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TYPES OF NAVAL OFFICERS

Drawn from the History of the British Navy

With Some Account of the Conditions of Naval
Warfare at the beginning of the Eighteenth
Century, and of its subsequent development
during the Sail Period

by

A. T. Mahan, D.C.L., LL.D.
Captain, United States Navy

Author of the "Influence of Sea Power upon History,
1660-1783," and "Upon the French Revolution
and Empire;" of "The Life of Nelson,"
and a "Life of Farragut"







London
Sampson Low, Marston & Company
Limited
1902
Copyright, 1893
by Houghton, Mifflin and Company.
Copyright, 1901_
by A. T. Mahan.
All rights reserved
November, 1901
University Press . John Wilson
and Son . Cambridge, U.S.A.





PREFACE


Although the distinguished seamen, whose lives and professional
characteristics it is the object of this work to present in brief
summary, belonged to a service now foreign to that of the United States,
they have numerous and varied points of contact with America; most of
them very close, and in some instances of marked historical interest.
The older men, indeed, were during much of their careers our fellow
countrymen in the colonial period, and fought, some side by side with
our own people in this new world, others in distant scenes of the
widespread strife that characterized the middle of the eighteenth
century, the beginnings of "world politics;" when, in a quarrel purely
European in its origin, "black men," to use Macaulay's words, "fought on
the coast of Coromandel, and red men scalped each other by the great
lakes of North America." All, without exception, were actors in the
prolonged conflict that began in 1739 concerning the right of the ships
of Great Britain and her colonies to frequent the seas bordering the
American dominions of Spain; a conflict which, by gradual expansion,
drew in the continent of Europe, from Russia to France, spread thence to
the French possessions in India and North America, involved Spanish
Havana in the western hemisphere and Manila in the eastern, and finally
entailed the expulsion of France from our continent. Thence, by
inevitable sequence, issued the independence of the United States. The
contest, thus completed, covered forty-three years.

The four seniors of our series, Hawke, Rodney, Howe, and Jervis,
witnessed the whole of this momentous period, and served conspicuously,
some more, some less, according to their age and rank, during its
various stages. Hawke, indeed, was at the time of the American
Revolution too old to go to sea, but he did not die until October 16,
1781, three days before the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown, which
is commonly accepted as the closing incident of our struggle for
independence. On the other hand, the two younger men, Saumarez and
Pellew, though they had entered the navy before the American Revolution,
saw in it the beginnings of an active service which lasted to the end of
the Napoleonic wars, the most continuous and gigantic strife of modern
times. It was as the enemies of our cause that they first saw gunpowder
burned in anger.

Nor was it only amid the commonplaces of naval warfare that they then
gained their early experiences in America. Pellew in 1776, on Lake
Champlain, bore a brilliant part in one of the most decisive--though
among the least noted--campaigns of the Revolutionary contest; and a
year later, as leader of a small contingent of seamen, he shared the
fate of Burgoyne's army at Saratoga. In 1776 also, Saumarez had his part
in an engagement which ranks among the bloodiest recorded between ships
and forts, being on board the British flag-ship Bristol at the attack
upon Fort Moultrie, the naval analogue of Bunker Hill; for, in the one
of these actions as in the other, the great military lesson was the
resistant power against frontal attack of resolute marksmen, though
untrained to war, when fighting behind entrenchments,--a teaching
renewed at New Orleans, and emphasized in the recent South African War.
The well-earned honors of the comparatively raw colonials received
generous recognition at the time from their opponents, even in the midst
of the bitterness proverbially attendant upon family quarrels; but it is
only just to allow that their endurance found its counterpart in the
resolute and persistent valor of the assailants. In these two battles,
with which the War of Independence may be said fairly to have begun, by
land and by water, in the far North and in the far South, the men of the
same stock, whose ancestors there met face to face as foes, have now in
peace a common heritage of glory. If little of bitterness remains in the
recollections which those who are now fellow-citizens retain of the
struggle between the North and the South, within the American Republic,
we of two different nations, who yet share a common tongue and a common
tradition of liberty and law, may well forget the wrongs of the earlier
strife, and look only to the common steadfast courage with which each
side then bore its share in a civil conflict.

The professional lives of these men, therefore, touch history in many
points; not merely history generally, but American history specifically.
Nor is this contact professional only, devoid of personal tinge. Hawke
was closely connected by blood with the Maryland family of Bladen; that
having been his mother's maiden name, and Governor Bladen of the then
colony being his first cousin. Very much of his early life was spent
upon the American Station, largely in Boston. But those were the days of
Walpole's peace policy; and when the maritime war, which the national
outcry at last compelled, attained large dimensions, Hawke's already
demonstrated eminence as a naval leader naturally led to his employment
in European waters, where the more immediate dangers, if not the
greatest interests, of Great Britain were then felt to be. The universal
character, as well as the decisive issues of the opening struggle were
as yet but dimly foreseen. Rodney also had family ties with America,
though somewhat more remote. Caesar Rodney, a signer of the Declaration
of Independence from Delaware, was of the same stock; their
great-grandfathers were brothers. It was from the marriage of his
ancestor with the daughter of a Sir Thomas Caesar that the American
Rodney derived his otherwise singular name.

Howe, as far as known, had no relations on this side of the water; but
his elder brother, whom he succeeded in the title, was of all British
officers the one who most won from the colonial troops with whom he was
associated a personal affection, the memory of which has been
transmitted to us; while the admiral's own kindly attitude towards the
colonists, and his intimacy with Franklin, no less than his professional
ability, led to his being selected for the North American command at the
time when the home country had not yet lost all hope of a peaceable
solution of difficulties. To this the Howe tradition was doubtless
expected to contribute. Jervis, a man considerably younger than the
other three, by the accidents of his career came little into touch with
either the colonies or the colonists, whether before or during the
Revolutionary epoch; yet even he, by his intimate friendship with Wolfe,
and intercourse with his last days, is brought into close relation with
an event and a name indelibly associated with one of the great
landmarks--crises--in the history of the American Continent. Although
the issue of the strife depended, doubtless, upon deeper and more
far-reaching considerations, it is not too much to say that in the
heights of Quebec, and in the name of Wolfe, is signalized the downfall
of the French power in America. There was prefigured the ultimate
predominance of the traditions of the English-speaking races throughout
this continent, which in our own momentous period stands mediator
between the two ancient and contrasted civilizations of Europe and Asia,
that so long moved apart, but are now brought into close, if not
threatening, contact.

Interesting, however, as are the historical and social environments in
which their personalities played their part, it is as individual men,
and as conspicuous exemplars--types--of the varied characteristics which
go to the completeness of an adequate naval organization, that they are
here brought forward. Like other professions,--and especially like its
sister service, the Army,--the Navy tends to, and for efficiency
requires, specialization. Specialization, in turn, results most
satisfactorily from the free play of natural aptitudes; for aptitudes,
when strongly developed, find expression in inclination, and readily
seek their proper function in the body organic to which they belong.
Each of these distinguished officers, from this point of view, does not
stand for himself alone, but is an eminent exponent of a class; while
the class itself forms a member of a body which has many organs, no one
of which is independent of the other, but all contributive to the body's
welfare. Hence, while the effort has been made to present each in his
full individuality, with copious recourse to anecdote and illustrative
incident as far as available, both as a matter of general interest and
for accurate portrayal, special care has been added to bring out
occurrences and actions which convey the impression of that natural
character which led the man to take the place he did in the naval body,
to develop the professional function with which he is more particularly
identified; for personality underlies official character.

In this sense of the word, types are permanent; for such are not the
exclusive possession of any age or of any service, but are found and are
essential in every period and to every nation. Their functions are part
of the bed-rock of naval organization and of naval strategy, throughout
all time; and the particular instances here selected owe their special
cogency mainly to the fact that they are drawn from a naval era,
1739-1815, of exceptional activity and brilliancy.

There is, however, another sense in which an officer, or a man, may be
accurately called a type; a sense no less significant, but of more
limited and transient application. The tendency of a period,--especially
when one of marked transition,--its activities and its results, not
infrequently find expression in one or more historical characters. Such
types may perhaps more accurately be called personifications; the man or
men embodying, and in action realizing, ideas and processes of thought,
the progress of which is at the time united, but is afterwards
recognized as a general characteristic of the period. Between the
beginning and the end a great change is found to have been effected,
which naturally and conveniently is associated with the names of the
most conspicuous actors; although they are not the sole agents, but
simply the most eminent.

It is in this sense more particularly that Hawke and Rodney are
presented as types. It might even be said that they complement each
other and constitute together a single type; for, while both were men of
unusually strong personality, private as well as professional, and with
very marked traits of character, their great relation to naval advance
is that of men who by natural faculty detect and seize upon incipient
ideas, for which the time is ripe, and upon the practical realization of
which the healthful development of the profession depends. With these
two, and with them not so much contemporaneously as in close historical
sequence, is associated the distinctive evolution of naval warfare in
the eighteenth century; in their combined names is summed up the
improvement of system to which Nelson and his contemporaries fell heirs,
and to which Nelson, under the peculiar and exceptional circumstances
which made his opportunity, gave an extension that immortalized him. Of
Hawke and Rodney, therefore, it may be said that they are in their
profession types of that element of change, in virtue of which the
profession grows; whereas the other four, eminent as they were,
exemplify rather the conservative forces, the permanent features, in the
strength of which it exists, and in the absence of any one of which it
droops or succumbs. It does not, however, follow that the one of these
great men is the simple continuator of the other's work; rather it is
true that each contributed, in due succession of orderly development,
the factor of progress which his day demanded, and his personality
embodied.

It was not in the forecast of the writer, but in the process of
treatment he came to recognize that, like Hawke and Rodney, the four
others also by natural characteristics range themselves in
pairs,--presenting points of contrast, in deficiencies and in
excellencies, which group them together, not by similarity chiefly, but
as complementary. Howe and Jervis were both admirable general officers;
but the strength of the one lay in his tactical acquirements, that of
the other in strategic insight and breadth of outlook. The one was
easy-going and indulgent as a superior; the other conspicuous for
severity, and for the searchingness with which he carried the exactions
of discipline into the minute details of daily naval life. Saumarez and
Pellew, less fortunate, did not reach high command until the great days
of naval warfare in their period had yielded to the comparatively
uneventful occupation of girdling the enemy's coast with a system of
blockades, aimed primarily at the restriction of his commerce, and
incidentally at the repression of his navy, which made no effort to take
the sea on a large scale. Under these circumstances the functions of an
admiral were mainly administrative; and if Saumarez and Pellew
possessed eminent capacity as general officers on the battle-field, they
had not opportunity to prove it. The distinction of their careers
coincides with their tenure of subordinate positions in the organisms of
great fleets. With this in common, and differentiating them from Howe
and Jervis, the points of contrast are marked. Saumarez preferred the
ship-of-the-line, Pellew the frigate. The choice of the one led to the
duties of a division commander, that of the other to the comparative
independence of detached service, of the partisan officer. In the one,
love of the military side of his calling predominated; the other was,
before all, the seaman. The union of the two perfects professional
character.

The question may naturally be asked,--Why, among types of naval
officers, is there no mention, other than casual, of the name of Nelson?
The answer is simple. Among general officers, land and sea, the group to
which Nelson belongs defies exposition by a type, both because it is
small in aggregate numbers, and because the peculiar eminence of the
several members,--the eminence of genius,--so differentiates each from
his fellows that no one among them can be said to represent the others.
Each, in the supremacy of his achievement, stands alone,--alone, not
only regarded as towering above a brilliant surrounding of distinguished
followers, but alone even as contrasted with the other great ones who in
their own day had a like supremacy. Such do not in fact form a class,
because, though a certain community of ideas and principles may be
traced in their actions, their personalities and methods bear each the
stamp of originality in performance; and where originality is found,
classification ceases to apply. There is a company, it may be, but not a
class.

The last four biographies first appeared as contributions to the
"Atlantic Monthly," in 1893 and 1894. I desire to return to the
proprietors my thanks for their permission to republish. The original
treatment has been here considerably modified, as well as enlarged. I am
also under special obligation to Mr. Fleetwood Hugo Pellew, who gave me
the photograph of Lord Exmouth, with permission also to reproduce it. It
represents that great officer at the age most characteristic of his
particular professional distinction, as by me understood.

A T. MAHAN.
OCTOBER, 1901.




CONTENTS

                                                  Page
I
Introductory.--Conditions of Naval Warfare at
the Beginning of the Eighteenth Century              3

II
Progress of Naval Warfare during the Eighteenth
Century
Hawke: The Spirit                                   77

III
Progress of Naval Warfare during the Eighteenth
Century (_Continued_)
Rodney: The Form                                   148

IV
Howe: The General Officer, as Tactician            254

V
Jervis: The General Officer, as Disciplinarian and
Strategist                                         320

VI
Saumarez: The Fleet Officer and Division Commander 382

VII
Pellew: The Frigate Captain and Partisan Officer   428

       *       *       *       *       *

Index                                              479




ILLUSTRATIONS


Edward, Lord Hawke                                    _Frontispiece_
From an engraving by W. Holl, after the painting by Francis Cotes
in the Naval Gallery at Greenwich Hospital.

                                                                PAGE
Plan of Byng's Action off Minorca, May 20, 1756                   48

George Brydges, Lord Rodney                                      148
From an engraving by Edward Finden, after the painting by W.
Grimaldi.

Richard, Earl Howe                                               254
From a mezzotint engraving by R. Dunkarton, after the painting
by John Singleton Copley.

John Jervis, Earl St. Vincent                                    320
From an engraving by J. Cook, after the painting by Sir William
Beechey.

James, Lord De Saumarez                                          382
From an engraving by W. Greatbatch, after a miniature in possession
of the family.

Edward Pellew, Lord Exmouth                                      428
From the original painting in the possession of Orr Ewing, Esq.







TYPES OF NAVAL OFFICERS

INTRODUCTORY

NAVAL WARFARE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY


The recent close of the nineteenth century has familiarized us with the
thought that such an epoch tends naturally to provoke an estimate of the
advance made in the various spheres of human activity during the period
which it terminates. Such a reckoning, however, is not a mere matter of
more and less, of comparison between the beginning and the end,
regardless of intermediate circumstances. The question involved is one
of an historical process, of cause and effect; of an evolution, probably
marked, as such series of events commonly are, by certain salient
incidents, the way-marks of progress which show the road traversed and
the succession of stages through which the past has become the present.
Frequently, also, such development associates itself not only with
conspicuous events, but with the names of great men, to whom, either by
originality of genius or by favoring opportunity, it has fallen to
illustrate in action the changes which have a more silent antecedent
history in the experience and reflection of mankind.

The development of naval warfare in the eighteenth century, its advance
in spirit and methods, is thus exemplified in certain striking events,
and yet more impressively is identified with the great names of Hawke
and Rodney. The period of nearly half a generation intervened between
their births, but they were contemporaries and actors, though to no
large extent associates, during the extensive wars that occupied the
middle of the century--the War of the Austrian Succession, 1739-1748,
and the Seven Years War, 1756-1763. These two conflicts are practically
one; the same characteristic jealousies and motives being common to
both, as they were also to the period of nominal peace, but scarcely
veiled contention, by which they were separated. The difference of age
between the two admirals contributed not only to obviate rivalry, by
throwing their distinctive activities into different generations, but
had, as it were, the effect of prolonging their influence beyond that
possible to a single lifetime, thus constituting it into a continuous
and fruitful development.

They were both successful men, in the ordinary acceptation of the word
success. They were great, not only in professional character, but in the
results which do not always attend professional desert; they were great
in achievement. Each name is indissolubly linked with a brilliant
victory, as well as with other less known but equally meritorious
actions; in all of which the personal factor of the principal agent, the
distinctive qualities of the commander-in-chief, powerfully contributed
and were conspicuously illustrated. These were, so to say, the examples,
that enforced upon the men of their day the professional ideas by which
the two admirals were themselves dominated, and upon which was forming a
school, with professional standards of action and achievement destined
to produce great effects.

Yet, while this is so, and while such emphatic demonstrations by deeds
undoubtedly does more than any other teaching to influence
contemporaries, and so to promote professional development, it is
probably true that, as a matter of historical illustration, the advance
of the eighteenth century in naval warfare is more clearly shown by two
great failures, for neither of which were these officers responsible,
and in one only of which in fact did either appear, even in a
subordinate capacity. The now nearly forgotten miscarriage of Admiral
Mathews off Toulon, in 1744, and the miserable incompetency of Byng, at
Minorca, in 1756, remembered chiefly because of the consequent execution
of the admiral, serve at least, historically, to mark the low extreme to
which had then sunk professional theory and practice--for both were
there involved. It is, however, not only as a point of departure from
which to estimate progress that these battles--if they deserve the
name--are historically useful. Considered as the plane to which
exertion, once well directed and virile, had gradually declined through
the prevalence of false ideals, they link the seventeenth century to the
eighteenth, even as the thought and action--the theory and practice--of
Hawke and Rodney uplifted the navy from the inefficiency of Mathews and
Byng to the crowning glories of the Nile and Trafalgar, with which the
nineteenth century opened. It is thus, as the very bottom of the wave,
that those singular and signal failures have their own distinctive
significance in the undulations of the onward movement. On the one hand
they are not unaccountable, as though they, any more than the Nile and
Trafalgar, were without antecedent of cause; and on the other they
serve, as a background at least, to bring out the figures of the two
admirals now before us, and to define their true historical import, as
agents and as exponents, in the changes of their day.

It is, therefore, important to the comprehension of the changes effected
in that period of transition, for which Hawke and Rodney stand, to
recognize the distinctive lesson of each of these two abortive actions,
which together may be said to fix the zero of the scale by which the
progress of the eighteenth century is denoted. They have a relation to
the past as well as to the future, standing far below the level of the
one and of the other, through causes that can be assigned. Naval warfare
in the past, in its origin and through long ages, had been waged with
vessels moved by oars, which consequently, when conditions permitted
engaging at all, could be handled with a scope and freedom not securable
with the uncertain factor of the wind. The motive power of the sea,
therefore, then resembled essentially that of the land,--being human
muscle and staying power, in the legs on shore and in the arms at sea.
Hence, movements by masses, by squadrons, and in any desired direction
corresponding to a fixed plan, in order to concentrate, or to
outflank,--all these could be attempted with a probability of success
not predicable of the sailing ship. Nelson's remarkable order at
Trafalgar, which may almost be said to have closed and sealed the record
of the sail era, began by assuming the extreme improbability of being
able at any given moment to move forty ships of his day in a fixed order
upon an assigned plan. The galley admiral therefore wielded a weapon far
more flexible and reliable, within the much narrower range of its
activities, than his successor in the days of sail; and engagements
between fleets of galleys accordingly reflected this condition, being
marked not only by greater carnage, but by tactical combinations and
audacity of execution, to which the sailing ship did not so readily lend
itself.

When the field of naval warfare became extended beyond the
Mediterranean,--for long centuries its principal scene,--the galley no
longer met the more exacting nautical conditions; and the introduction
of cannon, involving new problems of tactics and ship-building,
accelerated its disappearance. The traditions of galley-fighting,
however, remained, and were reinforced by the habits of land
fighting,--the same men in fact commanding armies on shore and fleets at
sea. In short, a period of transition ensued, marked, as such in their
beginnings are apt to be, by an evident lack of clearness in men's
appreciation of conditions, and of the path of development, with a
consequent confusion of outline in their practice. It is not always easy
to understand either what was done, or what was meant to be done, during
that early sail era; but two things appear quite certainly. There is
still shown the vehemence and determination of action which
characterized galley fighting, visible constantly in the fierce effort
to grapple the enemy, to break his ranks, to confuse and crush him; and
further there is clear indication of tactical plan on the grand scale,
broad in outline and combination, involving different--but not
independent--action by the various great divisions of the fleet, each of
which, in plan at least, has its own part, subordinate but contributory
to the general whole.

The results, though not unimportant, were not satisfactory, for men
were compelled to see that from various causes the huge numbers brought
upon the field lapsed into confusion, and that battle, however well
planned in large outline, resolved itself into a mere mass of warring
units incoherently struggling one with another. There was lack of
proportion between effort exerted and effect achieved. A period of
systematization and organization set in. Unwieldy numbers were reduced
to more manageable dimensions by excluding ships whose size and strength
did not add to the efficiency of the order of battle; the powers and
limitations of those which remained were studied, and certain simple
tactical dispositions, fitted to particular emergencies, were recognized
and adopted,--all tending to impart unity of movement and action, and to
keep the whole in regulated order under the hand of the
commander-in-chief, free from confusion.

To this point there was improvement; but reaction, as often, went too
far. The change in accepted ideas is emphatically shown by a comparison
of the Fighting Instructions of 1740 and 1756, when the crystallization
of the system was complete but disintegration had not yet begun, with
those issued in 1665 by the Duke of York, afterwards James II., at the
beginning of the second of the three Anglo-Dutch Wars. His in turn are
directly deducible from others framed shortly after the first war, in
1652-1654, when sail tactics had not passed the stage of infancy, and
were still strongly affected by the galley tradition. There is here
found, on the one hand, the prescription of the line of battle,--a
single column of ships formed in each other's wake,--with the provision
that if the enemy is to leeward, and awaits attack, the headmost
squadron of the British shall steer for the headmost of the enemy's
ships. This accords with the general tenor of the later Instructions;
but there occurs elsewhere, and previously, the direction that, when the
enemy is to windward, if the leading British Squadron finds it can
weather any considerable part of them, it is to "tack and stand in, and
strive to divide the enemy's body," and that, "being got to windward, is
to bear down on those ships to leeward of them," which have thus been
cut off.

The thing to be observed here is the separate, but positive, initiative
prescribed for a portion of the fleet, with a view to divide the enemy,
and then concentrate the whole fleet upon the fraction thus isolated.
The British van takes a particular, but not an independent, action; for
the other divisions contribute their part to the common purpose. "The
middle squadron is to keep her wind, and to observe the motion of the
enemy's van, which" [that is, "which" action of the middle squadron]
"the last squadron--the rear--is to second; and both of these squadrons
are to do their utmost to assist or relieve the first squadron, that
divided the enemy's fleet." Evidently here we have tactical combination
in order to decisive action; clearly contemplated also beforehand, not
merely by a capable individual general, but by the consensus of
professional opinion which such a paper as the Fighting Instructions
necessarily reflects. The stamp of the galley period is upon this:
strenuous and close battle, the piercing of the enemy's order, the
movement of the squadrons differentiated, in order that they may in a
real and effective sense _combine_, instead of being merely
_distributed_, as they afterwards were by both the letter of the later
Instructions and the tradition by which these became encrusted. Nor
should there be overlooked, in this connection, the discretion allowed
the centre and rear. They are to "keep their wind;" an expression which
leaves optional whether to tack, or stand as they are, whether to engage
the separated enemies to windward or to leeward, as occasion may offer,
in support of the van. The provisions of 1665 afterwards disappear. In
1740, and even as late as 1781, they are traceable only in certain
colorless articles, suggestive of the atrophied organs of a body
concerning whose past use physiologists may speculate.

As in the restoration of sounder methods, with which we shall be
concerned, this degeneration of ideals was a work of time. In June,
1666, the British met with a severe check in the Four Days Battle, in
which Monk, a soldier, commanded in chief. This reverse is chiefly to
be attributed to antecedent strategic errors, which made a portion only
of the available British force bear the brunt of the first three days;
but, among the inevitable criticisms, we find stress laid upon fighting
in line as essential to success. This insistence upon the line as an
effective instrument proceeded, among others, from Sir William Penn, a
seaman, and was at that time in the direction of professional advance.
The line had not yet obtained the general professional acceptance needed
to establish and utilize its indisputable value. This process was
gradual, but when effected it followed the usual laws of human
development; from a valuable means, it became in men's estimation an
exaggerated necessity. It came to pass in time that the line no longer
existed for tactics, but tactics for the line, in which they found their
consummation and end.

There intervened, however, a happier period,--one of transition,--and in
the third Anglo-Dutch war, 1672-1674, we seem to find a close approach
to just proportion between regularity of formation and decisive tactical
purpose; in which the principle of the line is recognized and observed,
but is utilized by professional audacity for definite and efficient
tactical action, aiming at conclusive results. The finest exponent of
this, the culminating epoch of naval warfare in the seventeenth century,
is the Dutchman Ruyter, who, taken altogether, was the greatest naval
seaman of that era, which may be roughly identified with the reign of
Charles II. After that, naval warfare was virtually suspended for
fifteen years, and when resumed in the last decade of the century, the
traces of incipient degeneracy can already be noted amid much brilliant
performance. From that time completeness of military achievement became
in men's minds less of an object than accurate observance of rule, and
in practice the defensive consideration of avoiding disaster began to
preponderate over offensive effort for the destruction of the enemy.

In the development of tactical science, the French had played a leading
part, as they usually have where reflective mental processes and formal
evolution of ideas are concerned. Among admirals, the greatest name of
this later period is the French Tourville, a master of the science of
his profession, and gifted with a personal courage of the heroic type;
while the leading exponent of Tourville's ideas, as well as historian of
his achievements, was the French priest Paul Hoste,--chaplain to his
fleet, and the father of the systematic treatment of naval evolutions.
But with Tourville's name is associated not only a high level of
professional management, but a caution in professional action not far
removed from timidity, so that an impatient Minister of Marine of his
day and nation styled him "poltroon in head, though not in heart." His
powers were displayed in the preservation and orderly movement of his
fleet; in baffling, by sheer skill, and during long periods, the efforts
of the enemy to bring him to action; in skilful disposition, when he
purposely accepted battle under disadvantage; but under most favorable
opportunities he failed in measures of energy, and, after achieving
partial success, superfluous care of his own command prevented his blows
from being driven home.

Tourville, though a brilliant seaman, thus not only typified an era of
transition, with which he was contemporary, but foreshadowed the period
of merely formal naval warfare, precise, methodical, and unenterprising,
emasculated of military virility, although not of mere animal courage.
He left to his successors the legacy of a great name, but also
unfortunately that of a defective professional tradition. The splendid
days of the French Navy under Louis XIV. passed away with him,--he died
in 1701; but during the long period of naval lethargy on the part of the
state, which followed, the French naval officers, as a class, never
wholly lost sight of professional ideals. They proved themselves, on the
rare occasions that offered, before 1715 and during the wars of Hawke
and Rodney, not only gallant seamen after the pattern of Tourville, but
also exceedingly capable tacticians, upon a system good as far as it
went, but defective on Tourville's express lines, in aiming rather at
exact dispositions and defensive security than at the thorough-going
initiative and persistence which confounds and destroys the enemy.
"War," to use Napoleon's phrase, "was to be waged without running
risks." The sword was drawn, but the scabbard was kept ever open for its
retreat.

The English, in the period of reaction which succeeded the Dutch wars,
produced their own caricature of systematized tactics. Even under its
influence, up to 1715, it is only just to say they did not construe
naval skill to mean anxious care to keep one's own ships intact. Rooke,
off Malaga, in 1704, illustrated professional fearlessness of
consequences as conspicuously as he had shown personal daring in the
boat attack at La Hougue; but his plans of battle exemplified the
particularly British form of inefficient naval action. There was no
great difference in aggregate force between the French fleet and that of
the combined Anglo-Dutch under his orders. The former, drawing up in the
accustomed line of battle, ship following ship in a single column,
awaited attack. Rooke, having the advantage of the wind, and therefore
the power of engaging at will, formed his command in a similar and
parallel line a few miles off, and thus all stood down together, the
ships maintaining their line parallel to that of the enemy, and coming
into action at practically the same moment, van to van, centre to
centre, rear to rear. This ignored wholly the essential maxim of all
intelligent warfare, which is so to engage as markedly to outnumber the
enemy at a point of main collision. If he be broken there, before the
remainder of his force come up, the chances all are that a decisive
superiority will be established by this alone, not to mention the moral
effect of partial defeat and disorder. Instead of this, the impact at
Malaga was so distributed as to produce a substantial equality from one
end to the other of the opposing fronts. The French, indeed, by
strengthening their centre relatively to the van and rear, to some
extent modified this condition in the particular instance; but the fact
does not seem to have induced any alteration in Rooke's dispositions.
Barring mere accident, nothing conclusive can issue from such
arrangements. The result accordingly was a drawn battle, although Rooke
says that the fight, which was maintained on both sides "with great fury
for three hours, ... was the sharpest day's service that I ever saw;" and
he had seen much,--Beachy Head, La Hougue, Vigo Bay, not to mention his
own great achievement in the capture of Gibraltar.

This method of attack remained the ideal--if such a word is not a
misnomer in such a case--of the British Navy, not merely as a matter of
irreflective professional acceptance, but laid down in the official
"Fighting Instructions." It cannot be said that these err on the side of
lucidity; but their meaning to contemporaries in this particular
respect is ascertained, not only by fair inference from their contents,
but by the practical commentary of numerous actions under commonplace
commanders-in-chief. It further received authoritative formulation in
the specific finding of the Court-Martial upon Admiral Byng, which was
signed by thirteen experienced officers. "Admiral Byng should have
caused his ships to tack together, and should immediately have borne
down upon the enemy; his van steering for the enemy's van, his rear for
its rear, each ship making for the one opposite to her in the enemy's
line, under such sail as would have enabled the worst sailer to preserve
her station in the line of battle." Each phrase of this opinion is a
reflection of an article in the Instructions. The line of battle was the
naval fetich of the day; and, be it remarked, it was the more dangerous
because in itself an admirable and necessary instrument, constructed on
principles essentially accurate. A standard wholly false may have its
error demonstrated with comparative ease; but no servitude is more
hopeless than that of unintelligent submission to an idea formally
correct, yet incomplete. It has all the vicious misleading of a
half-truth unqualified by appreciation of modifying conditions; and so
seamen who disdained theories, and hugged the belief in themselves as
"practical," became _doctrinaires_ in the worst sense.

It would seem, however, that a necessary antecedent to deliverance from
a false conception,--as from any injurious condition,--is a practical
illustration of its fallacy. Working consequences must receive
demonstration, concrete in some striking disastrous event, before
improvement is undertaken. Such experience is painful to undergo; but
with most men, even in their private capacity, and in nearly all
governmental action where mere public interests are at stake, remedy is
rarely sought until suffering is not only felt, but signalized in a
conspicuous incident. It is needless to say that the military
professions in peace times are peculiarly liable to this apathy; like
some sleepers, they can be awakened only by shaking. For them, war alone
can subject accepted ideas to the extreme test of practice. It is
doubtless perfectly true that acquaintance with military and naval
history, mastery of their teachings, will go far to anticipate the
penalty attaching to truth's last argument--chastisement; but
imagination is fondly impatient of warning by the past, and easily
avails itself of fancied or superficial differences in contemporary
conditions, to justify measures which ignore, or even directly
contravene, ascertained and fundamental principles of universal
application.

Even immediate practical experience is misinterpreted when incidents are
thus viewed through the medium of a precedent bias. The Transvaal War,
for instance, has afforded some striking lessons of needed
modifications, consequent upon particular local factors, or upon
developments in the material of war; but does any thoughtful military
man doubt that imagination has been actively at work, exaggerating or
distorting, hastily waiving aside permanent truth in favor of temporary
prepossessions or accidental circumstance? It is at least equally likely
that the naval world at the present time is hugging some fond delusions
in the excessive size and speed to which battle-ships are tending, and
in the disproportionate weight assigned to the defensive as compared to
the offensive factors in a given aggregate tonnage. Imagination, theory,
_a priori_ reasoning, is here at variance with rational historical
precedent, which has established the necessity of numbers as well as of
individual power in battle-ships, and demonstrated the superiority of
offensive over defensive strength in military systems. These--and
other--counterbalancing considerations have in past wars enforced the
adoption of a medium homogeneous type, as conducive both to adequate
numbers,--which permit the division of the fleet when required for
strategic or tactical purposes,--and also directly to offensive fleet
strength by the greater facility of manoeuvring possessed by such
vessels; for the strength of a fleet lies not chiefly in the single
units, but in their mutual support in elastic and rapid movement. Well
tested precedent--experience--has here gone to the wall in favor of an
untried forecast of supposed fundamental change in conditions. But
experience is uncommonly disagreeable when she revenges herself after
her own fashion.

The British Navy of the eighteenth century in this way received an
unpleasant proof of the faultiness of its then accepted conclusions, in
the miscarriages of Mathews off Toulon, in 1744, and of Byng off
Minorca, in 1756. So fixed were men's habits of thought that the lessons
were not at once understood. As evidenced by the distribution of
censure, the results were attributed by contemporary judges to
particular incidents of each battle, not to the erroneous underlying
general plans, contravening all sound military precedent, which from the
first made success improbable, indeed impossible, except by an
inefficiency of the enemy which was not to be presumed. These battles
therefore are important, militarily, in a sense not at all dependent
upon their consequences, which were ephemeral. They are significant as
extreme illustrations of incompetent action, deriving from faulty
traditions; and they have the further value of showing the starting
point, the zero of the scale, from which the progress of the century is
to be measured. In describing them, therefore, attention will be given
chiefly to those circumstances which exhibit the shackles under which
fleet movements then labored, not only from the difficulties inherent to
the sea and sailing ships, but from the ideas and methods of the times.
Those incidents also will be selected which show how false standards
affected particular individuals, according to their personal
characteristics.

In Admiral Mathews' action, in February, 1744, an allied fleet composed
of sixteen French ships-of-the-line and twelve Spanish lay in Toulon,
waiting to sail for a Spanish port. The British, in force numerically
equal, were at anchor under the Hyeres Islands, a few miles to the
eastward. They got underway when the allied movement began on February
20th; but anchored again for the night, because the enemy that day came
no farther than the outer road of Toulon. The next morning the French
and Spaniards put to sea with a wind at first westerly, and stretched to
the southward in long, single column, the sixteen French leading. At 10
A.M. the British followed, Vice-Admiral Lestock's division taking the
van; but the wind, shifting to east, threw the fleet on the port tack,
on which the rear under Rear-Admiral Rowley had to lead. It became
necessary, therefore, for this division and the centre to pass Lestock,
which took some time with the light airs prevailing. Two or three
manoeuvres succeeded, with the object of forming the fighting order, a
column similar and parallel to that of the enemy, and to get closer to
him. When night fell a signal was still flying for the line abreast, by
which, if completed, the ships would be ranged on a line parallel to the
allies, and heading towards them; consequently abreast of each other. It
would then need only a change of course to place them in column, sides
to the enemy; which, as before said, was the fighting order--the "line
of battle."

The line abreast, however, was not fully formed at dark. Therefore the
admiral, in order to hasten its completion, soon afterwards made a night
signal, with lanterns, for the fleet to bring-to,--that is, bring their
sides to the wind, and stop. He intended thereby that the ships already
in station should stand still, while the others were gaining their
places, all which is a case of simple evolution, by land as by sea. It
was contended by the admiral that Vice-Admiral Lestock's division was
then too far to the right and rear, and hence too distant from the
enemy, and that it was his duty first to get into his station and then
to bring-to. To this the vice-admiral on his trial replied, first, that
he was not out of his station; and, second, that if he were, the later
signal, to bring-to, suspended the earlier, to form line abreast, and
that it was therefore his business, without any discretion, to stop
where he was. Concerning the first plea, a number of witnesses, very
respectable in point of rank and opportunity for seeing, testified that
the vice-admiral did bring-to three or four miles to the right and rear
of his place in the line abreast, reckoning his station from the
admiral's ship; yet, as the Court peremptorily rejected their evidence,
it is probably proper to accept the contemporary decision as to this
matter of fact.

But as regards the second plea, being a matter of military correctness,
a difference of opinion is allowable. The Court adopted as its own the
argument of the vice-admiral. Without entering here into a technical
discussion, the Court's ruling, briefly stated, was that the second
signal superseded the first, so that, if the vice-admiral was in the
wrong place, it was not his duty to get into the right before stopping;
and that this was doubly the case because an article of the Night
Signals (7) prescribed that, under the conditions of the alleged
offence, "a fleet sailing before the wind, or nearly so, if the admiral
made the signal for the fleet to bring-to, the windward ships should
bring-to first." Therefore, if Lestock was to windward, as the charge
read, it was his duty to bring-to first and at once. It is evident,
however, that even the Sailing Instructions, cast-iron as they were,
contemplated a fleet in order, not one in process of forming order; and
that to bring-to helter-skelter, regardless of order, was to obey the
letter rather than the spirit. Muddle-headed as Mathews seems to have
been, what he was trying to do was clear enough; and the duty of a
subordinate was to carry out his evident aim. An order does not
necessarily supersede its predecessor, unless the two are incompatible.
The whole incident, from Lestock's act to the Court's finding, is
instructive as showing the slavish submission to the letter of the
Instructions; a submission traceable not to the law merely, but to the
added tradition that had then fast hold of men's minds. It is most
interesting to note that the unfortunate Byng was one of the signers of
this opinion, as he was also one of the judges that sentenced Mathews to
be dismissed from the navy, as responsible for the general failure.

During the night of the 21st the allies, who had stopped after dark,
appear again to have made sail. Consequently, when day broke, the
British found themselves some distance astern and to windward--
northeast; the wind continuing easterly. Their line, indifferently
well formed in van and centre, stretched over a length of nine
miles through the straggling of the rear. Lestock's ship was six
miles from that of Mathews, whereas it should not have been more than
two and a half, at most, in ordinary sailing; for battle, the
Instructions allowed little over a half-mile. Accepting the Court's
finding that he was in position at dark, this distance can only be
attributed, as Lestock argued and the Court admitted, to a current--that
most convenient of scape-goats in navigation. The allies, too, had a
lagging rear body, five Spanish ships being quite a distance astern; but
from van to rear they extended but six miles, against the British nine.
It was the distance of the British rear, not straggling in van or
centre, that constituted this disadvantage.

Mathews wished to wait till Lestock reached his place, but the allies
were receding all the time; and, though their pace was slackened to
enable the five sternmost Spaniards to come up, the space between the
fleets was increasing. It was the duty of the British admiral to force
an action, on general principles; but in addition he believed that the
French intended to push for Gibraltar, enter the Atlantic, and join
their Brest fleet, in order to cover an invasion of England by an army
reported to be assembling at Dunkirk. Clearly, therefore, something must
be done; yet to enter into a general engagement with near a third of his
command out of immediate supporting distance was contrary to the
accepted principles of the day. The fleet was not extended with that of
the enemy, by which is meant that the respective vans, centres, and
rears were not opposed; the British van being only abreast of the allied
centre, their centre of the allied rear, Lestock tailing away astern and
to windward, while the dozen leading French were some distance ahead of
both bodies. Now the Fighting Instructions required that, "If the
admiral and his fleet have the wind of the enemy, and they have
stretched themselves in a line of battle, the van of the admiral's fleet
is to steer with the van of the enemies, and _there_ to engage them."
There was no alternative course laid down; just as there was no
punishment alternative to death in the Article of War under which Byng
was shot.

Yet the indications all were that to wait for this most formal and
pedantic disposition, which ignored every principle of warfare, would
be to throw away the chance of battle. The French, fresh from port and
clean-bottomed, out-sailed the bulk of the British, as did the
Spaniards, though to a less degree; and it was part of Lestock's
defence, admitted by the Court, that, doing his utmost, his division, as
a whole, certainly could not get abreast the allied rear. Lestock,
indeed, directly submitted to the Court that the commander-in-chief was
at fault in not waiting till his line was thus extended and formed, and
then all bearing down together, in line abreast; although by his own
contention no such issue could have been reached that day, unless the
allies were obliging enough to wait. "I aver, and I shall die in this
opinion, that no man that is an officer, who knows his duty, will make
the signal for line abreast to steer down upon an enemy, until the fleet
has been stretched and extended in a line of battle, according to the
19th Article of the Fighting Instructions. Can it be service," he adds,
"to bear down so much unformed and in confusion, that the van cannot
possibly join battle with, or engage the van of the enemy, the centre
with the centre, and the rear with the rear?"

Mathews not being then on trial, the Court in its finding did not reply
directly to this question; but indirectly it left no doubt as to its
opinion. "The Admiral, by bearing down as he did upon the rear division
of the combined fleet, excluded the Vice-Admiral from any part of the
engagement, if he could have come up; for if both lines had been closed,
when the Admiral engaged the _Real_, there would have been no more than
one ship of the enemy's fleet for the Vice-Admiral and his whole
division to have engaged." Again, "It does not appear that the
Vice-Admiral was in any part the cause of the miscarriage of his
Majesty's fleet in the Mediterranean; the _bringing on of the general
engagement according to the 19th Article_ of the Fighting
Instructions ... not depending upon him." Sixteen officers of the rank of
captain and above signed these opinions, and there is no denying the
words of the 19th Article; yet one wonders to see no recognition of the
necessity of using your opportunity as you find it, of the moral effect
of an approaching reserve, which Lestock's division would have
constituted, of the part it may take in improving or repairing the
results of an action--taking the place of injured friends, preventing
injured foes escaping, turning doubtful battle into victory. But no;
these commonplaces of to-day and of all time were swamped by the
Fighting Instructions. It will be seen in the sequel what a disastrous
moral influence Lestock's aloofness exercised upon a few timid captains,
and not improbably upon the entire subsequent course and worst errors of
his unfortunate superior.

One of the witnesses in the ensuing Courts-Martial testified that the
commander-in-chief, under these perplexing circumstances, went into the
stern gallery of the flag-ship _Namur_, and called to Captain Cornwall
of the _Marlborough_, next astern, asking what he thought. Cornwall
replied he "believed they would lose the glory of the day, if they did
not attack the Spaniards,"--_i.e._, the allied rear-centre and
rear,--"the Vice-Admiral--Lestock--being so far astern." To which the
admiral said, "If you'll bear down and attack the _Real_,"--the _Real
Felipe_, Spanish flag-ship,--"I'll be your second." This was about one
o'clock, and the signal to engage had been made two hours earlier,
probably with the double object of indicating the ultimate intention of
the movements in hand, and the immediate urgency of forming the line.
The admiral's words betray the indecision of an irresolute nature and of
professional rustiness, but not of timidity, and Cornwall's words turned
the scale. The course of the flag-ship _Namur_ had hitherto been but a
little off the wind, "lasking" down, to use the contemporary but long
obsolete expression, in such manner as to show the admiral's desire to
engage himself with the enemy's centre, according to the Fighting
Instructions; but now, in hopelessness of that result, she kept broad
off, directly for the nearest enemy, accompanied closely by the
_Norfolk_, her next ahead, and by the _Marlborough_. Rear-Admiral
Rowley, commanding the van, imitated the admiral's example, bringing the
French ship abreast him to close action. He also was thoroughly
supported by the two captains next astern of him, the second of whom was
Edward Hawke,--afterwards the brilliant admiral,--in the _Berwick_. Two
British groups, each of three ships, were thus hotly engaged; but with
an interval between them of over half a mile, corresponding to the
places open for six or seven other vessels. The conduct of the ships
named, under the immediate influence of the example set by the two
admirals, suggests how much the average man is sustained by professional
tone; for a visible good example is simply a good standard, a high
ideal, realized in action.

Unfortunately, however, just as Hawke's later doings showed the man able
to rise above the level of prescribed routine duty, there was found in
the second astern of the _Namur_ a captain capable of exceptional
backwardness, of reasoning himself into dereliction of clear duty, and
thus effecting a demonstration that the example of timidity is full as
contagious and more masterful than that of audacity. The flag-ships and
their supporters ranged themselves along the hostile line to windward,
within point-blank range; according to the 20th Article of the Fighting
Instructions, which read, "Every Commander is to take care that his guns
are not fired till he is sure he can reach the enemy upon a point-blank;
and by no means to suffer his guns to be fired over any of our own
ships." The point-blank is the range of a cannon laid level, and the
requirement was necessary to efficient action in those days of crude
devices for pointing, with ordnance material of inferior power. Even
sixty years later Nelson expressed his indifference to improvements in
pointing, on the ground that the true way of fighting was to get so
close that you could not miss your aim. Thus Mathews' captain placed the
_Namur_, of ninety guns, within four hundred yards--less than quarter of
a mile--of the Spanish flag-ship, the _Real Felipe_, of one hundred and
ten guns; and Cornwall brought the _Marlborough_ immediately in the wake
of the _Namur_, engaging the Spanish _Hercules_. But the _Dorsetshire_,
which should have followed the _Marlborough_, was stopped by her
commander, Captain George Burrish, at a distance which was estimated by
several witnesses to be from half a mile to nearly a mile from the
enemy, or, to use a very expressive phrase then current, "at random
shot." The Court-Martial, however, in pronouncing upon this point,
decided that inasmuch as a bar-shot came on board the _Dorsetshire_ in
this early part of the engagement, she must be construed to have brought
to within extreme point-blank. In view of the mass of testimony to the
greater distance, this seems to have been simply giving the benefit of a
doubt.

Thus situated, the action between the _Namur_ and _Marlborough_ on the
one side, and the _Real Felipe_ and _Hercules_ on the other, was for
some time very hot; but the _Marlborough_, moving faster than the
_Namur_, closed upon her, so that she had to get out of the way, which
she did by moving ahead and at the same time hauling to windward, till
she reached as far from the Spanish line as the _Dorsetshire_ had
remained. The Court in this matter decided that, after the admiral had
thus hauled off, the _Dorsetshire_ was in a line, or as far to
leeward--towards the enemy--as the admiral. The _Marlborough_ was thus
left alone, exposed to the fire of a ship heavier than herself, and also
to that of the _Hercules_, which was able to train upon her a
considerable part of her battery. Under these circumstances, it was the
duty of the _Dorsetshire_, as it was the opportunity of her commander,
by attacking the _Hercules_, to second, and support, the engaged ship;
but she continued aloof. After two hours--by 3 P.M.--the main and mizzen
masts were cut out of the _Marlborough_, and she lost her captain with
forty-two men killed, and one hundred and twenty wounded, out of a crew
of seven hundred and fifty. Thus disabled, the sails on the foremast
turned her head towards the enemy, and she lay moving sluggishly,
between the fleets, but not under control. The admiral now sent an
officer to Burrish--the second that morning--to order him into his
station and to support the _Marlborough_; while to the latter, in
response to an urgent representation by boat of her condition, and that
she was threatened by the approach of the hitherto separated ships of
the Spanish rear, he replied that the _Namur_ was wearing and would come
to her assistance.

When Burrish received his message, he sent for his lieutenants on the
quarter-deck, and spoke to them words which doubtless reflect the
reasoning upon which he was justifying to himself his most culpable
inaction. "Gentlemen, I sent for you to show you the position of our
ships to windward," (_i.e._ the ships of the centre division behind him,
and Lestock's division), "likewise those five sail [Spanish] of the
enemy that are astern of us. I have my orders to engage the _Real_, and
you see I am bearing down for that purpose." The lieutenants remarked
that he could do so with safety. To this he rejoined, with a curtness
that testifies to the uneasiness of his mind, "I did not send for you to
ask your opinions, but only to observe that not one of our ships is
coming down to my assistance, in order to cut those five sail off, and
in case those five sail should oblige me to haul my wind again, and
leave the _Marlborough_, that you may be able to indemnify my conduct,
if called in question." One witness also testified that he "was angry
that Admiral Lestock's division did not bear down,"--which was just
enough,--and that "he thought it most advisable to keep his station;"
meaning by this, apparently, to remain where he was. His
cross-examination of the evidence was directed to prove the danger to
his ship from these remaining Spaniards. This anxiety was wholly
misplaced, and professionally unworthy. Quite independent of orders by
signal and message, he was bound, in view of the condition of the
_Marlborough_, to go to her relief, and to assume that the three English
ships of the centre division, in his rear, would surely sustain him. To
base contrary action upon a doubt of their faithfulness was to condemn
himself. Four ships to five under such conditions should be rather a
spur than a deterrent to an officer of spirit, who understands the
obligation of his calling.

Till this, the _Dorsetshire_ had been under her three topsails only. She
appears then to have stood down under more sail, but very slowly, and
here occurred another disaster which was largely chargeable to her being
out of her station. Seeing the desperate state of the _Marlborough_,
Mathews, who throughout managed blunderingly, with the single exception
of the original attack, had thought to aid her and divert the fire of
the _Real_ by sending against the latter a fire-ship. It was elementary
that vessels of this class needed energetic support and cover in their
desperate work. Small in size, of no battery-force except against boat
attacks, loaded with combustibles and powder, success in the use of them
under an enemy's guns required not only imperturbable coolness and
nerve, but the utmost attainable immunity from the attention of the
enemy. This could be secured only by a heavy and sustained fire from
their own fleet. With the _Norfolk_, _Namur_, _Marlborough_, and
_Dorsetshire_ in close line, as they should have been, and heavily
engaged, a fire-ship might have passed between them, and, though at
imminent hazard even so, have crossed the four hundred yards of
intervening water to grapple the hostile flag-ship; but with the
_Marlborough_ lying disabled and alone, the admiral himself acting with
indecision, and the _Dorsetshire_ hanging aloof, the attempt was little
short of hopeless. Still it was made, and the _Anne Galley_--such was
her odd name--bore down, passing close by the _Dorsetshire_.

It became doubly the duty of Burrish to act, to push home whatever
demonstration was in his power to make; the fire-ship, however, went by
him and was permitted to pursue her desperate mission without his
support. The _Real_, seeing the _Anne_ approach, bore up out of her
line, and at the same time sent a strongly-manned launch to grapple and
tow her out of the way. This was precisely one of the measures that it
was the business of supporting ships to repel. The captain of the
fire-ship, thrown upon his own resources, opened fire, a most hazardous
measure, as much of his priming was with loose powder; but the launch
readily avoided injury by taking position directly ahead, where the guns
would not bear. The crew of the _Anne_ were now ordered into the boat,
except the captain and five others, who were to remain to the last
moment, and light the train; but from some cause not certainly
demonstrated she exploded prematurely, being then within a hundred yards
of the _Real_. It is necessary to say that the Court-Martial acquitted
Burrish of blame, because he "had no orders to cover the fire-ship,
either by signal or otherwise." Technically, the effect of this finding
was to shift an obvious and gross blunder from the captain to some one
else; but it is evident that if the _Dorsetshire_ had occupied her
station astern of the _Marlborough_, the fire-ship's attempt would have
been much facilitated.

The Court decided unanimously that Burrish "ought to have borne down as
far to leeward as where the admiral first began to engage,
notwithstanding that the admiral might be hauled off before the
_Dorsetshire_ got so far to leeward." The point upon which the line
should have been formed was thus established by the Court's finding. The
subsequent proceedings of this ship need not be related. She now came
slowly into close action, but that part of the enemy's order was already
broken, and their rear vessels, the fear of which had controlled her
captain, passed by as they came up without serious action.

How far Burrish's example influenced the captains immediately behind him
cannot certainly be affirmed. Such shyness as he displayed is not only
infectious, but saps that indispensable basis upon which military
effectiveness reposes, namely, the certainty of co-operation and
support, derived from mutual confidence, inspired by military
discipline, obedience, and honor. It is well to note here that the
remoteness of Lestock's division thus affected Burrish, who evidently
could not understand either its distance or its failure to approach, and
who, being what he was, saw himself threatened with want of that backing
which he himself was refusing to the _Marlborough_. While he was blaming
Lestock, hard things were being said about him in Lestock's division;
but the lesson of Lestock's influence upon Burrish is not less
noteworthy because the latter forfeited both duty and honor by his
hesitation. It is to be feared that the captain of the _Essex_,
following the _Dorsetshire_, was a coward; even so Burrish, an old
captain, certainly did not cheer his heart by good example, but rather
gave him the pretext for keeping still farther off. The rearmost two
ships of the division but confirm the evidences of demoralization, and
the more so that their captains seem from the evidence to have been
well-disposed average men; but the five Spanish vessels approaching,
with the _Dorsetshire_ and the _Essex_ holding aloof, was too much for
their resolution--and not unnaturally. The broad result, however, was
lamentable; for four British ships feared to come to the aid of an
heroic and desperately injured consort, in deadly peril, because five
enemies were drawing nigh.

Upon these four therefore fell, and not unjustly, the weight of national
anger. Burrish was cashiered, and declared forever incapable of being an
officer in the Navy. Norris, of the _Essex_, absconded to avoid trial.
The two others were pronounced unfit to command, but, although never
again employed, mitigating circumstances in their behavior caused them
to be retained on the lists of the Navy. It is not too much to say that
they were men just of the stamp to have escaped this shame and ruin of
reputation, under more favorable conditions of professional tone.

Concerning the vice-admiral's action at this time, which had its share
in the ruin of these captains, another curious instance of men's bondage
to the order of battle transpires. The three rear ships of his squadron
were clean, that is, relatively fast; and they were rearmost for this
very reason of speed, because, when the division led on the other tack,
they, as headmost ships of the fleet, would be ready to chase.
Nevertheless, when the admiral sent to Lestock in the forenoon to hurry
him into line, no order was given to these ships to press ahead. Why?
Lestock answers that to send those ships ahead, out of the place in the
line prescribed to them by the commander-in-chief, was breaking the
line, which should expose him to condign punishment; and this opinion
the Court also adopts: "The [only] messages sent to the Vice-Admiral by
the Admiral's two lieutenants were to make what sail he possibly could,
and to close the line with his division; no signal was made for him to
chase with his division, or send ships of his division to chase; without
which, _while the signal for the line of battle was flying_, and more
especially after the messages brought him, he could not, _without breach
of duty_, either have chased or sent ships to chase out of the line." It
is to be noted that the word "chase" is here used in the strictest
technical sense, not merely to exclude Lestock from diverting a ship to
some other purpose than that of the engagement, but even from shifting
her place in the general order in the view of furthering the engagement;
for the Court says again: "The Vice-Admiral could not send any ships of
his division to the relief of the _Namur_ and _Marlborough without
breaking the order of battle_, there being four ships of the Admiral's
division" (to wit, the _Dorsetshire_ and that crowd) "stationed between
the Vice-Admiral's division and the _Marlborough_, which four ships
might have gone to the assistance of the _Marlborough_."

The second in command thus had no liberty to repair either the
oversights of his superior, or the results of obvious bad conduct in
juniors; for Burrish's backwardness was observed throughout the rear.
There was a long road yet to travel to Nelson's personal action at St.
Vincent and Copenhagen, or to his judicious order at Trafalgar, "The
Second in command will, after my intentions are made known to him, have
the entire direction of his line." Even that great officer Hood, off the
Chesapeake in 1781, felt himself tied hand and foot by the union flag at
the mizzen peak,--the signal for the line. Only the commander-in-chief
could loose the bonds; either by his personal initiative alone, and
vigilant supervision, as did Hawke and Rodney, or by adding to this the
broad view of discretion in subordinates which Nelson took. Before
leaving this subject, note may be taken of a pettifogging argument
advanced by Lestock and adopted by the Court, that orders to these three
ships to press ahead would have resulted in nothing, because of the
lightness of the wind then and afterwards. True, doubtless, and known
after the fact; but who before the event could predict the uncertain
Mediterranean breeze, or how much each foot gained might contribute to
the five minutes which measure the interval between victory and defeat.
It is not by such lagging hesitations that battles are won.

It is a trivial coincidence, though it may be noted in passing, that as
it was the second astern of the commander-in-chief on whom fell the
weight of the disgrace, so it was the second astern of the commander of
the van who alone scored a distinct success, and achieved substantial
gain of professional reputation. Hawke, at first bearing down, had come
to close action with the Spanish _Neptuno_, a vessel nominally of less
force than his own ship, the _Berwick_. The _Neptuno_ was at length
driven out of her line, with a loss of some two hundred killed and
wounded. Thus left without an immediate antagonist, Hawke's attention
was attracted by another Spanish vessel, the _Poder_, of the same
nominal force as the _Neptuno_, and following her in the order; with
which four or five of the seven British ships, that should have closed
the interval between Mathews and Rowley, were carrying on a distant and
circumspect engagement, resembling in caution that of the _Dorsetshire_
and her followers. He carried the _Berwick_ close alongside the new
enemy, dismasted her, and after two hours compelled her to strike her
flag; the only vessel in either fleet that day to surrender, and then
only after a resistance as honorable to Spain as that of the
_Marlborough_ had been to Great Britain. Her commander refused to yield
his sword to any but Hawke, who also took possession of the prize with a
party from his own ship; thus establishing beyond dispute, by all
customary formalities, his claim to the one trophy of the day. The
occurrences through which she was afterwards lost to the British, so
that only the honor of the capture remained, and that to Hawke alone,
must be briefly told; for they, too, are a part of the mismanagement
that has given to this battle its particular significance in naval
history.

As the unlucky fire-ship bore down, Mathews began wearing the
_Namur_,--turning her round, that is, from the wind, and therefore
towards the _Marlborough_ and her opponents. In this he seems to have
had first in view supporting the fire-ship and covering the
_Marlborough_. Boats were ahead of the latter towing her from the enemy.
As she was thus being dragged off, but after the fire-ship blew up, the
_Namur_ passed between her and the hostile line; then, hauling to the
wind on the starboard tack, she stood north towards Lestock's division.
This movement to the rear was imitated by the British ships of the
centre,--the _Dorsetshire_ and others,--and, beyond a brush with the
rear five Spanish vessels as they came up, the action in the centre here
ceased.

This retrograde movement of Mathews and his division drew the centre
away from the van. At about the same time the allied van, composed
wholly of French ships, seeing the straits of the _Poder_ and the
_Real_, tacked--turned round--to come down to their assistance. This
imposed a like movement upon the British van, lest it should be engaged
apart from the rest of the fleet, and perhaps doubled on, by a number of
perfectly fresh ships. The _Poder_, having lost her chief spars, could
not be carried off, nor was Hawke able even to remove the men he had
thrown on board. She was therefore retaken by the French. Lieutenant
Lloyd, the officer in charge, escaped with a part of the prize crew,
taking with him also a number of Spanish prisoners; but a junior
lieutenant and some seamen were left behind and captured. The _Berwick_
being compelled to follow her division, Lloyd could not rejoin her till
the following day, and sought refuge for that night on board another
ship.

The next day, February 23d, Mathews had another chance. As he did not
pursue during the night, while the allies continued to retire, he was a
long way off at daylight; but his fleet was now united, and the enemy
retreating. He need therefore have no anxiety about the crippled
_Marlborough_, but could follow freely; whereas, the enemy being
pursued, their injured ships both retarded the movement and were
endangered. In the course of the day, the _Poder_ had lagged so far
behind that Admiral Rowley, who had recognized Hawke's enterprise the
day before, directed him to move down upon her. As he approached, the
French ship in company abandoned her, but in taking possession Hawke was
anticipated by the _Essex_, which Mathews himself had ordered to do so.
The captain of the _Essex_ got hold of the Spanish flag, with some other
small trophies, which he afterwards refused to give up unless compelled;
and, as Mathews would not give an order, Hawke never got them. Thus
curiously it came to pass that the one man who above several
misdemeanants distinguished himself by bad conduct, amounting to
cowardice, and who ran away to escape trial, kept the tokens of the
single achievement of the day from him whose valor had won them. The
_Poder_ herself was set on fire, and destroyed.

The British fleet continued to follow during the 23d, and at nightfall
was within three or four miles of the enemy, when Mathews again stopped.
The allies, continuing to withdraw, were next morning nearly out of
sight, and further pursuit was abandoned.

Thus ended this almost forgotten affair, which in its day occasioned to
an unusual degree the popular excitement and discussion which always
follow marked disaster, and but rarely attend success. Besides the
particular missteps of Lestock and the individual captains, which have
been mentioned, Mathews's conduct was marked by serious failures in
professional competency. The charge preferred against him which seems
most to have attracted attention, and to have been considered most
damaging, was taking his fleet into action in a confused and disorderly
manner. It is significant of professional standards that this should
have assumed such prominence; for, however faulty may have been his
previous management, the most creditable part of his conduct was the
manner of his attack. He did not wait for a pedantically accurate line,
but by a straightforward onslaught, at a favorable moment, upon a part
of the enemy,--and that the rear,--set an example which, had it been
followed by all who could do so, would probably have resulted in a
distinct and brilliant success. He was justified--if he reasoned at
all--in expecting that Lestock could get into action as soon as the
French van; or, at the least, before it could reverse the conditions
which would have ensued from a vigorous encounter upon the lines of
Mathews's attack. It is most doubtful, indeed, whether the French van
would have ventured to engage, in the case supposed; for the French
admiral, writing to the French ambassador in Spain, used these words:
"It is clear, in the situation I was in, it could not be expected that a
French admiral should go to the assistance of the Spaniards; neither
could the vanguard of the fleet do it without running the hazard of
being surrounded by the vanguard of the English, which had the wind of
them; but _as soon as the English left me_ I drew together all the ships
of both squadrons, and sailed immediately to the assistance of the _Real
Felipe_, in doing which I was exposed to the fire of the whole English
line; but happily the English did not punish my _rashness_ as it
deserved." Evidently De Court shared to the full the professional
caution which marked the French naval officers, with all their personal
courage; for if it was rash to pass the hostile line after it wore, it
would be reckless to do so before.

Considered simply as a tactical situation, or problem, quite independent
of any tactical forethought or insight on the part of the
commander-in-chief,--of which there is little indication,--the
conditions resulting from his attack were well summed up in a
contemporary publication, wholly adverse to Mathews in tone, and
saturated with the professional prepossessions embodied in the Fighting
Instructions. This writer, who claims to be a naval officer, says:


     "The whole amount of this fight is that the centre, consisting of
     eleven ships-of-the-line, together with two of-the-line and two
     fifty-gun ships of the Rear-Admiral's division [the van], _were
     able to destroy_ the whole Spanish squadron, much more so as three
     of those ships went on with the French [the allied van], and four
     of the sternmost did not get up with their admiral before it was
     darkish, long after the fire-ship's misfortune, so that the whole
     afternoon there were only five, out of which the _Constante_ was
     beat away in less than an hour; what then fifteen ships could be
     doing from half an hour past one till past five, no less than four
     hours, and these ships not taken, burnt, and destroyed, is the
     question which behooves them to answer."


In brief, then, Mathews's attack was so delivered that the weight of
thirteen of-the-line fell upon five Spanish of the same class, the
discomfiture of which, actually accomplished even under the misbehavior
of several British ships, separated the extreme rear, five other Spanish
vessels, from the rest of the allies. Whatever the personal merit or
lack of merit on the part of the commander-in-chief, such an
opportunity, pushed home by a "band of brothers," would at the least
have wiped out these rear ten ships of the allies; nor could the
remainder in the van have redeemed the situation. As for the method of
attack, it is worthy of note that, although adopted by Mathews
accidentally, it anticipated, not only the best general practice of a
later date, but specifically the purpose of Rodney in the action which
he himself considered the most meritorious of his whole career,--that of
April 17, 1780. The decisive signal given by him on that occasion, as
explained by himself, meant that each ship should steer, not for the
ship corresponding numerically to her in the enemy's order, but for the
one immediately opposite at the time the signal was made. This is what
Mathews and his seconds did, and others should have imitated. Singularly
enough, not only was the opportunity thus created lost, but there is no
trace of its existence, even, being appreciated in such wise as to
affect professional opinion. As far as Mathews himself was concerned,
the accounts show that his conduct, instead of indicating tactical
sagacity, was a mere counsel of desperation.

But after engaging he committed palpable and even discreditable
mistakes. Hauling to windward--away--when the _Marlborough_ forced him
ahead, abandoned that ship to overwhelming numbers, and countenanced the
irresolution of the _Dorsetshire_ and others. Continuing to stand north,
after wearing on the evening of the battle, was virtually a retreat,
unjustified by the conditions; and it would seem that the same false
step gravely imperilled the _Berwick_, Hawke holding on, most properly,
to the very last moment of safety, in order to get back his prize-crew.
Bringing-to on the night of the 23d was an error of the same character
as standing north during that of the 22d. It was the act of a doubtful,
irresolute man,--irresolute, not because a coward, but because wanting
in the self-confidence that springs from conscious professional
competency. In short, the commander-in-chief's unfitness was graphically
portrayed in the conversation with Cornwall from the quarter gallery of
the flag-ship. "If you approve and will go down with me, I will go
down." Like so many men, he needed a backer, to settle his doubts and to
stiffen his backbone. The instance is far from unique.

In the case of Byng, as of Mathews, we are not concerned with the
general considerations of the campaign to which the battle was
incidental. It is sufficient to note that in Minorca, then a British
possession, the French had landed an army of 15,000 men, with siege
artillery sufficient to reduce the principal port and fortress, Port
Mahon; upon which the whole island must fall. Their communications with
France depended upon the French fleet cruising in the neighborhood.
Serious injury inflicted upon it would therefore go far to relieve the
invested garrison.

[Illustration: Plan of Byng's Action off Minorca, May 20, 1756]

[Transcriber's Note: This illustration shows on a map the positions of
the fleets and their ships at various times in the action.  Critical
positions on the map are marked with codes such as "B1" and "F2",
which will be referred to below in the text.  This illustration is
available in the HTML version of the e-book.]

Under these circumstances the British fleet sighted Minorca on the 19th
of May, 1756, and was attempting to exchange information with the
besieged, when the French fleet was seen in the southeast. Byng stood
towards it, abandoning for the time the effort to communicate. That
night both fleets manoeuvred for advantage of position with regard to
the wind. The next day, between 9 and 10 A.M., they came again in view
of each other, and at 11 were about six miles apart, the French still to
the southeast, with a breeze at south-southwest to southwest. The
British once more advanced towards them, close hauled on the starboard
tack, heading southeasterly, the enemy standing on the opposite tack,
heading westerly, both carrying sail to secure the weather gage (B1,
F1). It appeared at first that the French would pass ahead of the
British, retaining the windward position; but towards noon the wind
changed, enabling the latter to lie up a point or two higher (B2). This
also forced the bows of the several French vessels off their course, and
put them out of a regular line of battle; that is, they could no longer
sail in each other's wake (F2). Being thus disordered, they reformed on
the same tack, heading northwest, with the wind very little forward of
the beam. This not only took time, but lost ground to leeward, because
the quickest way to re-establish the order was for the mass of the fleet
to take their new positions from the leewardmost vessel. When formed
(F3), as they could not now prevent the British line from passing
ahead, they hove-to with their main-topsails aback,--stopped,--awaiting
the attack, which was thenceforth inevitable and close at hand.

In consequence of what has been stated, the British line (B2-B3)--more
properly, column--was passing ahead of the French (F2-F3), steering
towards their rear, in a direction in a general sense opposite to
theirs, but not parallel; that is, the British course made an angle, of
between thirty and forty-five degrees, with the line on which their
enemy was ranged. Hence, barring orders to the contrary,--which were not
given,--each British ship was at its nearest to the enemy as she passed
their van, and became more and more distant as she drew to the rear. It
would have been impossible to realize more exactly the postulate of the
17th Article of the Fighting Instructions, which in itself voiced the
ideal conditions of an advantageous naval position for attack, as
conceived by the average officer of the day; and, as though most
effectually to demonstrate once for all how that sort of thing would
work, the adjunct circumstances approached perfection. The admiral was
thoroughly wedded to the old system, without an idea of departing from
it, and there was a fair working breeze with which to give it effect,
for the ships under topsails and foresail would go about three knots;
with top-gallant sails, perhaps over four. A fifty-gun ship, about the
middle of the engagement, had to close her lower deck ports when she set
her top-gallant sails on the wind, which had then freshened a little.

The 17th Article read thus: "If the admiral see the enemy standing
towards him, and he has the wind of them, the van of the fleet is to
make sail till they come the length of the enemy's rear, and our rear
abreast of the enemy's van; then he that is in the rear of our fleet is
to tack first, and every ship one after another as fast as they can
throughout the whole line; and if the admiral will have the whole fleet
to tack together, the sooner to put them in a posture of engaging the
enemy, he will hoist" a prescribed signal, "and fire a gun; and whilst
they are in fight with the enemy the ships will keep at half a cable's
length--one hundred yards--one of the other." All this Byng aimed to do.
The conditions exactly fitted, and he exactly followed the rules, with
one or two slight exceptions, which will appear, and for which the Court
duly censured him.

When thus much had been done, the 19th Article in turn found its
postulate realized, and laid down its corresponding instruction: "If the
admiral and his fleet have the wind of the enemy, and they have
stretched themselves in a line of battle, the van of the admiral's fleet
is to _steer with_ the van of the enemy's, and there to engage with
them." The precise force of "steer with" is not immediately apparent to
us to-day, nor does it seem to have been perfectly clear then; for the
question was put to the captain of the flag-ship,--the heroic Gardiner,
--"You have been asked if the admiral did not express some uneasiness at
Captain Andrews"--of the van ship in the action--"not seeming to
understand the 19th Article of the Fighting Instructions; Do not you
understand that article to relate to our van particularly when the two
fleets are [already] in a parallel line of battle to each other?" (As
TT, F3). _Answer_: "I apprehended it in the situation" [not parallel]
"we were in[1] if the word _For_ were instead of the word _With_, he
would, I apprehend, have steered directly _for_ the van ship of the
Enemy." _Question_. "As the 19th Article expresses to steer with the van
of the enemy, if the leading ship had done so, in the oblique line we
were in with the enemy, and every ship had observed it the same, would
it not have prevented our rear coming to action at all, at least within
a proper distance?" _Answer_: "Rear, and van too." "Steer with"
therefore meant, to the Court and to Gardiner, to steer parallel to the
enemy,--possibly likewise abreast,--and if the fleets were already
parallel the instruction would work; but neither the articles
themselves, nor Byng by his signals, did anything to effect parallelism
before making the signal to engage.

The captain of the ship sternmost in passing, which became the van when
the fleet tacked together according to the Instructions and signals,
evidently shared Gardiner's impression; when about, he steered parallel
to--"with"--the French, who had the wind nearly abeam. The mischief was
that the ships ahead of him in passing were successively more and more
distant from the enemy, and if they too, after tacking, steered with the
latter, they would never get any nearer. The _impasse_ is clear. Other
measures doubtless would enable an admiral to range his fleet parallel
to the enemy at any chosen distance, by taking a position himself and
forming the fleet on his ship; or, in this particular instance, Byng
being with the van as it, on the starboard tack, was passing the enemy
(B3 B3), could at any moment have brought his fleet parallel to the
French by signalling the then van ship to keep away a certain amount,
the rest following in her wake. Nothing to that effect being in the
Instructions, it seems not to have occurred to him. His one idea was to
conform to them, and he apprehended that after tacking, as they
prescribed, the new van ship would bear down and engage without further
orders, keeping parallel to the French when within point-blank, the
others following her as they could; a process which, from the varying
distances, would expose each to a concentrated fire as they successively
approached. Byng's action is only explicable to the writer by supposing
that he thus by "steer with" understood "steer for;" for when, after the
fleet tacked together, the new van ship (formerly the rear) did not of
her own motion head for the leading enemy, he signalled her to steer one
point, and then two points, in that direction. This, he explained in his
defence, was "to put the leading captain in mind of his Instructions,
who I perceived did not steer away with the enemy's leading ship
agreeable to the 19th Article of the Fighting Instructions." The results
of these orders not answering his expectations, he then made the signal
to engage, as the only remaining way perceptible to him for carrying out
the Instructions.

To summarize the foregoing, up to the moment the signal for battle was
made: While the fleets were striving for the weather gage, the wind had
shifted to the southwest. The French, momentarily disordered by the
change, had formed in line ahead about noon, heading northwest,
westerly, so as just to keep their main topsails aback and the ships
with bare steerage way, but under command (F3). The British standing
south-southeast, by the wind, were passing (B2-B3) across the
head of the enemy's fleet at a distance of from three to two miles--the
latter being the estimate by their ships then in the rear. The French
having twelve vessels in line and the British thirteen, the gradual
progress of the latter should bring their then van "the length of the
enemy's rear," about the time the rear came abreast of his van. When
this happened, the Instructions required that the fleet tack together,
and then stand for the enemy, ship to ship, number one to number one,
and so along the line till the number twelves met[2].

This Byng purposed to do, but, unluckily for himself, ventured on a
refinement. Considering that, if his vessels bore down when abreast
their respective antagonists, they would go bows-on, perpendicularly,
subject to a raking--enfilading--fire, he deferred the signal to tack
till his van had passed some distance beyond the French rear, because
thus they would have to approach in a slanting direction. He left out of
his account here the fact that all long columns tend to straggle in the
rear; hence, although he waited till his three or four leading ships had
passed the enemy before making signal to tack, the rear had got no
farther than abreast the hostile van. Two of the clearest witnesses,
Baird of the _Portland_, next to the then rear ship, and Cornwall of the
_Revenge_, seventh from it, testified that, after tacking together, to
the port tack, when they kept away for the enemy in obedience to the
signal for battle, it was necessary, in order to reach their particular
opponents, to bring the wind not only as far as astern, but on the
starboard quarter, showing that they had been in rear of their station
before tacking, and so too far ahead after it; while Durell of the
_Trident_, ninth from rear and therefore fifth from van, asserted that
at the same moment the British van, which after tacking became the rear,
had overpassed the enemy by five or six ships. This may be an
exaggeration, but that three or four vessels had gone beyond is proved
by evidence from the ships at that end of the line.

The Court therefore distinctly censured the admiral for this novelty:
"Unanimously, the Court are of opinion that when the British fleet on
the starboard tack were stretched abreast, _or about the beam_ of the
enemy's line, the admiral should have tacked the fleet all together, and
immediately have conducted it on a direct course for the enemy, the van
steering for the enemy's van," etc. The instructive point, however, is
not Byng's variation, nor the Court's censure, but the idea, common to
both, that the one and only way to use your dozen ships under the
conditions was to send each against a separate antagonist. The highest
and authoritative conception of a fleet action was thus a dozen naval
duels, occurring simultaneously, under initial conditions unfavorable to
the assailant. It is almost needless to remark that this is as contrary
to universal military teaching as it was to the practice of Rodney,
Howe, Jervis, and Nelson, a generation or two later.

This is, in fact, the chief significance of this action, which ratified
and in a measure closed the effete system to which the middle eighteenth
century had degraded the erroneous, but comparatively hearty, tradition
received by it from the seventeenth. It is true, the same blundering
method was illustrated in the War of 1778. Arbuthnot and Graves,
captains when Byng was tried, followed his plan in 1781, with like
demonstration of practical disaster attending false theory; but, while
the tactical inefficiency was little less, the evidence of faint-hearted
professional incompetency, of utter personal inadequacy, was at least
not so glaring. It is the combination of the two in the person of the
same commander that has given to this action its pitiful pre-eminence in
the naval annals of the century.

It is, therefore, not so much to point out the lesson, as to reinforce
its teaching by the exemplification of the practical results, that there
is advantage in tracing the sequel of events in this battle. The signal
to tack was made when the British van had reached beyond the enemy's
rear, at a very little after 1 P.M. (B3). This reversed the line of
battle, the rear becoming the van, on the port tack. When done, the new
van was about two miles from that of the French (F4); the new rear,
in which Byng was fourth from sternmost, was three and a half or four
from their rear. Between this and 2 P.M. came the signals for the ship
then leading to keep two points, twenty-five degrees, more to starboard,
--towards the enemy; a measure which could only have the bad effect of
increasing the angle which the British line already made with that of
the French, and the consequent inequality of distance to be traversed by
their vessels in reaching their opponents. At 2.20 the signal for battle
was made, and was repeated by the second in command, Rear-Admiral Temple
West, who was in the fourth ship from the van. His division of six bore
up at once and ran straight down before the wind, under topsails only,
for their several antagonists; the sole exception being the van-most
vessel, which took the slanting direction desired by Byng, with the
consequence that she got ahead of her position, had to back and to wear
to regain it, and was worse punished than any of her comrades. The
others engaged in line, within point-blank, the rear-admiral hoisting
the flag for close action (B4). Fifteen minutes later, the sixth ship,
and rearmost of the van, the _Intrepid_, lost her foretopmast, which
crippled her.

The seventh ship, which was the leader of the rear, Byng's own division,
got out of his hands before he could hold her. Her captain, Frederick
Cornwall, was nephew to the gallant fellow who fell backing Mathews so
nobly off Toulon, and had then succeeded to the command of the
_Marlborough_, fighting her till himself disabled. He had to bring the
wind on the starboard quarter of his little sixty-four, in order to
reach the seventh in the enemy's line, which was an eighty-gun ship,
carrying the flag of the French admiral. This post, by professional
etiquette, as by evident military considerations, Byng owed to his own
flag-ship, of equal force.

