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TWO TRACTS ON CIVIL LIBERTY




_Published by the same Author_,

And printed for T. CADELL, in the Strand.


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                               TWO TRACTS
                                   ON
                             CIVIL LIBERTY,
                                   THE
                            WAR WITH AMERICA,
                                   AND
                        THE DEBTS AND FINANCES OF
                              THE KINGDOM:
                                  WITH
                       A GENERAL INTRODUCTION and
                               SUPPLEMENT.

                      By RICHARD PRICE, D.D. F.R.S.

                                 LONDON,
                  Printed for T. CADELL, in the STRAND.
                              MDCCLXXVIII.




GENERAL INTRODUCTION.


The first of the following tracts was published in the beginning of the
year 1776; and the second in the beginning of last year. They are now
offered to the public in one volume, with corrections and additions.
All the calculations, in the _Appendix_ to the first tract, have been
transferred to the _second_ and _fourth_ sections, in the third part of
the second tract.

The section on PUBLIC LOANS, in the second tract, has been revised with
care; and a _supplement_ to it, containing additional proposals and some
necessary explanations, has been given at the end of the whole.—This is
a subject to which I have applied (perhaps too unprofitably) much or my
attention. I have now done with it; and the whole is referred to the
candid examination of those who may be better informed, hoping for their
indulgence should they find that, in any instance, I have been mistaken.
I have not meant, in any thing I have said on this subject, to censure
any persons. That accumulation of artificial debt which I have pointed
out, and by which the dagger of the kingdom from its growing burdens
has been so needlessly increased, has, I doubt not, been the effect
of inattention in our ministers; and the scheme, by which the loan of
last year has been procured, gives reason to hope that better plans of
borrowing will be adopted for the future.

The principal design of the first part of the second tract was (as I
have observed in the introduction to it) to remove the misapprehensions
of my sentiments on CIVIL LIBERTY AND GOVERNMENT into which some had
fallen. It gives me concern to find that it has not answered that end
in the degree I wished. I am still charged with maintaining opinions
which tend to subvert all civil authority. I paid little regard to this
charge, while it was confined to the advocates for the principles which
have produced the present war; but as it seems lately to have been given
the public from the authority of a writer of the first character,[1] it
is impossible I should not be impressed by it; and I find myself under a
necessity of taking farther notice of it.

There are two accounts, directly opposite to one another, which have been
given of the origin of civil government. One of them is, that “civil
government is an expedient contrived by human prudence for gaining
security against oppression; and that, consequently, the power of civil
governors is a delegation or trust from the people for accomplishing this
end.”

The other account is, that “civil government is an ordinance of the
Deity, by which the body of mankind are given up to the will of a few;
and, consequently, that it is a trust from the Deity, in the exercise of
which civil governors are accountable only to him.”

The question “which of these accounts we ought to receive,” is important
in the highest degree. There is no question which more deeply affects the
happiness and dignity of man as a citizen of this world.—If the former
account is right, the people (that is, the body of independent agents)
in every community are their own legislators. All civil authority is
properly _their_ authority. Civil governors are only public _servants_;
and their power, being _delegated_, is by its nature _limited_.—On the
contrary. If the latter account is right, the people have nothing to
do with their own government. They are placed by their maker in the
situation of cattle on an estate, which the owner has a right to dispose
of as he pleases. Civil Governors are a body of _masters_; and their
power is a commission from Heaven held by divine right, and unbounded in
its extent.

I have espoused, with some zeal, the first of these accounts; and in the
following tracts, endeavoured to explain and defend it. And this is _all_
I have done to give countenance to the charge I have mentioned.—Even the
masterly writer who, after a croud of writers infinitely his inferiors,
seems to have taken up this accusation against me, often expresses
himself as if he had adopted the same idea of government[2]. Such indeed
is my opinion of his good sense, and such has been the zeal which he
has discovered for the rights of mankind, that I think it scarcely
possible his ideas and mine on this subject should be very different.
His language, however, sometimes puzzles me; and, particularly, when
he intimates that government is an institution of divine authority;[3]
when he scouts all discussions of the nature of civil liberty, the
foundation of civil rights, and the principles of free government;
and when he asserts the _competence_ of our legislature to revive the
_High-Commission Court_ and _Star-Chamber_, and its BOUNDLESS AUTHORITY
not only over the people of _Britain_, but over distant communities who
have no voice in it.

But whatever may be Mr. BURKE’S sentiments on this subject, he cannot
possibly think of the former account of government that “it is a
speculation which destroys all authority.”—Both accounts establish an
authority. The difference is, that one derives it from the _people_, and
makes it a _limited_ authority; and the other derives it from _Heaven_;
and makes it _unlimited_.—I have repeatedly declared my admiration
of such a constitution of government as our own would be, were the
House of Commons a fair representation of the kingdom, and under no
undue influence.—The sum of all I have meant to maintain is, “that
LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT, as opposed to OPPRESSION and TYRANNY, consists
in the dominion of equal laws made with common consent, or of men over
_themselves_; and not in the dominion of communities over communities, or
of any men over other men.” Introduction to the second Tract, p. 9.—How
then can it be pretended, that I have aimed at destroying all authority?
Does our own constitution destroy all authority? Is the authority of
equal laws made with common consent no authority? Must there be no
government in a state that governs itself? Or, must an institution,
contrived by the united counsels of the members of a community, for
restraining licentiousness and gaining security against injury and
violence, _encourage_ licentiousness, and give to every one a power to
commit what outrages he pleases?

The Archbishop of York, (in a sermon preached before the society for
propagating the gospel in foreign parts, Feb. 21, 1777,) has taken notice
of some loose opinions, as he calls them, which have been lately current
on civil liberty; some who mean delinquency having given accounts of it
“by which every man’s humour is made to be the rule of his obedience,
all the bad passions are let loose, and those dear interests abandoned
to outrage for the protection of which we trust in law,” 4to edit. p. 15
and 16. It is not difficult to guess at one of the delinquents intended
in these words. In opposition to the horrid sentiments of liberty
which they describe, but which in reality no man in his senses ever
entertained, the Archbishop defines it to be simply, the supremacy of
law, or GOVERNMENT by LAW, without adding to _law_, as I had done, the
words _equal_ and _made with common consent_;[4] and without opposing a
GOVERNMENT by LAW to a GOVERNMENT BY MEN, as others had done.—According
to him, therefore, the supremacy of law must be liberty, whatever the
law is, or whoever makes it.—In despotic countries government by law
is the same with government by the will of one man, which HOOKER has
called _the misery of all men_; but, according to this definition, it is
liberty.—In ENGLAND _formerly_, the law consigned to the flames all who
denyed certain established points of faith. Even _now_, it subjects to
fines, imprisonment and banishment all teachers of religion who have not
subscribed the doctrinal articles of the church of England; and the good
Archbishop, not thinking the law in this case sufficiently rigorous, has
proposed putting Protestant Dissenters under the same restraints with the
<DW7>s.[5] And should this be done, if done by _law_, it will be the
establishment of _liberty_.

The truth is, that a government by law is or is not liberty, just as
the laws are just or unjust; and as the body of the people do or do not
participate in the power of making them. The learned Prelate seems to
have thought otherwise, and therefore has given a definition of liberty,
which might as well have been given of slavery.

At the conclusion of his sermon, the Archbishop adds words which
he calls comfortable, addressed to those who had been _patient in
tribulation_,[6] and intimating that they might _rejoice in hope_, “a ray
of brightness then appearing after a prospect which had been long dark.”
And in an account which follows the sermon, from one of the missionaries
in the province of New-York, it is said, that “the rebellion would
undoubtedly be crushed, and that THEN will be the time for taking steps
for the increase of the church in America, by granting it an episcopate.”
In conformity to the sentiments of this missionary, the Archbishop also
expresses his hope, that the opportunity which such an event will give,
for establishing episcopacy among the colonists, will not be lost; and
advises, that measures should be thought of for that purpose, and for
thereby rescuing the church from the persecution it has long suffered in
_America_.

This is a subject so important, and it has been so much misrepresented,
that I cannot help going out of my way to give a brief account of it.

       *       *       *       *       *

It does not appear that the lay members themselves of the church in
_America_ have ever wished for Bishops. On the contrary, the assembly of
_Virginia_ (the first episcopal colony) some years ago returned thanks
to two clergymen in that colony, who had protested against a resolution
of the other clergy to petition for Bishops. The church _here_ cannot
have a right to _impose_ Bishops on the church in another country; and
therefore, while churchmen in _America_ are averse to Bishops, it must be
persecution to send Bishops among them. The _Presbyterians_, and other
religious sects there, are willing, from a sense of the reasonableness
of toleration, to admit Bishops whenever the body of episcopalian
laity shall desire them, provided security is given that they shall be
officers merely spiritual, possessed of no other powers than those which
are necessary to the full exercise of that mode of religious worship.
It is not Bishops, as _spiritual_ officers, they have opposed; but
Bishops on a state-establishment; Bishops with _civil_ powers; Bishops
at the head of ecclesiastical courts, maintained by taxing other sects,
and possessed of a PRE-EMINENCE which would be incompatible with the
equality which has long subsisted among all religious sects in _America_.
In this last respect, the colonies have hitherto enjoyed a happiness
which is unparalleled, but which the introduction of such Bishops as
would be sent from hence would destroy. In _Pensilvania_ (one of the
happiest countries under heaven before we carried into it desolation and
carnage) all sects of christians have been always perfectly on a level,
the legislature taking no part with any one sect against others, but
protecting all equally as far as they are peaceable. The state of the
colonies north of _Pensilvania_ is much the same; and, in the province
of _Massachusett’s-Bay_ in particular, civil authority interposes no
farther in religion than by imposing a tax for supporting public worship,
leaving to all the power of applying the tax to the support of that mode
of public worship which they like best. This tax the episcopalians were,
at one time, obliged to pay in common with others; but so far did the
province carry its indulgence to them, that an act was passed on purpose
to excuse them.—With this let the state of Protestant Dissenters in
this country be compared. Not only are they obliged to pay tithes for
the support of the established church, but their worship is not even
tolerated, unless their ministers will subscribe the articles of the
church. In consequence of having long scrupled this subscription, they
have lost all legal right to protection, and are exposed to the cruellest
penalties. Uneasy in such a situation, they not long ago applied twice to
parliament for the repeal of the penal laws against them. Bills for that
purpose were brought into the _House of Commons_, and passed that House.
But, in the House of Lords, they were rejected in consequence of the
opposition of the Bishops.—There are few I reverence so much as some on
the sacred bench; but such conduct (and may I not add the alacrity with
which most of them support the present measures?) must leave an indelible
stain upon them, and will probably exclude them for ever from _America_.

On this occasion, I cannot help thinking with concern of the learned
Prelate’s feelings. After a prospect long dark, he had discovered a ray
of brightness shewing him _America_ reduced, and the church triumphant:
But lately, that ray of brightness has vanished, and defeat has taken
place of victory and conquest.—And what do we _now_ see?—What a different
prospect, mortifying to the learned Prelate, presents itself?—A great
people likely to be formed, in spite of all our efforts, into free
communities, under governments which have[7] no religious tests and
establishments!—A new æra in future annals, and a new opening in human
affairs beginning, among the descendants of _Englishmen_, in a new
world;—A rising empire, extended over an immense continent, without
BISHOPS,—without NOBLES,—and without KINGS.

_O the depth of the riches of the wisdom of God! How unsearchable are his
judgments!_

But to proceed to another subject.

       *       *       *       *       *

In the second of the following tracts, page 48, I have observed, that in
former times it was the custom of parliament to pass bills for appointing
commissioners to take, state, and examine the public accounts. I have
lately had it in my power to inform myself more particularly on this
subject; and I shall here beg leave to give a brief recital of some of
the principal facts relating to it.

The first bill for the purpose I have mentioned was passed in the times
of the commonwealth, and in the year 1653. It was called an “act for
accounts, and for clearing of public debts, and discovering frauds and
concealments.” Seven commissioners were named in it, and the necessary
powers given them. In 1667, another act was passed for the same purpose;
after which I find no account of any such acts till the beginning of
the reign of King William. At this time complaints of mismanagement
and embezzlements in the disposition of public money were become so
prevalent, that the _House of Commons_ thought it necessary to enter
into measures for effectually preventing them, by obliging all revenue
officers to make up their accounts, and bringing defaulters to justice.

With these views, six of the acts I have mentioned were passed between
the years 1690 and 1701. Another was passed in the first of Queen _Anne_;
and _three_ more in her four last years. In King _William_’s reign they
were always passed by the _House of Commons_ without a division. In
_Queen Anne’s reign_, not _one_ passed without a division. In 1717, a
motion for such an act was _rejected_ without a division; and since 1717,
only one motion[8] has been made for such a bill, and it was rejected by
a majority of 136 to 66.

The preamble to these acts declares the reason of them to be, that “the
kingdom may be satisfied and truly informed, whether all the monies
granted by parliament have been faithfully issued and applied to the
end for which they had been given; and that all loyal subjects may be
thereby encouraged more chearfully to bear the burthens laid upon them.”
The number of commissioners named in them was generally nine or seven,
all members of the _House of Commons_. It was particularly ordered,
that they should take an account of all the revenues brought into the
receipt of the Exchequer, and all arrears thereof; of all monies in the
hands of the receivers general of the land-tax, customs and excise; of
all the public stores, provisions, &c. as well for land as sea service;
of all ships of war, and the sums of money provided or paid for the use
of the forces by sea and land, and the number of them respectively;
and of any briberies or corruptions in any persons concerned in the
receiving or disposing of the national treasure. And, for these purposes,
they were impowered to call before them, and to examine upon oath the
officers of the exchequer, the secretary at war, paymaster of the forces,
commissioners of the navy and ordnance, and all persons whatever employed
as commissioners, or otherwise, in or about the _Treasury_.

The reports, which the commissioners thus appointed delivered from time
to time to parliament, contain accounts of a waste of public money,
arising from the rapacity of contractors, and many scandalous abuses
and frauds in every part of the public service, which must shock every
person not grown callous to all the feelings of honesty and honour.
In consequence of these reports, the _House of Commons_ addressed the
throne, and remonstrated; several great men were accused, and brought
to shame; some were dismissed from their places, and ordered to be
prosecuted; some expelled, and some committed to the Tower. Thus did our
representatives in those times discharge their duty as guardians of the
public property; and it is, in my opinion, only by such means that they
are capable of doing this properly and effectually. It must, however, be
acknowledged, that these commissions of enquiry did not produce all the
good effects which might have been expected from them. The influence of
the crown, and the interest in parliament of many great men entrusted
with the disposition of public money, rendered the proper execution
of them extremely difficult. This led some even of the _Tories_, at
the time of the great change of ministry in 1710, to propose, that the
receiving and issuing of the public money should be taken from the crown;
and, in defence of this proposal, it was urged, that the issuing of
public money, being in some of the most despotic countries left in the
hands of the people, it was by no means a necessary part of the royal
prerogative. This would indeed have provided a complete remedy; and it
might have perpetuated the constitution. But, even in these times, it was
a reformation too great and too impracticable to engage much attention.

Ever since those times the public accounts have been growing more
complicated; and the temptations to profusion and embezzlement have been
increasing with increasing luxury and dissipation. How astonishing then
is it that every idea of such _commissions_ should be now lost; and that,
at a time when the nation is labouring under expences almost too heavy
to be borne, the passing of accounts by the _House of Commons_ is become
little more than a matter of form; our representatives scarcely thinking
it worth their while to attend on such occasions, and MILLIONS of the
public treasure being sometimes given away, in a few hours, just as
proposed by the _Treasury_, without debate or enquiry.

I must not forget to mention particularly on this subject, that the
commissioners named in the acts I have described, were always declared
incapable of holding any place or office of profit under the crown;
and directed to take an account “of all pensions, salaries, and sums
of money paid or payable to members of parliament out of the revenue
or otherwise.”—Not long before this time, the _House of Commons_ would
not suffer even the _Attorney-general_[9] to sit and vote in the
house because he was the king’s servant; and in 1678, a member, as Mr.
_Trenchard_ says, was committed to the Tower, for only saying in the
house that the king might keep guards for his defence, if he could pay
them.—Such _once_ was the House of Commons.—So jealous of the power
of the crown, and so chaste.—Since the reign of Queen _Ann_ and the
passing of the _Septennial Act_, a great change has taken place.[10]
A change which is little less than the total ruin of the constitution,
and which may end in a tyranny the most oppressive and insupportable. It
is, therefore, the greatest evil, which could have happened to us; and
the men, by whose abominable policy it has been accomplished, ought to
be followed with the everlasting execrations of every friend to public
virtue and liberty.

       *       *       *       *       *

I now withdraw to the situation of an anxious spectator of public events;
but before I do this, I must leave with the public, at this threatening
period, the following sentiments.

Not long ago, the colonies might have been kept, without bloodshed or
trouble, by repealing the _acts_ which have made us the aggressors in
the present war; but _now_ it would be great folly to expect this.—At
the same time I think it certain, that they may be rendered more useful
to us by a pacification on liberal terms, which shall bind them to us as
FRIENDS, than by any victories or slaughters (were they possible) which
can force them to submit to us as SUBJECTS.—I think it also certain,
that should the offer of such terms be delayed till they have formed an
alliance with _France_, this country is UNDONE.—Such an alliance, we may
hope, is not yet settled.—Our rulers, therefore, may _possibly_ have
still a moment for pausing and retreating; and every dictate of prudence
and feeling of humanity requires them to be speedy and earnest in
improving it.—But what am I saying? I know this must not be expected. Too
full of ideas of our own dignity, too proud to retract; and too tenacious
of dominion, we seem determined to persist: And the consequence must be,
that the colonies will become the allies of _France_; that a general war
will be kindled; and, perhaps, this once happy country be made, in just
retribution, the seat of that desolation and misery which it has produced
in other countries.

    January 19, 1778.

       *       *       *       *       *

Since the publication of the preceding Introduction, the event referred
to at the end of it has been announced to the public. A memorial from
the _French_ court has been delivered to our court, declaring, that
the former has concluded a treaty of commerce and friendship with the
colonies as INDEPENDENT STATES; and acquainting us that, IN CONCERT
WITH THEM, the King of France is determined and prepared to defend his
commerce against any interruption we may give it.—A new turn, therefore,
is now given to our affairs of a nature the most critical and alarming.
Would to God there were any concessions by which we could extricate
ourselves. But the opportunities for this have been shamefully lost,
and cannot be now recovered.—With a judicial blindness in our councils
which has hitherto carried us uniformly from _bad_ to _worse_—With near
half our strength torn from us, and our vaunted dignity in the dust—With
our resources failing; our credit tottering; and a debt threatening
to overwhelm us of more than a HUNDRED AND FIFTY MILLIONS—In these
circumstances, we seem to be entering on a war with the united powers of
_France_, _Spain_, and _America_.—This, should it happen, will complete
the measure of our troubles, and soon bring on that _catastrophe_ which
there has been all along reason to expect and dread.

    April 24, 1778.


ACCOUNT OF THE CUSTOMS FOR THE LAST SIX YEARS.

In the following tracts I have reckoned, among the destructive
consequences of the war with _America_, the loss of a considerable part
of our trade. In consequence of several accidental causes, particularly
the demand created by the war, this effect has not yet been so much felt
as was generally expected. The truth, however, is, that the war has
operated in this way to a degree that is alarming, as will appear from
the following account of the CUSTOMS for the last six years.

        Gross Receipt.  Debentures.  Net Receipt.  Payments into
                                                   the Exchequer.
  1772    5.134,503      2.214,508    2.441,038      2.525,515
  1773    5.159,800      2.463,767    2.221,460      2.431,071
  1774    5.068,000      2.132,600    2.455,500      2.547,717
  1775    5.146,900      1.904,900    2.709,340      2.476,302
  1776    3.726,970      1.544,300    1.633,380      2.460,402
  1777    3.293,200        932,860    1.846,390      2.199,105

It should be observed, that though, in 1776, there had been no
importation of _tobacco_, yet the duties on _tobacco_ brought into the
_Exchequer_ as much as ever, these duties having been paid for old
stock taken out of the warehouses for _home consumption_, instead of
_exportation_. This is one of the causes which kept up the payments into
the _Exchequer_ in 1776, notwithstanding a sudden fall of near a MILLION
AND A HALF in the gross receipt, and a MILLION in the net receipt.—In
the last year, or 1777, the duties on tobacco fell very short; and this
contributed to diminish the payments into the _Exchequer_ near a _quarter
of a million_. But what seems of more importance is, that the debentures
(or duties returned at exportation) which had fallen in 1775 and 1776
above a _fourth_, continued to fall in 1777; and did not then amount to
more than _two-fifths_ of the usual sum.

I have examined the customs from the Revolution to the present time; but
cannot find that any thing like such a fall in them has ever happened
before.


FIRST ADVERTISEMENT.

The present state of the public funds makes it necessary for me to
acquaint the reader, that when the _Supplement_ to the following Tracts
was written, the 3 _per cent._ annuities were at the price which the
calculations in it suppose, or nearly at 78. They have since fallen to
72, and once even below 69, which is a lower price than they were ever at
during the whole last war, except just at the pinch of the loan of twelve
millions in 1762.—The difference of price also between them and the new
_4 per cents._ is fallen, (for no reason that I can discover) from 14
to about 10½.—I find, likewise, that in consequence of a distressing
scarcity of money, the subscribers to the last loan of _five millions_
have not yet been able to complete their payments.—These facts afford
a dark prospect; and make it doubtful whether, if things don’t mend,
it will be possible, by any schemes, to procure the money necessary
to bear the expence of another campaign.—Should it happen, for these
reasons, that what I have written on loans can be of no use; or, though
capable of being of use, should it be neglected; I shall still reflect
with satisfaction, that I have now given what I wished to offer on this
subject with more correctness; and proved, beyond a doubt, that a great
part of the National Debt is an _artificial_ debt, for which no money has
been received, and which might have been easily avoided.

    Jan. 19, 1778.


SECOND ADVERTISEMENT.

Since the foregoing Advertisement in January last, the price of the 3
_per cent._ annuities has fallen from 72 to 60½. But the difference of
price between them and the 4 _per cent._ annuities created in 1777, has
risen to near 18l. agreeably to the true comparative value of these
annuities, as computed in page 14 of the Supplement.—It is necessary I
should farther mention, that there has been a new loan of six millions
for the service of the present year; but that, contrary to my hopes, the
managers of our finances have returned to the old modes of borrowing—The
consolidated 3 _per cent._ annuities being, when the loan was settled on
the 6th of February, at 66½; one hundred 3 _per cent. stock_ estimated
at this price, was given for every 100l. in _money_, with FOUR-FIFTHS of
the profits of a lottery ticket reckoned at 2½l. and an ANNUITY of 2½l.
for 30 years, reckoned worth 14 years purchase (or 135l.) but really
worth above 15 years purchase. This made a profit of 4l. on every 100l.
advanced. But the 3 _per cent._ annuities falling immediately to 64, and
in a few days to 60½; and the short annuity also happening to sell for no
more than 13 years purchase, this loan has been constantly at a discount,
which has fluctuated between 2 and 4½ _per cent._

The scheme of this loan is the first of the old schemes described in
the following Supplement, page 2d; and it is apparent that by including
the value of the _douceurs_ in the capital, it brings on the public
an artificial debt, for which nothing will be received, of above two
millions.—The sum to be lent, should it be ever paid, might have been as
well obtained, without making any material addition to the annual charge,
by selling separately the two _douceurs_ worth 2.244,000l. and offering
for the remaining sum necessary to make up six millions, an interest of
five _per cent._ subject to the regulations proposed in the Second Tract,
page 98, or in the Supplement, page 24.

    April 24, 1778.


The following accounts have been laid before the House of Commons since
January last.


_Account of the Gold Coin brought into the Mint from Great Britain and
Ireland by the Proclamations in 1773, 1774, and 1776._

                                    £.     _s._ _d._

  First Proclamation brought in  3.806,435   7   2  deficient more than
                                                    6 grains in a guinea.

  2d Proclamation brought in     4.876,171  18   3  deficient between
                                                    3 and 6 grains.

  3d Proclamation brought in     6.880,986   5   3  deficient between
                                                    1 and 3 grains.
                                ------------------
                        Total   15.563,593  10   8

Compare Second Tract from page 56 to 64.


_Account of the Expence of calling in and recoining all the Gold Coin
deficient more than a grain in a guinea._

                                            £.  _s._  _d._

  Expence to the Bank for melting        16,786  14    6

  Deficiency in melting                 317,314   6   11

  Interest of money advanced to the
    holders of gold coin                231,982  17    7

  To master of the Mint for the charge
    of recoining and other charges      115,459  12    9

  To several persons who were appointed
    in the several counties to take in
    and exchange the gold coin, and for
    other charges and expences           72,476   8    0
                                        ----------------
                                 Total  754,019  19    9

Towards defraying this expence there have been applied the following sums:

                                    £.   _s._  _d._

  Out of the supplies in 1774   250,000   0    0
                      in 1775    69,671   8    3
                      in 1776    92,421  14   11¼

  Out of the million
    vote of credit in    1776    30,000   0    0

  Out of the million
    vote of credit in    1777   206,699   8    3¾

  Provided for in        1778   105,227   8    3
                                -----------------
                                754,019  19    9

These accounts shew, that in the note, p. 63 of the Second Tract, the
words _16 millions and a half_ should have been _15 millions and a half_;
and that in p. 69, 2d line, 650,000l. should have been 754,019l. 19s. 9d.

       *       *       *       *       *

_N. B._ The loss attending the deficiency in the coin brought in by the
first proclamation amounted nearly to 300,000l. but having been thrown on
the holders of the coin, it could not be brought to account.


FOOTNOTES

[1] See Mr. _Burke’s_ Letter to the Sheriffs of _Bristol_, pages 53, 54.

[2] “To follow, not to force the public inclination; to give a direction,
a form, a technical dress and a specific, sanction to the general sense
of the community, is the true end of legislature. When it goes beyond
this, its authority will be precarious, let its rights be what they
will.” Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, p. 49.

[3] Ibid. p. 55. Thoughts on the causes of the present discontents, p.
67. “Government certainly, is an institution of divine authority; though
its _forms_ and the _persons_ who administer it, all originate from the
people.” It is probable that Mr. _Burke_ means only that government is
a divine institution, in the same sense in which any other expedient of
human prudence for gaining protection against injury, may be called a
Divine institution. All that we owe _immediately_ to our own foresight
and industry, must _ultimately_ be ascribed to God the giver of all our
powers, and the cause of all causes. It is in this sense that St. Paul in
Rom. xiii. 1, 2. calls civil magistracy the _ordinance of God_, and says
that _there is no power but of God_. If any one wants to be convinced of
this, he should read the excellent bishop HOADLY’s Sermon entitled _The
Measures of Submission to the civil Magistrate_, and the defences of it.

It is further probable, that when Mr. _Burke_ asserts the _omnipotence_
of Parliaments, or their _competence_ to establish any oppressions
(Letter, p. 46, 49) he means mere _power_ abstracted from _right_, or
the same sort of _power_ and _competence_ that trustees have to betray
their trust, or that armed ruffians have to rob and murder. Nor should
I doubt whether this is his meaning, were it not for the passage I have
quoted from him in the last page, the latter part of which seems to
imply, that a legislature may contradict its _end_, and yet retain its
_rights_.—Some of the justest remarks on this subject may be found in the
Earl of ABINGDON’s thoughts on Mr. _Burke_’s letter, a pamphlet which (on
account of the excellent public principles it maintains, and the spirit
of liberty it breathes, as well as the rank of the writer) must give to
every friend to the true interests of this country particular pleasure.

In p. 46, Mr. _Burke_ says, that “if there is one man in the world more
zealous than another for the supremacy of parliament and the rights of
this imperial crown, it is himself; though many may be more knowing in
the extent and the foundation of these rights.” He adds, that “he has
constantly declined such disquisitions, not being qualified for the chair
of a professor in metaphysics, and not chusing to put the solid interests
of the kingdom on speculative grounds.”—_The less knowledge, the more
zeal_, is a maxim which experience has dreadfully verified in _religion_.
But he that, in the present case, should apply this maxim to Mr. _Burke_,
would, whatever he may say of himself, greatly injure him. Though he
chuses to decry enquiries into the nature of liberty, there are, I am
persuaded, few in the world whose zeal for it is more united to extensive
knowledge and an exalted understanding.—He calls it, p. 55. “the vital
spring and energy of a state, and a blessing of the first order.” He
cannot, therefore, think that too much pains may be taken to UNDERSTAND
it. He must know, that nothing but usurpation and error can suffer by
enquiry and discussion.

Mr. WILKES, in an excellent speech which he lately made in moving
for the repeal of the declaratory law, observed, that this law was a
_compromise_ to which the great men, under whose administration it was
passed, were forced in order to obtain the repeal of the _Stamp-act_.
I think so highly of that administration and of the service it did the
public, that I have little doubt of the truth of this observation. But,
at the same time, I cannot help wishing Mr. _Burke_ had given no reason
for doubt by defending the _principle_ of that act; a _principle_ which,
unquestionably, he and his friends would never have acted upon; but which
others have since acted upon, with a violence which has brought us to the
brink of ruin.

[4] In p. 19. he calls liberty “a freedom from all restraints except
such as established law imposes for THE GOOD OF THE COMMUNITY.” But this
addition can make no difference of any consequence, as long as it is not
specified _where_ the power is lodged of judging what laws are for the
good of the community. In countries where the _laws_ are the _edicts_ of
absolute princes, the end professed is always the good of the Community.

[5] “The laws against <DW7>s have been extremely severe. New dangers may
arise; and if at any time ANOTHER DENOMINATION of men should be equally
dangerous to our civil interests, it would be justifiable to lay them
under similar restraints.” Page 17.—In another part of this sermon the
great men in opposition (some of the first in the kingdom in respect
of rank, ability, and virtue) are described as a body of men void of
principle, who, without regarding the relation in which they stand to
the community, have entered into a league for advancing their private
interest, and “who are held together by the same bond that keeps together
the lowest and wickedest combinations.”—Was there ever such a censure
delivered from a pulpit? What wonder is it that the Dissenters should
come in for a share in his Grace’s abuse?—Their political principles, he
says, are growing dangerous.—On what does he ground this insinuation?
He is mistaken if he imagines that they are all such delinquents as the
author of the following tracts, or that they think universally as he does
of the war with America. On this subject they are, like other bodies of
men in the kingdom, of different opinions.—But I will tell him in what
they agree.—They agree in detesting the doctrines of passive obedience
and non-resistance. They are all WHIGS, enemies to arbitrary power, and
firmly attached to those principles of civil and religious liberty which
produced the GLORIOUS REVOLUTION and the HANOVERIAN SUCCESSION.—Such
principles are the nation’s best defence; and Protestant Dissenters have
hitherto reckoned it their glory to be distinguished by zeal for them,
and an adherence to them. ONCE these principles were _approved_ by men in
power. No good can be expected, if they are now reckoned dangerous.

[6] That is, the missionaries of the society in America.—The charter of
the society declares the end of its incorporation to be “propagating the
gospel in foreign parts, and making provision for the worship of God
in those plantations which wanted the administration of God’s word and
sacraments, and were abandoned to atheism and infidelity.” The chief
business, on the contrary, of the society has been to provide for the
support of _episcopalianism_ in the northern colonies, and particularly
NEW-ENGLAND, where the sacraments are more regularly administered, and
the people less abandoned to infidelity, than perhaps in any country
under heaven. The missionaries employed and paid by the society for this
purpose, have generally been clergymen of the highest principles in
church and state. _America_, having been for some time very hostile to
men of such principles, most of them have been obliged to take refuge in
this country; and here they have, I am afraid, been too successful in
propagating their own resentments, in misleading our rulers, and widening
the breach which has produced the present war.

[7] I am sorry to mention one exception to the fact here intimated. The
new constitution for _Pensilvania_ (in other respects wise and liberal)
is dishonoured by a religious test. It requires an acknowledgment of the
divine inspiration of the Old and New Testament, as a condition of being
admitted to a seat in the House of Representatives; directing however, at
the same time, that no other religious test shall _for ever_ hereafter be
required of any civil officer.—This has been, probably, an accommodation
to the prejudices of some of the narrower sects in the province, to which
the more liberal part have for the present thought fit to yield; and,
therefore, it may be expected that it will not be of long continuance.

Religious tests and subscriptions in general, and all establishments
of particular systems of faith, with civil emoluments annexed, do
inconceivable mischief, by turning religion into a trade, by engendering
strife and persecution, by forming hypocrites, by obstructing the
progress of truth, and fettering and perverting the human mind; nor
will the world ever grow much _wiser_, or _better_, or _happier_, till,
by the abolition of them, truth can gain fair play, and reason free
scope for exertion. The Archbishop, page 11, speaks of christianity as
“insufficient to rely on its own energies; and of the assistances which
it is the business of civil authority to provide for gospel truths.”—A
worse slander was never thrown on gospel truths. Christianity disdains
such assistances as the corrupted governments of this world are capable
of giving it. Politicians and statesmen know little of it. Their _enmity_
has sometimes done it good; but their _friendship_, by supporting
corruptions carrying its name, has been almost fatal to it.

[8] In 1742, after the resignation of Sir _Robert Walpole_.

[9] Sir FRANCIS BACON was the _second_ ATTORNEY-GENERAL who sat in the
_House of Commons_; but, to prevent its being drawn into a precedent,
the House would not admit him, till they had made an order, that no
Attorney-General should for the future be allowed to sit and vote in that
House.—In conformity to this order, whenever afterwards a member was
appointed Attorney-General, his place was vacated, and a new writ issued.
This continued to be the practice till the year 1670, when Sir HENEAGE
FINCH (afterwards EARL OF NOTTINGHAM) being appointed Attorney-General,
he was allowed by connivance to preserve his seat, which connivance has
been continued ever since.—I give these facts not from any enquiry or
knowledge of my own, but from the authority of a friend, who is perhaps
better informed than any person in the kingdom on every subject of this
kind.

[10] The following facts will shew, in some degree, how this change
has been brought about.—For ten years ending Aug. 1, 1717 (a period
comprehending in it a general war abroad; and the demise of the crown,
the establishment of a new family, and an open rebellion at home) the
money expended in secret services amounted only to 279,444l.—For TEN
YEARS ending Feb. 11, 1742, it amounted to no less a sum than 1.384,600;
of which 50,077l. was paid to printers of News-papers and writers for
government; and a greater sum expended, in the last _six weeks_ of these
ten years, than had been spent in _three years_ before Aug. 1710.—See
the Report of the COMMITTEE appointed March 23, 1742, to enquire into
the conduct of _Robert Earl of Orford_, printed in the Journals of
the House of Commons, vol. 24, p. 295, 296, 300.—One passage, in this
report, contains remarks, so much to my present purpose and so important,
that I cannot help copying it.—“There are no laws particularly adapted
to the case of a minister who clandestinely employs the money of the
public, and the whole power and profitable employments that attend
the collecting and disposing of it, _against_ the people: And, by
this profusion and criminal distribution of offices, in some measure
justifies the expence that particular persons are obliged to be at, by
making it necessary to the preservation of all that is valuable to a
free nation. For in that case, the contest is plain and visible. It is,
whether the Commons shall retain the _third_ state in their own hands;
while this whole dispute is carried on at the expence of the people,
and, on the side of the minister, out of the money granted to support
and secure the constitutional independence of the three branches of
the legislature.—This method of corruption is as sure, and, therefore,
as criminal a way of subverting the constitution as by an armed force.
It is a crime, productive of a total destruction of the very being of
this government; and is so _high_ and _unnatural_, that nothing but
the powers of parliament can reach it; and, as it never can meet with
parliamentary animadversion but when it is unsuccessful, it must seek for
its _security_ in the extent and efficacy of the mischief it produces.”
P. 395. The obstructions which this committee met with in their enquiry
proved that the crime they here describe in such emphatical language, had
_even then_ obtained that very security, in the extent of the mischief it
produced, which, they observe, it was under a necessity of seeking.




                              OBSERVATIONS
                            ON THE NATURE OF
                             CIVIL LIBERTY,
                            THE PRINCIPLES OF
                               GOVERNMENT,
                                 AND THE
                           JUSTICE AND POLICY
                                 OF THE
                            WAR WITH AMERICA.

        _Quis furor iste novus? quo nunc, quo tenditis⸺_
        _Heu! miseri cives? non Hostem, inimicaque castra,_
        _⸺ Vestras Spes uritis._

                                                     VIRG.

                    By RICHARD PRICE, D. D. F. R. S.

                           THE EIGHTH EDITION,
                     With CORRECTIONS and ADDITIONS.

                                 LONDON:
                  Printed for T. CADELL, in the STRAND.
                             M.DCC.LXXVIII.




PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.


_In the following Observations, I have taken that liberty of examining
public measures, which, happily for this kingdom, every person in it
enjoys. They contain the sentiments of a private and unconnected man; for
which, should there be any thing wrong in them, he alone is answerable._

_After all that has been written on the dispute with America, no reader
can expect to be informed, in this publication, of much that he has not
before known. Perhaps, however, he may find in it some new matter; and if
he should, it will be chiefly in the Observations on the Nature of Civil
Liberty, and the Policy of the War with America._

    February 8th, 1776.




PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION.


The favourable reception which the following Tract has met with, makes
me abundant amends for the abuse it has brought upon me. I should be
ill employed were I to take much notice of this abuse: But there is one
circumstance attending it, which I cannot help just mentioning.—The
principles on which I have argued form the foundation of every state as
far as it is free; and are the same with those taught by Mr. Locke, and
all the writers on Civil Liberty who have been hitherto most admired
in this country. But I find with concern, that our Governors chuse to
decline trying by them their present measures: For, in a Pamphlet which
has been circulated by government with great industry, these principles
are pronounced to be “unnatural and wild, incompatible with practice, and
the offspring of the distempered imagination of a man who is biassed by
party, and who writes to deceive.”

I must take this opportunity to add, that I love quiet too well to think
of entering into a controversy with any writers; particularly, NAMELESS
ones. Conscious of good intentions, and unconnected with any party, I
have endeavoured to plead the cause of general liberty and justice: And
happy in knowing this, I shall, in silence, commit myself to that candour
of the public of which I have had so much experience.

    March 12th, 1776.




CONTENTS.


                                                                   _Page_

                                 PART I.

  SECT. I. _Of the Nature of Liberty in general._                      2

  SECT. II. _Of Civil Liberty and the Principles of Government._       6

  SECT. III. _Of the Authority of one Country over another._          19

                                PART II.

  SECT. I. _Of the Justice of the War with America._                  34

  SECT. II. _Whether the War with America is justified by
    the Principles of the Constitution._                              48

  SECT. III. _Of the Policy of the War with America._                 50

  SECT. IV. _Of the Honour of the Nation as affected by
    the War with America._                                            87

  SECT. V. _Of the Probability of succeeding in the War
    with America._                                                    94




OBSERVATIONS, &c.


Our Colonies in NORTH AMERICA appear to be now determined to risk
and suffer every thing, under the persuasion, that GREAT BRITAIN is
attempting to rob them of that Liberty to which every member of society,
and all civil communities, have a natural and unalienable title. The
question, therefore, whether this is a right persuasion, is highly
interesting, and deserves the careful attention of every _Englishman_
who values Liberty, and wishes to avoid staining himself with the
guilt of invading it. But it is impossible to judge properly of this
question without just ideas of Liberty _in general_; and of the nature,
limits, and principles of Civil Liberty _in particular_.—The following
observations on this subject appear to me of some importance; and I
cannot make myself easy without offering them to the public at the
present period, big with events of the last consequence to this kingdom.
I do this, with reluctance and pain, urged by strong feelings, but at
the same time checked by the consciousness that I am likely to deliver
sentiments not favourable to the present measures of that government,
under which I live, and to which I am a constant and zealous well-wisher.
Such, however, are my present sentiments and views, that this is a
consideration of inferior moment with me; and, as I hope never to go
beyond the bounds of decent discussion and expostulation, I flatter
myself, that I shall be able to avoid giving any person reason for
offence.

       *       *       *       *       *

The observations with which I shall begin, are of a more general
and abstracted nature; but being necessary to introduce what I have
principally in view, I hope they will be patiently read and considered.


SECT. I.

_Of the Nature of Liberty in General._

In order to obtain a more distinct view of the nature of Liberty as
such, it will be useful to consider it under the four following general
divisions.

First, _Physical_ Liberty.—Secondly, _Moral_ Liberty.—Thirdly,
_Religious_ Liberty.—And Fourthly, _Civil_ Liberty.—These heads
comprehend all the different kinds of Liberty. And I have placed _Civil_
Liberty last, because I mean to apply to it all I shall say of the other
kinds of Liberty.

By PHYSICAL LIBERTY I mean that principle of _Spontaneity_, or
_Self-determination_, which constitutes us _Agents_; or which gives us
a command over our actions, rendering them properly _ours_, and not
effects of the operation of any foreign cause.—MORAL LIBERTY is the power
of following, in all circumstances, our sense of right and wrong; or of
acting in conformity to our reflecting and moral principles, without
being controuled by any contrary principles.—RELIGIOUS LIBERTY signifies
the power of exercising, without molestation, that mode of religion
which we think best; or of making the decisions of our own consciences
respecting religious truth, the rule of our conduct, and not any of the
decisions of our fellow-men.—In like manner; CIVIL LIBERTY is the power
of a _Civil Society_ or _State_ to govern itself by its own discretion,
or by laws of its own making, without being subject to the impositions of
_any_ power, in appointing and directing which the collective body of the
people have no concern, and over which they have no controul.

It should be observed, that, according to these definitions of the
different kinds of liberty, there is one general idea, that runs through
them all; I mean, the idea of _Self-direction_, or _Self-government_.—Did
our volitions originate not with _ourselves_, but with some cause over
which we have no power; or were we under a necessity of always following
some will different from our own, we should want PHYSICAL LIBERTY.

In like manner; he whose perceptions of moral obligation are controuled
by his passions has lost his _Moral Liberty_; and the most common
language applied to him is, that he wants _Self-government_.

He likewise who, in religion, cannot govern himself by his convictions of
religious duty, but is obliged to receive formularies of faith, and to
practise modes of worship imposed upon him by others, wants _Religious
Liberty_.—And the Community also that is governed, not by itself, but by
some will independent of it, wants _Civil Liberty_.

In all these cases there is a force which stands opposed to the agent’s
_own_ will; and which, as far as it operates, produces _Servitude_.—In
the _first_ case, this force is incompatible with the very idea of
voluntary motion; and the subject of it is a mere passive instrument
which never _acts_, but is always _acted upon_.—In the _second_ case;
this force is the influence of passion getting the better of reason; or
the _brute_ overpowering and conquering the will of the _man_.—In the
_third_ case; it is _Human Authority_ in religion requiring conformity
to particular modes of faith and worship, and superseding _private
judgment_.—And in the last case, it is any will distinct from that of
the Majority of a Community, which claims a power of making laws for it,
and disposing of its property.

This it is, I think, that marks the limit between _Liberty_ and
_Slavery_. As far as, in any instance, the operation of any cause
comes in to restrain the power of Self-government, so far Slavery is
introduced: Nor do I think that a preciser idea than this of Liberty and
Slavery can be formed.

       *       *       *       *       *

I cannot help wishing I could here fix my reader’s attention, and engage
him to consider carefully the dignity of that blessing to which we give
the name of LIBERTY, according to the representation now made of it.
There is not a word in the whole compass of language which expresses so
much of what is important and excellent. It is, in every view of it, a
blessing truly sacred and invaluable.—Without _Physical Liberty_, man
would be a machine acted upon by mechanical springs, having no principle
of motion in himself, or command over events; and, therefore, incapable
of all merit and demerit.—Without _Moral Liberty_, he is a wicked and
detestable being, subject to the tyranny of base lusts, and the sport of
every vile appetite.—And without _Religious_ and _Civil Liberty_ he is
a poor and abject animal, without rights, without property, and without
a conscience, bending his neck to the yoke, and crouching to the will
of every silly creature who has the insolence to pretend to authority
over him.—Nothing, therefore, can be of so much consequence to us as
_Liberty_. It is the foundation of all honour, and the chief privilege
and glory of our natures.

In fixing our ideas on the subject of Liberty, it is of particular use to
take such an enlarged view of it as I have now given. But the immediate
object of the present enquiry being _Civil Liberty_, I will confine to it
all the subsequent observations.


SECT. II.

_Of Civil Liberty and the Principles of Government._

From what has been said it is obvious, that all civil government, as
far as it can be denominated _free_, is the creature of the people. It
originates with them. It is conducted under their direction; and has in
view nothing but their happiness. All its different forms are no more
than so many different modes in which they chuse to direct their affairs,
and to secure the quiet enjoyment of their rights.—In every free state
every man is his own Legislator.[11]—All _taxes_ are free-gifts for
public services.—All _laws_ are particular provisions or regulations
established by COMMON CONSENT for gaining protection and safety.—And all
_Magistrates_ are Trustees or Deputies for carrying these regulations
into execution.

Liberty, therefore, is too imperfectly defined when it is said to be “a
Government by LAWS, and not by MEN.” If the laws are made by one man,
or a junto of men in a state, and not by COMMON CONSENT, a government
by them does not differ from Slavery. In this case it would be a
contradiction in terms to say that the state governs itself.

From hence it is obvious that _Civil Liberty_, in its most perfect
degree, can be enjoyed only in small states, where every independent
agent is capable of giving his suffrage in person, and of being chosen
into public offices. When a state becomes so numerous, or when the
different parts of it are removed to such distances from one another,
as to render this impracticable, a diminution of Liberty necessarily
arises. There are, however, in these circumstances, methods by which such
near approaches may be made to perfect Liberty as shall answer all the
purposes of government, and at the same time secure every right of human
nature.

Tho’ all the members of a state should not be capable of giving their
suffrages on public measures, _individually_ and _personally_, they may
do this by the appointment of _Substitutes_ or _Representatives_. They
may entrust the powers of legislation, subject to such restrictions as
they shall think necessary, with any number of _Delegates_; and whatever
can be done by such delegates within the limits of their trust, may be
considered as done by the united voice and counsel of the Community.—In
this method a free government may be established in the largest state;
and it is conceivable that by regulations of this kind, any number of
states might be subjected to a scheme of government, that would exclude
the desolations of war, and produce universal peace and order.

Let us think here of what may be practicable in this way with respect
to _Europe_ in particular.—While it continues divided, as it is at
present, into a great number of independent kingdoms whose interests
are continually clashing, it is impossible but that disputes will often
arise which must end in war and carnage. It would be no remedy to this
evil to make one of these states supreme over the rest; and to give it an
absolute plenitude of power to superintend and controul them. This would
be to subject all the states to the arbitrary discretion of one, and to
establish an ignominious slavery not possible to be long endured. It
would, therefore, be a remedy worse than the disease; nor is it possible
it should be approved by any mind that has not lost every idea of Civil
Liberty. On the contrary.—Let every state, with respect to all its
internal concerns, be continued independent of all the rest; and let a
general confederacy be formed by the appointment of a SENATE consisting
of Representatives from all the different states. Let this SENATE
possess the power of managing all the _common_ concerns of the united
states, and of judging and deciding between them, as a common _Arbiter_
or _Umpire_, in all disputes; having, at the same time, under its
direction, the common force of the states to support its decisions.—In
these circumstances, each separate state would be secure against the
interference of foreign power in its private concerns, and, therefore,
would possess _Liberty_; and at the same time it would be secure against
all oppression and insult from every neighbouring state.—Thus might the
scattered force and abilities of a whole continent be gathered into one
point; all litigations settled as they rose; universal peace preserved;
and nation prevented _from any more lifting up a sword against nation_.

       *       *       *       *       *

I have observed, that tho’, in a great state, all the individuals that
compose it cannot be admitted to an immediate participation in the powers
of legislation and government, yet they may participate in these powers
by a delegation of them to a body of representatives.—In this case it
is evident that the state will be still _free_ or _self-governed_; and
that it will be more or less so in proportion as it is more or less
fairly and adequately represented. If the persons to whom the trust of
government is committed hold their places for short terms; if they are
chosen by the unbiassed voices of a majority of the state, and subject
to their instructions; Liberty will be enjoyed in its highest degree.
But if they are chosen for long terms by a part only of the state;
and if during that term they are subject to no controul from their
constituents; the very idea of Liberty will be lost, and the power of
chusing representatives becomes nothing but a power, lodged in a _few_,
to chuse at certain periods, a body of _Masters_ for themselves and for
the rest of the Community. And if a state is so sunk that the majority
of its representatives are elected by a handful of the meanest[12]
persons in it, whose votes are always paid for; and if also, there is a
higher will on which even these mock representatives themselves depend,
and that directs their voices: In these circumstances, it will be an
abuse of language to say that the state possesses Liberty. Private men,
indeed, might be allowed the exercise of Liberty; as they might also
under the most despotic government, but it would be an _indulgence_ or
_connivance_ derived from the spirit of the times, or from an accidental
mildness in the administration. And, rather than be governed in such a
manner, it would perhaps be better to be governed by the will of one man
without any representation: For a representation so degenerated could
answer no other end than to mislead and deceive, by disguising slavery,
and keeping up a _form_ of Liberty when the _reality_ was lost.

       *       *       *       *       *

Within the limits now mentioned, Liberty may be enjoyed in every possible
degree; from that which is complete and perfect, to that which is
merely nominal; according as the people have more or less of a share in
government, and of a controuling power over the persons by whom it is
administered.

In general, to be _free_ is to be guided by one’s own will; and to be
guided by the will of another is the characteristic of _Servitude_. This
is particularly applicable to Political Liberty. That state, I have
observed, is _free_, which is guided by its own will; or, (which comes
to the same) by the will of an assembly of representatives appointed
by itself and accountable to itself. And every state that is not so
governed; or in which a body of men representing the people make not an
essential part of the Legislature, is in _slavery_.—In order to form the
most perfect constitution of government, there may be the best reasons
for joining to such a body of representatives, an _Hereditary Council_
consisting of men of the first rank in the state, with a _Supreme
executive Magistrate_ at the head of all. This will form useful checks
in a legislature; and contribute to give it vigour, union, and dispatch,
without infringing liberty: for, as long as that part of a government
which represents the people is a _fair representation_; and also has
a negative on all public measures, together with the sole power of
imposing taxes and originating supplies; the essentials of liberty will
be preserved.—We make it our boast in this country, that this is our own
constitution. I will not say with how much reason.

       *       *       *       *       *

Of such Liberty as I have now described, it is impossible there should
be an excess. Government is an institution for the benefit of the people
governed, which they have power to model as they please; and to say,
that they can have too much of this power, is to say, that there ought
to be a power in the state superior to that which gives it being, and
from which all jurisdiction in it is derived.—Licentiousness, which
has been commonly mentioned, as an extreme of liberty, is indeed its
opposite. It is government by the will of rapacious individuals, in
opposition to the will of the community, made known and declared in
the laws. A free state, at the same time that it is free itself, makes
all its members free, by excluding licentiousness, and guarding their
persons and property and good name against insult. It is the end of all
just government, at the same time that it secures the liberty of the
public against _foreign_ injury, to secure the liberty of the individual
against _private_ injury. I do not, therefore, think it strictly just to
say, that it belongs to the nature of government to entrench on private
liberty. It ought never to do this, except as far as the exercise of
private liberty encroaches on the liberties of others. That is; it is
licentiousness it restrains, and liberty itself only when used to destroy
liberty.

It appears from hence, that licentiousness and despotism are more nearly
allied than is commonly imagined. They are both alike inconsistent
with liberty, and the true end of government; nor is there any other
difference between them, than that the one is the licentiousness of
_great_ men, and the other the licentiousness of _little_ men; or that,
by the one, the persons and property of a people are subject to outrage
and invasion from a King, or a lawless body of _Grandees_; and that, by
the other, they are subject to the like outrage from a _lawless mob_.—In
avoiding one of these evils, mankind have often run into the other. But
all well constituted governments guard equally against both. Indeed of
the two, the last is, on several accounts, the least to be dreaded, and
has done the least mischief. It may be truly said, that if licentiousness
has destroyed its thousands, despotism has destroyed its millions. The
former, having little power, and no system to support it, necessarily
finds its own remedy; and a people soon get out of the tumult and
anarchy attending it. But a despotism, wearing the form of government,
and being armed with its force, is an evil not to be conquered without
dreadful struggles. It goes on from age to age, debasing the human
faculties, levelling all distinctions, and preying on the rights and
blessings of society.—It deserves to be added, that in a state disturbed
by licentiousness, there is an animation which is favourable to the
human mind, and which puts it upon exerting its powers. But in a state
habituated to a despotism, all is still and torpid. A dark and savage
tyranny stifles every effort of genius; and the mind loses all its spirit
and dignity.

