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ANNALS OF A FORTRESS.




[Illustration: MAP OF THE LAND OF OHET.]


   ANNALS OF A FORTRESS.

   BY
   E. VIOLLET-LE-DUC.

   TRANSLATED BY BENJAMIN BUCKNALL,
   ARCHITECT.

   [Illustration]

   BOSTON:
   JAMES R. OSGOOD AND COMPANY,
   LATE TICKNOR & FIELDS, AND FIELDS, OSGOOD, & CO.

   1876.


   UNIVERSITY PRESS: WELCH, BIGELOW, & CO.,
   CAMBRIDGE.




TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.


The Fortress whose transmutations during successive ages are so vividly
described in the following pages is an ideal one; its supposed situation
is on the Cousin, an affluent of the Saone. The practical genius of the
author indicates the position which, in view of the new eastern
frontier, should be fortified in order to command the Saone.

To his unrivalled talent as an architect, Monsieur Viollet-le-Duc adds
the highest qualifications of the military engineer. In this branch of
applied science he is a recognised authority; and it may not be out of
place to notice here that he was frequently consulted by the late
Emperor respecting the permanent defences of the country. It is not too
much to assert that if his recommendations had been carried out the
investment of Paris would have been rendered impossible, whilst the
progress of the German invasion elsewhere would have been attended with
greater difficulties. As colonel of engineers, no officer displayed
greater energy, skill, or bravery, in the defence of the city; and every
operation planned and directed by him during the siege was successful.
Within two or three days after the signing of the armistice, the
Germans had done their utmost to destroy all evidences of their works of
investment. Nothing, however, had escaped the vigilant eye of M.
Viollet-le-Duc. In that brief space of time he had surveyed and
accurately noted all these works of investment; plans and descriptions
of which are given in his interesting memoir of the siege. Upon the
outbreak of the Commune, he was solicited by its chiefs to take the
military command; and had he not made a timely escape would probably
have paid the penalty of his life for refusing that questionable honour.
From his retreat at Pierrefonds he was recalled by General MacMahon, to
assist the Versailles troops in re-entering Paris. It is deserving of
mention that in his absence a devoted band of craftsmen thrice gallantly
defended his house from being burnt and pillaged.

In presenting the _Histoire d'une Forteresse_ in an English form, the
translator has considered it impossible to do justice to the original
without adhering to its archaic style and manner; and aware that a
translation must lose something either in point of sense or style, his
chief aim has been to give a faithful rendering of the sense.

   BENJAMIN BUCKNALL,
   _Architect._

   OYSTERMOUTH, SWANSEA,
   _February 11, 1875._




CONTENTS.


CHAPTER I.
                                                                PAGE
THE FIRST RETREAT                                                 1


CHAPTER II.

THE OPPIDUM                                                      11


CHAPTER III.

THE FIRST SIEGE                                                  26


CHAPTER IV.

THE COST OF DEFENDERS                                            65


CHAPTER V.

THE SECOND SIEGE                                                 69


CHAPTER VI.

THE PERMANENT CAMP--FOUNDATION OF A CITE                         90


CHAPTER VII.

THE FORTIFIED CITE                                               97


CHAPTER VIII.

THE THIRD SIEGE                                                 108


CHAPTER IX.

THE FEUDAL CASTLE                                               157


CHAPTER X.

THE FOURTH SIEGE                                                178


CHAPTER XI.

THE FIRST DEFENCES AGAINST FIRE ARTILLERY                       226


CHAPTER XII.

THE FIFTH SIEGE                                                 239


CHAPTER XIII.

THE CITE OF LA ROCHE-PONT IS FORTIFIED BY ERRARD DE BAR-LE-DUC,
ENGINEER TO THE MOST CHRISTIAN KING OF FRANCE AND NAVARRE       275


CHAPTER XIV.

THE SIXTH SIEGE                                                 282


CHAPTER XV.

THE TOWN OF LA ROCHE-PONT IS FORTIFIED BY M. DE VAUBAN          304


CHAPTER XVI.

THE SEVENTH SIEGE                                               315


CHAPTER XVII.


CONCLUSION                                                      354


EXPLANATION OF SOME OF THE TECHNICAL TERMS USED IN THIS BOOK    385




LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.


FIG.                                                            PAGE

 1. MAP OF THE LAND OF OHET                          _Frontispiece_.

    THE SAPPER                                           _Vignette_.

 2. THE OPPIDUM                                                  14

 3. RAMPART OF THE OPPIDUM                                       15

 4. GATES OF THE OPPIDUM                                         16

 5. THE NEMEDE AND THE DRUIDS' DWELLINGS                         16

    FIRST SIEGE.--SIGILD AND TOMAR                               32

 6.   "     "     WOODEN TOWERS OF THE OPPIDUM                   35

 7.   "     "     ADVANCED WORK OF THE OPPIDUM                   46

 8.   "     "     ASSAULT ON THE OPPIDUM                         55

 9. THE TOWN AND CITE D'AVON (WAR OF THE GAULS)                  70

10. SECOND SIEGE.--THE ROMAN 'AGGER' AND 'VINEAE'                 79

11.   "      "     A STIMULUS                                    80

12.   "      "     THE MOVABLE TOWER                             82

13.   "      "     ATTACK ON THE STRONGHOLD OF THE OPPIDUM       86

14. THE ROMAN PERMANENT CAMP                                     91

15. GATES OF THE CAMP                                            93

16. THE GALLO-ROMAN TOWN. CITY JULIANA      (_to face_)          99

17. SECTION OF THE RAMPART WALL                                 103

18. PLANS OF THE NORTH GATE                                     104

19. VIEW OF THE NORTH GATE                                      105

20. GENERAL VIEW OF THE GREAT SOUTHERN TETE DE PONT             106

21. THIRD SIEGE.--THE AGGER                                     123

22.   "     "     WORK BEFORE THE EAST GATE                     124

23.   "     "     THE 'VALLUM'                                  125

24.   "     "     THE NORTHERN SALIENT                          126

25.   "     "     BURNING OF THE WOODEN BRIDGE                  128

26.   "     "     THE ATTACK--THE MOVABLE BRIDGE INTENDED FOR
                  CROSSING THE SMALL ARM OF THE RIVER ABONIA    131

27.   "     "     THE AGGER                                     139

28.   "     "     THE ONAGER BATTERY                            141

29.   "     "     THE MINE AND COUNTER MINE                     142

30.   "     "     THE BREACH MINE                               145

31.   "     "     DEFENCE OF THE BREACH                         146

32.   "     "     THE BREACH OCCUPIED BY THE ASSAILANTS         147

33.   "     "     MINING BENEATH THE NORTH-WEST CORNER TOWER    151

34.   "     "     MINING BENEATH THE NORTHERN RAMPART WALL      153

35. THE OLD CASTLE OF LA ROCHE-PONT                             167

36. THE CASTLE OF LA ROCHE-PONT OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY (_to face_)
                                                                168

37. BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF THE CASTLE OF LA ROCHE-PONT              172

38. BRETECHE OF THE BRIDGE                                      184

39. FOURTH SIEGE.--THE BURGUNDIAN INTRENCHMENT OF CONTRAVALLATION
                                                                185

40.   "      "     NIGHT SORTIE OF THE GARRISON OF THE CASTLE
                                                  (_to face_)   187

41.   "      "     THE BESIEGERS GET POSSESSION OF THE BARBICAN 191

42.   "      "     THE CAT                                      193

43.   "      "     THE BOSSON      (_to face_)                  197

44.   "      "     THE BREACH AND THE BURNING OF THE NORTH GATE 199

45.   "      "     THE TAKING OF THE BAILEY (_to face_)         210

46.   "      "     THE SMALL BOSSON                             212

47.   "      "     THE MOVABLE TOWER      (_to face_)           222

48. THE TOWN OF LA ROCHE-PONT IS FORTIFIED BY CHARLES THE BOLD  228

49. BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF THE NORTHERN BOULEVARD AND FRONT         230

50. MASONRY TOWER FOR ARTILLERY                                 231

51. BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF BOULEVARD AND RAMPARTS                   233

52. TETE DE PONT AND CAVALIER                                   237

53. FIFTH SIEGE.--ATTACK ON THE NORTHERN BOULEVARD              243

54.   "     "     DEFENCE OF THE NORTHERN BOULEVARD             249

55.   "     "     ASSAULT ON THE BOULEVARD                      253

56.   "     "     ATTACK OF THE OLD FRONT       (_to face_)     255

57. FIFTH SIEGE.--THE OLD NORTH GATE BATTERED BY FIRE ARTILLERY 256

58.   "     "     TAKING OF AN ARTILLERY TOWER  (_to face_)     266

59. THE BASTIONS OF ERRARD DE LE BAR-LE-DUC                     277

60. THE NORTH WORK                                              279

61. ONE OF THE BASTIONS                                         280

62. SIXTH SIEGE.--GALAS' WORKS OF APPROACH                      289

63.   "     "     THE ATTACK ON ONE OF THE BESIEGERS' PLACE D'ARMES
                                                (_to face_)     290

64.   "     "     FORCIA'S PLAN OF SIEGE                        298

65. VAUBAN'S DEFENCES                                           305

66. VAUBAN'S OUTWORK                                            307

67. SECTIONS OF THE OUTWORK                                     309

68. TRACE OF THE OUTWORK                                        311

69. REVETEMENT OF THE BASTIONS                                  313

70. SEVENTH SIEGE.--THE THEORETICAL ATTACK OF VAUBAN'S WORK
                                                (_to face_)     337

71.    "      "     THE THIRD PARALLEL AND THE CROWNING OF THE COUVERT WAY
                                                (_to face_)     338

72.    "      "     CAPTAIN ALLAUD'S ADVANCED WORK              341

73.    "      "     SECTIONS AND INTERIOR VIEW OF THE WORK      347

74.    "      "     CAPTAIN ALLAUD'S CREMAILLERE WORK           341

75.    "      "     ATTACK ON THE WORKS OF COUNTER-APPROACH     347

76. ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ATTACK AND DEFENCE       358

77. DITTO                                                       358

78. DITTO                                                       359

79. APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE: "WHAT DEFENDS SHOULD ITSELF BE DEFENDED"
                                                                361

80. ILLUSTRATION OF THE ALTERED CONDITIONS NECESSITATED BY ARTILLERY
    OF LONG RANGE                                               362

81. PLAN OF FORTRESS SHOWING HOW THOSE CONDITIONS ARE MET       364

82. BLOCK PLAN OF THE DETACHED FORTS                            365

83. THEORETICAL PLAN OF A MODERN FORTRESS                       366

84. EMPLOYMENT OF THE POLYGONAL SYSTEM, DETACHED FORTS          372

85. DEFENSIVE SYSTEM OF GREAT INTRENCHED CAMP                   375




ANNALS OF A FORTRESS.


   "Je scais bien qu'il faut perdre, qu'il faut gaigner, et n'y a rien
   d'imprenable; mais desirez cent mil fois plustost la mort si tous
   moyens ne vous deffaillent, que dire ce mechant et vilain mot: 'JE LA
   RENDS.'"--_Comment._ de MONTLUC.




CHAPTER I.

_THE FIRST RETREAT._


Many winters, as we are told by the old men of the district, have passed
since human beings first settled in the land of Ohet, a somewhat
extensive valley of varying breadth, traversed by a winding stream
running southward till it flows into a great river.

The sides of the valley present a series of hills of moderate height,
descending by gentle <DW72>s where it widens, and more abruptly where it
narrows. On the steeper hill-sides grey crags jut out, and the ground is
strewn with fragments of rock. Ascending the stream for some three hours'
walk from the point where it joins the great river, we find on the right
another stream separating into several small branches in a more elevated
valley. In summer, some of these branches dry up, others form pools,
whose banks are covered with reeds and water-lilies. The inhabitants of
the vale dread this valley, which they believe to be haunted by evil
spirits. It is dangerous to wander there, because of the number of bogs
covered over with leaves and decaying branches in which the unwary sink.
The forest in this valley is so dense, the plants and bushes are so
thickly interlaced with the trunks and branches of dead trees, that
the rays of the sun hardly penetrate through it, and only illuminate
pools of water covered with a mantle of green. A kind of promontory
divides the two water-courses at this point (Frontispiece--Fig. 1);--the
river running from the north-west, and the smaller stream from the
north-north-east. This elevated part of the country is covered with
thick woods, and the inhabitants of the valley seldom go there except
to hunt the wild ox, the boar, the wolf, and the deer. Beyond, the
country seems a wilderness; and strangers who occasionally visit the
inhabitants of the vale to exchange amber, copper, gold, salt, and
coarse woollen or hempen fabrics for skins of beasts, never come except
by the way where flows the great river. The occupants live in families,
in the open spaces amid the woods and on the banks of the rivers,
inhabiting conical huts, made with stakes set in the ground, joined
at the top, and covered with branches, earth, and rushes. The father
of the family occupies one of these huts with his wife and children,
and as his sons grow up, they build another cabin and take a companion.

The products of the chase and fishing, with the wild roots which they
dry and crush between stones, are their only means of subsistence; they
do not till the soil, nor have they any flocks or herds. Our informants
add that they never had to fight men like themselves, and that if any
disputes arise between the families, they call together the oldest
chiefs of the other families to arbitrate between them. Those who are
unwilling to submit to their judgment are banished from the valley,
together with their families; they descend the shores of the great
river, and are no more heard of.

When these old men are further asked whether there were other human
beings before them settled in the valley, they answer that there were;
but that they were small men--dwarfs--who ate earth, and had no bows and
arrows to kill the wild beasts, nor hooks to catch fish, nor canoes to
cross the river; that at the approach of the present inhabitants, these
dwarfs disappeared, and took refuge underground, whence they came out
sometimes in the night to do mischief--to cut the fastenings of boats,
or sink the boats themselves--to cause children at the breast to die, or
to break the bows, or warn the animals of the forest of an intended
chase, so that they might get out of the way.

For some time a report has been current--brought by strangers who have
found their way along the river into the valley--that an alien race of
great stature and strength, with fair hair, and mounted on horses, have
already overspread the neighbouring countries, driving away their
inhabitants, or killing those who do not fly at their approach; speaking
an unknown tongue, and undertaking nothing without first deliberating in
great numbers, and consulting the elders and women, sparing none but
children, and employing these in labours of all kinds. This news has
spread great consternation in the valley; the chiefs of the families
meet together, and determine to watch by turns at the mouth of the
river; young men posted at regular intervals are to give warning, by
loud cries, of the arrival of the fair-haired people, so that all the
inhabitants of the valley may be quickly warned, and take refuge with
their families in the woods situated on the promontory which divides the
river from the smaller stream at their confluence; lastly, each is to
furnish himself with provisions such as will be sufficient for a
hunting expedition of several days; and then they will consult as to
what course shall be adopted.

Meantime, the elders of the people take counsel. They decide that at the
first cry of alarm, and while the invaders are entering the valley by
one of the banks, all the inhabitants of that side shall cross in the
boats to the opposite side shore, in order to unite with those who
inhabit that side, and that all together they shall hasten to bring
their cargoes to the point where the valley divides, so as to moor the
boats below the promontory on the left bank above the mouth of the
stream; that the women, children, and old men shall take refuge on the
promontory, so that the able-bodied, thus separated from the fair-haired
men by the river and the rivulet, will be able to deliberate whether
they should use their bows or fly to the forest above. Some days after,
just when the sun is beginning to decline, the valley resounds with the
cry of alarm, a hundred times repeated, announcing that the fair-haired
people are advancing and entering the valley on the western side.

Immediately the whole country--silent but a few minutes before--begins
to be filled with a continued hum; most of the inhabitants of the right
hasten in their boats to the left bank; but some, either through
negligence, or because they have been away from their dwellings, cannot
follow the advice of the elders.

In the meantime, the invaders advance with caution: first, a detachment
mounted on horses are seen riding round the woods, assembling in the
openings, and appearing to deliberate before going further. A body of
them have captured some unhappy loiterers among the inhabitants of the
valley, who, fastened with cords, are driven onwards by their captors,
and closely interrogated, but they do not understand what is said to
them.

In a little while, at every visible point in the direction of the river,
the valley appears dotted with men on foot and on horseback, and with
chariots; and every now and then shouts arise. The sun sinks upon the
horizon, but the shouting continues to be heard, and the columns of
smoke ascend from all sides; night comes, the valley appears lit up with
fires, and silence gradually supervenes.

Assembled at the foot of the promontory, along the banks of the two
streams, the men of the land of Ohet have concealed their boats among
the bulrushes; they have sent up the women, the children, and the aged
to the plateau; they dare not light any fires, lest they should attract
the attention of the invaders. The night is spent in fruitless
deliberation; some bold young hunters propose to take advantage of the
sleep of the fair-haired people to cross the river and fall upon them as
they would upon wild beasts, and to kill them all with their stone
hatchets; but the chiefs of the families consider that they are too few
in number for the execution of any such design; they urge that this body
of invaders is perhaps followed by others, that they have horses and can
easily escape, that they appear to be tall and strong; and, moreover,
that they do not appear to have killed the inhabitants they met with, as
the strangers had reported.

At break of day the valley echoes with unusual sounds, such as the
inhabitants of the land of Ohet had never heard before. It is not the
shouting of men, nor the songs of women, nor the bellowing of wild
bulls. These noises spread terror among the fugitives. They all abandon
the boats and climb the promontory; there, in the woods, they can see
through the trees what is taking place in the valley: They soon perceive
a numerous body of men on the opposite side, not far from the river.
Some canoes which had been forgotten are being guided up the stream by
the invaders. They go through the rushes, unfasten the boats, and draw
them up with loud cries on the shore opposite the promontory. These
cries are answered from other quarters, and the whole body rush to the
shore. But at this juncture the chiefs seem to interfere; they parley
for some time, and appear to threaten those who are impatient to get
into the boats, often pointing to the plateau above. The main body
retire again from the shore, and a dozen men only get into two boats,
which make for the opposite bank at the foot of the promontory. With
them are two of the inhabitants of the land of Ohet, tied by the neck
with leathern thongs. They land together, put the captives before them,
and ascend to the plateau. The twelve fair-haired men are armed with
sticks, terminated by a long, bright, metal point. Some hold bows in
their hands, with the arrows in place. They are dressed in short tunics
of ornamented stuffs, their arms bare, and their legs up to the knee
bound round with leathern thongs, to which are fastened covered sandals.
About their loins is a belt of skin, to which is suspended a bag, also
of skin, with the hair of the animal preserved, two knives--one long,
the other very short--and a hatchet, the blade of which is of bronze;
their necks and wrists are adorned with strings of large glass beads, or
with circlets of metal. Many have their hair fastened on the top of
their heads, with large pins of bone or bronze; others have their hair
divided into long tresses. Their beards have been carefully removed,
while their moustaches reach down to their breasts. Their aspect is
terrible, for they are tall; their light blue eyes, inclosed by black
lines, sparkle like diamonds beneath bushy brows dyed of a brilliant
red.

Approaching to within fifty paces of the brow of the promontory, where
the ground is somewhat clear, they stop, and one of the captives speaks
thus: "The fair-haired people have captured several of us; they have
done us no harm; they have not burned our huts, nor killed the women and
children. They wish to live in peace with us always, on the same ground.
They will not hinder us from hunting or fishing, or from remaining with
our wives and children. They say that the land is good, and can support
a much greater number of inhabitants than it does now. They bring an
abundance of things useful to man. They teach youths to ride, and to use
arms against evil men. They say in fine that we have nothing to fear,
and that you may return to your dwellings.

"I am told all this by one of their people who speaks as we do, and who
once lived in our valley, from which he was banished. They also say that
if you will not return to your homes and live in peace with them, they
will kill us all like wild beasts, for they are both numerous and
strong. They will await your answer here until the sun reaches the
middle of its daily course. This is all we have to say."

Several of the elders of the valley then came out of the wood and
advanced towards the captives; but the party of fair-haired men made
signs to them to come no farther, and fitted their arrows to the strings
of their bows. The captive who had already spoken, again addressed them:
"Do not come any nearer; deliberate among yourselves, and give an answer
quickly. This is all we have to say."

The old men thereupon assembled, and having cut some branches of trees
on which they seated themselves, one of them spoke thus: "These
fair-haired people with painted faces are more numerous than we; they
have murderous, weapons, and horses, and are brave; we are not able to
drive them out of the valley; if they desire to live with us in peace,
as they say they do, why not consider them as friends? Is it to their
advantage to kill us? No. They possess many things which we have not,
and are provided with what they need. Have you not observed the flocks
and herds, the loaded waggons, and the women and children that accompany
them? They are not empty-handed robbers. Let us accept the conditions
they offer us."

One of the hunters, among the bravest in the valley, then rose and spoke
in his turn: "Why do these people with painted faces come into our
valley? It is to take possession of it and drive us away. They are
strangers to us, and we have never done them any harm. Why do they not
remain where they were born? Will there be fish enough in the river and
enough wild animals in the forest to feed them and us? They will take
all and leave us nothing. Fighting against them is impossible, it is
true--but we can fly. There are other valleys and other rivers not far
off. Let us take our wives and children with us; I know the woods as far
as three days' journey. Let us leave our huts and our boats, and go and
settle far away from these strangers." After the utterance of these
contrary opinions a hundred voices were raised; some supporting the
advice of the old man, others that of the hunter.

A few young men even wished to fall upon the little troop of strangers
and massacre them.

Some of the most venerated of the inhabitants of the Val d'Ohet tried
more than once to impose silence and make themselves heard, but the
tumult continuing to increase, the assembly was broken up into groups,
and the women began to cry out and lament and the children to weep.
Meanwhile the little party of fair-haired men had begun to cut some
bushes and briars and to make a rampart with them.

Not long afterwards twelve boats crossed the river, and sixty of the
strangers came and joined the first twelve. These were bearing twelve
oval shields of wicker-work covered with skin. They set up these shields
by means of stakes driven in the ground, and placed themselves behind
them; only their heads painted red and blue and their sparkling eyes
remained visible. They were laughing together loudly.

Midday was at hand, and confusion continued to prevail among the
fugitives. Then were heard again those strange sounds which had so much
alarmed the unhappy inhabitants of Ohet at dawn; and the shore opposite
to the promontory was covered with a multitude of fair-haired men in
several detachments, all armed. They began to cross the river, and to
seat themselves in a line on the shore beneath the plateau. Then the
captive who had already spoken advanced alone toward the forest, and
when he was within hearing, said: "My friends, my brethren, you are
going to be attacked: and we are to be killed before your eyes. Have
pity on yourselves--have pity on us; come down to the fair-haired men;
they will do you no sort of harm; they have respected your houses and
the women that have fallen into their hands. Do not hope to defend
yourselves, for they will kill you with their keen weapons!" At this
last appeal the fugitives became silent, and one of the inhabitants of
the valley, who had remained since the morning without speaking a word,
rose up. He was a short, robust man, of dark complexion and crisp hair;
he was well known as a skilful carpenter, and the best boats were his
handy work. "There is no more time for discussion," said he. "Let those
who wish to stay in the valley come out from the wood, and let the rest
hide themselves as quickly as possible in the forest. They will be able
to fly with their families; for the strangers do not know how many we
are. As for myself, I remain where I was born." A great number assembled
round the carpenter with acclamations, accompanied by their wives and
children; and all together without a moment's delay showed themselves to
the troop of strangers. "We will return to our dwellings," was all the
carpenter said to the captive interpreter, and then they advanced
towards the little camp.

Many had bows and stone hatchets. "Throw down your arms," said the
captive; "throw down your arms, you have no need of them." The invaders
who had taken up their position on the shore, dividing into two bodies,
were rapidly climbing the sides of the promontory, to the right and
left; so that in a few minutes the carpenter and his companions were
surrounded by an innumerable crowd, which penetrating the mass of the
fugitives, separated them into small parties and took possession of the
few weapons which had been retained by some of their number.

The strangers laughed, skipped, and leaned their brows on the breasts of
the inhabitants of the valley in token of good will. Thus some hundreds
of the natives went down towards the river surrounded by their new
guests. They were compelled to get into the boats, and they went back to
their houses, which had been completely pillaged. Many of the huts
remained vacant, and the new-comers took possession of them, without
troubling themselves much respecting the inhabitants and what had become
of them.




CHAPTER II.

_THE OPPIDUM._


Two centuries later, the land of Ohet had assumed a new aspect, and its
name was changed. It was then called the Valley of Avon.

Beautiful fields, affording pasture to flocks and herds, carpeted the
<DW72>s of the bordering hill; while in the vale below ripened harvests
of barley and rye. The uplands were still covered with forest, and on
all sides wooden houses peeped out from the meadows, with their
inclosures of palisades painted in lively colours.

The marshes of the rivulet were drained, and at the summit of the
promontory was to be seen cutting the sky the talus of an _Oppidum_
which commanded the valley and the two streams. Its origin was as
follows:--

Not long after the invasion of the fair-haired people, the inhabitants
of the valley who had fled into the woods had re-appeared, accompanied
by a great multitude of men of the same race, and at dawn had fallen
with great violence and loud cries upon the strangers.

The latter, not expecting an attack, defended themselves as best they
could; but the younger and more active among them assembled on the
promontory, where they waited until night. Then they descended
noiselessly, crossed the stream, and fell in their turn upon the men of
the ancient race, who thought to repossess themselves of the valley. The
greater number were asleep; many had dispersed in search of food and
plunder. The young fair-haired men massacred a vast number of them,
making no distinction between the old inhabitants who had remained in
their homes and those who presented themselves as enemies; the women and
children alone were spared.

After a council of the elders, and after having consulted the women, it
was decided that in order to prevent fresh surprises, and to protect the
inhabitants of the valley, they should form a vast camp on the
promontory, where in case of alarm the people of the valley of Avon
could take refuge with their families, their flocks and herds,
provisions and arms, defy every attack, and resume the offensive at the
opportune moment.

The summit of the promontory was therefore cleared; every able-bodied
man was required to give one day's work in four till the camp was
finished; and those of the old inhabitants who had escaped the massacre,
as well as the children and women, had to labour without ceasing at the
circumvallations. The women prepared food for the workmen, and the
children carried earth in baskets or brought branches of trees which
were mingled with the earth.

Following exactly the verge of the plateau, the chiefs of the eight
tribes settled in the valley marked out the boundary of the camp, its
entrances, its defences, the retreat of the elders, the place for the
cattle, that of the huts for the families, and lastly the site proper
for the erection of the Nemede--the sacred inclosure--the sanctuary of
Belen and the dwellings of the Druids.

First, with the aid of strong levers of wood hardened by fire, the
stones which obtruded above the level of the plateau were forced out and
arranged on the perimeter described; then upon this layer, behind which
was heaped coarse gravel mixed with earth, were placed trunks of trees,
crosswise, four feet apart. The width of the base was twenty feet. The
interval between the trunks was filled with stones, earth, and branches.
Then another layer of stones mingled with earth, then three rows of
trunks of trees, laid this time lengthwise, bound together with strong
bands of green withy, always with gravel between. On this a third layer
of stones, more trunks of trees across, overlapping the others, and a
topping of gravel, of turf and soil, forming the rampart walk.

Stakes were placed upright, five feet apart, and firmly driven three
feet down into the rampart on the outer edge, serving to fix, by means
of osier bands, wattled hurdles five feet six inches high, so as to form
a continuous parapet pierced with loop-holes.

The rampart rose to a height of five feet. The inclosure completed, the
Druids marked out the area allotted to the eight tribes. To each of them
was given a circular space of two hundred feet in diameter; the huts
were disposed in two rings around the perimeter; in the middle was the
paddock for the animals and the hut of the chief.

[Illustration: FIG. 2.--THE OPPIDUM.]

The general view of the camp is given in Fig. 2, with the rampart, the
two entrances, the sunk approaches, defended on the other side by a
mound raised with the earth excavated to form these approaches, and the
eight circles allotted to the tribes; at A, the Nemede and the dwelling
of the Druids and Druidesses, surrounded by the sacred inclosure. Wells
were sunk in each of the circles of the tribes, and in the inclosure of
the Nemede.

[Illustration: FIG. 3.]

Fig. 3 gives the section of the rampart with its terrace-walk, A, for
the defenders, and, at intervals, the inclines, B, affording an easy
means for ascending to the terrace-walk. The entrances were masked by a
mound forming an advanced work, and leaving two ways out along the
ramparts. Fig. 4 shows how these entrances were disposed. The two
extremities of the rampart were strengthened by a wider embankment, H,
affording space for a numerous assemblage of defenders. Here is shown
the screen thrown up outside the cutting, and at K the sunken road with
its mound, L.

[Illustration: FIG. 4.]

Fig. 5 represents the Nemede, with its inclosure and the dwellings of
the Druids.

[Illustration: FIG. 5.]

The camp finished--except the habitations of the tribes, whose site was
only marked by circles of stones--a certain number of young men were put
to live there, who replaced each other every day. Arriving there at
sunset, they remained in the camp until the beginning of the next night.
Those of the former inhabitants of the valley who still lived were
forbidden to enter the camp on pain of death.

The tribes prospered, enriching themselves with the produce of the earth
and with their cattle. Some, having discovered copper ore in the
neighbourhood, manufactured arms and utensils. There were also potters
who wrought skilfully in clay. At certain periods of the year, merchants
brought to the valley stuffs, salt, spices, and even wine in leathern
bottles. They took in exchange articles of bronze, skins, cheese, and
corn.

The tribes, not having had any fresh attacks to resist during a
lengthened period, left off guarding the camp, which was rarely visited
except on occasion of certain solemnities and of assemblies convoked by
the Druids. The latter lived by themselves, surrounded by their college,
within the vast inclosure which they cultivated, and where their sheep
and cattle grazed. The ramparts, whose timber work had decayed, had
sunk, and presented only a slight elevation. They were overgrown with
vegetation in several places. But in the peaceful state in which the
tribes were living, no one thought of repairing these defences.

The inhabitants of the valley had been frequently embroiled with the
neighbouring tribes, and had often come to blows with them; but peace
was soon restored, for none of these groups of tribes cherished the
intention of subjugating its neighbours and seizing their territory.

Nevertheless repose was irksome to them, and their youths would often
quit the valley in quest of adventures, and to see the world.

About 389 B.C., a great number of men, attracted by the seductive
eloquence of a Brenn--a chief elected by certain tribes to command
distant expeditions--had quitted their hearths in the hope of amassing
wealthy spoils in the southern lands beyond the mountains. Two years
having passed away, a small number made their appearance again in the
valley; they brought with them gold and costly fabrics, and marvellous
were the tales they told of the countries they had traversed, and in
which they had been incessantly fighting.

They had seen cities environed by strong stone walls, and filled with
magnificent public buildings and sumptuous mansions--richly fertile
regions, where the vine and luscious fruits of every kind were
cultivated.

Among other results of adventure, it was observed that those who
returned from these distant expeditions had lost the habit of peaceful
industry; and although more than half their comrades had perished by the
way, their dreams were still of battles, and plunder, and adventures.
They were idle, insolent, and irascible, and even aspired to a kind of
lordship over the peaceable families that lived by industry. The latter
had at first joyfully welcomed the unhoped-for return of these warriors;
and had listened with admiration to the stories of their prowess and
adventures recited around the family hearth; but their imperious
bearing, their idleness and boasting, were beginning to become
intolerable. Every day saw new quarrels arise, which generally ended in
blood. The wives of these heroes were still more insolent than the
warriors themselves, and presumed to treat their dependents as slaves,
such as were those of the ladies in the countries so gloriously
traversed by their husbands.

Things being in this state, the tribes of the valley had been summoned
to a meeting in the old camp, according to custom, to deliberate on
their common interests, and to endeavour to put an end to feuds. The
men always repaired to these assemblies armed; the women used to come
bringing food and drink; for these meetings were usually terminated by
festivities lasting the whole night.

On the morning of the day appointed, the sound of trumpets re-echoed
through the valley, and from every quarter the inhabitants might be seen
flocking towards the hill. A wooden bridge had long since been built
over the river near the mouth of the rivulet. When the chiefs of the
tribes, accompanied by the mass of the people, presented themselves at
the bridge, they found it occupied by the warriors, whose ranks had been
increased by a large number of young men of the valley, and even other
warriors, strangers to the tribes.

"It is at the camp and not here that the people meet," said one of the
chiefs; "let us pass over." "You shall not pass," replied one of the
warriors, "without listening to the conditions we propose." "We have
neither conditions to submit to nor conditions to impose," rejoined the
first; "the men of this country are free, and the land is theirs, in the
valley and on the mountain; let us pass on!" "It will be by force then,"
replied the warrior, half unsheathing his sword.

A long-continued cry of indignation followed this defiance, and arms
began to glitter in the sun among the crowd like flashes of lightning.
The chiefs, however, imposed silence, and held the crowd in check. Then
advancing in concert to the entrance of the bridge, one of them spoke
thus:--"What do you want? Do you not belong to our tribes? Have you not
flocks, and wives, and children born in the valley? What conditions do
you aim to impose upon us--us who are your equals? Speak! What can you
ask for more than you already possess? What wrongs have been done you?
Why bring with you men who are strangers to the country, whom we do not
know, and who have no claim to an interest among us?" "Answer him,
answer him, Sigild," said all the warriors with one voice. Sigild
advanced. He was a handsome young man, a native of the valley, tall and
slight, with a mild look, and a beard just appearing; his breast covered
with a small bronze cuirass which glittered in the sun: his white arms
were bare, and adorned with bracelets of gold. He disdained a helmet,
and his blonde hair, fastened at the top of his head with a long golden
pin, fell down over his back; _chases_[1] wrought in bright colours
covered his legs; his waist was girt with a kind of scarf, which was
gracefully thrown back over the shoulder and left arm. A narrow buckler
and a sword hung at his side. He smiled, made a sign with his hand as if
requesting silence, and said:--"Friends and brethren, we are all
free--all of the same blood; we ought to remain united to conquer those
who desire to plunder or to enslave us. Consider, however, that you have
among you the elite of the warriors who have conquered powerful nations,
and have spread the renown of the Gallic name beyond the mountains. Many
have died in battle; but do not those who have returned to you after so
many trials, bringing, with them a rich booty and having acquired skill
in arms, deserve some consideration from you? Inured to war and always
ready to shed their blood, are they not more fitted to defend your
hearths than men who have done nothing but tend cattle and till the
soil? They do not, however, ask you to keep them in idleness, or to
consider them as chiefs or masters; their only wish is to defend you.
They know to what extent you are encompassed by rapacious and envious
men, who, jealous of the prosperity of your valley, are cherishing the
most sinister designs against you. They know this because they have seen
many peoples of whose existence you do not dream, though they are close
to your borders. Lulled by a prolonged security, you are not in a
condition to resist a serious attack. Now these warriors--your
relations, your brothers, your friends, of the same blood as
yourselves--have been considering with painful anxiety this state of
repose in which you are living. They have, therefore, formed the
intention--they, as men of war, to occupy the camp, to fortify it
effectually, to make it a reliable place of refuge in case of invasion,
and to defend themselves in it to the death. Is there any wrong in this?
As to these warriors, whom you regard as strangers, they are brethren in
arms who have fought side by side with us beyond the mountains, but who
no longer finding their abodes on returning to their valleys devastated
by marauders, ask an asylum with us. Besides, if they do not belong to
your tribes, are they not Gauls like ourselves?

"We have wished to say this to you here, and not in the place of
rendezvous itself, in the fear lest our intentions should be
misunderstood amid so great a concourse. If our proposals, conceived
with a view to the common interest, appear to you just, and if you still
persist in holding the assembly on the height above, we will go before
you to the camp, and will remain there when you return to your
habitations.

"As for us, devoting ourselves to those new functions which we are
competent to discharge, we will make of this camp a stronghold
impregnable to any enemy that might dare to attack us." A long murmur
followed this discourse and the chiefs of the tribes looked wistfully at
each other.

The most venerable of them, advancing in his turn replied thus: "Sigild,
your words are fair; but the act to which you and your companions are
committing yourselves at this moment is insulting, and aims a blow at
the liberty of the inhabitants of the valley. You parade before us
imaginary dangers, with a view to remaining on that height under the
pretext of defending our families, but really in order to separate
yourselves from us and act according to your good pleasure. Tell us who
will support you and take care of your cattle while you are remaining on
the height under arms, waiting for an enemy who perhaps will never make
his appearance? Sole masters of the bridge and the two streams, you will
be able, if you choose, to debar the inhabitants of the valley from
hunting in the woods that extend behind the camp, and from fishing in
the waters of the upper stream which furnish the best supply. We shall
thus be at your discretion. If the assembly thinks it desirable to
strengthen the fortifications of the camp, every inhabitant of the
valley will take his share in the work--yourselves with the rest. If it
shall be necessary to defend the inclosure, all who are in a condition
to bear arms must engage in the defence; for all are equally interested
in protecting their families, in repelling an enemy, and not exposing
themselves to insult. Come, then, with us to the camp; we will
deliberate on all that concerns the interests of the tribes, and you
will only have to submit, like ourselves, to the result of our
deliberation. As to the new-comers, if they ask for an asylum, you know
that it will not be refused them; but they must fulfil the conditions
imposed upon foreigners wishing to live among us. Moreover, we shall
have to consult the Ovates."

Thrusting back Sigild, who was preparing to give an answer, the first
warrior, who had spoken so insolently, advanced to the edge of the
bridge in front of the chiefs of the tribes, and putting aside their
arms, he said, "No one shall pass; all this parleying is useless; go
back to your houses; we will hold the camp."

At these words a thousand voices arose, and in spite of the endeavours
of the chiefs to restrain them, the crowd of the men of the valley
rushed forward like a torrent. Swords were drawn on both sides, and the
clash of arms was mingled with the cries of the two parties. The
imprecations of the women dispersed along the shore, and who were urging
the men towards the bridge, were heard above the clamour of the
multitude. The party that was endeavouring to obstruct the passages
recoiled for the moment, with a view to concentrate themselves on the
narrowest point; and, as the warriors had crowded together on the bridge
to hear what was being said on both sides, and many had even mounted on
the wooden parapets, this movement from front to rear threw confusion
into the closely-packed mass, and several fell into the river.

At sight of this a shout, followed by an immense burst of laughter,
issued from the groups assembled on the shore; and the defenders of the
bridge, and those who were advancing to meet them, having no conception
of the cause of this laughter, stopped and looked behind them on either
side.

But the warriors who had fallen from the bridge into the water,
embarrassed by their clothes and shackled by their armour, although able
to swim, were being swept down by the current, with a rapidity increased
by the swollen state of the river. They were all but engulfed in the
rapid torrent. Two boats were fastened to the bank on the valley side;
in a moment some of the spectators pushed off in them, and rowing with
might and main, and with the help of poles, had soon rescued the
half-drowned warriors and brought them to the shore.

Three had lost consciousness; every assistance was afforded them, and
the women especially lavished upon them the most assiduous attention.

The result of this episode was the intermingling of the parties; the
defenders of the bridge had advanced on the shore as far as the middle
of the passage, and were surrounding the handsome Sigild, who, with a
smile upon his lips, was answering all the questions addressed to him by
reassuring words. He might be seen slightly shrugging his shoulders and
shaking his head in graceful fashion. An armed struggle was no longer
possible, and the war-cry had been exchanged for laughter. A more
compact group, however, consisting of members of the two parties, were
keeping up a lively discussion along one of the parapets of the bridge,
when one of the inhabitants of the valley, to whom the attention of
those surrounding him seemed to be directed, mounted the hand-rail with
agility, and, fastening his buckler to his shoulder, plunged into the
river.

He soon re-appeared, and swimming with vigour and address, gained a
footing on the bank at the base of the promontory.

The hurraing on the opposite shore recommenced; in an instant the two
boats were filled by men of the valley, and others crossed swimming,
partly aided by the boats, which soon reached the other side. Some
vessels towed across conveyed considerable numbers--so many, indeed,
that the holders of the bridge saw themselves placed between two hostile
bodies, should they persist in their resolution. The laughter was kept
up on both sides, and was communicated even to the warriors posted on
the passage. The knot of defenders became less and less dense, and if
they did not retreat _en masse_--which would have called forth a fresh
burst of hilarity--they were gradually retiring. Soon the platform of
the bridge was deserted by all but the surly instigator of the strife,
whose insolent words had almost occasioned a sanguinary struggle. He
indeed was not laughing; when he saw himself abandoned he threw his
sword into the river, and making himself a passage through the crowd, he
bent his steps towards the valley. The handsome Sigild, surrounded by
the greater part of the warriors, was on his way upwards towards the
camp, and the whole multitude was following him.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: _Chases_--a kind of trousers divided down the legs and
fastened with bandelets.]




CHAPTER III.

_THE FIRST SIEGE._


Thirty years after the event just related, the valley of Avon still
preserved its smiling aspect and was covered with rustic habitations;
there might be seen, however, in front of and behind the bridge just
mentioned, two groups of houses in pretty close proximity: the first in
the direction of the valley, the second on the lower <DW72>s of the
plateau. A considerable number of boats were moored on the two banks
below the bridge, and were receiving or discharging packages covered
with wrappers made of rushes. On the top of the promontory was seen the
outline of a rampart made of stone, wood, and earth, but with square
towers composed in great part of timber and wattle-work, about a hundred
paces apart. Outside the inclosure rose palisades of no great height, in
front of a ditch six feet wide by three or four feet deep. The entrances
to the Oppidum, which still occupied the place previously indicated,
were amply environed outside by stakes connected by branches of trees.
At the lower end of the two sunk roads were raised besides two towers of
timber and wattle-work.

Grave events had been the cause of these changes.

The meeting announced in the preceding chapter had taken place on the
plateau. The uproar and confusion that prevailed threatened a sanguinary
conclusion. The warriors insisted on adhering to the programme sketched
by the handsome Sigild, and on reserving to themselves the privilege of
guarding the camp.

The chiefs of the tribes would not agree to this. The Ovates, the wisest
among the Druids, had been consulted. But their responses, of a somewhat
ambiguous character, did not satisfy the multitude.

The latter (the Ovates) declared in the first place, that the Nemede
could not be touched without drawing down the gravest calamities upon
the tribes; that the flocks belonging to the college must be allowed to
graze undisturbed on the plateau; and that if any peril threatened the
inhabitants of the valley, they, the Druids, would be able to give
timely warning to the defenders. During this deliverance the handsome
Sigild wore his accustomed smile and suavely shook his head in his usual
manner, but said not a word. The Druidesses, seated along the inclosure
of the Nemede, their hands on their knees in a musing attitude, appeared
to take no part in the discussion. The men were divided into groups, and
it seemed as if no decision would be arrived at before sunset. Hunger
and thirst began to be keenly felt, and the women were spreading on the
turf the provisions they had brought. At this juncture one of the
Druidesses, at the solicitation of her companions, advanced into the
midst of the assembly. She was young, tall, and dressed in a long white
robe--a kind of dalmatic without a girdle; and her bare arms were
adorned with bracelets of black glass. On seeing her every voice was
hushed, and surrounded by her companions, who had followed her, she
spoke thus:--

"You who are assembled here, who live in peace, thinking you have no
enemy to fear, are unable calmly to deliberate and adopt a wise
resolution. How will it be when the enemy is upon you? And I warn you
that such an enemy is near; he is preparing his arms and reckoning his
spoils in the pillage of your flocks and the plunder of your houses;
indeed he is already rejoicing in a victory which he deems certain
because he knows you are not in a condition to act in concert to resist
him.

"Abandon this place, which you are incapable of defending, since you
know not how to fortify it; return to your houses, and await in careless
ease the hour of peril." Around the young woman, pale with emotion, and
who spoke without a gesture or a movement, as if the words she was
slowly pronouncing had issued from a statue, the multitude had assembled
in a compact mass. A tremulous agitation ran through the crowd like the
breeze through the corn. Then, by one of those instinctive movements
which sway the multitude, all eyes were turned towards Sigild. The
latter, standing in front of the Druidess, who had remained rigid as a
statue on the stone that served her as a tribune, had his eyes fixed on
the ground contrary to his usual custom, as if he could not endure the
fire of all these glances directed towards him.

Through the murmurs of the crowd the name of Sigild could be vaguely
distinguished. "Let Sigild be our Brenn!" said a voice. Immediately
thousands of voices repeated, "Let Sigild be our Brenn!" It seemed then
as if all those who a few minutes before were of opinions widely
contrary had but a single thought, a single soul, a single voice.

Sigild was therefore proclaimed Brenn, and the night passed in joyous
festivities.

Whether the young Druidess had been informed of the projects formed
against the happy inhabitants of the valley of Avon, or whether
inspiration or chance had led to the coincidence, only a few months had
passed since the meeting in question, when they observed certain
strangers roaming about the hills, who speedily disappeared when the
inhabitants began to question them; and subsequently a larger number of
merchants than was customary, arrived in the valley. They were insolent,
endeavoured to embroil themselves with the inhabitants, and uttered
menaces when their assumptions were met by reason; and several of them
who were expelled from the country threatened to return and avenge
themselves.

One day, in fact, the heights that surrounded the valley appeared
occupied one after the other by troops of armed men.

Meanwhile Sigild, elected Brenn, had lost no time. He had first
assembled around him all his old companions in arms; and many young men
who preferred a life of war to the peaceful pursuits of the shepherd or
the husbandman had also joined him.

The new Brenn had gold, and on occasions would pay men to work at the
Oppidum. Full of respect and deference for the Druids, he had
embellished the Nemede; and seemed to engage in no undertaking till he
had consulted the Ovates. He gave them the produce of his hunting
expeditions, and had caused a decree to be made that the fishery above
the bridge should be reserved for the college.

The camp was assuming day by day a more formidable aspect, but the Brenn
and his men, with the college of the Druids, were the only persons
entitled to sojourn there. As on former occasions, every man of the
valley was obliged to devote one day in four to the work of
fortification; moreover, the inhabitants of the Val d'Avon supplied the
warriors with provisions. They were, however, beginning to murmur, and
to complain of the exactions of the latter; and things would probably
have not long continued on this footing, when the threatened enemy
appeared.

The sound of trumpets was immediately heard in the camp: it was the
signal agreed upon; and the unfortunate families of the valley might be
seen rushing in disorder towards the bridge, driving their cattle before
them, and carrying with them on their backs or in waggons their most
valued property, with provisions, clothes, and even furniture. The
bridge not being wide enough for the passage of the distracted multitude
who were thronging towards it, boats were heavily laden with people, and
many foundered.

The armed bands that had appeared on the hills, whether as a matter of
prudence or because they were waiting for the command to advance, made
no haste to descend into the valley, and night came without a single
enemy having quitted his post of observation.

This night was a painful one for the inhabitants of the valley. It was
autumn, and the cold was already beginning to be felt. They were
arriving breathless in the camp, covered with sweat; the sharp air of
the night was freezing their limbs. They were calling to or searching
for each other in the crowd, and although space was not wanting, it
seemed as if this multitude would never succeed in housing itself on the
plateau. Fires were being lighted, and the warriors, Sigild's
companions, were hastening to and fro on horseback among the distracted
crowd, endeavouring to make themselves heard and to introduce a little
order into this confusion; for each tribe had had its quarters traced
out for it by the wise foresight of the Brenn. But those who had arrived
first at any spot were loath to quit it and take up their baggage again
to carry it elsewhere. The animals were lowing or bleating, the children
were crying, and the women lamenting. The valley presented a quite
different spectacle; animated the night before, lighted up by the
household fires that sparkled through the trees, and filled with the
sounds of evening, it was now silent and deserted; not a light nor the
least appearance of life could be distinguished. A pale fog was diffused
over the meadows. At nightfall Sigild ordered the barriers of the camp
to be closed, prohibiting, on pain of death, their being opened to any
person whatever. Thus many belated families had to await the return of
day below the ramparts.

With smiling countenance the Brenn was leisurely traversing on horseback
the various quarters of the camp: he was addressing all he met, and his
gentle, penetrating voice seemed to restore order and silence wherever
it was heard. His words and counsels, and the fatigue that was taking
possession of the crowd, had soon caused an appearance of calm to
succeed the confusion that prevailed at first. Then the Brenn re-entered
the hut he had caused to be constructed for himself on the projecting
summit of the promontory, in front of the Nemede, and summoned Tomar
into his presence.

Tomar was one of the stranger warriors whom Sigild had kept near him
after the meeting above mentioned. Had these foreign warriors been
forced to quit their native regions in consequence of the devastation of
their estates and the ruin of their families, as the Brenn had affirmed;
or had they been banished by their countrymen for certain misdeeds? We
cannot say. Certain it is that they were devoted body and soul to
Sigild, who on his part was in a position liberally to reward their
devotion. Tomar was of medium height, and his large head, on a short
neck bristling with harsh, thick hair, seemed to move with difficulty.
His face also preserved a kind of immobility; and but for his grey eyes,
which, under his bushy eyebrows, seemed to penetrate in every
direction, the man might have been taken for a rough-hewn image of wood.
With curved back, long arms, always falling down by the side of his
body, and legs heavy and bent, Tomar could nevertheless perform a march
of twelve hours in succession without turning his head. Yet at the end
of the journey this automaton-like being had seen all that was visible
through the whole route, and could give an account of what he had
observed with the most minute exactness and in the most perfect
sequence. He could speak many Gallic dialects, but no one--not even
Sigild--knew his past history. Tomar rarely laughed. A travelling
merchant had brought an ape into the valley; and witnessing the grimaces
of this specimen of the quadrumana, Tomar burst into a fit of laughter.
It was almost the only time that he had permitted himself such an
ebullition, and if any one wanted to provoke anything like a smile upon
his rigid countenance, he must mention the ape.

[Illustration: SIGILD AND TOMAR.]

As his manner was, Tomar entered the Brenn's hut as noiselessly as a
cat, and placing himself before Sigild said, "Here I am!" "Tomar, I rely
upon thy aid." "Yes." "Thou wilt go out of the camp without a single
person--mind, a single person--suspecting thy departure." "Yes." "Thou
wilt go to the border of the Sequani; thou understandest? Thou wilt
speak to Ditovix; thou understandest?" "Yes." "Thou wilt ask him for
five hundred warriors who have nothing to lose." "Yes." "Thou wilt tell
him that these warriors will find here lands and wealth." "Yes." "Thou
wilt conduct them through the forests, getting all the information thou
canst." "Yes." "Thou wilt require three days to go; one day to arrange
matters with Ditovix; to assemble the five hundred warriors, six days;
to bring them here, four days; altogether fourteen days. The evening of
the fourteenth, dating from to-morrow morning, thou and the five hundred
warriors will be at a distance of three miles from the camp, towards the
north, in the woods. At sunset thou wilt place a pole at the top of one
of the highest trees; when the first quarter of the night has expired
thou will hoist a lighted <DW19> on the summit of the pole. Thy warriors
will be under arms, and you will immediately rush upon the enemies
between us and you. We shall make a sally at the same time, and fall
upon them." "The enemies will be there?" "The enemies are sure to be
there, because if they wish to besiege the camp they cannot take up any
other position. They are sure to be there." "Very well, I set out."
"Listen! if you meet any parties of the enemy, say that you have been
wronged by us, and that you are seeking vengeance, knowing that we are
on the point of yielding to them. They will either accept or refuse your
co-operation. If they accept it, the warriors of Ditovix will occupy a
part of the enemy's camp, and at the signal agreed on will spread
confusion on all sides, while we make a sortie from the ramparts, and
fall upon them; if they refuse it, you will pretend to be greatly
irritated, but will affect to retire, and at the close of the day you
will return to the place mentioned." "But if the enemy occupy that
spot?" "They will not occupy it, because we shall compel them to
concentrate their forces around us. Stop, here is gold, and a ring well
known to Ditovix. Listen further. During the attack, as it will be at
midnight, the warriors thou bringest and our men, not being acquainted
with each other, might engage in mutual slaughter. Before the battle let
each of thy men put on a necklace of grass, and set fire to everything
that can burn. That will be easy; the enemy will make himself a shelter
with branches: we shall wear necklaces like yours, and will light fires
on our side. Next, when making the attack, let all thy men shout
'Sigild!' Ours will answer with the same cry. To ensure the lighting of
the fires, take burning embers in earthen vessels; let there be at least
one of these to every five men. If the enemy accept your aid, keep as
much as possible in separate quarters, so that it will not be difficult
for you to make your grass necklaces, and you will have your lighted
fires to use, while you will also avail yourselves of the fire made by
the enemy. But if through distrust they separate you into small parties,
arrange beforehand your signals of attack, and instead of grass
necklaces, have the right leg bare.... Fourteen days!" "I understand."

[Illustration: FIG. 6.]

Sigild had surrounded the camp with a number of wooden towers placed on
the old rampart, which had been strengthened. These towers, whose
appearance is shown in Fig. 6, were made of trunks of trees piled one
upon another, and framed at their extremities. They projected from the
rampart. At their summit was constructed a wooden floor surrounded by a
parapet of wattling; and this floor was reached by means of a ladder
placed inside the tower. The under story gave shelter to the men charged
with the defence of the towers, and who watched from the top. If they
perceived any suspicious movement without, it was their duty to give the
alarm by blowing a horn. Sigild had fixed the number of men for each
tower at twenty. Two of these twenty men remained day and night on the
platform, the day and the night being each divided into four parts;
there were eight men on duty during the day and eight during the night.
Of the four remaining, the first was constituted chief of the tower; the
second was intrusted with the stores, and the distribution of food and
munitions; the third was to be at the disposal of the chief of the
tower, to carry messages and seek for help in case of need; and the
business of the fourth was to repair the injuries caused to the defences
in the event of an attack.

As the circumvallation measured four thousand five hundred paces, and
the towers were one hundred paces apart, there were forty-five towers,
including the stronger and loftier ones placed on the two sides of the
entrances. Nine hundred men sufficed to guard them. Sigild had taken the
precaution of having a store of timber and branches brought within the
inclosure of the Oppidum. By his care the wells had been deepened, and a
trench dug outside the ramparts, towards the north. In addition to the
flocks that habitually grazed within the camp, a great number of cattle
had been brought by the fugitives to the plateau. But it would not have
been possible to feed all these animals if stores of fodder had not been
laid in beforehand. Accordingly, great stacks of grass had been placed
along beside the rampart, thatched with reeds.

Between the towers the guarding of the ramparts was intrusted to a
thousand men, put under the order of fifty-three chiefs; the two
entrances were under the command of warriors of tried courage, and well
known to Sigild.

This garrison, consisting of about two thousand men, had long been
settled in the camp, and had partly executed the work of its
fortification. As to the fugitives, they might have amounted to twelve
thousand; and out of this number two thousand at least were able to
fight, were provided with arms, and had been habituated to endurance.

In place of the original huts, which had fallen to decay, Sigild had
formed a kind of _halles_, or vast sheds. There were eight of these
sheds; one for every tribe. In front of each were disposed, at regular
distances, circular fire-places, formed with flat stones, and intended
for cooking. As soon as the sun appeared above the horizon a confused
sound of voices succeeded to the silence which had gradually fallen upon
the plateau. But Sigild had not lost time during the night. Orders had
been given to his trusty followers; eight mounted chiefs, followed by
armed men, went among the multitude of fugitives, and pointed out to
each tribe the locality that had been assigned it. Whether through
lassitude, or from a sense of danger, the multitude obeyed, and towards
the middle of the day the camp had ceased to present the appearance of
disorder it exhibited the evening before. Around the sheds, which were
insufficient for such a number of families, might be seen men making
huts with branches. The larger animals were fastened to stakes, and
browsed on the grass which had not been too much trodden; the sheep were
folded, and the women were preparing the day's repast; in every quarter
the children were running about, and seemed to enjoy this new life. As
to the warriors, they silently kept watch on the ramparts and the
towers.

In the morning the valley was filled with a thick mist, and the hills
were visible on either side above it; upon their ridges was no sign of
the enemy, and from the white vapour which hid the valley, not a sound
issued. Had the enemy withdrawn? Was it a false alarm?

From the camp the course of the river was scarcely distinguishable
beneath the thick cloud of mist which covered it. Towards the end of
the first quarter of the day Sigild sent out a detachment of a hundred
men, with orders to explore the bridge and the banks of the river and
rivulet. If no enemy appeared they were to follow the course of the
latter and to reconnoitre towards the north; they were to avoid engaging
with the enemy. Ten men were to remain upon the bridge to collect
brushwood, and set fire to it the moment they saw the enemy in the
valley. Gradually the fog dispersed, and at noon the sun shone out in
all its splendour through the whole extent of the valley. Nothing broke
the silence, the air was still, and in the distance, cattle that had
been forgotten were seen quietly grazing. Many of the fugitives wished
to leave the camp and return to their houses, with a view to remaining
there, or to fetch articles which they had been unable to bring away.
Sigild doubled the posts at the gates, with orders not to let any one go
out. He went from one to another, trying to make the people understand
that the enemy, far from withdrawing, was only waiting an occasion to
seize the unwary who attempted to return to their homes. "They are in
ambush," he urged; "they hope that you will relapse into security and
will become their prey without a struggle; for though they covet your
goods, they are still more anxious to get possession of your persons:
they will carry you off to sell you, your wives and your children, as
slaves among the nations beyond the mountains." Despite this warning,
however, a great number were crowding towards the points of exit, and
the armed men had hard work to keep the multitude back, when there
arrived at the eastern entrance fifty of the warriors sent by Sigild to
reconnoitre. They were covered with mud and sweat. When interrogated by
the Brenn, they said that about three thousand paces from the camp,
towards the north, among the woods, and although they were proceeding
cautiously, they saw themselves all at once surrounded by the enemy:
that many of them had been killed or captured; that they owed their
escape only to their knowledge of the neighbourhood, and that they
effected it by rushing into a narrow ravine filled with underwood and
decayed trunks of trees, and leading down to the rivulet, not far from
the camp. "Your chief is killed?" said the Brenn. "We do not know." "You
left him behind you!" "We had orders to avoid any engagement." "You have
not abandoned your arms?" "We have our arms." "Go and take rest." In an
instant the entrances were clear, and the crowd returned in silence to
its camping grounds.

Sigild then went to the northern end of the camp; he looked long through
the depths of the forest; then he summoned to this front five hundred
armed men from the tribes, besides those who were at their post; he
stationed them behind the parapet, and ordered them to keep silence. He
went into each of the towers raised on that side, and spoke in a low
voice to each of the chiefs. Then all at once a shout arose from the
southern side of the plateau. The Brenn mounted his horse and rode off
hastily in that direction; but on his way he was told that the bridge
was on fire, and that the ten warriors stationed there were coming in by
the western gate.

"You have seen the enemy?" said Sigild, when the ten warriors made their
appearance. "We have seen them: they were advancing in a strong body
towards the bridge, endeavouring to screen themselves behind the reeds
and willows." Then Sigild selected a hundred men from among his best
warriors, and posted them on the <DW72>s of the plateau outside the
western gate, ordering them to pile up underwood and trunks of trees in
the sunken road, to keep behind on the banks, and not use their bows
and slings till they saw the enemy near the barricade; and if they
attempted an assault on this point in a considerable body, to retire
within and occupy the ramparts, helping those intrusted with their
defence. In reality, however, the Brenn did not anticipate any serious
attack on that side, which was difficult of approach. He thought the
enemy would not attempt an assault with a river at their back, even
should they succeed in crossing it. His attention was once more directed
to the north. On this side, in fact, the camp is separated only by a
slight hollow from the adjacent plateau, which widens and affords space
for the gathering of a large number of troops, and a secure retreat in
case of failure. He had also ascertained that the enemy already occupied
the wide, forest-covered plateau.

Sigild again rode through the whole length of the camp at a walking
pace, uttering here and there words of encouragement whenever he
encountered looks of alarm. His calmness, his frank and agreeable
expression, reassured the most timid. Night fell by the time he reached
the ramparts on the northern side. Silence still reigned in the woods.
When it was quite dark, some boys were let down by his orders over the
parapet, loaded with bundles of straw and dry grass; their instructions
were to untie these bundles in the ditch sunk at this point at the foot
of the escarpment. Then with the help of poles held down to them the
children climbed back again. Sigild allowed only a few small fires to be
lighted, screened by the height of the rampart, and all awaited the
issue. The Brenn walked about conversing in a low voice with some of his
trusty men, and the warriors standing around the smouldering fires,
which threw a red glare upon them, exchanged only a few low and hurried
words. Now and then a laugh escaped, but it was immediately stifled.
The guard of the rampart had orders to keep a good look out, and if they
perceived the enemy, to raise no cry. They were to give the alarm only
by throwing clods of turf on the fires. They were not to show their
heads above the wattle parapet. The night was clear, but there was no
moon.

At the middle of the first quarter of the night one of the chiefs came
down from the rampart walk and approached the Brenn.

"The enemy are coming," said he.

"What proof hast thou?"

"I heard the cracking of dead branches." Sigild ascended the rampart
surrounded by several warriors. "To your posts!" he said, in a low
voice. That very moment some clods of earth fell upon the fires,
scattering a shower of sparks.