The rest of the rear division the commander-in-chief attempted to carry
with himself, slanting down; or, as the naval term then had it,
"lasking" towards the enemy. The flag-ship kept away four
points--forty-five degrees; but hardly had she started, under the very
moderate canvas of topsails and foresail, to cover the much greater
distance to be travelled, in order to support the van by engaging the
enemy's rear, when Byng observed that the two ships on his left--towards
the van--were not keeping pace with him. He ordered the main and mizzen
topsails to be backed to wait for them. Gardiner, the captain, "took the
liberty of offering the opinion" that, if sail were increased instead of
reduced, the ships concerned would take the hint, that they would all be
sooner alongside the enemy, and probably receive less damage in going
down. It was a question of example. The admiral replied, "You see that
the signal for the line is out, and I am ahead of those two ships; and
you would not have me, as admiral of the fleet, run down as if I was
going to engage a single ship. It was Mr. Mathews's misfortune to be
prejudiced by not carrying his force down together, which I shall
endeavor to avoid." Gardiner again "took the liberty" of saying he would
answer for one of the two captains doing his duty. The incident, up to
the ship gathering way again, occupied less than ten minutes; but with
the van going down headlong--as it ought--one ceases to wonder at the
impression on the public produced by one who preferred lagging for
laggards to hastening to support the forward, and that the populace
suspected something worse than pedantry in such reasoning at such a
moment. When way was resumed, it was again under the very leisurely
canvas of topsails and foresail.

By this had occurred the incident of the _Intrepid_ losing her
foretopmast. It was an ordinary casualty of battle, and one to be
expected; but to such a temper as Byng's, and under the cast-iron
regulations of the Instructions, it entailed consequences fatal to
success in the action,--if success were ever attainable under such a
method,--and was ultimately fatal to the admiral himself. The wreck of
the fallen mast was cleared, and the foresail set to maintain speed,
but, despite all, the _Intrepid_ dropped astern in the line. Cornwall in
the _Revenge_ was taking his place at the moment, and fearing that the
_Intrepid_ would come back upon him, if in her wake, he brought up first
a little to windward, on her quarter; then, thinking that she was
holding her way, he bore up again. At this particular instant he looked
behind, and saw the admiral and other ships a considerable distance
astern and to windward; much Lestock's position in Mathews's action.
This was the stoppage already mentioned, to wait for the two other
ships. Had Cornwall been Burrish, he might in this have seen occasion
for waiting himself; but he saw rather the need of the crippled ship.
The _Revenge_ took position on the _Intrepid's_ lee quarter, to support
her against the enemy's fire, concentrated on her when her mast was seen
to fall. As her way slackened, the _Revenge_ approached her, and about
fifteen minutes later the ship following, the _Princess Louisa_,--one of
those for which Byng had waited,--loomed up close behind Cornwall, who
expected her to run him on board, her braces being shot away. She
managed, however, with the helm to back her sails, and dropped clear;
but in so doing got in the way of the vessel next after her, the
_Trident_, which immediately preceded Byng. The captain of the
_Trident_, slanting down with the rest of the division, saw the
situation, put his helm up, ran under the stern of the _Louisa_, passed
on her lee side,--nearest the enemy,--and ranged up behind the
_Revenge_; but in doing this he not only crossed the stern of the
_Louisa_, but the bow of the admiral's ship--the _Ramillies_.

Under proper management the _Ramillies_ doubtless could have done just
what the _Trident_ did,--keep away with the helm, till the ships ahead
of her were cleared; she would be at least hasting towards the enemy.
But the noise of battle was in the air, and the crew of the _Ramillies_
began to fire without orders, at an improper distance. The admiral
permitted them to continue, and the smoke enveloping the ship prevented
fully noting the incidents just narrated. It was, however, seen before
the firing that the _Louisa_ was come up into the wind with her topsails
shaking, and the _Trident_ passing her to leeward. There should,
therefore, have been some preparation of mind for the fact suddenly
reported to the admiral, by a military passenger on the quarter deck,
that a British ship was close aboard, on the lee bow. It was the
_Trident_ that had crossed from windward to leeward for the reasons
given, and an instant later the _Louisa_ was seen on the weather bow.
Instead of keeping off, as the _Trident_ had done, the admiral ordered
the foresail hauled up, the helm down, luffed the ship to the wind, and
braced the fore-topsail sharp aback; the effect of which was first to
stop her way, and then to pay her head off to leeward, clear of the two
vessels. About quarter of an hour elapsed, by Captain Gardiner's
evidence, from the time that the _Ramillies's_ head pointed clear of the
_Trident_ and _Louisa_ before sail was again made to go forward to aid
the van. The battle was already lost, and in fact had passed out of
Byng's control, owing to his previous action; nevertheless this further
delay, though probably due only to the importance attached by the
admiral to regularity of movement, had a discreditable appearance.

The Court held that the admiral was justified in not trying to go to
leeward of the two ships, under the circumstances when they were seen;
but blamed him for permitting the useless cannonade which prevented
seeing them sooner. The results at this moment in other parts of the
field should be summarized, as they show both the cause and the
character of the failures due to faulty management.

The five ships of the British van had already seen their adversaries
withdraw after a sharp engagement. This seems to have been due to the
fact that two were individually overmatched and driven off; whereupon
the other three retired because unable to contend with five. But no
support reached the British van at this important moment; on the
contrary, the British rear was now two or three miles distant, astern
and to windward. The lagging of the crippled _Intrepid_ held back the
_Revenge_. Cornwall was detained some time by the old idea that he
needed a signal to pass her, because to do so was breaking the order
established by the admiral; but concluding at last that Byng was unaware
of the conditions, and seeing that his immediate opponent--the French
admiral--was drawing ahead, he sent word to the _Intrepid_ to hold her
fire for a few moments till he could go by. He then made sail.

The French rear with its commander-in-chief had been watching the
incidents narrated: the crippling of the _Intrepid_, the consequent
disorder in the British rear, and the increasing distance between it and
the van. When the _Revenge_, however, passed ahead, and Byng
disentangled his flag-ship, the moment for a decisive step arrived. The
French rear vessels were nearer the British van than Byng's division
was. They now filled their topsails, made more sail, stood for the
British leading ships, already partially unrigged, passed by, and in so
doing gave them the fire of a number of substantially fresh vessels,
which had undergone only a distant and ineffective cannonade. Byng saw
what was about to happen, and also set more canvas; but it was no longer
possible to retrieve the preceding errors. The French admiral had it in
his power very seriously to damage, if not to destroy the hostile van;
but in accordance with the tradition of his nation he played an
over-prudent game, strictly defensive, and kept too far off. After
exchanging distant broadsides, he steered northwest towards Mahon,
satisfied that he had for the time disabled his opponent. The British
that evening tacked off-shore and stood to the southeast. Four days
later they abandoned the field, returning to Gibraltar. The fall of
Minorca followed.

Nothing could have been much worse than the deplorable management of
this action on the part of the commander-in-chief. It is a conspicuous
instance of weak and halting execution, superimposed upon a professional
conception radically erroneous; and it reflected throughout the timid
hesitancy of spirit which dictated the return to Gibraltar, under the
always doubtful sanction of a Council of War. But the historical value
of the lesson is diminished if attention is confined to the shortcomings
of the admiral, neglectful of the fact that his views as to the
necessity to observe the routine of the Fighting Instructions are
reproduced in the evidence of the captains; and that the finding of the
Court censures, not the general idea, but certain details, important yet
secondary. Durell, being asked whether the admiral could not have passed
under the stern of the _Trident_, as the _Trident_ had under that of the
_Louisa_, replies, "Yes, but she would have been to leeward of those
ships ahead;" that is, to leeward of the line. Gardiner "knows no other
method than what the admiral took, for preserving the line regular."
Cornwall cannot pass the _Intrepid_ without a signal, because it would
be breaking the order. These were all good men.

The Court, composed of four admirals and nine captains, the junior of
whom had over ten years seniority, give in their finding no shadow of
disapproval to the broad outlines of the action. There can be,
therefore, no doubt about service standards. The questions put to the
witnesses reveal indeed a distinct preference for forming the line of
battle _parallel_ to that of the enemy before bearing down, so that all
the ships may have the same distance to go, have a clear field ahead of
each, and the comparatively simple mutual bearing of "abeam" to observe;
but it refrains from censuring the admiral for forming on a line very
oblique to that of the enemy, which entailed the burden of changing the
relative positions during standing down, so as to arrive all together,
on a line parallel to his; while the course itself being oblique alike
to their own front and the enemy's, each preceding ship was liable to
get in the way, "to prove an impediment," to its follower,--as actually
happened. It was indeed impossible to fault the commander-in-chief in
this particular, because his action was conformable to the letter of the
Instructions, with which he was evidently and subserviently eager to
comply.

The decision of the Court therefore was, in substance, that in bearing
down upon the enemy Byng did not do wrong in starting upon a line
oblique to them; but that he should have steered such a course, and
maintained such spread of sail, graduated to the speed of the slowest
ship in the fleet, that all should reach point-blank range at the same
time, and be then ranged on a line parallel to that of the enemy. "When
on the starboard tack, the admiral should have tacked the fleet all
together and immediately conducted it on a direct course for the
enemy; ... each ship steering for her opposite ship in the enemy's line,
and under such sail as might have enabled the worst sailing ship, under
all her plain sail, to preserve her station." It is needless to insist with
any naval man, or to any soldier, that such an advance, in orderly
fashion, oblique to the front, is unattainable except by long drill,
while this fleet had been but a few weeks assembled; and the difficulty
is enhanced when each ship has not only to keep its station in line, but
to reach a particular enemy, who may not be just where he ought, having
respect to the British order. The manoeuvre favored by the Court for the
fleet as a whole was in fact just that which Byng attempted for his own
division, with the results that have been narrated. These were
aggravated by his mismanagement, but did not originate from it.

The invariable result of an attack thus attempted, however vigorously
made, was that the van of the assailant got into action first, receiving
the brunt of the enemy's fire without proper support. Not infrequently,
it also underwent a second hammering from the enemy's rear, precisely in
the same way as occurred in Byng's action; and whether this happened or
not depended more upon the enemy than upon the British rear. In
ignoring, therefore, the idea of combining an attack in superior
numbers upon a part of the enemy, and adopting instead that of an
onslaught upon his whole, all along the line, the British practice of
the eighteenth century not only surrendered the advantage which the
initiative has, of effecting a concentration, but subjected their own
fleets to being beaten in detail, subject only to the skill of the
opponent in using the opportunity extended to him. The results, at best,
were indecisive, tactically considered. The one apparent exception was
in June, 1794, when Lord Howe, after long vainly endeavoring a better
combination with a yet raw fleet, found himself forced to the old
method; but although then several ships were captured, this issue seems
attributable chiefly to the condition of the French Navy, greatly fallen
through circumstances foreign to the present subject. It was with this
system that Rodney was about to break, the first of his century formally
to do so. A false tactical standard, however, was not the only drawback
under which the British Navy labored in 1739. The prolonged series of
wars, which began when the establishment of civil order under Cromwell
permitted the nation to turn from internal strife to external interests,
had been for England chiefly maritime. They had recurred at brief
intervals, and had been of such duration as to insure a continuity of
experience and development. Usage received modification under the
influence of constant warlike practice, and the consequent changes in
methods, if not always thoroughly reasoned, at the least reflected a
similar process of professional advance in the officers of the service.
This was consecutively transmitted, and by the movement of actual war
was prevented from stagnating and hardening into an accepted finality.
Thus the service and its officers, in the full performance of their
functions, were alive and growing. Nor was this all. The same
surroundings that promoted this healthful evolution applied also a
continual test of fitness to persons. As each war began, there were
still to be found in the prime of vigor and usefulness men whose
efficiency had been proved in its predecessor, and thus the line of
sustained ability in leadership was carried on from one naval generation
to another, through the sixty-odd years, 1652-1713, over which these
conditions extended.

The peace of Utrecht in 1713 put an end to this period. A disputed
succession after the death of Queen Anne, in 1714, renewed the condition
of internal disquietude which had paralyzed the external action of
England under Charles I.; and this co-operated with the mere weariness
of war, occasioned by prolonged strife, to give both the country and the
navy a temporary distaste to further military activity. The man of the
occasion, who became the exponent and maintainer of this national
inclination, was Sir Robert Walpole; to whom, during his ministry of
over twenty years, can fairly be applied Jefferson's phrase concerning
himself, that his "passion was peace." But, whatever the necessity to
the country of such a policy, it too often results, as it did in both
these cases, in neglect of the military services, allowing the equipment
to decay, and tending to sap the professional interest and competency of
the officers.

From this last evil the United States Navy in Jefferson's day was saved
by the simple fact that the officers were young men, or at the most in
the early prime of life,--the Navy itself, in 1812, being less than
twenty years old as a corporate organization. The British Navy of 1739
was in very different case. For a quarter of a century the only
important military occurrence had been the Battle of Cape Passaro, in
1718, where the British fleet in a running fight destroyed a much
inferior Spanish force; and the occasion then was not one of existent
war, but of casual hostilities, which, precipitated by political
conditions, began and ended with the particular incident, as far as the
sea was concerned. Back of this lay only Malaga, in 1704; for the
remaining years of war, up to 1713, had been unmarked by fleet battles.
The tendency of this want of experience, followed by the long
period--not of peace only, but--of professional depression resultant
upon inactivity and national neglect, was to stagnation, to obviate
which no provision existed or was attempted. Self-improvement was not a
note of the service, nor of the times. The stimulus of occupation and
the corrective of experience being removed, average men stuck where they
were, and grew old in a routine of service, or, what was perhaps worse,
out of the service in all but name. In naval warfare, the Battle of
Malaga, the last point of performance, remained the example, and the
Fighting Instructions the passively accepted authority. The men at the
head of the Navy, to whom the country naturally looked, either had no
record--no proof of fitness--because but youths in the last war, or
else, in simple consequence of having then had a chance to show
themselves, were now superannuated. This very fact, however, had the
singular and unfortunate result that, because the officers of reputation
were old, men argued, by a curious perversion of thought, that none but
the old should be trusted.

Of this two significant cases will tell more than many words. Mathews,
who commanded at Toulon in 1744, was then sixty-seven years old, and had
not been at sea between 1724 and 1742. Hawke, in 1747, when he had
already established an excellent reputation as a captain, and for
enterprise in recent battle, was thought young to be entrusted with a
squadron of a dozen ships-of-the-line, although he was forty-two,--two
years older than Nelson at the Nile, but four years younger than
Napoleon and Wellington at Waterloo, and one year less in age than Grant
at the close of the American Civil War. Such instances are not of
merely curious interest; they are symptoms of professional states of
mind, of a perplexity and perversion of standards which work
disastrously whenever war succeeds to a prolonged period of peace, until
experience has done its work by sorting out the unsound from among the
fair-seeming, and has shown also that men may be too old as well as too
young for unaccustomed responsibility. The later prevalence of juster
views was exemplified in the choice of Wolfe, who was but thirty-two
when he fell before Quebec in 1759, charged with one of the most
difficult enterprises that had then been entrusted to a British general.

It is these two factors, therefore, an erroneous standard and a
lethargic peace, which principally caused the weakness of the British
official staff for battle service at the period of lowest descent, which
was reached in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, but was
prolonged and intensified by a protracted interval of professional
apathy. Other grievous evils doubtless existed, serious defects in
administration, involving indifferent equipment, bad and scanty
provisions, inferior physique in the ships' companies, and wretched
sanitary arrangements; but while all these unquestionably gravely
affected general efficiency for war, they belonged rather to the civil
than the military side of the profession. In the hour of battle it was
not these, but the tone and efficiency of the officers, that chiefly
told. A false pattern of action had been accepted at a moment favorable
to its perpetuation, when naval warfare on the grand scale had ceased,
owing to the decline of the principal enemy, the navy of France; while
the average competency of naval officers had been much lowered through
want of professional incentive, and the absence of any sifting process
by which the unfit could be surely eliminated. That plenty of good
material existed, was sufficiently shown by the number of names,
afterwards distinguished, which soon began to appear. Weeding went on
apace; but before its work was done, there had to be traversed a painful
period, fruitful of evidences of unfitness, of personal weakness, of low
or false professional ideas.

It is with this period that we have first had to do as our point of
departure, by which not only to estimate the nature and degree of the
subsequent advance, but to illustrate also the part specifically
contributed to it by Hawke and Rodney, through their personal and
professional characteristics. While types, they are more than mere
exponents of the change as a whole, and will be found to bear to it
particular relations,--its leaders in fact, as well as in name. It is
not merely fanciful to say that Hawke stands for and embodies the spirit
of the new age, while Rodney rather exemplifies and develops the form in
which that spirit needed ultimately to cloth itself in order to perfect
its working. The one is a protest in act against the professional
faintheartedness, exaggerated into the semblance of personal timidity,
shown by the captains off Toulon in 1774; the other, in the simple but
skilful methods and combinations adopted by him, both represents and
gives effect to a reaction against the extravagant pedantry, which it
fell to Byng, in all the honesty of a thoroughly commonplace man, to
exhibit in unintentional caricature.

In thus ascribing to these great men complementary parts in leading and
shaping the general movement, it is not meant that either is deficient
on the side attributed to the other. Hawke showed by his actions that he
was by no means indifferent to tactical combinations, which is another
way of saying that he appreciated the advantage of form in warfare;
while Rodney, though a careful organizer and driller of fleets, and
patient in effort to obtain advantage before attacking, exhibited on
occasion headlong, though not inconsiderate, audacity, and also
tenacious endurance in fight. Still, it will probably be admitted by the
student of naval biography that to him Hawke suggests primarily the
unhesitating sudden rush--the swoop--upon the prey, while Rodney
resembles rather the patient astute watcher, carefully keeping his own
powers in hand, and waiting for the unguarded moment when the adversary
may be taken suddenly at unawares. Certain it is that, with
opportunities much more numerous than were permitted to Hawke, his
successes would have been far greater but for an excess of methodical
caution. There was a third, who combined in due proportion, and
possessed to an extraordinary degree, the special qualities here
assigned to each. It is one of the ironies of history that the first Sir
Samuel Hood should have had just opportunity enough to show how great
were his powers, and yet have been denied the chance to exhibit them
under conditions to arrest the attention of the world; nay, have been
more than once compelled to stand by hopelessly, and see occasions lost
which he would unquestionably have converted into signal triumphs. In
him, as far as the record goes, was consummated the advance of the
eighteenth century. He was the greatest of the sowers. It fell to
Nelson, his pupil,--in part at least,--to reap the harvest.

Before closing this part of our subject, the necessary preliminary to
understanding the progress of naval warfare in the eighteenth century,
it is pertinent to note the respect in which advance there differs from
that of the nineteenth, and in some degree, though less, from that of
the seventeenth centuries. The period was not one of marked material
development. Improvements there were, but they were slow, small in
ultimate extent, and in no sense revolutionary. Ships and guns, masts
and sails, grew better, as did also administrative processes; it may
indeed be asserted, as an axiom of professional experience, that as the
military tone of the sea-officers rises, the effect will be transmitted
to those civil functions upon which efficiency for war antecedently
depends. Still, substantially, the weapons of war were in principle, and
consequently in general methods of handling, the same at the end of the
period as at the beginning. They were intrinsically more efficient; but
the great gain was not in them, but in the spirit and intellectual grasp
of the men who wielded them. There was no change in the least analogous
to that from oars to sails, or from sails to steam.

Under such conditions of continued similarity in means, advance in the
practice of any profession is effected rather in the realm of ideas, in
intellectual processes; and even their expert application involves mind
rather than matter. In the nineteenth century such intellectual
processes have been largely devoted to the purposes of material
development, and have found their realization, in the navy as elsewhere,
in revolutionizing instruments, in providing means never before
attainable. The railroad, the steamer, the electric telegraph, find
their counterpart in the heavily armored steamship of war. But in
utilizing these new means the navy must still be governed by the ideas,
which are, indeed, in many ways as old as military history, but which in
the beginning of the eighteenth century had passed out of the minds of
naval men. It was the task of the officers of that period to recall
them, to formulate them anew, to give them a living hold upon the theory
and practice of the profession. This they did, and they were undoubtedly
helped in so doing by the fact that their attention was not diverted and
absorbed, as that of our day very largely has been, by decisive changes
in the instruments with which their ideas were to be given effect. Thus
they were able to make a substantial and distinctive contribution to the
art of naval warfare, and that on its highest side. For the artist is
greater than his materials, the warrior than his arms; and it was in the
man rather than in his weapons that the navy of the eighteenth century
wrought its final conspicuous triumph.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] This wording and punctuation is exact from the text.

[2] So far was literalism carried, that, before the signal for battle,
Byng evened numbers with his opponent by directing his weakest ship to
leave the line, with no other orders than to be ready to take the place
of a disabled vessel.




HAWKE

1705-1781


The first great name in British naval annals belonging distinctively to
the eighteenth century rather than to the seventeenth, is that of Edward
Hawke. He was born in 1705, of a family of no marked social distinction,
his father being a barrister, and his grandfather a London merchant. His
mother's maiden name was Bladen. One of her brothers held an important
civil office as Commissioner of Trade and Plantations, and was for many
years a member of Parliament. Under the conditions which prevailed then,
and for some generations longer, the influence attaching to such
positions enabled the holder to advance substantially the professional
interests of a naval officer. Promotion in rank, and occupation both in
peace and war, were largely a matter of favor. Martin Bladen naturally
helped his nephew in this way, a service especially valuable in the
earlier part of a career, lifting a man out of a host of competitors and
giving him a chance to show what was in him. It may readily be believed
that Hawke's marked professional capacity speedily justified the
advantage thus obtained, and he seems to have owed his promotion to
post-captain to a superior officer when serving abroad; though it is
never possible to affirm that even such apparent official recognition
was not due either to an intimation from home, or to the give and take
of those who recognized Bismarck's motto, "Do ut des."

However this may have been, the service did not suffer by the favors
extended to Hawke. Nor was his promotion unduly rapid, to the injury of
professional character, as often happened when rank was prematurely
reached. It was not till March 20, 1734, that he was "made post," as the
expression went, by Sir Chaloner Ogle into the frigate _Flamborough_, on
the West India Station. Being then twenty-nine years old, in the prime
of life for naval efficiency, he had reached the position in which a
fair opportunity for all the honors of the profession lay open to him,
provided he could secure occupation until he was proved to be
indispensable. Here also his uncle's influence stood good. Although the
party with which the experienced politician was identified had gone out
of power with Sir Robert Walpole, in 1742, his position on the Board
dealing with Colonial affairs left him not without friends. "My
colleague, Mr. Cavendish," he writes, "has already laid in his claim for
another ship for you. But after so long a voyage" (he had been away over
three years) "I think you should be allowed a little time to spend with
your friends on shore. It is some consolation, however, that I have some
friends on the new Board of Admiralty." "There has been a clean sweep,"
he says again, "but I hope I may have some friends amongst the new Lords
that will upon my account afford you their protection."

This was in the beginning of 1743, when Hawke had just returned from a
protracted cruise on the West India and North American stations, where
by far the greater part of his early service was passed. He never again
returned there, and very shortly after his uncle's letter, just quoted,
he was appointed to the _Berwick_, a ship-of-the-line of seventy guns.
In command of her he sailed in September, 1743, for the Mediterranean;
and a few months after, by his decided and seamanlike course in
Mathews's action, he established his professional reputation and
fortunes, the firm foundations of which had been laid during the
previous years of arduous but inconspicuous service. Two years later, in
1746, Martin Bladen died, and with him political influence, in the
ordinary acceptation, departed from Hawke. Thenceforth professional
merit, forced upon men's recognition, stood him in stead.

He was thirty-nine when he thus first made his mark, in 1744. Prior to
this there is not found, in the very scanty records that remain of his
career, as in that of all officers of his period while in subordinate
positions, any certain proof that he had ever been seriously engaged
with an enemy. War against Spain had been declared, October 19, 1739. He
had then recently commissioned a fifty-gun ship, the _Portland_, and in
her sailed for the West Indies, where he remained until the autumn of
1742; but the inert manner in which Spain maintained the naval contest,
notwithstanding that her transmarine policy was the occasion of the
quarrel, and her West Indian possessions obviously endangered, removed
all chance of active service on the large scale, except in attacking her
colonies; and in none of those enterprises had the _Portland_ been
called upon to share.

Meantime, a general European war had begun in 1740, concerning the
succession to the Austrian throne; and, in the political combinations
which followed, France and Great Britain had as usual ranged themselves
on opposite sides, though without declaring war upon each other.
Further, there had existed for some time a secret defensive alliance
between France and Spain, binding each party to support the other, under
certain conditions, with an effective armed force, to be used not for
aggressive purposes, but in defence only. It was claimed, indeed, that
by so doing the supporting country was not to be considered as going to
war, or even as engaged in hostilities, except as regarded the
contingent furnished. This view received some countenance from
international law, in the stage of development it had then reached; yet
it is evident that if a British admiral met a Spanish fleet, of strength
fairly matching his own, but found it accompanied by a French division,
the commander of which notified him that he had orders to fight if an
attack were made, friendly relations between the two nations would be
strained near to the breaking point. This had actually occurred to the
British Admiral Haddock, in the Mediterranean, in 1741; and conditions
essentially similar, but more exasperated, constituted the situation
under which Hawke for the first time was brought into an action between
two great fleets.

On the 11th of January, 1744, when the _Berwick_ joined the British
fleet, it had rendezvoused at the Hyeres Islands, a little east of
Toulon, watching the movements of twelve Spanish ships-of-the-line,
which had taken refuge in the port. As these were unwilling to put to
sea trusting to their own strength, the French Admiral De Court was
ordered to accompany and protect them when they sailed. This becoming
known, Admiral Mathews had concentrated his fleet, which by successive
reinforcements--the _Berwick_ among others--numbered twenty-eight
of-the-line when the allies, in about equal force, began to come out on
the 20th of February.

The action which ensued owes its historical significance wholly to the
fact that it illustrated conspicuously, and in more than one detail, the
degenerate condition of the official staff of the British navy; the
demoralization of ideals, and the low average of professional
competency.[3] That there was plenty of good metal was also shown, but
the proportion of alloy was dangerously great. That the machinery of the
organization was likewise bad, the administrative system culpably
negligent as well as inefficient, had been painfully manifested in the
equipment of the ships, in the quality of the food, and in the
indifferent character of the ships' crews; but in this respect Hawke had
not less to complain of than others, having represented forcibly to the
Admiralty the miserable unfitness of the men sent him. Nevertheless,
despite all drawbacks, including therein a signalling system so
rudimentary and imperfect as to furnish a ready excuse to the unwilling,
as well as a recurrent perplexity to those honestly wishing to obey
their orders, he showed that good will and high purpose could not only
lead a man to do his full duty as directed, but guide him to independent
initiative action when opportunity offered. Under all external
conditions of difficulty and doubt, or even of cast-iron rule, the
principle was as true then as when Nelson formulated it, that no captain
when in doubt could do very wrong if he placed his ship alongside an
enemy. That Hawke so realized it brought out into more glaring relief
the failure of so many of his colleagues on this occasion.

But the lesson would be in great part lost, if there were to be seen in
this lapse only the personal element of the delinquents, and not the
widespread decline of professional tone. Undoubtedly, of course, it is
true that the personal equation, as always, made itself felt, but here
as intensifying an evil which had its principal source elsewhere.

Hawke carried Nelson's maxim into effect. Upon the signal for battle he
took his own ship into close action with the antagonist allotted to him
by the order of the fleet; but after beating her out of the line he
looked round for more work to do. Seeing then that several of the
British vessels had not come within point-blank, but, through
professional timidity, or over-cautious reverence for the line of
battle, were engaging at long range a single Spaniard, he quitted his
own position, brought her also to close quarters, and after an obstinate
contest, creditable to both parties, forced her to surrender. She was
the only ship to haul down her flag that day, and her captain refused to
surrender his sword to any but Hawke, whom alone he accepted as his
vanquisher.

A generation or two later Hawke's conduct in this matter would have
drawn little attention; it would not have been exceptional in the days
of St. Vincent and Nelson, nor even in that of Howe. At the time of its
occurrence, it was not only in sharp contrast with much that happened
on the same field of battle, but it was somewhat contrary to rule. It
possessed so far the merit of originality; and that on the right
side,--the side of fighting. As in all active life, so in war a man is
more readily pardoned for effecting too much than too little; and it was
doubly so here, because it was evident from the behavior of his peers
that he must expect no backing in the extra work he took upon himself.
Their aloofness emphasized his forwardness; and the fact that through
the withdrawal of his admiral for the night, the prize was ultimately
retaken, together with an officer and seamen he had placed on board,
fixed still further attention upon the incident, in which Hawke's action
was the one wholly creditable feature.

The effect of the battle upon his fortunes was summed up in a phrase.
When his first lieutenant was sent to report the loss of the prize-crew
to Rear-Admiral Rowley, the commander of the division, the latter
replied, among other things, that "he had not been well acquainted with
Captain Hawke before, but he should now be well acquainted with him from
his behavior." Like Nelson at St. Vincent, Hawke was now revealed, not
to the navy only but to the nation,--"through his behavior." Somewhat
exceptionally, the king personally took knowledge of him, and stood by
him. George II. paid most interested attention to the particulars
elicited by the Courts-Martial,--a fact which doubtless contributed to
make him so sternly unyielding in the case of Byng, twelve years later.
To the king Hawke became "my captain;" and his influence was directly
used when, in a flag promotion in 1747, some in the Admiralty proposed
to include Hawke in the retirement of senior captains, which was a
common incident in such cases. "I will not have Hawke 'yellowed,'" was
the royal fiat; a yellow admiral being the current phrase for one set
aside from further active employment.

Such were the circumstances under which Hawke first received experience
of the fighting conditions of the navy. Whatever his previous attitude
towards accepted traditions of professional practice, this no doubt
loosened the fetters; for they certainly never constrained him in his
subsequent career. He remained in the Mediterranean fleet, generally
upon detached services in command of divisions of ships, until the end
of 1745. Returning then to England, he saw no further active service
until he became a Rear-Admiral--of the White--on July 15, 1747.

The promotions being numerous, Hawke's seniority as captain carried him
well up the list of rear-admirals, and he was immediately employed;
hoisting his flag July 22d. He then became second to Sir Peter Warren,
commander-in-chief of the "Western Squadron." This cruised in the Bay of
Biscay, from Ushant to Finisterre, to intercept the naval divisions,
and the accompanying convoys of merchant and transport ships, with
which the French were then seeking to maintain their colonial empire in
North America and in India: an empire already sorely shaken, and
destined to fall finally in the next great war.

Hawke was now in the road of good luck, pure and unadulterated. His
happy action in capturing the _Poder_ illustrates indeed opportunity
improved; but it was opportunity of the every day sort, and it is the
merit that seized it, rather than the opportunity itself, that strikes
the attention. The present case was different. A young rear-admiral had
little reason to hope for independent command; but Warren, a well-tried
officer, possessing the full confidence of the First Lord, Anson,
himself a master in the profession, was in poor health, and for that
reason had applied for Hawke to be "joined with him in the command,"
apparently because he was the one flag-officer immediately available. He
proposed that Hawke should for the present occasion take his place, sail
with a few ships named, and with them join the squadron, then at sea in
charge of a captain. Anson demurred at first, on the ground of Hawke's
juniority,--he was forty-two,--and Warren, while persisting in his
request, shares the doubt; for he writes, "I observe what you say about
the ships abroad being under so young an officer. I am, and have been
uneasy about it, though I hope he will do well, _and it could not then
be avoided_." Anson, however, was not fixed in his opposition; for
Warren continued, "From your letter I have so little reason to doubt his
being put under my command, that I have his instructions all ready; and
he is prepared to go at a moment's notice." The instructions were issued
the following day, August 8th, and on the 9th Hawke sailed. But while
there was in this so much of luck, he was again to show that he was not
one to let occasion slip. Admiral Farragut is reported to have said,
"Every man has _one_ chance." It depends upon himself whether he is by
it made or marred. Burrish and Hawke toed the same line on the morning
of February 22d, and they had had that day at least equal opportunity.

Hawke's adequacy to his present fortune betrayed itself again in a
phrase to Warren, "I have nothing so much at heart as the faithful
discharge of my duty, and in such manner as will give satisfaction both
to the Lords of the Admiralty and yourself. This shall ever be my utmost
ambition, and _no lucre of profit, or other views_, shall induce me to
act otherwise." Not prize-money; but honor, through service. And this in
fact not only ruled his thought but in the moment of decision inspired
his act. Curiously enough, however, he was here at odds with the spirit
of Anson and of Warren. The latter, in asking Hawke's employment, said
the present cruise was less important than the one to succeed it, "for
the galleons"--the Spanish treasure-ships--"make it a general rule to
come home late in the fall or winter." Warren by prize-money and an
American marriage was the richest commoner in England, and Anson it was
that had captured the great galleon five years before, to his own great
increase; but it was Hawke who, acknowledging a letter from Warren, as
this cruise was drawing to its triumphant close, wrote, "With respect to
the galleons, as it is uncertain when they will come home and _likewise
impossible for me to divide my force in the_ present necessitous
condition of the ships under my command, I must lay aside all thoughts
of them during this cruise." In this unhesitating subordination of
pecuniary to military considerations we see again the temper of Nelson,
between whom and Hawke there was much community of spirit, especially in
their independence of ordinary motives and standards. "Not that I
despise money," wrote Nelson near the end of a career in which he had
never known ease of circumstances; "quite the contrary, I wish I had a
hundred thousand pounds this moment;" but "I keep the frigates about me,
for I know their value in the day of battle, and compared with that day,
what signifies any prizes they might take?" Yet he had his legal share
in every such prize.

The opening of October 14th, the eighth day after Hawke's letter to
Warren just quoted, brought him the sight of his reward. At seven that
morning, the fleet being then some four hundred miles west of La
Rochelle in France, a number of sails were seen in the southeast. Chase
was given at once, and within an hour it was evident, from the great
crowd of vessels, that it was a large convoy outward-bound which could
only be enemies. It was in fact a fleet of three hundred French
merchantmen, under the protection of eight ships-of-the-line and one of
fifty guns, commanded by Commodore L'Etenduere. The force then with
Hawke were twelve of-the-line and two of fifty guns. Frigates and
lighter vessels of course accompanied both fleets. The average size and
armament of the French vessels were considerably greater than those of
the British; so that, although the latter had an undoubted superiority,
it was far from as great as the relative numbers would indicate.
Prominent British officers of that day claimed that a French sixty-gun
ship was practically the equal of a British seventy-four. In this there
may have been exaggeration; but they had good opportunity for judging,
as many French ships were captured.

When L'Etenduere saw that he was in the presence of a superior enemy, he
very manfully drew out his ships of war from the mass, and formed them
in order of battle, covering the convoy, which he directed to make its
escape accompanied by one of the smaller ships-of-the-line with the
light cruisers. He contrived also to keep to windward of the approaching
British. With so strong a force interposed, Hawke saw that no
prize-money was easily to be had, but for that fortune his mind was
already prepared. He first ordered his fleet to form order of battle;
but finding time was thereby lost he changed the signal to that for a
general chase, which freed the faster sailers to use their utmost speed
and join action with the enemy, secure of support in due time by their
consorts as they successively came up.

Half an hour before noon the leading British reached the French rear,
already under short canvas. The admiral then made signal to engage, and
the battle began. As the ships under fire reduced sail, the others
overtook them, passed by the unengaged side and successively attacked
from rear to van. As Hawke himself drew near, Rodney's ship, the
_Eagle_, having her wheel and much of her rigging shot away, was for the
time unmanageable and fell twice on board the flag-ship, the
_Devonshire_, driving her to leeward, and so preventing her from close
action with the French flag-ship _Tonnant_, of eighty guns, a force far
exceeding that of the _Devonshire_, which had but sixty-six. "This
prevented our attacking _Le Monarque_, 74, and the _Tonnant_, within any
distance to do execution. However we attempted both, especially the
latter. While we were engaged with her, the breechings of all our
lower-deck guns broke, and the guns flew fore and aft, which obliged us
to shoot ahead, for our upper guns could not reach her." The breaking
of the breechings--the heavy ropes which take the strain of the guns'
recoil--was doubtless accelerated by the undue elevation necessitated by
the extreme range. The collision with the _Eagle_ was one of the
incidents common to battle, but it doubtless marred the completeness of
the victory. Of the eight French ships engaged, six were taken; two, the
_Tonnant_ and her next astern, escaped, though the former was badly
mauled.

Despite the hindrance mentioned, Hawke's personal share in the affair
was considerable, through the conspicuous activity of the flag-ship.
Besides the skirmish at random shot with the _Tonnant_, she engaged
successively the _Trident_, 64, and the _Terrible_, 74, both which were
among the prizes. He was entirely satisfied also with the conduct of all
his captains,--save one. The freedom of action permitted to them by the
general chase, with the inspiring example of the admiral himself, was
nobly used. "Captain Harland of the _Tilbury_, 60, observing that the
_Tonnant_ fired single guns at us in order to dismast us, stood on the
other tack, _between her and the Devonshire_, and gave her a very smart
fire." It was no small gallantry for a 60 thus to pass close under the
undiverted broadside of an 80,--nearly double her force,--and that
without orders; and Hawke recognized the fact by this particular notice
in the despatch. With similar initiative, as the _Tonnant_ and
_Intrepide_ were seen to be escaping, Captain Saunders of the Yarmouth,
64, pursued them on his own motion, and was accompanied, at his
suggestion, by the sixty-gun ships of Rodney and of Saumarez. A detached
action of an hour followed, in which Saumarez fell. The enemy escaped,
it is true; but that does not impeach the judgment, nor lessen the
merits, of the officers concerned, for their ships were both much
smaller and more injured than those they attacked. Harland and Saunders
became distinguished admirals; of Rodney it is needless to say the same.

In his report of the business, Hawke used a quaint but very expressive
phrase, "As the enemy's ships were large, _they took a great deal of
drubbing_, and (consequently) lost all their masts, except two, who had
their foremasts left. This has obliged me to lay-to for these two days
past, in order to put them into condition to be brought into port, as
well as our own, which have suffered greatly." Ships large in tonnage
were necessarily also ships large in scantling, heavy ribbed,
thick-planked, in order to bear their artillery; hence also with sides
not easy to be pierced by the weak ordnance of that time. They were in a
degree armored ships, though from a cause differing from that of to-day;
hence much "drubbing" was needed, and the prolongation of the drubbing
entailed increase of incidental injury to spars and rigging, both their
own and those of the enemy. Nor was the armor idea, directly, at all
unrecognized even then; for we are told of the _Real Felipe_ in
Mathews's action, that, being so weakly built that she could carry only
twenty-four-pounders on her lower deck, she had been "fortified in the
most extraordinary surprising manner; her sides being lined four or five
foot thick everywhere with junk or old cables to hinder the shot from
piercing."

It has been said that the conduct of one captain fell under Hawke's
displeasure. At a Council of War called by him after the battle, to
establish the fitness of the fleet to pursue the convoy, the other
captains objected to sitting with Captain Fox of the _Kent_, until he
had cleared himself from the imputation of misbehavior in incidents they
had noticed. Hawke was himself dissatisfied with Fox's failure to obey a
signal, and concurred in the objection. On the subsequent trial, the
Court expressly cleared the accused of cowardice, but found him guilty
of certain errors of judgment, and specifically of leaving the _Tonnant_
while the signal for close action was flying. As the _Tonnant_ escaped,
the implication of accountability for that result naturally follows. For
so serious a consequence the sentence only was that he be dismissed his
ship, and, although never again employed, he was retired two years after
as a rear-admiral. It was becoming increasingly evident that error of
judgment is an elastic phrase which can be made to cover all degrees of
faulty action, from the mistakes to which every man is liable and the
most faithful cannot always escape, to conduct wholly incompatible with
professional efficiency or even manly honor.

The case of Fox was one of many occurring at about this period, which,
however differing in detail between themselves, showed that throughout
the navy, both in active service before the enemy, and in the more
deliberate criteria of opinion which influence Courts-Martial, there was
a pronounced tendency to lowness of standard in measuring officer-like
conduct and official responsibility for personal action; a misplaced
leniency, which regarded failure to do the utmost with indulgence, if
without approval. In the stringent and awful emergencies of war too much
is at stake for such easy tolerance. Error of judgment is one thing;
error of conduct is something very different, and with a difference
usually recognizable. To style errors of conduct "errors of judgment"
denies, practically, that there are standards of action external to the
individual, and condones official misbehavior on the ground of personal
incompetency. Military standards rest on demonstrable facts of
experience, and should find their sanction in clear professional
opinion. So known, and so upheld, the unfortunate man who falls below
them, in a rank where failure may work serious harm, has only himself to
blame; for it is his business to reckon his own capacity before he
accepts the dignity and honors of a position in which the interests of
the nation are intrusted to his charge.

An uneasy consciousness of these truths, forced upon the Navy and the
Government by widespread shortcomings in many quarters--of which
Mathews's battle was only the most conspicuous instance--resulted in a
very serious modification of the Articles of War, after the peace. Up to
1748 the articles dealing with misconduct before the enemy, which had
been in force since the first half of the reign of Charles II., assigned
upon conviction the punishment of "death, or other punishment, as the
circumstances of the offence shall deserve and the Court-Martial shall
judge fit." After the experiences of this war, the last clause was
omitted. Discretion was taken away. Men were dissatisfied, whether
justly or not, with the use of their discretion made by Courts-Martial,
and deprived them of it. In the United States Navy, similarly, at the
beginning of the Civil War, the Government was in constant struggle with
Courts-Martial to impose sentences of severity adequate to the offence;
leaving the question of remission, or of indulgence, to the executive.
These facts are worthy of notice, for there is a facile popular
impression that Courts-Martial err on the side of stringency. The
writer, from a large experience of naval Courts, upon offenders of many
ranks, is able to affirm that it is not so. Marryat, in his day, midway
between the two periods here specified, makes the same statement, in
"Peter Simple." "There is an evident inclination towards the prisoner;
every allowance and every favor granted him, and no legal quibbles
attended to." It may be added that the inconvenience and expense of
assembling Courts make the executive chary of this resort, which is
rarely used except when the case against an accused is pretty clear,--a
fact that easily gives rise to a not uncommon assertion, that
Courts-Martial are organized to convict.

This is the antecedent history of Byng's trial and execution. There had
been many examples of weak and inefficient action--of distinct errors of
conduct--such as Byng was destined to illustrate in the highest rank and
upon a large scale, entailing an unusual and conspicuous national
disaster; and the offenders had escaped, with consequences to themselves
more or less serious, but without any assurance to the nation that the
punishment inflicted was raising professional standards, and so giving
reasonable certainty that the like derelictions would not recur. Hence
it came to pass, in 1749, not amid the agitations of war and defeats,
but in profound peace, that the article was framed under which Byng
suffered:


     "Every person in the fleet, who through cowardice, negligence, or
     disaffection, shall in time of action, ... not do his utmost to take
     or destroy every ship which it shall be his duty to engage; and to
     assist all and every of His Majesty's ships, or those of His
     allies, which it shall be his duty to assist and relieve, ... being
     convicted thereof by sentence of a Court-Martial, shall suffer
     death."


Let it therefore be observed, as historically certain, that the
execution of Byng in 1757 is directly traceable to the war of 1739-1747.
It was not determined, as is perhaps generally imagined, by an obsolete
statute revived for the purpose of a judicial murder; but by a recent
Act, occasioned, if not justified, by circumstances of marked national
humiliation and injury. The offences specified are those of which
repeated instances had been recently given; and negligence is ranked
with more positive faults, because in practice equally harmful and
equally culpable. Every man in active life, whatever his business, knows
this to be so.

At the time his battle with L'Etenduere was fought, Hawke was actually a
commander-in-chief; for Warren, through his disorder increasing upon
him, had resigned the command, and Hawke had been notified of the fact.
Hence there did not obtain in his case the consideration, so absurdly
advanced for limiting Nelson's reward after the Nile, that he was acting
under the orders of a superior several hundred miles away. Nevertheless,
Hawke, like Nelson later, was then a new man,--"a young officer;" and
the honor he received, though certainly adequate for a victory over a
force somewhat inferior, was not adequate when measured by that given
to Anson, the First Lord of the Admiralty, for a much less notable
achievement six months before. Anson was raised to the peerage; Hawke
was only given the Order of the Bath, the ribbon which Nelson coveted,
because a public token, visible to all, that the wearer had done
distinguished service. It was at that period a much greater distinction
than it afterwards became, through the great extension in numbers and
the division into classes. He was henceforth Sir Edward Hawke; and
shortly after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, signed April 30, 1748,
another flag-promotion raised him to the rank of Vice-Admiral, of the
Blue Squadron.

Such rank, accompanied by such recognized merit, insured that he should
thenceforth always command in chief; and so it was, with a single brief
interval due to a very special and exceptional cause to be hereafter
related. During the years of peace, from 1748 to 1755, his employment
was mainly on shore, in dockyard command, which carried with it
incidentally a good deal of presiding over Courts-Martial. This duty, in
his hands, could hardly fail to raise professional standards, with all
the effect that precedents, established by the rulings and decisions of
Courts, civil and military, exert upon practice. Such a period, however,
affords but little for narration, either professional or personal,
except when the particular occupations mentioned are the subject of
special study. General interest they cannot be said to possess.

But while thus unmarked on the biographical side, historically these
years were pregnant with momentous events, which not only affected the
future of great nations then existing, but were to determine for all
time the extension or restriction of their social systems and political
tendencies in vast distant regions yet unoccupied by civilized man, or
still in unstable political tenure. The balance of world power, in
short, was in question, and that not merely as every occurrence, large
or small, contributes its something to a general result, but on a grand
and decisive scale. The phrase "world politics," if not yet invented,
characterizes the issues then eminently at stake, though they probably
were not recognized by contemporaries, still blinded by the traditions
which saw in Europe alone the centre of political interests.

To realize the conditions, and their bearing upon a future which has
become our present, we should recall that in 1748 the British Empire, as
we understand the term, did not exist; that Canada and Louisiana--
meaning by the latter the whole undefined region west of the
Mississippi--were politically and socially French; that between them the
wide territory from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi was claimed by
France, and the claim vigorously contested not only by Great Britain
herself, but by the thirteen British colonies which became the United
States of America; that in India the representatives of both mother
countries were striving for mastery, not merely through influence in the
councils of native rulers, but by actual territorial sway, and that the
chances seemed on the whole to favor France.

In the great struggle for Anglo-Saxon predominance, which had begun
under William III., but was now approaching its crisis and final
decision in the Seven Years War, the determining factor was to be the
maritime strength of Great Britain. It is, therefore, the distinctive
and distinguished significance of Hawke's career that during so critical
a period he not only was the most illustrious and able officer of her
navy--the exponent of her sea-power--but that by the force of his
personality he chiefly shaped the naval outcome. He carried on the
development of naval warfare, revolutionized ideas, raised professional
standards, and thereby both affected the result in his own time, and
perpetuated an influence, the effect of which was to be felt in the
gigantic contests of later days. In this eminent particular, which
involves real originality, no sea officer of the eighteenth century
stands with him; in this respect only he and Nelson, who belongs rather
to the nineteenth, are to be named together.

In the years of nominal peace, 1748-1755, the Navy of Great Britain was
permitted by a politically cautious Government to decline much in
power; but there was compensation in the fact that that of France
drooped equally. In both countries there was then, as there has been
ever since, a party opposed to over-sea enterprise. "The partisans of
the Ministry," wrote Walpole in 1755, "d----n the Plantations [Colonies],
and ask if we are to involve ourselves in a war for them." The French
government underwent a like revulsion of feeling as regarded India, and
in 1754 recalled Dupleix in mid-career, in order to quiet the
remonstrances of Great Britain. It would be irrelevant, were it not
signally instructive, to remark that both nations passed under the
influence of the same ideas a hundred years later. In the middle of the
nineteenth century, the preponderant expression in England was that the
colonies were unprofitable incumbrances, and, if occasion arose, should
be encouraged to separate rather than urged to remain; while France,
through whatever motive, at a critical moment abandoned the field in
Egypt, by refusing joint action. It is, therefore, probably the result
of a true national genius, asserting itself above temporary aberrations,
that the close of the nineteenth century saw France wholly excluded,
politically, from Egypt, as she had before been from India, and Great
Britain involved in an expensive war, the aim of which was the
preservation of the imperial system, in the interest not only of the
mother country, but of the colonies as well.

And that it was in the interest of her colonies was precisely the all
important part which differentiated the Seven Years War in its day, and
the South African War in our day, from the struggle, so disastrous to
the Empire, that is known as the American Revolution. "There is no
repose for our thirteen colonies," wrote Franklin a hundred and fifty
years ago, "so long as the French are masters of Canada." "There is no
repose for British colonists in South Africa," was the virtual assertion
of Natal and the Cape Colony, "so long as the Boer political methods are
maintained in the Transvaal with the pledged support of the Orange Free
State." Irreconcilable differences of political and social systems, when
brought into close contact, involve irrepressible conflict, and admit of
no lasting solution except the subjugation and consequent submersion of
one or the other.

Such a final settlement was attained in North America and in India by
the Seven Years War. The full results thereof even we of this day have
not yet seen; for who can yet predict the effect upon the question of
the Pacific and of China, that by this war was assured the dominance of
the Anglo-Saxon political and legal tradition over the whole American
continent north of the tropics, and that the same tradition shall, for a
future yet indeterminate, decisively shape the course of India and the
Philippines? The preceding war, 1739-1748, had been substantially
inconclusive on the chief points at issue, because European questions
intervening had diverted the attention of both France and Great Britain
from America and from India; and the exhaustion of both had led to a
perfunctory compact, in which the underlying contention was
substantially ignored in order to reach formal agreement. That the
French conquest of Madras, in India, was yielded in exchange for
Louisburg and Cape Breton Island, which the American colonists had won
for England, typifies concisely the _status quo_ to which both parties
were willing momentarily to revert, while they took breath before the
inevitable renewal of the strife, with added fury, a few years later;
but then upon its proper scene, the sea and the over-sea regions in
dispute.

In this great arbitrament Hawke was at once called forth to play his
part. In 1754 diplomatic contention had become acrimonious, and various
events showed that the moment of open conflict was approaching. The
squadron in India was then considerably increased. In the beginning of
1755 Hawke was again afloat to command the Channel Fleet, the operations
of which extended ordinarily from the Channel, over the Bay of Biscay,
to Cape Finisterre. A naval force was collecting at the same time at
Portsmouth, under Boscawen, to counteract the preparations the French
were known to be making in North America. It sailed soon afterwards,
with orders to intercept a squadron convoying reinforcements for
Canada; and on the 8th of June two of these ships were captured off the
mouth of the St. Lawrence, the remainder escaping under cover of a fog.
In July Hawke went out, with instructions to take any French
ships-of-the-line that he might meet; and in August he was further
directed to send into port French ships of every kind, merchant and
other, that he might encounter. Before the end of the year three hundred
trading vessels, valued at $6,000,000, had been thus seized. War had not
yet been declared, but the captured vessels were held, as on other
occasions before and after, as hostages to await the settlement of
existing difficulties.

The French government protested of course, and recalled its ambassador,
but it did not proceed to formal hostilities. A great stroke was in
preparation at Toulon, which could be covered for a while by diplomatic
correspondence, coupled with angry demonstrations on the Atlantic and
Channel coasts. On the 10th of April, 1756, twelve French
ships-of-the-line and fifteen thousand troops sailed for Minorca, then a
British possession, and in the absence of a hostile fleet effected a
landing without opposition. The British cabinet having taken alarm too
late, Admiral Byng had sailed from Portsmouth, with ten ships, only
three days before the French left Toulon; when he arrived off Port
Mahon, six weeks later, a practicable breach in the works had already
been made. The French fleet was cruising outside in support of the
siege, and Byng, whose force had been increased to thirteen ships,
engaged it on May 20. The action was in itself indecisive; but, upon the
opinion of a council of war that nothing more could be done, Byng
retired to Gibraltar. The result to him personally is well known. Port
Mahon surrendered on June 28. War had by this been declared; by Great
Britain on the 17th of May, and by France June 20, 1756.

When the news of Byng's retreat was received in England, Hawke was sent
out to supersede him. He went only personally, accompanied by a second
in command, but with no fleet, and with sealed instructions. Opening
these when he reached Gibraltar, he found orders to send home Byng and
his second in command, and to institute an inquiry into the conduct of
the captains, suspending any one found "not to have acted with due
spirit and vigor." An investigation of this kind would enable him to
form an opinion of Byng's own conduct even more exact and authentic than
his other official opportunities for personal intercourse with the chief
actors, but he must have refrained with much discretion from expressing
his judgment on the affair in such way as to reach the public ear. It
was stated in the "Gentleman's Magazine," in 1766, that an inquiry was
provoked in the House of Commons, shortly after these events, by Pitt,
who took Byng's side; but that Hawke, being a member of the House,
denied some of Pitt's allegations as to the inadequacy of Byng's fleet,
on the strength of his own personal observation after taking over the
command. Thereupon, so the account says, the categorical test question,
the _argumentum ad hominem_, was put to him whether with Byng's means he
could have beat the enemy; and the manner of the first Pitt, in thus
dealing with an opponent in debate, can be imagined from what we know of
him otherwise. Whether the story be true or not, Hawke was not a man to
be so overborne, and the reply related is eminently characteristic, "By
the grace of God, he would have given a good account of them." Whatever
the reason, there seems little doubt that Pitt did not like Hawke; but
the latter was at once too independent to care, and too necessary to be
discarded.

He remained in the Mediterranean only six months, returning to England
in January, 1757. His tenure of this command was marked by an incident
which exemplifies the vigorous exercise of power frequent in naval
commanders, in the days when neither steam nor telegraph existed to
facilitate reference home for instructions; when men with their strong
right arms redressed on the spot what they thought a wrong. A British
ship carrying supplies to Gibraltar, where Hawke was then lying, was
captured by a French privateer and taken into the Spanish port of
Algeciras, on the opposite side of the bay. Her surrender was demanded
from the governor of the port, Spain being then neutral; but, being
refused, the admiral sent the boats of the squadron and cut her out.
This being resisted by the Spanish forts, a hundred British seamen were
killed or wounded. On the admiral's return home, Pitt is reported to
have told him that he thought he would himself have acted in the same
way, but would have made some concession afterwards. Hawke replied that
his duty, having the country's force in his hands, was to act as he
had,--not to make concessions; but that the Ministry could deal with the
case subsequently as it thought fit. In other words, as in joint
operations with the army, later in the year, he took the ground that the
land officers were the judges of their own business, but that he would
see them put safe on shore, as a first step; so in a matter affecting
national honor, as he conceived it, he would do the seaman's part and
redress the injury, after which the civil authority could arrange with
the other party. The known details of this transaction are not full
enough to permit a decided opinion as to how far the admiral was
justified in his action, judged even by the international law of the
day. It was not necessarily a breach of neutrality to admit a
belligerent with her prize; but it would have been, had the French ship
gone out from Algeciras, seized her prey, and returned with it. Whatever
the facts, however, the episode illustrates interestingly the spirit of
Hawke himself, and of the service of that day, as well as his
characteristic independence towards superiors when he felt himself
right.

From this time forward Hawke's service was confined to the Channel
Fleet. This was, during that war, the post for the most capable of
British officers; for, while the matter at stake was over-sea
predominance and conquest, yet both these depended upon the
communications of the French colonies and distant possessions with the
mother country. The source of all their strength, the one base
indispensable to their operations, was the coast of France; to close
exit from this was therefore to strike at the root. This was much less
true for the colonies of Great Britain, at least in America; their
numbers, and resources in every way, were so far superior to those of
Canada that they needed only to be preserved from interference by the
navy of France,--an end also furthered by the close watch of the French
ports. This blockade, as it is often, but erroneously, styled, Hawke was
the first to maintain thoroughly and into the winter months; and in so
doing he gave an extension to the practice of naval warfare, which
amounted to a veritable revolution in naval strategy. The conception was
one possible only to a thorough seaman, who knew exactly and practically
what ships could do; one also in whom professional knowledge received
the moral support of strong natural self-confidence,--power to initiate
changes, to assume novel responsibility, through the inner assurance of
full adequacy to bear it.

All this Hawke had. The method, therefore, the holding the sea, and the
exposure of heavy ships to weather before thought impossible, was well
within the range of his ability,--of his native and acquired faculties;
but it is due to him to recognize the intellectual force, the
originality, which lifted him above the accepted tradition of his
predecessors, and by example transmitted to the future a system of
warfare that then, as well as in his own hands, was to exercise a
decisive effect upon the course of history. It is also to be remembered
that he took this weighty step with instruments relatively imperfect,
and greatly so. The bottoms of ships were not yet coppered; in
consequence they fouled very rapidly, the result of which was loss of
speed. This meant that much greater power, press of canvas, was needed
to force them through the water, and that they had to be sent frequently
into port to be cleaned. Thus they were less able than ships of later
days to overtake an enemy, or to keep off a lee shore, while more
intricate administration and more ships were required to maintain the
efficiency of the squadron by a system of reliefs. Hawke noted also
another difficulty,--the fatigue of the crews in cleaning their ships'
bottoms. It was even more important to success, he said, to restore the
seaman, worn by cruising, by a few days quiet and sleep in port, than to
clean thoroughly at the expense of exhausting them. "If the enemy should
slip out and run," he writes, "we must follow as fast as we can."
Details such as these, as well as the main idea, must be borne in mind,
if due credit is to be given to Hawke for one of the most decisive
advances ever made in the practice of naval campaigning.

Some time, however, was to elapse before the close watch of the French
ports became a leading feature in the naval policy of the government.
The early disasters of the war had forced the king, after much
resistance, finally to accept the first Pitt as the leading minister of
the Crown, in June, 1757. Pitt's military purpose embraced two principal
objects: 1, the establishment of the British colonial system by the
destruction of that of France, which involved as a necessary precedent
the control of the sea by a preponderant navy; and, 2, the support of
Frederic of Prussia, then engaged in his deadly contest with the
combined armies of France, Austria, and Russia. Frederic's activity made
a heavy drain upon the troops and the treasure of France, preventing her
by just so much from supporting her colonies and maintaining her fleet;
but, heavily outnumbered as he was, it was desirable to work all
possible diversion in his favor by attacks elsewhere. This Pitt proposed
to do by a series of descents upon the French coast, compelling the
enemy to detach a large force from before the Prussian king to protect
their own shores.

As far as the home naval force was concerned, the years 1757 and 1758
were dominated by this idea of diversion in favor of Frederic the
Great. From the general object of these enterprises, the army was
necessarily the principal agent; but the navy was the indispensable
auxiliary. Hawke's association with them is interesting chiefly as
illustrative of professional character; for there was little or no room
for achievement of naval results. The first expedition in which he was
concerned was that against Rochefort in 1757. This, though now long
forgotten, occasioned by its failure a storm of contemporary
controversy. Whatever chances of success it may under any circumstances
have had were lost beforehand, owing to the lateness of the
season--June--in which Pitt took office. Preparation began at the moment
when execution was due. The troops which should have sailed in early
summer could not, from delays apparently unavoidable under the
conditions, get away before September 10. Hawke himself hoisted his
flag--assumed active command--only on August 15. The previous
administration was responsible for whatever defect in general readiness
increased this delay; as regards the particular purpose, Pitt's
government was at fault in attempting at all an undertaking which, begun
so late in the year, could not expect success under the notorious
inadequacy of organization bequeathed to him by his predecessors. But
there will always be found at the beginning of a war, or upon a change
of commanders, a restless impatience to do something, to make a showing
of results, which misleads the judgment of those in authority, and
commonly ends, if not in failure, at least in barren waste of powder and
shot.

Not the least of the drawbacks under which the enterprise labored was
extremely defective information--especially hydrographic. The character
of the coast, the places suited for landing, the depths of water, and
the channels, were practically unknown. Hence a necessity for
reconnoissances, pregnant of indefinite delay, as might have been
foreseen. Among Hawke's memoranda occur the words, "Not to undertake
anything without good pilots." The phrase is doubly significant, for he
was not a man to worry needlessly about pilots, knowing that pilots look
not to military results, but merely to their own responsibility not to
take the ground; and it shows the total ignorance under which labored
all who were charged with an undertaking that could only succeed as a
surprise, executed with unhesitating rapidity. Hawke himself was
astounded at finding in Basque Roads, before Rochefort, "a safe spacious
road in which all the navy of England, merchant ships included, may ride
without the least annoyance. Before I came here, the place was
represented as very difficult of access, and so narrow that ships could
not lie in safety from the forts--nay, _the pilots made many baulks
before we came in_." In fact, want of good pilotage summed up the fault
of the expedition, from its inception in the Cabinet throughout all the
antecedent steps of consultation and preparation. Pitt's impetuosity
doubtless acted as a spur to laggards, but it was accompanied by a
tendency to overbearing insolence that not infrequently browbeats
cautious wisdom. When applied to a man like Hawke, strong in natural
temper and in conscious mastery of his profession, the tone
characteristic of Pitt provokes an equally resolute self-assertion, as
far removed from subjection as it is from insubordination; but
friendship becomes impossible, and even co-operation difficult.

Throughout all Hawke kept his head, and made no serious mistake; but he
accepts no unmerited censures. Seeing that the transports are not enough
for the healthful carriage of the troops, he so represents it. The
government, already impatient at any report of defects, hopes that
things are now arranged to his _satisfaction_. "I am astonished at this
expression," he says, "it is my duty to represent defects, but I am
_satisfied_ with any decision _you_ make." Again, "I have received your
letter signifying His Majesty's directions to use the utmost diligence
in embarking the troops and getting to sea. As I cannot doubt my letter
of Sunday being immediately communicated to you, I should have expected
that _before yours was sent_ His Majesty would have been fully satisfied
that I needed no spur in executing his orders." As Hawke and Anson--the
First Lord--were friends, there can be little doubt that we see here a
firm protest against the much lauded tone to which the efficiency of the
British army and navy under Pitt has been too exclusively attributed. It
was in the civil administration, the preparation that underlies military
success, which being at home was under his own eye, that Pitt's energy
was beneficially felt, and also in his prompt recognition of fit
instruments; but he had no need to discover Hawke or Boscawen. He might
as well be thought to have discovered the sun.

In discharging his part of the expedition Hawke's course is consistent
and clear. It must in the first place be recognized that such
enterprises are of secondary importance, and do not warrant the risks
which are not only justifiable but imperative when a decisive issue is
at stake. Hawke's heroic disregard of pilotage difficulties at Quiberon,
in 1759, would have been culpable temerity at Basque Roads, in 1757.
But, save delays on this account, no time is lost by him. When the
decision to land is reached, he is clear as to the possibility of
landing; but when the generals think it impossible to effect certain
results, he replies that is their business, on which he does not pretend
to judge. In his evidence before the Court afterwards, he said, "Whether
they should land or not, he constantly thought it the part of the
generals to determine. He could not but suppose they were infinitely
better judges of their own business than he could be." Their conduct was
marked by vacillations strange to him, and which apparently displeased
him; the troops being, on one occasion, embarked in the boats for some
hours, and yet returning to the ships without proceeding. He then
addressed a formal letter to the commanding general, saying that if he
had no further operation to propose the fleet would return at once to
England, and he declined to attend a Council of War to decide either of
these points. The Army should decide, alone, whether it could effect
anything by landing; if not, he, without asking counsel, would stay no
longer. On October 7th he reached Spithead.

Pitt, who had espoused Byng's cause against the previous administration,
followed its precedent in throwing the blame on the military and naval
leaders. In Parliament, he "declared solemnly his belief that there was
a determined resolution, both in the naval and military commanders,
against any vigorous exertion of the national power." For far less than
this accusation Byng had been condemned; but in fact the fault at
Rochefort lay clearly on those who issued the orders,--upon the Cabinet;
upon the character of the expedition itself,--a great risk for a
secondary and doubtful object; upon the inconsiderate haste which
disregarded alike the season and the inadequate knowledge; upon
defective preparation in the broadest sense of the words. Diversions, in
truth, are feints, in which the utmost smoke with the least fire is the
object. Carried farther, they entail disaster; for they rest on no solid
basis of adequate force, but upon successful deception. Pitt's angry
injustice met with its due rebuke the next year at St. Cas. It can
scarcely be doubted that words such as those quoted were responsible, in
part at least, for the disastrous issue of that diversion, the story of
which belongs, if to the navy at all, to the life of Howe.

That Hawke resented this language can scarcely be doubted, and none the
less that he evidently himself felt that something might have been
attempted by the troops. He was clear of fault in his own consciousness;
but in the general censure he was involved with his associates--known,
so to say, by his friends, implicated in the meshes of a half-truth,
where effort to clear one's self results in worse entanglement. He had
the manly cast of character which will not struggle for
self-vindication; but his suppressed wrath gathered force, until a year
later it resulted, upon occasion of official provocation, in an
explosion that has not a close parallel in naval history.

He had hoisted his flag again on February 28, 1758. His first service
was directed against a French squadron of five ships-of-the-line,
fitting at Rochefort to convoy troops for the relief of Louisburg, in
Cape Breton Island, then about to be besieged by British and colonial
forces. Hawke's observations of the previous year had ascertained the
hitherto unknown facilities of Basque Roads for occupation by a fleet
and consequent effectual interception of such an expedition. Upon
making the land the French vessels were found already in the Roads,
therefore soon to sail; but before this superior force of seven ships
they cut their cables, and fled across the shoals up the river Charente,
on which Rochefort lies. Hawke, instructed by his previous experience,
had earnestly but fruitlessly demanded fire-ships and bomb-vessels to
destroy the enemy in case they grounded on the flats; which they did,
and for some hours lay exposed to such an attack. Not having these
means, he had to watch helplessly the process of lightening and towing
by which they at last made their escape. He then returned to England,
having frustrated the relief expedition but, through defective
equipment, not destroyed the vessels. The Admiralty, upon receiving his
report of the transaction, made no acknowledgments to him.

Pitt had profited by Hawke's ineffectual request for small vessels and
his suffering from the want of them; but he utilized the suggestions in
a manner that robbed their author of any share in the results. A
squadron of that sort was to be constituted, to operate on the French
coast in diversions like that of 1757; but it was to be an independent
command, under an officer chosen by the Government without consulting
the admiral. To the main fleet was assigned the necessary, but in credit
very secondary, office of cruising off Brest, to prevent interruption by
the French ships there; to play, in short, the inconspicuous role of a
covering force, while the light squadron had the brilliant part of
fighting. The officer selected for the latter was Howe, deservedly a
favorite of Hawke's, but not therefore acceptable to him as a supplanter
in his honors.

The admiral had been for some time superintending the equipment of the
vessels for the light division, when, on May 10, 1758, Howe reported to
him, bringing his orders. Hawke boiled over at once; and, in a heat
evidently beyond his will to control, despatched the following letter,
three hours after Howe's arrival.


     Portsmouth, 7 o'clock p.m. 10th May, 1758.

     Sir,--About 4 o'clock arrived here Captain Howe, and delivered me
     their Lordships' order of the 9th. In last September I was sent out
     to command an expedition under all the disadvantages one could
     possibly labor under, arising chiefly from my being under the
     influence of land-officers in Councils of War at sea.[4] Last
     cruise (March-April, 1758) I went out on a particular service,
     almost without the least means of performing it. Now every means to
     ensure success is provided; another is to reap the credit; while it
     is probable that I, with the capital ships, might be ordered to
     cruise in such a manner as to prevent his failing in this attempt.
     To fit out his ships for this service I have been kept here,[5] and
     even now have their Lordships' directions, at least in terms, to
     obey him. He is to judge of what he wants for his expedition; he is
     to make his demands, and I am to comply with them. I have
     therefore directed my flag immediately to be struck, and left their
     Lordships' orders with Vice-Admiral Holburne. For no consequence
     that can attend my striking it without orders shall ever outbalance
     with me the wearing it one moment with discredit.

      I am, etc.
      E. HAWKE.


It is impossible to justify so extreme a step as abandoning one's
command without permission, and especially under circumstances that
permitted the orderly course of asking for detachment. Nevertheless,
Hawke did well to be angry; and, as is sometimes the case, an
injudicious and, in point of occasion, unseemly loss of temper,
doubtless contributed to insure for him in the future, to a degree which
forbearance or mere remonstrance would not have assured, the
consideration essential to his duties. Many will remember the effect
produced by Plimsoll's unparliamentary outbreak. The erroneous
impression, that admirals and generals fit to be employed at all were to
be ridden booted and spurred, needed correction. Hawke had
misapprehended the intention of the Government, in so far as believing
that the light squadron was to be employed in Basque Roads, the scene of
last year's failure; but he was right in thinking that intrusting the
enterprise to another, on that occasion his junior, would be a
reflection upon himself, intensified by making the command practically
independent, while he was limited to the covering duty. Under these
circumstances, erroneously imagined by him, the squadron should have
been attached to his command, and the particular direction left to him;
the Government giving to him, instead of to Howe, the general orders
which it issued, and arranging with him beforehand as to the command of
the detached squadron.

But even under the actual conditions, of an intention to operate on the
western Channel coast of France, it would have been graceful and
appropriate to recognize Hawke's eminent past, and recent experience, by
keeping under his command the ships he had himself fitted for the
service, and directing him to despatch Howe with the necessary
instructions. It was as in the Nile campaign, where the general
directions were sent to St. Vincent, with a clear expression of the
Government's preference for Nelson as the officer to take charge. The
intended scene of Howe's operations, if not formally within Hawke's
district, was far less distant from Brest than Toulon and Italy were
from Cadiz, where St. Vincent covered Nelson's detachment. In the wish
for secrecy, perhaps, or perhaps through mere indifference to the effect
produced upon Hawke, as a man assumed to need curb and spur, he was left
in ignorance, to imagine what he pleased; and this action, succeeding
previous neglects and Pitt's imputations of the previous year, elicited
an outburst which, while it cannot be justified in its particular
manifestation, was in spirit inevitable. A man submissive to such
treatment as he had good cause to suspect, would be deficient in the
independence of character, and sensitive regard to official reputation,
without which he was unfit to command the Channel Fleet.

Hawke was summoned at once to the Admiralty, and in the interview which
ensued, as shown by the minutes endorsed on his own letter, his
misconception as to the quarter in which Howe was to act afforded
standing ground for a compromise. Hawke having committed himself
officially, and upon a mistaken premise, the Admiralty had him
technically at their mercy; but such a triumph as they could win by
disciplining him would be more disastrous than a defeat. He disclaimed
resentment towards any person, and reiterated that his action was
intended merely to defend his character and honor, which he said--to
quote the minute exactly--"were not _so much_ touched as he apprehended
when the suspicion he had of Mr. Howe's going to Basque Roads
arose--from the Lords asking him some days since for a draft of the
Roads." The italics are the present writer's; but the words as they
stand would indicate that he did not yield his view of the matter in
general, nor leave hearers under any doubt as to how far he could safely
be treated with contumely or slight. There can be little doubt that the
substantial result was to strengthen his position in the exacting duty
that lay before him in the following year.

The whole business was then salved over by the First Lord, Anson, taking
command of the Channel Fleet for the particular occasion. Hawke
accompanied him as second in command, while Howe went his way with the
light squadron and the troops. Both divisions sailed on the 1st of June.
On the 18th our admiral was so unwell with a severe fever and cold--a
complaint to which he was much subject--that he had to ask to be sent
into port. He went ashore before the end of the month, and remained
unemployed till the following May.

The year 1759 is the culminating epoch of Hawke's career. In it occurred
the signal triumph of Quiberon Bay, the seal of his genius, significant
above all as demonstrating that the ardor of the leader had found
fulfilment in his followers, that the spirit of Hawke had become the
spirit of the Navy. This year also yielded proof of his great capacity
as a seaman and administrator, in the efficient blocking of Brest,
prolonged through six months of closest watching into the period of the
winter gales, in face of which it had hitherto been thought impossible
to keep the sea with heavy ships massed in fleets; for, as he most
justly said, in explaining the necessity of maintaining the rendezvous
fixed by him, "A single ship may struggle with a hard gale of wind when
a squadron cannot. In working against a strong westerly gale in the
Channel, where it cannot make very long stretches,"--because it finds
shores and shoals on either side,--"it must always by wearing lose
ground, but more especially if it should so blow as to put it past
carrying sail." The method used by Hawke was not only an innovation on
all past practice, but, as has before been said, constituted the pattern
whereon were framed the great blockades of the Napoleonic period, which
strangled both the naval efficiency and the commercial and financial
resources of the Empire. These were but developments of Hawke's fine
achievement of 1759; the prestige of originality belongs to him. Even
their success, with better ships and the improvement of detail always
accompanying habit, is foreshadowed by his. "I may safely affirm that,
except the few ships that took refuge in Conquet, hardly a vessel of any
kind has been able to enter or come out of Brest for four
months,"--ending October 10th. "They have been obliged to unload near
forty victuallers at Quimperley and carry their cargoes by land to
Brest. It must be the fault of the weather, not ours, if any of them
escape."

It was suitable indeed that so strenuous and admirable an exhibition of
professional ability,--of naval generalship,--alike in strategic
combination, tactical disposition, and administrative superintendence,
should terminate in a brilliant triumph, at once its fruit and its
crown; wherein sedulous and unremittent readiness for instant action,
comprehended by few, received a startling demonstration which none could
fail to understand. As Nelson was pursued by ignorant sneers before the
Nile, so Hawke was burned in effigy by the populace, at the very moment
when laborious effort was about to issue in supreme achievement. The
victory in either case is less than the antecedent labor, as the crown,
after all, is less than the work, the symbol than the fact symbolized.

A brief account of preceding conditions, and of the dispositions
maintained to meet them, is therefore necessary to due appreciation of
the victory of Quiberon Bay. Although the diversions of 1758 had not
very materially aided Frederic of Prussia, they had inflicted distinct
humiliation and harassment upon France. This, added to defeat upon the
Continent and in North America, had convinced the French Government, as
it convinced Napoleon a half-century later, that a determined blow must
be struck at England herself as the operative centre upon which rested,
and from which proceeded, the most serious detriment to their cause and
that of their allies. It was resolved, therefore, to attempt an invasion
of England; to the threat of which the English people were always
extremely sensitive.

From local conditions the French preparations had to be made in several
separate places; it was the task of the British Navy to prevent the
concentration of these different detachments in a joint effort. The
troops must embark, of course, from some place near to England; their
principal points of assembly were on the Channel, whence they were to
cross in flat-boats, and in the Biscay ports, from Brest to the mouth of
the Loire. The Bay of Quiberon, from which Hawke's action takes its
name, lies between the two latter points. It is sheltered from the full
force of the Atlantic gales by a peninsula of the same name, and by some
shoals which prolong the barrier to the southward of the promontory.

To cross safely, it was necessary to provide naval protection. To this
end squadrons were equipped in Toulon and in Brest. Combined at the
latter point, and further strengthened by divisions expected to return
from North America, they would constitute a force of very serious
consideration in point of numbers. Rochefort also was an element in the
problem, though a minor one; for either the small force already there
might join the concentration, or, if the port were unwatched, the
American or other divisions might get in there, and be at least so much
nearer to Brest, or to a neighboring point of assembly, as Quiberon Bay.

As the French Navy was essential to the French crossing, as its junction
was essential to action, as the point of junction was at or near
Brest--for there was the district near which the troops were
assembling--and as by far the largest detachment was already in Brest,
that port became the important centre upon blocking which depended
primarily the thwarting of the invasion. If the French Navy succeeded in
concentrating at Brest, the first move in the game would be lost. Hawke
therefore had the double duty of not allowing the squadron there to get
out without fighting, and of closing the entrance to reinforcements. The
latter was far the more difficult, and could not be assured beyond the
chance of failure, because an on-shore gale, which would carry his fleet
into the Channel to avoid being driven on the French coast, would be
fair for an outside enemy to run into the port, friendly to him. This
actually occurred at a most critical moment, but it could only happen by
a combination of circumstances; that is, by the hostile squadron
chancing to arrive at a moment when the British had been blown off. If
it approached under ordinary conditions of weather it would run into the
midst of foes.

The great names of the British Navy were then all afloat in active
command. Rodney was before Havre, which he bombarded in the course of
the summer, doing a certain amount of damage, harassing the local
preparations for invasion, and intercepting vessels carrying supplies to
the Brest fleet and coastwise. Boscawen, second only to Hawke, was
before Toulon, to hold there the dozen ships-of-the-line under De la
Clue, as Hawke was charged to stop the score under Conflans.

In broad conception, Hawke's method was simple and can be easily stated;
the difficulty lay in carrying it out. The main body of his force had a
rendezvous, so chosen that in violent weather from the westward it could
at worst drift up Channel, but usually would have a fair wind for
Torbay, a roadstead on the British coast about a hundred miles distant.
To the rendezvous the fleet was not tied under ordinary circumstances;
it was merely a headquarters which admitted of cruising, but where
despatches from home would always find the admiral in person, or news of
his whereabouts. Near Brest itself was kept an inshore squadron of three
or four ships, which under ordinary circumstances could see the enemy
inside, noting his forwardness; for the cannon of the day could not
molest a vessel more than a mile from the entrance, while the conditions
within of spars and sails indicated to a seaman the readiness or
intention to move, to a degree not ascertainable with ships dependent on
steam only.

