarines even fairly reliable an enormous fleet of seaplanes would be
required. Again seaplanes do not, in themselves, constitute a means of
defence against submarine attack, they merely increase the likelihood of
detection, but, in actual warfare, it has now been proved that for every
submarine detected by seaplanes two others pass quite unobserved.

Many means of attack on submarines have been proposed; and no doubt some
of these, in certain cases, would prove effective; but none can be
relied upon. Therefore, one of the points in favour of the submarine
still remains without its antidote. This is the _moral effect_; for if
there is no absolutely reliable means of defence, there can be no
feeling of security for surface warships or merchant vessels when
anywhere within the danger zone of the submarine.

Let us now examine briefly what practical methods of defence a modern
warship has against submarine attacks. Great speed is undoubtedly a
surface ship’s most reliable defence; and when combined with a frequent
change of course, would greatly reduce the chances of a successful
under-water attack. Should hostile submarines be on the line of advance
they would not know whether to wait and chance the enemy approaching
within torpedo range or whether to run to starboard or port. This is, if
the surface warship was steaming in an erratic course—not a zigzag
course, for then it might be possible to estimate, within torpedo range,
the position of the ship at a given point if the “tacks” were regular.

Should submarines be seen approaching, a surface vessel would do well to
turn her stern to the attacking flotilla, presenting as small a target
as possible, and deflecting the torpedoes by her propeller race.

The escape of the Battle Cruiser _Queen Mary_ and the Light Cruiser
_Lowestoft_, during the action in the Heligoland Bight, as described in
the dispatch of Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., demonstrates what
may be done by the skilful use of the helm on surface warships to
frustrate submarine attacks. So interesting, and informative as to the
actual fighting between British warships and hostile submarines, in this
dispatch that I give it here in full. It should, however, be studied in
conjunction with the comprehensive report—the first in the history of
Naval warfare detailing submarine attack and reconnaissance—from
Commodore Roger J. B. Keyes, C.B., of the British submarines, given on
page 28.

                                                   “H.M.S. _Lion_,
                                                _1st September, 1914_.

 “SIR,—I have the honour to report that on Thursday, 27th August, at 5
 a.m., I proceeded with the First Battle Cruiser Squadron and First
 Light Cruiser Squadron in company, to rendezvous with the
 Rear-Admiral, _Invincible_.

 “At 4 a.m., 28th August, the movements of the Flotillas commenced as
 previously arranged, the Battle Cruiser Squadron and Light Cruiser
 Squadron supporting. The Rear-Admiral, _Invincible_, with _New
 Zealand_ and four Destroyers having joined my flag, the Squadron
 passed through the pre-arranged rendezvous.

 “At 8.10 a.m. I received a signal from the Commodore (T), informing me
 that the Flotilla was in action with the enemy. This was presumably in
 the vicinity of their pre-arranged rendezvous. From this time until 11
 a.m. I remained about the vicinity ready to support as necessary,
 intercepting various signals, which contained no information on which
 I could act.

 “At 11 a.m. the Squadron was attacked by three Submarines. The attack
 was frustrated by rapid manœuvring and the four Destroyers were
 ordered to attack them. Shortly after 11 a.m., various signals having
 been received indicating that the Commodore (T) and Commodore (S) were
 both in need of assistance, I ordered the Light Cruiser Squadron to
 support the Torpedo Flotillas.

 “Later I received a signal from the Commodore (T), stating that he was
 being attacked by a large Cruiser, and a further signal informing me
 that he was being hard pressed and asking for assistance. The Captain
 (D), First Flotilla, also signalled that he was in need of help.

 “From the foregoing the situation appeared to me critical. The
 Flotillas had advanced only ten miles since 8 a.m., and were only
 about twenty-five miles from two enemy bases on their flank and rear
 respectively. Commodore Goodenough had detached two of his Light
 Cruisers to assist some Destroyers earlier in the day, and these had
 not yet rejoined. (They rejoined at 2.30 p.m.). As the reports
 indicated the presence of many enemy ships—one a large Cruiser—I
 considered that his force might not be strong enough to deal with the
 situation sufficiently rapidly, so at 11.30 a.m. the Battle Cruisers
 turned to E.S.E., and worked up to full speed. It was evident that to
 be of any value the support must be overwhelming and carried out at
 the highest speed possible.

 “I had not lost sight of the risk of Submarines, and possible sortie
 in force from the enemy’s base, especially in view of the mist to the
 South-East.

 “Our high speed, however, made submarine attack difficult, and the
 smoothness of the sea made their detection comparatively easy. I
 considered that we were powerful enough to deal with any sortie except
 by a Battle Squadron, which was unlikely to come out in time, provided
 our stroke was sufficiently rapid.

 “At 12.15 p.m. _Fearless_ and First Flotilla were sighted retiring
 West. At the same time the Light Cruiser Squadron was observed to be
 engaging an enemy ship ahead. They appeared to have her beat.

