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TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE

  * Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_.
  * Small caps are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS.
  * Gesperrt Greek text is enclosed in tildes as in ~καὶ τὰ λοιπά~.
  * Original spelling, hyphenation and punctuation have been kept,
    but variant spellings were made consistent when a predominant
    usage was found.
  * Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after
    comparison with a later edition of this work. Greek text has
    also been corrected after checking with this later edition and
    with Perseus, when the reference was found.
  * Both “Euagoras” and “Evagoras” are used to refer to the same
    ruler.
  * The following changes were also made, after checking with other
    editions:

  page  vi: “fractions” → “factions”   (they divide into three
                                        factions).
  page 216: “Odrysians” → “Bithynians” (who charged through
                                        the Bithynians).
  page 326:      “with” → “which”      (which his successor Teleutias
                                        ... still farther completed)
  note  30:    “Ἑγγαδα” → “Ἑλλάδα”     (Τοιοῦτοι οὔν ὄντες, ἐπόθουν εἰς
                                        τὴν Ἑλλάδα σώζεσθαι).
  note 626:       “494” → “394”        (before the autumn of 394 B.C.).




  HISTORY OF GREECE

  BY
  GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.

  VOL. IX.

  REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION.

  NEW YORK:
  HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
  329 AND 331 PEARL STREET.
  1880.




CONTENTS.

VOL. IX.


PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.


CHAPTER LXIX.

CYRUS THE YOUNGER AND THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.

  Spartan empire.—March of the Ten Thousand Greeks.—Persian
  kings—Xerxes—Artaxerxes Longimanus.—Darius Nothus.—Cyrus the
  younger in Ionia—his vigorous operations against Athens.—Youth
  and education of Cyrus.—His esteem for the Greeks—his
  hopes of the crown.—Death of Darius Nothus—succession of
  Artaxerxes Mnemon.—Secret preparations of Cyrus for attacking
  his brother.—Klearchus and other Greeks in the service of
  Cyrus.—Strict administration, and prudent behavior, of
  Cyrus.—Cyrus collects his army at Sardis.—The Ten Thousand
  Greeks—their position and circumstances.—Xenophon.—How
  Xenophon came to join the Cyreian army.—Cyrus marches
  from Sardis—Kolossæ—Kelænæ.—Peltæ—Keramôn-Agora,
  Käystru-Pedion.—Distress of Cyrus for money—Epyaxa
  supplies him.—Thymbrium.—Tyriæum—Review of the Greeks by
  Cyrus.—Ikonium—Lykaonia—Tyana.—Pass over Taurus into
  Kilikia.—Syennesis of Kilikia—his duplicity—he assists Cyrus
  with money.—Cyrus at Tarsus—mutiny of the Greeks—their
  refusal to go farther.—Klearchus tries to suppress the
  mutiny by severity—he fails.—He tries persuasion—his
  discourse to the soldiers.—His refusal to march farther—well
  received.—Deceitful manœuvres of Klearchus to bring the
  soldiers round to Cyrus.—The soldiers agree to accompany
  Cyrus farther—increase of pay.—March onward—from Tarsus to
  Issus.—Flight of Abrokomas—abandonment of the passes.—Gates
  of Kilikia and Syria.—Desertion of Xenias and Pasion—prudence
  of Cyrus.—Cyrus marches from the sea to Thapsakus on the
  Euphrates.—Partial reluctance of the army—they ford the
  Euphrates.—Separate manœuvre of Menon.—Abrokomas abandons the
  defence of the river—his double dealing.—Cyrus marches along
  the left bank of the Euphrates—the Desert—privations of the
  army.—Pylæ—Charmandê—dangerous dispute between the soldiers
  of Klearchus and those of Menon.—Entry into Babylonia—treason
  of Orontes—preparation for battle.—Discourse of Cyrus to his
  officers and soldiers.—Conception formed by Cyrus of Grecian
  superiority.—Present of Cyrus to the prophet Silanus.—Cyrus
  passes the undefended trench—Kunaxa—sudden appearance of the
  king’s army—preparation of Cyrus for battle.—Last orders of
  Cyrus.—Battle of Kunaxa—easy victory of the Greeks on their
  side.—Impetuous attack of Cyrus upon his brother—Cyrus is
  slain.—Flight of Ariæus and the Asiatic force of Cyrus.—Plunder
  of the Cyreian camp by Artaxerxes. Victorious attitude of the
  Greeks.—Character of Cyrus.—If Cyrus had succeeded, he would
  have been the most formidable enemy to Greece.                  1-51


CHAPTER LXX.

RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.

  Dismay of the Greeks on learning the death of Cyrus. Klearchus
  offers the throne to Ariæus.—Artaxerxes summons the Greeks
  to surrender—their reply—language of Phalinus.—Ariæus
  refuses the throne, but invites the Greeks to join him
  for retreat.—The Greeks rejoin Ariæus—interchange of
  oaths—resolution to retreat together.—Position of the
  Greeks—to all appearance hopeless.—Commencement of the
  retreat, along with Ariæus—disorder of the army.—Heralds
  from the Persians to treat about a truce.—The heralds
  conduct the Greeks to villages furnished with provisions.
  March over the canals.—Abundant supplies obtained in the
  villages.—Visit of Tissaphernes—negotiations.—Convention
  concluded with Tissaphernes, who engages to conduct the
  Greeks home.—Motives of the Persians—favorable dispositions
  of Parysatis towards Cyrus.—Long halt of the Greeks—their
  quarrel with Ariæus.—Secret despair of Klearchus.—Retreating
  march begun, under Tissaphernes—they enter within the Wall
  of Media—march to Sittakê.—Alarm and suspicions of the
  Greeks—they cross the Tigris.—Retreating march up the left bank
  of the Tigris—to the Great Zab.—Suspicions between the Greeks
  and Tissaphernes.—Klearchus converses with Tissaphernes—and
  is talked over.—Klearchus, with the other Grecian generals,
  visits Tissaphernes in his tent.—Tissaphernes seizes the
  Greek generals. They are sent prisoners to the Persian court,
  and there put to death.—Menon is reserved to perish in
  torture—sentiments of queen Parysatis.—How Klearchus came
  to be imposed upon.—Plans of Tissaphernes—impotence and
  timidity of the Persians.—The Persians summon the Grecian army
  to surrender.—Indignant refusal of the Greeks—distress and
  despair prevalent among them.—First appearance of Xenophon—his
  dream.—He stimulates the other captains to take the lead and
  appoint new officers.—Address of Xenophon to the officers.
  New generals are named, Xenophon being one.—The army is
  convened in general assembly—speech of Xenophon.—Favorable
  augury from a man sneezing.—Encouraging topics insisted on by
  Xenophon.—Great impression produced by his speech—the army
  confirm the new generals proposed.—Great ascendency acquired
  over the army at once by Xenophon—qualities whereby he obtained
  it.—Combination of eloquence and confidence, with soldier-like
  resource and bravery.—Approach of the Persian Mithridates—the
  Greeks refuse all parley.—The Greeks cross the Zab and resume
  their march, harassed by the Persian cavalry.—Sufferings of
  the Greeks from marching under the attacks of the cavalry.
  Successful precautions taken.—Tissaphernes renews the attack,
  with some effect.—Comfortable quarters of the Greeks. They
  halt to repel the cavalry, and then march fast onward.—Victory
  of the Greeks—prowess of Xenophon.—The Greeks embarrassed as
  to their route—impossibility either of following the Tigris
  farther, or of crossing it.—The strike into the mountains of the
  Karduchians.—They burn much of their baggage—their sufferings
  from the activity and energy of the Karduchians.—Extreme danger
  of their situation.—Xenophon finds out another road to turn
  the enemy’s position.—The Karduchians are defeated and the
  road cleared.—Danger of Xenophon with the rear division and
  baggage.—Anxiety of the Greeks to recover the bodies of the
  slain.—They reach the river Kentritês, the northern boundary
  of Karduchia.—Difficulties of passing the Kentritês—dream of
  Xenophon.—They discover a ford and pass the river.—Xenophon
  with the rear-guard repels the Karduchians and effects his
  passage.—March through Armenia. Heavy snow and severe
  cold.—They ford the Eastern Euphrates or Murad.—Distressing
  marches—extreme misery from cold and hunger.—Rest in
  good quarters—subterranean villages well stocked with
  provisions.—After a week’s rest, they march onward—their
  guide runs away.—They reach a difficult pass occupied by the
  Chalybes—raillery exchanged between Xenophon and Cheirisophus
  about stealing.—They turn the pass by a flank-march, and
  force their way over the mountain.—March through the country
  of the Taochi—exhaustion of provisions—capture of a
  hill-fort.—Through the Chalybes, the bravest fighters whom
  they had yet seen—the Skythini.—They reach the flourishing
  city of Gymnias.—First sight of the sea from the mountain-top
  Thêchê—extreme delight of the soldiers.—Passage through the
  Makrônes.—Through the Kolchians—who oppose them and are
  defeated.—Kolchian villages—unwholesome honey.—Arrival at
  Trapezus on the Euxine (Trebizond).—Joy of the Greeks—their
  discharge of vows to their gods—their festivals and
  games.—Appendix.                                             52-120


CHAPTER LXXI.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS, FROM THE TIME THAT THEY
REACHED TRAPEZUS, TO THEIR JUNCTION WITH THE LACEDÆMONIAN ARMY IN
ASIA MINOR.

  Greek cities on the Euxine—Sinôpê with her colonies Kerasus,
  Kotyôra, and Trapezus.—Indigenous inhabitants—their relations
  with the Greek colonists.—Feelings of the Greeks on the Euxine
  when the Ten Thousand descended among them.—Uncertainty and
  danger of what they might do.—Plans of the army—Cheirisophus
  is sent to Byzantium to procure vessels for transporting
  them.—Regulations for the army proposed by Xenophon during
  his absence.—Adopted by the army—their intense repugnance
  to farther marching.—Measures for procuring transports.
  Marauding expeditions for supplies, against the Colchians and
  the Drilæ.—The army leave Trapezus, and march westward along
  the coast to Kerasus.—Acts of disorder and outrage committed by
  various soldiers near Kerasus.—March to Kotyôra—hostilities
  with the Mosynœki.—Long halt at Kotyôra—remonstrance from the
  Sinopians.—Speech of Hekatonymus of Sinôpê to the army—reply
  of Xenophon.—Success of the reply—good understanding
  established with Sinôpê.—Consultation of the army with
  Hekatonymus, who advises going home by sea.—Envoys sent by
  the army to Sinôpê to procure vessels.—Poverty and increasing
  disorganization or the army.—Ideas of Xenophon about founding
  a new city in the Euxine, with the army.—Sacrifice of Xenophon
  to ascertain the will of the gods—treachery of the prophet
  Silanus.—Silanus, Timasion, and others raise calumnies
  against Xenophon. General assembly of the army.—Accusations
  against Xenophon—his speech in defence.—He carries the
  soldiers with him—discontent and flight of Silanus.—Fresh
  manœuvres of Timasion—fresh calumnies circulated against
  Xenophon—renewed discontent of the army.—Xenophon convenes
  the assembly again.—his address in defence of himself.—His
  remonstrance against the disorders in the army.—Vote of the
  army unanimously favorable to Xenophon—disapproving the
  disorders, and directing trial.—Xenophon’s appeal to universal
  suffrage, as the legitimate political authority. Success of
  his appeal.—Xenophon recommends trial of the generals before
  a tribunal formed of the lochages or captains. Satisfaction of
  the army with Xenophon.—Manner in which discipline was upheld
  by the officers.—Complete triumph of Xenophon. His influence
  over the army, derived from his courage, his frankness, and
  his oratory.—Improved feeling of the army—peace with the
  Paphlagonian Korylas.—The army pass by sea to Sinôpê.—Return
  of Cheirisophus—resolution of the army to elect a single
  general—they wish to elect Xenophon, who declines—Cheirisophus
  is chosen.—The army pass by sea to Herakleia—they wish to
  extort money from the Herakleots—opposition of Cheirisophus
  and Xenophon.—Dissatisfaction of the army—they divide into
  three factions. 1. The Arcadians and Achæans. 2. A division
  under Cheirisophus. 3. A division under Xenophon.—Arcadian
  division start first and act for themselves—they get into
  great danger, and are rescued by Xenophon—the army reünited at
  Kalpê—old board of generals reëlected, with Neon in place of
  Cheirisophus.—Distress for provisions at Kalpê—unwillingness
  to move in the face of unfavorable sacrifices—ultimate victory
  over the troops of the country.—Halt at Kalpê—comfortable
  quarters—idea that they were about to settle there as a
  colony.—Arrival of Kleander, the Spartan harmost, from
  Byzantium, together with Dexippus.—Disorder in the army:
  mutiny against Kleander, arising from the treachery of
  Dexippus.—Indignation and threats of Kleander—Xenophon
  persuades the army to submit—fear of Sparta.—Satisfaction
  given to Kleander, by the voluntary surrender of Agasias with
  the mutinous soldier.—Appeal to the mercy of Kleander, who is
  completely soothed.—Kleander takes the command, expressing
  the utmost friendship both towards the army and towards
  Xenophon.—Unfavorable sacrifices make Kleander throw up the
  command and sail away.—March of the army across the country
  from Kalpê to Chalkêdon.—Pharnabazus bribes Anaxibius to carry
  the army across the Bosphorus into Europe—false promises of
  Anaxibius to the army.—Intention of Xenophon to leave the army
  immediately and go home—first proposition addressed to him by
  Seuthes of Thrace.—The army cross over to Byzantium—fraud
  and harsh dealing of Anaxibius, who sends the army at once out
  of the town.—Last orders of Anaxibius as the soldiers were
  going out of the gates.—Wrath and mutiny of the soldiers, in
  going away—they rush again into the gates, and muster within
  the town.—Terror of Anaxibius and all within the town.—The
  exasperated soldiers masters of Byzantium—danger of all within
  it—conduct of Xenophon.—Xenophon musters the soldiers in
  military order and harangues them.—Xenophon calms the army, and
  persuades them to refrain from assaulting the town—message sent
  by them to Anaxibius—they go out of Byzantium, and agree to
  accept Kœratadas as their commander.—Remarkable effect produced
  by Xenophon—evidence which it affords of the susceptibility of
  the Greek mind to persuasive influences. Xenophon leaves the
  army, and goes into Byzantium with the view of sailing home.
  Kœratadas is dismissed from the command.—Dissension among the
  commanders left.—Distress of the army—Aristarchus arrives from
  Sparta to supersede Kleander—Polus on his way to supersede
  Anaxibius.—Pharnabazus defrauds Anaxibius, who now employs
  Xenophon to convey the Cyreians across back to Asia.—Aristarchus
  hinders the crossing—his cruel dealing towards the sick Cyreians
  left in Byzantium.—His treacherous scheme for entrapping
  Xenophon.—Xenophon is again implicated in the conduct of
  the army—he opens negotiations with Seuthes.—Position of
  Seuthes—his liberal offers to the army.—Xenophon introduces
  him to the army, who accept the offers.—Service of the army
  with Seuthes, who cheats them of most of their pay.—The army
  suspect the probity of Xenophon—unjust calumnies against
  him—he exposes it in a public harangue, and regains their
  confidence.—Change of interest in the Lacedæmonians, who
  become anxious to convey the Cyreians across into Asia, in
  order to make war against the satraps.—Xenophon crosses over
  with the army to Asia—his poverty—he is advised to sacrifice
  to Zeus Meilichios—beneficial effects.—He conducts the army
  across Mount Ida to Pergamus.—His unsuccessful attempt to
  surprise and capture the rich Persian Asidates.—In a second
  attempt he captures Asidates—valuable booty secured.—General
  sympathy expressed for Xenophon—large share personally
  allotted to him.—The Cyreians are incorporated in the army of
  the Lacedæmonian general Thimbron—Xenophon leaves the army,
  depositing his money in the temple at Ephesus.—His subsequent
  return to Asia, to take command of Cyreians as a part of the
  Lacedæmonian army.—Xenophon in the Spartan service, with
  Agesilaus against Athens—he is banished.—He settles at Skillus
  near Olympia, on an estate consecrated to Artemis.—Charms of
  the residence—good hunting—annual public sacrifice offered by
  Xenophon.—Later life of Xenophon—expelled from Skillus after
  the battle of Leuktra—afterwards restored at Athens.—Great
  impression produced by the retreat of the Ten Thousand upon the
  Greek mind.                                                  121-180


CHAPTER LXXII.

GREECE UNDER THE LACEDÆMONIAN EMPIRE.

  Sequel of Grecian affairs generally—resumed.—Spartan
  empire—how and when it commenced.—Oppression and suffering
  of Athens under the Thirty.—Alteration of Grecian feeling
  towards Athens—the Thirty are put down and the democracy
  restored.—The Knights or Horsemen, the richest proprietors
  at Athens, were the great supporters of the Thirty in their
  tyranny.—The state of Athens, under the Thirty, is a sample of
  that which occurred in a large number of other Grecian cities,
  at the commencement of the Spartan empire.—Great power of
  Lysander—he establishes in most of the cities Dekarchies, along
  with a Spartan harmost.—Intimidation exercised everywhere by
  Lysander in favor of his own partisans.—Oppressive action of
  these Dekarchies.—In some points, probably worse than the
  Thirty at Athens.—Bad conduct of the Spartan harmosts—harsh
  as well as corrupt. No justice to be obtained against them
  at Sparta.—Contrast of the actual empire of Sparta, with
  the promises of freedom which she had previously held
  out.—Numerous promises of general autonomy made by Sparta—by
  the Spartan general Brasidas, especially.—Gradual change in
  the language and plans of Sparta towards the close of the
  Peloponnesian war.—Language of Brasidas contrasted with the
  acts of Lysander.—Extreme suddenness and completeness of the
  victory of Ægospotami left Lysander almost omnipotent.—The
  dekarchies became partly modified by the jealousy at Sparta
  against Lysander. The harmosts lasted much longer.—The Thirty
  at Athens were put down by the Athenians themselves, not by any
  reformatory interference of Sparta.—The empire of Sparta much
  worse and more oppressive than that of Athens.—Imperial Athens
  deprived her subject-allies of their autonomy, but was guilty
  of little or no oppression.—Imperial Sparta did this, and much
  worse—her harmosts and decemvirs are more complained of than the
  fact of her empire.—This more to be regretted, as Sparta had
  now an admirable opportunity for organizing a good and stable
  confederacy throughout Greece.—Sparta might have reörganized
  the confederacy of Delos, which might now have been made to work
  well.—Insupportable arrogance of Lysander—bitter complaints
  against him, as well as against the dekarchies.—Lysander
  offends Pharnabazus, who procures his recall. His disgust and
  temporary expatriation.—Surrender of the Asiatic Greeks to
  Persia, according to the treaty concluded with Sparta.—Their
  condition is affected by the position and ambitious schemes of
  Cyrus, whose protection they seek against Tissaphernes.—After
  the death of Cyrus, Tissaphernes returns as victor and satrap
  to the coast of Asia Minor.—Alarm of the Asiatic Greeks,
  who send to ask aid from Sparta. The Spartans send Thimbron
  with an army to Asia. His ill-success and recall—he is
  superseded by Derkyllidas.—Conduct of the Cyreians loose as
  to pillage.—Derkyllidas makes a truce with Tissaphernes, and
  attacks Pharnabazus in the Troad and Æolis.—Distribution of the
  Persian empire; relation of king, satrap, sub-satrap.—Mania,
  widow of Zênis, holds the subsatrapy of Æolis under Pharnabazus.
  Her regular payment and vigorous government.—Military force,
  personal conquests, and large treasures, of Mania.—Assassination
  of Mania, and of her son, by her son-in-law Meidias, who
  solicits the satrapy from Pharnabazus, but is indignantly
  refused.—Invasion and conquest of Æolis by Derkyllidas, who
  gets possession of the person of Meidias.—Derkyllidas acquires
  and liberates Skêpsis and Gergis, deposing Meidias, and seizing
  the treasures of Mania.—Derkyllidas concludes a truce with
  Pharnabazus, and takes winter quarters in Bithynia.—Command of
  Derkyllidas—satisfaction of Sparta with the improved conduct of
  the Cyreians.—Derkyllidas crosses into Europe, and employs his
  troops in fortifying the Chersonesus against the Thracians.—He
  captures and garrisons Atarneus.—He makes war upon Tissaphernes
  and Pharnabazus, upon the Mæander.—Timidity of Tissaphernes—he
  concludes a truce with Derkyllidas.—Derkyllidas is superseded
  by Agesilaus.—Alienation towards Sparta had grown up among her
  allies in Central Greece.—Great energy imparted to Spartan
  action by Lysander immediately after the victory of Ægospotami;
  an energy very unusual with Sparta.—The Spartans had kept all
  the advantages of victory to themselves—their allies were
  allowed nothing.—Great power of the Spartans—they take revenge
  upon those who had displeased them—their invasion of Elis.—The
  Spartan king Agis invades the Eleian territory. He retires
  from it immediately in consequence of an earthquake.—Second
  invasion of Elis by Agis—he marches through Triphylia and
  Olympia; victorious march, with much booty.—Insurrection of
  the oligarchical party in Elis—they are put down.—The Eleians
  are obliged to submit to hard terms of peace.—Sparta refuses
  to restore the Pisatans to the Olympic presidency.—Triumphant
  position of Sparta—she expels the Messenians from Peloponnesus
  and its neighborhood.                                        181-229


CHAPTER LXXIII.

AGESILAUS KING OF SPARTA.—THE CORINTHIAN WAR.

  Triumphant position of Sparta at the close of the
  war—introduction of a large sum of gold and silver by
  Lysander—opposed by some of the Ephors.—The introduction of money
  was only one among a large train of corrupting circumstances
  which then became operative on Sparta.—Contrast between
  Sparta in 432 B.C., and Sparta after 404 B.C.—Increase of
  peculation, inequality, and discontent at Sparta.—Testimonies
  of Isokrates and Xenophon to the change of character and habits
  at Sparta.—Power of Lysander—his arrogance and ambitious
  projects—flattery lavished upon him by sophists and poets.—Real
  position of the kings at Sparta.—His intrigues to make himself
  king at Sparta—he tries in vain to move the oracles in his
  favor—scheme laid for the production of sacred documents, as
  yet lying hidden, by a son of Apollo.—His aim at the kingship
  fails—nevertheless he still retains prodigious influence at
  Sparta.—Death of Agis, king of Sparta—doubt as to the legitimacy
  of his son Leotychides. Agesilaus, seconded by Lysander,
  aspires to the throne.—Character of Agesilaus.—Conflicting
  pretensions of Agesilaus and Leotychides.—Objection taken against
  Agesilaus on the ground of his lameness,—oracle produced by
  Diopeithes—eluded by the interpretation of Lysander.—Agesilaus
  is preferred as king—suspicions which always remained attached
  to Lysander’s interpretation.—Popular conduct of Agesilaus—he
  conciliates the ephors—his great influence at Sparta—his energy,
  combined with unscrupulous partisanship.—Dangerous conspiracy at
  Sparta—terror-striking sacrifices.—Character and position of the
  chief conspirator Kinadon—state of parties at Sparta—increasing
  number of malcontents.—Police of the ephors—information
  laid before them.—Wide-spread discontent reckoned upon by
  the conspirators.—Alarm of the ephors—their manœuvres for
  apprehending Kinadon privately.—Kinadon is seized, interrogated,
  and executed—his accomplices are arrested, and the conspiracy
  broken up.—Dangerous discontent indicated at Sparta.—Proceedings
  of Derkyllidas and Pharnabazus in Asia.—Persian preparations
  for reviving the maritime war against Sparta—renewed activity
  of Konon.—Agesilaus is sent with a land-force to Asia,
  accompanied by Lysander.—Large plans of Agesilaus, for
  conquest in the interior of Asia.—General willingness of
  the Spartan allies to serve in the expedition, but refusal
  from Thebes, Corinth, and Athens.—Agesilaus compares himself
  with Agamemnon—goes to sacrifice at Aulis—is contemptuously
  hindered by the Thebans.—Arrival of Agesilaus at Ephesus—he
  concludes a fresh armistice with Tissaphernes.—Arrogant
  behavior and overweening ascendency of Lysander—offensive to
  the army and to Agesilaus.—Agesilaus humbles and degrades
  Lysander, who asks to be sent away.—Lysander is sent to command
  at the Hellespont—his valuable service there.—Tissaphernes
  breaks the truce with Agesilaus, who makes war upon him and
  Pharnabazus—he retires for the purpose of organizing a force
  of cavalry.—Agesilaus indifferent to money for himself, but
  eager in enriching his friends.—His humanity towards captives
  and deserted children.—Spartan side of his character—exposure
  of naked prisoners—different practice of Asiatics and
  Greeks.—Efforts of Agesilaus to train his army, and to procure
  cavalry.—Agesilaus renews the war against Tissaphernes, and
  gains a victory near Sardis.—Artaxerxes causes Tissaphernes to
  be put to death and superseded by Tithraustes.—Negotiations
  between the new satrap and Agesilaus—the satraps in Asia Minor
  hostile to each other.—Commencement of action at sea against
  Sparta—the Athenian Konon, assisted by Persian ships and money,
  commands a fleet of eighty sail on the coast of Karia.—Rhodes
  revolts from the Spartan empire—Konon captures an Egyptian
  corn-fleet at Rhodes.—Anxiety of the Lacedæmonians—Agesilaus
  is appointed to command at sea as well as on land.—Severity
  of the Lacedæmonians towards the Rhodian Dorieus—contrast of
  the former treatment of the same man by Athens.—Sentiment of a
  multitude compared with that of individuals.—Efforts of Agesilaus
  to augment the fleet—he names Peisander admiral.—Operations
  of Agesilaus against Pharnabazus.—He lays waste the residence
  of the satrap, and surprises his camp—offence given to
  Spithridates.—Personal conference between Agesilaus and
  Pharnabazus.—Friendship established between Agesilaus and the son
  of Pharnabazus—character of Agesilaus.—Promising position and
  large preparations for Asiatic land-warfare, of Agesilaus—he is
  recalled with his army to Peloponnesus.—Efforts and proceedings
  of Konon in command of the Persian fleet—his personal visit to
  the Persian court.—Pharnabazus is named admiral jointly with
  Konon.—Battle of Knidus—complete defeat of the Lacedæmonian
  fleet—death of Peisander the admiral.                        230-283


CHAPTER LXXIV.

FROM THE BATTLE OF KNIDUS TO THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF
ATHENS.

  War in Central Greece against Sparta—called the Corinthian
  war.—Relations of Sparta with the neighboring states and with
  her allies after the accession of Agesilaus. Discontent among
  the allies.—Great power of Sparta, stretching even to Northern
  Greece—state of Herakleia.—Growing disposition in Greece
  to hostility against Sparta, when she becomes engaged in the
  war against Persia.—The satrap Tithraustes sends an envoy
  with money into Greece, to light up war against Sparta—his
  success at Thebes, Corinth, and Argos.—The Persian money did
  not create hostility against Sparta, but merely brought out
  hostile tendencies pre-existing. Philo-Laconian sentiment
  of Xenophon.—War between Sparta and Thebes—the Bœotian
  war.—Active operations of Sparta against Bœotia—Lysander
  is sent to act from Herakleia on the northward—Pausanias
  conducts an army from Peloponnesus.—The Thebans apply to
  Athens for aid—remarkable proof of the altered sentiment in
  Greece.—Speech of the Theban envoy at Athens.—Political feeling
  at Athens—good effects of the amnesty after the expulsion of
  the Thirty.—Unanimous vote of the Athenians to assist Thebes
  against Sparta.—State of the Bœotian confederacy—Orchomenus
  revolts and joins Lysander, who invades Bœotia with his army
  and attacks Haliartus.—Lysander is repulsed and slain before
  Haliartus.—Pausanias arrives in Bœotia after the death of
  Lysander—Thrasybulus and an Athenian army come to the aid
  of the Thebans.—Pausanias evacuates Bœotia, on receiving
  the dead bodies of Lysander and the rest for burial.—Anger
  against Pausanias at Sparta; he escapes into voluntary exile;
  he is condemned in his absence.—Condemnation of Pausanias not
  deserved.—Sparta not less unjust in condemning unsuccessful
  generals than Athens.—Character of Lysander—his mischievous
  influence, as well for Sparta as for Greece generally.—His
  plans to make himself king at Sparta—discourse of the
  sophist Kleon.—Encouragement to the enemies of Sparta, from
  the death of Lysander—alliance against her between Thebes,
  Athens, Corinth, and Argos—the Eubœans and others join the
  alliance.—Increased importance of Thebes—she now rises to the
  rank of a primary power—the Theban leader Ismenias.—Successful
  operations of Ismenias to the north of Bœotia—capture of
  Herakleia from Sparta.—Synod of anti-Spartan allies at
  Corinth—their confident hopes—the Lacedæmonians send to recall
  Agesilaus from Asia.—Large muster near Corinth of Spartans
  and Peloponnesians on one side, of anti-Spartan allies on the
  other.—Boldness of the language against Sparta—speech of
  the Corinthian Timolaus.—The anti-Spartan allies take up a
  defensive position near Corinth—advance of the Lacedæmonians to
  attack them.—Battle of Corinth—victory of the Lacedæmonians
  in their part of the battle; their allies in the other parts
  being worsted.—Lacedæmonian ascendency within Peloponnesus
  is secured, but no farther result gained.—Agesilaus—his
  vexation on being recalled from Asia—his large plans of Asiatic
  conquest.—Regret of the Asiatic allies when he quits Asia—he
  leaves Euxenus in Asia with four thousand men.—Agesilaus crosses
  the Hellespont and marches homeward through Thrace, Macedonia,
  and Thessaly.—Agesilaus and his army on the northern frontier
  of Bœotia—eclipse of the sun—news of the naval defeat at
  Knidus.—Bœotians and their allies mustered at Korôneia.—Battle
  of Korôneia—Agesilaus with most of his army is victorious; while
  the Thebans on their side are also victorious.—Terrible combat
  between the Thebans and Spartans; on the whole, the result is
  favorable to the Thebans.—Victory of Agesilaus, not without
  severe wounds—yet not very decisive—his conduct after the
  battle.—Army of Agesilaus withdraws from Bœotia—he goes to the
  Pythian games—sails homeward across the Corinthian Gulf—his
  honorable reception at Sparta.—Results of the battles of Corinth
  and Korôneia. Sparta had gained nothing by the former, and had
  rather lost by the latter.—Reverses of Sparta after the defeat
  of Knidus. Loss of the insular empire of Sparta. Nearly all her
  maritime allies revolt to join Pharnabazus and Konon.—Abydos
  holds faithfully to Sparta, under Derkyllidas.—Derkyllidas
  holds both Abydos and the Chersonesus opposite, in spite of
  Pharnabazus—anger of the latter.—Pharnabazus and Konon sail
  with their fleet to Peloponnesus and Corinth.—Assistance
  and encouragement given by Pharnabazus to the allies at
  Corinth—Remarkable fact of the Persian satrap and fleet at
  Corinth.—Pharnabazus leaves the fleet with Konon in the Saronic
  Gulf, and aids him, with money, to rebuild the Long Walls of
  Athens.—Konon rebuilds the Long Walls—hearty coöperation of
  the allies.—Great importance of this restoration—how much
  it depended upon accident—Maintenance of the lines of Corinth
  against Sparta, was one essential condition to the power of
  rebuilding the Long Walls. The lines were not maintained longer
  than the ensuing year.                                       284-324


CHAPTER LXXV.

FROM THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS TO THE PEACE OF
ANTALKIDAS.

  Large plans of Konon—organization of a mercenary force at
  Corinth.—Naval conflicts of the Corinthians and Lacedæmonians,
  in the Corinthian Gulf.—Land-warfare—the Lacedæmonians
  established at Sikyon—the anti-Spartan allies occupying the
  lines of Corinth from sea to sea.—Sufferings of the Corinthians
  from the war being carried on in their territory. Many Corinthian
  proprietors become averse to the war.—Growth and manifestation
  of the philo-Laconian party in Corinth. Oligarchical form of
  the government left open nothing but an appeal to force.—The
  Corinthian government forestall the conspiracy by a _coup
  d’état_.—Numerous persons of the philo-Laconian party are
  banished; nevertheless Pasimêlus the leader is spared, and
  remains at Corinth.—Intimate political union and consolidation
  between Corinth and Argos.—Pasimêlus admits the Lacedæmonians
  within the Long Walls of Corinth. Battle within those walls.—The
  Lacedæmonians are victorious—severe loss of the Argeians.—The
  Lacedæmonians pull down a portion of the Long Walls between
  Corinth and Lechæum, so as to open a free passage across. They
  capture Krommyon and Sidus.—Effective warfare carried on by
  the light troops under Iphikrates at Corinth—Military genius
  and improvements of Iphikrates.—The Athenians restore the Long
  Walls between Corinth and Lechæum—expedition of the Spartan
  king Agesilaus, who, in concert with Teleutias, retakes the Long
  Walls and captures Lechæum.—Alarm of Athens and Thebes at the
  capture of the Long Walls of Corinth. Propositions sent to Sparta
  to solicit peace. The discussions come to no result.—Advantages
  derived by the Corinthians from possession of Peiræum. At
  the instigation of the exiles, Agesilaus marches forth with
  an army to attack it.—Isthmian festival—Agesilaus disturbs
  the celebration. The Corinthian exiles, under his protection,
  celebrate it; then, when he is gone, the Corinthians from the
  city perform the ceremony over again.—Agesilaus attacks Peiræum,
  which he captures, together with the Heræum, many prisoners, and
  much booty.—Triumphant position of Agesilaus. Danger of Corinth.
  The Thebans send fresh envoys to solicit peace—contemptuously
  treated by Agesilaus.—Sudden arrival of bad news, which spoils
  the triumph.—Destruction of a Lacedæmonian mora by the light
  troops under Iphikrates.—Daring and well-planned manœuvres
  of Iphikrates.—Few of the mora escape to Lechæum.—The
  Lacedæmonians bury the bodies of the slain, under truce
  asked and obtained. Trophy erected by Iphikrates.—Great
  effect produced upon the Grecian mind by this event.
  Peculiar feelings of Spartans; pride of the relatives of the
  slain.—Mortification of Agesilaus—he marches up to the walls
  of Corinth and defies Iphikrates—he then goes back humiliated
  to Sparta.—Success of Iphikrates—he retakes Krommyon,
  Sidus, and Peiræum—Corinth remains pretty well undisturbed
  by enemies. The Athenians recall Iphikrates.—Expedition of
  Agesilaus against Akarnania—successful, after some delay—the
  Akarnanians submit, and enrol themselves in the Lacedæmonian
  confederacy.—The Lacedæmonians under Agesipolis invade
  Argos.—Manœuvre of the Argeians respecting the season of the
  holy truce. Agesipolis consults the oracles at Olympia and
  Delphi.—Earthquake in Argos after the invasion of Agesipolis—he
  disregards it.—He marches up near to Argos—much plunder
  taken—he retires.—Transactions in Asia—efforts of Sparta to
  detach the Great King from Athens.—The Spartan Antalkidas is
  sent as envoy to Tiribazus. Konon and other envoys sent also,
  from Athens and the anti-Spartan allies.—Antalkidas offers to
  surrender the Asiatic Greeks, and demands universal autonomy
  throughout the Grecian world—the anti-Spartan allies refuse
  to accede to those terms.—Hostility of Sparta to all the
  partial confederacies of Greece, now first proclaimed under
  the name of universal autonomy.—Antalkidas gains the favor of
  Tiribazus, who espouses privately the cause of Sparta, though
  the propositions for peace fail. Tiribazus seizes Konon—Konon’s
  career is now closed, either by death or imprisonment.—Tiribazus
  cannot prevail with the Persian court, which still continues
  hostile to Sparta. Struthas is sent down to act against the
  Lacedæmonians in Ionia.—Victory of Struthas over Thimbron and
  the Lacedæmonian army. Thimbron is slain.—Diphridas is sent
  to succeed Thimbron.—Lacedæmonian fleet at Rhodes—intestine
  disputes in the island.—The Athenians send aid to Evagoras
  at Cyprus. Fidelity with which they adhered to him, though
  his alliance had now become inconvenient.—Thrasybulus is
  sent with a fleet from Athens to the Asiatic coast—his
  acquisitions in the Hellespont and Bosphorus.—Victory of
  Thrasybulus in <DW26>s—he levies contributions along the
  Asiatic coast—he is slain near Aspendus.—Character of
  Thrasybulus.—Agyrrhius succeeds Thrasybulus—Rhodes still
  holds out against the Lacedæmonians.—Anaxibius is sent to
  command at the Hellespont in place of Derkyllidas—his vigorous
  proceedings—he deprives Athens of the tolls of the strait.—The
  Athenians send Iphikrates with his peltasts and a fleet to the
  Hellespont. His stratagem to surprise Anaxibius.—Defeat and
  death of Anaxibius.—The Athenians are again masters of the
  Hellespont and the strait dues.—The island of Ægina—its past
  history.—The Æginetans are constrained by Sparta into war
  with Athens. The Lacedæmonian admiral Teleutias at Ægina. He
  is superseded by Hierax. His remarkable popularity among the
  seamen.—Hierax proceeds to Rhodes, leaving Gorgôpas at Ægina.
  Passage of the Lacedæmonian Antalkidas to Asia.—Gorgôpas
  is surprised in Ægina, defeated, and slain, by the Athenian
  Chabrias; who goes to assist Evagoras in Cyprus.—The
  Lacedæmonian seamen at Ægina unpaid and discontented.
  Teleutias is sent thither to conciliate them.—Sudden and
  successful attack of Teleutias upon the Peiræus.—Unprepared
  and unguarded condition of Peiræus—Teleutias gains rich
  plunder, and sails away in safety.—He is enabled to pay his
  seamen—activity of the fleet—great loss inflicted upon Athenian
  commerce.—Financial condition of Athens. The Theôrikon.—Direct
  property-taxes.—Antalkidas goes up with Tiribazus to Susa—his
  success at the Persian court—he brings down the terms of peace
  asked for by Sparta, ratified by the Great King, to be enforced
  by Sparta in his name.—Antalkidas in command of the Lacedæmonian
  and Syracusan fleets in the Hellespont, with Persian aid. His
  successes against the Athenians.—Distress and discouragement of
  Athens—anxiety of the anti-Spartan allies for peace.—Tiribazus
  summons them all to Sardis, to hear the convention which had
  been sent down by the Great King.—Terms of the convention,
  called the peace of Antalkidas.—Congress at Sparta for
  acceptance or rejection. All parties accept. The Thebans at
  first accept under reserve for the Bœotian cities.—Agesilaus
  refuses to allow the Theban reserve, and requires unconditional
  acceptance. His eagerness, from hatred of Thebes, to get into a
  war with them single-handed. The Thebans are obliged to accept
  unconditionally.—Agesilaus forces the Corinthians to send away
  their Argeian auxiliaries. The philo-Argeian Corinthians go into
  exile; the philo-Laconian Corinthians are restored.          326-388




HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.




CHAPTER LXIX.

CYRUS THE YOUNGER AND THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.


In my last volume, I brought down the History of Grecian affairs to
the close of the Peloponnesian war, including a description of the
permanent loss of imperial power, the severe temporary oppression,
the enfranchisement and renewed democracy, which marked the lot of
defeated Athens. The defeat of that once powerful city, accomplished
by the Spartan confederacy,—with large pecuniary aid from the young
Persian prince Cyrus, satrap of most of the Ionian seaboard,—left
Sparta mistress, for the time, of the Grecian world. Lysander, her
victorious admiral, employed his vast temporary power for the purpose
of setting up, in most of the cities, Dekarchies or ruling Councils
of Ten, composed of his own partisans; with a Lacedæmonian Harmost
and garrison to enforce their oligarchical rule. Before I proceed,
however, to recount, as well as it can be made out, the unexpected
calamities thus brought upon the Grecian world, with their eventual
consequences,—it will be convenient to introduce here the narrative
of the Ten Thousand Greeks, with their march into the heart of
the Persian empire and their still more celebrated Retreat. This
incident, lying apart from the main stream of Grecian affairs, would
form an item, strictly speaking, in Persian history rather than in
Grecian. But its effects on the Greek mind, and upon the future
course of Grecian affairs, were numerous and important; while as an
illustration of Hellenic character and competence measured against
that of the contemporary Asiatics, it stands preeminent and full of
instruction.

This march from Sardis up to the neighborhood of Babylon, conducted
by Cyrus the younger and undertaken for the purpose of placing him
on the Persian throne in the room of his elder brother Artaxerxes
Mnemon,—was commenced about March or April in the year 401 B.C. It
was about six months afterwards, in the month of September or October
of the same year, that the battle of Kunaxa was fought, in which,
though the Greeks were victorious, Cyrus himself lost his life. They
were then obliged to commence their retreat, which occupied about one
year, and ultimately brought them across the Bosphorus of Thrace to
Byzantium, in October or November, 400 B.C.

The death of king Darius Nothus, father both of Artaxerxes and
Cyrus, occurred about the beginning of 404 B.C., a short time after
the entire ruin of the force of Athens at Ægospotami. His reign of
nineteen years, with that of his father Artaxerxes Longimanus which
lasted nearly forty years, fill up almost all the interval from
the death of Xerxes in 465 B.C. The close of the reigns both of
Xerxes and of his son Artaxerxes had indeed been marked by those
phenomena of conspiracy, assassination, fratricide, and family
tragedy, so common in the transmission of an Oriental sceptre.
Xerxes was assassinated by the chief officer of the palace, named
Artabanus,—who had received from him at a banquet the order to
execute his eldest son Darius, but had not fulfilled it. Artabanus,
laying the blame of the assassination upon Darius, prevailed upon
Artaxerxes to avenge it by slaying the latter; he then attempted the
life of Artaxerxes himself, but failed, and was himself killed, after
carrying on the government a few months. Artaxerxes Longimanus, after
reigning about forty years, left the sceptre to his son Xerxes the
second, who was slain after a few months by his brother Sogdianus;
who again was put to death after seven months, by a third brother
Darius Nothus mentioned above.[1]

  [1] See Diodor. xi, 69; xii, 64-71; Ktesias, Persica, c. 29-45;
  Aristotel. Polit. v, 14, 8. This last passage of Aristotle is not
  very clear. Compare Justin, x, 1.

  For the chronology of these Persian kings, see a valuable
  Appendix in Mr. Fynes Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici, App. 18, vol.
  ii, p. 313-316.

The wars between the Persian empire, and Athens as the head of the
confederacy of Delos (477-449 B.C.), have been already related in
one of my earlier volumes. But the internal history of the Persian
empire during these reigns is scarcely at all known to us; except a
formidable revolt of the satrap Megabyzus, obscurely noticed in the
Fragments of Ktesias.[2] About 414 B.C. the Egyptians revolted.
Their native prince Amyrtæus maintained his independence,—though
probably in a part only, and not the whole, of that country,[3]—and
was succeeded by a native Egyptian dynasty for the space of sixty
years. A revolt of the Medes, which took place in 408 B.C.,
was put down by Darius, and subsequently a like revolt of the
Kadusians.[4] The peace concluded in 449 B.C., between Athens and
the Persian empire, continued without open violation, until the
ruinous catastrophe which befel the former near Syracuse, in 413
B.C. Yet there had been various communications and envoys from
Sparta to the Persian court, endeavoring to procure aid from the
Great King during the early years of the war; communications so
confused and contradictory, that Artaxerxes (in a letter addressed
to the Spartans, in 425 B.C., and carried by his envoy Artaphernes
who was captured by the Athenians), complained of being unable
to understand what they meant,—no two Spartans telling the same
story.[5] It appears that Pissuthnes, satrap of Sardis, revolted from
the Persian king, shortly after this period, and that Tissaphernes
was sent by the Great King to suppress this revolt; in which having
succeeded, by bribing the Grecian commander of the satrap’s mercenary
troops, he was rewarded by the possession of the satrapy.[6] We find
Tissaphernes satrap in the year 413 B.C., commencing operations
jointly with the Spartans, for detaching the Asiatic allies from
Athens, after her reverses in Sicily; and employing the Spartans
successfully against Amorges, the revolted son of Pissuthnes, who
occupied the strong maritime town of Iasus.[7]

  [2] Ktesias, Persica, c. 38-40.

  [3] See the Appendix of Mr. Fynes Clinton, mentioned in the
  preceding note, p. 317.

  There were some Egyptian troops in the army of Artaxerxes at
  the battle of Kunaxa; on the other hand, there were other
  Egyptians in a state of pronounced revolt. Compare two passages
  of Xenophon’s Anabasis, i, 8, 9; ii, 5, 13; Diodor. xiii, 46; and
  the Dissertation of F. Ley, Fata et Conditio Ægypti sub imperio
  Persarum, p. 20-56 (Cologne, 1830).

  [4] Xen. Hellen. i, 2, 19; ii, 1, 13.

  [5] Thucyd. iv, 50. πολλῶν γὰρ ἐλθόντων πρεσβέων οὐδένα ταὐτὰ
  λέγειν.

  This incompetence, or duplicity, on the part of the Spartan
  envoys, helps to explain the facility with which Alkibiades duped
  them at Athens (Thucyd. v, 45). See above, in this History, Vol.
  VII. ch. lv, p. 47.

  [6] Ktesias, Persic. c. 52.

  [7] Thucyd. viii, 28. See Vol. VII, ch. lxi, p. 389 of this
  History.

The increased vigor of Persian operations against Athens, after
Cyrus, the younger son of Darius Nothus, came down to the Ionic coast
in 407 B.C., has been recounted in my preceding volume; together
with the complete prostration of Athenian power, accomplished during
the ensuing three years. Residing at Sardis and placed in active
coöperation with Greeks, this ambitious and energetic young prince
soon became penetrated with their superior military and political
efficiency, as compared with the native Asiatics. For the abilities
and character of Lysander, the Peloponnesian admiral, he contracted
so much admiration, that, when summoned to court during the last
illness of his father Darius in 405 B.C., he even confided to that
officer the whole of his tribute and treasure, to be administered in
furtherance of the war;[8] which during his absence was brought to a
victorious close.

  [8] Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 14. Compare Xen. Œconom. iv, 20.

Cyrus, born after the accession of his father to the throne, was
not more than eighteen years of age when first sent down to Sardis
(in 407 B.C.) as satrap of Lydia, Phrygia, and Kappadokia, and
as commander of that Persian military division which mustered at
the plain of Kastôlus; a command not including the Ionic Greeks on
the seaboard, who were under the satrapy of Tissaphernes.[9] We
cannot place much confidence in the account which Xenophon gives
of his education; that he had been brought up with his brother
and many noble Persian youths in the royal palace,—under the
strictest discipline and restraint, enforcing modest habits, with
the reciprocal duties of obedience and command, upon all of them,
and upon him with peculiar success.[10] It is contradicted by all
the realities which we read about the Persian court, and is a patch
of Grecian rather than of Oriental sentiment, better suited to the
romance of the Cyropædia that to the history of the Anabasis. But in
the Persian accomplishments of horsemanship, mastery of the bow and
of the javelin, bravery in the field, daring as well as endurance in
hunting wild beasts, and power of drinking much wine without being
intoxicated,—Cyrus stood preeminent; and especially so when compared
with his elder brother Artaxerxes, who was at least unwarlike, if not
lazy and timid.[11] And although the peculiar virtue of the Hellenic
citizen,—competence for alternate command and obedience,—formed
no part of the character of Cyrus, yet it appears that Hellenic
affairs and ideas became early impressed upon his mind; insomuch that
on first coming down to Sardis as satrap, he brought down with him
strong interest for the Peloponnesian cause, and strenuous antipathy
to that ancient enemy by whom the Persian arms had been so signally
humbled and repressed. How zealously he coöperated with Lysander and
the Peloponnesians in putting down Athens, has been shown in my last
preceding volume.[12]

  [9] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 2; i, 9, 7; Xen. Hellen. i, 4, 3.

  [10] Xen. Anab. i, 9, 3-5. Compare Cyropædia, i, 2, 4-6; viii, 1,
  16, etc.

  [11] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 2-6; Xen. Anab. _ut sup._

  [12] See Vol. VIII. ch. lxiv, p. 135.

An energetic and ambitious youth like Cyrus, having once learnt
from personal experience to appreciate the Greeks, was not slow in
divining the value of such auxiliaries as instruments of power to
himself. To coöperate effectively in the war, it was necessary that
he should act to a certain extent upon Grecian ideas, and conciliate
the good will of the Ionic Greeks; so that he came to combine the
imperious and unsparing despotism of a Persian prince, with something
of the regularity and system belonging to a Grecian administrator.
Though younger than Artaxerxes, he seems to have calculated from
the first upon succeeding to the Persian crown at the death of his
father. So undetermined was the law of succession in the Persian
royal family, and so constant the dispute and fratricide on each
vacancy of the throne, that such ambitious schemes would appear
feasible to a young man of much less ardor than Cyrus. Moreover he
was the favorite son of queen Parysatis,[13] who greatly preferred
him to his elder brother Artaxerxes. He was born after the accession
of Darius to the throne, while Artaxerxes had been born prior to
that event; and, as this latter consideration had been employed
seventy years earlier by queen Atossa[14] in determining her husband
Darius son of Hystaspes to declare (even during his lifetime) her
son Xerxes as his intended successor, to the exclusion of an elder
son by a different wife, and born before his accession,—so Cyrus,
perhaps, anticipated the like effective preference to himself from
the solicitations of Parysatis. Probably his hopes were farther
inflamed by the fact that he bore the name of the great founder of
the monarchy; whose memory every Persian reverenced. How completely
he reckoned on becoming king, is shown by a cruel act performed about
the early part of 405 B.C. It was required as a part of Persian
etiquette that every man who came into the presence of the king
should immerse his hands in certain pockets or large sleeves, which
rendered them for the moment inapplicable to active use; but such
deference was shown to no one except the king. Two first cousins of
Cyrus,—sons of Hieramenês, (seemingly one of the satraps or high
Persian dignitaries in Asia Minor), by a sister of Darius,—appeared
in his presence without thus concealing their hands;[15] upon which
Cyrus ordered them both to be put to death. The father and mother
preferred bitter complaints of this atrocity to Darius; who was
induced to send for Cyrus to visit him in Media, on the ground, not
at all fictitious, that his own health was rapidly declining.

  [13] Darius had had thirteen children by Parysatis; but all
  except Artaxerxes and Cyrus died young. Ktesias asserts that he
  heard this statement from Parysatis herself (Ktesias, Persica, c.
  49).

  [14] Herodot. vii, 4.

  [15] Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 8, 9; Thucyd. viii, 58.

  Compare Xen. Cyropæd. viii, 3, 10; and Lucian, Navigium seu Vota,
  c. 30. vol. iii, p. 267, ed. Hemsterhuys with Du Soul’s note.

  It is remarkable that, in this passage of the Hellenica, either
  Xenophon, or the copyist, makes the mistake of calling Xerxes
  (instead of Artaxerxes) father of Darius. Some of the editors,
  without any authority from MSS., wish to alter the text from
  Ξέρξου to Ἀρταξέρξου.

If Cyrus expected to succeed to the crown, it was important that he
should be on the spot when his father died. He accordingly went up
from Sardis to Media, along with his body guard of three hundred
Greeks, under the Arcadian Xenias; who were so highly remunerated for
this distant march, that the rate of pay was long celebrated.[16]
He also took with him Tissaphernes as an ostensible friend; though
there seems to have been a real enmity between them. Not long after
his arrival, Darius died; but without complying with the request
of Parysatis that he should declare in favor of Cyrus as his
successor. Accordingly Artaxerxes, being proclaimed king, went to
Pasargadæ, the religious capital of the Persians, to perform the
customary solemnities. Thus disappointed, Cyrus was farther accused
by Tissaphernes of conspiring the death of his brother; who caused
him to be seized, and was even on the point of putting him to death,
when the all-powerful intercession of Parysatis saved his life.[17]
He was sent down to his former satrapy at Sardis, whither he returned
with insupportable feelings of anger and wounded pride, and with a
determined resolution to leave nothing untried for the purpose of
dethroning his brother. This statement, given to us by Xenophon,
represents doubtless the story of Cyrus and his friends, current
among the Cyreian army. But if we look at the probabilities of the
case, we shall be led to suspect that the charge of Tissaphernes may
well have been true, and the conspiracy of the disappointed Cyrus
against his brother, a reality instead of a fiction.[18]

  [16] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 12.

  [17] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 4.

  [18] So it is presented by Justin, v, 11.

The moment when Cyrus returned to Sardis was highly favorable to his
plans and preparations. The long war had just been concluded by the
capture of Athens and the extinction of her power. Many Greeks, after
having acquired military tastes and habits, were now thrown out of
employment; many others were driven into exile, by the establishment
of the Lysandrian Dekarchies throughout all the cities at once.
Hence competent recruits, for a well-paid service like that of
Cyrus, were now unusually abundant. Having already a certain number
of Greek mercenaries, distributed throughout the various garrisons
in his satrapy, he directed the officers in command to strengthen
their garrisons by as many additional Peloponnesian soldiers as they
could obtain. His pretext was,—first, defence against Tissaphernes,
with whom, since the denunciation by the latter, he was at open
war,—next, protection of the Ionic cities on the seaboard, who had
been hitherto comprised under the government of Tissaphernes, but
had now revolted of their own accord, since the enmity of Cyrus
against him had been declared. Miletus alone had been prevented from
executing this resolution, for Tissaphernes, reinforcing his garrison
in that place, had adopted violent measures of repression, killing
or banishing several of the leading men. Cyrus, receiving these
exiled Milesians with every demonstration of sympathy, immediately
got together both an army and a fleet, under the Egyptian Tamos,[19]
to besiege Miletus by land and sea. He at the same time transmitted
to court the regular tribute due from these maritime cities, and
attempted, through the interest of his mother Parysatis, to procure
that they should be transferred from Tissaphernes to himself. Hence
the Great King was deluded into a belief that the new levies of Cyrus
were only intended for private war between him and Tissaphernes;
an event not uncommon between two neighboring satraps. Nor was it
displeasing to the court that a suspected prince should be thus
occupied at a distance.[20]

  [19] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 6; i, 4, 2.

  [20] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 7, 8, ὥστε οὐδὲν ἤχθετο (the king) αὐτῶν
  πολεμοῦντων.

Besides the army thus collected around Miletus, Cyrus found means
to keep other troops within his call, though at a distance and
unsuspected. A Lacedæmonian officer named Klearchus, of considerable
military ability and experience, presented himself as an exile at
Sardis. He appears to have been banished, (as far as we can judge
amidst contradictory statements,) for gross abuse of authority, and
extreme tyranny, as Lacedæmonian Harmost at Byzantium, and even for
having tried to maintain himself in that place after the Ephors had
formally dismissed him. The known efficiency, and restless warlike
appetite of Klearchus,[21] procured for him the confidence of Cyrus,
who gave him the large sum of ten thousand Darics, (about £7600),
which he employed in levying an army of mercenary Greeks for the
defence of the Grecian cities in the Chersonese against the Thracian
tribes in their neighborhood; thus maintaining the troops until they
were required by Cyrus. Again, Aristippus and Menon,—Thessalians
of the great family of the Aleuadæ at Larissa, who had maintained
their tie of personal hospitality with the Persian royal family
ever since the time of Xerxes, and were now in connection with
Cyrus,[22]—received from him funds to maintain a force of two
thousand mercenaries for their political purposes in Thessaly,
subject to his call whenever he should require them. Other Greeks,
too, who had probably contracted similar ties of hospitality with
Cyrus by service during the late war,—Proxenus, a Bœotian; Agias
and Sophænetus, Arcadians; Sokrates, an Achæan, etc.,—were also
empowered by him to collect mercenary soldiers. His pretended objects
were, partly the siege of Miletus; partly an ostensible expedition
against the Pisidians,—warlike and predatory mountaineers who did
much mischief from their fastnesses in the south-east of Asia Minor.

  [21] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 9; ii, 6, 3. The statements here contained
  do not agree with Diodor. xiv, 12; while both of them differ from
  Isokrates (Orat. viii, De Pace, s. 121; Or. xii, Panath. s. 111),
  and Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 6.

  I follow partially the narrative of Diodorus, so far as to
  suppose that the tyranny which he mentions was committed by
  Klearchus as Harmost of Byzantium. We know that there was a
  Lacedæmonian Harmost in that town, named as soon as the town was
  taken, by Lysander, after the battle of Ægospotami (Xen. Hellen.
  ii, 2, 2). This was towards the end of 405 B.C. We know farther,
  from the Anabasis, that Kleander was Harmost there in 400 B.C.
  Klearchus may have been Harmost there in 404 B.C.

  [22] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 10; Herodot. vii, 6; ix, 1; Plato, Menon,
  c. 1, p. 70; c. 11, p. 78 C.