       *       *       *       *       *

Before I proceed to what I have farther in view, I will observe, that
the account now given of the principles of public Liberty, and the
nature of an equal and free government, shews what judgment we should
form of that OMNIPOTENCE, which, it has been said, must belong to every
government as such. Great stress has been laid on this, but most
unreasonably.—Government, as has been before observed, is, in the very
nature of it, a TRUST; and all its powers a DELEGATION for gaining
particular ends. This _trust_ may be misapplied and abused. It may be
employed to defeat the very ends for which it was instituted; and to
subvert the very rights which it ought to protect.—A PARLIAMENT, for
instance, consisting of a body of representatives, chosen for a limited
period, to make laws, and to grant money for public services, would
forfeit its authority by making itself perpetual, or even prolonging its
own duration; by nominating its own members; by accepting bribes; or
subjecting itself to any kind of foreign influence. This would convert a
_Parliament_ into a _conclave_ or _junto_ of self-created tools; and a
state that has lost its regard to its own rights, so far as to submit to
such a breach of trust in its rulers, is enslaved.—Nothing, therefore,
can be more absurd than the doctrine which some have taught, with respect
to the omnipotence of parliaments. They possess no power beyond the
limits of the trust for the execution of which they were formed. If they
contradict this trust, they betray their constituents, and dissolve
themselves. All delegated power must be subordinate and limited.—If
omnipotence can, with any sense, be ascribed to a legislature, it must
be lodged where all legislative authority originates; that is, in the
PEOPLE. For _their_ sakes government is instituted; and their’s is the
only real omnipotence.

       *       *       *       *       *

I am sensible, that all I have been saying would be very absurd, were
the opinions just which some have maintained concerning the origin
of government. According to these opinions, government is not the
creature of the people, or the result of a convention between them and
their rulers: But there are certain men who possess in themselves,
independently of the will of the people, a right of governing them, which
they derive from the Deity. This doctrine has been abundantly refuted
by many[13] excellent writers. It is a doctrine which avowedly subverts
Civil Liberty; and which represents mankind as a body of vassals, formed
to descend like cattle from one set of owners to another, who have an
absolute dominion over them. It is a wonder, that those who view their
species in a light so humiliating, should ever be able to think of
themselves without regret and shame. The intention of these observations
is not to oppose such sentiments; but, taking for granted the
reasonableness of Civil Liberty, to shew wherein it consists, and what
distinguishes it from its contrary.—And, in considering this subject, as
it has been now treated, it is unavoidable to reflect on the excellency
of a free government, and its tendency to exalt the nature of man.—Every
member of a free state, having his property secure, and knowing himself
his own governor, possesses a consciousness of dignity in himself, and
feels incitements to emulation and improvement, to which the miserable
slaves of arbitrary power must be utter strangers. In such a state all
the springs of action have room to operate, and the mind is stimulated
to the noblest exertions[14].—But to be obliged, from our birth, to look
up to a creature no better than ourselves as the master of our fortunes;
and to receive his will as our law—What can be more humiliating? What
elevated ideas can enter a mind in such a situation?—Agreeably to
this remark; the subjects of free states have, in all ages, been most
distinguished for genius and knowledge. Liberty is the soil where the
arts and sciences have flourished; and the more free a state has been,
the more have the powers of the human mind been drawn forth into action,
and the greater number of brave men has it produced. With what lustre do
the antient free states of _Greece_ shine in the annals of the world? How
different is that country now, under the Great _Turk_? The difference
between a country inhabited by men and by brutes is not greater.

These are reflexions which should be constantly present to every mind
in this country.—As _Moral_ Liberty is the prime blessing of man in his
_private_ capacity, so is _Civil_ liberty in his _public_ capacity.
There is nothing that requires more to be _watched_ than power. There is
nothing that ought to be opposed with a more determined resolution than
its encroachments. Sleep in a state, as _Montesquieu_ says, is always
followed by slavery.

The people of this kingdom were once warmed by such sentiments as these.
Many a sycophant of power have they sacrificed. Often have they fought
and bled in the cause of Liberty. But that time seems to be going. The
fair inheritance of Liberty left us by our ancestors many of us are
willing to resign. An abandoned venality, the inseparable companion of
dissipation and extravagance, has poisoned the springs of public virtue
among us: And should any events ever arise that should render the same
opposition necessary that took place in the times of King _Charles_ the
First, and _James_ the Second, I am afraid all that is valuable to us
would be lost. The terror of the standing army, the danger of the public
funds, and the all-corrupting influence of the treasury, would deaden all
zeal, and produce general acquiescence and servility.


SECT. III.

_Of the Authority of one Country over another._

From the nature and principles of Civil Liberty, as they have been
now explained, it is an immediate and necessary inference that no one
community can have any power over the property or legislation of another
community, which is not incorporated with it by a just and adequate
representation.—Then only, it has been shewn, is a state _free_, when
it is governed by its own will. But a country that is subject to the
legislature of another country, in which it has no voice, and over which
it has no controul, cannot be said to be governed by its own will. Such
a country, therefore, is in a state of slavery. And it deserves to
be particularly considered, that such a slavery is worse, on several
accounts, than any slavery of private men to one another, or of kingdoms
to despots within themselves.—Between one state and another, there is
none of that fellow-feeling that takes place between persons in private
life. Being detached bodies that never see one another, and residing
perhaps in different quarters of the globe, the state that governs
cannot be a witness to the sufferings occasioned by its oppressions; or
a competent judge of the circumstances and abilities of the people who
are governed. They must also have in a great degree separate interests;
and the more the one is loaded, the more the other may be eased. The
infamy likewise of oppression, being in such circumstances shared among
a multitude, is not likely to be much felt or regarded.—On all these
accounts there is, in the case of one country subjugated to another,
little or nothing to check rapacity; and the most flagrant injustice and
cruelty may be practised without remorse or pity.—I will add, that it
is particularly difficult to shake off a tyranny of this kind. A single
despot, if a people are unanimous and resolute, may be soon subdued. But
a despotic state is not easily subdued; and a people subject to it cannot
emancipate themselves without entering into a dreadful, and, perhaps,
very unequal contest.

I cannot help observing farther, that the slavery of a people to internal
despots may be qualified and limited; but I don’t see what can limit
the authority of one state over another. The exercise of power in this
case can have no other measure than discretion; and, therefore, must be
indefinite and absolute.

       *       *       *       *       *

Once more. It should be considered that the government of one country by
another, can only be supported by a military force; and, without such a
support, must be destitute of all weight and efficiency.

This will be best explained by putting the following case.—There is,
let us suppose, in a province subject to the sovereignty of a distant
state, a subordinate legislature consisting of an Assembly chosen by the
people; a Council chosen by that Assembly; and a Governor _appointed_
by the Sovereign state, and paid by the Province. There are, likewise,
judges and other officers, appointed and paid in the same manner, for
administering _justice_ agreeably to the laws, by the verdicts of juries
fairly chosen.—This forms a constitution seemingly free, by giving the
people a share in their own government, and some check on their rulers.
But, while there is a higher legislative power, to the controul of which
such a constitution is subject, it does not itself possess Liberty,
and therefore cannot be of any use as a security to Liberty; nor is
it possible that it should be of long duration. Laws offensive to the
Province will be enacted by the Sovereign State. The legislature of the
Province will remonstrate against them. The magistrates will not execute
them. Juries will not convict upon them; and consequently, like the
Pope’s Bulls which once governed _Europe_, they will become nothing but
forms and empty sounds, to which no regard will be shewn.—In order to
remedy this evil, and to give efficiency to its government, the supreme
state will naturally be led to withdraw the _Governor_, the _Council_,
and the _Judges_[15] from the controul of the Province, by making
them entirely dependant on itself for their _pay_ and _continuance in
office_, as well as for their appointment. It will also alter the mode
of chusing Juries on purpose to bring them more under its influence: And
in some cases, under the pretence of the impossibility of gaining an
impartial trial where government is resisted, it will perhaps ordain,
that offenders shall be removed from the Province to be tried within its
own territories: And it may even go so far in this kind of policy, as
to endeavour to prevent the effects of discontents, by forbidding all
meetings and associations of the people, except at such times, and for
such particular purposes, as shall be permitted them.

Thus will such a Province be exactly in the same state that _Britain_
would be in, were our first executive magistrate, our House of Lords,
and our Judges, nothing but the instruments of a foreign democratical
power; were our Juries nominated by that power; or were we liable to
be transported to a distant country to be tried for offences committed
here, and restrained from calling any meetings, consulting about any
grievances, or associating for any purposes, except when leave should be
given us by a _Lord Lieutenant_ or _Viceroy_.

It is certain that this is a state of oppression which no country could
endure, and to which it would be vain to expect, that any people should
submit an hour without an armed force to compel them.

The late transactions in _Massachuset’s Bay_ are a perfect
exemplification of what I have now said. The government of _Great
Britain_ in that Province has gone on exactly in the train I have
described; till at last it became necessary to station troops there, not
amenable to the civil power; and all terminated in a government by the
SWORD. And such, if a people are not sunk below the character of men,
will be the issue of all government in similar circumstances.

       *       *       *       *       *

It may be asked—“Are there not causes by which one state may acquire a
_rightful_ authority over another, though not consolidated by an adequate
Representation?”—I answer, that there are no such causes.—All the causes
to which such an effect _can_ be ascribed are CONQUEST, COMPACT, or
OBLIGATIONS CONFERRED.

Much has been said of the right of _conquest_; and history contains
little more than accounts of kingdoms reduced by it under the dominion
of other kingdoms, and of the havock it has made among mankind. But
the authority derived from hence, being founded on violence, is never
_rightful_. The _Roman Republic_ was nothing but a faction against the
general liberties of the world; and had no more right to give law to the
Provinces subject to it, than thieves have to the property they seize,
or to the houses into which they break.—Even in the case of a just war
undertaken by one people to defend itself against the oppressions of
another people, conquest gives only a right to an indemnification for the
injury which occasioned the war, and a reasonable security against future
injury.

Neither can any state acquire such an authority over other states in
virtue of any _compacts_ or _cessions_. This is a case in which compacts
are not binding. _Civil_ Liberty is, in this respect, on the same footing
with _Religious_ Liberty. As no people can lawfully surrender their
_Religious_ Liberty, by giving up their right of judging for themselves
in religion, or by allowing any human beings to prescribe to them what
faith they shall embrace, or what mode of worship they shall practise;
so neither can any civil societies lawfully surrender their _Civil_
Liberty, by giving up to any extraneous jurisdiction their power of
legislating for themselves and disposing their property. Such a cession,
being inconsistent with the unalienable rights of human nature, would
either not bind at all; or bind only the individuals who made it. This
is a blessing which no one generation of men can give up for another;
and which, when lost, a people have always a right to resume.—Had our
ancestors in this country been so mad as to have subjected themselves to
any foreign Community, we could not have been under any obligation to
continue in such a state. And all the nations now in the world who, in
consequence of the tameness and folly of their predecessors, are subject
to arbitrary power, have a right to emancipate themselves as soon as they
can.

If neither _conquest_ nor _compact_ can give such an authority, much less
can any favours received, or any services performed by one state for
another.—Let the favour received be what it will, Liberty is too dear a
price for it. A state that has been _obliged_ is not, therefore, bound to
be _enslaved_. It ought, if possible, to make an adequate return for the
services done to it; but to suppose that it ought to give up the power of
governing itself, and the disposal of its property, would be to suppose,
that, in order to shew its gratitude, it ought to part with the power
of ever afterwards exercising gratitude.—How much has been done by this
kingdom for _Hanover_? But no one will say that on this account, we have
a right to make the laws of _Hanover_; or even to draw a single penny
from it without its own consent.

       *       *       *       *       *

After what has been said it will, I am afraid, be trifling to apply
the preceding arguments to the case of different communities, which
are considered as different parts of the same _Empire_. But there are
reasons which render it necessary for me to be explicit in making this
application.

What I mean here is just to point out the difference of situation between
communities forming an _Empire_; and particular bodies or classes of men
forming different parts of a _Kingdom_. Different communities forming
an _Empire_ have no connexions, which produce a necessary reciprocation
of interests between them. They inhabit different districts, and are
governed by different legislatures.—On the contrary. The different
classes of men _within a kingdom_ are all placed on the same ground.
Their concerns and interests are the same; and what is done to one
part must affect all.—These are situations totally different; and a
constitution of government that may be consistent with Liberty in one of
them, may be entirely inconsistent with it in the other. It is, however,
certain that, even in the last of these situations, no one part ought to
govern the rest. In order to a fair and equal government, there ought to
be a fair and equal representation of all that are governed; and as far
as this is wanting in any government, it deviates from the principles
of Liberty, and becomes unjust and oppressive.—But in the circumstances
of different communities, all this holds with unspeakably more force.
The government of a part in this case becomes complete tyranny; and
subjection to it becomes complete slavery.

       *       *       *       *       *

But ought there not, it is asked, to exist somewhere in an _Empire_ a
supreme legislative authority over the whole; or a power to controul and
bind all the different states of which it consists?—This enquiry has been
already answered. The truth is, that such a supreme controuling power
ought to exist no-where except in such a SENATE or body of delegates as
that described in page 8; and that the authority or supremacy of even
this senate ought to be limited to the common concerns of the _Empire_.—I
think I have proved that the fundamental principles of Liberty
necessarily require this.

In a word. An _Empire_ is a collection of states or communities united
by some common bond or tye. If these states have each of them free
constitutions of government, and, with respect to taxation and internal
legislation, are independent of the other states, but united by compacts,
or alliances, or subjection to a Great _Council_, representing the
whole, or to one monarch entrusted with the supreme executive power: In
these circumstances, the Empire will be an Empire of Freemen.—If, on the
contrary, like the different provinces subject to the _Grand Seignior_,
none of the states possess any independent legislative authority; but
are all subject to an absolute monarch, whose will is their law; then
is the Empire an Empire of Slaves.—If one of the states is free, but
governs by its will all the other states; then is the Empire, like that
of the Romans in the times of the republic, an Empire consisting of one
state free, and the rest in slavery: Nor does it make any more difference
in this case, that the governing state is itself free, than it does, in
the case of a kingdom subject to a _despot_, that this despot is himself
free. I have before observed, that this only makes the slavery worse.
There is, in the one case, a chance, that, in the quick succession of
despots, a good one will sometimes arise. But bodies of men continue the
same; and have generally proved the most unrelenting of all tyrants.

A great writer before[16] quoted, observes of the _Roman Empire_, that
while Liberty was at the center, tyranny prevailed in the distant
provinces; that such as were free under it were extremely so, while those
who were slaves groaned under the extremity of slavery; and that the same
events that _destroyed_ the liberty of the former, _gave_ liberty to the
latter.

The Liberty of the _Romans_, therefore, was only an additional calamity
to the provinces governed by them; and though it might have been said
of the _citizens_ of _Rome_, that they were the “freest members of any
civil society in the known world;” yet of the _subjects_ of _Rome_, it
must have been said, that they were the completest slaves in the known
world.—How remarkable is it, that this very people, once the freest of
mankind, but at the same time the most proud and tyrannical, should
become at last the most contemptible and abject slaves that ever existed?




PART II.


In the foregoing disquisitions, I have, from one leading principle,
deduced a number of consequences, that seem to me incapable of being
disputed. I have meant that they should be applied to the great question
between this kingdom and the Colonies which has occasioned the present
war with them.

It is impossible, but my readers must have been all along making this
application; and if they still think, that the claims of this kingdom
are reconcileable to the principles of true liberty and legitimate
government, I am afraid, that nothing I shall farther say will have any
effect on their judgments. I wish, however, they would have the patience
and candour to go with me, and grant me a hearing some time longer.

Though clearly decided in my own judgment on this subject, I am inclined
to make great allowances for the different judgments of others. We have
been so used to speak of the Colonies as _our_ Colonies, and to think of
them as in a state of subordination to us, and as holding their existence
in _America_ only for our use, that it is no wonder the prejudices of
many are alarmed, when they find a different doctrine maintained. The
meanest person among us is disposed to look upon himself as having a body
of subjects in _America_; and to be offended at the denial of his right
to make laws for them, though perhaps he does not know what colour they
are of, or what language they talk.—Such are the natural prejudices of
this country.—But the time is coming, I hope, when the unreasonableness
of them will be seen; and more just sentiments prevail.

       *       *       *       *       *

Before I proceed, I beg it may be attended to, that I have chosen to try
this question by the general principles of Civil Liberty; and not by the
practice of former times; or by the _Charters_ granted the colonies.—The
arguments _for_ them, drawn from these last topics, appear to me
greatly to outweigh the arguments _against_ them. But I wish to have
this question brought to a higher test, and surer issue. The question
with all liberal enquirers ought to be, not what jurisdiction over them
_Precedents_, _Statutes_, and _Charters_ give, but what reason and
equity, and the rights of humanity give.—This is, in truth, a question
which no kingdom has ever before had occasion to agitate. The case of
a free country branching itself out in the manner _Britain_ has done,
and sending to a distant world colonies which have there, from small
beginnings, and under free legislatures of their own, increased, and
formed a body of powerful states, likely soon to become superior the
parent state.—This is a case which is new in the history of mankind; and
it is extremely improper to judge of it by the rules of any narrow and
partial policy; or to consider it on any other ground than the general
one of reason and justice.—Those who will be candid enough to judge on
this ground, and who can divest themselves of national prejudices, will
not, I fancy, remain long unsatisfied.—But alas! Matters are gone too
far. The dispute probably must be settled another way; and the sword
alone, I am afraid, is now to determine what the rights of _Britain_ and
_America_ are.—Shocking situation!—Detested be the measures which have
brought us into it: And, if we are endeavouring to enforce injustice,
cursed will be the war.—A retreat, however, is not yet impracticable. The
duty we owe our gracious sovereign obliges us to rely on his disposition
to stay the sword, and to promote the happiness of all the different
parts of the Empire at the head of which he is placed. With some hopes,
therefore, that it may not be too late to reason on this subject, I will,
in the following Sections, enquire what the war with _America_ is in the
following respects.

1. In respect of Justice.

2. The Principles of the Constitution.

3. In respect of Policy and Humanity.

4. The Honour of the Kingdom.

And lastly, The Probability of succeeding in it.


SECT. I.

_Of the Justice of the War with America._

The enquiry, whether the war with the Colonies is a _just_ war, will be
best determined by stating the power over them, which it is the end of
the war to maintain: And this cannot be better done, than in the words
of an act of parliament, made on purpose to define it. That act, it is
well known, declares, “That this kingdom has power, and of right ought to
have power to make laws and statutes to bind the Colonies, and people of
_America_, in all cases whatever.”—Dreadful power indeed! I defy any one
to express slavery in stronger language. It is the same with declaring
“that we have a right to do with them what we please.”—I will not waste
my time by applying to such a claim any of the preceding arguments. If
my reader does not feel more in this case, than words can express, all
reasoning must be vain.

But, probably, most persons will be for using milder language; and for
saying no more than, that the united legislatures of _England_ and
_Scotland_ have of right power to tax the Colonies, and a _supremacy_ of
legislation over _America_.—But this comes to the same. If it means any
thing, it means, that the property and the legislations of the Colonies,
are subject to the absolute discretion of _Great Britain_, and ought of
right to be so. The nature of the thing admits of no limitation. The
Colonies can never be admitted to be judges, how far the authority over
them in these cases shall extend. This would be to destroy it entirely—If
_any_ part of their property is subject to our discretion, the _whole_
must be so. If we have a right to interfere at all in their internal
legislations, we have a right to interfere as far as we think proper.—It
is self-evident, that this leaves them nothing they can call _their
own_.—And what is it that can give to any people such a supremacy over
another people?—I have already examined the principal answers which have
been given to this enquiry. But it will not be amiss in this place to go
over some of them again.

       *       *       *       *       *

It has been urged, that such a right must be lodged somewhere, “in order
to preserve the UNITY of the British Empire.”

Pleas of this sort have, in all ages, been used to justify tyranny.—They
have in RELIGION given rise to numberless oppressive claims, and slavish
Hierarchies. And in the _Romish Communion_ particularly, it is well
known, that the POPE claims the title and powers of the supreme head
on earth of the Christian church, in order to preserve its UNITY.—With
respect to the _British Empire_, nothing can be more preposterous than to
endeavour to maintain its unity, by setting up such a claim. This is a
method of establishing unity, which, like the similar method in religion,
can produce nothing but discord and mischief.—The truth is, that a common
relation to one supreme executive head; an exchange of kind offices; tyes
of interest and affection, and _compacts_, are sufficient to give the
British Empire all the unity that is necessary. But if not—If, in order
to preserve its _Unity_, one half of it must be enslaved to the other
half, let it, in the name of God, want Unity.

Much has been said of “the _Superiority_ of the British State.” But what
gives us our superiority?—Is it our _Wealth_?—This never confers real
dignity. On the contrary: Its effect is always to debase, intoxicate,
and corrupt.—Is it the _number of our people_? The colonies will soon
be equal to us in number.—Is it our _Knowledge_ and _Virtue_? They
are probably _equally_ knowing, and _more_ virtuous. There are names
among them that will not stoop to any names among the philosophers and
politicians of this island.

“But we are the PARENT STATE.”—These are the magic words which have
fascinated and misled us.—The English came from _Germany_. Does that give
the _German_ states a right to tax us?—Children, having no property, and
being incapable of guiding themselves, the author of nature has committed
the care of them to their parents, and subjected them to their absolute
authority. But there is a period when, having acquired property, and a
capacity of judging for themselves, they become independent agents; and
when, for this reason, the authority of their parents ceases, and becomes
nothing but the respect and influence due to benefactors. Supposing,
therefore, that the order of nature in establishing the relation between
parents and children, ought to have been the rule of our conduct to the
Colonies, we should have been gradually relaxing our authority as they
grew up. But, like mad parents, we have done the contrary; and, at the
very time when our authority should have been most relaxed, we have
carried it to the greatest extent, and exercised it with the greatest
rigour. No wonder then, that they have turned upon us; and obliged us to
remember, that they are not Children.

“But we have, it is said, protected them, and run deeply in debt on their
account.”—The full answer to this has been already given, (page 26.) Will
any one say, that all we have done for them has not been more on our
_own_ account,[17] than on _theirs_?—But suppose the contrary. Have they
done nothing for us? Have they made no compensation for the protection
they have received? Have they not helped us to pay our _taxes_, to
support our poor, and to bear the burthen of our debts, by taking from
us, at our own price, all the commodities with which we can supply
them?—Have they not, for our advantage, submitted to many restraints
in acquiring property? Must they likewise resign to us the disposal of
that property?—Has not their exclusive trade with us been for many years
one of the chief sources of our wealth and power?—In all our wars have
they not fought by our side, and contributed much to our success? In
the last war, particularly, it is well known, that they ran themselves
deeply in debt; and that the parliament thought it necessary to grant
them considerable sums annually as compensations for going beyond their
abilities in assisting us. And in this course would they have continued
for many future years; perhaps, for ever.—In short; were an accurate
account stated, it is by no means certain which side would appear to
be most indebted. When asked as _freemen_, they have hitherto seldom
discovered any reluctance in giving. But, in obedience to a demand, and
with the bayonet at their breasts, they will give us nothing but blood.

It is farther said, “that the land on which they settled was ours.”—But
how came it to be ours? If sailing along a coast can give a right to
a country, then might the people of _Japan_ become, as soon as they
please, the proprietors of _Britain_. Nothing can be more chimerical than
property founded on such a reason. If the land on which the Colonies
first settled had any proprietors, they were the natives. The greatest
part of it they bought of the natives. They have since cleared and
cultivated it; and, without any help from us, converted a wilderness into
fruitful and pleasant fields. It is, therefore, now on a double account
their property; and no power on earth can have any right to disturb them
in the possession of it, or to take from them, without their consent, any
part of its produce.

But let it be granted, that the land was ours. Did they not settle upon
it under the faith of charters, which promised them the enjoyment of
all the rights of _Englishmen_; and allowed them to tax themselves, and
to be governed by legislatures of their own, similar to ours? These
charters were given them by an authority, which at the time was thought
competent; and they have been rendered sacred by an acquiescence on our
part for near a century. Can it then be wondered at, that the Colonies
should revolt, when they found their charters violated; and an attempt
made to force INNOVATIONS upon them by famine and the sword;—But I lay
no stress on charters. They derive their rights from a higher source. It
is inconsistent with common sense to imagine, that any people would ever
think of settling in a distant country, on any such condition, as that
the people from whom they withdrew, should for ever be masters of their
property, and have power to subject them to any modes of government they
pleased. And had there been express stipulations to this purpose in all
the charters of the colonies, they would, in my opinion, be no more bound
by them, than if it had been stipulated with them, that they should go
naked, or expose themselves to the incursions of wolves and tigers.

The defective state of the representation of this kingdom has been
farther pleaded to prove our right to tax _America_. We submit to a
parliament that does not represent us, and therefore they ought.—How
strange an argument is this? It is saying we want liberty; and therefore,
they ought to want it.—Suppose it true, that they are indeed contending
for a better constitution of government, and more liberty than we enjoy:
Ought this to make us angry?—Who is there that does not see the danger to
which this country is exposed?—Is it generous, because we are in a sink,
to endeavour to draw them into it? Ought we not rather to wish earnestly,
that there may at least be ONE FREE COUNTRY left upon earth, to which
we may fly, when venality, luxury, and vice have completed the ruin of
liberty here?

It is, however, by no means true, that _America_ has no more right to
be exempted from taxation by the _British_ parliament, than _Britain_
itself.—_Here_, all freeholders, and burgesses in boroughs, are
represented. _There_, not one _Freeholder_, or any other person, is
represented.—_Here_, the _aids_ granted by the represented part of
the kingdom must be proportionably _paid_ by themselves; and the laws
they make for _others_, they at the same time make for _themselves_.
_There_, the aids they would grant would not be _paid_, but _received_,
by themselves; and the laws they made would be made for _others
only_.—In short. The relation of one country to another country, whose
representatives have the power of taxing it (and of appropriating the
money raised by the taxes) is much the same with the relation of a
country to a single despot, or a body of despots, within itself, invested
with the like power. In both cases, the people taxed and those who tax
have separate interests; nor can there be any thing to check oppression,
besides either the abilities of the people taxed, or the humanity of the
_taxers_.—But indeed I can never hope to convince that person of any
thing, who does not see an essential difference[18] between the two cases
now mentioned; or between the circumstances of individuals, and classes
of men, making parts of a community imperfectly represented in the
legislature that governs it; and the circumstances of a whole community,
in a distant world, not at all represented.

But enough has been said by others on this point; nor is it possible for
me to throw any new light upon it. To finish, therefore, what I meant to
offer under this head, I must beg that the following considerations may
be particularly attended to.

       *       *       *       *       *

The question now between us and the Colonies is, Whether, in respect of
taxation and internal legislation, they are bound to be subject to the
jurisdiction of this kingdom: Or, in other words, Whether the _British_
parliament has or has not of right, a power to dispose of their property,
and to model as it pleases their governments?—To this supremacy over
them, we say, we are entitled; and in order to maintain it, we have begun
the present war.—Let me here enquire,

_1st._ Whether, if we have now this supremacy, we shall not be equally
entitled to it in any future time?—They are now but little short of half
our number. To this number they have grown, from a small body of original
settlers, by a very rapid increase. The probability is, that they will
go on to increase; and that, in 50 or 60 years, they will be _double_ our
number;[19] and form a mighty Empire, consisting of a variety of states,
all equal or superior to ourselves in all the arts and accomplishments,
which give dignity and happiness to human life. In that period, will
they be still bound to acknowledge that supremacy over them which we now
claim? Can there be any person who will assert this; or whose mind does
not revolt at the idea of a vast continent, holding all that is valuable
to it, at the discretion of a handful of people on the other side the
_Atlantic_?—But if, at _that_ period, this would be unreasonable; what
makes it otherwise _now_?—Draw the line, if you can.—But there is a still
greater difficulty.

       *       *       *       *       *

_Britain_ is now, I will suppose, the seat of Liberty and Virtue;
and its legislature consists of a body of able and independent men,
who govern with wisdom and justice. The time may come when all will
be reversed: When its excellent constitution of government will be
subverted: When, pressed by debts and taxes, it will be greedy to draw
to itself an increase of revenue from every distant Province, in order
to ease its own burdens: When the influence of the crown, strengthened
by luxury and an universal profligacy of manners, will have tainted
every heart, broken down every fence of Liberty, and rendered us a
nation of tame and contented vassals: When a General _Election_ will be
nothing but a general _Auction_ of _Boroughs_: And when the PARLIAMENT,
the Grand Council of the nation, and once the faithful guardian of the
state, and a terror to evil ministers, will be degenerated into a body
of _Sycophants_, dependent and venal, always ready to confirm _any_
measures; and little more than a public court for registering royal
edicts.—Such, it is possible, may, some time or other, be the state of
_Great Britain_.—What will, at that period, be the duty of the Colonies?
Will they be still bound to unconditional submission? Must they always
continue an appendage to our government; and follow it implicitly through
every change that can happen to it?—Wretched condition, indeed, of
millions of freemen as good as ourselves.—Will you say that we now govern
equitably; and that there is no danger of any such revolution?—Would
to God this were true.—But will you not always say the same? Who shall
judge whether we govern equitably or not? Can you give the Colonies any
_security_ that such a period will never come? Once more.

       *       *       *       *       *

If we have indeed that power which we claim over the legislations, and
internal rights of the Colonies, may we not, whenever we please, subject
them to the arbitrary power of the crown?—I do not mean, that this would
be a disadvantageous change: For I have before observed, that if a
people are to be subject to an external power over which they have no
command, it is better that power should be lodged in the hands of one man
than of a multitude. But many persons think otherwise; and such ought
to consider that, if this would be a calamity, the condition of the
Colonies must be deplorable.—“A government by King, Lords, and Commons,
(it has been said) is the perfection of government;” and so it is, when
the Commons are a just representation of the people; and when also, it is
not extended to any distant people, or communities, not represented. But
if this is the _best_, a government by a king only must be the _worst_;
and every claim implying a right to establish such a government among any
people must be unjust and cruel.—It is self-evident, that by claiming
a right to alter the constitutions of the Colonies, according to our
discretion, we claim this power: And it is a power that we have thought
fit to exercise in _one_ of our Colonies; and that we have attempted
to exercise in _another_.—_Canada_, according to the late extension of
its limits, is a country almost as large as half _Europe_; and it may
possibly come in time to be filled with British subjects. The _Quebec_
act makes the king of _Great Britain_ a despot over all that country.—In
the Province of _Massachuset’s Bay_ the same thing has been attempted and
begun.

The act for BETTER _regulating their government_, passed at the same
time with the _Quebec_ act, gives the king the right of appointing, and
removing at his pleasure, the members of one part of the legislature;
alters the mode of chusing juries, on purpose to bring it more under the
influence of the king; and takes away from the province the power of
calling any meetings of the people without the king’s consent.[20]—The
judges, likewise, have been made dependent on the king, for their
nomination and pay, and continuance in office.—If all this is no more
than we have a right to do; may we not go on to abolish the house of
representatives, to destroy all trials by juries, and to give up the
province absolutely and totally to the will of the king?—May we not even
establish popery in the province, as has been lately done in _Canada_,
leaving the support of protestantism to the king’s discretion?—Can
there be any Englishman who, were it his own case, would not sooner
lose his heart’s blood than yield to claims so pregnant with evils,
and destructive to every thing that can distinguish a _Freeman_ from a
_Slave_?

I will take this opportunity to add, that what I have now said, suggests
a consideration that demonstrates, on how different a footing the
Colonies are with respect to our government, from particular bodies of
men _within_ the kingdom, who happen not to be represented. Here, it is
impossible that the represented part should subject the unrepresented
part to arbitrary power, without including themselves. But in the
Colonies it is _not_ impossible. We know that it _has_ been done.


SECT. II.

_Whether the War with ~America~ is justified by the Principles of the
Constitution._

I have proposed, in the next place, to examine the war with the Colonies
by the principles of the constitution.—I know, that it is common to say
that we are now maintaining the constitution in _America_. If this means
that we are endeavouring to establish our own constitution of government
there; it is by no means true; nor, were it true, would it be right. They
have chartered governments of their own, with which they are pleased;
and which, if any power on earth may change without their consent, that
power may likewise, if it thinks proper, deliver them over to the _Grand
Seignior_.—Suppose the Colonies of _France_ had, by compacts, enjoyed
for many years, free governments open to all the world, under which they
had grown and flourished; what should we think of that kingdom, were it
to attempt to destroy their governments, and to force upon them its own
mode of government? Should we not applaud any zeal they discovered in
repelling such an injury?—But the truth is, in the present instance, that
we are not maintaining but violating our own constitution in _America_.
The essence of our constitution consists in its independency. There is
in this case no difference between _subjection_ and _annihilation_. Did,
therefore, the Colonies possess governments perfectly the same with ours,
the attempt to subject them to ours would be an attempt to ruin them. A
free government loses its nature from the moment it becomes liable to be
commanded or altered by any superior power.

But I intended here principally to make the following observation.

The fundamental principle of our government is, “The right of a people to
give and grant their own money.”—It is of no consequence, in this case,
whether we enjoy this right in a proper manner or not. Most certainly
we do not. It is, however, the _principle_ on which our government, as
a _free_ government, is founded. The _spirit_ of the constitution gives
it us; and, however imperfectly enjoyed, we glory in it as our first and
greatest blessing. It was an attempt to encroach upon this right, in a
trifling instance, that produced the civil war in the reign of _Charles_
the First.—Ought not our brethren in _America_ to enjoy this right as
well as ourselves? Do the principles of the constitution give it _us_,
but deny it to _them_? Or can we, with any decency, pretend that when
we give to the king _their_ money, we give him _our own_?[21]—What
difference does it make, that in the time of _Charles the First_ the
attempt to take away this right was made by _one man_: but that, in the
case of _America_, it is made by a body of men?

In a word. This is a war undertaken not only against the principles
of our own constitution; but on purpose to destroy other similar
constitutions in _America_; and to substitute in their room a military
force. See page 23, 24.—It is, therefore, a gross and flagrant violation
of the constitution.


SECT. III.

_Of the Policy if the War with ~America~._

In writing the present Section, I enter upon a subject of the last
importance, on which much has been said by other writers with great
force, and in the ablest manner[22]. But I am not willing to omit any
topic which I think of great consequence, merely because it has already
been discussed: And, with respect to this in particular, it will, I
believe, be found that some of the observations on which I shall insist,
have not been sufficiently attended to.

       *       *       *       *       *

The object of this war has been often enough declared to be “maintaining
the supremacy of this country over the colonies.” I have already enquired
how far reason and justice, the principles of Liberty, and the rights of
humanity, entitle us to this supremacy. Setting aside, therefore, now all
considerations of this kind, I would observe, that this supremacy is to
be maintained, either merely _for its own sake_, or for the sake of some
public interest connected with it and dependent upon it.—If _for its own
sake_; the only object of the war is the extension of dominion; and its
only motive is the lust of power.—All government, even _within_ a state,
becomes tyrannical, as far as it is a needless and wanton exercise of
power; or is carried farther than is absolutely necessary to preserve the
peace and to secure the safety of the state. This is what an excellent
writer calls GOVERNING TOO MUCH; and its effect must always be, weakening
government by rendering it contemptible and odious.—Nothing can be of
more importance, in governing distant provinces and adjusting the
clashing interests of different societies, than attention to this remark.
In these circumstances it is _particularly_ necessary to make a sparing
use of power, in order to preserve power.—Happy would it have been for
_Great Britain_, had this been remembered by those who have lately
conducted its affairs. But our policy has been of another kind. At the
period when our authority should have been most concealed, it has been
brought most in view; and by a progression of violent measures, every
one of which has increased distress, we have given the world reason to
conclude, that we are acquainted with no other method of governing than
_by force_.—What a shocking mistake!—If our object is power, we should
have known better how to use it; and our rulers should have considered,
that freemen will always revolt at the sight of a naked sword; and that
the complicated affairs of a great kingdom, holding in subordination
to it a multitude of distant communities, all jealous of their rights,
and warmed with spirits as high as our own, require not only the most
skilful, but the most cautious and tender management. The consequences of
a different management we are now feeling. We see ourselves driven among
rocks, and in danger of being lost.

       *       *       *       *       *

The following reasons make it too probable, that the present contest
with _America_ is a contest for power only[23], abstracted from all the
advantages connected with it.

_1st._ There is a love of power inherent in human nature; and it cannot
be uncharitable to suppose that the nation in general, and the cabinet
in particular, are too likely to be influenced by it. What can be
more flattering than to look across the _Atlantic_, and to see in the
boundless continent of _America_, increasing MILLIONS whom we have a
right to order as we please, who hold their property at our disposal,
and who have no other law than our will. With what complacency have we
been used to talk of them as OUR subjects?—Is it not the interruption
they now give to this pleasure; is it not the opposition they make to
our pride; and not any injury they have done us, that is the secret
spring of our present animosity against them?—I wish all in this kingdom
would examine themselves carefully on this point. Perhaps, they might
find, that they have not known what spirit they are of.—Perhaps, they
would become sensible, that it was a spirit of domination, more than a
regard to the true interest of this country, that lately led so many of
them, with such savage folly, to address the throne for the slaughter
of their brethren in _America_, if they will not submit to them; and to
make offers of their lives and fortunes for that purpose.—Indeed, I am
persuaded, that, were pride and the lust of dominion exterminated from
every heart among us, and the humility of Christians infused in their
room, this quarrel would be soon ended.

       *       *       *       *       *

_2dly._ Another reason for believing that this is a contest for power
only is, that our ministers have frequently declared, that their object
is not to draw a revenue from _America_; and that many of those who are
warmest for continuing it, represent the _American trade_ as of no great
consequence.

But what deserves particular consideration here is, that this is a
contest from which no advantages can possibly be derived.—Not a revenue:
For the provinces of America, when desolated, will afford no revenue;
or if they should, the expence of subduing them and keeping them in
subjection will much exceed that revenue.—Not any of the advantages
of trade: For it is a folly, next to insanity, to think trade can be
promoted by impoverishing our customers, and fixing in their minds
an everlasting abhorrence of us.—It remains, therefore, that this
war can have no other object than the extension of power.—Miserable
reflection!—To sheath our swords in the bowels of our brethren, and
spread misery and ruin among a happy people, for no other end than to
oblige them to acknowledge our supremacy. How horrid!—This is the cursed
ambition that led a _Cæsar_ and an _Alexander_, and many other mad
conquerors, to attack peaceful communities, and to lay waste the earth.

But a worse principle than even this, influences some among us. Pride and
the love of dominion are principles hateful enough; but blind resentment
and the desire of revenge are infernal principles: And these, I am
afraid, have no small share at present in guiding our public conduct.—One
cannot help indeed being astonished at the virulence, with which some
speak on the present occasion against the Colonies.—For, what have they
done?—Have they crossed the ocean and invaded us? Have they attempted
to take from us the fruits of our labour, and to overturn that form
of government which we hold so sacred?—This cannot be pretended.—On
the contrary. This is what we have done to them.—We have transported
ourselves to their peaceful retreats, and employed our fleets and
armies to stop up their ports, to destroy their commerce, to seize
their effects, and to burn their towns. Would we but let them alone,
and suffer them to enjoy in security their property and governments,
instead of disturbing us, they would thank and bless us. And yet it is
WE who imagine ourselves ill-used.—The truth is, we expected to find
them a cowardly rabble who would lie quietly at our feet; and they have
disappointed us. They have risen in their own defence, and repelled force
by force. They deny the plenitude of our power over them; and insist upon
being treated as free communities.—It is THIS that has provoked us; and
kindled our governors into rage.

I hope I shall not here be understood to intimate, that _all_ who
promote this war are actuated by these principles. Some, I doubt not,
are influenced by no other principle, than a regard to what they think
the just authority of this country over its colonies, and to the unity
and indivisibility of the British Empire. I wish such could be engaged
to enter thoroughly into the enquiry, which has been the subject of the
first part of this pamphlet; and to consider, particularly, how different
a thing maintaining the authority of government _within_ a state is from
maintaining the authority of one people over another, already happy in
the enjoyment of a government of their own. I wish farther they would
consider, that the desire of maintaining authority is warrantable, only
as far as it is the means of promoting some end, and doing some good;
and that, before we resolve to spread famine and fire through a country
in order to make it acknowledge our authority, we ought to be assured
that great advantages will arise not only to ourselves, but to the
country we wish to conquer.—That from the present contest no advantage
to _ourselves_ can arise, has been already shewn, and will presently be
shewn more at large.—That no advantage to the Colonies can arise from
it, need not, I hope, be shewn. It has however been asserted, that even
_their_ good is intended by this war. Many of us are persuaded, that they
will be much happier under our government, than under any government of
their own; and that their liberties will be safer when held for them by
us, than when trusted in their own hands.—How kind is it thus to take
upon us the trouble of judging for them what is most for their happiness?
Nothing can be kinder except the resolution we have formed to exterminate
them, if they will not submit to our judgment.—What strange language have
I sometimes heard? By an armed force we are now endeavouring to destroy
the laws and governments of America; and yet I have heard it said, that
we are endeavouring to support law and government there. We are insisting
upon our right to levy contributions upon them; and to maintain this
right, we are bringing upon them all the miseries a people can endure;
and yet it is asserted, that we mean nothing but their security and
happiness.

But I have wandered a little from the point I attended principally to
insist upon in this section, which is, “the folly, in respect of policy,
of the measures which have brought on this contest; and its pernicious
and fatal tendency.”

The following observations will, I believe, abundantly prove this.

_1st._ There are points which are likely always to suffer by discussion.
Of this kind are most points of authority and prerogative; and the best
policy is to avoid, as much as possible, giving any occasion for calling
them into question.

The colonies were at the beginning of this reign in the habit of
acknowledging our authority, and of allowing us as much power over
them as our interest required; and more, in some instances, than we
could reasonably claim. This habit they would have retained: and had
we, instead of imposing new burdens upon them, and increasing their
restraints, studied to promote their commerce, and to grant them
new indulgences, they would have been always growing more attached
to us. Luxury, and, together with it, their dependence upon us, and
our influence[24] in their assemblies, would have increased, till in
time perhaps they would have become as corrupt as ourselves; and we
might have succeeded to our wishes in establishing our authority over
them.—But, happily for _them_, we have chosen a different course. By
exertions of authority which have alarmed them, they have been put
upon examining into the grounds of all our claims, and forced to give
up their luxuries, and to seek all their resources within themselves:
And the issue is likely to prove the loss of _all_ our authority over
them, and of all the advantages connected with it. So little do men in
power sometimes know how to preserve power; and so remarkably does the
desire of extending dominion sometimes destroy it.—Mankind are naturally
disposed to continue in subjection to that mode of government, be it what
it will, under which they have been born and educated. Nothing rouses
them into resistance but gross abuses, or some particular oppressions out
of the road to which they have been used. And he who will examine the
history of the world will find, there has generally been more reason for
complaining that they have been too patient, than that they have been
turbulent and rebellious.

Our governors, ever since I can remember, have been jealous that the
Colonies, some time or other, would throw off their dependence. This
jealously was not founded on any of their acts or declarations. They have
always, while at _peace_ with us, disclaimed any such design; and they
have continued to disclaim it since they have been at _war_ with us.
I have reason, indeed, to believe, that independency is, even at this
moment,[25] generally dreaded among them as a calamity to which they are
in danger of being driven, in order to avoid a greater.—The jealousy I
have mentioned, was, however, natural; and betrayed a secret opinion,
that the subjection in which they were held was more than we could expect
them always to endure. In such circumstances, all possible care should
have been taken to give them no reason for discontent, and to preserve
them in subjection, by keeping in that line of conduct to which custom
had reconciled them, or at least never deviating from it, except with
great caution; and particularly, by avoiding all direct attacks on their
property and legislations. Had we done this, the different interests
of so many states scattered over a vast continent, joined to our own
prudence and moderation, would have enabled us to maintain them in
dependence for ages to come.—But instead of this, how have we acted?—It
is in truth too evident, that our whole conduct, instead of being
directed by that sound policy and foresight which in such circumstances
were absolutely necessary, has been nothing (to say the best of it) but
a series of the blindest rigour followed by retractation; of violence
followed by concession; of mistake, weakness and inconsistency.—A recital
of a few facts, within every body’s recollection, will fully prove this.

In the 6th of _George the Second_, an act was passed for imposing
certain duties on all foreign spirits, molasses and sugars imported
into the plantations. In this act, the duties imposed are said to be
GIVEN and GRANTED by the Parliament to the King; and this is the first
_American_ act in which these words have been used. But notwithstanding
this, as the act had the appearance of being only a regulation of trade,
the colonies submitted to it; and a small direct revenue was drawn by
it from them.—In the 4th of the present reign, many alterations were
made in this act, with the declared purpose of making provision for
raising a revenue in America. This alarmed the Colonies; and produced
discontents and remonstrances, which might have convinced our rulers this
was tender ground, on which it became them to tread very gently.—There
is, however, no reason to doubt but in time they would have sunk into
a quiet submission to this revenue act, as being at worst only the
exercise of a power which then they seem not to have thought much of
contesting; I mean, the power of taxing them EXTERNALLY.—But before they
had time to cool, a worse provocation was given them; and the STAMP-ACT
was passed. This being an attempt to tax them INTERNALLY; and a direct
attack on their property, by a power which would not suffer itself to
be questioned; which eased _itself_ by loading _them_; and to which it
was impossible to fix any bounds; they were thrown at once, from one end
of the continent to the other, into resistance and rage.—Government,
dreading the consequences, gave way; and the Parliament (upon a change
of ministry) repealed the _Stamp-Act_, without requiring from them
any recognition of its authority, or doing any more to preserve its
dignity, than asserting, by the declaratory law, that it was possessed
of full power and authority to make laws to bind them in all cases
whatever.—Upon this, peace was restored; and, had no farther attempts
of the same kind been made, they would undoubtedly have suffered us (as
the people of _Ireland_ have done) to enjoy quietly our declaratory
law. They would have recovered their former habits of subjection; and
our connexion with them might have continued an increasing source of
our wealth and glory.—But the spirit of despotism and avarice, always
blind and restless, soon broke forth again. The scheme for drawing a
revenue from _America_, by parliamentary taxation, was resumed; and in
a little more than a year after the repeal of the _Stamp-Act_, when all
was peace, a third act was passed, imposing duties payable in _America_
on tea, paper, glass, painters colours, &c.— This, as might have been
expected, revived all the former heats; and the Empire was a second time
threatened with the most dangerous commotions.—Government receded again;
and the Parliament (under another change of ministry) repealed all the
obnoxious duties, EXCEPT that upon tea. This exception was made in order
to maintain a shew of dignity. But it was, in reality, sacrificing safety
to pride; and leaving a splinter in the wound to produce a gangrene.—For
some time, however, this relaxation answered its intended purposes. Our
commercial intercourse with the Colonies was again recovered; and they
avoided nothing but that tea which we had excepted in our repeal. In this
state would things have remained, and even tea would perhaps in time have
been gradually admitted, had not the evil genius of _Britain_ stepped
forth once more to embroil the Empire.

The _East India_ company having fallen under difficulties, partly in
consequence of the loss of the _American_ market for tea, a scheme was
formed for assisting them by an attempt to recover that market. With this
view an act was passed to enable them to export their tea to _America_
free of all duties here, and subject only to 3d. per pound duty, payable
in _America_. It was to be offered at a low price; and it was expected
the consequence would prove that the Colonies would be tempted to buy
it; a precedent gained for taxing them; and at the same time the company
relieved. Ships were, therefore, fitted out; and large cargoes sent. The
snare was too gross to escape the notice of the Colonies. They saw it,
and spurned at it. They refused to admit the tea; and at BOSTON some
persons in disguise threw it into the sea.—Had our governors in this case
satisfied themselves with requiring a compensation from the province for
the damage done, there is no doubt but it would have been granted. Or had
they proceeded no farther in the infliction of punishment, than stopping
up the port and destroying the trade of Boston, till compensation was
made, the province might possibly have submitted, and a sufficient
saving would have been gained for the honour of the nation. But having
hitherto proceeded without wisdom, they observed now no bounds in their
resentment. To the Boston port bill was added a bill which destroyed the
chartered government of the province; a bill which withdrew from the
jurisdiction of the province, persons who in particular cases should
commit murder; and the _Quebec_ bill. At the same time a strong body of
troops was stationed at _Boston_ to enforce obedience to these bills.

       *       *       *       *       *

All who knew any thing of the temper of the Colonies saw that the
effect of this sudden accumulation of vengeance, would probably be not
intimidating but exasperating them, and driving them into a general
revolt. But our minister had different apprehensions. They believed that
the malecontents in the Colony of _Massachusett’s_ were a small party,
headed by a few factious men; that the majority of the people would take
the side of government, as soon as they saw a force among them capable
of supporting them; that, at worst, the Colonies in general would never
make a common cause with this province; and that, the issue would prove,
in a few months, order, tranquility and submission.—Every one of these
apprehensions was falsified by the events that followed.

When the bills I have mentioned came to be carried into execution,
the whole province was thrown into confusion. The courts of justice
were shut up, and all government was dissolved. The commander in chief
found it necessary to fortify himself in Boston; and the other Colonies
immediately resolved to make a common cause with this Colony.

Disappointed by these consequences, our ministers took fright. Once
more they made an effort to retreat; but indeed the most ungracious one
that can well be imagined. A proposal was sent to the Colonies, called
Conciliatory; and the substance of which was, that if any of them would
raise such sums as should be demanded of them by taxing themselves, the
Parliament would forbear to tax them.—It will be scarcely believed,
hereafter, that such a proposal could be thought conciliatory. It was
only telling them; “If you will tax yourselves BY OUR ORDER, we will save
ourselves the trouble of taxing you.”—They received the proposal as an
insult; and rejected it with disdain.

At the time this concession was transmitted to _America_, open
hostilities were not begun. In the sword our ministers thought they
had still a resource which would immediately settle all disputes. They
considered the people of _New-England_ as nothing but a mob, who would
be soon routed and forced into obedience. It was even believed, that a
few thousands of our army might march through all _America_, and make
all quiet where-ever they went. Under this conviction our ministers did
not dread urging the Province of _Massachusett’s Bay_ into rebellion, by
ordering the army to seize their stores, and to take up some of their
leading men.—The attempt was made.—The people fled immediately to arms,
and repelled the attack.—A considerable part of the flower of the British
army has been destroyed.—Some of our best Generals, and the bravest
of our troops, are now[26] disgracefully and miserably imprisoned at
_Boston_.—A horrid civil war is commenced;—And the Empire is distracted
and convulsed.

Can it be possible to think with patience of the policy that has brought
us into these circumstances? Did ever Heaven punish the vices of a
people more severely by darkening their counsels? How great would be our
happiness could we now recall former times, and return to the policy of
the last reigns?—But those times are gone.—I will, however, beg leave for
a few moments to look back to them; and to compare the ground we have
left with that on which we find ourselves. This must be done with deep
regret; but it forms a necessary part of my present design.

       *       *       *       *       *

In those times our Colonies, foregoing every advantage which they might
derive from trading with foreign nations, consented to send only to us
whatever it was for our interest to receive from them; and to receive
only from us whatever it was for our interest to send to them. They gave
up the power of making sumptuary laws, and exposed themselves to all the
evils of an increasing and wasteful luxury, because we were benefited by
vending among them the materials of it. The iron with which providence
had blessed their country, they were required by laws, in which they
acquiesced, to transport hither, that our people might be maintained
by working it for them into nails, ploughs, axes, &c. And, in several
instances, even one Colony was not allowed to supply any neighbouring
Colonies with commodities, which could be conveyed to them from
hence.—But they yielded much farther. They consented that we should have
the appointment of one branch of their legislature. By recognizing as
their King, a King resident among us and under our influence, they gave
us a negative on all their laws. By allowing an appeal to us in their
civil disputes, they gave us likewise the ultimate determination of all
civil causes among them.—In short. They allowed us every power we could
desire, except that of taxing them, and interfering in their internal
legislations: And they had admitted precedents which, even in these
instances, gave us no inconsiderable authority over them. By purchasing
our goods they paid our taxes; and, by allowing us to regulate their
trade in any manner we thought most for our advantage, they enriched our
merchants, and helped us to bear our growing burdens. They fought our
battles with us. They gloried in their relation to us. All their gains
centered among us; and they always spoke of this country and looked to it
as their home.

Such WAS the state of things.—What is it now?

Not contented with a degree of power, sufficient to satisfy any
reasonable ambition, we have attempted to extend it.—Not contented with
drawing from them a large revenue _indirectly_, we have endeavoured to
procure one _directly_ by an authoritative seizure; and, in order to
gain a pepper-corn in this way, have chosen to hazard millions, acquired
by the peaceable intercourse of trade.—Vile policy! What a scourge is
government so conducted?—Had we never deserted our old ground: Had we
nourished and favoured _America_, with a view to commerce, instead of
considering it as a country to be governed: Had we, like a liberal and
wise people, rejoiced to see a multitude of free states branched forth
from ourselves, all enjoying independent legislatures similar to our own:
Had we aimed at binding them to us only by the tyes of affection and
interest; and contented ourselves with a moderate power rendered durable
by being lenient and friendly, an umpire in their differences, an aid to
them in improving their own free governments, and their common bulwark
against the assaults of foreign enemies: Had this, I say, been our
policy and temper; there is nothing so great or happy that we might not
have expected. With their increase our strength would have increased. A
growing surplus in the revenue might have been gained, which, invariably
applied to the gradual discharge of the national debt, would have
delivered us from the ruin with which it threatens us. The Liberty of
_America_ might have preserved our Liberty; and, under the direction of
a patriot king or wise minister, proved the means of restoring to us
our almost lost constitution. Perhaps, in time, we might also have been
brought to see the necessity of carefully watching and restricting our
paper-credit: And thus we might have regained safety; and, in union with
our Colonies, have been more than a match for every enemy, and risen to a
situation of honour and dignity never before known amongst mankind.—But I
am forgetting myself.—Our Colonies are likely to be lost for ever. Their
love is turned into hatred; and their respect for our government into
resentment and abhorrence.—We shall see more distinctly what a calamity
this is, and the observations I have now made will be confirmed, by
attending to the following facts.