With these dispositions, if a westerly gale came on, the fleet held its
ground while it could, but when expedient to go put into Torbay. Owing
to the nearness of the two places, the weather, when of a pronounced
character, was the same at both. While the wind held to the westward of
south, or even at south-southeast, a ship-of-the-line could not beat out
from Brest; much less a fleet. The instant the wind went east, fair for
exit, the British left Torbay, with certainty of not being too late;
for, though the enemy might get out before their return, the east wind
would not suffer them to close with the French coast at another point
soon enough to avoid a meeting. While in Torbay the time was improved by
taking on board stores and provisions; nor was the night's rest at
anchor a small consideration for seamen worn with continual cruising.

The practical merits displayed by Hawke in maintaining this simple but
arduous service were, first and supremely, the recognition of its
possibility, contrary to a tradition heretofore as commonly and as
blindly accepted as those of the line-of-battle, and of the proper
methods for fleet attack before described. It must be remembered also
that in these wars, 1739-1763, for the first time the British Navy found
the scene of action, in European waters, to be the Biscay coast of
France. In the former great wars of the seventeenth century, French
fleets entered the Channel, and pitched battles were fought there and in
the North Sea. Thence the contest shifted to the Mediterranean, where
the great fleets operated in the later days of William III., and the
reign of Anne. Then, too, the heavy ships, like land armies, went into
winter quarters. It was by distinguished admirals considered
professionally criminal to expose those huge yet cumbrous engines of the
nation's power to the buffetings of winter gales, which might unfit them
next year to meet the enemy, snugly nursed and restored to vigor in
home ports during the same time. The need of periodical refitting and
cleaning the bottoms clinched the argument in favor of this seasonable
withdrawal from the sea.

With this presumed necessity, attention had not been paid to developing
a system of maintenance and refit adapted to the need of a fleet
performing what Hawke undertook. In this, of course, there cannot be
assigned to him the individuality of merit that may belong to a
conception, and does belong to the man who initiates and assumes, as he
did, the responsibility for a novel and hazardous course of action. Many
agents had to contribute to the forwarding of supplies and repairs; but,
while singleness of credit cannot be assumed, priority is justly due to
him upon whose shoulders fell not only all blame, in case his enterprise
failed, but the fundamental difficulty of so timing the reliefs of the
vessels under his command, so arranging the order of rotation in their
going and coming as to keep each, as well as the whole body, in a
constant condition of highest attainable efficiency--in numbers, in
speed, and in health--for meeting the enemy, whose time of exit could
not be foreknown. Naturally, too, the man on whom all this fell, and who
to the nation would personify success or failure, as the event might
be,--terms which to him would mean honor or ruin,--that man, when
professionally so competent as Hawke, would be most fruitful in orders
and in suggestions to attain the desired end. In this sense there can be
no doubt that he was foremost, and his correspondence bears evidence of
his preoccupation with the subject.

Into particulars it is scarcely necessary to go. Administrative details
are interesting only to specialists. But one quality absolutely
essential, and in which most men fail, he manifested in high degree. He
feared no responsibility, either towards the enemy, or towards the home
authorities. Superior and inferior alike heard plainly from him in case
of defects; still more plainly in case of neglect. "It is a matter of
indifference to me whether I fight the enemy, should they come out, with
an equal number, one ship more, or one ship less." "I depend not on
intelligence from the French ports; what I see I believe, and regulate
my conduct accordingly;" a saying which recalls one of Farragut's,--"The
officers say I don't believe anything. I certainly believe very little
that comes in the shape of reports. They keep everybody stirred up. I
mean to be whipped or to whip my enemy, and not to be scared to death."
Agitation, to a very considerable degree, was the condition of Hawke's
superiors; to say the least, anxiety strained to the point of
approaching panic. But Hawke could have adopted truly as his own
Farragut's other words, "I have full confidence in myself and in my
judgment,"--that is, of course, in professional matters; and he spoke
reassuringly out of the firmness of his self-reliance. "Their Lordships
will pardon me for observing that from the present disposition of the
squadron I think there is little room for alarm while the weather
continues tolerable." Again, a few days later, "Their Lordships may rest
assured there is little foundation for the present alarms. While the
wind is fair for the enemy's coming out, it is also favorable for our
keeping them in; and while we are obliged to keep off they cannot stir."
This was in October, when the weather was already wild and the days
shortening.

With equally little hesitancy, though without breach of subordination,
he overbears the Admiralty when they wish to pay what he considers
exaggerated care to cleaning the bottoms, traceable, no doubt, to the
prejudices of the Sea Lords. "If the ships take up a month by cleaning,
from the time they leave me to their return, it will be impossible for
me to keep up the squadron. The only practicable way is to heel, etc.,
and confine them to ten days in port for the refreshment of their
companies in case they should miss the spring tide." "Their Lordships
will give me leave to observe that the relief of the squadron depends
more on the refreshment of the ships' companies than on cleaning the
ships. By the hurry the latter must be performed in, unless the ship
continues a month or five weeks in port, which the present exigency will
by no means admit of, the men would be so harassed and fatigued that
they would return to me in a worse condition than when they left me....
However, I shall endeavor to comply with all their Lordships' directions
in such manner as, _to the best of my judgment, will answer their
intentions in employing me here_." The words italicized strike the true
note of subordination duly tempered with discretion.

To the Navy Board, a civil adjunct to the Admiralty, but possessed of
considerable independent power to annoy officers in active military
service, he took a more peremptory tone. He had discharged on his own
authority, and for reasons of emergency, a mutinous surgical officer.
For this he was taken to task, as Nelson a generation later was rebuked
by the same body. "I have to acquaint you," he replied, "that there was
no mistake in his being ordered by me to be discharged." He then gives
his reasons, and continues, "For the real good of the service I ordered
him to be discharged, and his crime noted on his list of pay, for your
information. I shall not enter into any dispute with you about my
authority as a Commanding Officer, neither do I ever think of
inconveniences or prejudices to myself, as a party, according to your
insinuations, where the good of the service is concerned." It must be
added that to subordinates he was as liberal with praise as he was with
censure, where either was merited; nor did he fail in kindly personal
intervention upon due occasion for deserving or unfortunate men. More
reserved, apparently, than Nelson, he seems to have been like him
sympathetic; and hence it was that, as before observed, it was his
spirit that he communicated to the navy rather than a system, admirable
as was the strategic system embodied in his methods of blockade. It was
by personal influence rather than by formulated precept that Hawke
inspired his service, and earned a just claim to be reckoned the
greatest force of his century in naval development.

The general conditions being as described, the fighting in the naval
campaign of 1759 began in the Mediterranean. On June 8th Boscawen,
having driven two French frigates into a fortified bay near Toulon,
attacked them with three ships-of-the-line. The attack failed, and the
British ships were badly injured; a timely lesson on the general
inexpediency of attacking shore batteries with vessels, unless for
special and adequate reasons of probable advantage. In July he returned
to Gibraltar, to refit and for provisions. In the absence of details,
positive criticism is unwarranted; but it is impossible not to note the
difference between this step, during summer weather, and the Toulon
blockades of Lord St. Vincent, who, when before Brest, modelled his
course upon that of Hawke. The port being thus left open, De la Clue
sailed on the 5th of August for Brest. On the 17th he was near the
straits of Gibraltar, hugging the African coast, and falling night gave
promise of passing unseen, when a British lookout frigate caught sight
of his squadron. She hauled in for Gibraltar at once, firing signal
guns. Boscawen's ships were in the midst of repairs, mostly dismantled;
but, the emergency not being unforeseen, spars and sails were sent
rapidly aloft, and within three hours they were underway in pursuit. The
French division separated during the night. Five ships put into Cadiz.
The British next morning caught sight of the remaining seven, among
which was the admiral, and a sharp chase resulted in the destruction of
five. From August 18th the Toulon fleet was eliminated from the
campaign; though the vessels in Cadiz remained to the end a charge upon
Hawke's watchfulness, similar to that caused by the enemy's divisions
expected from America.

That one of the latter was already on its way home, under the command of
Commodore Bompart, was notified to our admiral on September 21st by a
despatch from England. He immediately sent a division of heavy ships to
reinforce the light squadron to the southward. "If the alarm is great
now," he said, "it will be much greater if he get into Rochefort."
Further information from the West Indies contradicted the first report,
and on October 10th Hawke recalled the ships-of-the-line, apparently at
the wish of the Admiralty; for he expresses his regret at doing so, and
asks for more of the "many ships" then in England, that Rochefort may be
blocked as well as Brest. The incident has now little importance,
except as indicating the general national nervousness, and the
difficulty under which he labored through force inadequate to the
numerous and exacting duties entailed by constant holding the sea in
war. From this point of view it bears upon his conduct.

That Bompart was coming proved to be true. On November 10th Hawke
anchored with the fleet in Torbay, after three days of struggle against
a very heavy westerly storm. "Bompart, if near, may get in," he wrote
the Admiralty, "but no ship can get out from any port in the Bay." The
weather had then moderated, but was still too rough for boating, even in
the sheltered roadstead; hence he could get no reports of the state of
the ships, which shows incidentally the then defective system of
signalling. On the 12th he sailed, on the 13th was again forced into
Torbay by a south-wester, but on the 14th got away finally. On the
afternoon of the 16th the fleet was twenty-five miles from the Island of
Ushant, near Brest, and there learned from transports, returning from
the light division off Quiberon, that the French fleet had been seen the
day before, seventy-five miles northwest of Belleisle; therefore some
fifty or sixty miles southeast of the point where this news was
received. Conflans had sailed the same day that the British last left
Torbay, but before his departure Bompart had opportunely arrived, as
Hawke had feared. His ships were not able to go at once to sea on so
important a mission, but their seasoned crews were a welcome
reinforcement and were distributed through the main fleet, which
numbered twenty-one ships-of-the-line. Hawke had twenty-three.

Concluding that the enemy were bound for Quiberon, Hawke carried a press
of sail for that place. He knew they must be within a hundred miles of
him and aimed to cut them off from their port. During the 17th the wind,
hanging to the south and east, was adverse to both fleets, but on the
18th and 19th it became more favorable. At half-past eight on the
morning of the 20th, one of the lookout frigates ahead of the British
made the signal for sighting a fleet. It was then blowing strong from
the west-northwest, and Belleisle, which is ten miles west of Quiberon
Bay, and south of which the fleets must pass, was by the English
reckoning forty miles distant. A course of some fifty or sixty miles was
therefore to be run before the enemy could close the land, and there
remained about eight hours of sun.

Hawke's day had come. Towards ten o'clock he had the enemy sufficiently
in view to see that they were intent upon securing their arrival, rather
than fighting. He therefore made signal for the seven ships nearest them
"to chase and draw into a line-of-battle ahead of me, and endeavour to
stop them till the rest of the squadron should come up, who also were
_to form as they chased that no time might be lost_ in the pursuit." The
French "kept going off under such sail as all their squadron could
carry and _yet keep together_, while we crowded after him _with every
sail our ships could bear_." The words italicized sum up the whole
philosophy of a general chase. The pursued are limited to the speed of
the slowest, otherwise he who cannot but lag is separated and lost; the
pursuer need slacken no whit, for his friends are ever coming up to his
aid. Overtaking is inevitable, unless the distance is too short.

At half-past two firing began between the French rear and the leading
British. Of the two foremost in the chase, who thus opened the fight,
one was the same _Dorsetshire_ which in Mathews's battle had played the
laggard. Her captain, who thus rose to his opportunity, was one of the
two to whom Hawke addressed the enthusiastic compliment that they had
"behaved like angels." Hawke himself was at this moment south of
Belleisle, with several ships ahead of him; while the French admiral was
leading his fleet, in order better to pilot them over dangerous ground,
and by his own action show more surely than was possible by signal what
he wished done from moment to moment. At the southern extreme of the
shoals which act as a breakwater to Quiberon Bay are some formidable
rocks, known as the Cardinals. Around these M. de Conflans passed soon
after the firing began, his rear being then in hot action.

Hawke himself was without a pilot, as were most of his captains. The
sailing master of the flag-ship was charged with that duty for the
fleet, but had of the ground before him no exact personal knowledge; nor
could reliance be placed upon the imperfect surveys of a locality, which
it was not the interest of an almost constant enemy to disclose. Enough,
however, was known to leave no doubt of the greatness of the risks, and
it was the master's part to represent them. The occasion, however, was
not one of a mere diversion, of a secondary operation, but of one vital
to the nation's cause; and Hawke's reply, stamped with the firmness of a
great officer, showed how little professional timidity had to do with
his laudable care of his fleet in Basque Roads two years before. "You
have done your duty in warning me," he replied; "now lay us alongside
the French Commander-in-chief." So amid the falling hours of the day the
British fleet, under the unswerving impulse of its leader, moved
steadfastly forward, to meet a combination of perils that embraced all
most justly dreaded by seamen,--darkness, an intricate navigation, a lee
shore fringed with outlying and imperfectly known reefs and shoals,
towards which they were hurried by a fast-rising wind and sea, that
forbade all hope of retracing their steps during the long hours of the
night.

"Had we but two hours more daylight," wrote Hawke in his official
report, "the whole had been totally destroyed or taken; for we were
almost up with their van when night overtook us." His success would
have been greater, though not more decisive of issues than the event
proved it; but nothing could have added to the merit or brilliancy of
his action, to which no element of grandeur was wanting. This was one of
the most dramatic of sea fights. Forty-odd tall ships, pursuers and
pursued, under reefed canvas, in fierce career drove furiously on; now
rushing headlong down the forward <DW72> of a great sea, now rising on
its crest as it swept beyond them; now seen, now hidden; the helmsmen
straining at the wheels, upon which the huge hulls, tossing their prows
from side to side, tugged like a maddened horse, as though themselves
feeling the wild "rapture of the strife" that animated their masters,
rejoicing in their strength and defying the accustomed rein.

The French admiral had flattered himself that the enemy, ignorant of the
ground, would not dare to follow him round the Cardinals. He was soon
undeceived. Hawke's comment on the situation was that he was "for the
old way of fighting, to make downright work with them." It was an old
way, true; but he had more than once seen it lost to mind, and had
himself done most to restore it to its place,--a new way as well as an
old. The signals for the general chase and for battle were kept aloft,
and no British ship slacked her way. Without ranged order, save that of
speed, the leaders mingled with the French rear; the roar and flashes
of the guns, the falling spars and drifting clouds of smoke, now adding
their part to the wild magnificence of the scene. Though tactically
perfect in the sole true sense of tactics, that the means adopted
exactly suited the situation, this was a battle of incidents, often
untold,--not one of manoeuvres. As the ships, rolling heavily, buried
their flanks deeply in the following seas, no captain dared to open his
lower tier of ports, where the most powerful artillery was arrayed--none
save one, the French _Thesee_, whose rashness was rebuked by the
inpouring waters, which quickly engulfed both ship and crew. The
_Superbe_ met a like fate, though not certainly from the same cause. She
sank under the broadside of the _Royal George_, Hawke's flag-ship. "The
_Royal George's_ people gave a cheer," wrote an eye witness, "but it was
a faint one; the honest sailors were touched at the miserable state of
so many hundreds of poor creatures." Americans and English can couple
this story of long ago with Philip's ejaculation off Santiago de Cuba,
but three years since: "Don't cheer, boys, those poor devils are dying."

By five o'clock two French ships had struck, and two had been sunk.
"Night was now come," wrote Hawke, "and being on a part of the coast,
among islands and shoals of which we were totally ignorant, without a
pilot, as was the greatest part of the squadron, and blowing hard on a
lee shore, I made the signal to anchor." The day's work was over, and
doubtless looked to him incomplete, but it was effectually and finally
done. The French Navy did not again lift up its head during the three
years of war that remained. Balked in their expectation that the foe's
fear of the beach would give them refuge, harried and worried by the
chase, harnessed to no fixed plan of action, Conflans's fleet broke
apart and fled. Seven went north, and ran ashore at the mouth of the
little river Vilaine which empties into Quiberon Bay. Eight stood south,
and succeeded in reaching Rochefort. The fate of four has been told.
Conflans's flag-ship anchored after night among the British, but at
daybreak next morning cut her cables, ran ashore, and was burned by the
French. One other, wrecked on a shoal in the bay, makes up the tale of
twenty-one. Six were wholly lost to their navy; the seven that got into
Vilaine only escaped to Brest by twos, two years later, while the
Rochefort division was effectually blocked by occupying Basque Roads,
the islands of which and of Quiberon were cultivated as kitchen gardens
for the refreshment of British crews.

Of the British, one ship went on a shoal during the action, and on the
following day another coming to her assistance also grounded. Both were
lost, but most of their people were saved. Beyond this Hawke's fleet
suffered little. "As to the loss we have sustained," wrote he, "let it
be placed to the account of the necessity I was under of running all
risks to break this strong force of the enemy."

A contemporary witness assigns to Hawke's own ship a large individual
share in the fighting. Of this he does not himself speak, nor is it of
much matter. That all was done with her that could be done, to aid in
achieving success, is sufficiently assured by his previous record.
Hawke's transcendent merit in this affair was that of the general
officer, not of the private captain. The utmost courage shown by the
commander of a single ship before the enemy's fire cannot equal the
heroism which assumes the immense responsibility of a doubtful issue, on
which may hang a nation's fate; nor would the admiral's glory be shorn
of a ray, if neither then nor at any other time had a hostile shot
traversed his decks.

The night of the 20th passed in anxieties inseparable from a situation
dangerous at best, but still more trying to an admiral upon whom, after
such a day, night had closed without enabling him to see in what case
most of his ships were. "In the night," he reports, "we heard many guns
of distress fired, but, blowing hard, want of knowledge of the coast,
and whether they were fired by a friend or an enemy, prevented all means
of relief." In the morning he resumed his activity. Little, however,
could be done. The continuing violence of the wind, and ignorance of
the ground, prevented approach within gun-shot to the ships at the mouth
of the Vilaine, while they, by lightening and favor of the next flood
tide, warped their way inside through the mud flats.

Hawke remained nearly two months longer, returning to England January
17, 1760. He had then been thirty-five weeks on board, without setting
foot on shore. At the age of fifty-four, and amid such manifold cares,
it is not to be wondered at that he should need relief. Rather must he
be considered fortunate that his health, never robust in middle life,
held firm till his great triumph was achieved. Boscawen succeeded him
temporarily in the command.

He was received in England with acclamations and with honors; yet the
most conspicuous mark of approval conferred on admirals before and
after, the grant of the peerage, was not given to him, who had wrought
one of the very greatest services ever done for the country. Recent
precedent--that of Anson--demanded such recognition; and popular
enthusiasm would have applauded, although the full military merit of the
man could scarcely be appreciated by the standards of his generation.
That no such reward was bestowed is most probably attributable to
Hawke's own indifference to self-advancement. If demanded by him, it
could scarcely have been refused; but he never pushed his own interests.
His masculine independence in professional conduct, towards superiors
and inferiors, found its root and its reflection in personal
unconcern--as well antecedent as subsequent--about the results from his
actions to his fortunes. To do his own part to the utmost, within the
lines of the profession he knew, was his conception of duty. As he would
not meddle with the land officers' decision as to what they should or
should not do, so he left to the politicians, in whose hands the gifts
lay, to decide what they would, or should, accord to a successful
admiral. Pitt, the Great Commoner, left Hawke a commoner. Possibly he
recognized that only by stretch of imagination could Hawke be reckoned
one of the creations of a great Minister's genius.

Little remains to tell. On September 3, 1762, the admiral's flag was
hauled down for the last time. He never went to sea again. In 1766, when
Pitt came back to power as Lord Chatham, Hawke became First Lord of the
Admiralty, and so remained till 1771. It was a time of unbroken peace,
succeeding a period of continuous wars extending over a quarter of a
century; consequently there was in naval and military matters the
lassitude usual to such a period. Hawke is credited with formulating the
principle that "the British fleet could only be termed considerable in
the proportion it bore to that of the House of Bourbon;" that is, to the
combined navies of France and Spain, over which that House then reigned.
The maxim proves that he had some claim to statesmanship in his view of
affairs outside his service; and his manifested freedom from
self-seeking is the warrant that no secondary political motives would
divert his efforts from this aim. That he succeeded in the main, that he
was not responsible for the fallen condition of the fleet when war again
arose in 1778, is evidenced by a statement, uncontradicted, in the House
of Lords in 1779, that when he left office the navy had 139
ships-of-the-line, of which 81 were ready for sea.

In 1765 Hawke, who was then already a full admiral, wearing his flag at
the mainmast head, was made Vice-Admiral of Great Britain; an honorary
position, but the highest in point of naval distinction that the nation
had to give. As one who held it three-quarters of a century later wrote,
"It has ever been regarded as the most distinguished compliment
belonging to our profession." The coincidence is significant that upon
Hawke's death Rodney succeeded him in it; affirming, as it were, the
consecutiveness of paramount influence exercised by the two on the
development of the Navy. In 1776 the peerage was at last conferred;
seventeen years after his great victory, and when, having passed three
score and ten, a man who had ever disdained to ask must have felt the
honor barren to himself, though acceptable for his son.

His last recorded professional utterances are in private letters
addressed in the summer of 1780 to the commander-in-chief of the
Channel Fleet--Francis Geary--who had served with him in the Bay of
Biscay, though he missed Quiberon. He recommends the maintenance of his
old station off Brest, and says, "For God's sake, if you should be so
lucky as to get sight of the enemy, get as close to them as possible. Do
not let them shuffle with you by engaging at a distance, but get within
musket shot if you can. This will be the means to make the action
decisive." In these words we find an unbroken chain of tradition between
Hawke and Nelson. One of Hawke's pupils was William Locker; and Locker
in turn, just before Hawke's death, had Nelson for a lieutenant. To him
Nelson in after years, in the height of his glory, wrote, "To you, my
dear friend, I owe much of my success. It was you who taught me,--'Lay a
Frenchman close and you will beat him.'"

Hawke died October 16, 1781. On his tomb appear these words, "Wherever
he sailed, victory attended him." It is much to say, but it is not all.
Victory does not always follow desert. "It is not in mortals to command
success,"--a favorite quotation with the successful admirals St. Vincent
and Nelson. Hawke's great and distinctive glory is this,--that he, more
than any one man, was the source and origin of the new life, the new
spirit, of his service. There were many brave men before him, as there
were after; but it fell to him in a time of great professional
prostration not only to lift up and hand on a fallen torch, but in
himself to embody an ideal and an inspiration from which others drew,
thus rekindling a light which it is scarcely an exaggeration to say had
been momentarily extinguished.

FOOTNOTES:

[3] For the account of Mathews's action, including Hawke's personal
share in it, see _ante_, pp. 21-47.

[4] By express orders from the Ministry Councils of War had to be held.

[5] An application for four days' leave for private business had been
refused.




RODNEY

1719-1792


Unlike Hawke, Rodney drew his descent from the landed gentry of England,
and had relatives among the aristocracy. The name was originally Rodeney.
We are told by his son-in-law and biographer that the Duke of Chandos, a
connection by marriage, obtained the command of the Royal yacht for the
admiral's father, Henry Rodney. In one of the trips which George I.
frequently made between England and Hanover, he asked his captain if
there were anything he could do for him. The reply was a request that he
would stand sponsor for his son, who accordingly received the name of
George; his second name Brydges coming from the family through which
Chandos and the Rodneys were brought into relationship. The social
position and surroundings resulting from such antecedents contributed of
course to hasten the young officer's advancement, irrespective of the
unquestionable professional merit shown by him, even in early years; but
to them also, combined with narrow personal fortune, inadequate to the
tastes thus engendered, was probably due the pecuniary embarrassment
which dogged him through life, and was perhaps the moving incentive to
doubtful procedures that cast a cloud upon his personal and official
reputation.

Rodney was born in February, 1719, and went to sea at the age of
thirteen; serving for seven years in the Channel Fleet. Thence he was
transferred to the Mediterranean, where he was made lieutenant in 1739.
In 1742 he went again to the Mediterranean with Admiral Mathews, who
there gave him command of a "post" ship, with which he brought home the
trade,--three hundred merchant vessels,--from Lisbon. Upon arriving in
England his appointment by Mathews was "confirmed" by the Admiralty.
Being then only twenty-four, he anticipated by five years the age at
which Hawke reached the same rank of post-captain, the attainment of
which fixed a man's standing in the navy. Beyond that, advancement went
by seniority; a post-captain might be "yellowed,"--retired as a rear
admiral,--but while in active service he kept the advantage of his early
promotion.

When Rodney was in later years commander-in-chief in the West Indies, he
made his son a post-captain at fifteen; an exercise of official powers
which, though not singular to him, is too characteristic of the man and
the times to be wholly unmentioned. His own promotion, though rapid, was
not too much so for his professional good; but it is likely that
neither that consideration, nor the good of the service, counted for
much alongside of the influence he possessed. He appears, however, to
have justified from the first the favor of his superiors. His employment
was continuous, and in a military point of view he was more fortunate
than Hawke was at the same period of his career. Within two years, when
in command of a forty-gun ship, he fought and took a French privateer of
the same nominal force, and with a crew larger by one hundred than his
own. Thence he was advanced into the _Eagle_, sixty, in which, after
some commerce-destroying more lucrative than glorious, he bore an
extremely honorable part in Hawke's battle with L'Etenduere, already
related. The _Eagle_ was heavily engaged, and was one of the three small
ships that on their own initiative pursued and fought, though
unsuccessfully, the two escaping French vessels. Rodney shared Hawke's
general encomium, that "as far as fell within my notice, the commanders,
their officers, and ships' companies, behaved with the greatest spirit
and resolution." Rodney came under his close observation, for, the
_Eagle's_ "wheel being shot to pieces and all the men at it killed, and
all her braces and bowlines gone," she drove twice on board the
flag-ship. This was before her pursuit of the two fliers.

In the subsequent trial of Captain Fox,--the minutes of which the
present writer has not seen,--it appears, according to the biographer
of Lord Hawke,[6] that it was Captain Saunders's and Captain Rodney's
"sense of being deserted by Fox, and of the two French ships having
escaped through his failure of duty, which forms the chief feature of
the Court-Martial. Rodney especially describes his being exposed to the
fire of four of the enemy's ships, when, as he asserted, Fox's ship
might well have taken off some of it." The incident is very noteworthy,
for it bears the impress of personal character. Intolerance of
dereliction of duty, and uncompromising condemnation of the delinquent,
were ever leading traits in Rodney's course as a commander-in-chief. He
stood over his officers with a rod, dealt out criticism unsparingly, and
avowed it as his purpose and principle of action so to rule. It is not
meant that his censures were undeserved, or even excessive; but there
entered into them no ingredient of pity. His despatches are full of
complaints, both general and specific. When he spared, it was from a
sense of expediency,--or of justice, a trait in which he was by no
means deficient; but for human weakness he had no bowels. Hawke
complains of but this one captain, Fox, and towards him he seems not to
have evinced the strong feeling that animated his juniors. Each man has
his special gift, and to succeed must needs act in accordance with it.

There are those who lead and those who drive; Hawke belonged to the one
class, Rodney to the other.

In direct consequence of this difference of temperament, it will be
found, in contrasting the schools of which Hawke and Rodney are the
conspicuous illustrations, that the first represents the spirit, and the
second the form, which were the two efficient elements of the progress
made during the eighteenth century. The one introduces into a service
arrested in development, petrified almost, by blindly accepted rules and
unintelligent traditions, a new impulse, which transforms men from
within, breaking through the letter of the law in order to realize its
forgotten intent; the other gives to the spirit, thus freed from old
limitations, a fresh and sagacious direction, but needs nevertheless to
impose its own methods by constraint from without. It is the old
struggle, ever renewed, between liberty and law; in the due, but
difficult, combination of which consist both conservation and progress.

And so in the personality of the two great admirals who respectively
represent these contrasting schools of practice; while we find in both
these two elements, as they must exist in every efficient officer, yet
it is to be said that the one inspires and leads, the other moulds and
compels. The one, though seemingly reserved, is in character
sympathetic, and influences by example chiefly; the other, austerely
courteous, is towards associates distant and ungenial, working by fear
rather than by love. For these broad reasons of distinction it is
Mathews's battle that best measures the reaction of which Hawke is the
type, for there was especially illustrated defect of spirit, to cover
which the letter of the law was invoked; whereas in Byng's action,
extremely bad form, in the attempt to conform to the letter of the
Instructions, emphasizes the contrast with Rodney's methods, precise and
formal unquestionably, but in which form ceases to be an end in itself
and is reduced to its proper function as the means to carry into effect
a sound military conception. Of these two factors in the century's
progress, it needs hardly to be said that the one contributed by Hawke
is the greater. In spirit and in achievement he, rather than Rodney, is
the harbinger of Nelson.

A short time after the action with L'Etenduere the cruise of the _Eagle_
came to an end. When she was paid off Rodney was presented at Court by
Anson, the First Lord of the Admiralty; a merited and not unusual honor
after distinguished service in battle. The King was struck by his
youthful appearance, and said he had not known there was so young a
captain in the Navy. As he was then nearly thirty, and had seen much and
continuous service, it is singular that his face should not have borne
clear traces of the facts. Anson replied that he had been a captain for
six years, and it was to be wished that His Majesty had a hundred more
as good as he. Making allowance for courtly manners and fair-speaking,
the incident may be accepted as showing, not only that aptitude for the
service which takes its hardships without undue wear and tear, but also
an official reputation already well established and recognized.

Professional standing, therefore, as well as family influence, probably
contributed to obtain for him in 1749 the appointment of Commodore and
Commander-in-chief on the Newfoundland station; for he was still junior
on the list of captains, and had ten years more to run before obtaining
his admiral's flag. He remained in this post from 1749 to 1752. They
were years of peace, but of peace charged full with the elements of
discord which led to the following war. Canada was still French, and the
territorial limits between the North American possessions of the two
nations remained a subject of dispute and intrigue. The uncertain state
of political relations around the Gulf of St. Lawrence added to the
responsibility of Rodney's duty, and emphasized the confidence shown in
assigning him a position involving cautious political action.

Explicit confirmation of this indirect testimony is found in a private
letter to him from the Earl of Sandwich, who had succeeded Anson as
First Lord in 1748. "I think it necessary to inform you that, if the
Governor of Nova Scotia should have occasion to apply to you for succor,
and send to you for that purpose to Newfoundland, it would be approved
by Government if you should comply with his request. It is judged
improper, as yet, to send any public order upon a business of so
delicate a nature, which is the reason of my writing to you in this
manner; and I am satisfied that your prudence is such as will not suffer
you to make any injudicious use of the information you now receive.
There are some people that cannot be trusted with any but public orders,
but I shall think this important affair entirely safe under your
management and secrecy." Language such as this undoubtedly often covers
a hint, as well as expresses a compliment, and may have done so in this
instance; nevertheless, in after life it is certain that Rodney gave
proof of a very high order of professional discretion and of independent
initiative. It is therefore perfectly reasonable to suppose that he had
thus early convinced the Government that he was a man competent and
trustworthy under critical conditions, such as then characterized the
intercolonial relations of the two states. The particular incident is
farther noteworthy in connection with the backwardness, and even
reluctance, of the Government to employ him in the War of the American
Revolution, though Sandwich was again First Lord, and Rodney a strong
political supporter of the party in power. The precise cause for this is
probably not ascertainable; but it is a matter of perfectly reasonable
inference that the early promise of the young officer had meanwhile
become overclouded, that distrust had succeeded to confidence, for
reasons professional, but not strictly military. Rodney's war record
continued excellent from first to last; one not good only, but of
exceptional and singular efficiency.

In October, 1752, Rodney returned to England, having been elected to
Parliament. The Seven Years War, which, after two years of irregular
hostilities, began formally in 1756, found him still a captain. With its
most conspicuous opening incident, the attempted relief of Minorca, and
the subsequent trial and execution of the unsuccessful commander,
Admiral Byng, he had no connection, personal or official; nor was he a
member of the Court-Martial, although he seems to have been in England
at the time, and was senior to at least one of the sitting captains. The
abortive naval engagement off Port Mahon, however, stands in a directly
significant relation to his career, for it exemplifies to the most
exaggerated degree, alike in the purpose of the admiral and the finding
of the Court, the formal and pedantic conception of a correctly fought
fleet action, according to the rules and regulations "in such cases
prescribed" by the Fighting Instructions.[7] It was Rodney's lot to
break with this tradition, and to be the first to illustrate juster
ideas in a fairly ranged battle, where the enemy awaited attack, as he
had done at Malaga in 1704, and at Minorca in 1756. Precisely such an
opportunity never came to Hawke; for, although L'Etenduere waited, he
did so under conditions and dispositions which gave the ensuing affair a
nearer analogy to a general chase than to a pitched battle. Though the
British approach then was in a general sense parallel to the enemy's
line, it was from the rear, not from the beam; and through this
circumstance of overtaking, and from the method adopted, their vessels
came under fire in succession, not together. This was perfectly correct,
the course pre-eminently suited to the emergency, and therefore
tactically most sound; but the conditions were not those contemplated by
the Fighting Instructions, as they were in the case of Byng, and also in
the battle most thoroughly characteristic of Rodney--that of April 17,
1780. The contrast in conduct between the two commanders is strikingly
significant of progress, because of the close approach to identity in
circumstances.

Rodney accompanied the Rochefort expedition of 1757, under Hawke, some
account of which is given in the life of that admiral; and he commanded
also a ship-of-the-line in Boscawen's fleet in 1758, when the reduction
of Louisburg and Cape Breton Island was effected by the combined British
and colonial forces. After this important service, the necessary and
effectual antecedent of the capture of Quebec and the fall of Canada in
the following year, he returned to England, where on the 19th of May,
1759, he was promoted to Rear Admiral; being then forty. He was next,
and without interval of rest, given command of a squadron to operate
against Havre, where were gathering boats and munitions of war for the
threatened invasion of England; with the charge also of suppressing the
French coastwise sailings, upon which depended the assembling of the
various bodies of transports, and the carriage of supplies to the fleet
in Brest, that Hawke at the same time was holding in check. The service
was important, but of secondary interest, and calls for no particular
mention beyond that of its general efficiency as maintained by him.

In 1761, Rodney was again elected to Parliament, and, with a certain
political inconsequence, was immediately afterwards sent out of the
country, being appointed to the Leeward Islands Station, which embraced
the smaller Antilles, on the eastern side of the Caribbean Sea, with
headquarters at Barbados; Jamaica, to the westward, forming a distinct
command under an admiral of its own. He sailed for his new post October
21, 1761, taking with him instructions to begin operations against
Martinique upon the arrival of troops ordered from New York. These
reached Barbados December 24th, a month after himself, and on the 7th of
January, 1762, the combined forces were before Martinique, which after a
month of regular operations passed into the possession of the British on
the 16th of February. Its fall was followed shortly by that of the
other French Lesser Antilles,--Grenada, Santa Lucia, and St. Vincent.
Guadaloupe had been taken in 1759, and Dominica in June, 1761.

Up to this time the contest on the seas had been between Great Britain
and France only; but on March 5th a frigate reached Rodney with
instructions, then already nine weeks old, to begin hostilities against
Spain, whose clearly inimical purpose had induced the British Government
to anticipate her action, by declaring war. The same day another vessel
came in with like orders from the admiral at Gibraltar, while a third
from before Brest brought word that a French squadron of seven
ships-of-the-line, with frigates and two thousand troops, had escaped
from that port at the end of the year. With these circumstances before
him Rodney's conduct was like himself; prompt and officer-like. Lookout
ships were stationed along the length of the Caribbees, to windward, to
bring timely intelligence of the approach of the enemy's squadron; and
as its first destination was probably Martinique, the fall of which was
not yet known in Europe, he concentrated his fleet there, calling in
outlying detachments.

So far there was nothing in his course markedly different from that of
any capable officer, dealing with well ascertained conditions within the
limits of his own command. Occasion soon arose, however, to require more
exceptional action, and thus to illustrate at once the breadth of view,
and the readiness to assume responsibility, which already raised Rodney
conspicuously above the average level. On the 9th of March two lookout
vessels came in with news that they had sighted a fleet, corresponding
in numbers to the Brest division, fifteen miles to windward of
Martinique and standing to the southward; the trade wind making it
generally expedient to round the south point of the island in order to
reach the principal port on the west side,--Fort Royal. The British
squadron at once weighed anchor in pursuit; but the enemy, having
ascertained that the surrender was accomplished, had turned back north,
and were soon after reported from Guadaloupe as having passed there,
standing to the westward.

Rodney at once inferred that they must be gone to Santo Domingo. To
follow with the object of intercepting them was hopeless, in view of the
start they had; but the direction taken threatened Jamaica, the exposed
condition of which, owing to inadequate force, had been communicated to
him by the military and naval authorities there. His measures to meet
the case were thorough and deliberate, as well as rapid; no time was
lost either by hesitancy or delay, nor by the yet more facile error of
too precipitate movement. Orders for concentration were already out, but
the point on which to effect it was shifted to Antigua, where, although
inferior in natural resources to Martinique, the established British
naval station with its accumulated equipment was fixed; and the work of
provisioning and watering, so as to permit long continuance at sea
unhampered by necessity of replenishing, there went on apace. It was the
admiral's intention to leave his own command to look out for itself,
while he took away the mass of his fleet to protect national interests
elsewhere threatened.

Such a decision may seem superficially a commonplace matter of course;
that it was much more is a commonplace historical certainty. The merit
of Rodney's action appears not only in the details of execution, but in
its being undertaken at all; and in this case, as in a later instance in
his career, his resolution received the concrete emphasis that a sharp
and immediate contrast best affords. Prior to the enemy's arrival he had
laid the conditions before his colleague in service, General Moncton,
commanding the forces on shore, and asked a reinforcement of troops for
destitute Jamaica, if necessity arose. The result is best told in his
own words; for they convey, simply and without egotistic enlargement,
that settled personal characteristic, the want of which Jervis and
Nelson in their day noted in many, and which Rodney markedly possessed.
This was the capacity, which Sandwich eighteen years later styled
"taking the great line of considering the King's whole dominions under
your care;" an attribute far from common, as Moncton's reply showed. "I
acquainted him that I should certainly assist them with all the naval
force that could possibly be spared from the immediate protection of His
Majesty's Caribbee islands. I have again solicited the General for a
body of troops, since the enemy left these seas, and must do him the
justice to say, that he seems much concerned at the present distress of
Jamaica, but does not think himself sufficiently _authorized_ to detach
a body of troops without orders from England. I flatter myself their
Lordships will not be displeased with me if I take the liberty to
construe my instructions in such a manner as to think myself _authorized
and obliged_ to succor any of His Majesty's colonies that may be in
danger; and shall, therefore, without a moment's loss of time, hasten to
the succor of Jamaica, with ten sail-of-the-line, three frigates and
three bombs."[8]

It was not because, in so doing this, the obligation was absolute, and
the authority indisputable, that Rodney's course was professionally
meritorious. In such case his action would have risen little above that
obedience to orders, in which, as Nelson said, the generality find "all
perfection." The risk was real, not only to his station, but to the
possible plans of his superiors at home; the authority was his own only,
read by himself into his orders--at most their spirit, not their letter.
Consequently, he took grave chance of the penalty--loss of reputation,
if not positive punishment,--which, as military experience shows, almost
invariably follows independent action, unless results are kind enough to
justify it. It is, however, only the positive characters capable of
rising to such measures that achieve reputations enduring beyond their
own day. The incident needs to be coupled with Sandwich's compliment
just quoted, as well as with the one paid him when on the Newfoundland
command. Taken together, they avouch a personality that needs only
opportunity to insure itself lasting fame.

As it happened, Rodney not only took the responsibility of stripping his
own station to the verge of bareness in favor of the general interest,
but in so doing he came very near traversing, unwittingly, the plans of
the general government by his local action, laudable and proper as that
certainly was. He was, however, professionally lucky to a proverb, and
escaped this mischance by a hair's breadth. The purposed detachment had
already started for Jamaica, and he was accompanying it in person, when
there joined him on March 25th, off the island of St. Kitt's, not far
from Antigua, a frigate bearing Admiralty despatches of February 5th.
These required him to desist from any enterprises he might have in hand,
in order to give his undivided attention to the local preparations for
an expedition, as yet secret, which was shortly to arrive on his
station, under the command of Admiral Pocock, with ultimate destination
against Havana.

To be thus arrested at the very outset of a movement from which he
naturally expected distinction was a bitter disappointment to Rodney.
Several years later, in 1771, he wrote to Sandwich, who was not the
First Lord when Pocock was sent out, "I had the misfortune of being
superseded in the command of a successful fleet, entrusted to my care in
the West Indies, at the very time I had sailed on another expedition
against the enemy's squadron at Santo Domingo, and was thereby deprived
of pursuing those conquests which so honorably attended upon another,
and which secured him such great emoluments,"--for Havana proved a
wealthy prize. His steps, however, upon this unexpected reversal of his
plans, were again characterized by an immediateness, most honorable to
his professional character, which showed how thoroughly familiar he was
with the whole subject and its possible contingencies, and the
consequent readiness of his mind to meet each occasion as it arose;
marks, all, of the thoroughly equipped general officer. The order as to
his personal movements being not discretional, was of course absolutely
accepted; but his other measures were apparently his own, and were
instantaneous. A vessel was at once sent off to Barbados to notify
Admiral Pocock that the best place in the West Indies for his rendezvous
was Fort Royal Bay, in the newly acquired Martinique. The ten
sail-of-the-line, accompanied by two large transports from St. Kitt's,
were then sent on to Jamaica to move troops from there to join Pocock;
the command of the detachment being now entrusted to Sir James Douglas,
who received the further instruction to send back his fastest frigate,
with all the intelligence he could gather, directing her to keep in the
track Pocock would follow, in order to meet him betimes. The frigate
thus sent, having first made a running survey of the unfrequented
passage north of Cuba, by which the expedition was to proceed, joined
Pocock, and, by the latter's report, acted as pilot for the fleet.
"Having taken sketches of the land and cayos on both sides, Captain
Elphinstone kept ahead of the fleet, and led us through very well." This
service is claimed to the credit of Rodney's foresight by his
biographer. This may very well be, though more particular inquiry and
demonstration by his letters would be necessary to establish specific
orders beyond the general instructions given by him. It is, however,
safe to say that such particularity and minuteness of detail would be
entirely in keeping with the tenor of his course at this period. His
correspondence bears the stamp of a mind comprehensive as well as exact;
grasping all matters with breadth of view in their mutual relations, yet
with the details at his fingers' ends. The certainty of his touch is as
obvious as the activity of his thought.

In accordance with the spirit of his instructions, Rodney went in person
to Martinique, the spot named by him as best for the rendezvous, there
to superintend the preparations; to sow the seed for a harvest in which
he was to have no share. Incidental mention reveals that the sending of
the ships-of-the-line with Douglas had reduced him to three for his own
command; and also that Moncton, having now superior authority to do so,
found himself able to spare troops for Jamaica, which were afloat in
transports by the time Pocock came. In the same letter the admiral
frankly admits his anxiety for his station, under the circumstances of
the big detachment he had made; a significant avowal, which enhances the
merit of his spontaneous action by all the credit due to one who endures
a well-weighed danger for an adequate end.

The despatch of Pocock's expedition, which resulted in the fall of
Havana, August 13, 1762, practically terminated Rodney's active service
in the Seven Years War. In a career marked by unusual professional good
fortune in many ways, the one singular mischance was that he reached a
foremost position too late in life. When he returned to England in
August, 1763, he was in his full prime, and his conduct of affairs
entrusted to him had given clear assurance of capacity for great things.
The same evidence is to be found in his letters, which, as studies of
official character and competency, repay a close perusal. But now
fifteen years of peace were to elapse before a maritime war again broke
out, and the fifteen years between forty-five and sixty tell sorely upon
the physical stamina which need to underlie the mental and moral forces
of a great commander. St. Vincent himself staggered under the load, and
Rodney was not a St. Vincent in the stern self-discipline that had
braced the latter for old age. He had not borne the yoke in his youth,
and from this time forward he fought a losing fight with money troubles,
which his self-controlled contemporary, after one bitter experience, had
shaken off his shoulders forever.

The externals of Rodney's career during the period now in question are
sufficiently known; of his strictly private life we are left largely to
infer from indications, not wholly happy. He returned to England a
Vice-Admiral of the Blue, and had advanced by the successive grades of
that rank to Vice-Admiral of the Red, when, in January, 1771, he was
appointed Commander-in-chief at Jamaica. At this time he had been for
five years Governor of Greenwich Hospital, and he took it hard that he
was not allowed to retain the appointment in connection with his new
command, alleging precedents for such a favor; the latest of which,
however, was then twenty-five years old. The application was denied by
Sandwich. From the earnest tone in which it was couched, as well as the
comparatively weak grounds upon which Rodney bases his claims to such a
recognition, it can scarcely be doubted that pecuniary embarrassment as
well as mortification entered into his sense of disappointment. It is
the first recorded of a series of jars between the two, in which,
although the external forms of courtesy were diligently observed, an
underlying estrangement is evident.

The Jamaica Station at that day required, in an even greater degree than
Newfoundland before the conquest of Canada, a high order of political
tact and circumspection on the part of the naval commander-in-chief. The
island lies in the centre of what was then a vast semi-circular sweep of
Spanish colonies--Porto Rico, Santo Domingo, Cuba, Mexico, Central
America, and the mainland of South America from the Isthmus to the
Orinoco. Over this subject empire the mother country maintained
commercial regulations of the most mediaeval and exclusive type;
outraging impartially the British spirit of commercial enterprise, and
the daily needs of her own colonists, by the restrictions placed upon
intercourse between these and foreigners. Smuggling on a large scale,
consecrated in the practice of both parties by a century of tradition,
was met by a coast-guard system, employing numerous small vessels called
guarda-costas, which girt the Spanish coasts, but, being powerless to
repress effectually over so extensive a shore line, served rather to
increase causes of vexation. The British government, on the other hand,
not satisfied to leave the illicit trade on which Jamaica throve to
take care of itself, sought to increase the scope of transactions by the
institution of three free ports on the island,--free in the sense of
being open as depots, not for the entrance of goods, but where they
could be freely brought, and transshipped to other parts of the world by
vessels of all nations; broker ports, in short, for the facilitation of
general external trade.

To this open and ingenuous bid for fuller advantage by Spanish resort,
Spain replied by doubling her custom-house forces and introducing
renewed stringency into her commercial orders. The two nations, with
France in Hayti for a third, stood on ceaseless guard one against the
other; all imbued with the spirit of exclusive trade, and differing only
in the method of application, according to their respective day-to-day
views of policy. The British by the free-port system, instituted in
their central geographical position, hoped to make the profits of the
middleman. Rodney reported that the effect had been notably to
discourage the direct Spanish intercourse, and to destroy carriage by
British colonial vessels in favor of those of France, which now flocked
to Jamaica, smuggled goods into the island, and apparently cut under
their rivals by the greater benevolence shown them in Spanish ports.
"Commerce by British bottoms has totally ceased." Herewith, he added,
disappeared the opportunities of British seamen to become familiar with
the Spanish and French waters, while their rivals were invited to
frequent those of Jamaica; so that in case of war--which in those days
was periodical--the advantage of pilotage would be heavily on the side
of Great Britain's enemies. He also stated that the diminution of
employment to British merchant vessels had greatly impaired his means of
obtaining information from within Spanish ports; for British ships of
war were never allowed inside them, even when sent with a message from
him. The French permitted them indeed to enter, but surrounded them
throughout their visits with flattering attentions which wholly
prevented the making of observations.

Under these conditions of mutual jealousy between the governments and
officials, with the subjects on either side straining continually at the
leashes which withheld them from traffic mutually beneficial, causes of
offence were quick to arise. Rodney, like Sandwich, was a pronounced
Tory, in full sympathy with traditional British policy, as well as an
officer naturally of haughty temper and sharing all the prepossessions
of his service; but he found himself almost at once involved in a
difference with his superiors in his political party, which throws a
good deal of side light on personal as well as political relations. The
British man-of-war schooner _Hawke_ was overhauled off the Venezuelan
coast by two Spanish guarda-costas and compelled to enter the harbor of
Cartagena, under alleged orders from the Governor of the colony. After a
brief detention, she was let go with the admonition that, if any British
ships of war were found again within twelve leagues of the coast, they
would be taken and their crews imprisoned.

Rodney's course was unimpeachable, as far as appears. He wrote a civil
letter to the Governor, and sent it by a ship of war, the captain of
which was directed to deliver it in person. He was confident, he wrote,
that the Governor would disavow the action by calling to strict account
the officers concerned, and would also confirm his own belief that it
was impossible such a menace could have proceeded from any adequate
authority. A sufficient intimation of what would follow an attempt to
carry out the threat was conveyed by the words: "The British officer who
has dishonoured his King's colours by a tame submission to this insult
has been already dismissed the service."

It is difficult to see what less could have been done; but the British
government was at the moment extremely reluctant to war, and sensitive
to any step that seemed to make towards it. Spain was thought to be
seeking a quarrel. She had entered the Seven Years War so near its
termination as not to feel exhaustive effects; and the capture of Havana
and Manila, with the pecuniary losses involved, had left her merely
embittered by humiliation, prone rather to renew hostilities than to
profit by experience. At the same time the foreign policy of Great
Britain was enfeebled by a succession of short ministries, and by
internal commotions; while the discontent of the American continental
colonies over the Stamp Act emphasized the weakness of her general
position. Barely a year before the _Hawke_ incident the insult by Spain
at the Falkland Islands had brought the two nations to the verge of
rupture, which was believed to have been averted only by the refusal of
Louis XV., then advanced in years, to support the Spanish Bourbons at
the cost of another war.

Under these circumstances Rodney's report of the occurrences at
Cartagena filled the ministry with apprehensions, and brought him from
Sandwich an expression of dissatisfaction little removed from a
reprimand. The communication is remarkable rather for what it intimates,
and from the inferences naturally deducible, than for its direct
utterances. "I cannot help cautioning you, as a friend, to be upon your
guard, to avoid by every justifiable means the drawing this country into
a war, which, if it comes on too speedily, I fear we shall have cause to
lament." The warning is renewed in a later part of the letter, but in
itself has little significance compared with other hints, rather
personal than official. "I cannot conceal from you, that many people
have industriously spread stories here, that, among the foreign
ministers and others, you have expressed your wishes for a Spanish
war." Such expressions--if used--were asserted of the time succeeding
his appointment to Jamaica, and near his departure for it; for Sandwich
adds, "This sort of declaration is too little founded on your
instructions, and too indiscreet, to allow me to give them the least
credit." It is clear, however, that he thought them not improbable,--a
Spanish war was popular with seamen for the prize-money it brought, and
Rodney was poor,--for he adds, "I shall discredit the idea till I have
received your answer to this letter." He concludes with a warning, not
to be misunderstood, that a war, so far from helping Rodney, would
probably cause his supersession. "I will add one word more: Upon a
declaration of war larger squadrons must be sent out, and, very
probably, senior officers to most of our stations in foreign parts." In
face of an intimation thus thinly veiled, one scarcely needs to be told
what was being said round the table of the Cabinet.

That Rodney would have welcomed war for reasons personal as well as
professional, for money and for glory, can readily be believed; but his
measures in this case give no ground for such an innuendo as Sandwich
conveyed. Therefore, after making full allowance for the panic of
ministers ready to fear the worst, and to throw blame on anybody, it is
the more significant that he should have been suspected of an unworthy
personal motive underlying a worthy official act. It is an indication
of reputation already compromised by damaging association with pecuniary
embarrassments; an evidence of latent distrust easily quickened into
active suspicion. An officer of his rank and service, so far from home,
and with the precedents of his day, could scarcely be faulted for what
he had done to uphold the honor of the country; and his manner of doing
it was dignified and self-restrained, as well as forcible. There was no
violence like that of Hawke at Gibraltar, less than twenty years before,
which that admiral had boldly vindicated to Pitt himself; but there were
no weak joints in Hawke's armor. In the particular instance, time and
cooler judgment set Rodney right in men's opinion; but subsequent events
showed that his general reputation did not recover, either then, or
through his Jamaica career.

After immediate apprehension had subsided, Rodney's action was justified
by the government. Sandwich wrote him, a little later, that no
commander-in-chief stood upon a better footing, and assured him that his
private interests were safe in his hands. Sandwich, however, was an
extremely practical politician, who had much personal use for his own
patronage; and Rodney's necessities were great. Fulfilment therefore
fell far short of promise. Employment was necessary to the admiral, and
his hopes fixed upon a colonial governorship when his present
appointment should expire; Jamaica being his first choice. Sandwich
renewed assurances, but advised a personal application also to the Prime
Minister and other Cabinet officers. New York was mentioned, but nothing
came of it all. After three years Rodney was superseded, with permission
to remain in the island instead of returning to England. This he
declined. "I cannot bear to think of remaining here in a private
station, after commanding in chief with the approbation of the whole
island." How far this approbation was universal, or unqualified, is
perhaps doubtful; but the letters quoted by his biographer from his
correspondence bear continuous evidence, in this peace employment, of
the activity and perspicacity of mind characteristic of his more
strictly military proceedings.

In September, 1774, Rodney landed again in England, a disappointed man
and in embarrassed circumstances. Professional occupation was almost
hopeless, for in peace times there were few positions for an officer of
his rank; and, although recognized for able, he had not then the
distinction by which he is known to us. It is also evident, from
subsequent events, that he just now lacked the influence necessary to
obtain a preference over rivals in quest of employment. Under the
circumstances, his debts determined his action, and to escape
harassments he before long passed over into France and settled in Paris.
In that capital, as in London, he mixed with the best society; and
there, as before, the mode of life among his associates led him beyond
his means and involved him in further distresses. Consequently, when war
between France and Great Britain became imminent, in 1778, the vigilance
of his creditors prevented his going home in person to offer his
services. In February of that year, however, he made formal application
to the Admiralty to be sent at a moment's warning on any enterprise. To
this Sandwich, who was still First Lord, despite his previous assurances
of friendship, paid no attention beyond the formal customary
acknowledgment given to all such letters when they came from officers of
Rodney's standing. No indication was shown of intention, or even of
wish, to employ him.

Rodney was therefore compelled to look on idly while others, of
well-earned reputation indeed but as yet of less experience than himself
in high command, were preferred before him. Howe had already been sent
to North America in 1776, on a mission at once diplomatic and military;
and there he still was when war began. As it became imminent, Keppel was
appointed to the Channel Fleet, and Byron to the North American command,
from which Howe had asked to be relieved. All these were junior to
Rodney; and, as though to emphasize the neglect of him, rear-admirals
were sent to the two West India stations, Jamaica and the Leeward
Islands, which he had formerly commanded, and to which it would seem,
from one of his letters, that he desired to return. He had, too, now
reached the rank, the want of which had formed the burden of Sandwich's
warning that he was in danger of supersession at Jamaica; for in a
general flag promotion in January, 1778, he had become Admiral of the
White Squadron, than which no higher then obtained, commissions as
Admirals of the Red not being issued. For this persistent ignoring of an
officer of his unquestionable ability there were necessarily reasons
more controlling than appears on the surface; for the naval conditions
and the national emergency called for men of demonstrated high capacity.
Such Rodney was professionally; and although his age--he was now in his
sixtieth year--was against him, this consideration did not in those days
weigh; nor should it, unless accompanied by probable indication of
powers sapped.

The conclusion is inevitable that the objection lay in personal record
as bearing upon military efficiency. The Administration, responsible for
results, knew Rodney's capacity, though its full extent was yet to be
revealed; the question in their minds clearly must have been, "Can we
depend upon its exertion, full, sustained, and disinterested?" Sandwich,
despite the coldness with which he had received Rodney's
application,--going so far as to refuse to support it actively,--was
apparently in a minority among his colleagues in believing that they
could. He declared in the House of Lords that, "When it was first
proposed in the Council to employ Sir George, I, who knew him from a
very young man, declared that Rodney _once afloat_ would do his duty."
Naval officers will recognize a familiar ring in these words, and will
recall instances where high professional ability has been betrayed by
personal foible. Nor does Sandwich stand alone in offering a clue to the
hesitation of the Government. Rodney's biographer and son-in-law quotes
without reprobation the account of Mr. Richard Cumberland, who professed
to have interested himself warmly for Rodney's employment and to have
secured the support of the Secretary for War, Lord George Germaine. "The
West India merchants had been alarmed, and clamoured against the
appointment so generally and so decidedly as to occasion no small
uneasiness in my friend and patron, Lord George, and drew from him
something that resembled a remonstrance for the risk I had exposed him
to. But in the brilliancy of the capture of Langara's squadron all was
done away, and past alarms were only recollected to contrast the joy
which this success diffused." The opposition of the commercial class in
the West Indies might arise from an officer's over-faithfulness to duty,
as Nelson found to his cost; but it seems clear that in this case
distrust rested upon personal observation, which raised doubts as to the
singlemindedness of Rodney's administration of a command. Of the
particulars of observation or experience from which the feeling sprang,
we have no information; but St. Eustatius was destined to show that
apprehension was not wholly unfounded.

A summons to active employment would at once have silenced Rodney's
creditors by the assurance of increase of means, both through regular
income and probable prize-money; Admiralty neglect left him in fetters.
Lady Rodney returned to England to negotiate the means for his
liberation; but the matter dragged, and in the end he owed his release
to the friendly intervention of a French nobleman, the Marechal Biron,
who volunteered in warm terms to make him an advance to the amount of
L2,000. This chivalrous offer was for some time declined; but finally
conditions became so threatening, and his position so intolerable, that
he accepted a loan of about a thousand louis. "Nothing but a total
inattention to the distressed state I was in," he wrote to his wife,
"could have prevailed upon me to have availed myself of his voluntary
proposal; but not having had, for a month past, a letter from any person
but Mr. Hotham and yourself, and my passport being expired, it was
impossible for me to remain in this city at the risk of being sued by my
creditors, who grew so clamorous it was impossible to bear it; and had
they not been overawed by the Lieutenant of police, would have carried
their prosecutions to the greatest length. Their demands were all
satisfied this day,"--May 6th, 1778. Friends in England enabled him to
repay Biron immediately after his return.

This benevolent interference on behalf of a national enemy, although in
its spirit quite characteristic, at once of the country and of the class
to which the individual extending it belonged, has retained a certain
unique flavor of its own among military anecdotes; due undoubtedly to
the distinction subsequently acquired by Rodney at the expense of the
people to which his liberator belonged, rather than to anything
exceptional in its nature. As it is, it has acquired a clear
pre-eminence among the recorded courtesies of warfare. It is pleasant to
add that Great Britain had the opportunity in after times to requite
Biron's daughters an act from which she had so greatly benefited. They
having sought refuge, though with loss of fortune, from the early
excesses of the French Revolution, received for some time pensions from
the British Government.

Rodney came back to England feeling anything but cordial towards
Sandwich, whose decided support he had found wanting throughout a very
critical period of his career. More than any one else the First Lord had
had both the opportunity and the insight to see his professional value.
Tory though Rodney was, he hoped that "Lord Chatham (Pitt) would be
minister, and another First Lord of the Admiralty be appointed." "We
hear of a change of Administration. I hope it is true, and that I may
have a chance of being employed, should another be at the Admiralty."
"The refusal of Lord Sandwich does not surprise me. He cannot say but I
have offered my services, and some friend will let the King know I have
so done." Apparently he was to be ignored as well as overlooked.

Circumstances, however, soon compelled his employment. Sandwich was an
able man, but his personal character inspired mistrust. Not only was he
controlled by political considerations in administration; he was
suspected of corruptly using the Navy for party advantage. Whatever
might be thought of Byng's conduct, his execution, but twenty years
before, was commonly ascribed to political exigency, making him a
vicarious sacrifice to cover the neglects of a Government. As in Byng's
case, the material of the service was believed to be now inadequate to
the emergency come upon it; and it was known to have deteriorated
gravely during the seven years of Sandwich's tenure of office. He was a
Tory, as were his colleagues of the Cabinet; the leaders of the Navy in
professional estimation, Hawke and Keppel, with other distinguished
officers, were pronounced Whigs, whom it was thought the Administration
would be willing to destroy. Keppel evidently feared an intention to
ruin him by the command of the Channel Fleet, and the public discussion
of the Courts-Martial which followed his indecisive action with
D'Orvilliers, in July, 1778, assumed a decided and rancorous party
tone. His accuser then was his third-in-command, Vice-Admiral Palliser,
who had left his place on the Admiralty Board to take this position in
the fleet; and popular outcry charged him with having betrayed his chief
in the battle. So far was professional feeling moved that twelve
prominent admirals,--not all of whom were Whigs,--with Hawke at their
head, presented to the King a memorial, deprecating "particularly the
mischief and scandal of permitting men, _who are at once in high office
and subordinate military command_, previous to their making
recriminating accusations against their commander-in-chief, to attempt
to corrupt the public judgment by the publication of libels on their
officers in a common newspaper, thereby exciting mutiny in your
Majesty's Navy," etc. The words italicized show that this was aimed at
Palliser; and at Sandwich, who inferentially had "permitted" his action,
and ultimately rewarded him with the Governorship of Greenwich Hospital.

In this demoralized condition of professional sentiment the Admiralty
could no longer command the services of the best men. Howe came home in
disgust from America. Keppel threw up the command of the Channel Fleet,
and Barrington subsequently refused it on the expressed ground of
self-distrust, underlying which was real distrust of the ministry. He
would serve as second, but not as first. Byron, after relieving Howe in
New York, went to the West Indies, there made a failure, and so came
home in the summer of 1779. The Channel squadron fell into the hands of
men respectable, indeed, but in no way eminent, and advanced in years,
whose tenures of office were comparatively short. Hardy was sixty-three,
Geary seventy; and on both Hawke, who was friendly to them, passed the
comment that they were "too easy." The first had allowed "the discipline
of the fleet to come to nothing," and he feared the same for the other.
Not until the fall of the ministry, consequent upon Cornwallis's
surrender, was the post filled by a distinguished name, when Howe took
the command in 1782.

The Administration was thus forced back upon Rodney; fortunately for
itself, for, as far as history has since revealed, there was no other
man then in the service, and of suitable rank, exactly fitted to do the
work he did. Samuel Hood alone, then an unproved captain, and
practically in voluntary retirement, could have equalled and surpassed
him. Howe, like Rodney, was an accomplished tactician, and in conception
far in advance of the standards of the day. In his place he did
admirable service, which has been too little appreciated, and he was
fortunate in that the work which fell to him, at the first, and again at
the last of this war, was peculiarly suited to his professional
characteristics; but he was not interchangeable with Rodney. In the
latter there was a briskness of temper, a vivacity, very
distinguishable from Howe's solidity of persistence; and he was in no
sense one to permit "discipline to come to nought," the direction in
which Howe's easy though reserved disposition tended. The West Indies
were to be the great scene of battles, and, while the tactical ideas of
the two appear to have been essentially alike, in the common recognition
of combination as imperative to success, the severity of Rodney was
needed to jerk the West India fleet sharply out of sleepy tradition; to
compel promptness of manoeuvre and intelligent attention to the
underlying ideas which signals communicate. Flexibility of movement,
earnestness and rapidity of attack, mutual support by the essential
coherence of the battle order without too formal precision,--these were
the qualities which Rodney was to illustrate in practice, and to enforce
by personal impression upon his officers. The official staff of the
fleet had to pass under the rod of the schoolmaster, to receive new
ideas, and to learn novel principles of obedience,--to a living chief,
not to a dead letter crusted over by an unintelligent tradition. Not
till this step had been made, till discipline had full hold of men's
affections and understanding, was there room for the glorious liberty of
action which Nelson extended to his officers; preaching it in word, and
practising it in act. Hawke re-begat the British Navy in the spirit he
imparted to it; Rodney, first of several, trained its approaching
maturity in habits which, once acquired, stand by men as principles;
Nelson reaped the fulness of the harvest.

On October 1, 1779, Rodney was again appointed to the command of the
Leeward Islands Station. The year had been one of maritime misfortune
and discouragement. The French declaration of war in 1778 had been
followed by that of Spain in June, 1779; and a huge allied
fleet--sixty-six ships-of-the-line, to which the British could oppose
only thirty-five--had that summer entered and dominated the English
Channel. Nothing was effected by it, true; but the impression produced
was profound. In the West Indies Grenada had been lost, and Byron badly
worsted in an attempt to relieve it. On assuming his command, Rodney
could not but feel that he had more to do than to establish a
reputation; he had a reputation to redeem, and that under a burden of
national depression which doubly endangered the reputation of every
officer in responsible position. He must have known that, however
undeservedly, he had not the full confidence of the government, although
party and personal ties would naturally have predisposed it in his
favor. He therefore entered upon his career under the necessity to do
and to dare greatly; he had not a strong hand, and needed the more to
play a game not only strong, but to some extent adventurous.

To the radical difference between his personal standing at this opening
of his command, and that which he had at its close, in 1782, may
reasonably be attributed the clear difference in his action at the two
periods. The first was audacious and brilliant, exhibiting qualities of
which he was capable on occasion, but which did not form the groundwork
of his professional character. The display was therefore exceptional,
elicited by exceptional personal emergency. It was vitally necessary at
the outset, if opportunity offered, to vindicate his selection by the
government; to strike the imagination of the country, and obtain a hold
upon its confidence which could not easily be shaken. This prestige once
established, he could safely rest upon it to bear him through doubtful
periods of suspense and protracted issues. It would have been well had
he felt the same spur after his great battle in 1782. A necessity like
this doubtless lies upon every opening career, and comparatively few
there be that rise to it; but there is an evident distinction to be
drawn between one in the early prime of life, who may afford to wait,
who has at least no errors to atone, and him who is about to make his
last cast, when upon the turning of a die depends a fair opportunity to
show what is in him. Rodney was near sixty-one, when he took up the
command which has given him his well earned place in history.

He experienced at once indications of the attitude towards him; and in
two directions, from the Admiralty and from his subordinates. A month
before he was ready, Sandwich urges him, with evident impatience, to get
off. "For God's sake, go to sea without delay. You cannot conceive of
what importance it is to yourself, to me, and to the public" (this very
order of importance is suggestive), "that you should not lose this fair
wind; if you do, I shall not only hear of it in Parliament, but in
places to which I pay more attention.... I must once more repeat to you
that any delay in your sailing will have the most disagreeable
consequences." On the other hand, he had to complain not only of
inattention on the part of the dockyard officials, but of want of zeal
and activity in the officers of the fleet, many of whom behaved with a
disrespect and want of cordiality which are too often the precursor of
worse faults. Rodney was not the man to put up with such treatment. That
it was offered, and that he for the moment bore with it, are both
significant; and are to be remembered in connection with the fast
approaching future.

Gibraltar was then at the beginning of the three years siege, and his
intended departure was utilized to give him command of the first of the
three great expeditions for its relief, which were among the
characteristic operations of this war. He sailed from Plymouth on the
29th of December, 1779, having under him twenty-two sail-of-the-line, of
which only four were to continue with him to the West Indies. With this
great fleet, and its attendant frigates, went also a huge collection of
storeships, victuallers, ordnance vessels, troop ships, and merchantmen;
the last comprising the "trade" for Portugal and the West Indies, as the
other classes carried the reinforcements for the Rock.

On January 7th, the West India trade parted company off Cape Finisterre,
and the next day began the wonderful good fortune for which Rodney's
last command was distinguished. It is no disparagement to his merit to
say that in this he was, to use Ball's phrase about Nelson, "a
heaven-born admiral." A Spanish convoy of twenty-two sail, seven of
which were ships of war, the rest laden with supplies for Cadiz, were
sighted at daylight of the 8th, and all taken; not one escaped. Twelve
loaded with provisions were turned into the British convoy, and went on
with it to feed the Gibraltar garrison. A prince of the blood-royal,
afterwards King William IV., was with the fleet as a midshipman. One of
the prizes being a line-of-battle ship, Rodney had an opportunity to
show appositely his courtliness of breeding. "I have named her the
_Prince William_, in respect to His Royal Highness, in whose presence
_she had the honor to be taken_."

Repeated intelligence had reached the admiral that a Spanish division
was cruising off Cape St. Vincent. Therefore, when it was sighted at 1
P.M. of January 16th, a week after the capture of the convoy, he was
prepared for the event. A brief attempt to form line was quickly
succeeded by the signal for a general chase, the ships to engage to
leeward as they came up with the enemy, who, by taking flight to the
southeast, showed the intention to escape into Cadiz. The wind was
blowing strong from the westward, giving a lee shore and shoals to the
British fleet in the approaching long hours of a wintry night; but
opportunity was winging by, with which neither Rodney nor the Navy could
afford to trifle. He was already laid up with an attack of the gout that
continued to harass him throughout this command, and the decision to
continue the chase was only reached after a discussion between him and
his captain, the mention of which is transmitted by Sir Gilbert Blane,
the surgeon of the ship, who was present professionally. The merit of
the resolution must remain with the man who bore the responsibility of
the event; but that he reached it at such a moment only after
consultation with another, to whom current gossip attributed the chief
desert, must be coupled with the plausible claim afterwards advanced for
Sir Charles Douglas, that he suggested the breaking of the enemy's line
on April 12th. Taken together, they indicate at least a common
contemporary professional estimate of Rodney's temperament. No such
anecdote is transmitted of Hawke. The battle of Cape St. Vincent,
therefore, is not that most characteristic of Rodney's genius. Judged by
his career at large, it is exceptional; yet of all his actions it is
the one in which merit and success most conspicuously met. Nor does it
at all detract from his credit that the enemy was much inferior in
numbers; eleven to twenty-one. As in Hawke's pursuit of Conflans, with
which this engagement is worthy to be classed, what was that night
dared, rightly and brilliantly dared, was the dangers of the deep, not
of the foe. The prey was seized out of the jaws of disaster.

The results were commensurate to the risk. The action, which began at 4
P.M., lasted till two the following morning, the weather becoming
tempestuous with a great sea, so that it was difficult to take
possession of the captured vessels. Many of the heavy British ships
continued also in danger during the 17th, and had to carry a press of
sail to clear the shoals, on which two of their prizes were actually
wrecked. One Spanish ship-of-the-line was blown up and six struck, among
them the flag-ship of Admiral Langara, who was taken into Gibraltar.
Only four escaped.

Two such strokes of mingled good fortune and good management, within ten
days, formed a rare concurrence, and the aggregate results were as
exceptional as the combination of events. Sandwich congratulated Rodney
that he had already "taken more line-of-battle ships than had been
captured in any one action in either of the two last preceding wars."
Militarily regarded, it had a further high element of praise, for the
enemy's detachment, though in itself inferior, was part of a much
superior force; twenty-four allied ships-of-the-line besides it being at
the moment in Cadiz Bay. It is the essence of military art thus to
overwhelm in detail. A technical circumstance like this was doubtless
overlooked in the general satisfaction with the event, the most evident
feature in which was the relief of the Government, who just then stood
badly in need of credit. "The ministerial people feel it very sensibly,"
Lady Rodney wrote him. "It is a lucky stroke for them at this juncture."
Salutes were fired, and the city illuminated; the press teemed with
poetical effusion. Sandwich, somewhat impudently when the past is
considered, but not uncharacteristically regarded as an officeholder,
took to himself a large slice of the credit. "The worst of my enemies
now allow that I have pitched upon a man who knows his duty, and is a
brave, honest, and able officer.... I have obtained you the thanks of
both houses of Parliament." The letter does not end without a further
caution against indiscreet talking about the condition of his ships. It
all comes back on the Government, he laments. What Rodney may have said
to others may be uncertain; to his wife, soon after reaching his
station, he wrote, "What are the ministers about? Are they determined to
undo their country? Is it fair that the British fleet should be so
inferior to the French, and that the British officers and men are
always to be exposed to superior numbers? What right had the
administration to expect anything but defeat?" Then he passes on to
remark himself, what has been alluded to above, the change in his
personal position effected by his successes. "Thank God, I now fear no
frowns of ministers, and hope never again to stand in need of their
assistance. I know them well. All are alike, and no dependence is to be
placed on their promises." It is to be feared his sense of obligation to
Sandwich did not coincide with the latter's estimate.

In his official report Rodney gave much credit to his officers for the
St. Vincent affair. "The gallant behaviour of the admirals, captains,
officers and men, I had the honour to command, was conspicuous; they
seemed animated with the same spirit, and were eager to exert themselves
with the utmost zeal." Here also, however, he was biding his time for
obvious reasons; for to his wife he writes, "I have done them all like
honour, but it is because I would not have the world believe that there
were officers slack in their duty. Without a thorough change in naval
affairs, the discipline of our navy will be lost. I could say much, but
will not. You will hear of it from _themselves_;" that is, probably, by
their mutual recriminations. Such indulgent envelopment of good and bad
alike in a common mantle of commendation is far from unexampled; but it
rarely fails to return to plague its authors, as has been seen in
instances more recent than that of Rodney. He clearly had told Sandwich
the same in private letters, for the First Lord writes him, "I fear the
picture you give of the faction in your fleet is too well drawn. Time
and moderation will by degrees get the better of this bane of
discipline. I exceedingly applaud your resolution to shut your ears
against the illiberal language of your officers, who are inclined to
arraign each other's conduct." In this two things are to be remarked:
first, the evident and undeniable existence of serious cause of
complaint, which was preparing Rodney for the stern self-assertion soon
to be shown; and, second, that such imputations are frequent with him,
while he seems in turn to have had a capacity for eliciting
insubordination of feeling, though he can repress the act. It is a
question of personal temperament, which explains more than his relations
with other men. Hawke and Nelson find rare fault with those beneath
them; for their own spirit takes possession of their subordinates. Such
difference of spirit reveals itself in more ways than one in the active
life of a military community.

If there was joy in England over Rodney's achievement, still more and
more sympathetic was the exultation of those who in the isolation of
Gibraltar's Rock, rarely seeing their country's flag save on their own
flagstaff, witnessed and shared the triumph of his entrance there with
his train of prizes. The ships of war and transports forming the convoy
did not indeed appear in one body, but in groups, being dispersed by the
light airs, and swept eastward by the in-drag of the current from the
Atlantic to the Mediterranean; but the presence of the great fleet, and
the prestige of its recent victory, secured the practical immunity of
merchant vessels during its stay. Of the first to come in, on January
15th, an eye-witness wrote, "A ship with the British flag entering the
Bay was so uncommon a sight that almost the whole garrison were
assembled at the southward to welcome her in; but words are insufficient
to describe their transports on being informed that she was one of a
large convoy which had sailed the latter end of the preceding month for
our relief." The admiral himself had been carried beyond and gone into
Tetuan, in Morocco, whence he finally arrived on January 26th, having
sent on a supply fleet to Minorca, the garrison of which was undergoing
a severance from the outer world more extreme even than that of
Gibraltar. Upon the return thence of the convoying ships he again put to
sea, February 13th, with the entire fleet, which accompanied him three
days sail to the westward, when it parted company for England; he with
only four ships-of-the-line pursuing his way to his station. On March
27th he reached Santa Lucia, where he found seventeen of-the-line,
composing his command. Three weeks later he met the enemy; barely three
months, almost to a day, after the affair at St. Vincent.

The antecedent circumstances of the war, and the recent history of the
French navy, gave a singular opportuneness of occasion, and of personal
fitness, to Rodney's arrival at this moment. The humiliations of the
Seven Years War, with the loss of so much of the French colonial empire,
traceable in chief measure to naval decadence, had impressed the French
government with the need of reviving their navy, which had consequently
received a material development in quality, as well as in quantity,
unparalleled since the days of Colbert and Seignelay, near a century
before. Concomitant with this had been a singular progress in the theory
of naval evolutions, and of their handmaid, naval signalling, among
French officers; an advance to which the lucid, speculative, character
of the national genius greatly contributed. Although they as yet lacked
practice, and were numerically too few, the French officers were well
equipped by mental resources, by instruction and reflection, to handle
large fleets; and they now had large fleets to handle. No such
conjunction had occurred since Tourville; none such recurred during the
Revolution.

The condition was unique in naval history of the sail period. To meet
it, assuming an approach to equality in contending fleets, was required,
first, a commander-in-chief, and then a competent body of officers. The
latter the British had only in the sense of fine seamen and gallant men.
In courage there is no occasion to institute comparisons between the two
nations; in kind there may have been a difference, but certainly not in
degree. The practical superiority of seamanship in the British may be
taken as a set-off to the more highly trained understanding of military
principles and methods on the part of their enemy. For commander-in-chief,
there were at this time but two, Howe and Rodney, whose professional
equipment, as shown in practice, fitted them to oppose the French methods.
Of these Rodney was the better, because possessed of a quicker power of
initiative, and also of that personal severity required to enforce strict
conformity of action among indifferent or sullen subordinates.