Besides these unavowed Grecian levies, Cyrus sent envoys to the
Lacedæmonians to invoke their aid, in requital for the strenuous
manner in which he had seconded their operations against Athens,—and
received a favorable answer. He farther got together a considerable
native force, taking great pains to conciliate friends as well
as to inspire confidence. “He was straightforward and just, like
a candidate for command,”—to use the expression of Herodotus
respecting the Median Dëiokês;[23] maintaining order and security
throughout his satrapy, and punishing evil doers in great numbers,
with the utmost extremity of rigor; of which the public roads
exhibited abundant living testimony, in the persons of mutilated men,
deprived of their hands, feet, or eyesight.[24] But he was also exact
in rewarding faithful service, both civil and military. He not only
made various expeditions against the hostile Mysians and Pisidians,
but was forward in exposing his own person, and munificent, rewarding
the zeal of all soldiers who distinguished themselves. He attached
men to his person both by a winning demeanor and by seasonable gifts.
As it was the uniform custom, (and is still the custom in the East),
for every one who approached Cyrus to come with a present in his
hand,[25] so he usually gave away again these presents as marks of
distinction to others. Hence he not only acquired the attachment of
all in his own service, but also of those Persians whom Artaxerxes
sent down on various pretences for the purpose of observing his
motions. Of these emissaries from Susa, some were even sent to
obstruct and enfeeble him. It was under such orders that a Persian
named Orontes, governor of Sardis, acted, in levying open war against
Cyrus; who twice subdued him, and twice pardoned him, on solemn
assurance of fidelity for the future.[26] In all agreements, even
with avowed enemies, Cyrus kept faith exactly; so that his word was
trusted by every one.

  [23] Herodot. i. 96. Ὁ δὲ (Dëiokês) οἷα μνώμενος ἀρχὴν, ἰθύς τε
  καὶ δίκαιος ἦν.

  Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 1, 1; Diodor. xiv, 19.

  [24] Xen. Anab. 1, 9, 8. Πολλάκις δ᾽ ἰδεῖν ἦν ἀνὰ τὰς στειβομένας
  ὁδοὺς, καὶ ποδῶν καὶ χειρῶν καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν στερουμένους ἀνθρώπους.

  For other samples of mutilation inflicted by Persians, not
  merely on malefactors, but on prisoners by wholesale, see
  Quintus Curtius, v. 5, 6. Alexander the Great was approaching
  near to Persepolis, “quum miserabile agmen, inter pauca
  fortunæ exempla memorandum, regi occurrit. Captivi erant
  Græci ad quatuor millia ferè, quos Persæ vario suppliciorum
  modo affecerunt. Alios pedibus, quosdam manibus auribusque,
  amputatis, inustisque barbararum literarum notis, in longum sui
  ludibrium reservaverant,” etc. Compare Diodorus, xvii, 69; and
  the prodigious tales of cruelty recounted in Herodot. ix, 112;
  Ktesias, Persic. c. 54-59; Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 14, 16, 17.

  It is not unworthy of remark, that while there was nothing in
  which the Persian rulers displayed greater invention than in
  exaggerating bodily suffering upon a malefactor or an enemy,—at
  Athens, whenever any man was put to death by public sentence, the
  execution took place within the prison by administering a cup
  of hemlock, without even public exposure. It was the minimum of
  pain, as well as the minimum of indignity; as any one may see who
  reads the account of the death of Sokrates, given by Plato at the
  end of the Phædon.

  It is certain, that, on the whole, the public sentiment in
  England is more humane now than it was in that day at Athens.
  Yet an Athenian public could not have borne the sight of a
  citizen publicly hanged or beheaded in the market-place. Much
  less could they have borne the sight of the prolonged tortures
  inflicted on Damiens at Paris in 1757 (a fair parallel to the
  Persian σκάφευσις described in Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 16), in the
  presence of an immense crowd of spectators, when every window
  commanding a view of the Place de Grève was let at a high price,
  and filled by the best company in Paris.

  [25] Xen. Anab. i, 9, 13.

  [26] Xen. Anab. i, 6, 6.

Of such virtues, (rare in an Oriental ruler, either ancient or
modern,)—and of such secret preparations,—Cyrus sought to reap the
fruits at the beginning of 401 B.C. Xenias, his general at home,
brought together all the garrisons, leaving a bare sufficiency for
defence of the towns. Klearchus, Menon, and the other Greek generals
were recalled, and the siege of Miletus was relinquished; so that
there was concentrated at Sardis a body of seven thousand seven
hundred Grecian hoplites, with five hundred light armed.[27] Others
afterwards joined on the march, and there was, besides, a native
army of about one hundred thousand men. With such means Cyrus set
forth, (March or April, 401 B.C.), from Sardis. His real purpose was
kept secret; his ostensible purpose, as proclaimed and understood by
every one except himself and Klearchus, was to conquer and root out
the Pisidian mountaineers. A joint Lacedæmonian and Persian fleet,
under the Lacedæmonian admiral Samius, at the same time coasted
round the south of Asia Minor, in order to lend coöperation from the
sea-side.[28] This Lacedæmonian coöperation passed for a private levy
effected by Cyrus himself; for the ephors would not formally avow
hostility against the Great King.[29]

  [27] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 2-3.

  [28] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 1.

  [29] Diodor. xiv, 21.

The body of Greeks, immortalized under the name of the Ten
Thousand, who were thus preparing to plunge into so many unexpected
perils,—though embarking on a foreign mercenary service, were by
no means outcasts, or even men of extreme poverty. They were for
the most part persons of established position, and not a few even
opulent. Half of them were Acadians or Achæans.

Such was the reputation of Cyrus for honorable and munificent
dealing, that many young men of good family had run away from their
fathers and mothers; others of mature age had been tempted to leave
their wives and children; and there were even some who had embarked
their own money in advance of outfit for other poorer men, as well as
for themselves.[30] All calculated on a year’s campaign in Pisidia;
which might perhaps be hard, but would certainly be lucrative, and
would enable them to return with a well-furnished purse. So the Greek
commanders at Sardis all confidently assured them; extolling, with
the emphasis and eloquence suitable to recruiting officers, both
the liberality of Cyrus[31] and the abundant promise of all men of
enterprise.

  [30] Xen. Anab. vi, 4, 8. Τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι ἦσαν οὐ
  σπάνει βίου ἐκπεπλευκότες ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν μισθοφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τὴν
  Κύρου ἀρετὴν ἀκούοντες, οἱ μὲν καὶ ἄνδρας ἄγοντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ
  προσανελωκότες χρήματα, καὶ τούτων ἕτεροι ἀποδεδρακότες πατέρας
  καὶ μητέρας, οἱ δὲ καὶ τέκνα καταλιπόντες, ὡς χρήματα αὐτοῖς
  κτησάμενοι ἥξοντες πάλιν, ἀκούοντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς παρὰ
  Κύρῳ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ πράττειν. Τοιοῦτοι οὖν ὄντες, ἐπόθουν εἰς
  τὴν Ἑλλάδα σώζεσθαι. Compare v. 10, 10.

  [31] Compare similar praises of Ptolemy Philadelphus, in order to
  attract Greek mercenaries from Sicily to Egypt (Theokrit. xiv,
  50-59).

Among others, the Bœotian Proxenus wrote to his friend Xenophon, at
Athens, pressing him strongly to come to Sardis, and offering to
present him to Cyrus, whom he, (Proxenus,) “considered as a better
friend to him than his own country;[32]” a striking evidence of the
manner in which such foreign mercenary service overlaid Grecian
patriotism, which we shall recognize more and more as we advance
forward. This able and accomplished Athenian,—entitled to respectful
gratitude, not indeed from Athens his country, but from the Cyreian
army and the intellectual world generally,—was one of the class of
Knights or Horsemen, and is said to have served in that capacity at
the battle of Delium.[33] Of his previous life we know little or
nothing, except that he was an attached friend and diligent hearer of
Sokrates; the memorials of whose conversation we chiefly derive from
his pen, as we also derive the narrative of the Cyreian march. In
my last preceding chapter on Sokrates, I have made ample use of the
Memorabilia of Xenophon; and I am now about to draw from his Anabasis
(a model of perspicuous and interesting narrative) the account of the
adventures of the Cyreian army, which we are fortunate in knowing
from so authentic a source.

  [32] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4. Ὑπισχνεῖτο δὲ αὐτῷ (Proxenus to
  Xenophon) εἰ ἔλθοι, φίλον Κύρῳ ποιήσειν· ὃν αὐτος ἔφη κρείττω
  ἑαυτῷ νομίζειν τῆς πατρίδος.

  [33] Strabo, ix, p. 403. The story that Sokrates carried off
  Xenophon, wounded and thrown from his horse, on his shoulders,
  and thus saved his life,—seems too doubtful to enter into the
  narrative.

  Among the proofs that Xenophon was among the Horsemen or Ἱππεῖς
  of Athens, we may remark, not only his own strong interest, and
  great skill in horsemanship, in the cavalry service and the
  duties of its commander, and in all that relates to horses, as
  manifested in his published works,—but also the fact, that his
  son Gryllus served afterwards among the Athenian horsemen at the
  combat of cavalry which preceded the great battle of Mantineia
  (Diogen. Laërt. ii, 54).

On receiving the invitation from Proxenus, Xenophon felt much
inclined to comply. To a member of that class of Knights, which
three years before had been the mainstay of the atrocities of the
Thirty, (how far he was personally concerned, we cannot say,) it is
probable that residence in Athens was in those times not peculiarly
agreeable to him. He asked the opinion of Sokrates; who, apprehensive
lest service under Cyrus, the bitter enemy of Athens, might expose
him to unpopularity with his countrymen, recommended an application
to the Delphian oracle. Thither Xenophon went; but in truth he had
already made up his mind beforehand. So that instead of asking,
“whether he ought to go or refuse,”—he simply put the question, “To
which of the gods must I sacrifice, in order to obtain safety and
success in a journey which I am now meditating?” The reply of the
oracle,—indicating Zeus Basileus as the god to whom sacrifice was
proper,—was brought back by Xenophon; upon which Sokrates, though
displeased that the question had not been fairly put as to the
whole project, nevertheless advised, since an answer had now been
given, that it should be literally obeyed. Accordingly Xenophon,
having offered the sacrifices prescribed, took his departure first
to Ephesus and thence to Sardis, where he found the army about
to set forth. Proxenus presented him to Cyrus, who entreated him
earnestly to take service, promising to dismiss him as soon as the
campaign against the Pisidians should be finished.[34] He was thus
induced to stay, yet only as a volunteer or friend of Proxenus,
without accepting any special post in the army, either as officer
or soldier. There is no reason to believe that his service under
Cyrus had actually the effect apprehended by Sokrates, of rendering
him unpopular at Athens. For though he was afterwards banished,
this sentence was not passed against him until after the battle
of Korôneia in 394 B.C., where he was in arms as a conspicuous
officer under Agesilaus, against his own countrymen and their Theban
allies,—nor need we look farther back for the grounds of the
sentence.

  [34] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4-9; v. 9, 22-24.

Though Artaxerxes, entertaining general suspicions of his brother’s
ambitious views, had sent down various persons to watch him, yet
Cyrus had contrived to gain or neutralize these spies, and had
masked his preparations so skilfully, that no intimation was conveyed
to Susa until the march was about to commence. It was only then that
Tissaphernes, seeing the siege of Miletus relinquished, and the vast
force mustering at Sardis, divined that something more was meant than
the mere conquest of Pisidian freebooters, and went up in person
to warn the king; who began his preparations forthwith.[35] That
which Tissaphernes had divined was yet a secret to every man in the
army, to Proxenus as well as the rest,—when Cyrus, having confided
the provisional management of his satrapy to some Persian kinsmen,
and to his admiral the Egyptian Tamos, commenced his march in a
south-easterly direction from Sardis, through Lydia and Phrygia.[36]
Three days’ march, a distance stated at twenty-two parasangs,[37]
brought him to the Mæander; one additional march of eight parasangs,
after crossing that river, forwarded him to Kolossæ, a flourishing
city in Phrygia, where Menon overtook him with a reinforcement of
one thousand hoplites, and five hundred peltasts,—Dolopes, Ænianes,
and Olynthians. He then marched three days onward to Kelænæ, another
Phrygian city, “great and flourishing,” with a citadel very strong
both by nature and art. Here he halted no less than thirty days, in
order to await the arrival of Klearchus, with his division of one
thousand hoplites, eight hundred Thracian peltasts, and two hundred
Kretan bowmen; at the same time Sophænetus arrived with one thousand
farther hoplites, and Sosias with three hundred. This total of Greeks
was reviewed by Cyrus in one united body at Kelænæ; eleven thousand
hoplites and two thousand peltasts.[38]

  [35] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 4; ii, 3, 19.

  Diodorus (xiv, 11) citing from Ephorus affirms that the first
  revelation to Artaxerxes was made by Pharnabazus, who had learnt
  it from the acuteness of the Athenian exile Alkibiades. That the
  latter should have had any concern in it, appears improbable. But
  Diodorus on more than one occasion, confounds Pharnabazus and
  Tissaphernes.

  [36] Diodor. xiv, 19.

  [37] The parasang was a Persian measurement of length, but
  according to Strabo, not of uniform value in all parts of Asia;
  in some parts, held equivalent to thirty stadia, in others to
  forty, in others to sixty (Strabo, xi, p. 518; Forbiger, Handbuch
  der Alten Geograph. vol. i, p. 555). This variability of meaning
  is no way extraordinary, when we recollect the difference between
  English, Irish, and German miles, etc.

  Herodotus tells us distinctly what _he_ meant by a parasang, and
  what the Persian government of his day recognized as such in
  their measurement of the great road from Sardis to Susa, as well
  as in their measurements of territory for purposes of tribute
  (Herod. v, 53; vi, 43). It was thirty Greek stadia = nearly three
  and a half English miles, or nearly three geographical miles.
  The distance between every two successive stations, on the road
  from Sardis to Susa, (which was “all inhabited and all secure,”
  διὰ οἰκεομένης τε ἅπασα καὶ ἀσφολέος), would seem to have been
  measured and marked in parasangs and fractions of a parasang. It
  seems probable, from the account which Herodotus gives of the
  march of Xerxes (vii, 26), that this road passed from Kappadokia
  and across the river Halys, through Kelænæ and Kolossæ to Sardis;
  and therefore that the road which Cyrus took for his march, from
  Sardis at least as far as Kelænæ, must have been so measured and
  marked.

  Xenophon also in his summing up of the route, (ii, 2, 6; vii,
  8, 26) implies the parasang as equivalent to thirty stadia,
  while he gives for the most part, each day’s journey measured
  in parasangs. Now even at the outset of the march, we have
  no reason to believe that there was any official measurer of
  road-progress accompanying the army, like Bæton, ὁ Βηματιστὴς
  Ἀλεξάνδρου, in Alexander’s invasion; see Athenæus, x, p. 442, and
  Geier, Alexandri Magni Histor. Scriptt. p. 357. Yet Xenophon,
  throughout the whole march, even as far as Trebizond, states the
  day’s march of the army in parasangs; not merely in Asia Minor,
  where there were roads, but through the Arabian desert between
  Thapsakus and Pylæ,—through the snows of Armenia,—and through
  the territory of the barbarous Chalybes. He tells us that in the
  desert of Arabia they marched ninety parasangs in thirteen days,
  or very nearly seven parasangs per day,—and that too under the
  extreme heat of summer. He tells us, farther, that in the deep
  snows of Armenia, and in the extremity of winter, they marched
  fifteen parasangs in three days; and through the territory (also
  covered with snow) of the pugnacious Chalybes, fifty parasangs in
  seven days, or more than seven parasangs per day. Such marches,
  at thirty stadia for the parasang, are impossible. And how did
  Xenophon measure the distance marched over?

  The most intelligent modern investigators and travellers,—Major
  Rennell, Mr. Ainsworth, Mr. Hamilton, Colonel Chesney, Professor
  Koch, etc., offer no satisfactory solution of the difficulty.
  Major Rennell reckons the parasangs as equal to 2.25 geogr.
  miles; Mr. Ainsworth at three geogr. miles; Mr. Hamilton (travels
  in Asia Minor, c. 42, p. 200), at something less than two and a
  half geogr. miles; Colonel Chesney (Euphrat. and Tigris, ch. 8,
  p. 207) at 2.608 geogr. miles between Sardis and Thapsakus—at
  1.98 geogr. miles, between Thapsakus and Kunaxa,—at something
  less than this, without specifying how much, during the retreat.
  It is evident that there is no certain basis to proceed upon,
  even for the earlier portion of the route; much more, for the
  retreat. The distance between Ikonium and Dana (or Tyana), is one
  of the quantities on which Mr. Hamilton rests his calculation;
  but we are by no means certain that Cyrus took the direct route
  of march; he rather seems to have turned out of his way, partly
  to plunder Lykaonia, partly to conduct the Kilikian princess
  homeward. The other item, insisted upon by Mr. Hamilton, is the
  distance between Kelænæ and Kolossæ, two places the site of which
  seems well ascertained, and which are by the best modern maps,
  fifty-two geographical miles apart. Xenophon calls the distance
  twenty parasangs. Assuming the road by which he marched to have
  been the same with that now travelled, it would make the parasang
  of Xenophon = 2.6 geographical miles. I have before remarked that
  the road between Kolossæ and Kelænæ was probably measured and
  numbered according to parasangs; so that Xenophon, in giving the
  number of parasangs between these two places, would be speaking
  upon official authority.

  Even a century and a half afterwards, the geographer Eratosthenes
  found it not possible to obtain accurate measurements, in much of
  the country traversed by Cyrus (Strabo, ii, p. 73.)

  Colonel Chesney remarks,—“From Sardis to Cunaxa, or the mounds
  of Mohammed, cannot be much under or over twelve hundred and
  sixty-five geographical miles; making 2.364 geographical miles
  for each of the five hundred and thirty-five parasangs given by
  Xenophon between those two places.”

  As a measure of distance, the parasang of Xenophon is evidently
  untrustworthy. Is it admissible to consider, in the description
  of this march, that the parasangs and stadia of Xenophon are
  measurements rather of time than of space? From Sardis to Kelænæ,
  he had a measured road and numbered parasangs of distance; it is
  probable that the same mensuration and numeration continued for
  four days farther, as far as Keramôn-Agora, (since I imagine that
  the road from Kelænæ to the Halys and Kappadokia must have gone
  through these two places,)—and possibly it may have continued
  even as far as Ikonium or Dana. Hence, by these early marches,
  Xenophon had the opportunity of forming to himself roughly an
  idea of the time (measured by the course of the sun) which it
  took for the army to march one, two, or three parasangs; and when
  he came to the ulterior portions of the road, he called _that
  length of time_ by the name of one, two, or three parasangs. Five
  parasangs seem to have meant with him a full day’s march; three
  or four, a short day; six, seven, or eight, a long, or very long
  day.

  We must recollect that the Greeks in the time of Xenophon had no
  portable means of measuring hours, and did not habitually divide
  the day into hours, or into any other recognized fraction. The
  Alexandrine astronomers, near two centuries afterwards, were
  the first to use ὥρη in the sense of hour (Ideler, Handbuch der
  Chronologie, vol. i, p. 239.)

  This may perhaps help to explain Xenophon’s meaning, when he
  talks about marching five or seven parasangs amidst the deep
  snows of Armenia; I do not however suppose that he had this
  meaning uniformly or steadily present to his mind. Sometimes, it
  would seem, he must have used the word in its usual meaning of
  distance.

  [38] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 8, 9. About Kelænæ, Arrian, Exp. Al. i, 29,
  2; Quint. Curt. iii, 1, 6.

As far as Kelænæ, his march had been directed straight towards
Pisidia, near the borders of which territory that city is situated.
So far, therefore, the fiction with which he started was kept up.
But on leaving Kelænæ, he turned his march away from Pisidia, in
a direction nearly northward; first in two days, ten parasangs,
to the town of Peltæ; next in two days farther, twelve parasangs,
to Keramôn-Agora, the last city in the district adjoining Mysia.
At Peltæ, in a halt of three days, the Arcadian general Xenias
celebrated the great festival of his country, the Lykæa, with
its usual games and matches, in the presence of Cyrus. From
Keramôn-Agora, Cyrus marched in three days the unusual distance of
thirty parasangs,[39] to a city called Käystru-Pedion, (the plain
of Käystrus), where he halted for five days. Here his repose was
disturbed by the murmurs of the Greek soldiers, who had received no
pay for three months, (Xenophon had before told us that they were
mostly men who had some means of their own), and who now flocked
around his tent to press for their arrears. So impoverished was Cyrus
by previous disbursements,—perhaps also by remissions of tribute for
the purpose of popularizing himself,—that he was utterly without
money, and was obliged to put them off again with promises. And
his march might well have ended here, had he not been rescued from
embarrassment by the arrival of Epyaxa, wife of the Kilikian prince
Syennesis, who brought to him a large sum of money, and enabled him
to give to the Greek soldiers four months’ pay at once. As to the
Asiatic soldiers, it is probable that they received little beyond
their maintenance.

  [39] These three marches, each of ten parasangs, from
  Keramôn-Agora to Käystru-Pedion,—are the longest recorded in
  the Anabasis. It is rather surprising to find them so; for
  there seems no motive for Cyrus to have hurried forward. When
  he reached Käystru-Pedion, he halted five days. Koch (Zug der
  Zehn Tausend, Leipsic, 1850, p. 19) remarks that the three days’
  march, which seem to have dropped out of Xenophon’s calculation,
  comparing the items with the total, might conveniently be let
  in here; so that these thirty parasangs should have occupied
  six days’ march instead of three; five parasangs per day. The
  whole march which Cyrus had hitherto made from Sardis, including
  the road from Keramôn-Agora to Käystru-Pedion, lay in the great
  road from Sardis to the river Halys, Kappadokia, and Susa. That
  road (as we see by the March of Xerxes, Herodot. vii, 26; v,
  52) passed through both Kelænæ and Kolossæ; though this is a
  prodigious departure from the straight line. At Käystru-Pedion,
  Cyrus seems to have left this great road; taking a different
  route, in a direction nearly south-east towards Ikonium. About
  the point, somewhere near Synnada, where these different roads
  crossed, see Mr. Ainsworth, Trav. in the Track, p. 28.

  I do not share the doubts which have been raised about Xenophon’s
  accuracy, in his description of the route from Sardis to Ikonium;
  though the names of several of the places which he mentions are
  not known to us, and their sites cannot be exactly identified.
  There is a great departure from the straight line of bearing. But
  we at the present day assign more weight to that circumstance
  than is suited to the days of Xenophon. Straight roads,
  stretching systematically over a large region of country, are
  not of that age; the communications were probably all originally
  made, between one neighboring town and another, without much
  reference to saving of distance, and with no reference to any
  promotion of traffic between distant places.

  It was just about this time that King Archelaus began to “cut
  straight roads” in Macedonia,—which Thucydides seems to note as
  a remarkable thing (ii, 100).

Two ensuing days of march, still through Phrygia, brought the army
to Thymbrium; two more to Tyriæum. Each day’s march is called five
parasangs[40]. It was here that Cyrus, halting three days, passed
the army in review, to gratify the Kilikian princess Epyaxa, who
was still accompanying the march. His Asiatic troops were first
made to march in order before him, cavalry and infantry in their
separate divisions; after which he himself in a chariot, and Epyaxa
in a Harmamaxa, (a sort of carriage or litter covered with an awning
which opened or shut at pleasure), passed all along the front of
the Greek line, drawn up separately. The hoplites were marshalled
four deep, all in their best trim; brazen helmets, purple tunics,
greaves or leggings, and the shields rubbed bright, just taken out
of the wrappers in which they were carried during a mere march.[41]
Klearchus commanded on the left, and Menon on the right; the other
generals being distributed in the centre. Having completed his review
along the whole line, and taken a station with the Kilikian princess
at a certain distance in front of it, Cyrus sent his interpreter to
the generals, and desired that he might see them charge. Accordingly,
the orders were given, the spears were protended, the trumpets
sounded, and the whole Greek force moved forward in battle array with
the usual shouts. As they advanced, the pace became accelerated, and
they made straight against the victualling portion of the Asiatic
encampment. Such was the terror occasioned by the sight, that all the
Asiatics fled forthwith, abandoning their property,—Epyaxa herself
among the first, quitting her palanquin. Though she had among her
personal guards some Greeks from Aspendus, she had never before seen
a Grecian army, and was amazed as well as terrified; much to the
satisfaction of Cyrus, who saw in the scene an augury of his coming
success.[42]

  [40] Neither Thymbrium, nor Tyriæum, can be identified. But it
  seems that both must have been situated on the line of road now
  followed by the caravans from Smyrna to Konieh (Ikonium,) which
  line of road follows a direction between the mountains called
  Emir Dagh on the north-east, and those called Sultan Dagh on the
  south-west (Koch, Der Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 21, 22).

  [41] Εἶχον δὲ πάντες κράνη χαλκᾶ, καὶ χιτῶνας φοινικοῦς, καὶ
  κνημῖδας, καὶ ~τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐκκεκαθαρμένας~.

  When the hoplite was on march, without expectation of an enemy,
  the shield seems to have been carried behind him, with his
  blanket attached to it (see Aristoph. Acharn. 1085, 1089-1149);
  it was slung by the strap round his neck and shoulder. Sometimes
  indeed he had an opportunity of relieving himself from the
  burden, by putting the shield in a baggage-wagon (Xen. Anab. i,
  7, 20). The officers generally, and doubtless some soldiers,
  could command attendants to carry their shields for them (iv, 2,
  20; Aristoph. 1, c.).

  On occasion of this review, the shields were unpacked, rubbed,
  and brightened, as before a battle (Xen. Hell. vii, 5, 20); then
  fastened round the neck or shoulders, and held out upon the left
  arm, which was passed through the rings or straps attached to its
  concave or interior side.

  Respecting the cases or wrappers of the shields, see a curious
  stratagem of the Syracusan Agathokles (Diodor. xx, 11). The Roman
  soldiers also carried their shields in leathern wrappers, when on
  march (Plutarch, Lucull. c. 27).

  It is to be remarked that Xenophon, in enumerating the arms of
  the Cyreians, does not mention _breastplates_; which (though
  sometimes worn, see Plutarch, Dion. c. 30) were not usually worn
  by hoplites, who carried heavy shields. It is quite possible
  that _some_ of the Cyreian infantry may have had breastplates as
  well as shields, since every soldier provided his own arms; but
  Xenophon states only what was common to all.

  Grecian cavalry commonly wore a heavy breastplate, but had no
  shield.

  [42] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 16-19.

Three days of farther march, (called twenty parasangs in all) brought
the army to Ikonium, (now Konieh), the extreme city of Phrygia;
where Cyrus halted three days. He then marched for five days (thirty
parasangs) through Lykaonia; which country, as being out of his
own satrapy, and even hostile, he allowed the Greeks to plunder.
Lykaonia being immediately on the borders of Pisidia, its inhabitants
were probably reckoned as Pisidians, since they were of the like
predatory character:[43] so that Cyrus would be partially realizing
the pretended purpose of his expedition. He thus, too, approached
near to Mount Taurus, which separated him from Kilikia; and he here
sent the Kilikian princess, together with Menon and his division,
over the mountain, by a pass shorter and more direct, but seemingly
little frequented, and too difficult for the whole army; in order
that they might thus get straight into Kilikia,[44] in the rear of
Syennesis, who was occupying the regular pass more to the northward.
Intending to enter with his main body through this latter pass, Cyrus
first proceeded through Kappadokia (four days’ march, twenty-five
parasangs) to Dana or Tyana, a flourishing city of Kappadokia; where
he halted three days, and where he put to death two Persian officers,
on a charge of conspiring against him.[45]

  [43] Xen. Anab. iii, 2, 25.

  [44] This shorter and more direct pass crosses the Taurus by
  Kizil-Chesmeh, Alan Buzuk, and Mizetli; it led directly to the
  Kilikian seaport-town Soli, afterwards called Pompeiopolis. It
  is laid down in the Peutinger Tables as the road from Iconium to
  Pompeiopolis (Ainsworth, p. 40 _seq._; Chesney, Euph. and Tigr.
  ii, p. 209).

  [45] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 20.

This regular pass over Taurus, the celebrated Tauri-Pylæ or Kilikian
Gates, was occupied by Syennesis. Though a road fit for vehicles, it
was yet three thousand six hundred feet above the level of the sea,
narrow, steep, bordered by high ground on each side, and crossed by a
wall with gates, so that it could not be forced if ever so moderately
defended.[46] But the Kilikian prince, alarmed at the news that
Menon had already crossed the mountains by the less frequented pass
to his rear, and that the fleet of Cyrus was sailing along the coast,
evacuated his own impregnable position, and fell back to Tarsus; from
whence he again retired, accompanied by most of the inhabitants,
to an inaccessible fastness on the mountains. Accordingly Cyrus,
ascending without opposition the great pass thus abandoned, reached
Tarsus after a march of four days, there rejoining Menon and Epyaxa.
Two lochi or companies of the division of Menon, having dispersed on
their march for pillage, had been cut off by the natives; for which
the main body of Greeks now took their revenge, plundering both the
city and the palace of Syennesis. That prince, though invited by
Cyrus to come back to Tarsus, at first refused, but was at length
prevailed upon by the persuasions of his wife, to return under a
safe conduct. He was induced to contract an alliance, to exchange
presents with Cyrus, and to give him a large sum of money towards
his expedition, together with a contingent of troops; in return for
which it was stipulated that Kilikia should be no farther plundered,
and that the slaves taken away might be recovered wherever they were
found.[47]

  [46] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 21; Diodor. xiv, 20. See Mr. Kinneir,
  Travels in Asia Minor, p. 116; Col. Chesney, Euphrates and
  Tigris, vol. i, p. 293-354; and Mr. Ainsworth, Travels in the
  Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 40 _seq._; also his other work,
  Travels in Asia Minor, vol. ii. ch. 30, p. 70-77; and Koch,
  Der Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 26-172, for a description of this
  memorable pass.

  Alexander the Great, as well as Cyrus, was fortunate enough to
  find this impregnable pass abandoned; as it appears, through
  sheer stupidity or recklessness of the satrap who ought to have
  defended it, and who had not even the same excuse for abandoning
  it as Syennesis had on the approach of Cyrus (Arrian. E. A. ii.
  4; Curtius, iii, 9, 10, 11).

  [47] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 23-27.

It seems evident, though Xenophon does not directly tell us so, that
the resistance of Syennesis, (this was a standing name or title of
the hereditary princes of Kilikia under the Persian crown), was a
mere feint; that the visit of Epyaxa with a supply of money to Cyrus,
and the admission of Menon and his division over Mount Taurus, were
manœuvres in collusion with him; and that, thinking Cyrus would be
successful, he was disposed to support his cause, yet careful at the
same time to give himself the air of having been overpowered, in case
Artaxerxes should prove victorious.[48]

  [48] Diodorus (xiv, 20) represents Syennesis as playing a double
  game, though reluctantly. He takes no notice of the proceeding of
  Epyaxa.

  So Livy says, about the conduct of the Macedonian courtiers in
  regard to the enmity between Perseus and Demetrius, the two
  sons of Philip II. of Macedon: “Crescente in dies Philippi
  odio in Romanos, cui Perseus indulgeret, Demetrius summâ ope
  adversaretur, prospicientes animo exitum incauti a fraude
  fraternâ juvenis—_adjuvandum, quod futurum erat, rati,
  fovendamque spem potentioris, Perseo se adjungunt_,” _etc._
  (Livy, xl, 5).

At first, however, it appeared as if the march of Cyrus was destined
to finish at Tarsus, where he was obliged to remain twenty days. The
army had already passed by Pisidia, the ostensible purpose of the
expedition, for which the Grecian troops had been engaged; not one of
them, either officer or soldier, suspecting anything to the contrary,
except Klearchus, who was in the secret. But all now saw that they
had been imposed upon, and found out that they were to be conducted
against the Persian king. Besides the resentment at such delusion,
they shrunk from the risk altogether; not from any fear of Persian
armies, but from the terrors of a march of three months inward from
the coast, and the impossibility of return, which had so powerfully
affected the Spartan King Kleomenes,[49] a century before; most of
them being (as I have before remarked) men of decent position and
family in their respective cities. Accordingly they proclaimed their
determination to advance no farther, as they had not been engaged to
fight against the Great King.[50]

  [49] See Herodot. v. 49.

  [50] Xen. Anab. i, 3, 1.

Among the Grecian officers, each (Klearchus, Proxenus, Menon, Xenias,
etc.) commanded his own separate division, without any generalissimo
except Cyrus himself. Each of them probably sympathized more or less
in the resentment as well as in the repugnance of the soldiers. But
Klearchus, an exile and a mercenary by profession, was doubtless
prepared for this mutiny, and had assured Cyrus that it might be
overcome. That such a man as Klearchus could be tolerated as a
commander of free and non-professional soldiers, is a proof of the
great susceptibility of the Greek hoplites for military discipline.
For though he had great military merits, being brave, resolute, and
full of resource in the hour of danger, provident for the subsistence
of his soldiers, and unshrinking against fatigue and hardship,—yet
his look and manner were harsh, his punishments were perpetual as
well as cruel, and he neither tried nor cared to conciliate his
soldiers; who accordingly stayed with him, and were remarkable
for exactness of discipline, so long as political orders required
them,—but preferred service under other commanders, when they
could obtain it.[51] Finding his orders to march forward disobeyed,
Klearchus proceeded at once in his usual manner to enforce and
punish. But he found resistance universal; he himself with the cattle
who carried his baggage, was pelted when he began to move forward,
and narrowly escaped with his life. Thus disappointed in his attempt
at coercion, he was compelled to convene the soldiers in a regular
assembly, and to essay persuasion.

  [51] Xen. Anab. ii, 6, 5-15.

On first appearing before the assembled soldiers, this harsh and
imperious officer stood for a long time silent, and even weeping;
a remarkable point in Grecian manners,—and exceedingly impressive
to the soldiers, who looked on him with surprise and in silence. At
length he addressed them: “Be not astonished, soldiers, to see me
deeply mortified. Cyrus has been my friend and benefactor. It was
he who sheltered me as an exile, and gave me ten thousand Darics,
which I expended not on my own profit or pleasure, but upon you, and
in defence of Grecian interests in the Chersonese against Thracian
depredators. When Cyrus invited me, I came to him along with you, in
order to make him the best return in my power for his past kindness.
But now, since you will no longer march along with me, I am under the
necessity either of renouncing you or of breaking faith with him.
Whether I am doing right or not, I cannot say; but I shall stand
by you, and share your fate. No one shall say of me that, having
conducted Greek troops into a foreign land, I betrayed the Greeks and
chose the foreigner. You are to me country, friends, allies; while
you are with me, I can help a friend, and repel an enemy. Understand
me well; I shall go wherever you go, and partake your fortune.”[52]

  [52] Xen. Anab. i, 3, 2-7. Here, as on other occasions, I
  translate the sense rather than the words.

This speech, and the distinct declaration of Klearchus that he
would not march forward against the King, was heard by the soldiers
with much delight; in which those of the other Greek divisions
sympathized, especially as none of the other Greek commanders had yet
announced a similar resolution. So strong was this feeling among the
soldiers of Xenias and Pasion, that two thousand of them left their
commanders, coming over forthwith, with arms and baggage, to the
encampment of Klearchus.

Meanwhile Cyrus himself, dismayed at the resistance encountered,
sent to desire an interview with Klearchus. But the latter, knowing
well the game that he was playing, refused to obey the summons. He,
however, at the same time despatched a secret message to encourage
Cyrus with the assurance that everything would come right at
last,—and to desire farther that fresh invitations might be sent,
in order that he (Klearchus) might answer by fresh refusals. He then
again convened in assembly both his own soldiers and those who had
recently deserted Xenias to join him. “Soldiers (said he), we must
recollect that we have now broken with Cyrus. We are no longer his
soldiers, nor he our paymaster; moreover, I know that he thinks we
have wronged him,—so that I am both afraid and ashamed to go near
him. He is a good friend,—but a formidable enemy; and has a powerful
force of his own, which all of you see near at hand. This is no time
for us to slumber. We must take careful counsel whether to stay or
go; and if we go, how to get away in safety, as well as to obtain
provisions. I shall be glad to hear what any man has to suggest.”

Instead of the peremptory tone habitual with Klearchus, the troops
found themselves now, for the first time, not merely released from
his command, but deprived of his advice. Some soldiers addressed the
assembly, proposing various measures suitable to the emergency; but
their propositions were opposed by other speakers, who, privately
instigated by Klearchus himself, set forth the difficulties either
of staying or departing. One among these secret partisans of the
commander even affected to take the opposite side, and to be
impatient for immediate departure. “If Klearchus does not choose to
conduct us back (said this speaker) let us immediately elect other
generals, buy provisions, get ready to depart, and then send to
ask Cyrus for merchant-vessels,—or at any rate for guides in our
return march by land. If he refuses both these requests, we must
put ourselves in marching order, to fight our way back; sending
forward a detachment without delay to occupy the passes.” Klearchus
here interposed to say, that as for himself, it was impossible for
him to continue in command; but he would faithfully obey any other
commander who might be elected. He was followed by another speaker,
who demonstrated the absurdity of going and asking Cyrus, either for
a guide, or for ships, at the very moment when they were frustrating
his projects. How could he be expected to assist them in getting
away? Who could trust either his ships or his guides? On the other
hand, to depart without his knowledge or concurrence was impossible.
The proper course would be to send a deputation to him, consisting
of others along with Klearchus, to ask what it was that he really
wanted; which no one yet knew. His answer to the question should
be reported to the meeting, in order that they might take their
resolution accordingly.

To this proposition the soldiers acceded; for it was but too plain
that retreat was no easy matter. The deputation went to put the
question to Cyrus; who replied that his real purpose was to attack
his enemy Abrokomas, who was on the river Euphrates, twelve days’
march onward. If he found Abrokomas there, he would punish him as he
deserved. If, on the other hand, Abrokomas had fled, they might again
consult what step was fit to be taken.

The soldiers, on hearing this, suspected it to be a deception, but
nevertheless acquiesced, not knowing what else to do. They required
only an increase of pay. Not a word was said about the Great King, or
the expedition against him. Cyrus granted increased pay of fifty per
cent. upon the previous rate. Instead of one daric per month to each
soldier, he agreed to give a daric and a half.[53]

  [53] Xen. Anab. i, 3, 16-21.

This remarkable scene at Tarsus illustrates the character of the
Greek citizen-soldier. What is chiefly to be noted, is, the appeal
made to their reason and judgment,—the habit, established more
or less throughout so large a portion of the Grecian world, and
attaining its maximum at Athens, of hearing both sides and deciding
afterwards. The soldiers are indignant, justly and naturally, at the
fraud practised upon them. But instead of surrendering themselves to
this impulse arising out of the past, they are brought to look at the
actualities of the present, and take measure of what is best to be
done for the future. To return back from the place where they stood,
against the wish of Cyrus, was an enterprise so full of difficulty
and danger, that the decision to which they came was recommended by
the best considerations of reason. To go on was the least dangerous
course of the two, besides its chances of unmeasured reward.

As the remaining Greek officers and soldiers followed the example
of Klearchus and his division, the whole army marched forward from
Tarsus, and reached Issus, the extreme city of Kilikia, in five
days’ march,—crossing the rivers Sarus[54] and Pyramus. At Issus, a
flourishing and commercial port in the angle of the Gulf so called,
Cyrus was joined by his fleet of fifty triremes,—thirty-five
Lacedæmonian and twenty-five Persian triremes; bringing a
reinforcement of seven hundred hoplites, under the command of the
Lacedæmonian Cheirisophus, said to have been despatched by the
Spartan Ephors.[55] He also received a farther reinforcement of four
hundred Grecian soldiers; making the total of Greeks in his army
fourteen thousand, from which are to be deducted the one hundred
soldiers of Menon’s division, slain in Kilikia.

  [54] The breadth of the river Sarus (Scihun) is given by Xenophon
  at three hundred feet; which agrees nearly with the statements of
  modern travellers (Koch, Der Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 34).

  Compare, for the description of this country, Kinneir’s Journey
  through Asia Minor, p. 135; Col. Chesney, Euphrates and Tigris,
  ii, p. 211; Mr. Ainsworth, Travels in the Track of the Ten
  Thousand, p. 54.

  Colonel Chesney affirms that neither the Sarus nor the Pyramus
  is fordable. There must have been bridges; which, in the then
  flourishing state of Kilikia, is by no means improbable. He and
  Mr. Ainsworth, however, differ as to the route which they suppose
  Cyrus to have taken between Tarsus and Issus.

  Xenophon mentions nothing about the Amanian Gates, which
  afterwards appear noticed both in Arrian (ii, 6; ii, 7) and in
  Strabo (xiv, p. 676). The various data of ancient history and
  geography about this region are by no means easy to reconcile;
  see a valuable note of Mützel on Quintus Curtius, iii, 17, 7.
  An inspection of the best recent maps, either Colonel Chesney’s
  or Kiepert’s, clears up some of these better than any verbal
  description. We see by these maps that Mount Amanus bifurcates
  into two branches, one of them flanking the Gulf of Issus on
  its western, the other on its eastern side. There are thus two
  different passes, each called Pylæ Amanides or Amanian Gates; one
  having reference to the Western Amanus, the other to the Eastern.
  The former was crossed by Alexander, the latter by Darius, before
  the battle of Issus; and Arrian (ii, 6; ii, 7) is equally correct
  in saying of both of them that they passed the Amanian Gates;
  though both did not pass the same gates.

  [55] Diodor. xiv. 21.

The arrival of this last body of four hundred men was a fact of some
importance. They had hitherto been in the service of Abrokomas (the
Persian general commanding a vast force, said to be three hundred
thousand men, for the king, in Phœnicia and Syria), from whom they
now deserted to Cyrus. Such desertion was at once the proof of their
reluctance to fight against the great body of their countrymen
marching upwards, and of the general discouragement reigning
amidst the king’s army. So great, indeed, was that discouragement,
that Abrokomas now fled from the Syrian coast into the interior;
abandoning three defensible positions in succession—1. The Gates of
Kilikia and Syria. 2. The pass of Beilan over Mount Amanus. 3. The
passage of the Euphrates.—He appears to have been alarmed by the
easy passage of Cyrus from Kappadokia into Kilikia, and still more,
probably, by the evident collusion of Syennesis with the invader.[56]

  [56] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 3-5. Ἀβροκόμας δ᾽ οὐ τοῦτο ἐποίησεν ἀλλ᾽
  ἐπεὶ ἤκουσε Κῦρον ἐν Κιλικίᾳ ὄντα, αναστρέψας ἐκ Φοινίκης, παρὰ
  βασιλέα ἀπήλαυνεν, etc.

Cyrus had expected to find the gates of Kilikia and Syria stoutly
defended, and had provided for this emergency by bringing up his
fleet to Issus, in order that he might be able to transport a
division by sea to the rear of the defenders. The pass was at one
day’s march from Issus. It was a narrow road for the length of
near half a mile, between the sea on one side and the steep cliffs
terminating mount Amanus on the other. The two entrances, on the
side of Kilikia as well as on that of Syria, were both closed by
walls and gates; midway between the two the river Kersus broke out
from the mountains and flowed into the sea. No army could force this
pass against defenders; but the possession of the fleet doubtless
enabled an assailant to turn it. Cyrus was overjoyed to find it
undefended.[57] And here we cannot but notice the superior ability
and forethought of Cyrus as compared with the other Persians opposed
to him. He had looked at this as well as at the other difficulties
of his march, beforehand, and had provided the means of meeting
them; whereas, on the king’s side, all the numerous means and
opportunities of defence are successively abandoned; the Persians
have no confidence, except in vast numbers,—or when numbers fail, in
treachery.

  [57] Diodor. xiv.

Five parasangs, or one day’s march from this pass, Cyrus reached the
Phœnician maritime town of Myriandrus; a place of great commerce,
with its harbor full of merchantmen. While he rested here seven days,
his two generals Xenias and Pasion deserted him; privately engaging
a merchant vessel to carry them away with their property. They could
not brook the wrong which Cyrus had done them in permitting Klearchus
to retain under his command those soldiers who had deserted them
at Tarsus, at the time when the latter played off his deceitful
manœuvre. Perhaps the men who had thus deserted may have been
unwilling to return to their original commanders, after having taken
so offensive a step. And this may partly account for the policy of
Cyrus in sanctioning what Xenias and Pasion could not but feel as a
great wrong, in which a large portion of the army sympathized. The
general belief among the soldiers was, that Cyrus would immediately
despatch some triremes to overtake and bring back the fugitives.
But instead of this, he summoned the remaining generals, and after
communicating to them the fact that Xenias and Pasion were gone,
added,—“I have plenty of triremes to overtake their merchantmen
if I chose, and to bring them back. But I will do no such thing.
No one shall say of me, that I make use of a man while he is with
me,—and afterwards seize, rob, or ill-use him, when he wishes
to depart. Nay, I have their wives and children under guard as
hostages, at Tralles;[58] but even these shall be given up to them,
in consideration of their good behavior down to the present day. Let
them go if they choose, with the full knowledge that they behave
worse towards me than I towards them.” This behavior, alike judicious
and conciliating, was universally admired, and produced the best
possible effect upon the spirits of the army; imparting a confidence
in Cyrus which did much to outweigh the prevailing discouragement,
in the unknown march upon which they were entering.[59]

  [58] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 6. To require the wives or children of
  generals in service, as hostages for fidelity, appears to have
  been not unfrequent with Persian kings. On the other hand, it
  was remarked as a piece of gross obsequiousness in the Argeian
  Nikostratus, who commanded the contingent of his countrymen
  serving under Artaxerxes Ochus in Egypt, that he volunteered to
  bring up his son to the king as a hostage, without being demanded
  (Theopompus, Frag. 135 [ed. Wichers] ap. Athenæ. vi, p. 252).

  [59] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 7-9.

At Myriandrus Cyrus finally quitted the sea, sending back his
fleet,[60] and striking with his land-force eastward into the
interior. For this purpose it was necessary first to cross mount
Amanus, by the pass of Beilan; an eminently difficult road, which he
was fortunate enough to find open, though Abrokomas might easily have
defended it, if he had chosen.[61] Four days’ march brought the army
to the Chalus (perhaps the river of Aleppo), full of fish held sacred
by the neighboring inhabitants; five more days, to the sources of the
river Daradax, with the palace and park of the Syrian satrap Belesys;
three days farther, to Thapsakus on the Euphrates. This was a great
and flourishing town, a centre of commerce enriched by the important
ford or transit of the river Euphrates close to it, in latitude
about 35° 40′ N.[62] The river, when the Cyreians arrived, was four
stadia, or somewhat less than half an English mile, in breadth.

  [60] Diodor. xiv, 21.

  [61] See the remarks of Mr. Ainsworth, Travels in the Track of
  the Ten Thousand, p. 58-61; and other citations respecting the
  difficult road through the pass of Beilan, in Mützel’s valuable
  notes on Quintus Curtius, iii, 20, 13, p. 101.

  [62] Neither the Chalus, nor the Daradax, nor indeed the
  road followed by Cyrus in crossing Syria from the sea to the
  Euphrates, can be satisfactorily made out (Koch, Zug der Zehn
  Tausend, p. 36, 37).

  Respecting the situation of Thapsakus,—placed erroneously by
  Rennell lower down the river at Deir, where it stands marked even
  in the map annexed to Col. Chesney’s Report on the Euphrates, and
  by Reichard higher up the river, near Bir—see Ritter, Erdkunde,
  part x, B. iii; West Asien, p. 14-17, with the elaborate
  discussion, p. 972-978, in the same volume; also the work of
  Mr. Ainsworth above cited, p. 70. The situation of Thapsakus is
  correctly placed in Colonel Chesney’s last work (Euphr. and Tigr.
  p. 213), and in the excellent map accompanying that work; though
  I dissent from his view of the march of Cyrus between the pass of
  Beilan and Thapsakus.

  Thapsakus appears to have been the most frequented and
  best-known passage over the Euphrates, throughout the duration
  of the Seleukid kings, down to 100 B.C. It was selected as a
  noted point, to which observations and calculations might be
  conveniently referred, by Eratosthenes and other geographers
  (see Strabo, ii, p. 79-87). After the time when the Roman empire
  became extended to the Euphrates, the new Zeugma, higher up the
  river near Bir or Bihrejik (about the 37th parallel of latitude)
  became more used and better known, at least to the Roman writers.

  The passage at Thapsakus was in the line of road from Palmyra
  to Karrhæ in Northern Mesopotamia; also from Seleukeia (on the
  Tigris below Bagdad) to the other cities founded in Northern
  Syria by Seleukus Nikator and his successors, Antioch on the
  Orontes, Seleukeia in Pieria, Laodikeia, Antioch ad Taurum, etc.

  The ford at Thapsakus (says Mr. Ainsworth, p. 69, 70) “is
  celebrated to this day as the ford of the Anezeh or Beduins. On
  the right bank of the Euphrates there are the remains of a paved
  causeway leading to the very banks of the river, and continued on
  the opposite side.”

Cyrus remained at Thapsakus five days. He was now compelled formally
to make known to his soldiers the real object of the march, hitherto,
in name at least, disguised. He accordingly sent for the Greek
generals, and desired them to communicate publicly the fact, that
he was on the advance to Babylon against his brother,—which to
themselves, probably, had been for some time well known. Among the
soldiers, however, the first announcement excited loud murmurs,
accompanied by accusation against the generals, of having betrayed
them, in privity with Cyrus. But this outburst was very different to
the strenuous repugnance which they had before manifested at Tarsus.
Evidently they suspected, and had almost made up their minds to, the
real truth; so that their complaint was soon converted into a demand
for a donation to each man, as soon as they should reach Babylon;
as much as that which Cyrus had given to his Grecian detachment on
going up thither before. Cyrus willingly promised them five minæ
per head (about £19 5_s._), equal to more than a year’s pay, at the
rate recently stipulated of a daric and a half per month. He engaged
to give them, besides, the full rate of pay until they should have
been sent back to the Ionian coast. Such ample offers satisfied the
Greeks, and served to counterbalance at least, if not to efface, the
terrors of that unknown region which they were about to tread.

But before the general body of Greek soldiers had pronounced their
formal acquiescence, Menon with his separate division was already
in the water, crossing. For Menon had instigated his men to decide
separately for themselves, and to execute their decision, before
the others had given any answer. “By acting thus (said he) you will
confer special obligation on Cyrus, and earn corresponding reward.
If the others follow you across, he will suppose that they do so
because you have set the example. If, on the contrary, the others
should refuse, we shall all be obliged to retreat: but he will
never forget that you, separately taken, have done all that you
could for him.” Such breach of communion, and avidity for separate
gain, at a time when it vitally concerned all the Greek soldiers to
act in harmony with each other, was a step suitable to the selfish
and treacherous character of Menon. He gained his point, however,
completely; for Cyrus, on learning that the Greek troops had actually
crossed, despatched Glus the interpreter to express to them his
warmest thanks, and to assure them that he would never forget the
obligation; while at the same time, he sent underhand large presents
to Menon separately.[63] He passed with his whole army immediately
afterwards; no man being wet above the breast.

  [63] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 12-18.

What had become of Abrokomas and his army, and why did he not defend
this passage, where Cyrus might so easily have been arrested? We are
told that he had been there a little before, and that he had thought
it sufficient to burn all the vessels at Thapsakus, in the belief
that the invaders could not cross the river on foot. And Xenophon
informs us that the Thapsakenes affirmed the Euphrates to have been
never before fordable,—always passed by means of boats; insomuch
that they treated the actual low state of the water as a providential
interposition of the gods in favor of Cyrus; “the river made way
for him to come and take the sceptre.” When we find that Abrokomas
came too late afterwards for the battle of Kunaxa, we shall be led
to suspect that he too, like Syennesis in Kilikia, was playing a
double game between the two royal brothers, and that he was content
with destroying those vessels which formed the ordinary means of
communication between the banks, without taking any means to inquire
whether the passage was practicable without them. The assertion of
the Thapsakenes, in so far as it was not a mere piece of flattery to
Cyrus, could hardly have had any other foundation than the fact, that
they had never seen the river crossed on foot (whether practicable or
not), so long as there were regular ferry-boats.[64]

  [64] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 18. Compare (Plutarch, Alexand. 17)
  analogous expressions of flattery—from the historians of
  Alexander, affirming that the sea near Pamphylia providentially
  made way for him—from the inhabitants on the banks of the
  Euphrates, when the river was passed by the Roman legions and
  the Parthian prince Tiridates, in the reign of the Emperor
  Tiberius (Tacitus, Annal. vi. 37); and by Lucullus still earlier
  (Plutarch, Lucull. c. 24).

  The time when Cyrus crossed the Euphrates, must probably have
  been about the end of July or beginning of August. Now the period
  of greatest height, in the waters of the Euphrates near this
  part of its course, is from the 21st to the 28th of May; the
  period when they are lowest, is about the middle of November
  (see Colonel Chesney’s Report on the Euphrates, p. 5). Rennell
  erroneously states that they are lowest in August and September
  (Expedit, of Xenophon, p. 277). The waters would thus be at a
  sort of mean height, when Cyrus passed.

  Mr. Ainsworth states that there were only twenty inches of water
  in the ford at Thapsakus, from October 1841 to February 1842; the
  steamers Nimrod and Nitocris then struck upon it (p. 72), though
  the steamers Euphrates and Tigris had passed over it without
  difficulty in the month of May.

After crossing the Euphrates, Cyrus proceeded, for nine days’
march,[65] southward along its left bank, until he came to its
affluent, the river Araxes or Chaboras, which divided Syria from
Arabia. From the numerous and well-supplied villages there situated,
he supplied himself with a large stock of provisions, to confront
the desolate march through Arabia on which they were about to enter,
following the banks of the Euphrates still further southward. It was
now that he entered on what may be called the Desert,—an endless
breadth or succession of undulations, “like the sea,” without any
cultivation or even any tree; nothing but wormwood and various
aromatic shrubs.[66] Here too the astonished Greeks saw, for the
first time, wild asses, antelopes, ostriches, bustards, some of which
afforded sport, and occasionally food, to the horsemen who amused
themselves by chasing them; though the wild ass was swifter than
any horse, and the ostrich altogether unapproachable. Five days’
march brought them to Korsôtê, a town which had been abandoned by
its inhabitants,—probably, however, leaving the provision dealers
behind, as had before happened at Tarsus, in Kilikia;[67] since the
army here increased their supplies for the onward march. All that
they could obtain was required, and was indeed insufficient, for the
trying journey which awaited them. For thirteen successive days, and
ninety computed parasangs, did they march along the left bank of
the Euphrates, without provisions, and even without herbage except
in some few places. Their flour was exhausted, so that the soldiers
lived for some days altogether upon meat, while many baggage-animals
perished of hunger. Moreover the ground was often heavy and
difficult, full of hills and narrow valleys, requiring the personal
efforts of every man to push the cars and waggons at particular
junctures; efforts in which the Persian courtiers of Cyrus, under
his express orders, took zealous part, toiling in the dirt with
their ornamented attire.[68] After these thirteen days of hardship,
they reached Pylæ; near the entrance of the cultivated territory of
Babylonia, where they seem to have halted five or six days to rest
and refresh.[69] There was on the opposite side of the river, at or
near this point, a flourishing city named Charmandê; to which many of
the soldiers crossed over (by means of skins stuffed with hay), and
procured plentiful supplies, especially of date-wine and millet.[70]

  [65] Xenophon gives these nine days of march as covering fifty
  parasangs (Anab. i, 4, 19). But Koch remarks that the distance
  is not half so great as that from the sea to Thapsakus; which
  latter Xenophon gives at sixty-five parasangs. There is here some
  confusion; together with the usual difficulty in assigning any
  given distance as the equivalent of the parasang (Koch, Zug der
  Zehn Tausend, p. 38).

  [66] See the remarkable testimony of Mr. Ainsworth, from personal
  observation, to the accuracy of Xenophon’s description of the
  country, even at the present day.

  [67] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 24.

  [68] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 4-8.

  [69] I infer that the army halted here five or six days, from
  the story afterwards told respecting the Ambrakiot Silanus, the
  prophet of the army; who, on sacrificing, had told Cyrus that his
  brother would not fight for ten days (i, 7, 16). This sacrifice
  must have been offered, I imagine, during the halt—not during
  the distressing march which preceded. The ten days named by
  Silanus, expired on the fourth day after they left Pylæ.