 “I then steered N.E. to sounds of firing ahead, and at 12.30 p.m.
 sighted _Arethusa_ and Third Flotilla retiring to the Westward
 engaging a Cruiser of the _Kolberg_ class on our Port Bow. I steered
 to cut her off from Heligoland, and at 12.37 p.m. opened fire. At
 12.42 the enemy turned to N.E., and we chased at 27 knots.

 “At 12.56 p.m. sighted and engaged a two-funnelled Cruiser ahead.
 _Lion_ fired two salvoes at her, which took effect, and she
 disappeared into the mist, burning furiously and in a sinking
 condition. In view of the mist and that she was steering at high speed
 at right angles to _Lion_, who was herself steaming at 28 knots, the
 _Lion’s_ firing was very creditable.

 “Our Destroyers had reported the presence of floating mines to the
 Eastward and I considered it inadvisable to pursue her. It was also
 essential that the Squadrons should remain concentrated, and I
 accordingly ordered a withdrawal. The Battle Cruisers turned North and
 circled to port to complete the destruction of the vessel first
 engaged. She was sighted again at 1.25 p.m. steaming S.E. with colours
 still flying. _Lion_ opened fire with two turrets, and at 1.35 p.m.,
 after receiving two salvoes, she sank.

 “The four attached Destroyers were sent to pick up survivors, but I
 deeply regret that they subsequently reported that they searched the
 area but found none.

 “At 1.40 p.m. the Battle Cruisers turned to the Northward, and _Queen
 Mary_ was again attacked by a Submarine. The attack was avoided by the
 use of the helm. _Lowestoft_ was also unsuccessfully attacked. The
 Battle Cruisers covered the retirement until nightfall. By 6 p.m., the
 retirement having been well executed and all Destroyers accounted for,
 I altered course, spread the Light Cruisers, and swept northwards in
 accordance with the Commander-in-Chief’s orders. At 7.45 p.m. I
 detached _Liverpool_ to Rosyth with German prisoners, seven officers
 and 79 men, survivors from _Mainz_. No further incident occurred.—I
 have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient Servant.

                                            “(Signed) DAVID BEATTY,
                                                         “Vice-Admiral.
                                  “The Secretary of the Admiralty.”

Quick-firing guns of the 3-inch and 6-inch type are certainly the best
weapons for an attack on submarines. In combination with “sharp
look-outs,” they could be used with effect from the elevated positions
on the fore part of warships. The periscopic-tube of the submarine
always proves a target for gun-fire; but a grey steel tube, 3 inches in
diameter, at a distance of 1,000 yards requires “excellent” marksmanship
to hit. That it can be done is proved by the sinking of the German
submarine U.15 by the British Cruiser _Birmingham_ in the North Sea. The
effect of a shot carrying away the periscope is to blind the submarine,
at least in one eye, she can then be _run-down_ by the surface warship
or destroyed by rapid gun-fire at close range.

Of course, if submarines were caught napping on the surface the guns of
surface warships could quickly sink them; but another incident, similar
to that which opened the naval engagements of the Russo-Japanese War,
cannot be looked for in the naval engagements to come.

For a fleet engaged in bombarding or blockading, one of the best methods
of defence would be to lower the torpedo nets, not close round each
vessel, but suspended from “picket-boats” at a distance from the
bombarding or blockading fleet. “Picketing” is also considered a good
defence during daylight, but neither of these methods are reliable. A
submarine might be able to dive unobserved under, or past, the
destroyers acting as pickets, and it is this chance which causes these
under-water craft to be a source of constant anxiety.

The torpedo-boat destroyer should prove a nasty enemy to the submarine.
In warfare it is the duty of these 30-knot vessels to look after their
under-water opponents.

It has been suggested that internal armour could be fitted to warships
below the water-line, which would render the hulls able to withstand
mine or torpedo explosions. At present this is practically impossible,
as the great weight of this additional armour, combined with the
ever-increasing size of guns and weight of above-water protection, would
necessitate a vessel of such enormous displacement as to be quite
impossible, if the important factor—high speed—has also to be
maintained.

The defence of harbours against submarines is a problem which does not
present nearly so many difficulties as the defence of moving ships.
Portsmouth, for example, is closed by means of a submarine boom-defence,
which is stretched across the mouth of the harbour. The entrance to the
River Elbe (leading to the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal) is effectively closed
to British submarines by boom-defences, mines, and submerged wire
entanglements. Narrow waterways, such as the Straits of Dover, can be
closed by the laying of contact-mines, and even broader seas can be made
dangerous to submarines by the same method. An example of this is
afforded by the laying of a British mine-field somewhere between the
Goodwin Sands and the Dutch Coast, to prevent German submarines from
penetrating into the English Channel.

There are so many reliable means of defending harbours and narrow
waterways against submarines that it is unnecessary to say anything
further here. But to protect moving ships at sea, under all conditions,
certainly presents a most profound puzzle.




