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TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE

  * Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_.
  * Small caps are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS.
  * Letter spaced Greek text is enclosed in tildes as in ~καὶ τὰ
    λοιπά~.
  * Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after
    comparison with a later edition of this work. Greek text has
    also been checked with this later edition and with Perseus,
    when the reference was found.
  * Original spelling, hyphenation and punctuation have been kept,
    but variant spellings were made consistent when a predominant
    usage was found.
  * Some inconsistencies in the use of diæresis (like “reorganize”
    and “reörganize”) and in the use of accents over proper nouns
    (like “Autokles” and “Autoklês”) have been retained.
  * Throughout the text, “Mövers” has been changed to “Movers”, when
    referring to Franz Karl Movers, as it is the spelling used in the
    title pages of his main works in German.
  * The following changes were also made, after checking with other
    editions:

    page  27:   “Phokæn” → “Phokæan”    (that Phokæan lady).
    page  94:     “from” → “at”         (arriving at Sparta)
    page  96: “Kannônes” → “Kannônus”   (psephism of Kannônus).
    page 374:    “troad” → “Troad”      (especially in the Troad).
    note 711:  “vii, 39” → “vii, 4, 39” (“Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 39”)

  * In note 965, the printed book version has been retained: “Μὴ
    κινεῖ Καμάριναν, ἀκίνητόν περ ἐοῦσαν”, but the original English
    edition has “Μὴ κινεῖ Καμάριναν, ἀκινητὸς γὰρ ἀμείνων”.




  HISTORY OF GREECE.

  BY
  GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.

  VOL. X.

  REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION.

  NEW YORK:
  HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
  329 AND 331 PEARL STREET.




PREFACE TO VOL. X.


The present Volume is already extended to an unusual number of pages;
yet I have been compelled to close it at an inconvenient moment,
midway in the reign of the Syracusan despot Dionysius. To carry that
reign to its close, one more chapter will be required, which must be
reserved for the succeeding volume.

The history of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, forming as it does
a stream essentially distinct from that of the Peloponnesians,
Athenians, etc., is peculiarly interesting during the interval
between 409 B.C. (the date of the second Carthaginian invasion) and
the death of Timoleon in 336 B.C. It is, moreover, reported to us
by authors (Diodorus and Plutarch), who, though not themselves very
judicious as selectors, had before them good contemporary witnesses.
And it includes some of the most prominent and impressive characters
of the Hellenic world,—Dionysius I., Dion with Plato as instructor,
and Timoleon.

I thought it indispensable to give adequate development to this
important period of Grecian history, even at the cost of that
inconvenient break which terminates my tenth volume. At one time I
had hoped to comprise in that volume not only the full history of
Dionysius I., but also that of Dionysius II. and Dion—and that of
Timoleon besides. Three new chapters, including all this additional
matter, are already composed and ready. But the bulk of the present
volume compels me to reserve them for the commencement of my next,
which will carry Grecian history down to the battle of Chæroneia
and the death of Philip of Macedon—and which will, I trust, appear
without any long interval of time.

  G. G.

  LONDON, FEB. 15, 1852.




CONTENTS.

VOL. X.


PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.


  CHAPTER LXXVI.

  FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS DOWN TO THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS
  BY SPARTA.

  Peace or convention of Antalkidas. Its import and character.
  Separate partnership between Sparta and Persia.—Degradation
  in the form of the convention—an edict drawn up, issued, and
  enforced, by Persia upon Greece.—Gradual loss of Pan-hellenic
  dignity, and increased submission towards Persia as a means
  of purchasing Persian help—on the part of Sparta.—Her
  first application before the Peloponnesian war; subsequent
  applications.—Active partnership between Sparta and Persia
  against Athens, after the Athenian catastrophe at Syracuse.
  Athens is ready to follow her example.—The Persian force aids
  Athens against Sparta, and breaks up her maritime empire.—No
  excuse for the subservience of Sparta to the Persians. Evidence
  that Hellenic independence was not destined to last much
  longer.—Promise of universal autonomy—popular to the Grecian
  ear—how carried out.—The Spartans never intended to grant,
  nor ever really granted, general autonomy.—Immediate point
  made against Corinth and Thebes—isolation of Athens.—Persian
  affairs—unavailing efforts of the Great King to reconquer
  Egypt.—Evagoras, despot of Salamis in Cyprus.—Descent of
  Evagoras—condition of the island of Cyprus.—Greek princes of
  Salamis are dispossessed by a Phœnician dynasty.—Evagoras
  dethrones the Phœnician, and becomes despot of Salamis.—Able
  and beneficent government of Evagoras.—His anxiety to revive
  Hellenism in Cyprus—he looks to the aid of Athens.—Relations
  of Evagoras with Athens during the closing years of the
  Peloponnesian war.—Evagoras at war with the Persians—he receives
  aid both from Athens and from Egypt—he is at first very
  successful, so as even to capture Tyre.—Struggle of Evagoras
  against the whole force of the Persian empire after the peace
  of Antalkidas.—Evagoras, after a ten years’ war, is reduced,
  but obtains an honorable peace, mainly owing to the dispute
  between the two satraps jointly commanding.—Assassination of
  Evagoras, as well as of his son Pnytagoras, by an eunuch slave
  of Nikokreon.—Nikoklês, son of Evagoras, becomes despot of
  Salamis. Great power gained by Sparta through the peace of
  Antalkidas. She becomes practically mistress of Corinth, and the
  Corinthian isthmus. Miso-Theban tendencies of Sparta—especially
  of Agesilaus.—The Spartans restore Platæa. Former conduct of
  Sparta towards Platæa.—Motives of Sparta in restoring Platæa.
  A politic step, as likely to sever Thebes from Athens.—Platæa
  becomes a dependency and outpost of Sparta. Main object of Sparta
  to prevent the reconstitution of the Bœotiad federation—Spartan
  policy at this time directed by the partisan spirit of
  Agesilaus, opposed by his colleague Agesipolis.—Oppressive
  behavior of the Spartans towards Mantinea. They require the
  walls of the city to be demolished.—Agesipolis blockades the
  city, and forces it to surrender, by damming up the river
  Ophis. The Mantineans are forced to break up their city into
  villages.—Democratical leaders of Mantinea—owed their lives
  to the mediation of the exiled king Pausanias.—Mantinea is
  pulled down and distributed into five villages.—High-handed
  despotism of Sparta towards Mantinea—signal partiality of
  Xenophon. Return of the philo-Laconian exiles in the various
  cities, as partisans for the purposes of Sparta—case of
  Phlius.—Competition of Athens with Sparta for ascendency at
  sea. Athens gains ground, and gets together some rudiments of a
  maritime confederacy.—Ideas entertained by some of the Spartan
  leaders, of acting against the Persians for the rescue of the
  Asiatic Greeks.—Panegyrical Discourse of Isokrates.—State of
  Macedonia and Chalkidikê—growth of Macedonian power during
  the last years of the Peloponnesian war.—Perdikkas and
  Archelaus—energy and ability of the latter.—Contrast of Macedonia
  and Athens.—Succeeding Macedonian kings—Orestes, Æropus,
  Pausanias, Amyntas. Assassination frequent.—Amyntas is expelled
  from Macedonia by the Illyrians.—Chalkidians of Olynthus—they
  take into their protection the Macedonian cities on the coast,
  when Amyntas runs away before the Illyrians. Commencement of the
  Olynthian confederacy.—Equal and liberal principles on which the
  confederacy was framed from the beginning. Accepted willingly
  by the Macedonian and Greco-Macedonian cities.—The Olynthians
  extend their confederacy among the Grecian cities in Chalkidic
  Thrace—their liberal procedure—several cities join.—Akanthus
  and Apollonia resist the proposition. Olynthus menaces. They
  then solicit Spartan intervention against her.—Speech of
  Kleigenes the Akanthian envoy at Sparta.—Envoys from Amyntas at
  Sparta.—The Spartan Eudamidas is sent against Olynthus at once,
  with such force as could be got ready. He checks the career
  of the Olynthians.—Phœbidas, brother of Eudamidas, remains
  behind to collect fresh force, and march to join his brother
  in Thrace. He passes through the Theban territory and near
  Thebes.—Conspiracy of Leontiades and the philo-Laconian party in
  Thebes, to betray the town and citadel to Phœbidas.—The opposing
  leaders—Leontiades and Ismenias—were both Polemarchs.—Leontiades
  overawes the Senate, and arrests Ismenias: Pelopidas and
  the leading friends of Ismenias go into exile.—Phœbidas in
  the Kadmeia—terror and submission at Thebes.—Mixed feelings
  at Sparta—great importance of the acquisition to Spartan
  interests.—Displeasure at Sparta more pretended than real,
  against Phœbidas; Agesilaus defends him.—Leontiades at Sparta—his
  humble protestations and assurances—the ephors decide that they
  will retain the Kadmeia, but at the same time fine Phœbidas.—The
  Lacedæmonians cause Ismenias to be tried and put to death.
  Iniquity of this proceeding.—Vigorous action of the Spartans
  against Olynthus—Teleutias is sent there with a large force,
  including a considerable Theban contingent. Derdas coöperates
  with him.—Teleutias being at first successful, and having become
  over-confident, sustains a terrible defeat from the Olynthians
  under the walls of their city.—Agesipolis is sent to Olynthus
  from Sparta with a reinforcement. He dies of a fever.—Polybiades
  succeeds Agesipolis as commander—he reduces Olynthus to
  submission—extinction of the Olynthian federation. Olynthus and
  the other cities are enrolled as allies of Sparta.—Intervention
  of Sparta with the government of Phlius.—Agesilaus marches an
  army against Phlius—reduces the town by blockade, after a long
  resistance. The Lacedæmonians occupy the acropolis, naming a
  council of one hundred as governors.                            1-72


  CHAPTER LXXVII.

  FROM THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY THE LACEDÆMONIANS DOWN TO THE
  CONGRESS AT SPARTA, AND PARTIAL PEACE, IN 371 B.C.

  Great ascendency of Sparta on land in 379 B.C.—Sparta is now
  feared as the great despot of Greece.—Strong complaint of
  the rhetor Lysias, expressed at the Olympic festival of 384
  B.C.—Panegyrical oration of Isokrates.—Censure upon Sparta
  pronounced by the philo-Laconian Xenophon.—His manner of marking
  the point of transition in his history—from Spartan glory to
  Spartan disgrace.—Thebes under Leontiades and the philo-Spartan
  oligarchy, with the Spartan garrison in the Kadmeia—oppressive
  and tyrannical government.—Discontent at Thebes, though under
  compression. Theban exiles at Athens.—The Theban exiles at
  Athens, after waiting some time in hopes of a rising at Thebes,
  resolve to begin a movement themselves.—Pelopidas takes the
  lead—he, with Mellon and five other exiles, undertakes the task
  of destroying the rulers of Thebes. Coöperation of Phyllidas the
  secretary, and Charon at Thebes.—Plans of Phyllidas for admitting
  the conspirators into Thebes and the government-house—he
  invites the polemarchs to a banquet.—The scheme very nearly
  frustrated—accident which prevented Chlidon from delivering
  his message.—Pelopidas and Mellon get secretly into Thebes,
  and conceal themselves in the house of Charon.—Leontiades
  and Hypates are slain in their houses.—Phyllidas opens the
  prison, and sets free the prisoners. Epaminondas and many other
  citizens appear in arms.—Universal joy among the citizens on
  the ensuing morning, when the event was known. General assembly
  in the market-place—Pelopidas, Mellon, and Charon are named
  the first Bœotarchs.—Aid to the conspirators from private
  sympathizers in Attica.—Pelopidas and the Thebans prepare to
  storm the Kadmeia—the Lacedæmonian garrison capitulate and
  are dismissed—several of the oligarchical Thebans are put to
  death in trying to go away along with them. The harmost who
  surrendered the Kadmeia is put to death by the Spartans.—Powerful
  sensation produced by this incident throughout the Grecian
  world.—Indignation in Sparta at the revolution of Thebes—a
  Spartan army sent forth at once under king Kleombrotus. He
  retires from Bœotia without achieving anything.—Kleombrotus
  passes by the Athenian frontier—alarm at Athens—condemnation
  of the two Athenian generals who had favored the enterprise of
  Pelopidas.—Attempt of Sphodrias from Thespiæ to surprise the
  Peiræus by a night-march. He fails.—Different constructions
  put upon this attempt and upon the character of Sphodrias.—The
  Lacedæmonian envoys at Athens seized, but dismissed.—Trial of
  Sphodrias at Sparta; acquitted through the private favor and
  sympathies of Agesilaus.—Comparison of Spartan with Athenian
  procedure.—The Athenians declare war against Sparta, and contract
  alliance with Thebes.—Exertions of Athens to form a new maritime
  confederacy, like the Confederacy of Delos. Thebes enrolls
  herself as a member.—Athens sends round envoys to the islands
  in the Ægean. Liberal principles on which the new confederacy
  is formed.—Envoys sent round by Athens—Chabrias, Timotheus,
  Kallistratus.—Service of Iphikrates in Thrace after the peace of
  Antalkidas. He marries the daughter of the Thracian prince Kotys,
  and acquires possession of a Thracian seaport, Drys.—Timotheus
  and Kallistratus.—Synod of the new confederates assembled at
  Athens—votes for war on a large scale.—Members of the confederacy
  were at first willing and harmonious—a fleet is equipped.—New
  property-tax imposed at Athens. The Solonian census.—The
  Solonian census retained in the main, though with modifications,
  at the restoration under the archonship of Eukleides in 403
  B.C.—Archonship of Nausinikus in 378 B.C.—New census and
  schedule then introduced, of all citizens worth twenty minæ and
  upwards, distributed into classes, and entered for a fraction of
  their total property; each class for a different fraction.—All
  metics, worth more than twenty-five minæ, were registered in
  the schedule; all in one class, each man for one-sixth of his
  property. Aggregate schedule.—The Symmories—containing the
  twelve hundred wealthiest citizens—the three hundred wealthiest
  leaders of the Symmories.—Citizens not wealthy enough to be
  included in the Symmories, yet still entered in the schedule,
  and liable to property-tax. Purpose of the Symmories—extension
  of the principle to the trierarchy.—Enthusiasm at Thebes
  in defence of the new government and against Sparta.
  Military training—the Sacred Band.—Epaminondas.—His previous
  character and training—musical and intellectual, as well as
  gymnastic. Conversation with philosophers, Sokratic as well as
  Pythagorean.—His eloquence—his unambitious disposition—gentleness
  of his political resentments.—Conduct of Epaminondas at the
  Theban revolution of 379 B.C.—he acquires influence, through
  Pelopidas, in the military organization of the city.—Agesilaus
  marches to attack Thebes with the full force of the Spartan
  confederacy—good system of defence adopted by Thebes—aid from
  Athens under Chabrias. Increase of the Theban strength in
  Bœotia, against the philo-Spartan oligarchies in the Bœotian
  cities.—Second expedition of Agesilaus into Bœotia—he gains no
  decisive advantage. The Thebans acquire greater and greater
  strength. Agesilaus retires—he is disabled by a hurt in the
  leg.—Kleombrotus conducts the Spartan force to invade Bœotia.—He
  retires without reaching Bœotia.—Resolution of Sparta to equip
  a large fleet, under the admiral Pollis. The Athenians send
  out a fleet under Chabrias—Victory of Chabrias at sea near
  Naxos. Recollections of the battle of Arginusæ.—Extension
  of the Athenian maritime confederacy, in consequence of the
  victory at Naxos.—Circumnavigation of Peloponnesus by Timotheus
  with an Athenian fleet—his victory over the Lacedæmonian
  fleet—his success in extending the Athenian confederacy—his
  just dealing.—Financial difficulties of Athens.—She becomes
  jealous of the growing strength of Thebes—steady and victorious
  progress of Thebes in Bœotia.—Victory of Pelopidas at Tegyra
  over the Lacedæmonians.—The Thebans expel the Lacedæmonians out
  of all Bœotia, except Orchomenus—they reorganize the Bœotian
  federation.—They invade Phokis—Kleombrotus is sent thither
  with an army for defence—Athens makes a separate peace with
  the Lacedæmonians.—Jason of Pheræ—his energetic character and
  formidable power.—His prudent dealing with Polydamas.—The
  Lacedæmonians find themselves unable to spare any aid for
  Thessaly—they dismiss Polydamas with a refusal. He comes to terms
  with Jason, who becomes Tagus of Thessaly.—Peace between Athens
  and Sparta—broken off almost immediately. The Lacedæmonians
  declare war again, and resume their plans upon Zakynthus and
  Korkyra.—Lacedæmonian armament under Mnasippus, collected from
  all the confederates, invades Korkyra.—Mnasippus besieges the
  city—high cultivation of the adjoining lands.—The Korkyræans
  blocked up in the city—supplies intercepted—want begins—no hope
  of safety except in aid from Athens. Reinforcement arrives from
  Athens—large Athenian fleet preparing under Timotheus. Mnasippus
  is defeated and slain—the city supplied with provisions.—Approach
  of the Athenian reinforcement—Hypermenês, successor of Mnasippus,
  conveys away the armament, leaving his sick and much property
  behind.—Tardy arrival of the Athenian fleet—it is commanded not
  by Timotheus, but by Iphikrates—causes of the delay—preliminary
  voyage of Timotheus, very long protracted.—Discontent at Athens,
  in consequence of the absence of Timotheus—distress of the
  armament assembled at Kalauria—Iphikrates and Kallistratus
  accuse Timotheus. Iphikrates named admiral in his place.—Return
  of Timotheus—an accusation is entered against him, but trial is
  postponed until the return of Iphikrates from Korkyra.—Rapid
  and energetic movements of Iphikrates towards Korkyra—his
  excellent management of the voyage. On reaching Kephallenia,
  he learns the flight of the Lacedæmonians from Korkyra.—He
  goes on to Korkyra, and captures by surprise the ten Syracusan
  triremes sent by Dionysius to the aid of Sparta.—Iphikrates in
  want of money—he sends home Kallistratus to Athens—he finds
  work for his seamen at Korkyra—he obtains funds by service
  in Akarnania.—Favorable tone of public opinion at Athens, in
  consequence of the success at Korkyra—the trial of Timotheus
  went off easily—Jason and Alketas come to support him—his
  quæstor is condemned to death.—Timotheus had been guilty
  of delay, not justifiable under the circumstances—though
  acquitted, his reputation suffered—he accepts command under
  Persia.—Discouragement of Sparta in consequence of her defeat at
  Korkyra, and of the triumphant position of Iphikrates.—Helikê
  and Bura are destroyed by an earthquake.—The Spartans again send
  Antalkidas to Persia, to sue for a fresh intervention—the Persian
  satraps send down an order that the Grecian belligerents shall
  make up their differences.—Athens disposed towards peace.—Athens
  had ceased to be afraid of Sparta, and had become again jealous
  of Thebes.—Equivocal position of the restored Platæa, now that
  the Lacedæmonians had been expelled from Bœotia.—The Thebans
  forestall a negotiation by seizing Platæa, and expelling the
  inhabitants, who again take refuge at Athens.—Strong feeling
  excited in Athens against the Thebans, on account of their
  dealings with Platæa and Thespiæ. The Plataic discourse of
  Isokrates.—Increased tendency of the Athenians towards peace
  with Sparta—Athens and the Athenian confederacy give notice to
  Thebes. General congress for peace at Sparta.—Speeches of the
  Athenian envoys Kallias, Autokles, Kallistratus.—Kallistratus
  and his policy.—He proposes that Sparta and Athens shall divide
  between them the headship of Greece—Sparta on land, Athens at
  sea—recognizing general autonomy.—Peace is concluded. Autonomy of
  each city to be recognized: Sparta to withdraw her harmosts and
  garrisons.—Oaths exchanged. Sparta takes the oath for herself and
  her allies. Athens takes it for herself: her allies take it after
  her, successively.—The oath proposed to the Thebans. Epaminondas,
  the Theban envoy, insists upon taking the oath in the name of
  the Bœotian federation. Agesilaus and the Spartans require that
  he shall take it for Thebes alone.—Daring and emphatic speeches
  delivered by Epaminondas in the congress—protesting against the
  overweening pretensions of Sparta. He claims recognition of the
  ancient institutions of Bœotia, with Thebes as president of
  the federation.—Indignation of the Spartans, and especially of
  Agesilaus—brief questions exchanged—Thebes is excluded from the
  treaty.—General peace sworn, including Athens, Sparta, and the
  rest—Thebes alone is excluded.—Terms of peace—compulsory and
  indefeasible confederacies are renounced—voluntary alliances
  alone maintained.—Real point in debate between Agesilaus and
  Epaminondas.                                                  72-174


  CHAPTER LXXVIII.

  BATTLE OF LEUKTRA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

  Measures for executing the stipulations made at the congress of
  Sparta.—Violent impulse of the Spartans against Thebes.—King
  Kleombrotus is ordered to march into Bœotia, and encamps at
  Leuktra.—New order of battle adopted by Epaminondas.—Confidence
  of the Spartans and of Kleombrotus.—Battle of Leuktra.—Defeat
  of the Spartans and death of Kleombrotus.—Faint adherence of
  the Spartan allies.—Spartan camp after the defeat—confession of
  defeat by sending to solicit the burial-truce.—Great surprise,
  and immense alteration of feeling, produced throughout Greece
  by the Theban victory.—Effect of the news at Sparta—heroic
  self-command.—Reinforcements sent from Sparta.—Proceedings in
  Bœotia after the battle of Leuktra. The Theban victory not
  well received at Athens.—Jason of Pheræ arrives at Leuktra—the
  Spartan army retires from Bœotia under capitulation.—Treatment
  of the defeated citizens on reaching Sparta—suspension of
  the law.—Lowered estimation of Sparta in Greece—prestige of
  military superiority lost.—Extension of the power of Thebes.
  Treatment of Orchomenus and Thespiæ.—Power and ambition of
  Jason.—Plans of Jason—Pythian festival.—Assassination of Jason
  at Pheræ.—Relief to Thebes by the death of Jason—satisfaction in
  Greece.—Proceedings in Peloponnesus after the defeat of Leuktra.
  Expulsion of the Spartan harmosts and dekarchies.—Skytalism at
  Argos—violent intestine feud.—Discouragement and helplessness of
  Sparta.—Athens places herself at the head of a new Peloponnesian
  land-confederacy.—Accusation preferred in the Amphyctionic
  assembly, by Thebes against Sparta.—The Spartans are condemned
  to a fine—importance of this fact as an indication.—Proceedings
  in Arcadia.—Reëstablishment of the city of Mantinea by its own
  citizens.—Humiliating refusal experienced by Agesilaus from the
  Mantineans—keenly painful to a Spartan.—Feeling against Agesilaus
  at Sparta.—Impulse among the Arcadians towards Pan-Arcadian
  union. Opposition from Orchomenus and Tegea.—Revolution at
  Tegea—the philo-Spartan party are put down or expelled.—Tegea
  becomes anti-Spartan, and favorable to the Pan-Arcadian
  union.—Pan-Arcadian union is formed.—March of Agesilaus against
  Mantinea. Evidence of lowered sentiment in Sparta.—Application by
  the Arcadians to Athens for aid against Sparta; it is refused:
  they then apply to the Thebans.—Proceedings and views of
  Epaminondas since the battle of Leuktra.—Plans of Epaminondas for
  restoring the Messenians in Peloponnesus.—Also, for consolidating
  the Arcadians against Sparta.—Epaminondas and the Theban army
  arrive in Arcadia. Great allied force assembled there. The
  allies entreat him to invade Laconia.—Reluctance of Epaminondas
  to invade Laconia—reasonable grounds for it.—He marches into
  Laconia—four lines of invasion.—He crosses the Eurotas and
  approaches close to Sparta.—Alarm at Sparta—arrival of various
  allies to her aid by sea.—Discontent in Laconia among the Periœki
  and Helots—danger to Sparta from that cause.—Vigilant defence of
  Sparta by Agesilaus.—Violent emotion of the Spartans, especially
  the women. Partial attack upon Sparta by Epaminondas.—He retires
  without attempting to storm Sparta: ravages Laconia down to
  Gythium. He returns into Arcadia.—Great effect of this invasion
  upon Grecian opinion—Epaminondas is exalted, and Sparta farther
  lowered.—Foundation of the Arcadian Megalopolis.—Foundation of
  Messênê.—Abstraction of Western Laconia from Sparta.—Periœki
  and Helots established as freemen along with the Messenians
  on the Lacedæmonian border.—The details of this reorganizing
  process unhappily unknown.—Megalopolis—the Pan-Arcadian Ten
  Thousand.—Epaminondas and his army evacuate Peloponnesus.—The
  Spartans solicit aid from Athens—language of their envoys, as
  well as those from Corinth and Phlius, at Athens.—Reception of
  the envoys—the Athenians grant the prayer.—Vote passed to aid
  Sparta—Iphikrates is named general.—March of Iphikrates and his
  army to the Isthmus.—Trial of Epaminondas at Thebes for retaining
  his command beyond the legal time—his honorable and easy
  acquittal.                                                   174-241


  CHAPTER LXXIX.

  FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE AND MEGALOPOLIS TO THE DEATH OF
  PELOPIDAS.

  Changes in Peloponnesus since the battle of Leuktra.—Changes
  out of Peloponnesus.—Amyntas prince of Macedonia.—Ambitious
  views of Athens after the battle of Leuktra.—Her aspirations to
  maritime empire, and to the partial recovery of kleruchies.—She
  wishes to recover Amphipolis—Amyntas recognizes her right to the
  place.—Athens and Amphipolis.—Death of Jason and Amyntas—state
  of Thessaly and Macedonia.—Alexander of Pheræ—he is opposed
  by Pelopidas—influence of Thebes in Thessaly.—State of
  Macedonia—Alexander son of Amyntas—Euridikê—Ptolemy.—Assistance
  rendered by the Athenian Iphikrates to the family of
  Amyntas.—Iphikrates and Timotheus.—The Spartan allied
  army defends the line of Mount Oneium—Epaminondas breaks
  through it, and marches into Peloponnesus.—Sikyon joins the
  Thebans—Phlius remains faithful to Sparta.—Reinforcement from
  Syracuse to Peloponnesus, in aid of Sparta.—Forbearance and
  mildness of Epaminondas.—Energetic action and insolence of the
  Arcadians—Lykomedes animates and leads them on.—Great influence
  of Lykomedes.—Elis tries to recover her supremacy over the
  Triphylian towns, which are admitted into the Arcadian union,
  to the great offence of Elis.—Mission of Philiskus to Greece
  by Ariobarzanes.—Political importance of the reconstitution
  of Messênê, which now becomes the great subject of discord.
  Messenian victor proclaimed at Olympia.—Expedition of Pelopidas
  into Thessaly.—The Tearless Battle—victory of the Spartan
  Archidamus over the Arcadians.—Third expedition of Epaminondas
  into Peloponnesus—his treatment of the Achæan cities.—The Thebans
  reverse the policy of Epaminondas, on complaint of the Arcadians
  and others. They do not reëlect him Bœotarch.—Disturbed state of
  Sikyon. Euphron makes himself despot—his rapacious and sanguinary
  conduct.—Sufferings of the Phliasians—their steady adherence
  to Sparta.—Assistance rendered to Phlius by the Athenian
  Chares—surprise of the fort of Thyamia.—Euphron is expelled from
  Sikyon by the Arcadians and Thebans—he retires to the harbor,
  which he surrenders to the Spartans.—Euphron returns to Sikyon—he
  goes to Thebes, and is there assassinated.—The assassins are put
  upon their trial at Thebes—their defence.—They are acquitted by
  the Theban Senate.—Sentiment among the Many of Sikyon, favorable
  to Euphron—honors shown to his body and memory.—The Sikyonians
  recapture their harbor from the Spartans.—Application of Thebes
  for Persian countenance to her headship—mission of Pelopidas and
  other envoys to Susa.—Pelopidas obtains from Persia a favorable
  rescript.—Protest of the Athenians and Arcadians against the
  rescript.—Pelopidas brings back the rescript. It is read publicly
  before the Greek states convoked at Thebes.—The states convoked
  at Thebes refuse to receive the rescript. The Arcadian deputies
  protest against the headship of Thebes.—The Thebans send the
  rescript to be received at Corinth; the Corinthians refuse:
  failure of the Theban object.—Mission of Pelopidas to Thessaly.
  He is seized and detained prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ.—The
  Thebans despatch an army to rescue Pelopidas. The army, defeated
  and retreating, is only saved by Epaminondas, then a private
  man.—Triumph of Alexander in Thessaly and discredit of Thebes.
  Harsh treatment of Pelopidas.—Second Theban army sent into
  Thessaly, under Epaminondas, for the rescue of Pelopidas, who
  is at length released by Alexander under a truce.—Oropus is
  taken from Athens and placed in the hands of the Thebans. The
  Athenians recall Chares from Corinth.—Athens discontented with
  her Peloponnesian allies; she enters into alliance with Lykomedes
  and the Arcadians. Death of Lykomedes.—Epaminondas is sent as
  envoy into Arcadia; he speaks against Kallistratus.—Project of
  the Athenians to seize Corinth; they are disappointed.—They
  apply to Sparta.—Refusal of the Spartans to acknowledge the
  independence of Messênê; they reproach their allies with
  consenting.—Corinth, Epidaurus, Phlius, etc., conclude peace
  with Thebes, but without Sparta—recognizing the independence of
  Messênê.—Athens sends a fresh embassy to the Persian king—altered
  rescript from him, pronouncing Amphipolis to be an Athenian
  possession.—Timotheus sent with a fleet to Asia—Agesilaus—revolt
  of Ariobarzanes.—Conquest of Samos by Timotheus.—Partial
  readmission to the Chersonese obtained by Timotheus.—Athenian
  kleruchs or settlers sent thither as proprietors.—Difficulties
  of Athens in establishing kleruchs in the Chersonese.—Kotys
  of Thrace.—Timotheus supersedes Iphikrates.—Timotheus acts
  with success on the coast of Macedonia and Chalkidikê. He
  fails at Amphipolis.—Timotheus acts against Kotys and near the
  Chersonese.—Measures of the Thebans in Thessaly—Pelopidas is sent
  with an army against Alexander of Pheræ.—Epaminondas exhorts the
  Thebans to equip a fleet against Athens.—Discussion between him
  and Menekleidas in the Theban assembly.—Menekleidas seemingly
  right in dissuading naval preparations.—Epaminondas in command
  of a Theban fleet in the Hellespont and Bosphorus. Pelopidas
  attacks Alexander of Pheræ—his success in battle—his rashness—he
  is slain.—Excessive grief of the Thebans and Thessalians for his
  death.—The Thebans completely subdue Alexander of Pheræ.     242-310


  CHAPTER LXXX.

  FROM THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA.

  Conspiracy of the knights of Orchomenus against
  Thebes—destruction of Orchomenus by the Thebans.—Repugnance
  excited against the Thebans—regret and displeasure of
  Epaminondas.—Return of Epaminondas from his cruise—renewed
  complications in Peloponnesus.—State of Peloponnesus—Eleians and
  Achæans in alliance with Sparta.—The Eleians aim at recovering
  Triphylia—the Spartans, at recovering Messênê.—War between
  the Eleians and Arcadians; the latter occupy Olympia.—Second
  invasion of Elis by the Arcadians. Distress of the Eleians.
  Archidamus and the Spartans invade Arcadia.—Archidamus
  establishes a Spartan garrison at Kromnus. The Arcadians gain
  advantages over him—armistice.—The Arcadians blockade Kromnus,
  and capture the Spartan garrison.—The Arcadians celebrate
  the Olympic festival along with the Pisatans—excluding the
  Eleians.—The Eleians invade the festival by arms—conflict
  on the plain of Olympia—bravery of the Eleians.—Feelings of
  the spectators at Olympia.—The Arcadians take the treasures
  of Olympia to pay their militia.—Violent dissensions arising
  among the members of the Arcadian communion, in consequence
  of this appropriation. The Arcadian assembly pronounces
  against it.—Farther dissensions in Arcadia—invitation sent to
  the Thebans—peace concluded with Elis.—The peace generally
  popular—celebrated at Tegea—seizure of many oligarchical
  members at Tegea by the Theban harmost.—Conduct of the Theban
  harmost.—View taken by Epaminondas.—His view is more consistent
  with the facts recounted by Xenophon, than the view of Xenophon
  himself.—Policy of Epaminondas and the Thebans.—Epaminondas
  marches with a Theban army into Peloponnesus, to muster at
  Tegea.—Agesilaus and the Spartans are sent for.—Night-march of
  Epaminondas to surprise Sparta. Agesilaus is informed in time
  to prevent surprise.—Epaminondas comes up to Sparta, but finds
  it defended.—He marches back to Tegea—despatches his cavalry
  from thence to surprise Mantinea.—The surprise is baffled,
  by the accidental arrival of the Athenian cavalry—battle
  of cavalry near Mantinea, in which the Athenians have the
  advantage.—Epaminondas resolves to attack the enemy near
  Mantinea.—View of Xenophon—that this resolution was forced upon
  him by despair—examined.—Alacrity of the army of Epaminondas,
  when the order for fighting is given.—Mantinico-Tegeatic
  plain—position of the Lacedæmonians and Mantineans.—March of
  Epaminondas from Tegea.—False impression produced upon the
  enemy by his manœuvres.—Theban order of battle—plans of the
  commander.—Disposition of the cavalry on both sides.—Unprepared
  state of the Lacedæmonian army.—Battle of Mantinea—complete
  success of the dispositions of Epaminondas.—Victory of the
  Thebans—Epaminondas is mortally wounded.—Extreme discouragement
  caused by his death among the troops, even when in full victory
  and pursuit.—Victory claimed by both sides—nevertheless the
  Lacedæmonians are obliged to solicit the burial-truce.—Dying
  moments of Epaminondas.—The two other best Theban officers
  are slain also in the battle.—Who slew Epaminondas? Different
  persons honored for it.—Peace concluded—_statu quo_ recognized,
  including the independence of Messênê—Sparta alone stands
  out—the Thebans return home.—Results of the battle of Mantinea,
  as appreciated by Xenophon—unfair to the Thebans.—Character of
  Epaminondas.—Disputes among the inhabitants of Megalopolis. The
  Thebans send thither a force under Pammenes, which maintains the
  incorporation.—Agesilaus and Archidamus.—State of Persia—revolted
  satraps and provinces—Datames.—Formidable revolt of the satraps
  in Asia Minor—it is suppressed by the Persian court, through
  treachery.—Agesilaus goes as commander to Egypt—Chabrias is
  there also.—Death and character of Agesilaus.—State of Egypt
  and Persia.—Death of Artaxerxes Mnemon. Murders in the royal
  family.—Athenian maritime operations—Timotheus makes war
  against Amphipolis and against Kotys.—Ergophilus succeeds
  Timotheus at the Chersonese—Kallisthenes succeeds him against
  Amphipolis—war at sea against Alexander of Pheræ.—Ergophilus
  and Kallisthenes both unsuccessful—both tried.—Autokles in the
  Hellespont and Bosphorus—convoy for the corn-ships out of the
  Euxine.—Miltokythes revolts from Kotys in Thrace—ill-success of
  the Athenians.—Menon—Timomachus—as commanders in the Chersonese.
  The Athenians lose Sestos.—Kephisodotus in the Chersonese.
  Charidemus crosses thither from Abydos.—Assassination of
  Kotys.—Kersobleptes succeeds Kotys. Berisades and Amadokus, his
  rivals—ill-success of Athens—Kephisodotus.—Improved prospects of
  Athens in the Chersonese—Athenodorus—Charidemus.—Charidemus is
  forced to accept the convention of Athenodorus—his evasions—the
  Chersonese with Sestos is restored to Athens.—The transmarine
  empire of Athens now at its maximum. Mischievous effects of her
  conquests made against Olynthus.—Maximum of second Athenian
  empire—accession of Philip of Macedon.                       311-383


  CHAPTER LXXXI.

  SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT
  BEFORE SYRACUSE.

  Syracuse after the destruction of the Athenian
  armament.—Anticipation of the impending ruin of Athens—revolution
  at Thurii.—Syracusan squadron under Hermokrates goes to
  act against Athens in the Ægean.—Disappointed hopes—defeat
  at Kynossema—second ruinous defeat at Kyzikus.—Sufferings
  of the Syracusan seamen—disappointment and displeasure at
  Syracuse.—Banishment of Hermokrates and his colleagues. Sentence
  communicated by Hermokrates to the armament.—Internal state of
  Syracuse—constitution of Diokles.—Difficulty of determining
  what that constitution was.—Invasion from Carthage.—State of
  the Carthaginians.—Extent of Carthaginian empire—power, and
  population—Liby-Phœnicians.—Harsh dealing of Carthage towards
  her subjects. Colonies sent out from Carthage.—Military force of
  Carthage.—Political constitution of Carthage.—Oligarchical system
  and sentiment at Carthage.—Powerful families at Carthage—Mago,
  Hamilkar, Hasdrubal.—Quarrel between Egesta and Selinus in
  Sicily.—Application of Egesta to Carthage for aid—application
  granted—eagerness of Hannibal.—Carthaginian envoys sent to
  Sicily.—Hannibal crosses over to Sicily with a very large
  armament. He lays siege to Selinus.—Vigorous assault on
  Selinus—gallant resistance—the town is at length stormed.—Selinus
  is sacked and plundered—merciless slaughter.—Delay of the
  Syracusans and others in sending aid. Answer of Hannibal to
  their embassy.—Hannibal marches to Himera and besieges it.
  Aid from Syracuse under Diokles—sally from Himera. Hannibal
  destroys Himera, and slaughters three thousand prisoners, as an
  expiation to the memory of his grandfather.—Alarm throughout
  the Greeks of Sicily—Hannibal dismisses his army, and returns
  to Carthage.—New intestine discord in Syracuse—Hermokrates
  comes to Sicily.—He levies troops to effect his return by
  force.—He is obliged to retire—he establishes himself in the
  ruins of Selinus, and acts against the Carthaginians.—His
  father attempts to reënter Syracuse, with the bones of the
  Syracusans slain near Himera. Banishment of Diokles.—Hermokrates
  tries again to penetrate into Syracuse with an armed force.—He
  is defeated and slain.—First appearance of Dionysius at
  Syracuse.—Weakness of Syracuse, arising out of this political
  discord—party of Hermokrates. Danger from Carthage.—Fresh
  invasion of Sicily, by the Carthaginians. Immense host under
  Hannibal and Imilkon.—Great alarm in Sicily—active preparations
  for defence at Agrigentum.—Grandeur, wealth, and population of
  Agrigentum.—The Carthaginians attack Agrigentum. They demolish
  the tombs near its walls. Distemper among their army. Religious
  terrors—sacrifice.—Syracusan reinforcement to Agrigentum,
  under Daphnæus. His victory over the Iberians. He declines to
  pursue them.—Daphnæus enters Agrigentum. Discontent against
  the Agrigentine generals, for having been backward in attack.
  They are put to death.—Privations in both armies—Hamilkar
  captures the provision-ships of the Syracusans—Agrigentum
  is evacuated.—Agrigentum taken and plundered by the
  Carthagians.—Terror throughout Sicily.—Bitter complaints against
  the Syracusan generals.—The Hermokratean party at Syracuse comes
  forward to subvert the government and elevate Dionysius.—Harangue
  of Dionysius in the Syracusan assembly against the generals,
  who are deposed by vote of the people, and Dionysius with others
  appointed in their room.—Ambitious arts of Dionysius—he intrigues
  against his colleagues, and frustrates all their proceedings. He
  procures a vote for restoring the Hermokratean exiles.—Dionysius
  is sent with a Syracusan reinforcement to Gela. He procures the
  execution or banishment of the Geloan oligarchy.—He returns
  to Syracuse with an increased force—he accuses his colleagues
  of gross treason.—Dionysius is named general, single-handed,
  with full powers.—Apparent repentance of the people after the
  vote. Stratagem of Dionysius to obtain a vote ensuring to him a
  body of paid guards.—March of Dionysius to Leontini.—Dionysius
  establishes himself at Syracuse as despot.—Dionysius as
  despot—the means whereby he attained the power.              383-446


  CHAPTER LXXXII.

  SICILY DURING THE DESPOTISM OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS AT SYRACUSE.

  Imilkon with the Carthaginian army marches from Agrigentum to
  attack Gela.—Brave defence of the Geloans—Dionysius arrives
  with an army to relieve them.—Plan of Dionysius for a general
  attack on the Carthaginian army.—He is defeated and obliged
  to retreat.—He evacuates Gela and Kamarina—flight of the
  population of both places, which are taken and sacked by the
  Carthaginians.—Indignation and charges of treachery against
  Dionysius.—Mutiny of the Syracusan horsemen—they ride off to
  Syracuse, and declare against Dionysius.—Their imprudence.
  Dionysius master of Syracuse.—Propositions of peace come from
  Imilkon. Terms of peace.—Collusion of Dionysius with the
  Carthaginians, who confirm his dominion over Syracuse. Pestilence
  in the Carthaginian army.—Near coincidence, in time, of this
  peace, with the victory of Lysander at Ægospotami—sympathy
  of Sparta with Dionysius.—Depressed condition of the towns
  of Southern Sicily, from Cape Pachynus to Lilybæum.—Strong
  position of Dionysius.—Strong fortifications and other
  buildings erected by Dionysius, in and about Ortygia.—He
  assigns houses in Ortygia to his soldiers and partisans—he
  distributes the lands of Syracuse anew.—Exorbitant exactions
  of Dionysius—discontent at Syracuse.—Dionysius marches out of
  Syracuse against the Sikels—mutiny of the Syracusan soldiers
  at Herbesa—Dorikus the commander is slain.—The Syracusan
  insurgents, with assistance from Rhegium and Messênê, besiege
  Dionysius in Ortygia.—Despair of Dionysius—he applies to a
  body of Campanians in the Carthaginian service, for aid.—He
  amuses the assailants with feigned submission—arrival of the
  Campanians—victory of Dionysius.—Dionysius strengthens his
  despotism more than before—assistance lent to him by the
  Spartan Aristus—Nikoteles the Corinthian is put to death.—He
  disarms the Syracusan citizens—strengthens the fortifications
  of Ortygia—augments his mercenary force.—Dionysius conquers
  Naxus, Katana, and Leontini.—Great power of Dionysius.
  Foundation of Alæsa by Archonides.—Resolution of Dionysius to
  make war upon Carthage.—Locality of Syracuse—danger to which
  the town had been exposed, in the Athenian siege.—Additional
  fortifications made by Dionysius along the northern ridge of
  the cliffs of Epipolæ, up the Euryalus.—Popularity of the
  work—efforts made by all the Syracusans as well as by Dionysius
  himself.—Preparations of Dionysius for aggressive war against
  the Carthaginians.—Improvement in the behavior of Dionysius
  towards the Syracusans.—His conciliatory offers to other
  Grecian cities in Sicily. Hostile sentiment of the Rhegines
  towards him. Their application to Messênê.—He makes peace with
  Messênê and Rhegium.—He desires to marry a Rhegine wife. His
  proposition is declined by the city. He is greatly incensed.—He
  makes a proposition to marry a wife from Lokri—his wish is
  granted—he marries a Lokrian maiden named Doris.—Immense warlike
  equipment of Dionysius at Syracuse—arms, engines, etc.—Naval
  preparations in the harbor of Syracuse. Enlargement of the bulk
  of ships of war—quadriremes and quinqueremes.—General sympathy
  of the Syracusans in his projects against Carthage.—He hires
  soldiers from all quarters.—He celebrates his nuptials with two
  wives on the same day—Doris and Aristomachê. Temporary good
  feeling at Syracuse towards him.—He convokes the Syracusan
  assembly, and exhorts them to war against Carthage.—He desires
  to arrest the emigration of those who were less afraid of the
  Carthaginian dominion than of his.—He grants permission to
  plunder the Carthaginian residents and ships at Syracuse. Alarm
  at Carthage—suffering in Africa from the pestilence.—Dionysius
  marches out from Syracuse with a prodigious army against
  the Carthaginians in Sicily.—Insurrection against Carthage,
  among the Sicilian Greeks subject to her. Terrible tortures
  inflicted on the Carthaginians.—Dionysius besieges the
  Carthaginian seaport Motyê.—Situation of Motyê—operations of
  the siege—vigorous defence.—Dionysius overruns the neighboring
  dependencies of Carthage—doubtful result of the siege of
  Motyê—appearance of Imilkon with a Carthaginian fleet—he is
  obliged to return.—Desperate defence of Motyê. It is at length
  taken by a nocturnal attack.—Plunder of Motyê—the inhabitants
  either slaughtered or sold for slaves.—Farther operations of
  Dionysius.—Arrival of Imilkon with a Carthaginian armament—his
  successful operations—he retakes Motyê.—Dionysius retires to
  Syracuse.—Imilkon captures Messênê.—Revolt of the Sikels from
  Dionysius. Commencement of Tauromenium.—Provisions of Dionysius
  for the defence of Syracuse—he strengthens Leontini—he advances
  to Katana with his land-army as well as his fleet.—Naval battle
  off Katana—great victory of the Carthaginian fleet under
  Magon.—Arrival of Imilkon to join the fleet of Magon near
  Katana—fruitless invitation to the Campanians of Ætna.—Dionysius
  retreats to Syracuse—discontent of his army.—Imilkon marches
  close up to Syracuse—the Carthaginian fleet come up to occupy
  the Great Harbor—their imposing entry. Fortified position
  of Imilkon near the Harbor.—Imilkon plunders the suburb of
  Achradina—blockades Syracuse by sea.—Naval victory gained by the
  Syracusan fleet during the absence of Dionysius.—Effect of this
  victory in exalting the spirits of the Syracusans.—Public meeting
  convened by Dionysius—mutinous spirit against him—vehement
  speech by Thedorus.—Sympathy excited by the speech in the
  Syracusan assembly.—The Spartan Pharakidas upholds Dionysius—who
  finally dismisses the assembly, and silences the adverse
  movement.—Alliance of Sparta with Dionysius—suitable to her
  general policy at the time. The emancipation of Syracuse depended
  upon Pharakidas.—Dionysius tries to gain popularity.—Terrific
  pestilence among the Carthaginian army before Syracuse.—Dionysius
  attacks the Carthaginian camp. He deliberately sacrifices a
  detachment of his mercenaries.—Success of Dionysius, both by sea
  and by land, against the Syracusan position.—Conflagration of
  the Carthaginian camp—exultation at Syracuse.—Imilkon concludes
  a secret treaty with Dionysius, to be allowed to escape with the
  Carthaginians, on condition of abandoning his remaining army.
  Destruction of the remaining Carthaginian army, except Sikels and
  Iberians.—Distress at Carthage—miserable end of Imilkon.—Danger
  of Carthage—anger and revolt of her African subjects—at length
  put down.                                                    446-512




HISTORY OF GREECE.




PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.




CHAPTER LXXVI.

FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS DOWN TO THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY
SPARTA.


The peace or convention[1] which bears the name of Antalkidas, was an
incident of serious and mournful import in Grecian history. Its true
character cannot be better described than in a brief remark and reply
which we find cited in Plutarch. “Alas for Hellas (observed some one
to Agesilaus) when we see our Laconians _medising_!”—“Nay (replied
the Spartan king), say rather the Medes (Persians) _laconising_.”[2]

  [1] It goes by both names; Xenophon more commonly speaks of ἡ
  εἰρήνη—Isokrates, of αἱ συνθῆκαι.

  Though we say, the peace _of_ Antalkidas, the Greek authors say ἡ
  ἐπ’ Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνη; I do not observe that they ever phrase it
  with the genitive case Ἀνταλκίδου simply, without a preposition.

  [2] Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 22 (compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 23;
  and his Apophtheg. Lacon. p. 213 B). Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀγησίλαος, πρὸς
  τὸν εἰπόντα—Φεῦ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ὅπου μηδίζουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ Λάκωνες!...
  Μᾶλλον, εἶπεν, οἱ Μῆδοι λακωνίζουσι.

These two propositions do not exclude each other. Both were perfectly
true. The convention emanated from a separate partnership between
Spartan and Persian interests. It was solicited by the Spartan
Antalkidas, and propounded by him to Tiribazus on the express
ground, that it was exactly calculated to meet the Persian king’s
purposes and wishes,—as we learn even from the philo-Laconian
Xenophon.[3] While Sparta and Persia were both great gainers, no
other Grecian state gained anything, as the convention was originally
framed. But after the first rejection, Antalkidas saw the necessity
of conciliating Athens by the addition of a special article providing
that Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros should be restored to her.[4] This
addition seems to have been first made in the abortive negotiations
which form the subject of the discourse already mentioned, pronounced
by Andokides. It was continued afterwards and inserted in the final
decree which Antalkidas and Tiribazus brought down in the king’s name
from Susa; and it doubtless somewhat contributed to facilitate the
adherence of Athens, though the united forces of Sparta and Persia
had become so overwhelming, that she could hardly have had the means
of standing out, even if the supplementary article had been omitted.
Nevertheless, this condition undoubtedly did secure to Athens a
certain share in the gain, conjointly with the far larger shares both
of Sparta and Persia. It is, however, not less true, that Athens,
as well as Thebes,[5] assented to the peace only under fear and
compulsion. As to the other states of Greece, they were interested
merely in the melancholy capacity of partners in the general loss and
degradation.

  [3] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 14.

  [4] The restoration of these three islands forms the basis
  of historical truth in the assertion of Isokrates, that the
  Lacedæmonians were so subdued by the defeat of Knidus, as to come
  and tender maritime empire to Athens—(ἐλθεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν δώσοντας)
  Orat. vii, (Areopagit.) s. 74; Or. ix, (Evagor.); s. 83. But the
  assertion is true respecting a later time; for the Lacedæmonians
  really did make this proposition to Athens after they had been
  enfeebled and humiliated by the battle of Leuktra; but not before
  (Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 1, 3).

  [5] Diodor. xiv, 111.

That degradation stood evidently marked in the form, origin, and
transmission, of the convention, even apart from its substance.
It was a fiat issued from the court of Susa; as such it was
ostentatiously proclaimed and “sent down” from thence to Greece. Its
authority was derived from the king’s seal, and its sanction from his
concluding threat, that he would make war against all recusants. It
was brought down by the satrap Tiribazus (along with Antalkidas),
read by him aloud, and heard with submission by the assembled
Grecian envoys, after he had called their special attention to the
regal seal.[6] Such was the convention which Sparta, the ancient
president of the Grecian world had been the first to solicit at
the hands of the Persian king, and which she now not only set the
example of sanctioning by her own spontaneous obedience, but even
avouched as guarantee and champion against all opponents; preparing
to enforce it at the point of the sword against any recusant state,
whether party to it or not. Such was the convention which was now
inscribed on stone, and placed as a permanent record in the temples
of the Grecian cities;[7] nay, even in the common sanctuaries,—the
Olympic, Pythian, and others,—the great _foci_ and rallying points of
Pan-hellenic sentiment. Though called by the name of a convention,
it was on the very face of it a peremptory mandate proceeding from
the ancient enemy of Greece, an acceptance of which was nothing less
than an act of obedience. While to him it was a glorious trophy, to
all Pan-hellenic patriots it was the deepest disgrace and insult.[8]
Effacing altogether the idea of an independent Hellenic world,
bound together and regulated by the self-acting forces and common
sympathies of its own members,—even the words of the convention
proclaimed it as an act of intrusive foreign power, and erected the
barbarian king into a dictatorial settler of Grecian differences; a
guardian[9] who cared for the peace of Greece more than the Greeks
themselves. And thus, looking to the form alone, it was tantamount to
that symbol of submission—the cession of earth and water—which had
been demanded a century before by the ancestor of Artaxerxes from the
ancestors of the Spartans and Athenians; a demand, which both Sparta
and Athens then not only repudiated, but resented so cruelly, as to
put to death the heralds by whom it was brought,—stigmatizing the
Æginetans and others as traitors to Hellas for complying with it.[10]
Yet nothing more would have been implied in such cession than what
stood embodied in the inscription on that “colonna infame,” which
placed the peace of Antalkidas side by side with the Pan-hellenic
glories and ornaments at Olympia.[11]

  [6] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 30, 31. Ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ παρήγγειλεν ὁ Τιρίβαζος
  παρεῖναι ~τοὺς βουλομένους ὑπακοῦσαι~, ἣν βασιλεὺς εἰρήνην
  καταπέμποι, ταχέως πάντες παρεγένοντο. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ξυνῆλθον,
  ~ἐπιδείξας ὁ Τιρίβαζος τὰ βασιλέως σημεῖα~, ἀνεγίνωσκε τὰ
  γεγραμμένα, εἶχε δὲ ὧδε·

  Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς ~νομίζει δίκαιον~, τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις
  ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, καὶ τῶν νήσων Κλαζομένας καὶ Κύπρον· τὰς δὲ ἄλλας
  Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας, αὐτονόμους εἶναι, πλὴν
  Λήμνου, καὶ Ἴμβρου καὶ Σκύρου, ταύτας δὲ, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον, εἶναι
  Ἀθηναίων. Ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ δέχονται, ~τούτοις
  ἐγὼ πολεμήσω~, μετὰ τῶν ταὐτα βουλομένων, καὶ πέζῇ καὶ κατὰ
  θάλασσαν, καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ χρήμασιν.

  [7] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 211. Καὶ ταύτας ἡμᾶς
  ἠνάγκασεν (the Persian king) ἐν στήλαις λιθίναις ἀναγράψαντας ἐν
  τοῖς κοινοῖς τῶν ἱερῶν ἀναθεῖναι, πολὺ κάλλιον τρόπαιον τῶν ἐν
  ταῖς μάχαις γιγνομένων.

  The Oratio Panegyrica of Isokrates (published about 380
  B.C., seven years afterwards) from which I here copy, is
  the best evidence of the feelings with which an intelligent
  and patriotic Greek looked upon this treaty at the time;
  when it was yet recent, but when there had been full time
  to see how the Lacedæmonians carried it out. His other
  orations, though valuable and instructive, were published
  later, and represent the feelings of after-time.

  Another contemporary, Plato in his Menexenus (c. 17, p. 245
  D), stigmatizes severely “the base and unholy act (αἰσχρὸν καὶ
  ἀνόσιον ἔργον) of surrendering Greeks to the foreigner,” and
  asserts that the Athenians resolutely refused to sanction it.
  This is a sufficient mark of his opinion respecting the peace of
  Antalkidas.

  [8] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 207. Ἃ χρῆν ἀναιρεῖν,
  καὶ μηδεμίαν ἐᾷν ἡμέραν, νομίζοντες, ~προστάγματα καὶ οὐ
  συνθήκας~ εἶναι, etc. (s. 213). Αἰσχρὸν ἡμᾶς ~ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος
  ὑβριζομένης~, μηδεμίαν ποιήσασθαι κοινὴν τιμωρίαν, etc.

  The word προστάγματα exactly corresponds with an expression of
  Xenophon (put in the mouth of Autokles the Athenian envoy at
  Sparta), respecting the dictation of the peace of Antalkidas by
  Artaxerxes—Καὶ ὅτε μὲν ~Βασιλεὺς προσέταττεν~ αὐτονόμους τὰς
  πόλεις εἶναι, etc. (Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 9).

  [9] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 205. Καίτοι πῶς οὐ χρὴ
  διαλύειν ταύτας τὰς ὁμολογίας, ἐξ ὧν τοιαύτη δόξα γέγονεν, ὥστε
  ὁ μὲν Βάρβαρος κήδεται τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης ἐστὶν,
  ἡμῶν δέ τινές εἰσιν οἱ λυμαινόμενοι καὶ κακῶς ποιοῦντες αὐτήν;

  The word employed by Photius in his abstract of Theopompus
  (whether it be the expression of Theopompus himself, we cannot
  be certain—see Fragm. 111, ed. Didot), to designate the position
  taken by Artaxerxes in reference to this peace, is—τὴν εἰρήνην
  ἣν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐβράβευσεν—which implies the peremptory decision
  of an official judge, analogous to another passage (139) of the
  Panegyr. Orat. of Isokrates—Νῦν δ’ ἐκεῖνός (Artaxerxes) ἐστιν, ὁ
  διοικῶν τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ μόνον οὐκ ἐπιστάθμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
  καθιστάς. Πλὴν γὰρ τούτου τί τῶν ἄλλων ὑπόλοιπόν ἐστιν; Οὐ καὶ
  τοῦ πολέμου κύριος ἐγένετο, καὶ ~τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπρυτάνευσε~, καὶ
  τῶν παρόντων πραγμάτων ἐπιστάτης καθέστηκεν;

  [10] Herodot. vi, 49. κατηγόρεον Αἰγινητέων τὰ πεποιήκοιεν,
  προδόντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

  [11] Isokrates, Orat. xii, (Panathen.) s. 112-114.

  Plutarch (Agesil. c. 23; Artaxerxes, c. 21, 22) expresses
  himself in terms of bitter and well-merited indignation of this
  peace,—“if indeed (says he) we are to call this ignominy and
  betrayal of Greece by the name of _peace_, which brought with it
  as much infamy as the most disastrous war.” Sparta (he says) lost
  her headship by her defeat at Leuktra, but her honor had been
  lost before, by the convention of Antalkidas.

  It is in vain, however, that Plutarch tries to exonerate
  Agesilaus from any share in the peace. From the narrative
  (in Xenophon’s Hellenica, v. i, 33) of his conduct at
  the taking of the oaths, we see that he espoused it most
  warmly. Xenophon (in the Encomium of Agesilaus, vii, 7)
  takes credit to Agesilaus for being μισοπέρσης, which was
  true, from the year B.C. 396 to B.C. 394. But in B.C. 387,
  at the time of the peace of Antalkidas, he had become
  μισοθηβαῖος; his hatred of Persia had given place to hatred
  of Thebes.

  See also a vigorous passage of Justin (viii, 4), denouncing
  the disgraceful position of the Greek cities at a later time
  in calling in Philip of Macedon as arbiter; a passage not less
  applicable to the peace of Antalkidas; and perhaps borrowed from
  Theopompus.

Great must have been the change wrought by the intermediate
events, when Sparta, the ostensible president of Greece,—in her
own estimation even more than in that of others,[12]—had so lost
all Pan-hellenic conscience and dignity, as to descend into an
obsequious minister, procuring and enforcing a Persian mandate for
political objects of her own. How insane would such an anticipation
have appeared to Æschylus, or the audience who heard the Persæ! to
Herodotus or Thucydides! to Perikles and Archidamus! nay, even to
Kallikratidas or Lysander! It was the last consummation of a series
of previous political sins, invoking more and more the intervention
of Persia to aid her against her Grecian enemies.

  [12] Compare the language in which the Ionians, on their revolt
  from Darius king of Persia about 500 B.C., had implored the aid
  of Sparta (Herodot. v, 49). Τὰ κατήκοντα γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα· Ἰώνων
  παῖδας δούλους εἶναι ἀντ’ ἐλευθέρων—ὄνειδος καὶ ἄλγος μέγιστον
  μὲν αὐτοῖσι ἡμῖν, ~ἔτι δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑμῖν, ὅσῳ προεστέατε τῆς
  Ἑλλάδος~.

  How striking is the contrast between these words and the peace of
  Antalkidas! and what would have been the feelings of Herodotus
  himself if he could have heard of the latter event!

Her first application to the Great King for this purpose dates from
the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, and is prefaced by an
apology, little less than humiliating, from king Archidamus; who, not
unconscious of the sort of treason which he was meditating, pleads
that Sparta, when the Athenians are conspiring against her, ought
not to be blamed for asking from foreigners as well as from Greeks
aid for her own preservation.[13] From the earliest commencement to
the seventh year of the war, many separate and successive envoys
were despatched by the Spartans to Susa; two of whom were seized in
Thrace, brought to Athens, and there put to death. The rest reached
their destination, but talked in so confused a way, and contradicted
each other so much, that the Persian court, unable to understand
what they meant,[14] sent Artaphernes with letters to Sparta (in the
seventh year of the war) complaining of such stupidity, and asking
for clearer information. Artaphernes fell into the hands of an
Athenian squadron at Eion on the Strymon, and was conveyed to Athens;
where he was treated with great politeness, and sent back (after the
letters which he carried had been examined) to Ephesus. What is more
important to note is, that Athenian envoys were sent along with him,
with a view of bringing Athens into friendly communication with the
Great King; which was only prevented by the fact that Artaxerxes
Longimanus just then died. Here we see the fatal practice, generated
by intestine war, of invoking Persian aid; begun by Sparta as an
importunate solicitor,—and partially imitated by Athens, though we do
not know what her envoys were instructed to say, had they been able
to reach Susa.

  [13] Thucyd. i, 82. Κἀν τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν ἐξαρτύεσθαι
  ξυμμάχων τε προσαγωγῇ καὶ Ἑλλήνων ~καὶ βαρβάρων~, εἴ ποθέν τινα
  ~ἢ ναυτικοῦ ἢ χρημάτων~ δύναμιν προσληψόμεθα, (~ἀνεπίφθονον~ δὲ,
  ὅσοι ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων ἐπιβουλευόμεθα, μὴ Ἕλληνας
  μόνον ~ἀλλὰ καὶ βαρβάρους~ προσλαβόντας διασωθῆναι), etc. Compare
  also Plato, Menexenus, c. 14, p. 243 B.

  [14] Thucyd. ii, 7, 67; iv, 50.

Nothing more is heard about Persian intervention until the year of
the great Athenian disasters before Syracuse. Elate with the hopes
arising out of that event, the Persians required no solicitation, but
were quite as eager to tender interference for their own purposes, as
Sparta was to invite them for hers. How ready Sparta was to purchase
their aid by the surrender of the Asiatic Greeks, and that too
without any stipulations in their favor,—has been recounted in my
last volume.[15] She had not now the excuse,—for it stands only as an
excuse and not as a justification—of self-defence against aggression
from Athens, which Archidamus had produced at the beginning of the
war. Even then it was only a colorable excuse, not borne out by the
reality of the case; but now, the avowed as well as the real object
was something quite different,—not to repel, but to crush, Athens.
Yet to accomplish that object, not even of pretended safety, but
of pure ambition, Sparta sacrificed unconditionally the liberty of
her Asiatic kinsmen; a price which Archidamus at the beginning of
the war would certainly never have endured the thoughts of paying,
notwithstanding the then formidable power of Athens. Here, too,
we find Athens following the example; and consenting, in hopes of
procuring Persian aid, to the like sacrifice, though the bargain was
never consummated. It is true that she was then contending for her
existence. Nevertheless, the facts afford melancholy proof how much
the sentiment of Pan-hellenic independence became enfeebled in both
the leaders, amidst the fierce intestine conflict terminated by the
battle of Ægospotami.[16]

  [15] See Vol. IX, Ch. LXXV, p. 360.

  Compare the expressions of Demosthenes (cont. Aristokrat. c. 33,
  p. 666) attesting the prevalent indignation among the Athenians
  of his time, about this surrender of the Asiatic Greeks by
  Sparta,—and his oration De Rhodior. Libertate, c. 13, p. 199,
  where he sets the peace of Kallias, made by Athens with Persia in
  449 B.C., in contrast with the peace of Antalkidas, contracted
  under the auspices of Sparta.

  [16] This is strikingly set forth by Isokrates, Or. xii,
  (Panathen.) s. 167-173. In this passage, however, he distributes
  his blame too equally between Sparta and Athens, whereas the
  blame belongs of right to the former, in far greater proportion.
  Sparta not only began the practice of invoking the Great King,
  and invoking his aid by disgraceful concessions,—but she also
  carried it, at the peace of Antalkidas, to a more extreme point
  of selfishness and subservience. Athens is guilty of following
  the bad example of her rival, but to a less extent, and under
  greater excuse on the plea of necessity.

  Isokrates says in another place of this discourse, respecting
  the various acts of wrong-doing towards the general interest
  of Hellas—ἐπιδεικτέον τοὺς μὲν ἡμετέρους ~ὀψιμαθεῖς~ αὐτῶν
  γεγενημένους, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ ~τὰ μὲν πρώτους, τὰ δὲ μόνους~,
  ἐξαμαρτόντας (Panath. s. 103). Which is much nearer the truth
  than the passage before referred to.

After that battle, the bargain between Sparta and Persia would
doubtless have been fulfilled, and the Asiatic Greeks would have
passed at once under the dominion of the latter,—had not an entirely
new train of circumstances arisen out of the very peculiar position
and designs of Cyrus. That young prince did all in his power to
gain the affections of the Greeks, as auxiliaries for his ambitious
speculations; in which speculations both Sparta and the Asiatic
Greeks took part, compromising themselves irrevocably against
Artaxerxes, and still more against Tissaphernes. Sparta thus became
unintentionally the enemy of Persia, and found herself compelled to
protect the Asiatic Greeks against his hostility, with which they
were threatened; a protection easy for her to confer, not merely
from the unbounded empire which she then enjoyed over the Grecian
world, but from the presence of the renowned Cyreian Ten Thousand,
and the contempt for Persian military strength which they brought
home from their retreat. She thus finds herself in the exercise of a
Pan-hellenic protectorate or presidency, first through the ministry
of Derkyllidas, next of Agesilaus, who even sacrifices at Aulis,
takes up the sceptre of Agamemnon, and contemplates large schemes of
aggression against the Great King. Here, however, the Persians play
against her the same game which she had invoked them to assist in
playing against Athens. Their fleet, which fifteen years before she
had invited for her own purposes, is now brought in against herself,
and with far more effect, since her empire was more odious as well as
more oppressive than the Athenian. It is now Athens and her allies
who call in Persian aid; without any direct engagement, indeed, to
surrender the Asiatic Greeks, for we are told that after the battle
of Knidus, Konon incurred the displeasure of the Persians by his
supposed plans for reuniting them with Athens,[17] and Athenian aid
was still continued to Evagoras,—yet, nevertheless, indirectly paving
the way for that consummation. If Athens and her allies here render
themselves culpable of an abnegation of Pan-hellenic sentiment, we
may remark, as before, that they act under the pressure of stronger
necessities than could ever be pleaded by Sparta; and that they might
employ on their own behalf, with much greater truth, the excuse of
self-preservation preferred by king Archidamus.

  [17] Cornelius Nepos, Conon. c. 5.

But never on any occasion did that excuse find less real place than
in regard to the mission of Antalkidas. Sparta was at that time
so powerful, even after the loss of her maritime empire, that the
allies at the Isthmus of Corinth, jealous of each other and held
together only by common terror, could hardly stand on the defensive
against her, and would probably have been disunited by reasonable
offers on her part; nor would she have needed even to recall
Agesilaus from Asia. Nevertheless, the mission was probably dictated
in great measure by a groundless panic, arising from the sight of
the revived Long Walls and refortified Piræus, and springing at
once to the fancy, that a new Athenian empire, such as had existed
forty years before, was about to start into life; a fancy little
likely to be realized, since the very peculiar circumstances which
had created the first Athenian empire were now totally reversed.
Debarred from maritime empire herself, the first object with Sparta
was, to shut out Athens from the like; the next, to put down all
partial federations or political combinations, and to enforce
universal autonomy, or the maximum of political isolation; in
order that there might nowhere exist a power capable of resisting
herself, the strongest of all individual states. As a means to this
end, which was no less in the interest of Persia than in hers, she
outbid all prior subserviences to the Great King, betrayed to him
not only one entire division of her Hellenic kinsmen, but also the
general honor of the Hellenic name in the most flagrant manner,—and
volunteered to _medise_ in order that the Persians might repay her by
_laconising_.[18] To ensure fully the obedience of all the satraps,
who had more than once manifested dissentient views of their own,
Antalkidas procured and brought down a formal order signed and sealed
at Susa; and Sparta undertook, without shame or scruple, to enforce
the same order,—“the convention sent down by the king,”—upon all her
countrymen; thus converting them into the subjects, and herself into
a sort of viceroy or satrap, of Artaxerxes. Such an act of treason
to the Pan-hellenic cause was far more flagrant and destructive than
that alleged confederacy with the Persian king, for which the Theban
Ismenias was afterwards put to death, and that, too, by the Spartans
themselves.[19] Unhappily it formed a precedent for the future, and
was closely copied afterwards by Thebes;[20] foreboding but too
clearly the short career which Grecian political independence had to
run.

  [18] Isok. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 145. Καὶ τῷ βαρβάρῳ τῷ τῆς Ἀσίας
  κρατοῦντι συμπράττουσι (the Lacedæmonians) ὅπως ὡς μεγίστην ἀρχὴν
  ἕξουσιν.

  [19] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 35.

  [20] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33-39.

That large patriotic sentiment, which dictated the magnanimous answer
sent by the Athenians[21] to the offers of Mardonius in 479 B.C.,
refusing in the midst of ruin present and prospective, all temptation
to betray the sanctity of Pan-hellenic fellowship,—that sentiment
which had been during the two following generations the predominant
inspiration of Athens, and had also been powerful, though always
less powerful, at Sparta,—was now, in the former, overlaid by more
pressing apprehensions, and in the latter completely extinguished.
Now it was to the leading states that Greece had to look, for holding
up the great banner of Pan-hellenic independence; from the smaller
states nothing more could be required than that they should adhere
to and defend it, when upheld.[22] But so soon as Sparta was seen to
solicit and enforce, and Athens to accept (even under constraint),
the proclamation under the king’s hand and seal brought down by
Antalkidas,—that banner was no longer a part of the public emblems
of Grecian political life. The grand idea represented by it,—of
collective self-determining Hellenism,—was left to dwell in the
bosoms of individual patriots.

  [21] Herodot. viii, 143.

  The explanation which the Athenians give to the Spartan envoys,
  of the reasons and feelings which dictated their answer of
  refusal to Alexander (viii, 144), are not less impressive than
  the answer itself.

  But whoever would duly feel and appreciate the treason of the
  Spartans in soliciting the convention of Antalkidas, should read
  in contrast with it that speech which their envoys address to the
  Athenians, in order to induce the latter to stand out against the
  temptations of Mardonius (viii, 142).

  [22] The sixth oration (called Archidamus) of Isokrates sets
  forth emphatically the magnanimous sentiments, and comprehensive
  principles, on which it becomes Sparta to model her public
  conduct,—as altogether different from the simple considerations
  of prudence and security which are suitable to humbler states
  like Corinth, Epidaurus, or Phlius (Archidamus, s. 105, 106, 110).

  Contrast these lofty pretensions with the dishonorable realities
  of the convention of Antalkidas,—not thrust upon Sparta by
  superior force, but both originally sued out, and finally
  enforced by her, for her own political ends.

  Compare also Isokrates, Or. xii. (Panathen.) s. 169-172, about
  the dissension of the leading Grecian states, and its baneful
  effects.

If we look at the convention of Antalkidas apart from its form and
warranty, and with reference to its substance, we shall find that
though its first article was unequivocally disgraceful, its last was
at least popular as a promise to the ear. Universal autonomy, to
each city, small or great, was dear to Grecian political instinct.
I have already remarked more than once that the exaggerated force
of this desire was the chief cause of the short duration of Grecian
freedom. Absorbing all the powers of life to the separate parts,
it left no vital force or integrity to the whole; especially, it
robbed both each and all of the power of self-defence against foreign
assailants. Though indispensable up to a certain point and under
certain modifications, yet beyond these modifications, which Grecian
political instinct was far from recognizing, it produced a great
preponderance of mischief. Although, therefore, this item of the
convention was in its promise acceptable and popular,—and although
we shall find it hereafter invoked as a protection in various
individual cases of injustice,—we must inquire how it was carried
into execution, before we can pronounce whether it was good or evil,
the present of a friend or of an enemy.

The succeeding pages will furnish an answer to this inquiry. The
Lacedæmonians, as “presidents (guarantees or executors) of the peace,
sent down by the king,”[23] undertook the duty of execution; and
we shall see that from the beginning they meant nothing sincerely.
They did not even attempt any sincere and steady compliance with the
honest, though undistinguishing, political instinct of the Greek
mind; much less did they seek to grant as much as was really good,
and to withhold the remainder. They defined autonomy in such manner,
and meted it out in such portions, as suited their own political
interests and purposes. The promise made by the convention,
except in so far as it enabled them to increase their own power by
dismemberment or party intervention, proved altogether false and
hollow. For if we look back to the beginning of the Peloponnesian
war, when they sent to Athens to require general autonomy throughout
Greece, we shall find that the word had then a distinct and serious
import; demanding that the cities held in dependence by Athens should
be left free, which freedom Sparta might have ensured for them
herself at the close of the war, had she not preferred to convert
it into a far harsher empire. But in 387 (the date of the peace of
Antalkidas) there were no large body of subjects to be emancipated,
except the allies of Sparta herself, to whom it was by no means
intended to apply. So that in fact, what was promised, as well as
what was realized, even by the most specious item of this disgraceful
convention, was—“that cities should enjoy autonomy, not for their
own comfort and in their own way, but for Lacedæmonian convenience;”
a significant phrase (employed by Perikles,[24] in the debates
preceding the Peloponnesian war) which forms a sort of running text
for Grecian history during the sixteen years between the peace of
Antalkidas and the battle of Leuktra.

  [23] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 36.

  Ἐν δὲ τῷ πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἀντιῤῥόπως τοῖς ἐναντίοις πράττοντες
  οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ~πολὺ ἐπικυδέστεροι ἐγένοντο~ ἐκ τῆς ἐπ’
  Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνης καλουμένης· ~προστάται γὰρ γενόμενοι τῆς ὑπὸ
  βασιλέως καταπεμφθείσης εἰρήνης~ καὶ τὴν αὐτονομίαν ταῖς πόλεσι
  πράττοντες, etc.

  [24] Thucyd. i, 144. Νῦν δὲ τούτοις (to the Lacedæmonian envoys)
  ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀποπέμψωμεν ... τὰς δὲ πόλεις ὅτι αὐτονόμους
  ἀφήσομεν, εἰ καὶ αὐτονόμους ἔχοντες ἐσπεισάμεθα, καὶ ὅταν
  κἀκεῖνοι ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀποδῶσι πόλεσι ~μὴ σφίσι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις
  ἐπιτηδείως αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ αὐτοῖς ἑκάστοις, ὡς βούλονται~.

I have already mentioned that the first two applications of
the newly-proclaimed autonomy, made by the Lacedæmonians, were
to extort from the Corinthian government the dismissal of its
Argeian auxiliaries, and to compel Thebes to renounce her ancient
presidency of the Bœotian federation. The latter especially was an
object which they had long had at heart;[25] and by both, their
ascendency in Greece was much increased. Athens, too, terrified by
the new development of Persian force as well as partially bribed
by the restoration of her three islands, into an acceptance of the
peace,—was thus robbed of her Theban and Corinthian allies, and
disabled from opposing the Spartan projects. But before we enter upon
these projects, it will be convenient to turn for a short time to the
proceedings of the Persians.

  [25] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 36. οὗπερ πάλαι ἐπεθύμουν.

Even before the death of Darius Nothus (father of Artaxerxes and
Cyrus) Egypt had revolted from the Persians, under a native prince
named Amyrtæus. To the Grecian leaders who accompanied Cyrus in his
expedition against his brother, this revolt was well known to have
much incensed the Persians; so that Klearchus, in the conversation
which took place after the death of Cyrus about accommodation with
Artaxerxes, intimated that the Ten Thousand could lend him effectual
aid in reconquering Egypt.[26] It was not merely these Greeks who
were exposed to danger by the death of Cyrus, but also the various
Persians and other subjects who had lent assistance to him; all of
whom made submission and tried to conciliate Artaxerxes, except
Tamos, who had commanded the fleet of Cyrus on the coasts both of
Ionia and Kilikia. Such was the alarm of Tamos when Tissaphernes
came down in full power to the coast, that he fled with his fleet
and treasures to Egypt, to seek protection from king Psammetichus,
to whom he had rendered valuable service. This traitor, however,
having so valuable a deposit brought to him, forgot every thing
else in his avidity to make it sure, and put to death Tamos with
all his children.[27] About 395 B.C., we find Nephereus king of
Egypt lending aid to the Lacedæmonian fleet against Artaxerxes.[28]
Two years afterwards (392-390 B.C.), during the years immediately
succeeding the victory of Knidus, and the voyage of Pharnabazus
across the Ægean to Peloponnesus,—we hear of that satrap as employed
with Abrokomas and Tithraustes in strenuous but unavailing efforts
to reconquer Egypt.[29] Having thus repulsed the Persians, the
Egyptian king Akoras is found between 390-380 B.C.,[30] sending aid
to Evagoras in Cyprus against the same enemy. And in spite of farther
efforts made afterwards by Artaxerxes to reconquer Egypt, the native
kings in that country maintained their independence for about sixty
years in all, until the reign of his successor Ochus.

  [26] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 13.

  It would appear that the revolt of Egypt from Persia must date
  between 414-411 B.C.; but this point is obscure. See Boeckh,
  Manetho und die Hundsstern-Periode, pp. 358, 363, Berlin 1845; and
  Ley, Fata et Conditio Ægypti sub Imperio Persarum, p. 55.

  M. Rehdautz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Timothei, et Chabriæ, p. 240, places
  the revolt rather earlier, about 414 B.C.; and Mr. Fynes Clinton
  (Fasti Hellen. Appendix, ch. 18, p. 317) countenances the same
  date.

  [27] Diodor. xiv, 35.

  This Psammetichus is presumed by Ley (in his Dissertation above
  cited, p. 20) to be the same person as Amyrtæus the Saite in the
  list of Manetho, under a different name. It is also possible,
  however, that he may have been king over a part of Egypt,
  contemporaneous with Amyrtæus.

  [28] Diodor. xiv, 79.

  [29] This is the chronology laid down by M. Rehdautz (Vitæ
  Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, Epimetr. ii, pp. 241, 242) on
  very probable grounds, principally from Isokrates, Orat. iv,
  (Panegyr.) s. 161, 162.

  [30] Diodor. xv, 2, 3.

But it was a Grecian enemy,—of means inferior, yet of qualities much
superior, to any of these Egyptians,—who occupied the chief attention
of the Persians immediately after the peace of Antalkidas: Evagoras,
despot of Salamis in Cyprus. Respecting that prince we possess a
discourse of the most glowing and superabundant eulogy, composed
after his death for the satisfaction (and probably paid for with
the money) of his son and successor Nikoklês, by the contemporary
Isokrates. Allowing as we must do for exaggeration and partiality,
even the trustworthy features of the picture are sufficiently
interesting.

Evagoras belonged to a Salaminian stock or Gens called the Teukridæ,
which numbered among its ancestors the splendid legendary names of
Teukrus, Telamon, and Æakus; taking its departure, through them,
from the divine name of Zeus. It was believed that the archer
Teukrus, after returning from the siege of Troy to (the Athenian)
Salamis, had emigrated under a harsh order from his father Telamon,
and given commencement to the city of that name on the eastern
coast of Cyprus.[31] As in Sicily, so in Cyprus, the Greek and
Phœnician elements were found in near contact, though in very
different proportions. Of the nine or ten separate city communities,
which divided among them the whole sea-coast, the inferior towns
being all dependent upon one or other of them,—seven pass for
Hellenic, the two most considerable being Salamis and Soli; three
for Phœnician,—Paphos, Amathus, and Kitium. Probably, however,
there was in each a mixture of Greek and Phœnician population, in
different proportions.[32] Each was ruled by its own separate prince
or despot, Greek or Phœnician. The Greek immigrations (though their
exact date cannot be assigned) appear to have been later in date
than the Phœnician. At the time of the Ionic revolt (B.C. 496), the
preponderance was on the side of Hellenism; yet with considerable
intermixture of Oriental custom. Hellenism was, however, greatly
crushed by the Persian reconquest of the revolters, accomplished
through the aid of the Phœnicians[33] on the opposite continent. And
though doubtless the victories of Kimon and the Athenians (470-450
B.C.) partially revived it, yet Perikles, in his pacification with
the Persians, had prudently relinquished Cyprus as well as Egypt;[34]
so that the Grecian element in the former, receiving little
extraneous encouragement, became more and more subordinate to the
Phœnician.

  [31] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokl.) s. 50; Or. ix, (Evagoras) s.
  21; Pausanias, ii, 29, 4; Diodor. xiv, 98.

  The historian Theopompus, when entering upon the history of
  Evagoras, seems to have related many legendary tales respecting
  the Greek Gentes in Cyprus, and to have represented Agamemnon
  himself as ultimately migrating to it (Theopompus, Frag. 111, ed.
  Wichers; and ed. Didot. ap. Photium).

  The tomb of the archer Teukrus was shown at Salamis in Cyprus.
  See the Epigram of Aristotle, Antholog. i, 8, 112.

  [32] Movers, in his very learned investigations respecting the
  Phœnicians (vol. iii, ch. 5, p. 203-221 _seq._), attempts to
  establish the existence of an ancient population in Cyprus,
  called Kitians; once extended over the island, and of which the
  town called Kitium was the remnant. He supposes them to have
  been a portion of the Canaanitish population, anterior to the
  Jewish occupation of Palestine. The Phœnician colonies in Cyprus
  he reckons as of later date, superadded to, and depressing these
  natives. He supposes the Kilikian population to have been in
  early times Canaanitish also. Engel (Kypros, vol. i, p. 166)
  inclines to admit the same hypothesis as highly probable.

  The sixth century B.C. (from 600 downwards) appears to have been
  very unfavorable to the Phœnicians, bringing upon Tyre severe
  pressure from the Chaldeans, as it brought captivity upon the
  Jews. During the same period, the Grecian commerce with Egypt was
  greatly extended, especially by the reign of the Phil-hellenic
  Amasis, who acquired possession of Cyprus. Much of the Grecian
  immigration into Cyprus probably took place at this time; we know
  of one body of settlers invited by Philokyprus to Soli, under the
  assistance of the Athenian Solon (Movers, p. 244 _seq._).

  [33] Herodot. v, 109.

  Compare the description given by Herodotus of the costume and
  arms of the Cypriots in the armament of Xerxes,—half Oriental
  (vii, 90). The Salaminians used chariots of war in battle (v,
  113); as the Carthaginians did, before they learnt the art of
  training elephants (Diodor. xvi, 80; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27).

  [34] See Vol. V. of this History, Ch. xlv, p. 335.

It was somewhere about this time that the reigning princes of
Salamis, who at the time of the Ionic revolt had been Greeks of
the Teukrid Gens,[35] were supplanted and dethroned by a Phœnician
exile who gained their confidence and made himself despot in their
place.[36] To insure his own sceptre, this usurper did everything
in his power to multiply and strengthen the Phœnician population,
as well as to discourage and degrade the Hellenic. The same policy
was not only continued by his successor at Salamis, but seems also
to have been imitated in several of the other towns; insomuch that
during most part of the Peloponnesian war, Cyprus became sensibly
dis-hellenized. The Greeks in the island were harshly oppressed; new
Greek visitors and merchants were kept off by the most repulsive
treatment, as well as by threats of those cruel mutilations of the
body which were habitually employed as penalties by the Orientals;
while Grecian arts, education, music, poetry, and intelligence, were
rapidly on the decline.[37]

  [35] One of these princes, however, is mentioned as bearing the
  Phœnician name of Siromus (Herod. v, 104).

  [36] We may gather this by putting together Herodot. iv, 102; v,
  104-114, with Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 22.

  [37] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 23, 55, 58.

  Παραλαβὼν γὰρ (Evagoras) ~τὴν πόλιν ἐκβεβαρβαρωμένην~, καὶ διὰ
  τὴν τῶν Φοινίκων ἀρχὴν οὔτε τοὺς Ἕλληνας προσδεχομένην, οὔτε τέχνας
  ἐπισταμένην, οὔτ’ ἐμπορίῳ χρωμένην, οὔτε λιμένα κεκτημένην, etc.

  Πρὶν μὲν γὰρ λαβεῖν Εὐαγόραν τὴν ἀρχὴν, οὕτως ἀπροσοίστως καὶ
  χαλεπῶς εἶχον, ὥστε καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων τούτους ἐνόμιζον εἶναι
  βελτίστους οἵ ~τινες ὠμότατα πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας διακείμενοι~
  τυγχάνοιεν, etc.

  This last passage receives remarkable illustration from the
  oration of Lysias against Andokides, in which he alludes to the
  visit of the latter to Cyprus—μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἔπλευσεν ὡς τὸν
  Κιτιέων βασιλέα, καὶ προδιδοὺς ληφθεὶς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐδέθη, καὶ οὐ
  μόνον τὸν θάνατον ἐφοβεῖτο ἀλλὰ τὰ καθ’ ἡμέραν αἰκίσματα,
  ~οἰόμενος τὰ ἀκρωτήρια ζῶντος~ ἀποτμηθήσεσθαι (s. 26).

  Engel (Kypros, vol. i, p. 286) impugns the general correctness of
  this narrative of Isokrates. He produces no adequate reasons, nor
  do I myself see any, for this contradiction.

  Not only Konon, but also his friend Nikophemus, had a wife and
  family at Cyprus, besides another family in Athens (Lysias, De
  Bonis Aristophanis, Or. xix, s. 38).

Notwithstanding such untoward circumstances, in which the youth of
the Teukrid Evagoras at Salamis was passed, he manifested at an
early age so much energy both of mind and body, and so much power of
winning popularity, that he became at once a marked man both among
Greeks and Phœnicians. It was about this time that the Phœnician
despot was slain, through a conspiracy formed by a Kitian or Tyrian
named Abdêmon, who got possession of his sceptre.[38] The usurper,
mistrustful of his position, and anxious to lay hands upon all
conspicuous persons who might be capable of doing him mischief,
tried to seize Evagoras; but the latter escaped and passed over to
Soli and Kilikia. Though thus to all appearance a helpless exile,
he found means to strike a decisive blow, while the new usurpation,
stained by its first violences and rapacity, was surrounded by
enemies, doubters, or neutrals, without having yet established any
firm footing. He crossed over from Soli in Kilikia, with a small but
determined band of about fifty followers,—obtained secret admission
by a postern gate of Salamis,—and assaulted Abdêmon by night in
his palace. In spite of a vastly superior number of guards, this
enterprise was conducted with such extraordinary daring and judgment,
that Abdêmon perished, and Evagoras became despot in his place.[39]

  [38] Theopompus (Fr. 111) calls Abdêmon a Kitian; Diodorus
  (xiv, 98) calls him a Tyrian. Movers (p. 206) thinks that both
  are correct, and that he was a Kitian living at Tyre, who had
  migrated from Salamis during the Athenian preponderance there.
  There were Kitians, not natives of the town of Kition, but
  belonging to the ancient population of the island, living in the
  various towns of Cyprus; and there were also Kitians mentioned as
  resident at Sidon (Diogen. Laert. Vit. Zenon. s. 6).

  [39] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 29-35; also Or. iii,
  (Nikokl.) s. 33; Theopomp. Fragm. 111, ed. Wichers and ed. Didot.
  Diodor. xiv, 98.

  The two latter mention the name, Audymon or Abdêmon, which
  Isokrates does not specify.

The splendor of this exploit was quite sufficient to seat Evagoras
unopposed on the throne, amidst a population always accustomed to
princely government; while among the Salaminian Greeks he was still
farther endeared by his Teukrid descent.[40] His conduct fully
justified the expectations entertained. Not merely did he refrain
from bloodshed, or spoliation, or violence for the gratification
of personal appetite; abstinences remarkable enough in any Grecian
despot to stamp his reign with letters of gold, and the more
remarkable in Evagoras, since he had the susceptible temperament
of a Greek, though his great mental force always kept it under due
control.[41] But he was also careful in inquiring into, and strict in
punishing crime, yet without those demonstrations of cruel infliction
by which an Oriental prince displayed his energy.[42] His government
was at the same time highly popular and conciliating, as well towards
the multitude as towards individuals. Indefatigable in his own
personal supervision, he examined everything for himself, shaped out
his own line of policy, and kept watch over its execution.[43] He was
foremost in all effort and in all danger. Maintaining undisturbed
security, he gradually doubled the wealth, commerce, industry, and
military force, of the city, while his own popularity and renown went
on increasing.

  [40] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokles) s. 33.

  [41] Isokrat. Or. ix, s. 53. ἡγούμενος τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ
  ἀγόμενος ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, etc.

  [42] Isokr. Or. ix, 51. οὐδένα μὲν ἀδικῶν, τοὺς δὲ χρηστοὺς
  τιμῶν, καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἁπάντων ἄρχων, ~νομίμως δὲ τοὺς
  ἐξαμαρτάνοντας~ κολάζων (s. 58)—ὃς οὐ μόνον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πόλιν
  πλείονος ἀξίαν ἐποίησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν τόπον ὅλον, τὸν περιέχοντα
  τὴν νῆσον, ~ἐπὶ πρᾳότητα καὶ μετριότητα~ προήγαγεν, etc.; compare
  s. 81.

  These epithets, _lawful_ punishment, _mild_ dealing, etc., cannot
  be fully understood except in contrast with the mutilations
  alluded to by Lysias, in the passage cited in a note on page
  16, above; also with exactly similar mutilations, mentioned by
  Xenophon as systematically inflicted upon offenders by Cyrus
  the younger (Xenoph. Anabas. i, 9, 13). Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν (says
  Isokrates about the Persians) οὕτως αἰκίζεται τοὺς οἰκέτας, ὡς
  ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους κολάζουσιν—Or. iv, (Paneg.) 142.

  [43] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 50-56.

  The language of the encomiast, though exaggerated, must doubtless
  be founded in truth, as the result shows.

Above all, it was his first wish to renovate, both in Salamis and
in Cyprus, that Hellenism which the Phœnician despots of the last
fifty years had done so much to extinguish or corrupt. For aid in
this scheme, he seems to have turned his thoughts to Athens, with
which city he was connected as a Teukrid, by gentile and legendary
sympathies,—and which was then only just ceasing to be the great
naval power of the Ægean. For though we cannot exactly make out the
date at which Evagoras began to reign, we may conclude it to have
been about 411 or 410 B.C. It seems to have been shortly after that
period that he was visited by Andokides the Athenian;[44] moreover,
he must have been a prince not merely established, but powerful,
when he ventured to harbor Konon in 405 B.C., after the battle of
Ægospotami. He invited to Salamis fresh immigrants from Attica and
other parts of Greece, as the prince Philokyprus of Soli had done
under the auspices of Solon,[45] a century and a half before. He
took especial pains to revive and improve Grecian letters, arts,
teaching, music, and intellectual tendencies. Such encouragement was
so successfully administered, that in a few years, without constraint
or violence, the face of Salamis was changed. The gentleness and
sociability, the fashions and pursuits, of Hellenism, became again
predominant; with great influence of example over all the other towns
of the island.

  [44] Lysias cont. Andokid. s. 28.

  [45] Plutarch, Solon, c. 26.

Had the rise of Evagoras taken place a few years earlier, Athens
might perhaps have availed herself of the opening to turn her
ambition eastward, in preference to that disastrous impulse which
led her westward to Sicily. But coming as he did only at that later
moment when she was hard pressed to keep up even a defensive war, he
profited rather by her weakness than by her strength. During those
closing years of the war, when the Athenian empire was partially
broken up, and when the Ægean, instead of the tranquillity which it
had enjoyed for fifty years under Athens, became a scene of contest
between two rival money-levying fleets,—many out-settlers from
Athens, who had acquired property in the islands, the Chersonesus, or
elsewhere, under her guarantee, found themselves insecure in every
way, and were tempted to change their abodes. Finally, by the defeat
of Ægospotami (B.C. 405), all such out-settlers as then remained
were expelled, and forced to seek shelter either at Athens (at that
moment the least attractive place in Greece), or in some other
locality. To such persons, not less than to the Athenian admiral
Konon with his small remnant of Athenian triremes saved out of the
great defeat, the proclaimed invitations of Evagoras would present
a harbor of refuge nowhere else to be found. Accordingly, we learn
that numerous settlers of the best character, from different parts
of Greece, crowded to Salamis.[46] Many Athenian women, during the
years of destitution and suffering which preceded as well as followed
the battle of Ægospotami, were well pleased to emigrate and find
husbands in that city;[47] while throughout the wide range of the
Lacedæmonian empire, the numerous victims exiled by the harmosts and
dekarchies had no other retreat on the whole so safe and tempting.
The extensive plain of Salamis afforded lands for many colonists. On
what conditions, indeed, they were admitted, we do not know; but the
conduct of Evagoras as a ruler, gave universal satisfaction.

  [46] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 59-61; compare Lysias, Or.
  xix, (De Aristoph. Bon.) s. 38-46; and Diodor. xiv, 98.

  [47] Isokrates, _l. c._ παιδοποιεῖσθαι δὲ τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν
  γυναῖκας λαμβάνοντες παρ’ ἡμῶν, etc.

  For the extreme distress of Athenian women during these trying
  times consult the statement in Xenophon, Memorab. ii, 7, 2-4.

  The Athenian Andokides is accused of having carried out a young
  woman of citizen family,—his own cousin, and daughter of an
  Athenian named Aristeides,—to Cyprus, and there to have sold
  her to the despot of Kitium for a cargo of wheat. But being
  threatened with prosecution for this act before the Athenian
  Dikastery, he stole her away again and brought her back to
  Athens; in which act, however, he was detected by the prince, and
  punished with imprisonment from which he had the good fortune
  to escape. (Plutarch, Vit. X, Orat. p. 834; Photius, Cod. 261;
  Tzetzes, Chiliad. vi, 367).

  How much there may be of truth in this accusation, we have no
  means of determining. But it illustrates the way in which the
  Athenian maidens, who had no dowry at home, were provided for by
  their relatives elsewhere. Probably Andokides took this young
  woman out, under the engagement to find a Grecian husband for her
  in Cyprus. Instead of doing this, he sold her for his own profit
  to the harem of the prince; or at least, is accused of having so
  sold her.

During the first years of his reign, Evagoras doubtless paid his
tribute regularly, and took no steps calculated to offend the Persian
king. But as his power increased, his ambition increased also. We
find him towards the year 390 B.C., engaged in a struggle not merely
with the Persian king, but with Amathus and Kitium in his own island,
and with the great Phœnician cities on the mainland. By what steps,
or at what precise period, this war began, we cannot determine. At
the time of the battle of Knidus (394 B.C.) Evagoras had not only
paid his tribute, but was mainly instrumental in getting the Persian
fleet placed under Konon to act against the Lacedæmonians, himself
serving aboard.[48] It was in fact (if we may believe Isokrates)
to the extraordinary energy, ability, and power, displayed by him
on that occasion in the service of Artaxerxes himself, that the
jealousy and alarm of the latter against him are to be ascribed.
Without any provocation, and at the very moment when he was profiting
by the zealous services of Evagoras, the Great King treacherously
began to manœuvre against him, and forced him into the war in
self-defence.[49] Evagoras accepted the challenge, in spite of the
disparity of strength, with such courage and efficiency, that he at
first gained marked successes. Seconded by his son Pnytagoras, he not
only worsted and humbled Amathus, Kitium, and Soli, which cities,
under the prince Agyris, adhered to Artaxerxes,—but also equipped a
large fleet, attacked the Phœnicians on the mainland with so much
vigor as even to take the great city of Tyre; prevailing, moreover,
upon some of the Kilikian towns to declare against the Persians.[50]
He received powerful aid from Akoris, the native and independent
king in Egypt, as well as from Chabrias and the force sent out by
the Athenians.[51] Beginning apparently about 390 B.C., the war
against Evagoras lasted something more than ten years, costing the
Persians great efforts and an immense expenditure of money. Twice
did Athens send a squadron to his assistance, from gratitude for his
long protection to Konon and his energetic efforts before and in the
battle of Knidus,—though she thereby ran every risk of making the
Persians her enemies.

  [48] This much appears even from the meagre abstract of Ktesias,
  given by Photius (Ktesiæ Persica, c. 63, p. 80, ed. Bähr).

  Both Ktesias and Theopompus (Fr. iii, ed. Wichers, and ed. Didot)
  recounted the causes which brought about the war between the
  Persian king and Evagoras.

  [49] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 71, 73, 74. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτον
  (Evagoras) οὕτως ἐκ πολλοῦ περιδεῶς ἔσχε (Artaxerxes), ~ὥστε
  μεταξὺ πάσχων εὖ~, πολεμεῖν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπεχείρησε, δίκαια μὲν οὐ
  ποιῶν, etc.—ἐπειδὴ ~ἠναγκάσθη πολεμεῖν~ (_i. e._ Evagoras).

  [50] Isokr. Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 75, 76; Diodor. xiv, 98; Ephorus,
  Frag. 134, ed. Didot.

  [51] Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 2; Demosthenes adv. Leptinem,
  p. 479, s. 84.

The satrap Tiribazus saw that so long as he had on his hands a
war in Greece, it was impossible for him to concentrate his force
against the prince of Salamis and the Egyptians. Hence, in part, the
extraordinary effort made by the Persians to dictate, in conjunction
with Sparta, the peace of Antalkidas, and to get together such a
fleet in Ionia as should overawe Athens and Thebes into submission.
It was one of the conditions of that peace that Evagoras should be
abandoned;[52] the whole island of Cyprus being acknowledged as
belonging to the Persian king. Though thus cut off from Athens, and
reduced to no other Grecian aid than such mercenaries as he could
pay, Evagoras was still assisted by Akoris of Egypt, and even by
Hekatomnus prince of Karia with a secret present of money.[53] But
the peace of Antalkidas being now executed in Asia, the Persian
satraps were completely masters of the Grecian cities on the Asiatic
sea-board, and were enabled to convey round to Kilikia and Cyprus not
only their whole fleet from Ionia, but also additional contingents
from these very Grecian cities. A large portion of the Persian
force acting against Cyprus was thus Greek, yet seemingly acting by
constraint, neither well paid nor well used,[54] and therefore not
very efficient.

  [52] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 162. Εὐαγόραν—ὃς ἐν ταῖς
  συνθήκαις ἔκδοτός ἐστιν, etc.

  We must observe, however, that Cyprus had been secured to the
  king of Persia, even under the former peace, so glorious to
  Athens, concluded by Perikles about 449 B.C., and called the
  peace of Kallias. It was, therefore, neither a new demand on
  the part of Artaxerxes, nor a new concession on the part of the
  Greeks, at the peace of Antalkidas.

  [53] Diodor. xv, 2.

  It appears that Artaxerxes had counted much upon the aid of
  Hekatomnus for conquering Evagoras (Diodor. xiv, 98).

  About 380 B.C., Isokrates reckons Hekatomnus as being merely
  dependent in name on Persia; and ready to revolt openly on the
  first opportunity (Isokrates, Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 189).

  [54] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 153, 154, 179.

The satraps Tiribazus and Orontes commanded the land force, a large
portion of which was transported across to Cyprus; the admiral Gaos
was at the head of the fleet, which held its station at Kitium in the
south of the island. It was here that Evagoras, having previously
gained a battle on land, attacked them. By extraordinary efforts he
had got together a fleet of two hundred triremes, nearly equal in
number to theirs; but after a hard-fought contest, in which he at
first seemed likely to be victorious, he underwent a complete naval
defeat, which disqualified him from keeping the sea, and enabled the
Persians to block up Salamis as well by sea as by land.[55] Though
thus reduced to his own single city, however, Evagoras defended
himself with unshaken resolution, still sustained by aid from Akoris
in Egypt; while Tyre and several towns in Kilikia also continued
in revolt against Artaxerxes; so that the efforts of the Persians
were distracted, and the war was not concluded until ten years
after its commencement.[56] It cost them on the whole (if we may
believe Isokrates)[57] fifteen thousand talents in money, and such
severe losses in men, that Tiribazus acceded to the propositions
of Evagoras for peace, consenting to leave him in full possession
of Salamis, under payment of a stipulated tribute, “like a slave
to his master.” These last words were required by the satrap to be
literally inserted in the convention; but Evagoras peremptorily
refused his consent, demanding that the tribute should be recognized
as paid by “one king to another.” Rather than concede this point
of honor, he even broke off the negotiation, and resolved again to
defend himself to the uttermost. He was rescued, after the siege had
been yet farther prolonged, by a dispute which broke out between
the two commanders of the Persian army. Orontes, accusing Tiribazus
of projected treason and rebellion against the king, in conjunction
with Sparta, caused him to be sent for as prisoner to Susa, and thus
became sole commander. But as the besieging army was already wearied
out by the obstinate resistance of Salamis, he consented to grant
the capitulation, stipulating only for the tribute, and exchanging
the offensive phrase enforced by Tiribazus, for the amendment of the
other side.[58]

  [55] Diodor. xv, 4.

  [56] Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 187, 188—with
  Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 77.

  The war was not concluded,—and Tyre as well as much of
  Kilikia was still in revolt,—when Isokrates published the
  Panegyrical Oration. At that time, Evagoras had maintained
  the contest six years, counting either from the peace of
  Antalkidas (387 B.C.) or from his naval defeat about a year
  or two afterwards; for Isokrates does not make it quite
  clear from what point of commencement he reckons the six
  years.

  We know that the war between the king of Persia and
  Evagoras had begun as early as 390 B.C., in which year
  an Athenian fleet was sent to assist the latter (Xenoph.
  Hellen. iv, 8, 24). Both Isokrates and Diodorus state
  that it lasted ten years; and I therefore place the
  conclusion of it in 380 or 379 B.C., soon after the date
  of the Panegyrical Oration of Isokrates. I dissent on
  this point from Mr. Clinton (see Fasti Hellenici, ad
  annos 387-376 B.C., and his Appendix, No. 12—where the
  point is discussed). He supposes the war to have begun
  after the peace of Antalkidas, and to have ended in 376
  B.C. I agree with him in making light of Diodorus, but he
  appears to me on this occasion to contradict the authority
  of Xenophon,—or at least only to evade the necessity
  of contradicting him by resorting to an inconvenient
  hypothesis, and by representing the two Athenian
  expeditions sent to assist Evagoras in Cyprus, first in 390
  B.C., next in 388 B.C., as relating to “_hostile measures
  before the war began_” (p. 280). To me it appears more
  natural and reasonable to include these as a part of the
  war.

  [57] Isokrates, Or. ix, s. 73-76.

  [58] Diodor. xv. 8, 9.

  This remarkable anecdote, of susceptible Grecian honor on the
  part of Evagoras, is noway improbable, and seems safe to admit
  on the authority of Diodorus. Nevertheless, it forms so choice
  a morsel for a panegyrical discourse such as that of Isokrates,
  that one cannot but think he would have inserted it had it come
  to his knowledge. His silence causes great surprise—not without
  some suspicion as to the truth of the story.

It was thus that Evagoras was relieved from his besieging enemies,
and continued for the remainder of his life as tributary prince
of Salamis under the Persians. He was no farther engaged in war,
nor was his general popularity among the Salaminians diminished
by the hardships which they had gone through along with him.[59]
His prudence calmed the rankling antipathy of the Great King, who
would gladly have found a pretext for breaking the treaty. His
children were numerous, and lived in harmony as well with him as
with each other. Isokrates specially notices this fact, standing as
it did in marked contrast with the family-relations of most of the
Grecian despots, usually stained with jealousies, antipathies, and
conflict, often with actual bloodshed.[60] But he omits to notice
the incident whereby Evagoras perished; an incident not in keeping
with that superhuman good fortune and favor from the gods, of which
the Panegyrical Oration boasts as having been vouchsafed to the hero
throughout his life.[61] It was seemingly not very long after the
peace, that a Salaminian named Nikokreon formed a conspiracy against
his life and dominion, but was detected, by a singular accident,
before the moment of execution, and forced to seek safety in flight.
He left behind him a youthful daughter in his harem, under the care
of an eunuch (a Greek, born in Elis) named Thrasydæus; who, full of
vindictive sympathy in his master’s cause, made known the beauty of
the young lady both to Evagoras himself and to Pnytagoras, the most
distinguished of his sons, partner in the gallant defence of Salamis
against the Persians. Both of them were tempted, each unknown to
the other, to make a secret assignation for being conducted to her
chamber by the eunuch; both of them were there assassinated by his
hand.[62]

  [59] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokles) s. 40,—a passage which must
  be more true of Evagoras than of Nikokles.

  [60] Isokrat. Or. ix, s. 88. Compare his Orat. viii, (De Pace) s.
  138.

  [61] Isokrates, ib. s. 85. εὐτυχέστερον καὶ θεοφιλέστερον, etc.

  [62] I give this incident, in the main, as it is recounted in the
  fragment of Theopompus, preserved as a portion of the abstract
  of that author by Photius (Theopom. Fr. 111, ed. Wichers and ed.
  Didot).

  Both Aristotle (Polit. v, 8, 10) and Diodorus (xv, 47) allude
  to the assassination of Evagoras by the eunuch; but both these
  authors conceive the story differently from Theopompus. Thus
  Diodorus says—Nikoklês, the eunuch, assassinated Evagoras, and
  became “despot of Salamis.” This appears to be a confusion of
  Nikoklês with Nikokreon. Nikoklês was the son of Evagoras, and
  the manner in which Isokrates addresses him affords the surest
  proof that _he_ had no hand in the death of his father.

  The words of Aristotle are—ἡ (ἐπίθεσις) τοῦ εὐνούχου Εὐαγόρᾳ
  τῷ Κυπρίῳ· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν γυναῖκα παρελέσθαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ
  ἀπέκτεινεν ὡς ὑβρισμένος. So perplexing is the passage in its
  literal sense, that M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, in the note to his
  translation, conceives ὁ εὐνοῦχος to be a surname or _sobriquet_
  given to the conspirator, whose real name was Nikoklês. But this
  supposition is, in my judgment, contradicted by the fact, that
  Theopompus marks the same fact, of the assassin being an eunuch,
  by another word—Θρασυδαίου ~τοῦ ἡμιάῤῥενος~, ὃς ἦν Ἠλεῖος τὸ
  γένος, etc.

  It is evident that Aristotle had heard the story differently
  from Theopompus, and we have to choose between the two. I
  prefer the version of the latter; which is more marked as well
  as more intelligible, and which furnishes the explanation why
  Pnytagoras,—who seems to have been the most advanced of the sons,
  being left in command of the besieged Salamis when Evagoras
  quitted it to solicit aid in Egypt,—did not succeed his father,
  but left the succession to Nikoklês, who was evidently (from the
  representation even of an eulogist like Isokrates) not a man
  of much energy. The position of this eunuch in the family of
  Nikokreon seems to mark the partial prevalence of Oriental habits.

Thus perished a Greek of preëminent vigor and intelligence,
remarkably free from the vices usual in Grecian despots, and
forming a strong contrast in this respect with his contemporary
Dionysius, whose military energy is so deeply stained by crime and
violence. Nikoklês, the son of Evagoras, reigned at Salamis after
him, and showed much regard, accompanied by munificent presents,
to the Athenian Isokrates; who compliments him as a pacific and
well-disposed prince, attached to Greek pursuits and arts, conversant
by personal study with Greek philosophy, and above all, copying his
father in that just dealing and absence of wrong towards person or
property, which had so much promoted the comfort as well as the
prosperity of the city.[63]

  [63] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikoklês) s. 38-48; Or. ix, (Evagoras)
  s. 100; Or. xv, (Permut.) s. 43. Diodorus (xv, 47) places the
  assassination of Evagoras in 374 B.C.

We now revert from the episode respecting Evagoras,—interesting not
less from the eminent qualities of that prince than from the glimpse
of Hellenism struggling with the Phœnician element in Cyprus,—to the
general consequences of the peace of Antalkidas in Central Greece.
For the first time since the battle of Mykalê in 479 B.C., the
Persians were now really masters of all the Greeks on the Asiatic
coast. The satraps lost no time in confirming their dominion. In all
the cities which they suspected, they built citadels and planted
permanent garrisons. In some cases, their mistrust or displeasure was
carried so far as to raze the town altogether.[64] And thus these
cities, having already once changed their position greatly for the
worse, by passing from easy subjection under Athens to the harsh rule
of Lacedæmonian harmosts and native decemvirs,—were now transferred
to masters yet more oppressive and more completely without the pale
of Hellenic sympathy. Both in public extortion, and in wrong doing
towards individuals, the commandant and his mercenaries, whom the
satrap maintained, were probably more rapacious, and certainly more
unrestrained, than even the harmosts of Sparta. Moreover, the Persian
grandees required beautiful boys as eunuchs for their service, and
beautiful women as inmates of their harems.[65] What was taken
for their convenience admitted neither of recovery nor redress;
and Grecian women, if not more beautiful than many of the native
Asiatics, were at least more intelligent, lively, and seductive,—as
we may read in the history of that Phokæan lady, the companion of
Cyrus, who was taken captive at Kunaxa. Moreover, these Asiatic
Greeks, when passing into the hands of Oriental masters, came under
the maxims and sentiment of Orientals, respecting the infliction of
pain or torture,—maxims not only more cruel than those of the Greeks,
but also making little distinction between freemen and slaves.[66]
The difference between the Greeks and Phœnicians in Cyprus, on this
point, has been just noticed; and doubtless the difference between
Greeks and Persians was still more marked. While the Asiatic Greeks
were thus made over by Sparta and the Perso-Spartan convention of
Antalkidas, to a condition in every respect worse, they were at the
same time thrown in, as reluctant auxiliaries, to strengthen the
hands of the Great King against other Greeks,—against Evagoras in
Cyprus,—and above all, against the islands adjoining the coast of
Asia,—Chios, Samos, Rhodes, etc.[67] These islands were now exposed
to the same hazard, from their overwhelming Persian neighbors, as
that from which they had been rescued nearly a century before by the
Confederacy of Delos, and by the Athenian empire into which that
Confederacy was transformed. All the tutelary combination that the
genius, the energy, and the Pan-hellenic ardor, of Athens had first
organized, and so long kept up,—was now broken up; while Sparta, to
whom its extinction was owing, in surrendering the Asiatic Greeks,
had destroyed the security even of the islanders.

  [64] Isokrates. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 142, 156, 190. Τάς τε πόλεις
  τὰς Ἑλληνίδας οὕτω κυρίως παρείληφεν, ὥστε τὰς μὲν κατασκάπτειν,
  ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀκροπόλεις ἐντειχίζειν.

  [65] See Herodot. vi, 9; ix, 76.

  [66] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 142.

  Οἷς (to the Asiatic Greeks after the peace of Antalkidas) οὐκ
  ἐξαρκεῖ δασμολογεῖσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀκροπόλεις ὁρᾷν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν
  κατεχομένας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ταῖς κοιναῖς συμφοραῖς δεινότερα πάσχουσι
  τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀργυρωνήτων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν οὕτως αἰκίζεται τοὺς
  οἰκέτας, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους κολάζουσιν.

  [67] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 143, 154, 189, 190. How
  immediately the inland kings, who had acquired possession of the
  continental Grecian cities, aimed at acquiring the islands also,
  is seen in Herodot. i, 27. Chios and Samos indeed, surrendered
  without resisting, to the first Cyrus, when he was master of
  the continental towns, though he had no naval force (Herod. i,
  143-169). Even after the victory of Mykalê, the Spartans deemed
  it impossible to protect these islanders against the Persian
  masters of the continent (Herod. ix, 106). Nothing except the
  energy and organization of the Athenians proved that it was
  possible to do so.

It soon appeared, however, how much Sparta herself had gained by
this surrender in respect to dominion nearer home. The government
of Corinth,—wrested from the party friendly to Argos, deprived of
Argeian auxiliaries, and now in the hands of the restored Corinthian
exiles who were the most devoted partisans of Sparta,—looked to her
for support, and made her mistress of the Isthmus, either for offence
or for defence. She thus gained the means of free action against
Thebes, the enemy upon whom her attention was first directed. Thebes
was now the object of Spartan antipathy, not less than Athens had
formerly been; especially on the part of King Agesilaus, who had to
avenge the insult offered to himself at the sacrifice near Aulis,
as well as the strenuous resistance on the field of Koroneia. He
was at the zenith of his political influence; so that his intense
miso-Theban sentiment made Sparta, now becoming aggressive on all
sides, doubly aggressive against Thebes. More prudent Spartans,
like Antalkidas, warned him[68] that his persevering hostility
would ultimately kindle in the Thebans a fatal energy of military
resistance and organization. But the warning was despised until it
was too fully realized in the development of the great military
genius of Epaminondas, and in the defeat of Leuktra.

  [68] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 26; Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 13.

I have already mentioned that in the solemnity of exchanging oaths
to the peace of Antalkidas, the Thebans had hesitated at first to
recognize the autonomy of the other Bœotian cities; upon which
Agesilaus had manifested a fierce impatience to exclude them from the
treaty, and attack them single-handed.[69] Their timely accession
balked him in this impulse; but it enabled him to enter upon a series
of measures highly humiliating to the dignity as well as to the power
of Thebes. All the Bœotian cities were now proclaimed autonomous
under the convention. As solicitor, guarantee, and interpreter, of
that convention, Sparta either had, or professed to have, the right
of guarding their autonomy against dangers, actual or contingent,
from their previous Vorort or presiding city. For this purpose she
availed herself of this moment of change to organize in each of them
a local oligarchy, composed of partisans adverse to Thebes as well as
devoted to herself, and upheld in case of need by a Spartan harmost
and garrison.[70] Such an internal revolution grew almost naturally
out of the situation; since the previous leaders, and the predominant
sentiment in most of the towns, seem to have been favorable to
Bœotian unity, and to the continued presidency of Thebes. These
leaders would therefore find themselves hampered, intimidated, and
disqualified, under the new system, while those who had before been
an opposition minority would come forward with a bold and decided
policy, like Kritias and Theramenes at Athens after the surrender of
the city to Lysander. The new leaders doubtless would rather invite
than repel the establishment of a Spartan harmost in their town, as a
security to themselves against resistance from their own citizens as
well as against attacks from Thebes, and as a means of placing them
under the assured conditions of a Lysandrian dekarchy. Though most of
the Bœotian cities were thus, on the whole, favorable to Thebes,—and
though Sparta thrust upon them the boon, which she called autonomy,
from motives of her own, and not from their solicitation,—yet,
Orchomenus and Thespiæ, over whom the presidency of Thebes appears to
have been harshly exercised, were adverse to her, and favorable to
the Spartan alliance.[71] These two cities were strongly garrisoned
by Sparta, and formed her main stations in Bœotia.[72]

  [69] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 33.

  [70] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46. Ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι
  καθειστήκεσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις. Respecting the Bœotian city
  of Tanagra, he says—ἔτι γὰρ τότε καὶ τὴν Τανάγραν οἱ περὶ
  Ὑπατόδωρον, φίλοι ὄντες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, εἶχον (v, 4, 49).

  Schneider, in his note on the former of these two passages,
  explains the word δυναστεῖαι as follows—“Sunt factiones
  optimatium qui Lacedæmoniis favebant, cum præsidio et harmostâ
  Laconico.” This is perfectly just; but the words ὥσπερ ἐν
  Θήβαις seem also to require an explanation. These words allude
  to the “factio optimatium” at Thebes, of whom Leontiades was
  the chief; who betrayed the Kadmeia (the citadel of Thebes) to
  the Lacedæmonian troops under Phœbidas in 382 B.C.; and who
  remained masters of Thebes, subservient to Sparta and upheld by
  a standing Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia, until they were
  overthrown by the memorable conspiracy of Pelopidas and Mellon
  in 379 B.C. It is to this oligarchy under Leontiades at Thebes,
  devoted to Spartan interests and resting on Spartan support,—that
  Xenophon compares the governments planted by Sparta, after the
  peace of Antalkidas, in each of the Bœotian cities. What he says,
  of the government of Leontiades and his colleagues at Thebes,
  is—“that they deliberately introduced the Lacedæmonians into the
  acropolis, and enslaved Thebes to them, in order that they might
  themselves exercise a despotism”—τούς τε τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσαγαγόντας
  εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ βουληθέντας Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν
  πόλιν δουλεύειν, ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν (v, 4, 1: compare v, 2,
  36). This character—conveying a strong censure in the mouth
  of the philo-Laconian Xenophon—belongs to all the governments
  planted by Sparta in the Bœotian cities after the peace of
  Antalkidas, and, indeed, to the Dekarchies generally which she
  established throughout her empire.

  [71] Xenoph. Memorab. iii, 5, 2; Thucyd. iv, 133; Diodor. xv, 79.

  [72] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 15-20; Diodor. xv, 32-37; Isokrates, Or.
  xiv, (Plataic.) s. 14. 15.

The presence of such garrisons, one on each side of Thebes,—the
discontinuance of the Bœotarchs, with the breaking up of all symbols
and proceedings of the Bœotian federation,—and the establishment of
oligarchies devoted to Sparta in the other cities,—was doubtless a
deep wound to the pride of the Thebans. But there was another wound
still deeper, and this the Lacedæmonians forthwith proceeded to
inflict,—the restoration of Platæa.

A melancholy interest attaches both to the locality of this town, as
one of the brightest scenes of Grecian glory,—and to its brave and
faithful population, victims of an exposed position combined with
numerical feebleness. Especially, we follow with a sort of repugnance
the capricious turns of policy which dictated the Spartan behavior
towards them. One hundred and twenty years before, the Platæans had
thrown themselves upon Sparta, to entreat her protection against
Thebes. The Spartan king Kleomenes had then declined the obligation
as too distant, and had recommended them to ally themselves with
Athens.[73] This recommendation, though dictated chiefly by a wish
to raise contention between Athens and Thebes, was complied with;
and the alliance, severing Platæa altogether from the Bœotian
confederacy, turned out both advantageous and honorable to her until
the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. At that time, it suited
the policy of the Spartans to uphold and strengthen in every way
the supremacy of Thebes over the Bœotian cities; it was altogether
by Spartan intervention, indeed, that the power of Thebes was
reëstablished, after the great prostration as well as disgrace which
she had undergone, as traitor to Hellas and zealous in the service
of Mardonius.[74] Athens, on the other hand, was at that time doing
her best to break up the Bœotian federation, and to enrol its various
cities as her allies; in which project, though doubtless suggested
by and conducive to her own ambition, she was at that time (460-445
B.C.) perfectly justifiable on Pan-hellenic grounds; seeing that
Thebes as their former chief had so recently enlisted them all in
the service of Xerxes, and might be expected to do the same again
if a second Persian invasion should be attempted. Though for a
time successful, Athens was expelled from Bœotia by the defeat of
Korôneia; and at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the whole
Bœotian federation (except Platæa), was united under Thebes, in bitter
hostility against her. The first blow of the war, even prior to any
declaration, was struck by Thebes in her abortive nocturnal attempt
to surprise Platæa. In the third year of the war, king Archidamus,
at the head of the full Lacedæmonian force, laid siege to the latter
town; which, after an heroic defence and a long blockade, at length
surrendered under the extreme pressure of famine; yet not before one
half its brave defenders had forced their way out over the blockading
wall, and escaped to Athens, where all the Platæan old men, women,
and children, had been safely lodged before the siege. By a cruel
act which stands among the capital iniquities of Grecian warfare,
the Lacedæmonians had put to death all the Platæan captives, two
hundred in number, who fell into their hands; the town of Platæa
had been razed, and its whole territory, joined to Thebes, had
remained ever since cultivated on Theban account.[75] The surviving
Platæans had been dealt with kindly and hospitably by the Athenians.
A qualified right of citizenship was conceded to them at Athens, and
when Skionê was recaptured in 420 B.C., that town (vacant by the
slaughter of its captive citizens) was handed over to the Platæans
as a residence.[76] Compelled to evacuate Skionê, they were obliged
at the close of the Peloponnesian war,[77] to return to Athens,
where the remainder of them were residing at the time of the peace
of Antalkidas; little dreaming that those who had destroyed their
town and their fathers forty years before, would now turn round and
restore it.[78]

  [73] Herodot. vi, 108.

  [74] See Vol. V. Ch. xlv, p. 327 of this History.

  [75] Thucyd. iii, 68.

  [76] Thucyd. v, 32; Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 126; Or.
  xii, (Panathen.) s. 101.

  [77] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14.

  [78] Pausanias, ix, 1, 3.

Such restoration, whatever might be the ostensible grounds on which
the Spartans pretended to rest it, was not really undertaken either
to carry out the convention of Antalkidas, which guaranteed only the
autonomy of _existing_ towns,—or to repair previous injustice, since
the prior destruction had been the deliberate act of themselves, and
of King Archidamus the father of Agesilaus,—but simply as a step
conducive to the present political views of Sparta. And towards
this object it was skilfully devised. It weakened the Thebans, not
only by wresting from them what had been, for about forty years,
a part of their territory and property; but also by establishing
upon it a permanent stronghold in the occupation of their bitter
enemies, assisted by a Spartan garrison. It furnished an additional
station for such a garrison in Bœotia, with the full consent of the
newly-established inhabitants. And more than all, it introduced
a subject of contention between Athens and Thebes, calculated to
prevent the two from hearty coöperation afterwards against Sparta.
As the sympathy of the Platæans with Athens was no less ancient
and cordial than their antipathy against Thebes, we may probably
conclude that the restoration of the town was an act acceptable to
the Athenians; at least, at first, until they saw the use made of
it, and the position which Sparta came to occupy in reference to
Greece generally. Many of the Platæans, during their residence at
Athens, had intermarried with Athenian women,[79] who now, probably,
accompanied their husbands to the restored little town on the north
of Kithæron, near the southern bank of the river Asôpus.

  [79] Isokrates, Or. xiv. (Plataic.) s. 54.

Had the Platæans been restored to a real and honorable autonomy, such
as they enjoyed in alliance with Athens before the Peloponnesian
war, we should have cordially sympathized with the event. But the
sequel will prove—and their own subsequent statement emphatically
sets forth—that they were a mere dependency of Sparta, and an outpost
of Spartan operations against Thebes.[80] They were a part of the
great revolution which the Spartans now brought about in Bœotia;
whereby Thebes was degraded from the president of a federation into
an isolated autonomous city, while the other Bœotian cities, who had
been before members of the federation, were elevated each for itself
into the like autonomy; or rather (to substitute the real truth[81]
in place of Spartan professions) they became enrolled and sworn in
as dependent allies of Sparta, under oligarchical factions devoted
to her purposes and resting upon her for support. That the Thebans
should submit to such a revolution, and, above all, to the sight of
Platæa as an independent neighbor with a territory abstracted from
themselves,—proves how much they felt their own weakness, and how
irresistible at this moment was the ascendency of their great enemy,
in perverting to her own ambition the popular lure of universal
autonomy held out by the peace of Antalkidas. Though compelled to
acquiesce, the Thebans waited in hopes of some turn of fortune
which would enable them to reörganize the Bœotian federation; while
their hostile sentiment towards Sparta was not the less bitter for
being suppressed. Sparta on her part kept constant watch to prevent
the reunion of Bœotia;[82] an object in which she was for a time
completely successful, and was even enabled, beyond her hopes, to
become possessed of Thebes itself,[83] through a party of traitors
within,—as will presently appear.

  [80] See the Orat. xiv, (called Plataicus) of Isokrates; which
  is a pleading probably delivered in the Athenian assembly by
  the Platæans (after the second destruction of their city),
  and, doubtless, founded upon their own statements. The painful
  dependence and compulsion under which they were held by Sparta,
  is proclaimed in the most unequivocal terms (s. 31, 33, 48);
  together with the presence of a Spartan harmost and garrison in
  their town (s. 14).

  [81] Xenophon says, truly enough, that Sparta made the Bœotian
  cities αὐτονόμους ἀπὸ τῶν Θηβαίων (v. 1, 36), which she had long
  desired to do. Autonomy, in the sense of disconnection from
  Thebes, was insured to them,—but in no other sense.

  [82] To illustrate the relations of Thebes, the other Bœotian
  cities, and Sparta, between the peace of Antalkidas and the
  seizure of the Kadmeia by Sparta (387-382 B.C.)—compare
  the speech of the Akanthian envoys, and that of the Theban
  Leontiades, at Sparta (Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 16-34). Ὑμᾶς
  (the Spartans) τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως μὴ καθ’
  ἓν εἴη, etc. Καὶ ὑμεῖς γε τότε μὲν ἀεὶ προσείχετε τὸν νοῦν,
  πότε ἀκούσεσθε βιαζομένους αὐτοὺς (the Thebans) τὴν Βοιωτίαν
  ὑφ’ αὑτοῖς εἶναι· νῦν δὲ, ἐπεὶ τάδε πέπρακται, οὐδὲν ὑμᾶς δεῖ
  Θηβαίους φοβεῖσθαι, etc. Compare Diodor. xv, 20.

  [83] In the Orat. (14) Plataic. of Isokrates, s. 30—we find it
  stated among the accusations against the Thebans, that during
  this period (_i. e._ between the peace of Antalkidas and the
  seizure of the Kadmeia) they became sworn in as members of the
  Spartan alliance and as ready to act with Sparta conjointly
  against Athens. If we could admit this as true, we might also
  admit the story of Epaminondas and Pelopidas serving in the
  Spartan army at Mantinea (Plutarch, Pelop. c. 3). But I do not
  see how it can be even partially true. If it had been true, I
  think Xenophon could not have failed to mention it: all that he
  does say, tends to contradict it.

In these measures regarding Bœotia, we recognize the vigorous hand,
and the miso-Theban spirit, of Agesilaus. He was at this time the
great director of Spartan foreign policy, though opposed by his more
just and moderate colleague king Agesipolis,[84] as well as by a
section of the leading Spartans, who reproached Agesilaus with his
project of ruling Greece by means of subservient local despots or
oligarchies in the various cities,[85] and who contended that the
autonomy promised by the peace of Antalkidas ought to be left to
develop itself freely, without any coërcive intervention on the part
of Sparta.[86]

  [84] Diodor. xv. 29.

  [85] How currently this reproach was advanced against Agesilaus,
  may be seen in more than one passage of the Hellenica
  of Xenophon; whose narrative is both so partial, and so
  ill-constructed, that the most instructive information is dropped
  only in the way of unintentional side-wind, where we should
  not naturally look for it. Xen. Hellen. v. 3, 16. πολλῶν δὲ
  λεγόντων Λακεδαιμονίων ὡς ὀλίγων ἕνεκεν ἀνθρώπων πόλει (Phlius)
  ἀπεχθάνοιτο (Agesilaus) πλέον πεντακισχιλίων ἀνδρῶν. Again,
  v, 4, 13. (Ἀγησίλαος) εὖ εἰδὼς, ὅτι, εἰ στρατηγοίη, λέξειαν οἱ
  πολῖται, ὡς Ἀγησίλαος, ὅπως βοηθήσειε τοῖς τυράννοις, πράγματα τῇ
  πόλει παρέχοι, etc. Compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24-26.

  [86] Diodorus indeed affirms, that this was really done, for
  a short time; that the cities which had before been dependent
  allies of Sparta were now emancipated and left to themselves;
  that a reaction immediately ensued against those dekarchies
  or oligarchies which had hitherto managed the cities in the
  interests of Sparta; that this reaction was so furious, as
  everywhere to kill, banish, or impoverish, the principal
  partisans of Spartan supremacy; and that the accumulated
  complaints and sufferings of these exiles drove the Spartans,
  after having “endured the peace like a heavy burthen” (ὥσπερ
  βαρὺ φόρτιον—xv, 5) for a few months, to shake it off, and
  to reëstablish by force their own supremacy as well as the
  government of their friends in all the various cities. In this
  statement there is nothing intrinsically improbable. After what
  we have heard of the dekarchies under Sparta, no extent of
  violence in the reaction against them is incredible, nor can we
  doubt that such reaction would carry with it some new injustice,
  along with much well-merited retribution. Hardly any but Athenian
  citizens were capable of the forbearance displayed by Athens both
  after the Four Hundred and after the Thirty. Nevertheless, I
  believe that Diodorus is here mistaken, and that he has assigned
  to the period immediately succeeding the peace of Antalkidas,
  those reactionary violences which took place in many cities
  about sixteen years subsequently, _after the battle of Leuktra_.
  For Xenophon, in recounting what happened after the peace of
  Antalkidas, mentions nothing about any real autonomy granted by
  Sparta to her various subject-allies, and subsequently revoked;
  which he would never have omitted to tell us, had the fact been
  so, because it would have supplied a plausible apology for the
  high-handed injustice of the Spartans, and would have thus lent
  aid to the current of partiality which manifests itself in his
  history.

Far from any wish thus to realize the terms of peace which they
had themselves imposed, the Lacedæmonians took advantage of an
early moment after becoming free from their enemies in Bœotia and
Corinth, to strain their authority over their allies beyond its
previous limits. Passing in review[87] the conduct of each during
the war, they resolved to make an example of the city of Mantinea.
Some acts, not of positive hostility, but of equivocal fidelity,
were imputed to the Mantineans. They were accused of having been
slack in performance of their military obligations, sometimes even
to the length of withholding their contingent altogether, under
pretence of a season of religious truce; of furnishing corn in
time of war to the hostile Argeians; and of plainly manifesting
their disaffected feeling towards Sparta,—chagrin at every success
which she obtained,—satisfaction, when she chanced to experience
a reverse.[88] The Spartan ephors now sent an envoy to Mantinea,
denouncing all such past behavior, and peremptorily requiring that
the walls of the city should be demolished, as the only security
for future penitence and amendment. As compliance was refused, they
despatched an army, summoning the allied contingents generally for
the purpose of enforcing the sentence. They intrusted the command
to king Agesipolis, since Agesilaus excused himself from the duty,
on the ground that the Mantineans had rendered material service to
his father Archidamus in the dangerous Messenian war which had beset
Sparta during the early part of his reign.[89]

  [87] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 1-8. Αἰσθόμενοι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους
  ἐπισκοποῦντας τοὺς ξυμμάχους, ὁποῖοί τινες ἕκαστοι ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ
  αὐτοῖς ἐγεγένηντο, etc.

  [88] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 2. He had before stated, that the
  Mantineans had really shown themselves pleased, when the
  Lacedæmonian Mora was destroyed near Corinth by Iphikrates (iv,
  5, 18).

  [89] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 3.

Having first attempted to intimidate the Mantineans by ravaging
their lands, Agesipolis commenced the work of blockade by digging
a ditch around the town; half of his soldiers being kept on guard,
while the rest worked with the spade. The ditch being completed, he
prepared to erect a wall of circumvallation. But being apprised that
the preceding harvest had been so good, as to leave a large stock
of provision in the town, and to render the process of starving it
out tedious both for Sparta and for her allies,—he tried a more
rapid method of accomplishing his object. As the river Ophis, of
considerable breadth for a Grecian stream, passed through the middle
of the town, he dammed up its efflux on the lower side;[90] thus
causing it to inundate the interior of the city and threaten the
stability of the walls; which seem to have been of no great height,
and built of sun-burnt bricks. Disappointed in their application to
Athens for aid,[91] and unable to provide extraneous support for
their tottering towers, the Mantineans were compelled to solicit a
capitulation. But Agesipolis now refused to grant the request, except
on condition that not only the fortifications of their city, but
the city itself, should be in great part demolished; and that the
inhabitants should be re-distributed into those five villages, which
had been brought together, many years before, to form the aggregate
city of Mantinea. To this also the Mantineans were obliged to submit,
and the capitulation was ratified.

  [90] In 1627, during the Thirty years’ War, the German town of
  Wolfenbüttel was constrained to surrender in the same manner, by
  damming up the river Ocker which flowed through it; a contrivance
  of General Count Pappenheim, the Austrian besieging commander.
  See Colonel Mitchell’s Life of Wallenstein, p. 107.

  The description given by Xenophon of Mantinea as it stood in
  385 B.C., with the river Ophis, a considerable stream, passing
  through the middle of it, is perfectly clear. When the city,
  after having been now broken up, was rebuilt in 370 B.C., the
  site was so far changed that the river no longer ran through it.
  But the present course of the river Ophis, as given by excellent
  modern topographical examiners, Colonel Leake and Kiepert, is
  at a very considerable distance from the Mantinea rebuilt in
  370 B.C.; the situation of which is accurately known, since
  the circuit of its walls still remains distinctly marked. The
  Mantinea of 370 B.C., therefore, as compared with the Mantinea in
  385 B.C., must have been removed to a considerable distance—or
  else the river Ophis must have altered its course. Colonel
  Leake supposes that the Ophis had been artificially diverted
  from its course, in order that it might be brought through the
  town of Mantinea; a supposition, which he founds on the words
  of Xenophon,—σοφωτέρων γενομένων ταύτῃ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὸ μὴ
  διὰ τειχῶν ποταμὸν ποιεῖσθαι (Hellen. v, 2, 7). But it is very
  difficult to agree with him on this point, when we look at his
  own map (annexed to the Peloponnesiaca) of the Mantinice and
  Tegeatis, and observe the great distance between the river Ophis
  and Mantinea; nor do the words of Xenophon seem necessarily to
  imply any artificial diversion of the river. It appears easier to
  believe that the river has changed its course. See Leake, Travels
  in Morea, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 71; and Peloponnesiaca, p. 380;
  and Ernst Curtius, Peloponnesos, p. 239—who still, however,
  leaves the point obscure.

  [91] Diodor. xv, 5.

Though nothing was said in the terms of it about the chiefs of the
Mantinean democratical government, yet these latter, conscious that
they were detested both by their own oligarchical opposition and
by the Lacedæmonians, accounted themselves certain of being put
to death. And such would assuredly have been their fate, had not
Pausanias (the late king of Sparta, now in exile at Tegea), whose
good opinion they had always enjoyed, obtained as a personal favor
from his son Agesipolis the lives of the most obnoxious, sixty in
number, on condition that they should depart into exile. Agesipolis
had much difficulty in accomplishing the wishes of his father. His
Lacedæmonian soldiers were ranged in arms on both sides of the
gate by which the obnoxious men went out; and Xenophon notices it
as a signal mark of Lacedæmonian discipline, that they could keep
their spears unemployed when disarmed enemies were thus within
their reach; especially as the oligarchical Mantineans manifested
the most murderous propensities, and were exceedingly difficult to
control.[92] As at Peiræus before, so here at Mantinea again,—the
liberal, but unfortunate, king Pausanias is found interfering in the
character of mediator to soften the ferocity of political antipathies.

  [92] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 6. Οἰομένων δὲ ἀποθανεῖσθαι τῶν
  ἀργολιζόντων, καὶ τῶν τοῦ δήμου προστατῶν, διεπράξατο ὁ πατὴρ
  (see before, v, 2, 3) παρὰ τοῦ Ἀγησιπόλιδος, ἀσφάλειαν αὐτοῖς
  ἔσεσθαι, ἀπαλλαττομένοις ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἑξήκοντα οὖσι. Καὶ
  ἀμφοτέρωθεν μὲν τῆς ὁδοῦ, ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῶν πυλῶν ἔχοντες τὰ
  δόρατα οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἔστησαν, θεώμενοι τοὺς ἐξιόντας· ~καὶ
  μισοῦντες αὐτοὺς ὅμως ἀπείχοντο αὐτῶν ῥᾷον ἢ οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν
  Μαντινέων~· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν εἰρήσθω μέγα τεκμήριον πειθαρχίας.

  I have remarked more than once, and the reader will here observe
  a new example, how completely the word βέλτιστοι—which is applied
  to the wealthy or aristocratical party in politics, as its
  equivalent is in other languages, by writers who sympathize with
  them—is divested of all genuine ethical import as to character.

The city of Mantinea was now broken up, and the inhabitants were
distributed again into the five constituent villages. Out of
four-fifths of the population, each man pulled down his house in
the city, and rebuilt it in the village near to which his property
lay. The remaining fifth continued to occupy Mantinea as a village.
Each village was placed under oligarchical government, and left
unfortified. Though at first (says Xenophon) the change proved
troublesome and odious, yet presently, when men found themselves
resident upon their landed properties,—and still more, when they felt
themselves delivered from the vexatious demagogues,—the new situation
became more popular than the old. The Lacedæmonians were still better
satisfied. Instead of one city of Mantinea, five distinct Arcadian
villages now stood enrolled in their catalogue of allies. They
assigned to each a separate xenâgus (Spartan officer destined to the
command of each allied contingent), and the military service of all
was henceforward performed with the utmost regularity.[93]

  [93] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 7.

  He says of this breaking up of the city of Mantinea, διῳκίσθη ἡ
  Μαντίνεια τετραχῆ, καθάπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ᾤκουν. Ephorus (Fr. 138,
  ed. Didot) states that it was distributed into the five original
  villages; and Strabo affirms that there were _five_ original
  constituent villages (viii, p. 337). Hence it is probable that
  Mantinea the city was still left, after this διοίκισις, to
  subsist as one of the five unfortified villages; so that Ephorus,
  Strabo, and Xenophon may be thus made to agree, in substance.

Such was the dissection or cutting into parts of the ancient city
Mantinea; one of the most odious acts of high-handed Spartan
despotism. Its true character is veiled by the partiality of the
historian, who recounts it with a confident assurance, that after
the trouble of moving was over, the population felt themselves
decidedly bettered by the change. Such an assurance is only to be
credited, on the ground that, being captives under the Grecian laws
of war, they may have been thankful to escape the more terrible
liabilities of death or personal slavery, at the price of forfeiting
their civic community. That their feelings towards the change were
those of genuine aversion, is shown by their subsequent conduct after
the battle of Leuktra. As soon as the fear of Sparta was removed,
they flocked together, with unanimous impulse, to reconstitute and
refortify their dismantled city.[94] It would have been strange
indeed had the fact been otherwise; for attachment to a civic
community was the strongest political instinct of the Greek mind.
The citizen of a town was averse—often most unhappily averse—to
compromise the separate and autonomous working of his community
by joining in any larger political combination, however equitably
framed, and however it might promise on the whole an increase of
Hellenic dignity. But still more vehemently did he shrink from the
idea of breaking up his town into separate villages, and exchanging
the character of a citizen for that of a villager, which was nothing
less than great social degradation, in the eyes of Greeks generally,
Spartans not excepted.[95]

  [94] This is mentioned by Xenophon himself (Hellen. vi, 5,
  3). The Lacedæmonians, though they remonstrated against it,
  were at that time too much humiliated to interfere by force
  and prevent it. The reason why they did not interfere by force
  (according to Xenophon) was that a general peace had just then
  been sworn, guaranteeing autonomy to every distinct town, so
  that the Mantineans under this peace had a right to do what
  they did—στρατεύειν γε μέντοι ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς οὐ δυνατὸν ἐδόκει
  εἶναι, ἐπ’ αὐτονομίᾳ τῆς εἰρήνης γεγενημένης (vi, 5, 5). Of
  this second peace, Athens was the originator and the voucher;
  but the autonomy which it guaranteed was only the same as had
  been professedly guaranteed by the peace of Antalkidas, of which
  Sparta had been the voucher.

  General autonomy, as interpreted by Athens, was a different thing
  from general autonomy as it had been when interpreted by Sparta.
  The Spartans, when they had in their own hands both the power
  of interpretation and the power of enforcement, did not scruple
  to falsify autonomy so completely as to lay siege to Mantinea
  and break up the city by force; while, when interpretation and
  enforcement had passed to Athens, they at once recognized that
  the treaty precluded them from a much less violent measure of
  interference.

  We may see by this, how thoroughly partial and Laconian is
  the account given by Xenophon of the διοίκισις of Mantinea;
  how completely he keeps out of view the odious side of that
  proceeding.

  [95] See the remarkable sentence of the Spartans, in which they
  reject the claim of the Pisatans to preside over and administer
  the Olympic festival (which had been their ancient privilege)
  because they were χωρίται and not fit for the task (Xen. Hellen.
  iii, 2, 31): compare χωριτικῶς (Xen. Cyrop. iv. 5, 54).

In truth the sentence executed by the Spartans against Mantinea was
in point of dishonor, as well as of privation, one of the severest
which could be inflicted on free Greeks. All the distinctive glory
and superiority of Hellenism,—all the intellectual and artistic
manifestations,—all that there was of literature and philosophy, or
of refined and rational sociality,—depended upon the city-life of the
people. And the influence of Sparta, during the period of her empire,
was peculiarly mischievous and retrograde, as tending not only to
decompose the federations such as Bœotia into isolated towns, but
even to decompose suspected towns such as Mantinea into villages;
all for the purpose of rendering each of them exclusively dependent
upon herself. Athens, during her period of empire, had exercised no
such disuniting influence; still less Thebes, whom we shall hereafter
find coming forward actively to found the new and great cities of
Megalopolis and Messênê. The imperial tendencies of Sparta are worse
than those of either Athens or Thebes; including less of improving
or Pan-hellenic sympathies, and leaning the most systematically upon
subservient factions in each subordinate city. In the very treatment
of Mantinea just recounted, it is clear that the attack of Sparta was
welcomed at least, if not originally invited, by the oligarchical
party of the place, who sought to grasp the power into their own
hands and to massacre their political opponents. In the first object
they completely succeeded, and their government probably was more
assured in the five villages than it would have been in the entire
town. In the second, nothing prevented them from succeeding except
the accidental intervention of the exile Pausanias; an accident,
which alone rescued the Spartan name from the additional disgrace
of a political massacre, over and above the lasting odium incurred
by the act itself; by breaking up an ancient autonomous city, which
had shown no act of overt enmity, and which was so moderate in its
democratical manifestations as to receive the favorable criticism
of judges rather disinclined towards democracy generally.[96] Thirty
years before, when Mantinea had conquered certain neighboring
Arcadian districts, and had been at actual war with Sparta to
preserve them, the victorious Spartans exacted nothing more than
the reduction of the city to its original district;[97] now they
are satisfied with nothing less than the partition of the city into
unfortified villages, though there had been no actual war preceding.
So much had Spartan power, as well as Spartan despotic propensity,
progressed during this interval.

  [96] Aristot. Polit. vi, 2, 2.

  [97] Thucyd. v, 81.

The general language of Isokrates, Xenophon, and Diodorus,[98]
indicates that this severity towards Mantinea was only the most
stringent among a series of severities, extended by the Lacedæmonians
through their whole confederacy, and operating upon all such of
its members as gave them ground for dissatisfaction or mistrust.
During the ten years after the surrender of Athens, they had been
lords of the Grecian world both by land and sea, with a power never
before possessed by any Grecian state; until the battle of Knidus,
and the combination of Athens, Thebes, Argos, and Corinth, seconded
by Persia, had broken up their empire at sea, and much endangered
it on land. At length the peace of Antalkidas, enlisting Persia on
their side (at the price of the liberty of the Asiatic Greeks), had
enabled them to dissolve the hostile combination against them. The
general autonomy, of which they were the authorized interpreters,
meant nothing more than a separation of the Bœotian cities from
Thebes,[99] and of Corinth from Argos,—being noway intended to apply
to the relation between Sparta and her allies. Having thus their
hands free, the Lacedæmonians applied themselves to raise their
ascendency on land to the point where it had stood before the battle
of Knidus, and even to regain as much as possible of their empire at
sea. To bring back a dominion such as that of the Lysandrian harmosts
and dekarchies, and to reconstitute a local oligarchy of their most
devoted partisans, in each of those cities where the government had
been somewhat liberalized during the recent period of war,—was their
systematic policy.

  [98] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 133, 134, 146, 206; Or.
  viii, (De Pace) s. 123; Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 1-8; Diodor. xv, 5,
  9-19.

  [99] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 35.

Those exiles who had incurred the condemnation of their
fellow-citizens for subservience to Sparta, now found the season
convenient for soliciting Spartan intervention to procure their
return. It was in this manner that a body of exiled political
leaders from Phlius,—whose great merit it was that the city when
under their government had been zealous in service to Sparta, but
had now become lukewarm or even disaffected in the hands of their
opponents,—obtained from the ephors a message, polite in form but
authoritative in substance, addressed to the Phliasians, requiring
that the exiles should be restored, as friends of Sparta banished
without just cause.[100]

  [100] Xen. Hellen. v. 2, 8-10.

  The consequences of this forced return are difficult to foresee;
  they will appear in a subsequent page.

While the Spartan power, for the few years succeeding the peace of
Antalkidas, was thus decidedly in ascending movement on land, efforts
were also made to reëstablish it at sea. Several of the Cyclades
and other smaller islands were again rendered tributary. In this
latter sphere, however, Athens became her competitor. Since the
peace, and the restoration of Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, combined
with the refortified Peiræus and its Long Walls,—Athenian commerce
and naval power had been reviving, though by slow and humble steps.
Like the naval force of England compared with France, the warlike
marine of Athens rested upon a considerable commercial marine, which
latter hardly existed at all in Laconia. Sparta had no seamen except
constrained Helots or paid foreigners;[101] while the commerce of
Peiræus had both required and maintained a numerous population of
this character. The harbor of Peiræus was convenient in respect of
accommodation, and well-stocked with artisans,—while Laconia had few
artisans, and was notoriously destitute of harbors.[102] Accordingly,
in this maritime competition, Athens, though but the shadow of her
former self, started at an advantage as compared with Sparta, and
in spite of the superiority of the latter on land, was enabled to
compete with her in acquiring tributary dependencies among the
smaller islands of the Ægean. To these latter, who had no marine of
their own, and who (like Athens herself) required habitual supplies
of imported corn, it was important to obtain both access to Peiræus
and protection from the Athenian triremes against that swarm of
pirates, who showed themselves after the peace of Antalkidas, when
there was no predominant maritime state; besides which, the market of
Peiræus was often supplied with foreign corn from the Crimea, through
the preference shown by the princes of Bosphorus to Athens, at a time
when vessels from other places could obtain no cargo.[103] A moderate
tribute paid to Athens would secure to the tributary island greater
advantages than if paid to Sparta,—with at least equal protection.
Probably, the influence of Athens over these islanders was farther
aided by the fact, that she administered the festivals, and lent
out the funds, of the holy temple at Delos. We know by inscriptions
remaining, that large sums were borrowed at interest from the
temple-treasure, not merely by individual islanders, but also by the
island-cities collectively,—Naxos, Andros, Tenos, Siphnos, Seriphos.
The Amphiktyonic council who dispensed these loans (or at least the
presiding members) were Athenians named annually at Athens.[104]
Moreover, these islanders rendered religious homage and attendance
at the Delian festivals, and were thus brought within the range of a
central Athenian influence, capable, under favorable circumstances,
of being strengthened and rendered even politically important.

  [101] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 3-12.

  [102] Xen. Hell. iv, 8, 7.

  [103] Isokrates, Orat. xvii, (Trapezit.) s. 71.

  [104] See the valuable inscription called the Marmor Sandvicense,
  which contains the accounts rendered by the annual Amphiktyons at
  Delos, from 377-373 B.C.

  Boeckh, Staats-haushaltung der Athener, vol. ii, p. 214, ed. 1;
  vol. ii, p. 78 _seq._, ed. 2nd.

  The list of cities and individuals who borrowed money from the
  temple is given in these accounts, together with the amount of
  interest either paid by them, or remaining in arrear.

By such helps, Athens was slowly acquiring to herself a second
maritime confederacy, which we shall presently find to be of
considerable moment, though never approaching the grandeur of
her former empire; so that in the year 380 B.C., when Isokrates
published his Panegyrical Discourse (seven years after the peace of
Antalkidas), though her general power was still slender compared with
the overruling might of Sparta,[105] yet her navy had already made
such progress, that he claims for her the right of taking the command
by sea, in that crusade which he strenuously enforces, of Athens and
Sparta in harmonious unity at the head of all Greece, against the
Asiatic barbarians.[106]

  [105] This is the description which Isokrates himself gives
  (Orat. xv, (Permutat.) s. 61) of the state of the Grecian world
  when he published his Panegyrical Discourse—ὅτε Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν
  ἦρχον τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταπεινῶς ἐπράττομεν, etc.

  [106] The Panegyrical Discourse of Isokrates, the date of it
  being pretty exactly known, is of great value for enabling us
  to understand the period immediately succeeding the peace of
  Antalkidas.

  He particularly notices the multiplication of pirates, and the
  competition between Athens and Sparta about tribute from the
  islands in the Ægean (s. 133). Τίς γὰρ ἂν τοιαύτης καταστάσεως
  ἐπιθυμήσειεν, ἐν ᾗ καταποντισταὶ μὲν τὴν θάλασσαν κατέχουσι,
  πελτασταὶ δὲ τὰς πόλεις καταλαμβάνουσι, etc.

  ... Καίτοι χρὴ τοὺς φύσει καὶ μὴ διὰ τύχην μέγα φρονοῦντας
  τοιούτοις ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ~τοὺς νησιώτας
  δασμολογεῖν~, οὓς ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἐλέειν, ὁρῶντας τούτους μὲν διὰ
  σπανιότητα τῆς γῆς ὄρη γεωργεῖν ἀναγκαζομένους, τοὺς δ’ ἠπειρώτας
  δι’ ἀφθονίαν τῆς χώρας τὴν μὲν πλείστην αὐτῆς ἀργὸν περιορῶντας,
  etc. (s. 151).

  ... Ὧν ἡμεῖς (Athenians and Spartans) οὐδεμίαν ποιούμεθα
  πρόνοιαν, ἀλλὰ ~περὶ μὲν τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων ἀμφισβητοῦμεν~,
  τοσαύτας δὲ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τηλικαύτας τὸ μέγεθος δυνάμεις οὕτως
  εἰκῇ τῷ βαρβάρῳ παραδεδώκαμεν.

  Compare Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 12—μὴ εἰς νησύδρια ἀποβλέποντας,
  etc.

It would seem that a few years after the peace of Antalkidas, Sparta
became somewhat ashamed of having surrendered the Asiatic Greeks
to Persia; and that king Agesipolis and other leading Spartans
encouraged the scheme of a fresh Grecian expedition against Asia,
in compliance with propositions from some disaffected subjects of
Artaxerxes.[107] Upon some such project, currently discussed though
never realized, Isokrates probably built his Panegyrical Oration,
composed in a lofty strain of patriotic eloquence (380 B.C.) to
stimulate both Sparta and Athens in the cause, and calling on both,
as joint chiefs of Greece, to suspend dissensions at home for a great
Pan-hellenic manifestation against the common enemy abroad. But
whatever ideas of this kind the Spartan leaders may have entertained,
their attention was taken off, about 382 B.C. by movements in a
more remote region of the Grecian world, which led to important
consequences.

  [107] Diodor. xv, 9, 19.

Since the year 414 B.C. (when the Athenians were engaged in the
siege of Syracuse), we have heard nothing either of the kings of
Macedonia, or of the Chalkidic Grecian cities in the peninsula of
Thrace adjoining Macedonia. Down to that year, Athens still retained
a portion of her maritime empire in those regions. The Platæans
were still in possession of Skiônê (on the isthmus of Pallênê)
which she had assigned to them; while the Athenian admiral Euetion,
seconded by many hired Thracians, and even by Perdikkas king of
Macedonia, undertook a fruitless siege to reconquer Amphipolis on
the Strymon.[108] But the fatal disaster at Syracuse having disabled
Athens from maintaining such distant interests, they were lost to
her along with her remaining empire,—perhaps earlier; though we
do not know how. At the same time, during the last years of the
Peloponnesian war, the kingdom of Macedonia greatly increased in
power; partly, we may conceive, from the helpless condition of
Athens,—but still more from the abilities and energy of Archelaus,
son and successor of Perdikkas.