  It is in reference to this portion of the course of the
  Euphrates, from the Chaboras southward down by Anah and Hit (the
  ancient Is, noticed by Herodotus, and still celebrated from
  its unexhausted supply of bitumen), between latitude 35½° and
  34°—that Colonel Chesney, in his Report on the Navigation of the
  Euphrates (p. 2), has the following remarks:—

  “The scenery above Hit, in itself very picturesque, is greatly
  heightened, as one is carried along the current, by the frequent
  recurrence, at very short intervals, of ancient irrigating
  aqueducts; these beautiful specimens of art and durability are
  attributed by the Arabs to the times of the ignorant, meaning (as
  is expressly understood) the Persians, when fire-worshippers,
  and in possession of the world. They literally cover both banks,
  and prove that the borders of the Euphrates were once thickly
  inhabited by a people far advanced indeed in the application
  of hydraulics to domestic purposes, of the first and greatest
  utility—the transport of water. The greater portion is now more
  or less in ruins, but some have been repaired, and kept up for
  use either to grind corn or to irrigate. The aqueducts are of
  stone, firmly cemented, narrowing to about two feet or twenty
  inches at top, placed at right angles to the current, and carried
  various distances towards the interior, from two hundred to one
  thousand two hundred yards.

  “But what most concerns the subject of this memoir is, the
  existence of a parapet wall or stone rampart in the river, just
  above the several aqueducts. In general, there is one of the
  former attached to each of the latter. And almost invariably,
  between two mills on the opposite banks, one of them crosses the
  stream from side to side, with the exception of a passage left
  in the centre for boats to pass up and down. The object of these
  subaqueous walls would appear to be exclusively, to raise the
  water sufficiently at low seasons, to give it impetus, as well as
  a more abundant supply to the wheels. And their effect at those
  times is, to create a fall in every part of the width, save the
  opening left for commerce, through which the water rushes with
  a moderately irregular surface. These dams were probably from
  four to eight feet high originally; but they are now frequently a
  bank of stones disturbing the evenness of the current, but always
  affording a sufficient passage for large boats at low seasons.”

  The marks which Colonel Chesney points out, of previous
  population and industry on the banks of the Euphrates at this
  part of its course, are extremely interesting and curious, when
  contrasted with the desolation depicted by Xenophon; who mentions
  that there were no other inhabitants than some who lived by
  cutting millstones from the stone quarries near, and sending
  them to Babylon in exchange for grain. It is plain that the
  population, of which Colonel Chesney saw the remaining tokens,
  either had already long ceased, or did not begin to exist, or to
  construct their dams and aqueducts, until a period later than
  Xenophon. They probably began during the period of the Seleukid
  kings, after the year 300 B.C. For this line of road along the
  Euphrates began then to acquire great importance as the means
  of communication between the great city of Seleukeia (on the
  Tigris, below Bagdad) and the other cities founded by Seleukus
  Nikator and his successors in the North of Syria and Asia
  Minor—Seleukeia in Pieria, Antioch, Laodikeia, Apameia, etc.
  This route coincides mainly with the present route from Bagdad
  to Aleppo, crossing the Euphrates at Thapsakus. It can hardly be
  doubted that the course of the Euphrates was better protected
  during the two centuries of the Seleukid kings (B.C. 300-100,
  speaking in round numbers), than it came to be afterwards, when
  that river became the boundary line between the Romans and the
  Parthians. Even at the time of the Emperor Julian’s invasion,
  however, Ammianus Marcellinus describes the left bank of the
  Euphrates, north of Babylonia, as being in several parts well
  cultivated, and furnishing ample subsistence, (Ammian. Marc.
  xxiv, 1). At the time of Xenophon’s Anabasis, there was nothing
  to give much importance to the banks of the Euphrates north of
  Babylonia.

  Mr. Ainsworth describes the country on the left bank of the
  Euphrates, before reaching Pylæ, as being now in the same
  condition as it was when Xenophon and his comrades marched
  through it,—“full of hills and narrow valleys, and presenting
  many difficulties to the movement of an army. The illustrator
  was, by a curious accident, left by the Euphrates steamer on
  this very portion of the river, and on the same side as the
  Perso-Greek army, and he had to walk a day and a night across
  these inhospitable regions; so that he can speak feelingly of the
  difficulties which the Greeks had to encounter.” (Travels in the
  Track, etc. p. 81.)

  [70] I incline to think that Charmandê must have been nearly
  opposite Pylæ, lower down than Hit. But Major Rennell (p. 107)
  and Mr. Ainsworth (p. 84) suppose Charmandê to be the same place
  as the modern Hit (the Is of Herodotus). There is no other known
  town with which we can identify it.

It was during this halt opposite Charmandê that a dispute occurred
among the Greeks themselves, menacing to the safety of all. I have
already mentioned that Klearchus, Menon, Proxenus, and each of the
Greek chiefs, enjoyed a separate command over his own division,
subject only to the superior control of Cyrus himself. Some of the
soldiers of Menon becoming involved in a quarrel with those of
Klearchus, the latter examined into the case, pronounced one of
Menon’s soldiers to have misbehaved, and caused him to be flogged.
The comrades of the man thus punished resented the proceeding to such
a degree, that as Klearchus was riding away from the banks of the
river to his own tent, attended by a few followers only through the
encampment of Menon,—one of the soldiers who happened to be cutting
wood, flung the hatchet at him, while others hooted and began to pelt
him with stones. Klearchus, after escaping unhurt from this danger to
his own division, immediately ordered his soldiers to take arms and
put themselves in battle order. He himself advanced at the head of
his Thracian peltasts, and his forty horsemen, in hostile attitude
against Menon’s division; who on their side ran to arms, with Menon
himself at their head, and placed themselves in order of defence. A
slight accident might have now brought on irreparable disorder and
bloodshed, had not Proxenus, coming up at the moment with a company
of his hoplites, planted himself in military array between the two
disputing parties, and entreated Klearchus to desist from farther
assault. The latter at first refused. Indignant that his recent
insult and narrow escape from death should be treated so lightly,
he desired Proxenus to retire. His wrath was not appeased, until
Cyrus himself, apprised of the gravity of the danger, came galloping
up with his personal attendants and his two javelins in hand.
“Klearchus, Proxenus, and all you Greeks (said he), you know not what
you are doing. Be assured that if you now come to blows, it will be
the hour of my destruction,—and of your own also, shortly after me.
For if _your_ force be ruined, all these natives whom you see around,
will become more hostile to us even than the men now serving with the
King.” On hearing this (says Xenophon) Klearchus came to his senses,
and the troops dispersed without any encounter.[71]

  [71] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 11-17.

After passing Pylæ, the territory called Babylonia began. The hills
flanking the Euphrates, over which the army had hitherto been
passing, soon ceased, and low alluvial plains commenced.[72] Traces
were now discovered, the first throughout their long march, of a
hostile force moving in their front, ravaging the country and burning
the herbage. It was here that Cyrus detected the treason of a Persian
nobleman named Orontes, whom he examined in his tent, in the presence
of various Persians possessing his intimate confidence, as well as
of Klearchus with a guard of three thousand hoplites. Orontes was
examined, found guilty, and privately put to death.[73]

  [72] The commentators agree in thinking that we are to understand
  by Pylæ a sort of gate or pass, marking the spot where the desert
  country north of Babylonia—with its undulations of land, and
  its steep banks along the river—was exchanged for the flat and
  fertile alluvium constituting Babylonia proper. Perhaps there was
  a town near the pass, and named after it.

  Now it appears from Col. Chesney’s survey that this alteration
  in the nature of the country takes place a few miles below Hit.
  He observes—(Euphrates and Tigris, vol. i, p. 54)—“Three miles
  below Hit, the remains of aqueducts disappear, and the windings
  become shorter and more frequent, as the river flows through
  a tract of country almost level.” Thereabouts it is that I am
  inclined to place Pylæ.

  Colonel Chesney places it lower down, twenty-five miles from Hit.
  Professor Koch (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 44), lower down still.
  Mr. Ainsworth places it as much as seventy geographical miles
  lower than Hit (Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 81);
  compare Ritter, Erdkunde, West Asien, x. p. 16; xi, pp. 755-763.

  [73] The description given of this scene (known to the Greeks
  through the communications of Klearchus) by Xenophon, is
  extremely interesting (Anab. i, 6). I omit it from regard to
  space.

After three days’ march, estimated by Xenophon at twelve parasangs,
Cyrus was induced by the evidences before him, or by the reports
of deserters, to believe that the opposing army was close at hand,
and that a battle was impending. Accordingly, in the middle of the
night, he mustered his whole army, Greeks as well as barbarians;
but the enemy did not appear as had been expected. His numbers
were counted at this spot, and it was found that there were, of
Greeks ten thousand four hundred hoplites, and two thousand five
hundred peltasts; of the barbarian or Asiatic force of Cyrus, one
hundred thousand men with twenty scythed chariots. The numbers of
the Greeks had been somewhat diminished during the march, from
sickness, desertion, or other causes. The reports of deserters
described the army of Artaxerxes at one million two hundred thousand
men, besides the six thousand horse-guards commanded by Artagerses,
and two hundred scythed chariots, under the command of Abrokomas,
Tissaphernes, and two others. It was ascertained afterwards, however,
that the force of Abrokomas had not yet joined, and later accounts
represented the numerical estimation as too great by one-fourth.

In expectation of an action, Cyrus here convened the generals as
well as the Lochages (or captains) of the Greeks; as well to consult
about suitable arrangements, as to stimulate their zeal in his cause.
Few points in this narrative are more striking than the language
addressed by the Persian prince to the Greeks, on this as well as on
other occasions.

“It is not from want of native forces, men of Hellas, that I have
brought you hither, but because I account you better and braver than
any number of natives. Prove yourselves now worthy of the freedom
which you enjoy; that freedom for which I envy you, and which I would
choose, be assured, in preference to all my possessions a thousand
times multiplied. Learn now from me, who know it well, all that you
will have to encounter,—vast numbers and plenty of noise; but if
you despise these, I am ashamed to tell you what worthless stuff
you will find in these native men. Behave well,—like brave men,
and trust me for sending you back in such condition as to make your
friends at home envy you; though I hope to prevail on many of you to
prefer my service to your own homes.”

“Some of us are remarking, Cyrus, (said a Samian exile named
Gaulitês), that you are full of promises at this hour of danger, but
will forget them, or perhaps will be unable to perform them, when
danger is over.... As to ability, (replied Cyrus), my father’s empire
reaches northward to the region of intolerable cold, southward to
that of intolerable heat. All in the middle is now apportioned in
satrapies among my brother’s friends; all, if we are victorious,
will come to be distributed among mine. I have no fear of not having
enough to give away, but rather of not having friends enough to
receive it from me. To each of you Greeks, moreover, I shall present
a wreath of gold.”

Declarations like these, repeated by Cyrus to many of the Greek
soldiers, and circulated among the remainder, filled all of them with
confidence and enthusiasm in his cause. Such was the sense of force
and superiority inspired, that Klearchus asked him,—“Do you really
think, Cyrus, that your brother will fight you?... Yes, by Zeus, (was
the reply); assuredly, if he be the son of Darius and Parysatis, and
my brother, I shall not win this prize without a battle.” All the
Greeks were earnest with him at the same time not to expose his own
person, but to take post in the rear of their body.[74] We shall see
presently how this advice was followed.

  [74] Xen. Anab. i, 7, 2-9.

The declarations here reported, as well as the expressions employed
before during the dispute between Klearchus and the soldiers of
Menon near Charmandê—being, as they are, genuine and authentic, and
not dramatic composition such as those of Æschylus in the Persæ,
nor historic amplification like the speeches ascribed to Xerxes in
Herodotus,—are among the most valuable evidences respecting the
Hellenic character generally. It is not merely the superior courage
and military discipline of the Greeks which Cyrus attests, compared
with the cowardice of Asiatics,—but also their fidelity and sense
of obligation which he contrasts with the time-serving treachery
of the latter;[75] connecting these superior qualities with the
political freedom which they enjoy. To hear this young prince
expressing such strong admiration and envy for Grecian freedom, and
such ardent personal preference for it above all the splendor of his
own position,—was doubtless the most flattering of all compliments
which he could pay to the listening citizen-soldiers. That a young
Persian prince should be capable of conceiving such a sentiment, is
no slight proof of his mental elevation above the level both of his
family and of his nation. The natural Persian opinion is expressed
by the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus[76] in Herodotus.
To Xerxes, the conception of free citizenship,—and of orderly,
self-sufficing courage planted by a public discipline, patriotic as
well as equalizing,—was not merely repugnant, but incomprehensible.
He understood only a master issuing orders to obedient subjects, and
stimulating soldiers to bravery by means of the whip. His descendant
Cyrus, on the contrary, had learnt by personal observation to
enter into the feeling of personal dignity prevalent in the Greeks
around him, based as it was on the conviction that they governed
themselves and that there was no man who had any rights of his
own over them,—that the law was their only master, and that in
rendering obedience to it they were working for no one else but for
themselves.[77] Cyrus knew where to touch the sentiment of Hellenic
honor, so fatally extinguished after the Greeks lost their political
freedom by the hands of the Macedonians, and exchanged for that
intellectual quickness, combined with moral degeneracy, which Cicero
and his contemporaries remark as the characteristic of these once
high-toned communities.

  [75] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 16.

  [76] See Herodot. vii, 102, 103, 209. Compare the observations of
  the Persian Achæmenês, c. 236.

  [77] Herod. vii, 104. Demaratus says to Xerxes, respecting the
  Lacedæmonians—Ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ ἐόντες, οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροί εἰσι·
  ἔπεστι γάρ σφι δεσπότης, νόμος, τὸν ὑποδειμαίνουσι πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ
  οἱ σοὶ σέ.

  Again, the historian observes about the Athenians, and their
  extraordinary increase of prowess after having shaken off the
  despotism of Hippias (v. 78)—Δηλοῖ δ᾽ οὐ καθ᾽ ἓν μόνον ἀλλὰ
  πανταχοῦ, ἡ ἰσηγορίη ὥς ἐστι χρῆμα σπουδαῖον· εἰ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι
  τυραννευόμενοι μὲν, οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφέας περιοικεόντων ἦσαν τὰ
  πολέμια ἀμείνους, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων, μακρῷ πρῶτοι
  ἐγένοντο. Δηλοῖ ὦν ταῦτα, ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν ἐθελοκακεέον, ὡς
  δεσπότῃ ἐργαζόμενοι· ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ, αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἑωϋτῷ
  προθυμέετο ἐργάζεσθαι.

  Compare Menander, Fragm. Incert. CL. ap. Meineke, Fragm. Comm.
  Græc. vol. iv. p. 268—

    Ἐλεύθερος πᾶς ἑνὶ δεδούλωται, νόμῳ·
    Δυσὶν δὲ δοῦλος, καὶ νόμῳ καὶ δεσπότῃ.

Having concerted the order of battle with the generals, Cyrus
marched forward in cautious array during the next day, anticipating
the appearance of the king’s forces. Nothing of the kind was seen,
however, though abundant marks of their retiring footsteps were
evident. The day’s march, (called three parasangs) having been
concluded without a battle, Cyrus called to him the Ambrakiotic
prophet Silanus, and presented him with three thousand darics or
ten Attic talents. Silanus had assured him, on the eleventh day
preceding, that there would be no action in ten days from that time;
upon which Cyrus had told him,—“If your prophecy comes true, I will
give you three thousand darics. My brother will not fight at all, if
he does not fight within ten days.”[78]

  [78] Xen. Anab. i, 7, 14-17.

In spite of the strong opinion which he had expressed in reply to
Klearchus, Cyrus now really began to conceive that no battle would
be hazarded by his enemies; especially as in the course of this last
day’s march, he came to a broad and deep trench (thirty feet broad
and eighteen feet deep), approaching so near to the Euphrates as to
leave an interval of only twenty feet for passage. This trench had
been dug by order of Artaxerxes across the plain, for a length said
to be of twelve parasangs (about forty-two English miles, if the
parasang be reckoned at thirty stadia), so as to touch at its other
extremity what was called the walls of Media.[79] It had been dug
as a special measure of defence against the approaching invaders.
Yet we hear with surprise, and the invaders themselves found with
equal surprise, that not a man was on the spot to defend it; so
that the whole Cyreian army and baggage passed without resistance
through the narrow breadth of twenty feet. This is the first notice
of any defensive measures taken to repel the invasion,—except the
precaution of Abrokomas in burning the boats at Thapsakus. Cyrus
had been allowed to traverse all this immense space, and to pass
through so many defensible positions, without having yet struck a
blow. And now Artaxerxes, after having cut a prodigious extent of
trench at the cost of so much labor,—provided a valuable means of
resistance, especially against Grecian heavy-armed soldiers,—and
occupied it seemingly until the very last moment,—throws it up from
some unaccountable panic, and suffers a whole army to pass unopposed
through this very narrow gut. Having surmounted unexpectedly so
formidable an obstacle, Cyrus as well as the Greeks imagined that
Artaxerxes would never think of fighting in the open plain. All began
to relax in that careful array which had been observed since the
midnight review, insomuch that he himself proceeded in his chariot
instead of on horseback, while many of the Greek soldiers lodged
their arms on the waggons or beasts of burden.[80]

  [79] From Pylæ to the undefended trench, there intervened three
  entire days of march, and one part of a day; for it occurred in
  the fourth day’s march.

  Xenophon calls the three entire days, twelve parasangs in all.
  This argues short marches, not full marches. And it does not
  seem that the space of ground traversed during any one of them
  can have been considerable. For they were all undertaken with
  visible evidences of an enemy immediately in front of them; which
  circumstance was the occasion of the treason of Orontes, who
  asked Cyrus for a body of cavalry, under pretence of attacking
  the light troops of the enemy in front, and then wrote a letter
  to inform Artaxerxes that he was about to desert with his
  division. The letter was delivered to Cyrus, who thus discovered
  the treason.

  Marching with a known enemy not far off in front, Cyrus must
  have kept his army in something like battle order, and therefore
  must have moved slowly. Moreover the discovery of the treason of
  Orontes must itself have been an alarming fact, well calculated
  to render both Cyrus and Klearchus doubly cautious for the time.
  And the very trial of Orontes appears to have been conducted
  under such solemnities as must have occasioned a halt of the army.

  Taking these circumstances, we can hardly suppose the Greeks
  to have got over so much as thirty English miles of ground in
  the three entire days of march. The fourth day they must have
  got over very little ground indeed; not merely because Cyrus
  was in momentary expectation of the King’s main army, and of
  a general battle (i, 7, 14), but because of the great delay
  necessary for passing the trench. His whole army (more than one
  hundred thousand men), with baggage, chariots, etc., had to pass
  through the narrow gut of twenty feet wide between the trench
  and the Euphrates. He can hardly have made more than five miles
  in this whole day’s march, getting at night so far as to encamp
  two or three miles beyond the trench. We may therefore reckon
  the distance marched over between Pylæ and the trench as about
  thirty-two miles in all; and two or three miles farther to the
  encampment of the next night. Probably Cyrus would keep near the
  river, yet not following its bends with absolute precision; so
  that in estimating distance, we ought to take a mean between the
  straight line and the full windings of the river.

  I conceive the trench to have cut the Wall of Media at a much
  wider angle than appears in Col. Chesney’s map; so that the
  triangular space included between the trench, the Wall, and the
  river, was much more extensive. The reason, we may presume,
  why the trench was cut, was, to defend that portion of the
  well-cultivated and watered country of Babylonia which lay
  outside of the Wall of Media—which portion (as we shall see
  hereafter in the marches of the Greeks after the battle) was very
  considerable.

  [80] Xen. Anab. i, 7, 20. The account given by Xenophon of this
  long line of trench, first dug by order of Artaxerxes, and then
  left useless and undefended, differs from the narrative of
  Diodorus (xiv, 22), which seems to be borrowed from Ephorus.
  Diodorus says that the king caused a long trench to be dug, and
  lined with carriages and waggons as a defence for his baggage;
  and that he afterwards marched forth from this entrenchment, with
  his soldiers free and unincumbered, to give battle to Cyrus. This
  is a statement more plausible than that of Xenophon, in this
  point of view, that it makes out the king to have acted upon a
  rational scheme; whereas in Xenophon he appears at first to have
  adopted a plan of defence, and then to have renounced it, after
  immense labor and cost, without any reason, so far as we can see.
  Yet I have no doubt that the account of Xenophon is the true one.
  The narrow passage, and the undefended trench, were both facts of
  the most obvious and impressive character to an observing soldier.

On the next day but one after passing the undefended trench, they
were surprised, at a spot called Kunaxa,[81] just when they were
about to halt for the mid-day meal and repose, by the sudden
intimation that the king’s army was approaching in order of battle
on the open plain. Instantly Cyrus hastened to mount on horseback,
to arm himself, and to put his forces in order, while the Greeks on
their side halted and formed their line with all possible speed.[82]
They were on the right wing of the army, adjoining the river
Euphrates; Ariæus with the Asiatic forces being on the left, and
Cyrus himself, surrounded by a body-guard of six hundred well-armed
Persian horsemen, in the centre. Among the Greeks, Klearchus
commanded the right division of hoplites, with Paphlagonian horsemen
and the Grecian peltasts on the extreme right, close to the river;
Proxenus with his division stood next; Menon commanded on the left.
All the Persian horsemen around Cyrus had breastplates, helmets,
short Grecian swords, and two javelins in their right hands; the
horses also were defended by facings both over the breast and head.
Cyrus himself, armed generally like the rest, stood distinguished
by having an upright tiara instead of the helmet. Though the first
news had come upon them by surprise, the Cyreians had ample time
to put themselves in complete order; for the enemy did not appear
until the afternoon was advanced. First, was seen dust, like a white
cloud,—next, an undefined dark spot, gradually nearing, until the
armor began to shine, and the component divisions of troops, arranged
in dense masses, became discernible. Tissaphernes was on the left,
opposite to the Greeks, at the head of the Persian horsemen, with
white cuirasses; on his right, stood the Persian bowmen, with their
gerrha, or wicker shields, spiked so as to be fastened in the ground
while arrows were shot from behind them; next, the Egyptian infantry
with long wooden shields covering the whole body and legs. In front
of all was a row of chariots with scythes attached to the wheels,
destined to begin the charge against the Grecian phalanx.[83]

  [81] Xenophon does not mention the name Kunaxa, which comes to
  us from Plutarch (Artaxerx. c. 8), who states that it was five
  hundred stadia (about fifty-eight miles) from Babylon; while
  Xenophon was informed that the field of battle was distant from
  Babylon only three hundred and sixty stadia. Now, according to
  Colonel Chesney (Euphrates and Tigris, vol. i, p. 57), Hillah
  (Babylon) is distant ninety-one miles by the river, or sixty-one
  and a half miles direct, from Felujah. Following therefore the
  distance given by Plutarch (probably copied from Ktesias), we
  should place Kunaxa a little lower down the river than Felujah.
  This seems the most probable supposition.

  Rennell and Mr. Baillie Fraser so place it (Mesopotamia and
  Assyria, p. 186, Edin. 1842), I think rightly; moreover the
  latter remarks, what most of the commentators overlook, that the
  Greeks did not pass through the Wall of Media until long after
  the battle. See a note a little below, near the beginning of my
  next chapter, in reference to that Wall.

  [82] The distance of the undefended trench from the battle-field
  of Kunaxa would be about twenty-two miles. First, three miles
  beyond the trench, to the first night-station; next, a full day’s
  march, say twelve miles; thirdly, a half day’s march, to the time
  of the mid-day halt, say seven miles.

  The distance from Pylæ to the trench having before been stated at
  thirty-two miles, the whole distance from Pylæ to Kunaxa will be
  about fifty-four miles.

  Now Colonel Chesney has stated the distance from Hit to Felujah
  Castle (two known points) at forty-eight miles of straight line,
  and seventy-seven miles, if following the line of the river.
  Deduct four miles for the distance from Hit to Pylæ, and we shall
  then have between Pylæ and Felujah, a rectilinear distance of
  forty-four miles. The marching route of the Greeks (as explained
  in the previous note, the Greeks following generally, but not
  exactly, the windings of the river) will give fifty miles from
  Pylæ to Felujah, and fifty-three or fifty-four from Pylæ to
  Kunaxa.

  [83] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 8-11.

As the Greeks were completing their array, Cyrus rode to the front,
and desired Klearchus to make his attack with the Greeks upon the
centre of the enemy; since it was there that the king in person would
be posted, and if that were once beaten, the victory was gained. But
such was the superiority of Artaxerxes in numbers, that his centre
extended beyond the left of Cyrus. Accordingly Klearchus, afraid of
withdrawing his right from the river, lest he should be taken both in
flank and rear, chose to keep his position on the right,—and merely
replied to Cyrus, that he would manage everything for the best. I
have before remarked[84] how often the fear of being attacked on the
unshielded side and on the rear, led the Greek soldier into movements
inconsistent with military expediency; and it will be seen presently
that Klearchus, blindly obeying this habitual rule of precaution,
was induced here to commit the capital mistake of keeping on the
right flank, contrary to the more judicious direction of Cyrus.[85]
The latter continued for a short time riding slowly in front of the
lines, looking alternately at the two armies, when Xenophon, one of
the small total of Grecian horsemen, and attached to the division of
Proxenus, rode forth from the line to accost him, asking if he had
any orders to give. Cyrus desired him to proclaim to every one that
the sacrifices were favorable. Hearing a murmur going through the
Grecian ranks, he inquired from Xenophon what it was; and received
for answer, that the watchword was now being passed along for the
second time. He asked, with some surprise, who gave the watchword?
and what it was? Xenophon replied that it was “Zeus the Preserver,
and Victory.”—“I accept it,” replied Cyrus; “let that be the word;”
and immediately rode away to his own post in the centre, among the
Asiatics.

  [84] Thucyd. v. 70. See Vol. VII, ch. lvi, p. 84 of this History.

  [85] Plutarch (Artaxerx. c. 8) makes this criticism upon
  Klearchus; and it seems quite just.

The vast host of Artaxerxes, advancing steadily and without noise,
were now within less than half a mile of the Cyreians, when the
Greek troops raised the pæan or usual war-cry, and began to move
forward. As they advanced, the shout became more vehement, the pace
accelerated, and at last the whole body got into a run.[86] This
might have proved unfortunate, had their opponents been other than
Grecian hoplites; but the Persians did not stand to await the charge.
They turned and fled, when the assailants were yet hardly within
bow-shot. Such was their panic, that even the drivers of the scythed
chariots in front, deserting their teams, ran away along with the
rest; while the horses, left to themselves, rushed apart in all
directions, some turning round to follow the fugitives, others coming
against the advancing Greeks, who made open order to let them pass.
The left division of the king’s army was thus routed without a blow,
and seemingly without a man killed on either side; one Greek only
being wounded by an arrow, and another by not getting out of the way
of one of the chariots.[87] Tissaphernes alone,—who, with the body
of horse immediately around him, was at the extreme Persian left,
close to the river,—formed an exception to this universal flight.
He charged and penetrated through the Grecian peltasts, who stood
opposite to him between the hoplites and the river. These peltasts,
commanded by Episthenes of Amphipolis, opened their ranks to let him
pass, darting at the men as they rode by, yet without losing any
one themselves. Tissaphernes thus got into the rear of the Greeks,
who continued, on their side, to pursue the flying Persians before
them.[88]

  [86] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 17; Diodor. xiv, 23.

  [87] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 17-20.

  [88] Xen. Anab i, 10, 4-8.

Matters proceeded differently in the other parts of the field.
Artaxerxes, though in the centre of his own army, yet from his
superior numbers outflanked Ariæus, who commanded the extreme left of
the Cyreians.[89] Finding no one directly opposed to him, he began to
wheel round his right wing, to encompass his enemies; not noticing
the flight of his left division. Cyrus, on the other hand, when he
saw the easy victory of the Greeks on their side, was overjoyed;
and received from every one around him salutations, as if he were
already king. Nevertheless, he had self-command enough not yet to
rush forward as if the victory was already gained,[90] but remained
unmoved, with his regiment of six hundred horse around him, watching
the movements of Artaxerxes. As soon as he saw the latter wheeling
round his right division to get upon the rear of the Cyreians, he
hastened to check this movement by an impetuous charge upon the
centre, where Artaxerxes was in person, surrounded by the body-guard
of six thousand horse, under Artagerses. So vigorous was the attack
of Cyrus, that with his six hundred horse, he broke and dispersed
this body-guard, killing Artagerses with his own hand. His own six
hundred horse rushed forward in pursuit of the fugitives, leaving
Cyrus himself nearly alone, with only the select few, called his
“Table-Companions,” around him. It was under these circumstances
that he first saw his brother Artaxerxes, whose person had been
exposed to view by the flight of the body-guards. The sight filled
him with such a paroxysm of rage and jealous ambition,[91] that
he lost all thought of safety or prudence,—cried out, “I see the
man,”—and rushed forward with his mere handful of companions to
attack Artaxerxes, in spite of the numerous host behind him. Cyrus
made directly at his brother, darting his javelin with so true an aim
as to strike him in the breast, and wound him through the cuirass;
though the wound (afterwards cured by the Greek surgeon Ktesias)
could not have been very severe, since Artaxerxes did not quit the
field, but, on the contrary, engaged in personal combat, he and those
around him, against this handful of assailants. So unequal a combat
did not last long. Cyrus, being severely wounded under the eye by the
javelin of a Karian soldier, was cast from his horse and slain. The
small number of faithful companions around him all perished in his
defence. Artasyras, who stood first among them in his confidence and
attachment, seeing him mortally wounded and fallen, cast himself down
upon him, clasped him in his arms, and in this position either slew
himself, or was slain by order of the king.[92]

  [89] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 23; i, 9, 31.

  [90] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 21.

  Κῦρος δὲ, ὁρῶν τοὺς Ἕλληνας νικῶντας τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς καὶ
  διώκοντας, ἡδόμενος καὶ προσκυνούμενος ἤδη ὡς βασιλεὺς ὑπὸ τῶν
  ἀμφ᾽ αὐτὸν, ~οὐδ᾽ ὣς ἐξήχθη διώκειν~, etc.

  The last words are remarkable, as indicating that no other
  stimulus except that of ambitious rivalry and fraternal
  antipathy, had force enough to overthrow the self-command of
  Cyrus.

  [91] Compare the account of the transport of rage which seized
  the Theban Pelopidas, when he saw Alexander the despot of Pheræ
  in the opposite army; which led to the same fatal consequences
  (Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 32; Cornel. Nepos, Pelop. c. 5). See
  also the reflections of Xenophon on the conduct of Teleutas
  before Olynthus.—Hellenic. v. 3, 7.

  [92] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 22-29. The account of this battle and of
  the death of Cyrus by Ktesias (as far as we can make it out from
  the brief abstract in Photius—Ktesias, Fragm. c. 58, 59, ed.
  Bähr) does not differ materially from Xenophon. Ktesias mentions
  the Karian soldier (not noticed by Xenophon) who hurled the
  javelin; and adds that this soldier was afterwards tortured and
  put to death by Queen Parysatis, in savage revenge for the death
  of Cyrus. He also informs us that Bagapatês, the person who by
  order of Artaxerxes cut off the head and hand of Cyrus, was
  destroyed by her in the same way.

  Diodorus (xiv, 23) dresses up a much fuller picture of the
  conflict between Cyrus and his brother, which differs on many
  points, partly direct and partly implied, from Xenophon.

  Plutarch (Artaxerxes, c. 11, 12, 13) gives an account of the
  battle, and of the death of Cyrus, which he professes to have
  derived from Ktesias, but which differs still more materially
  from the narrative in Xenophon. Compare also the few words of
  Justin, v, 11.

  Diodorus (xiv, 24) says that twelve thousand men were slain of
  the king’s army at Kunaxa; the greater part of them by the Greeks
  under Klearchus, who did not lose a single man. He estimates the
  loss of Cyrus’s Asiatic army at three thousand men. But as the
  Greeks did not lose a man, so they can hardly have killed many
  in the pursuit; for they had scarcely any cavalry, and no great
  number of peltasts,—while hoplites could not have overtaken the
  flying Persians.

The head and the right hand of the deceased prince were immediately
cut off by order of Artaxerxes, and doubtless exhibited conspicuously
to view. This was a proclamation to every one that the entire contest
was at an end; and so it was understood by Ariæus, who, together
with all the Asiatic troops of Cyrus, deserted the field and fled
back to the camp. Not even there did they defend themselves, when
the king and his forces pursued them; but fled yet farther back to
the resting-place of the previous night. The troops of Artaxerxes
got into the camp and began to plunder it without resistance. Even
the harem of Cyrus fell into their power. It included two Grecian
women,—of free condition, good family, and education,—one from
Phokæa, the other from Miletus, brought to him, by force, from their
parents to Sardis. The elder of these two, the Phokæan, named Milto,
distinguished alike for beauty and accomplished intelligence,
was made prisoner and transferred to the harem of Artaxerxes;
the other, a younger person, found means to save herself, though
without her upper garments,[93] and sought shelter among some
Greeks who were left in the camp on guard of the Grecian baggage.
These Greeks repelled the Persian assailants with considerable
slaughter; preserving their own baggage, as well as the persons
of all who fled to them for shelter. But the Asiatic camp of the
Cyreians was completely pillaged, not excepting those reserved
waggons of provisions which Cyrus had provided in order that his
Grecian auxiliaries might be certain, under all circumstances, of a
supply.[94]

  [93] Xen. Anab. i, 10, 3. The accomplishments and fascinations
  of this Phokæan lady, and the great esteem in which she was
  held first by Cyrus and afterwards by Artaxerxes, have been
  exaggerated into a romantic story, in which we cannot tell
  what may be the proportion of truth (see Ælian, V. H. xii, 1;
  Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 26, 27; Justin, x, 2). Both Plutarch
  and Justin state that the subsequent enmity between Artaxerxes
  and his son Darius, which led to the conspiracy of the latter
  against his father, and to his destruction when the conspiracy
  was discovered, arose out of the passion of Darius for her. But
  as that transaction certainly happened at the close of the long
  life and reign of Artaxerxes, who reigned forty-six years—and
  as she must have been then sixty years old, if not more—we may
  fairly presume that the cause of the family tragedy must have
  been something different.

  Compare the description of the fate of Berenikê of Chios, and
  Monimê of Miletus, wives of Mithridates king of Pontus, during
  the last misfortunes of that prince (Plutarch, Lucullus, c. 18).

  [94] Xen. Anab. i, 10, 17. This provision must probably have been
  made during the recent halt at Pylæ.

While Artaxerxes was thus stripping the Cyreian camp, he was
joined by Tissaphernes and his division of horse, who had charged
through between the Grecian division and the river. At this time,
there was a distance of no less than thirty stadia or three and a
half miles between him and Klearchus with the Grecian division;
so far had the latter advanced forward in pursuit of the Persian
fugitives. Apprised, after some time, that the king’s troops had
been victorious on the left and centre, and were masters of the
camp,—but not yet knowing of the death of Cyrus,—Klearchus
marched back his troops, and met the enemy’s forces also returning.
He was apprehensive of being surrounded by superior numbers, and
therefore took post with his rear upon the river. In this position,
Artaxerxes again marshalled his troops in front, as if to attack
him, but the Greeks, anticipating his movement, were first in making
the attack themselves, and forced the Persians to take flight even
more terror-stricken than before. Klearchus, thus relieved from all
enemies, waited awhile in hopes of hearing news of Cyrus. He then
returned to the camp, which was found stripped of all its stores;
so that the Greeks were compelled to pass the night without supper,
while most of them also had had no dinner, from the early hour at
which the battle had commenced.[95] It was only on the next morning
that they learnt, through Proklês (descendant of the Spartan king
Demaratus, formerly companion of Xerxes in the invasion of Greece),
that Cyrus had been slain; news which converted their satisfaction at
their own triumph into sorrow and dismay.[96]

  [95] Xen. Anab. i, 10, 18, 19.

  [96] Xen. Anab. ii. 1, 3, 4.

Thus terminated the battle of Kunaxa, and along with it the ambitious
hopes as well as the life of this young prince. His character and
proceedings suggest instructive remarks. Both in the conduct of
this expedition, and in the two or three years of administration
in Asia Minor which preceded it, he displayed qualities such as
are not seen in Cyrus called the Great, nor in any other member of
the Persian regal family, nor indeed in any other Persian general
throughout the history of the monarchy. We observe a large and
long-sighted combination,—a power of foreseeing difficulties, and
providing means beforehand for overcoming them,—a dexterity in
meeting variable exigencies, and dealing with different parties,
Greeks or Asiatics, officers or soldiers,—a conviction of the
necessity, not merely of purchasing men’s service by lavish presents,
but of acquiring their confidence by straightforward dealing and
systematic good faith,—a power of repressing displeasure when policy
commanded, as at the desertion of Xenias and Pasion, and the first
conspiracies of Orontes; although usually the punishments which he
inflicted were full of Oriental barbarity. How rare were the merits
and accomplishments of Cyrus, as a Persian, will be best felt when
we contrast this portrait, by Xenophon, with the description of
the Persian satraps by Isokrates.[97] That many persons deserted
from Artaxerxes to Cyrus,—none, except Orontes, from Cyrus to
Artaxerxes,—has been remarked by Xenophon. Not merely throughout
the march, but even as to the manner of fighting at Kunaxa, the
judgment of Cyrus was sounder than that of Klearchus. The two matters
of supreme importance to the Greeks, were, to take care of the
person of Cyrus, and to strike straight at that of Artaxerxes with
the central division around him. Now it was the fault of Klearchus,
and not of Cyrus, that both these matters were omitted; and that
the Greeks gained only a victory comparatively insignificant on
the right. Yet in spite of such mistake, not his own, it appears
that Cyrus would have been victorious, had he been able to repress
that passionate burst of antipathy which drove him, like a madman,
against his brother. The same insatiable ambition, and jealous
fierceness when power was concerned, which had before led him to put
to death two first cousins, because they omitted, in his presence,
an act of deference never paid except to the king in person,—this
same impulse, exasperated by the actual sight of his rival brother,
and by that standing force of fraternal antipathy so frequent in
regal families,[98] blinded him, for the moment, to all rational
calculation.

  [97] Isokrates, Orat. iv, (Panegyric.) s. 175-182; a striking
  passage, as describing the way in which political institutions
  work themselves into the individual character and habits.

  [98] Diodorus (xiv, 23) notices the legendary pair of hostile
  brothers, Eteokles and Polyneikes, as a parallel. Compare
  Tacitus, Annal. iv, 60. “Atrox Drusi ingenium, super cupidinem
  potentiæ, et _solita fratribus odia_, accendebatur invidia, quod
  mater Agrippina promptior Neroni erat,” etc.; and Justin, xlii, 4.

  Compare also the interesting narrative of M. Prosper Mérimée, in
  his life of Don Pedro of Castile; a prince commonly known by the
  name of Peter the Cruel. Don Pedro was dethroned, and slain in
  personal conflict, by the hand of his bastard brother, Henri of
  Transtamare.

  At the battle of Navarrete, in 1367, says M. Mérimée, “Don Pèdre,
  qui, pendant le combat, s’était jété au plus fort de la mêlée,
  s’acharna long temps à la poursuite des fuyards. On le voyait
  galoper dans la plaine, monté sur un cheval noir, sa bannière
  armoriée de Castille devant lui, cherchant son frère partout où
  l’on combattait encore, et criant, échauffé par le carnage—‘Où
  est ce bâtard, qui se nomme roi de Castille?’” (Histoire de Don
  Pèdre, p. 504.)

  Ultimately Don Pedro, blocked up and almost starved out in the
  castle of Montiel, was entrapped by simulated negotiations into
  the power of his enemies. He was slain in personal conflict by
  the dagger of his brother Henri, after a desperate struggle,
  in which he seemed likely to prevail, if Henri had not been
  partially aided by a bystander.

  This tragical scene (on the night of the 23d of March, 1369) is
  graphically described by M. Mérimée (p. 564-566).

We may however remark that Hellas, as a whole, had no cause to regret
the fall of Cyrus at Kunaxa. Had he dethroned his brother and become
king, the Persian empire would have acquired under his hand such a
degree of strength as might probably have enabled him to forestall
the work afterwards performed by the Macedonian kings, and to make
the Greeks in Europe as well as those in Asia his dependents. He
would have employed Grecian military organization against Grecian
independence, as Philip and Alexander did after him. His money
would have enabled him to hire an overwhelming force of Grecian
officers and soldiers, who would (to use the expression of Proxenus
as recorded by Xenophon[99]) have thought him a better friend to
them than their own country. It would have enabled him also to take
advantage of dissension and venality in the interior of each Grecian
city, and thus to weaken their means of defence while he strengthened
his own means of attack. This was a policy which none of the Persian
kings, from Darius son of Hystaspes down to Darius Codomanus, had
ability or perseverance enough to follow out; none of them knew
either the true value of Grecian instruments, or how to employ
them with effect. The whole conduct of Cyrus, in reference to this
memorable expedition, manifests a superior intelligence, competent
to use the resources which victory would have put in his hands,—and
an ambition likely to use them against the Greeks, in avenging the
humiliations of Marathon, Salamis, and the peace of Kallias.

  [99] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4. Ὑπισχνεῖτο δὲ αὐτῷ (Ξενοφῶντα
  Πρόξενος) εἰ ἔλθοι, φίλον Κύρῳ ποιήσειν· ~ὃν αὐτός ἔφη κρείττω
  ἑαυτῷ νομίζειν τῆς πατρίδος~.




CHAPTER LXX.

RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.


The first triumphant feeling of the Greek troops at Kunaxa was
exchanged, as soon as they learnt the death of Cyrus, for dismay
and sorrow; accompanied by unavailing repentance for the venture
into which he and Klearchus had seduced them. Probably Klearchus
himself too repented, and with good reason, of having displayed,
in his manner of fighting the battle, so little foresight, and so
little regard either to the injunctions or to the safety of Cyrus.
Nevertheless he still maintained the tone of a victor in the field,
and after expressions of grief for the fate of the young prince,
desired Proklês and Glus to return to Ariæus, with the reply, that
the Greeks on their side were conquerors without any enemy remaining;
that they were about to march onward against Artaxerxes; and that if
Ariæus would join them, they would place him on the throne which had
been intended for Cyrus. While this reply was conveyed to Ariæus by
his particular friend Menon along with the messengers, the Greeks
procured a meal as well as they could, having no bread, by killing
some of the baggage animals; and by kindling fire, to cook their
meat, from the arrows, the wooden Egyptian shields which had been
thrown away on the field, and the baggage carts.[100]

  [100] Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 5-7.

Before any answer could be received from Ariæus, heralds appeared
coming from Artaxerxes; among them being Phalinus, a Greek from
Zakynthus, and the Greek surgeon Ktesias of Knidus, who was in the
service of the Persian king.[101] Phalinus, an officer of some
military experience and in the confidence of Tissaphernes, addressed
himself to the Greek commanders; requiring them on the part of the
king, since he was now victor and had slain Cyrus, to surrender their
arms and appeal to his mercy. To this summons, painful in the extreme
to a Grecian ear, Klearchus replied that it was not the practice for
victorious men to lay down their arms. Being then called away to
examine the sacrifice which was going on, he left the interview to
the other officers, who met the summons of Phalinus by an emphatic
negative. “If the king thinks himself strong enough to ask for our
arms unconditionally, let him come and try to seize them.” “The
king (rejoined Phalinus) thinks that you are in his power, being
in the midst of his territory, hemmed in by impassable rivers, and
encompassed by his innumerable subjects.”—“Our arms and our valor
are all that remain to us (replied a young Athenian); we shall not
be fools enough to hand over to you our only remaining treasure, but
shall employ them still to have a fight for your treasure.”[102] But
though several spoke in this resolute tone, there were not wanting
others disposed to encourage a negotiation; saying that they had been
faithful to Cyrus as long as he lived, and would now be faithful to
Artaxerxes, if he wanted their services in Egypt or anywhere else.
In the midst of this parley Klearchus returned, and was requested
by Phalinus to return a final answer on behalf of all. He at first
asked the advice of Phalinus himself; appealing to the common
feeling of Hellenic patriotism, and anticipating, with very little
judgment, that the latter would encourage the Greeks in holding out.
“If (replied Phalinus) I saw one chance out of ten thousand in your
favor, in the event of a contest with the king, I should advise you
to refuse the surrender of your arms. But as there is no chance
of safety for you against the king’s consent, I recommend you to
look out for safety in the only quarter where it presents itself.”
Sensible of the mistake which he had made in asking the question,
Klearchus rejoined,—“That is _your_ opinion; now report our
answer: We think we shall be better friends to the king, if we are
to be his friends,—or more effective enemies, if we are to be his
enemies,—with our arms, than without them.” Phalinus, in retiring,
said that the king proclaimed a truce so long as they remained in
their present position,—but war, if they moved, either onward or
backward. And to this Klearchus acceded, without declaring which he
intended to do.[103]

  [101] We know from Plutarch (Artaxer. c. 13) that Ktesias
  distinctly asserted himself to have been present at this
  interview, and I see no reason why we should not believe him.
  Plutarch indeed rejects his testimony as false, affirming that
  Xenophon would certainly have mentioned him, had he been there;
  but such an objection seems to me insufficient. Nor is it
  necessary to construe the words of Xenophon, ἦν δ᾽ αὐτῶν Φαλῖνος
  ~εἶς Ἕλλην~, (ii, 1, 7) so strictly as to negative the presence
  of one or two other Greeks. Phalinus is thus specified because he
  was the spokesman of the party—a military man.

  [102] Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 12 μὴ οὖν οἴου τὰ μόνα ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα
  ὑμῖν παραδώσειν· ἀλλὰ σὺν τούτοις καὶ περὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων ἀγαθῶν
  μαχούμεθα.

  [103] Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 14-22. Diodorus (xiv, 25) is somewhat
  copious in his account of the interview with Phalinus. But he
  certainly followed other authorities besides Xenophon, if even it
  be true that he had Xenophon before him. The allusion to the past
  heroism of Leonidas seems rather in the style of Ephorus.

Shortly after the departure of Phalinus, the envoys despatched to
Ariæus returned; communicating his reply, that the Persian grandees
would never tolerate any pretensions on his part to the crown, and
that he intended to depart early the next morning on his return; if
the Greeks wished to accompany him, they must join him during the
night. In the evening, Klearchus, convening the generals and the
lochages (or captains of lochi), acquainted them that the morning
sacrifice had been of a nature to forbid their marching against
the king,—a prohibition of which he now understood the reason,
from having since learnt that the king was on the other side of
the Tigris, and therefore out of their reach,—but that it was
favorable for rejoining Ariæus. He gave directions accordingly for a
night-march back along the Euphrates, to the station where they had
passed the last night but one prior to the battle. The other Grecian
generals, without any formal choice of Klearchus as chief, tacitly
acquiesced in his orders, from a sense of his superior decision and
experience, in an emergency when no one knew what to propose. The
night-march was successfully accomplished, so that they joined Ariæus
at the preceding station about midnight; not without the alarming
symptom, however, that Miltokythês the Thracian deserted to the king,
at the head of three hundred and forty of his countrymen, partly
horse, partly foot.

The first proceeding of the Grecian generals was to exchange solemn
oaths of reciprocal fidelity and fraternity with Ariæus. According
to an ancient and impressive practice, a bull, a wolf, a boar, and a
ram, were all slain, and their blood allowed to run into the hollow
of a shield; in which the Greek generals dipped a sword, and Ariæus,
with his chief companions, a spear.[104] The latter, besides the
promise of alliance, engaged also to guide the Greeks, in good faith,
down to the Asiatic coast. Klearchus immediately began to ask what
route he proposed to take; whether to return by that along which they
had come up, or by any other. To this Ariæus replied, that the road
along which they had marched was impracticable for retreat, from the
utter want of provisions through seventeen days of desert; but that
he intended to choose another road, which, though longer, would be
sufficiently productive to furnish them with provisions. There was,
however, a necessity (he added), that the first two or three days’
marches should be of extreme length, in order that they might get
out of the reach of the king’s forces, who would hardly be able to
overtake them afterwards with any considerable numbers.

  [104] Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 7-9. Koch remarks, however, with good
  reason, that it is difficult to see how they could get a wolf in
  Babylonia, for the sacrifice (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 51).

They had now come ninety-three days’ march[105] from Ephesus, or
ninety from Sardis.[106] The distance from Sardis to Kunaxa is,
according to Colonel Chesney, about twelve hundred and sixty-five
geographical miles, or fourteen hundred and sixty-four English miles.
There had been at least ninety-six days of rest, enjoyed at various
places, so that the total of time elapsed must have at least been one
hundred and eighty-nine days, or a little more than half a year;[107]
but it was probably greater, since some intervals of rest are not
specified in number of days.

  [105] Such is the sum total stated by Xenophon himself (Anab.
  ii, 1, 6). It is greater, by nine days, than the sum total which
  we should obtain by adding together the separate days’ march
  specified by Xenophon from Sardis. But the distance from Sardis
  to Ephesus, as we know from Herodotus, was three days’ journey
  (Herod. v, 55); and therefore the discrepancy is really only to
  the amount of six, not of nine. See Krüger ad Anabas. p. 556;
  Koch, Zug der Z. p. 141.

  [106] Colonel Chesney (Euphrates and Tigris, c. ii, p. 208)
  calculates twelve hundred and sixty-five geographical miles from
  Sardis to Kunaxa or the Mounds of Mohammed.

  [107] For example, we are not told how long they rested at Pylæ,
  or opposite to Charmandê. I have given some grounds (in the
  preceding chapter) for believing that it cannot have been less
  than five days. The army must have been in the utmost need of
  repose, as well as of provisions.

How to retrace their steps, was now the problem, apparently
insoluble. As to the military force of Persia in the field,
indeed, not merely the easy victory at Kunaxa, but still more the
undisputed march throughout so long a space, left them no serious
apprehensions.[108] In spite of this great extent, population, and
riches, they had been allowed to pass through the most difficult
and defensible country, and to ford the broad Euphrates, without a
blow; nay, the king had shrunk from defending the long trench which
he had specially caused to be dug for the protection of Babylonia.
But the difficulties which stood between them and their homes were
of a very different character. How were they to find their way back,
or obtain provisions, in defiance of a numerous hostile cavalry,
which, not without efficiency even in a pitched battle would be most
formidable in opposing their retreat? The line of their upward march
had all been planned, with supplies furnished, by Cyrus;—yet even
under such advantages, supplies had been on the point of failing,
in one part of the march. They were now, for the first time, called
upon to think and provide for themselves; without knowledge of either
roads or distances,—without trustworthy guides,—without any one
to furnish or even to indicate supplies,—and with a territory all
hostile, traversed by rivers which they had no means of crossing.
Klearchus himself knew nothing of the country, nor of any other
river except the Euphrates; nor does he indeed, in his heart, seem
to have conceived retreat as practicable without the consent of
the king.[109] The reader who casts his eye on a map of Asia, and
imagines the situation of this Greek division on the left bank of
the Euphrates, near the parallel of latitude 33° 30′—will hardly be
surprised at any measure of despair, on the part either of general or
soldiers. And we may add that Klearchus had not even the advantage of
such a map, or probably of any map at all, to enable him to shape his
course.

  [108] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 9.

  [109] Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 6, 7.

In this dilemma, the first and most natural impulse was to consult
Ariæus who (as has been already stated) pronounced, with good
reason, that return by the same road was impracticable; and promised
to conduct them home by another road,—longer indeed, yet better
supplied. At daybreak on the ensuing morning, they began their march
in an easterly direction, anticipating that before night they should
reach some villages of the Babylonian territory, as in fact they
did;[110] yet not before they had been alarmed in the afternoon by
the supposed approach of some of the enemy’s horse, and by evidences
that the enemy were not far off, which induced them to slacken
their march for the purpose of more cautious array. Hence they did
not reach the first villages before dark; and these too had been
pillaged by the enemy while retreating before them, so that only
the first-comers under Klearchus could obtain accommodation, while
the succeeding troops, coming up in the dark, pitched as they could
without any order. The whole camp was a scene of clamor, dispute, and
even alarm, throughout the night. No provisions could be obtained.
Early the next morning Klearchus ordered them under arms; and
desiring to expose the groundless nature of the alarm, caused the
herald to proclaim, that whoever would denounce the person who had
let the ass into the camp on the preceding night, should be rewarded
with a talent of silver.[111]

  [110] Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 13. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, ~ἐπορεύοντο
  ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχοντες τὸν ἥλιον~, λογιζόμενοι ἥξειν ἅμα ἡλίῳ δύνοντι
  εἰς κώμας τῆς Βαβυλωνίας χώρας· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθησαν.

  Schneider, in his note on this passage, as well as Ritter,
  (Erdkunde, part. x, 3, p. 17), Mr. Ainsworth (Travels in the
  Track, p. 103) and Colonel Chesney (Euph. and Tigr. p. 219),
  understand the words here used by Xenophon in a sense from
  which I dissent. “When it was day, the army proceeded onward on
  their march, having the sun on their right hand,”—these words
  they understand as meaning that the army marched _northward_;
  whereas, in my judgment, the words intimate that the army marched
  _eastward_. _To have the sun on the right hand_, does not so
  much refer either to the precise point where, or to the precise
  instant when, the sun rises,—but to his diurnal path through the
  heavens, and to the general direction of the day’s march. This
  may be seen by comparing the remarkable passage in Herodotus,
  iv, 42, in reference to the alleged circumnavigation of Africa,
  from the Red Sea round the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of
  Gibraltar, by the Phœnicians under the order of Nekos. These
  Phœnicians said, “that in sailing round Africa (from the Red Sea)
  they had the sun on their right hand”—ὡς τὴν Λιβύην περιπλώοντες
  ~τὸν ἠέλιον ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ~. Herodotus rejects this statement as
  incredible. Not knowing the phenomena of a southern latitude
  beyond the tropic of Capricorn, he could not imagine that men in
  sailing from East to West could possibly have the sun on their
  right hand; any man journeying from the Red Sea to the Straits
  of Gibraltar must, in his judgment, have the sun on the _left_
  hand, as he himself had always experienced in the north latitude
  of the Mediterranean or the African coast. See Vol. III. of this
  History, ch. xviii, p. 282.

  In addition to this reason, we may remark, that Ariæus and the
  Greeks, starting from their camp on the banks of the Euphrates
  (the place where they had passed the last night but one before
  the battle of Kunaxa) and marching _northward_, could not expect
  to arrive, and could not really arrive, at villages of the
  Babylonian territory. But they might naturally expect to do so,
  if they marched _eastward_, towards the Tigris. Nor would they
  have hit upon the enemy in a northerly march, which would in fact
  have been something near to a return upon their own previous
  steps. They would moreover have been stopped by the undefended
  Trench, which could only be passed at the narrow opening close to
  the Euphrates.

  [111] Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 20. This seems to have been a standing
  military jest, to make the soldiers laugh at their past panic.
  See the references in Krüger and Schneider’s notes.

What was the project of route entertained by Ariæus, we cannot
ascertain;[112] since it was not farther pursued. For the effect of
the unexpected arrival of the Greeks as if to attack the enemy,—and
even the clamor and shouting of the camp during the night—so
intimidated the Persian commanders, that they sent heralds the next
morning to treat about a truce. The contrast between this message,
and the haughty summons of the preceding day to lay down their arms,
was sensibly felt by the Grecian officers, and taught them that the
proper way of dealing with the Persians was by a bold and aggressive
demeanor. When Klearchus was apprised of the arrival of the heralds,
he desired them at first to wait at the outposts until he was at
leisure; then, having put his troops into the best possible order,
with a phalanx compact on every side to the eye, and the unarmed
persons out of sight, he desired the heralds to be admitted. He
marched out to meet them with the most showy and best-armed soldiers
immediately around him, and when they informed him that they had
come from the king with instructions to propose a truce, and to
report on what conditions the Greeks would agree to it, Klearchus
replied abruptly,—“Well then,—go and tell the king, that our first
business must be to fight; for we have nothing to eat, nor will any
man presume to talk to Greeks about a truce, without first providing
dinner for them.” With this reply the heralds rode off, but returned
very speedily; thus making it plain that the king, or the commanding
officer, was near at hand. They brought word that the king thought
their answer reasonable, and had sent guides to conduct them to a
place where they would obtain provisions, if the truce should be
concluded.

  [112] Diodorus (xvi, 24) tells us that Ariæus intended to guide
  them towards Paphlagonia; a very loose indication.