                               CHAPTER X

                         THE SUBMARINE TORPEDO


The submarine torpedo has become one of the principal naval arms. Not
only does it supply the chief offensive power of the submarine, the
torpedo-boat and the destroyer, but it is also carried as a separate
arm, with a special highly-trained crew, by almost every warship afloat.
At the beginning of hostilities the Naval Powers engaged owned
considerably over 80,000 of these weapons, and _one_ factory in England
alone can make them at the rate of two a day. During the first few weeks
of the _Great War_ the torpedo was responsible for the sinking of
warships to the value of over one million sterling. Had the German Fleet
been on the high seas instead of in harbour and protected from torpedo
raids by carefully-prepared submarine defences, there is little doubt
but what several more of the enemy’s ships would have been sunk by this
weapon. The fact that at first the British light cruisers suffered
rather heavily—though in total loss of ships and men less than the
German Navy—does not point to any advantage derived either from the type
of torpedo used or from skill in this mode of warfare possessed by the
Germans, but clearly to the timidity of the German main fleet, which was
at the very beginning of hostilities withdrawn from the zone of war and
placed behind fortifications, where it was safe from torpedo attack. The
British Fleet, true to the policy of “attack and not defence,” began
operations the moment war was declared, with results so brilliantly
successful, and of such far-reaching and world-wide importance, that
enumeration is well-nigh impossible. But while all these operations were
in progress the British Fleet was more or less exposed to torpedo attack
by any hostile submarines or fast surface craft which might succeed in
getting past the cordon of protecting destroyers, while the German Fleet
was safe, but ignominiously impotent. That the naval losses of Great
Britain, with all her fleets at sea, have not been far greater than they
have is in itself a victory of the greatest magnitude—a victory due
entirely to consummate naval skill.

The modern torpedo varies in length from 14 to 19 feet, and weighs up to
half a ton. It has an extreme range of 4,000 yards, or just over 2 ¼
miles. There are three types of torpedoes in use by the fleets at war.
The British use the _Whitehead Torpedo_, the French the Whitehead and
the _Schneider_, the Russians and the Japanese use the Whitehead; the
Germans have a type of their own, known as the _Schwartzkopf_, and the
Austrian arm is principally the Whitehead. All these types are alike in
their essential features, and therefore need not be described
separately.

The latest pattern 18-inch Whitehead torpedo is propelled by compressed
air stored in that section of the weapon known as the _air-chamber_ (see
diagram). The air on being released is heated and expanded in a tiny
three or four-cylinder engine which operates twin screws, moving
“clockwise” and “anti-clockwise.” The “war-head” contains about 200
pounds of wet gun-cotton which is exploded on the torpedo striking an
object. The essential features of the Whitehead torpedo are shown in the
diagram.[9]

This torpedo maintains a speed of 42 knots for 1,000 yards, 38 knots for
2,000 yards, 32 knots for 3,000 yards, and 28 knots for 4,000 yards.
Thus, if discharged at a distance of half a mile it reaches its object
in about 45 seconds.

[Illustration:

 Sketch showing the essential parts of a Whitehead torpedo. _A._ Pistol,
 detonator, primer, which causes the explosion of “B” when the torpedo
 strikes an object. _B._ Explosive head, filled with wet gun-cotton.
 (The “war-head” is substituted by a weighty dummy during practice.)
 _C._ Air chamber with compressed air, at a pressure of approximately
 1350 lbs. per square inch, for action. The chamber is tested to stand a
 pressure of 1700 lbs. per square inch. _D._ Balance chamber, containing
 mechanism for regulating the depth of submergence at which the torpedo
 is adjusted to run. _E._ Engine-room, containing propelling machinery
 (I.H.P. 60 in latest 18-in. type). _F._ Buoyancy chamber—a practically
 empty chamber—to give the necessary buoyancy to the torpedo. _G._
 Gyroscope. An instrument for correcting any deviation of the torpedo
 from the line of fire. _H._ Rudders, and mechanism for operating. _I._
 Twin-screws, operating “clockwise” and “anti-clockwise.”

]

Torpedoes are fired—or ejected—into the sea from surface or submerged
tubes, and on striking the water are propelled by their own engines in
an absolutely straight course towards the target. The exact mechanism of
the submerged tube—which is used in surface warships as well as in
submarines—is a naval secret. When fired from a surface tube the torpedo
sinks immediately to a depth of about 10 to 14 feet, and maintains this
depth until it strikes its object. When fired from a submerged tube it
rises—if necessary—to the same level. A torpedo always proceeds towards
its object of attack at a depth of a few feet below the surface. This,
combined with speed, renders it almost impossible to destroy an
approaching torpedo by gun-fire. So marvellous is the mechanism of these
little weapons that in anything like favourable circumstances they may
be _depended upon_, if well aimed, to strike within a yard or two of the
spot aimed at. This accuracy is due almost entirely to the gyroscope,
which, briefly described, is a rotating wheel automatically controlling
the torpedo’s course.