  [108] Thucyd. vii, 9.

The course of succession among the Macedonian princes seems not to
have been settled, so that disputes and bloodshed took place at
the death of several of them. Moreover, there were distinct tribes
of Macedonians, who, though forming part, really or nominally, of
the dominion of the Temenid princes, nevertheless were immediately
subject to separate but subordinate princes of their own. The reign
of Perdikkas had been troubled in this manner. In the first instance,
he had stripped his own brother Alketas of the crown,[109] who
appears (so far as we can make out) to have had the better right to
it; next he had also expelled his younger brother Philippus from his
subordinate principality. To restore Amyntas the son of Philippus,
was one of the purposes of the Thrakian prince Sitalkês, in the
expedition undertaken conjointly with Athens, during the second year
of the Peloponnesian war.[110] On the death of Perdikkas (about
413 B.C.), his eldest or only legitimate son was a child of seven
years old; but his natural son[111] Archelaus was of mature age and
unscrupulous ambition. The dethroned Alketas was yet alive, and had
now considerable chance of reëstablishing himself on the throne;
Archelaus, inviting him and his son under pretence that he would
himself bring about their reëstablishment, slew them both amidst
the intoxication of a banquet. He next despatched the boy, his
legitimate brother, by suffocating him in a well; and through these
crimes made himself king. His government, however, was so energetic
and able, that Macedonia reached a degree of military power such as
none of his predecessors had ever possessed. His troops, military
equipments, and fortified places, were much increased in numbers;
while he also cut straight roads of communication between the various
portions of his territory,—a novelty seemingly everywhere, at that
time.[112] Besides such improved organization (which unfortunately we
are not permitted to know in detail), Archelaus founded a splendid
periodical Olympic festival, in honor of the Olympian Zeus and
the Muses,[113] and maintained correspondence with the poets and
philosophers of Athens. He prevailed upon the tragic poets Euripides
and Agathon, as well as the epic poet Chœrilus, to visit him in
Macedonia, where Euripides especially was treated with distinguished
favor and munificence,[114] remaining there until his death in
406 or 405 B.C. Archelaus also invited Sokrates, who declined the
invitation,—and appears to have shown some favor to Plato.[115] He
perished in the same year as Sokrates (399 B.C.), by a violent
death; two Thessalian youths, Krateuas and Hellanokrates, together
with a Macedonian named Dekamnichus, being his assassins during a
hunting-party. The first two were youths to whom he was strongly
attached, but whose dignity he had wounded by insulting treatment and
non-performance of promises; the third was a Macedonian, who, for
having made an offensive remark upon the bad breath of Euripides, had
been given up by the order of Archelaus to the poet, in order that
he might be flogged for it. Euripides actually caused the sentence
to be inflicted; but it was not till six years after his death that
Dekamnichus, who had neither forgotten nor forgiven the affront,
found the opportunity of taking revenge by instigating and aiding the
assassins of Archelaus.[116]

  [109] This is attested by Plato, Gorgias, c. 26. p. 471 A.

  ... Ὅς γε (Archelaus son of Perdikkas) πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν
  τὸν δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον (Alketas) μεταπεμψάμενος, ~ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν
  ἀρχὴν ἣν Περδίκκας αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο~, etc.

  This statement of Plato, that Perdikkas expelled his brother
  Alketas from the throne, appears not to be adverted to by the
  commentators. Perhaps it may help to explain the chronological
  embarrassments connected with the reign of Perdikkas, the years
  of which are assigned by different authors, as 23, 28, 35, 40,
  41. See Mr. Clinton, Fasti Hellen. ch. iv, p. 222—where he
  discusses the chronology of the Macedonian kings: also Krebs,
  Lection. Diodoreæ, p. 159.

  There are no means of determining when the reign of Perdikkas
  began—nor exactly, when it ended. We know from Thucydides that he
  was king in 432, and in 414 B.C. But the fact of his acquiring
  the crown by the expulsion of an elder brother, renders it less
  wonderful that the beginning of his reign should be differently
  stated by different authors; though these authors seem mostly
  to conceive Perdikkas as the immediate successor of Alexander,
  without any notice of Alketas.

  [110] Thucyd. i, 57; ii, 97-100.

  [111] The mother of Archelaus was a female slave belonging
  to Alketas; it is for this reason that Plato calls Alketas
  ~δεσπότην~ καὶ θεῖον of Archelaus (Plato, Gorgias, c. 26. p. 471
  A.)

  [112] Thucyd. ii, 100. ὁδοὺς εὐθείας ἔτεμε, etc. See the note in
  Ch. lxix, p. 17 of Vol. ix.

  [113] Arrian, i, 11; Diodor. xvii, 16.

  [114] Plutarch, De Vitioso Pudore, c. 7, p. 531 E.

  [115] Aristotel. Rhetoric, ii, 24; Seneca, de Beneficiis, v, 6;
  Ælian, V. H. xiv, 17.

  [116] See the statements, unfortunately very brief, of Aristotle
  (Politic. v, 8, 10-13). Plato (Alkibiad. ii, c. 5, p. 141 D),
  while mentioning the assassination of Archelaus by his παιδικὰ
  represents the motive of the latter differently from Aristotle,
  as having been an ambitious desire to possess himself of the
  throne. Diodorus (xiv, 37) represents Krateuas as having killed
  Archelaus unintentionally in a hunting-party.

  Καὶ τῆς Ἀρχελάου δ’ ἐπιθέσεως Δεκάμνιχος ἡγεμὼν ἐγένετο,
  παροξύνων τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους πρῶτος· αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ὀργῆς, ὅτι αὐτὸν
  ἐξέδωκε μαστιγῶσαι Εὐριπίδῃ τῷ ποιητῇ· ὁ δὲ Εὐριπίδης ἐχαλέπαινεν
  εἰπόντος τι αὐτοῦ εἰς δυσώδειαν τοῦ στόματος (Arist. Pol. _l.
  c._).

  Dekamnichus is cited by Aristotle as one among the examples of
  persons actually scourged; which proves that Euripides availed
  himself of the privilege accorded by Archelaus.

These incidents, recounted on the authority of Aristotle, and
relating as well to the Macedonian king Archelaus as to the Athenian
citizen and poet Euripides, illustrate the political contrast
between Macedonia and Athens. The government of the former is one
wholly personal,—dependent on the passions, tastes, appetites, and
capacities, of the king. The ambition of Archelaus leads both to his
crimes for acquiring the throne, and to his improved organization of
the military force of the state afterwards; his admiration for the
poets and philosophers of Athens makes him sympathize warmly with
Euripides, and ensure to the latter personal satisfaction for an
offensive remark; his appetites, mingling license with insult, end by
drawing upon him personal enemies of a formidable character. _L’Etat,
c’est moi_—stands marked in the whole series of proceedings; the
personality of the monarch is the determining element. Now at Athens,
no such element exists. There is, on the one hand, no easy way of
bringing to bear the ascendency of an energetic chief to improve the
military organization,—as Athens found to her cost, when she was
afterwards assailed by Philip, the successor after some interval, and
in many respects the parallel, of Archelaus. But on the other hand,
neither the personal tastes nor the appetites, of any individual
Athenian, count as active causes in the march of public affairs,
which is determined by the established law and by the pronounced
sentiments of the body of citizens. However gross an insult might
have been offered to Euripides at Athens, the dikasts would never
have sentenced that the offender should be handed over to him to be
flogged. They would have inflicted such measure of punishment as the
nature of the wrong, and the preëxisting law appeared to them to
require. Political measures, or judicial sentences, at Athens, might
be well or ill-judged; but at any rate, they were always dictated
by regard to a known law and to the public conceptions entertained
of state-interests, state-dignity, and state-obligations, without
the avowed intrusion of any man’s personality. To Euripides,—who
had throughout his whole life been the butt of Aristophanes and
other comic writers, and who had been compelled to hear, in the
crowded theatre, taunts far more galling than what is ascribed to
Dekamnichus,—the contrast must have been indeed striking, to have
the offender made over to him, and the whip placed at his disposal,
by order of his new patron. And it is little to his honor, that
he should have availed himself of the privilege, by causing the
punishment to be really administered; a punishment which he could
never have seen inflicted, during the fifty years of his past life,
upon any free Athenian citizen.

Krateuas did not survive the deed more than three or four days, after
which Orestes, son of Archelaus, a child, was placed on the throne,
under the guardianship of Æropus. The latter, however, after about
four years, made away with his ward, and reigned in his stead for
two years. He then died of sickness, and was succeeded by his son
Pausanias; who, after a reign of only one year, was assassinated and
succeeded by Amyntas.[117] This Amyntas (chiefly celebrated as the
father of Philip and the grandfather of Alexander the Great), though
akin to the royal family, had been nothing more than an attendant
of Æropus,[118] until he made himself king by putting to death
Pausanias.[119] He reigned, though with interruptions, twenty-four
years (393-369 B.C.); years, for the most part, of trouble and
humiliation for Macedonia, and of occasional exile for himself. The
vigorous military organization introduced by Archelaus appears to
have declined; while the frequent dethronements and assassinations
of kings, beginning even with Perdikkas the father of Archelaus,
and continued down to Amyntas, unhinged the central authority
and disunited the various portions of the Macedonian name; which
naturally tended to separation, and could only be held together by a
firm hand.

  [117] Diodor. xiv. 84-89.

  [118] Ælian, V. H. xii, 43; Dexippus ap. Syncell. p. 263; Justin,
  vii, 4.

  [119] Diodor. xiv, 89. Ἐτελεύτησε δὲ καὶ Παυσανίας ὁ τῶν
  Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς, ἀναιρεθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἀμύντου δόλῳ, ἄρξας ἐνιαυτόν·
  τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν κατέσχεν Ἀμύντας, etc.

The interior regions of Macedonia were bordered, to the north,
north-east, and north-west, by warlike barbarian tribes, Thracian and
Illyrian, whose invasions were not unfrequent and often formidable.
Tempted, probably, by the unsettled position of the government,
the Illyrians poured in upon Amyntas during the first year of his
reign; perhaps they may have been invited by other princes of the
interior,[120] and at all events their coming would operate as
a signal for malcontents to declare themselves. Amyntas,—having
only acquired the sceptre a few months before by assassinating his
predecessor, and having little hold on the people,—was not only
unable to repel them, but found himself obliged to evacuate Pella,
and even to retire from Macedonia altogether. Despairing of his
position, he made over to the Olynthians a large portion of the
neighboring territory,—Lower Macedonia or the coast and cities round
the Thermaic Gulf.[121] As this cession is represented to have been
made at the moment of his distress and expatriation, we may fairly
suspect that it was made for some reciprocal benefit or valuable
equivalent; of which Amyntas might well stand in need, at a moment of
so much exigency.

  [120] See in Thucyd. iv, 112—the relations of Arrhibæus, prince
  of the Macedonians called Lynkestæ in the interior country, with
  the Illyrian invaders—B.C. 423.

  Archelaus had been engaged at a more recent period in war with a
  prince of the interior named Arrhibæus,—perhaps the same person
  (Aristot. Polit. v, 8, 11).

  [121] Diodor. xiv, 92; xv, 19. Ἀπογνοὺς δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν, Ὀλυνθίοις
  μὲν τὴν συνεγγὺς χώραν ἐδωρήσατο, etc. Τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ὀλυνθίων
  δωρησαμένου πολλὴν τῆς ὁμόρου χώρας, διὰ τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ
  δυναστείας, etc.

  The flight of Amyntas, after a year’s reign, is confirmed by
  Dexippus ap. Syncell. p. 263.

It is upon this occasion that we begin to hear again of the
Chalkidians of Olynthus, and the confederacy which they gradually
aggregated around their city as a centre. The confederacy seems to
have taken its start from this cession of Amyntas,—or rather, to
speak more properly, from his abdication; for the cession of what
he could not keep was of comparatively little moment, and we shall
see that he tried to resume it as soon as he acquired strength.
The effect of his flight was, to break up the government of Lower
or maritime Macedonia, and to leave the cities therein situated
defenceless against the Illyrians or other invaders from the
interior. To these cities, the only chance of security, was to throw
themselves upon the Greek cities on the coast, and to organize in
conjunction with the latter a confederacy for mutual support. Among
all the Greeks on that coast, the most strenuous and persevering
(so they had proved themselves in their former contentions against
Athens when at the summit of her power) as well as the nearest, were
the Chalkidians of Olynthus. These Olynthians now put themselves
forward,—took into their alliance and under their protection the
smaller towns of maritime Macedonia immediately near them,—and soon
extended their confederacy so as to comprehend all the larger towns
in this region,—including even Pella, the most considerable city
of the country.[122] As they began this enterprise at a time when
the Illyrians were masters of the country so as to drive Amyntas
to despair and flight, we may be sure that it must have cost them
serious efforts, not without great danger if they failed. We may
also be sure that the cities themselves must have been willing, not
to say eager, coadjutors; just as the islanders and Asiatic Greeks
clung to Athens at the first formation of the confederacy of Delos.
The Olynthians could have had no means of conquering even the less
considerable Macedonian cities, much less Pella, by force and against
the will of the inhabitants.

  [122] Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 12. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης
  μεγίστη πόλις Ὄλυνθος σχεδὸν πάντες ἐπίστασθε. Οὗτοι τῶν πόλεων
  προσηγάγοντο ἔστιν ἃς, ἐφ’ ᾧτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι νόμοις καὶ
  συμπολιτεύειν· ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν μειζόνων προσέλαβόν τινας. Ἐκ
  δὲ τούτου ἐπεχείρησαν καὶ τὰς τῆς Μακεδονίας πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν
  ἀπὸ Ἀμύντου, τοῦ βασιλέως Μακεδόνων. Ἐπεὶ δὲ εἰσήκουσαν αἱ
  ἐγγύτατα αὐτῶν, ταχὺ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς πόῤῥω καὶ μείζους ἐπορεύοντο·
  καὶ κατελίπομεν ἡμεῖς ἔχοντας ἤδη ἄλλας τε πολλὰς, καὶ Πέλλαν,
  ἥπερ μεγίστη τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ πόλεων. Καὶ Ἀμύνταν δὲ αἰσθανόμεθα
  ἀποχωροῦντά τε ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἐκπεπτωκότα ἤδη ἐκ
  πάσης Μακεδονίας.

  We know from Diodorus that Amyntas fled the country in despair,
  and ceded a large proportion at least of Lower Macedonia to the
  Olynthians. Accordingly, the struggle between the latter and
  Amyntas (here alluded to), must have taken place when he came
  back and tried to resume his dominion.

How the Illyrians were compelled to retire, and by what steps the
confederacy was got together, we are not permitted to know. Our
information (unhappily very brief) comes from the Akanthian envoy
Kleigenês, speaking at Sparta about ten years afterwards (B.C. 383),
and describing in a few words the confederacy as it then stood.
But there is one circumstance which this witness,—himself hostile
to Olynthus and coming to solicit Spartan aid against her,—attests
emphatically; the equal, generous, and brotherly principles, upon
which the Olynthians framed their scheme from the beginning. They
did not present themselves as an imperial city enrolling a body of
dependent allies, but invited each separate city to adopt common
laws and reciprocal citizenship with Olynthus, with full liberty
of intermarriage, commercial dealing, and landed proprietorship.
That the Macedonian cities near the sea should welcome so liberal a
proposition as this, coming from the most powerful of their Grecian
neighbors, cannot at all surprise us; especially at a time when they
were exposed to the Illyrian invaders, and when Amyntas had fled the
country. They had hitherto always been subjects;[123] their cities
had not (like the Greek cities) enjoyed each its own separate
autonomy within its own walls; the offer, now made to them by the
Olynthians, was one of freedom in exchange for their past subjection
under the Macedonian kings, combined with a force adequate to protect
them against Illyrian and other invaders. Perhaps also these various
cities,—Anthemus, Therma, Chalastra, Pella, Alôrus, Pydna, etc.,—may
have contained, among the indigenous population, a certain proportion
of domiciliated Grecian inhabitants, to whom the proposition of the
Olynthians would be especially acceptable.

  [123] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 12—τὰς τῆς Μακεδονίας πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν
  ἀπὸ Ἀμύντου, etc.; compare v, 2, 38.

We may thus understand why the offer of Olynthus was gladly
welcomed by the Macedonian maritime cities. They were the first who
fraternized as voluntary partners in the confederacy; which the
Olynthians, having established this basis, proceeded to enlarge
farther, by making the like liberal propositions to the Greek cities
in their neighborhood. Several of these latter joined voluntarily;
others were afraid to refuse; insomuch that the confederacy came
to include a considerable number of Greeks,—especially, Potidæa,
situated on the Isthmus of Pallênê, and commanding the road of
communication between the cities within Pallênê and the continent.
The Olynthians carried out with scrupulous sincerity their professed
principles of equal and intimate partnership, avoiding all
encroachment or offensive preëminence in favor of their own city. But
in spite of this liberal procedure, they found among their Grecian
neighbors obstructions which they had not experienced from the
Macedonian. Each of the Grecian cities had been accustomed to its own
town-autonomy and separate citizenship, with its peculiar laws and
customs. All of them were attached to this kind of distinct political
life, by one of the most tenacious and universal instincts of the
Greek mind; all of them would renounce it with reluctance, even on
consenting to enter the Olynthian confederacy, with its generous
promise, its enlarged security, and its manifest advantages; and
there were even some who, disdaining every prospective consideration,
refused to change their condition at all except at the point of the
sword.

Among these last were Akanthus and Apollonia, the largest cities
(next to Olynthus) in the Chalkidic peninsula, and, therefore,
the least unable to stand alone. To these the Olynthians did not
make application, until they had already attracted within their
confederacy a considerable number of other Grecian as well as
Macedonian cities. They then invited Akanthus and Apollonia to come
in, upon the same terms of equal union and fellow-citizenship. The
proposition being declined, they sent a second message intimating
that, unless it were accepted within a certain time, they would
enforce it by compulsory measures. So powerful already was the
military force of the Olynthian confederacy, that Akanthus and
Apollonia, incompetent to resist without foreign aid, despatched
envoys to Sparta to set forth the position of affairs in the
Chalkidic peninsula, and to solicit intervention against Olynthus.

Their embassy reached Sparta about B.C. 383, when the Spartans,
having broken up the city of Mantinea into villages, and coërced
Phlius, were in the full swing of power over Peloponnesus,—and when
they had also dissolved the Bœotian federation, placing harmosts
in Platæa and Thespiæ as checks upon any movement of Thebes. The
Akanthian Kleigenês, addressing himself to the Assembly of Spartans
and their allies, drew an alarming picture of the recent growth
and prospective tendencies of Olynthus, invoking the interference
of Sparta against that city. The Olynthian confederacy (he said)
already comprised many cities, small and great, Greek as well as
Macedonian,—Amyntas having lost his kingdom. Its military power,
even at present great, was growing every day.[124] The territory,
comprising a large breadth of fertile corn-land, could sustain a
numerous population. Wood for ship-building was close at hand, while
the numerous harbors of the confederate cities ensured a thriving
trade as well as a steady revenue from custom-duties. The neighboring
Thracian tribes would be easily kept in willing dependence, and would
thus augment the military force of Olynthus; even the gold mines of
Mount Pangæus would speedily come within her assured reach. “All
that I now tell you (such was the substance of his speech) is matter
of public talk among the Olynthian people, who are full of hope and
confidence. How can you Spartans, who are taking anxious pains to
prevent the union of the Bœotian cities,[125] permit the aggregation
of so much more formidable a power, both by land and by sea, as this
of Olynthus? Envoys have already been sent thither from Athens and
Thebes,—and the Olynthians have decreed to send an embassy in return
for contracting alliance with those cities; hence, your enemies will
derive a large additional force. We of Akanthus and Apollonia, having
declined the proposition to join the confederacy voluntarily, have
received notice that, if we persist, they will constrain us. Now we
are anxious to retain our paternal laws and customs, continuing as
a city by ourselves.[126] But if we cannot obtain aid from you, we
shall be under the necessity of joining them,—as several other cities
have already done, from not daring to refuse; cities, who would have
sent envoys along with us, had they not been afraid of offending
the Olynthians. These cities, if you interfere forthwith, and with
a powerful force, will now revolt from the new confederacy. But if
you postpone your interference, and allow time for the confederacy
to work, their sentiments will soon alter. They will come to be knit
together in attached unity, by the co-burgership, the intermarriage,
and the reciprocity of landed possessions, which have already been
enacted prospectively. All of them will become convinced that they
have a common interest both in belonging to, and in strengthening the
confederacy,—just as the Arcadians, when they follow you, Spartans,
as allies, are not only enabled to preserve their own property, but
also to plunder others. If, by your delay, the attractive tendencies
of the confederacy should come into real operation, you will
presently find it not so much within your power to dissolve.[127]”

  [124] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 14.

  The number of Olynthian troops is given in Xenophon as eight
  hundred hoplites—a far greater number of peltasts—and one
  thousand horsemen, assuming that Akanthus and Apollonia joined
  the confederacy. It has been remarked by Mr. Mitford and others,
  that these numbers, as they here stand, must be decidedly smaller
  than the reality. But we have no means of correction open to us.
  Mr. Mitford’s suggestion of eight thousand hoplites in place of
  eight hundred, rests upon no authority.

  Demosthenes states that Olynthus by herself, and before she had
  brought all the Chalkidians into confederacy (οὔπω Χαλκιδέων
  πάντων εἰς ἓν συνῳκισμένων—De Fals. Leg. c. 75, p. 425) possessed
  four hundred horsemen, and a citizen population of 5000; no more
  than this (he says) at the time when the Lacedæmonians attacked
  them. The historical statements of the great orator, for a time
  which nearly coincides with his own birth, are to be received
  with caution.

  [125] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 16. Ἐννοήσατε δὲ καὶ τόδε, πῶς εἰκὸς,
  ὑμᾶς τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως μὴ καθ’ ἓν εἴη, πολὺ δὲ
  μείζονος ἀθροιζομένης δυνάμεως ἀμελῆσαι, etc.

  I translate here the substance of the speech, not the exact words.

  [126] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 14. Ἡμεῖς δὲ, ὦ ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι,
  βουλόμεθα μὲν τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι, καὶ αὐτοπολῖται
  εἶναι· εἰ μέντοι μὴ βοηθήσει τις, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡμῖν μετ’ ἐκείνων
  γίγνεσθαι.

  [127] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 18. Δεῖ γε μὴν ὑμᾶς καὶ τόδε εἰδέναι,
  ὡς, ἣν εἰρήκαμεν δύναμιν μεγάλην οὖσαν, οὔπω δυσπάλαιστός τις
  ἐστίν· αἱ γὰρ ἄκουσαι τῶν πόλεων ~τῆς πολιτείας κοινωνοῦσαι~,
  αὗται, ἄν τι ἴδωσιν ἀντίπαλον, ταχὺ ἀποστήσονται· ~εἰ μέντοι
  συγκλεισθήσονται ταῖς τε ἐπιγαμίαις καὶ ἐγκτήσεσι παρ’ ἀλλήλαις,
  ἃς ἐψηφισμένοι εἰσὶ—καὶ γνώσονται, ὅτι μετὰ τῶν κρατούντων
  ἕπεσθαι κερδαλέον ἐστὶν~, ὥσπερ Ἄρκαδες, ὅταν μεθ’ ὑμῶν ἴωσι, τά
  τε αὐτῶν σώζουσι καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἁρπάζουσιν—~ἴσως οὔκεθ’ ὁμοίως
  εὔλυτα ἔσται~.

This speech of the Akanthian envoy is remarkable in more than one
respect. Coming from the lips of an enemy, it is the best of all
testimonies to the liberal and comprehensive spirit in which the
Olynthians were acting. They are accused,—not of injustice, nor of
selfish ambition, nor of degrading those around them,—but literally,
of organizing a new partnership on principles too generous and too
seductive; of gently superseding, instead of violently breaking
down, the barriers between the various cities, by reciprocal ties
of property and family among the citizens of each; of uniting them
all into a new political aggregate, in which not only all would
enjoy equal rights, but all without exception would be gainers. The
advantage, both in security and in power, accruing prospectively to
all, is not only admitted by the orator, but stands in the front of
his argument. “Make haste and break up the confederacy (he impresses
upon Sparta) before its fruit is ripe, so that the confederates may
never taste it nor find out how good it is; for if they do, you
will not prevail on them to forego it.” By implication, he also
admits,—and he says nothing tending even to raise a doubt,—that the
cities which he represents, Akanthus and Apollonia, would share
along with the rest in this same benefit. But the Grecian political
instinct was nevertheless predominant,—“We wish to preserve our
paternal laws, and to be a city by ourselves.” Thus nakedly is
the objection stated; when the question was, not whether Akanthus
should lose its freedom and become subject to an imperial city like
Athens,—but whether it should become a free and equal member of a
larger political aggregate, cemented by every tie which could make
union secure, profitable, and dignified. It is curious to observe
how perfectly the orator is conscious that this repugnance, though
at the moment preponderant, was nevertheless essentially transitory,
and would give place to attachment when the union came to be felt as
a reality; and how eagerly he appeals to Sparta to lose no time in
clenching the repugnance, while it lasted. He appeals to her, not for
any beneficial or Pan-hellenic objects, but in the interests of her
own dominion, which required that the Grecian world should be as it
were pulverized into minute, self-acting, atoms without cohesion,—so
that each city, or each village, while protected against subjection
to any other, should farther be prevented from equal political union
or fusion with any other; being thus more completely helpless and
dependent in reference to Sparta.

It was not merely from Akanthus and Apollonia, but also from the
dispossessed Macedonian king Amyntas, that envoys reached Sparta to
ask for aid against Olynthus. It seems that Amyntas, after having
abandoned the kingdom and made his cession to the Olynthians, had
obtained some aid from Thessaly and tried to reinstate himself
by force. In this scheme he had failed, being defeated by the
Olynthians. Indeed we find another person named Argæus, mentioned
as competitor for the Macedonian sceptre, and possessing it for two
years.[128]

  [128] Diodor. xiv, 92; xv, 19.

  Demosthenes speaks of Amyntas as having been expelled from his
  kingdom by the Thessalians (cont. Aristokrat. c. 29, p. 657).
  If this be historically correct, it must be referred to some
  subsequent war in which he was engaged with the Thessalians,
  perhaps to the time when Jason of Pheræ acquired dominion over
  Macedonia (Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 11).

After hearing these petitioners, the Lacedæmonians first declared
their own readiness to comply with the prayer, and to put down
Olynthus; next, they submitted the same point to the vote of the
assembled allies.[129] Among these latter, there was no genuine
antipathy against the Olynthians, such as that which had prevailed
against Athens before the Peloponnesian war, in the synod then
held at Sparta. But the power of Sparta over her allies was now
far greater than it had been then. Most of their cities were under
oligarchies, dependent upon her support for authority over their
fellow-citizens; moreover, the recent events in Bœotia and at
Mantinea had operated as a serious intimidation. Anxiety to keep
the favor of Sparta was accordingly paramount, so that most of the
speakers as well as most of the votes, declared for war,[130] and a
combined army of ten thousand men was voted to be raised. To make
up such total, a proportional contingent was assessed upon each
confederate; combined with the proviso now added for the first
time, that each might furnish money instead of men, at the rate of
three Æginæan oboli (half an Æginæan drachma) for each hoplite. A
cavalry-soldier, to those cities which furnished such, was reckoned
as equivalent to four hoplites; a hoplite, as equivalent to two
peltasts; or pecuniary contribution on the same scale. All cities in
default were made liable to a forfeit of one stater (four drachmæ)
per day, for every soldier not sent; the forfeit to be enforced by
Sparta.[131] Such licensed substitution of pecuniary payment for
personal service, is the same as I have already described to have
taken place nearly a century before in the confederacy of Delos
under the presidency of Athens.[132] It was a system not likely to
be extensively acted upon among the Spartan allies, who were at once
poorer and more warlike than those of Athens. But in both cases it
was favorable to the ambition of the leading state; and the tendency
becomes here manifest, to sanction, by the formality of a public
resolution, that increased Lacedæmonian ascendency which had already
grown up in practice.

  [129] See above in this History, Vol. VI. Ch. xlviii. p. 79.

  [130] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 20. Ἐκ τούτου μέντοι, πολλοὶ μὲν
  ξυνηγόρευον στρατιὰν ποιεῖν, μάλιστα δὲ οἱ βουλόμενοι
  Λακεδαιμονίοις χαρίζεσθαι, etc.

  [131] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 21, 22.

  Diodorus (xv, 31) mentions the fact that an hoplite was reckoned
  equivalent to two peltasts, in reference to a Lacedæmonian
  muster-roll of a few years afterwards; but it must have been
  equally necessary to fix the proportion on the present occasion.

  [132] See Vol. V. Ch. xlv, p. 302 of this History.

The Akanthian envoys, while expressing their satisfaction with
the vote just passed, intimated that the muster of these numerous
contingents would occupy some time, and again insisted on the
necessity of instant intervention, even with a small force; before
the Olynthians could find time to get their plans actually in work or
appreciated by the surrounding cities. A moderate Lacedæmonian force
(they said), if despatched forthwith, would not only keep those
who had refused to join Olynthus, steady to their refusal, but also
induce others, who had joined reluctantly, to revolt. Accordingly the
ephors appointed Eudamidas at once, assigning to him two thousand
hoplites,—Neodamodes (or enfranchised Helots), Periœki, and Skiritæ
or Arcadian borderers. Such was the anxiety of the Akanthians for
haste, that they would not let him delay even to get together the
whole of this moderate force. He was put in march immediately, with
such as were ready; while his brother Phœbidas was left behind
to collect the remainder and follow him. And it seems that the
Akanthians judged correctly. For Eudamidas, arriving in Thrace after
a rapid march, though he was unable to contend against the Olynthians
in the field, yet induced Potidæa to revolt from them, and was
able to defend those cities, such as Akanthus and Apollonia, which
resolutely stood aloof.[133] Amyntas brought a force to coöperate
with him.

  [133] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 24; Diodor. xv, 21.

The delay in the march of Phœbidas was productive of consequences no
less momentous than unexpected. The direct line from Peloponnesus
to Olynthus lay through the Theban territory; a passage which the
Thebans, whatever might have been their wishes, were not powerful
enough to refuse, though they had contracted an alliance with
Olynthus,[134] and though proclamation was made that no Theban
citizens should join the Lacedæmonian force. Eudamidas, having
departed at a moment’s notice, passed through Bœotia without a halt,
in his way to Thrace. But it was known that his brother Phœbidas was
presently to follow; and upon this fact the philo-Laconian party in
Thebes organized a conspiracy.

  [134] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 27-34.

They obtained from the ephors, and from the miso-Theban feelings
of Agesilaus, secret orders to Phœbidas, that he should coöperate
with them in any party movement which they might find opportunity
of executing;[135] and when he halted with his detachment near the
gymnasium a little way without the walls, they concerted matters as
well with him as among themselves. Leontiades, Hypatês, and Archias,
were the chiefs of the party in Thebes favorable to Sparta; a party
decidedly in minority, yet still powerful, and at this moment so
strengthened by the unbounded ascendency of the Spartan name, that
Leontiades himself was one of the polemarchs of the city. Of the
anti-Spartan, or predominant sentiment in Thebes,—which included most
of the wealthy and active citizens, those who came successively into
office as hipparchs or generals of the cavalry,[136]—the leaders were
Ismenias and Androkleides. The former, especially, the foremost as
well as ablest conductor of the late war against Sparta, was now in
office as Polemarch, conjointly with his rival Leontiades.

  [135] This is the statement of Diodorus (xv, 20), and
  substantially that of Plutarch (Agesil. c. 24), who intimates
  that it was the general belief of the time. And it appears to me
  much more probable than the representation of Xenophon—that the
  first idea arose when Phœbidas was under the walls of Thebes,
  and that the Spartan leader was persuaded by Leontiades to act
  on his own responsibility. The behavior of Agesilaus and of the
  ephors after the fact is like that of persons who had previously
  contemplated the possibility of it. But the original suggestion
  must have come from the Theban faction themselves.

  [136] Plutarch (De Genio Socratis, c. 5, p. 578 B.) states that
  most of these generals of cavalry (τῶν ἱππαρχηκότων νομίμως) were
  afterwards in exile with Pelopidas at Athens.

  We have little or no information respecting the government of
  Thebes. It would seem to have been at this moment a liberalized
  oligarchy. There was a Senate, and two Polemarchs (perhaps the
  Polemarchs may have been more than two in all, though the words
  of Xenophon rather lead us to suppose _only_ two)—and there seems
  also to have been a civil magistrate, chosen by lot (ὁ κυαμιστὸς
  ἄρχων) and renewed annually, whose office was marked by his
  constantly having in his possession the sacred spear of state (τὸ
  ἱερὸν δόρυ) and the city-seal (Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 31. p.
  597—B.—C.).

  At this moment, it must be recollected, there were no such
  officers as Bœotarchs; since the Lacedæmonians, enforcing the
  peace of Antalkidas, had put an end to the Bœotian federation.

While Ismenias, detesting the Spartans, kept aloof from Phœbidas,
Leontiades assiduously courted him and gained his confidence. On the
day of the Thesmophoria,[137] a religious festival celebrated by
the women apart from the men, during which the acropolis or Kadmeia
was consecrated to their exclusive use,—Phœbidas, affecting to have
concluded his halt, put himself in march to proceed as if towards
Thrace; seemingly rounding the walls of Thebes, but not going into
it. The Senate was actually assembled in the portico of the agora,
and the heat of a summer’s noon had driven every one out of the
streets, when Leontiades, stealing away from the Senate, hastened
on horseback to overtake Phœbidas, caused him to face about, and
conducted the Lacedæmonians straight up to the Kadmeia; the gates
of which, as well as those of the town, were opened by his order as
polemarch. There were not only no citizens in the streets, but none
even in the Kadmeia; no male person being permitted to be present
at the feminine Thesmophoria; so that Phœbidas and his army became
possessed of the Kadmeia without the smallest opposition. At the
same time they became possessed of an acquisition of hardly less
importance,—the persons of all the assembled Theban women; who served
as hostages for the quiet submission, however reluctant, of the
citizens in the town below. Leontiades handed to Phœbidas the key of
the gates, and then descended into the town, giving orders that no
man should go up without his order.[138]

  [137] The rhetor Aristeides (Or. xix, Eleusin. p. 452 Cant.;
  p. 419 Dind.) states that the Kadmeia was seized during the
  Pythian festival. This festival would take place, July or August
  382 B.C.; near the beginning of the third year of the (99th)
  Olympiad. See above in this History, Vol. VI. Ch. liv, p. 455,
  note. Respecting the year and month in which the Pythian festival
  was held, there is a difference of opinion among commentators.
  I agree with those who assign it to the first quarter of the
  third Olympic year. And the date of the march of Phœbidas would
  perfectly harmonize with this supposition.

  Xenophon mentions nothing about the Pythian festival as being in
  course of celebration when Phœbidas was encamped near Thebes: for
  it had no particular reference to Thebes.

  [138] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 28, 29.

The assembled Senate heard with consternation the occupation of the
acropolis by Phœbidas. Before any deliberation could be taken among
the senators, Leontiades came down to resume his seat. The lochages
and armed citizens of his party, to whom he had previously given
orders, stood close at hand. “Senators (said he), be not intimidated
by the news that the Spartans are in the Kadmeia; for they assure
us that they have no hostile purpose against any one who does not
court war against them. But I, as polemarch, am empowered by law to
seize any one whose behavior is manifestly and capitally criminal.
Accordingly, I seize this man Ismenias, as the great inflamer of
war. Come forward, captains and soldiers, lay hold of him, and carry
him off where your orders direct.” Ismenias was accordingly seized
and hurried off as a prisoner to the Kadmeia; while the senators,
thunderstruck and overawed, offered no resistance. Such of them as
were partisans of the arrested polemarch, and many even of the more
neutral members, left the Senate and went home, thankful to escape
with their lives. Three hundred of them, including Androkleidas,
Pelopidas, Mellon, and others, sought safety by voluntary exile to
Athens; after which, the remainder of the Senate, now composed of
few or none except philo-Spartan partisans, passed a vote formally
dismissing Ismenias, and appointing a new polemarch in his place.[139]

  [139] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 30, 31.

This blow of high-handed violence against Ismenias forms a
worthy counterpart to the seizure of Theramenes by Kritias,[140]
twenty-two years before, in the Senate of Athens under the Thirty.
Terror-striking in itself, it was probably accompanied by similar
deeds of force against others of the same party. The sudden explosion
and complete success of the conspiracy, plotted by the Executive
Chief himself, the most irresistible of all conspirators,—the
presence of Phœbidas in the Kadmeia, and of a compliant Senate in
the town,—the seizure or flight of Ismenias and all his leading
partisans,—were more than sufficient to crush all spirit of
resistance on the part of the citizens; whose first anxiety probably
was, to extricate their wives and daughters from the custody of
the Lacedæmonians in the Kadmeia. Having such a price to offer,
Leontiades would extort submission the more easily, and would
probably procure a vote of the people ratifying the new _régime_,
the Spartan alliance, and the continued occupation of the acropolis.
Having accomplished the first settlement of his authority, he
proceeded without delay to Sparta, to make known the fact that “order
reigned” at Thebes.

  [140] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3. See above in this History, Vol. VIII.
  Ch. lxv. p. 252.

The news of the seizure of the Kadmeia and of the revolution at
Thebes had been received at Sparta with the greatest surprise, as
well as with a mixed feeling of shame and satisfaction. Everywhere
throughout Greece, probably, it excited a greater sensation than any
event since the battle of Ægospotami. Tried by the recognized public
law of Greece, it was a flagitious iniquity, for which Sparta had not
the shadow of a pretence. It was even worse than the surprise of
Platæa by the Thebans before the Peloponnesian war, which admitted
of the partial excuse that war was at any rate impending; whereas
in this case, the Thebans had neither done nor threatened anything
to violate the peace of Antalkidas. It stood condemned by the
indignant sentiment of all Greece, unwillingly testified even by the
philo-Laconian Xenophon[141] himself. But it was at the same time
an immense accession to Spartan power. It had been achieved with
preëminent skill and success; and Phœbidas might well claim to have
struck for Sparta the most important blow since Ægospotami, relieving
her from one of her two really formidable enemies.[142]

  [141] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 1.

  [142] It is curious that Xenophon, treating Phœbidas as a man
  more warm-hearted than wise, speaks of him as if he had rendered
  no real service to Sparta by the capture of the Kadmeia (v, 2,
  28). The explanation of this is, that Xenophon wrote his history
  at a later period, after the defeat at Leuktra and the downfall
  of Sparta; which downfall was brought about by the reaction
  against her overweening and oppressive dominion, especially after
  the capture of the Kadmeia,—or (in the pious creed of Xenophon)
  by the displeasure of the gods, which such iniquity drew down
  upon her (v, 4, 1). In this way, therefore, it is made out that
  Phœbidas had not acted with true wisdom, and that he had done
  his country more harm than good; a criticism, which we may be
  sure that no man advanced, at the time of the capture itself, or
  during the three years after it.

Nevertheless, far from receiving thanks at Sparta, he became the
object of wrath and condemnation, both with the ephors and the
citizens generally. Every one was glad to throw upon him the odium
of the proceeding, and to denounce him as having acted without
orders. Even the ephors, who had secretly authorized him beforehand
to coöperate generally with the faction at Thebes, having doubtless
never given any specific instructions, now indignantly disavowed
him. Agesilaus alone stood forward in his defence, contending
that the only question was, whether his proceeding at Thebes had
been injurious or beneficial to Sparta. If the former, he merited
punishment; if the latter, it was always lawful to render service,
even _impromptu_ and without previous orders.

Tried by this standard, the verdict was not doubtful. For every man
at Sparta felt how advantageous the act was in itself; and felt it
still more, when Leontiades reached the city, humble in solicitation
as well as profuse in promise. In his speech addressed to the
assembled ephors and Senate, he first reminded them how hostile
Thebes had hitherto been to them, under Ismenias and the party just
put down,—and how constantly they had been in jealous alarm, lest
Thebes should reconstitute by force the Bœotian federation. “Now
(added he) your fears may be at an end; only take as good care to
uphold our government, as we shall take to obey your orders. For the
future, you will have nothing to do but to send us a short despatch,
to get every service which you require.[143]” It was resolved by the
Lacedæmonians, at the instance of Agesilaus, to retain their garrison
now in the Kadmeia, to uphold Leontiades with his colleagues in the
government of Thebes, and to put Ismenias upon his trial. Yet they
at the same time, as a sort of atonement to the opinion of Greece,
passed a vote of censure on Phœbidas, dismissed him from his command,
and even condemned him to a fine. The fine, however, most probably
was never exacted; for we shall see by the conduct of Sphodrias
afterwards that the displeasure against Phœbidas, if at first
genuine, was certainly of no long continuance.

  [143] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 34.

  Καὶ ὑμεῖς γε (says Leontiades to the Lacedæmonian ephors) τότε
  μὲν ἀεὶ προσείχετε τὸν νοῦν, πότε ἀκούσεσθε βιαζομένους αὐτοὺς
  τὴν Βοιωτίαν ὑφ’ αὑτοῖς εἶναι· νῦν δ’, ἐπεὶ τάδε πέπρακται, οὐδὲν
  ὑμᾶς δεῖ Θηβαίους φοβεῖσθαι· ἀλλ’ ἀρκέσει ὑμῖν μικρὰ σκυτάλη,
  ὥστε ἐκεῖθεν πάντα πράττεσθαι, ὅσων ἂν δέησθε—ἐὰν, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς
  ὑμῶν, οὕτω καὶ ὑμεῖς ἡμῶν, ἐπιμελῆσθε.

  Xenophon mentions the displeasure of the ephors and the Spartans
  generally against Phœbidas (χαλεπῶς ἔχοντας τῷ Φοιβίδᾳ) but not
  the fine, which is certified by Diodorus (xv, 20), by Plutarch
  (Pelopidas, c. 6, and De Genio Socratis, p. 576 A), and Cornelius
  Nepos (Pelopid. c. 1).

That the Lacedæmonians should at the same time condemn Phœbidas
and retain the Kadmeia—has been noted as a gross contradiction.
Nevertheless, we ought not to forget, that had they evacuated the
Kadmeia, the party of Leontiades at Thebes, which had compromised
itself for Sparta as well as for its own aggrandizement, would have
been irretrievably sacrificed. The like excuse, if excuse it be,
cannot be urged in respect to their treatment of Ismenias; whom they
put upon his trial at Thebes, before a court consisting of three
Lacedæmonian commissioners, and one from each allied city. He was
accused, probably by Leontiades and his other enemies, of having
entered into friendship and conspiracy with the Persian king to the
detriment of Greece,[144]—of having partaken in the Persian funds
brought into Greece by Timokrates the Rhodian,—and of being the real
author of that war which had disturbed Greece from 395 B.C. down
to the peace of Antalkidas. After an unavailing defence, he was
condemned and executed. Had this doom been inflicted upon him by his
political antagonists as a consequence of their intestine victory,
it would have been too much in the analogy of Grecian party-warfare
to call for any special remark. But there is something peculiarly
revolting in the prostitution of judicial solemnity and Pan-hellenic
pretence, which the Lacedæmonians here committed. They could have no
possible right to try Ismenias as a criminal at all; still less to
try him as a criminal on the charge of confederacy with the Persian
king,—when they had themselves, only five years before, acted not
merely as allies, but even as instruments, of that monarch, in
enforcing the peace of Antalkidas. If Ismenias had received money
from one Persian satrap, the Spartan Antalkidas had profited in
like manner by another,—and for the like purpose too of carrying on
Grecian war. The real motive of the Spartans was doubtless to revenge
themselves upon this distinguished Theban for having raised against
them the war which began in 395 B.C. But the mockery of justice
by which that revenge was masked, and the impudence of punishing
in him as treason that same foreign alliance with which they had
ostentatiously identified themselves, lends a deeper enormity to the
whole proceeding.

  [144] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 35; Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, p. 576
  A. Plutarch in another place (Pelopid. c. 5) represents Ismenias
  as having been conveyed to Sparta and tried there.

Leontiades and his partisans were now established as rulers in
Thebes, with a Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia to sustain them
and execute their orders. The once-haughty Thebes was enrolled as
a member of Lacedæmonian confederacy. Sparta was now enabled to
prosecute her Olynthian expedition with redoubled vigor. Eudamidas
and Amyntas, though they repressed the growth of the Olynthian
confederacy, had not been strong enough to put it down; so that a
larger force was necessary, and the aggregate of ten thousand men,
which had been previously decreed, was put into instant requisition,
to be commanded by Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus. The new general,
a man of very popular manners, was soon on his march at the head of
this large army, which comprised many Theban hoplites as well as
horsemen, furnished by the new rulers in their unqualified devotion
to Sparta. He sent forward envoys to Amyntas in Macedonia, urging
upon him the most strenuous efforts for the purpose of recovering
the Macedonian cities which had joined the Olynthians,—and also to
Derdas, prince of the district of Upper Macedonia called Elimeia,
inviting his coöperation against that insolent city, which would
speedily extend her dominion (he contended) from the maritime region
to the interior, unless she were put down.[145]

  [145] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 38.

Though the Lacedæmonians were masters everywhere and had their
hands free,—though Teleutias was a competent officer with powerful
forces,—and though Derdas joined with four hundred excellent
Macedonian horse,—yet the conquest of Olynthus was found no easy
enterprise.[146] The Olynthian cavalry, in particular, was numerous
and efficient. Unable as they were to make head against Teleutias
in the field or repress his advance, nevertheless in a desultory
engagement which took place near the city gates, they defeated
the Lacedæmonian and Theban cavalry, threw even the infantry into
confusion, and were on the point of gaining a complete victory, had
not Derdas with his cavalry on the other wing, made a diversion which
forced them to come back for the protection of the city. Teleutias,
remaining master of the field, continued to ravage the Olynthian
territory during the summer, for which, however, the Olynthians
retaliated by frequent marauding expeditions against the cities in
alliance with him.[147]

  [146] Demosthenes (De Fals. Leg. c. 75, p. 425) speaks with
  proper commendation of the brave resistance made by the
  Olynthians against the great force of Sparta. But his expressions
  are altogether misleading as to the tenor and result of the
  war. If we had no other information than his, we should be led
  to imagine that the Olynthians had been victorious, and the
  Lacedæmonians baffled.

  [147] Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 40-43.

In the ensuing spring, the Olynthians sustained various partial
defeats, especially one near Apollonia, from Derdas. They were more
and more confined to their walls; insomuch that Teleutias became
confident and began to despise them. Under these dispositions on
his part, a body of Olynthian cavalry showed themselves one morning,
passed the river near their city, and advanced in calm array towards
the Lacedæmonian camp. Indignant at such an appearance of daring,
Teleutias directed Tlemonidas with the peltasts to disperse them;
upon which the Olynthians slowly retreated, while the peltasts rushed
impatiently to pursue them, even when they recrossed the river. No
sooner did the Olynthians see that half the peltasts had crossed
it, than they suddenly turned, charged them vigorously, and put
them to flight with the loss of their commander Tlemonidas and a
hundred others. All this passed in sight of Teleutias, who completely
lost his temper. Seizing his arms, he hurried forward to cover the
fugitives with the hoplites around him, sending orders to all his
troops, hoplites, peltasts, and horsemen, to advance also. But the
Olynthians, again retreating, drew him on towards the city, with
such inconsiderate forwardness, that many of his soldiers ascending
the eminence on which the city was situated, rushed close up to the
walls.[148] Here, however, they were received by a shower of missiles
which forced them to recede in disorder; upon which the Olynthians
again sallied forth, probably, from more than one gate at once, and
charged them first with cavalry and peltasts, next with hoplites.
The Lacedæmonians and their allies, disturbed and distressed by the
first, were unable to stand against the compact charge of the last;
Teleutias himself, fighting in the foremost ranks, was slain, and his
death was a signal for the flight of all around. The whole besieging
force dispersed and fled in different directions,—to Akanthus, to
Spartôlus, to Potidæa, to Apollonia. So vigorous and effective was
the pursuit of the Olynthians, that the loss of the fugitives was
immense. The whole army was in fact ruined;[149] for probably many of
the allies who escaped became discouraged and went home.

  [148] Thucyd. i, 63—with the Scholiast.

  [149] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 4-6. παμπλήθεις ἀπέκτειναν ἀνθρώπους καὶ
  ὅτι περ ὄφελος ἦν τούτου τοῦ στρατεύματος.

  Diodorus (xv, 21) states the loss at twelve hundred men.

At another time, probably, a victory so decisive might have deterred
the Lacedæmonians from farther proceedings, and saved Olynthus. But
now, they were so completely masters everywhere else, that they
thought only of repairing the dishonor by a still more imposing
demonstration. Their king Agesipolis was placed at the head of an
expedition on the largest scale; and his name called forth eager
coöperation, both in men and money, from the allies. He marched
with thirty Spartan counsellors, as Agesilaus had gone to Asia;
besides a select body of energetic youth as volunteers, from the
Periœki, from the illegitimate sons of Spartans, and from strangers
or citizens who had lost their franchise through poverty, introduced
as friends of richer Spartan citizens to go through the arduous
Lykurgean training.[150] Amyntas and Derdas also were instigated to
greater exertions than before, so that Agesipolis was enabled, after
receiving their reinforcements in his march through Macedonia, to
present himself before Olynthus with an overwhelming force, and to
confine the citizens within their walls. He then completed the ravage
of their territory, which had been begun by Teleutias; and even took
Torônê by storm. But the extreme heat of the summer weather presently
brought upon him a fever, which proved fatal in a week’s time;
although he had caused himself to be carried for repose to the shady
grove, and clear waters, near the temple of Dionysus at Aphytis. His
body was immersed in honey and transported to Sparta, where it was
buried with the customary solemnities.[151]

  [150] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 9. Πολλοὶ δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν περιοίκων
  ἐθελονταὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ ἠκολούθουν, καὶ ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων
  καλουμένων, καὶ νόθοι τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, μάλα εὐειδεῖς τε καὶ τῶν ἐν
  τῇ πόλει καλῶν οὐκ ἄπειροι.

  The phrase—ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων—is illustrated by a passage from
  Phylarchus in Athenæus, vi, p. 271 (referred to by Schneider
  in his note here). I have already stated that the political
  franchise of a Spartan citizen depended upon his being able to
  furnish constantly his quota to the public mess-table. Many of
  the poor families became unable to do this, and thus lost their
  qualification and their training; but rich citizens sometimes
  paid their quota for them, and enabled them by such aid to
  continue their training as ξύντροφοι, τρόφιμοι, μόθακες, etc.
  as companions of their own sons. The two sons of Xenophon were
  educated at Sparta (Diog. Laert. ii, 54), and would thus be ξένοι
  τῶν τροφίμων καλουμένων. If either of them was now old enough, he
  might probably have been one among the volunteers to accompany
  Agesipolis.

  [151] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 18; Pausan. iii, 5, 9.

Polybiades, who succeeded Agesipolis in the command, prosecuted the
war with undiminished vigor; and the Olynthians, debarred from their
home produce as well as from importation, were speedily reduced to
such straits as to be compelled to solicit peace. They were obliged
to break up their own federation, and to enrol themselves as sworn
members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, with its obligations of
service to Sparta.[152] The Olynthian union being dissolved, the
component Grecian cities were enrolled severally as allies of Sparta,
while the maritime cities of Macedonia were deprived of their
neighboring Grecian protector, and passed again under the dominion of
Amyntas.

  [152] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 26; Diodor. xv, 22, 23.

Both the dissolution of this growing confederacy, and the
reconstitution of maritime Macedonia, were signal misfortunes to
the Grecian world. Never were the arms of Sparta more mischievously
or more unwarrantably employed. That a powerful Grecian confederacy
should be formed in the Chalkidic peninsula, in the border region
where Hellas joined the non-Hellenic tribes,—was an incident of
signal benefit to the Hellenic world generally. It would have
served as a bulwark to Greece against the neighboring Macedonians
and Thracians, at whose expense its conquests, if it made any,
would have been achieved. That Olynthus did not oppress her Grecian
neighbors—that the principles of her confederacy were of the most
equal, generous, and seducing character,—that she employed no greater
compulsion than was requisite to surmount an unreflecting instinct
of town-autonomy,—and that the very towns who obeyed this instinct
would have become sensible themselves, in a very short time, of the
benefits conferred by the confederacy on each and every one,—these
are facts certified by the urgency of the reluctant Akanthians,
when they entreat Sparta to leave no interval for the confederacy
to make its workings felt. Nothing but the intervention of Sparta
could have crushed this liberal and beneficent promise; nothing but
the accident, that during the three years from 382 to 379 B.C., she
was at the maximum of her power and had her hands quite free, with
Thebes and its Kadmeia under her garrison. Such prosperity did not
long continue unabated. Only a few months after the submission of
Olynthus, the Kadmeia was retaken by the Theban exiles, who raised
so vigorous a war against Sparta, that she would have been disabled
from meddling with Olynthus,—as we shall find illustrated by the
fact (hereafter to be recounted), that she declined interfering in
Thessaly to protect the Thessalian cities against Jason of Pheræ.
Had the Olynthian confederacy been left to its natural working,
it might well have united all the Hellenic cities around it in
harmonious action, so as to keep the sea coast in possession of a
confederacy of free and self-determining communities, confining
the Macedonian princes to the interior. But Sparta threw in her
extraneous force, alike irresistible and inauspicious, to defeat
these tendencies; and to frustrate that salutary change,—from
fractional autonomy and isolated action into integral and equal
autonomy with collective action,—which Olynthus was laboring to
bring about. She gave the victory to Amyntas, and prepared the
indispensable basis upon which his son Philip afterwards rose, to
reduce not only Olynthus, but Akanthus, Apollonia, and the major part
of the Grecian world, to one common level of subjection. Many of
those Akanthians, who spurned the boon of equal partnership and free
communion with Greeks and neighbors, lived to discover how impotent
were their own separate walls as a bulwark against Macedonian
neighbors; and to see themselves confounded in that common servitude
which the imprudence of their fathers had entailed upon them. By
the peace of Antalkidas, Sparta had surrendered the Asiatic Greeks
to Persia; by crushing the Olynthian confederacy, she virtually
surrendered the Thracian Greeks to the Macedonian princes. Never
again did the opportunity occur of placing Hellenism on a firm,
consolidated, and self-supporting basis, round the coast of the
Thermaic Gulf.

While the Olynthian expedition was going on, the Lacedæmonians
were carrying on, under Agesilaus, another intervention within
Peloponnesus, against the city of Phlius. It has already been
mentioned that certain exiles of this city had recently been
recalled, at the express command of Sparta. The ruling party in
Phlius had at the same time passed a vote to restore the confiscated
property of these exiles; reimbursing out of the public treasury,
to those who had purchased it, the price which they had paid,—and
reserving all disputed points for judicial decision.[153] The
returned exiles now again came to Sparta, to prefer complaint that
they could obtain no just restitution of their property; that the
tribunals of the city were in the hands of their opponents, many of
them directly interested as purchasers, who refused them the right
of appealing to any extraneous and impartial authority; and that
there were even in the city itself many who thought them wronged.
Such allegations were, probably, more or less founded in truth. At
the same time, the appeal to Sparta, abrogating the independence
of Phlius, so incensed the ruling Phliasians that they passed a
sentence of fine against all the appellants. The latter insisted on
this sentence as a fresh count for strengthening their complaints
at Sparta; and as a farther proof of anti-Spartan feeling, as well
as of high-handed injustice, in the Phliasian rulers.[154] Their
cause was warmly espoused by Agesilaus, who had personal relations
of hospitality with some of the exiles; while it appears that his
colleague, King Agesipolis, was on good terms with the ruling party
at Phlius,—had received from them zealous aid, both in men and money,
for his Olynthian expedition,—and had publicly thanked them for their
devotion to Sparta.[155] The Phliasian government, emboldened by the
proclaimed testimonial of Agesipolis, certifying their fidelity,
had fancied that they stood upon firm ground, and that no Spartan
coërcion would be enforced against them. But the marked favor of
Agesipolis, now absent in Thrace, told rather against them in the
mind of Agesilaus; pursuant to that jealousy which usually prevailed
between the two Spartan kings. In spite of much remonstrance at
Sparta, from many who deprecated hostilities against a city of five
thousand citizens, for the profit of a handful of exiles,—he not only
seconded the proclamation of war against Phlius by the ephors, but
also took the command of the army.[156]

  [153] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 10.

  [154] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 10, 11.

  [155] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 10. ἡ Φλιασίων πόλις, ἐπαινεθεῖσα μὲν
  ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀγησιπόλιδος, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ ταχέως αὐτῷ χρήματα ἐς τὴν
  στρατιὰν ἔδοσαν, etc.

  [156] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 12, 13; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24; Diodor.
  xv, 20.

The army being mustered, and the border sacrifices favorable,
Agesilaus marched with his usual rapidity towards Phlius; dismissing
those Phliasian envoys, who met him on the road and bribed or
entreated him to desist, with the harsh reply that the government
had already deceived Sparta once, and that he would be satisfied
with nothing less than the surrender of the acropolis. This being
refused, he marched to the city, and blocked it up by a wall of
circumvallation. The besieged defended themselves with resolute
bravery and endurance, under a citizen named Delphion; who, with a
select troop of three hundred, maintained constant guard at every
point, and even annoyed the besiegers by frequent sallies. By public
decree, every citizen was put upon half-allowance of bread, so that
the siege was prolonged to double the time which Agesilaus, from the
information of the exiles as to the existing stock of provisions, had
supposed to be possible. Gradually, however, famine made itself felt;
desertions from within increased, among those who were favorable,
or not decidedly averse, to the exiles; desertions, which Agesilaus
took care to encourage by an ample supply of food, and by enrolment
as Phliasian emigrants on the Spartan side. At length, after about a
year’s blockade,[157] the provisions within were exhausted, so that
the besieged were forced to entreat permission from Agesilaus to
despatch envoys to Sparta and beg for terms. Agesilaus granted their
request. But being at the same time indignant that they submitted
to Sparta rather than to him, he sent to ask the ephors that the
terms might be referred to his dictation. Meanwhile he redoubled his
watch over the city; in spite of which, Delphion, with one of his
most active subordinates, contrived to escape at this last hour.
Phlius was now compelled to surrender at discretion to Agesilaus,
who named a Council of One Hundred (half from the exiles, half from
those within the city) vested with absolute powers of life and death
over all the citizens, and authorized to frame a constitution for the
future government of the city. Until this should be done, he left a
garrison in the acropolis, with assured pay for six months.[158]

  [157] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 25.

  Καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ Φλιοῦντα οὕτως αὖ ἐπετετέλεστο ἐν ὀκτὼ μησὶ καὶ
  ἐνιαυτῷ.

  This general expression “the matters relative to Phlius,”
  comprises not merely the blockade, but the preliminary treatment
  and complaints of the Phliasian exiles. One year, therefore, will
  be as much as we can allow for the blockade,—perhaps more than we
  ought to allow.

  [158] Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 17-26.

Had Agesipolis been alive, perhaps the Phliasians might have obtained
better terms. How the omnipotent Hekatontarchy named by the partisan
feelings of Agesilaus,[159] conducted themselves, we do not know.
But the presumptions are all unfavorable, seeing that their situation
as well as their power was analogous to that of the Thirty at Athens
and the Lysandrian Dekarchies elsewhere.

  [159] The panegyrist of Agesilaus finds little to commend
  in these Phliasian proceedings, except the φιλεταιρεία or
  partisan-attachment of his hero (Xenoph. Agesil. ii, 21).

The surrender of Olynthus to Polybiades, and of Phlius to Agesilaus,
seem to have taken place nearly at the same time.




CHAPTER LXXVII.

FROM THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY THE LACEDÆMONIANS DOWN TO THE
CONGRESS AT SPARTA, AND PARTIAL PEACE, IN 371 B.C.


At the beginning of 379 B.C., the empire of the Lacedæmonians on
land had reached a pitch never before paralleled. On the sea, their
fleet was but moderately powerful, and they seem to have held divided
empire with Athens over the smaller islands; while the larger islands
(so far as we can make out) were independent of both. But the whole
of inland Greece, both within and without Peloponnesus,—except Argos,
Attica, and perhaps the more powerful Thessalian cities,—was now
enrolled in the confederacy dependent on Sparta. Her occupation of
Thebes, by a Spartan garrison and an oligarchy of local partisans,
appeared to place her empire beyond all chance of successful
attack; while the victorious close of the war against Olynthus
carried everywhere an intimidating sense of her far-reaching power.
Her allies, too,—governed as they were in many cases by Spartan
harmosts, and by oligarchies whose power rested on Sparta,—were much
more dependent upon her than they had been during the time of the
Peloponnesian war.

Such a position of affairs rendered Sparta an object of the same
mingled fear and hatred (the first preponderant) as had been felt
towards imperial Athens fifty years before, when she was designated
as the “despot city.[160]” And this sentiment was farther aggravated
by the recent peace of Antalkidas, in every sense the work of
Sparta; which she had first procured, and afterwards carried into
execution. That peace was disgraceful enough, as being dictated by
the king of Persia, enforced in his name, and surrendering to him
all the Asiatic Greeks. But it became yet more disgraceful when the
universal autonomy which it promised was seen to be so executed, as
to mean nothing better than subjection to Sparta. Of all the acts
yet committed by Sparta, not only in perversion of the autonomy
promised to every city, but in violation of all the acknowledged
canons of right dealing between city and city,—the most flagrant
was, her recent seizure and occupation of the Kadmeia at Thebes. Her
subversion (in alliance with, and partly for the benefit of, Amyntas
king of Macedonia) of the free Olynthian confederacy was hardly
less offensive to every Greek of large or Pan-hellenic patriotism.
She appeared as the confederate of the Persian king on one side, of
Amyntas the Macedonian, on another, of the Syracusan despot Dionysius
on a third,—as betraying the independence of Greece to the foreigner,
and seeking to put down, everywhere within it, that free spirit which
stood in the way of her own harmosts and partisan oligarchies.

  [160] Thucyd. i, 124. πόλιν τύραννον.

Unpopular as Sparta was, however, she stood out incontestably as the
head of Greece. No man dared to call into question her headship,
or to provoke resistance against it. The tone of patriotic and
free-spoken Greeks at this moment is manifested in two eminent
residents at Athens,—Lysias and Isokrates. Of these two rhetors, the
former composed an oration which he publicly read at Olympia during
the celebration of the 99th Olympiad, B.C. 384, three years after
the peace of Antalkidas. In this oration (of which unhappily only a
fragment remains, preserved by Dionysius of Halikarnassus), Lysias
raises the cry of danger to Greece, partly from the Persian king,
partly from the despot Dionysius of Syracuse.[161] He calls upon all
Greeks to lay aside hostility and jealousies one with the other,
and to unite in making head against these two really formidable
enemies, as their ancestors had previously done, with equal zeal for
putting down despots and for repelling the foreigner. He notes the
number of Greeks (in Asia) handed over to the Persian king, whose
great wealth would enable him to hire an indefinite number of Grecian
soldiers, and whose naval force was superior to anything which the
Greeks could muster; while the strongest naval force in Greece was
that of the Syracusan Dionysius. Recognizing the Lacedæmonians as
chiefs of Greece, Lysias expresses his astonishment that they should
quietly permit the fire to extend itself from one city to another.
They ought to look upon the misfortunes of those cities which had
been destroyed, both by the Persians and by Dionysius, as coming home
to themselves; not to wait patiently, until the two hostile powers
had united their forces to attack the centre of Greece, which yet
remained independent.

  [161] Lysias, Frag. Orat. xxxiii, (Olympic.) ed. Bekker ap.
  Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 520-525, Reisk.

  ... Ὁρῶν οὕτως αἰσχρῶς διακειμένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν
  αὐτῆς ὄντα ὑπὸ τῷ βαρβάρῳ, πολλὰς δὲ πόλεις ὑπὸ τυράννων
  ἀναστάτους γεγενημένας.

  ... Ὁρῶμεν γὰρ τοὺς κινδύνους καὶ μεγάλους καὶ παντάχοθεν
  περιεστηκότας. Ἐπίστασθε δὲ, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῶν κρατούντων τῆς
  θαλάσσης, τῶν δὲ χρημάτων βασιλεὺς ταμίας· ~τὰ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων
  σώματα, τῶν δαπανᾶσθαι δυναμένων~· ναῦς δὲ πολλὰς αὐτὸς κέκτηται,
  πολλὰς δ’ ὁ τύραννος τῆς Σικελίας....

  ... Ὥστε ἄξιον—τοὺς προγόνους μιμεῖσθαι, οἱ τοὺς μὲν βαρβάρους
  ἐποίησαν, τῆς ἀλλοτρίας ἐπιθυμοῦντας, τῆς σφετέρας αὐτῶν
  ἐστερῆσθαι· τοὺς δὲ τυράννους ἐξελάσαντες, κοινὴν ἅπασι τὴν
  ἐλευθερίαν κατέστησαν. Θαυμάζω δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους πάντων μάλιστα,
  τίνι ποτε γνώμῃ χρώμενοι, ~καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν~,
  ἡγεμόνες ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, etc.

  ... Οὐ τοίνυν ὁ ἐπιὼν καιρὸς τοῦ παρόντος βελτίων· οὐ γὰρ
  ἀλλοτρίας δεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς νομίζειν, ἀλλ’ οἰκείας·
  οὐδ’ ἀναμεῖναι, ἕως ἂν ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς αἱ δυνάμεις ~ἀμφοτέρων~
  (of Artaxerxes and Dionysius) ἔλθωσιν, ἀλλ’ ἕως ἔτι ἔξεστι, τὴν
  τούτων ὕβριν κωλῦσαι.

  Ephorus appears to have affirmed that there was a plan concerted
  between the Persian king and Dionysius, for attacking Greece in
  concert and dividing it between them (see Ephori Fragm. 141,
  ed. Didot). The assertion is made by the rhetor Aristeides,
  and the allusion to Ephorus is here preserved by the Scholiast
  on Aristeides (who, however, is mistaken, in referring it to
  Dionysius _the younger_). Aristeides ascribes the frustration of
  this attack to the valor of two Athenian generals, Iphikrates,
  and Timotheus; the former of whom captured the fleet of
  Dionysius, while the latter defeated the Lacedæmonian fleet at
  Leukas. But these events happened in 373-372 B.C., when the
  power of Dionysius was not so formidable or aggressive as it had
  been between 387-382 B.C.: moreover, the ships of Dionysius
  taken by Iphikrates were only ten in number, a small squadron.
  Aristeides appears to me to have misconceived the date to which
  the assertion of Ephorus really referred.

Of the two common enemies,—Artaxerxes and Dionysius,—whom Lysias
thus denounces, the latter had sent to this very Olympic festival
a splendid Theôry, or legation to offer solemn sacrifice in his
name; together with several chariots to contend in the race, and
some excellent rhapsodes to recite poems composed by himself. The
Syracusan legation, headed by Thearides, brother of Dionysius, were
clothed with rich vestments, and lodged in a tent of extraordinary
magnificence, decorated with gold and purple; such, probably, as had
not been seen since the ostentatious display made by Alkibiades[162]
in the ninetieth Olympiad (B.C. 420). While instigating the
spectators present to exert themselves as Greeks for the liberation
of their fellow-Greeks enslaved by Dionysius, Lysias exhorted them
to begin forthwith their hostile demonstration against the latter,
by plundering the splendid tent before them, which insulted the
sacred plain of Olympia with the spectacle of wealth extorted from
Grecian sufferers. It appears that this exhortation was partially,
but only partially, acted upon.[163] Some persons assailed the
tents, but were, probably, restrained by the Eleian superintendents
without difficulty. Yet the incident, taken in conjunction with
the speech of Lysias, helps us to understand the apprehensions and
sympathies which agitated the Olympic crowd in B.C. 384. This was
the first Olympic festival after the peace of Antalkidas; a festival
memorable, not only because it again brought thither Athenians,
Bœotians, Corinthians, and Argeians, who must have been prevented
by the preceding war from coming either in B.C. 388 or in B.C.
392,—but also as it exhibited the visitors and Theôries from the
Asiatic Greeks, for the first time since they had been handed over
by Sparta to the Persians,—and the like also from those numerous
Italians and Sicilian Greeks whom Dionysius had enslaved. All these
sufferers, especially the Asiatics, would doubtless be full of
complaints respecting the hardships of their new lot, and against
Sparta as having betrayed them; complaints, which would call forth
genuine sympathy in the Athenians, Thebans, and all others who had
submitted reluctantly to the peace of Antalkidas. There was thus a
large body of sentiment prepared to respond to the declamations of
Lysias. And many a Grecian patriot, who would be ashamed to lay hands
on the Syracusan tents or envoys, would yet yield a mournful assent
to the orator’s remark, that the free Grecian world was on fire[164]
at both sides; that Asiatics, Italians, and Sicilians, had already
passed into the hands of Artaxerxes and Dionysius; and that, if these
two formidable enemies should coalesce, the liberties even of central
Greece would be in great danger.

  [162] See Pseudo-Andokides cont. Alkibiad. s. 30; and Vol. VII.
  of this History, Ch. lv, p. 53.

  [163] Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 519; Diodor. xiv, 109.
  ὥστε τινας τολμῆσαι διαρπάζειν τὰς σκηνάς.

  Dionysius does not specify the date of this oration of Lysias;
  but Diodorus places it at Olympiad 98—B.C. 388—the year before
  the peace of Antalkidas. On this point I venture to depart from
  him, and assign it to Olympiad 99, or 384 B.C., three years
  after the peace; the rather as his Olympic chronology appears not
  clear, as may be seen by comparing xv, 7 with xiv, 109.

  1. The year 388 B.C. was a year of war, in which Sparta with
  her allies on one side,—and Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos
  on the other,—were carrying on strenuous hostilities. The war
  would hinder the four last-mentioned states from sending any
  public legation to sacrifice at the Olympic festival. Lysias, as
  an Athenian metic, could hardly have gone there at all; but he
  certainly could not have gone there to make a public and bold
  oratorical demonstration.

  2. The language of Lysias implies that the speech was delivered
  after the cession of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia,—ὁρῶν πολλὰ μὲν
  αὐτῆς (Ἑλλάδος) ὄντα ὑπὸ τῷ Βαρβάρῳ, etc. This is quite pertinent
  after the peace of Antalkidas; but not at all admissible before
  that peace. The same may be said about the phrase,—οὐ γὰρ
  ἀλλοτρίας δεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀπολωλότων συμφορὰς νομίζειν, ἀλλ’ οἰκείας;
  which must be referred to the recent subjection of the Asiatic
  Greeks by Persia, and of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks by
  Dionysius.

  3. In 388 B.C.—when Athens and so large a portion of the
  greater cities of Greece were at war with Sparta, and therefore
  contesting her headship,—Lysias would hardly have publicly
  talked of the Spartans as ἡγεμόνες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐκ ἀδίκως, καὶ
  διὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον ἀρετὴν καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιστήμην.
  This remark is made also by Sievers (Geschich. Griech. bis zur
  Schlacht von Mantinea, p. 138). Nor would he have declaimed so
  ardently against the Persian king, at a time when Athens was
  still not despairing of Persian aid against Sparta.

  On these grounds (as well as on others which I shall state when
  I recount the history of Dionysius), it appears to me that this
  oration of Lysias is unsuitable to B.C. 388—but perfectly
  suitable to 384 B.C.

  [164] Lysias, Orat. Olymp. Frag. καιομένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν,
  etc.

It is easy to see how much such feeling of grief and shame would
tend to raise antipathy against Sparta. Lysias, in that portion of
his speech which we possess, disguises his censure against her under
the forms of surprise. But Isokrates, who composed an analogous
discourse four years afterwards (which may perhaps have been read at
the next Olympic festival of B.C. 380), speaks out more plainly. He
denounces the Lacedæmonians as traitors to the general security and
freedom of Greece, and as seconding foreign kings as well as Grecian
despots to aggrandize themselves at the cost of autonomous Grecian
cities,—all in the interest of their own selfish ambition. No wonder
(he says) that the free and self-acting Hellenic world was every day
becoming contracted into a narrower space, when the presiding city
Sparta assisted Artaxerxes, Amyntas, and Dionysius to absorb it,—and
herself undertook unjust aggressions against Thebes, Olynthus,
Phlius, and Mantinea.[165]

  [165] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 145, 146: compare his
  Orat. viii, (De Pace) s. 122; and Diodor. xv, 23.

  Dionysius of Syracuse had sent twenty triremes to join the
  Lacedæmonians at the Hellespont, a few months before the peace of
  Antalkidas (Xenophon, Hellen. v, 1, 26).

The preceding citations, from Lysias and Isokrates, would be
sufficient to show the measure which intelligent contemporaries
took, both of the state of Greece and of the conduct of Sparta,
during the eight years succeeding the peace of Antalkidas (387-379
B.C.). But the philo-Laconian Xenophon is still more emphatic in his
condemnation of Sparta. Having described her triumphant and seemingly
unassailable position after the subjugation of Olynthus and Phlius,
he proceeds to say,[166]—“I could produce numerous other incidents,
both in and out of Greece, to prove that the gods take careful note
of impious men and of evil-doers; but the events which I am now about
to relate are quite sufficient. The Lacedæmonians, who had sworn to
leave each city autonomous, having violated their oaths by seizing
the citadel of Thebes, were punished by the very men whom they had
wronged,—though no one on earth had ever before triumphed over them.
And the Theban faction who had introduced them into the citadel, with
the deliberate purpose that their city should be enslaved to Sparta
in order that they might rule despotically themselves,—were put down
by no more than seven assailants, among the exiles whom they had
banished.”

  [166] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 1. Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ἄν τις ἔχοι καὶ
  ἄλλα λέγειν, καὶ Ἑλληνικὰ καὶ βαρβαρικὰ, ὡς θεοὶ οὔτε τῶν
  ἀσεβούντων οὔτε τῶν ἀνόσια ποιούντων ἀμελοῦσι· νῦν γε μὴν λέξω τὰ
  προκείμενα. Λακεδαιμόνιοί τε γὰρ, οἱ ὀμόσαντες αὐτονόμους ἐάσειν
  τὰς πόλεις, τὴν ἐν Θήβαις ἀκρόπολιν κατασχόντες, ὑπ’ αὐτῶν μόνων
  τῶν ἀδικηθέντων ἐκολάσθησαν, πρῶτον οὐδ’ ὑφ’ ἑνὸς τῶν πώποτε
  ἀνθρώπων κρατηθέντες. Τούς τε τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσαγαγόντας εἰς τὴν
  ἀκρόπολιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ βουληθέντας Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν πόλιν
  δουλεύειν, ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν ... τὴν τούτων ἀρχὴν ἑπτὰ μόνον
  τῶν φυγόντων ἤρκεσαν καταλῦσαι.

  This passage is properly characterized by Dr. Peter (in his
  Commentatio Critica in Xenophontis Hellenica, Hall. 1837, p. 82)
  as the turning-point in the history:—

  “Hoc igitur in loco quasi editiore operis sui Xenophon subsistit,
  atque uno in conspectu Spartanos, et ad suæ felicitatis
  fastigium ascendere videt, et rursus ab eo delabi: tantâ autem
  divinæ justitiæ conscientiâ tangitur in hac Spartanorum fortunâ
  conspicuæ, ut vix suum judicium, quanquam id solet facere,
  suppresserit.”

What must have been the hatred, and sense of abused ascendency,
entertained towards Sparta by neutral or unfriendly Greeks, when
Xenophon, alike conspicuous for his partiality to her and for his
dislike of Thebes, could employ these decisive words in ushering
in the coming phase of Spartan humiliation, representing it as a
well-merited judgment from the gods? The sentence which I have just
translated marks, in the commonplace manner of the Xenophontic
Hellenica, the same moment of pointed contrast and transition,—past
glory suddenly and unexpectedly darkened by supervening
misfortune,—which is foreshadowed in the narrative of Thucydides by
the dialogue between the Athenian envoys and the Melian[167] council;
or in the Œdipus and Antigonê of Sophokles,[168] by the warnings of
the prophet Teiresias.

  [167] See Vol. VII. of this History,—the close of Chapter lvi.

  [168] Soph. Œdip. Tyr. 450; Antigon. 1066.

The government of Thebes had now been for three years (since the blow
struck by Phœbidas) in the hands of Leontiades and his oligarchical
partisans, upheld by the Spartan garrison in the Kadmeia. Respecting
the details of its proceedings we have scarce any information. We can
only (as above remarked) judge of it by the analogy of the Thirty
tyrants at Athens, and of the Lysandrian Dekarchies, to which it was
exactly similar in origin, position, and interests. That the general
spirit of it must have been cruel, oppressive, and rapacious,—we
cannot doubt; though in what degree we have no means of knowing.
The appetites of uncontrolled rulers, as well as those of a large
foreign garrison, would ensure such a result; besides which, those
rulers must have been in constant fear of risings or conspiracies
amidst a body of high-spirited citizens who saw their city degraded,
from being the chief of the Bœotian federation, into nothing better
than a captive dependency of Sparta. Such fear was aggravated by
the vicinity of a numerous body of Theban exiles, belonging to the
opposite or anti-Spartan party; three or four hundred of whom had
fled to Athens at the first seizure of their leader Ismenias, and had
been doubtless joined subsequently by others. So strongly did the
Theban rulers apprehend mischief from these exiles, that they hired
assassins to take them off by private murder at Athens; and actually
succeeded in thus killing Androkleidas, chief of the band and chief
successor of the deceased Ismenias,—though they missed their blows at
the rest.[169] And we may be sure that they made the prison in Thebes
subservient to multiplied enormities and executions, when we read not
only that one hundred and fifty prisoners were found in it when the
government was put down,[170] but also that in the fervor of that
revolutionary movement, the slain gaoler was an object of such fierce
antipathy, that his corpse was trodden and spit upon by a crowd
of Theban women.[171] In Thebes, as in other Grecian cities, the
women not only took no part in political disputes, but rarely even
showed themselves in public;[172] so that this furious demonstration
of vindictive sentiment must have been generated by the loss or
maltreatment of sons, husbands, and brothers.

  [169] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 6: compare Plutarch, De Gen. Socr.
  c. 29, p. 596 B.

  [170] Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 14.

  [171] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 33, p. 598 B, C. ᾧ καὶ μεθ’
  ἡμέραν ἐπενέβησαν καὶ προσέπτυσαν οὐκ ὀλίγαι γυναῖκες.

  Among the prisoners was a distinguished Theban of the democratic
  party, named Amphitheus. He was about to be shortly executed,
  and the conspirators, personally attached to him, seem to have
  accelerated the hour of their plot partly to preserve his life
  (Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. p. 577 D, p. 586 F.).

  [172] The language of Plutarch (De Gen. Socrat. c. 33, p. 598
  C.) is illustrated by the description given in the harangue of
  Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. (c. xi, s. 40)—of the universal alarm
  prevalent in Athens after the battle of Chæroneia, such that
  even the women could not stay in their houses—ἀναξίως αὐτῶν καὶ
  τῆς πόλεως ὁρωμένας, etc. Compare also the words of Makaria, in
  the Herakleidæ of Euripides, 475; and Diodor. xiii, 55, in his
  description of the capture of Selinus in Sicily.

The Theban exiles found at Athens not only secure shelter, but
genuine sympathy with their complaints against Lacedæmonian
injustice. The generous countenance which had been shown by the
Thebans, twenty-four years before, to Thrasybulus and the other
Athenian refugees, during the omnipotence of the Thirty, was
now gratefully requited under this reversal of fortune to both
cities;[173] and requited too in defiance of the menaces of Sparta,
who demanded that the exiles should be expelled,—as she had in the
earlier occasion demanded that the Athenian refugees should be
dismissed from Thebes. To protect these Theban exiles, however, was
all that Athens could do. Their restoration was a task beyond her
power,—and seemingly yet more beyond their own. For the existing
government of Thebes was firmly seated, and had the citizens
completely under control. Administered by a small faction, Archias,
Philippus, Hypatês, and Leontiades (among whom the first two were at
this moment polemarchs, though the last was the most energetic and
resolute)—it was at the same time sustained by the large garrison of
fifteen hundred Lacedæmonians and allies,[174] under Lysanoridas and
two other harmosts, in the Kadmeia,—as well as by the Lacedæmonian
posts in the other Bœotian cities around,—Orchomenus, Thespiæ,
Platæa, Tanagra, etc. Though the general body of Theban sentiment
in the city was decidedly adverse to the government, and though the
young men while exercising in the palæstra (gymnastic exercises being
more strenuously prosecuted at Thebes than anywhere else except at
Sparta) kept up by private communication the ardor of an earnest,
but compressed, patriotism,—yet all manifestation or assemblage was
forcibly kept down, and the commanding posts of the lower town, as
well as the citadel, were held in vigilant occupation by the ruling
minority.[175]

  [173] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 6.

  See this sentiment of gratitude on the part of Athenian
  democrats, towards those Thebans who had sheltered them at Thebes
  during the exile along with Thrasybulus,—strikingly brought out
  in an oration of Lysias, of which unfortunately only a fragment
  remains (Lysias, Frag. 46, 47, Bekk.; Dionys. Hal. Judic. de
  Isæo, p. 594). The speaker of this oration had been received at
  Thebes by Kephisodotus the father of Pherenikus; the latter was
  now in exile at Athens; and the speaker had not only welcomed
  him (Pherenikus) to his house with brotherly affection, but
  also delivered this oration on his behalf before the Dikastery;
  Pherenikus having rightful claims on the property left behind by
  the assassinated Androkleidas.

  [174] Diodor. xv, 25; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 12; Plutarch, De
  Gen. Socr. c. 17, p. 586 E.

  In another passage of this treatise (the last sentence but one)
  he sets down the numbers in the Kadmeia at five thousand: but the
  smaller number is most likely to be true.

  [175] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 4, p. 577 B; c. 17, p. 587 B; c.
  25, p. 594 C; c. 27, p. 595 A.

For a certain time the Theban exiles at Athens waited in hopes of
some rising at home, or some positive aid from the Athenians. At
length, in the third winter after their flight, they began to despair
of encouragement from either quarter, and resolved to take the
initiative upon themselves. Among them were numbered several men of
the richest and highest families at Thebes, proprietors of chariots,
jockeys, and training establishments, for contending at the various
festivals: Pelopidas, Mellon, Damokleidas, Theopompus, Pherenikus,
and others.[176]

  [176] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 7, 8.

  Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 17, p. 587 D. Τῶν Μέλλωνος ἁρματηλατῶν
  ἐπιστάτης.... Ἆρ’ οὐ Χλίδωνα λέγεις, τὸν κέλητι τὰ Ἡραῖα νικῶντα
  πέρυσιν;

Of these the most forward in originating aggressive measures, though
almost the youngest, was Pelopidas; whose daring and self-devotion,
in an enterprise which seemed utterly desperate, soon communicated
itself to a handful of his comrades. The exiles, keeping up constant
private correspondence with their friends in Thebes, felt assured of
the sympathy of the citizens generally, if they could once strike a
blow. Yet nothing less would be sufficient than the destruction of
the four rulers, Leontiades and his colleagues,—nor would any one
within the city devote himself to so hopeless a danger. It was this
conspiracy which Pelopidas, Mellon, and five or ten other exiles (the
entire band is differently numbered, by some as seven, by others,
twelve[177]) undertook to execute. Many of their friends in Thebes
came in as auxiliaries to them, who would not have embarked in the
design as primary actors. Of all auxiliaries, the most effective and
indispensable was Phyllidas, the secretary of the polemarchs; next
to him, Charon, an eminent and earnest patriot. Phyllidas, having
been despatched to Athens on official business, entered into secret
conference with the conspirators, concerted with them the day for
their coming to Thebes, and even engaged to provide for them access
to the persons of the polemarchs. Charon not only promised them
concealment in his house, from their first coming within the gates
until the moment of striking their blow should have arrived,—but
also entered his name to share in the armed attack. Nevertheless,
in spite of such partial encouragements, the plan still appeared
desperate to many who wished heartily for its success. Epaminondas,
for example,—who now for the first time comes before us,—resident
at Thebes, and not merely sympathizing with the political views of
Pelopidas, but also bound to him by intimate friendship,—dissuaded
others from the attempt, and declined participating in it. He
announced distinctly that he would not become an accomplice in civil
bloodshed. It appears that there were men among the exiles whose
violence made him fear that they would not, like Pelopidas, draw the
sword exclusively against Leontiades and his colleagues, but would
avail themselves of success to perpetrate unmeasured violence against
other political enemies.[178]

  [177] Xenophon says _seven_ (Hellen. v, 4, 1, 2); Plutarch and
  Cornelius Nepos say _twelve_ (Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 2, p.
  576 C.; Plutarch, Pelopidas c. 8-13; Cornel. Nepos, Pelopidas, c.
  2).

  It is remarkable that Xenophon never mentions the name of
  Pelopidas in this conspiracy; nor indeed (with one exception)
  throughout his Hellenica.

  [178] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 3, p. 576 E.; p. 577 A.

The day for the enterprise was determined by Phyllidas the secretary,
who had prepared an evening banquet for Archias and Philippus, in
celebration of the period when they were going out of office as
polemarchs,—and who had promised on that occasion to bring into
their company some women remarkable for beauty, as well as of the
best families in Thebes.[179] In concert with the general body of
Theban exiles at Athens, who held themselves ready on the borders
of Attica, together with some Athenian sympathizers, to march to
Thebes the instant that they should receive intimation,—and in
concert also with two out of the ten Stratêgi of Athens, who took
on themselves privately to countenance the enterprise, without any
public vote,—Pelopidas and Mellon, and their five companions,[180]
crossed Kithæron from Athens to Thebes. It was wet weather, about
December B.C. 379; they were disguised as rustics or hunters, with
no other arms than a concealed dagger; and they got within the gates
of Thebes one by one at nightfall, just when the latest farming men
were coming home from their fields. All of them arrived safe at the
house of Charon, the appointed rendezvous.

  [179] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 4. τὰς σεμνοτάτας καὶ καλλίστας τῶν
  ἐν Θήβαις. Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 4, p. 577 C.; Plutarch,
  Pelopid. c. 9.

  The Theban women were distinguished for majestic figure and
  beauty (Dikæarchus, Vit. Græc. p. 144, ed Fuhr.).

  [180] Plutarch, (Pelopid. c. 25; De Gen. Socr. c. 26, p. 594 D.)
  mentions Menekleidês, Damokleidas, and Theopompus among them.
  Compare Cornel. Nepos, Pelopid. c. 2.

It was, however, by mere accident that they had not been turned back,
and the whole scheme frustrated. For a Theban named Hipposthenidas,
friendly to the conspiracy, but faint-hearted, who had been let into
the secret against the will of Phyllidas,—became so frightened as the
moment of execution approached, that he took upon himself, without
the knowledge of the rest, to despatch Chlidon, a faithful slave of
Mellon, ordering him to go forth on horseback from Thebes, to meet
his master on the road, and to desire that he and his comrades would
go back to Attica, since circumstances had happened to render the
project for the moment impracticable. Chlidon, going home to fetch
his bridle, but not finding it in its usual place, asked his wife
where it was. The woman, at first pretending to look for it, at last
confessed that she had lent it to a neighbor. Chlidon became so
irritated with this delay, that he got into a loud altercation with
his wife, who on her part wished him ill luck with his journey. He
at last beat her, until neighbors ran in to interpose. His departure
was thus accidentally frustrated, so that the intended message of
countermand never reached the conspirators on their way.[181]

  [181] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 8; Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. c. 17,
  p. 586 B.; c. 18, p. 587 D-E.

In the house of Charon they remained concealed all the ensuing day,
on the evening of which the banquet of Archias and Philippus was to
take place. Phyllidas had laid his plan for introducing them at that
banquet, at the moment when the two polemarchs had become full of
wine, in female attire, as being the women whose visit was expected.
The hour had nearly arrived, and they were preparing to play their
parts, when an unexpected messenger knocked at the door, summoning
Charon instantly into the presence of the polemarchs. All within
were thunderstruck with the summons, which seemed to imply that the
plot had been divulged, perhaps by the timid Hipposthenidas. It was
agreed among them that Charon must obey at once. Nevertheless, he
himself, even in the perilous uncertainty which beset him, was most
of all apprehensive lest the friends whom he had sheltered should
suspect him of treachery towards themselves and their cause. Before
departing, therefore, he sent for his only son, a youth of fifteen,
and of conspicuous promise in every way. This youth he placed in the
hands of Pelopidas, as a hostage for his own fidelity. But Pelopidas
and the rest, vehemently disclaiming all suspicion, entreated Charon
to put his son away, out of the reach of that danger in which all
were now involved. Charon, however, could not be prevailed on to
comply, and left his son among them to share the fate of the rest.
He went into the presence of Archias and Philippus; whom he found
already half-intoxicated, but informed, by intelligence from Athens,
that some plot, they knew not by whom, was afloat. They had sent for
him to question him, as a known friend of the exiles; but he had
little difficulty, aided by the collusion of Phyllidas, in blinding
the vague suspicions of drunken men, anxious only to resume their
conviviality.[182] He was allowed to retire and rejoin his friends.
Nevertheless, soon after his departure,—so many were the favorable
chances which befel these improvident men,—a fresh message was
delivered to Archias the polemarch, from his namesake Archias the
Athenian Hierophant, giving an exact account of the names and scheme
of the conspirators, which had become known to the philo-Laconian
party at Athens. The messenger who bore this despatch delivered it to
Archias with an intimation, that it related to very serious matters.
“Serious matters for to-morrow,” said the polemarch, as he put the
despatch, unopened and unread, under the pillow of the couch on which
he was reclining.[183]

  [182] Xenophon does not mention this separate summons and visit
  of Charon to the polemarchs,—nor anything about the scene
  with his son. He only notices Charon as having harbored the
  conspirators in his house, and seems even to speak of him as a
  person of little consequence—παρὰ Χαρωνί τινι, etc. (v, 4, 3).

  The anecdote is mentioned in both the compositions of Plutarch
  (De Gen. Socr. c. 28, p. 595; and Pelopidas, c. 9), and is too
  interesting to be omitted, being perfectly consistent with
  what we read in Xenophon; though it has perhaps somewhat of a
  theatrical air.

  [183] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 10; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 30,
  p. 596 F. Εἰς αὔριον τὰ σπουδαῖα.

  This occurrence also finds no place in the narrative of Xenophon.
  Cornelius Nepos, Pelopidas, c. 3. Æneas (Poliorcetic. c. 31)
  makes a general reference to the omission of immediate opening
  of letters arrived, as having caused the capture of the Kadmeia;
  which was, however, only its remote consequence.

Returning to their carousal, Archias and Philippus impatiently called
upon Phyllidas to introduce the women according to his promise. Upon
this the secretary retired, and brought the conspirators, clothed
in female attire, into an adjoining chamber; then going back to
the polemarchs, he informed them that the women would not come in
unless all the domestics were first dismissed. An order was forthwith
given that these latter should depart, while Phyllidas took care
that they should be well provided with wine at the lodging of one
among their number. The polemarchs were thus left only with one or
two friends at table, half-intoxicated as well as themselves; among
them Kabeirichus, the archon of the year, who always throughout his
term kept the consecrated spear of office in actual possession,
and had it at that moment close to his person. Phyllidas now
conducted the pretended women into the banqueting-room; three of
them attired as ladies of distinction, the four others following as
female attendants. Their long veils, and ample folds of clothing,
were quite sufficient as disguise,—even had the guests at table
been sober,—until they sat down by the side of the polemarchs; and
the instant of lifting their veils was the signal for using their
daggers. Archias and Philippus were slain at once and with little
resistance; but Kabeirichus with his spear tried to defend himself,
and thus perished with the others, though the conspirators had not
originally intended to take his life.[184]

  [184] The description given by Xenophon, of this assassination
  of the polemarchs at Thebes, differs materially from that of
  Plutarch. I follow Xenophon in the main; introducing, however,
  several of the details found in Plutarch, which are interesting,
  and which have the air of being authentic.

  Xenophon himself intimates (Hellen. v, 4, 7), that besides the
  story given in the text, there was also another story told by
  some,—that Mellon and his companions had got access to the
  polemarchs in the guise of drunken revellers. It is this latter
  story which Plutarch has adopted, and which carries him into
  many details quite inconsistent with the narrative of Xenophon.
  I think the story, of the conspirators having been introduced in
  female attire, the more probable of the two. It is borne out by
  the exact analogy of what Herodotus tells us respecting Alexander
  son of Amyntas, prince of Macedonia (Herod. v, 20).

  Compare Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 10, 11; Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat.
  c. 31, p. 597. Polyænus (ii, 4, 3) gives a story with many
  different circumstances, yet agreeing in the fact that Pelopidas
  in female attire killed the Spartan general. The story alluded to
  by Aristotle (Polit. v, 5, 10), though he names both Thebes and
  Archias, can hardly refer to this event.

  It is Plutarch, however, who mentions the presence of Kabeirichus
  the archon at the banquet, and the curious Theban custom that
  the archon during his year of office never left out of his hand
  the consecrated spear. As a Bœotian born, Plutarch was doubtless
  familiar with these old customs.

  From what other authors Plutarch copied the abundant details of
  this revolution at Thebes, which he interweaves in the life of
  Pelopidas and in the treatise called De Genio Socratis—we do not
  know. Some critics suppose him to have borrowed from Dionysodôrus
  and Anaxis—Bœotian historians whose work comprised this period,
  but of whom not a single fragment is preserved (see Fragm.
  Histor. Græc. ed. Didot, vol. ii, p. 84).

Having been thus far successful, Phyllidas conducted three of the
conspirators,—Pelopidas, Kephisodôrus, and Damokleidas,—to the house
of Leontiades, into which he obtained admittance by announcing
himself as the bearer of an order from the polemarchs. Leontiades was
reclining after supper, with his wife sitting spinning wool by his
side, when they entered his chamber. Being a brave and powerful man,
he started up, seized his sword, and mortally wounded Kephisodôrus
in the throat; a desperate struggle then ensued between him and
Pelopidas in the narrow doorway, where there was no room for a third
to approach. At length, however, Pelopidas overthrew and killed him,
after which they retired, enjoining the wife with threats to remain
silent, and closing the door after them with peremptory commands
that it should not be again opened. They then went to the house
of Hypatês, whom they slew while he attempted to escape over the
roof.[185]

  [185] Xen. Hell. v, 4, 9; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 11, 12; and De Gen.
  Socr. p. 597 D-F. Here again Xenophon and Plutarch differ; the
  latter represents that Pelopidas got into the house of Leontiades
  _without_ Phyllidas,—which appears to me altogether improbable.
  On the other hand, Xenophon mentions nothing about the defence
  of Leontiades and his personal conflict with Pelopidas, which
  I copy from Plutarch. So brave a man as Leontiades, awake and
  sober, would not let himself be slain without a defence dangerous
  to assailants. Plutarch, in another place, singles out the death
  of Leontiades as the marking circumstance of the whole glorious
  enterprise, and the most impressive to Pelopidas (Plutarch—Non
  posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum—p. 1099 A-E.).

The four great rulers of the philo-Laconian party in Thebes having
been now put to death, Phyllidas proceeded with the conspirators to
the prison. Here the gaoler, a confidential agent in the oppressions
of the deceased governors, hesitated to admit him; but was slain by a
sudden thrust with his spear, so as to ensure free admission to all.
To liberate the prisoners, probably, for the most part men of kindred
politics with the conspirators,—to furnish them with arms taken
from the battle-spoils hanging up in the neighboring porticos,—and
to range them in battle order near the temple of Amphion,—were the
next proceedings; after which they began to feel some assurance
of safety and triumph.[186] Epaminondas and Gorgidas, apprised of
what had occurred, were the first who appeared in arms with a few
friends to sustain the cause; while proclamation was everywhere made
aloud, through heralds, that the despots were slain,—that Thebes
was free,—and that all Thebans who valued freedom should muster in
arms in the market-place. There were at that moment in Thebes many
trumpeters who had come to contend for the prize at the approaching
festival of the Herakleia. Hipposthenidas engaged these men to blow
their trumpets in different parts of the city, and thus everywhere to
excite the citizens to arms.[187]

  [186] Xenoph. Hell. v, 4, 8; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 12; De Gen.
  Socr. p. 598 B.

  [187] This is a curious piece of detail, which we learn from
  Plutarch (De Gen. Socr. c. 34. p. 598 D.).

  The Orchomenian Inscriptions in Boeckh’s Collection record the
  prizes given to these Σαλπιγκταὶ or trumpeters (see Boeckh, Corp.
  Inscr. No. 1584, 1585, etc.).

Although during the darkness surprise was the prevalent feeling,
and no one knew what to do,—yet so soon as day dawned, and the
truth became known, there was but one feeling of joy and patriotic
enthusiasm among the majority of the citizens.[188] Both horsemen
and hoplites hastened in arms to the agora. Here for the first time
since the seizure of the Kadmeia by Phœbidas, a formal assembly
of the Theban people was convened, before which Pelopidas and his
fellow-conspirators presented themselves. The priests of the city
crowned them with wreaths, and thanked them in the name of the local
gods; while the assembly hailed them with acclamations of delight and
gratitude, nominating with one voice Pelopidas, Mellon, and Charon,
as the first renewed Bœotarchs.[189] The revival of this title, which
had been dropped since the peace of Antalkidas, was in itself an
event of no mean significance; implying not merely that Thebes had
waked up again into freedom, but that the Bœotian confederacy also
had been, or would be, restored.

  [188] The unanimous joy with which the consummation of the
  revolution was welcomed in Thebes,—and the ardor with which the
  citizens turned out to support it by armed force,—is attested by
  Xenophon, no very willing witness,—Hellen. v, 4, 9. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡμέρα
  ἦν καὶ φανερὸν ἦν τὸ γεγενημένον, ταχὺ δὴ καὶ οἱ ὁπλῖται καὶ οἱ
  ἱππεῖς σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐξεβοήθουν.

  [189] Plutarch, Pelop. c. 12.

Messengers had been forthwith despatched by the conspirators to
Attica to communicate their success; upon which all the remaining
exiles, with the two Athenian generals privy to the plot, and a body
of Athenian volunteers, or _corps francs_, all of whom were ready on
the borders awaiting the summons,—flocked to Thebes to complete the
work. The Spartan generals, on their side also, sent to Platæa and
Thespiæ for aid. During the whole night, they had been distracted and
alarmed by the disturbance in the city; lights showing themselves
here and there, with trumpets sounding and shouts for the recent
success.[190] Apprised speedily of the slaughter of the polemarchs,
from whom they had been accustomed to receive orders, they knew not
whom to trust or to consult, while they were doubtless beset by
affrighted fugitives of the now defeated party, who would hurry up
the Kadmeia for safety. They reckoned at first on a diversion in
their favor from the forces at Platæa and Thespiæ. But these forces
were not permitted even to approach the city gate; being vigorously
charged, as soon as they came in sight, by the newly-mustered Theban
cavalry, and forced to retreat with loss. The Lacedæmonians in the
citadel were thus not only left without support, but saw their
enemies in the city reinforced by the other exiles, and by the
auxiliary volunteers.[191]

  [190] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 598 E.; Pelop. c. 12.

  [191] Xenophon expressly mentions that the Athenians who were
  invited to come, and who actually did come, to Thebes, were the
  two generals and the volunteers; all of whom were before privy
  to the plot, and were in readiness on the borders of Attica—τοὺς
  ~πρὸς τοῖς ὁρίοις~ Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοὺς δύο τῶν στρατηγῶν—οἱ
  Ἀθηναῖοι ~ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρίων~ ἤδη παρῆσαν (Hellen. v, 4, 9, 10).

Meanwhile, Pelopidas and the other new Bœotarchs found themselves at
the head of a body of armed citizens, full of devoted patriotism
and unanimous in hailing the recent revolution. They availed
themselves of this first burst of fervor to prepare for storming
the Kadmeia without delay, knowing the importance of forestalling
all aid from Sparta. And the citizens were already rushing up to
the assault,—proclamation being made of large rewards to those who
should first force their way in,—when the Lacedæmonian commander sent
proposals for a capitulation.[192] Undisturbed egress from Thebes,
with the honors of war, being readily guaranteed to him by oath,
the Kadmeia was then surrendered. As the Spartans were marching out
of the gates, many Thebans of the defeated party came forth also.
But against these latter the exasperation of the victors was so
ungovernable, that several of the most odious were seized as they
passed, and put to death; in some cases, even their children along
with them. And more of them would have been thus despatched, had not
the Athenian auxiliaries, with generous anxiety, exerted every effort
to get them out of sight and put them into safety.[193] We are not
told,—nor is it certain,—that these Thebans were protected under the
capitulation. Even had they been so, however, the wrathful impulse
might still have prevailed against them. Of the three harmosts who
thus evacuated the Kadmeia without a blow, two were put to death,
the third was heavily fined and banished, by the authorities at
Sparta.[194] We do not know what the fortifications of the Kadmeia
were, nor how far it was provisioned. But we can hardly wonder that
these officers were considered to have dishonored the Lacedæmonian
arms, by making no attempt to defend it; when we recollect that
hardly more than four or five days would be required to procure
adequate relief from home,—and that forty-three years afterwards, the
Macedonian garrison in the same place maintained itself against the
Thebans in the city for more than fourteen days, until the return of
Alexander from Illyria.[195] The first messenger who brought news to
Sparta of the conspiracy and revolution at Thebes, appears to have
communicated at the same time that the garrison had evacuated the
Kadmeia and was in full retreat, with a train of Theban exiles from
the defeated party.[196]

  [192] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 10, 11. προσέβαλον πρὸς τὴν
  ἀκρόπολιν—τὴν προθυμίαν τῶν προσιόντων ἁπάντων ἑώρων, etc.

  Diodorus, xv, 25. ἔπειτα τοὺς πολίτας ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν
  παρακαλέσαντες (the successful Theban conspirators, Pelopidas,
  etc.) ~συνέργους ἔσχον ἅπαντας τοὺς Θηβαίους~.

  [193] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 12.

  [194] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 13; Diodor. xv, 27.

  Plutarch (Pelopid. c. 13) augments the theatrical effect by
  saying that the Lacedæmonian garrison on its retreat, actually
  met at Megara the reinforcements under king Kleombrotus, which
  had advanced thus far, on their march to relieve the Kadmeia.
  But this is highly improbable. The account of Xenophon intimates
  clearly that the Kadmeia was surrounded on the next morning after
  the nocturnal movement. The commanders capitulated in the first
  moment of distraction and despair, without even standing an
  assault.

  [195] Arrian, i, 6.

  [196] In recounting this revolution at Thebes, and the
  proceedings of the Athenians in regard to it, I have followed
  Xenophon almost entirely.

  Diodorus (xv, 25, 26) concurs with Xenophon in stating that the
  Theban exiles got back from Attica to Thebes by night, partly
  through the concurrence of the Athenians (συνεπιλαβομένων τῶν
  Ἀθηναίων)—slew the rulers—called the citizens to freedom next
  morning, finding all hearty in the cause—and then proceeded to
  besiege the fifteen hundred Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesians in
  the Kadmeia.

  But after thus much of agreement, Diodorus states what followed,
  in a manner quite inconsistent with Xenophon; thus (he tells us)—

  The Lacedæmonian commander sent instant intelligence to Sparta
  of what had happened, with request for a reinforcement. The
  Thebans at once attempted to storm the Kadmeia, but were repulsed
  with great loss, both of killed and wounded. Fearing that they
  might not be able to take the fort before reinforcement should
  come from Sparta, they sent envoys to Athens to ask for aid,
  reminding the Athenians that they (the Thebans) had helped to
  emancipate Athens from the Thirty, and to restore the democracy
  (ὑπομιμνήσκοντες μὲν ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ ~συγκατήγαγον τὸν δῆμον~ τῶν
  Ἀθηναίων καθ’ ὃν καιρὸν ὑπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα κατεδουλώθησαν). The
  Athenians, partly from desire to requite this favor, partly from
  a wish to secure the Thebans as allies against Sparta, passed a
  public vote to assist them forthwith. Demophon the general got
  together five thousand hoplites and five hundred horsemen, with
  whom he hastened to Thebes on the next day; and all the remaining
  population were prepared to follow, if necessary (πανδημεί).
  All the other cities in Bœotia also sent aid to Thebes too,—so
  that there was assembled there a large force of twelve thousand
  hoplites and two thousand horsemen. This united force, the
  Athenians being among them, assaulted the Kadmeia day and night,
  relieving each other; but were repelled with great loss of killed
  and wounded. At length the garrison found themselves without
  provisions; the Spartans were tardy in sending reinforcement;
  and sedition broke out among the Peloponnesian allies who formed
  the far larger part of the garrison. These Peloponnesians,
  refusing to fight longer, insisted upon capitulating; which the
  Lacedæmonian governor was obliged perforce to do, though both he
  and the Spartans along with him desired to hold out to the death.
  The Kadmeia was accordingly surrendered, and the garrison went
  back to Peloponnesus. The Lacedæmonian reinforcement from Sparta
  arrived only a little too late.

  All these circumstances stated by Diodorus are not only
  completely different from Xenophon, but irreconcilable with his
  conception of the event. We must reject either the one or the
  other.

  Now Xenophon is not merely the better witness of the two, but is
  in this case sustained by all the collateral probabilities of the
  case.

  1. Diodorus represents the Athenians as having despatched by
  public vote, assistance to Thebes, in order to requite the
  assistance which the Thebans had before sent to restore the
  Athenian democracy against the Thirty. Now this is incorrect
  in point of fact. The Thebans had _never sent any assistance_,
  positive or ostensible, to Thrasybulus and the Athenian democrats
  against the Thirty. They had assisted Thrasybulus underhand,
  and without any public government-act; and they had refused to
  serve along with the Spartans against him. But they never sent
  any force to help him against the Thirty. Consequently, the
  Athenians _could not_ now have sent any public force to Thebes,
  _in requital_ for a similar favor done before by the Thebans to
  them.

  2. Had the Athenians passed a formal vote, sent a large public
  army, and taken vigorous part in several bloody assaults on
  the Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia,—this would have been
  the most flagrant and unequivocal commencement of hostilities
  against Sparta. No Spartan envoys could, after that, have gone
  to Athens, and stayed safely in the house of the Proxenus,—as we
  know from Xenophon that they did. Besides,—the story of Sphodrias
  (presently to be recounted) proves distinctly that Athens was at
  peace with Sparta, and had committed no act of hostility against
  her, for three or four months at least after the revolution at
  Thebes. It therefore refutes the narrative of Diodorus about
  the public vote of the Athenians, and the public Athenian force
  under Demophon, aiding in the attack of the Kadmeia. Strange
  to say,—Diodorus himself, three chapters afterwards (xv, 29),
  relates this story about Sphodrias, just in the same manner
  (with little difference) as Xenophon; ushering in the story with
  a declaration, that _the Athenians were still at peace with
  Sparta_, and forgetting that he had himself recounted a distinct
  rupture of that peace on the part of the Athenians.

  3. The news of the revolution at Thebes must necessarily have
  taken the Athenian public completely by surprise (though some
  few Athenians were privy to the scheme), because it was a scheme
  which had no chance of succeeding except by profound secrecy.
  Now, that the Athenian public, hearing the news for the first
  time,—having no positive act to complain of on the part of
  Sparta, and much reason to fear her power,—having had no previous
  circumstances to work them up, or prepare them for any dangerous
  resolve,—should identify themselves at once with Thebes,
  and provoke war with Sparta in the impetuous manner stated
  by Diodorus,—this is, in my judgment, eminently improbable,
  requiring good evidence to induce us to believe it.

  4. Assume the statement of Diodorus to be true,—what reasonable
  explanation can be given of the erroneous version which we
  read in Xenophon? The facts as he recounts them conflict most
  pointedly with his philo-Laconian partialities; first, the
  overthrow of the Lacedæmonian power at Thebes, by a handful
  of exiles; still more, the whole story of Sphodrias and his
  acquittal.

  But assume the statement of Xenophon to be true,—and we can
  give a very plausible explanation how the erroneous version
  in Diodorus arose. A few months later, after the acquittal of
  Sphodrias at Sparta, the Athenians did enter heartily into
  the alliance of Thebes, and sent a large public force (indeed
  five thousand hoplites, the same number as those of Demophon,
  according to Diodorus, c. 32) to assist her in repelling
  Agesilaus with the Spartan army. It is by no means unnatural
  that their public vote and expedition undertaken about July 378
  B.C.,—should have been erroneously thrown back to December 379
  B.C. The Athenian orators were fond of boasting that Athens
  had saved the Thebans from Sparta; and this might be said with
  some truth, in reference to the aid which she really rendered
  afterwards. Isokrates (Or. Plataic. s. 31) makes this boast in
  general terms; but Deinarchus (cont. Demosthen. s. 40) is more
  distinct, and gives in a few words a version the same as that
  which we find in Diodorus; so also does Aristeides, in two very
  brief allusions (Panathen. p. 172, and Or. xxxviii, Socialis, p.
  486-498). Possibly Aristeides as well as Diodorus may have copied
  from Ephorus; but however this may be, it is easy to understand
  the mistake out of which their version grew.

  5. Lastly, Plutarch mentions nothing about the public vote of
  the Athenians, and the regular division of troops under Demophon
  which Diodorus asserts to have aided in the storming of the
  Kadmeia. See Plutarch (De Gen. Socrat. ad fin. Agesil. c. 23;
  Pelopid. 12, 13). He intimates only, as Xenophon does, that there
  were some Athenian volunteers who assisted the exiles.

  M. Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 38-43) discusses
  this discrepancy at considerable length, and cites the opinion
  of various German authors in respect to it, with none of whom I
  altogether concur.

  In my judgment, the proper solution is, to reject altogether (as
  belonging to a later time) the statement of Diodorus, respecting
  the public vote at Athens, and the army said to have been sent to
  Thebes under Demophon; and to accept the more credible narrative
  of Xenophon; which ascribes to Athens a reasonable prudence, and
  great fear of Sparta,—qualities such as Athenian orators would
  not be disposed to boast of. According to that narrative, the
  question about sending Athenians to aid in storming the Kadmeia
  could hardly have been submitted for public discussion, since
  that citadel was surrendered at once by the intimidated garrison.

This revolution at Thebes came like an electric shock upon the
Grecian world. With a modern reader, the assassination of the four
leaders, in their houses and at the banquet, raises a sentiment of
repugnance which withdraws his attention from the other features
of this memorable deed. Now an ancient Greek not only had no such
repugnance, but sympathized with the complete revenge for the seizure
of the Kadmeia and the death of Ismenias; while he admired, besides,
the extraordinary personal daring of Pelopidas and Mellon,—the
skilful forecast of the plot,—and the sudden overthrow, by a force
so contemptibly small, of a government which the day before seemed
unassailable.[197] It deserves note that we here see the richest
men in Thebes undertaking a risk, single-handed and with their
own persons, which must have appeared on a reasonable estimate
little less than desperate. From the Homeric Odysseus and Achilles
down to the end of free Hellenism, the rich Greek strips in the
Palæstra,[198] and exposes his person in the ranks as a soldier like
the poorest citizens; being generally superior to them in strength
and bodily efficiency.

  [197] The daring _coup de main_ of Pelopidas and Mellon, against
  the government of Thebes, bears a remarkable analogy to that by
  which Evagoras got into Salamis and overthrew the previous despot
  (Isokrates, Or. ix, Evagor. s. 34).

  [198] See, in illustration of Greek sentiment on this point,
  Xenophon, Hellen. iii, 4, 19; and Xenophon, Enc. Ages. i, 28.

As the revolution in Thebes acted forcibly on the Grecian mind from
the manner in which it was accomplished, so by its positive effects
it altered forthwith the balance of power in Greece. The empire of
Sparta, far from being undisputed and nearly universal over Greece,
is from henceforward only maintained by more or less effort, until at
length it is completely overthrown.[199]

  [199] If, indeed, we could believe Isokrates, speaking through
  the mouth of a Platæan, it would seem that the Thebans,
  immediately after their revolution, sent an humble embassy to
  Sparta deprecating hostility, entreating to be admitted as
  allies, and promising service, even against their benefactors
  the Athenians, just as devoted as the deposed government had
  rendered; an embassy which the Spartans haughtily answered by
  desiring them to receive back their exiles, and to cast out the
  assassins Pelopidas and his comrades. It is possible that the
  Thebans may have sent to try the possibility of escaping Spartan
  enmity; but it is highly improbable that they made any such
  promises as those here mentioned; and it is certain that they
  speedily began to prepare vigorously for that hostility which
  they saw to be approaching.

  See Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 31.

  This oration is put into the mouth of a Platæan, and seems to be
  an assemblage of nearly all the topics which could possibly be
  enforced, truly or falsely, against Thebes.

The exiles from Thebes, arriving at Sparta, inflamed both the ephors,
and the miso-Theban Agesilaus, to the highest pitch. Though it was
then the depth of winter,[200] an expedition was decreed forthwith
against Thebes, and the allied contingents were summoned. Agesilaus
declined to take the command of it, on the ground that he was above
sixty years of age, and therefore no longer liable to compulsory
foreign service. But this (says Xenophon[201]) was not his real
reason. He was afraid that his enemies at Sparta would say,—“Here
is Agesilaus again putting us to expense, in order that he may
uphold despots in other cities,”—as he had just done, and had been
reproached with doing, at Phlius; a second proof that the reproaches
against Sparta (which I have cited a few pages above from Lysias and
Isokrates) of allying herself with Greek despots as well as with
foreigners to put down Grecian freedom, found an echo even in Sparta
herself. Accordingly Kleombrotus, the other king of Sparta, took the
command. He had recently succeeded his brother Agesipolis, and had
never commanded before.

  [200] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 14. μάλα χειμῶνος ὄντος.

  [201] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 13. εὖ εἰδὼς ὅτι, εἰ στρατηγοίη, λέξειαν
  οἱ πολῖται, ὡς Ἀγησίλαος, ὅπως βοηθήσειε τοῖς τυράννοις, πράγματα
  τῇ πόλει παρέχοι. Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24.

Kleombrotus conducted his army along the Isthmus of Corinth through
Megara to Platæa, cutting to pieces an outpost of Thebans, composed
chiefly of the prisoners set free by the recent revolution, who had
been placed for the defence of the intervening mountain-pass. From
Platæa he went forward to Thespiæ, and from thence to Kynoskephalæ in
the Theban territory, where he lay encamped for sixteen days; after
which he retreated to Thespiæ. It appears that he did nothing, and
that his inaction was the subject of much wonder in his army, who
are said to have even doubted whether he was really and earnestly
hostile to Thebes. Perhaps the exiles, with customary exaggeration,
may have led him to hope that they could provoke a rising in Thebes,
if he would only come near. At any rate the bad weather must have
been a serious impediment to action; since in his march back to
Peloponnesus through Kreusis and Ægosthenæ the wind blew a hurricane,
so that his soldiers could not proceed without leaving their shields
and coming back afterwards to fetch them. Kleombrotus did not quit
Bœotia, however, without leaving Sphodrias as harmost at Thespiæ,
with one third of the entire army, and with a considerable sum of
money to employ in hiring mercenaries and acting vigorously against
the Thebans.[202]

  [202] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 15-18.

The army of Kleombrotus, in its march from Megara to Platæa, had
passed by the skirts of Attica; causing so much alarm to the
Athenians, that they placed Chabrias with a body of peltasts, to
guard their frontier and the neighboring road through Eleutheræ
into Bœotia. This was the first time that a Lacedæmonian army had
touched Attica (now no longer guarded by the lines of Corinth, as
in the war between 394 and 388 B.C.) since the retirement of king
Pausanias in 404 B.C.; furnishing a proof of the exposure of the
country, such as to revive in the Athenian mind all the terrible
recollections of Dekeleia and the Peloponnesian war. It was during
the first prevalence of this alarm,—and seemingly while Kleombrotus
was still with his army at Thespiæ or Kynoskephalæ, close on the
Athenian frontier,—that three Lacedæmonian envoys, Etymoklês and
two others, arrived at Athens to demand satisfaction for the part
taken by the two Athenian generals and the Athenian volunteers, in
concerting and aiding the enterprise of Pelopidas and his comrades.
So overpowering was the anxiety in the public mind to avoid giving
offence to Sparta, that these two generals were both of them accused
before the dikastery. The first of them was condemned and executed;
the second, profiting by this warning (since, pursuant to the
psephism of Kannônus,[203] the two would be put on trial separately),
escaped, and a sentence of banishment was passed against him.[204]
These two generals had been unquestionably guilty of a grave abuse
of their official functions. They had brought the state into public
hazard, not merely without consulting the senate or assembly, but
even without taking the sense of their own board of Ten. Nevertheless
the severity of the sentence pronounced indicates the alarm, as well
as the displeasure, of the general body of Athenians; while it served
as a disclaimer in fact, if not in form, of all political connection
with Thebes.[205]

  [203] See Vol. VIII. of this History, Ch. lxiv, p. 196—about the
  psephism of Kannônus.

  [204] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 19; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 14.

  Xenophon mentions the Lacedæmonian envoys at Athens, but does
  not expressly say that they were sent to demand reparation for
  the conduct of these two generals or of the volunteers. I cannot
  doubt, however, that the fact was so; for in those times, there
  were no resident envoys,—none but envoys sent on special missions.

  [205] The trial and condemnation of these two generals has
  served as the groundwork for harsh reproach against the Athenian
  democracy. Wachsmuth (Hellen. Alterth. i, p. 654) denounces
  it as “a judicial horror, or abomination—ein Greul-gericht.”
  Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 44, 45) says,—“Quid?
  quia invasionem Lacedæmoniorum viderant in Bœotiam factam esse,
  non puduit eos, damnare imperatores quorum facta suis decretis
  comprobaverant?” ... “Igitur hanc _illius facinoris excusationem_
  habebimus: Rebus quæ a Thebanis agebantur (_i. e._ by the
  propositions of the Thebans seeking peace from Sparta, and trying
  to get enrolled as her allies,—alleged by Isokrates, which I
  have noticed above as being, in my judgment, very inaccurately
  recorded) cognitis, Athenienses, quo _enixius subvenerant,
  eo majore pœnitentiâ perculsi_ sunt.... Sed tantum abfuit ut
  sibimet irascerentur, ut, _e more Atheniensium, punirentur qui
  perfecerant id quod tum populus exoptaverat_.”

  The censures of Wachsmuth, Rehdantz, etc. assume as matter of
  fact,—1. That the Athenians had passed a formal vote in the
  public assembly to send assistance to Thebes, under two generals,
  who accordingly went out in command of the army and performed
  their instructions. 2. That the Athenians, becoming afterwards
  repentant or terrified, tried and condemned these two generals
  for having executed the commission entrusted to them.

  I have already shown grounds (in a previous note) for believing
  that the first of these affirmations is incorrect; the second, as
  dependent on it, will therefore be incorrect also.

  These authors here appear to me to single out a portion of each
  of the two _inconsistent_ narratives of Xenophon and Diodorus,
  and blend them together in a way which contradicts both.

  Thus, they take from Diodorus the allegation, that the Athenians
  sent to Thebes by public vote a large army, which fought along
  with the Thebans against the Kadmeia,—an allegation which, not
  only is not to be found in Xenophon, but which his narrative
  plainly, though indirectly, excludes.

  Next, they take from Xenophon the allegation, that the Athenians
  tried and condemned the two generals who were accomplices in the
  conspiracy of Mellon against the Theban rulers,—τὼ δύω στρατηγὼ,
  οἳ συνηπιστάσθην τὴν τοῦ Μέλλωνος ἐπὶ τοὺς περὶ Λεοντιάδην
  ἐπανάστασιν (v, 4, 19). Now the mention of these two generals
  follows naturally and consistently in _Xenophon_. He had before
  told us that there were _two_ out of the Athenian generals, who
  both assisted underhand in organizing the plot, and afterwards
  went with the volunteers to Thebes. But it cannot be fitted
  on to the narrative of _Diodorus, who never says a word about
  this condemnation by the Athenians_—nor even mentions _any two
  Athenian generals_, at all. He tells us that the Athenian army
  which went to Thebes was commanded by Demophon; he notices
  no colleague whatever. He says in general words, that the
  conspiracy was organized “with the assistance of the Athenians”
  (συνεπιλαβομένων Ἀθηναίων); not saying a word about any _two
  generals_ as especially active.

  Wachsmuth and Rehdantz take it for granted, most gratuitously,
  that these two condemned generals (mentioned by Xenophon and not
  by Diodorus) are identical with Demophon and another colleague,
  commanders of an army which went out by public vote (mentioned by
  Diodorus and not by Xenophon).

  The narratives of Xenophon and Diodorus (as I have before
  observed) are distinct and inconsistent with each other. We have
  to make our option between them. I adhere to that of Xenophon,
  for reasons previously given. But if any one prefers that of
  Diodorus, he ought then to reject altogether the story of the
  condemnation of the two Athenian generals (_who nowhere appear
  in Diodorus_), and to suppose that Xenophon was misinformed upon
  that point, as upon the other facts of the case.

  That the two Athenian generals (assuming the Xenophontic
  narrative as true) should be tried and punished, when the
  consequences of their unauthorized proceeding were threatening to
  come with severity upon Athens,—appears to me neither improbable
  nor unreasonable. Those who are shocked by the very severity
  of the sentence, will do well to read the remarks which the
  Lacedæmonian envoys make (Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 23) on the conduct
  of Sphodrias.

  To turn from one severe sentence to another,—whoever believes the
  narrative of Diodorus in preference to that of Xenophon, ought
  to regard the execution of those two Lacedæmonian commanders
  who surrendered the Kadmeia as exceedingly cruel. According to
  Diodorus, these officers had done everything which brave men
  could do; they had resisted a long time, repelled many attacks,
  and were only prevented from farther holding out by a mutiny
  among their garrison.

  Here again, we see the superiority of the narrative of
  Xenophon over that of Diodorus. According to the former, these
  Lacedæmonian commanders surrendered the Kadmeia without any
  resistance at all. Their condemnation, like that of the Athenian
  two generals, becomes a matter easy to understand and explain.

Even before the Lacedæmonian envoys had quitted Athens, however,
an incident, alike sudden and memorable, completely altered the
Athenian temper. The Lacedæmonian harmost Sphodrias (whom Kleombrotus
had left at Thespiæ to prosecute the war against Thebes), being
informed that Peiræus on its land side was without gates or night
watch,—since there was no suspicion of attack,—conceived the idea of
surprising it by a night-march from Thespiæ, and thus of mastering
at one stroke the commerce, the wealth, and the naval resources of
Athens. Putting his troops under march one evening after an early
supper, he calculated on reaching the Peiræus the next morning before
daylight. But his reckoning proved erroneous. Morning overtook
him when he had advanced no farther than the Thriasian plain near
Eleusis; from whence, as it was useless to proceed farther, he turned
back and retreated to Thespiæ; not, however, without committing
various acts of plunder against the neighboring Athenian residents.

This plan against Peiræus appears to have been not ill conceived. Had
Sphodrias been a man competent to organize and execute movements as
rapid as those of Brasidas, there is no reason why it might not have
succeeded; in which case the whole face of the war would have been
changed, since the Lacedæmonians, if once masters of Peiræus, both
could and would have maintained the place. But it was one of those
injustices, which no one ever commends until it has been successfully
consummated,—“consilium quod non potest laudari nisi peractum.[206]”
As it failed, it has been considered, by critics as well as by
contemporaries, not merely as a crime but as a fault, and its author
Sphodrias as a brave man, but singularly weak and hot-headed.[207]
Without admitting the full extent of this censure, we may see
that his present aggression grew out of an untoward emulation of
the glory which Phœbidas, in spite of the simulated or transient
displeasure of his countrymen, had acquired by seizing the Kadmeia.
That Sphodrias received private instructions from Kleombrotus (as
Diodorus states) is not sufficiently proved; while the suspicion,
intimated by Xenophon as being abroad, that he was wrought upon
by secret emissaries and bribes from his enemies the Thebans, for
the purpose of plunging Athens into war with Sparta, is altogether
improbable;[208] and seems merely an hypothesis suggested by the
consequences of the act,—which were such, that if his enemies had
bribed him, he could not have served them better.

  [206] Tacit. Histor. i, 38.

  Compare (in Plutarch, Anton. c. 32) the remark of Sextus Pompey
  to his captain Menas, when the latter asked his permission to
  cut the cables of the ship, while Octavius and Antony were
  dining on board, and to seize their persons,—“I cannot permit
  any such thing; but you ought to have done it without asking my
  permission.” A reply familiar to the readers of Shakspeare’s
  Antony and Cleopatra.

  [207] Kallisthenes, Frag. 2, ed. Didot, apud Harpokration, v.
  Σφοδρίας; Diodor. xv, 29; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 14; Plutarch,
  Agesil. c. 24. The miscalculation of Sphodrias as to the time
  necessary for his march to Peiræus is not worse than other
  mistakes which Polybius (in a very instructive discourse, ix,
  12, 20, seemingly extracted from his lost commentaries on
  Tactics) recounts as having been committed by various other able
  commanders.

  [208] Πείθουσι τὸν ἐν ταῖς Θεσπιαῖς ἁρμοστὴν Σφοδρίαν, χρήματα
  δόντες, ὡς ὑπωπτεύετο—Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 20; Diodor. xv, 29;
  Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 14; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24, 25.

  Diodorus affirms private orders from Kleombrotus to Sphodrias.

  In rejecting the suspicion mentioned by Xenophon,—that it was
  the Theban leaders who instigated and bribed Sphodrias,—we may
  remark—1. That the plan might very possibly have succeeded; and
  its success would have been ruinous to the Thebans. Had they
  been the instigators, they would not have failed to give notice
  of it at Athens at the same time; which they certainly did not
  do. 2. That if the Lacedæmonians had punished Sphodrias, no war
  would have ensued. Now every man would have predicted, that
  assuming the scheme to fail, they certainly would punish him.
  3. The strong interest taken by Agesilaus afterwards in the
  fate of Sphodrias, and the high encomium which he passed on the
  general character of the latter,—are quite consistent with a
  belief on his part that Sphodrias (like Phœbidas) may have done
  wrong towards a foreign city from over-ambition in the service
  of his country. But if Agesilaus (who detested the Thebans
  beyond measure) had believed that Sphodrias was acting under the
  influence of bribes from them, he would not merely have been
  disposed to let justice take its course, but would have approved
  and promoted the condemnation.

  On a previous occasion (Hellen. iii, 5, 3) Xenophon had imputed
  to the Thebans a similar refinement of stratagem; seemingly with
  just as little cause.

The presence of Sphodrias and his army in the Thriasian plain was
communicated shortly after daybreak at Athens, where it excited
no less terror than surprise. Every man instantly put himself
under arms for defence; but news soon arrived that the invader had
retired. When thus reassured, the Athenians passed from fear to
indignation. The Lacedæmonian envoys, who were lodging at the house
of Kallias the proxenus of Sparta, were immediately put under arrest
and interrogated. But all three affirmed that they were not less
astonished, and not less exasperated, by the march of Sphodrias, than
the Athenians themselves; adding, by way of confirmation, that had
they been really privy to any design of seizing the Peiræus, they
would have taken care not to let themselves be found in the city,
and in their ordinary lodging at the house of the proxenus, where
of course their persons would be at once seized. They concluded by
assuring the Athenians, that Sphodrias would not only be indignantly
disavowed, but punished capitally, at Sparta. And their reply was
deemed so satisfactory, that they were allowed to depart; while an
Athenian embassy was sent to Sparta, to demand the punishment of the
offending general.[209]

  [209] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24.

The Ephors immediately summoned Sphodrias home to Sparta, to take
his trial on a capital charge. So much did he himself despair of
his case, that he durst not make his appearance; while the general
impression was, both at Sparta and elsewhere, that he would certainly
be condemned. Nevertheless, though thus absent and undefended, he was
acquitted, purely through private favor and esteem for his general
character. He was of the party of Kleombrotus, so that all the
friends of that prince espoused his cause, as a matter of course.
But as he was of the party opposed to Agesilaus, his friends dreaded
that the latter would declare against him, and bring about his
condemnation. Nothing saved Sphodrias except the peculiar intimacy
between his son Kleonymus and Archidamus son of Agesilaus. The
mournful importunity of Archidamus induced Agesilaus, when this
important cause was brought before the Senate of Sparta, to put aside
his judicial conviction, and give his vote in the following manner:
“To be sure, Sphodrias is guilty; upon that there cannot be two
opinions. Nevertheless, we cannot put to death a man like him, who,
as boy, youth, and man, has stood unblemished in all Spartan honor.
Sparta cannot part with soldiers like Sphodrias.[210]” The friends
of Agesilaus, following this opinion and coinciding with those of
Kleombrotus, ensured a favorable verdict. And it is remarkable,
that Etymoklês himself, who as envoy at Athens had announced as a
certainty that Sphodrias would be put to death,—as senator and friend
of Agesilaus voted for his acquittal.[211]

  [210] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 32. Ἐκεῖνός γε (Ἀγησίλαος) πρὸς πάντας
  ὅσοις διείλεκται, ταῦτὰ λέγει· Μὴ ἀδικεῖν μὲν Σφοδρίαν ἀδύνατον
  εἶναι· ὅστις μέντοι, παῖς τε ὢν καὶ παιδίσκος καὶ ἡβῶν, πάντα τὰ
  καλὰ ποιῶν διετέλεσε, χαλεπὸν εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἀποκτιννύναι·
  τὴν γὰρ Σπάρτην τοιούτων δεῖσθαι στρατιωτῶν.

  Xenophon explains at some length (v, 4, 25-33) and in a very
  interesting manner, both the relations between Kleonymus and
  Archidamus, and the appeal of Archidamus to his father. The
  statement has all the air of being derived from personal
  knowledge, and nothing but the fear of prolixity hinders me from
  giving it in full.

  Compare Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 25; Diodor. xv, 29.

  [211] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 22-32.

This remarkable incident (which comes to us from a witness not merely
philo-Laconian, but also personally intimate with Agesilaus) shows
how powerfully the course of justice at Sparta was overruled by
private sympathy and interests,—especially, those of the two kings.
It especially illustrates what has been stated in a former chapter
respecting the oppressions exercised by the Spartan harmosts and the
dekadarchies, for which no redress was attainable at Sparta. Here
was a case where not only the guilt of Sphodrias stood confessed,
but in which also his acquittal was sure to be followed by a war
with Athens. If, under such circumstances, the Athenian demand for
redress was overruled by the favor of the two kings, what chance
was there of any justice to the complaint of a dependent city, or
an injured individual, against the harmost? The contrast between
Spartan and Athenian proceeding is also instructive. Only a few days
before, the Athenians condemned, at the instance of Sparta, their two
generals who had without authority lent aid to the Theban exiles.
In so doing, the Athenian dikastery enforced the law against clear
official misconduct,—and that, too, in a case where their sympathies
went along with the act, though their fear of a war with Sparta was
stronger. But the most important circumstance to note is, that at
Athens there is neither private influence, nor kingly influence,
capable of overruling the sincere judicial conscience of a numerous
and independent dikastery.

The result of the acquittal of Sphodrias must have been well known
beforehand to all parties at Sparta. Even by the general voice
of Greece, the sentence was denounced as iniquitous.[212] But
the Athenians, who had so recently given strenuous effect to the
remonstrances of Sparta against their own generals, were stung by
it to the quick; and only the more stung, in consequence of the
extraordinary compliments to Sphodrias on which the acquittal was
made to turn. They immediately contracted hearty alliance with
Thebes, and made vigorous preparations for war against Sparta both
by land and sea. After completing the fortifications of Peiræus, so
as to place it beyond the reach of any future attempt, they applied
themselves to the building of new ships of war, and to the extension
of their naval ascendency, at the expense of Sparta.[213]

  [212] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 24.

  [213] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 34-63.

From this moment, a new combination began in Grecian politics. The
Athenians thought the moment favorable to attempt the construction
of a new confederacy, analogous to the Confederacy of Delos, formed
a century before; the basis on which had been reared the formidable
Athenian empire, lost at the close of the Peloponnesian war. Towards
such construction there was so far a tendency, that Athens had
already a small body of maritime allies; while rhetors like Isokrates
(in his Panegyrical Discourse, published two years before) had been
familiarizing the public mind with larger ideas. But the enterprise
was now pressed with the determination and vehemence of men smarting
under recent insult. The Athenians had good ground to build upon;
since, while the discontent against the ascendency of Sparta was
widely spread, the late revolution in Thebes had done much to lessen
that sentiment of fear upon which such ascendency chiefly rested. To
Thebes, the junction with Athens was preëminently welcome, and her
leaders gladly enrolled their city as a constituent member of the
new confederacy.[214] They cheerfully acknowledged the presidency of
Athens,—reserving, however, tacitly or expressly, their own rights
as presidents of the Bœotian federation, as soon as that could be
reconstituted; which reconstitution was at this moment desirable even
for Athens, seeing that the Bœotian towns were now dependent allies
of Sparta under harmosts and oligarchies.

  [214] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 34; Xen. de Vectigal. v, 7; Isokrates,
  Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 20, 23, 37; Diodor. xv, 29.

The Athenians next sent envoys round to the principal islands and
maritime cities in the Ægean, inviting all of them to an alliance
on equal and honorable terms. The principles were in the main the
same as those upon which the confederacy of Delos had been formed
against the Persians, almost a century before. It was proposed that
a congress of deputies should meet at Athens, one from each city,
small as well as great, each with one vote; that Athens should be
president, yet each individual city autonomous; that a common fund
should be raised, with a common naval force, through assessment
imposed by this congress upon each, and applied as the same authority
might prescribe; the general purpose being defined to be, maintenance
of freedom and security from foreign aggression, to each confederate,
by the common force of all. Care was taken to banish as much as
possible those associations of tribute and subjection which rendered
the recollection of the former Athenian empire unpopular.[215]
And as there were many Athenian citizens, who, during those times
of supremacy, had been planted out as kleruchs or out-settlers in
various dependencies, but had been deprived of their properties at
the close of the war,—it was thought necessary to pass a formal
decree,[216] renouncing and barring all revival of these suspended
rights. It was farther decreed that henceforward no Athenian should
on any pretence hold property, either in house or land, in the
territory of any one of the confederates; neither by purchase, nor
as security for money lent, nor by any other mode of acquisition.
Any Athenian infringing this law, was rendered liable to be informed
against before the synod; who, on proof of the fact, were to deprive
him of the property,—half of it going to the informer, half to the
general purposes of the confederacy.

  [215] The contribution was now called σύνταξις, not φόρος;
  see Isokrates, De Pace, s. 37-46; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7;
  Harpokration, v. Σύνταξις.

  Plutarch, De Fortunâ Athen. p. 351. ἰσόψηφον αὐτοῖς τὴν Ἑλλάδα
  κατέστησαν.

  [216] Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 47. Καὶ ~τῶν μὲν κτημάτων
  τῶν ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν ἀπέστητε~, βουλόμενοι τὴν συμμαχίαν ὡς
  μεγίστην ποιῆσαι, etc.

  Diodor. xv, 28, 29. Ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ καὶ ~τὰς γενομένας κληρουχίας
  ἀποκαταστῆσαι τοῖς πρότερον κυρίοις γεγονόσι~, καὶ νόμον ἔθεντο
  μηδένα τῶν Ἀθηναίων γεωργεῖν ἐκτὸς τῆς Ἀττικῆς. Διὰ δὲ ταύτης
  τῆς φιλανθρωπίας ἀνακτησάμενοι τὴν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εὔνοιαν,
  ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ἰδίαν ἡγεμονίαν.

  Isokrates and Diodorus speak loosely of this vote, in language
  which might make us imagine that it was one of distinct
  restitution, giving back property _actually enjoyed_. But the
  Athenians had never actually regained the outlying private
  property lost at the close of the war, though they had much
  desired it, and had cherished hopes that a favorable turn of
  circumstances might enable them to effect the recovery. As the
  recovery, if effected, would be at the cost of those whom they
  were now soliciting as allies, the public and formal renunciation
  of such rights was a measure of much policy, and contributed
  greatly to appease uneasiness in the islands; though in point of
  fact nothing was given up except rights to property not really
  enjoyed.

  An Inscription has recently been discovered at Athens, recording
  the original Athenian decree, of which the main provisions
  are mentioned in my text. It bears date in the archonship of
  Nausinikus. It stands, with the restorations of M. Boeckh
  (fortunately a portion of it has been found in tolerably good
  preservation), in the Appendix to the new edition of his
  work,—“Über die Staats-haushaltung der Athener—Verbesserungen und
  Nachträge zu den drei Banden der Staats-haushaltung der Athener,”
  p. xx.

  Ἀπὸ δὲ Ναυσινίκου ἄρχοντος μὴ ἐξεῖναι μήτε ἰδίᾳ μήτε δημοσίᾳ
  Ἀθηναίων μηδενὶ ἐγκτήσασθαι ἐν ταῖς τῶν συμμάχων χώραις μήτε
  οἰκίαν μήτε χώριον, μήτε πριαμένῳ, μήτε ὑποθεμένῳ, μήτε ἄλλῳ
  τρόπῳ μηδενί. Ἐὰν δέ τις ὠνῆται ἢ κτᾶται ἢ τίθηται τρόπῳ ὁτῳοῦν,
  ἐξεῖναι τῷ βουλομένῳ τῶν συμμάχων φῆναι πρὸς τοὺς συνέδρους τῶν
  συμμάχων. Οἱ δὲ σύνεδροι ἀπο- -μενοι ἀποδόντων [τὸ μὲν ἥ]μισυ
  τῷ φῄναντι, τὸ δὲ ἄ[λλο κοιν]ὸν ἔστω τῶν συνμμάχων. Ἐὰν δέ τις
  [ἴῃ] ἐπὶ πολέμῳ ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιησαμένους τὴν συμμαχίαν, ἢ κατὰ γῆν
  ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν, βοηθεῖν Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους τούτοις καὶ
  κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. Ἐὰν δέ
  τις εἴπῃ ἢ ἐπιψηφίσῃ, ἢ ἄρχων ἢ ἰδιώτης, παρὰ τόδε τὸ ψήφισμα,
  ὡς λύειν τι δεῖ τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ ψηφίσματι εἰρημένων, ὑπαρχέτω μὲν
  αὐτῷ ἀτίμῳ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ χρήματα αὐτοῦ δημόσια ἔστω καὶ τῆς θεοῦ
  τὸ ἐπιδέκατον· καὶ κρινέσθω ἐν Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις ὡς
  διαλύων τὴν συμμαχίαν. Ζημιούντων δὲ αὐτὸν θανάτῳ ἢ φυγῇ ὅπου
  Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι κρατοῦσι. Ἐὰν δὲ θανάτῳ τιμήθῃ, μὴ
  ταφήτω ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ μηδὲ ἐν τῇ τῶν συμμάχων.

  Then follows a direction, that the Secretary of the Senate of
  Five Hundred shall inscribe the decree on a column of stone,
  and place it by the side of the statue of Zeus Eleutherius;
  with orders to the Treasurers of the goddess to disburse sixty
  drachmas for the cost of so doing.

  It appears that there is annexed to this Inscription a list of
  such cities as had already joined the confederacy, together with
  certain other names added afterwards, of cities which joined
  subsequently. The Inscription itself directs such list to be
  recorded,—εἰς δὲ τὴν στήλην ταύτην ἀναγράφειν τῶν τε οὐσῶν πόλεων
  συμμαχίδων τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ ἥτις ἂν ἄλλη σύμμαχος γίγνηται.

  Unfortunately M. Boeckh has not annexed this list, which,
  moreover, he states to have been preserved only in a very partial
  and fragmentary condition. He notices only, as contained in it,
  the towns of Poiessa and Korêsus in the island of Keos,—and
  Antissa and Eresus in <DW26>s; all four as autonomous communities.

Such were the liberal principles of confederacy now proposed by
Athens,—who, as a candidate for power, was straightforward and
just, like the Herodotean Deiokês,[217]—and formally ratified, as
well by the Athenians as by the general voice of the confederate
deputies assembled within their walls. The formal decree and compact
of alliance was inscribed on a stone column and placed by the side
of the statue of Zeus Eleutherius or the Liberator; a symbol, of
enfranchisement from Sparta accomplished, as well as of freedom to
be maintained against Persia and other enemies.[218] Periodical
meetings of the confederate deputies were provided to be held (how
often, we do not know) at Athens, and the synod was recognized as
competent judge of all persons, even Athenian citizens, charged with
treason against the confederacy. To give fuller security to the
confederates generally, it was provided in the original compact, that
if any Athenian citizen should either speak, or put any question to
the vote, in the Athenian assembly, contrary to the tenor of that
document,—he should be tried before the synod for treason; and
that, if found guilty, he might be condemned by them to the severest
punishment.

  [217] Herodot. i, 96. Ὁ δὲ, οἷα δὴ μνεώμενος ἀρχὴν, ἰθύς τε καὶ
  δίκαιος ἦν.

  [218] This is the sentiment connected with Ζεὺς
  Ἐλευθέριος,—Pausanias the victor of Platæa, offers to Zeus
  Eleutherius a solemn sacrifice and thanksgiving immediately
  after the battle, in the agora of the town (Thucyd. ii, 71). So
  the Syracusans immediately after the expulsion of the Gelonian
  dynasty (Diodor. xi, 72)—and Mæandrius at Samos (Herodot. iii,
  142).

Three Athenian leaders stood prominent as commissioners in the
first organization of the confederacy, and in the dealings with
those numerous cities whose junction was to be won by amicable
inducement,—Chabrias, Timotheus son of Konon, and Kallistratus.[219]

  [219] Diodor. xv, 29.

The first of the three is already known to the reader. He and
Iphikrates were the most distinguished warriors whom Athens numbered
among her citizens. But not having been engaged in any war, since
the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B.C., she had had no need of their
services; hence both of them had been absent from the city during
much of the last nine years, and Iphikrates seems still to have
been absent. At the time when that peace was concluded, Iphikrates
was serving in the Hellespont and Thrace, Chabrias with Evagoras
in Cyprus; each having been sent thither by Athens at the head of
a body of mercenary peltasts. Instead of dismissing their troops,
and returning to Athens as peaceful citizens, it was not less
agreeable to the military tastes of these generals, than conducive
to their importance and their profit, to keep together their bands,
and to take foreign service. Accordingly, Chabrias had continued
in service first in Cyprus, next with the native Egyptian king
Akoris. The Persians, against whom he served, found his hostility so
inconvenient, that Pharnabazus demanded of the Athenians to recall
him, on pain of the Great King’s displeasure; and requested at the
same time that Iphikrates might be sent to aid the Persian satraps
in organizing a great expedition against Egypt. The Athenians, to
whom the goodwill of Persia was now of peculiar importance, complied
on both points; recalled Chabrias, who thus became disposable for
the Athenian service,[220] and despatched Iphikrates to take command
along with the Persians.

  [220] Diodor. xv, 29.

Iphikrates, since the peace of Antalkidas, had employed his peltasts
in the service of the kings of Thrace: first of Seuthes, near the
shores of the Propontis, whom he aided in the recovery of certain
lost dominions,—next of Kotys, whose favor he acquired, and whose
daughter he presently married.[221] Not only did he enjoy great
scope for warlike operations and plunder, among the “butter-eating
Thracians,”[222]—but he also acquired, as dowry, a large stock of
such produce as Thracian princes had at their disposal, together
with a boon even more important,—a seaport village not far from the
mouth of the Hebrus, called Drys, where he established a fortified
post, and got together a Grecian colony dependent on himself.[223]
Miltiades, Alkibiades, and other eminent Athenians had done the same
thing before him; though Xenophon had refused a similar proposition
when made to him by the earlier Seuthes.[224] Iphikrates thus became
a great man in Thrace, yet by no means abandoning his connection with
Athens, but making his position in each subservient to his importance
in the other. While he was in a situation to favor the projects of
Athenian citizens for mercantile and territorial acquisitions in the
Chersonese and other parts of Thrace,—he could also lend the aid of
Athenian naval and military art, not merely to princes in Thrace,
but to others even beyond those limits,—since we learn that Amyntas
king of Macedonia became so attached or indebted to him as to adopt
him for his son.[225] When sent by the Athenians to Persia, at the
request of Pharnabazus (about 378 B.C. apparently), Iphikrates had
fair ground for anticipating that a career yet more lucrative was
opening before him.[226]

  [221] Cornel. Nepos, Iphicrates, c. 2; Chabrias, c. 2, 3.

  [222] See an interesting Fragment (preserved by Athenæus, iv,
  p. 131) of the comedy called _Protesilaus_—by the Athenian poet
  Anaxandrides (Meineke, Comic. Græc. Frag. iii, p. 182). It
  contains a curious description of the wedding of Iphikrates with
  the daughter of Kotys in Thrace; enlivened by an abundant banquet
  and copious draughts of wine given to crowds of Thracians in the
  market-place:—

      δειπνεῖν δ’ ~ἄνδρας βουτυροφάγας~
      αὐχμηροκόμας μυριοπληθεῖς, etc.,

  brazen vessels as large as wine vats, full of broth,—Kotys
  himself girt round, and serving the broth in a golden basin,
  then going about to taste all the bowls of wine and water ready
  mixed, until he was himself the first man intoxicated. Iphikrates
  brought from Athens several of the best players on the harp and
  flute.

  The distinction between the _butter_ eaten, or rubbed on the
  skin, by the Thracians, and the _olive-oil_ habitually consumed
  in Greece, deserves notice. The word αὐχμηροκόμας seems to
  indicate the absence of those scented unguents which, at the
  banquet of Greeks, would have been applied to the hair of the
  guests, giving to it a shining gloss and moisture. It appears
  that the Lacedæmonian women, however, sometimes anointed
  themselves with butter, and not with oil; see Plutarch, adv.
  Koloten, p. 1109 B.

  The number of warlike stratagems in Thrace, ascribed to
  Iphikrates by Polyænus and other Tactic writers, indicates that
  his exploits there were renowned as well as long-continued.

  [223] Theopomp. Fragm. 175, ed. Didot; Demosth. cont. Aristokrat.
  p. 664.

  [224] Xenoph. Anab. vii, 2, 38; vii, 5, 8; vii, 6, 43. Xen.
  Hellen. i, 5, 17; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 36.

  See also a striking passage (in Lysias Orat. xxviii, cont.
  Ergokl. s. 5) about the advice given to Thrasybulus by a
  discontented fellow-citizen, to seize Byzantium, marry the
  daughter of Seuthes, and defy Athens.

  [225] Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 13. p. 249.

  At what time this adoption took place, we cannot distinctly
  make out; Amyntas died in 370 B.C., while from 378-371 B.C.,
  Iphikrates seems to have been partly on service with the Persian
  satraps, partly in command of the Athenian fleet in the Ionian
  Sea (see Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, etc. ch. 4). Therefore, the
  adoption took place at some time between 387-378 B.C.; perhaps
  after the restoration of Amyntas to his maritime dominions by
  the Lacedæmonian expedition against Olynthus—382-380 B.C.
  Amyntas was so weak and insecure, from the Thessalians, and
  other land-neighbors (see Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 657. s.
  112), that it was much to his advantage to cultivate the favor
  of a warlike Athenian established on the Thracian coast, like
  Iphikrates.

  [226] From these absences of men like Iphikrates and Chabrias,
  a conclusion has been drawn severely condemning the Athenian
  people. They were so envious and ill-tempered (it has been said),
  that none of their generals could live with comfort at Athens;
  all lived abroad as they could. Cornelius Nepos (Chabrias, c. 3)
  makes the remark, borrowed originally from Theopompus (Fr. 117,
  ed. Didot), and transcribed by many modern commentators as if
  it were exact and literal truth—“Hoc Chabrias nuntio (i. e. on
  being recalled from Egypt, in consequence of the remonstrance of
  Pharnabazus) Athenas rediit neque ibi diutius est moratus quam
  fuit necesse. Non enim libenter erat ante oculos civium suorum,
  quod et vivebat laute, et indulgebat sibi liberalius, quam ut
  invidiam vulgi posset effugere. Est enim hoc commune vitium in
  magnis liberisque civitatibus, ut invidia gloriæ comes sit, et
  libenter de his detrahant, quos eminere videant altius; neque
  animo æquo pauperes alienam opulentium intuentur fortunam. Itaque
  Chabrias, quoad ei licebat, plurimum aberat. Neque vero solus
  ille aberat Athenis libenter, sed omnes fere principes fecerunt
  idem, quod tantum se ab invidiâ putabant abfuturos, quantum a
  conspectu suorum recessissent. Itaque Conon plurimum Cypri vixit,
  Iphicrates in Thraciâ, Timotheus Lesbi, Chares in Sigeo.”

  That the people of Athens, among other human frailties, had their
  fair share of envy and jealousy, is not to be denied; but that
  these attributes belonged to them in a marked or peculiar manner,
  cannot (in my judgment) be shown by any evidence extant,—and most
  assuredly is not shown by the evidence here alluded to.

  “Chabrias was fond of a life of enjoyment and luxurious
  indulgence.” If instead of being an Athenian, he had been a
  Spartan, he would undoubtedly have been compelled to expatriate
  in order to gratify this taste; for it was the express drift and
  purpose of the Spartan discipline, not to equalize property,
  but to equalize the habits, enjoyments, and personal toils,
  of the rich and poor. This is a point which the admirers of
  Lykurgus,—Xenophon and Plutarch,—attest not less clearly than
  Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, and others. If then it were
  considered a proof of envy and ill-temper, to debar rich men
  from spending their money in procuring enjoyments, we might
  fairly consider the reproach as made out against Lykurgus and
  Sparta. Not so against Athens. There was no city in Greece
  where the means of luxurious and comfortable living were more
  abundantly exhibited for sale, nor where a rich man was more
  perfectly at liberty to purchase them. Of this the proofs are
  everywhere to be found. Even the son of this very Chabrias,
  Ktesippus, who inherited the appetite for enjoyment, without the
  greater qualities of his father,—found the means of gratifying
  his appetite so unfortunately easy at Athens, that he wasted
  his whole substance in such expenses (Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7;
  Athenæus, iv, p. 165). And Chares was even better liked at Athens
  in consequence of his love of enjoyment and license,—if we are to
  believe another Fragment (238) of the same Theopompus.