Sigild and the watchmen had observed certain forms of a whitish
appearance that seemed to be creeping towards the counterscarp. Some of
them let themselves down into the ditch, and pushing one another up
scaled the escarpment; they succeeded in reaching the wattling. Hearing
no sound inside, they turned round and helped up others. When about
fifty were at the top of the escarpment, poles were handed to them
furnished with hooks, which they fixed into the wattling: then those who
had remained on the counterscarp pulled the poles with all their force.

The wattling gave way, and the assailants rushed on to the rampart walk.
Thrust back by the swords of the defenders, the greater number rolled
down to the bottom of the fosse. Then, in accordance with the orders of
the Brenn, flaming brands were thrown among the straw placed at the
bottom of the ditch; it took fire, and, spreading a bright light,
brought into view a broad front of enemies. From the summits of the
towers the slings and bows discharged a shower of stones and arrows upon
them. Many of the defenders were preparing to cross the debris of the
wattling and get down the escarpment to throw themselves upon the enemy,
but the Brenn stopped them, threatening with death any who should quit
the rampart. The surprise had failed, and the ranks of the enemy wavered
and retired out of range of the missiles.

The Brenn, however, caused the wattling to be repaired as far as
circumstances allowed, and doubled the ranks of the defenders on the
rampart, as well to present a firm front to the assailants as to hold
back the men of the foremost rank whom the enemy should seek to pull
down into the ditch. Besides this, he formed between each tower small
bodies of twenty men, who were to hasten to the weak points and to hurl
down any of the assailants who should gain a footing on the rampart.
Then he sent some of his trusty men on horseback to the eastern and
western fronts, to convey intelligence, or to give warning in the event
of attacks being made on several points at once.

Scarcely were these measures taken when the enemy were seen returning in
considerable strength to the ditch; with loud cries they rushed up the
escarpment. They were warmly received, and the ditch was being filled
with the dead and wounded, facilitating the passage of those who
followed, especially as many bore fascines. After two attempts the
assailants gained a footing on one of the ramparts; but the reserve
bodies attacked them in front, while the men from the towers issuing
right and left took them in flank.

Whether the lighted straw had not been quite extinguished, or the
besieged had thrown more burning brands into the ditch, some fascines
took fire, burning the wounded, who uttered the most dreadful cries.

The attack languished, and at length the leaders of the besieging host
gave the signal for retreat.

A certain number of the assailants had remained alive in the power of
the besieged, and Sigild gave orders that they should be guarded and not
put to death. As to the wounded lying within the ramparts, they were
killed.

Towards the middle of the night fires were seen to be lighted in the
woods, about a thousand paces from the camp. The besieged had lost a few
men only, but the ditch was filled with the enemy's dead and wounded.
The groans of the latter were the only interruption to the quiet of the
night.

Sigild slept not; he kept half the warriors on vigorous guard during the
third quarter of the night, and the other half during the last quarter.

Those who were not on guard slept around the fires. The Brenn, when the
assault was over, had sent messengers to the chiefs of the eight tribes
to acquaint them with the happy result of this first engagement.

At break of day the Brenn had the prisoners brought before him. Two or
three of them spoke the language of the valley, but with a foreign
accent.

Clothed in drawers laced around, and a tunic of undyed wool, with a
broad strap which served them for a girdle, they looked not unlike some
of those merchants who occasionally came into the valley to barter
yellow amber and bronze for corn, cheese, tanned hides, and wool. "Why
do you come to attack us?" said Sigild. "We have been driven from the
lands we have inhabited from the most ancient times, by hordes from the
north. These men have killed many of us, taken away our wives, and
murdered our children: the stronger among us have combined together,
and crossing a wide river on rafts, we have travelled onwards towards
the setting sun, seeking a home. Two days' journey from this spot we
were told that this country is good and can afford sustenance to many;
so we have come hither.

"When our chiefs saw that you shut yourselves up in this place,
regarding us as enemies, they told us we must first make ourselves
masters of the camp. We obeyed. We are only doing to you what has been
done to us." "Why not have sent some of your number to ask of us what
you required?" "I do not know." "You have come as enemies, and as
enemies we have received you. How many are you?" "A great many." "Go
seek your chiefs and tell them that if by nightfall their entire host
have not quitted the land of Avon, the captives we have made here shall
suffer." "I will not go." "Why?" "Because our chiefs will not leave this
land. Put us to death; for if any of your party have fallen into the
hands of our men, they are doomed to death to avenge our comrades killed
this night." "Good." Sigild ordered that the captives should be fettered
till he had decided on their fate.

The Brenn was very anxious that the enemy should take up a position
towards the north, opposite to the weak point of the Oppidum.
Accordingly he was continually reconnoitring on the eastern and western
fronts as far as the river and the other side of the rivulet, to prevent
the besiegers from establishing themselves in either quarter. Upon the
steep sides of the plateau, opposite the burnt bridge, Sigild had placed
a small camp guarded by two hundred men. The reconnoitring parties,
which he sent out in large numbers, had orders to bring back into the
camp all the fodder and strayed cattle they could find, engaging the
enemy only when they encountered them in small bodies.

But the invaders did not seem to be contemplating another assault. They
took up their quarters in the woods to the north and on the <DW72>s of
the hills, right and left, leaving between them and the camp the river
and the rivulet; marauding parties might also be seen in the valley,
foraging, and pillaging the deserted dwellings. On the other side of the
destroyed bridge they formed a wide palisading strengthened by
barricading of timber; and two days afterwards they had constructed a
floating bridge on the river, formed with trunks of trees fastened
together and kept in place by a kind of dam made with piles of timber
fixed in the bed of the river and inclined up the stream.

It was evident that the besiegers were in no hurry; that they were
living upon the provisions left in the valley; and that it was their
intention to reduce the besieged by famine.

In fact the inhabitants of the Val d'Avon had been able to carry with
them only a small quantity of provisions. They had their cattle, but
these being badly fed and crowded together were dying in great numbers;
the cows ceased to give milk, and the store of forage was rapidly
diminishing.

On the sixth day of the investment, the chiefs of the tribes proposed to
the Brenn to cut their way through the enemy's lines while their men
still preserved their strength entire, and not to wait till the utter
failure of provisions should place them at the mercy of the invaders. Of
course the Brenn opposed this proposition, declaring that the day of
deliverance would come, and that they must have patience. Nevertheless
it was of great consequence to him that the enemy should concentrate his
forces on the northern side. Accordingly, one evening at nightfall, he
collected two bodies of men, one at the eastern, the other at the
western gate. He had observed that the enemy used to prepare their
morning meal just before noon, and that of the evening at sunset. After
the evening repast they were heard singing and shouting.

When the opportune moment arrived he divided each of his bodies into
two. The first two halves were to march along the ramparts parallel to
one another till they reached the woods; there they were to rush on the
two flanks of the besiegers' outposts; they were not to prolong the
attack, but to fall back with all speed to the northern salient of the
Oppidum. An issue would be open at this point. In the meantime, the two
other halves would unite, provided with stakes, before this salient,
where, with the aid of palisading, they would make an advanced work
(Fig. 7) and then fall back one hundred paces to the right and left.

[Illustration: FIG. 7.]

The men who guarded the north front had orders to cut an opening in the
rampart twenty paces wide, and to throw fascines and clods of turf into
the ditch, and have wattles ready to close the opening instantly.

The first two detachments, therefore, set out in silence; that on the
western side left a little before the one on the east, so as to arrive
at the same time on the enemy's flank. The two other detachments
preceded them, and stationing themselves at the northern extremity of
the Oppidum, drove in their stakes according to the instructions given,
and then fell back to right and left. A fine autumnal rain was falling,
and the ground was slippery. Some time elapsed before the two
detachments found themselves in sight of the enemy's camp. The besiegers
had no outposts; but their army encamped in front of the Oppidum, and at
a distance of about six hundred paces from it, was intrenched behind
barricades of timber; the intrenchment presented an extended front.
Their men might be seen around the fires, talking loudly, singing, and
drinking cider and mead, of which they had found abundance in the houses
of the valley. An attack on this front was not to be thought of; they
must get round it. So the two detachments separated farther and farther
from each other, and advanced with the greatest difficulty along the
bogs and under the woods in momentary fear of being seen by the enemy.
At length the one which was manoeuvring on the right reached the end of
the front, got under cover, and awaited the signal, which was to be
given by the one on the left by the blowing of a horn; for the Brenn had
calculated that the former would reach the extremity of the front before
the latter.

The time, however, was getting on, and Sigild, who had advanced with
several warriors on horseback along the verge of the wood, still heard
nothing. He sent two of his warriors to ascertain where the two
detachments were; they had great difficulty in making their way through
the wood, while the enemy's fires, which they saw in the distance
through the trees, only added to their difficulties, by preventing them
from seeing the ground they were riding over. The right front of the
enemy towards the river formed a lengthened curve, and the left
detachment kept advancing parallel with the front without finding a
point of attack.

Midnight had passed when this detachment found itself at last before an
opening left in the barricade, but this opening formed an interior
angle, which rendered the attack very hazardous. The detachment waited
until all was silent in the camp. The fires, fed only at irregular
intervals, cast here and there a fluctuating light, and fewer shadows
were passing before the braziers.

One of the warriors sent by Sigild was approaching; he considered that
the attack on this point should not be deferred, and that the enemy must
be surprised during his first sleep.

One of the men gave the signal agreed upon, and the troops rushed
through the opening, slaying all before them with terrific shouts,
scattering the fires and forming in triangle, so as to prevent the enemy
from getting round them. They did not proceed very far, for at the cries
of the assailants and of the wounded, men were seen to rise up on every
side and hasten towards the point of attack. The little troop then
closed, and ceasing to advance, turned and fled back towards the
Oppidum, following the verge of the wood along the steep banks of the
river. A long-continued shout was then heard on the enemy's left; the
attack had begun on that side also.

Whether the enemy, which had started in pursuit of the left detachment,
had succeeded in getting round it, or whether the detachment itself lost
its way in the darkness, it was unable to regain the plateau in time,
and continued to follow the course of the river.

As to the troop detached on the right, being less distant from the
Oppidum, directly it found itself pressed by a numerous body of the
enemy, it retired in good order, and went direct to the angle of the
intrenchments, as had been arranged, hotly pursued by the crowd of
besiegers. At the same time most of the enemy's forces that had started
in pursuit of the left detachment were coming on the ground.

The Brenn had anticipated the contingency of the attack which he had
arranged not succeeding in every point. Despite the darkness, he saw
that his people were not in advance, as they ought to have been, of the
hostile warriors who were making their appearance on his left; he
therefore quickly retired within the outwork of stakes which had been
formed by his orders, and commanded the straw fires to be lighted.

The two detachments in ambuscade to the right and left outside the
rampart had orders to refrain from attack till a signal agreed upon had
been given. At the barrier of stakes, then, there arrived at the same
time the right detachment in flight, that portion of the enemy who were
in close pursuit of them, and those who were looking for the errant left
detachment.

A great number entered pell-mell into the triangular space formed by the
stakes. It became the scene of an indescribable _melee_; those who were
defending the wattling which closed the breach dared not make any
openings for their brethren-in-arms whom they saw engaged with the
enemy. The Brenn struck into the midst of the crowd trying to rally his
men. He succeeded in cutting his way up to the wattling, against which
he leaned his back; and the warriors of the right detachment being
encouraged by his example, presented a head to the enemy, whose numbers,
however, continually augmented. A few minutes more and they would have
been swept down by the multitude of the assailants; the last comers were
urging on those in front of them, and the wattling and the warriors who
defended it would have been borne down by the tide. The Brenn, with his
long sword, was making a circle of dead and wounded around him. Then
shouting over the parapet to give the signal, the sound of trumpets
arose above the yells of the combatants. The enemy seemed to hesitate
for a moment; then, closing into a compact body, they rushed upon the
barricade, which gave way as if swept by a torrent.

At the same instant loud shouts were heard on each of the enemy's
flanks; the two troops in ambuscade attacked the confused column outside
the rampart....

The combat did not cease until daybreak. Those of the enemies who had
succeeded in penetrating into the Oppidum were killed or captured. The
triangle of broken stakes was strewn in every direction with the dead.
The enemy, disconcerted by the two simultaneous flank attacks, and
finding himself cut in two, was no longer able in the darkness to
concert an assault, and retired. Nevertheless, those who had been taken
in the outwork and at the gap of the Oppidum fought obstinately to the
last, and the captives who were driven before the Brenn were all more
less severely wounded.

Sigild was covered with blood and dirt; his great black horse had been
killed in the last _melee_, and he himself had been trampled on.

He ascended the nearest tower, and saw that the enemy remained not far
off; they were forming a contravallation of barricading three hundred
paces from the Oppidum. Their attitude was threatening, and it was to be
feared that they meditated another attack. The Brenn, therefore, had the
gap immediately repaired and the parapet strengthened with strong
stakes about two feet apart. Besides this, he sunk a second ditch with
intrenchment in a concave line, within the northern salient of the
Oppidum. This intrenchment could not be seen from without. He contrived
an egress at either end against a tower. The object was attained; the
enemy was concentrating himself in front of the weak salient of the
Oppidum, and was drawing nearer. The defenders, however, ignorant of the
motives which had induced the Brenn to attempt the hazardous sortie of
the previous night, shook their heads and appeared anxious. If two or
three hundred of the enemy had been killed, they had lost nearly as
many.

The women whose husbands were dead were filling the camp with their
lamentations. Yet it was essential that Sigild should possess the
confidence of his brethren in arms till the _denoument_ he had prepared
should arrive. He called together the chiefs of the tribes. "You see
plainly," said he, "that we cannot break through the lines which inclose
the camp. The enemy are very numerous and daring, and not to be
disconcerted. Besides, can we think of leaving here the aged, the women,
and the children to become their prey! It is very certain that even if a
troop of brave warriors could cut their way through such a host of
enemies, the women, the aged, and the children could not follow them.

"My object in the sortie of last night was to force the enemy to
concentrate all his forces towards the north; which he will be all the
more disposed to do, as it is the weakest point of the Oppidum. When we
have thus drawn him to that side, obliging him to withdraw from the
hill-sides, we will go down on a dark night into the valley, cross the
river by a bridge which I shall have in readiness and which fifty men
will be able to put in place, and fly towards the river. When we find
that we have no more provisions left than we are able to take with us,
friends with whom I am in communication will guide us to some
neighbouring tribes of our race, and who will give us a hearty welcome,
because they want help in cultivating the broad lands they possess. You
may therefore bid the tribes and the warriors take courage: every
contingency is provided for. But if the plan is to succeed, we must not
allow the enemy a moment's peace while we remain here."

Having nothing better to suggest, the chiefs of the tribes appeared to
put faith in Sigild's words. His confident air, his good looks, the
energy he displayed, and the care he took to make himself acquainted
with everything, continued to secure for him the sympathy of the
unfortunate refugees.

In the little camp above the burnt bridge he had, in accordance with the
plan stated, some light rafts made which could be readily fastened
together. He went frequently to see the work, and appeared to attach
great importance to it. He ordered that the captives who were badly
wounded should be killed; the others taken in the last engagement were
supplied with food in abundance. Confined in a sort of pit surrounded by
stakes, they could not observe what was going on in the camp. Well
guarded in the daytime, they were by Sigild's orders scarcely watched
during the night, on the supposition that some would contrive to escape
and would make the enemy believe that there was no scarcity of
provisions, which was exactly what happened. One night, three of the
stoutest captives succeeded in getting out of the pit, and gliding along
the ramparts, regained the besieger's camp. Then Sigild had the others
killed.

Of the warriors not engaged in guarding the ramparts, the Brenn had
formed four corps of three to five hundred men each; and at certain
times of the day and night he sent them down by one or other of the
gates to harass the enemy on one side of his camp, or at both sides at
once. Neither party suffered much loss in these skirmishes, whose only
result was to keep the besiegers in constant suspense, to weary them and
oblige them to concentrate their forces. It was also evident that the
enemy were preparing for a general assault. They were seen accumulating
<DW19>s, cutting long poles, and making wicker screens.

On the morning of the fourteenth day of the siege only a few scattered
parties were seen on the surrounding hills, while in the valley the
palisading formed opposite to the ruined bridge and the raft bridge were
alone still occupied by a considerable number of troops. "It is
certain," said Sigild, to the chiefs of the tribes, "that the enemy is
preparing to attack us. We must resist this assault with vigour, and
then we will take advantage of his exhaustion and disorder to carry out
our plan of flight." The besieger's preparations appeared formidable,
and the camp opposite the northern salient of the Oppidum presented a
busy scene. Sigild on his part neglected no means of resistance, though
he calculated on the arrival of the troops summoned to their relief in
the evening. He had the towers well supplied with stones and darts: on
the ramparts he strengthened the wattle parapet, and increased the
number of inclines for reaching it easily.

Both sides were preparing for a decisive conflict. The intrenchment made
behind the salient was well manned, and the Brenn trained his men to
pass out in a body through the two egresses formed at the extremities of
the intrenchment, so as to take the assailants in flank.

That day however, passed without fighting. At sunset the Brenn ascended
one of the towers, and attentively examined the horizon. His attendants
thought he was watching the movements of the enemy; he was, in fact,
waiting for Tomar's signal. The night passed, and no signal appeared.

Repressing all signs of the serious anxiety that had oppressed him
through this tedious night, the sun had no sooner arisen than the Brenn
disposed his men at the points he thought likely to be attacked.

The enemy had formed in two large bodies three hundred paces from the
Oppidum; they had accumulated in front of them an immense quantity of
<DW19>s, beams, and wattles. The sun was already high above the horizon
when they began to move. First came a line of warriors under cover of
wicker shields, which protected them from darts and stones.

In this way they reached the counterscarp of the ditch, despite of
missiles from the towers. There they fixed the wicker shields, and
behind these a great number of the enemy bearing <DW19>s gradually
posted themselves. Then over this screen they threw a great quantity of
these <DW19>s into the ditch. When they judged that there were enough of
them, they threw flaming brands upon them.

The besieged had no means of counteracting this kind of attack. They
showered darts and stones in abundance upon the assailants, but only
wounded a few of them; nor did they seem to mind these missiles. The
wind blew from the north-west. The <DW19>s were soon kindled, and the
smoke and sparks blinded the defenders. Three of the towers took fire,
as well as the wattling of the ramparts.

Sigild, calm and unmoved, had withdrawn his men behind the second
intrenchment. "The enemy," said he, "will not be able to pass till all
is consumed; that will take time; let him mount the rampart and cry
victory. Then will be our time for action." In fact, the green wood
burned badly, and produced much smoke; the besieged threw bushes and
chips on the red-hot <DW19>s to feed the fire, and it continued burning.
The enemy were becoming impatient; the besieged looked on cheerfully.
About the middle of the afternoon, however, the fire went out at some
points; the besiegers threw earth and trunks of trees into the ditch,
and, perceiving no defenders, thought that the ramparts being intenable
were abandoned. With shouts they rushed on to the <DW72>s, leaped the
half-consumed wattling, and meeting with no resistance, descended in a
close body into the camp (Fig. 8). There they were greeted by a sudden
shower of darts and stones; but they unhesitatingly rushed upon the
intrenchment, which presented only a slight elevation and a shallow
ditch, thinking to carry it easily.

[Illustration: FIG. 8.]

But the intrenchment was strong, and furnished with thick pointed
stakes. The assailants, urging forward and aiding each other, gained its
ridge; they were received with swords and pikes, and fell back dying
upon their comrades; others filled their places. The bodies of the
wounded, which in some places gradually filled up the ditch, afforded
them a passage. Many of the enemy had succeeded in throwing themselves
into the midst of the defenders, and in opening deep passages among them
which were instantly occupied by the most daring. The deep front which
the Brenn had formed behind the intrenchment was broken. Then it was
that he unmasked the two egresses at the extremities, sending out from
both the troops of chosen warriors, who, keeping close along the
deserted rampart, fell upon the dense stream of assailants. So compact
was the crowd, and so great the pressure against the intrenchment, that
they had scarcely room to move. The two detachments above mentioned were
mowing away before them to enable them to advance. But the enemy kept
pouring in, and the space regained was immediately filled with fresh
assailants, who, disregarding the attacks on their flanks, pushed
furiously on to the centre.

The bodies of the slain and the <DW19>s had filled the ditch for the
length of a hundred paces, and the loosened stakes formed but a slight
protection to the defenders. The noise of the attack brought a great
number of women hurrying to the spot. They might be seen with bare arms,
raising stones above their heads, and hurling them with shrill cries
against the breasts of the assailants, or despatching the wounded that
had fallen inside the intrenchment with the culinary wooden pestles used
for pounding herbs and flesh in hollow stones. A shout was raised, the
crowd of assailants opened, and a hundred men were seen steadily
advancing, bearing on their shoulders an enormous trunk of a tree, and
surrounded by warriors armed with axes. This column overthrowing all in
its passage, whether friend or foe, made a wide lane in the
intrenchment, strewn with dead and wounded. The beam was already more
than half way through on the inside of the defences when the women ran
in, and rushing like she-wolves on the flanks of the column, passed
between the warriors, and clung to the legs of the bearers. The enormous
beam swayed, toppled over, and bore down in its fall both assailants and
defenders by its vast weight. Sigild profiting by the confusion, then
dashed into the breach, followed by a troop of warriors which he had not
without difficulty kept in reserve. In his return he cut himself a
passage through the crowd of assailants. Seeing this movement, the
warriors who had issued from the two ends of the inner intrenchment
redoubled their efforts. Others rushed on to the rampart-walk by the
side issues of the intrenchment, and fell upon the enemies within or
without the rampart. The latter, cramped within this narrow space, and
with their centre broken through, were unable to use their arms. Some
fell and were suffocated. Those who were on the projecting part of the
rampart began to turn and fly into the midst of their advancing
comrades, who not seeing what was taking place behind the rampart, were
for compelling them to return to the battle.

The crowd fell into confusion, and disregarding the voice of the chiefs,
accumulated in such masses in the ditch, the escarpments and the
rampart-walk, that it could act only by its weight, and offered itself
to attack without power of defence. Most threw down their bucklers which
hampered their movements.

Sigild kept advancing, and all the warriors not engaged in defending the
intrenchment formed behind him in a column which became denser each
moment. As soon as they were outside the intrenchment, these warriors
turned about and threw themselves on the bulk of the assailants, who
were separated into two masses. Caught as in a pair of pincers by
Sigild's band, and by those coming from the terminal egresses of the
intrenchment, they were slaughtered without resistance.

In vain did the chiefs of the enemy sound a retreat. The bulk of
assailants, who were massed between the rampart and the intrenchment,
could neither advance nor recede. Very few succeeded in rejoining their
companions. Fatigue alone stayed the defenders; it was no longer a
combat but a massacre.

Although the warriors of the Val d'Avon had suffered considerable loss,
the success of the defence had intoxicated them, and they were eager to
take advantage of the disorder of the enemy to sally forth from the
Oppidum and fall upon them. Sigild was obliged to swear to them by the
most terrible of oaths, that their vengeance would be more effective by
delay.

He told them, moreover, that the enemy were very numerous, and that the
losses they had suffered had not weakened them to such a degree as to
render them contemptible; that they were burning for revenge, and that
to attack them in their camp was to give them the very opportunity they
desired. The authority of the chiefs of the tribes of the Druids had,
however, to be appealed to, to keep the warriors within the Oppidum.

Night fell on the narrow battle-field covered with the dead and wounded.
The Brenn took re-possession of the ramparts, had the wattle parapet
hastily repaired, the enemy's wounded put to death, and his own carried
into the middle of the camp, where they were consigned to the care of
the women; then he ascended one of the unburnt towers of that front,
hoping to perceive Tomar's signal. But the night was hazy, and the fires
of the enemy three or four hundred paces distant were scarcely visible.

It was evident that Tomar could not have lighted his fire, or if he had
lighted it, it was impossible to see it through the haze.

The warriors after the laborious day, chilled by the autumn fog, were
sleeping around their fires. The cries of victory had been exchanged for
a death-like silence, broken only by the groans of some of the wounded
who had been forgotten.

The Brenn was considering whether it would not be wise to follow the
plan which he had indicated to the chiefs of the tribes--to leave the
camp before daybreak by crossing the river on a line of rafts, before
the enemy had time to effect a fresh assault. Provisions would certainly
fail them soon. But how move this multitude! The warriors needed rest.
"One more day," he said to himself; "and if I have no news of Tomar, I
still must consider it." Then he went out and ordered to the point
attacked a body of warriors some hundreds strong, who, having guarded
the unbroken part of the ramparts during the assault, and having taken
no part in the conflict, were fresh and vigorous. Some women even
mounted the towers. He enjoined all of them to give the alarm vigorously
if they saw the enemy approaching the ramparts, so as to rouse the
sleeping warriors. He despatched several of his trusty friends to the
other fronts of the camp, with injunctions to watch the approaches, and
to send out scouts through the gates to ascertain any movements outside,
and to light fires a little way from the ramparts, so as to illuminate
the immediate vicinity. He proceeded towards the southern extremity of
the Oppidum, and saw that the little camp above the bridge that had been
destroyed was guarded; but also perceived through the mist the fires of
the enemy in the valley opposite this point.

It was midnight, and Sigild, exhausted by fatigue, returned to the
northern side and retired to rest beneath one of the towers. Some of his
friends kept watch outside around a large fire.

The Brenn was sleeping, when a hand placed on his shoulder awaked him.
By the light of a resin torch he saw Tomar standing by him. "Is it
really thou, Tomar?" said he, thinking he was dreaming. "It is I."
"Alone?" "Alone here; the warriors are down there; the fog rendered the
signal useless: I am come." "Hast thou been seen?" "Thy warriors sleep,
no one has recognised me; a woman told me thou wert here." "Why a day
late?" "Ditovix has assembled a thousand warriors." "Ah, Ditovix is with
them." A cloud passed over the brow of the Brenn. "He is a noble
fellow," said he, after a pause. "Thou knowest that we were attacked
yesterday?" "I know it; I saw the field of the slain. The enemy are
numerous; they cannot turn back, to-morrow they will make another
attack--they are resolved to succeed." "And then?" "Then Ditovix is to
fall upon them before midday, when he knows the conflict is begun."
"Well?" "If I do not go back to Ditovix, or if he hears nothing from
you, he will make the attack." "Remain with us, then; thou art sure that
we shall be assailed in the morning?" "I passed along the enemy's
camp--they are preparing for a fresh assault; and there are warriors
following the course of the river to attack the west side also."

There was not a moment to lose. Sigild called his friends together, and
informed them that a final effort must be made--that the enemy, harassed
on their rear by neighbouring tribes, must either get possession of the
Oppidum that very day or perish. Tomar was represented as having passed
the previous day in the besiegers' camp, and become acquainted with the
position of affairs.

No one doubted the veracity of Tomar, who, so far from exaggerating,
never told a quarter of what he knew.

Sigild scarcely had at his disposal, after the various assaults that had
taken place, three thousand men in a condition to fight, deducting the
troop stationed opposite the burnt bridge. He divided his forces into
three bodies, one of about twelve hundred men to defend the northern
ramparts, the second of eight hundred posted on the western rampart, and
the third of a thousand men which he kept in the centre of the Oppidum
under his own direct command.

At the other posts around the Oppidum he placed men unaccustomed to
fight and unprovided with arms, but who were yet able to offer some
resistance if the enemy should present themselves. Women were posted in
the towers away from the points of expected attack. Their only duty was
to hurl stones at the assailants.

The day broke slowly owing to the thick vapours obscuring the sky;
nevertheless the warriors, encouraged by the words of the Brenn and by
their success the day before, awaited the enemy full of ardour. The
Druids, informed by Sigild of the arrival of help, traversed the camp
announcing that the hour of deliverance had come, and that the souls of
those who should fall were secure of the most glorious future. The
Druidesses, with dishevelled hair, fastened sacred boughs to the
wattling of the ramparts.

A body of the enemy about two thousand strong now became distinctly
visible opposite the western front of the Oppidum, with the river at its
back. Towards the end of the first quarter of the day, this troop
climbed the escarpment and stopped an arrow's flight off. It then
divided itself into eight parties, each of which, provided with <DW19>s,
proceeded towards one of the towers. The assailants were received with
a shower of arrows and stones. They advanced nevertheless without
wavering, and heaped up the <DW19>s at the foot of the towers, not
without considerable loss on their side; for the besieged hurled on them
over the parapets large pebbles and trunks of trees.

The assailants tried several times to set fire to the <DW19>s, but the
wood was damp, and the defenders threw baskets of wet earth on the
incipient flames.

The assault on the western side had continued for some time, when a vast
number of the enemy threw themselves on the northern salient, whose
towers were partly destroyed.

As on the previous day, they rushed in such a compact mass upon the
salient, that they were not long in effecting a breach.

Sigild then sent out five hundred men by the western gate to take the
assaulting column in flank, whilst he proceeded with the five hundred of
the reserve body straight to the salient. By the time he had reached
this point the enemy was already within the rampart, and his forces were
sheltered behind the intrenchment.

On seeing the heaps of the slain with which this quarter was strewed,
the fury of the enemy appeared to be redoubled, and they swept along
like a flood through a wide breach. Thinking themselves at last masters
of the Oppidum, they fell in disorder upon the troops led by Sigild.
This body, disposed crescent-wise, formed as it were a second
intrenchment, which the assailants vainly endeavoured to break through.

The five hundred men who had gone out by the eastern gate had reached
the left flank of the throng of besiegers, when a tremendous shout arose
from the enemy's camp.

Horsemen came galloping at the top of their speed towards the Oppidum.
The attacking host wavered. Assailed on their flank they made scarcely
any resistance, and a movement of disorderly retreat became more and
more clearly manifest.

Those who had gained a footing within the rampart, seeing themselves no
longer supported, or rather forced on by new-comers, turned and fled
with all haste towards the wood.

Sigild perceived that Ditovix was making his attack; then, collecting
his warriors and summoning all the men from the various parts of the
defences, he formed a dense column, and overthrowing the assailants who
were betwixt him and the rampart, passed it and rejoined the warriors
already outside: "Now," cried he, "forward! the enemy is ours; let not
one escape."

The wretched besiegers, hemmed in between the warriors of Ditovix and
those led by Sigild, although twice as numerous as the forces of their
opponents united, became utterly disorganized, no longer thought of
defending themselves, and rushing now to one side, now to the other, met
death everywhere.

Many attempted to fly towards the river or the rivulet; but at an
intimation from Sigild, Tomar, who had remained in the Oppidum, sent the
warriors posted on the ramparts in pursuit of them.

The assailants on the western front, seeing the disorder into which
their party had been thrown on the plateau, had got down towards the
banks. On that side the warriors poured forth by the western gate, broke
the bridge of rafts, and fell upon the enemy hemmed in by the river.

Those of the besiegers who did not meet their death that day, perished
of cold or hunger in the endeavour to escape pursuit. A thousand,
however, were taken; among others those who guarded the palisade in the
valley. They were slain in the Nemede in presence of the Druids and
Druidesses. Most of the bodies were thrown into the river, and for
several days the dwellers on the banks of the river found corpses
entangled among the reeds.




CHAPTER IV.

_THE COST OF DEFENDERS._


Ditovix and his warriors had done their duty bravely; the tribes of the
Val d'Avon regarded them as saviours, and when the unfortunate besieged
went back to their devastated homes, they cheerfully divided the little
that remained to them with the new-comers.

In the enemy's camp were found provisions, the fruits of pillage, and
upon the bodies of the slain a little gold, and arms; and all this was
equally distributed. But winter was approaching, the fodder that had
been collected was dispersed, the animals lost or consumed, the stores
of grain destroyed. The means of subsistence had to be procured from the
merchants, and the allies to be fed. Scarcity prevailed in this valley,
so prosperous a month before. Its saviours were exacting, and began to
ask where was that wealth and plenty which had been promised them.

Quartered in the Oppidum with the warriors of Sigild, the followers of
Ditovix assumed a domineering air on the strength of the service
rendered to the inhabitants of the Val d'Avon, and whose importance they
were incessantly magnifying. Quarrels arose continually, and it needed
all the influence which Sigild had acquired among his people to moderate
their angry feelings.

Ditovix abstained from interference in these disputes. When assistance
had been asked--he would say to Sigild,--his men had been promised
wealth of all kinds; how could he remonstrate with them if they were
left to die of want?

Ditovix had brought a thousand warriors to aid the inhabitants of the
Val d'Avon; and, in spite of the losses suffered during the action, a
month after the dispersion of the enemy's army the number of these
auxiliaries was found to have unaccountably increased.

The Druids then interfered; they represented to Ditovix that though he
and his warriors had saved the families of the valley from total
destruction, they were reduced to poverty; that if they died of hunger
the same fate would befal his men, since there was nothing left to give
them; and that in the common interest it was necessary to come to some
understanding.

Then Ditovix adopted a different attitude. "I should be willing to take
my warriors back," said he, "but I cannot. They would refuse to follow
me, and would give themselves up to excesses of all kinds. I can
scarcely prevent their proceeding from murmurs to violence. I had to
promise much to induce them to come, and they must be satisfied.
Fighting has been their constant occupation--for the most part in the
countries beyond the mountains. They are not fitted for tilling the soil
or tending cattle. What do you propose?"--"What do you ask?" said the
Druids. "I will call together the leading men among them, and explain
the state of things; and will let you know what they want."

Ditovix and Sigild consulted together, for both saw the necessity of
securing the same advantages for the warriors of the valley and the
auxiliaries, if they would avoid a collision. The two chiefs called in
some of the principal merchants who frequented the valley, to induce
them to furnish supplies in consideration of certain guarantees very
advantageous to them.

Matters being thus concluded between Sigild and Ditovix, they called
their adherents together, and had no difficulty in getting them to
accept the conditions on which they themselves had agreed.

These conditions were as follows:--The Oppidum was to be placed under
the guard of the warriors of the vale and the followers of Ditovix
exclusively of all others. Their number amounted to nearly three
thousand. The inhabitants of the valley were to give them one day in
four to help them in executing the works necessary for defence or for
building their dwellings. A fourth part of their crops and of their
cattle was to be contributed by every family of the vale for the
maintenance of the three thousand warriors. As Sigild and Ditovix took
upon themselves to supply the wants of the people during the scarcity,
all the merchandise was to be deposited beneath the promontory near the
bridge; and the inhabitants were to receive and exchange it there, being
forbidden under the severest penalties to treat directly with the
merchants.

Harsh as these fiscal arrangements were, they were obliged to accept
them. Ditovix, loaded with valuable presents, quitted the Oppidum,
leaving his followers, who accepted Sigild for their Brenn. The bridge
was quickly restored, and there arose at either end dwellings and
storehouses for the merchants and their merchandise. The chiefs of the
warriors levied a toll on all the exchanges; they had the monopoly of
the market, as they bought up all the produce that was exchanged.

Notwithstanding the pressure of fiscal burdens, nay, even as a result of
it, the inhabitants of the Val d'Avon secured a larger return from their
land than formerly, and they had a greater number of cattle. Their
commerce became more extensive, and the population increased. Many
merchants came to live in the town built at the two extremities of the
bridge.

Thirty years therefore after the siege we have just described, the
valley had become highly prosperous; though the inhabitants smarted
under the domination of the warrior caste, and considered a quarter of
their substance and of their labour a great deal too much to give to men
who lived in idleness, and whose chiefs displayed an ostentatious
luxury. Often, it is true, these warriors would undertake some
expedition, from which all did not return to the valley; but those who
came back safe and sound took care to enforce the payment of past dues,
and would then spend days in eating and drinking, and were more exacting
than ever.

They recruited from among the youth of the valley, and even from among
foreigners, for it was of importance to them that their numbers should
not diminish.

Gradually the remembrance of the events which had led to this state of
things faded from the minds of the population. The grandchildren of the
followers of Sigild and Ditovix regarded the privileges accorded to
their ancestors as a birthright; while the tillers of the soil, and the
shepherds and craftsmen of the vale, became accustomed to submission,
and finally adopted the conviction that they had come into the world to
serve and support the men who inhabited the Oppidum.




CHAPTER V.

_THE SECOND SIEGE._


Two centuries and a half had elapsed, and the Val d'Avon had become the
centre of a numerous and wealthy district of the Lingones. At the base
of the Oppidum, extending on both sides of the river, was a town-a
mercantile _depot_ of some importance; for as the river is navigable
below the promontory, many boats coming from the Sequani ascended thus
far, laden with merchandise brought from the south, and returned
freighted with horses, tanned hides, ironwork, smoked and salted meat,
timber, grains, cheese, &c. &c.

The Oppidum was then partly covered with habitations and gardens
belonging to the descendants of Sigild and Ditovix's warriors. Its
ramparts, oftentimes repaired, were in imperfect condition; earthworks
were to be seen there, with a few towers of dry stone walling--principally
on the north side. The part of the town on the right bank was uninclosed,
but that which stood on the southern <DW72>s of the promontory was
surrounded by dry stone walls which reached the ramparts of the Oppidum.
A _tete de pont_, built of the same materials, appeared on the right
bank nearly contiguous to the houses of the part of the town built on
that side (Fig. 9).

[Illustration: FIG. 9--THE TOWN AND CITE D'AVON (WAR OF THE GAULS).]

It must not be supposed that this town presented the aspect of our
modern cities. It consisted of a series of inclosures of wood or dry
stone walls, surrounding gardens, in the middle of which were built
the houses--wooden buildings thatched with straw or reeds.

On the southern point of the Oppidum, however--behind the Nemede and
commanding the valley--there rose a structure of wood and stone, which
was conspicuous above the rampart (at A). It was the dwelling of the
chief of the warriors and his Ambactes,[2] who were numerous.

His name was Catognatus: rich by inheritance, he also farmed the tolls
and taxes over a wide district of the Lingones, having thus greatly
increased his wealth. By his liberality he had gained numerous
partisans, and was always surrounded by a troop of cavaliers equipped
and fed at his expense. By family alliances he had acquired considerable
influence, extending even among the AEdui, and took part in the wars
which that people were waging against the Arverni. He was able to muster
five or six thousand warriors among his own adherents and those of his
Ambactes.

When Caesar set out in pursuit of the Helvetian emigrants who persisted
in passing through the Roman province to spread themselves in Gaul, the
AEdui had promised to supply his troops with corn.

The Helvetians, and close upon their track the Romans, had already
passed the Avar,[3] and the promised grain had not arrived. The fact
was, that certain persons of influence among the AEdui were opposed to
the Romans, and, fearing that if once they got a footing in Gaul they
would aim at subjugating it, were using every effort to prevent the
fulfilment of the promises made by the magistrates of the principal city
of the AEdui.

Catognatus was one of the chiefs most actively opposed to the Romans,
and had friends among Caesar's auxiliaries who informed him of all that
was going on in the Roman camp. On his side he communicated to the
Helvetii whatever information he received respecting the movements or
position of the Roman army.

Caesar having become acquainted with these manoeuvres through Liscus,
took his measures accordingly; and after having in great part
annihilated the emigrant horde of the Helvetii, when the scattered
remnant sought refuge among the Lingones, he first sent couriers to
prohibit the latter from aiding or sheltering the fugitives: then, after
allowing his troops three days to recruit themselves, he pushed on again
in pursuit of the Helvetii. These quickly submitted; but Caesar had not
forgotten the share which Catognatus had had in the matter of supplies
promised by the AEdui, and while he was treating with the latter with a
view to relieve part of Gaul from the tyranny of Ariovistus, he
despatched a legion and some auxiliary troops to assure himself of the
disposition of the Lingones, to seize Catognatus and the Helvetii whom
he had harboured, and, if necessary, to chastise the inhabitants of the
Val d'Avon--_i.e._, if they persisted in holding to their chief.

Catognatus, who had his informants in Caesar's army, was soon warned of
the danger that threatened him.

He had, in fact, given an asylum to some Helvetian fugitives, thereby
raising the number of his men to nearly six thousand, supposing the
warriors of the Val d'Avon willing to make a stand against the Roman
troops. Assembling his Ambactes, therefore, and their principal
retainers, he urged on their consideration the inconsiderable size of
the Roman army; the fact that it was already distant from the frontiers
of the province, and had been weakened by preceding conflicts; that
though it had defeated the Helvetii in the open field, the issue would
have been different if the enemy had been posted behind intrenchments;
that they ought not to suffer the Romans to busy themselves with their
affairs or differences, since they, the Gauls, did not interfere with
the affairs of the provinces; that the Romans might justly prohibit the
Helvetii from passing through Roman territory, but that they infringed
the independence of their neighbours and allies when they presumed to
keep order among them without being formally requested to do so; that he
knew, moreover, that the AEdui, devoted though they seemed to the Romans,
were only waiting for an opportunity to chastise their presumption; that
Caesar was going to divide his forces, and that if the men of the Val
d'Avon resisted the troops sent against them, this would be the signal
for a general rising which would be fatal to the Roman armies. He told
them also that they ought to remember that their ancestors made the
Romans tremble even in Rome, and that it was disgraceful to submit to
the dictation of those whom they had formerly conquered.

Catognatus also adopted the stratagem of sending emissaries to the
houses of the people under the guise of travellers. They professed to
have seen Caesar's troops, and to have found them half-starved and
utterly destitute; they affirmed that the best of them had been obliged
frequently to retreat before the Helvetii; that they were reduced by
three-fourths, and that the remainder of their army was composed of raw
recruits and of auxiliaries, who were only waiting for an opportunity to
return home.

These reports, spread through the valley, were still more efficacious
than Catognatus's discourse; for the Gauls have always been inclined to
lend a willing ear to representations that flatter their desires,
without inquiring whether they are true or false. If any of the older
men shook their heads and said that it would be as well to know what
was asked of them before assuming a hostile attitude, they were treated
with contempt. Catognatus, seeing all the people inclined to resist, had
trunks of trees mingled with earth and pebbles heaped up before the
weaker points of the Oppidum.

They re-dug the ditch before the walls of the left bank and surrounded
with palisades the part of the city that had remained unprotected on the
right bank. In addition to this, Catognatus had a cutting dug at a
hundred paces from the Oppidum between its northern salient and the
plateau. These works, hastily undertaken, were still unfinished when the
arrival of the Roman troops was announced. The infantry were advancing
in good order in the valley on the left bank, while the cavalry followed
the hills on the same side. Not a man quitted the ranks to go and
pillage the houses, and neither songs nor shouts were heard. The helmets
of polished bronze worn by the legionaries were shining in the sun, and,
seen from a distance, the troop resembled a long fiery serpent uncoiling
in the meadows.

From the elevated tower occupied by Catognatus the slightest movements
of the Romans were visible. They soon deployed along the rivulet, their
left being against the river and their right protected by the cavalry on
the hills. The lieutenant, Titurius, then sent an envoy into the city.
He was commissioned to announce to the magistrates that the Romans
appeared as friends, but that since Catognatus had given an asylum to
some of the Helvetii, and had notoriously exercised his power to prevent
the AEdui from furnishing the supplies promised to the army commanded by
Caesar, and which had come into Gaul with the sole purpose of hindering
the Helvetii from devastating,--that is, strictly in the character of
allies,--they must deliver up the said Catognatus and the Helvetian
refugees to the lieutenant Titurius without delay: that if this was done
the Romans would only demand provisions for ten days,--a reasonable
requirement, as between allies; after which they would return to the
AEdui.

Catognatus, surrounded by his principal Ambactes, was present in the
assembly of the magistrates when the envoy delivered his commission.
Seeing them hesitating, he replied to the summons as follows: "Here is
the object of your search. I am Catognatus; I have afforded an asylum to
certain of the Helvetii, who are my friends, and whose hospitality I
myself have shared; I am allied with the Helvetii as I am allied with
the Romans. If the Romans had been beaten by the Helvetii, and any of
them escaped from massacre had taken refuge here, would they consider it
honourable for me to give them up to their enemies, had they come here
in arms to demand them? If such was the usual conduct of the Romans, I
should blush to be their ally. To the vague accusation respecting the
influence I am alleged to have exercised over the policy of the AEdui, I
have nothing to reply. The AEdui act according to their own good
pleasure, and it is not for me to interfere with them. The Romans should
demand satisfaction of the AEdui if they have not fulfilled their
engagements. As to myself, the Romans have asked nothing of me, and I
have promised them nothing: what business have they here? If they had a
message to send me, was it necessary that the bearer should be escorted
by a legion? Is this how allies should treat each other? Go and tell the
legate that we are at home here; that if he comes as a friend we shall
treat him as a friend; but that if he presumes to dictate to us and
treat us as children, we shall answer him as men who know how to act for
themselves." "He is right! he is right!" was the unanimous exclamation
of the Ambactes; and overwhelming the envoy with insults, they thrust
him out. Catognatus had to interpose to prevent the crowd from tearing
him to pieces.

Titurius was instructed to show the greatest possible consideration for
the inhabitants, that the neighbouring peoples might not be irritated;
and to adhere scrupulously to the terms of the demand transmitted by the
envoy--simply to require the surrender of the Helvetii and Catognatus.

On the other hand, his orders were to accomplish the expedition with all
possible despatch, as Caesar had but a few legions with him. The legate,
therefore, refrained from investing the city and the Oppidum, and, as he
had no reason to fear the immediate arrival of help to the enemy, he
judged it best to direct all his efforts to the plateau, hoping to take
the fortress by a vigorous effort. It was, however, to be feared that if
the Oppidum was taken by assault, Catognatus and a part of the Helvetii
might succeed in escaping.

At night, therefore, the legate was devising a plan by which, with the
eight thousand men or thereabouts of which his force consisted, he might
at the same time prevent all means of escape from within, and make a
vigorous attack upon the Oppidum, when a centurion came to tell him that
some of the inhabitants requested a private interview with him.

The inhabitants in question were magistrates of the lower town....
Falling at Titurius's feet, they told him with tears that it was with no
good will they submitted to the dominion of Catognatus and his warriors;
that the demands presented that day to the assembly by the envoy were
nothing but reasonable, since the Helvetii had entered Gaul only as
marauders, and that Catognatus had used his influence to embarrass the
march of the Romans their allies, who had come to destroy the Helvetii;
that they the magistrates had no authority over the warriors, and very
little over the populace, enthralled as they were, and deceived by the
agents of Catognatus; that this chief and his men had taken refuge in
the Oppidum, and the part of the town situated at the extremity of the
promontory, abandoning the part built on the right bank; that, in fact,
they entreated the legate to occupy that part of the city with his
troops, who would be well received, and who, they hoped, would not give
themselves up to any excesses, since they were treated as friends.

Titurius raised them, and, speaking kindly to them, promised to do what
they asked; but, fearing treachery, stated that he must keep them as
hostages. The magistrates surrendered themselves to his disposal,
declaring that his troops would find the gates open, the posts
unoccupied, and the inhabitants in great excitement, but by no means
hostile, if they were well treated.

On their arrival, the Romans had instituted a ferry on the river below
the town. A reconnoitring party despatched immediately reported that the
egresses were in fact free, and that no one appeared behind the walls.

Titurius therefore invested all the egresses, and towards midnight a
thousand men selected from among the auxiliaries were in possession of
the lower town, without any sound of disturbance or sign of disorder. In
the morning the Gallic warriors posted at the head of the bridge saw the
Romans before them, and were vehement in their abuse of the inhabitants,
threatening to burn the town as soon as they had driven away the Roman
troops. Meantime, the Romans demolished several houses adjoining the
head of the bridge, and made use of the _debris_ to form a semi-circular
intrenchment of contravallation, ending against the river at its two
extremities. Titurius established some posts along the rivulet; and on
the larger stream above the city he constructed a bridge of boats
guarded by two posts at either end. This accomplished, he removed with
the bulk of his troops to the northern part of the plateau.

Next day he examined the position, after having filled up a part of the
intrenchment; but Catognatus had done away with the egresses of the
northern front, and completed the rampart at this point. The assault was
vigorously repulsed. This success emboldened the besieged, and they
began to overwhelm the legate with sarcasms. Seeing that he could not
take the Oppidum by storm, in presence of a determined and numerous body
of men, he resolved upon a regular siege.

Although the cutting dug by the defenders between the Oppidum and the
plateau was only a bowshot from the rampart, in a few hours it was
almost entirely filled up, consolidated, and levelled. Then Titurius had
a great number of trees felled in the woods extending along the northern
plateau, and brought in front of the camp.

This wood being duly prepared, an _agger_ was commenced fifteen paces
from the ramparts, in spite of the darts and stones hurled by the
besieged.

This _agger_ consisted of a terrace about a hundred paces long, ten feet
high and twenty deep, with a gap in the middle twelve paces wide. From
the two sides of this interval extended at right angles two galleries
(_vineae_), solidly constructed with trunks of trees and covered in;
these galleries were about a hundred paces long. The _agger_ was made of
trunks of trees piled up, mingled with earth, with inclines for reaching
the summit. This was a work of some days; and as during that time the
Romans made no attack, and thought only of protecting those engaged in
it from the missiles thrown from the ramparts, the besieged did not
cease to ridicule them (for they were within hearing), asking them if
they were intending to build a city and pass the winter there. But one
morning the warriors of the Oppidum saw a wooden tower rising at the
extremity of the two galleries. This tower, the woodwork of which had
been prepared beforehand, was set up within the day; its summit rose
more than ten feet above the top of the towers of the rampart (Fig. 10).

[Illustration: FIG. 10.]

The Gauls contemplated this structure with uneasiness, although they did
not comprehend its importance; so Catognatus resolved to set fire to the
works during the night. With this view he had placed on the ramparts,
behind the wattling, barrels filled with pitch, grease, and dry sticks;
then he placed two bodies in readiness to go out by the eastern and
western gates, provided with vessels full of resin, tow, and grease.
These troops were to make their way along the outside of the defences,
and simultaneously attack the flanks of the besiegers, while the men
posted on the ramparts were to remove a portion of the wattling, and to
roll the barrels, after setting them on fire, against the _agger_ whose
front was raised on the counterscarp of the ditch.

[Illustration: FIG. 11.]

The Romans had been able to see these preparations from the summit of
the tower; moreover, they stationed a strong guard on the flanks of the
plateau every evening. The legate at nightfall had these points
protected by stakes, and had a quantity of _stimuli_ (Fig. 11) driven
into the ground outside. About the third hour of the night the besieged
issued noiselessly from the two gates and came within half a bowshot of
the Roman posts. At a signal given from the interior, the two bodies
rushed at once on the besiegers' flanks. But even before they could
reach the palisades, many of them, wounded by the _stimuli_, fell
uttering cries of pain. Those who reached the besiegers' posts, thinned
by the darts showered upon them, and hesitating on seeing so many of
their party fall, were more inclined to fly than to continue the attack
when they saw themselves in their turn taken in flank and rear by the
besiegers. The defenders on the ramparts, whom the darkness of the night
prevented from seeing clearly what was taking place, and not knowing
whether the confusion arose from the flight of the Romans or of their
own men, dared not discharge stones and arrows.

Meanwhile the lighted barrels were being rolled in front of the
galleries, which had already begun to take fire. By the glare of the
flames they could see the Roman soldiers mount on the terrace carrying
baskets full of wet earth, which they threw on the barrels; and the
defenders killed or wounded many of them. At this moment some of the
fugitives who had taken part in the two sorties, re-entered the camp
calling out that they were pursued by the Romans.

Catognatus had barely time to send troops to defend the two egresses and
to protect the retreat of his men. He himself took up a position in the
centre of the Oppidum with a chosen band, that he might be able to
assist the quarter that should be most closely pressed. Aided by this
diversion the Romans, less harassed by darts from the rampart, were able
to extinguish the fire. They took advantage of the last hours of the
night to advance the tower along the galleries by means of rollers, as
far as the edge of the _agger_, and in the morning the warriors of the
Val d'Avon were not a little surprised to see this ponderous wooden
structure commanding the whole rampart and the towers of the defences.

At dawn, showers of stones and arrows hurled from the top of the
besiegers' tower prevented them from approaching the defences, and two
catapults swept the part of the Oppidum in front of it with enormous
missiles, which, hissing through the air, killed or shattered to
fragments all they encountered. Two _onagri_ overwhelmed with stones the
scaffolding set up by the defenders on their front to attack the
_agger_, and smashed it in pieces.

[Illustration: FIG. 12.]

A bridge was soon let down on the rampart from the face of the tower,
and the Romans, advancing in good order, took possession of the defences
(Fig. 12).

Catognatus and his retainers, to the number of five or six hundred, had
not expected this turn of events, and had taken refuge in the
stronghold built beyond the Nemede, at the southern part of the Oppidum.

When the besiegers, whom no one thought any longer of resisting, were
drawn up in force on the rampart, and had occupied the towers--killing
those who occupied them rather as refugees than as defenders--they
separated into three large bodies: the two wings marched along the inner
side of the rampart, taking one after another the towers upon it, and
entered the enclosures and houses, killing those who endeavoured to
resist. The centre troop, drawn up in the form of a wedge, marched right
on and swept the plateau. The unfortunate defenders fled, and crowded
together along the side of the Nemede. Many endeavoured to gain the
stronghold, but the entrances were closed and the bridge destroyed.
Catognatus was thus abandoning the greater part of his followers and
leaving them to the mercy of the enemy. The warriors of the Val d'Avon
threw away their arms, and with out-stretched hands implored quarter of
the Romans. Titurius then stayed the slaughter, and told the defenders
that if they gave up Catognatus and the Helvetii who had taken refuge
among them, their lives should be spared. Pointing to the lofty fort,
beyond the Nemede, the besieged replied that it was not in their power
to surrender Catognatus, who had taken refuge there with a small number
of his followers, but that they would immediately deliver up the
Helvetii still among them. The legate wishing to act with mildness,
according to Caesar's instructions, contented himself with this
assurance. The Helvetii were immediately delivered up, and the people of
Avon, disarmed and stripped of their warlike accoutrements, were sent
back to the valley, with the exception of a hundred hostages. The few
chiefs, however, who had remained among them, having been put in
fetters, were to be kept, with a view to being placed at Caesar's
disposal. As to the Helvetii, who numbered five or six hundred, Titurius
kept some as hostages; the rest, having been disarmed, were ordered to
return to their country by the most direct route: provisions for the
journey were distributed among them.

The buildings of the Nemede and its grove prevented Catognatus from
seeing what was going on beneath its walls, but as he no longer heard
war-cries nor the clash of arms, he concluded that his men had
surrendered. As for himself and his retainers, knowing that they had no
mercy to hope for, they prepared themselves for defence, and resolved to
sell their lives as dearly as possible.

A deep ditch partly cut in the rock separated the stronghold from the
Nemede. The defences consisted of an enclosure, made in Gallic fashion,
of trunks of trees alternating with layers of stone surmounted by
wattling. A large quadrangular tower, constructed in the same way,
enclosing four stories, and terminated by a roof of reeds covering a
crenelation, served as a place of retreat. Within the enclosure were
wooden huts for the garrison; as the tower, which was only twenty paces
wide by twenty deep, and whose walls were thick (about three paces),
could barely contain a hundred men.

Titurius reconnoitred the approaches. The ditch interrupted all
communication with the Oppidum, and ended against its ramparts. Towards
the south, the stronghold rose immediately over the escarpment, which on
this side was so steep that no ditch had been required. But a palisade
on the outside, fixed in a mound, prevented approach to the base of the
stronghold. As stated before, the walls of the upper town occupying the
southern <DW72>s extended to the rampart of the Oppidum. But these walls
had been abandoned by the warriors of Catognatus who had taken refuge in
the stronghold. On quitting the upper town they had set fire to the
bridge, seeing which, the Romans posted opposite the head of the bridge
had passed this latter without meeting any resistance, and had succeeded
in extinguishing the flames. The bridge was promptly repaired.

The legate, therefore, effected a communication with his troops in the
northern quarter, who were then occupying the upper town, and completely
invested the stronghold. Time pressed, and as he had already lost twelve
days before the Oppidum, haste was necessary.

In the first place, he sent one of the Gallic prisoners to hold a parley
with the defenders of the stronghold. He promised to spare their lives
if they would give up their chief, and the Helvetii that might be among
them. If, on the other hand, the attack was once commenced, they must
expect to be all put to the sword.

The messenger was received by a shower of stones, and returned bleeding
to the legate, who could no longer hesitate. The order was given to fill
up the ditch, and to speed the work; the centurions, employing threats
and blows at need, compelled a good many of the vanquished to carry
<DW19>s and earth. Protecting themselves with mantelets, the Romans
suffered only trifling loss, for the besieged had but few missiles.
Besides, Titurius had brought up the engines of war, demolished those
parts of the wall of the Nemede which might embarrass the operations,
and posted the best slingers and archers on the flanks, so that the
rampart of the stronghold, riddled with projectiles, was scarcely
tenable. At night the filling-in of the fosse was consolidated by
timberwork, on which were spread brushwood and turf.

At the first hour of the day a cohort advanced in slow march on the
ground thus made, forming the _testudo_ (Fig. 13).

[Illustration: FIG. 13]

Some of the defenders endeavoured to resist; but they were few in
number, and exposed to the projectiles which the auxiliary troops of
slingers and archers incessantly discharged upon them in an oblique
direction. The rampart was soon taken; but darts, stones, and flaming
balls of pitch and tow were hurled upon the assailants from the tower,
and if they attempted to approach it, planks and pots filled with
gravel. It was necessary, therefore, to set up screens on the rampart
even; for to abandon that would have revived the courage of the
defenders. Here the Romans lost several men, and many were wounded. To
set fire to the tower was scarcely possible; for constructions of timber
mingled with stone do not readily take fire Titurius, however, placed
one of his catapults so that the projectiles thrown by it should reach
the roof of the tower; and when satisfied that this object was attained
(it was towards sunset), kept up a continuous discharge of burning
missiles--consisting of darts wrapped in tow saturated with oil and
tar--on the roof, which soon caught fire. The legate made sure that as
the floors of the tower were of timber, the roof when it fell in would
communicate the fire to the ground story; and in fact, the roof had not
long fallen in when a dense column of smoke, accompanied by sparks which
appeared as if issuing from a vast chimney, shot forth from the summit
of the tower.

Catognatus, and those of his followers who had crowded into the
stronghold, despairing of maintaining it, then opened a concealed
aperture, which gave egress on the sides of the upper town; and without
bucklers, a sword in one hand, a flaming brand in the other, rushed with
terrible cries on the Romans, who were keeping guard outside the
palisading on that side, and who, surprised by this column of warriors,
opposed but a feeble resistance, and made an attempt to rally and fall
upon the flanks of the fugitives. It was night, and the <DW72>s were
steep, occupied here and there by houses and palisading enclosing
gardens. The Romans were ill-acquainted with the ground, and often got
into places whence there was no exit.

Catognatus and his followers, reduced to about two hundred men, rapidly
descended the paths with which they were familiar; and in passing threw
their brands upon the thatched roofs, or into the barns filled with hay
and straw. The inhabitants rushed out in bewilderment, not knowing
whence the attack came. Seeing parties of Romans passing by seeking
egress, entering the gardens and the houses, and breaking through the
gates and barricades to reach Catognatus and his men, they cried
"Treachery!" and threw stones at them, thinking their object was to burn
and massacre. The women, with dishevelled hair, threw themselves in
their path, covering them with abuse; others hurled furniture and
whatever came to hand upon them from the windows. Rendered furious by
these obstacles, by the failure of their pursuit, and the attacks of the
inhabitants, and seeing it was useless to reason with these
terror-stricken people, the Romans killed all they encountered.

Hearing this outcry, and seeing the sky lit up by the flames, the legate
guessed what had happened, and sent two cohorts over the ramparts on the
town side, with injunctions to march with orderly pace down the paths,
rallying the Roman troops, and driving the inhabitants before them. At
the same time, he sent a centurion, by the bridge of boats which he had
formed across the river above the town, to warn the Roman detachments
that could be got together in the lower town and at the gateway of the
bridge, not to let any one pass out from the upper town.

Catognatus, with most of his warriors, had in fact got as far as the
bridge; but he found it guarded by a body of Romans. He attempted to cut
his way through them; but as the bridge was somewhat long, the
enterprise was hazardous. The commander of the guard, an old soldier,
had marshalled his men at the first alarm, seeing that this passage must
be defended at any cost. Barricading the entrance with all the materials
they could collect, they awaited the fugitives behind their bucklers.
When Catognatus presented himself and--uttering the war-cry--sought to
force his way through, he was met at close quarters with a shower of
darts. The whole foremost rank of the fugitives fell right and left: the
others, rendered frantic by despair, passed over their bodies and threw
themselves upon the front of the Romans, who had now taken to their
swords. A fearful struggle commenced, lighted only by the gleam of the
conflagration. The Romans, having the glare in their faces, aimed badly,
while the Gallic warriors knew where to strike.

The column of fugitives began to melt before the Roman front, whose gaps
were immediately filled up. Then came up the centurion, with fifty men
whom he had rallied. Seeing themselves supported, the Roman guard took
the offensive, and pressed on to the platform of the bridge, hewing down
the remnant of the defenders of the Oppidum like bushes in a thicket.
Not one of these warriors drew back; all met their death in the pass
through which they had thought to make their way.

It was with great difficulty that order was restored in the upper town,
and only when they saw the Romans extinguishing the fires did the
inhabitants begin to understand what had happened.