Although for many years torpedoes have been carried by nearly all types
of service warships, none of them were really ideal for this kind of
warfare. A new field for the torpedo was, however, opened out by the
introduction of the submarine boat. In order to be effective the torpedo
must be discharged from a distance under 4,000 yards—preferably from a
point less than half this distance from the object of attack. This means
that the vessel carrying the torpedo would have to get within a mile, or
at least a mile and a-half, of her object of attack before discharging a
torpedo. For a surface vessel to accomplish this in the face of a heavy
cannonade from quick-firing guns would be extremely risky. To make a
quick rush to close quarters, if possible, by several vessels from
different points, was the only chance of delivering a successful torpedo
attack on a hostile warship; unless, of course, she was favoured by fog
or darkness _at the right moment_—favourable conditions which would
seldom obtain in actual warfare. Again, every increase in the speed of
the big surface warship rendered the task of the ordinary torpedo-boat
and destroyer more difficult because in the event of a threatened attack
the larger vessel would make use of her speed to keep out of torpedo
range while her powerful guns were repelling the attacking torpedo-boat.

The _hour_ of the torpedo came with the _perfection_ of the
submarine. All the conditions of an ideal torpedo-boat were
fulfilled—_invisibility_ rendering daylight attacks possible;
_almost perfect immunity from gun-fire_ enabling the torpedo to be
discharged at closer range; _submerged discharge_ removing the
likelihood of the weapon being exploded by accurate gun-fire before
being discharged; _speed on the surface_ enabling the “carrying”
vessel to manœuvre for position; _moderate speed when submerged_
enabling an attack under all reasonably tactical conditions; and
_comparatively large displacement_ giving good cruising qualities,
wide range of action, and enabling a large number of torpedoes and
tubes being carried.

-----

Footnote 9:

  “Submarines of the World’s Navies,” By Charles W. Domville-Fife.
  (London: Francis Griffiths.)




                               CHAPTER XI

                            SUBMARINE MINES


If the Russo-Japanese war was the first to fully demonstrate the value
of the explosive mine, the Great European Conflict has certainly brought
this weapon to the forefront in the rapidly growing science of submarine
warfare. During the first few weeks of the naval fighting several
warships, beginning with H.M.S. _Amphion_, and many merchant vessels
representing millions of pounds sterling, were destroyed by these
weapons. Had it not been for the foresight of the British Admiralty in
providing a very large fleet of mine-sweepers, aided by seaplanes, there
can be no doubt but what the shipping of all countries—neutrals and
belligerents alike—would have suffered far greater losses.

[Illustration: LAUNCHING A GERMAN TROTYL MINE.]

[Illustration:

  A GERMAN SUBMARINE TROTYL MINE ON THE DECK OF A MINE-LAYER.

  These mines contain the famous T.N.T., or Trotyl explosive.
]

The indiscriminate scattering of mines across the trade routes, as
carried on by Germany immediately on the outbreak of war, and before
hardly any of the ships at sea belonging to neutral countries could be
warned to avoid the zone of operations, has never before been so
ruthlessly resorted to by a big civilised power.

The system of defence consists of the mooring of these mines in such
positions as to make it almost impossible for hostile ships to pass
without either striking or coming within the destructive zone of one or
more of them. What are known as _floating mines_ are those set adrift to
be washed about by the tide. They explode immediately on being struck by
a passing vessel, and, of course, do not discriminate between friend and
foe. The systems of destroying hostile mine-fields consist of
_counter-mining_, or placing other mines in the enemy’s field and
destroying it by their explosion, and by _sweeping_. The latter method
is the one mostly employed in modern warfare. The boats taking part in
the _sweep_ place themselves one on each side of the mine-field, and
between them hangs a long wire rope, weighted in the centre to keep it
well submerged. They then move forward, sweeping the mines to the
surface or exploding them harmlessly. It is, however, very dangerous but
highly necessary work.

There are two kinds of submarine mines, one is designed to explode on
being struck by a passing vessel, and is called a _contact mine_, and
the other is fired from the shore by an electric current, and is known
as an _observation mine_. The explosive principally used is wet
gun-cotton or Trotyl, owing not only to the safety with which they can
be stored and manipulated, but also to the fact that they seldom explode
in sympathy with neighbouring mines, requiring to be actually fired. The
importance of this will be more fully realised when it is remembered
that in warfare it is often necessary to explode certain mines over
which hostile ships are endeavouring to pass, while leaving others in
fairly close proximity intact, ready to repel a second invasion or to
destroy ships nearer to them. The actual explosion is caused by an
electric current, either from the shore or from a battery in the mine
itself, causing the detonation of fulminate of mercury in conjunction
with a small priming charge of dry gun-cotton. Mines are often laid in a
series, connected to a battery on the sea-bed in the centre of the line
of defence.

The _observation mine_ is mostly used for defending the approaches to
harbours, as an observer on shore can watch the movements of hostile
warships and explode each mine when the vessel passes over it. _Contact
mines_, on the other hand, are used wherever an enemy’s fleet is likely
to pass. They are anchored to the sea-bed by means of a cable and heavy
weight, and are allowed to float a few feet below the surface. They
explode immediately on contact. At times an unscrupulous or demoralised
enemy will simply throw a number of these mines overboard and allow them
to float at the mercy of wind and tide. They then become a terrible
danger to the shipping of all nations, as once they are left unwatched
it is extremely difficult to tell with any degree of certainty where
they will eventually proclaim their presence by devastating explosions.
Happily for the whole seafaring world, this method is seldom resorted
to, as mines set adrift in this way become a danger to both friend and
foe. In the Russo-Japanese war several ships were destroyed by their own
mines.