       *       *       *       *       *

Our American Colonies, particularly the Northern ones, have been for
some time in the happiest state of society; or, in that middle state of
civilization, between its first rude and its last refined and corrupt
state. Old countries consist, generally, of three classes of people;
a GENTRY; a YEOMANRY; and a PEASANTRY. The Colonies consist only of a
body of YEOMANRY[27] supported by agriculture, and all independent,
and nearly upon a level; in consequence of which, joined to a boundless
extent of country, the means of subsistence are procured without
difficulty, and the temptations to wickedness are so inconsiderable,
that executions[28] are seldom known among them. From hence arises an
encouragement to population so great, that in some of the Colonies
they double their own number in fifteen years; in others, in eighteen
years; and in all, taken one with another, in twenty-five years.—Such an
increase was, I believe, never before known. It demonstrates that they
must live at their ease; and be free from those cares, oppressions, and
diseases which depopulate and ravage luxurious states.

       *       *       *       *       *

With the population of the Colonies has increased their trade; but much
faster, on account of the gradual introduction of luxury among them.—In
1723 the exports to _Pensylvania_ were 16,000l.—In 1742 they were
75,295l.—In 1757 they were increased to 268,426l. and in 1773 to half a
million.

The exports to all the Colonies in 1744 were 640,114l.—In 1758, they
were increased to 1.832,948l. and in 1773, to three millions.[29] And
the probability is, that, had it not been for the discontents among the
Colonies since the year 1764, our trade with them would have been this
year double to what it was in 1773; and that in a few years more, it
would not have been possible for the whole kingdom, though consisting
only of manufacturers, to supply the American demand.

This trade, it should be considered, was not only thus an increasing
trade; but it was a trade in which we had no rivals; a trade certain,
constant, and uninterrupted; and which, by the shipping employed in it,
and the naval stores supplied by it, contributed greatly to the support
of that navy which is our chief national strength.—Viewed in these lights
it was an object unspeakably important. But it will appear still more
so if we view it in its connexions and dependencies. It is well known,
that our trade with _Africa_ and the _West-Indies_ cannot easily subsist
without it. And, upon the whole, it is undeniable, that it has been one
of the main springs of our opulence and splendour; and that we have, in
a great measure, been indebted to it for our ability to bear a debt so
much heavier, than that which, fifty years ago, the wisest men thought
would necessarily sink us.

This inestimable prize, and all the advantages connected with _America_,
we are now throwing away. Experience alone can shew what calamities must
follow. It will indeed be astonishing if this kingdom can bear such a
loss without dreadful consequences.—These consequences have been amply
represented by others; and it is needless to enter into any account
of them—At the time we shall be feeling them—The Empire dismembered;
the blood of thousands shed in an unrighteous quarrel; our strength
exhausted; our merchants breaking; our manufacturers starving; our
debts increasing; the revenue sinking; the funds tottering; and all the
miseries of a public bankruptcy impending—At such a _crisis_ should
our natural enemies, eager for our ruin, seize the opportunity—The
apprehension is too distressing.—Let us view this subject in another
light.

       *       *       *       *       *

On this occasion, particular attention should be given to the present
SINGULAR situation of this kingdom. This is a circumstance of the utmost
importance; and as I am afraid it is not much considered, I will beg
leave to give a distinct account of it.

At the REVOLUTION, the _specie_ of the kingdom amounted, according to[30]
_Davenant’_s account, to eighteen millions and a half.—From the ACCESSION
to the year 1772, there were coined at the mint, near 29 millions of
gold; and in ten years only of this time, or from January 1759 to January
1769, there were coined eight millions and a half.[31] But it has
appeared lately, that the gold specie now left in the kingdom is no more
than about twelve millions and a half.[32]—Not so much as half a million
of _Silver specie_ has been coined these sixty years; and it cannot be
supposed, that the quantity of it now in circulation exceeds two or three
millions. The whole specie of the kingdom, therefore, is probably at this
time about fifteen millions. Of this some millions must be hoarded at the
_Bank_.—Our circulating _specie_, therefore, appears to be decreased.
But our wealth, or the quantity of money in the kingdom, is greatly
increased. This is paper to a vast amount, issued in almost every corner
of the kingdom; and, particularly, by the BANK OF ENGLAND. While this
paper maintains its credit it answers all the purposes of specie, and is
in all respects the same with money.

Specie represents some real value in goods or commodities. On the
contrary; paper represents immediately nothing but specie. It is a
promise or obligation which the emitter brings himself under to pay a
given sum in coin; and it owes its currency to the credit of the emitter;
or to an opinion that he is able to make good his engagement; and that
the sum specified may be received upon being demanded.—Paper, therefore,
represents coin; and coin represents real value. That is, the one is a
_sign_ of wealth. The other is the _sign_ of that _sign_.—But farther.
Coin is an _universal_ sign of wealth, and will procure it every where.
It will bear any alarm, and stand any shock.—On the contrary. Paper,
owing its currency to opinion, has only a local and imaginary value. It
can stand no shock. It is destroyed by the approach of danger; or even
the _suspicion_ of danger.

In short. Coin is the basis of our paper-credit; and were it either all
destroyed, or were only the quantity of it reduced beyond a certain
limit, the paper circulation of the kingdom would sink at once. But, were
our paper destroyed, the coin would not only remain, but rise in value,
in proportion to the quantity of paper destroyed.

From this account it follows, that as far as, in any circumstances,
specie is not to be procured in exchange for paper, it represents
_nothing_, and is, worth _nothing_.—The specie of this kingdom is
inconsiderable, compared with the amount of the paper circulating in it.
This is generally believed; and, therefore, it is natural to enquire how
its currency is supported.—The answer is easy. It is supported in the
same manner with all other bubbles. Were all to demand specie in exchange
for their notes, payment could not be made; but, at the same time that
this is known, every one trusts, that no alarm producing such a demand
will happen, while he holds the paper he is possessed of; and that if
it should happen, he will stand a chance for being first paid; and this
makes him easy. And it also makes all with whom he traffics easy.—But
let any events happen which threaten danger; and every one will become
diffident. A run will take place; and a bankruptcy follow.

This is an account of what has often happened in _private_ credit. And
it is also an account of what _will_ (if no change of measures takes
place) happen some time or other in _public_ credit. The description I
have given of our paper-circulation implies, that nothing can be more
delicate or hazardous. It is an immense fabrick, with its head in the
clouds, that is continually trembling with every adverse blast and every
fluctuation of trade; and which, like the baseless fabrick of a vision,
may in a moment vanish, and leave no wreck behind.—The destruction
of a few books at the _Bank_; an improvement in the art of forgery;
the landing of a body of _French_ troops on our coasts; insurrections
threatening a revolution in government; or any events that should produce
a general panic, however groundless, would at once annihilate it, and
leave us without any other medium of traffic, than a quantity of _specie_
not much more than the money now drawn from the public by the taxes. It
would, therefore, become impossible to pay the taxes. The revenue would
fail. Near a hundred and forty millions of property would be destroyed.
The whole frame of government would fall to pieces; and a state of nature
would take place.—What a dreadful situation! It has never had a parallel
among mankind; except at one time in _France_ after the establishment
there of the Royal _Mississipi_ Bank. In 1720 this bank broke;[33] and,
after involving for some time the whole kingdom in a golden dream, spread
through it in one day, desolation and ruin.—The distress attending such
an event, in this free country, would be greater than it was in _France_.
Happily for that kingdom, they have shot this gulph. Paper-credit has
never since recovered itself there; and their circulating cash consists
now all of solid coin, amounting, according to the lowest account, to no
less a sum than 1500 millions of _Livres_;[34] or near 67 millions of
pounds sterling. This gives them unspeakable advantages; and, joined to
that quick reduction of their debts which is inseparable[35] from their
nature, places them on a ground of safety which we have reason to admire
and envy.

       *       *       *       *       *

These are subjects on which I should have chosen to be silent, did I
not think it necessary, that this country should be apprized and warned
of the danger which threatens it. This danger is created chiefly by the
national debt. High taxes are necessary to support a great public debt;
and a large supply of cash is necessary to support high taxes. This
cash we owe to our paper; and, in proportion to our paper, must be the
productiveness of our taxes.—King William’s wars drained the kingdom of
its specie. This sunk the revenue, and distressed government. In 1694
the BANK was established; and the kingdom was provided with a substitute
for specie. The taxes became again productive. The revenue rose; and
government was relieved.—Ever since that period our paper and taxes have
been increasing together, and supporting one another; and one reason,
undoubtedly, of the late increase in the productiveness of our taxes has
been the increase of our paper.

Was there no public debt, there would be no occasion for half the present
taxes. Our paper-circulation might be reduced. The balance of trade
would turn in our favour. Specie would flow in upon us. The quantity
of property destroyed by a failure of paper-credit (should it in such
circumstances happen) would be 140 millions less; and, therefore, the
shock attending it would be _tolerable_. But, in the present state of
things, whenever any calamity or panic shall produce such a failure, the
shock attending it will be _intolerable_.—May heaven soon raise up for us
some great statesman who shall see these things; and enter into effectual
measures, if not now too late, for extricating and preserving us.

Public banks are, undoubtedly, attended with great conveniences. But
they also do great harm; and, if their emissions are not restrained, and
conducted with great wisdom, they may prove the most pernicious of all
institutions; not only, by substituting _fictitious_ for _real_ wealth;
by increasing luxury; by raising the prices of provisions; by concealing
an unfavourable balance of trade; and by rendering a kingdom incapable of
bearing any _internal_ tumults or _external_ attacks, without the danger
of a dreadful convulsion: But, particularly, by becoming instruments in
the hands of ministers of state to increase their influence, to lessen
their dependence on the people, and to keep up a delusive shew of public
prosperity, when perhaps ruin may be near. There is, in truth, nothing
that a government may not do with such a mine at its command as a public
Bank, while it can maintain its credit; nor, therefore, is there any
thing more likely to be IMPROPERLY and DANGEROUSLY used.—But to return to
what may be more applicable to our own state at present.

       *       *       *       *       *

Among the causes that may produce a failure of paper-credit, there are
two which the present quarrel with _America_ calls upon us particularly
to consider.—The first is, “An unfavourable balance of trade.” This, in
proportion to the degree in which it takes place, must turn the course
of foreign exchange against us; raise the price of bullion; and carry
off our specie. The danger to which this would expose us is obvious; and
it has been much increased by the new coinage of the gold specie which
begun in 1773. Before this coinage, the greatest part of our gold coin
being light, but the same in currency as if it had been heavy, always
remained in the kingdom. But, being now nearly of full weight, whenever a
wrong balance of foreign trade alters the course of exchange, and gold in
_coin_ becomes of less value than in _bullion_, there is reason to fear,
that it will be melted down in such great quantities, and exported so
fast, as in a little time to leave none behind;[36] the consequence which
must prove, that the whole superstructure of paper-credit, now supported
by it, will break down.—The only remedy, in such circumstances, is an
increase of coinage at the mint. But this will operate too slowly; and,
by raising the price of bullion, will only increase the evil.—It is the
_Bank_ that at such a time must be the immediate sufferer: For it is from
thence that those who want coin for any purpose will always draw it.

For many years before 1773, the price of gold in _bullion_ had been, from
2 to 3 or 4 _per cent_. higher than in _coin_. This was a temptation
to melt down and export the coin, which could not be resisted. Hence
arose a demand for it on the BANK; and, consequently, the necessity of
purchasing bullion at a loss for a new coinage. But the more coin the
Bank procured in this way, the lower its price became in comparison with
that of bullion, and the faster it vanished; and, consequently, the more
necessary it became to coin again, and the greater loss fell upon the
Bank.—Had things continued much longer in this train, the consequences
might have proved very serious. I am by no means sufficiently informed to
be able to assign the causes which have produced the change that happened
in 1772. But, without doubt, the state of things which took place before
that year must be expected to return. The fluctuations of trade, in its
best state, render this unavoidable. But the contest with our Colonies
has a tendency to bring it on soon; and to increase unspeakably the
distress attending it. All know that the balance of trade with them is
greatly in our favour;[37] and that this balance is paid partly by direct
remittances of bullion; and partly by circuitous remittances through
_Spain_, _Portugal_, _Italy_, &c. which diminish the balance against
us with these countries.—During the last year they have been employed
in paying their debts, without adding to them; and their exportations
and remittances for that purpose have contributed to render the general
balance of trade more favourable to us, and, also, (in conjunction with
the late operations of the Bank) to keep up our funds. These remittances
are now ceased; and a few years will determine, if this contest goes on,
how far we can sustain such a loss without suffering the consequences I
have described.

The second event, ruinous to our paper circulation, which may arise from
our rupture with _America_, is a deficiency in the revenue. As a failure
of our paper would destroy the revenue, so a failure of the revenue, or
any considerable diminution of it, would destroy our paper. The BANK is
the support of our paper; and the support of the BANK is the credit of
government. Its principal securities, are a capital of eleven millions
lent to government; and money continually advanced to a vast amount on
the Land-tax and Malt-tax, Sinking Fund, Exchequer Bills, Navy Bills, &c.
Should, therefore, deficiencies in the revenue bring government under
any difficulties, all these securities would lose their value, and the
_Bank_ and Government, and all private and public credit, would fall
together.—Let any one here imagine, what would probably follow, were it
but suspected by the public in general, that the taxes were so fallen, as
not to produce enough to pay the interest of the public debts, besides
bearing the _ordinary_ expences of the nation; and that, in order to
supply the deficiency and to hide the calamity, it had been necessary
in any one year to anticipate the taxes, and to borrow of the Bank.—In
such circumstances I can scarcely doubt, but an alarm would spread of the
most dangerous tendency.—The next foreign war, should it prove _half_
as expensive as the last, will probably occasion such a deficiency;
and bring our affairs to that crisis towards which they have been long
tending.—But the war with _America_ has a greater tendency to do this;
and the reason is, that it affects our resources more; and is attended
more with the danger of internal disturbances.

Some have made the proportion of our trade depending on _North America_
to be near ONE HALF. A moderate computation makes it a THIRD.[38] Let it,
however, be supposed to be only a FOURTH. I will venture to say, this is
a proportion of our foreign trade, the loss of which, when it comes to be
felt, will be found insupportable.—In the article of _Tobacco_ alone it
will cause a deduction from the _Customs_ of at least 300,000_l._ _per
ann._[39] including the duties paid on foreign commodities purchased by
the exportation of tobacco. Let the whole deduction from the revenue be
supposed to be only half a million. This alone is more than the kingdom
can at present bear, without having recourse to lotteries, and the
land-tax at 4s. in order to defray the common and necessary expences
of peace. But to this must be added a deduction from the produce of
the _Excises_, in consequence of the increase of the poor, of the
difficulties of our merchants and manufacturers, of less national wealth,
and a retrenchment of luxury. There is no possibility of knowing to what
these deductions may amount. When the evils producing them begin, they
will proceed rapidly; and they may end in a general wreck before we are
aware of any danger.

In order to give a clearer view of this subject, I will in an
Appendix[40], state particularly the national expenditure and income
for eleven years, from 1764 to 1774. From that account it will appear,
that the money drawn every year from the public by the taxes, does not
fall greatly short of a sum equal to the whole _specie_ of the kingdom;
and that, notwithstanding the late increase in the productiveness of
the taxes, the whole surplus of the national income has not exceeded
338,759l. _per ann._ See the Second Tract, p. 160. This is a surplus
so inconsiderable as to be scarcely sufficient to guard against the
deficiencies arising from the common fluctuations of foreign trade, and
of home consumption. It is NOTHING when considered as the only fund we
have for paying off a debt of near 140 millions.—Had we continued in a
state of profound peace, it could not have admitted of any diminution.
What then must follow, when one of the most profitable branches of our
trade is destroyed; when a THIRD of the Empire is lost; when an addition
of many millions is made to the public debt; and when, at the same time,
perhaps some millions are taken away from the revenue?—I shudder at this
prospect.—A KINGDOM ON AN EDGE SO PERILOUS, SHOULD THINK OF NOTHING BUT A
RETREAT.


SECT. IV.

_Of the Honour of the Nation as affected by the War with ~America~._

One of the pleas for continuing the contest with _America_ is, “That
our honour is engaged; and that we cannot now recede without the most
humiliating concessions.”

With respect to this, it is proper to observe, that a distinction should
be made between the nation, and its rulers. It is melancholy that there
should be ever any reason for making such a distinction. A government
is, or ought to be, nothing but an institution for collecting and for
carrying into execution the will of the people. But so far is this from
being in general the fact, that the measures of government, and the
sense of the people, are sometimes in direct opposition to one another;
nor does it _often_ happen that any certain conclusion can be drawn from
the one to the other.—I will not pretend to determine, whether, in the
present instance, the dishonour attending a retreat would belong to the
nation at large, or only to the persons in power who guide its affairs.
Be this as it will, no good argument can be drawn from it against
receding. The disgrace which may be implied in making concessions, is
nothing to that of being the aggressors in an unrighteous quarrel;
and dignity, in such circumstances, consists in retracting freely and
speedily.—For, (to adopt on this occasion, words which I have heard
applied to this very purpose, in a great assembly, by a peer to whom
this kingdom has often looked as its deliverer, and whose ill state of
health at this awful moment of public danger every friend to _Britain_
must deplore) to adopt, I say, the words of this great man—“RECTITUDE IS
DIGNITY. OPPRESSION ONLY IS MEANNESS; AND JUSTICE, HONOUR.”

I will add, that PRUDENCE, no less than true HONOUR, requires us to
retract. For the time may come when, if it is not done voluntarily,
we may be _obliged_ to do it; and find ourselves under a necessity
of granting that to our distresses, which we now deny to equity and
humanity, and the prayers of _America_. The possibility of this appears
plainly from the preceding pages; and should it happen, it will bring
upon us disgrace indeed, disgrace greater than the worst rancour can
wish to see accumulated on a kingdom already too much dishonoured.—Let
the reader think here what we are doing.—A nation, once the protector of
Liberty in distant countries, and the scourge of tyranny, changed into
an enemy to Liberty, and engaged in endeavouring to reduce to servitude
its own brethren.—A great and enlightened nation, not content with a
controuling power over millions of people which gave it every reasonable
advantage, insisting upon such a supremacy over them as would leave them
nothing they could call their own, and carrying desolation and death
among them for disputing it.—What can be more ignominious?—How have we
felt for the brave _Corsicans_, in their struggle with the _Genoese_, and
afterwards with the _French_ government? Did GENOA or FRANCE want more
than an absolute command over their property and legislations; or the
power of binding them in all cases whatsoever?—The _Genoese_, finding it
difficult to keep them in subjection, CEDED them to the _French_.—All
such cessions of one people by another are disgraceful to human nature.
But if our claims are just, may not we also, if we please, CEDE the
Colonies to _France_?—There is, in truth, no other difference between
these two cases than that the _Corsicans_ were not descended from the
people who governed them, but that the _Americans_ are.

There are some who seem to be sensible, that the authority of one country
over another, cannot be distinguished from the servitude of one country
to another; and that unless different communities, as well as different
parts of the same community, are united by an equal representation, all
such authority is inconsistent with the principles of Civil Liberty.—But
they except the case of the Colonies and _Great Britain_; because the
Colonies are communities which have branched forth from, and which,
therefore, as they think, belong to _Britain_. Had the colonies been
communities of _foreigners_, over whom we wanted to acquire dominion, or
even to extend a dominion before acquired, they are ready to admit that
their resistance would have been just.—In my opinion, this is the same
with saying, that the Colonies ought to be worse off than the rest of
mankind, because they are our own _Brethren_.

Again. The United Provinces of _Holland_ were once subject to the
_Spanish_ monarchy; but, provoked by the violation of their charters;
by levies of money, without their consent; by the introduction of
Spanish troops among them; by innovations in their antient modes of
government; and the rejection of their petitions; they were driven to
that resistance which we and all the world have ever since admired; and
which has given birth to one of the greatest and happiest Republics
that ever existed.—Let any one read also, the history of the war which
the _Athenians_, from a thirst of Empire, made on the _Syracusans_ in
_Sicily_, a people derived from the same origin with them; and let him,
if he can, avoid rejoicing in the defeat of the _Athenians_.

Let him, likewise, read the account of the social war among the Romans.
The allied states of _Italy_ had fought the battles of _Rome_, and
contributed by their valour and treasure to its conquests and grandeur.
They claimed, therefore, the rights of Roman citizens, and a share
with them in legislation. The Romans, disdaining to make those their
_fellow-citizens_, whom they had always looked upon as their _subjects_,
would not comply; and a war followed, the most horrible in the annals of
mankind, which ended in the ruin of the Roman Republic. The feelings of
every _Briton_ in this case must force him to approve the conduct of the
Allies, and to condemn the proud and ungrateful Romans.

But not only is the present contest with _America_ thus disgraceful to
us, because inconsistent with our own feelings in similar cases; but
also because condemned by our own practice in former times. The Colonies
are persuaded that they are fighting for Liberty. We see them sacrificing
to this persuasion every private advantage. If mistaken, and though
guilty of irregularities, they should be pardoned by a people whose
ancestors have given them so many examples of similar conduct. ENGLAND
should venerate the attachment to Liberty amidst all its excesses;
and, instead of indignation or scorn, it would be most becoming them,
in the present instance, to declare their applause, and to say to the
Colonies—“We excuse your mistakes. We admire your spirit. It is the
spirit that has more than once saved _ourselves_. We aspire to no
dominion over you. We understand the rights of men too well to think of
taking from you the inestimable privilege of governing yourselves; and,
instead of employing our power for any such purpose, we offer it to you
as a friendly and guardian power, to be a mediator in your quarrels; a
protection against your enemies; and an aid to you in establishing a plan
of Liberty that shall make you great and happy. In return, we ask nothing
but your gratitude and your commerce.”

This would be a language worthy of a brave and enlightened nation.
But alas! it often happens in the _Political World_ as it does in
_Religion_, that the people who cry out most vehemently for Liberty to
themselves are the most unwilling to grant it to others.

But farther. This war is disgraceful on account of the persuasion which
led to it, and under which it has been undertaken. The general cry was
last winter, that the people of NEW-ENGLAND were a body of cowards, who
would at once be reduced to submission by a hostile look from our troops.
In this light were they held up to public derision in both Houses of
Parliament; and it was this persuasion that, probably, induced a Nobleman
of the first weight in the state to recommend, at the passing of the
_Boston Port Bill_, coercive measures; hinting at the same time, that
the _appearance_ of hostilities would be sufficient, and that all would
be soon over, SINE CLADE.—Indeed no one can doubt, but that had it been
believed some time ago, that the people of _America_ were brave, more
care would have been taken not to provoke them.

Again. The manner in which this war has been hitherto conducted, renders
it still more disgraceful.—English valour being thought insufficient to
subdue the Colonies, the laws and religion of _France_ were established
in _Canada_, on purpose to obtain the power of bringing upon them from
thence an army of _French Papists_. The wild _Indians_ and their own
Slaves have been instigated to attack them; and attempts have been
made to gain the assistance of a large body of _Russians_.—With like
views, _German_ troops have been hired; and the defence of our Forts and
Garrisons trusted in their hands.

These are measures which need no comment. The last of them, in
particular, having been carried into execution without the consent of
parliament, threatens us with imminent danger; and shews that we are in
the way to lose even the _Forms_ of the constitution.—If, indeed, our
ministers can at any time, without leave, not only send away the national
troops, but introduce _foreign_ troops in their room, we lie entirely at
mercy; and we have every thing to dread.


SECT. V.

_Of the Probability of Succeeding in the War with ~America~._

Let us next consider how far there is a possibility of succeeding in the
present war.

Our own people, being unwilling to enlist, and the attempts to procure
armies of _Russians_, _Indians_, and _Canadians_ having miscarried; the
utmost force we can employ, including foreigners, does not exceed, if
I am rightly informed, 40,000 effective men. This is the force that is
to conquer half a million _at least_[41] of determined men fighting on
their own ground, within sight of their houses and families, and for that
sacred blessing of Liberty, without which man is a beast, and government
a curse. All history proves, that in such a situation, a handful is a
match for millions.

In the _Netherlands_, a few states thus circumstanced, withstood, for a
long course of years, the whole force of the Spanish monarchy, when at
its zenith; and at last humbled its pride, and emancipated themselves
from its tyranny.—The citizens of SYRACUSE also, thus circumstanced,
withstood the whole power of the _Athenians_, and almost ruined
them.—The same happened in the contest between the house of _Austria_,
and the cantons[42] of _Switzerland_.—There is in this case an infinite
difference between attacking and being attacked; between fighting to
_destroy_, and fighting to _preserve_ or _acquire_ Liberty.—Were we,
therefore, capable of employing a _land_ force against _America_ equal
to its own, there would be little probability of success. But to think
of conquering that whole continent with 30,000 or 40,000 men to be
transported across the _Atlantic_, and fed from hence, and incapable of
being recruited after any defeat—This is indeed a folly so great, that
language does not afford a name for it.

With respect to our naval force, could it sail at land as it does at
sea, much might be done with it; but as that is impossible, _little_
or _nothing_ can be done with it, which will not hurt _ourselves_ more
than the _Colonists_.—Such of their maritime towns as they cannot guard
against our fleets, and have not been already destroyed, they are
determined either to give up to our resentment, or destroy themselves:
The consequence of which will be, that these towns will be rebuilt in
safer situations; and that we shall lose some of the principal pledges
by which we have hitherto held them in subjection.—As to their trade;
having all the necessaries and the chief conveniencies of life within
themselves, they have no dependence upon it; and the loss of it will do
them unspeakable good, by preserving them from the evils of luxury and
the temptations of wealth; and keeping them in that state of virtuous
simplicity which is the greatest happiness. I know that I am now speaking
the sense of some of the wisest men in America. It has been long their
wish that _Britain_ would shut up all their ports. They will rejoice,
particularly, in the last restraining act. It might have happened, that
the people would have grown weary of their agreements not to export
or import. But this act will oblige them to keep these agreements; and
confirm their unanimity and zeal. It will also furnish them with a reason
for confiscating the estates of all the friends of our government among
them, and for employing their sailors, who would have been otherwise
idle, in making reprisals on British property. Their ships, before
useless, and consisting of many hundreds, will be turned into ships of
war; and that attention, which they have hitherto confined to trade, will
be employed in fitting out a naval force for their own defence; and thus
the way will be prepared for their becoming, much sooner than they would
otherwise have been, a great maritime power. This act of parliament,
therefore, crowns the folly of all our late measures.[43]—None who know
me, can believe me to be disposed to superstition. Perhaps, however, I
am not in the present instance, free from this weakness.—I fancy I see
in these measures something that cannot be accounted for merely by human
ignorance. I am inclined to think, that the hand of Providence is in
them working to bring about some great ends.—But this leads me to one
consideration more, which I cannot help offering to the public, and
which appears to me in the highest degree important.

In this hour of tremendous danger, it would become us to turn our
thoughts to Heaven. This is what our brethren in the Colonies are doing.
From one end of _North America_ to the other, they are FASTING and
PRAYING. But what are we doing?—We are ridiculing them as _Fanatics_, and
scoffing at religion.—We are running wild after pleasure, and forgetting
every thing serious and decent at _Masquerades_.—We are trafficking for
Boroughs; perjuring ourselves at Elections; and selling ourselves for
places.—Which side then is Providence likely to favour?

In _America_ we see a number of rising states in the vigour of youth,
inspired by the noblest of all passions, the passion for being free;
and animated by piety.—_Here_ we see an old state, great indeed, but
inflated and irreligious; enervated by luxury; encumbred with debts; and
hanging by a thread.—Can any one look without pain to the issue? May we
not expect calamities that shall recover to _reflection_ (perhaps to
_devotion_) our _Libertines_ and _Atheists_?

Is our cause such as gives us reason to ask God to bless it?—Can we in
the face of Heaven declare, “that we are not the aggressors in this war;
and that we mean by it, not to acquire or even preserve dominion for its
own sake; not conquest, or Empire, or the gratification of resentment;
but solely to deliver ourselves from oppression; to gain reparation for
injury; and to defend ourselves against men who would plunder or kill
us?”—Remember, reader, whoever thou art, that there are no other just
causes of war; and that blood spilled, with any ether views, must some
time or other be accounted for.—But not to expose myself by saying more
in this way, I will now beg leave to recapitulate some of the arguments
I have used; and to deliver the feelings of my heart in a brief, but
earnest address to my countrymen.

       *       *       *       *       *

I am hearing it continually urged—“Are they not our subjects?”—The
plain answer is, they are not your subjects. The people of _America_
are no more the subjects of the people of _Britain_, than the people of
_Yorkshire_ are the subjects of the people of _Middlesex_. They are your
_fellow-subjects_.

“But _we_ are taxed; and why should not _they_ be taxed?”—_You_ are taxed
by yourselves. _They_ insist on the same privilege.—They are taxed to
support their own governments; and they help also to pay your taxes by
purchasing your manufactures, and giving you a monopoly of their trade.
Must they maintain _two_ governments? Must they submit to be _triple_
taxed?—Has your moderation in taxing yourselves been such as encourages
them to trust you with the power of taxing them?

“But they will not obey the _Parliament_ and the _Laws_.”—Say rather,
they will not obey _your_ parliament and _your_ laws. Their reason is:
They have no voice in your parliament. They have no share in making[44]
your laws.—“Neither have _most_ of us.”—Then you so far want Liberty;
and your language is, “_We_ are not free, Why will _they_ be free?”—But
_many_ of you have a voice in parliament: _None_ of them have. _All_
your freehold land is represented: But not a foot of _their_ land is
represented. At worst, therefore, you are only enslaved _partially_.—Were
they to submit, they would be enslaved _totally_.—They are governed
by parliaments chosen by themselves, and by legislatures similar to
yours. Why will you disturb them in the enjoyment of a blessing so
valuable? Is it reasonable to insist, that your discretion alone shall
be their law; that they shall have no constitutions of government,
except such as you shall be pleased to give them; and no property except
such as your parliament shall be pleased to leave them?—What is your
parliament?—Is there not a growing intercourse between it and the court?
Does it awe ministers of state as it once did?—Instead of contending
for a controuling power over the governments of _America,_ should you
not think more of watching and reforming your own?—Suppose the worst.
Suppose, in opposition to all their own declarations, that the Colonists
are now aiming at independence.[45]—“If they can subsist without you;”
is it to be wondered at? Did there ever exist a _community_, or even
an _individual_, that would not do the same?—“If they _cannot_ subsist
without you;” let them alone. They will soon come back.—“If you cannot
subsist without them,” reclaim them by[46] kindness; engage them by
moderation and equity. It is madness to resolve to butcher them. This
will make them detest and avoid you for ever. Freemen are not to be
governed by force; or dragooned into compliance. If capable of bearing to
be so treated, it is a disgrace to be connected with them.

“If _they_ can subsist without _you_; and also _you_ without _them_,” the
attempt to subjugate them by confiscating their effects, burning their
towns, and ravaging their territories, is a wanton exertion of cruel
ambition, which, however common it has been among mankind, deserves to
be called by harder names than I chuse to apply to it.—Suppose such an
attempt was to be succeeded: Would it not be a fatal preparation for
subduing yourselves? Would not the disposal of _American_ places, and the
distribution of an _American_ revenue, render that influence of the crown
irresistible, which has already stabbed your liberties?

Turn your eyes to _India_: There more has been done than is now attempted
in _America_. There ENGLISHMEN, actuated by the love of plunder and the
spirit of conquest, have depopulated whole kingdoms, and ruined millions
of innocent people by the most infamous oppression and rapacity.—The
justice of the nation has slept over these enormities. Will the justice
of heaven sleep?—Are we not now execrated on both sides of the globe?

       *       *       *       *       *

With respect to the Colonists; it would be folly to pretend they are
faultless. They were running fast into our vices. But this quarrel gives
them a salutary check: And it may be permitted on purpose to favour them,
and in _them_ the rest of mankind; by making way for establishing, in an
extensive country possessed of every advantage, a plan of government,
and a growing power that will astonish the world, and under which every
subject of human enquiry shall be open to free discussion, and the
friends of Liberty, in every quarter of the globe, find a safe retreat
from civil and spiritual tyranny.—I hope, therefore, our brethren in
_America_ will forgive their oppressors. It is certain _they know not
what they are doing_.


CONCLUSION.

Having said so much of the war with America, and particularly of the
danger with which it threatens us, it may be expected that I should
propose some method of escaping from this danger, and of restoring
this once happy Empire to a state of peace and security.—Various plans
of pacification have been proposed; and some of them, by persons so
distinguished by their rank and merit, as to be above my applause. But
till there is more of a disposition to attend to such plans; they cannot,
I am afraid, be of any great service. And there is too much reason to
apprehend, that nothing but calamity will bring us to repentance and
wisdom.—In order, however, to complete my design in these observations,
I will take the liberty to lay before the public the following sketch of
one of the plans just referred to, as it was opened before the holidays
to the house of Lords by the _Earl of Shelburne_; who, while he held
the seals of the Southern Department, with the business of the Colonies
annexed, possessed their confidence, without ever compromising the
authority of this country; a confidence which discovered itself by peace
among themselves, and duty and submission to the Mother-country. I hope
I shall not take an unwarrantable liberty, if, on this occasion, I use
his Lordship’s own words, as nearly as I have been able to collect them.

“Meet the Colonies on their own ground, in the last petition from the
Congress to the king. The surest, as well as the most dignified mode
of proceeding for this country.—Suspend all hostilities—Repeal the
acts which immediately distress America, namely, the last restraining
act,—the charter act,—the act for the more impartial administration of
justice;—and the Quebec act.—All the other acts (the custom house act,
the post office act, &c.) leave to a temperate revisal.—There will be
found much matter which both countries may wish repealed. _Some_ which
can never be given up, the principle being that regulation of trade for
the common good of the Empire, which forms our _Palladium_. _Other_
matter which is fair subject of mutual accommodation.—Prescribe the most
explicit acknowledgment of your right of regulating commerce in its most
extensive sense; if the petition and other public acts of the Colonies
have not already, by their declarations and acknowledgments, left it
upon a sufficiently secure foundation.—Besides the power of regulating
the general commerce of the Empire, something further might be expected;
provided a due and tender regard were had to the means and abilities
of the several provinces, as well as to those fundamental, unalienable
rights of _Englishmen_, which no father can surrender on the part of his
son, no representative on the part of his elector, no generation on the
part of the succeeding one; the right of judging not only of the _mode_
of raising, but the _quantum_, and the appropriation of such aids as
they shall grant.—To be more explicit; the debt of _England_, without
entering into invidious distinctions how it came to be contracted, might
be acknowledged the debt of every individual part of the whole Empire,
Asia, as well as America, included.—Provided, that full security were
held forth to them, that such free aids, together with the Sinking Fund
(Great Britain contributing her superior share) should not be left as
the privy purse of the minister, but be unalienably appropriated to the
original intention of that fund, the discharge of the debt;—and that by
an honest application of the _whole_ fund, the taxes might in time be
lessened, and the price of our manufactures consequently reduced, so that
every contributory part might feel the returning benefit—always supposing
the laws of trade duly observed and enforced.

“The time _was_, I am confident—and perhaps _is_, when these points
might be obtained upon the easy, the constitutional, and, therefore, the
indispensible terms of an exemption from parliamentary taxation, and an
admission of the sacredness of their charters; instead of sacrificing
their good humour, their affection, their effectual aids, and the act
of NAVIGATION itself, (which you are now in the direct road to do) for
a commercial quit-rent,[47] or a barren metaphysical chimæra.—How long
these ends may continue attainable, no man can tell.—But if no words are
to be relied on except such as make against the Colonies—If nothing is
acceptable, except what is attainable by force; it only remains to apply,
what has been so often remarked of unhappy periods,—_Quos deus vult, &c._”

These are sentiments and proposals of the last importance; and I am very
happy in being able to give them to the public from so respectable an
authority as that of the distinguished Peer I have mentioned; to whom, I
know, this kingdom, as well as America, is much indebted for his zeal to
promote those grand public points on which the preservation of Liberty
among us depends; and for the firm opposition which, jointly with many
others (Noblemen and Commoners of the first character and abilities,) he
has made to the present measures.

Had such a plan as that now proposed been adopted a few months ago, I
have little doubt but that a pacification would have taken place, on
terms highly advantageous to this kingdom.—In particular. It is probable,
that the Colonies would have consented to grant an annual supply, which,
increased by a saving of the money now spent in maintaining troops among
them, and by contributions which might have been gained from other
parts of the Empire, would have formed a fund considerable enough, if
unalienably applied, to redeem the public debt; in consequence of which,
agreeably to Lord Shelburne’s ideas, some of our worst taxes might be
taken off, and the Colonies would receive our manufactures cheaper; our
paper-currency might be restrained; our whole force would be free to meet
at any time foreign danger; the influence of the Crown would be reduced;
our Parliament would become less dependent; and the kingdom might,
perhaps, be restored to a situation of permanent safety and prosperity.

To conclude.—An important revolution in the affairs of this kingdom
seems to be approaching. If ruin is not to be our lot, all that has been
lately done must be undone, and new measures adopted. At that period, an
opportunity (never perhaps to be recovered, if lost) will offer itself
for serving essentially _this country_, as well as _America_; by putting
the national debt into a _fixed_ course of payment; by subjecting to new
regulations, the administration of the finances; and by establishing
measures for exterminating corruption and restoring the constitution.—For
my own part; if this is not to be the consequence of any future changes
in the ministry, and the system of corruption, lately so much improved,
is to go on; I think it totally indifferent to the kingdom who are _in_,
or who are _out_ of power.

       *       *       *       *       *

The following fact is of so much importance, that I cannot satisfy myself
without laying it before the public.—In a Committee of the American
CONGRESS in _June_ 1775, a declaration was drawn up containing an offer
to GREAT BRITAIN, “that the Colonies would not only continue to grant
extraordinary aids in time of war, but also, if allowed a free commerce,
pay into the SINKING-FUND such a sum annually for ONE HUNDRED YEARS, as
should be _more_ than sufficient in that time, if faithfully applied, to
extinguish all the present debts of BRITAIN. Or, provided this was not
accepted, that, to remove the groundless jealousy of _Britain_ that the
Colonies aimed at Independence and an abolition of the Navigation Act,
which in truth, they had never intended; and also, to avoid all future
disputes about the right of making that and other Acts for regulating
their commerce for the general benefit, they would enter into a covenant
with _Britain_, that she should fully possess and exercise that right for
_one hundred years_ to come.”

       *       *       *       *       *

At the end of the preceding Tract I have had the honor of laying before
the public the Earl of _Shelburne_’s plan of Pacification with the
Colonies. In that plan, it is particularly proposed, that the Colonies
should grant an annual supply to be carried to the Sinking Fund, and
unalienably appropriated to the discharge of the public debt.—It must
give this excellent Peer great pleasure to learn, from this resolution,
that even this part of his plan, as well as all the other parts,
would, most probably, have been accepted by the Colonies. For though
the resolution only offers the alternative of either a _free_ trade,
with extraordinary aids and an annual supply, or an _exclusive_ trade
confirmed and extended; yet there can be little reason to doubt, but that
to avoid the calamities of the present contest, BOTH would have been
consented to; particularly, if, on our part, such a revisal of the laws
of trade had been offered as was proposed in Lord Shelburne’s plan.

The preceding resolution was, I have said, drawn up in a Committee of
the Congress. But it was not entered in their minutes; a severe Act of
Parliament happening to arrive at that time, which determined them not to
give the sum proposed in it.

FINIS.


FOOTNOTES

[11] See a particular explanation of this assertion in the Second Tract,
Page 9.

[12] In _Great Britain_, consisting of near six _millions_ of
inhabitants, 5723 persons, most of them the lowest of the people, elect
one half of the _House of Commons_; and 364 votes chuse a ninth part.
This may be seen distinctly made out in the _Political Disquisitions_,
Vol. 1. Book 2. C. 4. a work full of important and useful instruction.

[13] See among others Mr. Locke on Government, and Dr. Priestley’s Essay
on the first Principles of Government.

[14] See Dr. Priestly on Government, page 68, 69, &c.

[15] The independency of the Judges we esteem in this country one of our
greatest privileges.—Before the revolution they generally, I believe,
held their places _during pleasure_. King William gave them their places
_during good behaviour_. At the accession of the present Royal Family
their places were given them _during good behaviour_, in consequence of
the Act of Settlement, 12 and 13 W. III. C. 2. But an opinion having
been entertained by some, that though their commissions were made under
the Act of Settlement to continue, during good behaviour, yet that they
determined on the demise of the Crown; it was enacted by a statute made
in the first year of his present Majesty, Chap. 23. “That the commissions
of Judges for the time being shall be, continue, and remain in full
force, during their good behaviour, notwithstanding the demise of his
Majesty, or of any of his Heirs and Successors;” with a proviso, “that
it may be lawful for his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, to remove
any Judge upon the address of both Houses of Parliament.” And by the
same Statute their salaries are secured to them during the continuance
of their commissions: His Majesty, according to the preamble of the
Statute, having been pleased to declare from the Throne to both Houses
of Parliament, “That he looked upon the independency and uprightness of
Judges as essential to the impartial administration of Justice, as one of
the best securities to the Rights and Liberties of his loving Subjects,
and as most conducive to the honour of his Crown.”

A worthy friend and able Lawyer has supplied me with this note. It
affords, when contrasted with that _dependence_ of the Judges which has
been thought reasonable in _America_, a sad specimen of the different
manner in which a kingdom may think proper to govern itself, and the
provinces subject to it.

[16] Montesquieu’s Spirit of Laws, Vol. I. Book 11. C. xix.

[17] This is particularly true of the _bounties_ granted on some
American commodities (as pitch, tar, indigo, &c.) when imported into
_Britain_; for it is well known, that the end of granting them was,
to get those commodities cheaper from the Colonies, and in return for
our manufactures, which we used to get from _Russia_ and other foreign
countries. And this is expressed in the preambles of the laws which
grant these bounties. See the Appeal to the Justice, &c. page 21, third
edition. It is, therefore, strange that Doctor TUCKER and others, should
have insisted so much upon these bounties as favours and indulgencies to
the Colonies.—But it is still more strange, that the same representation
should have been made of the compensations granted them for doing more
during the last war in assisting us than could have been reasonably
expected; and also of the sums we have spent in maintaining troops among
them _without_ their consent; and in opposition to their wishes.—See a
pamphlet, entitled “The rights of Great Britain asserted against the
claims of America.”

[18] It is remarkable that even the author of the _Remarks on the
Principal Acts of the 13th Parliament of Great Britain_, &c. finds
himself obliged to acknowledge this difference.—There cannot be more
detestable principles of government, than those which are maintained by
this writer. According to him, the _properties_ and _rights_ of a people
are only a kind of _alms_ given them by their civil governors. Taxes,
therefore, he asserts, are not the _gifts_ of the people. See page 58,
and 191.

[19] See Observations on Reversionary Payments, page 207, &c.

[20] See page 22.

[21] The author of _Taxation no Tyranny_ will undoubtedly assert this
without hesitation, for in page 69 he compares our present situation with
respect to the Colonies to that of the antient _Scythians_, who, upon
returning from a war, _found themselves shut out of their_ OWN HOUSES by
their SLAVES.

[22] See particularly, a speech intended to have been spoken on the
bill for altering the Charter of the Colony of Massachuset’s Bay; the
_Considerations on the Measures carrying on with respect to the British
Colonies_; the _Two Appeals to the Justice and Interests of the People_;
and the _further Examination_, just published, _of our present American
Measures_, by the Author of the Considerations, &c.

[23] I have heard it said by a person in one of the first departments
of the state, that the present contest is for DOMINION on the side of
the Colonies, as well as on ours: And so it is indeed; but with this
essential difference. _We_ are struggling for dominion over OTHERS.
_They_ are struggling for SELF-dominion: The noblest of all blessings.

[24] This has been our policy with respect to the people of _Ireland_;
and the consequence is, that we now see their parliament as obedient as
we can wish.

[25] It should be remembered, that this was written some time before the
Declaration of Independence in July 1776. See page 85 of the next Tract.

[26] In February 1776.—In a few weeks after this, they were driven from
_Boston_; and took refuge at _Hallifax_ in _Nova Scotia_; from whence,
after a strong reinforcement, they invaded the Province of _New-York_.

[27] Except the _Negroes_ in the Southern Colonies, who probably will now
either soon become extinct, or have their condition changed into that
of _Freemen_.—It is not the fault of the Colonies that they have among
them so many of these unhappy people. They have made laws to prohibit the
importation of them; but these laws have always had a negative put upon
them here, because of their tendency to hurt our <DW64> trade.

[28] In the county of Suffolk, where Boston is, there has not been, I am
informed, more than one execution these 18 years.

[29] Mr. Burke (in his excellent and admirable Speech on moving his
resolutions for conciliation with the Colonies, P. 9. &c.) has shewn,
that our trade to the Colonies, including that to _Africa_ and the
_West-Indies_, was in 1772 nearly equal to the trade which we carried on
with the whole world at the beginning of this Century.

[30] See Dr. Davenant’s works, collected and revised by Sir Charles
Whitworth, Vol. I. Page 363, &c. 443, &c.

[31] See Considerations on Money, Bullion, &c. Page 2 and 11.

[32] The coin deficient between one grain and three grains was not called
in at the time this was written. This call was made in the Summer of
1776; and it brought in above three millions more than was expected. The
quantity of gold coin should therefore have been stated at about SIXTEEN
MILLIONS, and the whole coin of the kingdom at 18 or 19 millions.—The
evidence from which I have drawn this estimate may be found in the first
Section of the Second Part of the next Tract.

[33] See Sir James Steuart’s Enquiry into the Principles of political
Œconomy, Vol. II. Book 4, Chap. 32.

[34] See the Second Tract, P. 65.

[35] Their debts consist chiefly of money raised by annuities on lives,
short annuities, anticipations of taxes for short terms, &c. During the
whole last war they added to their _perpetual_ annuities only 12 millions
sterling, according to Sir James Steuart’s account; whereas we added
to these annuities near 60 millions. In consequence therefore of the
nature of their debts, as well as of the management they are now using
for hastening the reduction of them, they must in a few years, if peace
continues, be freed from most of their incumbrances; while we probably
(if no event comes soon that will unburthen us at once) shall continue
with them all upon us.

[36] Mr. _Lowndes_ in the dispute between him and Mr. _Locke_, contended
for a reduction of the standard of silver. One of his reasons was, that
it would render the silver-coin more commensurate to the wants of the
nation; and CHECK HAZARDOUS PAPER-CREDIT.—Mr. CONDUIT, Sir ISAAC NEWTON’S
successor in the mint, has proposed, in direct contradiction to the laws
now in being, that all the bullion imported into the kingdom should be
carried into the mint to be coined; and only coin allowed to be exported.
“The height, he says, of paper-credit is the strongest argument for
trying this and _every other_ method that is likely to increase the
coinage. For whilst paper-credit does in a great measure the business of
money at home, Merchants and Bankers are not under a necessity, as they
were formerly, of coining a quantity of specie for their home trade;
and as Paper-credit brings money to the Merchants to be exported, the
money may go away insensibly, and NOT BE MISSED TILL IT BE TOO LATE: And
where Paper-credit is large and increasing, if the money be exported
and the coinage decrease, THAT CREDIT MAY SINK AT ONCE, for want of a
proportionable quantity of _Specie_, which alone can support it in a time
of distress.”—See Mr. _Conduit’_s Observations on the state of our Gold
and Silver Coins in 1730, Page 36, to 46.

[37] According to the accounts of the exports to, and imports from the
North-American Colonies, laid before Parliament, the balance in our
favour appears to have been, for 11 years before 1774, near a _million
and a half_ annually.

[38] See the substance of the evidence on the petition presented by the
_West-India_ Planters and Merchants to the House of Commons as it was
introduced at the BAR, and summed up by Mr. GLOVER.

[39] The annual average of the payments into the Exchequer, on account of
the duties on tobacco, was for five years, from 1770 to 1774, 219,117l.
exclusive of the payments from _Scotland_.—Near one half of the _tobacco_
trade is carried on from _Scotland_; and above _four fifths_ of the
tobacco imported is afterwards exported to _France_, _Germany_ and other
countries. From _France_ alone it brings annually into the Kingdom, I am
informed, about 150,000l. in money.

In 1775, being, alas! the _parting_ year, the duties on tobacco in
ENGLAND brought into the _Exchequer_ no less a sum than 298,202l.

[40] All the accounts and calculations in the _Appendix_ here referred
to, have been transferred to the 2d and 4th Sections of the 3d Part of
the Second Tract.

[41] A quarter of the inhabitants of every country are fighting men.—If,
therefore, the Colonies consist only of two millions of inhabitants, the
number of fighting men in them will be half a million.

[42] See the Appendix to Dr. Zubly’s Sermon, preached at the opening of
the Provincial Congress of _Georgia_.

[43] The apprehensions here expressed have been verified by the events
which have happened since this was written. American privateers have
spread themselves over the Atlantick. They have frightened us even on our
own coasts, and seized millions of British property.

[44] “I have no other notion of slavery, but being bound by a law to
which I do not consent.” See the case of _Ireland_’s being bound by acts
of Parliament in _England_, stated by William Molyneux, Esq; Dublin.—In
arguing against the authority of Communities, and all people not
incorporated, over one another; I have confined my views to taxation and
internal legislation. Mr. Molyneux carried his views much farther; and
denied the right of _England_ to make any laws even to regulate the trade
of _Ireland_. He was the intimate friend of Mr. Locke; and writ his book
in 1698, soon after the publication of Mr. Locke’s Treatise on Government.

[45] See on this subject the second Section of the second Part of the
next Tract, Page 77.

[46] Some persons, convinced of the _folly_ as well as _barbarity_ of
attempting to keep the Colonies by slaughtering them, have very humanely
proposed giving them up. But the highest authority has informed us, with
great reason, “That they are too important to be given up.”—Dr. TUCKER
has insisted on the depopulation, produced by migrations from this
country to the Colonies, as a reason for this measure. But, unless the
kingdom is made a prison to its inhabitants, these migrations cannot be
prevented; nor do I think that they have any great tendency to produce
depopulation. When a number of people quit a country, there is more
employment and greater plenty of the means of subsistence left for those
who remain; and the vacancy is soon filled up. The grand causes of
depopulation are, not migrations, or even famines and plagues, or any
other _temporary_ evils; but the permanent and slowly working evils of
debauchery, luxury, high taxes, and oppression.

[47] See the Resolutions on the _Nova-Scotia_ petition reported to the
House of Commons, November 29, 1775, by Lord North, Lord George Germaine,
&c. and a bill ordered to be brought in upon the said Resolutions.—There
is indeed, as Lord Shelburne has hinted, something very astonishing in
these Resolutions. They offer a relaxation of the authority of this
country, in points to which the Colonies have always consented, and by
which we are great gainers; at the same time, that, with a rigour which
hazards the Empire, we are maintaining its authority in points to which
they will never consent; and by which nothing can be gained.




                        ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS
                      On the NATURE and VALUE of
                            CIVIL LIBERTY,
                                AND THE
                           WAR WITH AMERICA:

                                 ALSO

               OBSERVATIONS on Schemes for raising Money
                           by PUBLIC LOANS;

              An Historical Deduction and Analysis of the
                            NATIONAL DEBT;

            And a brief Account of the DEBTS and RESOURCES
                              of FRANCE.

    Should the morals of the English be perverted by luxury;—should
    they lose their Colonies by restraining them, &c.—they will be
    enslaved; they will become insignificant and contemptible; and
    _Europe_ will not be able to shew the world one nation in which
    she can pride herself.

                                                       ABBE RAYNAL.




                                  TO
                         THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
                            THE LORD MAYOR,
                     THE ALDERMEN, AND THE COMMONS
                                OF THE
                            CITY OF LONDON,

                              THIS TRACT,
              Containing ADDITIONS to those OBSERVATIONS
                           on CIVIL LIBERTY,
           which they have honoured with their Approbation,

             Is, with the greatest Respect and Gratitude,
                              INSCRIBED,
                                  BY
                          Their most obedient
                          and humble Servant,
                            RICHARD PRICE.




CONTENTS.


                                                                    Page

  INTRODUCTION                                                       vii

                                PART I.

  SECT. I. _Of the NATURE of ~Civil~ Liberty, and the Essentials
    of a Free Government._                                             1

  SECT. II. _Of the VALUE of Liberty, and the EXCELLENCE of a
    Free Government._                                                 15

  CONCLUSION.                                                         41

                               PART II.

  SECT. I. _Supplemental Observations on the Surplus of the
    Revenue; the Quantity of Coin in the Kingdom; and Paper
    Credit._                                                          53

  SECT. II. _Of the State of the Nation; and the War with America._   69

  SECT. III. _Of Schemes for raising Money by public Loans._          89

                               PART III.

  SECT. I. _Abstract of the EXPORTS from, and IMPORTS to GREAT
    BRITAIN from 1697 to 1773, with Remarks._                        113

  SECT. II. _Historical Deduction and Analysis of the Public
    Debts._                                                          119

  SECT. III. _Of the DEBTS and RESOURCES of FRANCE._                 148

  SECT. IV. _Remarks on the Earl of STAIR’S Account of the Public
   Income and Expenditure._                                          156

  _Resolution of a Committee of the ~American~ Congress in
    June 1775._                                                      175




_Published by the same Author_,

And printed for T. CADELL, in the Strand.