After an affected delay and hesitation, in order to impose upon the
Persians, Klearchus concluded the truce, and desired that the guides
would conduct the army to those quarters where provisions could
be had. He was most circumspect in maintaining exact order during
the march, himself taking charge of the rear guard. The guides led
them over many ditches and channels, full of water, and cut for the
purpose of irrigation; some so broad and deep that they could not be
crossed without bridges. The army had to put together bridges for
the occasion, from palm trees either already fallen, or expressly
cut down. This was a troublesome business, which Klearchus himself
superintended with peculiar strictness. He carried his spear in the
left hand, his stick in the right; employing the latter to chastise
any soldier who seemed remiss,—and even plunging into the mud and
lending his own hands in aid wherever it was necessary.[113] As it
was not the usual season of irrigation for crops, he suspected that
the canals had been filled on this occasion expressly to intimidate
the Greeks, by impressing them with the difficulties of their
prospective march; and he was anxious to demonstrate to the Persians
that these difficulties were no more than Grecian energy could easily
surmount.

  [113] Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 7, 13.

At length they reached certain villages indicated by their guides
for quarters and provision; and here for the first time they had a
sample of that unparalleled abundance of the Babylonian territory,
which Herodotus is afraid to describe with numerical precision.
Large quantities of corn,—dates not only in great numbers, but of
such beauty, freshness, size and flavor, as no Greek had ever seen
or tasted, insomuch that fruit like what was imported into Greece,
was disregarded and left for the slaves,—wine and vinegar, both
also made from the date-palm: these are the luxuries which Xenophon
is eloquent in describing, after his recent period of scanty fare
and anxious apprehension; not without also noticing the headaches
which such new and luscious food, in unlimited quanity, brought upon
himself and others.[114]

  [114] Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 14, 17.

After three days passed in these restorative quarters, they were
visited by Tissaphernes, accompanied by four Persian grandees and
a suite of slaves. The satrap began to open a negotiation with
Klearchus and the other generals. Speaking through an interpreter,
he stated to them that the vicinity of his satrapy to Greece
impressed him with a strong interest in favor of the Cyreian Greeks,
and made him anxious to rescue them out of their present desperate
situation; that he had solicited the king’s permission to save them,
as a personal recompense to himself for having been the first to
forewarn him of the schemes of Cyrus, and for having been the only
Persian who had not fled before the Greeks at Kunaxa; that the King
had promised to consider this point, and had sent him in the meantime
to ask the Greeks what their purpose was in coming up to attack
him; and that he trusted the Greeks would give him a conciliatory
answer to carry back, in order that he might have less difficulty
in realizing what he desired for their benefit. To this Klearchus,
after first deliberating apart with the other officers, replied,
that the army had come together, and had even commenced their march,
without any purpose of hostility to the King; that Cyrus had brought
them up the country under false pretences, but that they had been
ashamed to desert him in the midst of danger, since he had always
treated them generously; that since Cyrus was now dead, they had
no purpose of hostility against the King, but were only anxious
to return home; that they were prepared to repel hostility from
all quarters, but would be not less prompt in requiting favor or
assistance. With this answer Tissaphernes departed, and returned
on the next day but one, informing them that he had obtained the
King’s permission to save the Grecian army,—though not without
great opposition, since many Persian counsellors contended that it
was unworthy of the King’s dignity, to suffer those who had assailed
him to escape. “I am now ready (said he) to conclude a covenant and
exchange oaths with you; engaging to conduct you safely back into
Greece, with the country friendly, and with a regular market for you
to purchase provisions. You must stipulate on your part always to
pay for your provisions, and to do no damage to the country. If I do
not furnish you with provisions to buy, you are then at liberty to
take them where you can find them.” Well were the Greeks content to
enter into such a covenant, which was sworn, with hands given upon
it, by Klearchus, the other generals, and the lochages, on their
side,—and by Tissaphernes with the King’s brother-in-law on the
other. Tissaphernes then left them, saying that he would go back to
the King, make preparations, and return to reconduct the Greeks home;
going himself to his own satrapy.[115]

  [115] Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 18-27.

The statements of Ktesias, though known to us only indirectly and
not to be received without caution, afford ground for believing that
Queen Parysatis decidedly wished success to her son Cyrus in his
contest for the throne,—that the first report conveyed to her of the
battle of Kunaxa, announcing the victory of Cyrus, filled her with
joy, which was exchanged for bitter sorrow when she was informed of
his death,—that she caused to be slain with horrible tortures all
those, who though acting in the Persian army and for the defence of
Artaxerxes, had any participation in the death of Cyrus—and that
she showed favorable dispositions towards the Cyreian Greeks.[116]
It seems probable, farther, that her influence may have been exerted
to procure for them an unimpeded retreat, without anticipating the
use afterwards made by Tissaphernes (as will soon appear) of the
present convention. And in one point of view, the Persian king had
an interest in facilitating their retreat. For the very circumstance
which rendered retreat difficult, also rendered the Greeks dangerous
to him in their actual position. They were in the heart of the
Persian empire, within seventy miles of Babylon; in a country
not only teeming with fertility, but also extremely defensible;
especially against cavalry, from the multiplicity of canals, as
Herodotus observed respecting Lower Egypt.[117] And Klearchus might
say to his Grecian soldiers,—what Xenophon was afterwards preparing
to say to them at Kalpê on the Euxine Sea, and what Nikias also
affirmed to the unhappy Athenian army whom he conducted away from
Syracuse[118]—that wherever they sat down, they were sufficiently
numerous and well-organized to become at once a city. A body of such
troops might effectually assist, and would perhaps encourage, the
Babylonian population to throw off the Persian yoke, and to exonerate
themselves from the prodigious tribute which they now paid to the
satrap. For these reasons, the advisers of Artaxerxes thought it
advantageous to convey the Greeks across the Tigris out of Babylonia,
beyond all possibility of returning thither. This was at any rate
the primary object of the convention. And it was the more necessary
to conciliate the good-will of the Greeks, because there seems to
have been but one bridge over the Tigris; which bridge could only be
reached by inviting them to advance considerably farther into the
interior of Babylonia.

  [116] Ktesiæ Persica, Fragm. c. 59, ed. Bähr; compared with the
  remarkable Fragment. 18, preserved by the so-called Demetrius
  Phalêreus: see also Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 17.

  [117] Herodot. i, 193; ii, 108; Strabo, xvii. p. 788.

  [118] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 16; Thucyd. vii.

Such was the state of fears and hopes on both sides, at the time when
Tissaphernes left the Greeks, after concluding his convention. For
twenty days did they await his return, without receiving from him
any communication; the Cyreian Persians under Ariæus being encamped
near them. Such prolonged and unexplained delay became, after a few
days, the source of much uneasiness to the Greeks; the more so as
Ariæus received during this interval several visits from his Persian
kinsmen, and friendly messages from the king, promising amnesty for
his recent services under Cyrus. Of these messages the effects were
painfully felt in manifest coldness of demeanor on the part of his
Persian troops towards the Greeks. Impatient and suspicious, the
Greek soldiers impressed upon Klearchus their fears, that the king
had concluded the recent convention only to arrest their movements,
until he should have assembled a larger army and blocked up more
effectually the roads against their return. To this Klearchus
replied,—“I am aware of all that you say. Yet if we now strike our
tents, it will be a breach of the convention and a declaration of
war. No one will furnish us with provisions; we shall have no guides;
Ariæus will desert us forthwith, so that we shall have his troops
as enemies instead of friends. Whether there be any other river for
us to cross, I know not; but we know that the Euphrates itself can
never be crossed, if there be an enemy to resist us. Nor have we any
cavalry,—while cavalry is the best and most numerous force of our
enemies. If the king, having all these advantages, really wishes to
destroy us, I do not know why he should falsely exchange all these
oaths and solemnities, and thus make his own word worthless in the
eyes both of Greeks and barbarians.”[119]

  [119] Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 3-8.

Such words from Klearchus are remarkable, as they testify his
own complete despair of the situation,—certainly a very natural
despair,—except by amicable dealing with the Persians; and also his
ignorance of geography and the country to be traversed. This feeling
helps to explain his imprudent confidence afterwards in Tissaphernes.

That satrap, however, after twenty days, at last came back, with
his army prepared to return to Ionia,—with the king’s daughter
whom he had just received in marriage,—and with another grandee
named Orontas. Tissaphernes took the conduct of the march, providing
supplies for the Greek troops to purchase; while Ariæus and his
division now separated themselves altogether from the Greeks, and
became intermingled with the other Persians. Klearchus and the Greeks
followed them, at the distance of about three miles in the rear, with
a separate guide for themselves; not without jealousy and mistrust,
sometimes shown in individual conflicts, while collecting wood or
forage, between them and the Persians of Ariæus. After three days’
march (that is, apparently, three days, calculated from the moment
when they began their retreat with Ariæus) they came to the Wall of
Media, and passed through it,[120] prosecuting their march onward
through the country on its other or interior side. It was of bricks
cemented with bitumen, one hundred feet high, and twenty feet broad;
it was said to extend a length of twenty parasangs (or about seventy
miles, if we reckon the parasang at thirty stadia), and to be not far
distant from Babylon. Two days of farther march, computed as eight
parasangs, brought them to the Tigris. During these two days they
crossed two great ship canals, one of them over a permanent bridge,
the other over a temporary bridge laid on seven boats. Canals of
such magnitude must probably have been two among the four stated by
Xenophon to be drawn from the river Tigris, each of them a parasang
distant from the other. They were one hundred feet broad, and deep
enough even for heavy vessels; they were distributed by means of
numerous smaller channels and ditches for the irrigation of the soil;
and they were said to fall into the Euphrates; or rather, perhaps,
they terminated in one main larger canal cut directly from the
Euphrates to the Tigris, each of them joining this larger canal at
a different point of its course. Within less than two miles of the
Tigris was a large and populous city named Sittakê, near which the
Greeks pitched their camp, on the verge of a beautiful park or thick
grove full of all kinds of trees; while the Persians all crossed the
Tigris, at the neighboring bridge.

  [120] Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 12. Διελθόντες δὲ ~τρεῖς σταθμοὺς~,
  ἀφίκοντο πρὸς τὸ Μηδίας καλούμενον τεῖχος, καὶ ~παρῆλθον αὐτοῦ
  εἴσω~. It appears to me that these three days’ march or σταθμοὶ
  can hardly be computed from the moment when they commenced
  their march under the conduct of Tissaphernes. On the other
  hand, if we begin from the moment when the Greeks started under
  conduct of Ariæus, we can plainly trace three distinct _resting
  places_ (σταθμοὺς) before they reached the Wall of Media.
  First, at the villages where the confusion and alarm arose (ii,
  13-21). Secondly, at the villages of abundant supply, where
  they concluded the truce with Tissaphernes, and waited twenty
  days for his return (ii, 3, 14; ii, 4, 9). Thirdly, one night’s
  halt under the conduct of Tissaphernes, before they reached the
  Wall of Media. This makes three distinct stations or halting
  places, between the station (the first station after passing
  the undefended trench) from whence they started to begin their
  retreat under the conduct of Ariæus,—and the point where they
  traversed the Wall of Media.

As Proxenus and Xenophon were here walking in front of the camp after
supper, a man was brought up who had asked for the former at the
advanced posts. This man said that he came with instructions from
Ariæus. He advised the Greeks to be on their guard, as there were
troops concealed in the adjoining grove, for the purpose of attacking
them during the night,—and also to send and occupy the bridge
over the Tigris, since Tissaphernes intended to break it down, in
order that the Greeks might be caught without possibility of escape
between the river and the canal. On discussing this information with
Klearchus, who was much alarmed by it, a young Greek present remarked
that the two matters stated by the informant contradicted each other;
for that if Tissaphernes intended to attack the Greeks during the
night, he would not break down the bridge, so as both to prevent his
own troops on the other side from crossing to aid, and to deprive
those on this side of all retreat if they were beaten,—while, if
the Greeks were beaten, there was no escape open to them, whether
the bridge continued or not. This remark induced Klearchus to ask
the messenger, what was the extent of ground between the Tigris and
the canal. The messenger replied, that it was a great extent of
country, comprising many large cities and villages. Reflecting on
this communication, the Greek officers came to the conclusion that
the message was a stratagem on the part of Tissaphernes to frighten
them and accelerate their passage across the Tigris; under the
apprehension that they might conceive the plan of seizing or breaking
the bridge and occupying a permanent position in the spot where they
were; which was an island, fortified on one side by the Tigris,—on
the other sides, by intersecting canals between the Euphrates and
the Tigris.[121] Such an island was a defensible position, having
a most productive territory with numerous cultivators, so as to
furnish shelter and means of hostility for all the king’s enemies.
Tissaphernes calculated that the message now delivered would induce
the Greeks to become alarmed with their actual position and to cross
the Tigris with as little delay as possible. At least this was the
interpretation which the Greek officers put upon his proceeding;
an interpretation highly plausible, since, in order to reach the
bridge over the Tigris, he had been obliged to conduct the Greek
troops into a position sufficiently tempting for them to hold,—and
since he knew that his own purposes were purely treacherous. But the
Greeks, officers as well as soldiers, were animated only by the wish
of reaching home. They trusted, though not without misgivings, in
the promise of Tissaphernes to conduct them; and never for a moment
thought of taking permanent post in this fertile island. They did
not, however, neglect the precaution of sending a guard during the
night to the bridge over the Tigris, which no enemy came to assail.
On the next morning they passed over it in a body, in cautious and
mistrustful array, and found themselves on the eastern bank of the
Tigris,—not only without attack, but even without sight of a single
Persian, except Glus, the interpreter, and a few others watching
their motions.

  [121] I reserve for this place the consideration of that which
  Xenophon states, in two or three passages, about the Wall
  of Media and about different canals in connection with the
  Tigris,—the result of which, as far as I can make it out, stands
  in my text.

  I have already stated, in the preceding chapter, that in the
  march of the day next but one preceding the battle of Kunaxa,
  the army came to a deep and broad trench dug for defence across
  their line of way, with the exception of a narrow gut of twenty
  feet broad close by the Euphrates; through which gut the whole
  army passed. Xenophon says, “This trench had been carried upwards
  across the plain as far as the Wall of Media, where indeed,
  the canals are situated, flowing from the river Tigris; four
  canals, one hundred feet in breadth, and extremely deep, so
  that corn-bearing vessels sail along them. They strike into the
  Euphrates, they are distant each from the other by one parasang,
  and there are bridges over them—Παρετέτατο δ᾽ ἡ τάφρος ἄνω διὰ
  τοῦ πεδίου ἐπὶ δώδεκα παράσαγγας, μέχρι τοῦ Μηδίας τείχους,
  ἔνθα δὴ (the books print a full stop between τείχους and ἔνθα,
  which appears to me incorrect, as the sense goes on without
  interruption) εἰσιν αἱ διωρύχες, ἀπὸ τοῦ Τίγρητος ποταμοῦ
  ῥέουσαι· εἰσὶ δὲ τέτταρες, τὸ μὲν εὖρος πλεθριαῖαι, βαθεῖαι
  δὲ ἰσχυρῶς, καὶ πλοῖα πλεῖ ἐν αὐταῖς σιταγωγά· εἰσβάλλουσι δὲ
  εἰς τὸν Εὐφράτην, διαλείπουσι δ᾽ ἑκάστη παρασάγγην, γέφυραι δ᾽
  ἔπεισιν. The present tense—εἰσιν αἱ διώρυχες—seems to mark the
  local reference of ἔνθα to the Wall of Media, and not to the
  actual march of the army.

  Major Rennell (Illustrations of the Expedition of Cyrus, pp.
  79-87, etc.), Ritter, (Erdkunde, x, p. 16), Koch, (Zug der Zehn
  Tausend, pp. 46, 47), and Mr. Ainsworth (Travels in the Track
  of the Ten Thousand, p. 88) consider Xenophon to state that
  the Cyreian army on this day’s march (the day but one before
  the battle) passed through the Wall of Media and over the four
  distinct canals reaching from the Tigris to the Euphrates. They
  all, indeed, contest the accuracy of this latter statement;
  Rennell remarking that the level of the Tigris, in this part
  of its course, is lower than that of the Euphrates; and that
  it could not supply water for so many broad canals so near to
  each other. Col. Chesney also conceives the army to have passed
  through the Wall of Media before the battle of Kunaxa.

  It seems to me, however, that they do not correctly interpret the
  words of Xenophon, who does not say that Cyrus ever passed either
  the Wall of Media, or these four canals _before_ the battle of
  Kunaxa, but who says (as Krüger, De Authentiâ Anabaseos, p. 12,
  prefixed to his edition of the Anabasis, rightly explains him),
  that these four canals flowing from the Tigris are at, or near,
  the Wall of Media, which the Greeks did not pass through until
  long _after_ the battle, when Tissaphernes was conducting them
  towards the Tigris, two days’ march before they reached Sittakê
  (Anab. ii, 4, 12).

  It has been supposed, during the last few years, that the
  direction of the Wall of Media could be verified by actual ruins
  still subsisting on the spot. Dr. Ross and Captain Lynch (see
  journal of the Geographical Society, vol. ix. pp. 447-473, with
  Captain Lynch’s map annexed) discovered a line of embankment
  which they considered to be the remnant of it. It begins on the
  western bank of the Tigris, in latitude 34° 3′, and stretches
  towards the Euphrates in a direction from N. N. E. to S. S. W.
  “It is a solitary straight single mound, twenty-five long paces
  thick, with a bastion on its western face at every fifty-five
  paces; and on the same side it has a deep ditch, twenty-seven
  paces broad. The wall is here built of the small pebbles of the
  country, imbedded in cement of lime of great tenacity; it is from
  thirty-five to forty feet in height, and runs in a straight line
  as far as the eye can trace it. The Bedouins tell me that it goes
  in the same straight line to two mounds called Ramelah on the
  Euphrates, some hours above Felujah; that it is, in places far
  inland, built of brick, and in some parts worn down to a level
  with the desert.” (Dr. Ross, l. c. p. 446).

  Upon the faith of these observations, the supposed wall (now
  called Sidd Nimrud by the natives) has been laid down as the Wall
  of Media reaching from the Tigris to the Euphrates, in the best
  recent maps, especially that of Colonel Chesney; and accepted as
  such by recent inquirers.

  Nevertheless, subsequent observations, recently made known by
  Colonel Rawlinson to the Geographical Society, have contradicted
  the views of Dr. Ross as stated above, and shown that the Wall
  of Media, in the line here assigned to it, has no evidence to
  rest upon. Captain Jones, commander of the steamer at Bagdad,
  undertook, at the request of Colonel Rawlinson a minute
  examination of the locality, and ascertained that what had been
  laid down as the Wall of Media was merely a line of mounds;
  no wall at all, but a mere embankment, extending seven or
  eight miles from the Tigris, and designed to arrest the winter
  torrents and drain off the rain water of the desert into a large
  reservoir, which served to irrigate an extensive valley between
  the rivers.

  From this important communication it results, that there is as
  yet no evidence now remaining for determining what was the line
  or position of the Wall of Media; which had been supposed to be
  a datum positively established, serving as premises from whence
  to deduce other positions mentioned by Xenophon. As our knowledge
  now stands, there is not a single point mentioned by Xenophon
  in Babylonia which can be positively verified, except Babylon
  itself,—and Pylæ, which is known pretty nearly, as the spot
  where Babylonia proper commences.

  The description which Xenophon gives of the Wall of Media is very
  plain and specific. I see no reason to doubt that he actually
  saw it, passed through it, and correctly describes it in height
  as well as breadth. Its entire length he of course only gives
  from what he was told. His statement appears to me good evidence
  that there was a Wall of Media, which reached from the Tigris to
  the Euphrates, or perhaps to some canal cut from the Euphrates,
  though there exists no mark to show what was the precise locality
  and direction of the Wall. Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiv, 2), in
  the expedition of the emperor Julian, saw near Macepracta, on
  the left bank of the Euphrates, the ruins of a wall, “which in
  ancient times had stretched to a great distance for the defence
  of Assyria against foreign invasion.” It is fair to presume that
  this was the Wall of Media; but the position of Macepracta cannot
  be assigned.

  It is important, however, to remember,—what I have already
  stated in this note,—that Xenophon did not see, and did not
  cross either the Wall of Media, or the two canals here mentioned,
  until many days after the battle of Kunaxa.

  We know from Herodotus that all the territory of Babylonia was
  intersected by canals, and that there was one canal greater
  than the rest and navigable, which flowed from the Euphrates to
  the Tigris, in a direction to the south of east. This coincides
  pretty well with the direction assigned in Colonel Chesney’s map
  to the Nahr-Malcha or Regium Flumen, into which the four great
  canals, described by Xenophon as drawn from the Tigris to the
  Euphrates, might naturally discharge themselves, and still be
  said to fall into the Euphrates, of which the Nahr-Malcha was as
  it were a branch. How the level of the two rivers would adjust
  itself, when the space between them was covered with a network of
  canals great and small, and when a vast quantity of the water of
  both was exhausted in fertilizing the earth, is difficult to say.

  The _island_ wherein the Greeks stood, at their position near
  Sittakê, before crossing the Tigris, would be a parallelogram
  formed by the Tigris, the Nahr-Malcha, and the two parallel
  canals joining them. It might well be called a large island,
  containing many cities and villages, with a large population.

After having crossed by a bridge laid upon thirty-seven pontoons,
the Greeks continued their march to the northward upon the eastern
side of the Tigris, for four days, to the river Physkus; said to
be twenty parasangs.[122] The Physkus was one hundred feet wide,
with a bridge, and the large city of Opis near it. Here, at the
frontier of Assyria and Media, the road from the eastern regions to
Babylon joined the road northerly on which the Greeks were marching.
An illegitimate brother of Artaxerxes was seen at the head of a
numerous force, which he was conducting from Susa and Ekbatana as a
reinforcement to the royal army. This great host halted to see the
Greeks pass by; and Klearchus ordered the march in column of two
abreast, employing himself actively to maintain an excellent array,
and halting more than once. The army thus occupied so long a time in
passing by the Persian host, that their numbers appeared greater than
the reality, even to themselves; while the effect upon the Persian
spectators was very imposing.[123] Here Assyria ended and Media
began. They marched, still in a northerly direction, for six days
through a portion of Media almost unpeopled, until they came to some
flourishing villages which formed a portion of the domain of queen
Parysatis; probably these villages, forming so marked an exception to
the desert character of the remaining march, were situated on the
Lesser Zab, which flows into the Tigris, and which Xenophon must have
crossed, though he makes no mention of it. According to the order
of march stipulated between the Greeks and Tissaphernes, the latter
only provided a supply of provisions for the former to purchase; but
on the present halt, he allowed the Greeks to plunder the villages,
which were rich and full of all sorts of subsistence,—yet without
carrying off the slaves. The wish of the satrap to put an insult on
Cyrus, as his personal enemy,[124] through Parysatis, thus proved a
sentence of ruin to these unhappy villagers. Five more days’ march,
called twenty parasangs, brought them to the banks of the river
Zabatus, or the Greater Zab, which flows into the Tigris near a
town now called Senn. During the first of these five days, they saw
on the opposite side of the Tigris a large town called Kænæ, from
whence they received supplies of provisions, brought across by the
inhabitants upon rafts supported by inflated skins.[125]

  [122] There seems reason to believe that in ancient times the
  Tigris, above Bagdad, followed a course more to the westward, and
  less winding, than it does now. The situation of Opis cannot be
  verified. The ruins of a large city were seen by Captain Lynch
  near the confluence of the river Adhem with the Tigris, which he
  supposed to be Opis, in lat. 34°.

  [123] Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 26.

  [124] Ktesias, Fragm. 18, ed. Bähr.

  [125] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 26-28.

  Mannert, Rennell, Mr. Ainsworth, and most modern commentators,
  identify this town of Καιναὶ or Kænæ with the modern town Senn;
  which latter place Mannert (Geogr. der Röm. v. p. 333) and
  Rennell (Illustrations p. 129) represent to be near the Lesser
  Zab instead of the Greater Zab.

  To me it appears that the locality assigned by Xenophon to
  Καιναὶ, does not at all suit the modern town of Senn. Nor is
  there much real similarity of name between the two; although our
  erroneous way of pronouncing the Latin name _Caenae_, creates a
  delusive appearance of similarity. Mr. Ainsworth shows that some
  modern writers have been misled in the same manner by identifying
  the modern town of Sert with Tigrano-_certa_.

  It is a perplexing circumstance in the geography of Xenophon’s
  work, that he makes no mention of the Lesser Zab, which yet he
  must have crossed. Herodotus notices them both, and remarks on
  the fact that though distinct rivers, both bore the same name (v,
  52). Perhaps in drawing up his narrative after the expedition,
  Xenophon may have so far forgotten, as to fancy that two
  synonymous rivers mentioned as distinct in his memoranda, were
  only one.

On the banks of the Great Zab they halted three days,—days of
serious and tragical moment. Having been under feelings of mistrust,
ever since the convention with Tissaphernes, they had followed
throughout the whole march, with separate guides of their own, in the
rear of his army, always maintaining their encampment apart. During
their halt on the Zab, so many various manifestations occurred to
aggravate the mistrust, that hostilities seemed on the point of
breaking out between the two camps. To obviate this danger Klearchus
demanded an interview with Tissaphernes, represented to him the
threatening attitude of affairs, and insisted on the necessity of
coming to a clear understanding. He impressed upon the satrap that,
over and above the solemn oaths which had been interchanged, the
Greeks on their side could have no conceivable motive to quarrel
with him; that they had everything to hope from his friendship, and
everything to fear, even to the loss of all chance of safe return,
from his hostility; that Tissaphernes, also, could gain nothing by
destroying them, but would find them, if he chose, the best and most
faithful instruments for his own aggrandizement and for conquering
the Mysians and the Pisidians,—as Cyrus had experienced while he was
alive. Klearchus concluded his protest by requesting to be informed,
what malicious reporter had been filling the mind of Tissaphernes
with causeless suspicions against the Greeks.[126]

  [126] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 2-15.

“Klearchus (replied the satrap), I rejoice to hear such excellent
sense from your lips. You remark truly, that if you were to meditate
evil against me, it would recoil upon yourselves. I shall prove to
you, in my turn, that you have no cause to mistrust either the king
or me. If we had wished to destroy you, nothing would be easier. We
have superabundant forces for the purpose; there are wide plains
in which you would be starved,—besides mountains and rivers which
you would be unable to pass, without our help. Having thus the
means of destroying you in our hands, and having nevertheless bound
ourselves by solemn oaths to save you, we shall not be fools and
knaves enough to attempt it now, when we should draw upon ourselves
the just indignation of the gods. It is my peculiar affection for my
neighbors, the Greeks,—and my wish to attach to my own person, by
ties of gratitude, the Greek soldiers of Cyrus,—which have made me
eager to conduct you to Ionia in safety. For I know that when you are
in my service, though the king is the only man who can wear his tiara
erect _upon his head_, I shall be able to wear mine erect upon _my
heart_, in full pride and confidence.”[127]

  [127] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 17-23. This last comparison is curious,
  and in all probability the genuine words of the satrap—τὴν μὲν
  γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ τιάραν βασιλεῖ μόνῳ ἔξεστιν ὀρθὴν ἔχειν, τὴν δ᾽
  ἐπὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ ἴσως ἂν ὑμῶν παρόντων καὶ ἕτερος εὐπετῶς ἔχοι.

So powerful was the impression made upon Klearchus by these
assurances, that he exclaimed,—“Surely those informers deserve the
severest punishment, who try to put us at enmity, when we are such
good friends to each other, and have so much reason to be so.” “Yes
(replied Tissaphernes), they deserve nothing less; and if you, with
the other generals and lochages, will come into my tent to-morrow, I
will tell you who the calumniators are.” “To-be-sure I will (rejoined
Klearchus), and bring the other generals with me. I shall tell you at
the same time, who are the parties that seek to prejudice us against
you.” The conversation then ended, the satrap detaining Klearchus
to dinner, and treating him in the most hospitable and confidential
manner.

On the next morning, Klearchus communicated what had passed to the
Greeks, insisting on the necessity that all the generals should go
to Tissaphernes pursuant to his invitation; in order to reëstablish
that confidence which unworthy calumniators had shaken, and to punish
such of the calumniators as might be Greeks. So emphatically did
he pledge himself for the good faith and philhellenic dispositions
of the satrap, that he overruled the opposition of many among the
soldiers; who, still continuing to entertain their former suspicions,
remonstrated especially against the extreme imprudence of putting
all the generals at once into the power of Tissaphernes. The urgency
of Klearchus prevailed. Himself with four other generals,—Proxenus,
Menon, Agias, and Sokrates,—and twenty lochages or captains,—went
to visit the satrap in his tent; about two hundred of the soldiers
going along with them, to make purchases for their own account in the
Persian camp-market.[128]

  [128] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 30.

On reaching the quarters of Tissaphernes,—distant nearly three
miles from the Grecian camp, according to habit,—the five generals
were admitted into the interior, while the lochages remained at
the entrance. A purple flag, hoisted from the top of the tent,
betrayed too late the purpose for which they had been invited to
come. The lochages and the Grecian soldiers who had accompanied them
were surprised and cut down, while the generals in the interior
were detained, put in chains, and carried up as prisoners to the
Persian court. Here Klearchus, Proxenus, Agias, and Sokrates were
beheaded after a short imprisonment. Queen Parysatis, indeed, from
affection to Cyrus, not only furnished many comforts to Klearchus
in the prison, by the hands of her surgeon, Ktesias, but used all
her influence with her son Artaxerxes to save his life; though
her efforts were counteracted, on this occasion, by the superior
influence of queen Stateira, his wife. The rivalry between these
two royal women, doubtless arising out of many other circumstances
besides the death of Klearchus, became soon afterwards so furious,
that Parysatis caused Stateira to be poisoned.[129]

  [129] Xen. Anab. ii, 6, 1. Ktesiæ Frag. Persica, c. 60, ed. Bähr;
  Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 19, 20; Diodor. xiv, 27.

Menon was not put to death along with the other generals. He appears
to have taken credit at the Persian court for the treason of
entrapping his colleagues into the hands of Tissaphernes. But his
life was only prolonged to perish a year afterwards in disgrace and
torture,—probably by the requisition of Parysatis, who thus avenged
the death of Klearchus. The queen-mother had always power enough to
perpetrate cruelties, though not always to avert them.[130] She had
already brought to a miserable end every one, even faithful defenders
of Artaxerxes, concerned in the death of her son Cyrus.

  [130] Tacit. Histor. i, 45. “Othoni nondum auctoritas inerat ad
  _prohibendum_ scelus; _jubere_ jam poterat. Ita, simulatione
  iræ, vinciri jussum (Marium Celsum) et majores pœnas daturum,
  affirmans, præsenti exitio subtraxit.”

  Ktesias (Persica, c. 60; compare Plutarch and Diodorus as
  referred to in the preceding note) attests the treason of Menon,
  which he probably derived from the story of Menon himself.
  Xenophon mentions the ignominious death of Menon, and he probably
  derived his information from Ktesias (see Anabasis, ii, 6, 29).

  The supposition that it was Parysatis who procured the death
  of Menon, in itself highly probable, renders all the different
  statements consistent and harmonious.

Though Menon thought it convenient, when brought up to Babylon, to
boast of having been the instrument through whom the generals were
entrapped into the fatal tent, this boast is not to be treated as
matter of fact. For not only does Xenophon explain the catastrophe
differently, but in the delineation which he gives of Menon, dark
and odious as it is in the extreme, he does not advance any such
imputation; indirectly, indeed, he sets it aside.[131] Unfortunately
for the reputation of Klearchus, no such reasonable excuse can be
offered for his credulity, which brought himself as well as his
colleagues to so melancholy an end, and his whole army to the brink
of ruin. It appears that the general sentiment of the Grecian army,
taking just measure of the character of Tissaphernes, was disposed
to greater circumspection in dealing with him. Upon that system
Klearchus himself had hitherto acted; and the necessity of it might
have been especially present to _his_ mind, since he had served with
the Lacedæmonian fleet at Miletus in 411 B.C., and had, therefore,
had fuller experience than other men in the army, of the satrap’s
real character.[132] On a sudden he now turns round, and on the faith
of a few verbal declarations, puts all the military chiefs into the
most defenceless posture and the most obvious peril, such as hardly
the strongest grounds for confidence could have justified. Though
the remark of Machiavel is justified by large experience,—that
from the short-sightedness of men and their obedience to present
impulse, the most notorious deceiver will always find new persons
to trust him,—still such misjudgment on the part of an officer of
age and experience is difficult to explain.[133] Polyænus intimates
that beautiful women, exhibited by the satrap at his first banquet
to Klearchus alone, served as a lure to attract him with all his
colleagues to the second; while Xenophon imputes the error to
continuance of a jealous rivalry with Menon. The latter,[134] it
appears, having always been intimate with Ariæus, had been thus
brought into previous communication with Tissaphernes, by whom he had
been well received, and by whom he was also encouraged to lay plans
for detaching the whole Grecian army from Klearchus, so as to bring
it all under his (Menon’s) command, into the service of the satrap.
Such at least was the suspicion of Klearchus; who, jealous in the
extreme of his own military authority, tried to defeat the scheme by
bidding still higher himself for the favor of Tissaphernes. Imagining
that Menon was the unknown calumniator who prejudiced the satrap
against him, he hoped to prevail on the satrap to disclose his name
and dismiss him.[135] Such jealousy seems to have robbed Klearchus
of his customary prudence. We must also allow for another impression
deeply fixed in his mind; that the salvation of the army was hopeless
without the consent of Tissaphernes, and, therefore, since the latter
had conducted them thus far in safety, when he might have destroyed
them before, that his designs at the bottom could not be hostile.[136]

  [131] Xenophon seems to intimate that there were various stories
  current, which he does not credit, to the disparagement of
  Menon,—καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ἀφανῆ ἔξεστι περὶ αὐτοῦ ψεύδεσθαι, etc.
  (Anab. ii, 6, 28).

  Athenæus (xi, p. 505) erroneously states that Xenophon affirmed
  Menon to be the person who caused the destruction of Klearchus by
  Tissaphernes.

  [132] Xenophon in the Cyropædia (viii, 8, 3) gives a strange
  explanation of the imprudent confidence reposed by Klearchus in
  the assurance of the Persian satrap. It arose (he says) from the
  high reputation for good faith which the Persians had acquired
  by the undeviating and scrupulous honor of the first Cyrus (or
  Cyrus the Great), but which they had since ceased to deserve,
  though the corruption of their character had not before publicly
  manifested itself.

  This is a curious perversion of history to serve the purpose of
  his romance.

  [133] Macciavelli, Principe, c. 18, p. 65.

  [134] Polyæn. vii, 18.

  [135] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 27, 28.

  [136] Compare Anab. ii, 4, 6, 7; ii, 5, 9.

Notwithstanding these two great mistakes,—one on the present
occasion, one previously, at the battle of Kunaxa, in keeping the
Greeks on the right contrary to the order of Cyrus,—both committed
by Klearchus, the loss of that officer was doubtless a great
misfortune to the army; while, on the contrary, the removal of Menon
was a signal benefit,—perhaps a condition of ultimate safety. A man
so treacherous and unprincipled as Xenophon depicts Menon, would
probably have ended by really committing towards the army that
treason, for which he falsely took credit at the Persian court in
reference to the seizure of the generals.

The impression entertained by Klearchus, respecting the hopeless
position of the Greeks in the heart of the Persian territory after
the death of Cyrus, was perfectly natural in a military man who could
appreciate all the means of attack and obstruction which the enemy
had it in their power to employ. Nothing is so unaccountable in this
expedition as the manner in which such means were thrown away,—the
spectacle of Persian impotence. First, the whole line of upward
march, including the passage of the Euphrates, left undefended; next,
the long trench dug across the frontier of Babylonia, with only
a passage of twenty feet wide left near the Euphrates, abandoned
without a guard; lastly, the line of the Wall of Media and the canals
which offered such favorable positions for keeping the Greeks out
of the cultivated territory of Babylonia, neglected in like manner,
and a convention concluded, whereby the Persians engaged to escort
the invaders safe to the Ionian coast, beginning by conducting them
through the heart of Babylonia, amidst canals affording inexpugnable
defences if the Greeks had chosen to take up a position among them.
The plan of Tissaphernes, as far as we can understand it, seems to
have been, to draw the Greeks to some considerable distance from
the heart of the Persian empire, and then to open his schemes of
treasonable hostility, which the imprudence of Klearchus enabled
him to do, on the banks of the Great Zab, with chances of success
such as he could hardly have contemplated. We have here a fresh
example of the wonderful impotence of the Persians. We should have
expected that, after having committed so flagrant an act of perfidy,
Tissaphernes would at least have tried to turn it to account; that
he would have poured, with all his forces and all his vigor, on the
Grecian camp, at the moment when it was unprepared, disorganized,
and without commanders. Instead of which, when the generals (with
those who accompanied them to the Persian camp) had been seized or
slain, no attack whatever was made except by small detachments of
Persian cavalry upon individual Greek stragglers in the plain. One
of the companions of the generals, an Arcadian named Nikarchus, ran
wounded into the Grecian camp, where the soldiers were looking from
afar at the horsemen scouring the plain without knowing what they
were about,—exclaiming that the Persians were massacring all the
Greeks, officers as well as soldiers. Immediately the Greek soldiers
hastened to put themselves in defence, expecting a general attack
to be made upon their camp; but no more Persians came near than a
body of about three hundred horse, under Ariæus and Mithridates
(the confidential companions of the deceased Cyrus), accompanied by
the brother of Tissaphernes. These men, approaching the Greek lines
as friends, called for the Greek officers to come forth, as they
had a message to deliver from the king. Accordingly, Kleanor and
Sophænetus, with an adequate guard, came to the front, accompanied by
Xenophon, who was anxious to hear news about Proxenus. Ariæus then
acquainted them that Klearchus, having been detected in a breach of
the convention to which he had sworn, had been put to death; that
Proxenus and Menon, who had divulged his treason, were in high honor
at the Persian quarters. He concluded by saying,—the king calls upon
you to surrender your arms, which now (he says) belong to him, since
they formerly belonged to his slave Cyrus.[137]

  [137] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 37, 38.

The step here taken seems to testify a belief on the part of these
Persians, that the generals being now in their power, the Grecian
soldiers had become defenceless, and might be required to surrender
their arms, even to men who had just been guilty of the most deadly
fraud and injury towards them. If Ariæus entertained such an
expectation, he was at once undeceived by the language of Kleanor and
Xenophon, who breathed nothing but indignant reproach; so that he
soon retired and left the Greeks to their own reflections.

While their camp thus remained unmolested, every man within it was a
prey to the most agonizing apprehensions. Ruin appeared impending and
inevitable, though no one could tell in what precise form it would
come. The Greeks were in the midst of a hostile country, ten thousand
stadia from home, surrounded by enemies, blocked up by impassable
mountains and rivers, without guides, without provisions, without
cavalry to aid their retreat, without generals to give orders. A
stupor of sorrow and conscious helplessness seized upon all. Few came
to the evening muster; few lighted fires to cook their suppers; every
man lay down to rest where he was; yet no man could sleep, for fear,
anguish, and yearning after relatives whom he was never again to
behold.[138]

[138] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 2, 3.

Amidst the many causes of despondency which weighed down this forlorn
army, there was none more serious than the fact, that not a single
man among them had now either authority to command, or obligation
to take the initiative. Nor was any ambitious candidate likely
to volunteer his pretensions, at a moment when the post promised
nothing but the maximum of difficulty as well as of hazard. A new,
self-kindled, light—and self-originated stimulus—was required, to
vivify the embers of suspended hope and action, in a mass paralyzed
for the moment, but every way capable of effort. And the inspiration
now fell, happily for the army, upon one in whom a full measure of
soldierly strength and courage was combined with the education of an
Athenian, a democrat, and a philosopher.

It is in true Homeric vein, and in something like Homeric language,
that Xenophon (to whom we owe the whole narrative of the expedition)
describes his dream, or the intervention of Oneirus, sent by Zeus,
from which this renovating impulse took its rise.[139] Lying mournful
and restless, like his comrades, he caught a short repose; when
he dreamt that he heard thunder, and saw the burning thunder-bolt
fall upon his paternal house, which became forthwith encircled by
flames. Awaking, full of terror, he instantly sprang up; upon which
the dream began to fit on and blend itself with his waking thoughts,
and with the cruel realities of his position. His pious and excited
fancy generated a series of shadowy analogies. The dream was sent by
Zeus[140] the King, since it was from him that thunder and lightning
proceeded. In one respect, the sign was auspicious,—that a great
light had appeared to him from Zeus, in the midst of peril and
suffering. But on the other hand, it was alarming, that the house had
appeared to be completely encircled by flames, preventing all egress,
because this seemed to indicate that he would remain confined where
he was in the Persian dominions, without being able to overcome the
difficulties which hedged him in. Yet doubtful as the promise was,
it was still the message of Zeus addressed to himself, serving as
a stimulus to him to break through the common stupor and take the
initiative movement.[141] “Why am I lying here? Night is advancing;
at daybreak the enemy will be on us, and we shall be put to death
with tortures. Not a man is stirring to take measures of defence.
Why do I wait for any man older than myself, or for any man of a
different city, to begin?”

  [139] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4-11. Ἦν δέ τις ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ Ξενοφῶν
  Ἀθηναῖος, ὃς οὔτε στρατηγὸς, etc.

  Homer, Iliad, v, 9—

    Ἦν δέ τις ἐν Τρώεσσι Δάρης, ἀφνεῖος, ἀμύμων,
    Ἱρεὺς Ἡφαίστοιο, etc.

  Compare the description of Zeus sending Oneirus to the sleeping
  Agamemnon, at the beginning of the second book of the Iliad.

  [140] Respecting the value of a sign from Zeus Basileus, and the
  necessity of conciliating him, compare various passages in the
  Cyropædia, ii, 4, 19; iii, 3, 21; vii, 5, 57.

  [141] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 12, 13. Περίφοβος δ᾽ εὐθὺς ἀνηγέρθη, καὶ
  τὸ ὄναρ τῆ μὲν ἔκρινεν ἀγαθόν, ὅτι ἐν πόνοις ὢν καὶ κινδύνοις
  φῶς μέγα ἐκ Διὸς ἰδεῖν ἔδοξε, etc. ... Ὁποῖον τι μὲν δή ἐστι τὸ
  τοιοῦτον ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, ἔξεστι σκοπεῖν ἐκ τῶν συμβάντων μετὰ τὸ
  ὄναρ. Γίγνεται γὰρ τάδε. Εὐθὺς ἐπειδὴ ἀνηγέρθη, πρῶτον μὲν ἔννοια
  αὐτῷ ἐμπίπτει· Τί κατάκειμαι; ἡ δὲ νὺξ προβαίνει· ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ
  εἰκὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἥξειν, etc.

  The reader of Homer will readily recall various passages in the
  Iliad and Odyssey, wherein the like mental talk is put into
  language and expanded,—such as Iliad, xi, 403—and several other
  passages cited or referred to in Colonel Mure’s History of the
  Language and Literature of Greece, ch. xiv, vol. ii, p. 25 _seq._

  A vision of light shining brightly out of a friendly house,
  counts for a favorable sign (Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, p. 587
  C.).

With these reflections, interesting in themselves and given with
Homeric vivacity, he instantly went to convene the lochagi or
captains who had served under his late friend Proxenus; and impressed
upon them emphatically the necessity of standing forward to put the
army in a posture of defence. “I cannot sleep, gentlemen; neither, I
presume, can you, under our present perils. The enemy will be upon
us at daybreak,—prepared to kill us all with tortures, as his worst
enemies. For my part, I rejoice that his flagitious perjury has put
an end to a truce by which we were the great losers; a truce under
which we, mindful of our oaths, have passed through all the rich
possessions of the king, without touching anything except what we
could purchase with our own scanty means. Now, we have our hands
free; all these rich spoils stand between us and him, as prizes for
the better man. The gods, who preside over the match, will assuredly
be on the side of us, who have kept our oaths in spite of strong
temptations, against these perjurers. Moreover, our bodies are more
enduring, and our spirits more gallant, than theirs. They are easier
to wound, and easier to kill, than we are, under the same favor of
the gods as we experienced at Kunaxa.

“Probably others also are feeling just as we feel. But let us not
wait for any one else to come as monitors to us; let us take the
lead, and communicate the stimulus of honor to others. Do you show
yourselves now the best among the lochages,—more worthy of being
generals than the generals themselves. Begin at once, and I desire
only to follow you. But if you order me into the front rank, I shall
obey without pleading my youth as an excuse,—accounting myself of
complete maturity, when the purpose is to save myself from ruin.”[142]

  [142] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 16, 25.

  “Vel imperatore, vel milite, me utemini.” (Sallust, Bellum
  Catilinar. c. 20).

All the captains who heard Xenophon cordially concurred in
his suggestion, and desired him to take the lead in executing
it. One captain alone,—Apollonides, speaking in the Bœotian
dialect,—protested against it as insane; enlarging upon their
desperate position, and insisting upon submission to the king, as the
only chance of safety. “How (replied Xenophon)? Have you forgotten
the courteous treatment which we received from the Persians in
Babylonia, when we replied to their demand for the surrender of our
arms by showing a bold front? Do not you see the miserable fate which
has befallen Klearchus, when he trusted himself unarmed in their
hands, in reliance on their oaths? And yet you scout our exhortations
to resistance, again advising us to go and plead for indulgence! My
friends, such a Greek as this man, disgraces not only his own city,
but all Greece besides. Let us banish him from our counsels, cashier
him, and make a slave of him to carry baggage.”—“Nay (observed
Agasias of Stymphalus), the man has nothing to do with Greece; I
myself have seen his ears bored, like a true Lydian.” Apollonides was
degraded accordingly.[143]

  [143] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 26-30. It would appear from the words
  of Xenophon, that Apollonides had been one of those who had held
  faint-hearted language (ὑπομαλακιζόμενοι, ii, 1, 14) in the
  conversation with Phalinus shortly after the death of Cyrus.
  Hence Xenophon tells him, that this is the second time of his
  offering such advice—Ἃ σὺ πάντα εἰδὼς, τοὺς μὲν ἀμύνασθαι
  κελεύοντας φλυαρεῖν φῂς, ~πείθειν δὲ πάλιν κελεύεις ἰόντας~;

  This helps to explain the contempt and rigor with which Xenophon
  here treats him. Nothing indeed could be more deplorable, under
  the actual circumstances, than for a man “to show his acuteness
  by summing up the perils around.” See the remarkable speech of
  Demosthenes at Pylos (Thucyd. iv, 10).

Xenophon with the rest then distributed themselves in order to bring
together the chief remaining officers in the army, who were presently
convened, to the number of about one hundred. The senior captain of
the earlier body next desired Xenophon to repeat to this larger body
the topics upon which he had just before been insisting. Xenophon
obeyed, enlarging yet more emphatically on the situation, perilous,
yet not without hope,—on the proper measures to be taken,—and
especially on the necessity that they, the chief officers remaining,
should put themselves forward prominently, first fix upon effective
commanders, then afterwards submit the names to be confirmed by the
army, accompanied with suitable exhortations and encouragement. His
speech was applauded and welcomed, especially by the Lacedæmonian
general Cheirisophus, who had joined Cyrus with a body of seven
hundred hoplites at Issus in Kilikia. Cheirisophus urged the captains
to retire forthwith, and agree upon other commanders instead of the
four who had been seized; after which the herald must be summoned,
and the entire body of soldiers convened without delay. Accordingly
Timasion of Dardanus was chosen instead of Klearchus; Xanthiklês in
place of Sokrates; Kleanor in place of Agias; Philesius in place
of Menon; and Xenophon instead of Proxenus.[144] The captains, who
had served under each of the departed generals, separately chose a
successor to the captain thus promoted. It is to be recollected that
the five now chosen were not the only generals in the camp; thus for
example, Cheirisophus had the command of his own separate division,
and there may have been one or two others similarly placed. But it
was now necessary for all the generals to form a Board and act in
concert.

  [144] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 36-46.

At daybreak the newly constituted Board of generals placed proper
outposts in advance, and then convened the army in general assembly,
in order that the new appointments might be submitted and confirmed.
As soon as this had been done, probably on the proposition of
Cheirisophus (who had been in command before), that general addressed
a few words of exhortation and encouragement to the soldiers. He was
followed by Kleanor, who delivered, with the like brevity, an earnest
protest against the perfidy of Tissaphernes and Ariæus. Both of
them left to Xenophon the task, alike important and arduous at this
moment of despondency, of setting forth the case at length,—working
up the feelings of the soldiers to that pitch of resolution which
the emergency required,—and above all, extinguishing all those
inclinations to acquiesce in new treacherous proposals from the
enemy, which the perils of the situation would be likely to suggest.

Xenophon had equipped himself in his finest military costume at this
his first official appearance before the army, when the scales seemed
to tremble between life and death. Taking up the protest of Kleanor
against the treachery of the Persians, he insisted that any attempt
to enter into convention or trust with such liars, would be utter
ruin,—but that if energetic resolution were taken to deal with them
only at the point of the sword, and punish their misdeeds, there was
good hope of the favor of the gods and of ultimate preservation. As
he pronounced this last word, one of the soldiers near him happened
to sneeze. Immediately the whole army around shouted with one accord
the accustomed invocation to Zeus the Preserver; and Xenophon, taking
up the accident, continued,—“Since, gentlemen, this omen from Zeus
the Preserver has appeared at the instant when we were talking about
preservation, let us here vow to offer the preserving sacrifice to
that god, and at the same time to sacrifice to the remaining gods as
well as we can, in the first friendly country which we may reach. Let
every man who agrees with me, hold up his hand.” All held up their
hands; all then joined in the vow, and shouted the pæan.

This accident, so dexterously turned to profit by the rhetorical
skill of Xenophon, was eminently beneficial in raising the army out
of the depression which weighed them down, and in disposing them to
listen to his animating appeal. Repeating his assurances that the
gods were on their side, and hostile to their perjured enemy, he
recalled to their memory the great invasions of Greece by Darius
and Xerxes,—how the vast hosts of Persia had been disgracefully
repelled. The army had shown themselves on the field of Kunaxa worthy
of such forefathers; and they would for the future be yet bolder,
knowing by that battle of what stuff the Persians were made. As for
Ariæus and his troops, alike traitors and cowards, their desertion
was rather a gain than a loss. The enemy were superior in horsemen;
but men on horseback were, after all, only men, half-occupied in the
fear of losing their seats,—incapable of prevailing against infantry
firm on the ground,—and only better able to run away. Now that the
satrap refused to furnish them with provisions to buy, they on their
side were released from their covenant, and would take provisions
without buying. Then as to the rivers; those were indeed difficult
to be crossed in the middle of their course; but the army would
march up to their sources, and could then pass them without wetting
the knee. Or indeed, the Greeks might renounce the idea of retreat,
and establish themselves permanently in the king’s own country,
defying all his force, like the Mysians and Pisidians. “If (said
Xenophon) we plant ourselves here at our ease in a rich country, with
these tall, stately, and beautiful Median and Persian women for our
companions,[145]—we shall be only too ready, like the Lotophagi,
to forget our way home. We ought first to go back to Greece, and
tell our countrymen that if they remain poor, it is their own fault,
when there are rich settlements in this country awaiting all who
choose to come, and who have courage to seize them. Let us burn our
baggage-waggons and tents, and carry with us nothing but what is of
the strictest necessity. Above all things, let us maintain order,
discipline, and obedience to the commanders, upon which our entire
hope of safety depends. Let every man promise to lend his hand to
the commanders in punishing any disobedient individuals; and let us
thus show the enemy that we have ten thousand persons like Klearchus,
instead of that one whom they have so perfidiously seized. Now is the
time for action. If any man, however obscure, has anything better to
suggest, let him come forward and state it; for we have all but one
object,—the common safety.”

  [145] Xen. Anab. iii, 2, 25.

  Ἀλλὰ γὰρ δέδοικα μή ἂν ἅπαξ μάθωμεν ἀργοὶ ζῆν καὶ ἐν ἀφθόνοις
  βιοτεύειν, καὶ Μήδων δὲ καὶ Περσῶν ~καλαῖς καὶ μεγάλαις γυναιξὶ
  καὶ παρθένοις ὁμιλεῖν~, μὴ ὥσπερ οἱ λωτοφάγοι, ἐπιλαθώμεθα τῆς
  οἴκαδε ὁδοῦ.

  Hippokrates (De Aëre, Locis, et Aquis, c. 12) compares the
  physical characteristics of Asiatics and Europeans, noticing the
  ample, full-grown, rounded, voluptuous, but inactive forms of
  the first,—as contrasted with the more compact, muscular, and
  vigorous type of the second, trained for movement, action, and
  endurance.

  Dio Chrysostom has a curious passage, in reference to the Persian
  preference for eunuchs as slaves, remarking that they admired
  even in males an approach to the type of feminine beauty,—their
  eyes and tastes being under the influence only of aphrodisiac
  ideas; whereas the Greeks, accustomed to the constant training
  and naked exercises of the palæstra, boys competing with boys and
  youths with youths, had their associations of the male beauty
  attracted towards active power and graceful motion.

  Οὐ γὰρ φανερὸν, ὅτι οἱ Πέρσαι εὐνούχους ἐποίουν τοὺς καλοὺς, ὅπως
  αὐτοῖς ὡς κάλλιστοι ὦσι; Τοσοῦτον διαφέρειν ᾤοντο πρὸς κάλλος τὸ
  θῆλυ· σχεδὸν καὶ πάντες οἱ βάρβαροι, διὰ τὸ μόνον τὰ ἀφροδίσια
  ἐννοεῖν. Κἀκεῖνοι γυναικός εἰδος περιτιθέασι τοῖς ἄῤῥεσιν, ἄλλως
  δ᾽ οὐκ ἐπίστανται ἐρᾷν· ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἡ τροφὴ αἰτία τοῖς Πέρσαις,
  τῷ μέχρι πολλοῦ τρέφεσθαι ὑπό τε γυναικῶν καὶ εὐνούχων τῶν
  πρεσβυτέρων· παῖδας δὲ μετὰ παιδῶν, καὶ μειράκια μετὰ μειρακίων
  μὴ πάνυ συνεῖναι, μηδὲ γυμνοῦσθαι ἐν παλαίστραις καὶ γυμνασίοις,
  etc. (Orat. xxi, p. 270).

  Compare Euripides, Bacchæ, 447 _seq._; and the Epigram of Strato
  in the Anthologia, xxxiv, vol. ii, p. 367 Brunck.

It appears that no one else desired to say a word, and that
the speech of Xenophon gave unqualified satisfaction; for when
Cheirisophus put the question, that the meeting should sanction his
recommendations, and finally elect the new generals proposed,—every
man held up his hand. Xenophon then moved that the army should break
up immediately, and march to some well-stored villages, rather more
than two miles distant; that the march should be in a hollow oblong,
with the baggage in the centre; that Cheirisophus, as a Lacedæmonian,
should lead the van; while Kleanor, and the other senior officers,
would command on each flank,—and himself with Timasion, as the two
youngest of the generals, would lead the rear-guard.

This proposition was at once adopted, and the assembly broke up,
proceeding forthwith to destroy, or distribute among one another,
every man’s superfluous baggage,—and then to take their morning meal
previous to the march.

The scene just described is interesting and illustrative in more
than one point of view.[146] It exhibits that susceptibility to the
influence of persuasive discourse which formed so marked a feature
in the Grecian character,—a resurrection of the collective body out
of the depth of despair, under the exhortation of one who had no
established ascendency, nor anything to recommend him, except his
intelligence, his oratorical power, and his community of interest
with themselves. Next, it manifests, still more strikingly, the
superiority of Athenian training as compared with that of other parts
of Greece. Cheirisophus had not only been before in office as one
of the generals, but was also a native of Sparta, whose supremacy
and name was at that moment all-powerful. Kleanor had been before,
not indeed a general, but a lochage, or one in the second rank of
officers;—he was an elderly man,—and he was an Arcadian, while
more than the numerical half of the army consisted of Arcadians and
Achæans. Either of these two, therefore, and various others besides,
enjoyed a sort of prerogative, or established starting-point,
for taking the initiative in reference to the dispirited army.
But Xenophon was comparatively a young man, with little military
experience;—he was not an officer at all, either in the first or
second grade, but simply a volunteer, companion of Proxenus;—he was,
moreover, a native of Athens, a city at that time unpopular among
the great body of Greeks, and especially of Peloponnesians, with
whom her recent long war had been carried on. Not only, therefore,
he had no advantages compared with others, but he was under positive
disadvantages. He had nothing to start with except his personal
qualities and previous training; in spite of which we find him not
merely the prime mover, but also the ascendent person for whom the
others make way. In him are exemplified those peculiarities of
Athens, attested not less by the denunciation of her enemies than
by the panegyric of her own citizens,[147]—spontaneous and forward
impulse, as well in conception as in execution,—confidence under
circumstances which made others despair,—persuasive discourse and
publicity of discussion, made subservient to practical business,
so as at once to appeal to the intelligence, and stimulate the
active zeal, of the multitude. Such peculiarities stood out more
remarkably from being contrasted with the opposite qualities in
Spartans,—mistrust in conception, slackness in execution, secrecy in
counsel, silent and passive obedience. Though Spartans and Athenians
formed the two extremities of the scale, other Greeks stood nearer on
this point to the former than to the latter.