Next morning the body of Catognatus was found lying on the bridge; his
head was sent to Caesar, and the expedition being terminated, Titurius
led back the legion and the auxiliaries to their quarters among the
AEdui.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 2: _Fideles_--warriors devoted to the chief.]

[Footnote 3: The Saone.]




CHAPTER VI.

_THE PERMANENT CAMP--FOUNDATION OF A CITE._


Six years after the events just related, the siege of Alesia being
terminated, Caesar gave orders for the establishment of a permanent camp
on the plateau of Avon--the site of the Gallic Oppidum.

As the plateau was near the road connecting Chalons-sur-Saone with
Langres, Caesar judged it desirable to have at this point, which was
naturally favourable for defence, a safe retreat for a numerous body of
troops, more especially as the road passed through somewhat disturbed
countries. The camp was to be sufficient in case of need for two legions
and some auxiliaries--about twenty thousand men. Now, as the site of the
Oppidum was much more extensive than was needed for a force of that
strength, it was determined that the camp should be placed on the
southern part of the plateau, whose level was elevated some few feet
above the northern point, and which was separated from this extremity by
a wide ditch.

[Illustration: FIG. 14.--THE ROMAN PERMANENT CAMP.]

Fig. 14 gives a plan of the arrangement. A ditch thirty feet wide and
seven feet deep divided the plateau obliquely from W.N.W. to E.S.E. At A
was placed the Praetorian gate, and at B the Praetorium. At D was the
Decuman gate. The two lateral gates, F, E, fronted east and west
respectively. The sunken roadways of the Gauls had to be altered and
made into metalled roads; they started right and left of the bridge, C,
and followed the acclivities of the plateau, rising till they branched
off at O into the road from Chalons to Langres. From these two lateral
military roads there was an ascent to the gates E, D, F, the _place
d'armes_, H, and the two side entrances of the small advanced camp, I,
on the south point of the plateau. Thus the outer circuit could be
traversed without difficulty.

The ramparts of the town occupying the southern declivities of the
promontory were destroyed, and the inhabitants obliged to settle on the
other side of the river, either to the south-east or to the south. The
head of the bridge, C, was repaired.

The gates of the camp had good _claviculae_, each with two towers
constructed of dry walling, earth, and timber work (Fig. 15).

At regular intervals along the _vallum_--which, except the front on the
N.N.E., exactly followed the edge of the plateau--were erected towers,
or rather watch-towers, of timber. In addition to the supply from the
wells within the limits of the camp, the Romans collected the water of
the springs on the northern plateau, by means of pipes made of trunks of
trees bored lengthwise and joined end to end. This channel followed the
roadway G, and conducted the water into six good cisterns, hollowed out
in the rock and lined with cement. There was a cistern under the
Praetorium, and two for each of the legions.

On the western side palisades connected the smaller camp with the ditch
sunk near the angle of the Praetorium; while on the eastern side of the
plateau its escarpment rendered this precaution unnecessary.

The engineer entrusted with the setting out had disposed the fosse in an
oblique direction, as shown in Fig. 14, so as to present a larger front
to assailants who, having taken the smaller camp, should present
themselves on the _place d'armes_, H. The projecting angle was well
defended by the Praetorium, and the obliquity of the _vallum_ enabled the
defenders making a sortie by the Praetorian gate, and by that marked F,
to take the enemy almost in rear, and to drive them over the eastern
declivity of the plateau.

[Illustration: FIG. 15.]

The rampart walk of the _vallum_ was raised three feet above the level
of the camp, and was furnished with a cresting of stakes with wattling
to retain the earth on the parapet (see Fig. 15). The fosse was twelve
feet wide and seven deep, and was continued all round the camp, even on
the sides where the declivities were steep.

The Nemede was demolished. The Druids had it re-erected on the plateau
in front of the camp, to the south, at the entrance of the wood. The
inhabitants of the Val d'Avon were enjoined, under penalty of seeing
their town destroyed, to abstain from injuring these intrenchments while
unoccupied; they were even charged to keep them in repair, and to supply
provisions to the troops who should be quartered there to protect the
country against the invasions of the barbarians; for as Gaul was then
tranquilized internally, and brought under the Roman sway, there was
nothing to fear, except the attacks of the Germans, who were continually
threatening the north-eastern provinces.

The camp was in fact occupied several times by Roman troops, and new
works were successively planned and executed there. The country was
fertile, and the position excellent, viz., between the large towns
Chalons-sur-Saone (Cabillonum), Langres (Andrematunnum), and Autun
(Bibracte). The camp received the name of _Aboniae Castrum_, the town
being thenceforth called Abonia--a name which it retained until the
fourth century.

It was from Abonia that Vindex set out with a party of troops, which he
assembled in the plains of the Saone, to rouse Gaul in revolt against
Nero, and to give the empire to Galba. After the death of the Gallic
hero, Galba wished to testify his gratitude to the towns and countries
that had declared in his favour: and Abonia then acquired the title and
rights of _civitas_, and enjoyed a long peace.

From the reign of Titus onwards, the camp was no longer appropriated
exclusively to the troops. At the time when the Oppidum had been
converted into a permanent camp, the whole of the plateau, its <DW72>s,
and part of the ground situated to the north, had been considered as
_Ager Romanus_. It was what we should now call "crown land,"--_Ager
Publicus_. The inhabitants, therefore, could not possess or build upon
this land, or, if permitted to occupy a part, it was as usufructuaries,
not as freeholders.

This Roman law, which dated from the time of the Republic, and which at
first affected all provincial soil, was never rigorously applied. Its
enforcement would have been difficult, and the populations of the
provinces, as well as those of Italy, solicited and easily obtained the
_jus Italicum_, which consisted in the full possession of the soil, with
liberty to use, to sell, and to transmit it by way of inheritance. When
the imperial government was definitively established, the emperors
favoured the development of the principle of private property; because
the great landholders were then the only persons who could be considered
as forming an aristocratic class, privileged, it is true, but, on the
other hand, bearing the burden of special functions--such, for instance,
as that of urban magistrature, then very onerous. It must be observed
that the civic rights accorded by Rome extended not only to a town, but
to the whole of the territory pertaining to it.

As the Vale of Abonia possessed the _jus civitatis_, and the site of the
camp remained unoccupied, the inhabitants petitioned that ground so well
adapted to habitations should be restored to civil uses. It was then
determined by the Emperor Vespasian that the _ager publicus_ of Abonia
should be colonized. Colonization under the Roman empire meant the
division solemnly made by the _agrimensores_, according to certain
religious prescriptions, of a part of the _ager publicus_ into shares.

These shares were unequal, and, although apportioned by lot among the
colonists--that is to say, among the native inhabitants and the
foreigners who presented themselves as applicants for their possession,
it always happened--by what means we are unable to say--that the
allotments fell according to the rank or fortune of the individual. The
ancient Oppidum was therefore colonized.

The remains of its ramparts soon disappeared; the wide fosse, which
separated the large camp from the smaller one, became a road terminating
by sloping paths in the level of the plateau; a theatre rose on the
eastern declivity; water was brought in abundance, by a fine aqueduct of
masonry, to baths constructed at the southern point, and to all the new
habitations which soon arose on every side, surrounded by gardens. A
temple, dedicated to Augustus, was erected on the site of the ancient
Praetorium, on the very spot where stood the shrine of former days, and a
second sacred edifice dedicated, say some, to Hercules--which is
doubtful--took the place of the ancient southern stronghold. A forum and
a basilica occupied the middle of the plateau. The _villae_ spread beyond
the circumvallation, and extended over the two declivities, east and
west.

The lower town continued to be occupied by the merchants, craftsmen,
boatmen, and the poorer class; it extended along the two shores down the
river. The bridge previously mentioned was rebuilt with stone, and a
second bridge of timber was thrown across half a mile further up the
stream, at the continuation of the sunken way by which the plateau was
divided.




CHAPTER VII.

_THE FORTIFIED CITE._


Three centuries of peace had caused the disappearance of the last
vestiges of the ancient ramparts which surrounded the permanent camp of
the Romans, then occupied by the cite of Abonia. But for many years the
incursions of the Germans had disquieted some of the neighbouring
countries. They had made their appearance among the Remi several times,
and although they habitually presented themselves as defenders of the
empire, or were actually called in by one party or the other during the
civil discords by which Gaul was then rent, their conduct was that of
enemies, not of allies. Finding the country attractive, they spread
gradually among the eastern provinces, robbing, pillaging, and burning
among the friends who invited their aid, as well as among the enemies
they were going to attack. At their approach the rural districts were
deserted, and the uninclosed towns hastily fortified.

Reims, Langres, and Autun had repaired their defences. Sens had walled
itself round with the materials of its chief public buildings. The vale
of Abonia, which at that time contained about twenty thousand
inhabitants, followed their example; and pulling down their public
edifices and the deserted temples of the city, the urban population
formed ramparts around the plateau and a fence around the lower towns.

The works, however, undertaken in haste, were of no great account, and
fortunately the Germans did not think of assailing them; but in the year
359, Julian, having assumed the purple, betook himself to Gaul to drive
out the barbarians. The siege of Autun raised, he passed through Abonia,
found its situation excellent, and arranged the plan of a fortress,
which after the battle of Strasburg and the defeat of Chnodomar, was
carried into execution. Abonia thus fortified formed part of the second
line of strong places established by Julian between Reims and Lyons, in
anticipation of fresh invasions by the Germans.

Gaul, although her sons had furnished the Roman army with its best
soldiers for three centuries, had become unaccustomed to war at home.
The Roman legions no longer consisted of troops such as those commanded
by the Vespasians, the Tituses, and the Trajans. Composed principally of
barbarians, they wanted cohesion, were not sustained by patriotism, and
deposed their chiefs on the slightest pretext.

The latter, moreover, too often appointed by a court governed by
intrigue, were for the most part incapable, or eager to enrich
themselves rather than to conquer the enemy. For these troops, composed
of heterogeneous elements, and having no faith in the valour of the
chiefs placed over them--for these populations, accustomed to peace and
the well-being it secures--ramparts were necessary, behind which the
defence of the territory might be organized; for in the open field, such
was the terror inspired by the Germans that a prolonged resistance could
not be reckoned upon. Julian, however, had shown that the troops in the
pay of the empire, if well commanded, were still in a condition to fight
the barbarians; but Julian was a philosopher; he understood his times,
and could not shut his eyes to the unsound state of the imperial
government, or at least believed the evil to lie so deep that he
attempted to stay its progress by a return to paganism, hoping perhaps
in this way to restore youth to the worn-out body.

[Illustration: FIG. 16.

THE GALLO-ROMAN TOWN CITE JULIANA.]

Julian had then about him Byzantine engineers who were very skilful in
the art of fortifying places. This branch of knowledge is often
developed among nations in proportion to the decay of military
organization in the field. The conqueror of the Germans had caused the
fortifications of Autun to be repaired and completed.

Those of Abonia, which were less extensive, were carried out with
completeness according to an entirely new plan, since there existed no
traces of the ancient fortifications: the engineer Philostratus sent by
Julian was therefore left to his own discretion.

He began by clearing away the <DW72>s of the ancient Oppidum along the
verge of the plateau, thus removing some of the villae that had not been
destroyed at the time when the arrival of the Germans was expected (see
Fig. 16). After having carefully studied the conformation of the ground,
he perceived that the front of the city towards the north was weak,
inasmuch as this front was most accessible to attack on account of the
neighbouring plateau, whose level was but little below that of the site.
He determined, therefore, to fall back, so as to get a more extended
front. The front thus adopted was three hundred and fifty paces long.[4]
Outside of this front he had a fosse sunk twenty feet wide in the
bottom,[5] so as entirely to divide the tongue of land which connected
the promontory with the northern plateau. This fosse terminated at the
two declivities east and west. At each end the bottom of the fosse was
furnished with palisades, and there was a descent into the fosse by
means of a flight of steps contrived in one of the towers, as will
presently be shown. Outside the fosse he formed a _vallum_ about four
hundred paces in length, with an outwork containing a guardhouse and a
watch-tower. The Roman road to Langres came to this point. On the
eastern side, the aqueduct which brought water to the city followed the
_vallum_, and was crenelated (_vide_ A). A gate was opened in the north
front, flanked on the outside by two cylindrical towers. At the
north-west angle arose a square tower high enough to afford a distant
view of the valley at the bottom of which runs the river, and of the
plateau; another square tower was built at the north-east angle, and
between these two towers and the gate two other towers; so that between
each tower there remained a space of about eighty feet.

Philostratus remarked that a daring besieger might run in towards the
west, between the river and the city, and attempt an assault towards the
salient of the west front, which commanded a rather gentle escarpment.
From the square tower, B, to the river, and set back a little, so as to
be flanked by the western face of this tower, he formed a _vallum_, with
a square tower at its extreme end, commanding the water-course. Further
back was constructed a wooden bridge, connecting the two banks, and
passing over the island of sand, C. Along the two escarpments the
engineer followed almost exactly the sinuosities of the edge of the
plateau, but placing the gates in the re-entering angles. Two gates were
disposed on the western front, and one on the eastern, very near the
situation of the ancient entrance to the _Oppidum_ on that side. These
three gates were each flanked by two towers, like those on the north.
The inclosure of the city, formed of a rampart rising twenty feet above
the level of the ground, including the battlement, and nine feet thick,
was thus strengthened by thirty-six towers, without reckoning those of
the gates. At the southern extremity, on the site of the ancient retreat
of Catognatus, was erected a _castellum_, or stronghold, separated from
the city by a battlemented wall, and about one hundred and eighty feet
away from the ramparts. At the southern extremity of the rampart, a
square tower had to be built of greater height than the others, to
overlook the vale of Abonia. Beneath this tower an egress was contrived,
abutting on a massive wall, following the declivity of the ground, and
crenelated on both sides; from the summit of which a descent could be
made into the work, E, commanding the junction of the rivulet with the
river, and the stone bridge constructed there. Upon the other bank was
built a vast _tete de pont_. The eastern gate was furnished with an
outwork commanding the road, G; on the northern flank of the north-west
entrance a guardhouse commanded the vicinity of the gate. The approaches
were improved, and a wooden bridge was thrown across at H, with a _tete
de pont_ and work commanding the confluence of roads at that point.
Building was prohibited on the western declivities--once occupied by
houses and gardens--within a distance of one hundred and ten paces from
the ramparts, or the military road, I; that is, habitations were allowed
to remain or to be built outside the military bounds.[6] Inside the
city, through the confusedly-grouped clusters of ancient houses,
Philostratus had new roads cut,[7] with a view to establish a
communication between the gates, and to facilitate the defence. At F was
placed a forum, with a temple to Apollo at I (for Julian had caused a
little Christian church, previously built in the city, to be
demolished). A basilica was built at M, a _curia_ at N; and at T baths
were erected. In the lower town, quay-walls, Q, kept the river within
bounds; a vast market was disposed at R, and an emporium for merchandise
at S. The town, or rather its suburbs, extended on the right bank, east
as far as the middle of the island of sand, C, and south, to the lower
side of the large _tete de pont_. These suburbs were simply inclosed by
a _vallum_, as a safeguard against a sudden attack; for being commanded
by higher ground they did not admit of defences adapted to resist a long
siege.

These works occupied several years, and were executed with resources
drawn partly from the imperial treasury but chiefly from municipal
imposts. Abonia was wealthy; but it suffered long from the burdens
imposed upon it to render it secure against the incursions of the
barbarians. Philostratus, moreover, had authority to make requisitions
and levy dues, and he largely availed himself of it.

The undertaking completed, this cite, thus transformed by the order of
the emperor who had saved Gaul, received the name of Juliana. The valley
alone preserved the name of Abonia.

It may be desirable to give a few details explanatory of the defences.
Fig. 17 gives the section of the rampart between the towers.

[Illustration: FIG. 17.]

Its terrace, raised to an average height of fourteen feet above the
ground-level of the plateau, had a flight of steps between the towers
five feet wide. The merlons were six feet high, and the sill of the
embrasures was three feet above the footway.

[Illustration: FIG. 18.]

The rampart was constructed with two faces, of courses of small square
stones, with courses of brick at intervals. The masonry between the two
faces was of coarse rubble concrete. Outside, along the verge of the
plateau, a fosse ten or twelve feet wide protected the base of the
rampart and followed the projections of the towers. A narrow covered way
was led along the counterscarp to facilitate surveillance and allow the
patrol to go their rounds. Fig. 18 gives the plans of the northern gate
with its two towers, at A on the ground level, at B on the level of the
curtain battlements. In one of these towers was constructed a stair, C,
leading down to a postern, D, and in each of them other flights of
stairs, E, which afforded easy access to the higher stories. The gate,
divided into two archways for entrance and exit, was surmounted by a
gallery, G, at the level of the rampart-walk, forming a crenelation. The
road crossed the fosse, F, over an arch, _a_, and a wooden platform,
_b_, which could be easily removed in time of siege; and then upon the
platform, H, a screen of woodwork was to be erected, completely masking
the two archways. Outside the bridge, the stonework of which was
battlemented, two small uncovered posts, I, defended the approaches, and
a palisade, P, obliged all comers to make a circuit in order to cross
the bridge. Fig. 19 shows this gate in perspective. Below the roofing
was the crenelation, which constituted the effective defence of the
towers. Moreover, at the level of the first story three openings were
made, which in time of war were furnished with screens, and which
afforded front and side views. Munitions of war were hoisted to the
higher stories by means of pulleys suspended in the round-arched
openings, K (_vide_ plan of the first story). The other gates were
constructed on the same model, the outworks alone being different,
according to the disposition of the ground.

[Illustration: FIG. 19]

Fig. 20 gives a general view of the great _tete de pont_ on the south,
the _place d'armes_ and the battlemented wall ascending to the square
tower on the south angle of the cite, and the _castellum_. The square
towers were not covered by roofs but by platforms, so as to allow
catapults or _onagri_ to be placed upon them.[8]

[Illustration: FIG. 20.]

With this design quadrangular towers of the kind described were raised
at the salient angles of the defences, which were weak points, but
which, on the other hand, facilitated the discharge of missiles over a
more extensive field. In case a front was attacked, propulsive machines
were set up behind the curtains on earthworks or wooden platforms.

The city thus strongly fortified was in a position to resist and defy
the attacks of the barbarians, who, at that period of their history,
were unable to undertake the siege of a stronghold well planned and
defended.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 4: A pace was equivalent to three feet.]

[Footnote 5: The Gallic foot was the _pied du roi_ (thirteen inches).]

[Footnote 6: The dark line indicates the habitations preserved, the red
line the tenements rebuilt on the sites left unoccupied after the
clearing necessary for the fortifications and their approaches.]

[Footnote 7: These new roads are indicated by red lines.]

[Footnote 8: The catapults could discharge bolts six feet long and very
heavy. The _onagri_ hurled stones of sixty pounds weight to a maximum
distance of two hundred and fifty paces.]




CHAPTER VIII.

_THIRD SIEGE._


Whether the Burgundians crossed the Rhine at the solicitation of the
Gauls, or to find more fertile settlements, or because the emperor
Honorius had granted them a territory on the left bank of the river,
certain it is that about the year 450 they were occupying the banks of
the Saone, and had pushed their way northwards to the neighbourhood of
Langres and Besancon, westwards as far as Autun, and southwards beyond
Lyons. Having entered Gaul as allies--as auxiliaries of the tottering
empire--they treated the inhabitants with a degree of consideration
which was not shown by the Franks and other tribes that were gradually
invading the west. They had indeed gained concessions of lands and gifts
of herds but they were living on a footing of equality with the Gauls,
and their presence resulted in a partition of property with the new
comers rather than subjection to their sway. The establishment of the
Burgundians on Gallic soil may be compared with that of those colonies
of veterans whom Rome sent out formerly to various territories, whose
position was similar to that of the original inhabitants, and who in the
second generation were confounded with them.

Gondebald, the third king of the Burgundians since their entrance on
Gallic soil, was sovereign in the year 500. At that time the territory
of this kingdom extended from Basle to Lorraine and Champagne, included
the district round Macon, reached as far as the frontiers of Auvergne,
and skirting the High Alps, followed the course of the Rhone to the
shores of the Mediterranean. Juliana, including the city and fortress,
with the district appertaining to it, was therefore clearly in
Burgundian ground. The war undertaken by Clovis against Gondebald, and
the defeat of the latter near Dijon, had indeed resulted in reducing the
extent of Burgundy on the north-west; but Autun and even Dijon and
Langres still remained in the hands of Gondomar, the second son of
Gondebald since Childebert and Clotaire came and besieged him in the
first of these three cities. Gondomar had been elected king of the
Burgundians, after his eldest brother Sigismund had been deposed and
condemned to monastic seclusion at Orleans by the sons of Clovis.
Gondomar put his tenable places in a state of defence, collected an
army, and after a battle with the Franks in Dauphiny, and in which
Clodomir perished, resumed peaceable possession of his kingdom. Ten
years later Clotaire and Childebert made a fresh attempt to destroy the
menacing power of Gondomar. They wished to associate Theodoric with
them; but as he was occupied with a war in Auvergne, he refused to
accompany them. The two sons of Clovis therefore directed their forces
in 532 towards Burgundy, and sat down before Autun, in which the king of
the Burgundians had shut himself up.

The cite was on the point of being taken; Gondomar succeeded in escaping
with some of his troops, and took refuge in the cite Juliana, as one of
the best munitioned strongholds of his kingdom, and the key to all the
mountainous and wooded part of Burgundy.

He was hoping to keep the troops of the Franks there till winter, and
then to take advantage of the rigour of the season in that district to
assume the offensive, with the aid of auxiliaries promised from the
East.

In fact, Clotaire and Childebert having taken Autun about the middle of
the summer, led their army before the cite Juliana; for they could not
think of pursuing their conquest while leaving this place on their
flanks or behind them.

Gondomar, having entered it about a fortnight before the arrival of the
Franks, had caused the defences to be repaired and provided with all
that was needed to sustain a long siege.

The lower town, the cite, and the vale, contained at that time a
population of about forty thousand souls, among whom might be reckoned
at least ten thousand persons capable of bearing arms. Many had even
become practically acquainted with war. For since the time of Julian
Gaul had been the theatre of incessant struggles; and though the country
surrounding Juliana had remained comparatively tranquil, its
inhabitants, both Gauls and Burgundians, had been present at more than
one engagement, especially since the definitive invasion of the men of
the North. These barbarians, long the auxiliaries of the empire, had
themselves learned the profession of war in the Roman school, and were
making use of the military engines adopted by the imperial armies.

Among the Franks, however, as among the Burgundians, the Roman standard
of discipline was not attained, and these troops had not the firmness
and tenacity which still distinguished the best soldiers commanded by
the generals of the empire. On the other hand they were often brave even
to temerity.

The cite Juliana was well stored with provisions and munitions of every
sort when the army of the Franks presented itself. Gondomar had not
thought it possible to defend that part of the town situated on the
right bank of the river of Abonia; for it was open, the habitations
having been built beyond the line of Roman intrenchments, and the latter
being commanded on the western front. He had contented himself with
keeping the two _tetes de pont_; one, the smallest, up the stream,
covering a wooden bridge; the other, the largest, a stone bridge. As
soon as the enemy's approach was announced, Gondomar set fire to the
foot-bridges spanning the river across the islet of sand.[9]

The troops of Childebert and Clotaire debouched by the northern road and
the western plateau, above the part of the town that had been abandoned.
These troops therefore formed two bodies, separated by the river.
Gondomar was a man of astuteness rather than a soldier; but he had with
him a certain Clodoald, a veteran of long experience in arms, and who
knew how to inspire confidence in the soldiers, as much by his bravery
as by his rude and simple manners. Severe towards himself as well as
towards others, and gifted with herculean strength, he used to punish
every act of disobedience with his own hand, inflicting one unvarying
penalty--death. In spite of, perhaps on account of this inflexibility,
Clodoald soon became the idol of the city; while he was among them they
could not doubt of success. He confounded the Franks with the Germans in
the implacable hatred which he had vowed to the latter. Gondomar placed
all the forces at his disposal under his command.

The defences of the cite Juliana were just as Philostratus had left
them; intact and massive, they defied all attack by main force. To take
them a regular siege was necessary. The army of the Frank kings
consisted of about forty thousand men when they had laid siege to
Autun, and, deducting losses and desertions, it counted scarcely more
than thirty-five thousand men on arriving before the city. It was,
however, expecting to be reinforced. The body which presented itself on
the northern plateau consisted of twenty thousand men, and that which
appeared above the lower town of fifteen thousand. The lower town was
nearly deserted; all the able-bodied men had taken refuge in the city,
and had sent the women, children, and old men to the eastern hills.

The main body of the Franks was therefore able to enter the lower town
without striking a blow, and naturally enough, began to pillage it.
Clodoald observed from the ramparts the disorder thus occasioned. At
nightfall he despatched a thousand men to the _place d'armes_ at the
south of the plateau, and reinforced the post that defended the _tete de
pont_ on the right bank. The Franks engaged in plundering the town had
scarcely taken notice of the large _tete de pont_ placed on the extreme
right, but had given special attention to the smaller one opposite the
wooden bridge. Towards the third hour of the night Clodoald had the
gates opened, and led forth his men in silence. The Franks had scarcely
kept a guard at this point. Surprised by Clodoald's attack, they went up
again to the lower town, uttering cries of alarm.

Many had encamped between the _Emporium_[10] and the _tete de pont_; the
Burgundians passed round them, and attacking them unawares, drove into
the river those who were not massacred. At the same time Clodoald set
fire to the whole quarter. The wind was blowing from the south, and the
habitations situated on the banks of the river soon presented a mass of
flames. When, the Franks having rallied, their forces were on the point
of taking the offensive, the Burgundians had already re-entered the
_tete de pont_, and were re-ascending the plateau. The Franks had lost
from four to five hundred men in this skirmish, while of the besieged
not more than twenty men had been put _hors de combat_. This
commencement brought joy to the city, and those who from the top of the
ramparts saw their houses in flames, endured their ill-fortune
patiently, thinking of the vengeance they might reasonably anticipate.

Experienced in war as he was, Clodoald would not allow this ardour to
cool. On the morning which followed this night so fatal to the Franks,
he formed two bodies of two thousand men each, well armed with _angons_,
_francisques_, and _scamasaxes_ (for throughout Gaul at that time these
weapons were common to the Franks, the Gauls, and the Burgundians, with
some slight variations). He ordered a body of about five hundred men to
issue by the eastern gate of the southern _place d'armes_, to cross the
rivulet, and make a show of intending to pass the river below the stone
bridge of the valley, by means of light boats which four men could carry
on their shoulders. These boats had been stowed away in the _place
d'armes_. At the same time, one of the two bodies was to assemble in the
northern outpost, which had not yet been attacked, and make a vigorous
sortie. Clodoald himself, with a body of a thousand men, was to pass the
eastern gate of the city, skirt the ramparts and the outpost, and come
to sustain the attack and take the enemy in flank. The five hundred men
furnished with boats were to limit themselves to such a pretence of
crossing over as would be sufficient to attract the Franks to the spot;
then the second troop was to pass the great _tete de pont_ and act as
the occasion might suggest, either attacking the enemy on the march, if
he followed the descent of the river, or keeping back the Franks coming
from the lower town. A body of a thousand men were to fall upon the
troop presenting itself on the banks of the river, and cut them to
pieces or drown them.[11]

This plan well explained to his lieutenants, the movement commenced
about the fourth hour of the day. The two Frank kings had taken the
command: Childebert of the troops encamped on the north, Clotaire of the
body encamped on the west in the lower town. A bridge of rafts had been
early constructed five hundred paces above the isle of sand, to
establish a communication between the two bodies.

It must be observed that after taking Autun, the two chiefs did not
expect any serious resistance in the rest of Burgundy. On the strength
of the reports that had reached them, they were persuaded that Gondomar
had been killed, that the garrison of Autun constituted his best
soldiers, and that the other strong towns would be defended, if at all,
only by inexperienced men.

The event of the preceding night, however, caused them to reconsider
their judgment; and at the moment when the sortie on the north was
taking place, the two chiefs were planning to take the _tete de pont_ by
a vigorous effort, and at the same time to attack the northern outpost.

The Franks are inclined, even more than the Gauls, to take for truth
what they desire to find so; and the two kings were under the persuasion
that the garrison within the city was small in number, and would be
disconcerted by these two simultaneous attacks. Things were in this
position when the Frank chiefs received the news that the line of
investment on the north was attacked.

By the term "line of investment" must not be understood a disposition of
their forces presenting a complete analogy with the strategic
arrangements of modern times. This line consisted of a body of men, one
thousand strong, grouped somewhat confusedly behind a barricade of trees
and brushwood, four hundred paces from the northern salient. A second
body followed, consisting in great part of cavalry, dispersed in the
woods at a hundred paces from the first line, and masking the encampment
of Childebert, surrounded by the bulk of his troops.

At the first alarm the two kings mounted their horses, and, hurrying
along with them those who were equipped for fight, hastened to the field
of action. The cavalry of the second line dashed forwards to aid the
first, separating into two squadrons to attack the enemy on his flanks.

Recovering from their first surprise, the Franks, protected to some
extent by the barricades, were keeping their ground against the attack.
A hand-to-hand conflict was commenced, but the Burgundians, as the more
numerous, were beginning to outflank the enemy's line, when the Frank
cavalry came up, and in their turn fell upon the two wings of the
attack. The Burgundians were compelled to give ground, and were obliged
to avail themselves of the barricades of branches and brushwood not to
be outflanked. Their position, however, was becoming untenable, when
Clodoald came up on the enemy's left flank. The Franks were
panic-struck, for the troop conducted by Clodoald was marching in good
order after the Roman fashion, in echelons, so as not to allow the
cavalry to outflank their right wing. The left of the Franks took to
flight, and their example was followed in turn by every part of the
line. The Burgundians dashed forward in pursuit of them, but Clodoald,
advancing to the front, brought his whole force to a stand, though not
without difficulty.

The fugitives, on the other hand, found themselves confronted with the
main body of Childebert's army. Full of wrath, and upbraiding them with
their cowardice, he compelled them to go back; and a body of ten
thousand men soon presented themselves in sight of the Burgundians
through the woods. The order for retreat was given; and they returned in
good order, not re-entering by the outpost, but marching along the east
front, under the protection of the ramparts. Childebert's irritation was
such that he immediately sent a thousand men to seize upon the outpost,
thinking it would be feebly guarded, since the defenders were outside
the city; but the attack had been foreseen, and the Franks lost a
hundred men in this fruitless attempt.

On the southern side, the sortie of the Burgundians had been more
decisively successful. The state of affairs was such as Clodoald had
foreseen. The Franks, expecting the enemy to cross the river so as to
outflank them on the right, had sent a thousand men to meet the
Burgundians. The lieutenant of Clodoald had then sallied out from the
great _tete de pont_ with his two thousand warriors. Drawing up half his
force in a square, on the river side, with his front towards the lower
town and his right supported by the _tete de pont_, he had dispatched
the other half in all haste against the Frank troops on their way to
oppose the passage.

This troop, taken in flank and thinned by the darts hurled at them by
the Burgundians in their boats, was broken up, and fled in utter
confusion. The Franks remaining in the lower town, now learning that
Childebert's army was attacked on the north, were uncertain whether they
should march towards the southern side to support the troop lower down
the river on the right bank, or betake themselves to the bridge of rafts
to assist Childebert's army. This indecision rendered the attack on the
Burgundians drawn up in square near the great _tete de pont_
inefficient, and permitted the two thousand men who made the sortie to
return without serious loss. The sortie on the north encountered more
trying fortunes; it had left in the woods more than two hundred dead,
and brought home as many wounded.

The Franks had lost in these two conflicts more than six hundred men,
without reckoning the wounded. Far from yielding to despondency,
however, both chiefs and soldiers were full of rage, believing they
should take the city in a few days, and that they had before them a
garrison quite disposed to capitulate, so depressed did they suppose the
Burgundians to have become by the capture of Autun: in twenty-four hours
they had lost more than a thousand men, without having even approached
the ramparts.

The wounded Burgundians remaining in their hands were decapitated; and
their heads, stuck on long poles, were ranged in a line at a hundred
paces from the advanced work. This, however, did not constitute a
countervallation sufficient to protect them from the sorties of the
besieged. It was therefore decided that the army on the north side
should dig a ditch at two hundred paces from the advanced work, which
should extend from the river valley to that of the rivulet; the ditch to
be about two thousand paces long, and behind this ditch, with the earth
dug out and barricades (of branches), an intrenchment was to be raised.
They could thus in the first place obviate any attack of the besieged at
this point. In the second place, it was resolved to seize the great
_tete de pont_. The only communication with the outside then left to the
besieged would be the valley of the rivulet; but this valley was almost
impracticable, full as it was of bogs and marshes; so that the
inhabitants of the city could attempt nothing on this side. As to
assistance from without, it was deemed out of the question then to
expect any; in any case, to prevent the besieged from issuing by the
eastern gate, a well-guarded work should be raised in front of it; next,
to prevent the besieged from getting provisions, the country on the left
bank of the river should be devastated. As regarded the aqueduct, it was
discovered and cut off.

These measures resolved upon, the besiegers set to work without loss of
time. But Clodoald, who had been present at more than one siege, knew by
experience that a garrison which had no expectation of help from
without, has but one means of safety, viz. to allow the besieger no
respite, especially at the commencement of the investment, when the
enemy had not yet been able to complete his works and effect a close
siege. Without knowing exactly what the army of the Franks had in
contemplation, he knew its numerical force, and did not doubt that it
commanded the services of some Latin engineers, as such was the case at
the siege of Autun. Clodoald therefore divided his troops into eight
bodies. The inclosure[12] being defended by forty-four towers, eleven
hundred and eighty men were required to guard them, reckoning
twenty-five men for each of the thirty-six towers of this inclosure, and
thirty-five for each of the eight towers of the gates, or seventy men
for each gate and its works. The post of each tower, it must be
understood, was, in conformity with the military usages of the time,
intrusted with the guard of the neighbouring curtain. The guard of the
northern outwork required two hundred men; for the _place d'armes_ on
the south, and the _tetes de pont_, five hundred men; to garrison the
stronghold (_Castellum_) one hundred men; to watch the rampart on the
north descending from the angle of the city to the river, and to guard
its banks, six hundred men. Total for the ordinary guard of the
defences, two thousand five hundred and eighty men. He distributed this
first body so that the best troops occupied the _place d'armes_, the
_tetes de pont_ and the advanced guard, as well as the front on this
side. Clodoald constituted a second body of a thousand men, held in
reserve in the middle of the city, to hasten at need to one or several
of the points attacked. He had about six thousand men left, which he
divided into six bodies of a thousand men each, thus distributed: two in
the part of the town situated between the cite and the river, two in the
neighbourhood of the northern gate, and two near the eastern gate. These
six bodies were to be ready to make a sortie whenever the order was
given.

Clodoald retained under his own direct command the thousand men in
reserve lodged in the middle of the cite. Then he provided for the wants
of the garrison and the inhabitants living within the walls. A great
quantity of provisions had been brought into the town by means of
requisitions and according to Roman usage. These provisions were stored
in the stronghold. The flocks and herds were driven to graze on the
<DW72>s of the plateau on the south and east. Timber in considerable
quantity had also been laid in store. It was ranged along the interior
of the curtain walls. In addition to its walls the town had vast
cisterns, supplied by the aqueduct. This being cut off, Clodoald had the
rain-water from the roofs collected in channels which led into these
cisterns. Moreover, in the part of the town situated between the
ramparts and the river there was a fine spring capable of supplying all
the upper part of this quarter.

Clodoald looked carefully to the lodging of his troops. Many of the
soldiers had their families in the town; he would not allow the
defenders to lodge in their houses. He had the public buildings arranged
to receive the seven thousand men who did not habitually occupy the
ramparts. Those who were charged with the guard were well lodged in the
towers, the public buildings of the quarter, or outside the ramparts.
Clodoald, as has been said, enjoyed the full confidence of his troops
before the arrival of the Franks; but after the successful affairs of
the first day, his men considered him as a kind of Providence, and
blindly obeyed him. Accordingly, these arrangements were readily
accepted and carried into execution. In details he had adopted the
composition of the Roman cohort, and every chief of a corps was
responsible for the execution of the orders he received under pain of
death. As for the inhabitants, they were obliged to lend assistance
whenever required; a refusal was capitally punished.

Gondomar, whom we have scarcely had occasion to mention hitherto,
inhabited the _Castellum_; and Clodoald manifested the greatest respect
for him, acting as he said only according to his instructions; but for
the garrison, the veritable chief was Clodoald.

Having provided for what was most pressing, namely the organization of
his force, he had two _onagri_ placed in the outwork the day following
the engagements, and these _onagri_ began to hurl stones of sixty pounds
weight on the Frank workmen engaged in the contravallation, two hundred
paces from the salient, with such effect that the besiegers were forced
to put back their fosse fifty paces out of range. The following night,
Clodoald sent out a thousand men by the eastern gate, who, defiling by
the road along the rampart, went and destroyed the first works of the
Franks, and re-entered immediately; at the same time another sortie,
effected through the south gate of the great _tete de pont_, surprised
several men of the Frankish outposts. Their heads, fixed on stakes,
were placed at the extremity of the northern outwork, as a response to
the proceedings of the Franks. That very night, the enemy attempted to
cross the river, aided by the islet of sand, in order to attack the
ramping curtain on the north from behind; but they were unable to land,
the quays being well lined with troops. Many of them were drowned.

Things were proceeding rather unfavourably for the army of the Frank
kings; it was accompanied, however, by an able Latin engineer, who had
given proofs of his skill, especially at the siege of Autun. Childebert,
exasperated by the success of the besieged, poured forth menaces against
his own men as well as the enemy. He had not deigned to listen to the
advice of his engineer, who since the arrival of the army before Juliana
had been urging him to encamp on the north, and not to invest the town
till he had reconnoitred its approaches. Consulted after the preliminary
checks, Secondinus--that was the name of the Latin engineer--admitted
that it was difficult to withdraw, since the army was engaged around the
place; that the first thing to be done was to make it impossible for the
besieged to make a sortie; and to effect this result--the latter being
unable to issue without danger except by the eastern gate, and the
_tetes de pont_--it was necessary to raise works in front of these
points of egress, so as to close them completely; that it was hazardous
and of little advantage to try to seize the great _tete de pont_ by a
direct attack; but that it was necessary to occupy the western quarter
below the ramparts, and therefore to cross the river; that then, by the
same blow, the _tetes de pont_ and the ramping wall on the north would
be lost to the besieged, and the southern _place d'armes_ endangered.

Thereupon, trees were felled in the forest on the plateau, and the
timberwork of the houses of the lower town brought away. A moat, filled
from the river, surrounded the works of the great _tete de pont_; but
those of the smaller one no longer possessed any; the fosse had long
been filled up, and the besieged had neglected to sink it afresh. The
south wall of the _Emporium_, which joined the northern shoulder of that
smaller _tete de pont_, was crenelated, and in the hands of the
defenders, including the square return on the road coming from the west.
Thus half the area of the Emporium was commanded in its length by this
wall.[13] Astride on this western road, Secondinus erected an _agger_
which rested against the river, fifty paces from the square return, and
on this agger he fixed up a work of framed timber, which commanded the
enemy's rampart (Fig. 21). Around the great _tete de pont_, he contented
himself with raising a contravallation, which cut off the two roads.
Before the eastern gate of the city, the operation presented great
difficulties, because of the steepness of the <DW72> of the plateau.
Every night, the besiegers' works were thrown down by the defenders, who
had the advantage of the dominant position. Secondinus, after several
unsuccessful attempts, was obliged to confine himself to forming beneath
the ascent of the plateau a work of earth and timber, forming an arc of
a circle, as in the accompanying sketch (Fig. 22).

The besiegers could reach this work, which was out of range of the
plateau, by a road descending gently towards the western arm of the
rivulet.

These works had not been executed without attempts on the part of the
besieged to destroy them, nor without considerable loss on the part of
the Franks. A fortnight, however, after the enemy's arrival, they were
completed, and strongly guarded.

[Illustration: FIG. 21.]

The enemy's troops were thus disposed around the cite:--The large
encampment on the north plateau was occupied by twelve thousand men; the
defenders of the great contravallation on the same side numbered two
thousand. The body lodged in the lower town consisted of six thousand
men; the guard of the work opposite the small _tete de pont_, five
hundred; that of the contravallation around the great _tete de pont_,
one thousand two hundred; the work raised at the bottom of the plateau
facing the east gate contained one thousand two hundred men. Total:
twenty-two thousand nine hundred men. There remained, deducting for
losses since the commencement of the siege, about ten thousand soldiers,
who scoured and devastated the country, collected provisions and forage,
and formed a reserve corps, ready to make a fresh attempt when the
propitious moment arrived.

[Illustration: FIG. 22.]

These preparations rendered it clear to Clodoald that the enemy since
his first checks was acting with method, and preparing for a decisive
action. He had quickly perceived that his attack would be directed to
the weak points of the fortress,--that is to say, the northern salient
and the banks of the river opposite the western bend of the cite; he had
therefore strongly barricaded all the roads of the town leading to the
quay, and had strengthened the latter with a _vallum_.

[Illustration: FIG. 23]

In addition to this, two hundred paces behind the square tower on the
river, to the north, he had run another vallum, _a_, _b_, through the
houses and gardens, following the <DW72>s of the plateau in an oblique
direction, and joining the south-west gate (Fig. 23). The habitations
had been left as a mask in front of this entrenchment; a few houses and
fences only had been cleared away to give a free space outside.

[Illustration: FIG. 24.]

Clodoald could not attempt anything before the northern salient, the
enemy being there in front of him in force; but within the salient
itself he sunk ditches with retrenchments of earth and stakes, as shown
in Fig. 24. These works being low and masked were invisible to the enemy
outside. Every night he sent out of the city, by the postern which led
to the bottom of the wide fosse on the northern front, spies who
rendered him an account of the operations of the enemy.

At the end of the third week from the beginning of the siege, his spies
reported a considerable degree of activity in the large camp; that
<DW19>s were being got ready, that the soldiers were preparing their
arms, and that war-engines were being mounted. One of these spies, who
crossed the river below the town and observed the attitude of the enemy
encamped on the west, brought a similar report. Clodoald judged,
therefore, that the besiegers were on the point of attempting a grand
effort on the west and the north.

On the morning of the twenty-third day of the siege, in fact, four
_onagri_ planted on the work opposite the small _tete de pont_ swept the
latter with stones so effectually that the defenders were scarcely
sheltered behind the parapets, and could not work the engines placed at
that point. At the same time, boats laden with inflammable materials
were launched in the river above the wooden bridge. These boats,
impelled in the direction required, were arrested by the piles of the
bridge, and were not long in setting it on fire (Fig. 25). The defenders
of the small _tete de pont_, seeing that their retreat was going to be
cut off, abandoned the work, which was soon occupied by the Franks.
Retired within the _place d'armes_ behind the bridge, the besieged
could do nothing but watch the fire.

[Illustration: FIG 25.]

At the same time, shielded by wicker mantelets, a numerous troop of the
enemy were advancing boldly against the north-east and north-west flanks
of the northern salient. Filling up the fosse with <DW19>s, the
assailants rushed in a dense column against the rampart. The conflict
was furious. Thanks to the stonework of the aqueduct the enemy were
unable to break through the north-east flank; but they succeeded in
gaining a footing[14] on the opposite one. The besieged were obliged to
abandon the salient, retiring from one retrenchment to another, and
with but slight loss, whereas the assailants had more than two hundred
men killed on the rampart and in the ditches.

At nightfall Clodoald with the three thousand men of his reserve corps
issued suddenly by the central gate--the bridge of which, strongly
barricaded, had remained in his possession--and fell upon the enemy: he
killed a hundred more, but was unable to retake the work. Moreover, he
anticipated another attack, and was not mistaken. Towards midnight the
Franks took possession of the island of sand with the help of rafts, and
there entrenched themselves in front of the quay. They were within
bowshot, and arrows were discharged on both sides, but with little
result.

The loss of the advanced work had only the effect of animating the
besieged, who were for immediately re-taking it. Clodoald had to calm
their ardour by promising them to do better than retake it; adding, that
just then he had another enterprise in view, and that the enemy was
going to give them a fine opportunity of beating him.

Clodoald strengthened the defences of the northern front, which could
not be taken by storm; placed a strong body in the outwork of the
eastern gate, with orders to defend it to the last man; and sent down as
large a number of troops as they would hold into the two _places
d`armes_ south and south-west. He strongly manned the oblique
entrenchment descending to the edge of the water, and placed there a
chief on whom he could depend, with special instructions.

The next day passed without fighting. The Franks were engaged in
intrenching themselves within the outwork against the north front, and
destroying the _vallum_. They were bringing to the island timbers,
fascines, earth, and stones, and were beginning to fill up the small
arm with these materials. Sheltering themselves with wicker mantelets,
they threw stones into the water, then fascines, in which large pebbles
were inclosed to make them sink between the stones, then when these
materials began to rise above the surface; they laid trunks of trees
upon them across the stream, and between these fascines and clods of
turf. The besieged could scarcely do anything to hinder these
operations. Two _onagri_ sometimes hurled stones at the workmen; but
they, well shielded and always in motion, were seldom struck. Towards
evening the embankment was barely twenty feet from the quay wall, and
the water--rather low at that season--ran through the sunken fascines
without endangering the stability of the dam. The Franks continued all
night working at the consolidation and enlargement of the causeway; then
they brought timbers and ladders, and raised on its extremity about
fifteen feet from the quay wall a stage of timberwork prepared
beforehand. At daybreak the besieged perceived on the stage the end of a
kind of bridge, furnished with a wicker mantelet, moving slowly forwards
towards the edge of the quay (Fig. 26). Secondinus had the platform of a
bridge framed ten feet wide: this platform, laid on rollers which rested
on the inclined beams, was propelled by soldiers, aided by levers, and
drawn by two cables wound on capstans fixed in advance. The men with the
levers were screened by sheets of thick canvas stretched before them,
which stopped the darts. All this time two catapults and two _onagri_
showered long darts and stones on the _vallum_ of the quay; while
slingers and archers rendered it impossible for the defenders to show
themselves.

[Illustration: FIG. 26.--THE ATTACK--THE MOVABLE BRIDGE INTENDED FOR
CROSSING THE SMALL ARM OF THE RIVER OF ABONIA.]

The chief who commanded the latter, following the instructions of
Clodoald, drew his men gradually away in the direction of the houses;
and when the rolling bridge attained the ridge of the _vallum_ of the
quay, not a single Burgundian remained behind this defence. The Franks
rushed with loud shouts on the platform, threw down the wicker parapet,
and spread themselves in great numbers over the deserted and silent
quay. Dreading some ambuscade, they were in no hurry to ascend the
<DW72>s of the plateau, gentle though they were at this point, or to
venture along the roads whose barricades appeared not to be guarded.
They drew up along the quay in good order until they numbered about
four thousand men. This did not take long; for as soon as the first few
had passed from the stage to the _vallum_, the besiegers had placed
beams across on which they laid logs, brushwood, and turf, and the
bridge had thus attained a width of nearly thirty feet.

A second body of considerable strength ready to sustain the first was
assembled on the island, and a third body was approaching on the
opposite bank.

Secondinus was one of the first to reach the left bank, and he augured
no good from the apparent inaction of the besieged. He desired that any
advance should be made with caution, and not until a _tete de pont_ had
been erected with stakes and _debris_ taken from the neighbouring
houses. An exploring party sent into these houses found that they were
deserted, while behind the barricades erected where the roads opened on
the quay there were no defenders.

He therefore ordered these barricades to be cleared away. All this took
up time, and the Franks began to murmur loudly, asking if they had been
sent across the river merely to guard the shores. Their chiefs insisted
that the besieged had abandoned this part of the cite, as they had the
lower town, that they had retired behind their walls, and that if
advantage was not taken of their retreat, they would regain courage and
come and attack the Franks in the night; that it was essential to occupy
the ground vacated by them without loss of time, and take up a position
beneath the walls, seizing in its rear the smaller _place d'armes_.
Secondinus shook his head, and persevered in ordering measures of
safety. Towards midday one of the Frank chiefs, still more impatient
than the rest, called his men together and declared that there had been
too long a delay, and that the <DW72>s must be occupied. "Let the brave
follow me, and those who are afraid remain here and find themselves
sheltering-places!" and he and his followers made for the summit of the
plateau. His example was quickly followed, and by various paths through
the houses and gardens more than two thousand men ascended the <DW72>s.

Arrived at the _vallum_ formed on the slant, they were received by a
shower of stones and darts. But soon recovering the surprise, and urged
on by their chiefs, the Franks sprang up the escarpment. Their position,
commanded as it was by the besieged, was unfavourable, and the first
assault failed. They had to rally in the shelter afforded by the
habitations and hedges left by Clodoald outside the _vallum_. Hearing
the shouts of the onslaught, the troops left near the passage hurried in
their turn up the hill. Secondinus then judged it expedient to get over
a thousand men from among those who had remained in the island, giving
excellent reasons for keeping them at that point.

Seeing the reinforcement ascending the hill, the first assailants
separated into three large parties, and at the word of command advanced
anew against the _vallum_. The fall of the foremost did not arrest the
new comers, who passed over their bodies. There were moments when the
intrenchment seemed to be carried, for its ridge was crowned by Frank
soldiers; but the defenders--independently of those who guarded the
_vallum_--had also divided into compact bodies, which, in readiness
behind, fell on the assaulting columns when their heads appealed above
the ridge. Thus the conflict presented a series of captures and
recaptures of the _vallum_, and it appeared as if the same turns of
fortune would be repeated as long as the assailants and defenders were
able to form bodies of soldiers. Many fell on both sides, for they
fought hand to hand.

Then it was that Clodoald, who held the smaller _place d'armes_ on the
south-west, led forth a thousand men in good order, keeping along the
river; he ordered those who occupied the large _place d'armes_ to pass
on between him and the _vallum_, and to fall on the assailants in flank.
From the right shore the Franks perceived this movement of Clodoald, and
hurried towards the island to attack him and support those of their
party who were on the left shore. But Clodoald had the start, and
advanced by a direct road, whereas the enemy had to make a detour. In a
few minutes, therefore, he came upon the body of Franks which, at the
instance of Secondinus, was guarding the passage. He attacked it most
vigorously, and cut down the first he met with. The Franks resisted,
however, and, covering the embankment, formed in a square, with their
right against the river. Fresh assailants passed over to the embankment,
and took up such a position on the left that Clodoald's troop was on the
point of being surrounded, and to free itself was obliged to make a
movement in retreat, not without much loss--abandoning the left shore in
order to reach the <DW72>s and choose more advantageous ground.

The second troop of Burgundians was then advancing on the flank of the
besiegers, who were furiously storming the _vallum_. The assailants,
attacked in flank, almost in rear--by reason of the direction of the
_vallum_--gave way and ran down towards the passage, pursued by the
Burgundians. Seeing himself thus supported, Clodoald assailed the foe
with renewed energy. At that juncture came Gondomar sallying out from
the western gate, with fresh troops to reinforce the defenders of the
_vallum_. Seeing the enemy flying in all haste towards the passage, he
concluded that his force was strong enough to press them vigorously,
and, following the southern ramping wall, and then turning to the left,
he attacked the enemy on the shore opposite the island. The Franks, thus
attacked in front and on both flanks, with a narrow passage behind,
offered a desperate resistance; but their very numbers were unfavourable
to success, and they were overwhelmed with missiles hurled by Burgundian
slingers posted in the houses on the <DW72>.

When night came not an enemy remained alive on the left shore; many had
sought to reach the island by swimming, and a considerable number had
also effected their escape by the embankment; but more than two thousand
five hundred bodies remained along the _vallum_ and about the entrance
of the passage. Clodoald had <DW19>s and straw heaped on the movable
bridge, which soon caught fire as well as the stage. The besieged lost a
thousand, and Clodoald was wounded.

The Burgundians had kept the western portion of the town, but they could
not take the offensive in that quarter, since dense masses of the enemy
presented themselves there.

During the same day the Frank kings had made a feint of attacking the
north front of the city; but the ramparts and the towers erected on this
front could only be taken by a regular siege, and the Burgundian troops
assigned to that quarter were more than sufficient to defy a serious
attack.

Retired within their tent, Childebert and his brother accused one
another of the failure of their operations, but ultimately agreed in
throwing on Secondinus the blame of their defeat. The latter, summoned
into their presence, had to undergo the bitterest reproaches. "If,"
replied the engineer, "your troops were disciplined--if they had not
persisted in attacking the quarter, on which we had fortunately gained a
footing, at haphazard--we should still be on that shore, and should
have been able to-morrow to seize the whole of that region; not that I
think it necessary to attack the cite on that front, but because we
could thus have prevented any sortie, and might without risk attack the
northern front and take it--which would only be an affair of time.

"Not being in possession of the western quarter, all our siege works may
be destroyed in a vigorous sortie; for the besieged are audacious--they
have shown themselves so; and the ramping wall which descends to the
river from the west corner will always put our attack on the north front
of the cite at the mercy of a vigorous effort.

"This ramping wall has no visible gates, but it will be easy for the
besieged to make outlets if there are not already some hidden ones; and
then under favour of night he can fall on the right flank of the attack,
burn our works, and render the siege much longer and more uncertain in
its issue. Each of our chiefs insists on commanding; and, brave though
they all are, before a cite so well fortified and defended, blind
bravery only involves you in useless perils. Obtain from them,
therefore, an implicit obedience to your commands, and remember that
your illustrious father owed his victories to the rigorous discipline
which he succeeded in maintaining." This firm language did not fail to
make an impression on the two kings, who, repressing their anger, began
to deliberate coolly on the situation. It was decided to seize the great
_tete de pont_, still in the hands of the besieged; to keep a strict
watch on the shores of the river; and to attack the place along the
whole extent of the northern front, comprising the ramping wall.

The two kings decided that the chiefs of the various corps should obey
Secondinus, whom they intrusted with the direction of their operations.
The chiefs were assembled, and received from Childebert's own mouth the
order not to engage in any enterprise except such as Secondinus should
sanction. But these Franks had no liking for the Roman, as they called
him, and received the admonition with a bad grace. Many raised
objections, declaring that the slow proceedings of the Roman were the
cause of their failures, and that if they might have their way the cite
would soon be in their power. Childebert and his brother began to feel
their resolution failing at these representations, and looked to
Secondinus to reply. Addressing himself then to the chiefs who had
accused him, he said: "Let those of you who have a plan of attack to
offer, speak; let them explain by what methods they propose to force
walls defended by men inured to war and well commanded; and if they can
exhibit a plan superior to mine, I am ready to follow them like the
humblest of their soldiers. But the kings and the whole army, before
being called upon to advance, have a right to demand that their lives be
not risked in an enterprise without definite purpose, and not presenting
any chance of success." To this speech there was no response. "You, who
spoke," said Childebert then to one of the chiefs, "what do you
propose?"--"We took Autun by main strength; we invested the cite, made a
breach in the wall, and entered it."--"Yes," replied Secondinus; "but
Autun is not a cite built on the summit of escarpments like this; we
were able to attack it from the level on two of its fronts, without
having a river in the rear. Its walls, good though they were, were but
ill defended, and our simultaneous attacks on two opposite points
disconcerted the besieged. Here there is but a single front that can be
attacked from the level; all the others crown escarpments, that could be
easily defended, even without walls. Only two courses, then, are
possible: either to invest the place so closely as to force it to
surrender through want of provisions--which may be a tedious process,
for the besieged are well provisioned, and the Frank army, which
dislikes inaction, will melt away during such a blockade--or to attack
the only vulnerable side, and concentrate all our forces on that point.

"By proceeding regularly, this front will be in our power in three
weeks. Then we shall be able to invest the _castellum_ closely, leaving
a numerous body to prevent any sortie. It must surrender eventually, and
in the meantime the kings will subdue the rest of Burgundy, without
being delayed here." Many of the chiefs responded, proposing irrational
plans of attack--appearing such, indeed, to the assembly; for though all
agreed in blaming the conduct of the siege hitherto, no one could
suggest a consistent plan of operation. Every proposition was therefore
received with murmurs or ironical laughter. Seeing this, Childebert made
a formal declaration that he and his brother were determined that
Secondinus should be obeyed in all points, since no one had a desirable
plan to propose; and the assembly separated. The two kings, remaining
alone with the engineer, urged him to contrive for securing an immediate
success that might cause the recent failures to be forgotten and restore
confidence to the army.

"The difficulty," replied Secondinus, "is to obtain such a success,
without risk, with troops that do not strictly follow orders. What
secures success in siege warfare is patience, assiduous labour, and
rigid discipline; but your men are not patient, are not fond of digging,
and are undisciplined. They prefer getting killed in an assault under
unfavourable conditions to the safe, though painful, labour which in the
course of some days would secure the capture of the place without much
loss."

Meantime the Frank army was reinforced by a body of about two thousand
men, sent by Theodoric, who, having terminated his expedition into
Auvergne, was reckoning on gaining some advantage from the war going on
in Burgundy. These two thousand men were robust, but ill-armed, and
little fitted for active war; but they were able to render great
services in siege works. They were placed directly under the orders of
Secondinus, who set them to work immediately, promising them a large
share of the booty when the cite was taken.

[Illustration: FIG. 27.]

We have seen that the northern salient had remained in the power of the
Franks. Secondinus raised an _agger_ at this point, in front of the gate
of the cite; and on the declivity of the plateau another _agger_
opposite and on the counterscarp of the fosse of the ramping wall (Fig.
27). The ridge of these works did not reach the level of the footway of
the cite walls, but yet rose high enough to allow great stones to be
discharged on the battlements by means of onagers, and to render the
situation perilous to the defenders. The especial object of this was to
occupy the besieged. Under shelter of these two earthworks, Secondinus
had two mines commenced, one at the point A, the other at B, which,
carried under the bottom of the dry ditches, were to penetrate beneath
the walls. Clodoald, who had been rather severely wounded, was obliged
to confide the superintendence of the defence to his lieutenants, who
informed him of the besiegers' operations, and who believed that the
Franks were going to raise timber works to command the walls, destroy
the battlements, and throw bridges across. Nothing, however, favoured
the supposition that such was the intention of the Franks, who limited
themselves to furnishing the earthworks with screens to protect their
engines. This apparent inactivity was a constant source of anxiety to
Clodoald, who knew, through his spies, that the besiegers had received
reinforcements. As he was unable to take the lead, he dared not direct
his lieutenants to undertake any fresh sorties, and was obliged to
content himself with recommending the most scrupulous vigilance.
Trusting, moreover, to the solidity of the Roman walls and the rocky
site of the plateau, he scarcely believed that mining could be rendered
efficient; yet, in anticipation of such a contingency, he ordered that
trusty men should be set to listen in the lower stories of the towers,
and at the base of the walls opposite the face of attack; then he had
platforms prepared behind the rampart to receive six machines, which
discharged stones in abundance on the earthworks of the besiegers (Fig.
28).

[Illustration: FIG. 28.]

The Franks, on their side, were working vigorously at their two mining
galleries, not without great difficulty, for they had at several points
very hard rock to pierce. The excavated earth was heaped up within the
earthwork, and could not be seen by the besieged. Till they reached the
fosse the noise of the work could not be heard from the cite; but when
the miners had arrived below the fosse, the men on guard in the town
heard the sound of pickaxes dully reverberating through the night.
Clodoald, informed of this, immediately gave orders to countermine,
starting from the interior base of the rampart, and in the direction of
the sound. On both sides, therefore, the miners were at work; but this
did not prevent the projectile engines from being worked all day by both
parties.

In a fortnight the besiegers' tunnels were near enough for the workmen
to hear the blows of the pickaxes in the rock. Clodoald was then in a
condition to leave his dwelling; he examined what had been done, stopped
the work, and listened attentively. He judged that the enemy's miners
were digging obliquely under the wall, near the north gate (Fig. 29),
while the countermine of the besieged followed the direction A B.

[Illustration: FIG. 29.]

He thought he also perceived that the enemy's tunnel was on a higher
level than his own. This seemed favourable to the plan he was intending
to adopt, and with a view to greater safety, he sunk the floor of the
countermine-tunnel still lower. On visiting the base of the ramping wall
he heard no noise at this point, although his lieutenants said they had
heard mining towards the upper third of the wall during the preceding
days. The countermine-tunnel was also commenced opposite to the place
where they thought they had heard the enemy's miners. Clodoald ordered a
suspension of the work till the besiegers' operations were clearly
understood.

Next day, on the north front, it became evident that the
countermine-tunnel was crossing that of the enemy, for the steps of the
pioneers were heard above the ceiling.

Clodoald then had the ceiling shored up along the sides of the tunnel,
and ordered that the layers of stone forming the ceiling should be
noiselessly removed by levers and crowbars, so as to render it as thin
as possible below the point where footsteps had been heard.

When this had been done to the extent of leaving only a very thin layer
of rock, Clodoald had dry <DW19>s, resin, tar, and all the inflammable
materials that could be got, heaped up in the countermine tunnel; then,
promising the most skilful of his miners a large reward on succeeding,
he told him to break down this crust, and as soon as he perceived an
opening, however small, to set fire to the <DW19>s, retiring towards the
entrance.