Rodney has therefore a singularly well defined place among British naval
chiefs. He was to oppose form to form, theory to theory, evolution to
evolution, upon the battle ground of the sea; with purpose throughout
tactically offensive, not defensive, and facing an adversary his equal
in professional equipment. Had he arrived a year before he would have
met no fair match in D'Estaing, a soldier, not a sailor, whose
deficiencies as a seaman would have caused a very different result from
that which actually followed his encounter with Byron, who in conduct
showed an utter absence of ideas and of method inconceivable in Rodney.
The French were now commanded by De Guichen, considered the most capable
of their officers by Rodney, whose recent abode in Paris had probably
familiarized him with professional reputations among the enemy.
Everything therefore conspired to make the occasion one eminently fitted
to his capacities. Such are the conditions--the man _and_ the hour--that
make reputations; though they do not form characters, which are growths
of radically different origin.

De Guichen put to sea from Martinique on April 15th, with a convoy for
Santo Domingo which he intended to see clear of British interference.
Rodney, whose anchorage was but thirty miles away, learned instantly the
French sailing and followed without delay. On the evening of April 16th,
the two fleets were in sight of each other to leeward of Martinique, the
British to windward; an advantage that was diligently maintained during
the night. At daylight of the 17th the two enemies were twelve to
fifteen miles apart, ranged on nearly parallel lines, the British twenty
heading northwest, the French twenty-three southeast. The numerical
difference represents sufficiently nearly the actual difference of
force, although French vessels averaged more powerful than British of
the same rates.

At 6.45 A.M. Rodney signalled that it was his intention to attack the
enemy's rear with his whole force. This was never annulled, and the
purpose governed his action throughout the day. This combination--on the
rear--is the one generally preferable to be attempted when underway, and
the relative situations of the fleets at this moment made it
particularly opportune; for the British, in good order, two cables
interval between the ships, were abreast the rear centre and rear of the
enemy, whose line was in comparison greatly extended,--the result
probably of inferior practical seamanship. To increase his advantage,
Rodney at 7 ordered his vessels to close to one cable, and at 8.30, when
the antagonists were still heading as at daybreak, undertook to lead the
fleet down by a series of signals directive of its successive movements.
In this he was foiled by De Guichen, who by wearing brought what was
previously his van into position to support the extreme threatened. "The
different movements of the enemy," wrote Rodney, "obliged me to be very
attentive and watch every opportunity of attacking them at advantage;" a
sentence that concisely sums up his special excellencies, of which the
present occasion offers the most complete illustration. It may be fully
conceded also that it would have vindicated his high title to fame by
conspicuous results, had the intelligence of his officers seconded his
dispositions.

The forenoon passed in manoeuvres, skilfully timed, to insure a definite
issue. At 11.50 Rodney considered that his opportunity had arrived.
Both fleets were then heading in the same direction, on the starboard
tack, and he had again succeeded in so placing his own that, by the
words of his report, he expected to bring "the whole force of His
Majesty's fleet against the enemy's rear, and of course part of their
centre, by which means the twenty sail of British ships would have been
opposed to only fifteen sail of the enemy's, and must in all probability
have totally disabled them before their van could have given them any
assistance." It would be difficult to cite a clearer renouncement of the
outworn "van to van," ship to ship, dogma; but Rodney is said to have
expressed himself in more emphatic terms subsequently, as follows:
"During all the commands Lord Rodney has been entrusted with, he made it
a rule to bring his whole force against a part of the enemy's, and never
was so absurd as to bring ship against ship, when the enemy gave him an
opportunity of acting otherwise." Though not distinctly so stated, it
would seem that his first movement on the present occasion had failed
because of the long distance between the fleets permitting the enemy to
succor the part threatened, before he could close. He was now nearer,
for at this second attempt only an hour proved to be needed for the
first British ship to open fire at long range. It may be for this
reason, also, that he at this stage threw himself upon his captains, no
longer prescribing the successive movements, but issuing the general
signal to bear down, each vessel to "steer," according to the 21st
Article of the _Additional_ Fighting Instructions, "for the ship of the
enemy which from the disposition of the two squadrons it must be her lot
to engage, notwithstanding the signal for the line ahead will be kept
flying: making or shortening sail in such proportion as _to preserve the
distance assigned by the signal for the line_, in order that the whole
squadron may, as near as possible, come into action at the same time."

Unfortunately for his manoeuvre, the Admiral here ran up against the
stolid idea of the old--and still existing--Fighting Instructions
concerning the line-of-battle in action, embodied in a typical
representative in the senior captain of his fleet. This gentleman,
Robert Carkett, had risen from before the mast, and after a lieutenancy
of thirteen years had become post in 1758, by succeeding to the command
when his captain was killed, in one of the most heroic single-ship
fights of the British navy. Unluckily, his seniority gave him the lead
of the fleet as it was now formed on the starboard tack, and he
considered that the signal for attacking the enemy's rear was annulled
by the present situation. "Both fleets," he stated in a letter to the
Admiralty, "were at 11.15 parallel to and abreast of each other. As I
was then the leading ship, it became my duty to engage the leading ship
of the French fleet, as this signal disannulled all former ones
relative to the mode of attack." The word "abreast," critically used,
would imply that the fleets were abreast, ship to ship, van to van; but
there appears no reason to question Rodney's statement of the facts made
to Carkett himself: "Forgetting that the signal for the line was only at
two cables length distance from each other, the van division was by you
led to more than two leagues distance from the centre division, which
was thereby exposed to the greatest strength of the enemy, and not
properly supported." Rodney, in short, meant by opposite the enemy's
ship opposite at the moment the signal was made; and he also expected
that the movements of his ships would be further controlled by the words
of the 21st Article, "preserve the distance assigned by the signal for
the line," which distance was to be taken from the centre; or, as
sometimes worded in the Instructions, "the distance shall be that
between the admiral and the ships next ahead and astern of him." Carkett
conceived that he was to attack the ship opposite him in numerical
order, that is, the leader of the enemy, and that the remaining British
would take distance from him.

Why the rest of the van should also have been led thus astray can be
explained only on the ground that Carkett's general views were shared by
the divisional commander, a rear-admiral, who, as was proved a year
later, possessed high courage of the pure game-cock order, but was
wholly thoughtless of gaining an unfair advantage, two against one, by
tactical ingenuity. The result was that the van as a body left the
centre to itself, and thereby not only wrecked the concentration at
which Rodney aimed, but was out of hand to support his flag and his
division, when badly battered by the enemy's fire. This was the great
tactical blunder which brought to nought Rodney's patient, wary
manoeuvres of the past six hours. To it especially, but not to it alone,
he referred in the stinging words of his despatch: "'T is with concern
inexpressible, mixt with indignation, that the duty I owe my sovereign
and country obliges me to acquaint their Lordships that, during the
action with the French fleet on the 17th instant [and] His Majesty's,
the British flag was not properly supported." To the specific error of
the van was added a widespread disregard of the order for close action,
despite the example of the commander-in-chief, who pressed the enemy so
hard that towards the end his flag-ship was to leeward of De Guichen's
wake. "Perceiving several of our ships engaging at a distance, I
repeated the signal for close action. With truth, but sorrow, I must say
it was little attended to." It is noticeable that one of the ships thus
censured, the _Cornwall_, next ahead of Rodney, lost as heavily in
killed and wounded as did the flag-ship herself; one of many instances
showing that distance lessened efficiency without increasing safety. The
forwardness of Rodney's flag on this occasion proves clearly enough his
consciousness that tactics, to succeed, must be more than a veil for
timidity; that hard hitting is as essential as skilful leading.

This combination of steady, patient, wary, skilful guidance, with
resolute and tenacious personal leadership, constituted the firm tissue
of Rodney's professional character, and at no time received such clear
illustration as in the case before us; for no like opportunity recurred.
One experience was enough for De Guichen; he did not choose again to
yield the advantage of the weather gage, and he had the tactical skill
necessary to retain it in his future contacts with this adversary. The
battle of April 12, 1782, upon which Rodney's fame has rested, was
rather an accident than an achievement, and as a revelation of character
its most conspicuous feature is wariness exaggerated into professional
timidity. He himself has weighed the relative professional value of the
two affairs. A letter published in 1809, anonymous, but bearing strong
internal evidence of being written by Sir Gilbert Blane, long on a
trusted physician's terms of intimacy with Rodney, states that he
"thought little of his victory on the 12th of April." He would have
preferred to rest his reputation upon this action with De Guichen, and
"looked upon that opportunity of beating, with an inferior fleet, such
an officer, whom he considered the best in the French service, as one by
which, but for the disobedience of his captains, he might have gained
an immortal renown."

The misconduct of his officers brought out in full vigor the severity
which was a salient feature of Rodney's professional character. In the
St. Vincent business he may have been partly actuated to spare, by the
reflection that the offenders were not his own captains; that they were
about to quit him finally. Moreover, there had been then a very
considerable tangible success; results cover a multitude of sins. No
such extenuations applied here. The wreck of his reasonable hopes of
personal distinction coincided with failure towards the nation itself.
Rodney's hand came down heavy upon the offenders; but so far as seen it
was the hand always of a gentleman. In private letters his full feelings
betrayed themselves in vehemence; but in public they were measured to
austerity. To Carkett, when questioned concerning the rumored
expressions in his despatch, he is withering in the pointed enumeration
of varied shortcomings; but he never lapses into a breach of
professional decorum of utterance. The unfortunate man represented to
the Admiralty his view of the matter,--already cited; but it bears no
indorsement to show that it had passed under Rodney's eye. Captain,
ship, and ship's company, were swept away a few months later in the
memorable hurricane of October, 1780.

The despatch specified no other delinquent by name; but the selection
of five captains to receive personal commendation, and the persistent
refusal of the same to all other subordinates, including the junior
flag-officers, made censure sufficiently individual; and the admiral's
subsequent line of conduct emphasized rebuke bitterly. The cruise was
not yet finished; for the French having taken refuge at Guadaloupe, it
was important to prevent them from regaining Martinique, their chief
depot and place of repairs. To intercept them there, Rodney at first
took station off Fort Royal, and when compelled for a moment to return
to Santa Lucia, kept lookouts to warn him betimes of the enemy's
appearance. So, when De Guichen approached from the windward side of the
islands, on May 9th, he found the British getting underway to meet him.
From that time until the 20th--eleven days--the fleets were manoeuvring
in sight of one another, beating to windward; the British endeavoring to
force action, the French to avoid it. De Guichen's orders from home were
"to keep the sea, so far as the force maintained by England in the
Windward Islands would permit, _without too far compromising_ the fleet
entrusted to him." Such instructions compelled him to defensive tactics;
as Rodney's views, and those traditional in his service, impelled him to
attack. Hence ensued a struggle of sustained vigilance, activity, and
skill, profoundly interesting professionally, but which does not lend
itself to other than technical narrative. "For fourteen days and
nights," wrote Rodney, "the fleets were so near each other that neither
officers nor men could be said to sleep. Nothing but the goodness of the
weather and climate could have enabled us to endure so continual a
fatigue. Had it been in Europe, half the people must have sunk under it.
For my part, it did me good." No evidence of professional aptness could
be given clearer than the last words. A man is easy under such
circumstances only when they fit him. De Guichen asked to be superseded;
"my health cannot endure such continual fatigue and anxiety." Twice the
wary Frenchman was nearly caught, but the wind did not favor Rodney long
enough to give him the weather position, the only sure one for offence.
But, while thus unable to compass results, he gave conclusive evidence
of the quickness of his eye, the alertness of his action, and the
flexibility which he was enabled to impress upon his fleet by sheer
force of personal character. The contest resembled that of two expert
swordsmen; more intermittent doubtless, but also much more prolonged.

There can be no trifling with such conditions. A moment's relaxation, or
inaptness, may forfeit opportunity, offered only by chance and not to be
regained by effort. Rodney was fixed that no such slip should occur
through the neglect of others, and his stern supervision, as represented
by himself to his wife, was that of a slave driver, lash in hand. "As I
had given public notice to all my captains, etc. that I should hoist my
flag on board one of my frigates, and that I expected implicit obedience
to every signal made, under the certain penalty of being instantly
superseded, it had an admirable effect, as they were all convinced,
after their late gross behaviour, that they had nothing to expect at my
hands but instant punishment to those who neglected their duty. My eye
on them had more dread than the enemy's fire, and they knew it would be
fatal. No regard was paid to rank,--admirals as well as captains, if out
of their station, were instantly reprimanded by signals, or messages
sent by frigates: and, in spite of themselves, I taught them to be what
they had never been before--_officers_: and showed them that an inferior
fleet, properly conducted, was more than a match for one far superior."
Making allowance for exaggeration in the irresponsible utterances of
family life, the above is eminently characteristic of temperament. It
must be added, as equally characteristic of an underlying justice which
Rodney possessed, that in his official account of these last manoeuvres
he gave credit to his subordinates as a whole. "I must inform their
Lordships, in justice to the commanders and officers of the fleet under
my command, that since the action of the 17th of April, and during the
pursuit of the enemy's fleet, and in the two rencontres with them, all
my officers, of every rank and denomination, were obedient and attentive
to orders and signals, and, I am convinced, if the enemy had given them
an opportunity, they would have done their duty to their King and
Country." The claims of justice against its own strict requirements he
also recognized to Carkett. "Nothing but the former service you had done
your King and Country, and my firm belief of your being a brave man,
could have induced me, as commander of a great fleet, to overlook." It
will not escape attention that this exact observance of credit, where
due, lends increased weight to censure, when inflicted.

To the pursuit of the French fleet, relinquished forty leagues eastward
of Martinique after the brush of May 19th, succeeded a period marked
only by the routine administrative cares attendant upon an admiral
charged with the defence of a lengthy, exposed chain of islands, and an
extensive trade, against enemies numerically much superior. The details
serve to show the breadth of intelligence, the sound judgment, and clear
professional conceptions that characterized Rodney in small things as
well as great; but it would be wearisome to elaborate demonstration of
this, and these qualities he had in common with many men otherwise
inferior to himself. Reaction from the opening strain of the campaign,
with the relaxation of vigor from the approach of the hot rainy season,
now began to tell on his health; and to this contributed the harassment
of mind due to the arrival of a large Spanish fleet, while
reinforcements promised him unaccountably failed to appear.
Nevertheless, his personal efficiency was not impaired, and towards the
end of July he resolved to execute a project which he had long
entertained, of carrying the mass of his fleet from the islands to the
Continental waters of North America.

During the year between his return from Paris and his present
appointment, he had laid before the Admiralty two papers, containing an
admirable summary of the leading strategic conditions of the whole scene
of war in the western hemisphere, with suggestions for action amounting
to a plan of campaign. One feature of this was based upon the weather
differences, which rendered cruising dangerous in the West Indies when
most favorable to the northward, and unsure in North America when most
certain among the islands. He proposed to utilize this alternation of
seasons, by shifting a mobile reinforcement suddenly and secretly from
one end to the other of the long front of operations. This is a common
enough expedient in military art, but had rarely received the convincing
formulation which he gave it; while that such a conception was a novelty
to the average naval mind of the day, may be inferred from the startled
wrath of the admiral in North America at Rodney's unexpected intrusion
upon his bailiwick.

Sandwich, however, had entertained the project, and in October, 1779,
just as Rodney's appointment issued, a vessel sailed from England with
letters to Admiral Arbuthnot in New York, directing him to send several
ships-of-the-line to the West Indies for the winter campaign. The vessel
lost a mast, kept off to Nassau in the Bahamas, and after arrival there
her captain, while spending some months in repairs, did not think to
send on the despatches. Arbuthnot, therefore, received them only on
March 16, 1780; too late, doubtless, to collect and equip a force in
time to reach Rodney before the affair of April 17th.

At the end of July, 1780, the conditions in the West Indies were that
the allied French and Spanish fleets had gone to leeward from
Martinique; to Havana, and to Cap Francois, in Hayti. At the latter port
was assembling a large trade convoy--three hundred ships, according to
Rodney's information. He reasoned that this must go to Europe, but would
not require the full strength of the French fleet; therefore,
transferring his own insight to the enemy's mind, he convinced himself
that a part of their vessels would seek Narragansett Bay, to reinforce
the seven ships-of-the-line that had reached there on July 12th, under
De Ternay, of whose arrival Rodney now knew. Great possibilities might
be open to such a combination, skilfully handled against the inferior
numbers of Arbuthnot. "As it plainly appeared to me that His Majesty's
territory, fleet, and army, in America were in imminent danger of being
overpowered by the superior force of the public enemy, I deemed it a
duty incumbent upon me to forego any emoluments that might have accrued
by the enterprise intended by General Vaughan and myself during the
hurricane months, and without a moment's hesitation flew with all
despatch possible to prevent the enemy's making any impression upon the
continent before my arrival there." The protestation of
disinterestedness here is somewhat intrusive, and being wholly
unnecessary excites rather criticism than confidence.

Although reasonable precautions had been taken for the security of his
own station, and all circumstances carefully weighed, there was in this
step of Rodney's an assumption of responsibility,--of risk,--as in his
similar action of 1762, before noted. This, as well as the military
correctness of the general conception, deserves to be noted to the
credit of his professional capacity. Making the land about Charleston,
South Carolina, he swept along the coast to the northward, until he
anchored off Sandy Hook, September 14th. The following day he issued an
order to Admiral Arbuthnot, directing him to put himself under his
command and to obey his instructions.

Rodney's coming was a grievous blow to Washington, who instead had
hoped, as Rodney had feared, the arrival of De Guichen, or at the least
of a strong French naval division. The enemy's disappointment is perhaps
the best proof of sagacity in a military movement, but Sandwich's clear
approval was also forthcoming. "It is impossible for us to have a
superior fleet in every part; and unless our commanders-in-chief will
take the great line, as you do, and consider the King's whole dominions
as under their care, our enemies must find us unprepared somewhere, and
carry their point against us." Arbuthnot, nevertheless, saw only
personal injury to himself; a natural feeling, but one which should not
be allowed display. Rodney had given various particular orders, and had
suggested that it would be better that the commander-in-chief on the
station should keep headquarters at New York, leaving the blockade of
Ternay, a hundred and thirty miles distant, to a junior admiral; also,
he intimated the opinion that such a blockade would be better conducted
underway than anchored in Gardiner's Bay, fifty miles from the enemy's
port. Though suggestion did not override discretion, Arbuthnot resented
it in all its forms. After explaining his reasons, he added, "How far,
Sir, your conduct (similarly circumstanced as you are) is praiseworthy
and proper, consequences must determine. Your partial interference in
the conduct of the American War is certainly incompatible with
principles of reason, and precedents of service. The frigates attending
on a cruising squadron you have taken upon you to counter-order, (a due
representation of which and other circumstances I shall make where it
will have every possible effect), and thus I have been for some time
without even a repeater of signals."

Though Rodney's step was unusual, his position as Arbuthnot's superior
officer, locally present, was impregnable. He nevertheless kept his
temper under provocation, and the dignified restraint of his reply is
notable; indeed, the only significant feature of this incident, from the
biographical point of view. "No offence to you was intended on my part.
Every respect due to you, as an officer and a gentleman, my inclination
as well as my duty led me to pay you in the strictest sense." He leaves
no doubt, however, that he does not intend to allow his functions to
lapse into a mere official primacy,--that he will rule, as well as
reign. "Duty, not inclination, brought me to North America. I came to
interfere in the American War, to command by sea in it, and to do my
best endeavours towards the putting an end thereto. I knew the dignity
of my own rank entitled me to take the supreme command, which I ever
shall do on every station where His Majesty's and the public service may
make it necessary for me to go, unless I meet a superior officer, in
which case it will be my duty to obey his orders." He then proceeds to
exercise his authority, by explicit directions and some criticism of
existing arrangements.

Afterwards, in submitting the papers to the Admiralty, Rodney wrote, "I
am ashamed to mention what appears to me the real cause, and from
whence Mr. Arbuthnot's chagrin proceeds, but the proofs are so plain
that prize-money is the occasion that I am under the necessity of
transmitting them. I can solemnly assure their Lordships that I had not
the least conception of any other prize-money on the coast of America
but that which would be most honourably obtained by the destruction of
the enemy's ships of war and privateers--but when prize-money appeared
predominant in the mind of my brother officer, I was determined to have
my share of that bounty so graciously bestowed by His Majesty and the
public." Nelson's retort to Arbuthnot's successor, two years later, may
be recalled. "You have come to a good station for prize-money." "Yes,
but the West Indies is the station for honour."

The visit to continental waters was on this occasion productive of
little result. Contrary alike to Rodney's anticipations and those of
Washington, De Guichen's whole fleet had returned to Europe. Some slight
redistribution of cruisers, the more frequent capture of privateers,
with increased security to the trade of New York and incidental support
to some rather predatory land operations, were all that Rodney could
show of tangible consequence from his presence. Arbuthnot alone was
superior to Ternay if neither received reinforcements. Rodney's health
felt the keener atmosphere, so that he had to go ashore in New York, and
he accepted the views of Arbuthnot as to the strength of the French
fleet's position in Newport, without examining it himself. Had he done
so, however, it is unlikely that he would have formed more strenuous
purposes. The disposition of the enemy's squadron there was so imposing
that only the genius of a Nelson, mindful as at Revel of the moral
influence of a great blow at a critical period of the war, could have
risen to the necessity of daring such a hazard. His phrase was there
applicable, "Desperate affairs require desperate remedies." There is no
indication of this supreme element in Rodney's composition. It is
interesting to note, however, that personal observation had given
conviction of success at Newport to the officer who was afterwards
Nelson's gallant second at Copenhagen,--Sir Thomas Graves.

This paucity of results in no way lessens the merit of the movement from
the West Indies to the continent. It was indubitably correct in idea,
and, as has been pointed out, the conception was Rodney's own, the
possibilities were great, the risk in many ways undeniable; when these
can be affirmed of a military action, failure to obtain results, because
conditions take an improbable direction, does not detract from credit.
Nor should the obviousness of this measure hide the fact that the
suggestion appears to have been original with him, occurring fully
developed in his memorandum of May, 1778, to the Admiralty; whether
written in Paris or England does not appear. The transfer of Hotham's
squadron to the southward in the following December, 1779, enabling
Barrington to conquer Santa Lucia,--a place insisted upon in the same
memorandum as of the first importance,--may not improbably be attributed
to this fruitful paper. In the next year, 1781, a detachment was again
sent to New York, and had Rodney been able to accompany it in person
there is no room to doubt that he would have saved Cornwallis; reversing
issues, at least momentarily, certainly prolonging the war, possibly
deciding the contest otherwise than as befell.

Rodney's return to the West Indies in December, 1780, concluded the most
eventful and illustriously characteristic year of his life. The
destruction of Langara's fleet in January, the brilliant tactical
displays of April 17th, and of the chase manoeuvres in May, the
strategic transference in August of a large division, unawares to the
enemy, from one point of the field of action to another, are all feats
that testify to his great ability as a general officer. Nor should there
be left out of the account the stern dignity of conduct which assured
his personal control of the fleet, his certainty of touch in the face of
an enemy. Thus considered, it was a year full of events, successful
throughout as regards personal desert, and singularly significant of
ability and temperament.

The year 1781 was far less happy, nor does the great victory, which in
1782 crowned his career with glory, contribute to the enhancement of his
professional distinction; rather the contrary. Upon reaching Barbados,
December 5th, he found the island shorn to the ground by the noted
hurricane, which in the previous October had swept the Caribbean, from
the Lesser Antilles to Jamaica. Eight of the division left by him in the
West Indies had been wrecked,--two being ships-of-the-line; and the
efficiency of the whole fleet was grievously impaired by the widespread
injury to vessels.

An event charged with more serious consequences to himself soon
followed. On the 27th of January, 1781, at Barbados, despatches from the
Admiralty notified him that Great Britain had declared war against
Holland, and directed him to proceed at once against the Dutch shipping
and West Indies. First among the enumerated objects of attack was the
small island of St. Eustatius. This, having enjoyed the advantages of
neutrality at a time when almost the whole Caribbean was in hostilities,
had become a depot for the accumulation and distribution of stores,
commercial and warlike. Ostensibly, it served all parties, giving to and
receiving from Europe, America, and the Caribbean alike. The political
sympathies of Holland, however, and it may be added those of the West
Indies in general, even of the British islands themselves, were rather
adverse to Great Britain in the current struggle; and this, combined
with the greater self-sufficingness of the British naval and commercial
administration, had made the neutral support of St. Eustatius more
benevolent, and much more useful, to the enemies of Great Britain,
including the revolted colonists, than it was to the mother country.
Rodney asserted that help from there was readily forthcoming to supply
French and Spanish requirements, while professions of inability abounded
whenever his fleet made a demand in occasional emergencies.

He was therefore full of gall against the island and its merchants, the
more so because he suspected that British subjects, unpatriotically
ardent for gain, were largely concerned in maintaining conditions thus
hurtful to their country; and, when the orders to act came, it needed
but three days for himself and General Vaughan to sail on an errand of
which they probably had previous intimations. On the 3d of February they
arrived off St. Eustatius, which in the face of their imposing force
submitted at once. They took possession of the island, with goods stored
to the estimated value of L3,000,000,--an immense spoil in those days. A
Dutch ship-of-war, with a hundred and fifty sail of traders of various
nationalities, were also seized; while a convoy of thirty merchant
ships, which had sailed thirty-six hours before, was pursued and
captured by a British detachment,--the Dutch admiral commanding the
ships-of-war being killed in the attendant action.

From one point of view this was an enormous success, though unproductive
of glory. It destroyed at a blow a centre of commerce and supply
powerfully contributive to the maintenance of the enemies of Great
Britain; both to their hostile operations, and to the indirect but no
less vital financial support that trade gives to national endurance,--to
the sinews of war. Besides this, however, there was the unprecedented
immediate booty, transferable as so much asset to the conquerors. It was
upon this present tangible result that Rodney's imagination fastened,
with an engrossment and tenacity that constitute a revelation of
character. It perverted his understanding of conditions, and paralyzed
his proper action as commander-in-chief. It is needless in this
connection to consider whether it was the matter of personal profit,
through legitimate prize-money, that thus influenced him,--an effect to
some extent pardonable in a man who had long suffered, and still was
suffering, from pecuniary straitness,--or whether, as he loudly
protested, it was the interest to the nation that made his personal
superintendence of the proceeds imperative. In either case the point to
be noted is not a palpable trait of covetousness,--if such it were,
--but the limitation to activity occasioned by preoccupation with a
realized, but imperfect, success. The comparatively crude impression of
greediness, produced by apparent absorption in a mere money gain, has
prevented the perception of this more important and decisive element in
Rodney's official character, revealed at St. Eustatius and confirmed on
the evening of the 12th of April. What he had won, he had won; what more
he might and should do, he would not see, nor would he risk.

His discontent with his junior flag-officers in the West Indies, and the
peculiar demoralization of professional tone at the moment, had made it
difficult for the Admiralty to provide him a satisfactory second in
command. In order to do this, they had "to make a promotion," as the
phrase went; that is, in order to get the man wanted, the seniors on the
captains' list were promoted down to and including him. The choice had
fallen on Sir Samuel Hood,--in later days Nelson's honored Lord
Hood,--than which none could have been happier in respect of capacity.
It has been truly said that he was as able as Rodney, and more
energetic; but even this falls short of his merit. He had an element of
professional--as distinguished from personal--daring, and an imaginative
faculty that penetrated the extreme possibilities of a situation,
quickened by the resolve, in which Rodney was deficient, to have all or
nothing; and these invaluable traits were balanced by the sound and
accurate judgment of a thorough seaman, without which imagination lures
to disaster. The man who as a junior formed the idea of seizing De
Grasse's anchorage in the Chesapeake in 1781, to effect the relief of
Cornwallis, and who in 1782, when momentarily in chief command,
illustrated the idea by actual performance under similar conditions in
the West Indies, rose to heights of conception and of achievement for
which we have no equivalent in Rodney's career. Unfortunately for him,
though thus mighty in act, opportunity for great results never came to
him. The hour never met the man.

Hood with eight ships-of-the-line and a large convoy arrived on the
station in January, 1781, and was at St. Eustatius with the
commander-in-chief when Rodney received a report, which proved to be
false, that eight to ten French ships-of-the-line, with a numerous
supply-fleet, had been sighted in European waters evidently bound for
the West Indies. He thereupon detached Hood, on February 12th, and
directed him with seventeen of-the-line to await the enemy to windward
of Martinique, their probable destination. A month later he ordered the
position to be shifted to leeward of the island, in front of the French
arsenal port, Fort Royal. Hood dissented from this, remonstrating
vigorously, and the event proved him right; but Rodney insisted, the
more injudiciously in that he was throwing the tactical burden upon his
junior while fettering thus his tactical discretion. Meantime, twenty
French ships-of-the-line did sail on March 22d for Martinique, under
Count De Grasse: beginning then the campaign which ended in the great
disaster of April 12, 1782, but not until it had been signalized by the
surrender of Cornwallis, due to this fleet, as Washington said. On the
28th of April it came in sight of Hood; but, owing to the leewardly
position insisted upon by Rodney, the English commander could not
prevent the junction to it of four French ships then in the port. A
battle followed next day, of eighteen British--one having just
joined--against twenty-four enemies; odds which, combined with the
weather gage held by the French, should have insured them a decisive
victory. This result was prevented by the tentative action of De Grasse,
encountering the tactical capacity and imperturbable self-possession of
Hood.

Rodney could not have bettered Hood's management, though he of course
attributed to him the blame for results. It is evident, however, that
for various reasons the commander-in-chief should have been with the
body of his fleet. Even barring certain and timely information of the
French coming, which Hood at least did not have, there was every
reasonable probability that such an expedition would arrive at about the
season it did. Hood's insight, which was adequate to divining
possibilities as well as to dealing with ascertained conditions, had
taught him that the latter half of April--and not sooner--was the time
by which the British should be refitted, provisioned and watered full,
and in all respects ready for prolonged operations against a powerful
enemy; as well as concentrated to windward. He reasoned thus from the
fact that the French navy, to the number of forty odd,--being the
combined fleets of D'Estaing from Brest and De Guichen from the West
Indies,--had been assembled in Cadiz towards the end of 1780, and did
not return to Brest until January, 1781. To refit, sail, and reach
Martinique again, would in his judgment postpone arrival to the middle
of April, and this respite should be improved by getting the British
ships into the best campaigning condition, so as not to be hampered in
subsequent movements by necessities of repair and supply. With this
persuasion he became eager, by the first of the month, for the admiral's
presence; the more so because confident that, if he were on the spot, he
would see the necessity of changing position from leeward to windward.
"I begin to be extremely impatient for the honour of being and acting
immediately under your flag, as I do not find myself pleasant in being
to leeward; for should an enemy's fleet attempt to get into Martinique,
and the commander of it inclines to avoid battle, nothing but a skirmish
will probably happen, which in its consequences may operate as a defeat
to the British squadron, though not a ship is lost and the enemy suffer
most."

This is a clear case in which events that actually befell were foreseen;
not by supernatural illumination, but by the clear light of unbiassed
reason acting upon evident considerations. There _was_ but a skirmish,
the British _did_ suffer badly, and the consequences _were_ equivalent
to defeat; for, had the whole British force of the line been present to
windward, it would have prevented the junction of the French, and
therefore have been so nearly equal to the main body as to have assured
an action inflicting very serious injury, incapacitating the enemy for
the attacks upon Santa Lucia and Tobago, before which the latter fell,
and not improbably deterring De Grasse from the expedition to the
Chesapeake which forced the capitulation of Cornwallis. Such deductions
are of course dependent upon the contingencies inseparable from warfare.
They are not certainties, indeed; but they are inferences of very great
probability. So much hinged upon the presence of an officer with the
full discretion denied to Hood; of the officer primarily responsible for
the fleet, which was intrusted to him and not to another.

Probable also is Hood's solution of Rodney's persistence in remaining at
St. Eustatius, and keeping the squadron under the command of his second
to leeward of Martinique. He was possessed with the fancied paramount
necessity of protecting St. Eustatius against a sudden attack by the
enemy, which he imagined might be supported by the small division in
Fort Royal; and the value of the booty shut his eyes to every other
consideration. As on the evening of the 12th of April, the great day of
glory in his career, the captures already made assumed sufficiency in
his eyes, and co-operating with surmisings as to what the beaten and
scattered French might do deterred him from further action; so now the
prize already secured at St. Eustatius combined with the imaginative
"picture he made for himself"--to use Napoleon's phrase--of its possible
dangers, to blind him to the really decisive needs of the situation. It
is clear, however, that local naval provision for the safety of a petty
island was in point of difficulty, as of consequence, a secondary
matter, within the competence of many of his captains; and that the
primary factor, on which all depended, was the control of the sea, by
the British fleet predominating over the enemy's. Consequently the
commander-in-chief should have been where his second was, at the centre
of decisive action, where an enemy's fleet was to be expected.

This was the more incumbent because Rodney himself, writing to Admiral
Parker in Jamaica on April 16th, said, "As the enemy hourly expect a
great fleet in these seas, I have scarcely a sufficient number of
line-of-battle-ships to blockade the island of Martinique, or to engage
the enemy's fleet should they appear, if their number should be so large
as reported,"--twenty-four. This report came from French sources, and it
will be noted, from the date of his letter, was in his possession
twelve days before the enemy arrived. It was both specific and
antecedently probable, and should have determined the admiral's action.
Whether he had similar news from home does not appear. Sandwich writing
him on March 21st, the day before the French left Brest, professed
ignorance of their destination, but added, "the most prevailing and most
probable opinion is that they are to go to the West India Islands, and
afterwards to North America." Their number he estimated at twenty-five,
which tallied with Rodney's intelligence of twenty-four. The latter was
exact, save that four were armed _en flute_; that is, as transports,
with their guns below, to be subsequently mounted. Despite everything,
the admiral remained at St. Eustatius until May 4th, when the arrival of
a crippled ship from Hood brought him the news of the skirmish. He was
attending, doubtless, to details pertaining to his command, but he was
chiefly occupied with the disposition of the property seized on the
island; a matter which he afterwards found to his cost would have been
much better committed to administrators skilled in the law. "Had they
abided by the first plan settled before I left them," wrote Hood, "and
not have interfered, but have left the management to the land and sea
folk appointed for that purpose, all would have gone smooth and easy."

However this might have proved, the immediate supervision of the island
and its spoils was no business for a commander-in-chief in active war
time; particularly when it entailed leaving the charge of his main
fleet, at a critical moment, to a junior admiral of very recent
appointment, and still unproved. It was not the separate importance of
the position intrusted to Hood that made it peculiarly the station for
the commander-in-chief. It might have been intrinsically as important,
yet relatively secondary; but actually it was the centre and key upon
which, and upon which alone, the campaign could turn and did turn.
Neither was the question one of the relative merits, as yet unknown, of
Rodney and Hood. A commander-in-chief cannot devolve his own proper
functions upon a subordinate, however able, without graver cause than
can be shown in this instance. The infatuation which detained Rodney at
a side issue can only be excused--not justified--by a temporary
inability to see things in their true proportion, induced on more than
one occasion by a temperamental defect,--the lack of the single eye to
military considerations,--which could find contentment in partial
success, and be indifferent to further results to be secured by
sustained action.

There is a saying, apt to prove true, that war does not forgive. For his
initial error Rodney himself, and the British campaign in general, paid
heavily throughout the year 1781. The French fleet in undiminished vigor
lay a dead weight upon all his subsequent action, which, like the
dispositions prior to its arrival, underwent the continued censure of
Hood; acrid, yet not undiscriminating nor misplaced. As already
observed, the surrender of Cornwallis can with probability be ascribed
to this loss of an opportunity afforded to strike a blow at the outset,
when the enemy was as yet divided, embarrassed with convoy, raw in
organization and drill, in all which it could not but improve as the
months passed. The results began at once to be apparent, and
embarrassments accumulated with time. Hood's ships, though no one was
wholly disabled, had suffered very considerably; and, while
indispensable repairs could temporarily be made, efficiency was
affected. They needed, besides, immediate water and supplies, as Rodney
himself stated--a want which Hood would have anticipated. To increase
difficulty, the French mounted the batteries of the vessels _en flute_,
and so raised their total nominal force to twenty-eight. Hood was unable
to regain Santa Lucia, because his crippled ships could not beat against
the current. He therefore left it to itself, and bore away to the
northward, where he joined Rodney on May 11th, between St. Kitts and
Antigua. The campaign of 1781, destined to be wholly defensive for the
British, opened under these odds, the responsibility for which lies in
considerable measure on Rodney.

After the junction, the British fleet went to Barbados, where it arrived
May 18th. Meantime, the French had proceeded in force against Santa
Lucia, landing a considerable body of troops, and investing the island
with twenty-five sail-of-the-line, two of which with 1300 soldiers went
on to attempt the British Tobago. The attack on Santa Lucia failed, and
the French returned to Martinique; but learning there that Rodney was at
sea, heading southward, De Grasse became alarmed for his detachment at
Tobago, and moved to its support with his entire fleet. Rodney, knowing
of the detachment only, sent against it six ships under Rear Admiral
Drake; a half-measure severely censured by Hood, whose comments
throughout indicate either a much superior natural sagacity, or else the
clearer insight of a man whose eye dwells steadfastly on the military
situation, untroubled by conflicting claims. "What a wonderful happy
turn would have been given to the King's affairs in this country had Sir
George Rodney gone with his whole force to Tobago as soon as he might,
and in my humble opinion ought to have done. Nay, had he even gone when
Mr. Drake did, the island would have been saved. I laboured much to
effect it, but all in vain, and fully stated my reasons in writing as
soon as the intelligence came. Every ship there with all the troops must
have fallen into our hands two days before De Grasse got there with his
twenty-one sail;" to which Rodney, in full strength, would again have
opposed twenty. "_Now_ the enemy may do as they will;" for they were
united in Martinique, twenty-eight to twenty. In short, Rodney saw at
Tobago only the one French detachment; Hood saw therein the definition
of the enemy's purpose, the necessity laid on them to fly to the aid of
their exposed division, and the chance to anticipate them,--to gain an
advantage first, and to beat them afterwards.

Rodney's tentative and inadequate action was not improbably induced
partly by the "extreme want of water," which he reported in his
despatches; and this again was due to failure to prepare adequately
during the period of respite foreseen by Hood, but unnoted by his own
preoccupied mind. The result is instructive. Drake fell in with the main
body of the French, and of course had to retire,--fortunate in regaining
his commander-in-chief unmolested. De Grasse's movement had become known
in Barbados, and as soon as Drake appeared Rodney sailed with the fleet,
but upon arriving off Tobago, on June 5th, learned that it had
surrendered on the 2d. Its fall he duly attributed to local neglect and
cowardice; but evidently the presence of the British fleet might have
had some effect. He then returned to Barbados, and during the passage
the hostile fleets sighted each other on the 9th,--twenty British to
twenty-three French; but Rodney was unwilling to engage lest he might be
entangled with the foul ground about Grenada. As that island was then in
the enemy's hands, he could get no anchorage there, and so might be
driven to leeward of his opponent, exposing Barbados. It is perhaps
needless to point out that had he been to windward of Martinique when De
Grasse first arrived, as Hood wished, he would have been twenty to
twenty, with clear ground, and the antagonist embarrassed with convoy.
His present perplexities, in their successive phases, can be seen
throughout to be the result of sticking to St. Eustatius, not only
physically, but mentally.

And so it was with what followed. On reaching Barbados again, he had to
report that the French were back in Martinique, and now twenty-eight
through the arming of the ships _en flute_. Despite their superiority,
"they do not venture to move," he said somewhat sneeringly, and
doubtless his "fleet in being" had an effect on them; but they were also
intent on a really great operation. On July 5th, De Grasse sailed for
Cap Francois in Hayti, there to organize a visit to the continent in
support of Washington's operations. Rodney, pursuant to his sagacious
plan of the previous years, sent also a detachment of fourteen ships
under Hood, which he endeavored, but unsuccessfully, to have increased
by some from Jamaica. That De Grasse would take his whole fleet to North
America, leaving none in the West Indies, nor sending any to Europe, was
a step that neither Rodney nor Hood foresaw. The miscalculation cannot
be imputed to either as an error at this time. It was simply one of the
deceptions to which the defensive is ever liable; but it is fairly
chargeable to the original fault whereby the French admiral was enabled
to enter Fort Royal uninjured in the previous April. From the time his
fleet was concentrated, the British had to accept the defensive with its
embarrassments.

Rodney had contemplated going in person with his ships, which Sandwich
also had urged upon him; but his health was seriously impaired, and the
necessity for a surgical operation combined to induce his return to
England. The final decision on this point he postponed to the last
moment of the homeward voyage, keeping a frigate in company in which to
go to New York, if able; but ultimately he felt compelled to give up.
This conclusion settled Cornwallis's fate, antecedently but finally.
That year Great Britain fell between two stools. In view of De Grasse's
known expressions, it may be affirmed with great confidence that he
would have seen reason to abandon the Chesapeake, leaving open the sea
road for Cornwallis to escape, had either Rodney or Hood commanded the
British fleet there in the battle of September 5th; but Rodney was away,
and Hood second only to an incompetent superior.

Rodney landed in England, September 19th, and was again afloat by
December 12th, although he did not finally sail for his station until
the middle of January, 1782. This brief period was one of the deepest
military depression; for during it occurred Cornwallis's surrender,
October 19th, under conditions of evident British inferiority, on sea
and shore alike, which enforced the conviction that the colonies must be
granted their independence. Not only so, but the known extensive
preparations of the Bourbon courts pointed to grave danger also for the
Caribbean colonies, the sugar and import trade of which counted largely
in the financial resources of the empire. Amid the general gloom Rodney
had his own special vexation; for, before he left, news was received of
the recapture of St. Eustatius by a small French expedition, prior to
the return of Hood to the West Indies from the unfortunate operations on
the continent. As in the case of Tobago, Rodney severely blamed the
local defence, and very possibly justly; but attention should not wander
from the effect that must have been produced upon all subsequent
conditions by preparation and action on the part of the British fleet,
in the spring of 1781, on the lines then favored by Hood.

Shortly before he had sailed for home, Rodney had written his wife, "In
all probability, the enemy, when they leave these seas, will go to
America. Wherever they go, I will watch their motions, and certainly
attack them if they give me a proper opportunity. The fate of England
may depend upon the event." The last sentence was in measure a prophecy,
so far, that is, as decisive of the original issue at stake,--the
subjugation or independence of the United Colonies; but, without further
laboring the point unduly, it may be permitted here to sum up what has
been said, with the remark that in the summer of 1781 control of events
had passed out of Rodney's hands. From the time of the original fault,
in suffering the French to meet Hood to leeward of Martinique, with an
inferior force, more and more did it become impossible to him to assure
conditions sufficiently favorable. With the highest personal courage, he
did not have eminent professional daring; nor, with considerable
tactical acquirement, was he gifted with that illuminative originality
which characterized Hood and Nelson. He therefore needed either a
reasonable probability of success, or the spur of imminent emergency, to
elicit the kind of action needed to save the British cause. The chances
to windward of Martinique would have been ninety out of a hundred; from
that time forward they diminished with continually increasing rapidity.
With such a situation he was not the man to cope.

On reaching Barbados, February 19, 1782, Rodney learned that the
garrison of St. Kitts was besieged in Brimstone Hill, and the island
itself beleaguered by the French fleet, thirty-three of-the-line, which
Sir Samuel Hood, with two thirds their number, had so far held in check
by a series of manoeuvres unusually acute in conception and brilliant
in execution. Proceeding immediately to Antigua, he there heard on the
23d that St. Kitts had capitulated on the 13th. Two days later he was
joined by Hood, and then took the united fleet to Santa Lucia, where he
was on March 5th. The knowledge of a large supply fleet expected for the
French, and essential to the known project of the allies against
Jamaica, carried the British fleet again to sea; but it failed to
intercept the convoy, and returned once more to Santa Lucia, where it
anchored in Gros Ilet Bay, thirty miles from Fort Royal, where the
French were lying. Various changes made the respective numbers, when
operations opened, British thirty-six of-the-line, French thirty-five,
with two fifty-gun ships; a near approach to equality.

Rodney's faculties were now all alert. He had had some needed repose,
and he was again under the stimulus of reputation to restore; for it
would have been vain to assert, even to himself, that he was entirely
clear, not merely of error, to which the most careful is liable, but of
serious fault in the previous year. Moreover, he had been sharply
assailed in Parliament for the transactions at St. Eustatius on the
civil side, distinct from his military conduct. To such ills there is no
plaster so healing as a victory; and the occasion about to arise proved,
in its successive stages,--until the last,--admirably adapted to his
natural and acquired qualifications. First, a series of manoeuvres
protracted over three or four days; and afterwards a hard fought battle,
converted by a happy yet by no means unusual accident into a decided and
showy success. Decided, but not decisive; for, like the soldier
desperate in deed before rewarded, but who, when summoned again, advised
that the chance be given to a man who had not a purse of gold, Rodney
preferred to pause on that personally safe side of moderation in
achievement which is rarely conducive to finality, and is nowhere so
ill-placed as in the aims of a commander-in-chief. The true prudence of
war,--as it is also its mercy, to friend and to foe,--is to strike
without cessation or slackness till power of future action is crushed.

De Grasse's immediate task was to protect a large convoy from Martinique
to Cap Francois (now Cap Haytien), in Hayti, a distance of about a
thousand miles. Cumbered with merchant vessels, and aware that Rodney
would be at once on his track, he could not go straight across the
Caribbean; the British fleet, not so hampered, would be sure to overtake
and destroy. He purposed, therefore, to skirt the Antilles, keeping
continually in reach of a port of refuge. Rodney, knowing the aim to be
Jamaica, had little doubt of overtaking in any case, if started
promptly. He therefore kept himself in signal touch of Fort Royal by a
chain of frigates, extending from its offing to his own anchorage.

On the 8th of April the French sailed. The British followed instantly,
and before sundown had them in sight, not only by lookout vessels, but
from the mastheads of the main fleet. At daybreak next morning they were
visible from the decks of the British van; a very marked gain. De Grasse
saw that at that rate, unless he got rid of the convoy, he would
certainly be overtaken, which it was his aim to elude in pursuance of
the usual French policy of ulterior purposes; so, being then north of
Dominica, he sent the merchant vessels into Guadaloupe, and undertook to
carry the ships-of-war through the passage between the two islands,
beating to windward. This would draw the British away from the convoy,
unless they were content to let the fleet go, which was not to be
expected.

Between 8 A.M. and 2 P.M. of April 9th, several sharp skirmishes took
place between the French and the British van, under Hood.[9] De Grasse
had here an opportunity of crushing a fraction of the enemy, but failed
to use it, thus insuring his own final discomfiture. Rodney, who was
becalmed with the centre and rear of his command, could do nothing but
push forward reinforcements to Hood as the wind served; and this he did.
Pursuit was maintained tenaciously during the following night and the
next two days,--April 10th and 11th; but in sustained chases of bodies
of ships, the chased continually drops units, which must be forsaken or
else the retreat of the whole must be retarded. So in this case, certain
of De Grasse's ships were either so leewardly or so ill handled that the
bulk of the fleet, which had gained considerably to windward, had to
bear down to them, thus losing the ground won. Under such circumstances
the chapter of accidents--or of incidents--frequently introduces great
results; and so it proved here.

At 2 A.M. of April 12th, De Grasse's flag-ship, the _Ville de Paris_,
and the seventy-four-gun ship _Zele_, crossing on opposite tacks, came
into collision. The former received little damage, but the _Zele_ lost
her foremast and bowsprit. De Grasse then ordered her into Guadaloupe,
in tow of a frigate. When day broke, about five o'clock, these two were
only about six miles from the British rear, under Hood, whose division
had been shifted from the van in consequence of injuries received on the
9th. The British column was then standing east-northeast, closehauled on
the starboard tack, the crippled vessel under its lee, but the French of
the main body well to windward. To draw them within reach, Rodney
signalled Hood to send chasers after the _Zele_. De Grasse took the bait
and ran down to her support, ordering his ships to form line-of-battle
on the port tack, which was done hastily and tumultuously. The two lines
on which the antagonists were respectively advancing now pointed to a
common and not distant point of intersection, which the French, despite
the loss of ground already undergone, reached first, passing in front
and to windward of the head of the British column. Eight ships thus went
by clear, but the ninth arrived at the same moment with the leading
British vessel, which put her helm up and ran along close to leeward of
the French line towards its rear, followed in so doing by the rest of
her fleet.

The battle thus assumed the phase of two fleets passing each other in
opposite directions, on parallel lines; a condition usually unproductive
of results, and amounting to little more than a brush, as had been the
case in two rencounters between Rodney and De Guichen in the prolonged
chase of May, 1780. Chance permitted a different issue on this occasion.
The wind at the moment of first collision, shortly before 8 A.M., was
east, and so continued till five minutes past nine, when it shifted
suddenly to the southeastward, ahead for the French, abaft for the
British. The former, being already close to the wind, could keep their
sails full only by bearing away, which broke up their line ahead, the
order of battle as ranged for mutual support; while the British being
able to luff could stand into the enemy's line. Rodney's flag-ship, the
_Formidable_, 90, was just drawing up with the _Glorieux_, 74, nineteenth
from the van in the French order and fourth astern of the _Ville de
Paris_, De Grasse's flag-ship. Luffing to the new wind, she passed
through the French line at this point, followed by the five ships astern
of her; while the sixth astern, the _Bedford_, 74, luffing on her own
account, broke also through the French astern of the _Cesar_ and the
_Hector_, 74's, eleventh and twelfth in their order. The twelve British
vessels in rear of the _Bedford_ followed in her wake. Hood was in one
of these, the _Barfleur_, 90. Of the ships ahead of Rodney the nearest
one imitated his example instantly and went through the line; the
remainder, sixteen in all, continued northward for a space.

These sudden and unexpected movements overpowered the _Cesar_, _Hector_,
and _Glorieux_ under a weight of successive broadsides that completely
crushed them, separated De Grasse with six companion vessels from his
van and his rear, and placed the British main body to windward of the
French. Both sides were disordered, but the French were not only
disordered but severed, into three formless groups, not to be united
except by a good breeze and exceeding good management, neither of which
was forthcoming. Even to frame a plan operative under such conditions
requires in an admiral accuracy of judgment and readiness rarely
bestowed; but to communicate his designs and enforce execution upon
captains under such a staggering shock of disaster is even more uncommon
of accomplishment. During the remainder of the day light airs from the
eastward prevailed, interspersed with frequent calms; conditions
unfavorable to movement of any kind, but far more to the French,
deprived of concert of purpose, than to the British, whose general
course was sufficiently defined by the confusion of the enemy, and the
accident of a small group surrounding their commander-in-chief, to
capture whom was always a recognized principal object. The very
feebleness of the breeze favored them by comparison; for they had but to
go before it with all their light sails, while their opponents, in order
to join, were constrained to lateral movement, which did not allow the
same canvas.

There was, in short, during the rest of the day an unusual opportunity
for success, on such a scale as should be not only brilliant, but really
decisive of the future course of the war; opportunity to inflict a
maritime blow from which the enemy could not recover. Does it need to
say clearly that here the choice was between a personal triumph, already
secured for the successful admiral, and the general security of the
nation by the "annihilation"--the word is Nelson's--of the enemy? That
Rodney thus phrased the alternative to himself is indeed most unlikely;
but that he failed to act efficiently, to rise to an emergency, for the
possible occurrence of which he had had ample time as well as warning to
prepare, is but too certain. Even after the British had got to windward
of the enemy and seen their disorder, although the signal for the line
was hauled down, none was made for a general chase. That for close
action, hoisted at 1 P.M., was discontinued thirty minutes later, when
five full hours of daylight remained. Even in example the admiral was
slack, by Hood's account. "He pursued only under topsails (sometimes his
foresail set, and at other times his mizzen topsail aback) the greatest
part of the afternoon, though the flying enemy had all the sail set
their very shattered state would allow." Hood, curbed by his superior's
immediate presence, did what he could by putting all sail on the
_Barfleur_, and signalling the various ships of his personal command to
do the same; "not one but chased in the afternoon with studding sails
below and aloft." It was bare poetic justice, therefore, that the _Ville
de Paris_, the great prize of the day, though surrounded by numerous
foes, struck formally to him.

The _Hector_, _Cesar_, and _Glorieux_, already paralyzed ere the chase
began, were the only results of this languid movement, except the French
flag-ship and the _Ardent_, 64. The latter was taken because,
notwithstanding her being an indifferent sailer, she gallantly tried to
pass from her own division, the van, to support her commander-in-chief
in his extremity. It was 6.29 P.M. when the _Ville de Paris_ struck;
sixteen minutes later, 6.45, Rodney made signal to bring-to for the
night--to give over pursuit. Only the _Ville de Paris_ and the _Ardent_
can be considered to have been secured by following, after the battle
proper closed.

Nor was any other attempt made to profit by the victory. On the 13th the
fleet began to move very slowly towards Jamaica, the local protection of
which had become imperative through the failure to annihilate the enemy,
who must now go to leeward--to Hayti; but after four hours Rodney
brought-to again, and on the 16th, according to Hood, was in "the exact
same spot off Guadaloupe. It has indeed been calm some part of the time,
but we might have been more than twenty leagues farther to the
westward." The _Cesar_ having been accidentally burned on the night of
the battle, the prizes _Hector_ and _Glorieux_ were sent ahead in charge
of three ships-of-the-line. This was a questionable disposition, as they
were advancing in the direction of the enemy, without being covered by
the interposition of the main fleet. The _Ville de Paris_ Rodney kept
close by his own side, unable to tear himself from her; so at least said
Hood, who "would to God she had sunk the moment she had yielded to the
arms of His Majesty," for "we would then have had a dozen better ships
in lieu of her." Rodney was so tickled with her that he "can talk of
nothing else, and says he will hoist his flag on board of her."

On April 17th Hood, having vainly urged his commander to improve the
situation by more energetic action, represented to him that the small
detachment convoying the _Hector_ and _Glorieux_ might fall in with a
superior enemy, if not supported. Rodney then directed him to go ahead
with ten ships until as far as Altavela, midway on the south side of
Santo Domingo, where he was to await the main body. Hood gave a wide
construction to these orders, and pushed for the Mona Passage, between
Santo Domingo and Porto Rico, where on the 19th he intercepted two
sixty-four gun ships, and two smaller cruisers. In reporting this
incident to Rodney, he added, "It is a very mortifying circumstance to
relate to you, Sir, that the French fleet which you put to flight on the
12th went through the Mona Channel on the 18th, only the day before I
was in it." That sustained vigorous chase could not have been fruitless
is further shown by the fact that Rodney himself, deliberately as he
moved, apparently lying-to each night of the first half-dozen succeeding
the battle, reached Jamaica three days only after the main body of the
defeated French gained Cap Francois, though they had every motive to
speed.

Of the reasons for such lethargic action, wholly inconsistent with true
military principle, and bitterly criticised by Hood,--who affirmed that
twenty ships might have been taken,--Rodney drew up an express account,
which cannot be considered as adequate to his justification. In this he
argued that, if he had pursued, the enemy, who "went off in a close
connected body, might have defeated by rotation the ships that had come
up with them, and thereby exposed the British fleet, after a victory, to
a defeat." "They went off in a body of twenty-six ships-of-the-line, and
might, by ordering two or three of their best-sailing ships or frigates
to have shown lights at times, and by changing their course, have
induced the British fleet to have followed them, while the main of their
fleet, by hiding their lights, might have hauled their wind, have been
far to windward before daylight, and intercepted the captured ships, and
the most crippled ships of the English;" and he even conceived that, as
the main body of the British would at the same time have gone far to
leeward, the French, regaining their own ports in Guadaloupe and
Martinique, might have taken Antigua, Barbados, and Santa Lucia.

The principal impression produced by this formal summary of reasons is
that of unwisdom after the event, and that it was elicited by the
remonstrances of Hood to himself, which are known to have voiced
discontent prevalent in the fleet, and rendered some ready reply
expedient. The substance of them, when analyzed, is that war must be
rendered effective by not running risks, and that calculation to that
effect is to be made by attributing every chance and advantage to the
enemy, and none to one's self. Further, no account is to be taken of
that most notable factor, ultimate risk,--as distinguished from present
risk. This phantasm, of the sudden assumption of the offensive by a
beaten and disordered fleet, which, through the capture of its chief,
had changed commanders at nightfall, is as purely and mischievously
imaginative as the fiction, upon which it rests, of the close connected
body. Instead of being close-connected, the French were scattered
hopelessly, utterly disabled for immediate, or even proximate,
resistance to a well sustained chase and attack. During the next
twenty-four hours their new admiral had with him but ten ships; and only
five joined in the following twelve days, to April 25th, when he reached
Cap Francois, where four more were found. Six others had strayed to
Curacao, six hundred miles distant, whence they did not rejoin the flag
until May. Neither in Rodney's surmises, nor in the actual facts of the
case, is to be found any reasonable excuse for failure to observe the
evident military duty of keeping touch with the enemy during the dark
hours,--"pursue under easy sail," to use Hood's words, "so as never to
have lost sight of the enemy in the night,"--with a view to resume the
engagement next day, at farthest. This, and to regain to windward, were
as feasible to the victor as to the vanquished.

A truer explanation of this grave negligence is to be found in Rodney's
more casual words recorded by Hood. "I lamented to Sir George on the
twelfth that the signal for a general chase was not made when that for
the line was hauled down, and that he did not continue to pursue so as
to keep sight of the enemy all night; to which he only answered, 'Come,
we have done very handsomely as it is.' I could therefore say no more
upon the subject." He did, however, resume the subject with Sir Charles
Douglas, the chief of staff. Douglas was of the same opinion as Hood,
and for making the suggestion at the proper moment had been snubbed by
Rodney, who had established over him a domination of manner which
precluded proper insistence, or even due representation, such as became
his office. "His answer was, 'Sir George chose to pursue in a body;'"
that is, in regular order, not by general chase. "'Why, Sir Charles,' I
replied, 'if that was Sir George's wish, could it have been more
effectually complied with than by the signal for a general chase, with
_proper attention_? Because, if a ship is too wide on the starboard
wing, you have a signal to make her steer more to port. If a ship is too
wide on the larboard wing, you have a signal to make her steer more to
starboard. If a ship is too far ahead, you can by signal make her
shorten sail,'" etc. This by daylight; while, "'if Sir George was
unwilling his ships should engage in the night, there is a signal to
call every ship in, and, that followed by the one for the form of
sailing, the fleet might have gone on in sight of the enemy all night in
the most compact and safe order for completing the business most
gloriously the next day.' Sir Charles walked off without saying another
word." There was in fact nothing to say. Hood's methods were not only
correct, but in no respect novel. Every capable officer was familiar
with them before, as well as after the battle. The trouble was that
Rodney was content with a present clear success, and averse from further
risk. He had reached his limitations. It is known now that Douglas
agreed with Hood, but he was too loyal to his chief to say so publicly,
then or afterwards; and especially, doubtless, to so irritable a talker.

As illustrative of Rodney's professional character the events of April
8th to 12th are therefore unfavorable rather than the reverse.
Concerning his stronger qualities their evidence is simply cumulative;
the new light thrown reveals defects, not unsuspected excellencies. The
readiness in which his fleet was held at Santa Lucia, the promptness
with which he followed, the general conduct of the chase as far as
appears, though doubtless open to criticism in detail as in the ever
censorious remarks of Hood,--all these show the same alert,
accomplished, and diligent officer, resolute to the utmost of his
natural and acquired faculties. It is the same after the battle joins,
so long as its progress does not transcend his accepted ideas,--which
were much in advance of the great mass of his contemporaries,--though
under the conditions he saw no chance to apply the particular methods
familiar to his thought.

But when sudden opportunity offered, of a kind he had not anticipated,
he is found unequal to it. Neither natural temper, nor acquired habit of
mind, respond to the call. To pass through the French line, when the
wind shifted, was an instigation too sudden and a risk too great for his
own initiative. The balance of evidence shows that it was due to the
suggestion, and even more to the pressure, of Sir Charles Douglas.
Carried beyond his habitual submission by the impulse of a great
thought, and unburdened by the ultimate responsibility which must remain
with the admiral, the Captain of the Fleet not only urged luffing
through the enemy's line, but--so the story runs--in the excitement of
the moment, and seeing the chance slipping past, even under the then
sluggish breeze, he ordered the helm down. The admiral, thus faced,
countermanded the order. A moment of silence followed, during which the
two men stepped apart, the admiral even entering the cabin, which would
be but a few paces from the wheel. Returning, he permitted Douglas to
have his way; an act which, whether done courteously or grudgingly, does
not bespeak professional conviction, but the simple acceptance of
another's will in place of one's own indecision.

The incident is in entire keeping with the picture of Rodney's
irresolution, and consequent uncertain course, drawn in successive
touches by Hood in the hours and days succeeding the victory. Events
had called him to deeds beyond his limitations. Age of course counted
for much; fatigue, after three days of doubtful chase and one of
prolonged battle, for more; but it may here be recalled that an older
man, after a more wearisome and doubtful exposure, willed of his own
motion to do what Rodney left undone. Sir Byam Martin has recorded,[10]
"After the battle of the 1st of June, Lord Howe was quite exhausted, as
well indeed he might, considering that they had been manoeuvring and
fighting for three days. Although feeble in body, and so exhausted as to
be obliged to sit down in a chair on deck, he expressed a wish to pursue
the flying enemy; but Sir Roger Curtis, the Captain of the Fleet (Chief
of Staff, as Douglas to Rodney) said, 'I vow to God, my lord, if you do
they will turn the tables upon us.' This anecdote I had from the late
Admiral Bowen, who was master of the _Queen Charlotte_ and a party to
the conversation." Under circumstances approaching similarity,--so far
as North Atlantic fogs and weather resemble West India climate,--Howe
was sixty-eight, Rodney sixty-three, at the moment of testing. The one
lost the support of the man--Curtis--upon whom he must chiefly rely for
observation and execution; the other was urged in vain by the officer
who held the same relation to him. Nelson once spoke slightingly of "a
Lord Howe's victory, take a part, and retire into port;" as a trait of
official character, however, Howe's purpose was far in advance of
Rodney's, as this was viewed by Nelson's ideal admiral, Hood. It is now
known, by a letter of Nelson's very recently published, that he held the
same opinion of Rodney's remissness in this instance, although he
cordially recognized the general obligation of the country and the navy
to that eminent seaman. Writing in 1804 to his intimate friend
Cornwallis, one of Rodney's captains, he used these words: "On the score
of fighting, I believe, my dear friend, that you have had your full
share, and in obtaining the greatest victory, _if it had been followed
up_, that our country ever saw."[11] It was a clear case of spirit being
brought into subjection to form.

Rodney's professional career may be reckoned to have ended with his
arrival at Jamaica on the 29th of April. The change of ministry
consequent upon Cornwallis's surrender brought into power his political
opponents, and in May the new Admiralty superseded him. News of the
victory reached England just too late to permit them to revoke the
order; his successor, Admiral Pigot, having already sailed. On the 22d
of July Rodney left Jamaica, and on the 15th of September landed at
Bristol. Although not so intended, his recall may be considered in line
with his proverbial good fortune. He left his successor to grapple with
difficulties, and with numbers, the continued existence of which was due
chiefly to his own neglect after April 12th, and by the burden of which
the conditions of peace were influenced adversely to Great Britain. To
quote again Hood's apt comment, "Had Sir George Rodney's judgment, after
the enemy had been so totally put to flight, bore any proportion to the
high courage, zeal and exertion, shown by every captain, officer, and
man under his command in battle, _all_ difficulty would now have been at
an end. We might have done just as we pleased, instead of being at this
hour (April 30th) upon the defensive." This is ultimate risk, which is
entailed by exaggerated concern for immediate apparent security, and
ends in sapping endurance.

The auspicious moment at which the news of the battle reached England,
and the surface brilliancy of the achievement,--especially the capture
of the enemy's commander-in-chief,--diverted attention from any
examination of possible shortcomings. Rodney received a vote of thanks
from Parliament, and was advanced to the peerage by the King. A pension
of L2,000 per annum was also voted, additional doubtless to a similar
sum granted after his destruction of Langara's squadron and relief of
Gibraltar. Other rewards and recognition had already attended his naval
career. He had been made a baronet in 1764, at the expiration of his
first tenure of the Leeward Islands Station; in 1780 the order of the
Bath was bestowed upon him,--the distinction being enhanced by not
awaiting a vacancy, but making him a supernumerary member,--and in 1781,
upon the death of Lord Hawke, he became Vice-Admiral of Great Britain,
the highest professional honor in the service.

After his return to England Rodney lived generally in retirement. His
latter years were harassed by law suits, growing chiefly out of his
proceedings at St. Eustatius, and the attendant expenses kept him poor.
He died in May, 1792, at the age of seventy-three.

FOOTNOTES:

[6] Life of Lord Hawke, by Captain Montagu Burrows, Royal Navy, p. 194.

[7] For account and analysis of Byng's action, see _ante_, pp. 47-67.

[8] The italics are the author's.

[9] The writer does not purpose to give an account of these actions,
except so far as Rodney himself is concerned. They can be found in
Mahan's "Influence of Sea Power upon History," pp. 480-495, or in the
"History of the Royal Navy," (Sampson Low, Marston & Co.), edited by Mr.
W. Laird Clowes, vol. iii. pp. 520-535.

[10] Journals of Sir T. Byam Martin, Navy Records Society, vol. iii. p.
137.

[11] The Blockade of Brest, Navy Records Society. Introduction, p. xvi.
Author's italics.




HOWE

1726-1799


The name of Howe, albeit that of a stranger to the land, has a special
claim upon the esteem and cordial remembrance of Americans. The elder
brother of the subject of this sketch, during the few short months in
which he was brought into close contact with the colonists of 1758,
before the unlucky campaign of Ticonderoga, won from them not merely the
trust inspired by his soldierly qualities and his genius for war,--the
genius of sound common sense and solidity of character,--but got a deep
hold upon their affections by the consideration and respect shown to
them by him, traits to which they had been too little accustomed in the
British officers of that day. Nor was this attitude on his part only a
superficial disguise assumed by policy to secure a needed support. The
shrewd, suspicious provincials would soon have penetrated a veil so
thin, that covered only the usual supercilious arrogance which they had
heretofore encountered. Lord Howe, almost alone among his military
contemporaries, warmly greeted them as fellow-countrymen, men of no
alien or degenerate blood. He admitted at once the value of their
experience, sought their advice, and profited by both; thus gaining,
besides the material advantage of methods adapted to the difficulties
before him, the adhesion of willing hearts that followed
enthusiastically, confident in their leader's wisdom, and glowing with
the unaccustomed sense of being appreciated, of receiving recognition
long withheld, but now at last ungrudgingly accorded. "The army felt
him, from general to drummer boy. He was its soul; and while breathing
into it his own energy and ardor, he broke through the traditions of the
service, and gave it new shapes to suit the time and place.... He made
himself greatly beloved by the provincial officers, and he did what he
could to break down the barriers between the colonial soldiers and the
British regulars."[12]

In campaign, Lord Howe adopted the tried expedients of forest warfare,
associating with himself its most practised exponents; and on the
morning of his death, in one of those petty skirmishes which have cut
short the career of so many promising soldiers, he discussed the
question of Ticonderoga and its approaches, lying on a bearskin beside
the colonial ranger, John Stark, to whose energy, nineteen years later,
was due the serious check that precipitated the ruin of Burgoyne's
expedition. Endeared as he was to American soldiers by the ties of
mutual labors and mutual perils gladly shared, and to all classes by
genial bearing and social accomplishments, his untimely end was followed
throughout the Northern colonies by a spontaneous outburst of sorrow,
elicited not only by the anticipated failure of the enterprise that hung
upon his life, but also by a sense of personal regret and loss.
Massachusetts perpetuated the memory of her grief by a tablet in
Westminster Abbey, which hands down to our day "the affection her
officers and soldiers bore to his command."

Captain Richard Howe of the Royal Navy, afterwards Admiral and Earl,
succeeded him in the Irish viscounty which had been bestowed upon their
grandfather by William III. Of a temperament colder, at least in
external manifestation, than that of his brother, the new Lord Howe was
distinguished by the same fairness of mind, and by an equanimity to
which perturbation and impulsive injustice were alike unknown. There
seems to have been in his bearing something of that stern, impassive
gravity that marked Washington, and imposed a constraint upon
bystanders; but whatever apparent harshness there was in the face only
concealed a genuine warmth of heart, which at times broke with an
illumining smile through the mask that covered it, and was always ready
to respond to the appeals of benevolence. If, as an officer, he had a
fault conspicuously characteristic, it was a reluctance to severity, a
tendency to push indulgence to undue extremes, into which may perhaps
have entered not merely leniency of disposition, but the weakness of
loving popularity. To be called by the seamen, as Howe was, the
"sailor's friend," is in the experience of navies a suspicious encomium,
involving more of flattery to a man's foibles than of credit to his
discretion and his judgment. But at the time when the quarrel between
Great Britain and her colonies was fast becoming imbittered, the same
kindliness, coupled with a calm reasonableness of temper, ruled his
feelings and guided his action. Although by political creed a moderate
Tory, he had none of the wrong-headedness of the party zealot; and the
growing alienation between those whom he, like his brother, regarded as
of one family, caused only distress and an earnest desire to avert
coming evils. Influenced by these sentiments, he sought the acquaintance
of Franklin, then in London as a commissioner from the colonies; and the
interviews between them, while resultless by reason of the
irreconcilable differences of opinion severing the two parties to the
dispute, convinced the wary American of the good will and
open-mindedness of the already distinguished British seaman. The same
qualities doubtless suggested the selection of Howe for the mission of
conciliation to America, in 1776, where his associate was his younger
brother, Sir William, in whom the family virtues had, by exaggeration,
degenerated into an indolent good humor fatal to his military
efficiency. The admiral, on the contrary, was not more remarkable for
amiability and resolute personal courage than he was for sustained
energy and untiring attention to duty,--traits which assured adequate
naval direction, in case conciliation should give place, as it did, to
coercive measures.

It is to be regretted that the methods, or the opportunities, of naval
biographers and historians of the past century have preserved to us
little, in personal detail and anecdote, of a period the peculiarities
of which, if not exactly picturesque, were at least grotesque and
amusing. The humor of Smollett has indeed drawn in broad caricature some
of the salient features of the seaman of his day, which was that of
Howe's entrance into the navy; and those who are familiar with the naval
light literature based upon the times of Nelson can recognize in it
characteristics so similar, though evidently softened by advancing
civilization and increased contact with the world, as to vouch for the
accuracy of the general impression conveyed by the earlier novelist. It
is, however, correct only as a _general_ impression, in which, too,
allowance must be made for the animus of an author who had grievances to
exploit, and whose great aim was to amuse, even if exact truthfulness
were sacrificed at the shrine of exaggerated portrayal. Though not
wholly without occasional gleams of light, shed here and there by
recorded incident and anecdote upon the strange life of the seamen of
that period, the early personal experiences of individuals have had
scant commemoration; and with the exception of St. Vincent, who
fortunately had a garrulous biographer, we learn little of men like
Hawke, Howe, Hood, and Keppel, until, already possessors of naval rank,
they stand forth as actors in events rather historical than
biographical.

Of Howe's first services, therefore, not much record remains except a
bare summary of dates,--of promotions, and of ships to which he was
attached,--until 1755, the beginning of the Seven Years War, when he was
already a post-captain. Born in 1726, he entered the navy in 1739, at
the outbreak of the war with Spain which initiated a forty years'
struggle over colonies and colonial trade. With short intervals of
peace, this contest was the prominent characteristic of the middle of
the eighteenth century, and terminated in the conquest of Canada, the
independence of the United States, and the establishment of British
predominance in India and upon the ocean. This rupture of a quiet that
had then endured a quarter of a century was so popular with the awakened
intelligence of England, aroused at last to the imminent importance of
her call to expansion by sea, that it was greeted by a general pealing
of the bells, which drew from the reluctant prime minister, Walpole,
that bitter gibe, "Ay, to-day they are ringing their bells, and
to-morrow they will be wringing their hands." Howe embarked with Anson's
squadron, celebrated for its sufferings, its persistence, and its
achievements, to waste the Spanish colonies of the Pacific; but the ship
in which he had started was so racked in the attempt to double Cape Horn
that she was forced to return to England. The young officer afterwards
served actively in the West Indies and in home waters. On the 1st of
May, 1746, being then in command of a small sloop of war, he was
severely wounded in action with a superior enemy's force off the coast
of Scotland. A few days before that, on the 10th of April, he had been
promoted post-captain, being barely turned twenty. Thus early he was
securely placed on the road to the highest honors of his profession,
which, however, were not to prove beyond the just claim of his already
established personal merit.

During the first thirty months of the Seven Years War, Howe was closely
engaged with, and at times in command of, the naval part of combined
expeditions of the army and navy, fitted out to harass the French
coasts. The chief, though not the sole aim in these undertakings was to
effect diversions in favor of Frederick the Great, then plunged in his
desperate struggle with the allied forces of Russia, Austria, and
France. It was believed that the last would be compelled, for the
defence of her own shores against those raids,--desultory, it is true
but yet uncertain as to the time and place where the attack would
fall,--to withdraw a number of troops that would sensibly reduce the
great odds then overbearing the Prussian king. It is more than doubtful
whether this direction of British power, in partial, eccentric efforts,
produced results adequate to the means employed. In immediate injury to
France they certainly failed, and it is questionable whether they
materially helped Frederick; but they made a brisk stir in the Channel
ports, their operations were within easy reach of England in a day when
news travelled slowly, and they drew the attention of the public and of
London society in a degree wholly disproportionate to their importance
relatively to the great issues of the war. Their failures, which
exceeded their achievements, caused general scandal; and their
occasional triumphs aroused exaggerated satisfaction at this earlier
period, before the round of unbroken successes under the first Pitt had
accustomed men, to use Walpole's lively phrase, to come to breakfast
with the question, "What new victory is there this morning?" The
brilliant letter-writer's correspondence is full of the gossip arising
from these usually paltry affairs; and throughout, whether in success or
disaster, the name of Howe appears frequently, and always as the subject
of praise. "Howe, brother of the lord of that name, was the third on the
naval list. He was undaunted as a rock, and as silent, the
characteristics of his whole race. He and Wolfe soon contracted a
friendship like the union of cannon and gunpowder." "Howe," he says in
another place, "never made a friendship except at the mouth of a
cannon."

Of his professional merits, however, professional opinions will be more
convincing. A Frenchman, who had acted as pilot of his ship, the
_Magnanime_, when going into action, was asked if it were possible to
take a lighter vessel, the _Burford_, close to the walls of another fort
farther in. "Yes," he replied, "but I should prefer to take the
_Magnanime_." "But why?" it was rejoined; "for the _Burford_ draws less
water." "True," he said, "_mais le capitaine Howe est jeune et brave_."
Sir Edward Hawke, the most distinguished admiral of that generation,
gave a yet higher commendation to the "young and brave" captain, who at
this time served under his orders,--one that must cause a sigh of
regretful desire to many a troubled superior. Several years later, when
First Lord of the Admiralty, he nominated Howe, in October, 1770, to
command a squadron destined to the Mediterranean, when hostilities with
Spain were expected. The appointment was criticised on the ground that
he was a junior admiral in the fleet, having been very recently
promoted; but Hawke, doubtless mindful that the same objection had been
made to him at a similar period of his career, answered, in the spirit
of St. Vincent defending his choice of Nelson, "I have tried Lord Howe
on most important occasions. He never asked me _how_ he was to execute
any service entrusted to his charge, but always went straight forward
and _did it_." Some quaint instances are recorded of the taciturnity for
which he was also noted. Amid the recriminations that followed the
failure at Rochefort, Howe neither wrote nor said anything. At last the
Admiralty asked why he had not expressed an opinion. In the somewhat
ponderous style that marked his utterances, he replied, "With regard to
the operations of the troops I was silent, as not being at that time
well enough informed thereof, and to avoid the mention of any
particulars that might prove not exactly agreeable to the truth." The
next year, an army officer of rank, putting questions to him and
receiving no answer, said, "Mr. Howe, don't you hear me? I have asked
you several questions." Howe answered curtly, "I don't like
questions,"--in which he was perhaps not peculiar.

It was during the continuance of these petty descents upon the French
coast, in 1758, that Howe was directed to receive on board, as
midshipman, and for service in the fleet, the Duke of York, a grandson
of the reigning monarch; in connection with whom arose a saying that was
long current, perhaps is still current, in the British navy. The young
lad of nineteen, before beginning his routine duties, held a reception
on board Commodore Howe's ship, at which the captains of the squadron
were presented to him. The seamen, unpractised in ceremonial
distinctions other than naval, saw with wonder that the midshipman kept
on his hat, while the rest uncovered. "The young gentleman," whispered
one, "isn't over civil, as I thinks. Look if he don't keep his hat on
before all the captains!" "Why," another was heard to reply, "where
should he learn manners, seeing as how he was never at sea before?"