1. OBSERVATIONS on REVERSIONARY PAYMENTS; on Schemes for providing
Annuities for Widows, and Persons in Old Age; on the Method of
calculating the Values of Assurances on Lives; and on the National Debt.
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a complete Set of Tables; particularly four New Tables, shewing the
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of two joint Lives.

The 3d Edition, with a Supplement, containing (besides several New
Tables) additional Observations on the Probabilities of Human Life in
different Situations; on the LONDON Societies for the Benefit of Widows
and of Old Age; and on the present State of Population in this Kingdom.
Price 6s.

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Particularly, those relating to the Original of our Ideas of Virtue, its
Nature, Foundation, Reference to the Deity, Obligation, Subject-matter,
and Sanctions. The Second Edition corrected. Price 6s.

III. FOUR DISSERTATIONS.—I. On Providence.—II. On Prayer.—III. On the
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IV. An APPEAL to the PUBLIC, on the Subject of the NATIONAL DEBT. The
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V. OBSERVATIONS on the Nature of CIVIL LIBERTY, the Principles of
GOVERNMENT, and the Justice and Policy of the WAR with AMERICA. To
which is added an Appendix, containing a State of the National Debt, an
Estimate of the Money drawn from the Public by the Taxes, and an Account
of the National Income and Expenditure since the last War. The 7th
Edition. Price 2s.




INTRODUCTION.


Before the reader enters on the following tract, I shall beg leave to
detain him while I give a general account of the contents of it, and make
a few introductory observations.

In the first part of the _Observations on Civil Liberty_, published last
winter, I gave a brief account of the nature of Liberty in general, and
of _Civil Liberty_ in particular. That account appears to me, after
carefully reconsidering it, to be just; nor do I think it in my power
to improve it. In order, however, to be as explicit as possible on this
subject, and to remove those misapprehensions of my sentiments into which
some have fallen, I have thought proper to add the _supplemental_ and
_explanatory_ observations, which will be found in the FIRST part of this
pamphlet.—In writing with this view, I have been led to refer often to
my former pamphlet, and to repeat some of the observations in it. But as
this could not have been avoided, it will, I hope, be excused.

The remarks in the SECOND part, I offer to the public with all the
deference due to the high station and abilities of the noble Lord, whose
speech at opening the Budget in _April_ last, has occasioned them.—These
remarks, having been promised long ago, should have been published
sooner. The reasons which have produced this delay are of little
consequence to the public; and, therefore, need not be mentioned.

In the first section of this _second_ part, it will, I think, appear,
that I went upon as good grounds as the nature of the case admitted, when
I stated the gold coin[48] of the kingdom at ABOUT TWELVE MILLIONS AND
A HALF. It appears now, indeed, to be some millions more. But this is a
discovery made by the call of last summer; which, I find, has brought in
near double the sum that the best judges expected. Nothing, however, very
encouraging can be inferred from hence. It only shews that a great deal
of gold has been hoarded; and will, probably, be again hoarded. This is
the natural consequence of public diffidence; and it is a circumstance
which may, hereafter, greatly increase distress. Before the REVOLUTION,
according to Dr. _Davenant_, near half the coin was hoarded; and the
same, undoubtedly, will be done again, whenever the nation comes to be
thoroughly alarmed.

In the next section of this part, I have made some further observations
on the contest with _America_.—I cannot expect any other than a tragical
and deplorable issue to this contest. But let events turn out as they
will, I shall always reflect with satisfaction, that I have, though a
private person of little consequence, bore my testimony, from deep-felt
conviction, against a war which must shock the feelings and the reason
of every considerate person; a war in which rivers of blood must be
shed, not to repel the attacks of enemies, or to maintain the authority
of government _within_ the realm, but to maintain sovereignty and
dominion in another world[49].—I wish the advocates for the measures
against _America_ would attend to the distinction now intimated.—The
support of just government _within_ the realm is always necessary, and
therefore right. But to maintain, by fire and sword, dominion over the
persons and the property of a people _out_ of the realm, who have no
share in its legislature, contradicts every principle of liberty and
humanity.—Legitimate government, let it be remembered, as opposed to
oppression and tyranny, consists “only in the dominion of EQUAL LAWS made
with COMMON CONSENT, or of men over THEMSELVES; and not in the dominion
of communities over communities, or of ANY MEN OVER OTHER MEN.”—This is
the great truth I have endeavoured to explain and defend; and happy
would the world be, were a due conviction of it impressed on every human
heart.

The representation I have given in this section and elsewhere, of the
state of this kingdom, is, without doubt, gloomy. But it is not the
effect, as some have intimated, of either a natural disposition to
gloominess, or of sinister views. Few, who know me, will entertain such
a suspicion. Valuing _most_ what politicians and statesmen generally
value _least_, I feel myself perfectly easy with respect to my interest
as a citizen of this world; nor is there any change of situation that can
make me happier, except a return to privacy and obscurity. The opinion
I have entertained of the present danger of the kingdom is, therefore,
the effect of evidence which appears to me irresistible. This evidence I
have stated to the public; and every one may judge of it as he pleases. I
am sensible of my own liableness to error. The measures which I condemn
as the worst that ever disgraced and hazarded a great kingdom, others,
whose integrity I cannot question, approve; and that very situation of
our affairs which I think alarming, others think prosperous. Time will
determine which of these opinions is right. But supposing the latter to
be so, no harm can arise from any representations which have a tendency
to put us on our guard.

I have bestowed particular attention on the observations in the third
section of this second part; and I think the subject of this section
so important, that it is probable, I should not have resolved on the
present publication, had it not been for the opportunity it gives me to
lay the observations it contains before the public.—An intimation of
them was given in the Introduction to the third edition of the Treatise
on _Reversionary Payments_. The nation being now once more got into a
course of borrowing; and our first step having been a return to a mode
of borrowing, which had appeared to me absurd and detrimental, I was
induced to resume the subject, and to examine it with more care. And
the result of an examination of only a _part_ of the public loans, will
be found to be, “that a capital of more than TWENTY MILLIONS has been a
needless addition to the public debt, for which no money, or any sort of
equivalent has been received; and which might have been avoided, together
with a great expence of interest, by only forming differently the schemes
of the public loans.”

       *       *       *       *       *

The intention of the first section of the THIRD PART is to give, in as
short a compass as possible, a view of the progress of our _foreign
trade_, and its effect on the nation, from the beginning of this century;
and, particularly, to point out an unfavourable change which seems to
have taken place since 1764.

In the second section of this part, an explanation and analysis are given
of all the different articles of the national debt, which will probably
inform every person of most that he can wish to know concerning them.—I
have added a general account of the debts and resources of FRANCE. This
is a subject at present particularly interesting to this country; and,
having been informed of some important facts relating to it, I have
thought proper to lay them before the public, with such reflexions as
have offered themselves in mentioning them.

The last section contains such of the calculations in the APPENDIX to the
_Observations on Civil Liberty_ as were necessary to be reprinted, in
order to introduce the remarks I have added on some particulars in the
state of the _public income and expenditure_, published not long ago by
the _Earl of Stair_. I have also meant to accommodate the purchasers of
the different editions of the _Observations on Civil Liberty_, who will
be enabled, by this section, to possess themselves of all the material
alterations and improvements which were made in that pamphlet after its
first publication.—The accounts, in the latter part of this tract, are
so various and extensive, that it is scarcely possible there should not
be some incorrectnesses in them. But the pains I have taken, and the
means of information which I have possessed have been such, that I cannot
suspect that I have fallen into any mistakes of consequence. Should,
however, any such have escaped me, it will be kind in any person to
point them out with candour; and to assist in making those accounts so
correct and perfect, as that they may serve for a basis to all future
accounts of the same kind.

       *       *       *       *       *

The following note in Mr. _Hume_’s History of _England_ was written
by him a little before his death, and left with other additions to be
inserted in the new edition of that history just published. It contains,
therefore, a kind of dying warning from Mr. _Hume_ to this kingdom; and I
have thought proper to transcribe it, and to insert it in this place, as
a confirmation of similar sentiments frequently expressed in these tracts.

       *       *       *       *       *

“The supplies granted Queen _Elizabeth_, during a reign of FORTY-FIVE
YEARS, amounted to three millions. The minister, in the war which begun
in 1754, was, in some periods, allowed to lavish a sum equal to this in
TWO MONTHS. The extreme frivolous object of the late war, and the great
importance of hers, set this matter in still a stronger light. Money
too was in most particulars of the same value in both periods: she paid
eight-pence a day to every foot soldier;—but our LATE DELUSIONS have
much exceeded any thing known in history, not even excepting those of
the Crusades. For, I suppose, there is no mathematical, still less an
arithmetical demonstration, that the road to the holy land was not the
road to Paradise; as there is, that the endless increase of national
debt is the direct road to national ruin. But having now completely
reached that goal, it is needless at present to reflect on the past. It
will be found in the present year (1776) that all the revenues of this
island, north of the _Trent_, and west of _Reading_, are mortgaged or
anticipated for ever. Could the small remainder be in a worse condition,
were these provinces seized by _Austria_ and _Prussia_? There is only
this difference, that some event might happen in _Europe_, which would
oblige those great monarchs to disgorge their acquisitions. But no
imagination can figure a situation which will induce our creditors to
relinquish their claims, or the public to seize their revenues.—So
egregious, indeed, has been our folly, that we have even lost all title
to compassion, under the numberless calamities that are waiting us.”—Mr.
_Hume_’s History, vol. 5th, page 475.




PART I.

SUPPLEMENTAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE and VALUE of CIVIL LIBERTY and
FREE GOVERNMENT.


SECT. I.

_Of the Nature of Civil Liberty, and the Essentials of a Free Government._

With respect to Liberty in general there are two questions to be
considered:

First, What it is?—And Secondly, How far it is of value?

There is no difficulty in answering the first of these questions.—To be
FREE, is “to be able to act or to forbear acting, as we think best;” or
“to be masters of our own resolutions and conduct.”—It may be pretended,
that it is not desirable to be thus free; but, without doubt, this it is
to be _free_; and this is what all mean when they say of themselves or
others that they are _free_.

I have observed, that all the different kinds of Liberty run up
into the general idea of self-government[50].—The Liberty of men as
_agents_ is that power of self-determination which all agents, as
such, possess.—Their Liberty as _moral_ agents is their power of
self-government in their _moral_ conduct.—Their Liberty as _religious_
agents is their power of self-government in _religion_.—And their
Liberty, as members of communities associated for the purposes of
civil government, is their power of self-government in all their civil
concerns. It is Liberty, in the last of these views of it, that is the
subject of my present enquiry; and it may, in other words, be defined to
be “the power of a state to govern itself by its own will.”—In order,
therefore, to determine whether a state is free, no more is necessary
than to determine whether there is any will, different from its own, to
which it is subject.

When we speak of a state, we mean the _whole_ state, and not any
_part_ of it; and the will of the state, therefore, is the will of the
whole.—There are two ways in which this will may be expressed. First,
by the suffrages of all the members given in person. Or secondly, by
the suffrages of a body of Representatives, in appointing whom all
the members have voices.—A state governed by its own will in the first
of these ways enjoys the most complete and perfect Liberty; but such
a government being impracticable, except in very small states, it is
necessary that civil communities in general should satisfy themselves
with that degree of Liberty which can be obtained in the last of these
ways; and Liberty so obtained may be sufficiently ample, and at the same
time is capable of being extended to the largest states[51].

       *       *       *       *       *

But here, before I proceed, I must desire, that an observation may
be attended to, which appears to me of considerable consequence.—A
distinction should be made between the _Liberty_ of a state, and
its not suffering oppression; or between a free government, and a
government under which freedom is enjoyed. Under the most despotic
government liberty may happen to be enjoyed. But being derived from a
will over which the state has no controul, and not from its own will;
or from an accidental mildness in the _administration_, and not from
a _constitution_ of government; it is nothing but an indulgence of a
precarious nature, and of little importance.—Individuals in private
life, while held under the power of masters, cannot be denominated free,
however equitably and kindly they may be treated. This is strictly true
of _communities_ as well as of _individuals_.—Civil Liberty (it should be
remembered) must be enjoyed as a right derived from the Author of nature
only, or it cannot be the blessing which merits this name. If there is
any human power which is considered as _giving_ it, on which it depends,
and which can invade or recall it at pleasure, it changes its nature, and
becomes a species of slavery.

       *       *       *       *       *

But to return—The force superseding self-government in a state, or the
power destroying its Liberty, is of two kinds. It may be either a power
_without_ itself, or a power _within_ itself. The former constitutes
what may be properly called _external_, and the latter _internal_
slavery.—Were there any distant state which had acquired a sovereignty
over this country, and exercised the power of making its laws and
disposing its property, we should be in the first kind of slavery; and,
if not totally depraved by a habit of subjection to such a power, we
should think ourselves in a miserable condition; and an advocate for
such a power would be considered as insulting us, who should attempt to
reconcile us to it by telling us, that we were _one_ community with that
distant state, though destitute of a single voice in its legislature;
and, on this ground, should maintain, that all resistance to it was no
less criminal than any resistance _within_ a state to the authority of
that state.—In short, every state, not incorporated with another by an
equal representation, and yet subject to its dominion, is enslaved in
this sense.—Such was the slavery of the provinces subject to antient
_Rome_; and such is the slavery of every community, as far as any other
community is master of it; or as far as, in respect of taxation and
internal legislation, it is not independent of every other community. Nor
does it make any difference to such a community, that it enjoys within
itself a free constitution of government, if that constitution is itself
liable to be altered, suspended or over-ruled at the discretion of the
state which possesses the sovereignty over it.

But the slavery most prevalent in the world has been internal slavery.—In
order better to explain this, it is proper to observe, that all civil
government being either the government of a _whole_ by _itself_, or of
a _whole_ by a _power extraneous_ to it, or of a _whole_ by a _part_;
the first _alone_ is LIBERTY, and the two last are TYRANNY, producing
the two sorts of slavery which I have mentioned. Internal slavery,
therefore, takes place wherever a whole community is governed by a
_part_; and this, perhaps, is the most concise and comprehensive
account that can be given of it.—The part that governs may be either a
_single_ man, as in _absolute Monarchies_; or, a body of grandees, as
in _Aristocracies_. In both these cases the powers of government are
commonly held for life without delegation, and descend from father to
son; and the people governed are in the same situation with cattle upon
an estate, which descends by inheritance from one owner to another.—But
farther. A community may be governed by a body of delegates, and yet be
enslaved.—Though government by representation alone is free, unless when
carried on by the personal suffrages of all the members of a state, yet
_all_ such government is by no means free. In order to render it so, the
following requisites are necessary.

First, The representation must be _complete_. No state, a _part_ of
which only is represented in the Legislature that governs it, is
_self_-governed. Had _Scotland_ no representatives in the Parliament of
_Britain_, it would not be free; nor would it be proper to call _Britain_
free, though _England_, its other part, were adequately represented. The
like is true, in general, of every country subject to a Legislature in
which _some_ of its parts, or some classes of men in it, are represented,
and others not.

Secondly, The representatives of a free state must be _freely_ chosen.
If this is not the case, they are not at all representatives; and
government by them degenerates into government by a junto of men in
the community, who happen to have power or wealth enough to command or
purchase their offices.

Thirdly, After being _freely_ chosen, they must be themselves _free_. If
there is any higher will which directs their resolutions, and on which
they are dependent, they become the instruments of that will; and it is
that will alone that in reality governs the state.

Fourthly, They must be chosen for short terms; and, in all their acts,
be accountable to their constituents. Without this a people will have no
controul over their representatives; and, in chusing them, they will give
up entirely their Liberty; and only enjoy the poor privilege of naming,
at certain intervals, a set of men whom they are to _serve_, and who are
to dispose, at their discretion, of their property and lives.

       *       *       *       *       *

The causes of internal slavery now mentioned prevail, some of them more
and others less, in different communities. With respect, in particular,
to a government by representation; it is evident, that it deviates more
or less from Liberty, in proportion as the representation is more or
less imperfect. And, if imperfect in every one of the instances I have
recited; that is, if inadequate and partial; subject to no controul from
the people; corruptly chosen for long terms; and, after being chosen,
venal and dependent;—in these circumstances, a representation becomes an
imposition and a nusance; and government by it is as inconsistent with
true Liberty as the most arbitrary and despotic government.

       *       *       *       *       *

I have been so much misunderstood[52] on this subject, that it is
necessary I should particularly observe here, that my intention in
this account has been merely to shew what is requisite to constitute a
state or a government free, and not at all to define the best form of
government. These are two very different points. The first is attended
with few difficulties. A free state is a state self-governed in the
manner I have described. But it may be free, and yet not enjoy the best
constitution of government. Liberty, though the most essential requisite
in government, is not the only one. Wisdom, union, dispatch, secresy, and
vigour are likewise requisite; and that is the best form of government
which best unites all these qualities; or which, to an equal and perfect
Liberty, adds the greatest wisdom in deliberating and resolving, and the
greatest union, force and expedition in executing[53].

In short, my whole meaning is, that the will of the Community alone
ought to govern; but that there are different methods of obtaining and
executing this will; of which those are the best which collect into it
most of the knowledge and experience of the community, and at the same
time carry it into execution with most dispatch and vigour.

It has been the employment of the wisest men in all ages to contrive
plans for this purpose; and the happiness of society depends so much on
civil government, that it is not possible the human understanding should
be better employed.

       *       *       *       *       *

I have said in the Observations on Civil Liberty, that “in a free state
every man is his own legislator.”—I have been happy in since finding
the[54] same assertion in _Montesquieu_, and also in Mr. Justice
_Blackstone_’s Commentaries. It expresses the fundamental principle
of our constitution; and the meaning of it is plainly, that every
independent agent in a free state ought to have a share in the government
of it, either by himself _personally_, or by a body of representatives,
in chusing whom he has a free vote, and therefore all the concern
and weight which are possible, and consistent with the equal rights
of every other member of the state.—But though the meaning of this
assertion is so obvious, and the truth of it undeniable, it has been
much exclaimed against, and occasioned no small part of the opposition
which has been made to the principles advanced in the _Observations on
Civil Liberty_.—One even of the most candid, as well as the ablest of
my opponents, (whose difference of opinion from me I sincerely lament)
has intimated, that it implies, that, in a free state,[55] _thieves and
pick-pockets have a right to make laws for themselves_.—The public will
not, I hope, wonder that I chuse to take little notice of such objections.

       *       *       *       *       *

It has been said, that the liberty for which I have pleaded, is
“a right or power in every one to act as he likes without any
restraint.”—However unfairly this representation has been given of my
account of liberty, I am ready to adopt it, provided it is understood
with a few limitations.—MORAL LIBERTY, in particular, cannot be better
defined than by calling it “a power in every one to do as he likes.”
My opponents in general seem to be greatly puzzled with this; and I am
afraid it will signify little to attempt explaining it to them by saying,
that every man’s will, if perfectly free from restraint, would carry him
invariably to rectitude and virtue; and that no one who acts wickedly
acts as he _likes_, but is conscious of a tyranny within him overpowering
his judgment, and carrying him into a conduct, for which he condemns
and hates himself. _The things that he would he does not_;[56] _and the
things that he would not, those he does_. He is, therefore, a slave in
the properest sense.

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, likewise, is a power of acting as we _like_ in
religion; or of professing and practising that mode of religious worship
which we think most acceptable to the Deity.—But here the limitation to
which I have referred must be attended to. ALL have the same unalienable
right to this Liberty; and consequently, no one has a right to such a use
of it as shall take it from others. Within this limit, or as far as he
does not encroach on the equal liberty of others, every one has a right
to do as he pleases in religion.—That the right to religious Liberty goes
as far as this every one must allow, who is not a friend to persecution;
and that it cannot go farther, is self-evident; for if it did, there
would be a contradiction in the natures of things; and it would be
true, that every one had a right to enjoy what every one had a right to
destroy.—If, therefore, the religious faith of any person leads him to
hurt another because he professes a different faith; or if it carries
him, in any instances, to intolerance, Liberty itself requires he should
be restrained, and that, in such instances, he should lose his liberty.

All this is equally applicable to the Liberty of man in his _civil_
capacity; and it is a maxim true universally, “that as far as any one
does not molest _others_, others ought not to molest _him_.”—All have
a right to the free and undisturbed possession of their good names,
properties and lives; and it is the right all have to this that gives
the right to establish civil government, which is or ought to be nothing
but an institution (by laws and provisions made with _common_ consent)
for guarding this right against invasion; for giving to every one, in
_temporals_ and _spirituals_, the power of commanding his own conduct;
or, of acting as he pleases, and going where he will, provided he does
not run foul of others.—Just government, therefore, does not _infringe_
liberty, but _establish_ it.—It does not _take away_ the rights of
mankind, but _protect_ and _confirm_ them.—I will add, that it does not
even create any new subordinations of particular men to one another,
but only gives security in those several stations, whether of authority
and pre-eminence, or of subordination and dependence, which nature has
established, and which must have arisen among mankind whether civil
government had been instituted or not. But this goes beyond my purpose in
this place, and more will be said of it presently.

       *       *       *       *       *

To sum up the whole—Our ideas of Civil Liberty will be rendered more
distinct by considering it under the three following views:—The Liberty
of the _citizen_—The liberty of the _government_—And the liberty of
the _community_.—A _citizen_ is free when the power of commanding his
own conduct and the quiet possession of his life, person, property and
good name are _secured_ to him by being his own legislator in the sense
explained in page 10[57].—A _government_ is free when constituted in
such a manner as to give this _security_.—And the freedom of a community
or nation is the same among nations, that the freedom of a citizen is
among his fellow-citizens.—It is not, therefore, as observed in page 3,
the mere possession of Liberty that denominates a citizen or a community
free; but that _security_ for the possession of it which arises from
such a free government as I have described; and which takes place, when
there exists no power that can take it away.—It is in the same sense
that the mere performance of virtuous actions is not what denominates
an agent virtuous; but the temper and habits from whence they spring;
or that _inward constitution_, and right balance of the affections,
which _secure_ the practice of virtue, produce stability of conduct, and
constitute a _character_.

I cannot imagine how it can be disputed whether this is a just account
of the nature of Liberty. It has been already given more briefly in the
Observations on Civil Liberty; and it is with reluctance I have repeated
so much of what has been there said. But the wrong apprehensions which
have been entertained of my sentiments have rendered this necessary. And,
for the same reason, I am obliged to go on to the subject of the next
section.


SECT. II.

_Of the VALUE of Liberty, and the EXCELLENCE of a Free Government._

Having shewn in the preceding section “what Liberty is;” the next
question to be considered is, “how far it is valuable.”

Nothing need be said to shew the value of the three kinds of liberty
which I have distinguished under the names of _Physical_, _Moral_, and
_Religious_ Liberty. They are, without doubt, the foundation of all the
happiness and dignity of men, as reasonable and moral agents, and the
subjects of the Deity.—It is, in like manner, true of _Civil_ Liberty,
that it is the foundation of the whole happiness and dignity of men as
members of civil society, and the subjects of civil government.

First. It is Civil Liberty, or such free government as I have described,
that alone can give just security against oppression. One government is
better than another in proportion as it gives more of this security.
It is, on this account, that the supreme government of the Deity is
perfect. There is not a possibility of being oppressed or aggrieved by
it. Subjection to it is the same with complete freedom.

Were there any men on whose superior wisdom and goodness we might
absolutely depend, they could not possess too much power; and the love of
liberty itself would engage us to fly to them, and to put ourselves under
their direction. But such are the principles that govern human nature;
such the weakness and folly of men; such their love of domination,
selfishness, and depravity; that none of them can be raised to an
elevation above others without the utmost danger. The constant experience
of the world has verified this; and proved, that nothing intoxicates the
human mind so much as power, and that men, when they have got possession
of it, have seldom failed to employ it in grinding their fellow-men, and
gratifying the vilest passions.—In the establishment, therefore, of civil
government, it would be preposterous to rely on the discretion of any
men. If a people would obtain security against oppression, they must seek
it in _themselves_, and never part with the powers of government out _of
their own_ hands. It is there only they can be safe.—A people will never
oppress themselves, or invade their own rights. But if they trust the
arbitrary will of any body or succession of men, they trust ENEMIES, and
it may be depended on that the worst evils will follow.

       *       *       *       *       *

It follows from hence, that a free government is the only government
which is consistent with the ends of government.—Men combine into
communities and institute government to obtain the peaceable enjoyment of
their rights, and to defend themselves against injustice and violence:
And when they endeavour to secure these ends by such a free government as
I have described, improved by such arrangements as may have a tendency to
preserve it from confusion, and to concentrate in it as much as possible
of the wisdom and force of the community; In this case, it is a most
rational and important institution.—But when the contrary is done; and
the benefits of government are sought by establishing a government of
_men_, and not of _laws_ made with common consent; it becomes a most
absurd institution.—It is seeking a remedy for oppression in _one_
quarter, by establishing it in _another_; and avoiding the outrages of
_little_ plunderers, by constituting a set of _great_ plunderers.—It
is, in short, the folly of _giving up_ liberty in order to _maintain_
Liberty; and, in the very act of endeavouring to secure the most valuable
rights, to arm a body of enemies with power to destroy them.

I can easily believe, that mankind, in the first and rude state of
society, might act thus irrationally. Absolute governments, being the
simplest forms of government, might be the first that were established. A
people having experienced the happy effects of the wisdom or the valour
of particular men, might be led to trust them with unlimited power
as their rulers and legislators. But they would soon find reason to
repent: And the time, I hope, may come, when mankind in general, taught
by long and dear experience, and _weary_ of the abuses of power under
_slavish_ governments, will learn to detest them, and never to give up
that SELF-GOVERNMENT, which, whether we consider men in their private or
collective capacities, is the first of all the blessings they can possess.

       *       *       *       *       *

Again. Free governments are the only governments which give scope
to the exertion of the powers of men, and are favourable to their
improvement.—The members of free states, knowing their rights to be
secure, and that they shall enjoy without molestation the fruits of every
acquisition they can make, are encouraged and incited to industry. Being
at liberty to push their researches as far as they can into all subjects,
and to guide themselves by their own judgments in all their religious
and civil concerns, while they allow others to do the same; error and
superstition must lose ground. Conscious of being their own governors,
bound to obey no laws except such as they have given their consent to,
and subject to no controul from the arbitrary will of any of their
fellow-citizens; they possess an elevation and force of mind which must
make them great and happy.—How different is the situation of the vassals
of despotic power?—Like cattle inured to the yoke, they are driven on in
one track, afraid of speaking or even thinking on the most interesting
points; looking up continually to a poor creature who is their master;
their powers fettered; and some of the noblest springs of action in
human nature rendered useless within them. There is nothing indeed more
humiliating than that debasement of mankind which takes place in such
situations.

It has been observed of free governments, that they are often torn by
violent contests, which render them dreadful scenes of distress and
anarchy. But it ought to be considered, that this has not been owing to
the _nature_ of such governments; but to their having been ill-modelled,
and wanted those arrangements and supplemental checks which are necessary
to constitute a wise form of government.—There is no reason to doubt, but
that free governments may be so contrived, as to exclude the greatest
part of the struggles and tumults which have arisen in free states; and,
as far as they cannot be excluded, they will do more good than harm. They
will occasion the display of powers, and produce exertions which can
never be seen in the _still_ scenes of life. They are the active efforts
of health and vigour; and always tend to preserve and purify. Whereas,
on the contrary, the _quiet_ which prevails under slavish governments,
and which may seem to be a recommendation of them, proceeds from an
ignominious tameness, and stagnation of the human faculties. It is the
same with the _stillness_ of midnight, or the _silence_ and torpor of
death.

       *       *       *       *       *

Further. Free governments are the only governments which are consistent
with the natural equality of mankind. This is a principle which, in my
opinion, has been assumed, with the greatest reason, by some of the
best writers on government. But the meaning of it is not, that all the
subordinations in human life owe their existence to the institution
of civil government. The superiorities and distinctions arising from
the relation of parents to their children; from the differences in the
personal qualities and abilities of men; and from servitudes founded on
voluntary compacts, must have existed in a state of nature, and would now
take place were all men so virtuous as to leave no occasion for civil
government.—The maxim, therefore, “that all men are naturally equal,”
refers to their state when grown up to maturity, and become independent
agents, capable of acquiring property, and of directing their own
conduct. And the sense of it is, that no one of them is constituted by
the author of nature the vassal or subject of another, or has any right
to give law to him, or, without his consent, to take away any part of
his property, or to abridge him of his liberty.—In a state of nature,
one man may have received benefits from another; and this would lay the
person obliged under an obligation of gratitude, but it would not make
his _benefactor_ his _master_; or give him a right to judge for him what
grateful returns he ought to make, and to extort these from him.—In
a state of nature, also, one man may possess more strength, or more
knowledge, or more property than another; and this would give him weight
and influence; but it would not give him any degree of authority. There
would not be one human being who would be bound to _obey_ him.—A person
likewise, in a state of nature, might let out his labour, or give up to
another, on certain stipulated terms, the direction of his conduct; and
this would so far bring him into the station of a _servant_; but being
done by himself, and on such terms only as he chuses to consent to, it is
an _instance_ of his liberty; and he will always have it in his power to
quit the service he has chosen, or to enter into another.

This equality or independence of men is one of their essential
rights.[58] It is the same with that equality or independence which now
actually takes place among the different states or kingdoms of the world
with respect to one another. Mankind came with this right from the hands
of their Maker.—But all governments, which are not free, are totally
inconsistent with it. They imply, that there are some of mankind who
are born with an inherent right of dominion; and that the rest are born
under an obligation to subjection; and that civil government, instead of
being founded on any compact, is nothing but the exercise of this right.
Some such sentiments seem to be now reviving in this country, and even
to be growing fashionable. Most of the writers against the _Observations
on Civil Liberty_ argue on the supposition of a right in the _few_ to
govern the _many_[59], independently of their own choice. Some of these
writers have gone so far as to assert, in plain language, that civil
governors derive their power immediately from the Deity; and are _his_
agents or representatives, accountable to him only. And one courtly
writer, in particular, has honoured them with the appellation of OUR
POLITICAL GODS.—Probably, this is the idea of civil governors entertained
by the author of the _Remarks on the Acts of the Thirteenth Parliament
of Great Britain_: for it is not easy to imagine on what other ground he
can assert, that _property_ and _civil rights_ are derived from civil
governors, and their _gifts_ to mankind[60].

If these sentiments are just, civil governors are indeed an awful order
of beings; and it becomes us to enquire with anxiety who they are, and
how we may distinguish them from the rest of mankind.—Shall we take for
such all, whether _men_ or _women_, whom we find in actual possession of
civil power, whatever may be their characters; or however they may have
acquired their power?—This is too extravagant to be asserted. It would
legalize the _American_ Congress.—There must then be some _pretenders_
among civil governors; and it is necessary we should know how to discover
them. It is incredible, that the Deity should not have made this easy to
us, by some particular marks and distinctions, which point out to our
notice his _real_ vicegerents; just as he has pointed out man, by his
figure and superior powers, to be the governor of the lower creatures.—In
particular; these persons must be possessed of wisdom and goodness
superior to those of the rest of mankind[61]; for, without this, a grant
of the powers they are supposed to possess would be nothing but a grant
of power to injure and oppress, without remedy and without bounds. But
this is a test by which they cannot be tryed. It would leave but few of
them in possession of the places they hold and the rights they claim.
It is not in the high ranks of life, or among the great and mighty,
that we are to seek wisdom and goodness. These love the shade, and fly
from observation. They are to be found chiefly in the middle ranks of
life, and among the contemplative and philosophical, who decline public
employments, and look down with pity on the scramble for power among
mankind, and the restlessness and misery of ambition.—It is proper to
add, that it has never been hitherto understood that any superiority in
intellectual and moral qualifications lays the foundation of a claim to
_dominion_.

It is not then, by their superior endowments, that the Deity intended to
point out to us the _few_ whom he has destined to command the _many_.—But
in what other manner could they be distinguished?—Must we embrace _Sir
Robert Filmer_’s _Patriarchal_ scheme? One would have thought, that Mr.
_Locke_ has said more than enough to expose this stupid scheme. One of
my opponents, however, has adopted it; and the necessary inference from
it is that, as there is but now one lineal descendent from Adam’s eldest
son, there can be but one rightful monarch of the world.—But I will not
abuse my reader’s patience by saying more on this subject. I am sorry
that in this country there should be any occasion for taking notice of
principles so absurd, and at the same time so pernicious[62]. I say,
PERNICIOUS; for they imply, that King _James_ the Second was deposed at
the Revolution unlawfully and impiously; that the present King is an
usurper; and that the present government, being derived from rebellion
and treason, has no right to our allegiance.

Without all doubt, it is the choice of the people that makes civil
governors.—The people are the spring of all civil power, and they have a
right to modify it as they please.

Mankind being naturally equal according to the foregoing explanation,
civil government, _in its genuine intention_, is an institution for
maintaining that equality, by defending it against the encroachments
of violence and tyranny. All the subordinations and distinctions in
society previous to its establishment, it leaves as it found them, only
confirming and protecting them. It makes no man _master_ of another. It
elevates no person above his fellow citizens. On the contrary, it levels
all by fixing all in a state of subjection to one common authority.—The
authority of the laws.—The will of the community.—TAXES are _given_;
not _imposed_. LAWS are regulations of common choice; not injunctions
of superior power.—The authority of magistrates is the authority of the
State; and their salaries are wages paid by the State for executing its
will and doing its business. _They_ do not govern the _State_. It is the
_State_ governs _them_; and had they just ideas of their own stations,
they would consider themselves as no less properly _servants_ of the
Public, than the labourers who work upon its roads, or the soldiers who
fight its battles.—A KING, in particular, is only the first executive
officer; the creature of the law; and as much accountable and subject to
the law as the meanest peasant[63]. And were Kings properly attentive to
their duty, and as anxious as they should be about performing it, they
could not easily avoid sinking under the weight of their charge.

       *       *       *       *       *

The account now given is, I am fully persuaded, in every particular,
a true account of what civil government _ought_ to be; and it teaches
us plainly the great importance and excellence of FREE Government.—It
is this only that answers the description I have given of government;
that secures against oppression; that gives room for that elevation of
spirit and that exertion of the human powers which is necessary to human
improvement; or that is consistent with the ends of government, with the
rights of mankind, and their natural equality and independence. _Free_
Government, therefore, only, is _just_ and _legitimate_ government.

It follows farther from the preceding account, that no people can
lawfully surrender or cede their Liberty. This must appear to any one
who will consider, that when a people make such a cession, and the
extensive powers of government are trusted to the discretion of any
man or body of men, they part with the powers of life and death, and
give themselves up a prey to oppression; that they make themselves the
instrument of any injustice in which their rulers may chuse to employ
them, by arming them against neighbouring states; and also, that they
do this not only for _themselves_, but for their _posterity_.—I will
add, that if such a cession has been made; or if through any causes, a
people have lost their Liberty, they must have a right to emancipate
themselves as soon as they can[64]. In attempting this, indeed, they
ought to consider the sufferings which may attend the struggle, and the
evils which may arise from a defeat. But at the same time, it will be
proper to consider, that the sufferings attending such a struggle must
be temporary, whereas the evils to be avoided are permanent; and that
Liberty is a blessing so inestimable, “that whenever there appears any
probability of recovering it, a people should be willing to run many
hazards, and even not to repine at the greatest expence of blood or
treasure.”[65]

       *       *       *       *       *

I am very sensible, that civil government, as it actually exists in the
world, by no means answers to the account I have given of it.—Instead
of being an institution for guarding the weak against the strong, we
find it an institution which makes the strong yet stronger, and gives
them a systematical power of oppressing. Instead of promoting virtue and
restraining vice, encouraging free enquiry, establishing Liberty, and
protecting alike all peaceable persons in the enjoyment of their civil
and religious rights; we see a savage despotism, under its name, laying
waste the earth, unreasonably elevating some and depressing others,
discouraging improvement, and trampling upon every human right. That
force of states, which ought to be applied only to their own defence,
we see continually applied to the purpose of attack, and used to extend
dominion by conquering neighbouring communities.—Civil governors consider
not themselves _servants_ but as _masters_. Their stations they think
they hold in their own right. The people they reckon their property; and
their possessions, a common _stock_ from which they have a right to take
what[66] they will, and of which no more belongs to any individual than
they are pleased to _leave_ him.

What a miserable perversion is this of a most important institution? What
a grievance is government so degenerated?—But this perversion furnishes
no just argument against the truth of the account I have given. Similar
degeneracies have prevailed in other instances of no less importance.

Reason in man, like the will of the community in the political world,
was intended to give law to his whole conduct, and to be the supreme
controuling power within him. The passions are subordinate powers, or
an _executive force_ under the direction of reason, kindly given to be,
as it were, wind and tide to the vessel of life in its course through
this world to future honour and felicity.—How different from this is
the _actual_ state of man?—Those powers which were destined to _govern_
are made to _serve_; and those powers which were destined to _serve_,
are allowed to _govern_. Passion guides human life; and most men make
no other use of their reason than to justify whatever their interest or
their inclinations determine them to do.

RELIGION likewise (the perfection of REASON) is, in its true nature,
the inspirer of humanity and joy, and the spring of all that can be
great and worthy in a character; and were we to see its genuine effects
among mankind, we should see nothing but peace and hope and justice and
kindness, founded on that regard to God and to his will, which is the
noblest principle of action.—But how different an aspect does religion
actually wear? What is it, too generally, in the practice of mankind, but
a gloomy and cruel superstition, rendering them severe and sour; teaching
them to compound for wickedness by punctuality in religious forms; and
prompting them to harrass, persecute and exterminate one another?

The same perversion has taken place still more remarkably in
CHRISTIANITY; the perfection of RELIGION.—JESUS CHRIST has established
among Christians absolute equality. He has declared, that they have
but _one_ master, even himself; and that they are all _brethren_; and,
therefore, has commanded them not to be called _masters_; and, instead of
assuming authority over one another, to be ready to _wash one another’s
feet_[67]. The princes of the Gentiles, he says, exercise lordship over
them, and are flattered with[68] high titles; but he has ordained, that
it shall not be so amongst his followers; and that if any one of them
would be _chief_, he must be the _servant_ of all.—The clergy in his
church are, by his appointment, no more than a body of men, chosen by
the different societies of Christians, to conduct their worship, and to
promote their spiritual improvement, without any other powers than those
of persuasion and instruction. It is expressly directed, that they shall
not make themselves Lords of _God’s heritage_, or exercise dominion over
the faith of Christians, but be _helpers of their joy_[69].—Who can,
without astonishment, compare these appointments of Christianity, with
the events which have happened in the Christian church?—That religion
which thus inculcates humility and forbids all domination, and the end of
which was to produce _peace an earth, and good-will among men_, has been
turned into an occasion of animosities the most dreadful, and of ambition
the most destructive. Notwithstanding its mildness and benignity, and the
tendency it has to extinguish in the human breast pride and malevolence;
it has been the means of arming the spirits of men with unrelenting fury
against one another. Instead of _peace_, it has brought a _sword_; and
its professors, instead of washing one another’s feet, have endeavoured
to tread on one another’s necks.—The ministers, in particular, of
Christianity, became, soon after its establishment, an independent body
of spiritual rulers, nominating one another in perpetual succession;
claiming, by divine right, the highest powers; and forming a HIERARCHY,
which by degrees produced a despotism more extravagant than any that ever
before existed on this earth.

A considerate person must find difficulties in enquiring into the causes
and reasons of that depravity of human nature which has produced these
evils, and rendered the best institutions liable to be so corrupted. This
enquiry is much the same with the enquiry into the origin of moral evil,
which has in all ages puzzled human wisdom. I have at present nothing
to do with it. It is enough for my purpose in these observations, that
the facts I have mentioned prove undeniably, that the state of civil
government in the world affords no reason for concluding, that I have not
given a just account of its true nature and origin.

       *       *       *       *       *

I have shewn at the beginning of this section, that it is free government
alone that can preserve from oppression, give security to the rights of
a people, and answer the ends of government. It is necessary I should
here observe, that I would not be understood to mean, that there can
be no _kind_ or _degree_ of security for the rights of a people, under
any government which cannot be denominated free. Even under an absolute
Monarchy or an Aristocracy, there may be laws and customs which, having
gained sacredness by time, may restrain oppression, and afford some
important securities.—Under governments by representation, there must
be still greater checks on oppression, provided the representation,
though partial, is uncorrupt, and also frequently changed. In these
circumstances, there may be so much of a common interest between the
body of representatives and the people, and they may stand so much on
one ground, that there will be no temptations to oppression.—The taxes
which the representative body impose, they will be obliged themselves to
pay; and the laws they make, they will make with the prospect of soon
returning to the situation of those for whom they make them, and of being
themselves governed by them.

It seems particularly worth notice here, that as far as there are any
such checks under any government, they are the consequence of its
partaking so far of Liberty, and that the security attending them is
more or less in proportion as a government partakes more or less of
Liberty. If, under an absolute government, fundamental laws and long
established institutions give security in any instances, it is because
they are held so sacred that a despot is afraid to violate them; or,
in other words, because a people, not being completely subdued, have
still some controul over the government.—The like is more evidently true
under mixed governments of which a house of representatives, fairly
chosen and freely deliberating and resolving, forms a part; and it is
one of the highest recommendations of such governments that, even when
the representation is most imperfect, they have a tendency to give more
security than any other governments.—Under other governments, it is the
fear of exciting insurrections by contradicting established maxims, that
restrains oppression. But, as, in general, a people will bear much, and
are seldom driven to resistance till grievances become intolerable,
their rulers can venture far without danger; and therefore, under such
governments, are very imperfectly restrained. On the contrary; If there
is an honest representation, vested with powers like to those of our
_House of Commons_, the redress of grievances, as soon as they appear,
will be always easily attainable, and the rulers of a state will be under
a necessity of regarding the first beginnings of discontent.—Such, and
greater than can be easily described, are the advantages of even an
_imperfect representation_ in a government. How great then must be the
blessing of a COMPLETE REPRESENTATION?—[70] It is this only gives full
security; and that can properly denominate a people free.

       *       *       *       *       *

It deserves to be added here, that as there can be no private character
so abandoned as to want _all_ virtue; so there can be no government
so slavish, as to exclude _every_ restraint upon oppression.—The most
slavish and, therefore, the worst governments are those under which
there is nothing to set bounds to oppression, besides the _discretion_
and _humanity_ of those who govern.—Of this kind are the following
governments.

First, All governments _purely_ despotic. These may be either
monarchical, aristocratical. The latter are the worst, agreeably to a
common observation, that it is better to have _one_ master than _many_.
The appetites of a single despot may be easily satiated; but this may be
impossible where there is a multitude.

Secondly, All provincial governments.—The history of mankind proves these
to be the worst of all governments; and that no oppression is equal
to that which one people are capable of practising towards another. I
have mentioned some of the reasons of this in the _Observations on Civil
Liberty_, Part I. sect. 3. Bodies of men do not feel for one another as
individuals do. The _odium_ of a cruel action, when shared among many,
is not regarded. The master of slaves working on a plantation, though he
may keep them down to prevent their becoming strong enough to emancipate
themselves, yet is led by _interest_, as well as _humanity_, to govern
them with such moderation, as to preserve their use: But these causes
will produce more of this good effect, when the slaves are under the eye
of their proprietor, and form a part of his family, than when they are
settled on a distant plantation, where he can know little of them, and is
obliged to trust them to the management of rapacious servants.

It is particularly observable here, that _free_ governments, though
happier in themselves, are more oppressive to their provinces than
despotic governments. Or, in other words, that the _subjects_ of free[71]
states are worse slaves than the subjects of states not free. This is
one of the observations which Mr. HUME represents as an universal axiom
in politicks[72].—“Though, says he, free governments have been commonly
the most happy for those who partake of their freedom, yet are they the
most oppressive and ruinous to their provinces; and this observation may
be fixed as an universal axiom in politics. What cruel tyrants were the
Romans over the world during the time of their commonwealth?—After the
dissolution of the commonwealth the Roman yoke became easier upon the
provinces, as _Tacitus_ informs us; and it may be observed, that many
of the worst Emperors (_Domitian_, for instance) were very careful to
prevent all oppression of the provinces.—The oppression and tyranny of
the _Carthaginians_ over their subject states in _Africa_ went so far,
as we learn from _Polybius_ (Lib. i. cap. 72.) that not content with
exacting the _half_ of all the produce of the ground, which of itself
was a very high rent, they also loaded them with many other taxes.—If we
pass from antient to modern times we shall always find the observation to
hold. The provinces of absolute monarchies are always better treated than
those of free states.”

Thirdly, Among the worst sorts of governments I reckon all governments
by a corrupt representation.—There is no instance in which the trite
observation is more true than in this, “that the best things when
corrupted become the worst.” A corrupt representation is so far from
being any _defence_ against oppression, that it is a _support_ to it.
Long established customs, in this case, afford no security, because,
under the sanction of such a representation, they may be easily
undermined or counteracted; nor is there any injury to a people which,
with the help of such an instrument, may not be committed with safety.
It is not, however, every degree of corruption, that will destroy the
use of a representation, and turn it into an evil so dreadful. In order
to this, corruption must pass a certain limit. But _every degree_ of it
_tends_ to this, saps the foundation of Liberty, and poisons the fountain
of Legislation. And when it gets to its last stage, and has proceeded
its utmost length: When, in particular, the means by which candidates
get themselves chosen are such as admit the _worst_, but exclude the
_best_ men; a House of Representatives becomes little better than a
sink into which is collected all that is most worthless and vile in a
kingdom.—There cannot be a greater calamity than such a government.—It
is impossible there should be a condition more wretched than that of a
nation, once free, so degenerated.


CONCLUSION.

It is time to dismiss this subject. But I cannot take a final leave
of it, (and probably of all subjects of this kind) without adding the
following reflections on our own state in this kingdom.

       *       *       *       *       *

It is well known, that MONTESQUIEU has paid the highest compliment to
this country, by describing its constitution of government, in giving
an account of a perfect government; and by drawing the character of
its inhabitants, in giving an account of the manners and characters
of a free people.—“All (he says) having, in free states, a share in
government, and the laws not being made for some more than others, they
consider themselves as _monarchs_, and are more properly _confederates
than fellow-subjects_.—No one citizen being subject to another, each
sets a greater value on his Liberty than on the glory of any of his
fellow-citizens.—Being independent, they are proud; for the pride of
kings is founded on their independence.—They are in a constant ferment,
and believe themselves in danger, even in those moments when they are
most safe.—They reason; but it is indifferent whether they reason well or
ill. It is sufficient that they _do_ reason. Hence springs that Liberty
which is their security.—This state, however, will lose its Liberty. It
will perish, when the _Legislative_ power shall become more corrupt than
the _executive_.”[73]

Such is the account which this great writer gave, many years ago, of the
_British_ constitution and people. We may learn from it, that we have
nothing to fear from that disposition to examine every public measure, to
censure ministers of state, and to be restless and clamorous, which has
hitherto characterized us.—On the contrary; we shall have every thing to
fear, when this disposition is lost. As soon as a people grow secure, and
cease to be quick in taking alarms, they are undone. A free constitution
of government cannot be preserved without an earnest and unremitting
jealousy. OUR Constitution, in particular, is so excellent, that it is
the properest object of such a jealousy. For my own part, I admire so
much the general frame and principles of it, that I could be almost
satisfied with that representation of the kingdom, which forms the most
important part of it, had I no other objection to this representation
than its _inadequateness_. Did it consist of a body of men, fairly
elected for a short term, by a number of independent persons, of all
orders in every part of the kingdom, equal to the number of the present
voters; and were it, after being elected, under no undue influence; it
would be a security of such importance, that I should be less disposed
to complain of the injustice done, by its inadequateness, to the
greatest part of the kingdom by depriving them of one their natural and
unalienable rights. To such a body of representatives we might commit,
with confidence, the guardianship of our rights, knowing, that having
one interest with the rest of the state, they could not violate them; or
that if they ever did, a little time would bring the power of gaining
redress without tumult or violence.—Happy the people so blessed.—If wise,
they will endeavour, by every possible method, to preserve the purity of
their representation; and, should it have degenerated, they will lose
no time in effecting a reformation of it.—But if, unhappily, infection
should have pervaded the whole mass of the state, and there should be no
room to hope for any reformation, it will be still some consolation to
reflect, that slavery, in all its rigour, will not immediately follow.
Between the time in which the securities of Liberty are undermined, and
its final subversion, there is commonly a flattering interval during
which the _enjoyment_ of Liberty may be continued, in consequence of
fundamental laws and rooted habits which cannot be at once exterminated.
And this interval is longer or shorter, according as the progress of
corruption is more or less rapid; and men in power more or less attentive
to improve favourable opportunities.—The government of this country, in
particular, is so well balanced, and the institutions of our common law
are so admirable, and have taken such deep root, that we can bear much
decay before our liberties fall.—Fall, however, they must, if our public
affairs do not soon take a new turn. That very evil, which, according to
the great writer I have quoted, is to produce our ruin, we see working
every where and increasing every day.—The following facts, among many
others, shew too plainly whither we are tending and how far we are
advanced.

First. It seems to me, that a general indifference is gaining ground
fast among us.—This is the necessary effect of increasing luxury and
dissipation; but there is another cause of it, which I think of with
particular regret.—In consequence of having been often duped by false
patriots; and found, that the leaders of opposition, when they get into
places, forget all their former declarations; the nation has been led
to a conviction, that all patriotism is imposture, and all opposition
to the measures of government nothing but a struggle for power and its
emoluments. The honest and independent part of the nation entertain at
present most of this conviction; and, therefore, having few public men
to whom they can look with confidence, they give up all zeal, and sink
into inactivity and despondence.

Secondly. At the Revolution, the House of Commons acquired its just
weight in the constitution; and, for some years afterwards, it was often
giving much trouble to men in power. Of late, it is well known, that
means have been tryed and a system adopted for quieting it.—I will not
say with what success—But I must say, that the men whose policy this has
been, have struck at the very _heart_ of public liberty, and are the
worst traitors this kingdom ever saw.—“If ever, (says Judge _Blackstone_)
it should happen, that the independency of any one of the three branches
of our legislature should be lost; or that it should become subservient
to the views of either of the other two, there would soon be an end of
our constitution. The legislature would be changed from that which was
originally set up by the general consent and fundamental act of the
society; and such a change, however effected, is according to Mr. _Locke_
(who perhaps carries his theory too far) at once an entire dissolution of
the bands of government, and the people are thereby reduced to a state
of anarchy, with liberty to constitute to themselves a new legislative
power.”[74]

Thirdly. Soon after the REVOLUTION, bills for triennial parliaments
passed both Houses, in opposition to the court[75]. At the ACCESSION,
septennial parliaments were established. Since this last period, many
attempts have been made, by the friends of the constitution, to restore
triennial parliaments; and, formerly, it was not without difficulty that
the ministry were able to defeat these attempts. The division in the
House of Commons in 1735, on a bill for this purpose, was 247 to 184.—I
need not say, that _now_ all such attempts drop of themselves. So much
are the sentiments of our representatives changed in this instance, that
the motion for such a bill, annually made by a worthy member of the House
of Commons, can scarcely produce a serious debate, or gain the least
attention.—For several years, at the beginning of the last reign, the
HOUSE OF COMMONS constantly passed _pension_ and _place_ bills, which
were as constantly rejected by the HOUSE OF LORDS. At present, no one is
so romantic as ever to think of introducing any such bills into the House
of Commons.

Fourthly. Standing armies have in all ages been destructive
to the Liberties of the states into which they have been
admitted.—MONTESQUIEU[76] observes, that the preservation of Liberty
in ENGLAND requires, that it should have no land forces.—Dr. FERGUSON
calls the establishment of standing armies “A FATAL REFINEMENT in the
present state of civil government.”[77]—Mr. _Hume_ pronounces “our
standing army a mortal distemper in the British constitution, of which
it must _inevitably_ perish.”[78]—Formerly, the nation was apprehensive
of this danger; and the _standing army_ was a constant subject of warm
debate in both Houses of Parliament. The principal reason then assigned
for continuing it was, the security of the House of HANOVER against the
friends of the _Pretender_. This is a reason which now exists no more;
the House of _Hanover_ being so well established as not to want any such
security.—The standing army also is now more numerous and formidable than
ever; and yet all opposition to it is lost, and it is become in a manner
a part of the constitution.

Fifthly. For many years after the accession the national debt was thought
an evil so alarming, that the reduction of it was recommended every year
from the throne to the attention of Parliament as an object of the last
importance. The FUND appropriated to this purpose was called the ONLY
HOPE of the kingdom; and when the practice of alienating it begun, it
was reckoned a kind of sacrilege, and zealously opposed in the House of
_Commons_, and protested against in the House of _Lords_. But now, though
the debt is almost _tripled_, we sit under it with perfect indifference;
and the sacred fund, which repeated laws had ordered to be applied _to no
other purpose_ than the redemption of it, is always alienated of course,
and become a constant part of the current supplies, and much more an
encouragement to dissipation than a preservative from bankruptcy.