In fact, a few minutes after the order had been given, the miner
appeared at the entrance of the shaft, followed by a thick smoke. He
reascended quickly, and this opening was stopped with planks and earth.

From the hole made below the floor of the besiegers' gallery the smoke
was rising into the tunnel, and suffocating the miners. They tried to
stop up this orifice, but the necessary materials were not at hand; and
the flame soon mounted high, as the hole produced a draft. The heat
burst the stone to pieces, and the opening was becoming larger. The
mining gallery was soon so filled with smoke that it was no longer
possible to stay there and some of the miners fell suffocated before
they could gain the somewhat distant mouth of the tunnel.

The stir caused among the besiegers beyond the earthwork proved to
Clodoald that the operations had been frustrated, and the mine rendered
untenable. He then stopped up the entrance to the countermine, and when
the smoke was dissipated, he resolved on examining the state of things
for himself. The <DW19>s were burning rapidly by reason of the draft,
and the flame was roaring through the hole, which was becoming larger
and larger. Fresh <DW19>s were thrown on the fire with pitchforks, the
limestone was cracking incessantly and falling in large slabs.

Secondinus had heard the counterminers at work, but had not been able to
ascertain the direction they were following, as they were excavating
under the limestone bed in a clayey sand. He thought the galleries would
meet some time or other, and that then there would be a struggle in the
tunnel. Anticipating this, he had screens in readiness, hoping thus to
remain master of his own gallery, and even to gain possession of the
countermine.

The event disconcerted his projects; no further progress was possible
there. Along the ramping wall, Secondinus's miners had reached the sand,
and were consequently no longer heard. He sent all his workmen,
therefore, to this quarter, and had his galleries deeply excavated
according to the plan (Fig. 30). Thanks to the yielding nature of the
soil, this operation was completed the following night. The galleries
were well propped and shored with dry wood taken from the houses of the
lower town. <DW19>s smeared with tar were placed among these props, and
at dawn were set fire to.

[Illustration: FIG. 30.]

Clodoald's anxiety had brought him once more to this front of the
defence, when a cracking noise was heard.... A wide piece of the wall,
above the oblique intrenchment made by the besieged, immediately split,
bent forward, and fell _en masse_ outside into the fosse. Clouds of
smoke and dust arose, and the exulting cries of the Franks were heard
from the cite.

There was not a moment to lose: weak as he still was from his wound,
Clodoald assembled all his men within call, and sent for a
reinforcement. With the soldiers--about two hundred in number--who had
hastened together at his first summons, he mounted to the summit of the
crumbling wall (Fig. 31) to meet the assault.

[Illustration: FIG. 31.]

When the dust and smoke were somewhat dispersed, he could see the
Franks, about two thousand in number, drawn up on the earthwork,
prepared to scale the ruins. Happily for the defenders, an engine
mounted on the platform of the square tower at the angle of the cite[15]
was quickly turned by those serving it, so as to discharge heavy stones
on the van of the attack, killing or wounding many men at every volley;
which forced the Franks to retreat until mantelets were brought up.
This delay enabled the besieged to assemble on the breach, and to heap
up fascines there--for the besiegers on their side were discharging a
quantity of stones on this point--and to place planks so as to ascend to
the summit of the crumbling wall more readily.

All this occupied but a quarter of an hour, when the Franks ascended the
_agger_ once more, protected by the mantelets, threw fascines into the
space between the head of the wall and the <DW72> of the _agger_, and
rushed forward resolutely to the assault.

The position of the besieged was disadvantageous, for they had behind
them the escarpment produced by the thickness of the fallen wall, and a
ground deeply creviced by the fall of the masonry; while this fallen
wall gave the besiegers a <DW72> of slight inclination, and of easy
access.

[Illustration: FIG. 32.]

The assault was vigorous and vigorously met, but the people of the cite
had only a thin front to oppose to a compact assaulting column; and
towards midday the Franks remained decidedly masters of the breach (Fig.
32.) Clodoald had died in the fight, and with him more than a thousand
Burgundians.

The Franks on their side had sustained heavy loss, and the breach was
literally covered with dead bodies. Either from fatigue, or because they
feared some surprise, the besiegers allowed the remainder of the enemy's
forces to re-enter the cite without pursuing them.

They now possessed all the western part of the town lying between the
river and the <DW72>s of the plateau. Outside the cite the Burgundians
occupied only the southern _place d'armes_ and the great _tete de pont_:
the smaller _place d'armes_ of the bridge previously burned, being
uninclosed on the side of its access, and not united with the ramparts,
was evacuated.

The Franks had no personal knowledge of Clodoald, and learned only from
prisoners that this brave captain had been killed in the assault. They
had his body sought for, and his head, fixed on a long pole, was placed
before the north gate. This time the prisoners were spared, and sent as
slaves to the royal domains.

The cite Juliana was now shut in on all sides and reduced to its walls,
which were able long to defy the attacks of the Franks. But Clodoald's
death thoroughly disheartened the besiegers, and the Burgundian king was
not energetic enough to replace his skilful lieutenant. On the evening
of this unfortunate day, he assembled the chiefs of the defending forces
to deliberate on the measures to be adopted. Accustomed to the bold
enterprises of Clodoald, they thought themselves sufficiently numerous
to attempt a sortie at two points--the southern _place d'armes_ and the
eastern gate; they believed that the cite would be destitute of
provisions in a few weeks, since they could get no more supplies from
without, and they considered that this extremity and the disgraceful
surrender that must follow should not be waited for. The sortie from the
southern _place d'armes_ was to be supported by a body issuing through
the south-west gate.

Thus they could drive back the Franks as far as the wall which they had
just passed. The sortie from the eastern gate would occupy them during
this time, on the left side of the plateau.

But while they were engaged in these deliberations, Secondinus
understood well how to avail himself of the advantage so dearly bought.
During the night he had an intrenchment made at some distance from the
gate of the _place d'armes_, caused the road to be intercepted and the
<DW72>s of the cite covered with abatis of trees, and thereupon commenced
without delay a mining tunnel under the descent from the castle to this
_place d`armes_ to destroy the fortified wall.

In the morning, therefore, when the Burgundians were preparing to pass
the north gate from the great _place d'armes_, they saw before them a
well-guarded intrenchment, bristling with pointed stakes and intertwined
branches of trees. Reckoning, however, on the attack to be made by the
body that was to issue by the south-west gate, they advanced resolutely
against the intrenchment, whose defenders might thus be taken in the
rear. But this contingency had been foreseen by Secondinus; another
intrenchment at right angles was already raised before this gate, and
the road cut off; the approaches being furnished with barricades. After
losing a hundred men, therefore, the two bodies re-entered without
having been able to execute their design. Originating power and
promptness in execution were henceforth wanting to these brave people,
who were, however, determined not to capitulate.

Three days afterwards the descent to the _place d'armes_ was undermined,
and part of it fell. The defenders of the post and of the _tete de
pont_ were surprised, and had only time to retire in haste by the road
ascending to the eastern gate: and some of them fell into the hands of
the Franks.

The cite was then completely surrounded within bowshot distance. No
sortie could be of any serious use to the besieged; for Secondinus had
established posts supported by intrenchments around the ramparts. Seeing
the success of his last efforts, the Frank chiefs began to place more
confidence in the Latin engineer, and were obedient to his orders.

Then Secondinus resumed his attack on the north front, and began four
mining galleries, making use of that which he had been forced to
abandon. Three were led under the square tower of the north-west
corner[16] (Fig. 33). The besieged soon heard the strokes of the miners'
pickaxes, and attempted a countermine, starting from the tower itself,
at A; but Clodoald was no longer there to direct the workmen, who,
wishing to repeat the manoeuvre previously adopted, dug too deep,
crossed the enemy's galleries underneath them, and had no clear
perception what direction their sapping should take.

The sounds they heard were diffused, and seemed to issue from several
points; and, in fact, the Franks were working in more than one
direction, and, as Secondinus ordered, immediately under the foundation;
sometimes they were digging in the sand, and all noise ceased; sometimes
they would meet with rock, and then the blows of the pioneers again
became audible.

[Illustration: FIG. 33.]

The countermine gallery, therefore, was winding about, and only weakened
the basis on which the tower rested; and four days after the
commencement of the work, it was supported only by dry props, greased
and smeared with pitch. These being set on fire, the tower fell in,
bringing down with it a large piece of the north wall. Anticipating this
result, King Gondomar, who, after Clodoald's death, took the command in
the cite, had ordered an interior retrenchment to be raised, with a
strong wooden tower in the middle of the curve, projectile engines being
placed behind. He had sufficient time to complete these works after the
fall of the tower; for the breach was scarcely practicable, and was
stoutly defended. The Franks were two days in getting possession of it
and occupying the corner of the cite in front of the retrenchment, not
without having lost two or three hundred men.

Secondinus interdicted the advance of the troops, who were eager to
storm the retrenchment and take it by main force; and this time he was
listened to. He had timber and mantelets brought, and gave orders for
the erection, on the very ruins of the angle, of a tower of green wood,
which he took care to protect with woollen blankets and fresh hides. The
engines of the defenders did not cease to discharge large stones at the
workmen, which greatly hindered them and killed many; but the Franks had
acquired confidence, and worked incessantly night and day with
enthusiastic ardour.

Twice the defenders of the cite endeavoured to sally forth from their
retrenchments to drive off the assailants and destroy their works; they
met with a warm reception, especially as the Franks could avail
themselves of the ruins as a rampart.

On their side projectile engines were hurling stones and darts on the
rampart walks of the extremities of the curtains that remained standing,
and made it impossible for the defenders to remain there. As soon as
anyone showed himself, showers of arrows were aimed at him. These
rampart walks were repeatedly furnished with mantelets, which were soon
thrown down by the stones from the engines. The wooden tower of the
besiegers was rising rapidly, and at the end of the second day
overtopped that of the retrenchment. An engine was planted at the top,
which incessantly discharged heavy stones on the works of the
Burgundians. The latter kept the old countermine gallery on the north
front; but they had not been able to extend it, because blocks of stone
had been thrown by the besiegers into the connecting opening, and were
replaced by others when the besieged ventured to remove them. The
enemy's miners were no longer heard on this side. The reason was that
Secondinus, having become better acquainted with the nature of the
soil, had perceived that by digging deeper he found a stratum of sand
easy to work in and carry away. From the old abortive gallery, however,
which the besieged could not speedily enter, he had conducted two
oblique tunnels, in an inverse direction and at a deep level, descending
into the sand, under the foundations of the curtain; one of them, A,
gradually rose again obliquely as far as the inner side of the ramparts
(Fig. 34). He expected in this way to make an entrance into the cite in
any case.

[Illustration: FIG. 34.]

But a thick bed of limestone prevented the ceiling from being speedily
penetrated. The gallery was far enough from that marked B, intended to
undermine the curtain wall, not to be destroyed by its fall, and he
reckoned on making use of it on occasion.

Five days had been spent in these labours, and on the fifth day--that is
to say, the next day after the fall of the square tower of the
corner--the curtain near the north gate was undermined for a length of
thirty paces. The stays and props were set on fire during the night, and
in the morning the curtain sank down into the fosse, separating into two
masses. The Franks immediately threw a quantity of fascines into the
fosse, brought ladders, and rushed in great numbers on the ruined wall,
which still rose about six feet above the interior level of the cite.
The Burgundians, taken by surprise, could scarcely offer any resistance
to this escalade, and their efforts were at most confined to hindering
the assailants from crossing the breach. The position of the defenders
was one of the most unfavourable that can be imagined, especially as
they had raised no retrenchment at this point. They barricaded
themselves, however--making use of the houses, and hurling a quantity of
projectiles from the top of the neighbouring tower upon the assailants;
and the struggle was prolonged. Then it was that Secondinus sent workmen
to destroy the ceiling of the mine gallery, A, which terminated on the
inside of the wall. In four hours this was effected, and the besieged
saw a large hole on their left. In a few seconds this gaping orifice
poured forth a stream of enemies, who spread themselves along the wall,
outflanked the defenders, and hurried towards the gate to burst it open.

The guard that defended this gate were massacred, and the doors being
smashed with axes and battering-rams, fresh troops were enabled to get
into the city. The town was taken, but the conflict was being kept up in
the streets and houses. Night came on, and the defenders of the
retrenchment, perceiving that the enemy had got round them, had retired
in haste towards the interior of the cite.

The Franks no longer gave ear to the orders of their chief, but rushed
in small bands into every opening that presented itself, burning,
killing, and pillaging; many of them fell in with numerous bodies of
the besieged and met their death.

The women, mad with fury, threw tiles, furniture, logs of wood, and
stones upon the Franks dispersed in the streets. As most of the houses
were of timber, the fire, fanned by a wind from the west, spread rapidly
in every direction. Besiegers and besieged fought till they were
surrounded with flames. It was a series of isolated struggles, in which
the voices of the chiefs on either side were unable to make themselves
heard.

Gondomar, with about a thousand men, had taken refuge in the castle; and
from the summit of its towers the Burgundian king could see his faithful
cite burning, and hear the shouts of the victors and the vanquished
approaching nearer and nearer the walls of this last retreat. He had
been unwilling to close the gates, that he might gather in the
unfortunate defenders; and towards the end of the night these, driven
into the southern extremity of the cite by the enemy and the fire, began
then to arrive in crowds, many being wounded, and among them women and
children. The castle was being filled, and the enemy was approaching; so
the bridge was thrown into the fosse and the gates were shut.

Engrossed with pillage, the Franks allowed the day which succeeded this
disastrous night to pass by without attempting anything against the
castle; and not before evening could the Frank king restore any degree
of order in the burning cite.

There were not enough provisions in the castle to feed its numerous
occupants for forty hours. This was just what Secondinus anticipated;
accordingly he had no difficulty in persuading the Frank king to rest
content with investing the stronghold. Gondomar, overwhelmed with grief,
and seeing his helplessness, sought death by throwing himself from the
top of one of the towers. The fugitives were forced to surrender at
discretion, and most of them were carried away into slavery.

The Frank kings destroyed the most important of the defensive works, so
as to render the cite Juliana incapable of sustaining a siege. But those
Roman works were massive; and two centuries afterwards the remains of
the towers and ramparts still presented an imposing mass of ruins. The
plateau was then a waste, and the ruins were overgrown with a luxuriant
vegetation; only a few shepherds' huts were to be seen in this desolated
region. On the western declivity, between the river and the ancient
ramparts, extended a poor little town, whose population did not amount
to more than twelve or fifteen hundred souls.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 9: See Fig. 16.]

[Footnote 10: See Fig. 16.]

[Footnote 11: See the plan, Fig. 16.]

[Footnote 12: See Fig. 16.]

[Footnote 13: See Fig. 16.]

[Footnote 14: See Fig. 24.]

[Footnote 15: See B, Fig. 16.]

[Footnote 16: See B, Fig. 16.]




CHAPTER IX.

_THE FEUDAL CASTLE._


In the year 1180, the valley had again become a fertile and prosperous
district. Several villages had arisen along the course of the river; and
a town of some importance covered, as in former times, the western
<DW72>s of the old cite Juliana, and extended on the opposite shore. This
town was then called Saint Julien. How was it that the cite founded by
the Emperor Julian the Apostate had changed its appellation of Juliana
for that of Saint Julien? We shall not attempt to explain the fact. It
will suffice to say, that about the eighth century a legend arose
respecting a companion of Lucian, Bishop of Beauvais, named Julian, a
native of the Val d'Abonia, who had been martyred with Maximian a short
time before his holy bishop. His body, transferred to the place of his
birth, had there wrought numerous miracles, and was then resting in the
crypt of the church placed under his invocation, and which was the
appanage of a rich abbey, situated at the northern extremity of the
plateau. On the site in question, therefore, was to be found the city
and abbey of Saint Julien, and the castle of Roche-Pont, occupied by the
lords of Roche-Pont. As for the valley, it had preserved pretty nearly
its old name; it was the Val d'Abonia. Ever since the ninth century the
lords of Roche-Pont had been possessors of the vale, the town, the lands
contiguous, and the forests stretching northwards on the plateaux; they
claimed descent by the female side from the ancient kings of Burgundy,
and were rich and powerful. One of their ancestors engaged in a war
against King Robert, in the year 1005, and had contributed greatly to
the failure of that prince's expedition into Burgundy. On the submission
of this province at a later date to the king, the lord of Roche-Pont had
made conditions that had notably improved his domain. This lord was the
founder of the Clunisian abbey which stood on the north of the plateau;
he had endowed it with the uncultivated lands of the rivulet valley. The
monks soon made a capital domain of this valley, by taking advantage of
the little water-course, which never failed. With the aid of dams they
secured very productive pools; waterfalls turned mills, worked forges,
and irrigated fair meadows for flocks and herds, and, on the <DW72> of
southern aspect, vineyards renowned for their fine produce.

There were occasional misunderstandings between the abbots of Saint
Julien and the lords of Roche-Pont. According to their foundation
charter, they claimed to be perfectly independent of the lordship of
Roche-Pont--indeed, of all superiority but that of Rome--and to have
complete suzerainty over the lands they possessed; they refused to
render feudal dues to the castle, and on several occasions disputes
resulted in acts of violence. Then the abbots appealed to the Duke of
Burgundy; men of war interfered in the contest; and, as a matter of
course, the vassals had to pay the costs.

One of the abbots, a restless and ambitious man, had presumed to
commence fortifying the abbey, and had persisted in doing so in spite of
the opposition of the lord of Roche-Pont. The lord had consequently laid
waste the abbey domain. The fraternity then appealed to the king of
France, who had intervened in the dispute. After much litigation and
cost to both sides, it had been decided that the abbey might be
surrounded by a wall without towers, and that in the event of a war in
which the interests of the suzerain were concerned, the lord of
Roche-Pont should garrison the abbey at the expense of the latter.

The retainers of the abbey and those of the lord continued,
nevertheless, in a permanent state of antagonism; and not a year passed
in which there were not differences to be settled on this score at the
court of the duke.

The castle of the lords of Roche-Pont was built on the remains of the
_castellum_ of the cite Juliana, and about the year 1182 it was very old
and dilapidated.

Anseric de la Roche-Pont was at that time its owner. He was a young man
of ardent temperament and ambitious disposition, married to a niece of
the Count of Nevers, deceased in 1176--an alliance which had increased
his possessions. He bore with impatience his subjection to the Duke of
Burgundy, and in endeavouring to shake it off, his first step was to
rebuild his old castle, and put it in a condition to defy every attack.
Anseric de la Roche-Pont was encouraged in these ideas of independence
by one of his uncles, an old seigneur, who, having spent fifteen years
of fighting in Syria, had returned, worn out and impoverished, to
Burgundy. Anseric had given him an asylum in his declining years, and he
soon acquired an influence over the mind of his nephew, and even of his
niece. During the long winter evenings, the recital of adventures beyond
seas, to which the Baron Guy knew how to give a life-like interest,
would inflame the breast of the young lord. Often on such occasions the
latter would rise and pace the hall, with sparkling eyes and clenched
hands, stung with shame at his own inactivity, and consumed by the
desire of some nobler occupation than killing boars, and disputing with
monks concerning mill or fishery rights. At such moments the old baron,
far from seeking to calm his nephew's ardour, would seek to direct it to
a more attainable end than the conquest of towns in Syria. The Baron Guy
was a personage of remarkable idiosyncrasy--physically an elderly man,
tall and angular, and somewhat bent by the weight of arms: his head,
still covered with rough grey locks, square in the crown, exhibiting
projecting cheek-bones, and--beneath shaggy eyebrows--eyes of sombre
green, deeply sunk in their orbits. His wide mouth with its thin lips
showed, when he laughed--which rarely happened--rows of sharp white
teeth. When he was relating long stories, seated, his hands on his knees
and his head bent down, the light of the wax tapers fell only on his
bushy hair, his high cheek-bones, and nose. Sometimes, at exciting
passages in the recital, his head would slowly rise and, still in shade,
his eyes would send forth flashes which reminded one of distant
lightning.

Morally, the Baron Guy is not so easily described. He hated monks--but
that is neither here nor there--and adored children; which is proof of a
happily constituted disposition. But the baron had seen so much of men
and things that it is not to be wondered at that there existed in his
mind a shade of scepticism, if such a term can be applied to the
_desenchantement_ of a noble at the end of the twelfth century. The
baron had, we say, acquired a marked influence over the mind of his
nephew; but to Anseric's two children their great-uncle was as indulgent
as possible. He was no less complaisant to his niece; she alone could
succeed in lighting up that stern visage with a ray of cheerfulness.

The very high and noble dame Jeanne Eleanor de la Roche-Pont was a
woman of middle height. When animated, her somewhat oval face reflected
a lively intelligence; her eyes of light azure then assumed the hue of
the _lapis-lazuli_, and her complexion, habitually pale, was suffused
with a rosy flush. She had a bewitching smile, though her mouth was
slightly drooping; her swan-like neck, and the exquisite contour of her
figure, lent to all her movements a perfect grace, rendered still more
charming by an address and vivacity which was the delight of the old
baron.

The baron, therefore, would pass whole hours with his eyes fixed on his
niece, as if he wished to study the least gestures of the Lady de la
Roche-Pont, and discover the marvellous mechanism in which their grace
and beauty originated. High-spirited on occasions, Eleanor was capable
of the greatest devotion and absolute self-sacrifice for those dear to
her. Her vassals loved her, and used to call her _la Gentil-Dame_.

It has seemed necessary to describe at some length persons who will play
an important part in the course of this narrative. Events were, in fact,
more ruled by the individual in feudal times than during any other
period. The personal character of a noble exercised a preponderating
influence around him for good or evil.

The Baron Guy, worn out, impoverished, and childless, was essentially
one of those sensitive spirits, bruised by contact with men and events,
which, having lost all elasticity where their own interests are
concerned, direct their entire energy and their need of something to
which to attach themselves, towards an object apparently distant or
fragile. The baron had certainly an affection for his nephew; but as far
as he alone was concerned, he would, have contented himself with leaving
him to hunt peacefully on his domains, and helping him at need; but for
his niece and her two children--handsome boys of five and eight years
old respectively--he had a love amounting to adoration, and which formed
the chief interest of his life. To him it seemed that for beings so dear
in his eyes the castle de la Roche-Pont and its domain were a very
pitiful heritage; and we may question whether even the duchy of Burgundy
would have appeared to him worthy of their acceptance.

Ambitions of this _indirect_ character, as they may be called, are the
most insatiable and tenacious; they are of the kind stimulating to the
most daring enterprises, because they are disinterested and
irresponsible.

When the Baron Guy spoke of the fortresses built by the Franks in
Palestine and Syria, he never failed to enumerate their towers, to
describe their lofty walls, their fair and strong defences; and,
invariably instituting a comparison between the wonderful fortresses of
Margat, Krak, Antarseus, Laodicea, Antioch, Ascalon, Giblet, and many
others, and the castle de la Roche-Pont, he exhibited the latter as a
mere hovel fit only for serfs to hide their heads in.

When the baron's discourse took this turn--and it frequently
did--Anseric's face clouded over. Eleanor looked down, blushed, and went
to look for the children.

One evening, as the baron had been complaisantly expatiating on the
advantageous site and solid construction of the castle of Krak, which he
had seen commenced shortly before his departure from Syria, and which
was to exceed in extent and strength the other Christian fortresses,
Anseric suddenly interrupted the recital. "Uncle," said he, "the
position of the castle de la Roche-Pont appears to me as good as that of
the knights beyond sea; and if it is only a question of making more
solid towers and higher walls than ours are, the thing is easy:--what do
you say to it?" The baron did not raise his head. "Yes," he replied,
"but you must resolve upon it." "Well, if I did resolve upon it?"
"Perhaps you might, my good nephew; but he who builds a strong castle
must expect to see it attacked." "Well, what then?" "Why, you will have
to defend it, my good nephew." "And have we not men and ourselves?"
"Yes, we shall indeed want men--men accustomed to fighting; and we shall
want arms and mangonels; moreover, the work must be done quickly if you
would avoid an attack before it is finished; and remember the duke's
court is not far off, and he will perhaps be curious to come and see for
himself what the Sire de la Roche-Pont is about." "The duke! the duke!
what business has the duke to inquire whether I am rebuilding my castle?
It is my affair, not his!" "The monks of the abbey, too, they will go
and complain to my lord duke (though he shows no great deference for
these white, black, or grey habits), and will persuade him that in
building a stronger castle your object is to lay hands more readily on
the wealth of the Church; whereas the duke prefers to keep the convent
treasures for himself." "As to the monks," said Eleanor, "you need be
under no anxiety about them; leave the matter in my hands, and I engage
that they shall give you no trouble." "Eh! what what will you do, _belle
amie_?" replied Anseric. "Will you let me act as I think best?" "By all
means; as you please, _belle amie_."

It must be observed that Eleanor--as a wife and a lady of high
descent--entered into the baron's views, though without letting it
appear that she did so; and her most cherished desire was to leave to
her firstborn the finest domain in the province. As allied to the house
of Nevers, she had no liking for the duke; and the feudal bonds which
connected her domain with the duchy of Burgundy were perhaps a greater
annoyance to her than to her husband.

Next day Eleanor sent for the abbot, under the pretext of having
something of importance to communicate to him. The abbot was a little
man of pale complexion, with sharp black eyes, and always elegantly
attired, as far as was permitted by the order of Cluny, which in point
of costume was then very tolerant. He came to the castle on a handsome
mule, richly caparisoned, followed by two monks, also mounted. Wine and
sweetmeats were offered them on their arrival, and when the abbot was in
Eleanor's presence, she spoke thus to him: "Sir abbot, you are aware in
what veneration I hold your sacred abbey, and how much I desire to add
something to its splendour; if my lord and myself have not done so
hitherto, it is because we have been waiting for a favourable
opportunity. My lord and myself are happy that such an opportunity
presents itself while you are ruling the abbey, because we have a
particular and profound esteem for you personally. While, then, what we
propose to do has for its object the securing to ourselves the more
especial protection of the holy apostles, Peter and Paul, it is also
prompted by consideration for your own virtues and wise administration.

"Our castle is very old and ruinous; my lord is intending to have it
repaired; and to draw down upon its walls the benediction of heaven, he
thinks of building within its inclosure a handsome chapel, which will be
served by your fraternity as you shall direct, and which will
consequently be dependent on the abbey. An annual revenue of a hundred
livres will be devoted to the maintenance of the chapel, to be raised
from our estate of Try. Moreover, your dependency of Vieil-Bois is
unsightly and dilapidated; my lord wishes to have it rebuilt, and to
assign for its support, which is at present insufficient, twenty-five
days' labour in such vineyards of our domain as are near that
dependency."

At each of these announcements the abbot bent his head in courteous
submission. "Lady," replied he, "the abbey of Saint Julien, founded by
one of my lord's ancestors, will be delighted by the new donations you
graciously promise. Though it has witnessed with sorrow the differences
that have sometimes arisen between the lords of Roche-Pont and its
abbots, it has never ceased to address prayers to God, to the Blessed
Virgin, and the holy apostles Peter and Paul, for the illustrious house
of its founders; and in the words that have proceeded to-day from your
gracious mouth, what it will appreciate beyond the announcement of your
intended gifts, is the assurance that its privileges and its
independence will receive fresh guarantees of that protection which was
accorded to it in the past."

"Assuredly," replied Eleanor; "we shall take care that no harm is done
you or your vassals; and, the charter we shall give you will expressly
mention our desire to respect the immunities of the abbey, and if need
be, to enforce that respect on others. Moreover, sir abbot, you are not
ignorant that in these unhappy times the property of the Church is not
always respected, even by those who ought to defend them. You know the
trials the abbey of Vezelay has experienced: it is our intention to
shelter the cloister of Saint Julien from these insults; and there is no
surer means of protecting your abbey than putting the castle in a state
of defence."

On his way back, the abbot asked himself what could be the cause of this
new turn in affairs. He re-entered the monastery, however, none the less
gratified; and after vespers a _Te Deum_ was sung.

"To-morrow, my dear lord," said Eleanor to her husband, when all met at
supper, "you may set about rebuilding your castle; the abbot of Saint
Julien will not feel himself aggrieved." "A good fairy has intervened,
no doubt," said the Baron Guy; "we are bound to proceed." "By the bodies
of the saints!" said Anseric, when he learned the conditions by which
the abbot's acquiescence was to be secured, "you propose to build so
much for the Church, _belle amie_, that there will remain nothing for
the castle!" "In good sooth," replied the baron, "I am not so very well
pleased that these monks should get a footing among us." "Pshaw! we will
put the chapel in the bailey;[17] and if we have to defend the castle,
the monks will remain outside." "But why, sir uncle, are you always so
severe upon the good monks?" "Ah! gentle fairy, if you had seen them, as
I have, in lands beyond the sea, you would agree with me that it is the
worst breed----" "Come, do not blaspheme, sir uncle; here we are in a
Christian land--not among the Saracens."

A few days afterwards, in fact, Anseric set the labourers to work. The
burgh and the villages of the domain had to furnish their contingent in
men, and in draught cattle and carts; materials were not wanting in the
vicinity. Kilns were erected for burning lime, and the forest supplied
timber in abundance. Baron Guy, in virtue of his military knowledge,
undertook the office of director. He sent secretly for a master of the
works--a native of Troyes, whom he had known in Palestine. This person
was kindly received at the castle, was well provided for and newly
clothed, but carefully watched, lest he should take it into his head to
run away. The plans of the new castle were devised by himself and the
baron. Use was made of a part of the Roman fortifications which still
existed. But the reader must know the position of the buildings then
occupying the plateau (Fig. 35) to understand what is to follow.

[Illustration: FIG. 35.--THE OLD CASTLE DE LA ROCHE-PONT.]

At A was the castle of la Roche-Pont, erected on the Roman remains, and
composed of irregular buildings out of repair; at B the cloister of the
abbey; and at C its church: at D the abbot's building.

The monastery was bounded on the west by the ruins of the ancient Roman
enclosure, and on the other three sides by battlemented walls, with a
few turrets.

At E was the pleasance of the abbey; at F that of the castle.[18] Two
fine mills, dependencies of the castle, stood at G; and at H was the
pond, filled by the pent water of the stream.

The upper town, built on the western incline of the plateau, contained
two parish churches, I and K. A wooden bridge, with mills belonging to
the castle, existed at L, another wooden bridge at M, and the Roman
stone bridge at N.

On the right bank were several houses with gardens. At O the road along
the plateau branched into two--one leading to the entrance of the abbey,
the other to that of the castle. At P was a breadth of cultivated land,
and at R the forest, which extended in a northerly direction more than
two thousand paces. Of the ancient ramping wall of the Romans, S, and of
the enclosure, T, there existed only heaps of _debris_. These remains,
overgrown with vegetation, formed, nevertheless, an elevation which it
was possible to defend.

This sketch of the general topography premised, we proceed to explain
the dispositions adopted in the building of the new castle (Fig.
36).[19] At O existed a fosse, which was re-excavated. A barbican
stood at A, entered on the left side.

[Illustration: FIG. 36

THE CASTLE OF LA ROCHE PONT. 12TH CENTURY.]

The main entrance of the castle, with its drawbridge, was necessarily
placed at B. This gate had to be protected by two towers. Upon a part of
the ancient Roman north front, five towers were planned, whose curtains
were to join the two ancient towers, Y, which were repaired and
re-crowned. A wide space, C, therefore necessarily remained behind this
foremost defence. It was the _bailey_, a fore-court or outer-court, in
which were laid out the chapel, E, promised to the abbot; stables, D;
and outbuildings, F, upon a Roman ruin. At P was sunk a second fosse for
the protection of the castle, whose gateway was disposed at G. A postern
gave egress at H. The ancient Roman wall, M, received a new crowning,
and three new towers were to add to its strength.

At I were laid the foundations of the donjon--partly on ancient
masonry--a donjon defended by a chemise and ditch. The buildings
designed for habitation were situated at K, with a chapel at I. At the
extremities of the ditch, P, cuttings were contrived in the two Roman
curtains, to intercept, if necessary, all communication between the
defences of the bailey and those of the castle. This contrivance was
also adopted for the two curtains abutting on the donjon.

The baron spent his whole time, ever since the decision come to by his
nephew, with the master of the works, Alain of Troyes; while the workmen
first called in cleared the ground and levelled the Roman ruins, and
quantities of stone, sand, gravel, and timber were brought in, and the
ditches and trenches for the foundations were excavated by the forced
labour of the tenants.

The baron designed to erect opposite the plateau (the point of attack) a
great front, slightly convex, to screen the projections, W. He wished
to have a wide barbican in the middle of this front, in which to collect
the troops intended for sorties, and to shelter them in case of retreat.
He had observed that in all the good defences erected by the Christians
in Syria the entrances were so disposed that the assailant was obliged
to present his right flank to the defender--with good reason, since the
left is protected by the shield or buckler. The position of the gate, C,
of the castle had been the subject of considerable study and discussion
on the part of the baron and his master of works. The latter wanted to
place it parallel with the front, but the baron insisted on its forming
a decided angle with the entrance of the bailey. The master of the works
urged that the left-hand tower of this gate, G, would then form a
projection insufficiently defended, and open to attack; but the baron
maintained that if the besiegers endeavoured to attack or mine this
tower, they would be commanded obliquely by the tower, R; that by giving
sinuosities to this front of the castle all points of the bailey would
be commanded; that the principal gate was thus well masked; that nothing
more would be needed than to give a considerable thickness to the walls
and a greater diameter to the entrance towers; and lastly, if the enemy
succeeded in reducing the projecting tower on the right hand, a
barricade might still be raised from S to T, and the defence prolonged,
with the favourable consideration that if this tower of the salient were
thrown down, the other would remain intact and would command the breach.

The postern, H, was also the subject of lengthened consideration on both
sides. This postern was necessary to secure the provisioning of the
castle without encumbering the main entrance. Placed near the angle
tower, U, which the enemy could not attack because of the steep
escarpment of the plateau, the postern was well protected by that
tower; moreover it was to be surmounted by a quadrangular work with
double portcullis and double doors; lastly, a _braie_,[20] X, defended
its approach. It was agreed, moreover, that the great central habitable
part of the castle, erected on the remains of the square Roman towers,
should be crenelated, and should command the curtain, and consequently
the two entrances. Wells existed or were sunk at _p_.

Every part having been thus carefully determined, the works were
vigorously prosecuted. The baron was always at hand, and persisted in
seeing everything for himself. The north front of the bailey, and the
chapel, E, were first begun. This exterior work did not greatly alter
the appearance of things; but the donjon was next commenced. And when
this tower, whose diameter was ninety feet, had reached an elevation of
thirty, its aspect had become formidable. The townspeople viewed from a
distance this huge mass rising on the point of the plateau, and began to
wonder what their lord was intending to do with such an enormous tower.
The abbot was somewhat disquieted; but he was so handsomely entertained
at the castle that he gave no sign of dissatisfaction, especially as the
great chapel of the bailey promised to be very beautiful.

Fortunately for Anseric, the Duke of Burgundy had at that time some
rather important matters in hand--a misunderstanding with the King of
France. Philip Augustus gave him considerable uneasiness, and at such a
time he did not wish to alienate his nobility. More than two years thus
passed without anything of serious consequence occurring to the lord of
the castle. By that time the building was very nearly finished. We give
a bird's-eye view of it (Fig. 37), taken from the north-east angle.

[Illustration: FIG. 37.--BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF THE CASTLE OF LA
ROCHE-PONT.]

Nothing was talked of throughout the province but the beauty and
strength of the new castle of Roche-Pont, and there were men of family
in the neighbourhood, envious of the wealth and connections of Anseric,
who did their best to represent him to the duke as an ambitious person,
impatient of the feudal ties which bound him to his suzerain. It was
even insinuated that the Sieur de la Roche-Pont, on the strength of his
descent, aimed at nothing less than supplanting the duke; and that he
had already begun to intrigue for that object with the king of France
and with Pierre de Courtenai, who had married Agnes, sister of the last
Count of Nevers and aunt of Eleanor; that his tenants were crushed under
the burden of forced labours; and that the duke ought not to allow one
of his vassals to oppress the poor people thus, in order to erect a
castle surpassed in strength by none in Burgundy.

As only too frequently happens, malevolence was thus suggesting to
Anseric the course he should pursue to fulfil his ambitious designs.

The Duke of Burgundy (Hugh III.) was anything but a protector of
ecclesiastical property. The abbot of Saint Julien knew this; so that,
although he was troubled in mind by the defensive preparations of the
lord of Roche-Pont, and augured no good to the abbey from the vicinity
of so strong a castle, he did not dare to manifest his fears, or
endeavour to communicate them to the ducal court; for he was perhaps
more afraid of the duke's intervention than of the power of his
immediate neighbour.

At length Hugh was moved, and lent an ear to all that was reported
concerning the character and intentions of his vassal. An opportunity
soon offered of revealing his real intentions. While Anseric had enemies
and enviers at the ducal court, he had also some friends; and they did
not fail to inform him of the sinister impressions produced in the
duke's mind respecting him, and which he took no trouble to conceal. He
had been heard to say that he would soon go and try whether the fortress
of La Roche-Pont was as strong as was asserted. Prudence was not the
duke's forte, any more than reticence. He had sent a body of his
men-at-arms to examine matters closely. Now, the duke's men-at-arms had
acquired the habits of their master; they were great robbers and
plunderers. Whether they acquitted themselves of their mission I cannot
say; but certain it is that they plundered some hamlets and set fire to
several granges belonging to the abbey of Saint Julien.

The monks were greatly disquieted, and did not fail to complain to the
lord of Roche-Pont.

The fief of Roche-Pont lay under the obligation to send every year to
the Duke of Burgundy, as its feudal dues, six war horses caparisoned. It
was the custom of the lord of Roche-Pont on this occasion to present
himself at the ducal court after Easter. The current year was 1185.
Anseric did not appear at court, and did not send the six horses. Hugh
demanded them; Anseric replied that the duke's men, plunderers and
brigands as they were, had themselves taken off the horses that were
destined for him; and that it was their place to give them up to their
master; that as for himself and the abbot of Saint Julien, they claimed
compensation for damages, and demanded that the plunderers should be
hanged on the public gallows. Moreover, that he, Anseric, was aware that
the Duke of Burgundy lent an ear to the malevolent insinuations of the
enemies of Roche-Pont, and he would choose his own time for giving them
the lie.

At this haughty answer Hugh's anger was roused, and he swore that he
would take no rest till the castle of Roche-Pont was razed to the
ground, should it cost him a fourth of his dukedom.

Baron Guy had observed the storm increasing not without a secret joy;
but though he liked fighting, and cherished an unbounded ambition, he
was a prudent man, and one who--like all who had long sojourned in the
East--knew how to intrigue and to secure the favour of circumstances.
Most of those old knights of Syria joined the character of the
diplomatist to that of soldier, in consequence of their relations with
the court of Constantinople and the Saracens.

After Anseric's reply, there was no alternative but to prepare for war,
and war _a outrance_. But, however strong the place might be, Baron Guy
knew well that every besieged fortress must, in the end, fall into the
besieger's hands, if it is not relieved. Anseric had no army to bring
into the open field against the duke's; he could assemble two hundred
and fifty men-at-arms--which would imply a total of about twelve hundred
fighting men, as each man-at-arms was accompanied by three or four
fighting men. Adding to this body the men in the town who owed service
to the lord, a garrison of fifteen to eighteen hundred men might be
reckoned upon.

Baron Guy had therefore a long conference with Eleanor and Anseric the
evening after the answer had been sent to the duke; when it was resolved
that the Lady de la Roche-Pont, with a sufficient retinue, should repair
to the court of the king of France, promising him liege-homage for the
lordship of Roche-Pont; and asking help from him against the Duke of
Burgundy, who was devastating the lands of his vassal, and plundering
the estates of the abbey of Saint Julien without cause or reason. Baron
Guy had some motives for believing that these overtures would be
favourably received; but he refrained from saying all he knew about the
matter. He advised his niece to take the abbot in her train, if
possible, or, at any rate, some of the fraternity, authorised by him.

Dame Eleanor undertook the commission without making the least
objection, and, with apparent calmness, though her heart was ready to
burst under her slender corset.

She employed the night with her women in making preparations for her
journey, and early in the morning sent for the abbot. The abbot, who
foresaw but too clearly--whatever might happen--the devastation of the
abbey domains, gave vent to repeated sighs, protested, and denounced the
barbarity of the times, but came to no resolution. "Sir abbot," said
Eleanor to him, at length, "with or without you or your monks I am going
to set out this morning; would you rather plead your cause yourself, or
have it pleaded by a woman?" "Ah! most gracious lady," replied the
abbot, "can I quit my flock when the wolf is preparing to devour it?"
"Well, then, give me three of your monks." "Yes, you are right--it must
be--it must be." "Let them be here on horseback in an hour." "Yes, noble
lady, they shall be here, under the protection of God and the Holy
Virgin!" "But, before all things, sir abbot, not a word about this
journey, and do not let the brotherhood know where I am taking them."
"Yes, certainly; the fraternity are to understand that they are sent to
some dependency or some neighbouring abbey." "Very good, but make
haste!" Dame Eleanor, weeping, embraced her children, her husband and
uncle; but, drying her tears as she mounted her palfrey, she presented
herself to her small retinue with a calm countenance. "Fair niece," said
Baron Guy to her, just as she was waiting on the horse-block, "the duke
will certainly do his utmost to be here as quickly as he can. He might
possibly arrive before your return. If it should be so, proceed with
caution, conceal yourself and your train at the vavasor's,--Pierre
Landry's--two leagues hence, in the valley; he will be informed of your
intention, look out for your return, and give me news of you. Then we
shall see what can be done."

The Lady de la Roche-Pont's train consisted of a dozen trusty men,
retainers of the castle, commanded by a veteran knight of prudence and
experience, with two women and the three monks. The party was supposed
by the servants at the castle, to be making a visit to the Lady de
Courtenai, Eleanor's aunt.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 17: Outer court.]

[Footnote 18: "The pleasance" was a garden, planted with fruit trees and
groves, which served for a place of promenade, and for divers outdoor
pastimes.]

[Footnote 19: In this figure the black tint indicates the Roman
substructions preserved and surmounted by new works; the yellow the
Roman buildings entirely razed; the red the defences added by the lord
of La Roche-Pont; and the grey the domestic buildings rebuilt or
repaired.]

[Footnote 20: An outer wall of no great height.]




CHAPTER X.

_THE FOURTH SIEGE._


The Duke of Burgundy was making all speed to reduce his vassal. In the
space of a fortnight he had gathered six or seven thousand men, and was
beginning his march. Anseric and Baron Guy had not failed to make the
most of this respite. They provisioned the castle for three months at
least. They fabricated four large trebuchets and half-a-dozen catapults.
Timber in sufficient quantity had been cut in the forest for making
hoardings, palisades, and wooden defences. Thirty stone-cutters were
constantly at work making projectiles of sixty and a hundred pounds
weight for the mangonels. Each workman could produce ten in a day, and
at the end of a fortnight they had amassed a store of four thousand five
hundred. In the town, cross-bows and quarrels were being made; for the
townsmen who had to render service were bound to come armed, equipped,
and provided with missiles in sufficient quantity. There were archers
also, for whom arrows of ashwood, bows of yew, and cords of long-fibred
hemp were being made.

Although the lord of Roche-Pont could not, as stated above, assemble
more than eighteen hundred men, and therefore could not contemplate
defending the whole plateau--that is to say, the castle and the
abbey--Baron Guy, who had reasons for it, urged him not to allow the
enemy to occupy the monastery without defending it, even were it
feebly. "You ought to defend the monastery," he would say to his nephew,
"whenever the interests of the suzerain are involved; and since
henceforth you are going to do homage for your fief to the king of
France, he is your suzerain; his interests, therefore, are involved, and
it is your duty to defend the abbey."

To this specious reasoning Anseric could find nothing to answer. The
northern wall of the abbey was therefore put in a state of defence; they
connected its north-east angle with the _debris_ of the Roman wall still
existing on the edge of the plateau by a strong palisade and ditch, and
barricaded the western brow above the town, between the abbey and the
bailey of the castle.

The abbot had made a show of opposing these works, asserting with reason
that the abbey was not at war with the Duke of Burgundy, and did not
refuse its customary homage. But Baron Guy, as an old crusader, was a
casuist of the first order, and, relying on the letter of the charter,
maintained that the lord of Roche-Pont was fighting for the cause of his
suzerain, and that consequently he must be faithful to the stipulations
respecting the abbey. These debates did not stop the workmen; and
although the abbot had sent for his vassals with a view to guard the
monastery, they were in no hurry to obey his summons, believing that
they were not in a condition to resist Anseric's vassals, and preferring
to await the result of what was being done before taking any side.

The baron also had a trench dug from the south-east angle of the abbey
wall to the eastern ridge of the plateau; then he had the trench covered
with timbers and <DW19>s, and the turf replaced above it, so as to leave
no external sign of its existence. Outside the barbican of the castle
and the ditch was raised a strong palisade which protected its
circumference, leaving between it and the wall a space of twenty paces,
and which gave lists thirty paces wide in front of the counterscarp of
the ditch.

The twenty-second day after Anseric's answer (the 5th of May), the
duke's troops appeared on the plateau before the abbey. The first comers
spread themselves in the town, and were beginning to plunder it, when
the duke interposed, and, contrary to his wont, gave orders that the
inhabitants and their property should be respected. Listening to wise
counsels for once, he was intending to separate the interests of
Anseric's vassals from those of their lord, to isolate the latter, and
thus subdue him more easily. So that very evening he issued a
proclamation by sound of trumpet through the whole town, to the effect
that he was attacking the lord of Roche-Pont only, who had been declared
a felon for having broken his fealty to the Duke of Burgundy; that the
inhabitants of the town and of the valley would be respected as long as
they did not take part with the lord of Roche-Pont; that from this day
forwards they were free of all dues and services towards the said lord;
but that those who should be convicted of taking part with him should be
hanged as traitors to their lawful lord, the Duke of Burgundy. A herald
presented himself before the walls of the abbey, and in a loud voice
uttered the same proclamation.[21] But the baron had foreseen this
contingency, and all the townsmen who had come in arms at Anseric's
summons were shut up in the castle. He had appointed for the defence of
the abbey, only men on whom he could rely--men who were directly
dependent on Anseric, and attached to his fortunes--with some of those
adventurers whose services were enlisted in any wars that might arise,
and who, having no ties of family or country, used to fight for those
who paid them best.

These defenders of the abbey were scarcely more than one hundred
resolute men. They received the herald's proclamation with derisive
shouts, answering that they knew no other lord but the king of France;
and that if it came to hanging, they could play at that game quite as
well as the duke's people. During the night two mangonels were mounted
opposite the north wall of the monastery, and had soon dismantled the
defences; but Anseric's men had retrenched themselves in the building
behind that wall; and when the Burgundians advanced with ladders to
scale the wall, they received them with a shower of darts, which killed
some of the assailants.

Nevertheless, the besiegers mounted the wall and descended into the long
narrow court enclosed by the building. There they were exposed to the
stones and _debris_ of timber which the defenders threw at them out of
the windows. The east court was barricaded, and Anseric, with about
twenty men, was guarding the barricades. He defended it bravely for a
good hour, and the Burgundians, fighting in a narrow space, sustained
some losses. They succeeded, however, in breaking open a door of the
building, and rushed into the cloister. There they were still exposed to
the darts and stones hurled at them by some of the defenders posted on
the north side of the church.

A body of Burgundians began to attack the south-east barricade, outside
the enclosure, to take the abbey in the rear. It was there that the
baron was posted, with about fifty men. The combat was severe and
sanguinary, and before withdrawing, seeing that the defenders were
gradually abandoning the abbey, he had the <DW19>s in the trench behind
set on fire.

Already Anseric and his men were on the road to the _chateau_, and were
sheltered by the defences of the barbican. Guy rejoined them, pursued by
a large body of Burgundians. But a thick smoke soon began to issue from
the trench, and the assailants who were coming up, seeing the ground
undermined beneath them, dared not advance. On this Guy and Anseric fell
upon those who had ventured within bowshot of the barbican, and killed a
good number of them. Excited by the struggle, and exasperated by the
resistance they met with, the duke's men entered the various buildings
of the abbey, killing the wounded, and plundering. Fire, kindled by the
defenders or the Burgundians, soon reached the cloister and the roof of
the church.

The poor monks, assembled in the choir during the struggle, were soon
forced to quit this retreat; for burning brands were falling on the
pavement through the holes in the vaulted ceiling. It was already night,
and many were massacred by the drunken soldiery. Most of them had
cowered down trembling in a vaulted chamber on the ground floor. It was
there that the duke found them when he entered the burning abbey. The
abbot threw himself on his knees; but the irritated duke repulsed him
harshly, saying: "Sir abbot, it ill becomes ecclesiastics to fight
against their lord; and if I do not have you and your monks hanged, you
may thank your habit. Begone, and tell your brethren of your
_forfeitures_!" Vainly did the abbot protest his innocence, and
asseverate that if the abbey had been defended, it was against his will;
and the duke, whose anger seemed to gather warmth at every word the
father spoke, ended by ordering his men to drive out all the monks.

The unhappy fraternity, perishing of hunger, betook themselves to the
town, where some kindly-disposed persons took them in; but the duke
would not allow this, and proclaimed next day that every inhabitant who
should give shelter to a monk should be hanged. Collecting some
provisions, therefore, they started for Cluny on foot.

The duke had given orders to extinguish the flames, for he was intending
to reside in the abbey during the siege of the castle; but there
remained no part of it fit for habitation except the abbot's dwelling,
situated north of the church.[22]

Retired within the castle, after having lost a fourth of their men who
had been engaged in the struggle, Anseric and the baron were making
their final arrangements. The troops who had re-entered with them were
in high spirits, for they had inflicted sensible losses on the enemy;
and thought of nothing but defending themselves to the uttermost. Guy
was delighted, and his sombre visage was lighted up with an air of
gaiety.

"We are getting on bravely," said he to his nephew, when they were
alone, "bravely, I say: now that the abbey is burned we are sure to be
aided by the king of France; we have made a capital commencement." "But
these poor monks; what has become of them? Ah! my worthy uncle, it would
have been better to leave them alone; we should now have some thirty
brave fellows more here, and should not have to reproach ourselves with
having caused the convent to be burned and the monks massacred,
perhaps." "Stay, stay, my good nephew; monks always get out of their
difficulties, and they are sure to be able to restore their abbey.
Besides, it is the duke's men who have burned it! Besides, was it not
our duty to defend it? Say no more about it. Jean Otte will get out
to-night by the donjon postern. He is a rough sort of fellow, but a
cunning blade; in five days he will be with our gentle Eleanor, and
tell how that the noble duke has sacked the abbey, and burned all the
monkery! It's capital! capital!"

On either side about a dozen prisoners had been taken. The next morning,
May 7th, the people of the castle saw three of these unhappy men hanging
up, by the duke's orders, on the trees of the pleasance. Immediately
three Burgundian prisoners were hanged on the battlements of the
barbican.

[Illustration: FIG. 38.]

None of the bridges had been destroyed by the besieged. They were
occupied by the duke's men, and defended each by a good _breteche_ (Fig.
38), to hinder any communication from one bank to the other. The south
wall of the abbey was strengthened by palisades joining the two ridges
west and east of the plateau. A guard was posted in the two mills
belonging to the monastery,[23] and a wooden tower built by the side of
the rivulet, below the south-east part of the castle.

These first measures adopted, the duke had a ditch dug, with a mound
crossing the pleasance of the castle within bowshot, and connecting the
two ridges. This intrenchment of contravallation was strengthened by two
wooden towers, one at each end, with an outlet near each of them, and
one in the middle (Fig. 39). The castle was thus completely invested
(May 15th).

[Illustration: FIG. 39.]

While these works were being executed, there were trifling skirmishes
every day between the defenders and the besiegers. They were trying each
other's strength, but nothing serious was attempted. The duke bent his
whole strength towards preventing the lord of Roche-Pont and his men
from escaping: he was taking his time. Baron Guy was often closeted with
a certain individual whom he called his chaplain, and who had
accompanied him from Palestine. In the castle, this so-called chaplain
never went by any other name than the _Saracen_. He was a tall, thin
personage, with dark brown skin, black eyes and hair, always dressed in
a coarse grey surtout. He spoke little, and drank nothing but water; but
never failed to be present at mass in the chapel of the castle, and
would remain long hours in prayer. The baron asserted that he was a monk
of the order of Bethlehem. Whatever he was, he had charge of the sick,
and possessed remedies for wounds of all kinds. He was gentle in manner,
never looked a woman in the face, was a scholar, and would read aloud so
as to charm the most delicate ears. His official name was Brother
Jerome. Now, during the leisure which the enemy left the besieged (who
were not sufficiently numerous to offer any hindrance to the siege works
of the Burgundians, and could do nothing but keep a careful look-out),
it was remarked at the castle that the baron and Brother Jerome passed
whole hours together, in the lower apartment of one of the towers, of
which they alone had the key. Their clothes were often observed to be
blackened when they came out.

It was the eighth day of the investment, which appeared now to be
complete (May 22nd). The baron had a secret conference with his nephew
and Brother Jerome in the evening, and about six o'clock, orders were
given to prepare one of the largest trebuchets, whose framing had been
transported thither during the preceding night, at the western end of
the lists, outside the ditch.

About two o'clock in the morning, the engine was mounted, the night
being still completely dark, as it would be at that season. They then
tried its range against the right-hand tower of the besiegers'
contravallation, with stones; and when the proper range had been
secured--a point ascertained by the noise of the projectiles that fell
on the woodwork--Brother Jerome placed in the lowered pouch of the
stone-propeller a barrel provided with a match, and giving orders to let
go the beam of the engine, set fire to the match with a brand taken from
a brasier kindled for the purpose.

With a whizzing sound, the end of the beam traced a bow of fire, and the
barrel was shot forth, leaving a long and luminous trail behind it; it
struck the wooden tower, and in bursting spread a sheaf of white flames
which seemed to cling to the woodwork. The engine, lowered anew, sent a
second barrel and a third. The wooden tower then resembled a furnace
(Fig. 40).

[Illustration: FIG. 40.--NIGHT SORTIE OF THE GARRISON OF THE CASTLE.]

Great was the agitation among the guard of the besiegers, and the
defenders could hear their shouts from the ramparts. Taking advantage of
their confusion, Anseric had the barrier of the lists opened, and
followed by two hundred men, went at full speed to the contravallation,
passed through the central gate, which was but slightly guarded, and
turned to the left, passing along the interior of the enemy's earthwork.

The Burgundians had betaken themselves to the tower to try to extinguish
the flames. The besieged rushed upon the disorderly mass, most of them
being unarmed. The baron had also gone out with a second body to protect
his nephew's retreat. The duke heard the shouting from the abbey, saw
the fire, and immediately gave orders to march forward. But during the
last hours of night, men are not very active. Before help arrived,
Anseric had had time to kill or put to flight all who were guarding the
contravallation. He could therefore re-enter the lists at his leisure,
and without having lost a single man; some few being wounded. Daylight
revealed to the duke the smoking remains of one of his towers.

This sally raised the courage of the besieged; none of them, except
those who had been in the wars of the Crusaders, knew the effects of
the Greek fire. They deemed themselves, thenceforth, invincible. This
was the baron's object in planning this attack, whose result was
otherwise of little value to the besieged.

In place of the wooden tower that had been burned, the duke had a
platform raised, consisting of wicker-work and turf, on which was placed
a substantial floor of beams to receive a _trebuchet_ which swept the
lists, and almost reached the barbican. Then he raised a second
platform, in the very centre of the front of the contravallation, with a
mangonel, whose projectiles fell right into the barbican. To these
engines the besieged opposed the first trebuchet, and another mounted in
the barbican. But on neither side was any great damage effected by them
during a whole day's working, for as soon as the soldiers saw the beam
of the enemy's engine lowered, they got out of the way. The besiegers
enlarged the central platform, and were then able to mount the mangonels
upon it, which succeeded in utterly destroying the trebuchet set up in
the barbican, and the palisades in front, and in dismantling the
battlements. The garrison of the castle were obliged to cower down
against the walls, if they would avoid abandoning the works. When the
besiegers deemed the palisades indefensible, and the battlements
sufficiently broken down, the signal was given for the assault (May
25th).

In the first place, protected by mantelets or by their bucklers, the
archers and crossbowmen advanced to about sixty paces from the barbican,
forming an arc of a circle around it--the archers in the front rank, the
crossbowmen behind. Immediately one of the defenders showed himself on
the rampart, he was hit. The garrison, sheltered as far as possible by
the remains of the merlons, and by their bucklers, replied as best they
could, but ineffectually, for their situation was a very trying one.
Not wishing to risk his men's lives uselessly, Anseric made them lie
flat on their faces on the rampart, so as to be ready at the moment of
assault.

Two bodies of Burgundians then advanced, provided with ladders having
hooks, and with planks, which they threw over the little ditch of the
palisade. Some resolute men defended the palisade, but it was so broken
by the projectiles that these defenders had to abandon it. Then about
thirty ladders were set up against the barbican, and strings of men
climbed their rounds; but the garrison succeeded in unhooking the
ladders and throwing down the assailants; others, making use of the
_debris_ of the merlons, crushed them. Those of the assailants who
reached the summit were received with blows of bills, boarspears, and
crowbars.

The foot of the barbican was already covered with dead and wounded, with
the _debris_ of ladders, and stones. From the towers of the bailey gate
skilful crossbowmen, well protected, hit most of those assailants who
succeeded in mounting on the remains of the parapet. The assault, three
times renewed, was as often repelled, with considerable loss to the
Burgundians. The assailants had burst in the gate of the barbican; but
the baron, seeing that the lists could not be defended, had caused the
gate to be barricaded, leaving only a narrow egress to allow the last
defenders of the palisades to re-enter. As soon as these had got in,
beams and barrels were heaped up against this gate. On this side the
assailants were exposed to the projectiles hurled from the towers and
curtains of the bailey. They succeeded, however, in setting up mantelets
to protect them, and throwing sulphur and resin on these remains of the
gate, set it on fire. The flames were communicated to the barricade, but
the defenders incessantly brought up fresh pieces of wood, and night
came without the enemy having been able to occupy the work. He
nevertheless maintained his position around the barbican, sheltered
behind fascines and mantelets, and piling against its walls trunks of
trees, clods of turf, and mattresses taken from the scattered houses;
while a trebuchet was incessantly discharging stones on the area of the
defence. The besieged had abandoned it since midnight, and had thrown
down the bridge giving entrance to the bailey.

At sunrise, therefore (May 26th), the Burgundians were able to get
within the walls of the barbican without opposition, but they found
themselves directly exposed to the projectiles thrown from the defences
of the bailey, which were provided with hoarding. It was not without
loss that the besiegers got a lodgment within the barbican, a
considerable length of whose wall they threw down. Then, having cleared
the breach, they set to work to bring forward a _cat_ which had been
framed together beforehand out of range, at some distance from the
contravallation, while two terraces were being raised outside the walls
of the barbican, and abutting against them (Fig. 41).

[Illustration: FIG. 41.--THE BESIEGERS GET POSSESSION OF THE BARBICAN.]

The Burgundians could not undertake a new attack before these works were
completed. Baron Guy determined to avail himself of this respite. Behind
the left-hand curtain of the bailey gate, he set up the two remaining
trebuchets on a wooden platform, and then connected the corner of the
chapel and the corner of the building D, belonging to the stables, by a
good palisading with a ditch.[24] The trebuchets were mounted within
this palisading, forming an interior retrenchment. The timbers of the
hoarding were thoroughly wetted and smeared with mud--as far as the
enemy's attacks permitted. This precaution was not useless, for the
Burgundians soon discharged on these hoardings, with their catapults,
darts furnished with tow dipped in pitch and lighted. The besieged,
armed with poles to which were fastened pieces of wet blanket,
extinguished these missiles without much trouble; for the flame had not
the intensity of the Greek fire, and did not cling to the wood. In fact
the tow would sometimes be extinguished in its passage.

In twelve hours the trebuchets of the besieged were mounted, and began
to hurl stones of sixty and a hundred pounds weight on the barbican
occupied by the enemy, and even beyond, which annoyed them excessively;
for not seeing the engines, they were unable to aim in return--except by
guess--with the mangonels they had set up on the terraces; and all the
projectiles passed over the heads of the defenders. During three days no
change occurred in the situation on either side. The Burgundians,
however, had succeeded in filling up the fosse on the right of the
bailey gate; and they had thrown so many stones with their mangonels
against the hoarding of the neighbouring towers, that these timber
defences fell to pieces; but the stone battlement behind remained
intact, and the defenders were still perfectly sheltered behind their
merlons, whence they sent showers of quarrels and arrows.

The fosse having been filled up (May 30th), the _cat_ advanced, rolling
on planks between the two terraces, through the breach of the barbican.
Then as the filling in of the fosse had an inclination towards the
curtain, the _cat_ of itself went striking its iron muzzle against the
wall (Fig. 42). Thereupon the besieged threw down on its double-sloped
roof huge stones, beams, and small barrels of Greek fire. But the roof
was solidly plated with iron; its <DW72>s greatly inclined, and covered
with earth and wetted mattresses, allowed the stones, beams, and
barrels to slip off right and left. Men placed within the _cat_ thrust
away the inflammable projectiles with long forks, so that they might not
set fire to the sides of the gallery. This latter was preserved,
therefore, despite the efforts of the besieged, and the miners,
protected by its roof, set to work at the base of the wall.