It is likewise from this period of Howe's career that two of the rare
personal anecdotes have been transmitted, illustrative of his coolness
and self-possession under all circumstances of danger, as well as when
under the enemy's fire; one of them also touched with a bit of
humor,--not a usual characteristic of his self-contained reticence. The
service involved considerable danger, being close in with the enemy's
coast, which was indifferently well known and subject to heavy gales of
wind blowing dead on shore. On one such occasion his ship had anchored
with two anchors ahead, and he had retired to his cabin, when the
officer of the watch hurriedly entered, saying, "My lord, the anchors
are coming home,"--the common sea expression for their failure to grip
the bottom, whereupon the ship of course drags toward the beach. "Coming
home, are they?" rejoined Howe. "I am sure they are very right. I don't
know who would stay abroad on such a night, if he could help it." Yet
another time he was roused from sleep by a lieutenant in evident
perturbation: "My lord, the ship is on fire close to the magazine; but
don't be frightened; we shall get it under shortly." "Frightened, sir!"
said Howe. "What do you mean? I never was frightened in my life." Then,
looking the unlucky officer in the face, he continued, "Pray, Mr. ----,
how does a man _feel_ when he is frightened? I need not ask how he
_looks_."

The even, unaffected self-possession indicated by these anecdotes of the
early prime of life remained with him to the end, as is shown by another
incident collected by a biographer who knew many of his contemporaries.
"When Howe was in command of the Channel Fleet, after a dark and
boisterous night, in which the ships had been in some danger of running
foul of each other, Lord Gardner, then the third in command, the next
day went on board the _Queen Charlotte_ and inquired of Lord Howe how he
had slept, for that he himself had not been able to get any rest from
anxiety of mind. Lord Howe said he had slept perfectly well, for as he
had taken every possible precaution he could before dark, he laid
himself down with a conscious feeling that everything had been done,
which it was in his power to do, for the safety of the ships, and the
lives of those intrusted to his care, and this conviction set his mind
at ease." The apprehensiveness with which Gardner was afflicted "is
further exemplified by an anecdote told by Admiral Sir James Whitshed,
who commanded the _Alligator_, next him in the line. Such was his
anxiety, even in ordinary weather, that, though each ship carried three
poop lanterns, he always kept one burning in his cabin, and when he
thought the _Alligator_ was approaching too near he used to run out into
the stern gallery with the lantern in his hand, waving it so as to be
noticed." From Gardner's rank at the time, the conversation narrated
must have occurred during the early years of the French Revolution, when
Howe was over sixty-seven. As illustrative of character it is
particularly interesting, for Gardner was not only a much younger man,
but one whose gallantry and competence had been eminently proved as a
captain in several hard fought battles, while as an admiral in chief
command he later acquired considerable reputation as a tactician.

Composure under suspense is chiefly a matter of temperament; of the
constitutional outfit with which Nature favors some, and does not
others. It may be cultivated by its happy possessor; but when wanting,
the sufferer can supply its place only by laborious self-control, the
tension of which by itself expends the energies it seeks to maintain,
and so imposes limitations of strength that are often insuperable
obstacles to achievement, especially if prolonged. The strain of this
endurance is prominent among those borne by commanders-in-chief, who can
at no moment afford to be lax, nor yet precipitate; and it increases
with time at compound interest. Howe's native imperturbability was
therefore one of the chief factors in his great professional powers,
making possible the full exercise of all the others. By dint of it
principally he reached the eminence which must be attributed to him as a
general officer; for it underlay the full, continuous, and sustained
play of the very marked faculties, personal and professional, natural
and acquired, which he had. It insured that they should be fully
developed, and should not flag; for it preserved his full command over
them by delivering him from the factitious burdens of the imagination.

This quality not only entered into his external professional life, but
characterized the habitual temper of his mind. "He divested himself in a
remarkable manner," says his biographer, "of every approach to a state
of anger or resentment"--instancing herein, it may be noted, the
improvement of a natural gift; "and he carefully abstained from all
irritating language, whether in speaking or writing. In the perusal of
the four hundred letters and upwards that have been mentioned, embracing
opinions of, and unreserved discussions upon, the merits or otherwise of
many and various characters, of all classes of individuals, it did not
fail forcibly to strike the reader of them, how invariably, with one
single exception, he takes the good natured and favorable side of every
question. In the whole series, the harshest word employed is
'blockhead,' bestowed on his steward for not taking care of his _own_
interests."

This equable frame of mind was thus a fundamental trait in Howe, private
as well as public, personal as well as professional; not assumed for the
moment, but constant in operation. He had none of the irritability
attributed to genius, as also he gives no sign of its inspiration,--of
originality. He is seen at his strongest in dealing stage by stage with
difficult situations created for him, following step by step, and step
by step checking, the lead of another; his action being elicited by
successive circumstances, not deriving from some creative, far-reaching
conception of his own. The temperament is one eminently practical,
capable on due opportunity of very great deeds, as Howe showed; for,
having improved much native capacity by the constant cultivation of
professional knowledge, and with the self-confidence which naturally
springs from such acquisition, he rose readily to the level of exertion
demanded by any emergency not in excess of his abilities, and so long as
the need lasted maintained himself there easily, without consciousness
of exhaustive effort, or apprehension of improbable contingencies.
"Never hasting, never resting," might be safely affirmed of him.

He is seen therefore at his best in a defensive campaign, such as that
against D'Estaing in the summer of 1778, which in the writer's opinion
was his greatest achievement; or again in a great deliberate operation
like the relief of Gibraltar,--the one of his deeds most esteemed, it is
said, by himself,--protracted over a month in its performance, and
essentially defensive in character, not only because of the much
superior fleet of the enemies, but because the adverse forces of nature
and the obstinate incapacity of the captains of supply ships had to be
counteracted by unremitting watchfulness, foresight, and skill, dealing
however with conditions determined for him, not imposed by his own
initiative; or, finally, in the chase and partial actions of May 28 and
29, 1794, in which persistence, endurance, and aptitude are alike and
equally displayed, assuring to him beyond dispute the credit of a great
tactician. Accordingly, in direct consequence of what has been noted, it
is as a tactician, and not as a strategist, that he can claim rank; for
whatever may be the fundamental identity of principles in the military
art, whether applied to strategy or to tactics, it in the end remains
true that the tactician deals with circumstances immediately before him
and essentially transient, while the strategist has to take wider views
of more lasting conditions, and into them to introduce his own
conceptions to be modifying factors. Creative thought and faculty of
initiation are therefore more characteristic of the natural endowments
of the born strategist. There is also more room for them in his work,
because in the larger and more complicated field there is greater
elasticity and opportunity to effect new combinations, to contrive which
makes a greater call upon originative power.

In the chain of eminent typical names which leads up to that of Nelson,
there will be found between Howe and his next conspicuous
successor,--conspicuous, that is, not only by merit, as was Hood, but by
achievement, which was denied to Hood,--between Howe and Jervis, just
that difference which essentially separates the tactician from the
strategist: the lifting of the eye from the moves of the game
immediately before one, to glance over the whole board, to view the
wider field, and from its possibilities to form conceptions directive of
immediate action for distant ends. In both these distinguished general
officers,--for such both were,--there is seen a similar close attention
to details, based upon and guided by an acquaintance with their
profession profound as well as extensive, minute as well as general; in
both the same diligence and iron equanimity in difficult situations,
although in Jervis the impression received is rather that of a burden
borne with resolute fortitude, whereas in Howe the burden is thrown off
by a placid, unforeboding temper; but in the adoption of measures, those
of Howe will be found generally not to extend beyond the situation
immediately before him, by which they are dictated, whereas Jervis seeks
to bend circumstances to his will, according to a conception he has
formed of what the situation ought to be, and can be forced to become.

The idiosyncrasy of either officer is emphasized in their respective
plans of campaign, while commanding the Channel Fleet during the French
Revolution. Howe will maintain a certain station in port, keeping his
fleet there in hand, well conditioned, and as far as may be well
drilled; then, when the French do something, he also will do something
to counteract them. Jervis, on the contrary, confronting substantially
the same conditions, frames his measures with a view to prevent the
enemy from doing anything, and all the details of his plan rest upon
this one idea, to the fulfilment of which they contribute. He puts the
fleet at once into the position of action, instead of that of awaiting,
as Howe does. Both are charged with the same duty,--the defence of Great
Britain,--and by the same Government, which evidently in each case
frames its instructions upon the ascertained views of the eminent
officer intrusted with the work. To carry out this defensive campaign,
Howe of his own choice narrows his strategic plan to the sheer
defensive, which follows the initiative of the enemy; Jervis of set
purpose seeks the same object by offensive dispositions, by which the
enemy is to be forced to regulate his movements. Howe sees the defence
of the empire in the preservation of his own fleet; Jervis in the
destruction of the enemy. The one view is local, narrow, and negative;
the other general, broad, and positive. As often happens--and very
naturally--Jervis's preoccupation with considerations wider than his own
command found expression, twice at least, in phrases which pithily
summed up his steadfast enduring habit of mind. On the morning of St.
Vincent he was overheard to mutter, "A victory is very necessary to
England at this time." The present odds to his own fleet, twenty-seven
against fifteen, disappeared in the larger needs of the country. Again,
when wrestling with the perplexities and exigencies of the wild Brest
blockade in midwinter, in January, 1801, he wrote concerning repairs to
his own vessels, "Under the present impending storm from the north of
Europe, and the necessity there is of equipping every ship in the royal
ports that can swim, no ship under my command must have anything done to
her at Plymouth or Portsmouth that can be done at this anchorage,"--at
Torbay, an open though partially sheltered roadstead. Here again is seen
the subordination of the particular and personal care to the broad
considerations of a great strategic emergency.

The series of diversions upon the French coast in which Howe was
employed during 1758, terminated with that season, and he returned to
his own ship, the _Magnanime_, rejoining with her the main fleet under
Hawke in the great Brest blockade of 1759. The French Government, after
four years of disaster upon the continent, of naval humiliation, and of
loss of maritime and colonial power, had now realized that its worst
evils and chief danger sprang from the sea power of Great Britain, and,
like Napoleon a half-century later, determined to attempt an invasion.
Its preparations and Hawke's dispositions to counteract them, have been
described in the life of that admiral, as have Rodney's bombardment of
Havre and interception of coastwise communications; all directed to the
same general end of confounding designs against England, but no longer
as mere diversions in favor of Frederick. Howe was still a private
captain, but he bore a characteristically conspicuous part in the stormy
final scene at Quiberon, when Hawke drove Conflans before him to utter
confusion. When the French fleet was sighted, the _Magnanime_ had been
sent ahead to make the land. She was thus in the lead in the headlong
chase which ensued, and was among the first in action; at 3 P.M., by
Howe's journal, the firing having begun at 2.30, according to Hawke's
despatch. The foreyard being soon shot away, the consequent loss of
manoeuvring power impeded her captain's designs in placing her, but she
remained closely engaged throughout, compelling one French vessel to
strike and anchor alongside her. The bad weather prevented taking
possession that night of the prize, which, in consequence, availed
herself of her liberty by running ashore, and so was lost to her
captors. The _Magnanime_ was reported as having thirteen killed and
sixty-six wounded, out of a total of hurt not much exceeding three
hundred in the entire fleet. The casualty list proves exposure to fire,
doubtless; but is no sure test of the effectiveness of a vessel's
action. The certainty of Howe's conduct in this affair, otherwise
imperfectly described, rests on a broader and firmer basis of
reputation, won by unvarying efficiency in many differing capacities and
circumstances.

He continued to serve, but without further noteworthy incident, up to
the peace made in the winter of 1762-63. From that time until the
difficulties with the American colonies came to a head in 1775, he was
not actively employed afloat, although continuously engaged upon
professional matters, especially as a close student of naval tactics and
its kindred subjects, to which he always gave sympathetic attention.
During this period, also, he became a member of the House of Commons,
and so continued until transferred from the Irish peerage to that of
Great Britain, in 1782. In 1770, at the age of forty-five, he became a
rear-admiral, and, as has been already stated, received at once a proof
of Hawke's high confidence, by being appointed to the command of the
squadron destined for the Mediterranean, when hostilities concerning the
Falkland Islands threatened with Spain; a dispute chiefly memorable as
the means of bringing into the navy both Nelson and Exmouth. In 1775 he
was promoted to vice-admiral, and in February of the following year was
appointed commander-in-chief of the North American station. Together
with his military duties, he was, as has before been said, given powers,
conjointly with his brother, to treat for the settlement of existing
troubles.

Although his habitual reticence restrained his sentiments from finding
expression in positive words, there can be little doubt that the
necessity of raising his hand against the Americans caused Howe keener
regret than it did to many of his brother officers. He took instant
occasion to address to Franklin a personal note, recalling their former
association, and expressing an earnest hope that their friendship might
contribute something to insure the success of his official mission. In
the five years that had elapsed, however, Franklin had been in the heat
of the political struggle, and, philosopher though he was, he had not
Howe's natural phlegm. Hence, his reply, while marked by respect and
even formal cordiality toward the admiral himself, displayed a vivacity
of resentment and a bitterness for which the latter had scarcely looked.
Still, his habitual equanimity was not ruffled, and he read the letter
with the simple comment, "My old friend expresses himself very warmly."

Howe's arrival antedated the signature of the Declaration of
Independence by less than a week. During the period of attempted
negotiation, while scrupulously faithful to his instructions, he showed
to his late fellow-countrymen all the courtesy and consideration that
the most cordial esteem could extend. The incident of the official
communication addressed by the Howes to Washington, in which they sought
to evade giving him the title of "General," is sufficiently familiar;
but it is more rarely recalled that, in verbal intercourse with American
officers, the admiral habitually styled him "General Washington," and
sent complimentary messages to him as such. He even spoke of the
colonies as "states," and at the same time dwelt with evident emotion
upon the testimonials of respect and affection which had been shown to
his brother's memory by the colonists.

To narrate Howe's share in the operations by which New York in 1776, and
Philadelphia in 1777, fell into the hands of the British, would be only
to repeat well-known historical episodes, enlivened by few or no
incidents personal to himself. In them the navy played a part at once
subordinate and indispensable, as is the office of a foundation to its
superstructure. The cause of the Americans was hopeless as long as their
waters remained in the undisputed control of the enemy's ships; and it
was the attempt of Great Britain to cast aside this essential support,
and to rely upon the army alone in a wild and intricate country, that
led to her first great disaster,--Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga. Upon
this, France at once recognized the independence of the colonies, and
their alliance with that kingdom followed. A French fleet of twelve
ships-of-the-line under the Count D'Estaing, left Toulon April 15, 1778,
for the American coast. This force far exceeded Howe's; and it was no
thanks to the British Government, but only to the admiral's sleepless
vigilance and activity, seconded, as such qualities are apt to be, by at
least an average degree of supineness on the part of his antagonist,
that his scanty squadron was not surprised and overpowered in Delaware
Bay, when Sir Henry Clinton evacuated Philadelphia to retreat upon New
York. Howe, who had the defects of his qualities, whose deliberate and
almost stolid exterior evinced a phlegmatic composure of spirit which
required the spur of imminent emergency to rouse it into vehement
action, never in his long career appeared to greater advantage, nor
achieved military results more truly brilliant, than at this time, and
up to the abandonment of the attack on Rhode Island by the Americans
under Sullivan, three months later. Then only, if ever, did he rise
above the level of an accomplished and resolute general officer, and
establish a claim to genius, of that order, however, which is not
originative in character, but signalized by an infinite capacity for
taking pains; and that not for a short time merely, but through a long,
protracted period of strain. The display, nevertheless, does not assure
him a place in the front rank of great commanders, whose actions find
their source in the living impulse of their own creative energy; for it
is elicited by extreme circumstances alone, by obvious pressure, to
which he must adapt himself. This he does with unfailing adequacy,
indeed; resolutely checkmating, but never initiating. Steady as a rock,
like a rock, also, Howe only gave forth sparks under blows that would
have broken weaker men.

D'Estaing was twelve weeks in coming from Toulon to Cape May, but Howe
knew nothing of his sailing until three weeks after he had started. Then
orders were received to abandon Philadelphia and concentrate upon New
York. The naval forces were scattered, and had to be collected; the
supplies of the army, except those needed for the march across Jersey,
were to be embarked at Philadelphia, and the great train of transports
and ships of war moved over a hundred miles down a difficult river, and
thence to New York. Despite every effort, a loss of ten days was
incurred, through calms, in the mere transit from Philadelphia to the
sea; but during this momentous crisis D'Estaing did not appear. Two days
more sufficed to bring the fleet into New York Bay on June 29th; but yet
the grave admiral, roused to the full tension of his great abilities,
rested not. With a force little more than half that coming against him,
he knew that all depended upon the rapidity with which his squadron took
the imposing position he had in mind. Still D'Estaing tarried, giving
to his untiring enemy twelve more precious days, during which the army
of Sir Henry Clinton, reaching Navesink beach the day after the fleet,
was snatched by it from the hot pursuit of the disappointed Washington,
and carried safely to New York.

In the expected French squadron were eight ships of seventy-four guns or
over, with three sixty-fours. To confront these, for the defence of the
port, Howe disposed of six, none heavier than a sixty-four; but they
were ranged to command the entrance of the harbor upon a tactical plan
that evinced both a careful study of the ground and the resources of a
thorough seaman. This instance alone, had Howe never done anything else,
would have established his reputation as a tactician. The ships, placed
in echelon, and enabled to turn their batteries in any direction, by the
provision of springs and adaptation to the tide conditions at the moment
when alone attack would be possible, could concentrate their entire
force of guns upon the enemy, raking them as they advanced up channel;
while, if they succeeded in coming abreast, then also the broadsides
would be turned upon them. When D'Estaing at last came, all was ready;
the energy that had improved every fleeting moment then gave place to
the imperturbable resolution which was Howe's greatest attribute, and
against which, seconded by his careful preparation, success could be
won only by a desperate and sanguinary struggle. The attempt was not
made. Ten days after arriving, the French admiral again put to sea,
heading to the southward. By combined energy and skill Howe had won the
first move in the game. Clinton's army and New York were saved.

"The arrival of the French fleet," wrote Washington a little later, "is
a great and striking event; but the operations of it have been injured
by a number of unforeseen and unfavorable circumstances, which have
lessened the importance of its services to a great degree. The length of
the passage, in the first instance, was a capital misfortune; for, had
even one of common length taken place, Lord Howe, with the British ships
of war and all the transports in the river Delaware, must inevitably
have fallen; and Sir Henry Clinton must have had better luck than is
commonly dispensed to men of his profession under such circumstances, if
he and his troops had not shared at least the fate of Burgoyne." If this
narration of events is so carefully worded as not to imply a censure
upon D'Estaing, it none the less, however unintentionally, measures the
great military merit of Lord Howe.

Nor did this end his achievements. Two or three days after the French
departed a small reinforcement from England reached New York, and in the
course of a week Howe, who had not failed to keep touch with the enemy's
fleet till it was ninety miles at sea, heard that it had been seen
again, heading for Narragansett Bay, then controlled by a British
garrison on Rhode Island. This was in pursuance of a prearranged plan to
support the American forces under General Sullivan, which had already
advanced against the place. Adapting anew his action to the
circumstances of the enemy's movements, Howe, though still much
inferior, hurried to the spot, arriving and anchoring off Point Judith,
at the entrance to Newport, on August 9th, the day after D'Estaing had
run the fire of the British works and entered the harbor. With correct
strategic judgment, with a flash of insight which did not usually
distinguish him when an enemy was not in view, and contrary to his
avowed policy when commander of the Channel Fleet, he saw that the true
position for his squadron was in face of the hostile port, ready to act
as circumstances might dictate. His mere presence blocked this operation
also. D'Estaing, either fearing that the British admiral might take the
offensive and gain some unexpected advantage, or tempted by the apparent
opportunity of crushing a small hostile division, put to sea the next
day. Howe, far superior as a seaman to his antagonist, manoeuvred to
avoid a battle with a force superior by a half to his own; and this
purpose was effected by his skilful management of his fleet, aided by
his adversary's irresolution, notwithstanding that the unusual action of
the wind thwarted his effort to control the situation by gaining the
weather gage. Both the general manoeuvres, and the special dispositions
made of his ships to meet the successive intentions of the enemy, as
they became apparent, showed a mind fortified by previous preparation as
well as by the natural self-possession for which he was conspicuous. It
was eminently a tactical triumph.

A tremendous gale followed, scattered both fleets, and dismasted several
of the French. D'Estaing appeared again off Rhode Island only to notify
Sullivan that he could no longer aid him; and the latter, deprived of an
indispensable support, withdrew in confusion. The disappointment of the
Americans showed itself by mobbing some French seamen in Boston, whither
their fleet retired. "After the enterprise upon Rhode Island had been
planned," continues Washington, in the letter above quoted, "and was in
the moment of execution, that Lord Howe with the British ships should
interpose merely to create a diversion, and draw the French fleet from
the island, was again unlucky, as the Count had not returned on the 17th
to the island, though drawn from it on the 10th; by which the whole was
subjected to a miscarriage." What Washington politicly calls bad luck
was French bad management, provoked and baffled by Howe's accurate
strategy, untiring energy, consummate seamanship, and tactical
proficiency. Clinton's army delivered, the forcing of New York
frustrated, Rhode Island and its garrison saved, by a squadron never
more than two thirds of that opposed to it, were achievements to
illustrate any career; and the more so that they were effected by sheer
scientific fencing, like some of Bonaparte's greatest feats, with little
loss of blood. They form Howe's highest title to fame, and his only
claim as a strategist. It will be observed, however, that the
characteristic of his course throughout is untiring and adequate
adaption to the exigencies of the situation, as momentarily determined
by the opponent's movements. There is in it no single original step.
Such, indeed, is commonly the case with a strictly defensive campaign by
a decisively inferior force. It is only the rare men who solve such
difficulties by unexpected exceptional action.

It is indicative of Howe's personal feelings about the colonial quarrel,
during the two years in which he thus ably discharged his official
duties, that both he and his brother determined to ask relief from their
commands as soon as it appeared that all hopes of conciliation were
over. The appointment of other commissioners hastened their decision,
and the permission to return was already in the admiral's hands when the
news of D'Estaing's coming was received. Fighting a traditional foreign
foe was a different thing from shedding the blood of men between whom
and himself there was so much in common; nor was Howe the man to dodge
responsibility by turning over an inferior force, threatened by such
heavy odds, to a junior officer before the new commander-in-chief came.
His resolution to remain was as happy for his renown as it was
creditable to his character. After the brief campaign just sketched,
true to his steady previous policy, he followed the French fleet to
Newport when he heard of its reappearance there, and thence to Boston,
coming off that port only three days after it; but finding it now
sheltered under shore batteries, impregnable to his still inferior
numbers, and learning that it was in need of extensive repairs, he
resigned the command in New York to a rear-admiral, and departed to
Newport to meet his successor, Vice-Admiral Byron. Upon the latter's
arrival he sailed for England, towards the end of September, 1778.
General Howe had preceded him by four months.

The two brothers went home with feelings of great resentment against the
ministry. The course of the war had so far been unfortunate. The loss of
Boston, the surrender of Burgoyne, the evacuation of Philadelphia, and
finally the entrance of France into the contest, constituted a
combination of mishaps which certainly implied fault somewhere. As
usual, no one was willing to accept blame, and hot disputes, with
injurious imputations, raged in Parliament. There is here, happily, no
necessity for apportioning the responsibility, except in the case of
Lord Howe; and as to him, it is reasonably clear that all was done that
could be up to the coming of the French, while it is incontestable that
afterwards, with a force utterly inadequate, for which the Government
was answerable, he had averted imminent disaster by most masterly
management. His words in the House of Commons were bitter. "He had been
deceived into his command, and he was deceived while he retained it.
Tired and disgusted, he had desired permission to resign it; and he
would have returned as soon as he obtained leave, but he could not think
of doing so while a superior enemy remained in American seas; that, as
soon as that impediment was removed, he gladly embraced the first
opportunity of returning to Europe. Such, and the recollection of what
he had suffered, were his motives for resigning the command, and such
for declining any future service so long as the present ministry
remained in office."

In terms like these could officers holding seats in Parliament speak
concerning the Government of the day. It was a period in which not only
did party feeling run high, but corruption was an almost avowed method
of political management. The navy itself was split into factions by
political bias and personal jealousies, and there was a saying that "if
a naval officer were to be roasted, another officer could always be
found to turn the spit." The head of the Admiralty, Lord Sandwich, was a
man of much ability, but also of profligate character, as well public as
private. He doubtless wished the success of his department,--under the
terrible chances of war no chief can do otherwise, for the
responsibility of failure must fall upon his own head; but through
corrupt administration the strength of the navy, upon the outbreak of
war, had been unequal to the work it had to do. Some one must suffer for
this remissness, and who more naturally than the commander of a distant
station, who confessed himself "no politician"? Hence, Howe certainly
thought, the neglect with which he had been treated. "It would not be
prudent to trust the little reputation he had earned by forty years'
service, his personal honor and everything else he held dear, in the
hands of men who have neither the ability to act on their own judgment,
nor the integrity and good sense to follow the advice of others who
might know more of the matter." A year later, it was roundly charged
that the Channel Fleet had been brought home at a most critical moment,
losing an exceptional opportunity for striking the enemy, in order to
affect the elections in a dockyard town. Admiral Keppel considered that
he had been sacrificed to party feeling; and a very distinguished
officer, Barrington, refused to take a fleet, although willing to serve
as second, even under a junior. "Who," he wrote, "would trust himself in
chief command with such a set of scoundrels as are now in office?" Even
a quarter of a century later, Earl St. Vincent gave to George III.
himself the same reason for declining employment. After eliciting from
him an unfavorable opinion as to the discipline and efficiency of the
Channel Fleet, the king asked, "Where such evils exist, does Lord St.
Vincent feel justified in refusing his conspicuous ability to remedy
them?" "My life," replied the old seaman, "is at your Majesty's
disposal, and at that of my country; but my honour is in my own keeping,
and I will not expose myself to the risk of losing it by the
machinations of this ministry, under which I should hold command." To
such feelings it was due that Howe, Keppel, and Barrington did not go to
sea during the anxious three years that followed the return of the
first. The illustrious Rodney, their only rival, but in himself a host,
was the one distinguished naval chief who belonged heart and soul to the
party with which Sandwich was identified.

Thus it happened that Rodney's period of activity during the war of the
American Revolution coincided substantially with that of Howe's
retirement. The same change of administration, in the spring of 1782,
that led to the recall of the older man, brought Howe again into
service, to replace the mediocrities who for three campaigns had
commanded the Channel Fleet, the mainstay of Great Britain's safety.
Upon it depended not only the protection of the British Islands and of
the trade routes converging upon them, but also the occasional
revictualling of Gibraltar, now undergoing the third year of the famous
siege. Its operations extended to the North Sea, where the Dutch, now
hostile, flanked the road to the Baltic, whence came the naval stores
essential to the efficiency of the British fleet; to the Bay of Biscay,
intercepting the convoys despatched from France to her navies abroad;
and to the Chops of the Channel, where focussed the trade routes from
East and West, and where more than once heavy losses had been inflicted
upon British commerce by the allies. All these services received
conspicuous and successful illustration during Howe's brief command, at
the hands either of the commander-in-chief or of his subordinates, among
whom were the very distinguished Barrington and Kempenfelt. Howe
himself, with twenty-five sail-of-the-line, in July encountered an
allied fleet of forty off Scilly. By an adroit tactical movement, very
characteristic of his resolute and adequate presence of mind, he carried
his ships between Scilly and Land's End by night, disappearing before
morning from the enemy's view. He thus succeeded in meeting to the
westward a valuable Jamaica convoy, homeward bound, and taking it under
his protection. The allies being afterwards driven south by a heavy
gale, the vessels of war and trade slipped by and reached England
safely. Thus does good luck often give its blessing to good management.

To relieve Gibraltar, however, was the one really great task,
commensurate to his abilities, that devolved upon Howe during this
short command. In the summer of 1782, the Spaniards were completing ten
heavy floating batteries, expected to be impervious to shot and to
combustion, and from an attack by which upon the sea front of the works
decisive results were anticipated. At the same time prolonged blockade
by land and sea, supported by forty-nine allied ships-of-the-line
anchored at Algeciras, the Spanish port on the opposite side of the Bay,
was producing its inevitable results, and the place was now in the last
extremity for provisions and munitions of war. To oppose the hostile
fleets and introduce the essential succors, to carry which required
thirty-one sail of supply ships, Great Britain could muster only
thirty-four of-the-line, but to them were adjoined the superb
professional abilities of Lord Howe, never fully evoked except when in
sight of an enemy, as he here must act, with Barrington and Kempenfelt
as seconds; the one the pattern of the practical, experienced, division
commander, tested on many occasions, the other an officer much of Howe's
own stamp, and like him a diligent student and promoter of naval
manoeuvres and naval signals, to the development of which both had
greatly contributed. To the train of supply ships were added for convoy
a number of merchant vessels destined to different parts of the world,
so that the grand total which finally sailed on September 11th was 183.
While this great body was gathering at Spithead, there occurred the
celebrated incident of the oversetting of the _Royal George_ at her
anchors, on August 29th,

    "When Kempenfelt went down
      With twice four hundred men."

Howe thus lost the man upon whom principally he must have relied for the
more purely tactical development of the fleet, opportunity for which he
anticipated in the necessarily slow and graduated progress of so large
an assemblage.

The occasion was indeed one that called for deliberation as well as for
calculated audacity, both controlled by a composure and ability rarely
conjoined to the same great extent as in Howe. Circumstances were more
imminent than in the two previous reliefs by Rodney and Darby; for the
greatly superior numbers of the allies were now not in Cadiz, as before,
but lying only four miles from the anchorage which the supply vessels
must gain. True, certainly, that for these a certain portion of their
path would be shielded by the guns of the fortress, but a much greater
part would be wholly out of their range; and the mere question of
reaching his berth, a navigational problem complicated by uncertain
winds, and by a very certain current sweeping in from the Atlantic, was
extremely difficult for the merchant skipper of the day, a seaman rough
and ready, but not always either skilful or heedful. The problem before
Howe demanded therefore the utmost of his seamanlike qualities and of
his tactical capacity.

The length of the passage speaks for the deliberate caution of Howe's
management, as his conduct at the critical moment of approach, and
during the yet more critical interval of accomplishing the entrance of
the supply ships, evinces the cool and masterful self-control which
always assured the complete and sustained exertion of his great
professional powers at a required instant. Thirty days were consumed in
the voyage from Spithead to Gibraltar, but no transport was dropped. Of
the huge convoy even, it is narrated that after a heavy gale, just
before reaching Cape Finisterre, the full tally of 183 was counted.
After passing that cape, the traders probably parted for their several
destinations, each body under a suitable escort. The stoppages for the
rounding-up of straying or laggard vessels, or for re-establishing the
observance of order which ever contributes to regulated movement, and
through it to success, were not in this case time lost. The admiral made
of them opportunities for exercising his ships-of-the-line in the new
system of signals, and in the simple evolutions depending upon them,
which underlie flexibility of action, and in the day of battle enable
the fleet to respond to the purposes of its commander with reasonable
precision, and in mutual support.

Such drill was doubly necessary, for it not only familiarized the
intelligence of the captains with ideas too generally neglected by
seamen until called upon to put them into practice, and revealed to them
difficulties not realized until encountered, but also enforced
recognition of the particular qualities of each vessel, upon the due
observance of which substantial accuracy of manoeuvre depends. The
experience gained during this cruise, going and returning, probably
opened the eyes of many officers to unsuspected deficiencies in
themselves, in handling a ship under the exigencies of fleet tactics.
Howe certainly was in this respect disappointed in his followers, but
probably not greatly surprised. At the same time it is but fair to note
that the service was performed throughout without any marked hitch
traceable to want of general professional ability. A French writer has
commented upon this. "There occurred none of those events, so frequent
in the experiences of a squadron, which often oblige admirals to take a
course wholly contrary to the end they have in view. It is impossible
not to recall the unhappy incidents which, from the 9th to the 12th of
April, of this same year, befell the squadron of the Count De Grasse. If
it is just to admit that Lord Howe displayed the highest talent, it
should be added that he had in his hands excellent instruments."

On the 10th of October the fleet and storeships drew nigh the Straits of
Gibraltar. On that day it was rejoined by a frigate, which forty-eight
hours before had been sent ahead to communicate the approach of the
relief, and to concert action. She brought the cheering news of the
victorious repulse by the British of the grand attack by sea and land
upon September 13th, with the entire destruction of the trusted floating
batteries. Under this flush of national triumph, and with a fair
westerly wind, the great expedition entered the straits on October 11th,
in ranged order for action. The convoy went first, because, sailing
before the wind, it was thus to leeward of the ships of war, in position
to be immediately defended, if attacked. Two squadrons of the fleet
succeeded them, in line-of-battle ahead, formed thus for instant
engagement, Howe leading in the _Victory_; while the third of the
squadrons followed in reserve, in an order not stated, but probably in a
line abreast, sweeping a broader belt of sea, and more nearly under the
eye of the Commander-in-chief, who, for the purposes of the present
operation, had left his traditional post in the centre. Howe's reasons
for this change of position, if ever stated, have not come under the
eyes of the writer; but analysis shows that he was there close to the
storeships, whose safe entrance to the port was at once the main object
of the enterprise and the one most critically uncertain of achievement,
because of the general bad behavior of convoys. There he could control
them more surely, and at the same time by his own conduct indicate his
general purposes to subordinates, who, however deficient in distinctly
tactical proficiency, had the seamanship and the willingness adequately
to support him.

At 6 P.M. the supply ships were off the mouth of the bay, with the wind
fair for their anchorage; but, although full and particular instructions
had been issued to them concerning currents and other local conditions,
all save four missed the entrance and were swept to the eastward of the
Rock. The fleet of course had to follow its charge, and by their failure
a new task confronted Howe's professional abilities and endurance.
Fortunately he had an able adviser in the captain of the fleet, who had
had long experience of the locality, invaluable during the trying week
that ensued. The allies had not yet stirred. To move near fifty
sail-of-the-line in pursuit of an enemy, inferior indeed, but ranged for
battle, and the precise moment of whose appearance could not have been
foreseen, was no slight undertaking, as Nelson afterwards said. It may
be recalled that before Trafalgar over twenty-four hours were needed for
the allied thirty-three to get out of Cadiz Bay. On the 13th, however,
the combined French and Spaniards sailed, intent primarily, it would
seem, not on the true and vital offensive purpose of frustrating the
relief, but upon the very secondary defensive object of preserving two
of their own numbers, which in a recent gale had been swept to the
eastward. Thus trivially preoccupied, they practically neglected Howe,
who on his part stripped for action by sending the supply vessels to the
Zaffarine Islands, where the vagarious instincts of their captains would
be controlled by an anchor on the bottom. On the 14th the allies bore
north from the British, close under the Spanish coast, and visible only
from the mastheads. On the 15th the wind came east, and the convoy and
fleet began cautiously to move towards Gibraltar, the enemy apparently
out of sight, and certainly to the eastward. On the evening of the 16th
eighteen supply ships were at the mole, and on the 18th all had arrived.
Gibraltar was equipped for another year's endurance.

We have less than could be wished of particulars touching this
performance of Howe's, from the day of leaving England to that of
fulfilment, five full weeks later. Inference and comment has to be built
up upon incidents transmitted disconnectedly, interpreted in connection
with the usual known conditions and the relative strength of the two
opposing parties. To professional understanding, thus far supplemented,
much is clear; quite enough, at the least, to avouch the deliberation,
the steadiness, the professional aptitude, the unremitting exertion that
so well supplies the place of celerity,--never resting, if never
hasting,--the calculated daring at fit moments, and above all the
unfailing self-possession and self-reliance which at every instant up
to the last secured to the British enterprise the full value of the
other qualities possessed by the Commander-in-chief. A biographical
notice of Howe cannot be complete without quoting the tribute of an
accomplished officer belonging to one of the navies then arrayed against
him. "The qualities displayed by Lord Howe during this short campaign,"
says Captain Chevalier of the French service, "rose to the full height
of the mission which he had to fulfil. This operation, one of the finest
in the War of American Independence, merits a praise equal to that of a
victory. If the English fleet was favored by circumstances,--and it is
rare that in such enterprises one can succeed without the aid of
fortune,--it was above all the Commander-in-chief's quickness of
perception, the accuracy of his judgment, and the rapidity of his
decisions that assured success."

Having accomplished his main object and landed besides fifteen hundred
barrels of powder from his own ships, Howe tarried no longer. Like
Nelson, at Gibraltar on his way to St. Vincent, he would not trifle with
an easterly wind, without which he could not leave the Straits against
the constant inset; neither would he adventure action, against a force
superior by a third, amid the currents that had caused him so trying an
experience. There was, moreover, the important strategic consideration
that if the allied fleets, which were again in sight, followed him out,
they would thereby be drawn from any possible molestation of the
unloading of the supply ships, which had been attempted, though with no
great success, on the occasion of the relief by Darby, in 1781. Howe
therefore at once headed for the Atlantic. The allies pursued, and
engaged partially on the afternoon and evening of October 20th; but the
attack was not pushed home, although they had the advantage of the wind
and of numbers. On the 14th of November the British fleet regained
Spithead. It may be remarked that Admirals Barrington and Millbank both
praised their captains very highly, for the maintenance of the order in
their respective divisions during this action; the former saying it "was
the finest close connected line I ever saw during my service at sea."
Howe, who held higher ideals, conceived through earnest and prolonged
study and reflection, was less well satisfied. It seems, however,
reasonable to infer that the assiduity of his efforts to promote
tactical precision had realized at least a partial measure of success.

Another long term of shore life now intervened, carrying the gallant
admiral over the change-fraught years of failing powers from fifty-six
to sixty-seven, at which age he was again called into service, in the
course of which he was to perform the most celebrated, but, it may
confidently be affirmed, not the most substantial, nor even the most
brilliant, action of his career. During much of this intermediate
period, between 1783 and 1788, Howe occupied the Cabinet position of
First Lord of the Admiralty, the civil head and administrator of the
Navy. Into the discharge of this office he carried the same qualities of
assiduous attention to duty, and of close devotion to details of
professional progress, which characterized him when afloat; but, while
far from devoid of importance, there is but little in this part of his
story that needs mention as distinctive. Perhaps the most interesting
incidents, seen in the light of afterwards, are that one of his earliest
appointments to a ship was given to Nelson; and that the cordiality of
his reception at the end of the cruise is said to have removed from the
hero an incipient but very strong disgust for the service. "You ask me,"
wrote the future admiral to his brother, "by what interest did I get a
ship? I answer, having served with credit was my recommendation to Lord
Howe. Anything in reason that I can ask, I am sure of obtaining from his
justice."

At the outbreak of the French Revolution, Howe stood conspicuously at
the head of the navy, distinguished at once for well-known professional
accomplishments and for tried capacity in chief command. His rivals in
renown among his contemporaries--Keppel, Barrington, and Rodney--had
gone to their rest. Jervis, Duncan, Nelson, Collingwood, and their
compeers, had yet to show what was in them as general officers. Lord
Hood alone remained; and he, although he had done deeds of great
promise, had come to the front too late in the previous war for his
reputation to rest upon sustained achievement as well as upon hopeful
indication. The great commands were given to these two: Hood, the
junior, going to the Mediterranean with twenty ships-of-the-line, Howe
taking the Channel Fleet of somewhat superior numbers.

The solid, deliberate, methodical qualities of the veteran admiral were
better adapted to the more purely defensive role, forced upon Great
Britain by the allied superiority in 1782, than to the continuous,
vigilant, aggressive action demanded by the new conditions with which he
now had to deal, when the great conflagration of the Revolution was to
be hemmed in and stamped out by the unyielding pressure and massive
blows of the British sea power. The days of regulated, routine
hostilities between rulers had passed away with the uprising of a
people; the time foretold, when nation should rise against nation, was
suddenly come with the crash of an ancient kingdom and of its social
order. An admirable organizer and indefatigable driller of ships, though
apparently a poor disciplinarian, Howe lacked the breadth of view, the
clear intuitions, the alacrity of mind, brought to bear upon the problem
by Jervis and Nelson, who, thus inspired, framed the sagacious plan to
which, more than to any other one cause, was due the exhaustion alike
of the Revolutionary fury and of Napoleon's imperial power. Keenly
interested in the material efficiency of his ships, as well as in the
precision with which they could perform necessary evolutions and
maintain prescribed formations, he sought to attain these ends by long
stays in port, varied by formal cruises devoted to secondary objects and
to fleet tactics. For these reasons also he steadfastly refused to
countenance the system of close-watching the enemy's ports, by the
presence before each of a British force adequate to check each movement
at its beginning.

Thus nursing ships and men, Howe flattered himself he should insure the
perfection of the instrument which should be his stay in the hour of
battle. Herein he ignored the fundamental truth, plainly perceived by
his successor, St. Vincent, that the effectiveness of a military
instrument consists more in the method of its use, and in the practised
skill of the human element that wields it, than in the material
perfection of the weapon itself. It may justly be urged on his behalf
that the preparation he sought should have been made, but was not, by
the Government in the long years of peace. This is true; but yet the
fact remains that he pursued his system by choice and conviction
repeatedly affirmed; that continuous instead of occasional cruising in
the proper positions would better have reached the ends of drill; and
that to the material well being of his ships he sacrificed those correct
military dispositions before the enemy's ports, instituted and
maintained by Hawke, and further developed and extended by Jervis, who
at the same time preserved the efficiency of the vessels by increased
energy and careful prevision of their wants. The brilliant victory of
the 1st of June has obscured the accompanying fact, that lamentable
failure characterized the general strategic use of the Channel Fleet
under Howe and his immediate successor.

Once in sight of the enemy, however, the old man regained the fire of
youth, and showed the attainments which long study and careful thought
had added to his natural talent for war, enabling him to introduce
distinct advances upon the tactical conceptions of his predecessors. The
battle of June 1, 1794, was brought about in the following manner.
Political anarchy and a bad season had combined to ruin the French
harvests in 1793, and actual famine threatened the land. To obviate
this, at least partially, the Government had bought in the United States
a large quantity of breadstuffs, which were expected to arrive in May or
June, borne by one hundred and eighty merchant vessels. To insure the
safety of this valuable convoy, the Brest Fleet was sent to meet it at a
designated point; five ships going first, and twenty-five following a
few days later. Robespierre's orders to the admiral, Villaret-Joyeuse,
were to avoid battle, if possible, but at all hazards to secure the
merchant fleet, or his head would answer for it.

About the same time, Howe, who had kept his vessels in port during the
winter, sailed from the Channel with thirty-two ships-of-the-line. These
he soon divided into two squadrons; one of which, numbering six, after
performing a specific service, was not ordered to rejoin the main body,
but to cruise in a different spot. These ships were sadly missed on the
day of battle, when they could have changed a brilliant into a crushing
victory. Howe himself went to seek the French, instead of taking a
position where they must pass; and after some running to and fro, in
which the British actually got to the westward of their foes, and might
well have missed them altogether, he was lucky enough, on the 28th of
May, some four hundred miles west of the island of Ushant, to find the
larger of their two detachments. This having been meanwhile joined by
one ship from the smaller, both opponents now numbered twenty-six heavy
vessels.

The French were to windward, a position which gives the power of
refusing or delaying decisive action. The average speed of any fleet,
however, must fall below the best of some of the force opposed to it;
and Howe, wishing to compel battle, sent out six of his fastest and
handiest ships. These were directed to concentrate their fire upon the
enemy's rear, which, from the point of view of naval tactics, was the
weakest part of a line-of-battle of sailing ships; because, to aid it,
vessels ahead must turn round and change their formation, performing a
regular evolution, whereas, if the van be assailed, the rear naturally
advances to its help. If this partial attack crippled one or more of the
French, the disabled ships would drift towards the British, where either
they would be captured, or their comrades would be obliged to come to
their rescue, hazarding the general engagement that Howe wanted. As it
happened, the French had in the rear an immense ship of one hundred and
ten guns, which beat off in detail the successive attacks of her smaller
antagonists; but in so doing she received so much injury that she left
the fleet after nightfall, passing the British unmolested, and went back
to Brest. One of her assailants, also, had to return to England; but, as
the relative force of the units thus clipped from the respective
opponents was as three to two, the general result was a distinct
material gain for Howe. It is to be scored to his credit as a tactician
that he let this single enemy go, rather than scatter his fleet and lose
ground in trying to take her. He had a more important object.

The next morning, May 29th, the French by poor seamanship had lost to
leeward, and were consequently somewhat nearer. Both fleets were heading
southeasterly, with the wind at south-southwest; both, consequently, on
the starboard tack. Howe saw that, by tacking in succession, his column
would so head that several of his vessels in passing could bring the
hostile rear under their guns, and that it was even possible that three
or four might be cut off, unless reinforced; to attempt which by the
enemy would involve also tactical possibilities favorable to the
British. The necessary movement was ordered; and the French admiral,
seeing things in the same light, was justly so alarmed for the result
that he turned his head ships, and after them his whole column in
succession, to run down to help the rear. Judicious, and indeed
necessary, as this was, it played right into Howe's hands, and was a
tribute to his tactical skill, by which it was compelled; for in doing
this the French necessarily gave up much of their distance to windward,
and so hastened the collision they wished to avoid. Although the attack
upon their rear was limited to a few desultory broadsides, the two
fleets were at last nearly within cannon shot, whereas the day before
they had been eight or ten miles apart. Both were now on the port tack,
running west in parallel lines.

Towards noon, Howe saw that the morning's opportunity of directing his
whole column upon the enemy's rear again offered, but with a far better
chance; that if his ships manoeuvred well half a dozen of the French
must be cut off, unless their admiral, to save them, repeated his
previous manoeuvre of running down to their assistance, which would
infallibly entail the general engagement sought by the British. The
signal to tack in succession was again made, and to pass through the
enemy's line; but here Howe's purpose was foiled, as Rodney's on April
17th, by the failure of his leading vessel. Her captain, like Carkett,
was of considerable seniority, having commanded a ship-of-the-line under
Howe at New York, in 1778. His conduct during this brief campaign was so
unfavorably noticed by his admiral that he asked a Court-Martial, which
dismissed him from his ship, though clearing him of cowardice. Upon the
present occasion he for some time delayed obedience; and, when he did go
about, wore instead of tacking, which lost ground and caused confusion
by going to leeward. The second ship acted well, and struck the French
column some distance from its rear, proving Howe right in judging that
the enemy's order could there be pierced. As this vessel was not closely
supported, she received such injuries from successive fires, that, when
she at last found an opening through which to pass, she was unable to
manoeuvre.

Seeing that the van was failing him, Howe, whose flag-ship, the _Queen
Charlotte_, was tenth from the head of his column, now took the lead
himself, tacked his own vessel, though her turn was not yet come, and,
accompanied by his next ahead and astern,--another striking instance of
the inspiring influence of a high example,--stood straight for the
hostile order. The three broke through astern of the sixth ship from the
French rear, and cut off two of the enemy, which were speedily
surrounded by others of the British. Villaret-Joyeuse then repeated his
former evolution, and nothing could have saved a general engagement
except the disorder into which the British had fallen, and Howe's
methodical abhorrence of attacks made in such confusion as prevailed.
Moreover, the decisive result of this last brush was that the French
entirely lost the windward position, and the British admiral knew that
he now had them where they could not escape; he could afford to postpone
the issue. Accordingly, fighting ceased for the day; but the French had
been so mauled that three more ships had to go into port, leaving them
but twenty-two to the enemy's twenty-five.

To appreciate Howe's personal merit as a tactician, reflection should be
bestowed upon the particulars of his conduct on these two days, with
which the First of June is not to be compared; for in them culminated,
so to speak, a long course of preparation in the study of tactical
possibilities, and of the system of signals needed to insure necessary
evolutions. His officers, as a body, do not appear to have deserved by
their manoeuvring the encomium passed by Rodney upon his, during the
long chase to windward in May, 1780; and, as Howe had now held command
for a year, this failure may probably be assigned to lack of that
punctilious severity to which Rodney attributed his own success. But in
the matter of personal acquirement Howe shows a distinct advance upon
Rodney's ideas and methods. There is not to be noted in Rodney's actions
any foreshadowing of the judicious attack upon the enemy's rear, on May
28th, by a smart flying squadron. This doubtless presents some analogy
to a general chase, but there is in it more of system and of regulated
action; in short, there is development. Again, although Rodney doubtless
tacked in succession repeatedly, between May 9th and May 20th, in his
efforts to reach the enemy to windward, there does not then appear, nor
did there appear on either of the two occasions when he succeeded in
striking their column from to leeward, any intention, such as Howe on
the 29th communicated by signal and enforced by action, of breaking
through the enemy's line even at the cost of breaking his own. Not even
on April 12th had Rodney, as far as appears, any such formulated plan.
There is here, therefore, distinct progress, in the nature of reflective
and reasoned development; for it is scarcely to be supposed that Howe's
assiduity and close contact with the navy had failed to note, for future
application, the incidents of Rodney's battles, which had been the
subject of animated discussion and censure by eye-witnesses.

It will be recognized that the conception in Howe's mind, maintained
unchangeably and carried consistently into effect during these two days,
was to attack continually, as opportunity offered, the rear end of the
enemy's column, which corresponds precisely with the attack upon the
flank of a line of battle on shore. Merit does not depend upon result,
but fortunate result should be noted for the encouragement and guidance
of the future. In consequence of these sustained and judiciously
directed movements, and of the steps found necessary by the French
admiral because of injuries received, the enemy had lost from their line
four ships, of which one was of one hundred and twenty guns, another of
eighty; while of those retained one had lost all her spars save the
lower masts, and had thenceforth to be towed in action. Against this was
to be set only one British seventy-four, disabled on the 28th and
returned to port; their other damaged vessels refitted at sea and stayed
with the fleet. On the other hand, Howe's separated division of six
remained separated, whereas four fresh French ships joined their main
fleet on the 30th. Admirable tactics were thus neutralized by defective
strategy; and therefore it may with substantial accuracy be said that
Howe's professional qualities and defects were both signally illustrated
in this, his last conspicuous service.

The French admiral on the evening of the 29th saw that he now must
fight, and at a disadvantage; consequently, he could not hope to protect
the convoy. As to save this was his prime object, the next best thing
was to entice the British out of its path. With this view he stood away
to the northwest; while a dense fog coming on both favored his design
and prevented further encounter during the two ensuing days, throughout
which Howe continued to pursue. In the evening of May 31st the weather
cleared, and at daybreak the next morning the enemies were in position,
ready for battle, two long columns of ships, heading west, the British
twenty-five, the French again twenty-six through the junction of the
four vessels mentioned. Howe now had cause to regret his absent six, and
to ponder Nelson's wise saying, "Only numbers can annihilate."

The time for manoeuvring was past. Able tactician as he personally was,
and admirable as had been the direction of his efforts in the two days'
fighting, Howe had been forced in them to realize two things, namely,
that his captains were, singly, superior in seamanship, and their crews
in gunnery, to the French; and again, that in the ability to work
together as a fleet the British were so deficient as to promise very
imperfect results, if he attempted any but the simplest formation. To
such, therefore, he resorted; falling back upon the old, unskilful,
sledge-hammer fashion of the British navy. Arranging his ships in one
long line, three miles from the enemy, he made them all go down
together, each to attack a specified opponent, coming into action as
nearly as might be at the same instant. Thus the French, from the
individual inferiority of the units of their fleet, would be at all
points overpowered. The issue justified the forecast; but the manner of
performance was curiously and happily marked by Howe's own peculiar
phlegm. There was a long summer day ahead for fighting, and no need for
hurry. The order was first accurately formed, and canvas reduced to
proper proportions. Then the crews went to breakfast. After breakfast,
the ships all headed for the hostile line, under short sail, the admiral
keeping them in hand during the approach, as an infantry officer dresses
his company. Hence the shock from end to end was so nearly simultaneous
as to induce success unequalled in any engagement conducted on the same
primitive plan.

Picturesque as well as sublime, animating as well as solemn, on that
bright Sunday morning, was this prelude to the stern game of war about
to be played: the quiet summer sea stirred only by a breeze sufficient
to cap with white the little waves that ruffled its surface; the dark
hulls gently rippling the water aside in their slow advance, a ridge of
foam curling on either side of the furrow ploughed by them in their
onward way; their massive sides broken by two, or at times three, rows
of ports, whence, the tompions drawn, yawned the sullen lines of guns,
behind which, unseen, but easily realized by the instructed eye,
clustered the groups of ready seamen who served each piece. Aloft swung
leisurely to and fro the tall spars, which ordinarily, in so light a
wind, would be clad in canvas from deck to truck, but whose naked
trimness now proclaimed the deadly purpose of that still approach. Upon
the high poops, where floated the standard of either nation, gathered
round each chief the little knot of officers through whom commands were
issued and reports received, the nerves along which thrilled the
impulses of the great organism, from its head, the admiral, through
every member to the dark lowest decks, nearly awash, where, as farthest
from the captain's own oversight, the senior lieutenants controlled the
action of the ships' heaviest batteries.

On board the _Queen Charlotte_, Lord Howe, whose burden of sixty-eight
years had for four days found no rest save what he could snatch in an
arm-chair, now, at the prospect of battle, "displayed an animation,"
writes an eye-witness, "of which, at his age, and after such fatigue of
body and mind, I had not thought him capable. He seemed to contemplate
the result as one of unbounded satisfaction." By his side stood his
fleet-captain, Curtis, of whose service among the floating batteries,
and during the siege of Gibraltar, the governor of the fortress had
said, "He is the man to whom the king is chiefly indebted for its
security;" and Codrington, then a lieutenant, who afterwards commanded
the allied fleets at Navarino. Five ships to the left, Collingwood, in
the _Barfleur_, was making to the admiral whose flag she bore the remark
that stirred Thackeray: "Our wives are now about going to church, but
we will ring about these Frenchmen's ears a peal which will drown their
bells." The French officers, both admirals and captains, were mainly
unknown men, alike then and thereafter. The fierce flames of the
Revolution had swept away the men of the old school, mostly aristocrats,
and time had not yet brought forward the very few who during the
Napoleonic period showed marked capacity. The commander-in-chief,
Villaret-Joyeuse, had three years before been a lieutenant. He had a
high record for gallantry, but was without antecedents as a general
officer. With him, on the poop of the _Montagne_, which took her name
from Robespierre's political supporters, stood that anomalous companion
of the generals and admirals of the day, the Revolutionary commissioner,
Jean Bon Saint-Andre, about to learn by experience the practical working
of the system he had advocated, to disregard all tests of ability save
patriotism and courage, depreciating practice and skill as unnecessary
to the valor of the true Frenchman.

As the British line drew near the French, Howe said to Curtis, "Prepare
the signal for close action." "There is no such signal," replied Curtis.
"No," said the admiral, "but there is one for closer action, and I only
want that to be made in case of captains not doing their duty." Then
closing a little signal book he always carried, he continued to those
around him, "Now, gentlemen, no more book, no more signals. I look to
you to do the duty of the _Queen Charlotte_ in engaging the flag-ship. I
don't want the ships to be bilge to bilge, but if you can lock the
yardarms, so much the better; the battle will be the quicker decided."
His purpose was to go through the French line, and fight the _Montagne_
on the far side. Some doubted their succeeding, but Howe overbore them.
"That's right, my lord!" cried Bowen, the sailing-master, who looked to
the ship's steering. "The _Charlotte_ will make room for herself." She
pushed close under the French ship's stern, grazing her ensign, and
raking her from stern to stem with a withering fire, beneath which fell
three hundred men. A length or two beyond lay the French _Jacobin_. Howe
ordered the _Charlotte_ to luff, and place herself between the two. "If
we do," said Bowen, "we shall be on board one of them." "What is that to
you, sir?" asked Howe quickly. "Oh!" muttered the master, not inaudibly.
"D----n my eyes if I care, if you don't. I'll go near enough to singe
some of our whiskers." And then, seeing by the _Jacobins_ rudder that
she was going off, he brought the _Charlotte_ sharp round, her jib boom
grazing the second Frenchman as her side had grazed the flag of the
first.

From this moment the battle raged furiously from end to end of the field
for nearly an hour,--a wild scene of smoke and confusion, under cover of
which many a fierce ship duel was fought, while here and there men
wandered, lost, in a maze of bewilderment that neutralized their better
judgment. An English naval captain tells a service tradition of one who
was so busy watching the compass, to keep his position in the ranks,
that he lost sight of his antagonist, and never again found him. Many a
quaint incident passed, recorded or unrecorded, under that sulphurous
canopy. A British ship, wholly dismasted, lay between two enemies, her
captain desperately wounded. A murmur of surrender was somewhere heard;
but as the first lieutenant checked it with firm authority, a cock flew
upon the stump of a mast and crowed lustily. The exultant note found
quick response in hearts not given to despair, and a burst of merriment,
accompanied with three cheers, replied to the bird's triumphant scream.
On board the _Brunswick_, in her struggle with the _Vengeur_, one of the
longest and fiercest fights the sea has ever seen, the cocked hat was
shot off the effigy of the Duke of Brunswick, which she bore as a
figure-head. A deputation from the crew gravely requested the captain to
allow the use of his spare chapeau, which was securely nailed on, and
protected his grace's wig during the rest of the action. After this
battle with the ships of the new republic, the partisans of monarchy
noted with satisfaction that, among the many royal figures that
surmounted the stems of the British fleet, not one lost his crown. Of a
harum-scarum Irish captain are told two droll stories. After being
hotly engaged for some time with a French ship, the fire of the latter
slackened, and then ceased. He called to know if she had surrendered.
The reply was, "No." "Then," shouted he, "d----n you, why don't you
fire?" Having disposed of his special antagonist without losing his own
spars, the same man kept along in search of new adventures, until he
came to a British ship totally dismasted and otherwise badly damaged.
She was commanded by a captain of rigidly devout piety. "Well, Jemmy,"
hailed the Irishman, "you are pretty well mauled; but never mind, Jemmy,
whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth."

The French have transmitted to us less of anecdote, nor is it easy to
connect the thought of humor with those grimly earnest republicans and
the days of the Terror. There is, indeed, something unintentionally
funny in the remark of the commander of one of the captured ships to his
captors. They had, it was true, dismasted half the French fleet, and had
taken over a fourth; yet he assured them it could not be considered a
victory, "but merely a butchery, in which the British had shown neither
science nor tactics." The one story, noble and enduring, that will ever
be associated with the French on the 1st of June is in full keeping with
the temper of the times and the enthusiasm of the nation. The
seventy-four-gun ship _Vengeur_, after a three hours' fight, yardarm to
yardarm, with the British _Brunswick_, was left in a sinking state by
her antagonist, who was herself in no condition to help. In the
confusion, the _Vengeur's_ peril was for some time not observed; and
when it was, the British ships that came to her aid had time only to
remove part of her survivors. In their report of the event the latter
said: "Scarcely had the boats pulled clear of the sides, when the most
frightful spectacle was offered to our gaze. Those of our comrades who
remained on board the _Vengeur du Peuple_, with hands raised to heaven,
implored, with lamentable cries, the help for which they could no longer
hope. Soon disappeared the ship and the unhappy victims it contained. In
the midst of the horror with which this scene inspired us all, we could
not avoid a feeling of admiration mingled with our grief. As we drew
away, we heard some of our comrades still offering prayers for the
welfare of their country. The last cries of these unfortunates were,
'Vive la Republique!' They died uttering them." Over a hundred Frenchmen
thus went down.

Seven French ships were captured, including the sunk _Vengeur_. Five
more were wholly dismasted, but escaped,--a good fortune mainly to be
attributed to Howe's utter physical prostration, due to his advanced
years and the continuous strain of the past five days. He now went to
bed, completely worn out. "We all got round him," wrote an officer,
Lieutenant Codrington, who was present; "indeed, I saved him from a
tumble, he was so weak that from a roll of the ship he was nearly
falling into the waist. 'Why, you hold me up as if I were a child,' he
said good-humoredly." Had he been younger, there can be little doubt
that the fruits of victory would have been gathered with an ardor which
his assistant, Curtis, failed to show. The fullest proof of this is the
anecdote, already quoted in the sketch of Rodney,[13] which has been
transmitted by Admiral Sir Byam Martin direct from the sailing-master of
the _Queen Charlotte_, afterwards Admiral Bowen; but his account is
abundantly confirmed by other officers, eye and ear witnesses. Taken in
connection with these, Codrington's story of his physical weakness bears
the note, not of pathos only, but of encouragement; for the whole
testifies assuredly to the persistence, through great bodily debility,
of a strong quality diligently cultivated in the days of health and
vigor. In truth, it was impossible for Howe to purpose otherwise. Having
been continuously what he was in his prime, it could not be that he
would not intend, with all the force of his will, to persevere to the
utmost in the duty before him. The faithfulness of a lifetime does not
so forsake a man in his end. What he lacked in that critical hour was
not the willing mind, but the instrument by which to communicate to the
fleet the impulse which his own failing powers were no longer able
directly to impart.

Lord Howe's career practically ended with this battle and the honors
that followed it. Infirmities then gained rapidly upon him, and it would
have been well had his own wish to retire been granted by the
Government. He remained in nominal command of the Channel Fleet, though
not going to sea, until the occurrence of the great mutinies of 1797.
The suppression--or, more properly, the composing--of this ominous
outbreak was devolved upon him by the ministry. He very wisely observed
that "preventive measures rather than corrective are to be preferred for
preserving discipline in fleets and armies;" but it was in truth his own
failure to use such timely remedies, owing to the lethargy of increasing
years, acting upon a temperament naturally indulgent and unapprehensive,
that was largely responsible for disorders of whose imminence he had
warning. From the military standpoint, the process of settlement had
much the air of opera bouffe,--a consummation probably inevitable when
just grievances and undeniable hardships get no attention until the
sufferers break through all rules, and seek redress by force. The
mutinous seamen protested to Howe the bitterness of their sorrow at the
sense of wrong doing, but in the same breath insisted that their demands
must be conceded, and that certain obnoxious officers must be removed
from their ships. The demands were yielded, Howe gently explaining to
the men how naughty they had been; and that, as to the unpopular
officers, they themselves asked relief from so unpleasant a situation.
In his curiously involved style, he wrote: "This request has been
complied with, under the pretext of an equal desire on the part of the
officers not to be employed in ships where exception, without
specification of facts, has been taken to their conduct. However
ineligible the concession, it was become indispensably necessary." Under
this thin veil, men persuaded themselves that appearances were saved, as
a woman hides a smile behind her fan. Admiral Codrington, a firm admirer
of Howe, justly said: "It was want of discipline which led to the
discontent and mutiny in the Channel Fleet. Lord Howe got rid of the
mutiny by granting the men all they asked; but discipline was not
restored until the ships most remarkable for misconduct had been, one
after the other, placed under the command of Lord St. Vincent."

With the settlement of this mutiny Lord Howe's long career of active
service closed. Immediately afterwards he retired formally, as he
sometime before had actually, from the command of the Channel Fleet, and
on the 5th of August, 1799, he died full of years and honors; having
lived just long enough to welcome the rising star of Nelson's glory as
it burst upon men's sight at Cape St. Vincent and the Nile.

FOOTNOTES:

[12] Parkman's "Montcalm and Wolfe," vol. ii. p. 90.

[13] _Ante_, p. 250.




JERVIS

1735-1823


The renown of Nelson is part of the heritage of the world. His deeds,
although their full scope and real significance have been but little
understood, stand out conspicuous among a host of lesser achievements,
and are become to mankind the symbol of Great Britain's maritime power
in that tremendous era when it drove the French Revolution back upon
itself, stifling its excesses, and so insuring the survival of the
beneficent tendencies which for a time seemed well nigh lost in the
madness of the nation.

The appearance of a prodigy like Nelson, however, is not an isolated
event, independent of antecedents. It is the result of a happy meeting
of genius and opportunity. The hour has come, and the man. Other men
have labored, and the hero enters into their labors; not unjustly, for
thereto he also has been appointed by those special gifts which fit him
to reap as theirs fitted them to sow. In relation to Nelson and his
career, the illustrious officer whose most distinguishing
characteristics we have now to trace stood pre-eminent among many
forerunners. It was he, above all others, who made the preparation
indispensable to the approaching triumphal progress of the first of
British naval heroes, so that his own work underlies that of his
successor, as foundation supports superstructure. There is not between
them the vital connection of root to branch, of plant to fruit. In the
matter of professional kinship Nelson has far more in common with Hood.
Between these there is an identity of kind, an orderly sequence of
development, an organic bond, such as knits together the series of a
progressive evolution. It is not so with Jervis. Closely conjoined as
the two men long were in a common service, and in mutual admiration and
sympathy, it would be an error to think of the elder as in any sense the
professional progenitor of the younger; yet he was, as it were, an
adoptive father, who from the first fostered, and to the last gloried
in, the genius which he confessed unparalleled. "It does not become me
to make comparisons," he wrote after Copenhagen; "all agree that there
is but one Nelson." And when the great admiral had been ten years in his
grave, he said of an officer's gallant conduct at the Battle of Algiers,
"He seems to have felt Lord Nelson's eye upon him;" as though no
stronger motive could be felt nor higher praise given.

John Jervis was born on the 20th of January, 1735, at Meaford, in
Staffordshire. He was intended for his father's profession, the law;
but, by his own account, a disinclination which was probably natural
became invincible through the advice of the family coachman. "Don't be a
lawyer, Master Jacky," said the old man; "all lawyers are rogues."
Sometime later, his father receiving the appointment of auditor to
Greenwich Hospital, the family removed to the neighborhood of London;
and there young Jervis, being thrown in contact with ships and seamen,
and particularly with a midshipman of his own age, became confirmed in
his wish to go to sea. Failing to get his parents' consent, he ran away
towards the close of the year 1747. From this escapade he was brought
back; but his father, seeing the uselessness of forcing the lad's
inclinations, finally acquiesced, though it seems likely, from his after
conduct, that it was long before he became thoroughly reconciled to the
disappointment.

In January, 1748, the future admiral and peer first went afloat in a
ship bound to the West Indies. The time was inauspicious for one making
the navy his profession. The war of the Austrian succession had just
been brought to an end by the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, and the
monotonous discomfort of hard cruising, unrelieved by the excitements of
battle or the flush of prize-taking, was the sole prospect of one whose
narrow means debarred him from such pleasures as the station afforded
and youth naturally prompted him to seek. His pay was little over twenty
pounds a year, and his father had not felt able to give more than that
sum towards his original outfit. After being three years on board,
practising a rigid economy scarcely to be expected in one of his years,
the lad of sixteen drew a bill upon home for twenty pounds more. It came
back dishonored. The latent force of his character was at once aroused.
To discharge the debt, he disposed of his pay tickets at a heavy
discount; sold his bed, and for three years slept on the deck; left the
mess to which he belonged, living forward on the allowance of a seaman,
and making, mending, and washing his own clothes, to save expense. Doubt
has been expressed as to the reality of these early privations, on the
ground that his father's office at Greenwich, and the subsequent
promotions of the young officer, show the existence of a family
influence, which would have counteracted such extreme restriction in
money matters. The particulars, however, have been so transmitted as to
entitle them to acceptance, unless contradicted by something more
positive than circumstantial inference from other conditions, not
necessarily contradictory.

This sharp experience was singularly adapted to develop and exaggerate
his natural characteristics, self-reliance, self-control, stern
determination, and, it must be added, the exacting harshness which
demanded of others all that he had himself accepted. His experience of
suffering and deprivation served, not to enlarge his indulgence, but to
intensify his severity. Yet it may be remarked that Jervis was at all
periods in thorough touch with distinctively naval feeling, sympathizing
with and respecting its sensibilities, sharing its prejudices, as well
as comprehending its weaknesses. Herein he differed from Rodney, who in
the matter of community of sentiment stood habitually external to his
profession; in it, but in heart not of it; belonging consciously and
willingly to a social class which cherished other ideals of life and
action. His familiarity with the service quickened him to criticise more
keenly and accurately than a stranger, to recognize failings with
harsher condemnation; but there appears no disposition to identify
himself with it further than as an instrument of personal advancement
and distinction.

Upon Jervis's naval future, the results of his early ordeal were wholly
good. Unable to pursue pleasure ashore, he stuck to sea-going ships; and
the energies of a singularly resolute mind were devoted to mastering all
the details of his profession. After six years in the Caribbean, he
returned to England in the autumn of 1754. The troubles between France
and Great Britain which issued in the Seven Years War had already begun,
and Jervis, whose merit commanded immediate recognition from those under
whom he served, found family influence to insure his speedy promotion
and employment. Being made lieutenant early in 1755, he was with
Boscawen off the Gulf of St. Lawrence when that admiral, although peace
yet reigned, was ordered to seize the French fleet bearing
reinforcements to Quebec. At the same time, Braddock's unfortunate
expedition was miscarrying in the forests of Pittsburg. A year later, in
1756, Jervis went to the Mediterranean with Admiral Hawke, sent to
relieve Byng after the fiasco at Minorca which brought that unhappy
commander to trial and to death.

Before and during this Mediterranean cruise Jervis had been closely
associated with Sir Charles Saunders, one of the most distinguished
admirals of that generation, upon whom he made so favorable an
impression that he was chosen for first lieutenant of the flag-ship,
when Saunders, in 1758, was named to command the fleet to act against
Quebec. The gallant and romantic General Wolfe, whose death in the hour
of victory saddened the triumph of the conquerors, embarked in the same
ship; and the long passage favored the growth of a close personal
intimacy between the two young men, who had been at school together as
boys, although the soldier was several years older than the sailor. The
relations thus formed and the confidences exchanged are shown by a
touching incident recorded by Jervis's biographer. On the night before
the battle on the Heights of Abraham, Wolfe went on board the
_Porcupine_, a small sloop of war to whose command Jervis had meanwhile
been promoted, and asked to see him in private. He then said that he was
strongly impressed with the feeling that he should fall on the morrow,
and therefore wished to entrust to his friend the miniature of the lady,
Miss Lowther, to whom he was engaged, and to have from him the promise
that, if the foreboding proved true, he would in person deliver to her
both the portrait and Wolfe's own last messages. From the interview the
young general departed to achieve his enterprise, to which daring
action, brilliant success, and heroic death have given a lustre that
time itself has not been able to dim, whose laurels remain green to our
own day; while Jervis, to whose old age was reserved the glory that his
comrade reaped in youth, remained behind to discharge his last
request,--a painful duty which, upon returning to England, was
scrupulously fulfilled.

Although the operations against Quebec depended wholly upon the control
of the water by the navy, its influence, as often happens, was so
quietly exerted as to draw no attention from the general eye, dazzled by
the conspicuous splendor of Wolfe's conduct. To Jervis had been assigned
the distinguished honor of leading the fleet with his little ship, in
the advance up river against the fortifications of the place; and it is
interesting to note that in this duty he was joined with the afterwards
celebrated explorer, James Cook, who, as master of the fleet, had
special charge of the pilotage in those untried waters. Wolfe, Cook, and
Jervis form a striking trio of names, then unknown, yet closely
associated, afterwards to be widely though diversely renowned.

When the city fell, Commander Jervis was sent to England, probably with
despatches. There he was at once given a ship, and ordered to return
with her to North America. Upon her proving leaky, he put in to
Plymouth, where, as his mission was urgent, he was directed to take
charge of a sloop named the _Albany_, then lying at anchor near by, and
to proceed in her. To this moment has been attributed an incident which,
as regards time and place, has been more successfully impeached than the
story of his early privations, in that no mention of it is found in the
ship's log; and there are other discrepancies which need reconcilement.
Nevertheless it is, as told, so entirely characteristic, that the
present writer has no doubt it occurred, at some time, substantially as
given by his biographer, who was son to a secretary long in close
relations with him when admiral. It would be entirely in keeping with
all experience of testimony that the old man's recollections, or those
of his secretary, may have gone astray on minor circumstances, while
preserving accurately the fundamental and only really important facts,
which are perfectly consistent with, and illustrative of, the stern
decision afterwards shown in meeting and suppressing mutiny of the most
threatening description. The crew of the _Albany_, it is said, from some
motives of discontent refused to sail. Jervis had brought with him a few
seamen from his late command. These he ordered to cut the cables which
held the ship to her anchors, and to loose the foresail. Daunted more,
perhaps, by the bearing of the man than by the mere acts, the mutineers
submitted, and in twenty-four days, an extraordinarily short passage for
that time, the _Albany_ was at New York. Here Jervis was unfortunately
delayed, and thus, being prevented from rejoining Sir Charles Saunders,
lost the promotion which a British commander-in-chief could then give to
an officer in his own command who had merited his professional approval.
It was not until October, 1761, when he was twenty-six, that Jervis
obtained "post" rank,--the rank, that is, of full, or post, captain. By
the rule of the British navy, an officer up to that rank could be
advanced by selection; thenceforth he waited, through the long
succession of seniority, for his admiral's commission. This Jervis did
not receive until 1787, when he was fifty-two.

It was as a general officer, as an admiral commanding great fleets and
bearing responsibilities unusually grave through a most critical period
of his country's history, that Jervis made his high and deserved
reputation. For this reason, the intervening years, though pregnant with
the finished character and distinguished capacity which fitted him for
his onerous work, and though by no means devoid of incident, must be
hastily sketched. The Treaty of Paris, which in 1763 closed the Seven
Years War, was followed by twelve years of peace. Then came the American
Revolution, bringing in its train hostilities with France and Spain.
During the peace, Jervis for nearly four years commanded a frigate in
the Mediterranean. It is told that while his ship was at Genoa two
Turkish slaves escaped from a Genoese galley, and took refuge in a
British boat lying at the mole, wrapping its flag round their persons.
Genoese officers took them forcibly from the boat and restored them to
their chains. Jervis resented this, as being not only an insult to the
British flag, but also an enforcement of slavery against men under its
protection; and so peremptory was his tone that an apology was made, the
two captives were given up on the frigate's quarter-deck, and the
offending officers punished. The captain's action, however, was not
sustained by his own government. It is curious to note that,
notwithstanding his course in this case, and although he was not merely
nominally, but strenuously, a Whig, or Liberal, in political faith,
connected by party ties with Fox and his coterie of friends, Jervis was
always opposed to the abolition of the slave trade and to the education
of the lower orders. Liberty was to him an inherited worship, associated
with certain stock beliefs and phrases, but subordination was the true
idol of his soul.

In 1775 Captain Jervis commissioned the _Foudroyant_, of eighty-four
guns, a ship captured in 1758 from the French, and thereafter thought to
be the finest vessel in the British fleet. To this, her natural
superiority, Jervis added a degree of order, discipline, and drill which
made her the pride and admiration of the navy. He was forty when his
pennant first flew from her masthead, and he held the command for eight
years, a period covering the full prime of his own maturity, as well as
the entire course of the American Revolution. It was also a period
marked for him, professionally, less by distinguished service than by
that perfection of military organization, that combination of dignified
yet not empty pomp with thorough and constant readiness, which was so
eminently characteristic of all the phases of Jervis's career, and
which, when the rare moments came, was promptly transformed into
unhesitating, decisive, and efficient action. The _Foudroyant_, in her
state and discipline, was the type in miniature of Jervis's
Mediterranean fleet, declared by Nelson to be the finest body of ships
he had ever known; nay, she was the precursor of that regenerate British
navy in which Nelson found the instruments of his triumphs. Sixty years
later, old officers recalled the feelings of mingled curiosity and awe
with which, when sent to her on duty from their own ships, they climbed
on board the _Foudroyant_, and from the larboard side of her
quarter-deck gazed upon the stern captain, whose qualities were
embodied in his vessel and constituted her chief excellences.

During Jervis's command, the _Foudroyant_ was continuously attached to
the Channel Fleet, whose duty, as the name implies, was to protect the
English Channel and its approaches; a function which often carried the
ships far into the Bay of Biscay. Thus he took a prominent part in
Keppel's battle off Ushant in 1778, in the movements occasioned by the
entrance into the Channel of an overpowering Franco-Spanish fleet in
1779 and 1781, and in the brilliant relief of Gibraltar by Admiral Howe
towards the end of 1782. His most distinguished service, however, was
taking, single-handed, the French seventy-four _Pegase_, in the spring
of the latter year. The capture was effected after an action of fifty
minutes, preceded by a chase of twelve hours, running before a half-gale
of wind. The _Foudroyant_ was unquestionably superior in battery to her
enemy, who, moreover, had but recently been commissioned; but, as has
justly been remarked of some of the victories of our own ships over
those of the British in the War of 1812, although there was disparity of
forces, the precision and rapidity with which the work was done bore
incontrovertible testimony to the skill and training of the captain and
crew. Single combats, such as this, were rare between vessels of the
size of the _Foudroyant_ and _Pegase_, built to sail and fight in
fleets. That one occurred here was due to the fact that the speed of
the two opponents left the British squadron far astern. The exploit
obtained for Jervis a baronetcy and the ribbon of the Order of the Bath.

Sir John Jervis did not serve afloat during the ten years of peace
following 1783, although, from his high repute, he was one of those
summoned upon each of the alarms of war that from time to time arose.
Throughout this period he sat in Parliament, voting steadily with his
party, the Whigs, and supporting Fox in his opposition to measures which
seemed to tend towards hostilities with France. When war came, however,
he left his seat, ready to aid his country with his sword in the quarrel
from which he had sought to keep her.