Sixthly. Nothing is more the duty of the representatives of a nation than
to keep a strict eye over the expenditure of the money granted for public
services.—In the reign of King William, the House of Commons passed
almost every year bills for appointing commissioners for taking, stating
and examining the public accounts; and, particularly, the army and navy
debts and contracts. In the reign of Queen Ann such bills became less
frequent. But since the accession, only two motions have been made for
such bills; one in 1715, and the other in 1741; and both were rejected.

Seventhly. I hope I may add, that there was a time when the kingdom
could not have been brought to acquiesce in what was done in the case
of the _Middlesex_ election. This is a precedent which, by giving the
House of Commons the power of excluding its members at discretion, and of
introducing others in their room on a minority of votes, has a tendency
to make it a self-created House, and to destroy entirely the right of
representation: And a few more such precedents would completely overthrow
the constitution.

Lastly. I cannot help mentioning here the addition which has been
lately made to the power of the Crown, by throwing into its hands the
_East-India Company_. Nothing more unfavourable to the security of public
Liberty has been done since the REVOLUTION: And should our statesmen,
thus strengthened by the patronage of the EAST, be farther strengthened
by the conquest and patronage of the WEST, they will indeed have no small
reason for triumph; and there will be little left to protect us against
the encroachments and usurpations of power. ROME sunk into slavery, in
consequence of enlarging its territories, and becoming the center of the
wealth of conquered provinces, and the seat of universal empire. It seems
the appointment of Providence, that free states, when, not contented with
_self_-government, and prompted by the love of domination, they make
themselves masters of other states, shall lose Liberty at the same time
that they take it away; and, by subduing, be themselves subdued. Distant
and dependent provinces can be governed only by a military force. And
a military force which governs abroad, will soon govern at home. The
_Romans_ were so sensible of this, that they made it treason for any of
their generals to march their armies over the _Rubicon_ into _Italy_.
CÆSAR, therefore, when he came to this river, hesitated; but he passed
it, and enslaved his country.

“Among the circumstances (says Dr. FERGUSON) which in the event of
national prosperity and in the result of commercial arts, lead to the
establishment of despotism, there is none perhaps that arrives at
this termination with so sure an aim as the perpetual enlargement of
territory. In every state the freedom of its members depends on the
balance and adjustment of its interior parts; and the existence of
any such freedom among mankind depends on the balance of nations. In
the progress of conquest those who are subdued are said to have lost
their liberties. But, from the history of mankind, to conquer or to be
conquered has appeared in effect the same.”[79]

Many more facts of this kind might easily be enumerated; but these are
sufficient.—They shew, with sad evidence, how fast we have, for some
time, been advancing towards the greatest of all public calamities.

We may, also, infer from the preceding observations, that there is only
one way in which our deliverance is possible; and that is, by RESTORING
OUR GRAND NATIONAL SECURITY. This is the object which our great men in
opposition ought to hold forth to the kingdom, and to bind themselves by
some decisive tests to do all they can to obtain. That patriotism must be
spurious which does not carry its views principally to this. Without it,
nothing is of great importance to the kingdom; and even an accommodation
with _America_ would only preserve a limb, and save from present danger,
while a gangrene was left to consume the vitals.

But, probably, we are gone too far; and corruption has struck its roots
too deep to leave us much room for hope.—Mr. HUME has observed,[80] that
as the affairs of this country are not likely to take a turn favourable
to the establishment of a perfect plan of Liberty, “an absolute
monarchy is the easiest death, the true EUTHANASIA of the British
constitution.”—If this observation is just, our constitution (should no
great calamity intervene) is likely, in some future period, to receive
a very quiet dissolution.—At present, however, it must be acknowledged,
that we enjoy a degree of Liberty, civil and religious, which has seldom
been paralleled among mankind. We ought to rejoice in this happiness; and
to be graceful to that benevolent disposer of all events who blesses us
with it. But, at the same time, our hearts must bleed when we reflect,
that, the supports of it having given way, it is little more than a
_sufferance_ which we owe to the temper of the times; the lenity of our
governors; and some awe, in which the friends of despotism are still
held, by the voice and spirit of the uncorrupted part of the kingdom.—May
these causes, if no better securities can be hoped for, long delay our
fate.

       *       *       *       *       *

It must not be forgotten, that all I have now said is meant on the
supposition, that our affairs will proceed smoothly till, by a common and
natural progress, we have gone the round of other nations once free, and
are brought to their end.—But it is possible this may not happen.—Our
circumstances are singular; and give us reason to fear, that we have
before us a death which will not be easy or common.




PART II.

CONTAINING REMARKS on some Particulars in a SPEECH at opening the BUDGET
in _April 1776_.


SECT. I.

_Supplemental Observations on the Surplus of the Revenue; the Quantity of
Coin in the Kingdom; and Paper-Credit._

It is well known, that the great minister who presides over our finances,
took occasion, at opening the Budget in April last, to enter into a
particular account of the state of the nation. In this account, he
represented us as in a condition the most sound and happy; our trade and
revenue flourishing; our common people well provided for; our debts and
taxes light; our current specie sufficiently ample; our paper-circulation
safe; and the BANK, in particular, as little less firm and durable than
the world.

This account, so encouraging and flattering, was generally understood
to be given in designed opposition to another account very different,
which had been given in the _Observations on Civil Liberty_.—It cannot,
therefore, I hope, be thought too presuming in me to offer the following
remarks in my own defence.

       *       *       *       *       *

I have grounded my opinion of the hazardous state of the kingdom, partly
on the smallness of the surplus in the revenue, and the nature and
circumstances of our paper-circulation, compared with the quantity of
_specie_ in the kingdom, and the weight of our debts and taxes.

The surplus of the revenue I have made out in two different methods;
and by a deduction so minute, that it is, I think, scarcely possible
it should be materially wrong. One of these methods brings it out
338,759_l._ _per ann._[81]: and the other, 300,000_l._ _per ann._
supposing the expence of calling in the gold coin, and the profits of
lotteries excluded; the land-tax at three shillings in the pound; and
the peace establishment the same that it has been at a medium for eleven
years, from 1764 to 1775.

Nothing more was said in opposition to this, than a general intimation,
that had it not been for the war with _America_, the peace-establishment
for the navy would have been reduced, and a sufficient surplus gained
(including lotteries) to enable parliament to pay off a million every
year of the public debt.

       *       *       *       *       *

I am very sensible that reductions of the public expences and
improvements in the revenue are practicable, which would give such a
surplus. But I am afraid, they will never take place. Nor can I think
it proper, in determining what permanent surplus we possess, to include
those pernicious profits of lotteries, by which infinitely more is upon
the whole lost than gained; or, to form our judgment of the expence of
_future_ years, by any other rule than the medium expence of _past_
years.—It would, however, give little consolation, were there a certainty
that, had peace continued, a MILLION annually of the public debt would
have been discharged. This would have made a very slow progress in
discharging our debts. A million every year discharged in peace, and
eight or ten millions every year added in war, would leave us under the
necessity of breaking at last. But hitherto we have not proceeded in a
course so favourable. The great person to whom I refer, must know, that
in 1772, he announced in the _House of Commons_, his intention to pay off
a _million and a half_ every year, and SEVENTEEN MILLIONS in ten years;
that yet only 2.800,000_l._ was paid off in the three subsequent years;
and that, on account of the increase of the _navy_ and _civil-list_
debts, there has not been in fact the ability (without the help of
lotteries) to pay half that sum.

       *       *       *       *       *

In page 74th of the _Observations on Civil Liberty_, I have said, “that
it has appeared lately, that the gold specie of the kingdom, is no more
than about TWELVE MILLIONS AND A HALF.”—This assertion has been much
controverted; and it is therefore necessary I should give a distinct
account of the reasons on which it was grounded.

I had learnt from unquestionable authority, that the quantity of gold
coin brought into the mint, by the Acts of Parliament and Proclamations
in 1773 and 1774, was about NINE MILLIONS[82]; or as much as, when
recoined, amounted nearly to that sum.—I find also, that it was expected
by the best judges, that the proclamation lately issued would bring in
about _three_ millions. These two sums make up _twelve_ millions; and
they include the gold coin of _Ireland_. Let this be estimated at a[83]
million; and the whole gold coin of _Britain_, to be brought in by all
the calls, will be ELEVEN millions; and none will remain, except that
part which was deficient less than a grain in a guinea, and remained
in the kingdom, at the time the coin Act took effect in June 1773. We
are here left entirely to conjecture. But it should be remembered, that
for many years before 1773, the heavy coin was catched up as soon as
issued, and either clipped, or melted down and exported; and that from
hence arose such a scarcity of heavy coin, that, in some counties, heavy
guineas might be disposed of at a premium.—In such circumstances, an
allowance of about a million and a half, for the coin deficient less than
a grain in a guinea before the coin Act in 1773, seems to be sufficient;
and therefore, it might, I think, with reason be said, that it appeared
that the gold coin of the kingdom was about TWELVE MILLIONS AND A HALF.

       *       *       *       *       *

But there is another reason, by which I have been convinced, that this is
a moderate estimate.

The quantity of gold coin, deficient between three and six grains in a
guinea, was 4.800,000_l._ and this, when recoined, made 4.600,000_l._—The
coin deficient less than three grains could not have been so much, for
the following reasons. First, new coin being rougher, wears faster than
old coin; and therefore, does not remain so long in any given degree of
deficiency.—Secondly, coin, deficient less than three grains, is subject
to several peculiar causes of diminution and destruction.—Clipping and
sweating remove part of it to greater degrees of deficiency; and part is
destroyed by being melted down and exported; whereas, lighter coin is
diminished only by being worn[84].

These reasons seem to prove, that if the gold coin, deficient in June
1773 less than three grains, is estimated at _five millions_, (that is,
at a little more than the coin deficient between three and six grains) it
will be rated rather too high; and the conclusion will be, that the whole
of our gold coin (exclusive of the _Irish_) might possibly be _less_, but
could not have been _much more_, than the sum at which I have reckoned it.

       *       *       *       *       *

Such have been the facts and arguments by which my judgment has been
determined in this instance.—But it must not be overlooked, that it helps
only to ascertain the quantity of _circulating_ specie in the kingdom,
as distinguished from that which is _hoarded_. When the _Observations on
Civil Liberty_ were published, I did not apprehend, that this part of the
coin could be considerable enough to deserve regard. But the contrary has
lately appeared. The Proclamation issued last summer, and which it was
expected would bring in about three millions, has, I am informed, brought
in about _six millions and a half_. This exceeds the sum at which I have
been led to state the _whole_ gold coin deficient less than three grains;
and proves, that several millions must have been hoarded[85]. Nor, I
think, will this appear incredible, when it is recollected, that only
gold coin under three grains of deficiency is likely to be hoarded; and
also, that distrust of the _Funds_ and of Paper-money has a particular
tendency to increase the practice of hoarding.

Assisted, therefore, by this new light, I would now state the
_circulating_ gold coin of the kingdom before 1773, nearly as I did
before; and call it TWELVE or THIRTEEN MILLIONS. But the whole gold coin
(including the hoarded part) I would reckon at SIXTEEN or SEVENTEEN
MILLIONS[86].

       *       *       *       *       *

An account very different from this was given at opening the Budget; the
substance of which I will state as faithfully as my memory will enable
me; and just as I understood it.

“From the beginning of the year 1772, to the 23d of April last,
13.200,000_l_. had been coined at the Tower; and on that day there was
600,000_l_. more ready to be coined.—All this, (it was intimated) is
now left in the kingdom. The last Proclamation, it was expected, would
bring in three millions more; which, added to the coin deficient less
than a grain resting in the kingdom at the time of the Coin Act in
1773, and issued before 1772, will make the whole, EIGHTEEN OR NINETEEN
MILLIONS[87].”

       *       *       *       *       *

On this account I would observe,

First. That if just, it proves that, in 1773, a _third_ at least of the
_circulating_ coin was in the best state possible. For the late calls
having shewn, that there was then, in _Britain_ and _Ireland_, no more
than about twelve _millions_ deficient _more_ than a grain; six millions
(that is, a third of eighteen millions) or seven millions (that is, more
than a third of nineteen millions) must have been deficient _less_ than
a grain.[88]—It will also follow, (since the quantity brought in by
the first call is known to have been 4.900,000l.) that but little more
than a _fourth_ could have been deficient so much as six grains, or a
shilling in a guinea.—No person can think this credible who recollects
the distress of traffic, and the complaints of the kingdom before 1773.

Secondly. The truth of the account I have stated depends, in a great
measure, on the supposition, that all the gold coined since the beginning
of 1772 is now in the kingdom. I cannot conceive on what grounds this
was taken for granted.—From the beginning of 1772 to June 1773, the
practice of clipping was more prevalent than it had ever been. During
the greatest part of 1772, the price of gold was so much above mint
price, that a profit, from 2 to 4 _per cent_. might be got by melting
heavy guineas[89]. And, in February in that year, the price of gold was
at 4l. 1s. 6d. per ounce; and 4½ _per cent._ might be got by melting
heavy guineas. Instead, therefore, of believing, that all the gold coined
since the beginning of 1772 remains with us; I think it almost certain,
that the greatest part of all coined during the first year and a half of
this period, has been either clipped or melted into bullion. That part
which was clipped has been recoined; and that part which was melted has
been either recoined or exported; and, therefore, neither has made any
addition to the coin of the kingdom.

These observations demonstrate, that the amount of the gold coin at the
time of the Coin Act in 1773, must have been near the sum at which I
have reckoned it. There may, for ought I know, have been an increase
since; but I shall not believe there has, till I know, whether the coin
brought in by the last proclamation has been all recoined and issued. But
this cannot be expected; for should it be done, FOUR MILLIONS[90] more
will have been coined and issued, than has been brought in.—The truth,
therefore, may be, that the coinage, since June 1773, has been carried
on only to provide a supply of new coin to be exchanged for old; in which
case, the quantity of coin in the kingdom, even according to this method
of computing it, will come out nearly the same with that which I have
given.

       *       *       *       *       *

After all, let the _specie_ of the kingdom, including the silver, be
allowed to be as considerable as some have asserted; or about four
millions more than I have reckoned it; the difference arising from
hence will not be of particular consequence; and it will be still true,
that notwithstanding all our increase of trade and apparent opulence,
the _specie_ of the kingdom[91] is not much more than it was at the
_Revolution_.—What then is all the rest of our circulating cash? What
is it keeps up rents; feeds our luxury; pays our taxes; supplies the
revenue, and supports government?—Paper, chiefly, emitted, not only at
the Bank, but by tradesmen, merchants, and bankers in every corner of
the kingdom.—And is this a solid and permanent support?[92] Is there,
in the annals of the world, another instance of a great kingdom so
supported?—The causes are numberless which may suddenly destroy it; and
were this to happen, we should fall at once, with a debt of 140 millions
upon us, to the state we were in before the REVOLUTION.—Imagination
cannot paint to itself the shock this would give.—I must repeat here
what I have said in the _Observations on Civil Liberty_, page 73, &c.
that we should think of nothing but guarding ourselves against the danger
of such a situation, by restricting our paper currency, and gradually
discharging our public debts.—In giving this admonition, I look upon
myself as doing my country one of the best offices in my power; and
acting in the character of one who calls to another to awake who is
sleeping over a precipice.—But I know I call in vain.—The great minister
who directs our finances has assured us all is well; and, under this
persuasion, we are advancing, with unsuspicious and careless speed, to
the catastrophe I have pointed out; and pursuing measures which must
increase the difficulty of avoiding it, and the distress attending it.

Among these measures I have mentioned the present new coinage.—Before
this coinage, I have observed, the light money always remained, because
nothing could be got by melting and exporting it. But now, as soon as
gold rises to the price it bore for many years before 1773, the melters
and exporters of coin will be saved the trouble of selection; and
every piece on which they can lay their hands will be proper for their
purpose.—It seems, therefore, obvious, that, in consequence of this
measure, all our coin may be carried away, and the whole superstructure
of paper supported by it, break down, before we are aware of any danger.

I will take this opportunity to add, that this measure will at the
same time increase our paper. This has been the consequence of the two
former calls; but it will probably be more the consequence of the last
call. For, as no coin is now to be current which is more than a grain
deficient; and as also a great deal of it is already at or near that
limit; the vexation attending it will be so intolerable, that it will
be generally cried down, and paper substituted in its room.—Certain it
is, that nothing can prevent this evil, but another evil; I mean, the
deficient coin forcing itself again into circulation, and furnishing
clippers with more employment than ever; and, consequently, a return,
with increased violence, of the confusion and distress which took place
before the Coin Act in 1773.—This, indeed, will be much the least of the
two evils; nor, in my opinion, are there any methods of preventing the
diminution of the coin, which will not produce greater evils, except such
alterations in its form[93] as shall render clipping less practicable,
joined to the execution of severe laws against clippers, and a strict
vigilance in detecting them.

Upon the whole, it seems to me, that enough had been done by the
first coin act to restore the gold coin; and that all which has been
done since, at the expence of about 650,000l. has been nothing but a
preparation of the coin for melters and exporters, to the dreadful hazard
of the kingdom.—These are my present views of this subject. But I must
say, that I suspect my own judgment in this instance. The noble Lord,
who is furnished with infinitely more of the means of information than I
am, intimated, if I remember rightly, that there is no such danger: And
though I did not understand the reason he assigned for this assertion,
I must believe, that, in a matter so particularly interesting to the
kingdom, he has gone upon the best evidence.


SECT. II.

_Of the State of the Nation; and the War with America._

At the beginning of the preceding section, I have taken notice of the
flattering account which was given, at opening the Budget in April last,
of the state of the kingdom with respect to its commerce, revenue, and
opulence. On that account I shall beg leave to offer the following
reflections.

       *       *       *       *       *

First. The observations in the last section prove, I think, that it
is not so well supported by facts, as there is reason to wish. I am
sensible, indeed, that we never made a more gay and splendid appearance.
But no considerate person will draw much encouragement from hence. That
pride and security; that luxury, venality and dissipation which give us
this appearance, are melancholy symptoms; and have hitherto been the
forerunners of distress and calamity.

Secondly. When this account was given there was a particular end to
be answered by it. Additional taxes were to be imposed; and it was
necessary to reconcile the public to the prospect of a great increase
of its burthens, in order to carry on the war with _America_.—On other
occasions, different accounts had been given. In order to prove the
justice of taxing the _Americans_, the weight of our own taxes had been
often insisted upon; and the difficulty of raising a sufficient force
among ourselves to reduce them, had been urged as a reason for seeking
and employing, at a great expence, the assistance of foreign powers.
On such occasions, I have heard our unhappy and embarrassed situation
mentioned; and, at the end of the last session of Parliament, one of our
greatest men, whose opinion in favour of coercion, had contributed to
bring us into our present situation, acknowledged the distress attending
it, and represented the vessel of the state as having never before rode
in so dangerous a storm.—This is, without doubt, the truth. But, if the
account on which I am remarking was just, we were then safe and happy;
nor was the vessel of the state ever wafted by more gentle and prosperous
gales.

But the reflection which, on this occasion, has given me most pain is the
following.

If, without _America_, we can be in a state so flourishing, a war to
reduce _America_ must be totally inexcuseable. I wish I could engage
attention to this. War is a dreadful evil; and those who involve a people
in it _needlessly_, will find they have much to answer for. Nothing can
ever justify it, but the necessity of it to secure some _essential_
interest against unjust attacks. But, it seems, there is no interest
to be secured by the present war. The revenue has never flourished so
much, as since _America_ has been rendered hostile to us; and it is now
reckoned by many a decided point, that little depends on the _American_
trade. It follows then, that if the end of the present war is to “obtain
a revenue,” it is a revenue we do not want; if “to maintain authority,”
it is an authority of no use to us.—Must not humanity shudder at such a
war?—Why not let _America_ alone, if we can subsist without it?—Why carry
fire and sword into a happy country to do ourselves no good?

Some of the very persons who depreciate the value of the colonies, as a
support to our revenue and finances, yet say, that we are now under a
necessity of reducing them, or perishing. I wish such persons would give
an account of the causes which, according to their ideas, create this
dreadful necessity. Is it the same that led _Haman_ of old to reckon
all his honours and treasures nothing to him, while _Mordecai_ the Jew
would not bow to him?—Or, are we become so luxurious, that luxury even
in the revenue is become necessary to us; and so depraved, that, like
many individuals in private life, having lost _self_-dominion, we cannot
subsist without dominion over _others_?

It must not be forgotten, that I speak here on the supposition, that
it is possible for this country to be as safe and prosperous without
_America_ as some have asserted, and as was implied in what was said at
opening the last Budget.—This is far from being my own opinion.—Some time
or other we shall, in all probability, feel severely, in our commerce and
finances, the loss of the colonies. As a source of revenue they are, I
think, of great importance to us; but they are still more important as
supports to our navy, and an aid to us in our wars. It appears now, that
there is a force among them so formidable and so growing, that, with its
assistance, any of the great _European_ powers may soon make themselves
masters of all the _West-Indies_ and _North-America_; and nothing ought
to be more alarming to us than that our natural enemies see this, and
are influenced by it.—With the colonies united to us, we might be the
greatest and happiest nation that ever existed. But with the colonies
separated from us, and in alliance with _France_ and _Spain_, we are no
more a people.—They appear, therefore, to be indeed worth any price.—Our
existence depends on keeping them.—But HOW are they to be kept?—Most
certainly, not by forcing them to unconditional submission at the expence
of many millions of money and rivers of blood. The resolution to attempt
this, is a melancholy instance of that infatuation, which sometimes
influences the councils of kingdoms. It is attempting to keep them by a
method, which, if it succeeds, will destroy their use, and make them not
worth the having; and which, if it does _not_ succeed, will throw them
into the scale of rival powers, kindle a general war, and undo the empire.

The extension of our territories in _America_, during the last war,
increased the expence of our _peace_-establishment, from 2.400,000l. _per
ann._ to four millions _per ann._—Almost all the provinces in _America_,
which used to be ours, are now to be conquered. Let the expence of this
be stated at 25 or 30 millions; or, at a capital bearing a million
_per annum_ interest.—_America_ recovered by the sword must be kept by
the sword, and forts and garrisons must be maintained in every province
to awe the wretched inhabitants, and to hold them in subjection. This
will create another addition of expence; and both together cannot, I
suppose, be stated at less than two millions _per annum_.—But how is
such an increase of revenue to be procured?—The colonies, desolated and
impoverished, will yield no revenue.—The surplusses of the sinking fund
have, for many years, formed a necessary part of the current and ordinary
supplies.—It must, therefore, be drawn from _new_ taxes.—But can the
kingdom bear such an increase of taxes? Or, if it can, where shall we
find a surplus for discharging an enormous debt of above 160 millions?
And what will be our condition, when the next foreign war shall add two
millions _per annum_ more to our expences?—Indeed this is a frightful
prospect. But it will be rendered infinitely more frightful by carrying
our views to that increase of the power of the Crown which will arise
from the increase of the army, from the disposal of new places without
number, and the patronage of the whole continent of _North-America_.

These consequences have been stated moderately on the supposition, that
we shall succeed in subduing _America_; and that, while we are doing
it, our natural enemies will neglect the opportunity offered them, and
continue to satisfy themselves with assisting _America indirectly_.—But
should the contrary happen.—I need not say what will follow.

Some time ago this horrid danger might have been avoided, and
the colonies kept by the easiest means.—By a prudent lenity and
moderation.—By receiving their petitions.—By giving up the right we
claim to dispose of their property, and to alter their governments.—By
guarantying to them, in these respects, a legislative independence;[94]
and establishing them in the possession of equal liberty with
ourselves.—This a great and magnanimous nation should have done. This,
since the commencement of hostilities, would have brought them back to
their former habits of respect and subordination; and might have bound
them to us for ever.

MONTESQUIEU has observed, that ENGLAND, in planting colonies, should
have _commerce_, not _dominion_, in view; the increase of dominion being
incompatible with the security of public liberty.—Every advantage that
could arise from commerce they have offered us without reserve; and
their language to us has been—“Restrict us, as much as you please, in
_acquiring_ property by regulating our trade for your advantage; but
claim not the disposal of that property after it has been acquired.—Be
satisfied with the authority you exercised over us before the present
reign.—PLACE US WHERE WE WERE IN 1763.”—On these terms they have
repeatedly sued for a reconciliation. In return, we have denounced them
_Rebels_; and with our fleets in their ports, and our bayonets at their
breasts, have left them no other alternative than to acknowledge our
supremacy, and give up rights they think most sacred; or stand on the
defensive, and appeal to heaven.—They have chosen the latter.

In this situation, if our feelings for _others_ do not make us tremble,
our feelings for _ourselves_ soon may.—Should we suffer the consequences
I have intimated, our pride will be humbled.—We shall admire the plans of
moderation and equity which, without bloodshed or danger, would have kept
_America_.—We shall wish for the happiness of former times; and remember,
with anguish, the measures which many of us lately offered their lives
and fortunes to support.

       *       *       *       *       *

I must not conclude these observations, without taking particular notice
of a charge against the colonies, which has been much insisted on.—“They
have, it is said, always had independency in view; and it is this,
chiefly, that has produced their present resistance.”—It is scarcely
possible there should be a more unreasonable charge. Without all doubt,
our connexion with them might have been preserved for ages to come,
(perhaps _for ever_) by wise and liberal treatment. Let any one read
a pamphlet published in 1761, by Dr. _Franklin_, and entitled, _The
interest of Great Britain with respect to her Colonies_; and let him deny
this if he can.—Before the present quarrel, there prevailed among them
the purest affection for this country, and the warmest attachment to the
House of HANOVER. And since the present quarrel begun, and not longer ago
than the beginning of last winter, independency was generally dreaded
among them. There is the fullest evidence for this; and all who are
best acquainted with _America_, must know it to be true. As a specimen
of this evidence, and of the temper of _America_ till the period I have
mentioned, I will just recite the following facts.

In the resolutions of the _Assembly_, which met at _Philadelphia_,
July 15, 1774, after making the strongest professions of affection to
_Britain_, and duty to their sovereign, they declare their abhorrence of
every idea of an unconstitutional independence on the parent state.—An
assembly of delegates from all the towns of the county of _Suffolk_
(of which _Boston_ is the capital) delivered in September 1774, to
General Gage, a remonstrance against fortifying _Boston-neck_. In this
remonstrance, they totally disclaim every wish of independence.—The same
is done in the instructions given by the several colonies to the first
deputies chosen for a general Congress.—In the petition of the first
Congress to the King, they declare they shall always, carefully and
zealously, endeavour to support and maintain their connexion with _Great
Britain_. In the memorial of the same Congress to the people of this
country, they repeat this assurance.—In the order of the _Congress_,
which met in May 1775, for a general fast, they call upon all _America_
to unite in beseeching the Almighty to avert the judgments with which
they were threatened, and _to bless their rightful Sovereign_, that so
_a reconciliation might be brought about with the parent state_.—And in
their declaration setting forth the causes of their taking arms, they
warn us, “that, should they find it necessary, foreign assistance was
undoubtedly attainable;” but at the same time declare, “that they did not
mean to dissolve the union which had so long and so happily subsisted
between them and this country; that necessity had not yet driven them
to that desperate measure, or induced them to excite any other nation
to war against us; and that they had not raised armies with ambitious
designs of forming independent states, but solely for the protection of
their property against violence, and the defence of that freedom which
was their birth-right.”—In the instructions, delivered Nov. 9, 1775, by
a committee of the representatives of the province of _Pensylvania_, to
their delegates in the third general congress; they enjoin them, in
behalf of the province, “utterly to reject any propositions, should such
be made, that might lead to a separation from the mother country.”

What reason can there be for thinking the colonies not sincere in
all these declarations?—In truth; it was not possible they should be
otherwise than sincere; for so little did they think of war, at the
time when most of these declarations were made, that they were totally
unprepared for it: And, even when hostilities were begun at LEXINGTON
in April 1775, they were so destitute of every instrument of defence,
particularly ammunition, that _half_ the force which is now invading
them, would have been sufficient to conquer them at once.

I will beg leave to add on this occasion, the following extracts from
letters, written by some leading persons at NEW-YORK, the genuineness of
which may be depended on.

_New-York, August_ 3d. 1775.—“I am sensible of the many artifices and
falshoods which have been used to biass the minds of your countrymen,
who believe evil reports of us; and, particularly, that we are aiming at
independence.—Of this be assured, that even HANCOCK and ADAMS are averse
to independence. There was a lye current last week, that the congress had
finally agreed upon independence to take place the 10th of March next,
should not our grievances be redressed before that time. I wrote to one
of our delegates, to enquire whether this report was true. In his answer
he declares, upon his honour, that he believed there was not one man in
the Congress who would dare to make a motion tending to independence; or,
that if any one did, two could not be found to support the motion.—None
but those who are on the spot can conceive what a spirit is gone forth
among all ranks and degrees of men.—We deserve to be free. It is a heavy
sacrifice we are making. Trade is at an end. We expect our city to be
knocked about our ears. But I declare solemnly, I will submit to all,
and die in a log-house in the wilds of America, and be free; rather than
flourish in servitude.”—In a subsequent letter, dated NEW-YORK, Jan.
3d. 1776, the same person writes as follows:—“It is in the power of the
ministry to annihilate all our disputes, by restoring us to the situation
we were in at the conclusion of the last war. If this is done, we shall
immediately return to our allegiance. But if not, be assured, that an
awful scene will be opened in the spring. Let me repeat a caution to you;
believe not the insinuations of our enemies, who would make you all
believe that _independence_ is what _America_ aims at. It is an insidious
falshood. Madmen will be found in all large societies. It would be
singular, were there none such to be found in a body of three millions of
people and upwards. But they are like a grain of sand on the sea shore.”

Another person writes thus.—NEW-YORK, Nov. 2d. 1775. “We love and
honour our King. He has no subjects in all his dominions more attached
to his person, family and government, notwithstanding the epithet of
rebels bestowed upon us. No charge is more unjust than the charge that
we desire an independence on _Great Britain_. Ninety-nine in a hundred
of the inhabitants of this country deprecate this as the heaviest of
evils. But if administration will persist in their present measures,
this will and must inevitably be the event; for submit to the present
claims of the British parliament, while unrepresented in it, you may
be assured they never will. And what deserves notice is, that all the
violence of _Britain_ only unites the _Americans_ still more firmly
together, and renders them more determined to be free or die. This
spirit is unconquerable by violence; but they may be easily won by
kindness.—Serious people of all denominations among us, episcopal and
non-episcopal, are much employed in prayer to God for the success of the
present struggles of _America_. They consider their cause as the cause of
God; and as such, they humbly commit it to him, confident of success in
the end, whatever blood or treasure it may cost them.”

Since these letters were written, the sentiments of _America_, with
respect to _independence_, have been much altered. But it should be
remembered, that this alteration has been owing entirely to OURSELVES; I
mean, to the measures of the last winter and summer, and particularly the
following.

First. The rejection of the petition from the Congress brought over by
Governor PENN. In this petition they professed, in strong language, that
they still retained their loyalty to the King and attachment to this
country; and only prayed, “that they might be directed to some mode by
which the united applications of the Colonies might be improved into a
happy reconciliation; and that, in the mean time, some measures might be
taken for preventing their farther destruction, and for repealing such
statutes as more immediately distressed them.”—The Colonies had often
petitioned before without being heard. They had, therefore, little hope
from this application; and meant that, if rejected, it should be their
last.

Secondly. The last prohibitory bill, by which our protection of them was
withdrawn; their ships and effects confiscated; and open war declared
against them.

Thirdly. Employing _foreign_ troops to subdue them. This produced
a greater effect in _America_ than is commonly imagined. And it is
remarkable, that even the writers in _America_ who answered the pamphlet
entitled COMMON SENSE, acknowledge, that should the _British_ ministry
have recourse to foreign aid, it might become[95] proper to follow their
example, and to embrace the necessity of resolving upon _independence_.

I have, further, reason to believe, that the answer to the last petition
of the City of London, presented in March 1776,[96] had no small share in
producing the same effect.

By these measures, and others of the same kind, those Colonists who had
all along most dreaded and abhorred independence, were at last reconciled
to it.—I can, however, say from particular information, that even so
lately as the month of June last, an accommodation might have been
obtained with the Colonies, on a reasonable and moderate plan; without
giving up any one of the rights claimed by this country, except that
of altering their charters and disposing of their property.—And, as it
would have restored peace and prevented the desolating calamities into
which _America_ and _Britain_ are now plunged, no friend to humanity
can avoid regretting that such a plan, when offered, was not adopted.
But our rulers preferred coercion and conquest: And the consequence has
been, that the Colonies, after being goaded and irritated to the utmost,
resolved to disengage themselves, and directed the CONGRESS to declare
them Independent States; which was accordingly done, as is well-known, on
the 4th of July last. Since that time, they have, probably, been making
applications to foreign powers; and it is to be feared, that _now_ we
may in vain offer them the very terms for which they once sued.—All this
is the necessary consequence of the principles by which human nature
is governed.—There was a time when, perhaps, we should ourselves have
acted with more violence; and, instead of remonstrating and praying,
as _America_ has done, have refused the most advantageous terms when
offered with defiance, and under an awe from a military force. Had King
WILLIAM, instead of coming over by invitation to deliver us, invaded us;
and, at the head of an army, offered us the BILL OF RIGHTS; we should,
perhaps, have spurned at it; and considered LIBERTY itself as no better
than SLAVERY, when enjoyed as a boon from an insolent conqueror.—But we
have all along acted as if we thought the people of _America_ did not
possess the feelings and passions of _men_, much less of _Englishmen_.—It
is indeed strange our ministers did not long ago see, that they had
mistaken the proper method of treating the Colonies; and that though they
might be gradually _influenced_ to any thing, they could be dragooned to
nothing.—Had King _James the Second_ avoided violence; and been a little
more patient and secret in pursuing his views, he might have gained
all he wished for. But an eager haste and an open avowal of the odious
claims of prerogative ruined him.—This has been since considered; and
a plan both here and in _Ireland_,[97] less _expeditious_ indeed, but
more _sure_, has been pursued. And had the same plan been pursued in
_America_, the whole empire might in time have been brought, without a
struggle, to rest itself quietly in the lap of corruption and slavery.
It may, therefore, in the issue prove happy to the Colonies, that they
have not been thought worthy of any such cautious treatment. Our coercive
measures have done all for them that their warmest patriots could have
desired. They have united them among themselves, and bound them together
under one government. They have checked them in the career of vicious
luxury; guarded them against any farther infection from hence; taught
them to seek all their resources within themselves; instructed them in
the use of arms; and led them to form a naval and military power which
may, perhaps, in time, become superior to any force that can attack
them, and prove the means of preserving from invasion and violence, a
government of justice and virtue, to which the oppressed in every quarter
of the globe may fly, and find peace, protection, and liberty.—In short.
These measures have, in all probability, hastened that disruption of the
_new_ from the _old_ world, which will begin a new _æra_ in the annals
of mankind;[98] and produce a revolution more important, perhaps, than
any that has happened in human affairs.—As a friend, therefore, to the
general interest of mankind, I ought, probably, to rejoice in these
measures; and to bless that all-governing Providence, which, often, out
of the evil intended by wretched mortals, brings the greatest good.—But
when I consider the _present_ sufferings which these measures must
occasion, and the _catastrophe_ with which they threaten GREAT-BRITAIN;
I am shocked; and feel myself incapable of looking forward, without
distress, to the fate of an empire, once united and happy, but now torn
to pieces, and falling a sacrifice to despotic violence and blindness.
Under the impressions of these sentiments, and dreading the awful
_crisis_ before us, I cannot help, however impotent my voice, crying out
to this country—“Make no longer war against _yourselves_. Withdraw your
armies from your Colonies. Offer your power to them as a _protecting_,
not a _destroying_ power. Grant the security they desire to their
property and charters; and renounce those notions of dignity, which lead
you to prefer the exactions of force to the offerings of gratitude, and
to hazard _every thing_ to gain _nothing_.—By such wisdom and equity
_America_ may, perhaps, be still preserved; and that dreadful breach
healed, which your enemies are viewing with triumph, and all _Europe_
with astonishment.”

But what am I doing?—At the moment I am writing this, the possibility of
a reconciliation may be lost.—_America_ may have formed an alliance with
FRANCE—And the die may be cast.


SECT. III.

_Of Schemes for raising Money by Public Loans._

The following observations were occasioned by the scheme for the public
loan of last year, proposed to the _House of Commons_ at opening the
_Budget_, and afterwards agreed to. I have thought proper, therefore,
to introduce these observations here; and, as they appear to me of some
importance, I shall endeavour to explain them with as much care and
perspicuity as possible.

       *       *       *       *       *

In order to raise _two millions_, the Legislature created last year a
new capital in the 3 _per cent._ consolidated annuities, of 2.150,000l.
Every share of 77l. 10s. in this new capital was valued at 65l.
17s. 6d. or every 100l. _stock_ at 85l. For the whole new capital,
therefore, Government has received in money, 1.827,500l.—The remaining
sum, necessary to make up _two millions_, was a compensation advanced
to Government for relinquishing the profits of a Lottery, consisting
of 60,000 tickets, each of the same value with 10l. _three per cent.
stock_; and might have been obtained, without annexing the Lottery to the
annuities.—This new capital the public may be obliged to redeem at _par_;
in which case, 322,500l. (being the difference between 1.827,500 and
2.150,000l.) that is 17½ _per cent._ will be paid by the public more than
it has received.—In this transaction, therefore, Government has acted as
a private person would act, who, in order to raise 850l. on a mortgage,
should promise for it 30l. _per ann._ (or 3½ _per cent._ interest) and
150l. (that is 17½ _per cent_. nearly) over and above the principal,
when the mortgage came to be discharged.—Such a _premium_ (should the
mortgage be discharged soon) would be very extravagant; but, if _never_
to be discharged, would be insignificant: Nor would it be possible to
account for such a bargain, except by supposing, that the borrower,
instead of meaning to repay the sum he borrowed, chose to continue
_always_ paying interest for it, or returning 30l. annually for 850l.
once advanced; and to subject his estate, for that purpose, to an eternal
incumbrance.

The public, I have said, may be obliged to discharge the new capital,
lately created, at _par_; and, consequently, to suffer a loss by this
year’s loan of 322,500l. This will, undoubtedly, happen, should the
nation prosper, and the public debts be put into a regular and fixed
course of redemption; for the 3 _per cents._ would then soon rise to
_par_.

The extravagance I have pointed out is the more to be regretted, because
it was entirely needless; for the same sum might as well have been
borrowed by schemes, which would not have subjected the public to the
necessity of paying, when the loan came to be discharged, more money than
had been received.—For instance. The sum advanced for the new capital of
2.150,000l. _three per cent._ annuities, might have been procured by
offering 3½ _per cent._ on a capital equal to the sum advanced; or on
1.827,500l. And the remainder, necessary to make up _two millions_, might
have been obtained by the profits of a Lottery, consisting of 60,000
tickets each worth 10l. in MONEY. This scheme would have differed but
little in value from the other; and the interest, or the annuity payable
by the public, would have been 63,962l. at 3½ _per cent._ on a capital
of 1.827,500l.;[99] instead of 64,500l. at 3 _per cent._ on a capital of
2.150,000l.

When a 100l. _stock_ in the 3 _per cent._ annuities is sold at 85¾,
purchasers get 3½ _per cent._ interest for their money. When, therefore,
the 3 _per cents_ are at this price, 3½ _per cents_ would be at _par_;
and a capital of 1.827,500l. might be redeemed by the public, (without
losing any advantage arising from its debts being at a discount,) by
paying this sum; or by returning the money borrowed[100]. But in the same
circumstances, a capital of 2.150,000l. in the 3 _per cent._ annuities,
for which 85l. _per cent._ or, in the whole, 1.827,500l. had been
received, could not be redeemed without offering 86 or 87 _per cent._
for it; nor, therefore, without paying _more_ than the original sum
borrowed.—When the 3 _per cents_ are near _par_, there would be a loss of
322,500l. in redeeming the same capital; whereas, the former annuities,
for which the same sum had been advanced, might be always discharged
by either paying the very sum[101] advanced, or a _less sum_.—In all
possible circumstances, therefore, these annuities would have the
advantage.—But we never, when contracting debts, carry our views to the
discharge of the principal; and the consequences must prove fatal.

       *       *       *       *       *

It is necessary I should observe, in justice to our present ministers,
that in adapting the scheme on which I have made these remarks, they have
only followed the example of former ministers; and that, however needless
a waste it occasions of public money, there is reason to fear it will be
followed by future ministers; for the increase of difficulty and expence
in redeeming the public debts, which such schemes create, being to be
felt _hereafter_, it makes no impression, and is little regarded.

       *       *       *       *       *

In 1759, the fifth year of the last war, the lenders of 6.600,000l. were
granted a capital in the 3 _per cents_ of 7.590,000l. together with the
profits of the Lottery. Subtract from the sum advanced, 150,000l. for
the profits of the Lottery; and it will appear, that, in this instance,
1.140,000l. was _needlessly_ added to the capital; there being no reason
to doubt, but that lenders would then have readily advanced 6.600,000l.
for a capital of 6.450,000l. bearing 3½ _per cent._[102] interest,
provided the profits of a Lottery were annexed; instead of advancing the
same sum for a nominal capital near 18 _per cent._ greater, but bearing 3
_per cent._ interest.

       *       *       *       *       *

Again. In 1762, in order to raise 12 millions, every contributor of 80l.
was entitled to a capital of 100l. to bear 4 _per cent._ interest for
19 years; and afterwards to become redeemable, and to bear interest at
3 _per cent._ And for the remaining 20l. necessary to make up a 100l.
contributors were entitled to an annuity of 1l. for 98 years.—This was
the same with promising, for every 60l. advanced, a 100l. capital in
the 3 _per cent._ annuities, not redeemable for 19 years; and, for the
remaining 40l. necessary to make up 100l. an annuity of 2l. for 19 years;
and, after that, of 1l. for 79 years.

By this scheme no less a sum than 4.800,000l. was needlessly added to
the capital of the public debts. For, had 5 _per cent._ been offered for
every 60l. advanced;[103] and, for the remaining 40l. an annuity of 2l.
during 19 years, and afterwards of 1l. for 79 years; equal encouragement
would have been given to contributors; the annuity payable by the public
would have been the same; and the new capital would have been 7.200,000l.
bearing 5 _per cent._ interest; which might, at any time, have been
redeemed with a saving of a million _per ann._ (the first payment to be
made immediately) in _five_ years and a _quarter_: Whereas now, this debt
will not become redeemable till 1781; and then, it will form a capital
of 12 millions, not capable of being redeemed with the same saving, in
less than _nine_ years and a half. Five millions and a quarter,[104]
therefore, will be wasted.

The capital of 12 millions four _per cent._ annuities created this year,
were made irredeemable for 19 years, to guard against the effects of an
apprehension then unavoidable, that an interest of 4 _per cent._ would,
if the capitals were redeemable, be reduced, whenever peace came, to 3
_per cent._ as had been done in the preceding peace.—But this end would
have been answered, with equal effect and more advantage to the public,
by pledging the faith of Parliament, that whatever interest was promised
on any capital, should not be _reduced_ for 19 years; or (which comes to
the same) that the capital should not be _redeemed_, during that term,
by borrowing money, and creating a new capital bearing _lower_ interest.
This would have placed capitals bearing any interest on the same footing
_nearly_ with the 3 _per cent._ annuities; and an assurance, that no part
of them should be discharged, without at the same time discharging an
equal capital in the 3 _per cents_, would have placed them _entirely_ on
the same footing.—Had it, however, been necessary, on account of the fear
of a reduction of interest, to make the capital here proposed bearing 5
_per cent_, and the capitals to be mentioned presently bearing 4 _per
cent._ irredeemable, (and therefore the interest irreducible) for any
term (suppose till 1781); had, I say, even this been necessary (and more
could not have been necessary) no advantage of great consequence would
have been lost. These capitals would, during that term, have been exactly
the same burden on the public with the capitals which were actually
created; and after that term, they would have been a much less burden, as
will be shewn at the end of this section.

Again. In January 1760, eight millions were borrowed by offering for
this sum a capital of eight millions to carry 4 _per cent._ interest
for 21 years, and afterwards 3 _per cent_, together with a _premium_ of
240,000l. stock carrying the same interest, and divided into 80,000l.
lottery tickets, each 3l. stock.—This was the same with offering, for
80l. of every 100l. advanced, a capital of 100l. in the 3 _per cent._
annuities,[105] not redeemable for 21 years; and for the remainder
besides a lottery ticket an annuity of 1l. for 21 years.—The same sum
might have been raised by offering 4 _per cent_, irreducible during 21
years, or 3l. _per ann._ for 75l. of every 100l. advanced, and for the
remaining 25l. an annuity of 1l. for 21 years, together with a lottery
ticket.—In this case, the new capital, instead of 8.240,000l. bearing 3
_per cent._ not subject to redemption, and having an annuity of 82,400l.
annexed to it, for 21 years; would have been 6.000,000l. bearing 4 _per
cent._ with the same annuity annexed, but redeemable at _any_ time; and
240,000_l._[106] bearing 4 _per cent._ for 21 years, and afterwards 3
_per cent._

By the scheme likewise in 1761, for borrowing 11.400,000_l._ a capital
of 100_l._ bearing 3 _per cent. interest_, was given for part of every
100_l._ advanced; and for the other part, an annuity of 1_l._ 2_s._ 6_d._
for 99 years. Had, in this case, 75_l._ FOUR _per cent._ STOCK, been
offered for 75_l._ in _money_; and, for the remaining 25_l._ necessary to
make up 100_l._ the said annuity of 1_l._ 2_s._ 6_d._ for 99 years;[107]
the whole annual charge would have been the same; subscribers could not
have been sensible of any difference in the encouragement offered them;
and the public, in paying its debts, would have saved 2.850,000_l._

There was also this year 600,000_l._ received by government for
600,000_l._ stock, carrying 3 _per cent._ interest, and divided into
60,000 lottery tickets, each worth 10_l._ in stock.—As 150,000_l._ of
this sum was paid for the profits of the lottery; and as 4 _per cent._
could not at this time be made of money laid out in the funds, it is out
of doubt, that the same sum (or 600,000_l._) would have been given for
450,000_l._ stock, carrying 4 _per cent._ and divided into 60,000 lottery
tickets, each of the same value with 7_l._ 10_s._ four _per cent._ stock;
and thus 150,000_l._ more would have been saved.

In like manner; it will appear, that _three millions_, raised in
1757, by creating a capital of _three millions_ bearing 3 _per cent._
interest,[108] with a life annuity annexed of 1_l._ 2_s._ 6_d._ for every
100_l._ advanced; and also, _four millions and a half_ raised in 1758, by
creating a capital of _four millions and a half_, bearing 3 _per cent._
with an annuity of a _half per cent._ annexed for 24 years; might have
been raised by creating, in the former case, a capital of two millions
and a half, and, in the latter, a capital of four millions, bearing 3½
_per cent._ interest, with the same annuities annexed.

In 1758, the additional sum of half a million was borrowed at 3 _per
cent._ by a lottery, consisting of 50,000 tickets, each of the same
real value with 10l. _stock_, but sold to the subscribers for 10l. in
_money_[109]. As the 3 _per cents._ were now at 94, 3¼ _per cent._ could
not be made of money laid out in the funds. Therefore, 350,000_l._ of
this half million might have been raised at 3½ _per cent._ interest,
and the remaining 150,000_l._ might have been procured for the profits
of the lottery. Or (which is the same) 10_l._ each would have been given
for 50,000 tickets, of the same value taken all together, with 350,000l.
carrying 3½ _per cent._ interest; and a capital of 150,000_l._ would have
been saved.

The same is true of the lottery, by which half a million was borrowed
in 1756.—A million and a half also borrowed in this year, by creating a
capital of a million and a half, bearing 3½ _per cent._ for 15 years, and
afterwards 3 _per cent._ might have been procured, by creating a capital
of only 1.400,000_l._ bearing 3¼ _per cent._ interest. But I will not
examine any more of these loans. Let us next consider how detrimental
they have been to the public.

       *       *       *       *       *

All the savings and surplus monies of the kingdom from 1763 to 1775, have
amounted (deducting 400,000_l._ gained by debts discharged at a discount)
to 10.739,793_l._ and with this sum 11.139,793_l._ of the national debt
has been paid off. (See the _Postscript_ at the end of this work.)—The
needless addition which was made to the capital of the national debt, by
injudicious schemes for raising money during the last war, exceeded this
sum; and it follows, therefore, that the whole surplus of the revenue for
twelve years, has not been sufficient to discharge the capital, to which
in the last war a right was given, without receiving any money for it, or
obtaining the least advantage by it.

The attentive reader must have observed, as I have gone along, that the
extravagance on which I have insisted, has been the consequence of not
separating, in the schemes for raising money, the premiums (consisting
of short and long and life-annuities) from the perpetual annuities, and
requiring them to be distinctly paid for; and also, of not attending to
the difference between selling an _annuity_, and selling the _stock_ for
which that annuity is paid. When a 100_l._ _stock_ in the 3 _per cents._
is at any given price, there is no one who would not be glad to purchase
from government a perpetual annuity of 3_l._ at any _lower_ price[110].
But when government sells the _stock_, instead of the _annuity_, at that
price, the public is injured in the manner I have represented.

Would any one, in selling any part of his property, offer to make the
purchase-money an outstanding principal which he shall be bound to
return?[111] This is what government has uniformly done in its proposals
for raising money.—Were I to desire any sum to be lent me _without_
interest, offering as a _compensation_ or _premium_ an annuity for a
given term, or an advantageous contract; the proposal would not be
accepted, unless the annuity or the contract was worth the sum to be
lent; and I should make myself a debtor to the purchaser for the very
thing which I sold to him.—The absurdity would be the same, if instead of
borrowing _without_ interest, I should in the same way borrow at a _low_
interest. In every such bargain, I should bring upon myself a needless
debt, equal to the value of the _premium_.

I am afraid I have tired my reader’s attention on this subject. But as
much depends upon a right understanding of it, I am anxious about shewing
it in every possible light. In hopes, therefore, of being attended to
a little longer, I shall endeavour to give a yet fuller view of this
subject, and to prove its importance, by recapitulating some of the
foregoing remarks, and comparing the _present_ state of our public debts,
with that which would have been their state, had the errors I have
pointed out, in the schemes of the public loans during the last war, been
avoided.

       *       *       *       *       *

The sum of 12 millions, borrowed in 1762, would have left, at the end
of the war, a redeemable capital of 7.200,000l. carrying 5 _per cent._
interest, with an annuity added of 120,000l. for 18 years from January
1763, instead of an _ir_-redeemable capital of 12 millions carrying 4
_per cent._ for 18 years, and afterwards 3 _per cent._ See page 95, &c.

The sum of 12 millions, borrowed in 1761, would have left a redeemable
capital of 9 millions bearing 4 _per cent._ interest, with a long annuity
annexed; instead of 12 millions with the same annuity annexed. Page 100.

The sum of 8 millions, borrowed in 1760, would have left a redeemable
capital of 6.180,000l. carrying 4 _per cent._ with an annuity of 82,400l.
for 18 years from January 1763; instead of 8.240,000l. _ir_-redeemable,
and carrying 4 _per cent._ for 18 years, and afterwards 3 _per cent._
Page 99.

The sum of 6.600,000l. borrowed in 1759, would have left a capital of
6.450,000l. carrying 3½ _per cent_; instead of a capital of 7.590,000l.
carrying 3 _per cent._ Page 95.

The sum of five millions, borrowed in 1758, would have left a redeemable
capital of 4.350,000l. bearing 3½ _per cent._ interest, with an annuity
added of 22,500l. for 19 years from Midsummer 1763; instead of a capital
of five millions irredeemable, and carrying 3½ _per cent._ for 19 years,
and afterwards 3 _per cent._ Page 101, 102, &c.

The sum of three millions, borrowed in 1757, would have left a capital of
two millions and a half bearing 3½ _per cent._ interest, instead of three
millions bearing 3 _per cent._ interest.—And two millions, borrowed
in 1756, instead of leaving a capital of two millions, would have left a
capital of only 1.750,000l. Page 104.

The result, therefore, is, that the whole capital of the public debts
would have been, at the end of the last war, near TWELVE MILLIONS AND
A HALF less than it was; and at the same time, the annual charge not
greater.—In 1775, the difference would have been much more considerable.
For,

Supposing all the same sums applied since the last war to the discharge
of the public debts that we know have been so applied, not only the
_capital_ but the _annual charge_ would have been considerably less.—This
will be demonstrated by the following account.

It may be learnt from the _Postscript_ at the end of this Tract, that
11.139,793l. of the public debts has been discharged with 10.739,793l. of
the public money, derived from various savings and surplusses. All this
money _might_ have been employed, and without doubt _would_ have been
employed, in redeeming first the capital I have mentioned in Page 107,
of 7.200,000l. bearing 5 _per cent._ interest; and afterwards, the two
other capitals there mentioned of 9 millions, and of 6.180,000l. bearing
4 _per cent._ interest. It would have been sufficient to redeem the whole
of the former capital, and also 3.539,793l. of the two last capitals;
which would have set free for the public an annual charge of 501,591l.—To
this sum must be added an annual charge of 256,000l. saved in 1765, 1766,
1767 and 1768, by redeeming, with 6.400,000l. borrowed in those years, so
much of a debt unfunded at the end of the war, but afterwards funded, and
carrying 4 _per cent._ interest. And also 12,537l. _per ann._ gained by
changing 1.253,700l. from an interest of 4 to 3 _per cent._ and 7,500l.
_per ann._ gained in 1771, by the ceasing of an annuity of a ½ _per
cent._ annexed for 15 years to 1.500,000l. borrowed in 1756.—The total
decrease, therefore, of the annual charge would have been 777,628l.—But
at the same time there would have been the following additions to
it.—First. There would have been the addition of 199,500l. _per ann._
being the interest of 6.650,000l. borrowed since 1763.—Secondly. Of
69,187l. _per ann._ being the interest of 2.306,240l. applied, in 1764
and 1765, to the discharge of German and army debts derived from the
war, and which might have been converted into a funded capital bearing
3 _per cent._ interest, by borrowing money to pay them off, in order to
avoid diverting money employed in redeeming capitals bearing 5 _per cent._

These two sums make 268,687l. which deducted from 777,628l. leaves
508,941l. And this is the clear annual charge which would have been
saved to the public, exclusive of the savings which have arisen from the
falling in of life-annuities.