[Illustration: FIG. 42.--THE CAT.]

The following night Baron Guy determined to make a last effort to set
the _cat_ on fire. The working of the miners could be heard. Beneath the
gate B[25] of the bailey, there was a drain which discharged the
rain-water of the court into the ditch. This mouth had been in great
part walled up when the enemy presented themselves before the place. The
floor of the bridge, in falling, had moreover hidden it from the
besiegers. The baron had the walling removed noiselessly with crowbars,
and when the opening was large enough to allow a man to pass, he chose
three determined fellows who, with Brother Jerome, slid down into the
ditch. Crawling up the mound which supported the _cat_, they slipped
beneath its gallery two small barrels of Greek fire. Lighting the match
with the aid of a preparation which the brother brought in a box, they
went back as they had come, and the mouth of the drain was again walled
up.

From the summit of the neighbouring towers the besieged had then the
pleasure of seeing the barrels spread streams of white flames, which,
clinging to the timbers of the gallery, set it on fire.

The more water the besiegers threw on the flames the more intense they
became, so they began to try turf and mould. The defenders then
recommenced throwing beams and stones on the roof of the _cat_; then
more barrels of Greek fire, bundles of straw, and <DW19>s.

In spite of the efforts of the Burgundians, the gallery being quite
filled with suffocating smoke, was no longer tenable. They were forced
to abandon it; and it was with great difficulty that they were able to
preserve from the fire about eighteen feet by cutting it away with axes.
The besieged on their side had not been able to prevent part of the
remains of the hoardings above the _cat_ from catching fire; but these
hoardings were already past service, and their efforts were confined to
preventing the fire from extending right and left. The entire head of
the _cat_ against the wall and twenty feet of its length was burned. The
operations of the miners were not much advanced, still they had already
removed enough material to give shelter to two men from the projectiles
falling from the ramparts. Under favour of night, therefore, some
pioneers returned to the mine-hole by creeping under the _debris_ of the
_cat_. The darkness was great and the defenders did not observe them.
But Brother Jerome was on the watch for suspicious sounds, and soon came
to inform the baron that they were mining again. "Well," said the
latter, "let us repeat yesterday's manoeuvre; send men out through the
mouth of the drain which these Burgundians are so stupid as not to have
looked for; and let some good thrusts of the knife relieve us of these
burrowers; but let there be no noise!" The mouth of the drain was once
more unwalled, and Brother Jerome with his three companions in the
previous exploit, armed with long knives and gliding along the wall,
reached the hole of the mine. Three pioneers, intent on their work, were
noiselessly killed; a fourth, who was outside hidden in the _debris_ of
the _cat_ to watch, slept, heard nothing, and remained there unperceived
by Brother Jerome and his companions. Waking up soon afterwards he
called in a low voice to his comrades ... there was no answer; he felt
with his hand, touched a dead body--then a second, then a third.
Terrified and not daring to return to the Burgundians from fear (a very
reasonable one) of being hanged, he followed the wall, came to the
_debris_ of the bridge, and found himself in front of the mouth of the
drain, which was being silently walled up for the third time. Only a
dark lantern threw its faint light on the workmen who were visible
through the small opening which remained to be closed. The Burgundian
comprehended, and immediately determined what to do. "A deserter!" said
he in a low voice at the orifice. "Thy hand!" replied Brother Jerome.
The hand appeared at the entrance of the hole, and the whole body was
forcibly dragged through, not without excoriations, by the friar and one
of his companions. The new comer was disarmed and conducted before
Anseric and the baron as soon as the mouth of the drain had been
securely closed. The poor wretch remained trembling before the two
Seigneurs and naively recounted what had happened to him. He was a young
man from Semur, in Auxois, who, like most of his countrymen, was not
wanting in intelligence. He gave all the information demanded of him
concerning the duke's army: "Listen attentively to what I say," said the
baron: "if the castle is taken, thou wilt be hanged by us before the
first Burgundian enters. If the duke's men take the castle, thou wilt be
hanged by them, to a certainty. If thou servest us faithfully and the
duke's troops are obliged to raise the siege, the Lord of Roche-Pont
will take thee into his service: what is thy calling?" "A harness-maker"
"Well then! thou shalt be attached to his stables--shall he not, my
worthy nephew?" "Certainly; and if he aids us efficiently, and if events
show us that he speaks the truth, he shall have two pounds of silver on
the raising of the siege."

[Illustration: FIG. 43.--THE BOSSON.]

These last words completely loosened the harness-maker's tongue; and he
told all that he knew as to the number of the engines, the arrangements
of the besiegers, the posts they guarded, and the towers of the
contravallation; after which he was sent to the servants' hall, where he
soon made friends with Anseric's dependants. Friar Jerome, however, was
ordered not to lose sight of him.

It was not before the time when the miners were to be relieved (by
another set) that the Burgundians discovered what had happened. The
vanished harness-maker was strongly suspected of having assassinated his
comrades while at work; they sought for him--to no purpose, of course.

Before sunrise the baron commenced a countermine at the point indicated
by the deserter, inside the bailey wall. "If thou mistakest by so much
as a yard," said the baron to the harness-maker, "thou shalt be hanged."

The work was carried on by both parties, and towards the close of the
day the miners and counterminers met and attacked each other in their
close quarters with crowbars and pickaxes. The Burgundians and the Lord
of Roche-Pont each sent men to seize the mines. A barrel of Greek fire
dislodged the duke's men; but the masonry of the wall, whose mortar had
not thoroughly set, cracked above the mine. Seeing this, the Burgundians
next night, making use of the rescued portion of the _cat_, set up a
kind of front-work, formed of pieces of timber; and in the morning
brought a _bosson_, or battering-ram on wheels (Fig. 43), with which
they set to work to batter the base of the wall. At each blow the
masonry was shaken, and stones fell down within and without.

The besieged tried to break the _bosson_, by letting fall great pieces
of timber on its head, and to set fire to the timber; but these had
been wetted, covered with mud, and filled round with manure at the
bottom: the parapet was so well swept by the duke's mangonels and by the
crossbow men that it was scarcely possible to retain a footing on it.
Besides the men upon this wall, shaken as it was and vibrating at every
blow of the ram, lost their self-possession and did not do their best;
while the _bosson_ held out, especially as the assailants had put large
pieces of timber in an inclined position against the wall, which caused
the beams thrown by the besieged to slide off.

At the end of three hours of continued effort, the wall gave way, and a
piece about twelve feet long fell on the bosson. The Burgundians
immediately bringing up planks and ladders rushed to the assault through
the narrow breach. The struggle was severe, and the garrison themselves,
mounted on the ruins of the wall, fought bravely and maintained their
front unbroken.

From the parts of curtains that remained intact and from the towers the
defenders showered darts and stones on the assaulting column. The
trebuchets within the rampart continued to send stones which, passing
over the heads of the defenders and assailants on the breach, struck
those who were gathered around the remains of the _cat_, and made wide
lanes among them. By the evening, the Burgundians were masters of the
breach; but seeing the interior rampart before them they did not venture
to descend, but took up a position on the breach, protected by mantelets
and fascines.

The same evening they set miners to work between the tower of the
north-west angle and its neighbour; reckoning on thus getting round the
retrenchment by passing through a second breach.[26] They likewise took
possession of the two rampart walks of the curtain in which the breach
had been made; but the tower of the gate and that on the left were still
holding out at eight o'clock in the evening.

[Illustration: FIG. 44.]

An hour later, the assailants being masters of the rampart walk in that
quarter, set fire to the roofs of these towers (Fig. 44), which the
defenders were forced to abandon.

In the morning, therefore, the gate was in the power of the enemy. The
defenders still held the rampart walk to the east and west of the
towers that had been burned, had raised barricades, and were determined
to contest the position inch by inch.

The assailants as well as the defenders needed rest. Notwithstanding
their progress, the Burgundians were suffering considerable losses,
while of the force in the castle there were only a hundred killed and
wounded. By a kind of tacit agreement the day following the assault
passed without fighting. The duke, alarmed at the losses he had already
sustained, determined not to continue the attack without taking every
precaution; for his men were complaining that they were always made to
fight unprotected against soldiers carefully shielded, and asserting
that even if they got as far as the donjon, there would not be a man
left in the duke's army to enter it.

That day was spent by the Burgundians in thoroughly protecting their
quarters on the breach, in placing a catapult, then in crenelating the
back walls of the towers, of which they had got possession, and in
constructing a kind of wooden tower provided with a second catapult at
the interior opening of the gateway. The defenders, on the other hand,
made a second retrenchment from the angle of the building D of the
stabling to the western curtain, and a strong barricade from the angle
of the chapel choir E, to the neighbouring tower. Next, in front of the
main gateway of the castle, a _breteche_, or outwork with palisading to
protect the men in case of retreat. It was evident that next day, the
6th of June, a decisive action would render the Burgundians masters of
the bailey, even if they did not exert themselves to the utmost; but the
defenders were resolved that they should pay dearly for their success.
Anseric, firmly resolved to resist to the last extremity, and to perish
under the ruins of his donjon, congratulated himself on Eleanor's
absence, and regretted that his children were not with her. The noble
lady was, however, not far off. The evening of the day that had been
entirely employed in preparations for attacking and defending the
bailey, she and her escort had arrived at the dwelling of the vavassor,
Pierre Landry, who had immediately despatched a trusty messenger to the
castle.

At the base of the donjon was pierced a slanting aperture one foot six
inches square, which, opening into the lower hall, ended in the rampart
walk left between the great tower and its outer inclosure. From this
rampart walk a subterranean passage made along the foundations of the
Roman wall, descended the <DW72> of the plateau for a length of sixty
feet, and opened out in an old quarry overgrown with brambles. Two
strong iron gratings closed this tunnel. Watchmen were posted night and
day in this passage; they were let down and hoisted up through the
inclined shaft of the donjon by means of a carriage worked by a
windlass.

By this passage Anseric had often sent out and brought in spies, who at
night made their way furtively among the Burgundian posts. Now in the
dead of night, Pierre Landry's messenger presented himself at the
entrance of the subterranean passage, gave the signal agreed upon, and
handed to the watchman a little box, saying that he was awaiting the
answer hidden in the quarry. The box was immediately transmitted to
Anseric. Eleanor informed him of her return, and said that she would
contrive to re-enter the castle with her train the following night by
the donjon postern. Anseric hardly knew whether to rejoice or grieve at
this return. But the baron called his attention to a flower which
Eleanor had attached to the end of the vellum on which the letter was
written, and which was a token of good news.

On the morning of the 6th of June the Burgundians were in no hurry to
attack; they contented themselves with sending darts inside the
retrenchment, with their catapults and quarrels and arrows in great
numbers from the top of the abandoned towers; they were replied to from
the top of the church, the stabling, and the great towers of the castle
gateway. About three o'clock in the afternoon, the miners engaged (as
above mentioned) at the north-west curtain, threw down a part of it. The
duke had thus three openings into the bailey; this last breach, the one
effected two days before, and the gateway. Baron Guy advised that time
and men should not be lost in defending this second breach, since they
were intrenched behind; but, thanks to the corner tower, he was able to
resist the immediate capture of the rampart of the curtains on that
side. The defenders occupying the tower Y[27] were thus cut off. Anseric
sent them a note by means of an arrow, urging them to hold out as long
as possible. Fortunately this tower had no doors opening on the bailey,
and no perceptible communication except with the ramparts. Now those
adjacent to this tower still remained in the power of the occupants of
the castle; as the Burgundians only possessed the defences of the middle
part of the front. About five o'clock the signal for the assault was
given. Three columns entered in good order by the two breaches and the
gateway, and rushed, protected by their shields and bucklers, against
the palisading, resolutely throwing themselves into the little ditch, in
spite of the missiles which the defenders, who still possessed the tower
Y and its curtains, hurled upon them from behind.

An egress had been left in the strong barricade which connected the
angle of the chapel choir with the adjacent tower.

Anseric and a party of his best men issued by this outlet and fell upon
the flank of the attack, which fell back in disorder.

Then other egresses well masked were opened on the front of the
retrenchment, and the defenders resumed the offensive. They very nearly
regained possession of these breaches and of the gateway; but the duke,
on seeing his force in disorder, brought up his reserves, and the three
bodies of assailants, four times more numerous than the defenders,
obliged the latter to retire again behind their retrenchments. Then
about seven o'clock in the evening--for the combat was prolonged without
decisive success on either side, and the days are long at this period of
the year--the two catapults discharged a quantity of darts furnished
with burning tow on the roof of the stabling and of the chapel. The men
of the castle exclusively occupied with the defence of the retrenchment,
had no time to think of extinguishing the fire, more especially as the
crossbowmen stationed on the defences of the bailey, now in the hands of
the Burgundians, struck every defender showing himself on these
buildings. The fire, therefore, soon gained the roofs. During the attack
on the retrenchment, the duke resolved to get rid of the defenders
remaining in his rear in the tower Y, and who annoyed the assailants. He
called to them by a herald, that they could no longer hope for relief,
that if they did not instantly surrender they should all be put to the
sword. These brave men sent, as their only reply to the herald, a
crossbow bolt, which wounded him. Then the duke, much irritated, ordered
straw and <DW19>s to be collected within the bailey and in the outside
ditch, and all the wood they might have at hand, and set fire to, in
order to smoke out the rebels. Very soon, in fact, the tower was licked
by curls of flame, and communicated the fire to the hoarding and roof.
Not one man cried "quarter!" for all seeing the fire gaining them, and
blinded by the smoke, had retreated by a subterranean passage which from
this tower communicated with the gateway of the castle--it was a Roman
work preserved beneath the ancient curtain.[28] In withdrawing, they had
stopped up the outlet of this passage, which, moreover, was soon filled
up by the smoking _debris_ of the tower floors. The duke was persuaded
that they had perished in the flames rather than surrender, and that set
him gravely thinking.

To the last glimmering of daylight succeeded, for the combatants, the
illumination of these three fires.

It seemed as if the heavens were bent on adding to the horror of the
scene. The day had been fiercely hot; a storm soon arose accompanied by
gusts of wind from the south-west, which blew down the smoke and strewed
burning brands over the combatants.

At one time Anseric began to resume the offensive with his best soldiers
by the barricade of the chapel; then transporting himself to the
opposite palisade, he debouched along the western rampart upon the
assailants, who on this side tried to get round the stable building. The
direction of the wind was most unfavourable to the Burgundians; they
received full in their faces both the smoke and the sparks from the
western building. The attack languished, despite the efforts of the duke
to obtain a decided advantage, and to bring his united force to bear on
one point. A pouring rain and fatigue stopped the combatants about nine
o'clock in the evening.

They almost touched one another, being only separated by the
retrenchment. The rain fell so heavily that, in every direction,
assailants and defenders sought shelter, until there remained none but
the watchmen within and without the palisading.

At nightfall, Eleanor and her escort, habited as Burgundian soldiers,
departed on horseback from the house of the vavassor, Pierre Landry, and
under his guidance. They ascended the valley in silence, and saw before
them the outline of the castle in dark relief before the sky, lit up by
the fires. With hearts full of anxiety, none dared to express their
fears.... What was burning? Was the enemy already within the bailey? Had
he succeeded in setting fire to the northern defences of the castle?
Having got to within two bowshots of the wooden tower, erected by the
duke, at the junction of the river with the stream, they kept along the
latter, forded it below the mill, left their horses there under the care
of the vavassor's men, and ascended a-foot the <DW72> of the plateau in
the direction of the quarry. But at some distance from the opening,
Pierre Landry, who was walking in front, perceived through the rain some
men occupying the point of the plateau beneath the outer wall of the
donjon. The duke had in fact sent some parties to watch the environs of
the castle during the combat, and especially the base of the donjon,
supposing, with reason, that this defence possessed a postern, as was
usual, and fearing, that if the assault turned in his favour, the
garrison, in despair of maintaining the defence any longer, after the
taking of the bailey, might attempt to escape by some secret outlets.

Pierre Landry turned back towards Eleanor's escort and communicated to
it this disagreeable discovery. To enter the quarry was not to be
thought of. What was to be done?...

The vavassor concealed Eleanor, her two women, the three monks, and the
twelve men-at-arms, as well as their captain, in the best way he could,
and made his way along the escarpment by creeping through the
underwood. Flashes of distant lightning enabled him from time to time to
make out the eastern walls of the castle. No troop appeared on that
side; he advanced therefore gradually as far as the foot of the rampart.

After the combat, Anseric, full of anxiety, and without stopping to
change his martial accoutrements, covered with mud and blood, had
hastened towards the postern of the donjon. There he had learned from
his watchmen that the environs of the outer wall were occupied by the
Burgundians about bowshot distant, that they were numerous, well
shielded, and communicated with another post established beneath the
western rampart, and with a third on the eastern side.

Anseric felt a cold sweat cover his face; but he said to himself that
the vavassor was cautious, and certainly would not come and throw
himself blindly into the snare. He thought for the moment of sallying
with his bravest men by the postern to fall on the troop; but to what
purpose? The latter would quickly be supported, the post of the wooden
tower would take to their arms, and all chance of getting Eleanor and
her party in would be compromised. It would be better to send away his
wife and to await events.... But how communicate with her? It was
impossible to send her a message. He then remounted the steps of the
postern in anxious thought. The baron came that way, and Anseric related
everything to him.

"Nothing is lost, dear nephew; we will get Eleanor in, for it is
necessary that we should know from herself the result of her mission;
that must influence, one way or the other, the sequel of our
defence..... Leave me to act.... Brother Jerome is an intelligent
fellow; we will consult together....

"In the meanwhile, go and watch without from the top of the eastern
ramparts; for, whether Pierre Landry comes alone or with our party, it
can only be by that side, since he cannot cross the river whose bridges
are guarded. He must have crossed the rivulet in order to get to the
outlet of the postern. Go, look and listen attentively!".... Anseric,
ascending the eastern defences, enjoined on his men the greatest
silence, and put his ear to the listening places--first in one tower
then in the next; but he only heard the dripping of the rain on the
roofs, and the sighing of the wind. In a little while the baron and
brother Jerome, provided with a long rope, came to seek him. "Make
yourself easy, dear nephew; Brother Jerome is first going to
reconnoitre.... But call four men to help us."

A board was fastened transversely to one end of the cord; this end was
thrown over the outside through one of the embrasures, while the cord
was held by the four men. Brother Jerome, with his grey dress tucked up,
a large knife at his belt, put his feet on the board, grasped the cord
with both hands, and he was gently let down. When the rope was slack,
the brother was at the foot of the rampart, and they waited.

At the end of half-an-hour, which seemed an age to Anseric, a slight
movement given to the cord intimated that brother Jerome was returning.
The cord tightened, and the four men had soon hoisted the brother up to
the merlons. "Well?" said Anseric. "The vavassor is there; I was very
nearly killing him, taking him for a Burgundian, for he has the dress of
one; it was he who recognised me and called me by my name." "Well! well!
Eleanor?"--"All are there concealed, for the Burgundians are not far
off; in this diabolical weather they are earthed like rabbits; no time
must be lost. Let down a _barquette_ at the end of the cord; we will
hoist up the Lady Eleanor, and the others afterwards, if the Burgundians
let us."

The _barquette_ was quickly brought, and firmly attached to the cord,
then let down; a shake of the rope intimated that Pierre Landry was
below: soon after, a second shake intimated that the _barquette_ was
loaded. They hoisted, and dame Eleanor very soon showed her face at the
battlement; all hands lifted her to the arms of her husband. The two
women, the captain, the eleven men-at-arms, and the three monks were
thus hoisted, without mishap, but were wetted to the skin.

In spite of the loss of the bailey, and the death of a good number on
their side, Anseric's men were full of joy when at dawn the defenders
were told that an army of the King of France was coming to their relief,
and that it was only a question of continuing the defence a few days
longer.

Eleanor's mission had perfectly succeeded. The king, Philip Augustus,
who appeared to hesitate at first, had quickly determined when the
messenger Jean Otte came to tell Eleanor of the burning of the abbey.
The king had desired to see this messenger, and the latter, who knew
whom he had to deal with, had recounted how the duke's men, without
warning, without any provocation, had taken possession of the monastery,
had set it on fire, had massacred some of the monks, and driven out
those who remained. Soon after, a letter from the abbot of Cluny came to
confirm the fact, imploring the justice of the king.

Eleanor, as a woman who knew what she was about, had not failed to make
known to the suzerain that the dearest wish of her husband and herself
for a long while had been to put the fief of La Roche-Pont into the
hands of the king: that they should not, however, have declined the
homage rendered to the duke for the fief, if that noble had not, by his
violence and the plundering of his men, provoked this decision on their
part; that far from being the protector of his vassals, the said duke
was bent upon ruining them: and that if he (the king of France)
presented himself on the domain of Roche-Pont, he would be received
there as the sole and puissant justiciary, alone worthy to govern.

The opportunity was too tempting for Philip Augustus not to be eager to
avail himself of it. To lessen the power of a great vassal under so
plausible a pretext, and with the rights of the case in his favour,
accorded too completely with his general policy to allow him to display
less than the full measure of that vigour and firmness for which he was
so distinguished. Eleanor quitted the court with the assurance that, a
few days after her return to Roche-Pont, the royal army would confront
the forces of the Duke of Burgundy.

The grand point, therefore, was to sustain the enemy's attacks with
firmness. The defenders numbered no more than a thousand men capable of
offering an effective resistance; but the perimeter of the defence was
sensibly diminished, for it was impossible to recover the inclosure of
the bailey. They must limit themselves to the castle walls, arresting
the progress of the Burgundians as far as possible. The baron made no
great account of the retrenchment raised between the stables and the
chapel; but he considered it of the greatest importance to preserve the
west part of the bailey as long as possible, for the north flank of the
castle gate evidently presented a weak point, although it was defended
by three towers. The baron, convinced that the duke was not sparing of
the lives of his men, had no doubt that by sacrificing a thousand
soldiers, this front might be broken into in forty-eight hours; the
works designed to bear upon this point must therefore be interrupted at
all risks. The building, D,[29] of the stabling had been burned; but
fortunately the lateral wall of the building looking eastward was part
of the Roman curtain, of thick and solid construction. Between this
building and the castle ditch the enemy could not pass. He could only
attack by the breach made on the side of the tower, Y, or by the
interval left between this tower and the building, D, that had been
burned. The tower, V, of the western angle had remained in the hands of
the defenders. It was wide and solidly built, resting on the Roman
substruction, and covered by a platform on vaulting. Towards daybreak
the baron had caused two trebuchets remaining within the palisade to be
dismounted with all speed. Their timbers were carried into the court of
the castle, for, as he foresaw that the palisaded retrenchment would not
hold out long, he did not wish these engines to be taken possession of
by the Burgundians. A strong catapult had been reserved in the western
corner tower V. The baron had it mounted on the platform by daylight,
not without difficulty.[30] But that a clear idea may be formed of what
follows, we must give a plan indicating the position of the enemy, and
the state of the defences (Fig. 45).[31]

[Illustration: FIG 45

THE TAKING OF THE BAILEY]

On the morning of the 7th of June the defenders were still in possession
of the retrenchment C, of that marked A A, and of the barricade B; at H
a strong palisade, with a _breteche_, had been erected before the
entrance at the very commencement of the siege. At D' another palisade
arose in front of the ditch; at E was a second retrenchment, before the
postern entrance; and at G a strong barricade. The building, F, part of
the old Roman construction, crenelated at the top, might hold out for
some time. The towers, V, M, _m_, _m'_, and V' were still in the hands
of the defenders, and could take the assailants in the rear, should they
attempt to enter the chapel, I, and the stables, D, that had been
burned.

Anseric and his uncle came to the determination to abandon the
retrenchment, A A. To defend it was only to lose men, since the enemy
could not venture into the return formed by the two towers of the gate
and the building F. It was preferable to direct all their efforts to C,
for this was evidently the point of attack.

About five o'clock in the morning, therefore, the retrenchment, A A, was
abandoned; and in fact the Burgundians contented themselves with making
gaps in it without advancing further. In the early morning the duke had
directed a quantity of burning darts on the roof of the tower, M; but
the catapult planted by the defenders on that of the angle, V, greatly
annoyed the assailants grouped outside, who were preparing to make a
vigorous attack through the breach C.

It was about noon that the duke gave orders for a simultaneous attack on
two points; the roof of the tower, M, was already on fire. The first
attack was vigorously directed to the retrenchment C. The second made a
gap in the crenelated walls of the chapel, the intention being to get
possession of the palisade E. At the same time, two catapults planted
outside were showering burning darts upon the roofs of the towers _m_,
_n'_ and V, while a trebuchet was destroying the hoarding and
battlements with volleys of stones.

The defenders posted on the summit of the tower, V, by discharging
stones and quarrels on the flanks of the assailants, who were
impetuously assaulting the retrenchment, C, did them much damage, their
bucklers not availing to protect them in front and flank; and from the
narrow front of the castle, skilful archers discharged arrows in
abundance over the heads of their own party on the assailants who
presented themselves at the breach, C; for they were within bowshot.

[Illustration: FIG. 46.]

Seeing they could make no impression, the duke withdrew his men, and had
mantelets brought forward and placed perpendicularly to the wall, and
fronting the tower in the angle, and then a small bosson on wheels--its
head strongly armed with a solid iron point. The wheels of this bosson
were screened (Fig. 46), to shelter those engaged in working it. Twenty
men under shelter, with heavy crowbars, were awaiting the effect of the
bosson. The fourth time it encountered the palisade a dozen stakes were
greatly shaken, and the cross-rails broken. Then the pioneers, armed
with crowbars, set about bringing down the shaken stakes, or at least
turning them aside. The assaulting column threw itself upon the
openings. There was a hand-to-hand fight, and so densely were they
pressed together, that the men posted in the tower at the corner dared
not shoot for fear of wounding their comrades.

On the opposite side the Burgundians had succeeded in making a wide gap
in the wall south of the chapel; and screened by its ruins, they
attacked the angle of the retrenchment E.[32] From the east curtain,
however, the garrison discharged stones and arrows on their rear; and
this assault was but feeble, as the duke was entirely occupied with
directing the others.

Anseric defended this point by the desire of the baron, who had urged
him to resume the offensive, supported by the building F, however
difficult the undertaking might be.

One of the men posted at the defences of the gate hurried down, and,
passing the postern, came and told him that the retrenchment, C, was
forced and his people in great danger at this point. Anseric, therefore,
taking two hundred and fifty men whom he had with him, issued from the
retrenchment by its eastern extremity, rushed furiously on the
assailants, threw them into disorder, and leaving forty brave soldiers
to defend the gap in the chapel, and the barricade, B, that had remained
almost intact, traversed the area of the bailey in an oblique direction,
crossed the retrenchment, A, which was partly destroyed, and fell on the
left flank of the assailants, uttering the war-cry: "Roche-Pont!
Roche-Pont!" ... The Burgundians, surprised by this unforeseen attack
and not knowing whence these soldiers came, abandoned the retrenchment,
the bosson, and even the breach, C.

The baron's troops, seeing this, plucked up courage, and killing all
that had remained within the bailey, occupied the breach, _c_, once
more, while Anseric was occupying the barricade, C. The bosson was
destroyed with hatchets, and the mantelets left by the enemy were put in
readiness for repairing the broken-down palisades.

The duke was furious, and had broken his sword on the backs of the
runaways. But no further attempt could be made that day, and the
advantages he had gained with so much trouble were jeopardized. The
defenders were seen barricading the breaches, and he could hear the
cries of the unfortunate men who had remained in the bailey, and were
being pitilessly massacred.

The Burgundians had lost more than two thousand men since the
commencement of the siege; and on the 7th of June the duke's army
amounted to no more than four thousand five hundred or five thousand men
at most. The besieged were reduced to about a thousand; but they were
full of hope, and assured of success, while the besiegers were losing
confidence. Their advantages had been gained only by enormous
sacrifices, and this last affair threatened altogether to "demoralize"
them.

The duke had reckoned on taking the place in a month at most; and now at
the end of thirty-two days he found that he had lost the third of his
army without being much more advanced than the second day after his
arrival. Order and method had been wanting in the various phases of the
siege; this he could see when it was rather too late. If, instead of
pursuing their advantages in the centre of the front of the bailey, the
besiegers had contented themselves with taking the barbican, so as to
hinder any sortie from that side, and if with good earthworks they had
advanced under cover against the western end of this front towards the
tower, M,[33] directing all their efforts to this point and raising a
movable tower, they would be in possession of the western court, would
destroy in succession the works on their right, would be able to protect
themselves against offensive re-action on their left, and would attack
the castle on its weak side; that is, between the gate towers and that
marked Q. Thus they might take in the rear all the eastern defences,
moving along the western curtain by successive breaches.

The duke, it is true, was not acquainted with the place, and believed
that in making a wide breach in its centre he was striking at its heart.

These reflections occurred to him too late; he could not draw back, and
it was necessary to act with decision. Assembling his chief captains,
therefore, in the evening, he announced that a decisive effort must be
made; representing it as evident--in spite of the check just
experienced--that if they could gain a permanent footing in the western
court of the bailey, they could soon break into the castle on the flank
of the gateway defence, and this flank once seized the castle would be
theirs. The soldiers, rather ashamed of the panic that had lost them the
advantages they had acquired, cast the blame of the failure upon each
other; and those who had been the first to run away were bent upon
vindicating their bravery. So that when, on the morning of the 8th of
June, the order was given for attacking the lost breach, _c_, and every
preparation had been made for protecting their position within the
bailey, the Burgundians were eager to advance.

A vigorous return to the charge was expected by the garrison, and the
baron concluded that the breach, _c_, would be attacked. Part of the
night, therefore, had been occupied in strongly barricading this
breach. Two Burgundian catapults and a trebuchet covered the breach with
darts and stones, so that the defenders had to shelter themselves to the
right and left behind the remains of the curtains; and about ten o'clock
the barricade was destroyed and only a heap of rubbish remained. The
palisade of the retrenchment in the rear was also damaged, and the
projectiles that were showered upon this point precluded the defenders
from repairing it. Then the first attacking column advanced, passed
through the breach, and reached the palisades. Anseric, posted behind
the building, D (belonging to the stables), was on the point of taking
this column in flank, as on the previous day, but a second troop rushed
through the breach, and the Lord of Roche-Pont was all but taken. With
great difficulty he and his men retreated to the outwork of the gate,
and brought aid to the defenders of the western court. The surging host
of the Burgundians was continually increasing, the palisade was taken,
and the second palisade, D, was the scene of a desperate struggle
between assailants and defenders. The garrison could not bring their
forces to bear on this point, and Anseric feared they might be cut off,
and not be able to retire into the outwork of the gate, H; he therefore
ordered a retreat in the evening, while from the three towers and the
curtain of the castle, quarrels and arrows were showered on the
assailants confined in the court.

The tower, V, which still remained in the hands of the besieged, took
the Burgundians in the rear; and the latter employed all the rest of the
day in securing themselves in front and in flank, while the duke had the
tower, M, undermined.

The door of the tower, V, opening into the bailey, had been broken in;
but the stairs were so well barricaded with stones and _debris_ that it
was impossible to clear it; and even should this be done the assailants
would be easily overpowered by the defenders.

A wooden bridge connected the curtain of the bailey on this side with
the corner tower of the castle. By means of a catapult the Burgundians
succeeded in throwing combustibles on it, which obliged the defenders to
abandon the tower, V, in haste. They were seen re-entering the castle
just when the flames were beginning to consume the bridge. The roof of
the tower, Q, was all but set on fire; and the defenders had great
difficulty in arresting the progress of the flames.

If Anseric had had five hundred more men he might from the central court
have resumed the offensive at the moment when the Burgundians were
trying to gain a lodgment in the western court. But he had lost a
hundred men in the last engagement, and had no more soldiers than were
absolutely necessary for the defence of the castle. In the evening the
central part of the bailey was occupied by the Burgundians, who took up
their quarters there, and intrenched themselves securely this time.

Next morning, the 9th of June, the tower, M, being undermined, fell, and
the breach, _c_, was proportionately widened. The ditch was filled up,
and the tower, V, occupied by the Burgundians. The defenders, before
they abandoned it, had set fire to the catapult mounted on the platform.

The crown of the tower, Q, in the corner of the castle, rose more than
twenty feet above the curtain, and thus hindered the Burgundians from
moving at will on the rampart-walk of this curtain, which was not
furnished with covered hoarding.

The whole of the 10th of June was employed by the Burgundians in
completing their works in the western court of the bailey, clearing the
breach, _c_, and working at a wooden movable tower, designed to attack
and command the rampart between the gate and the corner tower, Q, of the
castle; for this rampart, raised on the rock, could not be undermined.
The duke, aware by this time of the strength of the place, and supposing
the defenders to be more numerous than they really were, was unwilling
henceforth to run any hazards. As far as was possible he manned the tops
of the ramparts of that part of the bailey which was in his possession,
succeeded in setting fire to the roofs and floors of the towers _m_ and
_m'_, and commenced a mining attack on the tower _v'_. It was no longer
the interest of the defenders to guard these works, which weakened them
to no purpose. They therefore evacuated them, threw down the bridge
uniting the eastern rampart of the bailey with the corner tower, and
retired permanently within the castle. Meantime the Burgundians were
working at their movable tower outside the old palisade, C, that had
been destroyed, and covered the outside with fresh hides to preserve it
from the Greek fire. They filled up the ditch in front of the tower
_p_,[34] not without difficulty protecting themselves with fascines and
mantelets.

On the 20th of June the tower was completed, and the road for it
constructed of strong planks firmly fastened as far as the filling up of
the ditch. For the few last days the enemy had been incessantly working
the catapults and two trebuchets against the crest of the defences of
the castle between the gate and the tower, Q, and had tried to set fire
to the hoarding and roofs; but these ramparts were higher than those of
the bailey, and the baron had covered all the timbers with hides and
blankets always kept wet, so that the flaming darts of the Burgundians
were ineffectual against them. The roofs, too, were carefully watched.
The hoarding, however, was almost entirely destroyed by the projectiles,
and its _debris_ had been removed by the garrison, as only embarrassing
the defence. The whole of the crown of the tower, P, was greatly
damaged, especially as it did not rise above the crest of the curtain.
Seeing the enemy's preparations, the baron mounted a strong mantelet of
thick wood and a catapult on the platform of this tower, P, which had no
roof. Then, to meet every contingency, he had a strong retrenchment made
from the angle, _t_, to the opposite tower, behind the tower, Q.

In the evening of this day, the 20th of June, the wooden tower began to
be moved, borne along on huge rollers. As soon as it was about thirty
yards from the rampart, the baron had the catapult directed upon it, and
sent against it cases of Greek fire fixed near the iron points of the
darts. The fresh hides protected it well, and the points did not stick
in the wood; so the fire fell on the ground, and the Burgundians, under
cover of the base-work of the tower, flung off the flaming cases by
means of forks. This gave them plenty to do, and the tower advanced but
slowly, while the further it proceeded the greater was the chance of its
taking fire. The baron, who had but a small quantity of Greek fire
remaining, was afraid to waste it. Already five cases had been thrown
without effect; so he resolved to wait till the tower was close to the
ramparts.

At this time of the year (June 21) the nights are not completely dark,
and day breaks early. At two o'clock in the morning the wooden tower was
on the counterscarp of the ditch. The mound that filled it presented a
<DW72> towards the ramparts, and was covered with planks. At a signal,
the tower, urged on from behind by means of twenty powerful levers,
rolled quickly along its inclined plane and came into collision with the
summit of the tower P, above which it rose ten feet. The shock made the
walls tremble, and a shower of stones and darts was poured upon the
defenders from the top of the wooden tower. Then a bridge fell noisily
on the head of the tower above-mentioned, shattered the mantelets and
the catapult; and the assailants, uttering formidable shouts, leaped on
the platform.

Anseric was at the top of the tower, Q, and Baron Guy was posted on the
battlements of the gate. Both of them, rushing towards the curtains,
attacked in their turn the assaulting column on this narrow rampart;
many on both sides fell within the court, and were killed or had their
limbs broken.

Numbers conferred no advantage, since it was impossible to deploy; so
that the crowd of assailants that continued to pour forth from the
wooden tower had to fight on the right and the left in a space six feet
wide. The staircase of the tower, P, having been blocked up, the enemy
could not get down through it; so that, driven into a corner on the
platform of the tower, they had to make their way along one curtain or
the other. Anseric, at the head of his troop, was cutting an ensanguined
road before him with a long-handled axe. At his side, his men, armed
with pikes and hooks, stabbed or grappled with and threw down the wall
those who attempted to approach their lord. These unfortunate men fell
from a height of twenty-five feet on the _debris_ of hoarding which the
garrison had thrown down within, to clear the rampart walk.

The crossbowmen, posted at the top of the wooden tower, discharged
quarrels on the two bands; but the men were well protected with armour,
and the quarrels rebounded from their helmets or were arrested by their
hauberks. Friar Jerome, armed with an enormous mace, mounted on a
merlon, felled all who came within his reach.

The duke, remaining at the bottom of the wooden tower, and supposing the
rampart taken, was urging on his men-at-arms that they might follow up
with overwhelming numbers those who had first reached the rampart.
Thanks to Anseric's efforts and those of the baron, there was some
amount of delay at the top of the tower, and the exit from the bridge
could not be readily effected. The assailants who were coming up behind
the front of the assault were pressing upon those before them, and this
pressure only increased the confusion.

By dint of numbers, however, the Burgundians succeeded in gaining a
footing on the tower; and the two bands of defenders were not
sufficiently numerous to thrust them back. Seeing that they were going
to be absolutely overwhelmed, the baron called Father Jerome, who,
leaping from merlon to merlon, succeeded in reaching him.

A word spoken in the friar's ear made him run towards the neighbouring
tower belonging to the gate. A moment afterwards and a strong crossbow
mounted on the upper story of the work, behind the hoarding, shot
quarrels, to which cases of Greek fire were fastened, against the sides
of the wooden tower, which was not so well protected by skins as its
front. The friar took a cool aim at the exposed part of the timbers,
chiefly about seven or eight feet above the base of the tower. He had
ten of these cases left, and all were aimed with a sure hand, being
attached to strong quarrels, whose points were well sharpened. Four of
the quarrels failed to stick, but the six others were fixed firmly in
the timber, and the cases they bore spread a tenacious and burning lava
over the wood.

At the first moment the Burgundians, absorbed in the attack, did not
perceive the danger. Those who had reached the top of the tower could
not be aware of it.

The duke was one of the first to see the thick smoke issuing from the
kindled wood. Immediately he gave orders for the extinction in all haste
of the fire with the aid of small hand-ladders; but as soon as anyone
mounted one of these ladders, a dozen archers and crossbowmen posted in
the gate tower made him their mark. Four or five men had been killed or
wounded before the level of the flame was reached. Inside, the soldiers
who, like a rising flood, were ascending to the top of the tower, soon
found themselves surrounded by the suffocating smoke produced by the
Greek fire. Some were the more eager to mount, others hesitated and were
for going down. "Now! to the rescue! Arde le beffroi!" cried Friar
Jerome, coming to rejoin the baron's troop, which was almost driven into
a corner close to the tower; and with his long mace he took the lead,
breaking heads and arms. "Arde le beffroi!" he shouted at every blow.
"Roche-Pont! Roche-Pont! Arde le beffroi!" shouted, in its turn, the
baron's small troop (Fig. 47). Anseric's men, who were crowded up in the
corner tower, re-echoed this cry.

[Illustration: FIG. 47.--THE MOVABLE TOWER.]

The Burgundians, however, did not retreat; in fact, if they had wished
to do so, they could not. They tried to place ladders to get down into
the court, but they were too short. "Burgundy! Burgundy!" shouted the
assailants, in their turn. "Place prise! Place prise!"

The grey light of dawn faintly illumined this scene of carnage, and its
pale, cold gleams mingled with the ruddy glow of the fire. The smoke,
driven by a breeze from the north-east, beat down upon the combatants,
and sometimes hindered them from seeing each other; but the struggle
raged on. Heaps of the dead and wounded--the latter being speedily
dispatched by menials posted in the court to resist any who should
try to get down into it--lay at the interior base of the curtains.

Although Anseric and the baron had ordered those who remained in the two
neighbouring towers (that of the angle and that of the gate) not to quit
their post under any pretext, and not to unbar the gates till the two
troops were absolutely driven back upon those defences, these brave men,
seeing so fine an opportunity of routing the Burgundians, and observing
the weakness of the two bands of the defenders compared with the host of
assailants, opened the gates and sallied forth to help their comrades.

Eleanor and her waiting-women, with some of the wounded, perceiving the
critical state of affairs (for the combat took place in front of the
western inhabited part of the castle), had proceeded along the western
curtain and had reached the corner tower, Q,[35] behind the troop
commanded by Anseric. The lady of the castle was the first to encourage
the men on guard there to go out, saying that she knew well enough how
to bar the doors. As to the wounded who were with her, they posted
themselves as best they could at the hoarding, to shoot at the enemy
outside and the compact mass of Burgundians engaged on the platform of
the tower. These two reinforcements arrived very opportunely. The new
comers, fresh and vigorous, made their way, some on the tops of the
merlons, others on the _debris_ of the hoarding, and relieved their
comrades exhausted by the struggle.

The fire was catching the framework of the tower, and the Burgundians
soon found their retreat cut off. Those who had gained the rampart,
however, sold their lives dearly, and the struggle did not cease till
the flames of the burning tower curled round the platform and the
rampart walk.

Nearly five hundred Burgundians were killed, wounded, taken prisoners,
or burned. The sparks of fire, driven by the wind, were borne down upon
the roof and the hoarding of the tower at the angle, and it caught fire
about six o'clock in the morning.

The day was a fortunate one for the defenders, but they had lost nearly
two hundred in killed and wounded. Anseric had been struck by several
quarrels that pierced his hauberk, and was covered with blood. The
baron, that he might be more at his ease in fighting, feeling himself
oppressed by his helmet, had taken it off during the struggle, and had a
large wound in his head. They hastened to throw over the battlements the
bodies of the slain Burgundians upon the last blazing timbers of the
tower, and to bury in the court the dead that had fallen there. All in
the castle were exhausted with fatigue. Eleanor and her attendants were
engaged in dressing wounds and in bringing food and drink to the various
posts. The lady of the castle preserved her tranquil countenance and
gentle look amid these sanguinary scenes, and during the whole day and
through the following night she did not cease to render aid to all who
needed it. "Fair niece," said the baron to her, while she was dressing
his wound, "if the king's army does not make haste it will find no more
defenders to deliver; but we have given the duke some trouble, and if he
goes on he, too, may have to return to his court alone."

The 22nd of June passed without fighting. The duke had a _cat_
constructed with a view to sapping the rampart at its base--which seemed
the more feasible, since the destruction of its hoarding and the burning
of the tower in the angle deprived the defenders of the means of
opposing the sapping effectually. The garrison could see the enemy
engaged in this work in the bailey behind the mantelets, and they
accumulated within the rampart all the materials they could procure,
with a view to blocking up the mouth of the mine at the moment it
reached the court.

On the morning of the 25th of June, the watch posted on the gateway
tower were much surprised at seeing not a single Burgundian in the
bailey. They went immediately to inform Anseric and the baron. "It is
either a ruse, or the king's army is coming," said the latter; "let
there be a sharp look-out in every quarter." They ascended the donjon.
The posts on the south were abandoned. The _cat_ and the mantelets
remained in the bailey as well as the trebuchets. About noon the baron
sent out ten men with the deserter, who was to conduct them to the
various points occupied by the Burgundian captains. In three hours' time
they returned, saying that they had met only some laggards, who had fled
at their approach, and some wounded; that the encampment was utterly
deserted, but there were some waggons and military engines left.

The duke having been informed of the advance of the king's army, which
was only a day's march from the castle, had decamped in the night,
abandoning his material of war.

Great was the joy at La Roche-Pont. The inhabitants of the town soon
came and confirmed the news. The last of the Burgundians had departed
about noon, not without leaving many of their men on the field; for, in
spite of the injunctions of the duke, the inhabitants of the lower town
of Saint-Julien had been considerably plundered and had driven out the
last of the soldiers with stones and pike thrusts.

Soon afterwards the Sieur de la Roche-Pont did homage for his fief to
King Philip Augustus; and the monks re-entered their abbey, for the
repair of which the king gave five hundred livres.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 21: See Fig. 35.]

[Footnote 22: See Fig. 35.]

[Footnote 23: See G, Fig. 35.]

[Footnote 24: See Fig. 36.]

[Footnote 25: See Fig. 36.]

[Footnote 26: See Fig. 36.]

[Footnote 27: See Fig. 36.]

[Footnote 28: See Fig. 36.]

[Footnote 29: See Fig. 36.]

[Footnote 30: See the general bird's-eye view, Fig. 37.]

[Footnote 31: The parts of the castle marked red are those taken by the
Burgundians; those marked black are still retained by the defenders. At
_a_ is marked the breach in the barbican; at _b_ the filling up of the
fosse and the first breach made in the curtain; at _c_ the second
breach. At _o o_ are seen the Burgundian posts established on the night
of the 6th and 7th of June; at _x_ the outline of the subterranean
passage of the refuge postern of the donjon; at _z_ the quarry; at P the
route traversed by Pierre Landry and Eleanor's escort; at R their place
of concealment, and at S the point where they were got into the castle
by means of a rope.]

[Footnote 32: See Fig. 45.]

[Footnote 33: See Fig. 45.]

[Footnote 34: See Fig. 45.]

[Footnote 35: See Fig. 45.]




CHAPTER XI.

_THE FIRST DEFENCES AGAINST FIRE ARTILLERY._


King John had possessed himself of the duchy of Burgundy and united it
with the crown; he resigned it in favour of his son Philip, who, as is
well known, had distinguished himself on the fatal day of Poictiers.
From that epoch till the time of Charles the Bold, the duchy had
remained in the hands of the descendants of King John; and although the
dukes of Burgundy were very warlike, and had formed a league with the
English against the crown of France, in consequence of the quarrel that
arose in 1400 between Philip and the Duke Louis d'Orleans, brother of
Charles VI., the duchy was relatively at peace, while the north of
France, as far as the Loire, was in the power of foreigners.

After the death of Charles the Bold before Nancy, King Louis XI. lost no
time in despatching to the province of Burgundy La Tremoille, baron of
Craon, who, acting in concert with the Prince of Orange, soon reduced
the whole province into subjection to the king of France; this was in
1477.

The town of La Roche-Pont (at that time the abbey alone preserved the
name of Saint-Julien, and the town had adopted that of the castle) had
been deemed by Charles the Bold worthy of special attention. Recognising
the advantageous site of the place and the importance of its strategic
position, this prince had adapted the ancient defences to the new mode
of attack. The old castle of La Roche-Pont, several times repaired,
still showed some of its defences dating from the end of the twelfth
century, the donjon being particularly well preserved; but the abbey and
the entire plateau had been surrounded by a new wall by Philip, about
1380, and the town had been rebuilt within this enclosure, the right
bank of the larger stream being completely abandoned. At the end of the
fourteenth century there existed only a suburb on the <DW72>s of the
plateau along the left bank, and this suburb had no other defence than a
wall of inconsiderable strength on the north. The great-grandson of
Anseric, Sieur de la Roche-Pont, having died without male heirs, the
fief of La Roche-Pont had reverted to the Duke Philip, who, as well as
his successors, appointed the governors of the town and castle,
henceforth a ducal domain.

The enclosure of the town had been rebuilt in great part on the Roman
foundations. It consisted of a substantial wall rising about twenty-four
feet above the outside ground level, without machicoulis, strengthened
with cylindrical towers thirty-six feet in height surrounded by
machicoulis and covered with conical roofs. Machicoulis formed also the
upper defence of the curtains and towers of the castle, whose plan had
not been changed.

This place had not suffered any attack since the date of these new
works, and it was intact under Charles the Bold. During his struggle in
the north with the people of Ghent and Hainault, and as a precaution
against the intrigues of Louis XI., he had thought it needful to put the
town of La Roche-Pont in a good state of defence. Now, limited though
its efficiency was, the artillery of the king of France already played a
sufficiently important part in sieges to render it necessary to provide
against its effects. The duke therefore raised several boulevards to
replace the walls and receive artillery. (Fig. 48.)

[Illustration: FIG. 48.--THE TOWN OF LA ROCHE-PONT IS FORTIFIED BY
CHARLES THE BOLD.]

As shown in our plan, the bailey of the castle no longer existed. It was
replaced by a wide ditch, A, of little depth; its bottom was on a level
with the two boulevards, B and C. A third boulevard surrounded the base
of the donjon externally, in the place of the ancient _chemise_. This
boulevard commanded the stone bridge rebuilt in the fourteenth century
on the Roman piers. Before the north front was raised an isolated
boulevard of earth, D, of slight elevation, but commanding the road of
the plateau. At the angles of the north front two large towers, E, F,
adapted to receive cannon, flanked the angles and were in a position to
sweep the boulevard, D. Set back on the eastern side, a similar tower,
G, commanded the valley of the rivulet. Two boulevards, H and I, forming
projections beneath the defences of the fourteenth century, commanded
the course of the river, and could cross their fire with the boulevard
B, and the tower E. A boulevard was also raised on the eastern salient
at K.

The faubourg had preserved its two parish churches, and a convent of
Jacobins had been built at L, on lands bought by Saint Louis while the
fief of La Roche-Pont was still directly dependent on the crown of
France.

The abbey of Saint-Julien, O, had diminished its enclosure, and yielded
a part of its estates. Houses arose in its ancient pleasance, whose
perimeter had been somewhat altered. These habitations were within its
liberties and belonged to the abbey, which granted them on lease.

At M, a parish church under the invocation of Our Lady had been built
towards the end of the thirteenth century, when the lord of La
Roche-Pont, wanting money, sold some lands--formerly belonging to the
castle--for building. At N was the market-place. Three gates gave
admission to the _cite_: one on the north, called Saint-Julien's gate;
one on the east, Mill-gate; and the third on the south-east, called
Castle-gate.

We must enter into some details respecting the new defences raised under
Charles the Bold. Figure 49 presents a bird's-eye view of the northern
boulevard, D, with the _cite_ front in the background, its gate of the
fourteenth century, and the two great corner towers.

[Illustration: FIG. 49.]

Fig. 50 A gives the plan of one of these towers at the level of the
lower battery, and B its section through _a_, _b_.

These towers were forty yards in diameter on the outside, and consisted
of a low battery, whose floor was six feet beneath the upper level of
the plateau. The descent to this low battery was by a <DW72> ending in an
octagonal hall whose vaults rested on four great cylindrical pillars.
Three chambers with embrasures for three large cannons opened into this
hall. By the galleries, C, there was a communication between two of
these chambers and two other smaller ones pierced with embrasures for
culverins. From the descent D, two passages, E, gave access to two
chambers, F, likewise arranged with embrasures to receive two large
guns.

[Illustration: FIG. 50.--MASONRY TOWER FOR ARTILLERY.]

The barrel vaults of these rooms had openings to allow the smoke to
escape. Small powder magazines, G, opened near each of the chambers, and
five large lunettes pierced in the vaults of the central hall gave air
and light to the interior. At H, a well was connected with a cistern
constructed under the central hall, as indicated in section B. This
cistern was supplied by rain-water falling on the platform and
discharged by four pipes passing down through the inner walls. Two
winding staircases connected the lower battery with the platform and the
curtains of the fourteenth century, I I, and allowed of a descent
through two posterns, K, into the braie, L, defended by an epaulement, a
palisade, and narrow ditch. Flanks, _l_, raked the salient of this
braie. The curtain, whose rampart walk rose six feet above the level of
the platform, closed the gorge of the tower, as shown in section B at N.
Two watch-towers, P, were built in the thickness of the parapet, pierced
with nineteen embrasures for small pieces. This parapet was not too high
for arbalisters to shoot over its <DW72>. A wide incline, R, facilitated
the getting up of guns and the ascent of men to the platform.

Fig. 51 presents a bird's-eye view of boulevard _I_,[36] with the
ramparts of the fourteenth century. These boulevards were earthworks,
and their interior surface was four yards below the level of the
plateau. The boulevards, B and C, raised at the western angles of the
castle, had their platforms on a level with the bottom of the ditch, as
mentioned above. Having thus described the general plan and the details,
we proceed to narrate the events of which the town of La Roche-Pont was
the theatre in 1477 and 1478.

[Illustration: FIG. 51.]

With a view to securing the aid of the Prince of Orange, after the death
of Duke Charles, Louis XI. had been most liberal to him in promises, one
of which was that he would place in his hands all the strong towns of
Burgundy that belonged to the estate of the Prince of Orange, his
grandfather, and which Duke Charles had forestalled.

But when the Seigneur de Craon had taken possession of these places he
would not give them up, notwithstanding the demands made upon him by the
Prince, and the apparent orders of King Louis XI.

The marriage between the daughter of Charles the Bold, sole heiress of
his domains, and Maximilian, Duke of Austria, took place in the
meantime. The latter proceeded to recover possession of the duchy of
Burgundy, and had a conference with the Prince of Orange, exasperated at
the non-fulfilment of the promises made him; while the province was soon
to a large extent roused against the French, whom the Seigneur de Craon,
eager for gain, and by no means faithful in accomplishing his
engagements, rendered detestable.

The Seigneur de Craon had left in the town of La Roche-Pont only a
somewhat feeble garrison. At the instigation of the agents of
Maximilian, who was filling the country with emissaries, the inhabitants
barricaded themselves one evening in the streets, and attacked the
French posts. The latter, small in number, and indifferently commanded,
took refuge in the castle after having lost some soldiers. The castle
was ill supplied with provisions and munitions. Surrounded by the
townspeople, the garrison could not hold their position long; so that
one night it escaped on the south side, passing right through the
Burgundian posts to join the Seigneur de Craon's army near Dijon. The
inhabitants immediately hoisted the Cross of Burgundy on the keep, and
hastened to Maximilian to inform him of the success of the rising, and
to ask assistance against a return of the king's armies; for they were
scarcely in a condition to defend themselves. Maximilian sent them a
body of twelve hundred Germans, Swiss, and Brabancons, with cannon,
munitions, and engineers. The first thing these troops did on arriving
was to commit some depredations in the environs and the western
faubourg, after which they set about the defence of the place.

The Sire de Montcler had been invested with the command of the foreign
troops and of those he was able to collect together in the town and
neighbourhood. He was an active, enterprising, and rather shrewd man, of
noble bearing and handsome countenance, in the prime of life, capable of
enforcing obedience, and trusting to himself alone in getting his orders
executed. He had soon decided on his plans.

The able-bodied population of the town amounted to about two thousand
men, half of whom were in a condition to render effective service, and
were accustomed to war. Some days after the arrival of the foreign
troops, some Burgundian lords who favoured the young duchess, and were
much incensed against the Seigneur de Craon--who, for no other reason
than to get money, had plundered their estates and taken away their most
valuable property--assembled at La Roche-Pont. They brought with them
two hundred lances and some convoys of provisions. The effective
garrison might therefore be said to amount to three thousand fighting
men, of whom five hundred were horse--each lance being followed by an
esquire.

The place was not in a good state of defence; the braies were much
dilapidated, the earthen boulevards crumbling away, while the ditches
wanted clearing out. No piece was mounted. There were neither gabions
nor fascines nor stakes for palisades. The Sire de Montcler made the
following arrangement:--All, whether captains, soldiers, pioneers,
inhabitants of the town, men or women, were to go every morning before
daybreak to the posts assigned them beforehand, on pain of death. And
with a view to impressing this order on all, gallows were set up in the
various wards, which bore the following names: Tower ward (on the
North); Saint-Julien's ward (including the abbey and the eastern part of
the _cite_ opposite the monastery); Saint-Louis's ward (situated between
the abbey and the castle, on the west); the Mill ward, looking towards
the east. The tenants of the abbey had claimed exemption from the
service, but the Sire de Montcler had paid no attention to their claims
any more than to those of the abbot, whose gardens and buildings served
as a central arsenal. Two or three obstinate burgesses had been hanged,
and since then none had failed in his duty. At noon all went to dinner,
and returned at two o'clock to work till nightfall. The women and the
children from eleven to sixteen years of age carried earth in baskets
and traies; and the soldiers, pioneers, and townsmen, under the
direction of the engineers, began to restore the parapets of the
boulevards, cleared out the ditches and restored the braies again. A
sawing machine was established at the mill and cut wood to make
palisades. In a few days the inhabitants, who had at first thought this
very hard work and regretted having driven away the French garrison, had
become habituated to this life of fatigue, and endured it quite
cheerfully. Singing and laughing were heard in every quarter while the
work was going on. It might have been supposed that they were engaged in
a _fete_.

The governor had not overlooked the supply of provisions. It was the end
of the summer. All the harvest produce of the neighbourhood had been
ordered to be brought into the town. A pair of millstones, which were
still available after the establishment of the saw-mill, was at work
night and day. All the provisions stored in the houses were to be
deposited in the abbey or the castle, on pain of death, and the
inhabitants received their several rations like the soldiers. A large
store of grain and vegetables laid up in the abbey considerably
increased the supplies of provisions. The Sire de Montcler had of
course laid hands on these provisions.

[Illustration: FIG. 52.]

The old men and young children were occupied in making gabions and
cutting turf for the taluses of the boulevards. Behind the north front
the governor had a good trench dug, demolishing some houses, with
retrenchment and good gabionades on the flanks for artillery. The north
wall of the abbey was terraced and united to the east curtain by a
retrenchment with a ditch.

The Sire de Montcler was a good-humoured man, familiar with all, present
everywhere and talking to everybody; and, thanks to his jocular and
pleasant ways, the good people saw their houses demolished and the soil
of their gardens taken away to make ditches and epaulements without
being greatly distressed.

When everything was well prepared for the defence, however, the governor
sent away all useless mouths. Women, children, and old men had to seek
an asylum in the environs. After this, the western faubourg was burned
to prevent its being occupied by the troops of Louis XI.

A _tete du pont_ had been formed on the right bank outside the
drawbridge (Fig. 52), with a large cavalier on the left bank; the two
other bridges were destroyed. On the plateau towards the north arose, in
front of the boulevard D,[37] an intrenchment of earth, with barricades
of trees and large gabions screening two culverins. The boulevards and
towers on the north were armed with bombards.

Every night the governor took care to reconnoitre the environs.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 36: See the general plan, Fig. 48.]

[Footnote 37: See Fig. 48.]




CHAPTER XII.

_THE FIFTH SIEGE._


The 4th of September, 1478, the army of King Louis XI. was reported by a
company of horsemen to be half a day's march from the town. This army,
consisting of five hundred lances and infantry, forming a total of about
six thousand men, was commanded by Messire Charles d'Amboise, lord of
Chaumont, a sage and moderate man, no plunderer as his predecessor had
been, and as valiant a man of war as he was a clever politician.

Messire Charles d'Amboise was expecting a reinforcement of twelve
hundred Swiss; for he had been able to push his interests so ably with
some of the gentry of the Cantons by offering them attractive
advantages, that they had resolved to furnish him with troops.

Besides the four florins and a half a month which he gave to each man,
Messire Charles d'Amboise paid for this service twenty thousand francs
to the cities of Berne, Lucerne, Zurich, Solerne, and twenty thousand to
the private individuals who undertook the recruiting. For which
consideration, a body of Swiss troops for the service of the king was to
be raised, amounting to six thousand infantry.

The king's army took with it a good and powerful artillery, consisting
of twelve large bombards, twenty-four spiroles, veuglaires and
ribeaudequins, without reckoning fire-arms and the munitions for this
ordnance. Thus accompanied it marched slowly and in good order, well
guarded on its flanks.

Some of the Burgundian lords, with about forty lances, having wished to
try the strength of the French previous to their arrival before the
city, suffered for their adventurous spirit; for they left half their
number on the field. The governor, therefore, commanded that no one
should go out without his orders. The first troops of Messire Charles
d'Amboise showed themselves at nightfall on the northern side of the
plateau, just beyond the range of boulevard D[38], and began to install
themselves, setting up between them and the town, mantelets brought on
carts, and fixed with the help of stakes driven in the ground. When it
became quite dark, the Sire de Montcler tried to attack them; but
perceiving that this vanguard was efficiently sustained by a large body
posted in the rear, he retired after a slight skirmish.