  The allegation of Theopompus and Nepos, therefore, is neither
  true as matter of fact, nor sufficient, if it had been true, to
  sustain the hypothesis of a malignant Athenian public, with which
  they connect it. Iphikrates and Chabrias did not stay away from
  Athens because they loved enjoyments or feared the envy of their
  countrymen; but because both of them were large gainers by doing
  so, in importance, in profit, and in tastes. Both of them were
  men πολεμικοὶ καὶ φιλοπόλεμοι ἐσχάτως (to use an expression of
  Xenophon respecting the Lacedæmonian Klearchus—Anab. ii, 6, 1);
  both of them loved war and had great abilities for war,—qualities
  quite compatible with strong appetite for enjoyment; while
  neither of them had either taste or talent for the civil routine
  and debate of Athens when at peace. Besides, each of them was
  commander of a body of peltasts, through whose means he could
  obtain lucrative service as well as foreign distinction; so that
  we can assign a sufficient reason why both of them preferred to
  be absent from Athens during most part of the nine years that
  the peace of Antalkidas continued. Afterwards, Iphikrates was
  abroad three or four years, in service with the Persian satraps,
  by order of the Athenians; Chabrias also went a long time
  afterwards, again on foreign service, to Egypt, at the same time
  when the Spartan king Agesilaus was there (yet without staying
  long away, since we find him going out on command from Athens
  to the Chersonese in 359-358 B.C.—Demosth. cont. Aristokr. p.
  677, s. 204); but neither he nor Agesilaus, went there to escape
  the mischief of envious countrymen. Demosthenes does not talk of
  Iphikrates as being uncomfortable in Athens, or anxious to get
  out of it; see Orat. cont. Meidiam, p. 535, s. 83.

  Again, as to the case of Konon and his residence in Cyprus; it
  is truly surprising to see this fact cited as an illustration of
  Athenian jealousy or ill-temper. Konon went to Cyprus immediately
  after the disaster of Ægospotami, and remained there, or remained
  away from Athens, for eleven years (405-393 B.C.) until the
  year after his victory at Knidus. It will be recollected that
  he was one of the six Athenian generals who commanded the fleet
  at Ægospotami. That disaster, while it brought irretrievable
  ruin upon Athens, was at the same time such as to brand with
  well-merited infamy the generals commanding. Konon was so far
  less guilty than his colleagues, as he was in a condition to
  escape with eight ships when the rest were captured. But he could
  not expect, and plainly did not expect, to be able to show his
  face again in Athens, unless he could redeem the disgrace by some
  signal fresh service. He nobly paid this debt to his country,
  by the victory of Knidus in 394 B.C.; and then came back the
  year afterwards, to a grateful and honorable welcome at Athens.
  About a year or more after this, he went out again as envoy to
  Persia in the service of his country. He was there seized and
  imprisoned by the satrap Tiribazus, but contrived to make his
  escape, and died at Cyprus, as it would appear, about 390 B.C.
  Nothing therefore can be more unfounded than the allegation of
  Theopompus, “that Konon lived abroad at Cyprus, because he was
  afraid of undeserved ill-temper from the public at Athens.” For
  what time Timotheus may have lived at <DW26>s, we have no means of
  saying. But from the year 370 B.C. down to his death, we hear of
  him so frequently elsewhere, in the service of his country, that
  his residence cannot have been long.

Iphikrates being thus abroad, the Athenians joined with Chabrias, in
the mission and measures for organizing their new confederacy, two
other colleagues, of whom we now hear for the first time—Timotheus
son of Konon, and Kallistratus the most celebrated orator of
his time.[227] The abilities of Kallistratus were not military
at all; while Timotheus and Chabrias were men of distinguished
military merit. But in acquiring new allies and attracting deputies
to her proposed congress, Athens stood in need of persuasive
appeal, conciliatory dealing, and substantial fairness in all
her propositions, not less than of generalship. We are told that
Timotheus, doubtless as son of the liberator Konon, from the
recollections of the battle of Knidus—was especially successful in
procuring new adhesions; and probably Kallistratus,[228] going round
with him to the different islands, contributed by his eloquence
not a little to the same result. On their invitation, many cities
entered as confederates.[229] At this time (as in the earlier
confederacy of Delos) all who joined must have been unconstrained
members. And we may understand the motives of their junction, when
we read the picture drawn by Isokrates (in 380 B.C.) of the tyranny
of the Persians on the Asiatic mainland, threatening, to absorb the
neighboring islands. Not only was there now a new basis of imposing
force, presented by Athens and Thebes in union—but there was also
a wide-spread hatred of imperial Sparta, aggravated since her
perversion of the pretended boon of autonomy, promised by the peace
of Antalkidas; and the conjunction of these sentiments caused the
Athenian mission of invitation to be extremely successful. All the
cities in Eubœa (except Histiæa, at the north of the island)—as well
as Chios, Mitylênê, Byzantium, and Rhodes—the three former of whom
had continued favorably inclined to Athens ever since the peace of
Antalkidas,[230]—all entered into the confederacy. An Athenian fleet
under Chabrias, sailing among the Cyclades and the other islands of
the Ægean, aided in the expulsion of the Lacedæmonian harmosts,[231]
together with their devoted local oligarchies, wherever they still
subsisted; and all the cities thus liberated became equal members of
the newly-constituted congress at Athens. After a certain interval,
there came to be not less than seventy cities, many of them
separately powerful, which sent deputies to it;[232] an aggregate
sufficient to intimidate Sparta, and even to flatter Athens with the
hope of restoration to something like her former lustre.

  [227] Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 40, p. 283.

  [228] The employment of the new word συντάξεις, instead
  of the unpopular term φόρους, is expressly ascribed to
  Kallistratus,—Harpokration in Voce.

  [229] Isokrates gives the number twenty-four cities (Or. xv,
  Permut. s. 120). So also Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. s. 15;
  cont. Philokl. s. 17. The statement of Æschines, that Timotheus
  brought seventy-five cities into the confederacy, appears large,
  and must probably include all that that general either acquired
  or captured (Æsch. Fals. Leg. c. 24, p. 263). Though I think
  the number twenty-four probable enough, yet it is difficult
  to identify what towns they were. For Isokrates, so far as he
  particularizes, includes Samos, Sestos, and Krithôtê, which were
  not acquired until many years afterwards,—in 366-365 B.C.

  Neither of these orators distinguish between those cities which
  Timotheus brought or persuaded to come into the confederacy, when
  it was first formed (among which we may reckon Eubœa, or most
  part of it—Plutarch, De Glor. Athen. p. 351 A.)—from those others
  which he afterwards took by siege, like Samos.

  [230] Isokrates, Or. xiv, Plataic. s. 30.

  [231] Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 20. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑφ’ ὑμῶν κατὰ
  κράτος ἁλόντες εὐθὺς μὲν ἁρμοστοῦ καὶ δουλείας ἀπηλλάγησαν, νῦν
  δὲ τοῦ συνεδρίου καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσιν, etc.

  The adverb of time here used indicates about 372 B.C., about a
  year before the battle of Leuktra.

  [232] Diodor. xv, 30.

The first votes both of Athens herself, and of the newly-assembled
congress, threatened war upon the largest scale. A resolution was
passed to equip twenty thousand hoplites, five hundred horsemen, and
two hundred triremes.[233] Probably the insular and Ionic deputies
promised each a certain contribution of money, but nothing beyond.
We do not, however, know how much,—nor how far the engagements,
large or small, were realized,—nor whether Athens was authorized to
enforce execution against defaulters,—or was in circumstances to act
upon such authority, if granted to her by the congress. It was in
this way (as the reader will recollect from my fifth volume) that
Athens had first rendered herself unpopular in the confederacy of
Delos,—by enforcing the resolutions of the confederate synod against
evasive or seceding members. It was in this way that what was at
first a voluntary association had ultimately slid into an empire
by constraint. Under the new circumstances of 378 B.C., we may
presume that the confederates, though ardent and full of promises
on first assembling at Athens, were even at the outset not exact,
and became afterwards still less exact, in performance; yet that
Athens was forced to be reserved in claiming, or in exercising,
the right of enforcement. To obtain a vote of contribution by the
majority of deputies present, was only the first step in the process;
to obtain punctual payment, when the Athenian fleet was sent round
for the purpose of collecting,—yet without incurring dangerous
unpopularity,—was the second step, but by far the most doubtful and
difficult.

  [233] Diodor. xv, 29.

  Polybius (ii, 62) states that the Athenians _sent out_ (not
  merely, _voted_ to send out) ten thousand hoplites, and manned
  one hundred triremes.

  Both these authors treat the resolution as if it were taken by
  the Athenians alone; but we must regard it in conjunction with
  the newly-assembled synod of allies.

It must, however, be borne in mind that at this moment, when the
confederacy was first formed, both Athens and the other cities
came together from a spontaneous impulse of hearty mutuality and
coöperation. A few years afterwards, we shall find this changed;
Athens selfish, and the confederates reluctant.[234] Inflamed, as
well by their position of renovated headship, as by fresh animosity
against Sparta, the Athenians made important efforts of their own,
both financial and military. Equipping a fleet, which for the time
was superior in the Ægean, they ravaged the hostile territory of
Histiæa in Eubœa, and annexed to their confederacy the islands of
Peparêthus and Skiathus. They imposed upon themselves also a direct
property-tax; to what amount, however, we do not know.

  [234] Xen. De Vectigal. v, 6. οὔκουν καὶ τότ’, ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν
  ἀπεσχόμεθα, πάλιν ~ὑπὸ τῶν νησιωτῶν ἑκόντων προστάται~ τοῦ
  ναυτικοῦ ἐγενόμεθα;

  In the early years of this confederacy, votive offerings of
  wreaths or crowns, in token of gratitude to Athens, were decreed
  by the Eubœans, as well as by the general body of allies. These
  crowns were still to be seen thirty years afterwards at Athens,
  with commemorative inscriptions (Demosthen. cont. Androtion. c.
  21, p. 616; cont. Timokrat. c. 41, p. 756).

It was on the occasion of this tax that they introduced a great
change in the financial arrangements and constitution of the city;
a change conferring note upon the archonship of Nausinikus, (B.C.
378-377). The great body of substantial Athenian citizens as well as
metics were now classified anew for purposes of taxation. It will
be remembered that even from the time of Solon[235] the citizens of
Athens had been distributed into four classes,—Pentakosiomedimni,
Hippeis, Zeugitæ, Thêtes,—distinguished from each other by the
amount of their respective properties. Of these Solonian classes,
the fourth, or poorest, paid no direct taxes; while the three former
were taxed according to assessments representing a certain proportion
of their actual property. The taxable property of the richest (or
Pentakosiomedimni, including all at or above the minimum income of
five hundred medimni of corn per annum) was entered in the tax-book
at a sum equal to twelve times their income; that of the Hippeis
(comprising all who possessed between three hundred and five hundred
medimni of annual income) at ten times their income; that of the
Zeugitæ (or possessors of an annual income between two hundred and
three hundred medimni) at five times their income. A medimnus of
corn was counted as equivalent to a drachma; which permitted the
application of this same class-system to movable property as well
as to land. So that, when an actual property-tax (or _eisphora_)
was imposed, it operated as an equal or proportional tax, so far as
regarded all the members of the same class; but as a graduated or
progressive tax, upon all the members of the richer class as compared
with those of the poorer.

  [235] For the description of the Solonian census, see Vol. III,
  Ch. xi, p. 117, of this History.

The three Solonian property-classes above named appear to have
lasted, though probably not without modifications, down to the
close of the Peloponnesian war; and to have been in great part
preserved, after the renovation of the democracy in B.C. 403,
during the archonship of Eukleides.[236] Though eligibility to the
great offices of state had before that time ceased to be dependent
on pecuniary qualification, it was still necessary to possess some
means of distinguishing the wealthier citizens, not merely in case
of direct taxation being imposed, but also because the liability to
serve in liturgies or burdensome offices was consequent on a man’s
enrolment as possessor of more than a given minimum of property. It
seems, therefore, that the Solonian census, in its main principles
of classification and graduation, was retained. Each man’s property
being valued, he was ranged in one of three or more classes according
to its amount. For each of the classes, a fixed proportion of taxable
capital to each man’s property was assumed, and each was entered in
the schedule, not for his whole property, but for the sum of taxable
capital corresponding to his property, according to the proportion
assumed. In the first or richest class, the taxable capital bore a
greater ratio to the actual property than in the less rich; in the
second, a greater ratio than in the third. The sum of all these items
of taxable capital, in all the different classes, set opposite to
each man’s name in the schedule, constituted the aggregate census
of Attica; upon which all direct property-tax was imposed, in equal
proportion upon every man.

  [236] This is M. Boeckh’s opinion, seemingly correct, as far
  as can be made out on a subject very imperfectly known (Public
  Economy of Athens, B, iv, ch. 5).

Respecting the previous modifications in the register of taxable
property, or the particulars of its distribution into classes, which
had been introduced in 403 B.C. at the archonship of Eukleides, we
have no information. Nor can we make out how large or how numerous
were the assessments of direct property-tax, imposed at Athens
between that archonship and the archonship of Nausinikus in 378
B.C. But at this latter epoch the register was again considerably
modified, at the moment when Athens was bracing herself up for
increased exertions. A new valuation was made of the property of
every man possessing property to the amount of twenty-five minæ
(or twenty-five hundred drachmæ) and upwards. Proceeding upon this
valuation, every one was entered in the schedule for a sum of taxable
capital equal to a given fraction of what he possessed. But this
fraction was different in each of the different classes. How many
classes there were, we do not certainly know; nor can we tell, except
in reference to the lowest class taxed, what sum was taken as the
minimum for any one of them. There could hardly have been less,
however, than three classes, and there may probably have been four.
But respecting the first or richest class, we know that each man was
entered in the schedule for a taxable capital equal to one-fifth of
his estimated property; and that possessors of fifteen talents were
included in it. The father of Demosthenes died in this year, and the
boy Demosthenes was returned by his guardians to the first class, as
possessor of fifteen talents; upon which his name was entered on the
schedule with a taxable capital of three talents set against him;
being one-fifth of his actual property. The taxable capital of the
second class was entered at a fraction less than one-fifth of their
actual property (probably enough, one-sixth, the same as all the
registered metics); that of the third, at a fraction still smaller;
of the fourth (if there was a fourth), even smaller than the third.
This last class descended down to the minimum of twenty-five minæ, or
twenty-five hundred drachmæ; below which no account was taken.[237]

  [237] Demosthen. cont. Aphob. i, p. 815, 816; cont. Aphob. ii, p.
  836; cont. Aphob. de Perjur. p. 862. Compare Boeckh, Publ. Econ.
  Ath. iv, 7.

  In the exposition which M. Boeckh gives of the new
  property-schedule introduced under the archonship of Nausinikus,
  he inclines to the hypothesis of four distinct Classes, thus
  distributed (p. 671 of the new edition of his Staats-haushaltung
  der Athener):—

  1. The first class included all persons who possessed property to
  the value of twelve talents and upwards. They were entered on the
  schedule, each for one-fifth, or twenty per cent. of his property.

  2. The second class comprised all who possessed property to
  the amount of six talents, but below twelve talents. Each was
  enrolled in the schedule, for the amount of sixteen per cent.
  upon his property.

  3. The third class included all whose possessions amounted to the
  value of two talents, but did not reach six talents. Each was
  entered in the schedule at the figure of twelve per cent. upon
  his property.

  4. The fourth class comprised all, from the minimum of
  twenty-five minæ, but below the maximum of two talents. Each was
  entered in the schedule for the amount of eight per cent. upon
  his property.

  This detail rests upon no positive proof; but it serves to
  illustrate the principle of distribution, and of graduation, then
  adopted.

Besides the taxable capitals of the citizens, thus graduated, the
schedule also included those of the metics or resident aliens; who
were each enrolled (without any difference of greater or smaller
property, above twenty-five minæ) at a taxable capital equal to
one-sixth of his actual property;[238] being a proportion less than
the richest class of citizens, and probably equal to the second
class in order of wealth. All these items summed up amounted to
five thousand seven hundred and fifty or six thousand talents,[239]
forming the aggregate schedule of taxable property; that is,
something near about six thousand talents. A property-tax was no part
of the regular ways and means of the state. It was imposed only on
special occasions; and whenever it was imposed, it was assessed upon
this schedule,—every man, rich or poor, being rated equally according
to his taxable capital as there entered. A property-tax of one per
cent. would thus produce sixty talents; two per cent., one hundred
and twenty talents, etc. It is highly probable that the exertions of
Athens during the archonship of Nausinikus, when this new schedule
was first prepared, may have caused a property-tax to be then
imposed, but we do not know to what amount.[240]

  [238] Demosthen. cont. Androtion. p. 612, c. 17. τὸ ἑκτὸν μέρος
  εἰσφέρειν μετὰ τῶν μετοίκων.

  [239] Polybius states the former sum (ii, 62), Demosthenes the
  latter (De Symmoriis, p. 183, c. 6). Boeckh however has shown,
  that Polybius did not correctly conceive what the sum which he
  stated really meant.

  [240] I am obliged again, upon this point, to dissent from
  M. Boeckh, who sets it down as positive matter of fact that
  a property-tax of five per cent., amounting to three hundred
  talents, was imposed and levied in the archonship of Nausinikus
  (Publ. Econ. Ath. iv, 7, 8; p. 517-521, Eng. Transl.). The
  evidence upon which this is asserted, is, a passage of
  Demosthenes cont. Androtion. (p. 606. c. 14). Ὑμῖν ~παρὰ τὰς
  εἰσφορὰς τὰς ἀπὸ Ναυσινίκου~, παρ’ ἴσως τάλαντα τριακόσια ἢ
  μικρῷ πλείω, ἔλλειμμα τέτταρα καὶ δέκα ἐστὶ τάλαντα· ὧν ἑπτὰ
  οὗτος (Androtion) εἰσέπραξεν. Now these words imply,—not that
  a property-tax of about three hundred talents had been levied
  or called for _during_ the archonship of Nausinikus, but—that
  a total sum of three hundred talents, or thereabouts, had been
  levied (or called for) by all the various property-taxes imposed
  _from the archonship of Nausinikus down to the date of the
  speech_. The oration was spoken about 355 B.C.; the archonship
  of Nausinikus was in 378 B.C. What the speaker affirms,
  therefore, is, that a sum of three hundred talents had been
  levied or called for by all the various property-taxes imposed
  between these two dates; and that the aggregate sum of arrears
  due upon all of them, at the time when Androtion entered upon his
  office, was fourteen talents.

  Taylor, indeed, in his note, thinking that the sum of three
  hundred talents is very small, as the aggregate of all
  property-taxes imposed for twenty-three years, suggests that
  it might be proper to read ~ἐπὶ~ Ναυσινίκου instead of ~ἀπὸ~
  Ναυσινίκου; and I presume that M. Boeckh adopts that reading.
  But it would be unsafe to found an historical assertion upon
  such a change of text, even if the existing text were more
  indefensible than it actually is. And surely the plural number
  τὰς εἰσφορὰς proves that the orator has in view, not the single
  property-tax imposed in the archonship of Nausinikus, but two
  or more property-taxes, imposed at different times. Besides,
  Androtion devoted himself to the collection of outstanding
  arrears generally, in whatever year they might have accrued. He
  would have no motive to single out those which had accrued in
  the year 378 B.C.; moreover, those arrears would probably have
  become confounded with others, long before 355 B.C. Demosthenes
  selects the year of Nausinikus as his initial period, because it
  was then that the new schedule and a new reckoning, began.

Along with this new schedule of taxable capital, a new distribution
of the citizens now took place into certain bodies called Symmories.
As far as we can make out, on a very obscure subject, it seems that
these Symmories were twenty in number, two to each tribe; that each
contained sixty citizens, thus making one thousand two hundred in
all; that these one thousand two hundred were the wealthiest citizens
of the schedule,—containing, perhaps, the two first out of the four
classes enrolled. Among these one thousand two hundred, however, the
three hundred wealthiest stood out as a separate body; thirty from
each tribe. These three hundred were the wealthiest men in the city,
and were called “the leaders or chiefs of the Symmories.” The three
hundred and the twelve hundred corresponded, speaking roughly, to
the old Solonian classes of Pentakosiomedimni and Hippeis; of which
latter class there had also been twelve hundred, at the beginning of
the Peloponnesian war.[241] The liturgies, or burdensome and costly
offices, were discharged principally by the Three Hundred, but partly
also by the Twelve Hundred. It would seem that the former was a body
essentially fluctuating, and that after a man had been in it for
some time, discharging the burdens belonging to it, the Stratêgi
or Generals suffered him to be mingled with the Twelve Hundred,
and promoted one of the latter body to take his place in the Three
Hundred. As between man and man, too, the Attic law always admitted
the process called Antidosis, or Exchange of Property. Any citizen
who believed himself to have been overcharged with costly liturgies,
and that another citizen, as rich or richer than himself, had not
borne his fair share,—might, if saddled with a new liturgy, require
the other to undertake it in his place; and in case of refusal, might
tender to him an exchange of properties, under an engagement that he
would undertake the new charge, if the property of the other were
made over to him.

  [241] Respecting the Symmories, compare Boeckh,
  Staats-haushaltung der Athener, iv, 9, 10; Schömann, Antiq. Jur.
  Publ. Græcor. s. 78; Parreidt, De Symmoriis, p. 18 _seq._

It is to be observed, that besides the twelve hundred wealthiest
citizens who composed the Symmories, there were a more considerable
number of less wealthy citizens not included in them, yet still
liable to the property-tax; persons who possessed property from the
minimum of twenty-five minæ, up to some maximum that we do not know,
at which point the Symmories began,—and who corresponded, speaking
loosely, to the third class or Zeugitæ of the Solonian census.
The two Symmories of each tribe (comprising its one hundred and
twenty richest members) superintended the property-register of each
tribe, and collected the contributions due from its less wealthy
registered members. Occasionally, when the state required immediate
payment, the thirty richest men in each tribe (making up altogether
the three hundred) advanced the whole sum of tax chargeable upon
the tribe, having their legal remedy of enforcement against the
other members for the recovery of the sum chargeable upon each. The
richest citizens were thus both armed with rights and charged with
duties, such as had not belonged to them before the archonship of
Nausinikus. By their intervention (it was supposed) the schedule
would be kept nearer to the truth as respects the assessment on each
individual, while the sums actually imposed would be more immediately
forthcoming, than if the state directly interfered by officers of
its own. Soon after, the system of the Symmories was extended to the
trierarchy; a change which had not at first been contemplated. Each
Symmory had its chiefs, its curators, its assessors, acting under the
general presidency of the Stratêgi. Twenty-five years afterwards, we
also find Demosthenes (then about thirty years of age) recommending a
still more comprehensive application of the same principle, so that
men, money, ships, and all the means and forces of the state, might
thus be parcelled into distinct fractions, and consigned to distinct
Symmories, each with known duties of limited extent for the component
persons to perform, and each exposed not merely to legal process,
but also to loss of esteem, in the event of non-performance. It will
rather appear, however, that, in practice, the system of Symmories
came to be greatly abused, and to produce pernicious effects never
anticipated.

At present, however, I only notice this new financial and political
classification introduced in 378 B.C., as one evidence of the ardor
with which Athens embarked in her projected war against Sparta. The
feeling among her allies, the Thebans, was no less determined. The
government of Leontiades and the Spartan garrison had left behind
it so strong an antipathy, that the large majority of citizens,
embarking heartily in the revolution against them, lent themselves
to all the orders of Pelopidas and his colleagues; who, on their
part, had no other thought but to repel the common enemy. The Theban
government now became probably democratical in form; and still more
democratical in spirit, from the unanimous ardor pervading the
whole mass. Its military force was put under the best training; the
most fertile portion of the plain north of Thebes, from which the
chief subsistence of the city came, was surrounded by a ditch and
a palisade,[242] to repel the expected Spartan invasion; and the
memorable Sacred Band was now for the first time organized. This was
a brigade of three hundred hoplites, called the Lochus, or regiment
of the city, as being consecrated to the defence of the Kadmeia, or
acropolis.[243] It was put under constant arms and training, at the
public expense, like the Thousand at Argos, of whom mention was made
in my seventh volume.[244] It consisted of youthful citizens from the
best families, distinguished for their strength and courage amidst
the severe trials of the palæstra in Thebes, and was marshalled in
such manner, that each pair of neighboring soldiers were at the same
time intimate friends; so that the whole band were thus kept together
by ties which no dangers could sever. At first its destination, under
Gorgidas its commander (as we see by the select Three Hundred who
fought in 424 B.C. at the battle of Delium),[245] was to serve as
front rank men, for the general body of hoplites to follow. But from
a circumstance to be mentioned presently, it came to be employed by
Pelopidas and Epaminondas as a regiment by itself, and in a charge
was then found irresistible.[246]

  [242] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 38.

  [243] Plutarch. Pelopid. c. 18, 19.

  [244] Hist. of Greece. Vol. VII, ch. lv, p. 11.

  [245] Diodor. xii, 70.

  These pairs of neighbors who fought side by side at Delium, were
  called Heniochi and Parabatæ,—Charioteers and Side Companions; a
  name borrowed from the analogy of chariot-fighting, as described
  in the Iliad and probably in many of the lost epic poems; the
  charioteer being himself an excellent warrior, though occupied
  for the moment with other duties,—Diomedes and Sthenelus,
  Pandarus and Æneas, Patroklus and Automedon, etc.

  [246] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18, 19.

  Ὁ συνταχθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἐπαμινώνδου ἱερὸς λόχος (Hieronymus apud
  Athenæum, xiii, p. 602 A.). There was a Carthaginian military
  division which bore the same title, composed of chosen and
  wealthy citizens, two thousand five hundred in number (Diodor.
  xvi, 80).

We must remark that the Thebans had always been good soldiers, both
as hoplites and as cavalry. The existing enthusiasm, therefore, with
the more sustained training, only raised good soldiers into much
better. But Thebes was now blessed with another good fortune, such as
had never yet befallen her. She found among her citizens a leader of
the rarest excellence. It is now for the first time that Epaminondas,
the son of Polymnis, begins to stand out in the public life of
Greece. His family, poor rather than rich, was among the most ancient
in Thebes, belonging to those Gentes called Sparti, whose heroic
progenitors were said to have sprung from the dragon’s teeth sown
by Kadmus.[247] He seems to have been now of middle age; Pelopidas
was younger, and of a very rich family; yet the relations between
the two were those of equal and intimate friendship, tested in a day
of battle, wherein the two were ranged side by side as hoplites,
and where Epaminondas had saved the life of his wounded friend, at
the cost of several wounds, and the greatest possible danger, to
himself.[248]

  [247] Pausan. viii, 11, 5.

  Dikæarchus, only one generation afterwards, complained that
  he could not find out the name of the mother of Epaminondas
  (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19).

  [248] Plutarch, Pelop. c. 4; Pausan. ix, 13, 1. According to
  Plutarch, Epaminondas had attained the age of forty years, before
  he became publicly known (De Occult. Vivendo, p. 1129 C.).

  Plutarch affirms that the battle (in which Pelopidas was
  desperately wounded, and saved by Epaminondas) took place
  at Mantinea, when they were fighting on the side of the
  Lacedæmonians, under king Agesipolis, against the Arcadians; the
  Thebans being at that time friends of Sparta, and having sent a
  contingent to her aid.

  I do not understand what battle Plutarch can here mean. The
  Thebans were never so united with Sparta as to send any
  contingent to her aid, after the capture of Athens (in 404 B.C.).
  Most critics think that the war referred to by Plutarch, is, the
  expedition conducted by Agesipolis against Mantinea, whereby the
  city was broken up into villages—in 385 B.C.; see Mr. Clinton’s
  Fasti Hellenici ad 385 B.C. But, in the first place, there cannot
  have been any Theban contingent then assisting Agesipolis; for
  Thebes was on terms unfriendly with Sparta,—and certainly was not
  her ally. In the next place, there does not seem to have been any
  battle, according to Xenophon’s account.

  I therefore am disposed to question Plutarch’s account, as to
  this alleged battle of Mantinea; though I think it probable that
  Epaminondas may have saved the life of Pelopidas at some earlier
  conflict, before the peace of Antalkidas.

Epaminondas had discharged, with punctuality, those military and
gymnastic duties which were incumbent on every Theban citizen.
But we are told that in the gymnasia he studied to acquire the
maximum of activity rather than of strength; the nimble movements
of a runner and wrestler,—not the heavy muscularity, purchased in
part by excessive nutriment, of the Bœotian pugilist.[249] He also
learned music, vocal and instrumental, and dancing; by which, in
those days, was meant, not simply the power of striking the lyre or
blowing the flute, but all that belonged to the graceful, expressive,
and emphatic management, either of the voice or of the body;
rhythmical pronunciation, exercised by repetition of the poets,—and
disciplined movements, for taking part in a choric festival with
becoming consonance amidst a crowd of citizen performers. Of such
gymnastic and musical training, the combination of which constituted
an accomplished Grecian citizen, the former predominated at Thebes,
the latter at Athens. Moreover, at Thebes the musical training
was based more upon the flute (for the construction of which,
excellent reeds grew near the Lake Kopaïs); at Athens more upon
the lyre, which admitted of vocal accompaniment by the player. The
Athenian Alkibiades[250] was heard to remark, when he threw away
his flute in disgust, that flute-playing was a fit occupation for
the Thebans, since they did not know how to speak; and in regard
to the countrymen of Pindar[251] generally, the remark was hardly
less true than contemptuous. On this capital point, Epaminondas
formed a splendid exception. Not only had he learnt the lyre[252]
as well as the flute from the best masters, but also, dissenting
from his brother Kapheisias and his friend Pelopidas, he manifested
from his earliest years an ardent intellectual impulse, which would
have been remarkable even in an Athenian. He sought with eagerness
the conversation of the philosophers within his reach, among whom
were the Theban Simmias and the Tarentine Spintharus, both of
them once companions of Sokrates; so that the stirring influence
of the Sokratic method would thus find its way, partially and at
second-hand, to the bosom of Epaminondas. As the relations between
Thebes and Athens, ever since the close of the Peloponnesian war, had
become more and more friendly, growing at length into alliance and
joint war against the Spartans,—we may reasonably presume that he
profited by teachers at the latter city as well as at the former. But
the person to whom he particularly devoted himself, and whom he not
only heard as a pupil, but tended almost as a son, during the close
of an aged life,—was a Tarentine exile, named Lysis; a member of the
Pythagorean brotherhood, who, from causes which we cannot make out,
had sought shelter at Thebes, and dwelt there until his death.[253]
With him, as well as with other philosophers, Epaminondas discussed
all the subjects of study and inquiry then afloat. By perseverance
in this course for some years, he not only acquired considerable
positive instruction, but also became practised in new and enlarged
intellectual combinations; and was, like Perikles,[254] emancipated
from that timorous interpretation of nature, which rendered so many
Grecian commanders the slaves of signs and omens. His patience as a
listener, and his indifference to showy talk on his own account, were
so remarkable, that Spintharus (the father of Aristoxenus), after
numerous conversations with him, affirmed that he had never met with
any one who understood more, or talked less.[255]

  [249] Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 2; Plutarch, Apophth. Reg. p. 192
  D.; Aristophan. Acharn. 872.

  Compare the citations in Athenæus, x, p. 417. The perfection of
  form required in the runner was also different from that required
  in the wrestler (Xenoph. Memor. iii, 8, 4; iii, 10, 6).

  [250] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 2.

  [251] Pindar, Olymp. vi, 90.

      ἀρχαῖον ὄνειδος—Βοιώτιον ὗν, etc.

  [252] Aristoxenus mentions the flute, Cicero and Cornelius Nepos
  the lyre (Aristoxen. Fr. 60, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ. iv, p. 184;
  Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i, 2, 4; Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 2).

  [253] Aristoxenus, Frag. 11, ed. Didot; Plutarch, De Gen. Socr.
  p. 583, Cicero, De Offic. i, 44, 155; Pausan. ix, 13, 1; Ælian,
  V. H. iii, 17.

  The statement (said to have been given by Aristoxenus, and copied
  by Plutarch as well as by Jamblichus) that Lysis, who taught
  Epaminondas, had been one of the persons actually present in
  the synod of Pythagoreans at Kroton when Kylon burnt down the
  house, and that he with another had been the only persons who
  escaped—cannot be reconciled with chronology.

  [254] Compare Diodor. xv, 52 with Plutarch, Perikles, c. 6, and
  Plutarch, Demosthenes, c. 20.

  [255] Plutarch, De Gen. Sokrat. p. 576 D. μετείληφε παιδείας
  διαφόρου καὶ περιττῆς—(p. 585 D.) τὴν ἀρίστην τροφὴν ἐν
  φιλοσοφίᾳ—(p. 592 F.) Σπίνθαρος ὁ Ταραντῖνος οὐκ ὀλίγον αὐτῷ
  (Epaminondas) συνδιατρίψας ἐνταῦθα χρόνον, ἀεὶ δήπου λέγει,
  μηδενί που τῶν καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἀνθρώπων ἐντετευχέναι, μήτε πλείονα
  γιγνώσκοντι μήτε ἐλάττονα φθεγγομένῳ. Compare Cornel. Nepos,
  Epamin. c. 3—and Plutarch, De Audiend. c. 3, p. 39 F.

  We may fairly presume that this judgment of Spintharus was
  communicated by him to his son Aristoxenus, from whom Plutarch
  copied it; and we know that Aristoxenus in his writings mentioned
  other particulars respecting Epaminondas (Athenæus, iv, p.
  184). We see thus that Plutarch had access to good sources of
  information respecting the latter. And as he had composed a life
  of Epaminondas (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 28), though unfortunately
  it has not reached us, we may be confident that he had taken
  some pains to collect materials for the purpose, which materials
  would naturally be employed in his dramatic dialogue, “De Genio
  Socratis.” This strengthens our confidence in the interesting
  statements which that dialogue furnishes respecting the
  character of Epaminondas; as well as in the incidental allusions
  interspersed among Plutarch’s other writings.

Nor did such reserve proceed from any want of ready powers of
expression. On the contrary, the eloquence of Epaminondas, when
he entered upon his public career, was shown to be not merely
preëminent among Thebans, but effective even against the best
Athenian opponents.[256] But his disposition was essentially modest
and unambitious, combined with a strong intellectual curiosity
and a great capacity; a rare combination amidst a race usually
erring on the side of forwardness and self-esteem. Little moved by
personal ambition, and never cultivating popularity by unworthy
means, Epaminondas was still more indifferent on the score of
money. He remained in contented poverty to the end of his life,
not leaving enough to pay his funeral expenses, yet repudiating
not merely the corrupting propositions of foreigners, but also the
solicitous tenders of personal friends;[257] though we are told
that, when once serving the costly office of choregus, he permitted
his friend Pelopidas to bear a portion of the expense.[258] As
he thus stood exempt from two of the besetting infirmities which
most frequently misguided eminent Greek statesmen, so there was a
third characteristic not less estimable in his moral character;
the gentleness of his political antipathies,—his repugnance to
harsh treatment of conquered enemies,—and his refusal to mingle in
intestine bloodshed. If ever there were men whose conduct seemed
to justify unmeasured retaliation, it was Leontiades and his
fellow-traitors. They had opened the doors of the Kadmeia to the
Spartan Phœbidas, and had put to death the Theban leader Ismenias.
Yet Epaminondas disapproved of the scheme of Pelopidas and the
other exiles to assassinate them, and declined to take part in it;
partly on prudential grounds, but partly, also, on conscientious
scruples.[259] None of his virtues was found so difficult to imitate
by his subsequent admirers, as this mastery over the resentful and
vindictive passions.[260]

  [256] Cornel. Nepos, Epaminond. c. 5; Plutarch, Præcept. Reip.
  Gerend. p. 819 C. Cicero notices him as the only man with any
  pretensions to oratorical talents, whom Thebes, Corinth, or Argos
  had ever produced (Brutus, c. 13, 50).

  [257] Plutarch (De Gen. Socr. p. 583, 584; Pelopid. c. 3; Fab.
  Max. c. 27. Compar. Alcibiad. and Coriol. c. 4): Cornel. Nepos.
  Epamin. c. 4.

  [258] Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 1; Justin, vi, 8.

  [259] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 576 F. Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ, μὴ
  πείθων ὡς οἴεται βέλτιον εἶναι ταῦτα μὴ πράσσειν· εἰκότως
  ἀντιτείνει πρὸς ἃ μὴ πέφυκε, μηδὲ δοκιμάζει, παρακαλούμενος.

  ... Ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ πείθει τοὺς πολλοὺς, ἀλλὰ ταύτην ὡρμήκαμεν τὴν
  ὁδὸν, ἐᾷν αὐτὸν κελεύει φόνου καθαρὸν ὄντα καὶ ἀναίτιον ἐφεστᾶναι
  τοῖς καιροῖς, μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου τῷ συμφέροντι προσοισόμενον.

  Compare the same dialogue, p. 594 B.; and Cornelius Nepos,
  Pelopidas, c. 4.

  Isokrates makes a remark upon Evagoras of Salamis, which may
  be well applied to Epaminondas; that the objectionable means,
  without which the former could not have got possession of the
  sceptre, were performed by others and not by him; while all the
  meritorious and admirable functions of command were reserved for
  Evagoras (Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 28).

  [260] See the striking statements of Plutarch and Pausanias about
  Philopœmen,—καίπερ Ἐπαμεινώνδου βουλόμενος εἶναι μάλιστα ζηλωτὴς,
  τὸ δραστήριον καὶ συνετὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ χρημάτων ἀπαθὲς ἰσχυρῶς
  ἐμιμεῖτο, τῷ δὲ πράῳ καὶ βαθεῖ καὶ φιλανθρώπῳ παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς
  διαφορὰς ἐμμένειν οὐ δυνάμενος, δι’ ὀργὴν καὶ φιλονεικίαν, μᾶλλον
  ἐδόκει στρατιωτικῆς ἢ πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς οἰκεῖος εἶναι. To the like
  purpose, Pausanias, viii, 49, 2; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 25:
  Cornel. Nepos, Epamin. c. 3—“patiens admirandum in modum.”

Before Epaminondas could have full credit for these virtues, however,
it was necessary that he should give proof of the extraordinary
capacities for action with which they were combined, and that he
should achieve something to earn that exclamation of praise which
we shall find his enemy Agesilaus afterwards pronouncing, on seeing
him at the head of the invading Theban army near Sparta,—“Oh! thou
man of great deeds!”[261] In the year B.C. 379, when the Kadmeia
was emancipated, he was as yet undistinguished in public life,
and known only to Pelopidas with his other friends; among whom,
too, his unambitious and inquisitive disposition was a subject of
complaint as keeping him unduly in the background.[262] But the
unparalleled phenomena of that year supplied a spur which overruled
all backwardness, and smothered all rival inclinations. The Thebans,
having just recovered their city by an incredible turn of fortune,
found themselves exposed single-handed to the full attack of Sparta
and her extensive confederacy. Not even Athens had yet declared
in their favor, nor had they a single other ally. Under such
circumstances, Thebes could only be saved by the energy of all her
citizens,—the unambitious and philosophical as well as the rest. As
the necessities of the case required such simultaneous devotion, so
the electric shock of the recent revolution was sufficient to awaken
enthusiasm in minds much less patriotic than that of Epaminondas.
He was among the first to join the victorious exiles in arms, after
the contest had been transferred from the houses of Archias and
Leontiades to the open market-place; and he would probably have been
among the first to mount the walls of the Kadmeia, had the Spartan
harmost awaited an assault. Pelopidas being named Bœotarch, his
friend Epaminondas was naturally placed among the earliest and most
forward organizers of the necessary military resistance against the
common enemy; in which employment his capacities speedily became
manifest. Though at this moment almost an unknown man, he had
acquired, in B.C. 371, seven years afterwards, so much reputation
both as speaker and as general, that he was chosen as the expositor
of Theban policy at Sparta, and trusted with the conduct of the
battle of Leuktra, upon which the fate of Thebes hinged. Hence we
may fairly conclude, that the well-planned and successful system of
defence, together with the steady advance of Thebes against Sparta,
during the intermediate years, was felt to have been in the main his
work.[263]

  [261] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 32. Ὦ τοῦ μεγαλοπράγμονος ἀνθρώπου!

  [262] Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. p. 576 E. Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ, Βοιωτῶν
  ἁπάντων τῷ πεπαιδεῦσθαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀξιῶν διαφέρειν, ἀμβλὺς ἐστι
  καὶ ἀπρόθυμος.

  [263] Bauch, in his instructive biography of Epaminondas
  (Epaminondas, und Thebens Kampf um die Hegemonie: Breslau, 1834,
  p. 26), seems to conceive that Epaminondas was never employed
  in any public official post by his countrymen, until the period
  immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra. I cannot concur in
  this opinion. It appears to me that he must have been previously
  employed in such posts as enabled him to show his military
  worth. For all the proceedings of 371 B.C. prove that in that
  year he actually possessed a great and established reputation,
  which must have been acquired by previous acts in a conspicuous
  position; and as he had no great family position to start from,
  his reputation was probably acquired only by slow degrees.

  The silence of Xenophon proves nothing in contradiction of this
  supposition; for he does not mention Epaminondas even at Leuktra.

The turn of politics at Athens which followed the acquittal of
Sphodrias was an unspeakable benefit to the Thebans, in seconding as
well as encouraging their defence; and the Spartans, not unmoved at
the new enemies raised up by their treatment of Sphodrias, thought
it necessary to make some efforts on their side. They organized on
a more systematic scale the military force of their confederacy,
and even took some conciliatory steps with the view of effacing
the odium of their past misrule.[264] The full force of their
confederacy,—including, as a striking mark of present Spartan power,
even the distant Olynthians,[265]—was placed in motion against
Thebes in the course of the summer under Agesilaus; who contrived,
by putting in sudden requisition a body of mercenaries acting in
the service of the Arcadian town Kleitor against its neighbor
the Arcadian Orchomenus, to make himself master of the passes of
Kithæron, before the Thebans and Athenians could have notice of his
passing the Lacedæmonian border.[266] Then crossing Kithæron into
Bœotia, he established his head-quarters at Thespiæ, a post already
under Spartan occupation. From thence he commenced his attacks
upon the Theban territory, which he found defended partly by a
considerable length of ditch and palisade—partly by the main force of
Thebes, assisted by a division of mixed Athenians and mercenaries,
sent from Athens under Chabrias. Keeping on their own side of the
palisade, the Thebans suddenly sent out their cavalry, and attacked
Agesilaus by surprise, occasioning some loss. Such sallies were
frequently repeated, until, by a rapid march at break of day, he
forced his way through an opening in the breastwork into their
inner country, which he laid waste nearly to the city walls.[267]
The Thebans and Athenians, though not offering him battle on equal
terms, nevertheless kept the field against him, taking care to hold
positions advantageous for defence. Agesilaus on his side did not
feel confident enough to attack them against such odds. Yet on one
occasion he had made up his mind to do so; and was marching up to
the charge, when he was daunted by the firm attitude and excellent
array of the troops of Chabrias. They had received orders to await
his approach, on a high and advantageous ground, without moving
until signal should be given; with their shields resting on the
knee, and their spears protended. So imposing was their appearance,
that Agesilaus called off his troops without daring to complete the
charge.[268] After a month or more of devastations on the lands of
Thebes, and a string of desultory skirmishes in which he seems to
have lost rather than gained, Agesilaus withdrew to Thespiæ; the
fortifications of which he strengthened, leaving Phœbidas with a
considerable force in occupation, and then leading back his army to
Peloponnesus.

  [264] Diodor. xv, 31.

  [265] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 54; Diodor. xv, 31.

  [266] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 36-38.

  [267] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 41.

  [268] Diodor. xv, 32; Polyæn. ii, 1, 2; Cornel. Nepos, Chabrias,
  c. 1,—“obnixo genu scuto,”—Demosthen. cont. Leptinem, p. 479.

  The Athenian public having afterwards voted a statue to the honor
  of Chabrias, he made choice of this attitude for the design
  (Diodor. xv, 33).

Phœbidas,—the former captor of the Kadmeia,—thus stationed at
Thespiæ, carried on vigorous warfare against Thebes; partly with his
own Spartan division, partly with the Thespian hoplites, who promised
him unshrinking support. His incursions soon brought on reprisals
from the Thebans; who invaded Thespiæ, but were repulsed by Phœbidas
with the loss of all their plunder. In the pursuit, however, hurrying
incautiously forward, he was slain by a sudden turn of the Theban
cavalry;[269] upon which all his troops fled, chased by the Thebans
to the very gates of Thespiæ. Though the Spartans, in consequence of
this misfortune, despatched by sea another general and division to
replace Phœbidas, the cause of the Thebans was greatly strengthened
by their recent victory. They pushed their success not only against
Thespiæ, but against the other Bœotian cities, still held by local
oligarchies in dependence on Sparta. At the same time, these
oligarchies were threatened by the growing strength of their own
popular or philo-Theban citizens, who crowded in considerable numbers
as exiles to Thebes.[270]

  [269] Xen. Hellen. v, 4. 42-45; Diodor. xv, 33.

  [270] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου πάλιν αὖ τὰ τῶν Θηβαίων
  ἀνεζωπυρεῖτο, καὶ ἐστρατεύοντο εἰς Θεσπιὰς, καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας
  τὰς περιοικίδας πόλεις. Ὁ μέντοι δῆμος ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰς τὰς Θήβας
  ἀπεχώρει· ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι καθειστήκεσαν,
  ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις· ὥστε καὶ οἱ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσι φίλοι τῶν
  Λακεδαιμονίων βοηθείας ἐδέοντο.

A second expedition against Thebes, undertaken by Agesilaus in the
ensuing summer with the main army of the confederacy, was neither
more decisive nor more profitable than the preceding. Though he
contrived, by a well-planned stratagem, to surprize the Theban
palisade, and lay waste the plain, he gained no serious victory;
and even showed, more clearly than before, his reluctance to engage
except upon perfectly equal terms.[271] It became evident that
the Thebans were not only strengthening their position in Bœotia,
but also acquiring practice in warfare and confidence against
the Spartans; insomuch that Antalkidas and some other companions
remonstrated with Agesilaus, against carrying on the war so as only
to give improving lessons to his enemies in military practice,—and
called upon him to strike some decisive blow. He quitted Bœotia,
however, after the summer’s campaign, without any such step.[272] In
his way he appeased an intestine conflict which was about to break
out in Thespiæ. Afterwards, on passing to Megara, he experienced
a strain or hurt, which grievously injured his sound leg, (it has
been mentioned already that he was lame of one leg,) and induced his
surgeon to open a vein in the limb for reducing the inflammation.
When this was done, however, the blood could not be stopped until he
swooned. Having been conveyed home to Sparta in great suffering, he
was confined to his couch for several months; and he remained during
a much longer time unfit for active command.[273]

  [271] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 47, 51.

  The anecdotes in Polyænus (ii, 1, 18-20), mentioning
  faint-heartedness and alarm among the allies of Agesilaus, are
  likely to apply (certainly in part) to this campaign.

  [272] Diodor. xv, 33, 34; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 26.

  [273] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 58.

The functions of general now devolved upon the other king
Kleombrotus, who in the next spring conducted the army of the
confederacy to invade Bœotia anew. But on this occasion, the
Athenians and Thebans had occupied the passes of Kithæron, so that he
was unable even to enter the country, and was obliged to dismiss his
troops without achieving anything.[274]

  [274] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 59.

His inglorious retreat excited such murmurs among the allies when
they met at Sparta, that they resolved to fit out a large naval
force, sufficient both to intercept the supplies of imported corn
to Athens, and to forward an invading army by sea against Thebes,
to the Bœotian port of Kreusis in the Krissæan Gulf. The former
object was attempted first. Towards midsummer, a fleet of sixty
triremes, fitted out under the Spartan admiral Pollis, was cruising
in the Ægean; especially round the coast of Attica, near Ægina,
Keos, and Andros. The Athenians, who, since their recently renewed
confederacy, had been undisturbed by any enemies at sea, found
themselves thus threatened, not merely with loss of power, but also
with loss of trade and even famine; since their corn-ships from the
Euxine, though safely reaching Geræstus (the southern extremity of
Eubœa), were prevented from doubling Cape Sunium. Feeling severely
this interruption, they fitted out at Peiræus a fleet of eighty
triremes,[275] with crews mainly composed of citizens; who, under
the admiral Chabrias, in a sharply contested action near Naxos,
completely defeated the fleet of Pollis, and regained for Athens the
mastery of the sea. Forty-nine Lacedæmonian triremes were disabled
or captured, eight with their entire crews.[276] Moreover, Chabrias
might have destroyed all or most of the rest, had he not suspended
his attack, having eighteen of his own ships disabled, to pick up
both the living men and the dead bodies on board, as well as all
Athenians who were swimming for their lives. He did this (we are
told[277]), from distinct recollection of the fierce displeasure
of the people against the victorious generals after the battle of
Arginusæ. And we may thus see, that though the proceedings on that
memorable occasion were stained both by illegality and by violence,
they produced a salutary effect upon the public conduct of subsequent
commanders. Many a brave Athenian (the crews consisting principally
of citizens) owed his life, after the battle of Naxos, to the
terrible lesson administered by the people to their generals in 406
B.C., thirty years before.

  [275] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 61. ἐνέβησαν αὐτοὶ εἰς τὰς ναῦς, etc.
  Boeckh (followed by Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. ch. 38, vol. v, p.
  58) connects with this maritime expedition an Inscription (Corp.
  Insc. No. 84, p. 124) recording a vote of gratitude, passed by
  the Athenian assembly in favor of Phanokritus, a native of Parium
  in the Propontis. But I think that the vote can hardly belong
  to the present expedition. The Athenians could not need to be
  informed by a native of Parium about the movements of a hostile
  fleet near Ægina and Keos. The information given by Phanokritus
  must have related more probably, I think, to some occasion of the
  transit of hostile ships along the Hellespont, which a native
  of Parium would be the likely person first to discover and
  communicate.

  [276] Diodor. xv, 35; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 17, p. 480.

  I give the number of prize-ships taken in this action, as stated
  by Demosthenes; in preference to Diodorus, who mentions a smaller
  number. The orator, in enumerating the exploits of Chabrias in
  this oration, not only speaks from a written memorandum in his
  hand, which he afterwards causes to be read by the clerk,—but
  also seems exact and special as to numbers, so as to inspire
  greater confidence than usual.

  [277] Diodor. xv, 35. Chabrias ἀπέσχετο παντελῶς τοῦ διωγμοῦ,
  ἀναμνησθεὶς τῆς ἐν Ἀργινούσαις ναυμαχίας, ἐν ᾗ τοὺς νικήσαντας
  στρατηγοὺς ὁ δῆμος ἀντὶ μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας θανάτῳ περιέβαλεν,
  ~αἰτιασάμενος ὅτι τοὺς τετελευτηκότας κατὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν οὐκ
  ἔθαψαν~· εὐλαβήθη οὖν (see Wesseling and Stephens’s note)
  μή ποτε τῆς περιστάσεως ὁμοίας γενομένης κινδυνεύσῃ παθεῖν
  παραπλήσια. Διόπερ ~ἀποστὰς τοῦ διώκειν, ἀνελέγετο τῶν πολιτῶν
  τοὺς διανηχομένους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἔτι ζῶντας διέσωσε, τοὺς
  δὲ τετελευτηκότας ἔθαψεν~. Εἰ δὲ μὴ περὶ ταύτην ἐγένετο τὴν
  ἐπιμέλειαν, ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἅπαντα τὸν πολεμίων στόλον διέφθειρε.

  This passage illustrates what I remarked in my preceding volume
  (Vol. VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 175), respecting the battle of Arginusæ
  and the proceedings at Athens afterwards. I noticed that Diodorus
  incorrectly represented the excitement at Athens against the
  generals as arising from their having neglected to pick up the
  bodies of the _slain_ warriors for burial,—and that he omitted
  the more important fact, that they left many living and wounded
  warriors to perish.

  It is curious, that in the first of the two sentences above
  cited, Diodorus repeats his erroneous affirmation about the
  battle of Arginusæ; while in the second sentence he corrects the
  error, telling us that Chabrias, profiting by the warning, took
  care to pick up the _living_ men on the wrecks and in the water,
  as well as the dead bodies.

This was the first great victory (in September, 376 B.C.[278])
which the Athenians had gained at sea since the Peloponnesian war;
and while it thus filled them with joy and confidence, it led to
a material enlargement of their maritime confederacy. The fleet
of Chabrias,—of which a squadron was detached under the orders of
Phokion, a young Athenian now distinguishing himself for the first
time and often hereafter to be mentioned,—sailed victorious round
the Ægean, made prize of twenty other triremes in single ships,
brought in three thousand prisoners with one hundred and ten talents
in money, and annexed seventeen new cities to the confederacy,
as sending deputies to the synod and furnishing contributions.
The discreet and conciliatory behavior of Phokion, especially
obtained much favor among the islanders, and determined several
new adhesions to Athens.[279] To the inhabitants of Abdêra in
Thrace, Chabrias rendered an inestimable service, by aiding them to
repulse a barbarous horde of Triballi, who quitting their abode from
famine, had poured upon the sea-coast, defeating the Abderites and
plundering their territory. The citizens, grateful for a force left
to defend their town, willingly allied themselves with Athens, whose
confederacy thus extended itself to the coast of Thrace.[280]

  [278] Plutarch, Phokion, c. 6; Plutarch, Camillus, c. 19.

  [279] Demosthen. cont. Leptin. p. 480; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7.

  [280] Diodor. xv, 36. He states by mistake, that Chabrias was
  afterwards assassinated at Abdera.

Having prosperously enlarged their confederacy to the east of
Peloponnesus, the Athenians began to aim at the acquisition of new
allies in the west. The fleet of sixty triremes, which had recently
served under Chabrias, was sent, under the command of Timotheus, the
son of Konon, to circumnavigate Peloponnesus and alarm the coast of
Laconia; partly at the instance of the Thebans, who were eager to
keep the naval force of Sparta occupied, so as to prevent her from
conveying troops across the Krissæan Gulf from Corinth to the Bœotian
port of Kreusis.[281] This Periplus of Peloponnesus,—the first
which the fleet of Athens had attempted since her humiliation at
Ægospotami,—coupled with the ensuing successes, was long remembered
by the countrymen of Timotheus. His large force, just dealing,
and conciliatory professions, won new and valuable allies. Not
only Kephallenia, but the still more important island of Korkyra,
voluntarily accepted his propositions; and as he took care to avoid
all violence or interference with the political constitution, his
popularity all around augmented every day. Alketas, prince of
the Molossi,—the Chaonians with other Epirotic tribes,—and the
Akarnanians on the coast,—all embraced his alliance.[282] While near
Alyzia and Leukas on this coast, he was assailed by the Peloponnesian
ships under Nikolochus, rather inferior in number to his fleet. He
defeated them, and being shortly afterwards reinforced by other
triremes from Korkyra, he became so superior in those waters, that
the hostile fleet did not dare to show itself. Having received only
thirteen talents on quitting Athens, we are told that he had great
difficulty in paying his fleet; that he procured an advance of
money, from each of the sixty trierarchs in his fleet, of seven minæ
towards the pay of their respective ships; and that he also sent
home requests for large remittances from the public treasury;[283]
measures which go to bear out that honorable repugnance to the
plunder of friends or neutrals, and care to avoid even the suspicion
of plunder, which his panegyrist Isokrates ascribes to him.[284]
This was a feature unhappily rare among the Grecian generals on
both sides, and tending to become still rarer, from the increased
employment of mercenary bands.

  [281] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 62.

  [282] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 64; Diodor. xv, 36.

  [283] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 66; Isokrates, De Permutat. s. 116;
  Cornelius Nepos, Timotheus, c. 2.

  The advance of seven minæ respectively, obtained by Timotheus
  from the sixty trierarchs under his command, is mentioned by
  Demosthenes cont. Timotheum (c. 3, p. 1187). I agree with M.
  Boeckh (Public Economy of Athens, ii, 24, p. 294) in referring
  this advance to his expedition to Korkyra and other places in the
  Ionian Sea in 375-374 B.C.; not to his subsequent expedition of
  373 B.C., to which Rehdantz, Lachmann, Schlosser, and others
  would refer it (Vitæ Iphicratis, etc. p. 89). In the second
  expedition, it does not appear that he ever had really sixty
  triremes, or sixty trierarchs, under him. Xenophon (Hellen. v,
  4, 63) tells us that the fleet sent with Timotheus to Korkyra
  consisted of sixty ships; which is the exact number of trierarchs
  named by Demosthenes.

  [284] Isokrates, Orat. De Permutat. s. 128, 131, 135.

The demands of Timotheus on the treasury of Athens were not favorably
received. Though her naval position was now more brilliant and
commanding than it had been since the battle of Ægospotami,—though
no Lacedæmonian fleet showed itself to disturb her in the
Ægean,[285]—yet the cost of the war began to be seriously felt.
Privateers from the neighboring island of Ægina annoyed her commerce,
requiring a perpetual coast-guard; while the contributions from the
deputies to the confederate synod were not sufficient to dispense
with the necessity of a heavy direct property tax at home.[286]

  [285] Isokrates, De Permutat. s. 117; Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c. 2.

  [286] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1.

In this synod the Thebans, as members of the confederacy, were
represented.[287] Application was made to them to contribute towards
the cost of the naval war; the rather, as it was partly at their
instance that the fleet had been sent round to the Ionian Sea. But
the Thebans declined compliance,[288] nor were they probably in any
condition to furnish pecuniary aid. Their refusal occasioned much
displeasure at Athens, embittered by jealousy at the strides which
they had been making during the two last years, partly through the
indirect effect of the naval successes of Athens. At the end of the
year 377 B.C., after the two successive invasions of Agesilaus, the
ruin of two home crops had so straitened the Thebans, that they were
forced to import corn from Pagasæ in Thessaly; in which enterprise
their ships and seamen were at first captured by the Lacedæmonian
harmost at Oreus in Eubœa, Alketas. His negligence, however, soon
led not only to an outbreak of their seamen who had been taken
prisoners, but also to the revolt of the town from Sparta, so that
the communication of Thebes with Pagasæ became quite unimpeded.
For the two succeeding years, there had been no Spartan invasion
of Bœotia; since, in 376 B.C., Kleombrotus could not surmount the
heights of Kithæron,—while in 375 B.C., the attention of Sparta had
been occupied by the naval operations of Timotheus in the Ionian
Sea. During these two years, the Thebans had exerted themselves
vigorously against the neighboring cities of Bœotia, in most of which
a strong party, if not the majority of the population, was favorable
to them, though the government was in the hands of the philo-Spartan
oligarchy, seconded by Spartan harmosts and garrison.[289] We hear of
one victory gained by the Theban cavalry near Platæa, under Charon;
and of another near Tanagra, in which Panthöides, the Lacedæmonian
harmost in that town, was slain.[290]

  [287] See Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 21, 23, 37.

  [288] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1. Οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναῖοι, αὐξανομένους μὲν
  ὁρῶντες διὰ σφᾶς τοὺς Θηβαίους, χρήματά δ’ οὐ συμβαλλομένους
  εἰς τὸ ναυτικὸν, αὐτοὶ δ’ ἀποκναιόμενοι καὶ χρημάτων εἰσφοραῖς
  καὶ λῃστείαις ἐξ Αἰγίνης, καὶ φυλακαῖς τῆς χώρας, ἐπεθύμησαν
  παύσασθαι τοῦ πολέμου.

  [289] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46-55.

  [290] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 15-25.

But the most important of all their successes was that of Pelopidas
near Tegyra. That commander, hearing that the Spartan harmost, with
his two (moræ or) divisions in garrison at Orchomenus, had gone
away on an excursion into the Lokrian territory, made a dash from
Thebes with the Sacred Band and a few cavalry, to surprise the place.
It was the season in which the waters of the Lake Kopaïs were at
the fullest, so that he was obliged to take a wide circuit to the
north-west, and to pass by Tegyra, on the road between Orchomenus and
the Opuntian Lokris. On arriving near Orchomenus, he ascertained
that there were still some Lacedæmonians in the town, and that no
surprise could be effected; upon which he retraced his steps. But
on reaching Tegyra, he fell in with the Lacedæmonian commanders,
Gorgoleon and Theopompus, returning with their troops from the
Lokrian excursion. As his numbers were inferior to theirs by half,
they rejoiced in the encounter; while the troops of Pelopidas were
at first dismayed, and required all his encouragement to work them
up. But in the fight that ensued, closely and obstinately contested
in a narrow pass, the strength, valor, and compact charge of the
Sacred Band proved irresistible. The two Lacedæmonian commanders were
both slain; their troops opened, to allow the Thebans an undisturbed
retreat; but Pelopidas, disdaining this opportunity, persisted in the
combat until all his enemies dispersed and fled. The neighborhood of
Orchomenus forbade any long pursuit, so that Pelopidas could only
erect his trophy, and strip the dead, before returning to Thebes.[291]

  [291] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 17; Diodor. xv, 37.

  Xenophon does not mention the combat at Tegyra. Diodorus
  mentions, what is evidently this battle, near Orchomenus; but he
  does not name Tegyra.

  Kallisthenes seems to have described the battle of Tegyra, and to
  have given various particulars respecting the religious legends
  connected with that spot (Kallisthenes, Fragm. 3, ed. Didot, ap.
  Stephan. Byz. v. Τεγύρα).

This combat, in which the Lacedæmonians were for the first time
beaten in fair field by numbers inferior to their own, produced a
strong sensation in the minds of both the contending parties. The
confidence of the Thebans, as well as their exertion, was redoubled;
so that by the year 374 B.C., they had cleared Bœotia of the
Lacedæmonians, as well as of the local oligarchies which sustained
them; persuading or constraining the cities again to come into
union with Thebes, and reviving the Bœotian confederacy. Haliartus,
Korôneia, Lebadeia, Tanagra, Thespiæ, Platæa, and the rest, thus
became again Bœotian;[292] leaving out Orchomenus alone, (with its
dependency Chæroneia,) which was on the borders of Phokis, and still
continued under Lacedæmonian occupation. In most of these cities, the
party friendly to Thebes was numerous, and the change, on the whole,
popular; though in some the prevailing sentiment was such, that
adherence was only obtained by intimidation. The change here made by
Thebes, was not to absorb these cities into herself, but to bring
them back to the old federative system of Bœotia; a policy which she
had publicly proclaimed on surprising Platæa in 431 B.C.[293] While
resuming her own ancient rights and privileges as head of the Bœotian
federation, she at the same time guaranteed to the other cities,—by
convention, probably express, but certainly implied,—their ancient
rights, their security, and their qualified autonomy, as members; the
system which had existed down to the peace of Antalkidas.

  [292] That the Thebans thus became again presidents of all
  Bœotia, and revived the Bœotian confederacy,—is clearly stated by
  Xenophon, Hellen. v, 4, 63; vi, 1, 1.

  [293] Thucyd. ii, 2. Ἀνεῖπεν ὁ κήρυξ (the Theban herald after the
  Theban troops had penetrated by night into the middle of Platæa)
  εἴ τις βούλεται ~κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν~ ξυμμαχεῖν,
  τίθεσθαι παρ’ αὐτοὺς τὰ ὅπλα, νομίζοντες σφίσι ῥᾳδίως τούτῳ τῷ
  τρόπῳ προσχωρήσειν τὴν πόλιν.

  Compare the language of the Thebans about τὰ πάτρια τῶν Βοιωτῶν
  (iii, 61, 65, 66). The description which the Thebans give of
  their own professions and views, when they attacked Platæa in 431
  B.C., may be taken as fair analogy to judge of their professions
  and views towards the recovered Bœotian towns in 376-375 B.C.

The position of the Thebans was materially improved by this
reconquest or reconfederation of Bœotia. Becoming masters of Kreusis,
the port of Thespiæ,[294] they fortified it, and built some triremes
to repel any invasion from Peloponnesus by sea across the Krissæan
Gulf. Feeling thus secure against invasion, they began to retaliate
upon their neighbors and enemies the Phokians, allies of Sparta, and
auxiliaries in the recent attacks on Thebes,—yet also, from ancient
times, on friendly terms with Athens.[295] So hard pressed were
the Phokians,—especially as Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly was at the
same time their bitter enemy,[296]—that unless assisted, they would
have been compelled to submit to the Thebans, and along with them
Orchomenus, including the Lacedæmonian garrison then occupying it;
while the treasures of the Delphian Temple would also have been laid
open, in case the Thebans should think fit to seize them. Intimation
being sent by the Phokians to Sparta, King Kleombrotus was sent to
their aid, by sea across the Gulf, with four Lacedæmonian divisions
of troops, and an auxiliary body of allies.[297] This reinforcement,
compelling the Thebans to retire, placed both Phokis and Orchomenus
in safety. While Sparta thus sustained them, even Athens looked upon
the Phokian cause with sympathy. When she saw that the Thebans had
passed from the defensive to the offensive,—partly by her help, yet
nevertheless refusing to contribute to the cost of her navy,—her
ancient jealousy of them became again so powerful, that she sent
envoys to Sparta, to propose terms of peace. What these terms were,
we are not told; nor does it appear that the Thebans even received
notice of the proceeding. But the peace was accepted at Sparta, and
two of the Athenian envoys were despatched at once from thence,
without even going home, to Korkyra, for the purpose of notifying the
peace to Timotheus, and ordering him forthwith to conduct his fleet
back to Athens.[298]

  [294] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3; Compare Diodor. xv, 53.

  [295] Diodor. xv, 31; Xen. Hellen, vi, 3, 1; iii, 6, 21.

  [296] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 21-27.

  [297] Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 1; vi, 21.

  This expedition of Kleombrotus to Phokis is placed by Mr. Fynes
  Clinton in 375 B.C. (Fast. Hel. ad 375 B.C.). To me it seems
  to belong rather to 374 B.C. It was not undertaken until the
  Thebans had reconquered all the Bœotian cities (Xen. Hell. vi, 1,
  1); and this operation seems to have occupied them all the two
  years,—376 and 375 B.C. See v, 4, 63, where the words οὔτ’ ἐν ᾧ
  Τιμόθεος περιέπλευσε must be understood to include, not simply
  the time which Timotheus took in _actually circumnavigating_
  Peloponnesus, but the year which he spent afterwards in the
  Ionian Sea, and the time which he occupied in performing his
  exploits near Korkyra, Leukas, and the neighborhood generally.
  The “Periplus” for which Timotheus was afterwards honored at
  Athens (see Æschines cont. Ktesiphont. c. 90, p. 458) meant the
  exploits performed by him during the year and with the fleet of
  the “Periplus.”

  It is worth notice that the Pythian games were celebrated in this
  year 374 B.C.,—ἐπὶ Σωκρατίδου ἄρχοντος; that is, in the first
  quarter of that archon, or the third Olympic year; about the
  beginning of August, Chabrias won a prize at these games with a
  chariot and four; in celebration of which, he afterwards gave a
  splendid banquet at the point of sea-shore called Kôlias, near
  Athens (Demosthen. cont. Neæram. c. 11, p. 1356).

  [298] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 1, 2.

  Kallias seems to have been one of the Athenian envoys (Xen.
  Hellen. vi, 3, 4).

This proposition of the Athenians, made seemingly in a moment of
impetuous dissatisfaction, was made to the advantage of Sparta, and
served somewhat to countervail a mortifying revelation which had
reached the Spartans a little before from a different quarter.

Polydamas, an eminent citizen of Pharsalus in Thessaly, came to
Sparta to ask for aid. He had long been on terms of hospitality
with the Lacedæmonians; while Pharsalus had not merely been in
alliance with them, but was for some time occupied by one of their
garrisons.[299] In the usual state of Thessaly, the great cities
Larissa, Pheræ, Pharsalus, and others, each holding some smaller
cities in a state of dependent alliance, were in disagreement with
each other,—often even in actual war. It was rare that they could
be brought to concur in a common vote for the election of a supreme
chief or Tagus. At his own city of Pharsalus, Polydamas was now
in the ascendant, enjoying the confidence of all the great family
factions who usually contended for predominance; to such a degree,
indeed, that he was entrusted with the custody of the citadel and the
entire management of the revenues, receipts as well as disbursements.
Being a wealthy man, “hospitable and ostentatious in the Thessalian
fashion,” he advanced money from his own purse to the treasury
whenever it was low, and repaid himself when public funds came
in.[300]

  [299] Diodor. xiv, 82.

  [300] Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 3. Καὶ ὁπότε μὲν ἐνδεὴς εἴη,
  παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ προσετίθει· ὁπότε δὲ περιγένοιτο τῆς προσόδου,
  ἀπελάμβανεν· ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλως φιλόξενός τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὴς τὸν
  Θετταλικὸν τρόπον.

  Such loose dealing of the Thessalians with their public revenues
  helps us to understand how Philip of Macedon afterwards got into
  his hands the management of their harbors and customs-duties
  (Demosthen. Olynth. i, p. 15; ii. p. 20). It forms a striking
  contrast with the exactness of the Athenian people about
  their public receipts and disbursements, as testified in the
  inscriptions yet remaining.

But a greater man than Polydamas had now arisen in Thessaly,—Jason,
despot of Pheræ; whose formidable power, threatening the independence
of Pharsalus, he now came to Sparta to denounce. Though the force of
Jason can hardly have been very considerable when the Spartans passed
through Thessaly, six years before, in their repeated expeditions
against Olynthus, he was now not only despot of Pheræ, but master of
nearly all the Thessalian cities (as Lykophron of Pheræ had partially
succeeded in becoming thirty years before),[301] as well as of a
large area of tributary circumjacent territory. The great instrument
of his dominion was, a standing and well-appointed force of six
thousand mercenary troops, from all parts of Greece. He possessed
all the personal qualities requisite for conducting soldiers with
the greatest effect. His bodily strength was great; his activity
indefatigable; his self-command, both as to hardship and as to
temptation, alike conspicuous. Always personally sharing both in the
drill and in the gymnastics of the soldiers, and encouraging military
merits with the utmost munificence, he had not only disciplined them,
but inspired them with extreme warlike ardor and devotion to his
person. Several of the neighboring tribes, together with Alketas,
prince of the Molossi in Epirus, had been reduced to the footing
of his dependent allies. Moreover, he had already defeated the
Pharsalians, and stripped them of many of the towns which had once
been connected with them, so that it only remained for him now to
carry his arms against their city. But Jason was prudent, as well as
daring. Though certain of success, he wished to avoid the odium of
employing force, and the danger of having malcontents for subjects.
He therefore proposed to Polydamas, in a private interview, that he
(Polydamas) should bring Pharsalus under Jason’s dominion, accepting
for himself the second place in Thessaly, under Jason installed as
Tagus or president. The whole force of Thessaly thus united, with
its array of tributary nations around, would be decidedly the first
power in Greece, superior on land either to Sparta or Thebes, and
at sea to Athens. And as to the Persian king, with his multitudes
of unwarlike slaves, Jason regarded him as an enemy yet easier to
overthrow; considering what had been achieved first by the Cyreians,
and afterwards by Agesilaus.

  [301] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 4.

  The story (told in Plutarch, De Gen. Socrat. p. 583 F.) of Jason
  sending a large sum of money to Thebes, at some period anterior
  to the recapture of the Kadmeia, for the purpose of corrupting
  Epaminondas,—appears not entitled to credit. Before that time,
  Epaminondas was too little known to be worth corrupting;
  moreover, Jason did not become _tagus_ of Thessaly until long
  after the recapture of the Kadmeia (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 18, 19).

Such were the propositions, and such the ambitious hopes, which the
energetic despot of Pheræ had laid before Polydamas; who replied,
that he himself had long been allied with Sparta, and that he could
take no resolution hostile to her interests. “Go to Sparta, then
(rejoined Jason), and give notice there, that I intend to attack
Pharsalus, and that it is for them to afford you protection. If
they cannot comply with the demand, you will be unfaithful to the
interests of your city if you do not embrace my offers.” It was on
this mission that Polydamas was now come to Sparta, to announce that
unless aid could be sent to him, he should be compelled unwillingly
to sever himself from her. “Recollect (he concluded) that the enemy
against whom you will have to contend is formidable in every way,
both from personal qualities and from power; so that nothing short of
a first-rate force and commander will suffice. Consider, and tell me
what you can do.”

The Spartans, having deliberated on the point, returned a reply in
the negative. Already a large force had been sent under Kleombrotus
as essential to the defence of Phokis; moreover, the Athenians were
now the stronger power at sea. Lastly, Jason had hitherto lent no
active assistance to Thebes and Athens—which he would assuredly be
provoked to do, if a Spartan army interfered against him in Thessaly.
Accordingly the ephors told Polydamas plainly, that they were unable
to satisfy his demands, recommending him to make the best terms that
he could, both for Pharsalus and for himself. Returning to Thessaly,
he resumed his negotiation with Jason, and promised substantial
compliance with what was required. But he entreated to be spared the
dishonor of admitting a foreign garrison into the citadel which had
been confidentially entrusted to his care; engaging at the same time
to bring his fellow-citizens into voluntary union with Jason, and
tendering his two sons as hostages for faithful performance. All this
was actually brought to pass. The politics of the Pharsalians were
gently brought round, so that Jason, by their votes as well as the
rest, was unanimously elected Tagus of Thessaly.[302]

  [302] See the interesting account of this mission, and the speech
  of Polydamas, which I have been compelled greatly to abridge (in
  Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 4-18).

The dismissal of Polydamas implied a mortifying confession of
weakness on the part of Sparta. It marks, too, an important stage in
the real decline of her power. Eight years before, at the instance
of the Akanthian envoys, backed by the Macedonian Amyntas, she had
sent three powerful armies in succession to crush the liberal and
promising confederacy of Olynthus, and to re-transfer the Grecian
cities on the sea-coast to the Macedonian crown. The region to
which her armies had been sent, was the extreme verge of Hellas.
The parties in whose favor she acted, had scarcely the shadow of a
claim, as friends or allies; while those _against_ whom she acted,
had neither done nor threatened any wrong to her: moreover, the
main ground on which her interference was invoked, was to hinder
the free and equal confederation of Grecian cities. _Now_, a claim,
and a strong claim, is made upon her by Polydamas of Pharsalus,
an old friend and ally. It comes from a region much less distant;
lastly, her political interest would naturally bid her arrest the
menacing increase of an aggressive power already so formidable as
that of Jason. Yet so seriously has the position of Sparta altered
in the last eight years (382-374 B.C.), that she is now compelled
to decline a demand which justice, sympathy, and political policy
alike prompted her to grant. So unfortunate was it for the Olynthian
confederacy, that their honorable and well-combined aspirations
fell exactly during those few years in which Sparta was at her
maximum of power! So unfortunate was such coincidence of time, not
only for Olynthus, but for Greece generally:—since nothing but
Spartan interference restored the Macedonian kings to the sea-coast,
while the Olynthian confederacy, had it been allowed to expand,
might probably have confined them to the interior, and averted the
death-blow which came upon Grecian freedom in the next generation
from their hands.

The Lacedæmonians found some compensation for their reluctant
abandonment of Polydamas, in the pacific propositions from Athens
which liberated them from one of their chief enemies. But the peace
thus concluded was scarcely even brought to execution. Timotheus,
being ordered home from Korkyra, obeyed and set sail with his fleet.
He had serving along with him some exiles from Zakynthus; and as
he passed by that island in his homeward voyage, he disembarked
these exiles upon it, aiding them in establishing a fortified post.
Against this proceeding the Zakynthian government laid complaints
at Sparta, where it was so deeply resented, that redress having
been in vain demanded at Athens, the peace was at once broken off,
and war again declared. A Lacedæmonian squadron of twenty-five sail
was despatched to assist the Zakynthians,[303] while plans were
formed for the acquisition of the more important island of Korkyra.
The fleet of Timotheus having now been removed home, a malcontent
Korkyræan party formed a conspiracy to introduce the Lacedæmonians
as friends, and betray the island to them. A Lacedæmonian fleet of
twenty-two triremes accordingly sailed thither, under color of a
voyage to Sicily. But the Korkyræan government, having detected the
plot, refused to receive them, took precautions for defence, and sent
envoys to Athens to entreat assistance.

  [303] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 3; Diodor. xv, 45.

  The statements of Diodorus are not clear in themselves; besides
  that on some points, though not in the main, they contradict
  Xenophon. Diodorus states that those exiles whom Timotheus
  brought back to Zakynthus, were the philo-Spartan leaders, who
  had been recently expelled for their misrule under the empire of
  Sparta. This statement must doubtless be incorrect. The exiles
  whom Timotheus restored must have belonged to the anti-Spartan
  party in the island.

  But Diodorus appears to me to have got into confusion by
  representing that universal and turbulent reaction against the
  philo-Spartan oligarchies, which really did not take place until
  after the battle of Leuktra—as if it had taken place some three
  years earlier. The events recounted in Diodor. xv, 40, seem to me
  to belong to a period _after_ the battle of Leuktra.

  Diodorus also seems to have made a mistake in saying that the
  Athenians sent _Ktesikles_ as auxiliary commander to _Zakynthus_
  (xv, 46); whereas this very commander is announced by himself
  in the next chapter (as well as by Xenophon, who calls him
  _Stesikles_) as sent to _Korkyra_ (Hellen. v, 2, 10).

  I conceive Diodorus to have inadvertently mentioned this Athenian
  expedition under Stesiklês or Ktesiklês, twice over; once as sent
  to Zakynthus—then again, as sent to _Korkyra_. The latter is the
  truth. No Athenian expedition at all appears on this occasion to
  have gone to Zakynthus; for Xenophon enumerates the Zakynthians
  among those who helped to fit out the fleet of Mnasippus (v, 2,
  3).

  On the other hand, I see no reason for calling in question the
  reality of the two Lacedæmonian expeditions, in the last half of
  374 B.C.—one under Aristokrates to Zakynthus, the other under
  Alkidas to Korkyra—which Diodorus mentions (Diod. xv, 45, 46). It
  is true that Xenophon does not notice either of them; but they
  are noway inconsistent with the facts which he does state.

The Lacedæmonians now resolved to attack Korkyra openly, with
the full naval force of their confederacy. By the joint efforts
of Sparta, Corinth, Leukas, Ambrakia, Elis, Zakynthus, Achaia,
Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis,—strengthened by pecuniary
payments from other confederates, who preferred commuting their
obligation to serve beyond sea,—a fleet of sixty triremes and a body
of one thousand five hundred mercenary hoplites were assembled;
besides some Lacedæmonians, probably Helots or Neodamodes.[304]
At the same time, application was sent to Dionysius the Syracusan
despot, for his coöperation against Korkyra, on the ground that the
connection of that island with Athens had proved once, and might
prove again, dangerous to his city.

  [304] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 3, 5, 16: compare v, 2, 21—about the
  commutation of personal service for money.

  Diodorus (xv, 47) agrees with Xenophon in the main about the
  expedition of Mnasippus, though differing on several other
  contemporary points.

It was in the spring of 373 B.C. that this force proceeded against
Korkyra, under the command of the Lacedæmonian Mnasippus; who, having
driven in the Korkyræan fleet with the loss of four triremes, landed
on the island, gained a victory, and confined the inhabitants within
the walls of the city. He next carried his ravages round the adjacent
lands, which were found in the highest state of cultivation, and
full of the richest produce; fields admirably tilled,—vineyards in
surpassing condition,—with splendid farm-buildings, well-appointed
wine-cellars, and abundance of cattle as well as laboring-slaves.
The invading soldiers, while enriching themselves by depredations
on cattle and slaves, became so pampered with the plentiful stock
around, that they refused to drink any wine that was not of the first
quality.[305] Such is the picture given by Xenophon, an unfriendly
witness, of the democratical Korkyra, in respect of its lauded
economy, at the time when it was invaded by Mnasippus; a picture not
less memorable than that presented by Thucydides (in the speech of
Archidamus), of the flourishing agriculture surrounding democratical
Athens, at the moment when the hand of the Peloponnesian devastator
was first felt there in 431 B.C.[306]

  [305] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 6. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀπέβη (when Mnasippus
  landed), ἐκράτει τε τῆς γῆς καὶ ἐδῄου ἐξειργασμένην μὲν παγκαλῶς
  καὶ πεφυτευμένην τὴν χώραν, μεγαλοπρεπεῖς δὲ οἰκήσεις καὶ
  οἰνῶνας κατεσκευασμένους ἔχουσαν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν· ὥστ’ ἔφασαν τοὺς
  στρατιώτας εἰς τοῦτο τρυφῆς ἐλθεῖν, ὥστ’ οὐκ ἐθέλειν πίνειν,
  εἰ μὴ ἀνθοσμίας εἴη. Καὶ ἀνδράποδα δὲ καὶ βοσκήματα πάμπολλα
  ἡλίσκετο ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν.

  Οἶνον, implied in the antecedent word οἰνῶνας, is understood
  after πίνειν.

  [306] Thucyd. i, 82. (Speech of Archidamus) μὴ γὰρ ἄλλο τι
  νομίσητε τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν (of the Athenians) ἢ ὅμηρον ἔχειν, καὶ οὐχ
  ἧσσον ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ἐξείργασται.

  Compare the earlier portion of the same speech (c. 80), and the
  second speech of the same Archidamus (ii, 11).

  To the same purpose Thucydides speaks, respecting the properties
  of the wealthy men established throughout the area of
  Attica,—οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ καλὰ κτήματα κατὰ τὴν χώραν οἰκοδομίαις
  τε καὶ πολυτελέσι κατασκευαῖς ἀπολωλεκότες (_i. e._ by the
  invasion)—Thucyd. ii, 65.

With such plentiful quarters for his soldiers, Mnasippus encamped
on a hill near the city walls, cutting off those within from
supplies out of the country, while he at the same time blocked
up the harbor with his fleet. The Korkyræans soon began to be in
want. Yet they seemed to have no chance of safety except through
aid from the Athenians; to whom they had sent envoys with pressing
entreaties,[307] and who had now reason to regret their hasty consent
(in the preceding year) to summon home the fleet of Timotheus from
the island. However, Timotheus was again appointed admiral of a new
fleet to be sent thither; while a division of six hundred peltasts,
under Stesiklês, was directed to be despatched by the quickest
route, to meet the immediate necessities of the Korkyræans, during
the delays unavoidable in the preparation of the main fleet and its
circumnavigation of Peloponnesus. These peltasts were conveyed by
land across Thessaly and Epirus, to the coast opposite Korkyra; upon
which island they were enabled to land through the intervention of
Alketas solicited by the Athenians. They were fortunate enough to
get into the town; where they not only brought the news that a large
Athenian fleet might be speedily expected, but also contributed much
to the defence. Without such encouragement and aid, the Korkyræans
would hardly have held out; for the famine within the walls increased
daily; and at length became so severe, that many of the citizens
deserted, and numbers of slaves were thrust out. Mnasippus refused to
receive them, making public proclamation that every one who deserted
should be sold into slavery; and since deserters nevertheless
continued to come, he caused them to be scourged back to the
city-gates. As for the unfortunate slaves, being neither received by
him, nor re-admitted within, many perished outside of the gates from
sheer hunger.[308]

  [307] The envoys from Korkyra to Athens (mentioned by Xenophon,
  v, 2, 9) would probably cross Epirus and Thessaly, through the
  aid of Alketas. This would be a much quicker way for them than
  the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus: and it would suggest
  the same way for the detachment of Stesiklês presently to be
  mentioned.

  [308] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 15.

Such spectacles of misery portended so visibly the approaching hour
of surrender, that the besieging army became careless, and the
general insolent. Though his military chest was well-filled, through
the numerous pecuniary payments which he had received from allies in
commutation of personal service,—yet he had dismissed several of his
mercenaries without pay, and had kept all of them unpaid for the last
two months. His present temper made him not only more harsh towards
his own soldiers,[309] but also less vigilant in the conduct of the
siege. Accordingly the besieged, detecting from their watch-towers
the negligence of the guards, chose a favorable opportunity and
made a vigorous sally. Mnasippus, on seeing his outposts driven in,
armed himself and hastened forward with the Lacedæmonians around him
to sustain them; giving orders to the officers of the mercenaries
to bring their men forward also. But these officers replied, that
they could not answer for the obedience of soldiers without pay;
upon which Mnasippus was so incensed, that he struck them with his
stick and with the shaft of his spear. Such an insult inflamed still
farther the existing discontent. Both officers and soldiers came to
the combat discouraged and heartless, while the Athenian peltasts and
the Korkyræan hoplites, rushing out of several gates at once, pressed
their attack with desperate energy. Mnasippus, after displaying
great personal valor, was at length slain, and all his troops, being
completely routed, fled back to the fortified camp in which their
stores were preserved. Even this too might have been taken, and the
whole armament destroyed, had the besieged attacked it at once. But
they were astonished at their own success. Mistaking the numerous
camp-followers for soldiers in reserve, they retired back to the city.

  [309] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 16.

  Ὁ δ’ αὖ Μνάσιππος ὁρῶν ταῦτα, ἐνόμιζέ τε ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη ἔχειν τὴν
  πόλιν, καὶ περὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους, ἐκαινούργει, καὶ τοὺς μέν τινας
  αὐτῶν ἀπομίσθους ἐπεποιήκει, τοῖς δ’ οὖσι καὶ δυοῖν ἤδη μηνοῖν
  ὤφειλε τὸν μισθὸν, οὐκ ἀπορῶν, ὡς ἐλέγετο, χρημάτων, etc.

Their victory was however so complete, as to reopen easy
communication with the country, to procure sufficient temporary
supplies, and to afford a certainty of holding out until
reinforcement from Athens should arrive. Such reinforcement, indeed,
was already on its way, and had been announced as approaching to
Hypermenês (second under the deceased Mnasippus), who had now
succeeded to the command. Terrified at the news, he hastened to sail
round from his station,—which he had occupied with the fleet to
block up the harbor,—to the fortified camp. Here he first put the
slaves, as well as the property, aboard of his transports, and sent
them away; remaining himself to defend the camp with the soldiers
and marines,—but remaining only a short time, and then taking these
latter also aboard the triremes. He thus completely evacuated the
island, making off for Leukas. But such had been the hurry,—and so
great the terror lest the Athenian fleet should arrive,—that much
corn and wine, many slaves, and even many sick and wounded soldiers,
were left behind. To the victorious Korkyræans, these acquisitions
were not needed to enhance the value of a triumph which rescued them
from capture, slavery, or starvation.[310]

  [310] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 18-26; Diodor. xv, 47.

The Athenian fleet had not only been tardy in arriving, so as to
incur much risk of finding the island already taken,—but when it
did come, it was commanded by Iphikrates, Chabrias, and the orator
Kallistratus,[311]—not by Timotheus, whom the original vote of the
people had nominated. It appears that Timotheus,—who (in April
373 B.C.), when the Athenians first learned that the formidable
Lacedæmonian fleet had begun to attack Korkyra, had been directed to
proceed thither forthwith with a fleet of sixty triremes,—found a
difficulty in manning his ships at Athens, and therefore undertook
a preliminary cruise to procure both seamen and contributory funds,
from the maritime allies. His first act was to transport the six
hundred peltasts under Stesiklês to Thessaly, where he entered into
relations with Jason of Pheræ. He persuaded the latter to become
the ally of Athens, and to further the march of Stesiklês with
his division by land across Thessaly over the passes of Pindus, to
Epirus; where Alketas, who was at once the ally of Athens, and the
dependent of Jason, conveyed them by night across the strait from
Epirus to Korkyra. Having thus opened important connection with the
powerful Thessalian despot, and obtained from him a very seasonable
service, together (perhaps) with some seamen from Pagasæ to man his
fleet,—Timotheus proceeded onward to the ports of Macedonia, where he
also entered into relations with Amyntas, receiving from him signal
marks of private favor,—and then to Thrace as well as the neighboring
islands. His voyage procured for him valuable subsidies in money and
supplies of seamen, besides some new adhesions and deputies to the
Athenian confederacy.

  [311] Xen. Hellen. vi. 2, 39.

This preliminary cruise of Timotheus, undertaken with the general
purpose of collecting means for the expedition to Korkyra, began
in the month of April or commencement of May 373 B.C.[312] On
departing, it appears, he had given orders to such of the allies
as were intended to form part of the expedition, to assemble at
Kalauria (an island off Trœzen, consecrated to Poseidon) where he
would himself come and take them up to proceed onward. Pursuant to
such order, several contingents mustered at this island,—among them
the Bœotians, who sent several triremes, though in the preceding
year it had been alleged against them that they contributed nothing
to sustain the naval exertions of Athens. But Timotheus stayed out a
long time. Reliance was placed upon him, and upon the money which he
was to bring home, for the pay of the fleet; and the unpaid triremes
accordingly fell into distress and disorganization at Kalauria,
awaiting his return.[313] In the mean time fresh news reached Athens
that Korkyra was much pressed; so that great indignation was felt
against the absent admiral, for employing in his present cruise
a precious interval essential to enable him to reach the island
in time. Iphikrates (who had recently come back from serving with
Pharnabazus, in an unavailing attempt to reconquer Egypt for the
Persian king) and the orator Kallistratus, were especially loud in
their accusations against him. And as the very salvation of Korkyra
required pressing haste, the Athenians cancelled the appointment of
Timotheus even during his absence,—naming Iphikrates, Kallistratus,
and Chabrias, to equip a fleet and go round to Korkyra without
delay.[314]

  [312] The manner in which I have described the preliminary
  cruise of Timotheus, will be found (I think) the only way of
  uniting into one consistent narrative the scattered fragments of
  information which we possess respecting his proceedings in this
  year.

  The date of his setting out from Athens is exactly determined by
  Demosthenes, adv. Timoth. p. 1186—the month Munychion, in the
  archonship of Sokratidês—April 373 B.C. Diodorus says that he
  proceeded to Thrace, and that he acquired several new members for
  the confederacy (xv, 47); Xenophon states that he sailed towards
  the islands (Hellen. vi, 2, 12); two statements not directly the
  same, yet not incompatible with each other. In his way to Thrace,
  he would naturally pass up the Eubœan strait and along the coast
  of Thessaly.

  We know that Stesikles and his peltasts must have got to Korkyra,
  not by sea circumnavigating Peloponnesus, but by land across
  Thessaly and Epirus; a much quicker way. Xenophon tells us that
  the Athenians “asked Alketas to help them to cross over from
  the mainland of Epirus to the opposite island of Korkyra: and
  that they were in consequence carried across by night,”—Ἀλκέτου
  δὲ ἐδεήθησαν ~συνδιαβιβάσαι~ τούτους· καὶ οὗτοι μὲν ~νυκτὸς
  διακομισθέντες~ που τῆς χώρας, εἰσῆλθον εἰς τὴν πόλιν.

  Now these troops could not have got to Epirus without crossing
  Thessaly; nor could they have crossed Thessaly without the
  permission and escort of Jason. Moreover, Alketas himself was the
  dependent of Jason, whose goodwill was therefore doubly necessary
  (Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 7).

  We farther know that in the year preceding (374 B.C.), Jason
  was not yet in alliance with Athens, nor even inclined to
  become so, though the Athenians were very anxious for it (Xen.
  Hellen. vi, 1, 10). But in November 373 B.C., Jason (as well as
  Alketas) appears as the established ally of Athens; not as then
  becoming her ally for the first time, but as so completely an
  established ally, that he comes to Athens for the express purpose
  of being present at the trial of Timotheus and of deposing in his
  favor—Ἀφικομένου γὰρ Ἀλκέτου καὶ Ἰάσονος ὡς τοῦτον (Timotheus)
  ἐν τῷ Μαιμακτηριῶνι μηνὶ τῷ ἐπ’ Ἀστείου ἄρχοντος, ~ἐπὶ τὸν
  ἀγῶνα τὸν τούτου, βοηθησόντων αὐτῷ~ καὶ καταγομένων εἰς τὴν
  οἰκίαν τὴν ἐν Πειραιεῖ, etc. (Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 5, p.
  1190). Again,—Αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦτον (Timotheus) ~ἐξαιτουμένων μὲν~
  τῶν ἐπιτηδείων καὶ οἰκείων αὐτῷ ἁπάντων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ~Ἀλκέτου
  καὶ Ἰάσονος, συμμάχων ὄντων ὑμῖν~, μόλις μὲν ἐπείσθητε ἀφεῖναι
  (Demosthen. ib. c, 3, p. 1187.) We see from hence, therefore,
  that the first alliance between Jason and Athens had been
  contracted in the early part of 373 B.C.; we see farther that it
  had been contracted by Timotheus in his preliminary cruise, which
  is the only reasonable way of explaining the strong interest felt
  by Jason as well as by Alketas in the fate of Timotheus, inducing
  them to take the remarkable step of coming to Athens to promote
  his acquittal. It was Timotheus who had first made the alliance
  of Athens with Alketas (Diodor. xv, 36; Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c.
  2), a year or two before.

  Combining all the circumstances here stated, I infer with
  confidence, that Timotheus, in his preliminary cruise, visited
  Jason, contracted alliance between him and Athens, and prevailed
  upon him to forward the division of Stesikles across Thessaly to
  Epirus and Korkyra.

  In this oration of Demosthenes, there are three or four exact
  dates mentioned, which are a great aid to the understanding of
  the historical events of the time. That oration is spoken by
  Apollodorus, claiming from Timotheus the repayment of money lent
  to him by Pasion the banker, father of Apollodorus; and the dates
  specified are copied from entries made by Pasion at the time in
  his commercial books (c. 1. p. 1186; c. 9. p. 1197).

  [313] Demosthen. adv. Timoth. c. 3, p. 1188. ἄμισθον μὲν τὸ
  στράτευμα καταλελύσθαι ἐν Καλαυρίᾳ, etc.—ibid. c. 10, p. 1199.
  προσῆκε γὰρ τῷ μὲν Βοιωτίῳ ἄρχοντι παρὰ τούτου (Timotheus) τὴν
  τροφὴν τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ παραλαμβάνειν· ~ἐκ γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν
  συντάξεων ἡ μισθοφορία ἦν τῷ στρατεύματι· τὰ δὲ χρήματα σὺ~
  (Timotheus) ~ἅπαντα ἐξέλεξας ἐκ τῶν συμμάχων~· καὶ σὲ ἔδει αὐτῶν
  λόγον ἀποδοῦναι.

  [314] Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 2, 12, 13, 39; Demosthen. adv. Timoth.
  c. 3. p. 1188.

Before they could get ready, Timotheus returned; bringing several new
adhesions to the confederacy, with a flourishing account of general
success.[315] He went down to Kalauria to supply the deficiencies
of funds, and make up for the embarrassments which his absence had
occasioned. But he could not pay the Bœotian trierarchs without
borrowing money for the purpose on his own credit; for though the sum
brought home from his voyage was considerable, it would appear that
the demands upon him had been greater still. At first an accusation,
called for in consequence of the pronounced displeasure of the
public, was entered against him by Iphikrates and Kallistratus. But
as these two had been named joint admirals for the expedition to
Korkyra, which admitted of no delay,—his trial was postponed until
the autumn; a postponement advantageous to the accused, and doubtless
seconded by his friends.[316]

  [315] Diodor. xv, 47.

  [316] I collect what is here stated from Demosthen. adv. Timoth.
  c. 3. p. 1188; c. 10. p. 1199. It is there said that Timotheus
  was about to sail home from Kalauria to take his trial; yet it
  is certain that his trial did not take place until the month
  Mæmakterion or November. Accordingly, the trial must have been
  postponed, in consequence of the necessity for Iphikrates and
  Kallistratus going away at once to preserve Korkyra.

Meanwhile Iphikrates adopted the most strenuous measures for
accelerating the equipment of his fleet. In the present temper of
the public, and in the known danger of Korkyra, he was allowed
(though perhaps Timotheus, a few weeks earlier, would not have
been allowed) not only to impress seamen in the port, but even to
coërce the trierarchs with severity,[317] and to employ all the
triremes reserved for the coast-guard of Attica, as well as the two
sacred triremes called Paralus and Salaminia. He thus completed a
fleet of seventy sail, promising to send back a large portion of it
directly, if matters took a favorable turn at Korkyra. Expecting to
find on the watch for him a Lacedæmonian fleet fully equal to his
own, he arranged his voyage so as to combine the maximum of speed
with training to his seamen, and with preparation for naval combat.
The larger sails of an ancient trireme were habitually taken out
of the ship previous to a battle, as being inconvenient aboard:
Iphikrates left such sails at Athens,—employed even the smaller sails
sparingly,—and kept his seamen constantly at the oar; which greatly
accelerated his progress, at the same time that it kept the men in
excellent training. Every day he had to stop, for meals and rest, on
an enemy’s shore; and these halts were conducted with such extreme
dexterity as well as precision, that the least possible time was
consumed, not enough for any local hostile force to get together. On
reaching Sphakteria, Iphikrates learnt for the first time the defeat
and death of Mnasippus. Yet not fully trusting the correctness of
his information, he still persevered both in his celerity and his
precautions, until he reached Kephallenia, where he first fully
satisfied himself that the danger of Korkyra was past. The excellent
management of Iphikrates throughout this expedition is spoken of in
terms of admiration by Xenophon.[318]

  [317] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 14. Ὁ δὲ (Iphikrates) ἐπεὶ κατέστη
  στρατηγὸς, μάλα ὀξέως τὰς ναῦς ἐπληροῦτο, καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους
  ἠνάγκαζε.

  [318] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 27, 32.

Having no longer any fear of the Lacedæmonian fleet, the Athenian
commander probably now sent back the home-squadron of Attica which
he had been allowed to take, but which could ill be spared from
the defence of the coast.[319] After making himself master of some
of the Kephallenian cities, he then proceeded onward to Korkyra;
where the squadron of ten triremes from Syracuse was now on the
point of arriving; sent by Dionysius to aid the Lacedæmonians, but
as yet uninformed of their flight. Iphikrates, posting scouts on the
hills to give notice of their approach, set apart twenty triremes
to be ready for moving at the first signal. So excellent was his
discipline, (says Xenophon,) that “the moment the signal was made,
the ardor of all the crews was a fine thing to see; there was not a
man who did not hasten at a run to take his place aboard.”[320] The
ten Syracusan triremes, after their voyage across from the Iapygian
cape, had halted to rest their men on one of the northern points of
Korkyra; where they were found by Iphikrates and captured, with all
their crews and the admiral Anippus; one alone escaping, through the
strenuous efforts of her captain, the Rhodian Melanôpus. Iphikrates
returned in triumph, towing his nine prizes into the harbor of
Korkyra. The crews, being sold or ransomed, yielded to him a sum
of sixty talents; the admiral Anippus was retained in expectation
of a higher ransom, but slew himself shortly afterwards from
mortification.[321]

  [319] Compare vi, 2, 14—with vi, 2, 39.

  [320] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 34.

  [321] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 35, 38; Diodor. xv, 47.

  We find a story recounted by Diodorus (xvi, 57), that the
  Athenians under Iphikrates captured, off Korkyra, some triremes
  of Dionysius, carrying sacred ornaments to Delphi and Olympia.
  They detained and appropriated the valuable cargo, of which
  Dionysius afterwards loudly complained.

  This story (if there be any truth in it) can hardly allude to
  any other triremes than those under Anippus. Yet Xenophon would
  probably have mentioned the story, if he had heard it; since
  it presents the enemies of Sparta as committing sacrilege. And
  whether the triremes were carrying sacred ornaments or not, it is
  certain that they were coming to take part in the war, and were
  therefore legitimate prizes.

Though the sum thus realized enabled Iphikrates for the time to pay
his men, yet the suicide of Anippus was a pecuniary disappointment
to him, and he soon began to need money. This consideration induced
him to consent to the return of his colleague Kallistratus; who,—an
orator by profession, and not on friendly terms with Iphikrates,—had
come out against his own consent. Iphikrates had himself singled
out both Kallistratus and Chabrias as his colleagues. He was
not indifferent to the value of their advice, nor did he fear
the criticisms, even of rivals, on what they really saw in his
proceedings. But he had accepted the command under hazardous
circumstances; not only from the insulting displacement of Timotheus,
and the provocation consequently given to a powerful party attached
to the son of Konon,—but also in great doubts whether he could
succeed in relieving Korkyra, in spite of the rigorous coërcion
which he applied to man his fleet. Had the island been taken and had
Iphikrates failed, he would have found himself exposed to severe
crimination, and multiplied enemies, at Athens. Perhaps Kallistratus
and Chabrias, if left at home, might in that case have been among
his assailants,—so that it was important to him to identify both of
them with his good or ill success, and to profit by the military
ability of the latter, as well as by the oratorical talent of the
former.[322] As the result of the expedition, however, was altogether
favorable, all such anxieties were removed. Iphikrates could well
afford to part with both his colleagues; and Kallistratus engaged,
that if permitted to go home, he would employ all his efforts to
keep the fleet well paid from the public treasury; or if this were
impracticable, that he would labor to procure peace.[323] So terrible
are the difficulties which the Grecian generals now experience in
procuring money from Athens, (or from other cities in whose service
they are acting,) for payment of their troops! Iphikrates suffered
the same embarrassment which Timotheus had experienced the year
before,—and which will be found yet more painfully felt as we advance
forward in the history. For the present, he subsisted his seamen
by finding work for them on the farms of the Korkyræans, where
there must doubtless have been ample necessity for repairs after
the devastations of Mnasippus, while he crossed over to Akarnania
with his peltasts and hoplites, and there obtained service with the
townships friendly to Athens against such others as were friendly to
Sparta; especially against the warlike inhabitants of the strong town
called Thyrieis.[324]

  [322] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 39. The meaning of Xenophon here is not
  very clear, nor is even the text perfect.

  Ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ ταύτην τὴν στρατηγίαν τῶν Ἰφικράτους οὐχ ἥκιστα
  ἐπαινῶ· ἔπειτα καὶ τὸ ~προσελέσθαι κελεῦσαι ἑαυτῷ~ (this shows
  that Iphikrates himself singled them out) Καλλίστρατόν τε τὸν
  δημήγορον, οὐ μάλα ἐπιτήδειον ὄντα, καὶ Χαβρίαν, μάλα στρατηγικὸν
  νομιζόμενον. Εἴτε γὰρ φρονίμους αὐτοὺς ἡγούμενος εἶναι,
  συμβούλους λαβεῖν ἐβούλετο, σῶφρόν μοι δοκεῖ διαπράξασθαι· ~εἴτε
  ἀντιπάλους νομίζων~, οὕτω θρασέως (some words in the text seem to
  be wanting) ... μήτε καταῤῥᾳθυμῶν μήτε καταμελῶν φαίνεσθαι μηδὲν,
  μεγαλοφρονοῦντος ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι.

  I follow Dr. Thirlwall’s translation of οὐ μάλα ἐπιτήδειον, which
  appears to me decidedly preferable. The word ἠφίει (vi, 3, 3)
  shows that Kallistratus was an unwilling colleague.

  [323] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3. ὑποσχόμενος γὰρ Ἰφικράτει
  (Kallistratus) ~εἰ αὐτὸν ἠφίει~, ἢ χρήματα πέμψειν τῷ ναυτικῷ, ἢ
  εἰρήνην ποιήσειν, etc.

  [324] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 37, 38.

The happy result of the Korkyræan expedition, imparting universal
satisfaction at Athens, was not less beneficial to Timotheus than
to Iphikrates. It was in November, 373 B.C., that the former, as
well as his quæstor or military treasurer Antimachus, underwent each
his trial. Kallistratus, having returned home, pleaded against the
quæstor, perhaps against Timotheus also, as one of the accusers;[325]
though probably in a spirit of greater gentleness and moderation,
in consequence of his recent joint success and of the general good
temper prevalent in the city. And while the edge of the accusation
against Timotheus was thus blunted, the defence was strengthened
not merely by numerous citizen friends speaking in his favor with
increased confidence, but also by the unusual phenomenon of two
powerful foreign supporters. At the request of Timotheus, both
Alketas of Epirus, and Jason of Pheræ, came to Athens a little
before the trial, to appear as witnesses in his favor. They were
received and lodged by him in his house in the Hippodamian Agora,
the principal square of the Peiræus. And as he was then in some
embarrassment for want of money, he found it necessary to borrow
various articles of finery in order to do them honor,—clothes,
bedding, and two silver drinking bowls,—from Pasion, a wealthy
banker near at hand. These two important witnesses would depose to
the zealous service and estimable qualities of Timotheus; who had
inspired them with warm interest, and had been the means of bringing
them into alliance with Athens; an alliance, which they had sealed
at once by conveying Stesikles and his division across Thessaly and
Epirus to Korkyra. The minds of the dikastery would be powerfully
affected by seeing before them such a man as Jason of Pheræ, at
that moment the most powerful individual in Greece; and we are
not surprised to learn that Timotheus was acquitted. His treasurer
Antimachus, not tried by the same dikastery, and doubtless not so
powerfully befriended, was less fortunate. He was condemned to death,
and his property confiscated; the dikastery doubtless believing (on
what evidence we do not know) that he had been guilty of fraud in
dealing with the public money, which had caused serious injury at a
most important crisis. Under the circumstances of the case, he was
held responsible as treasurer, for the pecuniary department of the
money-levying command confided to Timotheus by the people.

  [325] Demosthen. cont. Timoth. c. 9, p. 1197, 1198.

As to the military conduct, for which Timotheus himself would be
personally accountable, we can only remark that having been invested
with the command for the special purpose of relieving the besieged
Korkyra, he appears to have devoted an unreasonable length of time
to his own self-originated cruise elsewhere; though such cruise was
in itself beneficial to Athens; insomuch that if Korkyra had really
been taken, the people would have had good reason for imputing the
misfortune to his delay.[326] And although he was now acquitted, his
reputation suffered so much by the whole affair, that in the ensuing
spring he was glad to accept an invitation of the Persian satraps,
who offered him the command of the Grecian mercenaries in their
service for the Egyptian war; the same command from which Iphikrates
had retired a little time before.[327]

  [326] The narrative here given of the events of 373 B.C., so far
  as they concern Timotheus and Iphikrates, appears to me the only
  way of satisfying the exigencies of the case, and following the
  statements of Xenophon and Demosthenes.

  Schneider in his note, indeed, implies, and Rehdantz (Vitæ
  Iphicratis, etc. p. 86) contends, that Iphikrates did not take
  command of the fleet, nor depart from Athens, until _after_ the
  trial of Timotheus. There are some expressions in the oration of
  Demosthenes, which might seem to countenance this supposition;
  but it will be found hardly admissible, if we attentively study
  the series of facts.

  1. Mnasippus arrived with his armament at Korkyra, and began the
  siege, either before April, or at the first opening of April, 373
  B.C. For his arrival there, and the good condition of his fleet,
  was known at Athens _before_ Timotheus received his appointment
  as admiral of the fleet for the relief of the island (Xen.
  Hellen. vi, 2, 10, 11, 12).

  2. Timotheus sailed from Peiræus on this appointed voyage, in
  April 373 B.C.

  3. Timotheus was tried at Athens in November 373 B.C.; Alketas
  and Jason being then present, as allies of Athens and witnesses
  in his favor.

  Now, if the truth were, that Iphikrates did not depart from
  Athens with his fleet until after the trial of Timotheus in
  November, we must suppose that the siege of Korkyra by Mnasippus
  lasted seven months, and the cruise of Timotheus nearly five
  months. Both the one and the other are altogether improbable. The
  Athenians would never have permitted Korkyra to incur so terrible
  a chance of capture, simply in order to wait for the trial of
  Timotheus. Xenophon does not expressly say how long the siege of
  Korkyra lasted; but from his expressions about the mercenaries of
  Mnasippus (that already pay was owing to them for _as much as two
  months_,—καὶ δυοῖν ~ἤδη~ μηνοῖν—vi, 2, 16), we should infer that
  it could hardly have lasted more than three months in all. Let
  us say, that it lasted four months; the siege would then be over
  in August, and we know that the fleet of Iphikrates arrived just
  after the siege was concluded.

  Besides, is it credible, that Timotheus—named as admiral for the
  express purpose of relieving Korkyra, and knowing that Mnasippus
  was already besieging the place with a formidable fleet—would
  have spent so long a time as _five_ months in his preliminary
  cruise?

  I presume Timotheus to have stayed out in this cruise about _two_
  months; and even this length of time would be quite sufficient to
  raise strong displeasure against him at Athens, when the danger
  and privations of Korkyra were made known as hourly increasing.
  At the time when Timotheus came back to Athens, he found all
  this displeasure actually afloat against him, excited in part
  by the strong censures of Iphikrates and Kallistratus (Dem.
  cont. Timoth. p. 1187. c. 3). The adverse orations in the public
  assembly, besides inflaming the wrath of the Athenians against
  him, caused a vote to be passed deposing him from his command to
  Korkyra, and nominating in his place Iphikrates, with Chabrias
  and Kallistratus. Probably those who proposed this vote would at
  the same time give notice that they intended to prefer a judicial
  accusation against Timotheus for breach or neglect of duty. But
  it would be the interest of all parties to postpone _actual
  trial_ until the fate of Korkyra should be determined, for which
  purpose the saving of time would be precious. Already too much
  time had been lost, and Iphikrates was well aware that his whole
  chance of success depended on celerity; while Timotheus and his
  friends would look upon postponement as an additional chance
  of softening the public displeasure, besides enabling them to
  obtain the attendance of Jason and Alketas. Still, though trial
  was postponed, Timotheus was from this moment under impeachment.
  The oration composed by Demosthenes therefore (delivered by
  Apollodorus as plaintiff, several years afterwards),—though
  speaking loosely, and not distinguishing the angry speeches
  against Timotheus _in the public assembly_ (in June 373 B.C.,
  or thereabouts, whereby his deposition was obtained), from the
  accusing speeches against him at his actual trial in November
  373 B.C., _before the dikastery_—is nevertheless not incorrect
  in saying,—ἐπειδὴ δ’ ἀπεχειροτονήθη μὲν ὑφ’ ὑμῶν στρατηγὸς
  διὰ τὸ μὴ περιπλεῦσαι Πελοπόννησον, ἐπὶ ~κρίσει δὲ παρεδέδοτο
  εἰς τὸν δῆμον~, αἰτίας τῆς μεγίστης τυχὼν (c. 3, p. 1187)—and
  again respecting his coming from Kalauria to Athens—μέλλων
  τοίνυν καταπλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν κρίσιν, ἐν Καλαυρίᾳ δανείζεται, etc.
  (p. 1188, 1189.) That Timotheus had been handed over to the
  people for trial—that he was sailing back from Kalauria _for
  his trial_—might well be asserted respecting his position in
  the month of June, though his trial did not actually take place
  until November. I think it cannot be doubted that the triremes at
  Kalauria would form a part of that fleet which actually went to
  Korkyra under Iphikrates; not waiting to go thither until after
  the trial of Timotheus in November, but departing as soon as
  Iphikrates could get ready, probably about July 373 B.C.

  Rehdantz argues that if Iphikrates departed with the fleet in
  July, he must have returned to Athens in November to the trial
  of Timotheus, which is contrary to Xenophon’s affirmation that
  he remained in the Ionian sea until 371 B.C. But if we look
  attentively at the oration of Demosthenes, we shall see that
  there is no certain ground for affirming Iphikrates to have
  been present in Athens in November, during the actual trial of
  Timotheus. The phrases in p. 1187—ἐφειστήκει δ’ αὐτῷ Καλλίστρατος
  καὶ Ἰφικράτης ... οὕτω δὲ διέθεσαν ὑμᾶς κατηγοροῦντες τούτου
  αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ συναγορεύοντες αὐτοῖς, etc., may be well
  explained, so far as Iphikrates is concerned, by supposing them
  to allude to those pronounced censures in the public assembly
  whereby the vote of deposition against Timotheus was obtained,
  and whereby the general indignation against him was first
  excited. I therefore see no reason for affirming that Iphikrates
  was actually present at the trial of Timotheus in November. But
  Kallistratus was really present at the trial (see c. 9. p. 1197,
  1198); which consists well enough with the statement of Xenophon,
  that this orator obtained permission from Iphikrates to leave
  him at Korkyra and come back to Athens (vi, 3, 3). Kallistratus
  directed his accusation mainly against Antimachus, the treasurer
  of Timotheus. And it appears to me that under the circumstances
  of the case, Iphikrates, having carried his point of superseding
  Timotheus in the command and gaining an important success at
  Korkyra—might be well-pleased to be dispensed from the obligation
  of formally accusing him before the dikastery, in opposition to
  Jason and Alketas, as well as to a powerful body of Athenian
  friends.

  Diodorus (xv, 47) makes a statement quite different from
  Xenophon. He says that Timotheus was at first deposed from
  his command, but afterwards forgiven and re-appointed by the
  people (jointly with Iphikrates) in consequence of the great
  accession of force which he had procured in his preliminary
  cruise. Accordingly the fleet, one hundred and thirty triremes
  in number, was despatched to Korkyra under the joint command
  of Iphikrates and Timotheus. Diodorus makes no mention of the
  trial of Timotheus. This account is evidently quite distinct
  from that of Xenophon, which latter is on all grounds to be
  preferred, especially as its main points are in conformity with
  the Demosthenic oration.

  [327] Demosth. cont. Timoth. c. 6. p. 1191; c. 8. p. 1194.

  We see from another passage of the same oration, that the
  creditors of Timotheus reckoned upon his making a large sum
  of money in the Persian service (c. 1, p. 1185). This farther
  illustrates what I have said in a previous note, about the
  motives of the distinguished Athenian officers to take service in
  foreign parts away from Athens.

That admiral, whose naval force had been reinforced by a large
number of Korkyræan triremes, was committing without opposition
incursions against Akarnania, and the western coast of Peloponnesus;
insomuch that the expelled Messenians, in their distant exile at
Hesperides in Libya, began to conceive hopes of being restored by
Athens to Naupaktus, which they had occupied under her protection
during the Peloponnesian war.[328] And while the Athenians were
thus masters at sea both east and west of Peloponnesus,[329] Sparta
and her confederates, discouraged by the ruinous failure of their
expedition against Korkyra in the preceding year, appear to have
remained inactive. With such mental predispositions, they were
powerfully affected by religious alarm arising from certain frightful
earthquakes and inundations with which Peloponnesus was visited
during this year, and which were regarded as marks of the wrath of
the god Poseidon. More of these formidable visitations occurred this
year in Peloponnesus than had ever before been known; especially one,
the worst of all, whereby the two towns of Helikê and Bura in Achaia
were destroyed, together with a large portion of their population.
Ten Lacedæmonian triremes, which happened to be moored on this shore
on the night when the calamity occurred, were destroyed by the rush
of the waters.[330]

  [328] Xen. Hellen. vi, 2, 38; Pausanias, iv, 26, 3.

  [329] See a curious testimony to this fact in Demosthen. cont.
  Neæram, c. 12, p. 1357.

  [330] Diodor. xi, 48, 49; Pausan. vii, 25; Ælian. Hist. Animal.
  xi, 19.

  Kallisthenes seems to have described at large, with appropriate
  religious comments, numerous physical portents which occurred
  about this time (see Kallisthen. Fragm. 8, ed. Didot).

Under these depressing circumstances, the Lacedæmonians had recourse
to the same manœuvre which had so well served their purpose fifteen
years before, in 388-387 B.C. They sent Antalkidas again as envoy
to Persia, to entreat both pecuniary aid,[331] and a fresh Persian
intervention enforcing anew the peace which bore his name; which
peace had now been infringed (according to Lacedæmonian construction)
by the reconstitution of the Bœotian confederacy under Thebes as
president. And it appears that in the course of the autumn or
winter, Persian envoys actually did come to Greece, requiring that
the belligerents should all desist from war, and wind up their
dissensions on the principles of the peace of Antalkidas.[332] The
Persian satraps, at this time renewing their efforts against Egypt,
were anxious for the cessation of hostilities in Greece, as a means
of enlarging their numbers of Grecian mercenaries; of which troops
Timotheus had left Athens a few months before to take the command.

  [331] This second mission of Antalkidas is sufficiently verified
  by an indirect allusion of Xenophon (vi, 3, 12). His known
  philo-Laconian sentiments sufficiently explain why he avoids
  directly mentioning it.

  [332] Diodor. xv, 50.

  Diodorus had stated (a few chapters before, xv, 38) that Persian
  envoys had also come into Greece a little before the peace of 374
  B.C., and had been the originators of that previous peace. But
  this appears to me one of the cases (not a few altogether in his
  history) in which he repeats himself, or gives the same event
  twice over under analogous circumstances. The intervention of the
  Persian envoys bears much more suitably on the period immediately
  preceding the peace of 371 B.C., than upon that which preceded
  the peace of 374 B.C., when, in point of fact, no peace was ever
  fully executed.

  Dionysius of Halikarnassus also (Judic. de Lysiâ, p. 479)
  represents the king of Persia as a party to the peace sworn by
  Athens and Sparta in 371 B.C.

Apart, however, from this prospect of Persian intervention, which
doubtless was not without effect,—Athens herself was becoming more
and more disposed towards peace. That common fear and hatred of the
Lacedæmonians, which had brought her into alliance with Thebes in 378
B.C., was now no longer predominant. She was actually at the head
of a considerable maritime confederacy; and this she could hardly
hope to increase by continuing the war, since the Lacedæmonian naval
power had already been humbled. Moreover, she found the expense of
warlike operations very burdensome, nowise defrayed either by the
contributions of her allies or by the results of victory. The orator
Kallistratus,—who had promised either to procure remittances from
Athens to Iphikrates, or to recommend the conclusion of peace,—was
obliged to confine himself to the latter alternative, and contributed
much to promote the pacific dispositions of his countrymen.[333]

  [333] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3.

Moreover, the Athenians had become more and more alienated from
Thebes. The ancient antipathy between these two neighbors had for
a time been overlaid by common fear of Sparta. But as soon as
Thebes had reëstablished her authority in Bœotia, the jealousies
of Athens again began to arise. In 374 B.C., she had concluded a
peace with the Spartans, without the concurrence of Thebes; which
peace was broken almost as soon as made, by the Spartans themselves,
in consequence of the proceedings of Timotheus at Zakynthus. The
Phokians,—against whom, as having been active allies of Sparta in her
invasions of Bœotia, Thebes was now making war,—had also been ancient
friends of Athens, who sympathized with their sufferings.[334]
Moreover, the Thebans on their side probably resented the unpaid and
destitute condition in which their seamen had been left by Timotheus
at Kalauria, during the expedition for the relief of Korkyra in the
preceding year;[335] an expedition of which Athens alone reaped
both the glory and the advantage. Though they remained members of
the confederacy, sending deputies to the congress at Athens, the
unfriendly spirit on both sides continued on the increase, and was
farther exasperated by their violent proceeding against Platæa in the
first half of 372 B.C.

  [334] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 1.

  [335] Demosthen. cont. Timoth. p. 1188, s. 17.

During the last three or four years, Platæa, like the other towns of
Bœotia, had been again brought into the confederacy under Thebes.
Reëstablished by Sparta after the peace of Antalkidas as a so-called
autonomous town, it had been garrisoned by her as a post against
Thebes, and was no longer able to maintain a real autonomy after
the Spartans had been excluded from Bœotia in 376 B.C. While other
Bœotian cities were glad to find themselves emancipated from their
philo-Laconian oligarchies and rejoined to the federation under
Thebes, Platæa,—as well as Thespiæ,—submitted to the union only by
constraint; awaiting any favorable opportunity for breaking off,
either by means of Sparta or of Athens. Aware probably of the growing
coldness between the Athenians and Thebans, the Platæans were
secretly trying to persuade Athens to accept and occupy their town,
annexing Platæa to Attica;[336] a project hazardous both to Thebes
and Athens, since it would place them at open war with each other,
while neither was yet at peace with Sparta.

  [336] Diodor. xv, 46. I do not know from whom Diodorus copied
  this statement; but it seems extremely reasonable.

This intrigue, coming to the knowledge of the Thebans, determined
them to strike a decisive blow. Their presidency, over more than one
of the minor Bœotian cities, had always been ungentle, suitable to
the roughness of their dispositions. Towards Platæa, especially, they
not only bore an ancient antipathy, but regarded the reëstablished
town as little better than a Lacedæmonian encroachment, abstracting
from themselves a portion of territory which had become Theban, by
prescriptive enjoyment lasting for forty years from the surrender
of Platæa in 427 B.C. As it would have been to them a loss as
well as embarrassment, if Athens should resolve to close with the
tender of Platæa,—they forestalled the contingency by seizing the
town for themselves. Since the reconquest of Bœotia by Thebes, the
Platæans had come again, though reluctantly, under the ancient
constitution of Bœotia; they were living at peace with Thebes,
acknowledging her rights as president of the federation, and having
their own rights as members guaranteed in return by her, probably
under positive engagement,—that is, their security, their territory,
and their qualified autonomy, subject to the federal restrictions
and obligations. But though thus at peace with Thebes,[337] the
Platæans knew well what was her real sentiment towards them,
and their own towards her. If we are to believe, what seems very
probable, that they were secretly negotiating with Athens to help
them in breaking off from the federation,—the consciousness of
such an intrigue tended still farther to keep them in anxiety and
suspicion. Accordingly, being apprehensive of some aggression from
Thebes, they kept themselves habitually on their guard. But their
vigilance was somewhat relaxed and most of them went out of the city
to their farms in the country, on the days, well known beforehand,
when the public assemblies in Thebes were held. Of this relaxation
the Bœotarch Neokles took advantage.[338] He conducted a Theban armed
force, immediately from the assembly, by a circuitous route through
Hysiæ to Platæa; which town he found deserted by most of its male
adults, and unable to make resistance. The Platæans,—dispersed in the
fields, finding their walls, their wives, and their families, all in
possession of the victor,—were under the necessity of accepting the
terms proposed to them. They were allowed to depart in safety, and to
carry away all their movable property; but their town was destroyed,
and its territory again annexed to Thebes. The unhappy fugitives
were constrained for the second time to seek refuge at Athens, where
they were again kindly received, and restored to the same qualified
right of citizenship as they had enjoyed prior to the peace of
Antalkidas.[339]

  [337] This seems to me what is meant by the Platæan speaker in
  Isokrates, when he complains more than once that Platæa had
  been taken by the Thebans in time of peace,—εἰρήνης οὔσης. The
  speaker, in protesting against the injustice of the Thebans,
  appeals to two guarantees which they have violated; for the
  purpose of his argument, however, the two are not clearly
  distinguished, but run together into one. The first guarantee
  was, the peace of Antalkidas, under which Platæa had been
  restored, and to which Thebes, Sparta, and Athens, were all
  parties. The second guarantee, was that given by Thebes when she
  conquered the Bœotian cities in 377-370 B.C., and reconstituted
  the federation; whereby she ensured to the Platæans existence
  as a city, with so much of autonomy as was consistent with the
  obligations of a member of the Bœotian federation. When the
  Platæan speaker accuses the Thebans of having violated “the oaths
  and the agreement” (ὅρκους καὶ ξυνθήκας), he means the terms of
  the peace of Antalkidas, subject to the limits afterwards imposed
  by the submission of Platæa to the federal system of Bœotia. He
  calls for the tutelary interference of Athens, as a party to the
  peace of Antalkidas.

  Dr. Thirlwall thinks (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 38. p. 70-72) that
  the Thebans were parties to the peace of 374 B.C. between Sparta
  and Athens; that they accepted it, intending deliberately to
  break it; and that under that peace, the Lacedæmonian harmosts
  and garrisons were withdrawn from Thespiæ and other places in
  Bœotia. I am unable to acquiesce in this view; which appears to
  me negatived by Xenophon, and neither affirmed nor implied in
  the Plataic discourse of Isokrates. In my opinion, there were
  no Lacedæmonian harmosts in Bœotia (except at Orchomenus in the
  north) in 374 B.C. Xenophon tells (Hellen. v, 4, 63; vi, 1, 1)
  that the Thebans “were recovering the Bœotian cities—had subdued
  the Bœotian cities”—in or before 375 B.C., so that they were
  able to march out of Bœotia and invade Phokis; which implies the
  expulsion or retirement of all the Lacedæmonian forces from the
  southern part of Bœotia.

  The reasoning in the Plataic discourse of Isokrates is not very
  clear or discriminating; nor have we any right to expect that it
  should be, in the pleading of a suffering and passionate man.
  But the expression εἰρήνης οὔσης and εἰρήνη may always (in my
  judgment) be explained, without referring it, as Dr. Thirlwall
  does, to the peace of 374 B.C., or supposing Thebes to have been
  a party to that peace.

  [338] Pausanias, ix, 1, 3.

  [339] Diodor. xv, 47.

  Pausanias (ix, 1, 3) places this capture of Platæa in the third
  year (counting the years from midsummer to midsummer) before
  the battle of Leuktra; or in the year of the archon Asteius at
  Athens; which seems to me the true date, though Mr. Clinton
  supposes it (without ground, I think) to be contradicted by
  Xenophon. The year of the archon Asteius reaches from midsummer
  373 to 372 B.C. It is in the latter half of the year that I
  suppose Platæa to have been taken.

It was not merely with Platæa, but also with Thespiæ, that Thebes
was now meddling. Mistrusting the dispositions of the Thespians, she
constrained them to demolish the fortifications of their town;[340]
as she had caused to be done fifty-two years before, after the
victory of Delium,[341] on suspicion of leanings favorable to Athens.

  [340] I infer this from Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 21-38;
  compare also sect. 10. The Platæan speaker accuses the Thebans
  of having destroyed the walls of some Bœotian cities (over and
  above what they had done to Platæa,) and I venture to apply this
  to Thespiæ. Xenophon indeed states that the Thespians were at
  this very period treated exactly like the Platæans; that is,
  driven out of Bœotia, and their town destroyed; except that they
  had not the same claim on Athens (Hellen. vi, 3, 1—ἀπόλιδας
  γενομένους: compare also vi, 3, 5). Diodorus also (xv, 46)
  speaks of the Thebans as having destroyed Thespiæ. But against
  this, I gather, from the Plataic Oration of Isokrates, that the
  Thespians were not in the same plight with the Platæans when
  that oration was delivered; that is, they were not expelled
  collectively out of Bœotia. Moreover, Pausanias also expressly
  says that the Thespians were present in Bœotia at the time of
  the battle of Leuktra, and that they were expelled shortly
  afterwards. Pausanias at the same time gives a distinct story,
  about the conduct of the Thespians, which it would not be
  reasonable to reject (ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1). I believe therefore
  that Xenophon has spoken inaccurately in saying that the
  Thespians were ἀπόλιδες _before_ the battle of Leuktra. It is
  quite possible that they might have sent supplications to Athens
  (ἱκετεύοντας—Xen. Hell. vi, 3, 1) in consequence of the severe
  mandate to demolish their walls.

  [341] Thucyd. iv, 133.

Such proceedings on the part of the Thebans in Bœotia excited
strong emotion at Athens; where the Platæans not only appeared as
suppliants, with the tokens of misery conspicuously displayed, but
also laid their case pathetically before the assembly, and invoked
aid to regain their town, of which they had been just bereft. On a
question at once so touching and so full of political consequences,
many speeches were doubtless composed and delivered, one of which has
fortunately reached us; composed by Isokrates, and perhaps actually
delivered by a Platæan speaker before the public assembly. The hard
fate of this interesting little community is here impressively set
forth; including the bitterest reproaches, stated with not a little
of rhetorical exaggeration, against the multiplied wrongs done
by Thebes, as well towards Athens as towards Platæa. Much of his
invective is more vehement than conclusive. Thus when the orator
repeatedly claims for Platæa her title to autonomous existence,
under the guarantee of universal autonomy sworn at the peace of
Antalkidas,[342]—the Thebans would doubtless reply, that at the
time of that peace, Platæa was no longer in existence; but had
been extinct for forty years, and was only renovated afterwards by
the Lacedæmonians for their own political purposes. And the orator
intimates plainly, that the Thebans were noway ashamed of their
proceeding, but came to Athens to justify it, openly and avowedly;
moreover, several of the most distinguished Athenian speakers
espoused the same side.[343] That the Platæans had coöperated with
Sparta in her recent operations in Bœotia against both Athens and
Thebes, was an undeniable fact; which the orator himself can only
extenuate by saying that they acted under constraint from a present
Spartan force,—but which was cited on the opposite side as a proof
of their philo-Spartan dispositions, and of their readiness again
to join the common enemy as soon as he presented himself.[344]
The Thebans would accuse Platæa of subsequent treason to the
confederacy; and they even seem to have contended, that they had
rendered a positive service to the general Athenian confederacy
of which they were members,[345] by expelling the inhabitants of
Platæa and dismantling Thespiæ; both towns being not merely devoted
to Sparta, but also adjoining Kithæron, the frontier line whereby
a Spartan army would invade Bœotia. Both in the public assembly of
Athens, and in the general congress of the confederates at that
city, animated discussions were raised upon the whole subject;[346]
discussions, wherein, as it appears, Epaminondas, as the orator and
representative of Thebes, was found a competent advocate against
Kallistratus, the most distinguished speaker in Athens; sustaining
the Theban cause with an ability which greatly enhanced his growing
reputation.[347]

  [342] Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 11, 13, 18, 42, 46, 47,
  68.

  [343] Isokrates, Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 3. Εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ Θηβαίους
  ἑωρῶμεν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου παρεσκευασμένους πείθειν ὑμᾶς ὡς οὐδὲν
  εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐξημαρτήκασι, διὰ βραχέων ἂν ἐποιησάμεθα τοὺς λόγους·
  ἐπειδὴ δ’ εἰς τοῦτ’ ἀτυχίας ἤλθομεν, ὥστε μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸν
  ἀγῶνα πρὸς τούτους ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ῥητόρων τοὺς δυνατωτάτους, οὓς
  ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων αὑτοῖς οὗτοι παρεσκευάσαντο συνηγόρους, etc.

  Compare sect. 36.

  [344] Isokr. Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 12, 13, 14, 16, 28, 33, 48.

  [345] Isokrat. Or. xiv, (Plat.) s. 23-27. λέγουσιν ὡς ὑπὲρ τοῦ
  κοινοῦ τῶν συμμάχων ταῦτ’ ἔπραξαν—φασὶ τὸ Θηβαίους ἔχειν τὴν
  ἡμετέραν, τοῦτο σύμφερον εἶναι τοῖς συμμάχοις, etc.

  [346] Isokrat. Or. 14, (Plat.) s. 23, 24.

  [347] Diodorus, (xv, 38) mentions the parliamentary conflict
  between Epaminondas and _Kallistratus_, assigning it to the
  period immediately antecedent to the abortive peace concluded
  between Athens and Sparta three years before. I agree with
  Wesseling (see his note _ad loc._) in thinking that these debates
  more properly belong to the time immediately preceding the peace
  of 371 B.C. Diodorus has made great confusion between the two;
  sometimes repeating twice over the same antecedent phenomena,
  as if they belonged to both,—sometimes assigning to one what
  properly belongs to the other.

  The altercation between Epaminondas and _Kallistratus_ (ἐν τῷ
  κοινῷ συνεδρίῳ) seems to me more properly appertaining to debates
  in the assembly of the confederacy at Athens,—rather than to
  debates at Sparta, in the preliminary discussions for peace,
  where the altercations between Epaminondas and _Agesilaus_
  occurred.

But though the Thebans and their Athenian supporters, having all the
prudential arguments on their side, carried the point so that no step
was taken to restore the Platæans, nor any hostile declaration made
against those to whom they owed their expulsion,—yet the general
result of the debates, animated by keen sympathy with the Platæan
sufferers, tended decidedly to poison the good feeling, and loosen
the ties, between Athens and Thebes. This change showed itself
by an increased gravitation towards peace with Sparta; strongly
advocated by the orator Kallistratus, and now promoted not merely by
the announced Persian intervention, but by the heavy cost of war,
and the absence of all prospective gain from its continuance. The
resolution was at length taken,—first by Athens, and next, probably,
by the majority of the confederates assembled at Athens,—to make
propositions of peace to Sparta, where it was well known that similar
dispositions prevailed towards peace. Notice of this intention was
given to the Thebans, who were invited to send envoys thither also,
if they chose to become parties. In the spring of 371 B.C., at the
time when the members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy were assembled
at Sparta, both the Athenian and Theban envoys, and those from the
various members of the Athenian confederacy, arrived there. Among
the Athenian envoys, two at least,—Kallias (the hereditary daduch or
torchbearer of the Eleusinian ceremonies) and Autoklês,—were men of
great family at Athens; and they were accompanied by Kallistratus the
orator.[348] From the Thebans, the only man of note was Epaminondas,
then one of the Bœotarchs.

  [348] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 3.

  It seems doubtful, from the language of Xenophon, whether
  Kallistratus was one of the envoys appointed, or only a companion.

Of the debates which took place at this important congress, we
have very imperfect knowledge; and of the more private diplomatic
conversations, not less important than the debates, we have no
knowledge at all. Xenophon gives us a speech from each of the three
Athenians, and from no one else. That of Kallias, who announces
himself as hereditary proxenus of Sparta at Athens, is boastful
and empty, but eminently philo-Laconian in spirit;[349] that of
Autoklês is in the opposite tone, full of severe censure on the past
conduct of Sparta; that of Kallistratus, delivered after the other
two,—while the enemies of Sparta were elate, her friends humiliated,
and both parties silent from the fresh effect of the reproaches of
Autoklês,[350]—is framed in a spirit of conciliation; admitting
faults on both sides, but deprecating the continuance of war, as
injurious to both, and showing how much the joint interests of both
pointed towards peace.[351]

  [349] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 4-6.

  [350] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 7-10. Ταῦτ’ εἰπὼν, σιωπὴν μὲν παρὰ
  πάντων ἐποίησεν (Autoklês), ἡδομένους δὲ τοὺς ἀχθομένους τοῖς
  Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐποίησε.

  [351] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 10-17.

This orator, representing the Athenian diplomacy of the time,
recognizes distinctly the peace of Antalkidas as the basis upon which
Athens was prepared to treat,—autonomy to each city, small as well
as great; and in this way, coinciding with the views of the Persian
king, he dismisses with indifference the menace that Antalkidas was
on his way back from Persia with money to aid the Lacedæmonians in
the war. It was not from fear of the Persian treasures (he urged),—as
the enemies of peace asserted,—that Athens sought peace.[352] Her
affairs were now so prosperous, both by sea and land, as to prove
that she only did so on consideration of the general evils of
prolonged war, and on a prudent abnegation of that rash confidence
which was always ready to contend for extreme stakes,[353] like a
gamester playing double or quits. The time had come for both Sparta
and Athens now to desist from hostilities. The former had the
strength on land, the latter was predominant at sea; so that each
could guard the other; while the reconciliation of the two would
produce peace throughout the Hellenic world, since in each separate
city, one of the two opposing local parties rested on Athens, the
other on Sparta.[354] But it was indispensably necessary that
Sparta should renounce that system of aggression (already pointedly
denounced by the Athenian, Autoklês) on which she had acted since
the peace of Antalkidas; a system, from which she had at last reaped
bitter fruits, since her unjust seizure of the Kadmeia had ended by
throwing into the arms of the Thebans all those Bœotian cities, whose
separate autonomy she had bent her whole policy to ensure.[355]

  [352] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 12, 13.

  [353] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 16.

  [354] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 14. Καὶ γὰρ δὴ κατὰ γῆν μὲν τις ἂν,
  ὑμῶν φίλων ὄντων, ἱκανὸς γένοιτο ἡμᾶς λυπῆσαι; κατὰ θάλαττάν γε
  μὴν τις ἂν ὑμᾶς βλάψαι τι, ἡμῶν ὑμῖν ἐπιτηδείων ὄντων;

  [355] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 11. Καὶ ὑμῖν δὲ ἔγωγε ὁρῶ διὰ τὰ
  ἀγνωμόνως πραχθέντα ἔστιν ὅτε πολλὰ ἀντίτυπα γιγνόμενα· ὧν ἦν καὶ
  ἡ καταληφθεῖσα ἐν Θήβαις Καδμεία· νῦν γοῦν, ὡς (?) ἐσπουδάσατε
  αὐτονόμους τὰς πόλεις γίγνεσθαι, πᾶσαι πάλιν, ἐπεὶ ἠδικήθησαν οἱ
  Θηβαῖοι, ἐπ’ ἐκείνοις γεγένηνται.

Two points stand out in this remarkable speech, which takes a
judicious measure of the actual position of affairs;—first, autonomy
to every city; and autonomy in the genuine sense, not construed and
enforced by the separate interests of Sparta, as it had been at the
peace of Antalkidas; next, the distribution of such preëminence or
headship, as was consistent with this universal autonomy, between
Sparta and Athens; the former on land, the latter at sea,—as the
means of ensuring tranquillity in Greece. That “autonomy perverted
to Lacedæmonian purposes,”—which Perikles had denounced before
the Peloponnesian war as the condition of Peloponnesus, and which
had been made the political canon of Greece by the peace of
Antalkidas,—was now at an end. On the other hand, Athens and Sparta
were to become mutual partners and guarantees; dividing the headship
of Greece by an ascertained line of demarcation, yet neither of them
interfering with the principle of universal autonomy. Thebes, and
her claim to the presidency of Bœotia, were thus to be set aside by
mutual consent.

It was upon this basis that the peace was concluded. The armaments
on both sides were to be disbanded; the harmosts and garrisons
everywhere withdrawn, in order that each city might enjoy full
autonomy. If any city should fail in observance of these conditions,
and continue in a career of force against any other, all were at
liberty to take arms for the support of the injured party; but no
one who did not feel disposed, was bound so to take arms. This last
stipulation exonerated the Lacedæmonian allies from one of their most
vexatious chains.

To the conditions here mentioned, all parties agreed; and on the
ensuing day the oaths were exchanged. Sparta took the oath for
herself and her allies; Athens took the oath for herself only; her
allies afterwards took it severally, each city for itself. Why such
difference was made, we are not told; for it would seem that the
principle of severance applied to both confederacies alike.

Next came the turn of the Thebans to swear; and here the fatal hitch
was disclosed. Epaminondas, the Theban envoy, insisted on taking the
oath, not for Thebes separately, but for Thebes as president of the
Bœotian federation, including all the Bœotian cities. The Spartan
authorities on the other hand, and Agesilaus as the foremost of all,
strenuously opposed him. They required that he should swear for
Thebes alone, leaving the Bœotian cities to take the oath each for
itself.

Already in the course of the preliminary debates, Epaminondas
had spoken out boldly against the ascendency of Sparta. While
most of the deputies stood overawed by her dignity, represented
by the energetic Agesilaus as spokesman,—he, like the Athenian
Autoklês, and with strong sympathy from many of the deputies
present, had proclaimed that nothing kept alive the war except her
unjust pretensions, and that no peace could be durable unless such
pretensions were put aside.[356] Accepting the conditions of peace
as finally determined, he presented himself to swear to them in the
name of the Bœotian federation. But Agesilaus, requiring that each
of the Bœotian cities should take the oath for itself, appealed to
those same principles of liberty which Epaminondas himself had just
invoked, and asked him whether each of the Bœotian cities had not as
good a title to autonomy as Thebes. Epaminondas might have replied
by asking, why Sparta had just been permitted to take the oath for
her allies as well as for herself. But he took a higher ground. He
contended that the presidency of Bœotia was held by Thebes on as
good a title as the sovereignty of Laconia by Sparta.[357] He would
remind the assembly that when Bœotia was first conquered and settled
by its present inhabitants, the other towns had all been planted out
from Thebes as their chief and mother-city; that the federal union of
all, administered by Bœotarchs chosen by and from all, with Thebes
as president, was coeval with the first settlement of the country;
that the separate autonomy of each was qualified by an established
institution, devolving on the Bœotarchs and councils sitting at
Thebes the management of the foreign relations of all jointly.
All this had been already pleaded by the Theban orator fifty-six
years earlier, before the five Spartan commissioners, assembled to
determine the fate of the captives after the surrender of Platæa;
when he required the condemnation of the Platæans as guilty of
treason to the ancestral institutions of Bœotia;[358] and the Spartan
commissioners had recognized the legitimacy of these institutions
by a sweeping sentence of death against the transgressors. Moreover,
at a time when the ascendency of Thebes over the Bœotian cities
had been greatly impaired by her anti-Hellenic coöperation with
the invading Persians, the Spartans themselves had assisted her
with all their power to reëstablish it, as a countervailing force
against Athens.[359] Epaminondas could show, that the presidency of
Thebes over the Bœotian cities was the keystone of the federation;
a right not only of immemorial antiquity, but pointedly recognized
and strenuously vindicated by the Spartans themselves. He could show
farther that it was as old, and as good, as their own right to govern
the Laconian townships; which latter was acquired and held (as one of
the best among their own warriors had boastfully proclaimed)[360] by
nothing but Spartan valor and the sharpness of the Spartan sword.

  [356] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 27.

  [357] Plutarch. Agesil. c. 28.

  [358] Thucyd. iii, 61. ἡμῶν (the Thebans) κτισάντων Πλάταιαν
  ὕστερον τῆς ἄλλης Βοιωτίας καὶ ἄλλα χωρία μετ’ αὐτῆς, ἃ
  ξυμμίκτους ἀνθρώπους ἐξελάσαντες ἔσχομεν, οὐκ ἠξίουν οὗτοι (the
  Platæans), ~ὥσπερ ἐτάχθη τὸ πρῶτον~, ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑφ’ ἡμῶν,
  ~ἔξω δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Βοιωτῶν παραβαίνοντες τὰ πάτρια~, ἐπειδὴ
  προσηναγκάζοντο, προσεχώρησαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, etc.

  Again (c. 65) he says respecting the oligarchical Platæans who
  admitted the Theban detachment when it came by night to surprise
  Platæa,—εἰ δὲ ἄνδρες ὑμῶν οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ γένει,
  βουλόμενοι τῆς μὲν ἔξω ξυμμαχίας ὑμᾶς παῦσαι, ~ἐς δὲ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν
  πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια καταστῆσαι~, ἐπεκαλέσαντο ἕκοντες, etc.

  Again (c. 66), κατὰ τὰ πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια, etc. Compare ii, 2.

  [359] Diodor. xi, 81.

  [360] Thucyd. iv, 126.

  Brasidas, addressing his soldiers when serving in Macedonia, on
  the approach of the Illyrians:—

  Ἀγαθοῖς γὰρ εἶναι προσήκει ὑμῖν τὰ πολέμια, οὐ διὰ ξυμμάχων
  παρουσίαν ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ δι’ οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν, καὶ μηδὲν πλῆθος
  πεφοβῆσθαι ἑτέρων· οἵ γε μηδὲ ἀπὸ πολιτειῶν τοιούτων ἥκετε, ἐν
  αἷς οὐ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων ἄρχουσιν, ἀλλὰ πλειόνων μᾶλλον ἐλάσσους·
  ~οὐκ ἄλλῳ τινὶ κτησάμενοι τὴν δυναστείαν ἢ τῷ μαχόμενοι κρατεῖν~.

An emphatic speech of this tenor, delivered amidst the deputies
assembled at Sparta, and arraigning the Spartans not merely in their
supremacy over Greece, but even in their dominion at home,—was as it
were the shadow cast before, by coming events. It opened a question
such as no Greek had ever ventured to raise. It was a novelty
startling to all,—extravagant probably in the eyes of Kallistratus
and the Athenians,—but to the Spartans themselves, intolerably
poignant and insulting.[361] They had already a long account of
antipathy to clear off with Thebes; their own wrong-doing in seizing
the Kadmeia,—their subsequent humiliation in losing it and being
unable to recover it,—their recent short-comings and failures, in
the last seven years of war against Athens and Thebes jointly. To
aggravate this deep-seated train of hostile associations, their
pride was now wounded in an unforeseen point, the tenderest of all.
Agesilaus, full to overflowing of the national sentiment, which in
the mind of a Spartan passed for the first of virtues, was stung to
the quick. Had he been an Athenian orator like Kallistratus, his
wrath would have found vent in an animated harangue. But a king of
Sparta was anxious only to close these offensive discussions with
scornful abruptness, thus leaving to the presumptuous Theban no
middle ground between humble retraction and acknowledged hostility.
Indignantly starting from his seat, he said to Epaminondas,—“Speak
plainly,—will you, or will you not, leave to each of the Bœotian
cities its separate autonomy?” To which the other replied—“Will
_you_ leave each of the Laconian towns autonomous?” Without saying
another word, Agesilaus immediately caused the name of the Thebans
to be struck out of the roll, and proclaimed them excluded from the
treaty.[362]

  [361] One may judge of the revolting effect produced by such
  a proposition, before the battle of Leuktra,—by reading the
  language which Isokrates puts into the mouth of the Spartan
  prince Archidamus, five or six years after that battle,
  protesting that all Spartan patriots ought to perish rather than
  consent to the relinquishment of Messenia,—περὶ μὲν ἄλλων τινῶν
  ἀμφισβητήσεις, ἐγίγνοντο, περὶ δὲ Μεσσήνης, οὔτε βασιλεὺς, οὐθ’
  ἡ τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλις, οὐδὲ πώποθ’ ἡμῖν ἐνεκάλεσεν ὡς ἀδίκως
  κεκτημένοις αὐτήν (Isok. Arch. s. 32). In the spring of 371 B.C.,
  what had once been Messenia, was only a portion of Laconia, which
  no one thought of distinguishing from the other portions (see
  Thucyd. iv, 3, 11).

  [362] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 28; Pausanias, ix, 13, 1; compare
  Diodor. xv, 51. Pausanias erroneously assigns the debate to the
  congress preceding the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B.C.; at which
  time Epaminondas was an unknown man.

  Plutarch gives this interchange of brief questions, between
  Agesilaus and Epaminondas, which is in substance the same as that
  given by Pausanias, and has every appearance of being the truth.
  But he introduces it in a very bold and abrupt way, such as
  cannot be conformable to the reality. To raise a question about
  the right of Sparta to govern Laconia, was a most daring novelty.
  A courageous and patriotic Theban might venture upon it as a
  retort against those Spartans who questioned the right of Thebes
  to her presidency of Bœotia; but he would never do so without
  assigning his reasons to justify an assertion so startling to a
  large portion of his hearers. The reasons which I here ascribe to
  Epaminondas are such as we know to have formed the Theban creed,
  in reference to the Bœotian cities; such as were actually urged
  by the Theban orator in 427 B.C., when the fate of the Platæan
  captives was under discussion. After Epaminondas had once laid
  out the reasons in support of his assertion, he might then, if
  the same brief question were angrily put to him a second time,
  meet it with another equally brief counter-question or retort. It
  is this final interchange of thrusts which Plutarch has given,
  omitting the arguments previously stated by Epaminondas, and
  necessary to warrant the seeming paradox which he advances. We
  must recollect that Epaminondas does not contend that Thebes was
  entitled to _as much power_ in Bœotia as Sparta in Laconia. He
  only contends that Bœotia, under the presidency of Thebes, was as
  much an integral political aggregate, as Laconia under Sparta,—in
  reference to the Grecian world.

  Xenophon differs from Plutarch in his account of the conduct of
  the Theban envoys. He does not mention Epaminondas at all, nor
  any envoy by name; but he says that “the Thebans, having entered
  their name among the cities which had taken the oaths, came on
  the next day and requested, that the entry might be altered,
  and that ‘_the Bœotians_’ might be substituted in place of _the
  Thebans_, as having taken the oath. Agesilaus told them that he
  could make no change; but he would strike their names out if they
  chose, and he accordingly did strike them out” (vi, 3, 19). It
  seems to me that this account is far less probable than that of
  Plutarch, and bears every mark of being incorrect. Why should
  such a man as Epaminondas (who doubtless was the envoy) consent
  at first to waive the presidential pretensions of Thebes, and to
  swear for her alone? If he did consent, why should he retract
  the next day? Xenophon is anxious to make out Agesilaus to be as
  much in the right as may be; since the fatal consequences of his
  proceedings manifested themselves but too soon.

Such was the close of this memorable congress at Sparta in June,
371 B.C. Between the Spartans and Athenians, and their respective
allies, peace was sworn. But the Thebans were excluded, and their
deputies returned home (if we may believe Xenophon[363]) discouraged
and mournful. Yet such a man as Epaminondas must have been well
aware that neither his claims nor his arguments would be admitted by
Sparta. If therefore he was disappointed with the result, this must
be because he had counted upon, but did not obtain, support from the
Athenians or others.

  [363] Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 3, 20.

The leaning of the Athenian deputies had been adverse rather than
favorable to Thebes throughout the congress. They were disinclined,
from their sympathies with the Platæans, to advocate the presidential
claims of Thebes, though on the whole it was the political interest
of Athens that the Bœotian federation should be maintained, as
a bulwark to herself against Sparta. Yet the relations of Athens
with Thebes, after the congress as before it, were still those of
friendship, nominal rather than sincere. It was only with Sparta, and
her allies, that Thebes was at war, without a single ally attached to
her. On the whole, Kallistratus and his colleagues had managed the
interests of Athens in this congress with great prudence and success.
They had disengaged her from the alliance with Thebes, which had been
dictated seven years before by common fear and dislike of Sparta,
but which had no longer any adequate motive to countervail the cost
of continuing the war; at the same time, the disengagement had been
accomplished without bad faith. The gains of Athens, during the last
seven years of war, had been considerable. She had acquired a great
naval power, and a body of maritime confederates; while her enemies
the Spartans had lost their naval power in the like proportion.
Athens was now the ascendent leader of maritime and insular
Greece,—while Sparta still continued to be the leading power on land,
but only on land; and a tacit partnership was now established between
the two, each recognizing the other in their respective halves of the
Hellenic hegemony.[364] Moreover, Athens had the prudence to draw her
stake, and quit the game, when at the maximum of her acquisitions,
without taking the risk of future contingencies.

  [364] Diodor. xv, 38-82.

On both sides, the system of compulsory and indefeasable
confederacies was renounced; a renunciation which had already been
once sworn to, sixteen years before, at the peace of Antalkidas, but
treacherously perverted by Sparta in the execution. Under this new
engagement, the allies of Sparta or Athens ceased to constitute an
organized permanent body, voting by its majority, passing resolutions
permanently binding upon dissentients, arming the chief state with
more or less power of enforcement against all, and forbidding
voluntary secessions of individual members. They became a mere
uncemented aggregate of individuals, each acting for himself; taking
counsel together as long as they chose, and coöperating so far as
all were in harmony; but no one being bound by any decision of the
others, nor recognizing any right in the others to compel him even
to performance of what he had specially promised, if it became
irksome. By such change, therefore, both Athens and Sparta were
losers in power; yet the latter to a much greater extent than the
former, inasmuch as her reach of power over her allies had been more
comprehensive and stringent.

We here see the exact point upon which the requisition addressed
by Sparta to Thebes, and the controversy between Epaminondas and
Agesilaus, really turned. Agesilaus contended that the relation
between Thebes and the other Bœotian cities was the same as what
subsisted between Sparta and her allies; that accordingly, when
Sparta renounced the indefeasible and compulsory character of
her confederacy, and agreed to deal with each of its members as
a self-acting and independent unit, she was entitled to demand
that Thebes should do the same in reference to the Bœotian towns.
Epaminondas, on the contrary, denied the justice of this parallel.
He maintained that the proper subject of comparison to be taken, was
the relation of Sparta, not to her extra-Laconian allies, but to
the Laconian townships; that the federal union of the Bœotian towns
under Thebes was coeval with the Bœotian settlement, and among the
most ancient phenomena of Greece; that in reference to other states,
Bœotia, like Laconia or Attica, was the compound and organized
whole, of which each separate city was only a fraction; that other
Greeks had no more right to meddle with the internal constitution
of these fractions, and convert each of them into an integer,—than
to insist on separate independence for each of the townships of
Laconia. Epaminondas did not mean to contend that the power of Thebes
over the Bœotian cities was as complete and absolute in degree, as
that of Sparta over the Laconian townships; but merely that her
presidential power, and the federal system of which it formed a part,
were established, indefeasible, and beyond the interference of any
Hellenic convention,—quite as much as the internal government of
Sparta in Laconia.