There are many different kinds of submarine mines, both of the
observation and the contact type. Some are spherical in shape and others
cylindrical. Some are moored close down to the sea-bed with a very heavy
explosive charge (200‒500 lbs. of gun-cotton), and have a small buoyant
globe floating above them, which, when struck, fires the mine below.
Others, known as secret-mines, are kept continually moored in the
waterways leading to important naval harbours, and are only allowed to
rise sufficiently high from the sea-bed to be struck by passing vessels
in times of emergency. The type most generally used is, however, the
ordinary _offensive contact mine_, which contains a powerful explosive
charge and is anchored in the path of hostile warships. These mines are
usually automatically sown in large numbers over a wide area of sea by
the mine-laying fleets.




                              CHAPTER XII

                           MINE-LAYING FLEETS


The _regular_ mine-laying fleets of the powers at war are composed of
the following vessels, all of which are fitted with special apparatus
for the work. Submarine mines can, however, be laid by any vessel, and
it is therefore almost impossible to say exactly what ships are engaged
in this work. Both Germany and Austria have converted a large number of
their merchantmen into mine-layers. England, in reply, has converted a
large number of small steamers into _mine-sweepers_. Russia is a strong
believer in explosive mines, and has strewn the gulfs of Finland and
Riga with them. Japan, being on the offensive, is employing more
mine-sweepers than layers. France has an elaborate system of submarine
mine defence for all her important harbours, and maintains a small fleet
at each base, known as the “defence mobile.” These vessels are all
capable of both mine-laying and sweeping.

The submarine mine is primarily the defence of the weaker naval power,
and therefore a fleet acting on the defensive, either temporarily or
permanently, requires more mine-layers than mine-sweepers, but the
reverse is naturally the case with a fleet acting on the offensive.
Although this may be taken as a general rule, it does not imply that a
strong naval power like Great Britain, whose policy is attack and not
defence, needs no mines or mine-layers. On the contrary, the laying of
_counter_ mines is one of the ways of destroying an enemy’s mine-field;
and even the strongest fleet cannot guard every portion of a long coast
line with many harbours exposed to attack. The judicious laying of
mine-fields will often prevent raids by hostile submarines and
torpedo-boats; and will limit the theatre of operations, as was done by
the British Navy in the southern portion of the North Sea in October,
1914. The axiom that a really strong navy needs to be strong in _every_
branch, therefore holds good in this, as in all other respects.


                          MINE-LAYING FLEETS.


                             GREAT BRITAIN.

 _Apollo._  _Thetis._  _Andromache._  _Latona._  _Naiad._  _Intrepid._
                             _Iphigenia._

These are all second class cruisers of from 3,400 to 3,600 tons, built
about 1891‒2, which have been converted into mine-layers. They are
equipped with a very large number of submarine explosive mines, which
can be automatically lowered into the water as the vessels steam along.
Their speed is about 15 knots, and their armament consists of four
4·7-inch quick-firing guns. Their complement is about 150 officers and
men.

[Illustration:

 _Photo, Cribb, Southsea._]

               THE BRITISH MINE-LAYER H.M.S. _IPHIGENIA_.

            The mine-dropping gear can be seen in the stern.

]


                                GERMANY.

  _Pelikan_ (1890).  _Nautilus_ (1906).  _Albatross_ (1907).  _Arkona_
                                (1903).

All these vessels, with the exception of the _Arkona_, which was a
protected cruiser, have been specially built for mine-laying work. Their
displacement is about 2,000 tons. The _Pelikan_ has a speed of 15 knots,
the _Albatross_ and _Nautilus_ of 20 knots, and the _Arkona_ of 21 ½
knots. They are all fitted with special gear for dropping the large
number of mines carried, and their armament consists of from four to
eight 21-pdr. quick-firing guns. Their complement is about 200 officers
and men.


                                AUSTRIA.

The Austro-Hungarian Navy possesses only one regular mine-laying
warship—the _Chamaleon_, which was being completed when war was
declared. She is a vessel of 1,800 tons displacement, with a speed of 20
knots. Her mine-launching gear is of the most modern and efficient type,
and she is armed with several quick-firing guns.

Since the beginning of hostilities Austria has converted several old
warships and merchantmen into mine-layers.


                           FRANCE AND RUSSIA.

Neither of these powers possess proper mine-laying vessels, but on the
outbreak of war several old warships and small merchant steamers were
used for that purpose.