  [146] A very meagre abstract is given by Diodorus, of that which
  passed after the seizure of the generals (xiv, 27). He does
  not mention the name of Xenophon on this occasion, nor indeed
  throughout all his account of the march.

  [147] Compare the hostile speech of the Corinthian envoy at
  Sparta, prior to the Peloponnesian war, with the eulogistic
  funeral oration of Perikles, in the second year of that war
  (Thucyd. i, 70, 71; ii, 39, 40).

  Οἱ μέν γε (εἰσὶ), νεωτεροποιοὶ (description of the Athenians by
  the Corinthian speaker) ~καὶ ἐπινοῆσαι ὀξεῖς καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργῳ
  ἃ ἂν γνῶσιν~· ὑμεῖς δὲ (Lacedæmonians), τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σώζειν
  καὶ ἐπιγνῶναι μηδὲν, καὶ ἔργῳ οὐδὲ τἀναγκαῖα ἐξικέσθαι. Αὖθις δὲ,
  οἱ μὲν, καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταὶ καὶ παρὰ γνώμην κινδυνευταὶ καὶ
  ἐπὶ τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες· τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον, τῆς τεδυνάμεως ἐνδεᾶ
  πρᾶξαι, τῆς τε γνώμης μηδὲ τοῖς βεβαίοις πιστεῦσαι, τῶν τε δεινῶν
  μηδέποτε οἴεσθαι ἀπολυθήσεσθαι. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς
  μελλήτας, καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους, etc.

  Again, in the oration of Perikles—Καὶ αὐτοὶ ἤτοι κρίνομεν ἢ
  ἐνθυμούμεθα ὀρθῶς τὰ πράγματα, οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην
  ἡγούμενοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ προδιδαχθῆναι μᾶλλον λόγῳ, πρότερον ἢ ἐπὶ ἃ
  δεῖ ἔργῳ ἐλθεῖν. Διαφερόντως μὲν δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔχομεν, ~ὥστε τολμᾷν
  τε οἱ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπιχειρήσομεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι~· ὃ
  τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀμαθία μὲν θράσος, λογισμὸς δὲ ὄκνον, φέρει.

If, even in that encouraging autumn which followed immediately
upon the great Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, the inertia
of Sparta could not be stirred into vigorous action without the
vehemence of the Athenian Alkibiades,—much more was it necessary
under the depressing circumstances which now overclouded the
unofficered Grecian army, that an Athenian bosom should be found as
the source of new life and impulse. Nor would any one, probably,
except an Athenian, either have felt or obeyed the promptings to
stand forward as a volunteer at that moment, when there was every
motive to decline responsibility, and no special duty to impel him.
But if by chance, a Spartan or an Arcadian had been found thus
forward, he would have been destitute of such talents as would
enable him to work on the minds of others[148]—of that flexibility,
resource, familiarity with the temper and movements of an assembled
crowd, power of enforcing the essential views and touching the
opportune chords, which Athenian democratical training imparted.
Even Brasidas and Gylippus, individual Spartans of splendid merit,
and equal or superior to Xenophon in military resource, would not
have combined with it that political and rhetorical accomplishment
which the position of the latter demanded. Obvious as the wisdom
of his propositions appears, each of them is left to him not only
to imitate, but to enforce;—Cheirisophus and Kleanor, after a few
words of introduction, consign to him the duty of working up the
minds of the army to the proper pitch. How well he performed this,
may be seen by his speech to the army, which bears in its general
tenor a remarkable resemblance to that of Perikles addressed to the
Athenian public in the second year of the war, at the moment when
the miseries of the epidemic, combined with those of invasion, had
driven them almost to despair. It breathes a strain of exaggerated
confidence, and an undervaluing of real dangers, highly suitable
for the occasion, but which neither Perikles nor Xenophon would
have employed at any other moment.[149] Throughout the whole of his
speech, and especially in regard to the accidental sneeze near at
hand which interrupted the beginning of it, Xenophon displayed that
skill and practice in dealing with a numerous audience and a given
situation, which characterized more or less every educated Athenian.
Other Greeks, Lacedæmonians or Arcadians, could act, with bravery
and in concert; but the Athenian Xenophon was among the few who
could think, speak, and act, with equal efficiency.[150] It was this
tripartite accomplishment which an aspiring youth was compelled to
set before himself as an aim, in the democracy of Athens, and which
the sophists as well as the democratical institutions, both of them
so hardly depreciated, helped and encouraged him to acquire. It was
this tripartite accomplishment, the exclusive possession of which,
in spite of constant jealousy on the part of Bœotian officers and
comrades of Proxenus,[151] elevated Xenophon into the most ascendent
person of the Cyreian army, from the present moment until the time
when it broke up,—as will be seen in the subsequent history.

  [148] Compare the observations of Perikles, in his last speech
  to the Athenians about the inefficiency of the best thoughts, if
  a man had not the power of setting them forth in an impressive
  manner (Thucyd. ii, 60). Καίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιούτῳ ἀνδρὶ ὀργίζεσθε, ὃς
  οὐδενὸς οἴομαι ἥσσων εἶναι ~γνῶναί τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι
  ταῦτα~, φιλόπολίς τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείττων· ὅ τε γὰρ γνοὺς καὶ μὴ
  σαφῶς διδάξας, ἐν ἵσῳ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐνεθυμήθη, etc.

  The philosopher and the statesman at Athens here hold the same
  language. It was the opinion of Sokrates—μόνους ἀξίους εἶναι
  τιμῆς ~τοὺς εἰδότας τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι δυναμένους~
  (Xenoph. Mem. i, 2, 52).

  A striking passage in the funeral harangue of Lysias (Orat. ii,
  Epitaph. s. 19) sets forth the prevalent idea of the Athenian
  democracy—authoritative law, with persuasive and instructive
  speech, as superseding mutual violence (νόμος and λόγος, as the
  antithesis of βία). Compare a similar sentiment in Isokrates (Or.
  iv, (Panegyr.) s. 53-56).

  [149] See the speech of Perikles (Thuc. ii, 60-64). He justifies
  the boastful tone of it, by the unwonted depression against which
  he had to contend on the part of his hearers—Δελώσω δὲ καὶ
  τόδε ὅ μοι δοκεῖτε οὔτ᾽ αὐτοὶ πώποτε ἐνθυμηθῆναι ὑπάρχον ὑμῖν
  μεγέθους περὶ ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὔτ᾽ ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς πρὶν λόγοις, ~οὐδ᾽
  ἂν νῦν ἐχρησάμην κομπωδεστέραν ἔχοντι τὴν προσποίησιν, εἰ μὴ
  καταπεπληγμένους ὑμᾶς παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἑώρων~.

  This is also the proper explanation of Xenophon’s tone.

  [150] In a passage of the Cyropædia (v. 5, 46), Xenophon sets
  forth in a striking manner the combination of the λεκτικὸς καὶ
  πρακτικός—Ὥσπερ καὶ ὅταν μάχεσθαι δέῃ, ὁ πλείστους χειρωσάμενος
  ἀλκιμώτατος δοξάζεται εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ ὅταν πεῖσαι δέῃ, ὁ
  πλέιστους ὁμογνώμονας ἡμῖν ποιήσας οὗτος δικαίως ἂν ~λεκτικώτατος
  καὶ πρακτικώτατος~ κρίνοιτο ἂν εἶναι. Μὴ μέντοι ὡς ~λόγον
  ἡμῖν ἐπιδειξόμενοι, οἷον ἂν εἴποιτε πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, τοῦτο
  μελετᾶτε—ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τοὺς πεπεισμένους ὑφ᾽ ἑκάστου δήλους ἐσομένους
  οἷς ἂν πράττωσιν, ὅυτω παρασκευάζεσθε~.

  In describing the duties of a Hipparch or commander of the
  cavalry, Xenophon also insists upon the importance of persuasive
  speech, as a means of keeping up the active obedience of the
  soldiers—Εἴς γε μὴν τὸ εὐπειθεῖς εἶναι τοὺς ἀρχομένους, μέγα μὲν
  καὶ τὸ λόγῳ διδάσκειν, ὅσα ἀγαθὰ ἔνι ἐν τῷ πειθαρχεῖν, etc. (Xen.
  Mag. Eq. i, 24).

  [151] See Xenoph. Anab. v, 6, 25.

I think it the more necessary to notice this fact,—that the
accomplishments whereby Xenophon leaped on a sudden into such
extraordinary ascendency, and rendered such eminent service to
his army, were accomplishments belonging in an especial manner to
the Athenian democracy and education,—because Xenophon himself
has throughout his writings treated Athens not merely without the
attachment of a citizen, but with feelings more like the positive
antipathy of an exile. His sympathies are all in favor of the
perpetual drill, the mechanical obedience, the secret government
proceedings, the narrow and prescribed range of ideas, the silent
and deferential demeanor, the methodical, though tardy, action—of
Sparta. Whatever may be the justice of his preference, certain it
is, that the qualities whereby he was himself enabled to contribute
so much both to the rescue of the Cyreian army, and to his own
reputation,—were Athenian far more than Spartan.

While the Grecian army, after sanctioning the propositions of
Xenophon, were taking their morning meal before they commenced
their march, Mithridates, one of the Persians previously attached
to Cyrus, appeared with a few horsemen on a mission of pretended
friendship. But it was soon found out that his purposes were
treacherous, and that he came merely to seduce individual soldiers
to desertion,—with a few of whom he succeeded. Accordingly, the
resolution was taken to admit no more heralds or envoys.

Disembarrassed of superfluous baggage, and refreshed, the army
now crossed the Great Zab River, and pursued their march on the
other side, having their baggage and attendants in the centre, and
Cheirisophus leading the van, with a select body of three hundred
hoplites.[152] As no mention is made of a bridge, we are to presume
that they forded the river,—which furnishes a ford (according to Mr.
Ainsworth), still commonly used, at a place between thirty and forty
miles from its junction with the Tigris. When they had got a little
way forward, Mithridates again appeared with a few hundred cavalry
and bowmen. He approached them like a friend; but as soon as he was
near enough, suddenly began to harass the rear with a shower of
missiles. What surprises us most, is, that the Persians, with their
very numerous force, made no attempt to hinder them from crossing so
very considerable a river; for Xenophon estimates the Zab at four
hundred feet broad,—and this seems below the statement of modern
travellers, who inform us that it contains not much less water than
the Tigris; and though usually deeper and narrower, cannot be much
narrower at any fordable place.[153] It is to be recollected that
the Persians, habitually marching in advance of the Greeks, must
have reached the river first, and were, therefore, in possession
of the crossing, whether bridge or ford. Though on the watch for
every opportunity of perfidy, Tissaphernes did not dare to resist
the Greeks even in the most advantageous position, and ventured only
upon sending Mithridates to harass the rear; which he executed with
considerable effect. The bowmen and darters of the Greeks, few in
number, were at the same time inferior to those of the Persians;
and when Xenophon employed his rear guard, hoplites and peltasts,
to charge and repel them, he not only could never overtake any one,
but suffered much in getting back to rejoin his own main body. Even
when retiring, the Persian horseman could discharge his arrow or cast
his javelin behind him with effect; a dexterity which the Parthians
exhibited afterwards still more signally, and which the Persian
horsemen of the present day parallel with their carbines. This was
the first experience which the Greeks had of marching under the
harassing attack of cavalry. Even the small detachment of Mithridates
greatly delayed their progress; so that they accomplished little
more than two miles, reaching the villages in the evening, with many
wounded, and much discouragement.[154]

  [152] Xen. Anab. iii, 3, 6; iii, 5, 43.

  [153] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 1. Ainsworth. Travels and Researches in
  Asia Minor, etc. vol. ii, ch. 44, p. 327; also his Travels in the
  Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 119-134.

  Professor Koch, who speaks with personal knowledge both of
  Armenia and of the region east of the Tigris, observes truly
  that the Great Zab is the only point (east of the Tigris) which
  Xenophon assigns in such a manner as to be capable of distinct
  local identification. He also observes, here as elsewhere, that
  the number of parasangs specified by Xenophon is essentially
  delusive as a measure of distance (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 64).

  [154] Xen. Anab. iii, 3, 9.

“Thank Heaven,” (said Xenophon in the evening, when Cheirisophus
reproached him for imprudence in quitting the main body to charge
cavalry, whom yet he could not reach.) “Thank Heaven, that our
enemies attacked us with a small detachment only, and not with their
great numbers. They have given us a valuable lesson, without doing
us any serious harm.” Profiting by the lesson, the Greek leaders
organized during the night and during the halt of the next day, a
small body of fifty cavalry; with two hundred Rhodian slingers,
whose slings, furnished with leaden bullets, both carried farther
and struck harder than those of the Persians hurling large stones.
On the ensuing morning, they started before daybreak, since there
lay in their way a ravine difficult to pass. They found the ravine
undefended (according to the usual stupidity of Persian proceedings),
but when they had got nearly a mile beyond it, Mithridates reappeared
in pursuit with a body of four thousand horsemen and darters.
Confident from his achievement of the preceding day, he had promised,
with a body of that force, to deliver the Greeks into the hands
of the satrap. But the latter were now better prepared. As soon
as he began to attack them, the trumpet sounded,—and forthwith
the horsemen, slingers, and darters, issued forth to charge the
Persians, sustained by the hoplites in the rear. So effective was
the charge, that the Persians fled in dismay, notwithstanding their
superiority in number; while the ravine so impeded their flight
that many of them were slain, and eighteen prisoners made. The
Greek soldiers of their own accord mutilated the dead bodies, in
order to strike terror into the enemy.[155] At the end of the day’s
march they reached the Tigris, near the deserted city of Larissa,
the vast, massive, and lofty brick walls of which (twenty-five feet
in thickness, one hundred feet high, seven miles in circumference)
attested its former grandeur. Near this place was a stone pyramid,
one hundred feet in breadth, and two hundred feet high; the summit
of which was crowded with fugitives out of the neighboring villages.
Another day’s march up the course of the Tigris brought the army to
a second deserted city called Mespila, nearly opposite to the modern
city of Mosul. Although these two cities, which seem to have formed
the continuation or the substitute of the once colossal Nineveh or
Ninus, were completely deserted,—yet the country around them was so
well furnished with villages and population, that the Greeks not only
obtained provisions, but also strings for the making of new bows, and
lead for bullets to be used for the slingers.[156]

  [155] Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 1-5.

  [156] Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 17, 18. It is here, on the site of the
  ancient Nineveh, that the recent investigations of Mr. Layard
  have brought to light so many curious and valuable Assyrian
  remains. The legend which Xenophon heard on the spot, respecting
  the way in which these cities were captured and ruined, is of a
  truly Oriental character.

During the next day’s march, in a course generally parallel with
the Tigris, and ascending the stream, Tissaphernes, coming up along
with some other grandees, and with a numerous army, enveloped the
Greeks both in flanks and rear. In spite of his advantage of numbers,
he did not venture upon any actual charge, but kept up a fire of
arrows, darts, and stones. He was, however, so well answered by
the newly-trained archers and slingers of the Greeks, that on the
whole they had the advantage, in spite of the superior size of the
Persian bows, many of which were taken and effectively employed on
the Grecian side. Having passed the night in a well-stocked village,
they halted there the next day in order to stock themselves with
provisions, and then pursued their march for four successive days
along a level country, until, on the fifth day, they reached hilly
ground with the prospect of still higher hills beyond. All this
march was made under unremitting annoyance from the enemy, insomuch
that though the order of the Greeks was never broken, a considerable
number of their men were wounded. Experience taught them, that it
was inconvenient for the whole army to march in one inflexible,
undivided, hollow square; and they accordingly constituted six lochi
or regiments of one hundred men each, subdivided into companies
of fifty, and enômoties or smaller companies of twenty-five, each
with a special officer (conformably to the Spartan practice) to
move separately on each flank, and either to fall back, or fall in,
as might suit the fluctuations of the central mass, arising from
impediments in the road or menaces of the enemy.[157] On reaching
the hills, in sight of an elevated citadel or palace, with several
villages around it, the Greeks anticipated some remission of the
Persian attack. But after having passed over one hill, they were
proceeding to ascend the second, when they found themselves assailed
with unwonted vigor by the Persian cavalry from the summit of it,
whose leaders were seen flogging on the men to the attack.[158]
This charge was so efficacious, that the Greek light troops were
driven in with loss, and forced to take shelter within the ranks of
the hoplites. After a march both slow and full of suffering, they
could only reach their night-quarters by sending a detachment to get
possession of some ground above the Persians, who thus became afraid
of a double attack.

  [157] Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 19-23.

  I incline to believe that there were six lochi upon _each_
  flank—that is, twelve lochi in all; though the words of Xenophon
  are not quite clear.

  [158] Xen. Anab. iii, 4-25. Compare Herodot. vii, 21, 56, 103.

The villages which they now reached (supposed by Mr. Ainsworth
to have been in the fertile country under the modern town called
Zakhu),[159] were unusually rich in provisions; magazines of flour,
barley, and wine, having been collected there for the Persian
satrap. They reposed here three days, chiefly in order to tend the
numerous wounded, for whose necessities, eight of the most competent
persons were singled out to act as surgeons. On the fourth day they
resumed their march, descending into the plain. But experience had
now satisfied them that it was imprudent to continue in march under
the attack of cavalry, so that when Tissaphernes appeared and began
to harass them, they halted at the first village, and when thus in
station, easily repelled him. As the afternoon advanced, the Persian
assailants began to retire; for they were always in the habit of
taking up their night-post at a distance of near seven miles from
the Grecian position; being very apprehensive of nocturnal attack in
their camp, when their horses were tied by the leg and without either
saddle or bridle.[160] As soon as they had departed, the Greeks
resumed their march, and made so much advance during the night, that
the Persians did not overtake them either on the next day or the day
after.

  [159] Professor Koch (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 68) is of the same
  opinion.

  [160] Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 35; see also Cyropædia, iii, 3, 37.

  The Thracian prince Seuthes was so apprehensive of night attack,
  that he and his troops kept their horses bridled all night (Xen.
  Anab. vii, 2, 21.)

  Mr. Kinneir (Travels in Asia Minor, etc., p. 481) states that the
  horses of Oriental cavalry, and even of the English cavalry in
  Hindostan, are still kept tied and shackled at night, in the same
  way as Xenophon describes to have been practised by the Persians.

On the ensuing day, however, the Persians, having made a forced
march by night, were seen not only in advance of the Greeks, but
in occupation of a spur of high and precipitous ground overhanging
immediately the road whereby the Greeks were to descend into the
plain. When Cheirisophus approached, he at once saw that descent
was impracticable in the face of an enemy thus posted. He therefore
halted, sent for Xenophon from the rear, and desired him to bring
forward the peltasts to the van. But Xenophon, though he obeyed
the summons in person and galloped his horse to the front, did not
think it prudent to move the peltasts from the rear, because he saw
Tissaphernes, with another portion of the army, just coming up; so
that the Grecian army was at once impeded in front, and threatened by
the enemy closing upon them behind. The Persians on the high ground
in front could not be directly assailed. But Xenophon observed,
that on the right of the Grecian army, there was an accessible
mountain-summit yet higher, from whence a descent might be made for a
flank attack upon the Persian position. Pointing out this summit to
Cheirisophus, as affording the only means of dislodging the troops
in front, he urged that one of them should immediately hasten with a
detachment to take possession of it, and offered to Cheirisophus the
choice either of going, or staying with the army. “Choose yourself,”
said Cheirisophus. “Well, then, (said Xenophon), I will go; since I
am the younger of the two.” Accordingly, at the head of a select
detachment from the van and centre of the army, he immediately
commenced his flank march up the steep ascent to this highest
summit. So soon as the enemy saw their purpose, they also detached
troops on their side, hoping to get to the summit first; and the two
detachments were seen mounting at the same time, each struggling with
the utmost efforts to get before the other,—each being encouraged by
shouts and clamor from the two armies respectively.

As Xenophon was riding by the side of his soldiers, cheering them
on and reminding them that their chance of seeing their country and
their families all depended upon success in the effort before them, a
Sikyonian hoplite in the ranks, named Sotêridas, said to him,—“You
and I are not on an equal footing, Xenophon. You are on horseback; I
am painfully struggling up on foot, with my shield to carry.” Stung
with this taunt, Xenophon sprang from his horse, pushed Sotêridas out
of his place in the ranks, took his shield as well as his place, and
began to march forward afoot along with the rest. Though thus weighed
down at once by the shield belonging to an hoplite, and by the heavy
cuirass of a horseman (who carried no shield), he nevertheless put
forth all his strength to advance, under such double incumbrance,
and to continue his incitement to the rest. But the soldiers around
him were so indignant at the proceeding of Sotêridas, that they
reproached and even struck him, until they compelled him to resume
his shield as well as his place in the ranks. Xenophon then remounted
and ascended the hill on horseback as far as the ground permitted;
but was obliged again to dismount presently, in consequence of the
steepness of the uppermost portion. Such energetic efforts enabled
him and his detachment to reach the summit first. As soon as the
enemy saw this, they desisted from their ascent, and dispersed in all
directions; leaving the forward march open to the main Grecian army,
which Cheirisophus accordingly conducted safely down into the plain.
Here he was rejoined by Xenophon on descending from the summit. All
found themselves in comfortable quarters, amidst several well-stocked
villages on the banks of the Tigris. They acquired moreover an
additional booty of large droves of cattle, intercepted when on the
point of being transported across the river; where a considerable
body of horse were seen assembled on the opposite bank.[161]

  [161] Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 36-49; iii, 5, 3.

Though here disturbed only by some desultory attacks on the part of
the Persians, who burnt several of the villages which lay in their
forward line of march, the Greeks became seriously embarrassed
whither to direct their steps; for on their left flank was the
Tigris, so deep that their spears found no bottom,—and on their
right, mountains of exceeding height. As the generals and the
lochages were taking counsel, a Rhodian soldier came to them with a
proposition for transporting the whole army across to the other bank
of the river by means of inflated skins, which could be furnished
in abundance by the animals in their possession. But this ingenious
scheme, in itself feasible, was put out of the question by the view
of the Persian cavalry on the opposite bank; and as the villages in
their front had been burnt, the army had no choice except to return
back one day’s march to those in which they had before halted. Here
the generals again deliberated, questioning all their prisoners as
to the different bearings of the country. The road from the south
was that in which they had already marched from Babylon and Media;
that to the westward, going to Lydia and Ionia, was barred to them
by the interposing Tigris; eastward (they were informed) was the way
to Ekbatana and Susa; northward, lay the rugged and inhospitable
mountains of the Karduchians,—fierce freemen who despised the
Great King, and defied all his efforts to conquer them; having once
destroyed a Persian invading army of one hundred and twenty thousand
men. On the other side of Karduchia, however, lay the rich Persian
satrapy of Armenia, wherein both the Euphrates and the Tigris could
be crossed near their sources, and from whence could choose their
farther course easily towards Greece. Like Mysia, Pisidia, and other
mountainous regions, Karduchia was a free territory surrounded on all
sides by the dominions of the Great King, who reigned only in the
cities and on the plains.[162]

  [162] Xen. Anab. iii, 5; iv, 1, 3. Probably the place where
  the Greeks quitted the Tigris to strike into the Karduchian
  mountains, was the neighborhood of Jezireh ibn Omar, the ancient
  Bezabde. It is here that farther march, up the eastern side of
  the Tigris, is rendered impracticable by the mountains closing
  in. Here the modern road crosses the Tigris by a bridge, from the
  eastern bank to the western (Koch, Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 72).

Determining to fight their way across these difficult mountains into
Armenia, but refraining from any public announcement, for fear that
the passes should be occupied beforehand,—the generals sacrificed
forthwith, in order that they might be ready for breaking up at a
moment’s notice. They then began their march a little after midnight,
so that soon after daybreak they reached the first of the Karduchian
mountain-passes, which they found undefended. Cheirisophus, with
his front division and all the light troops, made haste to ascend
the pass, and having got over the first mountain, descended on the
other side to some villages in the valley or nooks beneath; while
Xenophon with the heavy-armed and the baggage, followed at a slower
pace,—not reaching the villages until dark, as the road was both
steep and narrow. The Karduchians, taken completely by surprise,
abandoned the villages as the Greeks approached, and took refuge
on the mountains; leaving to the intruders plenty of provisions,
comfortable houses, and especially, abundance of copper vessels. At
first the Greeks were careful to do no damage, trying to invite the
natives to amicable colloquy. But none of the latter would come near,
and at length necessity drove the Greeks to take what was necessary
for refreshment. It was just when Xenophon and the rear guard were
coming in at night, that some few Karduchians first set upon them; by
surprise and with considerable success,—so that if their numbers had
been greater, serious mischief might have ensued.[163]

  [163] Xen. Anab. iv, 1, 12.

Many fires were discovered burning on the mountains,—an earnest
of resistance during the next day; which satisfied the Greek
generals that they must lighten the army, in order to ensure greater
expedition as well as a fuller complement of available hands during
the coming march. They therefore gave orders to burn all the baggage
except what was indispensable, and to dismiss all the prisoners;
planting themselves in a narrow strait, through which the army had
to pass, in order to see that their directions were executed. The
women, however, of whom there were many with the army, could not be
abandoned; and it seems farther that a considerable stock of baggage
was still retained;[164] nor could the army make more than slow
advance, from the narrowness of the road and the harassing attack
of the Karduchians, who were now assembled in considerable numbers.
Their attack was renewed with double vigor on the ensuing day, when
the Greeks were forced, from want of provisions, to hasten forward
their march, though in the midst of a terrible snow-storm. Both
Cheirisophus in the front and Xenophon in the rear, were hard pressed
by the Karduchian slingers and bowmen; the latter, men of consummate
skill, having bows three cubits in length, and arrows of more than
two cubits, so strong that the Greeks when they took them could dart
them as javelins. These archers, amidst the rugged ground and narrow
paths, approached so near and drew the bow with such surprising
force, resting one extremity of it on the ground, that several Greek
warriors were mortally wounded even through both shield and corslet
into the reins, and through the brazen helmet into their heads;
among them especially, two distinguished men, a Lacedæmonian named
Kleonymus, and an Arcadian named Basias.[165] The rear division,
more roughly handled than the rest, was obliged continually to halt
to repel the enemy, under all the difficulties of the ground, which
made it scarcely possible to act against nimble mountaineers. On one
occasion, however, a body of these latter were entrapped into an
ambush, driven back with loss, and (what was still more fortunate)
two of their number were made prisoners.

  [164] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 19-30.

  [165] Xen. Anab. iv, 1, 18; iv, 2, 28.

Thus impeded, Xenophon sent frequent messages entreating Cheirisophus
to slacken the march of the van division; but instead of obeying,
Cheirisophus only hastened the faster, urging Xenophon to follow
him. The march of the army became little better than a rout, so that
the rear division reached the halting-place in extreme confusion;
upon which Xenophon proceeded to remonstrate with Cheirisophus for
prematurely hurrying forward and neglecting his comrades behind. But
the other,—pointing out to his attention the hill before them, and
the steep path ascending it, forming their future line of march,
which was beset with numerous Karduchians,—defended himself by
saying that he had hastened forward in hopes of being able to reach
this pass before the enemy, in which attempt however he had not
succeeded.[166]

  [166] Xen. Anab. iv, 1, 21.

To advance farther on this road appeared hopeless; yet the guides
declared that no other could be taken. Xenophon then bethought
him of the two prisoners whom he had just captured, and proposed
that these two should be questioned also. They were accordingly
interrogated apart; and the first of them,—having persisted in
denying, notwithstanding all menaces, that there was any road
except that before them,—was put to death under the eyes of the
second prisoner. This latter, on being then questioned, gave more
comfortable intelligence; saying that he knew of a different road,
more circuitous, but easier and practicable even for beasts of
burden, whereby the pass before them and the occupying enemy might be
turned; but that there was one particular high position commanding
the road, which it was necessary to master beforehand by surprise,
as the Karduchians were already on guard there. Two thousand Greeks,
having the guide bound along with them, were accordingly despatched
late in the afternoon, to surprise this post by a night-march; while
Xenophon, in order to distract the attention of the Karduchians in
front, made a feint of advancing as if about to force the direct
pass. As soon as he was seen crossing the ravine which led to this
mountain, the Karduchians on the top immediately began to roll down
vast masses of rock, which bounded and dashed down the roadway, in
such manner as to render it unapproachable. They continued to do this
all night, and the Greeks heard the noise of the descending masses
long after they had returned to their camp for supper and rest.[167]

  [167] Xen. Anab. iv, 2, 4.

Meanwhile the detachment of two thousand, marching by the circuitous
road, and reaching in the night the elevated position, (though there
was another above yet more commanding), held by the Karduchians,
surprised and dispersed them, passing the night by their fires. At
daybreak, and under favor of a mist, they stole silently towards
the position occupied by the other Karduchians in front of the main
Grecian army. On coming near they suddenly sounded their trumpets,
shouted aloud, and commenced the attack, which proved completely
successful. The defenders, taken unprepared, fled with little
resistance, and scarcely any loss, from their activity and knowledge
of the country; while Cheirisophus and the main Grecian force, on
hearing the trumpet which had been previously concerted as the
signal, rushed forward and stormed the height in front; some along
the regular path, others climbing up as they could and pulling each
other up by means of their spears. The two bodies of Greeks thus
joined each other on the summit, so that the road became open for
farther advance.

Xenophon, however, with the rear guard, marched on the circuitous
road taken by the two thousand, as the most practicable for the
baggage animals, whom he placed in the centre of his division,—the
whole array covering a great length of ground, since the road was
very narrow. During this interval, the dispersed Karduchians had
rallied, and reoccupied two or three high peaks, commanding the
road,—from whence it was necessary to drive them. Xenophon’s
troops stormed successively these three positions, the Karduchians
not daring to affront close combat, yet making destructive use of
their missiles. A Grecian guard was left on the hindermost of the
three peaks, until all the baggage train should have passed by. But
the Karduchians, by a sudden and well-timed movement, contrived
to surprise this guard, slew two out of the three leaders, with
several soldiers, and forced the rest to jump down the crags as they
could, in order to join their comrades in the road. Encouraged by
such success, the assailants pressed nearer to the marching army,
occupying a crag over against that lofty summit on which Xenophon was
posted. As it was within speaking distance, he endeavored to open a
negotiation with them in order to get back the dead bodies of the
slain. To this demand the Karduchians at first acceded, on condition
that their villages should not be burnt; but finding their numbers
every moment increasing, they resumed the offensive. When Xenophon
with the army had begun his descent from the last summit, they
hurried onward in crowds to occupy it; beginning again to roll down
masses of rock, and renew their fire of missiles, upon the Greeks.
Xenophon himself was here in some danger, having been deserted by
his shield-bearer; but he was rescued by an Arcadian hoplite named
Eurylochus, who ran to give him the benefit of his own shield as a
protection for both in the retreat.[168]

  [168] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 17-21.

After a march thus painful and perilous, the rear division at
length found themselves in safety among their comrades in villages
with well-stocked houses and abundance of corn and wine. So eager,
however, were Xenophon and Cheirisophus to obtain the bodies of
the slain for burial, that they consented to purchase them by
surrendering the guide, and to march onward without any guide;—a
heavy sacrifice in this unknown country, attesting their great
anxiety about the burial.[169]

  [169] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 23.

For three more days did they struggle and fight their way through
the narrow and rugged paths of the Karduchian mountains, beset
throughout by these formidable bowmen and slingers; whom they had to
dislodge at every difficult turn, and against whom their own Kretan
bowmen were found inferior, indeed, but still highly useful. Their
seven days’ march through this country, with its free and warlike
inhabitants, were days of the utmost fatigue, suffering and peril;
far more intolerable than anything which they had experienced from
Tissaphernes and the Persians. Right glad were they once more to
see a plain, and to find themselves near the banks of the river
Kentritês, which divided these mountains from the hillocks and plains
of Armenia,—enjoying comfortable quarters in villages, with the
satisfaction of talking over past miseries.[170]

  [170] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 2. His expressions have a simple emphasis
  which marks how unfading was the recollection of what he had
  suffered in Karduchia.

  Καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐνταῦθα ἀνεπαύσαντο ἄσμενοι ἰδόντες πεδίον· ἀπεῖχε
  δὲ τῶν ὀρέων ὁ ποταμὸς ἓξ ἢ ἕπτα στάδια τῶν Καρδούχων. Τότε μὲν
  οὖν ηὐλίσθησαν μάλα ἡδέως, καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔχοντες καὶ πολλὰ
  τῶν παρεληλυθότων πόνων μνημονεύοντες. Ἕπτα γὰρ ἡμέρας, ὅσασπερ
  ἐπορεύθησαν διὰ τῶν Καρδούχων, πάσας μαχόμενοι διετέλεσαν, καὶ
  ἔπαθον κακὰ ὅσα οὐδὲ τὰ σύμπαντα ὑπὸ βασιλέως καὶ Τισσαφέρνους.
  Ὡς οὖν ἀπηλλαγμένοι τούτων ἡδέως ἐκοιμήθησαν.

Such were the apprehensions of Karduchian invasion, that the Armenian
side of the Kentritês, for a breadth of fifteen miles, was unpeopled
and destitute of villages.[171] But the approach of the Greeks having
become known to Tiribazus, satrap of Armenia, the banks of the river
were lined with his cavalry and infantry to oppose their passage; a
precaution, which if Tissaphernes had taken at the Great Zab at the
moment when he perfidiously seized Klearchus and his colleagues, the
Greeks would hardly have reached the northern bank of that river.
In the face of such obstacles, the Greeks, nevertheless, attempted
the passage of the Kentritês, seeing a regular road on the other
side. But the river was two hundred feet in breadth (only half the
breadth of the Zab), above their breasts in depth, extremely rapid,
and with a bottom full of slippery stones; insomuch that they could
not hold their shields in the proper position, from the force of the
stream, while if they lifted the shields above their heads, they
were exposed defenceless to the arrows of the satrap’s troops. After
various trials, the passage was found impracticable, and they were
obliged to resume their encampment on the left bank. To their great
alarm they saw the Karduchians assembling on the hills in their
rear, so that their situation, during this day and night, appeared
nearly desperate. In the night, Xenophon had a dream,—the first,
which he has told us, since his dream on the terrific night after
the seizure of the generals,—but on this occasion, of augury more
unequivocally good. He dreamed that he was bound in chains, but that
his chains on a sudden dropped off spontaneously; on the faith of
which, he told Cheirisophus at daybreak that he had good hopes of
preservation; and when the generals offered sacrifice, the victims
were at once favorable. As the army were taking their morning meal,
two young Greeks ran to Xenophon with the auspicious news that they
had accidentally found another ford near half a mile up the river,
where the water was not even up to their middle, and where the rocks
came so close on the right bank that the enemy’s horse could offer no
opposition. Xenophon, starting from his meal in delight, immediately
offered libations to those gods who had revealed both the dream to
himself in the night, and the unexpected ford afterwards to these
youths; two revelations which he ascribed to the same gods.[172]

  [171] Xen. Anab. iv, 4, 1.

  [172] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 6-13.

Presently they marched in their usual order, Cheirisophus
commanding the van and Xenophon the rear, along the river to the
newly-discovered ford; the enemy marching parallel with them on
the opposite bank. Having reached the ford, halted, and grounded
arms, Cheirisophus placed a wreath on his head, took it off again,
and then resumed his arms, ordering all the rest to follow his
example.[173] Each lochus (company of one hundred men) was then
arranged in column or single file, with Cheirisophus himself in
the centre. Meanwhile the prophets were offering sacrifice to the
river. So soon as the signs were pronounced to be favorable, all
the soldiers shouted the pæan, and all the women joined in chorus
with their feminine yell. Cheirisophus then at the head of the army,
entered the river and began to ford it; while Xenophon, with a large
portion of the rear division, made a feint of hastening back to the
original ford, as if he were about to attempt the passage there. This
distracted the attention of the enemy’s horse; who became afraid of
being attacked on both sides, galloped off to guard the passage at
the other point, and opposed no serious resistance to Cheirisophus.
As soon as the latter had reached the other side, and put his
division into order, he marched up to attack the Armenian infantry,
who were on the high banks a little way above; but this infantry,
deserted by its cavalry, dispersed without awaiting his approach. The
handful of Grecian cavalry, attached to the division of Cheirisophus,
pursued and took some valuable spoils.[174]

  [173] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 17.

  ... ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ αὐτὸς πρῶτος Χειρίσοφος, στεφανωσάμενος
  καὶ ἀποδὺς, ἐλάμβανε τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι παρήγγελλε.

  I apprehend that the words τὸν στέφανον are here to be understood
  after ἀποδὺς—not the words τὰ ὅπλα, as Krüger in his note seems
  to imagine. It is surely incredible, that in the actual situation
  of the Grecian army, the soldiers should be ordered first to
  disarm, and then to resume their arms. I conceive the matter
  thus:—First, the order is given, to ground arms; so that the
  shield is let down and drops upon the ground, sustained by the
  left hand of the soldier upon its upper rim; while the spear,
  also resting on the ground, is sustained by the shield and by the
  same left hand. The right hand of the soldier being thus free, he
  is ordered first to wreath himself (the costume usual in offering
  sacrifice)—next, to take off his wreath—lastly, to resume his
  arms.

  Probably the operations of wreathing and unwreathing, must
  here have been performed by the soldiers symbolically, or by
  gesture, raising the hand to the head, as if to crown it. For it
  seems impossible that they could have been provided generally
  with actual wreaths, on the banks of the Kentritês, and just
  after their painful march through the Karduchian mountains.
  Cheirisophus himself, however, had doubtless a real wreath, which
  he put on and took off; so probably had the prophets and certain
  select officiating persons.

  [174] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 20-25.

As soon as Xenophon saw his colleague successfully established on
the opposite bank, he brought back his detachment to the ford over
which the baggage and attendants were still passing, and proceeded to
take precautions against the Karduchians on his own side, who were
assembling in the rear. He found some difficulty in keeping his rear
division together, for many of them, in spite of orders, quitted
their ranks, and went to look after their mistresses or their baggage
in the crossing of the water.[175] The peltasts and bowmen, who had
gone over with Cheirisophus, but whom that general now no longer
needed, were directed to hold themselves prepared on both flanks of
the army crossing, and to advance a little way into the water, in
the attitude of men just about to recross. When Xenophon was left
with only the diminished rear-guard, the rest having got over,—the
Karduchians rushed upon him, and began to shoot and sling. But on
a sudden, the Grecian hoplites charged with their accustomed pæan,
upon which the Karduchians took to flight,—having no arms for close
combat on the plain. The trumpet now being heard to sound, they ran
away so much the faster; while this was the signal, according to
orders before given by Xenophon, for the Greeks to suspend their
charge, to turn back, and to cross the river as speedily as possible.
By favor of this able manœuvre, the passage was accomplished by the
whole army, with little or no loss, about mid-day.[176]

  [175] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 30.

  [176] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 31-34; iv, 4, 1.

They now found themselves in Armenia; a country of even, undulating
surface, but very high above the level of the sea, and extremely cold
at the season when they entered it,—December. Though the strip of
land bordering on Karduchia furnished no supplies, one long march
brought them to a village, containing abundance of provisions,
together with a residence of the satrap Tiribazus; after which, in
two farther marches, they reached the river Teleboas, with many
villages on its banks. Here Tiribazus himself, appearing with a
division of cavalry, sent forward his interpreter to request a
conference with the leaders; which being held, it was agreed that the
Greeks should proceed unmolested through his territory, taking such
supplies as they required,—but should neither burn nor damage the
villages. They accordingly advanced onward for three days, computed
at fifteen parasangs, or three pretty full days’ march; without
any hostility from the satrap, though he was hovering within less
than two miles of them. They then found themselves amidst several
villages, wherein were regal or satrapical residences, with a
plentiful stock of bread, meat, wine, and all sorts of vegetables.
Here, during their nightly bivouac, they were overtaken by so heavy
a fall of snow, that the generals, on the next day, distributed
the troops into separate quarters among the villages. No enemy
appeared near, while the snow seemed to forbid any rapid surprise.
Yet at night, the scouts reported that many fires were discernible,
together with traces of military movements around; insomuch that the
generals thought it prudent to put themselves on their guard, and
again collected the army into one bivouac. Here, in the night, they
were overwhelmed by a second fall of snow, still heavier than the
preceding; sufficient to cover over the sleeping men and their arms,
and to benumb the cattle. The men, however, lay warm under the snow
and were unwilling to rise, until Xenophon himself set the example
of rising, and employing himself, without his arms, in cutting
wood and kindling a fire.[177] Others followed his example, and
great comfort was found in rubbing themselves with pork-fat, oil of
almonds, or of sesame, or turpentine. Having sent out a clever scout
named Demokrates, who captured a native prisoner, they learned that
Tiribazus was laying plans to intercept them in a lofty mountain-pass
lying farther on in their route; upon which they immediately set
forth, and by two days of forced march, surprising in their way the
camp of Tiribazus, got over the difficult pass in safety. Three days
of additional march brought them to the Euphrates river,[178]—that
is, to the eastern branch, now called Murad. They found a ford and
crossed it, without having the water higher than the navel; and they
were informed that its sources were not far off.

  [177] Xen. Anab. iv, 4, 11.

  [178] Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 2.

  The recent editors, Schneider and Krüger, on the authority of
  various MSS., read here ἐπορεύθησαν—~ἐπὶ~ τὸν Εὐφράτην ποταμόν.
  The old reading was, as it stands in Hutchinson’s edition, ~παρὰ~
  τὸν Εὐφράτην ποταμόν.

  This change may be right, but the geographical data are here too
  vague to admit of any certainty. See my Appendix annexed to this
  chapter.

Their four days of march, next on the other side of the Euphrates,
were toilsome and distressing in the extreme; through a plain covered
with deep snow (in some places six feet deep), and at times in the
face of a north wind so intolerably chilling and piercing, that at
length one of the prophets urged the necessity of offering sacrifices
to Boreas; upon which (says Xenophon[179]) the severity of the wind
abated conspicuously, to the evident consciousness of all. Many of
the slaves and beasts of burden, and a few even of the soldiers,
perished; some had their feet frost-bitten, others became blinded by
the snow, others again were exhausted by hunger. Several of these
unhappy men were unavoidably left behind; others lay down to perish,
near a warm spring which had melted the snow around, from extremity
of fatigue and sheer wretchedness, though the enemy were close upon
the rear. It was in vain that Xenophon, who commanded the rear-guard,
employed his earnest exhortations, prayers, and threats, to induce
them to move forward. The sufferers, miserable and motionless,
answered only by entreating him to kill them at once. So greatly was
the army disorganized by wretchedness, that we hear of one case in
which a soldier, ordered to carry a disabled comrade, disobeyed the
order, and was about to bury him alive.[180] Xenophon made a sally,
with loud shouts and clatter of spear with shield, in which even the
exhausted men joined,—against the pursuing enemy. He was fortunate
enough to frighten them away, and drive them to take shelter in
a neighboring wood. He then left the sufferers lying down, with
assurance that relief should be sent to them on the next day,—and
went forward, seeing all along the line of march the exhausted
soldiers lying on the snow, without even the protection of a watch.
He and his rear-guard, as well as the rest, were obliged thus to
pass the night without either food or fire, distributing scouts in
the best way the case admitted. Meanwhile, Cheirisophus with the van
division had got into a village, which they reached so unexpectedly,
that they found the women fetching water from a fountain outside
the wall, and the headman of the village in his house within. This
division here obtained rest and refreshment, and at daybreak some of
their soldiers were sent to look after the rear. It was with delight
that Xenophon saw them approach, and sent them back to bring up in
their arms, into the neighboring village, those exhausted soldiers
who had been left behind.[181]

  [179] Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 4.

  Ἔνθα δὴ τῶν μάντέων τις εἶπε σφαγιάσασθαι τῷ Ἀνέμῳ· καὶ πᾶσι δὴ
  περιφανῶς ἔδοξε λῆξαι τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦ πνεύματος.

  The suffering of the army from the terrible snow and cold of
  Armenia are set forth in Diodorus, xiv, 28.

  [180] Xen. Anab. v, 8, 8-11.

  [181] Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 8-22.

Repose was now indispensable after the recent sufferings. There
were several villages near at hand, and the generals, thinking it
no longer dangerous to divide the army, quartered the different
divisions among them according to lot. Polykrates, an Athenian, one
of the captains in the division of Xenophon, requested his permission
to go at once and take possession of the village assigned to him,
before any of the inhabitants could escape. Accordingly, running
at speed with a few of the swiftest soldiers, he came upon the
village so suddenly as to seize the headman, with his newly-married
daughter, and several young horses intended as a tribute for the
king. This village, as well as the rest, was found to consist of
houses excavated in the ground (as the Armenian villages are at
the present day), spacious within, but with a narrow mouth like a
well, entered by a descending ladder. A separate entrance was dug
for conveniently admitting the cattle. All of them were found amply
stocked with live cattle of every kind, wintered upon hay; as well as
with wheat, barley, vegetables, and a sort of barley-wine or beer,
in tubs, with the grains of barley on the surface. Reeds or straws,
without any joint in them, were lying near, through which they
sucked the liquid.[182] Xenophon did his utmost to conciliate the
headman (who spoke Persian, and with whom he communicated through the
Perso-Grecian interpreter of the army), promising him that not one
of his relations should be maltreated, and that he should be fully
remunerated if he would conduct the army safely out of the country,
into that of the Chalybes which he described as being adjacent.
By such treatment the headman was won over, promised his aid, and
even revealed to the Greeks the subterranean cellars wherein the
wine was deposited; while Xenophon, though he kept him constantly
under watch, and placed his youthful son as a hostage under the care
of Episthenes, yet continued to treat him with studied attention
and kindness. For seven days did the fatigued soldiers remain in
these comfortable quarters, refreshing themselves and regaining
strength. They were waited upon by the native youths, with whom they
communicated by means of signs. The uncommon happiness which all of
them enjoyed after their recent sufferings, stands depicted in the
lively details given by Xenophon; who left here his own exhausted
horse, and took young horses in exchange, for himself and the other
officers.[183]

  [182] Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 26. Κάλαμοι γόνατα οὐκ ἔχοντες.

  This Armenian practice of sucking the beer through a reed, to
  which the observation of modern travellers supplies analogies
  (see Krüger’s note), illustrates the Fragment of Archilochus (No.
  28, ed. Schneidewin, Poetæ Græc. Minor).

    ὥσπερ αὐλῷ βρύτον ἢ Θρῆιξ ἀνὴρ
    ἢ Φρὺξ ἔβρυζε, etc.

  The similarity of Armenian customs to those of the Thracians and
  Phrygians, is not surprising.

  [183] Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 26-36.

After this week of repose, the army resumed its march through the
snow. The headman, whose house they had replenished as well as they
could, accompanied Cheirisophus in the van as guide, but was not
put in chains or under guard; his son remained as an hostage with
Episthenes, but his other relations were left unmolested at home. As
they marched for three days without reaching a village, Cheirisophus
began to suspect his fidelity, and even became so out of humor,
though the man affirmed that there were no villages in the track, as
to beat him,—yet without the precaution of putting him afterwards
in fetters. The next night, accordingly, this headman made his
escape; much to the displeasure of Xenophon, who severely reproached
Cheirisophus, first for his harshness, and next for his neglect. This
was the only point of difference between the two (says Xenophon),
during the whole march; a fact very honorable to both, considering
the numberless difficulties against which they had to contend.
Episthenes retained the headman’s youthful son, carried him home in
safety, and became much attached to him.[184]

  [184] Xen. Anab. iv. 6, 1-3.

Condemned thus to march without a guide, they could do no better than
march up the course of a river; and thus, from the villages which
had proved so cheering and restorative, they proceeded seven days’
march all through snow, up the river Phasis; a river not verifiable,
but certainly not the same as is commonly known under that name by
Grecian geographers; it was one hundred feet in breadth.[185] Two
more days’ march brought them from this river to the foot of a range
of mountains; near a pass occupied by an armed body of Chalybes,
Taochi, and Phasiani.

  [185] Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 4.

Observing the enemy in possession of this lofty ground, Cheirisophus
halted until all the army came up; in order that the generals might
take counsel. Here Kleanor began by advising that they should storm
the pass with no greater delay than was necessary to refresh the
soldiers. But Xenophon suggested that it was far better to avoid the
loss of life which must thus be incurred, and to amuse the enemy by
feigned attack, while a detachment should be sent by stealth, at
night, to ascend the mountain at another point and turn the position.
“However (continued he, turning to Cheirisophus), stealing a march
upon the enemy is more your trade than mine. For I understand that
you, the full citizens and peers at Sparta, practise stealing from
your boyhood upward;[186] and that it is held no way base, but even
honorable, to steal such things as the law does not distinctly
forbid. And to the end that you may steal with the greatest effect,
and take pains to do it in secret, the custom is, to flog you if you
are found out. Here, then, you have an excellent opportunity for
displaying your training. Take good care that we be not found out in
stealing an occupation of the mountain now before us; for if we _are_
found out, we shall be well beaten.

  [186] Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 10-14.

  Καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ~καλὸν~ κλέπτειν, etc. The reading
  ~καλὸν~ is preferred by Schneider to ~ἀναγκαῖον~, which has been
  the vulgar reading, and is still retained by Krüger. Both are
  sanctioned by authority of MSS., and either would be admissible;
  on the whole, I incline to side with Schneider.

“Why, as for that (replied Cheirisophus), you Athenians, also, as I
learn, are capital hands at stealing the public money, and that too
in spite of prodigious peril to the thief; nay, your most powerful
men steal most of all,—at least, if it be the most powerful men
among you who are raised to official command. So that this is a time
for _you_ to exhibit _your_ training as well as for me to exhibit
mine.”[187]

  [187] Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 16.

  Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Χειρίσοφος, κἀγὼ ὑμᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀκούω
  δεινοὺς εἶναι κλέπτειν τὰ δημόσια, καὶ μάλα ὄντος δεινοῦ τοῦ
  κινδύνου τῷ κλέπτοντι, καὶ τοὺς κρατίστους μέντοι μάλιστα,
  εἴπερ ὑμῖν οἱ κράτιστοι ἄρχειν ἀξιοῦνται· ὥστε ὥρα καὶ σοὶ
  ἐπιδείκνυσθαι τὴν παίδειαν.

We have here an interchange of raillery between the two Grecian
officers, which is not an uninteresting feature in the history of
the expedition. The remark of Cheirisophus, especially illustrates
that which I noted in a former chapter as true both of Sparta and
Athens[188],—the readiness to take bribes, so general in individuals
clothed with official power; and the readiness, in official
Athenians, to commit such peculation, in spite of serious risk of
punishment. Now this chance of punishment proceeded altogether from
those accusing orators commonly called demagogues, and from the
popular judicature whom they addressed. The joint working of both
greatly abated the evil, yet was incompetent to suppress it. But
according to the pictures commonly drawn of Athens, we are instructed
to believe that the crying public evil was,—too great a license of
accusation, and too much judicial trial. Assuredly, such was not
the conception of Cheirisophus; nor shall we find it borne out by
any fair appreciation of the general evidence. When the peculation
of official persons was thus notorious in spite of serious risks,
what would it have become if the door had been barred to accusing
demagogues, and if the numerous popular dikasts had been exchanged
for a few select judges of the same stamp and class as the official
men themselves?

  [188] See Vol. VII, ch. lxi, p. 401 _seq._

Enforcing his proposition, Xenophon now informed his colleagues
that he had just captured a few guides by laying an ambush for
certain native plunderers who beset the rear; and that these guides
acquainted him that the mountain was not inaccessible, but pastured
by goats and oxen. He farther offered himself to take command of
the marching detachment. But this being overruled by Cheirisophus,
some of the best among the captains, Aristonymus, Aristeas, and
Nichomachus, volunteered their services and were accepted. After
refreshing the soldiers, the generals marched with the main army near
to the foot of the pass, and there took up their night-station,
making demonstrations of a purpose to storm it the next morning. But
as soon as it was dark, Aristonymus and his detachment started, and
ascending the mountain at another point, obtained without resistance
a high position on the flank of the enemy, who soon, however, saw
them and despatched a force to keep guard on that side. At daybreak
these two detachments came to a conflict on the heights, in which the
Greeks were completely victorious, while Cheirisophus was marching
up the pass to attack the main body. His light troops, encouraged
by seeing this victory of their comrades, hastened on to the charge
faster than their hoplites could follow. But the enemy was so
dispirited by seeing themselves turned, that they fled with little or
no resistance. Though only a few were slain, many threw away their
light shields of wicker or wood-work, which became the prey of the
conquerors.[189]

  [189] Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 20-27.

Thus masters of the pass, the Greeks descended to the level ground
on the other side, where they found themselves in some villages
well-stocked with provisions and comforts; the first in the country
of the Taochi. Probably they halted here some days; for they had seen
no villages, either for rest or for refreshment, during the last nine
days’ march, since leaving those Armenian villages in which they had
passed a week so eminently restorative, and which apparently had
furnished them with a stock of provisions for the onward journey.
Such halt gave time to the Taochi to carry up their families and
provisions into inaccessible strongholds, so that the Greeks found
no supplies, during five days’ march through the territory. Their
provisions were completely exhausted, when they arrived before one
of these strongholds, a rock on which were seen the families and
the cattle of the Taochi; without houses or fortification, but
nearly surrounded by a river, so as to leave only one narrow ascent,
rendered unapproachable by vast rocks which the defenders hurled
or rolled from the summit. By an ingenious combination of bravery
and stratagem, in which some of the captains much distinguished
themselves, the Greeks overcame this difficulty, and took the
height. The scene which then ensued was awful. The Taochian women
seized their children, flung them over the precipice, and then cast
themselves headlong also, followed by the men. Almost every soul thus
perished, very few surviving to become prisoners. An Arcadian captain
named Æneas, seeing one of them in a fine dress about to precipitate
himself with the rest, seized him with a view to prevent it. But the
man in return grasped him firmly, dragged him to the edge of the
rock, and leaped down to the destruction of both. Though scarcely any
prisoners were taken, however, the Greeks obtained abundance of oxen,
asses, and sheep, which fully supplied their wants.[190]

  [190] Xen. Anab. iv, 7, 2-15.

They now entered into the territory of the Chalybes, which they
were seven days in passing through. These were the bravest warriors
whom they had seen in Asia. Their equipment was a spear of fifteen
cubits long, with only one end pointed,—a helmet, greaves, stuffed
corselet, with a kilt or dependent flaps,—a short sword which they
employed to cut off the head of a slain enemy, displaying the head
in sight of their surviving enemies with triumphant dance and song.
They carried no shield; perhaps because the excessive length of the
spear required the constant employment of both hands,—yet they did
not shrink from meeting the Greeks occasionally in regular, stand-up
fight. As they had carried off all their provisions into hill-forts,
the Greeks could obtain no supplies, but lived all the time upon
the cattle which they had acquired from the Taochi. After seven
days of march and combat,—the Chalybes perpetually attacking their
rear,—they reached the river Harpasus (four hundred feet broad),
where they passed into the territory of the Skythini. It rather seems
that the territory of the Chalybes was mountainous; that of the
Skythini was level, and containing villages, wherein they remained
three days, refreshing themselves, and stocking themselves with
provisions.[191]

  [191] Xen. Anab. iv, 7, 18.

Four days of additional march brought them to a sight, the like of
which they had not seen since Opis and Sittakê on the Tigris in
Babylonia,—a large and flourishing city called Gymnias; an earnest
of the neighborhood of the sea, of commerce, and of civilization. The
chief of this city received them in a friendly manner, and furnished
them with a guide who engaged to conduct them, after five days’
march, to a hill from whence they would have a view of the sea.
This was by no means their nearest way to the sea, for the chief of
Gymnias wished to send them through the territory of some neighbors
to whom he was hostile; which territory, as soon as they reached it,
the guide desired them to burn and destroy. However, the promise was
kept, and on the fifth day, marching still apparently through the
territory of the Skythini, they reached the summit of a mountain
called Thêchê, from whence the Euxine Sea was visible.[192]

  [192] Diodorus (xiv, 29) calls the mountain Χήνοιν—Chenium. He
  seems to have had Xenophon before him in his brief description of
  this interesting scene.