Once already this question had been disputed between Sparta and
Thebes at the peace of Antalkidas; and already decided once by the
superior power of the former, extorting submission from the latter.
The last sixteen years had reversed the previous decision, and
enabled the Thebans to reconquer those presidential rights of which
the former peace had deprived them. Again, therefore, the question
stood for decision, with keener antipathy on both sides,—with
diminished power in Sparta,—but with increased force, increased
confidence, and a new leader whose inestimable worth was even yet
but half-known,—in Thebes. The Athenians,—friendly with both, yet
allies of neither,—suffered the dispute to be fought out without
interfering. How it was settled will appear in the next chapter.




CHAPTER LXXVIII.

BATTLE OF LEUKTRA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.


Immediately after the congress at Sparta in June 371 B.C., the
Athenians and Lacedæmonians both took steps to perform the covenants
sworn respectively to each other as well as to the allies generally.
The Athenians despatched orders to Iphikrates, who was still at
Korkyra or in the Ionian Sea, engaged in incursions against the
Lacedæmonian or Peloponnesian coasts,—that he should forthwith
conduct his fleet home, and that if he had made any captures
subsequent to the exchange of oaths at Sparta, they should all be
restored;[365] so as to prevent the misunderstanding which had
occurred fifty-two years before with Brasidas,[366] in the peninsula
of Pallênê. The Lacedæmonians on their side sent to withdraw their
harmosts and their garrisons from every city still under occupation.
Since they had already made such promise once before, at the peace
of Antalkidas, but had never performed it,—commissioners,[367] not
Spartans, were now named from the general congress, to enforce the
execution of the agreement.

  [365] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 1.

  [366] Thucyd. iv.

  [367] Diodorus, xv, 38. ἐξαγωγεῖς, Xen. Hellen. _l. c._

  Diodorus refers the statements in this chapter to the peace
  between Athens and Sparta in 374 B.C. I have already remarked
  that they belong properly to the peace of 371 B.C.; as Wesseling
  suspects in his note.

No great haste, however, was probably shown in executing this part
of the conditions; for the whole soul and sentiment of the Spartans
were absorbed by their quarrel with Thebes. The miso-Theban impulse
now drove them on with a fury which overcame all other thoughts;
and which, though doubtless Agesilaus and others considered it at
the time as legitimate patriotic resentment for the recent insult,
appeared to the philo-Laconian Xenophon, when he looked back upon it
from the subsequent season of Spartan humiliation, to be a misguiding
inspiration sent by the gods,[368]—like that of the Homeric Atê. Now
that Thebes stood isolated from Athens and all other allies out of
Bœotia, Agesilaus had full confidence of being able to subdue her
thoroughly. The same impression of the superiority of Spartan force
was also entertained both by the Athenians and by other Greeks; to a
great degree even by the Thebans themselves. It was anticipated that
the Spartans would break up the city of Thebes into villages (as they
had done at Mantinea) or perhaps retaliate upon her the fate which
she had inflicted upon Platæa—or even decimate her citizens and her
property to the profit of the Delphian god, pursuant to the vow that
had been taken more than a century before, in consequence of the
assistance lent by the Thebans to Xerxes.[369] Few persons out of
Bœotia doubted of the success of Sparta.

  [368] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3. ἤδη γὰρ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ δαιμόνιον
  ἦγεν, etc.

  [369] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 20; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 20; Diodor.
  xv, 51.

To attack Thebes, however, an army was wanted; and as Sparta, by the
peace just sworn, had renounced everything like imperial ascendency
over her allies, leaving each of them free to send or withhold
assistance as they chose,—to raise an army was no easy task; for
the allies, generally speaking, being not at all inflamed with the
Spartan antipathy against Thebes, desired only to be left to enjoy
their newly-acquired liberty. But it so happened, that at the moment
when peace was sworn, the Spartan king Kleombrotus was actually at
the head of an army, of Lacedæmonians and allies, in Phokis, on the
north-western frontier of Bœotia. Immediately on hearing of the
peace, Kleombrotus sent home to ask for instructions as to his future
proceedings. By the unanimous voice of the Spartan authorities and
assembly, with Agesilaus as the most vehement of all,[370] he was
directed to march against the Thebans, unless they should flinch
at the last moment (as they had done at the peace of Antalkidas),
and relinquish their presidency over the other Bœotian cities.
One citizen alone, named Prothöus, interrupted this unanimity. He
protested against the order, first, as a violation of their oaths,
which required them to disband the army and reconstitute it on the
voluntary principle,—next, as imprudent in regard to the allies, who
now looked upon such liberty as their right, and would never serve
with cordiality unless it were granted to them. But Prothöus was
treated with disdain as a silly alarmist,[371] and the peremptory
order was despatched to Kleombrotus; accompanied, probably, by a
reinforcement of Spartans and Lacedæmonians, the number of whom, in
the ensuing battle, seems to have been greater than can reasonably be
imagined to have been before serving in Phokis.

  [370] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 28.

  [371] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 2, 3. ἐκεῖνον μὲν φλυαρεῖν ἡγήσατο, etc.

Meanwhile no symptoms of concession were manifested at Thebes.[372]
Epaminondas, on his return, had found cordial sympathy with the
resolute tone which he had adopted both in defence of the Bœotian
federation and against Sparta. Though every one felt the magnitude
of the danger, it was still hoped that the enemy might be prevented
from penetrating out of Phokis into Bœotia. Epaminondas accordingly
occupied with a strong force the narrow pass near Koroneia, lying
between a spur of Mount Helikon on one side and the Lake Kopaïs on
the other; the same position as had been taken by the Bœotians, and
forced by the army returning from Asia under Agesilaus, twenty-three
years before. Orchomenus lay northward (that is, on the Phokian side)
of this position; and its citizens, as well as its Lacedæmonian
garrison, now doubtless formed part of the invading army of
Kleombrotus. That prince, with a degree of military skill rare in
the Spartan commanders, baffled all the Theban calculations. Instead
of marching by the regular road from Phokis into Bœotia, he turned
southward by a mountain-road scarcely deemed practicable, defeated
the Theban division under Chæreas which guarded it, and crossed the
ridge of Helikon to the Bœotian port of Kreusis on the Crissæan Gulf.
Coming upon this place by surprise, he stormed it, capturing twelve
Theban triremes which lay in the harbor. He then left a garrison
to occupy the port, and marched without delay over the mountainous
ground into the territory of Thespiæ on the eastern declivity
of Helikon; where he encamped on the high ground, at a place of
ever-memorable name, called Leuktra.[373]

  [372] It is stated that either the Lacedæmonians from Sparta,
  or Kleombrotus from Phokis, sent a new formal requisition to
  Thebes, that the Bœotian cities should be left autonomous; and
  the requisition was repudiated (Diodor. xv, 51; Aristeides, Or.
  (Leuktr.) ii, xxxiv, p. 644, ed. Dindorf). But such mission seems
  very doubtful.

  [373] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 3, 4; Diodor. xv, 53; Pausan. ix, 13, 2.

Here was an important success, skilfully gained; not only placing
Kleombrotus within an easy march of Thebes, but also opening a sure
communication by sea with Sparta, through the port of Kreusis, and
thus eluding the difficulties of Mount Kithæron. Both the king
and the Lacedæmonians around him were full of joy and confidence;
while the Thebans on their side were struck with dismay as well as
surprise. It required all the ability of Epaminondas, and all the
daring of Pelopidas, to uphold the resolution of their countrymen,
and to explain away or neutralize the terrific signs and portents,
which a dispirited Greek was sure to see in every accident of the
road. At length, however, they succeeded in this, and the Thebans
with their allied Bœotians were marched out from Thebes to Leuktra,
where they were posted on a declivity opposite to the Spartan camp.
They were commanded by the seven Bœotarchs, of whom Epaminondas
was one. But such was the prevalent apprehension of joining battle
with the Spartans on equal terms, that even when actually on the
ground, three of these Bœotarchs refused to concur in the order for
fighting, and proposed to shut themselves up in Thebes for a siege,
sending their wives and families away to Athens. Epaminondas was
vainly combatting their determination, when the seventh Bœotarch,
Branchylides, arrived from the passes of Kithæron, where he had been
on guard, and was prevailed upon to vote in favor of the bolder
course. Though a majority was thus secured for fighting, yet the
feeling throughout the Theban camp was more that of brave despair
than of cheering hope; a conviction that it was better to perish in
the field, than to live in exile with the Lacedæmonians masters
of the Kadmeia. Some encouraging omens, however, were transmitted
to the camp, from the temples in Thebes as well as from that of
Trophonius at Lebadeia:[374] and a Spartan exile named Leandrias,
serving in the Theban ranks, ventured to assure them that they were
now on the very spot foredoomed for the overthrow of the Lacedæmonian
empire. Here stood the tomb of two females (daughters of a Leuktrian
named Skedasus) who had been violated by two Lacedæmonians and had
afterwards slain themselves. Skedasus, after having in vain attempted
to obtain justice from the Spartans for this outrage, came back,
imprecating curses on them, and slew himself also. The vengeance of
these departed sufferers would now be sure to pour itself out on
Sparta, when her army was in their own district and near their own
tomb. And the Theban leaders, to whom the tale was full of opportune
encouragement, crowned the tomb with wreaths, invoking the aid of its
inmates against the common enemy now present.[375]

  [374] Kallisthenes, apud Cic. de Divinatione, i, 34, Fragm. 9,
  ed. Didot.

  [375] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 7; Diodor. xv, 54; Pausan. ix, 13, 3;
  Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 20, 21; Polyænus, ii, 3, 8.

  The latter relates that Pelopidas in a dream saw Skedasus,
  who directed him to offer on this tomb “an auburn virgin” to
  the deceased females. Pelopidas and his friends were greatly
  perplexed about the fulfilment of this command; many urged
  that it was necessary for some maiden to devote herself, or to
  be devoted by her parents, as a victim for the safety of the
  country, like Menœkeus and Makaria in the ancient legends; others
  denounced the idea as cruel and inadmissible. In the midst of the
  debate, a mare, with a chestnut filly, galloped up, and stopped
  not far off; upon which the prophet Theokritus exclaimed,—“Here
  comes the victim required, sent by the special providence of the
  gods.” The chestnut filly was caught and offered as a sacrifice
  on the tomb; every one being in high spirits from a conviction
  that the mandate of the gods had been executed.

  The prophet Theokritus figures in the treatise of Plutarch De
  Genio Socratis (c. 3, p. 576 D.) as one of the companions of
  Pelopidas in the conspiracy whereby the Theban oligarchy was put
  down and the Lacedæmonians expelled from the Kadmeia.

While others were thus comforted by the hope of superhuman aid,
Epaminondas, to whom the order of the coming battle had been
confided, took care that no human precautions should be wanting. His
task was arduous; for not only were his troops dispirited, while
those of the enemy were confident,—but their numbers were inferior,
and some of the Bœotians present were hardly even trustworthy.
What the exact numbers were on either side, we are not permitted
to know. Diodorus assigns about six thousand men to the Thebans;
Plutarch states the numbers of Kleombrotus at eleven thousand.[376]
Without placing faith in these figures, we see good reason for
believing that the Theban total was decidedly inferior. For such
inferiority Epaminondas strove to make up by skilful tactics, and by
a combination at that time novel as well as ingenious. In all former
Grecian battles, the opposite armies had been drawn up in line,
and had fought along the whole line; or at least such had been the
intention of the generals,—and if it was not realized, the cause was
to be sought in accidents of the ground, or backwardness or disorder
on the part of some division of the soldiers. Departing from this
habit, Epaminondas now arrayed his troops so as to bring his own left
to bear with irresistible force upon the Spartan right, and to keep
back the rest of his army comparatively out of action. Knowing that
Kleombrotus, with the Spartans and all the official persons, would be
on the right of their own line, he calculated that, if successful on
this point against the best troops, he should find little resistance
from the remainder. Accordingly he placed on his own left wing
chosen Theban hoplites, to the prodigious depth of fifty shields,
with Pelopidas and the Sacred Band in front. His order of advance
was disposed obliquely or in echelon, so that the deep column on
the left should join battle first, while the centre and right kept
comparatively back and held themselves more in a defensive attitude.

  [376] Diodor. xv, 52-56; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 20.

In 371 B.C., such a combination was absolutely new, and betokened
high military genius. It is therefore no disgrace to Kleombrotus
that he was not prepared for it, and that he adhered to the ordinary
Grecian tactics of joining battle at once along the whole line.
But so unbounded was the confidence reigning among the Spartans,
that there never was any occasion on which peculiar precautions
were less thought of. When, from their entrenched camp on the
Leuktrian eminence, they saw the Thebans encamped on an opposite
eminence, separated from them by a small breadth of low ground and
moderate declivities,—their only impatience was to hurry on the
decisive moment, so as to prevent the enemy from escaping. Both the
partisans and the opponents of Kleombrotus united in provoking
the order for battle, each in their own language. The former urged
him, since he had never yet done anything against the Thebans, to
strike a blow, and clear himself from the disparaging comparisons
which rumor instituted between him and Agesilaus; the latter gave
it to be understood, that if Kleombrotus were now backward, their
suspicions would be confirmed that he leaned in his heart towards
the Thebans.[377] Probably the king was himself sufficiently eager
to fight, and so would any other Spartan general have been, under
the same circumstances, before the battle of Leuktra. But even had
he been otherwise, the impatience, prevalent among the Lacedæmonian
portion of his army, left him no option. Accordingly, the decided
resolution to fight was taken. The last council was held, and the
final orders issued by Kleombrotus, after his morning meal, where
copious libations of wine both attested and increased the confident
temper of every man. The army was marched out of the camp, and
arrayed on the lower portion of the declivity; Kleombrotus with
the Spartans and most of the Lacedæmonians being on the right, in
an order of twelve deep. Some Lacedæmonians were also on the left,
but respecting the order of the other parts of the line, we have no
information. The cavalry was chiefly posted along the front.

  [377] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 5.

Meanwhile, Epaminondas also marched down his declivity, in his
own chosen order of battle: his left wing being both forward, and
strengthened into very deep order, for desperate attack. His cavalry
too were posted in front of his line. But before he commenced his
march, he sent away his baggage and attendants home to Thebes;
while at the same time he made proclamation that any of his Bœotian
hoplites, who were not hearty in the cause, might also retire, if
they chose. Of such permission the Thespians immediately availed
themselves;[378] so many were there, in the Theban camp, who
estimated the chances to be all in favor of Lacedæmonian victory. But
when these men, a large portion of them unarmed, were seen retiring,
a considerable detachment from the army of Kleombrotus, either with
or without orders, ran after to prevent their escape, and forced
them to return for safety to the main Theban army. The most zealous
among the allies of Sparta present,—the Phokians, the Phliasians, and
the Herakleots, together with a body of mercenaries,—executed this
movement; which seems to have weakened the Lacedæmonians in the main
battle, without doing any mischief to the Thebans.

  [378] Polyæn. ii, 2, 2; Pausanias, ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1.

The cavalry first engaged, in front of both lines; and here the
superiority of the Thebans soon became manifest. The Lacedæmonian
cavalry,—at no time very good, but at this moment unusually bad,
composed of raw and feeble novices, mounted on horses provided by
the rich,—was soon broken and driven back upon the infantry, whose
ranks were disturbed by the fugitives. To reëstablish the battle,
Kleombrotus gave the word for the infantry to advance, himself
personally leading the right. The victorious Theban cavalry probably
hung upon the Lacedæmonian infantry of the centre and left, and
prevented them from making much forward movement; while Epaminondas
and Pelopidas with their left, advanced according to their intention
to bear down Kleombrotus and his right wing. The shock here was
terrible; on both sides victory was resolutely and desperately
disputed, in a close hand-combat, with pushing of opposite shields
and opposite masses. But such was the overwhelming force of the
Theban charge,—with the sacred band or chosen warriors in front,
composed of men highly trained in the palæstra,[379] and the deep
column of fifty shields propelling behind,—that even the Spartans,
with all their courage, obstinacy, and discipline, were unable to
stand up against it. Kleombrotus, himself either in or near the
front, was mortally wounded, apparently early in the battle; and
it was only by heroic and unexampled efforts, on the part of his
comrades around, that he was carried off yet alive, so as to preserve
him from falling into the hands of the enemy. Around him also fell
the most eminent members of the Spartan official staff; Deinon the
polemarch, Sphodrias, with his son Kleonymus, and several others.
After an obstinate resistance and a fearful slaughter, the right wing
of the Spartans was completely beaten, and driven back to their camp
on the higher ground.

  [379] Plutarch, Symposiac. ii. 5, p. 639 F.

It was upon this Spartan right wing, where the Theban left was
irresistibly strong, that all the stress of the battle fell,—as
Epaminondas had intended that it should. In no other part of the line
does there appear to have been any serious fighting; partly through
his deliberate scheme of not pushing forward either his centre or
his right,—partly through the preliminary victory of the Theban
cavalry, which probably checked a part of the forward march of the
enemy’s line,—and partly also through the lukewarm adherence, or even
suppressed hostility, of the allies marshalled under the command of
Kleombrotus.[380] The Phokians and Herakleots,—zealous in the cause
from hatred of Thebes,—had quitted the line to strike a blow at the
retiring baggage and attendants; while the remaining allies, after
mere nominal fighting and little or no loss, retired to the camp
as soon as they saw the Spartan right defeated and driven back to
it. Moreover, even some Lacedæmonians on the left wing, probably
astounded by the lukewarmness of those around them, and by the
unexpected calamity on their own right, fell back in the same manner.
The whole Lacedæmonian force, with the dying king, was thus again
assembled and formed behind the entrenchment on the higher ground,
where the victorious Thebans did not attempt to molest them.[381]

  [380] Pausanias (ix, 13, 4; compare viii, 6, 1) lays great stress
  upon this indifference or even treachery of the allies. Xenophon
  says quite enough to authenticate the reality of the fact (Hellen.
  vi, 4, 15-24); see also Cicero De Offic. ii, 7, 26.

  Polyænus has more than one anecdote respecting the dexterity of
  Agesilaus in dealing with faint-hearted conduct or desertion on
  the part of the allies of Sparta (Polyæn. ii, 1, 18-20).

  [381] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 13, 14.

But very different were their feelings as they now stood arrayed
in the camp, from that exulting boastfulness with which they had
quitted it an hour or two before; and fearful was the loss when
it came to be verified. Of seven hundred Spartans who had marched
forth from the camp, only three hundred returned to it.[382] One
thousand Lacedæmonians, besides, had been left on the field, even
by the admission of Xenophon; probably the real number was even
larger. Apart from this, the death of Kleombrotus was of itself an
event impressive to every one, the like of which had never occurred
since the fatal day of Thermopylæ. But this was not all. The allies
who stood alongside of them in arms were now altered men. All were
sick of their cause, and averse to farther exertion; some scarcely
concealed a positive satisfaction at the defeat. And when the
surviving polemarchs, now commanders, took counsel with the principal
officers as to the steps proper in the emergency, there were a few,
but very few, Spartans who pressed for renewal of the battle, and for
recovering by force their slain brethren in the field, or perishing
in the attempt. All the rest felt like beaten men; so that the
polemarchs, giving effect to the general sentiment, sent a herald to
solicit the regular truce for burial of their dead. This the Thebans
granted, after erecting their own trophy.[383] But Epaminondas,
aware that the Spartans would practise every stratagem to conceal
the magnitude of their losses, coupled the grant with a condition
that the allies should bury their dead first. It was found that the
allies had scarce any dead to pick up, and that nearly every slain
warrior on the field was a Lacedæmonian.[384] And thus the Theban
general, while he placed the loss beyond possibility of concealment,
proclaimed at the same time such public evidence of Spartan courage,
as to rescue the misfortune of Leuktra from all aggravation on the
score of dishonor. What the Theban loss was, Xenophon does not tell
us. Pausanias states it at forty-seven men,[385] Diodorus at three
hundred. The former number is preposterously small, and even the
latter is doubtless under the truth; for a victory in close fight,
over soldiers like the Spartans, must have been dearly purchased.
Though the bodies of the Spartans were given up to burial, their arms
were retained; and the shields of the principal officers were seen by
the traveller Pausanias at Thebes five hundred years afterwards.[386]

  [382] Xen. Hellen. l. c. Plutarch (Agesil. c. 28) states a
  thousand Lacedæmonians to have been slain; Pausanias (ix, 13, 4)
  gives the number as more than a thousand; Diodorus mentions four
  thousand (xv. 56), which is doubtless above the truth, though the
  number given by Xenophon may be fairly presumed as somewhat below
  it. Dionysius of Halikarnassus (Antiq. Roman. ii, 17) states that
  seventeen hundred Spartans perished.

  [383] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 15.

  [384] Pausan. ix, 13, 4; Plutarch, Apotheg. Reg. p. 193 B.;
  Cicero, de officiis, ii, 7.

  [385] Pausan. ix, 13, 4; Diodor. xv, 55.

  [386] Pausan. ix, 16, 3.

Twenty days only had elapsed, from the time when Epaminondas quitted
Sparta after Thebes had been excluded from the general peace, to
the day when he stood victorious on the field of Leuktra.[387]
The event came like a thunderclap upon every one in Greece, upon
victors as well as vanquished,—upon allies and neutrals, near and
distant, alike. The general expectation had been that Thebes would
be speedily overthrown and dismantled; instead of which, not only
she had escaped, but had inflicted a crushing blow on the military
majesty of Sparta. It is in vain that Xenophon,—whose account of the
battle is obscure, partial, and imprinted with that chagrin which
the event occasioned to him,[388]—ascribes the defeat to untoward
accidents,[389] or to the rashness and convivial carelessness of
Kleombrotus; upon whose generalship Agesilaus and his party at Sparta
did not scruple to cast ungenerous reproach,[390] while others
faintly exculpated him by saying that he had fought contrary to
his better judgment, under fear of unpopularity. Such criticisms,
coming from men wise after the fact, and consoling themselves for
the public calamity by censuring the unfortunate commander, will
not stand examination. Kleombrotus represented on this occasion the
feeling universal among his countrymen. He was ordered to march
against Thebes with the full belief, entertained by Agesilaus and all
the Spartan leaders, that her unassisted force could not resist him.
To fight the Thebans on open ground was exactly what he and every
other Spartan desired. While his manner of forcing the entrance of
Bœotia, and his capture of Kreusis, was a creditable manœuvre, he
seems to have arranged his order of battle in the manner usual with
Grecian generals at the time. There appears no reason to censure
his generalship, except in so far as he was unable to divine,—what
no one else divined,—the superior combinations of his adversary,
then for the first time applied to practice. To the discredit of
Xenophon, Epaminondas is never named in his narrative of the battle,
though he recognizes in substance that the battle was decided by
the irresistible Theban force brought to bear upon one point of
the enemy’s phalanx; a fact which both Plutarch and Diodorus[391]
expressly refer to the genius of the general. All the calculations
of Epaminondas turned out successful. The bravery of the Thebans,
cavalry as well as infantry, seconded by the training which they had
received during the last few years, was found sufficient to carry
his plans into full execution. To this circumstance, principally,
was owing the great revolution of opinion throughout Greece which
followed the battle. Every one felt that a new military power had
arisen, and that the Theban training, under the generalship of
Epaminondas, had proved itself more than a match on a fair field,
with shield and spear, and with numbers on the whole inferior,—for
the ancient Lykurgean discipline; which last had hitherto stood
without a parallel as turning out artists and craftsmen in war,
against mere citizens in the opposite ranks, armed but without the
like training.[392] Essentially stationary and old-fashioned, the
Lykurgean discipline was now overborne by the progressive military
improvement of other states, handled by a preëminent tactician; a
misfortune predicted by the Corinthians[393] at Sparta sixty years
before, and now realised, to the conviction of all Greece, on the
field of Leuktra.

  [387] This is an important date, preserved by Plutarch (Agesil.
  c. 28). The congress was broken up at Sparta on the fourteenth of
  the Attic month Skirrophorion (June), the last month of the year
  of the Athenian archon Alkisthenes; the battle was fought on the
  fifth of the Attic month of Hekatombæon, the first month of the
  next Attic year, of the archon Phrasikleidês; about the beginning
  of July.

  [388] Diodorus differs from Xenophon on one important matter
  connected with the battle; affirming that Archidamus son of
  Agesilaus was present and fought, together with various other
  circumstances, which I shall discuss presently, in a future note.
  I follow Xenophon.

  [389] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 8. Εἰς δ’ οὖν τὴν μάχην τοῖς μὲν
  Λακεδαιμονίοις πάντα τἀναντία ἐγίγνετο, τοῖς δὲ (to the Thebans)
  πάντα καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης κατωρθοῦτο.

  [390] Isokrates, in the Oration vi, called _Archidamus_ (composed
  about five years after the battle, as if to be spoken by
  Archidamus son of Agesilaus), puts this statement distinctly
  into the mouth of Archidamus—μέχρι μὲν ταυτησὶ τῆς ἡμέρας
  δεδυστυχηκέναι δοκοῦμεν ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τῇ πρὸς Θηβαίους, καὶ τοῖς μὲν
  σώμασι κρατηθῆναι ~διὰ τὸν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἡγησάμενον~, etc. (s. 9).

  I take his statement as good evidence of the real opinion
  entertained both by Agesilaus and by Archidamus; an opinion the
  more natural, since the two contemporary kings of Sparta were
  almost always at variance, and at the head of opposing parties;
  especially true about Agesilaus and Kleombrotus, during the life
  of the latter.

  Cicero (probably copying Kallisthenes or Ephorus) says, de
  Officiis, i, 24, 84—“Illa plaga (Lacedæmoniis) pestifera,
  quâ, quum Cleombrotus invidiam timens temere cum Epaminondâ
  conflixisset, Lacedæmoniorum opes corruerunt.” Polybius remarks
  (ix. 23, we know not from whom he borrowed) that all the
  proceedings of Kleombrotus during the empire of Sparta, were
  marked with a generous regard for the interests and feelings
  of the allies; while the proceedings of Agesilaus were of the
  opposite character.

  [391] Diodor. xv, 55. Epaminondas, ἰδίᾳ τινι καὶ περιττῇ τάξει
  χρησάμενος, διὰ τῆς ἰδίας στρατηγίας περιεποιήσατο τὴν περιβόητον
  νίκην ... διὸ καὶ λοξὴν ποιήσας τὴν φάλαγγα, τῷ τοὺς ἐπιλέκτους
  ἔχοντι κέρατι ἔγνω κρίνειν τὴν μάχην, etc. Compare Plutarch,
  Pelop. c. 23.

  [392] See Aristotel. Politic. viii, 3, 3, 5.

  Compare Xenophon, De Repub. Laced. xiii, 5. τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους
  αὐτοσχεδιαστὰς εἶναι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ μόνους
  τῷ ὄντι τεχνίτας τῶν πολεμικῶν—and Xenoph. Memorab. iii, 5, 13,
  14.

  [393] Thucyd. i, 71. ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν (of you Spartans) τὰ
  ἐπιτηδεύματα πρὸς αὐτούς ἐστιν. ~Ἀνάγκη δ’ ὥσπερ τέχνης ἀεὶ τὰ
  ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρατεῖν~· καὶ ἡσυχαζούσῃ μὲν πόλει τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα
  ἄριστα, πρὸς πολλὰ δὲ ἀναγκαζομένοις ἰέναι, ~πολλῆς καὶ τῆς
  ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ~, etc.

But if the Spartan system was thus invaded and overpassed in its
privilege of training soldiers, there was another species of teaching
wherein it neither was nor could be overpassed,—the hard lesson of
enduring pain and suppressing emotion. Memorable indeed was the
manner in which the news of this fatal catastrophe was received at
Sparta. To prepare the reader by an appropriate contrast, we may turn
to the manifestation at Athens twenty-seven years before, when the
trireme called Paralus arrived from Ægospotami, bearing tidings of
the capture of the entire Athenian fleet. “The moan of distress (says
the historian)[394] reached all up the Long Walls from Peiræus to
Athens, as each man communicated the news to his neighbor: on that
night, not a man slept, from bewailing for his lost fellow-citizens
and for his own impending ruin.” Not such was the scene at Sparta,
when the messenger arrived from the field of Leuktra, although there
was everything calculated to render the shock violent. For not only
was the defeat calamitous and humiliating beyond all former parallel,
but it came at a moment when every man reckoned on victory. As soon
as Kleombrotus, having forced his way into Bœotia, saw the unassisted
Thebans on plain ground before him, no Spartan entertained any doubt
of the result. Under this state of feeling, a messenger arrived
with the astounding revelation, that the army was totally defeated,
with the loss of the king, of four hundred Spartans, and more than
a thousand Lacedæmonians; and that defeat stood confessed by having
solicited the truce for interment of the slain. At the moment when
he arrived, the festival called the Gymnopædia was actually being
celebrated, on its last day; and the chorus of grown men was going
through its usual solemnity in the theatre. In spite of all the
poignancy of the intelligence, the ephors would not permit the
solemnity to be either interrupted or abridged. “_Of necessity, I
suppose, they were grieved_,—but they went through the whole as if
nothing had happened, only communicating the names of the slain to
their relations, and issuing a general order to the women, to make
no noise or wailing, but to bear the misfortune in silence.” That
such an order should be issued, is sufficiently remarkable; that it
should be issued and obeyed, is what could not be expected; that it
should not only be issued and obeyed, but overpassed, is what no man
could believe, if it were not expressly attested by the contemporary
historian. “On the morrow (says he) you might see those whose
relations had been slain, walking about in public with bright and
cheerful countenances; but of those whose relatives survived, scarce
one showed himself; and the few who were abroad, looked mournful and
humbled.”[395]

  [394] Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 3.

  [395] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 16. Γενομένων δὲ τούτων, ὁ μὲν εἰς τὴν
  Λακεδαίμονα ἀγγελῶν τὸ πάθος ἀφικνεῖται, Γυμνοπαιδιῶν τε οὐσῶν
  τῆς τελευταίας, καὶ τοῦ ἀνδρικοῦ χόρου ἔνδον ὄντος· Οἱ δὲ ἔφοροι,
  ἐπεὶ ἤκουσαν τὸ πάθος, ἐλυποῦντο μὲν, ὥσπερ οἶμαι, ἀνάγκῃ· τὸν
  μέντοι χόρον οὐκ ἐξήγαγον, ἀλλὰ διαγωνίσασθαι εἴων. Καὶ τὰ μὲν
  ὀνόματα πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους ἑκάστου τῶν τεθνηκότων ἀπέδοσαν·
  προεῖπον δὲ ταῖς γυναιξὶ, μὴ ποιεῖν κραυγὴν, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ τὸ πάθος
  φέρειν. Τῇ δὲ ὑστεραίᾳ ἦν ὁρᾷν, ὧν μὲν ἐτέθνασαν οἱ προσήκοντες,
  λιπαροὺς καὶ φαιδροὺς ἐν τῷ φανερῷ ἀναστρεφομένους· ὧν δὲ ζῶντες
  ἠγγελμένοι ἦσαν, ὀλίγους ἂν εἶδες, τούτους δὲ σκυθρωποὺς καὶ
  ταπεινοὺς περιϊόντας—and Plutarch, Agesil. c. 29.

  See a similar statement of Xenophon, after he has recounted the
  cutting in pieces of the Lacedæmonian mora near Lechæum, about
  the satisfaction and even triumph of those of the Lacedæmonians
  who had lost relations in the battle; while every one else was
  mournful (Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 10). Compare also Justin, xxviii,
  4—the behavior after the defeat of Sellasia.

In comparing this extraordinary self-constraint and obedience to
orders, at Sparta, under the most trying circumstances,—with the
sensitive and demonstrative temper, and spontaneous outburst of
feeling at Athens, so much more nearly approaching to the Homeric
type of Greeks,—we must at the same time remark, that in reference
to active and heroic efforts for the purpose of repairing past
calamities and making head against preponderant odds, the Athenians
were decidedly the better of the two. I have already recounted
the prodigious and unexpected energy displayed by Athens, after
the ruinous loss of her two armaments before Syracuse, when no one
expected that she could have held out for six months: I am now
about to recount the proceedings of Sparta, after the calamity at
Leuktra,—a calamity great and serious indeed, yet in positive amount
inferior to what had befallen the Athenians at Syracuse. The reader
will find that, looking to the intensity of active effort in both
cases, the comparison is all to the advantage of Athens; excusing at
least, if not justifying, the boast of Perikles[396] in his memorable
funeral harangue,—that his countrymen, without the rigorous drill
of Spartans, were yet found noway inferior to Spartans in daring
exertion, when the hour of actual trial arrived.

  [396] Thucyd. ii, 39.

It was the first obligation of the ephors to provide for the safety
of their defeated army in Bœotia; for which purpose they put in march
nearly the whole remaining force of Sparta. Of the Lacedæmonian
moræ, or military divisions (seemingly six in the aggregate), two
or three had been sent with Kleombrotus; all the remainder were now
despatched, even including elderly citizens up to near sixty years of
age, and all who had been left behind in consequence of other public
offices. Archidamus took the command (Agesilaus still continuing
to be disabled), and employed himself in getting together the aid
promised from Tegea,—from the villages representing the disintegrated
Mantinea,—from Corinth, Sikyon, Phlius, and Achaia; all these places
being still under the same oligarchies which had held them under
Lacedæmonian patronage, and still adhering to Sparta. Triremes were
equipped at Corinth, as a means of transporting the new army across
to Kreusis, and thus joining the defeated troops at Leuktra; the port
of Kreusis, the recent acquisition of Kleombrotus, being now found
inestimable, as the only means of access into Bœotia.[397]

  [397] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 17-19.

Meanwhile the defeated army still continued in its entrenched camp
at Leuktra, where the Thebans were at first in no hurry to disturb
it. Besides that this was a very arduous enterprise, even after the
recent victory,—we must recollect the actual feeling of the Thebans
themselves, upon whom their own victory had come by surprise, at a
moment when they were animated more by despair than by hope. They
were doubtless absorbed in the intoxicating triumph and exultation
of the moment, with the embraces and felicitations of their families
in Thebes, rescued from impending destruction by their valor. Like
the Syracusans after their last great victory[398] over the Athenian
fleet in the Great Harbor, they probably required an interval to give
loose to their feelings of ecstasy, before they would resume action.
Epaminondas and the other leaders, aware how much the value of Theban
alliance was now enhanced, endeavored to obtain reinforcement from
without, before they proceeded to follow up the blow. To Athens they
sent a herald, crowned with wreaths of triumph, proclaiming their
recent victory. They invited the Athenians to employ the present
opportunity for taking full revenge on Sparta, by joining their hands
with those of Thebes. But the sympathies of the Athenians were now
rather hostile than friendly to Thebes, besides that they had sworn
peace with Sparta, not a month before. The Senate, who were assembled
in the acropolis when the herald arrived, heard his news with evident
chagrin, and dismissed him without even a word of courtesy; while
the unfortunate Platæans, who were doubtless waiting in the city in
expectation of the victory of Kleombrotus, and of their own speedy
reëstablishment, found themselves again struck down and doomed to
indefinite exile.

  [398] See Thucyd. vii, 73.

To Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly, another Theban herald was sent for the
same purpose, and very differently received. The despot sent back
word that he would come forthwith by sea, and ordered triremes to be
equipped for the purpose. But this was a mere deception; for at the
same time, he collected the mercenaries and cavalry immediately near
to him, and began his march by land. So rapid were his movements,
that he forestalled all opposition,—though he had to traverse the
territory of the Herakleots and Phokians, who were his bitter
enemies,—and joined the Thebans safely in Bœotia.[399] But when the
Theban leaders proposed that he should attack the Lacedæmonian camp
in flank, from the high ground, while they would march straight
up the hill and attack it in front,—Jason strongly dissuaded the
enterprise as too perilous; recommending that they should permit the
enemy’s departure under capitulation. “Be content (said he) with the
great victory which you have already gained. Do not compromise it
by attempting something yet more hazardous, against Lacedæmonians
driven to despair in their camp. Recollect that a few days ago,
_you_ yourselves were in despair, and that your recent victory is
the fruit of that very feeling. Remember that the gods take pleasure
in bringing about these sudden changes of fortune.”[400] Having by
such representations convinced the Thebans, he addressed a friendly
message to the Lacedæmonians, reminding them of their dangerous
position, as well as of the little trust to be reposed in their
allies,—and offering himself as mediator to negotiate for their safe
retreat. Their acquiescence was readily given; and at his instance,
a truce was agreed to by both parties, assuring to the Lacedæmonians
the liberty of quitting Bœotia. In spite of the agreement, however,
the Lacedæmonian commander placed little faith either in the Thebans
or in Jason, apprehending a fraud for the purpose of inducing him
to quit the camp and of attacking him on the march. Accordingly,
he issued public orders in the camp for every man to be ready for
departure after the evening meal, and to march in the night to
Kithæron, with a view of passing that mountain on the next morning.
Having put the enemy on this false scent, he directed his real
night-march by a different and not very easy way, first to Kreusis,
next to Ægosthena in the Megarian territory.[401] The Thebans offered
no opposition; nor is it at all probable that they intended any
fraud, considering that Jason was here the guarantee, and that he had
at least no motive to break his word.

  [399] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 20, 21.

  However, since the Phokians formed part of the beaten army at
  Leuktra, it must be confessed that Jason had less to fear from
  them at this moment, than at any other.

  [400] Pausanias states that immediately after the battle,
  Epaminondas gave permission to the allies of Sparta to depart and
  go home, by which permission they profited, so that the Spartans
  now stood alone in the camp (Paus. ix, 14, 1). This however is
  inconsistent with the account of Xenophon (vi, 4, 26), and I
  think improbable.

  Sievers (Geschichte, etc. p. 247) thinks that Jason preserved
  the Spartans by outwitting and deluding Epaminondas. But it
  appears to me that the storming of the Spartan camp was an
  arduous enterprise, wherein more Thebans than Spartans would
  have been slain: moreover, the Spartans were masters of the port
  of Kreusis, so that there was little chance of starving out the
  camp before reinforcements arrived. The capitulation granted by
  Epaminondas seems to have been really the wisest proceeding.

  [401] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 22-25.

  The road from Kreusis to Leuktra, however, must have been that by
  which Kleombrotus arrived.

It was at Ægosthena that the retreating Lacedæmonians met Archidamus,
who had advanced to that point with the Laconian forces, and was
awaiting the junction of his Peloponnesian allies. The purpose of his
march being now completed, he advanced no farther. The armament was
disbanded, and Lacedæmonians as well as allies returned home.[402]

  [402] This is the most convenient place for noticing the
  discrepancy, as to the battle of Leuktra, between Diodorus and
  Xenophon. I have followed Xenophon.

  Diodorus (xv, 54) states both the arrival of Jason in Bœotia, and
  the out-march of Archidamus from Sparta, to have taken place,
  _not after_ the battle of Leuktra, but _before_ it. Jason (he
  says) came with a considerable force to the aid of the Thebans.
  He prevailed upon Kleombrotus, who doubted the sufficiency of
  his own numbers, to agree to a truce and to evacuate Bœotia.
  But as Kleombrotus was marching homeward, he met Archidamus
  with a second Lacedæmonian army, on his way to Bœotia, by order
  of the ephors, for the purpose of reinforcing him. Accordingly
  Kleombrotus, finding himself thus unexpectedly strengthened,
  openly broke the truce just concluded, and marched back with
  Archidamus to Leuktra. Here they fought the battle, Kleombrotus
  commanding the right wing, and Archidamus the left. They
  sustained a complete defeat, in which Kleombrotus was slain; the
  result being the same on both statements.

  We must here make our election between the narrative of
  Xenophon and that of Diodorus. That the authority of the
  former is greater, speaking generally, I need hardly remark;
  nevertheless his philo-Laconian partialities become so glaring
  and preponderant, during these latter books of the Hellenica
  (where he is discharging the mournful duty of recounting
  the humiliation of Sparta), as to afford some color for the
  suspicions of Palmerius, Morus, and Schneider, who think that
  Xenophon has concealed the direct violation of truce on the part
  of the Spartans, and that the facts really occurred as Diodorus
  has described them. See Schneider ad Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 5, 6.

  It will be found, however, on examining the facts, that such
  suspicion ought not to be admitted, and that there are grounds
  for preferring the narrative of Xenophon.

  1. He explains to us how it happened that the remains of the
  Spartan army, after the defeat of Leuktra, escaped out of Bœotia.
  Jason arrives after the battle, and prevails upon the Thebans
  to allow them to retreat under a truce; Archidamus also arrives
  after the battle to take them up. If the defeat had taken place
  under the circumstances mentioned by Diodorus,—Archidamus and the
  survivors would have found it scarcely possible to escape out of
  Bœotia.

  2. If Diodorus relates correctly, there must have been
  a violation of truce on the part of Kleombrotus and the
  Lacedæmonians, as glaring as any that occurs in Grecian history.
  But such violation is never afterwards alluded to by any one,
  among the misdeeds of the Lacedæmonians.

  3. A part, and an essential part, of the story of Diodorus,
  is, that Archidamus was present and fought at Leuktra. But we
  have independent evidence rendering it almost certain that
  he was not there. Whoever reads the Discourse of Isokrates
  called _Archidamus_ (Or. vi, sect. 9, 10, 129), will see that
  such observations could not have been put into the mouth of
  Archidamus, if he had been present there, and (of course) in
  joint command with Kleombrotus.

  4. If Diodorus be correct, Sparta must have levied a new army
  from her allies, just after having sworn the peace, which peace
  exonerated her allies from everything like obligation to follow
  her headship; and a new army, not for the purpose of extricating
  defeated comrades in Bœotia, but for pure aggression against
  Thebes. This, to say the least, is eminently improbable.

  On these grounds, I adhere to Xenophon and depart from Diodorus.

In all communities, the return of so many defeated soldiers,
liberated under a capitulation by the enemy, would have been a
scene of mourning. But in Sparta it was pregnant with grave and
dangerous consequences. So terrible was the scorn and ignominy
heaped upon the Spartan citizen who survived a defeat, that life
became utterly intolerable to him. The mere fact sufficed for his
condemnation, without any inquiry into justifying or extenuating
circumstances. No citizen at home would speak to him, or be seen
consorting with him in tent, game, or chorus; no other family would
intermarry with his; if he was seen walking about with an air of
cheerfulness, he was struck and ill-used by the passers-by, until
he assumed that visible humility which was supposed to become his
degraded position. Such rigorous treatment (which we learn from
the panegyrist Xenophon)[403] helps to explain the satisfaction of
the Spartan father and mother, when they learned that their son
was among the slain and not among the survivors. Defeat of Spartan
troops had hitherto been rare. But in the case of the prisoners
at Sphakteria, when released from captivity and brought back to a
degraded existence at Sparta, some uneasiness had been felt, and some
precautions deemed necessary to prevent them from becoming dangerous
malcontents.[404] Here was another case yet more formidable. The
vanquished returning from Leuktra were numerous, while the severe
loss sustained in the battle amply attested their bravery. Aware of
the danger of enforcing against them the established custom, the
ephors referred the case to Agesilaus; who proposed that for that
time and case the customary penalties should be allowed to sleep;
but should be revived afterwards and come into force as before. Such
was the step accordingly taken;[405] so that the survivors from
this fatal battle-field were enabled to mingle with the remaining
citizens without dishonor or degradation. The step was indeed doubly
necessary, considering the small aggregate number of fully qualified
citizens; which number always tended to decline,—from the nature
of the Spartan political franchise combined with the exigencies of
Spartan training,[406]—and could not bear even so great a diminution
as that of the four hundred slain at Leuktra. “Sparta (says
Aristotle) could not stand up against a single defeat, but was ruined
through the small number of her citizens.”[407]

  [403] Xenoph. Rep. Lac. c. ix; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.

  [404] Thucyd. v, 34.

  [405] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30; Plutarch, Apophtheg. Lacon. p. 214
  B.; Apophtheg. Reg. p. 191 C.; Polyænus, ii, 1, 13.

  A similar suspension of penalties, for the special occasion, was
  enacted after the great defeat of Agis and the Lacedæmonians by
  Antipater, B.C. 330. Akrotatus, son of King Kleomenes, was the
  only person at Sparta who opposed the suspension (Diodor. xix,
  70). He incurred the strongest unpopularity for such opposition.
  Compare also Justin, xxviii, 4—describing the public feeling at
  Sparta after the defeat at Sellasia.

  [406] The explanation of Spartan citizenship will be found in an
  earlier part of this History, Vol. II, Ch. vi.

  [407] Aristotel. Polit. ii, 6, 12. Μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπήνεγκεν
  ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ’ ἀπώλετο διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν.

The cause here adverted to by Aristotle, as explaining the utter
loss of ascendency abroad, and the capital diminution both of power
and of inviolability at home, which will now be found to come thick
upon Sparta, was undoubtedly real and important. But a fact still
more important was, the alteration of opinion produced everywhere
in Greece with regard to Sparta, by the sudden shock of the battle
of Leuktra. All the prestige and old associations connected with
her long-established power vanished; while the hostility and
fears, inspired both by herself and by her partisans, but hitherto
reluctantly held back in silence,—now burst forth into open
manifestation.

The ascendency, exercised down to this time by Sparta north of the
Corinthian Gulf, in Phokis and elsewhere, passed away from her,
and became divided between the victorious Thebans and Jason of
Pheræ. The Thebans, and the Bœotian confederates who were now in
cordial sympathy with them, excited to enthusiasm by their recent
success, were eager for fresh glories, and readily submitted to the
full exigencies of military training; while under a leader like
Epaminondas, their ardor was turned to such good account, that
they became better soldiers every month.[408] The Phokians, unable
to defend themselves single-handed, were glad to come under the
protection of the Thebans, as less bitterly hostile to them than
the Thessalian Jason,—and concluded with them obligations of mutual
defence and alliance.[409] The cities of Eubœa, together with the
Lokrians (both Epiknemidian and Opuntian,) the Malians and the
town of Heraklea, followed the example. The latter town was now
defenceless; for Jason, in returning from Bœotia to Thessaly, had
assaulted it and destroyed its fortifications; since by its important
site near the pass of Thermopylæ, it might easily be held as a
position to bar his entrance into Southern Greece.[410] The Bœotian
town of Orchomenus, which had held with the Lacedæmonians even until
the late battle, was now quite defenceless; and the Thebans, highly
exasperated against its inhabitants, were disposed to destroy the
city, reducing the inhabitants to slavery. Severe as this proposition
was, it would not have exceeded the customary rigors of war, nor
even what might have befallen Thebes herself, had Kleombrotus been
victorious at Leuktra. But the strenuous remonstrance of Epaminondas
prevented it from being carried into execution. Alike distinguished
for mild temper and for long-sighted views, he reminded his
countrymen that in their present aspiring hopes towards ascendency in
Greece, it was essential to establish a character for moderation of
dealing[411] not inferior to their military courage, as attested by
the recent victory. Accordingly, the Orchomenians were pardoned upon
submission, and re-admitted as members of the Bœotian confederacy. To
the Thespians, however, the same lenity was not extended. They were
expelled from Bœotia, and their territory annexed to Thebes. It will
be recollected, that immediately before the battle of Leuktra, when
Epaminondas caused proclamation to be made that such of the Bœotians
as were disaffected to the Theban cause might march away, the
Thespians had availed themselves of the permission and departed.[412]
The fugitive Thespians found shelter, like the Platæans, at
Athens.[413]

  [408] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 24. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν Βοιωτοὶ πάντες
  ἐγυμνάζοντο περὶ τὰ ὅπλα, ἀγαλλόμενοι τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις νίκῃ, etc.

  These are remarkable words from the unwilling pen of Xenophon:
  compare vii, 5, 12.

  [409] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 23; vii, 5, 4; Diodor. xv, 57.

  [410] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 27; vi, 5, 23.

  [411] Diodor. xv, 57.

  [412] Pausan. ix, 13, 3; ix, 14, 1.

  [413] Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 1.

  I have already given my reasons (in a note on the preceding
  chapter) for believing that the Thespians were not ἀπόλιδες
  _before_ the battle of Leuktra.

While Thebes was commemorating her recent victory by the erection
of a treasury chamber,[414] and the dedication of pious offerings
at Delphi,—while the military organization of Bœotia was receiving
such marked improvement, and the cluster of dependent states attached
to Thebes was thus becoming larger, under the able management of
Epaminondas,—Jason in Thessaly was also growing more powerful every
day. He was tagus of all Thessaly; with its tributary neighbors under
complete obedience,—with Macedonia partly dependent on him,—and with
a mercenary force, well paid and trained, greater than had ever
been assembled in Greece. By dismantling Heraklea, in his return
home from Bœotia, he had laid open the strait of Thermopylæ, so
as to be sure of access into southern Greece whenever he chose.
His personal ability and ambition, combined with his great power,
inspired universal alarm; for no man knew whither he would direct
his arms; whether to Asia, against the Persian king, as he was fond
of boasting,[415]—or northward against the cities in Chalkidikê—or
southward against Greece.

  [414] Pausanias, x, 11, 4.

  [415] Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 141.

The last-mentioned plan seemed the most probable, at the beginning
of 370 B.C., half a year after the battle of Leuktra: for Jason
proclaimed distinctly his intention of being present at the Pythian
festival (the season for which was about August 1, 370 B.C.,
near Delphi), not only with splendid presents and sacrifices to
Apollo, but also at the head of a numerous army. Orders had been
given that his troops should hold themselves ready for military
service,[416]—about the time when the festival was to be celebrated;
and requisitions had been sent round, demanding from all his
tributaries victims for the Pythian sacrifice, to a total of not
less than one thousand bulls, and ten thousand sheep, goats, and
swine; besides a prize-bull to take the lead in the procession, for
which a wreath of gold was to be given. Never before had such honor
been done to the god; for those who came to offer sacrifice were
usually content with one or more beasts bred on the neighboring
plain of Kirrha.[417] We must recollect, however, that this Pythian
festival of 370 B.C. occurred under peculiar circumstances; for the
two previous festivals in 374 B.C. and 378 B.C. must have been
comparatively unfrequented; in consequence of the war between Sparta
and her allies on one side, and Athens and Thebes on the other,—and
also of the occupation of Phokis by Kleombrotus. Hence the festival
of 370 B.C., following immediately after the peace, appeared to
justify an extraordinary burst of pious magnificence, to make up for
the niggardly tributes to the god during the two former; while the
hostile dispositions of the Phokians would be alleged as an excuse
for the military force intended to accompany Jason.

  [416] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 30. παρήγγειλε δὲ καὶ ὡς
  στρατευσομένοις εἰς τὸν περὶ τὰ Πύθια χρόνον Θετταλοῖς
  παρασκευάζεσθαι.

  I agree with Dr. Arnold’s construction of this passage (see his
  Appendix ad. Thucyd. v, 1, at the end of the second volume of his
  edition of Thucydides) as opposed to that of Mr. Fynes Clinton.
  At the same time, I do not think that the passage proves much
  either in favor of his view, or against the view of Mr. Clinton,
  about the month of the Pythian festival; which I incline to
  conceive as celebrated about August 1; a little later than Dr.
  Arnold, a little earlier than Mr. Clinton, supposes. Looking
  to the lunar months of the Greeks, we must recollect that the
  festival would not always coincide with the same month or week of
  our year.

  I cannot concur with Dr. Arnold in setting aside the statement of
  Plutarch respecting the coincidence of the Pythian festival with
  the battle of Koroneia.

  [417] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 29, 30. βοῦν ἠγεμόνα, etc.

But there were other intentions, generally believed though not
formally announced, which no Greek could imagine without uneasiness.
It was affirmed that Jason was about to arrogate to himself the
presidency and celebration of the festival, which belonged of
right to the Amphiktyonic assembly. It was feared, moreover, that
he would lay hands on the rich treasures of the Delphian temple; a
scheme said to have been conceived by the Syracusan despot Dionysius
fifteen years before, in conjunction with the epirot Alketas, who
was now dependent upon Jason.[418] As there were no visible means
of warding off this blow, the Delphians consulted the god to know
what they were to do if Jason approached the treasury; upon which
the god replied, that he would himself take care of it,—and he kept
his word. This enterprising despot, in the flower of his age and at
the summit of his power, perished most unexpectedly before the day
of the festival arrived.[419] He had been reviewing his cavalry near
Pheræ, and was sitting to receive and answer petitioners, when seven
young men approached, apparently in hot dispute with each other, and
appealing to him for a settlement. As soon as they got near, they set
upon him and slew him.[420] One was killed on the spot by the guards,
and another also as he was mounting on horseback; but the remaining
five contrived to reach horses ready prepared for them and to gallop
away out of the reach of pursuit. In most of the Grecian cities which
these fugitives visited, they were received with distinguished honor,
as having relieved the Grecian world from one who inspired universal
alarm,[421] now that Sparta was unable to resist him, while no other
power had as yet taken her place.

  [418] Diodor. xv, 13.

  [419] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 30. ἀποκρίνασθαι τὸν θεὸν, ὅτι αὐτῷ
  μελήσει. ~Ὁ δ’ οὖν ἀνὴρ, τηλικοῦτος ὢν, καὶ τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα
  διανοούμενος~, etc.

  Xenophon evidently considers the sudden removal of Jason as a
  consequence of the previous intention expressed by the god to
  take care of his own treasure.

  [420] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 31, 32.

  The cause which provoked these young men is differently stated:
  compare Diodor. xv, 60; Valer. Maxim. ix, 10, 2.

  [421] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 32.

  The death of Jason in the spring or early summer of 370 B.C.,
  refutes the compliment which Cornelius Nepos (Timoth. c. 4) pays
  to Timotheus; who can never have made war upon Jason after 373
  B.C., when he received the latter at Athens in his house.

Jason was succeeded in his dignity, but neither in his power, nor
ability, by two brothers,—Polyphron and Polydorus. Had he lived
longer, he would have influenced most seriously the subsequent
destinies of Greece. What else he would have done, we cannot say; but
he would have interfered materially with the development of Theban
power. Thebes was a great gainer by his death, though perfectly
innocent of it, and though in alliance with him to the last; insomuch
that his widow went to reside there for security.[422] Epaminondas
was relieved from a most formidable rival, while the body of Theban
allies north of Bœotia became much more dependent than they would
have remained, if there had been a competing power like that of Jason
in Thessaly. The treasures of the god were preserved a few years
longer, to be rifled by another hand.

  [422] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 37.

While these proceedings were going on in Northern Greece, during
the months immediately succeeding the battle of Leuktra, events
not less serious and stirring had occurred in Peloponnesus. The
treaty sworn at Sparta twenty days before that battle, bound the
Lacedæmonians to disband their forces, remove all their harmosts
and garrisons, and leave every subordinate city to its own liberty
of action. As they did not scruple to violate the treaty by the
orders sent to Kleombrotus, so they probably were not zealous in
executing the remaining conditions; though officers were named, for
the express purpose of going round to see that the evacuation of the
cities was really carried into effect.[423] But it probably was not
accomplished in twenty days; nor would it perhaps have been ever more
than nominally accomplished, if Kleombrotus had been successful in
Bœotia. But after these twenty days came the portentous intelligence
of the fate of that prince and his army. The invincible arm of
Sparta was broken; she had not a man to spare for the maintenance
of foreign ascendency. Her harmosts disappeared at once, (as they
had disappeared from the Asiatic and insular cities twenty-three
years before, immediately after the battle of Knidus,[424]) and
returned home. Nor was this all. The Lacedæmonian ascendency had
been maintained everywhere by local oligarchies or dekarchies,
which had been for the most part violent and oppressive. Against
these governments, now deprived of their foreign support, the
long-accumulated flood of internal discontent burst with irresistible
force, stimulated probably by returning exiles. Their past
misgovernment was avenged by severe sentences and proscription, to
the length of great reactionary injustice; and the parties banished
by this anti-Spartan revolution became so numerous, as to harass and
alarm seriously the newly-established governments. Such were the
commotions which, during the latter half of 371 B.C., disturbed
many of the Peloponnesian towns,—Phigaleia, Phlius, Corinth, Sikyon,
Megara, etc., though with great local difference, both of detail and
of result.[425]

  [423] Diodor. xv, 38. ἐξαγωγεῖς.

  [424] Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-5.

  [425] Diodor. xv, 39, 40.

  Diodorus mentions these commotions as if they had taken place
  after the peace concluded in 374 B.C., and not after the peace
  of 371 B.C. But it is impossible that they can have taken place
  after the former, which in point of fact, was broken off almost
  as soon as sworn,—was never carried into effect,—and comprised no
  one but Athens and Sparta. I have before remarked that Diodorus
  seems to have confounded, both in his mind and in his history,
  these two treaties of peace together, and has predicated of the
  former what really belongs to the latter. The commotions which he
  mentions come in, most naturally and properly, immediately after
  the battle of Leuktra.

  He affirms the like reaction against Lacedæmonian supremacy and
  its local representatives in the various cities, to have taken
  place even after the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B.C. (xv, 5).
  But if such reaction began at that time, it must have been
  promptly repressed by Sparta, then in undiminished and even
  advancing power.

  Another occurrence, alleged to have happened after the battle of
  Leuktra, may be properly noticed here. Polybius (ii, 39), and
  Strabo seemingly copying him (viii, p. 384), assert that both
  Sparta and Thebes agreed to leave their disputed questions of
  power to the arbitration of the Achæans, and to abide by their
  decision. Though I greatly respect the authority of Polybius, I
  am unable here to reconcile his assertion either with the facts
  which unquestionably occurred, or with general probability. If
  any such arbitration was ever consented to, it must have come to
  nothing; for the war went on without interruption. But I cannot
  bring myself to believe that it was even consented to, either by
  Thebes or by Sparta. The exuberant confidence of the former, the
  sense of dignity on the part of the latter, must have indisposed
  both to such a proceeding; especially to the acknowledgment of
  umpires like the Achæan cities, who enjoyed little estimation in
  370 B.C., though they acquired a good deal a century and a half
  afterwards.

But the city where intestine commotion took place in its most violent
form was Argos. We do not know how this fact was connected with
the general state of Grecian politics at the time, for Argos had
not been in any way subject to Sparta, nor a member of the Spartan
confederacy, nor (so far as we know) concerned in the recent war,
since the peace of Antalkidas in 387 B.C. The Argeian government
was a democracy, and the popular leaders were vehement in their
denunciations against the oligarchical opposition party—who were men
of wealth and great family position. These last, thus denounced,
formed a conspiracy for the forcible overthrow of the government.
But the conspiracy was discovered prior to execution, and some of
the suspected conspirators were interrogated under the torture, to
make them reveal their accomplices; under which interrogation one of
them deposed against thirty conspicuous citizens. The people, after
a hasty trial, put these thirty men to death, and confiscated their
property, while others slew themselves to escape the same fate. So
furious did the fear and wrath of the people become, exasperated by
the popular leaders, that they continued their executions until they
had put to death twelve hundred (or, as some say, fifteen hundred)
of the principal citizens. At length the popular leaders became
themselves tired and afraid of what they had done; upon which the
people were animated to fury against them, and put them to death
also.[426]

  [426] Diodor. xv, 57, 58.

This gloomy series of events was termed the Skytalism, or Cudgelling,
from the instrument (as we are told) by which these multiplied
executions were consummated; though the name seems more to indicate
an impetuous popular insurrection than deliberate executions. We know
the facts too imperfectly to be able to infer anything more than
the brutal working of angry political passion amidst a population
like that of Argos or Korkyra, where there was not (as at Athens)
either a taste for speech, or the habit of being guided by speech,
and of hearing both sides of every question fully discussed. Cicero
remarks that he had never heard of an Argeian orator. The acrimony
of Demosthenes and Æschines was discharged by mutual eloquence of
vituperation, while the assembly or the dikastery afterwards decided
between them. We are told that the assembled Athenian people, when
they heard the news of the Skytalism at Argos, were so shocked at it,
that they caused the solemnity of purification to be performed round
the assembly.[427]

  [427] Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. p. 814 B.; Isokrates.
  Or. v, (Philip.) s. 58.; compare Dionys. Halic. Antiq. Rom. vii,
  66.

Though Sparta thus saw her confidential partisans deposed, expelled,
or maltreated, throughout so many of the Peloponnesian cities,—and
though as yet there was no Theban interference within the isthmus,
either actual or prospective,—yet she was profoundly discouraged,
and incapable of any effort either to afford protection or to uphold
ascendency. One single defeat had driven her to the necessity of
contending for home and family;[428] probably too the dispositions of
her own Periœki and Helots in Laconia, were such as to require all
her force as well as all her watchfulness. At any rate, her empire
and her influence over the sentiments of Greeks out of Laconia,
became suddenly extinct, to a degree which astonishes us, when
we recollect that it had become a sort of tradition in the Greek
mind, and that, only nine years before, it had reached as far as
Olynthus. How completely her ascendency had passed away, is shown in
a remarkable step taken by Athens, seemingly towards the close of
371 B.C., about four months after the battle of Leuktra. Many of
the Peloponnesian cities, though they had lost both their fear and
their reverence for Sparta, were still anxious to continue members
of a voluntary alliance under the presidency of some considerable
city. Of this feeling the Athenians took advantage, to send envoys
and invite them to enter into a common league at Athens, on the
basis of the peace of Antalkidas, and of the peace recently sworn
at Sparta.[429] Many of them, obeying the summons, entered into an
engagement to the following effect: “I will adhere to the peace sent
down by the Persian king, and to the resolutions of the Athenians and
the allies generally. If any of the cities who have sworn this oath
shall be attacked, I will assist her with all my might.” What cities,
or how many, swore to this engagement, we are not told; we make out
indirectly that Corinth was one;[430] but the Eleians refused it,
on the ground that their right of sovereignty over the Marganeis,
the Triphylians, and the Skilluntians, was not recognized. The
formation of the league itself, however, with Athens as president, is
a striking fact, as evidence of the sudden dethronement of Sparta,
and as a warning that she would henceforward have to move in her
own separate orbit, like Athens after the Peloponnesian war. Athens
stepped into the place of Sparta, as president of the Peloponnesian
confederacy, and guarantee of the sworn peace; though the cities
which entered into this new compact were not for that reason
understood to break with their ancient president.[431]

  [428] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 10.

  The discouragement of the Spartans is revealed by the unwilling,
  though indirect, intimations of Xenophon,—not less than by
  their actual conduct—Hellen. vi, 5, 21; vii, 1, 30-32; compare
  Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.

  [429] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 1-3.

  Ἐνθυμηθέντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὅτι οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἔτι οἴονται, χρῆναι
  ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ οὔπω διακέοιντο οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὥσπερ τοὺς
  Ἀθηναίους διέθεσαν—μεταπέμπονται τὰς πόλεις, ὅσοι βούλονται τῆς
  εἰρήνης μετέχειν, ἣν βασιλεὺς κατέπεμψεν.

  In this passage, Morus and some other critics maintain that
  we ought to read οὔπω (which seems not to be supported by any
  MSS.), in place of οὕτω. Zeune and Schneider have admitted the
  new reading into the text; yet they doubt the propriety of the
  change, and I confess that I share their doubts. The word οὕτω
  will construe, and gives a clear sense; a very different sense
  from οὔπω, indeed,—yet more likely to have been intended by
  Xenophon.

  [430] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 37.

  [431] Thus the Corinthians still continued allies of Sparta (Xen.
  Hellen. vii, 4, 8).

Another incident too, apparently occurring about the present time,
though we cannot mark its exact date,—serves to mark the altered
position of Sparta. The Thebans preferred in the assembly of
Amphiktyons an accusation against her, for the unlawful capture of
their citadel the Kadmeia by Phœbidas, while under a sworn peace; and
for the sanction conferred by the Spartan authorities on this act, in
detaining and occupying the place. The Amphiktyonic assembly found
the Spartans guilty, and condemned them to a fine of five hundred
talents. As the fine was not paid, the assembly, after a certain
interval, doubled it; but the second sentence remained unexecuted as
well as the first, since there were no means of enforcement.[432]
Probably neither those who preferred the charge, nor those who
passed the vote, expected that the Lacedæmonians would really submit
to pay the fine. The utmost which could be done, by way of punishment
for such contumacy, would be to exclude them from the Pythian games,
which were celebrated under the presidency of the Amphiktyons; and we
may perhaps presume that they really were thus excluded.

  [432] Diodor. xvi, 23-29; Justin, viii, 1.

  We may fairly suppose that both of them borrow from Theopompus,
  who treated at large of the memorable Sacred War against the
  Phokians, which began in 355 B.C., and in which the conduct of
  Sparta was partly determined by this previous sentence of the
  Amphiktyons. See Theopompi Fragm. 182-184, ed. Didot.

The incident however deserves peculiar notice, in more than one
point of view. First, as indicating the lessened dignity of Sparta.
Since the victory of Leuktra and the death of Jason, Thebes had
become preponderant, especially in Northern Greece, where the
majority of the nations or races voting in the Amphiktyonic assembly
were situated. It is plainly through the ascendency of Thebes,
that this condemnatory vote was passed. Next, as indicating the
incipient tendency, which we shall hereafter observe still farther
developed, to extend the functions of the Amphiktyonic assembly
beyond its special sphere of religious solemnities, and to make it
the instrument of political coërcion or revenge in the hands of
the predominant state. In the previous course of this history, an
entire century has passed without giving occasion to mention the
Amphiktyonic assembly as taking part in political affairs. Neither
Thucydides nor Xenophon, though their united histories cover seventy
years, chiefly of Hellenic conflict, ever speak of that assembly.
The latter, indeed, does not even notice this fine imposed upon the
Lacedæmonians, although it falls within the period of his history. We
know the fact only from Diodorus and Justin; and unfortunately merely
as a naked fact, without any collateral or preliminary details.
During the sixty or seventy years preceding the battle of Leuktra,
Sparta had always had her regular political confederacy and synod of
allies convened by herself: her political ascendency was exercised
over them, _eo nomine_, by a method more direct and easy than that of
perverting the religious authority of the Amphiktyonic assembly, even
if such a proceeding were open to her.[433] But when Thebes, after
the battle of Leuktra, became the more powerful state individually,
she had no such established confederacy and synod of allies, to
sanction her propositions, and to share or abet her antipathies.
The Amphiktyonic assembly, meeting alternately at Delphi and at
Thermopylæ, and composed of twelve ancient races, principally
belonging to Northern Greece, as well as most of them inconsiderable
in power,—presented itself as a convenient instrument for her
purposes. There was a certain show of reason for considering the
seizure of the Kadmeia by Phœbidas as a religious offence; since it
was not only executed during the Pythian festival, but was in itself
a glaring violation of the public law and interpolitical obligations
recognized between Grecian cities; which, like other obligations,
were believed to be under the sanction of the gods; though probably,
if the Athenians and Platæans had preferred a similar complaint to
the Amphiktyons against Thebes for her equally unjust attempt to
surprise Platæa under full peace in the spring of 431 B.C.,—both
Spartans and Thebans would have resisted it. In the present case,
however, the Thebans had a case against Sparta sufficiently
plausible, when combined with their overruling ascendency, to carry a
majority in the Amphiktyonic assembly, and to procure the imposition
of this enormous fine. In itself the sentence produced no direct
effect,—which will explain the silence of Xenophon. But it is the
first of a series of proceedings, connected with the Amphiktyons,
which will be found hereafter pregnant with serious results for
Grecian stability and independence.

  [433] See Tittmann, Ueber den Bund der Amphiktyonen, pp. 192-197
  (Berlin, 1812).

Among all the inhabitants of Peloponnesus, none were more powerfully
affected, by the recent Spartan overthrow at Leuktra, than the
Arcadians. Tegea, their most important city, situated on the border
of Laconia, was governed by an oligarchy wholly in the interest of
Sparta: Orchomenus was of like sentiment; and Mantinea had been
broken up into separate villages (about fifteen years before) by the
Lacedæmonians themselves—an act of high-handed injustice committed
at the zenith of their power after the peace of Antalkidas. The
remaining Arcadian population were in great proportion villagers;
rude men, but excellent soldiers, and always ready to follow the
Lacedæmonian banners, as well from old habit and military deference,
as from the love of plunder.[434]

  [434] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 19.

The defeat of Leuktra effaced this ancient sentiment. The Arcadians
not only ceased to count upon victory and plunder in the service of
Sparta, but began to fancy that their own military prowess was not
inferior to that of the Spartans; while the disappearance of the
harmosts left them free to follow their own inclinations. It was by
the Mantineans that the movement was first commenced. Divested of
Grecian city-life, and condemned to live in separate villages, each
under its own philo-Spartan oligarchy, they had nourished a profound
animosity, which manifested itself on the first opportunity of
deposing these oligarchies and coming again together. The resolution
was unanimously adopted, to re-establish Mantinea with its walls, and
resume their political consolidation; while the leaders banished by
the Spartans at their former intervention, now doubtless returned to
become foremost in the work.[435] As the breaking up of Mantinea had
been one of the most obnoxious acts of Spartan omnipotence, so there
was now a strong sympathy in favor of its re-establishment. Many
Arcadians from other quarters came to lend auxiliary labor, while the
Eleians sent three talents as a contribution towards the cost. Deeply
mortified by this proceeding, yet too weak to prevent it by force,
the Spartans sent Agesilaus with a friendly remonstrance. Having
been connected with the city by paternal ties of hospitality, he had
declined the command of the army of coërcion previously employed
against it; nevertheless, on this occasion, the Mantinean leaders
refused to convene their public assembly to hear his communication,
desiring that he would make known his purpose to them. Accordingly,
he intimated that he had come with no view of hindering the
re-establishment of the city, but simply to request that they would
defer it until the consent of Sparta could be formally given; which
(he promised) should soon be forthcoming, together with a handsome
subscription to lighten the cost. But the Mantinean leaders answered,
that compliance was impossible, since a public resolution had already
been taken to prosecute the work forthwith. Enraged at such a rebuff,
yet without power to resent it, Agesilaus was compelled to return
home.[436] The Mantineans persevered and completed the rebuilding of
their city, on a level site, and in an elliptical form, surrounded
with elaborate walls and towers.

  [435] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 6; vi, 5, 3.

  [436] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 4, 5.

  Pausanias (viii, 8, 6: ix, 14, 2) states that the Thebans
  reëstablished the city of Mantinea. The act emanated from the
  spontaneous impulse of the Mantineans and other Arcadians, before
  the Thebans had yet begun to interfere actively in Peloponnesus,
  which we shall presently find them doing. But it was doubtless
  done in reliance upon Theban support, and was in all probability
  made known to, and encouraged by, Epaminondas. It formed the
  first step to that series of anti-Spartan measures in Arcadia,
  which I shall presently relate.

  Either the city of Mantinea now built was not exactly in the
  same situation as the one dismantled in 385 B.C., since the
  river Ophis did not run through it, as it had run through the
  former,—or else the course of the Ophis has altered. If the
  former, there would be three successive sites, the oldest of
  them being on the hill called Ptolis, somewhat north of Gurzuli.
  Ptolis was perhaps the larger of the primary constituent
  villages. Ernst Curtius (Peloponnesos, p. 242) makes the hill
  Gurzuli to be the same as the hill called Ptolis; Colonel Leake
  distinguishes the two, and places Ptolis on his map northward
  of Gurzuli (Peloponnesiaca, p. 378-381). The summit of Gurzuli
  is about one mile distant from the centre of Mantinea (Leake,
  Peloponnes. p. 383).

  The walls of Mantinea, as rebuilt in 370 B.C., form an ellipse
  of about eighteen stadia, or a little more than two miles in
  circumference. The greater axis of the ellipse points north and
  south. It was surrounded with a wet ditch, whose waters join into
  one course at the west of the town, and form a brook which Sir
  William Gell calls the Ophis (Itinerary of the Morea, p. 142).
  The face of the wall is composed of regularly cut square stones;
  it is about ten feet thick in all,—four feet for an outer wall,
  two feet for an inner wall, and an intermediate space of four
  feet filled up with rubbish. There were eight principal double
  gates, each with a narrow winding approach, defended by a round
  tower on each side. There were quadrangular towers, eighty feet
  apart, all around the circumference of the walls (Ernst Curtius,
  Peloponnesos, p. 236, 237).

  These are instructive remains, indicating the ideas of the Greeks
  respecting fortification in the time of Epaminondas. It appears
  that Mantinea was not so large as Tegea, to which last Curtius
  assigns a circumference of more than three miles (p. 253).

The affront here offered, probably studiously offered, by Mantinean
leaders who had either been exiles themselves, or sympathized with
the exiles,—was only the prelude to a series of others (presently
to be recounted) yet more galling and intolerable. But it was
doubtless felt to the quick both by the ephors and by Agesilaus,
as a public symptom of that prostration into which they had so
suddenly fallen. To appreciate fully such painful sentiment, we must
recollect that an exaggerated pride and sense of dignity, individual
as well as collective, founded upon military excellence and earned
by incredible rigor of training,—was the chief mental result imbibed
by every pupil of Lykurgus, and hitherto ratified as legitimate by
the general testimony of Greece. This was his principal recompense
for the severe fatigue, the intense self-suppression, the narrow,
monotonous, and unlettered routine, wherein he was born and died.
As an individual, the Spartan citizen was pointed out by the finger
of admiration at the Olympic and other festivals;[437] while he
saw his city supplicated from the most distant regions of Greece,
and obeyed almost everywhere near her own border, as Pan-hellenic
president. On a sudden, with scarce any preparatory series of events,
he now felt this proud prerogative sentiment not only robbed of its
former tribute, but stung in the most mortifying manner. Agesilaus,
especially, was the more open to such humiliation, since he was not
only a Spartan to the core, but loaded with the consciousness of
having exercised more influence than any other king before him,—of
having succeeded to the throne at a moment when Sparta was at the
maximum of her power,—and of having now in his old age accompanied
her, in part brought her by his misjudgments, into her present
degradation.

  [437] Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus) s. 111.

Agesilaus had, moreover, incurred unpopularity among the Spartans
themselves, whose chagrin took the form of religious scruple and
uneasiness. It has been already stated that he was, and had been
from childhood, lame; which deformity had been vehemently insisted
on by his opponents (during the dispute between him and Leotychides
in 398 B.C. for the vacant throne) as disqualifying him for the
regal dignity, and as being the precise calamity against which an
ancient oracle—“Beware of a lame reign”—had given warning. Ingenious
interpretation by Lysander, combined with superior personal merit
in Agesilaus, and suspicions about the legitimacy of Leotychides,
had caused the objection to be then overruled. But there had always
been a party, even during the palmy days of Agesilaus, who thought
that he had obtained the crown under no good auspices. And when
the humiliation of Sparta arrived, every man’s religion suggested
to him readily the cause of it,[438]—“See what comes of having set
at nought the gracious warning of the gods, and put upon ourselves
a lame reign!” In spite of such untoward impression, however, the
real energy and bravery of Agesilaus, which had not deserted even
an infirm body and an age of seventy years, was more than ever
indispensable to his country. He was still the chief leader of
her affairs, condemned to the sad necessity of submitting to this
Mantinean affront, and much worse that followed it, without the least
power of hindrance.

  [438] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30, 31, 34.

The reëstablishment of Mantinea was probably completed during the
autumn and winter of B.C. 371-370. Such coalescence of villages
into a town, coupled with the predominance of feelings hostile to
Sparta, appears to have suggested the idea of a larger political
union among all who bore the Arcadian name. As yet, no such union
had ever existed; the fractions of the Arcadian name had nothing in
common, apart from other Greeks, except many legendary and religious
sympathies, with a belief in the same heroic lineage and indigenous
antiquity.[439] But now the idea and aspiration, espoused with
peculiar ardor by a leading Mantinean named Lykomedes, spread itself
rapidly over the country, to form a “commune Arcadum,” or central
Arcadian authority, composed in certain proportions out of all the
sections now autonomous,—and invested with peremptory power of
determining by the vote of its majority. Such central power, however,
was not intended to absorb or set aside the separate governments, but
only to be exercised for certain definite purposes; in maintaining
unanimity at home, together with concurrent, independent action, as
to foreign states.[440] This plan of Pan-Arcadian federation was
warmly promoted by the Mantineans, who looked to it as a protection
to themselves in case the Spartan power should revive; as well as
by the Thebans and Argeians, from whom aid was expected in case of
need. It found great favor in most parts of Arcadia, especially in
the small districts bordering on Laconia, which stood most in need
of union to protect themselves against the Spartans,—the Mænalians,
Parrhasians, Eutresians, Ægytes,[441] etc. But the jealousies among
the more considerable cities made some of them adverse to any scheme
emanating from Mantinea. Among these unfriendly opponents were
Heræa, on the west of Arcadia bordering on Elis,—Orchomenus,[442]
conterminous with Mantinea to the north—and Tegea, conterminous
to the south. The hold of the Spartans on Arcadia had been always
maintained chiefly through Orchomenus and Tegea. The former was the
place where they deposited their hostages taken from other suspected
towns; the latter was ruled by Stasippus and an oligarchy devoted to
their interests.[443]

  [439] It seems, however, doubtful whether there were not some
  common Arcadian coins struck, even before the battle of Leuktra.

  Some such are extant; but they are referred by K. O. Müller, as
  well as by M. Boeckh (Metrologisch. Untersuchungen, p. 92) to a
  later date subsequent to the foundation of Megalopolis.

  On the other hand, Ernst Curtius (Beyträge zur Aeltern Münzkunde,
  p. 85-90, Berlin, 1851) contends that there is a great difference
  in the style and execution of these coins, and that several
  in all probability belong to a date earlier than the battle
  of Leuktra. He supposes that these older coins were struck in
  connection with the Pan-Arcadian sanctuary and temple of Zeus
  Lykæus, and probably out of a common treasury at the temple of
  that god for religious purposes; perhaps also in connection
  with the temple of Artemis Hymnia (Pausan. viii, 5, 11) between
  Mantinea and Orchomenus.

  [440] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 6. συνῆγον ἐπὶ τὸ συνιέναι πᾶν τὸ
  Ἀρκαδικὸν, καὶ ὅ,τι νικῴη ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι καὶ τῶν
  πόλεων, etc.

  Compare Diodor. xv, 59-62.

  [441] See Pausanias, viii, 27, 2, 3.

  [442] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 11.

  [443] For the relations of these Arcadian cities, with Sparta and
  with each other, see Thucyd. iv, 134; v, 61, 64, 77.

Among the population of Tegea, however, a large proportion were
ardent partisans of the new Pan-Arcadian movement, and desirous
of breaking off their connection with Sparta. At the head of
this party were Proxenus and Kallibius; while Stasippus and his
friends, supported by a senate composed chiefly of their partisans,
vehemently opposed any alteration of the existing system. Proxenus
and his partisans resolved to appeal to the assembled people, whom
accordingly they convoked in arms; pacific popular assemblies, with
free discussion, forming seemingly no part of the constitution
of the city. Stasippus and his friends appeared in armed numbers
also; and a conflict ensued, in which each party charged the other
with bad faith and with striking the first blow.[444] At first
Stasippus had the advantage. Proxenus with a few of the opposite
party were slain, while Kallibius with the remainder maintained
himself near the town-wall, and in possession of the gate on the
side towards Mantinea. To that city he had before despatched an
express, entreating aid, while he opened a parley with the opponents.
Presently the Mantinean force arrived, and was admitted within
the gates; upon which Stasippus, seeing that he could no longer
maintain himself, escaped by another gate towards Pallantium. He took
sanctuary with a few friends in a neighboring temple of Artemis,
whither he was pursued by his adversaries, who removed the roof,
and began to cast the tiles down upon them. The unfortunate men
were obliged to surrender. Fettered and placed on a cart, they were
carried back to Tegea, and put on their trial before the united
Tegeans and Mantineans, who condemned them and put them to death.
Eight hundred Tegeans, of the defeated party, fled as exiles to
Sparta.[445]

  [444] Xenophon in his account represents Stasippus and his
  friends as being quite in the right, and as having behaved
  not only with justice but with clemency. But we learn from an
  indirect admission, in another place, that there was also another
  story, totally different, which represented Stasippus as having
  begun unjust violence. Compare Hellenic. vi, 5, 7, 8 with vi, 5,
  36.

  The manifest partiality of Xenophon, in these latter books,
  greatly diminishes the value of his own belief on such a matter.

  [445] Xen. Hellen. vi. 5. 8, 9, 10.

Such was the important revolution which now took place at Tegea; a
struggle of force on both sides, and not of discussion,—as was in
the nature of the Greek oligarchical governments, where scarce any
serious change of policy in the state could be brought about without
violence. It decided the success of the Pan-Arcadian movement, which
now proceeded with redoubled enthusiasm. Both Mantinea and Tegea were
cordially united in its favor; though Orchomenus, still strenuous in
opposing it, hired for that purpose, as well as for her own defence,
a body of mercenaries from Corinth under Polytropus. A full assembly
of the Arcadian name was convoked at a small town called Asea, in
the mountainous district west of Tegea. It appears to have been
numerously attended; for we hear of one place, Eutæa (in the district
of Mount Mænalus,[446] and near the borders of Laconia), from whence
every single male adult went to the assembly. It was here that the
consummation of the Pan-Arcadian confederacy was finally determined;
though Orchomenus and Heræa still stood aloof.[447]

  [446] Pausanias, viii, 27, 3.

  [447] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 11, 12.

There could hardly be a more fatal blow to Sparta than this loss
to herself, and transfer to her enemies, of Tegea, the most
powerful of her remaining allies.[448] To assist the exiles and
avenge Stasippus, as well as to arrest the Arcadian movement,
she resolved on a march into the country, in spite of her present
dispirited condition; while Heræa and Lepreum, but no other places,
sent contingents to her aid. From Elis and Argos, on the other
hand, reinforcements came to Mantinea and Tegea. Proclaiming that
the Mantineans had violated the recent peace by their entry into
Tegea, Agesilaus marched across the border against them. The first
Arcadian town which he reached was Eutæa,[449] where he found
that all the male adults had gone to the great Arcadian assembly.
Though the feebler population, remaining behind, were completely
in his power, he took scrupulous care to respect both person and
property, and even lent aid to rebuild a decayed portion of the
wall. At Eutæa he halted a day or two, thinking it prudent to wait
for the junction of the mercenary force and the Bœotian exiles under
Polytropus, now at Orchomenus. Against the latter place, however,
the Mantineans had marched under Lykomêdes, while Polytropus, coming
forth from the walls to meet them, had been defeated with loss, and
slain.[450] Hence Agesilaus was compelled to advance onward with
his own unassisted forces, through the territory of Tegea up to the
neighborhood of Mantinea. His onward march left the way from Asea
to Tegea free, upon which the Arcadians assembled at Asea broke up,
and marched by night to Tegea; from whence, on the next day, they
proceeded to Mantinea, along the mountain range eastward of the
Tegeatic plain; so that the whole Arcadian force thus became united.
Agesilaus on his side, having ravaged the fields and encamped within
little more than two miles from the walls of Mantinea, was agreeably
surprised by the junction of his allies from Orchomenus, who had
eluded by a night-march the vigilance of the enemy. Both on one side
and on the other, the forces were thus concentrated. Agesilaus found
himself on the first night, without intending it, embosomed in a
recess of the mountains near Mantinea, where the Mantineans gathered
on the high ground around, in order to attack him from above, the
next morning. By a well-managed retreat, he extricated himself from
this inconvenient position, and regained the plain; where he remained
three days, prepared to give battle if the enemy came forth, in order
that he might “not seem (says Xenophon) to hasten his departure
through fear.”[451] As the enemy kept within their walls, he marched
homeward, on the fourth day, to his former camp in the Tegean
territory. The enemy did not pursue, and he then pushed on his march,
though it was late in the evening, to Eutæa; “wishing (says Xenophon)
to get his troops off before even the enemies’ fires could be seen,
in order that no one might say that his return was a flight. He
thought that he had raised the spirit of Sparta out of the previous
discouragement, by invading Arcadia and ravaging the country without
any enemy coming forth to fight him.”[452] The army was then brought
back to Sparta and disbanded.

  [448] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 2.

  See the prodigious anxiety manifested by the Lacedæmonians
  respecting the sure adhesion of Tegea (Thucyd. v, 64).

  [449] I cannot but think that Eutæa stands marked upon the maps
  of Kiepert at a point too far from the frontier of Laconia, and
  so situated in reference to Asea, that Agesilaus must have passed
  very near Asea in order to get to it; which is difficult to
  suppose, seeing that the Arcadian convocation was assembled at
  Asea. Xenophon calls Eutæa πόλιν ὅμορον with reference to Laconia
  (Hellen. vi, 5, 12); this will hardly suit with the position
  marked by Kiepert.

  The district called Mænalia must have reached farther southward
  than Kiepert indicates on his map. It included Oresteion, which
  was on the straight road from Sparta to Tegea (Thucyd. v, 64;
  Herodot. ix, 11). Kiepert has placed Oresteion in his map
  agreeably to what seems the meaning of Pausanias, viii, 44, 3.
  But it rather appears that the place mentioned by Pausanias must
  have been _Oresthasion_, and that _Oresteion_ must have been a
  different place, though Pausanias considers them the same. See
  the geographical Appendix to K. O. Müller’s Dorians, vol. ii, p.
  442—Germ. edit.

  [450] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 13, 14; Diodor. xv, 62.

  [451] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 20. ὅπως μὴ δοκοίη φοβούμενος σπεύδειν
  τὴν ἔφοδον.

  See Leake’s Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, c. xxiv, p. 74, 75.
  The exact spot designated by the words τὸν ὄπισθεν κόλπον τῆς
  Μαντινικῆς, seems hardly to be identified.

  [452] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 21. βουλόμενος ἀπαγαγεῖν τοὺς ὁπλίτας,
  πρὶν καὶ τὰ πυρὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἰδεῖν, ἵνα μή τις εἴπῃ, ὡς φεύγων
  ἀπαγάγοι. Ἐκ γὰρ τῆς πρόσθεν ἀθυμίας ἐδόκει τε ἀνειληφέναι τὴν
  πόλιν, ὅτι καὶ ἐμβεβλήκει εἰς τὴν Ἀρκαδίαν, καὶ δῃοῦντι τὴν χώραν
  οὐδεὶς ἠθελήκει μάχεσθαι: compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30.

It had now become a matter of boast for Agesilaus (according to his
own friendly historian) to keep the field for three or four days,
without showing fear of Arcadians and Eleians! So fatally had Spartan
pride broken down, since the day (less than eighteen months before)
when the peremptory order had been sent to Kleombrotus, to march out
of Phokis straight against Thebes!

Nevertheless it was not from fear of Agesilaus, but from a wise
discretion, that the Arcadians and Eleians had kept within the
walls of Mantinea. Epaminondas with the Theban army was approaching
to their aid, and daily expected; a sum of ten talents having been
lent by the Eleians to defray the cost.[453] He had been invited by
them and by others of the smaller Peloponnesian states, who felt
the necessity of some external protector against Sparta,—and who
even before they applied to Thebes for aid, had solicited the like
interference from Athens (probably under the general presidency
accepted by Athens, and the oaths interchanged by her with various
inferior cities, since the battle of Leuktra), but had experienced a
refusal.[454]

  [453] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 19.

  [454] Diodor. xv, 62. Compare Demosthenes, Orat. pro Megalopolit.
  pp. 205-207, s. 13-23.

Epaminondas had been preparing for this contingency ever since the
battle of Leuktra. The first use made of his victory had been to
establish or confirm the ascendency of Thebes both over the recusant
Bœotian cities and over the neighboring Phokians and Lokrians,
etc. After this had been accomplished, he must have been occupied
(during the early part of 370 B.C.) in anxiously watching the
movements of Jason of Pheræ,—who had already announced his design
of marching with an imposing force to Delphi for the celebration of
the Pythian games (about August 1.) Though this despot was the ally
of Thebes, yet as both his power, and his aspirations towards the
headship of Greece,[455] were well known, no Theban general, even
of prudence inferior to Epaminondas, could venture in the face of
such liabilities to conduct away the Theban force into Peloponnesus,
leaving Bœotia uncovered. The assassination of Jason relieved Thebes
from such apprehensions, and a few weeks sufficed to show that his
successors were far less formidable in power as well as in ability.
Accordingly, in the autumn of 370 B.C. Epaminondas had his attention
free to turn to Peloponnesus, for the purpose both of maintaining
the anti-Spartan revolution which had taken place in Tegea, and
of seconding the pronounced impulse among the Arcadians towards
federative coalition.

  [455] Diodor. xv, 60.

But the purposes of this distinguished man went farther still;
embracing long-sighted and permanent arrangements, such as should
forever disable Sparta from recovering her prominent station in the
Grecian world. While with one hand he organized Arcadia, with the
other he took measures for replacing the exiled Messenians on their
ancient territory. To achieve this, it was necessary to dispossess
the Spartans of the region once known as independent Messenia, under
its own line of kings, but now, for near three centuries, the best
portion of Laconia, tilled by Helots for the profit of proprietors
at Sparta. While converting these Helots into free Messenians, as
their forefathers had once been, Epaminondas proposed to invite back
all the wanderers of the same race who were dispersed in various
portions of Greece; so as at once to impoverish Sparta by loss of
territory, and to plant upon her flank a neighbor bitterly hostile.
It has been already mentioned, that during the Peloponnesian war, the
exiled Messenians had been among the most active allies of Athens
and Sparta,—at Naupaktus, at Sphakteria, at Pylus, in Kephallenia,
and elsewhere. Expelled at the close of that war by the triumphant
Spartans,[456] not only from Peloponnesus, but also from Naupaktus
and Kephallenia, these exiles had since been dispersed among various
Hellenic colonies; at Rhegium in Italy, at Messênê in Sicily, at
Hesperides in Libya. From 404 B.C. (the close of the war) to 373
B.C., they had remained thus without a home. At length, about the
latter year (when the Athenian confederate navy again became equal
or superior to the Lacedæmonian on the west coast of Peloponnesus),
they began to indulge the hope of being restored to Naupaktus.[457]
Probably their request may have been preferred and discussed in the
synod of Athenian allies, where the Thebans sat as members. Nothing
however had been done towards it by the Athenians,—who soon became
fatigued with the war, and at length made peace with Sparta,—when the
momentous battle of Leuktra altered, both completely and suddenly,
the balance of power in Greece. A chance of protection was now opened
to the Messenians from Thebes, far more promising than they had
ever had from Athens. Epaminondas, well aware of the loss as well
as humiliation that he should inflict upon Sparta by restoring them
to their ancient territory, entered into communication with them,
and caused them to be invited to Peloponnesus from all their distant
places of emigration.[458] By the time of his march into Arcadia, in
the late autumn of 370 B.C., many of them had already joined him,
burning with all their ancient hatred of Sparta, and contributing to
aggravate the same sentiment among Thebans and allies.

  [456] Diodor. xiv, 34.

  [457] Pausanias. iv, 26, 3.

  [458] Diodor. xv, 66; Pausanias, iv, 26, 3, 4.

With the scheme of restoring the Messenians, was combined in the
mind of Epaminondas another, for the political consolidation of
the Arcadians; both being intended as parts of one strong and
self-supporting organization against Sparta on her own border. Of
course he could have accomplished nothing of the kind, if there had
not been a powerful spontaneous movement towards consolidation among
the Arcadians themselves. But without his guidance and protection,
the movement would have proved abortive, through the force of local
jealousies within the country, fomented and seconded by Spartan aid
from without. Though the general vote for federative coalition had
been passed with enthusiasm, yet to carry out such a vote to the
satisfaction of all, without quarrelling on points of detail, would
have required far more of public-minded sentiment, as well as of
intelligence, than what could be reckoned upon among the Arcadians.
It was necessary to establish a new city; since the standing jealousy
between Mantinea and Tegea, now for the first time embarked in one
common cause, would never have permitted that either should be
preferred as the centre of the new consolidation.[459] Besides fixing
upon the new site required, it was indispensable also to choose
between conflicting exigencies, and to break up ancient habits, in a
way such as could hardly have been enforced by any majority purely
Arcadian. The authority here deficient was precisely supplied by
Epaminondas; who brought with him a victorious army and a splendid
personal name, combined with impartiality as to the local politics of
Arcadia, and single-minded hostility to Sparta.

  [459] To illustrate small things by great—At the first formation
  of the Federal Constitution of the United States of America, the
  rival pretensions of New York and Philadelphia were among the
  principal motives for creating the new federal city of Washington.

It was with a view to these two great foundations, as well as to
expel Agesilaus, that Epaminondas now marched the Theban army
into Arcadia; the command being voluntarily intrusted to him by
Pelopidas and the other Bœotarchs present. He arrived shortly after
the retirement of Agesilaus, while the Arcadians and Eleians
were ravaging the lands of the recusant town of Heræa. As they
speedily came back to greet his arrival, the aggregate confederate
body,—Argeians, Arcadians, and Eleians, united with the Thebans
and their accompanying allies,—is said to have amounted to forty
thousand, or according to some, even to seventy thousand men.[460]
Not merely had Epaminondas brought with him a choice body of
auxiliaries,—Phokians, Lokrians, Eubœans, Akarnanians, Herakleots,
Malians, and Thessalian cavalry and peltasts,—but the Bœotian bands
themselves were so brilliant and imposing, as to excite universal
admiration. The victory of Leuktra had awakened among them an
enthusiastic military ardor, turned to account by the genius of
Epaminondas, and made to produce a finished discipline which even the
unwilling Xenophon cannot refuse to acknowledge.[461] Conscious of
the might of their assembled force, within a day’s march of Laconia,
the Arcadians, Argeians, and Eleians pressed Epaminondas to invade
that country, now that no allies could approach the frontier to its
aid. At first he was unwilling to comply. He had not come prepared
for the enterprise; being well aware, from his own journey to Sparta
(when the peace-congress was held there prior to the battle of
Leuktra), of the impracticable nature of the intervening country, so
easy to be defended, especially during the winter-season, by troops
like the Lacedæmonians, whom he believed to be in occupation of all
the passes. Nor was his reluctance overcome until the instances
of his allies were backed by assurances from the Arcadians on the
frontier, that the passes were not all guarded; as well as by
invitations from some of the discontented Periœki, in Laconia. These
Periœki engaged to revolt openly, if he would only show himself
in the country. They told him that there was a general slackness
throughout Laconia in obeying the military requisitions from Sparta;
and tendered their lives as atonement if they should be found to
speak falsely. By such encouragements, as well as by the general
impatience of all around him to revenge upon Sparta her long career
of pride and abused ascendency, Epaminondas was at length induced to
give the order of invasion.[462]

  [460] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 31; and compare Agesil. and Pomp. c.
  4; Diodor. xv, 62. Compare Xenophon, Agesilaus, 2, 24.

  [461] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 23. Οἱ δὲ Ἀρκάδες καὶ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ
  Ἠλεῖοι ἔπειθον αὐτοὺς ἡγεῖσθαι ὡς τάχιστα εἰς τὴν Λακωνικήν,
  ἐπιδείκνυντες μὲν τὸ ἑαυτῶν πλῆθος, ὑπερεπαινοῦντες δὲ τὸ τῶν
  Θηβαίων στράτευμα. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν Βοιωτοὶ ἐγυμνάζοντο πάντες περὶ
  τὰ ὅπλα, ἀγαλλόμενοι τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις νίκῃ, etc.

  [462] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 24, 25.

That he should have hesitated in taking this responsibility, will
not surprise us, if we recollect, that over and above the real
difficulties of the country, invasion of Laconia by land was
an unparalleled phenomenon,—that the force of Sparta was most
imperfectly known,—that no such thought had been entertained when he
left Thebes,—that the legal duration of command, for himself and his
colleagues, would not permit it,—and that though his Peloponnesian
allies were forward in the scheme, the rest of his troops and his
countrymen might well censure him, if the unknown force of resistance
turned out as formidable as their associations from old time led them
to apprehend.

The invading army was distributed into four portions, all penetrating
by different passes. The Eleians had the westernmost and easiest
road, the Argeians the easternmost;[463] while the Thebans themselves
and the Arcadians formed the two central divisions. The latter
alone experienced any serious resistance. More daring even than
the Thebans, they encountered Ischolaus the Spartan at Ium or Oeum
in the district called Skiritis, attacked him in the village, and
overpowered him by vehemence of assault, by superior numbers, and
seemingly also by some favor or collusion[464] on the part of the
inhabitants. After a desperate resistance, this brave Spartan with
nearly all his division perished. At Karyæ, the Thebans also found
and surmounted some resistance; but the victory of the Arcadians
over Ischolaus operated as an encouragement to all, so that the four
divisions reached Sellasia[465] and were again united in safety.
Undefended and deserted (seemingly) by the Spartans, Sellasia was
now burnt and destroyed by the invaders, who, continuing their march
along the plain or valley towards the Eurotas, encamped in the sacred
grove of Apollo. On the next day they reached the Eurotas, at the
foot of the bridge which crossed that river and led to the city of
Sparta.

  [463] Diodor. xv, 64.

  See Colonel Leake’s Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, ch. 23, p. 29.

  [464] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 26. When we read that the Arcadians got
  on the roofs of the houses to attack Ischolaus, this fact seems
  to imply that they were admitted into the houses by the villagers.

  [465] Respecting the site of Sellasia, Colonel Leake thinks, and
  advances various grounds for supposing, that Sellasia was on the
  road from Sparta to the north-east, towards the Thyreatis; and
  that Karyæ was on the road from Sparta northward, towards Tegea.
  The French investigators of the Morea, as well as Professor Ross
  and Kiepert, hold a different opinion, and place Sellasia on the
  road from Sparta northward towards Tegea (Leake, Peloponnesiaca,
  p. 342-352; Ross, Reisen im Peloponnes. p. 187; Berlin, 1841).

  Upon such a point, the authority of Colonel Leake is very high;
  yet the opposite opinion respecting the site of Sellasia seems to
  me preferable.

Epaminondas found the bridge too well-guarded to attempt forcing it;
a strong body of Spartan hoplites being also discernible on the other
side, in the sacred ground of Athênê Alea. He therefore marched down
the left bank of the river, burning and plundering the houses in his
way, as far as Amyklæ, between two and three miles below Sparta. Here
he found a ford, though the river was full, from the winter season;
and accomplished the passage, defeating, after a severe contest, a
body of Spartans who tried to oppose it. He was now on the same side
of the river as Sparta, to which city he slowly and cautiously made
his approach; taking care to keep his Theban troops always in the
best battle order, and protecting them, when encamped, by felled
trees; while the Arcadians and other Peloponnesian allies dispersed
around to plunder the neighboring houses and property.[466]

Great was the consternation which reigned in the city; destitute
of fortifications, yet hitherto inviolate in fact and unassailable
even in idea. Besides their own native force, the Spartans had
no auxiliaries except those mercenaries from Orchomenus who had
come back with Agesilaus; nor was it certain beforehand that
even these troops would remain with them, if the invasion became
formidable.[467] On the first assemblage of the irresistible army
on their frontier, they had despatched one of their commanders of
foreign contingents (called Xenâgi) to press the instant coming of
such Peloponnesian allies as remained faithful to them; and also
envoys to Athens, entreating assistance from that city. Auxiliaries
were obtained, and rapidly put under march, from Pellênê, Sikyon,
Phlius, Corinth, Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis.[468] But
the ordinary line of march into Laconia was now impracticable to
them; the whole frontier being barred by Argeians and Arcadians.
Accordingly they were obliged to proceed first to the Argolic
peninsula, and from thence to cross by sea (embarking probably at
Halieis on the south-western coast of the peninsula) to Prasiæ on the
eastern coast of Laconia; from whence they made their way over the
Laconian mountains to Sparta. Being poorly provided with vessels,
they were forced to cross in separate detachments, and to draw lots
for priority.[469] By this chance the Phliasian contingent did not
come over until the last; while the xenagus, eager to reach Sparta,
left them behind, and conducted the rest thither, arriving only
just before the confederate enemies debouched from Sellasia. The
Phliasians, on crossing to Prasiæ, found neither their comrades nor
the xenagus, but were obliged to hire a guide to Sparta. Fortunately
they arrived there both safely and in time, eluding the vigilance of
the enemy, who were then near Amyklæ.

  [466] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 30; Diodor. xv, 65.

  [467] This I apprehend to be the meaning of the phrase—ἐπεὶ
  μέντοι ἔμενον μὲν οἱ ἐξ Ὀρχομένου μισθόφοροι, etc.

  [468] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 29; vii, 2, 2.

  [469] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 2. Καὶ ~διαβαίνειν τελευταῖοι
  λαχόντες~ (the Phliasians) εἰς Πρασιὰς τῶν συμβοηθησάντων
  ... οὐ γὰρ πώποτε ἀφέστασαν, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’, ἐπεὶ ὁ ξεναγὸς ~τοὺς
  προδιαβεβῶτας~ λαβὼν ἀπολιπὼν αὐτοὺς ᾤχετο, οὐδ’ ὡς ἀπεστράφησαν,
  ἀλλ’ ἡγεμόνα μισθωσάμενοι ἐκ Πρασιῶν, ὄντων τῶν πολεμίων περὶ
  Ἀμύκλας, ὅπως ἐδύναντο διαδύντες ἐς Σπάρτην ἀφίκοντο.

These reinforcements were no less seasonable to Sparta, than
creditable to the fidelity of the allies. For the bad feeling which
habitually reigned in Laconia, between the Spartan citizens on one
side, and the Periœki and Helots on the other, produced in this hour
of danger its natural fruits of desertion, alarm, and weakness.
Not only were the Periœki and Helots in standing discontent, but
even among the Spartan citizens themselves, a privileged fraction
called Peers had come to monopolize political honors; while the
remainder,—poorer men, yet ambitious and active, and known under
the ordinary name of the Inferiors,—were subject to a degrading
exclusion, and rendered bitterly hostile. The account given in a
previous chapter of the conspiracy of Kinadon, will have disclosed
the fearful insecurity of the Spartan citizen, surrounded by so many
disaffected companions; Periœki and Helots in Laconia, inferior
citizens at Sparta. On the appearance of the invading enemy,
indeed, a certain feeling of common interest arose, since even the
disaffected might reasonably imagine that a plundering soldiery, if
not repelled at the point of the sword, would make their condition
worse instead of better. And accordingly, when the ephors made public
proclamation, that any Helot who would take heavy armor and serve
in the ranks as an hoplite, should be manumitted,—not less than
six thousand Helots gave in their names to serve. But a body thus
numerous, when seen in arms, became itself the object of mistrust to
the Spartans; so that the arrival of their new allies from Prasiæ
was welcomed as a security, not less against the armed Helots within
the city, than against the Thebans without.[470] Open enmity,
however, was not wanting. A considerable number both of Periœki and
Helots actually took arms on behalf of the Thebans; others remained
inactive, disregarding the urgent summons from the ephors, which
could not now be enforced.[471]

  [470] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 28, 29. ὥστε φόβον αὖ οὗτοι παρεῖχον
  συντεταγμένοι καὶ λίαν ἐδόκουν πολλοὶ εἶναι, etc.

  [471] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 25; vi, 5, 32; vii, 2, 2.

  It is evident from the last of these three passages, that the
  number of Periœki and Helots who actually revolted, was very
  considerable; and that the contrast between the second and third
  passages evinces the different feelings with which the two seem
  to have been composed by Xenophon.

  In the second, he is recounting the invasion of Epaminondas,
  with a wish to soften the magnitude of the Spartan disgrace and
  calamity as much as he can. Accordingly, he tells us no more
  than this,—“there were some among the Periœki, who even took
  active service in the attack of Gythium, and fought along with
  the Thebans,”—ἦσαν δέ τινες τῶν Περιοίκων, οἳ καὶ ἐπέθεντο καὶ
  συνεστρατεύοντο τοῖς μετὰ Θηβαίων.

  But in the third passage (vii, 2, 2: compare his biography called
  Agesilaus, ii, 24) Xenophon is extolling the fidelity of the
  Phliasians to Sparta under adverse circumstances of the latter.
  Hence it then suits his argument, to magnify these adverse
  circumstances, in order to enhance the merit of the Phliasians;
  and he therefore tells us,—“_Many_ of the Periœki, all the
  Helots, and all the allies except a few, had revolted from
  Sparta,”—σφαλέντων δ’ αὐτῶν τῇ ἐν Λεύκτροις μάχῃ, καὶ ἀποστάντων
  μὲν πολλῶν Περιοίκων, ἀποστάντων δὲ πάντων τῶν Εἱλώτων, ἔτι δὲ
  τῶν συμμάχων πλὴν πάνυ ὀλίγων, ἐπιστρατευόντων δ’ αὐτοῖς, ὡς
  εἰπεῖν, πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πιστοὶ διέμειναν (the Phliasians).

  I apprehend that both statements depart from the reality, though
  in opposite directions. I have adopted in the text something
  between the two.

Under such wide-spread feelings of disaffection the defence even of
Sparta itself against the assailing enemy was a task requiring all
the energy of Agesilaus. After having vainly tried to hinder the
Thebans from crossing the Eurotas, he was forced to abandon Amyklæ
and to throw himself back upon the city of Sparta, towards which they
immediately advanced. More than one conspiracy was on the point of
breaking out, had not his vigilance forestalled the projects. Two
hundred young soldiers of doubtful fidelity were marching, without
orders, to occupy a strong post (sacred to Artemis) called the
Issorium. Those around him were about to attack them, but Agesilaus,
repressing their zeal, went up alone to the band, addressed them in
language betokening no suspicion, yet warning them that they had
mistaken his orders: their services were needed, not at the Issorium,
but in another part of the city. They obeyed his orders, and moved to
the spot indicated; upon which he immediately occupied the Issorium
with troops whom he could trust. In the ensuing night, he seized
and put to death fifteen of the leaders of the two hundred. Another
conspiracy, said to have been on the point of breaking out, was
repressed by seizing the conspirators in the house where they were
assembled, and putting them to death untried; the first occasion
(observes Plutarch) on which any Spartan was ever put to death
untried,[472]—a statement which I hesitate to believe without knowing
from whom he borrowed it, but which, if true, proves that the Spartan
kings and ephors did not apply to Spartan citizens the same measure
as to Periœki and Helots.

  [472] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 32; Polyænus, ii, 1, 14; Ælian, V. H.
  xiv, 27.

By such severe proceedings, disaffection was kept under; while the
strong posts of the city were effectively occupied, and the wider
approaches barricaded by heaps of stones and earth.[473] Though
destitute of walls, Sparta was extremely defensible by position.
Epaminondas marched slowly up to it from Amyklæ; the Arcadians and
others in his army spreading themselves to burn and plunder the
neighborhood. On the third or fourth day his cavalry occupied the
Hippodrome (probably a space of level ground near the river, under
the hilly site of the town), where the Spartan cavalry, though
inferior both in number and in goodness, gained an advantage
over them, through the help of three hundred chosen hoplites whom
Agesilaus had planted in ambush hard by, in a precinct sacred to the
Dioskuri. Though this action was probably of little consequence, yet
Epaminondas did not dare to attempt the city by storm. Satisfied with
having defied the Spartans and manifested his mastery of the field
even to their own doors, he marched away southward down to Eurotas.
To them, in their present depression, it was matter of consolation
and even of boasting,[474] that he had not dared to assail them
in their last stronghold. The agony of their feelings,—grief,
resentment, and wounded honor,—was intolerable. Many wished to go out
and fight, at all hazard; but Agesilaus resisted them with the same
firmness as Perikles had shown at Athens, when the Peloponnesians
first invaded Attica at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.
Especially the Spartan women, who had never before beheld an enemy,
are said to have manifested emotions so furious and distressing, as
to increase much the difficulty of defence.[475] We are even told
that Antalkidas, at that time one of the ephors, sent his children
for safety away from Sparta to the island of Kythêra. Epaminondas
knew well how desperate the resistance of the Spartans would be if
their city were attacked; while to himself, in the midst of a hostile
and impracticable country, repulse would be absolute ruin.[476]

  [473] Æneas, Poliorceticus, c. 2, p. 16.

  [474] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 32. Καὶ τὸ μὲν μὴ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν
  προσβαλεῖν ἂν ἔτι αὐτοὺς, ἤδη τι ἐδόκει θαῤῥαλεώτερον, εἶναι.

  This passage is not very clear, nor are the commentators
  unanimous either as to the words or as to the meaning. Some omit
  μὴ, construe ἐδόκει as if it were ἐδόκει τοῖς Θηβαίοις, and
  translate θαῤῥαλεώτερον “excessively rash.”

  I agree with Schneider in dissenting from this alteration and
  construction. I have given in the text what I believe to be the
  meaning.

  [475] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 28; Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 8;
  Plutarch, Agesil. c. 32, 33; Plutarch, comp. Agesil. and Pomp. c.
  4.

  [476] Aristotle (in his Politica, iv, 10, 5), discussing the
  opinion of those political philosophers who maintained that a
  city ought to have no walls, but to be defended only by the
  bravery of its inhabitants,—gives various reasons against such
  opinion, and adds “that these are old-fashioned thinkers; that
  the cities which made such ostentatious display of personal
  courage, have been proved to be wrong by actual results”—λίαν
  ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνουσι, καὶ ταῦθ’ ὁρῶντες ἐλεγχομένας ἔργῳ τὰς
  ἐκείνως καλλωπισαμένας.

  The commentators say (see the note of M. Barth. St. Hilaire) that
  Aristotle has in his view Sparta at the moment of this Theban
  invasion. I do not see what else he can mean; yet at the same
  time, if such be his meaning, the remark is surely difficult to
  admit. Epaminondas came close up to Sparta, but did not dare
  to attempt to carry it by assault. If the city had had walls
  like those of Babylon, they could not have procured for her
  any greater protection. To me the fact appears rather to show
  (contrary to the assertion of Aristotle) that Sparta was so
  strong by position, combined with the military character of her
  citizens, that she could dispense with walls.

  Polyænus (ii, 2, 5) has an anecdote, I know not from whom
  borrowed, to the effect that Epaminondas might have taken
  Sparta, but designedly refrained from doing so, on the ground
  that the Arcadians and others would then no longer stand in need
  of Thebes. Neither the alleged matter of fact, nor the reason,
  appear to me worthy of any credit. Ælian (V. H. iv, 8) has the
  same story, but with a different reason assigned.

On leaving Sparta, Epaminondas carried his march as far as Helos
and Gythium on the sea-coast; burning and plundering the country,
and trying for three days to capture Gythium, which contained the
Lacedæmonian arsenal and ships. Many of the Laconian Periœki joined
and took service in his army; nevertheless his attempt on Gythium
did not succeed; upon which he turned back and retraced his steps to
the Arcadian frontier. It was the more necessary for him to think of
quitting Laconia, since his Peloponnesian allies, the Arcadians and
others, were daily stealing home with the rich plunder which they had
acquired, while his supplies were also becoming deficient.[477]

  [477] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 50; Diodor. xv, 67.

Epaminondas had thus accomplished far more than he had projected
when quitting Thebes; for the effect of the expedition on Grecian
opinion was immense. The reputation of his army, as well as his
own, was prodigiously exalted; and even the narrative of Xenophon,
unfriendly as well as obscure, bears involuntary testimony both to
the excellence of his generalship and to the good discipline of his
troops. He made his Thebans keep in rank and hold front against the
enemy, even while their Arcadian allies were dispersing around for
plunder. Moreover, the insult and humiliation to Sparta were still
greater than that inflicted by the battle of Leuktra; which had
indeed shown that she was no longer invincible in the field, but
had still left her with the admitted supposition of an inviolable
territory and an unapproachable city.

The resistance of the Spartans indeed (except in so far as regards
their city) had been far less than either friends or enemies
expected; the belief in their power was thus proportionally
abridged. It now remained for Epaminondas to complete their
humiliation by executing those two enterprises which had formed the
special purpose of his expedition: the reëstablishment of Messênê,
and the consolidation of the Arcadians.

The recent invasion of Laconia, victorious as well as lucrative,
had inspired the Arcadians with increased confidence and antipathy
against Sparta, and increased disposition to listen to Epaminondas.
When that eminent man proclaimed the necessity of establishing a
strong frontier against Sparta on the side of Arcadia, and when
he announced his intention of farther weakening Sparta by the
restoration of the exiled Messenians,—the general feeling of the
small Arcadian communities, already tending in the direction of
coalescence, became strong enough to overbear all such impediments
of detail as the breaking up of ancient abode and habit involves.
Respecting early Athenian history, we are told by Thucydides,[478]
that the legendary Theseus, “having become powerful, in addition
to his great capacity,” had effected the discontinuance of those
numerous independent governments which once divided Attica, and had
consolidated them all into one common government at Athens. Just
such was the revolution now operated by Epaminondas, through the
like combination of intelligence and power. A Board of Œkists or
Founders was named to carry out the resolution taken by the Arcadian
assemblies at Asea and Tegea, for the establishment of a Pan-Arcadian
city and centre. Of this Board, two were from Tegea, two from
Mantinea, two from Kleitor, two from the district of Menalus, two
from that of the Parrhasians. A convenient site being chosen upon
the river Helisson (which flowed through and divided the town in
two), about twenty miles west of Tegea, well-fitted to block up the
marches of Sparta in a north-westerly direction,—the foundation of
the new Great City (Megalopolis) was laid by the Œkists jointly with
Epaminondas. Forty distinct Arcadian townships,[479] from all sides
of this centre, were persuaded to join the new community. Ten were
from the Mænalii, eight from the Parrhasii, six from the Eutresii,
three great sections of the Arcadian name, each an aggregate of
villages. Four little townships, occupying a portion of the area
intended for the new territory, yet being averse to the scheme, were
constrained to join; but in one of them, Trapezus, the aversion was
so strong, that most of the inhabitants preferred to emigrate, and
went to join the Trapezuntines in the Euxine Sea (Trebizond), who
received them kindly. Some of the leading Trapezuntines were even
slain by the violent temper of the Arcadian majority. The walls of
the new city enclosed an area of fifty stadia in circumference (more
than five miles and a half); while an ample rural territory was also
gathered around it, extending northward as much as twenty-four miles
from the city, and conterminous on the east with Tegea, Mantinea,
Orchomenus, and Kaphyæ,—on the west with Messênê,[480] Phigalia, and
Heræa.

  [478] Thucyd. ii, 15. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ Θησεὺς ἐβασίλευσε, γενόμενος μετὰ
  τοῦ ξυνετοῦ καὶ δυνατὸς, etc.

  [479] Diodor. xv, 72.

  [480] Pausan. viii, 27; viii, 35, 5. Diodor. xv, 63.

  See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, p. 418, where
  the facts respecting Megalopolis are brought together and
  discussed.

  It is remarkable that though Xenophon (Hellen. v, 2, 7) observes
  that the capture of Mantinea by Agesipolis had made the
  Mantineans see the folly of having a river run through their
  town,—yet in choosing the site of Megalopolis, this same feature
  was deliberately reproduced: and in this choice the Mantineans
  were parties concerned.

The other new city,—Messênê,—was founded under the joint auspices
of the Thebans and their allies, Argeians and others; Epitelês
being especially chosen by the Argeians for that purpose.[481]
The Messenian exiles, though eager and joyful at the thought of
regaining their name and nationality, were averse to fix their new
city either at Œchalia or Andania, which had been the scenes of their
calamities in the early wars with Sparta. Moreover the site of Mount
Ithômê is said to have been pointed out by the hero Kaukon, in a
dream, to the Ageian general Epitelês. The local circumstances of
this mountain (on which the last gallant resistance of the revolted
Messenians against Sparta had been carried on, between the Persian
and Peloponnesian wars) were such, that the indications of dreams,
prophets, and religious signs coincided fully with the deliberate
choice of a judge like Epaminondas. In after days, this hill Ithômê
(then bearing the town and citadel of Messênê), together with the
Akrocorinthus, were marked out by Demetrius of Pharus as the two
horns of Peloponnesus: whoever held these two horns, was master of
the bull.[482] Ithômê was near two thousand five hundred feet above
the level of the sea, having upon its summit an abundant spring of
water, called Klepsydra. Upon this summit the citadel or acropolis
of the new town of Messênê was built; while the town itself was
situated lower down on the <DW72>, though connected by a continuous
wall with its acropolis. First, solemn sacrifices were offered,
by Epaminondas, who was recognized as Œkist or Founder,[483] to
Dionysius and Apollo Ismenius,—by the Argeians, to the Argeian Hêrê
and Zeus Nemeius,—by the Messenians, to Zeus Ithomatês and the
Dioskuri. Next, prayer was made to the ancient Heroes and Heroines
of the Messenian nation, especially to the invincible warrior
Aristomenes, that they would now come back and again take up their
residence as inmates in enfranchised Messênê. After this, the ground
was marked out and the building was begun, under the sound of Argeian
and Bœotian flutes, playing the strains of Pronomus and Sakadas.
The best masons and architects were invited from all Greece, to
lay out the streets with regularity, as well as to ensure a proper
distribution and construction of the sacred edifices.[484] In respect
of the fortifications, too, Epaminondas was studiously provident.
Such was their excellence and solidity, that they exhibited matter
for admiration even in the after-days of the traveller Pausanias.[485]

  [481] Pausan. iv, 26, 6.

  [482] Strabo. viii, p. 361: Polybius, vii, 11.

  [483] Pausan. ix, 14, 2: compare the inscription on the statue of
  Epaminondas (ix, 15, 4).

  [484] Pausan. iv, 27, 3.

  [485] Pausan. iv, 31, 5.

From their newly-established city on the hill of Ithômê, the
Messenians enjoyed a territory extending fifteen miles southward
down to the Messenian Gulf, across a plain, then as well as now, the
richest and most fertile in Peloponnesus; while to the eastward,
their territory was conterminous with that of Arcadia and the
contemporary establishment of Megalopolis. All the newly-appropriated
space was land cut off from the Spartan dominion. How much was cut
off in the direction south-east of Ithômê (along the north-eastern
coast of the Messenian Gulf), we cannot exactly say. But it would
appear that the Periœki of Thuria, situated in that neighborhood,
were converted into an independent community and protected by
the vicinity of Messênê.[486] What is of more importance to
notice, however, is,—that all the extensive district westward
and south-westward of Ithômê,—all the south-western corner of
Peloponnesus, from the river Neda southward to Cape Akritas,—was now
also subtracted from Sparta. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian
war, the Spartan Brasidas had been in garrison near Methônê[487] (not
far from Cape Akritas); Pylus,—where the Athenian Demosthenes erected
his hostile fort, near which the important capture at Sphakteria
was effected,—had been a maritime point belonging to Sparta, about
forty-six miles from the city;[488] Aulon (rather farther north, near
the river Neda) had been at the time of the conspiracy of Kinadon a
township of Spartan Periœki, of very doubtful fidelity.[489] Now all
this wide area, from the north-eastern corner of the Messenian Gulf
westward, the best half of the Spartan territory, was severed from
Sparta to become the property of Periœki and Helots, converted into
freemen; not only sending no rent or tribute to Sparta, as before,
but bitterly hostile to her from the very nature of their tenure.
It was in the ensuing year that the Arcadian army cut to pieces the
Lacedæmonian garrison at Asinê,[490] killing the Spartan polemarch
Geranor; and probably about the same time the other Lacedæmonian
garrisons in the south-western peninsula must have been expelled.
Thus liberated, the Periœki of the region welcomed the new Messênê as
the guarantee of their independence. Epaminondas, besides confirming
the independence of Methônê and Asinê, reconstituted some other
towns,[491] which under Lacedæmonian dominion had probably been kept
unfortified and had dwindled away.

  [486] Pausan. iv, 31, 2.

  [487] Thucyd. ii, 25.

  [488] Thucyd. iv, 3.

  [489] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 8.

  [490] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 25.

  [491] Pausan. iv, 27, 4. ἀνῴκιζον δὲ καὶ ἄλλα πολίσματα, etc.
  Pausanias, following the line of coast from the mouth of the
  river Pamisus in the Messenian Gulf, round Cape Akritas to the
  mouth of the Neda in the Western Sea,—enumerates the following
  towns and places,—Kôronê, Kolônides, Asinê, the Cape Akritas,
  the Harbor Phœnikus, Methônê, or Mothônê, Pylus, Aulon (Pausan.
  iv, 34, 35, 36). The account given by Skylax (Periplus, c.
  46, 47) of the coast of these regions, appears to me confused
  and unintelligible. He reckons Asinê and Mothônê as cities of
  Laconia; but he seems to have conceived these cities as being in
  the _central southern_ projection of Peloponnesus (whereof Cape
  Tænarus forms the extremity); and not to have conceived at all
  the _south-western_ projection, whereof Cape Akritas forms the
  extremity. He recognizes Messene, but he pursues the Paraplus of
  the Messenian coast from the mouth of the river Neda to the coast
  of the Messenian Gulf south of Ithômê without interruption. Then
  after that, he mentions Asinê, Mothônê, Achilleios Limên, and
  Psamathus, with Cape Tænarus between them. Besides, he introduces
  in Messenia two different cities,—one called Messênê, the other
  called Ithômê; whereas there was only one Messênê situated on
  Mount Ithome.

  I cannot agree with Niebuhr, who, resting mainly upon this
  account of Skylax, considers that the south-western corner of
  Peloponnesus remained a portion of Laconia and belonging to
  Sparta, long after the establishment of the city of Messênê. See
  the Dissertation of Niebuhr on the age of Skylax of Karyanda,—in
  his Kleine Schriften, p. 119.

In the spring of 425 B.C., when Demosthenes landed at Pylus,
Thucydides considers it a valuable acquisition for Athens, and
a serious injury to Sparta, to have lodged a small garrison of
Messenians in that insignificant post, as plunderers of Spartan
territory and instigators of Helots to desertion,[492]—especially as
their dialect could not be distinguished from that of the Spartans
themselves. How prodigious must have been the impression throughout
Greece, when Epaminondas, by planting the Messenian exiles and others
on the strong frontier city and position of Ithômê, deprived Sparta
in a short time of all the wide space between that mountain and the
western sea, enfranchising the Periœki and Helots contained in it!
We must recollect that the name Messênê had been from old times
applied generally to this region, and that it was never bestowed
upon any city before the time of Epaminondas. When therefore the
Spartans complained of “the liberation of Messênê,”—“the loss of
Messênê,”—they included in the word, not simply the city on Mount
Ithômê, but all this territory besides; though it was not all
comprised in the domain of the new city.

  [492] Thucyd. iv, 3, 42.

They complained yet more indignantly, that along with the genuine
Messenians, now brought back from exile,—a rabble of their own
emancipated Periœki and Helots had been domiciled on their
border.[493] Herein were included, not only such of these two
classes as, having before dwelt in servitude throughout the
territory westward of Ithômê, now remained there in a state of
freedom—but also doubtless a number of others who deserted from
other parts of Laconia. For as we know that such desertions had
been not inconsiderable, even when there was no better shelter than
the outlying posts of Pylus and Kythêra—so we may be sure that they
became much more numerous, when the neighboring city of Messênê
was founded under adequate protection, and when there was a chance
of obtaining, westward of the Messenian Gulf, free lands with a
new home. Moreover, such Periœki and Helots as had actually joined
the invading army of Epaminondas in Laconia, would be forced from
simple insecurity to quit the country when he retired, and would be
supplied with fresh residences in the newly-enfranchised territory.
All these men would pass at once, out of a state of peculiarly harsh
servitude, into the dignity of free and equal Hellens,[494] sending
again a solemn Messenian legation or Theôry to the Olympic festival,
after an interval of more than three centuries,[495]—outdoing their
former masters in the magnitude of their offerings from the same
soil,—and requiting them for previous ill-usage by words of defiance
and insult, instead of that universal deference and admiration which
a Spartan had hitherto been accustomed to look upon as his due.

  [493] The Oration (vi,) called Archidamus, by Isokrates. exhibits
  powerfully the Spartan feeling of the time, respecting this
  abstraction of territory, and emancipation of serfs, for the
  purpose of restoring Messênê, s. 30. Καὶ εἰ μὲν τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς
  Μεσσηνίους κατῆγον (the Thebans), ἠδίκουν μὲν ἂν, ὅμως δ’
  εὐλογωτέρως ἂν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐξημάρτανον· νῦν δὲ τοὺς Εἵλωτας ὁμόρους
  ἡμῖν παρακατοικίζουσιν, ὥστε μὴ τοῦτ’ εἶναι χαλεπώτατον, εἰ τῆς
  χώρας στερησόμεθα παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ’ εἰ τοὺς δούλους ἡμετέρους
  ἐποψόμεθα κυρίους αὐτῆς ὄντας.

  Again—s. 101. ἢν γὰρ παρακατοικισώμεθα τοὺς Εἵλωτας, καὶ τὴν
  πόλιν ταύτην περιΐδωμεν αὐξηθεῖσαν, τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι πάντα τὸν
  βίον ἐν ταραχαῖς καὶ κινδύνοις διατελοῦμεν ὄντες; compare also
  sections 8 and 102.

  [494] Isokrates, Orat. vi, (Archidam.) s. 111. Ἄξιον δὲ καὶ τὴν
  Ὀλυμπιάδα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσχυνθῆναι πανηγύρεις, ἐν αἷς ἕκαστος
  ἡμῶν (Spartans) ζηλωτότερος ἦν καὶ θαυμαστότερος τῶν ἀθλητῶν
  τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι τὰς νίκας ἀναιρουμένων. Εἰς ἃς τίς ἂν ἐλθεῖν
  τολμήσειεν, ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι καταφρονηθησόμενος—ἔτι δὲ πρὸς
  ~τούτοις ὀψόμενος μὲν τοὺς οἰκέτας ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας~ ἧς οἱ πατέρες
  ἡμῖν κατέλιπον ἀπαρχὰς καὶ θυσίας μείζους ἡμῶν ποιουμένους,
  ἀκουσόμενος δ’ ~αὐτῶν τοιαύταις βλασφημίαις χρωμένων, οἵαις περ
  εἰκὸς τοὺς χαλεπώτερον τῶν ἄλλων δεδουλευκότας~, ἐξ ἴσου δὲ νῦν
  τὰς συνθήκας τοῖς δεσπόταις πεποιημένους.

  This oration, composed only five or six years after the battle of
  Leuktra, is exceedingly valuable as a testimony of the Spartan
  feeling under such severe humiliations.

  [495] The freedom of the Messenians had been put down by the
  first Messenian war, after which they became subjects of Sparta.
  The second Messenian war arose from their revolt.

  No free Messenian legation could therefore have visited Olympia
  since the termination of the first war; which is placed by
  Pausanias (iv, 13, 4) in 723 B.C.; though the date is not to be
  trusted. Pausanias (iv, 27, 3) gives two hundred and eighty-seven
  years between the end of the second Messenian war and the
  foundation of Messênê by Epaminondas. See the note of Siebelis on
  this passage. Exact dates of these early wars cannot be made out.

The enfranchisement and reörganization of all Western Laconia, the
renovation of the Messenian name, the foundation of the two new
cities (Messênê and Megalopolis) in immediate neighborhood and
sympathy,—while they completed the degradation of Sparta, constituted
in all respects the most interesting political phenomena that Greece
had witnessed for many years. To the profound mortification of the
historian,—he is able to recount nothing more than the bare facts,
with such inferences as these facts themselves warrant. Xenophon,
under whose eyes all must have passed, designedly omits to notice
them;[496] Pausanias, whom we have to thank for most of what we
know, is prompted by his religious imagination to relate many divine
signs and warnings, but little matter of actual occurrence. Details
are altogether withheld from us. We know neither how long a time was
occupied in the building of the two cities, nor who furnished the
cost; though both the one and the other must have been considerable.
Of the thousand new arrangements, incident to the winding up of many
small townships, and the commencement of two large cities, we are
unable to render any account. Yet there is no point of time wherein
social phenomena are either so interesting or so instructive. In
describing societies already established and ancient, we find the
force of traditional routine almost omnipotent in its influence
both on men’s actions and on their feelings; bad as well as good
is preserved in one concrete, since the dead weight of the past
stifles all constructive intelligence, and leaves little room even
for improving aspirations. But the forty small communities which
coalesced into Megalopolis, and the Messenians and other settlers
who came for the first time together on the hill of Ithômê, were in
a state in which new exigencies of every kind pressed for immediate
satisfaction. There was no file to afford a precedent, nor any
resource left except to submit all the problems to discussion by
those whose character and judgment was most esteemed. Whether the
problems were well- or ill-solved, there must have been now a genuine
and earnest attempt to strike out as good a solution as the lights of
the time and place permitted, with a certain latitude for conflicting
views. Arrangements must have been made for the apportionment of
houses and lands among the citizens, by purchase, or grant, or both
together; for the political and judicial constitution; for religious
and recreative ceremonies, for military defence, for markets, for
the security and transmission of property, etc. All these and many
other social wants of a nascent community must now have been provided
for, and it would have been highly interesting to know how. Unhappily
the means are denied to us. We can record little more than the bare
fact that these two youngest members of the Hellenic brotherhood of
cities were born at the same time, and under the auspices of the
same presiding genius, Epaminondas; destined to sustain each other
in neighborly sympathy and in repelling all common danger from the
attacks of Sparta; a purpose, which, even two centuries afterwards,
remained engraven on the mind of a Megalopolitan patriot like
Polybius.[497]

  [496] The partiality towards Sparta, visible even from the
  beginning of Xenophon’s history, becomes more and more
  exaggerated throughout the two latter books wherein he recounts
  her misfortunes; it is moreover intensified by spite against the
  Thebans and Epaminondas as her conquerors. But there is hardly
  any instance of this feeling, so glaring or so discreditable,
  as the case now before us. In describing the expedition of
  Epaminondas into Peloponnesus in the winter of 370-369 B.C., he
  totally omits the foundation both of Messênê and Megalopolis;
  though in the after part of his history, he alludes (briefly)
  both to one and to the other as facts accomplished. He represents
  the Thebans to have come into Arcadia with their magnificent
  army, for the simple purpose of repelling Agesilaus and the
  Spartans, and to have been desirous of returning to Bœotia, as
  soon as it was ascertained that the latter had already returned
  to Sparta (vi, 5, 23). Nor does he once mention the name of
  Epaminondas as general of the Thebans in the expedition, any more
  than he mentions him at Leuktra.

  Considering the momentous and striking character of these
  facts, and the eminence of the Theban general by whom they were
  achieved, such silence on the part of an historian, who professes
  to recount the events of the time, is an inexcusable dereliction
  of his duty to state the _whole truth_. It is plain that
  Messênê and Megalopolis wounded to the quick the philo-Spartan
  sentiment of Xenophon. They stood as permanent evidences of
  the degradation of Sparta, even after the hostile armies had
  withdrawn from Laconia. He prefers to ignore them altogether. Yet
  he can find space to recount, with disproportionate prolixity,
  the two applications of the Spartans to Athens for aid, with the
  favorable reception which they obtained,—also the exploits of the
  Phliasians in their devoted attachment to Sparta.

  [497] See a striking passage in Polybius, iv, 32. Compare also
  Pausan. v, 29, 3; and viii, 27, 2.

Megalopolis was intended not merely as a great city in itself, but as
the centre of the new confederacy; which appears to have comprised
all Arcadia, except Orchomenus and Heræa. It was enacted that a synod
or assembly, from all the separate members of the Arcadian name,
and in which probably every Arcadian citizen from the constituent
communities had the right of attending, should be periodically
convoked there. This assembly was called the Ten Thousand, or the
Great Number. A body of Arcadian troops, called the Epariti, destined
to uphold the federation, and receiving pay when on service, was
also provided. Assessments were levied upon each city for their
support, and a Pan-Arcadian general (probably also other officers)
was named. The Ten Thousand, on behalf of all Arcadia, received
foreign envoys,—concluded war, or peace, or alliance,—and tried all
officers or other Arcadians brought before them on accusations of
public misconduct.[498] The great Athenian orators, Kallistratus,
Demosthenes, Æschines, on various occasions pleaded before it.[499]
What were its times of meeting, we are unable to say. It contributed
seriously, for a certain time, to sustain a Pan-Arcadian communion
of action and sentiment which had never before existed;[500] and to
prevent, or soften, those dissensions which had always a tendency
to break out among the separate Arcadian cities. The patriotic
enthusiasm, however, out of which Megalopolis had first arisen,
gradually became enfeebled. The city never attained that preëminence
or power which its founders contemplated, and which had caused the
city to be laid out on a scale too large for the population actually
inhabiting it.[501]

  [498] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 38; vii, 4, 2, 33, 34; vii, 3, 1.

  [499] Demosthen. Fals. Legat. p. 344, s. 11, p. 403, s. 220,
  Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 296, c. 49; Cornel. Nepos. Epamin. c. 6.

  [500] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 38; vii, 4, 33; Diodor. xv, 59;
  Aristotle—Ἀρκάδων Πολιτεία—ap. Harpokration, v. Μύριοι, p. 106,
  ed. Neumann.

  [501] Polybius, ii, 55.

Not only was the portion of Laconia west of the Messenian Gulf now
rendered independent of Sparta, but also much of the territory which
lies north of Sparta, between that city and Arcadia. Thus the Skiritæ
(hardy mountaineers of Arcadian race, heretofore dependent upon
Sparta, and constituting a valuable contingent to her armies),[502]
with their territory forming the northern frontier of Laconia
towards Arcadia, became from this time independent of and hostile to
Sparta.[503] The same is the case even with a place much nearer to
Sparta,—Sellasia; though this latter was retaken by the Lacedæmonians
four or five years afterwards.[504]

  [502] Thucyd. v, 66.

  [503] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 21.

  [504] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 12; Diodor. xv, 64.

Epaminondas remained about four months beyond the legal duration of
his command in Arcadia and Laconia.[505] The sufferings of a severe
mid-winter were greatly mitigated to his soldiers by the Arcadians,
who, full of devoted friendship, pressed upon them an excess of
hospitality which he could not permit consistently with his military
duties.[506] He stayed long enough to settle all the preliminary
debates and difficulties, and to put in train of serious execution
the establishment of Messênê and Megalopolis. For the completion
of a work thus comprehensive, which changed the face and character
of Peloponnesus, much time was of course necessary. Accordingly, a
Theban division under Pammenes was left to repel all obstruction from
Sparta;[507] while Tegea also, from this time forward, for some
years, was occupied as a post by a Theban harmost and garrison.[508]

  [505] The exact number of eighty-five days, given by Diodorus
  (xv. 67), seems to show that he had copied literally from Ephorus
  or some other older author.

  Plutarch, in one place (Agesil. c. 32), mentions “three entire
  months,” which differs little from eighty-five days. He expresses
  himself as if Epaminondas spent all this time in ravaging
  Laconia. Yet again, in the Apophth. Reg. p. 194 B. (compare
  Ælian, V. H. xiii, 42), and in the life of Pelopidas (c. 25),
  Plutarch states, that Epaminondas and his colleagues held the
  command four whole months over and above the legal time, being
  engaged in their operations in Laconia and Messenia. This seems
  to me the more probable interpretation of the case; for the
  operations seem too large to have been accomplished in either
  three or four months.

  [506] See a remarkable passage in Plutarch—An Seni sit gerenda
  Respublica (c. 8, p. 788 A.).

  [507] Pausan. viii, 27, 2. Pammenes is said to have been an
  earnest friend of Epaminondas, but of older political standing;
  to whom Epaminondas partly owed his rise (Plutarch, Reip. Ger.
  Præcep. p. 805 F.).

  Pausanias places the foundation of Megalopolis in the same
  Olympic year as the battle of Leuktra, and a few months after
  that battle, during the archonship of Phrasikleides at Athens;
  that is, between Midsummer 371 and Midsummer 370 B.C. (Pausan.
  viii, 27, 6). He places the foundation of Messênê in the next
  Olympic year, under the archonship of Dyskinêtus at Athens; that
  is, between Midsummer 370 and Midsummer 369 B.C. (iv, 27, 5).

  The foundation of Megalopolis would probably be understood to
  date from the initial determination taken by the assembled
  Arcadians, soon after the revolution at Tegea, to found a
  Pan-Arcadian city and federative league. This was probably taken
  before Midsummer 370 B.C., and the date of Pausanias would thus
  be correct.

  The foundation of Messênê would doubtless take its æra from the
  expedition of Epaminondas,—between November and March 370-369
  B.C. which would be during the archonship of Dyskinêtus at
  Athens, as Pausanias affirms.

  What length of time was required to complete the erection and
  establishment of either city, we are not informed.

  Diodorus places the foundation of Megalopolis in 368 B.C. (xv,
  72).

  [508] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 36.

Meanwhile the Athenians were profoundly affected by these proceedings
of Epaminondas in Peloponnesus. The accumulation of force against
Sparta was so powerful, that under a chief like him, it seemed
sufficient to crush her; and though the Athenians were now neutral in
the contest, such a prospect was not at all agreeable to them,[509]
involving the aggrandizement of Thebes to a point inconsistent with
their security. It was in the midst of the successes of Epaminondas
that envoys came to Athens from Sparta, Corinth, and Phlius, to
entreat her aid. The message was one not merely humiliating to the
Lacedæmonians, who had never previously sent the like request to any
Grecian city,—but also difficult to handle in reference to Athens.
History showed abundant acts of jealousy and hostility, little
either of good feeling or consentient interest, on the part of the
Lacedæmonians towards her. What little was to be found, the envoys
dexterously brought forward; going back to the dethronement of the
Peisistratids from Athens by Spartan help, the glorious expulsion
of Xerxes from Greece by the joint efforts of both cities,—and the
auxiliaries sent by Athens into Laconia in 465 B.C., to assist the
Spartans against the revolted Messenians on Mount Ithômê. In these
times (he reminded the Athenian assembly) Thebes had betrayed the
Hellenic cause by joining Xerxes, and had been an object of common
hatred to both. Moreover the maritime forces of Greece had been
arrayed under Athens in the Confederacy of Delos, with full sanction
and recommendation from Sparta; while the headship of the latter by
land had in like manner been accepted by the Athenians. He called on
the assembly, in the name of these former glories, to concur with
Sparta in forgetting all the deplorable hostilities which had since
intervened, and to afford to her a generous relief against the old
common enemy. The Thebans might even now be decimated (according to
the vow said to have been taken after the repulse of Xerxes), in
spite of their present menacing ascendency,—if Athens and Sparta
could be brought heartily to coöperate; and might be dealt with as
Thebes herself had wished to deal with Athens after the Peloponnesian
war, when Sparta refused to concur in pronouncing the sentence of
utter ruin.[510]

  [509] Isokrates (Archidamus), Or. vi, s. 129.

  [510] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 34, 35.

This appeal from Sparta was earnestly seconded by the envoys
from Corinth and Phlius. The Corinthian speaker contended, that
Epaminondas and his army, passing through the territory of Corinth
and inflicting damage upon it in their passage into Peloponnesus,
had committed a glaring violation of the general peace, sworn in
371 B.C., first at Sparta and afterwards at Athens, guaranteeing
universal autonomy to every Grecian city. The envoy from
Phlius,—while complimenting Athens on the proud position which she
now held, having the fate of Sparta in her hands,—dwelt on the meed
of honor which she would earn in Greece, if she now generously
interfered to rescue her ancient rival, forgetting past injuries and
remembering only past benefits. In adopting such policy, too, she
would act in accordance with her own true interests; since, should
Sparta be crushed, the Thebans would become undisputed heads of
Greece, and more formidable still to Athens.[511]

  [511] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 38-48.

It was not among the least marks of the prostration of Sparta, that
she should be compelled to send such an embassy to Athens, and to
entreat an amnesty for so many untoward realities during the past.
The contrast is indeed striking, when we set her present language
against that which she had held respecting Athens, before and through
the Peloponnesian war.

At first, her envoys were heard with doubtful favor; the sentiment
of the assembly being apparently rather against than for them. “Such
language from the Spartans (murmured the assembled citizens) is
intelligible enough during their present distress; but so long as
they were in good circumstances, we received nothing but ill-usage
from them.”[512] Nor was the complaint of the Spartans, that the
invasion of Laconia was contrary to the sworn peace guaranteeing
universal autonomy, admitted without opposition. Some said that
the Lacedæmonians had drawn the invasion upon themselves, by their
previous interference with Tegea and in Arcadia; and that the
intervention of the Mantineans at Tegea had been justifiable, since
Stasippus and the philo-Laconian party in that city had been the
first to begin unjust violence. On the other hand, the appeal made
by the envoys to the congress of Peloponnesian allies held in 404
B.C., after the surrender of Athens,—when the Theban deputy had
proposed that Athens should be totally destroyed, while the Spartans
had strenuously protested against so cruel a sentence—made a powerful
impression on the assembly, and contributed more than anything else
to determine them in favor of the proposition.[513] “As Athens was
then, so Sparta is now, on the brink of ruin, from the fiat of the
same enemy: Athens was then rescued by Sparta, and shall she now
leave the rescue unrequited?” Such was the broad and simple issue
which told upon the feelings of the assembled Athenians, disposing
them to listen with increasing favor both to the envoys from Corinth
and Phlius, and to their own speakers on the same side.

  [512] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 35. Οἱ μέντοι Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ πάνυ
  ἐδέξαντο, ἀλλὰ θροῦς τις τοιοῦτος διῆλθεν, ὡς νῦν μὲν ταῦτα
  λέγοιεν· ὅτε δὲ εὖ ἔπραττον, ἐπέκειντο ἡμῖν.

  [513] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 35. Μέγιστον δὲ τῶν λεχθέντων παρὰ
  Λακεδαιμονίων ἐδόκει εἶναι, etc.

To rescue Sparta, indeed, was prudent as well as generous. A
counterpoise would thus be maintained against the excessive
aggrandizement of Thebes, which at this moment doubtless caused
serious alarm and jealousy to the Athenians. And thus, after the
first ebullition of resentment against Sparta, naturally suggested
by the history of the past, the philo-Spartan view of the situation
gradually became more and more predominant in the assembly.
Kallistratus[514] the orator spoke eloquently in support of the
Lacedæmonians; while the adverse speakers were badly listened to,
as pleading in favor of Thebes, whom no one wished to aggrandize
farther. A vote, decisive and enthusiastic, was passed for assisting
the Spartans with the full force of Athens; under the command of
Iphikrates, then residing as a private citizen[515] at Athens, since
the peace of the preceding year, which had caused him to be recalled
from Korkyra.

  [514] Demosthenes cont. Neær. p. 1353.

  Xenokleides, a poet, spoke in opposition to the vote for
  supporting Sparta (ib.).

  [515] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 49; Dionys. Hal. Judic. de Lysiâ, p.
  479.

As soon as the sacrifices, offered in contemplation of this
enterprise were announced to be favorable, Iphikrates made
proclamation that the citizens destined for service should equip
themselves and muster in arms in the grove of Akadêmus (outside the
gates), there to take their evening meal, and to march the next
morning at daybreak. Such was the general ardor, that many citizens
went forth from the gates even in advance of Iphikrates himself;
and the total force which followed him is said to have been twelve
thousand men,—not named under conscription by the general, but
volunteers.[516] He first marched to Corinth, where he halted some
days; much to the discontent of his soldiers, who were impatient to
accomplish their project of carrying rescue to Sparta. But Iphikrates
was well aware that all beyond Corinth was hostile ground, and that
he had formidable enemies to deal with. After having established his
position at Corinth, and obtained information regarding the enemy,
he marched into Arcadia, and there made war without any important
result. Epaminondas and his army had quitted Laconia, while many of
the Arcadians and Eleians had gone home with the plunder acquired;
so that Sparta was, for the time, out of danger. Impelled in part
by the recent manifestation of Athens,[517] the Theban general
himself soon commenced his march of return into Bœotia, in which
it was necessary for him to pass the line of Mount Oneium between
Corinth and Kenchreæ. This line was composed of difficult ground,
and afforded good means of resistance to the passage of an army;
nevertheless Iphikrates, though he occupied its two extremities, did
not attempt directly to bar the passage of the Thebans. He contented
himself with sending out from Corinth all his cavalry, both Athenian
and Corinthian, to harass them in their march. But Epaminondas beat
them back with some loss, and pursued them to the gates of Corinth.
Excited by this spectacle, the Athenian main body within the town
were eager to march out and engage in general battle. Their ardor was
however repressed by Iphikrates; who, refusing to go forth, suffered
the Thebans to continue their retreat unmolested.[518]

  [516] This number is stated by Diodorus (xv, 63).

  [517] To this extent we may believe what is said by Cornelius
  Nepos (Iphicrates, c. 2).

  [518] The account here given in the text coincides as to the
  matter of fact with Xenophon, as well as with Plutarch; and also
  (in my belief) with Pausanias (Xen. Hell. vi, 5, 51; Plutarch,
  Pelop. c. 24; Pausan. ix, 14, 3).

  But though I accept the facts of Xenophon, I cannot accept either
  his suppositions as to the purpose, or his criticisms on the
  conduct, of Iphikrates. Other modern critics appear to me not
  to have sufficiently distinguished Xenophon’s _facts_ from his
  _suppositions_.

  Iphikrates (says Xenophon), while attempting to guard the line
  of Mount Oneium, in order that the Thebans might not be able
  to reach Bœotia,—left the excellent road adjoining to Kenchreæ
  unguarded. Then,—wishing to inform himself, whether the Thebans
  had as yet passed the Mount Oneium, he sent out as scouts all the
  Athenian and all the Corinthian cavalry. Now (observes Xenophon)
  a few scouts can see and report as well as a great number; while
  the great number find it more difficult to get back in safety.
  By this foolish conduct of Iphikrates, in sending out so large a
  body, several horsemen were lost in the retreat; which would not
  have happened if he had only sent out a few.

  The criticism here made by Xenophon appears unfounded. It is
  plain, from the facts which he himself states, that Iphikrates
  never intended to bar the passage of the Thebans; and that he
  sent out his whole body of cavalry, not simply as scouts, but to
  harass the enemy on ground which he thought advantageous for the
  purpose. That so able a commander as Iphikrates should have been
  guilty of the gross blunders with which Xenophon here reproaches
  him, is in a high degree improbable; it seems to me more probable
  that Xenophon has misconceived his real purpose. Why indeed
  should Iphikrates wish to expose the whole Athenian army in a
  murderous conflict for the purpose of preventing the homeward
  march of the Thebans? His mission was, to rescue Sparta; but
  Sparta was now no longer in danger; and it was for the advantage
  of Athens that the Thebans should go back to Bœotia, rather than
  remain in Peloponnesus. That he should content himself with
  harassing the Thebans, instead of barring their retreat directly,
  is a policy which we should expect from him.

  There is another circumstance in this retreat which has excited
  discussion among the commentators, and on which I dissent from
  their views. It is connected with the statement of Pausanias, who
  says,—Ὡς προϊὼν τῷ στρατῷ (Epaminondas) κατὰ Λέχαιον ἐγίνετο,
  καὶ διεξιέναι τῆς ὁδοῦ τὰ στενὰ καὶ δύσβατα ἔμελλεν, Ἰφικράτης
  ὁ Τιμοθέου πελταστὰς καὶ ἄλλην Ἀθηναίων ἔχων δύναμιν, ἐπιχειρεῖ
  τοῖς Θηβαίοις. Ἐπαμινώνδας δὲ τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους τρέπεται, ~καὶ
  πρὸς αὐτὸ ἀφικόμενος Ἀθηναίων τὸ ἄστυ~, ὡς ἐπεξιέναι μαχουμένους
  τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐκώλυεν Ἰφικράτης, ὁ δὲ αὖθις ἐς τὰς Θήβας
  ἀπήλαυνε.

  In this statement there are some inaccuracies, as that of calling
  Iphikrates “son of Timotheus;” and speaking of _Lechæum_, where
  Pausanias ought to have named _Kenchreæ_. For Epaminondas could
  not have passed Corinth on the side of Lechæum, since the Long
  Walls, reaching from one to the other, would prevent him;
  moreover, the “rugged ground” was between Corinth and Kenchreæ,
  not between Corinth and Lechæum.

  But the words which occasion most perplexity are those which
  follow: “Epaminondas repulses the assailants, and _having come to
  the city itself of the Athenians_, when Iphikrates forbade the
  Athenians to come out and fight, he (Epaminondas) again marched
  away to Thebes.”

  What are we to understand _by the city of the Athenians_? The
  natural sense of the word is certainly Athens; and so most of
  the commentators relate. But when the battle was fought between
  Corinth and Kenchreæ, can we reasonably believe that Epaminondas
  pursued the fugitives to Athens—through the city of Megara, which
  lay in the way, and which seems then (Diodor. xv, 68) to have
  been allied with Athens? The station of Iphikrates was _Corinth_;
  from thence he had marched out,—and thither his cavalry, when
  repulsed, would go back, as the nearest shelter.

  Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Greece, vol. v, ch. 39, p. 141) understands
  Pausanias to mean, that Iphikrates retired with his defeated
  cavalry to Corinth,—that Epaminondas then marched straight on
  to Athens,—and that Iphikrates followed him. “Possibly (he
  says) the only mistake in this statement is, that it represents
  the _presence_ of Iphikrates, instead of his _absence_, as the
  cause which prevented the Athenians from fighting. According to
  Xenophon, Iphikrates must have been in the rear of Epaminondas.”

  I cannot think that we obtain this from the words of Xenophon.
  Neither he nor Plutarch countenance the idea that Epaminondas
  marched to the walls of Athens, which supposition is derived
  solely from the words of Pausanias. Xenophon and Plutarch
  intimate only that Iphikrates interposed some opposition, and not
  very effective opposition, near Corinth, to the retreating march
  of Epaminondas, from Peloponnesus into Bœotia.

  That Epaminondas should have marched to Athens at all, under
  the circumstances of the case, when he was returning to Bœotia,
  appears to me in itself improbable, and to be rendered still more
  improbable by the silence of Xenophon. Nor is it indispensable
  to put this construction even upon Pausanias; who may surely
  have meant by the words—πρὸς αὐτὸ Ἀθηναίων τὸ ἄστυ,—not Athens,
  but _the city then occupied by the Athenians engaged_,—that is,
  _Corinth_. _The city of the Athenians_, in reference to this
  battle, was Corinth; it was the city out of which the troops of
  Iphikrates had just marched, and to which, on being defeated,
  they naturally retired for safety, pursued by Epaminondas to the
  gates. The statement of Pausanias,—that Iphikrates would not let
  the Athenians in the town (Corinth) go out to fight,—then follows
  naturally. Epaminondas, finding that they would not come out,
  drew back his troops, and resumed his march to Thebes.

  The stratagem of Iphikrates noticed by Polyænus (iii, 9, 29),
  can hardly be the same incident as this mentioned by Pausanias.
  It purports to be a nocturnal surprise planned by the Thebans
  against Athens; which certainly must be quite different (if it
  be in itself a reality) from this march of Epaminondas. And the
  stratagem ascribed by Polyænus to Iphikrates is of a strange and
  highly improbable character.