But the annual charge that has in fact been saved is only
382,129[112].—The difference is 126,812l.—With this additional saving,
as it fell in and increased from time to time during the course of 12
years, a million more of the public debts bearing 4 _per cent._ might
have been redeemed; and this would have made a farther saving of 40,000l.
_per ann._ It appears, therefore, upon the whole, that had the mistakes I
have pointed out, in the loans of the last war, been avoided, (all other
public measures remaining the same) the nation would _now_ have had 13
millions and a half less to pay, in order to redeem its debts; and also
an annual charge upon it 166,812l. less.

All this supposes that the capitals of the 5 _per cent._ and 4 _per
cent._ annuities in the improved schemes were redeemable.—But had they
been made irredeemable till 1781, as mentioned in page 98, the public
would not have been much less benefited: For, soon after 1781, these 5
and 4 _per cents._ (the former 7.200,000l. and the latter 15.180,000l.)
might have been easily reduced to 3½ _per cent._ and this would have
occasioned an annual saving of 183,900l. over and above the savings,
which would have arisen in that year, from the extinction of the short
annuities.

I will add, that had these annuities been made not only _irredeemable_
till 1781; but _irreducible_ for some time beyond that year, in the
manner intimated in page 98, the public would still have been greatly
benefited. For, the annual charge upon it would not at any time have been
greater; but its debts would have been 12 millions and a half less; and,
at the same time, they would have been capable of being discharged with
more expedition, and at a less expence, than a smaller quantity of its
present debts. See the note, page 94.

       *       *       *       *       *

I cannot doubt but that all who will attentively examine these
observations will find them to be just.—I have confined my enquiries
to the loans of the last war. Had I extended them to all our loans, it
would have appeared, that a greater sum than most persons can think
credible,[113] has been such a needless addition to our debts as I have
explained; or, “a pure and uncompensated loss, which might have been
avoided by only framing differently the schemes of the public loans.”




PART III.


SECT. I.

ABSTRACT of the EXPORTS from and IMPORTS to GREAT-BRITAIN from 1697 to
1773, with REMARKS.

                     IMPORTS.    EXPORTS.   EXCESS of EXPORTS.
                        £.          £.          £.
  ANNUAL MEDIUM
    for FOUR YEARS
    ended at 1700   4.956,975   6.034,724  1.077,749 or 10/56 of
                                             the exports.

  For FIVE YEARS
    ended at 1710   5.321,717   6.713,246  1.391,529 or 10/48 of
                                             the exports.
          at 1715   5.304,343   7.401,946  2.097,603 or 10/35 of
                                             the exports.
          at 1725   6.628,279   9.663,527  3.035,248 or 10/32 of
                                             the exports.
          at 1735   7.470,454  11.855,226  4.384,772 or 10/27 of
                                             the exports.
          at 1745   7.363,079  11.922,982  4.559,903 or 10/26 of
                                             the exports.
          at 1750   7.429,739  12.877,129  5.447,390 or 10/24 of
                                             the exports.
          at 1755   8.264,834  13.406,530  5.141,696 or 10/26 of
                                             the exports.
          at 1760   8.877,144  14.253,377  5.376,233 or 10/26 of
                                             the exports.
  For FOUR YEARS
    ended at 1764  10.110,870  15.793,158  5.682,228 or 10/28 of
                                             the exports.

  For NINE YEARS
    ended at 1773  11.996,769  14.814,074  2.817,305 or 10/53 of
                                             the exports.

This ABSTRACT has been formed from the accounts delivered annually to the
HOUSE OF COMMONS, and lately published by Sir CHARLES WHITWORTH.

In order to draw just inferences from it, the following particulars
should be remembered.—First. The EXPORTS in the _Custom-House_ entries
are, for reasons well-known, too high. This excess has, by some of
the best judges, been reckoned at a million _per ann._—Secondly. The
IMPORTS are too low, no smuggled commodities being included in them.
This deficiency has been estimated at another million _per ann._ But, in
order to be sure of keeping within bounds, I will take both at a _million
and a half per ann._—Thirdly. The interest of the national debt paid to
foreigners; the money spent in foreign countries by _English_ travellers;
the bullion consumed in manufactures; and the wear of the current coin,
cannot, perhaps, amount to much less than two millions _per ann._ I will,
however, take them at no more than the annual sum which has been commonly
supposed to be due to foreigners from our funds; or, a _million and a
half_.—In order, therefore, to find the GRAND BALANCE OF PAYMENT between
_Britain_ and the rest of the world _since_ the last war, all these
sums (making up THREE MILLIONS) must be deducted from the excess of the
exports.—But, in order to find the same balance _before_ the end of the
last war, less must be deducted, in proportion as the national debt and
the foreign trade were _then_ less than they are _now_.

If the foregoing Abstract is examined with a due regard to this rule, it
will be found that, from[114] 1710 to 1764, the BALANCE OF PAYMENT must
have been in favour of _Britain_; and that consequently, there must have
been, during that period, an influx of money into the kingdom.—It was
this, together with the increase of our paper, that produced the rapid
fall of interest which began a few years before the _Accession_. And it
was this also that enabled us to bear the great expence of the two last
wars, and the loss of those enormous sums which were sent out of the
kingdom to pay foreign subsidies, and to support armies on the continent.

Before 1710 it appears to be doubtful, whether the excess of the
exports was such as brought any money into the kingdom; but it seems
certain, that it could not have been such as in any degree compensated
that drain of the public cash, which was occasioned by the continental
wars of King _William_ and Queen _Ann_. In consequence of this, the
quantity of _specie_ in the kingdom must have been greatly diminished;
and Dr. _Davenant_ computes that in 1711 it was nine millions less than
at the _Revolution_. Hence proceeded the high rate of interest; the
unproductiveness of the taxes; and the difficulties which government
met with in raising money during those two wars: And there is reason to
believe, these difficulties would have been insurmountable, had not a
substitute for _specie_ been provided by the establishment of the _Bank_.

In the interval of peace between the two last wars, or from 1748 to
1755, the balance in favour of _Britain_ was at the highest; and this
contributed to raise the stocks[115] to such a price, as enabled
government to reduce the interest of the public debts from 4 to 3 _per
cent._

But the observation I here intended principally to make is, that the
_balance_, since the year 1764, appears, from the preceding abstract, to
have been _against_ BRITAIN; and that this accounts for the high price of
bullion, the scarcity of specie, and the distress of the _Bank_ from that
year to 1773.

It deserves farther to be observed that, while the exports were
decreasing from 1764 to 1773, the IMPORTS appear to have increased
faster than ever: And the fact is, that since 1760, a greater addition
has been made to them, than had been made during the whole time from the
_Accession_ to that year.—This is a striking proof that luxury has been
for some years increasing with rapidity among us; and it is worth adding,
that the productiveness of the taxes has kept pace, as might have been
expected, with this increase of luxury, both the CUSTOMS and EXCISES
having brought in lately, near 250,000l. _per ann._ each, more than they
did twelve years ago.—It should be attended to, that this improvement
of the revenue must be the effect solely of an increased consumption
occasioned by luxury; the taxes, ever since the end of the last war,
having been nearly the same.

The _exports_ from 1710 to 1764 went on increasing constantly. I have
observed, that from 1764 to 1773 they have decreased. One reason of this
has been, the decline of the PORTUGAL trade; the exports to that country
having fallen, since 1760, from 1.200,000l. _per ann._ to 600,000l. _per
ann._—Another reason has been the check which a wretched policy has been
giving, ever since 1763, to our trade with the Colonies. This trade had
for many years contributed more than any other trade towards raising our
_exports_; and even in the period between 1763 and 1774, notwithstanding
the checks it received, it went on increasing, and produced a balance
in our favour of a million and a half _per ann._ But since 1774 it has
been entirely lost. _Before_ this loss, the balance of payment between
us and the rest of the world was, according to the account I have given,
_against_ us. Undoubtedly then, it was a loss we could by no means have
sustained, had it not been for the seasonable interposition of some very
particular causes. Time will shew whether these causes are of a permanent
nature, or temporary and accidental.


SECT. II.

_HISTORICAL DEDUCTION and ANALYSIS of the PUBLIC DEBTS._


_STATE and AMOUNT of the NATIONAL DEBT, at Midsummer, 1775, with the
Charges of Management._

       CAPITALS and ANNUITIES transferable at the BANK OF ENGLAND.

                                                      Principal.  Interest.
                                                          £.         £.

  CAPITAL of their original Fund—See Note (1) p. 125   3.200,000     96,000

  EXCHEQUER bills, by 3d of _Geo._ I. c. 8th, bearing
    originally 5 _per cent._ interest, but reduced
    to 4 _per cent._ in 1727, and to 3 _per cent._ by
    23d _George_ II. 1749. See Note (2) p. 126           500,000     15,000

  Purchased of the SOUTH SEA COMPANY in 1722,—reduced
    from 6 to 5 _per cent._ interest in 1717; from 5
    to 4. _per cent._ in 1727; and to 3 _per cent._
    by 23d of _George_ II. 1749.—See Note (3)          4.000,000    120,000

  Lent to government at 4 _per cent._ in 1728,
    charged on the surplus of the fund for the
    lottery in 1714, and reduced to 3 _per cent._
    by 23d _George_ II. 1749                           1.250,000     37,500

  Lent at 4 _per cent._ in 1727; charged on the
    duties on coals; and reduced to 3 _per cent._
    by 23d of _George_ II. 1749                        1.750,000     52,500

  Lent at 4 _per cent._ in 1746; charged on licences
    for retailing spirituous liquors; and reduced to
    3 _per cent._ by 23d _Geo._ II. 1749                 986,800     29,604

                                                      ---------------------
  Amount of Bank capital                              11.686,800    350,604
    See Note (4) p. 126.

  Charge of management 5,898_l._ _per ann._

                             BANK ANNUITIES.

  Consolidated 4 _per cent._  annuities due
    _April_ 5, and _October_ 10—See Note (5)          18.986,300    759,452

  These annuities fall to 3 _per cent._ in
    _January_, 1781. Charge of management
    10,680_l._ _per ann._

  Annuities at 3½ _per cent._ 1758, due _Jan._ 5, and
    _July_ 5.—These annuities fall to 3 _per cent._
    in 1782                                            4.500,000    157,500

  See an account of them in p. 101.

  Charge of management 2,805_l._ _per ann._
    including management on half a million raised
    at the same time by a lottery, and made a part
    of the consolidated 3 _per cents_.

  CONSOLIDATED 3 _per cent._ annuities due _Jan._ 5,
    and _July_ 5. See Note(6)                         38.251,696  1.147,551

  Management 21,087_l._ _per ann._

  REDUCED 3 _per cent._ annuities, due _April_ 5,
    and _Oct._ 10. See Note (7)                       18.353,774    550,613

  Charge of management 10,324_l._ _per ann._

  Three _per cent._ 1726, due _Jan._ 5, and _July_ 5,
    charged on the deduction of 6_d._ _per_ pound on
    all pensions from the civil list; and on all
    payments from the crown, except to the navy and
    army—See Note (8) p. 128                           1.000,000     30,000

  Management 360_l._ _per ann._

  Long annuity due _Jan._ 5, and _July_ 5              6.702,750    248,250

  The remaining term from _Jan._ 1776, is 84
    years—See Note (9) p. 128.

  Management 3,491_l._ _per ann._

       CAPITALS and ANNUITIES transferable at the SOUTH SEA HOUSE.

  SOUTH SEA STOCK                                      3.662,784    109,884

  The dividend on this stock, at 3½ _per cent._
    is 128,197_l._ 9_s._—Due _Jan._ 5, and _July_ 5.

  SOUTH SEA 3 _per cent._ OLD Annuities due
    _April_ 5, and _Oct._ 10                          11.907,470    357,224

  Three _per cent._ NEW Annuities due _Jan._ 5,
     and _July_ 5                                      8.494,830    254,845

  Three _per cent._ 1751, due _Jan._ 5, and
    _July_ 5                                           1.919,600     57,588

  Charge of management on _South Sea_ Stock and
    Annuities 15,100_l._ _per ann._—See Note (10).

         CAPITAL and ANNUITIES transferable at the INDIA HOUSE.

  EAST INDIA STOCK                                     3.200,000     96,000

  Interest 3 _per cent._

  _Dividend_ 7 _per cent._ 224,000_l._ due _Jan._
    5, and _July_ 5.—See Note (11).

  Charge of management 1.285_l._ 14_s._ 4_d._

  EAST INDIA Annuity due _April_ 5, and _Oct._ 10,
    charged on the surplus of a tax on spirituous
    liquors. See Note (12)                             1.000,000     30,000

  Management 401_l._ 15_s._ 8_d._ _per ann._

                   ANNUITIES payable at the EXCHEQUER.

  ANNUITIES for 96 and 99 years, from various
    dates, in the  time of King _William_
    and Queen _Anne_—See Note (13)                     1.836,276    131,203

  Salaries to Exchequer officers, and
    management—5,250_l._ _per ann._

  Annuities for lives, with benefit of survivorship,
    granted by the 4th of _William_ and _Mary_,
    1693.—These annuities are not yet extinct,
    and they are valued at three years purchase           22,781      7,567

  Annuities for lives, with benefit of survivorship,
    by an Act of the 5th of _Geo._ III. 1765—See
    Note (14)                                             18,000        540

  Annuities for two or three lives, granted in
    1694.—Also, Annuities on single lives  1745, 1746,
    and 1757.—See Note (15)—Their original amount,
    taken all together, was very nearly 124,000_l._
    but they are now reduced by deaths to near
    80,000_l._ and their value is here taken at
    10 years purchase                                    800,000     80,000

  UNFUNDED DEBT, consisting of Exchequer bills,
    (1.250,000_l._) Navy debt, (1.850,000_l._)
     and Civil list debt, supposed 500,000_l._—The
     interest is reckoned at 2 _per cent._—See
     Note (16)                                         3.600,000     72,000

  Salaries to Exchequer bill officers 650_l._
    _per ann._
                                                      ---------------------
  Total of the principal and interest of the
    National Debt at _Midsummer_ 1775.            £. 135.943,051  4.440,821


_NOTES containing an EXPLANATION and HISTORY of the different Articles in
the foregoing Account._

NOTE (1)—BANK OLD CAPITAL. See Page 119.—The BANK was established in
1694. Their original capital was 1.200,000_l._ bearing 8 _per cent._
interest, charged on 5/7ths. of 9_d._ _per_ barrel excise, with 4000_l._
_per ann._ for management.—In 1709, they lent to government 400,000_l._
without interest, which increased their old capital to 1.600,000_l._
bearing 6 _per cent._ interest. In 1742, they again lent to government
1.600,000l. without interest; and thereby increased this capital to its
present amount, or to 3.200,000_l._ bearing 3 _per cent._ with the same
annual sum for management.—It is of particular importance to observe with
respect to the sums of 400,000_l._ and of 1.600,000_l._ just mentioned,
that they were properly a compensation from the _Bank_ to the public for
continuing their exclusive privileges; and would have been advanced,
or at least the greatest part of them, though government had not bound
itself to return the purchase money, by making it a part of the principal
due to the _Bank_, provided the same interest had been continued for
some time on their former principal, and the same liberty granted to
increase their _stock_.—The like is true of 1.200,000_l._ advanced by the
_India_ Company without interest in 1708.—In these instances, therefore,
a needless addition was made to the public debt of 3.200,000_l._ which,
had it been avoided, the public would have had not only a principal so
much less to pay; but it would have saved in interest at least 96000_l._
_per ann._ for the old capital of the _Bank_ and the capital of the _East
India_ Company would have formed, in this case, between them, a debt of
only 3.200,000_l._ (instead of 6.400,000_l._) the interest of which might
long ago have been reduced at least one half; or from 8 _per cent._ the
original interest, to 4 _per cent._

       *       *       *       *       *

NOTE (2)—_Half a million_, part of the BANK CAPITAL. See Page 119.—This
part of the Bank capital consisted originally of two millions in
_Exchequer_ bills, cancelled for government by an act of the 3d of _Geo._
I. But half a million was discharged in 1729; and a million in 1738.

       *       *       *       *       *

NOTE (3)—FOUR MILLIONS purchased of the SOUTH-SEA COMPANY; part of the
BANK Capital. See Page 119.—In order to procure this money, the _Bank_
sold new stock at 18 _per cent._ premium. This produced a saving of
610,169_l._ the sale of 3.389,831_l._ _stock_ having produced four
millions in _money_. And, consequently, though by this transaction the
capital for which they received interest was increased four millions,
yet the _stock_ on which they made their dividends was increased only
3.389,831_l._

       *       *       *       *       *

NOTE (4)—BANK STOCK and DIVIDEND.—The _stock_ on which the _Bank_ divides
is only 10,780,000_l._ This dividend varies as their profits vary; but
for several years it has been 5½ _per cent._ payable half-yearly at
_Lady-day_ and _Michaelmas_. Their whole annual dividend is, therefore,
592,900_l._ which subtracted from 350,604_l._ the interest paid by
government, makes their clear annual profit 242,296_l._—Besides interest,
they receive for management of their capital 4000_l._ _per ann._ on
account of their old capital, and 1,898_l._ _per ann._ on account of
four millions purchased of the South Sea Company; in all, 5,898_l._ _per
ann._—The _Bank_ receives farther the sums specified in the foregoing
account, towards bearing the expences of managing the annuities commonly
called _Bank Annuities_. All these expences, including the sums granted
for managing their capital, amount to 54,645_l._ _per ann._

       *       *       *       *       *

NOTE (5)—CONSOLIDATED 4 _per cent._ BANK ANNUITIES. See Page 120.—The
capital of these Annuities consists of two loans, one in 1760, and
the other in 1762, consolidated into one stock, and charged on the
additional duty of 3_d._ per bushel on malt, the surplus of the duties
on spirituous liquors, and the additional duties on windows; all which
duties were ordered by 2d Geo. III. to be carried to the Sinking Fund,
and the interest with which they were charged to be paid out of that
fund.—I have made some remarks on these loans in page 96, and page 99.
They amounted to 20.240,000_l._ But 1.253,700_l._ of this capital was
changed in 1770, from an interest of 4 to 3 _per cent._ and the capital
reduced to the present sum.—A more full account of these annuities may be
found in Mr. _Ashmore_’s Analysis of the several Bank Annuities, p. 17.

       *       *       *       *       *

NOTE (6)—CONSOLIDATED 3 _per cent._ BANK ANNUITIES. See page 121.—The
capital of these annuities is made a distinct stock from that of the
annuities called _Reduced_, because it never bore a higher interest than
3 _per cent._—It consisted originally of the following loans—37,821_l._
remaining in 1727, of 3 _per cent._ annuities, granted in lieu of
St. _Christopher_’s and _Nevis_ debentures—800,000_l._ borrowed in
1731—600,000_l._ borrowed in 1736—300,000_l_. in 1738—6.400,000_l_.
in 1742, 1743, 1744 and 1745, and charged on additional duties on
spirituous liquors, wines, vinegar, &c.—1.000,000_l._ borrowed in
1750—24.490,000_l._ borrowed in the course of the last war, and funded on
the additional duties on beer, houses, stamps, &c.—4.900,000_l._ borrowed
in 1766, 1767 and 1768—And 1.253,700_l._ of the 4 _per cent._ annuities,
subscribed into the 3 _per cent._ annuities in 1770.

All these loans were by 25 Geo. II. 1751, and several subsequent Acts
of Parliament, consolidated into one joint stock; and carried, with the
duties for paying the interest, to the _Sinking Fund_. And in 1770, they
formed a capital of 39.781,521_l._ which has been since reduced, by the
payments mentioned in the _Postscript_ at the end of this tract, to the
sum specified in the account to which this note refers.—See a more full
account in Mr. Ashmore’s Analysis, &c. from page 5 to page 11.

       *       *       *       *       *

NOTE (7)—REDUCED 3 _per cent._ BANK ANNUITIES. See page 121.—The capital
of these annuities consisted, in 1749, of loans in 1746, 1747, and 1748,
and navy, ordnance and transport debts funded in 1749, amounting to
18.402,472_l._ and all bearing 4 _per cent._ interest.—By the 23d of
Geo. II. 1749, these loans were reduced to an interest of 3 _per cent._
and by the great consolidating Act in 1751, they were converted into one
stock, and carried into the Sinking Fund with the duties on carriages,
and the additional duties on glass, spirituous liquors, houses, windows,
stamps, merchandize imported, &c. which had been granted for paying the
interest.—In 1751, certain exchequer tallies and orders, amounting to
129,750_l._ were subscribed into this stock; and in 1765, navy bills to
the amount of 1,482,000_l._ were subscribed into it, which made its whole
original amount 20.014.222_l._—In 1751, there was paid off 830,898_l._
being stock which had not been subscribed agreeably to the Act in 1749
for reducing interest; and in 1772, 1774, and 1775, so much more of this
stock was paid off as reduced it to its present amount.—See Mr. Ashmore’s
Analysis, p. 12-16.

       *       *       *       *       *

NOTE (8)—CIVIL LIST MILLION. See page 121.—The income settled upon King
George I. for his civil list, was 700,000_l._—In 1720, there had been
granted him besides, from the _Royal Exchange_ and _London_ Assurance
companies, 300,000_l._ And in 1726, this million was farther granted
towards paying off his debts.

       *       *       *       *       *

NOTE (9)—BANK LONG ANNUITY. See page 122.—This annuity consists of
128,250_l._ _per ann._ for 99 years, given in 1761, as a _premium_ to the
subscribers of 11.400,000_l._ at 3 _per cent_; and of 120,000_l._ _per
ann._ for 98 years, given in 1762, as a premium to the lenders of twelve
millions at 4 _per cent._ See page 95 and 100. It is charged, together
with the loans to which it was annexed, on the _Sinking Fund_.—Its value
in the Alley is about 25 years purchase; but the remaining term is really
worth 27 years purchase, reckoning interest at 3½, (or the 3 _per cents._
being at 85¾.) But when interest is at 4 _per cent._ or the 3 _per
cents._ are at 75, it is worth only 24 years purchase.—When this annuity
is called a _premium_, it must not be imagined, that no compensation was
given for it. Government received the value of it; but, at the same time,
made itself a debtor for that value. And, what is very surprizing, this
has been uniformly practised with respect to all the premiums or douceurs
granted by government; and the consequence has been, that great and
needless increase of the public debt explained in the 3d section of the
2d Part.

       *       *       *       *       *

NOTE (10).—SOUTH-SEA STOCK AND ANNUITIES. See page 122.—These four
capitals amounting to 25.984,684_l._ 13_s._ consist almost entirely
of the remainder of debts contracted in the reigns of _King William_
and Queen _Anne_. The following account will probably give sufficient
information concerning them.

In 1711, Lord Oxford being minister, the proprietors of certain navy,
army, ordnance and transport debts, to the amount of 9.177,968_l._
including arrears of interest, and half a million for the current
supplies, were incorporated into a company for trading to the
_South-seas_. They were allowed 6 _per cent._ interest for this debt,
with 8000_l._ _per ann._ for management; and the duties on wine, tobacco,
_East-India_ goods, candles, &c. were made perpetual, and granted as a
_Fund_ (ever since called the _South-sea Company’s Fund_) for paying the
interest. This kept up public credit at the time, and has been called
the _Earl of Oxford_’s master-piece.—By the 1st of Geo. I. 822,032_l._
consisting chiefly of interest payable on the Company’s capital, was
added to the capital, in consequence of which it was increased to TEN
MILLIONS, (ever since called their _original capital_) bearing 6 _per
cent._ interest.—In 1717, they agreed to take 5 _per cent_; and this was
the first great reduction of interest, which in conjunction with the same
reduction of the other redeemable debts almost all carrying 6 _per cent._
laid the foundation of the SINKING FUND established in this year. But
it is remarkable, that so fast did interest fall at this time, that the
price of _South-sea stock_, notwithstanding this reduction, rose from 101
to 111.—In 1719, the _South-sea_ capital was increased to 11.746,844_l._
bearing 5 _per cent._ interest (with an addition of 1,397_l._ 9_s._
to their former allowance for management) by advancing to government
544,142_l._ and by the proprietors of 94,329_l._ 12_s._ lottery annuities
for 32 years granted in 1710, accepting in lieu of them 1.202,702_l._
_South Sea stock_.—In 1720, the agreement was made by government with
the South Sea Company, which produced the great SOUTH SEA BUBBLE.—There
existed at that time _long_ annuities to the amount of 666,821_l._
8_s._ and _short_ annuities, for 32 years from 1710, to the amount of
127,260_l._ 6_s._ The proprietors of these annuities were allowed to
subscribe them into the _South Sea_ trading stock; and the Company, for
every 100_l._ of the _long_ annuity which should be subscribed, were
to receive from government an addition to their capital of 2000_l._
bearing 5 _per cent._ interest till 1727, and afterwards 4 _per cent._
till redeemed: and for every 100_l._ of the _short_ annuities, they
were to receive an addition to their capital of 1400_l._ bearing the
same interest.—They were besides to take in the redeemable debts to the
amount of 16.546,482_l_. and to receive an addition to their capital of
100_l._ for every 100_l._ subscribed.—By the subscription of the _long_
and _short_ annuities which followed this agreement, a capital due from
government to the Company was created, which was greater by 3.034,769_l._
than the original sum advanced for the annuities subscribed. And as
much of these annuities and of the redeemable debts were subscribed, as
increased the _South Sea_ trading capital to 37.802,203_l._—In 1722,
four millions of this capital was purchased by the BANK, (See Note 3.)
which reduced it to 33.802,203_l._—By 9 Geo. I. 1723, this remaining
capital was divided into two equal parts, one of which alone (or
16.901,101_l._) was ordered to be the trading capital of the Company,
and the other part was directed to be called _South Sea Annuities_.—In
1733, the _South Sea_ trading capital had been reduced by payments at
different times to 14.651,137_l._ 12_s._ By an Act of Parliament in
that year, this remaining stock received a farther division; and only
a fourth part, or 3.662,784_l._ was allowed to be the Company’s stock;
and the other three parts, or 10.988,353_l._ were directed to be called
NEW South Sea Annuities, in order to distinguish them from the former
annuities, which have ever since gone under the name of OLD South Sea
annuities.—From 1733, to the present time, SOUTH SEA STOCK has continued
the same; but the capital of the OLD South Sea annuities has been
reduced, by redemptions, to 11,907,470_l._ and of the NEW South Sea
annuities, to 8.494,830_l._ And of the whole _South Sea_ debt, which in
1722 was 33.802,203_l._ there has, since that year, been paid off in all
9.737,119_l._ This should have reduced it to 24.065,081_l._ but it is in
reality 25.984,685_l._ The reason of this is, that the diminution just
mentioned of the _South Sea_ debt was made in part with money borrowed in
1751, to pay off such proprietors of South Sea annuities as had refused
to consent to the reduction of interest proposed to them in 1749. The sum
borrowed for this purpose was 2.100,000_l._ bearing 3 _per cent._ with
1181_l._ 5_s._ for management. This debt is now reduced by redemptions to
the sum specified in the preceding account; or to 1.919,600_l._

       *       *       *       *       *

NOTE (11).—EAST-INDIA STOCK. See page 123.—In 1698, a company of
merchants, in consideration of two millions lent to government at 8 _per
cent._ were incorporated, and entitled to the sole privilege of trading
to the _East-Indies_.—These two millions formed the first capital of the
present _East-India_ Company.—In 1702, an old company of traders to the
_East-Indies_ was united to this company; and in 1708, these united
companies lent to government 1.200,000_l._ without additional interest,
which made their capital 3.200,000_l._ bearing 5 _per cent._—In 1730,
this interest was reduced to 4 _per cent._ and by the 23d Geo. II. 1749,
to 3 _per cent._—The salt duties, and some additional stamp duties, were
at first charged with the annuity due on this capital; but at present the
duties constituting the aggregate fund are charged with it.

       *       *       *       *       *

NOTE (12).—EAST-INDIA ANNUITY. See page 123.—The capital of this
annuity was advanced to government in 1744, at 3 _per cent._ and, in
consideration of this loan, the exclusive charter of the Company was
continued to Lady-day 1783, at which time it is to cease, provided three
years notice has been given, and the debt due from government discharged.

An observation here forces itself upon me, which I have often had
occasion to make.—Part of this loan was a compensation from the
_East-India_ Company for prolonging the term of its charter; and,
therefore, ought not to have been included in the loan. The Company would
have lent 750,000_l._ on the interest common at the time, or 4 _per
cent._ and the remainder would have been advanced as a gratuity.—It is a
pity those who managed these contracts for the public, did not attend to
the absurdity and extravagance of making a _debt_ of purchase money, and
_borrowing_ in the very act of _selling_.

       *       *       *       *       *

NOTE (13).—EXCHEQUER LONG ANNUITIES. See page 123.—These are the _long_
annuities which, in 1720, remained unsubscribed to the South Sea Company.
See Note 10.—They consist first of annuities to the amount of 54,900_l._
14_s._ 6_d._ purchased by the 4th, 5th, and 6th of _William_ and _Mary_,
for 96 years, from January 1695, with the addition of 1350_l._ _per ann._
for salaries to exchequer officers. These annuities were originally 14
_per cent._ life-annuities. By the 6th and 7th of _William_ and _Mary_,
in order to raise more money, these annuitants, or any other persons
for them, were offered a reversionary interest in the annuities after
the failure of the lives, till the end of 96 years from January 1695,
on paying 4½ years purchase, (that is 63_l._) for every annuity of
14_l._—The predecessors of the present company of the MILLION BANK (so
called from the MILLION lottery 1694, in which they were some of the
principal adventurers) purchased 30,669_l._ 4_s._ of these reversionary
annuities. The life annuitants being now reduced to a very small number,
almost the whole of this annuity is lapsed to the _company_; and though
they have divided for several years 5 _per cent._ on a capital of half a
million, yet their growing savings, from the falling in of lives, have
been such, that, when their annuity ceases in 1791, they will, I am
informed, have accumulated a fund considerably larger, than the capital
on which they have made their dividends. But to return.

       *       *       *       *       *

These EXCHEQUER Annuities consist farther of

         £.    _s._  _d._
       30,400    6    8    purchased for 99 years from _Christmas_
                             1705, by 2d and 3d of _Anne_, with
                             1450_l._ for management.
       23,234   16    6    purchased for 99 years from _Lady-day_,
                             1706, by 4 _Anne_, with 1470_l._
                             _per ann._ for management.
        7,776   10    0    purchased for 99 years from _Lady-day_,
                             1707, by 5 _Anne_, with 375_l._ 12_s._
                             _per ann._ for management.
        4,710   0     0    purchased for 99 years from _Lady-day_,
                             1708, by 6th of _Anne_, with 208_l._
                             2_s._ _per ann._ for management.
       10,181   0     0    purchased for 99 years from _Lady-day_,
                             1707, by a 2d Act of 5th of _Anne_,
                             with 416_l._ _per ann._ for management.
  Add  54,900  14     6
      -----------------
      131,203   7     8    Total.

The original sum contributed for these annuities was 1.836,276_l._ They
are even now worth more than this sum. The public has already paid above
TEN MILLIONS; and by the time they are all extinct, it will have paid
above THIRTEEN MILLIONS, on their account. This is great extravagance;
but it is nothing to the extravagance constantly practised of borrowing
on perpetual annuities, without putting them into a fixed course of
redemption.

       *       *       *       *       *

NOTE (14).—TONTINE by an act of 6 Geo. III. See page 124.—The intention
of this Act was to raise 300,000_l._ towards paying off navy bills, by
offering to subscribers for every 100_l._ advanced, an annuity of 3_l._
for their lives, with benefit of survivorship. But the scheme did not
succeed, and only 18000_l._ was subscribed.

       *       *       *       *       *

NOTE (15).—LIFE ANNUITIES. See page 124.—The annuities on _two_ lives in
1694, were sold at 12_l._ _per ann._ during _two_ lives, of any ages, and
the annuities on _three_ lives, at 10_l._ _per ann._ during three lives,
for every 100_l._ advanced.—This was very extravagant; for, supposing the
annuitants in general, about the age of 20 or 30, it was the same, in
the case of _two_ lives, with giving above 10 _per cent._ for money, and
in the case of _three_ lives, 9 _per cent._—It is, likewise, extremely
absurd in these cases to pay no regard to difference of ages. A _single_
life at the age of 60, supposing money improved at 4 _per cent._ is
intitled to 11 _per cent._ but at the age of 10, scarcely to 6 _per
cent._ _Two_ lives at 60, are entitled, on the same supposition, to 8½
_per cent._ but at 10, not to 5 _per cent._—The original amount of these
annuities was 22,700_l._ nearly. In 1762, that is, in 68 years, they were
reduced by deaths no lower than 9,215_l._

The other life-annuities mentioned in the preceding account were
_douceurs_ granted for loans in 1745, 1746, and 1757. An account of the
annuities granted in the last of these years may be seen in page 101.

The life-annuities in 1745, amounted to 22,500_l._ and were granted,
together with the profits of a lottery, for a loan of two millions at 4
_per cent._

The life-annuities in 1746, amounted to 45,000_l._ and were granted,
with the profits of another lottery, for a loan of three millions, at
the same interest.—The remarks made in the 3d section of the last part,
and particularly in the note, p. 101, are applicable to these two loans.
The value of the life-annuities, and the profits of the lotteries, were
made a part of the public debt. And, supposing the life-annuities worth,
one with another, only 14 years purchase, and the profits of the two
lotteries worth 300,000_l._ it will follow, that the capital created
by these loans, instead of being 5.000,000_l._ should have been only
3.755,000_l._

But there is another remark, which it is proper to mention here. The
life-annuities granted in 1757, amounting to 33,750_l._ were, in January
1775, that is in 18 years, reduced by deaths to 28,732_l._ or but a
little more than a seventh part. But, supposing the annuitants all in
the firmest stage of life, or between the age of 10 and 30, they ought,
according to some of the best tables of observations, to have been
reduced a _quarter_. These life-annuities have, therefore, fallen in much
more slowly than could have been expected; and I have found the same to
be true of all the other life-annuities.—The reason, undoubtedly, is,
that the tables exhibit the rate of mortality among all sorts and orders
of men taken together; whereas, the lives on which annuities are bought,
are a selection of the better sort of lives from the general mass, and
therefore must be of greater value.—Indeed I am not acquainted with any
table of observations which gives the probabilities of the duration
of life high enough to be a guide in this case; except that which was
formed by Mr. _De Parcieux_, from the French _Tontines_.—A calculation,
therefore, of the values of lives, agreeably to this table, would be of
considerable use.

       *       *       *       *       *

NOTE (16).—UNFUNDED DEBT. See page 124.—I have given the navy debt, as it
was in January, 1775.—The civil list debt in 1775, was probably more than
the sum at which I have reckoned it. Lord STAIR, in his account of the
national debt, income, and expenditure, reckons it at 800,000_l._

Much the greatest part of the foregoing debts, with the taxes for
paying the interest, including the duties composing the _Aggregate_,
_South-Sea_, and _General_ Funds, have, by the 25th of _George_ the
Second, 1751, and several subsequent acts of Parliament, been thrown
into one general account; and the _surplus_ of the whole, after
deducting the interest, 800,000l. _per ann._ to the civil list, and a
few other payments, forms the SINKING FUND.—The debts not brought to
this account are about seven millions and a half in the _South-Sea_
House; 11.186,800l. of the _Bank_ capital; the Civil List million; four
millions and a half borrowed at 3½ _per cent._ in 1758; the capital of
the East-India annuity; and the Exchequer long and life annuities, except
those granted in 1758. But the _surplusses_ of the duties which pay
the interest of these debts are either carried _immediately_ into the
_Sinking Fund_ account; or brought _first_ to the _Aggregate_ Fund, and
from thence carried into that account.—On the contrary. Deficiencies in
these duties when they happen, are made good out of the Sinking Fund; and
afterwards replaced from the supplies.

For example. Three old nine-penny excises on beer, with an additional
three-pence per barrel, producing above half a million annually; also,
3,700l. _per_ week out of the hereditary excise on beer, together with
some duties on paper, coals, &c. and ⅓ additional subsidy of tonnage and
poundage, are appropriated to the payment of the Banker’s Annuity; the
Life Annuities granted in 1693 and 1694; the Exchequer Long Annuities;
and annuities on various sums subscribed to the South-Sea Company in
1720. The surplusses make a part of the _Aggregate Fund_; and after
contributing to satisfy the charge on that fund, are carried into the
_Sinking Fund_.—Again. Certain additional duties on soap, parchment,
coals, &c. are appropriated to pay the interest of 1.250,000l. and
of 1.750,000l. parts of the Bank capital.—The surplusses are carried
_directly_ to the _Sinking Fund_.—In like manner. The duties on houses
and windows imposed by an act of the 20th of _George_ the Second,
1747,[116] after deducting from them 91,485l. _per ann._ to satisfy
certain charges on old house-duties in the _Aggregate Fund_; and, also,
other duties on houses and windows imposed by the 2d and 6th of _George_
the Third, amounting in all to about 205,000l. _per ann._ are carried
into the Sinking Fund, together with the capitals, the interest of which
has been charged upon them. But the addition to these duties (with a
tax on pensions) granted in 1758, and charged with the interest (at 3½
_per cent._) of the loan in that year, having not been carried into the
_Sinking Fund_, and proving deficient; the deficiency is constantly made
good out of this fund, and afterwards replaced from the supplies.


_State and Amount of the NATIONAL DEBT at Christmas 1753; with the
Charges of Management._

                            BANK OF ENGLAND.

                                                      Principal.  Interest.
                                                          £.         £.

  BANK capital                                        11.686,800    393,038

  Of this capital 3.200,000l. bore at this time 3
    _per cent._ interest; and the remainder bore 3½
    _per cent._ till 1757, by 23d Geo. II. 1749.—See
    note (1) p. 125.

  Management 5,898l. _per ann._

  Three _per cent._ BANK Annuities consolidated by
    25 Geo. II. 1751.—See note (6) p. 127.             9.137,821    274,135

  Management 4,450l. _per ann._

  BANK Annuities consolidated by 25 Geo. II.
    2.713,618l. carrying 3½ _per cent._ interest
    till 1755; and 14.857,956l. carrying the same
    interest till 1757. See note (7) p. 128.          17.740,132    619,546

  Management 9,884l. _per ann._

  Civil List million, 1726                             1.000,000     30,000

  Management 360l. _per ann._

  Whole charge of Management at the Bank in
    1753—20,592l. _per ann._

                           SOUTH-SEA COMPANY.

  SOUTH-SEA STOCK carrying 4 _per cent._ till 1757     3.662,784    146,511

  Old and New SOUTH-SEA Annuities carrying 3½
    _per cent._ till 1757                             21.362,525    747,688

  Three _per cent._ 1751—See note (10) p. 131.         2.100,000     63,000

  Whole charge of management at the _South-Sea-House_
    on stock and annuities, 15,748l. _per ann._

                            EAST-INDIA HOUSE.

  EAST-INDIA STOCK, reduced to 3½ till 1757            3.200,000    112,000

  EAST-INDIA annuity 1744                              1.000,000     30,000

  Management 1,687l. 10s. _per ann._
                                                      ---------------------
                                   Total[117]      £. 70,851,254  2.415,918

                               EXCHEQUER.

  ANNUITIES for 96 and 99 years from various dates
    in King _William_’s and Queen _Anne_’s times
    being the original sum contributed. See note
    (13) page 132.                                     1.836,276    131,203

  Management 5,230l. _per ann._ inclusive of
    management for the two next articles.

  ANNUITIES for lives with benefit of survivorship,
    being the original sum contributed                   108,100      7,567

  ANNUITIES for two and three lives, being the
    remainder after deducting the annuities fallen
    in by deaths, and reckoned worth 10 years
    purchase                                             106,650     10,665

  ANNUITIES for single lives 1745, being the
    remainder after deducting the annuities fallen
    in by deaths; and reckoned worth 14 years
    purchase                                             296,142     21,153

  ANNUITIES for single lives 1746, being the
    remainder after the lives fallen in                  582,274     41,591

  Navy debt in 1754—Interest reckoned at 2
    _per cent._                                        1.296,568     25,931
                                                      ---------------------
  Total of the principal and interest of the
    public debts in 1753                           £. 75.077,264  2.654,028


_STATE and AMOUNT of the NATIONAL DEBT in 1739._

                            BANK OF ENGLAND.

                                                      Principal.  Interest.
                                                          £.         £.

  BANK CAPITAL, consisting of 1.600,000l. old capital
    carrying 6 _per cent_; and 7.500,000l. carrying 4
    _per cent._ See note 1, p. 123.                    9.100,000    396,000

  BANK ANNUITIES at 3 _per cent._ for the lottery in
    1731.                                                800,000     24,000

                           SOUTH-SEA COMPANY.

  Stock and annuities bearing 4 _per cent._           27.302,203  1.092,088

                           EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

  EAST-INDIA stock carrying 4 _per cent._              3.200,000    128,000

                          EXCHEQUER ANNUITIES.

  Annuities at 3½ by 4 Geo. II. paid off in 1752         400,000     14,000

  ANNUITIES at 4 _per cent._ charged on the duty on
    wrought plate by 6 Geo. I. 1720                      312,000     12,480

  182,250l. of this capital was paid off in 1750.
    The remainder is now included in the capital
    of the reduced 3 _per cent._ annuities.

  ANNUITIES at 3 _per cent._ charged on the Sinking
    Fund by 9 and 10 Geo. II. Now included in the
    consolidated 3 _per cent._ annuities                 900,000     27,000

  ANNUITIES on _Nevis_ and St. _Christopher_ Debentures
    at 3 _per cent._ Now included in the consolidated
    3 _per cents._                                        37,821      1,135

  EXCHEQUER BILLS charged on a duty upon victuallers
    by 12 Geo. I. 1726—Carrying 3 _per cent._            480,000     14,400

  EXCHEQUER BILLS charged on a duty on sweets by 10 of
    Geo. II. 1737—Carrying 3 _per cent._ and paid off
    in 1754—See the note p. 140.                         499,600     14,988

  ANNUITIES for long terms from various dates          1.836,276    131,203

  ANNUITIES for lives with _benefit_ of _Survivorship_
    granted in 1693                                      108,100      7,567

  ANNUITIES for two and three lives, 1694                106,650     15,000

  _Navy_ debt[118]                                     1.300,000     26,000
                                                      ---------------------
  Total of the _Principal_ and _Interest_ of the
    National Debt in 1739[119]                     £. 46.382,650  1.903,861

From the account in the POSTSCRIPT, at the end of this tract, it will
appear, that 10.639,793l. of the public debt was discharged between
the years 1763 and 1775; and also that the _funded_ debt was, in
1775, 1.400,000l. greater than it was at the end of the last war.
From hence, and from the amount of the public debt in 1775, as stated
in page 124, it follows, that the funded debt at the end of the war
was 130.943,051l. and the whole debt 146.582,844l. and, consequently,
that the war left upon the nation an _unfunded debt_ amounting to[120]
15.639,793l. This unfunded debt consisted of the following particulars—Of
3.500,000l. borrowed after the peace in 1763, and applied towards
bearing such expences of the war as could not immediately cease with its
operations.—Of near _eight millions_ in navy, victualling, ordnance, and
transport debts.—Of 1.800,000l. _Exchequer bills_; and the remainder,
of subsidies to foreign princes, extraordinaries of the army, and German
demands.

In the interval of peace between 1748 and 1755 the following debts were
paid off.

                                                                     £.

  _Bank Annuities_ bearing 4 _per cent._                          1.013,148

  SOUTH-SEA Annuities bearing 4 _per cent._                         176,893

  _Annuities_ bearing 3½ _per cent._ charged by 4 Geo. II. on
    additional Stamp-duties                                         400,000

  EXCHEQUER Bills bearing 3 _per cent._ charged by 10 Geo. II.
    1737 on the duties on sweets                                    499,600

  Borrowed in 1745 at 3½ _per cent._ on the credit of the Salt
    duties                                                        1.000,000

    See note, page 140.
                                                                -----------
                                                  [121]Total   £. 3.089,641

From the whole, the following account of the progress of the National
Debt, from 1739 to 1775, may be deduced.

                                                   Principal.     Interest.
                                                      £.              £.

  _Amount_ of the _principal_ and _interest_
    of the national debt before the war
    which begun in 1740                           46.382,650     1.903,861

  Amount in 1749 immediately after the war        78.166,906     2.765,608

  Increased by the war                            31.784,256       861,747

  Diminished by the Peace from 1748 to 1755        3.089,641       111,590

  Amount at the commencement of the last war      75.077,264     2.654,018

  Amount at the end of the war in 1763           146.582,844     4.840,821

  Increased by the last war                       71.505,580     2.186,803

  Diminished by the Peace, in twelve years from
    1763 to 1775                                  10.639,793  [122]400,000

  Amount at _Midsummer_, 1775                    135.943,051     4.440,821

We are now involved in another war, and the public debts are increasing
again fast. _Exchequer_ Bills have been increased from 1.250,000l. to
1.500,000l. A new capital of 2.150,000l. has been added to the 3 _per
cent._ Consolidated Annuities. And a vote of credit was given in the
last session of Parliament for a million. The last year, therefore, has
added 3.400,000l. to our debts, besides a vast sum not yet provided for,
consisting of navy, ordnance, victualling, transport and army debts.—The
present year (1777) must make another great addition to them; and what
they will be at the end of these troubles, no one can tell.—The union of
a _foreign_ war to the present _civil_ war might perhaps raise them to
TWO HUNDRED MILLIONS; but, more probably, it would sink them to—NOTHING.


SECT. III.

_Of the DEBTS and RESOURCES of France._

Ministers have of late sought to remove the public apprehensions by
general accounts of the weakness of powers, which, from the circumstances
of former wars as well as national prejudices, have been felt by the
people as jealous rivals or formidable enemies.—I wish it was possible
for me to confirm these accounts; and by contrasting the preceding state
of our own debts with a similar one of those of FRANCE, to shew, that
from this power in particular we have nothing to fear. The following
particulars, on the correctness of which I can rely, may give some
assistance in judging of this subject.

       *       *       *       *       *

The whole expence of the last war to FRANCE was 1.118.307,047 livres;
that is, 49.702,000l. sterling: of which 23.152,000l. (520.926,000
livres) consisted of money procured by the sale of taxes, by free-gifts,
and extra-impositions during the war, which left behind them no debts:
And 26.550,000l. (597.380,100 livres) consisted of LOANS, or money raised
on perpetual annuities, life-annuities, and lotteries.—At the beginning
of 1769 the whole amount of the debts of _France_, including all arrears
and capitals advanced on annuities and lotteries, was 128.622,000l.
sterling, or 2.894.053,616 livres. The annual charge derived from this
debt was 6.707,500l. sterling (150.919,284 livres)—All the appropriations
amounted to 8.218,500l. sterling (184.919,284 livres).—The expences of
the army, navy, king’s houshold, prince’s houshold, foreign affairs, &c.
amounted to 8.947,000l. or 201.307,312 livres. So that the whole annual
expence was 17.165,000l. (386.226,596 livres).—The whole revenue had
amounted, before 1769, to 13.484,500l. sterling (303.401,696 livres).—The
public expence, therefore, had exceeded the revenue 3.681,000l.
(82.800,000 livres.) _per ann._

From the year 1769 to the present King’s Accession, by forced reductions
of interest, and by new taxes, the public revenue was carried to
16.289,000l. sterling (366.508,000 livres) and the public expence was
reduced so as not to exceed the revenue above 766,800l. _per annum_
(17.253,000 livres).—The anticipations also of the revenue, which
before 1769 had extended to _seventeen_ months, were reduced to _five_
months.—Such was the progress of reformation; namely, an increase of
revenue amounting to little less than THREE MILLIONS sterling _per ann._
in a few years, under an unpopular minister, in the latter days of a
reign never characterized by an attention to oeconomy, or a regard to the
public interest; and at this time particularly stamped by unprecedented
profusion and a general relaxation.

A new reign produced a new minister of finance whose name will be
respected by posterity for a set of measures as new to the _political_
world, as any late discoveries in the system of nature have been to the
_philosophical_ world.—Doubtful in their operation, as all unproved
measures must be, but distinguished by their tendency to lay a solid
foundation for endless peace, industry, and a general enjoyment of
the gifts of nature, arts, and commerce.—The edicts issued during his
administration exhibit indeed a phænomenon of the most extraordinary
kind. An absolute king rendering a voluntary account to his subjects,
and inciting his people to _think_; a right which it has been the
business of all absolute princes and their ministers to extinguish in
the minds of men.—In these edicts the king declared in the most distinct
terms against a bankruptcy, an augmentation of taxes, and new loans;
while the minister applied himself to increase every public resource by
principles more liberal than _France_, or any part of _Europe_, ever had
in serious contemplation.—It is much to be regretted, that the opposition
he met with, and the intrigues of a court, should have deprived the world
of those lights which must have resulted from the example of such an
administration.

After a short interval, a nomination, in some respects still more
extraordinary, has taken place in the court of FRANCE. A court which a
few years since was distinguished by its bigotry and intolerance, has
raised a _Protestant_, the subject of a small but virtuous republic, to
a decisive lead in the regulation of its finances. It is to be presumed,
that so singular a preference will produce an equally singular exertion
of integrity and talents. Though differing from Monsieur TURGOT in
several principles, which regard the larger lines of government, he
appears by his first steps, and, particularly, the preamble to a late
edict for raising 24 millions of livres by a lottery, to put his foot
on the same great basis of general justice, and a strict conservation
of the faith o£ the king; and points more particularly at the surest
of all resources in any modern states, a simplification of taxes and
a reformation in the collection of them. This administration, making
improvements in the Revenue its immediate object, is more capable of
present exertion; and, as such, is more formidable.

From these facts and observations it is impossible not to conclude,
that if we trust our safety to the difficulties of FRANCE, we may
find ourselves fatally deceived. I will add, that though (like the
3s. land-tax and lotteries among ourselves) some of the extraordinary
impositions of the last war have been continued in _France_, there
are some which ceased with the war, and which they can renew. It is,
particularly, an advantage of unspeakable importance to them, that they
can carry on a war, as they did the last, at _half_ our expence; and
that, having no dependence on the flattering delusion of paper, they
can, as they did in 1759, bear even a bankruptcy in the middle of a
war, and yet carry it on vigorously.—Their debts time itself is sinking
fast. Of 3.111,000l. (seventy millions of livres) in annuities on the
_Hotel de Ville_ at _Paris_, 1.777,000l. (forty millions of livres)
consisted in 1774 of Life Annuities, which were falling by deaths at
the rate of 71,000l. (1.600,000 livres) every year.—Even their loss of
credit, whatever present embarrassment attends it, favours them upon
the whole. To this they owe the advantages just mentioned. The facility
with which our high credit has enabled us to run in debt ensnares us;
and, if a change of measures does not take place,[123] must _ruin_ us.
Experience has given them a just horror at borrowing on permanent funds;
and were they inclined to do it, they are not able to do it to any great
amount; and, consequently, they cannot go on mortgaging one resource
after another till none is left.—While we lose sight of the capital in
the interest, they carry their views chiefly to the reimbursement of
the capital; and after receiving high interest, for some years, can be
satisfied with receiving back a part of their capital.—Their debts, being
confined in a great measure to the _Farmers General_ and others at PARIS,
are not circulated and diffused among the body of the people in the
manner ours are: And it is well known, that they can make use of methods
to discharge them which our government must never think of. The acts of
arbitrary power and unjust expedients to which, on many occasions, they
have had recourse for this purpose without producing any tumults, are
such as appear to us almost incredible; and should the time ever come,
when it will be necessary in this country to make use of any violence of
the same kind, all government will probably be at an end.

In point of territory and number of inhabitants, the two countries will
bear no comparison[124]. We have hitherto opposed _France_ by our free
spirit, and our colonies; and to them chiefly we owe our prosperity and
victories. Our colonies once separated from us, the islands will soon
follow. But should they remain ours, our comparative advantages will best
appear from the following authentic account of the imports into _France_
from their islands.

                          In 1774.

                                         Weight in Pounds.

  Sugar imported into _France_              147.986,959
  Indigo                                      1.734,206
  Rocou                                         210,187
  Coffee                                     58.247,133
                                            -----------
                                            208.178,485

                          In 1775.

                                         Weight in Pounds.

  Sugar imported into _France_              171.932,972
  Indigo                                      2.134,247
  Rocou                                         169,831
  Coffee                                     58.545,000
                                            -----------
                                       [125]232.782,050

Value of the above commodities re-exported from _France_, taken upon the
average price.