An animated shout from the soldiers who formed the van-guard
testified the impressive effect of this long-deferred spectacle,
assuring as it seemed to do, their safety and their return home. To
Xenophon and to the rear-guard,—engaged in repelling the attack
of natives who had come forward to revenge the plunder of their
territory,—the shout was unintelligible. They at first imagined that
the natives had commenced attack in front as well as in the rear,
and that the van-guard was engaged in battle. But every moment the
shout became louder, as fresh men came to the summit and gave vent
to their feelings; so that Xenophon grew anxious, and galloped up
to the van with his handful of cavalry to see what had happened.
As he approached, the voice of the overjoyed crowd was heard
distinctly crying out, _Thalatta, Thalatta_ (The sea, the sea), and
congratulating each other in ecstasy. The main body, the rear-guard,
the baggage-soldiers driving up their horses and cattle before
them, became all excited by the sound, and hurried up breathless
to the summit. The whole army, officers and soldiers, were thus
assembled, manifesting their joyous emotions by tears, embraces, and
outpourings of enthusiastic sympathy. With spontaneous impulse they
heaped up stones to decorate the spot by a monument and commemorative
trophy; putting on the stones such homely offerings as their means
afforded,—sticks, hides, and a few of the wicker shields just taken
from the natives. To the guide, who had performed his engagement of
bringing them in five days within sight of the sea, their gratitude
was unbounded. They presented him with a horse, a silver bowl, a
Persian costume, and ten darics in money; besides several of the
soldiers’ rings, which he especially asked for. Thus loaded with
presents, he left them, having first shown them a village wherein
they could find quarters,—as well as the road which they were to
take through the territory of the Makrônes.[193]

  [193] Xen. Anab. iv, 7, 23-27.

When they reached the river which divided the land of the Makrônes
from that of the Skythini, they perceived the former assembled in
arms on the opposite side to resist their passage. The river not
being fordable, they cut down some neighboring trees to provide the
means of crossing. While these Makrônes were shouting and encouraging
each other aloud, a peltast in the Grecian army came to Xenophon,
saying that he knew their language, and that he believed this to
be his country. He had been a slave at Athens, exported from home
during his boyhood,—he had then made his escape (probably during
the Peloponnesian war, to the garrison of Dekeleia), and afterwards
taken military service. By this fortunate accident, the generals
were enabled to open negotiations with the Makrônes, and to assure
them that the army would do them no harm, desiring nothing more than
a free passage and a market to buy provisions. The Makrônes, on
receiving such assurance in their own language from a countryman,
exchanged pledges of friendship with the Greeks, assisted them to
pass the river, and furnished the best market in their power during
the three days’ march across their territory.[194]

  [194] Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 4-7.

The army now reached the borders of the Kolchians, who were found in
hostile array, occupying the summit of a considerable mountain which
formed their frontier. Here Xenophon, having marshalled the soldiers
for attack, with each lochus (company of one hundred men) in single
file, instead of marching up the hill in phalanx, or continuous front
with only a scanty depth,—addressed to them the following pithy
encouragement,—“Now, gentlemen, these enemies before us are the only
impediment that keeps us away from reaching the point at which we
have been so long aiming. We must even eat them raw, if in any way we
can do so.”

Eighty of these formidable companies of hoplites, each in single
file, now began to ascend the hill; the peltasts and bowmen being
partly distributed among them, partly placed on the flanks.
Cheirisophus and Xenophon, each commanding on one wing, spread
their peltasts in such a way as to outflank the Kolchians, who
accordingly weakened their centre in order to strengthen their
wings. Hence the Arcadian peltasts and hoplites in the Greek
centre were enabled to attack and disperse the centre with little
resistance; and all the Kolchians presently fled, leaving the Greeks
in possession of their camp, as well as of several well-stocked
villages in their rear. Amidst these villages the army remained to
refresh themselves for several days. It was here that they tasted the
grateful, but unwholesome honey, which this region still continues to
produce,—unaware of its peculiar properties. Those soldiers who ate
little of it were like men greatly intoxicated with wine; those who
ate much, were seized with the most violent vomiting and diarrhœa,
lying down like madmen in a state of delirium. From this terrible
distemper some recovered on the ensuing day, others two or three days
afterwards. It does not appear that any one actually died.[195]

  [195] Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 15-22. Most modern travellers attest the
  existence, in these regions, of honey intoxicating and poisonous,
  such as Xenophon describes. They point out the _Azalea Pontica_,
  as the flower from which the bees imbibe this peculiar quality.
  Professor Koch, however, calls in question the existence of any
  honey thus naturally unwholesome near the Black Sea. He states
  (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 111) that after careful inquiries he
  could find no trace of any such. Not contradicting Xenophon, he
  thinks that the honey which the Greeks ate must have been stale
  or tainted.

Two more days’ march brought them to the sea, at the Greek maritime
city of Trapezus or Trebizond, founded by the inhabitants of Sinôpê
on the coast of the Kolchian territory. Here the Trapezuntines
received them with kindness and hospitality, sending them presents
of bullocks, barley-meal, and wine. Taking up their quarters in some
Kolchian villages near the town, they now enjoyed, for the first
time since leaving Tarsus, a safe and undisturbed repose during
thirty days, and were enabled to recover in some degree from the
severe hardships which they had undergone. While the Trapezuntines
brought produce for sale into the camp, the Greeks provided the
means of purchasing it by predatory incursions against the Kolchians
on the hills. Those Kolchians who dwelt under the hills and on the
plain were in a state of semi-dependence upon Trapezus; so that the
Trapezuntines mediated on their behalf and prevailed on the Greeks
to leave them unmolested, on condition of a contribution of bullocks.

These bullocks enabled the Greeks to discharge the vow which they had
made, on the proposition of Xenophon, to Zeus the Preserver, during
that moment of dismay and despair which succeeded immediately on the
massacre of their generals by Tissaphernes. To Zeus the Preserver,
to Hêraklês the Conductor, and to various other gods, they offered
an abundant sacrifice on their mountain camp overhanging the sea;
and after the festival ensuing, the skins of the victims were given
as prizes to competitors in running, wrestling, boxing, and the
pankration. The superintendence of such festival games, so fully
accordant with Grecian usage and highly interesting to the army,
was committed to a Spartan named Drakontius; a man whose destiny
recalls that of Patroklus and other Homeric heroes,—for he had been
exiled as a boy, having unintentionally killed another boy with a
short sword. Various departures from Grecian custom, however, were
admitted. The matches took place on the steep and stony hill-side
overhanging the sea, instead of on a smooth plain; and the numerous
hard falls of the competitors afforded increased interest to the
bystanders. The captive non-Hellenic boys were admitted to run for
the prize, since otherwise a boy-race could not have been obtained.
Lastly, the animation of the scene, as well as the ardor of the
competitors, was much enhanced by the number of their mistresses
present.[196]

  [196] Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 23-27.

  A curious and interesting anecdote in Plutarch’s Life of
  Alexander, (c. 41) attests how much these Hetæræ accompanying
  the soldiers (women for the most part free), were esteemed in
  the Macedonian army, and by Alexander himself among the rest. A
  Macedonian of Ægæ named Eurylochus, had got himself improperly
  put on a list of veterans and invalids, who were on the point of
  being sent back from Asia to Europe. The imposition was detected,
  and on being questioned he informed Alexander that he had
  practised it in order to be able to follow a free Hetæra named
  Telesippa, who was about to accompany the departing division. “I
  sympathize with your attachment, Eurylochus (replied Alexander);
  let us see whether we cannot prevail upon Telesippa either by
  persuasion or by presents, since she is of free condition, to
  stay behind” (Ἡμᾶς μὲν, ὦ Εὐρύλοχε, συνερῶντας ἔχεις· ὅρα δὲ ὅπως
  πείθωμεν ἢ λόγοις ἢ δώροις τὴν Τελεσίππαν, ἐπειδήπερ ἐξ ἐλευθέρας
  ἐστί).




APPENDIX TO CHAPTER LXX.

ON THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND AFTER THEY
QUITTED THE TIGRIS AND ENTERED THE KARDUCHIAN MOUNTAINS.


It would be injustice to this gallant and long-suffering body of
men not to present the reader with a minute description of the full
length of their stupendous march. Up to the moment when the Greeks
enter Karduchia, the line of march may be indicated upon evidence
which, though not identifying special halting-places or localities,
makes us certain that we cannot be far wrong on the whole. But after
that moment, the evidence gradually disappears, and we are left with
nothing more than a knowledge of the terminus, the general course,
and a few negative conditions.

Mr. Ainsworth has given, in his Book IV. (Travels in the Track of the
Ten Thousand, p. 155 seq.) an interesting topographical comment on
the march through Karduchia, and on the difficulties which the Greeks
would have to surmount. He has farther shown what may have been their
probable line of march through Karduchia; but the most important
point which he has established here, seems to be the identity of
the river Kentritês with the Buhtan-Chai, an eastern affluent of
the Tigris—distinguishing it from the river of Bitlis on the west
and the river Khabur on the south-east, with both of which it had
been previously confounded (p. 167). The Buhtan-Chai falls into the
Tigris at a village called Til, and “constitutes at the present day,
a natural barrier between Kurdistan and Armenia” (p. 166). In this
identification of the Kentritês with the Buhtan-Chai, Professor Koch
agrees (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 78).

If the Greeks crossed the Kentritês near its confluence with the
Tigris, they would march up its right bank in one day to a situation
near the modern town of Sert (Mr. Ainsworth thinks), though Xenophon
takes no notice of the river of Bitlis, which nevertheless they must
have passed. Their next two days of march, assuming a direction
nearly north, would carry them (as Xenophon states, iv. 4, 2) beyond
the sources of the Tigris; that is, “beyond the headwaters of the
eastern tributaries to the Tigris.”

Three days of additional march brought them to the river
Teleboas—“of no great size, but beautiful” (iv. 4, 4). There appear
sufficient reasons to identify this river with the Kara-Su or Black
River, which flows through the valley or plain of Mush into the Murad
or Eastern Euphrates (Ainsworth, p. 172; Ritter, Erdkunde, part
x. s. 37. p. 682). Though Kinneir (Journey through Asia Minor and
Kurdistan, 1818, p. 484), Rennell (Illustrations of the Expedition of
Cyrus, p. 207) and Bell (System of Geography, iv. p. 140) identify it
with the Ak-Su or river of Mush—this, according to Ainsworth, “is
only a small tributary to the Kara-Su, which is the great river of
the plain and district.”

Professor Koch, whose personal researches in and around Armenia
give to his opinion the highest authority, follows Mr. Ainsworth in
identifying the Teleboas with the Kara-Su. He supposes, however, that
the Greeks crossed the Kentritês, not near its confluence with the
Tigris, but considerably higher up, near the town of Sert or Sort.
From hence he supposes that they marched nearly north-east in the
modern road from Sert to Bitlis, thus getting round the head or near
the head of the river called Bitlis-Su, which is one of the eastern
affluents to the Tigris (falling first into the Buhtan-Chai), and
which Xenophon took for the Tigris itself. They then marched farther,
in a line not far distant from the Lake of Van, over the saddle which
separates that lake from the lofty mountain Ali-Dagh. This saddle is
the water-shed which separates the affluents to the Tigris from those
to the Eastern Euphrates, of which latter the Teleboas or Kara-Su is
one (Koch, Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 82-84).

After the river Teleboas, there seems no one point in the march which
can be identified with anything approaching to certainty. Nor have
we any means even of determining the general line of route, apart
from specific places, which they followed from the river Teleboas to
Trebizond.

Their first object was to reach and cross the Eastern Euphrates.
They would of course cross at the nearest point where they could
find a ford. But how low down its course does the river continue to
be fordable, in mid-winter, with snow on the ground? Here professor
Koch differs from Mr. Ainsworth and colonel Chesney. He affirms that
the river would be fordable a little above its confluence with the
Tscharbahur, about latitude 39° 3′. According to Mr. Ainsworth, it
would not be fordable below the confluence with the river of Khanus
(Khinnis). Koch’s authority, as the most recent and systematic
investigator of these regions, seems preferable, especially as it
puts the Greeks nearly in the road now travelled over from Mush to
Erzerum, which is said to be the only pass over the mountains open
throughout all the winter, passing by Khinnis and Koili; see Ritter,
Erdkunde, x. p. 387. Xenophon mentions a warm spring, which the army
passed by during the third or fourth day after crossing the Euphrates
(Anab. iv, 5, 15). Professor Koch believes himself to have identified
this warm spring—the only one, as he states (p. 90-93), south of
the range of mountains called the Bingöldagh—in the district called
Wardo, near the village of Bashkan.

To lay down, with any certainty, the line which the Greeks followed
from the Euphrates to Trebizond, appears altogether impossible. I
cannot admit the hypothesis of Mr. Ainsworth, who conducts the army
across the Araxes to its northern bank, carries them up northward
to the latitude of Teflis in Georgia, then brings them back again
across the Harpa Chai (a northern affluent of the Araxes, which he
identifies with the Harpasus mentioned by Xenophon) and the Araxes
itself, to Gymnias, which he places near the site of Erzerum.
Professor Koch (p. 104-108), who dissents with good reason from Mr.
Ainsworth, proposes (though with hesitation and uncertainty) a line
of his own which appears to me open greatly to the same objection
as that of Mr. Ainsworth. It carries the Greeks too much to the
northward of Erzerum, more out of their line of march from the place
where they crossed the Eastern Euphrates, than can be justified by
any probability. The Greeks knew well that, in order to get home they
must take a westerly direction (see Anab. iii. 5, 15).

Their great and constant purpose would be to make way to the
westward, as soon as they had crossed the Euphrates; and the road
from that river, passing near the site of Erzerum to Trebizond, would
thus coincide, in the main, with their spontaneous tendency. They
had no motive to go northward of Erzerum, nor ought we to suppose it
without some proof. I trace out, therefore, a line of march much less
circuitous; not meaning it to be understood as the real road which
the army can be proved to have taken, but simply because it seems a
possible line, and because it serves as a sort of approximation to
complete the reader’s idea of the entire ground travelled over by the
Ten Thousand.

Koch hardly makes sufficient account of the overwhelming hardships
with which the Greeks had to contend, when he states (p. 96) that
if they had taken a line as straight, or nearly as straight as was
practicable, they might have marched from the Euphrates to Trebizond
in sixteen or twenty days, even allowing for the bad time of year.
Considering that it was mid-winter, in that very high and cold
country, with deep snow throughout; that they had absolutely no
advantages or assistance of any kind; that their sick and disabled
men, together with their arms, were to be carried by the stronger;
that there were a great many women accompanying them; that they had
beasts to drive along, carrying baggage and plunder,—the prophet
Silanus, for example, having preserved his three thousand darics
in coin from the field of Kunaxa until his return; that there was
much resistance from the Chalybes and Taochi; that they had to take
provisions where provisions were discoverable; that even a small
stream must have impeded them, and probably driven them out of their
course to find a ford,—considering the intolerable accumulation
of these and other hardships, we need not wonder at any degree of
slowness in their progress. It rarely happens that modern travellers
go over these regions in mid-winter; but we may see what travelling
is at that season, by the dreadful description which Mr. Baillie
Fraser gives of his journey from Tauris to Erzerum in the month of
March (Travels in Koordhistan, Letter XV). Mr. Kinneir says (Travels,
p. 353)—“The winters are so severe that all communication between
Baiburt and the circumjacent villages is cut off for four months in
the year, in consequence of the depth of the snow.”

Now if we measure on Kiepert’s map the rectilinear distance,—the
air-line—from Trebizond to the place where Koch represents the
Greeks to have crossed the Eastern Euphrates,—we shall find
it one hundred and seventy English miles. The number of days’
journey-marches which Xenophon mentions are fifty-four; even if we
include the five days of march undertaken from Gymnias (Anab. iv.
7, 20), which, properly speaking, were directed against the enemies
of the governor of Gymnias, more than for the promotion of their
retreat. In each of those fifty-four days, therefore, they must
have made 3.14 miles of rectilinear progress. This surely is not an
unreasonably slow progress to suppose, under all the disadvantages of
their situation; nor does it imply any very great actual departure
from the straightest line practicable. Indeed Koch himself (in his
Introduction, p. 4) suggests various embarrassments which must have
occurred on the march, but which Xenophon has not distinctly stated.

The river which Xenophon calls the Harpasus seems to be probably the
Tchoruk-su, as colonel Chesney and Prof. Koch suppose. At least it is
difficult to assign any other river with which the Harpasus can be
identified.

I cannot but think it probable that the city which Xenophon calls
_Gymnias_ (Diodorus, xiv. 29, calls it Gymnasia) was the same as
that which is now called Gumisch-Khana (Hamilton), Gumush-Kaneh
(Ainsworth), Gemisch-Khaneh (Kinneir). “Gumisch-Khana (says Mr.
Hamilton, Travels in Asia Minor, vol. i. ch. xi. p. 168; ch. xiv. p.
234) is celebrated as the site of the most ancient and considerable
silver-mines in the Ottoman dominions.” Both Mr. Kinneir and Mr.
Hamilton passed through Gumisch-Khana on the road from Trebizond to
Erzerum.

Now here is not only great similarity of name, and likelihood of
situation,—but the existence of the silver mines furnishes a
plausible explanation of that which would otherwise be very strange;
the existence of this “great, flourishing, inhabited, city,” inland,
in the midst of such barbarians,—the Chalybes, the Skythini, the
Makrônes, etc.

Mr. Kinneir reached Gumisch-Khana at the end of the third day after
quitting Trebizond; the two last days having been very long and
fatiguing. Mr. Hamilton, who also passed through Gumisch-Khana,
reached it at the end of two long days. Both these travellers
represent the road near Gumisch-Khana as extremely difficult. Mr.
Ainsworth, who did not himself pass through Gumisch-Khana, tells
us (what is of some importance in this discussion) that it lies in
the _winter-road_ from Erzerum to Trebizond (Travels in Asia Minor,
vol. ii. p. 394). “The winter-road, which is the longest, passes by
Gumisch-Khana, and takes the longer portion of valley; all the others
cross over the mountain at various points, to the east of the road
by the mines. But whether going by the mountains or the valley, the
muleteers often go indifferently to the west as far as Ash Kaleh, and
at other times turn off by the villages of Bey Mausour and Kodjah
Bunar, where they take to the mountains.”

Mr. Hamilton makes the distance from Trebizond to Gumisch-Khana
eighteen hours, or fifty-four calculated post miles; that is, about
forty English miles (Appendix to Travels in Asia Minor, vol. ii. p.
389).

Now we are not to suppose that the Greeks marched in any direct road
from Gymnias to Trebizond. On the contrary, the five days’ march
which they undertook immediately from Gymnias were conducted by a
guide sent from that town, who led them over the territories of
people hostile to Gymnias, in order that they might lay waste the
lands (iv. 7, 20). What progress they made, during these marches,
towards Trebizond, is altogether doubtful. The guide promised that on
the fifth day he would bring them to a spot from whence they could
view the sea, and he performed his promise by leading them to the top
of the sacred mountain Thêchê.

Thêchê was a summit (ἄκρον, iv. 7, 25), as might be expected. But
unfortunately it seems impossible to verify the particular summit
on which the interesting scene described by Xenophon took place.
Mr. Ainsworth presumes it to be the mountain called Kop-Dagh; from
whence, however, according to Koch, the sea cannot be discerned.
D’Anville and some other geographers identify it with the ridge
called Tekieh-Dagh, to the east of Gumisch-Khana; nearer to the sea
than that place. This mountain, I think, would suit pretty well for
the narrative in respect to position; but Koch and other modern
travellers affirm that it is neither high enough, nor near enough to
the sea, to permit any such view as that which Xenophon relates. It
stands on Kiepert’s map at a distance of full thirty-five English
miles from the sea, the view of which, moreover, seems intercepted
by the still higher mountain-chain now called Kolath-Dagh, a portion
of the ancient Paryadres, which runs along parallel to the coast. It
is to be recollected that in the first half of February, the time of
Xenophon’s visit, the highest peaks would certainly be all covered
with snow, and therefore very difficult to ascend.

There is a striking view obtained of the sea from the mountain called
Karakaban. This mountain, more than four thousand feet high, lies
rather above twenty miles from the sea, to the south of Trebizond,
and immediately north of the still higher chain of Kolath-Dagh. From
the Kolath-Dagh chain, which runs east and west, there strike out
three or four parallel ridges to the northward, formed of primitive
slate, and cut down precipitously so as to leave deep and narrow
valleys between. On leaving Trebizond, the traveller ascends the hill
immediately above the town, and then descends into the valley on
the other side. His road to Karakaban lies partly along the valley,
partly along the crest of one of the four ridges just mentioned. But
throughout all this road, the sea is never seen; being hidden by the
hills immediately above Trebizond. He does not again see the sea
until he reaches Karakaban, which is sufficiently high to enable him
to see over those hills. The guides (as I am informed by Dr. Holland,
who twice went over the spot) point out with great animation this
view of the sea, as particularly deserving of notice. It is enjoyed
for a short space while the road winds round the mountain, and then
again lost.

Here is a view of the sea at once distant, sudden, impressive,
and enjoyed from an eminence not too high to be accessible to the
Cyreian army. In so far, it would be suitable to the description of
Xenophon. Yet again it appears that a person coming to this point
from the land-side (as Xenophon of course did), would find it in
his descending route, not in his ascending; and this can hardly be
reconciled with the description which we read in the Greek historian.
Moreover, the subsequent marches which Xenophon mentions after
quitting the mountain summit Thêchê, can hardly be reconciled with
the supposition that it was the same as what is now called Karakaban.
It is, indeed, quite possible, (as Mr. Hamilton suggests), that
Thêchê may have been a peak apart from any road, and that the guide
may have conducted the soldiers thither for the express purpose of
showing the sea, guiding them back again into the road afterwards.
This increases the difficulty of identifying the spot. However, the
whole region is as yet very imperfectly known, and perhaps it is
not impossible that there may be some particular locality even on
Tekiah-Dagh, whence, through an accidental gap in the intervening
mountains, the sea might become visible.




CHAPTER LXXI.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS, FROM THE TIME THAT THEY
REACHED TRAPEZUS, TO THEIR JUNCTION WITH THE LACEDÆMONIAN ARMY IN
ASIA MINOR.


We now commence a third act in the history of this memorable
body of men. After having followed them from Sardis to Kunaxa as
mercenaries to procure the throne for Cyrus,—then from Kunaxa to
Trapezus as men anxious only for escape, and purchasing their safety
by marvellous bravery, endurance, and organization, we shall now
track their proceedings among the Greek colonies on the Euxine and
at the Bosphorus of Thrace, succeeded by their struggles against
the meanness of the Thracian prince Seuthes, as well as against the
treachery and arbitrary harshness of the Lacedæmonian commanders
Anaxibius and Aristarchus.

Trapezus, now Trebizond, where the army had recently found repose,
was a colony from Sinôpê, as were also Kerasus and Kotyôra, farther
westward; each of them receiving an harmost or governor from the
mother-city, and paying to her an annual tribute. All these three
cities were planted on the narrow strip of land dividing the Euxine
from the elevated mountain range which so closely borders on its
southern coast. At Sinôpê itself, the land stretches out into a
defensible peninsula, with a secure harbor, and a large breadth of
adjacent fertile soil. So tempting a site invited the Milesians,
even before the year 600 B.C., to plant a colony there, and enabled
Sinôpê to attain much prosperity and power. Farther westward, not
more than a long day’s journey for a rowing vessel from Byzantium,
was situated the Megarian colony of Herakleia, in the territory of
the Mariandyni.

The native tenants of this line of coast, upon whom the Greek
settlers intruded themselves (reckoning from the westward), were the
Bithynian Thracians, the Mariandyni, the Paphlagonians, the Tibarêni,
Chalybes, Mosynœki, Drilæ, and Kolchians. Here, as elsewhere, these
natives found the Greek seaports useful, in giving a new value to
inland produce, and in furnishing the great men with ornaments
and luxuries to which they would otherwise have had no access. The
citizens of Herakleia had reduced into dependence a considerable
portion of the neighboring Mariandyni, and held them in a relation
resembling that of the natives of Esthonia and Livonia to the German
colonies in the Baltic. Some of the Kolchian villages were also
subject, in the same manner, to the Trapezuntines;[197] and Sinôpê
doubtless possessed a similar inland dominion of greater or less
extent. But the principal wealth of this important city arose from
her navy and maritime commerce; from the rich thunny fishery attached
to her promontory; from the olives in her immediate neighborhood,
which was a cultivation not indigenous, but only naturalized by the
Greeks on the seaboard; from the varied produce of the interior,
comprising abundant herds of cattle, mines of silver, iron, and
copper in the neighboring mountains, wood for ship-building, as well
as for house furniture, and native slaves.[198] The case was similar
with the three colonies of Sinôpê, more to the eastward,—Kotyôra,
Kerasus, and Trapezus; except that the mountains which border on the
Euxine, gradually approaching nearer and nearer to the shore, left
to each of them a more confined strip of cultivable land. For these
cities the time had not yet arrived, to be conquered and absorbed
by the inland monarchies around them, as Miletus and the cities on
the eastern coast of Asia Minor had been. The Paphlagonians were at
this time the only indigenous people in those regions who formed
a considerable aggregated force, under a prince named Korylas; a
prince tributary to Persia, yet half independent,—since he had
disobeyed the summons of Artaxerxes to come up and help in repelling
Cyrus[199]—and now on terms of established alliance with Sinôpê,
though not without secret designs, which he wanted only force to
execute, against that city.[200] The other native tribes to the
eastward were mountaineers both ruder and more divided; warlike on
their own heights, but little capable of any aggressive combinations.

  [197] Strabo, xii, p. 542; Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 24.

  [198] Strabo. xii, p. 545, 546.

  [199] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 8.

  [200] Xen. Anab. v, 5, 23.

Though we are told that Perikles had once despatched a detachment of
Athenian colonists to Sinôpê,[201] and had expelled from thence the
despot Timesilaus,—yet neither that city nor any of their neighbors
appear to have taken a part in the Peloponnesian war, either for
or against Athens; nor were they among the number of tributaries
to Persia. They doubtless were acquainted with the upward march of
Cyrus, which had disturbed all Asia; and probably were not ignorant
of the perils and critical state of his Grecian army. But it was
with a feeling of mingled surprise, admiration, and alarm, that they
saw that army descend from the mountainous region, hitherto only
recognized as the abode of Kolchians, Makrônes, and other analogous
tribes, among whom was perched the mining city of Gymnias.

  [201] Plutarch, Perikles, c. 20.

Even after all the losses and extreme sufferings of the retreat, the
Greeks still numbered, when mustered at Kerasus,[202] eight thousand
six hundred hoplites, with peltasts or targeteers, bowmen, slingers,
etc., making a total of above ten thousand military persons. Such a
force had never before been seen in the Euxine. Considering both the
numbers and the now-acquired discipline and self-confidence of the
Cyreians, even Sinôpê herself could have raised no force capable of
meeting them in the field. Yet they did not belong to any city, nor
receive orders from any established government. They were like those
mercenary armies which marched about in Italy during the fourteenth
century, under the generals called Condottieri, taking service
sometimes with one city, sometimes with another. No one could predict
what schemes they might conceive, or in what manner they might deal
with the established communities on the shores of the Euxine. If we
imagine that such an army had suddenly appeared in Sicily, a little
time before the Athenian expedition against Syracuse, it would have
been probably enlisted by Leontini and Katana in their war against
Syracuse. If the inhabitants of Trapezus had wished to throw off the
dominion of Sinôpê,—or if Korylas, the Paphlagonian, were meditating
war against that city,—here were formidable auxiliaries to second
their wishes. Moreover there were various tempting sites, open to the
formation of a new colony, which, with so numerous a body of original
Greek settlers, would probably have overtopped Sinôpê herself. There
was no restraining cause to reckon upon, except the general Hellenic
sympathies and education of the Cyreian army; and what was of not
less importance, the fact that they were not mercenary soldiers by
permanent profession, such as became so formidably multiplied in
Greece during the next generation,—but established citizens who had
come out on a special service under Cyrus, with the full intention,
after a year of lucrative enterprise, to return to their homes and
families.[203] We shall find such gravitation towards home steadily
operative throughout the future proceedings of the army. But at the
moment when they first emerged from the mountains, no one could be
sure that it would be so. There was ample ground for uneasiness among
the Euxine Greeks, especially the Sinopians, whose supremacy had
never before been endangered.

  [202] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 3; v, 7, 9. The maximum of the Grecian
  force, when mustered at Issus after the junction of those three
  hundred men who deserted from Abrokomas, was thirteen thousand
  nine hundred men. At the review in Babylonia, three days before
  the battle of Kunaxa, there were mustered, however, only twelve
  thousand nine hundred (Anab. i, 7, 10).

  [203] Xen. Anab. vi, 2, 8.

  Τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν ὁι πλεῖστοι ἦσαν οὐ σπάνει βίου ἐκπεπλευκότες
  ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν μισθοφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τὴν Κύρου ἀρετὴν ἀκούοντες,
  οἱ μὲν καὶ ἄνδρας ἄγοντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ προσανηλωκότες χρήματα,
  καὶ τούτων ἕτεροι ἀποδεδρακότες πατέρας καὶ μητέρας, οἱ δὲ
  καὶ τέκνα καταλιπόντες, ὡς χρήματα αὐτοῖς κτησάμενοι ἥξοντες
  πάλιν, ἀκούοντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς παρὰ Κύρῳ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ
  πράττειν. Τοιοῦτοι οὖν ὄντες ἐπόθουν εἶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα σώζεσθαι.

  This statement respecting the position of most of the soldiers
  is more authentic, as well as less disparaging, than that of
  Isokrates (Orat. iv, Panegyr. s. 170).

  In another oration, composed about fifty years after the
  Cyreian expedition, Isokrates notices the large premiums which
  it had been formerly necessary to give to those who brought
  together mercenary soldiers, over and above the pay to the
  soldiers themselves (Isokrates, Orat. v. ad Philipp. s. 112); as
  contrasted with the over-multiplication of unemployed mercenaries
  during his own later time (Ibid. s. 142 _seq._)

An undisturbed repose of thirty days enabled the Cyreians to recover
from their fatigues, to talk over their past dangers, and to take
pride in the anticipated effect which their unparalleled achievement
could not fail to produce in Greece. Having discharged their vows
and celebrated their festival to the gods, they held an assembly
to discuss their future proceedings; when a Thurian soldier, named
Antileon, exclaimed,—“Comrades, I am already tired of packing up,
marching, running, carrying arms, falling into line, keeping watch,
and fighting. Now that we have the sea here before us, I desire to
be relieved from all these toils, to sail the rest of the way, and
to arrive in Greece outstretched and asleep, like Odysseus.” This
pithy address being received with vehement acclamations, and warmly
responded to by all,—Cheirisophus offered, if the army chose to
empower him, to sail forthwith to Byzantium, where he thought he
could obtain from his friend the Lacedæmonian admiral, Anaxibius,
sufficient vessels for transport. His proposition was gladly
accepted; and he departed to execute the project.

Xenophon then urged upon the army various resolutions and
measures, proper for the regulation of affairs during the absence
of Cheirisophus. The army would be forced to maintain itself by
marauding expeditions among the hostile tribes in the mountains.
Such expeditions, accordingly, must be put under regulation; neither
individual soldiers, nor small companies, must be allowed to go out
at pleasure, without giving notice to the generals; moreover, the
camp must be kept under constant guard and scouts, in the event of
surprise from a retaliating enemy. It was prudent also to take the
best measures in their power for procuring vessels; since, after all,
Cheirisophus might possibly fail in bringing an adequate number.
They ought to borrow a few ships of war from the Trapezuntines, and
detain all the merchant ships which they saw; unshipping the rudders,
placing the cargoes under guard, and maintaining the crew during all
the time that the ships might be required for transport of the army.
Many such merchant vessels were often sailing by;[204] so that they
would thus acquire the means of transport, even though Cheirisophus
should bring few or none from Byzantium. Lastly, Xenophon proposed to
require the Grecian cities to repair and put in order the road along
the coast, for a land-march; since, perhaps, with all their efforts,
it would be found impossible to get together a sufficient stock of
transports.

  [204] Xen. Anab. v, 1, 3-13.

  Ὁρῶ δ᾽ ἐγὼ πλοῖα πολλάκις παραπλέοντα, etc. This is a forcible
  proof how extensive was the Grecian commerce with the town and
  region of Phasis, at the eastern extremity of the Euxine.

All the propositions of Xenophon were readily adopted by the army,
except the last. But the mere mention of a renewed land-march excited
such universal murmurs of repugnance, that he did not venture to put
that question to the vote. He took upon himself, however, to send
messages to the Grecian cities, on his own responsibility; urging
them to repair the roads, in order that the departure of the army
might be facilitated. And he found the cities ready enough to carry
his wishes into effect, as far as Kotyôra.[205]

  [205] Xen. Anab v. 1, 15.

The wisdom of these precautionary suggestions of Xenophon soon
appeared; for Cheirisophus not only failed in his object, but was
compelled to stay away for a considerable time. A pentekonter (or
armed ship with fifty oars) was borrowed from the Trapezuntines, and
committed to the charge of a Lacedæmonian Periœkus, named Dexippus,
for the purpose of detaining the merchant vessels passing by. This
man having violated his trust, and employed the ship to make his own
escape out of the Euxine, a second was obtained and confided to an
Athenian, Polykrates; who brought in successively several merchant
vessels. These the Greeks did not plunder, but secured the cargoes
under adequate guard, and only reserved the vessels for transports.
It became, however, gradually more and more difficult to supply the
camp with provisions. Though the army was distributed into suitable
detachments for plundering the Kolchian villages on the hills, and
seizing cattle and prisoners for sale, yet these expeditions did
not always succeed; indeed on one occasion, two Grecian lochi or
companies got entangled in such difficult ground, that they were
destroyed, to a man. The Kolchians united on the hills in increased
and menacing numbers, insomuch that a larger guard became necessary
for the camp; while the Trapezuntines,—tired of the protracted
stay of the army, as well as desirous of exempting from pillage
the natives in their own immediate neighborhood,—conducted the
detachments only to villages alike remote and difficult of access.
It was in this manner that a large force under Xenophon himself,
attacked the lofty and rugged stronghold of the Drilæ,—the most
warlike nation of mountaineers in the neighborhood of the Euxine;
well armed, and troublesome to Trapezus by their incursions. After a
difficult march and attack which Xenophon describes in interesting
detail, and wherein the Greeks encountered no small hazard of ruinous
defeat,—they returned in the end completely successful, and with a
plentiful booty.[206]

  [206] Xen. Anab. v. 2.

At length, after long awaiting in vain the reappearance of
Cheirisophus, increasing scarcity and weariness determined them to
leave Trapezus. A sufficient number of vessels had been collected to
serve for the transport of the women, of the sick and wounded, and of
the baggage. All these were accordingly placed on board, under the
command of Philesius and Sophænetus, the two oldest generals; while
the remaining army marched by land, along a road which had been just
made good under the representations of Xenophon. In three days they
reached Kerasus, another maritime colony of the Sinopeans, still in
the territory called Kolchian; there they halted ten days, mustered
and numbered the army, and divided the money acquired by the sale of
their prisoners. Eight thousand six hundred hoplites, out of a total
probably greater than eleven thousand, were found still remaining;
besides targeteers and various light troops.[207]

  [207] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 3. Mr. Kinneir (Travels in Asia Minor, p.
  327) and many other authors, have naturally presumed from the
  analogy of name that the modern town Kerasoun (about long. 38°
  40′) corresponds to the Kerasus of Xenophon; which Arrian in
  his Periplus conceives to be identical with what was afterwards
  called Pharnakia.

  But it is remarked both by Dr. Cramer (Asia Minor, vol. i, p.
  281) and by Mr. Hamilton (Travels in Asia Minor, ch. xv, p. 250),
  that Kerasoun is too far from Trebizond to admit of Xenophon
  having marched with the army from the one place to the other in
  three days; or even in less than ten days, in the judgment of Mr.
  Hamilton. Accordingly Mr. Hamilton places the site of the Kerasus
  of Xenophon much nearer to Trebizond (about long. 39° 20′, as it
  stands in Kiepert’s map of Asia Minor,) near a river now called
  the Kerasoun Dere Sú.

During the halt at Kerasus, the declining discipline of the army
became manifest as they approached home. Various acts of outrage
occurred, originating now, as afterwards, in the intrigues of
treacherous officers. A captain named Klearetus persuaded his company
to attempt the plunder of a Kolchian village near Kerasus, which had
furnished a friendly market to the Greeks, and which rested secure on
the faith of peaceful relations. He intended to make off separately
with the booty in one of the vessels; but his attack was repelled,
and he himself slain. The injured villagers despatched three elders,
as heralds, to remonstrate with the Grecian authorities; but these
heralds being seen in Kerasus by some of the repulsed plunderers,
were slain. A partial tumult then ensued, in which even the
magistrates of Kerasus were in great danger, and only escaped the
pursuing soldiers by running into the sea. This enormity, though it
occurred under the eyes of the generals, immediately before their
departure from Kerasus, remained without inquiry or punishment, from
the numbers concerned in it.

Between Kerasus and Kotyôra, there was not then (nor is there now)
any regular road.[208] This march cost the Cyreian army not less
than ten days, by an inland track departing from the sea-shore, and
through the mountains inhabited by the indigenous tribes Mosynœki
and Chalybes. The latter, celebrated for their iron works, were
under dependence to the former. As the Mosynœki refused to grant a
friendly passage across their territory, the army were compelled to
fight their way through it as enemies, with the aid of one section
of these people themselves; which alliance was procured for them by
the Trapezuntine Timesitheos, who was proxenus of the Mosynœki, and
understood their language. The Greeks took the mountain fastnesses
of this people, and plundered the wooden turrets which formed their
abodes. Of their peculiar fashions Xenophon gives an interesting
description, which I have not space to copy.[209] The territory of
the Tibarêni was more easy and accessible. This people met the Greeks
with presents, and tendered a friendly passage. But the generals at
first declined the presents,—preferring to treat them as enemies
and plunder them; which in fact they would have done, had they not
been deterred by inauspicious sacrifices.[210]

  [208] It was not without great difficulty that Mr. Kinneir
  obtained horses to travel from Kotyôra to Kerasoun by land.
  The aga of the place told him that it was madness to think of
  travelling by land, and ordered a felucca for him; but was at
  last prevailed on to furnish horses. There seems, indeed, to
  have been no regular or trodden road at all; the hills approach
  close to the sea, and Mr. Kinneir “travelled the whole of the way
  along the shore alternately over a sandy beach and a high wooded
  bank. The hills at intervals jutting out into the sea, form capes
  and numerous little bays along the coast; but the nature of the
  country was still the same, that is to say, studded with fine
  timber, flowers, and groves of cherry trees” (Travels in Asia
  Minor, p. 324).

  Kerasus is the indigenous country of the cherry tree, and the
  origin of its name.

  Professor Koch thinks, that the number of days’ march given by
  Xenophon (ten days) between Kerasus and Kotyôra, is more than
  consists with the real distance, even if Kerasus be placed where
  Mr. Hamilton supposes. If the number be correctly stated, he
  supposes that the Greeks must have halted somewhere (Zug der Zehn
  Tausend. p. 115. 116).

  [209] Xen. Anab. v, 5, 3.

  [210] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 18-25.

Near Kotyôra, which was situated on the coast of the Tibarêni, yet
on the borders of Paphlagonia, they remained forty-five days, still
awaiting the appearance of Cheirisophus with the transports to carry
them away by sea. The Sinopian harmost or governor, did not permit
them to be welcomed in so friendly a manner as at Trapezus. No market
was provided for them, nor were their sick admitted within the walls.
But the fortifications of the town were not so constructed as to
resist a Greek force, the like of which had never before been seen
in those regions. The Greek generals found a weak point, made their
way in, and took possession of a few houses for the accommodation
of their sick; keeping a guard at the gate to secure free egress,
but doing no farther violence to the citizens. They obtained their
victuals partly from the Kotyôrite villages, partly from the
neighboring territory of Paphlagonia, until at length envoys arrived
from Sinôpê to remonstrate against their proceedings.

These envoys presented themselves before the assembled soldiers in
the camp, when Hekatonymus, the chief and the most eloquent among
them, began by complimenting the army upon their gallant exploits
and retreat. He then complained of the injury which Kotyôra and
Sinôpê, as the mother city of Kotyôra, had suffered at their hands,
in violation of common Hellenic kinship. If such proceedings were
continued, he intimated that Sinôpê would be compelled in her own
defence to seek alliance with the Paphlagonian prince Korylas, or
any other barbaric auxiliary who would lend them aid against the
Greeks.[211] Xenophon replied that if the Kotyôrites had sustained
any damage, it was owing to their own ill-will and to the Sinopian
harmost in the place; that the generals were under the necessity of
procuring subsistence for the soldiers, with house-room for the sick,
and that they had taken nothing more; that the sick men were lying
within the town, but at their own cost, while the other soldiers were
all encamped without; that they had maintained cordial friendship
with the Trapezuntines, and requited all their good offices; that
they sought no enemies except through necessity, being anxious
only again to reach Greece; and that as for the threat respecting
Korylas, they knew well enough that that prince was eager to become
master of the wealthy city of Sinôpê, and would speedily attempt
some such enterprise if he could obtain the Cyreian army as his
auxiliaries.[212]

  [211] Xen. Anab. v, 5, 7-12.

  [212] Xen. Anab. v, 5, 13-22.

This judicious reply shamed the colleagues of Hekatonymus so much,
that they went the length of protesting against what he had said,
and of affirming that they had come with propositions of sympathy
and friendship to the army, as well as with promises to give them
an hospitable reception at Sinôpê, if they should visit that town
on their way home. Presents were at once sent to the army by the
inhabitants of Kotyôra, and a good understanding established.

Such an interchange of good will with the powerful city of Sinôpê was
an unspeakable advantage to the army,—indeed, an essential condition
to their power of reaching home. If they continued their march by
land, it was only through Sinopian guidance and mediation that they
could obtain or force a passage through Paphlagonia; while for a
voyage by sea, there was no chance of procuring a sufficient number
of vessels except from Sinôpê, since no news had been received of
Cheirisophus. On the other hand, that city had also a strong interest
in facilitating their transit homeward, and thus removing formidable
neighbors for whose ulterior purposes there could be no guarantee.
After some preliminary conversation with the Sinopian envoys, the
generals convoked the army in assembly, and entreated Hekatonymus
and his companions to advise them as to the best mode of proceeding
westward to the Bosphorus. Hekatonymus, after apologizing for the
menacing insinuations of his former speech, and protesting that
he had no other object in view except to point out the safest and
easiest plan of route for the army, began to unfold the insuperable
difficulties of a march through Paphlagonia. The very entrance
into the country must be achieved through a narrow aperture in the
mountains, which it was impossible to force if occupied by the enemy.
Even assuming this difficulty to be surmounted, there were spacious
plains to be passed over, wherein the Paphlagonian horse, the most
numerous and bravest in Asia, would be found almost irresistible.
There were also three or four great rivers, which the army would
be unable to pass,—the Thermodon and the Iris, each three hundred
feet in breadth,—the Halys, two stadia or nearly a quarter of a mile
in breadth,—the Parthenius, also very considerable. Such an array
of obstacles (he affirmed) rendered the project of marching through
Paphlagonia impracticable; whereas the voyage by sea from Kotyôra
to Sinôpê, and from Sinôpê to Herakleia, was easy; and the transit
from the latter place, either by sea to Byzantium, or by land across
Thrace, yet easier.[213]

  [213] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 4-11.

Difficulties like these, apparently quite real, were more than
sufficient to determine the vote of the army, already sick of
marching and fighting, in favor of the sea-voyage; though there were
not wanting suspicions of the sincerity of Hekatonymus. But Xenophon,
in communicating to the latter the decision of the army, distinctly
apprised him that they would on no account permit themselves to be
divided; that they would either depart or remain all in a body,
and that vessels must be provided sufficient for the transport of
all. Hekatonymus desired them to send envoys of their own to Sinôpê
to make the necessary arrangements. Three envoys were accordingly
sent,—Ariston, an Athenian, Kalimachus, an Arcadian, and Samolas, an
Achæan; the Athenian, probably, as possessing the talent of speaking
in the Sinopian senate or assembly.[214]

  [214] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 14.

During the absence of these envoys, the army still continued near
Kotyôra with a market provided by the town, and with traders from
Sinôpê and Herakleia in the camp. Such soldiers as had no money
wherewith to purchase, subsisted by pillaging the neighboring
frontier of Paphlagonia.[215] But they were receiving no pay; every
man was living on his own resources; and instead of carrying back a
handsome purse to Greece, as each soldier had hoped when he first
took service under Cyrus, there seemed every prospect of their
returning poorer than when they left home.[216] Moreover, the army
was now moving onward without any definite purpose, with increasing
dissatisfaction and decreasing discipline; insomuch that Xenophon
foresaw the difficulties which would beset the responsible commanders
when they should come within the stricter restraints and obligations
of the Grecian world.

  [215] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 19; vi, 1, 2.

  [216] Xen. Anab. vi, 4, 8; vi, 2, 4.

It was these considerations which helped to suggest to him the
idea of employing the army on some enterprise of conquest and
colonization in the Euxine itself; an idea highly flattering to
his personal ambition, especially as the army was of unrivalled
efficiency against an enemy, and no such second force could ever
be got together in those distant regions. His patriotism as a
Greek was inflamed with the thoughts of procuring for Hellas a new
autonomous city, occupied by a considerable Hellenic population,
possessing a spacious territory, and exercising dominion over many
indigenous neighbors. He seems to have thought first of attacking and
conquering some established non-Hellenic city; an act which his ideas
of international morality did not forbid, in a case where he had
contracted no special convention with the inhabitants,—though he (as
well as Cheirisophus) strenuously protested against doing wrong to
any innocent Hellenic community.[217] He contemplated the employment
of the entire force in capturing Phasis or some other native city;
after which, when the establishment was once safely effected, those
soldiers who preferred going home to remaining as settlers, might
do so without emperiling those who stayed, and probably with their
own purses filled by plunder and conquest in the neighborhood. To
settle as one of the richest proprietors and chiefs,—perhaps even
the recognized Œkist, like Agnon at Amphipolis,—of a new Hellenic
city such as could hardly fail to become rich, powerful, and
important,—was a tempting prospect for one who had now acquired the
habits of command. Moreover, the sequel will prove, how correctly
Xenophon appreciated the discomfort of leading the army back to
Greece without pay and without certain employment.

  [217] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 15-30; vi, 2, 6; vii, 1, 25, 29.

  Haken and other commentators do injustice to Xenophon when they
  ascribe to him the design of seizing the Greek city of Kotyôra.

It was the practice of Xenophon, and the advice of his master
Sokrates,[218] in grave and doubtful cases, where the most careful
reflection was at fault, to recur to the inspired authority of an
oracle or a prophet, and to offer sacrifice, in full confidence
that the gods would vouchsafe to communicate a special revelation
to any person whom they favored. Accordingly Xenophon, previous to
any communication with the soldiers respecting his new project, was
anxious to ascertain the will of the gods by a special sacrifice; for
which he invoked the presence of the Ambrakiot Silanus, the chief
prophet in the army. This prophet (as I have already mentioned),
before the battle of Kunaxa, had assured Cyrus that Artaxerxes would
not fight for ten days,—and the prophecy came to pass; which made
such an impression on Cyrus that he rewarded him with the prodigious
present of three thousand darics or ten Attic talents. While others
were returning poor, Silanus, having contrived to preserve this sum
throughout all the hardships of the retreat, was extremely rich,
and anxious only to hasten home with his treasure in safety. He
heard with strong repugnance the project of remaining in the Euxine,
and determined to traverse it by intrigue. As far as concerned
the sacrifices, indeed, which he offered apart with Xenophon, he
was obliged to admit that the indications of the victims were
favorable;[219] Xenophon himself being too familiar with the process
to be imposed upon. But he at the same time tried to create alarm by
declaring that a nice inspection disclosed evidence of treacherous
snares laid for Xenophon; which latter indications he himself began
to realize, by spreading reports among the army that the Athenian
general was laying clandestine plans for keeping them away from
Greece without their own concurrence.[220]

  [218] Xen. Memorab. i, 1, 8, 9. Ἔφη δὲ (Sokrates) δεῖν, ἃ μὲν
  μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ, μανθάνειν· ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς
  ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι·
  τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ, οἷς ἂν ὦσιν ἰλέω, σημαίνειν.

  Compare passages in his Cyropædia, i, 6, 3; De Officio Magistr.
  Equit. ix, 9.

  “The gods (says Euripides, in the Sokratic vein) have given us
  wisdom to understand and appropriate to ourselves the ordinary
  comforts of life; in obscure or unintelligible cases, we are
  enabled to inform ourselves by looking at the blaze of the fire,
  or by consulting prophets who understand the livers of sacrificial
  victims and the flight of birds. When they have thus furnished so
  excellent a provision for life, who but spoilt children can be
  discontented, and ask for more? Yet still human prudence, full of
  self-conceit, will struggle to be more powerful, and will presume
  itself to be wiser, than the gods.”

    Ἃ δ᾽ ἔστ᾽ ἄσημα, κοὐ σαφῆ, γιγνώσκομεν
    Εἰς πῦρ βλέποντες, καὶ κατὰ σπλάγχνων πτύχας
    Μάντεις προσημαίνουσιν οἰωνῶν τ᾽ ἄπο.
    Ἆρ᾽ οὐ τρυφῶμεν, θεοῦ κατασκευὴν βίου
    Δόντος τοιαύτην, οἷσιν οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τάδε;
    Ἀλλ᾽ ἡ φρόνησις τοῦ θεοῦ μεῖζον σθένειν
    Ζητεῖ· τὸ γαῦρον δ᾽ ἐν χεροῖν κεκτημένοι
    Δοκοῦμεν εἶναι δαιμόνων σοφώτεροι (Supplices, 211).

  It will be observed that this constant outpouring of special
  revelations, through prophets, omens, etc., was (in the view of
  these Sokratic thinkers) an essential part of the divine
  government; indispensable to satisfy their ideas of the
  benevolence of the gods; since rational and scientific
  prediction was so habitually at fault and unable to fathom the
  phenomena of the future.

  [219] Xen. Anab. v. 6, 29.

  [220] Though Xenophon accounted sacrifice to be an essential
  preliminary to any action of dubious result, and placed great
  faith in the indications which the victims offered, as signs of
  the future purposes of the gods,—he nevertheless had very little
  confidence in the professional prophets. He thought them quite
  capable of gross deceit (See Xen. Cyrop. i, 6, 2, 3; compare
  Sophokles, Antigone, 1035, 1060; and Œdip. Tyrann. 387).

Thus prematurely and insidiously divulged, the scheme found some
supporters, but a far larger number of opponents; especially among
those officers who were jealous of the ascendency of Xenophon.
Timasion and Thorax employed it as a means of alarming the
Herakleotic and Sinopian traders in the camp; telling them that
unless they provided not merely transports, but also pay for the
soldiers, Xenophon would find means to detain the army in the Euxine,
and would employ the transports when they arrived, not for the
homeward voyage, but for his own projects of acquisition This news
spread so much terror both at Sinôpê and Herakleia, that large offers
of money were made from both cities to Timasion, on condition that he
would ensure the departure of the army, as soon as the vessels should
be assembled at Kotyôra. Accordingly these officers, convening an
assembly of the soldiers, protested against the duplicity of Xenophon
in thus preparing momentous schemes without any public debate or
decision. And Timasion, seconded by Thorax, not only strenuously
urged the army to return, but went so far as to promise to them, on
the faith of the assurances from Herakleia and Sinôpê, future pay
on a liberal scale, to commence from the first new moon after their
departure; together with a hospitable reception in his native city of
Dardanus on the Hellespont, from whence they could make incursions on
the rich neighboring satrapy of Pharnabazus.[221]

  [221] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 19-26.

It was not, however, until these attacks were repeated from more
than one quarter,—until the Achæans Philesius and Lykon had loudly
accused Xenophon of underhand manœuvring to cheat the army into
remaining against their will,—that the latter rose to repel the
imputation; saying, that all that he had done was, to consult the
gods whether it would be better to lay his project before the army or
to keep it in his own bosom. The encouraging answer of the gods, as
conveyed through the victims and testified even by Silanus himself,
proved that the scheme was not ill-conceived; nevertheless, (he
remarked) Silanus had begun to lay snares for him, realizing by his
own proceedings a collateral indication which he had announced to be
visible in the victims. “If (added Xenophon) you had continued as
destitute and unprovided as you were just now,—I should still have
looked out for a resource in the capture of some city which would
have enabled such of you as chose, to return at once; while the rest
stay behind to enrich themselves. But now there is no longer any
necessity; since Herakleia and Sinôpê are sending transports, and
Timasion promises pay to you from the next new moon. Nothing can be
better; you will go back safely to Greece, and will receive pay for
going thither. I desist at once from my scheme, and call upon all who
were favorable to it to desist also. Only let us all keep together
until we are on safe ground; and let the man who lags behind or runs
off, be condemned as a wrong-doer.”[222]

  [222] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 30-33.

Xenophon immediately put this question to the vote, and every hand
was held up in its favor. There was no man more disconcerted with
the vote than the prophet Silanus, who loudly exclaimed against the
injustice of detaining any one desirous to depart. But the soldiers
put him down with vehement disapprobation, threatening that they
would assuredly punish him if they caught him running off. His
intrigue against Xenophon thus recoiled upon himself, for the moment.
But shortly afterwards, when the army reached Herakleia, he took his
opportunity for clandestine flight, and found his way back to Greece
with the three thousand darics.[223]

  [223] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 34; vi, 4, 13.

If Silanus gained little by his manœuvre, Timasion and his partners
gained still less. For so soon as it became known that the army had
taken a formal resolution to go back to Greece, and that Xenophon
himself had made the proposition, the Sinopians and the Herakleots
felt at their ease. They sent the transport vessels, but withheld the
money which they had promised to Timasion and Thorax. Hence these
officers were exposed to dishonor and peril; for, having positively
engaged to find pay for the army, they were now unable to keep their
word. So keen were their apprehensions, that they came to Xenophon
and told him that they had altered their views, and that they now
thought it best to employ the newly-arrived transports in conveying
the army, not to Greece, but against the town and territory of Phasis
at the eastern extremity of the Euxine.[224] Xenophon replied, that
they might convene the soldiers and make the proposition, if they
chose; but that he would have nothing to say to it. To make the
very proposition themselves, for which they had so much inveighed
against Xenophon, was impossible without some preparation; so that
each of them began individually to sound his captains, and get
the scheme suggested by them. During this interval, the soldiery
obtained information of the manœuvre, much to their discontent
and indignation; of which Neon (the lieutenant of the absent
Cheirisophus) took advantage, to throw the whole blame upon Xenophon;
alleging that it was he who had converted the other officers to his
original project, and that he intended as soon as the soldiers were
on shipboard, to convey them fraudulently to Phasis instead of to
Greece. There was something so plausible in this glaring falsehood,
which represented Xenophon as the author of the renewed project,
once his own,—and something so improbable in the fact that the
other officers should spontaneously have renounced their own strong
opinions to take up his,—that we can hardly be surprised at the
ready credence which Neon’s calumny found among the army. Their
exasperation against Xenophon became so intense, that they collected
in fierce groups; and there was even a fear that they would break
out into mutinous violence, as they had before done against the
magistrates of Kerasus.

  [224] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 36.

  I may here note that this _Phasis_ in the Euxine means the town
  of that name, not the river.

Well knowing the danger of such spontaneous and informal assemblages,
and the importance of the habitual solemnities of convocation
and arrangement, to ensure either discussion or legitimate
defence,[225]—Xenophon immediately sent round the herald to summon
the army into the regular agora, with customary method and ceremony.
The summons was obeyed with unusual alacrity, and Xenophon then
addressed them,—refraining, with equal generosity and prudence, from
saying anything about the last proposition which Timasion and others
had made to him. Had he mentioned it, the question would have become
one of life and death between him and those other officers.

  [225] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 1-3.

  Ἐπεὶ δὲ ᾐσθάνετο ὁ Ξενοφῶν, ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ὡς τάχιστα συναγαγεῖν
  αὐτῶν ἀγορὰν, καὶ μὴ ἐᾶσαι συλλεγῆναι αὐτομάτους· καὶ ἐκέλευε τὸν
  κήρυκα συλλέξαι ἀγοράν.

  The prudence of Xenophon in convoking the assembly at once is
  incontestable. He could not otherwise have hindered the soldiers
  from getting together, and exciting one another to action,
  without any formal summons.

  The reader should contrast with this the scene at Athens
  (described in Thucydides, ii, 22; and in Vol. VI, Ch. xlviii, p.
  133 of this History) during the first year of the Peloponnesian
  war, and the first invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians;
  when the invaders were at Acharnæ, within sight of the walls of
  Athens, burning and destroying the country. In spite of the most
  violent excitement among the Athenian people, and the strongest
  impatience to go out and fight, Perikles steadily refused to call
  an assembly, for fear that the people should take the resolution
  of going out. And what was much more remarkable—the people
  even in that state of excitement though all united within the
  walls, did not meet in any informal assembly, nor come to any
  resolution, or to any active proceeding; which the Cyreians would
  certainly have done, had they not been convened in a regular
  assembly.