Having in the mean time risen from the rank of captain to that of
rear-and of vice-admiral, Jervis's first service, in 1794, was in the
Caribbean Sea, as commander of the naval part of a joint expedition of
army and navy to subdue the French West India islands. The operation,
although most important and full of exciting and picturesque incident,
bears but a small share in his career, and therefore may not be dwelt
upon in so short a sketch as the present aims to be. Attended at first
by marked and general success, it ended with some severe reverses,
occasioned by the force given him being less than he demanded, and than
the extent of the work to be done required. A quaintly characteristic
story is told of the admiral's treatment of a lieutenant who at this
period sought employment on board his ship. Knowing that he stood high
in the old seaman's favor, the applicant confidently expected his
appointment, but, upon opening the "letter on service," was stunned to
read:--


     SIR,--You, having thought fit to take to yourself a
     wife, are to look for no further attentions from

     Your humble servant,
     J. JERVIS.


The supposed culprit, guiltless even in thought of this novel
misdemeanor, hastened on board, and explained that he abhorred such an
offence as much as could the admiral. It then appeared that the letter
had been sent to the wrong person. Jervis was himself married at this
time; but his well-regulated affections had run steadily in harness
until the mature age of forty-eight, and he saw no reason why other men
should depart from so sound a precedent. "When an officer marries," he
tersely said, "he is d----d for the service."

Returning to England in February, 1795, Jervis was in August nominated
to command the Mediterranean station, and in November sailed to take up
his new duties. At the end of the month, in San Fiorenzo Bay, an
anchorage in the north of Corsica, he joined the fleet, which continued
under his flag until June, 1799. He had now reached the highest rank in
his profession, though not the highest grade of that rank as it was
then subdivided; being a full Admiral of the Blue. The crowning period
of his career here began. Admirable and striking as had been his
previous services, dignified and weighty as were the responsibilities
borne by him in the later part of a life prolonged far beyond the span
of man, the four years of Jervis's Mediterranean command stand
conspicuous as the time when preparation flowered into achievement,
solid, durable, and brilliant. It may be interesting to Americans to
recall that his age was nearly the same as that of Farragut when the
latter assumed the charge in which, after long years of obscure
preparation, he also reaped his harvest of glory. It is likewise worthy
of note that this happy selection was made wholly independent of the
political bias, which till then had so often and unworthily controlled
naval appointments. Jervis belonged to the small remnant of Whigs who
still followed Fox and inveighed against the current war, as unnecessary
and impolitic. It was a pure service choice, as such creditable alike to
the Government and the officer.

Though distinguished success now awaited him, a period of patient
effort, endurance, and disappointment had first to be passed,
reproducing in miniature the longer years of faithful service preceding
his professional triumphs. Jervis came to the Mediterranean too late for
the best interests of England. The year 1795, just ending, was one in
which the energies of France, after the fierce rush of the Terror, had
flagged almost to collapse. Not only so, but in its course the republic,
discouraged by frequent failure, had decided to abandon the control of
the sea to its enemy, to keep its great fleets in port, and to confine
its efforts to the harassment of British commerce. To this change of
policy in France is chiefly to be ascribed the failure of naval
achievement with which Macaulay has reproached Pitt's earlier ministry.
Battles cannot be fought if the foe keeps behind his walls. Prior to
this decision, two fleet battles had been fought in the Mediterranean in
the spring and summer of 1795, in which the British had missed great
successes only through the sluggishness of their admiral. "To say how
much we wanted Lord Hood" (the last commander-in-chief), wrote Nelson,
"is to ask, 'Will you have all the French fleet or no battle?'" Could he
have foreseen all that Jervis was to be to the Mediterranean, his
distress must have been doubled to know that the fortunes of the nation
thus fell between two stools.

His predecessor's slackness in pushing military opportunities, due
partly to ill health, was mainly constitutional, and therefore could not
but show itself by tangible evidences in the more purely administrative
and disciplinary work. Jervis found himself at once under the necessity
of bringing his fleet--in equipment, in discipline, and in
drill--sharply up to that level of efficiency which is essential to the
full development of power when occasion offers. This his perfect
achievement, of organization and administration, in its many intricate
details, needs at least to be clearly noted, even though space do not
admit many particulars; because his capacity as administrator at the
head of the Admiralty a few years later has been seriously impugned, by
a criticism both partial and excessive, if not wholly unjust. Nelson, a
witness of his Mediterranean service from beginning to end, lauded to
the utmost the excellence there reached, and attributed most of the
short-coming noted in the later office to the yielding of a man then
advanced in years, to advisers, in trusting whom fully he might well
believe himself warranted by experience.

Although, when taking command, his fleet reached the seemingly large
proportions of twenty-five ships-of-the-line and some fifty cruisers,
heavy allowance must be made for the variety of services extending over
the two thousand miles of the Mediterranean, from east to west. Seven
of-the-line had to be kept before Cadiz, though still a neutral port, to
check a French division within. One of the same class was on the Riviera
with Nelson; and other demands, with the necessities of occasional
absences for refit, prevented the admiral from ever assembling before
Toulon, his great strategic care, much more than a round dozen to watch
equal French numbers there. The protection of Corsica, then in British
hands; the convoy of commerce, dispersed throughout the station; the
assurance of communications to the fortress and Straits of Gibraltar, by
which all transit to and from the Mediterranean passes; diplomatic
exigencies with the various littoral states of the inland sea; these
divergent calls, with the coincident necessity of maintaining every ship
in fit condition for action, show the extent of the administrative work
and of the attendant correspondence. The evidence of many eye-witnesses
attests the successful results.

Similar attention, broad yet minute, was demanded for the more onerous
and invidious task of enforcing relaxed discipline and drill. Concerning
these, the most pregnant testimony, alike to the stringency and the
persistence of his measures, may be found in the imbittered expressions
of enemies. Five years later, when the rumor spread that he was to have
the Channel Fleet, the toast was drunk at the table of the man then in
command, "May the discipline of the Mediterranean never be introduced
into the Channel." "May his next glass of wine choke the wretch," is a
speech attributed to a captain's wife, wrathful that her husband was
kept from her side by the admiral's regulations. For Jervis's discipline
began at the top, with the division and ship commanders. One of the
senior admirals under him persisting in a remonstrance, beyond the point
which he considered consistent with discipline, was sent home. "The very
disorderly state of His Majesty's ship under your command," he writes to
a captain, "obliges me to require that neither yourself nor any of your
officers are to go on shore on what is called pleasure." "The
commander-in-chief finds himself under the painful necessity of publicly
reprimanding Captains ---- and ---- for neglect of duty, in not
maintaining the stations assigned to their ships during the last night."
In a letter to a lieutenant he says, "If you do not immediately make a
suitable apology to Commissioner Inglefield for the abominable neglect
and disrespect you have treated him with, I will represent your
behaviour to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and recommend
your name to be struck off the list of lieutenants." Captains of vessels
were not only subject to strict regulation as to their personal
proceedings, compelled to sleep on board, for instance, even in home
ports; but duties customarily left to subordinates, with results to
discipline that might not now obtain but which were in those days
deplorable, were also assigned to them.

"The commander-in-chief has too exalted an opinion of the respective
captains of the squadron to doubt their being upon deck when the signal
is made to tack or wear _in the night_, and he requires all lieutenants
then to be at their stations, except those who had the watch
immediately preceding." Nor did he leave this delicately worded, but
pointed, admonition, issued in the Mediterranean, to take care of
itself. In after years, when he was nigh seventy, his secretary tells
that on a cold and rainy November night off Brest, the signal to tack
being made, he hurried to the cabin to persuade the old man not to go on
deck, as was his custom. He was not, however, in his cot, nor could he
for a long time be found; but at last a look into the stern gallery
discovered him, in flannel dressing-gown and cocked hat, watching the
movements of the fleet. To remonstrance he replied, "Hush, I want to see
how the evolution is performed on such a night, and to know whether
Jemmy Vashon (commanding the ship next astern) is on deck;" but soon
hearing the captain's well-known shrill voice, crying, "Are you all
ready forward?" he consented then to retire.

Post-captains and commanders were required to attend at points on shore
where the boats and crews of ships congregated on service; at landing
places and watering places,--scenes fruitful in demoralization,--to
maintain order and suppress disturbance. "The Masters and Commanders are
to take it in turn, according to rank, to attend the duty on shore at
the ragged staff [at Gibraltar], from gun-fire in the morning to sunset,
to keep order and prevent disputes, and to see that boats take their
regular turns. They are never to be absent from the spot except at
regular meal times." "When the squadron is at anchor in Torbay [in the
English Channel], a captain of a ship-of-the-line is to command at the
watering place at Brixham, taking to his assistance his commanding
officer of marines with a party of his men. He also may take with him a
lieutenant of the ship and as many midshipmen as he thinks fit; _but he
himself_ is not to quit his command until regularly relieved." A greater
stringency is observable at this later date, in the Channel Fleet, than
in the Mediterranean; for at the earlier period the spirit of mutiny had
not openly broken out, and he had besides on the distant station better
captains than those who had clung to the home fleet under its lax
discipline. "Old women in the guise of young men," he affirmed many of
them to be.

There was in fact an imminent necessity that naval rank should be made
to feel its responsibilities, and to exert its predominance; to be
restored to prestige, not by holding aloof in its privileges, but by
asserting itself in act. The preponderance of political and family
influence in determining promotion of officers, unbalanced by valid
tests of fitness such as later days imposed, had not only lowered the
competency of the official body as a whole, but impaired the respect
which personal merit alone can in the long run maintain. On the other
hand, the scarcity of seamen in proportion to the heavy demands of the
war, and the irregular methods of impressment and recruiting then
prevailing, swept into the service a vast number of men not merely
unfit, but of extremely bad character,--"miscreants," to use
Collingwood's word,--to be ruled only by fear of the law and of their
officers, supported by the better element among the crews. But these
better men also were becoming alienated by the harsh restrictions of the
times, and by the procrastination of superiors--Howe, the Sailor's
Friend, among others--to heed their just complaints. The stern Jervis,
whom none suspected of fatherly tenderness, if less indulgent to
culprits, was far more attentive to meet the reasonable demands of those
under him. While quelling insubordination mercilessly, he ever sought to
anticipate grievance; exhibiting thus the two sides of the same spirit
of careful, even-handed justice.

Jervis's work during the first eighteen months of his command was
therefore not only necessary, but most timely. By improving that period
of comparative internal quiet, he educated his officers and men to pass
steadfastly, though not unmoved, through the awful crisis of the
mutinies in 1797-98. Professional self-respect, a most powerful moral
force, was more than restored; it was intensified by the added dignity
and power manifest in the surroundings of daily life, as well as in the
military results obtained. Seamen, like others, deal more conservatively
with that of which they are proud because it reflects honor upon
themselves; and they obey more certainly men who share their labors and
lead them capably in danger, as did Jervis's Mediterranean captains.
With himself, severity was far from being the only instrument.
Thoroughly capable professionally, and thereby commandful of respect, he
appealed also to men's regard by intelligent and constant thought for
the wants and comfort of those under him; by evidence of strong service
feeling on his own part; by clear and clearly expressed recognition of
merit, wherever found; by avoidance of misunderstandings through
explanation volunteered when possible,--not apologetically, but as it
were casually, yet appealing to men's reason. Watchfulness and
sympathetic foresight were with him as constant as sternness, though
less in evidence.

Of this prevalence of kindly naval feeling amid the harshness which
seemed superficially the chief characteristic of his rule, many
instances could be cited. Passing by the frequent incidental praise of
distinguished captains, Nelson, Troubridge, and others, he thus
advocates the claims of one of the humble, hopeless class of
sailing-masters, out of the line of promotion. After an act of brilliant
merit in the West Indies, "Mr. White was ambitious to become a
lieutenant; but not having served six years in the navy, and being a
master, I could not then comply with his wishes. He is now Master of the
_Defence_, and his captain speaks in the highest terms of him; and it is
a tribute _due to the memory_ of Captain Faulknor,--whose certificate
of that matchless service is enclosed,--and _to the gallantry of his
officers and crew_, to state the claims of Mr. White to your Lordship,
who is the protector of us all." The present and the past, the merits of
the living, the memory of the glorious dead, the claims of the navy to
see well-doers rewarded, are all pressed into service to support a just
request, and with a manifest heartiness which in virtue of its reality
approaches eloquence. "I have given an order to Mr. Ellis to command as
a lieutenant, he being the son of a very old officer whom I knew many
years; and coming very strongly recommended from his last ship, I place
him under your Lordship's protection as _a child of the service_." When
a man thus bears others' deserts and the profession on his heart, he can
retain the affections of his subordinates even though he show all the
unbending severity of Jervis, and despite the numerous hangings, which,
for that matter, rarely fell except on the hopelessly bad. A most
significant feature of his rule as a disciplinarian was his peculiar
care of health, by instructed sanitary measures, by provision of
suitable diet, and by well-ordered hospital service. This was not merely
a prudential consideration for the efficiency of the fleet; he regarded
also the welfare of the sufferers. He made it a rule to inspect the
hospitals himself, and he directed a daily visit by a captain and by the
surgeons of the ships from which patients were sent, thus keeping the
sick in touch with those they knew, and who had in them a personal
interest. An odd provision, amusingly illustrative of the obverse side
of the admiral's character, was that the visiting captain should be
accompanied by a boatswain's mate, the functionary charged with
administering floggings, and, "if they find the patients do not conduct
themselves properly and orderly, they are to punish them agreeably to
the rules of the Navy." It was, however, on his care of health, in its
various exposures, that the admiral specially valued himself; it was, he
said, his proudest boast among the services to which he laid claim.

But while he labored thus for the welfare of the seamen, it was
naturally upon the professional tone of his officers that his chief
reliance must be placed; and the leaders among them he grappled to his
soul with hooks of steel, as they recognized the wisdom and force of his
measures, and the appreciation given to them and others. Whatever
beneficent influence might issue from him as a fountain-head must
through them be distributed, and by them reinforced and sustained. "The
discipline of the fleet," he said, "is in the ward-room;" and greatly
did he lament the loose insubordinate talk, the spirit of irresponsible
criticism that found voice at mess-tables, within the hearing of
servants, by whom it was disseminated throughout the body of the ship.
Not only he, but many, attributed to this hot-bed the fomenting of
discontent into organized mutiny. This could not be stopped by direct
measures, but only by imposing a feeling of fear, and nurturing that of
officer-like propriety, by stringent prescription of forms of respect
and rigid exaction of their observance. To stand uncovered before a
superior, instead of lightly touching the hat, to pay outward reverence
to the national flag, to salute the quarter-deck as the seat of
authority, were no vain show under him. "Discipline," he was fond of
quoting, "is summed up in the one word, 'Obedience;'" and these customs
were charged with the observance which is obedience in spirit. They
conduced to discipline as conventional good manners, by rendering the
due of each to each, knit together the social fabric and maintain the
regularity and efficiency of common life; removing friction, suppressing
jars, and ministering constantly to the smooth and even working of the
social machinery.

By measures such as these, extending to all ranks and every detail,
exemplifying, in spirit and in form, the extremes of cordial reward,
iron restraint, and weighty punishment, Jervis patiently fashioned the
fleet which was to be both a pattern for coming days, and the highly
tempered instrument to achieve his own victory of Cape St. Vincent and
the earlier triumphs of Nelson; as well as to sustain and to crush the
onset of mutiny which soon afterwards shook the Navy to its centre. For
purely military action of an aggressive character no opportunity was
afforded him. His coming to the Mediterranean coincided with that of
Napoleon Bonaparte to the Army of Italy. During 1795, wrote Nelson, if
the British fleet had done its duty, the French army could not have
moved along the Riviera of Genoa. It failed, and the Austrian general,
its ally, also failed to act with vigor. So the year had ended, for the
Austrians, with a disastrous defeat and a retreat behind the Apennines.
To the Riviera they never returned to receive the co-operation which
Jervis stood eager to give. At their first move to cross the mountains,
Bonaparte struck, and followed up his blows with such lightning-like
rapidity that in thirty days they were driven back over a hundred miles,
behind the Adige; their chief fortress, Mantua, was blockaded; all
northwest Italy with its seaboard, including Leghorn, was in the power
of France; and Naples also had submitted. Jervis, powerless to strike a
blow when no enemy was within reach, found his fleet without a friendly
port nearer than Gibraltar, while Corsica, where alone he could expect
anchorage and water, was seething with revolt against the British crown,
to which, by its own vote, it had been annexed but two years before.

Amid these adverse circumstances, the only large operation possible to
him was the close watching of the port of Toulon, conducted on the same
general plan that was afterwards more illustriously exhibited before
Brest, between 1800 and 1805, under conditions of surpassing difficulty.
All contemplated movements of the French fleet were thus dammed at the
source, for it must first fight the British, after which there was
little hope of being in a state to fulfil any further mission. For six
months, from April to October, Jervis held his fleet close up to the
port, the advanced body two miles from the entrance. The effort was
admirable as a pattern, and for disciplinary purposes. The ships, forced
to self-dependence, became organically self-reliant. Their routine life
of seamanship and military exercise perfected habit and efficiency, and
difficulties to others insuperable were as the light burdens which a
giant carries unwittingly.

Further than this, achievement could not then go. During the summer
Bonaparte held Mantua by the throat, and overthrew one after another the
Austrian forces approaching to its relief. Two French armies, under
Jourdan and Moreau, penetrated to the heart of Germany; while Spain,
lately the confederate of Great Britain, made an offensive and defensive
alliance with France, and sent a fleet of over twenty ships-of-the-line
into the Mediterranean. Staggered by these reverses, the British
ministry ordered Corsica evacuated and the Mediterranean abandoned.
Jervis was cruelly embarrassed. A trusted subordinate of high reputation
had been before Cadiz with seven ships-of-the-line, watching a French
division in that port. Summoned, in view of the threatening attitude of
Spain, to reinforce the main fleet in San Fiorenzo Bay, he lost his head
altogether, hurried past Gibraltar without getting supplies, and brought
his ships destitute to the admiral, already pressed to maintain the
vessels then with him. Although there were thirty-five hostile ships in
Toulon and the British had only twenty-two, counting this division,
there was nothing to do but to send it back to Gibraltar, under urgent
orders to return with all speed. With true military insight and a
correct appreciation of the forces opposed to him, Jervis saw the need
of fighting the combined enemies then and there.

Unfortunately, the division commander, Admiral Mann, on reaching
Gibraltar, became infected with the spirit of discouragement then
prevailing in the garrison, called a council of naval captains, and upon
their advice, which could in no wise lessen his own responsibility,
decided to return to England. This culpably unwarrantable act aptly
illustrates the distinction, rarely appreciated, between an error of
judgment and an error of conduct. Upon arrival, he was at once deprived
of his command, a step of unquestionable justice, but which could not
help Jervis. "We were all eyes, looking westward from the mountain
tops," wrote Collingwood, then a captain in the fleet, "but we looked in
vain. The Spanish fleet, nearly double our number, was cruising almost
in view, and our reconnoitring frigates sometimes got among them, while
we expected them hourly to be joined by the French fleet." "I cannot
describe to your lordship," wrote Jervis himself, "the disappointment my
ambition and zeal to serve my country have suffered by this diminution
of my force; for had Admiral Mann sailed from Gibraltar on the 10th of
October, the day he received my orders, and fulfilled them, I have every
reason to believe the Spanish fleet would have been cut to pieces. The
extreme disorder and confusion they were observed to be in, by the
judicious officers who fell in with them, leave no doubt upon my mind
that a fleet so trained and generally well commanded as this is would
have made its way through them in every direction."

Nelson shared this opinion, the accuracy of which was soon to be tested
and proved. "They at home," wrote he to his wife, "do not know what this
fleet is capable of performing; anything and everything. The fleets of
England are equal to meet the world in arms; and of all the fleets I
ever saw, I never beheld one, in point of officers and men, equal to Sir
John Jervis's, who is a commander-in-chief able to lead them to glory."
To a friend he wrote: "Mann is ordered to come up; we shall then be
twenty-two sail-of-the-line such as England hardly ever produced,
commanded by an admiral who will not fail to look the enemy in the face,
be their force what it may. I suppose it will not be more than
thirty-four of-the-line." "The admiral is firm as a rock," wrote at the
same moment the British viceroy of Corsica. Through all doubts and
uncertainties he held on steadily, refusing to leave the rendezvous till
dire necessity forced him, lest Mann, arriving, should be exposed alone
and lost. At last, with starvation staring him in the face if delaying
longer, he sailed for Gibraltar, three men living on the rations of one
during the passage down.

Mann's defection had reduced the fleet from twenty-two vessels to
fifteen. A series of single accidents still further diminished it. In a
violent gale at Gibraltar three ships-of-the-line drove from their
anchors. One, the _Courageux_, stretching over toward the Barbary coast,
ran ashore there and was totally wrecked, nearly all her crew perishing.
Her captain, a singularly capable seaman named Hallowell, was out of her
upon a courtmartial, and it was thought she would not have been lost had
he been on board. Another, the _Gibraltar_, struck so heavily on a reef
that she had to be sent to England. Upon being docked, a large piece of
rock was found to have penetrated the bottom and stuck fast in the hole.
Had it worked out, the ship would have foundered. The third vessel, the
_Zealous_, was less badly hurt, but she had to be left behind in
Gibraltar when Jervis, by orders from home, took his fleet to Lisbon.
There, in entering the Tagus, a fourth ship was lost on a shoal, so
that but eleven remained out of twenty-two. Despite these trials of his
constancy, the old man's temper still continued "steady as a rock."
"Whether you send me a reinforcement or not," he wrote to the Admiralty,
"I shall sleep perfectly sound,--not in the Tagus, but at sea; for as
soon as the _St. George_ has shifted her topmast, the _Captain_ her
bowsprit, and the _Blenheim_ repaired her mainmast, I will go out."
"Inactivity in the Tagus," he wrote again, "will make cowards of us
all." This last expression summed up much of his naval philosophy. Keep
men at sea, he used to say, and they cannot help being seamen, though
attention will be needed to assure exercise at the guns. And it may be
believed he would thus contemn the arguments which supported Howe's idea
of preserving the ships by retaining them in port. Keep them at sea, he
would doubtless have replied, and they will learn to take care of
themselves.

In quitting the river another vessel took the ground, and had to be left
behind. This, however, was the last of the admiral's trials for that
time. A few days later, on the 6th of February, 1797, there joined him a
body of five ships-of-the line, detached from England as soon as the
government had been freed from the fear of the invasion of Ireland,
which the French had attempted on a large scale in December. On the
13th, Nelson, a host in himself, returned from an adventurous mission
up the Mediterranean. The next day, February 14th, Jervis with his
fifteen ships met a Spanish fleet of twenty-seven some thirty miles from
Cape St. Vincent, which has given its name to the battle.

The Spaniards were running for Cadiz, to the east-southeast,--say,
across the page from left to right, inclining a little downward,--while
Jervis's fleet was approaching nearly at right angles from the north, or
top of the page. It was in two close, compact columns, of seven and
eight ships respectively. The Spaniards, on the contrary, were in
disorder and dispersed. Six of their ships were far ahead of the others,
an interval of nearly eight miles separating the two groups. The
weather, which was foggy, cleared gradually. Jervis was walking back and
forth on the poop with Hallowell, lately captain of the wrecked
_Courageux_, and he was heard to say, "A victory is very essential to
England at this moment." As ship after ship of the enemy loomed up
through the haze, successive reports were made to him. "There are eight
sail-of-the-line, Sir John." "There are twenty sail-of-the-line, Sir
John." "There are twenty-five of-the-line, Sir John." Finally, when the
full tale of twenty-seven was made out, the captain of the fleet
remarked on the greatness of the odds. "Enough of that, sir," retorted
the admiral, intent on that victory which was so essential to England;
"if there are fifty sail, I will go through them." This reply so
delighted Hallowell, an eccentric man, who a year later gave Nelson the
coffin made from the mainmast of the _Orient_, that he patted his august
superior on the back. "That's right, Sir John," said he, "and, by G----,
we'll give them a d----d good licking!"

When the weather finally cleared, toward 10 A.M., the British were near
to the enemy and heading direct for the gap, which the Spaniards, too
late, were trying to close. Almost at the moment of meeting, Jervis
formed his two columns into one--the order of battle--"with the utmost
celerity;" thus doubling the length of the line interposed between the
two divisions of the enemy. Soon opened the guns of the leading ship,
the _Culloden_, Captain Troubridge; the reports following one another in
regular succession, as though firing a salute by watch. The _Culloden's_
course led so direct upon a Spanish three-decker, that the first
lieutenant reported a collision imminent. "Can't help it, Griffiths,"
replied Troubridge; "hardest fend off." But the Spaniard, in confusion,
put his helm up and went clear. By this time the Spanish division on the
right, or west, of the British had changed its course and was steering
north, parallel but opposite to its foes. As the _Culloden_ went
through, the admiral signalled her to put about and follow it.
Troubridge, fully expecting this order, obeyed at once; and Jervis's
signal was scarce unfurled when, by the flapping of the _Culloden's_
sails, he saw it was receiving execution. "Look at Troubridge!" he
shouted. "Doesn't he handle his ship as though the eyes of all England
were on him? I would to God they were, that she might know him as I know
him!" But here a graver matter drew the admiral's care. The Spanish
division from the left, steering across his path of advance, approached,
purposing in appearance to break through the line. The _Victory_
stopped, or, as seamen say, hove-to; and as the Spanish admiral came
near within a hundred yards, her broadside rang out, sweeping through
the crowded decks and lofty spars a storm of shot, to which, in the
relative positions, the foe could not reply. Staggered and crippled he
went about, and the _Victory_ stood on.

Meanwhile, the ships which Troubridge and his followers were pursuing
drew toward the tail of the British column, and as they did so made a
movement to pass round it, and so join their friends who had just been
so severely handled in making the attempt to pass through. But Nelson
was in this part of the order, there being but two ships behind him.
Now, as far as signals went, he should continue on, and, like the
others, follow in due succession behind the _Culloden_. He saw that if
this were done the Spaniards would effect their junction, so he
instantly turned his ship toward the rear, out of her place, and threw
her alone across the enemy's advance. It is said that the Captain of the
Fleet drew Jervis's attention to this breach of discipline. "Ay,"
replied the old seaman, "and if ever you offend in the same way, I
promise you my forgiveness beforehand." For a while Nelson took the
brunt of the hostile fire from half a dozen ships, but not for long.
Soon Troubridge, his dearest friend, came up with a couple of others;
and Collingwood, the close associate of early days, who had the rear
ship, was signalled to imitate Nelson's act. In doing this, he silenced
the fire of two enemies; but, wrote Nelson, "disdaining the parade of
taking possession of beaten ships, Captain Collingwood most gallantly
pushed on to save his old friend and messmate, who appeared to be in a
critical state, being then fired upon by three first-rates, and the _San
Nicolas_, eighty." To get between Nelson's ship and the _San Nicolas_,
Collingwood had to steer close, passing within ten feet of the latter;
so that, to use his own expression, "though we did not touch sides, you
could not put a bodkin between us." His fire drove the _San Nicolas_
upon one of the first-rates, the _San Josef_; and when, continuing on to
seek other unbeaten foes, he left the field again clear for Nelson, the
latter, by a movement of the helm, grappled the _San Nicolas_.
Incredible as it may appear, the crew of this one British seventy-four
carried, sword in hand, both the enemy's ships, though of far superior
force. "Extravagant as the story may seem," wrote Nelson, "on the
quarter-deck of a Spanish first-rate I received the swords of the
vanquished Spaniards, which, as I received, I gave to William Fearney,
one of my bargemen, who placed them with the greatest _sang-froid_ under
his arm."

Four Spanish ships, two of them of the largest size, were the trophies
of this victory; but its moral effect in demonstrating the relative
values of the two navies, and the confidence England could put in men
like Jervis, Nelson, and the leading captains, was far greater. The
spirit of the nation, depressed by a long series of reverses, revived
like a giant refreshed with wine. Jervis had spoken truth when he said a
victory was essential to England at that time. The gratitude of the
state was shown in the profusion of rewards showered upon the victors.
Promotions and honors were liberally distributed. The Government had
already purposed to recognize Jervis's previous services by raising him
to the lower ranks of the peerage; but this timely triumph procured him
at one step a higher elevation. He was created Earl of St. Vincent, with
a pension of three thousand pounds per annum.

The tactical decisions made by Jervis on this momentous occasion were
correct as far as they went; but, except the initial determination to
attack the larger body of the enemy, because to windward, there is no
evidence of tactical originality in him, no innovation comparable to
Howe's manoeuvres on May 28 and 29,--and there was undoubted oversight
in not providing by signal against that move of the weather Spanish
division which it became Nelson's opportunity and glory to counteract.
It is also possible that the signal to tack in succession, a wholly
routine proceeding, might have been made earlier to advantage; but the
writer does not think that the body of the fleet should then have tacked
together, as some criticism would have it. Until the British van
approached on the new tack, the broadsides of the centre were better
ranged on the original line to counteract the efforts, actually made, by
the lee Spanish division to break through. As regards the decision not
to follow the victory further, which has been censured in the instances
of Rodney and Howe, the conditions here differed in much. The disparity
of numbers was very great; if many of the enemy had suffered greatly,
many also had not suffered at all; they were now reunited; above all
Jervis's strategic and political insight--far superior to his tactical
equipment--had rightly read the situation when he said that what England
needed was a victory,--moral effect. The victory was there, undeniable
and brilliant, it was better not risked.

The rest of the Spaniards, many of them badly crippled, took refuge in
Cadiz, and there Jervis, after repairing damages, held them blockaded
for two years, from April, 1797, to May, 1799. For the greater part of
this time the operation was conducted by anchoring the British fleet, a
resource which the character of the ground permitted, and which, though
not everywhere possible, St. Vincent declared the only way of assuring
the desired end of holding a position in all weathers. During this
period was rendered the other most signal service done by him to the
state, in suppressing the mutinous action of the seamen, which there, as
everywhere else in the British navy at that time, sought to overthrow
the authority of the officers.

The cause of the mutinies of 1797 is not here in question. Suffice it to
say that, in their origin, they alleged certain tangible material
grievances which were clearly stated, and, being undeniable, were
redressed. The men returned to their duty; but, like a horse that has
once taken the bit between his teeth, the restive feeling remained,
fermenting in a lot of vicious material which the exigencies of the day
had forced the navy to accept. Coinciding in time with the risings in
Ireland, 1796-1798, there arose between the two movements a certain
sympathy, which was fostered by the many Irish in the fleets, where
agents were in communication with the leaders of the United Irishmen on
shore.

In the Channel and the North Sea, the seamen took the ships, with few
exceptions, out of the hands of their officers. In the former, they
dictated their terms; in the latter, after a month of awful national
suspense, they failed: the difference being that in the one case the
demands, being reasonable, carried conviction, while in the other,
becoming extravagant, the Government's resistance was supported by
public opinion. It remained to be seen how the crisis would be met in a
fleet so far from home that the issue must depend upon the firmness and
judgment of a man of adamant. It was no more than prudent to expect that
the attempt would be made there also; and the watchfulness of the
superior officers of the fleet soon obtained certain information of its
approach, though as yet without proof adequate to the arrest of
individuals. The policy of the admiral, broadly stated, was that of
isolating ship from ship--_divide et impera_--to prevent concerted
action; a measure effected to all practical purpose by his unremitting
vigilance, and by the general devotion to his policy among his leading
officers. On the other hand, evidence was not wanting that in the ships
long under his orders his own character was now fairly understood, and
obtained for him a backing among the seamen themselves, without which
his severity alone might have failed.

The first overt sign of trouble was the appearance of letters addressed
to the leading petty officers of the different ships of the
Mediterranean fleet. These were detected by a captain, who held on to
them, and sent to St. Vincent to ask if they should be delivered.
Careful to betray no sign of anxiety, the admiral's reply was a general
signal for a lieutenant from each ship to come to him; and by them word
was sent that all letters should be delivered as addressed, unopened.
"Should any disturbance arise," he added, "the commander-in-chief will
know how to repress it."

Disturbance soon did arise, and it is significant to note that it
appeared in a ship which, by taking the ground when leaving Lisbon, had
not shared in the Battle of St. Vincent. In July, 1797, two seamen of
the _St. George_ had been condemned to death for an infamous crime.
Their shipmates presented a petition, framed in somewhat peremptory
terms, for their liberation, on the ground that execution for such an
offence would bring disgrace upon all. The admiral refusing to pardon,
the occasion was seized to bring mutiny to a head. A plot to take
possession of the ship was formed, but was betrayed to the captain. The
outburst began with a tumultuous assembling of the crew, evidently,
however, mistrustful of their cause. After vainly trying to restore
order, the captain and first lieutenant rushed among them, each
collaring a ringleader. The rest fell back, weakened, as men of
Anglo-Saxon traditions are apt to be, by the sense of law-breaking. The
culprits were secured, and at once taken to the flag-ship. A
courtmartial was ordered for the next day, Saturday; and as the
prisoners were being taken to the court, St. Vincent, with a hard
bluntness of speech which characterized him,--a survival of the frank
brutality of the past century,--said, "My friends, I hope you are
innocent, but if you are guilty make your peace with God; for, if you
are condemned, and there is daylight to hang you, you will die this
day."

They were condemned; but the trial ended late, and the president of the
court told them they should have Sunday to prepare. "Sir," said the
earl, "when you passed sentence, your duty was done; you had no right to
say that execution should be delayed;" and he fixed it for eight the
next morning. One of the junior admirals saw fit to address him a
remonstrance upon what he termed a desecration of the Sabbath. Nelson,
on the contrary, approved. "Had it been Christmas instead of Sunday,"
wrote he, "I would have hanged them. Who can tell what mischief would
have been brewed over a Sunday's grog?" Contrary to previous custom,
their own shipmates, the partners and followers in their crime, were
compelled to hang them, manning the rope by which the condemned were
swayed to the yardarm. The admiral, careful to produce impression,
ordered that all the ships should hold divine service immediately upon
the execution. Accordingly, when the bell struck eight, the fatal gun
was fired, the bodies swung with a jerk aloft, the church flags were
hoisted throughout the fleet, and all went to prayers. Ere yet the
ceremony was over, the Spanish gunboats came out from Cadiz and opened
fire; but St. Vincent would not mar the solemnity of the occasion by
shortening the service. Gravely it was carried to its end; but when the
flags came down, all boats were ordered manned. The seamen, with nerves
tense from the morning's excitement, gladly hurried into action, and the
enemy were forced back into port.

One such incident was far from ending the ordeal through which the
admiral had to pass, and which was prolonged throughout the period of
the Cadiz blockade. In May, 1798, when Nelson was sent into the
Mediterranean to win the Battle of the Nile, the detachment committed to
him was replaced by a dozen ships-of-the-line from the Channel, seething
with the mutinous temper which at home had been humored rather than
scotched. Immediately on their joining, request was made for a Court
Martial on some men of the _Marlborough_, on board which two violent
mutinies had occurred,--one on the passage out. St. Vincent, having
known beforehand that this ship had been pre-eminent for
insubordination, had ordered her anchored in the centre of the fleet,
between the two lines in which it was ranged; and the Court met without
delay. The remainder of the incident is quoted substantially from one of
St. Vincent's biographers, for it illustrates most forcibly the
sternness of his action, as well when dealing with weakness in officers
as with mutiny in crews. The written order to the commander of the
division of launches appears among the earl's papers, as does also a
similar one in the case of a mutiny on board the _Defence_ some months
earlier. The ulterior object of parading these boats was kept profoundly
secret. They appeared to be only part of the pageantry, of the solemn
ceremonial, with which the wisdom of the great commander-in-chief
providently sought to invest all exhibitions of authority, in order to
deepen impression.

The object of the last mutiny on board the _Marlborough_ had been to
protect the life of a seaman forfeited by a capital crime. No sooner was
one sentenced to die than the commander-in-chief ordered him to be
executed on the following morning, "and by the crew of the _Marlborough_
alone, no part of the boats' crews from the other ships, as had been
used on similar occasions, to assist in the punishment,--his lordship's
invariable order on the execution of mutineers. On the receipt of the
necessary commands for this execution, Captain Ellison of the
_Marlborough_ waited upon the commander-in-chief, and reminding his
lordship that a determination that their shipmates should not suffer
capital punishment had been the very cause of the ship's company's
mutiny, expressed his conviction that the _Marlborough's_ crew would
never permit the man to be hanged on board that ship.

"Receiving the captain on the _Ville de Paris's_ quarter-deck, before
the officers and ship's company hearkening in breathless silence to
what passed, and standing with his hat in his hand over his head, as
was his lordship's invariable custom during the whole time that any
person, whatever were his rank, even a common seaman, addressed him on
service, Lord St. Vincent listened very attentively till the captain
ceased to speak; and then after a pause replied,--

"'Do you mean to tell me, Captain Ellison, that you cannot _command_ his
Majesty's ship, the _Marlborough_? for if that is the case, sir, I will
immediately send on board an officer who can.'

"The captain then requested that, at all events, the boats' crews from
the rest of the fleet might, as always had been customary in the
service, on executions, attend at this also, to haul the man up; for he
really did not expect the _Marlborough's_ would do it.

"Lord St. Vincent sternly answered: 'Captain Ellison, you are an old
officer, sir, have served long, suffered severely in the service, and
have lost an arm in action, and I should be very sorry that any
advantage should be now taken of your advanced years. That man shall be
hanged, at eight o'clock to-morrow morning, _and by his own ship's
company_: for not a hand from any other ship in the fleet shall touch
the rope. You will now return on board, sir; and, lest you should not
prove able to command your ship, an officer will be at hand who can.'

"Without another word Captain Ellison instantly retired. After he had
reached his ship, he received orders to cause her guns to be housed and
secured, and that at daybreak in the morning her ports should be
lowered. A general order was then issued to the fleet for all launches
to rendezvous under the _Prince_ at seven o'clock on the following
morning, armed with carronades and twelve rounds of ammunition for
service; each launch to be commanded by a lieutenant, having an expert
and trusty gunner's-mate and four quarter gunners, exclusive of the
launch's crew. The whole were to be under the command of Captain
Campbell, of the _Blenheim_, to whom, on presenting to him the written
orders under which he was to act, Lord St. Vincent further said, 'he was
to attend the execution, and if any symptoms of mutiny appeared in the
_Marlborough_, any attempt to open her ports, or any resistance to the
hanging of the prisoner, he was to proceed close touching the ship, and
to fire into her, and to continue to fire until all mutiny or resistance
should cease; and that, should it become absolutely necessary, he should
even sink the ship in face of the fleet.'

"Accordingly, at seven the next morning, all the launches, thus armed,
proceeded, from the _Prince_ to the _Blenheim_, and thence, Captain
Campbell having assumed the command, to the _Marlborough_.

"Having lain on his oars a short time alongside, the captain then formed
his force in a line athwart her bows, at rather less than pistol shot
distance off, and then he ordered the tompions to be taken out of the
carronades, and to load.

"At half-past seven, the hands throughout the fleet having been turned
up to witness punishment, the eyes of all bent upon a powerfully armed
boat as it quitted the flag-ship; every one knowing that there went the
provost-marshal conducting his prisoner to the _Marlborough_ for
execution. The crisis was come; now was to be seen whether the
_Marlborough's_ crew would hang one of their own men.

"The ship being in the centre between the two lines of the fleet, the
boat was soon alongside, and the man was speedily placed on the cathead
and haltered. A few awful minutes of universal silence followed, which
was at last broken by the watch bells of the fleet striking eight
o'clock. Instantly the flag-ship's gun fired, and at the sound the man
was lifted well off; but then, and visibly to all, he dropped back
again; and the sensation throughout the fleet was intense. For, at this
dreadful moment, when the eyes of every man in every ship was straining
upon this execution, as the decisive struggle between authority and
mutiny, as if it were destined that the whole fleet should see the
hesitating unwillingness of the _Marlborough's_ crew to hang their
rebel, and the efficacy of the means taken to enforce obedience, by an
accident on board the ship the men at the yard-rope unintentionally let
it slip, and the turn of the balance seemed calamitously lost; but then
they hauled him up to the yard arm with a run. The law was satisfied,
and, said Lord St. Vincent at the moment, perhaps one of the greatest of
his life, 'Discipline is preserved, sir!'"

Again a year later, in May, 1799, when twenty-five French
ships-of-the-line broke through the wretchedly inefficient guard at that
time kept before Brest, and entered the Mediterranean, a reinforcement
of over a dozen was sent from the Channel to Lord St. Vincent, who was
found then in Port Mahon, Minorca. Sir Edward Pellew, captain of one of
the new-comers, asked a Court-Martial upon a mutiny that had occurred
just before leaving the home port. St. Vincent at first demurred,
startled, according to Pellew's biographer, by the extent of the plot
then revealed, and thinking it politic to suppress the facts; but it is
alleged with equal probability that he was indignant at being
continually called upon to remedy evils due to the general indiscipline
of the Channel Fleet. "What do they mean by invariably sending the
mutinous ships to me? Do they think that I will be hangman to the
fleet?" Both versions are likely enough to be correct. There is a limit
to all human endurance, and the earl was now broken in health; he was
sixty-four, had borne his load for three years, and was on the point of
resigning his command to Lord Keith. The Court, however, was ordered,
and three men were sentenced to be hanged. Pellew then interceded for
one, on the ground of previous good character. "No," replied St.
Vincent. "Those who have suffered hitherto have been so worthless before
that their fate was of little use as an example. I shall now convince
the seamen that no character, however good, shall save a man who is
guilty of mutiny."

But St. Vincent was not content with mere repression. Outwardly, and
indeed inwardly, unshaken, he yet unwearyingly so ordered the fleet as
to avoid occasions of outbreak. With the imposing moral control exerted
by his unflinching steadiness, little trouble was to be apprehended from
single ships; ignorant of what might be hoped from sympathizers
elsewhere, but sure of the extreme penalty in case of failure, the
movements lacked cohesion and were easily nipped. Concerted action only
was to be feared, and careful measures were taken to remove
opportunities. Captains were forbidden to entertain one another at
dinner,--the reason, necessarily unavowed, being that the boats from
various ships thus assembling gave facilities for transmitting messages
and forming plans; and when ships arrived from England they underwent a
moral quarantine, no intercourse with them being permitted until
sanctioned by the admiral. When the captain reported to him, his boat,
while waiting, was shoved off out of earshot. It is said that on one
occasion a seaman in such a boat managed to call to one looking out of
a port of the flag-ship, "I say, there, what have you fellows been doing
out here, while we have been fighting for your beef and pork?" To which
the other replied, "You'd best say nothing at all about that out here,
for if old Jarvie hears ye he'll have ye dingle-dangle at the yardarm at
eight o'clock to-morrow morning."

The severe strain of this prolonged watchfulness told on even his iron
hardihood, and it would almost appear that some of the rough practical
jokes told of this period must represent reaction from the tension under
which he necessarily was through the grave anxieties pressing upon him.
Humor he certainly had, but at this time it often showed itself in
horse-play, so fantastic as to suggest some unusual exciting cause.
Thus, for one such prank he seemed to draw his inspiration from the
Sunday celebration of Divine Service. Upon its conclusion, he framed and
published a new signal, for "all chaplains," the employment of which,
however, was postponed to an occasion suited to his lordship's fun. "A
few days after it blew great guns from west-southwest, which is directly
into the Bay of Cadiz. The inshore squadron lay six miles from the
flag-ship, directly to leeward, and up went the signal for all
chaplains. It was a hard pull for the rowers, and no luxury for the
sitters. When they reached the quarter-deck of the _Ville de Paris_,
literally drenched with salt-water, the admiral presented them to
'Bishop Morgan,' as he called the chaplain of the flag-ship, and desired
that they would go down into the ward-room and hold a conclave." One who
has had a pull of that kind, as most officers have in their day, can
understand that the humor was less appreciable to the victims than to
the author.

"He sometimes amused himself by paying a visit to the quarter-deck at
what most people would deem very unseasonable hours. Coming up one
morning at half-past two, in the middle watch, he sent for Colonel
Flight, the commanding officer of marines. Up came the colonel, armed at
all points, supposing that some enterprise was in hand. 'I have sent for
you,' said the Chief, in the quiet and gentlemanly style which he could
always command, 'I have sent for you, Colonel, that you might smell, for
the first time in your life, the delicious odors brought off by the land
wind from the shores of Andalusia. Take a good sniff, and then you may
go and turn in again.'"

"A lieutenant one day came on board to answer a signal. Lord St. Vincent
thought there was about him too much _embonpoint_ for an officer of that
rank. 'Calder,' said he to the captain of the fleet, 'all the
lieutenants are running to belly; they have been too long at anchor (for
the fleet was still off Cadiz); block up the entering port, except for
admirals and captains, and make them climb over the hammocks.' The
entering port in a three-decked ship being on the middle deck, the
difference between going into that and climbing over the hammocks may be
compared to entering the drawing-room by the balcony window, or mounting
to the parapet and taking the attics by storm. There was also great
inconvenience, and even expense, attending this painful operation, since
in those days all officers wore white knee-breeches, or shorts, as they
were called, and many useful garments which could not readily be
replaced, were torn and spoiled in this attempt at juvenile activity,
and many oaths probably sworn, which but for this needless exertion
would not have been elicited."

A more pleasing, and it may well be believed much more characteristic,
instance of his playfulness has also been transmitted; one illustrative
too of his deep fund of kindliness which was shown in many acts, often
of large pecuniary liberality, and tinged especially with a certain
distinct service coloring, with sympathy for the naval officer and the
naval seaman, which must have gone far to obtain for him the obedience
of the will as well as submission of conduct. He wisely believed in the
value of forms, and was careful to employ them, in this crisis of the
mutinies, to enforce the habit of reverence for the insignia of the
state and the emblems of military authority. Young lieutenants--for
there were _young_ lieutenants in those days--were directed to stand
cap in hand before their superiors, and not merely to touch their hats
in a careless manner. "The discipline of the cabin and ward-room
officers is the discipline of the fleet," said the admiral; and savage,
almost, were the punishments that fell upon officers who disgraced their
cloth. The hoisting of the colors, the symbol of the power of the
nation, from which depended his own and that of all the naval hierarchy,
was made an august and imposing ceremony. The marine guard, of near a
hundred men, was paraded on board every ship-of-the-line. The national
anthem was played, the scarlet-clad guard presented, and all officers
and crews stood bareheaded, as the flag with measured dignity rose
slowly to the staff-head. Lord St. Vincent himself made a point of
attending always, and in full uniform; a detail he did not require of
other officers. Thus the divinity that hedges kings was, by due
observance, associated with those to whom their authority was delegated,
and the very atmosphere the seaman breathed was saturated with
reverence.

The presence of Lord St. Vincent on these occasions, and in full
uniform, gave rise to an amusing skit by one of the lieutenants of the
fleet, attributing the homage exacted, not to the flag, but to the great
man himself; and this, becoming known to the admiral, elicited from him
in turn the exhibition of practical humor to which allusion has just
been made. Parodying the Scriptural story of Nebuchadnezzar's golden
image, the squib began:--

"I. The Earl of St. Vincent, the commander-in-chief, made an Image of
blue and gold, whose height was about five feet seven inches, and the
breadth thereof was about twenty inches" (which we may infer were the
proportions of his lordship). "He set it up every ten o'clock A.M. on
the quarter-deck of the _Ville de Paris_, before Cadiz."

Passing from hand to hand, it can be understood that this effusion,
which was characterized throughout by a certain sprightliness, gave more
amusement to men familiar with the local surroundings, and welcoming any
trifle of fun in the dulness of a blockade, than it does to us. At last
it reached the admiral, who knew the author well. Sending for him on
some pretext, an hour before the time fixed for a formal dinner to the
captains of the fleet, he detained him until the meal was served, and
then asked him to share it. All passed off quietly until the cloth was
removed, and then the host asked aloud, "What shall be done to the man
whom the commander-in-chief delights to honour?" "Promote him," said one
of the company. "Not so," replied St. Vincent, "but set him on high
among the people. So, Cumby," addressing the lieutenant, "do you sit
there,"--on a chair previously arranged at some height above the
deck,--"and read this paper to the captains assembled." Mystified, but
not yet guessing what was before him, Cumby took his seat, and, opening
the paper, saw his own parody. His imploring looks were lost upon the
admiral, who sat with his stern quarter-deck gravity unshaken, while the
abashed lieutenant, amid the suppressed mirth of his audience, stumbled
through his task, until the words were reached, "Then the Earl of St.
Vincent was full of fury, and the form of his visage was changed against
the poor Captain of the Main-Top," who had not taken off his hat before
the Image of blue and gold. Here a roar of laughter from the head of the
table unloosed all tongues, and Cumby's penance ended in a burst of
general merriment. "Lieutenant Cumby," said the admiral, when quiet was
restored, "you have been found guilty of parodying Holy Writ to bring
your commander-in-chief into disrespect; and the sentence is that you
proceed to England at once on three months' leave of absence, and upon
your return report to me to take dinner here again."

Compelled by general break-down of health to seek rest at home, St.
Vincent returned to England in August, 1799. He was not left long in
repose. The condition of the Channel Fleet as regards discipline has
already appeared, and the very recent incident of the escape of the
great French fleet from Brest, coupled with the equally humiliating and
even more threatening experience of the same character in 1796, when the
invasion of Ireland was attempted,--both which occurred under the same
British commander-in-chief,--showed the urgent necessity of placing in
control the only man of suitable rank, whose complete adequacy to such a
post had been demonstrated. St. Vincent accordingly hoisted his flag in
April, 1800.

In the effort to restore discipline, he here encountered not only
opposition, intensified by the greater desire for shore privileges that
always attends a home station and the proximity of wives and children,
but something very like an attempt at combination against his orders--a
very grave military offence--on the part of the captains. All this he
trampled down with severity amounting to ruthlessness. The insubordinate
toast--"May the discipline of the Mediterranean never be introduced into
the Channel Fleet"--was met face to face by republishing every order and
restriction upon which the discipline of the Mediterranean had rested.
In the more distinctly military part of his task, the closing of the
port of Brest to evasions by the enemy, such as those just mentioned, he
achieved a noteworthy success. Modelling his scheme upon that of Hawke,
forty years before, he gave to it a development, a solidity, and an
extension which his distinguished forerunner had not been able to
impart. Hawke had not the advantage, which St. Vincent had, of following
a period of inefficiency, the remembrance of which compelled the
Admiralty vigorously to support all measures of the commander-in-chief,
if they desired to replace the interminable uncertainties and anxieties
of the last administration of the fleet by a sense of security, and
consequent popular content.

St. Vincent's institution and maintenance of the Brest blockade must be
regarded under two principal heads. There is, first, the usefulness of
the blockade as an instrument to the general ends of the current war,
which is the strategic point of view, involving a conception permanent
in character; and there are again the local dispositions, arising from
the local conditions, that may rightly be styled tactical, and vary from
port to port thus watched. The former, the strategic, was more directly
in line with his natural gifts; and in the possession which the idea
took of him is to be found the germ of the system that thenceforward
began to throttle the power of the French Revolution, whether under the
Republic or the Empire. The essence of the scheme was to cut loose from
the beach, and keep to the sea; ever watchful, with the same
watchfulness that had not only crushed mutiny, but by diligent care
forestalled occasions of revolt. "Our great reliance," he said,--not
directly in reference to the blockade, but to the general thought of
which the blockade, as instituted by him, was the most illustrious
exemplification,--"is on the vigilance and activity of our cruisers at
sea, any reduction in the number of which, by applying them to guard our
ports, inlets, and beaches, would in my judgment tend to our
destruction." Amplified as the idea was by him, when head of the
Admiralty, to cover not only Brest but all ports where hostile divisions
lay, it became a strategic plan of wide sweep, which crushed the
vitality of the hostile navies, isolated France from all support by
commerce, and fatally sapped her strength. To St. Vincent, more than to
any one man, is due the effective enforcement and maintenance of this
system; and in this sense, as practically the originator of a decisive
method, he is fairly and fully entitled to be considered the organizer
of ultimate victory.

The local dispositions before Brest will not here be analyzed.[14]
Suffice it to say that, as revealed in Jervis's correspondence, they
show that equipment of general professional knowledge, that careful
study of conditions,--of what corresponds to "the ground" of a shore
battle-field,--and the thoughtful prevision of possibilities, which
constitute so far the skilful tactician. The defence and the attack of
seaports, embracing as they do both occupation of permanent positions
and the action of mobile bodies, are tactical questions; differing much,
yet not radically, from field operations, where positions are taken
incidentally, but where movement of armed men is the principal factor.
In the one sense St. Vincent displayed a high degree of aptitude for
ordered permanent dispositions, which is the side of tactics most akin
to strategy. On the more distinctively tactical side, in the movements
of a fleet in action, he had little opportunity. As far as shown by his
one battle, Cape St. Vincent, it would not appear that either by nature
or cultivation he possessed to any great extent the keen insight and
quick appreciation that constitute high tactical ability.

Earl St. Vincent rendered three great services to England. The first was
the forming and disciplining the Mediterranean fleet into the perfection
that has been mentioned. Into it, thus organized, he breathed a spirit
which, taking its rise from the stern commander himself, rested upon a
conviction of power, amply justified in the sequel by Cape St. Vincent
and the Nile, its two greatest achievements. The second was the winning
of the Battle of St. Vincent at a most critical political moment. The
third was the suppression of mutiny in 1797 and 1798. But, in estimating
the man, these great works are not to be considered as isolated from his
past and his future. They were the outcome and fruitage of a character
naturally strong, developed through long years of patient sustained
devotion to the ideals of discipline and professional tone, which in
them received realization. Faithful in the least, Jervis, when the time
came, was found faithful also in the greatest. Nor was the future
confined to his own personal career. Though he must yield to Nelson the
rare palm of genius, which he himself cannot claim, yet was the glory
of Nelson, from the Nile to Trafalgar, the fair flower that could only
have bloomed upon the rugged stalk of Jervis's navy. Upon him,
therefore, Nelson showered expressions of esteem and reverence,
amounting at times almost to tenderness, in his early and better days.
In later years their mutual regard suffered an estrangement which,
whatever its origin, appears as a matter of feeling to have been chiefly
on the part of the younger man, whose temper, under the malign influence
of an unworthy passion, became increasingly imbittered, at strife within
itself and at variance with others. The affectionate admiration of St.
Vincent for his brilliant successor seems to have remained proof against
external differences.

It was poetic justice, then, that allotted to St. Vincent the
arrangement of the responsible expedition which, in 1798, led to the
celebrated Battle of the Nile; in its lustre and thorough workmanship
the gem of all naval exploits. To him it fell to choose for its command
his brilliant younger brother, and to winnow for him the flower of his
fleet, to form what Nelson after the victory called "his band of
brothers." "The Battle of the Nile," said the veteran admiral, Lord
Howe, "stands singular in this, that every captain distinguished
himself." The achievement of the battle was Nelson's own, and Nelson's
only; but it was fought on St. Vincent's station, by a detachment from
St. Vincent's fleet. He it was who composed the force, and chose for
its leader the youngest flag-officer in his command. Bitter reclamations
were made by the admirals senior to Nelson, but St. Vincent had one
simple sufficient reply,--"Those who are responsible for measures must
have the choice of the men to execute them."

When St. Vincent, in 1799, quitted the Mediterranean, he had yet nearly
a quarter of a century to live. His later years were distinguished by
important services, but they embody the same spirit and exemplify the
same methods that marked his Mediterranean command, which was the
culminating period of his career. In 1801, when Pitt's long term of
office came to an end, he became First Lord of the Admiralty,--the head
of naval affairs for the United Kingdom,--and so continued during the
Addington administration, till 1804. In 1806, at the age of seventy-two,
he was again for a short time called to command the Channel fleet; but
in 1807 he retired from active service, and the square flag that had so
long flown with honor was hauled down forever.

The rest of his life was spent chiefly at his country-seat, Rochetts, in
Essex, sixteen miles from London. Having a handsome income, though not
wealthy, he entertained freely; and his retreat was cheered by frequent
visits from his old naval subordinates and political friends. Generous
in the use of money, and without children for whom to save, the
neighborhood learned to love him as a benefactor. In cases of necessity,
his liberality rose to profusion, and he carried into the management of
his estate a carelessness he never showed in administering a fleet. It
is told that he once undertook to raise a sum by mortgage, in entire
forgetfulness of a much larger amount in bank. Far into old age he
retained the active habits of his prime. To say that he rose at four,
asserts a biographer, would be to understate the case; he was frequently
in the fields at half-past two in the early summer dawn of
England,--always before his laborers,--and he was not pleased if his
male guests did not appear by six. To ladies he was more tolerant. With
mind unclouded and unweakened to the last, he retained his interest in
public affairs and in the navy, contributing to the conversation which
animated his home the judgment of an acute intellect, though one deeply
tinged by prejudices inseparable from so strong a character. Thus
honored and solaced by the companionship of his friends, he awaited in
calm dignity the summons, which came on the 13th of March, 1823. He was
two months over eighty-eight when he passed away, the senior admiral of
Great Britain.

FOOTNOTE:

[14] This has been done by the author elsewhere (Influence of Sea Power
upon the French Revolution and Empire, Vol. I. pp. 371-377).




SAUMAREZ

1757-1836


"These were honourable among the thirty," says the ancient Hebrew
chronicler, "yet they attained not unto the first three." Since that
far-away day, when the three mighty men broke through the host of the
Philistines that they might bring their chieftain water from the well of
Bethlehem, to how many fighters, land and sea, have these words been
applicable!--men valiant in deed, wise in council, patient in endurance,
yet lacking that divine somewhat which, for want of a better name, we
call genius. Of such an one now, and, in contrasted sequence, of another
of his peers, we are about to give an account; men who in their
respective careers illustrated more conspicuously, the one the
distinctively military, the other the more purely nautical, aspects, in
the due blending of which the excellence of the profession is realized;
foremost, both, among the ocean warriors whose pennants flew through the
wild scenes where England's flag was called to brave the battle and the
breeze,

    "Till danger's troubled night depart,
        And the star of peace return."

James Saumarez was born on the 11th of March, 1757, in Guernsey, one of
the Channel group of islands that still remain attached to the English
crown,--the sole remaining fragment of the Norman duchy to which the
kingdom itself was for a while but an appendage. In Saumarez's
childhood, French was still so generally spoken there that, despite the
very early age at which he went to sea, he always retained a perfect
mastery of that language; and it is recorded that one of his uncles,
being intended for the sea service, was sent to school in England when
ten years old, in order to acquire the use of English. From such a
stock, whose lineage among the gentry of the island can be traced to the
fourteenth century, sprang three distinguished officers of this name,
destined to illustrate the British flag by their deeds in several wars,
in which their chief opponent was the French navy. Among these, the
subject of this article attained the most brilliant renown. Eighteen
months older than Nelson, not even Nelson saw more or harder fighting
than did James Saumarez, nor bore himself more nobly throughout their
day and generation.

Having early shown a taste for the navy, his father, who had six sons
and a restricted income, obtained of a naval captain to have his name
borne on the books of a ship of war at the early age of ten; a curious
custom of that day allowing such constructive service to be counted in
the time prescribed for attaining a lieutenant's commission. The boy did
not actually go afloat until 1770, when a little over thirteen. This
first employment kept him from home continuously for five years, a
period spent wholly in the Mediterranean, and for the most part in the
Levant; the active naval war then existing between Turkey and Russia, in
the waters of Asia Minor, necessitating a special protection to British
interests. It is a singular circumstance that this sea, esteemed so
important to Great Britain, was never again visited by him, with the
exception of the few brief months from May to October, 1798, when, as
second in command, he followed Nelson's flag during the pursuit of
Bonaparte's fleet which ended in its destruction at the Battle of the
Nile.

Returning to England in 1775, his actual and constructive service
permitted Saumarez to appear for examination for a lieutenancy. This he
passed, but was not at once promoted. The troubles with the American
colonies had now become open hostilities, and he was appointed, as
master's mate or passed midshipman, to the _Bristol_ of fifty guns,
selected as flag-ship for the expedition against Charleston. This duty,
which, by bringing him immediately under the eyes of the naval
commander-in-chief, placed him also on the highway to advancement, he
owed to Admiral Keppel, then one of the leading flag officers of the
British navy. His uncle, Philip Saumarez, and Keppel had shared the
perils and sufferings of Anson's well-known expedition to the South Seas
in 1740. Together they had buffeted the wild weather off Cape Horn, with
ships' companies more than decimated by scurvy; together they had spread
terror among the Spanish colonies of the Pacific; together they had
captured the great galleon off Manila; and Keppel still retained an
affectionate interest in the kinsman of his old shipmate, who had long
since fallen gloriously on the deck of his ship, in close action with a
French vessel of far superior force.

The squadron, which was commanded by Commodore Sir Peter Parker,
assembled at Cork, whence it sailed in January, 1776. Embarked on board
the _Bristol_ was Lord Cornwallis, afterwards so closely, and for
himself disastrously, associated with the course of the American
Revolution. Struck by Saumarez's activity and efficiency, he offered him
a commission in his own regiment, with the position of aide-de-camp to
himself. The young seaman, having a naturally strong military bent,
which at that moment seemed more likely to receive satisfaction on shore
than at sea, and swayed doubtless also by the prospect of a powerful
patron, in the days when patronage had so much to do with men's careers,
was on the point of accepting; but his messmates chaffed him so
mercilessly upon adopting a profession which habitually supplied them
with derisive illustrations and comparisons, that he finally declined.
Many years later, when Saumarez was among the senior captains of the
navy, the two gentlemen met as guests at the table of the head of the
Admiralty, who upon hearing the incident from Cornwallis remarked that
he would have deprived the navy of one of its best officers.

Owing partly to delays inseparable from sailing vessels, and partly to
the dilatoriness with which war was most often waged before the days of
the French Revolution, the British expedition did not appear off
Charleston until the beginning of June, 1776. To Americans who know
their own history, the stirring story of Fort Moultrie and its repulse
of the British fleet has been familiar from childhood. Few are the
American boys to whom the names of Jasper, of Marion, and of their brave
commander, Moultrie himself, are unknown. But while all honor is due to
the band of raw provincials who at this critical moment--one week before
the Declaration of Independence was signed--withstood the enemy, and for
the moment saved the province, the steady, obstinate valor shown by the
seamen of kindred race, who contended with them, was no less brilliant,
and was even more severely tested. The loss of the fort was thirty-seven
killed and wounded; that of the _Bristol_ alone was one hundred and
eleven out of a crew of three hundred and fifty; and during much of the
action, which lasted thirteen hours, she was powerless to return the
raking fire of the enemy, in consequence of shot severing the ropes that
kept her broadside in position. Saumarez was here for the first time
engaged, and had two narrow escapes. Once, when pointing a gun, a
cannon-ball entering the port swept away seven of the eight men who
served the piece; and somewhat later another ball struck off the head of
a messmate by whom he was standing, covering him with blood.

In this, his maiden action, Saumarez gave full proof of the steady
courage which ever distinguished him; and it is worthy of passing remark
that, in the doggedness of the fighting and the severity of the
slaughter, the battle was typical of a great part of his after
experience. Several death vacancies resulting among the officers, he was
promoted to be lieutenant a fortnight later; and when the _Bristol_ went
north he was again actively engaged in the operations on Long Island,
and along the East and Hudson rivers, up to the evacuation of New York
by the Americans. His conspicuous activity at length obtained for him
the command of a galley, with which he was sent to Rhode Island in
February, 1778. The judgment of the illustrious Rodney, as well as the
repeated efforts of the Americans to regain control of Narragansett Bay,
may be cited against the opinion expressed by Bancroft, that the seizure
of this important naval centre by the British was a mistake. The tenure
of the island, however, depended upon the control of the surrounding
waters, and upon the active destruction of the American means of
transport. Saumarez's galley was one of the force stationed in the
eastern, or Seakonnet, passage; and in the five months thus employed it
is recorded that he was forty-seven times under fire.

Sullivan was at this time preparing for his attack upon the British
lines, expecting co-operation by the French fleet. This arrived on the
29th of July, and six days later Seakonnet Channel was entered by a
detachment superior in force to the British there. The latter burned
their ships and retreated to Rhode Island, where the officers and
seamen, Saumarez among them, continued actively engaged in the defence
of the works. On August 8th, the main French fleet, under the Count
d'Estaing, ran the batteries of the principal channel, and anchored off
the north end of the island, seriously increasing the perils of the
defenders; but next day the appearance of Lord Howe with an inferior
squadron lured the French admiral out of the bay, his vessels were
crippled by a storm, and he abandoned the coast. Sullivan, deprived of
an essential factor in his scheme, had then to fall back; and the
British captains, with their crews, being no longer needed, returned to
England to seek other ships.

Both by fortune and by choice, Saumarez's lot throughout life was thrown
with the line-of-battle force of the navy, that body of heavy fighting
ships which constitute the true backbone of a sea service, because their
essential function is to fight, not singly, but in masses, co-operating
with others like themselves. In that respect they correspond to the
solid masses of infantry, which, however disposed tactically, form the
strength of armies. The aptitudes of brilliant officers differ. Some are
born frigate-captains, partisan warriors, ever actively on the wing, and
rejoicing in the comparative freedom and independence of their
movements, like the cavalry raider and outpost officer. Of this type was
Pellew, Lord Exmouth, a seaman inbred, if ever there was one, who in
this sphere won the renown most distinctively associated with his name,
while giving proof throughout a long career of high professional
capacity in many directions. But while Saumarez, in his turn, was
occasionally employed in frigate and light cruiser service, and always
with great credit, his heart was with the ship-of-the-line, whose high
organization, steady discipline, and decisive influence upon the issues
of war appealed to a temperament naturally calm, methodical, and
enduring. "He always preferred the command of a ship-of-the-line to a
frigate," says his biographer, who knew him well,--"notwithstanding the
chances of prize-money are in favor of the latter;" and he himself
confirmed the statement, not only by casual utterance,--"My station as
repeating frigate is certainly more desirable than a less conspicuous
one, at the same time I would rather command a seventy-four,"--but by
repeated formal applications. In variety and interest of operations, as
well as in prize-money, did a cruising frigate have advantages; for much
of the time of ships-of-the-line passed necessarily in methodical
routine and combined movements, unfavorable to individual initiative.
Nevertheless, their functions are more important and more military in
character. In accordance with this preference Saumarez is found, whether
by his own asking or not, serving the remaining three years of his
lieutenant's time upon vessels of that class; and in one of them he
passed through his next general action, a scene of carnage little
inferior to the Charleston fight, illustrated by the most dogged courage
on the part of the combatants, but also, it must be said, unrelieved by
any display of that skill which distinguishes scientific warfare from
aimless butchery. This, however, was not Saumarez's fault.

Towards the end of 1780, Great Britain, having already France, Spain,
and America upon her hands, found herself also confronted by a league
between the Baltic states to enforce by arms certain neutral claims
which she contested. To this league, called the Armed Neutrality,
Holland acceded, whereupon England at once declared war. Both nations
had extensive commercial interests in the Baltic, and it was in
protecting vessels engaged in this trade, by a large body of ships of
war, that the only general action between the two navies occurred. This
was on the 5th of August, 1781, in the North Sea, off the Dogger-Bank,
from which it has taken its name.

At the time of meeting, the British, numbering six ships-of-the-line,
were returning from the Baltic; the Dutch, with seven ships, were bound
thither. Despite the numerical difference, no great error is made in
saying that the two squadrons were substantially of equal force. Each at
once ordered the merchant vessels under its protection to make the best
of their way towards port, while the ships of war on either side began
to form in order of battle between the enemy and their own convoy. The
lists being thus cleared and the lines ranged, the British vessels,
which were to windward, stood down together, after what was then the
time-honored and unintelligent practice of their service, each to attack
one of the Dutch; disdaining to attempt doubling upon any part of the
hostile line. Their ideal appears to have been that of the tournament,
where every advantage of numbers and combination was rejected in order
to insure that the test should be that of individual courage and skill.
So strong was this tradition in the British navy that its ablest
contemporary chronicler, James, has sought to explain away, half
apologetically, the advantage gained by Nelson in doubling on the French
van at the Nile.

The Dutch, equally quixotic, refrained from taking advantage of the
enemy's inability to use his broadsides while thus approaching nearly
head-on. Arrayed in a close column, the ships about six hundred feet
apart, the crews at the guns, and the marines drawn up on the poops,
they waited in silence until the English, at 8 A.M., were in position at
half musket shot. Then the battle-flag was hoisted by each admiral, and
all opened together, the conflict raging with fury for nearly four
hours. It was the first time since the days of the great De Ruyter, more
than a century before, that these kindred people had thus met in fair
fight upon the sea. Equal in courage and in seamanship, and each
neglecting to seek a tactical advantage, the usual result followed. Many
men were killed and wounded, no ship was taken, and the combatants
separated after a drawn battle; but as one Dutch ship sank the next day,
and their convoy could not proceed, the British claimed a victory. Their
own merchant vessels, being on the return voyage, were able to complete
it.

Saumarez had shown his usual gallantry, and was again promoted. On the
23d of August, eighteen days after the action, he was made commander
into the _Tisiphone_, a small but fast cruiser, technically called a
fire-ship, and attached to the Channel fleet. In December, the British
government learned that a large number of transports and supply ships
were about to sail from Brest for the West Indies. These were to carry
troops and stores to the fleet of Count De Grasse, who had returned to
Martinique after the surrender at Yorktown, and was now about to
undertake the conquest of Jamaica. It was imperative to intercept an
expedition so essential to the success of the French plan, and Admiral
Kempenfelt--the same who afterwards, in the _Royal George_, "went down
with twice four hundred men"--was sent in pursuit with twelve
ships-of-the-line. The _Tisiphone_ accompanied them as lookout vessel,
and on the 12th of December, 1781, being then well ahead of the fleet,
she was able to signal the admiral that the enemy was in sight to
leeward with seventeen of-the-line; but that the latter, instead of
being between the British and the transports, were on the far side.
Kempenfelt, an able tactician as well as seaman, seized his advantage,
pushed between the men-of-war and the convoy, and carried off fifteen
sail laden with military and naval stores, of great money value and
greater military importance. More could not be done without risking a
battle with a too superior force. It was essential, therefore, to
apprise the British commander in the West Indies of the approach of the
French reinforcements as well as of Kempenfelt's successes, and the
_Tisiphone_ was the same day despatched on this errand.

Although he knew it not, Saumarez was now being borne by the tide which
leads on to fortune. The next step in promotion then fixed, and still
fixes, the seniority of a British officer, and the _Tisiphone's_
mission led him straight to it. Easily outsailing the unwieldy mass of
enemies, he reached Barbados, and there learned that the British fleet,
under Sir Samuel Hood, was anchored off the island of St. Christopher,
then invaded by a French army supported by De Grasse's fleet. The tenure
of the island depended upon a fort on Brimstone Hill, still held by the
British; and Hood, though much inferior in force, had by a brilliant
tactical move succeeded in dislodging De Grasse from his anchorage
ground, taking it himself, and establishing there his fleet in such
order that its position remained impregnable. The French, however,
continued cruising to the southward, off the adjoining island of Nevis,
where they interposed between Hood and Saumarez; and the latter could
reach his commander only by threading the reefs lining the passage
between the two islands,--a feat considered hazardous, if not
impracticable. Nevertheless, the _Tisiphone_ effected it by diligent
care and seamanship, joining the fleet on January 31st, 1782.

Saumarez now found himself in the midst of the most active operations,
at the opening of a campaign which promised to be of singular and
critical importance. But in the midst of his rejoicing at the good
fortune which had transferred him from the comparative inactivity of the
Channel fleet, a momentary reverse befell. Called by signal on board the
flag-ship, he received a bag of despatches, with orders to sail that
night for England. As he went dejectedly down the ship's side to his
boat and was shoving off, the gig of a post-captain pulled alongside.
"Hallo, Saumarez," said its occupant, "where are you going?" "To
England, I grieve to say." "Grieve!" rejoined the other. "I wish I were
in your place. I have been wanting this long time to go home for my
health. Hold on a moment; perhaps it can be arranged." The new-comer,
named Stanhope, went at once to the admiral, who a few minutes later
sent for Saumarez. Hood had learned to value the active young officer
who had taken a forward part in the guerilla enterprises of the fleet.
"Captain Saumarez," he said, "you know not how much I wish to serve you.
Captain Stanhope shall go home, as he desires, and you shall have
command of the _Russell_." The same night the _Tisiphone_ sailed;
Saumarez remaining as an acting post-captain, with a ship of
seventy-four guns under him.

Thus it happened that two months later, at the age of twenty-five,
Saumarez commanded a ship-of-the-line in Rodney's renowned battle of the
12th of April; with one exception the most brilliant and decisive action
fought by the British navy in a century. This circumstance alone would
have insured the confirmation of his rank by the Admiralty, even had he
not also eminently distinguished himself; but it was for him one of
those periods when inconstant fortune seems bent upon lavishing her
favors. He was near the head of the British column, as the hostile
fleets passed in opposite directions, exchanging broadsides. As his ship
cleared the French rear, a neighboring British vessel, commanded by one
of the senior captains, turned to pursue the enemy. Saumarez gladly
imitated him; but when the other resumed his former course, because the
admiral of the van, his immediate superior, had not turned, the
_Russell_ kept on after the French. At this moment, Rodney in the centre,
and Hood in the rear, favored by a change of wind, were breaking through
the French line. The _Russell's_ course carried her toward them, and
consequently, in the _melee_ which followed, she had the distinguished
honor of engaging De Grasse's flag-ship, and of being in action with her
when she surrendered. Indeed, although Saumarez with characteristic
modesty refrained from pressing his claim, he always, when questioned on
the subject, maintained that although the enemy's vessel certainly
struck to Hood's flag-ship, she did so immediately upon the latter
joining the _Russell_.

However regarded, this was a brilliant achievement for so young a
captain, less than a twelvemonth having elapsed since he was but a
lieutenant. Rodney, who had meanwhile signalled his van to go about, was
somewhat perplexed at finding a single ship thus opportunely in the
direction whence the _Russell_ appeared; and, upon being informed that
she belonged to the van squadron, declared that her commander had
distinguished himself above all others in the fleet. It proved, in fact,
the keen military sense of the demands of an occasion which constitutes
the born corps or division commander. This was Saumarez's third general
action, at a time when Nelson, although three years a post-captain, had
commanded only frigates, and had never seen a battle between fleets.
But, if Saumarez used well the singular opportunities with which fortune
favored him, it was characteristic of Nelson that his value transpired
through the simplest intercourse and amid the most commonplace incidents
of service. Men felt, rather than realized, that under the slight,
quaint, boyish exterior there lay the elements of a great man, who would
one day fulfil his own boast of climbing to the top of the tree; and he
had been made a full captain in 1779, when not quite twenty-one.
According to the rule of the British service, already mentioned, this
assured for life his precedence over Saumarez, promoted in 1782.

The latter, however, if outstripped by a younger competitor, who was to
become the greatest of British admirals, had secured a position of
vantage for that great war which then lay in the womb of the future.
Returning to England in 1782, he passed in retirement the ten years that
preceded the outbreak of hostilities with the French republic. During
this period he was twice called out for service upon occasions of war
threatening,--in 1787 with France, and in 1790 with Spain; but though in
each case appointed to a ship, the employment went no farther, as
hostilities were timely averted. This protracted withdrawal from active
pursuit of his profession, viewed in connection with his prolonged and
efficient service of the twenty following years, may be taken as
indicating two things: first, that to professional excellence once
attained such a break is not as fatal as is commonly argued; and second,
considered with his favorable entertainment of Cornwallis's proposal to
exchange into the army, this contentment with shore life during the
peace confirms the remark already made, that, although a thorough
seaman, Saumarez was so incidentally. His quickening interest was in the
military rather than the nautical side of his calling. Pellew, on the
contrary, now eagerly sought duty at sea, impelled thereto by clear
restless predilection as well as, possibly, by need of increased income.
It was during this interval of repose, in 1788, that Saumarez married; a
step which did not in his case entail the professional deterioration
charged against it by the cynical criticisms of St. Vincent. At this
time, also, he made a trip to France, upon the occasion of sinking the
first cone of the great Cherbourg breakwater, designed to give the
French navy a first-class arsenal upon the Channel,--a purpose which it
now fulfils. Louis XVI. was present at this ceremony, and treated
Saumarez with much attention. This was the only time that he ever set
foot upon French soil, although his home was in sight of the coast and
he spoke the language fluently.