                              CHAPTER XIII

                          MINE-SWEEPING FLEETS


For clearing away the mines dropped by an enemy special vessels are
employed. Each vessel is fitted on both sides with a curious contrivance
known as the “picking-up gear.” This apparatus is lowered into the
water, and “picks up” any mines which may lie in the path of an
on-coming fleet. When a mine-field is discovered by either destroyers or
seaplanes these vessels are immediately dispatched to destroy it; and
they are aided, in the case of the British Navy, by a large flotilla of
steam trawlers. Many of these auxiliary vessels are not fitted with the
_picking-up gear_, but go to work in pairs. Two vessels, connected
together by a long wire rope weighted in the centre to keep it
submerged, range themselves on each side of a mine-field, and by
steaming ahead in a parallel line sweep up the mines floating between
them. This process can be carried on simultaneously by a large number of
trawlers, covering a very wide area of sea. In the meantime the attached
destroyers and seaplanes can be searching for new fields. It often
happens during sweeping operations that mines are brought into contact
with each other and violent explosions occur. Sometimes the vessels
engaged in this hazardous work will themselves strike one of the mines,
but it is more often the _searching_ flotillas which meet with sudden
disaster in this way. Fully equipped mine-sweepers usually precede a
fleet of battleships and big cruisers through dangerous and narrow seas,
within the likely zone of hostile mines.

The British Mine-Sweeping Fleet comprises the following vessels:—_Circe_
(810 tons), _Jason_ (810 tons), _Speedy_ (810 tons), _Leda_ (810 tons),
_Gossamer_ (735 tons), _Seagull_ (735 tons), _Skipjack_ (735 tons), and
_Speedwell_ (735 tons).

These eight vessels are obsolete torpedo-gunboats which have been
specially fitted out for the work of mine-sweeping. There is also a
large flotilla of steam fishing trawlers engaged. Some of these vessels
were purchased by the Admiralty before the war, and were also equipped
for mine-sweeping; but many others were, by special arrangement, handed
over to the Navy on the outbreak of war. The whole of the mine-sweeping
fleet is manned by a special section of the Royal Naval Reserve, known
as the “Trawler Section,” which consists of about 142 _skippers_ and
1,136 men. This is, of course, in addition to the several thousand naval
sailors employed on the regular mine-sweepers, named above, and also to
those employed on the large number of additional small steamers taken
over for this work by the Admiralty at the commencement of hostilities.
It is estimated that the task of keeping the North Sea clear of mines
during the first four weeks of the Great War required over 100 vessels
and 5,000 sailors, in addition to the usual destroyer and submarine
patrols with their crews, and also to the seaplanes with their pilots
and observers.

Almost any steamship can be quickly converted into an effective
mine-sweeper, and for this reason it is impossible to give here more
than the very briefest information concerning the vessels employed in
these operations by the other Naval Powers at war. Russia had fifteen
special mine-sweeping vessels building when war broke out; but,
doubtless, many small merchant ships have since been used for this
purpose. France employed a number of mine-sweepers in the Adriatic; and
Japan used some in clearing the approaches to Tsing-tau. Germany and
Austria, of course, did not need many vessels of this kind, as the
Allied Navies laid comparatively few mines and German oversea commerce
ceased to exist almost as soon as war was declared. It was in the North
Sea, during the first phase of the naval war, that the value of a big
British mine-sweeping fleet made itself so wonderfully apparent.




                              CHAPTER XIV

       COMPARATIVE FIGHTING VALUE OF THE SUBMARINE FLEETS AT WAR


Tempered and tried in the forge of war the submarine has at last been
lifted from the experimental stage of naval construction to the
fore-front of fleets in being. For over twenty years naval experts,
marine engineers and scientists have been wrestling with the vast and
complex problems of submarine construction, navigation and warfare, and
have, at a cost of many lives and many millions sterling, produced
submersible warships of steadily increasing size and power, until to-day
264 of these vessels, of over a dozen different and more or less secret
designs, with displacements ranging from 100 to 1,000 tons are in the
fighting line of the Fleets at war. Thousands of sailors have been
trained to fight beneath the seas; torpedoes, guns, engines, and even
the air to breath, have been adapted for submarine work. A comparison,
therefore, of the strength and fighting power of the submarine fleets
engaged for the first time in this great struggle for the mastery of the
seas is of more than passing interest.


                             BRITISH NAVY.


                           SEA-GOING VESSELS.

  Submarines of 1,000‒1,500 tons (“F” class), range 6,000 miles,     6
    speed 20/12 knots, armament 6 torpedo tubes and 2 q.-f. guns:
    (nearly completed)

  Submarines of 800 tons (“E” class), range 5,000 miles, speed      19
    16/10 knots, armament 4 torpedo tubes and 2 q.-f. guns: (in
    commission)

  Submarines of 500‒600 tons (“D” class), range 4,000 miles, speed   8
    16/10 knots, armament 3 torpedo tubes and 1 q.-f. gun: (in
    commission)

  Submarines of 300‒400 tons (“C” class), range 1,700 miles, speed  37
    14/9 knots, armament 2 torpedo tubes: (in commission)

  Total Sea-going Submarines                                        70


                         COAST DEFENCE VESSELS.