               _Livres._    _Sterling._

  In 1774     75.901,373    3.373,000
  In 1775     74.961,318    3.331,000

The whole importation from the _West Indies_ into _Britain_ is about
three millions _per ann._

But I have gone much beyond the views with which I begun this section.
The facts which have been stated, and the reflections which they have
occasioned, are intended principally to shew that we ought not to suffer
ourselves to be drawn into security by any assurances of the weakness
of _France_.—May she, however, find herself the weakest of kingdoms
whenever, from motives of interest or ambition, she shall attempt to
injure any of her neighbours.—May _Britain_, hitherto the most favoured
spot under heaven, always preserve her distinguished happiness, and
escape the danger which now threatens her. And may the time soon come,
when all mankind, sensible of the value of the blessings of peace and
equal liberty, shall suffer one another to enjoy them, and learn war no
more.


SECT. IV.

_Containing an Account of the National Income and Expenditure; the
Surplus of the Revenue; and the Money drawn from the Public by the Taxes;
with Remarks on Lord STAIR’S Account._

               _APPROPRIATED REVENUE at Midsummer, 1775._

                                                                     £.

  Interest of the national debt                                   4.440,821

  Civil list revenue. See the note in page 163                      800,000

  Expences of management attending the national debt; of which
    71,432 l. is the expence of management at the Bank, South-Sea
    House, and _India_ House; and 5.900 l. salaries to _Exchequer
    Officers_. See Page 119, &c.                                     77,332

  Annuities payable out of the Aggregate Fund to the DUKE OF
    GLOUCESTER, 8000 l.—DUKE OF CUMBERLAND, 8000 l.—the
    Representatives of ARTHUR ONSLOW, Esq; 3000 l.—And the
    Sheriffs of ENGLAND and WALES, 4000 l.—In all                    23,000

  Clerk of the Hanaper in Chancery—Coinage[126] expence—Tenths
    and first-fruits of the Clergy appropriated to the
    augmentation of small livings—Extra revenues of the
    crown, consisting of _American_ quit-rents; duty of 4½
    _per cent._ in the Leeward Islands; revenues of Gibraltar
    and dutchy of _Cornwall_, &c.—Fees for warrants and orders,
    for auditing and engrossing accounts of dividend warrants,
    and other charges at the EXCHEQUER and TREASURY[127]            100,000
                                                                  ---------
  Total of the Appropriated Revenue                            £. 5.441,153


_State of the SURPLUS of the REVENUE for 11 years ended at 1775._

                         UNAPPROPRIATED REVENUE.

  NEAT PRODUCE of the Sinking Fund, for five years, including
    casual surplusses, reckoning to _Christmas_ in every year;
    being the annual medium, after deducting from it about
    45,000l. always carried to it from the supplies, in order
    to replace so much taken from it every year to make good
    a deficiency in a Fund established in 1758.                £. 2.610,759

  Neat annual produce of Land Tax at 3s. militia deducted;
    and of the Malt Tax[128]                                      1.800,000

  (N. B. These two taxes in 1773, brought in only 1.665,475l.)

  There are some casual Receipts, not included in the Sinking
    Fund, such as Savings in Pay-Office, duties on Gum Senega,
    American Revenue, &c. But they are so uncertain and
    inconsiderable, that it is scarcely proper to give them as
    a part of the permanent Revenue. Add however on this account     50,000
                                                                  ---------
  Total of unappropriated Revenue                              £. 4.460,759


_Produce of the SINKING FUND, reckoned to Christmas in every Year._

  1770           £. 2.486,836
  1771              2.553,505
  1772              2.683,831
  1773              2.823,150
  1774              2.731,476

The average of these five years is 2.655,759l. or, deducting 45,000l. (as
directed in the last page), 2.610,759l.

In 1775, the Sinking Fund was taken for 2.900,000l. including an
extraordinary charge of 100,000l. on the _Aggregate_ Fund; but it
produced 2.917,869l. The average of six years, including 1775, was
2.654,443l. The average of five years before 1770, was 2.234,780l.


ANNUAL EXPENDITURE.

                                                              £.

  Peace Establishment, for the Navy and Army, including
   all miscellaneous and incidental expences               3.700,000

  Annual increase of the Navy and Civil List debts           350,000

  Interest at 2 _per cent._ of 3.600,000l. unfunded debt,
    which must be paid out of the unappropriated Revenue      72,000

                                                           ---------
                                                    Total  4.122,000
                            ANNUAL SURPLUS of the Revenue    338,759
                                                           ---------
                                         Annual income £.  4.460,759

The estimate for the peace establishment, including miscellaneous
expences, amounted, in 1775, to 3.703,476l.—But the extraordinary
expences, occasioned by the war with America, made it fall very
short.—In 1774 it amounted to 3.784,452l. exclusive of 250,000l. raised
by Exchequer Bills, towards defraying the expence of calling in the
gold coin. And the medium for eleven years, from 1765, has been nearly
3.700,000l.—According to the accounts which I have collected, the expence
of the peace establishment (including miscellaneous expences) was in
1765, 1766, and 1767, 3.540,000l. _per ann._—In 1768, 1769, and 1770,
it was 3.354,000l. _per ann._—In 1771, 1772, 1773, 1774, and 1775, the
average has been nearly four millions _per ann._ exclusive of the expence
of calling in the coin.

       *       *       *       *       *

The parliament votes for the sea service 4l. _per_ month _per_ man,
including wages, wear and tear, victuals and ordnance. This allowance
is insufficient, and falls short every year more or less, in proportion
to the number of men voted. From hence, in a great measure, arises that
annual increase of the navy debt, mentioned in the second article of the
_National Expenditure_. This increase in 1772 and 1773 was 669,996l. or
335,000l. _per ann._ The number of men voted in those two years, was
20,000. I have supposed them reduced to 16,000, and the annual increase
of the Navy Debt to be only 250,000l.—Add 100,000l. for the annual
increase of the Civil List Debt, and the total will be 350,000l.

       *       *       *       *       *

Soon after the publication of the preceding account in _February_ last
year, the EARL OF STAIR obliged the public with another account of
the same kind, which brings out a conclusion much more unfavourable.
According to this account, were lotteries abolished, and the land-tax
at 3s. in the pound only, there would be a _deficiency_ in the revenue,
instead of such a _surplus_ as I have stated. The following remarks will
shew the reason of this difference.

The EARL OF STAIR has taken the annual produce of the _Sinking_ Fund
at 2.506,400l. being the average produce of EIGHT years ended at _Lady
day_ 1775.—I have taken it at 2.610,759l. being the average of FIVE
years ended at _Christmas_ 1775.—The neat produce of the land and malt
taxes has been also taken near 50,000l. higher in my account; and I have
besides admitted 50,000l. _per ann._ for casual supplies, which his
Lordship has not charged.

The annual increase of the Navy Debt, LORD STAIR states at 300,000l. and
of the Civil List at 200,000l. I have stated the former at 250,000l. and
the latter at 100,000l.—In order also to avoid, as much as possible, all
exaggeration, I have thrown out the expence of the new coinage. Lord
Stair has admitted it, and given an yearly expence derived from hence of
100,000l.—He has also taken the Peace Establishment for 1774, as a fair
medium for common years of peace, because it was lower in that year than
in the three years preceding 1775. I have taken the average of _eleven_
years of peace, which is 75,000l. less.

In consequence of these differences, the national PEACE expenditure in
_Lord Stair_’s account comes out 325,000l. _per ann. higher_ than in
mine; and the national income comes out 204,359l. _lower_; from whence it
follows, that without lotteries, and the land being at 3s. in the pound,
the kingdom must, according to his Lordship’s calculation, run out at the
rate of about 200,000l. every year.

In some of the particulars I have mentioned, this account is probably
nearest to the truth; but, I hope, it will be considered, that I have
studied to give moderate accounts, and aimed at erring always rather on
the favourable than the unfavourable side.


_Second Method of deducing the SURPLUS of the REVENUE._

From the year 1763 to the year 1775, or during a period of 12 years,
10.639,793l. of the public[129] debt was paid off.—The money employed
for this purpose must have been derived from the surplus of the
_ordinary_ revenue, added to the _extraordinary_ receipts. These receipts
have consisted of the following articles.—1st. The land-tax at 4s. in the
pound in 1764, 1765, 1766, and 1771; or 1s. in the pound extraordinary
for four years, making 1.750,000l.—2. The profits of ten lotteries[130]
making (at 150,000l. each lottery) 1.500,000l.—3. A contribution of
400,000l. _per ann._ for five years from the EAST INDIA Company, making
2.000,000l.—4. Savings by debts discharged at a discount,[131] making
at least 400,000l.—5. Paid by the Bank in 1764 for the renewal of their
charter, 110,000l.—6. Savings on high grants during the war; produce of
_French_ prizes taken before the declaration of war; sale of lands in the
ceded islands; and composition for maintaining _French_ prisoners,[132]
making 2.520,000l.—All these sums amount to 8.280,000l. There remains to
make up 10.639,793l. (the whole debt discharged) 2.359,793l. and this,
therefore, is the amount of the whole surplus of the _ordinary_ revenue
for twelve years; or 196,000l. _per ann._[133]

The Earl of STAIR has also, in this method, calculated the _surplus_ of
the Revenue; and makes the total, for eleven years, to be no more than
2.557,378l. even with the assistance of lotteries, and the land-tax at
4s. in the pound for five years; from whence it follows, that _without_
these assistances, there would have been a deficiency of near 60,000l.
_per ann._—The reason is, that his Lordship has taken the whole debt paid
since 1763, at no more than 7.053,855l. or three millions and a half
less than I have made it; and he has taken it so much less, chiefly in
consequence of including in the amount of the public debt in 1775, the
excess of the expences of that year above the common peace expences.
This excess is to be charged to the present war; and, in determining the
ordinary peace _surplus_, which is my object, it was proper to exclude
it, and to terminate the account at the commencement of the war.—I will
only add, that Lord STAIR has also included more in the extraordinary
receipts than I have; and, particularly, 700,000l. which he supposes the
public gained by the TEA INDEMNITY.—But this was only a compensation made
by the _East-India_ Company for the loss which the public sustained by
taking off, in 1766, a part (or 1s. _per_ pound) of the duty on tea. In
1772 it was restored; and the excise upon tea has since, if I am rightly
informed, produced as much as ever. _Before_ 1766, it produced annually
474,091l. Immediately[134] after 1766, it produced 341,284l.—But in 1775,
it produced near half a million.


_Sketch of an Account of the Money drawn from the Public by the Taxes,
before the Year 1776._

                                                                     £.

  CUSTOMS in ENGLAND, being the medium of the payments
    into the Exchequer, for 3 years ending in 1773[135]           2.528,275

  Amount of the EXCISES in ENGLAND, including the malt tax,
    being the medium of 3 years ending in 1773                    4.649,892

  Land Tax at 3s.                                                 1.300,000

  Land Tax at 1s. in the pound                                      450,000

  SALT DUTIES, being the medium of the years 1765 and 1766          218,739

  Duties on Stamps, Cards, Dice, Advertisements, Bonds, Leases,
    Indentures, News-papers, Almanacks, &c.                         280,788

  Duties on houses and windows, being the medium of 3 years
    ending in 1771                                                  385,369

  Post Office, Seizures, Wine Licences, Hackney Coaches, Tenths
    of the Clergy, &c.                                              250,000

  EXCISES in SCOTLAND, being the medium of 3 years ending in 1773    95,229

  CUSTOMS in SCOTLAND, being the medium of 3 years ending in 1773    68,369

  Annual profit from Lotteries                                      150,000

  Inland taxes in SCOTLAND, coinage duties, casual revenues, such
    as the duties on Gum-Senega, American revenue, &c.              150,000

  EXPENCE of collecting the EXCISES in ENGLAND, being the average
    of the years 1767 and 1768, when their produce was 4.531,075l.
    _per ann._—6 _per cent._ of the gross produce                   297,887

  EXPENCE of collecting the Excises in SCOTLAND, being the medium
    of the years 1772 and 1773, and the difference between the
    gross and nett produce—31 _per cent._ of the gross produce       43,254

  EXPENCE of collecting the CUSTOMS in ENGLAND, being the average
    of 1771 and 1772, bounties included, and 15 _per cent._ of
    the gross produce, exclusive of drawbacks and over-entries      468,703

  N. B. The bounties for 1771 were 202,840l.—for 1772, 172,468l.

  The charges of management for 1771, were 276,434l.

  For 1772, 285,764l. or 10 _per cent._ nearly.

  Interest of loans on the land tax at 4s. expences of collection,
    militia, &c.                                                    250,000

  PERQUISITES, &c. to Custom-house officers, &c. supposed           250,000

  EXPENCE of collecting the Salt-duties in ENGLAND, 10½ _per cent._  27,000

  Bounties on fish exported                                          18,000

  EXPENCE of collecting the duties on Stamps, Cards, Advertisements,
    &c. 5¼ _per cent._                                               18,000
                                                                 ----------
                                                     Total    £. 11.900,505
                                                                 ----------

It must be seen, that this account is imperfect and defective. It is,
however, sufficient to prove, that the whole money raised DIRECTLY by the
taxes, (exclusive of tithes, county rates, and the taxes which support
the poor,) cannot be much less than TWELVE MILLIONS. The _Earl of Stair_
has in his papers made it to be above 400,000l. more, by including in
his estimate several articles which I have omitted; particularly, the
interest and management on the equivalent to _Scotland_, the Scotch crown
Revenues, Dutchy of _Cornwall_ and _Lancaster_ Fines, &c. He has also
given an estimate of the fees and perquisites of office of every kind,
and reckoned them at half a million; whereas, I have only reckoned the
perquisites of office at the _Custom-house_.

I should be inexcusable were I to quit this subject, without taking
notice of the particular gratitude due from the public to _Lord Stair_,
for publishing his papers; and for stepping forth at this time to draw
attention, by the weight of his name and character, to calculations,
which, as he justly says, “it becomes every man of property among us to
understand; to awaken the nation from the lethargy into which the mockery
of paper wealth has plunged it; and to bear his testimony against the
present unnatural war.”




POSTSCRIPT.


The following POSTSCRIPT has been published only in a few of the last
Editions of the _Observations on Civil Liberty._ It has been often
referred to in the preceding work; and, therefore, it is necessary to
give it a place here.


_ACCOUNT of Public Debts discharged, Money borrowed, and Annual Interest
saved from 1763 to 1775._

  Debts paid off since 1763.                  Annuity decreased.
            £.                                     £.    _s._
  1765    870,888 funded, bearing interest at
                            4 _per cent._         34,835  10
        1.500,000 unfunded, 4 _per cent._         60,000  00
  1766  0.870,888 funded,   4 _per cent._         34,835  10
        1.200,000 unfunded, 4     —               48,000  00
  1767  2.616,777 funded,   4     —              104,671   0
  1768  2.625,000 funded,   4     —              105,000   0
  1771  1.500,000 funded,   3 _per cent._         45,000   0
  1772  1.500,000 funded,   3 _per cent._         45,000   0
  1773    800,000 unfunded, 3     —               24,000   0
  1774  1.000,000 funded,   3     —               30,000   0
  1775  1.000,000 funded,   3     —               30,000   0
        ----------                                ----------
  Total 15.483,553                        Total  561,342   0

In 1764, there was paid off 650,000_l._ navy-debt; but this I have not
charged, because scarcely equal to that annual increase of the navy-debt
for 1764, 1765, and 1766, which forms a part of the ordinary peace
establishment. The same is true of 300,000_l._ navy-debt, paid in 1767;
of 400,000_l._ paid in 1769; of 100,200_l._ paid in 1770; 200,000_l._ in
1771; 215,883_l._ in 1772; and 200,000_l._ in 1774.


_Account of money borrowed and debts contracted since 1763._


                                                        Annual interest
                                                 £        increased.
  Borrowed and funded,
    at 3 _per cent._       in   1765         1.500,000        45,000
                           in   1766         1.500,000        45,000
                           in   1767         1.500,000        45,000
                           in   1768         1.900,000        57,000
                  Unfunded in   1774           250,000         7,500
           Civil list debt in   1775           500,000[136]
                                             ---------       -------
                               Total         7.150,000       199,500

From 15.483,553_l._ the total of debts discharged, subtract 7.150,000_l._
the total of debts contracted; and the remainder, or 8.333,553_l._ will
be the diminution of the public debts since 1763. Also, from 561,342_l._
the total of the decrease of the annual interest, subtract 199,500_l._
(the total of its increase), and the remainder, or 361,842_l._ will
be the interest or annuity saved since 1763.—To this must be added
12,537_l._ _per ann._ saved by changing a capital of 1.253,700_l._ (part
of 20.240,000_l._) from an interest of 4 to 3 _per cent._ pursuant to
an act of the 10th of George III.; also the life-annuities that have
fallen in; and 7,500_l._ _per ann._ gained by the falling (in 1771) of
1.500,000_l._ from an interest of 3½ to 3 _per cent._; which will make a
saving in the whole of near 400,000_l._ _per annum_: And it is to this
saving, together with the increase of luxury, that the increase of the
_Sinking-Fund_ for the last ten years has been owing.

To the debts discharged the following additions must be made.

In 1764 there was paid towards discharging the extraordinary expences of
the army, 987,434_l._: In 1765, these expences amounted to 404,496_l._:
In 1766, to 479,088_l._—Total 1.871,018_l._—This sum is at least a
million higher than the extraordinary expences of the army for three
years in a time of peace. This excess, being derived from the preceding
war, must be reckoned a debt left by the war. And the same is true
of 1.106,000_l._ applied, in 1764, 1765, and 1766, towards satisfying
_German_ demands.—There are likewise some smaller sums of the same kind;
such as subsidies to _Hesse-Cassel_, _Brunswick_, &c. And they may be
taken at 200,000_l._—The total of all these sums is 2.306,240_l._; which,
added to 8.333,553_l._ makes the whole diminution of the public debt
since 1763, to be 10.639,793_l._

Soon after the peace in 1763, an unfunded debt, amounting to
6.983,553_l._ was funded on the _Sinking Fund_, and on new duties on wine
and cyder, at 4 _per cent._ There has been since borrowed and funded
on coals exported, window-lights, &c. 6.400,000_l._ The funded debt,
therefore, has increased since the war 13.383,553_l._ It has decreased
(as appears from page 171) 11.983,553_l._; and, consequently, there has
been on the whole an addition to it of 1.400,000_l._—During seven years,
from 1767 to 1774, 1.415,883_l._ navy-debt was paid off. See page 172.
But, as this is a debt arising from constant deficiencies in the peace
estimates for the navy, it is a part of the current peace expences.—In
1768 this debt was[137] 1.226,915_l._—In 1774 it was 1.850,000_l._; and
consequently, though 1.415,883_l._ was paid off, an addition was made to
it, in seven years, of 623,085_l._ It increased, therefore, at the rate
of 291,000_l._ _per ann._

The paper from which I have taken the following account, came into my
hands after almost the whole of this work had been printed off. It
contains a fact of so much importance, that I cannot satisfy myself
without laying it before the public.—In a Committee of CONGRESS in _June_
1775, a declaration was drawn up containing an offer to GREAT BRITAIN,
“that the Colonies would not only continue to grant extraordinary aids in
time of war, but also, if allowed a free commerce, pay into the SINKING
FUND such a sum annually for ONE HUNDRED YEARS, as should be _more_ than
sufficient in that time, if faithfully applied, to extinguish all the
present debts of BRITAIN. Or, provided this was not accepted, that, to
remove the groundless jealousy of _Britain_ that the Colonies aimed at
Independence and an abolition of the Navigation Act, which, in truth,
they had never intended; and also, to avoid all future disputes about the
right of making that and other Acts for regulating their commerce for the
general benefit, they would enter into a covenant with _Britain_, that
she should fully possess and exercise that right for _one hundred years_
to come.”

At the end of the _Observations on Civil Liberty_, I had the honor of
laying before the public the Earl of _Shelburne’s_ plan of Pacification
with the Colonies. In that plan, it is particularly proposed, that the
Colonies should grant an annual supply to be carried to the Sinking Fund,
and unalienably appropriated to the discharge of the public debt.—It must
give this excellent Peer great pleasure to learn, from this resolution,
that even this part of his plan, as well as all the other parts,
would, most probably, have been accepted by the Colonies. For though
the resolution only offers the alternative of either a _free_ trade,
with extraordinary aids and an annual supply, or an _exclusive_ trade
confirmed and extended; yet there can be little reason to doubt, but that
to avoid the calamities of the present contest, both would have been
consented to; particularly, if, on our part, such a revisal of the laws
of trade had been offered as was proposed in Lord Shelburne’s plan.

The preceding resolution was, I have said, drawn up in a Committee of
the Congress. But it was not entered in their minutes; a severe Act of
Parliament happening to arrive at that time, which determined them not to
give the sum proposed in it.

FINIS.




POSTSCRIPT.


The following POSTSCRIPT was published only in a few of the last Editions
of the _Observations on Civil Liberty_. It has been often referred to in
the preceding work; and therefore, it is necessary to give it a place
here.


_ACCOUNT of Public Debts discharged, Money borrowed, and Annual Interest
saved from 1763 to 1775._

  Debts paid off since 1763.                  Annuity decreased.
              £.                                    £.   _s._
  1765     876,888 funded, bearing interest at
                              4  _per cent._      34,835  10
          1.500,000 unfunded, 4  _per cent._      60,000  00
  1766    0.870,888 funded,   4  _per cent._      34,835  10
          1.200,000 unfunded, 4      —            48,000  00
  1767    2.616,777 funded,   4      —           104,671   0
  1768    2.625,000 funded,   4      —           105,000   0
  1771    1.500,000 funded,   3½ _per cent._      52,500   0
  1772    1.500,000 funded,   3  _per cent._      45,000   0
  1773      800,000 unfunded, 3      —            24,000   0
  1774    1.000,000 funded,   3      —            30,000   0
  1775    1.000,000 funded,   3      —            30,000   0
          ----------                             -----------
  Total  15.483,553                        Total 568,842   0

In 1764, there was paid off 650,000l. navy-debt; but this I have not
charged, because scarcely equal to that annual increase of the navy-debt
for 1764, 1765, and 1766, which forms a part of the ordinary peace
establishment. The same is true of 300,000l. navy-debt, paid in 1767; of
400,000l. paid in 1769; of 100,200l. paid in 1770; 200,000l. in 1771;
215,883l. in 1772; and 200,000l. in 1774.


_Account of money borrowed and debts contracted since 1763._

                                                   Annual interest
                                               £      increased.
  Borrowed and funded,
    at 3 _per cent._         in   1765     1.500,000    45,000
                             in   1766     1.500,000    45,000
                             in   1767     1.500,000    45,000
                             in   1768     1.900,000    57,000
                    Unfunded in   1774       250,000     7,500
             Civil list debt in   1775       500,000[138]
                                           ---------   -------
                                   Total   7.150,000   199,500

From 15.483,553l. the total of debts discharged, subtract 7.150,000l.
the total of debts contracted; and the remainder, or 8.333,553l. will
be the diminution of the public debts since 1763. Also, from 568,842l.
the total of the decrease of the annual interest, subtract 199,500l.
(the total of its increase), and the remainder, or 369,342l. will be the
interest or annuity saved since 1763.—To this must be added 12,537l _per
ann._ saved by changing a capital of 1.253,700l. (part of 20.240,000l.)
from an interest of 4 to 3 _per cent._ pursuant to an act of the 10th of
George III.; also the life-annuities that have fallen in; which will make
a saving in the whole of near 400,000l. _per annum_: And it is to this
saving, together with the increase of luxury, that the increase of the
_Sinking Fund_ for the last ten years has been owing.

To the debts discharged the following additions must be made.

In 1764 there was paid towards discharging the extraordinary expences
of the army, 987,434l. In 1765, these expences amounted to 404,496l.
In 1766, to 479,088l.—Total 1.871,018l.—This sum is 1.100,000l. higher
than the extraordinary expences of the army for three years in a time
of peace. This excess, being derived from the preceding war, must be
reckoned a debt left by the war. And the same is true of 1.106,000l.
applied, in 1764, 1765, and 1766, towards satisfying _German_
demands.—There are likewise some smaller sums of the same kind; such as
subsidies to _Hesse-Cassel_, _Brunswick_, &c. And they may be taken at
200,000l.—The total of all these sums is 2.406,240l. which, added to
8.333,553l. makes the whole diminution of the public debts, or the whole
saving of the kingdom, since 1763, to be 10.739,793l.

Soon after the peace in 1763, an unfunded debt, amounting to 6.983,553l.
was funded on the _Sinking Fund_, and on new duties on wine and cyder, at
4 _per cent._ There has been since borrowed and funded on coals exported,
window-lights, &c. 6.400,000l. The funded debt, therefore, has increased
since the war 13.383,553l. It has decreased (as may appear from page 177)
11.983,553l. and, consequently, there has been on the whole an addition
to it of 1.400,000l.—During seven years, from 1768 to 1774, 1.115,883l.
navy-debt was paid off. See page 178. But, as this is a debt arising from
constant deficiencies in the peace estimates for the navy, it is a part
of the current peace expences.—On the 31st of December, 1767, this debt
was 1.213,072l.—On the 31st of December, 1774, it was 1.850,000l. and
consequently, though 1.115,883l. was paid off, an addition was made to
it, in seven years, of 673,028l. It increased, therefore, at the rate of
255,558l. _per ann._


SUPPLEMENT TO SECTION III PART II.

_Containing additional Observations on Schemes for raising Money by
Public Loans._

It is impossible, that any attentive person can reflect without concern,
on that monstrous accumulation of artificial debt for which no value
has been received, which has been pointed out in different parts of the
preceding Tract; and, particularly in the third Section of the second
Part. This being a subject which, in the present state of our finances,
is highly interesting; I have been induced to return to it in this place;
and to offer some further observations and proposals which have occurred
to me in reconsidering it, and which I think necessary to explain and
confirm those which have been already offered.

       *       *       *       *       *

There are two methods in which money is capable of being borrowed for
public services. The first is, by offering such _high_ interest as may
of itself be sufficient to induce lenders to advance the sums that
are wanted: And the second is, by offering a _low_ interest, with a
_gratuity_ or _douceur_ to produce the acceptance of it.—The last has
been the method in which our government has most commonly borrowed money;
and the gratuity offered has been either a right to a greater capital
than the sum advanced, or a _long_ or _short_ or _life_ annuity, or the
profits of a lottery, or some advantages of trade.—The first without
doubt, is the most rational method of borrowing; and the latter is
so absurd and extravagant as to be incapable of being adopted in the
common transactions of life.—In order to give a just and full idea of
this, I shall instance in the last loan; specifying the manner in which
it _would_ have been made if the usual method of borrowing had been
followed; and comparing this with the manner in which it _was_ made; and
the manner in which, I think, it _might_ have been made to the greatest
advantage.

FIVE MILLIONS, it is well known, were borrowed last year; and, had the
old plan of borrowing been adopted, this sum would have been borrowed by
some such scheme as one of the _two_ following.

First. Interest in the public funds being then near 4 _per cent. per
ann._ an interest of only 3 _per cent._ would have been offered; or, in
other words, for every 100l. in _money_, 100l. _stock_ carrying 3 _per
cent._ (worth then 78l.) would have been given; but at the same time,
as a _premium_ or _compensation_ for accepting such low interest, a
life-annuity, or a short annuity would have been offered worth somewhat
more than the difference between 100l. and 78l. or about 24l. The whole
premium, therefore, in raising _five millions_, would have been equal
in value to about 1.200,000l. and, supposing it to have been either a
life-annuity, or a short annuity for 17 years of 2l. worth 12 years
purchase, annexed to every 100l. stock, the whole annual charge incurred
by the loan would have been 250,000l. for a term of years, and 150,000l.
for ever till the capital is redeemed.

It is manifest that the capital including in it according to this account
almost the whole _premium_, the public makes itself, by this mode of
borrowing, a _debtor_ for the very thing it _gives_; and, besides paying
the annuity, obliges itself to advance at redemption the whole value
of it.—It is proper to add, that this is done _unnecessarily_, because
1.200,000 might have been procured by selling the annuity, and the
remaining 3.800,000l. necessary to make up five millions, might have been
procured, as will be shewn presently, without any _douceur_ by giving
higher interest.

But there is another method of borrowing which has been practised by
government on former occasions, and which might have been adopted in the
last loan.

For every 100l. advanced a new capital in the 3 _per cent._ funds worth
that sum would have been sold, including a funded 10l. lottery ticket.
This new capital would have been nearly 127l. three _per cent. stock_
for every 100l. in _money_, or 6.343,954l. stock for FIVE MILLIONS in
money; of which stock 5.718,954l. would have been sold, to encourage
subscriptions, at 2 _per cent._ below the market price, that is, at 76l.
½; and the remaining stock, having a lottery annexed, would have been
sold at _par_. A fictitious or artificial capital, therefore, would
have been created, or a debt incurred more than the value received, of
1.343,954l. besides relinquishing about 150,000l. which might have been
obtained by the profits of the lottery.

I have been seldom more surprized than at the preference of this scheme,
which, at the time of settling the last loan, was expressed by some very
respectable members of the House of Commons; nor can this preference be
easily accounted for on any other supposition than that they consider
the public debts as incumbrances, never to be removed, and, therefore,
think it of no consequence with what difficulties the redemption of
them is loaded by an increase of capitals bearing low interest. It must
be acknowledged indeed that this method of borrowing would have been
attended with a small present advantage; for the interest of 6.343,954l.
at 3 _per cent._ is 190,318l. and this, together with the interest of
150,000l. or 6000l. _per ann._ lost by giving up the profits of a
lottery, would have been the whole present annual charge it would have
brought on the public. But if this be a sufficient reason for preferring
such a scheme, it would perhaps be best to create capitals bearing 2
_per cent._ or even 1 _per cent._ interest; for probably such capitals
would bear a better price, in proportion to the rates of interest, than
any 3 _per cent._ capitals, and consequently, a greater present saving
might be made by selling them. No other objection can be made to this
than that by lowering interest, and laying the public under an obligation
to return _double_ or _triple_ every sum it receives; the redemption of
the public debts might be rendered so expensive and difficult as to be
entirely impracticable. But this would be of no consequence if indeed
their redemption is already become impracticable; and if, therefore,
every new charge they bring on the public is to be considered as laid on
for eternity.

       *       *       *       *       *

With these schemes let us now compare the scheme actually adopted for the
last loan.

Instead of a 3 _per cent._ capital, a new capital bearing 4 _per cent._
interest, irredeemable for ten years, was offered at 95l. for every 100l.
_stock_, with two _douceurs_ to raise the value of the stock above 100l.
in money; namely, a short annuity of a HALF _per cent._ for ten years,
(reckoned worth 4l. 2s.) and the profit (reckoned at 3l.) of one ticket
in a money lottery consisting of 50,000 tickets.

The chief difference between this scheme and the first I have described
is, that the new stock created is a FOUR _per cent._ instead of a THREE
_per cent._ stock. But this is a difference of particular importance,
and brings it near to such plans of borrowing as appear to me the
best.—In the _first_ scheme, the artificial capital is 1.200,000l. In the
_second_, 1.343,954l. In this _third_ scheme it is only 250,000l. This
scheme, therefore, has evidently great merit; and perhaps, in the present
state of the public debts, it does not admit of any great improvement.
There is, however, an easy alteration which, I think, would have been an
improvement, and which I shall take the liberty to mention.

According to a preceding observation, the two _douceurs_ being included
in the capital, are granted, and must be paid twice over. This is so
absurd and extravagant that it ought to be avoided as far as possible;
and it might have been avoided, in a great measure, by offering for
every 100l. advanced 95l. stock, carrying 4 _and a quarter_ interest
irredeemable for ten years, with the same short annuity and a lottery
ticket annexed.[139] In this case, the new capital would have been
4.750,000_l_. carrying (at 4¼ _per cent._) 201,875_l_. _per ann._
interest. There would, therefore, have been a saving of 250,000l. in the
capital; and the annual charge would have been nearly the same.

It must be observed that this scheme supposes that a stock bearing
4¼ _per cent._ interest would have been valued nearly at _par_; and,
according to the principles on which the scheme was calculated, it could
not have been valued at much less; or, supposing it valued at 1 or 2
_per cent._ less, the difference might have been made up by only adding
two or three years to the duration of the short annuity and the term
of irredeemableness.—Had a _stock_ been offered bearing 4¼ _per cent._
interest irredeemable for ten years, one _half_ at least of the short
annuity might have been saved. The annual charge for ten years would have
been somewhat less;[140] and the excess afterwards would have been much
more than compensated by the advantages at redemption attending a higher
interest and a smaller capital.

But, perhaps, such a scheme as the following would have been preferable
to any of those now proposed.

For every 100l. in _money_ 75l. stock irredeemable for 10 years and
carrying 4¼ _per cent._ interest, might have been offered, together with
an annuity for 27 years of 1½ _per cent._ (valued cheap at 16 years
purchase, or 24l.) and the advantage of a lottery ticket. This scheme
would have been as likely to be attended with a profit as that which
was adopted. The new capital would have been only 3.750,000l. bearing
159,375l. interest. The short annuity would have been 75,000l. and the
whole annual charge (supposing no redemptions of the capital to take
place after ten years) 234,375l. for 27 years, and afterwards 159,375l.
It appears, therefore, that 1.250,000l. or a _quarter_ of the capital
that was actually created, would have been saved; and also a rent charge
on the public after 27 years of 40,750l. _per ann._ for ever.—The
additional expence to balance these advantages would have been 9.650l.
_per ann._ for ten years, and 34,375l. _per ann._ for 17 years. In other
words; the public would have absolutely secured the redemption of a
_quarter_ of the loan, (or of 1.250,000l.) besides an easier redemption
of the remainder, at the expence of 680,875l. in the whole,[141] to be
paid annually in small sums during the course of 27 years.

       *       *       *       *       *

All that has been now said has gone on the supposition that, agreeably
to the calculations on which the last loan was formed, 100l. _stock_
irredeemable for ten years and bearing 4 _per cent._ interest, would sell
at 17l. more than 100l. stock bearing 3 _per cent._ interest; (or at 95l.
when the latter stock is at 78l.) and also, that a short annuity for ten
years would sell at 8⅟₁₀ years purchase.—But events have shewn that these
valuations were too high. The new subscription (including 100l. four
_per cent._ stock, a half _per cent._ short annuity, and the profit of a
lottery ticket) should have sold, according to these valuations, at about
102½. But it never bore so high a price; and in a little time it fell to
_par_, and at last to 3 _per cent._ discount.—Various reasons have been
assigned for this; but the true reasons were the following.

First. A general fall of near 2 _per cent._ which took place in the
stocks soon after the loan was settled.

Secondly. A lower valuation of the new 4 _per cent._ stock and the short
annuity which took place in the ALLEY.—This was the principal reason; and
it will be proper particularly to explain it. In doing this, it will be
necessary to look back a little to the history of the public funds.

       *       *       *       *       *

In 1717 the public debts were reduced from an interest of 6 _per cent._
to 5 _per cent._ and in 1727, from 5 _per cent._ to 4 _per cent._ In
1737 a bill was brought into the HOUSE OF COMMONS by Sir _John Barnard_,
for a farther reduction from 4 to 3 _per cent._ At this time the 3 _per
cents._ were above _par_; and even, during the three first years of the
war which began in 1740, they continued so high that government was
able to raise the necessary supplies by borrowing at 3 _per cent._—In
such circumstances, it was impossible the public creditors should avoid
expecting a _third_ reduction; and this expectation would necessarily
link the value of the FOUR PER CENTS. by leading the public to consider
them as no more than a THREE _per cent._ stock having a short annuity of
ONE _per cent._ annexed. Accordingly; _before_ the war the difference of
price between the THREE and the FOUR _per cent._ stocks was about 10 or
11 _per cent._ After the commencement of the war, a reduction becoming
more doubtful and more distant, this difference became greater, and
generally kept between 14 and 17 _per cent._ At the approach of the
PEACE in 1748, it sunk to 11 _per cent._ and soon _after_ the PEACE,
the 3 _per cents._ having risen considerably above _par_,[142] and an
universal expectation of a speedy reduction taking place, it sunk to 6
_per cent._—It is evident, therefore, that the price of the FOUR _per
cents._ has been governed by the expectation of their reduction,[143] and
that, had there been no such expectation, their price, compared with the
3 _per cents._ would have been much higher. It will appear presently to
be most probable, that had it not been for this expectation, the prices
of these stocks would not have differed much from the proportion of the
rates of interest.

In taking this account, I have only compared the THREE _per cents._
with the SOUTH-SEA FOUR _per cent._ capitals before their reduction in
1749, at which time they amounted to above 27 millions, and were (as
the consolidated three _per cent._ annuities are now) the grand staple
stock of the kingdom. In 1746 and 1747, two new FOUR _per cent._ capitals
were created redeemable at any time, and transferable at the BANK. The
price of these new capitals kept for some time after their creation,
considerably below the price of the old SOUTH-SEA four _per cents._ the
reasons of which were, I suppose, the general reasons which make new
funds bear a lower price than old ones; and, particularly, their having
less traffic in them, and being small and detached parcels likely to be
first selected for the operations of finance.

       *       *       *       *       *

Were the cause now assigned, or the expectation of a reduction of
interest, the only cause that governed the comparative prices of 3 _per
cent._ and 4 _per cent._ capitals, the excess of one above the other
would never be more than the supposed value of a short annuity of 1l.
till _reduction_.—But there is another cause which may operate in this
instance, and which ought not to be overlooked; I mean, the expectation
of a greater payment at _redemption_. The effect of the former is to
_diminish_, and of the latter to _increase_ the value of FOUR _per
cent._ capitals.—In order to understand this it must be remembered, that
when the 3 _per cents._ are at any considerable discount, it becomes
practicable to redeem them under _par_, while debts bearing 4 _per cent._
interest must be redeemed at _par_. This will make a difference in favour
of the latter, which will be greater or less in proportion to the greater
or less discount at which the _three per cents._ are sold, the greater or
less quantity of stock bearing 4 _per cent._ interest, and the greater
or less probability that the whole or a considerable part of it will be
soon redeemed[144]—Let us suppose, for instance, that all the public
debts bearing 4 _per cent._ interest, consist of a single capital of
FIVE MILLIONS redeemable at any time; and that all the rest of the public
debts are THREE _per cent._ capitals sold at a discount of 12 _per cent._
or at 88l. for every 100l. stock. In these circumstances, there would be
a certainty that the small stock bearing 4 _per cent._ interest would be
selected for redemption as soon as possible; and, as a stock carrying
such high interest could not be expected, when the 3 _per cents._ are
at 88, to be redeemed under _par_, its real value would on this account
exceed that of the THREE _per cents._ more or less in proportion as its
redemption was more or less distant. And its _whole_ excess of value in
these circumstances is to be computed in the following manner.—It would
consist of a 3 _per cent._ capital, for every 100l. of which 100l. in
money is to be received; and of an additional annuity of 1 _per cent._
till redemption. Its excess of value, therefore, if the whole capital was
to be redeemed immediately, would be the same with the discount of the
3 _per cents._ or 12 _per cent._ If the capital was not to be redeemed
till the end of 7 years, its excess of value would consist of 12 _per
cent._ payable seven years hence, and the present worth of an annuity of
1 _per cent._ for the intermediate term of seven years. 12l. payable at
the end of 7 years is worth in present money (allowing compound interest
at 4 _per cent._) 9l. 2s. 6d. An annuity of 1l. for seven years is worth
(reckoning the same interest) 6l. The whole excess of value, therefore,
will be 15l. 2s. 6d. for every 100l. stock. If the redemption of the
capital is to be delayed 15 years, the excess of value computed in the
same manner will be 17l. 15s. 6d.—if 20 years, 19l. 1s.—if 30 years, 21l.

If the 3 _per cents._ had been supposed at a greater discount, it is
evident that these several values would have been likewise greater;
and had the quantity of 4 _per cent._ stock been supposed _double_ or
_triple_, the effect would have been the same with a delay of redemption;
and had it been supposed thirty or forty millions, the effect (in
consequence of our slow progress in redeeming our debts) would not have
fallen very short of an eternal delay of redemption.

Before 1749, the amount of the public debts carrying 4 _per cent._
interest was near 58 millions. The expectation, therefore, of the
advantage now explained could not _then_ have any effect; and the only
cause which could have influenced, in any considerable degree, the
comparative prices of these stocks must have been the first I have
assigned, or the expectation of their _reduction_; that is, in other
words, the expectation of a _sudden redemption_ of them, as soon as the
3 _per cents._ got above _par_, by borrowing money at that interest. Had
not this been foreseen, or had there been an act of parliament rendering
it impracticable, there is no reason to doubt but the price of the FOUR
_per cents._ compared with the THREE _per cents._ would have approached
nearly to the proportion of the rates of interest, agreeably to what is
said in (page 191).

The state of the public funds has been much changed since the two last
wars; but it is an alteration that has increased the comparative value of
4 _per cent._ capitals.

I have already observed, that during the last war there was reason to
expect, that, as soon as peace came, the THREE _per cents._ would rise
above _par_. No one can now entertain any such expectation. On the
contrary; it is most probable, that they will never again rise to that
which has been their average price during the last peace from 1763 to
1775, and which, I think, may be stated at 87 or 88.—My reason for this
assertion is,

First, that after the present war, should we be so happy as to escape
the ruin with which it threatens us, our taxes and expences will be so
much increased, and at the same time our resources so much diminished, as
necessarily to leave the credit and value of our public securities lower
than ever.

Secondly. Though our credit and resources should continue undiminished,
yet the great addition which the present war will make to the public
debt, is alone likely to sink their value, because every increase of a
saleable commodity has always a tendency to lower its price.—It follows
from hence, that the purchasers of FOUR _per cent._ capitals have now a
prospect of an advantage of 12 or 14 _per cent._ at redemption, which
they could not have had before the last peace.

In connexion with this it must be considered, that it is now highly
probable, that it will never be again practicable to reduce the
interest of any 4 _per cent._ capitals. In order to such a reduction,
government must be able to offer to the proprietors of these capitals
their _principal_, should they not chuse to take lower interest, and
consequently to borrow at an interest of 3½ or 3¾ _per cent._ But no
sums will be lent on such lower interest, unless it can be depended Upon
that capitals bearing that interest, when brought to market, will bear
a premium of 1 or 2 _per cent._; and this, when the _three per cents._
are not higher than 87 or 88, would require the excess of value of such
capitals to be estimated at 14 or 15 _per cent._ whereas it has been
lately found, that even FOUR _per cent._ capitals irredeemable for ten
years, will not bear such an excess of value.—A _reduction_, therefore,
of the interest of FOUR _per cent._ capitals, or a _redemption_ of them
by borrowed money, cannot now be reckoned upon; and the only cause that
can REASONABLY sink their value compared with the THREE _per cents._
below the ratio of the rates of interest, is the probability of a
redemption of them by the surplus of the national revenue. I need not say
how little is to be expected from hence. Supposing, however, that much
may be expected, I have shewn what effect it ought to have; and from the
observations I have made, and particularly the computation in (page 194),
&c. it appears, I think, that the price of the capital of five millions
four _per cent._ annuities lately created ought to have been near 18 _per
cent._ more than the price of the THREE _per cents._ This appears to be
true on the supposition that this capital will be redeemed in fifteen
years; (that is, in five years after the expiration of the term for
which it is made irredeemable) that the 3 _per cents._ will rise to as
high a price as they bore during the last peace; and that purchasers are
allowed to make FOUR _per cent._ compound interest of their money.—Were
we to suppose this capital discharged even in two years after it becomes
redeemable, the value, made out in the same way, would be nearly 17l.

He who will consider all this, and also recollect the general price of
the 4 _per cents._ before their reduction in 1749, (see page 190) must
be convinced that the TREASURY, at the time the last loan was settled,
had good reason for taking the price of the new _four per cent._ capitals
17 _per cent._ higher than the price of the three _per cents._—It has,
however, been found that this was too high a valuation. Instead of being
sold at 17l. more for every 100l. stock than the 3 _per cents._ they
have been sold at only 13l. or 14l. more; and this has been the chief
reason of the discount to which the last subscription fell.—It is hard
to say, by what principles the money’d men who traffic in the funds have
governed themselves in this instance; but certain it is, that they have
not been guided by any of the rules of just calculation: And the same
must be said of the value at which they have reckoned the short annuity
of a half _per cent._ for ten years annexed to the new 4 _per cents._
In forming the scheme for the last loan this annuity was, I have said,
estimated at 8⅟₁₀ years purchase, agreeably to its real value, supposing
the payments yearly, the first payment to be made at the distance of a
year, and money improved at 4 _per cent._ compound interest. But it has
in general been sold at about 7½ years purchase; which is _less_ than its
value, supposing money improved at 5½ _per cent._ compound interest.[145]

From this account it appears, that could the caprice of the public have
been foreseen, the price of the new four _per cents._ should not have
been reckoned at more than 91l.; (the 3 _per cents._ being at 78l.) and
that, consequently, to make up a value which would have produced 102l.
for every 100l. advanced, either the term of irredeemableness and of the
short annuity should have been lengthened; or, supposing this term the
same, the short annuity should have been more than doubled. An artificial
capital, indeed, of near half a million would in this case have been
created. But this disadvantage might have been avoided, without bringing
any additional expence on the public, by such alterations as I have
before proposed; and by increasing in the corrected schemes, (page 186),
&c. either the term of irredeemableness, or the short annuity, or the
rate of interest, or all of them together.

       *       *       *       *       *

The preceding account will, I fancy, help to shew what is practicable,
_taking things as they are_, in borrowing money for public uses. It
proves, that the nation loses greatly by the low price of all capitals
bearing a higher interest than 3 _per cent._ and that could their value
be raised, it would be greatly benefited.—For example. Could the new FOUR
_per cents._ have been taken at 99l. for every 100l. stock, instead of
95l. the whole expence of the short annuity in the scheme of the last
loan, and of a _quarter per cent._ perpetual interest, in the corrected
schemes, (page 186), &c. might have been saved. But had the value of
the 4 _per cents._ been raised in proportion to the rate of interest,
or _nearly_ in that proportion, a farther saving might have been made,
in all the schemes, of the profits of the lottery, and, consequently,
of 6000l. _per annum_ in the annual charge.—My next enquiry, therefore,
shall be, in what manner and by what regulations this may be done. I have
written in the section on loans, on the supposition that such regulations
are practicable; and I have proposed one of them; but I will here be more
explicit.

       *       *       *       *       *

It has been shewn, that before 1749 the cause which depressed the value
of the 4 _per cents._ was the expectation of their being reduced; and
that _now_ this cause is the expectation of their being soon _redeemed_.
Remove, therefore, these causes in any degree, and their value must
rise in the same degree.—With respect to the first, it is in my opinion
certain that it would be doing great service to the public to exclude
it entirely. Our reductions of interest have proceeded from a policy
too narrow; and the nation is likely to suffer by them much more
than it has gained.[146] The savings they produce, being expended on
current services, tempt to extravagance; give a fallacious appearance of
opulence; and, by making our debts sit lighter, render us less anxious
about redeeming them, and less apprehensive of danger from the increase
of them. At the same time they render their redemption a work of more
difficulty, and oblige government, when under a necessity of contracting
new debts, either to give extravagant interest, or to offer extravagant
premiums. That accumulation of artificial debts which I have pointed
out has been owing principally to this cause; and had it not been, in
particular, for the reduction in 1749, the public debts would now have
been near 14 millions less; and a debt of above a hundred millions,
instead of consisting of capitals bearing interest at 3 _per cent._ would
have consisted of capitals bearing some of them 3½, some 4, and some 4½
and 5 _per cent._ interest, which (supposing them all at a medium to bear
4 _per cent._) a million _per ann._ would have redeemed in six years
less time, and at twenty-one millions less expence.—In short; reducing
of interest is one of those unhappy TEMPORARY EXPEDIENTS to which
statesmen are apt to betake themselves; and by which _present_ relief
is gained at the expence of _future_ safety, and distress postponed by
rendering it in the end more unavoidable and dreadful.—There cannot,
therefore, be any sufficient reason against making the interest of the
new capitals which may be created by any future loans, IRREDUCIBLE.[147]
Should this raise the price of capitals bearing high interest in
proportion to the increase of interest, government would be enabled to
borrow to equal advantage whatever interest it offered; the new loans
would not bring any greater annual charge on the nation than would have
been necessary had the same sums been obtained by selling 3 _per cent._
capitals; and, at the same time, all the immense expence of _douceurs_
and _fictitious capitals_ would be saved, and all the advantages in
redeeming the public debts obtained, arising from smaller capitals
bearing higher interest.

Such a regulation as that now proposed would be alone sufficient for
these purposes, when the amount of the debts bearing high interest
and declared irreducible, is considerable, as appears from what is
said in (page 195). But when a debt happens to bear a higher interest
than any other, and is at the same time small, the probability of a
_quick redemption_ will operate in the same manner on its price with
the expectation of a _reduction_; and in this case, therefore, it will
become necessary, in order to avoid the inconveniences I have described,
to POSTPONE REDEMPTION; and one of the best methods of doing this will
be, by ordering, that such a debt shall be redeemed _after_ some other
given part of the funded public debts.—So slow has been our progress
in redeeming debts, that this (supposing the part to be first redeemed
considerable) would be reckoned, in the present circumstances of the
funds, the same with making the debt to be last redeemed, irredeemable
for ever. And should such an apprehension prove right, the public would
lose nothing, because the debt whose redemption was postponed, would
bring no greater annual charge on the public, than if the same sum had
been obtained by selling a capital bearing any lower interest. But
should it prove false, or should our debts be ever put into a fixed
course of redemption, the public would gain greatly by being able, after
discharging one part of its debts, to discharge the remainder more
expeditiously and easily.

I shall beg leave to illustrate what has been now said by having recourse
again to the last loan of FIVE MILLIONS.—During the last 60 years, or
from the first establishment of the sinking fund to the year 1777, no
more than about FIFTEEN MILLIONS of the public funded debts have been
paid. An order, therefore, that the capital of five millions bearing 4
_per cent._ created by the last loan, should not be discharged unless
a capital of twenty-five or thirty millions in the three _per cents._
shall have been _first_ discharged, would have carried its redemption
to so distant a period, as might probably have raised it to the same
comparative value with any 3 _per cent._ capitals.

Let it, however, be supposed to advance its price only to 102l. when
the 3 _per cents._ are at 78; that is, when the ratio of the rates
of interest required the price to be at 104. In these circumstances,
4.850,000l. of the five millions would have been advanced for an equal
capital carrying 194,000l. interest at 4 _per cent._; and the remaining
150,000l. would have been advanced for the lottery: And thus the whole
expence of the short annuity, and 150,000l. capital, would have been
saved.—And had the same sum been obtained by selling a 3 _per cent._
capital, the amount of interest, though the least possible, would not
have been much less;[148] but, at redemption, there would have been a
necessity of paying above a MILLION AND A QUARTER for which no value had
been received.—When such advantages, uncompensated by any loss, can be
obtained by so easy and simple a regulation as only changing the ORDER of
paying the public debts,[149] what possible reason can there be against
adopting it?

There is another method by which the value of any stocks bearing high
interest might be raised, which would probably be no less effectual; I
mean, by ordering that no part of such stocks shall be redeemed, without
at the same time redeeming an _equal_, or any _larger_ sum, in other
capitals. This is the regulation proposed in the section on public loans,
(page 98); and it will not be amiss here to give an illustration of
it, by supposing, that EIGHT MILLIONS will be wanted for the necessary
supplies of this year; and that this sum will be procured by selling, as
was done in the last loan, a capital equal to the sum advanced, bearing 4
_per cent._ interest. Were the interest in this case made irreducible,
and the capital incapable of being redeemed without at the same time
redeeming four times as much of the 3 _per ct._ or some other stocks,
an increase of value would be communicated to it which would render all
DOUCEURS unnecessary. For it would be a capital, the redemption of which
could not be completed without discharging in all FORTY[150] MILLIONS
of the public debts.—I cannot doubt but that, in these circumstances
(supposing the price of the 3 _per cents._ to continue near 78) a
100l. in money would be given for 100l. in such a stock, and the whole
extravagant expence of short annuities, lotteries, and artificial
capitals would be saved.

In short. With the aid of such regulations as those now proposed, EIGHT
MILLIONS might this year be borrowed (supposing the 3 _per cents._
not lower than 78 or 77) _probably_ at an interest of 4 _per cent._,
but _certainly_ at an interest an EIGHTH or a QUARTER higher, without
offering any _premiums_. Whereas, if no such regulations are established,
either an artificial debt of near[151] _two millions and a half_ must
be created; or 5 _per cent._ for 15 or 20 years certain, together with
the profits of a lottery, must be given; and a new tax laid which will
produce 400,000l. _per ann._

It may deserve to be added, that an unprosperous state of public affairs,
and apprehensions of public danger, would have a tendency, by placing the
redemption of our debts at a greater distance, to promote, rather than
obstruct the success of schemes attended with such regulations.

       *       *       *       *       *

There remains one proposal more on this subject which I wish may be
attended to.

I have observed, that our reductions of interest have been the effect
of too narrow a policy. It seems to me, that one of the best measures
that could now be adopted, would be to undo what we have done in this
instance, by restoring the 3 _per cent._ capitals to a higher interest,
and making this restoration, one of the means of raising the necessary
supplies. That this is practicable, and that it would be advantageous,
will appear from the following scheme, and observations.