When war with France again began, in 1793, Saumarez was appointed to the
frigate _Crescent_, of thirty-six guns, with which he served actively in
the Channel. In her, on the 20th of October, 1793, he succeeded in
intercepting the French frigate _Reunion_, of substantially equal force,
which he had learned was in the habit of quitting Cherbourg in pursuit
of British merchant vessels every night, returning in the morning. The
ensuing action called for an exhibition of seamanship which showed he
had not lost aptitude during his retirement. In the beginning he placed
the _Crescent_ on the weather quarter of the French ship,--that is, on
the windward side, but a little to the rear. This was well judged,
because (1) the all-important rudder is thus less exposed, (2) in case
of an unfavorable accident the adversary tends to leave rather than to
approach, and (3) the vessel, moving ahead, is at once under command to
stop short of the opponent. After being placed, speed was regulated by
backing or filling the mizzen-topsail, thus maintaining the relative
positions, and directing fire upon the enemy's rudder. In this situation
the fore-topsail yard and foretopmast of the _Crescent_ were shot away
in quick succession, and the ship flew up head to wind, bringing all her
sails aback. For a moment she was in an awkward plight, but the
_Reunion_, drawing away, could not rake; and Saumarez, by adroit
management of the rudder and sails, _backed_ his ship round,--always a
nice operation and especially when near an enemy,--till the wind came
again abaft, restoring the normal conditions of moving ahead under
control of the helm. The contest was then renewed, and ended in the
surrender of the French vessel. The disparity of loss--1 British to 118
French--proved the discipline of the _Crescent_ and the consummate
seamanship of her commander. For this exploit Saumarez was knighted.
Faithful to his constant preference, he as soon as possible exchanged
into a ship-of-the-line, the _Orion_, of seventy-four guns. In her he
again bore a foremost part, in 1795, in a fleet-battle off the Biscay
coast of France, where three enemy's ships were taken; and two years
later he was in the action with the Spaniards off Cape St. Vincent, of
which an account has been given in the sketch of Earl St. Vincent. After
this Saumarez remained on the same station, blockading Cadiz.

In the following year, 1798, it became necessary to send a small
detachment into the Mediterranean, and off the chief arsenal of the
enemy, Toulon, to ascertain the facts concerning a great armament, since
known as Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition, which rumor said was there in
preparation. The hazardous nature of the duty, which advanced three
ships of medium size, unsupported, in the very teeth of over a dozen
enemies, many of superior strength, demanded the utmost efficiency in
each member of the little body so exposed; a consideration which
doubtless led Lord St. Vincent to choose Saumarez, though one of the
senior captains, for this service, of which Nelson, the junior flag
officer of the fleet, was given charge.

It seems scarcely credible that, when it was afterwards decided to raise
this detachment to fourteen ships-of-the-line, sufficient to cope with
the enemy, both St. Vincent and Nelson wished to remove Saumarez, with
his antecedents of brilliant service, so as to allow Troubridge, his
junior, to be second in command. The fact, however, is certain. Nelson
had orders which would have allowed him to send the _Orion_ back, when
thus proceeding on a service pregnant with danger and distinction, to
the immeasurable humiliation of her brave commander. After making every
deduction for the known partiality for Troubridge of both St. Vincent
and Nelson, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Saumarez, with
all his undoubted merit, was in their eyes inferior to Troubridge in the
qualities necessary to chief command, in case of Nelson's death, at a
juncture which called for the highest abilities of a general officer.
The moment was too critical to permit mere favoritism to sway two such
men against their judgment. As it was, however, Nelson felt he could not
part with so efficient a ship; and he therefore contented himself with
giving Troubridge and Saumarez each a subdivision of four vessels,
keeping six under his own immediate direction.

As all know, the French, when found, were at anchor. Thus surprised, the
British fleet was hurled at them in a single mass; nor was there any
subordinate command exercised, by Saumarez or any other, except that of
each captain over his particular ship. Nelson's first expectation was to
overtake the unwieldy numbers of the enemy, amounting to over four
hundred sail, at sea, and there to destroy both convoy and escort. In
such an encounter there would be inestimable tactical advantage in those
compact subdivisions, which could be thrown as units, under a single
head, in a required direction. For such a charge Saumarez possessed most
eminent capacity.

The warm family affection that was among the many winning traits of
Saumarez's symmetrical and attractive character impelled him to copious
letter-writing. Hence we have a record of this pursuit of the French
fleet, with almost daily entries; an inside picture, reflecting the
hopes, fears, and perplexities of the squadron. Bonaparte's enterprise
has been freely condemned in later days as chimerical; but it did not so
appear at the time to the gallant seamen who frustrated it. The
preparations had been so shrouded in mystery that neither Nelson nor his
government had any certainty as to its destination,--an ignorance
shared by most of the prominent French officials. When, after many
surmises, the truth gradually transpired, the British officers realized
that much time must yet elapse before the English ministry could know
it. Two months, for instance, passed before news of the Battle of the
Nile reached London. Then, if India were the ultimate object, to which
Egypt was but the stepping-stone, four months more, at least, would be
needed to get a naval reinforcement to the threatened point. What if,
meanwhile, the ally of France in the peninsula, Tippoo Saib, had been
assembling transports with the secrecy observed at Toulon and the other
ports whence the divisions had sailed? "I dined with Sir Horatio
to-day," writes Saumarez on June 15th, nearly four weeks after
Bonaparte's starting, "and find that his intelligence extends only to
the enemy's fleet having been seen off Sicily; but we have reason to
suppose them gone for Alexandria, the distance from which to the Red Sea
is only three days' journey. They may soon be transported thence by
water to the East Indies, with the assistance of Tippoo Saib; and with
their numerous army they expect to drive us out of our possessions in
India. This profound scheme, _which is thought very feasible_, we hope
to frustrate by coming up with them before they reach the place of their
destination." A week later, Nelson received off Sicily news of the
surrender of Malta to the French. In accordance with the views above
expressed, Sir James now--June 22d--gave Nelson his written opinion,
favoring the course adopted of seeking the enemy off the coast of Egypt;
one of the most responsible decisions ever taken by an admiral in chief
command, especially at the beginning of a career, as Nelson then was.
"We are now crowding sail for Alexandria; but it is very doubtful if we
fall in with them at all, as we are proceeding on the merest conjecture,
and not on any positive information. If, at the end of our journey, we
find we are upon the wrong scent, our embarrassment will be great
indeed. Fortunately, I only act here _en second_; but did the chief
responsibility rest with me, I fear it would be more than my too
irritable nerves would bear." Nelson, in truth, was passing these hours
in a fever of anxiety, scarce able to eat or drink. Yet at that very
moment the British were crossing the enemy's wake, unseeing and unseen,
and barely fifty miles separated the two fleets.

The perplexity foreshadowed by Saumarez actually fell upon the English
admiral, through his reaching Alexandria three days before the French.
Harassed out of his better judgment, he hurried back to the westward,
touched at Sicily, and thence once more to Egypt. Meantime, the French
had landed successfully. On the 1st of August the British fleet again
sighted Alexandria; saw the French flag on the walls, but no ships of
war. "When the reconnoitring squadron made the signal that the enemy
was not there," wrote Saumarez, "despondency nearly took possession of
my mind, and I do not remember ever to have felt so utterly hopeless or
out of spirits as when we sat down to dinner. Judge, then, what a change
took place when, as the cloth was being removed, the officer of the
watch hastily came in, saying, 'Sir, a signal is just now made that the
enemy is in Aboukir Bay, and moored in a line of battle.' All sprang
from their seats, and, only staying to drink a bumper to our success, we
were in a moment on deck." As the captain appeared, the crew hailed him
with three hearty cheers, a significant token of the gloom which had
wrapped the entire squadron through the recent ordeal of suspense and
disappointment.

It is only with Saumarez's share in this renowned battle that we are
here concerned. As is generally known, Nelson's tactics consisted in
doubling upon the van and centre of the enemy, who lay at anchor in a
column head to wind, or nearly so. Their rear, being to leeward, was
thus thrown out of action. The French had thirteen ships-of-the-line, of
which one was of one hundred and twenty guns, and two eighties. The
British also had thirteen, all seventy-fours, and one of fifty guns; but
one of the former going aground left them equal in numbers and inferior
in force. There were two successive acts in the drama. In the first, ten
British ships engaged the eight leading French; in the second, the
fifty and two of the seventy-fours, which had been belated, came upon
the field and strengthened the attack upon the enemy's centre. The
_Orion_, being third in the order, was one of the five vessels which
passed within the French, and fought on that side. In so doing, she
described a wide sweep around her two predecessors. While thus standing
down to her station, an enemy's frigate, the _Serieuse_, opened fire
upon her, wounding two men. It was then part of the chivalrous comity of
fleet-actions that frigates should not be molested by the
ships-of-the-line, so long as they minded their own business,--an
immunity which of course ceased if they became aggressive. Saumarez was
urged to return her fire. "No," he replied, "let her alone; she will get
bolder and come nearer. Shorten sail." She did draw nearer, and then the
_Orion_, swinging sharply towards her, let drive her broadside of
double-shotted guns. All the masts of the unlucky frigate went
overboard, and she shortly sank, nothing but her poop being visible the
next day. The helm of the British vessel was then shifted, but so much
ground had been lost that she could anchor only abreast the fifth French
ship; the interval left being filled by those who followed. In this
position the _Orion_ silenced her immediate opponent, the _Peuple
Souverain_, which, being in an hour and a half totally dismasted, cut
her cables and dropped out of the line; the contest being then
continued with the sixth in the French order, the _Franklin_, next ahead
of the flag-ship, _Orient_. The _Orion_ was thus near by the latter when
she blew up, but the few burning fragments which fell on board were
quickly extinguished.

Twenty-four hours after the battle, Saumarez, who had been delayed till
then by a severe wound from a splinter, went on board the flag-ship to
call on the admiral; and to this visit we owe the knowledge of two
closely related incidents, recorded by his biographer and friend, which
are significant at once of his individual ideas on tactical combination,
and of the lack of personal sympathy apparent between him and Nelson. He
"found several of his brother officers on the quarter-deck, discussing
the merits of the action. Some regret having been expressed at the
escape of the two sternmost ships of the French line, Sir James said to
the admiral, 'It was unfortunate we did not--' and was proceeding to say
'all anchor on the same side.' But, before he could finish the sentence,
Nelson hastily interrupted him, exclaiming, 'Thank God there was no
order!' Then turning the conversation, he entered his cabin and sent for
Captain Ball.... We may relate the circumstances which induced Saumarez,
without the least intention to offend, to make the observation at which
offence was taken. It was Nelson's custom, when in communication or
company with the captains under his command, to converse with them on
the various modes of attacking the enemy under different circumstances;
and, on one of these occasions, Sir James Saumarez, who had seen the
evil consequences of _doubling_ on the enemy, especially in a night
action, had differed with the admiral in that plan of attack, saying
that 'it never required two English ships to capture one French, and
that the damage which they must necessarily do each other might render
them both unable to fight an enemy's ship that had not been engaged;
and, as in this case two ships could be spared to the three-decker,
everyone might have his opponent.'"

Inasmuch as Nelson, in pursuance of his previously announced idea, had
himself in the flag-ship--the sixth to enter action--set the example of
_doubling_, by anchoring on the side of the enemy's line opposite to
that of his first five ships, and in doing so had deliberately taken
position on one side of a French vessel already engaged on the other,
Saumarez's remark was substantially a censure, inopportune to a degree
singular in a man of his kindly and generous temper; and its reception
by Nelson is not a cause for surprise. On the other hand, as a matter of
tactical criticism, based upon tactical conceptions previously adopted,
if we assume it to be true that two British ships were not needed to
capture one French, it may yet be confidently affirmed that to attack
with decisively superior force a part of the enemy's order--to combine
in short--is shown by experience to attain the same degree of success
more certainly and at less cost than the simple distribution of effort
advocated by Saumarez. To double, and to beat in detail, remained the
ideal of Nelson, as it had been of Howe. It was by him applied then and
afterwards to all cases, small or great, actual or supposed. To it he
chiefly owed his dazzling successes, and this divergence of ideals marks
the difference in professional insight which mainly determines the
relative positions of Nelson and Saumarez in naval biography. It
indicates the distinction between the great general officer and the
accomplished and resolute division or corps commander.

At the Battle of the Nile Saumarez received the only wound that ever
fell to him throughout his numerous meetings with the enemy, being
struck on the thigh and side by a heavy splinter, which had killed two
officers before reaching him. The total loss of his ship was forty-two
killed and wounded, out of a crew of six hundred. Ten days after the
action he was ordered to take charge of six of the prizes, which had
been partly repaired, and with seven of the fleet to convoy them to
Gibraltar. At the same time he was notified that the _Orion_ was to go
home as soon as this duty was performed. A more charming prospect can
scarcely be imagined than this returning to his family after a long
absence, fresh from the completest achievement ever wrought by the
British navy; but even his tranquil temper, whose expressions never
lapse into the complaints of Nelson or the querulousness of Collingwood,
was tried by the slow progress of his battered and crippled squadron.
"The prizes get on very slowly," he writes; "but I am endowed with
unparalleled patience, having scarcely uttered a murmur at their
tardiness, so perfectly satisfied am I with the prospect before me."
Some time later he notes: "We have been three weeks effecting what might
be accomplished in two days. This extraordinary delay makes me more
fractious than can be imagined, and I begin to lose the character for
patience which I had given myself, by so tiresome a situation." It was
still the season of westerly winds, and the voyage from Alexandria to
Gibraltar occupied sixty-nine days.

The _Orion_ was now completely worn out, having been continuously in
commission since the war began in 1793. Besides the three general
actions in which Saumarez commanded her, she had borne a valiant part in
Howe's great battle of the 1st of June. "This last business has so
shattered the poor _Orion_" wrote Saumarez, "that she will not, without
considerable repairs, be in a state for more service." On reaching
England she was paid off; and in February, 1799, he was appointed to the
_Caesar_, of eighty-four guns, one of the finest ships in the navy, which
was to bear his flag in the last and most brilliant episode of his
hard-fighting career.

A year later, Lord St. Vincent, having returned from the Mediterranean,
took command of the Channel Fleet, and at once instituted in its
methods, and particularly in the blockade of Brest, changes which
gradually revolutionized the character of the general naval war;
baffling beyond any other single cause the aims of Napoleon, and
insuring the fall of his empire. One of the new requirements was the
maintenance of a powerful advanced division of six or eight
ships-of-the-line, within ten miles of the harbor's mouth. It was a duty
singularly arduous, demanding neither dash nor genius, but calmness,
steadiness, method, and seamanship of a high order, for all which
Saumarez was conspicuous. From either side of the Bay of Brest a long
line of reefs projects for fifteen miles to the westward. Far inside
their outer limits, and therefore embayed by the westerly winds which
blow at times with hurricane violence, was the station of the advanced
squadron, off some well-marked rocks of the northern reef, known as the
Black Rocks. On this spot, called Siberia by the seamen, during fifteen
weeks, from August to December, Sir James Saumarez kept so close a watch
that not a vessel of any force entered or left Brest. "With you there,"
wrote Earl St. Vincent, "I sleep as sound as if I had the key of Brest
in my pocket." No work ever done by him was more meritorious or more
useful. Near its expiration St. Vincent wrote to him, "The employment
you have conducted is the most important of this war." He there
demonstrated that what before had apparently been thought impossible
could be done, though involving a degree of anxiety and peril far
exceeding that of battle, while accompanied by none of the distinction,
nor even recognition, which battle bestows. "None but professional men
who have been on that service," says his biographer with simple truth,
"can have any idea of its difficulties,--surrounded by dangers of every
kind, exposed to the violence of storms, sailing amidst a multitude of
rocks and variable currents in the longest and darkest nights, and often
on a lee shore on the enemy's coast, while the whole of their fleet is
near, ready to take advantage of any disaster." Collingwood, who in the
next war succeeded to the same unenviable duty, wrote home that, even in
the summer month of August, "I bid adieu to comfortable naps at night,
never lying down but in my clothes. An anxious time I have of it, what
with tides and rocks, which have more of danger in them than a battle
once a week." In this laborious task Saumarez was the patient,
unobserved pioneer.

There was one man, however, who could and did recognize to the full the
quality of the work done by Saumarez, and its value to those sagacious
plans which he himself had framed, and which in the future were to sap
the foundations of the French power. That man was St. Vincent. "The
merit of Sir James Saumarez," he said, "cannot be surpassed;" and
again, to Saumarez himself, "The manner in which you have conducted the
advanced squadron calls upon me to repeat my admiration of it."
Succeeding soon after to the post of First Lord of the Admiralty, he
gave him an opportunity for distinction, which resulted in an action of
singular lustre and striking success.

Bonaparte, long before returned from Egypt, and now, as First Consul,
practically the absolute ruler of France, had overthrown all enemies on
the Continent. Peace with Austria, after her disasters of Marengo and
Hohenlinden, had been signed in February, 1801. The great objects of the
French ruler now were to compass a maritime peace and withal to retain
Egypt, associated from far back with the traditional policies of France,
and moreover a conquest in which his own reputation was peculiarly
interested. To compel Great Britain to peace, he sought, by diplomacy or
force, to exclude her commerce from the Continent, as well as to raise
up maritime enemies against her. Thus he had fostered, if not actually
engendered, the Baltic league of 1801, shattered by Nelson at
Copenhagen; and for this purpose he intended to occupy both Portugal and
the kingdom of Naples. A powerful British expedition against Egypt had
entered the Mediterranean. It was essential either to attack this
directly, or to <DW36> its communications. Unable to do the former,
and persistently thwarted in his attempts to reinforce his own troops in
that distant dependency by the close watch of the British navy, of which
Saumarez gave so conspicuous an illustration before Brest, Napoleon
resorted to the common and sound military expedient of collecting a
threatening force upon the flank of his enemy's line of communications.
He directed a concentration of the Spanish and French navies at Cadiz,
which, by its nearness to the straits, met the desired requirement.
Among others, three French ships were ordered thither from Toulon.

The British ministry was informed that at Cadiz were collecting Spanish
vessels, said by report to be intended against Portugal. This is
unlikely, as Bonaparte could have subdued that country from the land
side by the assistance of Spain; moreover, the object of the
concentration is stated in his letters. A squadron of five
ships-of-the-line was accordingly formed, and placed under the command
of Saumarez, who on the 1st of January, 1801, had been made a rear
admiral. His orders were to go off Cadiz, where he would find two more
vessels, and to prevent the enemies within the port from sailing, or
from being joined by any from outside. Whatever Bonaparte's object, it
would be thwarted by a force thus interposed, in a position to meet
either one or the other of the converging detachments before they could
unite.

Saumarez sailed on his mission June 16, 1801, and on the 28th arrived
off Cadiz. On the 5th of July he was informed that three French ships
had anchored off Algeciras, the Spanish port on the west side of
Gibraltar Bay, confronting the British fortress on the east side. This
was the division from Toulon, which upon reaching the straits first
learned of the British squadron that effectually prevented its entrance
to Cadiz.

Saumarez at once started for Algeciras with six of his
ships-of-the-line, the seventh being out of recall to the northward. The
following day, July 6th, he entered the bay, and found the French moored
in a strong position, under cover of Spanish land batteries, and
supported by a number of gunboats. Still, though difficult and doubtful,
the enterprise was not hopeless; and, as the breeze allowed his vessels
to head for the enemy, he steered to engage at once. Unfortunately, the
wind fell as the squadron drew nigh, and only four ships were able to
take their intended places; the other two had to anchor outside their
consorts, and fire as they could through the intervals. This mishap
lessened by one-third the fighting power of the British, and, coupled
with the acknowledged superiority of guns on solid ground over those
afloat, reduced them to inferiority. Their disadvantage was increased by
the arrangements of the French admiral, carefully elaborated during the
two preceding days. Had the preparations of Brueys at the Nile equalled
those of Linois at Algeciras, Nelson's task must have been harder and
his victory less complete. Nevertheless, after an engagement of an hour
and a half, the British fire so far prevailed that the enemy resorted to
a measure for which precautions had been taken beforehand. Lines had
been run from each French ship to the shoal water lying close inside
them; and by means of these they were warped away from their opponents
until they took the ground. This increase of distance was in every way a
gain to the party standing on the defensive, and a corresponding loss to
the assailants. Saumarez ordered the cables cut and sail made to close
once more; but the light and fickle airs both baffled this effort and
further embarrassed the British, through the difficulty of keeping their
broadsides in position. Here happened the great disaster of the day. One
of the outer ships, the _Hannibal_, tried to pass inside the headmost of
the French, not realizing that the latter had moved. In so doing she ran
aground close under a battery, to whose fire she could make no reply.
After a brave and prolonged resistance, in which she lost seventy-five
killed and seventy wounded out of a crew of six hundred, and had many of
her guns dismounted, she hauled down her flag. By this time another
ship, the _Pompee_, was dismasted, and success was plainly hopeless. The
British admiral, therefore, ordered the action discontinued, and
withdrew to the Gibraltar side; the _Pompee_ having to be towed away by
the boats of the squadron.

Saumarez had failed, and failure, however explained, can hardly be
carried to a man's credit; but his after course, by wresting success out
of seemingly irretrievable disaster, has merited the highest eulogium.
Maintaining both courage and energy unimpaired, every effort was
instantly made to get the ships once more into fighting condition, that
the attack might be renewed. "Tell the Admiralty," said he to the bearer
of his despatches, "that I feel confident I shall soon have an
opportunity of attacking the enemy again, and that they may depend upon
my availing myself of it."

The opportunity did come. On the morning of July 9th, the _Superb_, the
seventh ship, which had not been in the action, was seen rounding the
west point of the bay under all sail, with a signal flying that the
enemy was in pursuit. A few moments later appeared five Spanish vessels,
two of which, the _Real Carlos_ and the _Hermenegildo_, carrying each
one hundred and twelve guns, were among the largest then afloat. On
board them had embarked a number of the _jeunesse doree_ of Cadiz, eager
to join the triumphal procession which it was thought would soon enter
the port, flushed with a victory considered by them to be rather Spanish
than French, and escorting the rare trophy of a British ship-of-the-line
that had struck to Spanish batteries. Besides the two giants, there
were a ninety-gun ship and two seventy-fours; and the next day a French
vessel of the latter class joined, making a total reinforcement of six
heavy ships.

To these Saumarez could oppose but five. The _Hannibal_ he had lost. The
_Pompee_ could not be repaired in time; her people were therefore
distributed among the other vessels of the squadron. Even his own
flag-ship, the _Caesar_, was so injured that he thought it impossible to
refit her; but when her crew heard his decision, one cry arose,--to work
all day and night till she was ready for battle. This was zeal not
according to knowledge; but, upon the pleading of her captain in their
name, it was agreed that they should work all day, and by watches at
night. So it happened, by systematic distribution of effort and
enthusiastic labor, that the _Caesar_, whose mainmast on the 9th was out
and her rigging cut to pieces, was on the 12th able to sail in pursuit
of the foe.

During the forenoon of the latter day the combined squadron was seen
getting under way. The wind, being easterly, was fair for the British,
and, besides, compelled the enemy to make some tacks to clear the land.
This delay was invaluable to Saumarez, whose preparations, rapid as they
had been, were still far from complete. Not till one in the afternoon
did the headmost Spaniards reach the straits, and there they had to
await their companions. The _Hannibal_ was unable to join them, and
reanchored at Algeciras. At half-past two the _Caesar_ hauled out from
Gibraltar mole, her band playing, "Cheer up, my lads, 't is to glory we
steer!" which was answered from the mole-head with "Britons, strike
home!" At the same moment Saumarez's flag, provisionally shifted to
another vessel, was rehoisted at her masthead. The rugged flanks of the
rock and the shores of Algeciras were crowded with eager and cheering
sight-seers, whose shouts echoed back the hurrahs of the seamen. Rarely,
indeed, is so much of the pride and circumstance, if not of the pomp, of
war rehearsed before an audience which, breathless with expectation, has
in it no part save to admire and applaud.

Off Europa Point, on the Gibraltar side, there clustered round the
_Caesar_ her four consorts, all but one bearing, like herself, the still
fresh wounds of the recent conflict. Four miles away, off Cabrita Point,
assembled the three French of Linois's division, having like honorable
marks, together with the six new unscarred arrivals. At 8 P.M. of the
summer evening the allies kept away for Cadiz; Linois's division
leading, the other six interposing between them and the five ships of
Saumarez, which followed at once. It was a singular sight, this pursuit
of nine ships by five, suggestive of much of the fatal difference, in
ideals and efficiency, between the navies concerned. Towards nine
o'clock Saumarez ordered the _Superb_, whose condition alone was
unimpaired by battle, to press ahead and bring the rear of the enemy to
action. The wind was blowing strong from the east, with a heavy sea. At
half-past eleven the _Superb_ overtook the _Real Carlos_, and opened
fire. Abreast the Spanish vessel, on her other side, was the
_Hermenegildo_. The latter, probably through receiving some of the
_Superb's_ shot, fancied the ship nearest her to be an enemy, and
replied. In the confusion, one of them caught fire, the other ran on
board her, and in a few moments there was presented to the oncoming
British the tremendous sight of these two huge ships, with their twenty
hundred men, locked in a fast embrace and blazing together. At half-past
two in the morning, having by that time drifted apart, they blew up in
quick succession.

Leaving them to their fate, the hostile squadron passed on. The _Superb_
next encountered the _St. Antoine_, and forced her to strike. Soon
afterwards the wind died away, and both fleets were much scattered. A
British ship brought to action one of the French which had been in the
first battle; indeed, the French accounts say that the latter had fought
three enemies. However that may be, she was again severely mauled; but
the English vessel opposed to her ran on a shoal, and lost all her
masts. With this ended the events of that awful night.

The net results of this stirring week completely relieved the fears of
the British ministers. Whatever the objects of the concentration at
Cadiz, they were necessarily frustrated. Though the first attack was
repulsed, the three French ships had been very roughly handled; and, of
the relieving force, three out of six were now lost to the enemy. "Sir
James Saumarez's action has put us upon velvet," wrote St. Vincent, then
head of the Admiralty; and in the House of Peers he highly eulogized the
admiral's conduct, as also did Nelson. The former declared that "this
gallant achievement surpassed everything he had ever met with in his
reading or service," a statement sufficiently sweeping; while the praise
of the hero of the Nile was the more to be prized because there never
was cordial sympathy between him and Saumarez. Closely as they had been
associated, Nelson's letters to his brother officer began always "My
dear Sir James," not "My dear Saumarez."

In this blaze of triumph the story of Saumarez fitly terminates. He was
never again engaged in serious encounter with the enemy. The first war
with the French republic ended three months after the battle of
Algeciras. After the second began, in 1803, he was, until 1807,
commander-in-chief at the Channel Islands, watching the preparations for
the invasion of England, and counteracting the efforts of cruisers
against British commerce. In 1808, in consequence of the agreements of
Tilsit between the Czar and Napoleon, affairs in the Baltic became such
as to demand the presence of a large British fleet,--first to support
Sweden, then at war with Russia, and later to protect the immense
British trade, which, under neutral flags and by contraband methods,
maintained by way of the northern sea the intercourse of Great Britain
with the Continent. Of this trade Sweden was an important intermediary,
and her practical neutrality was essential to its continuance. This was
insured by the firm yet moderate attitude of Sir James Saumarez, even
when she had been forced by France to declare war against Great Britain.

It may be said without exaggeration that from this time, and until the
breach between Napoleon and Russia in 1812, the maritime interest of the
war between Great Britain and France centred in the Baltic. Elsewhere
the effective but monotonous blockade of the continental ports
controlled by the French Emperor absorbed the attention of the British
fleets. Of great battles there were none after Trafalgar. To Saumarez,
therefore, fell the most distinctive, and probably also the most
decisive, field of work open to the British navy. The importance of the
Baltic was twofold. It was then the greatest source of materials
essential to ship-building--commonly called naval stores; and further,
the Russian part of its coast line, being independent of Napoleon's
direct regulation, was the chief means of approach by which Great
Britain maintained commercial intercourse with the Continent, to exclude
her from which had become the leading object with the Emperor. The
contravention of his policy in this way, in disregard, as he claimed, of
the agreements existing between him and the Czar, led eventually to the
Russian war, and so finally to his own overthrow and the deliverance of
the Continent from his domination.

The historical significance of the position now occupied by Saumarez,
and its importance to the great issues of the future, are thus manifest.
It was a post that he was eminently qualified to fill. Firm, yet calm,
sagacious, and moderate, he met with rare efficiency the varied and
varying demands of those changeful times. The unremitting and well
directed efforts of his cruisers broke up reciprocal commerce between
the countries surrounding the narrow inland sea, so essential to their
welfare while submitting to Napoleon; while the main fleet sustained the
foreign trade with Russia and Sweden, carried on through neutral ships
for the advantage of Great Britain. Two instances will illustrate his
activities better than many words. In the year 1809 four hundred and
thirty local vessels were captured, averaging the small size of sixty
tons each, three hundred and forty of which belonged to Denmark, then
under Napoleon's absolute sway. At the close of the open season of 1810,
the merchant ships for England, which ordinarily were despatched under
convoy in bodies of five hundred, numbered, according to Saumarez's
flag-lieutenant and biographer, no less than one thousand vessels,
gathered in one mass.

As long as Sweden remained friendly, the admiral's duties, though
weighty, did not differ materially from those usual to his profession;
but when she was unwillingly forced into a declaration of war by
Napoleon, his task became more complicated and more delicate. The
British minister having to leave, Saumarez succeeded to a diplomatic
situation, in which the problem was to support the interests and dignity
of his own nation, without transforming the formal war into actual
hostilities, and substituting imbitterment for the secret good will of
the Swedish government and people, who, in common with the Russian
nobles and subjects, were alienated by the imperious and merciless
exactions of the French demands. The secret aim of Great Britain was so
to nourish this ill-will towards France, and so to avoid causes of
offence by herself, as to convert covert hostility into open antagonism,
and thus to reverse the political and military combinations of Europe.
In the absence of regular accredited diplomatic representatives,
Saumarez became at once the exponent and the minister of this vital
policy. He had to avoid quarrels, and yet at the same time to restrain
Sweden from acts of injury to which she was constantly impelled by the
Emperor, whose purpose naturally was exactly the opposite of his; and
who sought further to estrange all people from Great Britain.

In the performance of this task Saumarez's success was not only
complete, but peculiarly his own. His temper was at times severely
tried, but it never got beyond his control. He repressed injury, and
demanded satisfaction for it, when committed; but, relying with good
reason on the motives of the Swedish government, he contrived to secure
redress without resorting to force, which, however understood by
statesmen, would enrage the peoples he had to conciliate. After the
ordeal was over, and Russia was at war with France, a leading Swedish
statesman wrote to him: "You have been the guardian angel of my country;
by your wise, temperate, and loyal conduct, you have been the first
cause of the plans which have been formed against the demon of the
continent.... Once more I must tell you, that _you_ were the first cause
that Russia had dared to make war against France; had you fired one
shot when we declared war against England, all had been ended and Europe
would have been enslaved." Saumarez, an extremely religious man, may
have reflected that "he who ruleth his spirit is greater than he that
taketh a city."

Though in the strictest sense professional, the Baltic service of
Saumarez involved little of purely military interest. Shortly after his
assuming the command, in 1808, a Russian fleet which had been keeping
the sea took refuge, on the approach of the allied British and Swedes,
in a harbor on the Gulf of Finland. Saumarez followed close upon their
heels, and after a consultation and reconnoissance of the position,
which consumed two days, secured the co-operation of the Swedish admiral
for an attack on the day following; an essential condition, for the
Russian force was superior to his own in the proportion of eight to six.
Unhappily, the wind shifted, and blew an adverse gale for eight days; at
the end of which time the enemy had so far fortified the surroundings
that Saumarez thought it inexpedient to attack. In this decision he was
supported by the opinion of captains of such established reputation as,
joined to his own brilliant record, must be taken to justify his action,
which seems to have caused some dissatisfaction in England. On the face,
it could not but be a disappointment to people accustomed to the
brilliant victories of Nelson, and his apparent invincibility by
obstacles; but in the end it was all for the best, for doubtless the
mortifying destruction of a Russian fleet would not have furthered the
reconciliation, which soon became a leading object with the British
government and the great bulk of the Russian nation. It is, however,
probable that to this frustration of public expectation, which had been
vividly aroused by preceding accounts of the conditions, is to be
attributed the delay in granting the peerage, eagerly desired by
Saumarez in his later days,--not for itself merely, but as a recognition
which he not unnaturally thought earned by his long and distinguished
service. Saumarez held the Baltic command through five eventful
years,--from 1808 to 1812. After Napoleon's disastrous Russian
expedition, affairs in that sea no longer required a force adequate to
his rank, and he then finally retired from service afloat, still in the
full maturity of a healthy prime, at the age of fifty-five. The
remainder of his life, with brief exception, was passed in his native
island of Guernsey, amid those charms of family affection and general
esteem which he had deserved by his fidelity to all the duties of the
man and the citizen. Though so far removed from the active centres of
life, he kept touch with it by the variety of his interests in all
useful and benevolent undertakings, to which an ample fortune allowed
him freely to contribute. "The hopes entertained of his assistance and
sympathy," observes his biographer, "were never disappointed." Among
naval biographies, there is none that presents a more pleasing picture
of genial and dignified enjoyment of well-earned repose. In 1831, upon
the accession of William IV., the Sailor King, the long-coveted peerage
was at last bestowed. Lord de Saumarez died on the 9th of October, 1836,
in his eightieth year.




PELLEW

1757-1833


Like the English tongue itself, the names of British seamen show the
composite origin of their nation. As the Danes after the day of
Copenhagen, to them both glorious and disastrous, claimed that in Nelson
they had been vanquished by a man of their own blood, descended from
their Viking forefathers; as Collingwood and Troubridge indicate the
English descent of the two closest associates of the victor of
Trafalgar; so Saumarez and the hero of this sketch, whose family name
was Pellew, represent that conquering Norman race which from the shores
of the Northern ocean carried terror along the coasts of Europe and the
Mediterranean, and as far inland as their light keels could enter. After
the great wars of the French Revolution and the Battle of Algiers, when
Lord Exmouth had won his renown and his position had been attained,
kinship with him was claimed by a family still residing in Normandy,
where the name was spelled "Pelleu." Proof of common origin was offered,
not only in the name, but also in the coat of arms. In England, the
Pellew family was settled in the extreme southwest, in Cornwall and
Devonshire, counties whose nearness to the great Atlantic made them the
source of so much of the maritime enterprise that marked the reign of
Elizabeth. Lord Exmouth's grandfather was a man of wealth; but, as he
left many children, the juniors had to shift for themselves, and the
youngest son, Samuel Pellew, the father of the admiral, at the time of
the latter's birth commanded a post-office packet on the Dover station.
He accordingly made the town of that name the home of his wife and
children; and there Edward, the second of his four sons, was born, April
19, 1757. Their mother was the daughter of a Jacobite gentleman, who had
been out for the Pretender in 1715,--a fact which probably emphasized
the strong Hanoverian sympathies of Samuel Pellew, whose habit was to
make his children, every Sunday, drink King George's health upon their
knees.

In 1765, when the future admiral was only eight years old, his father
died, and the mother making an imprudent marriage three years later, the
children were thrown upon the world with small provision and scanty
care. The resolute, active, and courageous character of the lads,
however, brought them well forward among their equals in age. At school
Edward was especially distinguished for fearlessness. Of this he gave a
marked instance, when not yet twelve, by entering a burning house where
gunpowder was stored, which no other of the bystanders would approach.
Alone and with his own hands the lad brought out the powder. A less
commendable but very natural result of the same energetic spirit was
shown in the numerous fighting matches in which he was engaged. Being
threatened with a flogging for one of these, the circumstance became the
immediate occasion of his going to sea. If flogged, he declared, he
would run away; and as a decided taste for seafaring life had already
manifested itself, his guardian thought better to embrace at once the
more favorable alternative and enter him regularly in the navy. He thus
went afloat towards the end of 1770, the date at which Nelson, also,
though one year younger, began his career.

His first cruise was in the Mediterranean. It came to a premature end
through a quarrel between the commander of the ship and one of the
midshipmen. In this the captain was clearly and grossly in the wrong;
yet nevertheless carried his resentment, and the power of oppression in
his hands, then little restrained by law, so far as to expel the
youngster from the ship and set him on shore in Marseilles. Pellew
insisted upon accompanying his messmate, and the two lads of fourteen,
aided by some of the lieutenants, secured a passage home. It shows a
pleasing trait in our hero's character that, some years afterwards, he
advanced materially the professional fortunes of the son of the officer
who had thus abused his authority.

He next passed under the command of a Captain Pownoll, between whom and
himself were established such warm relations, of affectionate interest
on the one side and reverential regard on the other, that Pownoll became
a family name among the descendants of the admiral. He himself gave it
to his first-born, and it still appears in the present generation. Under
him, also, Pellew was brought into direct contact with the American
Revolution; for on board the frigate _Blonde_, Pownoll's ship, General
Burgoyne embarked in 1775 for Canada, there beginning the undertaking
which ended so disastrously for him. It is told that when the
distinguished passenger came on board, the yards being manned to receive
him with the honors due to his rank, he was startled to see on one
yardarm a midshipman standing on his head. Upon expressing alarm, he was
laughingly reassured by the captain, who said that Pellew--for he it was
who put this extra touch upon the general's reception--was quite capable
of dropping from the yard, passing under the ship's bottom, and coming
up on the other side. A few days later the young officer actually did
leap from the yardarm, the ship going fast through the water--not,
however, as bravado, but to aid a seaman who had fallen overboard, and
whom he succeeded in saving.

Throughout his youth the exuberant vitality of the man delighted in
these feats of wanton power. To overturn a boat by press of canvas, as a
frolic, is not unexampled among lads of daring; but it is at least
unusual, when a hat goes overboard, to follow it into the water, if
alone in a boat under sail. This Pellew did, on one occasion, when he
was old enough to know better; being at the moment in the open Channel,
in a small punt, going from Falmouth to Plymouth. The freak nearly cost
him his life; for, though he had lashed the helm down and hove-to the
boat, she fell off and gathered way whenever he approached. When at last
he laid hold of her rail, after an hour of this fooling, barely strength
remained to drag himself on board, where he fell helpless, and waited
long before his powers were restored. It is trite to note in such
exhibitions of recklessness many of the qualities of the ideal seaman,
though not so certainly those of the foreordained commander-in-chief.
Pellew was a born frigate captain.

At the end of 1775 the Americans were still engaged in the enterprise
against Quebec, the disastrous termination of which is familiarly known.
After the fall of General Montgomery in the unsuccessful night assault
of December 31, 1775, the American operations were reduced to a land
blockade of the town, which was cut off from the sea by ice in the
river. A close investment was thus maintained for five months, until
the early part of May, 1776, when the place was relieved by the arrival
of a small naval force, commanded by Captain Charles Douglas.
Immediately upon its appearance the commanding British general Carleton,
attacked the besiegers, who, already prostrated by disease and
privation, abandoned their positions and fell back upon Sorel, at the
mouth of the river Richelieu, the outlet from Lake Champlain to the St.
Lawrence. Here they remained until June, when the enemy, who had
received heavy reinforcements, advanced in overpowering numbers. The
Americans again retired above the rapids of the Richelieu to St. Johns.
Thence there is a clear channel southward; and embarking there, the
retreating force without further molestation reached Crown Point, a
fortified post a hundred miles distant, at the head of the lake,
commanding the narrow stream to which it is reduced in its upper part.
Twelve miles above Crown Point is Ticonderoga, the well-known border
fortress of the Colonial and Revolutionary wars; and for fifteen or
twenty miles farther the stream is navigable for boats of some size,
thus affording an easy means of communication in those early days of
impassable forests and scanty transport.

Though greatly superior on land, the British had now for a time to stay
their pursuit; for the water highway essential to its continuance was
controlled by the flotilla under the command of Benedict Arnold,
forbidding further advance until it was subdued. The presence of these
vessels, which, though few, were as yet unopposed, gained for the
Americans, in this hour of extremity, the important respite from June to
October, 1776; and then the lateness of the season compelled the
postponement of the invasion to the following year. The toil with which
this little force had been created, a few months before, was thus amply
justified; for delay is ever to the advantage of the defence. In this
case it also gave time for a change of commanders on the part of the
enemy, from Carleton to Burgoyne, which not improbably had a decisive
effect upon the fortunes of the next campaign.

As soon as established at St. Johns, the British took steps to place a
naval force upon the lake, an undertaking involving trouble and delay,
notwithstanding their greatly superior resources in men and material.
Some thirty fighting vessels, suitable to the waters upon which they
were to act, were required, and also four hundred bateaux for the
transport of the troops. These had either to be built upon the spot,
despite the lack of all dockyard facilities, or else to be brought
bodily from the St. Lawrence, by road, or through the rapids of the
Richelieu, until the deep water at St. Johns was reached. In this hardy,
strenuous work, Pellew naturally was conspicuously active; and in its
course he gained a particular professional accomplishment which
afterwards stood him in good stead. Several vessels were built upon the
shores of the stream; among others, one of one hundred and eighty tons,
the _Inflexible_, whose heavier timbers were brought overland to St.
Johns. The construction of these craft was superintended by a
lieutenant--afterwards Admiral Schank--of scientific knowledge as a ship
architect; and through close association with him Pellew's instinctive
appreciation of all things nautical received an intelligent guidance,
which gave him a quick insight into the probable behavior of a ship from
an examination of her build, and enabled him often to suggest a suitable
remedy for dangerous faults. During this period of equipment occurred a
characteristic incident which has only recently become public through a
descendant.[15] "On the day the _Inflexible_ was launched, Pellew on the
top of the sheers was trying to get in the mainmast. The machinery not
being of the best gave way, and down came mainmast, Pellew, and all,
into the lake. 'Poor Pellew,' exclaimed Schank, 'he is gone at last!'
However, he speedily emerged and was the first man to mount the sheers
again. 'Sir,' Admiral Schank used to conclude, 'he was like a
squirrel.'"

Thirty days after the keel of the _Inflexible_ was laid at St. Johns,
the vessel herself not only was launched, but had set sail for the
southward. She carried eighteen twelve-pounders, nine on a side, and was
thus superior in power, not only to any one vessel of the Americans, but
to their whole assembled flotilla on Lake Champlain. Except the
principal pieces of her hull, the timber of which she was built was
hewed in the neighboring forest; and indeed, the whole story of the
rapid equipment of this squadron recalls vividly the vigorous
preparation of Commander Perry, of the United States navy, in 1813, for
his successful attempt to control Lake Erie. The entire British force,
land and naval, now moved toward Crown Point. On the 11th of October the
American flotilla was discovered, a short distance above Plattsburg and
about twenty miles from the foot of the lake, drawn up between Valcour
Island and the western shore, which are from one-half to three-fourths
of a mile apart. It lay there so snugly that the British, wafted by a
northwest wind, had actually passed to the southward without seeing it,
and the discovery was purely accidental,--a fact which suggests that
Arnold, who must have felt the impossibility of a force so inferior as
his own contesting, or even long delaying, the enemy's advance by direct
opposition, may have entertained some purpose of operating in their
rear, and thus causing a diversion which at this late season might
effectually arrest their progress. It is true that such a stroke would
frightfully imperil his little squadron; but, in circumstances of
absolute inferiority, audacity, usually the best policy in war, offers
the only chance of success. Mere retreat, however methodical, must end
in final destruction. To act towards St. Johns, trusting to dexterity
and to local knowledge of the network of islands at the foot of the lake
to escape disaster, or at least to protract the issue, offered the best
chance; and that the situation thus accepted would not be hopeless was
proved by the subsequent temporary evasion of pursuit by the Americans,
even in the open and narrow water of the middle lake.

The British moved to attack as soon as the hostile shipping was
discovered. Pellew was second officer of the schooner _Carleton_, of
twelve guns, the third vessel of the flotilla in point of force. The
wind being contrary, and apparently light, the _Carleton_ alone of the
sailing vessels got into action; and although she was supported by a
number of rowing gunboats, whose artillery was heavy, the match was
unequal. According to Arnold's own account, he had disposed his gunboats
and gondolas "on the west side of Valcour Island, as near together as
possible, and in such a form that few vessels can attack us at the same
time, and those will be exposed to the fire of the whole fleet." To this
Captain Douglas, in his report of the occurrences, adds the suggestive
particular that the _Carleton_, by a lucky slant of wind, fetched
"nearly into the middle of the rebel half-moon, where she anchored with
a spring on her cable." The position was one of honorable distinction,
but likewise of great exposure. Her first officer lost an arm; her
captain, Lieutenant Dacres, was so severely wounded that he was about
to be thrown overboard as dead; and Pellew, thus left without a
superior, fought the vessel through the engagement. When signal was at
last made to withdraw, the _Carleton_ was able to do so only by help of
the gunboats, which towed her out of fire. On the other hand, Arnold's
flag-ship, the schooner _Royal Savage_, which had fought in advance of
her consorts and under canvas, fell to leeward, and came there under the
distant fire of the _Inflexible_, by which she was badly crippled. She
then was run ashore on the southern point of the island, where she fell
momentarily into the hands of the British, who turned her guns on her
former friends. Later in the day, it seeming probable that she might be
retaken, she was set on fire and burned to the water's edge. Thus
abandoned, she sank to the bottom, where her hull rests to this day.
During the recent summer of 1901 some gun-carriages have been recovered
from her, after lying for a century and a quarter beneath the surface of
the lake.

Pellew's personal activity and strength enabled his gallantry to show to
particular advantage in this sanguinary contest. When the _Carleton_, in
her attempt to withdraw, hung in stays under the island, her decks swept
by the bullets of the riflemen on shore, it was he who sprang out on the
bowsprit to bear the jib over to windward. When the tow-rope was cut by
a shot, it was Pellew again who exposed his person for the safety of the
vessel. His two seniors being forced by their wounds to leave the
schooner, he succeeded to the command, in which he was afterwards
confirmed. In this sharp affair the _Carleton_ lost eight killed and six
wounded,--about half her crew,--and had two feet of water in her hold
when she anchored out of range.

Towards evening the _Inflexible_ succeeded in getting within point-blank
range of the American flotilla, "when five broadsides," wrote Douglas,
"silenced their whole line;" a sufficient testimony to the superiority
of her concentrated battery over the dispersed force of all her numerous
petty antagonists. The British then anchored to the southward of
Arnold's little force; but that active and enterprising officer
succeeded in stealing during the night between the enemy and the western
shore, and retired towards Crown Point. The chase to windward continued
during the next day, but a favorable shift of wind, to the north,
reached the British first, and enabled them to close. Arnold again
behaved with the extraordinary bravery and admirable conduct which
distinguished him in battle. Sending on the bulk of the squadron, he
took the rear with two galleys, covering the retreat. Fighting like a
lion, he opposed the enemy's advance long enough to secure the escape of
six of his vessels; and then, seeing his one consort forced to strike,
he ran his own galley ashore and set her on fire. "Arnold," says the
naval historian Cooper, "covered himself with glory, and his example
seems to have been nobly followed by most of his officers and men. The
manner in which the Congress was fought until she had covered the
retreat of the galleys, and the stubborn resolution with which she was
defended until destroyed, converted the disasters of this part of the
day into a species of triumph." "The Americans," says a contemporary
British writer, "chiefly gloried in the dangerous attention paid by
Arnold to a nice point of honor, in keeping his flag flying, and not
quitting his galley till she was in flames, lest the enemy should have
boarded and struck it."

Pellew received like recognition, not, perhaps, from the popular voice,
but from his official superiors. Douglas, the senior naval officer at
Quebec, who was made a baronet in reward of these operations, Lord Howe
at New York, and the First Lord of the Admiralty in England, all sent
him personal letters of commendation; and the two latter promised him
promotion as soon as he came within their respective jurisdictions. His
continuance at the front of operations during this and the following
year therefore postponed his deserved advancement to a lieutenancy, by
retaining him from the "jurisdiction" of those able to bestow it.

The two gallant enemies were soon again brought together in an incident
which came near to change the career of one of them, and, in so doing,
to modify seriously the fortunes of many others. Arnold having one day
pulled out on the open lake, in his venturesome manner, Pellew gave
chase in another boat. The Americans being hard pressed and capture
probable, Arnold unbuckled his stock and himself took an oar. So nearly
caught was he, that he had to escape into the bushes, leaving behind him
stock and buckle; and these, as late as sixty years after, remained in
the possession of Pellew's brother. Had he thus been deprived of the
opportunity that Saratoga gave him the next year, Arnold's name might
now be known to us only as that of the brave officer who kept his
country's flag flying till his vessel was in flames.

On the 14th of October Carleton landed at Crown Point, which the
Americans had abandoned; but the lateness of the season deterred him
from advancing against Ticonderoga, and he soon afterwards returned to
Canada. The full import of this halt is too easily overlooked, with
consequent failure to appreciate the momentous influence exerted upon
the course of the Revolutionary War by this naval campaign, in which
Pellew bore so conspicuous a part. It has never been understood in
America, where the smallness of the immediate scale has withdrawn
attention from the greatness of the ultimate issue, in gaining time for
the preparations which resulted in the admittedly decisive victories
about Saratoga. "If we could have begun our expedition four weeks
earlier," wrote a German general there present, "I am satisfied
everything would have been ended this year [1776]; were our whole army
here, it would be an easy matter to drive the enemy from their
entrenchments at Ticonderoga." The delay, not of four weeks only, but of
the whole summer, was obtained by the naval force organized upon
Champlain by Arnold and his superior, General Schuyler. The following
year the invasion was resumed, under General Burgoyne. Pellew
accompanied him with a body of seamen, taking part in all the operations
down to the final surrender. Burgoyne, indeed, afterwards chaffed him
with being the cause of the disaster, by rebuilding the bridge which
enabled the army to cross from the east bank of the Hudson to the west.

Returning to England in the early part of 1778, Pellew was made
lieutenant, and in 1780 we find him again serving under Captain Pownoll,
as first lieutenant of the _Apollo_ frigate. On the 15th of June, in the
same year, the _Apollo_ met the French frigate _Stanislas_. A severe
action followed, and at the end of an hour Pownoll was shot through the
body. As his young friend raised him from the deck, he had barely time
to say, "Pellew, I know you won't give his Majesty's ship away," and
immediately expired. The engagement lasted an hour longer, when the
enemy, which had all the time been standing in for the Belgian coast,
took the ground, the most of her spars, already wounded, going overboard
with the shock. The _Apollo_ had hauled off a few moments before,
finding that she had less than five feet of water under her keel.

Though unable again to attack the _Stanislas_, which claimed the
protection of the neutral flag, the result was substantially a victory;
but to Pellew's grief for the death of a tried friend was added the
material loss of a powerful patron. Happily, however, his reputation was
known to the head of the Admiralty, who not only promoted him for this
action, but also gave him a ship, though a poor one. After a succession
of small commands, he was fortunate enough again to distinguish
himself,--driving ashore and destroying several French privateers, under
circumstances of such danger and difficulty as to win him his next
grade, post-captain. This step, which, so far as selection went, fixed
his position in the navy, he received on the 25th of May, 1782.

The ten years of peace that shortly followed were passed by many
officers in retirement, which we have seen was contentedly accepted by
his distinguished contemporary, Saumarez; but Pellew was a seaman to the
marrow, and constantly sought employment afloat. When out of occupation,
he for a while tried farming, the Utopian employment that most often
beguiles the imagination of the inbred seaman in occasional weariness of
salt water; but, as his biographer justly remarks, his mind, which
allowed him to be happy only when active, could ill accommodate itself
to pursuits that almost forbade exertion. "To have an object in view,
yet to be unable to advance it by any exertions of his own, was to him a
source of constant irritation. He was wearied with the imperceptible
growth of his crops, and complained that he made his eyes ache by
watching their daily progress."

His assiduous applications, however, were not wholly unavailing to
obtain him the professional employments usually so hard to get in times
of peace. For five of the ten years, 1783-1793, he commanded frigates,
chiefly on the Newfoundland station; and in them, though now turning
thirty, he displayed the superabundant vitality and restless activity
that had characterized his early youth. "Whenever there was exertion
required aloft," wrote a midshipman who served with him at this period,
"to preserve a sail or a mast, the captain was foremost in the work,
apparently as a mere matter of amusement, and there was not a man in the
ship that could equal him in personal activity. He appeared to play
among the elements in the hardest storms. I remember once, in
close-reefing the main topsail, the captain had given his orders from
the quarter-deck and sent us aloft. On gaining the topsail yard, the
most active and daring of our party hesitated to go upon it, as the sail
was flapping violently, making it a service of great danger; but a voice
was heard from the extreme end of the yard, calling upon us to exert
ourselves to save the sail, which would otherwise beat to pieces. A man
said, 'Why, that's the captain! How the ---- did he get there?' He had
followed us up, and, clambering over the backs of the sailors, had
reached the topmast head, above the yard, and thence descended by the
lift,"--a feat unfortunately not easy to be explained to landsmen, but
which will be allowed by seamen to demand great hardihood and address.

All this was the simple overflow of an animal energy not to be
repressed, the exulting prowess of a giant delighting to run his course.
It found expression also in joyous practical jests, like those of a big
boy, which at times had ludicrous consequences. On one occasion of state
ceremony, the king's birthday, Pellew had dressed in full uniform to
attend a dinner on shore. The weather was hot, and the crew had been
permitted an hour's swimming around the ship. While his boat was being
manned, the captain stood by the frigate's rail watching the bathers,
and near by him was one of the ship's boys. "I too shall have a good
swim soon," called the latter to a comrade in the water. "The sooner,
the better," said Pellew, coming behind him and tipping him overboard.
No sooner had the lad risen to the surface from his plunge than it was
plain that he could not swim; so in after him went the practical joker,
with all his toggery. "If ever the captain was frightened," writes the
officer just quoted, "it was then."

But along with all this physical exuberance and needless assumption of
many of the duties of a foremast hand, Pellew possessed to a very
remarkable extent that delicate art of seamanship which consists in so
handling a ship as to make her do just what you want, and to put her
just where she should be; making her, to use a common sea expression, do
everything but talk. This is a faculty probably inborn, like most others
that reach any great degree of perfection, and, while a very desirable
gift, it is by no means indispensable to the highest order of naval
excellence. Nelson did not at all equal Pellew in this respect, as is
indicated by an amusing story transmitted by a Colonel Stewart, who
served on board the great admiral's flag-ship during the expedition
against Copenhagen: "His lordship was rather too apt to interfere in the
working of the ship, and not always with the best judgment or success.
The wind, when off Dungeness, was scanty, and the ship was to be put
about. Lord Nelson would give the orders, and caused her to miss stays.
Upon this he said, rather peevishly, to the officer of the watch, 'Well,
now see what we have done. Well, sir, what mean you to do now?' The
officer saying, with hesitation, 'I don't exactly know, my lord. I fear
she won't do,' Lord Nelson turned sharply to the cabin, and replied,
'Well, I am sure if you do not know what to do with her, no more do I,
either.' He went in, leaving the officer to work the ship as he liked."
Yet Nelson understood perfectly what ships could do, and what they could
not; no one could better handle or take care of a fleet, or estimate the
possibility of performing a given manoeuvre; and long before he was
called to high command he was distinguished for a knowledge of naval
tactics to which few, if any other, of his time attained. He was a great
general officer; and whether he had the knack of himself making a ship
go through all her paces without a fault mattered as little as whether
he was a crack shot with a gun.

A ship is certainly the most beautiful and most graceful of machines; a
machine, too, so varied in its movements and so instinct with life that
the seaman affectionately transfers to her credit his own virtues in
handling her. Pellew's capacity in this part of his profession was so
remarkable that it is somewhat singular to find him, in his first
frigate action, compelled to discard manoeuvring, and to rely for
victory upon sheer pluck and luck. When war with the French republic
began in 1793, his high reputation immediately insured him command of a
frigate, the _Nymphe_. The strength of England as a naval power lay
largely in the great reserve of able seamen manning her merchant ships;
but as these were scattered in all quarters of the world, great
embarrassment was commonly felt at the outbreak of a war, and especially
when it came with the unexpected rapidity of the revolutionary fury. As
the object of first importance was to get the fleets of
ships-of-the-line to sea, Pellew had to depend chiefly upon his own
indefatigable exertions to procure a crew for his vessel. Seamen being
hard to find, he had on board a disproportionate number of landsmen when
the _Nymphe_, on the 19th of June, 1793, encountered the French vessel
_Cleopatre_, of force slightly inferior, except in men, but not
sufficiently so to deny the victor the claim of an even fight.

A peculiar incident preceding the action has interest, as showing the
strong preoccupation of men's minds at the opening of war, before
meetings with the enemy have lost novelty. Pellew's younger brother,
Israel, a commander in the navy, being otherwise unemployed, had come
out with him for the cruise. The _Cleopatre_ having been first seen in
the early morning, Edward would not have him called till just as the
_Nymphe_ was closing. As he came on deck, the brother said
affectionately, "Israel, you have no business here. We are too many eggs
from one nest. I am sorry I brought you from your wife." But the other
was unheeding, his eyes fixed upon the stranger. "That's the very
frigate," he cried, "that I've been dreaming of all night! I dreamt that
we shot away her wheel." And, hastening to the after-gun, he made the
French ship's wheel the object of an unremitting fire.

By the way the enemy was handled it was evident that she was well
manned and ably commanded. She had, in fact, been in commission for over
a year. Great as was his own skill, Pellew could not venture upon
manoeuvres with a green crew, untrained save at the guns, and only
filled the night before by pressing from a merchant vessel. He therefore
determined upon a simple artillery duel. The Frenchman waited under
short canvas, while the _Nymphe_, with greater way, drew slowly up on
his starboard, or right-hand side; both ships running nearly before the
wind, but having it a little on the left side. Each captain stood
uncovered, and as the bows of the _Nymphe_ doubled upon the stern of the
_Cleopatre_, within three hundred feet, a French sailor was seen to run
aloft and fasten a red cap of liberty to the mainmast head. The eyes of
the British seamen were fastened upon their commander, awaiting the
gesture which he had set, instead of word of mouth, for opening fire. At
quarter-past six he gave it, raising his cap to his head. A furious
cannonade at once began, and, the _Nymphe_ shortening sail as soon as
fairly abreast her antagonist, the two frigates continued on parallel
lines, maintaining their relative positions as though at anchor, and
rolling easily in the soft summer sea under the recoil of their guns. So
nearly matched were the gunners that the conflict, unusually deadly
though it was, might have lasted long, but at a little before seven
Israel Pellew's dream was fulfilled. The Frenchman's wheel was shot
away, and, the mizzenmast going overboard at the same time, the
_Cleopatre_ yielded to the impulse of her forward sails, turned sharp
round to the right, and ran perpendicularly into the _Nymphe_. The
British boarded her, fixed in this disadvantageous position, fought
their way aft, and, although the French crew was numerically superior,
in ten minutes hauled down the colors. In this brief hour they had lost
twenty-three killed and twenty-seven wounded, the enemy sixty-three
killed and wounded, out of ships' companies numbering respectively two
hundred and forty and three hundred and twenty.

This was the first decisive frigate action of the War of the French
Revolution, and in consequence great was the enthusiasm aroused. Lord
Howe wrote to Pellew, "The manner in which you have taken the enemy's
ship will set an example for the war." In truth, however, while
admitting the soundness of Pellew's judgment in adopting the course he
did, the actual demand upon his personal skill was less, and in so far
the credit due therefore less, than in the second successful frigate
action, in the following October, in which Sir James Saumarez commanded.
Not only was the French vessel's superiority in force more marked in the
latter instance, but Saumarez's ship there met with an accident similar
in character to that which befell the _Cleopatre_, from the consequences
of which she was extricated by his masterly seamanship. Still, it may
with fairness be argued that, as the one action from its attendant
circumstances evidenced the individual skill of the commander, so the
other testified to the antecedent preparation and efficiency of the
crew, which are always to be attributed to the care of the captain,
especially under the conditions of Pellew's enlistments. Both captains
fully deserved the reward of knighthood bestowed upon their success.
Israel Pellew was promoted to post-captain.

During the first three years of this war British commerce in the
neighborhood of the Channel suffered most severely from French cruisers.
The latter resumed the methods of Jean Bart and other celebrated
privateers of the days of Louis XIV.; the essence of which was to prey
upon the enemy's commerce, not by single vessels, but by small squadrons
of from five to seven. Cruisers so combined, acting in mutual support,
were far more efficient than the same number acting separately.
Spreading like a fan, they commanded a wider expanse than a ship alone;
if danger arose, they concentrated for mutual support; did opportunity
offer, the work was cut out and distributed, thus insuring by
co-operation more thorough results. At the suggestion of Sir Edward
Pellew, the British Admiralty determined to oppose to these organized
depredators a similar system. Groups of crack frigates were constituted,
and sent to cruise within the limits of the Channel Fleet, but
independent of its admiral. In these Pellew served for the next five
years, much of the time as squadron commander; to him a period of
incessant, untiring activity, and illustrated by many brilliant and
exciting incidents, for which the limits of this sketch afford no space.

There are, however, two episodes in which he was so distinctly the
central figure that they demand at least a brief narration. In January,
1796, while his ship was repairing, a large East Indiaman, the _Dutton_,
carrying some six hundred troops and passengers, was by a series of
mishaps driven ashore on the beach of Plymouth, then an unprotected
sound. As she struck, all her masts went overboard, and she lay
broadside to the waves, pounding heavily as they broke over her. Pellew
was at this moment driving to a dinner with his wife. Seeing crowds
running from various directions towards the same quarter, he asked the
reason. Upon learning it, he left his carriage and hurried to the scene.
When he arrived, he recognized, by the confusion on board, by the way
the ship was laboring, by the poverty of the means that had been
contrived for landing the imperilled souls,--only a single hawser having
been run to the shore,--that the loss of nearly all on board was
imminent. Night, too, was falling, as well as the destruction of the
vessel impending. After vainly offering rewards to the hardy boatmen
standing by, if they would board the wreck with a message from him, he
said, "Then I must go myself." Though then close to forty years of age,
his immense personal strength and activity enabled him, though sorely
bruised thereby, to be hauled on board through the breakers by the
hawser, which alternately slacked and then tightened with a jerk as the
doomed ship rolled to and fro in the seas. Once on board, he assumed
command, the want of which, through the absence of the proper captain,
had until then hampered and well-nigh paralyzed all effectual effort.
When his well-known name was spoken, three hearty cheers arose from the
troops on board, echoed by the thousands of spectators on shore; and the
hope that revived with the presence of a born leader of men showed
itself at once in the renewed activity and intelligent direction of
effort, on the decks and on the beach. The degree of the danger can be
estimated from the fact that boats from the ships of war in port, his
own included, tried in vain to approach and had to run for safety to the
inner harbor. With sword drawn,--for many of the soldiers were drunk and
riotous,--Pellew maintained order, guided with a seaman's readiness the
preparations for landing, and saw the women, the children,--one child
but three weeks old,--the sick, landed first, then the soldiers, lastly
the seamen. When he himself was transferred to the beach by the same
means that his skill had contrived for others, but three persons
remained on board, officers of the ship, who eased him on shore. The
injuries he had received in his perilous passage out, and which confined
him to his bed for a week, forbade his being last. To the end of his
life, this saving of the crew of the _Dutton_ was the action in which he
took most pride.

The year that opened with this magnificent act of self-devotion saw
Pellew, at its close, bearing a seaman's part in the most serious crisis
that befell his country during the wars of the French Revolution. The
end of 1796 and the earlier months of 1797 marked the nadir of Great
Britain's military fortunes. The successes of Bonaparte's Italian
campaign were then culminating; Austria was on the point of making peace
with France; England was about to find herself alone, and the discontent
of the seamen of the navy, long smouldering, was soon to break out into
the famous and threatening mutinies of the Channel Fleet and of the
Nore. At the same time France, relieved on her eastern frontiers, felt
able to devote seventeen ships-of-the-line and eighteen thousand troops
to the invasion of Ireland.

Pellew, with two frigates besides his own, was stationed off the mouth
of Brest harbor to watch the enemy's movements; the main British fleet
being some fifty miles to seaward. To this emergency he brought not only
the intrepidity of a great seaman and the ardor of an anxious patriot,
but likewise the intense though narrow Protestant feeling transmitted
from a past, then not so remote, when Romanism and enmity to England
were almost synonymous. "How would you like," said he to an officer who
shared Pitt's liberal tendencies, "to see Roman Catholic chaplains on
board our ships?" and to the end of his life he opposed the political
enfranchisement of persons of that creed.

The French expedition against Ireland sailed from Brest on the 16th of
December, 1796. Having sent off successively each of his consorts with
information for the fleet, Pellew remained with his own ship alone, the
_Indefatigable_, at the moment of the final start. There are two
principal channels by which Brest can be left, one leading to the south,
the other due west. The French admiral had at first intended to use the
former; but, the wind showing signs of an unfavorable shift, he
endeavored to change the orders just as night was falling. The weather
being hazy, his signals were understood by but few of the forty-odd
vessels composing the force. Eight or ten joined him; the remainder
followed the original instructions and went out by the south. Pellew
attached himself to the admiral's division, kept along with it just out
of gun-shot, and by making false signals, burning blue lights and
sending up rockets, introduced into the attempts to convey the wishes of
the commander-in-chief such confusion as rendered them utterly futile.
Having satisfied himself as to the general direction taken by the
enemy, he left them, and made all sail for Falmouth, where he arrived on
the 20th.

The general fortunes of the expedition do not belong to the present
story. Suffice it to say that the greater part reached Ireland safely,
but through stress of weather was unable to land the troops, and went
back to France by detachments, in January, 1797. It is during this
process of return that Sir Edward Pellew again appears, in perhaps the
most dramatic incident of his stirring career.

On the afternoon of January 13th, being then in company with the frigate
_Amazon_, and about one hundred and twenty miles west of Brest, a French
ship-of-the-line was discovered. The stranger, named the _Droits de
l'Homme_, was returning from Ireland, and heading east. The frigates
steered courses converging towards hers, seeking to cut her off from the
land. The weather was thick and gloomy, with a strong west wind fast
rising to a gale. At half-past four, as night was falling, the French
ship carried away her fore and main topmasts in a heavy squall; and an
hour later the _Indefatigable_, now under close reefs, passed across her
stern, pouring in a broadside from so near that the French flag floated
across her poop, where it was seized and torn away by some of the
British seamen. The enemy, having on board nearly a thousand soldiers
besides her crew, replied with rapid volleys of musketry, and, as the
frigate passed ahead, sheered impetuously towards her, attempting to
board, and in her turn grazing the stern of the _Indefatigable_. In
another hour the _Amazon_ drew up, and then the British vessels took
their positions, one on either bow of the _Droits de l'Homme_, whence,
by movements of the helm, they alternately raked her. The labor of the
gunners, however, was arduous, due to the deep rolling of the ships, on
board which, also, the seas poured in volumes through the gun-ports. On
the main decks the men fought up to their middles in water, the heavy
cannon broke away from the breechings, or ropes used to control them,
and even iron bolts tore out from the ships' sides under the severe
recoil of the guns. Thus through the long winter night the three ships
rushed headlong before the gale towards the French coast, intent on
mutual destruction; the constant storm of shot, though flying wild under
the violent motions of the vessels, tearing through spars and rigging,
and crippling them in much that was essential to their safety.

At four o'clock in the morning of the 14th, long before daybreak, land
was sighted right ahead. The _Indefatigable_ hauled at once to the
southward, the _Amazon_ to the northward; the enemy alone, seemingly
unconscious of the danger, kept on, and as she passed Pellew's ship
fired a broadside which severely wounded all the masts. The situation of
the combatants was well-nigh desperate. They had reached the coast of
France at a point where it forms a deep recess, called Audierne Bay,
from either side of which project capes that must be cleared in order to
gain once more the open sea. One only of the three escaped. The _Droits
de l'Homme_, unmanageable for want of sail power, tried to anchor, but
drove, and struck on a shoal some distance from the beach. Of sixteen
hundred souls on board when the battle began, over one hundred had been
killed; and of those who survived the fight three hundred perished in
the wreck. The _Amazon_, likewise crippled, though not so badly, had
gone ashore to the northward only ten minutes after she ceased firing.
Of her people, but six were drowned. The _Indefatigable_, beating back
and forth against the gale before the scene of the French disaster, upon
which her crew gazed with the solemn feeling that such might soon be
their own fate, succeeded at last in clearing the southern cape. At
eleven o'clock, nearly twenty-four hours after first meeting the foe,
and with six feet of water in her hold, she passed only three-quarters
of a mile outside of the Penmarcks, a rocky promontory thirty miles
south of Brest.

This remarkable encounter is said to have suggested to Marryat the vivid
sea picture with which "The King's Own" ends. Pellew's unusual personal
endurance was signally illustrated on the same day, very shortly after
the safety of the ship from wreck was assured. Her principal sails had
been so torn by shot as to require immediate renewing, and this had
scarcely been done when two vessels were sighted, one of which was for
the moment supposed to be the _Amazon_, whose fate was yet unknown.
Pellew gave orders to chase, but his officers represented to him that,
whatever he himself was capable of, the ship's company was too exhausted
for present further exertion; and that, besides, the ammunition was very
short, almost the last filled cartridge having been expended. Under
these circumstances he was compelled to desist.

The interest of Pellew's career centres mainly in his command of
frigates. This independent but yet restricted sphere afforded the
fullest scope for a conspicuous display of those splendid
qualities--fearlessness, enterprise, sound judgment, instant decision,
and superb seamanship--which he so eminently possessed. He was, above
all, the frigate captain. "Nothing like hesitation was ever seen in him.
His first order was always his last; and he often declared of himself
that he never had a second thought worth sixpence." In 1799, by a new
Admiralty rule, he was transferred to the _Impetueux_, a
ship-of-the-line, and thenceforth served in that class of vessel until
his promotion to admiral.

As a general officer, Pellew had no opportunity to show whether he
possessed ability of the highest order. For five years he held the
command in India; and soon after Collingwood's death he was, in 1811,
appointed commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean. On both stations he
evinced that faculty for careful organization, systematic preparation,
and sagacious distribution of force which carries success up to the
point which administrative capacity can reach. His ability in planning,
while yet a subordinate in command of squadrons, had been recognized by
St. Vincent during his management of the Brest blockade. "The
disposition made by Sir Edward Pellew for the descent on a certain point
is the most masterly I have ever seen.... Although the naval command in
Quiberon may appear too important for a captain, I shall not divest him
of it, unless I am ordered to do so; feeling a thorough conviction that
no man in His Majesty's Navy, be his rank ever so high, will fill it so
well." At the time this was written, June, 1800, he had seven
ships-of-the-line under his orders. After the Peace of Amiens, when war
again began in 1803, he commanded a similar division watching the
Spanish port of Ferrol, in which, although formally neutral, a French
division lay at anchor; and in discharge of this duty, both as a seaman
and an administrator, he again justified the eulogium of the old Earl,
now at the head of the navy as First Lord.

In 1804 he was promoted Rear-Admiral, and soon afterwards assigned to
the East India Station, which he held from 1805 to 1809. Here no naval
actions on the great scale were to be fought, but under his systematic
organization of convoys and cruisers for the protection of commerce the
insurance premium--the war risk--on the most exposed routes fell
markedly,--for the port of Bombay fifty per cent less than at any former
period of hostilities; while the losses by capture, when the merchants
observed his instructions, amounted to but one per cent on the property
insured, which was less than those caused by the dangers of the sea, and
considerably less, also, than the average war losses in other parts of
the world. All this shows great ability, carefully utilized in diligent
preparation and efficient precaution; and the same characteristics are
to be observed in his administration of the Mediterranean command, of
wider scope and more purely military importance. Nevertheless, it gives
no sure proof of the particular genius of a great captain. Whether,
having forged his weapon, Pellew could also wield it; whether, having
carefully sowed, he could also reap the harvest by large combinations on
the battle-field, must remain uncertain, at least until probable
demonstration of his conceptions is drawn from his papers. Nothing is as
yet adduced to warrant positive inference.

Pellew's Mediterranean command coincided in time with the period of
Napoleon's falling fortunes. After Trafalgar, the Emperor decided to
increase his navy largely, but to keep it in port instead of at sea,
forcing Great Britain also to maintain huge fleets, the expense of
which, concurring with the commercial embarrassments that he sought to
bring upon her, might exhaust her power to continue the war. In
consequence of this policy, British military achievement on the grand
scale was confined to the army in the Spanish peninsula; and in the
bestowal of rewards, after Napoleon's first abdication, but one peerage
was given to the navy. The great claims of Sir James Saumarez, who was
the senior of the two, were disregarded on the ground that his flag was
not flying at the moment, and Pellew was created Baron Exmouth.

During the process of settlement which succeeded the final fall of
Napoleon at Waterloo, Lord Exmouth remained in the Mediterranean. In the
early part of 1816 he was ordered to visit with his fleet the Barbary
ports, and to compel the unconditional release of all slaves who were
natives of the Ionian Islands; they having become subjects of Great
Britain by the terms of the peace. For many years, while the powers of
Europe were engrossed in the tremendous strife of the French Revolution,
these piratical states, under pretence of regular hostilities, had
preyed upon the coasts as well as upon the commerce of the weak
Mediterranean countries, and captives taken by them were kept in bitter
slavery. Nelson in his correspondence, in 1796, mentions a curious
incident which sufficiently characterizes the general motives and
policy of these barbarian Courts. He asked an Algerine official visiting
his ship, why the Dey would not make peace with Genoa and Naples, for
they would pay well for immunity, as the United States also at that time
did. The reply was, "If we make peace with every one, what is the Dey to
do with his ships?" In his later experience with the Mediterranean the
great admiral realized yet more forcibly the crying shame of Great
Britain's acquiescence. "My blood boils that I cannot chastise these
pirates. They could not show themselves in this sea did not our country
permit. Never let us talk of the cruelty of the African slave trade,
while we permit such a horrid war." The United States alone, although
then among the least of naval powers, had taken arms before 1805 to
repress outrages that were the common reproach of all civilized
nations,--a measure the success of which went far to establish the
character of her navy and prepare it for 1812. Lord Exmouth was also
directed to demand peace for Sardinia, as well as for any other state
that should authorize him to act for it. Only Naples availed itself of
this opportunity.

As far as his instructions went, his mission was successful, and, by a
happy accident, he was able at Tunis and Tripoli to extort further from
the rulers a promise that thereafter captives should be treated as in
civilized countries; in other words, that they should no longer be
reduced to slavery. Algiers refused this concession; and the admiral
could not take steps to enforce it, because beyond his commission. The
Dey, however, undertook to consult the Porte; and the fleet, with a few
exceptions, returned to England, where it arrived towards the end of
June.

Meanwhile British public feeling had become aroused; for men were saying
that the outrages of the past had been rather welcome to the commercial
selfishness of the country. The well-protected traders of Great Britain,
shielded by her omnipotent navy, had profited by crimes which drove
their weaker rivals from the sea. Just then news came that at the port
of Bona, on the Algiers coast, where there was under the British flag an
establishment for carrying on the coral fishery, a large number of the
fishermen, mostly Italians, had been wantonly slaughtered by a band of
Turkish troops. To insist, arms in hand, upon reparation for such an
outrage, and upon guarantees for the future, would doubtless be
condemned by some of our recent lights; but such was not then the temper
of Great Britain. The government determined at once to send a fleet to
the spot, and Lord Exmouth was chosen for the command, with such a force
as he himself should designate. The gist of his instructions was to
demand the release, without ransom, of _all_ Christian slaves, and a
solemn declaration from the Dey that, in future wars, prisoners should
receive the usage accorded them by European states. Great Britain thus
made herself, as befitted the obligation imposed by her supreme maritime
power, the avenger of all those oppressed by these scourges of the sea.
The times of the barbarians were fulfilled.

During a long career of successful piracy, the port of Algiers had
accumulated an extensive and powerful system of defences. These had
doubtless suffered in condition from the nonchalant fatalism of Turkish
rule, encouraged by a long period of impunity; but they constituted
still, and under all the shortcomings of the defenders, a most imposing
menace to an attacking fleet. To convey a precise impression of them by
detailed verbal description would be difficult, and the attempt probably
confusing. It may be said, in brief, that the town faces easterly,
rising abruptly up a steep hill; that from its front there then
projected a pier, nearly a thousand feet long, at whose end was a
circular fort, carrying seventy guns in three tiers; from that point a
mole extended at right angles to the southward,--parallel, that is, in a
general sense, to the town front, but curving inward through the
southern half of its length, so as better to embrace and shelter the
vessels inside. This mole was somewhat over a thousand feet in length,
and had throughout two tiers of guns, linked at their northern extremity
to the circular fort at the pier end. These principal works were flanked
and covered, at either end and on the hillside, by others which it is
unnecessary to particularize. The total number of guns bearing seaward
numbered near three hundred, of very respectable size for that day. The
basin formed by the pier and the mole constituted the port proper, and
in it, at the time of the attack, was collected the entire Algerine
navy, nine frigates and corvettes and thirty-seven gunboats, the paltry
force that had so long terrorized the Mediterranean.