  Submarines of 300 tons (“B” class), range 1,000 miles, speed 12/8 10
    knots, armament 2 torpedo tubes: (in commission)

  Submarines of 200 tons (“A” class), range 350 miles, speed 11/7    8
    knots, armament 2 torpedo tubes: (in commission)

  Total Coast Defence Submarines                                    18

                                                                    ――

  Total number of vessels in British Flotillas                      88

It must, however, be pointed out that six vessels of the sea-going “F”
class have not yet taken their place in the active flotillas; and that
eight vessels of the “E” class were on duty on foreign stations when war
commenced.


                              FRENCH NAVY.


                           SEA-GOING VESSELS.

  Submarines of 600‒1,000 tons (_Diane_ class, _Bellone_ class, and  7
    _Gustave Zede_ class), range 4,000‒5,000 miles, speed 18/10
    knots, armament 4 to 6 torpedo tubes and 2 to 4 q.-f. guns:
    (completing)

  Submarines of 500‒600 tons (_Clorinde_ class), range 3,500 miles, 10
    speed 15/9 ½ knots, armament 4 torpedo tubes: (in commission)

  Submarines of 600‒800 tons (vessels: _Mariotte_, _Archimède_,      4
    _Charles Brun_, and _Admiral Bourgeoise_), range 3,000‒3,500
    miles, speed 15/10 knots, armament 4 torpedo tubes: (in
    commission)

  Submarines of 600 tons (_Fresnel_ class), range 2,000 miles,      22
    speed 12/9 knots, armament 4 torpedo tubes: (in commission)

  Submarines of 500‒600 tons (_Pluviôse_ class), range 2,500 miles, 11
    speed 12/9 knots, armament 4 torpedo tubes: (in commission)

  Total Sea-going Submarines                                        54


                         COAST DEFENCE VESSELS.

  Submarines of 450 tons (_Circe_ class), range 1,000 miles, speed   2
    11/8 knots, armament 2 torpedo tubes and 2 torpedoes in
    holders: (in commission)

  Submarines of 400 tons (_Emeraude_ class), range 1,000 miles,      6
    speed 12/8 ½ knots, armament 2 tubes and 4 holders: (in
    commission)

  Submarines of 300‒400 tons (_Argonaute_ and _Aigrette_ class),     3
    range 700 miles, speed 10/9 knots, armament 1 to 4 torpedo
    tubes: (in commission)

  Total Coast Defence Submarines                                    11


                        HARBOUR DEFENCE VESSELS.

  Submarines of 150‒200 tons (_Triton_ class, _Française_ class,     9
    and _Lutin_ class), range 100‒600 miles, speed 11/8 knots,
    armament 3 to 4 torpedo tubes or holders: (in commission)

  Submarines of 50‒100 tons (_Naiade_ class), range 100 miles,      20
    speed 8 ½/5 knots, armament 1 torpedo tube and 2 holders: (in
    commission)

  Total Harbour Defence Submarines                                  29

                                                                    ――

  Total number of vessels in French Flotillas                       94


                             RUSSIAN NAVY.


                           SEA-GOING VESSELS.

  Submarines of 800‒1,500 tons (_Tigr_ class), no particulars:      12
    (completing)

  Submarines of 500‒600 tons (_Kaschalot_ class), range 3,000        7
    miles, speed 16/10 knots, armament 3 torpedo tubes and 1 q.-f.
    gun: (in commission)

  Submarines of 400‒500 tons (_Alligator_ class), range 3,000        4
    miles, speed 15/10 knots, armament 4 torpedo tubes: (in
    commission)

  Submarines of 300‒400 tons (_Akula_ class), range 2,500 miles,     1
    speed 16/10 knots, armament 3 torpedo tubes: (in commission)

  Submarines of 200‒300 tons (_Karp_ class), range 1,000 miles,      2
    speed 12/8 knots, armament 2 torpedo tubes: (in commission)

  Submarines of 200 tons (_Makrel_ class), range 800‒1,000 miles,    2
    speed 10/8 knots, armament 2 torpedo tubes and 2 holders: (in
    commission)

  Total Sea-going Submarines                                        28


                   COAST AND HARBOUR DEFENCE VESSELS.

  Submarines of 150‒200 tons (_Minoga_ class, _Lossos_ class,       19
    _Sig_, _Sterliad_ class, _Som_ class, _Ostr_ class, and _Graf
    Cheremetieve_ class), range 400‒600 miles, speed 11‒9 knots on
    surface and 6‒7 knots submerged, armament 1‒3 torpedo tubes and
    holders: (in commission)

  Total Coast Defence Submarines                                    19

                                                                    ――

  Total number of vessels in Russian Flotillas                      47


                             JAPANESE NAVY.


                           SEA-GOING VESSELS.

  Submarines of 500 tons (Nos. 16‒17), range 3,500 miles, speed      6
    18/9 knots, armament 6 torpedo tubes and holders: (completing)

  Submarines of 300‒400 tons (Nos. 10‒15), range 1,700 miles, speed  6
    14/9 knots, armament 2 torpedo tubes: (in commission)

  Submarines of 300 tons (Nos. 8‒9), range 1,500 miles, speed 13/8   2
    knots, armament 2 torpedo tubes: (in commission)

  Total Sea-going Submarines                                        14


                   COAST AND HARBOUR DEFENCE VESSELS.