  The contrast with the Cyreian army here illustrates the
  extraordinary empire exercised by constitutional forms over the
  minds of the Athenian citizens.

“Soldiers (said he), I understand that there are some men here
calumniating me, as if I were intending to cheat you and carry you
to Phasis. Hear me, then, in the name of the gods. If I am shown to
be doing wrong, let me not go from hence unpunished; but if, on the
contrary, my calumniators are proved to be the wrong-doers, deal
with them as they deserve. You surely well know where the sun rises
and where he sets; you know that if a man wishes to reach Greece,
he must go westward,—if to the barbaric territories, he must go
eastward. Can any one hope to deceive you on this point, and persuade
you that the sun rises on _this_ side, and sets on _that_? Can any
one cheat you into going on shipboard with a wind which blows you
away from Greece? Suppose even that I put you aboard when there is
no wind at all. How am I to force you to sail with me against your
own consent,—I being only in one ship, you in a hundred and more?
Imagine, however, that I could even succeed in deluding you to
Phasis. When we land there, you will know at once that we are not
in Greece; and what fate can I then expect,—a detected impostor in
the midst of ten thousand men with arms in their hands? No,—these
stories all proceed from foolish men, who are jealous of my influence
with you; jealous, too, without reason,—for I neither hinder _them_
from outstripping me in your favor, if they can render you greater
service,—nor _you_ from electing them commanders, if you think fit.
Enough of this, now; I challenge any one to come forward and say how
it is possible either to cheat, or to be cheated, in the manner laid
to my charge.”[226]

  [226] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 7-11.

Having thus grappled directly with the calumnies of his enemies, and
dissipated them in such manner as doubtless to create a reaction in
his own favor, Xenophon made use of the opportunity to denounce the
growing disorders in the army; which he depicted as such that, if no
corrective were applied, disgrace and contempt must fall upon all.
As he paused after this general remonstrance, the soldiers loudly
called upon him to go into particulars; upon which he proceeded to
recall, with lucid and impressive simplicity, the outrages which had
been committed at and near Kerasus,—the unauthorized and unprovoked
attack made by Klearetus and his company on a neighboring village
which was in friendly commerce with the army,—the murder of the
three elders of the village, who had come as heralds to complain
to the generals about such wrong,—the mutinous attack made by
disorderly soldiers even upon the magistrates of Kerasus, at the
very moment when they were remonstrating with the generals on what
had occurred; exposing these magistrates to the utmost peril, and
putting the generals themselves to ignominy.[227] “If such are to
be our proceedings, (continued Xenophon), look you well into what
condition the army will fall. You, the aggregate body,[228] will no
longer be the sovereign authority to make war or peace with whom
you please; each individual among you will conduct the army against
any point which he may choose. And even if men should come to you as
envoys, either for peace or for other purposes, they may be slain
by any single enemy; so that you will be debarred from all public
communications whatever. Next, those whom your universal suffrage
shall have chosen commanders, will have no authority; while any
self-elected general who chooses to give the word, Cast! Cast! (i.
e. darts or stones), may put to death, without trial, either officer
or soldier, as it suits him; that is, if he finds you ready to obey
him, as it happened near Kerasus. Look, now, what these self-elected
leaders have done for you. The magistrate of Kerasus, if he was
really guilty of wrong towards you, has been enabled to escape with
impunity; if he was innocent, he has been obliged to run away from
you, as the only means of avoiding death without pretence or trial.
Those who stoned the heralds to death, have brought matters to such
a pass, that you alone, among all Greeks, cannot enter the town of
Kerasus in safety, unless in commanding force; and that we cannot
even send in a herald to take up our dead (Klearetus and those who
were slain in the attack on the Kerasuntine village) for burial;
though at first those who had slain them in self-defence were anxious
to give up the bodies to us. For who will take the risk of going in
as herald, from those who have set the example of putting heralds to
death? We generals were obliged to entreat the Kerasuntines to bury
the bodies for us.”[229]

  [227] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 13-26.

  [228] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 26-27. Εἰ οὖν ταῦτα τοιαῦτα ἔσται,
  θεάσασθε οἵα ἡ κατάστασις ἡμῖν ἔσται τῆς στρατιᾶς. Ὑμεῖς μὲν οἱ
  πάντες οὐκ ἔσεσθε κύριοι, οὔτ᾽ ἀνελέσθαι πόλεμον ᾧ ἂν βούλησθε,
  οὔτε καταλῦσαι· ἰδίᾳ δὲ ὁ βουλόμενος ἄξει στράτευμα ἐφ᾽ ὅ,τι ἂν
  ἐθέλῃ. Κἄν τινες πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἴωσι πρέσβεις, ἢ εἰρήνης δεόμενοι ἢ
  ἄλλου τινός, κατακαίνοντες τούτους οἱ βουλόμενοι, ποιήσουσιν ὑμᾶς
  τῶν λόγων μὴ ἀκοῦσαι τῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἰόντων. Ἔπειτα δὲ, οὓς μὲν ἂν
  ὑμεῖς ἅπαντες ἔλησθε ἄρχοντας, ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ χώρᾳ ἔσονται· ὅστις δ᾽
  ἂν ἑαυτὸν ἕληται στρατηγὸν, καὶ ἐθέλῃ λέγειν, Βάλλε, Βάλλε, οὗτος
  ἔσται ἱκανὸς καὶ ἄρχοντα κατακαίνειν καὶ ἰδιώτην ὃν ἂν ὑμῶν ἐθέλῃ
  ἄκριτον—ἂν ὦσιν οἱ πεισόμενοι αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἐγένετο.

  [229] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 27-30.

Continuing in this emphatic protest against the recent disorders
and outrages, Xenophon at length succeeded in impressing his own
sentiment, heartily and unanimously, upon the soldiers. They passed
a vote that the ringleaders of the mutiny at Kerasus should be
punished; that if any one was guilty of similar outrages in future,
he should be put upon his trial by the generals, before the lochages
or captains as judges, and if condemned by them, put to death; and
that trial should be had before the same persons, for any other wrong
committed since the death of Cyrus. A suitable religious ceremony was
also directed to be performed, at the instance of Xenophon and the
prophets, to purify the army.[230]

  [230] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 34, 35.

This speech affords an interesting specimen of the political
morality universal throughout the Grecian world, though deeper and
more predominant among its better sections. In the miscellaneous
aggregate, and temporary society, now mustered at Kotyôra, Xenophon
insists on the universal suffrage of the whole body, as the
legitimate sovereign authority for the guidance of every individual
will; the decision of the majority, fairly and formally collected,
as carrying a title to prevail over every dissentient minority;
the generals chosen by the majority of votes, as the only persons
entitled to obedience. This is the cardinal principle to which he
appeals, as the anchorage of political obligation in the mind of
each separate man or fraction; as the condition of all success, all
safety, and all conjoint action; as the only condition either for
punishing wrong or protecting right; as indispensable to keep up
their sympathies with the Hellenic communities, and their dignity
either as soldiers or as citizens. The complete success of his speech
proves that he knew how to touch the right chord of Grecian feeling.
No serious acts of individual insubordination occurred afterwards,
though the army collectively went wrong on more than one occasion.
And what is not less important to notice,—the influence of Xenophon
himself, after his unreserved and courageous remonstrance, seems to
have been sensibly augmented,—certainly no way diminished.

The circumstances which immediately followed were indeed well
calculated to augment it. For it was resolved, on the proposition of
Xenophon himself[231] that the generals themselves should be tried
before the newly-constituted tribunal of the lochages or captains,
in case any one had complaint to make against them for past matters;
agreeably to the Athenian habit of subjecting every magistrate to
a trial of accountability on laying down his office. In the course
of this investigation, Philesius and Xanthiklês were fined twenty
minæ, to make good an assignable deficiency of that amount, in the
cargoes of those merchantmen which had been detained at Trapezus
for the transport of the army; Sophænetus, who had the general
superintendence of this property, but had been negligent in that
duty, was fined ten minæ. Next, the name of Xenophon was put up, when
various persons stood forward to accuse him of having beaten and
ill-used them. As commander of the rear-guard, his duty was by far
the severest and most difficult, especially during the intense cold
and deep snow; since the sick and wounded, as well as the laggards
and plunderers, all fell under his inspection. One man especially
was loud in complaints against him, and Xenophon questioned him, as
to the details of his case, before the assembled army. It turned out
that he had given him blows, because the man, having been intrusted
with the task of carrying a sick soldier, was about to evade the duty
by burying the dying man alive.[232] This interesting debate (given
in the Anabasis at length) ended by full approbation, on the part of
the army, of Xenophon’s conduct, accompanied with regret that he had
not handled the man yet more severely.

  [231] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 35.

  Παραινοῦντος δὲ Ξενοφῶντος, καὶ τῶν μάντεων συμβουλευόντων, ἔδοξε
  καὶ καθᾶραι τὸ στράτευμα· καὶ ἐγένετο καθαρμός· ἔδοξε δὲ καὶ τοὺς
  στρατηγοὺς δίκην ὑποσχεῖν τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου.

  In the distribution of chapters as made by the editors, chapter
  the eighth is made to begin at the second ἔδοξε, which seems to
  me not convenient for comprehending the full sense. I think that
  the second ἔδοξε, as well as the first, is connected with the
  words παραινοῦντος Ξενοφῶντος, and ought to be included not only
  in the same chapter with them, but also in the same sentence,
  without an intervening full stop.

  [232] Xen. Anab. v, 8, 3-12.

The statements of Xenophon himself give us a vivid idea of the
internal discipline of the army, even as managed by a discreet and
well-tempered officer. “I acknowledge (said he to the soldiers) to
have struck many men for disorderly conduct; men who were content to
owe their preservation to your orderly march and constant fighting,
while they themselves ran about to plunder and enrich themselves at
your cost. Had we all acted as they did, we should have perished to
a man. Sometimes, too, I struck men who were lagging behind with
cold and fatigue, or were stopping the way so as to hinder others
from getting forward; I struck them with my fist,[233] in order to
save them from the spear of the enemy. You yourselves stood by,
and saw me; you had arms in your hands, yet none of you interfered
to prevent me. I did it for their good as well as for yours, not
from any insolence of disposition; for it was a time when we were
all alike suffering from cold, hunger, and fatigue; whereas I now
live comparatively well, drink more wine, and pass easy days,—and
yet I strike no one. You will find that the men who failed most
in those times of hardship, are now the most outrageous offenders
in the army. There is Boïskus,[234] the Thessalian pugilist, who
pretended sickness during the march, in order to evade the burthen
of carrying his shield,—and now, as I am informed, he has stripped
several citizens of Kotyôra of their clothes. If (he concluded) the
blows which I have occasionally given, in cases of necessity, are
now brought in evidence,—I call upon those among you also, to whom
I have rendered aid and protection, to stand up and testify in my
favor.”[235]

  [233] Xen. Anab. v, 8, 16. ἔπαισα πὺξ, ὅπως μὴ λόγχῃ ὑπὸ τῶν
  πολεμίων παίοιτο.

  [234] The idea that great pugilists were not good soldiers in
  battle, is as old among the Greeks as the Iliad. The unrivalled
  pugilist of the Homeric Grecian army, Epeius, confesses his own
  inferiority as a soldier (Iliad, xxiii 667).

    Ἆσσον ἴτω, ὅστις δέπας οἴσεται ἀμφικύπελλον·
    Ἡμίονον δ᾽ οὔ φημί τιν᾽ ἄξεμεν ἄλλον Ἀχαιῶν,
    Πυγμῇ νικήσαντ᾽· ἐπεὶ εὔχομαι εἶναι ἄριστος.
    ~Ἦ οὐχ ἅλις, ὅ,ττι μάχης ἐπιδεύομαι~; οὐδ᾽ ἄρα πως ἦν
    Ἐν πάντεσσ᾽ ἔργοισι δαήμονα φῶτα γενέσθαι.

  [235] Xen. Anab. v, 8, 13-25.

Many individuals responded to this appeal, insomuch that Xenophon
was not merely acquitted, but stood higher than before in the
opinion of the army. We learn from his defence that for a commanding
officer to strike a soldier with his fist, if wanting in duty,
was not considered improper; at least under such circumstances as
those of the retreat. But what deserves notice still more, is, the
extraordinary influence which Xenophon’s powers of speaking gave him
over the minds of the army. He stood distinguished from the other
generals, Lacedæmonian, Arcadian, Achæan, etc., by having the power
of working on the minds of the soldiers collectively; and we see
that he had the good sense, as well as the spirit, not to shrink
from telling them unpleasant truths. In spite of such frankness—or
rather, partly by means of such frankness,—his ascendency as
commander not only remained unabated, as compared with that of the
others, but went on increasing. For whatever may be said about the
flattery of orators as a means of influence over the people,—it
will be found that though particular points may be gained in this
way, yet wherever the influence of an orator has been steady and
long-continued (like that of Perikles[236] or Demosthenes) it is
owing in part to the fact that he has an opinion of his own, and is
not willing to accommodate himself constantly to the prepossessions
of his hearers. Without the oratory of Xenophon, there would have
existed no engine for kindling or sustaining the _sensus communis_
of the ten thousand Cyreians assembled at Kotyôra, or for keeping
up the moral authority of the aggregate over the individual members
and fractions. The other officers could doubtless speak well enough
to address short encouragements, or give simple explanations, to
the soldiers; without this faculty, no man was fit for military
command over Greeks. But the oratory of Xenophon was something of
a higher order. Whoever will study the discourse pronounced by him
at Kotyôra, will perceive a dexterity in dealing with assembled
multitudes,—a discriminating use sometimes of the plainest and
most direct appeal, sometimes of indirect insinuation or circuitous
transitions to work round the minds of the hearers,—a command of
those fundamental political convictions which lay deep in the Grecian
mind, but were often so overlaid by the fresh impulses arising out of
each successive situation, as to require some positive friction to
draw them out from their latent state—lastly, a power of expansion
and varied repetition—such as would be naturally imparted both
by the education and the practice of an intelligent Athenian, but
would rarely be found in any other Grecian city. The energy and
judgment displayed by Xenophon in the retreat were doubtless not less
essential to his influence than his power of speaking; but in these
points we may be sure that other officers were more nearly his equals.

  [236] See the striking remarks of Thucydides (ii, 65) upon
  Perikles.

The important public proceedings above described not only restored
the influence of Xenophon, but also cleared off a great amount of
bad feeling, and sensibly abated the bad habits, which had grown up
in the army. A scene which speedily followed was not without effect
in promoting cheerful and amicable sympathies. The Paphlagonian
prince Korylas, weary of the desultory warfare carried on between
the Greeks and the border inhabitants, sent envoys to the Greek camp
with presents of horses and fine robes,[237] and with expressions of
a wish to conclude peace. The Greek generals accepted the presents,
and promised to submit the proposition to the army. But first they
entertained the envoys at a banquet, providing at the same time
games and dances, with other recreations amusing not only to them
but also to the soldiers generally. The various dances, warlike and
pantomimic, of Thracians, Mysians, Ænianes, Magnêtes, etc., are
described by Xenophon in a lively and interesting manner. They were
followed on the next day by an amicable convention concluded between
the army and the Paphlagonians.[238]

  [237] Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 2. Πέμπει παρὰ τοὺς Ἕλληνας πρέσβεις,
  ἔχοντας ἵππους καὶ στολὰς καλάς, etc.

  The horses sent were doubtless native Paphlagonian; the robes
  sent were probably the produce of the looms of Sinôpê and
  Kotyôra; just as the Thracian princes used to receive fine woven
  and metallic fabrics from Abdêra and the other Grecian colonies
  on their coast—ὑφαντὰ καὶ λεῖα, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κατασκευὴ, etc.
  (Thucyd. ii, 96). From the like industry probably proceeded
  the splendid “regia textilia” and abundance of gold and silver
  vessels, captured by the Roman general Paulus Emilius along with
  Perseus the last king of Macedonia (Livy, xlv, 33-35).

  [238] Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 10-14.

Not long afterwards,—a number of transports, sufficient for the
whole army, having been assembled from Herakleia and Sinôpê,—all the
soldiers were conveyed by sea to the latter place, passing by the
mouth of the rivers Thermodon, Iris, and Halys, which they would have
found impracticable to cross in a land-march through Paphlagonia.
Having reached Sinôpê after a day and a night of sailing with a fair
wind, they were hospitably received, and lodged in the neighboring
seaport of Armênê, where the Sinopians sent to them a large present
of barley-meal and wine, and where they remained for five days.

It was here that they were joined by Cheirisophus, whose absence
had been so unexpectedly prolonged. But he came with only a single
trireme, bringing nothing except a message from Anaxibius, the
Lacedæmonian admiral in the Bosphorus; who complimented the army,
and promised that they should be taken into pay as soon as they
were out of the Euxine. The soldiers, severely disappointed on
seeing him arrive thus empty-handed, became the more strongly bent
on striking some blow to fill their own purses before they reached
Greece. Feeling that it was necessary to the success of any such
project that it should be prepared not only skilfully, but secretly,
they resolved to elect a single general in place of that board of
six (or perhaps more) who were still in function. Such was now the
ascendency of Xenophon, that the general sentiment of the army at
once turned towards him; and the lochages or captains, communicating
to him what was in contemplation, intimated to him their own anxious
hopes that he would not decline the offer. Tempted by so flattering
a proposition, he hesitated at first what answer he should give. But
at length the uncertainty of being able to satisfy the exigencies
of the army, and the fear of thus compromising the reputation which
he had already realized, outweighed the opposite inducements. As
in other cases of doubt, so in this,—he offered sacrifice to Zeus
Basileus; and the answer returned by the victims was such as to
determine him to refusal. Accordingly, when the army assembled, with
predetermination to choose a single chief, and proceeded to nominate
him,—he respectfully and thankfully declined, on the ground that
Cheirisophus was a Lacedæmonian, and that he himself was not; adding
that he should cheerfully serve under any one whom they might name.
His excuse, however, was repudiated by the army; and especially by
the lochages. Several of these latter were Arcadians; and one of
them, Agasias, cried out, with full sympathy of the soldiers, that if
that principle were admitted, he, as an Arcadian, ought to resign his
command. Finding that his former reason was not approved, Xenophon
acquainted the army that he had sacrificed to know whether he ought
to accept the command, and that the gods had peremptorily forbidden
him to do so.[239]

  [239] Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 22-31.

Cheirisophus was then elected sole commander, and undertook the
duty; saying that he would have willingly served under Xenophon,
if the latter had accepted the office, but that it was a good
thing for Xenophon himself to have declined,—since Dexippus had
already poisoned the mind of Anaxibius against him, although he
(Cheirisophus) had emphatically contradicted the calumnies.[240]

  [240] Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 32.

On the next day, the army sailed forward, under the command of
Cheirisophus, to Herakleia; near which town they were hospitably
entertained, and gratified with a present of meal, wine, and
bullocks, even greater than they had received at Sinôpê. It now
appeared that Xenophon had acted wisely in declining the sole
command; and also that Cheirisophus, though elected commander, yet
having been very long absent, was not really of so much importance
in the eyes of the soldiers as Xenophon. In the camp near Herakleia,
the soldiers became impatient that their generals (for the habit
of looking upon Xenophon as one of them still continued) took no
measures to procure money for them. The Achæan Lykon proposed that
they should extort a contribution of no less than three thousand
staters of Kyzikus (about sixty thousand Attic drachmæ, or ten
talents, equal to two thousand three hundred pounds) from the
inhabitants of Herakleia; another man immediately outbid this
proposition, and proposed that they should require ten thousand
staters—a full month’s pay for the army. It was moved that
Cheirisophus and Xenophon should go to the Herakleots as envoys with
this demand. But both of them indignantly refused to be concerned in
so unjust an extortion from a Grecian city which had just received
the army kindly, and sent handsome presents. Accordingly, Lykon
with two Arcadian officers undertook the mission, and intimated
the demand, not without threats in case of non-compliance, to
the Herakleots. The latter replied that they would take it into
consideration. But they waited only for the departure of the envoys,
and then immediately closed their gates, manned their walls, and
brought in their outlying property.

The project being thus baffled, Lykon and the rest turned their
displeasure upon Cheirisophus and Xenophon, whom they accused of
having occasioned its miscarriage. And they now began to exclaim,
that it was disgraceful to the Arcadians and Achæans; who formed more
than one numerical half of the army and endured all the toil—to obey
as well as to enrich generals from other Hellenic cities; especially
a single Athenian who furnished no contingent to the army. Here
again it is remarkable that the personal importance of Xenophon
caused him to be still regarded as a general, though the sole command
had been vested, by formal vote, in Cheirisophus. So vehement was
the dissatisfaction, that all the Arcadian and Achæan soldiers in
the army, more than four thousand and five hundred hoplites in
number, renounced the authority of Cheirisophus, formed themselves
into a distinct division, and chose ten commanders from out of
their own numbers. The whole army thus became divided into three
portions—first, the Arcadians and Achæans; secondly, one thousand
and four hundred hoplites and seven hundred peltasts, who adhered
to Cheirisophus; lastly, one thousand seven hundred hoplites, three
hundred peltasts, and forty horsemen, (all the horsemen in the army)
attaching themselves to Xenophon; who however was taking measures to
sail away individually from Herakleia and quit the army altogether,
which he would have done had he not been restrained by unfavorable
sacrifices.[241]

  [241] Xen. Anab. vi, 2, 11-16.

The Arcadian division, departing first, in vessels from Herakleia,
landed at the harbor of Kalpê; an untenanted promontory of the
Bithynian or Asiatic Thrace, midway between Herakleia and Byzantium.
From thence they marched at once into the interior of Bithynia, with
the view of surprising the villages, and acquiring plunder. But
through rashness and bad management, they first sustained several
partial losses, and ultimately became surrounded upon an eminence, by
a large muster of the indigenous Bithynians from all the territory
around. They were only rescued from destruction by the unexpected
appearance of Xenophon with his division; who had left Herakleia
somewhat later, but heard by accident, during their march, of the
danger of their comrades. The whole army thus became re-assembled at
Kalpê, where the Arcadians and Achæans, disgusted at the ill-success
of their separate expedition, again established the old union
and the old generals. They chose Neon in place of Cheirisophus,
who,—afflicted by the humiliation put upon him, in having been
first named sole commander and next deposed within a week,—had
fallen sick of a fever and died. The elder Arcadian captains farther
moved a resolution, that if any one henceforward should propose to
separate the army into fractions, he should be put to death.[242]

  [242] Xenoph. Anab. vi. 3, 10-25; vi, 4, 11.

The locality of Kalpê was well suited for the foundation of a colony,
which Xenophon evidently would have been glad to bring about, though
he took no direct measures tending towards it; while the soldiers
were so bent on returning to Greece, and so jealous lest Xenophon
should entrap them into remaining, that they almost shunned the
encampment. It so happened that they were detained there for some
days without being able to march forth even in quest of provisions,
because the sacrifices were not favorable. Xenophon refused to
lead them out, against the warning of the sacrifices—although the
army suspected him of a deliberate manœuvre for the purpose of
detention. Neon, however, less scrupulous, led out a body of two
thousand men who chose to follow him, under severe distress for want
of provisions. But being surprised by the native Bithynians, with
the aid of some troops of the Persian satrap Pharnabazus, he was
defeated with the loss of no less than five hundred men; a misfortune
which Xenophon regards as the natural retribution for contempt of
the sacrificial warning. The dangerous position of Neon with the
remainder of the detachment was rapidly made known at the camp; upon
which Xenophon, unharnessing a waggon-bullock as the only animal near
at hand, immediately offered sacrifice. On this occasion, the victim
was at once favorable; so that he led out without delay the greater
part of the force, to the rescue of the exposed detachment, which was
brought back in safety to the camp. So bold had the enemy become,
that in the night the camp was attacked. The Greeks were obliged on
the next day to retreat into stronger ground, surrounding themselves
with a ditch and palisade. Fortunately a vessel arrived from
Herakleia, bringing to the camp at Kalpê a supply of barley-meal,
cattle, and wine; which restored the spirits of the army, enabling
them to go forth on the ensuing morning, and assume the aggressive
against the Bithynians and the troops of Pharnabazus. These troops
were completely defeated and dispersed, so that the Greeks returned
to their camp at Kalpê in the evening, both safe and masters of the
country.[243]

  [243] Xen. Anab. vi, 5.

At Kalpê they remained some time, awaiting the arrival of Kleander
from Byzantium, who was said to be about to bring vessels for their
transport. They were now abundantly provided with supplies, not
merely from the undisturbed plunder of the neighboring villages, but
also from the visits of traders who came with cargoes. Indeed the
impression—that they were preparing, at the instance of Xenophon,
to found a new city at Kalpê—became so strong, that several of the
neighboring native villages sent envoys to ask on what terms alliance
would be granted to them. At length Kleander came, but with two
triremes only.[244]

  [244] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 1-5.

Kleander was the Lacedæmonian harmost or governor of Byzantium. His
appearance opens to us a new phase in the eventful history of this
gallant army, as well as an insight into the state of the Grecian
world under the Lacedæmonian empire. He came attended by Dexippus,
who had served in the Cyreian army until their arrival at Trapezus,
and who had there been entrusted with an armed vessel for the purpose
of detaining transports to convey the troops home, but had abused the
confidence reposed in him by running away with the ship to Byzantium.

It so happened that at the moment when Kleander arrived, the whole
army was out on a marauding excursion. Orders had been already
promulgated, that whatever was captured by every one when the whole
army was out, should be brought in and dealt with as public property;
though on days when the army was collectively at rest, any soldier
might go out individually and take to himself whatever he could
pillage. On the day when Kleander arrived, and found the whole army
out, some soldiers were just coming back with a lot of sheep which
they had seized. By right, the sheep ought to have been handed into
the public store. But these soldiers, desirous to appropriate them
wrongfully, addressed themselves to Dexippus, and promised him a
portion if he would enable them to retain the rest. Accordingly
the latter interfered, drove away those who claimed the sheep as
public property, and denounced them as thieves to Kleander; who
desired him to bring them before him. Dexippus arrested one of them,
a soldier belonging to the lochus or company of one of the best
friends of Xenophon,—the Arcadian Agasias. The latter took the man
under his protection; while the soldiers around, incensed not less
at the past than at the present conduct of Dexippus, broke out into
violent manifestations, called him a traitor and pelted him with
stones. Such was their wrath that not Dexippus alone, but the crew
of the triremes also, and even Kleander himself, fled in alarm; in
spite of the intervention of Xenophon and the other generals, who
on the one hand explained to Kleander, that it was an established
army-order which these soldiers were seeking to enforce—and on the
other hand controlled the mutineers. But the Lacedæmonian harmost
was so incensed as well by his own fright as by the calumnies of
Dexippus, that he threatened to sail away at once, and proclaim the
Cyreian army enemies to Sparta, so that every Hellenic city should
be interdicted from giving them reception.[245] It was in vain that
the generals, well knowing the formidable consequences of such
an interdict, entreated him to relent. He would consent only on
condition that the soldier who had begun to throw stones, as well as
Agasias the interfering officer, should be delivered up to him. This
latter demand was especially insisted upon by Dexippus, who, hating
Xenophon, had already tried to prejudice Anaxibius against him, and
believed that Agasias had acted by his order.[246]

  [245] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 5-9.

  [246] Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 32; vi, 4, 11-15.

The situation became now extremely critical; since the soldiers
would not easily be brought to surrender their comrades,—who had
a perfectly righteous cause, though they had supported it by undue
violence,—to the vengeance of a traitor like Dexippus. When the
army was convened in assembly, several of them went so far as to
treat the menace of Kleander with contempt. But Xenophon took pains
to set them right upon this point. “Soldiers (said he), it will be
no slight misfortune if Kleander shall depart as he threatens to
do, in his present temper towards us. We are here close upon the
cities of Greece; now the Lacedæmonians are the imperial power in
Greece, and not merely their authorized officers, but even each one
of their individual citizens, can accomplish what he pleases in the
various cities. If then Kleander begins by shutting us out from
Byzantium, and next enjoins the Lacedæmonian harmosts in the other
cities to do the same, proclaiming us lawless and disobedient to
Sparta,—if, besides, the same representation should be conveyed to
the Lacedæmonian admiral of the fleet, Anaxibius,—we shall be hard
pressed either to remain or to sail away; for the Lacedæmonians are
at present masters, both on land and at sea.[247] We must not, for
the sake of any one or two men, suffer the whole army to be excluded
from Greece. We must obey whatever the Lacedæmonians command,
especially as our cities, to which we respectively belong, now obey
them. As to what concerns myself, I understand that Dexippus has told
Kleander that Agasias would never have taken such a step except by my
orders. Now, if Agasias himself states this, I am ready to exonerate
both him and all of you, and to give myself up to any extremity
of punishment. I maintain too, that any other man whom Kleander
arraigns, ought in like manner to give himself up for trial, in order
that you collectively may be discharged from the imputation. It will
be hard indeed, if just as we are reaching Greece, we should not
only be debarred from the praise and honor which we anticipated, but
should be degraded even below the level of others, and shut out from
the Grecian cities.”[248]

  [247] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 12, 13.

  Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἐγγὺς αἱ Ἑλληνίδες πόλεις· τῆς δ᾽ Ἑλλάδος
  Λακεδαιμόνιοι προεστήκασιν· ~ἱκανοὶ δέ εἰσι καὶ εἶς ἕκαστος
  Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅ,τι βούλονται διαπράττεσθαι~.
  Εἰ οὖν οὗτος πρῶτον μὲν ἡμᾶς Βυζαντίου ἀποκλείσει, ἔπειτα δὲ
  τοῖς ἄλλοις ἁρμοσταῖς παραγγελεῖ εἰς τὰς πόλεις μὴ δέχεσθαι,
  ὡς ἀπιστοῦντας Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ ἀνόμους ὄντας—ἔτι δὲ πρὸς
  Ἀναξίβιον τὸν ναύαρχον οὗτος ὁ λόγος περὶ ἡμῶν ἥξει—χαλεπὸν
  ἔσται καὶ μένειν καὶ αποπλεῖν· ~καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ γῇ ἄρχουσι
  Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ τὸν νῦν χρόνον~.

  [248] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 12-16.

After this speech from the philo-Laconian Xenophon,—so significant
a testimony of the unmeasured ascendency and interference of the
Lacedæmonians throughout Greece,—Agasias rose and proclaimed, that
what he had done was neither under the orders, nor with the privity,
of Xenophon; that he had acted on a personal impulse of wrath, at
seeing his own honest and innocent soldier dragged away by the
traitor Dexippus; but that he now willingly gave himself up as a
victim, to avert from the army the displeasure of the Lacedæmonians.
This generous self-sacrifice, which at the moment promised nothing
less than a fatal result to Agasias, was accepted by the army; and
the generals conducted both him and the soldier whom he had rescued,
as prisoners to Kleander. Presenting himself as the responsible
party, Agasias at the same time explained to Kleander the infamous
behavior of Dexippus to the army, and said that towards no one else
would he have acted in the same manner; while the soldier whom he had
rescued and who was given up at the same time, also affirmed that
he had interfered merely to prevent Dexippus and some others from
overruling, for their own individual benefit, a proclaimed order
of the entire army. Kleander, having observed that if Dexippus had
done what was affirmed, he would be the last to defend him, but that
no one ought to have been stoned without trial,—desired that the
persons surrendered might be left for his consideration, and at the
same time retracted his expressions of displeasure as regarded all
the others.[249]

  [249] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 22-28.

The generals then retired, leaving Kleander in possession of the
prisoners, and on the point of taking his dinner. But they retired
with mournful feelings, and Xenophon presently convened the army
to propose that a general deputation should be sent to Kleander to
implore his lenity towards their two comrades. This being cordially
adopted, Xenophon, at the head of a deputation comprising Drakontius,
the Spartan, as well as the chief officers, addressed an earnest
appeal to Kleander, representing that his honor had been satisfied
with the unconditional surrender of the two persons required; that
the army, deeply concerned for two meritorious comrades, entreated
him now to show mercy and spare their lives; that they promised him
in return the most implicit obedience, and entreated him to take the
command of them, in order that he might have personal cognizance
of their exact discipline, and compare their worth with that of
Dexippus. Kleander was not merely soothed, but completely won over
by this address; and said in reply that the conduct of the generals
belied altogether the representations made to him, (doubtless by
Dexippus) that they were seeking to alienate the army from the
Lacedæmonians. He not only restored the two men in his power, but
also accepted the command of the army, and promised to conduct them
back into Greece.[250]

  [250] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 31-36.

The prospects of the army appeared thus greatly improved; the
more so, as Kleander, on entering upon his new functions as
commander, found the soldiers so cheerful and orderly, that he was
highly gratified, and exchanged personal tokens of friendship and
hospitality with Xenophon. But when sacrifices came to be offered,
for beginning the march homeward, the signs were so unpropitious,
for three successive days, that Kleander could not bring himself to
brave such auguries at the outset of his career. Accordingly, he told
the generals, that the gods plainly forbade him, and reserved it
for them, to conduct the army into Greece; that he should therefore
sail back to Byzantium, and would receive the army in the best way
he could, when they reached the Bosphorus. After an interchange
of presents with the soldiers, he then departed with his two
triremes.[251]

  [251] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 36, 37.

The favorable sentiment now established in the bosom of Kleander will
be found very serviceable hereafter to the Cyreians at Byzantium;
but they had cause for deeply regretting the unpropitious sacrifices
which had deterred him from assuming the actual command at Kalpê. In
the request preferred to him by them that he would march as their
commander to the Bosphorus, we may recognize a scheme, and a very
well-contrived scheme, of Xenophon; who had before desired to leave
the army at Herakleia, and who saw plainly that the difficulties of
a commander, unless he were a Lacedæmonian of station and influence,
would increase with every step of their approach to Greece. Had
Kleander accepted the command, the soldiers would have been better
treated, while Xenophon himself might either have remained as his
adviser, or might have gone home. He probably would have chosen the
latter course.

Under the command of their own officers, the Cyreians now marched
from Kalpê across Bithynia to Chrysopolis,[252] (in the territory of
Chalkêdon on the Asiatic edge of the Bosphorus, immediately opposite
to Byzantium, as Scutari now is to Constantinople), where they
remained seven days, turning into money the slaves and plunder which
they had collected. Unhappily for them, the Lacedæmonian admiral
Anaxibius was now at Byzantium, so that their friend Kleander was
under his superior command. And Pharnabazus, the Persian satrap
of the north-western regions of Asia Minor, becoming much alarmed
lest they should invade his satrapy, despatched a private message
to Anaxibius; whom he prevailed upon, by promise of large presents,
to transport the army forthwith across to the European side of the
Bosphorus.[253] Accordingly, Anaxibius, sending for the generals and
the lochages across to Byzantium, invited the army to cross, and gave
them his assurance that as soon as the soldiers should be in Europe,
he would provide pay for them. The other officers told him that they
would return with this message and take the sense of the army; but
Xenophon, on his own account, said that he should not return; that he
should now retire from the army, and sail away from Byzantium. It was
only on the pressing instance of Anaxibius that he was induced to go
back to Chrysopolis and conduct the army across; on the understanding
that he should depart immediately afterwards.

  [252] Nearly the same cross march was made by the Athenian
  general Lamachus, in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war,
  after he had lost his triremes by a sudden rise of the water
  at the mouth of the river Kalex, in the territory of Herakleia
  (Thucyd. iv, 75).

  [253] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 2. Πέμψας πρὸς Ἀναξίβιον τὸν ναύαρχον,
  ἐδεῖτο διαβιβάσαι τὸ στράτευμα ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, καὶ ὑπισχνεῖτο πάντα
  ποιήσειν αὐτῷ ὅσα δέοι.

  Compare vii, 2, 7, when Anaxibius demanded in vain the fulfilment
  of this promise.

Here at Byzantium, he received his first communication from the
Thracian prince Seuthes; who sent Medosadês to offer him a reward
if he would bring the army across. Xenophon replied that the army
would cross; that no reward from Seuthes was needful to bring about
that movement; but that he himself was about to depart, leaving the
command in other hands. In point of fact, the whole army crossed
with little delay, landed in Europe, and found themselves within the
walls of Byzantium.[254] Xenophon, who had come along with them, paid
a visit shortly afterwards to his friend the harmost Kleander, and
took leave of him as about to depart immediately. But Kleander told
him that he must not think of departing until the army was out of
the city, and that he would be held responsible if they stayed. In
truth Kleander was very uneasy so long as the soldiers were within
the walls, and was well aware that it might be no easy matter to
induce them to go away. For Anaxibius had practised a gross fraud
in promising them pay, which he had neither the ability nor the
inclination to provide. Without handing to them either pay or even
means of purchasing supplies, he issued orders that they must go
forth with arms and baggage, and muster outside of the gates, there
to be numbered for an immediate march; any one who stayed behind
being held as punishable. This proclamation was alike unexpected
and offensive to the soldiers, who felt that they had been deluded,
and were very backward in obeying. Hence Kleander, while urgent
with Xenophon to defer his departure until he had conducted the
army outside of the walls, added—“Go forth as if you were about to
march along with them; when you are once outside, you may depart as
soon as you please.”[255] Xenophon replied that this matter must be
settled with Anaxibius, to whom accordingly both of them went, and
who repeated the same directions, in a manner yet more peremptory.
Though it was plain to Xenophon that he was here making himself a
sort of instrument to the fraud which Anaxibius had practised upon
the army, yet he had no choice but to obey. Accordingly, he as well
as the other generals put themselves at the head of the troops, who
followed, however reluctantly, and arrived most of them outside
of the gates. Eteonikus (a Lacedæmonian officer of consideration,
noticed more than once in my last preceding volume) commanding at
the gate, stood close to it in person; in order that when all the
Cyreians had gone forth, he might immediately shut it and fasten it
with the bar.[256]

  [254] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 5-7.

  [255] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 7-10. Ἀλλ᾽ ὁμῶς (ἔφη), ἐγώ σοι
  συμβουλεύω ἐξελθεῖν ὡς πορευσόμενον· ἐπειδὰν δ᾽ ἔξω γένηται τὸ
  στράτευμα, τότε ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.

  [256] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 12.

Anaxibius knew well what he was doing. He fully anticipated that the
communication of the final orders would occasion an outbreak among
the Cyreians, and was anxious to defer it until they were outside.
But when there remained only the rearmost companies still in the
inside and on their march, all the rest having got out—he thought
the danger was over, and summoned to him the generals and captains,
all of whom were probably near the gates superintending the march
through. It seems that Xenophon, having given notice that he intended
to depart, did not answer to this summons as one of the generals, but
remained outside among the soldiers. “Take what supplies you want
(said Anaxibius) from the neighboring Thracian villages, which are
well furnished with wheat, barley, and other necessaries. After thus
providing yourselves, march forward to the Chersonesus, and there
Kyniskus will give you pay.”[257]

  [257] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 13.

This was the first distinct intimation given by Anaxibius that he did
not intend to perform his promise of finding pay for the soldiers.
Who Kyniskus was, we do not know, nor was he probably known to the
Cyreians; but the march here enjoined was at least one hundred and
fifty English miles, and might be much longer. The route was not
indicated, and the generals had to inquire from Anaxibius whether
they were to go by what was called the Holy Mountain (that is, by
the shorter line, skirting the northern coast of the Propontis), or
by a more inland and circuitous road through Thrace;—also whether
they were to regard the Thracian prince, Seuthes, as a friend or an
enemy.[258]

  [258] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 14.

Instead of the pay which had been formally promised to them by
Anaxibius if they would cross over from Asia to Byzantium, the
Cyreians thus found themselves sent away empty-handed, to a long
march,—through another barbarous country, with chance supplies to
be ravished only by their own efforts,—and at the end of it a lot
unknown and uncertain; while, had they remained in Asia, they would
have had at any rate the rich satrapy of Pharnabazus within their
reach. To perfidy of dealing was now added a brutal ejectment from
Byzantium, without even the commonest manifestations of hospitality;
contrasting pointedly with the treatment which the army had recently
experienced at Trapezus, Sinôpê, and Herakleia; where they had been
welcomed not only by compliments on their past achievements, but also
by an ample present of flour, meat, and wine. Such behavior could
not fail to provoke the most violent indignation in the bosoms of
the soldiery; and Anaxibius had therefore delayed giving the order
until the last soldiers were marching out, thinking that the army
would hear nothing of it until the generals came out of the gates
to inform them; so that the gates would be closed, and the walls
manned to resist any assault from without. But his calculations were
not realized. Either one of the soldiers passing by heard him give
the order, or one of the captains forming his audience stole away
from the rest, and hastened forward to acquaint his comrades on the
outside. The bulk of the army, already irritated by the inhospitable
way in which they had been thrust out, needed nothing farther to
inflame them into spontaneous mutiny and aggression. While the
generals within (who either took the communication more patiently, or
at least, looking farther forward, felt that any attempt to resent
or resist the ill usage of the Spartan admiral would only make their
position worse) were discussing with Anaxibius the details of the
march just enjoined, the soldiers without, bursting into spontaneous
movement, with a simultaneous and fiery impulse, made a rush back to
get possession of the gate. But Eteonikus, seeing their movement,
closed it without a moment’s delay, and fastened the bar. The
soldiers on reaching the gate and finding it barred, clamored loudly
to get it opened, threatened to break it down, and even began to
knock violently against it. Some ran down to the sea-coast, and made
their way into the city round the line of stones at the base of the
city wall, which protected it against the sea; while the rearmost
soldiers who had not yet marched out, seeing what was passing, and
fearful of being cut off from their comrades, assaulted the gate from
the inside, severed the fastenings with axes, and threw it wide open
to the army.[259] All the soldiers then rushed up, and were soon
again in Byzantium.

  [259] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 15-17.

Nothing could exceed the terror of the Lacedæmonians as well as of
the native Byzantines, when they saw the excited Cyreians again
within the walls. The town seemed already taken and on the point of
being plundered. Neither Anaxibius nor Eteonikus took the smallest
means of resistance, nor stayed to brave the approach of the
soldiers, whose wrath they were fully conscious of having deserved.
Both fled to the citadel—the former first running to the sea-shore,
and jumping into a fishing-boat to go thither by sea. He even thought
the citadel not tenable with its existing garrison, and sent over to
Chalkêdon for a reinforcement. Still more terrified were the citizens
of the town. Every man in the market-place instantly fled; some to
their houses, others to the merchant vessels in the harbor, others to
the triremes or ships of war, which they hauled down to the water,
and thus put to sea.[260]

  [260] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 18, 19.

To the deception and harshness of the Spartan admiral, there was
thus added a want of precaution in the manner of execution, which
threatened to prove the utter ruin of Byzantium. For it was but
too probable that the Cyreian soldiers, under the keen sense of
recent injury, would satiate their revenge, and reimburse themselves
for the want of hospitality towards them, without distinguishing
the Lacedæmonian garrison from the Byzantine citizens; and that
too from mere impulse, not merely without orders, but in spite of
prohibitions, from their generals. Such was the aspect of the case,
when they became again assembled in a mass within the gates; and
such would probably have been the reality, had Xenophon executed
his design of retiring earlier, so as to leave the other generals
acting without him. Being on the outside along with the soldiers,
Xenophon felt at once, as soon as he saw the gates forced open and
the army again within the town, the terrific emergency which was
impending; first, the sack of Byzantium,—next, horror and antipathy,
throughout all Greece, towards the Cyreian officers and soldiers
indiscriminately,—lastly, unsparing retribution inflicted upon all
by the power of Sparta. Overwhelmed with these anxieties, he rushed
into the town along with the multitude, using every effort to pacify
them and bring them into order. They on their parts, delighted to
see him along with them, and conscious of their own force, were
eager to excite him to the same pitch as themselves, and to prevail
on him to second and methodize their present triumph. “Now is your
time, Xenophon, (they exclaimed), to make yourself a man. You have
here a city,—you have triremes,—you have money,—you have plenty
of soldiers. Now then, if you choose, you can enrich us; and we in
return can make you powerful.”—“You speak well (replied he); I
shall do as you propose; but if you want to accomplish anything,
you must fall into military array forthwith.” He knew that this was
the first condition of returning to anything like tranquillity; and
by great good fortune, the space called the Thrakion, immediately
adjoining the gate inside, was level, open, and clear of houses;
presenting an excellent place of arms or locality for a review. The
whole army,—partly from their long military practice,—partly under
the impression that Xenophon was really about to second their wishes
and direct some aggressive operation,—threw themselves almost of
their own accord into regular array on the Thrakion; the hoplites
eight deep, the peltasts on each flank. It was in this position that
Xenophon addressed them as follows:—

“Soldiers! I am not surprised that you are incensed, and that you
think yourselves scandalously cheated and ill-used. But if we give
way to our wrath, if we punish these Lacedæmonians now before us for
their treachery, and plunder this innocent city,—reflect what will
be the consequence. We shall stand proclaimed forthwith as enemies to
the Lacedæmonians and their allies; and what sort of a war that will
be, those who have witnessed and who still recollect recent matters
of history may easily fancy. We Athenians entered into the war
against Sparta with a powerful army and fleet, an abundant revenue,
and numerous tributary cities in Asia as well as Europe,—among them
this very Byzantium in which we now stand. We have been vanquished
in the way that all of you know. And what then will be the fate of
us soldiers, when we shall have as united enemies, Sparta with all
her old allies and Athens besides,—Tissaphernes and the barbaric
forces on the coast,—and most of all, the Great King whom we marched
up to dethrone and slay, if we were able? Is any man fool enough to
think that we have a chance of making head against so many combined
enemies? Let us not plunge madly into dishonor and ruin, nor incur
the enmity of our own fathers and friends; who are in the cities
which will take arms against us,—and will take arms justly, if we,
who abstained from seizing any barbaric city, even when we were in
force sufficient, shall nevertheless now plunder the first Grecian
city into which we have been admitted. As far as I am concerned, may
I be buried ten thousand fathoms deep in the earth, rather than see
you do such things; and I exhort _you_, too, as Greeks, to obey the
leaders of Greece. Endeavor, while thus obedient, to obtain your just
rights; but if you should fail in this, rather submit to injustice
than cut yourselves off from the Grecian world. Send to inform
Anaxibius that we have entered the city, not with a view to commit
any violence, but in the hope, if possible, of obtaining from him the
advantages which he promised us. If we fail, we shall at least prove
to him that we quit the city, not under his fraudulent manœuvres, but
under our own sense of the duty of obedience.”[261]

  [261] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 30-31.

This speech completely arrested the impetuous impulse of the army,
brought them to a true sense of their situation, and induced them to
adopt the proposition of Xenophon. They remained unmoved in their
position on the Thrakion, while three of the captains were sent to
communicate with Anaxibius. While they were thus waiting, a Theban
named Kœratadas approached, who had once commanded in Byzantium under
the Lacedæmonians, during the previous war. He had now become a sort
of professional Condottiero or general, looking out for an army to
command, wherever he could find one, and offering his services to any
city which would engage him. He addressed the assembled Cyreians,
and offered, if they would accept him for their general, to conduct
them against the Delta of Thrace (the space included between the
north-west corner of the Propontis and the south-west corner of the
Euxine), which he asserted to be a rich territory presenting great
opportunity to plunder; he farther promised to furnish them with
ample subsistence during the march. Presently the envoys returned,
bearing the reply of Anaxibius, who received the message favorably,
promising that not only the army should have no cause to regret their
obedience, but that he would both report their good conduct to the
authorities at home, and do everything in his own power to promote
their comfort.[262] He said nothing farther about taking them into
pay; that delusion having now answered its purpose. The soldiers, on
hearing his communication, adopted a resolution to accept Kœratadas
as their future commander, and then marched out of the town. As soon
as they were on the outside, Anaxibius, not content with closing the
gates against them, made public proclamation that if any one of them
were found in the town, he should be sold forthwith into slavery.

  [262] Xen. Anab. viii, 1, 32-35.

There are few cases throughout Grecian history in which an able
discourse has been the means of averting so much evil, as was averted
by this speech of Xenophon to the army in Byzantium. Nor did he
ever, throughout the whole period of his command, render to them a
more signal service. The miserable consequences, which would have
ensued, had the army persisted in their aggressive impulse,—first,
to the citizens of the town, ultimately to themselves, while
Anaxibius, the only guilty person, had the means of escaping by
sea, even under the worst circumstances,—are stated by Xenophon
rather under than above the reality. At the same time no orator ever
undertook a more difficult case, or achieved a fuller triumph over
unpromising conditions. If we consider the feelings and position
of the army at the instant of their breaking into the town, we
shall be astonished that any commander could have arrested their
movements. Though fresh from all the glory of their retreat, they
had been first treacherously entrapped over from Asia, next roughly
ejected, by Anaxibius; and although it may be said truly that the
citizens of Byzantium had no concern either in the one or the other,
yet little heed is commonly taken, in military operations, to the
distinction between garrison and citizens in an assailed town.
Having arms in their hands, with consciousness of force arising
out of their exploits in Asia, the Cyreians were at the same time
inflamed by the opportunity both of avenging a gross recent injury,
and enriching themselves in the process of execution; to which we
may add, the excitement of that rush whereby they had obtained the
reëntry, and the farther fact, that without the gates they had
nothing to expect except poor, hard, uninviting service in Thrace.
With soldiers already possessed by an overpowering impulse of this
nature, what chance was there that a retiring general, on the point
of quitting the army, could so work upon their minds as to induce
them to renounce the prey before them? Xenophon had nothing to
invoke except distant considerations, partly of Hellenic reputation,
chiefly of prudence; considerations indeed of unquestionable reality
and prodigious magnitude, yet belonging all to a distant future,
and therefore of little comparative force, except when set forth in
magnified characters by the orator. How powerfully he worked upon
the minds of his hearers, so as to draw forth these far-removed
dangers from the cloud of present sentiment by which they were
overlaid,—how skilfully he employed in illustration the example of
his own native city,—will be seen by all who study his speech. Never
did his Athenian accomplishments,—his talent for giving words to
important thoughts,—his promptitude in seizing a present situation
and managing the sentiments of an impetuous multitude,—appear to
greater advantage than when he was thus suddenly called forth to
meet a terrible emergency. His pre-established reputation and the
habit of obeying his orders, were doubtless essential conditions of
success. But none of his colleagues in command would have been able
to accomplish the like memorable change on the minds of the soldiers,
or to procure obedience for any simple authoritative restraint;
nay, it is probable, that if Xenophon had not been at hand, the
other generals would have followed the passionate movement, even
though they had been reluctant,—from simple inability to repress
it.[263] Again,—whatever might have been the accomplishments of
Xenophon, it is certain that even _he_ would not have been able to
work upon the minds of these excited soldiers, had they not been
Greeks and citizens as well as soldiers,—bred in Hellenic sympathies
and accustomed to Hellenic order, with authority operating in part
through voice and persuasion, and not through the Persian whip and
instruments of torture. The memorable discourse on the Thrakion
at Byzantium illustrates the working of that persuasive agency
which formed one of the permanent forces and conspicuous charms of
Hellenism. It teaches us that if the orator could sometimes accuse
innocent defendants and pervert well-disposed assemblies,—a part
of the case which historians of Greece often present as if it were
the whole,—he could also, and that in the most trying emergencies,
combat the strongest force of present passion, and bring into vivid
presence the half-obscured lineaments of long-sighted reason and duty.

  [263] So Tacitus says about the Roman general Spurinna (governor
  of Placentia for Otho against Vitellius), and his mutinous army
  who marched out to fight the Vitellian generals against his
  strenuous remonstrance—“Fit _temeritatis alienæ comes_ Spurinna,
  primo coactus, mox _velle simulans_, quo plus auctoritatis
  inesset consiliis, si seditio mitesceret” (Tacitus, Hist. ii, 18).

After conducting the army out of the city, Xenophon sent, through
Kleander, a message to Anaxibius, requesting that he himself might
be allowed to come in again singly, in order to take his departure
by sea. His request was granted, though not without much difficulty;
upon which he took leave of the army, under the strongest expressions
of affection and gratitude on their part,[264] and went into
Byzantium along with Kleander; while on the next day Kœratadas came
to assume the command according to agreement, bringing with him a
prophet, and beasts to be offered in sacrifice. There followed in
his train twenty men carrying sacks of barley-meal, twenty more with
jars of wine, three bearing olives, and one man with a bundle of
garlic and onions. All these provisions being laid down, Kœratadas
proceeded to offer sacrifice, as a preliminary to the distribution
of them among the soldiers. On the first day, the sacrifices being
unfavorable, no distribution took place; on the second day, Kœratadas
was standing with the wreath on his head at the altar, and with the
victims beside him, about to renew his sacrifice,—when Timasion and
the other officers interfered, desired him to abstain, and dismissed
him from the command. Perhaps the first unfavorable sacrifices may
have partly impelled them to this proceeding. But the main reason
was, the scanty store, inadequate even to one day’s subsistence for
the army, brought by Kœratadas,—and the obvious insufficiency of his
means.[265]

  [264] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 33.

  [265] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 34-40.

On the departure of Kœratadas, the army marched to take up its
quarters in some Thracian villages not far from Byzantium, under
its former officers; who however could not agree as to their future
order of march. Kleanor and Phryniskus, who had received presents
from Seuthes, urged the expediency of accepting the service of
that Thracian prince; Neon insisted on going to the Chersonese
under the Lacedæmonian officers in that peninsula (as Anaxibius had
projected); in the idea that he, as a Lacedæmonian, would there
obtain the command of the whole army; while Timasion, with the view
of re-establishing himself in his native city of Dardanus, proposed
returning to the Asiatic side of the strait.

Though this last plan met with decided favor among the army, it
could not be executed without vessels. These Timasion had little
or no means of procuring; so that considerable delay took place,
during which the soldiers, receiving no pay, fell into much distress.
Many of them were even compelled to sell their arms in order to get
subsistence; while others got permission to settle in some of the
neighboring towns, on condition of being disarmed. The whole army was
thus gradually melting away, much to the satisfaction of Anaxibius,
who was anxious to see the purposes of Pharnabazus accomplished.
By degrees, it would probably have been dissolved altogether, had
not a change of interest on the part of Anaxibius induced him to
promote its reorganization. He sailed from Byzantium to the Asiatic
coast, to acquaint Pharnabazus that the Cyreians could no longer
cause uneasiness, and to require his own promised reward. It seems
moreover that Xenophon himself departed from Byzantium by the same
opportunity. When they reached Kyzikus, they met the Lacedæmonian
Aristarchus; who was coming out as newly-appointed harmost of
Byzantium, to supersede Kleander, and who acquainted Anaxibius that
Polus was on the point of arriving to supersede him as admiral.
Anxious to meet Pharnabazus and make sure of his bribe, Anaxibius
impressed his parting injunction upon Aristarchus to sell for slaves
all the Cyreians whom he might find at Byzantium on his arrival, and
then pursued his voyage along the southern coast of the Propontis
to Parium. But Pharnabazus, having already received intimation of
the change of admirals, knew that the friendship of Anaxibius was no
longer of any value, and took no farther heed of him; while he at the
same time sent to Byzantium to make the like compact with Aristarchus
against the Cyreian army.[266]

  [266] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 7. Φαρνάβαζος δὲ, ἐπεὶ ᾔσθετο
  Ἀρίσταρχόν τε ἥκοντα εἰς Βυζάντιον ἁρμοστὴν καὶ Ἀναξίβιον
  οὐκέτι ναυαρχοῦντα, Ἀναξιβίου μὲν ἠμέλησε, πρὸς Ἀρίσταρχον δὲ
  διεπράττετο τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τοῦ Κυρείου στρατεύματος ἅπερ καὶ πρὸς
  Ἀναξίβιον.

Anaxibius was stung to the quick at this combination of
disappointment and insult on the part of the satrap. To avenge it, he
resolved to employ those very soldiers whom he had first corrupted
and fraudulently brought across to Europe, next cast out from
Byzantium, and lastly, ordered to be sold into slavery, so far as any
might yet be found in that town; bringing them back into Asia for
the purpose of acting against Pharnabazus. Accordingly he addressed
himself to Xenophon, and ordered him without a moment’s delay to
rejoin the army, for the purpose of keeping it together, of recalling
the soldiers who had departed, and transporting the whole body across
into Asia. He provided him with an armed vessel of thirty oars to
cross over from Parium to Perinthus, sending over a peremptory
order to the Perinthians to furnish him with horses in order that
he might reach the army with the greatest speed.[267] Perhaps it
would not have been safe for Xenophon to disobey this order, under
any circumstances. But the idea of acting with the army in Asia
against Pharnabazus, under Lacedæmonian sanction, was probably very
acceptable to him. He hastened across to the army, who welcomed his
return with joy, and gladly embraced the proposal of crossing to
Asia, which was a great improvement upon their forlorn and destitute
condition. He accordingly conducted them to Perinthus, and encamped
under the walls of the town; refusing, in his way through Selymbria,
a second proposition from Seuthes to engage the services of the army.