In prevision of his present enterprise, Lord Exmouth before leaving the
Mediterranean had despatched a light cruiser to Algiers, on a casual
visit similar to those continually made by ships of war to foreign
ports. Her commander, Captain Charles Warde, received from him very
precise and most secret instructions to examine closely into the
defences and soundings; to do which it was necessary not only to observe
every precaution of seeming indifference,--even to the extent of
appearing engrossed with social duties,--but also to conduct under this
cover measurements and observations of at least approximate correctness.
This duty was performed with singular diligence and success, with the
double result of revealing the hopeless inaccuracy of existing charts
and of placing in Exmouth's hands a working plan of the ground,
perfectly trustworthy for his tactical dispositions.

As before remarked, in the sketch of Lord St. Vincent, the defence and
attack of seaports, involving as they do both occupation of permanent
positions and the action of mobile bodies, are tactical questions. They
differ much, though not radically, from operations in the open sea, or
in the field, where positions may be taken incidentally, but where the
movements of mobile bodies are the principal factor. In this way, though
without using the word tactical, Exmouth treated the problem before him.
Furnished, thanks to his own foresight and Warde's efficiency, with
reliable information concerning the preparations of the enemy, he
calculated the dispositions necessary to meet them and to crush their
fire. Having assigned to the hostile works, severally and collectively,
the force needed to overbear them, and having arranged the anchoring
positions for the vessels of his command with reference to the especial
task of each, as well as for mutual support, he had substantially his
plan of battle, afterwards communicated to the fleet before going into
action; and the same data afforded the foundation for his statement to
the Government of the number and character of ships needed for success.

To the surprise of the Admiralty, Lord Exmouth asked for but five
ships-of-the-line, five frigates, and five smaller vessels, to which
were added four mortar boats to play upon the town and arsenal. When met
with expressions of doubt, he replied, "I am satisfied, and take the
responsibility entirely upon myself." To satisfy the hesitancy of the
Government, he left with the Secretary to the Admiralty a written
statement that his every requirement had been fulfilled, and that to him
alone, therefore, would failure from deficient power be attributable. On
the eve of departure he said to his brother Israel, "If they open fire
when the ships are coming up, and <DW36> them in their masts, the
difficulty and loss will be greater; but if they allow us to take our
stations, I am sure of them, for I know that nothing can resist a
line-of-battle ship's fire." He trusted to the extreme care of his
preparations, which neglected no particular of equipment or
organization, elaborating every detail of training and discipline, and
providing, by the most diligent foresight and minute instruction, that
each officer concerned should know exactly what was expected of him. In
short, it was to perfection of quality, and not to an unwieldy bulk of
superfluous quantity, that Exmouth confided his fortunes in this last
hazard.

The fleet sailed from England on the 28th of July, 1816, was joined at
Gibraltar by a Dutch squadron of five frigates, whose commander asked to
share the coming contest, and on the 26th of August was off the north
point of Algiers Bay, some twenty miles from the town. At daybreak the
next morning, the weather being almost calm, a flag of truce was sent
in, bearing the British demands. During its absence a breeze from the
sea sprang up, and the fleet stood in to a mile from the works, where
it stopped to await the reply. At two P.M. the boat was seen returning,
with the signal that no answer had been given. The flag-ship queried,
"Are you ready?" Each ship at once replied, "Yes;" and all filling away
together stood down to the attack, the admiral leading.

The Algerine batteries were fully manned; the mole, moreover, was
crowded with troops. With singular temerity, they fired no gun as the
ships came on, thus relieving the most anxious of Exmouth's
preoccupations concerning the difficulties before him; fearing,
seemingly, that, if otherwise received, the prey might turn and escape.
The British, on their side, observed the utmost silence; not a gun, not
a cheer, marred the solemn impression of the approach. The flag-ship,
_Queen Charlotte_,[16] piloted by an officer who had served continuously
with Exmouth since 1793, anchored by the stern across the mole head, at
a distance of fifty yards, her starboard batteries pointing to sweep it
from end to end. Still no sound of battle, as she proceeded to lash her
bows to those of an Algerine brig lying just within the mole. This done,
her crew gave three cheers, as well they might. Then the stolid,
unaccountable apathy of the barbarians ceased, and three guns in quick
succession were fired from the eastern battery. Stirred by a movement
of compassion, Lord Exmouth, from the flag-ship's poop, seeing the
Moorish soldiery clustered thick upon the parapets to watch the ships,
waved to them with his hand to get down. At the first hostile gun he
gave the order "Stand by!" at the second, "Fire!" and simultaneously
with the third the _Queen Charlotte's_ broadside rang out, and the
battle began.

The other vessels of the squadron were not all as successful as the
flag-ship in taking the exact position assigned, and the admiral's plan
thereby suffered some of that derangement to which every undertaking,
especially military and naval, is liable. This, however, produced no
effect upon the general result, except by increasing somewhat the lists
of killed and wounded, through loss of advantageous offensive position,
with consequent defect in mutual support. But the first broadside is
proverbially half the battle. It was a saying of Collingwood to his
crew, in a three-decker like the _Queen Charlotte_, that if they could
deliver three effective fires in the first five minutes no vessel could
resist them; and this was yet more certain when opposed to the
semi-discipline of adversaries such as the Algerine pirates. Exmouth's
general design was to concentrate his heavy ships at the southern end of
the mole, whence the curve in the line of batteries would enable them to
enfilade or take in reverse the works at the northern extremity. Here
were to be the two three-deckers, with a seventy-four between them, all
three in close order, stem to stern. The two-decker, however, anchored
some seven hundred feet astern of the _Queen Charlotte_, the intervening
space being left empty until filled by a thirty-six-gun frigate, upon
whose captain St. Vincent passed the eulogium, "He seems to have felt
Lord Nelson's eye upon him." The two remaining seventy-fours placed
themselves successively close astern of the first, which was in accord
with the original purpose, while the other three-decker took the right
flank of the line, and somewhat too far out; in which exposed and
unintended position, beyond the extreme north point contemplated for the
British order, she underwent a very heavy loss.

In general summary, therefore, it may be said that the broadsides of the
ships-of-the-line were opposed from end to end to the heavy central
batteries on the mole, while the lighter vessels engaged the flanking
works on the shore to the southward, thus diverting the fire which would
have harassed the chief assailants,--a service in which the Dutch
squadron, composed entirely of frigates, rendered important assistance.
The bomb vessels from the rear threw their shells over the fighting
ships into the town and arsenal, and in the admiral's report are
credited with firing all the shipping in the harbor, except one frigate,
creating a conflagration which spread over the arsenal and storehouses.
Soon after the contest opened, the thirty-seven Algerine gunboats,
crowded with troops, were seen advancing under cover of the smoke to
board the flag-ship. The attempt, rash to insanity, met the fate it
should have expected; thirty-three were sent to the bottom by the guns
of the _Leander_, stationed ahead of the _Queen Charlotte_, and
commanding the entrance to the port. An hour later, Lord Exmouth
determined to set fire to the remaining frigate. The service was
performed by an officer and boat's crew, with a steadiness which
elicited from him such admiration that, on the return of the party, he
stopped the working of the ship's upper battery to give them three
cheers. As the hostile vessel burned, she drifted so near the _Queen
Charlotte_ as nearly to involve her in the same fate.

From three to ten P.M. the battle lasted, steady disciplined valor
contending with a courage in no way inferior, absolutely insensible to
danger, but devoid of that coherent, skilful direction which is to
courage what the brain and eye are to the heart. "I never," wrote
Exmouth to his brother, "saw any set of men more obstinate at their
guns, and it was superior fire only that could keep them back. To be
sure, nothing could stand before the _Queen Charlotte's_ broadside.
Everything fell before it, and the Swedish consul assures me we killed
above five hundred at the very first fire, from the crowded way in which
the troops were drawn up, four deep above the gunboats, which were also
full of men. It was a glorious sight," he continues, "to see the
_Charlotte_ take her anchorage, and to see her flag towering on high,
when she appeared to be in the flames of the mole itself; and never was
a ship nearer burnt; it almost scorched me off the poop. We were obliged
to haul in the ensign, or it would have caught fire." He was himself
struck thrice, though not seriously injured. A cannon-ball carried away
the skirts of his coat, and one glass of the spectacles in his pocket
was broken, and the frame bulged, by a shot.

At ten P.M., the ammunition of the fleet running short, and its work
being substantially accomplished, the ships began to haul off. The sea
defences and a great part of the town were in ruins. "To be again
effective," wrote Exmouth, "the defences must be rebuilt from the
foundation." The flanking batteries and the hill forts continued to
annoy the vessels as they retired, but the spirit of the Dey was broken.
Towards eleven a light air from the land sprang up, which freshened into
a violent and prolonged thunderstorm, lasting for three hours; and the
flashes of heaven's artillery combined with the glare of the burning
town to illuminate the withdrawal of the ships.

The following morning the Dey signified his submission, and on the 30th
of August Lord Exmouth made known to the fleet that all the terms of
Great Britain had been yielded; that Christian slavery was forever
abolished, and that by noon of the following day all slaves then in
Algiers would be delivered to his flag. This was accordingly done, the
whole number amounting to 1642; which, with those previously released at
Tunis and Tripoli, raised to 3003 the human beings whom Exmouth had been
the instrument of freeing from a fate worse than death. Of this total,
but eighteen were English; the remainder were almost wholly from the
Mediterranean countries. On the 3d of September, just one week after the
attack, the fleet sailed for England.

Profuse acknowledgment necessarily awaited the hero of a deed in which
national exultation so happily blended with the sentiment of pity for
the oppressed. The admiral was raised to the next rank in the peerage,
and honors poured in upon him from every side,--from abroad as well as
from his own countrymen. His personal sense of the privilege permitted
him, thus to crown a life of strenuous exertion by a martial deed of
far-reaching beneficence, was a reward passing all others. In the
opening words of his official report he voices his thankfulness: "In all
the vicissitudes of a long life of public service, no circumstance has
ever produced on my mind such impressions of gratitude and joy as the
event of yesterday. To have been one of the humble instruments in the
hands of Divine Providence for bringing to reason a ferocious
Government, and destroying for ever the horrid system of Christian
slavery, can never cease to be a source of delight and heartfelt comfort
to every individual happy enough to be employed in it."

Here Lord Exmouth's career closes. Just forty years had elapsed since as
a youth he had fought the _Carleton_ on Lake Champlain, and he was yet
to live sixteen in honored retreat; bearing, however, the burden of
those whose occupation is withdrawn at an age too advanced to form new
interests. Though in vigorous health and with ample fortune, "he would
sometimes confess," says his biographer, "that he was happier amid his
early difficulties." The idea of retirement, indeed, does not readily
associate itself with the impression of prodigious vitality, which from
first to last is produced by the record of his varied activities. In
this respect, as in others, the contrast is marked between him and
Saumarez, the two who more particularly illustrate the complementary
sides of the brilliant group of naval leaders, in the second rank of
distinction, which clustered around the great names of Nelson, Howe, and
Jervis. In the old age of Saumarez, the even, ordered tenor of his
active military life is reflected in the peaceful, satisfied enjoyment
of repose and home happiness, of the fruits of labors past, which
Collingwood, probably without good reason, fancied to be characteristic
of his own temperament. Lord Exmouth, compelled to be a passive
spectator, saw with consequent increased apprehension the internal
political troubles of Great Britain in his later days. Though not a
party man, he was strongly conservative, so that the agitations of the
Reform era concealed from him the advantages towards which it was
tending, and filled him with forebodings for the future of his country.

Like his distinguished contemporary, Admiral Saumarez, and like many
others of those lion-hearted, masculine men who had passed their lives
amid the storms of the elements and of battle,--and like our own
Farragut,--Lord Exmouth was a deeply religious man. Strong as was his
self-reliance in war and tempest, he rested upon the Almighty with the
dependence of a child upon its father. His noble brother, Sir Israel
Pellew, who had followed Nelson into the fire at Trafalgar, departed
with the words, "I know in Whom I have believed;" and of the admiral
himself, an officer who was often with him during the closing scene
said, "I have seen him great in battle, but never so great as on his
deathbed."

Lord Exmouth died on January 23, 1833. He was at the time Vice-Admiral
of England, that distinguished honorary rank having been conferred upon
him but a few months before his death.

       *       *       *       *       *

Of the last four admirals whose careers have been here sketched, Howe
alone inherited fortune and high social rank; but he also fought his
way far beyond the modest position bequeathed to him by his brother.
Eminent all, though in varying manner and degree, each illustrated a
distinct type in the same noble profession. All were admirable officers,
but they differed greatly in original endowments and consequent
development. It was intuitive with St. Vincent to take wide and
far-sighted views, and to embody them in sustained, relentless action.
Endued by nature with invincible energy and determination, he moved
spontaneously and easily along his difficult path. He approached,
although he did not attain genius. In Howe is seen rather the result of
conscientious painstaking acting upon excellent abilities, but
struggling always against a native heaviness and a temper
constitutionally both indolent and indulgent; a temper to which indeed
he does not yield, over which he triumphs, but which nevertheless
imposes itself upon his general course with all the force inseparable
from hereditary disposition. A man of talent, he educates himself to
acquirements which in his rival have the character of perception; and
only under the spur of emergency does he rise to the height of
greatness. Both were great general officers, a claim which can scarcely
be advanced for Saumarez and Exmouth, able, brilliant, and devoted as
they were. Saumarez was the steadfast, skilful, accomplished master of
his profession, but one whose aptitudes and tastes placed him in the
great organization of the fleet, as a principal subordinate rather than
as head. Exmouth was the typical, innate seaman, intensely active, whose
instincts are those of the partisan warrior, and who shines most in the
freedom of detached service. All bore a conspicuous part in the greatest
war of modern times, with honor such that their names will be remembered
as long as naval history endures.

FOOTNOTES:

[15] Fleetwood Hugo Pellew, in "Our Naval Heroes."

[16] This _Queen Charlotte_ was the successor of the ship which carried
Howe's flag on the First of June, and which had been destroyed by fire
off Leghorn in 1800.




Index


Aboukir Bay, 405.

Age, standard of, a factor in efficiency, 70.

_Albany_, sloop, 327, 328.

Alexandria, 403; 404;
  battle off, 405-408; 410.

Algeciras, allied fleet anchored at, 289;
  French ships anchor off, 415;
  Saumarez starts for, 415;
  Saumarez finds French ships moored at, 415;
  _Hannibal_ re-anchors at, 419;
  crowded with eager sight-seers, 419;
  renewed battle off, 420.

Algiers, battle of, 428;
  policy of, 462,463;
  Nelson denounces, 463;
  refuses demand of Lord Exmouth in regard to treatment of captives, 464;
  Italian coral fishermen slaughtered on coast of, 464;
  Lord Exmouth demands release of Christian slaves in, 464;
  its system of defences, 465;
  navy of, in port, 466;
  Capt. Warde examines defences in port of, 466;
  Lord Exmouth sails against, 468;
  battle at bay of, 470-473.

Algiers, Dey of, 463;
  consults the Porte, 464;
  makes submission to Exmouth, 473;
  delivers up Christian slaves, 473, 474.

_Alligator_, ship, 266.

Altavela, 244.

_Amazon_, ship, 456;
  fight of, with _Droits de l'Homme_, 456, 457;
  wreck of, 458, 459.

Amiens, Peace of, 460.

Anglo-Dutch war, marks period of transition in naval warfare, 12.

Anglo-Saxon predominance, beginning of the struggle for, 100;
  approaching its crisis, 100.

ANSON, Lord, takes command of Channel fleet, 122;
  presents Rodney at court, 153;
  succeeded by Earl of Sandwich, 154; 385.

Antigua, 163; 228; 245.

_Apollo_, frigate, 442;
  engages Stanislas, 442; 443.

ARBUTHNOT, Admiral, ordered to send ships to West Indies, 210;
  his force added to Rodney's, 211;
  regards himself injured, 212.

_Ardent_, ship, 242.

ARNOLD, Benedict, 433; 436; 437;
  bravery of, in battle, 439;
  retires toward Crown Point, 439;
  Cooper's praise of, 440; 441; 442.

Articles of War, modified, 95.

Audierne Bay, 458.

Austria, peace signed with, 413; 454.


Baltic league, fostered by Napoleon, 413;
  shattered by Nelson, 413;
  Saumarez disturbs, 422, 423.

Baltic Sea, affairs in, 421.

Barbados, injuries at, by hurricane, 217;
  British fleet arrives at, 228;
  Rodney returns to, 230;
  Rodney unwilling to fight French, off, 230;
  Rodney reaches, 233; 245;
  Saumarez reaches, 394.

_Barfleur_, ship, 240; 242; 311.

BARRINGTON, declines command of Channel fleet, 182;
  refuses
  command of a fleet, 286;
  denounces ministry, 286; 287;
  second to Howe, 289; 297.

BART, Jean, French privateer, 451.

Basque Roads, its character as a harbor, 112; 141.

_Bedford_, ship, 240.

_Berwick_, ship, 79, 81.

BIRON, Marechal, makes money advance to Rodney, 179.

Black Rocks, reef, 411.

_Blenheim_, ship, 351; 365.

_Blonde_, ship, Burgoyne embarks on, 431.

Bombay, 461.

BOMPART, Commodore, leaves America, 134;
  his arrival, 135.

BONAPARTE, _see Napoleon_.

BOSCAWEN, Admiral, fleet under, collecting at Portsmouth, 103;
  sails to intercept French squadron, 103, 104;
  loses two ships, 104;
  before Toulon, 126;
  attacks French frigates near Toulon, 133;
  his failure, 133;
  returns to Gibraltar, 133;
  criticism of, 133;
  surprised while repairing, 134;
  his rapid movements, 134;
  goes in pursuit of De la Clue, 134;
  destroys five French ships, 134;
  succeeds Hawke temporarily, 143.

Boston, loss of, 284.

Brest, Hawke's efficient blockade of, 122;
  movements of French navy at, 126;
  De la Clue sails for, 133;
  Conflans's ships escape to, 141;
  Rodney operates against, 158;
  Jervis closes port of, 375, 392;
  blockade of, 411;
  bay of, 411;
  Pellew stationed off, 454;
  French expedition against Ireland sails from, 455.

Brimstone Hill, 234; 394.

_Bristol_, ship, 384; 385; 386; 387.

British Empire, non-existent in 1748, 99.

British Ministry, apprehensive over schooner _Hawke_ incident, 172;
  cautions Rodney, 172;
  learns that Spain is concentrating vessels at Cadiz, 414.

BRUEYS, at Battle of Nile, 416.

_Brunswick_, ship, 314; 315.

_Burford_, ship, 262.

BURGOYNE, 276; 284; 431; 434;
  leads renewed invasion, 442.

BURRISH, Capt. George, off Toulon, 30;
  his address to his lieutenants, 32;
  decision of court in case of, 35;
  cashiered, 37.

BYNG, Admiral, his incompetency at Minorca, 5, 20;
  finding of courtmartial of, 17;
  one of the judges of Mathews, 24;
  his punishment, 25;
  his situation at Minorca reviewed, 47-63;
  author's criticism of, 64;
  discussion of trial of, 64;
  article under which he was convicted and executed, 96, 97;
  his sailing for Minorca, 104;
  arrival off Port Mahon, 104;
  engages French fleet, 105;
  retires to Gibraltar, 105;
  news of retreat of, reaches England, 105;
  superseded by Hawke, 105;
  sent home, 105;
  inquiry concerning in House of Commons, 105;
  defended by Pitt, 105;
  his execution a political exigency, 180.

BYRON, given North American command, 176; 284;
  relieves Howe and goes to West Indies, 183; 284;
  his failure and return to England, 183.


Cabrita Point, 419.

Cadiz, French ships escape to, 134; 336; 347;
  Spaniards running for, 352;
  Spanish gunboats leave, 361;
  blockade at, 362;
  Saumarez blockades, 400;
  French and Spanish navies concentrated at, 414;
  Saumarez ordered to blockade, 414;
  Saumarez arrives off, 415;
  Saumarez prevents entrance of French ship to, 415;
  object of concentration at, frustrated by Saumarez, 421.

Cadiz, Bay of, 369.

_Caesar_, ship, Saumarez appointed to command, 410;
  injured at Algeciras, 418;
  refitted, 418;
  hauls out from Gibraltar mole, 419;
  sails for Algeciras, 419;
  appears off Europa Point, 419.

CAMPBELL, Captain, aids in suppressing mutiny on board
  ship _Marlborough_, 365.

Cape Horn, 260.

Cape Passaro, Battle of, 69.

Cape St. Vincent, _see St. Vincent, Cape_.

Cap Francois, 231; 236; 244; 246.

_Captain_, ship, 351.

Cardinals, The, rocks, 137, 139.

CARKETT, Captain, 200;
  his disobedience of Rodney's orders, 200, 201.

CARLETON, General, 433; 434.

_Carleton_, schooner, 437;
  Pellew left in command of, 438;
  obliged to withdraw, 438; 439; 475.

Cartagena, harbor of, schooner _Hawke_ taken to, 171;
  governor of, Rodney demands schooner _Hawke_ from, 171.

_Cesar_, ship, 240.

Champlain, Lake, 433; 436;
  battle on, 436, 437; 442; 475.

CHANDOS, Duke of, 148.

Channel Fleet, Keppel appointed to command
  of, 176; 183; 271; 281; 286; 287;
  Howe takes command of, 299;
  Howe remains in nominal command of, 318;
  Howe formally retires from command of, 319;
  Jervis attached to, 331;
  rumor concerning command of, 337;
  lack of discipline in, 367; 374; 375;
  St. Vincent again called to command of, 380;
  _Tisiphone_ attached to, 392; 394;
  St. Vincent takes command of, 411; 451; 454.

Channel Islands, Saumarez commander-in-chief at, 421.

Charente, river, French vessels flee up, 117.

Charleston, British fleet arrives off, 386.

Cherbourg, Saumarez present at beginning of work on breakwater at, 398;
  frigate _Reunion_ quits, 399.

CHEVALIER, Captain, tribute of, to Admiral Howe, 296.

_Cleopatre_, ship, fight of, with _Nymphe_, 448, 449.

CLINTON, Sir Henry, his evacuation of New York, 277;
  at Cape May, 278;
  reaches Navesink, 279; 280.

CODRINGTON, Lieutenant, 311; 316.

COLLINGWOOD, 311;
  criticises movement of Admiral Mann, 348;
  at battle off Cape St. Vincent, 355; 410;
  off Brest, 412;
  Pellew succeeds, 460.

CONFLANS, opposed by Hawke, 126;
  sails, 135;
  his fleet breaks apart and flees, 141;
  his flag-ship destroyed, 141; 273.

COOK, James, master of fleet at Quebec, 326, 327.

COOPER, naval historian, his opinion of Arnold, 440.

Copenhagen, 413; 446.

Cornwall, 429.

_Cornwall_, ship, 202.

CORNWALLIS, Lord, his fate in America, settled, 232;
  his surrender, 233;
  surrender of, change of ministry consequent upon, 251;
  offers commission to Saumarez, 385;
  meeting of, with Saumarez, subsequently, 385.

Corsica, 333; 337;
  in revolt against Britain, 346;
  evacuated by British, 347.

_Courageux_, ship, wrecked on Barbary coast, 350; 352.

_Crescent_, frigate, Saumarez appointed to command, 399;
  action of, with French frigate _Reunion_, 399, 400.

Crown Point, 433; 439;
  Pellew lands at, 441.

_Culloden_, ship, 353, 354.

CUMBERLAND, Richard, his remark concerning Rodney, 178.

CUMBY, Lieutenant, parody by, upon Admiral Jervis, 373;
  pretended revenge of Admiral upon, 374.

Curacao, 246.

CURTIS, Fleet Captain, 311.

CURTIS, Sir Roger, 250.

Czar of Russia, 421.


DACRES, Lieutenant, wounded, 437, 438.

Declaration of Independence, 275.

DE COURT, Admiral, his comments on engagement off Toulon, 44; 81.

_Defence_, ship, 342; 363.

DE GRASSE, Count, fleet under, sails for Martinique, 221, 222;
  sights Hood's division, 222;
  gives Hood battle, 222;
  moves to support his detachment at Tobago, 229;
  sails for Hayti, 231;
  protects convoy from Martinique to Cap Francois, 236;
  is followed by Rodney, 236;
  separates ships of war from convoy, 237;
  fails to use his opportunity, 237;
  condition of ships of, 238;
  flag-ship of, collides with _Zele_, 238;
  battle with Rodney, 238-242;
  disaster to squadron of, 292;
  transports sail to carry stores to, 392;
  off St. Christopher, 394;
  Saumarez engages flag-ship of, 396.

DE GUICHEN, sails from Martinique, 197;
  his battle with Rodney, 200-206;
  asks to be relieved, 206;
  his fleet returns to Europe, 214; 239.

DE LA CLUE, Admiral, sails for Brest, 133;
  near Gibraltar, 133;
  is seen by British frigate, 134;
  pursued by Boscawen, 134;
  fire-ships destroyed by Boscawen, 134.

DE RUYTER, pronounced greatest naval seaman in era of Charles II., 12, 13.

D'ESTAING, Count, Howe's campaign against, 268, 269;
  leaves Toulon for America, 277;
  his arrival delayed, 279;
  strength of squadron of, 279;
  arrives, 279;
  sails southward, 280;
  enters harbor of Newport, 281;
  again puts to sea, 281;
  fleet of, scattered, 282;
  appears again off Rhode Island, 282;
  retires to Boston, 282;
  runs batteries at Seakonnet channel, 388;
  is lured out of bay, 388;
  abandons coast, 388.

Devonshire, 429.

_Devonshire_, ship, 90, 91.

Dey, of Algiers, _see Algiers, Dey of_.

Dominica, 237.

_Dorsetshire_, frigate, 41, 46, 137.

DOUGLAS, Sir Charles, his criticism of Rodney's encounter with
  De Grasse, 247; 433; 437;
  on battle of Lake Champlain, 439;
  commands Pellew, 440.

DOUGLAS, Sir James, 165.

DRAKE, Rear Admiral, sent by Rodney against De Grasse, 229;
  forced to retire before superior force, 230.

_Droits de l'Homme_, ship, fight of, with _Indefatigable_
  and _Amazon_, 456, 457;
  wreck of, 458.

Dungeness, anecdote of Nelson off, 446, 447.

DUPLEIX, recalled from India by French government, 101.

_Dutton_, ship, driven ashore at Plymouth, 452;
  her troops, passengers, and crew saved through action
  of Admiral Pellew, 452-454.


_Eagle_, ship, 90, 153.

East Indies, 403.

East India, station, Pellew assigned to, 460.

Egypt, 403; 404; 413.

ELLIS, Lieutenant, 343.

ELLISON, Captain, Earl St. Vincent's rebuke to, 363, 364.

ELPHINSTONE, Captain, 165.

Erie, Lake, 436.

_Essex_, ship, 112.

Europa Point, 419.

EXMOUTH, Lord, _see Pellew_.


Falkland Islands, incident at, brings Great Britain and Spain
  on verge of rupture, 172.

Falmouth, 456.

FAULKNER, Captain, 342, 343.

FEARNEY, William, bargeman, receives surrendered Spanish swords
  from Nelson, 356.

Ferrol, Spanish port of, Pellew watches, 460.

Fighting Instructions, of 1740 and 1756, compared with those of 1665;
  Rooke's tactics adopted in, 16.

Finisterre, Cape, 291.

Finland, gulf of, Russian fleet takes refuge in, 425.

First Consul, Napoleon as, 413.

_Flamborough_, frigate, 78.

FLIGHT, Colonel, Admiral Jervis plays joke upon, 370.

_Formidable_, flag-ship of Rodney, 239.

Fort Moultrie, _see Moultrie Fort_.

Fort Royal, 235.

_Foudroyant_, ship, 330; 331.

Four Days Battle, British meet severe check in, 11;
  attributed to strategic errors, 12;
  Penn's criticism of, 12.

Fox, Captain, criticised for conduct in battle off La Rochelle, 93;
  court-martialled, 93;
  retired as a rear-admiral, 93.

Fox, Charles J., supported in Parliament by Admiral Jervis, 332.

France, abandons Egypt, 101;
  sends fleet and force against Minorca, 104;
  declares war against Great Britain, 105;
  captures British supply vessel off Gibraltar, 106;
  sends squadron to convoy troops to Cape Breton, 1758, 116;
  ships of, flee up river Charente, 117;
  vessels of, make their escape, 117;
  determines to invade England, 124;
  preparations of, for invasion of England, 124, 125;
  war between Great Britain and, imminent, 176;
  declares war against Great Britain, 185;
  expedition of, against Ireland, sails from Brest, 455;
  failure of expedition of, against Ireland, 456.

Francois, Cap, 231; 236; 244; 246.

FRANKLIN, Benjamin, on French occupation of Canada, 102;
  receives note from Admiral Howe, 275;
  bitter reply of, 275;
  Howe's comment on, 275.

_Franklin_, ship, 406.

FREDERICK the Great, 260.

Free ports, Great Britain institutes, in West Indies, 169;
  effect of, 169;
  Rodney's report concerning, 169; 170.

French Navy, _see Navy, French_.

French, the, their part in development of tactical science, 13;
  seamen mobbed in Boston, 282;
  land in Egypt, 404.


Galley fighting, its superiority in effectiveness to that in
  sailing vessels, 7;
  its decline, 8;
  its traditions linger, 8.

GARDNER, Lord, 265.

GEARY, Francis, Hawke's advice to, 146.

GEORGE I., King of England, stands sponsor for infant Rodney, 148.

GEORGE II., King of England, takes knowledge of Hawke, 84.

GEORGE III., King of England, conversation of, with Earl St. Vincent, 287.

Gibraltar, Rooke's capture of, 16;
  Byng retires to, 105;
  Hawke reaches, 105;
  Boscawen returns to, 133;
  De la Clue near, 133; 187;
  joy at, over Rodney's victory off Cape St. Vincent, 193, 194; 269;
  Howe's relief of, 288-295;
  Jervis at relief of, 331; 346; 348;
  three ships wrecked at, 350;
  Saumarez convoys prizes to, 409; 410;
  Saumarez withdraws from Algeciras to, 416;
  Exmouth joins Dutch fleet at, 468.

_Gibraltar_, ship, injured on a reef, 350.

_Glorieux_, ship, 239.

Great Britain, declares war against France, 105;
  institutes free ports in Jamaica, 169;
  effect of this movement, 169;
  foreign policy of, enfeebled, 172;
  on verge of rupture with Spain over Falkland Islands incident, 172;
  war between France and, imminent, 176;
  pensions daughters of Marechal Biron, 180;
  declares war against Holland, 217;
  Napoleon seeks to exclude commerce of, 413.

Great Britain, Navy of, _see Navy of Great Britain_.

Greenwich Hospital, Palliser appointed to governorship of, 182.

Grenada, captured by British, 159.

Gros Ilet Bay, 235.

Guadaloupe, 237; 238; 243; 245.

Guernsey, Island, James Saumarez born on, 383;
  later years of Saumarez at, 427.


HALLOWELL, Captain, 352;
  eccentric response of, to Jervis, 353.

_Hannibal_, ship, loss of, at Algeciras, 416; 418;
  re-anchors at Algeciras, 419.

Havana, Rodney at fall of, 166;
  loss of, embitters Spain, 171.

Havre, Rodney operates against, 158.

HAWKE, Admiral, development of naval warfare identified with name of, 4;
  uplifted the navy, 6;
  off Toulon, 29, 39, 40;
  his capture of the Spanish vessel, _Poder_, 40;
  his birth and parentage, 77;
  his promotion to post-captain, 78;
  appointed to the _Berwick_, 79;
  sails for the Mediterranean, 79;
  loses his political influence, 79;
  war against Spain declared, 80;
  sails for West Indies in _Portland_, 80;
  war of Austrian succession, 80;
  before Toulon, 81;
  his exceptional conduct in battle, 81;
  is complimented by Rear-Admiral Rowley, 84;
  effect of the battle on his fortunes, 84;
  the king takes knowledge of him, 84;
  becomes a rear-admiral, 85;
  hoists his flag, 85;
  cruises in the Bay of Biscay, under Sir Peter Warren, 85;
  joined to Warren in command, 86;
  goes to sea in command, 86;
  subordinates pecuniary to military considerations, 88;
  descries the enemy off La Rochelle, 89;
  overhauls fleet of French merchantmen convoyed by
  Commodore L'Etenduere, 89;
  orders general chase, 90;
  overtakes the French rear, 90;
  his brilliant victory, 91;
  his report of the engagement, 92;
  calls a council of war, 93;
  displeased with Capt. Fox, 93;
  actually commander in battle with L'Etenduere, 97;
  given Order of the Bath, 98;
  now known as Sir Edward Hawke, 98;
  promoted to rank of vice-admiral, 98;
  in dock yard command, 98;
  most illustrious naval officer, 100;
  revolutionizes naval ideas, 100;
  his part in arbitrament with France, 103;
  again in command of a fleet, 103;
  sails against French, 104;
  seizes 300 trading vessels, 104;
  supersedes Byng, 105;
  reaches Gibraltar, 105;
  sends Byng home, 105;
  institutes inquiry into conduct of Byng's captains, 105;
  denies allegations of Pitt in House of Commons, 105;
  disliked by Pitt, 106;
  returns to England, 106;
  recaptures British supply vessel in Spanish port, 107;
  his characteristic independence illustrated, 107;
  his service henceforth confined to Channel fleet, 108;
  maintains blockade of French ports, 108;
  his expedition against Rochefort, 111;
  controversy concerning it, 111;
  his maxim concerning pilots, 112;
  his surprise at Basque Roads, 112;
  characterization of that harbor, 112;
  his coolness, 113;
  his self-assertion, 113;
  his bold disregard of pilotage difficulties at Quiberon, 114;
  declines to attend a council of war, 115;
  reaches Spithead, 115;
  resents language of Pitt, 116;
  his service against French squadron, 1758, 116;
  his failure to destroy French squadron through defective equipment, 117;
  practically supplanted by Howe, 118;
  abandons his command in an indignant note, 118, 119;
  his anger in some respects justified, 119;
  is summoned to the Admiralty, 121;
  defends his action, 121;
  his position strengthened, 121;
  accompanies Anson as second in command, 122;
  culminating epoch in career of, 122;
  his triumph at Quiberon Bay, 122;
  his capacity as a seaman proved, 122;
  his efficient blockade of Brest, 122;
  is burned in effigy, 124;
  operations at Brest, 126;
  his double duty there, 126;
  his difficulties, 126;
  opposes Conflans, 126;
  his method at Quiberon analyzed, 127-130;
  assures the Admiralty, 131;
  his great tact in correspondence, 132;
  discharges a mutinous surgical officer, 132;
  defends his act, 132;
  his liberality toward subordinates, 132;
  watches French ships at Cadiz, 134;
  sends ships to reinforce light squadron, 134;
  recalls ships-of-the-line, 134;
  anchors in Torbay, 135;
  receives news of French fleet, 135;
  crowds all sail for Quiberon, 136;
  sights the French fleet, 136;
  gives pursuit, 136, 137;
  opens fire, 137;
  his orders to his sailing master, 138;
  is overtaken by night, 139;
  follows French fleet round The Cardinals, 139;
  sinks two French ships, 140;
  cows the French navy, 141;
  his losses at Quiberon, 141;
  his feat at Quiberon analyzed, 142;
  returns to England, 143;
  is succeeded by Boscawen temporarily, 143;
  received with honors, 143;
  denied a peerage, 143;
  his indifference to self-advancement, 143;
  his independence in professional conduct, toward superiors, 143, 144;
  hauls down his flag, 144;
  becomes first Lord of the Admiralty, 144;
  made vice-admiral of Great Britain, 145;
  the peerage conferred, 145;
  his advice to Geary, 146;
  his death, 146;
  his distinctive glory, 146;
  his opinion of Howe, 262; 273.

_Hawke_, schooner, 170,
  overhauled by Spanish coast guard vessels, 170;
  taken to Cartagena, 171.

Hayti, 231; 236.

_Hector_, ship, 240.

_Hermenegildo_, ship, 417; 420;
  remarkable loss of, 420.

Hohenlinden, 413.

Holland, Great Britain declares war against, 217; 390.

HOOD, Sir Samuel, strength of his powers, 74;
  made second in command to Rodney, 220;
  arrives at West India station, 221;
  his disagreement with Rodney, 221;
  gives battle to De Grasse, 222;
  urges Rodney to effect a coalition of forces, 223;
  joins Rodney at St. Kitts, 228;
  criticises Rodney's movement against De Grasse at Tobago, 229;
  defends St. Kitts, 234;
  urges Rodney to more energetic action, 243;
  criticises Rodney, 244-246;
  his comment on Rodney, 252;
  in command of Mediterranean fleet, 299;
  anchors off St. Christopher, 394;
  appoints Saumarez to command _Russell_, 395.

Horn, Cape, 260.

HOSTE, Paul, historian of achievements of Tourville, 13.

HOWE, Lord, his important mission, 176;
  his return from America, 182;
  his character and temperament, 183, 184;
  anecdote of, recorded by Sir Byam Martin, 250; 254;
  his especial claim on esteem of Americans, 254;
  respect in American colonies for his elder brother, 254-256;
  succeeds to the peerage held by his brother, 256;
  character compared with that of his brother, 256;
  his early service, 259;
  enters the navy, 259;
  embarks for Pacific in Anson's squadron, 259;
  serves in West Indies, 260;
  his part in Seven Years War, 260;
  his friendship with Wolfe, 262;
  characterization of, by a French pilot, 262;
  Hawke's opinion of, 262, 263;
  his taciturnity, 263;
  receives the Duke of York, 263;
  his coolness and self-possession, 263;
  anecdotes of, 264, 265;
  his composure under suspense, 266, 267, 268;
  his campaign against D'Estaing, 268;
  contrasted with Jervis, 270, 271;
  at Quiberon, 273;
  in House of Commons, 274;
  becomes rear-admiral, 274;
  in confidence of Hawke, 274;
  appointed to command squadron, 274;
  vice-admiral, 275;
  commander-in-chief of North American station, 275;
  given treaty powers, 275;
  addresses note to Franklin, 275;
  his comment on Franklin's reply, 275;
  concerning his letter to Washington, 276;
  his operations about New York, 276;
  author's characterization of, 277, 278;
  learns of coming of D'Estaing, 278;
  concentrates at New York, 278;
  disposition of squadron of, against D'Estaing, 279, 280;
  manoeuvres to avoid battle with D'Estaing, 281;
  fleet of, scattered, 282;
  highest title of, to fame, 283;
  follows French fleet to Newport, and Boston, 284;
  resigns command, 284;
  succeeded by Vice-admiral Byron, 284;
  sails for England, 284;
  words of, in House of Commons, 284;
  again brought into service, 287;
  encounters allied fleet off Scilly, 288;
  tactical manoeuvre of, off Land's End, 288;
  relief of Gibraltar by, 288, 295;
  tribute of Chevalier to, 296;
  headed for Atlantic, 297;
  is pursued by allies, 297;
  regains Spithead, 297;
  on shore duty, 297;
  as first Lord of Admiralty, 298;
  appoints Nelson to a ship, 298;
  at head of navy at outbreak of French revolution, 298;
  takes command of Channel fleet, 299;
  encounters French fleet and convoy, 301, 302;
  gives chase, 302;
  tactical skill of, 303, 304;
  analysis of tactics in fight with Villaret-Joyeuse, 306, 307;
  attacks latter, in force, 310;
  conduct of, in action, 311;
  victory of, over French fleet, 315, 316;
  career of, ended, 318;
  in nominal command of Channel fleet, 318;
  suppresses mutinies, 318;
  active service of, closed, 319;
  retires formally from command of
  Channel fleet, 319;
  estimate of, of Battle of the Nile, 379;
  appearance of, off Rhode Island, 388, 409;
  commends Pellew, 440;
  again commends Pellew, 450, 476, 477.

HOWE, General, departs for England, 284.

Hudson, river, 442.

Hyeres Islands, 21.


_Indefatigable_, ship, 455;
  fight of, with _Droits de l'Homme_, 456, 457;
  narrow escape of, from wreck, 458.

India, 403.

_Inflexible_, ship, 435;
  launch and description of, 435, 436;
  in battle of Lake Champlain, 438, 439.

_Intrepide_, ship, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 91.

Ionian Isles, slaves, natives of, released by Pellew, 462.

Ireland, French expedition against, sails from Brest, 455;
  expedition reaches, 456.


_Jacobin_, ship, 313.

Jamaica, threatened by Brest fleet, 160; 161;
  succored by Rodney, 162; 163;
  station, Rodney appointed to command, 167;
  station, required high degree of executive ability to command, 168;
  its situation in relation to Spanish colonies, 168;
  free ports instituted in, 169;
  Rodney moves toward, 243; 393.

JAMES II., Duke of York, his fighting instructions, 1665, 9.

JERVIS, Admiral, contrasted with Howe, 270-272, 320;
  contrasted with Nelson, 321;
  his opinion of Nelson, 321;
  birth of, 321, 322;
  early life of, 322;
  runs away to sea, 322;
  sails for West Indies, 322;
  early privations, 323;
  contrasted with Rodney, 324;
  cruises in the Caribbean, 324;
  returns to England, 324;
  is made lieutenant, 325;
  with Boscawen in the St. Lawrence, 325;
  goes to Mediterranean with Hawke, 325;
  relieves Byng, 325;
  associated with Sir Charles Saunders, 325;
  intimacy with Wolfe, 325;
  in command of _Porcupine_, 326;
  conversation of, with Wolfe before
  battle of Plains of Abraham, 326;
  leads fleet against Quebec, 326;
  goes to England after fall of Quebec, 327;
  appointed to command a ship, 327;
  ordered to return to North America, 327;
  puts in at Plymouth, leaking, 327;
  given command of sloop _Albany_, 327;
  conquers mutinous sailors, and sets sail, 328;
  arrives at New York, 328;
  promoted to post-captain, 328;
  an admiral at fifty-two, 328;
  commands frigate in Mediterranean, 328;
  resents insult to British flag, by Genoese officers, 329;
  forces an apology, 329;
  opposed to abolition of slave trade, 329;
  commissions the _Foudroyant_, 330;
  attached to the Channel fleet, 331;
  in Keppel's battle off Ushant, 331;
  at Gibraltar with Howe, 331;
  captures French ship _Pegase_, 331;
  receives a baronetcy, 332;
  receives Order of the Bath, 332;
  takes seat in Parliament, 332;
  supports Fox, 332;
  attains rank of rear-admiral and of vice-admiral, 332;
  is again afloat, 332;
  on service in Caribbean Sea, 332;
  his brusque treatment of a lieutenant, 332, 333;
  his attitude toward matrimony, 333;
  returns to England, 333;
  appointed to command Mediterranean Station, 333;
  joins fleet in San Fiorenzo Bay, 333;
  reaches grade of admiral of the Blue, 334;
  reaches crowning period of his career, 334;
  disposition of fleet of, 336;
  as strict disciplinarian, 337;
  anecdotes concerning this characteristic of, 337-340;
  his care of health of officers and men, 343, 344;
  embarrassment of, 347;
  disappointment of, at Admiral Mann's failure to obey orders, 349;
  cheerfulness of, under discouragements, 351;
  reinforcements reach, 351;
  encounters large Spanish fleet, 352;
  courageous remark of, 352;
  victory of, at Cape St. Vincent, 352-357;
  gratitude of England toward, 356;
  created Earl of St. Vincent, 356;
  analysis of movements of, in battle of Cape St. Vincent, 356, 357;
  blockades Spanish at Cadiz, 357;
  suppresses mutinous action of seamen, 358, 359;
  action of, in case of seamen, of ship _St. George_, 360, 361;
  repels attack of Spanish gunboats from Cadiz, 361, 362;
  stern repression of mutiny by, on board ship _Marlborough_, 362-367;
  stern rebuke of, to Capt. Ellison, 363, 364;
  brusque reply of, to Sir Edward Pellew, 367;
  sternness of, 368;
  forbids captains to dine each other, 368;
  quaint humor of, 369;
  anecdotes of, 369, 370;
  reverence of, for the flag, 372;
  satire upon, by Lieutenant Cumby, 373;
  pretended revenge of, for, 373. 374;
  decline of health of, 374;
  return of, to England, 374;
  placed in command of Channel fleet, 375;
  establishes rigid discipline in same, 375;
  closes port of Brest, 375;
  analysis of last named movement, 376;
  three great services of, to England, 378;
  discipline of, of Mediterranean fleet, 378;
  winning by, of Battle of St. Vincent, 378;
  suppression of mutinies by, 378;
  contrasted with Nelson, 378, 379;
  Nelson's esteem for, 379;
  Nelson's differences with, 379;
  arranges expedition which led to Battle of the Nile, 379;
  credit due, for same, 379, 380;
  later years of, 380;
  succeeds Pitt as First Lord of the Admiralty, 380;
  retires from active
  service, 380;
  hauls down his flag, 380;
  country seat of, 380;
  closing years of, 380, 381;
  liberality, of, 381;
  active habits of in old age, 381;
  death of, 381.

Judith, Point, 281.


KEITH, Lord, 367.

KEMPENFELT, Admiral, 288;
  second to Howe, 289;
  death of, 290;
  sent in pursuit of De Grasse, 393;
  makes valuable capture, 393.

KEPPEL, Admiral, appointed to Channel fleet, 176;
  resigns command of Channel fleet, 182;
  chagrin of, 286; 287;
  Jervis with, at Ushant, 331;
  assists Saumarez in advancement, 384, 385;
  companion of uncle of Saumarez, 385


Land's End, Howe's tactical movement off, 288.

LANGARA, his fleet destroyed by Rodney, 216.

_Leander_, ship, 472.

L'ETENDUERE, Commodore, attacked by Hawke, 89;
  Hawke commander in battle with, 97; 157.

Leghorn, in power of France, 346.

LESTOCK, Vice-Admiral, off Toulon, 21, 22;
  his part in trial of Mathews, 21-25;
  his own trial and defence, 26.

Levant, the, 384.

LINOIS, at battle at Algeciras, 416;
  his division in second attack, 419.

Lisbon, 350.

_Louisa_, ship, 60, 61, 64.

LOUIS XVI., treats Saumarez with attention, 398, 399.

LOWTHER, Miss, betrothed of Gen. Wolfe, 326.


Madras, French conquest of, 103;
  yielded in exchange for Louisburg, 103.

_Magnanime_, ship, 262; 272; 273.

Malaga, movements of Rooke off, 15;
  battle, 69, 70; 156.

Malta, Nelson receives news of surrender of, to the French, 403.

Manila, loss of, embitters Spain, 171.

MANN, Admiral, discouragement of, 348;
  calls council of officers, 348;
  returns to England, 348;
  deprived of command, 348;
  Jervis's criticism of, 349;
  Nelson's criticism of, 349;
  effect on fleet of defection of, 350.

Mantua, blockaded, 346.

Marengo, 413.

_Marlborough_, frigate, 41; 42; 57;
  mutinies on, 362-367.

Marseilles, 430.

MARTIN, Sir Byam, records anecdote of Lord Howe, 250.

Martinique, Rodney operates against, 158;
  captured by British, 158; 165; 236; 245; 393.

MARRYATT, Capt, _Peter Simple_ quoted, 95, 96;
 source of sea picture in his _The King's Own_, 458.

MATHEWS, Admiral, off Toulon in 1774, 5;
  description of engagement, 21, 22, 41, 42, 43;
  courtmartial of, 27, 28;
  author's criticism of, 45, 56.

Mediterranean, fighting begins in, 1759, 133;
  Nelson returns from cruise in, 351, 352; 400; 411;
  British expedition enters, 413;
  Pellew cruises in, 430;
  Pellew is appointed Commander-in-chief in, 460; 461.

MILLBANK, Admiral, 297.

Minorca, Byng's incompetency at, 5, 20;
  affair at, reviewed, 47-63;
  French send a fleet against, 104;
  French fleet lands at, 104; 156; 367.

Mona Passage, 244.

MONCTON, General, his reluctance to move, 161;
  sends troops to Jamaica, 166.

MONK, commands in Four Days Battle, 11.

_Montague_, ship, 312; 313.

MONTGOMERY, fall of, 432.

MOREAU, French general, 347.

Moultrie, Fort, attack of British fleet on, 386.

Mutiny, in British navy, 1797, 358, 359;
  on ship _Marlborough_, 363.


NAPLES, Kingdom of, Napoleon designs to occupy, 413; 463.

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE, contemporary of Jervis, 346;
  before Mantua, 347; 402; 403; 411;
  practically absolute ruler of Europe, 412;
  designs to occupy Portugal and Kingdom of Naples, 413;
  threatens Saumarez's flank, 414;
  concentrates Spanish and French navies at Cadiz, 414;
  agreement of, with Czar, at Tilsit, 421;
  breach of, with Russia, 422;
  forces Sweden to declaration of war, 422; 454;
  decline of, coincides with Pellew's advance, 461.

Narragansett Bay, 210;
  D'Estaing's fleet at, 281; 387.

Naval Warfare, in 18th century, 3, _et seq._;
  Hawke and Rodney identified with, 4;
  advance in, shown by two great failures, 5;
  waged with vessels moved by oars, 7;
  such method more reliable than by sail, 7;
  its scene long in the Mediterranean, 8;
  introduction of cannon in, 8;
  a period of systematization sets in, 9;
  period of transition in, 12;
  Tourville's influence on, 14;
  peace of Utrecht closed transitional period in, 68;
  Napoleon's influence on, 68, 69;
  conditions of, in 18th century, 74, 75;
  advance of, in 19th century.

Navy, French, its movements at Quiberon Bay, 125;
  attempts to concentrate at Brest, 126;
  vanquished by Hawke, 141;
  concentrated at Cadiz, 414.

Navy of Great Britain, in 1739, 69;
  permitted to decline, 100.

Navy of U.S., in 1812, 69.

NELSON, Admiral, his remarkable order at Trafalgar, alluded to, 7;
  on true way of fighting, 30;
  on the comparative value of prize money, 88; 146;
  appointed to command a ship by Howe, 298;
  letter of, to his brother, 298;
  opinion of, of Jervis's Mediterranean fleet, 330;
  remark of, concerning Hood, 335;
  criticises movements of British fleet, 1795, 346;
  his criticism of Admiral Mann, 349;
  return from mission up Mediterranean, 351, 352;
  at battle off Cape St. Vincent, 355;
  receives Spanish surrender, 355, 356;
  approves sentence of seamen of ship _St. George_, 361; 362;
  contrasted with Jervis, Earl St Vincent, 378, 379;
  esteem of, for Jervis, 379;
  credit due to, for victory of the Nile, 379;
  contrasted with Saumarez, 383; 401; 402;
  his lack of personal sympathy with Saumarez, 407;
  Saumarez's unfortunate remark to, 407;
  at battle of the Nile, 407-409; 410;
  Baltic league shattered by, 413;
  eulogizes Saumarez in House of Lords, 421;
  seamanship of, contrasted with that of Pellew, 446;
  anecdote of, 446;
  mentions incident
  of Algerine policy, 462, 463;
  denounces Algerine piracy, 463;
  Israel Pellew with, at Trafalgar, 476.

Nevis, island, 394.

Newport, D'Estaing enters harbor of, 281.

Nile, battle of, 362;
  Admiral Howe's estimate of, 379;
  credit due to Admiral Lord St. Vincent for, 379, 380;
  Saumarez cruises in, 384; 403;
  description of battle of, 405-408;
  Saumarez wounded at, 409.

Nore, threatening mutinies of, 454.

NORRIS, Captain, absconds to avoid trial, 37.

_Nymphe_, frigate, Pellew in command of, 447; 448;
fight of, with _Cleopatre_, 448, 449.


_Orient_, ship, Nelson's coffin made from mainmast of, 353;
  blows up, 407.

_Orion_, ship, Saumarez appointed to command, 400; 401; 406; 409; 410.


PALLISER, Vice-Admiral, accused of betrayal of his chief, 182;
  twelve admirals memorialize the king against, 182.

Paris, Rodney settles in, 175.

PARKER, Admiral, Rodney writes to, 225.

PARKER, Commodore Sir Peter, 385.

Passaro, Cape, Battle of, 69.

_Pegase_, ship, 331.

PELLEW, Admiral, asks for courtmartial upon a mutiny, 367; 368; 389; 428;
  of Norman extraction, 428;
  early orthography of name, 428;
  settlement of family in England, 429;
  father of, 429;
  fearlessness of, at school, 429;
  goes afloat, 430;
  sides with a companion in a quarrel and leaves the ship, 430;
  intimacy of, with Captain Pownoll, 431;
  brought in contact with American revolution, 431;
  at reception of Burgoyne on ship _Blonde_, 431;
  saves a sailor from drowning, 431;
  exuberant vitality of, 431;
  anecdote of recklessness of, 431;
  anecdote of accident to, 435;
  second officer of _Carleton_, 437;
  in battle of Lake Champlain, 436, 437;
  by loss of superiors left in command, 438;
  gallantry of, in contest, 438;
  is commended by Douglas, Lord Howe and the Admiralty, 440;
  is promised promotion, 440;
  gives chase to Arnold, 441;
  lands at Crown Point, 441;
  accompanies Burgoyne, 442;
  returns to England, 442;
  promoted to a lieutenancy, 442;
  serves under Capt. Pownoll, 442;
  lieutenant of frigate _Apollo_, 442;
  meets French frigate _Stanislas_, 442;
  action with, 442;
  succeeds to command at death of Pownoll, 442;
  grief of, for death of Pownoll, 443;
  gains promotion, 443;
  destroys French privateers, 443;
  wins grade of post-captain, 443;
  in time of peace tries farming, 443;
  commands frigate on Newfoundland Station, 444;
  personal activity of, 444;
  anecdotes of, 444, 445;
  his knowledge of seamanship, 446; 447;
  in command of _Nymphe_, 447;
  at fight between _Nymphe_ and _Cleopatre_, 448, 449;
  Lord Howe commends, 450;
  opposes French privateers, 451, 452;
  directs rescue of troops, passengers, and crew of ship _Dutton_, 452-454;
  stationed off Brest, 454;
  discouraged appointment of Roman Catholic chaplains, 455;
  opposes enfranchisement of Roman Catholics, 455;
  follows French expedition against Ireland, 455, 456;
  sails for Falmouth, 456;
  fights _Indefatigable_ and _Amazon_ against _Droits de l'Homme_, 456-458;
  narrow escape of, from shipwreck, 458;
  great personal endurance of, illustrated, 459;
  eminent qualities of, 459;
  holds command in India, 459, 460;
  appointed commander-in-chief in Mediterranean, 460;
  made a rear-admiral, 460;
  assigned to East India station, 460;
  Mediterranean command of, coincides with Bonaparte's falling
  fortunes, 461;
  created Baron Exmouth, 462;
  visits Barbary ports, 462;
  compels release of slaves, 462;
  demands peace for Sardinia, 463;
  arranges with Tunis and Tripoli for treatment of captives, 463;
  Algiers refuses concession to, regarding treatment of captives, 464;
  demands release of all Christian slaves in Algiers, 464;
  despatches cruiser to Algiers, 466;
  instructions of, to Capt. Charles Warde, 466;
  asks for small force against Algiers, 467;
  preparations of, against Algiers, 468;
  sails for Algiers, 468;
  joins Dutch fleet at Gibraltar, 468;
  arrives at Algiers Bay, 468;
  serves demands on Dey of Algiers, 468;
  receives no answer, 468;
  opens battle, 469, 470;
  is slightly wounded, 473;
  receives submission of Dey, 473;
  frees Algerian, Tunisian, and Tripolitan slaves, 474;
  returns to England, 474;
  close of career of, 475;
  later days of, 475, 476;
  religious nature of, 476;
  death of, 476;
  rank of, at death 476.

PELLEW, Israel, bravery of, in fight between _Nymphe_
  and _Cleopatre_, 448, 449;
  promoted to post-captain, 451; 476.

Penmarcks, rocks, 458.

PENN, Sir William, his criticism of Four Days Battle, 12.

PERRY, Commander, 436.

_Peuple Souverain_, ship, 406.

Philadelphia, evacuation of, 284.

PITT, William, defends Admiral Byng, 105;
  his dislike of Hawke, 106;
  his military purpose, 110;
  proposed series of descents on French coast, 110;
  his impetuosity a spur to laggards, 113;
  his energy felt in civil administration, 114;
  blames military and naval leaders, 115;
  his injustice meets rebuke, 116;
  profits by Hawke's suggestions, 117;
  leaves Hawke a commodore, 144;
  succeeded by Lord St. Vincent in Admiralty, 380.

Plattsburg, 436.

Plymouth, ship _Dutton_ driven ashore at, 452.

POCOCK, Admiral, 164; 165.

_Poder_, ship, 41, 42, 43, 86.

Point Judith, 281.

_Pompee_, ship, dismasted at Algeciras, 416;
  withdraws under tow, 417; 418.

_Porcupine_, sloop-of-war, 326.

_Portland_, ship, 80.

Port Mahon, surrendered, 105; 156; 367.

Porto Rico, 244.

Portugal, Napoleon designs to occupy, 413; 414.

POWNOLL, Captain, intimacy of, with Pellew, 431;
  commands frigate _Apollo_, 442;
  death of, 442.

_Prince_, ship, 365.

_Prince William_, ship, 188.

QUEBEC, 432.

_Queen Charlotte_, ship, 250, 265; 305; 311; 313; 317; 469; 470; 472; 473.

Quiberon Bay, Hawke's disregard of pilotage difficulties at, 114;
  Hawke's triumph at, 122;
  France determines to invade England, 124;
  location of, 125;
  Hawke crowds all sail for, 136;
  islands of, cultivated as kitchen gardens, 141;
  Howe at, 273; 460.


_Ramillies_, ship, 60, 61.

_Real_, ship, 41, 44.

_Real Carlos_, ship, 417; 420;
  remarkable loss of, 420.

Red Sea, 403.

_Reunion_, frigate, quits Cherbourg, 399;
  meets British frigate _Crescent_, 399;
  action of, with _Crescent_, 399, 400.

_Revenge_, ship, 59; 60; 62.

Rhode Island, Saumarez sent to, 387;
  British retreat to, 387.

Richelieu, river, 433; 434.

ROBESPIERRE, orders of, to Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse, 301.

Rochefort, Hawke's expedition against, 111;
  Conflans's vessels escape to, 141.

Rochetts, country seat of Lord St. Vincent, 380.

RODNEY, Admiral, development of naval warfare identified with name of, 4;
  uplifted the navy, 6;
  before Havre, 126;
  succeeds Hawke, 145;
  his descent, 148;
  his father in command of the royal yacht, 148;
  George I. his sponsor, 148;
  given the name of the king, 148;
  his advancement, 148;
  contrasted in temperament with Hawke, 152;
  presented at Court, 153;
  complimented to the king, 153;
  appointed Commodore, and commander of Newfoundland station, 154;
  letter to, from Earl of Sandwich, 154, 155;
  the Earl's confidence in, 155;
  returns to England, 156;
  elected to Parliament, 156;
  no connection with Minorca incident, 156;
  breaks with tradition, 156;
  accompanies Rochefort expedition under Hawke, 157;
  commands ship-of-the-line under Boscawen, at Louisburg, 157;
  again returns to England, 157;
  promoted to rear-admiral, 158;
  operates against Havre and Brest, 158;
  again elected to Parliament, 158;
  appointed to Leeward Islands station, 158;
  sails for his new post, 158;
  begins operations against Martinique, 158;
  begins hostilities against Spain, 159;
  receives intelligence of approach of Brest fleet, 160;
  gives pursuit, 160;
  hastens to succor of Jamaica, 160;
  takes the responsibility, 162, 163;
  his bitter disappointment, 164;
  ordered to join expedition under Pocock, 164;
  his letter to Earl of Sandwich, 164;
  goes to Martinique, 166;
  at fall of Havana, 166;
  active service in Seven Years War terminated, 166;
  returns to England, 1763, 166;
  made a vice-admiral of the Blue, and vice-admiral of the Red, 167;
  appointed commander-in-chief at Jamaica, 167;
  governor of Greenwich hospital, 167;
  his report concerning free-ports, 169, 170;
  was a pronounced Tory, 170;
  demands of governor of Cartagena delivery of captured war
  schooner _Hawke_, 171;
  disturbs British ministry by _Hawke_ incident, 172;
  Sandwich's cautionary letter to, 172, 173;
  his act justified by government, 174;
  Sandwich reassures him, 174;
  his hopes for a colonial appointment, 174;
  Jamaica his first choice, 174;
  Sandwich's renewed assurances, 175;
  is superseded, 175;
  has permission to remain at Jamaica, 175;
  lands in England, 175;
  lacked influence to obtain preferment, 175;
  settles in Paris, 175;
  becomes pecuniarily involved, 175;
  applies to Admiralty for employment, 176;
  his application disregarded, 176;
  admiral of white squadron, 177;
  declaration of Sandwich concerning, in House of Lords, 178;
  Richard Cumberland's remark concerning, 178;
  detained in France by creditors, 179;
  Lady Rodney's efforts to release, 179;
  Marechal Biron makes advance to, 179;
  demands of creditors of, satisfied, 179, 180;
  repays Biron, 180;
  returns to England, 180;
  appointed to command Leeward Islands station, 185;
  analysis of his powers in 1782, 186;
  Sandwich urges him to sea with all despatch, 187;
  sails from Plymouth, 187;
  captures a Spanish convoy, 188;
  sights Spanish fleet, off Cape St. Vincent, 188;
  is congratulated by Sandwich, 190;
  letter of latter to, 191;
  letter to, from Lady Rodney, 191;
  his reply, 192;
  his report of battle, 192;
  Sandwich's letter to, 193;
  England's joy over achievement of, 193;
  reaches St. Lucia, 194;
  place of, among naval chiefs, 196;
  follows De Guichen's sailing from Martinique, 197;
  overtakes French fleet, 197;
  attacks the enemy, 198;
  criticises misconduct of his officers, 204;
  his stern discipline, 206, 207;
  makes suggestions to the Admiralty, 209;
  sails for North American coast, 211;
  anchors off Sandy Hook, 211;
  his coming a grievous blow to Washington, 211;
  disclaims intention of offending Arbuthnot, 213;
  lands at New York, 214;
  returns to West Indies, 216;
  destruction of Langara's fleet by, 216;
  reaches Barbados, 217;
  vessels lost in hurricane, 217;
  ordered to proceed against Dutch shipping, 217;
  captures St. Eustatius island, 218;
  captures Dutch fleet of merchant ships, 218;
  author criticises hampering of Hood, 222;
  writes to Admiral Parker, 225;
  is advised of approach of French fleet, 225, 226;
  devotes himself to supervision of St. Eustatius island, 226;
  his error, 227;
  sends small force against De Grasse, 229;
  forced to retire, 230;
  his return to England, 232;
  again afloat, 232;
  sails for his station, 232;
  reaches Barbados, 234;
  learns of capitulation of St. Kitts, 235;
  takes united fleet to Santa Lucia, 235;
  is assailed in Parliament, 235;
  follows French fleet from Martinique, 236;
  pushes reinforcements to Hood, 237;
  battle with De Grasse, 238-242;
  his victory, 242;
  moves toward Jamaica, 243;
  is criticised for lethargic action, by Hood, 244;
  his defence, 244, 245;
  analysis of character as shown in battle with De Grasse, 248, 249, 250;
  his professional career ends, 251;
  is superseded, 251;
  succeeded by Pigot, 251;
  leaves Jamaica and lands at Bristol, 251;
  Hood's comment on, 252;
  receives thanks of Parliament, 252;
  advanced to the peerage, 252;
  is voted a pension, 252;
  his other
  honors, 253;
  made vice-admiral of Great Britain, 253;
  his troublous later years, 253;
  death of, 253;
  in accord with Lord Sandwich, 287.

RODNEY, Lady, goes to England to obtain pecuniary relief for husband, 179;
  her letter to husband concerning victory off Cape St. Vincent, 191, 192.

ROOKE, Admiral, his movements off Malaga, 15.

ROWLEY, Rear-Admiral, off Toulon, 21, 28;
  compliments Hawke, 84.

Royal, Fort, 235.

_Royal George_, ship, 140;
  loss of, 290; 393.

_Royal Savage_, schooner, 438.

_Russell_, ship, Saumarez appointed to command, 395; 396.

Russia, Sweden at war with, 421;
  breach of, with Napoleon, 422;
  fleet of, takes refuge in Gulf of Finland, 425.

Russia, Czar of, 421.


_St. Antoine_, ship, 420.

St. Christopher, island, 394.

St. Eustatius, island, captured by Rodney, 217, 218;
  recaptured by French, 233;
  Rodney assailed in Parliament for acts at, 235.

_St. George_, ship, 351;
  two seamen of, condemned for infamous crime, 360;
  outburst of crew of, 360;
  execution of seamen of, 361.

St. Johns (Canada); 434, 435; 437.

St. Kitts, 163; 165; 228;
  is besieged by French, 234;
  capitulates, 235.

St. Lawrence, river, 433; 434.

St. Vincent, Cape, captured by British, 159;
  Spanish fleet sighted by Rodney, off, 188;
  battle off, 190;
  victory of Jervis at, 345; 353; 355;
  Jervis's battle off, 352-357;
  Saumarez at battle off, 400.

ST. VINCENT, Earl, declines a command, 286;
  denounces ministry to George III., 287;
  Admiral Jervis created, 356; 359; 360; 361; 362; 364; 367; 368;
    370; 372; 373; 374; 375; 376; 377; 379; 380; 381; 401;
  assumes command Channel fleet, 411;
  complimentary note of, to Saumarez, 411, 412;
  his praise of Saumarez, 412, 413;
  recognizes ability of Pellew, 460,
  _see also Jervis_.

SAINTE-ANDRE, Jean Bon, 312.

SANDWICH, Earl of, letter from, to Rodney, 154,155;
  his confidence in Rodney, 155;
  his cautionary letter to Rodney, 172, 173;
  disregards Rodney's application for employment, 176;
  his remark concerning Rodney in House of Lords, 178;
  urges Rodney to sea with all despatch, 187;
  congratulates Rodney, 190;
  private letter from, to Rodney, 193;
  character of, 285, 286.

Sandy Hook, Rodney anchors off, 211.

San Fiorenzo Bay, 333; 348.

_San Josef_, ship, 355.

_San Nicolas_, ship, 355.

Santa Lucia, island, captured by British, 159; 228;
  French proceed against, 229;
  failure of attack on, 229;
  Rodney takes united fleet to, 235; 245; 248.

Santo Domingo, 244.

Saratoga, 276; 441; 442.

Sardinia, Lord Exmouth demands peace for, 463.

SAUMAREZ, Admiral, 382;
  birth of, 383;
  his mastery of French language, 383;
  lineage of, 383;
  contrasted with Nelson, 383;
  early taste of, for navy, 383;
  begins career at early age, 383, 384;
  goes afloat at thirteen, 384;
  cruises in Mediterranean, 384;
  follows Nelson in pursuit of Bonaparte's fleet, 384;
  return of, to England, 384;
  examined for promotion to lieutenancy, 384;
  appointed Master's Mate, 384;
  owes advancement to Admiral Keppel, 384, 385;
  sails in squadron commanded by Commodore Sir Peter Parker, 385;
  offered commission by Lord Cornwallis, 385;
  meeting of, with Cornwallis subsequently, 385;
  arrives off Charleston, 386;
  aids in attack on Fort Moultrie, 386;
  courage of, in action, 387;
  promotion of, to lieutenancy, 387;
  in command of a galley, 387;
  is sent to Rhode Island, 387;
  stationed at Seakomet, 388;
  returns to England, 388;
  his lot thrown with line-of-battle force, 388, 389;
  in action with Dutch off Dogger Bank, 391, 392;
  again promoted, 392;
  made commander of _Tisiphone_, 392;
  on the tide which leads to fortune, 393;
  reaches Barbados, 394;
  joins fleet, 394;
  encounters French fleet under De Grasse, 394;
  effects brilliant manoeuvre, 394;
  ordered to England, 395;
  Hood substitutes another officer, 395;
  appointed to command _Russell_, 495;
  an acting post-captain, 395;
  bravery of, in Rodney's renowned battle, 395, 396;
  engages De Grasse's flag-ship, 396;
  brilliant manoeuvre of, 396;
  promoted and returns to England, 397;
  in retirement, 397;
  marries, 398;
  makes trip to France, 398;
  at beginning of work on Cherbourg breakwater, 398;
  receives attention from Louis XVI., 398;
  appointed to command _Crescent_, 399;
  intercepts French frigate _Reunion_, 399;
  analysis of action between _Crescent_ and _Reunion_, 399;
  is knighted for victory, 400;
  appointed to ship-of-the-line _Orion_, 400;
  captures three French ships, 400;
  at battle off Cape St. Vincent, 400;
  blockades Cadiz, 400;
  operates off Toulon, 400;
  inferior to Troubridge in eyes of St. Vincent and Nelson, 401;
  given equal command with Troubridge, 402;
  his attack upon French fleet before Toulon, 402;
  as a letter writer, 402;
  his record of pursuit of French fleet, 402;
  favors seeking enemy off coast of Egypt, 404;
  reaches Alexandria, 404;
  returns westward, 404;
  again sights Alexandria, 404;
  despondency of, 405;
  learns of proximity of enemy in Aboukir Bay, 405;
  share of, in battle of the Nile, 405;
  wounded, 407, 409;
  unfortunate remark of, to Nelson, 407, 408;
  losses of, at battle of Nile, 409;
  convoys prizes to Gibraltar, 409;
  ordered to home station, 409;
  impatient at delays, 410;
  reaches England, 410; appointed to command the _Caesar_, 410;
  at blockade of Brest, 411;
  St. Vincent's flattering note to, 411, 412;
  importance of situation of, off Brest, 412;
  St. Vincent's praise of, 412, 413;
  Napoleon threatens flank of, 414;
  given command of a squadron, 414;
  now a rear-admiral, 414;
  ordered to blockade Cadiz, 414;
  sails on his mission, 415;
  arrives off Cadiz, 415;
  learns of French vessels at Algeciras, 415;
  starts for Algeciras, 415;
  finds French fleet moored at, 415;
  steers to engage French, 415;
  failure of wind interferes with plans of, 415;
  disaster to two ships of, 416;
  withdraws to Gibraltar, 416;
  failure of, 416;
  confident despatch of, to Admiralty, 417;
  fresh opportunity of, 417;
  learns of approach of Spanish fleet, 417, 418;
  sails in pursuit of Spaniards, 418;
  gives battle off Algeciras, 420;
  St. Vincent's praise of, 421;
  St. Vincent eulogizes, in House of Lords, 421;
  eulogized by Nelson, in House of Lords, 421;
  never again engaged in serious encounter with enemy, 421;
  commander-in-chief at Channel Islands, 421;
  insures Swedish neutrality, 422;
  maintains importance of Baltic, 421;
  disturbs commerce between nations on the Baltic, controlled
    by Napoleon, 422;
  succeeds to diplomatic situation, 424;
  success of, 425;
  praise of, by Swedish statesman, 425;
  follows Russian fleet in Gulf of Finland, 426;
  retires from service, 427;
  later life at Guernsey, 427;
  receives peerage from William IV., 427;
  death of, 427; 476; 477.

SAUMAREZ, Lord de, 427.

SAUMAREZ, Philip, 385.

SAUNDERS, Captain, his conduct in battle off La Rochelle, 92.

SAUNDERS, Sir Charles, associated with Jervis, 325; 328.

SCHANK, Admiral, 435.

SCHUYLER, General, 442.

Scilly, Howe encounters allied fleet off, 288.

_Serieuse_, frigate, 406.

Seven Years War, contrasted with American revolution, 102;
  result of, in North America and India, 102;
  finds Rodney a captain, 156;
  Rodney's career in, terminated, 166;
  Howe's part in, 260.

Siberia (on French coast), 411.

Sicily, 403; 404.

Smuggling, in West Indies, 168, 169.

Sorel, town of, 433.

South African war, contrasted with American revolution, 101.

Spain, refuses to surrender British supply vessel captured by
    the French, 106;
  Great Britain begins hostilities against, 159;
  increases custom-house force in West Indies, 169;
  seeks a quarrel with Great Britain, 171;
  embittered by loss of Havana and Manila, 171;
  near verge of rupture with Great Britain, over Falkland
    Islands incident, 172;
  declares war, 185;
  fleet of, enters English Channel, 185;
  navy of, concentrated at Cadiz, 414.

Spanish colonies, in West Indies, their geographical
    relation to Jamaica, 168;
  smuggling in, 168.

Stamp Act, discontent over, in American colonies, 172.

_Stanislas_, frigate, 442;
  goes aground off Belgian coast, 442, 443.

STEWART, Colonel, 446.

_Superb_, ship, 417; 419; 420.

Sweden, British fleet supports, 421; 424;
  forced by Napoleon to declaration of war, 424.


TAGUS, river, 351.

TERNAY, Admiral, 212; 214.

_Terrible_, ship, 91.

_Thesee_, ship, 140.

Ticonderoga, 433; 441; 442.

Tilsit, agreements at, 421.

TIPPOO SAIB, 403.

_Tisiphone_, ship, 392; 393; 395.

Tobago, attack on, 229;
  Drake
  meets De Grasse, off, 230;
  surrenders to De Grasse, 230.

_Tormant_, ship, 90, 91.

Torbay, British fleet leaves, 128.

Toulon, Admiral Mathews off, 5, 20;
  engagement off, 21, 22;
  description of action off, 30, 31;
  movements of fleet criticised, 33, 34; 346; 348;
  Saumarez operates off, 400; 403; 414; 415.

TOURVILLE, characterization of, 13;
  his death, 14.

Trafalgar, 422; 461; 476.

Transvaal, war in, some lessons from, 18.

_Trident_, ship, 60, 61, 64, 91.

Tripoli, agrees to treat captives as civilized countries, 463;
  releases Christian slaves, 474.

TROUBRIDGE, Captain, 353;
  gallantry of, at battle off Cape St. Vincent, 353; 355; 401; 402.

Tunis, agrees to treat captives as civilized countries, 463;
  delivers up Christian slaves, 474.

Turkey, troops of, slaughter coral fishermen on Algerine coast, 464.


UNITED STATES, Navy of, _see Navy of United States_.

Ushant, island, Howe encounters French fleet off, 302;
  Jervis in battle off, 331.


VALCOUR Island, 436; 437.

_Vengeur_, ship, 314; 315;
  loss of, 316.

_Victory_, ship, 293; 354.

Vilaine, river, 141, 143.

VILLARET-JOYEUSE Admiral, orders of Robespierre to, 301;
  encounters fleet under Howe, 302; 306;
  attacked by Howe in force, 310;
  record of, 312.

_Ville de Paris_, flag-ship of De Grasse, collides with _Zele_, 238;
  strikes her flag, 242; 363; 369; 373.


WALPOLE, on the Colonies, 101.

WARDE, Captain Charles, instructions of Lord Exmouth to, 466;
  examines defences and soundings in port of Algiers, 466.

WASHINGTON, George, Rodney's coming to American coast
    a grievous blow to, 211; 214;
  concerning letter of Howe to, 276; 279;
  comment of, on arrival of D'Estaing, 280;
  letter, of, concerning movement against Rhode Island, 282.

West Indies, smuggling in, 168;
  Arbuthnot ordered to send ships to, 210;
  conditions in, 1780, 210
  Rodney returns to, 216; 392; 393.

WHITE, sailing-master, commended by Jervis, 342, 343.

WHITSHED, Admiral Sir James, 266;
  his anecdote of Lord Gardner, 266.

WILLIAM III., King of England, grantor of peerage
    to grandfather of Lord Howe, 256.

WILLIAM IV., King of England, a midshipman at taking
    of Spanish convoy, 188;
  confers a peerage on Admiral Saumarez, 427.

WOLFE, General, Howe's friendship with, 262;
  intimacy of, with Admiral Jervis, 325, 326;
  anecdote concerning, 326;
  message of, by Jervis, to Miss Lowther, 326.


YORK, Duke of, received on shipboard by Howe, 263;
  holds reception, 263, 264.

Yorktown, 393.


_Zealous_, ship, 350.

_Zele_, ship, 238;
  collides with flag-ship _Ville de Paris_, 238.


       *       *       *       *       *


        _Works by Captain A. T. Mahan_.


    THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY.
      1660-1783.

    THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH
      REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE. TWO vols.

    THE LIFE OF NELSON, THE EMBODIMENT OF THE
      SEA POWER OF GREAT BRITAIN. TWO vols.

    THE LIFE OF NELSON. _Popular edition_. One vol.

    THE INTEREST OF AMERICA IN SEA POWER,
      PRESENT AND FUTURE.

    LESSONS OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN, AND OTHER
      ARTICLES.

    THE PROBLEM OF ASIA AND ITS EFFECT UPON
      INTERNATIONAL POLICIES.

    TYPES OF NAVAL OFFICERS, WITH SOME REMARKS
      ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF NAVAL WARFARE
      DURING THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.



***