Next day, the 5th of September, Messire Charles d'Amboise sent some
scouts into the lower town, and on the eastern side towards the mills,
which he took without striking a blow, for they were not guarded.
Immediately, some bombs were discharged at these mills, and the
besiegers were obliged to abandon them for the moment, for at the second
discharge one of the roofs fell in. The Sire de Montcler organized his
troops as follows:--

  In each of the four wards mentioned above, 200 armed men from the town
    were intrusted with the guard and defence of the ramparts           800
  There remained 500 Burgundian foot soldiers, among whom there were
    bombardiers and culverineers                                        150
  Skilled javelin men, archers, and arbalisters                         250
  Pioneers                                                              100
  The Germans who were not on friendly terms with the inhabitants were
    posted in reserve in the abbey, amounting to                        800
  And in the castle, amounting to                                       400
  The men-at-arms, partly in the abbey                                  200
  Partly in the castle                                                  200
  Partly in the neighbourhood of the gates                               50
                                                                      -----
                                    Total of force                    2,950
                                                                      -----

It was evident that the garrison was not numerous enough to attempt
sorties; it had already enough to do to guard its defences in presence
of a besieging army amounting to nearly six thousand men; an army
moreover which might receive reinforcements. The governor was clearly
awake to the facts, and felt that he must economise his strength.

He resolved, therefore, to limit himself at least for the moment to an
energetic defence; but this did not prevent him from sending messengers
to Maximilian before the complete investment, to ask him to intervene
and send a corps of relief, if he did not wish to see the place fall
into the hands of the king of France, which would certainly happen if it
were left to itself. But he added it would resist to the last, and he
could answer for the disposition of the garrison.

On his side, Messire Charles d'Amboise seemed not to wish to precipitate
matters; he hanged several soldiers who had been guilty of acts of
pillage in the neighbourhood, and ordered that the dwellers in the
suburbs should be considerately treated. By the evening of the 8th of
September the town was completely invested. A body, consisting of three
thousand two hundred men, remained encamped on the northern plateau,
acting in conjunction with five hundred men posted among the ruins of
the lower town and three hundred men behind the walls on the lower
<DW72>s of the hills on the east.[39] Most of the cavalry occupied the
right shore of the larger stream and the valley on the south. A body of
about five hundred men blockaded the _tete du pont_, and had orders to
seize it when a favourable occasion offered. That night some pieces of
artillery were brought into position on the lower <DW72>s of the eastern
hills to command all the eastern declivity of the _cite_. Some were
assigned to the body of troops blockading the _tete du pont_.

The besiegers' artillery was thus disposed:--

                                                            Veuglaires,
                                                 Bombards.    Spiroles.

   Attack on the northern boulevard                  4              2
   Battery on the <DW72>s of the eastern hills        2              4
   Before the _tete du pont_                                        4
   On the western <DW72>s of the plateau commanding
     the lower town                                                 2
   Park of reserve                                   6             12
                                                    --             --
   Total                                            12             24
                                                    --             --

The artillery of the besieged consisted of:--

                                                 Bombards.    Culverins.

   On the platforms of the three great northern
     towers                                          3              3
   In the casemated batteries of these towers                       6
   On the earthwork in front of the northern
     boulevard                                                      2
   On the northern boulevard                         1              2
   On the boulevards B, C, H, I, K                   5              5
   On the cavalier commanding the bridge             1              2
   Reserve in the abbey and the castle               4              8
                                                    --             --
   Totals                                           14             28
                                                    --             --

On the 10th of September the besiegers began a cavalier in form of a
horseshoe, three hundred paces from the boulevard, E, towards the
north-east, to rake its gorge at A (Fig. 53). This cavalier was armed
with two bombards and a spirole. Northwards, on the side of the road, a
second cavalier, B, was also provided with two bombards. Next was
commenced an earthwork, running obliquely with traverses, to reach from
this cavalier in a south-west direction as far as the edge of the
plateau near the defenders' intrenchment C, D. The great boulevard, E,
of the defence was armed with a bombard and two culverins, and two other
culverins flanked the intrenchment C, D. On the morning of the 17th of
September, the four bombards of the besiegers sent into the boulevard
stone balls two hundred pounds weight, which very much damaged the
gorge, and about noon dismounted the bombard and one of the culverins.
The besieged had answered their fire as well as they could, both from
the boulevard and the two great towers G, H. But it was only the balls
of the bombard mounted on the platform of the tower H, that reached the
cavalier A. Those of the tower G only rolled as far as the <DW72> of the
cavalier B. The governor might have mounted other bombards on the
boulevard E; but he was afraid of losing the pieces, and preferred
reserving them for the defence at close quarters. On the 18th the
besieger had terminated his earthwork as far as the point I, and there
he brought up a veuglaire to dismount the flank culverin C. At this
point some men were lost on both sides; for the besiegers sent among
those engaged in the works large balls of stone and leaden bullets,
fired from the bombards of the tower G, and from small cannon.

[Illustration: FIG. 53.]

On the 18th of September, at daybreak, the bombards of the cavaliers, A
and B, redoubled their fire on the boulevard; then Messire Charles
d'Amboise, having massed a body of four hundred men at the point, I,
sheltered by gabions and fascines put up during the night; at the word
of command this body fell upon the flank, C, which was vigorously
defended for an hour. After this the Sire de Montcler, observing that
the besiegers were continually sending reinforcements to this point,
withdrew his troops into the barbican, K, and the boulevard, E, which
enabled the artillerymen posted in the tower, G, to keep up a brisk fire
from their bombard and their small cannon upon the assailants.

From the boulevard, E, the besieged, in spite of the projectiles they
received in their rear, sheltering themselves as best they could,
discharged volleys of stones with their culverins on the point occupied
by the enemy. The latter sought to avoid them by descending a short
distance below the ridge of the plateau; but they were none the less
exposed there to the fire from the tower, G. They brought up gabions and
fascines, and endeavoured to gain a footing on this flank, not without
some loss, when about three o'clock in the afternoon another attack was
contrived against the flank, D. Passing round the end of the
intrenchment, and hastening with all speed along the <DW72>s, the enemy
attempted to take the defenders in the rear. This attack was
unsuccessful. Those who served the bombards and culverins of the tower,
H, seized the right moment for discharging volleys against this column
of assailants, which made deep lanes in the battalions. These, moreover,
who were retired within the barbican, precipitated down the <DW72>s those
of the enemy who had already passed beyond the intrenchment; and the
struggle ceased towards evening, the besieger occupying the point C
alone, without being able to advance. He was endeavouring to find
shelter there, both against the projectiles and against any attack in
retaliation. The citizens had lost only a few men and a culverin. The
enemy reckoned one hundred and fifty dead, and a large number of
wounded.

During the night the Sire de Montcler brought up fascines, casks, and
timber _debris_ with which he raised a barricade connecting the barbican
with the boulevard along the road, and a second connecting the eastern
extremity of the intrenchment, D, with the fausse-braie of the tower, H,
along the ridge of the plateau. He brought up one of the reserve
culverins, and mounted it in the centre of the first barricade, then,
with gabions, he strengthened the shelters and parados of the boulevard.
The bombard was remounted as well as it could be, and directed against
the point, C, of the intrenchment. And a second bombard was brought from
the abbey to the platform of the tower G.

On his side, Messire Charles d'Amboise had not remained inactive. At the
point, I, an earthwork was raised with gabionades, and two bombards were
brought thither. The point captured was strengthened by great gabions,
all covered with fascines, and well furnished with small cannon. These
works were scarcely terminated when the day broke (September 19th). It
was the besieged who began to direct the fire of their bombard from the
boulevard, E, against the point C.

Immediately one of the bombards from the platform, I, replied, while
the other discharged balls on the tower G, whose pieces were not slow in
responding. Then the bombards of the cavaliers A and B joined in as on
the previous day. The fire of these five pieces, converging at once on
the boulevard, soon threw down the gabionades, killed most of the
artillerymen, and dismounted the bombard a second time. This defence was
no longer tenable. However, the governor would not yet abandon the
advanced work: protecting his men as best he could along the interior
<DW72>s, he sent for five hundred Germans held in reserve in the abbey,
and when duly marshalled, at a signal agreed upon, all the pieces of the
tower G, the culverins of the barricade, and another culverin that had
remained in battery on the boulevard, fired at once on the point C; and
immediately putting himself at the head of the Germans and one hundred
volunteers, among whom were most of the Burgundian men-at-arms, crossed
the barricade and charged the enemy's position, who, surprised by this
bold attack, defended themselves but feebly, and were partly driven on
the <DW72>s of the plateau. Messire Charles d'Amboise, who was on the
platform I, seeing this rebuff, threw two large battalions, held in
reserve behind the earthwork, against the intrenchment between the point
C and the boulevard.

His men crossed the obstacle quickly enough, in spite of the barricade
and the defenders posted at this point, and attacked the troop of the
besieged in flank and in rear. In the midst of this _melee_, the
artillerymen on both sides were prevented from firing; it was a combat
with sharp weapons only. The Sire de Montcler found himself much
jeopardised when, from the barbican and the boulevard, those who were on
the field, although they had orders not to quit their posts, fell in
their turn on the troop of besiegers. Immediately dividing his forces
into two bodies, the governor was able with one to hold his ground
against the assailants thrown on the <DW72>s, and with the other to make
head against the French, in their turn attacked on both sides.

The conflict was sanguinary. The besiegers, driven back against the
intrenchment, could neither deploy nor manoeuvre. Messire Charles
d'Amboise sent a reinforcement, but the bombardiers of the tower G, at
the risk of killing some of their own party, discharged stone balls and
leaden bullets over the intrenchment at the fresh troops. Some
well-aimed shots threw this battalion into confusion, as the soldiers
could not see what was taking place in the interior, and were besides
exposed to projectiles thrown by defenders mounted on the salient of the
intrenchment. In fact the utmost these last comers could do was to
facilitate the retreat of their comrades, which had become a very
perilous one. The outwork was therefore recovered by the besieged--were
they able to keep it?

Messire Charles d'Amboise saw that it was not prudent to hurry on an
attack, and that in the face of a resolute garrison he must determine to
proceed methodically. As the last rays of daylight faded the besiegers
had all repassed the intrenchment conquered the day before, and were
leaving on the field more than a hundred dead, wounded, and prisoners.

They had been obliged to abandon the culverin they had seized. The
wounded were transported to the abbey and consigned to the care of the
monks, who attended to them as well as to the wounded among the
besieged. The prisoners were shut up in the castle, where they were well
treated. Some Swiss were among them.

It was painful to the Sire de Montcler to abandon the outwork after this
success; but it was evident that the besiegers would make new efforts to
seize it, since the place was accessible only on that side, and many
men must be sacrificed in retaining it. Now the garrison had suffered in
the last struggle losses at least equivalent to those of the enemy; and
these losses could not be repaired, while the troops of the king of
France would be reinforced, if necessary. The Swiss prisoners, when
questioned, had not concealed the fact that the enemy might reckon upon
a fresh body of their own countrymen, five hundred in number, before
long.

At nightfall therefore the governor assembled the captains of the
various posts and the Burgundian lords, and spoke to them as
follows:--"Gentlemen, our troops have displayed courage and intelligence
in this day's struggle; and this assures us success, with the help of
God. Though inferior to the enemy in numbers, we have defended and
recovered the outwork; it would therefore be possible to keep it. Yet we
cannot do so without directing all our means of resistance to this
point, and imposing a severe task on the garrison. We should be rapidly
exhausting our strength, while the enemy, which is much more numerous
than we, can employ fresh troops every day. It would seem wise, then, to
abandon this outwork, exposed to the batteries of the enemy, and to
retire behind the ramparts; but besides the disinclination which men of
honour must feel for retreating, after a success has been gained, and
not trying to avail themselves of the advantages they have secured,
there is the consideration that if we abandon the boulevard this defence
will be turned against us by the besieger, and will support him in
attacking our front. I have, therefore, resolved to unite this boulevard
with the extremities of the curtains by two intrenchments, which will be
flanked by the towers. This very night we must begin; and if we have not
finished the works to-morrow morning we must defend our present
intrenchment, that we may secure time to finish the new one. Be so good,
therefore, as to assemble the townspeople in their various quarters
within an hour, and let them be in readiness on the ground to work at
the said intrenchments."

[Illustration: FIG. 54]

The orders of the governor were peremptory, and about nine o'clock four
hundred workmen, and even women, issued by the north gate to raise the
earthworks marked out on the ground by the engineer (Fig. 54). This
intrenchment consisted of a small ditch with an earthwork surmounted by
stakes, rubbish from the demolition of houses in the town, fascines, and
barrels filled with earth. On the western side it started from the
boulevard at N, and joined the fosse of the curtain at L, leaving a
passage of twenty-four feet between its extremity and the ditch. On the
eastern side it reached the entrance of the boulevard O, and followed
the line O M, with a similar passage at M. At R and P two culverins were
mounted, protected by strong gabionades. On the enemy's side an
embankment, with platform and gabions, had been raised at S, and the two
bombards of the cavalier, B, were mounted on this platform. At T,
Messire Charles d'Amboise had placed a culverin, protected by a
gabionade.

The bombards of the cavalier B were replaced by three veuglaires to
crush the battery S, if the besieged, taking the offensive, endeavoured
to seize it.

On the morning of the 20th of September the works of the besieged were
almost completed, or at any rate were high enough to present an obstacle
to the assailant. The boulevard, E, had been well furnished with
fascines and gabions that very night. The bombard, remounted, swept the
point C, and the two culverins the exterior. The intrenchment, C D, was
strongly occupied by the defenders at the break of day with small cannon
and powerful catapults. The barricades on the flanks, V and X, were
strengthened. The Sire de Montcler sent two hundred men to the
boulevard, E, with orders to keep under cover as far as possible, and to
use their weapons only in case of the intrenchment being forced. The
attack commenced about six o'clock. The two bombards, S, discharged
stone balls on the salient of the intrenchment and on the boulevard; at
the same time the two pieces, I and T, directed their fire on the
epaulement, C, and the interval, S T, was occupied by arbalisters and
men who served the small cannon under cover of mantelets. From the
cavalier, A, the bombards continued to discharge balls broadcast on the
boulevard E, as on the previous days. From the platform of this cavalier
A, Messire Charles d'Amboise had observed the intrenchment which the
besieged had raised during the night; he therefore resolved to bring all
his efforts to bear on the salient and the boulevard. With this view,
about eight o'clock, he brought up two culverins at Y, which, protected
by gabions, were also made to do duty. The besieged replied only with
their small cannon and the two culverins of the epaulements, C and D,
and their arbalisters. They were husbanding their fire for the moment of
assault. At noon, the salient of the intrenchment was broken down, and
the escarpment of the boulevard was greatly damaged. The defenders were
driven from their position at Z; their culverin, C, was dismounted, and
the western epaule rendered untenable. They dispersed or took refuge
along the intrenchment from Z to D, which was less exposed. The Sire de
Montcler gave orders to return within the second intrenchment. They
brought away the culverin D, which was mounted at the extremity L; but
they were obliged to leave the piece C after having spiked it. As soon
as Charles d'Amboise saw the besieged abandon his intrenchment he ceased
firing, and, having marshalled an assaulting column furnished with
ladders, poles, and cutlasses, ordered it to cross the ruined salient
and assault the boulevard without giving the enemy breathing time. This
was the moment for which the commandant was waiting. As soon as he saw
this column begin to move and pass the intrenchment, he directed upon it
a simultaneous fire from the pieces of the two towers G and H, the two
culverins mounted on the boulevard, and all the small cannon. The
assaulting column, thus taken obliquely and in front, hesitated and
fell back; when it was greeted by a shower of crossbow bolts from the
ramparts of the boulevard. It rallied, however, behind the battery S,
which discharged a volley upon the boulevard, and, turning slightly on
its right so as at least to shelter itself from the fire of the tower H,
it passed the intrenchment once more and threw its scaling ladders on
the escarpment of the boulevard. The defenders sustained the assault
resolutely. The tower, G, then began to fire on the assailants as well
as the culverins brought up at L and P.

The besiegers suffered severe losses. On two occasions some of their
number reached the parapet, but could not hold their ground. They did
not fall back, however; and most of them heated by the fight, not
obeying or not hearing the voice of their captains, advanced along the
new intrenchment N L, hoping to force it, for it was but weak. In fact,
in a few moments this defence was passed, and the assailants then
endeavoured to take the boulevard by the gorge. The defenders posted
between C and M seeing themselves taken in rear, took refuge, some in
the boulevard and others in barbican K. A hand to hand fight began in
this triangle. In this _melee_ the garrison dared not shoot from the
curtain. The Sire de Montcler, who was in the barbican, then put himself
at the head of his men and encouraged them by saying that the enemy was
taken in a snare from which he could not escape; he sallied forth in
good order, driving the scattered assailants before him as far as the
gorge of the boulevard, which was crowded by the defenders, crying
"Burgundy! Burgundy!" (Fig. 55). The works of this boulevard were
commanded by a cool-headed captain, who was able to prevent his men from
being disturbed by the struggle going on behind them; and who
maintained his ground against the assault--now diminishing in
vigour--issued from the gorge, and rallying all the panic-stricken
soldiers who were massed together at this point, rushed on the enemy.
The French were then obliged to retreat as best they could, not without
leaving many of their men on the field. But it was evident that the
boulevard P could hold out no longer. Surrounded by the enemy's fire,
and the outer intrenchment taken, a fresh assault would place it in the
power of the enemy. Its parapets were ruined, and its three pieces
disabled. All night the besiegers occupied both sides of the
intrenchments N, L, O, M and kept up an incessant fire to hinder the
besieged from reinforcing this defence. The Sire de Montcler determined,
though with regret, and only to avoid a useless sacrifice of life, to
give the orders required for bringing back into the town such pieces of
ordnance as were still serviceable. He was obliged to abandon the
bombard, of which indeed the besiegers could make no use. Two of the
five culverins were placed on the platforms of the great towers, and the
three others on terraces raised behind the curtain, together with three
pieces taken from the reserve.

[Illustration: FIG. 55.--ASSAULT ON THE BOULEVARD.]

On the morning of the 21st of September, the besiegers found the outwork
abandoned; but in occupying it themselves they were exposed to the fire
of the two great bombards of the towers and of ten culverins, which did
not cease to fire on the boulevard and the intrenchment.

Towards evening, however, they had succeeded in opening a wide breach in
the boulevard, opposite the gorge, and inclosing the latter. They were
occupied all night in restoring its <DW72>s and parapets in front of the
town, and raising platforms and mounting three bombards on the
boulevard.

[Illustration: FIG. 56

ATTACK ON THE OLD FRONT.]

At the two epaulements of the intrenchment C, D they raised two
gabioned cavaliers, and placed a bombard and two veuglaires on each of
them.

On the 21st of September, these works having been terminated by noon in
spite of the fire of the besieged, one of the bombards of the boulevard
discharged its stone balls at the gate, the two others at the two
towers. At the same time the veuglaires of the cavaliers fired on these
towers with iron balls and the bombards with their stone balls. These
projectiles left only feeble traces on the masonry, but often threw down
the gabionades and the parapets, and dismounted the pieces (Fig.
56).[40]

This artillery fight lasted till evening; on both sides pieces had been
dismounted or were silenced; and the whole of the night was employed
both by besieger and besieged in replacing the cannon on their repaired
carriages or in bringing up new pieces.

Messire Charles d'Amboise was irritated; the affair was advancing but
slowly. He had already received pressing letters from the king; for
Louis XI. was afraid that a prolonged resistance would determine the
other parts of Burgundy which had remained faithful to the court of
France, to declare for the young duchess. He knew that emissaries of
Maximilian were going through the province and endeavouring to persuade
the authorities of the great towns that the king's army was feeble and
disheartened; seeing that, in spite of formidable artillery, twenty days
had not enabled it to make any impression on the little city of
Roche-Pont.

Although the besiegers concentrated their fire, the number of pieces
mounted by them was inferior to that of the cannon of the besieged. The
stone balls of the bombards did no great damage to the defences. Messire
Charles d'Amboise, therefore, during the night intervening between the
22nd and 23rd, raised a cavalier at A, strongly gabioned and terraced,
and armed it with three large culverins. On the morning of the 23rd of
September the corner tower, G, received the fire of five pieces loaded
with iron ball and of a bombard discharging stone balls. After two
hours' fire all the defences of the platform were knocked down and the
three pieces dismounted, the embrasures of the tower battery shattered,
and the defenders killed or wounded. Then orders were given that the
tower should be fired upon only by two pieces from the cavalier C; and
the fire of the three culverins of the cavalier A, and the three
bombards of the boulevard, concentrated their fire on the gate and its
barbican. Towards the end of the day this fine gate presented the
appearance shown in Fig. 57. In the evening the besieger's pieces that
had not been dismounted--that is to say, two culverins of the battery A,
a veuglaire of the cavalier, and one of the bombards of the
boulevard--concentrated their fire on the terrace P, of the
besieged.[41] By evening the wall was dismantled, the gabionades tumbled
down, and only one of the three culverins was available. However there
was no breach, and an assault could not be attempted.

[Illustration: FIG. 57]

The Sire de Montcler decided that he must at all risks <DW44> the
besieger's progress if he could do nothing more. He reckoned that in two
days the enemy would be able to effect a breach, either by his cannon or
by mining, and that then the _cite_ must be taken; for the garrison
could not long hold out behind the interior retrenchments. In the
cannonade of the preceding days the Sire de Montcler had lost but few
men, and his reserve force had not been drawn upon. He therefore got
them under arms about nine o'clock, summoned a troop of one hundred
well-mounted horsemen, and gave the following orders:--The hundred
horsemen, accompanied by a hundred _coutilliers_ on foot, were to sally
forth by the eastern gate against the post established at the mills,
attack the small encampment installed in the meadows below, fall back by
the road skirting the plateau on the east side, skirmish on the
outskirts of the French camp, or cut down the posts they came upon on
their way, and then return at full speed to the east gate. A second body
of a hundred foot soldiers was to be at the cross road above the mills
to protect their retreat. During these attacks, designed to attract the
enemy's attention to the left, a troop of five hundred men on foot would
issue from a masked postern giving egress below the front of the abbey
on the west, and filing off along the ramparts, vigorously attack the
cavalier C, and the battery A, spike the pieces, and do all possible
damage. It was to retire by the same way, protected by the western
ramparts.

Messire Charles d'Amboise was too experienced a warrior to fail in
pushing his advantage. He knew that success, especially in sieges,
ultimately accrues to him who leaves the enemy no repose, and does not
fall asleep when his first advantage has been gained. The north front of
the place was rendered powerless; but an energetic governor of a town
may, in a single night, accumulate many obstacles, devise a hundred
stratagems, and very greatly hinder the efficiency of an attack. Charles
d'Amboise had therefore resolved to have fascines conveyed to the ditch
by a body of a thousand men, some yards from the great tower of the
corner G, and to attempt an escalade, while the ordnance, firing on this
tower at discretion, hindered the defenders from fortifying the platform
again. He had observed the embrasure on the flank of this tower raking
the ditch, and had summoned a body of twenty men, furnished with
mattresses, and pieces of wood to mask it. As regarded the
_fausse-braie_, that was ruined, and could not present any serious
obstacle.

The Sire de Montcler had some reason to expect a night attack; but he
intended to be beforehand with it, and crush it in the bud. "Whatever
happens," he said to the troops ordered for the sorties, "act according
to your instructions: do not allow yourselves to be diverted by any
attempt at an assault; on the contrary, execute the orders given you to
the letter. We are still numerous enough to sustain an attack."

At a quarter past ten the two detachments were in the act of issuing
forth by the eastern gate and by the abbey postern. The governor then
mounted the _debris_ of the defences of the tower at the corner C, and
attentively examined the attitude of the enemy. The fires they had
lighted were no longer to be seen; but, on listening, he heard
indistinct sounds along the works of the besieger. The sky was overcast,
and drops of rain were in falling. The Sire de Montcler descended to the
lower battery; all the embrasures fronting the exterior were in ruins,
and all the pieces of ordnance covered with rubbish. The embrasure of
the flank was intact, and the small piece with which it was furnished
was in good condition. He had it loaded in his presence with nails and
old iron, and gave orders to those serving it not to fire till they saw
the enemy a few paces off; behind this piece he had a second placed
similarly loaded, so that two volleys might be discharged one after the
other. Then he went up again to the rampart walk of the curtain, and
himself drew up his men, who were armed with long bills and good daggers
and axes. He next visited the ruined gate. It presented such a pile of
rubbish that the enemy would not have been able to pass it in the night;
nevertheless in every corner he posted troops, with orders not to use
their weapons till they found themselves face to face with the enemy, to
observe absolute silence, and not to shout during the fight. This done,
he placed a reserve of two hundred men behind the interior retrenchment,
and fifty men, furnished with tarred bundles of straw, on the ridge of
this retrenchment, with orders to kindle them when they heard the cry
"Burgundy!"

About three-quarters past ten the Sire de Montcler again ascended the
platform of the corner tower, and recognised the presence of the enemy
some yards from the ditch. Notwithstanding the darkness, he could see a
black mass deploying in silence; then he heard the fascines rolling into
the fosse and the wood cracking under the men's feet. In a few minutes,
about fifty ladders were set up against the curtain, and each of them
was covered by the enemy. These ladders were provided with hooks at the
top and stays along the sides, so that the defenders could not throw
them down: two, however, fell, dragging the assailants with them.

At this moment the small pieces of ordnance on the flank of the tower
fired, and the cries of the wounded resounded from the ditch, while
three more ladders were broken and fell. The hosts of assailants surged
over on the rampart walk, and at the cry of "Burgundy!" the fires having
been kindled, the encounter with keen weapons in this narrow space
presented the strangest spectacle.

The artillery of the besieged was then directed to the flank of the
curtain and the exterior, from the platform of the corner tower; while
shouts arose from this battery, and the five hundred Burgundians who
were ordered to the sortie on the west began an attack, and the troops
that were preparing to reinforce the assault turned their backs to the
town to fall on this attacking body.

The Sire de Montcler heard shouting in the distance on the north-east
side, and saw a bright gleam through the darkness. He then went down to
bring his reserves to the curtain. The French, however, succeeded in
getting to the top of the rampart, and reached the corner tower. The few
men who were on the summit of the dismantled platform struggled bravely
until the moment when the reserve sent by the governor, ascending the
incline on which the artillery was posted, fell on the French, and drove
them back to the rampart walk of the curtain. The assailants then
forming in a column on the rampart walk, directed a vigorous attack
against the tower. From the interior retrenchment, showers of bolts,
arrows, and small-shot were discharged upon them in flank; and although
they had bucklers, the French lost a great many. As the rampart walk was
narrow, the head of the column could present only three men abreast, and
was met by a compact mass of defenders. It was not advancing; the
soldiers in the rear, who were exposed to darts in flank, were pressing
on those before them in order to force the platform and fight. In this
press many fell mutilated within the town. One of the culverineers of
the tower, aided by a dozen men, had succeeded during the struggle in
getting a culverin out of the rubbish and carrying it without its
carriage, loaded, into the midst of the group of Burgundians defending
the passage. Thrusting the mouth of the piece between their legs, he
fired it: the ball, and the stones with which the bore of the culverin
had been filled, made a frightful lane in the compact body of the
French: some leaped down into the town, others ran towards the towers of
the gateway, and several climbed the parapet to regain their ladders.
The Burgundians made another rush along the rampart, killing all who
resisted.

But at that juncture a large body of the French issued forth through the
gate of the lower battery. By aid of pickaxes and crowbars they had
succeeded, after filling up the ditch with fascines, in enlarging the
openings of two of the embrasures, already broken down by the cannon;
then, throwing into these openings lighted bundles of straw and tar
mixed with gunpowder so as to drive away the defenders, they had made
their way into the interior at the risk of being themselves suffocated
by the smoke, and rushing towards the gate, killing the few that had
remained in the battery, they had forced the doors and made an entrance
for their comrades by the same road. Issuing forth into the town they
ascended the incline at full speed.[42] The cry Of victory on the part
of the Burgundians was answered by cries of "France! d'Amboise!" These
shouts revived the courage of the French who had remained on the
rampart, and they renewed the attack. The Sire de Montcler despatched
his last reserves against the new comers, but they continued to pour out
on level ground and fought valiantly. Their number was increasing every
moment, and they succeeded in driving back the reserves to the
retrenchment. The Burgundians, cooped up on the platform of the tower,
surrendered after having lost half their men. Messire Charles d'Amboise
ordered that they should be honourably treated. The tower of the
north-west salient was in the power of the enemy, as well as the whole
of the curtain stretching from this tower to the north gate.

Day was breaking when the combat ceased, and some hours' repose were
needed on both sides. The corner tower was lost to the besieged; the
governor strongly barricaded the adjoining tower opening on to the
curtain, and placed a number of small cannon in the upper story of this
tower. He had done the same on the broken summit of the western tower of
the gate. He wished to hinder the enemy from gaining ground on the
curtains, and outflanking--particularly on his right--the retrenchment
connected with the old wall surrounding the abbey, and meeting the tower
on the north-east corner.[43]

A short time before the end of the struggle, the two bodies destined for
the sorties were on their return, the foot soldiers through the abbey
postern, and the men-at-arms, not through the east gate, but through
that near the castle on the west. The foot soldiers brought in a hundred
prisoners; the horse had lost a third of their party. The fortune of
these two bodies had been as follows:--The foot soldiers, operating on
the left, had come upon the enemy unawares, making their way through the
brushwood of the western <DW72> of the plateau as far as the gorge of the
enemy's battery, C,[44] had fallen on the guard, spiked the guns, and,
taking advantage of the confusion, had taken the attacking column in
flank, had entered the battery, A, whose pieces they had also spiked,
but, seeing themselves too far advanced, had beat a retreat, descending
the <DW72>s straight towards the west. As they were not vigorously
pursued, they had entered the lower town, surprised and captured two
bodies of guards, set fire to some huts erected by the besiegers, and
regained the town. Charles d'Amboise, at first surprised by the audacity
of the attack, but quickly perceiving that it could do him no serious
damage, had given the strictest orders that nothing should divert his
men from the assault, and had contented himself with sending against the
troops of the besieged two or three hundred men to keep them back and
compel them to seek the <DW72>s, without troubling to pursue them. The
men-at-arms had followed the governor's instructions, had fallen upon
the small encampment above the mills, and, leaving the _coutilliers_
there to complete their commission (the latter had re-entered about two
o'clock in the morning by the east gate), they had pursued the road
indicated as far as the base of the plateau, and had arrived without
hindrance at the boundary of the French camp, charging the posts in a
direct line at full speed.

This attack had thrown confusion into that part of the camp which was
occupied by the baggage, the carts, and camp servants. Stacks of forage
had caught fire amid the disorder thus occasioned. But the assailants
had soon observed three or four hundred horsemen close upon them; they
had then made straight for the north, and buried themselves in the thick
woods upon their right; they next wheeled towards the left, reached the
banks of the stream, whose left bank they followed without interruption,
but with the loss of a third of their comrades, who had strayed, or been
captured or killed. They supposed they had fallen in with a body of the
French in the lower town, and were preparing to pass it at a gallop, but
they turned out to be the Burgundian foot soldiers.

Charles d'Amboise, at the first report of this attack on the rear of the
camp, had been much disquieted, supposing that succour had arrived; but
being soon correctly informed, had sent out men-at-arms to cut off this
body of adventurers, and was only the more eager for the assault.

Messire Charles d'Amboise was accustomed (in this respect differing from
the warriors of the time) to surround himself with young captains of
intelligence and energy, who kept him constantly informed of all that
took place in the army, during the march and on the field. When the
information furnished was found to be exact, and was reported in cool
discretion and without exaggeration, Charles d'Amboise would praise
these young officers in presence of all his captains, and recompense
them liberally. If, on the contrary, the reports were false or tainted
with exaggeration, or incomplete, he would inflict severe and public
censure on the reporters, and assign them some subaltern and humiliating
duty, such as guarding the baggage or superintending the camp servants.

When Charles d'Amboise learned next morning the damage caused on the
border of the camp by a few Burgundian men-at-arms, the loss of his men
encamped at the mill and in the lower town, and the spiking of six of
his pieces of ordnance, he was much annoyed, but could not refrain from
saying to his captains: "We have to do with brave men, who defend
themselves valiantly. I beg you, gentlemen, to take care that their
wounded and prisoners be treated with all the respect due to soldiers
who do their duty." Then about the second hour of the day he sent a
herald to the retrenchment of the besieged, to ask a parley with the
governor. The Sire de Montcler having ascended the terrace, the herald
spoke as follows: "Sir Governor! Monseigneur Charles d'Amboise,
commanding the army of our lord the king of France, sends me to you to
require of you to render up the town and castle of Roche-Pont, which you
are withholding contrary to the treaties and defending against their
lawful lord. Henceforward the said _cite_ is in the power of the army of
our lord the king of France, and a longer resistance will only cause the
useless loss of a great number of brave men. In consideration of your
brave and noble defence, Monseigneur Charles d'Amboise will let you go
forth--you and your men--with your lives and property. May God have you
in his keeping and guide you to a wise decision." "Sir messenger,"
replied the governor, "Messire Charles d'Amboise is a captain too well
acquainted with war to think himself master of the town and castle of
Roche-Pont because he has got possession of a tower and a curtain. He
knows what it has cost him to advance even so far; and there is still a
considerable space between this retrenchment and the castle, and the
castle is good and defensible. I acknowledge no other lawful lords of
Burgundy, and of this city in particular, than the Duchess of Burgundy,
daughter of the noble and puissant Duke Charles, and her illustrious
husband Maximilian. I am here to defend their property against all
comers, and I will defend it as long as I have a sword in my hand.
Nevertheless, tell Messire Charles d'Amboise that if he is willing to
exchange prisoners, man for man, I am prepared to do so. If he prefers
to leave things as they are, I give him my word of honour that his
people are being well treated."

"Well, then," said Charles d'Amboise, when the herald had conveyed this
answer to him, "this _cite_ will be damaged for a long time to come!"

During the 24th of September, the rain did not cease to fall in
torrents. Besiegers and besieged were at a hundred paces from each
other. They were employed in burying the dead, whose numbers were
especially great on the side of the French, and both were preparing for
a fresh struggle, though the bad weather greatly impeded the workers.
Figure 58 shows the position of the besieged and the besiegers.[45]

[Illustration: FIG. 58

TAKING OF AN ARTILLERY TOWER.]

After the losses sustained since the commencement of the siege, the
garrison scarcely reckoned more than two thousand available men, for
typhus was already devastating the town; three-fourths of the wounded
crowded together in the abbey were attacked by it. The good monks tended
them with their utmost care, but they themselves were largely sacrificed
to the contagion; and of a community of a hundred and fifty in number
scarcely more than fifty survived. The progress of the besieger,
however, seemed only to increase the determination of the inhabitants,
and the women worked heartily at the defences. They were the first to
cry shame on those of the defenders who manifested despondency.

During the night between the 24th and 25th, the Sire de Montcler
strengthened the retrenchment. From A to B[46] he took advantage of the
ancient enclosure-wall of the abbot's pleasance, then occupied by
dwellings. A culverin was mounted on a terrace at B. The retrenchment
leading from C to D, which had been made of earth and the _debris_ of
the houses demolished at this point, was armed with three culverins at
C, at E, and D.

The French on their side had cleared the platform of the conquered
tower, G, had well gabioned the parapet, and mounted three pieces
pointed at the retrenchment, and a spirole directed against the tower,
K, which remained in the power of the Burgundians.

The women, children, and old men were employed in strengthening also the
second retrenchment, I, M, behind the abbey wall, and the junction, M,
N. This second retrenchment was armed with three pieces. Places of
egress were reserved at the extremities and through the gate, O, of the
abbey.

The rain continued during the 25th of September, which passed without
any serious engagement. The combatants were trying one another's
strength. The garrison was not numerous enough to allow of their
leaving a post at the _tete du pont_. This work was abandoned on the
night between the 25th and 26th, and the enemy entered it without
striking a blow.

But as they were fired on by the bombard of boulevard I,[47] they did
not advance along the ascent, but took shelter behind the cavalier of
the left bank. The Sire de Montcler conjectured, however, that the
French were preparing a real or feigned attack on this side.

During the night, thirty-six feet of the northern curtain, near the
tower, G, fell into the ditch, reaching from _a_ to _b_; the miners had
been working for two days to accomplish this. On the morning of the 26th
of September, the besiegers opened fire against the retrenchment. The
dominant position of the tower, G, gave them a great advantage; and
though the garrison did their best to reply, the culverins, C and D,
were dismounted and the gabions thrown down about noon, when orders were
given for the assault. A strong column of infantry advanced through the
breach, _a b_, cutlasses in hand, and in fine order. But from the
platform of the tower, F, which had remained in the power of the
Burgundians, two culverins fired simultaneously on this column. Messire
Charles d'Amboise supposed that the pieces in this tower had been
silenced, and so they had been. But during the night, the Sire de
Montcler had hoisted up three of the small pieces of the lower battery
through the vault holes, and had masked them under the rubbish of the
parapets. This discharge produced disorder in the column of the
assailants. Fortunately for them, the pieces of the outer boulevard, in
the power of the French, began to fire in their turn on the platform of
the tower, P, and soon silenced the Burgundian spiroles.

The assault was vigorous, well directed and well sustained, while from
without the French did not cease firing on the gate and tower F, so that
those of the garrison who had remained in the upper works of the gate
had to abandon them and escape by the curtain and tower F.

Messire Charles d'Amboise, standing on the breach, _a b_, was
continually sending reinforcements to the assailants, and when he saw
his people too fatigued he would replace them by fresh troops. The
Burgundians had not enough men to do the like, so that about four
o'clock they were exhausted, and some were beginning to file off along
the ramparts. At length a vigorous effort forced the centre of the
retrenchment, and the French pushed forward through the street running
along the old wall of the abbey. The Sire de Montcler, however,
retreated in good order in three columns, two along the ramparts, and
the third by the road in the middle. When he saw his men sheltered
behind the second retrenchment, he discharged the _pierrier_ placed at
M, and the culverin mounted at I, so that the assailants fell back in
disorder. Then, followed by some brave men--his last reserve--he fell on
the French coming along by the abbey and the western rampart. From the
top of this rampart the assailants were also exposed to a shower of
darts. Night was advancing: the brave men who had kept close to the
governor were urging forward, attempting to recapture the first
retrenchment. Many of the Burgundians who had retired behind the second
retrenchment, seeing the enemy fall back, began to issue forth in their
turn, filled with fresh ardour.

Messire Charles d'Amboise, however, was able to keep his troops at the
first retrenchment, and had some small pieces brought up which fired on
the groups of Burgundians who were still distinguishable in the
torchlight.

The combat lasted thus for two hours more, in the midst of confusion,
and the Sire de Montcler was obliged to sound the retreat several times
to rally his troops.

In this engagement he had lost nearly five hundred men taken, killed, or
wounded. About ten o'clock at night there was silence on both sides; the
Sire de Montcler, retreating to the second retrenchment, sent back all
his men who had remained on the ramparts beyond this retrenchment, and
prepared to defend this last line vigorously--the castle being his only
refuge should that be taken. But on reviewing his troops, he observed
the absence of a body of five hundred Germans, whom he had posted in the
abbey to protect the retreat of the defenders of the first retrenchment.

These Germans, seeing the unfavourable position of affairs, and taking
advantage of the general confusion during the last struggle, had gone
away through the abbey postern.

The governor had only a thousand men remaining. He endeavoured to
persuade his men that the Germans were shut up in the castle by his
orders; but few were deceived by this, for it was evident to all that
after the taking of the corner tower the Germans scarcely cared to fight
for a cause which had no great interest for them, and which they
regarded as lost.

The fate of these runaways was, by the way, miserable enough. To support
themselves they took to plundering in the outskirts, were surprised by a
corps of French gendarmerie employed as scouts round the camp, and put
to the sword or hanged as thieves. The few who succeeded in escaping
perished under the blows of the peasants in arms against marauders.

It seemed hard to the Sire de Montcler to abandon his second
retrenchment without awaiting an attack; so as he had scarcely any need
to economise the provisions in the town, he had a double ration
distributed to his men, and encouraged them by cheering words,
preserving his animation in mien and gesture when among them. He told
them that succour would soon arrive, and that if they resisted a few
days longer Charles d'Amboise would be obliged to raise the siege.

Having examined the retrenchment, and posted men in the houses behind
and in the northern building of the abbey, the Sire de Montcler was
preparing to take some repose, when he was informed that along the
<DW72>s, above the bridge, the sentinels posted on the boulevards thought
they perceived some movement on the part of the enemy. He went
immediately towards that quarter, and saw in effect a black mass that
appeared to be advancing up the <DW72> like the rising tide, opposite to
the boulevard, B.[48]

To summon the garrison of the castle and to draw them up in this
boulevard--they were only two hundred in number--required only a few
minutes. The escarpment of this boulevard, whose platform was on the
level of the castle ditch, rose but slightly above the acclivities
(about twelve feet). Before the assailant had placed his ladders, the
governor fired on that moving mass, which the darkness of the night did
not completely hide from view. The balls from the culverin and the
bombards made furrows among them; shouts were heard, and the assailants,
separating into two columns, set up their ladders on the two flanks of
the boulevard.

Nearly at the same instant the second retrenchment was vigorously
assaulted, and to facilitate this night attack, the assailants set fire
to the houses between the first and second retrenchment. Thus, having
the fire at their back, they could clearly see the defenders, while the
latter were blinded by this mass of flame, whence the French seemed to
issue like black shades. The Sire de Montcler was hastening on horseback
from one point of attack to another, cheering on his men, and exposing
himself to the projectiles; and both the attacks were well sustained.
From the abbey building the arbalisters and bearers of small cannon
inflicted very serious loss on the assailants, who, despairing of
forcing the retrenchment at this point, were moving towards the
junction, M N.

It was evident to the brave governor that the place was lost, and that
nothing was left for him to do but to rally the remains of the garrison
in the castle, if he could reach it. But he was determined that this
retreat should cost the enemy dear. He therefore sent a reserve which he
was keeping in the abbey to reinforce the defenders of the boulevard,
B.[49] This reserve consisted of a hundred men at most; but they were
brave fellows; their orders were to defend the boulevard at all cost,
and if they were outflanked to return into the castle as soon as
possible, to raise the bridge, and not let it down again till they saw
him return with the remains of the garrison through the enemy, through
whom he would force a passage.

Then he took up his position resolutely at the head of the _debris_,
which still defended the retrenchment, and, availing himself of the
houses and the abbey walls, he gave way only step by step, obliging the
enemy to besiege every house and every enclosure, and taking advantage
of the lanes and passages to resume the offensive, and inflict losses on
the French. Exasperated by this, the latter set fire to the houses which
they could not break open. The abbey resisted for more than two hours
after the besieger had taken the retrenchment. The defenders, seeing
their retreat cut off, fought with desperation; for the postern was
occupied outside by a large body of men. The church and the principal
buildings were in flames.

The Sire de Montcler maintained the struggle in the streets and houses
of the town till daybreak, and then debouched with four or five hundred
men who remained to him in the open space before the castle. He found it
almost entirely occupied by the enemy, whom some brave men were still
resisting.

He rallied this greatly diminished body, and entered the castle, whose
bridge was immediately raised. The town was taken, but much damaged, as
Messire Charles d'Amboise had predicted. He gave the strictest orders to
stay the flames and stop pillage, and to save the lives of the unarmed
inhabitants. But there were many victims. The wounded and sick shut up
in the abbey had perished in the flames; women, old men, and children,
were lying on the pavement and in the houses. The 27th and 28th of
September were spent by the French in re-establishing order among the
troops after the combat of the night, in removing the wounded and
burying the dead. Messire Charles d'Amboise, during the two preceding
days, had lost a thousand men; he was anxious to end the struggle.
During the night of the 28th, therefore, he had twelve pieces of
ordnance brought up in front of the castle, provided them with
gabionades, and once more sent a herald to summon the garrison to
surrender.

The reply was that the garrison would not surrender till it saw itself
incapacitated from continuing the struggle.

On the morning of the 29th the twelve pieces began to open fire against
the defences of the gate. The besieged could only answer the attack with
small pieces mounted on the summit of the towers. But in the evening all
these summits were dismantled, the roofs pierced, and the
machicolations destroyed.

Moreover, in the course of the 30th of September and 1st of October,
four large bombards were mounted in front of the outer tower of the
gate. In the evening this tower was falling in ruins into the ditch.

Messire Charles d'Amboise, before commencing the assault, again proposed
to the governor to capitulate. The latter then appeared on the ruins,
and declared that he would surrender the castle on condition of being
allowed to quit it with his troops, their lives and baggage being
spared, and with colours flying, and to go wherever they chose.

Charles d'Amboise on his side, then came forward on the breach, and gave
his word of honour that these conditions should be granted. The two
captains then approached and held out their hands to each other.

The city and castle of Roche-Pont were again subjected to King Louis XI.
The Sire de Montcler had but five hundred fighting men left; and even of
these there were a full third wounded. Messire Charles d'Amboise gave
them a safe-conduct, ordered that they should be supplied with
provisions, and entertained the Sire de Montcler and his captains at his
table. Two days afterwards they took their departure for Flanders with
the foreign troops that were still with them.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 38: See Fig. 48.]

[Footnote 39: See the topographical map, Fig. 1.]

[Footnote 40: In this figure the parts  red indicate the works
occupied by the besieger and the direction of his fire.]

[Footnote 41: See Fig. 56.]

[Footnote 42: See Fig. 50.]

[Footnote 43: See Fig. 48.]

[Footnote 44: See Fig. 56.]

[Footnote 45: The black lines show the part of the defence still
occupied by the besieged, the red lines the parts gained by the
besiegers.]

[Footnote 46: Fig. 58.]

[Footnote 47: See Fig. 48.]

[Footnote 48: See Fig. 48.]

[Footnote 49: See Fig. 58.]




CHAPTER XIII.

_THE CITE OF LA ROCHE-PONT IS FORTIFIED BY ERRARD DE BAR-LE-DUC,
ENGINEER TO THE MOST CHRISTIAN KING OF FRANCE AND OF NAVARRE._


In 1606, Henry IV. had succeeded in subjugating the religious and feudal
factions that had imperilled France for more than thirty years. He
cherished great designs which his skilful policy, his patriotic soul,
his military talents and the advantageous alliances he was able to form,
promised to render successful. But Henry IV. left nothing to chance, and
would not embark in any enterprise after his accession to the throne,
till he had made every preparation to insure its success.

When he saw the moment arriving at which he could effectually intervene
in the affairs of Germany--a part of which had its eyes directed to
France, and was only waiting for a signal from the Louvre to escape from
the incessant rivalries of the princes and from religious
contentions--he took measures not only to facilitate a successful
intervention abroad, but to strengthen his frontiers and establish
depots and centres for provisioning his troops. Assured of the good-will
of the Swiss and tranquil as regarded Italy--thanks to the alliances he
had formed in that Peninsula--and wishing to act at once in the east,
and on the Pyrenean side, he turned his attention to the defences of
Roussillon and of the line which unites Burgundy with Champagne.

Henry IV. had been engaged in partisan warfare; but then he had only his
own life at stake. As a sovereign he thought it his duty not to run
risks; and before launching into the great enterprises he had in view,
and which might change the face of Europe, he wished to put fortune on
his side as far as possible. For more than six years, in concert with
Sully, he had lost not a day or an hour in preparing for France, which
had been a prey to civil war and invasion at the end of the sixteenth
century, a future of the noblest order, and which might have secured to
it the most honourable destiny, if the hand of an assassin had not in a
single day destroyed hopes founded in a wise policy and the most
thoughtful foresight.

This prince knew by experience that in war a check is always possible,
even when fortune is, or seems to be, entirely on our side, and that the
talent of a general consists in his ability to discover new resources
after a reverse. Success in arms is secure in proportion to the
foresight exercised in preventing a first reverse from becoming a
disaster. Henry IV. therefore set about preparing a good line of retreat
and supply in the rear of the army, which he was intending to lead in
person towards the east. He put in a state of defence the towns and
important strategic points from Chalons-sur-Saone, passing through
Beaune, Dijon, Langres, along the course of the Haute-Marne, and from
Langres to Chaumont, Saint-Dizier, Chalons, Reims, Laon, Peronne, and
Amiens. Verdun and Metz had been visited by him, with a view to
examining their defences. At Metz he had ordered works of considerable
importance. The town of La Roche-Pont was comprised in that portion of
this line of defence which lay between Dijon and Langres. The engineer
Errard de Bar-le-Duc had been entrusted with these operations, beginning
with Chalons-sur-Saone. He had, we may observe, merited the confidence
reposed in him by the king, for he had given proofs of considerable
ability and ingenuity.

Errard de Bar-le-Duc made use of the ancient walls, considering them
suitable for defence at close quarters; but he constructed works outside
which would command the country, and force the besieger to commence his
operations at a distance of one thousand or one thousand two hundred
yards. The system of boulevards was still maintained, but these, instead
of presenting only an isolated obstacle, defended each other by crossing
their fire, and were, in fact, true bastions.

[Illustration: FIG. 59.--THE BASTIONS OF ERRARD DE BAR-LE-DUC.]

The three great round towers on the north of the _cite_ of La Roche-Pont
were then much dilapidated. Errard had them terraced, and then
surrounded them with earthworks with walled escarpments. Towards the
plateau fronting the north he had a great tenaille constructed with a
double ditch and ravelin. Fig. 59 gives the plan of the _cite_ after the
operations planned by Errard. Besides the works just mentioned,
indicated at A, B, C and D, the king's engineer raised the bastions, E,
F, G, H, and I, which crossed their fires, and whose orillons masked
small pieces designed to flank the old ramparts.

Most of the old towers were lowered and terraced to receive cannon. The
ancient castle, of which little more than the donjon and some
outbuildings remained, was surrounded by a bastioned enclosure, with a
tenaille on the town side.

The lower town, towards the west, though reduced to narrow dimensions,
continued nearly in the condition already described. As to the upper
town, after the conflagration of the last siege, it had been rebuilt in
a very indifferent style. Under Francis I., the abbey had been
secularised, and its ancient church was served by a Chapter. The old
stone bridge near the outflow of the rivulet still existed, and at O was
a second wooden bridge connecting the two shores. The bridge, P, had
fallen into ruins and had not been rebuilt.

[Illustration: FIG. 60.]

From the bastion, B, to the river, and from the bastion, D, to the pool,
Errard built two fronts, K and L, _a cremailleres_,[50] to command the
<DW72>s of the plateau on the right and left, and to hinder an assailant
from occupying a position on the east and west flanks of the _cite_.

For the time, these works appeared strong, and the axiom in
fortifications, "What offers itself as a defence ought to be defended,"
was already pretty generally adhered to. Fig. 60 gives the northern work
which was destined to sweep the plateau, and to render difficult the
approach to the cite on this its very accessible side. This work
consisted of a ravelin, A, whose height above the level of the plateau
was not more than six feet; next of a first tenaille, B, with orillons,
eighteen feet above the plateau, and a second tenaille, C, three feet
above the level of the tenaille, B. Two bastions, D and F, enveloped the
two great towers, G and H, which were terraced. The platforms of the
latter rose three feet above the platforms of the bastions. The gate, I,
of the fourteenth century, had been preserved and repaired, and the
curtains, K, terraced to receive cannon.

[Illustration: FIG. 61.]

The road passed over the right face of the ravelin, and thence at right
angles to the centre of the tenailles. A wide fosse, E, protected the
exterior works, and a second fosse, L, the curtain of the second
tenaille.

Fig. 61 gives a sketch in perspective of the bastion, F.[51] No use,
however, was made of these defences till about thirty years after their
construction.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 50: In plan not straight, but broken by a series of returns
each in advance of the other.]

[Footnote 51: Of the general plan, Fig. 59.]




CHAPTER XIV.

_THE SIXTH SIEGE._


About the beginning of July, 1636, France, governed by the Cardinal de
Richelieu, saw its northern frontier invaded by the too celebrated Jean
de Weert, with an army of Hispano-Belgians, to which the empire had
added a numerous body of cavalry, composed of Poles, Hungarians, and
Croats. These allied troops advanced into Picardy, and Paris was, for
the moment, anticipating a siege; but the enemy were delayed by the
siege of Corbie, and, having taken this town, in which they left a
garrison, they retired for fear of being taken in rear by the Dutch.

The French army soon came in its turn to besiege and retake Corbie. At
the same time, an attack on Burgundy had been concerted by the Imperial
troops, while the army of Conde was besieging Dole, which was holding
out for the Spaniards. But the Imperialist army having had to wait long
for the necessary reinforcements, did not start at the same time as that
of the Hispano-Belgians, and did not cross the frontier till the 22nd of
October; which gave time for the French troops employed at the siege of
Corbie to pass into Burgundy, to assemble the troops of the province,
and to receive the reinforcements sent to the Prince de Conde by the
Duke of Weimar and the Cardinal de la Valette. Being unable to raise the
siege of Dole, the Imperialists directed their course to the Saone,
which they passed, and sent a body to seize the little _cite_ of La
Roche-Pont, the capture of which would give them a centre for attacking
Dijon or Langres, and enable them to isolate the Prince de Conde. The
town of La Roche-Pont was but scantily furnished with artillery, and had
a garrison of only a thousand men, when the Imperialist forces presented
themselves before it on the 2nd of November. They numbered six thousand
men, and brought with them thirty pieces of ordnance, of which twelve
were of large calibre. They were commanded by Galas, and were expecting
to take the place in a few days, for the captains knew by their scouts
that the garrison was weak, scantily provisioned and unprepared for an
attack.

However, Count Rantzau had been sent by the French generals to
re-victual Saint-Jean-de-Losne and La Roche-Pont, and to place an
experienced captain in the latter. The count arrived before La
Roche-Pont two days previous to the Germans; he left a thousand men
there, with Rincourt as governor--ordnance munitions and a convoy of
provisions; but having only two or three thousand men left him, he
thought himself not in a condition to attack the Imperialist army, and
therefore marched to Saint-Jean-de-Losne, which he entered on the 2nd of
November, in the teeth of the Germans, who were already beginning to
invest the town. Immediately on his arrival before La Roche-Pont, Galas
summoned the place, offering the garrison the most favourable
conditions, and the inhabitants respect for their persons and property.
The envoy of the Imperialist general was sent back as he had come, and
attack and defence were respectively prepared for.

Rincourt's nature was one of those which are apparently nonchalant and
cold, fond of repose, and never appearing discomposed; he was of middle
height, with a little embonpoint. His pale face, blonde hair, and dull
blue eyes, would be deemed no indication of a soul of firm temper, but
rather of one quite destitute of elasticity--an _esprit blase_, or at
least an impassive disposition. Rincourt had however given proof of his
ability on many occasions, and Count de Rantzau, who knew him well,
esteemed him highly. On leaving him in the place, he had given him these
simple instructions--"Hold out here to the last man: for the rest act as
you judge best." To Galas's messenger, Rincourt had replied: "My
instructions are to defend the place, and I shall defend it."

Rincourt, while making the arrangements necessary for the defence, and
enquiring into the stores of provisions, was aware that if he allowed
himself to be shut up at once in the town, the enemy would have made a
breach in less than a week, and the taking of La Roche-Pont would be at
most an affair of fifteen or twenty days. The stock of provisions
scarcely admitted of so long a resistance; and at this time of the year
it was difficult to add to them, even if the place were not closely
invested. The governor resolved, therefore, to take the initiative and
to hinder the enemy's approach-works to such an extent, that however
favourable the weather might be, the enemy would have difficulty in
maintaining his position.

He sent for the mayor and notables of the town, and asked them what they
intended to do, and whether the inhabitants would remain at home with
their hands folded, while the king's men were fighting to defend the
town. They assured him that, on the contrary, the inhabitants were
disposed to defend themselves, and that even the women would mount the
ramparts if necessary; that all of them knew how the enemy had behaved
in Picardy, and thought that the worst course was to trust to their
promises, and that if they must die, it was better to die fighting. "If
it be so," replied the governor, "and if your acts respond to your
words, you may be assured that the Germans will not enter this place;
but, you must be doing. Have you any artillerymen among the
inhabitants?" "We have some; all our young men are hardy and robust, and
many know how to make use of musket and pike." "Well, assemble them
to-night, and let all the volunteers, armed or unarmed, be with you
to-morrow morning, in the open space before the castle. Whatever you
hear this evening, do not let your attention be diverted from this
object, and do not be alarmed."

When night arrived (and it comes early on the 2nd of November), Rincourt
prepared for the transport of two small pieces of cannon, and ordered two
hundred men to mount their horses--for he had some cavalry--accompanied
by four hundred foot soldiers; took care that the artillerymen should be
at their guns in the works of the tenaille, leaving their captains
precise instructions; summoned four hundred men to appear at three
o'clock in the morning; and about ten o'clock sallied forth with his
six hundred men and two guns through the gate of the outwork.

The night was foggy and perfectly dark. The governor had taken the
precaution to envelope the wheels of his two guns with pieces of cloth
and canvas, and to have the crowbars, powder spoons, and rammers,
carried by the servers, to avoid noise. On issuing from the ravelin, he
directed the two cannons obliquely right and left, so as to keep them
within musket shot from the centre column; the cavalry was escorting
them. He himself, with his three or four hundred foot soldiers, marched
straight for the enemy's outposts. About a thousand yards from the
outwork he met them, making soup in front of their fires. Falling
suddenly on the sentinels and neighbouring posts, he threw himself into
the very heart of the enemy dispersed among the orchards, and killing
all who resisted, drove them before him.

In conformity with the instructions they had received, the artillerymen
then brought their pieces into position, and fired right and left
towards the two extremities of the encampment. The Imperialists believed
themselves attacked along the whole extent of their front, and took some
time to concert their defence.

As soon as Rincourt saw the enemy drawn up in considerable numbers
before him, he hastily drew off the right and left of his small band
towards the two guns and the cavalry. The Germans then advanced in a
compact, but not very orderly body, looking for the assailant, and not
knowing whether they should go towards the east or west of the plateau
in pursuit of him. Then, after a renewed discharge of the pieces, the
two small French corps, cavalry and infantry, rushed upon the flanks of
the column, killed or took about a hundred men, and fell back with all
speed to the outwork, protected by volleys discharged with as good aim
as circumstances allowed from the bastions of the tenaille.

This affray terminated at midnight, without loss. Rincourt sent his men
to rest, and at three o'clock in the morning sallied forth once more
with the four hundred foot soldiers, summoned for that hour; this time
without cannon or cavalry. He went along the western edge of the
plateau, and when he saw himself within musket shot of the advanced
posts, drawing out his musketeers in a long line, he commanded a general
discharge; then moving off obliquely, he executed the same movements a
few seconds afterwards, on the eastern side, after which he retired.

The enemy were completely puzzled by these attacks. They had passed the
whole of the night on the look-out, and in the morning determined to
establish their first lines about a mile from the tenaille, placing
advanced posts behind intrenchments hastily thrown up. They then opened
the trench about half a mile distant.

Throughout the day the heavy guns mounted on the platforms of the
tenaille kept up a fire on these advanced posts, killed some men and
overthrew the intrenchments. During the night of the 3rd of November,
Rincourt, who had observed that a considerable body of the enemy was
advancing up the river, perhaps with the view of passing the night
there, and attacking the front K[52] in the rear with cannon, sent out
two hundred of his infantry, under efficient command, through the
ravelin of the outwork, and made a sortie with three hundred men through
the gate of the front, K. He attacked the posts along the river, while
the first troop was skirmishing with the advanced posts established
along the western <DW72>s of the plateau. When the first troop saw itself
too much pressed, it rapidly descended the western <DW72> to rally
Rincourt's force, who on his side was retreating after having thrown the
enemy into confusion.

The besiegers, however, being on their guard, went in pursuit of the
five hundred men from the town with vigour, and in increasing numbers.
But this had been foreseen by the governor; and a second body of four
hundred men, which during the action issued in its turn from the
ravelin, descended the western <DW72>s at full speed, and fell upon the
flank of the Imperialists.

On this the five hundred men commanded by Rincourt faced about. There,
also, two or three hundred Germans were killed, wounded, or threw
themselves into the water. The losses of the French were insignificant.

While these continual alarms in some degree fatigued and disconcerted
the besiegers, who did not suppose they had before them a garrison
numerous enough to dare to act on the offensive, they restored
confidence to the besieged, and gave them a high idea of the military
talents of the governor.

Rincourt continued to preserve his cool aspect and nonchalant demeanour,
though he was constantly on the alert, and gave his orders with
precision. Seeing the turn things were taking the _dizainiers_ of the
town assured the governor of their entire devotion, and of the good-will
of the volunteers, who deemed themselves capable of guarding the
ramparts unaided; he might therefore commence operations outside in full
confidence, and "amuse" the enemy. This was exactly what Rincourt
wanted.

The Imperialists in the meantime continued to advance with their trench.
On the evening of the 5th of November it was fifteen hundred feet from
the salient, and in the rear there was a pretty good _place d'armes_,
surrounded by an epaulement with cannon at the angles and abatis of
trees, at the foot of the bank. Every night the governor found means to
disquiet the enemy, often at intervals of two or three hours, so as to
keep him incessantly in alarm.

Galas, in the meanwhile, had sent two pieces of ordnance to the right
bank of the stream out of sight of the besieged, and on the 7th of
November he mounted them on this bank so as to attack the front _a
cremaillere_, K,[53] in the rear. The wooden bridge had been burned by
the besieged, and the stone bridge barricaded and furnished with a
cavalier on the left bank, which swept the right bank. Behind the houses
of the western faubourg, Rincourt established a battery armed with three
cannons, which had been taken from the arsenal during the night. On the
morning of the 8th of November the houses which masked the three pieces
having been thrown down, these guns opened their fire against the
besieger's battery, which was soon silenced.