For 20l. in money, let 110l. stock bearing 3½ _per cent._ interest,
be offered, in exchange for every 100l. of the 3 _per cent._ stocks;
and let the new 3½ _per cent._ flock be capable of being redeemed at
any time, but never under _par_, unless when the price of the 3 _per
cents._ happens to be below 85l.—By this scheme the public would procure
20l. from the conversion of every 100l. 3 _per cent._ stock into 110l.
stock carrying 3½ _per cent._; or FIVE MILLIONS from the conversion of
TWENTY-FIVE MILLIONS. The new _additional_ capital would be only TWO
MILLIONS AND A HALF, (or 10 _per cent._ of the old capital); and the
_additional_ interest would be 17s. (that is, a half _per cent._ added to
7s. the interest of 10l. at 3½ _per cent._) for every 20l. advanced; or
4¼ _per cent._ for the whole loan.

That such a scheme would afford ample encouragement to subscriptions,
supposing the 3 _per cents._ at or near 78, will appear from
considering, that the interest offered is above a _quarter per cent._
more than could be made by purchasing any perpetual annuities, and at the
same time, in consequence of forming a part of the interest of a THREE
AND A HALF _per cent._ capital, is incapable of reduction, and therefore
nearly on an equal footing with the interest of any 3 _per cent._
capital.—But to be a little more explicit.

The new capital of 110l. bearing 3½ _per cent._ interest would be
better than the 100l. THREE _per cent._ capitals for which it would be
substituted, in the following respects.—1st. It would carry 17s. _per
ann._ more interest; and such an interest, when the price of an annuity
of 3l. is 78l., ought to be worth 22l. 2s. The additional interest,
therefore, would be disposed of at 2l. 2s. for every sum of 22l. 2s. (or
at 9½ _per cent._) less than its true value, compared with the price of
the 3 _per cent._ annuities.

Secondly. The 3 _per cents._ when _peace_ comes, will probably be capable
of being redeemed at 88l.[152] But this stock, in the same circumstances,
must be redeemed at _par_. It will, therefore, produce 12l. more in
every 100l. at redemption. Add the 10l. additional stock; and the whole
additional sum to be received at redemption will be 22l.—There will,
therefore, be a profit at redemption of 10l. _per cent._ of the money
advanced; and this profit deserves the more notice, because the stock to
which it is annexed, being redeemable at any time, and bearing a higher
interest than the 3 _per cents._ will be selected for redemption before
them; and therefore its price will be so much the more likely always to
keep near _par_.—Setting aside, however, this advantage, and supposing
only the 20l. advanced likely to be received at redemption, it may be
found by calculating in the manner explained in (p. 194), &c. that the
substitution of 110l. flock carrying THREE AND A HALF _per cent._ for
100l. carrying THREE _per cent._, or, in other words, that 20l. to
be received some time hereafter, besides an annuity of 17s. for the
intermediate time, is worth in present money more than 20l., reckoning
compound interest at 4 _per cent._

Such a scheme, therefore, in whatever way its value was rightly
calculated, would appear to offer an advantageous bargain. Should there,
however, be reason to fear that the public might judge otherwise; or
should the 3 _per cents._ be at 74 or 75, the value might be easily
increased near nine _per cent._ by making the substituted stock 112l.
instead of 110l. in which case, the interest for the 20l. advanced would
become 18s. 5d. _per ann._, or a little more than four and a half _per
cent._ instead of _four and a quarter_.

The advantages to the public which would arise from such a scheme
are—1st. That it would be one of the best preparations for measures that
must some time or other be entered into for putting the public debts into
a _fixed_ course of redemption.[153]—In consequence of being raised to
a higher interest, a considerable part of them would be made capable of
being redeemed with more ease and expedition; and for this reason, it is
certain that, if there remains a possibility of our escaping a public
bankruptcy, the time must come when we shall wish all our debts bore a
high interest.[154]

Secondly. A capital of TWO MILLIONS AND A HALF would be saved in raising
FIVE MILLIONS. That is; the nation in procuring _five millions_ would
incur a debt of only _half_ that sum; and instead of having a QUARTER or
a THIRD _more_ to pay at redemption than had been received, it would have
ONE HALF _less_ to pay.

Thirdly. Such a scheme would keep up public credit; and, by its
necessary operation, contribute to carry _itself_ into execution. For
the advantages attending it being grounded entirely upon the old 3
_per cent._ stocks, few at such a time would chuse to sell them, but
many would be induced to buy, and, consequently, their price would be
advanced, contrary to the common effect of public loans.—These seem to me
advantages so unspeakably important, that I cannot but think it would
be right to go to some extraordinary expence, in making at least one
experiment of this kind. If, in consequence of offering high terms in
_one_ trial for a small sum, such an experiment should succeed, it might
be renewed on lower terms; and the way might be discovered of managing,
in the best manner, larger loans on the same plan.—I cannot help thinking
indeed, that it would be found that in this way great sums might be
raised without creating _any_ new capitals, or making any addition to the
public debts. I fancy, for instance, that few, when the 3 _per cents._
are about 78, would scruple to pay 25l. for the conversion of 100l. THREE
_per cent._ stock into a 100l. FOUR _per cent._ stock, provided this last
stock was not to become redeemable till THIRTY or FORTY MILLIONS of our
present debts have been discharged: And supposing this true, money for
public services would be raised at 4 _per cent._ or at an interest nearly
as low as possible; and, at the same time, a sum equal to the whole
money advanced would be saved. But were it necessary to take for such a
substitution 24l. or even 23l. (that is, to pay about 4¼ _per cent._ for
money) the gain, if our debts are ever to be redeemed, would abundantly
overbalance the increased expence of interest.


FOOTNOTES

[48] See Observations on Civil Liberty, page 74.

[49] Of all the writers against this war, the learned Dr. TUCKER is the
severest. For if, as he maintains, contrary to repeated declarations from
the throne, a separation from the Colonies would be an advantage to us,
the attempt to keep them, by invasion and bloodshed, deserves a harsher
censure than words can convey.

[50] See Observations on Civil Liberty, Part I. sect. 1.

[51] See Observations, Part I. sect. 2.

[52] The greatest part of Mr. _Goodricke_’s remarks are founded on
this misunderstanding. He is so candid that I know he did not mean to
misrepresent me; and yet I cannot help thinking it hard, after repeated
declarations of my preference of such a constitution as our own, to be
considered as an advocate for a pure Democracy. See _Observations on Dr.
Price’s Theory and Principles of Civil Liberty and Government_, by Mr.
GOODRICKE.

[53] One of the best plans of this kind has been with much ability,
described by Mr. DE LOLME, in his account of the Constitution of England.

[54] “As in a free state, every man who is supposed a free agent, ought
to be his own governor; so the legislative power should reside in the
whole body of the people.” _Spirit of Laws_, Book XI. chap. vi. See
likewise Justice Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England,
page 158. 1st Vol. oct. edition.—_Demosthenes_ speaking in his first
Philippic, sect. 3d. of certain free states, calls them _their own
legislators_, αυτονομουμηνα καὶ ελευθερα.

[55] See _Remarks_, printed for Mr. Cadell, _on a pamphlet published by
Dr. Price. In a letter from a gentleman in the country to a member of
parliament_, page 10.

[56] Rom. vii.

[57] Dr. PRIESTLY, in his Essay on the _first principles of Government_,
makes a distinction between _civil_ Liberty and _political_ Liberty;
the former of which he defines to be “the power which the members of a
state ought to enjoy over their actions;” and the latter, “their power
of arriving at public offices, or, at least, of having votes in the
nomination of those who fill them.”—This distinction forms a very proper
subdivision of _the liberty of the citizen_ here mentioned; and it may be
accommodated to all I have said on this subject, by only giving some less
general name to that which Dr. Priestly calls _civil_ Liberty.

[58] See on this Subject an excellent Sermon entitled, _The Principles of
the REVOLUTION vindicated_. By Dr. Watson, Regius Professor of Divinity,
at Cambridge.

[59] Some who maintain this doctrine concerning government, overthrow
their own system by acknowledging the right of resistance in certain
cases. For, if there is such a right, the people must be judges _when_
it ought to be exercised; a right to resist only when civil governors
_think_ there is reason, being a gross absurdity and nullity.—The right
of resistance, therefore, cannot mean less than a right in the people,
whenever they think it necessary, to change their governors, and to limit
their power. And from the moment this is done, government becomes the
work of the people, and governors become their trustees or agents.

[60] It has been commonly reckoned, that it is the end of civil
government and civil laws to protect the _property_ and _rights_ of men;
but, according to this writer, civil government and civil laws create
_property_ and _rights_. It follows therefore, that, antecedently to
civil laws, men could have no _property_ or _rights_; and that civil
governors, being the makers of civil laws, it is a contradiction to
suppose, that mankind can have any property or rights which are valid
against the claims of their governors. See Three Letters to Dr. _Price_,
p. 21, &c. And Remarks on the principal Acts of the 13th Parliament of
Great-Britain, p. 58, &c. and p. 191.

[61] This has been done in a lower instance. Parents have been furnished
with a particular affection for their children, in order to prevent any
abuse of their power over them.

[62] “In ages of darkness, and too often also in those of greater
knowledge, by the perfidious arts of designing princes, and by the
base servility of too many ecclesiastics, who managed the superstition
of the populace, by the violent restraints put upon divulging any
juster sentiments about the rights of mankind, the natural notions of
polity were erased out of the minds of men; and they were filled with
some confused imaginations of something adorable in monarchs, some
representation of the Divinity; and that even in the worst of them; and
of some certain Divine claims in certain families.—No wonder this! that
millions thus look upon themselves as a piece of property to one of their
fellows as silly and worthless as the meanest of them; when the like arts
of superstition have made millions, nay the very artificers themselves,
fall down before the block or stone they had set up; or adore monkies,
cats, and crocodiles, as the sovereign disposers of their fortunes.” See
Dr. HUTCHESON’S System of Moral Philosophy. Vol. ii. p. 280.

[63] “Let not, therefore, these _pretended masters_ of the people
be allowed even to do good against the general consent.—Let it be
considered, that the condition of rulers is exactly the same as that
of the Cacique, who being asked whether he had any slaves, answered;
_Slaves? I know but one slave in all my district, and that is myself._”
See the Philosophical and Political History of the Settlements and Trade
of the _Europeans_ in the EAST AND WEST INDIES. Translated from the
French of the Abbe _Raynal_, by Mr. _Justamond_. Vol. v. page 414.

[64] See Obs. p. 25. “The rights of mankind are so sacred that no
prescription of tyranny or arbitrary power can have authority enough to
abolish them.” Mr. _Hume_’s Essays, vol. iii. Essay on the Coalition of
Parties.

[65] “Mankind have been generally a great deal too tractable; and hence
so many wretched forms of power have always enslaved nine tenths of the
nations of the world, where they have the fullest right to make all
efforts for a change.” Dr. _Hutcheson_’s Moral Philosophy. Vol. ii. p.
280.

[66] See Remarks on the Acts of the Thirteenth Parliament of _Great
Britain_. P. 34, &c.—“Is not the same reasoning applicable to taxes paid
for the support of civil government? Are not these too the property of
the civil magistrate?” Ibid. p. 56.—If I understand this writer, his
meaning is, not only that the taxes which the civil magistrate _has_
imposed are his property; but also, _any_ which he shall please to impose.

[67] Matth. xxiii. 8-12.—John xiii. 14.

[68] Luke xxii. 25, &c.

[69] 1 Pet. v. 3.—2 Cor. i. 24.

[70] He who wants to be convinced of the _practicability_, even in this
country, of a complete representation, should read a pamphlet lately
published, the title of which is, TAKE YOUR CHOICE.

[71] “A _free_ subject of a free state” is a contradiction in terms. See
the Proclamation for a Fast.

[72] Mr. Hume’s Essays. Vol. i. Essay iv. p. 31.

[73] Spirit of Laws. Book xix. ch. 27.

[74] Introduction to the Commentaries on the Laws of England, p. 48. See
also Book i. ch. 8.

[75] In 1692 King William rejected a bill for triennial Parliaments,
after it had passed both Houses. But in a following year he thought
proper to give his assent to it.

[76] Spirit of Laws. Book xix. ch. 27.

[77] History of Civil Society. Part vi. sect. 5.

[78] _Political_ Discourses. Essay xii. p. 301.

[79] History of Civil Society. Part iv. sect. 5.

[80] See Mr. Hume’s Essays. Vol. i. p. 91.

[81] See the conclusion of the Third Part.

[82] This was confirmed by the account of the noble Lord at opening the
last Budget.

[83] I have mentioned this sum at random. It is not of great consequence
whether it is half a million too little or half a million too much.

[84] The quantity of coin within all equal degrees of deficiency would be
equal, were equal quantities issued every year, and were there also no
cause which diminished or destroyed it, except the _uniform_ operation
of time in wearing it. Any cause, therefore, which destroys it more, or
diminishes it faster at first than at last, must render the quantity less
in the first degrees of deficiency. And the same must be the consequence
of a greater proportion issued formerly, in any given time, than of
late.—The causes of diminution never probably operated so much on the
gold coin as they did for about twelve years before 1773; and this will
balance the greater proportion coined during that time. The very reason
of the increase of coinage in those years was, a necessity created by
the loss of the new coin, and never before felt in an equal degree. The
coinage, however, in those years, was not so much more than usual as some
may imagine. In ten years before 1770, eight millions and a half were
coined; and in twelve years after the _Accession_, the same quantity was
coined; and in twenty-seven years after the _Accession_, more was coined
than in twenty-seven years before 1770. See _Considerations on Money,
Bullion_, &c. p. 2.—The whole quantity of gold coined from the Accession
to 1770, was near 29 millions; more than one half of which must have been
melted and exported; and, the greatest part of the remainder must have
been precipitated in its progress towards deficiency by being clipped and
sweated.

[85] When the silver _specie_ was recoined in King William’s time, it
appeared, that a great treasure had been hoarded before the _Revolution_,
in consequence of the danger of public liberty at that time. See
Davenant’s Works, Vol. I. p. 439, &c.

In _Russia_ it is reckoned, that as much money lies buried under ground,
as exists above ground.

[86] In these sums is included all the coin which the late Proclamations
have brought in from HOLLAND and other foreign countries; and which, I
think, ought not to be deemed a part of the resting stock of the kingdom.

[87] Or deducting a million for the _Irish_ coin, seventeen or eighteen
millions.

[88] This is said on the supposition, that the last call would bring in
no more than was expected, or about three millions. Its having brought in
above double this sum makes little difference. For it proves, that the
whole quantity of gold coin must have been (according to Lord NORTH’s
method of computing) 21 or 22 millions; and the quantity deficient more
than a grain about 15 millions; and, consequently, six or seven millions
(that is, near a _third_) will still remain to be the quantity deficient
less than a grain.

[89] It has been thought very strange, that a piece of metal should
bear a higher price, merely because it wants the stamp of the mint. But
the reason is, that bullion alone being exportable in any considerable
quantity, the price of it must vary as the demand for it varies; or,
in other words, as the _balance of payment_ between us and the rest of
the world is favourable or unfavourable.—This will be explained at the
beginning of the Third Part, where it will appear that, in consequence
of the increase of luxury and the national debt, this balance has been
generally against us ever since the end of the last war.

[90] The coin brought in last Summer, added to near 14 millions coined
from the beginning of 1772 to the time of the last call, amounts to about
20 millions and a half; but only 16 millions and a half have been brought
in, including the coin from _Ireland_ and foreign countries.

[91] Or EIGHTEEN MILLIONS AND A HALF. See Dr. DAVENANT’s Works, Vol. i.
p. 363, &c. 443, &c. A great part of this specie was carried out of the
nation in King WILLIAM’s wars; and the consequence was, that the taxes
became unproductive; and that Government fell under great difficulties,
from which it was afterwards relieved by the establishment of the _Bank_
and the increase of trade. See the beginning of the Third Part.

[92] The paper currency of the Colonies is one of the greatest
disadvantages under which they labour; but it is of a more safe and
permanent nature than ours. Were it not so, it could not have been of the
least use to them for the last year and a half. He who doubts this, need
only consider what our paper would be worth were we now invaded as they
are.

This difference depends chiefly, on the following circumstances.—Their
paper is not payable on demand.—It is a legal tender.—It represents fixed
property which is mortgaged for it.—It does not support such a monstrous
debt as ours.—And when public emergencies require any extraordinary
emissions, they are generally sunk by taxes in four or five years.—It
is the first of these circumstances that gives our paper its currency;
and it is also this circumstance that creates the danger attending it,
by rendering it incapable of sustaining any great shock or panic.—The
possession of securities equal in nominal value to the amount of the
paper emitted, or the debts contracted, is of little consequence when
the value of these securities depends on the paper, and is created by
it; that is, in other words, when the debts themselves are the very cash
which must pay the debts.—Nothing can be more unnatural than such a state
of things; and it may hereafter be a curious object of enquiry, how it
could be ever possible that it should subsist any long time.

In page 78 of the _Observations on Civil Liberty_, I have said, “that
the kingdom of FRANCE has no such dependence as we have on paper-credit;
and that its specie amounts to 67 millions sterling.” In mentioning this
sum I took the lowest of different accounts which I had then received
from different authorities. I have since received accounts which make
it 87 millions and a half; or 2000 millions of _livres_. This, in
particular, is the account of an author whom all know to be likely to
be well informed on this subject; I mean the author of the Treatise on
the _Legislation_ and _Commerce of Corn_, Part I. chap. v.—In the same
treatise it is said, (Part I. chap. viii,) that it appears, from the
returns made by the intendants of the different Provinces, that the
number of _annual_ deaths in the whole kingdom of France, for three
years ended in 1772, was 780,040. I have been informed by the ingenious
author, that this account may be depended on; and if so, _France_ must
contain 26 millions of inhabitants; for the best observations prove, that
no more than a thirty-third part of a whole kingdom dies annually. See
Observations on Reversionary Payments, page 200.—In _Sweden_, though a
nineteenth part die in the capital every year, only a thirty-fifth part
die in the whole kingdom. See Philosophical Transactions, Vol. lxv. for
1775, p. 426. The particulars now mentioned, added to the nature of the
debts of FRANCE as mentioned in page 78 of the _Observations on Civil
Liberty_, form a striking contrast between the state of that kingdom and
ours. Nothing gives us our superiority but the advantages we derive from
our RELIGION and our LIBERTY. Even in these respects, however, they seem
to be improving, while we are declining. _Montesquieu_, _Abbe Raynal_,
and others of their most admired writers, inculcate principles of
government, and breathe a spirit of Liberty, which, to the shame of this
country, are become offensive in it.

[93] See the proposals and observations in a pamphlet lately published by
Lord Viscount MAHON on this subject.

[94] “There is something (says a great writer) so unnatural in supposing
a large society, sufficient for all the good purposes of an independent
political union, remaining subject to the direction and government of
a distant body of men who know not sufficiently the circumstances and
exigencies of this society; or in supposing this society obliged to be
governed solely for the benefit of a distant country; that it is not easy
to imagine there can be any foundation for it in justice or equity. The
insisting on _old claims_ and _tacit conventions_, to extend civil power
over distant nations, and form grand unwieldy empires, without regard
to the obvious maxims of humanity, has been one great source of human
misery.” _System of Moral Philosophy_, by Dr. HUTCHESON, vol. ii. p.
309. In the section from whence this quotation is taken, Dr. HUTCHESON
discusses the question, “When colonies have a right to be released from
the dominion of the parent state?” And his general sentiment seems to
be, that they acquire such a right, “Whenever they are so increased in
numbers and strength, as to be sufficient by themselves for all the
good ends of a political union.”—Such a decision given by a wise man,
long before we had any disputes with the colonies, deserves, I think,
particular notice.

[95] See COMMON SENSE, and PLAIN TRUTH, p. 44. Published for Mr. _Almon_.

[96] The Colonies, I am assured, were not perfectly unanimous till they
saw this answer.

[97] I am sorry to differ from those respectable persons who have
proposed placing _America_ on the same ground with _Ireland_. If the same
ground of LAW is meant, it is already done; for our laws give us the same
power over _Ireland_, that we claim over _America_. If the same ground of
PRACTICE is meant; it has been most unfortunate for _Ireland_, and would
be equally so for _America_.

[98] See the Abbe RAYNAL’s Reflections on this subject at the end of
the 18th book of his History of the _European Settlements_ in the East
and West-Indies.—“Is it not likely, says this writer, that the distrust
and hatred which have of late taken place of that regard and attachment
which the _English_ Colonies felt for the parent country, may hasten
their separation from one another? Every thing conspires to produce
this great disruption; the æra of which it is impossible to know.—Every
thing tends to this point: The progress of good in the new hemisphere,
and the progress of evil in the old.—In proportion as our people are
weakened, and resign themselves to each other’s dominion, population
and agriculture will flourish in _America_; and the arts make a rapid
progress: And that country rising out nothing, will be fired with the
ambition of appearing with glory in its turn on the face of the globe—O
posterity! ye, peradventure, will be more happy than your unfortunate and
contemptible ancestors.”—Mr. _Justamond_’s Translation.

[99] Had this interest been insufficient, it might have been increased
a 16th or even an 8th _per cent._ without any material difference; or,
(which would have been better) 3½ _per cent._ might have been offered for
_four fifths_ of the sum borrowed, and 4 _per cent._ for the remainder;
in which case, the annuity payable by the public would have been 65,790l.

[100] It should be remembered here, that tho’ Government, when its debts
are at a discount, may be able, with the consent of the creditors, to
redeem a given capital by paying a less sum than that capital; yet it can
never be obliged to pay _more_.—In other words; a 100l. capital in the 3
_per cents_; 3½ _per cents_; or 4, or 5 _per cents_, Government is always
at liberty to redeem by paying 100l. whatever the market price of it may
be, and whether the creditors will consent or not.

[101] There is another very great advantage which would attend these
annuities.—One and the same _surplus_ would discharge a given capital
in less time. For example. A surplus of a million _per ann._ invariably
applied, and the first payment to be made immediately, would discharge
a capital of a _hundred millions_ bearing 3 _per cent._ interest in 46
years. But if the same capital bore 3½ _per cent._ interest, it would
be discharged in 43½ years; if 4 _per cent._ in 40 years; if 5 _per
cent._ in 37¼ years.—A capital _less_ than a 100 millions, in the same
proportion that the interest is _more_ than 3 _per cent._ and for which,
therefore, the same annuity is paid, (as in the present case) the same
surplus would discharge in 39 years, if the interest is 3½; in 34¼ years,
if the interest is 4 _per cent._ in 27¼ years if the interest is 5 _per
cent._—Supposing, therefore, 75 millions borrowed in the manner of our
Government, by creating a capital of a 100 millions bearing 3 _per cent._
(that is, by selling 3 _per cent._ stock for 75l. in money) which might
have been borrowed by creating a capital of only 75 millions bearing 4
_per cent._ (that is by selling 4 _per cent._ stock at 100) there will
not only be a loss of 25 millions by a needless increase of the capital;
but also a loss of 14 millions, by an increase of the time in which one
and the same saving will discharge the two capitals.—This may be proved
in the following manner.—A million, _per ann._ will, in 34 years and a
quarter, very nearly discharge a debt of 75 millions bearing interest
at 4 _per cent._; but the same saving will, in the same time, discharge
only a capital of 61 millions, if it bears interest at 3 _per cent._
When, therefore, such a saving has compleated the redemption of the _one_
capital, there will remain unpaid of the other, 39 millions.—What has
been now applied to a large sum holds true in proportion of any smaller
sums.

It appears from hence to be a very wrong observation which some have
made; “that provided the annual charge is the same, it signifies little
what the _principal_ of the public debt is.”—As there is no way of
removing the annual charge but by paying the _principal_, it is of
just as much consequence what it is, as whether it is practicable or
impracticable, to remove a burden which weakens and <DW36>s, and must
in time sink the public. An annuity of SIX MILLIONS, if the principal is
HUNDRED MILLIONS borrowed at 6 _per cent._ might be redeemed in 33 years
with a million _per ann._ surplus. But if the principal is TWO HUNDRED
MILLIONS bearing 3 _per cent._ the same surplus would, in the same time,
pay off only 56 millions; and but little more than a _quarter_ of the
annuity would be redeemed. If, therefore, the same sum might as well have
been obtained by creating a principal of a hundred millions bearing 6
_per cent._ as by creating a capital of two hundred millions bearing 3
_per cent._ there will be a needless expence, in discharging the debt, of
144 millions.

[102] The price of the 3 _per cents_ at the time of this loan (in the
beginning of Feb. 1759) was 88½ and 89.

[103] The 3 _per cents_ just before this loan were at 69l. and,
consequently, 5 _per cent._ interest, (or 3l. _per ann._ for 60l.) would
have afforded subscribers a profit of 9l. for every 60l. advanced. The
long annuity was worth, as the stocks then stood, 21 years purchase, and
the short annuity, 13 years purchase. Upon the whole loan, therefore, the
profit would have been 3 _per cent._

[104] That is, the difference between 12 millions, and the sum bearing
interest at 3 _per cent._ which a million _per ann._ would pay off, in
five years and a quarter.

[105] The 3 _per cents_ being at this time at 80l. an annuity of 3l.
purchased for 75l. would have produced a profit of 5l. Therefore these
schemes are of exactly the same value. But they are too narrow; and the
subscription this year fell immediately to one _per cent._ discount. But
in the scheme I have proposed this might have been prevented by only
offering 4 _per cent._ for 77l. or 78l. (instead of 75l.) of every 100l.

[106] It is plain, that this capital, as well as the former, might have
been a quarter (or 60,000_l._) less, which would have made the whole
saving of capital 2.060,000_l._

[107] At the time of this loan, the 3 _per cents._ were above 75; and,
therefore, a perpetual annuity of 3_l._ could not be purchased for 75_l._
and an annuity of 1_l._ 2_s._ 6_d._ for 99 years, was worth at least
27_l._ This, therefore, would have been a scheme very profitable to
subscribers.

[108] The life-annuity granted in this case could not have been worth
so little as 16_l._ or 14 years purchase; and, therefore, a capital
of 100_l._ in the 3 _per cents_ was sold for 84_l_; or a capital of
three millions, for 2.520,000_l._—A premium, therefore, was granted of
480,000_l_; and this was done without the least reason. For the 3 _per
cents_ being at that time at 87 and 88, 2.520,000_l._ would undoubtedly
have been lent at 3½ _per cent._ interest; and the remaining 480,000_l._
necessary to make up three millions, would have been given for the life
annuities; in which case, the annual charge occasioned by the new capital
would have been somewhat less; and 480,000_l._ would have been saved,
together with the additional expence occasioned by the longer time which
a given surplus would require to discharge a debt bearing 3 _per cent._
interest, as explained in the note, p. 94.

[109] It is a general and certain maxim “that whenever money is borrowed
by a lottery which gives a right to _stock_ equal to the sum advanced,
there is a loss equal to the sum which might have been received for the
profits of the lottery.”—When the 3 _per cents._ are at 76 or 77, half
a million might be borrowed by a lottery, consisting of 50,000 tickets,
each of the same value with 10l. three _per cent._ stock: and hitherto
such a method of borrowing has been reckoned advantageous. But it only
gives a fallacious appearance of borrowing at 3 _per cent._ It is the
same with selling the profits of a lottery, and at the same time absurdly
converting the purchase-money into a debt due to the purchaser.—Since the
last war we have had seven of these lotteries, including two in 1763; and
above a million has been lost by them.

In Queen _Anne_’s time, there were several lotteries, consisting of all
_prizes_ and no _blanks_. This is so curious, and most persons may be so
much at a loss to conceive of the possibility of it, that I cannot help
explaining it.

A capital, equal to the whole money advanced, was distributed _equally_
among all the tickets in the lottery; and, in order to make them prizes
of different values, there was farther distributed among them different
shares of an additional capital, to which a right was given, though
no money had been paid for it.—For example—In 1711, two millions were
raised by a lottery of this kind, called a class lottery. The whole sum
advanced was divided into 20,000 tickets, each 100_l._ stock bearing 6
_per cent._ interest. This capital was increased by a gratuitous capital
of 602,200_l._ bearing the same interest, and divided into shares which
were added to the tickets, in order to form prizes.—This was the same
with giving near 8 _per cent._ for money, besides a _premium_ of 30
_per cent._—As the interest of money was at this time 6 _per cent._ the
sum borrowed would most certainly have been advanced at 8 _per cent._
without any _premium_; but it was, I suppose, reckoned necessary that
government should not _seem_ to give such high interest.—In the same
year, 1.500,000_l._ was borrowed by another such lottery, and creating
a capital of 1.928,570_l._ And in 1712, 3.600,000_l._ was borrowed by
two more such lotteries, and creating a capital of 4.683,080_l._—The
greatest part of the debts contracted by these lotteries (amounting to
9.213,850_l._ though only 7.100,000_l._ was advanced) remains at this
hour an incumbrance on the public; and the duties constituting the
_general fund_ are charged with the interest of it.

In 1714, the national interest was reduced to 5 _per cent._ But in that
very year 1.400,000_l._ was borrowed by a lottery, which gave a right to
a capital of 1.876,000_l._ bearing 4 _per cent._ that is, by giving near
5½ _per cent._ interest, besides a _premium_ of 34 _per cent._—Thus have
our debts been increased. But even worse has been done. The taxes charged
with the interest of the public debts proving often deficient, the
shortest way of discharging the arrears has been often taken, by adding
them to the principal, and paying _compound_ interest for money.—Is it a
wonder, that a nation which has been so careless in contracting debts,
should have done so little towards discharging them?

[110] That is, in other words; there is no one who would not be glad to
lend to government on any higher interest than that which he can make in
the funds. There is no one, for instance, who would not be glad to lend
75_l._ at 4 _per cent._ when the 3 _per cents._ are at 76, and when,
therefore, he cannot make 4 _per cent._ by purchasing them.

[111] The expectation of receiving back some time or other the
purchase-money would probably, in private loans, influence a purchaser.
But in the cases to which I allude, this certainly was not considered,
and did not at all influence. And if it had influenced, the observations
I have made as I have gone along, demonstrate that the same loans would
have been made without any such expectation.

[112] See the Postscript.

[113] SIXTEEN MILLIONS have been specified. It will come in my way to
mention above FOUR MILLIONS more in the second section of the next part.
Notes 1, 12, 14.—No notice has been here taken of the loans of the war
before the last; but losses of the same kind to a great amount were
incurred by them.

[114] In the exports, as delivered to the _House of Commons_, is included
bullion exported. If this, as well as the other sums I have mentioned,
is deducted, there will be still a balance left in favour of _Britain_
during this period. Since 1764, it does not appear, from the accounts
laid before the _House of Commons_, as published by Sir _Charles
Whitworth_, that any bullion has been entered for exportation.

[115] The 3 _per cent._ annuities were then at 105; and, during the first
five years of the war which began in 1755, they were higher than they
have generally been _since_ the war.

[116] These duties were appropriated to the payment of the interest at 4
_per cent._ of a capital of 4.400,000l. created in 1747, for which four
millions only had been advanced. It is now a part of the capital of the
reduced 3 _per cent._ annuities.

[117] The whole of this sum, (except 16.437,821l. consisting of the old
Bank capital, the consolidated 3 _per cents_, the South-Sea 3 _per cent._
annuities 1751, the Civil List million, and the East-India annuity)
that is, 54.413,433l. was reduced by 23 Geo. II. 1749. from an interest
of 4 _per cent._ to 3½ till 1757, and afterwards to 3 _per cent._—The
proprietors of a capital of 3.290,042l. refused to consent to this
reduction, which, therefore, was paid off; 1.190,042l. with _Exchequer_
Bills (afterwards cancelled); and 2.100,000l. with money borrowed at
3 _per cent._ and added to the capital of the _South-Sea_ annuities.
The whole sum, therefore, reduced and paid off, was 57.703,475l. which
produced a saving to the public, and an addition to the Sinking Fund
after 1757, of 612,735l. _per ann._

The SALT DUTIES in 1753 had been for some time mortgaged to pay the
principal and interest of a million borrowed in 1745. In 1757, after
clearing the mortgage, they became free, and were carried into the
Sinking Fund, of which they have ever since formed a part. This produced
a farther addition to the _Sinking Fund_, after 1757, of about 220,000l.
_per ann._

I have not included the million now mentioned in the account given
above of the public debts in 1753, because it was in a fixed course of
redemption; nor have I included 499,600l. in Exchequer Bills charged on
the duty on sweets, because these Exchequer Bills were paid off in 1754.

[118] Having met with no account of the Navy Debt at this time, I have
chosen, rather than omit it, to suppose it nearly the same that it was at
the commencement of the last war; which, probably, is reckoning it too
high.

[119] In this account I have omitted a million borrowed in 1734, because
the redemption of it was near being completed by the Salt Duties. I have
also omitted _Short Annuities_ amounting to 24,334l. being the remainder
of 9 _per cent._ annuities for 32 years created in 1710, because the term
for which they were created was near expiring.

[120] The author of the _Considerations on the Trade and Finances of
this Kingdom_ makes this debt 1.318,000l. more than the sum at which I
have here stated it. See page 22; and _State of the Nation_ by the same
author, page 15, quarto editions.—The reason of this difference is,
that this writer has included in the unfunded debt left by the war the
deficiencies of grants and funds in 1763 and 1764, and the _whole_ army
debt not provided for in those years; whereas I have excluded the former
entirely; and admitted only as much of the latter as exceeded the army
debts common in subsequent years. See the Postscript.

[121] In 1751 there was applied to the payment of Navy debts 200,000l.
and in 1752, the sum of 900,000l. But I have not reckoned these sums,
because they did little more than make up the constant deficiency in the
_Peace Establishment_ for the Navy.

[122] See the Postscript.

[123] “Either the nation (Mr. Hume says) must destroy public credit, or
public credit will destroy the nation.” Political Essays, page 135.

[124] The number of inhabitants in _France_ is 26 millions. In _Britain_
it cannot exceed six or seven millions. See p. 66. And _Observations on
Reversionary Payments_, page 185, third edition.

[125] Near one half of all this importation is made into _Bourdeaux_
only; and the rest into _Rochelle_, _Marseilles_, _Nantz_, _Havre_, and
_Honfleur_.

[126] In order to defray the expence of coinage, a duty of 10s. _per_ ton
has been laid on wines imported; and, as far as this duty happens to fall
short of 15,000 l. the deficiency is made good out of the supplies.

[127] I am not able to give the exact amount of this part of the
appropriated revenue. I have, therefore, reckoned it at such a round sum,
as, I think, cannot much exceed or fall short of it.

[128] The Land-tax at 3s. is given by Parliament for 1.500,000l.; and the
Malt-tax for 750,000l. but they are always greatly deficient.—Both these
taxes (and also sometimes the income of the Sinking Fund) are borrowed
of the _Bank_, and spent long before they come into the Exchequer; and
therefore, are debts constantly due to the Bank, for which interest is
paid.

[129] The account given by Lord North at opening the Budget in 1775,
was, that the public debt had been diminished since 1763, near nine
millions and a half. The grounds on which I have stated this diminution
at 10.639,793l. may be seen in the POSTSCRIPT, (p. 171).

[130] Four of these lotteries have been annexed to annuities; but it
would be a great mistake to think that they have not been equally
profitable with the other lotteries. For instance; in 1767, a million and
a half was borrowed on an annuity of 45,000l. with a lottery of 60,000
tickets annexed. In the same year, 2.616,777l. was paid off; but, had it
not been for the lottery, only 1.350,000l. could have been raised on the
annuity; and 150,000l. less must have been paid off.

[131] The discounts on a million and a half paid off in 1772, and two
millions paid off in 1774 and 1775, amounted nearly to this sum.

[132] The particular sums may be found in a pamphlet, entitled, _The
Present State of the Nation_, p. 28, quarto edition. But I have not
included all the sums there enumerated; nor have I admitted the Army
savings in 1772, and some other smaller sums.

[133] This surplus, being the medium for the whole 12 years of peace, is
less than that in p. 160, which is the medium at the end of this period,
when the Sinking-Fund produced above a quarter more than it did at the
beginning of it.

[134] I have here taken the average of two years before and after 1766.

[135] The annual medium of the payments into the Exchequer from the
CUSTOMS in ENGLAND, for the last five years, has been 2.521,769l.—In
1774 the payment into the Exchequer was 2.547,717l.—In 1775, it was
2.476,302l.—The produce of the CUSTOMS, therefore, has been given rather
too high.

The produce of the EXCISES in England has been higher, in 1772 and
1775, than in any two years before 1776; but the average of any three
successive years, or of all the five years since 1770, will not differ
much from the sum I have given.—In 1754, or the year before the last
war, the CUSTOMS produced only 1.558,254l.—The Excises, exclusive of
the Malt-tax, produced 2.819,702l,—And the whole revenue, exclusive
of the Malt-tax and Land-tax at 2s. was 5.097,617l.—In 1753 the whole
revenue was 5.189,745l. And the appropriation or annual charge upon it,
(consisting of the Civil List, 834,443l. interest of the national debt,
exclusive of navy debt, 2.628,087l. expences of management, 43,691l. 4½
_per cent._ from the Leeward Islands 27,378l. annuity to the late Duke of
Cumberland 25,000l. first-fruits and tenths of the Clergy 13,597l. &c.
&c.) was 3.733,713l. The Sinking-Fund, therefore, produced 1.456,000l.;
which, added to 1.500,000l. (the neat produce, at that time, of Land at
2s. and Malt-tax) made the unappropriated revenue 2.956,032l.—The expence
of the peace establishment, consisting of 10,000 seamen, and 18,857
landmen, was, in 1753 and 1754, (including an allowance for the increase
of the Navy-debt) 2.400,000l. nearly; which left an annual surplus in the
national income of 556,000l. _without_ lotteries, and land at 2s. This
surplus (with land at 3s.) has of late scarcely exceeded 300,000l.; and,
therefore, has not been a THIRD of what it was in the last peace, and
before the reduction of interest to 3 _per cent._ was compleated.

[136] This article was omitted in the former editions of this
_Postscript_; and its insertion here makes the diminution of the public
debts, since 1763, half a million less than the sum at which it is taken
in p. 104 and 108.—It might have been proper also to add, the excess of
Navy debts _contracted_ above the Navy debts _discharged_, from 1763 to
1775; and had this been done, the surplus in p. 165, would have been
reduced to 150,000l.

[137] See _The Present State of the Nation_, page 26.

[138] This article was omitted in the first editions of this
_Postscript_.—It might have been proper to add, the excess of Navy debts
_contracted_ above the Navy debts _discharged_, from 1763 to 1775; and
had this been done, the surplus in p. 166, would have been reduced to
150,000l. _per ann._

[139] Or, for every 105l. contributed, 100l. STOCK irredeemable for 10
years might have been given, carrying 4¼ _per cent._ interest, with the
same short annuity and a lottery ticket annexed; and then the new capital
would have been 4.762,000l. carrying (at 4¼ _per cent._) 202,385l. _per
ann._ interest. The amount of the short annuity would have been 23,810l.
and the number of lottery tickets 47,620.

[140] 211,375l. the interest at 4½ of 4.750,000l. and 12,500l. a short
annuity of a QUARTER _per cent._ annexed to every 100l. contributed, make
223,875l. This last sum, therefore, would have been the annual charge
for 10 years; and the first sum the annual charge after ten years till
redemption.

[141] Ten payments of 9,650l. and seventeen payments of 34,375l. make
680,875l.

[142] It may be worth observing, that during this whole war they never
fell below 82, except for a few months during the rebellion in 1745; that
after the PEACE in 1748 they rose to 105, and in the succeeding war never
fell so low as they are now, except in the two last years; that after
the PEACE in 1763 it was expected they would again rise above _par_; but
that, instead of this, they have in general during the whole peace kept
12 or 13 _per cent._ below _par_, and 15 or 16 _per cent._ below the
price they bore before the two last wars.—One of the reasons of the great
alteration which has taken place since the last war is, I think, pointed
out in the 3d Section of the 3d Part of this Tract.

[143] Since the reduction in 1749 there has been no FOUR _per cent._
capital created except that of the last year.

[144] What is here said has been verified, in the particular instance
of a _million and a half_ borrowed in 1756, which was to carry 3½ _per
cent._ interest till 1771, and then to become redeemable.—During the last
war, and for about three years after the commencement of peace, there
was a general expectation that the THREE _per cents._ would rise above
_par_ as they had done in the former peace; and while this expectation
continued, this stock reckoned no better than a THREE _per cent._ stock
with a short annuity of a _half per cent._ annexed; and for this reason
it bore, during that period, a lower price than another stock of 4
millions and a half which was to bear the same interest till 1782, and
then to become redeemable, and to sink to an interest of 3 _per cent._—In
the latter end of 1767 and beginning of 1768 the price of the former
stock rose above that of the latter, and continued not far from _par_
from that time to the time of its redemption in 1771. The reason must
have been, that being a small stock bearing a higher interest than the
other stocks, it was expected, that it would be paid off at _par_, and
therefore with a considerable profit, as soon as it became redeemable;
which accordingly happened. See Postscript, (page 177).

[145] Nothing has been more undervalued in the ALLEY than _Annuities on
lives_. They have been always granted, very unreasonably, without any
limitation of age; and their value has been taken at no more than 12 or
13 years purchase; tho’ really worth one with another 16 or 17 years
purchase. This is a strong reason for preferring short annuities to them
in all schemes for raising money. Short annuities for 21 years will be
taken for as much as life-annuities; and yet experience has proved that
in this time not a _quarter_ of the life-annuities will drop; and the
whole expence brought by them on the public will not be removed in less
than 70 or 80 years. See Note 15, (Page 134).

[146] I would except here the first reduction in 1717. This was then
necessary to gain a fund for sinking the public debts; and had the fund
thus gained been applied, as the laws required, invariably to this
purpose, and all farther reductions been avoided, we should now have been
burthened with no debts.

[147] That is; never capable of being redeemed by substituting one
debt for another; or of being saved from redemption by accepting lower
interest.

[148] Supposing the 3 _per cents._ sold at 76½, the capital necessary to
produce 4.850,000l. in money would be 6.339,869l. the interest of which
at 3 _per cent._ is 190,195l.

[149] When the amount of interest, payable for a sum obtained by selling
a 4 _per cent._ capital, is the same with the amount of interest, payable
for an equal sum obtained by selling a 3 _per cent._ capital, which is
nearly the present case, postponing, in the manner I have proposed,
the redemption of the former, becomes as indifferent as it would be to
postpone in the same manner the redemption of any 3 _per cents._

[150] In this case only a FIFTH of the _surplus_ to be at any time
employed in redeeming debts could be applied to the redemption of this
_particular_ loan. The rest after nine years might be employed in
redeeming the 4 _per cent._ stock created last year; or jointly with it,
such parts of future loans bearing high interest, as, in borrowing on the
same plan, might be left redeemable. And thus no obligation would arise
from this mode of borrowing to prefer the redemption of 3 _per cents._ to
the redemption of capitals bearing higher interest. In particular; had
this been the plan of borrowing through the last war, all surplus monies
might have been ever since employed intirely in paying off 4, 4½ and 5
_per cent._ capitals preferably to any others; and at the same time, no
_douceurs_ would have been granted in order to procure the loans, no
artificial debt contracted, or extraordinary charge incurred.

[151] Should this be disregarded, and a long annuity offered, as a
_douceur_, of 1½ _per cent._ for 90 or 100 years, _eight millions_ might
perhaps be borrowed at an interest, including the long annuity, of 4½
_per cent._ even though the 3 _per cents._ should fall as low as 73.—And
this, probably, would be the very scheme a minister would prefer, who,
minding chiefly present ease, did not care how much he burdened the
nation hereafter.

[152] In 1774, a million of the 3 _per cents._ was redeemed at this
price; and in 1772, a million and a half at 90.

[153] I mean such a course of redemption as should not be liable to
interruption by a WAR; or, as would be the effect of the establishment of
such an unalienable _sinking_ fund as has been described in the _Appeal
to the Public on the Subject of the National Debt_, and the _Observations
on reversionary Payments_.—Nothing can save us from bankruptcy but such
a fund; and were it established, the 3 _per cents._, when they came to
be redeemed, would soon rise to _par_; and, consequently, the obligation
implied in this scheme to pay a part of them at _par_ would occasion no
additional expence. It is, however, so little to be expected, that such
a fund will be ever established, that it would have been folly to have
made the calculation given above, on any supposition less favourable,
than that the 3 _per cents._ will bear the same price after the present
war, that they bore after the last; and that we shall go on as we have
hitherto done, paying off a _million_, or a _million and a half_, now and
then in a time of peace.

[154] The conversion of a 3 _per cent._ stock into a 3½ _per cent._ stock
gives the same advantage in redeeming it, that the power of redeeming it
at 85¾ for every 100l. would give.—A million _per ann._ surplus would
redeem 114 millions and a quarter of the latter stock in the same time,
and therefore at the same expence, that it would redeem 100 millions
of the former. I suppose here the 3 _per cents._ paid at _par_; and
this I have before observed will be found to be necessary should a time
(scarcely the object of hope) ever come when government will set itself
in earnest and with any effect to pay the public debts.




CORRECTIONS and ADDITIONS.

Transcriber’s Note: Whilst minor typesetting errors have been corrected in
the course of producing this e-text, the author’s list of corrections and
additions below has not been addressed.


In THE SECOND TRACT, (page 120), after the words _Lent at 4 per cent. in
1746, charged on licences for retailing spirituous liquors, and reduced
to 3 per cent. by 23d of George II. 1749_, add, _and consisting of old
Exchequer Bills then cancelled and converted into a debt from Government
to the Bank, for which the Bank was allowed to add to its capital an
equal sum by 19th George II. Ch. 6_.

In (page 128), instead of the words, _In 1751, certain Exchequer tallies
and orders, amounting to 129,750l._ read, _In 1751, the remainder of
certain Exchequer tallies and orders charged on the duties on wrought
plate, and amounting to 129,750l._

(Page 136), line 17, instead of 1758 read 1757.

(Page 137), line 2d from the bottom, for 205,000l. read 215,000l.

(Page 139), for 17.7401,32l. read 17.701,324l.

(Page 144), after _Exchequer Bills charged on a duty upon victuallers by
12th Geo. I. 1726_, add, _and afterwards by 16th Geo. II. 1743, charged
on the duties on licences for retailing spirituous liquors. Now included
in the Bank Capital by 19th Geo. II. Ch. 6_.

(Page 144), Note (b) after the words, _In this account I have omitted
a million borrowed in 1734_, add, _and half a million borrowed in 1736;
because these debts had for some time been in a fixed course of
redemption by the salt-duties_.

In (page 145), line 2d, for 10.639,793l. read 10.739,793l.—Ibid,
line 10th, for 146.582,844l. read 146.682,844l.—Ib. line 12th, for
15.639,793l. read 15.739,793l—Ibid. note, line 2d, for 1.118,000l. read
1.218,000l.

(P. 147). For 146.582,844l. read 146.682,844l.—For 71.505,580l. read
71.605,580l.—And for 10.639,793l. read 10.739,793.

FINIS.


A SUMMARY VIEW and COMPARISON of the different Schemes of Public Loans
described in the SUPPLEMENT.

_N.B._ The Sum borrowed is always supposed FIVE MILLIONS; and the Price
of the 3 _per cents._ 78l. But all the Schemes may be accommodated to
any other Price of the 3 _per cents._ and to Schemes for borrowing any
greater or smaller Sums.

                          +---------------------------------+-------------+
                          |                                 |             |
                          |          OLD SCHEMES.           |             |
                          |                                 |             |
                          |       I.               II.      |Scheme of the|
                          +----------------+----------------+loan in 1777.|
                          |Scheme described|Scheme described|  Page 185.  |
                          |    Page 182.   |    Page 183.   |             |
                          |                |                |             |
                          |                |                |     III.    |
                          |                |                |             |
                          |     £.         |       £.       |      £.     |
  SUM ADVANCED            |   5.000,000    |   5.000,000    |  5.000,000  |
  ------------------------+----------------+----------------+-------------+
  NEW CAPITAL, or sum     |                |                |             |
    payable at redemption |   5.000,000    |   6.343,954    |  5.000,000, |
  ------------------------+----------------+----------------+-------------+
  Interest offered        | 3 _per cent._  | 3 _per cent._  |4 _per cent._|
  ------------------------+----------------+----------------+-------------+
  ARTIFICIAL CAPITAL,     |                |                |             |
    or sum payable at     |   1.200,000    |    1.343,954   |    250,000  |
    redemption more than  |                |                |             |
    the value received    |                |                |             |
  ------------------------+----------------+----------------+-------------+
  DOUCEURS consisting of  |                |                |             |
    additional capitals   |     --0--      |    1.343,954   |     --0--   |
  Short Annuity worth     |   1.200,000    |      --0--     |    200,000  |
  Lottery worth           |     --0--      |      150,000   |    150,000  |
  ------------------------+----------------+----------------+-------------+
      ANNUAL CHARGE.      |                |                |             |
  Perpetual               |     150,000    |      100,318   |    200,000  |
  Temporary               |     100,000    |      --0--     |     25,000  |
                          |  For lives or  |                |for 10 years.|
                          |     17 yrs.    |                |             |
  ------------------------+----------------+----------------+-------------+
  Total of Annual Charge  |     250,000    |      190,318   |    225,000  |
  ------------------------+----------------+----------------+-------------+

                          +-------------------------------+---------------+
                          |    Scheme of 1777, altered    |Scheme of 1777;|
                          |    to avoid douceurs and      |supposing 100l.|
                          |    an artificial capital.     |four _per ct._ |
                          +---------------+---------------+ stock worth   |
                          | See Page 186. | See Page 188. | 91l. when the |
                          |               |               | 3 _per cts._  |
                          |               |               |  are at 78l.  |
                          |               |               |   Page 200.   |
                          |       IV.     |      V.       |        VI.    |
                          |               |               |               |
                          |       £.      |      £.       |        £.     |
  SUM ADVANCED            |    5.000,000  |   5.000,000   |   5.000,000   |
  ------------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
  NEW CAPITAL, or sum     |               |               |               |
    payable at redemption |    4.750,000  |   3.750,000   |   5.000,000   |
  ------------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
  Interest offered        | 4¼ _per cent._| 4¼ _per cent._|  4 _per cent._|
  ------------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
  ARTIFICIAL CAPITAL,     |               |               |               |
    or sum payable at     |    --0--      |    --0--      |[155]450,000   |
    redemption more than  |               |               |               |
    the value received    |               |               |               |
  ------------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
  DOUCEURS consisting of  |               |               |               |
    additional capitals   |    --0--      |    --0--      |      --0--    |
  Short Annuity worth     |    --0--      |    --0--      |     450,000   |
  Lottery worth           |   150,000     |   150,000     |     150,000   |
  ------------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
      ANNUAL CHARGE.      |               |               |               |
  Perpetual               |   201,875     |   159,375     |     200,000   |
  Temporary               |    25,000     |    75,000     |      56,250   |
                          | For 10 years. | for 27 years. |  for 10 years.|
  ------------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
  Total of Annual Charge  |   226,875     |   234,375     |     256,250   |
  ------------------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+

                          +---------------+-------------------------------+
                          |               |  Schemes of loans by changing |
                          |    Scheme     |  the 3 _per cent._ stocks to  |
                          |   founded     |      stocks bearing higher    |
                          |   on the      |           interest.           |
                          |  regulations  +--------------+----------------+
                          |   proposed    | See Page 209.| See Page 214.  |
                          | Page 205, &c. |              |                |
                          |               |              |                |
                          |      VII.     |     VIII.    |        IX.     |
                          |               |              |                |
                          |      £.       |       £.     |       £.       |
  SUM ADVANCED            |  5.000,000    |   5.000,000  |   5.000,000    |
  ------------------------+---------------+--------------+----------------+
  NEW CAPITAL, or sum     |               |              |                |
    payable at redemption |  4.850,000    |   2.500,000  |     --0--      |
  ------------------------+---------------+--------------+----------------+
  Interest offered        | _4 per cent._ |4¼ _per cent._|  4 _per cent._ |
  ------------------------+---------------+--------------+----------------+
  ARTIFICIAL CAPITAL,     |               |              |                |
    or sum payable at     |     --0--     |     --0--    |     --0--      |
    redemption more than  |               |              |                |
    the value received    |               |              |                |
  ------------------------+---------------+--------------+----------------+
  DOUCEURS consisting of  |               |              |                |
    additional capitals   |     --0--     |     --0--    |     --0--      |
  Short Annuity worth     |     --0--     |     --0--    |     --0--      |
  Lottery worth           |     --0--     |     --0--    |     --0--      |
  ------------------------+---------------+--------------+----------------+
      ANNUAL CHARGE.      |               |              |                |
  Perpetual               |    194,000    |    212,500   |   200,000      |
  Temporary               |     --0--     |     --0--    |     --0--      |
                          |               |              |                |
  ------------------------+---------------+--------------+----------------+
  Total of Annual Charge  |    194,000    |    212,500   |   200,000      |
  ------------------------+---------------+--------------+----------------+

[To be placed last of all, facing Page 216.]

[155] This Scheme may be altered to avoid the artificial Capital and
450,000l. Douceur (preserving nearly the same annual Charge) in the
Manner directed in the 4th or 5th Scheme.





End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Two Tracts on Civil Liberty, the War
with America, and the Debts and Fina, by Richard Price

*** 