  Submarines of 180‒200 tons (Nos. 6‒7), range 800 miles, speed      2
    10/8 knots, armament 1 torpedo tube: (in commission)

  Submarines of 100‒150 tons (Nos. 1‒5), range 500 miles, speed 9/7  5
    knots, armament 1 torpedo tube: (in commission)

  Total Coast Defence Submarines                                     7

                                                                    ――

  Total number of vessels in Japanese Flotillas                     21


                              GERMAN NAVY.


                           SEA-GOING VESSELS.

  Submarines of 900 tons (U.25-U.30 completed, and U.31-U.37        13
    completing), range 4,000 miles, speed 18/10 knots, armament 4
    torpedo tubes and 4 q.-f. guns: (in commission and completing)

  Submarines of 800 tons (U.21-U.24), range 3,000 miles, speed 14/9  4
    knots, armament 4 torpedo tubes and 3 q.-f. guns: (in
    commission)

  Submarines of 400‒500 tons (U.19-U.20), range 2,000 miles, speed   2
    13 ½/8 knots, armament 3 torpedo tubes and 2 q.-f. guns: (in
    commission)

  Submarines of 300 tons (U.9-U.18), range 1,500 miles, speed 13/8  10
    knots, armament 3 torpedo tubes and 1 q.-f. gun: (in
    commission)

  Submarines of 200‒300 tons (U.2.-U.8), range 1,000 miles, speed    7
    12/8 knots, armament 2 torpedo tubes: (in commission)

  Total Sea-going Submarines                                        36


                         COAST DEFENCE VESSELS.

  Submarines of 200 tons (U.1), range 700‒800 miles, speed 10/7      1
    knots, armament 1 torpedo tube: (in commission)

                                                                    ――

  Total number of vessels in German Flotillas                       37


                             AUSTRIAN NAVY.


                           SEA-GOING VESSELS.

  Submarines of 800 tons (U.7-U.11), range 3,000 miles, speed 14/9   5
    knots, armament 4 torpedo tubes and 3 q.-f. guns:
    (completing—delivery doubtful)

  Submarines of 300‒400 tons (U.5-U.6), range 1,500 miles, speed     2
    12/8 knots, armament 2 torpedo tubes: (in commission)

  Submarines of 300 tons (U.1-U.4), range 1,500 miles, speed 13/8    2
    knots, armament 3 torpedo tubes: (in commission)

  Submarines of 200‒300 tons (U.1-U.2), range 800 miles, speed 12/8  2
    knots, armament 3 torpedo tubes: (in commission)

                                                                    ――

  Total number of vessels in Austrian Flotillas                      6

When war commenced all the vessels of the German Flotillas (30 to 37)
were concentrated in the North Sea and Baltic. The Austrian Flotilla of
six vessels was in the Adriatic. Great Britain had in home waters 74
submarines and 14 others on duty in the outer seas. France had several
of the 92 vessels composing her powerful flotillas at her oversea
colonial naval bases. Russia had 14 submarines in the Baltic, 11 in the
Black Sea, and 12 in the Far East. The Japanese Flotilla (17) was
concentrated in Japanese waters.


  _Printed in Great Britain by Wyman & Sons Ltd., London and Reading._




                          Transcriber’s Notes


 Printed           Corrected                 Page
 guns              guns.             Frontispiece and 2 q.-f. guns.
 gunfire           gun-fire                    30 attacked by gun-fire
 ),                ).                          37 E. B. Feilmann).
 Submarines        Submarines:                 61 Submarines: B.3, B.4,
 destroyers·       destroyers.                 74 and destroyers.
 BUILDING:         BUILDING.                   75 SUBMARINES BUILDING.
 topedo-boats      torpedo-boats.             108 torpedo-boats.
 and               AND                        113 U.19 AND U.20.
 _eompleted_       _completed_                118 were being _completed_
 manœvring         manœuvering                125 with manœuvering
 Fig. 1            FIG. 1                     133 FIG. 1 represents a
 Fig. 2            FIG. 2                     135 FIG. 2 shows the
 manœuvre          manœuvre,                  143 method, or manœuvre,
 “anti-clockwise.’ “anti-clockwise.”          164 and “anti-clockwise.”
 oncoming          on-coming                  179 path of an on-coming

On the Title Page, a comma was added after “SUBMARINES OF THE WORLD’S
NAVIES”.

The image for RIGHT-ANGLE ATTACK BY SUBMARINES. appeared after Page 160
in the digitized source.

Under the SEA-GOING VESSELS heading on Page 190, “Total Sea-going
Submarines | 36” was added for consistency.

Some hyphenation inconsistencies have been retained.





End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Submarines, Mines and Torpedoes in the
War, by Charles William Domville-Fife

*** 