[Illustration: FIG. 62.]

That same day the trench was nine hundred feet from the outwork, and a
second _place d'armes_ was commenced at this point (Fig. 62). The
governor resolved to overthrow the enemy's works. At two o'clock in the
morning he first sent out a troop of five hundred men to attack the
_place d'armes_ on the west, while a second troop of two hundred men was
to attack it on the east, and himself going out with four hundred men to
continue the offensive, if the former had a chance of succeeding, or to
protect its retreat. His men were armed with pikes, cutlasses, grenades,
and pistols.

The besieger had at this point from twelve to fifteen hundred men to
protect the workmen. The first troop of the garrison advanced resolutely
against the flank, throwing grenades into the trenches, and destroying
the gabions and fascines. They were soon attacked by all the Germans
posted at this point; but knowing that they were going to be immediately
reinforced, they maintained their position in the middle of the _place
d'armes_, making use of every obstacle to intrench themselves. This
struggle was visible only through some bivouac fires at a considerable
distance, and the explosions of the grenades. The townspeople, that they
might recognise each other, had put shirts over their buff coats, or
their _pourpoints_. The second troop soon arrived from the east, and a
part of the besiegers was thus attacked on both sides. The latter
retired, and rallying about a hundred paces behind the _place d'armes_,
attacked in their turn the people of the town on the two flanks; the
struggle recommenced with violence, the French not being willing to
abandon the place. They would, however, have been ultimately overwhelmed
by numbers, if Rincourt had not come up in the midst of the _melee_ with
his reserve of four hundred men (Fig. 63). He fell upon one of the
flanks of the numerous troop of the Germans without uttering a sound.
These then fell into confusion, and commenced a speedy retreat. Soon, in
spite of the officers, the route was complete, and the fugitives went
off and alarmed the neighbouring posts, and even the camp, asserting
that they had been surprised by a large body that had come to succour
the besieged.

[Illustration: FIG. 63.--NIGHT SORTIE--THE ATTACK ON ONE OF THE
BESIEGERS' PLACE D'ARMES.]

Galas was not certain whether this was a concerted sortie or whether
succour had reached the besieged between his lines and the place.
Collecting all the troops at his disposal, and ordering two or three
hundred men to mount their horses, he betook himself to the abandoned
works. Rincourt had not waited for him; but having damaged the trench
for the length of a hundred paces, scattered the gabions, set fire to
heaps of fascines, spiked two guns, which the enemy had abandoned,
broken open some casks of munitions, and taken away the tools of the
pioneers, retreated with his men. This sortie had cost him about fifty
men; he brought back his wounded.

When Galas came up none but the dead of both parties and some wounded
remained in the works. In his anger, he broke his cane on the back of
the first soldiers he met with, calling them cowards and traitors, and
threatening to decimate the whole troop entrusted with the guard of the
trench. The mischief could not be repaired in the few hours of night
that were left. They were quite bewildered in the midst of these
scattered gabions and trenches filled up at some points; and when day
appeared the besieged discharged three or four volleys from the tenaille
in the midst of this confused host, which then retreated to the first
_place d'armes_.

To increase his embarrassment, about ten o'clock in the morning, a
message sent from Saint-Jean-de-Losne informed the Imperialist general
that this insignificant town was holding out, that the continual sorties
of the garrison were fatiguing the troops, that the siege would be
longer than was supposed at first, and that, in fact, his presence would
be necessary to direct the attack and make head against the Count de
Rantzau, who was occupying the town.

The possession of Saint-Jean-de-Losne, which he supposed was already in
the hands of his troops, was still more important to the Imperialists
than that of La Roche-Pont. For Saint-Jean-de-Losne secured to the
Germans the passage of the Saone; but if this town held out they might
be cut off by the Prince de Conde, who, on raising the siege of Dole, or
taking that place, would fall upon the rear of the Imperial army.

Galas was therefore much embarrassed. To raise the siege of La
Roche-Pont, and to march with all his forces against the Prince de
Conde, was perhaps the wisest part to take, but this would have
interfered with the plan of the campaign on which the Imperialists
founded the most brilliant hopes; it would have been to abandon that
conquest of Burgundy which a few days before Germany had regarded as
certain; it would have been a manifest check at the very commencement of
the campaign.

Galas therefore adopted a middle course, which in war is always the
least desirable; he resolved to leave before La Roche-Pont sufficient
troops to invest it closely, knowing that the place had not provisions
sufficient to last long, and to finish the siege of Saint-Jean-de-Losne.
This place fallen, he might resume his original plan.

On the evening of the 9th of November, after having appointed a
commander for the troops remaining before La Roche-Pont, and leaving his
instructions, he quitted the camp to go and rejoin the army before
Saint-Jean-de-Losne.

These instructions were in substance as follows--the establishment of a
line of investment around the place and the continuance of the attack on
the northern salient, under good protection and taking the time
necessary for the works. He had also a plan made out for a battery of
bomb mortars. He had sent for four of these engines to bombard the
town.[54] Galas's lieutenant was of Italian origin, and was named
Forcia: he was an impetuous man, serviceable for a bold stroke, a great
talker, a fairly skilful engineer, but wanting in persistency and
perseverance, and continually changing his plans. By dint of flattery
and the admiration he manifested on all occasions for the military
talents of Galas, Forcia had succeeded in persuading him that no one was
better fitted than himself to act for the general, to enter into his
designs, and put his plans in execution. Forcia, we say, had appeared to
appreciate the wisdom of Galas's designs, and had promised to follow his
instructions implicitly and to the letter. But where is the flatterer,
however astute, who does not leave in the mind of the person
flattered--however wanting in judgment--a feeling of mistrust.
Accordingly Galas in quitting the camp of La Roche-Pont, had instructed
a young lieutenant who acted as his secretary, and whom he left with
Forcia, to take note of all that transpired and to keep him informed of
the minutest details by frequent messages.

Rincourt allowed his troops the night of the 9th for repose, as half the
garrison had been engaged the night before. On the morning of the 10th
one of the spies whom he was careful to employ in the country, and even
in the camp of the enemy, came to inform him that Galas had departed the
evening before with an inconsiderable escort, and that the Imperialist
troops were placed under the command of one of his lieutenants. This
news set the governor gravely thinking; he knew that Saint-Jean-de-Losne
was still holding out, and he gained a glimpse of the real state of
affairs. Devoted to the Count de Rantzau, he felt it his duty more than
ever to give the enemy so much to do as to render it impossible for him
to think of reducing the number of troops assembled around La
Roche-Pont, to reinforce those engaged in the siege of
Saint-Jean-de-Losne.

The garrison was full of confidence and determination; and the militia
of the town asked to share in the sorties. This militia consisted of a
body of about twelve hundred men, which Rincourt had divided into
companies of one hundred men each, commanded by ten subalterns and a
captain. He had divided these companies into two battalions of six
hundred men each. The first was composed of the robuster men who had had
some experience in arms; the second was composed of the householders,
men of mature age inexperienced in war. These latter were especially
employed as guards of the ramparts, as a daily and nightly patrol, and
as a police for the town. With the regular troops, therefore, the
governor had at his disposal, even after the losses he had sustained,
and after leaving in the town artillerymen enough to man the guns, about
two thousand two hundred men.

The women of Roche-Pont had also offered their services. Rincourt formed
them into brigades of ten; and their duty was to bring ammunition,
prepare the provisions, repair military accoutrements, and make fascines
and bags.

Even since the enemy's arrival, the governor had been able to get some
cattle, grain, and fodder into the town, affording a supply for sixteen
days longer.

He had good hopes of getting rid of the Germans before the end of this
period. The townspeople, moreover, were rationed like the garrison, and
the inhabitants were obliged under pain of death to deposit all the
provisions they had in the public storehouses. The two churches of the
upper town had been converted into hospitals for the wounded.

If the spirits of the garrison were kept up and even raised, such was by
no means the case with the Imperialists. Forcia lost no time in announcing
to the German troops that he was appointed commander-in-chief; he called
the captains together and thought it incumbent upon him to address them
in a somewhat long and high-flown discourse, accompanied by theatrical
gestures.

This had but a slight effect on the minds of the officers, who were for
the most part veterans, and who had no great respect for Forcia. They
returned to their quarters, therefore, somewhat depressed, and auguring
no good for the prospects of the siege. Following the instructions left
him by Galas, Forcia gave orders for the complete investment of the
place.

Deducting the losses suffered since the beginning of the siege, and the
desertions, Forcia when entrusted with the command had little more than
five thousand men. The object to be secured was to maintain at the point
of attack a body of troops numerous enough to prevent the sorties of the
garrison from not being formidable to them, and to distribute around the
_cite_ posts sufficiently well connected and defended to cut off all
communication between the town and the outside; for it was certain that
the inhabitants would be reduced to famine before many days elapsed.

Prudence therefore demanded that a line of contravallation should be
established, and provided with artillery, that every point should be
efficiently guarded, and that the garrison should be so occupied as to
make vigorous sorties impossible. These tactics must infallibly result
in the surrender of the town at no distant time. Such were in substance
the instructions of Galas. But Forcia had a more ambitious aim; these
methods appeared to him tedious and unworthy of him; and he saw himself
in imagination master of the place, and sending the news of its
capitulation to Galas in a message worthy of ancient Rome.

Still he dared not formally disregard his instructions, but he resolved
merely to affect compliance with them, eager to show the army how an
engineer of first-rate ability can conduct a siege. He believed that
three thousand men would be enough to keep the besieged in awe on the
north, to prosecute the approach-works vigorously and to take the place.
With two thousand men he made sure of intercepting all communication
between the inhabitants and the outside. Accordingly he established a
post of two hundred men along the river on the left bank, two hundred
yards from the angle of the curtain K;[1] a second post of two hundred
men on the right bank, in front of the destroyed wooden bridge O; a
third post of one hundred men, opposite the ancient bridge P; a fourth
post of three hundred men, two hundred yards from the stone bridge; a
fifth post of three hundred men along the rivulet to the south-east of
the escarpment of the castle; a sixth post of two hundred men behind the
embankment of the mills on the east; and a seventh post of three hundred
men above the pool to the north-east--in all sixteen hundred men. Four
hundred men were commissioned to connect these principal posts, or to
strengthen them at need. The rampart L[55], prevented the besieger from
making his way between the pool and the town, the fifth, sixth, and
seventh posts communicated with headquarters only by a long detour, and
could not be supported by the posts of the right bank unless a bridge
were thrown across below the stone bridge. This was a serious
disadvantage. Forcia had no idea of taking possession of the stone
bridge by a sudden attack, as this passage was commanded by a cavalier
and by the bastions of the castle. He preferred throwing a bridge across
below to put his posts in communication with each other.

Wishing to keep all his artillery to batter the place and to effect a
breach quickly, he did not provide any of these posts with guns, but
contented himself with ordering them to erect a strong palisading, and
to raise epaulements for shelter. The instructions he gave were wanting
in precision, but he often cited Caesar and Vegetius and Frontinus, and
some of the great captains who had shed a lustre on Italy in the
preceding century. While urging vigilance on his captains he merely went
with them to reconnoitre the ground, and to determine their posts; but
did not trouble himself further to know whether his orders were
understood and strictly carried out. The investment was only a
concession made to the general-in-chief, and his attention was entirely
given to the attack on the north. He could not even avoid observing in
presence of his officers that up to that time the works had been feebly
conceived and executed; a remark which soon reached the ears of Galas.

Rincourt took advantage of the respite allowed him by the besieger to
organize his little garrison more effectually. We have seen that he had
six hundred militiamen capable of acting outside the ramparts. He set
about equipping these men, who were but imperfectly armed. The castle
contained a hundred muskets, which he distributed to those who knew best
how to use this weapon, but had not been provided with it. The rest he
armed with strong pikes, breach-knives, and partisans. Not counting
artillerymen, he had remaining sixteen hundred soldiers--three hundred
being horsemen--whom he formed into four bodies of four companies of
infantry of eighty men each, commanded by a captain, and three companies
of horsemen, one hundred strong.

The town contained thirty-two pieces of ordnance of various calibre.
There were sixteen mounted in the north work; two on the cavalier behind
the bridge; one in the bastion of the donjon; two in the bastion F[56]
and one in each of the seven other bastions; in all twenty-eight. Two
were placed in the tenaille of the castle, and two were kept in reserve.
The enemy's arrangements were soon made known to the governor, either
through spies or the reconnaissances made by his best officers, or
himself personally; he took care not to disturb the carrying out of
those arrangements, and contented himself with doubling the guard at the
bridge, which was raised to two hundred men.

[Illustration: FIG. 64.]

During the night of the 11th of November, Forcia had a second breach
opened, and marked out the approach-works, as shown in Fig. 64. Besides
the two _places d'armes_ A and B, already marked out, he planned a
third, C, to be reached by a new trench D, next two batteries at G and
F, for two pieces each, and a battery for two mortars H. He had the
first trench lengthened at I, with a piece at its extremity sweeping the
curtain K. Two pieces mounted in the _place d'armes_ B commanded the
battery F, and the surroundings; a piece mounted at E commanded the
battery G; and a piece mounted in the _place d`armes_ C swept the
outside of the western battery. He thought he should thus provide for
every contingency. If the besieged determined to attempt some bold
stroke, they could not advance far, and if they succeeded in taking
either of the batteries G, F, he could crush them. The two batteries G,
F were intended to silence the fire of the north-west salient and of the
left half of the tenaille. That done, he could--secure against the
right-hand fire--advance as far as the counterscarp, set up a breach
battery, and take the place by the north-west salient. Meanwhile, the
mortar battery would render the right of the work untenable, crush the
defenders of the ancient terraced walls, damage the gates, and prevent
the besieged from attempting anything at this point. The plan was not
badly conceived; nothing remained but to execute it.

The phlegmatic governor had the gabionades of the work strengthened, and
traverses and _pareclats_ raised, especially on the platforms of the two
great towers. He had shelter places arranged on the platforms of the
earthworks. Moreover he kept up a continual fire on the workmen, so that
they could scarcely make any advance except during the night. Sometimes
at ten o'clock at night, sometimes at midnight, at two o'clock in the
morning, or shortly before daybreak, Rincourt would alarm the enemy's
camp by sorties of no importance considered with reference to the final
result, but which greatly exhausted the besiegers.

These sorties were effected by one or two companies while the others
rested. In this way he exercised the militia, and accustomed them to
fighting.

By the 15th of November the besieger's works had scarcely made any
progress. However the _place d'armes_ C was made, as also the parallel
which connected it with the _place d'armes_ B; and the trenches were
commenced which were to lead to the two batteries. The bomb-mortars were
mounted, and began to fire towards evening. But they produced more noise
than damage to the besieged. Their fire was badly directed, and most of
the bombs burst too soon or too late. The besieged became accustomed to
them, and kept out of their way when they saw them coming. For a dozen
bombs fired the first evening, two men were wounded, and one
gun-carriage damaged.

On the morning of the 25th of November the weather, hitherto fine,
suddenly changed. About nine a fine snow fell, and was soon after
followed by a deluge of rain, accompanied by squalls. During the night
of the 15th, the men on guard in the trenches were up to their knees in
water; it was impossible to work. The rain continued regular and heavy
during the whole of the 16th. Rincourt took advantage of this
disagreeable state of the weather. The bridge which had been thrown
across the river by the Imperialists, below the stone bridge, consisted
of a floor six feet wide, laid partly on trestles, partly on boats
collected in the valley and linked together. This was a clumsy
contrivance, for the water on beginning to rise lifted the boats
proportionately so that it was extremely difficult to maintain the
connexion between the floor resting on the boats and that laid on the
trestles. Accordingly in spite of the rain the besiegers worked all day
on the 16th to prevent the rupture of this bridge. The governor who
passed all that day in examining the environs, had perceived from the
top of the platform of the cavalier the precarious condition of the
besieger's bridge, and at night he had some large trunks of trees thrown
over the parapet of the stone bridge, which struck against the boats and
trestles and impeded the current, which kept on rising. At midnight
twenty of these trunks had accumulated against the boats, and the river
continuing to rise, the bridge was carried away. A light appearing for
an instant at a certain point of the valley of Abonne apprised Rincourt
of the destruction of the bridge. The signal was given by one of the
spies.

Secure, therefore, against being cut off on his right by the
Imperialists, the governor sent out three hundred militiamen and three
companies of soldiers, kept under arms after supper, by the western
gate, next to the castle; and another three hundred of the militia, and
two companies by the eastern gate. This second troop was commissioned to
make for the causeway of the pool, attack the enemy's post established
beyond the embankment, outflank it on his right and pursue it hotly
along the rivulet. Rincourt commanded the foremost troop of six hundred
men. He descended the <DW72> of the bridge, crossed the rivulet by means
of planks and trestles which he had ready prepared behind the cavalier,
and attacked the post of three hundred men established at two hundred
yards below the stone bridge. Finding themselves attacked by a body much
more numerous than themselves, they quitted the bivouacs in all haste,
and set off along the left bank of the rivulet to join the second post
(consisting) of three hundred men established between them and the dam,
as the bridge was broken. This was just what Rincourt anticipated. At
the same time, in an opposite direction the post at the pool embankment
was in flight, pursued by the second troop of the besieged,--depending
on getting the support of the post at the rivulet and that of the
bridge, since they were outflanked on their right. These two posts--that
of the bridge and that of the embankment--retreating as fast as the
nature of the ground permitted in an inverse direction, to the post at
the rivulet, the latter supposed it was an attack, and fired several
arquebusades at the two troops of these outposts. They recognised each
other with difficulty, and these eight hundred men thus collected, saw
themselves attacked on two sides by Rincourt and the second troop of the
besieged. The combat did not last long, in consequence of the confusion
into which they were thrown as much as through the numerical
inferiority. Few resisted, many sought the marshes, and two or three
hundred laid down their arms and begged for quarter. Of those who had
betaken themselves right and left to the marshes, about a hundred
managed to reach the camp in the morning, the others were killed by the
peasants.

Forcia, informed in the middle of the night of the attack on his
south-eastern posts, got a thousand men under arms. But the weather
continued as bad as ever; the captains obeyed with a very ill grace;
they had lost all confidence, and it was not until daylight that Galas's
lieutenant was able to go down into the valley. His three posts were
taken, and he found from two to three hundred men dead or wounded on the
banks of the rivulet.

Rincourt had quietly gone up again into the town with his two troops and
his prisoners by the castle gate, about three o'clock in the morning. He
had not lost more than fifty men, killed, wounded, or strayed. Forcia
returned to the camp about ten o'clock in the morning. But from the top
of the donjon, at the first glimmering of daylight, the governor had
seen the troop of Imperialists defiling in the direction of the posts
that had been taken. Without an instant's delay, placing himself at the
head of four companies of foot soldiers, fresh and ready for the
struggle, and of his three hundred horsemen, and after having fired
several volleys on the besieger's works, he courageously sallied forth
by the ravelin and rushed impetuously upon the trenches. The enemy,
taken by surprise, without a commander, and out of heart, fled, and
Rincourt succeeded in spiking the guns of the two foremost _places
d'armes_, spiking and throwing down the mortars along the <DW72>s,
breaking the gun-carriages, overthrowing the gabionades, and taking a
quantity of workmen's tools.

When Forcia returned, it was to learn this fresh disaster. His captains
murmured loudly. He called them cowards and ignoramuses, and they
retorted sharply, and abuse was lavished on both sides. Happily for
Forcia a messenger came from Galas that evening enjoining him to raise
the siege of Roche-Pont and to fall back upon the Saone without an
hour's delay.

Saint-Jean-de-Losne had held out and had suffered no damage; the
Imperialists, surprised by the inundations, and fearing to be cut off by
the French army, determined on returning home.

If that French army had been led by a Rantzau and a Rincourt, not a
German would have repassed the frontier; but the Duke of Weimar and the
Cardinal de la Valette, who might have destroyed the invaders, were by
no means energetic in the pursuit. The Imperialists, however, lost in
this expedition, by which they hoped to gain the most brilliant
advantages, all their baggage, a good part of their artillery, and a
third of their force.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 52: See Fig. 59.]

[Footnote 53: See Fig. 59.]

[Footnote 54: Bombs, invented by the Dutch in the beginning of the
seventeenth century, were already used in sieges.]

[Footnote 55: See Fig. 59.]

[Footnote 56: See Fig. 59.]




CHAPTER XV.

_THE TOWN OF LA ROCHE-PONT IS FORTIFIED BY M. DE VAUBAN._


Born at Saint-Leger de Foucheret, in the middle of Burgundy, Vauban, who
loved and was well acquainted with this beautiful province, had occasion
to visit Roche-Pont several times. The situation of the fortress and its
strategical position attracted his notice, and suggested a plan
connecting this little town with a line starting with Besancon, passing
through Dole, Auxonne, La Roche-Pont, Langres, Neufchateau, Toul,
Pont-a-Mousson, Metz, Thionville, Longwy, Montmedy, Sedan, Mezieres,
Rocroy, Avesnes, Maubeuge, Valenciennes, Lille, and ending at
Dunquerque. The date was 1680; it was a second line. Would to Heaven it
had always been maintained by works accommodated to the means of attack!
but if the French know how to take, they are but remiss in keeping what
they have taken.

The fortress of La Roche-Pont was exposed to attack only from the
northern plateau, and the artillery of Vauban's time could make a
serious impression only on that side, as the town was protected on its
two sides, east and west, by escarpments and two water-courses.
Batteries placed on the hills east and west were either dominated by the
artillery of the town or must have been placed at a distance of eighteen
hundred yards--_i.e._, out of range--to attain the level of the
ramparts. Vauban decided therefore to construct outside the ancient town
a large work on the north, which should command the plateau. At the same
time--for he was economical of the money of the state--he thought he
might avail himself of part of Errard's works, especially the bastions
which that engineer had raised on the east and west fronts, and improve
the defence of the castle, which would then become a good stronghold.
Besides this he planned works, only revetted at the base, along the
river, to protect the lower town. On the rivulet side, in like manner,
he planned a flanked front for musketry, to secure that side from
approach, and to keep some land useful either for the cultivation of
vegetables in case of siege, or for pasturage. A weir placed at the
mouth of the rivulet, with a flood gate, allowed the inhabitants to
inundate the meadows situated on the east of the escarpment.

[Illustration: FIG. 65.--VAUBAN'S DEFENCES.]

Fig. 65 presents the general plan of the works laid out by Vauban. At
first he had thought of making on the north, before the front fortified
by Errard de Bar-le-Duc, a horn-work before a demi-lune; but he could
not thus effectually sweep the divergent points of the plateau. He
determined, therefore, on the plan given in Fig. 65, making use of a
part of the northern revetments of Errard de Bar-le-Duc. In advance of
the northern front, in lieu of the narrow and contracted defences of
Errard,[57] he made a great demi-lune, A (Fig. 65), with a tenaille
behind, and next the bastioned work, B, which swept the whole plateau.
As to the rest of the town, making use of the old bastions, he strongly
flanked them and disposed the stronghold as shown by the plan, D. The
roads of the upper town were widened and improved, and the houses
detached from the ramparts. The ancient bridge at C had been destroyed
by a swelling of the river, and was not rebuilt; but at P, in 1675, a
new stone bridge was built, with a _tete du pont_ of earthwork. At O a
foot-bridge still existed in 1680. The town had again extended along the
left bank, and the importance of the _cite_ above was diminishing.

[Illustration: FIG. 66.--VAUBAN'S OUTWORK.]

Fig. 66 presents on a larger scale the plan of the outwork constructed
by Vauban. Before the three fronts of this work, demi-lunes with
tenailles behind defended the approaches.

Four barracks were built at _a_. Cavaliers arose on the bastions, and
the covered ways, with their _places d'armes_, were furnished with
traverses. In the event of this work being taken, the main body of the
fortress could still hold out some days.

Fig. 67 gives the sections of these works, which were cased with
masonry, presenting a strong defence which only a regular siege could
affect.

[Illustration: FIG. 67.]

But it is desirable to point out the reasons that determined the plan of
this work, and the method adopted by the illustrious engineer.

Vauban fortified according to the nature of the position, and was not
one of those _esprits routiniers_ who, when once a certain system has
made good its claims, insist on applying it on all occasions.

The fortresses, which, like that of La Roche-Pont, are situated at the
extremity of a promontory and present only a narrow front to the
besieger, assuredly give certain advantages to the defence, since they
have scarcely to fear more than one attack and are accessible only on
one side; but this position is not without its drawbacks, especially if,
as in the present instance, a fan-shaped plateau spreads outside the
fortress; for then the besiegers sweep the defences with converging
fires, to which the besieged can oppose only a narrow front unprovided
with considerable flankments. On the east side the large bastion, in
the middle of which Vauban had left standing the fifteenth-century
tower, which thus gave him a good revetted cavalier, sufficiently
flanked the eastern brow of the outer plateau; but on the western side
such a flankment failed entirely, on account of the outward bend caused
by the promontory. To obviate these disadvantages Vauban inclined his
capital some paces eastwards.[58]

He had thought at first of suppressing the south flanks of the two
extreme bastions, but in that case the exteriors of the east and west
faces of these bastions would have been too slanting to sweep the crests
of the plateau effectively, while the two curtains answered this object.
Besides, the enemy could not then, without risk, commence his trenches
on the <DW72>s of the plateau and rapidly approach fronts insufficiently
flanked. Vauban therefore set out the plan of the great outwork
according to the following method (Fig. 68):--To the outside he gave a
length of 180 toises, or 1,156 feet. To the western side, _a c_, 1,120
feet; to the eastern side, _b d_, 1,054 feet--that is, he placed the
points _c_ and _d_ according with the edge of the plateau; the two
angles _a_ and _b_ being equal to one another. On the centre of the side
_a b_ of the polygon he erected the perpendicular, _e f_, having a
length equal to one-sixth of _a b_. From this extreme point, _f_, were
drawn the lines of defence, _a g_, _b h_, on which the lengths of the
faces of the bastion, _a k_, _b i_, were set off equal to two-sevenths
of the outer side, _a b_. To find the flanks of the bastion, according
to the method usually adopted in these defences, points _k_ and _i_, he
described arcs of a circle, _k l_, taking _i k_ as the radius. The point
of intersection of this arc with the line _b h_ gave the length and the
direction of the flank of the bastion; but, not having been able to
trace a regular half-hexagon, and the angles _a_ and _b_ being less
obtuse than those of a regular hexagon, by proceeding in this manner,
the gorges of the bastion would have been too contracted. Therefore, to
determine the flank of the bastion, from the points _i_ and _k_, he let
fall perpendiculars to the lines of defence, _a g_, _b h_, and the
point _h_ gave the re-entering angle in the curtain, _h g_, parallel to
the side _a b_. This exposed the flanks a little too much, but enabled
them to sweep the outsides more effectively, and in this particular case
that was the principal consideration.

[Illustration: FIG. 68.]

The width of the ditch of the main work was fixed at 112 ft. 7 in., to
the rounding of the counterscarp; and this was determined by a tangent
to this rounding, drawn from the angle of the epaule of the opposite
bastion.

The ditches being dry, Vauban sunk cunettes in the middle, 23 ft. 4 in.
wide and 6 ft. 8 in. deep. Double caponnieres connected the tenailles
with the demi-lunes. The demi-lune was set out as follows:--Taking _g k_
as radius, the arc _k m_ was drawn. Its meeting with the perpendicular,
_e f_, prolonged, gave the point of intersection _m_, the salient of the
demi-lune. From _m_, the face _m n_ was directed upon a point, _o_,
taken on the face of the bastion at 31 ft. 3 in. from the angle of the
epaule, _i_. The width of the covered way was fixed at 31 ft. 3 in., and
that of the glacis at 124 ft. 4 in. The internal _places d'armes_ were
100 ft. across the demi-gorge and 133 ft. 4 in. along the faces. These
_places d'armes_ were closed by traverses. The ditch of the demi-lune
was 89 ft. 7 in. in width. The tenailles, _g_, constructed in the
direction of the lines of defence, were 43 ft. 9 in. wide at the base.

Cavaliers were made on the bastions to obtain convenient views over the
<DW72>s of the plateau. Their faces and sides, parallel to those of the
bastions, had to be placed at a considerable distance from the
epaulements, in order that the un-cased external foot of the talus might
leave the necessary room for the easy working of the pieces of
artillery.[59]

The same method was followed for the sides _a c_ and _b d_. The width of
the ditch was increased to 100 ft., and the great demi-lune, _t_, was so
formed that its faces had a length of 332 ft. and its narrow sides 66
ft. The old bastions restored and enlarged, _u v_, were armed with
cavaliers, and the escarp of these bastions was 6 ft. 6-1/2 in. higher
than that of the bastions of the outwork,[60] which difference, for that
matter, was favoured by the conformation of the ground.

All the escarps and counterscarps were cased with strong masonry, with
counterforts in the terre-plein; as shown in the sections of Fig. 67 and
Fig. 69.

[Illustration: FIG. 69.]

The works communicated with each other by posterns. As the fortress of
La Roche-Pont was only assailable on one side, the number of cannon
necessary for its defence might be, it appeared, in proportion to its
extent, inconsiderable. The number amounted to thirty twenty-four
pounders, ten twelve-and four-pounders to arm the demi-lunes.

At the end of the reign of Louis XIV., the efforts of the coalition were
directed towards the north-eastern frontiers, and the garrison of La
Roche-Pont did not get a view of the enemy. However, during the course
of the eighteenth century, this fortress was kept in passable condition.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 57: See Fig. 60.]

[Footnote 58: See Fig. 65.]

[Footnote 59: See Fig. 67, the section on E, F.]

[Footnote 60: See Fig. 67, the sections on G H and I K.]




CHAPTER XVI.

_THE SEVENTH SIEGE._


On the 31st of December, 1813, the grand army of Bohemia, one hundred
and eighty thousand men strong, and commanded by Prince Schwartzenberg,
crossed the Rhine at Bale, entered Switzerland, and penetrated into
France. Its right bore down on Belfort, Colmar, and Strasburg, its
centre marched for Langres, its left for Dijon. The same day the
Prussians were crossing the Rhine at Mayence. The invasion of the
eastern frontier had to be met by sixty thousand men, at most, echeloned
between Epinal and Langres; and this force consisted only of dispirited
soldiers and of recruits scarcely knowing how to use their arms. Prince
Schwartzenberg's army--which had some reason to fear being attacked on
the side of Savoy by the forces commanded by Prince Eugene, and knew
that the _debris_ of the army of Spain had orders to make for Lyons with
all speed--wishing to secure its base of operation, left detachments
before Besancon, Dole, along the Saone and between Dijon and Langres,
with injunctions to occupy the most favourable strategic position. La
Roche-Pont was to be taken; and the generalissimo of the Bohemian army
imagined that it was not in a condition to hold out eight-and-forty
hours, for he knew that it had no garrison, and that the citizens were
little disposed to defend themselves.

Among the inhabitants of La Roche-Pont were some royalist families,
whose emissaries had assured the commander-in-chief of the Bohemian army
that the whole population were impatiently awaiting the arrival of the
Allies to declare for the Bourbons. Prince Schwartzenberg was too
clear-sighted, and knew too well to what illusions the royalists were
ready to yield themselves, to place an unlimited faith in these
statements; and he was anxious not to encounter serious obstacles during
his first stages, that he might put himself as speedily as possible in
communication with his allies on their way from the north-east. He
therefore informed the royalists of La Roche-Pont that it was
undesirable to provoke a political manifestation on his march; that the
best means of assuring the success of the Allies was to remain quiet;
that his troops, in conformity with the proclamation issued by the
coalition on entering French territory, would respect property; that
they were not animated by a spirit of vengeance, and that their glory
would consist in concluding peace as quickly as possible, so as to
restore to Europe the repose it so much needed.

In the meantime Napoleon, on learning that the German troops had entered
France from the south through Basle, had sent pressing orders into the
Bourbonnais, Auvergne, and Burgundy, to make a levy of conscripts as
soon as possible and send them to Paris. At the same time the depots of
Dauphiny and Provence, as also the conscripts in the eastern
departments, were to assemble at Lyons to close to the enemy the
approaches from Switzerland and Savoy, and if necessary to operate on
his rear.

The prefects of Burgundy, Picardy, and Normandy, and of Touraine and
Brittany, were to appeal to the communes to form companies of National
Guards _d'elite_, who were to march to Paris, Meaux, Montereau, and
Troyes.

These arrangements were hardly made in time to present a serious
obstacle to the invaders. The civil authorities and the regular troops
began to make a hasty retreat before the armies of the coalition, and
were leaving the inhabitants to themselves without arms or guidance. It
thus happened that some bodies of troops coming from the south found
themselves in an isolated position, and uncertain whether they ought to
continue their route or fall back. Such a case happened on the Saone;
three battalions of infantry, certain artillerymen called to Vincennes
to assemble at the great central depot which the Emperor was organising
there, and some detachments of various arms making their way for Dijon,
to push on thence towards Troyes--found themselves on the flank of the
left column of the army of Bohemia. They retraced their steps, and made
a rather long detour, hoping to get beyond the enemy's right, and resume
the route for Troyes through Beaune, Semur, Montbard, and
Chatillon-sur-Seine; but surprised by bad weather and snow, during a
night march in the mountains of the Cote-d'Or, they lost their way, and
found themselves in the morning at Saint-Seine, which was already
occupied by a body of Austrian pioneers. The French were much limited in
point of munitions, and had no artillery. They could not force the
passage, and were obliged to fall back into the valley of Suzon, hoping
still to find the road from Dijon to Langres clear. But at
Thil-le-Chatel they came upon another body of the enemy, and had to
retire towards the small town of La Roche-Pont, for it was evident that
they were cut off. The colonel who commanded this small column was
instructed, should it be impossible to reach Langres, to take up a
position at Auxonne or at La Roche-Pont, to keep his ground there, and
to form a nucleus of defence until the arrival of Augereau's force,
which was to march from Lyons through Macon, Chalon, and Gray, to fall
on the rear of Prince Schwartzenberg.

Such were the events that had happened at this juncture at La
Roche-Pont. Conformably to the last orders transmitted by the prefect,
companies of National Guards had been promptly organised. The
inhabitants of La Roche-Pont, like their neighbours of Auxonne, Dole,
and Saint-Jean-de-Losne, preserve military habits; and sieges--not
without reason, as we have seen--are a tradition among them. There were
always companies of archers and arbalisters at La Roche-Pont during the
Middle Ages, and at a later date bombardiers and artillerymen. Under the
Consulate La Roche-Pont had been a depot for the army concentrated
between Dijon and the Swiss frontier to pass the Saint-Bernard, and
munitions had been stored there; some siege pieces had also been placed
there, and still remained. At the approach of Prince Schwartzenberg's
army the population of La Roche-Pont was in agitation; and even before
the prefectoral instructions had arrived, three companies of National
Guards, one of which was of artillerymen, had been spontaneously formed.
All had old muskets of the time of the Revolution, or good hunting
weapons. The lower town, occupied in great part by rich families, of
which several were devoted to the royal cause, did not share in these
preparations for war. Some indiscreet revelations made the upper town
aware of the intrigues of the royalists. The mayor was a man who had
been conspicuous for his devotion to the Emperor while the Empire had
been in vigour; but who, seeing its fortunes decline, became daily more
and more of a royalist.

If he had not actively opposed, he had at least obstructed the formation
of a company of National Guards _d'elite_, endeavouring to gain time.
The little citadel of La Roche-Pont was occupied by a company of sixty
veterans, for the most part invalided, under the orders of an old
one-armed captain of engineers, who had served in almost all the
campaigns of the Empire. When it was known that the enemy had entered
France, Captain Allaud--that was his name--had asked for orders from
Dijon, but had not received them. However, he employed his men in
restoring and replenishing the arsenal. He enjoyed a certain amount of
authority in the upper town. The male population of the _cite_, composed
in great part of men who had been soldiers--all the youth had left in
the first months of 1813--never called Captain Allaud anything but "the
Governor," and had applied to him to form companies, only asking for
munitions. Now the arsenal of La Roche-Pont contained a good supply of
powder and balls, about twenty old bronze pieces of small calibre, six
twenty-four pounders, two howitzers, four small mortars, and about a
hundred muskets past service. The six gendarmes remaining till then at
La Roche-Pont had been summoned to Dijon at the beginning of January.

Captain Allaud asked for co-operation in repairing the arms, making
cartouches and cartridges, repairing the parapets, the traverses, and
epaulements, and fabricating gabions and fascines; and the women made
bags for earth,--as if it had been possible to sustain a siege with the
sixty veterans and the three companies of National Guards, forming a
total of two hundred and sixty men. The Prefect of Dijon had transmitted
the order for these select companies of National Guards to fall back
upon Langres, but the order had not arrived. The royalists shrugged
their shoulders on seeing these two hundred and sixty National Guards
exercising on the platform of the outwork, and went so far as to joke in
the places of public resort about Captain Allaud's _garrison_. He could
not put up with raillery, and talked aloud to his men about running
their swords through the jokers. High words and even blows were
exchanged in the _cafes_. The mayor ventured to interpose his authority;
he was insulted and called a traitor, and the captain was informed of
the intrigues set on foot by the royalists. At night the captain had the
gates of the _cite_ shut, and the antagonism between the upper and lower
town was increasing in violence. "If the Austrians come," said the
captain, "the houses of these royalist traitors will be the first marks
for our balls!" Both parties became excited, and the mayor had the
impudence to ask the captain on whose authority he was acting. "I am the
_commandant de place_," replied the veteran, "since there is no other
officer here, and La Roche-Pont is a defensible place.... To prove it to
you I arrest you!" And he had the mayor conducted to the citadel.

Great was the excitement in the town, but the royalists were in a feeble
minority, and dared not stir. They cried "Vive le Gouverneur!" in the
taverns. The mob attempted to plunder the mayor's house, which was
situated on the _cite_, and the captain had great difficulty in putting
down the disturbance. "Rascals!" cried he to the fellows who were
already breaking in the doors of the house, "I will have you shot like
dogs. Sacrebleu! you can break open doors; we shall see whether you have
so much pluck when the Germans come! Here," added he, turning to a dozen
veterans, who were following him, "clear the place of this _canaille_!"
and, setting the example, he dealt blows in abundance with the flat of
his sword on the backs of the plunderers.

It was the morning following this riot when the French corps above
spoken of presented itself before La Roche-Pont. It was welcomed in the
upper town with every demonstration of joy. An army come to their help
magnificently accoutred and provided would not have been better
received. But this troop, exhausted by fatigue, and having eaten nothing
for twenty-four hours, without artillery or munitions, had all the
appearance of a band of fugitives. Covered with mud, and scantily
clothed, these poor soldiers seemed scarcely able even to defend
themselves. But in such times of distress, so much do people cling to
any semblance of hope, that the sight of a friendly uniform revives
every heart. Seeing themselves so well received, these brave fellows
made their entrance into the city in good order, and presented when
defiling through the streets, in spite of their exhaustion, a martial
appearance which redoubled the enthusiasm of the inhabitants. A colonel,
three chiefs of battalions, and some captains, of whom one belonged to
the artillery, composed the staff. Two hours after their arrival, these
soldiers, most of whom had seen much service, having rested well and
brushed themselves up, presented a very different appearance.

The news brought by this small corps proved clearly enough that there
was no time to lose, if they wanted to put the town of La Roche-Pont in
a condition to defend itself with honour, if not with hope of success.
The colonel, of course, took the command; his name was Dubois. He had
been in the campaign in Portugal, then in Russia, whence he had returned
captain, and having been appointed _chef de bataillon_ in the Saxon
campaign, he had distinguished himself at Dresden, and had been a
colonel from the date of the battle of Leipzig. He was a man of about
thirty, but appeared to be much older. He had scarcely seen anything but
the disastrous side of French glory. His countenance, therefore, did not
bear that impress of confidence which was exhibited by many of his
brethren in arms, who had been less tried than himself by the
misfortunes of the times. Of the war in Spain he had seen only the
miseries, the privations, the failure of order, the utter
disintegration. With Ney on the return from Moscow he had learned what
the performance of duty is without the prestige of glory. At Dresden,
the regiment to which he was attached had lost half its men; and the
disaster of Leipzig had followed. With each grade in his promotion was
associated a mournful date.

Colonel Dubois had an appearance of coldness that served to hide his
natural timidity and profound distrust of his fellow-men. It must be
allowed that there were reasons for his distrust of men and things.
Entering the service at the age of twenty as a common soldier, though he
belonged to an honourable family in Poitou and had spent his earliest
years in the bosom of his family, he had seen only the sinister side of
warfare, and his first companions in arms did not respond to his ideal
of the soldier's character. It was still worse when he went to Spain.
His delicate nature had fallen back on itself, and allowed no sign of
pity or even sympathy for anyone to be visible. Yet so profoundly does
what we call "heart" imprint itself on every action, even when its
possessor attempts to conceal its slightest manifestation, that this
man, in appearance so cold, and who was not known to have a friend,
exercised a moral authority over his soldiers which was very rare at
that time.

The soldier--an infallible judge in this matter--is able to discover the
weak side of the officer; but he only esteems him and confides entirely
in him when he recognises besides military talents a soul of energetic
vigour and a heart that beats in unison with his own. The soldier's
glance can penetrate without difficulty a cold and harsh exterior, and
soon discovers whether this appearance conceals insufficiency,
stupidity, or pride; or whether it is only the countenance of a man
accustomed to command--the exterior of a soul really accessible to all
human sentiments.

In an action Dubois could see his men fall without the slightest show of
emotion, and would not permit a soldier to leave his place to help them;
but after the battle he was the first and the most attentive in
relieving the wounded, and would take no rest till they were carried to
the ambulances.

Of the three battalions (they were not complete) which he commanded, two
belonged to his own regiment; the third was composed of fragments drawn
from all sides. Nevertheless, after two or three days' march, all these
men, as well as the companies of various arms which he was to lead to
Troyes, knew Colonel Dubois better perhaps than he knew himself. These
brave men, after some hours' rest were well satisfied to submit to
circumstances and remain under the orders of their Colonel de _Bois_, as
they used to call him--and thought it a fine joke to defend themselves
in this _nest_ of La Roche-Pont, cut off from all help.

Though in concert with Captain Allaud he made the most needful
preparations for defence--were it only to save his own honour--Colonel
Dubois wished to ascertain whether it was possible to reach Langres and
Troyes without compromising his troops. He therefore instructed a young
orderly officer of energy and intelligence, by whom he was
accompanied--giving him two attendants and two guides from the town and
known to the captain, all mounted--to reconnoitre the route and return
as quickly as possible.

We have seen that before the colonel's arrival the defenders numbered
three hundred and twenty men, of whom sixty were veterans. Among these
men about fifty were capable of serving the guns, having been
artillerymen. The troop brought by the colonel consisted of three
battalions, in all one thousand four hundred and fifty men, twenty-five
artillerymen, and thirty dismounted horsemen; total, one thousand eight
hundred and twenty-five men, including officers.

Provisions were the first question. The colonel, having learned the
arrest of the mayor, summoned him into his presence, and soon heard the
confession of the municipal magistrate. He gave him to understand that
the proofs of his royalist intrigues were sufficient to justify his
being shot there and then, and that the only means of avoiding this
unpleasant necessity was to set about provisioning the city without a
moment's delay. He added that he only commanded the vanguard of a _corps
d'armee_, marching from Lyons in the rear of the enemy, while the
Emperor was to take them in front: it was important therefore for the
town of La Roche-Pont to be in a position to resist for some days, and
if it were obliged to surrender for want of provisions, the Emperor's
Government would lay blame on the mayor, as having an understanding with
the enemy, and then it was all over with him.

The poor mayor, more dead than alive, promised everything, and swore by
all the saints that he was devoted to the Emperor, and that in
four-and-twenty hours the fortress should be supplied with all the
provisions that could be found in the neighbourhood. "I don't know what
there may be in the neighbourhood," replied the colonel; "you probably
_do_; but I have to tell you that by four o'clock to-morrow
afternoon--it is now a quarter-past six--there must be on this spot,
first, rations of meal, meat, and wine for a garrison of two thousand
men for twenty-five days at least; secondly, the inhabitants of the town
must also be provisioned for thirty days; and that if this is not done,
I shall be unfortunately obliged to send you back to your place of
confinement, where you will await the decision of the Emperor's
Government; I am going to give you twenty men to accompany you and help
you. Planton! ask the major to come here!" "But, colonel," said the
mayor, "you must be aware that at this time of the year I shall have
great difficulty--" "You prefer then to return to prison immediately?"
interrupted the colonel. "Major!" said he when this officer was
introduced, "Monsieur le maire de la Roche-Pont engages to provision the
town within twenty-four hours. Here is a list of what is required. You
will accompany him, and have twenty pressed men with you--thirty if you
want them. You must begin at once. I wish you good luck, Monsieur le
maire." Addressing himself to the major, while the mayor was retiring,
pale and covered with perspiration, in spite of the cold: "Do not suffer
this man to go out of your sight, he is a Royalist; keep him at work,
and bring him back here with the provisions." "I understand, colonel."
It was many years since the upper and lower town of La Roche-Pont had
been so animated. The upper town resounded with the noise of arms, of
the excavators going to the works, of guns being taken from the arsenal
and mounted in the batteries, and of the repairing of the carriages. In
another part the carpenters were at work making platforms. As in former
times, women mingled with the workmen and brought bundles of willows cut
from the side of the pool to make gabions. Behind every window some were
to be seen sewing bags for earth. Wheelwrights were repairing wheels;
and all engaged were singing and laughing as if they were preparing for
a fete. The meal and forage carts were coming in, while pigs, cows, and
sheep were rendering the streets almost impassable.

The lower town presented a different aspect: the _cafes_ were full, and
all were talking at once and very loud. The mayor, followed by the
major, who kept close to his elbow, and by his staff of assistants, was
making his visits to the shops and houses.

The whole of the population was at the windows or at the door-sills.
Carts were got ready, and the twenty pressed men filled them in no time;
if horses could not be found to draw them, the workmen pushed at the
wheels. Some large houses, however, remained closely shut.

They had to go through the valley and visit the farmers and millers of
the neighbourhood. Many inhabitants of the upper town went down in
search of hams, meal, and grains. The grocers' shops and the pork shops
were emptied one after the other; provisions were rising in price, so
that the last ham was sold, at three o'clock in the afternoon, for sixty
francs.

At four o'clock the mayor, followed like his shadow by the major,
presented himself before the colonel and gave him the list of all the
provisions he had been able to bring into the upper town. The colonel
bade him sit down, and examined the account carefully, asking many
questions and appealing to the major's testimony respecting the
correctness of the statements. The twenty-five days' rations for the two
thousand men were found complete, thanks to a good stock of un-ground
corn which made up for what was wanting in meal.

The colonel expressed himself satisfied, especially as they had found in
the castle some few hundred-weight of biscuit in good condition. "Thank
you, Monsieur le maire," said he; "you must be fatigued, and may return
home; but as I am not unaware of the ill-feeling of some bad sort of
people towards you, you shall have a man on guard posted at your door;
and I must beg you not to quit your house except to go to your office,
which fortunately is situated in the upper town, which will enable you,
when we are invested, to fulfil your functions with the zeal you have
just manifested.

"I will also beg you to make arrangements without delay for an ambulance
with fifty beds duly furnished--suppose we say to-night--and to send me
the surgeons of the town, if there are any at La Roche-Pont, this very
evening.... Major! accompany Monsieur le maire while he attends to this
business, so that no harm may befal him...."

That same day, at eight o'clock in the evening, the reconnaissance
returned and reported what they had seen.

The enemy was at Gray near Champlitte, and was occupying the roads
between Gray and Thil-le-Chatel. His force had been seen at Beze, about
eighteen miles from La Roche-Pont. Communication between Dijon and
Langres was cut off: and although the enemy had not occupied that town,
he was forming a curtain between it and the north to mask his ulterior
movements.

The circumstantial details given by his orderly officer confirmed the
colonel in the idea that the army of Bohemia was paying but little
attention to what was taking place in his rear, but was pushing on
towards the capital by the basin of the Seine. "Ah!" said the colonel,
when he had heard every particular from the young officer, "if we only
had twenty thousand of those men who were lost in Russia, we could make
these German and Russian gentlemen pay dearly for their temerity, and
few of them would see the other side of the Rhine again."

Colonel Dubois therefore determined to follow the second part of his
instructions. He sent a reliable man, selected by Captain Allaud, to
Auxonne to inform the governor of the place--if the town was not already
occupied--that he was holding La Roche-Pont, that he was in a condition
to defend himself there for some time, and that he should wish all
isolated detachments and any provisions or munitions that had no
particular destination to be sent to him.

Up to the 15th of January the town of La Roche-Pont had not seen a
single enemy. The centre column of Prince Schwartzenberg's army was
marching in the direction of Gray along the heights of the Seine and
Marne basins, and avoiding the Lower Saone. This delay had allowed
additional munitions to be brought into the town, and the garrison
increased by some recruits who, not being able to join their regiments,
were wandering about without orders. Four pieces of field artillery,
whose carriages were out of repair, had also been got into the town. The
colonel had put himself in communication with Lyons; and Marshal
Augereau, still hoping to commence offensive operations, had confirmed
the previous orders that had been given--that is to say, to hold La
Roche-Pont, and to gain all possible information respecting the enemy's
movements in the north.

Towards the end of January the great army of Bohemia had some grounds
for apprehending an attack on its rear; and Prince Schwartzenberg knew
that from Macon along the ascent of the Saone, and as far as the
countries intersected by hills which form a part of Upper Burgundy, a
nucleus of resistance was being formed which might at any moment take
the offensive and embarrass him greatly. After the battle of Brienne
(29th of January), as the result of which the Prussians were thrown back
by Napoleon on La Rothiere, the sovereigns assembled in Prince
Schwartzenberg's neighbourhood deliberated as to whether they should
stop short at Langres or risk advancing alone against the troops
commanded by the Emperor.

This indecision with regard to ulterior operations led to a more
effective concentration and the occupation of a circle of wider radius
around Langres.

Orders were then given to a body of four thousand of the allied
Bavarians and Austrians to invest La Roche-Pont, and to guard the route
from Lyons to Langres.

It was not till the 1st of February that the front of this corps showed
itself before La Roche-Pont.

Colonel Dubois had not been wasting time: the garrison was provisioned
for more than six weeks, and munitions were not wanting. This superior
officer had put everything in order; and his troops, motley in
appearance, certainly, but well rested and full of confidence, amounted
at that time to more than nineteen hundred men, of whom twelve hundred
were experienced soldiers who might be relied upon. The works on the
north were well armed and the defences in good condition, duly furnished
with palisades, traverses, and appliances for shelter.

On the evening of the 2nd of February, some of the enemy's horse were
caracoling at a distance of about two hundred yards from the works; this
bravado cost them about a dozen men.

The enemy, however, did not seem desirous of undertaking a regular
siege, but took up a position about a mile from the northern salient; he
sent detachments to occupy the faubourg on the left bank, and raised an
encampment on the eastern hills.

The colonel had blown up the stone-bridge and destroyed the
foot-bridges.

On the morning of the 4th of February an envoy appeared on the glacis
and handed on to the governor of the place a summons from General
Werther, demanding the surrender of La Roche-Pont to the troops of the
allied princes. The garrison would be allowed to retire southwards with
arms, baggage, and field artillery.

The colonel replied that the place was sufficiently strong and well
provided; it would not capitulate till the moment when the breaches were
no longer tenable; and he judged that the defence could not be prolonged
to any purpose.

The following night Colonel Dubois sent out a hundred men to try the
strength of the enemy's outposts and reconnoitre their positions.

By the end of the two following days--the 5th and 6th--the investment
was almost complete, and the communication with the surrounding country
interrupted. On the evening of the 9th there came another summons from
the enemy's general, declaring that if the place were not surrendered
within twenty-four hours the bombardment would commence. The colonel
replied as before.

In fact, on the 10th of February a mortar battery opened fire, first on
the northern salient, about eight o'clock in the evening. The bombs
produced no effect, and in ten hours' bombardment only eight men had
been struck, the roof of one of the barracks broken in, and two
gun-carriages damaged.

The pieces of large calibre mounted on the cavaliers of the bastions of
the work did not begin to fire on the mortar battery until daybreak, and
silenced it about noon. The enemy appeared then to limit his efforts to
the investment; and it was not till the 17th of February, probably in
consequence of news received from the north, that he appeared to decide
on a regular siege. Perhaps until this moment he had not the needful
appliances.

On the night of the 17th, the first parallel was commenced about six
hundred yards from the salient of the re-entering _place d'armes_ (Fig.
70), as also the communications between this parallel and the depots.
About two o'clock in the morning the governor sent out a hundred and
fifty men, who charged the advanced posts protecting the workmen on the
western side of the plateau, and forced their passage through to the
trench; put the sappers to rout, took some of their tools, and then,
seeing themselves taken in flank, rushed up the <DW72>s of the plateau,
and re-entered by the postern of the lower town, protected by the fires
of the demi-bastion.

On the 18th of February those who worked by day finished what their
comrades, told off for night work, had commenced; and the engineers
fixed in the parallel the prolongations of the works of the place, which
they were intending to ricochet, with a view to planting the first
batteries. By the method in which the besieger was proceeding, Colonel
Dubois and Captain Allaud had no difficulty in perceiving that they had
to do with a methodical enemy, who would conduct his attack according to
the rules of the art, and would employ the acknowledged methods of
approach against the main work of La Roche-Pont. The commander of the
Bavarian engineers, in fact, had drawn out the plan of siege as
exhibited in Fig. 70.

On the night of the 18th of February he commenced the ricochet batteries
of the first parallel, and the boyaux of communication that were to lead
to the second parallel; the works were continued by day. He was
intending to direct the siege in the method we are going to describe.

On the third night the batteries of the first parallel were completed so
as to fire in concert at daybreak.

The fourth night, supposing the artillery of the besieged to be
silenced, they would commence the second parallel, and the fifth night
the counter-batteries parallel and perpendicular to the faces to be
cannonaded.

The sixth night would be occupied with the continuation of the
counter-batteries and the commencement, by sap, of the zigzags about as
far as one hundred and sixty yards from the crest of the salient angles
of the covered way.

During the seventh night the construction of the counter-batteries would
be finished, and they would dig the demi-parallels.

On the eighth night they would continue to advance by sap in zigzag, and
arm the demi-parallel with howitzers and mortars, to commence their fire
at daybreak at the same time as the counter-batteries.

On the ninth night the sap-fronts would reach the glacis fifty or sixty
yards from the salient angles of the covered way, and the zigzags would
enter the third parallel, which they would continue by day.

On the tenth night the works would be completed, the third parallel
should be finished, and batteries of stone mortars planted there.

On the eleventh night they were to drive two saps a length of twenty-six
or thirty yards, right and left, of the capital (Fig. 71). They would
dig the circular trenches, and then advance straight on the capital by
double sap to within range of hand-grenades; twenty-six to thirty yards
from the salient of the _places d'armes_. Protected by the fire of the
third parallel, this work would be continued by day.

The twelfth night would be employed in tracing the trench cavalier by
means of two saps; these works were to be terminated by day.

The thirteenth night, starting from the extremities of the trench
cavaliers near the capitals, by double sap, they would crown the salient
angles of the covered way. At daybreak these crownings would be
finished, and the construction of the counter-batteries commenced. They
would get down by means of two saps (Fig. 71) to the _place d'armes_,
to establish a lodgment parallel to the rounding of the ditches.

If necessary, they would drive right and left of the crowning two saps
which would meet each other in the middle of this crowning. A fourth
parallel would, if necessary, be established, on which they would then
place the stone mortars of the third parallel. If this fourth parallel
was not needed, they would advance from the third parallel by means of a
double sap directly upon the salient of the re-entering _place d'armes_.

The fourteenth night the crowning was to be extended along the branches
of the covered way as far as the first traverse. The construction of the
counter-batteries, and that of the fourth parallel, would be continued.
If this fourth parallel were not required, the saps would reach to the
salient of the re-entering _place d'armes_, which they would crown. At
daybreak the breach batteries would be commenced.

On the fifteenth night these works would be completed; then, if they had
been obliged to dig a fourth parallel, they would diverge from that in
two saps which would unite to form a strong traverse, under shelter of
which these saps would reach as far as the salient of the re-entering
_place d'armes_, which they would crown by extending that crowning right
and left. They would then have to commence the descent of the ditch.

During the sixteenth night the breach batteries would be terminated, and
would begin firing. They would work at the descent of the ditch. If
possible, they would get down into the _place d'armes_ to install
themselves and plant a battery of stone mortars there.

The seventeenth night would be occupied in finishing the descent to the
ditch, and they would commence the epaulement of the passage.

During the eighteenth night they would begin to make a breach, and
advance the passage of the ditch of the breach, which should be effected
in the morning.

During the nineteenth night they would reconnoitre the breach, and the
sappers would render it practicable. They would terminate the
epaulements of the passage of the ditch, that the assault might be made
next day.

Thus, according to the plan of the siege, in nineteen times twenty-four
hours the place would be in the power of the enemy.

The lines were fixed upon, and General Werther did not doubt of success,
as he did not imagine that La Roche-Pont could be succoured, and was
aware of the weakness of the garrison and the inefficient character of
its artillery.

Nevertheless, these theoretic calculations were somewhat disconcerted by
the energy of the defence.

Colonel Dubois had not men enough to act efficiently at a distance; he
did his utmost to economise his strength, and contented himself with
impeding the works at the commencement with his artillery. This
consisted, as we have seen, of--

   Guns of various calibre   20
   Twenty-four pounders       6
   Howitzers                  2
   Mortars                    4
   Field-pieces               4
                             --
   Total of ordnance         36
                             ==

A dozen stone mortars and rampart rifles formed the rest of the
artillery. The arsenal contained also a certain supply of hand-grenades
and fireworks.

At length, on the 20th of February, the batteries of the first parallel,
to the number of ten, opened their fire. Each of them was armed with
three guns; the first on the right (of the besieger), a ricochet, raked
the covered way in front of the right face of the left bastion (of the
besieged). The second swept the right face of the left demi-lune; the
third, the left face of the middle demi-lune; the fourth, a ricochet,
raked the covered way in front of the left face of the left bastion; the
fifth swept the salient of the demi-lune; the sixth swept the right face
of that demi-lune; the seventh, a ricochet, raked the covered way in
front of the left face of the right bastion; the eighth, a ricochet,
raked the left face of the demi-lune in the centre; the ninth swept the
left face of the right demi-lune; and the tenth, a ricochet, raked the
covered way before the left face of the right bastion. Four mortars were
mounted between the batteries 4 and 5, 6 and 7. Captain Allaud did not
doubt that the principal attack would be directed to the left bastion;
he had the gorge of this bastion therefore retrenched during the night.
The six twenty-four pounders were placed in battery on the cavaliers of
the bastions of the main defence, and well sheltered by traverses and
blindages. These six pieces concentrated their fire on the fourth and
fifth batteries of the besieger, and succeeded in silencing their fire
about noon. Then they fired on battery No. 3, and before night silenced
its three guns also. The guns in battery on the cavaliers of the
bastions of the work were sufficiently well sheltered not to be in
danger from the enemy's projectiles, to which they responded only
feebly. But on the night of the 20th February the plans of the besieger
had to be modified. At midnight the colonel ordered five hundred men to
arm, put horses to his four field-pieces, whose wheels had been covered
with rags and wool, and going out by the left demi-lune, he had two
pieces placed on the right and two on the left of the road, two hundred
yards in front of the glacis, and, on the road itself, the two
howitzers, a hundred yards behind. Then he advanced resolutely towards
the communicating boyau, between the third and fourth of the enemy's
batteries, whose fire had been silenced. The posts offered but a slight
resistance; the sappers fled, abandoning the trench, and were pursued to
the batteries at the point of the bayonet.

[Illustration: FIG. 70.

THE THEORETICAL ATTACK ON VAUBAN'S WORK.]

The reinforcements then arrived, and the colonel drew back his men
quietly, by echelons, to the guns. These then opened a simultaneous fire
on the enemy with grape; and the five hundred men advanced once more,
and brought back some prisoners, but seeing themselves again attacked by
a superior force, fell back. This time the Germans did not go beyond
their trenches, but contented themselves with a few volleys of grape at
random. This skirmish did not last more than half an hour. At one
o'clock A.M. Captain Allaud placed two hundred workmen at a distance of
two hundred and fifty yards in front of the face of the left demi-lune
No. 1, crossed by the road, to commence a trench at this point (Fig.
72). These workmen were protected by a post of one hundred men, and the
two howitzers left on the road. This work consisted of two redans, with
massive traverse-shelters (see A). It was sufficiently advanced at
daybreak to be able to shelter the workmen. When the enemy, who had
begun his work again at the trench boyaux, B and C, in order to commence
the second parallel, perceived at early dawn the new work executed by
the besieged, he hastened to bring the fire of battery No. 1 upon it,
for batteries 2, 3, and 4 had not yet been remounted. But from the
cavaliers of the bastions No. I. and V., six guns in two hours silenced
this battery, No. 1, in spite of the besieger's batteries, 5 and 6. The
day thus passed in cannonading, and the Germans could not continue their
boyau of communication, B, which was raked by one of the howitzers which
the besieged had placed behind the great traverse of the salient of
the redan on the left. They had to modify the direction of the trench,
and follow the dotted line, _a b_.