On returning to Thebes, Epaminondas with Pelopidas and the other
Bœotarchs, resigned the command. They had already retained it for
four months longer than the legal expiration of their term. Although,
by the constitutional law of Thebes, any general who retained his
functions longer than the period fixed by law was pronounced worthy
of death, yet Epaminondas, while employed in his great projects
for humiliating Sparta and founding the two hostile cities on her
border, had taken upon himself to brave this illegality, persuading
all his colleagues to concur with him. On resigning the command, all
of them had to undergo that trial of accountability which awaited
every retiring magistrate, as a matter of course,—but which, in the
present case, was required on special ground, since all had committed
an act notoriously punishable as well as of dangerous precedent.
Epaminondas undertook the duty of defending his colleagues as well
as himself. That he as well as Pelopidas had political enemies,
likely to avail themselves of any fair pretext for accusing him,—is
not to be doubted. But we may well doubt, whether on the present
occasion any of these enemies actually came forward to propose that
the penalty legally incurred should be inflicted; not merely because
this proposition, in the face of a victorious army, returning elate
with their achievements and proud of their commanders, was full of
danger to the mover himself,—but also for another reason,—because
Epaminondas would hardly be imprudent enough to wait for the case
to be stated by his enemies. Knowing that the illegality committed
was flagrant and of hazardous example,—having also the reputation
of his colleagues as well as his own to protect,—he would forestall
accusation by coming forward himself to explain and justify the
proceeding. He set forth the glorious results of the expedition
just finished; the invasion and devastation of Laconia, hitherto
unvisited by any enemy,—the confinement of the Spartans within their
walls,—the liberation of all Western Laconia, and the establishment
of Messênê as a city,—the constitution of a strong new Arcadian city,
forming, with Tegea on one flank and Messênê on the other, a line
of defence on the Spartan frontier, so as to ensure the permanent
depression of the great enemy of Thebes,—the emancipation of Greece
generally, from Spartan ascendency, now consummated.

Such justification,—whether delivered in reply to a substantive
accuser, or (which is more probable) tendered spontaneously by
Epaminondas himself,—was not merely satisfactory, but triumphant.
He and the other generals were acquitted by acclamation; without
even going through the formality of collecting the votes.[519] And
it appears that both Epaminondas and Pelopidas were immediately
re-appointed among the Bœotarchs of the year.[520]

  [519] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 25; Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 194
  B.; Pausan. ix, 14, 4; Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 7, 8;
  Ælian, V. H. xiii, 42.

  Pausanias states the fact plainly and clearly; the others,
  especially Nepos and Ælian, though agreeing in the main fact,
  surround it with colors exaggerated and false. They represent
  Epaminondas as in danger of being put to death by ungrateful
  and malignant fellow-citizens; Cornelius Nepos puts into his
  mouth a justificatory speech of extreme insolence (compare
  Arist. Or. xlvi, περὶ τοῦ παραφθέγματος—p. 385 Jebb.; p. 520
  Dindorf.); which, had it been really made, would have tended more
  than anything else to set the public against him,—and which is
  moreover quite foreign to the character of Epaminondas. To carry
  the exaggeration still farther, Plutarch (De Vitioso Pudore, p.
  540 E.) describes Pelopidas as trembling and begging for his life.

  Epaminondas had committed a grave illegality, which could not be
  passed over without notice in his trial of accountability. But
  he had a good justification. It was necessary that he should put
  in the justification; when put in, it passed triumphantly. What
  more could be required? The facts, when fairly stated, will not
  serve as an illustration of the alleged ingratitude of the people
  towards great men.

  [520] Diodorus (xv, 81) states that Pelopidas was Bœotarch
  without interruption, annually re-appointed, from the revolution
  of Thebes down to his decease. Plutarch also (Pelopid. c. 34)
  affirms that when Pelopidas died, he was in the thirteenth year
  of his appointment; which may be understood as the same assertion
  in other words. Whether Epaminondas was rechosen, does not appear.

  Sievers denies the reappointment as well of Pelopidas as of
  Epaminondas. But I do not see upon what grounds; for, in my
  judgment, Epaminondas appears again as commander in Peloponnesus
  during this same year (369 B.C.) Sievers holds Epaminondas to
  have commanded without being Bœotarch; but no reason is produced
  for this (Sievers, Geschicht. Griech. bis zur Schlacht von
  Mantinea, p. 277).




CHAPTER LXXIX.

FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE AND MEGALOPOLIS TO THE DEATH OF
PELOPIDAS.


Prodigious was the change operated throughout the Grecian world
during the eighteen months between June 371 B.C. (when the general
peace, including all except Thebes, was sworn at Sparta, twenty days
before the battle of Leuktra), and the spring of 369 B.C., when
the Thebans, after a victorious expedition into Peloponnesus, were
reconducted home by Epaminondas.

How that change worked in Peloponnesus, amounting to a partial
reconstitution of the peninsula, has been sketched in the preceding
chapter. Among most of the cities and districts hitherto dependent
allies of Sparta, the local oligarchies, whereby Spartan influence
had been maintained, were overthrown, not without harsh and violent
reaction. Laconia had been invaded and laid waste, while the Spartans
were obliged to content themselves with guarding their central hearth
and their families from assault. The western and best half of Laconia
had been wrested from them; Messênê had been constituted as a free
city on their frontier; a large proportion of their Periœki and
Helots had been converted into independent Greeks bitterly hostile
to them; moreover the Arcadian population had been emancipated from
their dependence, and organized into self-acting jealous neighbors in
the new city of Megalopolis, as well as in Tegea and Mantinea. The
once philo-Laconian Tegea was now among the chief enemies of Sparta;
and the Skiritæ, so long numbered as the bravest of the auxiliary
troops of the latter, were now identified in sentiment with Arcadians
and Thebans against her.

Out of Peloponnesus, the change wrought had also been considerable;
partly, in the circumstances of Thessaly and Macedonia, partly in the
position and policy of Athens.

At the moment of the battle of Leuktra (July, 371 B.C.) Jason was
tagus of Thessaly, and Amyntas king of Macedonia. Amyntas was
dependent on, if not tributary to, Jason, whose dominion, military
force, and revenue, combined with extraordinary personal energy and
ability, rendered him decidedly the first potentate in Greece, and
whose aspirations were known to be unbounded; so that he inspired
more or less alarm everywhere, especially to weaker neighbors like
the Macedonian prince. Throughout a reign of twenty-three years, full
of trouble and peril, Amyntas had cultivated the friendship both of
Sparta and of Athens,[521] especially the former. It was by Spartan
aid only that he had been enabled to prevail over the Olynthian
confederacy, which would otherwise have proved an overmatch for
him. At the time when Sparta aided him to crush that promising and
liberal confederacy, she was at the maximum of her power (382-379
B.C.), holding even Thebes under garrison among her subject allies.
But the revolution of Thebes, and the war against Thebes and Athens
(from 378 B.C. downward) had sensibly diminished her power on land;
while the newly-organized naval force and maritime confederacy of
the Athenians, had overthrown her empire at sea. Moreover, the
great power of Jason in Thessaly had so grown up (combined with the
resistance of the Thebans) as to cut off the communication of Sparta
with Macedonia, and even to forbid her (in 374 B.C.) from assisting
her faithful ally, the Pharsalian Polydamas, against him.[522]
To Amyntas, accordingly, the friendship of Athens, now again the
greatest maritime potentate in Greece, had become more important than
that of Sparta. We know that he tried to conciliate the powerful
Athenian generals, Iphikrates and Timotheus. He adopted the former as
his son;[523] at what exact period, cannot be discovered; but I have
already stated that Iphikrates had married the daughter of Kotys king
of Thrace, and had acquired a maritime settlement called Drys, on the
Thracian coast. In the years 373-372 B.C., we find Timotheus also in
great favor with Amyntas, testified by a valuable present sent to him
at Athens; a cargo of timber, the best produce of Macedonia.[524]
Amyntas was at this period on the best footing with Athens, sent his
deputies as a confederate to the regular synod there assembled, and
was treated with considerable favor.[525]

  [521] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 249; Isokrates, Or. v,
  (Philipp.) s. 124. Ὁ γὰρ πατήρ σου (Isokrates to Philip) πρὸς
  τὰς πόλεις ταύτας (Sparta, Athens, Argos, and Thebes), αἷς σοι
  παραινῶ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, πρὸς ἁπάσας οἰκείως εἶχε.

  The connection of Amyntas with Thebes could hardly have been
  considerable; that with Argos, was based upon a strong legendary
  and ancestral sentiment rather than on common political grounds;
  with Athens, it was both political and serious; with Sparta, it
  was attested by the most essential military aid and coöperation.

  [522] Xen. Hellen. vi, 1, 17.

  [523] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 249.

  [524] Demosthen. cont. Timotheum. c. 8, p. 1194; Xenoph. Hellen.
  vi, 1, 11.

  [525] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 13, p. 248. τὴν πατρικὴν
  εὔνοιαν, καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας ἃς ὑμεῖς ὑπήρξατε Ἀμύντᾳ, τῷ Φιλίππου
  πατρὶ, etc.

  Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. c. 30, p. 660. τὴν πατρικὴν φιλίαν
  ἀνανεοῦθαι (Philip to the Athenians): compare ibid. c. 29, p. 657.

The battle of Leuktra (July 371 B.C.) tended to knit more closely
the connection between Amyntas and the Athenians, who were now the
auxiliaries most likely to sustain him against the ascendency of
Jason. It produced at the same time the more important effect of
stimulating the ambition of Athens in every direction. Not only
her ancient rival, Sparta, beaten in the field and driven from
one humiliation to another, was disabled from opposing her, and
even compelled to solicit her aid,—but new rivals, the Thebans,
were suddenly lifted into an ascendency inspiring her with mingled
jealousy and apprehension. Hence fresh hopes as well as fresh
jealousies conspired to push Athens in a career of aspiration such as
had never appeared open to her since the disasters of 404 B.C. Such
enlargement of her views was manifested conspicuously by the step
taken two or three months after the battle of Leuktra (mentioned in
my preceding chapter),—of causing the peace, which had already been
sworn at Sparta in the preceding month of June, to be resworn under
the presidency and guarantee of Athens, by cities binding themselves
mutually to each other as defensive allies of Athens;[526] thus
silently disenthroning Sparta and taking her place.

On land, however, Athens had never held, and could hardly expect to
hold, anything above the second rank, serving as a bulwark against
Theban aggrandizement. At sea she already occupied the first place,
at the head of an extensive confederacy; and it was to farther
maritime aggrandizement that her present chances, as well as her past
traditions, pointed. Such is the new path upon which we now find
her entering. At the first formation of her new confederacy, in 378
B.C., she had distinctly renounced all idea of resuming the large
amount of possessions, public and private, which had been snatched
from her along with her empire at the close of the Peloponnesian
war; and had formally proclaimed that no Athenian citizen should
for the future possess or cultivate land out of Attica—a guarantee
against renovation of the previous kleruchies or out-possessions.
This prudent self-restraint, which had contributed so much during
the last seven years to raise her again into naval preëminence, is
now gradually thrown aside, under the tempting circumstances of the
moment. Henceforward, the Athenian maritime force becomes employed
for the recovery of lost possessions as well as for protection or
enlargement of the confederacy. The prohibition against kleruchies
out of Attica will soon appear to be forgotten. Offence is given to
the prominent members of the maritime confederacy; so that the force
of Athens, misemployed and broken into fragments, is found twelve or
thirteen years afterwards unable to repel a new aggressor, who starts
up, alike able and unexpected, in the Macedonian prince Philip, son
of Amyntas.

  [526] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.

Very different was the position of Amyntas himself towards Athens, in
371 B.C. He was an unpretending ally, looking for help in case of
need against Jason, and sending his envoy to the meeting at Athens
about September or October 371 B.C., when the general peace was
resworn under Athenian auspices. It was at this meeting that Athens
seems to have first put forth her new maritime pretensions. While
guaranteeing to every Grecian city, great and small, the enjoyment
of autonomy, she made exception of some cities which she claimed as
belonging to herself. Among these was certainly Amphipolis; probably
also the towns in the Thracian Chersonesus and Potidæa; all which
we find, a few years afterwards, occupied by Athenians.[527] How
much of their lost possessions the Athenians thought it prudent now
to reclaim, we cannot distinctly make out. But we know that their
aspirations grasped much more than Amphipolis;[528] and the moment
was probably thought propitious for making other demands besides.
Amyntas through his envoy, together with the rest of the assembled
envoys, recognized without opposition the right of the Athenians to
Amphipolis.[529]

  [527] Demosthen. (Philippic. ii, c. 4, p. 71; De Halonneso, c. 3,
  p. 79; De Rebus Chersones. c. 2, p. 91); also Epistol. Philipp.
  ap. Demosthen. c. 6, p. 163.

  [528] Compare the aspirations of Athens, as stated in 391 B.C.,
  when the propositions of peace recommended by Andokides were
  under consideration, aspirations, which were then regarded as
  beyond all hope of attainment, and imprudent even to talk about
  (Andokides, De Pace, s. 15). φέρε, ἀλλὰ Χεῤῥόνησον καὶ τὰς
  ἀποικίας καὶ τὰ ἐγκτήματα καὶ τὰ χρέα ἵνα ἀπολάβωμεν; Ἀλλ’ οὔτε
  βασιλεὺς, οὔτε οἱ σύμμαχοι, συγχωροῦσιν ἡμῖν, μεθ’ ὧν αὐτὰ δεῖ
  πολεμοῦντας κτήσασθαι.

  [529] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 14, p. 250.

  Συμμαχίας γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων συνελθούσης,
  εἷς ὢν τούτων Ἀμύντας ὁ Φιλίππου πατὴρ, καὶ πέμπων σύνεδρον,
  καὶ τῆς καθ’ ἐαυτὸν ψήφου κύριος ὢν, ~ἐψηφίσατο Ἀμφίπολιν τὴν
  Ἀθηναίων συνεξαιρεῖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων Ἀθηναίοις~. Καὶ τοῦτο
  τὸ κοινὸν δόγμα τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ τοὺς ψηφισαμένους, ~ἐκ τῶν
  δημοσίων γραμμάτων~ μάρτυρας παρεσχόμην.

  The remarkable event to which Æschines here makes allusion, must
  have taken place either in the congress held at Sparta, in the
  month preceding the battle of Leuktra, where the general peace
  was sworn, with universal autonomy guaranteed,—leaving out only
  Thebes; or else, at the subsequent congress held three or four
  months afterwards at Athens, where a peace, on similar conditions
  generally, was again sworn under the auspices of Athens as
  president.

  My conviction is, that it took place on the latter occasion,—at
  Athens. First, the reference of Æschines to the δημόσια γράμματα
  leads us to conclude that the affair was transacted in that city;
  secondly, I do not think that the Athenians would have been in
  any situation to exact such a reserve in their favor, prior to
  the battle of Leuktra; thirdly, the congress at Sparta was held,
  not for the purpose of συμμαχία or alliance, but for that of
  terminating the war and concluding peace; while the subsequent
  congress at Athens formed the basis of a defensive alliance, to
  which, either then or soon afterwards, Sparta acceded.

Such recognition was not indeed in itself either any loss to
Amyntas, or any gain to Athens; for Amphipolis, though bordering
on his kingdom, had never belonged to him, nor had he any power of
transferring it. Originally an Athenian colony,[530] next taken from
Athens in 424-423 B.C. by Brasidas, through the improvidence of
the Athenian officers Euklês and Thucydides, then recolonized under
Lacedæmonian auspices,—it had ever since remained an independent
city; though Sparta had covenanted to restore it by the peace of
Nikias (421 B.C.), but had never performed her covenant. Its
unparalleled situation, near to both the bridge and mouth of the
Strymon, in the midst of a fertile territory, within reach of the
mining district of Pangæus,—rendered it a tempting prize; and
the right of Athens to it was indisputable; so far as original
colonization before the capture by Brasidas, and formal treaty of
cession by Sparta after the capture, could confer a right. But this
treaty, not fulfilled at the time, was now fifty years old. The
repugnance of the Amphipolitan population, which had originally
prevented its fulfilment, was strengthened by all the sanction of
a long prescription; while the tomb and chapel of Brasidas their
second founder, consecrated in the agora, served as an imperishable
admonition to repel all pretensions on the part of Athens. Such
pretensions, whatever might be the right, were deplorably impolitic
unless Athens was prepared to back them by strenuous efforts of men
and money; from which we shall find her shrinking now as she had
done (under the unwise advice of Nikias) in 421 B.C., and the years
immediately succeeding. In fact, the large renovated pretensions of
Athens both to Amphipolis and to other places on the Macedonian and
Chalkidic coast, combined with her languor and inertness in military
action,—will be found henceforward among the greatest mischiefs
to the general cause of Hellenic independence, and among the most
effective helps to the well-conducted aggressions of Philip of
Macedon.

  [530] The pretensions advanced by Philip of Macedon (in
  his Epistola ad Athenienses, ap. Demosthen. p. 164), that
  Amphipolis or its locality originally belonged to his ancestor
  Alexander son of Amyntas, as having expelled the Persians from
  it,—are unfounded, and contradicted by Thucydides. At least,
  if (which is barely possible) Alexander ever did acquire the
  spot, he must have lost it afterwards; for it was occupied by
  the Edonian Thracians, both in 465 B.C., when Athens made her
  first unsuccessful attempt to plant a colony there,—and in 437
  B.C., when she tried again with better success under Agnon, and
  established Amphipolis (Thucyd. iv, 102).

  The expression of Æschines, that Amyntas in 371 B.C. “gave up or
  receded from” Amphipolis (ὧν δ’ Ἀμύντας ἀπέστη—De Fals. Leg. 1
  c.) can at most only be construed as referring to rights which he
  may have claimed, since he was never in actual possession of it;
  though we cannot wonder that the orator should use such language
  in addressing Philip son of Amyntas, who was really master of the
  town.

Though the claim of Athens to the recovery of a portion of her lost
transmarine possessions was thus advanced and recognized in the
congress of autumn 371 B.C., she does not seem to have been able to
take any immediate steps for prosecuting it. Six months afterwards,
the state of northern Greece was again completely altered by the
death, nearly at the same time, of Jason in Thessaly, and of Amyntas
in Macedonia.[531] The former was cut off (as has been mentioned
in the preceding chapter) by assassination, while in the plenitude
of his vigor; and his great power could not be held together by an
inferior hand. His two brothers, Polyphron and Polydorus, succeeded
him in the post of tagus of Thessaly. Polyphron, having put to death
his brother, enjoyed the dignity for a short time; after which he
too was slain by a third brother, Alexander of Pheræ; but not before
he had committed gross enormities by killing and banishing many of
the most eminent citizens of Larissa and Pharsalus; among them the
estimable Polydamas.[532] The Larissæan exiles, many belonging to
the great family of the Aleuadæ, took refuge in Macedonia, where
Amyntas (having died in 370 B.C.) had been succeeded in the throne
by his youthful son Alexander. The latter, being persuaded to invade
Thessaly for the purpose of restoring them, succeeded in getting
possession of Larissa and Krannon; both which cities he kept under
his own garrisons, in spite of unavailing resistance from Polyphron
and Alexander of Pheræ.[533]

  [531] Diodor. xv, 60.

  [532] Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 4, 33, 34.

  Diodorus (xv, 61) calls Alexander of Pheræ brother of Polydorus;
  Plutarch (Pelopid. c. 29) calls him nephew. Xenophon does not
  expressly say which; but his narrative seems to countenance the
  statement of Diodorus rather than that of Plutarch.

  [533] Diodor. xv, 61.

This Alexander, who succeeded to Jason’s despotism in Pheræ, and
to a considerable portion of his military power, was nevertheless
unable to keep together the whole of it, or to retain Thessaly and
its circumjacent tributaries in one united dominion. The Thessalian
cities hostile to him invited assistance, not merely from Alexander
of Macedon, but also from the Thebans; who despatched Pelopidas
into the country, seemingly in 369 B.C., soon after the return of
the army under Epaminondas from its victorious progress in Laconia
and Arcadia. Pelopidas entered Thessaly at the head of an army,
and took Larissa with various other cities into Theban protection;
apparently under the acquiescence of Alexander of Macedon, with whom
he contracted an alliance.[534] A large portion of Thessaly thus came
under the protection of Thebes in hostility to the dynasty of Pheræ,
and to the brutal tyrant Alexander who now ruled in that city.

Alexander of Macedon found that he had difficulty enough in
maintaining his own dominion at home, without holding Thessalian
towns in garrison. He was harassed by intestine dissensions, and
after a reign of scarcely two years, was assassinated (368 B.C.) by
some conspirators of Alôrus and Pydna, two cities (half Macedonian,
half Hellenic) near the western coast of the Thermaic Gulf. Ptolemæus
(or Ptolemy) of Alôrus is mentioned as leader of the enterprise,
and Apollophanês of Pydna as one of the agents.[535] But besides
these conspirators, there was also another enemy, Pausanias,—a
man of the royal lineage and a pretender to the throne;[536] who,
having been hitherto in banishment, was now returning at the head
of a considerable body of Greeks, supported by numerous partisans
in Macedonia,—and was already master of Anthemus, Thermê, Strepsa,
and other places in or near the Thermaic Gulf. He was making war
both against Ptolemy and against the remaining family of Amyntas.
Eurydikê, the widow of that prince, was now left with her two younger
children, Perdikkas, a young man, and Philip, yet a youth. She was in
the same interest with Ptolemy, the successful conspirator against
her son Alexander, and there was even a tale which represented her
as his accomplice in the deed. Ptolemy was regent, administering her
affairs and those of her minor children, against Pausanias.[537]

  [534] Diodor. xv, 67.

  The transactions of Macedonia and Thessaly at this period are
  difficult to make out clearly. What is stated in the text comes
  from Diodorus; who affirms, however, farther,—that Pelopidas
  marched into Macedonia, and brought back as a hostage to
  Thebes the youthful Philip, brother of Alexander. This latter
  affirmation is incorrect; we know that Philip was in Macedonia,
  and free, _after_ the death of Alexander. And I believe that the
  march of Pelopidas into Macedonia, with the bringing back of
  Philip as a hostage, took place in the following year 368 B.C.

  Justin also states (vii, 5) erroneously, that Alexander of
  Macedon gave his brother Philip as a hostage, first to the
  Illyrians, next to the Thebans.

  [535] Demosthen. De Fals. Leg. c. 58, p. 402; Diodorus, xv, 71.

  Diodorus makes the mistake of calling this Ptolemy son of Amyntas
  and brother of Perdikkas; though he at the same time describes
  him as Πτολεμαῖος Ἀλωρίτης, which description would hardly be
  applied to one of the royal brothers. Moreover, the passage of
  Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 14, p. 250, shows that Ptolemy was not
  son of Amyntas; and Dexippus (ap. Syncellum, p. 263) confirms the
  fact.

  See these points discussed in Mr. Fynes Clinton’s Fasti
  Hellenici, Appendix, c. 4.

  [536] Diodor. xvi, 2.

  [537] Æschines, Fals. Legat. c. 13, 14, p. 249, 250; Justin, vii,
  6.

  Æschines mentions Ptolemy as regent, on behalf of Eurydikê and
  her younger sons. Æschines also mentions Alexander as having
  recently died, but says nothing about his assassination.
  Nevertheless there is no reason to doubt that he was
  assassinated, which we know both from Demosthenes and Diodorus;
  and assassinated by Ptolemy, which we know from Plutarch (Pelop.
  c. 27), Marsyas (ap. Athenæum, xiv. p. 629), and Diodorus.
  Justin states that Eurydikê conspired both against her husband
  Amyntas, and against her children, in concert with a paramour.
  The statements of Æschines rather tend to disprove the charge of
  her having been concerned in the death of Amyntas, but to support
  that of her having been accomplice with Ptolemy in the murder of
  Alexander.

  Assassination was a fate which frequently befel the Macedonian
  kings. When we come to the history of Olympias, mother of
  Alexander the Great, it will be seen that Macedonian queens were
  capable of greater crimes than those imputed to Eurydikê.

Deserted by many of their most powerful friends, Eurydikê and Ptolemy
would have been forced to yield the country to Pausanias, had they
not found by accident a foreign auxiliary near at hand. The Athenian
admiral Iphikrates, with a squadron of moderate force, was then on
the coast of Macedonia. He had been sent thither by his countrymen
(369 B.C.) (soon after his partial conflict near Corinth with the
retreating army of Epaminondas, on its way from Peloponnesus to
Bœotia), for the purpose of generally surveying the maritime region
of Macedonia and Thrace, opening negotiations with parties in the
country, and laying his plans for future military operations. At the
period when Alexander was slain, and when Pausanias was carrying on
his invasion, Iphikrates happened to be on the Macedonian coast.
He was there visited by Eurydikê with her two sons Perdikkas and
Philip; the latter seemingly about thirteen or fourteen years of age,
the former somewhat older. She urgently implored him to assist the
family in their present emergency, reminding him that Amyntas had
not only throughout his life been a faithful ally of Athens, but had
also adopted him (Iphikrates) as his son, and had thus constituted
him brother to the two young princes. Placing Perdikkas in his hands,
and causing Philip to embrace his knees, she appealed to his generous
sympathies, and invoked his aid as the only chance of restoration,
or even of personal safety, to the family. Iphikrates, moved by this
affecting supplication, declared in her favor, acted so vigorously
against Pausanias as to expel him from Macedonia, and secured the
sceptre to the family of Amyntas; under Ptolemy of Alôrus as regent
for the time.

This striking incident is described by the orator Æschines[538] in
an oration delivered many years afterwards at Athens. The boy, who
then clasped the knees of Iphikrates, lived afterwards to overthrow
the independence, not of Athens alone, but of Greece generally. The
Athenian general had not been sent to meddle in the disputes of
succession to the Macedonian crown. Nevertheless, looking at the
circumstances of the time, his interference may really have promised
beneficial consequences to Athens; so that we have no right to blame
him for the unforeseen ruin which it was afterwards found to occasion.

  [538] Æschines, Fals. Leg. c. 13, 14, p. 249, 250; Cornelius
  Nepos, Iphicrates, c. 3.

Though the interference of Iphikrates maintained the family of
Amyntas, and established Ptolemy of Alôrus as regent, it did not
procure to Athens the possession of Amphipolis; which was not in
the power of the Macedonian kings to bestow. Amphipolis was at
that time a free Greek city, inhabited by a population in the
main seemingly Chalkidic, and in confederacy with Olynthus.[539]
Iphikrates prosecuted his naval operations on the coast of Thrace
and Macedonia for a period of three years (368-365 B.C.). We make
out very imperfectly what he achieved. He took into his service a
general named Charidemus, a native of Oreus in Eubœa; one of those
Condottieri (to use an Italian word familiar in the fourteenth
century), who, having a band of mercenaries under his command, hired
himself to the best bidder and to the most promising cause. These
mercenaries served under Iphikrates for three years,[540] until he
was dismissed by the Athenians from his command and superseded by
Timotheus. What successes they enabled him to obtain for Athens,
is not clear; but it is certain that he did not succeed in taking
Amphipolis. He seems to have directed one or two attempts against the
town by other officers, which proved abortive; but he got possession
of some Amphipolitan prisoners or hostages,[541] which opened a
prospect of accomplishing the surrender of the town.

  [539] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 150.

  ... μισθοῖ πάλιν αὑτὸν (Charidemus) τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις, τοῖς ὑμετέροις
  ἐχθροῖς καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσιν Ἀμφίπολιν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον.

  Demosthenes is here speaking of the time when Timotheus
  superseded Iphikrates in the command, that is, about 365-364 B.C.
  But we are fairly entitled to presume that the same is true of
  369 or 368 B.C.

  [540] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 149, c. 37.

  [541] Demosthen. cont. Aristokr. p. 669, s. 149, c. 37.

  The passage in which the orator alludes to these _hostages_ of
  the Amphipolitans in the hands of Iphikrates, is unfortunately
  not fully intelligible without farther information.

  (Charidemus) Πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς ~Ἀμφιπολιτῶν ὁμήρους, οὓς παρ’
  Ἁρπάλου λαβὼν Ἰφικράτης ἔδωκε φυλάττειν αὐτῷ, ψηφισαμένων ὑμῶν~
  ὡς ὑμᾶς κομίσαι, παρέδωκεν Ἀμφιπολίταις· καὶ τοῦ μὴ λαβεῖν
  Ἀμφίπολιν, τοῦτ’ ἐμπόδιον κατέστη.

  Who Harpalus was,—or what is meant by Iphikrates “obtaining
  (or capturing) from him the Amphipolitan hostages”—we cannot
  determine. Possibly Harpalus may have been commander of a
  body of Macedonians or Thracians acting as auxiliaries to the
  Amphipolitans, and in this character exacting hostages from them
  as security. Charidemus, as we see afterwards when acting for
  Kersobleptes, received hostages from the inhabitants of Sestos
  (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 679. c. 40 s. 177).

It seems evident, however, in spite of our great dearth of
information, that Iphikrates during his command between 369-365
B.C. did not satisfy the expectations of his countrymen. At that
time, those expectations were large, as testified by sending out not
only Iphikrates to Macedonia and Thrace, but also Timotheus (who
had returned from his service with the Persians in 372-371 B.C.)
to Ionia and the Hellespont, in conjunction with Ariobarzanes the
satrap of Phrygia.[542] That satrap was in possession of Sestos, as
well as of various other towns in the Thracian Chersonesus, towards
which Athenian ambition now tended, according to that new turn,
towards more special and separate acquisitions for Athens, which it
had taken since the battle of Leuktra. But before we advert to the
achievements of Timotheus (366-365 B.C.) in these regions, we must
notice the main course of political conflict in Greece Proper, down
to the partial pacification of 366 B.C.

  [542] Demosthen. De Rhodior. Libertat. c. 5, p. 193.

Though the Athenians had sent Iphikrates (in the winter of 370-369
B.C.) to rescue Sparta from the grasp of Epaminondas, the terms of
a permanent alliance had not yet been settled between them; envoys
from Sparta and her allies visited Athens shortly afterwards for
that purpose.[543] All pretensions to exclusive headship on the
part of Sparta were now at an end. Amidst abundant discussion in
the public assembly, all the speakers, Lacedæmonian and others as
well as Athenian, unanimously pronounced that the headship must be
vested jointly and equally in Sparta and Athens; and the only point
in debate was, how such an arrangement could be most suitably carried
out. It was at first proposed that the former should command on
land, the latter at sea; a distribution, which, on first hearing,
found favor both as equitable and convenient, until an Athenian
named Kephisodotus reminded his countrymen, that the Lacedæmonians
had few ships of war, and those manned chiefly by Helots; while the
land-force of Athens consisted of her horsemen and hoplites, the
choice citizens of the state. Accordingly, on the distribution now
pointed out, Athenians, in great numbers and of the best quality,
would be placed under Spartan command; while few Lacedæmonians, and
those of little dignity, would go under Athenian command; which would
be, not equality, but the reverse. Kephisodotus proposed that both
on land and at sea, the command should alternate between Athens and
Sparta, in periods of five days; and his amendment was adopted.[544]

  [543] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 1.

  The words τῷ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει must denote the year beginning in the
  spring of 369 B.C. On this point I agree with Dr. Thirlwall
  (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 40, p. 145 note); differing from him
  however (p. 146 note), as well as from Mr. Clinton, in this,—that
  I place the second expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus
  (as Sievers places it, p. 278) in 369 B.C.; not in 368 B.C.

  The narrative of Xenophon carries to my mind conviction that this
  is what he meant to affirm. In the beginning of Book VII, he
  says, τῷ δ’ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων πρέσβεις
  ἦλθον αὐτοκράτορες Ἀθήναζε, βουλευσόμενοι καθ’ ὅ,τι ἡ συμμαχία
  ἔσοιτο Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις.

  Now the words τῷ δ’ ὑστέρῳ ἔτει denote the spring of 369 B.C.

  Xenophon goes on to describe the assembly and the discussion
  at Athens, respecting the terms of alliance. This description
  occupies, from vii, 1, 1 to vii, 1, 14, where the final vote and
  agreement is announced.

  Immediately after this vote, Xenophon goes on to
  say,—Στρατευομένων δ’ ἀμφοτέρων αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων
  (Lacedæmonians, Athenians, and allies) εἰς Κόρινθον, ἔδοξε κοινῇ
  φυλάττειν τὸ Ὄνειον. Καὶ ἐπεὶ ἐπορεύοντο οἱ Θηβαῖοι καὶ οἱ
  σύμμαχοι, παραταξάμενοι ἐφύλαττον ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν τοῦ Ὀνείου.

  I conceive that the decision of the Athenian assembly,—the
  march of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians to guard the lines of
  Oneion,—and the march of the Thebans to enter Peloponnesus,—are
  here placed by Xenophon as events in immediate sequence, with no
  long interval of time between them. I see no ground to admit the
  interval of a year between the vote of the assembly and the march
  of the Thebans; the more so, as Epaminondas might reasonably
  presume that the building of Megalopolis and Messene, recently
  begun, would need to be supported by another Theban army in
  Peloponnesus during 369 B.C.

  It is indeed contended (and admitted even by Sievers) that
  Epaminondas could not have been reëlected Bœotarch in 369 B.C.
  But in this point I do not concur. It appears to me that the
  issue of the trial at Thebes was triumphant for him; thus making
  it more probable,—not less probable,—that he and Pelopidas were
  reëlected Bœotarchs immediately.

  [544] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 10-14.

Though such amendment had the merit of perfect equality between the
two competitors for headship, it was by no means well-calculated for
success in joint operations against a general like Epaminondas. The
allies determined to occupy Corinth as a main station, and to guard
the line of Mount Oneium between that city and Kenchreæ,[545] so as
to prevent the Thebans from again penetrating into Peloponnesus.
It is one mark of the depression in the fortunes of Sparta, that
this very station, now selected for the purpose of keeping a Theban
invader away from her frontier, had been held, during the war from
394-387 B.C., by the Athenians and Thebans against herself, to
prevent her from breaking out of Peloponnesus into Attica and Bœotia.
Never since the invasion of Xerxes had there been any necessity for
defending the Isthmus of Corinth against an extra-Peloponnesian
assailant. But now, even to send a force from Sparta to Corinth,
recourse must have been had to transport by sea, either across the
Argolic Gulf from Prasiæ to Halieis, or round Cape Skyllæum to the
Saronic Gulf and Kenchreæ; for no Spartan troops could march by land
across Arcadia or Argos. This difficulty however was surmounted, and
a large allied force (not less than twenty thousand men according
to Diodorus),—consisting of Athenians with auxiliary mercenaries
under Chabrias, Lacedæmonians, Pellenians, Epidaurians, Megarians,
Corinthians, and all the other allies still adhering to Sparta,—was
established in defensive position along the line of Oneium.

  [545] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 15, 16; Diodor. xv, 68.

It was essential for Thebes to reopen communication with her
Peloponnesian allies. Accordingly Epaminondas, at the head of the
Thebans and their northern allies, arrived during the same summer in
front of this position, on his march into Peloponnesus. His numbers
were inferior to those of his assembled enemies, whose position
prevented him from joining his Arcadian, Argeian, and Eleian allies,
already assembled in Peloponnesus. After having vainly challenged
the enemy to come down and fight in the plain, Epaminondas laid
his plan for attacking the position. Moving from his camp a little
before daybreak, so as to reach the enemy just when the night-guards
were retiring, but before the general body had yet risen and got
under arms,[546]—he directed an assault along the whole line. But
his principal effort, at the head of the chosen Theban troops, was
made against the Lacedæmonians and Pellenians, who were posted in
the most assailable part of the line.[547] So skilfully was his
movement conducted, that he completely succeeded in surprising them.
The Lacedæmonian polemarch, taken unprepared, was driven from his
position, and forced to retire to another point of the hilly ground.
He presently sent to solicit a truce for burying his dead; agreeing
to abandon the line of Oneium, which had now become indefensible. The
other parts of the Theban army made no impression by their attack,
nor were they probably intended to do more than occupy attention,
while Epaminondas himself vigorously assailed the weak point of
the position. Yet Xenophon censures the Lacedæmonian polemarch as
faint-hearted, for having evacuated the whole line as soon as his
own position was forced; alleging, that he might easily have found
another good position on one of the neighboring eminences, and might
have summoned reinforcements from his allies,—and that the Thebans,
in spite of their partial success, were so embarrassed how to descend
on the Peloponnesian side of Oneium, that they were half disposed to
retreat. The criticism of Xenophon indicates doubtless an unfavorable
judgment pronounced by many persons in the army; the justice of which
we are not in a condition to appreciate. But whether the Lacedæmonian
commander was to blame or not, Epaminondas, by his skilful and
victorious attack upon this strong position, enhanced his already
high military renown.[548]

  [546] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 16; Polyænus, ii, 2, 9.

  This was an hour known to be favorable to sudden assailants,
  affording a considerable chance that the enemy might be off their
  guard. It was at the same hour that the Athenian Thrasybulus
  surprised the troops of the Thirty, near Phylê in Attica (Xen.
  Hellen. ii, 4, 6).

  [547] Xen. Hellen. ib.; Pausanias, ix, 15, 2.

  Pausanias describes the battle as having been fought περὶ
  Λέχαιον; not very exact, topographically, since it was on the
  other side of Corinth, between Corinth and Kenchreæ.

  Diodorus (xv, 68) states that the whole space across, from
  Kenchreæ on one sea to Lechæum on the other, was trenched and
  palisaded by the Athenians and Spartans. But this cannot be true,
  because the Long Walls were a sufficient defence between Corinth
  and Lechæum; and even between Corinth and Kenchreæ, it is not
  probable that any such continuous line of defence was drawn,
  though the assailable points were probably thus guarded. Xenophon
  does not mention either trench or palisade.

  [548] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 14-17; Diodor. xv, 68.

Having joined his Peloponnesian allies, Arcadians, Eleians, and
Argeians, he was more than a match for the Spartan and Athenian
force, which appears now to have confined itself to Corinth, Lechæum,
and Kenchreæ. He ravaged the territories of Epidaurus, Trœzen, and
Phlius; and obtained possession of Sikyon as well as of Pellênê.[549]
At Sikyon, a vote of the people being taken, it was resolved to
desert Sparta, to form alliance with Thebes, and to admit a Theban
harmost and garrison into the acropolis; Euphron, a citizen hitherto
preponderant in the city by means of Sparta and devoted to her
interest, now altered his politics and went along with the stronger
tide.[550] We cannot doubt also that Epaminondas went into Arcadia to
encourage and regulate the progress of his two great enterprises,—the
foundation of Messênê and Megalopolis; nor does the silence of
Xenophon on such a matter amount to any disproof. These new towns
having been commenced less than a year before, cannot have been yet
finished, and may probably have required the reappearance of his
victorious army. The little town of Phlius,—situated south of Sikyon
and west of Corinth,—which was one of the most faithful allies of
Sparta, was also in great hazard of being captured by the Phliasian
exiles. When the Arcadians and Eleians were marching through Nemea to
join Epaminondas at Oneium, these exiles entreated them only to show
themselves near Phlius; with the assurance that such demonstration
would suffice to bring about the capture of the town. The exiles then
stole by night to the foot of the town walls with scaling-ladders,
and there lay hid, until, as day began to break, the scouts from the
neighboring hill Trikaranum announced that the allied enemies were in
sight. While the attention of the citizens within was thus engaged
on the other side, the concealed exiles planted their ladders,
overpowered the few unprepared guards, and got possession of the
acropolis. Instead of contenting themselves with this position until
the allied force came up, they strove also to capture the town; but
in this they were defeated by the citizens, who, by desperate efforts
of bravery, repulsed both the intruders within and the enemy without;
thus preserving their town.[551] The fidelity of the Phliasians to
Sparta entailed upon them severe hardships through the superiority
of their enemies in the field, and through perpetual ravage of their
territory from multiplied hostile neighbors (Argos, Arcadia, and
Sikyon), who had established fortified posts on their borders; for it
was only on the side of Corinth that the Phliasians had a friendly
neighbor to afford them the means of purchasing provisions.[552]

  [549] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 18; vii, 2, 11; Diodor. xv, 69.

  This march against Sikyon seems alluded to by Pausanias (vi, 3,
  1); the Eleian horse were commanded by Stomius, who slew the
  enemy’s commander with his own hand.

  The stratagem of the Bœotian Pammenes in attacking the harbor
  of Sikyon (Polyænus, v, 16, 4) may perhaps belong to this
  undertaking.

  [550] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 18, 22, 44; vii, 3, 2-8.

  [551] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 5-9.

  This incident may have happened in 369 B.C., just about the
  time when Epaminondas surprised and broke through the defensive
  lines of Mount Oneium. In the second chapter of the seventh Book,
  Xenophon takes up the history of Phlius, and carries it on from
  the winter of 370-369 B.C., when Epaminondas invaded Laconia,
  through 369, 368, 367 B.C.

  [552] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 17.

Amidst general success, the Thebans experienced partial reverses.
Their march carrying them near to Corinth, a party of them had the
boldness to rush at the gates, and to attempt a surprise of the town.
But the Athenian Chabrias, then commanding within it, disposed his
troops so skilfully, and made so good a resistance, that he defeated
them with loss and reduced them to the necessity of asking for the
ordinary truce to bury their dead, which were lying very near to
the walls.[553] This advantage over the victorious Thebans somewhat
raised the spirits of the Spartan allies; who were still farther
encouraged by the arrival in Lechæum of a squadron from Syracuse,
bringing a body of two thousand mercenary Gauls and Iberians,
with fifty horsemen, as a succor from the despot Dionysius. Such
foreigners had never before been seen in Peloponnesus. Their bravery,
and singular nimbleness of movement, gave them the advantage in
several partial skirmishes, and disconcerted the Thebans. But the
Spartans and Athenians were not bold enough to hazard a general
battle, and the Syracusan detachment returned home after no very long
stay,[554] while the Thebans also went back to Bœotia.

  [553] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 19; Diodor. xv, 69.

  [554] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 22; Diodor. xv, 70.

  Diodorus states that these mercenaries had been furnished with
  pay for five months; if this is correct, I presume that we must
  understand it as comprehending the time of their voyage from
  Sicily and back to Sicily. Nevertheless, the language of Xenophon
  would not lead us to suppose that they remained in Peloponnesus
  even so long as three months.

  I think it certain however that much more must have passed in
  this campaign than what Xenophon indicates. Epaminondas would
  hardly have forced the passage of the Oneium for such small
  objects as we find mentioned in the Hellenica.

  An Athenian Inscription, extremely defective, yet partially
  restored and published by M. Boeckh (Corp. Inscr. No. 85 a.
  Addenda to vol. i, p. 897), records a vote of the Athenian people
  and of the synod of Athenian confederates—praising Dionysius of
  Syracuse,—and recording him with his two sons as benefactors of
  Athens. It was probably passed somewhere near this time; and we
  know from Demosthenes that the Athenians granted the freedom
  of their city to Dionysius and his descendants (Demosthenes ad
  Philipp. Epistol. p. 161, as well as the Epistle of Philip, on
  which this is a comment). The Inscription is too defective to
  warrant any other inferences.

One proceeding of Epaminondas during this expedition merits especial
notice. It was the general practice of the Thebans to put to death
all the Bœotian exiles who fell into their hands as prisoners, while
they released under ransom all other Greek prisoners. At the capture
of a village named Phœbias in the Sikyonian territory, Epaminondas
took captive a considerable body of Bœotian exiles. With the least
possible delay, he let them depart under ransom, professing to regard
them as belonging to other cities.[555] We find him always trying
to mitigate the rigorous dealing then customary towards political
opponents.

  [555] Pausanias, ix, 15, 2.

Throughout this campaign of 369 B.C., all the Peloponnesian allies
had acted against Sparta cheerfully under Epaminondas and the
Thebans. But in the ensuing year the spirit of the Arcadians had
been so raised, by the formation of the new Pan-Arcadian communion,
by the progress of Messênê and Megalopolis, and the conspicuous
depression of Sparta,—that they fancied themselves not only capable
of maintaining their independence by themselves, but also entitled
to divide headship with Thebes, as Athens divided it with Sparta.
Lykomedes the Mantinean, wealthy, energetic, and able, stood forward
as the exponent of this new aspiration, and as the champion of
Arcadian dignity. He reminded the Ten Thousand (the Pan-Arcadian
synod),—that while all other residents in Peloponnesus were
originally immigrants, they alone were the indigenous occupants of
the peninsula; that they were the most numerous section, as well as
the bravest and hardiest men, who bore the Hellenic name,—of which
proof was afforded by the fact, that Arcadian mercenary soldiers were
preferred to all others; that the Lacedæmonians had never ventured to
invade Attica, nor the Thebans to invade Laconia, without Arcadian
auxiliaries. “Let us follow no man’s lead (he concluded), but stand
up for ourselves. In former days, we built up the power of Sparta by
serving in her armies; and now, if we submit quietly to follow the
Thebans, without demanding alternate headship for ourselves, we shall
presently find them to be Spartans under another name.”[556]

  [556] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 23.

Such exhortations were heard with enthusiasm by the assembled
Arcadians, to whom political discussion and the sentiment of
collective dignity was a novelty. Impressed with admiration for
Lykomedes, they chose as officers every man whom he recommended
calling upon him to lead them into active service, so as to
justify their new pretensions. He conducted them into the
territory of Epidaurus, now under invasion by the Argeians; who
were however in the greatest danger of being cut off, having
their retreat intercepted by a body of troops from Corinth under
Chabrias,—Athenians and Corinthians. Lykomêdês with his Arcadians,
fighting his way through enemies as well as through a difficult
country, repelled the division of Chabrias, and extricated the
embarrassed Argeians. He next invaded the territory south of the
new city of Messene and west of the Messenian Gulf, part of which
was still held by Spartan garrisons. He penetrated as far as
Asinê, where the Spartan commander, Geranor, drew out his garrison
to resist them, but was defeated with loss, and slain, while the
suburbs of Asinê were destroyed.[557] Probably the Spartan mastery
of the south-western corner of the Peloponnesus was terminated by
this expedition. The indefatigable activity which these Arcadians
now displayed under their new commander, overpowering all enemies,
and defying all hardships and difficulties of marching over the
most rugged mountains, by night as well as by day, throughout the
winter season,—excited everywhere astonishment and alarm; not
without considerable jealousy even on the part of their allies the
Thebans.[558]

  [557] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 25.

  Στρατευσάμενοι δὲ καὶ εἰς Ἀσίνην τῆς Λακωνικῆς, ἐνίκησάν τε τὴν
  τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων φρουρὰν, καὶ τὸν Γεράνορα, τὸν πολέμαρχον
  Σπαρτιάτην γεγενημένον, ἀπέκτειναν, καὶ τὸ προάστειον τῶν
  Ἀσιναίων ἐπόρθησαν.

  Diodorus states that Lykomedes and the Arcadians took Pellênê,
  which is in a different situation, and can hardly refer to the
  same expedition (xv, 67).

  [558] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 26.

While such jealousy tended to loosen the union between the Arcadians
and Thebes, other causes tended at the same time to disunite them
from Elis. The Eleians claimed rights of supremacy over Lepreon and
the other towns of Triphylia, which rights they had been compelled
by the Spartan arms to forego thirty years before.[559] Ever since
that period, these towns had ranked as separate communities, each
for itself as a dependent ally of Sparta. Now that the power of
the latter was broken, the Eleians aimed at resumption of their
lost supremacy. But the formation of the new “commune Arcadum” at
Megalopolis, interposed an obstacle never before thought of. The
Tryphilian towns, affirming themselves to be of Arcadian origin, and
setting forth as their eponymous Hero Triphylus son of Arkas,[560]
solicited to be admitted as fully qualified members of the incipient
Pan-Arcadian communion. They were cordially welcomed by the general
Arcadian body (with a degree of sympathy similar to that recently
shown by the Germans towards Sleswick-Holstein), received as
political brethren, and guaranteed as independent against Elis.[561]
The Eleians, thus finding themselves disappointed of the benefits
which they had anticipated from the humiliation of Sparta, became
greatly alienated from the Arcadians.

  [559] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 30, 31.

  [560] Polyb. iv, 77.

  [561] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 26; vii, 4, 12.

Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Phrygia, with whom the Athenians had
just established a correspondence, now endeavored (perhaps at their
instance) to mediate for peace in Greece, sending over a citizen
of Abydus named Philiskus, furnished with a large sum of money.
Choosing Delphi as a centre, Philiskus convoked thither, in the name
of the Persian king, deputies from all the belligerent parties,
Theban, Lacedæmonian, Athenian, etc., to meet him. These envoys
never consulted the god as to the best means of attaining peace
(says Xenophon), but merely took counsel among themselves; hence,
he observes, little progress was made towards peace; since the
Spartans[562] peremptorily insisted that Messênê should again be
restored to them, while the Thebans were not less firm in resisting
the proposition. It rather seems that the allies of Sparta were
willing to concede the point, and even tried, though in vain, to
overcome her reluctance. The congress accordingly broke up; while
Philiskus, declaring himself in favor of Sparta and Athens, employed
his money in levying mercenaries for the professed purpose of aiding
them in the war.[563] We do not find, however, that he really lent
them any aid. It would appear that his mercenaries were intended for
the service of the satrap himself, who was then organizing his revolt
from Artaxerxes; and that his probable purpose in trying to close
the war was, that he might procure Grecian soldiers more easily and
abundantly. Though the threats of Philiskus produced no immediate
result, however, they so alarmed the Thebans as to determine them to
send an embassy up to the Great King; the rather, as they learnt that
the Lacedæmonian Euthykles had already gone up to the Persian court,
to solicit on behalf of Sparta.[564]

  [562] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27. Ἐκεῖ δὲ ἐλθόντες, τῷ μὲν θεῷ οὐδὲν
  ἐκοινώσαντο, ὅπως ἂν ἡ εἰρήνη γένοιτο, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐβουλεύοντο.

  [563] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27; Diodor. xv, 70.

  Diodorus states that Philiskus was sent by Artaxerxes; which
  seems not exact; he was sent by Ariobarzanes in the name
  of Artaxerxes. Diodorus also says that Philiskus left two
  thousand mercenaries with pay provided, for the service of the
  Lacedæmonians; which troops are never afterwards mentioned.

  [564] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33.

How important had been the move made by Epaminondas in reconstituting
the autonomous Messenians, was shown, among other evidences, by
the recent abortive congress at Delphi. Already this formed the
capital article in Grecian political discussion; an article, too,
on which Sparta stood nearly alone. For not only the Thebans (whom
Xenophon[565] specifies as if there were no others of the same
sentiment), but all the allies of Thebes, felt hearty sympathy and
identity of interest with the newly-enfranchised residents in Mount
Ithômê and in Western Laconia; while the allies even of Sparta were,
at most, only lukewarm against them, if not positively inclined in
their favor.[566] A new phenomenon soon presented itself, which
served as a sort of recognition of the new-born, or newly-revived,
Messenian community, by the public voice of Greece. At the one
hundred and third Olympic festival (Midsummer 368 B.C.),—which
occurred within less than two years after Epaminondas laid the
foundation-stone of Messênê,—a Messenian boy named Damiskus gained
the wreath as victor in the foot-race of boys. Since the first
Messenian war, whereby the nation became subject to Sparta,[567] no
Messenian victor had ever been enrolled; though before that war, in
the earliest half-century of recorded Olympiads, several Messenian
victors are found on the register. No competitor was admitted to
enter the lists, except as a free Greek from a free community;
accordingly so long as these Messenians had been either enslaved,
or in exile, they would never have been allowed to contend for the
prize under that designation. So much the stronger was the impression
produced, when, in 368 B.C., after an interval of more than three
centuries, Damiscus the Messenian was proclaimed victor. No Theôry
(or public legation for sacrifice) could have come to Olympia from
Sparta, since she was then at war both with Eleians and Arcadians;
probably few individual Lacedæmonians were present; so that the
spectators, composed generally of Greeks unfriendly to Sparta,
would hail the proclamation of the new name as being an evidence of
her degradation, as well as from sympathy with the long and severe
oppression of the Messenians.[568] This Olympic festival,—the first
after the great revolution occasioned by the battle of Leuktra,—was
doubtless a scene of earnest anti-Spartan emotion.

  [565] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27.

  [566] See this fact indicated in Isokrates, Archidamus (Or. vi,)
  s. 2-11.

  [567] Pausanias, vi, 2, 5.

  Two Messenian victors had been proclaimed during the interval;
  but they were inhabitants of Messênê in Sicily. And these two
  were ancient citizens of Zanklê, the name which the Sicilian
  Messênê bore before Anaxilaus the despot chose to give to it this
  last-mentioned name.

  [568] See the contrary, or Spartan, feeling,—disgust at the idea
  of persons who had just been their slaves, presenting themselves
  as spectators and competitors in the plain of Olympia,—set forth
  in Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus) s. 111, 112.

During this year 368 B.C., the Thebans undertook no march into
Peloponnesus; the peace-congress at Delphi probably occupied their
attention, while the Arcadians neither desired nor needed their aid.
But Pelopidas conducted in this year a Theban force into Thessaly,
in order to protect Larissa and the other cities against Alexander
of Pheræ, and to counter-work the ambitious projects of that despot,
who was soliciting reinforcement from Athens. In his first object
he succeeded. Alexander was compelled to visit him at Larissa, and
solicit peace. This despot, however, alarmed at the complaints which
came from all sides against his cruelty,—and at the language, first,
admonitory, afterwards, menacing, of Pelopidas—soon ceased to think
himself in safety, and fled home to Pheræ. Pelopidas established a
defensive union against him among the other Thessalian cities, and
then marched onward into Macedonia, where the regent Ptolemy, not
strong enough to resist, entered into alliance with the Thebans;
surrendering to them thirty hostages from the most distinguished
families in Macedonia, as a guarantee for his faithful adherence.
Among the hostages was the youthful Philip, son of Amyntas, who
remained in this character at Thebes for some years, under the
care of Pammenês.[569] It was thus that Ptolemy and the family of
Amyntas, though they had been maintained in Macedonia by the active
intervention of Iphikrates and the Athenians not many months before,
nevertheless now connected themselves by alliance with the Thebans,
the enemies of Athens. Æschines the Athenian orator denounces them
for ingratitude; but possibly the superior force of the Thebans left
them no option. Both the Theban and Macedonian force became thus
enlisted for the protection of the freedom of Amphipolis against
Athens.[570] And Pelopidas returned to Thebes, having extended the
ascendency of Thebes not only over Thessaly, but also over Macedonia,
assured by the acquisition of the thirty hostages.

  [569] Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 26.

  [570] Æschines, De Fals. Leg. c. 14, p. 249.

  ... διδάσκων, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ὑπὲρ Ἀμφιπόλεως ἀντέπραττε (Ptolemy)
  τῇ πόλει (to Athens), καὶ πρὸς Θηβαίους διαφερομένων Ἀθηναίων,
  συμμαχίαν ἐποιήσατο, etc.

  Neither Plutarch nor Diodorus appear to me precise in specifying
  and distinguishing the different expeditions of Pelopidas
  into Thessaly. I cannot but think that he made four different
  expeditions; two before his embassy to the Persian court (which
  embassy took place in 367 B.C.; see Mr. Clinton, Fast. Hellen.
  on that year, who rightly places the date of the embassy), and
  two after it.

  1. The first was, in 369 B.C., after the death of Amyntas, but
  during the short reign, less than two years, of his son Alexander
  of Macedon.

  Diodorus mentions this fact (xv, 67), but he adds, what is
  erroneous, that Pelopidas on this occasion brought back Philip as
  a hostage.

  2. The second was in 368 B.C.; also mentioned by Diodorus (xv,
  71) and by Plutarch (Pelop. c. 26).

  Diodorus (erroneously, as I think) connects this expedition with
  the seizure and detention of Pelopidas by Alexander of Pheræ. But
  it was really on this occasion that Pelopidas brought back the
  hostages.

  3. The third (which was rather a mission than an expedition) was
  in 366 B.C., after the return of Pelopidas from the Persian
  court, which happened seemingly in the beginning of 366 B.C.
  In this third march, Pelopidas was seized and made prisoner
  by Alexander of Pheræ, until he was released by Epaminondas.
  Plutarch mentions this expedition, clearly distinguishing it
  from the second (Pelopidas, c. 27—μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν, etc.);
  but with this mistake, in my judgment, that he places it before
  the journey of Pelopidas to the Persian court; whereas it really
  occurred after and in consequence of that journey, which dates in
  367 B.C.

  4. The fourth and last, in 364-363 B.C.; wherein he was slain
  (Diodor. xv. 80; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 32).

Such extension of the Theban power, in Northern Greece, disconcerted
the maritime projects of Athens on the coast of Macedonia, at the
same time that it laid the foundation of an alliance between her
and Alexander of Pheræ. While she was thus opposing the Thebans in
Thessaly, a second squadron and reinforcement arrived at Corinth
from Syracuse, under Kissidas, despatched by the despot Dionysius.
Among the synod of allies assembled at Corinth, debate being held
as to the best manner of employing them, the Athenians strenuously
urged that they should be sent to act in Thessaly. But the Spartans
took an opposite view, and prevailed to have them sent round to the
southern coast of Laconia, in order that they might coöperate in
repelling or invading the Arcadians.[571] Reinforced by these Gauls
and other mercenaries, Archidamus led out the Lacedæmonian forces
against Arcadia. He took Karyæ by assault, putting to death every
man whom he captured in the place; and he farther ravaged all the
Arcadian territory, in the district named after the Parrhasii, until
the joint Arcadian and Argeian forces arrived to oppose him; upon
which he retreated to an eminence near Midea.[572] Here Kissidas, the
Syracusan commander, gave notice that he must retire, as the period
to which his orders reached had expired. He accordingly marched back
to Sparta; but midway in the march, in a narrow pass, the Messenian
troops arrested his advance, and so hampered him, that he was forced
to send to Archidamus for aid. The latter soon appeared, while the
main body of Arcadians and Argeians followed also; and Archidamus
resolved to attack them in general battle near Midea. Imploring his
soldiers, in an emphatic appeal, to rescue the great name of Sparta
from the disgrace into which it had fallen, he found them full of
responsive ardor. They rushed with such fierceness to the charge,
that the Arcadians and Argeians were thoroughly daunted, and fled
with scarce any resistance. The pursuit was vehement, especially by
the Gallic mercenaries, and the slaughter frightful. Ten thousand
men (if we are to believe Diodorus) were slain, without the loss
of a single Lacedæmonian. Of this easy and important victory,—or,
as it came to be called, “the tearless battle,”—news was forthwith
transmitted by the herald Demotelês to Sparta. So powerful was the
emotion produced by his tale, that all the Spartans who heard it
burst into tears; Agesilaus, the Senators, and the ephors, setting
the example;[573]—a striking proof how humbled, and disaccustomed
to the idea of victory, their minds had recently become!—a striking
proof also, when we compare it with the inflexible self-control which
marked their reception of the disastrous tidings from Leuktra, how
much more irresistible is unexpected joy than unexpected grief, in
working on these minds of iron temper!

  [571] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28.

  [572] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28. The place here called Midea cannot
  be identified. The only place of that name known, is in the
  territory of Argos, quite different from what is here mentioned.
  O. Müller proposes to substitute Malæa for Midea; a conjecture,
  which there are no means of verifying.

  [573] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 28-32; Diodor. xv, 72; Plutarch,
  Agesil. c. 33.

So offensive had been the insolence of the Arcadians, that the news
of their defeat was not unwelcome even to their allies the Thebans
and Eleians. It made them feel that they were not independent of
Theban aid, and determined Epaminondas again to show himself in
Peloponnesus, with the special view of enrolling the Achæans in his
alliance. The defensive line of Oneium was still under occupation
by the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, who had their head-quarters at
Corinth. Yet having remained unattacked all the preceding year, it
was now so negligently guarded, that Peisias, the general of Argos,
instigated by a private request of Epaminondas, was enabled suddenly
to seize the heights above Kenchreæ, with a force of two thousand
men and seven days’ provision. The Theban commander, hastening his
march, thus found the line of Oneium open near Kenchreæ, and entered
Peloponnesus without resistance; after which he proceeded, joined by
his Peloponnesian allies, against the cities in Achaia.[574] Until
the battle of Leuktra, these cities had been among the dependent
allies of Sparta, governed by local oligarchies in her interest.
Since that event, they had broken off from her, but were still
under oligarchical governments (though doubtless not the same men),
and had remained neutral without placing themselves in connection
either with Arcadians or Thebans.[575] Not being in a condition to
resist so formidable an invading force, they opened negotiations
with Epaminondas, and solicited to be enrolled as allies of Thebes;
engaging to follow her lead whenever summoned, and to do their duty
as members of her synod. They tendered securities which Epaminondas
deemed sufficient for the fulfilment of their promise. Accordingly,
by virtue of his own personal ascendency, he agreed to accept them
as they stood, without requiring either the banishment of the
existing rulers or substitution of democratical forms in place of
the oligarchical.[576] Such a proceeding was not only suitable to
the moderation of dealing so remarkable in Epaminondas, but also
calculated to strengthen the interests of Thebes in Peloponnesus,
in the present jealous and unsatisfactory temper of the Arcadians,
by attaching to her on peculiar grounds Achæans as well as Eleians;
the latter being themselves half-alienated from the Arcadians.
Epaminondas farther liberated Naupaktus and Kalydon,[577] which were
held by Achæan garrisons, and which he enrolled as separate allies of
Thebes; whither he then returned, without any other achievements (so
far as we are informed) in Peloponnesus.

  [574] I think that this third expedition of Epaminondas into
  Peloponnesus belongs to 367 B.C.; being simultaneous with the
  embassy of Pelopidas to the Persian court. Many chronologers
  place it in 366 B.C., after the conclusion of that embassy;
  because the mention of it occurs in Xenophon after he has brought
  the embassy to a close. But I do not conceive that this proves
  the fact of subsequent date. For we must recollect that the
  embassy lasted several months; moreover the expedition was made
  while Epaminondas was Bœotarch; and he ceased to be so during the
  year 366 B.C. Besides, if we place the expedition in 366 B.C.,
  there will hardly be time left for the whole career of Euphron at
  Sikyon, which intervened before the peace of 366 B.C. between
  Thebes and Corinth (see Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 44 _seq._).

  The relation of cotemporaneousness between the embassy of
  Pelopidas to Persia, and the expedition of Epaminondas, seems
  indicated when we compare vii, 1, 33 with vii, 1, 48—Συνεχῶς
  δὲ βουλευόμενοι οἱ Θηβαῖοι, ὅπως ἂν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν λάβοιεν τῆς
  Ἑλλάδος, ἐνόμισαν εἰ πέμψειαν πρὸς τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα, etc. Then
  Xenophon proceeds to recount the whole embassy, together with its
  unfavorable reception on returning, which takes up the entire
  space until vii, 2, 41, when he says—Αὖθις δ’ Ἐπαμεινώνδας,
  βουληθεὶς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς προσυπαγαγέσθαι, ὅπως μᾶλλον σφίσι καὶ
  οἱ Ἀρκάδες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι προσέχοιεν τὸν νοῦν, ἔγνωκε
  στρατευτέον εἶναι ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀχαΐαν.

  This fresh expedition of Epaminondas is one of the modes adopted
  by the Thebans of manifesting their general purpose expressed in
  the former words,—συνεχῶς βουλευόμενοι, etc.

  [575] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 42-44.

  The neutrality before observed, is implied in the phrase whereby
  Xenophon describes their conduct afterwards; ἐπεὶ δὲ κατελθόντες
  ~οὐκέτι ἐμέσευον~, etc.

  [576] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 42.

  His expression marks how completely these terms were granted
  by the personal determination of Epaminondas, overruling
  opposition,—~ἐνδυναστεύει~ ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας, ὥστε μὴ φυγαδεῦσαι
  τοὺς κρατίστους, μηδὲ τὰς πολιτείας μεταστῆσαι, etc.

  [577] Diodor. xv, 75.

But the generous calculations of this eminent man found little favor
with his countrymen. Both the Arcadians, and the opposition-party
in the Achæan cities, preferred accusations against him, alleging
that he had discouraged and humiliated all the real friends of
Thebes; leaving power in the hands of men who would join Sparta
on the first opportunity. The accusation was farther pressed
by Menekleidas, a Theban speaker of ability, strongly adverse
to Epaminondas, as well as to Pelopidas. So pronounced was the
displeasure of the Thebans,—partly perhaps from reluctance to offend
the Arcadians,—that they not only reversed the policy of Epaminondas
in Achaia, but also refrained from reëlecting him as Bœotarch during
the ensuing year.[578] They sent harmosts of their own to each of
the Achæan cities,—put down the existing oligarchies,—sent the chief
oligarchical members and partisans into exile,—and established
democratical governments in each. Hence a great body of exiles soon
became accumulated; who, watching for a favorable opportunity and
combining their united forces against each city successively, were
strong enough to overthrow the newly-created democracies, and to
expel the Theban harmosts. Thus restored, the Achæan oligarchs took
decided and active part with Sparta;[579] vigorously pressing the
Arcadians on one side, while the Lacedæmonians, encouraged by the
recent Tearless Battle, exerted themselves actively on the other.

  [578] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 1, 43; Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 25.

  Diodorus (xv, 72) refers the displeasure of the Thebans against
  Epaminondas to the events of the preceding year. They believed
  (according to Diodorus) that Epaminondas had improperly spared
  the Spartans, and not pushed his victory so far as might have
  been done, when he forced the lines of Mount Oneium in 369 B.C.
  But it is scarcely credible that the Thebans should have been
  displeased on this account; for the forcing of the lines was a
  capital exploit, and we may see from Xenophon that Epaminondas
  achieved much more than the Spartans and their friends believed
  to be possible.

  Xenophon tells us that the Thebans were displeased with
  Epaminondas, on complaint from the Arcadians and others, for his
  conduct in Achaia two years after the action at Oneium; that
  is, in 367 B.C. This is much more probable in itself, and much
  more consistent with the general series of facts, than the cause
  assigned by Diodorus.

  [579] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 23.

  For a similar case, in which exiles from many different cities,
  congregating in a body, became strong enough to carry their
  restoration in each city successively, see Thucyd. i, 113.

The town of Sikyon, closely adjoining to Achaia, was at this time in
alliance with Thebes, having a Theban harmost and garrison in its
acropolis. But its government, which had always been oligarchical,
still remained unaltered. The recent counter-revolution in the Achæan
cities, followed closely by their junction with Sparta, alarmed
the Arcadians and Argeians, lest Sikyon also should follow the
example. Of this alarm a leading Sikyonian citizen named Euphron,
took advantage. He warned them that if the oligarchy were left in
power, they would certainly procure aid from the garrison at Corinth,
and embrace the interests of Sparta. To prevent such defection (he
said) it was indispensable that Sikyon should be democratized. He
then offered himself, with their aid, to accomplish the revolution,
seasoning his offer with strong protestations of disgust against the
intolerable arrogance and oppression of Sparta: protestations not
unnecessary, since he had himself, prior to the battle of Leuktra,
carried on the government of his native city as local agent for her
purposes and interest. The Arcadians and Argeians, entering into
the views of Euphron, sent to Sikyon a large force, under whose
presence and countenance he summoned a general assembly in the
market-place, proclaimed the oligarchy to be deposed, and proposed
an equal democracy for the future. His proposition being adopted, he
next invited the people to choose generals; and the persons chosen
were, as might naturally be expected, himself with five partisans.
The prior oligarchy had not been without a previous mercenary force
in their service, under the command of Lysimenês; but these men were
overawed by the new foreign force introduced. Euphron now proceeded
to reorganize them, to place them under the command of his son Adeas
instead of Lysimenês, and to increase their numerical strength.
Selecting from them a special body-guard for his own personal safety,
and being thus master of the city under the ostensible color of chief
of the new democracy, he commenced a career of the most rapacious
and sanguinary tyranny.[580] He caused several of his colleagues to
be assassinated, and banished others. He expelled also by wholesale
the wealthiest and most eminent citizens, on suspicion of Laconism;
confiscating their properties to supply himself with money, pillaging
the public treasure, and even stripping the temples of all their rich
stock of consecrated gold and silver ornaments. He farther procured
for himself adherents by liberating numerous slaves, exalting them
to the citizenship, and probably enrolling them among his paid
force.[581] The power which he thus acquired became very great. The
money seized enabled him not only to keep in regular pay his numerous
mercenaries, but also to bribe the leading Arcadians and Argeians, so
that they connived at his enormities; while he was farther ready and
active in the field to lend them military support. The Theban harmost
still held the acropolis with his garrison, though Euphron was master
of the town and harbor.

  [580] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 44-46; Diodor. xv, 70.

  [581] Xen. Hellen, vii, 3, 8.

During the height of Euphron’s power at Sikyon, the neighboring city
of Phlius was severely pressed. The Phliasians had remained steadily
attached to Sparta throughout all her misfortunes; notwithstanding
incessant hostilities from Argos, Arcadia, Pellênê, and Sikyon, which
destroyed their crops and inflicted upon them serious hardships. I
have already recounted, that in the year 369 B.C., a little before
the line of Oneium was forced by Epaminondas, the town of Phlius,
having been surprised by its own exiles with the aid of Eleians
and Arcadians, had only been saved by the desperate bravery and
resistance of its citizens.[582] In the ensuing year, 368 B.C.,
the Argeian and Arcadian force again ravaged the Phliasian plain,
doing great damage; yet not without some loss to themselves in their
departure, from the attack of the chosen Phliasian hoplites and of
some Athenian horsemen from Corinth.[583] In the ensuing year 367
B.C., a second invasion of the Phliasian territory was attempted by
Euphron, with his own mercenaries to the number of two thousand,—the
armed force of Sikyon and Pellênê,—and the Theban harmost and
garrison from the acropolis of Sikyon. On arriving near Phlius, the
Sikyonians and Pellenians were posted near the gate of the city which
looked towards Corinth, in order to resist any sally from within;
while the remaining invaders made a circuit round, over an elevated
line of ground called the _Trikaranum_ (which had been fortified
by the Argeians and was held by their garrison), to approach and
ravage the Phliasian plain. But the Phliasian cavalry and hoplites
so bravely resisted them, as to prevent them from spreading over the
plain to do damage, until at the end of the day they retreated to
rejoin the Sikyonians and Pellenians. From these last, however, they
happened to be separated by a ravine which forced them to take a
long circuit; while the Phliasians, passing by a shorter road close
under their own walls, were beforehand in reaching the Sikyonians
and Pellenians, whom they vigorously attacked and defeated with
loss. Euphron with his mercenaries, and the Theban division, arrived
too late to prevent the calamity, which they made no effort to
repair.[584]

  [582] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 6-9.

  [583] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 10.

  [584] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 11-15.

An eminent Pellenian citizen, named Proxenus having been here made
prisoner, the Phliasians, in spite of all their sufferings, released
him without ransom. This act of generosity—coupled with the loss
sustained by the Pellenians in the recent engagement, as well as
with the recent oligarchical counter-revolutions which had disjoined
the other Achæan cities from Thebes—altered the politics of Pellênê,
bringing about a peace between that city and Phlius.[585] Such
an accession afforded sensible relief,—it might almost be said,
salvation,—to the Phliasians, in the midst of cruel impoverishment;
since even their necessary subsistence, except what was obtained by
marauding excursions from the enemy, being derived by purchase from
Corinth, was found difficult to pay for, and still more difficult
to bring home, in the face of an enemy. They were now enabled, by
the aid of the Athenian general Charês and his mercenary troops from
Corinth, to escort their families and their non-military population
to Pellênê, where a kindly shelter was provided by the citizens. The
military Phliasians, while escorting back a stock of supplies to
Phlius, broke through and defeated an ambuscade of the enemy in their
way; and afterwards, in conjunction with Charês, surprised the fort
of Thyamia, which the Sikyonians were fortifying as an aggressive
post on their borders. The fort became not only a defence for Phlius,
but a means of aggression against the enemy, affording also great
facility for the introduction of provisions from Corinth.[586]

  [585] This change of politics at Pellênê is not mentioned by
  Xenophon, at the time, though it is noticed afterwards (vii,
  4, 17) as a fact accomplished; but we must suppose it to have
  occurred now, in order to reconcile sections 11-14 with sections
  18-20 of vii, 2.

  The strong Laconian partialities of Xenophon induce him to allot
  not only warm admiration, but a space disproportionate compared
  with other parts of his history, to the exploits of the brave
  little Phliasian community. Unfortunately, here, as elsewhere,
  he is obscure in the description of particular events, and still
  more perplexing when we try to draw from him a clear idea of the
  general series.

  With all the defects and partiality of Xenophon’s narrative,
  however, we must recollect that it is a description of real
  events by a contemporary author who had reasonable means of
  information. This is a precious ingredient, which gives value to
  all that he says; inasmuch as we are so constantly obliged to
  borrow our knowledge of Grecian history either from authors who
  write at second-hand and after the time,—or from orators whose
  purposes are usually different from those of the historian. Hence
  I have given a short abridgment of these Phliasian events as
  described by Xenophon, though they were too slight to exercise
  influence on the main course of the war.

  [586] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 18-23.

Another cause, both of these successes and of general relief to
the Phliasians, arose out of the distracted state of affairs in
Sikyon. So intolerable had the tyranny of Euphron become, that the
Arcadians, who had helped to raise him up, became disgusted. Æneas of
Stymphalus, general of the collective Arcadian force, marched with a
body of troops to Sikyon, joined the Theban harmost in the Acropolis,
and there summoned the Sikyonian _notables_ to an assembly. Under
his protection, the intense sentiment against Euphron was freely
manifested, and it was resolved to recall the numerous exiles, whom
he had banished without either trial or public sentence. Dreading
the wrath of these numerous and bitter enemies, Euphron thought
it prudent to retire with his mercenaries to the harbor; where he
invited Pasimêlus the Lacedæmonian to come, with a portion of the
garrison of Corinth, and immediately declared himself an open
partisan of Sparta. The harbor, a separate town and fortification at
some little distance from the city (as Lechæum was from Corinth),
was thus held by and for the Spartans; while Sikyon adhered to the
Thebans and Arcadians. In Sikyon itself however, though evacuated
by Euphron, there still remained violent dissensions. The returning
exiles were probably bitter in reactionary measures; the humbler
citizens were fearful of losing their newly-acquired political
privileges; and the liberated slaves, yet more fearful of forfeiting
that freedom, which the recent revolution had conferred upon them.

Hence Euphron still retained so many partisans, that having procured
from Athens a reinforcement of mercenary troops, he was enabled to
return to Sikyon, and again to establish himself as master of the
town in conjunction with the popular party. But as his opponents,
the principal men in the place, found shelter along with the
Theban garrison in the acropolis, which he vainly tried to take
by assault,[587]—his possession even of the town was altogether
precarious, until such formidable neighbors could be removed.
Accordingly he resolved to visit Thebes, in hopes of obtaining from
the authorities an order for expelling his opponents and handing over
Sikyon a second time to his rule. On what grounds, after so recent
a defection to the Spartans, he rested his hopes of success, we do
not know; except that he took with him a large sum of money for the
purpose of bribery.[588] His Sikyonian opponents, alarmed lest he
should really carry his point, followed him to Thebes, where their
alarm was still farther increased by seeing him in familiar converse
with the magistrates. Under the first impulse of terror and despair,
they assassinated Euphron in broad daylight,—on the Kadmeia, and even
before the doors of the Theban Senate-house, wherein both magistrates
and Senate were sitting.

  [587] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 9.

  [588] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 4-6.

For an act of violence thus patent, they were of course seized
forthwith, and put upon their trial, before the Senate. The
magistrates invoked upon their heads the extreme penalty of death,
insisting upon the enormity and even impudence of the outrage,
committed almost under the eyes of the authorities,—as well as upon
the sacred duty of vindicating not merely the majesty, but even the
security of the city, by exemplary punishment upon offenders who had
despised its laws. How many in number were the persons implicated,
we do not know. All, except one, denied actual hand-participation;
but that one avowed it frankly, and stood up to justify it before the
Theban Senate. He spoke in substance nearly as follows,—taking up the
language of the accusing magistrates:—

“Despise you I cannot, men of Thebes; for you are masters of my
person and life. It was on other grounds of confidence that I slew
this man: first, I had the conviction of acting justly; next, I
trusted in your righteous judgment. I knew that _you_ did not wait
for trial and sentence to slay Archias and Hypatês,[589] whom you
caught after a career similar to that of Euphron,—but punished them
at the earliest practicable opportunity, under the conviction that
men manifest in sacrilege, treason, and despotism, were already
under sentence by all men. Well! and was not Euphron, too, guilty
of all these crimes? Did not he find the temples full of gold and
silver offerings, and strip them until they were empty? How can
there be a traitor more palpable than the man, who, favored and
upheld by Sparta, first betrayed her to you; and then again, after
having received every mark of confidence from you, betrayed you to
her,—handing over the harbor of Sikyon to your enemies? Was not he
a despot without reserve, the man who exalted slaves, not only into
freemen, but into citizens? the man who despoiled, banished, or slew,
not criminals, but all whom he chose, and most of all, the chief
citizens? And now, after having vainly attempted, in conjunction
with your enemies the Athenians, to expel your harmost by force from
Sikyon, he has collected a great stock of money, and come hither to
turn it to account. Had he assembled arms and soldiers against you,
you would have thanked me for killing him. How then can you punish me
for giving him his due, when he has come with money to corrupt you,
and to purchase from you again the mastery of Sikyon, to your own
disgrace as well as mischief? Had he been my enemy and your friend,
I should undoubtedly have done wrong to kill him in your city; but
as he is a traitor, playing you false, how is he more my enemy
than yours? I shall be told that he came hither of his own accord,
confiding in the laws of the city. Well! you would have thanked me
for killing him anywhere out of Thebes; why not _in_ Thebes also,
when he has come hither only for the purpose of doing you new wrong
in addition to the past? Where among Greeks has impunity ever been
assured to traitors, deserters, or despots? Recollect, that you have
passed a vote that exiles from any one of your allied cities might
be seized as outlaws in any other. Now Euphron is a condemned exile,
who has ventured to come back to Sikyon without any vote of the
general body of allies. How can any one affirm that he has not justly
incurred death? I tell you in conclusion, men of Thebes,—if you put
me to death, you will have made yourselves the avengers of your very
worst enemy,—if you adjudge me to have done right, you will manifest
yourselves publicly as just avengers, both on your own behalf and on
that of your whole body of allies.”[590]

  [589] This refers to the secret expedition of Pelopidas and the
  six other Theban conspirators from Athens to Thebes, at the time
  when the Lacedæmonians were masters of that town and garrisoned
  the Kadmeia. The conspirators, through the contrivance of the
  secretary Phyllidas, got access in disguise to the oligarchical
  leaders of Thebes, who were governing under Lacedæmonian
  ascendency, and put them to death. This event is described in a
  former chapter, Ch. lxxvii, p. 85 _seq._

  [590] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 7-11.

  To the killing of Euphron, followed by a defence so
  characteristic and emphatic on the part of the agent,—Schneider
  and others refer, with great probability, the allusion in
  the Rhetoric of Aristotle (ii, 24, 2)—καὶ περὶ τοῦ Θήβῃσιν
  ἀποθανόντος, περὶ οὗ ἐκέλευε κρῖναι, εἰ δίκαιος ἦν ἀποθανεῖν ὡς
  οὐκ ἄδικον ὂν ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν δικαίως ἀποθανόντα.

This impressive discourse induced the Theban Senate to pronounce
that Euphron had met with his due. It probably came from one of the
principal citizens of Sikyon, among whom were most of the enemies
as well as the victims of the deceased despot. It appeals, in a
characteristic manner, to that portion of Grecian morality which bore
upon men, who by their very crimes procured for themselves the means
of impunity; against whom there was no legal force to protect others,
and who were therefore considered as not being entitled to protection
themselves, if the daggers of others could ever be made to reach
them. The tyrannicide appeals to this sentiment with confidence, as
diffused throughout all the free Grecian cities. It found responsive
assent in the Theban Senate, and would probably have found the like
assent, if set forth with equal emphasis, in most Grecian senates or
assemblies elsewhere.

Very different, however, was the sentiment in Sikyon. The body
of Euphron was carried thither, and enjoyed the distinguished
preëminence of being buried in the market-place.[591] There, along
with his tomb, a chapel was erected, in which he was worshipped
as Archêgetês, or Patron-hero and Second Founder, of the city.
He received the same honors as had been paid to Brasidas at
Amphipolis. The humbler citizens and the slaves, upon whom he had
conferred liberty and political franchise,—or at least the name of
a political franchise,—remembered him with grateful admiration as
their benefactor, forgetting or excusing the atrocities which he
had wreaked upon their political opponents. Such is the retributive
Nemesis which always menaces, and sometimes overtakes, an oligarchy
who keep the mass of the citizens excluded from political privileges.
A situation is thus created, enabling some ambitious and energetic
citizen to confer favors and earn popularity among the many, and thus
to acquire power, which, whether employed or not for the benefit
of the many, goes along with their antipathies when it humbles or
crushes the previously monopolizing few.

  [591] Xen. Hellen. vii, 3, 12.

We may presume from these statements that the government of Sikyon
became democratical. But the provoking brevity of Xenophon does
not inform us of the subsequent arrangements made with the Theban
harmost in the acropolis,—nor how the intestine dissensions, between
the democracy in the town and the refugees in the citadel, were
composed,—nor what became of those citizens who slew Euphron. We
learn only that not long afterwards, the harbor of Sikyon, which
Euphron had held in conjunction with the Lacedæmonians and Athenians,
was left imperfectly defended by the recall of the latter to Athens;
and that it was accordingly retaken by the forces from the town,
aided by the Arcadians.[592]

  [592] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1.

It appears that these proceedings of Euphron (from his first
proclamation of the democracy at Sikyon and real acquisition of
despotism to himself, down to his death and the recovery of the
harbor) took place throughout the year 367 B.C. and the earlier half
of 366 B.C. No such enemy, probably, would have arisen to embarrass
Thebes, unless the policy recommended by Epaminondas in Achaia had
been reversed, and unless he himself had fallen under the displeasure
of his countrymen. His influence too was probably impaired, and the
policy of Thebes affected for the worse, by the accidental absence
of his friend Pelopidas, who was then on his mission to the Persian
court at Susa. Such a journey and return, with the transaction of the
business in hand, must have occupied the greater part of the year 367
B.C., being terminated probably by the return of the envoys in the
beginning of 366 B.C.

The leading Thebans had been alarmed by the language of
Philiskus,—who had come over a few months before as envoy from the
satrap Ariobarzanes and had threatened to employ Asiatic money in
the interest of Athens and Sparta against Thebes, though his threats
seem never to have been realized, as well as by the presence of the
Lacedæmonian Euthyklês (after the failure of Antalkidas[593]) at the
Persian court, soliciting aid. Moreover Thebes had now pretensions to
the headship of Greece, at least as good as either of her two rivals;
while since the fatal example set by Sparta at the peace called by
the name of Antalkidas in 387 B.C., and copied by Athens after the
battle of Leuktra in 371 B.C.,—it had become a sort of recognized
fashion that the leading Grecian state should sue out its title
from the terror-striking rescript of the Great King, and proclaim
itself as enforcing terms which he had dictated. On this ground of
borrowed elevation Thebes now sought to place herself. There was in
her case a peculiar reason which might partly excuse the value set
upon it by her leaders. It had been almost the capital act of her
policy to establish the two new cities, Megalopolis and Messênê. The
vitality and chance for duration, of both,—especially that of the
latter, which had the inextinguishable hostility of Sparta to contend
with,—would be materially improved, in the existing state of the
Greek mind, if they were recognized as autonomous under a Persian
rescript. To attain this object,[594] Pelopidas and Ismenias now
proceeded as envoys to Susa; doubtless under a formal vote of the
allied synod, since the Arcadian Antiochus, a celebrated pankratiast,
the Eleian Archidamus, and a citizen from Argos, accompanied them.
Informed of the proceeding, the Athenians also sent Timagoras and
Leon to Susa; and we read with some surprise that these hostile
envoys all went up thither in the same company.[595]

  [593] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

  [594] It is plain that Messênê was the great purpose with
  Pelopidas in his mission to the Persian court; we see this not
  only from Cornelius Nepos (Pelop. c. 4) and Diodorus (xv, 81),
  but also even from Xenophon, Hellen. vii, 1, 36.

  [595] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33-38; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30;
  Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

  The words of Xenophon ἠκολούθει δὲ καὶ Ἀργεῖος must allude to
  some Argeian envoy; though the name is not mentioned, and must
  probably have dropped out,—or perhaps the word τις, as Xenophon
  may not have heard the name.

  It would appear that in the mission which Pharnabazus conducted
  up to the Persian court (or at least undertook to conduct) in 408
  B.C., envoys from hostile Greek cities were included in the same
  company (Xen. Hellen. i, 3, 13), as on the present occasion.

Pelopidas, though he declined to perform the usual ceremony of
prostration,[596] was favorably received by the Persian court.
Xenophon,—who recounts the whole proceeding in a manner unfairly
invidious towards the Thebans, forgetting that they were now only
copying the example of Sparta in courting Persian aid,—affirms that
his application was greatly furthered by the recollection of the
ancient alliance of Thebes with Xerxes, against Athens and Sparta,
at the time of the battle of Platæa; and by the fact that Thebes had
not only refused to second, but had actually discountenanced, the
expedition of Agesilaus against Asia. We may perhaps doubt, whether
this plea counted for much; or the straightforward eloquence of
Pelopidas, so much extolled by Plutarch,[597] which could only reach
Persian ears through an interpreter. But the main fact for the Great
King to know was, that the Thebans had been victorious at Leuktra;
that they had subsequently trodden down still farther the glory
of Sparta, by carrying their arms over Laconia, and emancipating
the conquered half of the country; that when they were no longer
in Peloponnesus, their allies the Arcadians and Argeians had been
shamefully defeated by the Lacedæmonians (in the Tearless Battle).
Such boasts on the part of Pelopidas,—confirmed as matters of fact
even by the Athenian Timagoras,—would convince the Persian ministers
that it was their interest to exercise ascendency over Greece through
Thebes in preference to Sparta. Accordingly Pelopidas being asked
by the Great King what sort of rescript he wished, obtained his own
terms. Messênê was declared autonomous and independent of Sparta:
Amphipolis also was pronounced to be a free and autonomous city: the
Athenians were directed to order home and lay up their ships of war
now in active service, on pain of Persian intervention against them,
in case of disobedience. Moreover Thebes was declared the head city
of Greece, and any city refusing to follow her headship was menaced
with instant compulsion by Persian force.[598] In reference to the
points in dispute between Elis and Arcadia (the former claiming
sovereignty over Triphylia, which professed itself Arcadian and had
been admitted into the Arcadian communion), the rescript pronounced
in favor of the Eleians;[599] probably at the instance of Pelopidas,
since there now subsisted much coldness between the Thebans and
Arcadians.

  [596] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

  His colleague Ismenias, however, is said to have dropped his
  ring, and then to have stooped to pick it up, immediately before
  the king; thus going through the prostration.

  [597] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30.

  [598] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 36. Ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ
  βασιλέως ὁ Πελοπίδας τί βούλοιτο ἑαυτῷ γραφῆναι, εἶπεν ὅτι
  Μεσσήνην τε αὐτόνομον εἶναι ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ Ἀθηναίους
  ἀνέλκειν τὰς ναῦς: εἰ δὲ ταῦτα μὴ πείθοιντο, στρατεύειν ἐπ’
  αὐτούς· ~εἴ τις δὲ πόλις μὴ ἐθέλοι ἀκολουθεῖν~, ἐπὶ ταύτην πρῶτον
  ἰέναι.

  It is clear that these are not the exact words of the rescript of
  367 B.C., though in the former case of the peace of Antalkidas
  (387 B.C.) Xenophon seems to have given the rescript in its
  exact words (v, 1, 31).

  What he states afterwards (vii, 1, 38) about Elis and Arcadia
  proves that other matters were included. Accordingly I do not
  hesitate to believe that Amphipolis also was recognized as
  autonomous. This we read in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 383,
  c. 42. Καὶ γάρ τοι πρῶτον μὲν Ἀμφίπολιν πόλιν ἡμετέραν δούλην
  κατέστησεν (the king of Persia), ~ἣν τότε σύμμαχον αὐτῷ καὶ
  φίλην~ ἔγραψεν. Demosthenes is here alluding to the effect
  produced on the mind of the Great King, and to the alteration in
  his proceedings, when he learnt that Timagoras had been put to
  death on returning to Athens; the adverb of time τότε alludes to
  the rescript given when Timagoras was present.

  In the words of Xenophon,—εἴ τις δὲ πόλις μὴ ἐθέλοι
  ~ἀκολουθεῖν~,—the headship of Thebes is declared or implied.
  Compare the convention imposed by Sparta upon Olynthus, after the
  latter was subdued (v, 3, 26.)

  [599] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38. Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων πρέσβεων ὁ μὲν Ἠλεῖος
  Ἀρχίδαμος, ὅτι ~προὐτίμησε τὴν Ἦλιν πρὸ τῶν Ἀρκάδων~, ἐπήνει τὰ
  τοῦ βασιλέως· ὁ δ’ Ἀντίοχος, ὅτι ~ἠλαττοῦτο τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν~, οὔτε
  τὰ δῶρα ἐδέξατο, etc.

Leon the Athenian protested against the Persian rescript, observing
aloud when he heard it read,—“By Zeus, Athenians, I think it is time
for you to look out for some other friend than the Great King.”
This remark, made in the King’s hearing and interpreted to him,
produced the following addition to the rescript: “If the Athenians
have anything juster to propose, let them come to the King and
inform him.” So vague a modification, however, did little to appease
the murmurs of the Athenians. On the return of their two envoys to
Athens, Leon accused his colleague Timagoras of having not only
declined to associate with him during the journey, but also of having
lent himself to the purposes of Pelopidas, of being implicated in
treasonable promises, and of receiving large bribes from the Persian
King. On these charges Timagoras was condemned and executed.[600]
The Arcadian envoy Antiochus was equally indignant at the rescript;
refusing even to receive such presents of formal courtesy as were
tendered to all, and accepted by Pelopidas himself, who however
strictly declined everything beyond. The conduct of this eminent
Theban thus exhibited a strong contrast with the large acquisitions
of the Athenian Timagoras.[601] Antiochus, on returning to Arcadia,
made report of his mission to the Pan-Arcadian synod, called the Ten
Thousand, at Megalopolis. He spoke in the most contemptuous terms
of all that he had seen at the Persian court. There were (he said)
plenty of bakers, cooks, wine-pourers, porters, etc., but as for men
competent to fight against Greeks, though he looked out for them with
care, he could see none; and even the vaunted golden plane-tree was
not large enough to furnish shade for a grasshopper.[602]

  [600] Demosthen. Fals. Leg. c. 42, p. 383.

  In another passage of the same oration (c. 57, p. 400),
  Demosthenes says that Leon had been joint envoy with Timagoras
  _for four years_. Certainly this mission of Pelopidas to the
  Persian court cannot have lasted four years; and Xenophon states
  that the Athenians sent the two envoys when they heard that
  Pelopidas was going thither. I imagine that Leon and Timagoras
  may have been sent up to the Persian court shortly after the
  battle of Leuktra, at the time when the Athenians caused the
  former rescript of the Persian king to be resworn, putting Athens
  as head into the place of Sparta (Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 1, 2).
  This was exactly four years before (371-367 B.C.). Leon and
  Timagoras having jointly undertaken and perhaps recently returned
  from their first embassy, were now sent _jointly_ on a second.
  Demosthenes has summed up the time of the two as if it were one.

  [601] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 30.

  Demosthenes speaks of the amount received, in money, by Timagoras
  from the Persian king as having been forty talents, ὡς λέγεται
  (Fals. Leg. p. 383), besides other presents and conveniences.
  Compare also Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 22.

  [602] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38.

On the other hand, the Eleian envoy returned with feelings of
satisfaction, and the Thebans with triumph. Deputies from each of
their allied cities were invited to Thebes, to hear the Persian
rescript. It was produced by a native Persian, their official
companion from Susa,—the first Persian probably ever seen in Thebes
since the times immediately preceding the battle of Platæa,—who,
after exhibiting publicly the regal seal, read the document aloud;
as the satrap Tiribazus had done on the occasion of the peace of
Antalkidas.[603]

  [603] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 30.

But though the Theban leaders thus closely copied the conduct of
Sparta both as to means and as to end, they by no means found the
like ready acquiescence, when they called on the deputies present
to take an oath to the rescript, to the Great King, and to Thebes.
All replied that they had come with instructions, authorizing them
to hear and report, but no more; and that acceptance or rejection
must be decided in their respective cities. Nor was this the worst.
Lykomedes and the other deputies from Arcadia, already jealous of
Thebes, and doubtless farther alienated by the angry report of their
envoy Antiochus, went yet farther, and entered a general protest
against the headship of Thebes; affirming that the synod ought not
to be held constantly in that city, but in the seat of war, wherever
that might be. Incensed at such language, the Thebans accused
Lykomedes of violating the cardinal principle of the confederacy;
upon which he and his Arcadian comrades forthwith retired and went
home, declaring that they would no longer sit in the synod. The other
deputies appear to have followed his example. Indeed, as they had
refused to take the oath submitted to them, the special purpose of
the synod was defeated.

Having thus failed in carrying their point with the allies
collectively, the Thebans resolved to try the efficacy of
applications individually. They accordingly despatched envoys, with
the Persian rescript in hand, to visit the cities successively,
calling upon each for acceptance with an oath of adhesion. Each
city separately (they thought) would be afraid to refuse, under
peril of united hostility from the Great King and from Thebes. So
confident were they in the terrors of the king’s name and seal, that
they addressed this appeal not merely to the cities in alliance
with them, but even to several among their enemies. Their envoys
first set forth the proposition at Corinth; a city, not only at
variance with them, but even serving as a centre of operation for
the Athenian and Lacedæmonian forces to guard the line of Oneium,
and prevent the entrance of a Theban army into Peloponnesus. But the
Corinthians rejected the proposition altogether, declining formally
to bind themselves by any common oaths towards the Persian king.
The like refusal was experienced by the envoys as they passed on to
Peloponnesus, if not from all the cities visited, at least from so
large a proportion, that the mission was completely frustrated. And
thus the rescript, which Thebes had been at such pains to procure,
was found practically inoperative in confirming or enforcing her
headship;[604] though doubtless the mere fact, that it comprised and
recognized Messênê, contributed to strengthen the vitality, and exalt
the dignity, of that new-born city.

  [604] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 40. Καὶ αὐτὴ μὲν ἡ Πελοπίδου καὶ τῶν
  Θηβαίων τῆς ἀρχῆς περιβολὴ οὕτω διελύθη.

In their efforts to make the Persian rescript available towards
the recognition of their headship throughout Greece, the Thebans
would naturally visit Thessaly and the northern districts as well
as Peloponnesus. It appears that Pelopidas and Ismenias themselves
undertook this mission; and that in the execution of it they were
seized and detained as prisoners by Alexander of Pheræ. That despot
seems to have come to meet them, under pacific appearances, at
Pharsalus. They indulged hopes of prevailing on him as well as the
other Thessalians to accept the Persian rescript; for we see by the
example of Corinth, that they had tried their powers of persuasion
on enemies as well as friends. But the Corinthians, while refusing
the application, had nevertheless respected the public morality held
sacred even between enemies in Greece, and had dismissed the envoys
(whether Pelopidas was among them, we cannot assert) inviolate. Not
so the tyrant of Pheræ. Perceiving that Pelopidas and Ismenias were
unaccompanied by any military force, he seized their persons, and
carried them off to Pheræ as prisoners.

Treacherous as this proceeding was, it proved highly profitable
to Alexander. Such was the personal importance of Pelopidas, that
his imprisonment struck terror among the partisans of Thebes in
Thessaly, and induced several of them to submit to the despot of
Pheræ; who moreover sent to apprise the Athenians of his capture,
and to solicit their aid against the impending vengeance of Thebes.
Greatly impressed with the news, the Athenians looked upon Alexander
as a second Jason, likely to arrest the menacing ascendency of their
neighbor and rival.[605] They immediately despatched to his aid
thirty triremes and one thousand hoplites under Autoklês; who, unable
to get through the Euripus, when Bœotia and Eubœa were both hostile
to Athens, were forced to circumnavigate the latter island. He
reached Pheræ just in time; for the Thebans, incensed beyond measure
at the seizure of Pelopidas, had despatched without delay eight
thousand hoplites and six hundred cavalry to recover or avenge him.
Unfortunately for them, Epaminondas had not been rechosen commander
since his last year’s proceedings in Achaia. He was now serving as an
hoplite in the ranks, while Kleomenes with other Bœotarchs had the
command. On entering Thessaly, they were joined by various allies
in the country. But the army of Alexander, aided by the Athenians,
and placed under the command of Autoklês, was found exceedingly
formidable, especially in cavalry. The Thessalian allies of Thebes,
acting with their habitual treachery, deserted in the hour of danger;
and the enterprise, thus difficult and perilous, was rendered
impracticable by the incompetence of the Bœotarchs. Unable to make
head against Alexander and the Athenians, they were forced to retreat
homeward. But their generalship was so unskilful, and the enemy’s
cavalry so active, that the whole army was in imminent danger of
being starved or destroyed. Nothing saved them now, but the presence
of Epaminondas as a common soldier in the ranks. Indignant as well
as dismayed, the whole army united to depose their generals, and
with one voice called upon him to extricate them from their perils.
Epaminondas accepted the duty,—marshalled the retreat in consummate
order,—took for himself the command of the rear-guard, beating off
all the attacks of the enemy,—and conducted the army safely back to
Thebes.[606]

  [605] The strong expressions of Demosthenes show what a
  remarkable effect was produced by the news at Athens (cont.
  Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 142).

  Τί δ’; Ἀλέξανδρον ἐκεῖνον τὸν Θετταλὸν, ἡνίκ’ εἶχε μὲν αἰχμάλωτον
  δήσας Πελοπίδαν, ἐχθρὸς δ’ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἦν Θηβαίοις, ὑμῖν δ’ οἰκείως
  διέκειτο, οὕτως ὥστε παρ’ ὑμῶν στρατηγὸν αἰτεῖν, ἐβοηθεῖτε δ’
  αὐτῷ καὶ πάντ’ ἦν Ἀλέξανδρος, etc.

  Alexander is said to have promised to the Athenians so ample a
  supply of cattle as should keep the price of meat very low at
  Athens (Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 193 E.)

  [606] Diodor. xv, 71; Plutarch, Pelop. c. 28; Pausanias ix, 15, 1.

This memorable exploit, while it disgraced the unsuccessful
Bœotarchs, who were condemned to fine and deposition from their
office, raised higher than ever the reputation of Epaminondas among
his countrymen. But the failure of the expedition was for the time a
fatal blow to the influence of Thebes in Thessaly; where Alexander
now reigned victorious and irresistible, with Pelopidas still in
his dungeon. The cruelties and oppressions, at all times habitual
to the despot of Pheræ, were pushed to an excess beyond all former
parallel. Besides other brutal deeds of which we read with horror, he
is said to have surrounded by his military force the unarmed citizens
of Melibœa and Skotussa, and slaughtered them all in mass. In such
hands, the life of Pelopidas hung by a thread; yet he himself, with
that personal courage which never forsook him, held the language of
unsubdued defiance and provocation against the tyrant. Great sympathy
was manifested by many Thessalians, and even by Thêbê the wife of
Alexander, for so illustrious a prisoner; and Alexander, fearful
of incurring the implacable enmity of Thebes, was induced to spare
his life, though retaining him as a prisoner. His confinement, too,
appears to have lasted some time before the Thebans, discouraged
by their late ill-success, were prepared to undertake a second
expedition.

At length they sent a force for the purpose; which was placed, on
this occasion, under the command of Epaminondas. The renown of his
name rallied many adherents in the country; and his prudence, no less
than his military skill, was conspicuously exhibited, in defeating
and intimidating Alexander, yet without reducing him to such despair
as might prove fatal to the prisoner. The despot was at length
compelled to send an embassy excusing his recent violence, offering
to restore Pelopidas, and soliciting to be admitted to peace and
alliance with Thebes. But Epaminondas would grant nothing more than
a temporary truce,[607] coupled with the engagement of evacuating
Thessaly; while he required in exchange the release of Pelopidas
and Ismenias. His terms were acceded to, so that he had the delight
of conveying his liberated friend in safety to Thebes. Though this
primary object was thus effected, however, it is plain that he did
not restore Thebes to the same influence in Thessaly which she had
enjoyed prior to the seizure of Pelopidas.[608] That event with
its consequences still remained a blow to Thebes and a profit to
Alexander; who again became master of all or most part of Thessaly,
together with the Magnêtes, the Phthiot Achæans, and other tributary
nations dependent on Thessaly—maintaining unimpaired his influence
and connection at Athens.[609]

  [607] Plutarch (Pelopidas, c. 29) says, a truce for thirty days;
  but it is difficult to believe that Alexander would have been
  satisfied with a term so very short.

  [608] The account of the seizure of Pelopidas by Alexander,
  with its consequences, is contained chiefly in Diodorus, xv,
  71-75; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 27-29; Cornel. Nep. Pelop. c. 5;
  Pausanias, ix, 15, 1. Xenophon does not mention it.

  I have placed the seizure in the year 366 B.C., after the return
  of Pelopidas from his embassy in Persia; which embassy I agree
  with Mr. Fynes Clinton in referring to the year 367 B.C. Plutarch
  places the seizure before the embassy; Diodorus places it in the
  year between Midsummer 368 and Midsummer 367 B.C.; but he does
  not mention the embassy at all, in its regular chronological
  order; he only alludes to it in summing up the exploits at the
  close of the career of Pelopidas.

  Assuming the embassy to the Persian court to have occurred in 367
  B.C., the seizure cannot well have happened before that time.

  The year 368 B.C. seems to have been that wherein Pelopidas
  made his second expedition into Thessaly, from which he returned
  victorious, bringing back the hostages. See above, p. 264, note.

  The seizure of Pelopidas was accomplished at a time when
  Epaminondas was not Bœotarch, nor in command of the Theban army.
  Now it seems to have been not until the close of 367 B.C., after
  the accusations arising out of his proceedings in Achaia, that
  Epaminondas missed being rechosen as general.

  Xenophon, in describing the embassy of Pelopidas to Persia,
  mentions his grounds for expecting a favorable reception, and
  the matters which he had to boast of (Hell. vii, 1, 35). Now if
  Pelopidas, immediately before, had been seized and detained for
  some months in prison by Alexander of Pheræ, surely Xenophon
  would have alluded to it as an item on the other side. I know
  that this inference from the silence of Xenophon is not always to
  be trusted. But in this case, we must recollect that he dislikes
  both the Theban leaders; and we may fairly conclude, that where
  he is enumerating the trophies of Pelopidas, he would hardly
  have failed to mention a signal disgrace, if there had been one,
  immediately preceding.

  Pelopidas was taken prisoner by Alexander, not in battle, but
  when in pacific mission, and under circumstances in which
  no man less infamous than Alexander would have seized him
  (παρασπονδηθεὶς—Plutarch, Apoph. p. 194 D.; Pausan. ix, 15, 1;
  “legationis jure satis tectum se arbitraretur” Corn. Nep.). His
  imprudence in trusting himself under any circumstances to such
  a man as Alexander, is blamed by Polybius (viii, 1) and others.
  But we must suppose such imprudence to be partly justified or
  explained by some plausible circumstances; and the proclamation
  of the Persian rescript appears to me to present the most
  reasonable explanation of his proceeding.

  On these grounds, which, in my judgment, outweigh any
  probabilities on the contrary side, I have placed the seizure of
  Pelopidas in 366 B.C., after the embassy to Persia; not without
  feeling, however, that the chronology of this period cannot be
  rendered absolutely certain.

  [609] Plutarch. Pelopid c. 31-35.

While the Theban arms were thus losing ground in Thessaly, an
important point was gained in their favor on the other side of
Bœotia. Orôpus, on the north-eastern frontier of Attica adjoining
Bœotia, was captured and wrested from Athens by a party of exiles
who crossed over from Eretria in Eubœa, with the aid of Themison,
despot of the last-mentioned town. It had been more than once
lost and regained between Athens and Thebes; being seemingly in
its origin Bœotian, and never incorporated as a Deme or equal
constituent member of the Athenian commonwealth, but only recognized
as a dependency of Athens; though, as it was close on the frontier,
many of its inhabitants were also citizens of Athens, demots of
the neighboring Deme Græa.[610] So recently before as the period
immediately preceding the battle of Leuktra, angry remonstrances had
been exchanged between Athens and Thebes respecting a portion of
the Oropian territory. At that time, it appears, the Thebans were
forced to yield, and their partisans in Oropus were banished.[611]
It was these partisans who, through the aid of Themison and the
Eretrians, now effected their return, so as to repossess themselves
of Oropus, and doubtless to banish the principal citizens friendly to
Athens.[612] So great was the sensation produced among the Athenians,
that they not only marched with all their force to recover the place,
but also recalled their general, Chares, with that mercenary force
which he commanded in the territories of Corinth and Phlius. They
farther requested aid from the Corinthians and their other allies in
Peloponnesus. These allies did not obey the summons; but the Athenian
force alone would have sufficed to retake Oropus, had not the Thebans
occupied it so as to place it beyond their attack. Athens was obliged
to acquiesce in their occupation of it; though under protest, and
with the understanding that the disputed right should be referred to
impartial arbitration.[613]

  [610] See the instructive Inscription and comments published by
  Professor Ross, in which the Deme Γραῆς, near Oropus, was first
  distinctly made known (Ross, Die Demen von Attika, p. 6, 7—Halle,
  1846).

  [611] Isokrates, Orat. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 22-40.

  [612] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1; Diodor. xv, 76.

  The previous capture of Oropus, when Athens lost it in 411 B.C.,
  was accomplished under circumstances very analogous (Thucyd.
  viii, 60).

  [613] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 1; Diodor. xv, 76.

  Compare Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 259, s. 123; Æschines cont.
  Ktesiphont. p. 397, s. 85.

  It would seem that we are to refer to this loss of Oropus the
  trial of Chabrias and Kallistratus in Athens, together with
  the memorable harangue of the latter which Demosthenes heard
  as a youth with such strong admiration. But our information is
  so vague and scanty, that we can make out nothing certainly on
  the point. Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, p.
  109-114) brings together all the scattered testimonies in an
  instructive chapter.

This seizure of Oropus produced more than one material consequence.
Owing to the recall of Chares from Corinth, the harbor of Sikyon
could no longer be maintained against the Sikyonians in the town;
who, with the aid of the Arcadians, recaptured it, so that both
town and harbor again came into the league of Thebans and Arcadians.
Moreover, Athens became discontented with her Peloponnesian allies,
for having neglected her summons on the emergency at Oropus,
although Athenian troops had been constantly in service for the
protection of Peloponnesus against the Thebans. The growth of such
dispositions at Athens became known to the Mantinean Lykomedes;
the ablest and most ambitious leader in Arcadia, who was not only
jealous of the predominance of the Thebans, but had come to a formal
rupture with them at the synod held for the reception of the Persian
rescript.[614] Anxious to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes as well
as from Sparta, Lykomedes now took advantage of the discontent of
Athens to open negotiations with that city; persuading the majority
of the Arcadian Ten Thousand to send him thither as ambassador. There
was difficulty among the Athenians in entertaining his proposition,
from the alliance subsisting between them and Sparta. But they were
reminded, that to disengage the Arcadians from Thebes, was no less
in the interest of Sparta than of Athens; and a favorable answer was
then given to Lykomedes. The latter took ship at Peiræus for his
return, but never reached Arcadia; for he happened to land at the
spot where the Arcadian exiles of the opposite party were assembled,
and these men put him to death at once.[615] In spite of his death,
however, the alliance between Arcadia and Athens was still brought to
pass, though not without opposition.

  [614] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 39; vii, 4, 2.

  [615] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 3.

  Xenophon notices the singularity of the accident. There were
  plenty of vessels in Peiræus; Lykomedes had only to make his
  choice, and to determine where he would disembark. He fixed upon
  the exact spot where the exiles were assembled, not knowing that
  they were there—δαιμονιώτατα ἀποθνήσκει.

Thebes was during this year engaged in her unsuccessful campaign in
Thessaly (alluded to already) for the rescue of Pelopidas, which
disabled her from effective efforts in Peloponnesus. But as soon as
that rescue had been accomplished, Epaminondas, her greatest man, and
her only conspicuous orator, was despatched into Arcadia to offer,
in conjunction with an envoy from Argos, diplomatic obstruction to
the proposed Athenian alliance. He had to speak against Kallistratus,
the most distinguished orator at Athens, who had been sent by his
countrymen to plead their cause amidst the Arcadian Ten Thousand, and
who, among other arguments, denounced the enormities which darkened
the heroic legends both of Thebes and Argos. “Were not Orestes and
Alkmæon, both murderers of their mothers (asked Kallistratus),
natives of Argos? Was not Œdipus, who slew his father and married his
mother, a native of Thebes?”—“Yes (said Epaminondas, in his reply)
they were. But Kallistratus has forgotten to tell you, that these
persons, while they lived at home were innocent, or reputed to be so.
As soon as their crimes became known, Argos and Thebes banished them;
and then it was that Athens received them, stained with confessed
guilt.”[616] This clever retort told much to the credit of the
rhetorical skill of Epaminondas; but his speech as a whole, was not
successful. The Arcadians concluded alliance with Athens; yet without
formally renouncing friendship with Thebes.

  [616] Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 6: Plutarch, Repub. Ger.
  Præc. p. 810 F.; Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 193 D.

  Compare a similar reference, on the part of others, to the crimes
  embodied in Theban legend (Justin, ix, 3).

  Perhaps it may have been during this embassy into Peloponnesus,
  that Kallistratus addressed the discourse to the public assembly
  at Mêssenê, to which Aristotle makes allusion (Rhetoric, iii, 17,
  3); possibly enough, against Epaminondas also.

As soon as such new alliance had been ratified, it became important
to Athens to secure a free and assured entrance into Peloponnesus;
while at the same time the recent slackness of the Corinthians, in
regard to the summons to Oropus, rendered her mistrustful of their
fidelity. Accordingly it was resolved in the Athenian assembly, on
the motion of a citizen named Demotion, to seize and occupy Corinth;
there being already some scattered Athenian garrisons, on various
points of the Corinthian territory, ready to be concentrated and
rendered useful for such a purpose. A fleet and land-force under
Chares was made ready and despatched. But on reaching the Corinthian
port of Kenchreæ, Chares found himself shut out even from admittance.
The proposition of Demotion, and the resolution of the Athenians
had become known to the Corinthians; who forthwith stood upon their
guard, sent soldiers of their own to relieve the various Athenian
outposts on their territory, and called upon these latter to give
in any complaints for which they might have ground, as their
services were no longer needed. Chares pretended to have learnt that
Corinth was in danger. But both he and the remaining Athenians were
dismissed, though with every expression of thanks and politeness.[617]

  [617] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 4-6.

  The public debates of the Athenian assembly were not favorable to
  the success of a scheme, like that proposed by Demotion, to which
  secrecy was indispensable. Compare another scheme, divulged in
  like manner, in Thucydides, iii, 3.

The treacherous purpose of Athens was thus baffled, and the
Corinthians were for the moment safe. Yet their position was
precarious and uncomfortable; for their enemies, Thebes and Argos,
were already their masters by land, and Athens had now been converted
from an ally into an enemy. Hence they resolved to assemble a
sufficient mercenary force in their own pay;[618] but while thus
providing for military security, they sent envoys to Thebes to open
negotiations for peace. Permission was granted to them by the Thebans
to go and consult their allies, and to treat for peace in conjunction
with as many as could be brought to share their views. Accordingly
the Corinthians went to Sparta and laid their case before the full
synod of allies, convoked for the occasion. “We are on the point
of ruin (said the Corinthian envoy), and must make peace. We shall
rejoice to make it in conjunction with you, if you will consent; but
if you think proper to persevere in the war, be not displeased if we
make peace without you.” The Epidaurians and Phliasians, reduced to
the like distress, held the same language of weariness and impatience
for peace.[619]

  [618] It seems probable that these were the mercenaries placed by
  the Corinthians under the command of Timophanes, and employed by
  him afterwards as instruments for establishing a despotism.

  Plutarch (Timoleon, c. 3, 4) alludes briefly to mercenaries
  equipped about this time (as far as we can verify his chronology)
  and to the Corinthian mercenaries now assembled, in connection
  with Timoleon and Timophanes, of whom I shall have to say much in
  a future chapter.

  [619] Compare Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 8, 9 with Isokrates, Or. vi,
  (Archidamus), s. 106.

It had been ascertained at Thebes, that no propositions for peace
could be entertained, which did not contain a formal recognition of
the independence of Messênê. To this the Corinthians and other allies
of Sparta had no difficulty in agreeing. But they vainly endeavored
to prevail upon Sparta herself to submit to the same concession.
The Spartans resolutely refused to relinquish a territory inherited
from victorious forefathers, and held under so long a prescription.
They repudiated yet more indignantly the idea of recognizing as
free Greeks and equal neighbors, those who had so long been their
slaves; and they proclaimed their determination of continuing the
war, even single-handed and with all its hazards, to regain what they
had lost;[620] and although they could not directly prohibit the
Corinthians and other allies, whose sickness of the war had become
intolerable, from negotiating a separate peace for themselves,—yet
they gave only a reluctant consent. Archidamus son of Agesilaus even
reproached the allies with timorous selfishness, partly in deserting
their benefactress Sparta at her hour of need, partly in recommending
her to submit to a sacrifice ruinous to her honor.[621] The Spartan
prince conjured his countrymen, in the name of all their ancient
dignity, to spurn the mandates of Thebes; to shrink neither from
effort nor from peril for the reconquest of Messênê, even if they
had to fight alone against all Greece; and to convert their military
population into a permanent camp, sending away their women and
children to an asylum in friendly foreign cities.

  [620] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 9.

  [621] This sentiment of dissatisfaction against the allies is
  strongly and repeatedly set forth in the oration of Isokrates
  called Archidamus, composed as if to be spoken in this
  synod,—and good evidence (whether actually spoken or not) of
  the feelings animating the prince and a large party at Sparta.
  Archidamus treats those allies who recommended the Spartans to
  surrender Messênê, as worse enemies even than those who had
  broken off altogether. He specifies Corinthians, Phliasians,
  and Epidaurians, sect. 11-13,—εἰς τοῦτο δ’ ἥκουσι πλεονεξίας,
  καὶ τοσαύτην ἡμῶν κατεγνώκασιν ἀνανδρίαν, ὥστε πολλάκις ἡμᾶς
  ἀξιώσαντες ὑπὲρ τῆς αὑτῶν πολεμεῖν, ὑπὲρ Μεσσήνης οὐκ οἴονται
  δεῖν κινδυνεύειν· ἀλλ’ ἵν’ αὐτοὶ τὴν σφετέραν αὐτῶν ἀσφαλῶς
  καρπῶνται, πειρῶνται διδάσκειν ἡμᾶς ὡς χρὴ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς τῆς
  ἡμετέρας παραχωρῆσαι, καὶ πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπαπειλοῦσιν, ὡς, εἰ
  μὴ ταῦτα συγχωρήσομεν, ποιησόμενοι τὴν εἰρήνην κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτούς.
  Compare sect. 67, 87, 99, 105, 106, 123.

  We may infer from this discourse of Isokrates, that the
  displeasure of the Spartans against their allies, because the
  latter advised them to relinquish Messênê,—was much greater than
  the narrative of Xenophon (Hellen. vii, 4, 8-11) would lead us to
  believe.

  In the argument prefixed to the discourse, it is asserted (among
  various other inaccuracies), that the Spartans had sent to Thebes
  to ask for peace, and that the Thebans had said in reply,—peace
  would be granted, εἰ Μεσσήνην ἀνοικίσωσι καὶ αὐτόνομον ἐάσωσι.
  Now the Spartans had never sent to Thebes for this purpose; the
  Corinthians went to Thebes, and there learnt the peremptory
  condition requiring that Messênê should be recognized. Next, the
  Thebans would never require Sparta to recolonize or reconstitute
  (ἀνοικίσαι) Messênê; that had been already done by the Thebans
  themselves.

Though the Spartans were not inclined to adopt the desperate
suggestions of Archidamus, yet this important congress ended
by a scission between them and their allies. The Corinthians,
Phliasians, Epidaurians, and others, went to Thebes, and concluded
peace; recognizing the independence of Messênê, and affirming the
independence of each separate city within its own territory, without
either obligatory alliance, or headship on the part of any city. Yet
when the Thebans invited them to contract an alliance, they declined,
saying that this would be only embarking in war on the other side;
whereas that which they sighed for was peace. Peace was accordingly
sworn, upon the terms indicated in the Persian rescript, so far as
regarded the general autonomy of each separate town, and specially
that of Messênê; but not including any sanction, direct or indirect,
of Theban headship.[622]

  [622] Diodorus (xv, 76) states that the Persian king sent envoys
  to Greece who caused this peace to be concluded. But there seems
  no ground for believing that any Persian envoys had visited
  Greece since the return of Pelopidas, whose return with the
  rescript did in fact constitute a Persian intervention. The peace
  now concluded was upon the general basis of that rescript; so
  far, but no farther (as I conceive), the assertion of Diodorus
  about Persian intervention is exact.

This treaty removed out of the war, and placed in a position of
neutrality, a considerable number of Grecian states; chiefly those
near the Isthmus,—Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus; probably Trœzen and
Hermionê, since we do not find them again mentioned among the
contending parties. But it left the more powerful states, Thebes and
Argos,—Sparta and Athens,[623]—still at war; as well as Arcadia,
Achaia, and Elis. The relations between these states, however, were
now somewhat complicated; for Thebes was at war with Sparta, and in
alliance, though not altogether hearty alliance, with the Arcadians;
while Athens was at war with Thebes, yet in alliance with Sparta
as well as with Arcadia. The Argeians were in alliance with Thebes
and Arcadia, and at war with Sparta; the Eleians were on unfriendly
terms, though not yet at actual war, with Arcadia—yet still (it
would appear) in alliance with Thebes. Lastly, the Arcadians
themselves were losing their internal coöperation and harmony one
with another, which had only so recently begun. Two parties were
forming among them, under the old conflicting auspices of Mantinea
and Tegea. Tegea, occupied by a Theban harmost and garrison, held
strenuously with Megalopolis and Messênê as well as with Thebes, thus
constituting a strong and united frontier against Sparta.

  [623] Diodorus (xv, 76) is farther inaccurate in stating the
  peace as universally accepted, and as being a conclusion of the
  Bœotian and Lacedæmonian war, which had begun with the battle of
  Leuktra.

As the Spartans complained of their Peloponnesian allies, for urging
the recognition of Messênê as an independent state,—so they were
no less indignant with the Persian king; who, though still calling
himself their ally, had inserted the same recognition in the rescript
granted to Pelopidas.[624] The Athenians also were dissatisfied with
this rescript. They had (as has been already stated) condemned to
death Timagoras, one of their envoys who had accompanied Pelopidas,
for having received bribes. They now availed themselves of the
opening left for them in the very words of the rescript, to send a
fresh embassy up to the Persian court, and solicit more favorable
terms. Their new envoys, communicating the fact that Timagoras had
betrayed his trust and had been punished for it, obtained from the
Great King a fresh rescript, pronouncing Amphipolis to be an Athenian
possession instead of a free city.[625] Whether that other article
also in the former rescript, which commanded Athens to call in
all her armed ships, was now revoked, we cannot say; but it seems
probable.

  [624] Xenophon, Enc. Agesil. ii, 30. ἐνόμιζε—τῷ Πέρσῃ δίκην
  ἐπιθήσειν καὶ τῶν πρόσθεν, καὶ ὅτι νῦν, σύμμαχος εἶναι φάσκων,
  ἐπέταττε Μεσσήνην ἀφιέναι.

  [625] This second mission of the Athenians to the Persian court
  (pursuant to the invitation contained in the rescript given to
  Pelopidas, Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 37), appears to me implied in
  Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 384, s. 150, p. 420, s. 283; Or. De
  Halonneso, p. 84, s. 30.

  If the king of Persia was informed that Timagoras had been put
  to death by his countrymen on returning to Athens,—and if he
  sent down (κατέπεμψεν) a fresh rescript about Amphipolis,—this
  information can only have been communicated, and the new rescript
  only obtained, by a second embassy sent to him from Athens.

  Perhaps the Lacedæmonian Kallias may have accompanied this second
  Athenian mission to Susa; we hear of him as having come back with
  a friendly letter from the Persian king to Agesilaus (Xenophon,
  Enc. Ages. viii, 3; Plutarch, Apophth. Lacon. p. 1213 E.),
  brought by a Persian messenger. But the statement is too vague to
  enable us to verify this as the actual occasion.

At the same time that the Athenians sent this second embassy, they
also despatched an armament under Timotheus to the coast of Asia
Minor, yet with express instructions not to violate the peace with
the Persian king. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, went to the same
scene, though without any public force; availing himself only of
his long-established military reputation to promote the interests
of his country as negotiator. Both Spartan and Athenian attention
was now turned, directly and specially, towards Ariobarzanes the
satrap of Phrygia; who (as has been already related) had sent over to
Greece, two years before, Philiskus of Abydus, with the view either
of obtaining from the Thebans peace on terms favorable to Sparta,
or of aiding the latter against them.[626] Ariobarzanes was then
preparing, and apparently had since openly consummated, his revolt
from the Persian king, which Agesilaus employed all his influence in
fomenting. The Athenians, however, still wishing to avoid a distinct
breach with Persia, instructed Timotheus to assist Ariobarzanes,—yet
with a formal proviso, that he should not break truce with the Great
King. They also conferred both upon Ariobarzanes (with his three
sons), and upon Philiskus, the gift of Athenian citizenship.[627]
That satrap seems now to have had a large mercenary force, and to
have been in possession of both sides of the Hellespont, as well as
of Perinthus on the Propontis; while Philiskus, as his chief officer,
exercised extensive ascendency, disgraced by much tyranny and
brutality, over the Grecian cities in that region.

  [626] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 27.

  [627] Demosthen. De Rhodior. Libert. p. 193, s. 10, cont.
  Aristokrat. p. 666, s. 165; p. 687, s. 242.

Precluded by his instructions from openly aiding the revolted
Ariobarzanes, Timotheus turned his force against the island of Samos;
which was now held by Kyprothemis, a Grecian chief with a military
force in the service of Tigranes, Persian satrap on the opposite
mainland. How or when Tigranes had acquired it we do not know; but
the Persians, when once left by the peace of Antalkidas in quiet
possession of the continental Asiatic Greeks, naturally tended to
push their dominion over the neighboring islands. After carrying on
his military operations in Samos, with eight thousand peltasts and
thirty triremes, for ten or eleven months, Timotheus became master
of it. His success was the more gratifying, as he had found means
to pay and maintain his troops during the whole time at the cost
of enemies; without either drawing upon the Athenian treasury, or
extorting contributions from allies.[628] An important possession
was thus acquired for Athens, while a considerable number of Samians
of the opposite party went into banishment, with the loss of their
properties. Since Samos was not among the legitimate possessions
of the king of Persia, this conquest was not understood to import
war between him and Athens. Indeed it appears that the revolt of
Ariobarzanes, and the uncertain fidelity of various neighboring
satraps, shook for some time the king’s authority, and absorbed his
revenues in these regions. Autophradates, the satrap of Lydia,—and
Mausôlus, native prince of Karia under Persian supremacy,—attacked
Ariobarzanes, with the view, real or pretended, of quelling his
revolt; and laid siege to Assus and Adramyttium. But they are
said to have been induced to desist by the personal influence
of Agesilaus.[629] As the latter had no army, nor any means of
allurement (except perhaps some money derived from Ariobarzanes),
we may fairly presume that the two besiegers were not very earnest
in the cause. Moreover, we shall find both of them, a few years
afterwards, in joint revolt with Ariobarzanes himself against the
Persian king.[630] Agesilaus obtained, from all three, pecuniary aid
for Sparta.[631]

  [628] Demosth. _ut sup._; Isokrates, Or. xv, (De Permut.) s. 118;
  Cornel. Nepos, Timoth. c. 1.

  The stratagems whereby Timotheus procured money for his troops
  at Samos, are touched upon in the Pseudo-Aristoteles, Œconomic.
  ii, 23; and in Polyæn. iii, 10, 9; so far as we can understand
  them, they appear to be only contributions, levied under a thin
  disguise, upon the inhabitants.

  Since Ariobarzanes gave money to Agesilaus, he may perhaps have
  given some to Timotheus during this siege.

  [629] Xenoph. Enc. Ages. ii, 26; Polyænus, vii, 26.

  I do not know whether it is to this period that we are to refer
  the siege of Atarneus by Autophradates, which he was induced to
  relinquish by an ingenious proposition of Eubulus, who held the
  place (Aristot. Politic. ii, 4, 10).

  [630] It is with the greatest difficulty that we make out
  anything like a thread of events at this period; so miserably
  scanty and indistinct are our authorities.

  Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, chap. v, p.
  118-130) is an instructive auxiliary in putting together the
  scraps of information; compare also Weissenborn, Hellen. p.
  192-194 (Jena, 1844).

  [631] Xen. Enc. Ages. ii, 26, 27.

The acquisition of Samos, while it exalted the reputation of
Timotheus, materially enlarged the maritime dominion of Athens.
It seems also to have weakened the hold of the Great King on Asia
Minor,—to have disposed the residents, both satraps and Grecian
cities, to revolt,—and thus to have helped Ariobarzanes, who rewarded
both Agesilaus and Timotheus. Agesilaus was enabled to carry home
a sum of money to his embarrassed countrymen; but Timotheus,
declining pecuniary aid, obtained for Athens the more valuable boon
of readmission to the Thracian Chersonese. Ariobarzanes made over
to him Sestus and Krithôtê in that peninsula; possessions doubly
precious, as they secured to the Athenians a partial mastery of the
passage of the Hellespont; with a large circumjacent territory for
occupation.[632]

  [632] Isokrates, Or. xv, (De Permut.) s. 115-119; Cornelius
  Nepos, Timotheus, c. 1.

  Isokrates particularly dwells upon the fact that the conquests
  of Timotheus secured to Athens a large circumjacent territory—ὧν
  ληφθεισῶν ἅπας ὁ τόπος περιέχων οἰκεῖος ἠναγκάσθη τῇ πόλει
  γενέσθαι, etc. (s. 114).

  From the value of the Hellespont to Athens as ensuring a regular
  supply of corn imported from the Euxine, Sestus was sometimes
  called “the flour-board of the Peiræus”—ἡ τηλία τοῦ Πειραιῶς
  (Aristot. Rhetor. iii, 10, 3).

Samos and the Chersonese were not simply new tributary confederates
aggregated to the Athenian synod. They were, in large proportion,
new territories acquired to Athens, open to be occupied by Athenian
citizens as out-settlers or kleruchs. Much of the Chersonese had
been possessed by Athenian citizens, even from the time of the first
Miltiades and afterwards down to the destruction of the Athenian
empire in 405 B.C. Though all these proprietors had been then driven
home and expropriated, they had never lost the hope of a favorable
turn of fortune and eventual reëntry.[633] That moment had now
arrived. The formal renunciation of all private appropriations of
land out of Attica, which Athens had proclaimed at the formation
of her second confederacy in 378 B.C., as a means of conciliating
maritime allies—was forgotten, now that she stood no longer in
fear of Sparta. The same system of kleruchies, which had so much
discredited her former empire, was again partially commenced. Many
kleruchs, or lot-holders, were sent out to occupy lands both at Samos
and in the Chersonese. These men were Athenian citizens, who still
remained citizens of Athens even in their foreign domicile, and
whose properties formed part of the taxable schedule of Athens. The
particulars of this important measure are unknown to us. At Samos
the emigrants must have been new men; for there had never been any
kleruchs there before.[634] But in the Chersonese, the old Athenian
proprietors, who had been expropriated forty years before (or their
descendants), doubtless now went back, and tried, with more or less
of success, to regain their previous lands; reinforced by bands of
new emigrants. And Timotheus, having once got footing at Sestus and
Krithôtê, soon extended his acquisitions to Elæus and other places;
whereby Athens was emboldened publicly to claim the whole Chersonese,
or at least most part of it, as her own ancient possession,—from its
extreme northern boundary at a line drawn across the isthmus north of
Kardia, down to Elæus at its southern extremity.[635]

  [633] See Andokides de Pace, s. 15.

  [634] That the Athenian occupation of Samos (doubtless only in
  part) by kleruchs, _began_ in 366 or 365 B.C.,—is established
  by Diodorus, xviii, 8-18, when he mentions the restoration of
  the Samians forty-three years afterwards by the Macedonian
  Perdikkas. This is not inconsistent with the fact that additional
  detachments of kleruchs were sent out in 361 and in 352 B.C.,
  as mentioned by the Scholiast on Æschines cont. Timarch. p. 31
  c. 12; and by Philochorus, Fr. 131, ed. Didot. See the note of
  Wesseling, who questions the accuracy of the date in Diodorus. I
  dissent from his criticism, though he is supported both by Boeckh
  (Public Econ. of Athens, b. iii, p. 428) and by Mr. Clinton (F.
  H. ad ann. 352). I think it highly improbable that so long an
  interval should have elapsed between the capture of the island
  and the sending of the kleruchs, or that this latter measure,
  offensive as it was in the eyes of Greece, should have been
  _first_ resorted to by Athens in 352 B.C., when she had been
  so much weakened both by the Social War, and by the Progress of
  Philip. Strabo mentions two thousand kleruchs as having been
  sent to Samos. But whether he means the first batch alone, or
  altogether, we cannot say (Strabo xiv, p. 638). The father of the
  philosopher Epikurus was among these kleruchs; compare Diogen.
  Laert. x, 1.

  Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ et Timothei, p. 127) seems to
  me to take a just view of the very difficult chronology of this
  period.

  Demosthenes mentions the property of the kleruchs, in his general
  review of the ways and means of Athens; in a speech delivered in
  Olym. 106, before 352 B.C. (De Symmoriis, p. 182, s. 19).

  [635] See Demosthenes, De Halonneso, p. 86, s. 40-42; Æschines, De
  Fals. Legat. 264, s. 74.

  This transfer of lands in Samos to Athenian proprietors, combined
  with the resumption of the Chersonese, appears to have excited
  a strong sensation throughout Greece, as a revival of ambitious
  tendencies on the part of Athens, and a manifest departure from
  those disinterested professions which she had set forth in 378
  B.C. Even in the Athenian assembly, a citizen named Kydias
  pronounced an emphatic protest against the emigration of the
  kleruchs to Samos.[636] However, obnoxious as the measure was to
  criticism, yet having been preceded by a conquering siege and the
  expulsion of many native proprietors, it does not seem to have
  involved Athens in so much real difficulty as the resumption of
  her old rights in the Chersonese. Not only did she here come into
  conflict with independent towns, like Kardia,[637] which resisted
  her pretensions,—and with resident proprietors whom she was to
  aid her citizens in dispossessing,—but also with a new enemy,
  Kotys, king of Thrace. That prince, claiming the Chersonese as
  Thracian territory, was himself on the point of seizing Sestus,
  when Agesilaus or Ariobarzanes drove him away,[638] to make room
  for Timotheus and the Athenians.

  [636] Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii, 8, 4.

  [637] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 201; p. 679, s. 209.

  [638] Xenophon, Enc. Agesil. ii, 26.

It has been already mentioned, that Kotys,[639]—the new Thracian
enemy, but previously the friend and adopted citizen, of Athens,—was
father-in-law of the Athenian general Iphikrates, whom he had enabled
to establish and people the town and settlement called Drys, on
the coast of Thrace. Iphikrates had been employed by the Athenians
for the last three or four years on the coasts of Macedonia and
Chalkidikê, and especially against Amphipolis; but he had neither
taken the latter place, nor obtained (so far as we know) any other
success; though he had incurred the expense for three years of
a mercenary general named Charidemus with a body of troops. How
so unprofitable a result, on the part of an energetic man like
Iphikrates, is to be explained,—we cannot tell. But it naturally
placed him before the eyes of his countrymen in disadvantageous
contrast with Timotheus, who had just acquired Samos and the
Chersonese. An additional reason for mistrusting Iphikrates, too,
was presented by the fact, that Athens was now at war with his
father-in-law Kotys. Hence it was now resolved by the Athenians to
recall him, and appoint Timotheus[640] to an extensive command,
including Thrace and Macedonia as well as the Chersonese. Perhaps
party enmities between the two Athenian chiefs, with their respective
friends, may have contributed to the change. As Iphikrates had been
the accuser of Timotheus a few years before, so the latter may have
seized this opportunity of retaliating.[641] At all events the
dismissed general conducted himself in such a manner as to justify
the mistrust of his countrymen; taking part with his father-in-law
Kotys in the war, and actually fighting against Athens.[642] He had
got into his possession some hostages of Amphipolis, surrendered to
him by Harpalus; which gave great hopes of extorting the surrender
of the town. These hostages he had consigned to the custody of the
mercenary general Charidemus, though a vote had been passed in the
Athenian assembly that they should be sent to Athens.[643] As soon
as the appointment of Iphikrates was cancelled, Charidemus forthwith
surrendered the hostages to the Amphipolitans themselves, thus
depriving Athens of a material advantage. And this was not all.
Though Charidemus had been three years with his band in the service
of Athens under Iphikrates, yet when the new general Timotheus
wished to reëngage him, he declined the proposition; conveying
away his troops in Athenian transports, to enter into the pay of a
decided enemy of Athens—Kotys; and in conjunction with Iphikrates
himself.[644] He was subsequently coming by sea from Kardia to take
service under her other enemies, Olynthus and Amphipolis, when he was
captured by the Athenian fleet. Under these circumstances, he was
again prevailed on to serve Athens.

  [639] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 141.

  [640] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 174. Ἐπειδὴ τὸν μὲν
  Ἰφικράτην ἀποστράτηγον ἐποιήσατε, Τιμόθεον δ’ ἐπ’ Ἀμφίπολιν καὶ
  Χεῤῥόνησον ἐξεπέμψατε στρατηγὸν, etc.

  [641] See Demosthen. cont. Timoth. p. 1187, 1188, s. 10-15.

  Timotheus swore and pledged himself publicly in the Athenian
  assembly, on one occasion, to prefer against Iphikrates a γραφὴν
  ξενίας; but he never realized this engagement, and he even
  afterwards became so far reconciled with Iphikrates, as to give
  his daughter in marriage to the son of the latter (ibid. p. 1204,
  s. 78).

  To what precise date, or circumstance, this sworn engagement is
  to be referred, we cannot determine. Possibly the γραφὴ ξενίας
  may refer to the connection of Iphikrates with Kotys, which
  might entail in some manner the forfeiture of his right of
  citizenship; for it is difficult to understand how γραφὴ ξενίας,
  in its usual sense (implying the negation of any original right
  of citizenship), could ever be preferred as a charge against
  Iphikrates; who not only performed all the active duties of a
  citizen, but served in the highest post, and received from the
  people distinguished honors.

  [642] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 153. ἐτόλμησεν ὑπὲρ
  τῶν Κότυος πραγμάτων ἐναντία τοῖς ὑμετέροις στρατηγοῖς ναυμαχεῖν.

  [643] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669. s. 174-177. Respecting
  these hostages, I can do nothing more than repeat the brief
  and obscure notice of Demosthenes. Of the various conjectures
  proposed to illustrate it, none appear to me at all satisfactory.
  Who Harpalus was, I cannot presume to say.

  [644] Demosthen. cont. Aristocrat. p. 669. s. 175.

  The orator refers to letters written by Iphikrates and Timotheus
  to the Athenian people, in support of these allegations.
  Unfortunately these letters are not cited in substance.

It was against these two cities, and to the general coast of
Macedonia and the Chalkidic Thrace, that Timotheus devoted his first
attention, postponing for the moment Kotys and the Chersonese. In
this enterprise he found means to obtain the alliance of Macedonia,
which had been hostile to his predecessor Iphikrates. Ptolemy of
Alôrus, regent of that country, who had assassinated the preceding
king, Alexander son of Amyntas, was himself assassinated (365 B.C.)
by Perdikkas, brother of Alexander.[645] Perdikkas, during the first
year or two of his reign, seems to have been friendly and not hostile
to Athens. He lent aid to Timotheus, who turned his force against
Olynthus and other towns both in the Chalkidic Thrace and on the
coast of Macedonia.[646] Probably the Olynthian confederacy may have
been again acquiring strength during the years of recent Spartan
humiliation; so that Perdikkas now found his account in assisting
Athens to subdue or enfeeble it, just as his father Amyntas had
invoked Sparta for the like purpose. Timotheus, with the assistance
of Perdikkas, was very successful in these parts; making himself
master of Torônê, Potidæa, Pydna, Methônê, and various other places.
As he mastered many of the Chalkidic towns allied with Olynthus,
the means and adherents still retained by that city became so much
diminished, that Timotheus is spoken of loosely as having conquered
it.[647] Here, as at Samos, he obtained his successes not only
without cost to Athens, but also (as we are told) without severities
upon the allies, simply from the regular contributions of the
Thracian confederates of Athens, assisted by the employment of a
temporary coinage of base metal.[648] Yet though Timotheus was thus
victorious in and near the Thermaic Gulf, he was not more fortunate
than his predecessor in his attempt to achieve that which Athens had
most at heart,—the capture of Amphipolis; although, by the accidental
capture of Charidemus at sea, he was enabled again to enlist that
chief with his band, whose services seem to have been gratefully
appreciated at Athens.[649] Timotheus first despatched Alkimachus,
who was repulsed,—then landed himself and attacked the city. But the
Amphipolitans, aided by the neighboring Thracians, in large numbers
(and perhaps by the Thracian Kotys), made so strenuous a resistance,
that he was forced to retire with loss; and even to burn some
triremes, which, having been carried across to assail the city from
the wide part of the river Strymon above, could not be brought off
in the face of the enemy.[650]

  [645] Diodorus, xv, 77; Æschines de Fals. Leg. p. 250. c. 14.

  [646] Demosthenes (Olynth. 1, p. 21. s. 14) mentions the
  assistance of the Macedonians to Timotheus against Olynthus.
  Compare also his oration ad Philippi Epistolam (p. 154. s. 9).
  This can hardly allude to anything else than the war carried on
  by Timotheus on those coasts in 364 B.C. See also Polyæn. iii,
  10, 14.

  [647] Diodor. xv, 81; Cornelius Nepos, Timoth. 1; Isokrates, Or.
  xv, (De Permut.) s. 115-119; Deinarchus cont. Demosth. s. 14.
  cont. Philokl. s. 19.

  I give in the text what I apprehend to be the real truth
  contained in the large assertion of Isokrates,—Χαλκιδεῖς ἅπαντας
  κατεπολέμησεν (s. 119). The orator states that Timotheus acquired
  twenty-four cities in all; but this total probably comprises
  his conquests in other times as well as in other places. The
  expression of Nepos—“Olynthios bello subegit” is vague.

  [648] Isokrates, _l. c._; Aristotel. Œconomic. ii, 22: Polyæn.
  iii, 10, 14.

  [649] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669. s. 177.

  [650] Polyænus (iii, 10, 8) mentions this fact, which is
  explained by comparing (in Thucydides, vii, 9) the description of
  the attack made by the Athenian Euetion upon Amphipolis in 414
  B.C.

  These ill-successes of Timotheus stand enumerated, as I conceive,
  in that catalogue of _nine_ defeats, which the Scholiast on
  Æschines (De Fals. Leg. p. 755, Reiske) specifies as having been
  undergone by Athens at the territory called _Nine Ways_ (Ἐννέα
  Ὁδοὶ), the previous name of the spot where Amphipolis was built.
  They form the eighth and ninth items of the catalogue.

  The third item, is the capture of Amphipolis by Brasidas. The
  fourth is, the defeat of Kleon by Brasidas. Then come,—

  5. οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες ἐπ’ Ἠϊόνα Ἀθηναῖοι ἐξελάθησαν. The only way
  in which I can make historical fact out of these words, is,
  by supposing that they allude to the driving in of all the
  out-resident Athenians to Athens, after the defeat of Ægospotami.
  We know from Thucydides that when Amphipolis was taken by
  Brasidas, many of the Athenians who were there settled retired
  to Eion; where they probably remained until the close of the
  Peloponnesian war, and were then forced back to Athens. We should
  then have to construe οἱ ἐνοικοῦντες ἐπ’ Ἠϊόνα Ἀθηναῖοι—“the
  Athenians residing at Eion;” which, though not a usual sense
  of the preposition ἐπὶ with an accusative case, seems the only
  definite meaning which can be made out here.

  6. οἱ μετὰ Σιμμίχου στρατηγοῦντος διεφθάρησαν.

  7. ὅτε Πρωτόμαχος ἀπέτυχεν (Ἀμφιπολιτῶν αὐτοὺς παραδόντων τοῖς
  ὁμόροις Θρᾳξί, these last words are inserted by Bekker from
  a MS.). These two last-mentioned occurrences are altogether
  unknown. We may perhaps suppose them to refer to the period when
  Iphikrates was commanding the forces of Athens in these regions,
  from 368-365 B.C.

  8. ἐκπεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Τιμοθέου Ἀλκíμαχος ἀπέτυχεν αὐτοῦ, παραδόντων
  αὑτοὺς Θρᾳξὶν ἐπὶ Τιμοκράτους Ἀθήνῃσιν ἄρχοντος.

  The word Τιμοθέου is here inserted by Bekker from a MS., in place
  of Τιμοσθένους, which appeared in Reiske’s edition.

  9. Τιμόθεος ἐπιστρατεύσας ἡττήθη ἐπὶ Καλαμιώνος.

  Here are two defeats of Timotheus specified, one in the
  archonship of Timokrates, which exactly coincides with the
  command of Timotheus in these regions (Midsummer 364 to Midsummer
  363 B.C.). But the other archon Kalamion, is unknown in the Fasti
  of Athens. Winiewski (Comment. in Demosth. de Corona, p. 39),
  Böhnecke, and other commentators follow Corsini in representing
  Kalamion to be a corruption of _Kallimedes_, who was archon
  from Midsummer 360-359 B.C.; and Mr. Clinton even inserts the
  fact in his tables for that year. But I agree with Rehdantz
  (Vit. Iph. Chab. et Tim. p. 153) that such an occurrence after
  Midsummer 360 B.C., can hardly be reconciled with the proceedings
  in the Chersonese before and after that period, as reported by
  Demosthenes in the Oration against Aristokrates. Without being
  able to explain the mistake about the name of the archon, and
  without determining whether the real mistake may not consist
  in having placed ἐπὶ in place of ὑπὸ,—I cannot but think that
  Timotheus underwent two repulses, one by his lieutenant, and
  another by himself, near Amphipolis,—both of them occurring in
  364 or the early part of 363 B.C. During great part of 363 B.C.,
  the attention of Timotheus seems to have been turned to the
  Chersonese, Byzantium, Kotys, etc.

  My view of the chronology of this period agrees generally with
  that of Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. 42, p. 244-257).

Timotheus next turned his attention to the war against Kotys in
Thrace, and to the defence of the newly-acquired Athenian possessions
in the Chersonese, now menaced by the appearance of a new and
unexpected enemy to Athens in the eastern waters of the Ægean,—a
Theban fleet.

I have already mentioned that in 366 B.C., Thebes had sustained
great misfortunes in Thessaly. Pelopidas had been fraudulently seized
and detained as prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ; a Theban army had
been sent to rescue him, but had been dishonorably repulsed, and had
only been enabled to effect its retreat by the genius of Epaminondas,
then serving as a private, and called upon by the soldiers to take
the command. Afterwards, Epaminondas himself had been sent at the
head of a second army to extricate his captive friend, which he had
accomplished, but not without relinquishing Thessaly and leaving
Alexander more powerful than ever. For a certain time after this
defeat, the Thebans remained comparatively humbled and quiet. At
length, the aggravated oppressions of the tyrant Alexander occasioned
such suffering, and provoked such missions of complaint on the part
of the Thessalians to Thebes, that Pelopidas, burning with ardor
to revenge both his city and himself, prevailed on the Thebans to
place him at the head of a fresh army for the purpose of invading
Thessaly.[651]

  [651] Plutarch Pelopid. c. 31; Diodor. xv, 80.

At the same time, probably, the remarkable successes of the Athenians
under Timotheus, at Samos and the Chersonese, had excited uneasiness
throughout Greece, and jealousy on the part of the Thebans.
Epaminondas ventured to propose to his countrymen that they should
grapple with Athens on her own element, and compete for the headship
of Greece not only on land but at sea. In fact the rescript brought
down by Pelopidas from the Persian court sanctioned this pretension,
by commanding Athens to lay up her ships of war, on pain of incurring
the chastisement of the Great King;[652] a mandate, which she had so
completely defied as to push her maritime efforts more energetically
than before. Epaminondas employed all his eloquence to impress upon
his countrymen, that, Sparta being now humbled, Athens was their
actual and prominent enemy. He reminded them,—in language such as had
been used by Brasidas in the early years of the Peloponnesian war,
and by Hermokrates at Syracuse,[653]—that men such as the Thebans,
brave and trained soldiers on land, could soon acquire the like
qualities on shipboard; and that the Athenians themselves had once
been mere landsmen, until the exigencies of the Persian war forced
them to take to the sea.[654] “We must put down this haughty rival
(he exhorted his countrymen); we must transfer to our own citadel,
the Kadmeia, those magnificent Propylæa which adorn the entrance of
the acropolis at Athens.”[655]

  [652] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 36.

  [653] Thucyd ii, 87; vii, 21.

  [654] Diodor. xv, 78.

  [655] Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 276, c. 32, s. 111. Ἐπαμινώνδας,
  οὐχ ὑποπτήξας τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀξίωμα, εἶπε διαῤῥήδην ἐν τῷ
  πλήθει τῶν Θηβαίων, ὡς δεῖ τὰ τῆς Ἀθηναίων ἀκροπόλεως προπύλαια
  μετενεγκεῖν εἰς τὴν προστασίαν τῆς Καδμείας.

Such emphatic language, as it long lived in the hostile recollection
of Athenian orators, so it excited at the moment extreme ardor on
the part of the Theban hearers. They resolved to build and equip
one hundred triremes, and to construct docks with ship-houses fit
for the constant maintenance of such a number. Epaminondas himself
was named commander, to sail with the first fleet, as soon as it
should be ready, to the Hellespont and the islands near Ionia;
while invitations were at the same time despatched to Rhodes,
Chios, and Byzantium, encouraging them to prepare for breaking with
Athens.[656] Some opposition however was made in the assembly to the
new undertaking; especially by Menekleidas, an opposition speaker,
who, being frequent and severe in his criticisms upon the leading men
such as Pelopidas and Epaminondas, has been handed down by Nepos
and Plutarch in odious colors. Demagogues like him, whose power
resided in the public assembly, are commonly represented as if they
had a natural interest in plunging their cities into war, in order
that there might be more matter of accusation against the leading
men. This representation is founded mainly on the picture which
Thucydides gives of Kleon in the first half of the Peloponnesian war:
I have endeavored in my sixth volume to show,[657] that it is not a
fair estimate even of Kleon separately, much less of the demagogues
generally, unwarlike men both in tastes and aptitudes. Menekleidas
at Thebes, far from promoting warlike expeditions in order that
he might denounce the generals when they came back, advocated the
prudence of continued peace, and accused Epaminondas of involving his
country in distant and dangerous schemes, with a view to emulate the
glories of Agamemnon by sailing from Aulis in Bœotia, as commander
of an imposing fleet to make conquests in the Hellespont. “By the
help of Thebes (replied Epaminondas) I have already done more than
Agamemnon. He, with the forces of Sparta and all Greece besides, was
ten years in taking a single city; while _I_, with the single force
of Thebes and at the single day of Leuktra, have crushed the power of
the Agamemnonian Sparta.”[658] While repelling the charge of personal
motives, Epaminondas contended that peace would be equivalent to an
abnegation of the headship of Greece; and that, if Thebes wished
to maintain that ascendant station, she must keep her citizens in
constant warlike training and action.

  [656] Diodor. xv, 78, 79.

  [657] See Vol. VI. Ch. liv. p. 475.

  [658] Cornelius Nepos, Epaminond. c. 5; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c.
  25; Plutarch, De Sui Laude, p. 542 A.

  Neither of these the authors appear to me to conceive rightly
  either the attack, or the reply, in which the name of Agamemnon
  is here brought forward. As I have given it in the text, there is
  a real foundation for the attack, and a real point in the reply;
  as it appears in Cornelius Nepos, there is neither one nor the
  other.

  That the Spartans regarded themselves as having inherited the
  leadership of Greece from Agamemnon, may be seen by Herodotus,
  vii, 159.

To err with Epaminondas may be considered, by some readers, as
better than being right with Menekleidas. But on the main point of
this debate, Menekleidas appears to have been really right. For
the general exhortations ascribed to Epaminondas resemble but too
closely those feverish stimulants, which Alkibiades administered at
Athens to wind up his countrymen for the fatal expedition against
Syracuse.[659] If we should even grant his advice to be wise, in
reference to land-warfare, we must recollect that he was here
impelling Thebes into a new and untried maritime career, for which
she had neither aptitude nor facilities. To maintain ascendency
on land alone, would require all her force, and perhaps prove
too hard for her; to maintain ascendency by land and sea at once
would be still more impracticable. By grasping at both she would
probably keep neither. Such considerations warrant us in suspecting,
that the project of stretching across the Ægean for ultramarine
dependencies was suggested to this great man not so much by a sound
appreciation of the permanent interests of Thebes, as by jealousy of
Athens,—especially since the recent conquests of Timotheus.[660]

  [659] Thucyd. vi, 17, 18.

  [660] Plutarch (Philopœmen, c. 14) mentions that some authors
  represented Epaminondas as having consented unwillingly to this
  maritime expedition. He explains such reluctance by reference
  to the disparaging opinion expressed by Plato about maritime
  service. But this opinion of Plato is founded upon reasons
  foreign to the character of Epaminondas; and it seems to me
  evident that the authors whom Plutarch here followed, introduced
  the opinion only as an hypothesis to explain why so great a
  general on land as Epaminondas had accomplished so little at sea,
  when he took command of a fleet; putting himself in a function
  for which he had little capacity, like Philopœmen (Plutarch,
  Reipublic. Gerend. Præcep. p. 812 E.).

  Bauch (in his tract, Epaminondas und Thebens Kampf um die
  Hegemonie, Breslau, 1834, p. 70, 71) maintains that Epaminondas
  was constrained against his own better judgment to undertake this
  maritime enterprise. I cannot coincide in his opinion. The oracle
  which Bauch cites from Pausanias (viii, 11, 6) proves as little
  as the above extract from Plutarch.