[Illustration: FIG. 71.

THE THIRD PARALLEL AND CROWNING OF THE COVERED-WAY.]

[Illustration: FIG. 72.]

During the night of the 21st of February, Captain Allaud completed his
redans, enlarged the traverses, and set up blindages for seven guns; and
in the morning the work presented on the inner side the appearance
(Fig. 73). The gun on the left, A, directed its fire on battery No. 1;
the two guns on the left return, B C, on battery No. 4; the pieces D E,
of the right return, on battery No. 1; and the two pieces F G, of the
right face, on battery No. 6.[61] But this did not hinder the
bastions V., VI., I., II., and III. from firing on these batteries.

[Illustration: FIG. 73.]

That same night, however, the besieger had been able to start his second
parallel; but he was evidently embarrassed on his right, and was
modifying his plan on this side. He seemed to be giving up an attempt on
the place by the salient of bastion No. 2, and was working actively on
his left.

During the 22nd of February, the besiegers could not restore battery No.
1, because the besieged kept up a constant discharge on this point. They
succeeded only at nightfall in remounting their guns in batteries 2 and
3; and having determined the range before night, discharged the balls of
two guns on the salients of the redans. About midnight Colonel Dubois
sent out five hundred men, who, traversing the western ridge of the
plateau, attacked battery No. 1. A few moments afterwards, a second
troop of four hundred men attacked the two batteries, 2 and 3; and the
besieger having been dislodged from battery No. 1, the first troop of
the besieged came and formed in line of musketry between battery No. 2
and the salient of the redan on the right; while fusiliers posted at the
trench, A,[62] and one of the howitzers, swept the ground as far as
battery No. 1, in order to hinder the enemy from taking the sortie in
the rear.

This operation was completely successful; not only were the works of
battery No. 1 damaged, and the three guns with which it was armed (the
carriages belonging to these guns, as stated above, were already
broken), but around batteries 2 and 3 there was a very sharp struggle
which resulted in the Germans being repulsed, the guns rendered useless,
the munitions scattered, and the gabions and earth-bags thrown down. A
body of a hundred men had also been posted by the colonel on the <DW72>s
of the plateau to hinder the enemy from making his way along that
escarpment to attack the work A.

Under favour of this sortie, two hundred workmen had been placed by
Captain Allaud along the western ridge of the plateau, to raise a new
work, B C D (Fig. 74), which consisted of three new redans presenting
three batteries each for two guns, traced _en cremaillere_, and
separated by strong traverses. By the morning of the 23rd of February
the first battery, B, was sufficiently strong to resist projectiles.

Moreover, this battery could not be immediately attacked by battery No.
1, which was abandoned, and whose guns were useless. Forty-eight hours
at least were required to enable the besieger to restore batteries 2 and
3. Batteries 4 and 5 must change their embrasures to direct their fire
on this battery B, and only batteries 6 and 7 could sweep the redans A
and B. Now these batteries, 6 and 7, received the fire of the two guns
of the right face of the right-hand redan, of the two guns of the right
face of the bastion II., of the two guns of the left face of the bastion
III., and of a gun of the right face of the demi-lune 2. Every moment it
was necessary to repair the gabionades, and replace the earth-bags; and
since the beginning of the day the enemy had had ten artillerymen
killed, and as many more wounded, in these two batteries.

The German engineer, who had so methodically traced the successive
operations of the siege, was evidently embarrassed by the strategy of
the besieged. It was in his opinion barbarous, absolutely contrary to
rules, and showed an ignorance of, and contempt for the art of
fortification, which must end in disaster.

[Illustration: FIG. 74.]

During the night of the 23rd of February the Germans were finishing
their second parallel, except in the north-west side. They gave the
eastern branch of this parallel an inclination towards the south,[63]
and commenced the batteries 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15. Battery 13, of two
guns, was to rake the work A.

But that same night Captain Allaud terminated the second battery, C,
started the third, D, had an intrenchment made on the ridge of the
plateau, and raised an epaulement, E, to sweep the <DW72>s, with a good
parados.

If the besieged succeeded in finishing and arming these works, the
batteries 11 and 12 of the besieger would be taken obliquely, the boyaux
of communication would be for the most part raked, and the siege would
have to be recommenced. The German general was in a very bad humour, and
blamed the commander of the engineers, who, with his plan on the table,
endeavoured to show that his siege had been duly arranged, according to
all the rules of the art; that the ignorant temerity of these Frenchmen
could not be foreseen, and that if the Germans acted with vigour, they
would be made bitterly to repent of thus advancing wedge-like on the
flank of the attack; that such a thing had never been seen, and that if
they concentrated three batteries on this salient in the air, they would
soon crush it.

On the morning of the 24th of February two twenty-four pounders, placed
in battery on the left face of bastion VIII., opened fire on batteries
13, 14, and 15 of the besieger, which they raked, and damaged greatly
before they were completely finished. This time the German general
proceeded from ill-humour to passion and even menaces; so that the
unfortunate officer of the engineers, repairing to these batteries after
a violent scene to raise traverses and rectify the line, which he
asserted had not been executed conformably to his instructions, had his
head broken by a splinter from a gun-carriage.

The direction of the engineering was then given to a young officer, who,
after a conference with General Werther, modified the plan of the
attack. During the 24th of the month there was scarcely any firing on
either side, the besieger firing only at long intervals. The French
garrison, which was anxious to economise its munitions, scarcely
replied, but worked with ardour at perfecting its advanced works on the
west.

A sortie effected during the night of the 24th, to ascertain whether the
enemy was re-taking possession of batteries 1, 2, and 3, only
encountered advanced posts, which retired after a feeble resistance.
These three batteries were in the condition to which they had been
reduced by the preceding sortie.

Captain Allaud employed the whole of the night in strengthening the
batteries B, C, D. They were armed with six guns, which on the morning
of the 25th swept the boyaux of communication and a whole branch of the
second parallel.

The Germans scarcely replied, and seemed to be abandoning their works.

They were probably going to try another attack. The colonel was somewhat
disquieted at Captain Allaud's novel strategy, which, in face of a bold
assailant, presented grave perils. The calmness of the enemy made him
fear some unexpected design; perhaps a strenuous attack on that salient
which, if it were taken, would furnish the besiegers with an excellent
position for rapidly establishing breach batteries against demi-lune No.
I, and bastion II. This salient therefore must be defended at any cost,
since they had been led to establish it in order to disconcert the
systematic attack of the Germans. Moreover, if they lost it, they would
probably lose at the same time most of the guns that armed it; and the
defence had only a restricted number.

Thirteen guns armed the advanced work. The two howitzers were placed in
battery, one at the extremity of the salient D, pointed at battery No.
1, the other in the right re-entering _place d'armes_ of the demi-lune
No. 1. Two guns were also placed on the right face of the demi-lune; two
guns on the front, between the bastions I. and II., and two guns on the
right and left faces of this bastion, to sweep the advanced works if
they were taken. In all, nineteen guns and two howitzers. Besides, the
ridge of the plateau was well defended by a good trench-shelter with
traverses, that the work might not be able to be taken by assault in
rear by the escarpment. One of the twenty-four pounders was placed in
battery in the bastion V. of the main work, in the direction of its
capital, to sweep this <DW72>.

On the 25th of February only a few cannon-shots were exchanged. The
mortar batteries of the besieger concentrated their fire on the western
redan, without doing much damage; but during the night of the 25th the
fire of the bombs was so incessant that it became difficult to labour at
these works. It continued during the 26th, but the besieged dismounted
three of these mortars with the guns left on the bastions II. and III.
The besieged on his side placed the two mortars in battery on the front
between these two bastions, and sent projectiles into the batteries 11
and 12.

During the 26th of the month (the weather being clear) the enemy was
seen to be erecting three batteries on the north-west, evidently
directed against the batteries A, B, C, D, to crush them. They could not
reply to their fire; the colonel therefore decided that they should
bring back into the town temporarily the six guns of the batteries B, C,
D. The bombs continued to fall into the works during the whole night of
the 26th; and on the morning of the 27th the fire of the three batteries
of the enemy, erected six hundred and fifty yards behind the abandoned
battery No. 1, was opened against the redans B, C, D; it lasted the
whole night of the 27th, damaged the blindages very severely, and threw
down the traverses. On the morning of the 28th the _cremaillere_ ceased
to be tenable, but the work A had not been seriously injured. The
howitzer placed at D had been brought back behind the great traverse F
surmounted with a banquette.

About nine o'clock the enemy resumed possession of the battery No. 1,
installed four field-pieces there in spite of the fire of the bastions
I. and II., and threw an assaulting column against the damaged works D,
C, B. This was what the colonel anticipated. The column encountered the
fire of the three guns left in the redans A, the howitzer, and a front
of fusiliers posted on the great traverse F. Bending to the right and
defiling below the crest of the plateau, this column was able to seize
the work B, C, D, without excessive loss; and, sheltered behind the
ruins of the earthworks, it was able to keep its ground there while the
field-pieces of the battery No. 1 cleared off the defenders of the great
traverse F. The colonel, however, had brought in again the guns left in
work A, and gave orders to his men to fall back. But at this juncture,
from the demi-lune No. 1, the bastions I. and II. and the curtain
between these bastions, twenty-two guns and some stone mortars poured a
tremendously heavy fire into the abandoned work, inflicting very serious
loss on the besieger, who was endeavouring to hold his ground there.
This cannonade lasted till noon. The colonel, supposing the enemy to be
giving way, sallied forth at the head of eight hundred men and fell on
the posts which the Germans had begun to fortify. He had his attack
sustained by the two howitzers. The work was retaken, but not without
the loss of about a hundred men. The great point was to keep it. About
two o'clock two field-pieces conveyed behind the ruined epaulements of
batteries 2 and 3, and the four of battery No. 1, once more overwhelmed
the salient with small bombs, balls, and grape. The bastions I., II.,
and III. replied immediately, and dismounted some of the enemy's pieces,
which were ill-protected by the battered-down epaulements. The colonel
made his men lie down behind the traverses C, B, F, and awaited a second
assault; which was in fact attempted about four o'clock, as the enemy
believed the outwork was once more abandoned. The assaulting columns
passed the first epaulement; but as soon as they found themselves in the
last redan, D, they were received by a discharge of muskets almost at
arm's length, from behind the traverse C (Fig. 75), followed by a
bayonet charge; this time two hundred Germans remained on the field, and
the remains of the assaulting column fell back in disorder to the
batteries, which recommenced firing and went on till nightfall.

The besieged remained masters of the place, but under the converging
fire of the enemy they could not maintain this wedge-shaped and badly
flanked position. There was no advantage in keeping it, sufficient to
compensate for the loss they would suffer in resisting fresh attacks.
However, the colonel was unwilling to abandon the redans without cost to
the enemy. The evening was employed in charging three powder-mines under
the salients A and B, and raising earthworks to protect themselves as
well as they could. All this night of the 28th of February the bombs
fell thick on the outwork: the men were still tolerably protected on the
_debris_ of the blindages. On the morning of the 1st of March the German
artillery recommenced firing on the redans more briskly than the day
before, from the three batteries behind and from battery No. 6.

The colonel withdrew his men into the town, and left only one platoon,
well sheltered, with orders to fire the mines only when the enemy
thought himself covered by the epaulement of the redan A, and was
endeavouring to take up his position there.

[Illustration: FIG. 75.--ATTACK ON THE WORKS OF COUNTER-APPROACH.]

The 1st of March passed by without a new assault being attempted by the
besiegers. "They will try it to-night," thought Colonel Dubois. He went
back about seven o'clock in the evening into the salient, to make
certain that the train was well laid; and to encourage his men, he
reinforced them with twenty fusiliers, enjoining upon them, when they
saw their enemy, to make such a pretence of defending themselves as
should be sufficient to draw him on; but to fall back promptly after
setting fire to the train.

The bombardment was recommenced about eight o'clock, but at ten ceased
for a time; and the colonel, who had ascended the cavalier of bastion
II., thought the enemy was about to make a fresh attempt. In fact,
notwithstanding the darkness of the night, he saw black masses spreading
successively through the works D, C, and B[64]. On arriving at the
traverse F, they were received by a volley of musketry, to which they
responded by a well-sustained fire. A mass of the enemy might be seen
moving along the traverse F, and halting outside the redans A. At this
moment three successive explosions were heard which made the ground
tremble, succeeded by loud cries. The order was given: from the
demi-lune No. 1. and bastions I. and II., all the pieces fired together
on the outwork for half an hour; after which two hundred men of the
garrison sallied forth and rushed on the enemy. The outwork contained
only dead and wounded. Captain Allaud then went out in his turn with two
hundred volunteer workmen, to fill up the trenches and destroy obstacles
as far as possible. About midnight the bombs fell once more on the
corner of the defence, and orders were given to retire within the
fortress, so as to avoid unnecessary loss.

The siege had lasted twelve days, and the second parallel, which ought
to have been terminated on the sixth day, was not finished. The garrison
reckoned about a hundred and fifty men killed and wounded; but they had
inflicted more serious losses on the besiegers.

General Werther found the affair a very tedious one, and was much
annoyed. Some royalists, who had mansions in the faubourg on the other
side of the river Abonne, were on very friendly terms with the troops of
the coalition, and manifested their impatience and anger against "this
handful of _brigands_" who were holding the upper town and prolonging a
useless struggle. The German general was very anxious to come to terms
with the garrison: four hundred of his men were already _hors de
combat_, and he thought this a great expenditure in taking this "nest,"
which was supposed to be without a garrison or munitions. The news he
had lately received from the north was more encouraging, but he was
urged to finish the business.

One of the most zealous of the royalists, who were constantly in the
German camp, proposed therefore to pay a visit to the governor, to
inform him that Napoleon's armies were retreating at every point, that
the capture of Paris was imminent, that the Bourbons would soon return
amid the acclamations of the whole of France, and to urge the
uselessness of a longer defence.

General Werther readily acceded to the proposal, and on the 2nd of
March, Baron de X*** presented himself at the outpost with a German
envoy. The colonel received the German officer and the baron in a room
in one of the ruined barracks. The German envoy first asked for an
exchange of prisoners. This was readily granted by the colonel. Then
the Baron de X*** began in his turn to explain the object of his visit.

Scarcely had he begun when the colonel stopped him: "I do not know, and
do not desire to know, sir, whether you come here to speak for yourself
alone or as the representative of a certain number of your countrymen;
but I will answer you briefly and clearly. I am here on the authority of
superior orders to defend the place against the enemies of the country.
The political inducements which you urge have not the slightest weight
with me. I utterly ignore them. I shall not surrender the place unless
compelled by force or ordered to do so by the Emperor's Government.
Permit me to add, sir, that the part you are performing to-day is not an
honourable one. What do you think of it, _Monsieur le capitaine_?" added
he, turning to the German officer. The latter merely bowed slightly.
"The prisoners shall be exchanged this very day, if you desire it, man
for man," said the colonel, rising. "As to you, sir, if you had not come
here protected by a flag of truce, I should have you tried, and probably
shot before the garrison, ere sunset." And dismissing his two visitors,
the governor enjoined on the officer commissioned to accompany them back
to the outposts not to allow them to have any communication with anyone.

The besieger from this day forwards was but slow in carrying on his
approach works; he contented himself with terminating the second
parallel and setting up three batteries of six pieces each, which opened
fire on the 6th of March upon the faces right and left of bastions II.
and III., and on the left face of demi-lune No. 2, with the evident
intention of making a breach at four hundred yards' distance. Three
mortar batteries covered the works with bombs. The Germans were
evidently intending to keep the garrison occupied, and put it out of
heart; waiting the chance of political events to put the place in their
hands. Of the four thousand men under General Werther's command, and who
had been reduced to three thousand four hundred by the losses sustained,
it was necessary to send one thousand to Troyes; only two thousand five
hundred men therefore remained before La Roche-Pont. Besides, the
general had received orders to run no risks, but limit himself to a
surveillance of the passages from the Saone to the Marne, and blockading
the garrison of La Roche-Pont, keeping it sufficiently employed to
prevent its taking the offensive, but without losing men in the capture
of so insignificant a place. On the other hand, the royalists of the
lower town were constantly predicting the end of hostilities and the
return of the Bourbons.

On the 12th of March news was received at headquarters that Napoleon had
received a check before Laon, that Marmont's force had been routed, and
that the allied troops were in full march on Paris. The royalists
thought that the moment had come for another application to General
Werther to induce him to complete the capture. They were anxious to be
the first in Burgundy to declare for the Bourbons, and the cautious
deliberation of the general of the allied troops exasperated them. He,
too, would have liked to get possession of the place before the
anticipated cessation of hostilities. He therefore sent another envoy to
Colonel Dubois, to give him the latest news of the armies of the
coalition, to inform him that the Allies were just about to enter Paris,
which was now without defence, and to summon him to surrender in order
to avoid a useless effusion of blood; and to say that if he refused to
capitulate he must expect rigorous measures, which he, General Werther,
would rather avoid, and of which the governor alone would have to bear
the responsibility. Colonel Dubois' answer was exactly the same as
before. He said he could not capitulate, as his defences remained
entire.

During the night of the 12th of March, two mortar batteries were planted
on the hill <DW72>s of the right bank, and opened fire in the evening on
the faubourg of the left bank. The _fleche_ which served as a _tete du
pont_ was broken down by the shells. The German general thought he
should thus induce the townspeople to insist on the governor's promptly
capitulating. Some of the houses in this faubourg caught fire, and the
inhabitants took refuge in the upper town. The garrison could not
respond to the fire of the mortar batteries, as they had no more guns of
large calibre. The six twenty-four pounders were employed to oppose the
enemy's batteries on the north, and they could not disarm the bastions
on this side. To complete their distress typhus broke out among the
wounded in the _cite_.

Provisions, too, were becoming scarce, and the garrison was placed on
half rations.

On the plateau the cannonade on both sides was continuing, and the
escarpments of the two bastions II. and III. were much damaged. As the
enemy found nothing more to destroy or burn in the lower town on the
right bank, he began his approaches on the 15th of March, and
established a demi-parallel with two fresh batteries during the night
(of the 15th and following day), of four guns each. This was, however,
not accomplished without difficulty, for these batteries were only three
hundred yards from the faces of bastions II. and III., whose cavaliers
still preserved three guns of large calibre. But on the 18th and 19th of
March twenty-six guns were brought to bear against the works, and
succeeded in throwing down the parapets and dismounting the guns of the
besieged.

During the night of the 19th of March, the colonel endeavoured to mount
the cannon that still remained to him; but these pieces of small calibre
could effect nothing against the enemy's works. However, the breaches
made in the salients of demi-lune No. 2 and of bastion II., were not
practicable; and the colonel, wishing to reserve the little artillery he
had left, for the moment of assault, retrenched the gorge of bastion
II., withdrew its cannon within the fortification and waited the issue.
Not to keep his soldiers idle he occupied them at night in trifling
sorties which fatigued the besieger. He kept the covered ways in good
repair as far as the enemy's fire allowed, and prepared camouflets and
_chicanes_ for the moment when the assailant should try to ascend the
counterscarp.

On the 25th of March the third parallel was finished. The place was
thenceforth only defended by musketry, and a few stone mortars, and
grenades, which small sallying parties threw into the trenches at night.

The approaches to crown the covered way and set up breach batteries were
advancing but slowly, thanks to the activity of the garrison, whose
courage seemed redoubled in seeing the enemy approaching and which
defended its glacis foot by foot.

On the 1st of April came the news of the capitulation of Paris, the
abdication of the Emperor, and the order to suspend hostilities. The
garrison was allowed to retire to Nevers, through Auxonne, Beaune, Autun
and Chateau-Chinon.

On the 5th of April Colonel Dubois quitted La Roche-Pont at the head of
seven hundred soldiers of all arms, who were all the able-bodied men
left him.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 61: See for the numbers of the enemy's batteries, Fig. 72.]

[Footnote 62: See Fig. 72.]

[Footnote 63: See Fig. 74.]

[Footnote 64: See Fig. 74.]




CHAPTER XVII.

_CONCLUSION._


Notwithstanding its bastioned enclosure and great outwork which was
still existing in 1870, exactly as Vauban had planned it, the town of La
Roche-Pont could not have held out forty-eight hours before the German
artillery. A few batteries to the north, on the plateau, and on the west
and east on the sides of the hills placed at nearly two miles distant
would have overwhelmed the place with projectiles without a possibility
of replying; for in September 1870 the small arsenal of La Roche-Pont
contained only six cast iron guns, and four bronze pieces with smooth
bore, two thousand pounds of powder and two or three hundred solid
balls.

It was not attacked, though bodies of the enemy showed themselves not
far from its walls.

Its garrison consisted then of a guard of the engineers and a brigade of
gendarmes.

The inhabitants of La Roche-Pont are, however, patriotic, and mention
with pride the numerous sieges they have experienced.

They had organized their national guard as early as August, including an
artillery corps. It is true they had not been able to supply these
National Guards with more than a hundred flint guns which were lying in
the citadel, and about thirty muzzle-loading guns. These brave people
were not less determined to defend themselves, and began to cast
bullets and make cartridges. They had not the pain of seeing the Germans
there.

In 1871, a French captain of engineers, having been in General
Bourbaki's army, had entered Switzerland with the _debris_ of the corps.

Captain Jean had received a bullet in his breast, not far from the
frontier, and had been taken up by some peasants in the environs of
Pontarlier, and saved by some Swiss custom house officers who had
conveyed him to Lausanne, where he had received the most careful
attention. We might give a touching account of that sad period of our
disasters; and indeed we must write it if it is to be on record at all,
for the Swiss are not the people to make a parade of the zealous
kindness they displayed on this occasion in saving our harassed,
famished, and frozen soldiers. Peasants and townspeople set out amid the
snows of the Jura, to guide and to give shelter to our disbanded and
wandering regiments. Some sacrificed their lives in this service of
humanity, and emulated each other in offering an asylum and giving
assistance to our exhausted soldiers. The behaviour of these excellent
people has excited universal admiration.

Captain Jean was living at Lausanne when Monsieur N.... an officer on
half pay happened to be there. His medical attendants thought that the
climate would contribute to the cure of the wounded man, who had
obtained a conge in the hope of regaining health under the clement skies
of this part of the lake of Geneva. His sister had come to join him and
was doing all for his cure that the tenderest affection could suggest.
His strength was however not returning and alarming symptoms continued.

Captain Jean was from La Roche-Pont; he was on intimate terms with
Monsieur N.... and the conversation often turned on the recent war and
the resources which through ignorance or inability had not been
employed; and they frequently spoke of this beautiful province of
Burgundy, placed on the flank of the invasion, and which was so well
adapted to mask and protect an offensive movement, if they had had an
army of reserve with its right supported by Besancon and its left by
Dijon, and abundantly supplied from the basins of the Rhone and the
Saone.

The Captain used to employ his leisure in studying the defence of his
dear little town whose history he knew so well and which he deemed a
strategic position of some importance.

Monsieur N.... spent nearly a month in the company of this amiable and
well-informed man, whose feelings were deeply affected by our disasters;
but whose active mind sought in these misfortunes themselves a means of
instruction, and an opportunity for developing the resources and
advantages peculiar to France. This was an inexhaustible subject of
conversation for the two friends, and they would continue talking till
the sister interposed her authority as nurse to enjoin silence and rest.

In December 1871, Monsieur N.... received the following letter at Paris,
accompanied by a bundle of papers.

"LAUSANNE, _December 10th, 1871_.

"SIR,

"My dearly loved brother died in my arms the day before yesterday, his
death being the result of his wound and also perhaps of grief for our
late disasters,--deeply affected as he was by the indelible recollection
of the sufferings he had witnessed.

"He retained his consciousness to the last, and I am fulfilling one of
his most urgent requests in sending you these papers. It is the only
souvenir he can bequeath to you--as he said to me the day before his
death--of the hours you so kindly devoted to a poor invalid.

"My brother often spoke to me of you; you were able to appreciate his
excellencies and noble character, and will receive his bequest, I doubt
not, as a mark of the profound esteem he had for you.

"As for myself I cannot quit a neighbourhood where I have lived with my
brother, and where we have met with so much sympathy."


_Extracts from Captain Jean's papers._

Attack implies a shock or onset; defence is a resistance to this onset.
Whether a piece of ordnance discharges a ball against a plate of iron,
or a casing of masonry, or an earthwork; or an assaulting column climbs
a breach, the problem is substantially the same; in either case we have
to oppose to the impulsive force a resistance that will neutralise its
effect.

When there were no projectile weapons, or their range was
inconsiderable, only a normal resistance had to be opposed to the
shock--a man to a man--or if the effect was to be rendered certain, two
men to one. But when projectile arms acquired a longer range, the
_position_ of the attack and defence became a question of importance.
Thus were evolved for combatants in open ground the elements of tactics,
and for fortification, arrangements of a more and more complicated
character.

It is evident, for example, that when it came to a close engagement--a
hand-to-hand struggle with an adversary; if the latter found himself
placed behind a circular enclosure, the obstacle that protected him
would give him a considerable advantage--an advantage that could only be
compensated for by renewing the attack.

[Illustration: FIG. 76.]

To make this very simple principle intelligible at a glance, suppose
(Fig. 76) a circular enclosure containing forty defenders separated from
each other about a yard apart; a hand-to-hand struggle can only be
carried on with a number equal to that of the defenders--or nearly
so--and these under cover. It is no use for the assailants to assemble
as at _A_, they can only present a front equal to that of the defence,
and if this is energetic, the triangle _a_, _b_, _c_, will be effective
only at _c_.

[Illustration: FIG. 77.]

But let us suppose the attacking body to possess projectile arms (Fig.
77), and instead of encountering the circular enclosure, the assailants
to set up their engines between _A_ and _B_ within fair range. They will
overwhelm the segment _d_, _c_, _e_, of the circle with projectiles,
while the defenders will be able to oppose only an inferior number of
engines to the convergent fire.

[Illustration: FIG. 78.]

To compensate in part for this inferiority the defending party adds
appendages to the enclosure (Fig. 78 A), which allow an almost equal
front of defence to be opposed to the attacking front, as regards the
number of projectile weapons, and very superior in point of elevation
and protection. But the attacking force will thus naturally arrange its
engines as seen at B. Thus the projectiles sent from _a_, _b_, _c_, _d_,
_e_, converge upon the salient C. The defence adds the new appendages D
D, and if the engines are well protected, it can make the projectiles
_g_, _h_, _i_, converge on the engine K and crush it, secondly the
projectiles _l_, _g_, _h_, on engine _m_ and destroy it, and so on.

Besides, these appendages have the further advantage of giving side
views over the circumvallation itself and masking its foot.

This principle regulates and will always regulate attack and defence;
distances alone modify its applications.

The more eccentric the defence is, the more distant must be the attack,
and the wider the perimeter it must occupy; but it should be observed,
that the more widely the defence is extended, the more open its flanks
are to attack; these flanks therefore must also be capable of being
defended, for every obstacle that offers only its own resisting force,
without being protected by the action of a neighbouring obstacle, is
soon destroyed.

Whether fortifications or plans of battle are in question, the same
principle comes into play. "Every part should defend its neighbour and
be defended by it." It is clear that the solution of the problem becomes
more and more difficult in proportion to the enlargement of the range of
projectile weapons, and the extent of fronts of fortification or lines
of battle.

Vauban, and most of the engineers who were his rivals and successors,
had resolved the problem in view of the range of the artillery of the
period.

Suppose a hexagon (Fig. 79), fortified according to Vauban's first
method, it is evident that all the parts of the circumference of one
thousand, and even one thousand eight hundred yards, are commanded by
the curtains, the faces of the bastions and the demi-lunes. If the
fortress stands in a level country, the enemy cannot occupy any point in
that circumference without being exposed to its fire.

To raise his first parallel and first batteries, he would have to begin
his works at the limit of the range of the rampart guns; and, as we saw
in Fig. 70, he must erect these batteries sufficiently near the place to
enable their fire to tell upon the defences--_i.e._, at eight or nine
hundred yards. At this distance the curtains could be swept, the faces
and flanks raked, and the parapets thrown down. As the projectiles
reached either point blank, or under an angle of about 10 deg. when the ball
rebounded, the besieged could protect himself against it for a very
considerable time, and keep his own artillery intact.

[Illustration: FIG. 79.]

But as the range of siege pieces in the present day extends to eight or
nine thousand yards, the conditions both for the besieged and the
besieger are very different. Hence (Fig. 80) the enemy raises his
batteries on two or three fronts of the circumference, taking advantage
of the rise in the ground, a wall, or a wood to protect his works, and
when all is ready, he unmasks these batteries, and covers a segment of
the fortress with a quantity of explosive projectiles, which, reaching
it at an angle of 25 deg. to 30 deg. burst, no matter where--_dans le tas_, to
use a common expression--the distance not allowing an aim at flanks or
faces in particular--the besieger being in fact unable to distinguish
them. Supposing the besieged able to maintain his artillery and reply,
exposed as he is to the deluge of iron on his face and flanks, he has to
aim at eccentric points which may vary, to whose position he has no clue
but the smoke of the guns, and at an enemy, who, taking advantage of an
indefinite amount of space to make his arrangements and shelter his men,
is completely free. But to maintain his artillery and preserve his men
and munitions, the besieged has only a space relatively limited to move
in; he is soon encumbered with _debris_ of all kinds, every movement is
difficult for him, and he has not even room to repair damages. He tires
himself out to no great purpose. If the attack has maintained its fire
at a long range for several days, it has introduced such confusion into
a great part of the defences, that in two or three nights afterwards the
first parallel may be commenced at about one thousand yards, it may be
well armed and protected by batteries _en retraite_ and trench-shelters,
so as to discourage sorties and allow of an advance to crown the covered
ways. In what state are the works of the besieged by this time? The
flanks of the bastions are as much damaged as their faces, the
demi-lunes are untenable, and the ditches partly filled up; disorder and
confusion prevail on all sides. No breach is practicable, certainly; but
all the works are seriously injured on three or four fronts, and at one
thousand yards distance, a breach may be made, and that a wide one. The
garrison may sustain the assault to the last, and sell the possession of
the _debris_ of its work dearly; but in this case the final result is
not doubtful.

[Illustration: FIG. 80.]

In proportion to the length of the trajectory, therefore, the defence
must remove its defensive arrangement from the centre of the place.

[Illustration: FIG. 81.]

If each front of Vauban's defence was about four hundred yards in
length, it ought to be from thirteen to fourteen thousand yards now
(Fig. 81). That is to say, the side of the hexagon which was four
hundred yards--_i.e._, from one salient of a bastion to another--should
be fourteen hundred yards. Let A be the main body of the fortress--on a
plain suppose; forts will be erected at B and C, the zone of action of
each of these works being eight thousand yards, they will protect each
other and cross their fires without the possibility of their projectiles
falling into the fortress if any of them should be in the power of the
enemy.

[Illustration: FIG. 82.]

Fig. 82 presents the block plan of each of those forts B and C, to whose
interior arrangements we shall return. But by this excessive lengthening
of the _capitals_, the forts B (Fig. 81), may be swept along the whole
extent of the arc of a circle _a b_ (more than the third of the
circumference); they occupy the points of a triangle, and if one of them
were taken the enemy would be able to batter two of the forts C. It is
therefore necessary, with an extended radius, to multiply the defences,
and to enable them to protect each other in a more effective manner.
This is the method indicated in Fig. 83.

Here we have a dodecagon. The forts of the outer zone are seven thousand
yards apart, and the works, A, flank each other; a second zone of forts
B commands the latter, if required, and the zone of action of these
second works extends beyond the outer line of forts. Railways are
required to connect the forts of each zone, and to put them in
communication with the body of the place.

This extension of the fields of defence may, according to the nature of
the ground, be divided into two zones with a central nucleus.

[Illustration: FIG. 83.]

The interior zone would consist of permanent works, forming an _enceinte
de preservation_; a line of forts at intervals sufficiently
strengthened, in case of war, by field works.

The exterior zone would be fixed by occupying strategic points well
chosen and considered beforehand, forming small camps protected by
temporary works, and affording security to a numerous army, whose
manoeuvres the enemy could not espy.

The expenditure entailed by such a system of defence is unquestionably
enormous. But as respects this question there is to all appearance an
unwillingness to realize exactly the new state of things produced by
artillery of long range.

The expenditure involved in the successive systems of defence from
ancient times downwards has been a continually increasing one. The wall
built round Paris by Philippe-Augustus, would not cost, the running
yard, as much as that of Charles V.; the latter, again, must have been
less expensive than the bastioned fronts of Louis XIII., and these again
would be far from necessitating the outlay (_i.e._ estimated by the
running yard, and reckoning detached forts) occasioned by the
fortification of Paris under Louis Philippe. Similarly the mounting of
four or five trebuchets, and the movable towers required for attacking a
fortified place before fire artillery was employed, cost less than the
manufacture of the artillery used at the siege of Turin in 1535. The
latter again would be far less costly than the French and English
artillery at the siege of Sebastopol. Whereas at the time when
smooth-bore guns were used a place might be attacked with about sixty
pieces, five times the quantity are needed now; since it is necessary to
operate over a much more extensive area.

War is therefore a game which tends to become more and more costly, and
especially siege warfare. Are we then to conclude that nations will
become disgusted with warfare on account of the frightful expense it
involves? This is not probable.

At the present day, as in times past, that which costs most is defeat.
With forty millions well laid out in France, before the war of 1870, and
from forty to eighty millions spent in the war itself, we probably
should not have had to pay the four hundred millions which this war cost
us, and we should not have lost two provinces which are certainly worth
still more than that sum.

Parsimony in military preparations, in times of serious change, such as
ours, is ruinous.

The principles to be followed may be summed up as follows: Commit
yourself to no superfluous outlay, but spend all that is necessary.
Besides, is it after all certain that a good system of territorial
defence is so costly as some allege?

Is it a question of building something like a Chinese Wall on our
eastern frontier? Is it likely that if a few strong positions rendered
impregnable without unnecessary works enabled us to keep an army of
observation two hundred thousand strong, secure from any surprise in the
elevated valleys bounded by the ranges of hills which stretch from the
Jura along Belfort, Remiremont, Epinal, Langres and Dijon, and border
the right bank of the Saone as far as Lyons, the Germans would be in a
hurry to make their way a second time to Paris? If they experienced the
slightest check on such a route, if they were obliged even to halt, what
would become of them?

The essential consideration therefore is a good choice of positions;
shelter from the approach of an invasion on the flanks, and the
avoidance of enormous expenditure in the attempt to defend all points.
Let us suppose that Metz had been rendered impregnable, or at least so
provided with defences that it could have held out for six months; and
certainly the thing was possible. In the first place we should not have
lost that town, and secondly the war, notwithstanding our deficiencies
in soldiers and in artillery, might have taken quite another turn.
Greater sacrifices on the part of the enemy, more prudence, and a still
greater loss of men, would have been required to constrain us to a peace
accepted before the cannon's mouth.

War is made now a-days with armies a million strong; this is all very
well while the invading force meets no very serious obstacle, either in
front of it or on its flanks; when the combinations which such a vast
display of forces necessitates are not disturbed at any point, and when
the strategic operations upon the ground succeed each other with perfect
precision, as one might trace them on a map in our studies. But these
enormous agglomerations of men could give rise in a single day to
appalling perils, after a grave check on one of their flanks. Such
masses can be advanced, fed, and manoeuvred only by means of a very
complicated, and therefore delicate and easily deranged machinery. The
Germans asserted that by the possession of Alsace and a part of Lorraine
we had a hold upon Germany. Now their country is almost dove-tailed into
France. The future will show whether that will greatly benefit them.

In 1870 and 1871 we saw what could be accomplished by the little
fortress of Belfort; which was perhaps the only one among our strong
places possessing guns of long range, and a garrison well commanded and
determined to defend itself.

It persisted in maintaining the offensive over a circle of from twelve
to sixteen miles, thanks to a few rifled cannon with which the ramparts
were furnished, and which protected sorties through a radius of three to
four miles. For a month it hindered the planting of siege batteries;
and, in spite of a bombardment of seventy-three days, the town had only
four of its houses burned. This defence is instructive, and shows that
the old defensive system has had its day.

During the siege the batteries of the besieged hardly suffered at all,
and had recourse to indirect firing--that is, they fired over the
barracks from the gorge of the castle without seeing the mark, but
regulating by observation. This indirect firing, which took no account
of the plan of the crests of the defence, and which thus enabled a
powerful fire to be directed to any point, without regarding the faces,
produced a great effect on the batteries of the enemy, who, on his side,
could not see these guns, and did not know how to regulate his fire.

The question, therefore, remains undecided; and, though a long range
enables the attack to envelope each work more decidedly with its fires,
each battery of the besieger may be subjected to the fire of a greater
number of guns by the defence. At Paris, the forts which are by no means
planned in view of the present long range, enabled a weak and
inexperienced garrison, whose _morale_ was none of the firmest, to
execute sorties with success to a distance of two miles and a half.[65]

With good troops, then, we might have raised in one night, works which
would have enabled us to resume the offensive, and to push further on,
to break the line of contravallation, and seriously to embarrass the
besieger. It is not therefore proved that long ranges give a greater
advantage to the attack than to the defence, while, on the other hand,
the long range of rifled cannon may be affirmed to be favourable to the
defence; but it would be so only on the condition of the works being
planned in view of the new action of artillery, and not according to old
traditions, however glorious. The destructive power of explosive
projectiles puts obstacles in the way of the besieger's approaches; and,
in fact, during the late war we never saw employed that old mode of
approach with a view to attacking by breach and crossing the ditch.

The Germans were not so stupid as to employ these classical methods.
They took up their position on favourable and often commanding points,
at three thousand eight hundred to four thousand two hundred yards
around our fortresses, which adhered to the old defensive system adapted
to ranges of two thousand two hundred yards at most; and covered with
shells our works and the towns they were supposed to protect, without
risk to a single sapper. We thought that odious and unreasonable; like
those nobles of the fifteenth century, who thought it an abominable
shame that their feudal nests should be breached with bombards, and
declared that the trade of war was thereby damaged. But suppose we
should some day condescend to practical consideration, when these old
flanked fronts fall into disesteem, and the new generation of military
engineers determine to admit that we have to do with artillery of long
range, and to take advantage of the fact, a certain degree of
superiority might be doubtless given to defence over attack.

How ought these isolated forts, which are destined to replace the
salients of our old fortresses, to be planned? They should afford ample
space for a large number of fires--even indirect fires--in case of need;
consequently extended faces and short flankings--that is, as shallow as
possible, and perfectly open gorges. They should efficiently protect the
works of counter-approach, and consider defence at close quarters as a
question of only secondary importance; for very seldom would there be
occasion for it, if indeed the case ever presented itself, which is
doubtful.

[Illustration: FIG. 84.]

Referring to the general defensive system shown in Fig. 83, and required
the plan of one of the forts, A, the result will be Fig. 84, giving the
work at the lower level at C, and at the level of the batteries at D.
The counterscarp should be cased up to at least sixteen or seventeen
feet above the bottom of the ditch.

The escarp should be made with tipped earth. The masonry works should
all be covered and secured from being enfiladed; they form casemates
inside E. Beneath the terracings, powder magazines, F, and the passages
communicating with the _oiseaux_ or lower _orillons_, G, protected by
the counterscarp and the covered way, and which are used only if the
enemy attempts to pass the ditch. The faces and flanks on the outside
are planned on angles sufficiently obtuse to cross their fires. The two
faces in the plan (Fig. 84) may be armed with eight guns and the flanks
with six guns. This work is separated from that of the gorge by a
traverse that efficiently protects this gorge, which possesses its
flanks, armed with four guns and its orillons.

From the work of the gorge is a communication into the fort by a covered
caponniere, forming traverse in the direction of the _capital_ or centre
line. The gorge is defended by a curtain for the riflemen, and, at need,
for small pieces of artillery. At need also, on the terre-plein of the
work of the gorge may be mounted guns of long range, affording an
indirect fire in the circumference of a semi-circle, over the great
traverse H, if the parapets of the faces are damaged by the fire of the
enemy.

Fausse-braies consisting of palings are fixed in the ditch at ten feet
from the base of the escarp, to hinder the fallen _debris_ of the escarp
from filling up the ditch, and to enable its passage to be defended. The
well-covered internal masonry works prevent the accumulation of earth on
the interior platforms, and afford casemates, which enable the garrison
to take rest in perfect security; at any rate along the two faces and
the great traverse. Blindages can be set up on the traverses of the
batteries, and can be easily repaired every night, as well as the escarp
of tipped earth.

It would be difficult to say how many projectiles it would require to
render such a work untenable; since we have seen in the siege of Paris,
that a marine battery erected on tipped earth on the military road
between the forts of Rosny and de Noisy, armed with three guns, had been
a mark for the German shells during twenty-four days, without any of its
guns having been dismounted, or its escarp suffering more than could be
made good each night.

Permanent works should, however, only be established with the utmost
circumspection:--1. Because they require a very considerable outlay. 2.
Because they are necessarily familiar to, and for a long while studied
by the enemy, who takes his measures accordingly.

The important point is to possess an accurate acquaintance with the
ground to be defended, and only to establish permanent works in second
line, and on points incontestably favourable for defence, supposing an
artillery of even a still longer range than the present.

Every centre to be defended should therefore possess works sufficient to
prevent a surprise; and in addition at a distance of six to eight
thousand yards, a line of forts, crossing their fires if possible, or at
any rate connected by strong batteries; and lastly, at a distance of
about four thousand yards, positions previously examined and known,
suitable for placing very simple works of field fortification, but which
at a given moment may offer a resistance sufficient to permit movements
on a grand scale--and delay the formation of an enemy's batteries.

[Illustration: FIG. 85.--DEFENSIVE SYSTEM OF THE GREAT INTRENCHED CAMP.]

In applying these principles to the defence of the town of La
Roche-Pont, whose strategical position is one of major importance, since
it connects Besancon with Dijon, and forms a salient on the flanks of an
army which manoeuvres from Epinal and from Vesoul upon Langres and
Chaumont, it would be necessary to construct around this place, whose
old fortifications are no longer of any value (Fig. 85) eight forts, A,
on the brows of the plateaus which surround the town, and thirteen
batteries or redoubts, B, a little behind or to command the meeting of
the river Abonne with the Saone and enfilade the valleys. Thus the group
of roads which from the point C lead to Langres and Champlitte, from D
to Dijon and Beaune, from E to Besancon and Dole, from F to Gray and
from G to Saint-Jean-de-Losne, would be occupied. A _tete du pont_ H,
protected by batteries which would dominate the Saone, would enable an
army to manoeuvre on both banks.

This passive defence would occupy a perimeter of forty miles, and the
zone of action of the permanent works, a perimeter of sixty miles.

The purely passive defence would require, for the eight forts, four
thousand eight hundred men; for the thirteen batteries two thousand men;
for the guard of the intermediary trenches and the service of the
_enceinte de preservation_, not including the forts and batteries,
eighteen thousand men; reserve in the fortress, two thousand five
hundred men; total, twenty-seven thousand three hundred men, whilst the
effective investment would require an army of one hundred thousand men.
But if this great intrenched camp contained an army of a hundred and
fifty thousand men in addition to the troops necessary for the passive
defence, this army could besides, on a very extended perimeter or on
some advantageous points, occupy within the zone of action of the forts,
an _enceinte de combat_ defended by field works, which would enable it
to assume the offensive at the opportune moment.

The armament of the forts would consist of a hundred and sixty guns of
large calibre, and that of the batteries of forty-five guns of long
range. With the reserve park this would give a total of two hundred and
thirty pieces of ordnance.

Harnessed guns would be also necessary to support the trenches of the
passive defence.

   Each fort would cost about L48,900. The eight together      L391,200
   Each battery or redoubt would cost about L6,000. The
       thirteen together                                         78,000
                                                               --------
                                                Total          L469,200
                                                               ========

To make head against an invasion at all points at once has always been a
difficult problem to solve; and it is still more so if we confine
ourselves to the defensive, for the enemy starts from a base of
operation with a view to concentrating himself upon a point unknown to
the defenders. The latter has therefore only a line to oppose to the
apex of a triangle of action. He must limit himself to preserving the
heart of the country and certain districts that are already naturally
protected, and which allow him to operate on the flanks of the invading
forces; regions behind which lie extensive tracts of country from which
supplies may be drawn.

Let us suppose that on the zone of defence of which La Roche-Pont forms
the centre, an army of a hundred and fifty thousand men were assembled,
which was able to reach Belfort through Besancon or by the road from
Vesoul to Langres through Gray or Chatillon-sur-Seine through Dijon,
these towns of Besancon, Vesoul, Langres, and Dijon being themselves in
a condition to arrest the enemy's advance: the latter in attempting to
make his way to Paris would be obliged either to watch this zone with an
army of three hundred thousand men, or to move, and that with extreme
caution, along the Luneville and Nancy routes.

If a defensive zone of the same importance is disposed on the north, a
point becomes very dangerous, especially if the capital is provided
with an _enceinte de preservation_, and an _enceinte de combat_ allowing
an army to manoeuvre.

Three hundred thousand men therefore would be required to watch the
defensive zone of Burgundy and the same number that of the north, and
four hundred thousand men to invest Paris; total, one million, without
reckoning the troops required for keeping open the communication between
the three armies and guarding the base of operations.

It follows that the slightest check might entail a serious disaster.

As the army of Metz under the ramparts of the town was not able to
manoeuvre, the two hundred thousand men employed in blockading it were
rendered inactive for two months.

If the French army had been able to move within a perimeter of 60 miles,
with a good supply of provisions, it would have reduced three hundred
thousand men to inaction; since the Germans, who leave nothing to
chance, reckon--and not unreasonably--that on the field it is desirable
to be at least two to one. It would seem then that the art of war
now-a-days--as far as resistance to an invader is concerned--consists
not in endeavouring to defend any extensive lines which may be taken or
outflanked, but in establishing a small number of centres of defence,
sufficiently remote from each other and connected by a system of
railways in the rear; which are capable of holding out long, and which
compel the enemy either to divide in order to watch them or to take
them, or to expose his flanks to an attack if he leaves them alone, or
to see himself cut off from his base of operations if he advances _en
masse_ against one of them without covering himself against the
others....

But we must confess to a limited confidence in fortifications on this
immense scale. It is certain that they are ruinous: it is not certain
that they are effective in proportion to the enormous expense they
occasion.

The men-at-arms of the fifteenth century cased themselves and their
horses in iron to resist crossbow bolts, lance-thrusts, and strokes of
axe or sword. Fire artillery, which at first aimed at nothing more than
substituting powder for the mechanism of engines worked by counterpoise
or ropes, and like these discharged only stone balls, becomes improved
and uses iron balls and leaden bullets; and instead of being ponderous
and fixed as formerly, moves on wheels and is rendered easily
manageable, and at the beginning of the sixteenth century places pistols
and arquebusses in the hands of foot-soldiers and horsemen. What plan do
the men-at-arms adopt? They thicken the plates of their armour and line
them so thoroughly that they are no longer fit for a charge. This method
lasts about fifty years, until it is perceived that the best way to
enable cavalry to face artillery, so as not to be crushed by it, is to
allow it to move rapidly.

Cannon are made whose balls pierce through and through the wooden planks
of a vessel. Immediately these planks are cased with iron. To-day's
balls are resisted by the vessel's sides. The plates of iron are doubled
... and forthwith the penetrating force of the projectiles is increased;
but those of the next day pierce them. Steel is made to take the place
of iron: but after thousands upon thousands have been spent the
projectile has always the best of it. But it happens in a naval
engagement that an Admiral steams at full speed right athwart an enemy's
ship and sinks it! In fact it is by rapidity of movement and facility in
manoeuvring that victories at sea are ensured much more than by
increased protective plating.

And in the art of fortification we are exactly at the same point as
were the men-at-arms of the end of the fifteenth century, who heaped
plates on plates to protect themselves from artillery. It is time the
art of fortification should be modified.

It will be objected that a vessel or a horseman can move about, but that
a fortress is immovable, and that consequently passive force cannot here
be replaced by active force or agility. This is a mistake. Though a
fortress cannot be moved, the defensive system of a district can and
ought to be studied, in view of various contingencies. In future warfare
the plan of temporary fortification ought to play a principal part and
may be made to do so. In other terms, an army ought to be able to
fortify itself everywhere, and take advantage of every position. It is
temporary fortification therefore which it is desirable to render easy,
prompt, and efficacious, in order to defeat the combinations studied
beforehand by the enemy, to reduce him in certain cases to the
defensive, when he was hoping to attack, and to embarrass his movements
on the great scale by unforeseen resistance at a point which he expected
to pass with ease, and oblige him incessantly to modify his plans by
rapidly executed arrangements for defence.

Vauban's fortresses have had their day; who can conjecture what may be
accomplished in a future war by the system of defence of which an
example has just been presented?

Still the most reliable fortress for a country is a good and
well-commanded army, and a well-educated, brave, and intelligent
population, resolved to make every sacrifice rather than undergo the
humiliation of a foreign occupation.

Captain Jean's papers contained many other critical remarks which cannot
be recorded here. These documents sufficiently indicate that, whatever
may have been said about the matter, there were among our officers some
who worked, and many who had anticipated the dangers to which we were
exposed by a blind confidence in our valour and an utter ignorance of
the progress made by our enemies. Indeed among these papers of Captain
Jean's, numerous notes, dated 1866, 1867, 1868, show the inefficiency of
the defensive system then recognised in France, and the necessity of
providing our strong places with works adapted to the recent progress in
artillery.

Will the town of La Roche-Pont witness the realisation of Captain Jean's
projects, or is its military history closed for ever? The future will
show.

In the meantime it is engaged in cultivating its vineyards, and its
suburbs are invading once more the <DW72>s of the plateau on the south
and the west. The lower part of its donjon of the 12th century is still
visible above the escarpment of the little citadel, and antiquaries can
discover Roman basements at some points in its wall. When cellars are
excavated, Gallo-Roman coins are sometimes found with broken pieces of
red and black pottery, charred wood, and even flint hatchets.

These evidences of the antiquity of the cite are deposited in a small
museum which also contains sculptures taken from the abbey and the
castle.

If you go to La Roche-Pont, ascend the ruins of the donjon. From this
elevated point the view on a clear spring morning is very fine; towards
the south it extends as far as the Saone, showing the little river
Abonne, winding along the vale through meadows and orchards. On the
north spreads the plateau covered with clumps of trees, and bounded only
by the blue outlines of the hills of the Haute-Marne. At your feet the
town with its ramparts looks like a vessel moored at the extremity of a
promontory. We are reminded then of all the events which this little
nook of ground has witnessed, of the ruins that have been accumulated by
human passion, and the blood that has been so lavishly shed. We fancy we
hear the shouts with which these walls have so often echoed.

Nature however remains the same; the meadows continue to be enamelled
with flowers, and clothe with a mantle of beauty the ruins that have
been heaped up by the fury of men. A feeling of deep sadness comes over
us, and we say to ourselves: "What use is it all?" "What use!" replies
at once a voice in the depth of our our soul. "What is the use of
independence? What good is the love of our country? What use is the
memory of self-sacrifice?" Do not blaspheme, Egoistic Philosophy; be
silent before centuries of struggle--before that layer upon layer of the
bones of the dead, and those heaps of successive ruins which have formed
our country's soil. Though often ravaged, this hill has never been
abandoned by its inhabitants; the more affronts it has had to sustain,
the more its children have become attached to its side, the more they
hold to the soil that has been impregnated with the blood of their
ancestors, and the more hatred they feel towards those who would attempt
to detach them from this ancestral tomb. This is patriotism; and it is
the only human passion that can be dignified with the title of holy. War
makes nations, and war raises them again when they sink down under the
influence of material interests. War is struggle, and we find struggle
everywhere in nature; it secures greatness and duration to the best
educated, the most capable, the noblest, the most worthy to survive. And
in the present day more than ever, success in war is the result of
intelligence and of that which develops intelligence--Work.

Whenever what is called fraternity between nations shall become a
reality, the reign of senile barbarism and of shameful decay will not be
far distant.

Before this rock on which so many generations have fought to defend
their independence, to resist aggression and to keep the rapacious
foreigner at a distance, it is not an expression of regret that is
called for--it is rather of homage to the dead which hearts full of
gratitude cannot withhold. They do not ask for tears but for imitation.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 65: The battle of Champigny had extended our lines to four
thousand six hundred and twenty yards from the Fort de la
Faisanderie.]




EXPLANATION

OF SOME OF THE TECHNICAL TERMS USED IN THIS BOOK.


AGGER (Latin), terrace, or platform, which the Romans raised before the
fronts attacked, for the purpose of setting up their projectile
machines, securing a commanding position, and masking the troops
assembled for an assault.

BAILEY, fore-court; court of the outer works, or yard. The stables and
the lodgings for the garrison were usually disposed in the bailey of the
strong castles of the Middle Ages (see p. 169).

BALISTA (Latin, _onager_), an engine for propelling stones, worked by
means of strongly-twisted cords.

BARBICAN, exterior defence protecting an entrance, and allowing a large
assemblage of men to prepare for sorties, or to protect a retreat.
Barbicans were either of masonry or earth, or constructed of a simple
palisade. They were always of a circular form (see p. 169).

BASTION, an earthwork, cased externally with masonry, salient beyond the
main body of the fortress, and possessing two faces, two flanks, and a
gorge, so as to sweep the ground without, to cross the fires, and to
flank the curtains. The gorge of bastions is open, closed, or
retrenched. Bastions are said to be full when their _terre-plein_ is
level with the curtains; empty, when their _terre-plein_ is beneath that
level; armed with a cavalier, when upon their _terre-plein_ is raised a
battery of earth which commands the country without over the parapets
(see p. 278, 310).

BOULEVARD, an earthwork--in use at the time when fire artillery had
attained a certain degree of importance--for placing cannon outside
ancient defences still preserved. Boulevards were of all forms--square,
circular, and triangular (see p. 229).

BRAIE, an exterior defence of trifling height, protecting the foot of
the ramparts, and hindering the enemy's approach.

BRETECHE, timber construction intended to strengthen and to flank a
front or a salient (see p. 184).

CAT, timber gallery, low and long, covered with a longitudinal very
pointed and strongly ironed roof. Placed on wheels, these galleries were
advanced to the foot of the walls, after the ditch was filled up, and
enabled the miners to begin working into the masonry under cover. The
name _rat_ was given to these galleries in some provinces.

CATAPULT, engine for shooting large darts by means of a powerful bow.

CAVALIER, earthwork raised in the middle of a bastion, or upon any point
of the defence, to command the exterior. In the sixteenth century the
besieging armies erected cavaliers around defences to mount cannon upon
them. Our siege batteries are the modern analogues of these works (see
p. 237, 312).

CHEMISE, exterior inclosure of a donjon; the chemise of the donjon
consists of a wall which leaves a space of some yards between it and the
donjon. A postern with a drawbridge gives a communication between one of
the rooms of the donjon and the rampart walk of the chemise (see p.
201).

CLAVICULA (Latin), exterior defence, raised outside the gates of a camp,
and which obliged those who endeavoured to enter to present their flank
to the defenders of the ramparts (see p. 92).

COVERED WAY, road formed on the counterscarp and protected by the relief
of the glacis (see p. 307).

COUNTERSCARP, is the casing of the ditch which is opposite to the
defence.

DEMI-LUNE, low work, disposed before a curtain between two bastions,
separated from the main body of the fortress by a ditch, and possessing
two faces and two short flanks (see p. 306).

DONJON OR KEEP, chief retreat of the defenders of a strong castle. The
donjon was always separated from the defences of the castle, and put in
direct communication with the exterior (see p. 169).

ESCARP is that part of a revetment of fortifications which fronts the
exterior, from the bottom of the ditch to the parapet or crenelation.

FAUSSE-BRAIE, palisade or trench, with parapet, defending the bottom of
the ditch, low enough to be masked by the relief of the counterscarp.

GLACIS, sloping ground which extends from the counterscarp of the ditch
towards the country, and masks the covered ways as well as the escarp.

HOARDING, wooden gallery which in time of war was put outside
crenelations to enable the defenders to see the foot of the ramparts and
towers, and to throw stones and materials of all kinds upon assailants
attempting to approach.

LIST, interval left between the exterior defences and those of the body
of the place (see p. 180).

MACHICOULIS--The wooden hoarding being easily set on fire, it was
replaced in France, about the end of the thirteenth century, by stone
corbels carrying a crenelation of masonry, and leaving intervals between
them for throwing materials upon the assailants who approached the foot
of the walls. In Syria, the Christians had adopted the machicoulis as
early as the beginning of the thirteenth century.

MANGONEL, engine for propelling large stones from a kind of sling
attached to the longer arm of a movable beam heavily weighted at its
other extremity.

MERLON, solid space in the parapet between two embrasures. During the
Middle Ages the merlons were usually perforated in the middle by a
loop-hole. In time of war the battlements were masked by mantelets of
wood, which could be raised at discretion by means of an axle turning in
two iron collars let into the upper angles of the merlons.

MOVABLE TOWER, timber tower which was mounted on rollers and was
advanced to the walls for the purpose of assault. The movable towers
were made to command the battlements, and the upper story was furnished
with a bridge which fell upon the crest of the ramparts of the towers
(see p. 218).

OISEAU, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a small masonry work
which, disposed at the salient angles in the ditch, swept the latter and
was intended to bar the passage. The _oiseaux_ were masked by the
counterscarp. In modern polygonal fortifications this plan has been
re-adopted (see p. 373).

OPPIDUM (Latin), a citadel or fortified strategical position, among the
Gallic populations. Many Roman camps were formed at the epoch of the
conquest of Gaul, on the Gallic _oppida_, which were only a kind of
intrenched camps formed upon elevated plateaux. Several of our French
towns occupy the sites of ancient _oppida_--Langres, Laon, Beziers,
Carcassone, Uzerche, Sainte-Reine (Alesia), Le Puy-en-Velay,
Semur-en-Auxois, Avalon, Puy d'Issolu, &c.

ORILLON, projecting part of faces of bastions, intended to mask the
flanks and to shield the guns which arm these flanks (see p. 280).

PARADOS, mound of earth disposed behind the guns in battery, to shelter
them as well as the servers from reverse firing.

PARALLEL, trench parallel to the sides of the polygon of a fortress,
supplying a covered communication for planting and serving the siege
batteries. Formerly these parallels were required for approaching and
planting the breach batteries. These parallels communicated with each
other by trench boyaux traced in zigzags, so as not to be raked by the
fires of the place (see p. 330).

PARECLAT, epaulment of earth, or formed with gabions raised on the
ramparts, or in the middle of bastions, to shelter the defenders from
the splinters of bombs and shells.

PLACE D'ARMES, space defended by an epaulment, intended to enclose a
body of men and to protect it from projectiles (see pp. 288, 307).

POSTERN, secondary gate, small gate, generally masked (see p. 170).

RAMPART, epaulment raised with the earth taken from the ditch sunk on
the outer side; also a wall crowned with a parapet and rampart walk. It
signifies a permanent defence.

RAVELIN, name originally given to demi-lunes. A work consisting of two
faces, open at the gorge, low, and intended to sweep the exterior
between two bastions (see p. 279).

REDAN, work presenting a salient angle and a re-entering angle (see p.
305).

RETRENCHMENT, a work made to augment the defensive strength of a place
within the permanent fortifications, so as to present a fresh obstacle
should the latter fall into the power of the enemy; the retrenchment
consists of an epaulment of earth raised with the material from the
ditch sunk on the outside.

STIMULUS (Latin), barbed iron crook, which, fixed on a short stake stuck
in the ground or in the bottom of conical holes, protected the
approaches of a defence (see p. 80).

TENAILLE, work consisting of a curtain having at each extremity two
demi-bastions (see pp. 278, 306).

TRAVERSE, a mound of earth disposed across covered ways, _terre pleins_,
bastions, and curtains, to shield the guns and the defenders against
enfilade, oblique, or ricochet fire (see p. 335).

TREBUCHET, engine for propelling large stones, very similar to the
mangonel, but whose counterpoise was suspended from the beam instead of
being fixed to it.

TRENCH, road sunk in the ground, the earth being thrown up on one side
only, or on both sides, for enabling the approach of places under cover.

TRENCH-SHELTER, temporary defence, consisting of an exterior epaulment
made with the earth taken from a trench, in a way to shield the soldiers
upon a front, around a camp or a post, and enable them to fire under
cover. The trench-shelter is destined to play an important part since
fire-arms have acquired a long range and a rapid discharge. The Romans,
in their day, made use of trench-shelters in the field.

VINEA (Latin), a wooden mantlet, also a timber gallery, set up
perpendicularly to the _agger_, and which affords approach to the
platform under cover. The wooden towers intended to attack the ramparts
of the besieged were rolled forward on these wooden galleries (see p.
83).


THE END.





End of Project Gutenberg's Annals of a Fortress, by E. Viollet-le-Duc

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