The project however was really executed, and a large Theban fleet
under Epaminondas crossed the Ægean in 363 B.C. In the same year,
apparently, Pelopidas marched into Thessaly, at the head of a Theban
land-force, against Alexander of Pheræ. What the fleet achieved,
we are scarcely permitted to know. It appears that Epaminondas
visited Byzantium; and we are told that he drove off the Athenian
guard-squadron under Laches, prevailing upon several of the allies
of Athens to declare in his favor.[661] Both he and Timotheus
appear to have been in these seas, if not at the same time, at least
with no great interval of time between. Both were solicited by the
oligarchy of the Pontic Herakleia against the people; and both
declined to furnish aid.[662] Timotheus is said to have liberated
the besieged town of Kyzikus: by whom it was besieged, we do not
certainly know, but probably by the Theban fleet.[663] Epaminondas
brought back his fleet at the end of the year, without having gained
any splendid victory or acquired any tenable possession for Thebes;
yet not without weakening Athens, unsettling her hold upon her
dependencies, and seconding indirectly the hostilities carried on
by Kotys; insomuch that the Athenian affairs in the Chersonese and
Thrace were much less prosperous in 362 B.C. than they had been in
364 B.C. Probably Epaminondas intended to return with his fleet in
the next year (362 B.C.), and to push his maritime enterprises still
farther;[664] but we shall find him imperatively called elsewhere, to
another and a fatal battle-field. And thus the first naval expedition
of Thebes was likewise the last.

  [661] Isokrates. Or. v, (Philip.) s. 53; Diodor. xv, 78. ἰδίας
  τὰς πόλεις τοῖς Θηβαίοις ἐποίησεν. I do not feel assured that
  these general words apply to Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, which
  had before been mentioned.

  [662] Justin, xvi, 4.

  [663] Diodor. xv, 81; Cornel. Nepos, Timotheus, c. 1.

  [664] Diodor. xv, 79.

Meanwhile his friend and colleague Pelopidas had marched into
Thessaly against the despot Alexander; who was now at the height of
his power, holding in dependence a large portion of Thessaly together
with the Phthiot Achæans and the Magnetes, and having Athens as his
ally. Nevertheless, so revolting had been his cruelties, and so
numerous were the malcontents who had sent to invite aid from Thebes,
that Pelopidas did not despair of overpowering him. Nor was he
daunted even by an eclipse of the sun, which is said to have occurred
just as he was commencing his march, nor by the gloomy warnings which
the prophets founded upon it; though this event intimidated many of
his fellow-citizens, so that his force was rendered less numerous
as well as less confident. Arriving at Pharsalus, and strengthening
himself by the junction of his Thessalian allies, he found Alexander
approaching to meet him at the head of a well-appointed mercenary
force, greatly superior in number. The two chiefs contended who
should occupy first the hills called Kynos Kephalæ, or the Dog’s
Heads. Pelopidas arrived there first with his cavalry, beat the
cavalry of the enemy, and pursued them to some distance; but he thus
left the hills open to be occupied by the numerous infantry of the
enemy, while his own infantry, coming up later, were repulsed with
loss in their attempt to carry the position. Thus unpromising did the
battle appear, when Pelopidas returned from the pursuit. Ordering
his victorious cavalry to charge the infantry on the hill in flank,
he immediately dismounted, seized his shield, and put himself at
the head of his own discouraged infantry, whom he again led up the
hill to attack the position. His presence infused so much fresh
ardor, that his troops, in spite of being twice repulsed, succeeded
in a third attempt to drive the enemy from the summit of the hill.
Thus master of the hill, Pelopidas saw before him the whole army
of the enemy, retiring in some disorder, though not yet beaten;
while Alexander in person was on the right wing, exerting himself
to rally and encourage them. When Pelopidas beheld, as it were
within his reach, this detested enemy,—whose treacherous arrest and
dungeon he had himself experienced, and whose cruelties filled every
one’s mouth,—he was seized with a transport of rage and madness,
like Cyrus the younger on the field of Kunaxa at the sight of his
brother Artaxerxes. Without thinking of his duties as a general, or
even looking to see by whom he was followed, he rushed impetuously
forward, with loud cries and challenges to Alexander to come forth
and fight. The latter, declining the challenge, retired among his
guards, into the midst of whom Pelopidas plunged, with the few who
followed him; and there, while fighting with desperate bravery, met
his death. So rapidly had this rash proceeding been consummated, that
his army behind did not at first perceive it. But they presently
hastened forward to rescue or avenge him, vigorously charged the
troops of Alexander, and put them to flight with severe loss.[665]

  [665] For the description of this memorable scene, see Plutarch,
  Pelopidas, c. 31, 32; Diodor. xv, 80, 81; Cornel. Nepos. Pelopid.
  c. 5.

Yet this victory, though important to the Thebans, and still more
important to the Thessalians, was to both of them robbed of all its
sensible value by the death of Pelopidas. The demonstrations of grief
throughout the army were unbounded and universal. The soldiers yet
warm from their victory, the wounded men with wounds yet untended,
flocked around the corpse, piling up near to it as a trophy the arms
of the slain enemies. Many, refusing either to kindle fire, or to
touch their evening meal, testified their affliction by cutting off
their own hair as well as the manes of their horses. The Thessalian
cities vied with each other in tokens of affectionate respect, and
obtained from the Thebans permission to take the chief share in
his funeral, as their lost guardian and protector. At Thebes, the
emotion was no less strikingly manifested. Endeared to his countrymen
first as the head of that devoted handful of exiles who braved
every peril to rescue the city from the Lacedæmonians, Pelopidas
had been reëlected without interruption to the annual office of
Bœotarch during all the years that had since elapsed[666] (378-364
B.C.). He had taken a leading part in all their struggles, and
all their glories; he had been foremost to cheer them in the hour
of despondency; he had lent himself, with the wisdom of a patriot
and the generosity of a friend, to second the guiding ascendency
of Epaminondas, and his moderation of dealing towards conquered
enemies.[667]

  [666] Diodor. xv, 81. Plutarch (Pelop. c. 34) states
  substantially the same.

  [667] Plutarch, Compar. Pelopid. and Marcell. c. 1.

All that Thebes could do, was, to avenge the death of Pelopidas. The
Theban generals, Malkitas and Diogeiton,[668] conducted a powerful
force of seven thousand hoplites into Thessaly, and put themselves at
the head of their partisans in that country. With this united army,
they pressed Alexander hard, completely worsted him, and reduced him
to submit to their own terms. He was compelled to relinquish all
his dependencies in Thessaly; to confine himself to Pheræ, with its
territory near the Gulf of Pagasæ; and to swear adherence to Thebes
as a leader. All Thessaly, together with the Phthiot Achæans and the
Magnêtes, became annexed to the headship of the Thebans, who thus
acquired greater ascendency in Northern Greece than they had ever
enjoyed before.[669] The power of Alexander was effectually put down
on land; but he still continued both powerful and predatory at sea,
as will be seen in the ensuing year.

  [668] Diodor. (xv, 78) places in one and the same year both,—1.
  The maritime project of Epaminondas, including his recommendation
  of it, the equipment of the fleet, and the actual expedition. 2.
  The expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly, with its immediate
  consequences.—He mentions the former of the two first, but he
  places both in the first year of Olympiad 104, the year in which
  Timokrates was archon at Athens; that is, from Midsummer 364
  to Midsummer 363 B.C. He passes immediately from the maritime
  expedition into an allusion to the battle of Mantinea, which (he
  says) proved fatal to Epaminondas and hindered him from following
  up his ideas of maritime activity.

  The battle of Mantinea took place in June or July 362 B.C. The
  maritime expedition, immediately preceding that battle, would
  therefore naturally take place in the summer of 363 B.C.; the
  year 364 B.C. having been occupied in the requisite naval
  equipments.

  I incline to think that the march of Pelopidas into Thessaly also
  took place during 363 B.C., and that his death thus occurred
  while Epaminondas was absent on shipboard. A probable reason is
  thus supplied why the second Theban army which went to avenge
  Pelopidas, was commanded, not by his friend and colleague
  Epaminondas, but by other generals. Had Epaminondas been then at
  home, this would hardly have been.

  The eclipse of the sun, which both Plutarch and Diodorus mention
  to have immediately preceded the out-march of Pelopidas, does
  not seem to have been as yet certainly identified. Dodwell, on
  the authority of an astronomical friend, places it on the 13th
  of June, 364 B.C., at five o’clock in the morning. On the other
  hand, Calvisius places it on the 13th of July in the same Julian
  year, at a quarter before eleven o’clock in the day (see L’Art de
  Vérifier les Dates, tom. i, p. 257). We may remark, that the day
  named by Dodwell (as he himself admits) would not fall within the
  Olympic year 364-363 B.C., but during the months preceding the
  commencement of that year. Moreover Dodwell speaks as if there
  were no other months in the year, except June, July, and August,
  fit for military expeditions; an hypothesis not reasonable to
  admit.

  Sievers and Dr. Thirlwall both accept the eclipse mentioned by
  Dodwell, as marking the time when the expedition of Pelopidas
  commenced—June 364 B.C. But against this, Mr. Clinton takes
  no notice of it in his tables; which seems to show that he was
  not satisfied as to the exactness of Dodwell’s statement or
  the chronological identity. If it should turn out, on farther
  astronomical calculations, that there occurred no eclipse of
  the sun in the year 363 B.C., visible at Thebes,—I should then
  fix upon the eclipse mentioned by Calvisius (13 July 364 B.C.)
  as identifying the time of the expedition of Pelopidas; which
  would, on that supposition, precede by eight or nine months
  the commencement of the transmarine cruise of Epaminondas. The
  eclipse mentioned by Calvisius is preferable to that mentioned by
  Dodwell, because it falls within the Olympic year indicated by
  Diodorus.

  But it appears to me that farther astronomical information is
  here required.

  [669] Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 35.




CHAPTER LXXX.

FROM THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA.


It was during this period,—while Epaminondas was absent with the
fleet, and while Pelopidas was engaged in that Thessalian campaign
from whence he never returned,—that the Thebans destroyed Orchomenus.
That city, the second in the Bœotian federation, had always been
disaffected towards Thebes; and the absence of the two great leaders,
as well as of a large Theban force in Thessaly, seems to have been
regarded by the Orchomenian Knights or Horsemen (the first and
richest among the citizens, three hundred in number) as a favorable
moment for attack. Some Theban exiles took part in this scheme, with
a view to overthrow the existing government; and a day, appointed
for a military review near Thebes, was fixed for execution. A large
number of conspirators joined, with apparent ardor. But before the
day arrived, several of them repented and betrayed the plot to the
Bœotarchs; upon which the Orchomenian horsemen were seized, brought
before the Theban assembly, condemned to death, and executed.
But besides this, the resolution was taken to destroy the town,
to kill the male adults, and to sell the women and children into
slavery.[670] This barbarous decree was executed, though probably a
certain fraction found means to escape, forming the kernel of that
population which was afterwards restored. The full measure of ancient
Theban hatred was thus satiated; a hatred, tracing its origin even
to those mythical times when Thebes was said to have paid tribute to
Orchomenus. But the erasure of this venerable city from the list of
autonomous units in Hellas, with the wholesale execution and sale of
so many free kinsmen into slavery, excited strong sympathy throughout
the neighbors, as well as repugnance against Theban cruelty;[671] a
sentiment probably aggravated by the fact, which we must presume to
have been concurrent,—that the Thebans appropriated the territory
among their own citizens. It would seem that the neighboring town of
Koroneia shared the same fate; at least the two are afterwards spoken
of together in such manner as to make us suppose so.[672] Thebes thus
absorbed into herself these two towns and territories to the north of
her own city, as well as Platæa and Thespiæ to the south.

  [670] Diodor. xv, 79.

  [671] See the sentiment expressed by Demosthenes cont. Leptinem,
  p. 489, s. 121,—an oration delivered in 355 B.C.; eight years
  after the destruction of Orchomenus.

  [672] Demosth. De Pace, p. 62, s. 21; Philippic. II, p. 69, s.
  13; s. 15; Fals. Leg. p. 375, s. 122; p. 387, s. 162; p. 445, s.
  373.

We must recollect that during the supremacy of Sparta and the
period of Theban struggle and humiliation, before the battle of
Leuktra, Orchomenus had actively embraced the Spartan cause.
Shortly after that victory, the Thebans had been anxious under
their first impulse of resentment to destroy the city, but had been
restrained by the lenient recommendations of Epaminondas.[673] All
their half-suppressed wrath was revived by the conspiracy of the
Orchomenian Knights; yet the extreme severity of the proceeding would
never have been consummated, but for the absence of Epaminondas, who
was deeply chagrined on his return.[674] He well knew the bitter
censures which Thebes would draw upon herself by punishing the entire
city for the conspiracy of the wealthy Knights, and in a manner even
more rigorous than Platæa and Thespiæ; since the inhabitants of these
two latter were expelled with their families out of Bœotia, while the
Orchomenian male adults were slain, and the women and children sold
into slavery.

  [673] Diodor. xv, 57.

  [674] Pausan. ix, 15, 2.

  Diodorus places in the same year all the three facts:—1. The
  maritime expedition of Epaminondas. 2. The expedition of
  Pelopidas into Thessaly, his death, and the following Theban
  victories over Alexander of Pheræ. 3. The conspiracy of the
  Orchomenian Knights, and the destruction of Orchomenus.

  The year in which he places them is, the archonship of
  Timokrates,—from Midsummer 364 to Midsummer 363 B.C.

  That the destruction of Orchomenus occurred during the absence
  of Epaminondas, and that he was greatly distressed at it on
  his return,—is distinctly stated by Pausanias; who however is
  (in my judgment) so far mistaken, that he refers the absence
  of Epaminondas to that previous occasion when he had gone into
  Thessaly to rescue Pelopidas from the dungeon of Alexander, 366
  B.C.

  This date is not so probable as the date assigned by Diodorus;
  nor do the chronological conceptions of Pausanias seem to me
  exact.

On returning from his maritime expedition at the end of 363 B.C.,
Epaminondas was reëlected one of the Bœotarchs. He had probably
intended to renew his cruise during the coming year. But his
chagrin for the Orchomenian affair, and his grief for the death of
Pelopidas,—an intimate friend, as well as a political colleague whom
he could trust,—might deter him from a second absence; while the
affairs of Peloponnesus also were now becoming so complicated, as to
render the necessity of renewed Theban interference again probable.

Since the peace concluded in 366 B.C. with Corinth, Phlius, etc.,
Thebes had sent no army into that peninsula; though her harmost
and garrison still continued at Tegea, perhaps at Megalopolis and
Messênê also. The Arcadians, jealous of her as well as disunited
among themselves, had even gone so far as to contract an alliance
with her enemy Athens. The main conflict however now was, between the
Arcadians and the Eleians, respecting the possession of Triphylia
and the Pisatid. The Eleians about this time (365 B.C.) came into
alliance again with Sparta,[675] relinquishing their alliance with
Thebes; while the Achæans, having come into vigorous coöperation with
Sparta[676] ever since 367 B.C. (by reaction against the Thebans,
who, reserving the judicious and moderate policy of Epaminondas,
violently changed the Achæan governments), allied themselves with
Elis also, in or before 365 B.C.[677] And thus Sparta, though
robbed by the pacification of 366 B.C. of the aid of Corinth,
Phlius, Epidaurus, etc., had now acquired in exchange Elis and
Achaia,—confederates not less valuable.

  [675] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 19.

  [676] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 43.

  [677] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 17.

Triphylia, the territory touching the western coast of Peloponnesus,
immediately north of the river Neda,—and the Pisatid (including
the lower course of the river Alpheius and the plain of Olympia),
immediately north of Triphylia,—both of them between Messenia and
Elis,—had been in former times conquered and long held by the
Eleians, but always as discontented subjects. Sparta, in the days of
her unquestioned supremacy, had found it politic to vindicate their
independence, and had compelled the Eleians, after a war of two or
three years, to renounce formally all dominion over them.[678] No
sooner, however, had the battle of Leuktra disarmed Sparta, than
the Eleians reclaimed their lost dominion;[679] while the subjects
on their side found new protectors in the Arcadians, and were even
admitted, under pretence of kindred race, into the Pan-Arcadian
confederacy.[680] The Persian rescript brought down by Pelopidas
(367-366 B.C.) seems to have reversed this arrangement, recognizing
the imperial rights of the Eleians.[681] But as the Arcadians had
repudiated the rescript, it remained for the Eleians to enforce their
imperial rights by arms, if they could. They found Sparta in the same
interest as themselves; not only equally hostile to the Arcadians,
but also complaining that she had been robbed of Messênê, as they
complained of the loss of Triphylia. Sparta had just gained a slight
advantage over the Arcadians, in the recapture of Sellasia; chiefly
through the aid of a Syracusan reinforcement of twelve triremes,
sent to them by the younger Dionysius, but with orders speedily to
return.[682]

  [678] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 30, 31.

  [679] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.

  [680] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 26.

  [681] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 38.

  [682] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 12.

Besides the imperial claims over Triphylia and the Pisatid, which
thus placed Elis in alliance with Sparta and in conflict with
Arcadia,—there was also a territory lying north of the Alpheius
(on the hilly ground forming the western or Eleian side of Mount
Erymanthus, between Elis and the north-western portion of Arcadia),
which included Lasion and the highland townships called Akroreii, and
which was disputed between Elis and Arcadia. At this moment, it was
included as a portion of the Pan-Arcadian aggregate;[683] but the
Eleians, claiming it as their own and suddenly marching in along with
a body of Arcadian exiles, seized and occupied Lasion as well as some
of the neighboring Akroreii. The Arcadians were not slow in avenging
the affront. A body of their Pan-Arcadian militia called the epariti,
collected from the various cities and districts, marched to Lasion,
defeated the Eleian hoplites with considerable loss both of men and
arms, and drove them out of the district. The victors recovered
both Lasion and all the Akroreii, except Thraustus; after which they
proceeded to the sacred ground of Olympia, and took formal possession
of it, planting a garrison, protected by a regular stockaded circle,
on the hill called Kronion. Having made good this position, they
marched on even to the city of Elis itself, which was unfortified
(though it had a tenable acropolis), so that they were enabled to
enter it, finding no resistance until they reached the agora. Here
they found mustered the Eleian horsemen and the chosen hoplites, who
repulsed them with some loss. But Elis was in great consternation;
while a democratical opposition now manifested itself against the
ruling oligarchy,—seizing the acropolis in hopes of admitting the
Arcadians. The bravery of the horsemen and hoplites, however, put
down this internal movement, recovered the acropolis, and forced the
malcontents, to the number of four hundred, to evacuate the city.
Thus expelled, the latter seized and established themselves at Pylus
(in the Eleian territory, about nine miles from Elis towards the
Arcadian border[684]), where they were reinforced not only by a body
of Arcadians, but also by many of their partisans who came from the
city to join them. From this fortified post, planted in the country
like Dekeleia in Attica, they carried on harassing war against the
Eleians in the city, and reduced them after some time to great
straits. There were even hopes of compelling the city to surrender,
and a fresh invasion of the Arcadians was invited to complete the
enterprise. The Eleians were only rescued by a reinforcement from
their allies in Achaia, who came in large force and placed the city
in safety; so that the Arcadians could do nothing more than lay waste
the territory around.[685]

  [683] It had been taken from Elis by Agis, at the peace of 399
  B.C. after his victorious war (Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31).

  [684] Pausanias, vi, 22, 3.

  [685] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 13-18; Diodor. xv, 77.

Retiring on this occasion, the Arcadians renewed their invasion not
long afterwards; their garrison still occupying Olympia, and the
exiles continuing at Pylus. They now marched all across the country,
even approaching Kyllênê, the harbor of Elis on the western sea.
Between the harbor and the city, the Eleians ventured to attack them,
but were defeated with such loss, that their general Andromachus (who
had prompted the attack) fell upon his sword in despair. The distress
of the Eleians became greater than ever. In hopes of drawing off
the Arcadian invaders, they sent an envoy to Sparta, entreating that
the Lacedæmonians would make a diversion on their side of Arcadia.
Accordingly, the Spartan prince Archidamus (son of king Agesilaus),
invading the south-western portion of Arcadia, occupied a hill-town
or post called Kromnus (seemingly in the territory of Megalopolis,
and cutting off the communication between that city and Messênê),
which he fortified and garrisoned with about two hundred Spartans and
Periœki. The effect which the Eleians contemplated was produced. The
Arcadian army (except the garrison of Olympia) being withdrawn home,
they had leisure to act against Pylus. The Pylian exiles had recently
made an abortive attempt upon Thalamæ, on their return from which
they were overtaken and worsted by the Eleians, with severe loss in
killed, and two hundred of their number ultimately made prisoners.
Among these latter, all the Eleian exiles were at once put to death;
all the remainder sold for slaves.[686]

  [686] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 26.

Meanwhile the main Arcadian force, which had returned from Elis,
was joined by allies,—Thebans,[687] Argeians, and Messenians,—and
marched at once to Kromnus. They there blocked up the Lacedæmonian
garrison by a double palisade carried all around, which they kept
a numerous force to occupy. In vain did Archidamus attempt to draw
them off, by carrying his devastations into the Skiritis and other
portions of Arcadia; for the Skiritæ, in former days dependents of
Sparta and among the most valuable constituents of the Lacedæmonian
armies,[688] had now become independent Arcadians. The blockade was
still continued without interruption. Archidamus next tried to get
possession of a hill-top which commanded the Arcadian position. But
in marching along the road up, he encountered the enemy in great
force, and was repulsed with some loss; himself being thrust through
the thigh with a spear, and his relatives Polyænidas and Chilon
slain.[689] The Lacedæmonian troops retreated for some space into
a wider breadth of ground, where they were again formed in battle
order, yet greatly discouraged both by the repulse and by the
communication of the names of the slain, who were among the most
distinguished soldiers of Sparta. The Arcadians on the contrary were
advancing to the charge in high spirits, when an ancient Spartan,
stepping forth from the ranks, shouted with a loud voice “What
need to fight, gentlemen? Is it not better to conclude a truce and
separate?” Both armies accepted the proposition joyfully. The truce
was concluded; the Lacedæmonians took up their dead and retired: the
Arcadians also retreated to the spot where they had gained their
advantage, and there erected their trophy.[690]

  [687] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27.

  The Thebans who are here mentioned must have been soldiers in
  garrison at Tegea, Megalopolis, or Messênê. No fresh Theban
  troops had come into Peloponnesus.

  [688] Thucyd. v, 68; Xen. Rep. Laced, xii, 3; xiii, 6.

  [689] The seizure of Kromnus by the Lacedæmonians, and the wound
  received by Archidamus, are alluded to by Justin, vi, 6.

  [690] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 20-25. Ὡς δὲ, πλησίον ὄντων, ἀναβοήσας
  τις τῶν πρεσβυτέρων εἶπε—Τί δεῖ ἡμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες, μάχεσθαι, ἀλλ’
  οὐ σπεισαμένους διαλυθῆναι; ἄσμενοι δὴ ἀμφότεροι ἀκούσαντες,
  ἐσπείσαντο.

Under the graphic description here given by Xenophon, seems to be
concealed a defeat of the Lacedæmonians more serious than he likes to
enunciate. The Arcadians completely gained their point, by continuing
the blockade without interruption. One more attempt was made by the
Lacedæmonians for the relief of their countrymen. Suddenly assailing
the palisade at night, they succeeded in mastering the portion
of it guarded by the Argeians.[691] They broke down an opening,
and called to the besieged to hasten out. But the relief had come
unexpected, so that only a few of those near at hand could profit by
it to escape. The Arcadians, hurrying to the spot in large force,
drove off the assailants and reënclosed the besieged, who were soon
compelled to surrender for want of provisions. More than a hundred
prisoners, Spartans and Periœki together, were distributed among the
captors,—Argeians, Thebans, Arcadians, and Messenians,—one share to
each.[692] Sixty years before, the capture of two hundred and twenty
Spartans and Lacedæmonians in Sphakteria, by Kleon and Demosthenes,
had excited the extreme of incredulous wonder throughout all Greece;
emphatically noted by the impartial Thucydides.[693] Now, not a trace
of such sentiment appears, even in the philo-Laconian Xenophon. So
sadly had Spartan glory declined!

  [691] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27. The conjecture of Palmerius,—τοῦ
  κατὰ τοὺς Ἀργείους,—seems here just and necessary.

  [692] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 27.

  [693] Thucyd. iv, 40.

Having thus put an end to the Spartan attack, the Arcadians resumed
their aggression against Elis, in conjunction with a new project of
considerable moment. It was now the spring immediately preceding the
celebration of the great quadrennial Olympic festival, which came
about midsummer. The presidency over this sacred ceremony had long
been the cherished privilege of the Eleians, who had acquired it when
they conquered the Pisatans—the inhabitants of the region immediately
around Olympia, and the first curators of the festival in its most
primitive state. These Pisatans, always reluctant subjects of Elis,
had never lost the conviction that the presidency of the festival
belonged to them of right; and had entreated Sparta to restore to
them their right, thirty-five years before, when Agis as conqueror
imposed terms of peace upon the Eleians.[694] Their request had
been then declined, on the ground that they were too poor and rude
to do worthy honor to the ceremony. But on now renewing it, they
found the Arcadians more compliant than the Spartans had been. The
Arcadian garrison, which had occupied the sacred plain of Olympia
for more than a year, being strongly reinforced, preparation was
made for celebrating the festival by the Pisatans under Arcadian
protection.[695] The Grecian states would receive with surprise, on
this occasion, two distinct notices from official heralds, announcing
to them the commencement of the hieromenia or sacred season, and
the precise day when the ceremonies would begin: for doubtless the
Eleians, though expelled by force from Olympia, still asserted their
rights and sent round their notices as usual.

  [694] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31.

  [695] Xen. Hellen. vii, 2, 29. Compare Pausanias, vi, 22, 2.

It was evident that this memorable plain, consecrated as it was to
Hellenic brotherhood and communion, would on the present occasion be
dishonored by dispute and perhaps by bloodshed: for the Arcadians
summoned to the spot, besides their own military strength, a
considerable body of allies: two thousand hoplites from Argos,
and four hundred horsemen from Athens. So imposing a force being
considered sufficient to deter the unwarlike Eleians from any idea of
asserting their rights by arms, the Arcadians and Pisatans began the
festival with its ordinary routine of sacrifice and matches. Having
gone through the chariot-race, they entered upon the pentathlon, or
quintuple contest, wherein the running match and the wrestling-match
came first in order. The running-match had already been completed,
and those who had been successful enough in it to go on contending
for the prize in the other four points, had begun to wrestle in the
space between the stadium and the great altar,[696]—when suddenly the
Eleians were seen entering the sacred ground in arms, accompanied
by their allies the Achæans, and marching up to the opposite bank
of the little river Kladeus,—which flowed at a little distance to
the westward of the Altis, or interior enclosed precinct of Zeus,
falling afterwards into the Alpheius. Upon this the Arcadians drew
up in armed order, on their own side of the Kladeus, to resist the
farther approach of the Eleians.[697] The latter, with a boldness
for which no one gave them credit, forded the rivulet, headed by
Stratolas with his chosen band of three hundred, and vigorously
charged first the Arcadians, next the Argeians; both of whom were
defeated and driven back. The victorious Eleians forced their way
into the Altis, and pressed forward to reach the great altar. But at
every step of their advance the resistance became stronger, aided as
it was by numerous buildings,—the senate-house, the temple of Zeus,
and various porticos,—which both deranged their ranks, and furnished
excellent positions of defence for darters and archers on the roofs.
Stratolas was here slain; while his troops, driven out of the sacred
ground, were compelled to recross the Kladeus. The festival was then
resumed and prosecuted in its usual order. But the Arcadians were so
afraid of a renewed attack on the following day, that they not only
occupied the roofs of all the buildings more completely than before,
but passed the night in erecting a palisade of defence; tearing down
for that purpose the temporary booths which had been carefully put up
to accommodate the crowd of visitors.[698] Such precautions rendered
the place unassailable, so that the Eleians were obliged to return
home on the next day; not without sympathy and admiration among many
of the Greeks, for the unwonted boldness which they had displayed.
They revenged themselves by pronouncing the 104th Olympiad to be no
Olympiad at all, and by registering it as such in their catalogue,
when they regained power; preserving however the names of those who
had been proclaimed victors, which appeared in the lists like the
rest.[699]

  [696] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 29. Καὶ τὴν μὲν ἱπποδρομίαν ἤδη
  ἐπεποιήκεσαν, καὶ τὰ δρομικὰ τοῦ πεντάθλου· οἱ δ’ εἰς πάλην
  ἀφικόμενοι ~οὐκέτι ἐν τῷ δρόμῳ~, ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ τοῦ δρόμου καὶ τοῦ
  βωμοῦ ἐπάλαιον. ~Οἱ γὰρ Ἠλεῖοι~ παρῆσαν ἤδη, etc.

  Diodorus erroneously represents (xv, 78) the occurrence as if the
  Eleians had been engaged in celebrating the festival, and as if
  the Pisatans and Arcadians had marched up and attacked them while
  doing so. The Eleians were really the assailants.

  [697] Xen. Hellen. _l. c._ Οἱ γὰρ Ἠλεῖοι παρῆσαν σὺν τοῖς ὅπλοις
  ~εἰς τὸ τέμενος~. Οἱ δὲ Ἀρκάδες ποῤῥωτέρω μὲν οὐκ ἀπήντησαν, ἐπὶ
  δὲ τοῦ Κλαδάου ποτάμου παρετάξαντο, ὃς παρὰ τὴν Ἄλτιν καταῤῥέων
  εἰς τὸν Ἄλφειον ἐμβάλλει. Καὶ μὴν ~οἱ Ἠλεῖοι τἀπὶ θάτερα τοῦ
  ποτάμου παρετάξαντο~, σφαγιασάμενοι δὲ εὐθὺς ἐχώρουν.

  The τέμενος must here be distinguished from the Altis; as meaning
  the entire breadth of consecrated ground at Olympia, of which the
  Altis formed a smaller interior portion enclosed with a wall. The
  Eleians entered into the τέμενος before they crossed the river
  Kladeus, which flowed _through_ the τέμενος, but _alongside_ of
  the Altis. The tomb of Œnomaus, which was doubtless included in
  the τέμενος, was on the right bank of the Kladeus (Pausan. vi,
  21, 3); while the Altis was on the left bank of the river.

  Colonel Leake (in his Peloponnesiaca, pp. 6, 107) has given a
  copious and instructive exposition of the ground of Olympia,
  as well as of the notices left by Pausanias respecting it.
  Unfortunately, little can be made out certainly, except the
  position of the great temple of Zeus in the Altis. Neither the
  positions assigned to the various buildings, the Stadion, or
  the Hippodrome, by Colonel Leake,—nor those proposed by Kiepert
  in the plan comprised in his maps—nor by Ernst Curtius, in
  the Plan annexed to his recent Dissertation called _Olympia_
  (Berlin, 1852)—rest upon very sufficient evidence. Perhaps future
  excavations may hereafter reveal much that is now unknown.

  I cannot agree with Colonel Leake however in supposing that Pisa
  was at any time a _city_, and afterwards deserted.

  [698] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4. 32. ὥστε οὐδ’ ἀνεπαύσαντο τῆς νυκτὸς
  ἐκκόπτοντες τὰ διαπεπονημένα σκηνώματα, etc.

  [699] Diodor. xv, 78; Pausanias, vi, 8, 2.

Such was the unholy combat which dishonored the sanctuary of
Pan-hellenic brotherhood, and in which the great temple, with its
enthroned inmate the majestic Zeus of Pheidias, was for the first
time turned into a fortress against its habitual presidents the
Eleians. It was a combat wherein, though both Thebes and Sparta, the
competing leaders of Greece, stand clear, Athens as well as most of
the Peloponnesian chief states were implicated. It had been brought
on by the rapacious ambition of the Arcadians, and its result seemed
to confirm them, under color of Pisatan presidency, in the permanent
mastery of Olympia. But in spite of such apparent promise, it was
an event which carried in itself the seeds of violent reaction. We
cannot doubt that the crowd of Grecian spectators present were not
merely annoyed by the interruption of the proceedings and by the
demolition of their tents, but also deeply shocked by the outrage
to the sacred ground,—“imminentium templorum religio.”[700] Most of
them probably believed the Eleians to be the rightful presidents,
having never either seen or heard of any one else in that capacity.
And they could hardly help feeling strong sympathy for the unexpected
courage of these dispossessed presidents; which appeared so striking
to Xenophon (himself perhaps a spectator) that he ascribes it to a
special inspiration of the gods.[701]

  [700] Tacitus, Hist. i, 40. He is describing the murder of Galba
  in the Forum at Rome, by the Othonian soldiers:—

  “Igitur milites Romani, quasi Vologesen aut Pacorum avito
  Arsacidarum solio depulsuri, ac non Imperatorem suum, inermem et
  senem, trucidare pergerent—disjectâ plebe, proculcato Senatu,
  truces armis, rapidis equis, forum irrumpunt: nec illos Capitolii
  aspectus, et imminentium templorum religio, et priores et futuri
  Principes, terruere, quominus facerent scelus, cujus ultor est
  quisquis successit.”

  [701] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 32.

If they disapproved of the conduct of the Arcadians and Pisatans
as an unjust intrusion, they would disapprove yet more of that
spoliation of the rich temples at Olympia, whereby the intruders
rewarded themselves. The Arcadians, always on the look-out for
plunder and pay as mercenary soldiers, found themselves supplied with
both, in abundant measure, from this war: the one from the farms, the
stock, and the field-laborers, of the Eleian neighborhood generally,
more plentiful than in any part of Peloponnesus;[702] the other from
the ample accumulation, both of money and of precious offerings,
distributed over the numerous temples at Olympia. The Pisatans, now
installed as administrators, would readily consent to appropriate
these treasures to the pay of their own defenders, whom they
doubtless considered as acting in the service of the Olympian Zeus.
Accordingly the Epariti, the militia of joint Arcadia, were better
paid than ever they had been before so that the service attracted
numerous volunteers of the poorer class.[703]

  [702] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 20; Polybius, iv, 73.

  [703] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33, 34.

At the outset of the Peloponnesian war, the Corinthians and Spartans
had talked of prosecuting it in part by borrowed money from the
treasuries of Delphi and Olympia.[704] How far the project had
ever been executed, we have no information. But at least, it had
not been realized in any such way as to form a precedent for the
large sums now appropriated by the Pisatans and Arcadians; which
appropriation accordingly excited much outcry, as flagrant rapacity
and sacrilege. This sentiment was felt with peculiar force among
many even of the Arcadians themselves, the guilty parties. Moreover
some of the leaders employed had made important private acquisitions
for themselves, so as to provoke both resentment and jealousy among
their rivals. The Pan-Arcadian communion, recently brought together
and ill-cemented, was little calculated to resist the effect of any
strong special cause of dissension. It was composed of cities which
had before been accustomed to act apart and even in hostility to each
other; especially Mantinea and Tegea. These two cities now resumed
their ancient rivalry.[705] The Mantineans, jealous both of Tegea
and Megalopolis, began to labor underhand against Arcadian unity
and the Theban alliance,—with a view to renewed connection with
Sparta; though only five years before, they had owed to Thebes the
reëstablishment of their own city, after it had been broken up into
villages by Spartan force. The appropriation of the sacred funds,
offensive as it was to much of sincere sentiment, supplied them with
a convenient ground for commencing opposition. In the Mantinean
assembly, a resolution was passed, renouncing all participation in
the Olympic treasures; while at the same time an adequate sum was
raised among the citizens, to furnish pay for all members of the
Epariti who came from their city. This sum was forwarded to the
officers in command; who however not only refused to receive it;
but even summoned the authors of the proceeding to take their trial
before the Pan-Arcadian assembly,—the Ten Thousand at Megalopolis,—on
the charge of breaking up the integrity of Arcadia.[706] The
Mantinean leaders thus summoned, having refused to appear, and
being condemned in their absence by the Ten Thousand,—a detachment
of the epariti was sent to Mantinea to secure their persons. But the
gates were found shut, and the order was set at defiance. So much
sympathy was manifested in Arcadia towards the Mantineans, that many
other towns copied their protest. Nay, even the majority of the Ten
Thousand themselves, moved by repeated appeals made to them in the
name of the offended gods, were gradually induced to adopt it also,
publicly renouncing and interdicting all farther participation in the
Olympian treasures.

  [704] Thucyd. i, 121.

  Perikles in his speech at Athens alludes to this understood
  purpose of the Spartans and their confederacy (Thucyd. i, 143).

  [705] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33, 34; Diodor. xv, 82; Pausanias,
  vii, 8, 6.

  [706] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 33. φάσκοντες αὐτοὺς λυμαίνεσθαι τὸ
  Ἀρκαδικὸν, ἀνεκαλοῦντο εἰς τοὺς μυρίους τοὺς προστάτας αὐτῶν, etc.

Here was a just point carried, and an important advantage gained,
in desisting from a scandalous misappropriation. The party which
had gained it immediately sought to push it farther. Beginning as
the advocates of justice and of the Olympian Zeus, the Mantineans
speedily pronounced themselves more clearly as the champions of
oligarchy; friendly to Sparta and adverse to Thebes. Supplies from
Olympia being no longer obtained, the means presently failed, of
paying the epariti or public militia. Accordingly, such members
of that corps as were too poor to continue without pay, gradually
relinquished the service; while on the other hand, the more wealthy
and powerful citizens, by preconcerted understanding with each other,
enrolled themselves in large numbers, for the purpose of getting
the national force out of the hands of the opposite party and into
their own.[707] The leaders of that opposite party saw plainly,
that this oligarchical movement would not only bring them to severe
account for the appropriation of the sacred treasure, but would also
throw Arcadia again into alliance with Sparta. Accordingly they sent
intimation to the Thebans of the impending change of policy, inviting
them to prevent it by an immediate expedition into Arcadia. Informed
of this proceeding,[708] the opposite leaders brought it before the
Pan-Arcadian assembly; in which they obtained a resolution, that
envoys should be despatched to Thebes, desiring that no Theban army
might enter into Arcadia until formally summoned,—and cancelling the
preceding invitation as unauthorized. At the same time, the assembly
determined to conclude peace with the Eleians, and to restore to them
the locality of Olympia with all their previous rights. The Eleians
gladly consented, and peace was accordingly concluded.[709]

  [707] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 34.

  [708] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 34. ~Οἱ δὲ τὰ κράτιστα τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ
  βουλευόμενοι~ ἔπεισαν τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκάδων, πέμψαντας πρέσβεις
  εἰπεῖν τοῖς Θηβαίοις, etc.

  The phrase here used by Xenophon, to describe the oligarchical
  party, marks his philo-Laconian sentiment. Compare vii, 5, 1. οἱ
  κηδόμενοι τῆς Πελοποννήσου, etc.

  [709] Xen. Hellen. _l. c._

The transactions just recounted occupied about one year and nine
or ten months, from Midsummer 364 B.C. (the time of the battle at
Olympia) to about April 362 B.C. The peace was generally popular
throughout Arcadia, seemingly even among the cities which adhered to
Thebes, though it had been concluded without consulting the Thebans.
Even at Tegea, the centre of Theban influence, satisfaction was felt
at the abandonment of the mischievous aggression and spoliation of
Olympia, wherein the Thebans had had no concern. Accordingly when the
peace, having been first probably sworn in other Arcadian cities,
came to be sworn also at Tegea,—not only the city authorities, but
also the Theban harmost, who occupied the town with a garrison of
three hundred Bœotians, were present and took part in the ceremony.
After it had been finished, most of the Mantineans went home; their
city being both unfriendly to Tegea and not far distant. But many
other Arcadians passed the evening in the town, celebrating the
peace by libations, pæans, and feasting. On a sudden the gates were
shut by order, and the most prominent of the oligarchical party
were arrested as they sat at the feast, by the Bœotian garrison and
the Arcadian Epariti of the opposite party. The leaders seized were
in such considerable number, as to fill both the prison and the
government-house; though there were few Mantineans among them, since
most of these last had gone home. Among the rest the consternation
was extreme. Some let themselves down from the walls, others escaped
surreptitiously by the gates. Great was the indignation excited at
Mantinea on the following morning, when the news of this violent
arrest was brought thither. The authorities,—while they sent
round the intelligence to the remaining Arcadian cities, inviting
them at once to arms,—despatched heralds to Tegea, demanding all
the Mantinean prisoners there detained. They at the same time
protested emphatically against the arrest or the execution of any
Arcadian, without previous trial before the Pan-Arcadian community;
and they pledged themselves in the name of Mantinea, to answer
for the appearance of any Arcadian against whom charges might be
preferred.[710]

  [710] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 37, 38.

Upon receiving this requisition, the Theban harmost forthwith
released all his prisoners. He then called together an
assembly,—seemingly attended by only a few persons, from feelings of
mistrust,[711]—wherein he explained that he had been misled, and that
he had ordered the arrest upon a false report that a Lacedæmonian
force was on the borders, prepared to seize the city in concert with
treacherous correspondents within. A vote was passed accepting the
explanation, though (according to Xenophon) no one believed it. Yet
envoys were immediately sent to Thebes probably from the Mantineans
and other Arcadians, complaining loudly of his conduct, and insisting
that he should be punished with death.

  [711] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 39. συγκαλέσας τῶν Ἀρκάδων ὁπόσοι γε
  δὴ συνελθεῖν ἠθέλησαν, ἀπελογεῖτο, ὡς ἐξαπατηθείη.

On a review of the circumstances, there seems reason for believing
that the Theban officer gave a true explanation of the motives
under which he had acted. The fact of his releasing the prisoners
at the first summons, is more consistent with this supposition than
with any other. Xenophon indeed says that his main object was to
get possession of the Mantineans, and that, when he found but few
of the latter among the persons seized, he was indifferent to the
detention of the rest. But if such had been his purpose, he would
hardly have set about it in so blind and clumsy a manner. He would
have done it while the Mantineans were still in the town, instead of
waiting until after their departure. He would not have perpetrated
an act offensive as well as iniquitous, without assuring himself
that it was done at a time when the determining purpose was yet
attainable. On the other hand, nothing can be more natural than the
supposition that the more violent among the Arcadian epariti believed
in the existence of a plot to betray Tegea to the Lacedæmonians, and
impressed the Theban with a persuasion of the like impending danger.
To cause a revolution in Tegea, would be a great point gained for the
oligarchical party, and would be rendered comparatively practicable
by the congregation of a miscellaneous body of Arcadians in the
town. It is indeed not impossible, that the idea of such a plot may
really have been conceived; but it is at least highly probable, that
the likelihood of such an occurrence was sincerely believed in by
opponents.[712]

  [712] The representation of Diodorus (xv, 82), though very loose
  and vague, gives us to understand that the two opposing parties
  at Tegea came to an actual conflict of arms, on occasion of the
  peace.

The explanation of the Theban governor, affirming that his order for
arrest had either really averted, or appeared to him indispensable
to avert, a projected treacherous betrayal,—reached Thebes at the
same time as the complaints against him. It was not only received
as perfectly satisfactory, but Epaminondas even replied to the
complainants by counter-complaints of his own,—“The arrest (he said)
was an act more justifiable than the release of those arrested.
You Arcadians have already committed treason against us. It was on
your account, and at your request, that we carried the war into
Peloponnesus,—and you now conclude peace without consulting us! Be
assured that we shall presently come in arms into Arcadia, and make
war to support our partisans in the country.”[713]

  [713] Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 40.

Such was the peremptory reply which the Arcadian envoy brought
back from Thebes, announcing to his countrymen that they must
prepare for war forthwith. They accordingly concerted measures for
resistance with the Eleians and Achæans. They sent an invitation to
the Lacedæmonians to march into Arcadia, and assist in repelling
any enemy who should approach for the purpose of subjugating
Peloponnesus,—yet with the proviso, as to headship, that each state
should take the lead when the war was in its own territory; and they
farther sent to solicit aid from Athens. Such were the measures taken
by the Mantineans and their partisans, now forming the majority in
the Pan-Arcadian aggregate, who (to use the language of Xenophon)
“were really solicitous for Peloponnesus.”[714] “Why do these Thebans
(said they) march into our country when we desire them not to come?
For what other purpose, except to do us mischief? to make us do
mischief to each other, in order that both parties may stand in need
of _them_? to enfeeble Peloponnesus as much as possible, in order
that they may hold it the more easily in slavery?”[715] Such is the
language which Xenophon repeats, with a sympathy plainly evincing
his philo-Laconian bias. For when we follow the facts as he himself
narrates them, we shall find them much more in harmony with the
reproaches which he puts into the mouth of Epaminondas. Epaminondas
had first marched into Peloponnesus (in 369 B.C.) at the request
of both Arcadians and Eleians, for the purpose of protecting them
against Sparta. He had been the first to give strength and dignity
to the Arcadians, by organizing them into a political aggregate, and
by forming a strong frontier for them against Sparta, in Messênê and
Megalopolis. When thus organized, the Arcadians had manifested both
jealousy of Thebes, and incompetence to act wisely for themselves.
They had caused the reversal of the gentle and politic measures
adopted by Epaminondas towards the Achæan cities, whom they had thus
thrown again into the arms of Sparta. They had, of their own accord,
taken up the war against Elis and the mischievous encroachment
at Olympia. On the other hand, the Thebans had not marched into
Peloponnesus since 367 B.C.—an interval now of nearly five years.
They had tried to persuade the Arcadians to accept the Persian
rescript, and to desist from the idea of alliance with Athens; but
when refused, they had made no attempt to carry either of these
points by force. Epaminondas had a fair right now to complain of them
for having made peace with Elis and Achaia, the friends and allies of
Sparta, without any consultation with Thebes. He probably believed
that there had been a real plot to betray Tegea to the Lacedæmonians,
as one fruit of this treacherous peace; and he saw plainly that the
maintenance of the frontier line against Sparta,—Tegea, Megalopolis,
and Messênê,—could no longer be assured without a new Theban invasion.

  [714] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 1. Οἱ κηδόμενοι τῆς Πελοποννήσου.

  [715] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 2, 3.

This appears to me the reasonable estimate of the situation in
Peloponnesus, in June 362 B.C.—immediately before the last invasion
of Epaminondas. We cannot trust the unfavorable judgment of Xenophon
with regard either to this great man or to the Thebans. It will not
stand good, even if compared with the facts related by himself; still
less probably would it stand, if we had the facts from an impartial
witness.

I have already recounted as much as can be made out of the
proceedings of the Thebans, between the return of Pelopidas from
Persia with the rescript (in the winter 367-366 B.C.) to the close
of 363 B.C. In 366-365 B.C., they had experienced great loss and
humiliation in Thessaly connected with the detention of Pelopidas,
whom they had with difficulty rescued from the dungeon of Pheræ. In
364-363 B.C., Pelopidas had been invested with a fresh command in
Thessaly, and though he was slain, the Theban arms had been eminently
successful, acquiring more complete mastery of the country than
ever they possessed before; while Epaminondas, having persuaded his
countrymen to aim at naval supremacy, had spent the summer of 363
B.C. as admiral of a powerful Theban fleet on the coast of Asia.
Returning to Thebes at the close of 363 B.C., he found his friend
Pelopidas slain; while the relations of Thebes, both in Peloponnesus
and in Thessaly, were becoming sufficiently complicated to absorb
his whole attention on land, without admitting farther aspirations
towards maritime empire. He had doubtless watched, as it went on,
the gradual change of politics in Arcadia (in the winter and spring
of 363-362 B.C.), whereby the Mantinean and oligarchical party,
profiting by the reaction of sentiment against the proceedings at
Olympia, had made itself a majority in the Pan-Arcadian assembly
and militia, so as to conclude peace with Elis, and to present the
prospect of probable alliance with Sparta, Elis, and Achaia. This
political tendency was doubtless kept before Epaminondas by the
Tegean party in Arcadia, opposed to the party of Mantinea; being
communicated to him with partisan exaggerations even beyond the
reality. The danger, actual or presumed, of Tegea, with the arrest
which had been there operated, satisfied him that a powerful Theban
intervention could be no longer deferred. As Bœotarch, he obtained
the consent of his countrymen to assemble a Bœotian force, to summon
the allied contingents, and to conduct this joint expedition into
Peloponnesus.

The army with which he began his march was numerous and imposing.
It comprised all the Bœotians and Eubœans, with a large number
of Thessalians (some even sent by Alexander of Pheræ, who had now
become a dependent ally of Thebes), the Lokrians, Malians, Ænianes,
and probably various other allies from Northern Greece; though the
Phokians declined to join, alleging that their agreement with Thebes
was for alliance purely defensive.[716] Having passed the line of
Mount Oneium,—which was no longer defended, as it had been at his
former entrance,—he reached Nemea, where he was probably joined
by the Sikyonian contingent,[717] and where he halted, in hopes
of intercepting the Athenian contingent in their way to join his
enemies. He probably had information which induced him to expect
them;[718] but the information turned out false. The Athenians never
appeared, and it was understood that they were preparing to cross
by sea to the eastern coast of Laconia. After a fruitless halt,
he proceeded onward to Tegea, where his Peloponnesian allies all
presently joined him: the Arcadians of Tegea, Pallantium, Asea, and
Megalopolis, the Messenians—(all these forming the line of frontier
against Laconia)—and the Argeians.

  [716] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 5; Diodor. xv, 85.

  [717] Diodor. xv, 85.

  [718] The explanation which Xenophon gives of this halt at
  Nemea,—as if Epaminondas was determined to it by a peculiar
  hatred of Athens (Hellen. vii, 5, 6)—seems alike fanciful and
  ill-tempered.

The halt at Nemea, since Epaminondas missed its direct purpose,
was injurious in another way, as it enabled the main body of his
Peloponnesian enemies to concentrate at Mantinea; which junction
might probably have been prevented, had he entered Arcadia without
delay. A powerful Peloponnesian army was there united, consisting
of the Mantineans with the major part of the other Arcadians,—the
Eleians,—and the Achæans. Invitation had been sent to the Spartans;
and old Agesilaus, now in his eightieth year, was in full march with
the Lacedæmonian forces to Mantinea. Besides this, the Athenian
contingent was immediately expected; especially valuable from its
cavalry, since the Peloponnesians were not strong in that description
of force,—some of them indeed having none at all.

Epaminondas established his camp and place of arms within the walls
of Tegea; a precaution which Xenophon praises, as making his troops
more secure and comfortable, and his motions less observable by the
enemy.[719] He next marched to Mantinea, to provoke the enemy to
an action before the Spartans and Athenians joined; but they kept
carefully on their guard, close to Mantinea, too strongly posted to
be forced.[720] On returning to his camp in Tegea, he was apprised
that Agesilaus with the Spartan force, having quitted Sparta on
the march to Mantinea, had already made some progress and reached
Pellênê. Upon this he resolved to attempt the surprise of Sparta
by a sudden night-march from Tegea, which lay in the direct road
from Sparta to Mantinea, while Agesilaus in getting from Sparta to
Mantinea had to pursue a more circuitous route to the westward.
Moving shortly after the evening meal, Epaminondas led the Theban
force with all speed towards Sparta; and he had well-nigh come upon
that town, “like a nest of unprotected young birds,” at a moment
when no resistance could have been made. Neither Agesilaus, nor any
one else, expected so daring and well-aimed a blow, the success of
which would have changed the face of Greece. Nothing saved Sparta
except the providential interposition of the gods,[721] signified
by the accident that a Kretan runner hurried to Agesilaus, with the
news that the Thebans were in full march southward from Tegea, and
happened to arrest in time his farther progress towards Mantinea.
Agesilaus instantly returned back with the troops around him to
Sparta, which was thus put in a sufficient posture of defence before
the Thebans arrived. Though sufficient for the emergency, however,
his troops were not numerous; for the Spartan cavalry and mercenary
forces were still absent, having been sent forward to Mantinea.
Orders were sent for the main army at that city to hasten immediately
to the relief of Sparta.[722]

  [719] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 8.

  [720] Plutarch, De Gloriâ Athen. p. 346 B.

  [721] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 10. Καὶ εἰ μὴ Κρὴς, θείᾳ τινὶ μοίρᾳ
  προσελθὼν, ἐξήγγειλε τῷ Ἀγησιλάῳ προσιὸν τὸ στράτευμα, ἔλαβεν ἂν
  τὴν πόλιν ὥσπερ νεοττιὰν, παντάπασιν ἔρημον τῶν ἀμυνουμένων.

  Diodorus coincides in the main fact (xv, 82, 83), though with
  many inaccuracies of detail. He gives a very imperfect idea
  of this narrow escape of Sparta, which is fully attested by
  Xenophon, even against his own partialities.

  Kallisthenes asserted that the critical intelligence had been
  conveyed to Agesilaus by a Thespian named Euthynus (Plutarch,
  Agesilaus, c. 34).

  [722] Xenophon (Hellen. vii, 5, 10, 11) describes these facts
  in a manner different on several points from Polybius (ix, 8),
  and from Diodorus (xv, 83). Xenophon’s authority appears to me
  better in itself, while his narrative is also more probable. He
  states distinctly that Agesilaus heard the news of the Theban
  march while he was yet at Pellênê (on the road to Mantinea, to
  which place a large portion of the Spartan troops had already
  gone forward),—that he turned back forthwith, and reached Sparta
  before Epaminondas, with a division not numerous, yet sufficient
  to put the town in a state of defence. Whereas Polybius affirms,
  that Agesilaus heard the news when he was at Mantinea,—that he
  marched from thence with the whole army to Sparta, but that
  Epaminondas reached Sparta before him, had already attacked the
  town and penetrated into the market-place, when Agesilaus arrived
  and drove him back. Diodorus relates that Agesilaus never left
  Sparta, but that the other king Agis, who had been sent with the
  army to Mantinea, divining the plans of Epaminondas, sent word by
  some swift Kretan runners to Agesilaus and put him upon his guard.

  Wesseling remarks justly, that the mention of Agis must be a
  mistake; that the second king of Sparta at that time was named
  Kleomenes.

  Polyænus (ii, 3, 10) states correctly that Agesilaus reached
  Sparta before Epaminondas; but he adds many other details which
  are too uncertain to copy.

The march of Epaminondas had been undertaken only on the probability,
well-nigh realized, of finding Sparta undefended. He was in no
condition to assault the city, if tolerably occupied,—still less
to spend time before it; for he knew that the enemy from Mantinea
would immediately follow him into Laconia, within which he did not
choose to hazard a general action. He found it impracticable to take
this unfortified, yet unassailable city, Sparta, even at his former
invasion of 370-369 B.C.; when he had most part of Peloponnesus in
active coöperation with him, and when the Lacedæmonians had no army
in the field. Accordingly, though he crossed the Eurotas and actually
entered into the city of Sparta[723] (which had no walls to keep him
out), yet as soon as he perceived the roofs manned with soldiers and
other preparations for resistance, he advanced with great caution,
not adventuring into the streets and amidst the occupied houses.
He only tried to get possession of various points of high ground
commanding the city, from whence it might be possible to charge down
upon the defenders with advantage. But even here, though inferior in
number they prevented him from making any impression. And Archidamus
son of Agesilaus, sallying forth unexpectedly beyond the line of
defence, with a small company of one hundred hoplites, scrambled over
some difficult ground in his front, and charged the Thebans even up
the hill, with such gallantry, that he actually beat them back with
some loss; pursuing them for a space, until he was himself repulsed
and forced to retreat.[724] The bravery of the Spartan Isidas, too,
son of Phœbidas the captor of the Theban Kadmeia, did signal honor
to Sparta, in this day of her comparative decline. Distinguished for
beauty and stature, this youth sallied forth naked and unshielded,
with his body oiled as in the palæstra. Wielding in his right hand
a spear and in his left a sword, he rushed among the enemy, dealing
death and destruction; in spite of which he was suffered to come back
unwounded: so great was the awe inspired by his singular appearance
and desperate hardihood. The ephors decorated him afterwards with a
wreath of honor, but at the same time fined him for exposing himself
without defensive armor.[725]

  [723] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 11. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγένετο Ἐπαμινώνδας ~ἐν τῇ
  πόλει~ τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, etc.

  [724] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 12, 13.

  Justin (vi, 7) greatly exaggerates the magnitude and violence of
  the contest. He erroneously represents that Agesilaus did not
  reach Sparta till after Epaminondas.

  [725] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 34.

Though the Spartans displayed here an honorable gallantry, yet these
successes, in themselves trifling, are magnified into importance only
by the partiality of Xenophon. The capital fact was, that Agesilaus
had been accidentally forewarned so as to get back to Sparta and put
it in defence before the Thebans arrived. As soon as Epaminondas
ascertained this, he saw that his project was no longer practicable;
nor did he do more than try the city round, to see if he could detect
any vulnerable point, without involving himself in a hazardous
assault. Baffled in his first scheme, he applied himself, with equal
readiness of resource and celerity of motion, to the execution of
a second. He knew that the hostile army from Mantinea would be
immediately put in march for Sparta, to ward off all danger from that
city. Now the straight road from Mantinea to Sparta (a course nearly
due south all the way) lying through Tegea, was open to Epaminondas,
but not to the enemy, who would be forced to take another and more
circuitous route, probably by Asea and Pallantion; so that he was
actually nearer to Mantinea than they. He determined to return to
Tegea forthwith, while they were on their march towards Sparta, and
before they could be apprised of his change of purpose. Breaking
up accordingly, with scarce any interval of rest, he marched back
to Tegea; where it became absolutely indispensable to give repose
to his hoplites, after such severe fatigue. But he sent forward
his cavalry without any delay, to surprise Mantinea, which would
be now (he well knew) unprepared and undefended; with its military
force absent on the march to Sparta, and its remaining population,
free as well as slave, largely engaged in the fields upon the
carrying of harvest. Nothing less than the extraordinary ascendency
of Epaminondas,—coupled with his earnestness in setting forth the
importance of the purpose, as well as the probable plunder,—could
have prevailed upon the tired horsemen to submit to such additional
toil, while their comrades were enjoying refreshment and repose at
Tegea.[726]

  [726] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 14. Πάλιν δὲ πορευθεὶς ὡς ἐδύνατο
  τάχιστα εἰς τὴν Τεγέαν, τοὺς μὲν ὁπλίτας ἀνέπαυσε, τοὺς δὲ ἱππέας
  ἔπεμψεν εἰς τὴν Μαντίνειαν, δεηθεὶς αὐτῶν προσκαρτερῆσαι, καὶ
  διδάσκων ὡς πάντα μὲν εἰκὸς ἔξω εἶναι τὰ τῶν Μαντινέων βοσκήματα,
  πάντας δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἄλλως τε καὶ σίτου συγκομιδῆς οὔσης.

Everything near Mantinea was found in the state which Epaminondas
anticipated. Yet the town was preserved, and his well-laid scheme
defeated, by an unexpected contingency which the Mantineans doubtless
ascribed to the providence of the gods,—as Xenophon regards the
previous warning given to Agesilaus. The Athenian cavalry had
arrived, not an hour before, and had just dismounted from their
horses within the walls of Mantinea. Having departed from Eleusis
(probably after ascertaining that Epaminondas no longer occupied
Nemea), they took their evening meal and rested at the isthmus
of Corinth, where they seem to have experienced some loss or
annoyance.[727] They then passed forward through Kleonæ to Mantinea,
arriving thither without having broken fast, either themselves or
their horses, on that day. It was just after they reached Mantinea,
and when they had yet taken no refreshment,—that the Theban and
Thessalian cavalry suddenly made their appearance, having advanced
even to the temple of Poseidon, within less than a mile of the
gates.[728]

  [727] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 15, 16.

  The words—δυστυχήματος γεγενημένου ἐν Κορίνθῳ τοῖς
  ἱππεῦσιν—allude to something which we have no means of making
  out. It is possible that the Corinthians, who were at peace with
  Thebes and had been ill-used by Athens (vii, 4, 6-10), may have
  seen with displeasure, and even molested, the Athenian horsemen
  while resting on their territory.

  [728] Polybius, ix, 8.

The Mantineans were terror-struck at this event. Their military
citizens were absent on the march to Sparta, while the remainder
were dispersed about the fields. In this helpless condition, they
implored aid from the newly-arrived Athenian cavalry; who, though
hungry and tired, immediately went forth,—and indeed were obliged
to do so, since their own safety depended upon it. The assailants
were excellent cavalry, Thebans and Thessalians, and more numerous
than the Athenians. Yet such was the gallantry with which the
latter fought, in a close and bloody action, that on the whole they
gained the advantage, forced the assailants to retire, and had
the satisfaction to preserve Mantinea with all its citizens and
property. Xenophon extols[729] (and doubtless with good reason) the
generous energy of the Athenians, in going forth hungry and fatigued.
But we must recollect that the Theban cavalry had undergone yet
more severe hunger and fatigue,—that Epaminondas would never have
sent them forward in such condition, had he expected any serious
resistance; and that they probably dispersed to some extent, for
the purpose of plundering and seizing subsistence in the fields
through which they passed, so that they were found in disorder when
the Athenians sallied out upon them. The Athenian cavalry-commander
Kephisodôrus,[730] together with Gryllus (son of the historian
Xenophon), then serving with his brother Diodorus among the Athenian
horse, were both slain in the battle. A memorable picture at Athens
by the contemporary painter Euphranor, commemorated both the battle
and the personal gallantry of Gryllus, to whose memory the Mantineans
also paid distinguished honors.

  [729] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 15, 16, 17.

  Plutarch (De Gloriâ Athen. p. 346 D.—E.) recounts the general
  fact of this battle and the rescue of Mantinea; yet with several
  inaccuracies which we refute by means of Xenophon.

  Diodor. (xv, 84) mentions the rescue of Mantinea by the
  unexpected arrival of the Athenians; but he states them as being
  six thousand soldiers, that is hoplites, under Hegelochus; and
  he says nothing about the cavalry battle. Hegesilaus is named by
  Ephorus (ap. Diog. Laert. ii, 54,—compare Xenoph. De Vectigal.
  iii, 7) as the general of the entire force sent out by Athens on
  this occasion, consisting of infantry as well as cavalry. The
  infantry must have come up somewhat later.

  Polybius also (ix, 8), though concurring in the main with
  Xenophon, differs in several details. I follow the narrative of
  Xenophon.

  [730] Harpokration v, Κηφισόδωρος, Ephorus ap. Diogen. Laert. ii,
  53; Pausan. 1, 3, 4; viii, 9, 8; viii, 11, 5.

  There is a confusion, on several points, between this cavalry
  battle near Mantinea,—and the great or general battle, which
  speedily followed it, wherein Epaminondas was slain. Gryllus is
  sometimes said to have been slain in the battle of Mantinea, and
  even to have killed Epaminondas with his own hand. It would seem
  as if the picture of Euphranor represented Gryllus in the act
  of killing the Theban commander; and as if the latter tradition
  of Athens as well as of Thebes, erroneously bestowed upon that
  Theban commander the name of Epaminondas.

  See this confusion discussed and cleared up, in a good article
  on the Battle of Mantinea, by Arnold Schäfer, p. 58, 59, in the
  Rheinisches Museum für Philologie (1846—Fünfter Jahrgang, Erstes
  Heft).

Here were two successive movements of Epaminondas, both
well-conceived, yet both disappointed by accident, without any
omission of his own. He had his forces concentrated at Tegea, while
his enemies on their side, returning from Sparta, formed a united
camp in the neighborhood of Mantinea. They comprised Lacedæmonians,
Eleians, Arcadians, Achæans, and Athenians; to the number, in all, of
twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse, if we could trust the
assertion of Diodorus;[731] who also gives the numbers of Epaminondas
as thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse. Little value can be
assigned to either of these estimates; nor is it certain which of the
two armies was the more numerous. But Epaminondas saw that he had now
no chance left for striking a blow except through a pitched battle,
nor did he at all despair of the result.[732] He had brought out his
northern allies for a limited time; which time they were probably not
disposed to prolong, as the season of harvest was now approaching.
Moreover, his stock of provisions was barely sufficient;[733] the new
crop being not yet gathered in, while the crop of the former year was
probably almost exhausted. He took his resolution therefore to attack
the enemy forthwith.

  [731] Diodor. xv, 84.

  [732] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 8. καὶ μὴν οἰόμενος κρείττων τῶν
  ἀντιπάλων εἶναι, etc.

  [733] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 19. σπάνια δὲ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔχοντας
  ὅμως πείθεσθαι ἐθέλειν, etc.

But I cannot adopt the view of Xenophon, that such resolution was
forced upon Epaminondas, against his own will, by a desperate
position, rendering it impossible for him to get away without
fighting,—by the disappointment of finding so few allies on his
own side, and so many assembled against him,—and by the necessity
of wiping off the shame of his two recent failures (at Sparta and
at Mantinea) or perishing in the attempt.[734] This is an estimate
of the position of Epaminondas, not consistent with the facts
narrated by Xenophon himself. It could have been no surprise to the
Theban general that the time had arrived for ordering a battle.
With what other view had he come into Peloponnesus? Or for what
other purpose could he have brought so numerous an army? Granting
that he expected greater support in Peloponnesus than he actually
found, we cannot imagine him to have hoped that his mere presence,
without fighting, would suffice to put down enemies courageous as
well as powerful. Xenophon exaggerates the importance of the recent
defeats (as he terms them) before Sparta and Mantinea. These were
checks or disappointments rather than defeats. On arriving at Tegea,
Epaminondas had found it practicable (which he could not have known
beforehand) to attempt a _coup de main_, first against Sparta, next
against Mantinea. Here were accidental opportunities which his
genius discerned and turned to account. Their success, so near to
actual attainment, would have been a prodigious point gained;[735]
but their accidental failure left him not worse off than he was
before. It remained for him then, having the enemy before him in the
field, and no farther opportunities of striking at them unawares by
side-blows, to fight them openly; which he and all around him must
have contemplated, from their first entrance into Peloponnesus, as
the only probable way of deciding the contest.

  [734] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 18. αὐτὸς δὲ λελυμασμένος παντάπασι
  τῇ ἑαυτοῦ δόξῃ ἔσοιτο, ἡττημένος μὲν ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι σὺν πολλῷ
  ὁπλιτικῷ ὑπ’ ὀλίγων, ἡττημένος δὲ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ ἱππομαχίᾳ, αἴτιος
  δὲ γεγενημένος διὰ τὴν ἐς Πελοπόννησον στράτειαν τοῦ συνεστάναι
  Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Ἀρκάδας καὶ Ἠλείους καὶ Ἀθηναίους· ὥστε οὐκ
  ἐδόκει δυνατὸν εἶναι ἀμαχεὶ παρελθεῖν, etc.

  [735] Polybius, ix. 8, 2.

The army of Epaminondas, far from feeling that sentiment of
disappointed hope and stern necessity which Xenophon ascribes to
their commander, were impatient to fight under his orders, and full
of enthusiastic alacrity when he at last proclaimed his intention.
He had kept them within the walls of Tegea, thus not only giving
them better quarters and fuller repose, but also concealing his
proceedings from the enemy; who on their side were encamped on the
border of the Mantinean territory. Rejoicing in the prospect of
going forth to battle, the horsemen and hoplites of Epaminondas all
put themselves in their best equipment. The horsemen whitened their
helmets,—the hoplites burnished up their shields, and sharpened
their spears and swords. Even the rustic and half-armed Arcadian
villagers, who had nothing but clubs in place of sword or spear, were
eager to share the dangers of the Thebans, and inscribed upon their
shields (probably nothing but miserable squares of wood) the Theban
ensign.[736] The best spirit and confidence animated all the allies,
as they quitted the gates of Tegea, and disposed themselves in the
order of march commanded by Epaminondas.

  [736] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 20. Προθύμως μὲν ἐλευκοῦντο οἱ ἱππεῖς
  τὰ κράνη, κελεύοντος ἐκείνου· ἐπεγράφοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Ἀρκάδων
  ὁπλῖται, ῥόπαλα ἔχοντες, ὡς Θηβαῖοι ὄντες· πάντες δὲ ἠκονῶντο καὶ
  λόγχας καὶ μαχαίρας, καὶ ἐλαμπρύνοντο τὰς ἀσπίδας.

  There seems a sort of sneer in these latter words, both at the
  Arcadians and Thebans. The Arcadian club-men are called ὁπλῖται;
  and are represented as passing themselves off to be as good as
  Thebans.

  Sievers (Geschicht. p. 342) and Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. c. 40,
  p. 200) follow Eckhel in translating this passage to mean that
  “the Arcadian hoplites inscribed upon their shields the figure
  of a club, that being the ensign of the Thebans.” I cannot think
  this interpretation is the best,—at least until some evidence
  is produced, that the Theban symbol on the shield was a club.
  Xenophon does not disdain on other occasions to speak sneeringly
  of the Theban hoplites,—see vii, 5, 12. The mention of λόγχας καὶ
  μαχαίρας, immediately afterwards, sustains the belief that ῥόπαλα
  ἔχοντες, immediately before, means “men armed with clubs”; the
  natural sense of the words.

  The horsemen are said to have “whitened their helmets (or
  head-pieces).” Hence I presume that these head-pieces were not
  made of metal, but of wood or wicker-work. Compare Xen. Hellen.
  ii, 4, 25.

The lofty Mantinico-Tegeatic plain, two thousand feet above the level
of the sea (now known as the plain of Tripolitza)—“is the greatest
of that cluster of valleys in the centre of Peloponnesus, each of
which is so closely shut in by the intersecting mountains that no
outlet is afforded to the waters except through the mountains
themselves.”[737] Its length stretches from north to south, bordered
by the mountain range of Mænalus on the west, and of Artemisium and
Parthenion on the east. It has a breadth of about eight miles in the
broadest part, and of one mile in the narrowest. Mantinea is situated
near its northern extremity, Tegea near its southern; the direct
distance between the two cities, in a line not much different from
north and south, being about ten English miles. The frontier line
between their two domains was formed by a peculiarly narrow part of
the valley, where a low ridge projecting from the range of Mænalus on
the one side, and another from Artemisium on the opposite, contract
the space and make a sort of defensible pass near four miles south
of Mantinea;[738] thus about six miles distant from Tegea. It was at
this position, covering the whole Mantinean territory, that the army
opposed to Epaminondas was concentrated; the main Lacedæmonian force
as well as the rest having now returned from Sparta.[739]

  [737] See Colonel Leake’s Travels in the Morea, vol. iii, ch. 24,
  p. 45.

  [738] Three miles from Mantinea (Leake, ib. p. 51-94) “a low
  ridge of rocks, which, advancing into the plain from a projecting
  part of the Mænalium, formed a natural division between the
  districts of Tegea and Mantineia.”

  Compare the same work, vol. i, ch. 3, p. 100, 112, 114, and the
  recent valuable work of Ernst Curtius, Peloponnesos (Gotha,
  1851), pp. 232-247. Gell says that a wall has once been carried
  across the plain at this boundary (Itinerary of the Morea, p.
  141-143).

  [739] See the indications of the locality of the battle in
  Pausanias, viii, 11, 4, 5; and Colonel Leake—as above referred to.

Epaminondas, having marched out from Tegea by the northern gate,
arrayed his army in columns proper for advancing towards the enemy;
himself with the Theban columns forming the van. His array being
completed, he at first began his forward march in a direction
straight towards the enemy. But presently he changed his course,
turning to the left towards the Mænalian range of mountains which
forms the western border of the plain, and which he probably reached
somewhere near the site of the present Tripolitza. From thence he
pursued his march northward, skirting the flank of the mountain on
the side which lies over against or fronts towards Tegea;[740] until
at length he neared the enemy’s position, upon their right flank.
He here halted, and caused his columns to face to the right; thus
forming a line, or phalanx of moderate depth, fronting towards the
enemy. During the march, each lochus or company had marched in single
file with the lochage or captain (usually the strongest and best
soldier in it), at the head; though we do not know how many of these
lochages marched abreast, or what was the breadth of the column. When
the phalanx or front towards the enemy was formed, each lochage was
of course in line with his company, and at its left hand; while the
Thebans and Epaminondas himself were at the left of the whole line.
In this position, Epaminondas gave the order to ground arms.[741]

  [740] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 21.

  Tripolitza is reckoned by Colonel Leake as about three miles and
  a half from the site of Tegea; Mr. Dodwell states it as about
  four miles, and Gell’s Itinerary of the Morea much the same.

  Colonel Leake reckons about eight miles from Tripolitza to
  Mantinea. Gell states it as two hours and three minutes, Dodwell
  as two hours and five minutes,—or seven miles.

  Colonel Leake, Travels in Morea, vol. i, p. 88-100; Gell’s
  Itinerary, p. 141; Dodwell’s Travels, vol. ii, p. 418-422.

  It would seem that Epaminondas, in this latter half of his march,
  must have followed nearly the road from Mantinea to Pallantium.
  Pallantium was situated west by south from Tegea.

  [741] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22.

The enemy, having watched him ever since he had left Tegea and formed
his marching array, had supposed at first that he was coming straight
up to the front of their position, and thus expected speedy battle.
But when he turned to the left towards the mountains, so that for
some time he did not approach sensibly nearer to their position, they
began to fancy that he had no intention of fighting on that day.
Such belief, having been once raised, still continued, even though,
by advancing along the skirts of the mountain, he gradually arrived
very close upon their right flank. They were farther confirmed in the
same supposition, when they saw his phalanx ground arms; which they
construed as an indication that he was about to encamp on the spot
where he stood. It is probable that Epaminondas may have designedly
simulated some other preliminaries of encampment, since his march
from Tegea seems to have been arranged for the purpose partly of
raising such false impression in his enemies, partly of getting upon
their right flank instead of their front. He completely succeeded
in his object. The soldiers on the Lacedæmonian side, believing
that there would be no battle until the next day, suffered their
ranks to fall into disorder, and scattered about the field. Many
of the horsemen even took off their breast-plates and unbridled
their horses. And what was of hardly less consequence,—that mental
preparation of the soldier, whereby he was wound up for the moment of
action, and which provident commanders never omitted, if possible, to
inflame by a special harangue at the moment,—was allowed to slacken
and run down.[742] So strongly was the whole army persuaded of the
intention of Epaminondas to encamp, that they suffered him not only
without hindrance, but even without suspicion, to make all his
movements and dispositions preparatory to immediate attack.

  [742] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22. Καὶ γὰρ δὴ, ὡς πρὸς τῷ ὄρει
  ἐγένετο, ἐπεὶ ἐξετάθη αὐτῷ ἡ φάλαγξ, ὑπὸ τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς ἔθετο τὰ
  ὅπλα· ὥστε εἰκάσθη στρατοπεδευομένῳ. Τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσας, ἔλυσε μὲν
  τῶν πλείστων πολεμίων τὴν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πρὸς μάχην παρασκευήν,
  ἔλυσε δὲ τὴν ἐν ταῖς συντάξεσιν.

Such improvidence is surprising, when we recollect that the ablest
commander and the best troops in Greece were so close upon the right
of their position. It is to be in part explained, probably, by the
fact that the Spartan headship was now at an end, and that there was
no supreme chief to whom the whole body of Lacedæmonian allies paid
deference. If either of the kings of Sparta was present,—a point
not distinctly ascertainable,—he would have no command except over
the Lacedæmonian troops. In the entire allied army, the Mantineans
occupied the extreme right (as on a former occasion, because the
battle was in their territory,[743] and because the Lacedæmonians
had lost their once-recognized privilege), together with the other
Arcadians. On the right-centre and centre were the Lacedæmonians,
Eleians, and Achæans; on the extreme left, the Athenians.[744] There
was cavalry on both the wings; Athenian on the left,—Eleian on the
right; spread out with no more than the ordinary depth, and without
any intermixture of light infantry along with the horsemen.[745]

  [743] Thucyd. v, 67; Pausanias, viii, 9, 5; viii. 10, 4.

  [744] Diodor. xv. 85.

  That the Athenians were on the left, we also know from Xenophon
  (Hell. vii, 5, 24), though he gives no complete description of
  the arrangement of the allies on either side.

  [745] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 23.

In the phalanx of Epaminondas, he himself with the Thebans and
Bœotians was on the left; the Argeians on the right; the Arcadians,
Messenians, Eubœans, Sikyonians and other allies in the centre.[746]
It was his purpose to repeat the same general plan of attack
which had succeeded so perfectly at Leuktra; to head the charge
himself with his Bœotians on the left against the opposing right
or right-centre, and to bear down the enemy on that side with
irresistible force, both of infantry and cavalry; while he kept
back his right and centre, composed of less trustworthy troops,
until the battle should have been thus wholly or partially decided.
Accordingly, he caused the Bœotian hoplites,—occupying the left of
his line in lochi or companies, with the lochage or captain at the
left extremity of each,—to wheel to the right and form in column
fronting the enemy, in advance of his remaining line. The Theban
lochages thus became placed immediately in face of the enemy, as
the heads of a column of extraordinary depth; all the hoplites of
each lochus, and perhaps of more than one lochus, being ranged in
file behind them.[747] What the actual depth was, or what was the
exact number of the lochus, we do not know. At Leuktra, Epaminondas
had attacked with fifty shields of depth; at Mantinea, the depth of
his column was probably not less. Himself, with the chosen Theban
warriors, were at the head of it, and he relied upon breaking through
the enemy’s phalanx at whatever point he charged; since their files
would hardly be more than eight deep, and very inadequate to resist
so overwhelming a shock. His column would cut through the phalanx of
the enemy, like the prow of a trireme impelled in sea-fight against
the midships of her antagonist.

  [746] Here again, we know from Xenophon that the Thebans were on
  the left; but the general arrangement of the other contingents we
  obtain only from Diodorus (xv, 85).

  The Tactica of Arrian, also (xi, 2) inform us that Epaminondas
  formed his attacking column, at Leuktra, of the Thebans—at
  Mantinea, of all the Bœotians.

  About the practice of the Thebans, both at and after the battle
  of Leuktra, to make their attack with the left, see Plutarch.
  Quæst. Roman. p. 282 D.

  [747] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22. Ἐπεί γε μὴν, παραγαγὼν τοὺς ἐπὶ
  κέρως πορευομένους λόχους εἰς μέτωπον, ἰσχυρὸν ἐποιήσατο τὸ περὶ
  ἑαυτὸν ἔμβολον, τότε δὴ ἀναλαβεῖν παραγγείλας τὰ ὅπλα, ἡγεῖτο·
  οἱ δ’ ἠκολούθουν ... Ὁ δὲ τὸ στράτευμα ἀντίπρωρον ὥσπερ τριήρη
  προσῆγε, νομίζων, ὅπη ἐμβαλὼν διακόψειε, διαφθερεῖν ὅλον τὸ τῶν
  ἐναντίων στράτευμα, etc.

It was apparently only the Bœotian hoplites who were thus formed in
column, projecting forward in advance; while the remaining allies
were still left in their ordinary phalanx or lines.[748] Epaminondas
calculated, that when he should have once broken through the enemy’s
phalanx at a single point, the rest would either take flight, or
become so dispirited, that his allies coming up in phalanx could
easily deal with them.

  [748] I agree with Folard (Traité de la Colonne, p. lv-lxi,
  prefixed to the translation of Polybius) in considering
  ἔμβολον to be a column,—rather than a wedge tapering towards
  the front. And I dissent from Schneider’s explanation, who
  says,—“Epaminondas phalangem contrahit sensim et colligit in
  frontem, ut cunei seu rostri navalis formam efficeret. Copiæ
  igitur ex utroque latere explicatæ transeunt in frontem; hoc
  est, παράγειν εἰς μέτωπον.” It appears to me that the troops
  which Epaminondas caused to wheel into the front and to form the
  advancing column, consisted only of the left or Theban division,
  the best troops in the army,—τῷ μὲν ἰσχυροτάτῳ παρεσκευάζετο
  ἀγωνίζεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀσθενέστατον πόῤῥω ἀπέστησεν. Moreover,
  the whole account of Xenophon implies that Epaminondas made
  the attack from his own left against the enemy’s right, or
  right-centre. He was afraid that the Athenians would take him in
  flank from their own left.

Against the cavalry on the enemy’s right, which was marshaled only
with the ordinary depth of a phalanx of hoplites (four, six, or
perhaps eight deep),[749] and without any light infantry intermingled
with the ranks—the Theban general opposed on his left his own
excellent cavalry, Theban and Thessalian, but in strong and deep
column, so as to ensure to them also a superior weight of attack.
He farther mingled in their ranks some active footmen, darters and
slingers, of whom he had many from Thessaly and the Maliac Gulf.[750]

  [749] Compare a similar case in Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 13, where
  the Grecian cavalry, in the Asiatic army of Agesilaus, is said to
  be drawn up ὥσπερ φάλαγξ ἐπὶ τεσσάρων, etc.

  [750] These πέζοι ἅμιπποι—light-armed footmen, intermingled with
  the ranks of the cavalry,—are numbered as an important item
  in the military establishment of the Syracusan despot Gelon
  (Herodot. vii. 158).

There remained one other precaution to take. His deep Theban and
Bœotian column, in advancing to the charge, would be exposed on its
right or unshielded side to the attack of the Athenians, especially
the Athenian cavalry, from the enemy’s left. To guard against any
such movement, he posted, upon some rising ground near his right, a
special body of reserve, both horse and foot, in order to take the
Athenians in the rear if they should attempt it.

All these fresh dispositions for attack, made on the spot, must have
occupied time, and caused much apparent movement. To constitute
both the column of infantry, and the column of cavalry, for attack
on his left—and to post the body of reserve on the rising ground at
his right against the Athenians—were operations which the enemy from
their neighboring position could not help seeing. Yet they either did
not heed, or did not understand, what was going on.[751] Nor was it
until Epaminondas, perceiving all to be completed, actually gave the
word of command to “take up arms,” that they had any suspicion of
the impending danger. As soon as they saw him in full march moving
rapidly towards them, surprise and tumultuous movement pervaded
their body. The scattered hoplites ran to their places; the officers
exerted every effort to establish regular array; the horsemen
hastened to bridle their horses and resume their breast-plates.[752]
And though the space dividing the two armies was large enough to
allow such mischief to be partially corrected,—yet soldiers thus
taken unawares, hurried, and troubled, were not in condition to stand
the terrific shock of chosen Theban hoplites in deep column.

  [751] Perhaps Epaminondas may have contrived in part to conceal
  what was going on by means of cavalry-movements in his front.
  Something of the kind seems alluded to by Polyænus (ii, 3, 14).

  [752] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 22.

The grand force of attack, both of cavalry and infantry, which
Epaminondas organized on his left, was triumphant in both its
portions. His cavalry, powerfully aided by the intermingled darters
and light troops from Thessaly, broke and routed the enemy’s cavalry
opposed to them, and then restraining themselves from pursuit,
turned to fall upon the phalanx of infantry. Epaminondas, on his
part, with his Theban column, came into close conflict with the
Mantinean and Lacedæmonian line of infantry, whom, after a desperate
struggle of shield, spear, and sword, he bore down by superior force
and weight. He broke through the enemy’s line of infantry at this
point, compelling the Lacedæmonians opposed to him, after a brave
and murderous resistance, to turn their backs and take to flight.
The remaining troops of the enemy’s line, seeing the best portion of
their army defeated and in flight, turned and fled also. The centre
and right of Epaminondas, being on a less advanced front, hardly came
into conflict with the enemy until the impression of his charge had
been felt, and therefore found the troops opposed to them already
wavering and disheartened. The Achæan, Eleian, and other infantry on
that side, gave way after a short resistance; chiefly as it would
appear, from contagion and alarm, when they saw the Lacedæmonians
broken. The Athenians however, especially the cavalry, on the
left wing of their own army, seem to have been engaged in serious
encounter with the cavalry opposite to them. Diodorus affirms them
to have been beaten, after a gallant fight,[753] until the Eleian
cavalry from the right came to their aid. Here, as on many other
points, it is difficult to reconcile his narrative with Xenophon, who
plainly intimates that the stress of the action fell on the Theban
left and Lacedæmonian right and centre,—and from whose narrative we
should rather have gathered, that the Eleian cavalry, beaten on their
own right, may have been aided by the Athenian cavalry from the left;
reversing the statement of Diodorus.

  [753] Diodor. xv, 85.

  The orator Æschines fought among the Athenian hoplites on this
  occasion (Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 300. c. 53.)

In regard to this important battle, however, we cannot grasp with
confidence anything beyond the capital determining feature and
the ultimate result.[754] The calculations of Epaminondas were
completely realized. The irresistible charge, both of infantry and
cavalry, made by himself with his left wing, not only defeated the
troops immediately opposed, but caused the enemy’s whole army to
take flight. It was under these victorious circumstances, and while
he was pressing on the retiring enemy at the head of his Theban
column of infantry, that he received a mortal wound with a spear in
the breast. He was by habit and temper, always foremost in braving
danger, and on this day probably exposed himself preëminently, as
a means of encouraging those around him, and ensuring the success
of his own charge, on which so much depended; moreover, a Grecian
general fought on foot in the ranks, and carried the same arms
(spear, shield, etc.) as a private soldier. Diodorus tells us that
the Lacedæmonian infantry were making a prolonged resistance, when
Epaminondas put himself at the head of the Thebans for a fresh and
desperate effort; that he stepped forward, darted his javelin,
and slew the Lacedæmonian commander; that having killed several
warriors, and intimidated others, he forced them to give way; that
the Lacedæmonians, seeing him in advance of his comrades, turned upon
him and overwhelmed him with darts, some of which he avoided, others
he turned off with his shield, while others, after they had actually
entered his body and wounded him, he plucked out and employed them
in repelling the enemy. At length he received a mortal wound in his
breast with a spear.[755] I cannot altogether admit to notice these
details; which once passed as a portion of Grecian history, though
they seem rather the offspring of an imagination fresh from the
perusal of the Iliad than a recital of an actual combat of Thebans
and Lacedæmonians, both eminent for close-rank fighting, with long
spear and heavy shield. The mortal wound of Epaminondas, with a
spear in the breast, is the only part of the case which we really
know. The handle of the spear broke, and the point was left sticking
in his breast. He immediately fell, and as the enemy were at that
moment in retreat, fell into the arms of his own comrades. There was
no dispute for the possession of his body, as there had been for
Kleombrotus at Leuktra.

  [754] The remark made by Polybius upon this battle deserves
  notice. He states that the description given of the battle
  by Ephorus was extremely incorrect and absurd, arguing great
  ignorance both of the ground where it was fought and of
  the possible movements of the armies. He says that Ephorus
  had displayed the like incompetence also in describing the
  battle of Leuktra; in which case, however, his narrative was
  less misleading, because that battle was simple and easily
  intelligible, involving movements only of one wing of each
  army. But in regard to the battle of Mantinea (he says), the
  misdescription of Ephorus was of far more deplorable effect;
  because that battle exhibited much complication and generalship,
  which Ephorus did not at all comprehend, as might be seen by any
  one who measured the ground and studied the movements reported in
  his narrative (Polybius, xii, 25).

  Polybius adds that Theopompus and Timæus were as little to be
  trusted in the description of land-battles as Ephorus. Whether
  this remark has special application to the battle of Mantinea,
  I do not clearly make out. He gives credit however to Ephorus
  for greater judgment and accuracy, in the description of naval
  battles.

  Unfortunately, Polybius has not given us his own description of
  this battle of Mantinea. He only says enough to make us feel how
  imperfectly we know its details. There is too much reason to fear
  that the account which we now read in Diodorus may be borrowed in
  large proportion from that very narrative of Ephorus here so much
  disparaged.

  [755] Diodor. xv, 87. Cornelius Nepos (Epam. c. 9) seems to copy
  the same authority as Diodorus, though more sparing of details.
  He does not seem to have read Xenophon.

  I commend the reader again to an excellent note of Dr. Arnold, on
  Thucydides, iv, 11; animadverting upon similar exaggerations and
  embellishments of Diodorus, in the description of the conduct of
  Brasidas at Pylus.

The news of his mortal wound spread like wild-fire through his
army; and the effect produced is among the most extraordinary
phenomena in all Grecian military history. I give it in the words
of the contemporary historian. “It was thus (says Xenophon) that
Epaminondas arranged his order of attack; and he was not disappointed
in his expectation. For having been victorious, on the point where
he himself charged, he caused the whole army of the enemy to take
flight. But so soon as he fell, those who remained had no longer
any power even of rightly using the victory. Though the phalanx
of the enemy’s infantry was in full flight, the Theban hoplites
neither killed a single man more, nor advanced a step beyond the
actual ground of conflict. Though the enemy’s cavalry was also in
full flight, yet neither did the Theban horsemen continue their
pursuit, nor kill any more either of horsemen or of hoplites, but
fell back through the receding enemies with the timidity of beaten
men. The light troops and peltasts, who had been mingled with the
Theban cavalry and had aided in their victory, spread themselves over
towards the enemy’s left with the security of conquerors; but there
(being unsupported by their own horsemen) they were mostly cut to
pieces by the Athenians.”[756]

  [756] Xen. Hellen. vii, 5, 25. Τὴν μὲν δὴ συμβολὴν οὕτως
  ἐποιήσατο, καὶ οὐκ ἐψεύσθη τῆς ἐλπίδος· ~κρατήσας γὰρ ἧ
  προσέβαλεν, ὅλον ἐποίησε~ φεύγειν τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων. Ἐπεί γε μὴν
  ἐκεῖνος ἔπεσεν, οἱ λοιποὶ οὐδὲ τῇ νίκῃ ὀρθῶς ἔτι ἐδυνάσθησαν
  χρήσασθαι, ἀλλὰ φυγούσης μὲν αὐτοῖς τῆς ἐναντίας φάλαγγος, οὐδένα
  ἀπέκτειναν οἱ ὁπλῖται, οὐδὲ προῆλθον ἐκ τοῦ χωρίου ἔνθα ἡ συμβολὴ
  ἐγένετο· φυγόντων δ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν ἱππέων, ἀπέκτειναν μὲν οὐδὲ
  οἱ ἱππεῖς διώκοντες οὔτε ἱππέας οὔθ’ ὁπλίτας, ὥσπερ δὲ ἡττώμενοι
  πεφοβημένως διὰ τῶν φευγόντων πολεμίων διέπεσον. Καὶ μὴν οἱ
  ἅμιπποι καὶ οἱ πελτασταὶ, συννενικηκότες τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν, ἀφίκοντο
  μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ εὐωνύμου, ὡς κρατοῦντες· ἐκεῖ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ
  πλεῖστοι αὐτῶν ἀπέθανον.

Astonishing as this recital is, we cannot doubt that it is
literally true, since it contradicts the sympathies of the
reciting witness. Nothing but the pressure of undeniable evidence
could have constrained Xenophon to record a scene so painful to
him as the Lacedæmonian army beaten, in full flight, and rescued
from destruction only by the untimely wound of the Theban general.
That Epaminondas would leave no successor either equal or second
to himself, now that Pelopidas was no more,—that the army which
he commanded should be incapable of executing new movements or of
completing an unfinished campaign,—we can readily conceive. But that
on the actual battle-field, when the moment of dangerous and doubtful
struggle has been already gone through, and when the soldier’s
blood is up, to reap his reward in pursuit of an enemy whom he sees
fleeing before him—that at this crisis of exuberant impatience, when
Epaminondas, had he been unwounded, would have found it difficult to
restrain his soldiers from excessive forwardness, they should have
become at once paralyzed and disarmed on hearing of his fall,—this
is what we could not have believed, had we not found it attested by
a witness at once contemporary and hostile. So striking a proof has
hardly ever been rendered, on the part of soldiers towards their
general, of devoted and absorbing sentiment. All the hopes of this
army, composed of such diverse elements, were centred in Epaminondas;
all their confidence of success, all their security against defeat,
were derived from the idea of acting under his orders; all their
power, even of striking down a defeated enemy, appeared to vanish
when those orders were withdrawn. We are not indeed to speak of such
a proceeding with commendation. Thebes and her allied cities had
great reason to complain of their soldiers, for a grave dereliction
of military duty, and a capital disappointment of well-earned
triumph,—whatever may be our feelings about the motive. Assuredly the
man who would be most chagrined of all, and whose dying moments must
have been embittered if he lived to hear it,—was Epaminondas himself.
But when we look at the fact simply as a mark and measure of the
ascendency established by him over the minds of his soldiers, it will
be found hardly paralleled in history. I have recounted, a few pages
ago, the intense grief displayed by the Thebans and their allies
in Thessaly over the dead body of Pelopidas[757] on the hill of
Kynoskephalæ. But all direct and deliberate testimonies of attachment
to a dead or dying chief (and doubtless these too were abundant on
the field of Mantinea) fall short of the involuntary suspension of
arms in the tempting hour of victory.

  [757] Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 33, 34.

That the real victory, the honors of the day, belonged to Epaminondas
and the Thebans, we know from the conclusive evidence of Xenophon.
But as the vanquished, being allowed to retire unpursued, were only
separated by a short distance from the walls of Mantinea, and perhaps
rallied even before reaching the town,—as the Athenian cavalry had
cut to pieces some of the straggling light troops,—they too pretended
to have gained a victory. Trophies were erected on both sides.
Nevertheless the Thebans were masters of the field of battle; so
that the Lacedæmonians, after some hesitation, were forced to send a
herald to solicit truce for the burial of the slain, and to grant for
burial such Theban bodies as they had in their possession.[758] This
was the understood confession of defeat.

  [758] The statement of Diodorus (xv, 87) on this point appears to
  me more probable than that of Xenophon (vii, 5, 26).

  The Athenians boasted much of this slight success with their
  cavalry, enhancing its value by acknowledging that all their
  allies had been defeated around them (Plutarch, De Gloriâ Athen.
  p. 350 A.).

The surgeons, on examining the wound of Epaminondas, with the
spear-head yet sticking in it, pronounced that he must die as soon as
that was withdrawn. He first inquired whether his shield was safe;
and his shield-bearer, answering in the affirmative, produced it
before his eyes. He next asked about the issue of the battle, and
was informed that his own army was victorious.[759] He then desired
to see Iolaidas and Daiphantus, whom he intended to succeed him
as commanders; but received the mournful reply, that both of them
had been slain.[760] “Then (said he) you must make peace with the
enemy.” He ordered the spear-head to be withdrawn, when the efflux of
blood speedily terminated his life.

  [759] Diodor. xv, 88; Cicero, De Finibus, ii, 30, 97; Epistol. ad
  Familiares, v, 12, 5.

  [760] Plutarch, Apophthegm. Regum, p. 194 C.; Ælian, V. H. xii, 3.

  Both Plutarch and Diodorus talk of Epaminondas being carried back
  to the _camp_. But it seems that there could hardly have been any
  camp. Epaminondas had marched out only a few hours before from
  Tegea. A tent may have been erected on the field to receive him.
  Five centuries afterwards, the Mantineans showed to the traveller
  Pausanias a spot called Skiopê near the field of battle, to which
  (they affirmed) the wounded Epaminondas had been carried off, in
  great pain, and with his hand on his wound—from whence he had
  looked with anxiety on the continuing battle (Pausan. viii, 11,
  4).

Of the three questions here ascribed to the dying chief, the third
is the gravest and most significant. The death of these two other
citizens, the only men in the camp whom Epaminondas could trust,
shows how aggravated and irreparable was the Theban loss, not indeed
as to number, but as to quality. Not merely Epaminondas himself, but
the only two men qualified in some measure to replace him, perished
in the same field; and Pelopidas had fallen in the preceding year.
Such accumulation of individual losses must be borne in mind when
we come to note the total suspension of Theban glory and dignity,
after this dearly-bought victory. It affords emphatic evidence of the
extreme forwardness with which their leaders exposed themselves, as
well as of the gallant resistance which they experienced.

The death of Epaminondas spread rejoicing in the Lacedæmonian camp
proportioned to the sorrow of the Theban. To more than one warrior
was assigned the honor of having struck the blow. The Mantineans
gave it to their citizen Machærion; the Athenians, to Gryllus son
of Xenophon; the Spartans, to their countryman Antikrates.[761] At
Sparta, distinguished honor was shown, even in the days of Plutarch,
to the posterity of Antikrates, who was believed to have rescued the
city from her most formidable enemy. Such tokens afford precious
testimony, from witnesses beyond all suspicion, to the memory of
Epaminondas.

  [761] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 35; Pausanias, i, 3, 3; viii, 9,
  2-5; viii, 11, 4; ix, 15, 3.

  The reports however which Pausanias gives, and the name of
  Machærion which he heard both at Mantinea and at Sparta, are
  confused, and are hardly to be reconciled with the story of
  Plutarch.

  Moreover, it would seem that the subsequent Athenians did not
  clearly distinguish between the first battle fought by the
  Athenian cavalry, immediately after their arrival at Mantinea,
  when they rescued that town from being surprised by the Thebans
  and Thessalians—and the general action which followed a few days
  afterwards wherein Epaminondas was slain.

How the news of his death was received at Thebes, we have no
positive account. But there can be no doubt that the sorrow, so
paralysing to the victorious soldiers on the field of Mantinea, was
felt with equal acuteness, and with an effect not less depressing,
in the senate-house and market-place of Thebes. The city, the
citizen-soldiers, and the allies, would be alike impressed with the
mournful conviction, that the dying injunction of Epaminondas must
be executed. Accordingly, negotiations were opened, and peace was
concluded,—probably at once, before the army left Peloponnesus.
The Thebans and their Arcadian allies exacted nothing more than
the recognition of the _statu quo;_ to leave everything exactly as
it was, without any change or reactionary measure, yet admitting
Megalopolis, with the Pan-Arcadian constitution attached to it,—and
admitting also Messênê as an independent city. Against this last
article Sparta loudly and peremptorily protested. But not one of her
allies sympathized with her feelings. Some, indeed, were decidedly
against her; to such a degree, that we find the maintenance of
independent Messênê against Sparta ranking shortly afterwards as
an admitted principle in Athenian foreign politics.[762] Neither
Athenians, nor Eleians, nor Arcadians, desired to see Sparta
strengthened. None had any interest in prolonging the war, with
prospects doubtful to every one; while all wished to see the large
armies now in Arcadia dismissed. Accordingly, the peace was sworn to
on these conditions, and the autonomy of Messênê guaranteed, by all,
except the Spartans; who alone stood out, keeping themselves without
friends or auxiliaries, in the hope for better times,—rather than
submit to what they considered as an intolerable degradation.[763]

  [762] See the oration of Demosthenes on behalf of the
  Megalopolitans (Orat. xvi, s. 10, p. 204; s. 21, p. 206).

  [763] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 35; Diodor. xv, 89; Polybius, iv,
  33.

  Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellen. B.C. 361) assigns the
  conclusion of peace to the succeeding year. I do not know however
  what ground there is for assuming such an interval between the
  battle and the peace. Diodorus appears to place the latter
  immediately after the former. This would not count for much,
  indeed, against any considerable counter-probability; but the
  probability here (in my judgment) is rather in favor of immediate
  sequence between the two events.

Under these conditions, the armies on both sides retired. Xenophon
is right in saying, that neither party gained anything, either city,
territory, or dominion; though before the battle, considering the
magnitude of the two contending armies, every one had expected
that the victors, whichever they were, would become masters, and
the vanquished, subjects. But his assertion,—that “there was more
disturbance, and more matter of dispute, in Greece, after the battle
than before it,”—must be interpreted, partly as the inspiration of
a philo-Laconian sentiment, which regards a peace not accepted by
Sparta as no peace at all,—partly as based on the circumstance,
that no definite headship was recognized as possessed by any state.
Sparta had once enjoyed it, and had set the disgraceful example of
suing out a confirmation of it from the Persian king at the peace of
Antalkidas. Both Thebes and Athens had aspired to the same dignity,
and both by the like means, since the battle of Leuktra; neither
of them had succeeded. Greece was thus left without a head, and
to this extent the affirmation of Xenophon is true. But it would
not be correct to suppose that the last expedition of Epaminondas
into Peloponnesus was unproductive of any results,—though it was
disappointed of its great and brilliant fruits by his untimely
death. Before he marched in, the Theban party in Arcadia, (Tegea,
Megalopolis, etc.), was on the point of being crushed by the
Mantineans and their allies. His expedition, though ending in an
indecisive victory, nevertheless broke up the confederacy enlisted
in support of Mantinea; enabling Tegea and Megalopolis to maintain
themselves against their Arcadian opponents, and thus leaving the
frontier against Sparta unimpaired. While therefore we admit the
affirmation of Xenophon,—that Thebes did not gain by the battle
either city, or territory, or dominion,—we must at the same time add,
that she gained the preservation of her Arcadian allies, and of her
anti-Spartan frontier, including Messênê.

This was a gain of considerable importance. But dearly, indeed, was
it purchased, by the blood of her first hero, shed on the field of
Mantinea; not to mention his two seconds, whom we know only from his
verdict,—Daiphantus and Iolaidas.[764] He was buried on the field of
battle, and a monumental column was erected on his tomb.

  [764] Pausanias, viii, 11, 4, 5.

Scarcely any character in Grecian history has been judged with
so much unanimity as Epaminondas. He has obtained a meed of
admiration,—from all, sincere and hearty,—from some, enthusiastic.
Cicero pronounces him to be the first man of Greece.[765] The
judgment of Polybius, though not summed up so emphatically in a
single epithet, is delivered in a manner hardly less significant
and laudatory. Nor was it merely historians or critics who formed
this judgment. The best men of action, combining the soldier and
the patriot, such as Timoleon and Philopœmen,[766] set before them
Epaminondas as their model to copy. The remark has been often made,
and suggests itself whenever we speak of Epaminondas, though its
full force will be felt only when we come to follow the subsequent
history,—that with him the dignity and commanding influence of Thebes
both began and ended. His period of active political life comprehends
sixteen years, from the resurrection of Thebes into a free community,
by the expulsion of the Lacedæmonian harmost and garrison, and the
subversion of the ruling oligarchy,—to the fatal day of Mantinea
(379-362 B.C.). His prominent and unparalleled ascendency belongs
to the last eight years, from the victory of Leuktra (371 B.C.).
Throughout this whole period, both all that we know and all that we
can reasonably divine, fully bears out the judgment of Polybius and
Cicero, who had the means of knowing much more. And this too,—let it
be observed,—though Epaminondas is tried by a severe canon: for the
chief contemporary witness remaining is one decidedly hostile. Even
the philo-Laconian Xenophon finds neither misdeeds nor omissions to
reveal in the capital enemy of Sparta,—mentions him only to record
what is honorable,—and manifests the perverting bias mainly by
suppressing or slurring over his triumphs. The man whose eloquence
bearded Agesilaus at the congress immediately preceding the battle
of Leuktra,[767]—who in that battle stripped Sparta of her glory,
and transferred the wreath to Thebes,—who a few months afterwards,
not only ravaged all the virgin territory of Laconia, but cut off
the best half of it for the restitution of independent Messênê,
and erected the hostile Arcadian community of Megalopolis on its
frontier,—the author of these fatal disasters inspires to Xenophon
such intolerable chagrin and antipathy, that in the two first he
keeps back the name, and in the third, suppresses the thing done.
But in the last campaign, preceding the battle of Mantinea (whereby
Sparta incurred no positive loss, and where the death of Epaminondas
softened every predisposition against him), there was no such
violent pressure upon the fidelity of the historian. Accordingly,
the concluding chapter of Xenophon’s ‘Hellenica’ contains a
panegyric,[768] ample and unqualified, upon the military merits of
the Theban general; upon his daring enterprise, his comprehensive
foresight, his care to avoid unnecessary exposure of soldiers, his
excellent discipline, his well-combined tactics, his fertility of
aggressive resource in striking at the weak points of the enemy,
who content themselves with following and parrying his blows (to
use a simile of Demosthenes[769]) like an unskilful pugilist, and
only succeed in doing so by signal aid from accident. The effort of
strategic genius, then for the first time devised and applied, of
bringing an irresistible force of attack to bear on one point of
the hostile line, while the rest of his army was kept comparatively
back until the action had been thus decided,—is clearly noted by
Xenophon, together with its triumphant effect, at the battle of
Mantinea; though the very same combination on the field of Leuktra is
slurred over in his description, as if it were so commonplace as not
to require any mention of the chief with whom it originated. Compare
Epaminondas with Agesilaus,—how great is the superiority of the
first,—even in the narrative of Xenophon, the earnest panegyrist of
the other! How manifestly are we made to see that nothing except the
fatal spear-wound at Mantinea, prevented him from reaping the fruit
of a series of admirable arrangements, and from becoming arbiter of
Peloponnesus, including Sparta herself!

  [765] Cicero, Tusculan. i, 2, 4; De Orator. iii, 34, 139.
  “Epaminondas, princeps, meo judicio, Græciæ,” etc.

  [766] Plutarch, Philopœmen, c. 3; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 36.

  [767] See the inscription of four lines copied by Pausanias from
  the statue of Epaminondas at Thebes (Paus. ix, 16, 3):—

    Ἡμετέραις βουλαῖς Σπάρτη μὲν ἐκείρατο δόξαν, etc.

  [768] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 5, 8, 9.

  [769] Demosthenes, Philipp. I, p. 51, s. 46.

The military merits alone of Epaminondas, had they merely belonged to
a general of mercenaries, combined with nothing praiseworthy in other
ways,—would have stamped him as a man of high and original genius,
above every other Greek, antecedent or contemporary. But it is the
peculiar excellence of this great man that we are not compelled
to borrow from one side of his character in order to compensate
deficiencies in another.[770] His splendid military capacity was
never prostituted to personal ends: neither to avarice, nor ambition,
nor overweening vanity. Poor at the beginning of his life, he left at
the end of it not enough to pay his funeral expenses; having despised
the many opportunities for enrichment which his position afforded,
as well as the richest offers from foreigners.[771] Of ambition he
had so little, by natural temperament, that his friends accused him
of torpor. But as soon as the perilous exposure of Thebes required
it, he displayed as much energy in her defence as the most ambitious
of her citizens, without any of that captious exigence, frequent
in ambitious men, as to the amount of glorification or deference
due to him from his countrymen. And his personal vanity was so
faintly kindled, even after the prodigious success at Leuktra, that
we find him serving in Thessaly as a private hoplite in the ranks,
and in the city as an ædile or inferior street-magistrate, under
the title of Telearchus. An illustrious specimen of that capacity
and goodwill, both to command and to be commanded, which Aristotle
pronounces to form in their combination the characteristic feature
of the worthy citizen.[772] He once incurred the displeasure of his
fellow-citizens, for his wise and moderate policy in Achaia, which
they were ill-judged enough to reverse. We cannot doubt also that
he was frequently attacked by political censors and enemies,—the
condition of eminence in every free state; but neither of these
causes ruffled the dignified calmness of his political course. As he
never courted popularity by unworthy arts, so he bore unpopularity
without murmurs, and without angry renunciation of patriotic
duty.[773]

  [770] The remark of Diodorus (xv, 88) upon Epaminondas is more
  emphatic than we usually find in him,—Παρὰ μὲν γὰρ ἑκάστῳ τῶν
  ἄλλων ἓν ἂν εὕροι προτέρημα τῆς δόξης, παρὰ δὲ τούτῳ πάσας τὰς
  ἀρετὰς ἠθροισμένας.

  [771] Polybius, xxxii, 8, 6. Cornelius Nepos (Epaminondas, c.
  4) gives one anecdote, among several which he affirms to have
  found on record, of large pecuniary presents tendered to, and
  repudiated by, Epaminondas; an anecdote recounted with so much
  precision of detail, that it appears to deserve credit, though we
  cannot assign the exact time when the alleged briber Diomedon of
  Kyzicus, came to Thebes.

  Plutarch (De Genio Socratis, p. 583 F.) relates an incident about
  Jason of Pheræ tendering money in vain to Epaminondas, which
  cannot well have happened before the liberation of the Kadmeia
  (the period to which Plutarch’s dialogue assigns it), but may
  have happened afterwards.

  Compare Plutarch, Apophthegm. Reg. p. 193 C.; and Plutarch’s Life
  of Fabius Maximus, c. 27.

  [772] Aristotel. Politic. iii, 2, 10.

  [773] Plutarch, Compar. Alkibiad. and Coriolanus, c. 4. Ἐπεὶ τό
  γε μὴ λιπαρῆ μηδὲ θεραπευτικὸν ὄχλων εἶναι, καὶ Μέτελλος εἶχε
  καὶ Ἀριστείδης καὶ Ἐπαμεινώνδας· ἀλλὰ τῷ καταφρονεῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς
  ὧν δῆμός ἐστι καὶ δοῦναι καὶ ἀφελέσθαι κύριος, ἐξοστρακιζόμενοι
  καὶ ἀποχειροτονούμενοι καὶ καταδικαζόμενοι πολλάκις οὐκ ὠργίζοντο
  τοῖς πολίταις ἀγνωμονοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ ἠγάπων αὖθις μεταμελομένους καὶ
  διηλλάττοντο παρακαλούντων.

The mildness of his antipathies against political opponents at home
was undeviating; and, what is even more remarkable, amidst the
precedence and practice of the Grecian world, his hostility against
foreign enemies, Bœotian dissentients, and Theban exiles, was
uniformly free from reactionary vengeance. Sufficient proofs have
been adduced in the preceding pages of this rare union of attributes
in the same individual; of lofty disinterestedness, not merely
as to corrupt gains, but as to the more seductive irritabilities
of ambition, combined with a just measure of attachment towards
partisans, and unparalleled gentleness towards enemies. His
friendship with Pelopidas was never disturbed during the fifteen
years of their joint political career; an absence of jealousy signal
and creditable to both, though most creditable to Pelopidas, the
richer, as well as the inferior, man of the two. To both, and to
the harmonious coöperation of both, Thebes owed her short-lived
splendor and ascendency. Yet when we compare the one with the other,
we not only miss in Pelopidas the transcendent strategic genius and
conspicuous eloquence, but even the constant vigilance and prudence,
which never deserted his friend. If Pelopidas had had Epaminondas as
his companion in Thessaly, he would hardly have trusted himself to
the good faith, nor tasted the dungeon, of the Pheræan Alexander; nor
would he have rushed forward to certain destruction, in a transport
of phrensy, at the view of that hated tyrant in the subsequent battle.

In eloquence, Epaminondas would doubtless have found superiors at
Athens; but at Thebes, he had neither equal, nor predecessor, nor
successor. Under the new phase into which Thebes passed by the
expulsion of the Lacedæmonians out of the Kadmeia, such a gift was
second in importance only to the great strategic qualities; while
the combination of both elevated their possessor into the envoy,
the counsellor, the debater, of his country,[774] as well as her
minister at war and commander-in-chief. The shame of acknowledging
Thebes as leading state in Greece, embodied in the current phrases
about Bœotian stupidity, would be sensibly mitigated, when her
representative in an assembled congress spoke with the flowing
abundance of the Homeric Odysseus, instead of the loud, brief, and
hurried bluster of Menelaus.[775] The possession of such eloquence,
amidst the uninspiring atmosphere of Thebes, implied far greater
mental force than a similar accomplishment would have betokened at
Athens. In Epaminondas, it was steadily associated with thought and
action,—that triple combination of thinking, speaking, and acting,
which Isokrates and other Athenian sophists[776] set before their
hearers as the stock and qualification for meritorious civic life. To
the bodily training and soldier-like practice, common to all Thebans,
Epaminondas added an ardent intellectual impulse and a range of
discussion with the philosophical men around, peculiar to himself.
He was not floated into public life by the accident of birth or
wealth,—nor hoisted and propped up by oligarchical clubs,—nor even
determined to it originally by any spontaneous ambition of his own.
But the great revolution of 379 B.C., which expelled from Thebes
both the Lacedæmonian garrison and the local oligarchy who ruled
by its aid, forced him forward by the strongest obligations both
of duty and interest; since nothing but an energetic defence could
rescue both him and every other free Theban from slavery. It was
by the like necessity that the American revolution, and the first
French revolution, thrust into the front rank the most instructed and
capable men of the country, whether ambitious by temperament or not.
As the pressure of the time impelled Epaminondas forward, so it also
disposed his countrymen to look out for a competent leader wherever
he was to be found; and in no other living man could they obtain the
same union of the soldier, the general, the orator, and the patriot.
Looking through all Grecian history, it is only in Perikles that we
find the like many-sided excellence; for though much inferior to
Epaminondas as a general, Perikles must be held superior to him as a
statesman. But it is alike true of both,—and the remark tends much
to illustrate the sources of Grecian excellence,—that neither sprang
exclusively from the school of practice and experience. They both
brought to that school minds exercised in the conversation of the
most instructed philosophers and sophists accessible to them,—trained
to varied intellectual combinations and to a larger range of subjects
than those that came before the public assembly,—familiarized with
reasonings which the scrupulous piety of Nikias forswore, and which
the devoted military patriotism of Pelopidas disdained.

  [774] See an anecdote about Epaminondas as the diplomatist and
  negotiator on behalf of Thebes against Athens—δικαιολογούμενος,
  etc. Athenæus, xiv, p. 650 E.

  [775] Homer, Iliad, iii, 210-220 (Menelaus and Odysseus)—

    Ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ Τρώεσσιν ἀγειρομένοισιν ἔμιχθεν,
    Ἤτοι μὲν Μενέλαος ἐπιτροχάδην ἀγόρευε,
    Παῦρα μὲν, ἀλλὰ μάλα λιγέως· ἐπεὶ οὐ πολύμυθος, etc.
    ... Ἀλλ’ ὅτε δή ῥ’ ὄπα τε μεγάλην ἐκ στήθεος ἵει (Odysseus),
    Καὶ ἔπεα νιφάδεσσιν ἐοικότα χειμερίῃσιν,
    Οὐκέτ’ ἔπειτ’ Ὀδυσῆΐ γ’ ἐρίσσειε βροτὸς ἄλλος, etc.

  [776] See Vol. VIII. of this History, Ch. lxvii, p.
  357-397—φρονεῖν, λέγειν, καὶ πράττειν, etc.

On one point, as I have already noticed, the policy recommended by
Epaminondas to his countrymen appears of questionable wisdom,—his
advice to compete with Athens for transmarine and naval power.
One cannot recognize in this advice the same accurate estimate of
permanent causes,—the same long-sighted view, of the conditions of
strength to Thebes and of weakness to her enemies, which dictated the
foundation of Messênê and Megalopolis. These two towns, when once
founded, took such firm root, that Sparta could not persuade even
her own allies to aid in effacing them; a clear proof of the sound
reasoning on which their founder had proceeded. What Epaminondas
would have done,—whether he would have followed out maxims equally
prudent and penetrating,—if he had survived the victory of
Mantinea,—is a point which we cannot pretend to divine. He would
have found himself then on a pinnacle of glory, and invested with a
plenitude of power, such as no Greek ever held without abusing. But
all that we know of Epaminondas justifies the conjecture that he
would have been found equal, more than any other Greek, even to this
great trial; and that his untimely death shut him out from a future
not less honorable to himself, than beneficial to Thebes and to
Greece generally.

Of the private life and habits of Epaminondas we know scarcely
anything. We are told that he never married; and we find brief
allusions, without any details, to attachments in which he is said
to have indulged.[777] Among the countrymen of Pindar,[778] devoted
attachment between mature men and beautiful youths was more frequent
than in other parts of Greece. It was confirmed by interchange of
mutual oaths at the tomb of Iolaus, and was reckoned upon as the
firmest tie of military fidelity in the hour of battle. Asopichus
and Kaphisodorus are named as youths to whom Epaminondas was much
devoted. The first fought with desperate bravery at the battle of
Leuktra, and after the victory caused an image of the Leuktrian
trophy to be carved on his shield, which he dedicated at Delphi;[779]
the second perished along with his illustrious friend and chief on
the field of Mantinea, and was buried in a grave closely adjacent to
him.[780]

  [777] Plutarch, Apophtheg. Reg. p. 192 E. Athenæ. xiii, p. 590 C.

  [778] Hieronymus ap. Athenæ. xiii, p. 602 A.; Plutarch,
  Pelopidas, c. 18; Xen. Rep. Lacedæmon. ii, 12.

  See the striking and impassioned fragment of Pindar, addressed by
  him when old to the youth Theoxenus of Tenedos, Fragm. 2 of the
  Skolia, in Dissen’s edition, and Boeckh’s edition of Pindar, vol.
  iii, p. 611, ap. Athenæum, xiii, p. 605 C.

  [779] See Theopompus, Frag. 182, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæ. xiii, p.
  605 A.

  [780] Plutarch, Pelopid. _ut sup._; Plutarch, Amatorius, p. 761
  D.; compare Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 39.

It rather appears that the Spartans, deeply incensed against their
allies for having abandoned them in reference to Messênê, began to
turn their attention away from the affairs of Greece to those of Asia
and Egypt. But the dissensions in Arcadia were not wholly appeased
even by the recent peace. The city of Megalopolis had been founded
only eight years before by the coalescence of many smaller townships,
all previously enjoying a separate autonomy more or less perfect. The
vehement anti-Spartan impulse, which marked the two years immediately
succeeding the battle of Leuktra, had overruled to so great a degree
the prior instincts of these townships, that they had lent themselves
to the plans of Lykomedes and Epaminondas for an enlarged community
in the new city. But since that period, reaction had taken place. The
Mantineans had come to be at the head of an anti-Megalopolitan party
in Arcadia; and several of the communities which had been merged
in Megalopolis, counting upon aid from them and from the Eleians,
insisted on seceding, and returning to their original autonomy. But
for foreign aid, Megalopolis would now have been in great difficulty.
A pressing request was sent to the Thebans, who despatched into
Arcadia three thousand hoplites under Pammenes. This force enabled
the Megalopolitans, though not without measures of considerable
rigor, to uphold the integrity of their city, and keep the refractory
members in communion.[781] And it appears that the interference thus
obtained was permanently efficacious, so that the integrity of this
recent Pan-Arcadian community was no farther disturbed.

  [781] Diodor. xv, 94.

  I venture here to depart from Diodorus, who states that these
  three thousand men were _Athenians_, not _Thebans_; that the
  Megalopolitans sent to ask aid from _Athens_, and that the
  _Athenians_ sent these three thousand men under Pammenes.

  That Diodorus (or the copyist) has here mistaken Thebans for
  Athenians, appears to me, on the following grounds:—

  1. Whoever reads attentively the oration delivered by Demosthenes
  in the Athenian assembly (about ten years after this period)
  respecting the propriety of sending an armed force to defend
  Megalopolis against the threats of Sparta—will see, I think,
  that Athens can never before have sent any military assistance
  to Megalopolis. Both the arguments which Demosthenes urges, and
  those which he combats as having been urged by opponents, exclude
  the reality of any such previous proceeding.

  2. Even at the time when the above-mentioned oration was
  delivered, the Megalopolitans were still (compare Diodorus,
  xvi, 39) under special alliance with, and guardianship of,
  Thebes—though the latter had then been so much weakened by the
  Sacred War and other causes, that it seemed doubtful whether
  she could give them complete protection against Sparta. But
  in the year next after the battle of Mantinea, the alliance
  between Megalopolis and Thebes, as well as the hostility between
  Megalopolis and Athens, was still fresher and more intimate. The
  Thebans (then in unimpaired power), who had fought for them in
  the preceding year,—not the Athenians, who had fought against
  them,—would be the persons invoked for aid to Megalopolis; nor
  had any positive reverses as yet occurred to disable the Thebans
  from furnishing aid.

  3. Lastly, Pammenes is a _Theban_ general, friend of Epaminondas.
  He is mentioned as such not only by Diodorus himself in another
  place (xvi, 34), but also by Pausanias (viii, 27, 2), as
  the general who had been sent to watch over the building of
  Megalopolis, by Plutarch (Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 26; Plutarch,
  Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p. 805 F.), and by Polyænus (v, 16, 3).
  We find a private Athenian citizen named Pammenes, a goldsmith,
  mentioned in the oration of Demosthenes against Meidias (s. 31.
  p. 521); but no Athenian officer or public man of that time so
  named.

  Upon these grounds, I cannot but feel convinced that Pammenes and
  his troops were Thebans, and not Athenians.

  I am happy to find myself in concurrence with Dr. Thirlwall on
  this point (Hist. Gr. vol. v, ch. xliii, p. 368 note).

The old king Agesilaus was compelled, at the age of eighty, to see
the dominion of Sparta thus irrevocably narrowed, her influence in
Arcadia overthrown, and the loss of Messênê formally sanctioned even
by her own allies. All his protests, and those of his son Archidamus,
so strenuously set forth by Isokrates, had only ended by isolating
Sparta more than ever from Grecian support and sympathy. Archidamus
probably never seriously attempted to execute the desperate scheme
which he had held out as a threat some two or three years before the
battle of Mantinea; that the Lacedæmonians would send away their
wives and families, and convert their military population into
a perpetual camp, never to lay down arms until they should have
reconquered Messênê or perished in the attempt.[782] Yet he and his
father, though deserted by all Grecian allies, had not yet abandoned
the hope that they might obtain aid, in the shape of money for
levying mercenary troops, from the native princes in Egypt and the
revolted Persian satraps in Asia, with whom they seem to have been
for some time in a sort of correspondence.[783]

  [782] See Isokrates, Orat. vi, (Archidamus) s. 85-93.

  [783] Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archid.) s. 73.

About the time of the battle of Mantinea,—and as it would seem,
for some years before,—a large portion of the western dominions of
the Great King were in a state partly of revolt, partly of dubious
obedience. Egypt had been for some years in actual revolt, and
under native princes, whom the Persians had vainly endeavored to
subdue (employing for that purpose the aid of the Athenian generals
Iphikrates and Timotheus) both in 374 and 371 B.C. Ariobarzanes,
satrap of the region near the Propontis and the Hellespont, appears
to have revolted about the year 367-366 B.C. In other parts of Asia
Minor, too,—Paphlagonia, Pisidia, etc.,—the subordinate princes or
governors became disaffected to Artaxerxes. But their disaffection
was for a certain time kept down by the extraordinary ability and
vigor of a Karian named Datames, commander for the king in a part
of Kappadokia, who gained several important victories over them
by rapidity of movement and well-combined stratagem. At length
the services of Datames became so distinguished as to excite the
jealousy of many of the Persian grandees; who poisoned the royal
mind against him, and thus drove him to raise the standard of revolt
in his own district of Kappadokia, under alliance and concert with
Ariobarzanes. It was in vain that Autophradates, satrap of Lydia,
was sent by Artaxerxes with a powerful force to subdue Datames. The
latter resisted all the open force of Persia, and was at length
overcome only by the treacherous conspiracy of Mithridates (son of
Ariobarzanes), who, corrupted by the Persian court and becoming a
traitor both to his father Ariobarzanes and to Datames, simulated
zealous coöperation, tempted the latter to a confidential interview,
and there assassinated him.[784]

  [784] Cornelius Nepos has given a biography of Datames at some
  length, recounting his military exploits and stratagems. He
  places Datames, in point of military talent, above all _barbari_,
  except Hamilcar Barca and Hannibal (c. 1). Polyænus also (vii,
  29) recounts several memorable proceedings of the same chief.
  Compare too Diodorus, xv, 91; and Xen. Cyropæd. viii, 8, 4.

  We cannot make out with any certainty either the history, or the
  chronology, of Datames. His exploits seem to belong to the last
  ten years of Artaxerxes Mnemon, and his death seems to have taken
  place a little before the death of that prince; which last event
  is to be assigned to 359-358 B.C. See Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fast.
  Hell. ch. 18. p. 316, Appendix.

Still, however, there remained powerful princes and satraps in Asia
Minor, disaffected to the court; Mausôlus, prince of Karia; Orontes,
satrap of Mysia, and Autophradates, satrap of Lydia,—the last having
now apparently joined the revolters, though he had before been
active in upholding the authority of the king. It seems too that the
revolt extended to Syria and Phœnicia, so that all the western coast
with its large revenues, as well as Egypt, was at once subtracted
from the empire. Tachos, native king of Egypt, was prepared to lend
assistance to this formidable combination of disaffected commanders,
who selected Orontes as their chief; confiding to him their united
forces, and sending Rheomithres to Egypt to procure pecuniary
aid. But the Persian court broke the force of this combination
by corrupting both Orontes and Rheomithres, who betrayed their
confederates, and caused the enterprise to fail. Of the particulars
we know little or nothing.[785]

  [785] Diodor. xv, 91, 92; Xenophon, Cyropæd. viii, 8, 4.

  Our information about these disturbances in the interior of
  the Persian empire is so scanty and confused, that few of the
  facts can be said to be certainly known. Diodorus has evidently
  introduced into the year 362-361 B.C. a series of events, many
  of them belonging to years before and after. Rehdantz (Vit.
  Iphicrat. Chabr. et. Timoth. p. 154-161) brings together all the
  statements; but unfortunately with little result.

Both the Spartan king Agesilaus, with a thousand Lacedæmonian or
Peloponnesian hoplites,—and the Athenian general Chabrias, were
invited to Egypt to command the forces of Tachos; the former on
land, the latter at sea. Chabrias came simply as a volunteer,
without any public sanction or order from Athens. But the service of
Agesilaus was undertaken for the purposes and with the consent of the
authorities at home, attested by the presence of thirty Spartans who
came out as his counsellors. The Spartans were displeased with the
Persian king for having sanctioned the independence of Messênê; and
as the prospect of overthrowing or enfeebling his empire appeared
at this moment considerable, they calculated on reaping a large
reward for their services to the Egyptian prince, who would in return
lend them assistance towards their views in Greece. But dissension
and bad judgment marred all the combinations against the Persian
king. Agesilaus, on reaching Egypt,[786] was received with little
respect. The Egyptians saw with astonishment, that one, whom they
had invited as a formidable warrior, was a little deformed old man,
of mean attire, and sitting on the grass with his troops, careless
of show or luxury. They not only vented their disappointment in
sarcastic remarks, but also declined to invest him with the supreme
command, as he had anticipated. He was only recognized as general
of the mercenary land force, while Tachos himself commanded in
chief, and Chabrias was at the head of the fleet. Great efforts
were made to assemble a force competent to act against the Great
King; and Chabrias is said to have suggested various stratagems
for obtaining money from the Egyptians.[787] The army having been
thus strengthened, Agesilaus, though discontented and indignant,
nevertheless accompanied Tachos on an expedition against the Persian
forces in Phœnicia; from whence they were forced to return by the
revolt of Nektanebis, cousin of Tachos, who caused himself to be
proclaimed king of Egypt. Tachos was now full of supplications to
Agesilaus to sustain him against his competitor for the Egyptian
throne; while Nektanebis, also on his side, began to bid high for
the favor of the Spartans. With the sanction of the authorities at
home, but in spite of the opposition of Chabrias, Agesilaus decided
in favor of Nektanebis, withdrawing the mercenaries from the camp of
Tachos,[788] who was accordingly obliged to take flight. Chabrias
returned home to Athens; either not choosing to abandon Tachos, whom
he had come to serve,—or recalled by special order of his countrymen,
in consequence of the remonstrance of the Persian king. A competitor
for the throne presently arose in the Mendesian division of Egypt.
Agesilaus, vigorously maintaining the cause of Nektanebis, defeated
all the efforts of his opponent. Yet his great schemes against
the Persian empire were abandoned, and nothing was effected as
the result of his Egyptian expedition except the establishment of
Nektanebis; who, having in vain tried to prevail upon him to stay
longer, dismissed him in the winter season with large presents, and
with a public donation to Sparta of two hundred and thirty talents.
Agesilaus marched from the Nile towards Kyrênê, in order to obtain
from that town and its ports ships for the passage home. But he died
on the march, without reaching Kyrênê. His body was conveyed home by
his troops, for burial, in a preparation of wax, since honey was not
to be obtained.[789]

  [786] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 36; Athenæus, xiv, p. 616 D.;
  Cornelius Nepos, Agesil. c. 8.

  [787] See Pseudo-Aristotel. Œconomic. ii, 25.

  [788] Diodorus (xv, 93) differs from Plutarch and others (whom
  I follow) in respect to the relations of Tachos and Nektanebis
  with Agesilaus; affirming that Agesilaus supported Tachos, and
  supported him with success, against Nektanebis.

  Compare Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 2, 3.

  We find Chabrias serving Athens in the Chersonese—in 359-358 B.C.
  (Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 204).

  [789] Diodor. xv, 93; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 38-40; Cornelius
  Nepos, Agesil. 8.

Thus expired, at an age somewhat above eighty, the ablest and most
energetic of the Spartan kings. He has enjoyed the advantage,
denied to every other eminent Grecian leader, that his character
and exploits have been set out in the most favorable point of view
by a friend and companion,—Xenophon. Making every allowance for
partiality in this picture, there will still remain a really great
and distinguished character. We find the virtues of a soldier, and
the abilities of a commander, combined with strenuous personal will
and decision, in such measure as to ensure for Agesilaus constant
ascendency over the minds of others far beyond what was naturally
incident to his station; and that, too, in spite of conspicuous
bodily deformity, amidst a nation eminently sensitive on that point.
Of the merits which Xenophon ascribes to him, some are the fair
results of a Spartan education;—his courage, simplicity of life, and
indifference to indulgences,—his cheerful endurance of hardship under
every form. But his fidelity to engagements, his uniform superiority
to pecuniary corruption, and those winning and hearty manners which
attached to him all around—were virtues not Spartan but personal
to himself. We find in him, however, more analogy to Lysander—a
man equally above reproach on the score of pecuniary gain—than to
Brasidas or Kallikratidas. Agesilaus succeeded to the throne, with
a disputed title, under the auspices and through the intrigues of
Lysander; whose influence, at that time predominant both at Sparta
and in Greece, had planted everywhere dekarchies and harmosts as
instruments of ascendency for imperial Sparta—and under the name of
Sparta, for himself. Agesilaus, too high-spirited to comport himself
as second to any one, speedily broke through so much of the system as
had been constructed to promote the personal dominion of Lysander;
yet without following out the same selfish aspirations, or seeking
to build up the like individual dictatorship, on his own account.
His ambition was indeed unbounded, but it was for Sparta in the
first place, and for himself only in the second. The misfortune was,
that in his measures for upholding and administering the imperial
authority of Sparta, he still continued that mixture of domestic and
foreign coërcion (represented by the dekarchy and the harmost) which
had been introduced by Lysander; a sad contrast with the dignified
equality, and emphatic repudiation of partisan interference,
proclaimed by Brasidas, as the watchword of Sparta, at Akanthus and
Torônê—and with the still nobler Pan-hellenic aims of Kallikratidas.

The most glorious portion of the life of Agesilaus was that spent
in his three Asiatic campaigns, when acting under the miso-Persian
impulse for which his panegyrist gives him so much credit.[790]

  [790] Xenoph. Encom. Ages. vii, 7. Εἰ δ’ αὖ καλὸν καὶ μισοπέρσην
  εἶναι, etc.

He was here employed in a Pan-hellenic purpose, to protect the
Asiatic Greeks against that subjection to Persia which Sparta herself
had imposed upon them a few years before, as the price of Persian aid
against Athens.

The Persians presently succeeded in applying the lessons of Sparta
against herself, and in finding Grecian allies to make war upon her
near home. Here was an end of the Pan-hellenic sentiment, and of the
truly honorable ambition, in the bosom of Agesilaus. He was recalled
to make war nearer home. His obedience to the order of recall is
greatly praised by Plutarch and Xenophon—in my judgment, with little
reason, since he had no choice but to come back. But he came back an
altered man. His miso-Persian feeling had disappeared, and had been
exchanged for a miso-Theban sentiment which gradually acquired the
force of a passion. As principal conductor of the war between 394-387
B.C., he displayed that vigor and ability which never forsook him
in military operations. But when he found that the empire of Sparta
near home could not be enforced except by making her the ally of
Persia and the executor of a Persian rescript, he was content to
purchase such aid, in itself dishonorable, by the still greater
dishonor of sacrificing the Asiatic Greeks. For the time, his policy
seemed to succeed. From 387-379 B.C. (that is, down to the time of
the revolution at Thebes, effected by Pelopidas and his small band),
the ascendency of Sparta on land, in Central Greece, was continually
rising. But her injustice and oppression stand confessed even by her
panegyrist Xenophon; and this is just the period when the influence
of Agesilaus was at its maximum. Afterwards we find him personally
forward in sheltering Sphodrias from punishment, and thus bringing
upon his countrymen a war with Athens as well as with Thebes. In the
conduct of that war his military operations were, as usual, strenuous
and able, with a certain measure of success. But on the whole, the
war turns out unfavorably for Sparta. In 371 B.C., she is obliged to
accept peace on terms very humiliating, as compared with her position
in 387 B.C.; and the only compensation which she receives, is, the
opportunity of striking the Thebans out of the treaty, thus leaving
them to contend single-handed against what seemed overwhelming odds.
Of this intense miso-Theban impulse, which so speedily brought about
the unexpected and crushing disaster at Leuktra, Agesilaus stands
out as the prominent spokesman. In the days of Spartan misfortune
which followed, we find his conduct creditable and energetic, so
far as the defensive position, in which Sparta then found herself,
allowed; and though Plutarch seems displeased with him[791] for
obstinacy in refusing to acknowledge the autonomy of Messênê (at the
peace concluded after the battle of Mantinea), when acknowledged
by all the other Greeks,—yet it cannot be shown that this refusal
brought any actual mischief to Sparta; and circumstances might well
have so turned out, that it would have been a gain.

  [791] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 35.

On the whole, in spite of the many military and personal merits of
Agesilaus, as an adviser and politician he deserves little esteem.
We are compelled to remark the melancholy contrast between the state
in which he found Sparta at his accession, and that wherein he left
her at his death—“Marmoream invenit, lateritiam reliquit.” Nothing
but the death of Epaminondas at Mantinea saved her from something
yet worse; though it would be unfair to Agesilaus, while we are
considering the misfortunes of Sparta during his reign, not to
recollect that Epaminondas was an enemy more formidable than she had
ever before encountered.

The efficient service rendered by Agesilaus during his last
expedition to Egypt, had the effect of establishing firmly the
dominion of Nektanebis the native king, and of protecting that
country for the time from being reconquered by the Persians; an event
that did not happen until a few years afterwards, during the reign of
the next Persian king. Of the extensive revolt, however, which at one
time threatened to wrest from the Persian crown Asia Minor as well as
Egypt, no permanent consequence remained. The treachery of Orontes
and Rheomithres so completely broke up the schemes of the revolters,
that Artaxerxes Mnemon still maintained the Persian empire (with the
exception of Egypt), unimpaired.

He died not long after the suppression of the revolt (apparently
about a year after it, in 359-358 B.C.), having reigned forty-five
or forty-six years.[792] His death was preceded by one of those
bloody tragedies which so frequently stained the transmission of
a Persian sceptre. Darius, the eldest son of Artaxerxes, had been
declared by his father successor to the throne. According to Persian
custom, the successor thus declared was entitled to prefer any
petition which he pleased; the monarch being held bound to grant
it. Darius availed himself of the privilege to ask for one of the
favorite inmates of his father’s harem, for whom he had contracted a
passion. The request so displeased Artaxerxes, that he seemed likely
to make a new appointment as to the succession; discarding Darius
and preferring his younger son Ochus, whose interests were warmly
espoused by Atossa, wife as well as daughter of the monarch. Alarmed
at this prospect, Darius was persuaded by a discontented courtier,
named Teribazus, to lay a plot for assassinating Artaxerxes; but the
plot was betrayed, and the king caused both Darius and Teribazus
to be put to death. By this catastrophe the chance of Ochus was
improved, and his ambition yet farther stimulated. But there still
remained two princes, older than he—Arsames and Ariaspes. Both these
brothers he contrived to put out of the way; the one by a treacherous
deceit, entrapping him to take poison,—the other by assassination.
Ochus thus stood next as successor to the crown, which was not long
denied to him,—for Artaxerxes, now very old and already struck down
by the fatal consummation respecting his eldest son, Darius, did not
survive the additional sorrow of seeing his two other sons die so
speedily afterwards.[793] He expired, and his son Ochus, taking the
name of Artaxerxes, succeeded to him without opposition; manifesting
as king the same sanguinary dispositions as those by which he had
placed himself on the throne.

  [792] Diodor. xv, 93.

  There is a difference between Diodorus and the Astronomical
  Canon, in the statements about the length of reign, and date of
  death, of Artaxerxes Mnemon, of about two years—361 or 359 B.C.
  See Mr. Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, ch. 18. p. 316—where
  the statements are brought together and discussed. Plutarch
  states the reign of Artaxerxes Mnemon to have lasted sixty-two
  years (Plutarch, Artax. c. 33); which cannot be correct, though
  in what manner the error is to be amended, we cannot determine.

  An Inscription of Mylasa in Karia recognizes the forty-fifth year
  of the reign of Artaxerxes, and thus supports the statement in
  the Astronomical Canon, which assigns to him forty-six years of
  reign. See Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. No. 2691, with his comments, p.
  470.

  This same inscription affords ground of inference respecting the
  duration of the revolt; for it shows that the Karian Mausolus
  recognized himself as satrap, and Artaxerxes as his sovereign, in
  the year beginning November 359 B.C., which corresponds with the
  forty-fifth year of Artaxerxes Mnemon. The revolt therefore must
  have been suppressed before that period: see Sievers, Geschichte
  von Griechenland bis zur Schlacht von Mantineia, p. 373, note.

  [793] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 29, 30; Justin, x, 1-3.

  Plutarch states that the lady whom the prince Darius asked for,
  was, Aspasia of Phokæa—the Greek mistress of Cyrus the younger,
  who had fallen into the hands of Artaxerxes after the battle of
  Kunaxa, and had acquired a high place in the monarch’s affections.

  But if we look at the chronology of the case, it will appear
  hardly possible that the lady who inspired so strong a passion
  to Darius, in or about 361 B.C., as to induce him to risk the
  displeasure of his father—and so decided a reluctance on the
  part of Artaxerxes to give her up—can have been the person who
  accompanied Cyrus to Kunaxa _forty years_ before; for the battle
  of Kunaxa was fought in 401 B.C. The chronological improbability
  would be still greater, if we adopted Plutarch’s statement that
  Artaxerxes reigned sixty-two years; for it is certain that the
  battle of Kunaxa occurred very near the beginning of his reign,
  and the death of his son Darius near the end of it.

  Justin states the circumstances which preceded the death of
  Artaxerxes Mnemon in a manner yet more tragical. He affirms that
  the plot against the life of Artaxerxes was concerted by Darius
  in conjunction with several of his brothers; and that, on the
  plot being discovered, all these brothers, together with their
  wives and children, were put to death. Ochus, on coming to the
  throne, put to death a great number of his kinsmen and of the
  principal persons about the court, together with their wives and
  children—fearing a like conspiracy against himself.

During the two years following the battle of Mantinea, Athens, though
relieved by the general peace from land-war, appears to have been
entangled in serious maritime contests and difficulties. She had been
considerably embarrassed by two events; by the Theban naval armament
under Epaminondas, and by the submission of Alexander of Pheræ to
Thebes,—both events belonging to 364-363 B.C. It was in 363-362 B.C.
that the Athenian Timotheus,—having carried on war with eminent
success against Olynthus and the neighboring cities in the Thermaic
Gulf, but with very bad success against Amphipolis,—transferred his
forces to the war against Kotys king of Thrace near the Thracian
Chersonese. The arrival of the Theban fleet in the Hellespont
greatly distracted the Athenian general, and served as a powerful
assistance to Kotys; who was moreover aided by the Athenian general
Iphikrates, on this occasion serving his father-in-law against his
country.[794] Timotheus is said to have carried on war against Kotys
with advantage, and to have acquired for Athens a large plunder.[795]
It would appear that his operations were of an aggressive character,
and that during his command in those regions the Athenian possessions
in the Chersonese were safe from Kotys; for Iphikrates would only
lend his aid to Kotys towards defensive warfare; retiring from his
service when he began to attack the Athenian possessions in the
Chersonese.[796]

  [794] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 153.

  [795] The affirmation of Cornelius Nepos (Timotheus, c. 1), that
  Timotheus made war on Kotys with such success as to bring into
  the Athenian treasury twelve hundred talents, appears extravagant
  as to amount; even if we accept it as generally true.

  [796] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 155.

We do not know what circumstances brought about the dismissal or
retirement of Timotheus from the command. But in the next year,
we find Ergophilus as Athenian commander in the Chersonese,
and Kallisthenes (seemingly) as Athenian commander against
Amphipolis.[797] The transmarine affairs of Athens, however, were
far from improving. Besides that under the new general she seems
to have been losing strength near the Chersonese, she had now upon
her hands a new maritime enemy—Alexander of Pheræ. A short time
previously, he had been her ally against Thebes, but the victories
of the Thebans during the preceding year had so completely humbled
him, that he now identified his cause with theirs; sending troops
to join the expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus,[798] and
equipping a fleet to attack the maritime allies of Athens. His fleet
captured the island of Tenos, ravaged several of the other Cyclades,
and laid siege to Peparethos. Great alarm prevailed in Athens, and
about the end of August (362 B.C.),[799] two months after the battle
of Mantinea, a fleet was equipped with the utmost activity, for the
purpose of defending the insular allies, as well as of acting in the
Hellespont. Vigorous efforts were required from all the trierarchs,
and really exerted by some, to accelerate the departure of this
fleet. But that portion of it, which, while the rest went to the
Hellespont, was sent under Leosthenes to defend Peparethos,—met with
a defeat from the ships of Alexander, with the loss of five triremes
and six hundred prisoners.[800] We are even told that soon after this
naval advantage, the victors were bold enough to make a dash into the
Peiræus itself (as Teleutias had done twenty-seven years before),
where they seized both property on shipboard and men on the quay,
before there was any force ready to repel them.[801] The Thessalian
marauders were ultimately driven back to their harbor of Pegasæ; yet
not without much annoyance to the insular confederates, and some
disgrace to Athens. The defeated admiral Leosthenes was condemned to
death; while several trierarchs,—who, instead of serving in person,
had performed the duties incumbent on them by deputy and by contract,
were censured or put upon trial.[802]

  [797] See Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, p.
  151, and the preceding page.

  M. Rehdantz has put together, with great care and sagacity, all
  the fragments of evidence respecting this obscure period; and
  has elicited, as it seems to me, the most probable conclusions
  deducible from such scanty premises.

  [798] Xenoph. Hellen. vii, 5, 4.

  [799] We are fortunate enough to get this date exactly,—the
  twenty third of the month Metageitnion, in the archonship of
  Molon,—mentioned by Demosthenes adv. Polyklem, p. 1207, s. 5, 6.

  [800] Diodor xvi, 95; Polyænus, vi, 2, 1.

  [801] Polyænus, vi, 2, 2.

  It must have been about this time (362-361 B.C.) that Alexander
  of Pheræ sent envoys into Asia to engage the service of
  Charidemus and his mercenary band, then in or near the troad. His
  application was not accepted (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 675,
  s. 192).

  [802] Demosthenes, de Coronâ Trierarch. p. 1230, s. 9.

  Diodorus farther states that the Athenians placed Chares in
  command of a fleet for the protection of the Ægean; but that this
  admiral took himself off to Korkyra, and did nothing but plunder
  the allies (Diodor. xvi, 95).

Not only had the affairs of Athens in the Hellespont become worse
under Ergophilus than under Timotheus, but Kallisthenes also, who had
succeeded Timotheus in the operations against Amphipolis, achieved no
permanent result. It would appear that the Amphipolitans, to defend
themselves against Athens, had invoked the aid of the Macedonian
king Perdikkas; and placed their city in his hands. That prince had
before acted in conjunction with the Athenian force under Timotheus
against Olynthus; and their joint invasion had so much weakened
the Olynthians as to disable them from affording aid to Amphipolis.
At least, this hypothesis explains how Amphipolis came now, for the
first time, to be no longer a free city; but to be disjoined from
Olynthus, and joined with (probably garrisoned by) Perdikkas, as a
possession of Macedonia.[803] Kallisthenes thus found himself at
war under greater disadvantages than Timotheus; having Perdikkas
as his enemy, together with Amphipolis. Nevertheless, it would
appear, he gained at first great advantages, and reduced Perdikkas
to the necessity of purchasing a truce by the promise to abandon
the Amphipolitans. The Macedonian prince, however, having gained
time during the truce to recover his strength, no longer thought of
performing his promise, but held Amphipolis against the Athenians as
obstinately as before. Kallisthenes had let slip an opportunity which
never again returned. After having announced at Athens the victorious
truce and the approaching surrender, he seems to have been compelled,
on his return, to admit that he had been cheated into suspending
operations, at a moment when (as it seemed) Amphipolis might have
been conquered. For this misjudgment or misconduct he was put upon
trial at Athens, on returning to his disappointed countrymen; and at
the same time Ergophilus also, who had been summoned home from the
Chersonesus for his ill-success or bad management of the war against
Kotys.[804] The people were much incensed against both; but most
against Ergophilus. Nevertheless it happened that Kallisthenes was
tried first, and condemned to death. On the next day, Ergophilus was
tried. But the verdict of the preceding day had discharged the wrath
of the dikasts, and rendered them so much more indulgent, that they
acquitted him.[805]

  [803] Compare Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 669, s. 174-176;
  and Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 250, c. 14.

  [804] The facts as stated in the text are the most probable
  result, as it seems to me, derivable from Æschines, Fals. Leg. p.
  250, c. 14.

  [805] Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii, 3, 3.

  Ergophilus seems to have been fined (Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p.
  398, s. 200).

Autokles was sent in place of Ergophilus to carry on war for Athens
in the Hellespont and Bosphorus. It was not merely against Kotys
that his operations were necessary. The Prokonnesians, allies of
Athens, required protection against the attacks of Kyzikus; besides
which, there was another necessity yet more urgent. The stock of
corn was becoming short, and the price rising, not merely at Athens,
but at many of the islands in the Ægean, and at Byzantium and other
places. There prevailed therefore unusual anxiety, coupled with keen
competition, for the corn in course of importation from the Euxine.
The Byzantines, Chalkedonians, and Kyzikenes, had already begun to
detain the passing corn-ships, for the supply of their own markets;
and nothing less than a powerful Athenian fleet could ensure the safe
transit of such supplies to Athens herself.[806] The Athenian fleet,
guarding the Bosphorus even from the Hieron inwards (the chapel near
the junction of the Bosphorus with the Euxine), provided safe convoy
for the autumnal exports of this essential article.

  [806] Demosthen. adv. Polyklem. p. 1207. s. 6.

In carrying on operations against Kotys, Autokles was favored with
an unexpected advantage by the recent revolt of a powerful Thracian
named Miltokythes against that prince. This revolt so alarmed Kotys,
that he wrote a letter to Athens in a submissive tone, and sent
envoys to purchase peace by various concessions. At the same time
Miltokythes also first sent envoys—next, went in person—to Athens, to
present his own case and solicit aid. He was however coldly received.
The vote of the Athenian assembly, passed on hearing the case (and
probably procured in part through the friends of Iphikrates), was so
unfavorable,[807] as to send him away not merely in discouragement,
but in alarm; while Kotys recovered all his power in Thrace, and
even became master of the Sacred Mountain with its abundance of
wealthy deposits. Nevertheless, in spite of this imprudent vote,
the Athenians really intended to sustain Miltokythes against Kotys.
Their general Autokles was recalled after a few months, and put
upon his trial for having suffered Kotys to put down this enemy
unassisted.[808] How the trial ended or how the justice of the
case stood, we are unable to make out from the passing allusions of
Demosthenes.

  [807] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 655, s. 122; cont.
  Polyklem. p. 1207.

  ὅτε Μιλτοκύθης ἀπέστη Κότυος ... ἐγράφη τι παρ’ ὑμῖν ψήφισμα
  τοιοῦτον, δι’ οὗ Μιλτοκύθης μὲν ~ἀπῆλθε~ φοβηθεὶς καὶ νομίσας
  ὑμᾶς οὐ προσέχειν αὐτῷ, Κότυς δὲ ἐγκρατὴς τοῦ τε ὄρους τοῦ ἱεροῦ
  καὶ τῶν θησαυρῶν ἐγένετο.

  The word ἀπῆλθε implies that Miltokythes was at Athens in person.

  The humble letter written by Kotys, in his first alarm at the
  revolt of Miltokythes, is referred to by the orator, p. 658, s.
  136, 137.

  [808] Demosthenes adv. Polykl. p. 1210, s. 16; Demosthenes cont.
  Aristok. p. 655, s. 123.

Menon was sent as commander to the Hellespont to supersede Autokles;
and was himself again superseded after a few months, by Timomachus.
Convoy for the corn-vessels out of the Euxine became necessary anew,
as in the preceding year; and was furnished a second time during the
autumn of 361 B.C. by the Athenian ships of war;[809] not merely for
provisions under transport to Athens, but also for those going to
Maroneia, Thasos, and other places in or near Thrace. But affairs in
the Chersonese became yet more unfavorable to Athens. In the winter
of 361-360 B.C., Kotys, with the coöperation of a body of Abydene
citizens and Sestian exiles, who crossed the Hellespont from Abydos,
contrived to surprise Sestos;[810] the most important place in the
Chersonese, and the guard-post of the Hellespont on its European
side, for all vessels passing in or out. The whole Chersonese was now
thrown open to his aggressions. He made preparations for attacking
Elæus and Krithôtê, the two other chief possessions of Athens, and
endeavored to prevail on Iphikrates to take part in his projects. But
that general, though he had assisted Kotys in defence against Athens,
refused to commit the more patent treason involved in aggressive
hostility against her. He even quitted Thrace, but not daring at once
to visit Athens, retired to <DW26>s.[811] In spite of his refusal,
however, the settlers and possessions of Athens in the Chersonese
were attacked and imperiled by Kotys, who claimed the whole peninsula
as his own, and established toll-gatherers at Sestos to levy the dues
both of strait and harbor.[812]

  [809] Demosthen. adv. Polyklem, p. 1212, s. 24-26; p. 1213, s.
  27; p. 1225, s. 71.

  [810] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 673, s. 187. Ἐκ γὰρ
  Ἀβύδου, τῆς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ὑμῖν ἐχθρᾶς, καὶ ὅθεν ἦσαν οἱ
  Σηστὸν καταλαβόντες, εἰς Σηστὸν διέβαινεν, ἣν εἶχε Κότυς. (He is
  speaking of Charidemus.)

  The other oration of Demosthenes (adv. Polykl. p. 1212) contains
  distinct intimation that Sestos was not lost by the Athenians
  _until after November 361_ B.C. Apollodorus the Athenian
  trierarch was in the town at that time, as well as various
  friends whom he mentions; so that Sestos must have been still an
  Athenian possession in November 361 B.C.

  It is lucky for some points of historical investigation, that
  the purpose of this oration against Polykles (composed by
  Demosthenes, but spoken by Apollodorus) requires great precision
  and specification of dates, even to months and days. Apollodorus
  complains that he has been constrained to bear the expense of
  a trierarchy, for four months beyond the year in which it was
  incumbent upon him jointly with a colleague. He sues the person
  whose duty it was to have relieved him as successor at the end of
  the year, but who had kept aloof and cheated him. The trierarchy
  of Apollodorus began in August 362 B.C., and lasted (not merely
  to Aug. 361 B.C., its legal term, but) to November 361 B.C.

  Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 144, note), in the
  valuable chapters which he devotes to the obscure chronology of
  the period, has overlooked this exact indication of the time
  _after which_ the Athenians lost Sestos. He supposes the loss to
  have taken place two or three years earlier.

  [811] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 664, s. 155.

  [812] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 658, s. 136; p. 679, s.
  211.

  What is said in the latter passage about the youthful
  Kersobleptes, is doubtless not less true of his father Kotys.

The fortune of Athens in these regions was still unpropitious. All
her late commanders, Ergophilus, Autokles, Menon, Timomachus, had
been successively deficient in means, in skill, or in fidelity, and
had undergone accusation at home.[813] Timomachus was now superseded
by Kephisodotus, a man of known enmity towards both Iphikrates and
Kotys.[814] But Kephisodotus achieved no more than his predecessors,
and had even to contend against a new enemy, who crossed over from
Abydos to Sestos to reinforce Kotys—Charidemus with the mercenary
division under his command. That officer, since his service three
years before under Timotheus against Amphipolis, had been for some
time in Asia, especially in the Troad. He hired himself to the
satrap Artabazus; of whose embarrassments he took advantage to
seize by fraud the towns of Skepsis, Kebren, and Ilium; intending
to hold them as a little principality.[815] Finding his position,
however, ultimately untenable against the probable force of the
satrap, he sent a letter across to the Chersonese, to the Athenian
commander Kephisodotus, asking for Athenian triremes to transport
his division across to Europe; in return for which, if granted, he
engaged to crush Kotys and reconquer the Chersonese for Athens.
This proposition, whether accepted or not, was never realized; for
Charidemus was enabled, through a truce unexpectedly granted to
him by the satrap, to cross over from Abydos to Sestos without any
Athenian ships. But as soon as he found himself in the Chersonese,
far from aiding Athens to recover that peninsula, he actually took
service with Kotys against her; so that Elæeus and Krithôtê, her
chief remaining posts, were in greater peril than ever.[816]

  [813] Demosthen. pro Phormione, p. 960, s. 64; Demosth. Fals.
  Leg. p. 398, s. 200.

  [814] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 672, s. 184.

  [815] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 671, s. 183. Compare
  Pseudo-Aristot. Œconomic. ii, 30.

  [816] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 672, 673.

  The orator reads a letter (not cited however) from the governor
  of Krithôtê, announcing the formidable increase of force which
  threatened the place since the arrival of Charidemus.

The victorious prospects of Kotys, however, were now unexpectedly
arrested. After a reign of twenty-four years he was assassinated by
two brothers, Python and Herakleides, Greeks from the city of Ænus in
Thrace, and formerly students under Plato at Athens. They committed
the act to avenge their father; upon whom, as it would appear, Kotys
had inflicted some brutal insult, under the influence of that violent
and licentious temper which was in him combined with an energetic
military character.[817] Having made their escape, Python and his
brother retired to Athens, where they were received with every
demonstration of honor, and presented with the citizenship as well
as with golden wreaths; partly as tyrannicides, partly as having
relieved the Athenians from an odious and formidable enemy.[818]
Disclaiming the warm eulogies heaped upon him by various speakers in
the assembly, Python is said to have replied—“It was a god who did
the deed; we only lent our hands:”[819] an anecdote, which, whether
it be truth or fiction, illustrates powerfully the Greek admiration
of tyrannicide.

  [817] Aristotle (Politic. v, 8, 12) mentions the act and states
  that the two young men did it to avenge their father. He does
  not expressly say what Kotys had done to the father; but he
  notices the event in illustration of the general category,—Πολλαὶ
  δ’ ἐπιθέσεις γεγένηνται καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχύνεσθαι
  τῶν μονάρχων τινάς (compare what Tacitus says about _mos
  regius_—Annal. vi, 1). Aristotle immediately adds another case of
  cruel mutilation inflicted by Kotys,—Ἀδάμας δ’ ἀπέστη Κότυος διὰ
  τὸ ἐκτμηθῆναι ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ παῖς ὢν, ὡς ὑβρισμένος.

  Compare, about Kotys, Theopompus, Fragm. 33, ed. Didot, ap.
  Athenæ. xii, p. 531, 532.

  Böhnecke (Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte, p. 725,
  726) places the death of Kotys in 359 B.C.; and seems to infer
  from Athenæus (vi, p. 248; xii, p. 531) that he had actual
  communication with Philip of Macedon as king, whose accession
  took place between Midsummer 360 and Midsummer 359 B.C. But the
  evidence does not appear to me to bear out such a conclusion.

  The story cited by Athenæus from Hegesander, about letters
  reaching Philip from Kotys, cannot be true about this Kotys;
  because it seems impossible that Philip, in the first year of
  his reign, can have had any such flatterer as Kleisophus; Philip
  being at that time in the greatest political embarrassments, out
  of which he was only rescued by his indefatigable energy and
  ability. And the journey of Philip to Onokarsis, also mentioned
  by Athenæus out of Theopompus, does not imply any personal
  communication with Kotys.

  My opinion is, that the assassination of Kotys dates more
  probably in 360 B.C.

  [818] Demosthenes cont. Aristokrat. p. 660, s. 142; p. 662, s.
  150; p. 675, s. 193. Plutarch, De Sui Laude, p. 542 E.; Plutarch,
  adv. Koloten, p. 1126, B.

  [819] Plutarch, De Sui Laude, _ut sup._

The death of Kotys gave some relief to Athenian affairs in the
Chersonese. Of his children, even the eldest, Kersobleptes, was only
a youth:[820] moreover two other Thracian chiefs, Berisades and
Amadokus, now started up as pretenders to shares in the kingdom of
Thrace. Kersobleptes employed as his main support and minister the
mercenary general Charidemus, who either had already married, or
did now marry, his sister; a nuptial connection had been formed in
like manner by Amadokus with two Greeks named Simon and Bianor—and
by Berisades with an Athenian citizen named Athenodorus, who (like
Iphikrates and others) had founded a city, and possessed a certain
independent dominion, in or near the Chersonese.[821] These Grecian
mercenary chiefs thus united themselves by nuptial ties to the
princes whom they served, as Seuthes had proposed to Xenophon, and as
the Italian Condottieri of the fifteenth century ennobled themselves
by similar alliance with princely families—for example, Sforza
with the Visconti of Milan. All these three Thracian competitors
were now represented by Grecian agents. But at first, it seems,
Charidemus on behalf of Kersobleptes was the strongest. He and his
army were near Perinthus on the north coast of the Propontis, where
the Athenian commander, Kephisodotus, visited him, with a small
squadron of ten triremes, in order to ask for the fulfilment of those
fair promises which Charidemus had made in his letter from Asia. But
Charidemus treated the Athenians as enemies, attacked by surprise
the seamen on shore, and inflicted upon them great damage. He then
pressed the Chersonese severely for several months, and marched
even into the midst of it, to protect a nest of pirates whom the
Athenians were besieging at the neighboring islet on its western
coast—Alopekonnesus. At length, after seven months of unprofitable
warfare (dating from the death of Kotys), he forced Kephisodotus
to conclude with him a convention so disastrous and dishonorable,
that as soon as known at Athens, it was indignantly repudiated.[822]
Kephisodotus, being recalled in disgrace, was put upon his trial, and
fined; the orator Demosthenes (we are told), who had served as one of
the trierarchs in the fleet, being among his accusers.[823]

  [820] Demosthen. cont. Aristokr. p. 674, s. 193. μειρακύλλιον,
  etc.

  [821] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 623, 624, s. 8-12; p. 664, s.
  153 (in which passage κηδεστὴς may be fairly taken to mean any
  near connection by marriage).

  About Athenodorus compare Isokrates, Or. viii, (de Pace) s. 31.

  [822] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 674-676, s. 193-199.

  In sect. 194, are the words, ~ἧκε δὲ Κηφισόδοτος στρατηγῶν~,
  πρὸς ὃν αὐτὸς (Charidemus) ἔπεμψε τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐκείνην, καὶ
  αἱ τριήρεις, αἳ, ὅτ’ ἦν ἄδηλα τὰ τῆς σωτηρίας αὐτῷ, καὶ μὴ
  συγχωροῦντος Ἀρταβάζου σώζειν ἔμελλον αὐτόν.

  The verb ἧκε, in my judgment—not to the _first coming out_ of
  Kephisodotus from Athens to take the command, as Weber (Comment.
  ad Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 460) and other commentators
  think, but—to the coming of Kephisodotus with ten triremes _to
  Perinthus_, near which place Charidemus was, for the purpose of
  demanding fulfilment of what the latter had promised; see s.
  196. When Kephisodotus came to him at Perinthus (παρόντος τοῦ
  στρατηγοῦ—πρὸς ὃν τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐπεπόμφει—s. 195) to make this
  demand, then Charidemus, instead of behaving honestly, acted like
  a traitor and an enemy. The allusion to this antecedent letter
  from Charidemus to Kephisodotus, shows that the latter must have
  been on the spot for some time, and therefore that ἧκε cannot
  refer to his first coming out.

  The term ἑπτὰ μῆνας (s. 196) counts, I presume, from the death of
  Kotys.

  [823] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676, s. 199; Æschines cont.
  Ktesiphont. p. 384, c. 20.

  Demosthenes himself may probably have been among the trierarchs
  called before the dikastery as witnesses to prove what took place
  at Perinthus and Alopekonnesus (Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p.
  676, s. 200); Euthykles, the speaker of the discourse against
  Aristokrates, had been himself also among the officers serving
  (p. 675, s. 196; p. 683, s. 223).

Among the articles of this unfavorable convention, one was that
the Greek city of Kardia should be specially reserved to Charidemus
himself. That city—eminently convenient from its situation on
the isthmus connecting the Chersonese with Thrace—claimed by the
Athenians as within the Chersonese, yet at the same time intensely
hostile to Athens—became his principal station.[824] He was fortunate
enough to seize, through treachery, the person of the Thracian
Miltokythes, who had been the pronounced enemy of Kotys, and had
coöperated with Athens. But he did not choose to hand over this
important prisoner to Kersobleptes, because the life of Miltokythes
would thus have been saved: it not being the custom of Thracians,
in their intestine disputes, to put each other to death.[825] We
remark with surprise a practice milder than that of Greece, amidst a
people decidedly more barbarous and blood-thirsty than the Greeks.
Charidemus accordingly surrendered Miltokythes to the Kardians,
who put the prisoner with his son into a boat, took them a little
way out to sea, slew the son before the eyes of the father, and
then drowned the father himself.[826] It is not improbable that
there may have been some special antecedent causes, occasioning
intense antipathy on the part of the Kardians towards Miltokythes,
and inducing Charidemus to hand him over to them as an acceptable
subject for revenge. However this may be, their savage deed kindled
violent indignation among all the Thracians, and did much injury to
the cause of Kersobleptes and Charidemus. Though Kephisodotus had
been recalled, and though a considerable interval elapsed before any
successor came from Athens, yet Berisades and Amadokus joined their
forces in one common accord, and sent to the Athenians propositions
of alliance, with request for pecuniary aid. Athenodorus, the general
of Berisades, putting himself at the head of Thracians and Athenians
together, found himself superior in the field to Kersobleptes and
Charidemus; whom he constrained to accept a fresh convention dictated
by himself. Herein it was provided, that the kingdom of Thrace should
be divided in equal portions between the three competitors; that
all three should concur in surrendering the Chersonese to Athens;
and that the son of a leading man named Iphiades at Sestos, held
by Charidemus as hostage for the adherence of that city, should be
surrendered to Athens also.[827]

  [824] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 679, s. 209; p. 681, s.
  216. Demosthen. de Halonneso, p. 87, s. 42.

  [825] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 676, s. 201. οὐκ ὄντος
  νομίμου τοῖς Θρᾳξὶν ἀλλήλους ἀποκτιννύναι, etc.

  [826] Demosthenes, cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 201.

  [827] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677, s. 202-204.

  Aristotle (Politic. v. 5, 9) mentions the association or faction
  of Iphiades as belonging to Abydos, not to Sestos. Perhaps there
  may have been an Abydene association now exercising influence at
  Sestos; at least we are told, that the revolution which deprived
  the Athenians of Sestos, was accomplished in part by exiles who
  crossed from Abydos; something like the relation between Argos
  and Corinth in the years immediately preceding the peace of
  Antalkidas.

This new convention, sworn on both sides, promised to Athens the full
acquisition which she desired. Considering the thing as done, the
Athenians sent Chabrias as commander in one trireme to receive the
surrender, but omitted to send the money requested by Athenodorus;
who was accordingly constrained to disband his army for want of
pay. Upon this Kersobleptes and Charidemus at once threw up their
engagement, refused to execute the convention just sworn, and
constrained Chabrias, who had come without any force, to revert to
the former convention concluded with Kephisodotus. Disappointed and
indignant, the Athenians disavowed the act of Chabrias, in spite
of his high reputation. They sent ten envoys to the Chersonese,
insisting that the convention of Athenodorus should be resworn by all
the three Thracian competitors—Berisades, Amadokus, Kersobleptes;
if the third declined, the envoys were instructed to take measures
for making war upon him, while they received the engagements of
the other two. But such a mission, without arms, obtained nothing
from Charidemus and Kersobleptes, except delay or refusal; while
Berisades and Amadokus sent to Athens bitter complaints respecting
the breach of faith. At length, after some months—just after the
triumphant conclusion of the expedition of Athens against Eubœa (358
B.C.)—the Athenian Chares arrived in the Chersonese, at the head
of a considerable mercenary force. Then at length the two recusants
were compelled to swear anew to the convention of Athenodorus, in the
presence of the latter as well as of Berisades and Amadokus.[828]
And it would appear that before long, its conditions were realized.
Charidemus surrendered the Chersonese, of course including its
principal town Sestos, to Athens;[829] yet he retained for himself
Kardia,[830] which was affirmed (though the Athenians denied it)
not to be included in the boundaries of that peninsula. The kingdom
of Thrace was also divided between Kersobleptes, Berisades, and
Amadokus; which triple division, diminishing the strength of each,
was regarded by Athens as a great additional guarantee for her secure
possession of the Chersonese.[831]

  [828] Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 678, p. 205, 206; p. 680.
  s. 211, 212. The arrival of Chares in the Hellespont is marked by
  Demosthenes as immediately following the expedition of Athens to
  drive the Thebans out of Eubœa, which took place about the middle
  of 358 B.C.

  [829] We see that Sestos must have been surrendered on this
  occasion, although Diodorus describes it as having been conquered
  by Chares five years afterwards, in the year 353 B.C. (Diod.
  xvi, 34). It is evident from the whole tenor of the oration
  of Demosthenes, that Charidemus did actually surrender the
  Chersonese at this time. Had he still refused to surrender
  Sestos, the orator would not have failed to insist on the fact
  emphatically against him. Besides, Demosthenes says, comparing
  the conduct of Philip towards the Olynthians, with that of
  Kersobleptes towards Athens—ἐκεῖνος ἐκείνοις Ποτίδαιαν οὐχὶ
  τηνικαῦτ’ ἀπέδωκεν, ἥνικ’ ἀποστερεῖν οὐκέθ’ οἷός τ’ ἦν, ὥσπερ
  ὑμῖν Κερσοβλέπτης Χεῤῥόνησον (p. 656. s. 128). This distinctly
  announces that the Chersonese was _given back_ to Athens, though
  reluctantly and tardily, by Kersobleptes. Sestos must have been
  given up along with it, as the principal and most valuable post
  upon all accounts. If it be true (as Diodorus states) that
  Chares in 353 B.C. took Sestos by siege, slew the inhabitants
  of military age and reduced the rest to slavery—we must suppose
  the town again to have revolted between 358 and 353 B.C.; that
  is, during the time of the Social War; which is highly probable.
  But there is much in the statement of Diodorus which I cannot
  distinctly make out; for he says that Kersobleptes in 353 B.C.,
  on account of his hatred towards Philip, surrendered to Athens
  all the cities in the Chersonese except Kardia. That had already
  been done in 358 B.C., and without any reference to Philip; and
  if after surrendering the Chersonese in 358 B.C., Kersobleptes
  had afterwards reconquered it, so as to have it again in his
  possession in the beginning of 353 B.C.—it seems unaccountable
  that Demosthenes should say nothing about the reconquest in his
  oration against Aristokrates, where he is trying to make all
  points possible against Kersobleptes.

  [830] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 681, s. 216.

  [831] Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 623, s. 8; p. 654, s. 121.
  The chronology of these events as given by Rehdantz (Vitæ
  Iphicratis, Chabriæ, etc. p. 147) appears to me nearly correct,
  in spite of the strong objection expressed against it by Weber
  (Prolegg. ad Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. lxxiii.)—and more
  exact than the chronology of Böhnecke, Forschungen, p. 727,
  who places the coming out of Kephisodotus as general to the
  Chersonese in 358 B.C., which is, I think, a full year too late.
  Rehdantz does not allow, as I think he ought to do, for a certain
  interval between Kephisodotus and the Ten Envoys, during which
  Athenodorus acted for Athens.

It was thus that Athens at length made good her possession of the
Chersonese against the neighboring Thracian potentates. And it
would seem that her transmarine power, with its dependencies and
confederates, now stood at a greater height than it had ever reached
since the terrible reverses of 405 B.C. Among them were numbered not
only a great number of the Ægean islands (even the largest, Eubœa,
Chios, Samos, and Rhodes), but also the continental possessions of
Byzantium—the Chersonese—Maroneia[832] with other places on the
southern coast of Thrace—and Pydna, Methônê, and Potidæa, with most
of the region surrounding the Thermaic Gulf.[833] This last portion
of empire had been acquired at the cost of the Olynthian fraternal
alliance of neighboring cities, against which Athens too, as well as
Sparta, by an impulse most disastrous for the future independence of
Greece, had made war with inauspicious success. The Macedonian king
Perdikkas, with a just instinct towards the future aggrandizement of
his dynasty, had assisted her in thus weakening Olynthus; feeling
that the towns on the Thermaic Gulf, if they formed parts of a
strong Olynthian confederacy of brothers and neighbors, reciprocally
attached and self-sustaining, would resist Macedonia more
effectively, than if they were half-reluctant dependencies of Athens,
even with the chances of Athenian aid by sea. The aggressive hand of
Athens against Olynthus, indeed, between 368-363 B.C., was hardly
less mischievous, to Greece generally, than that of Sparta had been
between 382-380 B.C. Sparta had crushed the Olynthian confederacy in
its first brilliant promise—Athens prevented it from rearing its head
anew. Both conspired to break down the most effective barrier against
Macedonian aggrandizement; neither were found competent to provide
any adequate protection to Greece in its room.

  [832] Demosthen. cont. Polyklem, p. 1212, s. 26.

  [833] Demosthen. Philippic. I, p. 41, s. 6. εἴχομέν ποτε ἡμεῖς, ὦ
  ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Πύδναν καὶ Ποτίδαιαν καὶ Μεθώνην ~καὶ πάντα τὸν
  τόπον τοῦτον οἰκεῖον κύκλῳ~, etc.

The maximum of her second empire, which I have remarked that Athens
attained by the recovery of the Chersonese,[834] lasted but for a
moment. During the very same year, there occurred that revolt among
her principal allies, known by the name of the Social War, which gave
to her power a fatal shock, and left the field comparatively clear
for the early aggressions of her yet more formidable enemy—Philip
of Macedon. That prince had already emerged from his obscurity as a
hostage in Thebes, and had succeeded his brother Perdikkas, slain
in a battle with the Illyrians, as king (360-359 B.C.). At first,
his situation appeared not merely difficult, but almost hopeless.
Not the most prescient eye in Greece could have recognized, in the
inexperienced youth struggling at his first accession against rivals
at home, enemies abroad, and embarrassments of every kind—the future
conqueror of Chæroneia, and destroyer of Grecian independence. How,
by his own genius, energy, and perseverance, assisted by the faults
and dissensions of his Grecian enemies, he attained his inauspicious
eminence—will be recounted in my subsequent volume.

  [834] I have not made any mention of the expedition against Eubœa
  (whereby Athens drove the Theban invaders out of that island),
  though it occurred just about the same time as the recovery of
  the Chersonese.

  That expedition will more properly come to be spoken of in my
  next volume. But the recovery of the Chersonese was the closing
  event of a series of proceedings which had been going on for four
  years; so that I could hardly leave that series unfinished.

       *       *       *       *       *

At the opening of my ninth volume, after the surrender of Athens,
Greece was under the Spartan empire. Its numerous independent
city-communities were more completely regimented under one chief than
they had ever been before, Athens and Thebes being both numbered
among the followers of Sparta.

But the conflicts recounted in these two volumes (during an interval
of forty-four years—404-403 B.C. to 360-359 B.C.) have wrought
the melancholy change of leaving Greece more disunited, and more
destitute of presiding Hellenic authority, than she had been at
any time since the Persian invasion. Thebes, Sparta, and Athens,
had all been engaged in weakening each other; in which, unhappily,
each has been far more successful than in strengthening herself.
The maritime power of Athens is now indeed considerable, and may be
called very great, if compared with the state of degradation to which
she had been brought in 403 B.C. But it will presently be seen how
unsubstantial is the foundation of her authority, and how fearfully
she has fallen off from that imperial feeling and energy which
ennobled her ancestors under the advice of Perikles.

It is under these circumstances, so untoward for defence, that the
aggressor from Macedonia arises.




CHAPTER LXXXI.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT
BEFORE SYRACUSE.


In the sixtieth chapter of this work, I brought down the history
of the Grecian communities in Sicily to the close of the Athenian
siege of Syracuse, where Nikias and Demosthenes with nearly their
entire armament perished by so lamentable a fate. I now resume from
that point the thread of Sicilian events, which still continues so
distinct from those of Peloponnesus and Eastern Greece, that it is
inconvenient to include both in the same chapters.

If the destruction of the great Athenian armament (in September 413
B.C.) excited the strongest sensation throughout every part of the
Grecian world, we may imagine the intoxication of triumph with which
it must have been hailed in Sicily. It had been achieved (Gylippus
and the Peloponnesian allies aiding) by the united efforts of nearly
all the Grecian cities in the island,—for all of them had joined
Syracuse as soon as her prospects became decidedly encouraging;
except Naxos and Katana, which were allied with the Athenians,—and
Agrigentum, which remained neutral.[835] Unfortunately we know
little or nothing of the proceedings of the Syracusans, immediately
following upon circumstances of so much excitement and interest. They
appear to have carried on war against Katana, where some fugitives
from the vanquished Athenian army contributed to the resistance
against them.[836] But both this city and Naxos, though exposed to
humiliation and danger as allies of the defeated Athenians, contrived
to escape without the loss of their independence. The allies of
Syracuse were probably not eager to attack them, and thereby to
aggrandize that city farther; while the Syracusans themselves also
would be sensible of great exhaustion, arising from the immense
efforts through which alone their triumph had been achieved. The
pecuniary burdens to which they had been obliged to submit—known
to Nikias during the last months of the siege,[837] and fatally
misleading his judgment,—were so heavy as to task severely their
powers of endurance. After paying, and dismissing with appropriate
gratitude, the numerous auxiliaries whom they had been obliged to
hire,—after celebrating the recent triumph, and decorating the
temples, in a manner satisfactory to the exuberant joy of the
citizens[838]—there would probably be a general disposition to repose
rather than to aggressive warfare. There would be much destruction to
be repaired throughout their territory, poorly watched or cultivated
during the year of the siege.

  [835] Thucyd. vii, 50-58.

  [836] Lysias, Orat. xx, (pro Polystrato) s. 26, 27.

  [837] Thucyd. vii, 48, 49.

  [838] Diodor. xiii, 34.

In spite of such exhaustion, however, the sentiment of exasperation
and vengeance against Athens, combined with gratitude towards the
Lacedæmonians, was too powerful to be balked. A confident persuasion
reigned throughout Greece that Athens[839] could not hold out for one
single summer after her late terrific disaster; a persuasion, founded
greatly on the hope of a large auxiliary squadron to act against her
from Syracuse and her other enemies in Sicily and Italy. In this day
of Athenian distress, such enemies of course became more numerous.
Especially the city of Thurii in Italy,[840] which had been friendly
to Athens and had furnished aid to Demosthenes in his expedition
to Sicily, now underwent a change, banished three hundred of the
leading philo-Athenian citizens (among them the rhetor Lysias), and
espoused the Peloponnesian cause with ardor. The feeling of reaction
at Thurii, and of vengeance at Syracuse, stimulated the citizens of
both places to take active part in an effort promising to be easy
and glorious, for the destruction of Athens and her empire. And
volunteers were doubtless the more forward, as the Persian satraps of
the sea-board were now competing with each other in invitations to
the Greeks, with offers of abundant pay.

  [839] Thucyd. viii, 2; compare vii, 55.

  [840] Thucyd. vii, 33-57; Dionysius Halikarn. Judic. de Lysiâ, p.
  453.

Accordingly, in the summer of the year 412 B.C. (the year following
the catastrophe of the Athenian armament,) a Sicilian squadron of
twenty triremes from Syracuse and two from Selinus, under the command
of Hermokrates, reached Peloponnesus and joined the Lacedæmonian
fleet in its expedition across the Ægean to Miletus. Another
squadron of ten triremes from Thurii, under the Rhodian Dorieus,
and a farther reinforcement from Tarentum, and Lokri, followed soon
after. It was Hermokrates who chiefly instigated his countrymen to
this effort.[841] Throughout the trying months of the siege, he
had taken a leading part in the defence of Syracuse, seconding the
plans of Gylippus with equal valor and discretion. As commander of
the Syracusan squadron in the main fleet now acting against Athens
in the Ægean (events already described in my sixty-first chapter),
his conduct was not less distinguished. He was energetic in action,
and popular in his behavior towards those under his command; but
what stood out most conspicuously as well as most honorably, was
his personal incorruptibility. While the Peloponnesian admiral and
trierarchs accepted the bribes of Tissaphernes, conniving at his
betrayal of the common cause and breach of engagement towards the
armament, with indifference to the privations of their own unpaid
seamen,—Hermokrates and Dorieus were strenuous in remonstrance, even
to the extent of drawing upon themselves the indignant displeasure
of the Peloponnesian admiral Astyochus, as well as of the satrap
himself.[842] They were the more earnest in performing this duty,
because the Syracusan and Thurian triremes were manned by freemen in
larger proportion than the remaining fleet.[843]

  [841] Thucyd. viii, 26, 35, 91.

  [842] Thucyd. viii, 29, 45, 78, 84.

  [843] Thucyd. viii, 84.

The sanguine expectation, however, entertained by Hermokrates and his
companions in crossing the sea from Sicily,—that one single effort
would gloriously close the war,—was far from being realized. Athens
resisted with unexpected energy; the Lacedæmonians were so slack
and faint-hearted, that they even let slip the golden opportunity
presented to them by the usurpation of the Athenian Four Hundred.
Tissaphernes was discovered to be studiously starving and protracting
the war for purposes of his own, which Hermokrates vainly tried
to counter-work by a personal visit and protest at Sparta.[844]
Accordingly, the war trailed on with fluctuating success, and even
renovated efficiency on the part of Athens; so that the Syracusans
at home, far from hearing announced the accomplishment of those
splendid anticipations under which their squadron had departed,
received news generally unfavorable, and at length positively
disastrous. They were informed that their seamen were ill-paid and
distressed; while Athens, far from striking her colors, had found
means to assemble a fleet at Samos competent still to dispute the
mastery of the Ægean. They heard of two successive naval defeats,
which the Peloponnesian and Syracusan fleets sustained in the
Hellespont[845] (one at Kynossema,—411 B.C.,—a second between Abydos
and Dardanus,—410 B.C.); and at length of a third, more decisive and
calamitous than the preceding,—the battle of Kyzikus (409 B.C.),
wherein the Lacedæmonian admiral Mindarus was slain, and the whole
of his fleet captured or destroyed. In this defeat the Syracusan
squadron were joint sufferers. Their seamen were compelled to burn
all their triremes without exception, in order to prevent them from
falling into the hands of the enemy; and were left destitute, without
clothing or subsistence, on the shores of the Propontis amidst the
satrapy of Pharnabazus.[846] That satrap, with generous forwardness,
took them into his pay, advanced to them clothing and provision for
two months, and furnished them with timber from the woods of Mount
Ida to build fresh ships. At Antandrus (in the Gulf of Adramyttium,
one great place of export for Idæan timber), where the reconstruction
took place, the Syracusans made themselves so acceptable and useful
to the citizens, that a vote of thanks and a grant of citizenship was
passed to all of them who chose to accept it.[847]

  [844] Thucyd. viii, 85.

  [845] Thucyd. viii, 105; Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 7.

  [846] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 19.

  [847] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 23-26.

In recounting this battle, I cited the brief and rude despatch,
addressed to the Lacedæmonians by Hippokrates, surviving second
officer of the slain Mindarus, describing the wretched condition of
the defeated armament—“Our honor is gone. Mindarus is slain. The men
are hungry. We know not what to do.”[848] This curious despatch has
passed into history, because it was intercepted by the Athenians, and
never reached its destination. But without doubt the calamitous state
of facts, which it was intended to make known, flew rapidly, under
many different forms of words, both to Peloponnesus and to Syracuse.
Sad as the reality was, the first impression made by the news would
probably be yet sadder; since the intervention of Pharnabazus,
whereby the sufferers were so much relieved, would hardly be felt
or authenticated until after some interval. At Syracuse, the event
on being made known excited not only powerful sympathy with the
sufferers, but also indignant displeasure against Hermokrates and
his colleagues; who, having instigated their countrymen three years
before, by sanguine hopes and assurances, to commence a foreign
expedition for the purpose of finally putting down Athens, had not
only achieved nothing, but had sustained a series of reverses, ending
at length in utter ruin, from the very enemy whom they had pronounced
to be incapable of farther resistance.

  [848] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 23. Ἔῤῥει τὰ καλά. Μίνδαρος ἀπεσσούα·
  πεινῶντι τὤνδρες· ἀπορέομες τί χρὴ δρᾷν.

It was under such sentiment of displeasure, shortly after the defeat
of Kyzikus, that a sentence of banishment was passed at Syracuse
against Hermokrates and his colleagues. The sentence was transmitted
to Asia, and made known by Hermokrates himself to the armament,
convoked in public meeting. While lamenting and protesting against
its alleged injustice and illegality, he entreated the armament to
maintain unabated good behavior for the future, and to choose new
admirals for the time, until the successors nominated at Syracuse
should arrive. The news was heard with deep regret by the trierarchs,
the pilots, and the maritime soldiers or marines; who, attached
to Hermokrates from his popular manner, his constant openness of
communication with them, and his anxiety to collect their opinions,
loudly proclaimed that they would neither choose, nor serve under,
any other leaders.[849] But the admirals repressed this disposition,
deprecating any resistance to the decree of the city. They laid down
their command, inviting any man dissatisfied with them to prefer his
complaint at once publicly, and reminding the soldiers of the many
victories and glorious conflicts, both by land and sea, which had
knit them together by the ties of honorable fellowship. No man stood
forward to accuse them; and they consented, on the continued request
of the armament, to remain in command, until their three successors
arrived—Demarchus, Myskon, and Potamis. They then retired amidst
universal regret; many of the trierarchs even binding themselves
by oath, that on returning to Syracuse they would procure their
restoration. The change of commanders took place at Miletus.[850]

  [849] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 27.

  [850] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 27-31.

Though Hermokrates, in his address to the soldiers, would doubtless
find response when he invoked the remembrance of past victories, yet
he would hardly have found the like response in a Syracusan assembly.
For if we review the proceedings of the armament since he conducted
it from Syracuse to join the Peloponnesian fleet, we shall find that
on the whole his expedition had been a complete failure, and that
his assurances of success against Athens had ended in nothing but
disappointment. There was therefore ample cause for the discontent
of his countrymen. But on the other hand, as far as our limited
means of information enable us to judge, the sentence of banishment
against him appears to have been undeserved and unjust. For we
cannot trace the ill-success of Hermokrates to any misconduct or
omission on his part; while in regard to personal incorruptibility,
and strenuous resistance to the duplicity of Tissaphernes, he stood
out as an honorable exception among a body of venal colleagues. That
satrap, indeed, as soon as Hermokrates had fallen into disgrace,
circulated a version of his own, pretending that the latter, having
asked money from him and been refused, had sought by calumnious
means to revenge such refusal.[851] But this story, whether believed
elsewhere or not, found no credit with the other satrap Pharnabazus;
who warmly espoused the cause of the banished general, presenting
him with a sum of money even unsolicited. This money Hermokrates
immediately employed in getting together triremes and mercenary
soldiers to accomplish his restoration to Syracuse by force.[852]
We shall presently see how he fared in this attempt. Meanwhile we
may remark that the sentence of banishment, though in itself unjust,
would appear amply justified in the eyes of his countrymen by his own
subsequent resort to hostile measures against them.

  [851] Thucyd. viii, 85.

  [852] Xen. Hellen. i, 1, 31; Diodor. xiii, 63.

The party opposed to Hermokrates had now the preponderance in
Syracuse, and by their influence probably the sentence against him
was passed, under the grief and wrath occasioned by the defeat of
Kyzikus. Unfortunately we have only the most scanty information as
to the internal state of Syracuse during the period immediately
succeeding the Athenian siege; a period of marked popular sentiment
and peculiar interest. As at Athens under the pressure of the
Xerxeian invasion—the energies of all the citizens, rich and poor,
young and old, had been called forth for repulse of the common
enemy, and had been not more than enough to achieve it. As at Athens
after the battles of Salamis and Platæa, so at Syracuse after the
destruction of the Athenian besiegers—the people, elate with the
plenitude of recent effort, and conscious that the late successful
defence had been the joint work of all, were in a state of animated
democratical impulse, eager for the utmost extension and equality
of political rights. Even before the Athenian siege, the government
had been democratical; a fact, which Thucydides notices as among the
causes of the successful defence, by rendering the citizens unanimous
in resistance, and by preventing the besiegers from exciting
intestine discontent.[853] But in the period immediately after the
siege, it underwent changes which are said to have rendered it still
more democratical. On the proposition of an influential citizen named
Dioklês, a commission of Ten was named, of which he was president,
for the purpose of revising both the constitution and the legislation
of the city. Some organic alterations were adopted, one of which
was, that the lot should be adopted, instead of the principle of
election, in the nomination of magistrates. Furthermore, a new code,
or collection of criminal and civil enactments, was drawn up and
sanctioned. We know nothing of its details, but we are told that
its penalties were extremely severe, its determination of offences
minute and special, and its language often obscure as well as brief.
It was known by the name of the Laws of Dioklês, the chief of the
Committee who had prepared it. Though now adopted at Syracuse, it did
not last long; for we shall find in five or six years the despotism
of Dionysius extinguishing it, just as Peisistratus had put down
the Solonian legislation at Athens. But it was again revived at the
extinction of the Dionysian dynasty, after the lapse of more than
sixty years; with comments and modifications by a committee, among
whose members were the Corinthians Kephalus and Timoleon. It is also
said to have been copied in various other Sicilian cities, and to
have remained in force until the absorption of all Sicily under the
dominion of the Romans.[854]

  [853] Thucyd. vii, 55.

  [854] Diodor. xiii, 33-35.

We have the austere character of Dioklês illustrated by a story (of
more than dubious credit,[855] and of which the like is recounted
respecting other Grecian legislators), that having inadvertently
violated one of his own enactments, he enforced the duty of obedience
by falling on his own sword. But unfortunately we are not permitted
to know the substance of his laws, which would have thrown so much
light on the sentiments and position of the Sicilian Greeks. Nor can
we distinctly make out to what extent the political constitution
of Syracuse was now changed. For though Diodorus tells us that the
lot was now applied to the nomination of magistrates, yet he does
not state whether it was applied to all magistrates, or under what
reserves and exceptions—such, for example, as those adopted at
Athens. Aristotle too states that the Syracusan people, after the
Athenian siege, changed their constitution from a partial democracy
into an entire democracy. Yet he describes Dionysius, five or six
years afterwards, as pushing himself up to the despotism, by the most
violent demagogic opposition; and as having accused, disgraced, and
overthrown certain rich leaders then in possession of the functions
of government.[856] If the constitutional forms were rendered more
democratical, it would seem that the practice cannot have materially
changed, and that the persons actually in leading function still
continued to be rich men.

  [855] Compare Diodor. xiii, 75—about the banishment of Dioklês.

  [856] Aristotel. Politic. v, 3, 6. Καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ὁ δῆμος,
  αἴτιος γενόμενος τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἐκ
  πολιτείας εἰς δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλε.

  v, 4, 4, 5. Καὶ Διονύσιος κατηγορῶν Δαφναίου καὶ τῶν πλουσίων
  ἠξιώθη τῆς τυραννίδος, διὰ τὴν ἔχθραν πιστευθεὶς ὡς δημοτικὸς ὤν.

The war carried on by the Syracusans against Naxos and Katana, after
continuing more than three years,[857] was brought to a close by an
enemy from without, even more formidable than Athens. This time, the
invader was not Hellenic, but Phœnician—the ancient foe of Hellas,
Carthage.

  [857] Diodor. xiii, 56.

It has been already recounted, how in the same eventful year (480
B.C.) which transported Xerxes across the Hellespont to meet his
defeat at Salamis, the Carthaginians had poured into Sicily a vast
mercenary host under Hamilkar, for the purpose of reinstating in
Himera the despot Terillus, who had been expelled by Theron of
Agrigentum. On that occasion, Hamilkar had been slain, and his large
army defeated, by the Syracusan despot Gelon, in the memorable battle
of Himera. So deep had been the impression left by this defeat, that
for the seventy years which intervened between 480-410 B.C., the
Carthaginians had never again invaded the island. They resumed their
aggressions shortly after the destruction of the Athenian power
before Syracuse; which same event had also stimulated the Persians,
who had been kept in restraint while the Athenian empire remained
unimpaired, again to act offensively for the recovery of their
dominion over the Asiatic Greeks. The great naval power of Athens,
inspiring not merely reserve but even alarm to Carthage,[858] had
been a safeguard to the Hellenic world both at its eastern and its
western extremity. No sooner was that safeguard overthrown, than the
hostile pressure of the foreigner began to be felt, as well upon
Western Sicily as on the eastern coast of the Ægean.

  [858] Thucyd. vi, 34. Speech of Hermokrates to his countrymen at
  Syracuse—δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ ἐς Καρχηδόνα ἄμεινον εἶναι πέμψαι. Οὐ
  γὰρ ἀνέλπιστον αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ διὰ φόβου εἰσὶ μή ποτε Ἀθηναῖοι
  αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔλθωσιν, etc.

From this time forward for two centuries, down to the conclusion of
the second Punic war, the Carthaginians will be found frequent in
their aggressive interventions in Sicily, and upon an extensive
scale, so as to act powerfully on the destinies of the Sicilian
Greeks. Whether any internal causes had occurred to make them
abstain from intervention during the preceding generations, we are
unable to say. The history of this powerful and wealthy city is very
little known. We make out a few facts, which impart a general idea
both of her oligarchical government and of her extensive colonial
possessions, but which leave us in the dark as to her continuous
history. Her possessions were most extensive, along the coast of
Africa both eastward and westward from her city; comprehending also
Sardinia and the Balearic isles, but (at this time, probably) few
settlements in Spain. She had quite enough to occupy her attention
elsewhere, without meddling in Sicilian affairs; the more so, as
her province in Sicily was rather a dependent ally than a colonial
possession. In the early treaties made with Rome, the Carthaginians
restrict and even interdict the traffic of the Romans both with
Sardinia and Africa (except Carthage itself), but they grant the
amplest license of intercourse with the Carthaginian province of
Sicily; which they consider as standing in the same relation to
Carthage as the cities of Latium stood in to Rome.[859] While the
connection of Carthage with Sicily was thus less close, it would
appear that her other dependencies gave her much trouble, chiefly in
consequence of her own harsh and extortionate dominion.

  [859] Polybius, iii, 22, 23, 24.

  He gives three separate treaties (either wholly or in part)
  between the Carthaginians and Romans. The latest of the three
  belongs to the days of Pyrrhus, about 278 B.C.; the earliest to
  508 B.C. The intermediate treaty is not marked as to date by
  any specific evidence, but I see no ground for supposing that
  it is so late as 345 B.C., which is the date assigned to it by
  Casaubon, identifying it with the treaty alluded to by Livy, vii,
  27. I cannot but think that it is more likely to be of earlier
  date, somewhere between 480-410 B.C. This second treaty is far
  more restrictive than the first, against the Romans; for it
  interdicts them from all traffic either with Sardinia or Africa,
  except the city of Carthage itself; the first treaty permitted
  such trade under certain limitations and conditions. The second
  treaty argues a comparative superiority of Carthage to Rome,
  which would rather seem to belong to the latter half of the fifth
  century B.C., than to the latter half of the fourth.

All our positive information, scanty as it is, about Carthage and
her institutions, relates to the fourth, third, or second centuries
B.C., yet it may be held to justify presumptive conclusions as to the
fifth century B.C., especially in reference to the general system
pursued. The maximum of her power was attained before her first war
with Rome, which began in 264 B.C.; the first and second Punic wars
both of them greatly reduced her strength and dominion. Yet in spite
of such reduction we learn that about 150 B.C., shortly before the
third Punic war, which ended in the capture and depopulation of the
city, not less than seven hundred thousand souls[860] were computed
in it, as occupants of a fortified circumference of above twenty
miles, covering a peninsula with its isthmus. Upon this isthmus its
citadel Byrsa was situated, surrounded by a triple wall of its own,
and crowned at its summit by a magnificent temple of Æsculapius.
The numerous population is the more remarkable, since Utica (a
considerable city, colonized from Phœnicia more anciently than even
Carthage itself, and always independent of the Carthaginians, though
in the condition of an inferior and discontented ally), was within
the distance of seven miles from Carthage[861] on the one side, and
Tunis seemingly not much farther off on the other. Even at that time,
too, the Carthaginians are said to have possessed three hundred
tributary cities in Libya.[862] Yet this was but a small fraction of
the prodigious empire which had belonged to them certainly in the
fourth century B.C., and in all probability also between 480-410 B.C.
That empire extended eastward as far as the Altars of the Philæni,
near the Great Syrtis,—westward, all along the coast to the Pillars
of Herakles and the western coast of Morocco. The line of coast
south-east of Carthage, as far as the bay called the Lesser Syrtis,
was proverbial (under the name of Byzacium and the Emporia) for its
fertility. Along this extensive line were distributed indigenous
Libyan tribes, living by agriculture; and a mixed population called
Liby-Phœnicians, formed by intermarriage and coalition of some of
these tribes either with colonists from Tyre and Sidon, or perhaps
with a Canaanitish population akin in race to the Phœnicians, yet of
still earlier settlement in the country.[863] These Liby-Phœnicians
dwelt in towns, seemingly of moderate size and unfortified, but each
surrounded by a territory ample and fertile, yielding large produce.
They were assiduous cultivators, but generally unwarlike, which
latter quality was ascribed by ancient theory to the extreme richness
of their soil.[864] Of the Liby-Phœnician towns the number is not
known to us, but it must have been prodigiously great, since we are
told that both Agathokles and Regulus in their respective invasions
captured no less than two hundred. A single district, called Tuska,
is also spoken of as having fifty towns.[865]

  [860] Strabo, xvii, p. 832, 833; Livy, Epitome, lib. 51.

  Strabo gives the circumference as three hundred and sixty stadia,
  and the breadth of the isthmus as sixty stadia. But this is
  noticed by Barth as much exaggerated (Wanderungen auf der Küste
  des Mittelmeers, p. 85).

  [861] Appian. Reb. Punic, viii, 75.

  [862] Strabo, _ut sup._

  [863] This is the view of Movers, sustained with much
  plausibility, in his learned and instructive work—Geschichte der
  Phœnizier, vol. ii, part ii, p. 435-455. See Diodor. xx, 55.

  [864] Livy, xxix, 25. Compare the last chapter of the history of
  Herodotus.

  [865] Diodor. xx, 17; Appian, viii, 3, 68.

A few of the towns along the coast,—Hippo, Utica, Adrumetum, Thapsus,
Leptis, etc.,—were colonies from Tyre, like Carthage herself.
With respect to Carthage, therefore, they stood upon a different
footing from the Liby-Phœnician towns, either maritime or in the
interior. Yet the Carthaginians contrived in time to render every
town tributary, with the exception of Utica. They thus derived
revenue from all the inhabitants of this fertile region, Tyrian,
Liby-Phœnician, and indigenous Libyan; and the amount which they
imposed appears to have been exorbitant. At one time, immediately
after the first Punic war, they took from the rural cultivators as
much as one-half of their produce,[866] and doubled at one stroke
the tribute levied upon the towns. The town and district of Leptis
paid to them a tribute of one talent per day, or three hundred and
sixty-five talents annually. Such exactions were not collected
without extreme harshness of enforcement, sometimes stripping the
tax-payer of all that he possessed, and even tearing him from his
family to be sold in person for a slave.[867] Accordingly the general
sentiment among the dependencies towards Carthage was one of mingled
fear and hatred, which rendered them eager to revolt on the landing
of any foreign invader. In some cases the Carthaginians seem to have
guarded against such contingencies by paid garrisons; but they also
provided a species of garrison from among their own citizens; by
sending out from Carthage poor men, and assigning to them lots of
land with the cultivators attached. This provision for poor citizens
as emigrants (mainly analogous to the Roman colonies), was a standing
feature in the Carthaginian political system, serving the double
purpose of obviating discontent among their own town population at
home, and of keeping watch over their dependencies abroad.[868]

  [866] Colonel Leake observes, with respect to the modern Greeks,
  who work on the plains of Turkey, upon the landed property of
  Turkish proprietors—“The Helots seem to have resembled the
  Greeks, who labor on the Turkish farms _in the plains_ of Turkey,
  and who are bound to account to their masters for one-half of the
  produce of the soil, as Tyrtæus says of the Messenians of his
  time—

      Ὥσπερ ὄνοι μεγάλοις ἄχθεσι τειρόμενοι
    Δεσποσύνοισι φέροντες, ἀναγκαίης ὑπὸ λυγρῆς,
      Ἥμισυ πᾶν, ὅσσον κάρπον ἄρουρα φέροι.
                                    (Tyrtæus, Frag. 5, ed. Schneid.)

  The condition of the Greeks in the mountainous regions is not so
  hard” (Leake, Peloponnesiaca, p. 168).

  [867] Polybius, i, 72; Livy, xxxiv, 62.

  Movers (Geschichte der Phœnizier, ii, 2, p. 455) assigns this
  large assessment to Leptis Magna; but the passage of Livy can
  relate only to Leptis Parva, in the region called Emporia.

  Leptis Magna was at a far greater distance from Carthage, near
  the Great Syrtis.

  Dr. Barth (Wanderungen durch die Küstenländer des
  Mittelländischen Meers, p. 81-146) has given a recent and
  valuable examination of the site of Carthage and of the
  neighboring regions. On his map, however, the territory called
  Emporia is marked near the Lesser Syrtis, two hundred miles from
  Carthage (Pliny, H. N. v, 3). Yet it seems certain that the name
  Emporia must have comprised the territory south of Carthage and
  approaching very near to the city; for Scipio Africanus, in his
  expedition from Sicily, directed his pilots to steer for Emporia.
  He intended to land very near Carthage; and he actually did land
  on the White Cape, near to that city, but on the north side, and
  still nearer to Utica. This region north of Carthage was probably
  not included in the name Emporia (Livy, xxix, 25-27).

  [868] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 8, 9; vi, 3, 5.

In the fifth century B.C., the Carthaginians had no apprehension
of any foreign enemy invading them from seaward; an enterprise
first attempted in 316 B.C., to the surprise of every one, by the
boldness of the Syracusan Agathokles. Nor were their enemies on
the land side formidable as conquerors, though they were extremely
annoying as plunderers. The Numidians and other native tribes,
half-naked and predatory horsemen, distinguished for speed as
well as for indefatigable activity, so harassed the individual
cultivators of the soil, that the Carthaginians dug a long line of
ditch to keep them off.[869] But these barbarians did not acquire
sufficient organization to act for permanent objects, until the
reign of Masinissa and the second Punic war with Rome. During the
fifth and fourth centuries B.C., therefore (prior to the invasion
of Agathokles), the warfare carried on by the Carthaginians was
constantly aggressive and in foreign parts. For these purposes they
chiefly employed foreign mercenaries, hired for the occasion from
Italy, Gaul, Spain, and the islands of the Western Mediterranean,
together with conscripts from their Libyan dependencies. The native
Carthaginians,[870] though encouraged by honorary marks to undertake
this military service, were generally averse to it, and sparingly
employed. But these citizens, though not often sent on foreign
service, constituted a most formidable force when called upon. No
less then forty thousand hoplites went forth from the gates of
Carthage to resist Agathokles, together with one thousand cavalry,
and two thousand war-chariots.[871] An immense public magazine,—of
arms, muniments of war of all kinds, and provisions,—appears to have
been kept in the walls of Byrsa, the citadel of Carthage.[872] A
chosen division of two thousand five hundred citizens, men of wealth
and family, formed what was called the Sacred Band of Carthage,[873]
distinguished for their bravery in the field as well as for the
splendor of their arms, and the gold and silver plate which
formed part of their baggage. We shall find these citizen-troops
occasionally employed on service in Sicily: but most part of the
Carthaginian armies consists of Gauls, Iberians, Libyans, etc., a
mingled host got together for the occasion, discordant in language as
well as in customs. Such men had never any attachment to the cause
in which they fought,—seldom, to the commanders under whom they
served; while they were often treated by Carthage with bad faith,
and recklessly abandoned to destruction.[874] A military system such
as this was pregnant with danger, if ever the mercenary soldiers got
footing in Africa; as happened after the first Punic war, when the
city was brought to the brink of ruin. But on foreign service in
Sicily, these mercenaries often enabled Carthage to make conquest at
the cost only of her money, without any waste of the blood of her own
citizens. The Carthaginian generals seem generally to have relied,
like Persians, upon numbers,—manifesting little or no military skill;
until we come to the Punic wars with Rome, conducted under Hamilkar
Barca and his illustrious son Hannibal.

  [869] Appian, viii, 32, 54, 59; Phlegon, Trall. de Mirabilibus,
  c. 18. Εὔμαχος δέ φησιν ἐν Περιηγήσει, Καρχηδονίους
  περιταφρεύοντας τὴν ἰδίαν ἐπαρχίαν, εὑρεῖν ὀρύσσοντας δύο
  σκελετοὺς ἐν σόρῳ κειμένους, etc.

  The line of trench however was dug apparently at an early stage
  of the Carthaginian dominion; for the Carthaginians afterwards,
  as they grew more powerful, extended their possessions beyond the
  trench; as we see by the passages of Appian above referred to.

  Movers (Gesch. der Phœniz. ii, 2, p. 457) identifies this trench
  with the one which Pliny names near Thenæ on the Lesser Syrtis,
  as having been dug by order of the second Africanus—to form a
  boundary between the Roman province of Africa, and the dominion
  of the native kings (Pliny, H. N. v, 3). But I greatly doubt such
  identity. It appears to me that this last is distinct from the
  Carthaginian trench.

  [870] A Carthaginian citizen wore as many rings as he had served
  campaigns (Aristotel. Politic. vii, 2, 6).

  [871] Diodor. xx, 10.

  [872] Appian, viii, 80. Twenty thousand panoplies, together with
  an immense stock of weapons and engines of siege, were delivered
  up to the perfidious manœuvres of the Romans, a little before the
  last siege of Carthage.

  See Bötticher, Geschichte der Carthager, p. 20-25.

  [873] Diodor. xvi, 8.

  [874] See the striking description in Livy, of the motley
  composition of the Carthaginian mercenary armies, where he
  bestows just admiration on the genius of Hannibal, for having
  always maintained his ascendency over them, and kept them in
  obedience and harmony (Livy, xxviii, 12). Compare Polybius, i,
  65-67, and the manner in which Imilkon abandoned his mercenaries
  to destruction at Syracuse (Diodor. xiv, 75-77).

Respecting the political constitution of Carthage, the facts
known are too few, and too indistinct, to enable us to comprehend
its real working. The magistrates most conspicuous in rank and
precedence were, the two kings or suffetes, who presided over the
Senate.[875] They seem to have been renewed annually, though how
far the same persons were reëligible, or actually rechosen, we do
not know, but they were always selected out of some few principal
families or Gentes. There is reason for believing that the genuine
Carthaginian citizens were distributed into three tribes, thirty
curiæ, and three hundred gentes—something in the manner of the Roman
patricians. From these gentes emanated a Senate of three hundred,
out of which again was formed a smaller council or committee of
thirty _principes_ representing the curiæ;[876] sometimes a still
smaller, of only ten _principes_. These little councils are both
frequently mentioned in the political proceedings of Carthage; and
perhaps the Thirty may coincide with what Polybius calls the Gerusia,
or Council of Ancients,—the Three Hundred, with that which he calls
the Senate.[877] Aristotle assimilates the two kings (suffetes) of
Carthage to the two kings of Sparta—and the Gerusia of Carthage also
to that of Sparta;[878] which latter consisted of thirty members,
including the kings who sat in it. But Aristotle does not allude to
any assembly at Carthage analogous to what Polybius calls the Senate.
He mentions two Councils, one of one hundred members, the other of
one hundred and four; and certain Boards of Five,—the pentarchies. He
compares the Council of one hundred and four to the Spartan ephors;
yet again he talks of the pentarchies as invested with extensive
functions, and terms the Council of one hundred the greatest
authority in the state. Perhaps this last Council was identical with
the assembly of one hundred Judges (said to have been chosen from the
Senate as a check upon the generals employed), or Ordo Judicum; of
which Livy speaks after the second Punic war, as existing with its
members perpetual and so powerful that it overruled all the other
assemblies and magistracies of the state. Through the influence
of Hannibal, a law was passed to lessen the overweening power of
this Order of Judges; causing them to be elected only for one year,
instead of being perpetual.[879]

  [875] There were in like manner two suffetes in Gades and each
  of the other Phœnician colonies (Livy, xxviii, 37). Cornelius
  Nepos (Hannibal, c. 7) talks of Hannibal as having been made
  _king_ (rex) when he was invested with his great foreign military
  command, at twenty-two years of age. So Diodorus (xiv, 54) talks
  about Imilkon, and Herodotus (vii, 166) about Hamilkar.

  [876] See Movers, Die Phönizier, ii, 1, p. 483-499.

  [877] Polybius, x, 18; Livy, xxx, 16.

  Yet again Polybius in another place speaks of the Gerontion at
  Carthage as representing the aristocratical force, and as opposed
  to the πλῆθος or people (vi, 51). It would seem that by Γερόντιον
  he must mean the same as the assembly called in another passage
  (x, 18) Σύγκλητος.

  [878] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 8, 2.

  [879] Livy, xxxiii, 46. Justin (xix, 2) mentions the one hundred
  select Senators set apart as judges.

These statements, though coming from valuable authors, convey so
little information and are withal so difficult to reconcile, that
both the structure and working of the political machine at Carthage
may be said to be unknown.[880] But it seems clear that the general
spirit of the government was highly oligarchical; that a few rich,
old, and powerful families, divided among themselves the great
offices and influence of the state; that they maintained themselves
in pointed and even insolent distinction from the multitude;[881]
that they stood opposed to each other in bitter feuds, often stained
by gross perfidy and bloodshed; and that the treatment with which,
through these violent party-antipathies, unsuccessful generals were
visited, was cruel in the extreme.[882] It appears that wealth was
one indispensable qualification, and that magistrates and generals
procured their appointments in a great measure by corrupt means. Of
such corruption, one variety was, the habit of constantly regaling
the citizens in collective banquets of the _curiæ_ or the political
associations; a habit so continual, and embracing so wide a circle of
citizens, that Aristotle compares these banquets to the _phiditia_
or public mess of Sparta.[883] There was a demos or people at
Carthage, who were consulted on particular occasions, and before whom
propositions were publicly debated, in cases where the suffetes and
the small Council were not all of one mind.[884] How numerous this
demos was, or what proportion of the whole population it comprised,
we have no means of knowing. But it is plain, that whether more or
less considerable, its multitude was kept under dependence to the
rich families by stratagems such as the banquets, the lucrative
appointments with lots of land in foreign dependencies, etc. The
purposes of government were determined, its powers wielded and the
great offices held—suffetes, senators, generals, or judges,—by
the members of a small number of wealthy families; and the chief
opposition which they encountered, was from their feuds against
each other. In the main, the government was conducted with skill
and steadiness, as well for internal tranquillity as for systematic
foreign and commercial aggrandizement. Within the knowledge of
Aristotle, Carthage had never suffered either the successful
usurpation of a despot, or any violent intestine commotion.[885]

  [880] Heeren (Ideen über den Verkehr der Alten Welt, part ii, p.
  138, 3rd edit.) and Kluge (in his Dissertation, Aristoteles de
  Politiâ Carthaginiensium, Wratisl. 1824) have discussed all these
  passages with ability. But their materials do not enable them to
  reach any certainty.

  [881] Valerius Max. ix, 5, 4. “Insolentiæ inter Carthaginiensem
  et Campanum senatum quasi æmulatio fuit. Ille enim separato à
  plebe balneo lavabatur, hic diverso foro utebatur.”

  [882] Diodor. xx, 10; xxiii, 9; Valer. Max. ii, 7, 1.

  [883] Aristotel Politic. iii, 5, 6.

  These banquets must have been settled, daily proceedings,—as
  well as multitudinous, in order to furnish even apparent warrant
  for the comparison which Aristotle makes with the Spartan public
  mess. But even granting the analogy on these external points,—the
  intrinsic difference of character and purpose between the two
  must have been so great, that the comparison seems not happy.

  Livy (xxxiv, 61) talks of the _circuli et convivia_ at Carthage;
  but this is probably a general expression, without particular
  reference to the public banquets mentioned by Aristotle.

  [884] Aristotel. Polit. ii, 8, 3.

  [885] Aristot. Polit. ii, 8, 1. He briefly alludes to the
  abortive conspiracy of Hanno (v, 6, 2), which is also mentioned
  in Justin (xxi, 4). Hanno is said to have formed the plan of
  putting to death the Senate, and making himself despot. But he
  was detected, and executed under the severest tortures; all his
  family being put to death along with him.

  Not only is it very difficult to make out Aristotle’s statements
  about the Carthaginian government,—but some of them are even
  contradictory. One of these (v, 10, 3) has been pointed out by M.
  Barthélemy St. Hilaire, who proposes to read ἐν Χαλκηδόνι instead
  of ἐν Καρχηδόνι. In another place (v, 10, 4) Aristotle calls
  Carthage (ἐν Καρχηδόνι δημοκρατουμένῃ) a state democratically
  governed; which cannot be reconciled with what he says in ii, 8,
  respecting its government.

  Aristotle compares the Council of One Hundred and Four at
  Carthage to the Spartan ephors. But it is not easy to see how so
  numerous a body could have transacted the infinite diversity of
  administrative and other business performed by the five ephors.

The first eminent Carthaginian leader brought to our notice, is
Mago (seemingly about 530-500 B.C.), who is said to have mainly
contributed to organize the forces, and extend the dominion,
of Carthage. Of his two sons, one, Hasdrubal, perished after a
victorious career in Sardinia;[886] the other, Hamilkar, commanding
at the battle of Himera in Sicily, was there defeated and slain by
Gelon, as has been already recounted. After the death of Hamilkar,
his son Giskon was condemned to perpetual exile, and passed his
life in Sicily at the Greek city of Selinus.[887] But the sons of
Hasdrubal still remained at Carthage, the most powerful citizens
in the state; carrying on hostilities against the Moors and other
indigenous Africans, whom they compelled to relinquish the tribute
which Carthage had paid, down to that time, for the ground whereon
the city was situated. This family are said indeed to have been so
powerful, that a check upon their ascendency was supposed to be
necessary; and for that purpose the select One Hundred Senators
sitting as judges were now nominated for the first time.[888] Such
wars in Africa doubtless tended to prevent the Carthaginians from
farther interference in Sicily, during the interval between 480-410
B.C. There were probably other causes also, not known to us,—and
down to the year 413 B.C., the formidable naval power of Athens
(as has been already remarked) kept them on the watch even for
themselves. But now, after the great Athenian catastrophe before
Syracuse, apprehensions from that quarter were dissipated; so that
Carthage again found leisure, as well as inclination, to seek in
Sicily both aggrandizement and revenge.

  [886] Justin. xix, 1.

  [887] Diodor. xiii.

  [888] Justin, xix, 2.

It is remarkable that the same persons, acting in the same quarrel,
who furnished the pretext or the motive for the recent invasion by
Athens, now served in the like capacity as prompters to Carthage.
The inhabitants of Egesta, engaged in an unequal war with rival
neighbors at Selinus, were in both cases the soliciting parties.
They had applied to Carthage first, without success,[889] before
they thought of sending to invoke aid from Athens. This war indeed
had been for the time merged and forgotten in the larger Athenian
enterprise against Syracuse; but it revived after that catastrophe,
wherein Athens and her armament were shipwrecked. The Egestæans had
not only lost their protectors, but had incurred aggravated hostility
from their neighbors, for having brought upon Sicily so formidable an
ultramarine enemy. Their original quarrel with Selinus had related
to a disputed portion of border territory. This point they no longer
felt competent to maintain, under their present disadvantageous
circumstances. But the Selinuntines, confident as well as angry,
were now not satisfied with success in their original claim. They
proceeded to strip the Egestæans of other lands indisputably
belonging to them, and seriously menaced the integrity as well as the
independence of the city. To no other quarter could the Egestæans
turn, with any chance of finding both will and power to protect them,
except to Carthage.[890]

  [889] Diodor. xii, 82.

  It seems probable that the war which Diodorus mentions to have
  taken place in 452 B.C., between the Egestæans and Lilybæans—was
  really a war between Egesta and Selinus (see Diodor, xi, 86—with
  Wesseling’s note). Lilybæum as a town attained no importance
  until after the capture of Motyê by the older Dionysius in 393
  B.C.

  [890] Diodor. xiii, 43.

The town of Egesta (non-Hellenic or at least only semi-Hellenic) was
situated on or near the northern line of Sicilian coast, not far from
the western cape of the island, and in the immediate neighborhood
of the Carthaginian settlements,—Motyê, Panormus (now Palermo), and
Soloeis or Soluntum. Selinus also was near the western cape, but on
the southern coast of Sicily, with its territory conterminous to
the southern portion of Egesta. When therefore the Egestæan envoys
presented their urgent supplications at Carthage for aid, proclaiming
that unless assisted they must be subjugated and become a dependency
of Selinus,—the Carthaginians would not unreasonably conceive,
that their own Sicilian settlements would be endangered, if their
closest Hellenic neighbor were allowed thus to aggrandize herself.
Accordingly they agreed to grant the aid solicited; yet not without
much debate and hesitation. They were uneasy at the idea of resuming
military operations in Sicily,—which had been laid aside for seventy
years, and had moreover left such disastrous recollections[891]—at a
moment when Syracusan courage stood in high renown, from the recent
destruction of the Athenian armament. But the recollections of the
Gelonian victory at Himera, while they suggested apprehension,
also kindled the appetite of revenge; especially in the bosom of
Hannibal, the grandson of that general Hamilkar who had there met his
death. Hannibal was at this moment king, or rather first of the two
suffetes, chief executive magistrates of Carthage, as his grandfather
had been seventy years before. So violent had been the impression
made upon the Carthaginians by the defeat of Himera, that they had
banished Giskon, son of the slain general Hamilkar and father of
Hannibal, and had condemned him to pass his whole life in exile. He
had chosen the Greek city of Selinus; where probably Hannibal also
had spent his youth, though restored since to his country and to
his family consequence,—and from whence he brought back an intense
antipathy to the Greek name, as well as an impatience to wipe off by
a signal revenge the dishonor both of his country and of his family.
Accordingly, espousing with warmth the request of the Egestæans, he
obtained from the Senate authority to take effective measures for
their protection.[892]

  [891] Diodor. xiii, 43.

  [892] Diodor. xiii, 43. Κατέστησαν στρατηγὸν τὸν Ἀννίβαν, κατὰ
  νόμους τότε βασιλεύοντα. Οὗτος δὲ ἦν υἱωνὸς μὲν τοῦ πρὸς Γέλωνα
  πολεμήσαντος Ἁμίλκου, καὶ πρὸς Ἱμέρᾳ τελευτήσαντος, υἱὸς δὲ
  Γέσκωνος, ὃς διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἧτταν ἐφυγαδεύθη, καὶ κατεβίωσεν
  ἐν τῇ Σελινοῦντι. Ὁ δ’ οὖν Ἀννίβας, ὢν μὲν καὶ ~φύσει μισέλλην~,
  ὅμως δὲ τὰς τῶν προγόνων ἀτιμίας διορθώσασθαι βουλόμενος, etc.

  The banishment of Giskon, and that too for the whole of his
  life, deserves notice, as a point of comparison between the
  Greek republics and Carthage. A defeated general in Greece, if
  he survived his defeat, was not unfrequently banished, even
  where there seems neither proof nor probability that he had
  been guilty of misconduct, or misjudgment, or omission. But I
  do not recollect any case in which, when a Grecian general thus
  apparently innocent was not merely defeated but slain in the
  battle, his son was banished for life, as Giskon was banished
  by the Carthaginians. In appreciating the manner in which the
  Grecian states, both democratical and oligarchical, dealt with
  their officers, the contemporary republic of Carthage is one
  important standard of comparison. Those who censure the Greeks,
  will have to find stronger terms of condemnation when they review
  the proceedings of the Carthaginians.

His first proceeding was to send envoys to Egesta and Selinus, to
remonstrate against the encroachments of the Selinuntines; with
farther instructions, in case remonstrance proved ineffectual, to
proceed with the Egestæans to Syracuse, and there submit the whole
dispute to the arbitration of the Syracusans. He foresaw that the
Selinuntines, having superiority of force on their side, would refuse
to acknowledge any arbitration; and that the Syracusans, respectfully
invoked by one party but rejected by the other, would stand aside
from the quarrel altogether. It turned out as he had expected.
The Selinuntines sent envoys to Syracuse, to protest against the
representations from Egesta and Carthage; but declined to refer
their case to arbitration. Accordingly, the Syracusans passed a vote
that they would maintain their alliance with Selinus, yet without
impeachment of their pacific relations with Carthage: thus leaving
the latter free to act without obstruction. Hannibal immediately sent
over a body of troops to the aid of Egesta: five thousand Libyans
or Africans; and eight hundred Campanian mercenaries, who had been
formerly in the pay and service of the Athenians before Syracuse, but
had quitted that camp before the final catastrophe occurred.[893]

  [893] Diodor. xiii, 43, 44.

In spite of the reinforcement and the imposing countenance of
Carthage, the Selinuntines, at this time in full power and
prosperity, still believed themselves strong enough to subdue Egesta.
Under such persuasion, they invaded the territory with their full
force. They began to ravage the country, yet at first with order
and precaution; but presently, finding no enemy in the field to
oppose them, they became careless, and spread themselves about for
disorderly plunder. This was the moment for which the Egestæans
and Carthaginians were watching. They attacked the Selinuntines
by surprise, defeated them with the loss of a thousand men, and
recaptured the whole booty.[894]

  [894] Diodor. xiii, 44.

The war, as hitherto carried on, was one offensive on the part of
the Selinuntines, for the purpose of punishing or despoiling their
ancient enemy Egesta. Only so far as was necessary for the defence of
the latter, had the Carthaginians yet interfered. But against such an
interference the Selinuntines, if they had taken a prudent measure of
their own force, would have seen that they were not likely to achieve
any conquest. Moreover, they might perhaps have obtained peace now,
had they sought it; as a considerable minority among them, headed
by a citizen named Empedion,[895] urgently recommended: for Selinus
appears always to have been on more friendly terms with Carthage
than any other Grecian city in Sicily. Even at the great battle of
Himera, the Selinuntine troops had not only not assisted Gelon, but
had actually fought in the Carthaginian army under Hamilkar;[896]
a plea, which, had it been pressed, might probably have had weight
with Hannibal. But this claim upon the goodwill of Carthage appears
only to have rendered them more confident and passionate in braving
her force and in prosecuting the war. They sent to Syracuse to ask
for aid, which the Syracusans, under present circumstances, promised
to send them. But the promise was given with little cordiality,
as appears by the manner in which they fulfilled it, as well as
from the neutrality which they had professed so recently before;
for the contest seemed to be aggressive on the part of Selinus, so
that Syracuse had little interest in helping her to conquer Egesta.
Neither Syracusans nor Selinuntines were prepared for the immense
preparations, and energetic rapidity of movement by which Hannibal at
once altered the character, and enlarged the purposes, of the war. He
employed all the ensuing autumn and winter in collecting a numerous
host of mercenary troops from Africa, Spain, and Campania, with
various Greeks who were willing to take service.[897]

  [895] Diodor. xiii, 59.

  [896] Diodor. xiii, 55; xi, 21.

  [897] Diodor. xiii, 54-58. οἱ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις Ἕλληνες
  ξυμμαχοῦντες, etc.

  It cannot therefore be exact,—that which Plutarch affirms,
  Timoleon, c. 30,—that the Carthaginians had never employed Greeks
  in their service, at the time of the battle of the Krimêsus,—B.C.
  340.

In the spring of the memorable year 409 B.C., through the exuberant
wealth of Carthage, he was in a condition to leave Africa with a
great fleet of sixty triremes, and fifteen hundred transports or
vessels of burthen;[898] conveying an army, which, according to
the comparatively low estimate of Timæus, amounted to more than
one hundred thousand men; while Ephorus extended the number to two
hundred thousand infantry, and four thousand cavalry, together
with muniments of war and battering machines for siege. With these
he steered directly for the western Cape of Sicily, Lilybæum;
taking care, however, to land his troops and to keep his fleet on
the northern side of that cape, in the bay near Motyê,—and not to
approach the southern shore, lest he should alarm the Syracusans with
the idea that he was about to prosecute his voyage farther eastward
along the southern coast towards their city. By this precaution, he
took the best means for prolonging the period of Syracusan inaction.
The Selinuntines, panic-struck at the advent of an enemy so much more
overwhelming than they had expected, sent pressing messengers to
Syracuse to accelerate the promised help. They had made no provision
for standing on the defensive against a really formidable aggressor.
Their walls, though strong enough to hold out against Sicilian
neighbors, had been neglected during the long-continued absence of
any foreign besieger, and were now in many places out of repair.
Hannibal left them no time to make good past deficiencies. Instead
of wasting his powerful armament (as the unfortunate Nikias had done
five years before) by months of empty flourish and real inaction,
he waited only until he was joined by the troops from Egesta and
the neighboring Carthaginian dependencies, and then marched his
whole force straight from Lilybæum to Selinus. Crossing the river
Mazara in his way, and storming the fort which lay near its mouth,
he soon found himself under the Selinuntine walls. He distributed
his army into two parts, each provided with battering machines and
movable wooden towers; and then assailed the walls on many points at
once, choosing the points where they were most accessible or most
dilapidated. Archers and slingers in great numbers were posted near
the walls, to keep up a discharge of missiles and chase away the
defenders from the battlements. Under cover of such discharge, six
wooden towers were rolled up to the foot of the wall, to which they
were equal or nearly equal in height, so that the armed men in their
interior were prepared to contend with the defenders almost on a
level. Against other portions of the wall, battering-rams with iron
heads were driven by the combined strength of multitudes, shaking or
breaking through its substance, especially where it showed symptoms
of neglect or decay. Such were the methods of attack which Hannibal
now brought to bear upon the unprepared Selinuntines. He was eager to
forestal the arrival of auxiliaries, by the impetuous movements of
his innumerable barbaric host, the largest seen in Sicily since his
grandfather Hamilkar had been defeated before Himera. Collected from
all the shores of the western Mediterranean, it presented soldiers
heterogeneous in race, in arms, in language,—in everything, except
bravery and common appetite for blood as well as plunder.[899]

  [898] Thucyd. vi, 34. δυνατοὶ δέ εἰσι (the Carthaginians) μάλιστα
  τῶν νῦν, βουληθέντες· χρυσὸν γὰρ καὶ ἄργυρον πλεῖστον κέκτηνται,
  ὅθεν ὅ τε πόλεμος καὶ τἄλλα εὐπορεῖ.

  [899] Diodor. xiii, 54, 55.

The dismay of the Selinuntines, when they suddenly found themselves
under the sweep of this destroying hurricane, is not to be described.
It was no part of the scheme of Hannibal to impose conditions or
grant capitulation; for he had promised the plunder of their town
to his soldiers. The only chance of the besieged was, to hold out
with the courage of desperation, until they could receive aid from
their Hellenic brethren on the southern coast,—Agrigentum, Gela,
and especially Syracuse,—all of whom they had sent to warn and to
supplicate. Their armed population crowded to man the walls, with a
resolution worthy of Greeks and citizens; while the old men and the
females, though oppressed with agony from the fate which seemed to
menace them, lent all the aid and encouragement in their power. Under
the sound of trumpets, and every variety of war-cry, the assailants
approached the walls, encountering everywhere a valiant resistance.
They were repulsed again and again, with the severest loss. But fresh
troops came up to relieve those who were slain or fatigued; and at
length, after a murderous struggle, a body of Campanians forced their
way over the walls into the town. Yet in spite of such temporary
advantage, the heroic efforts of the besieged drove them out again
or slew them, so that night arrived without the capture being
accomplished. For nine successive days was the assault thus renewed
with undiminished fury; for nine successive days did this heroic
population maintain a successful resistance, though their enemies
were numerous enough to relieve each other perpetually,—though their
own strength was every day failing,—and though not a single friend
arrived to their aid. At length, on the tenth day, and after terrible
loss to the besiegers, a sufficient breach was made in the weak part
of the wall, for the Iberians to force their way into the city.
Still however the Selinuntines, even after their walls were carried,
continued with unabated resolution to barricade and defend their
narrow streets, in which their women also assisted, by throwing down
stones and tiles upon the assailants from the house-tops. All these
barriers were successively overthrown, by the unexhausted numbers,
and increasing passion, of the barbaric host; so that the defenders
were driven back from all sides into the agora, where most of them
closed their gallant defence by an honorable death. A small minority,
among whom was Empedion, escaped to Agrigentum, where they received
the warmest sympathy and the most hospitable treatment.[900]

  [900] Diodor. xiii, 56, 57.

Resistance being thus at an end, the assailants spread themselves
through the town in all the fury of insatiate appetites,—murderous,
lustful, and rapacious. They slaughtered indiscriminately elders
and children, preserving only the grown women as captives. The sad
details of a town taken by storm are to a great degree the same
in every age and nation; but the destroying barbarians at Selinus
manifested one peculiarity, which marks them as lying without the
pale of Hellenic sympathy and sentiment. They mutilated the bodies
of the slain; some were seen with amputated hands strung together
in a row and fastened round their girdles; while others brandished
heads on the points of their spears and javelins.[901] The Greeks
(seemingly not numerous) who served under Hannibal, far from sharing
in these ferocious manifestations, contributed somewhat to mitigate
the deplorable fate of the sufferers. Sixteen thousand Selinuntines
are said to have been slain, five thousand to have been taken
captive; while two thousand six hundred escaped to Agrigentum.[902]
These figures are probably under, rather than above, the truth. Yet
they do not seem entitled to any confidence; nor do they give us any
account of the entire population in its different categories,—old and
young,—men and women,—freemen and slaves,—citizens and metics. We
can only pretend to appreciate this mournful event in the gross. All
exact knowledge of its details is denied to us.

  [901] Diodor. xiii, 57.

  [902] Diodor. xiii, 57, 58.

It does little honor either to the generosity or to the prudence
of the Hellenic neighbors of Selinus, that this unfortunate city
should have been left to its fate unassisted. In vain was messenger
after messenger despatched, as the defence became more and more
critical, to Agrigentum, Gela, and Syracuse. The military force
of the two former was indeed made ready, but postponed its march
until joined by that of the last; so formidable was the account
given of the invading host. Meanwhile the Syracusans were not
ready. They thought it requisite, first, to close the war which
they were prosecuting against Katana and Naxos,—next, to muster a
large and carefully-appointed force. Before these preliminaries
were finished, the nine days of siege were past, and the death-hour
of Selinus had sounded. Probably the Syracusans were misled by the
Sicilian operations of Nikias, who, beginning with a long interval
of inaction, had then approached their town by slow blockade, such
as the circumstances of his case required. Expecting in the case
of Selinus that Hannibal would enter upon the like elaborate
siege,—and not reflecting that he was at the head of a vast host
of miscellaneous foreigners hired for the occasion, of whose lives
he could afford to be prodigal, while Nikias commanded citizens of
Athens and other Grecian states, whom he could not expose to the
murderous but thorough-going process of ever-renewed assault against
strong walls recently erected,—they were thunderstruck on being
informed that nine days of carnage had sufficed for the capture. The
Syracusan soldiers, a select body of three thousand, who at length
joined the Geloans and Agrigentines at Agrigentum, only arrived in
time to partake in the general dismay everywhere diffused. A joint
embassy was sent by three cities to Hannibal, entreating him to
permit the ransom of the captives, and to spare the temples of the
gods; while Empedion went at the same time to sue for compassion on
behalf of his own fugitive fellow-citizens. To the former demand
the victorious Carthaginian returned an answer at once haughty and
characteristic,—“The Selinuntines have not been able to preserve
their freedom, and must now submit to a trial of slavery. The gods
have become offended with them, and have taken their departure
from the town.”[903] To Empedion, an ancient friend and pronounced
partisan of the Carthaginians, his reply was more indulgent. All
the relatives of Empedion, found alive among the captives, were
at once given up; moreover permission was granted to the fugitive
Selinuntines to return, if they pleased, and reoccupy the town with
its lands, as tributary subjects of Carthage. At the same time
that he granted such permission, however, Hannibal at once caused
the walls to be razed, and even the town with its temples to be
destroyed.[904] What was done about the proposed ransom, we do not
hear.

  [903] Diodor. xiii, 59. Ὁ δὲ Ἀννίβας ἀπεκρίθη, τοὺς μὲν
  Σελινουντίους μὴ δυναμένους τηρεῖν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, πεῖραν τῆς
  δουλείας λήψεσθαι· τοὺς δὲ θεοὺς ἐκτὸς Σελινοῦντος οἴχεσθαι,
  προσκόψαντας τοῖς ἐνοικοῦσιν.

  [904] Diodor. xiii, 59. The ruins, yet remaining, of the ancient
  temples of Selinus, are vast and imposing; characteristic as
  specimens of Doric art, during the fifth and sixth centuries
  B.C. From the great magnitude of the fallen columns, it has been
  supposed that they were overthrown by an earthquake. But the
  ruins afford distinct evidence, that these columns have been
  first undermined, and then overthrown by crow-bars.

  This impressive fact, demonstrating the agency of the
  Carthaginian destroyers, is stated by Niebuhr, Vorträge über alte
  Geschichte, vol. iii. p. 207.

Having satiated his troops with this rich plunder Hannibal now
quitted the scene of bloodshed and desolation, and marched across
the island to Himera on its northern coast. Though Selinus, as the
enemy of Egesta, had received the first shock of his arms, yet it was
against Himera that the grand purpose of his soul was directed. Here
it was that Hamilkar had lost both his army and his life, entailing
inexpiable disgrace upon the whole life of his son Giskon: here it
was that his grandson intended to exact full vengeance and requital
from the grandchildren of those who then occupied the fated spot.
Not only was the Carthaginian army elate with the past success,
but a number of fresh Sikels and Sikans, eager to share in plunder
as well as to gratify the antipathies of their races against the
Grecian intruders, flocked to join it; thus making up the losses
sustained in the recent assault. Having reached Himera, and disposed
his army in appropriate positions around, Hannibal proceeded to
instant attack, as at Selinus; pushing up his battering machines and
towers against the vulnerable portions of the walls, and trying at
the same time to undermine them. The Himeræans defended themselves
with desperate bravery; and on this occasion the defence was not
unassisted; for four thousand allies, chiefly Syracusans, and headed
by the Syracusan Dioklês, had come to the city as a reinforcement.
For a whole day they repelled with slaughter repeated assaults.
No impression being made upon the city, the besieged became so
confident in their own valor, that they resolved not to copy the
Selinuntines in confining themselves to defence, but to sally out
at daybreak the next morning and attack the besiegers in the field.
Ten thousand gallant men,—Himeræans, Syracusans, and other Grecian
allies,—accordingly marched out with the dawn; while the battlements
were lined with old men and women as anxious spectators of their
exploits. The Carthaginians near the walls, who, preparing to renew
the assault, looked for nothing less than for a sally, were taken
by surprise. In spite of their great superiority of number, and in
spite of great personal bravery, they fell into confusion, and were
incapable of long resisting the gallant and orderly charge of the
Greeks. At length they gave way and fled towards the neighboring
hill, where Hannibal himself with his body of reserve was posted to
cover the operations of assault. The Greeks pursued them fiercely
and slaughtered great numbers (six thousand according to Timæus,
but not less than twenty thousand, if we are to accept the broad
statement of Ephorus), exhorting each other not to think of making
prisoners. But in the haste and exultation of pursuit, they became
out of breath, and their ranks fell into disorder. In this untoward
condition, they found themselves face to face with the fresh body of
reserve brought up by Hannibal, who marched down the hill to receive
and succor his own defeated fugitives. The fortune of the battle
was now so completely turned, that the Himeræans, after bravely
contending for some time against these new enemies, found themselves
overpowered and driven back to their own gates. Three thousand of
their bravest warriors, however, despairing of their city and mindful
of the fate of Selinus, disdained to turn their backs, and perished
to a man in obstinate conflict with the overwhelming numbers of the
Carthaginians.[905]

  [905] Diodor. xiii, 60.

Violent was the sorrow and dismay in Himera, when the flower of her
troops were thus driven in as beaten men, with the loss of half
their numbers. At this moment there chanced to arrive at the port
a fleet of twenty-five triremes, belonging to Syracuse and other
Grecian cities in Sicily; which triremes had been sent to aid the
Peloponnesians in the Ægean, but had since come back, and were now
got together for the special purpose of relieving the besieged city.
So important a reinforcement ought to have revived the spirit of
the Himeræans. It announced that the Syracusans were in full march
across the island, with the main force of the city, to the relief
of Himera. But this good news was more than countervailed by the
statement, that Hannibal was ordering out the Carthaginian fleet in
the bay of Motyê, in order that it might sail round cape Lilybæum and
along the southern coast into the harbor of Syracuse, now defenceless
through the absence of its main force. Apparently the Syracusan
fleet, in sailing from Syracuse to Himera, had passed by the bay of
Motyê, observed maritime movement among the Carthaginians there, and
picked up these tidings in explanation. Here was intelligence more
than sufficient to excite alarm for home, in the bosom of Dioklês
and the Syracusans at Himera; especially under the despondency
now reigning. Dioklês not only enjoined the captains of the fleet
to sail back immediately to Syracuse, in order to guard against
the apprehended surprise, but also insisted upon marching back
thither himself by land with the Syracusan forces, and abandoning
the farther defence of Himera. He would in his march home meet his
fellow-citizens on their march outward, and conduct them back along
with him. To the Himeræans, this was a sentence of death, or worse
than death. It plunged them into an agony of fright and despair. But
there was no safer counsel to suggest, nor could they prevail upon
Dioklês to grant anything more than means of transport for carrying
off the Himeræan population, when the city was relinquished to the
besiegers. It was agreed that the fleet, instead of sailing straight
to Syracuse, should employ itself in carrying off as much of the
population as could be put on board, and in depositing them safely
at Messênê; after which it would return to fetch the remainder, who
would in the mean time defend the city with their utmost force.

Such was the frail chance of refuge now alone open to these unhappy
Greeks, against the devouring enemy without. Immediately the feebler
part of the population,—elders, women, and children,—crowding on
board until the triremes could hold no more, sailed away along the
northern coast to Messênê. On the same night, Dioklês also marched
out of the city with his Syracusan soldiers; in such haste to get
home, that he could not even tarry to bury the numerous Syracusan
soldiers who had been just slain in the recent disastrous sally.
Many of the Himeræans, with their wives and children, took their
departure along with Dioklês, as their only chance of escape; since
it was but too plain that the triremes could not carry away all.
The bravest and most devoted portion of the Himeræan warriors still
remained, to defend their city until the triremes came back. After
keeping armed watch on the walls all night, they were again assailed
on the next morning by the Carthaginians, elate with their triumph
of the preceding day and with the flight of so many defenders. Yet
notwithstanding all the pressure of numbers, ferocity, and battering
machines, the resistance was still successfully maintained; so
that night found Himera still a Grecian city. On the next day, the
triremes came back, having probably deposited their unfortunate cargo
in some place of safety not so far off as Messênê. If the defenders
could have maintained their walls until another sunset, many of them
might yet have escaped. But the good fortune, and probably the
physical force, of these brave men, was now at an end. The gods were
quitting Himera, as they had before quitted Selinus. At the moment
when the triremes were seen coming near to the port, the Iberian
assailants broke down a wide space of the fortification with their
battering-rams, poured in through the breach, and overcame all
opposition. Encouraged by their shouts, the barbaric host now on all
sides forced the walls, and spread themselves over the city, which
became one scene of wholesale slaughter and plunder. It was no part
of the scheme of Hannibal to interrupt the plunder, which he made
over as a recompense to his soldiers. But he speedily checked the
slaughter, being anxious to take as many prisoners as possible, and
increasing the number by dragging away all who had taken sanctuary in
the temples. A few among this wretched population may have contrived
to reach the approaching triremes; all the rest either perished or
fell into the hands of the victor.[906]

  [906] Diodor. xiii, 61, 62.

It was a proud day for the Carthaginian general when he stood as
master on the ground of Himera; enabled to fulfil the duty, and
satisfy the exigencies, of revenge for his slain grandfather.
Tragical indeed was the consummation of this long-cherished purpose.
Not merely the walls and temples (as at Selinus), but all the houses
in Himera, were razed to the ground. Its temples, having been first
stripped of their ornaments and valuables, were burnt. The women
and children taken captive were distributed as prizes among the
soldiers. But all the male captives, three thousand in number, were
conveyed to the precise spot where Hamilkar had been slain, and there
put to death with indignity,[907] as an expiatory satisfaction to
his lost honor. Lastly, in order that even the hated name of Himera
might pass into oblivion, a new town called Therma (so designated
because of some warm springs) was shortly afterwards founded by the
Carthaginians in the neighborhood.[908]

  [907] Diodor. xiii, 62. Τῶν δ’ αἰχμαλώτων γυναικάς τε καὶ παῖδας
  διαδοὺς εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον παρεφύλαττε· τῶν δ’ ἀνδρῶν τοὺς
  ἁλόντας, εἰς τρισχιλίους ὄντας, παρήγαγεν ἐπὶ τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ
  πρότερον Ἀμίλκας ὁ πάππος αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ Γέλωνος ἀνῃρέθη, καὶ πάντας
  αἰκισάμενος κατέσφαξε.

  The Carthaginians, after their victory over Agathokles in 307
  B.C., sacrificed their finest prisoners as offerings of thanks to
  the gods (Diodor. xx, 65.)

  [908] Diodor. xiii, 79.

No man can now read the account of this wholesale massacre without
horror and repugnance. Yet we cannot doubt, that among all the acts
of Hannibal’s life, this was the one in which he most gloried; that
it realized, in the most complete and emphatic manner, his concurrent
inspirations of filial sentiment, religious obligation, and honor
as a patriot; that to show mercy would have been regarded as a mean
dereliction of these esteemed impulses; and that if the prisoners had
been even more numerous, all of them would have been equally slain,
rendering the expiatory fulfilment only so much the more honorable
and efficacious. In the Carthaginian religion, human sacrifices were
not merely admitted, but passed for the strongest manifestation
of devotional fervor, and were especially resorted to in times of
distress, when the necessity for propitiating the gods was accounted
most pressing. Doubtless the feelings of Hannibal were cordially
shared, and the plenitude of his revenge envied, by the army around
him. So different, sometimes so totally contrary, is the tone and
direction of the moral sentiments, among different ages and nations.

In the numerous wars of Greeks against Greeks, which we have been
unfortunately called upon to study, we have found few or no examples
of any considerable town taken by storm. So much the more terrible
was the shock throughout the Grecian world, of the events just
recounted; Selinus and Himera, two Grecian cities of ancient standing
and uninterrupted prosperity,—had both of them been stormed, ruined,
and depopulated, by a barbaric host, within the space of three
months.[909] No event at all parallel had occurred since the sack
of Miletus by the Persians after the Ionic revolt (495 B.C.),[910]
which raised such powerful sympathy and mourning in Athens. The
war now raging in the Ægean, between Athens and Sparta with their
respective allies, doubtless contributed to deaden, throughout
Central Greece, the impression of calamities sustained by Greeks at
the western extremity of Sicily. But within that island, the sympathy
with the sufferers was most acute, and aggravated by terror for the
future. The Carthaginian general had displayed a degree of energy
equal to any Grecian officer throughout the war, with a command of
besieging and battering machinery surpassing even the best equipped
Grecian cities.

The mercenaries whom he had got together were alike terrible from
their bravery and ferocity; encouraging Carthaginian ambition to
follow up its late rapid successes by attacks against the other
cities of the island. No such prospects indeed were at once realized.
Hannibal, having completed his revenge at Himera, and extended the
Carthaginian dominion all across the north-west corner of Sicily
(from Selinus on the southern sea to the site of Himera or Therma
on the northern), dismissed his mercenary troops and returned home.
Most of them were satiated with plunder as well as pay, though the
Campanians, who had been foremost at the capture of Selinus, thought
themselves unfairly stinted, and retired in disgust.[911] Hannibal
carried back a rich spoil, with glorious trophies, to Carthage, where
he was greeted with enthusiastic welcome and admiration.[912]

  [909] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 37.

  [910] Herodot. vi, 28.

  [911] Diodor. xiii, 62-80.

  [912] Diodor. xiii, 62.

Never was there a time when the Greek cities in Sicily,—and Syracuse
especially, upon whom the others would greatly rest in the event of
a second Carthaginian invasion,—had stronger motives for keeping
themselves in a condition of efficacious defence. Unfortunately,
it was just at this moment that a new cause of intestine discord
burst upon Syracuse; fatally impairing her strength, and proving in
its consequences destructive to her liberty. The banished Syracusan
general Hermokrates had recently arrived at Messênê in Sicily;
where he appears to have been, at the time when the fugitives
came from Himera. It has already been mentioned that he, with two
colleagues, had commanded the Syracusan contingent serving with the
Peloponnesians under Mindarus in Asia. After the disastrous defeat
of Kyzikus, in which Mindarus was slain and every ship in the fleet
taken or destroyed, sentence of banishment was passed at Syracuse
against the three admirals. Hermokrates was exceedingly popular
among the trierarchs and the officers; he had stood conspicuous for
incorruptibility, and had conducted himself (so far as we have means
of judging) with energy and ability in his command. The sentence,
unmerited by his behavior, was dictated by acute vexation for the
loss of the fleet, and for the disappointment of those expectations
which Hermokrates had held out; combined with the fact that Diokles
and the opposite party were now in the ascendant at Syracuse. When
the banished general, in making it known to the armament, complained
of its injustice and illegality, he obtained warm sympathy, and even
exhortations still to retain the command, in spite of orders from
home. He forbade them earnestly to think of raising sedition against
their common city and country;[913] upon which the trierarchs, when
they took their last and affectionate leave of him, bound themselves
by oath, as soon as they should return to Syracuse, to leave no means
untried for procuring his restoration.

  [913] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 28. Οἱ δ’ οὐκ ἔφασαν δεῖν στασιάζειν
  πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν, etc.

The admonitory words addressed by Hermokrates to the forwardness
of the trierarchs, would have been honorable to his patriotism,
had not his own conduct at the same time been worthy of the worst
enemies of his country. For immediately on being superseded by the
new admirals, he went to the satrap Pharnabazus, in whose favor he
stood high; and obtained from him a considerable present of money,
which he employed in collecting mercenary troops and building ships,
to levy war against his opponents in Syracuse and procure his own
restoration.[914] Thus strengthened, he returned from Asia to Sicily,
and reached the Sicilian Messênê rather before the capture of Himera
by the Carthaginians. At Messênê he caused five fresh triremes to
be built, besides taking into his pay one thousand of the expelled
Himeræans. At the head of these troops, he attempted to force his
way into Syracuse, under concert with his friends in the city,
who engaged to assist his admission by arms. Possibly some of the
trierarchs of his armament, who had before sworn to lend him their
aid, had now returned and were among this body of interior partisans.

  [914] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 31; Diodor. xiii, 63.

The moment was well chosen for such an enterprise. As the disaster
at Kyzikus had exasperated the Syracusans against Hermokrates, so
we cannot doubt that there must have been a strong reaction against
Diokles and his partisans, in consequence of the fall of Selinus
unaided, and the subsequent abandonment of Himera. What degree of
blame may fairly attach to Diokles for these misfortunes, we are not
in a condition to judge. But such reverses in themselves were sure
to discredit him more or less, and to lend increased strength and
stimulus to the partisans of the banished Hermokrates. Nevertheless
that leader, though he came to the gates of Syracuse, failed in
his attempt to obtain admission, and was compelled to retire; upon
which he marched his little army across the interior of the island,
and took possession of the dismantled Selinus. Here he established
himself as the chief of a new settlement, got together as many as
he could of the expelled inhabitants (among whom probably some had
already come back along with Empedion), and invited many fresh
colonists from other quarters. Reëstablishing a portion of the
demolished fortifications, he found himself gradually strengthened
by so many new-comers, as to place at his command a body of six
thousand chosen hoplites,—probably independent of other soldiers of
inferior merit. With these troops he began to invade the Carthaginian
settlements in the neighborhood, Motyê and Panormus.[915] Having
defeated the forces of both in the field, he carried his ravages
successfully over their territories, with large acquisitions of
plunder. The Carthaginians had now no army remaining in Sicily;
for their immense host of the preceding year had consisted only of
mercenaries levied for the occasion, and then disbanded.

  [915] Diodor. xiii, 63.

These events excited strong sensation throughout Sicily. The valor of
Hermokrates, who had restored Selinus and conquered the Carthaginians
on the very ground where they had stood so recently in terrific
force, was contrasted with the inglorious proceeding of Diokles at
Himera. In the public assemblies of Syracuse, this topic, coupled
with the unjust sentence whereby Hermokrates had been banished, was
emphatically set forth by his partisans; producing some reaction
in his favor, and a still greater effect in disgracing his rival
Diokles. Apprised that the tide of Syracusan opinion was turning
towards him, Hermokrates made renewed preparations for his return,
and resorted to a new stratagem for the purpose of smoothing the
difficulty. He marched from Selinus to the ruined site of Himera,
informed himself of the spot where the Syracusan troops had undergone
their murderous defeat, and collected together the bones of his slain
fellow-citizens; which (or rather the unburied bodies) must have
lain upon the field unheeded for about two years. Having placed
these bones on cars richly decorated, he marched with his forces and
conveyed them across the island from Himera to the Syracusan border.
Here as an exile he halted; thinking it suitable now to display
respect for the law,—though in his previous attempt he had gone up
to the very gates of the city, without any similar scruples. But he
sent forward some friends with the cars and the bones, tendering
them to the citizens for the purpose of being honored with due
funeral solemnities. Their arrival was the signal for a violent
party discussion, and for an outburst of aggravated displeasure
against Diokles, who had left the bodies unburied on the field of
battle. “It was to Hermokrates (so his partisans urged) and to his
valiant efforts against the Carthaginians, that the recovery of
these remnants of the slain, and the opportunity of administering
to them the funeral solemnities, was now owing. Let the Syracusans,
after duly performing such obsequies, testify their gratitude to
Hermokrates by a vote of restoration, and their displeasure against
Diokles by a sentence of banishment.”[916] Diokles with his partisans
was thus placed at great disadvantage. In opposing the restoration of
Hermokrates, he thought it necessary also to oppose the proposition
for welcoming and burying the bones of the slain citizens. Here the
feelings of the people went vehemently against him; the bones were
received and interred, amidst the respectful attendance of all; and
so strong was the reactionary sentiment generally, that the partisans
of Hermokrates carried their proposition for sentencing Diokles to
banishment. But on the other hand, they could not so far prevail as
to obtain the restoration of Hermokrates himself. The purposes of the
latter had been so palpably manifested, in trying a few months before
to force his way into the city by surprise, and in now presenting
himself at the frontier with an armed force under his command,—that
his readmission would have been nothing less than a deliberate
surrender of the freedom of the city to a despot.[917]

  [916] Diodor. xiii, 63, 75.

  [917] Diodor. xiii, 75. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Διοκλῆς ἐφυγαδεύθη, τὸν δὲ
  Ἑρμοκράτην οὐδ’ ὡς προσεδέξαντο· ὑπώπτευον γὰρ τὴν τἀνδρὸς
  τόλμαν, μή ποτε τυχὼν ἡγεμονίας, ἀναδείξῃ ἑαυτὸν τύραννον.

Having failed in this well-laid stratagem for obtaining a vote
of consent, Hermokrates saw that his return could not at that
moment be consummated by open force. He therefore retired from the
Syracusan frontier; yet only postponing his purposes of armed attack
until his friends in the city could provide for him a convenient
opportunity. We see plainly that his own party within had been much
strengthened, and his opponents enfeebled, by the recent manœuvre.
Of this a proof is to be found in the banishment of Diokles, who
probably was not succeeded by any other leader of equal influence.
After a certain interval, the partisans of Hermokrates contrived a
plan which they thought practicable, for admitting him into the city
by night. Forewarned by them, he marched from Selinus at the head
of three thousand soldiers, crossed the territory of Gela,[918] and
reached the concerted spot near the gate of Achradina during the
night. From the rapidity of his advance, he had only a few troops
along with him; the main body not having been able to keep up. With
these few, however, he hastened to the gate, which he found already
in possession of his friends, who had probably (like Pasimêlus at
Corinth[919]) awaited a night on which they were posted to act as
sentinels. Master of the gate, Hermokrates, though joined by his
partisans within in arms, thought it prudent to postpone decisive
attack until his own main force came up. But during this interval,
the Syracusan authorities in the city, apprised of what had happened,
mustered their full military strength in the agora, and lost no time
in falling upon the band of aggressors. After a sharply contested
combat, these aggressors were completely worsted, and Hermokrates
himself slain with a considerable proportion of his followers. The
remainder having fled, sentence of banishment was passed upon them.
Several among the wounded, however, were reported by their relatives
as slain, in order that they might escape being comprised in such a
condemnation.[920]

  [918] Diodor. xiii, 75. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἑρμοκράτης τότε τὸν καιρὸν οὐχ
  ὁρῶν εὔθετον εἰς τὸ βιάσασθαι, πάλιν ἀνεχώρησεν εἰς Σελινοῦντα.
  Μετὰ δέ τινα χρόνον, τῶν φίλων αὐτὸν μεταπεμπομένων, ὥρμησε μετὰ
  τρισχιλίων στρατιωτῶν, καὶ πορευθεὶς διὰ τῆς Γελώας, ἧκε νυκτὸς
  ἐπὶ τὸν συντεταγμένον τόπον.

  [919] Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 4, 8.

  [920] Diodor. xiii, 75.

  Xenophon (Hellen. i, 3, 13) states that Hermokrates, ἤδη φεύγων
  ἐκ Συρακουσῶν, was among those who accompanied Pharnabazus along
  with the envoys intended to go to Susa, but who only went as far
  as Gordium in Phrygia, and were detained by Pharnabazus (on the
  requisition of Cyrus) for three years. This must have been in the
  year 407 B.C. Now I cannot reconcile this with the proceedings
  of Hermokrates as described by Diodorus; his coming to the
  Sicilian Messênê,—his exploits near Selinus,—his various attempts
  to procure restoration to Syracuse:—all of which must have
  occurred in 408-407 B.C., ending with the death of Hermokrates.

  It seems to me impossible that the person mentioned by Xenophon
  as accompanying Pharnabazus into the interior can have been the
  eminent Hermokrates. Whether it was another person of the same
  name,—or whether Xenophon was altogether misinformed,—I will not
  take upon me to determine. There were really two contemporary
  Syracusans bearing that name, for the father of Dionysius the
  despot was named Hermokrates.

  Polybius (xii, 25) states that Hermokrates fought with the
  Lacedæmonians at Ægospotami. He means the eminent general so
  called; who however cannot have been at Ægospotami in the summer
  or autumn of 405 B.C. There is some mistake in the assertion of
  Polybius, but I do not know how to explain it.

Thus perished one of the most energetic of the Syracusan citizens; a
man not less effective as a defender of his country against foreign
enemies, than himself dangerous as a formidable enemy to her internal
liberties. It would seem, as far as we can make out, that his attempt
to make himself master of his country was powerfully seconded, and
might well have succeeded. But it lacked that adventitious support
arising from present embarrassment and danger in the foreign
relations of the city, which we shall find so efficacious two years
afterwards in promoting the ambitious projects of Dionysius.

Dionysius,—for the next coming generation the most formidable name
in the Grecian world,—now appears for the first time in history. He
was a young Syracusan of no consideration from family or position,
described as even of low birth and low occupation; as a scribe or
secretary, which was looked upon as a subordinate, though essential,
function.[921] He was the son of Hermokrates,—not that eminent person
whose death has been just described, but another person of the same
name, whether related or not, we do not know.[922] It is highly
probable that he was a man of literary ability and instruction, since
we read of him in after-days as a composer of odes and tragedies;
and it is certain that he stood distinguished in all the talents
for military action,—bravery, force of will, and quickness of
discernment. On the present occasion, he espoused strenuously the
party of Hermokrates, and was one of those who took arms in the
city on his behalf. Having distinguished himself in the battle,
and received several wounds, he was among those given out for dead
by his relations.[923] In this manner he escaped the sentence of
banishment passed against the survivors. And when, in the course of
a certain time, after recovering from his wounds, he was produced
as unexpectedly living,—we may presume that his opponents and the
leading men in the city left him unmolested, not thinking it worth
while to reopen political inquisition in reference to matters already
passed and finished. He thus remained in the city, marked out by his
daring and address to the Hermokratæan party, as the person most fit
to take up the mantle, and resume the anti-popular designs, of their
late leader. It will presently be seen how the chiefs of this party
lent their aid to exalt him.

  [921] Diodor. xiii, 96; xiv, 66.

  Isokrates, Or. v, Philipp. s. 73—Dionysius, πολλοστὸς ὢν
  Συρακοσίων καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δόξῃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν, etc.

  Demosthenes, adv. Leptinem, p. 506, s. 178. γραμματέως, ὥς φασι,
  etc. Polybius (xv, 35), ἐκ δημοτικῆς καὶ ταπεινῆς ὑποθέσεως
  ὁρμηθεὶς, etc. Compare Polyænus, v, 2, 2.

  [922] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 24. Διονύσιος ὁ Ἑρμοκράτους. Diodor.
  xiii, 91.

  [923] Diodor. xiii, 75.

Meanwhile the internal condition of Syracuse was greatly enfeebled by
this division. Though the three several attempts of Hermokrates to
penetrate by force or fraud into the city had all failed, yet they
had left a formidable body of malcontents behind; while the opponents
also, the popular government and its leaders, had been materially
reduced in power and consideration by the banishment of Diokles. This
magistrate was succeeded by Daphnæus and others, of whom we know
nothing, except that they are spoken of as rich men and representing
the sentiments of the rich,—and that they seem to have manifested but
little ability. Nothing could be more unfortunate than the weakness
of Syracuse at this particular juncture: for the Carthaginians, elate
with their successes at Selinus and Himera, and doubtless also piqued
by the subsequent retaliation of Hermokrates upon their dependencies
at Motyê and Panormus, were just now meditating a second invasion of
Sicily on a still larger scale. Not uninformed of their projects,
the Syracusan leaders sent envoys to Carthage to remonstrate against
them, and to make propositions for peace. But no satisfactory answer
could be obtained, nor were the preparations discontinued.[924]

  [924] Diodor. xiii, 79.

In the ensuing spring, the storm gathering from Africa burst with
destructive violence upon this fated island. A mercenary force had
been got together during the winter, greater than that which had
sacked Selinus and Himera; three hundred thousand men, according to
Ephorus,—one hundred and twenty thousand, according to Xenophon and
Timæus. Hannibal was again placed in command; but his predominant
impulses of family and religion having been satiated by the great
sacrifice of Himera, he excused himself on the score of old age,
and was only induced to accept the duty by having his relative
Imilkon named as colleague. By their joint efforts, the immense
host of Iberians, Mediterranean islanders, Campanians, Libyans, and
Numidians, was united at Carthage, and made ready to be conveyed
across, in a fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes, with no less
than one thousand five hundred transports.[925] To protect the
landing, forty Carthaginian triremes were previously sent over to
the Bay of Motyê. The Syracusan leaders, with commendable energy and
watchfulness, immediately despatched the like number of triremes
to attack them, in hopes of thereby checking the farther arrival
of the grand armament. They were victorious, destroying fifteen of
the Carthaginian triremes, and driving the rest back to Africa; yet
their object was not attained; for Hannibal himself, coming forth
immediately with fifty fresh triremes, constrained the Syracusans
to retire. Presently afterwards the grand armament appeared,
disembarking its motley crowd of barbaric warriors near the western
cape of Sicily.

  [925] Diodor. xiii, 80; Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 21.

Great was the alarm caused throughout Sicily by their arrival. All
the Greek cities either now began to prepare for war, or pushed with
a more vigorous hand equipments previously begun, since they seem
to have had some previous knowledge of the purpose of the enemy.
The Syracusans sent to entreat assistance both from the Italian
Greeks and from Sparta. From the latter city, however, little was
to be expected, since her whole efforts were now devoted to the
prosecution of the war against Athens; this being the year wherein
Kallikratidas commanded, and when the battle of Arginusæ was fought.

Of all Sicilian Greeks, the Agrigentines were both the most
frightened and the most busily employed. Conterminous as they were
with Selinus on their western frontier, and foreseeing that the first
shock of the invasion would fall upon them, they immediately began
to carry in their outlying property within the walls, as well as
to accumulate a stock of provisions for enduring blockade. Sending
for Dexippus, a Lacedæmonian then in Gela as commander of a body of
mercenaries for the defence of that town, they engaged him in their
service, with one thousand five hundred hoplites; reinforced by eight
hundred of those Campanians who had served with Hannibal at Himera,
but had quitted him in disgust.[926]

  [926] Diodor. xiii, 81-84.

Agrigentum was at this time in the highest state of prosperity and
magnificence; a tempting prize for any invader. Its population
was very great; comprising, according to one account, twenty
thousand citizens among an aggregate total of two hundred thousand
males,—citizens, metics, and slaves; according to another account, an
aggregate total of no less than eight hundred thousand persons;[927]
numbers unauthenticated, and not to be trusted farther than as
indicating a very populous city. Situated a little more than two
miles from the sea, and possessing a spacious territory highly
cultivated, especially with vines and olives, Agrigentum carried on a
lucrative trade with the opposite coast of Africa, where at that time
no such plantations flourished. Its temples and porticos, especially
the spacious temple of Zeus Olympius,—its statues and pictures,—its
abundance of chariots and horses,—its fortifications,—its sewers,—its
artificial lake of near a mile in circumference, abundantly stocked
with fish,—all these placed it on a par with the most splendid
cities of the Hellenic world.[928] Of the numerous prisoners taken
at the defeat of the Carthaginians near Himera seventy years before,
a very large proportion had fallen to the lot of the Agrigentines,
and had been employed by them in public works contributing to the
advantage or ornament of the city.[929] The hospitality of the
wealthy citizens,—Gellias, Antisthenes, and others,—was carried
even to profusion. The surrounding territory was celebrated for its
breed of horses,[930] which the rich Agrigentines vied with each
other in training and equipping for the chariot-race. At the last
Olympic games immediately preceding this fatal Carthaginian invasion
(that is at the 93rd Olympiad,—408 B.C.), the Agrigentine Exænetus
gained the prize in a chariot-race. On returning to Sicily after his
victory, he was welcomed by many of his friends, who escorted him
home in procession with three hundred chariots, each drawn by a pair
of white horses, and all belonging to native Agrigentines. Of the
festival by which the wealthy Antisthenes celebrated the nuptials of
his daughter, we read an account almost fabulous. Amidst all this
wealth and luxury, it is not surprising to hear that the rough duties
of military exercise were imperfectly kept up, and that indulgences,
not very consistent with soldier-like efficiency, were allowed to the
citizens on guard.

  [927] Diogen. Laert. viii, 63.

  [928] Diodor. xiii, 81-84; Polyb. ix, 7.

  [929] Diodor. xi, 25.

  [930] Virgil, Æneid. iii, 704.

Such was Agrigentum in May 406 B.C., when Hannibal and Imilkon
approached it with their powerful army. Their first propositions,
however, were not of a hostile character. They invited the
Agrigentines to enter into alliance with Carthage; or if this were
not acceptable, at any rate to remain neutral and at peace. Both
propositions were declined.[931]

  [931] Diodor. xiii, 85.

Besides having taken engagements with Gela and Syracuse, the
Agrigentines also felt a confidence, not unreasonable, in the
strength of their own walls and situation. Agrigentum with its
citadel was placed on an aggregate of limestone hills, immediately
above the confluence of two rivers, both flowing from the north; the
river Akragas on the eastern and southern sides of the city, and the
Hypsas on its western side. Of this aggregate of hills, separated
from each other by clefts and valleys, the northern half is the
loftiest, being about eleven hundred feet above the level of the
sea—the southern half is less lofty. But on all sides, except on the
south-west, it rises by a precipitous ascent; on the side towards
the sea, it springs immediately out of the plain, thus presenting a
fine prospect to ships passing along the coast. The whole of this
aggregate of hills was encompassed by a continuous wall, built round
the declivity, and in some parts hewn out of the solid rock. The
town of Agrigentum was situated in the southern half of the walled
enclosure. The citadel, separated from it by a ravine, and accessible
only by one narrow ascent, stood on the north-eastern hill; it was
the most conspicuous feature in the place, called the Athenæum,
and decorated by temples of Athênê and of Zeus Atabyrius. In the
plain under the southern wall of the city stood the Agrigentine
sepulchres.[932]—Reinforced by eight hundred Campanian mercenaries,
with the fifteen hundred other mercenaries brought by Dexippus from
Gela,—the Agrigentines awaited confidently the attack upon their
walls, which were not only in far better condition than those of
Selinus, but also unapproachable by battering-machines or movable
towers, except on one part of the south-western side. It was here
that Hannibal, after reconnoitering the town all round, began his
attack. But after hard fighting without success for one day, he was
forced to retire at nightfall; and even lost his battering train,
which was burnt during the night by a sally of the besieged.[933]
Desisting from farther attempts on that point, Hannibal now ordered
his troops to pull down the tombs; which were numerous on the lower
or southern side of the city, and many of which, especially that of
the despot Theron, were of conspicuous grandeur. By this measure he
calculated on providing materials adequate to the erection of immense
mounds, equal in height to the southern wall, and sufficiently
close to it for the purpose of assault. His numerous host had made
considerable progress in demolishing these tombs, and were engaged
in breaking down the monument of Theron, when their progress was
arrested by a thunderbolt falling upon it. This event was followed
by religious terrors, suddenly overspreading the camp. The prophets
declared that the violation of the tombs was an act of criminal
sacrilege. Every night the spectres of those whose tombs had been
profaned manifested themselves, to the affright of the soldiers on
guard; while the judgment of the gods was manifested in a violent
pestilential distemper. Numbers of the army perished, Hannibal
himself among them; and even of those who escaped death, many were
disabled from active duty by distress and suffering. Imilkon was
compelled to appease the gods, and to calm the agony of the troops,
by a solemn supplication according to the Carthaginian rites. He
sacrificed a child, considered as the most propitiatory of all
offerings, to Kronus; and cast into the sea a number of animal
victims as offerings to Poseidon.[934]

  [932] See about the Topography of Agrigentum,—Seyfert, Akragas,
  p. 21, 23, 40 (Hamburg, 1845).

  The modern town of Girgenti stands on one of the hills of this
  vast aggregate, which is overspread with masses of ruins, and
  around which the traces of the old walls may be distinctly made
  out, with considerable remains of them in some particular parts.

  Compare Polybius, i, 18; ix, 27.

  Pindar calls the town ποταμίᾳ τ’ Ἀκράγαντι—Pyth. vi, 6: ἱερὸν
  οἴκημα ποταμοῦ—Olymp. ii, 10.

  [933] Diodor. xiii, 85.

  We read of a stratagem in Polyænus (v, 10, 4), whereby Imilkon is
  said to have enticed the Agrigentines, in one of their sallies,
  into incautious pursuit, by a simulated flight; and thus to have
  inflicted upon them a serious defeat.

  [934] Diodor. xiii, 86.

These religious rites calmed the terrors of the army, and mitigated,
or were supposed to have mitigated, the distemper; so that Imilkon,
while desisting from all farther meddling with the tombs, was enabled
to resume his batteries and assaults against the walls, though
without any considerable success. He also dammed up the western river
Hypsas, so as to turn the stream against the wall; but this manœuvre
produced no effect. His operations were presently interrupted by
the arrival of a powerful army which marched from Syracuse, under
Daphnæus, to the relief of Agrigentum. Reinforced in its road by
the military strength of Kamarina and Gela, it amounted to thirty
thousand foot and five thousand horse, on reaching the river Himera,
the eastern frontier of the Agrigentine territory; while a fleet
of thirty Syracusan triremes sailed along the coast to second its
efforts. As these troops neared the town, Imilkon despatched against
them a body of Iberians and Campanians;[935] who however, after a
strenuous combat, were completely defeated, and driven back to the
Carthaginian camp near the city, where they found themselves under
the protection of the main army. Daphnæus, having secured the victory
and inflicted severe loss upon the enemy, was careful to prevent his
troops from disordering their ranks in the ardor of pursuit, in the
apprehension that Imilkon with the main body might take advantage
of that disorder to turn the fortune of the day,—as had happened in
the terrible defeat before Himera, three years before. The routed
Iberians were thus allowed to get back to the camp. At the same time
the Agrigentines, witnessing from the walls, with joyous excitement,
the flight of their enemies, vehemently urged their generals to lead
them forth for an immediate sally, in order that the destruction
of the fugitives might thus be consummated. But the generals were
inflexible in resisting such demand; conceiving that the city itself
would thus be stripped of its defenders, and that Imilkon might seize
the occasion for assaulting it with his main body, when there was not
sufficient force to repel them. The defeated Iberians thus escaped
to the main camp; neither pursued by the Syracusans, nor impeded, as
they passed near the Agrigentine walls, by the population within.

  [935] Diodor. xiii, 87.

  It appears that an eminence a little way eastward from Agrigentum
  still bears the name of _Il Campo Cartaginese_, raising some
  presumption that it was once occupied by the Carthaginians.
  Evidently, the troops sent out by Imilkon to meet and repel
  Daphnæus, must have taken post to the eastward of Agrigentum,
  from which side the Syracusan army of relief was approaching.
  Seyfert (Akragas, p. 41) contests this point, and supposes that
  they must have been on the western side; misled by the analogy
  of the Roman siege in 262 B.C., when the Carthaginian relieving
  army under Hanno were coming from the westward,—from Heraklei
  (Polyb. i, 19).

Presently Daphnæus with his victorious army reached Agrigentum,
and joined the citizens; who flocked in crowds, along with the
Lacedæmonian Dexippus, to meet and welcome them. But the joy of
meeting, and the reciprocal congratulations on the recent victory,
were fatally poisoned by general indignation for the unmolested
escape of the defeated Iberians; occasioned by nothing less than
remissness, cowardice, or corruption, (so it was contended), on the
part of the generals,—first the Syracusan generals, and next the
Agrigentine. Against the former, little was now said, though much
was held in reserve, as we shall soon hear. But against the latter,
the discontent of the Agrigentine population burst forth instantly
and impetuously. A public assembly being held on the spot, the
Agrigentine generals, five in number, were put under accusation.
Among many speakers who denounced them as guilty of treason, the most
violent of all was the Kamarinæan Menês,—himself one of the leaders,
seemingly of the Kamarinæan contingent in the army of Daphnæus. The
concurrence of Menês, carrying to the Agrigentines a full sanction of
their sentiments, wrought them up to such a pitch of fury, that the
generals, when they came to defend themselves, found neither sympathy
nor even common fairness of hearing. Four out of the five were stoned
and put to death on the spot; the fifth, Argeius, was spared only
on the ground of his youth; and even the Lacedæmonian Dexippus was
severely censured.[936]

  [936] Diodor. xiii, 87.

  The youth of Argeius, combined with the fact of his being in high
  command, makes us rather imagine that he was of noble birth:
  compare Thucydid. vi, 38,—the speech of Athenagoras.

How far, in regard to these proceedings, the generals were really
guilty, or how far their defence, had it been fairly heard, would
have been valid,—is a point which our scanty information does not
enable us to determine. But it is certain that the arrival of the
victorious Syracusans at Agrigentum completely altered the relative
position of affairs. Instead of farther assaulting the walls, Imilkon
was attacked in his camp by Daphnæus. The camp, however, was so
fortified as to repel all attempts, and the siege from this time
forward became only a blockade; a contest of patience and privation
between the city and the besiegers, lasting seven or eight months
from the commencement of the siege. At first Daphnæus, with his own
force united to the Agrigentines, was strong enough to harass the
Carthaginians and intercept their supplies, so that the greatest
distress began to prevail among their army. The Campanian mercenaries
even broke out into mutiny, crowding, with clamorous demands for
provision and with menace of deserting, around the tent of Imilkon;
who barely pacified them by pledging to them the gold and silver
drinking-cups of the chief Carthaginians around him,[937] coupled
with entreaties that they would wait yet a few days. During that
short interval, he meditated and executed a bold stroke of relief.
The Syracusans and Agrigentines were mainly supplied by sea from
Syracuse; from whence a large transport of provision-ships was now
expected, under convoy of some Syracusan triremes. Apprised of
their approach, Imilkon silently brought out forty Carthaginian
triremes from Motyê and Panormus, with which he suddenly attacked the
Syracusan convoy, no way expecting such a surprise. Eight Syracusan
triremes were destroyed; the remainder were driven ashore, and the
whole fleet of transports fell into the hands of Imilkon. Abundance
and satisfaction now reigned in the camp of the Carthaginians,
while the distress, and with it the discontent, was transferred to
Agrigentum. The Campanian mercenaries in the service of Dexippus
began the mutiny, complaining to him of their condition. Perhaps he
had been alarmed and disgusted at the violent manifestation of the
Agrigentines against their generals, extending partly to himself
also. At any rate, he manifested no zeal in the defence, and was even
suspected of having received a bribe of fifteen talents from the
Carthaginians. He told the Campanians that Agrigentum was no longer
tenable, for want of supplies; upon which they immediately retired,
and marched away to Messênê, affirming that the time stipulated
for their stay had expired. Such a secession struck every one with
discouragement. The Agrigentine generals immediately instituted an
examination, to ascertain the quantity of provision still remaining
in the city. Having made the painful discovery that there remained
but very little, they took the resolution of causing the city to be
evacuated by its population during the coming night.[938]

  [937] Mention is again made, sixty-five years afterwards, in the
  description of the war of Timoleon against the Carthaginians,—of
  the abundance of gold and silver drinking cups, and rich personal
  ornaments, carried by the native Carthaginians on military
  service (Diodor. xvi, 81; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 28, 29).

  There was a select body of Carthaginians,—a Sacred
  Band,—mentioned in these later times, consisting of two thousand
  five hundred men of distinguished bravery as well as of
  conspicuous position in the city (Diodor. xvi, 80; xx, 10).

  [938] Diodor. xiii, 88.

A night followed, even more replete with woe and desolation than
that which had witnessed the flight of Diokles with the inhabitants
of Himera from their native city. Few scenes can be imagined more
deplorable than the vast population of Agrigentum obliged to hurry
out of their gates during a December night, as their only chance of
escape from famine or the sword of a merciless enemy. The road to
Gela was beset by a distracted crowd, of both sexes and of every age
and condition, confounded in one indiscriminate lot of suffering.
No thought could be bestowed on the preservation of property
or cherished possessions. Happy were they who could save their
lives; for not a few, through personal weakness or the immobility
of despair, were left behind. Perhaps here and there a citizen,
combining the personal strength with the filial piety of Æneas, might
carry away his aged father with the household gods on his shoulders;
but for the most part, the old, the sick, and the impotent, all
whose years were either too tender or too decrepit to keep up with a
hurried flight, were of necessity abandoned. Some remained and slew
themselves, refusing even to survive the loss of their homes and
the destruction of their city; others, among whom was the wealthy
Gellias, consigned themselves to the protection of the temples, but
with little hope that it would procure them safety. The morning’s
dawn exhibited to Imilkon unguarded walls, a deserted city, and a
miserable population of exiles huddled together in disorderly flight
on the road to Gela.

For these fugitives, however, the Syracusan and Agrigentine soldiers
formed a rear-guard sufficient to keep off the aggravated torture of
a pursuit. But the Carthaginian army found enough to occupy them in
the undefended prey which was before their eyes. They rushed upon
the town with the fury of men who had been struggling and suffering
before it for eight months. They ransacked the houses, slew every
living person that was left, and found plunder enough to satiate
even a ravenous appetite. Temples as well as private dwellings were
alike stripped, so that those who had taken sanctuary in them became
victims like the rest: a fate which Gellius only avoided by setting
fire to the temple in which he stood and perishing in its ruins.
The great public ornaments and trophies of the city,—the bull of
Phalaris, together with the most precious statues and pictures,—were
preserved by Imilkon and sent home as decorations to Carthage.[939]
While he gave up the houses of Agrigentum to be thus gutted, he still
kept them standing, and caused them to serve as winter-quarters for
the repose of his soldiers, after the hardships of an eight months’
siege. The unhappy Agrigentine fugitives first found shelter and kind
hospitality at Gela; from whence they were afterwards, by permission
of the Syracusans, transferred to Leontini.

  [939] Diodor. xiii, 89, 90.

I have described, as far as the narrative of Diodorus permits us to
know, this momentous and tragical portion of Sicilian history; a
suitable preface to the long despotism of Dionysius. It is evident
that the seven or eight months (the former of these numbers is
authenticated by Xenophon, while the latter is given by Diodorus)
of the siege or blockade must have contained matters of the
greatest importance which are not mentioned, and that even of the
main circumstances which brought about the capture, we are most
imperfectly informed. But though we cannot fully comprehend its
causes, its effects are easy to understand. They were terror-striking
and harrowing in the extreme. When the storm which had beaten down
Selinus and Himera was now perceived to have extended its desolation
to a city so much more conspicuous, among the wealthiest and most
populous in the Grecian world,—when the surviving Agrigentine
population, including women and children, and the great proprietors
of chariots whose names stood recorded as victors at Olympia, were
seen all confounded in one common fate of homeless flight and
nakedness—when the victorious host and its commanders took up their
quarters in the deserted houses, ready to spread their conquests
farther after a winter of repose,—there was hardly a Greek in Sicily
who did not tremble for his life and property.[940] Several of them
sought shelter at Syracuse, while others even quitted the island
altogether, emigrating to Italy.

  [940] Diodor. xiii, 91.

Amidst so much anguish, humiliation, and terror, there were loud
complaints against the conduct of the Syracusan generals under whose
command the disaster had occurred. The censure which had been cast
upon them before, for not having vigorously pursued the defeated
Iberians, was now revived, and aggravated tenfold by the subsequent
misfortune. To their inefficiency the capture of Agrigentum was
ascribed, and apparently not without substantial cause; for the town
was so strongly placed as to defy assault, and could only be taken
by blockade; now we discern no impediments adequate to hinder the
Syracusan generals from procuring supplies of provisions; and it
seems clear that the surprise of the Syracusan store-ships might
have been prevented by proper precautions; upon which surprise the
whole question turned, between famine in the Carthaginian camp and
famine in Agrigentum.[941] The efficiency of Dexippus and the other
generals, in defending Agrigentum (as depicted by Diodorus), stands
sadly inferior to the vigor and ability displayed by Gylippus before
Syracuse, as described by Thucydides: and we can hardly wonder that
by men in the depth of misery, like the Agrigentines,—or in extreme
alarm, like the other Sicilian Greeks—these generals, incompetent or
treasonable, should be regarded as the cause of the ruin.

  [941] Diodor. xiii, 88.

  Xenophon confirms the statement of Diodorus, that Agrigentum was
  taken by famine (Hellen. i, 5, 21; ii, 2, 24).

Such a state of sentiment, under ordinary circumstances, would have
led to the condemnation of the generals and to the nomination of
others, with little farther result. But it became of far graver
import, when combined with the actual situation of parties in
Syracuse. The Hermokratean opposition party,—repelled during the
preceding year with the loss of its leader, yet nowise crushed,—now
re-appeared more formidable than ever, under a new leader more
aggressive even than Hermokrates himself. Throughout ancient as
well as modern history, defeat and embarrassment in the foreign
relations have proved fruitful causes of change in the internal
government. Such auxiliaries had been wanting to the success of
Hermokrates in the preceding year; but alarms of every kind now
overhung the city in terrific magnitude, and when the first Syracusan
assembly was convoked on returning from Agrigentum, a mournful
silence reigned;[942] as in the memorable description given by
Demosthenes of the Athenian assembly held immediately after the
taking of Elateia.[943] The generals had lost the confidence of their
fellow-citizens; yet no one else was forward, at a juncture so full
of peril, to assume their duty, by proffering fit counsel for the
future conduct of the war. Now was the time for the Hermokratean
party to lay their train for putting down the government. Dionysius,
though both young and of mean family, was adopted as leader in
consequence of that audacity and bravery which even already he
had displayed, both in the fight along with Hermokrates and in the
battles against the Carthaginians. Hipparinus, a Syracusan of rich
family, who had ruined himself by dissolute expenses, was eager to
renovate his fortunes by seconding the elevation of Dionysius to the
despotism;[944] Philistus (the subsequent historian of Syracuse),
rich, young, and able, threw himself ardently into the same cause;
and doubtless other leading persons, ancient Hermokrateans and
others, stood forward as partisans in the conspiracy. But it either
was, from the beginning, or speedily became, a movement organized
for the purpose of putting the sceptre into the hands of Dionysius,
to whom all the rest, though several among them were of far greater
wealth and importance, served but as satellites and auxiliaries.

  [942] Diodor. xiii, 91.

  [943] Demosthenes de Coronâ, p. 286, s. 220.

  This comparison is made by M. Brunet de Presle, in his valuable
  historical work (Recherches sur les Establissemens des Grecs en
  Sicile, Part ii, s. 39, p. 219).

  [944] Aristotel. Politic. v, 5, 6. Γίνονται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τῆς
  ὀλιγαρχίας, καὶ ὅταν ἀναλώσωσι τὰ ἴδια, ζῶντες ἀσελγῶς· καὶ γὰρ
  οἱ τοιοῦτοι καινοτομεῖν ζητοῦσι, καὶ ἢ τυραννίδι ἐπιτίθενται
  αὐτοὶ, ἢ κατασκευάζουσιν ἕτερον· ὥσπερ Ἱππαρῖνος Διονύσιον ἐν
  Συρακούσαις.

  Hipparinus was the father of Dion, respecting whom more hereafter.

  Plato, in his warm sympathy for Dion, assigns to Hipparinus more
  of an equality of rank and importance with the elder Dionysius,
  than the subsequent facts justify (Plato, Epistol. viii. p. 353
  A.; p. 355 F.).

Amidst the silence and disquietude which reigned in the Syracusan
assembly, Dionysius was the first who rose to address them. He
enlarged upon a topic suitable alike to the temper of his auditors
and to his own views. He vehemently denounced the generals as having
betrayed the security of Syracuse to the Carthaginians,—and as the
persons to whom the ruin of Agrigentum, together with the impending
peril of every man around, was owing. He set forth their misdeeds,
real or alleged, not merely with fulness and acrimony, but with a
ferocious violence outstripping all the limits of admissible debate,
and intended to bring upon them a lawless murder, like the death of
the generals recently at Agrigentum. “There they sit, the traitors!
Do not wait for legal trial or verdict; but lay hands upon them at
once, and inflict upon them summary justice.”[945] Such a brutal
exhortation, not unlike that of the Athenian Kritias, when he
caused the execution of Theramenes in the oligarchical senate, was
an offence against law as well as against parliamentary order. The
presiding magistrates reproved Dionysius as a disturber of order,
and fined him, as they were empowered by law.[946] But his partisans
were loud in his support. Philistus not only paid down the fine for
him on the spot, but publicly proclaimed that he would go on for
the whole day paying all similar fines which might be imposed,—and
incited Dionysius to persist in such language as he thought proper.
That which had begun as illegality, was now aggravated into open
defiance of the law. Yet so enfeebled was the authority of the
magistrates, and so vehement the cry against them, in the actual
position of the city, that they were unable either to punish or
to repress the speaker. Dionysius pursued his harangue in a tone
yet more inflammatory, not only accusing the generals of having
corruptly betrayed Agrigentum, but also denouncing the conspicuous
and wealthy citizens generally, as oligarchs who held tyrannical
sway,—who treated the many with scorn, and made their own profit out
of the misfortunes of the city. Syracuse (he contended) could never
be saved, unless men of a totally different character were invested
with authority; men, not chosen from wealth and station, but of
humble birth, belonging to the people by position, and kind in their
deportment from consciousness of their own weakness.[947] His bitter
invective against generals already discredited, together with the
impetuous warmth of his apparent sympathy for the people against
the rich, were both alike favorably received. Plato states that the
assembly became so furiously exasperated, as to follow literally
the lawless and blood-thirsty inspirations of Dionysius, and to
stone all these generals, ten in number, on the spot, without any
form of trial. But Diodorus simply tells us, that a vote was passed
to cashier the generals, and to name in their places Dionysius,
Hipparinus, and others.[948] This latter statement is, in my opinion,
the more probable.

  [945] Diodor. xiii, 91. Ἀπορουμένων δὲ πάντων παρελθών Διονύσιος
  ὁ Ἑρμοκράτους, τῶν μὲν στρατηγῶν κατηγόρησεν, ὡς προδιδόντων τὰ
  πράγματα τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις· τὰ δὲ πλήθη παρώξυνε πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν
  τιμωρίαν, παρακαλῶν μὴ περιμεῖναι τὸν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους κλῆρον,
  ἀλλ’ ἐκ χειρὸς εὐθέως ἐπιθεῖναι τὴν δίκην.

  [946] Diodor. xiii, 91. Τῶν δ’ ἀρχόντων ζημιούντων τὸν Διονύσιον
  κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, ὡς θορυβοῦντα, Φίλιστος, ὁ τὰς ἱστορίας ὕστερον
  συγγράψας, οὐσίαν ἔχων μεγάλην, etc.

  In the description given by Thucydides (vi, 32-39) of the debate
  in the Syracusan assembly (prior to the arrival of the Athenian
  expedition) in which Hermokrates and Athenagoras speak, we find
  the magistrates interfering to prevent the continuance of a
  debate which had become very personal and acrimonious; though
  there was nothing in it at all brutal, nor any exhortation to
  personal violence or infringement of the law.

  [947] Diodor. xiii, 91.

  [948] Plato, Epistol. viii, p. 354. Οἱ γὰρ πρὸ Διονυσίου καὶ
  Ἱππαρίνου ἀρξάντων Σικελιῶται τότε ὡς ᾤοντο εὐδαιμόνως ἔζων,
  τρυφῶντές τε καὶ ἅμα ἀρχόντων ἄρχοντες· οἱ καὶ τοῦς δέκα
  στρατηγοὺς κατέλευσαν βάλλοντες τοὺς πρὸ Διονυσίου, κατὰ νόμον
  οὐδένα κρίναντες, ἵνα δὴ δουλεύοιεν μηδένι μήτε σὺν δίκῃ μήτε
  νόμῳ δεσπότῃ, ἐλεύθεροι δ’ εἶεν πάντῃ πάντως· ὅθεν αἱ τυραννίδες
  ἐγένοντο αὐτοῖς.

  Diodor. xiii, 92. παραυτίκα τοὺς μὲν ἔλυσε τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἑτέρους δὲ
  εἵλετο στρατηγοὺς, ἐν οἷς καὶ τὸν Διονύσιον. Some little time
  afterwards, Diodorus farther mentions that Dionysius accused
  before the public assembly, and caused to be put to death,
  Daphnæus and Demarchus (xiii, 96); now Daphnæus was one of the
  generals (xiii, 86-88).

  If we assume the fact to have occurred as Plato affirms it,
  we cannot easily explain how something so impressive and
  terror-striking came to be transformed into the more commonplace
  statement of Diodorus, by Ephorus, Theopompus, Hermeias, Timæus,
  or Philistus, from one of whom probably his narrative is borrowed.

  But if we assume Diodorus to be correct, we can easily account
  for the erroneous belief in the mind of Plato. A very short
  time before this scene at Syracuse, an analogous circumstance
  had really occurred at Agrigentum. The assembled Agrigentines,
  being inflamed against their generals for what they believed
  to be slackness or treachery in the recent fight with the
  Carthaginians, had stoned four of them on the spot, and only
  spared the fifth on the score of his youth (Diodor. xiii, 87).

  I cannot but think that Plato confounded in his memory the scene
  and proceedings at Syracuse with the other events, so recently
  antecedent, at Agrigentum. His letter (from which the above
  citation is made) was written in his old age,—fifty years after
  the event.

  This is one inaccuracy as to matter-of-fact, which might be
  produced in support of the views of those who reject the
  letters of Plato as spurious, though Ast does not notice it,
  while going through the letters _seriatim_, and condemning
  them not only as un-Platonic but as despicable compositions.
  After attentively studying both the letters themselves, and his
  reasoning, I dissent entirely from Ast’s conclusion. The first
  letter, that which purports to come not from Plato, but from
  Dion, is the only one against which he seems to me to have made
  out a good case (see Ast, Ueber Platon’s Leben und Schriften,
  p. 504-530). Against the others, I cannot think that he has
  shown any sufficient ground for pronouncing them to be spurious
  and I therefore continue to treat them as genuine, following
  the opinion of Cicero and Plutarch. It is admitted by Ast that
  their authenticity was not suspected in antiquity, as far as our
  knowledge extends. Without considering the presumption hence
  arising as conclusive, I think it requires to be countervailed by
  stronger substantive grounds than those which Ast has urged.

  Among the total number of thirteen letters, those relating
  to Dion and Dionysius (always setting aside the first
  letter)—that is the second, third, fourth, seventh, eighth, and
  thirteenth,—are the most full of allusions to fact and details.
  Some of them go very much into detail. Now had they been the
  work of a forger, it is fair to contend that he could hardly
  avoid laying himself more open to contradiction than he has done,
  on the score of inaccuracy and inconsistency with the supposed
  situation. I have already mentioned one inaccuracy which I take
  to be a _fault_ of memory, both conceivable and pardonable. Ast
  mentions another, to disprove the authenticity of the eighth
  letter, respecting the son of Dion. Plato, in this eighth
  letter, speaking in the name of the deceased Dion, recommends
  the Syracusans to name Dion’s son as one of the members of a
  tripartite kingship, along with Hipparinus (son of the elder
  Dionysius) and the younger Dionysius. This (contends Ast, p. 523)
  cannot be correct, because Dion’s son died before his father. To
  make the argument of Ast complete, we ought to be sure that Dion
  had only _one_ son; for which there is doubtless the evidence
  of Plutarch, who after having stated that the son of Dion, a
  youth nearly grown up, threw himself from the roof of the house
  and was killed, goes on to say that Kallippus, the political
  enemy of Dion, founded upon this misfortune a false rumor which
  he circulated,—ὡς ὁ Δίων ~ἄπαις γεγονὼς~ ἔγνωκε τὸν Διονυσίου
  καλεῖν Ἀπολλοκράτην καὶ ποιεῖσθαι διάδοχον (Plutarch, Dion. c.
  55, 56: compare also c. 21,—τοῦ παιδίου). But since the rumor was
  altogether false, we may surely imagine that Kallippus, taking
  advantage of a notorious accident which had just proved fatal to
  the eldest son of Dion, may have fabricated a false statement
  about the family of Dion, though there might be a younger boy at
  home. It is not certain that the number of Dion’s children was
  familiarly known among the population of Syracuse; nor was Dion
  himself in the situation of an assured king, able to transfer
  his succession at once to a boy not yet adult. And when we find
  in another chapter of Plutarch’s Life of Dion (c. 31), that the
  son of Dion was called by Timæus, _Aretæus_,—and by Timonides,
  _Hipparinus_,—this surely affords some presumption that there
  were _two_ sons, and not one son called by two different names.

  I cannot therefore admit that Ast has proved the eighth Platonic
  letter to be inaccurate in respect to matter of fact. I will add
  that the letter does not mention the _name_ of Dion’s son (though
  Ast says that it calls him _Hipparinus_); and that it does
  specify the _three_ partners in the tripartite kingship suggested
  (though Ast says that it only mentioned _two_).

  Most of Ast’s arguments against the authenticity of the letters,
  however, are founded, not upon alleged inaccuracies of fact,
  but upon what he maintains to be impropriety and meanness of
  thought, childish intrusion of philosophy, unseasonable mysticism
  and pedantry, etc. In some of his criticisms I coincide, though
  by no means in all. But I cannot accept them as evidence to
  prove the point for which he contends,—the spuriousness of the
  letters. The proper conclusion from his premises appears to me
  to be, that Plato wrote letters which, when tried by our canons
  about letter-writing, seem awkward, pedantic, and in bad taste.
  Dionysius of Halikarnassus (De adm. vi dicend. in Demosth.
  p. 1025-1044), while emphatically extolling the admirable
  composition of Plato’s dialogues, does not scruple to pass an
  unfavorable criticism upon him as a speech-writer; referring to
  the speeches in the Symposion as well as to the funeral harangue
  in the Menexenus. Still less need we be afraid to admit, that
  Plato was not a graceful letter-writer.

  That Plato would feel intensely interested, and even personally
  involved, in the quarrel between Dionysius II. and Dion, cannot
  be doubted. That he would write letters to Dionysius on the
  subject,—that he would anxiously seek to maintain influence over
  him, on all grounds,—that he would manifest a lofty opinion
  of himself and his own philosophy,—is perfectly natural and
  credible. And when we consider both the character and the station
  of Dionysius, it is difficult to lay down beforehand any assured
  canon as to the epistolary tone which Plato would think most
  suitable to address him.

Such was the first stage of what we may term the despot’s progress,
successfully consummated. The pseudo-demagogue Dionysius outdoes,
in fierce professions of antipathy against the rich, anything that
we read as coming from the real demagogues, Athenagoras at Syracuse,
or Kleon at Athens. Behold him now sitting as a member of the new
Board of generals, at a moment when the most assiduous care and
energy, combined with the greatest unanimity, were required to put
the Syracusan military force into an adequate state of efficiency. It
suited the policy of Dionysius not only to bestow no care or energy
himself, but to nullify all that was bestowed by his colleagues, and
to frustrate deliberately all chance of unanimity. He immediately
began a systematic opposition and warfare against his colleagues. He
refused to attend at their Board, or to hold any communication with
them. At the frequent assemblies held during this agitated state of
the public mind, he openly denounced them as engaged in treasonable
correspondence with the enemy. It is obvious that his colleagues, men
newly chosen in the same spirit with himself, could not as yet have
committed any such treason in favor of the Carthaginians. But among
them was his accomplice Hipparinus;[949] while probably the rest
also, nominated by a party devoted to him personally, were selected
in a spirit of collusion, as either thorough-going partisans, or
worthless and incompetent men, easy for him to set aside. At any
rate, his calumnies, though received with great repugnance by the
leading and more intelligent citizens, found favor with the bulk of
the assembly, predisposed at that moment from the terrors of the
situation to suspect every one. The new Board of generals being thus
discredited, Dionysius alone was listened to as an adviser. His
first and most strenuous recommendation was, that a vote should be
passed for restoring the exiles; men (he affirmed) attached to their
country, and burning to serve her, having already refused the offers
of her enemies; men who had been thrown into banishment by previous
political dispute, but who, if now generously recalled, would
manifest their gratitude by devoted patriotism, and serve Syracuse
far more warmly than the allies invoked from Italy and Peloponnesus.
His discredited colleagues either could not, or would not, oppose the
proposition; which, being warmly pressed by Dionysius and all his
party, was at length adopted by the assembly. The exiles accordingly
returned, comprising all the most violent men who had been in arms
with Hermokrates when he was slain. They returned glowing with
party-antipathy and revenge, prepared to retaliate upon others the
confiscation under which themselves had suffered, and looking to the
despotism of Dionysius as their only means of success.[950]

  [949] Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.

  [950] Diodor. xiii, 93.

The second step of the despot’s progress was now accomplished.
Dionysius had filled up the ranks of the Hermokratean party, and
obtained an energetic band of satellites, whose hopes and interests
were thoroughly identified with his own. Meanwhile letters arrived
from Gela, entreating reinforcements, as Imilkon was understood to be
about to march thither. Dionysius being empowered to march thither
a body of two thousand hoplites, with four hundred horsemen, turned
the occasion to profitable account. A regiment of mercenaries,
under the Lacedæmonian Dexippus, was in garrison at Gela; while the
government of the town is said to have been oligarchical, in the
hands of the rich, though with a strong and discontented popular
opposition. On reaching Gela, Dionysius immediately took part with
the latter; originating the most violent propositions against the
governing rich, as he had done at Syracuse. Accusing them of treason
in the public assembly, he obtained a condemnatory vote under
which they were put to death and their properties confiscated. With
the funds so acquired, he paid the arrears due to the soldiers of
Dexippus, and doubled the pay of his own Syracusan division. These
measures procured for him immense popularity, not merely with all the
soldiers, but also with the Geloan Demos, whom he had relieved from
the dominion of their wealthy oligarchy. Accordingly, after passing a
public vote testifying their gratitude, and bestowing upon him large
rewards, they despatched envoys to carry the formal expression of
their sentiments to Syracuse. Dionysius resolved to go back thither
at the same time, with his Syracusan soldiers; and tried to prevail
on Dexippus to accompany him with his own division. This being
refused, he went thither with his Syracusans alone. To the Geloans,
who earnestly entreated that they might not be forsaken when the
enemy was daily expected, he contented himself with replying that he
would presently return with a larger force.[951]

  [951] Diodor. xiii, 93.

A third step was thus obtained. Dionysius was going back to Syracuse
with a testimonial of admiration and gratitude from Gela,—with
increased attachment on the part of his own soldiers, on account of
the double pay,—and with the means of coining and circulating a new
delusion. It was on the day of a solemn festival that he reached
the town, just as the citizens were coming in crowds out of the
theatre. Amidst the bustle of such a scene as well as of the return
of the soldiers, many citizens flocked around him to inquire, What
news about the Carthaginians? “Do not ask about your foreign enemies
(was the reply of Dionysius); you have much worse enemies within
among you. Your magistrates,—these very men upon whose watch you
rely during the indulgence of the festival,—they are the traitors
who are pillaging the public money, leaving the soldiers unpaid, and
neglecting all necessary preparation, at a moment when the enemy
with an immense host is on the point of assailing you. I knew their
treachery long ago, but I have now positive proof of it. For Imilkon
sent to me an envoy, under pretence of treating about the prisoners,
but in reality to purchase my silence and connivance; he tendered to
me a larger bribe than he had given to them, if I would consent to
refrain from hindering them, since I could not be induced to take
part in their intrigues. This is too much. I am come home now to
throw up my command. While my colleagues are corruptly bartering away
their country, I am willing to take my share as a citizen in the
common risk, but I cannot endure to incur shame as an accomplice in
their treachery.”

Such bold allegations, scattered by Dionysius among the crowd
pressing round him,—renewed at length, with emphatic formality in
the regular assembly held the next day,—and concluding with actual
resignation,—struck deep terror into the Syracusan mind. He spoke
with authority, not merely as one fresh from the frontier exposed,
but also as bearing the grateful testimonial of the Geloans, echoed
by the soldiers whose pay he had recently doubled. His assertion of
the special message from Imilkon, probably an impudent falsehood,
was confidently accepted and backed by all these men, as well as
by his other partisans, the Hermokratean party, and most of all by
the restored exiles. What defence the accused generals made, or
tried to make, we are not told. It was not likely to prevail, nor
did it prevail, against the positive deposition of a witness so
powerfully seconded. The people, persuaded of their treason, were
incensed against them, and trembled at the thought of being left, by
the resignation of Dionysius, to the protection of such treacherous
guardians against the impending invasion. Now was the time for his
partisans to come forward with their main proposition: “Why not get
rid of these traitors, and keep Dionysius alone? Leave them to be
tried and punished at a more convenient season; but elect him at
once general with full powers, to make head against the pressing
emergency from without. Do not wait until the enemy is actually
assaulting our walls. Dionysius is the man for our purpose, the only
one with whom we have a chance of safety. Recollect that our glorious
victory over the three hundred thousand Carthaginians at Himera was
achieved by Gelon acting as general with full powers.” Such rhetoric
was irresistible in the present temper of the assembly,—when the
partisans of Dionysius were full of audacity and acclamation,—when
his opponents were discomfited, suspicious of each other, and without
any positive scheme to propose,—and when the storm, which had already
overwhelmed Selinus, Himera, and Agrigentum, was about to burst on
Gela and Syracuse. A vote of the assembly was passed, appointing
Dionysius general of the city, alone, and with full powers;[952] by
what majority we do not know.

  [952] Diodor. xiii, 94.

The first use which the new general-plenipotentiary made of his
dignity was to propose, in the same assembly, that the pay of the
soldiers should be doubled. Such liberality (he said) would be the
best means of stimulating their zeal; while in regard to expense,
there need be no hesitation; the money might easily be provided.

Thus was consummated the fourth, and most important, act of the
despot’s progress. A vote of the assembly had been obtained, passed
in constitutional forms, vesting in Dionysius a single-handed power
unknown to and above the laws,—unlimited and unresponsible. But he
was well aware that the majority of those who thus voted had no
intention of permanently abnegating their freedom,—that they meant
only to create a temporary dictatorship, under the pressing danger
of the moment, for the express purpose of preserving that freedom
against a foreign enemy,—and that even thus much had been obtained
by impudent delusion and calumny, which subsequent reflection would
speedily dissipate. No sooner had the vote passed, than symptoms of
regret and alarm became manifest among the people. What one assembly
had conferred, a second repentant assembly might revoke.[953] It
therefore now remained for Dionysius to ensure the perpetuity of his
power by some organized means; so as to prevent the repentance, of
which he already discerned the commencement, from realizing itself
in any actual revocation. For this purpose he required a military
force extra-popular and anti-popular; bound to himself and not to
the city. He had indeed acquired popularity with the Syracusan as
well as with the mercenary soldiers, by doubling and ensuring their
pay. He had energetic adherents, prepared to go all lengths on his
behalf, especially among the restored exiles. This was an important
basis, but not sufficient for his objects without the presence of a
special body of guards, constantly and immediately available, chosen
as well as controlled by himself, yet acting in such vocation under
the express mandate and sanction of the people. He required a farther
vote of the people, legalizing for his use such a body of guards.

  [953] Diodor. xiii, 95. Διαλυθείσης δὲ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, οὐκ ὀλίγοι
  τῶν Συρακουσίων κατηγόρουν τῶν πραχθέντων, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ
  ταῦτα κεκυρωκότες· τοῖς γὰρ λογισμοῖς εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ἐρχόμενοι,
  τὴν ἐσομένην δυναστείαν ἀνεθεώρουν. Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν βεβαιῶσαι
  βουλόμενοι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ἔλαθον ἑαυτοὺς δεσπότην τῆς πατρίδος
  καθεστακότες. Ὁ δὲ Διονύσιος, ~τὴν μετάνοιαν τῶν ὄχλων φθάσαι
  βουλόμενος~, ἐπεζήτει δι’ οὗ τρόπου δύναιτο φύλακας αἰτήσασθαι
  τοῦ σώματος· τούτου γὰρ συγχωρηθέντος, ῥᾳδίως ἤμελλε κυριεύσειν
  τῆς τυραννίδος.

But with all his powers of delusion, and all the zeal of his
partisans, he despaired of getting any such vote from an assembly
held at Syracuse. Accordingly, he resorted to a manœuvre, proclaiming
that he had resolved on a march to Leontini, and summoning the full
military force of Syracuse (up to the age of forty) to march along
with him, with orders for each man to bring with him thirty days’
provision. Leontini had been, a few years before, an independent
city; but was now an outlying fortified post, belonging to the
Syracusans; wherein various foreign settlers, and exiles from the
captured Sicilian cities, had obtained permission to reside. Such
men, thrown out of their position and expectations as citizens, were
likely to lend either their votes or their swords willingly to the
purposes of Dionysius. While he thus found many new adherents there,
besides those whom he brought with him, he foresaw that the general
body of the Syracusans, and especially those most disaffected to him,
would not be disposed to obey his summons or accompany him.[954]
For nothing could be more preposterous, in a public point of view,
than an out-march of the whole Syracusan force for thirty days to
Leontini, where there was neither danger to be averted nor profit to
be reaped; at a moment too when the danger on the side of Gela was
most serious, from the formidable Carthaginian host at Agrigentum.

  [954] Diodor. xiii, 95. Αὐτὴ δ’ ἡ πόλις (Leontini) τότε φρούριον
  ἦν τοῖς Συρακουσίοις, πλῆρες ὕπαρχον φυγάδων καὶ ξένων ἀνθρώπων.
  Ἤλπιζε γὰρ τούτους συναγωνιστὰς ἕξειν, ἀνθρώπους δεομένους
  μεταβολῆς· τῶν δὲ Συρακουσίων τοὺς πλείστους οὐδ’ ἥξειν εἰς
  Λεοντίνους.

  Many of the expelled Agrigentines settled at Leontini, by
  permission of the Syracusans (Diodor. xiii, 89).

Dionysius accordingly set out with a force which purported,
ostensibly and according to summons, to be the full military
manifestation of Syracuse; but which, in reality, comprised mainly
his own adherents. On encamping for the night near to Leontini, he
caused a factitious clamor and disturbance to be raised during the
darkness, around his own tent,—ordered fires to be kindled,—summoned
on a sudden his most intimate friends,—and affected to retire under
their escort to the citadel. On the morrow an assembly was convened,
of the Syracusans and residents present, purporting to be a Syracusan
assembly; Syracuse in military guise, or as it were in Comitia
Centuriata,—to employ an ancient phrase belonging to the Roman
republic. Before this assembly Dionysius appeared, and threw himself
upon their protection; affirming that his life had been assailed
during the preceding night,—calling upon them emphatically to stand
by him against the incessant snares of his enemies,—and demanding
for that purpose a permanent body of guards. His appeal, plausibly
and pathetically turned, and doubtless warmly seconded by zealous
partisans, met with complete success. The assembly,—Syracusan or
quasi-Syracusan, though held at Leontini,—passed a formal decree,
granting to Dionysius a body-guard of six hundred men, selected
by himself and responsible to him alone.[955] One speaker indeed
proposed to limit the guards to such a number as should be sufficient
to protect him against any small number of personal enemies, but not
to render him independent of, or formidable to, the many.[956] But
such precautionary refinement was not likely to be much considered,
when the assembly was dishonest or misguided enough to pass the
destructive vote here solicited; and even if embodied in the words
of the resolution, there were no means of securing its observance
in practice. The regiment of guards being once formally sanctioned,
Dionysius heeded little the limit of number prescribed to him. He
immediately enrolled more than one thousand men, selected as well
for their bravery as from their poverty and desperate position. He
provided them with the choicest arms, and promised to them the most
munificent pay. To this basis of a certain, permanent, legalized,
regiment of household troops, he added farther a sort of standing
army, composed of mercenaries hardly less at his devotion than the
guards properly so called. In addition to the mercenaries already
around him, he invited others from all quarters, by tempting offers;
choosing by preference outlaws and profligates, and liberating
slaves for the purpose.[957] Next, summoning from Gela Dexippus the
Lacedæmonian, with the troops under his command, he sent this officer
away to Peloponnesus,—as a man not trustworthy for his purpose and
likely to stand forward on behalf of the freedom of Syracuse. He then
consolidated all the mercenaries under one organization, officering
them anew with men devoted to himself.

  [955] Diodor. xiii, 95.

  [956] Aristotel. Politic. iii, 10, 10. Καὶ Διονυσίῳ τις, ὅτ’ ᾔτει
  τοὺς φύλακας, συνεβούλευε τοῖς Συρακουσίοις διδόναι τοσούτους
  τοὺς φύλακας—i. e. τοσαύτην τὴν ἴσχυν, ὥσθ’ ἑκάστου μὲν καὶ ἑνὸς
  καὶ συμπλειόνων κρείττω, τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἥττω, εἶναι.

  [957] Diodor. xiv, 7. τοὺς ἠλευθερωμένους δούλους, etc.

This fresh military levy and organization was chiefly accomplished
during his stay at Leontini, without the opposition which would
probably have arisen if it had been done at Syracuse; to which latter
place Dionysius marched back, in an attitude far more imposing than
when he left it. He now entered the gates at the head not only of his
chosen body-guard, but also of a regular army of mercenaries, hired
by and dependent upon himself. He marched them at once into the islet
of Ortygia (the interior and strongest part of the city, commanding
the harbor), established his camp in that acropolis of Syracuse, and
stood forth as despot conspicuously in the eyes of all. Though the
general sentiment among the people was one of strong repugnance, yet
his powerful military force and strong position rendered all hope
of open resistance desperate. And the popular assembly,—convoked
under the pressure of this force, and probably composed of none but
his partisans,—was found so subservient, as to condemn and execute,
upon his requisition, Daphnæus and Demarchus. These two men, both
wealthy and powerful in Syracuse, had been his chief opponents,
and were seemingly among the very generals whom he had incited the
people to massacre on the spot without any form of trial, in one
of the previous public assemblies.[958] One step alone remained to
decorate the ignoble origin of Dionysius, and to mark the triumph of
the Hermokratean party by whom its elevation had been mainly brought
about. He immediately married the daughter of Hermokrates; giving his
own sister in marriage to Polyxenus, the brother of that deceased
chief.[959]

  [958] Diodor. xiii, 96.

  [959] Diodor. 1, c.; Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.

Thus was consummated the fifth or closing act of the despot’s
progress, rendering Dionysius master of the lives and fortunes of
his fellow-countrymen. The successive stages of his rise I have
detailed from Diodorus, who (excepting a hint or two from Aristotle)
is our only informant. His authority is on this occasion better than
usual, since he had before him not merely Ephorus and Timæus, but
also Philistus. He is, moreover, throughout this whole narrative at
least clear and consistent with himself. We understand enough of the
political strategy pursued by Dionysius, to pronounce that it was
adapted to his end with a degree of skill that would have greatly
struck a critical eye like Machiavel; whose analytical appreciation
of means, when he is canvassing men like Dionysius, has been often
unfairly construed as if it implied sympathy with and approbation
of their end. We see that Dionysius, in putting himself forward as
the chief and representative of the Hermokratean party, acquired
the means of employing a greater measure of fraud and delusion than
an exile like Hermokrates, in prosecution of the same ambitious
purposes. Favored by the dangers of the state and the agony of the
public mind, he was enabled to simulate an ultra-democratical ardor
both in defence of the people against the rich, and in denunciation
of the unsuccessful or incompetent generals, as if they were corrupt
traitors. Though it would seem that the government of Syracuse, in
406 B.C., must have been strongly democratical, yet Dionysius in his
ardor for popular rights, treats it as an anti-popular oligarchy;
and tries to acquire the favor of the people by placing himself in
the most open quarrel and antipathy to the rich. Nine years before,
in the debate between Hermokrates and Athenagoras in the Syracusan
assembly, the former stood forth, or at least was considered to
stand forth, as champion of the rich; while the latter spoke as a
conservative democrat, complaining of conspiracies on the part of
the rich. In 406 B.C., the leader of the Hermokratean party has
reversed this policy, assuming a pretended democratical fervor much
more violent than that of Athenagoras. Dionysius, who took up the
trade of what is called a demagogue on this one occasion, simply
for the purpose of procuring one single vote in his own favor, and
then shutting the door by force against all future voting and all
correction,—might resort to grosser falsehood than Athenagoras; who,
as an habitual speaker, was always before the people, and even if
successful by fraud at one meeting, was nevertheless open to exposure
at a second.

In order that the voting of any public assembly shall be really
available as a protection to the people, its votes must not only be
preceded by full and free discussion, but must also be open from
time to time to rediscussion and correction. That error will from
time to time be committed, as well by the collective people as by
particular fractions of the people, is certain; opportunity for
amendment is essential. A vote which is understood to be final, and
never afterwards to be corrigible, is one which can hardly turn to
the benefit of the people themselves, though it may often, as in the
case of Dionysius, promote the sinister purposes of some designing
protector.




CHAPTER LXXXII.

SICILY DURING THE DESPOTISM OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS AT SYRACUSE.


The proceedings, recounted at the close of my last chapter, whereby
Dionysius erected his despotism, can hardly have occupied less
than three months; coinciding nearly with the first months of 405
B.C., inasmuch as Agrigentum was taken about the winter solstice
of 406 B.C.[960] He was not molested during this period by the
Carthaginians, who were kept inactive in quarters at Agrigentum, to
repose after the hardships of the blockade; employed in despoiling
the city of its movable ornaments, for transmission to Carthage, and
in burning or defacing, with barbarous antipathy, such as could not
be carried away.[961] In the spring Imilkon moved forward towards
Gela, having provided himself with fresh siege-machines, and ensured
his supplies from the Carthaginian territory in his rear. Finding
no army to oppose him, he spread his troops over the territory both
of Gela and of Kamarina, where much plunder was collected and much
property ruined. He then returned to attack Gela, and established
a fortified camp by clearing some plantation-ground near the river
of the same name, between the city and the sea. On this spot stood,
without the walls, a colossal statue of Apollo, which Imilkon caused
to be carried off and sent as a present to Tyre.

  [960] Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 24. Ὁ ἐνιαυτὸς ἔληγεν, ἐν ᾧ μεσοῦντι
  Διονύσιος ἐτυράννησε, etc.

  The year meant here is an Olympic year, from Midsummer to
  Midsummer; so that the middle months of it would fall in the
  first quarter of the Julian year.

  If we compare however Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 21 with ii, 2, 24, we
  shall see that the indications of time cannot both be correct;
  for the acquisition of the despotism by Dionysius followed
  immediately, and as a consequence directly brought about, upon
  the capture of Agrigentum by the Carthaginians.

  It seems to me that the mark of time is not quite accurate in
  either one passage or the other. The capture of Agrigentum took
  place at the close of B.C. 406; the acquisition of the despotism
  by Dionysius, in the early months of 405 B.C., as Diodorus places
  them. Both events are in the same Olympic year, between Midsummer
  406 B.C. and Midsummer 405 B.C. But this year is exactly the
  year which falls between the two passages above referred to in
  Xenophon; not coinciding exactly with either one or the other.
  Compare Dodwell, Chronolog. Xenoph. ad ann. 407 B.C.

  [961] Diodor. xiii, 82, 96, 108. τὰς γλυφὰς καὶ τὰ περιττοτέρως
  εἰργασμένα κατέσκαψεν, etc.

Gela was at this moment defended only by its own citizens, for
Dionysius had called away Dexippus with the mercenary troops. Alarmed
at the approach of the formidable enemy who had already mastered
Agrigentum, Himera, and Selinus,—the Geloans despatched pressing
entreaties to Dionysius for aid; at the same time resolving to
send away their women and children for safety to Syracuse. But the
women, to whom the idea of separation was intolerable, supplicated
so earnestly to be allowed to stay and share the fortunes of their
fathers and husbands, that this resolution was abandoned. In
expectation of speedy relief from Dionysius, the defence was brave
and energetic. While parties of the Geloans, well-acquainted with the
country, sallied out and acted with great partial success against
the Carthaginian plunderers,—the mass of the citizens repelled the
assaults of Imilkon against the walls. His battering-machines and
storming-parties were brought to bear on several places at once; the
walls themselves,—being neither in so good a condition, nor placed
upon so unassailable an eminence, as those of Agrigentum,—gave
way on more than one point. Yet still the besieged, with obstinate
valor, frustrated every attempt to penetrate within; reëstablishing
during the night the breaches which had been made during the day.
The feebler part of their population aided, by every means in
their power, the warriors on the battlements; so the defence was
thus made good until Dionysius appeared with the long-expected
reinforcement. It comprised his newly-levied mercenaries, with the
Syracusan citizens, and succors from the Italian as well as from the
Sicilian Greeks; amounting in all to fifty thousand men, according to
Ephorus,—to thirty thousand foot, and one thousand horse, as Timæus
represented. A fleet of fifty ships of war sailed round Cape Pachynus
to coöperate with them off Gela.[962]

  [962] Diodor. xiii, 109.

Dionysius fixed his position between Gela and the sea, opposite to
that of the Carthaginians, and in immediate communication with his
fleet. His presence having suspended the assaults upon the town, he
became in his turn the aggressor; employing both his cavalry and his
fleet to harass the Carthaginians and intercept their supplies. The
contest now assumed a character nearly the same as had taken place
before Agrigentum, and which had ended so unfavorably to the Greeks.
At length, after twenty days of such desultory warfare, Dionysius,
finding that he had accomplished little, laid his plan for a direct
attack upon the Carthaginian camp. On the side towards the sea, as no
danger had been expected, that camp was unfortified; it was there,
accordingly, that Dionysius resolved to make his principal attack
with his left division, consisting principally of Italiot Greeks,
sustained by the Syracusan ships, who were to attack simultaneously
from seaward. He designed at the same time also to strike blows from
two other points. His right division, consisting of Sicilian allies,
was ordered to march on the right or western side of the town of
Gela, and thus fall upon the left of the Carthaginian camp; while he
himself, with the mercenary troops which he kept specially around
him, intended to advance through the town itself, and assail the
advanced or central portion of their position near the walls, where
their battering-machinery was posted. His cavalry were directed to
hold themselves in reserve for pursuit, in case the attack proved
successful; or for protection to the retreating infantry, in case it
failed.[963]

  [963] Diodor. xiii, 109.

Of this combined scheme, the attack upon the left or seaward side
of the Carthaginian camp, by the Italiot division and the fleet
in concert, was effectively executed, and promised at first to be
successful. The assailants overthrew the bulwarks, forced their way
into the camp, and were only driven out by extraordinary efforts
on the part of the defenders; chiefly Iberians and Campanians, but
reinforced from the other portions of the army, which were as yet
unmolested. But of the two other divisions of Dionysius, the right
did not attack until long after the moment intended, and the centre
never attacked at all. The right had to make a circuitous march, over
the Geloan plain round the city, which occupied longer time than had
been calculated; while Dionysius with the mercenaries around him,
intending to march through the city, found themselves so obstructed
and embarrassed that they made very slow progress, and were yet
longer before they could emerge on the Carthaginian side. Probably
the streets, as in so many other ancient towns, were crooked, narrow,
and irregular; perhaps also, farther blocked up by precautions
recently taken for defence. And thus the Sicilians on the right,
not coming up to the attack until the Italians on the left had been
already repulsed, were compelled to retreat, after a brave struggle,
by the concurrent force of the main Carthaginian army. Dionysius and
his mercenaries, coming up later still, found that the moment for
attack had passed altogether, and returned back into the city without
fighting at all.

Whether the plan or the execution was here at fault,—or both the
one and the other,—we are unable certainly to determine. There will
appear reasons for suspecting, that Dionysius was not displeased at a
repulse which should discourage his army, and furnish an excuse for
abandoning Gela. After retiring again within the walls, he called
together his principal friends to consult what was best to be done.
All were of opinion that it was imprudent to incur farther hazard for
the preservation of the town. Dionysius now found himself in the same
position as Diokles after the defeat near Himera, and as Daphnæus
and the other Syracusan generals before Agrigentum, after the capture
of their provision-fleet by the Carthaginians. He felt constrained
to abandon Gela, taking the best means in his power for protecting
the escape of the inhabitants. Accordingly, to keep the intention of
flight secret, he sent a herald to Imilkon to solicit a burial-truce
for the ensuing day; he also set apart a body of two thousand light
troops, with orders to make noises in front of the enemy throughout
the whole night, and to keep the lights and fires burning, so as to
prevent any suspicion on the part of the Carthaginians.[964] Under
cover of these precautions, he caused the Geloan population to
evacuate their city in mass at the commencement of night, while he
himself with his main army followed at midnight to protect them. All
hurried forward on their march to Syracuse, turning to best account
the hours of darkness. On their way thither lay Kamarina,—Kamarina
the immovable,[965] as it was pronounced by an ancient oracle or
legend, yet on that fatal night seeming to falsify the epithet. Not
thinking himself competent to defend this city, Dionysius forced
all the Kamarinæan population to become partners in the flight of
the Geloans. The same heart-rending scene, which has already been
recounted at Agrigentum and Himera, was now seen repeated on the road
from Gela to Syracuse: a fugitive multitude, of all ages and of both
sexes, free as well as slave, destitute and terror-stricken, hurrying
they knew not whither, to get beyond the reach of a merciless enemy.
The flight to Syracuse, however, was fortunately not molested by any
pursuit. At daybreak the Carthaginians, discovering the abandonment
of the city, immediately rushed in and took possession of it. As very
little of the valuable property within it had been removed, a rich
plunder fell into the hands of the conquering host, whose barbarous
hands massacred indiscriminately the miserable remnant left behind:
old men, sick, and children, unable to accompany a flight so sudden
and so rapid. Some of the conquerors farther satiated their ferocious
instincts by crucifying or mutilating these unhappy prisoners.[966]

  [964] Diodor. xiii, 111.

  [965] Μὴ κινεῖ Καμάριναν, ἀκίνητόν περ ἐοῦσαν—

                  “fatis nunquam concessa moveri
      Apparet Camarina procul.”—Virgil. Æneid, iii, 701.

  [966] Diodor. xiii. 111. Οὐδεμία γὰρ ἦν παρ’ αὐτοῖς φειδὼ τῶν
  ἁλισκομένων, ἀλλ’ ἀσυμπαθῶς τῶν ἠτυχηκότων οὓς μὲν ἀνεσταύρουν,
  οἷς δ’ ἀφορήτους ἐπῆγον ὕβρεις.

Amidst the sufferings of this distressed multitude, however, and
the compassion of the protecting army, other feelings also were
powerfully aroused. Dionysius, who had been so unmeasured and so
effective in calumniating unsuccessful generals before, was now
himself exposed to the same arrows. Fierce were the bursts of wrath
and hatred against him, both among the fugitives and among the army.
He was accused of having betrayed to the Carthaginians, not only
the army, but also Gela and Kamarina, in order that the Syracusans,
intimidated by these formidable neighbors so close to their borders,
might remain in patient servitude under his dominion. It was remarked
that his achievements for the relief of Gela had been unworthy of
the large force which he brought with him; that the loss sustained
in the recent battle had been nowise sufficient to compel, or even
to excuse, a disgraceful flight; that the mercenaries, especially,
the force upon which he most relied, had not only sustained no loss,
but had never been brought into action; that while his measures
taken against the enemy had thus been partial and inefficient, they
on their side had manifested no disposition to pursue him in his
flight,—thus affording a strong presumption of connivance between
them. Dionysius was denounced as a traitor by all,—except his own
mercenaries, whom he always kept near him for security. The Italiot
allies, who had made the attack and sustained the main loss during
the recent battle, were so incensed against him for having left them
thus unsupported, that they retired in a body, and marched across the
centre of the island home to Italy.

But the Syracusans in the army, especially the horsemen, the
principal persons in the city, had a double ground of anger against
Dionysius; partly from his misconduct or supposed treachery in
this recent enterprise, but still more from the despotism which he
had just erected over his fellow-citizens. This despotism, having
been commenced in gross fraud and consummated by violence, was now
deprived of the only plausible color which it had ever worn, since
Dionysius had been just as disgracefully unsuccessful against the
Carthaginians as those other generals whom he had denounced and
superseded. Determined to rid themselves of one whom they hated at
once as a despot and as a traitor, the Syracusan horsemen watched
for an opportunity of setting upon Dionysius during the retreat, and
killing him. But finding him too carefully guarded by the mercenaries
who always surrounded his person, they went off in a body, and
rode at their best speed to Syracuse, with the full purpose of
reëstablishing the freedom of the city, and keeping out Dionysius. As
they arrived before any tidings had been received of the defeat and
flight at Gela, they obtained admission without impediment into the
islet of Ortygia; the primitive interior city, commanding the docks
and harbor, set apart by the despot for his own residence and power.
They immediately assaulted and plundered the house of Dionysius,
which they found richly stocked with gold, silver, and valuables
of every kind. He had been despot but a few weeks; so that he must
have begun betimes to despoil others, since it seems ascertained
that his own private property was by no means large. The assailants
not only plundered his house with all its interior wealth, but also
maltreated his wife so brutally that she afterwards died of the
outrage.[967] Against this unfortunate woman they probably cherished
a double antipathy, not only as the wife of Dionysius, but also as
the daughter of Hermokrates. They at the same time spread abroad the
news that Dionysius had fled never to return; for they fully confided
in the disruption which they had witnessed among the retiring army,
and in the fierce wrath which they had heard universally expressed
against him.[968] After having betrayed his army, together with Gela
and Kamarina, to the Carthaginians, by a flight without any real
ground of necessity (they asserted),—he had been exposed, disgraced,
and forced to flee in reality, before the just displeasure of his own
awakened fellow-citizens. Syracuse was now free; and might, on the
morrow, reconstitute formally her popular government.

  [967] Diodor. xiii, 112; xiv, 44. Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.

  [968] Diodor. xiii, 112.

Had these Syracusans taken any reasonable precautions against adverse
possibilities, their assurances would probably have proved correct.
The career of Dionysius would here have ended. But while they
abandoned themselves to the plunder of his house and brutal outrage
against his wife, they were so rashly confident in his supposed
irretrievable ruin, and in their own mastery of the insular portion
of the city, that they neglected to guard the gate of Achradina
(the outer city) against his reëntry. The energy and promptitude
of Dionysius proved too much for them. Informed of their secession
from the army, and well knowing their sentiments, he immediately
divined their projects, and saw that he could only defeat them by
audacity and suddenness of attack. Accordingly, putting himself
at the head of his best and most devoted soldiers,—one hundred
horsemen and six hundred foot,—he left his army and proceeded by a
forced march to Syracuse; a distance of about four hundred stadia,
or about forty-five English miles. He arrived there about midnight,
and presented himself, not at the gate of Ortygia, which he had
probably ascertained to be in possession of his enemies, but at that
of Achradina; which latter (as has been already mentioned) formed
a separate fortification from Ortygia, with the Nekropolis between
them.[969] Though the gate was shut, he presently discovered it to be
unguarded, and was enabled to apply to it some reeds gathered in the
marshes on his road, so as to set it on fire and burn it. So eager
had he been for celerity of progress, that at the moment when he
reached the gate, a part only of his division were with him. But as
the rest arrived while the flames were doing their work, he entered,
with the whole body, into Achradina or the outer city. Marching
rapidly through the streets, he became master, without resistance,
of all this portion of the city, and of the agora, or market-place,
which formed its chief open space. His principal enemies, astounded
by this alarming news, hastened out of Ortygia into Achradina, and
tried to occupy the agora. But they found it already in possession
of Dionysius; and being themselves very few in number, having taken
no time to get together any considerable armed body, they were
overpowered and slain by his mercenaries. Dionysius was thus strong
enough to vanquish all his enemies, who entered Achradina in small
and successive parties, without any order, as they came out of
Ortygia. He then proceeded to attack the houses of those whom he knew
to be unfriendly to his dominion, slew such as he could find within,
and forced the rest to seek shelter in exile. The great body of the
Syracusan horsemen,—who but the evening before were masters of the
city, and might with common prudence have maintained themselves in
it, were thus either destroyed or driven into banishment. As exiles
they established themselves in the town of Ætna.[970]

  [969] Diodor. xiii, 113. παρῆν περὶ μέσας νύκτας πρὸς τὴν πύλην
  τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς ... εἰσήλαυνε διὰ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς, etc.

  [970] Diodor. xiii, 113. Compare Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 5.

Thus master of the city, Dionysius was joined on the ensuing day by
the main body of his mercenaries, and also by the Sicilian allies,
who had now completed their march. The miserable sufferers from
Gela and Kamarina, who looked upon him with indignation as their
betrayer,—went to reside at Leontini; seemingly as companions of the
original Leontine citizens, who had been for some time domiciliated
at Syracuse, but who no longer chose to remain there under Dionysius.
Leontini thus became again an independent city.[971]

  [971] Xenophon (Hellen. ii, 3, 5) states that “the Leontines,
  co-residents at Syracuse, revolted to their own city from
  Dionysius and the Syracusans.”

  This migration to Leontini seems a part of the same transaction
  as what Diodorus notices (xiii, 113). Leontini, recognized as
  independent by the peace which speedily followed, is mentioned
  again shortly afterwards as independent (xiv, 14). It had been
  annexed to Syracuse before the Athenian siege.

Though the disasters at Gela had threatened to ruin Dionysius, yet
he was now, through his recent victory, more master of Syracuse
than ever; and had more completely trodden down his opponents. The
horsemen, whom he had just destroyed and chased away, were for the
most part the rich and powerful citizens of Syracuse. To have put
down such formidable enemies, almost indispensable as leaders to
any party which sought to rise against him, was the strongest of
all negative securities for the prolongation of his reign. There
was no public assembly any longer at Syracuse, to which he had to
render account of his proceedings at Gela and Kamarina, and before
which he was liable to be arraigned,—as he himself had arraigned
his predecessors who had commanded at Himera and Agrigentum. All
such popular securities he had already overridden or subverted. The
superiority of force, and intimidation of opponents, upon which his
rule rested, were now more manifest and more decisive than ever.

Notwithstanding such confirmed position, however, Dionysius might
still have found defence difficult, if Imilkon had marched on with
his victorious army, fresh from the plunder of Gela and Kamarina, and
had laid energetic siege to Syracuse. From all hazard and alarm of
this sort he was speedily relieved, by propositions for peace, which
came spontaneously tendered by the Carthaginian general. Peace was
concluded between them, on the following terms:—

1. The Carthaginians shall retain all their previous possessions,
and all their Sikanian dependencies, in Sicily. They shall keep,
besides, Selinus, Himera, Agrigentum. The towns of Gela and Kamarina
may be reoccupied by their present fugitive inhabitants; but on
condition of paying tribute to Carthage, and destroying their walls
and fortifications.

2. The inhabitants of Leontini and Messênê, as well as all the Sikel
inhabitants, shall be independent and autonomous.

3. The Syracusans shall be subject to Dionysius.[972]

  [972] Diodor. xiii, 114. καὶ Συρακουσίους μὲν ὑπὸ Διονύσιον
  τετάχθαι, etc.

4. All the captives, and all the ships, taken on both sides, shall be
mutually restored.

Such were the conditions upon which peace was now concluded. Though
they were extremely advantageous to Carthage, assigning to her,
either as subject or as tributary, the whole of the southern shore
of Sicily,—yet as Syracuse was, after all, the great prize to be
obtained, the conquest of which was essential to the security of
all the remainder, we are astonished that Imilkon did not push
forward to attack it, at a moment so obviously promising. It
appears that immediately after the conquest of Gela and Kamarina,
the Carthaginian army was visited by a pestilential distemper,
which is said to have destroyed nearly the half of it, and to
have forbidden future operations. The announcement of this event
however, though doubtless substantially exact, comes to us in a way
somewhat confused.[973] And when we read, as one of the articles in
the treaty, the express and formal provision that “The Syracusans
shall be subject to Dionysius,”—we discern plainly, that there was
also an additional cause for this timely overture, so suitable to
his interests. There was real ground for those bitter complaints
against Dionysius, which charged him with having betrayed Gela and
Kamarina to the Carthaginians in order to assure his own dominion
at Syracuse. The Carthaginians, in renouncing all pretensions to
Syracuse and recognizing its autonomy, could have no interest in
dictating its internal government. If they determined to recognize by
formal treaty the sovereignty as vested in Dionysius, we may fairly
conclude that he had purchased the favor from them by some underhand
service previously rendered. In like manner both Hiketas and
Agathoklês,—the latter being the successor, and in so many points the
parallel of Dionysius, ninety years afterwards,—availed themselves
of Carthaginian support as one stepping-stone to the despotism of
Syracuse.[974]

  [973] Diodor. xiii, 114.

  Diodorus begins this chapter with the words,—~Διόπερ ὑπὸ τῶν
  πραγμάτων ἀναγκαζόμενος~ Ἰμίλκων, ἔπεμψεν εἰς Συρακούσας κήρυκα,
  παρακαλῶν τοὺς ἡττημένους διαλύσασθαι. Ἀσμένως δ’ ὑπακούσαντος
  τοῦ Διονυσίου, τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπὶ τοῖσδε ἔθεντο, etc.

  Now there is not the smallest matter of fact either mentioned
  or indicated before, to which the word διόπερ can have
  reference. Nothing is mentioned but success on the part of the
  Carthaginians, and disaster on the part of the Greeks; the
  repulse of the attack made by Dionysius upon the Carthaginian
  camp,—his retreat and evacuation of Gela and Kamarina,—the
  occupation of Gela by the Carthaginians,—the disorder, mutiny,
  and partial dispersion of the army of Dionysius in its
  retreat,—the struggle within the walls of Syracuse. There is
  nothing in all this to which διόπερ can refer. But a few lines
  farther on, after the conditions of peace have been specified,
  Diodorus alludes to _the_ terrible disease (ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου) which
  laid waste the Carthaginian army, as if he had mentioned it
  before.

  I find in Niebuhr (Vorträge über alte Geschichte, vol. iii, p.
  212, 213) the opinion expressed, that here is a gap in Diodorus
  “intentionally disguised in the MSS., and not yet noticed by any
  editor.” Some such conclusion seems to me unavoidable. Niebuhr
  thinks, that in the lost portion of the text, it was stated that
  Imilkon marched on to Syracuse, formed the siege of the place,
  and was there visited with the terrific pestilence to which
  allusion is made in the remaining portion of the text. This also
  is nowise improbable; yet I do not venture to assert it,—since
  the pestilence may possibly have broken out while Imilkon was
  still at Gela.

  Niebuhr farther considers, that Dionysius lost the battle of
  Gela through miserable generalship,—that he lost it by design,
  as suitable to his political projects,—and that by the terms of
  the subsequent treaty, he held the territory around Syracuse only
  under Carthaginian supremacy.

  [974] Justin, xxii, 2; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 2, 7, 9.

The pestilence, however, among the Carthaginian army is said to have
been so terrible as to destroy nearly the half of their numbers.
The remaining half, on returning to Africa, either found it already
there, or carried it with them; for the mortality at and around
Carthage was not less deplorable than in Sicily.[975]

  [975] Diodor. xiii, 114.

It was in the summer of 405 B.C., that this treaty was concluded,
which consigned all the Hellenic ground on the south of Sicily to
the Carthaginian dominion, and Syracuse with its population to
that of Dionysius. It was in September or October of the same year
that Lysander effected his capture of the entire Athenian fleet at
Ægospotami, destroyed the maritime ascendency and power of Athens,
and gave commencement to the Lacedæmonian empire, completed by the
actual surrender of Athens during the ensuing year. The dekarchies
and harmosts, planted by Lysander in so many cities of the central
Hellenic world, commenced their disastrous working nearly at the same
time as the despotism of Dionysius in Syracuse. This is a point to be
borne in mind, in reference to the coming period. The new position
and policy wherein Sparta now became involved, imparted to her a
sympathy with Dionysius such as in earlier times she probably would
not have felt; and which contributed materially, in a secondary way,
to the durability of his dominion, as well by positive intrigues
of Lacedæmonian agents, as by depriving the oppressed Syracusans
of effective aid or countenance from Corinth or other parts of
Greece.[976]

  [976] Diodor. xiv, 10.

  The valuable support lent to Dionysius by the Spartans is
  emphatically denounced by Isokrates, Orat. iv, (Panegyric.) s.
  145; Orat. viii, (De Pace) s. 122.

The period immediately succeeding this peace was one of distress,
depression, and alarm, throughout all the south of Sicily. According
to the terms of the treaty, Gela and Kamarina might be reoccupied by
their fugitive population; yet with demolished walls,—with all traces
of previous opulence and comfort effaced by the plunderers,—and
under the necessity of paying tribute to Carthage. The condition
of Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera, now actually portions of
Carthaginian territory, was worse; especially Agrigentum, hurled
at one blow from the loftiest pinnacle of prosperous independence.
No free Hellenic territory was any longer to be found between Cape
Pachynus and Cape Lilybæum, beyond the Syracusan frontier.

Amidst the profound discouragement of the Syracusan mind, the
withdrawal from Sicily of the terror-striking Carthaginian
army would be felt as a relief, and would procure credit for
Dionysius.[977] It had been brought about under him, though not
as a consequence of his exploits; for his military operations
against Imilkon at Gela had been completely unsuccessful (and even
worse); and the Carthaginians had suffered no harm except from the
pestilence. While his partisans had thus a plea for extolling him
as the savior of the city, he also gathered strength in other ways
out of the recent events. He had obtained a formal recognition of
his government from the Carthaginians; he had destroyed or banished
the chief Syracusan citizens opposed to his dominion, and struck
terror into the rest; he had brought back all his mercenary troops
and guards, without loss or dissatisfaction. He now availed himself
of his temporary strength to provide precautions for perpetuity,
before the Syracusans should recover spirit, or obtain a favorable
opportunity, to resist.

  [977] Plato, while he speaks of Dionysius and Hipparinus on
  this occasion as the saviors of Syracuse, does not insist upon
  extraordinary valor and ability on their parts, but assigns
  the result mainly to fortune and the favor of the gods (Plato,
  Epistol. viii, p. 353 B.; p. 355 F.).

  His letter is written with a view of recommending a compromise at
  Syracuse, between the party of freedom, and the descendants of
  Dionysius and Hipparinus; he thus tries to set up as good a case
  as he can, in favor of the title of both the two latter to the
  gratitude of the Syracusans.

  He reluctantly admits how much Dionysius the elder afterwards
  abused the confidence placed in him by the Syracusans (p. 353 C.).

His first measure was to increase the fortifications of the islet
called Ortygia, strengthening it as a position to be held separately
from Achradina and the remaining city. He constructed a new wall,
provided with lofty turrets and elaborate defences of every kind,
immediately outside of the mole which connected this islet with
Sicily. On the outside of this new wall, he provided convenient
places for transacting business, porticos spacious enough to shelter
a considerable multitude, and seemingly a distinct strong fort,
destined for a public magazine of corn.[978] It suited his purpose
that the trade of the town should be carried on, and the persons
of the traders congregated, under or near the outer walls of his
peculiar fortress. As a farther means of security, he also erected
a distinct citadel or acropolis within the islet and behind the new
wall. The citadel was close to the Lesser Harbor or Portus Lakkius.
Its walls were so extended as to embrace the whole of this harbor,
closing it up in such a way as to admit only one ship at a time,
though there was room for sixty ships within. He was thus provided
with an almost impregnable stronghold, not only securing him against
attack from the more numerous population in the outer city, but
enabling him to attack them whenever he chose,—and making him master,
at the same time, of the grand means of war and defence against
foreign enemies.

  [978] That this was the situation of the fortified _horrea
  publica_ at Syracuse, we see from Livy, xxiv, 21. I think we may
  presume that they were begun at this time by Dionysius, as they
  form a natural part of his scheme.

To provide a fortress in the islet of Ortygia, was one step towards
perpetual dominion at Syracuse; to fill it with devoted adherents,
was another. For Dionysius, the instruments of dominion were his
mercenary troops and body-guards; men chosen by himself from
their aptitude to his views, identified with him in interest, and
consisting in large proportion not merely of foreigners, but even of
liberated slaves. To these men he now proceeded to assign a permanent
support and residence. He distributed among them the houses in the
islet or inferior stronghold, expelling the previous proprietors, and
permitting no one to reside there except his own intimate partisans
and soldiers. Their quarters were in the islet, while he dwelt in
the citadel,—a fortress within a fortress, sheltering his own person
against the very garrison or standing army, by means of which he kept
Syracuse in subjection.[979] Having provided houses for his soldiers,
by extruding the residents in Ortygia,—he proceeded to assign to them
a comfortable maintenance, by the like wholesale dispossession of
proprietors, and reappropriation of lands, without. He distributed
anew the entire Syracusan territory; reserving the best lands, and
the best shares, for his own friends and for the officers in command
of his mercenaries,—and apportioning the remaining territory in equal
shares to all the inhabitants, citizens as well as non-citizens. By
this distribution the latter became henceforward citizens as well as
the former; so far at least, as any man could be properly called a
citizen under his despotism. Even the recently enfranchised slaves
became new citizens and proprietors as well as the rest.[980]

  [979] Diodor. xiv, 7.

  The residence of Dionysius in the acropolis, and the quarters
  of his mercenaries without the acropolis, but still within
  Ortygia,—are noticed in Plato’s account of his visit to the
  younger Dionysius (Plato, Epistol. vii, p. 350; Epist. iii, p.
  315).

  [980] Diodor. xiv, 7. Τῆς δὲ χώρας τὴν μὲν ἀρίστην ἐξελόμενος
  ἐδωρήσατο τοῖς τε φίλοις καὶ τοῖς ἐφ’ ἡγεμονίας τεταγμένοις·
  ~τὴν δ’ ἄλλην ἐμέρισεν ἐπίσης ξένῳ τε καὶ πολίτῃ~, συμπεριλαβὼν
  τῷ τῶν πολιτῶν ὀνόματι τοὺς ἠλευθερωμένους δούλους, οὓς ἐκάλει
  νεοπολίτας. Διέδωκε δὲ καὶ τὰς οἰκίας τοῖς ὄχλοις, πλὴν τῶν ἐν τῇ
  Νήσῳ· ταύτας δὲ τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τοῖς μισθοφόροις ἐδωρήσατο. Ἐπεὶ
  δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὴν τυραννίδα καλῶς ἐδόκει διῳκηκέναι, etc.

Respecting this sweeping change of property, it is mortifying to
have no farther information than is contained in two or three brief
sentences of Diodorus. As a basis for entire redivision of lands,
Dionysius would find himself already possessed of the property
of those Syracusan Horsemen or Knights whom he had recently put
down or banished. As a matter of course, their property would be
confiscated, and would fall into his possession for reassignment. It
would doubtless be considerable, inasmuch as these Horsemen were for
the most part wealthy men. From this basis, Dionysius enlarged his
scheme to the more comprehensive idea of a general spoliation and
reappropriation, for the benefit of his partisans and his mercenary
soldiers. The number of these last we do not know; but on an occasion
not very long afterwards, the mercenaries under him are mentioned as
amounting to about ten thousand.[981] To ensure landed properties
to each of these men, together with the monopoly of residence in
Ortygia, nothing less than a sweeping confiscation would suffice.
How far the equality of share, set forth in principle, was or could
be adhered to in practice, we cannot say. The maxim of allowing
residence in Ortygia to none but friends and partisans, passed from
Dionysius into a traditional observance for future anti-popular
governments of Syracuse. The Roman consul Marcellus, when he subdued
the city near two centuries afterwards, prescribed the rule of
admitting into the islet none but Romans, and of excluding all native
Syracusan residents.[982]

  [981] Diodor. xiv, 78.

  So also, after the death of the elder Dionysius, Plutarch speaks
  of his military force as having been βαρβάρων μυρíανδρον φυλακήν
  (Plutarch, Dion. c. 10). These expressions however have little
  pretence to numerical accuracy.

  [982] Cicero in Verrem, v. 32, 84; 38, 98.

Such mighty works of fortification, combined with so extensive
a revolution both in property and in domicile, cannot have been
accomplished in less than a considerable time, nor without provoking
considerable resistance in detail. Nor is it to be forgotten that
the pecuniary cost of such fortifications must have been very
heavy. How Dionysius contrived to levy the money, we do not know.
Aristotle informs us that the contributions which he exacted from the
Syracusans were so exorbitant, that within the space of five years,
the citizens had paid into his hands their entire property; that is,
twenty per cent. per annum upon their whole property.[983] To what
years this statement refers, we do not know; nor what was the amount
of contribution exacted on the special occasion now before us. But
we may justly infer from it that Dionysius would not scruple to lay
his hand heavily upon the Syracusans for the purpose of defraying
the cost of his fortifications; and that the simultaneous burthen
of large contributions would thus come to aggravate the painful
spoliation and transfers of property, and the still more intolerable
mischiefs of a numerous standing army domiciled as masters in the
heart of the city. Under such circumstances, we are not surprised
to learn that the discontent among the Syracusans was extreme, and
that numbers of them were greatly mortified at having let slip the
favorable opportunity of excluding Dionysius, when the Horsemen were
actually for a moment masters of Syracuse, before he suddenly came
back from Gela.[984]

  [983] Aristotel. Politic. v, 9, 4. Καὶ ἡ εἰσφορὰ τῶν τελῶν
  (τυραννικόν ἐστι) ἐν πέντε γὰρ ἔτεσιν ἐπὶ Διονυσίου τὴν οὐσίαν
  ἅπασαν εἰσενηνοχέναι συνέβαινε.

  [984] Diodorus, xiv, 7.

Whatever might be the extent of indignation actually felt, there
could be no concert or manifestation in Syracuse, under a watchful
despot with the overwhelming force assembled in Ortygia. But a
suitable moment speedily occurred. Having completed his fortress and
new appropriation for the assured maintenance of the mercenaries,
Dionysius resolved to attempt a conquest of the autonomous Sikel
tribes in the interior of the island, some of whom had sided with
Carthage in the recent war. He accordingly marched out with a
military force, consisting partly of his mercenary troops, partly
of armed Syracusan citizens under a commander named Dorikus.
While he was laying siege to the town of Erbessus, the Syracusan
troops, finding themselves assembled in arms and animated with one
common sentiment, began to concert measures for open resistance
to Dionysius. The commander Dorikus, in striving to repress these
manifestations, lifted up his hand to chastise one of the most
mutinous speakers;[985] upon which the soldiers rushed forward in
a body to defend him. They slew Dorikus, and proclaimed themselves
again, with loud shouts, free Syracusan citizens; calling upon all
their comrades in the camp to unite against the despot. They also
sent a message forthwith to the town of Ætna, inviting the immediate
junction of the Syracusan Horsemen, who had sought shelter there in
their exile from Dionysius. Their appeal found the warmest sympathy
among the Syracusan soldiers in the camp, all of whom declared
themselves decisively against the despot, and prepared for every
effort to recover their liberty.

  [985] Diodor. xiv, 7. Compare an occurrence very similar, at
  Mendê in Thrace (Thucyd. iv, 130).

So rapidly did this sentiment break out into vehement and unanimous
action, that Dionysius was too much intimidated to attempt to put
it down at once by means of his mercenaries. Profiting by the
lesson which he had received, after the return march from Gela, he
raised the siege of Erbessus forthwith, and returned to Syracuse to
make sure of his position in Ortygia, before his Syracusan enemies
could arrive there. Meanwhile the latter, thus left full of joy and
confidence, as well as masters of the camp, chose for their leaders
those soldiers who had slain Dorikus, and found themselves speedily
reinforced by the Horsemen, or returning exiles from Ætna. Resolved
to spare no effort for liberating Syracuse, they sent envoys to
Messênê and Rhegium, as well as to Corinth, for aid; while they at
the same time marched with all their force to Syracuse, and encamped
on the heights of Epipolæ. It is not clear whether they remained in
this position, or whether they were enabled, through the sympathy
of the population, to possess themselves farther of the outer city
Achradina, and with its appendages Tycha and Neapolis. Dionysius
was certainly cut off from all communication with the country; but
he maintained himself in his impregnable position in Ortygia, now
exclusively occupied by his chosen partisans and mercenaries. If he
even continued master of Achradina, he must have been prevented from
easy communication with it. The assailants extended themselves under
the walls of Ortygia, from Epipolæ to the Greater as well as the
Lesser Harbor.[986] A considerable naval force was sent to their aid
from Messênê and Rhegium, giving to them the means of blocking him
up on the seaside; while the Corinthians, though they could grant no
farther assistance, testified their sympathy by sending Nikoteles as
adviser.[987] The leaders of the movement proclaimed Syracuse again
a free city, offered large rewards for the head of Dionysius, and
promised equal citizenship to all the mercenaries who should desert
him.

  [986] Diodor. xiv, 8.

  [987] Diodor. xiv, 10.

Several of the mercenaries, attracted by such offers, as well
as intimidated by that appearance of irresistible force which
characterizes the first burst of a popular movement, actually came
over and were well received. Everything seemed to promise success to
the insurgents, who, not content with the slow process of blockade,
brought up battering-machines, and vehemently assaulted the walls
of Ortygia. Nothing now saved Dionysius except those elaborate
fortifications which he had so recently erected, defying all attack.
And even though sheltered by them, his position appeared to be so
desperate, that desertion from Ortygia every day increased. He
himself began to abandon the hope of maintaining his dominion;
discussing with his intimate friends the alternative, between death
under a valiant but hopeless resistance, and safety purchased by
a dishonorable flight. There remained but one means of rescue: to
purchase the immediate aid of a body of twelve hundred mercenary
Campanian cavalry, now in the Carthaginian service, and stationed
probably at Gela or Agrigentum. His brother-in-law Polyxenus
advised him to mount his swiftest horse, to visit in person the
Campanians, and bring them to the relief of Ortygia. But this
counsel was strenuously resisted by two intimate friends,—Helôris
and Megaklês,—who both impressed upon him, that the royal robe was
the only honorable funeral garment, and that, instead of quitting
his post at full speed, he ought to cling to it until he was dragged
away by the leg.[988] Accordingly, Dionysius determined to hold out,
without quitting Ortygia; sending private envoys to the Campanians,
with promises of large pay if they would march immediately to his
defence. The Carthaginians were probably under obligation not to
oppose this, having ensured to Dionysius by special article of treaty
the possession of Syracuse.

  [988] Diodor. xiv, 8; xx, 78. Isokrates, Or. vi, (Archidamus)
  sect. 49.

  It appears that Timæus the historian ascribed this last
  observation to Philistus; and Diodorus copies Timæus in one of
  the passages above referred to, though not in the other. But
  Philistus himself in his history asserted that the observation
  had been made by another person (Plutarch, Dion. c. 35).

  The saying seems to have been remembered and cited long
  afterwards in Syracuse; but cited as having been delivered by
  Dionysius himself, not as addressed to him (Livy, xxiv, 22).

  Isokrates, while recording the saying, represents it as having
  been delivered when the Carthaginians were pressing Syracuse
  hardly by siege; having in mind doubtless the siege or blockade
  undertaken by Imilkon seven years afterwards. But I apprehend
  this to be a misconception. The story seems to suit better to the
  earlier occasion named by Diodorus.

To gain time for their arrival, by deluding and disarming the
assailants, Dionysius affected to abandon all hope of prolonged
defence, and sent to request permission to quit the city, along with
his private friends and effects. Permission was readily granted
to him to depart with five triremes. But as soon as this evidence
of success had been acquired, the assailants without abandoned
themselves to extravagant joy and confidence, considering Dionysius
as already subdued, and the siege as concluded. Not merely was all
farther attack suspended, but the forces were in a great measure
broken up. The Horsemen were disbanded, by a proceeding alike unjust
and ungrateful, to be sent back to Ætna; while the hoplites dispersed
about the country to their various lands and properties. The same
difficulty of keeping a popular force long together for any military
operation requiring time, which had been felt when the Athenians
besieged their usurpers Kylon and Peisistratus in the acropolis,[989]
was now experienced in regard to the siege of Ortygia. Tired with
the length of the siege, the Syracusans blindly abandoned themselves
to the delusive assurance held out by Dionysius; without taking
heed to maintain their force and efficiency undiminished, until
his promised departure should be converted into a reality. In this
unprepared and disorderly condition, they were surprised by the
sudden arrival of the Campanians,[990] who, attacking and defeating
them with considerable loss, forced their way through to join
Dionysius in Ortygia. At the same time, a reinforcement of three
hundred fresh mercenaries reached him by sea. The face of affairs
was now completely changed. The recent defeat produced among the
assailants not only discouragement, but also mutual recrimination
and quarrel. Some insisted upon still prosecuting the siege of
Ortygia, while others, probably the friends of the recently dismissed
Horsemen, declared in favor of throwing it up altogether and joining
the Horsemen at Ætna; a resolution, which they seem at once to
have executed. Observing his opponents thus enfeebled and torn by
dissension, Dionysius sallied out and attacked them, near the suburb
called Neapolis or Newtown, on the south-west of Achradina. He was
victorious, and forced them to disperse. But he took great pains to
prevent slaughter of the fugitives, riding up himself to restrain his
own troops; and he subsequently buried the slain with due solemnity.
He was anxious by these proceedings to conciliate the remainder;
for the most warlike portion of his opponents had retired to Ætna,
where no less than seven thousand hoplites were now assembled along
with the Horsemen. Dionysius sent thither envoys to invite them to
return to Syracuse, promising the largest amnesty for the past. But
it was in vain that his envoys expatiated upon his recent forbearance
towards the fugitives and decent interment of the slain. Few could
be induced to come back, except such as had left their wives and
families at Syracuse in his power. The larger proportion, refusing
all trust in his word and all submission to his command, remained
in exile at Ætna. Such as did return were well treated, in hopes of
inducing the rest gradually to follow their example.[991]

  [989] Herodotus, v, 71; Thucydides, i, 112.

  [990] It is said that the Campanians, on their way to Syracuse,
  passed by Agyrium, and deposited their baggage in the care of
  Agyris the despot of that town (Diodor. xiv, 9). But if we
  look at the position of Agyrium on the map, it seems difficult
  to understand how mercenaries coming from the Carthaginian
  territory, and in great haste to reach Syracuse, can have passed
  anywhere near to it.

  [991] Diodor. xiv, 9.

Thus was Dionysius rescued from a situation apparently desperate, and
reëstablished in his dominion; chiefly through the rash presumption
(as on the former occasion after the retreat from Gela), the want of
persevering union, and the absence of any commanding leader, on the
part of his antagonists. His first proceeding was to dismiss the
newly-arrived Campanians. For though he had to thank them mainly for
his restoration, he was well aware that they were utterly faithless,
and that on the first temptation they were likely to turn against
him.[992] But he adopted more efficient means for strengthening
his dominion in Syracuse, and for guarding against a repetition of
that danger from which he had so recently escaped. He was assisted
in his proceedings by a Lacedæmonian envoy named Aristus, recently
despatched by the Spartans for the ostensible purpose of bringing
about an amicable adjustment of parties at Syracuse. While Nikoteles,
who had been sent from Corinth, espoused the cause of the Syracusan
people, and put himself at their head to obtain for them more or
less of free government,—Aristus, on the contrary, lent himself to
the schemes of Dionysius. He seduced the people away from Nikoteles,
whom he impeached and caused to be slain. Next, pretending himself
to act along with the people, and to employ the great ascendency of
Sparta in defence of their freedom,[993] he gained their confidence
and then betrayed them. The despot was thus enabled to strengthen
himself more decisively than before, and probably to take off the
effective popular leaders thus made known to him; while the mass of
the citizens were profoundly discouraged by finding Sparta enlisted
in the conspiracy against their liberties.

  [992] Diodor. xiv, 9. The subsequent proceedings of the
  Campanians justified his wisdom in dismissing them. They went
  to Entella (a town among the dependencies of Carthage, in the
  south-western portion of Sicily,—Diod. xiv, 48), where they were
  welcomed and hospitably treated by the inhabitants. In the night,
  they set upon the Entellan citizens by surprise, put them all to
  death, married their widows and daughters, and kept possession of
  the town for themselves.

  [993] Diodor. xiv, 10. Ἀπέστειλαν (οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι) Ἄριστον,
  ἄνδρα τῶν ἐπιφανῶν, εἰς Συρακούσας, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ προσποιούμενοι
  καταλιπεῖν τὴν δυναστείαν, τῇ δ’ ἀληθείᾳ σπεύδοντες αὐξῆσαι τὴν
  τυραννίδα· ἤλπιζον γὰρ συγκατασκευάζοντες τὴν ἀρχὴν, ὑπήκοον
  ἕξειν τὸν Διονύσιον διὰ τὰς εὐεργεσίας. Ὁ δ’ Ἄριστος καταπλεύσας
  εἰς Συρακούσας, καὶ τῷ τυράννῳ λάθρα περὶ τούτων διαλεχθεὶς, τούς
  τε Συρακοσίους ἀνασείων, Νικοτέλην τὸν Κορίνθιον ἀνεῖλεν,
  ἀφηγούμενον τῶν Συρακοσίων· τοὺς δὲ πιστεύσαντας προδοὺς, τὸν μὲν
  τύραννον ἰσχυρὸν κατέστησε, διὰ δὲ τῆς πράξεως ταύτης ἀσχημονεῖν
  ἐποίησεν αὑτὸν ἅμα καὶ τὴν πατρίδα. Compare xiv, 70.

Of this renovated tide of success Dionysius took advantage, to
strike another important blow. During the season of harvest, while
the citizens were busy in the fields, he caused the houses to be
searched, and seized all the arms found therein. Not satisfied
with thus robbing his opponents of the means of attack, he farther
proceeded to construct additional fortifications around the islet of
Ortygia, to augment his standing army of mercenaries, and to build
fresh ships. Feeling more than ever that his dominion was repugnant
to the Syracusans, and rested only on naked force, he thus surrounded
himself with precautions probably stronger than any other Grecian
despot had ever accumulated. He was yet farther strengthened by the
pronounced and active support of Sparta, now at the maximum of her
imperial ascendency;[994] and by the presence of the mighty Lysander
at Syracuse as her ambassador to countenance and exalt him.[995]
The Spartan alliance, however, did not prevent him from enrolling
among his mercenaries a considerable fraction of the Messenians, the
bitter enemies of Sparta; who were now driven out of Naupaktus and
Kephallenia, with no other possession left except their arms[996]—and
whose restoration to Peloponnesus by Epaminondas, about thirty years
afterwards, has been described in a preceding chapter.

  [994] Diodor. xiv, 10. Καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ παρεσκευάζετο πρὸς τὴν
  ἀσφάλειαν τῆς τυραννίδος, ὡς ἂν ἔργοις ἤδη πεῖραν εἰληφὼς, ὅτι
  πᾶν ὑπομένουσιν οἱ Συρακούσιοι χάριν τοῦ μὴ δουλεύειν.

  [995] Plutarch, Lysander, c. 2.

  [996] Diodor. xiv, 34.

So large a mercenary force, while the people in Syracuse were
prostrate and in no condition for resistance, naturally tempted
Dionysius to seek conquest as well as plunder beyond the border. Not
choosing as yet to provoke a war with Carthage, he turned his arms
to the north and north-west of the Syracusan territory; the Grecian
(Chalkidic or Ionic) cities, Naxus, Katana, and Leontini—and the
Sikels, towards the centre of Sicily. The three Chalkidic cities
were the old enemies of Syracuse, but Leontini had been conquered by
the Syracusans even before the Athenian expedition, and remained as
a Syracusan possession until the last peace with the Carthaginians,
when it had been declared independent. Naxus and Katana had contrived
to retain their independence against Syracuse, even after the ruin
of the Athenian armament under Nikias. At the head of a powerful
force, Dionysius marched out from Syracuse first against the town of
Ætna, occupied by a considerable body of Syracusan exiles hostile
to his dominion. Though the place was strong by situation,[997]
yet these men, too feeble to resist, were obliged to evacuate it;
upon which he proceeded to attack Leontini. But on summoning the
inhabitants to surrender, he found his propositions rejected, and
every preparation made for a strenuous defence; so that he could do
nothing more than plunder the territory around, and then advanced
onward into the interior Sikel territory, towards Enna and Erbita.
But his march in this direction was little more than a feint, for the
purpose of masking his real views upon Naxus and Katana, with both
which cities he had already opened intrigues. Arkesilaus, general
of Katana, and Prokles, general of Naxus, were both carrying on
corrupt negotiations for the purpose of selling to him the liberty
of their native cities. Until the negotiations were completed,
Dionysius wished to appear as if turning his arms elsewhere, and
therefore marched against Enna. Here he entered into conspiracy with
an Ennæan citizen named Aeimnestus, whom he instigated to seize the
sceptre of his native town,—by promises of assistance, on condition
of being himself admitted afterwards. Aeimnestus made the attempt
and succeeded, but did not fulfil his engagement to Dionysius; who
resented this proceeding so vehemently, that he assisted the Ennæans
in putting down Aeimnestus, delivered him as prisoner into their
hands, and then retired, satisfied with such revenge, without farther
meddling. He next marched against Erbita, before which he passed his
time with little or no result, until the bribes promised at Naxus
and Katana had taken effect. At length the terms were fully settled.
Dionysius was admitted at night by Arkesilaus into Katana, seized
the city, disarmed the inhabitants, and planted there a powerful
garrison. Naxus was next put into his hands, by the like corruption
on the part of Prokles; who was rewarded with a large bribe, and with
the privilege of preserving his kinsmen. Both cities were given up
to be plundered by his soldiers; after which the walls as well as
the houses were demolished, and the inhabitants sold as slaves. The
dismantled site of Katana was then assigned to a body of Campanian
mercenaries in the service of Dionysius, who however retained in his
possession hostages for their fidelity;[998] the site of Naxus to the
indigenous Sikels in the neighborhood. These captures struck so much
terror into the Leontines, that when Dionysius renewed his attack
upon them, they no longer felt competent to resist. He required them
to surrender their city, to remove to Syracuse, and there to reside
for the future as citizens; which term meant, at the actual time, as
subjects of his despotism. The Leontines obeyed the requisition, and
their city thus again became an appendage of Syracuse.[999]

  [997] Diodor. xiv, 58.

  [998] Diodor. xiv, 61.

  [999] Diodor. xiv, 15.

These conquests of Dionysius, achieved mainly by corrupting the
generals of Naxos and Katana, were of serious moment, and spread so
much alarm among the Sikels of the interior, that Archonides, the
Sikel prince of Erbita, thought it prudent to renounce his town and
soil; withdrawing to a new site beyond the Nebrode mountains, on the
northern coast of the island, more out of the reach of Syracusan
attack. Here, with his mercenary soldiers and with a large portion of
his people who voluntarily accompanied him, he founded the town of
Alæsa.[1000]

  [1000] Diodor. xiv, 16. This Archonides may probably have been
  son of the Sikel prince Archonides, who, having taken active part
  as an ally of Nikias and the Athenian invaders against Syracuse,
  died just before Gylippus reached Sicily (Thucyd. vii, 1).

Strengthened at home by these successes abroad, the sanguine despot
of Syracuse was stimulated to still greater enterprises. He resolved
to commence aggressive war with the Carthaginians. But against such
formidable enemies, large preparations were indispensable, defensive
as well as offensive, before his design could be proclaimed. First,
he took measures to ensure the defensibility of Syracuse against all
contingencies. Five Grecian cities on the south of the island, one
of them the second in Sicily, had already undergone the deplorable
fate of being sacked by a Carthaginian host; a calamity, which might
possibly be in reserve for Syracuse also, especially if she herself
provoked a war, unless the most elaborate precautions were taken to
render a successful blockade impossible.

Now the Athenian blockade under Nikias had impressed valuable lessons
on the mind of every Syracusan. The city had then been well-nigh
blocked up by a wall of circumvallation carried from sea to sea;
which was actually more than half completed, and would have been
entirely completed, had the original commander been Demosthenes
instead of Nikias. The prodigious importance of the <DW72> of
Epipolæ to the safety of the city had been demonstrated by the most
unequivocal evidence. In my seventh volume, I have already described
the site of Syracuse and the relation of this <DW72> to the outer city
called Achradina. Epipolæ was a gentle ascent west of Achradina.
It was bordered, along both the north side and the south side, by
lines of descending cliff, cut down precipitously, about twenty feet
deep in their lowest part. These lines of cliff nearly converged at
the summit of the <DW72>, called Euryalus; leaving a narrow pass or
road between elevated banks, which communicated with the country
both north and west of Syracuse. Epipolæ thus formed a triangle upon
an inclined plane, sloping upward from its base, the outer wall of
Achradina, to its apex at Euryalus; and having its two sides formed,
the one by the northern, the other by the southern, line of cliffs.
This apex formed a post of the highest importance, commanding the
narrow road which approached Epipolæ from its western extremity or
summit, and through which alone it was easy for an army to get on
the declivity of Epipolæ, since the cliffs on each side were steep,
though less steep on the northern side than on the southern.[1001]
Unless an enemy acquired possession of this <DW72>, Syracuse could
never be blocked up from the northern sea at Trogilus to the Great
Harbor; an enterprise, which Nikias and the Athenians were near
accomplishing, because they first surprised from the northward the
position of Euryalus, and from thence poured down upon the <DW72>
of Epipolæ. I have already described, in my seventh volume, how
the arrival of Gylippus deprived them of superiority in the field,
at a time when their line of circumvallation was already half
finished,—having been carried from the centre of Epipolæ southward
down to Great Harbor, and being partially completed from the same
point across the northern half of Epipolæ to the sea at Trogilus; how
he next intercepted their farther progress, by carrying out, from the
outer wall of Achradina, a cross wall traversing their intended line
of circumvallation and ending at the northern cliff; how he finally
erected a fort or guard-post on the summit of Euryalus, which he
connected with the cross-wall just mentioned by a single wall of
junction carried down the <DW72> of Epipolæ.[1002]

  [1001] See the Dissertation of Saverio Cavallari,—Zur Topographie
  von Syrakus (Göttingen, 1845), p. 22.

  [1002] See, for a farther exposition of these points, my account
  of the siege of Syracuse by the Athenians, Vol. VII, ch. lix, lx.

Both the danger which Syracuse had then incurred, and the means
whereby it had been obviated, were fresh in the recollection of
Dionysius. Since the Athenian siege, the Syracusans may perhaps
have preserved the fort erected by Gylippus near Euryalus; but
they had pulled down the wall of junction, the cross-wall, and the
outer wall of protection constructed between the arrival of Nikias
in Sicily and his commencement of the siege, enclosing the sacred
precinct of Apollo Temenites. The outer city of Syracuse was thus
left with nothing but the wall of Achradina, with its two suburbs or
excrescences, Tychê and Neapolis. Dionysius now resolved to provide
for Syracuse a protection substantially similar to that contrived
by Gylippus, yet more comprehensive, elaborate, and permanent.
He carried out an outer line of defence, starting from the sea
near the port called Trogilus, enclosing the suburb called Tychê
(which adjoined Achradina to the north-west), and then ascending
westward, along the brink of the northern cliff of Epipolæ, to the
summit of that <DW72> at Euryalus. The two extremities thus became
connected together,—not as in the time of Gylippus,[1003] by a single
cross-wall carried out from the city-wall to the northern cliff, and
then joined at an angle by another single wall descending the <DW72>
of Epipolæ from Euryalus, but,—by one continuous new line bordering
the northern cliff down to the sea. And the new line, instead of
being a mere single wall, was now built under the advice of the best
engineers, with lofty and frequent towers interspersed throughout its
length, to serve both as means of defence and as permanent quarters
for soldiers. Its length was thirty stadia (about three and a half
English miles); it was constructed of large stones carefully hewn,
some of them four feet in length.[1004] The quarries at hand supplied
abundant materials, and for the labor necessary, Dionysius brought
together all the population of the city and its neighborhood, out of
whom he selected sixty thousand of the most effective hands, to work
on the wall. Others were ordered to cut the stones in the quarry,
while six thousand teams of oxen were put in harness to draw them to
the spot. The work was set out by furlongs and by smaller spaces of
one hundred feet each, to regiments of suitable number, each under
the direction of an overseer.[1005]

  [1003] Thucyd. vi, 75.

  [1004] Diodor. xiv, 18. λίθων τετραπόδων. The stones may have
  been cubes of four feet; but this does not certainly appear.

  [1005] Diodor. xiv, 18.

As yet, we have heard little about Dionysius except acts of fraud,
violence, and spoliation, for the purpose of establishing his own
dominion over Syracuse, and aggrandizing himself by new conquests
on the borders. But this new fortification was a work of different
import. Instead of being, like his forts and walls in Ortygia,
a guardhouse both of defence and aggression merely for himself
against the people of Syracuse,—it was a valuable protection to the
people, and to himself along with them, against foreign besiegers.
It tended much to guarantee Syracuse from those disasters which had
so recently befallen Agrigentum and the other cities. Accordingly,
it was exceeding popular among the Syracusans, and produced between
them and Dionysius a sentiment of friendship and harmony such as had
not before been seen. Every man labored at the work not merely with
good will, but with enthusiasm; while the despot himself displayed
unwearied zeal, passing whole days on the spot, and taking part in
all the hardship and difficulty. He showed himself everywhere amidst
the mass, as an unguarded citizen, without suspicion or reserve, in
marked contrast with the harshness of his previous demeanor,[1006]
proclaiming rewards for the best and most rapid workmen; he also
provided attendance or relief for those whose strength gave way.
Such was the emulation thus inspired, that the numbers assembled,
often toiling by night as well as by day, completed the whole wall
in the space of twenty days. The fort at Euryalus, which formed the
termination of this newly-constructed line of wall, is probably not
to be understood as comprised within so short a period of execution;
at least in its complete consummation. For the defences provided
at this fort (either now or at a later period) were prodigious
in extent as well as elaborate in workmanship; and the remains of
them exhibit, even to modern observers, the most complete specimen
preserved to us of ancient fortification.[1007] To bring them into
such a condition must have occupied a longer time than twenty days.
Even as to the wall, perhaps, twenty days is rather to be understood
as indicating the time required for the essential continuity of its
line, leaving towers, gates, etc., to be added afterwards.

  [1006] Diodor. xiv, 18. Καθόλου δὲ ἀποθέμενος τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς βάρος,
  ἰδιώτην αὑτὸν ἀπεδείκνυε, etc.

  Compare cap. 45 and cap. 47—μισοῦντες τὸ βάρος τῆς τῶν Φοινίκων
  ἐπικρατείας, etc.

  [1007] According to the testimony of Saverio Cavallari, the
  architect under whose directions the excavations were made in
  1839, whereby these remains were first fully disclosed (Zur
  Topographie von Syrakus, p. 21).

To provide defence for Syracuse against a besieging army, however,
was only a small part of the extensive schemes of Dionysius. What he
meditated was aggressive war against the Carthaginians; for which
purpose, he not only began to accumulate preparations of every kind
on the most extensive scale, but also modified his policy both
towards the Syracusans and towards the other Sicilian Greeks.

Towards the Syracusans his conduct underwent a material change.
The cruelty and oppression which had hitherto marked his dominion
was discontinued; he no longer put men to death, or sent them into
banishment, with the same merciless hand as before. In place of such
tyranny, he now substituted comparative mildness, forbearance, and
conciliation.[1008] Where the system had before been so fraught with
positive maltreatment to many and alarm to all, the mitigation of
it must have been sensibly as well as immediately felt. And when we
make present to our minds the relative position of Dionysius and
the Syracusans, we shall see that the evil inflicted by his express
order by no means represented the whole amount of evil which they
suffered. He occupied the impregnable fortress of Ortygia, with the
entire harbor, docks, and maritime means of the city. The numerous
garrison in his pay, and devoted to him, consisted in great part of
barbaric or non-Hellenic soldiers and of liberated slaves, probably
also non-Hellenic. The Syracusans resident in the outer city and
around were not only destitute of the means of defensive concert
and organization, but were also disarmed. For these mercenaries
either pay was to be provided from the contributions of the citizens,
or lands from their properties; for them, and for other partisans
also, Dionysius had enforced spoliations and transfers of land and
house-property by wholesale.[1009] Now, while the despot himself
was inflicting tyrannical sentences for his own purposes, we may be
sure that these men, the indispensable instruments of his tyranny,
would neither of themselves be disposed to respect the tranquillity
of the other citizens, nor be easily constrained to do so. It was
not, therefore, merely from the systematic misrule of the chief that
the Syracusans had to suffer, but also from the insolence and unruly
appetites of the subordinates. And accordingly they would be doubly
gainers, when Dionysius, from anxiety to attack the Carthaginians,
thought it prudent to soften the rigor of his own proceedings; since
his example, and in case of need his interference, would restrict the
license of his own partisans. The desire for foreign conquest made
it now his interest to conciliate some measure of goodwill from the
Syracusans; or at least to silence antipathies which might become
embarrassing if they broke out in the midst of a war. And he had in
this case the advantage of resting on another antipathy, powerful
and genuine in their minds. Hating as well as fearing Carthage,
the Syracusans cordially sympathized in the aggressive schemes of
Dionysius against her; which held out a prospect of relief from the
tyranny under which they groaned, and some chance of procuring a
restoration of the arms snatched from them.[1010]

  [1008] Diodor. xiv, 45. Ἀπετίθετο γὰρ ἤδη τὸ πικρὸν τῆς
  τυραννίδος, καὶ μεταβαλλόμενος εἰς ἐπιείκειαν, φιλανθρωπότερον
  ἦρχε τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων, οὔτε φονεύων, οὔτε φυγάδας ποιῶν,
  ~καθάπερ εἰώθει~.

  [1009] Diodor. xiv, 7.

  [1010] Diodor. xiv, 45.

Towards the Sicilian Greeks, also, the conduct of Dionysius was
mainly influenced by his anti-Carthaginian projects, which made him
eager to put aside, or at least to defer, all possibilities of war
in other quarters. The inhabitants of Rhegium, on the Italian side
of the Strait of Messina, had recently manifested a disposition to
attack him. They were of common Chalkidic origin with Naxos and
Katana, the two cities which Dionysius had recently conquered and
enslaved. Sixteen years before, when the powerful Athenian armament
visited Sicily with the ostensible view of protecting the Chalkidic
cities against Syracuse, the Rhegines in spite of their fellowship of
race, had refused the invitation of Nikias[1011] to lend assistance,
being then afraid of Athens. But subsequent painful experience had
taught them, that to residents in or near Sicily, Syracuse was the
more formidable enemy of the two. The ruin of Naxus and Katana, with
the great extension of Syracusan dominion northward, had filled
them with apprehension from Dionysius, similar to the fears of
Carthage, inspired to the Syracusans themselves by the disasters
of Agrigentum and Gela. Anxious to revenge their enslaved kinsmen,
the Rhegines projected an attack upon Dionysius before his power
should become yet more formidable; a resolution, in which they were
greatly confirmed by the instigations of the Syracusan exiles (now
driven from Ætna and the other neighboring cities to Rhegium),
confident in their assurances that insurrection would break out
against Dionysius at Syracuse, so soon as any foreign succor should
be announced as approaching. Envoys were sent across the strait to
Messênê, soliciting coöperation against Dionysius, upon the urgent
plea that the ruin of Naxus and Katana could not be passed over,
either in generosity or in prudence, by neighbors on either side of
the strait. These representations made so much impression on the
generals of Messênê, that without consulting the public assembly,
they forthwith summoned the military force of the city, and marched
along with the Rhegines towards the Syracusan frontier,—six thousand
Rhegine and four thousand Messenian hoplites,—six hundred Rhegine and
four hundred Messenian horsemen,—with fifty Rhegine triremes. But
when they reached the frontiers of the Messenian territory, a large
portion of the soldiers refused to follow their generals farther. A
citizen named Laomedon headed the opposition, contending that the
generals had no authority to declare war without a public vote of
the city, and that it was imprudent to attack Dionysius unprovoked.
Such was the effect of these remonstrances, that the Messenian
soldiers returned back to their city; while the Rhegines, believing
themselves to be inadequate to the enterprise single handed, went
home also.[1012]

  [1011] Thucyd. vi, 46.

  [1012] Diodor. xiv, 40.

Apprised of the attack meditated, Dionysius had already led his
troops to defend the Syracusan frontier. But he now reconducted them
back to Syracuse, and listened favorably to propositions for peace
which speedily reached him, from Rhegium and Messênê.[1013] He was
anxious to conciliate them for the present, at all price, in order
that the Carthaginians, when he came to execute his plans, might
find no Grecian allies to coöperate with them in Sicily. He acquired
an influence in Messênê, by making to the city large concessions of
conterminous territory; on which side of the border, or how acquired,
we do not know. He farther endeavored to open an intimate connection
with Rhegium by marrying a Rhegine wife; with which view he sent a
formal message to the citizens, asking permission to contract such an
alliance, accompanied with a promise to confer upon them important
benefits, both in territorial aggrandizement and in other ways.
After a public debate, the Rhegines declined his proposition. The
feeling in their city was decidedly hostile to Dionysius, as the
recent destroyer of Naxus and Katana; and it appears that some of the
speakers expressed themselves with contemptuous asperity, remarking
that the daughter of the public executioner was the only fit wife for
him.[1014] Taken by itself, the refusal would be sufficiently galling
to Dionysius. But when coupled with such insulting remarks (probably
made in public debate in the presence of his own envoys, for it seems
not credible that the words should have been embodied in the formal
reply or resolution of the assembly[1015]), it left the bitterest
animosity; a feeling, which we shall hereafter find in full operation.

  [1013] Diodor. xiv, 40.

  [1014] Diodor. xiv, 44, 106, 107.

  [1015] Diodorus, when he first mentions the answer, does not give
  this remark as comprised in it; though he afterwards alludes to
  it as having been _said_ to be (φασὶ) so comprised (xix, 44-107).

Refused at Rhegium, Dionysius sent to prefer a similar request,
with similar offers, at the neighboring city of Lokri; where it was
favorably entertained. It is remarkable that Aristotle comments upon
this acquiescence of the Lokrians as an act of grave imprudence, and
as dictated only by the anxiety of the principal citizens, in an
oligarchical government, to seek for aggrandizement to themselves
out of such an alliance. The request would not have been granted
(Aristotle observes) either in a democracy or in a well-regulated
aristocracy. The marital connection now contracted by Dionysius with
a Lokrian female, Doris, the daughter of a citizen of distinction
named Xenetus, produced as an ultimate consequence the overthrow
of the oligarchy of Lokri.[1016] And even among the Lokrians,
the request was not granted without opposition. A citizen named
Aristeides (one of the companions of Plato), whose daughter Dionysius
had solicited in marriage, returned for answer that he would
rather see her dead than united to a despot. In revenge for this
bitter reply, Dionysius caused the sons of Aristeides to be put to
death.[1017]

  [1016] Aristot. Politic. v, 6, 7. Ἔτι διὰ τὸ πάσας τὰς
  ἀριστοκρατικὰς πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικὰς εἶναι, μᾶλλον πλεονεκτοῦσιν
  οἱ γνώριμοι· οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσίαι
  ἔρχονται, καὶ ἔξεστι ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν θέλωσι τοῖς γνωρίμοις μᾶλλον,
  καὶ κηδεύειν ὅτῳ θέλουσι. Διὸ καὶ ἡ Λοκρῶν πολιτεία ἀπώλετο ἐκ
  τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον κηδείας· ὃ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, οὐδ’
  ἂν ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ εὖ μεμιγμένῃ.

  [1017] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 6.

But the amicable relations which Dionysius was at so much pains to
establish with the Greek cities near the Strait of Messênê, were
destined chiefly to leave him free for preparations against Carthage;
which preparations he now commenced on a gigantic scale. Efforts so
great and varied, combined not merely with forecast but with all
the scientific appliances then available, have not hitherto come
before us throughout this history. The terrible effect with which
Hannibal had recently employed his battering-machines against Selinus
and Himera, stimulated Dionysius to provide himself with the like
implements in greater abundance than any Greek general had ever
before possessed. He collected at Syracuse, partly by constraint,
partly by allurement, all the best engineers, mechanists, armorers,
artisans, etc., whom Sicily or Italy could furnish. He set them
upon the construction of machines and other muniments of war, and
upon the manufacture of arms offensive as well as defensive, with
the greatest possible assiduity. The arms provided were of great
variety; not merely such as were suitable for Grecian soldiers, heavy
or light, but also such as were in use among the different barbaric
tribes around the Mediterranean, Gauls, Iberians, Tyrrhenians, etc.,
from whom Dionysius intended to hire mercenaries; so that every
different soldier would be furnished, on arriving, with the sort
of weapon which had become habitual to him. All Syracuse became a
bustling military workshop,—not only the market-places, porticos,
palæstræ, and large private houses, but also the fore-chambers and
back-chambers of the various temples. Dionysius distributed the
busy multitude into convenient divisions, each with some eminent
citizen as superintendent. Visiting them in person frequently, and
reviewing their progress, he recompensed largely, and invited to his
table, those who produced the greatest amount of finished work. As
he farther offered premiums for inventive skill, the competition of
ingenious mechanists originated several valuable warlike novelties;
especially the great projectile engine for stones and darts, called
Catapulta, which was now for the first time devised. We are told that
the shields fabricated during this season of assiduous preparation
were not less than one hundred and forty thousand in number, and
the breast-plates fourteen thousand, many of them unrivalled in
workmanship, destined for the body-guard and the officers. Helmets,
spears, daggers, etc., with other arms and weapons in indefinite
variety, were multiplied in corresponding proportion.[1018] The
magazines of arms, missiles, machines, and muniments of war in every
variety, accumulated in Ortygia, continued stupendous in amount
through the whole life of Dionysius, and even down to the downfall of
his son.[1019]

  [1018] Diodor. xiv, 42, 43.

  The historian Philistus had described with much minuteness these
  warlike preparations of Dionysius. Diodorus has probably abridged
  from him (Philisti Fragment. xxxiv, ed. Marx and ed. Didot.)

  [1019] Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 13.

If the preparations for land-warfare were thus stupendous, those
for sea-warfare were fully equal, if not superior. The docks of
Syracuse were filled with the best ship-builders, carpenters, and
artisans; numerous wood-cutters were sent to cut ship-timber on
the well-clothed <DW72>s of Ætna and the Calabrian Apennines; teams
of oxen were then provided to drag it to the coast, from whence it
was towed in rafts to Syracuse. The existing naval establishment
of Syracuse comprised one hundred and ten triremes; the existing
docks contained one hundred and fifty ship-houses, or covered slips
for the purpose either of building or housing a trireme. But this
was very inadequate to the conceptions of Dionysius, who forthwith
undertook the construction of one hundred and sixty new ship-houses,
each competent to hold two vessels,—and then commenced the building
of new ships of war to the number of two hundred; while he at the
same time put all the existing vessels and docks into the best
state of repair. Here too, as in the case of the catapulta, the
ingenuity of his architects enabled him to stand forth as a maritime
inventor. As yet, the largest ship of war which had ever moved on
the Grecian or Mediterranean waters, was the trireme, which was
rowed by three banks or tiers of oars. It was now three centuries
since the first trireme had been constructed at Corinth and Samos by
the inventive skill of the Corinthian Ameinokles:[1020] it was not
until the period succeeding the Persian invasion that even triremes
had become extensively employed; nor had any larger vessels ever
been thought of. The Athenians, who during the interval between the
Persian invasion and their great disaster at Syracuse had stood
preëminent and set the fashion in all nautical matters, were under no
inducement to build above the size of the trireme. As their style of
manœuvring consisted of rapid evolutions and changes in the ship’s
direction, for the purpose of striking the weak parts of an enemy’s
ship with the beak of their own,—so, if the size of their ship had
been increased, her capacity for such nimble turns and movements
would have been diminished. But the Syracusans had made no attempt to
copy the rapid evolutions of the Athenian navy. On the contrary, when
fighting against the latter in the confined harbor of Syracuse,[1021]
they had found every advantage in their massive build of ships, and
straightforward impact of bow driven against bow. For them, the
larger ships were the more suitable and efficient; so that Dionysius
or his naval architects, full of ambitious aspirations, now struck
out the plan of building ships of war with four or five banks of oars
instead of three; that is, quadriremes, or quinqueremes, instead of
triremes.[1022] Not only did the Syracusan despot thus equip a naval
force equal in number of ships to Athens in her best days; but he
also exhibited ships larger than Athens had ever possessed, or than
Greece had ever conceived.

  [1020] Thucyd. i, 13.

  [1021] Thucyd. vii, 36-62.

  [1022] Diodor. xiv, 42.

In all these offensive preparations against Carthage, as in the
previous defences on Epipolæ, the spontaneous impulse of the
Syracusans generally went hand in hand with Dionysius.[1023] Their
sympathy and concurrence greatly promoted the success of his efforts,
for this immense equipment against the common enemy. Even with all
this sympathy, indeed, we are at a loss to understand, nor are we at
all informed, how he found money to meet so prodigious an outlay.

  [1023] Diodor. xiv, 41. Συμπροθυμουμένων δὲ τῶν Συρακουσίων
  τῇ τοῦ Διονυσίου προαιρέσει, πολλὴν συνέβαινε γενέσθαι τὴν
  φιλοτιμίαν περὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων κατασκευήν.

After the material means for war had thus been completed,—an
operation which can hardly have occupied less than two or three
years,—it remained to levy men. On this point, the ideas of Dionysius
were not less aspiring. Besides his own numerous standing force,
he enlisted all the most effective among the Syracusan citizens,
as well as from the cities in his dependency. He sent friendly
addresses, and tried to acquire popularity, among the general body
of Greeks throughout the island. Of his large fleet, one-half was
manned with Syracusan rowers, marines, and officers; the other half
with seamen enlisted from abroad. He farther sent envoys both to
Italy and to Peloponnesus to obtain auxiliaries, with offers of the
most liberal pay. From Sparta, now at the height of her power, and
courting his alliance as a means of perpetuity to her own empire,
he received such warm encouragement, that he was enabled to enlist
no inconsiderable numbers in Peloponnesus; while many barbaric or
non-Hellenic soldiers from the western regions near the Mediterranean
were hired also.[1024] He at length succeeded, to his satisfaction,
in collecting an aggregate army, formidable not less from numbers and
bravery, than from elaborate and diversified equipment. His large and
well-stocked armory (already noticed) enabled him to furnish each
newly-arrived soldier, from all the different nations, with native
and appropriate weapons.[1025]

  [1024] Diodor. xiv, 43, 44, 45.

  [1025] Diodor. xiv, 41.

When all his preparations were thus complete, his last step was
to celebrate his nuptials, a few days previous to the active
commencement of the war. He married, at one and the same time, two
wives,—the Lokrian Doris (already mentioned), and a Syracusan woman
named Aristomachê, daughter of his partisan Hipparinus (and sister
of Dion, respecting whom much will occur hereafter). The first use
made of one among his newly-invented quinquereme vessels, was to sail
to Lokri, decked out in the richest ornaments of gold and silver,
for the purpose of conveying Doris in state to Ortygia. Aristomachê
was also brought to his house in a splendid chariot with four white
horses.[1026] He celebrated his nuptials with both of them in his
house on the same day; no one knew which bedchamber he visited first;
and both of them continued constantly to live with him at the same
table, with equal dignity, for many years. He had three children by
Doris, the eldest of whom was Dionysius the Younger; and four by
Aristomachê; but the latter was for a considerable time childless;
which greatly chagrined Dionysius. Ascribing her barrenness to
magical incantations, he put to death the mother of his other wife
Doris, as the alleged worker of these mischievous influences.[1027]
It was the rumor at Syracuse that Aristomachê was the most beloved
of the two. But Dionysius treated both of them well, and both of
them equally; moreover his son by Doris succeeded him, though he had
two sons by the other. His nuptials were celebrated with banquets
and festive recreations, wherein all the Syracusan citizens as well
as the soldiers partook. The scene was probably the more grateful
to Dionysius, as he seems at this moment, when every man’s mind was
full of vindictive impulse and expected victory against Carthage, to
have enjoyed a real short-lived popularity, and to have been able
to move freely among the people; without that fear of assassination
which habitually tormented his life even in his inmost privacy and
bedchamber—and that extremity of suspicion which did not except
either his wives or his daughters.[1028]

  [1026] Diodor. xiv, 44; xvi, 6.

  [1027] Plutarch, Dion. c. 3.

  [1028] Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v, 20, 57-63; Valer. Maxim. ix, 13;
  Diodor. xiv, 2.

After a few days devoted to such fellowship and festivity, Dionysius
convoked a public assembly, for the purpose of formally announcing
the intended war. He reminded the Syracusans that the Carthaginians
were common enemies to Greeks in general, but most of all to the
Sicilian Greeks—as recent events but too plainly testified. He
appealed to their generous sympathies on behalf of the five Hellenic
cities, in the southern part of the island, which had lately
undergone the miseries of capture by the generals of Carthage, and
were still groaning under her yoke. Nothing prevented Carthage
(he added) from attempting to extend her dominion over the rest
of the island, except the pestilence under which she had herself
been suffering in Africa. To the Syracusans this ought to be an
imperative stimulus for attacking her at once, and rescuing their
Hellenic brethren, before she had time to recover.[1029]

  [1029] Diodor. xiv, 45.

These motives were really popular and impressive. There was besides
another inducement, which weighed with Dionysius to hasten the war,
though he probably did not dwell upon it in his public address to the
Syracusans. He perceived that various Sicilian Greeks were migrating
voluntarily with their properties into the territory of Carthage;
whose dominion, though hateful and oppressive, was, at least while
untried, regarded by many with less terror than his dominion when
actually suffered. By commencing hostilities at once, he expected
not only to arrest such emigration, but to induce such Greeks as
were actually subjects of Carthage to throw off her yoke and join
him.[1030]

  [1030] Diodor. xiv, 41.

Loud acclamations from the Syracusan assembly hailed the proposition
for war with Carthage; a proposition, which only converted into
reality what had been long the familiar expectation of every man.
And the war was rendered still more popular by the permission,
which Dionysius granted forthwith, to plunder all the Carthaginian
residents and mercantile property either in Syracuse or in any of
his dependent cities. We are told that there were not only several
domiciliated Carthaginians at Syracuse, but also many loaded vessels
belonging to Carthage in the harbor, so that the plunder was
lucrative.[1031] But though such may have been the case in ordinary
times, it seems hardly credible, that under the actual circumstances,
any Carthaginian (person or property) can have been at Syracuse
except by accident; for war with Carthage had been long announced,
not merely in current talk, but in the more unequivocal language
of overwhelming preparation. Nor is it easy to understand how the
prudent Carthaginian Senate (who probably were not less provided with
spies at Syracuse than Dionysius was at Carthage)[1032] can have
been so uninformed as to be taken by surprise at the last moment,
when Dionysius sent thither a herald formally declaring war; which
herald was not sent until after the license for private plunder had
been previously granted. He peremptorily required the Carthaginians
to relinquish their dominion over the Greek cities in Sicily,[1033]
as the only means of avoiding war. To such a proposition no answer
was returned, nor probably expected. But the Carthaginians were
now so much prostrated (like Athens in the second or third years
of the Peloponnesian war) by depopulation, suffering, terrors, and
despondency, arising out of the pestilence which beset them in
Africa, that they felt incompetent to any serious effort, and heard
with alarm the letter read from Dionysius. There was, however,
no alternative, so that they forthwith despatched some of their
ablest citizens to levy troops for the defence of their Sicilian
possessions.[1034]

  [1031] Diodor. xiv, 46.

  There were also Greeks, and seemingly Greeks of some
  consideration, who resided at Carthage, and seemed to have
  continued resident there throughout the war between the
  Carthaginians and Dionysius (Diodor. xiv, 77). We should infer,
  from their continuing to reside there, that the Carthaginians did
  not retaliate upon them the plunder now authorized by Dionysius
  against their countrymen resident at Syracuse; and farther, it
  affords additional probability that the number of Carthaginians
  actually plundered at Syracuse was not considerable.

  For instances of intermarriage, and inter-residence, between
  Carthage and Syracuse, see Herodot. vii, 166; Livy, xxiv, 6.

  Phœnician coins have been found in Ortygia, bearing a Phœnician
  inscription signifying _The Island_,—which was the usual
  denomination of Ortygia (Movers, Die Phönizier, ii, 2, p. 327).

  [1032] Diodor. xiv, 55. Τοῦτο δ’ ἐμηχανήσατο (Ἰμίλκων) πρὸς τὸ
  μηδένα τῶν κατασκόπων ἀπαγγεῖλαι τὸν κατάπλουν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, etc.

  [1033] Diodor. xiv, 46, 47.

  [1034] Diodor. xiv, 47.

The first news that reached them was indeed appalling. Dionysius had
marched forth with his full power, Syracusan as well as foreign,
accumulated by so long a preparation. It was a power, the like of
which had never been beheld in Greece; greater even than that wielded
by his predecessor Gelon eighty years before. If the contemporaries
of Gelon had been struck with awe[1035] at the superiority of his
force to anything that Hellas could show elsewhere, as much or more
would the same sentiment be felt by those who surrounded Dionysius.
More intimately still was a similar comparison, with the mighty
victor of Himera, present to Dionysius himself. He exulted in setting
out with an army yet more imposing, against the same enemy, and for
the same purpose of liberating the maritime cities of Sicily subject
to Carthage;[1036] cities, whose number and importance had since
fearfully augmented.

  [1035] Herodot. vii, 145. Τὰ δὲ Γέλωνος πρήγματα μεγάλα ἐλέγετο
  εἶναι, οὐδαμῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τῶν οὐ πολλὸν μέζω. Compare c. 160-162.

  [1036] Herodot. vii, 158. Gelon’s speech to the Lacedæmonians who
  come to solicit his aid against Xerxes.

  Αὐτοὶ δὲ, ἐμεῦ πρότερον δεηθέντος βαρβαρικοῦ στρατοῦ
  συνεπάψασθαι, ὅτε μοι πρὸς Καρχηδονίους νεῖκος συνῆπτο ...
  ~ὑποτείνοντός τε τὰ ἐμπόρια συνελευθεροῦν~, etc.

These subject-cities, from Kamarina on one side of the island to
Selinus and Himera on the other, though there were a certain number
of Carthaginian residents established there, had no effective
standing force to occupy or defend them on the part of Carthage;
whose habit it was to levy large mercenary hosts for the special
occasion and then to disband them afterwards. Accordingly, as soon
as Dionysius with his powerful army passed the Syracusan border,
and entered upon his march westward along the southern coast of
the island, proclaiming himself as liberator—the most intense
anti-Carthaginian manifestations burst forth at once, at Kamarina,
Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera. These Greeks did not merely
copy the Syracusans in plundering the property of all Carthaginians
found among them, but also seized their persons, and put them to
death with every species of indignity and torture. A frightful
retaliation now took place for the cruelties recently committed by
the Carthaginian armies, in the sacking of Selinus, Agrigentum, and
the other conquered cities.[1037] The Hellenic war-practice, in
itself sufficiently rigorous, was aggravated into a merciless and
studied barbarity, analogous to that which had disfigured the late
proceedings of Carthage and her western mercenaries. These “Sicilian
vespers,” which burst out throughout all the south of Sicily against
the Carthaginian residents, surpassed even the memorable massacre
known under that name in the thirteenth century, wherein the Angevine
knights and soldiers were indeed assassinated, but not tortured.
Diodorus tells us that the Carthaginians learnt from the retaliation
thus suffered, a lesson of forbearance. It will not appear however,
from their future conduct, that the lesson was much laid to heart;
while it is unhappily certain, that such interchange of cruelties
with less humanized neighbors, contributed to lower in the Sicilian
Greeks that measure of comparative forbearance which characterized
the Hellenic race in its own home.

  [1037] Diodor. xiv, 46. Οὐ μόνον γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς οὐσίας διήρπασαν,
  ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὺς συλλαμβάνοντες, πᾶσαν αἰκίαν καὶ ὕβριν εἰς
  τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν ἀπετίθεντο, μνημονεύοντες ὧν αὐτοὶ κατὰ τὴν
  αἰχμαλωσίαν ἔπαθον. Ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δὲ τῆς κατὰ τῶν Φοινίκων
  τιμωρίας προέβησαν, καὶ τότε καὶ κατὰ τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον,
  ὥστε τοὺς Καρχηδονίους διδαχθῆναι μηκέτι παρανομεῖν εἰς τοὺς
  ὑποπεσόντας.

Elate with this fury of revenge, the citizens of Kamarina, Gela,
Agrigentum, and Selinus joined Dionysius on his march along the
coast. He was enabled, from his abundant stock of recently fabricated
arms, to furnish them with panoplies and weapons; for it is probable
that as subjects of Carthage they had been disarmed. Strengthened
by all these reinforcements, he mustered a force of eighty thousand
men, besides more than three thousand cavalry; while the ships of war
which accompanied him along the coast were nearly two hundred, and
the transports, with stores and battering machines, not less than
five hundred. With this prodigious army, the most powerful hitherto
assembled under Grecian command, he appeared before the Carthaginian
settlement of Motyê, a fortified seaport in a little bay immediately
north of Cape Lilybæum.[1038]

  [1038] Diodor. xiv, 47.

Of the three principal establishments of Carthage in Sicily,—Motyê,
Panormus (Palermo), and Soloeis,—Motyê was at once the nearest to the
mother-city,[1039] the most important, and the most devoted. It was
situated (like the original Syracuse in Ortygia) upon a little islet,
separated from Sicily by a narrow strait about two-thirds of a mile
in breadth, which its citizens had bridged over by means of a mole,
so as to form a regular, though narrow, footpath. It was populous,
wealthy, flourishing, and distinguished for the excellence both of
its private houses and its fortifications. Perceiving the approach of
Dionysius, and not intimidated by the surrender of their neighbors
and allies, the Elymi at Eryx, who did not dare to resist so powerful
a force,—the Motyênes put themselves in the best condition of
defence. They broke up their mole, and again insulated themselves
from Sicily, in the hope of holding out until relief should be
sent from Carthage. Resolved to avenge upon Motyê the sufferings
of Agrigentum and Selinus, Dionysius took a survey of the place in
conjunction with his principal engineers. It deserves notice, that
this is among the earliest sieges recorded in Grecian history wherein
we read of a professed engineer as being directly and deliberately
called on to advise the best mode of proceeding.[1040]

  [1039] Thucyd. vi, 2; Pausan. v, 25, 3.

  [1040] Diodor. xiv, 48. Διονύσιος δὲ μετὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτόνων
  κατασκεψάμενος τοὺς τόπους, etc.

  Artemon the engineer was consulted by Perikles at the siege of
  Samos (Plutarch, Perikles, c. 27).

Having formed his plans, he left his admiral Leptines with a portion
of the army to begin the necessary works, while he himself with
the remainder laid waste the neighboring territory dependent on or
allied with Carthage. The Sikani and others submitted to him; but
Ankyræ, Soloeis, Panormus, Egesta, and Entella, all held out, though
the citizens were confined to their walls, and obliged to witness,
without being able to prevent, the destruction of their lands.[1041]
Returning from this march, Dionysius pressed the siege of Motyê with
the utmost ardor, and with all the appliances which his engineers
could devise. Having moored his transports along the beach, and
hauled his ships of war ashore in the harbor, he undertook the
laborious task of filling up the strait (probably of no great depth)
which divided Motyê from the main island;[1042]—or at least as much
of the length of the strait as was sufficient to march across both
with soldiers and with battering engines, and to bring them up close
against the walls of the city. The numbers under his command enabled
him to achieve this enterprise, though not without a long period
of effort, during which the Carthaginians tried more than once to
interrupt his proceedings. Not having a fleet capable of contending
in pitched battle against the besiegers, the Carthaginian general
Imilkon tried two successive manœuvres. He first sent a squadron of
ten ships of war to sail suddenly into the harbor of Syracuse, in
hopes that the diversion thus operated would constrain Dionysius to
detach a portion of his fleet from Motyê. Though the attack, however,
was so far successful as to destroy many merchantmen in the harbor,
yet the assailants were beaten off without making any more serious
impression, or creating the diversion intended.[1043] Imilkon next
made an attempt to surprise the armed ships of Dionysius, as they
lay hauled ashore in the harbor near Motyê. Crossing over from
Carthage by night, with one hundred ships of war, to the Selinuntine
coast, he sailed round Cape Lilybæum, and appeared at daybreak off
Motyê. His appearance took every man by surprise. He destroyed or put
to flight the ships on guard, and sailed into the harbor prepared
for attack while as yet only a few of the Syracusan ships had been
got afloat. As the harbor was too confined to enable Dionysius to
profit by his great superiority in number and size of ships, a great
portion of his fleet would have been now destroyed, had it not been
saved by his numerous land force and artillery on the beach. Showers
of missiles, from this assembled crowd as well as from the decks of
the Syracusan ships, prevented Imilkon from advancing far enough to
attack with effect. The newly-invented engine called the catapulta,
of which the Carthaginians had as yet had no experience, was
especially effective; projecting large masses to a great distance,
it filled them with astonishment and dismay. While their progress
was thus arrested, Dionysius employed a new expedient to rescue his
fleet from the dilemma in which it had been caught. His numerous
soldiers were directed to haul the ships, not down to the harbor,
but landward, across a level tongue of land, more than two miles in
breadth, which separated the harbor of Motyê from the outer sea.
Wooden planks were laid so as to form a pathway for the ships; and
in spite of the great size of the newly-constructed quadriremes and
quinqueremes, the strength and ardor of the army sufficed for this
toilsome effort of transporting eighty ships across in one day. The
entire fleet, double in number to that of the Carthaginians, being at
length got afloat, Imilkon did not venture on a pitched battle, but
returned at once back to Africa.[1044]

  [1041] Diodor. xiv, 48, 49.

  [1042] Diodor. xiv, 49. ἐχώννυε τὸν μεταξὺ πόρον, καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς
  ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ λόγον ἅμα τῇ τοῦ χώματος αὐξήσει προσήγαγε τοῖς
  τείχεσι.

  [1043] Diodor. xiv, 50.

  [1044] Diodor. xiv, 50; Polyænus, v, 2, 6.

Though the citizens of Motyê saw from the walls the mournful
spectacle of their friends retiring, their courage was nowise
abated. They knew well that they had no mercy to expect; that the
general ferocity of the Carthaginians in their hour of victory,
and especially the cruel treatment of Greek captives even in Motyê
itself, would now be retaliated; and that their only chance lay in
a brave despair. The road across the strait having been at length
completed, Dionysius brought up his engines and began his assault.
While the catapulta with its missiles prevented defenders from
showing themselves on the battlements, battering-rams were driven
up to shake or overthrow the walls. At the same time large towers
on wheels were rolled up, with six different stories in them one
above the other, and in height equal to the houses. Against these
means of attack the besieged on their side elevated lofty masts
above the walls, with yards projecting outwards. Upon these yards
stood men protected from the missiles by a sort of breastwork,
and holding burning torches, pitch, and other combustibles, which
they cast down upon the machines of the assailants. Many machines
took fire in the woodwork, and it was not without difficulty that
the conflagration was extinguished. After a long and obstinate
resistance, however, the walls were at length overthrown or carried
by assault, and the besiegers rushed in, imagining the town to be in
their power. But the indefatigable energy of the besieged had already
put the houses behind into a state of defence, and barricaded the
streets, so that a fresh assault, more difficult than the first,
remained to be undertaken. The towers on wheels were rolled near,
but probably could not be pushed into immediate contact with the
houses in consequence of the ruins of the overthrown wall which
impeded their approach. Accordingly the assailants were compelled
to throw out wooden platforms or bridges from the towers to the
houses, and to march along these to the attack. But here they were
at great disadvantage, and suffered severe loss. The Motyenes,
resisting desperately, prevented them from setting firm foot on the
houses, slew many of them in hand-combat, and precipitated whole
companies to the ground, by severing or oversetting the platform.
For several days this desperate combat was renewed. Not a step was
gained by the besiegers, yet the unfortunate Motyenes became each
day more exhausted, while portions of the foremost houses were
also overthrown. Every evening Dionysius recalled his troops to
their night’s repose, renewing the assault next morning. Having
thus brought the enemy into an expectation that the night would be
undisturbed, he on one fatal night took them by surprise, sending the
Thurian Archylus with a chosen body of troops to attack the foremost
defences. This detachment, planting ladders and climbing up by means
of the half-demolished houses, established themselves firmly in a
position within the town before resistance could be organized. In
vain did the Motyenes, discovering the stratagem too late, endeavor
to dislodge them. The main force of Dionysius was speedily brought
up across the artificial earth-way to confirm their success, and the
town was thus carried, in spite of the most gallant resistance, which
continued even after it had become hopeless.[1045]

  [1045] Diodor. xiv, 51, 52, 53.

The victorious host who now poured into Motyê, incensed not merely
by the length and obstinacy of the defence, but also by antecedent
Carthaginian atrocities at Agrigentum and elsewhere, gave full
loose to the sanguinary impulses of retaliation. They butchered
indiscriminately men and women, the aged and the children, without
mercy to any one. The streets were thus strewed with the slain,
in spite of all efforts on the part of Dionysius, who desired
to preserve the captives that they might be sold as slaves, and
thus bring in a profitable return. But his orders to abstain from
slaughter were not obeyed, nor could he do anything more than invite
the sufferers by proclamation to take refuge in the temples; a step,
which most of them would probably resort to uninvited. Restrained
from farther slaughter by the sanctuary of the temples, the victors
now turned to pillage. Abundance of gold, silver, precious vestments,
and other marks of opulence, the accumulations of a long period of
active prosperity, fell into their hands; and Dionysius allowed to
them the full plunder of the town, as a recompense for the toils
of the siege. He farther distributed special recompenses to those
who had distinguished themselves; one hundred minæ being given to
Archylus, the leader of the successful night-surprise. All the
surviving Motyenes he sold into slavery; but he reserved for a more
cruel fate Daimenês and various other Greeks who had been taken among
them. These Greeks he caused to be crucified;[1046] a specimen of
the Phœnician penalties transferred by example to their Hellenic
neighbors and enemies.

  [1046] Diodor. xiv, 53.

The siege of Motyê having occupied nearly all the summer, Dionysius
now reconducted his army homeward. He left at the place a Sikel
garrison under the command of the Syracusan Biton, as well as a
large portion of his fleet, one hundred and twenty ships, under the
command of his brother Leptines; who was instructed to watch for
the arrival of any force from Carthage, and to employ himself in
besieging the neighboring towns of Egesta and Entella. The operations
against these two towns however had little success. The inhabitants
defended themselves bravely, and the Egestæans were even successful,
through a well-planned nocturnal sally, in burning the enemy’s camp,
with many horses, and stores of all kinds in the tents. Neither of
the two towns was yet reduced, when, in the ensuing spring, Dionysius
himself returned with his main force from Syracuse. He reduced the
inhabitants of Halikyæ to submission, but effected no other permanent
conquest, nor anything more than devastation of the neighboring
territory dependent upon Carthage.[1047]

  [1047] Diodor. xiv, 54.

  Leptines was brother of Dionysius (xiv, 102; xv, 7), though he
  afterwards married the daughter of Dionysius,—a marriage not
  condemned by Grecian sentiment.

Presently the face of the war was changed by the arrival of Imilkon
from Carthage. Having been elevated to the chief magistracy of the
city, he now brought with him an overwhelming force, collected as
well from the subjects in Africa as from Iberia and the Western
Mediterranean. It amounted, even in the low estimate of Timæus,
to one hundred thousand men, reinforced afterwards in Sicily
by thirty thousand more,—and in the more ample computations of
Ephorus, to three hundred thousand foot, four thousand horse, four
hundred chariots of war, four hundred ships of war, and six hundred
transports carrying stores and engines. Dionysius had his spies at
Carthage,[1048] even among men of rank and politicians, to apprise
him of all movements or public orders. But Imilkon, to obviate
knowledge of the precise point in Sicily where he intended to land,
gave to the pilots sealed instructions, to be opened only when
they were out at sea, indicating Panormus (Palermo) as the place
of rendezvous.[1049] The transports made directly for that port,
without nearing the land elsewhere; while Imilkon with the ships of
war approached the harbor of Motyê and sailed from thence along the
coast to Panormus. He probably entertained the hope of intercepting
some portion of the Syracusan fleet. But nothing of the kind was
found practicable; while Leptines on his side was even fortunate
enough to be able to attack, with thirty triremes, the foremost
vessels of the large transport-fleet on their voyage to Panormus. He
destroyed no less than fifty of them, with five thousand men, and
two hundred chariots of war; but the remaining fleet reached the
port in safety, and were there joined by Imilkon with the ships of
war. The land force being disembarked, the Carthaginian general led
them to Motyê, ordering his ships of war to accompany him along the
coast. In his way he regained Eryx, which was at heart Carthaginian,
having only been intimidated into submission to Dionysius during the
preceding year. He then attacked Motyê, which he retook, seemingly
after very little resistance. It had held out obstinately against
the Syracusans a few months before, while in the hands of its
own Carthaginian inhabitants, with their families and properties
around them; but the Sikel garrison had far less motive for stout
defence.[1050]

  [1048] Justin, xx, 5. One of these Carthaginians of rank, who,
  from political enmity to Hanno, wrote letters in Greek to
  communicate information to Dionysius, was detected and punished
  as a traitor. On this occasion, the Carthaginian senate is
  said to have enacted a law, forbidding all citizens to learn
  Greek,—either to write it or to speak it.

  [1049] Diodor. xiv, 54; Polyænus, v, 10, 1.

  [1050] Diodor. xiv, 55.

Thus was Dionysius deprived of the conquest which had cost him so
much blood and toil during the preceding summer. We are surprised
to learn that he made no effort to prevent its recapture, though he
was then not far off, besieging Egesta,—and though his soldiers,
elate with the successes of the preceding year were eager for a
general battle. But Dionysius, deeming this measure too adventurous,
resolved to retreat to Syracuse. His provisions were failing, and
he was at a great distance from allies, so that defeat would have
been ruinous. He therefore returned to Syracuse, carrying with him
some of the Sikanians, whom he persuaded to evacuate their abode in
the Carthaginian neighborhood, promising to provide them with better
homes elsewhere. Most of them, however, declined his offers; some
(among them, the Halikyæans) preferring to resume their alliance
with Carthage. Of the recent acquisitions nothing now remained to
Dionysius beyond the Selinuntine boundary; but Gela, Kamarina,
Agrigentum, and Selinus had been emancipated from Carthage, and
were still in a state of dependent alliance with him; a result
of moment,—yet seemingly very inadequate to the immense warlike
preparations whereby it had been attained. Whether he exercised a
wise discretion in declining to fight the Carthaginians, we have not
sufficient information to determine. But his army appear to have been
dissatisfied with it, and it was among the causes of the outbreak
against him shortly afterwards at Syracuse.[1051]

  [1051] Diodor. xiv, 55.

Thus left master of the country, Imilkon, instead of trying to
reconquer Selinus and Himera, which had probably been impoverished
by recent misfortunes,—resolved to turn his arms against Messênê in
the north-east of the island; a city as yet fresh and untouched,—so
little prepared for attack that its walls were not in good
repair,—and moreover at the present moment yet farther enfeebled
by the absence of its horsemen in the army of Dionysius.[1052]
Accordingly, he marched along the northern coast of Sicily, with his
fleet coasting in the same direction to coöperate with him. He made
terms with Kephalœdium and Therma, captured the island of Lipara, and
at length reached Cape Pelôrus, a few miles from Messênê. His rapid
march and unexpected arrival struck the Messenians with dismay. Many
of them, conceiving defence to be impossible against so numerous a
host, sent away their families and their valuable property to Rhegium
or elsewhere. On the whole, however, a spirit of greater confidence
prevailed, arising in part from an ancient prophecy preserved among
the traditions of the town, purporting that the Carthaginians should
one day carry water in Messênê. The interpreters affirmed that “to
carry water” meant, of course, “to be a slave,”—and the Messenians,
persuading themselves that this portended defeat to Imilkon, sent out
their chosen military force to meet him at Pelôrus, and oppose his
disembarkation. The Carthaginian commander, seeing these troops on
their march, ordered his fleet to sail forward into the harbor of the
city, and attack it from seaward during the absence of the defenders.
A north wind so favored the advance of the ships, that they entered
the harbor full sail, and found the city on that side almost
unguarded. The troops who had marched out towards Pelôrus hastened
back, but were too late;[1053] while Imilkon himself also, pushing
forward by land, forced his way into the town over the neglected
parts of the wall. Messênê was taken; and its unhappy population
fled in all directions for their lives. Some found refuge in the
neighboring cities; others ran to the hill-forts of the Messenian
territory, planted as a protection against the indigenous Sikels;
while about two hundred of them near the harbor, cast themselves into
the sea, and undertook the arduous task of swimming across to the
Italian coast, in which fifty of them succeeded.[1054]

  [1052] Diodor. xiv, 56, 57. τῶν ἰδίων ἱππέων ἐν Συρακούσαις
  ὄντων, etc. διὰ τῶν πεπτωκότων τειχῶν εἰσβιασάμενοι, etc. τὰ
  τείχη καταπεπτωκότα, etc.

  Compare another example of inattention to the state of their
  walls, on the part of the Messenians (xix, 65).

  [1053] Kleon and the Athenians took Torônê by a similar manœuvre
  (Thucyd. v, 2).

  [1054] Diodor. xiv, 57.

Though Imilkon tried in vain to carry by assault some of the
Messenian hill-forts, which were both strongly placed and gallantly
defended,—yet his capture of Messênê itself was an event both
imposing and profitable. It deprived Dionysius of an important ally,
and lessened his facilities for obtaining succor from Italy. But
most of all, it gratified the anti-Hellenic sentiment of the Punic
general and his army, counterbalancing the capture of Motyê in the
preceding year. Having taken scarce any captives, Imilkon had nothing
but unconscious stone and wood upon which to vent his antipathy. He
ordered the town, the walls, and all the buildings, to be utterly
burnt and demolished; a task which his numerous host are said to
have executed so effectually, that there remained hardly anything
but ruins, without a trace of human residence.[1055] He received
adhesion and reinforcements from most of the Sikels[1056] of the
interior, who had been forced to submit to Dionysius a year or two
before, but detested his dominion. To some of these Sikels, the
Syracusan despot had assigned the territory of the conquered Naxians,
with their city probably unwalled. But anxious as they were to escape
from him, many had migrated to a point somewhat north of Naxus,—to
the hill of Taurus, immediately over the sea, unfavorably celebrated
among the Sikel population as being the spot where the first Greek
colonists had touched on arriving in the island. Their migration was
encouraged, multiplied, and organized, under the auspices of Imilkon,
who prevailed upon them to construct, upon the strong eminence of
Taurus, a fortified post, which formed the beginning of the city
afterwards known as Tauromenium.[1057] Magon was sent with the
Carthaginian fleet to assist in the enterprise.

  [1055] Diodor. xiv, 58. Ἰμίλκων δὲ τῆς Μεσσήνης τὰ τείχη
  κατασκάψας, προσέταξε τοῖς στρατιώταις καταβαλεῖν τὰς οἰκίας
  εἰς ἔδαφος, καὶ μήτε κέραμον, μήθ’ ὕλην, μήτ’ ἄλλο μηδὲν
  ὑπολιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν κατακαῦσαι, τὰ δὲ συντρίψαι. Ταχὺ δὲ τῇ
  τῶν στρατιωτῶν πολυχειρίᾳ λαβόντων τῶν ἔργων συντέλειαν, ἡ πόλις
  ἄγνωστος ἦν, ὅπου πρότερον αὐτὴν οἰκεῖσθαι συνέβαινεν. Ὁρῶν γὰρ
  τὸν τόπον πόῤῥω μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν συμμαχίδων πόλεων κεχωρισμένον,
  εὐκαιρότατον δὲ τῶν περὶ Σικελίαν ὄντα, προῄρητο δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ
  τελέως ἀοίκητον διατηρεῖν, ἢ δυσχερῆ καὶ πολυχρόνιον τὴν κτίσιν
  αὐτῆς γίνεσθαι.

  Ἐναποδειξάμενος οὖν τὸ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας μῖσος ἐν τῇ τῶν
  Μεσσηνίων ἀτυχίᾳ, etc.

  It would appear, however, that the demolition of Messênê can
  hardly have been carried so far in fact as Imilkon intended;
  since the city reappears shortly afterwards in renewed dignity.

  [1056] Diodor. xiv, 59-76.

  [1057] Diodor. xiv, 59.

Meanwhile Dionysius, greatly disquieted at the capture of Messênê,
exerted himself to put Syracuse in an effective position of defence
on her northern frontier. Naxus and Katana being both unfortified, he
was forced to abandon them, and he induced the Campanians whom he had
planted in Katana to change their quarters to the strong town called
Ætna, on the skirt of the mountain so named. He made Leontini his
chief position; strengthening as much as possible the fortifications
of the city as well as those of the neighboring country forts,
wherein he accumulated magazines of provisions from the fertile
plains around. He had still a force of thirty thousand foot and more
than three thousand horse; he had also a fleet of one hundred and
eighty ships of war,—triremes and others. During the year preceding,
he had brought out both a land force and a naval force much superior
to this, even for purposes of aggression; how it happened that he
could now command no more, even for defence and at home,—or what had
become of the difference,—we are not told. Of the one hundred and
eighty ships of war, sixty only were manned by the extraordinary
proceeding of liberating slaves. Such sudden and serious changes
in the amount of military force from year to year, are perceptible
among Carthaginians as well as Greeks,—indeed throughout most part
of Grecian history;—the armies being got together chiefly for
special occasions, and then dismissed. Dionysius farther despatched
envoys to Sparta, soliciting a reinforcement of a thousand mercenary
auxiliaries. Having thus provided the best defence that he could
through the territory, he advanced forward with his main land-force
to Katana, having his fleet also moving in coöperation, immediately
off shore.

Towards this same point of Katana the Carthaginians were now moving,
in their march against Syracuse. Magon was directed to coast along
with the fleet from Taurus (Tauromenium) to Katana, while Imilkon
intended himself to march with the land force on shore, keeping
constantly near the fleet for the purpose of mutual support. But
his scheme was defeated by a remarkable accident. A sudden eruption
took place from Ætna; so that the stream of lava from the mountain
to the sea forbade all possibility of marching along the shore to
Katana, and constrained him to make a considerable circuit with
his army on the land-side of the mountain. Though he accelerated
his march as much as possible, yet for two days or more he was
unavoidably cut off from the fleet; which under the command of Magon
was sailing southward towards Katana. Dionysius availed himself of
this circumstance to advance beyond Katana along the beach stretching
northward, to meet Magon in his approach, and attack him separately.
The Carthaginian fleet was much superior in number, consisting of
five hundred sail in all; a portion of which, however, were not
strictly ships of war, but armed merchantmen,—that is, furnished
with brazen bows for impact against an enemy, and rowed with oars.
But on the other hand, Dionysius had a land-force close at hand
to coöperate with his fleet; an advantage which in ancient naval
warfare counted for much, serving in case of defeat as a refuge to
the ships, and in case of victory as intercepting or abridging the
enemy’s means of escape. Magon, alarmed when he came in sight of
the Grecian land-force mustered on the beach, and the Grecian fleet
rowing up to attack him,—was nevertheless constrained unwillingly
to accept the battle. Leptines, the Syracusan admiral,—though
ordered by Dionysius to concentrate his ships as much as possible,
in consequence of his inferior numbers,—attacked with boldness, and
even with temerity; advancing himself with thirty ships greatly
before the rest, and being apparently farther out to sea than the
enemy. His bravery at first appeared successful, destroying or
damaging the headmost ships of the enemy. But their superior numbers
presently closed around him, and after a desperate combat, fought
in the closest manner, ship to ship and hand to hand, he was forced
to sheer off, and to seek escape seaward. His main fleet, coming
up in disorder, and witnessing his defeat, were beaten also, after
a strenuous contest. All of them fled, either landward or seaward
as they could, under vigorous pursuit by the Carthaginian vessels;
and in the end, no less than a hundred of the Syracusan ships, with
twenty thousand men, were numbered as taken, or destroyed. Many of
the crews, swimming or floating in the water on spars, strove to get
to land to the protection of their comrades. But the Carthaginian
small craft, sailing very near to the shore, slew or drowned these
unfortunate men, even under the eyes of friends ashore who could
render no assistance. The neighboring water became strewed, both
with dead bodies and with fragments of broken ships. As victors, the
Carthaginians were enabled to save many of their own seamen, either
on board of damaged ships, or swimming for their lives. Yet their own
loss too was severe; and their victory, complete as it proved, was
dearly purchased.

Though the land-force of Dionysius had not been at all engaged,
yet the awful defeat of his fleet induced him to give immediate
orders for retreating, first to Katana and afterwards yet farther to
Syracuse. As soon as the Syracusan army had evacuated the adjoining
shore, Magon towed all his prizes to land, and there hauled them up
on the beach; partly for repair, wherever practicable,—partly as
visible proofs of the magnitude of the triumph, for encouragement to
his own armament. Stormy weather just then supervening, he was forced
to haul his own ships ashore also for safety, and remained there for
several days refreshing the crews. To keep the sea under such weather
would have been scarcely practicable; so that if Dionysius, instead
of retreating, had continued to occupy the shore with his unimpaired
land-force, it appears that the Carthaginian ships would have been
in the greatest danger; constrained either to face the storm, to run
back a considerable distance northward, or to make good their landing
against a formidable enemy, without being able to wait for the
arrival of Imilkon.[1058] The latter, after no very long interval,
came up, so that the land-force and the navy of the Carthaginians
were now again in coöperation. While allowing his troops some
days of repose and enjoyment of the victory, he sent envoys to the
town of Ætna, inviting the Campanian mercenary soldiers to break
with Dionysius and join him. Reminding them that their countrymen
at Entella were living in satisfaction as a dependency of Carthage
(which they had recently testified by resisting the Syracusan
invasion), he promised to them an accession of territory, and a share
in the spoils of the war, to be wrested from Greeks who were enemies
of Campanians not less than of Carthaginians.[1059] The Campanians of
Ætna would gladly have complied with his invitation, and were only
restrained from joining him by the circumstance that they had given
hostages to the despot of Syracuse, in whose army also their best
soldiers were now serving.

  [1058] Diodor. xiv, 60, 61. Compare the speech of Theodôrus at
  Syracuse afterwards (c. 68), from which we gather a more complete
  idea of what passed after the battle.

  [1059] Diodor. xiv, 61. Καὶ καθόλου δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος
  ἀπεδείκνυε πολέμιον ὕπαρχον τῶν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν.

  These manifestations of anti-Hellenic sentiment, among the
  various neighbors of the Sicilian Greeks, are important to
  notice, though they are not often brought before us.

Meanwhile Dionysius, in marching back to Syracuse, found his army
grievously discontented. Withdrawn from the scene of action without
even using their arms, they looked forward to nothing better than a
blockade at Syracuse, full of hardship and privation. Accordingly
many of them protested against retreat, conjuring him to lead them
again to the scene of action, that they might either assail the
Carthaginian fleet in the confusion of landing, or join battle
with the advancing land-force under Imilkon. At first, Dionysius
consented to such change of scheme. But he was presently reminded
that unless he hastened back to Syracuse, Magon with the victorious
fleet might sail thither, enter the harbor, and possess himself of
the city; in the same manner as Imilkon had recently succeeded at
Messênê. Under these apprehensions he renewed his original order for
retreat, in spite of the vehement protest of his Sicilian allies;
who were indeed so incensed that most of them quitted him at once.
Which of the two was the wiser plan, we have no sufficient means
to determine. But the circumstances seem not to have been the same
as those preceding the capture of Messênê; for Magon was not in a
condition to move forward at once with the fleet, partly from his
loss in the recent action, partly from the stormy weather; and
might perhaps have been intercepted in the very act of landing,
if Dionysius had moved rapidly back to the shore. As far as we can
judge, it would appear that the complaints of the army against the
hasty retreat of Dionysius rested on highly plausible grounds. He
nevertheless persisted, and reached Syracuse with his army not only
much discouraged, but greatly diminished by the desertion of allies.
He lost no time in sending forth envoys to the Italian Greeks and
to Peloponnesus, with ample funds for engaging soldiers, and urgent
supplications to Sparta as well as to Corinth.[1060] Polyxenus, his
brother-in-law, employed on this mission, discharged his duty with
such diligence, that he came back in a comparatively short space
of time, with thirty-two ships of war under the command of the
Lacedæmonian Pharakidas.[1061]

  [1060] Diodor. xiv, 61.

  [1061] Diodor. xiv, 63.

  Polyænus (v, 8, 2) recounts a manœuvre of _Leptines_, practised
  in bringing back a Lacedæmonian reinforcement from Sparta to
  Sicily on his voyage along the Tarentine coast. Perhaps this may
  be the Lacedæmonian division intended.

Meanwhile Imilkon, having sufficiently refreshed his troops after
the naval victory off Katana, moved forward towards Syracuse both
with the fleet and the land-force. The entry of his fleet into the
Great Harbor was ostentatious and imposing; far above even that of
the second Athenian armament, when Demosthenes first exhibited its
brilliant but short-lived force.[1062] Two hundred and eight ships
of war first rowed in, marshalled in the best order, and adorned
with the spoils of the captured Syracusan ships. These were followed
by transports, five hundred of them carrying soldiers, and one
thousand others either empty or bringing stores and machines. The
total number of vessels, we are told, reached almost two thousand,
covering a large portion of the Great Harbor.[1063] The numerous
land-force marched up about the same time; Imilkon establishing his
head quarters in the temple of Zeus Olympius, nearly one English mile
and a half from the city. He presently drew up his forces in order
of battle, and advanced nearly to the city walls; while his ships of
war also, being divided into two fleets of one hundred ships each,
showed themselves in face of the two interior harbors or docks (on
each side of the connecting strait between Ortygia and the main land)
wherein the Syracusan ships were safely lodged. He thus challenged
the Syracusans to combat on both elements; but neither challenge was
accepted.

  [1062] Thucyd. vii, 42; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 21; Diodor. xiii, 11.

  [1063] Diodor. xiv, 62.

  The text of Diodorus is here so perplexed as to require
  conjectural alteration, which Rhodomannus has supplied; yet not
  so as to remove all that is obscure. The word εἰσθεόμεναι still
  remains to be explained or corrected.

Having by such defiance farther raised the confidence of his own
troops, he first spread them over the Syracusan territory, and
allowed them for thirty days to enrich themselves by unlimited
plunder. Next, he proceeded to establish fortified posts, as
essential to the prosecution of a blockade which he foresaw would
be tedious. Besides fortifying the temple of the Olympian Zeus, he
constructed two other forts; one at Cape Plemmyrium (on the southern
entrance of the harbor, immediately opposite to Ortygia, where
Nikias had erected a post also), the other on the Great Harbor,
midway between Plemmyrium and the temple of the Olympian Zeus, at
the little bay called Daskon. He farther encircled his whole camp,
near the last-mentioned temple, with a wall; the materials of which
were derived in part from the demolition of the numerous tombs
around; especially one tomb, spacious and magnificent, commemorating
Gelon and his wife Damaretê. In these various fortified posts he was
able to store up the bread, wine, and other provisions which his
transports were employed in procuring from Africa and Sardinia, for
the continuous subsistence of so mighty an host.

It would appear as if Imilkon had first hoped to take the city by
assault; for he pushed up his army as far as the very walls of
Achradina (the outer city). He even occupied the open suburb of that
city, afterwards separately fortified under the name of Neapolis,
wherein were situated the temples of Demeter and Persephonê, which he
stripped of their rich treasures.[1064] But if such was his plan,
he soon abandoned it, and confined himself to the slower process
of reducing the city by famine. His progress in this enterprise,
however, was by no means encouraging. We must recollect that he was
not, like Nikias, master of the centre of Epipolæ; able from thence
to stretch his right arm southward to the Great Harbor, and his left
arm northward to the sea at Trogilus. As far as we are able to make
out, he never ascended the southern cliff, nor got upon the <DW72> of
Epipolæ; though it seems that at this time there was no line of wall
along the southern cliff, as Dionysius had recently built along the
northern. The position of Imilkon was confined to the Great Harbor
and to the low lands adjoining, southward of the cliff of Epipolæ;
so that the communications of Syracuse with the country around
remained partially open on two sides,—westward, through the Euryalus
at the upper extremity of Epipolæ,—and northward towards Thapsus
and Megara, through the Hexapylon, or the principal gate in the new
fortification constructed by Dionysius along the northern cliff of
Epipolæ. The full value was now felt of that recent fortification,
which, protecting Syracuse both to the north and west, and guarding
the precious position of Euryalus, materially impeded the operations
of Imilkon. The city was thus open, partially at least, on two
sides, to receive supplies by land. And even by sea means were
found to introduce provisions. Though Imilkon had a fleet so much
stronger that the Syracusans did not dare to offer pitched battle,
yet he found it difficult to keep such constant watch as to exclude
their store-ships, and ensure the arrival of his own. Dionysius and
Leptines went forth themselves from the harbor with armed squadrons
to accelerate and protect the approach of their supplies; while
several desultory encounters took place, both of land-force and of
shipping, which proved advantageous to the Syracusans, and greatly
raised their spirits.

  [1064] Diodor. xiv, 63. Κατελάβετο δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς
  προάστειον, καὶ τοὺς νέως τῆς τε Δήμητρος καὶ Κόρης ἐσύλησεν.

  Cicero (in Verrem, iv, 52, 53) distinctly mentions the temples
  of Demeter and Persephonê, and the statue of Apollo Temenites,
  among the characteristic features of Neapolis; which proves the
  identity of Neapolis with what Diodorus calls the suburb of
  Achradina. This identity, recognized by Serra di Falco, Colonel
  Leake, and other authors, is disputed by Saverio Cavallari, on
  grounds which do not appear to me sufficient.

  See Colonel Leake, notes on Syracuse, pp. 7-10; Cavallari, Zur
  Topographie von Syrakus, p. 20.

One naval conflict especially, which occurred while Dionysius was
absent on his cruise, was of serious moment. A corn-ship belonging to
Imilkon’s fleet being seen entering the Great Harbor, the Syracusans
suddenly manned five ships of war, mastered it, and hauled it into
their own dock. To prevent such capture, the Carthaginians from
their station sent out forty ships of war; upon which the Syracusans
equipped their whole naval force, bore down upon the forty with
numbers decidedly superior, and completely defeated them. They
captured the admiral’s ship, damaged twenty-four others, and pursued
the rest to the naval station; in front of which they paraded,
challenging the enemy to battle. As the challenge was not accepted,
they returned to their own dock, towing in their prizes in triumph.

This naval victory indicated, and contributed much to occasion, that
turn in the fortune of the siege which each future day still farther
accelerated. Its immediate effect was to fill the Syracusan public
with unbounded exultation. “Without Dionysius we conquer our enemies;
under his command we are beaten; why submit to slavery under him any
longer?” Such was the burst of indignant sentiment which largely
pervaded the groups and circles in the city; strengthened by the
consciousness that they were now all armed and competent to extort
freedom,—since Dionysius, when the besieging enemy actually appeared
before the city, had been obliged, as the less of two hazards, to
produce and redistribute the arms which he had previously taken from
them. In the midst of this discontent, Dionysius himself returned
from his cruise. To soothe the prevalent temper, he was forced to
convene a public assembly; wherein he warmly extolled the recent
exploit of the Syracusans, and exhorted them to strenuous confidence,
promising that he would speedily bring the war to a close.

It is possible that Dionysius, throughout his despotism, may have
occasionally permitted what were called public assemblies; but we
may be very sure, that, if ever convened, they were mere matters of
form, and that no free discussion or opposition to his will was ever
tolerated. On the present occasion, he anticipated the like passive
acquiescence; and after having delivered a speech, doubtless much
applauded by his own partisans, he was about to dismiss the assembly,
when a citizen named Theodôrus unexpectedly rose. He was a Horseman
or Knight,—a person of wealth and station in the city, of high
character and established reputation for courage. Gathering boldness
from the time and circumstances, he now stood forward to proclaim
publicly that hatred of Dionysius, and anxiety for freedom, which so
many of his fellow-citizens around had been heard to utter privately
and were well known to feel.[1065]

  [1065] Diodor. xiv, 64. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τοιούτων λόγων γινομένων,
  Διονύσιος κατέπλευσε, καὶ συναγαγὼν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπῄνει τοὺς
  Συρακοσίους, καὶ παρεκάλει θαῤῥεῖν, ἐπαγγελλόμενος ταχέως
  καταλύσειν τὸν πόλεμον. Ἤδη δ’ αὐτοῦ μέλλοντος διαλύειν τὴν
  ἐκκλησίαν, ἀναστὰς Θεόδωρος ὁ Συρακούσιος, ἐν τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν
  εὐδοκιμῶν καὶ δοκῶν εἶναι πρακτικὸς, ἀπετόλμησε περὶ τῆς
  ἐλευθερίας τοιούτοις χρήσασθαι λόγοις.

Diodorus in his history gives us a long harangue (whether composed
by himself, or copied from others, we cannot tell) as pronounced by
Theodôrus. The main topics of it are such as we should naturally
expect, and are probably, on the whole, genuine. It is a full review,
and an emphatic denunciation, of the past conduct of Dionysius,
concluding with an appeal to the Syracusans to emancipate themselves
from his dominion. “Dionysius (the speaker contends, in substance) is
a worse enemy than the Carthaginians: who, if victorious, would be
satisfied with a regular tribute, leaving us to enjoy our properties
and our paternal polity. Dionysius has robbed us of both. He has
pillaged our temples of their sacred deposits. He has slain or
banished our wealthy citizens, and then seized their properties by
wholesale, to be transferred to his own satellites. He has given
the wives of these exiles in marriage to his barbarian soldiers. He
has liberated our slaves, and taken them into his pay, in order to
keep their masters in slavery. He has garrisoned our own citadel
against us, by means of these slaves, together with a host of other
mercenaries. He has put to death every citizen who ventured to raise
his voice in defence of the laws and constitution. He has abused
our confidence,—once, unfortunately, carried so far as to nominate
him general,—by employing his powers to subvert our freedom, and
rule us according to his own selfish rapacity in place of justice.
He has farther stripped us of our arms; these, recent necessity has
compelled him to restore,—and these, if we are men, we shall now
employ for the recovery of our own freedom.”[1066]

  [1066] Diodor. xiv, 65. Οὗτος δὲ, τὰ μὲν ἱερὰ συλήσας, τοὺς δὲ
  τῶν ἰδιωτῶν πλούτους ἅμα ταῖς τῶν κεκτημένων ψυχαῖς ἀφελόμενος,
  τοὺς οἰκέτας μισθοδοτεῖ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν δεσποτῶν δουλείας....

  c. 66. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρόπολις, δούλων ὅπλοις τηρουμένη, κατὰ τῆς
  πόλεως ἐπιτετείχισται· τὸ δὲ τῶν μισθοφόρων πλῆθος ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ
  τῶν Συρακοσίων ἤθροισται. Καὶ κρατεῖ τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἐπίσης
  βραβεύων τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ μόναρχος πλεονεξίᾳ κρίνων πράττειν
  πάντα. Καὶ νῦν μὲν οἱ πολέμιοι βραχὺ μέρος ἔχουσι τῆς χώρας·
  Διονύσιος δὲ, πᾶσαν ποιήσας ἀνάστατον, τοῖς τὴν τυραννίδα
  συναύξουσιν ἐδωρήσατο....

  ... Καὶ πρὸς μὲν Καρχηδονίους δύο μάχας ἐνστησάμενος ἐν ἑκατέραις
  ἥττηται· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς πολίταις πιστευθεὶς ἅπαξ στρατηγίαν, εὐθέως
  ἀφείλετο τὴν ἐλευθερίαν· φονεύων μὲν τοὺς παῤῥησίαν ἄγοντας ὑπὲρ
  τῶν νόμων, φυγαδεύων δὲ τοὺς ταῖς οὐσίαις προέχοντας· καὶ τὰς μὲν
  τῶν φυγάδων γυναῖκας οἰκέταις καὶ μιγάσιν ἀνθρώποις συνοικίζων,
  τῶν δὲ πολιτικῶν ὅπλων βαρβάρους καὶ ξένους ποιῶν κυρίους....

  c. 67. Οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθα τὸν πολέμιον ἔχοντες ἡγεμόνα, τὸν τὰ κατὰ
  τὴν πόλιν ἱερὰ σεσυληκότα;

  c. 69. Διόπερ ἕτερον ἡγεμόνα ζητητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὸν σεσυληκότα
  τοὺς τῶν θεῶν ναοὺς στρατηγὸν ἔχοντες ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ θεομαχῶμεν....

“If the conduct of Dionysius towards Syracuse has been thus infamous,
it has been no better towards the Sicilian Greeks generally.
He betrayed Gela and Kamarina, for his own purposes, to the
Carthaginians. He suffered Messênê to fall into their hands without
the least help. He reduced to slavery, by gross treachery, our
Grecian brethren and neighbors of Naxus and Katana; transferring the
latter to the non-Hellenic Campanians, and destroying the former.
He might have attacked the Carthaginians immediately after their
landing from Africa at Panormus, before they had recovered from the
fatigue of the voyage. He might have fought the recent naval combat
near the port of Katana, instead of near the beach north of that
town; so as to ensure to our fleet, if worsted, an easy and sure
retreat. Had he chosen to keep his land-force on the spot, he might
have prevented the victorious Carthaginian fleet from approaching
land, when the storm came on shortly after the battle; or he might
have attacked them, if they tried to land, at the greatest advantage.
He has conducted the war, altogether, with disgraceful incompetence;
not wishing sincerely, indeed, to get rid of them as enemies, but
preserving the terrors of Carthage, as an indirect engine to keep
Syracuse in subjection to himself. As long as we fought with him,
we have been constantly unsuccessful; now that we have come to
fight without him, recent experience tells us that we can beat the
Carthaginians, even with inferior numbers.

“Let us look out for another leader (concluded Theodôrus), in place
of a sacrilegious temple-robber whom the gods have now abandoned. If
Dionysius will consent to relinquish his dominion, let him retire
from the city with his property unmolested; if he will not, we are
here all assembled, we are possessed of our arms, and we have both
Italian and Peloponnesian allies by our side. The assembly will
determine whether it will choose leaders from our own citizens,—or
from our metropolis Corinth,—or from the Spartans, the presidents of
all Greece.”

Such are the main points of the long harangue ascribed to Theodôrus;
the first occasion, for many years, on which the voice of free speech
had been heard publicly in Syracuse. Among the charges advanced
against Dionysius, which go to impeach his manner of carrying on
the war against the Carthaginians, there are several which we can
neither admit nor reject, from our insufficient knowledge of the
facts. But the enormities ascribed to him in his dealing with the
Syracusans,—the fraud, violence, spoliation, and bloodshed, whereby
he had first acquired, and afterwards upheld, his dominion over
them,—these are assertions of matters of fact, which coincide in the
main with the previous narrative of Diodorus, and which we have no
ground for contesting.

Hailed by the assembly with great sympathy and acclamation, this
harangue seriously alarmed Dionysius. In his concluding words,
Theodôrus had invoked the protection of Corinth as well as of Sparta,
against the despot, whom with such signal courage he had thus
ventured publicly to arraign. Corinthians as well as Spartans were
now lending aid in the defence, under the command of Pharakidas.
That Spartan officer came forward to speak next after Theodôrus.
Among various other sentiments of traditional respect towards
Sparta, there still prevailed a remnant of the belief that she was
adverse to despots; as she really had once been, at an earlier
period of her history.[1067] Hence the Syracusans hoped, and even
expected, that Pharakidas would second the protest of Theodôrus, and
stand forward as champion of freedom to the first Grecian city in
Sicily.[1068] Bitterly indeed were they disappointed. Dionysius had
established with Pharakidas relations as friendly as those of the
Thirty tyrants at Athens with Kallibius the Lacedæmonian harmost in
the acropolis.[1069] Accordingly Pharakidas in his speech not only
discountenanced the proposition just made, but declared himself
emphatically in favor of the despot; intimating that he had been sent
to aid the Syracusans and Dionysius against the Carthaginians,—not
to put down the dominion of Dionysius. To the Syracusans this
declaration was a denial of all hope. They saw plainly that in
any attempt to emancipate themselves, they would have against
them not merely the mercenaries of Dionysius, but also the whole
force of Sparta, then imperial and omnipotent; represented on the
present occasion by Pharakidas, as it had been in a previous year
by Aristus. They were condemned to bear their chains in silence,
not without unavailing curses against Sparta. Meanwhile Dionysius,
thus powerfully sustained, was enabled to ride over the perilous
and critical juncture. His mercenaries crowded in haste around his
person,—having probably been sent for, as soon as the voice of a
free spokesman was heard.[1070] And he was thus enabled to dismiss
an assembly, which had seemed for one short instant to threaten the
perpetuity of his dominion, and to promise emancipation for Syracuse.

  [1067] Thucyd. i, 18; Herodot. v, 92.

  [1068] Diodor. xiv, 70. Τοιούτοις τοῦ Θεοδώρου χρησαμένου λόγοις,
  οἱ μὲν Συρακούσιοι μετέωροι ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγένοντο, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς
  συμμάχους ἀπέβλεπον. Φαρακίδου δὲ τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίου ναυαρχοῦντος
  τῶν συμμάχων, καὶ παρελθόντος ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα, πάντες προσεδόκων
  ἀρχηγὸν ἔσεσθαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας.

  [1069] Diodor. xiv, 70. Ὁ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸν τύραννον ἔχων οἰκείως,
  etc.; compare Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 14.

  [1070] Diodor. xiv, 70. Παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσδοκίαν γενομένης τῆς
  ἀποφάσεως, οἱ μὲν μισθόφοροι συνέδραμον πρὸς τὸν Διονύσιον,
  οἱ δὲ Συρακούσιοι καταπλαγέντες τὴν ἡσυχίαν, εἶχον, πολλὰ
  τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις καταρώμενοι. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ πρότερον Ἀρέτης ὁ
  Λακεδαιμόνιος (he is called previously _Aristus_, xiv, 10),
  ἀντιλαμβανομένων αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθερίας, ἐγένετο προδότης· καὶ τότε
  Φαρακίδας ἐνέστη ταῖς ὁρμαῖς τῶν Συρακουσίων.

During this interesting and momentous scene, the fate of Syracuse
had hung upon the decision of Pharakidas: for Theodôrus, well aware
that with a besieging enemy before the gates, the city could not be
left without a supreme authority, had conjured the Spartan commander,
with his Lacedæmonian and Corinthian allies, to take into his own
hands the control and organization of the popular force. There can
be little doubt that Pharakidas could have done this, if he had been
so disposed, so as at once to make head against the Carthaginians
without, and to restrain, if not to put down, the despotism within.
Instead of undertaking the tutelary intervention solicited by the
people, he threw himself into the opposite scale, and strengthened
Dionysius more than ever, at the moment of his greatest peril.
The proceeding of Pharakidas was doubtless conformable to his
instructions from home, as well as to the oppressive and crushing
policy which Sparta, in these days of her unresisted empire (between
the victory of Ægospotami and the defeat of Knidus), pursued
throughout the Grecian world.

Dionysius was fully sensible of the danger which he had thus been
assisted to escape. Under the first impressions of alarm, he strove
to gain something like popularity; by a conciliatory language and
demeanor, by presents adroitly distributed, and by invitations to
his table. Whatever may have been the success of such artifices, the
lucky turn, which the siege was now taking, was the most powerful of
all aids for building up his full power anew.

It was not the arms of the Syracusans, but the wrath of Demeter and
Persephonê, whose temple (in the suburb of Achradina) Imilkon had
pillaged, that ruined the besieging army before Syracuse. So the
piety of the citizens interpreted that terrific pestilence which
now began to rage among the multitude of their enemies without. The
divine wrath was indeed seconded (as the historian informs us[1071])
by physical causes of no ordinary severity. The vast numbers of
the host were closely packed together; it was now the beginning
of autumn, the most unhealthy period of the year; moreover this
summer had been preternaturally hot, and the low marshy ground
near the Great Harbor, under the chill of morning contrasted with
the burning sun of noon, was the constant source of fever and
pestilence. These unseen and irresistible enemies fell with appalling
force upon the troops of Imilkon; especially upon the Libyans, or
native Africans, who were found the most susceptible. The intense
and varied bodily sufferings of this distemper,—the rapidity with
which it spread from man to man,—and the countless victims which it
speedily accumulated,—appear to have equalled, if not surpassed,
the worst days of the pestilence of Athens in 429 B.C. Care and
attendance upon the sick, or even interment of the dead, became
impracticable; so that the whole camp presented a scene of deplorable
agony, aggravated by the horrors and stench of one hundred and
fifty thousand unburied bodies.[1072] The military strength of the
Carthaginians was completely prostrated by such a visitation. Far
from being able to make progress in the siege, they were not even
able to defend themselves against moderate energy on the part of the
Syracusans; who (like the Peloponnesians during the great plague of
Athens) were themselves untouched by the distemper.[1073]

  [1071] Diodor. xiv, 70. Συνεπελάβετο δὲ καὶ τῇ τοῦ δαιμονίου
  συμφορᾷ τὸ μυριάδας εἰς ταὐτὸ συναθροισθῆναι, καὶ τὸ τῆς ὥρας
  εἶναι πρὸς τὰς νόσους ἐνεργότατον, etc.

  [1072] Diodor. xiv, 71-76. πεντεκαίδεκα μυριάδας ἐπεῖδον ἀτάφους
  διὰ τὸν λοιμὸν σεσωρευμένους.

  I give the figure as I find it, without pretending to trust it as
  anything more than an indication of a great number.

  [1073] Thucyd. ii, 54.

  When the Roman general Marcellus was besieging Syracuse in 212
  B.C., a terrific pestilence, generated by causes similar to
  that of this year, broke out. All parties, Romans, Syracusans,
  and Carthaginians, suffered from it considerably; but the
  Carthaginians worst of all; they are said to have all perished
  (Livy, xxv, 26).

Such was the wretched spectacle of the Carthaginian army, clearly
visible from the walls of Syracuse. To overthrow it by a vigorous
attack, was an enterprise not difficult; indeed, so sure, in the
opinion of Dionysius, that in organizing his plan of operation, he
made it the means of deliberately getting rid of some troops in the
city who had become inconvenient to him. Concerting measures for a
simultaneous assault upon the Carthaginian station both by sea and
land, he entrusted eighty ships of war to Pharakidas and Leptines,
with orders to move at daybreak; while he himself conducted a body
of troops out of the city, during the darkness of night; issuing
forth by Epipolæ and Euryalus (as Gylippus had formerly done when he
surprised Plemmyrium[1074]), and making a circuit until he came, on
the other side of the Anapus, to the temple of Kyanê; thus getting on
the land-side or south-west of the Carthaginian position. He first
despatched his horsemen, together with a regiment of one thousand
mercenary foot-soldiers, to commence the attack. These latter troops
had become peculiarly obnoxious to him, having several times engaged
in revolt and disturbance. Accordingly, while he now ordered them
up to the assault in conjunction with the horse, he at the same
time gave secret directions to the horse, to desert their comrades
and take flight. Both his orders were obeyed. The onset having been
made jointly, in the heat of combat the horsemen fled, leaving their
comrades all to be cut to pieces by the Carthaginians.[1075] We have
as yet heard nothing about difficulties arising to Dionysius from
his mercenary troops, on whose arms his dominion rested; and what we
are here told is enough merely to raise curiosity without satisfying
it. These men are said to have been mutinous and disaffected; a
fact, which explains, if it does not extenuate, the gross perfidy of
deliberately inveigling them to destruction, while he still professed
to keep them under his command.

  [1074] Thucyd. vii, 22, 23.

  [1075] Diodor. xiv, 72. Οὗτοι δ’ ἦσαν οἱ μισθόφοροι τῷ Διονυσίῳ
  παρὰ πάντας ἀλλοτριώτατοι, καὶ πλεονάκις ἀποστάσεις καὶ ταραχὰς
  ποιοῦντες. Διόπερ ὁ μὲν Διονύσιος τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν ἦν παρηγγελκὼς,
  ὅταν ἐξάπτωνται τῶν πολεμίων, φεύγειν, καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους
  ἐγκαταλιπεῖν· ὧν ποιησάντων τὸ προσταχθὲν, οὗτοι μὲν ἅπαντες
  κατεκόπησαν.

In the actual state of the Carthaginian army, Dionysius could afford
to make them a present of this obnoxious division. His own attack,
first upon the fort of Polichnê, next upon that near the naval
station at Daskon, was conducted with spirit and success. While the
defenders, thinned and enfeebled by the pestilence, were striving
to repel him on the land-side, the Syracusan fleet came forth from
its docks in excellent spirits and order to attack the ships at the
station. These Carthaginian ships, though afloat and moored, were
very imperfectly manned. Before the crews could get aboard to put
them on their defence, the Syracusan triremes and quinqueremes,
ably rowed and with their brazen beaks well directed, drove against
them on the quarter or midships, and broke through the line of
their timbers. The crash of such impact was heard afar off, and the
best ships were thus speedily disabled.[1076] Following up their
success, the Syracusans jumped aboard, overpowered the crews, or
forced them to seek safety as they could in flight. The distracted
Carthaginians being thus pressed at the same time by sea and by land,
the soldiers of Dionysius from the land-side forced their way through
the entrenchment to the shore, where forty pentekonters were hauled
up, while immediately near them were moored both merchantmen and
triremes. The assailants set fire to the pentekonters; upon which the
flames, rapidly spreading under a strong wind, communicated presently
to all the merchantmen and triremes adjacent. Unable to arrest this
terrific conflagration, the crews were obliged to leap overboard;
while the vessels, severed from their moorings by the burning of the
cables, drifted against each other under the wind, until the naval
station at Daskon became one scene of ruin.

  [1076] Diodor. xiv, 72. Πάντη δὲ τῶν ἐξοχωτάτων νεῶν θραυομένων,
  αἱ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἐμβόλων ἀναῤῥηττόμεναι λακίδες ἐξαίσιον ἐποιοῦντο
  ψόφον, etc.

Such a volume of flame, though destroying the naval resources of the
Carthaginians, must at the same time have driven off the assailing
Syracusan ships of war, and probably also the assailants by land.
But to those who contemplated it from the city of Syracuse, across
the breadth of the Great Harbor, it presented a spectacle grand and
stimulating in the highest degree; especially when the fire was seen
towering aloft amidst the masts, yards, and sails of the merchantmen.
The walls of the city were crowded with spectators, women, children,
and aged men, testifying their exultation by loud shouts, and
stretching their hands to heaven,—as on the memorable day, near
twenty years before, when they gained their final victory in the
same harbor, over the Athenian fleet. Many lads and elders, too much
excited to remain stationary, rushed into such small craft as they
could find, and rowed across the harbor to the scene of action, where
they rendered much service by preserving part of the cargoes, and
towing away some of the enemy’s vessels deserted but not yet on fire.
The evening of this memorable day left Dionysius and the Syracusans
victorious by land as well as by sea; encamped near the temple of
Olympian Zeus which had so recently been occupied by Imilkon. Though
they had succeeded in forcing the defences of the latter both at
Polichnê and at Daskon, and in inflicting upon him a destructive
defeat, yet they would not aim at occupying his camp, in its infected
and deplorable condition.

On two former occasions during the last few years, we have seen the
Carthaginian armies decimated by pestilence,—near Agrigentum and near
Gela,—previous to this last and worst calamity. Imilkon, copying the
weakness of Nikias rather than the resolute prudence of Demosthenes,
had clung to his insalubrious camp near the Great Harbor, long
after all hope of reducing Syracuse had ceased, and while suffering
and death to the most awful extent were daily accumulating around
him. But the recent defeat satisfied even him that his position
was no longer tenable. Retreat was indispensable; yet nowise
impracticable,—with the brave men, Iberians and others, in his army,
and with the Sikels of the interior on his side,—had he possessed the
good qualities as well as the defects of Nikias, or been capable of
anything like that unconquerable energy which ennobled the closing
days of the latter. Instead of taking the best measures available for
a retiring march, Imilkon despatched a secret envoy to Dionysius,
unknown to the Syracusans generally; tendering to him the sum of
three hundred talents which yet remained in the camp, on condition
of the fleet and army being allowed to sail to Africa unmolested.
Dionysius would not consent, nor would the Syracusans have confirmed
any such consent, to let them all escape; but he engaged to permit
the departure of Imilkon himself with the native Carthaginians. The
sum of three hundred talents was accordingly sent across by night to
Ortygia; and the fourth night ensuing was fixed for the departure of
Imilkon and his Carthaginians, without opposition from Dionysius.
During that night forty of their ships, filled with Carthaginians,
put to sea and sailed in silence out of the harbor. Their stealthy
flight, however, did not altogether escape the notice of the
Corinthian seamen in Syracuse; who not only apprised Dionysius, but
also manned some of their own ships and started in pursuit. They
overtook and destroyed one or two of the slowest sailers; but all the
rest with Imilkon himself, accomplished their flight to Carthage.

Dionysius,—while he affected to obey the warning of the Corinthians,
with movements intentionally tardy and unavailing,—applied himself
with earnest activity to act against the forsaken army remaining.
During the same night he led out his troops from the city to the
vicinity of their camp. The flight of Imilkon speedily promulgated,
had filled the whole army with astonishment and consternation. No
command,—no common cause,—no bond of union,—now remained among this
miscellaneous host, already prostrated by previous misfortune. The
Sikels in the army, being near to their own territory and knowing the
roads, retired at once, before daybreak, and reached their homes.
Scarcely had they passed, when the Syracusan soldiers occupied the
roads, and barred the like escape to others. Amidst the general
dispersion of the abandoned soldiers, some perished in vain attempts
to force the passes, others threw down their arms and solicited
mercy. The Iberians alone, maintaining their arms and order with
unshaken resolution, sent to Dionysius propositions to transfer to
him their service; which he thought proper to accept, enrolling them
among his mercenaries. All the remaining host, principally Libyans,
being stripped and plundered by his soldiers, became his captives,
and were probably sold as slaves.[1077]

  [1077] Diodor. xiv, 75.

The heroic efforts of Nikias, to open for his army a retreat in
the face of desperate obstacles, had ended in a speedy death as
prisoner at Syracuse,—yet without anything worse than the usual fate
of prisoners of war. But the base treason of Imilkon, though he
insured a safe retreat home by betraying the larger portion of his
army, earned for him only a short prolongation of life amidst the
extreme of ignominy and remorse. When he landed at Carthage with the
fraction of his army preserved, the city was in the deepest distress.
Countless family losses, inflicted by the pestilence, added a keener
sting to the unexampled public loss and humiliation now fully made
known. Universal mourning prevailed; all public and private business
was suspended, all the temples were shut, while the authorities and
the citizens met Imilkon in sad procession on the shore. The defeated
commander strove to disarm their wrath, by every demonstration of
a broken and prostrate spirit. Clothed in the sordid garment of a
slave, he acknowledged himself as the cause of all the ruin, by his
impiety towards the gods; for it was they, and not the Syracusans,
who had been his real enemies and conquerors. He visited all the
temples, with words of atonement and supplication,—replied to all the
inquiries about relatives who had perished under the distemper,—and
then retiring, blocked up the doors of his house, where he starved
himself to death.

But the season of misfortune to Carthage was not closed by his
decease. Her dominion over her Libyan subjects was always harsh
and unpopular, rendering them disposed to rise against her at any
moment of calamity. Her recent disaster in Sicily would have been
in itself perhaps sufficient to stimulate them into insurrection;
but its effect was aggravated by their resentment for the deliberate
betrayal of their troops serving under Imilkon, not one of whom lived
to come back. All the various Libyan subject towns had on this matter
one common feeling of indignation; all came together in congress,
agreed to unite their forces, and formed an army which is said to
have reached one hundred and twenty thousand men. They established
their head-quarters at Tunês (Tunis), a town within a short distance
of Carthage itself, and were for a certain time so much stronger in
the field, that the Carthaginians were obliged to remain within their
walls. For a moment it seemed as if the star of this great commercial
city was about to set for ever. The Carthaginians themselves were
in the depth of despondency, believing themselves to be under the
wrath of the goddesses Demeter and her daughter Persephonê; who, not
content with the terrible revenge already taken in Sicily, for the
sacrilege committed by Imilkon, were still pursuing them into Africa.
Under the extreme religious terror which beset the city, every means
were tried to appease the offended goddesses. Had it been supposed
that the Carthaginian gods had been insulted, expiation would have
been offered by the sacrifice of human victims,—and those too the
most precious, such as beautiful captives, or children of conspicuous
citizens. But on this occasion, the insult had been offered to
Grecian gods, and atonement was to be made according to the milder
ceremonies of Greece. The Carthaginians had never yet instituted in
their city any worship of Demeter or Persephonê; they now established
temples in honor of these goddesses, appointed several of their most
eminent citizens to be priests, and consulted the Greeks resident
among them, as to the form of worship most suitable to be offered.
After having done this, and cleared their own consciences, they
devoted themselves to the preparation of ships and men for the
purpose of carrying on the war. It was soon found that Demeter and
Persephonê were not implacable, and that the fortune of Carthage was
returning. The insurgents, though at first irresistible, presently
fell into discord among themselves about the command. Having no
fleet, they became straitened for want of provisions, while Carthage
was well supplied by sea from Sardinia. From these and similar
causes, their numerous host gradually melted away, and rescued the
Carthaginians from alarm at the point where they were always weakest.
The relations of command and submission, between Carthage and her
Libyan subjects, were established as they had previously stood,
leaving her to recover slowly from her disastrous reverses.[1078]

  [1078] Diodor. xiv, 77.

But though the power of Carthage in Africa was thus restored, in
Sicily it was reduced to the lowest ebb. It was long before she
could again make head with effect against Dionysius, who was left
at liberty to push his conquests in another direction, against the
Italiot Greeks. The remaining operations of his reign,—successful
against the Italiots, unsuccessful against Carthage,—will come to be
recounted in my next succeeding chapter and volume.





End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of History of Greece, Volume 10 (of 12), by 
George Grote

*** 