  [267] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 8-25.

  Ἐκ τούτου δὴ ὁ Ἀναξίβιος, καλέσας Ξενοφῶντα, ~κελεύει πάσῃ τέχνῃ
  καὶ μηχανῇ πλεῦσαι ἐπὶ τὸ στράτευμα ὡς τάχιστα~, καὶ συνέχειν τε
  τὸ στράτευμα καὶ συναθροίζειν τῶν διεσπαρμένων ὡς ἂν πλείστους
  δύνηται, καὶ παραγαγόντα εἰς τὴν Πέρινθον διαβιβάζειν εἰς τὴν
  Ἀσίαν ~ὅτι τάχιστα~· καὶ δίδωσιν αὐτῷ τριακόντορον, καὶ ἐπιστολὴν
  καὶ ἄνδρα συμπέμπει κελεύσοντα τοὺς Περινθίους ~ὡς τάχιστα~
  Ξενοφῶντα προπέμψαι τοῖς ἵπποις ἐπὶ τὸ στράτευμα.

  The vehement interest which Anaxibius took in this new project is
  marked by the strength of Xenophon’s language; extreme celerity
  is enjoined three several times.

While Xenophon was exerting himself to procure transports for the
passage of the army at Perinthus, Aristarchus the new harmost arrived
there with two triremes from Byzantium. It seems that not only
Byzantium, but also both Perinthus and Selymbria, were comprised in
his government as harmost. On first reaching Byzantium to supersede
Kleander, he found there no less than four hundred of the Cyreians,
chiefly sick and wounded; whom Kleander, in spite of the ill-will
of Anaxibius, had not only refused to sell into slavery, but had
billeted upon the citizens, and tended with solicitude; so much did
his good feeling towards Xenophon and towards the army now come
into play. We read with indignation that Aristarchus, immediately
on reaching Byzantium to supersede him, was not even contented
with sending these four hundred men out of the town; but seized
them,—Greeks, citizens, and soldiers as they were,—and sold them
all into slavery.[268] Apprised of the movements of Xenophon
with the army, he now came to Perinthus to prevent their transit
into Asia; laying an embargo on the transports in the harbor, and
presenting himself personally before the assembled army to prohibit
the soldiers from crossing. When Xenophon informed him that Anaxibius
had given them orders to cross, and had sent him expressly to conduct
them,—Aristarchus replied, “Anaxibius is no longer in functions
as admiral, and I am harmost in this town. If I catch any of you
at sea, I will sink you.” On the next day, he sent to invite the
generals and the captains (lochages) to a conference within the
walls. They were just about to enter the gates, when Xenophon, who
was among them, received a private warning, that if he went in,
Aristarchus would seize him, and either put him to death or send
him prisoner to Pharnabazus. Accordingly Xenophon sent forward the
others, and remained himself with the army, alleging the obligation
of sacrificing. The behavior of Aristarchus,—who, when he saw the
others without Xenophon, sent them away, and desired that they
would all come again in the afternoon,—confirmed the justice of
his suspicions, as to the imminent danger from which he had been
preserved by this accidental warning.[269] It need hardly be added
that Xenophon disregarded the second invitation no less than the
first; moreover a third invitation, which Aristarchus afterwards
sent, was disregarded by all.

  [268] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 6. Καὶ ὁ Ἀναξίβιος τῷ μὲν Ἀριστάρχῳ
  ἐπιστέλλει ὁπόσους ἂν εὕροι ἐν Βυζαντίῳ τῶν Κύρου στρατιωτῶν
  ὑπολελειμμένους, ἀποδόσθαι· ὁ δὲ Κλέανδρος οὐδένα ἐπεπράκει,
  ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας ἐθεράπευεν οἰκτείρων, καὶ ἀναγκάζων
  οἰκίᾳ δέχεσθαι. Ἀρίσταρχος δ᾽ ἐπεὶ ἦλθε τάχιστα, οὐκ ἐλάττους
  τετρακοσίων ἀπέδοτο.

  [269] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 14-16.

  Ἥδη δὲ ὄντων πρὸς τῷ τείχει, ἐξαγγέλλει τις τῷ Ξενοφῶντι ὅτι, εἰ
  εἴσεισι, συλληφθήσεται· καὶ ἢ αὐτοῦ τι πείσεται, ἢ καὶ Φαρναβάζῳ,
  παραδοθήσεται. Ὁ δὲ, ἀκούσας ταῦτα, τοὺς μὲν προπέμπεται, αὐτὸς
  δ᾽ εἶπεν, ὅτι θῦσαί τι βούλοιτο.... Οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ
  λοχαγοὶ ἥκοντες παρὰ τοῦ Ἀριστάρχου, ἀπήγγελλον ὅτι νῦν μὲν
  ἀπιέναι σφᾶς κελεύει, τῆς δείλης δὲ ἥκειν· ἔνθα καὶ δήλη μᾶλλον
  ἐδόκει [εἶναι] ἡ ἐπιβουλή. Compare vii, 3, 2.

We have here a Lacedæmonian harmost, not scrupling to lay a snare of
treachery as flagrant as that which Tissaphernes had practised on
the banks of the Zab to entrap Klearchus and his colleagues,—and
that too against a Greek, and an officer of the highest station
and merit, who had just saved Byzantium from pillage, and was now
actually in execution of orders received from the Lacedæmonian
admiral Anaxibius. Had the accidental warning been withheld, Xenophon
would assuredly have fallen into this snare, nor could we reasonably
have charged him with imprudence,—so fully was he entitled to count
upon straightforward conduct under the circumstances. But the same
cannot be said of Klearchus, who undoubtedly manifested lamentable
credulity, nefarious as was the fraud to which he fell a victim.

At the second interview with the other officers, Aristarchus, while
he forbade the army to cross the water, directed them to force their
way by land through the Thracians who occupied the Holy mountain, and
thus to arrive at the Chersonese; where (he said) they should receive
pay. Neon the Lacedæmonian, with about eight hundred hoplites who
adhered to his separate command, advocated this plan as the best. To
be set against it, however, there was the proposition of Seuthes to
take the army into pay; which Xenophon was inclined to prefer, uneasy
at the thoughts of being cooped up in the narrow peninsula of the
Chersonese, under the absolute command of the Lacedæmonian harmost,
with great uncertainty both as to pay and as to provisions.[270]
Moreover it was imperiously necessary for these disappointed troops
to make some immediate movement; for they had been brought to the
gates of Perinthus in hopes of passing immediately on shipboard; it
was mid-winter,—they were encamped in the open field, under the
severe cold of Thrace,—they had neither assured supplies, nor even
money to purchase, if a market had been near.[271] Xenophon, who
had brought them to the neighborhood of Perinthus, was now again
responsible for extricating them from this untenable situation,
and began to offer sacrifices, according to his wont, to ascertain
whether the gods would encourage him to recommend a covenant with
Seuthes. The sacrifices were so favorable, that he himself, together
with a confidential officer from each of the generals, went by
night and paid a visit to Seuthes, for the purpose of understanding
distinctly his offers and purposes.

  [270] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 15; vii, 3, 3; vii, 6, 13.

  [271] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 24. μέσος δὲ χείμων ἦν, etc. Probably
  the month of December.

Mæsadês, the father of Seuthes, had been apparently a dependent
prince under the great monarchy of the Odrysian Thracians; so
formidable in the early years of the Peloponnesian war. But intestine
commotions had robbed him of his principality over three Thracian
tribes; which it was now the ambition of Seuthes to recover, by
the aid of the Cyreian army. He offered to each soldier one stater
of Kyzikus (about twenty Attic drachmæ, or nearly the same as that
which they originally received from Cyrus) as pay per month; twice as
much to each lochage or captain,—four times as much to each of the
generals. In case they should incur the enmity of the Lacedæmonians
by joining him, he guaranteed to them all the right of settlement and
fraternal protection in his territory. To each of the generals, over
and above pay, he engaged to assign a fort on the sea-coast, with a
lot of land around it, and oxen for cultivation. And to Xenophon in
particular, he offered the possession of Bisanthê, his best point on
the coast. “I will also (he added, addressing Xenophon) give you my
daughter in marriage; and if you have any daughter, I will buy her
from you in marriage according to the custom of Thrace.”[272] Seuthes
farther engaged never on any occasion to lead them more than seven
days’ journey from the sea, at farthest.

  [272] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 17-38.

These offers were as liberal as the army could possibly expect;
and Xenophon himself, mistrusting the Lacedæmonians, as well as
mistrusted by them, seems to have looked forward to the acquisition
of a Thracian coast-fortress and territory (such as Miltiades,
Alkibiades, and other Athenian leaders had obtained before him) as
a valuable refuge in case of need.[273] But even if the promise had
been less favorable, the Cyreians had no alternative; for they had
not even present supplies,—still less any means of subsistence
throughout the winter; while departure by sea was rendered impossible
by the Lacedæmonians. On the next day, Seuthes was introduced by
Xenophon and the other generals to the army, who accepted his offers
and concluded the bargain.

  [273] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 34.

They remained for two months in his service, engaged in warfare
against various Thracian tribes, whom they enabled him to conquer
and despoil; so that at the end of that period, he was in possession
of an extensive dominion, a large native force, and a considerable
tribute. Though the sufferings of the army from cold were extreme,
during these two months of full winter and amidst the snowy
mountains of Thrace, they were nevertheless enabled by their
expeditions along with Seuthes to procure plentiful subsistence;
which they could hardly have done in any other manner. But the pay
which he had offered was never liquidated; at least, in requital
of their two months of service, they received pay only for twenty
days and a little more. And Xenophon himself, far from obtaining
fulfilment of those splendid promises which Seuthes had made to
him personally, seems not even to have received his pay as one
of the generals. For him, the result was singularly unhappy;
since he forfeited the good-will of Seuthes by importunate demand
and complaint for the purpose of obtaining the pay due to the
soldiers; while they on their side, imputing to his connivance the
non-fulfilment of the promise, became thus in part alienated from
him. Much of this mischief was brought about by the treacherous
intrigues and calumny of a corrupt Greek from Maroneia, named
Herakleides; who acted as minister and treasurer to Seuthes.

Want of space compels me to omit the narrative given by Xenophon,
both of the relations of the army with Seuthes, and of the warfare
carried on against the hostile Thracian tribes,—interesting as it
is from the juxtaposition of Greek and Thracian manners. It seems
to have been composed by Xenophon under feelings of acute personal
disappointment, and probably in refutation of calumnies against
himself as if he had wronged the army. Hence we may trace in it a
tone of exaggerated querulousness, and complaint that the soldiers
were ungrateful to him. It is true that a portion of the army, under
the belief that he had been richly rewarded by Seuthes while they had
not obtained their stipulated pay, expressed virulent sentiments and
falsehoods against him.[274] Until such suspicions were refuted, it
is no wonder that the army were alienated; but they were perfectly
willing to hear both sides,—and Xenophon triumphantly disproved the
accusation. That in the end, their feelings towards him were those
of esteem and favor, stands confessed in his own words,[275] proving
that the ingratitude of which he complains was the feeling of some
indeed, but not of all.

  [274] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 9, 10.

  [275] Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 55-57.

It is hard to say, however, what would have been the fate of this
gallant army, when Seuthes, having obtained from their arms in two
months all that he desired, had become only anxious to send them off
without pay,—had they not been extricated by a change of interest
and policy on the part of all-powerful Sparta. The Lacedæmonians had
just declared war against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus,—sending
Thimbron into Asia to commence military operations. They then became
extremely anxious to transport the Cyreians across to Asia, which
their harmost, Aristarchus had hitherto prohibited,—and to take them
into permanent pay; for which purpose two Lacedæmonians, Charmînus
and Polynîkus were commissioned by Thimbron to offer to the army the
same pay as had been promised, though not paid, by Seuthes; and as
had been originally paid by Cyrus. Seuthes and Herakleides, eager
to hasten the departure of the soldiers, endeavored to take credit
with the Lacedæmonians for assisting their views.[276] Joyfully did
the army accept this offer, though complaining loudly of the fraud
practised upon them by Seuthes; which Charmînus, at the instance
of Xenophon, vainly pressed the Thracian prince to redress.[277]
He even sent Xenophon to demand the arrear of pay in the name of
the Lacedæmonians, which afforded to the Athenian an opportunity
of administering a severe lecture to Seuthes.[278] But the latter
was found less accessible to the workings of eloquence than the
Cyreian assembled soldiers; nor did Xenophon obtain anything beyond a
miserable dividend upon the sum due;—together with civil expressions
towards himself personally,—an invitation to remain in his service
with one thousand hoplites instead of going to Asia with the
army,—and renewed promises, not likely now to find much credit, of a
fort and grant of lands.

  [276] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 1-7.

  [277] Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 15.

  [278] Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 21-47.

  The lecture is of unsuitable prolixity, when we consider the
  person to whom, and the circumstances under which, it purports to
  have been spoken.

When the army, now reduced by losses and dispersions to six thousand
men,[279] was prepared to cross into Asia, Xenophon was desirous of
going back to Athens, but was persuaded to remain with them until the
junction with Thimbron. He was at this time so poor, having scarcely
enough to pay for his journey home, that he was obliged to sell his
horse at Lampsakus, the Asiatic town where the army landed. Here
he found Eukleides, a Phliasian prophet with whom he had been wont
to hold intercourse and offer sacrifice at Athens. This man, having
asked Xenophon how much he had acquired in the expedition, could not
believe him when he affirmed his poverty. But when they proceeded to
offer sacrifice together, from some animals sent by the Lampsakenes
as a present to Xenophon, Eukleides had no sooner inspected the
entrails of the victims, than he told Xenophon that he fully credited
the statement. “I see (he said) that even if money shall be ever on
its way to come to you, you yourself will be a hindrance to it, even
if there be no other (here Xenophon acquiesced); Zeus Meilichios (the
Gracious)[280] is the real bar. Have you ever sacrificed to him, with
entire burnt-offerings, as we used to do together at Athens?” “Never
(replied Xenophon), throughout the whole march.” “Do so now, then
(said Eukleides), and it will be for your advantage.” The next day,
on reaching Ophrynium, Xenophon obeyed the injunction; sacrificing
little pigs entire to Zeus Meilichios, as was the custom at Athens
during the public festival called Diasia. And on the very same day he
felt the beneficial effects of the proceeding; for Biton and another
envoy came from the Lacedæmonians with an advance of pay to the army,
and with dispositions so favorable to himself, that they bought back
for him his horse, which he had just sold at Lampsakus for fifty
darics. This was equivalent to giving him more than one year’s pay
in hand (the pay which he would have received as general being four
darics per month, or four times that of the soldier), at a time when
he was known to be on the point of departure, and therefore would not
stay to earn it. The short-comings of Seuthes were now made up with
immense interest, so that Xenophon became better off than any man in
the army; though he himself slurs over the magnitude of the present,
by representing it as a delicate compliment to restore to him a
favorite horse.

  [279] Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 23.

  [280] It appears that the epithet _Meilichios_ (the Gracious)
  is here applied to Zeus in the same euphemistic sense as the
  denomination _Eumenides_ to the avenging goddesses. Zeus
  is conceived as having actually inflicted, or being in a
  disposition to inflict, evil; the sacrifice to him under this
  surname represents a sentiment of fear, and is one of atonement,
  expiation or purification, destined to avert his displeasure; but
  the surname itself is to be interpreted _proleptice_, to use the
  word of the critics—it designates, not the actual disposition of
  Zeus (or of other gods), but that disposition which the sacrifice
  is intended to bring about in him.

  See Pausan. i, 37, 3; ii, 20, 3. K. F. Herrmann, Gottesdienstl.
  Alterthümer der Griechen, s. 58; Van Stegeren, De Græcorum Diebus
  Festis, p. 5 (Utrecht, 1849).

Thus gratefully and instantaneously did Zeus the Gracious respond
to the sacrifice which Xenophon, after a long omission, had been
admonished by Eukleides to offer. And doubtless Xenophon was more
than ever confirmed in the belief, which manifests itself throughout
all his writings, that sacrifice not only indicates, by the interior
aspect of the immolated victims, the tenor of coming events,—but
also, according as it is rendered to the right god and at the right
season, determines his will, and therefore the course of events, for
dispensations favorable or unfavorable.

But the favors of Zeus the Gracious, though begun, were not yet
ended. Xenophon conducted the army through the Troad, and across
mount Ida, to Antandrus; from thence along the coast to Lydia,
through the plain of Thêbê and the town of Adramyttium, leaving
Atarneus on the right hand, to Pergamus in Mysia, a hill-town
overhanging the river and plain of Käikus. This district was occupied
by the descendants of the Eretrian Gongylus, who, having been
banished for embracing the cause of the Persians when Xerxes invaded
Greece, had been rewarded (like the Spartan king Demaratus) with
this sort of principality under the Persian empire. His descendant,
another Gongylus, now occupied Pergamus, with his wife Hellas and
his sons Gorgion and Gongylus. Xenophon was here received with great
hospitality. Hellas acquainted him that a powerful Persian, named
Asidates, was now dwelling, with his wife, family, and property, in a
tower not far off, on the plain; and that a sudden night-march, with
three hundred men, would suffice for the capture of this valuable
booty, to which her own cousin should guide him. Accordingly, having
sacrificed and ascertained that the victims were favorable, Xenophon
communicated his plan after the evening meal to those captains who
had been most attached to him throughout the expedition, wishing to
make them partners in the profit. As soon as it became known, many
volunteers, to the number of six hundred, pressed to be allowed
to join. But the captains repelled them, declining to take more
than three hundred, in order that the booty might afford an ampler
dividend to each partner.

Beginning their march in the evening, Xenophon and his detachment of
three hundred reached about midnight the tower of Asidates; it was
large, lofty, thickly built, and contained a considerable garrison.
It served for protection to his cattle and cultivating slaves around,
like a baronial castle in the middle ages; but the assailants
neglected this outlying plunder, in order to be more sure of taking
the castle itself. Its walls however were found much stronger than
was expected; and although a breach was made by force about daybreak,
yet so vigorous was the defence of the garrison, that no entrance
could be effected. Signals and shouts of every kind were made by
Asidates to procure aid from the Persian forces in the neighborhood;
numbers of whom soon began to arrive, so that Xenophon and his
company were obliged to retreat. And their retreat was at last only
accomplished, after severe suffering and wounds to nearly half of
them, through the aid of Gongylus with his forces from Pergamus, and
of Proklês (the descendant of Demaratus) from Halisarna, a little
farther off seaward.[281]

  [281] Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 10-19.

Though his first enterprise thus miscarried, Xenophon soon laid plans
for a second, employing the whole army; and succeeded in bringing
Asidates prisoner to Pergamus, with his wife, children, horses, and
all his personal property. Thus (says he, anxious above all things
for the credit of sacrificial prophecy) the “previous sacrifices
(those which had promised favorably before the first unsuccessful
attempt) now came true.”[282] The persons of this family were
doubtless redeemed by their Persian friends for a large ransom;[283]
which, together with the booty brought in, made up a prodigious total
to be divided.

  [282] Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 22. Ἐνταῦθα οἱ περὶ Ξενοφῶντα
  συμπεριτυγχάνουσιν αὐτῷ καὶ λαμβάνουσιν αὐτὸν (Ἀσιδάτην) καὶ
  γυναῖκα καὶ παῖδας καὶ τοὺς ἵππους καὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα· ~καὶ οὕτω
  τὰ πρότερα ἱερὰ ἀπέβη~.

  [283] Compare Plutarch, Kimon, c. 9; and Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21.

In making the division, a general tribute of sympathy and admiration
was paid to Xenophon, to which all the army,—generals, captains, and
soldiers,—and the Lacedæmonians besides,—unanimously concurred.
Like Agamemnon at Troy, he was allowed to select for himself the
picked lots of horses, mules, oxen, and other items of booty;
insomuch that he became possessor of a share valuable enough to
enrich him at once, in addition to the fifty darics which he had
before received. “Here then Xenophon (to use his own language[284])
had no reason to complain of the god” (Zeus Meilichios). We may
add,—what he ought to have added, considering the accusations which
he had before put forth,—that neither had he any reason to complain
of the ingratitude of the army.

  [284] Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 23.

  Ἐνταῦθα τὸν θεὸν οὐκ ᾐτιάσατο ὁ Ξενοφῶν· συνέπραττον γὰρ καὶ οἱ
  Λάκωνες καὶ οἱ λοχαγοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται,
  ὥστε ἐξαίρετα λαβεῖν καὶ ἵππους καὶ ζεύγη καὶ ἄλλα, ὥστε ἱκανὸν
  εἶναι καὶ ἄλλον ἤδη εὖ ποιεῖν.

As soon as Thimbron arrived with his own forces, and the Cyreians
became a part of his army, Xenophon took his leave of them. Having
deposited in the temple at Ephesus that portion which had been
confided to him as general, of the tithe set apart by the army at
Kerasus for the Ephesian Artemis,[285] he seems to have executed his
intention of returning to Athens.[286] He must have arrived there,
after an absence of about two years and a half, within a few weeks,
at farthest, after the death of his friend and preceptor Sokrates,
whose trial and condemnation have been recorded in my last volume.
That melancholy event certainly occurred during his absence from
Athens;[287] but whether it had come to his knowledge before he
reached the city, we do not know. How much grief and indignation
it excited in his mind, we may see by his collection of memoranda
respecting the life and conversations of Sokrates, known by the name
of Memorabilia, and probably put together shortly after his arrival.

  [285] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 6. It seems plain that this deposit must
  have been first made on the present occasion.

  [286] Compare Anabasis, vii, 7, 57; vii, 8, 2.

  [287] Xenoph. Memorab. iv, 8, 4—as well as the opening sentence
  of the work.

That he was again in Asia, three years afterwards, on military
service under the Lacedæmonian king Agesilaus, is a fact attested by
himself; but at what precise moment he quitted Athens for his second
visit to Asia, we are left to conjecture. I incline to believe that
he did not remain many months at home, but that he went out again
in the next spring to rejoin the Cyreians in Asia,—became again
their commander,—and served for two years under the Spartan general
Derkyllidas before the arrival of Agesilaus. Such military service
would doubtless be very much to his taste; while a residence at
Athens, then subject and quiescent, would probably be distasteful to
him; both from the habits of command which he had contracted during
the previous two years, and from feelings arising out of the death of
Sokrates. After a certain interval of repose, he would be disposed to
enter again upon the war against his old enemy Tissaphernes; and his
service went on when Agesilaus arrived to take the command.[288]

  [288] See Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 2, 7—a passage which Morus
  refers, I think with much probability, to Xenophon himself.

  The very circumstantial details, which Xenophon gives (iii, 1,
  11-28) about the proceedings of Derkyllidas against Meidias in
  the Troad, seem also to indicate that he was serving there in
  person.

But during the two years after this latter event, Athens became a
party to the war against Sparta, and entered into conjunction with
the king of Persia as well as with the Thebans and others; while
Xenophon, continuing his service as commander of the Cyreians, and
accompanying Agesilaus from Asia back into Greece, became engaged
against the Athenian troops and their Bœotian allies at the bloody
battle of Korôneia. Under these circumstances, we cannot wonder that
the Athenians passed sentence of banishment against him; not because
he had originally taken part in aid of Cyrus against Artaxerxes,—nor
because his political sentiments were unfriendly to democracy, as has
been sometimes erroneously affirmed,—but because he was now openly
in arms, and in conspicuous command, against his own country.[289]
Having thus become an exile, Xenophon was allowed by the
Lacedæmonians to settle at Skillus, one of the villages of Triphylia,
near Olympia in Peloponnesus, which they had recently emancipated
from the Eleians. At one of the ensuing Olympic festivals, Megabyzus,
the superintendent of the temple of Artemis at Ephesus, came over as
a spectator; bringing with him the money which Xenophon had dedicated
therein to the Ephesian Artemis. This money Xenophon invested in the
purchase of lands at Skillus, to be consecrated in permanence to the
goddess; having previously consulted her by sacrifice to ascertain
her approval of the site contemplated, which site was recommended
to him by its resemblance in certain points to that of the Ephesian
temple. Thus, there was near each of them a river called by the
same name Selinus, having in it fish and a shelly bottom. Xenophon
constructed a chapel, an altar, and a statue of the goddess made of
cypress-wood: all exact copies, on a reduced scale, of the temple and
golden statue at Ephesus. A column near them was inscribed with the
following words,—“This spot is sacred to Artemis. Whoever possesses
the property and gathers its fruits, must sacrifice to her the tithe
every year, and keep the chapel in repair out of the remainder.
Should any one omit this duty the goddess herself will take the
omission in hand.”[290]

  [289] That the sentence of banishment on Xenophon was not passed
  by the Athenians until after the battle of Korôneia, appears
  plainly from Anabasis, v. 3, 7. This battle took place in August
  394 B.C.

  Pausanias also will be found in harmony with this statement, as
  to the time of the banishment. Ἐδιώχθη δὲ ὁ Ξενοφῶν ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων,
  ὡς ἐπὶ βασιλέα τῶν Περσῶν, ~σφίσιν εὔνουν ὄντα~, στρατείας
  μετασχὼν Κύρῳ πολεμιωτάτῳ τοῦ δήμου (iv, 6, 4). Now it was not
  until 396 or 395 B.C., that the Persian king began to manifest
  the least symptoms of good-will towards Athens; and not until the
  battle of Knidus (a little before the battle of Korôneia in the
  same year), that he testified his good-will by conspicuous and
  effective service. If, therefore, the motive of the Athenians
  to banish Xenophon arose out of the good feeling on the part of
  the king of Persia toward them, the banishment could not have
  taken place before 395 B.C., and is not likely to have taken
  place until after 394 B.C.; which is the intimation of Xenophon
  himself as above.

  Lastly, Diogenes Laërtius (ii, 52) states, what I believe to
  be the main truth, that the sentence of banishment was passed
  against Xenophon by the Athenians on the ground of his attachment
  to the Lacedæmonians—ἐπὶ Λακωνισμῷ.

  Krüger and others seem to think that Xenophon was banished
  because he took service under Cyrus, who had been the bitter
  enemy of Athens. It is true that Sokrates, when first consulted,
  was apprehensive beforehand that this might bring upon him the
  displeasure of Athens (Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 5). But it is to be
  remembered that _at this time_, the king of Persia was just as
  much the enemy of Athens as Cyrus was; and that Cyrus in fact
  had made war upon her with the forces and treasures of the king.
  Artaxerxes and Cyrus being thus, at that time, both enemies of
  Athens, it was of little consequence to the Athenians whether
  Cyrus succeeded or failed in his enterprise. But when Artaxerxes,
  six years afterwards, became their friend, their feelings towards
  his enemies were altered.

  The passage of Pausanias as above cited, if understood as
  asserting the main cause of Xenophon’s banishment, is in my
  judgment inaccurate. Xenophon was banished _for Laconism_, or
  attachment to Sparta against his country; the fact of his having
  served under Cyrus against Artaxerxes counted at best only as a
  secondary motive.

  [290] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 13. Καὶ στήλη ἔστηκε παρὰ τὸν ναὸν,
  γράμματα ἔχουσα—Ἱερὸς ὁ Χῶρος τῆς Αρτέμιδος· τὸν δὲ ἔχοντα καὶ
  καρπούμενον τὴν μὲν δεκάτην καταθύειν ἑκάστου ἔτους, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ
  περίττου τόν ναὸν ἐπισκευάζειν· ἐὰν δέ τις μὴ ποιῇ ταῦτα, τῇ θεῷ
  μελήσει.

Immediately near the chapel was an orchard of every description of
fruit-trees, while the estate around comprised an extensive range
of meadow, woodland, and mountain,—with the still loftier mountain
called Pholoê adjoining. There was thus abundant pasture for horses,
oxen, sheep, etc., and excellent hunting-ground near for deer and
other game; advantages not to be found near the Artemision at
Ephesus. Residing hard by on his own property, allotted to him by
the Lacedæmonians, Xenophon superintended this estate as steward
for the goddess; looking perhaps to the sanctity of her name for
protection from disturbance by the Eleians, who viewed with a jealous
eye the Lacedæmonian[291] settlers at Skillus, and protested against
the peace and convention promoted by Athens after the battle of
Leuktra, because it recognized that place, along with the townships
of Triphylia, as autonomous. Every year he made a splendid sacrifice,
from the tithe of all the fruits of the property; to which solemnity
not only all the Skilluntines, but also all the neighboring villages,
were invited. Booths were erected for the visitors, to whom the
goddess furnished (this is the language of Xenophon) an ample dinner
of barley-meal, wheaten loaves, meat, game, and sweetmeats;[292] the
game being provided by a general hunt, which the sons of Xenophon
conducted, and in which all the neighbors took part if they chose.
The produce of the estate, saving this tithe and subject to the
obligation of keeping the holy building in repair, was enjoyed
by Xenophon himself. He had a keen relish for both hunting and
horsemanship, and was among the first authors, so far as we know, who
ever made these pursuits, with the management of horses and dogs, the
subject of rational study and description.

  [291] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.

  [292] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 9. Παρεῖχε δ᾽ ἡ θεὸς τοῖς σκηνοῦσιν ἄλφιτα
  ἄρτους, οἶνον, τραγήματα, etc.

Such was the use to which Xenophon applied the tithe voted by
the army at Kerasus to the Ephesian Artemis; the other tithe,
voted at the same time to Apollo, he dedicated at Delphi in the
treasure-chamber of the Athenians, inscribing upon the offering his
own name and that of Proxenus. His residence being only at a distance
of twenty stadia from the great temple of Olympia, he was enabled to
enjoy society with every variety of Greeks,—and to obtain copious
information about Grecian politics, chiefly from philo-Laconian
informants, and with the Lacedæmonian point of view predominant in
his own mind; while he had also leisure for the composition of his
various works. The interesting description which he himself gives of
his residence at Skillus, implies a state of things not present and
continuing,[293] but past and gone; other testimonies too, though
confused and contradictory, seem to show that the Lacedæmonian
settlement at Skillus lasted no longer than the power of Lacedæmon
was adequate to maintain it. During the misfortunes which befel
that city after the battle of Leuktra (371 B.C.), Xenophon, with
his family and his fellow-settlers, was expelled by the Eleians,
and is then said to have found shelter at Corinth. But as Athens
soon came to be not only at peace, but in intimate alliance, with
Sparta,—the sentence of banishment against Xenophon was revoked; so
that the latter part of his life was again passed in the enjoyment
of his birthright as an Athenian citizen and Knight.[294] Two of
his sons, Gryllus and Diodorus, fought among the Athenian horsemen
at the cavalry combat which preceded the battle of Mantineia, where
the former was slain, after manifesting distinguished bravery; while
his grandson Xenophon became in the next generation the subject of
a pleading before the Athenian Dikastery, composed by the orator
Deinarchus.[295]

  [293] Xen. Anab. v. 3, 9.

  [294] Diogen. Laërt. ii, 53, 54, 59. Pausanias (v, 6, 4) attests
  the reconquest of Skillus by the Eleians, but adds (on the
  authority of the Eleian ἐξηγηταὶ or show guides) that they
  permitted Xenophon, after a judicial examination before the
  Olympic Senate, to go on living there in peace. The latter point
  I apprehend to be incorrect.

  The latter works of Xenophon (De Vectigalibus, De Officio
  Magistri Equitum, etc.), seem plainly to imply that he had been
  restored to citizenship, and had come again to take cognizance of
  politics at Athens.

  [295] Diogen. Laërt. ut sup. Dionys. Halic. De Dinarcho, p. 664,
  ed. Reiska. Dionysius mentions this oration under the title of
  Ἀποστασίου ἀπολογία Αἰσχύλου πρὸς Ξενοφῶντα. And Diogenes also
  alludes to it—ὥς φησι Δείναρχος ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ξενοφῶντα ἀποστασίου.

  Schneider in his Epimetrum (ad calcem Anabaseos, p. 573),
  respecting the exile of Xenophon, argues as if the person against
  whom the oration of Deinarchus was directed, was Xenophon
  himself, the Cyreian commander and author. But this, I think, is
  chronologically all but impossible; for Deinarchus was not born
  till 361 B.C., and composed his first oration in 336 B.C.

  Yet Deinarchus, in his speech against Xenophon, undoubtedly
  mentioned several facts respecting the Cyreian Xenophon, which
  implies that the latter was a relative of the person against
  whom the oration was directed. I venture to set him down as
  grandson, on that evidence, combined with the identity of name
  and the suitableness in point of time. He might well be the son
  of Gryllus, who was slain fighting at the battle of Mantineia in
  362 B.C.

  Nothing is more likely than that an orator, composing an oration
  against Xenophon the grandson, should touch upon the acts and
  character of Xenophon the grandfather; see for analogy, the
  oration of Isokrates, de Bigis; among others.

On bringing this accomplished and eminent leader to the close of
that arduous retreat which he had conducted with so much honor, I
have thought it necessary to anticipate a little on the future,
in order to take a glance at his subsequent destiny. To his exile
(in this point of view not less useful than that of Thucydides) we
probably owe many of those compositions from which so much of our
knowledge of Grecian affairs is derived. But to the contemporary
world, the retreat, which Xenophon so successfully conducted,
afforded a far more impressive lesson than any of his literary
compositions. It taught in the most striking manner the impotence
of the Persian land-force, manifested not less in the generals than
in the soldiers. It proved that the Persian leaders were unfit
for any systematic operations, even under the greatest possible
advantages, against a small number of disciplined warriors resolutely
bent on resistance; that they were too stupid and reckless even
to obstruct the passage of rivers, or destroy roads, or cut off
supplies. It more than confirmed the contemptuous language applied
to them by Cyrus himself, before the battle of Kunaxa; when he
proclaimed that he envied the Greeks their freedom, and that he was
ashamed of the worthlessness of his own countrymen.[296] Against
such perfect weakness and disorganization, nothing prevented the
success of the Greeks along with Cyrus, except his own paroxysm
of fraternal antipathy.[297] And we shall perceive hereafter the
military and political leaders of Greece,—Agesilaus, Jason of
Pheræ,[298] and others down to Philip and Alexander[299]—firmly
persuaded that with a tolerably numerous and well-appointed Grecian
force, combined with exemption from Grecian enemies, they could
succeed in overthrowing or dismembering the Persian empire. This
conviction, so important in the subsequent history of Greece, takes
its date from the retreat of the Ten Thousand. We shall indeed find
Persia exercising an important influence, for two generations to
come,—and at the peace of Antalkidas an influence stronger than
ever,—over the destinies of Greece. But this will be seen to arise
from the treason of Sparta, the chief of the Hellenic world, who
abandons the Asiatic Greeks, and even arms herself with the name and
the force of Persia, for purposes of aggrandizement and dominion
to herself. Persia is strong by being enabled to employ Hellenic
strength against the Hellenic cause; by lending money or a fleet
to one side of the Grecian intestine parties, and thus becoming
artificially strengthened against both. But the Xenophontic Anabasis
betrays her real weakness against any vigorous attack; while it at
the same time exemplifies the discipline, the endurance, the power
of self-action and adaptation, the susceptibility of influence from
speech and discussion, the combination of the reflecting obedience of
citizens with the mechanical regularity of soldiers,—which confer
such immortal distinction on the Hellenic character. The importance
of this expedition and retreat, as an illustration of the Hellenic
qualities and excellence, will justify the large space which has been
devoted to it in this History.

  [296] Xen. Anab. i, 7, 4. Compare Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 20; and
  Isokrates, Panegyr. Or. iv, s. 168, 169 _seq._

  The last chapter of the Cyropædia of Xenophon (viii, 20, 21-26)
  expresses strenuously the like conviction, of the military
  feebleness and disorganization of the Persian empire, not
  defensible without Grecian aid.

  [297] Isokrates, Orat. v, (Philipp.) s. 104-106. ἤδη δ᾽
  ἐγκρατεῖς δοκοῦντας εἶναι (_i. e._ the Greeks under Klearchus)
  διὰ τὴν Κύρου ~προπέτειαν~ ἀτυχῆσαι, etc.

  [298] Isokrates. Orat. v. (Philipp.) s. 141: Xen. Hellen. vi, 1,
  12.

  [299] See the stress laid by Alexander the Great upon the
  adventures of the Ten Thousand, in his speech to encourage his
  soldiers before the battle of Issus (Arrian, E. A. ii, 7, 8).




CHAPTER LXXII.

GREECE UNDER THE LACEDÆMONIAN EMPIRE


The three preceding Chapters have been devoted exclusively to the
narrative of the Expedition and Retreat, immortalized by Xenophon,
occupying the two years intervening between about April 401 B.C.
and June 399 B.C. That event, replete as it is with interest and
pregnant with important consequences, stands apart from the general
sequence of Grecian affairs,—which sequence I now resume.

It will be recollected that as soon as Xenophon with his Ten Thousand
warriors descended from the rugged mountains between Armenia and the
Euxine to the hospitable shelter of Trapezus, and began to lay their
plans for returning to Central Greece,—they found themselves within
the Lacedæmonian empire, unable to advance a step without consulting
Lacedæmonian dictation, and obliged, when they reached the Bosphorus,
to endure without redress the harsh and treacherous usage of the
Spartan officers, Anaxibius and Aristarchus.

Of that empire the first origin has been set forth in my last
preceding volume. It began with the decisive victory of Ægospotami
in the Hellespont (September or October 405 B.C.), where the
Lacedæmonian Lysander, without the loss of a man, got possession of
the entire Athenian fleet and a large portion of their crews,—with
the exception of eight or nine triremes with which the Athenian
admiral Konon effected his escape to Euagoras at Cyprus. The whole
power of Athens was thus annihilated, and nothing remained for
the Lacedæmonians to master except the city itself and Peiræus; a
consummation certain to happen, and actually brought to pass in
April 404 B.C., when Lysander entered Athens in triumph, dismantled
Peiræus, and demolished a large portion of the Long Walls. With the
exception of Athens herself,—whose citizens deferred the moment of
subjection by an heroic, though unavailing, struggle against the
horrors of famine,—and of Samos,—no other Grecian city offered any
resistance to Lysander after the battle of Ægospotami; which in fact
not only took away from Athens her whole naval force, but transferred
it all over to him, and rendered him admiral of a larger Grecian
fleet than had ever been seen together since the battle of Salamis.

I have recounted in my sixty-fifth chapter, the sixteen months
of bitter suffering undergone by Athens immediately after her
surrender. The loss of her fleet and power was aggravated by an
extremity of internal oppression. Her oligarchical party and her
exiles, returning after having served with the enemy against her,
extorted from the public assembly, under the dictation of Lysander
who attended it in person, the appointment of an omnipotent council
of thirty for the ostensible purpose of framing a new constitution.
These thirty rulers,—among whom Kritias was the most violent, and
Theramenes (seemingly) the most moderate, or at least the soonest
satiated,—perpetrated cruelty and spoliation on the largest scale,
being protected against all resistance by a Lacedæmonian harmost and
garrison established in the acropolis. Besides numbers of citizens
put to death, so many others were driven into exile with the loss
of their property, that Thebes and the neighboring cities became
crowded with them. After about eight months of unopposed tyranny, the
Thirty found themselves for the first time attacked by Thrasybulus
at the head of a small party of these exiles coming out of Bœotia.
His bravery and good conduct,—combined with the enormities of the
Thirty, which became continually more nefarious, and to which even
numerous oligarchical citizens, as well as Theramenes himself,
successively became victims,—enabled him soon to strengthen himself,
to seize the Peiræus, and to carry on a civil war which ultimately
put down the tyrants.

These latter were obliged to invoke the aid of a new Lacedæmonian
force. And had that force still continued at the disposal of
Lysander, all resistance on the part of Athens would have been
unavailing. But fortunately for the Athenians, the last few months
had wrought material change in the dispositions both of the allies
of Sparta and of many among her leading men. The allies, especially
Thebes and Corinth, not only relented in their hatred and fear of
Athens, now that she had lost her power,—but even sympathized with
her suffering exiles, and became disgusted with the self-willed
encroachments of Sparta; while the Spartan king Pausanias, together
with some of the ephors, were also jealous of the arbitrary
and oppressive conduct of Lysander. Instead of conducting the
Lacedæmonian force to uphold at all price the Lysandrian oligarchy,
Pausanias appeared rather as an equitable mediator to terminate
the civil war. He refused to concur in any measure for obstructing
the natural tendency towards a revival of the democracy. It was in
this manner that Athens, rescued from that sanguinary and rapacious
_regime_ which has passed into history under the name of the Thirty
Tyrants, was enabled to reappear as a humble and dependent member
of the Spartan alliance,—with nothing but the recollection of her
former power, yet with her democracy again in vigorous and tutelary
action for internal government. The just and gentle bearing of her
democratical citizens, and the absence of reactionary antipathies,
after such cruel ill-treatment,—are among the most honorable
features in her history.

The reader will find in my last volume, what I can only rapidly
glance at here, the details of that system of bloodshed, spoliation,
extinction of free speech and even of intellectual teaching, efforts
to implicate innocent citizens as agents in judicial assassination,
etc.,—which stained the year of Anarchy (as it was termed in
Athenian annals[300]) immediately following the surrender of the
city. These details depend on evidence perfectly satisfactory; for
they are conveyed to us chiefly by Xenophon, whose sympathies are
decidedly oligarchical. From him too we learn another fact, not less
pregnant with instruction; that the knights or horsemen, the body of
richest proprietors at Athens, were the mainstay of the Thirty from
first to last, notwithstanding all the enormities of their career.

  [300] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 1.

We learn from these dark, but well-attested details, to appreciate
the auspices under which that period of history called the
Lacedæmonian empire was inaugurated. Such phenomena were by no means
confined within the walls of Athens. On the contrary, the year of
Anarchy (using that term in the sense in which it was employed by the
Athenians) arising out of the same combination of causes and agents,
was common to a very large proportion of the cities throughout
Greece. The Lacedæmonian admiral Lysander, during his first year of
naval command, had organized in most of the allied cities factious
combinations of some of the principal citizens, corresponding with
himself personally; by whose efforts in their respective cities he
was enabled to prosecute the war vigorously, and whom he repaid,
partly by seconding as much as he could their injustices in their
respective cities,—partly by promising to strengthen their hands
still farther as soon as victory should be made sure.[301] This
policy, while it served as a stimulus against the common enemy,
contributed still more directly to aggrandize Lysander himself;
creating for him an ascendency of his own, and imposing upon him
personal obligations towards adherents, apart from what was required
by the interests of Sparta.

  [301] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 5.

The victory of Ægospotami, complete and decisive beyond all
expectations either of friend or foe, enabled him to discharge these
obligations with interest. All Greece at once made submission to the
Lacedæmonians,[302] except Athens and Samos,—and these two only held
out a few months. It was now the first business of the victorious
commander to remunerate his adherents, and to take permanent
security for Spartan dominion as well as for his own. In the greater
number of cities, he established an oligarchy of ten citizens, or a
dekarchy,[303] composed of his own partisans; while he at the same
time planted in each a Lacedæmonian harmost or governor, with a
garrison to uphold the new oligarchy. The dekarchy of ten Lysandrian
partisans, with the Lacedæmonian harmost to sustain them, became the
general scheme of Hellenic government throughout the Ægean, from
Eubœa to the Thracian coast-towns, and from Myletus to Byzantium.
Lysander sailed round in person, with his victorious fleet, to
Byzantium and Chalkêdon, to the cities of <DW26>s, to Thasos, and
other places,—while he sent Eteonikus to Thrace, for the purpose of
thus recasting the governments everywhere. Not merely those cities
which had hitherto been on the Athenian side, but also those which
had acted as allies of Sparta, were subjected to the same intestine
revolution and the same foreign constraint.[304] Everywhere the new
Lysandrian dekarchy superseded the previous governments, whether
oligarchical or democratical.

  [302] Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 6.

  [303] These Councils of Ten, organized by Lysander, are sometimes
  called _Dekarchies_—sometimes _Dekadarchies_. I use the former
  word by preference; since the word _Dekadarch_ is also employed
  by Xenophon in another and very different sense—as meaning an
  officer who commands a _dekad_.

  [304] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13.

  Καταλυών δὲ τοὺς δήμους καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας, ἕνα μὲν ἁρμοστὴν
  ἑκάστῃ Λακεδαιμόνιον κατέλιπε, δέκα δὲ ἄρχοντας ἐκ τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ
  συγκεκροτημένων κατὰ πόλιν ἑταιρειῶν. Καὶ ταῦτα πράττων ~ὁμοίως
  ἔν τε ταῖς πολεμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμάχοις γεγενημέναις πόλεσι~,
  παρέπλει σχολαίως τρόπον τινα κατασκευαζόμενος ἑαυτῷ τὴν τῆς
  Ἑλλάδος ἡγεμονίαν. Compare Xen. Hellen. ii, 2, 2-5; Diodor. xiii,
  3, 10, 13.

At Thasus, as well as in other places, this revolution was not
accomplished without much bloodshed as well as treacherous stratagem,
nor did Lysander himself scruple to enforce, personally and by his
own presence, the execution and expulsion of suspected citizens.[305]
In many places, however, simple terrorism probably sufficed. The
new Lysandrian Ten overawed resistance and procured recognition of
their usurpation by the menace of inviting the victorious admiral
with his fleet of two hundred sail, and by the simple arrival of
the Lacedæmonian harmost. Not only was each town obliged to provide
a fortified citadel and maintenance for this governor with his
garrison, but a scheme of tribute, amounting to one thousand talents
annually, was imposed for the future, and assessed ratably upon each
city by Lysander.[306]

  [305] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13. πολλαῖς παραγινόμενος αὐτὸς
  σφαγαῖς καὶ συνεκβάλλων τοὺς τῶν φίλων ἐχθροὺς, οὐκ ἐπιεικὲς
  ἐδίδου τοῖς Ἕλλησι δεῖγμα τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων ἀρχῆς, etc.

  Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14. Καὶ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων πόλεων ὁμαλῶς ἁπασῶν
  κατέλυε τὰς πολιτείας καὶ καθίστη δεκαδαρχίας· πολλῶν μὲν ἐν
  ἑκάστῃ σφαττομένων, πολλῶν δὲ φευγόντων, etc.

  About the massacre at Thasus, see Cornelius Nepos, Lysand. c. 2;
  Polyæn. i, 45, 4. Compare Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19; and see Vol.
  VIII, Ch. lxv, p. 220 of this History.

  [306] Diodor. xiv, 10. Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s.
  151; Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 1.

In what spirit these new dekarchies would govern, consisting as they
did of picked oligarchical partisans distinguished for audacity and
ambition,[307]—who, to all the unscrupulous lust of power which
characterized Lysander himself, added a thirst for personal gain,
from which he was exempt, and were now about to reimburse themselves
for services already rendered to him,—the general analogy of Grecian
history would sufficiently teach us, though we are without special
details. But in reference to this point, we have not merely general
analogy to guide us; we have farther the parallel case of the Thirty
at Athens, the particulars of whose rule are well known and have
already been alluded to. These Thirty, with the exception of the
difference of number, were to all intents and purposes a Lysandrian
dekarchy; created by the same originating force, placed under the
like circumstances, and animated by the like spirit and interests.
Every subject town would produce its Kritias and Theramenes, and
its body of wealthy citizens like the knights or horsemen at Athens
to abet their oppressions, under Lacedæmonian patronage and the
covering guard of the Lacedæmonian harmost. Moreover, Kritias,
with all his vices, was likely to be better rather than worse, as
compared with his oligarchical parallel in any other less cultivated
city. He was a man of letters and philosophy, accustomed to the
conversation of Sokrates, and to the discussion of ethical and
social questions. We may say the same of the knights or horsemen
at Athens. Undoubtedly they had been better educated, and had been
exposed to more liberalizing and improving influences, than the
corresponding class elsewhere. If, then, these knights at Athens
had no shame in serving as accomplices to the Thirty throughout all
their enormities, we need not fear to presume that other cities would
furnish a body of wealthy men yet more unscrupulous, and a leader at
least as sanguinary, rapacious, and full of antipathies, as Kritias.
As at Athens, so elsewhere; the dekarchs would begin by putting to
death notorious political opponents, under the name of “the wicked
men;”[308] they would next proceed to deal in the same manner
with men of known probity and courage, likely to take a lead in
resisting oppression.[309] Their career of blood would continue,—in
spite of remonstrances from more moderate persons among their own
number, like Theramenes,—until they contrived some stratagem for
disarming the citizens, which would enable them to gratify both their
antipathies and their rapacity by victims still more numerous,—many
of such victims being wealthy men, selected for purposes of pure
spoliation.[310] They would next despatch by force any obtrusive
monitor from their own number, like Theramenes; probably with far
less ceremony than accompanied the perpetration of this crime at
Athens, where we may trace the effect of those judicial forms and
habits to which the Athenian public had been habituated,—overruled
indeed, yet still not forgotten. There would hardly remain any fresh
enormity still to commit, over and above the multiplied executions,
except to banish from the city all but their own immediate partisans,
and to reward these latter with choice estates confiscated from
the victims.[311] If called upon to excuse such tyranny, the
leader of a dekarchy would have sufficient invention to employ the
plea of Kritias,—that all changes of government were unavoidably
death-dealing, and that nothing less than such stringent measures
would suffice to maintain his city in suitable dependence upon
Sparta.[312]

  [307] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13. τοῦ Λυσάνδρου τῶν ὀλίγων τοῖς
  θρασυτάτοις καὶ φιλονεικοτάτοις τὰς πόλεις ἐγχειρίζοντος.

  [308] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 13.

  ... ἔπεισαν Λύσανδρον φρουροὺς σφίσι ξυμπρᾶξαι ἐλθεῖν, ἕως δὴ
  ~τοὺς πονηροὺς~ ἐκποδὼν ποιησάμενοι καταστήσαιντο τὴν πολιτείαν,
  etc.

  [309] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 14. Τῶν δὲ φρουρῶν τούτου (the harmost)
  συμπέμποντος αὐτοῖς, οὓς ἐβούλοντο, συνελάμβανον οὐκέτι τοὺς
  πονηροὺς καὶ ὀλίγου ἀξίους, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη οὓς ἐνόμιζον ἥκιστα
  μὲν παρωθουμένους ἀνέχεσθαι, ἀντιπράττειν δέ τι ἐπιχειροῦντας
  πλείστους τοὺς συνεθέλοντας λαμβάνειν.

  [310] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 21.

  [311] Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 1.

  [312] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 24-32. Καὶ εἰσὶ μὲν δήπου πᾶσαι
  μεταβολαὶ πολιτειῶν θανατήφοροι, etc.

Of course, it is not my purpose to affirm that in any other city,
precisely the same phenomena took place as those which occurred in
Athens. But we are nevertheless perfectly warranted in regarding
the history of the Athenian Thirty as a fair sample, from whence to
derive our idea of those Lysandrian dekarchies which now overspread
the Grecian world. Doubtless, each had its own peculiar march; some
were less tyrannical; but, perhaps, some even more tyrannical,
regard being had to the size of the city. And in point of fact,
Isokrates, who speaks with indignant horror of these dekarchies,
while he denounces those features which they had in common with the
triakontarchy at Athens,—extrajudicial murders, spoliations, and
banishments,—notices one enormity besides, which we do not find
in the latter, violent outrages upon boys and women.[313] Nothing
of this kind is ascribed to Kritias and his companions;[314] and
it is a considerable proof of the restraining force of Athenian
manners, that men who inflicted so much evil in gratification of
other violent impulses, should have stopped short here. The decemvirs
named by Lysander, like the decemvir Appius Claudius at Rome, would
find themselves armed with power to satiate their lusts as well as
their antipathies, and would not be more likely to set bounds to the
former than to the latter. Lysander, in all the overweening insolence
of victory, while rewarding his most devoted partisans with an
exaltation comprising every sort of license and tyranny, stained the
dependent cities with countless murders, perpetrated on private as
well as on public grounds.[315] No individual Greek had ever before
wielded so prodigious a power of enriching friends or destroying
enemies, in this universal reorganization of Greece;[316] nor was
there ever any power more deplorably abused.

  [313] Isokrates Orat. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 127-132 (c. 32).

  He has been speaking, at some length, and in terms of energetic
  denunciation, against the enormities of the dekarchies. He
  concludes by saying—Φυγὰς δὲ καὶ στάσεις καὶ νόμων συγχύσεις καὶ
  πολιτειῶν μεταβολὰς, ~ἔτι δὲ παιδῶν ὕβρεις καὶ γυναικῶν αἰσχύνας
  καὶ χρημάτων ἁρπαγὰς~, τίς ἂν δύναιτο διεξελθεῖν· πλὴν τοσοῦτον
  εἰπεῖν ἔχω καθ᾽ ἁπάντων, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν δεινὰ ῥᾳδίως ἄν τις
  ἑνὶ ψηφίσματι διέλυσε, τὰς δὲ σφαγὰς καὶ τὰς ἀνομίας τὰς ἐπὶ
  τούτων γενομένας οὐδεὶς ἂν ἰάσασθαι δύναιτο.

  See also, of the same author, Isokrates, Orat. v, (Philipp.) s.
  110; Orat. viii, (de Pace) s. 119-124; Or. xii, (Panath.) s. 58,
  60, 106.

  [314] We may infer that if Xenophon had heard anything of the
  sort respecting Kritias, he would hardly have been averse to
  mention it; when we read what he says (Memorab. i, 2, 29.)
  Compare a curious passage about Kritias in Dion. Chrysostom. Or.
  xxi, p. 270.

  [315] Plutarch Lysand. c. 19. Ἦν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
  δημοτικῶν φόνος οὐκ ἀριθμητὸς, ἅτε δὴ μὴ κατ᾽ ἰδίας μόνον
  αἰτίας αὐτοῦ κτείνοντος, ἀλλὰ πολλαῖς μὲν ἔχθραις, πολλαῖς δὲ
  πλεονεξίαις, τῶν ἑκασταχόθι φίλων χαριζομένου τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ
  συνεργοῦντος; also Pausanias, vii, 10, 1; ix, 32, 6.

  [316] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 7.

It was thus that the Lacedæmonian empire imposed upon each of the
subject cities a double oppression;[317] the native decemvirs, and
the foreign harmost; each abetting the other, and forming together an
aggravated pressure upon the citizens, from which scarce any escape
was left. The Thirty at Athens paid the greatest possible court to
the harmost Kallibius,[318] and put to death individual Athenians
offensive to him, in order to purchase his coöperation in their own
violences. The few details which we possess respecting these harmosts
(who continued throughout the insular and maritime cities for about
ten years, until the battle of Knidus, or as long as the maritime
empire of Sparta lasted,—but in various continental dependencies
considerably longer, that is, until the defeat of Leuktra in 371
B.C.), are all for the most part discreditable. We have seen in the
last chapter the description given by the philo-Laconian Xenophon,
of the harsh and treacherous manner in which they acted towards the
returning Cyreian soldiers, combined with their corrupt subservience
to Pharnabazus. We learn from him that it depended upon the fiat of
a Lacedæmonian harmost whether these soldiers should be proclaimed
enemies and excluded forever from their native cities; and Kleander,
the harmost of Byzantium, who at first threatened them with this
treatment, was only induced by the most unlimited submission,
combined with very delicate management, to withdraw his menace. The
cruel proceeding of Anaxibius and Aristarchus, who went so far as to
sell four hundred of these soldiers into slavery, has been recounted
a few pages above. Nothing can be more arbitrary or reckless than
their proceedings. If they could behave thus towards a body of Greek
soldiers full of acquired glory, effective either as friends or as
enemies, and having generals capable of prosecuting their collective
interests and making their complaints heard,—what protection would
a private citizen of any subject city, Byzantium or Perinthus, be
likely to enjoy against their oppression?

  [317] See the speech of the Theban envoys at Athens, about eight
  years after the surrender of Athens (Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 13).

  ... Οὐδὲ γὰρ φυγεῖν ἐξῆν (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19).

  [318] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 13.

  τὸν μὲν Καλλίβιον ἐθεράπευον πάσῃ θεραπείᾳ, ὡς πάντα ἐπαινοίῃ, ἃ
  πράττοιεν, etc. (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15).

  The Thirty seem to have outdone Lysander himself. A young
  Athenian of rank, distinguished as a victor in the pankratium,
  Autolykus,—having been insulted by Kallibius, resented it,
  tripped him up, and threw him down. Lysander, on being appealed
  to, justified Autolykus, and censured Kallibius, telling him
  that he did not know how to govern freemen. The Thirty, however,
  afterwards put Autolykus to death, as a means of courting
  Kallibius (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15). Pausanius mentions Eteonikus
  (not Kallibius) as the person who struck Autolykus; but he
  ascribes the same decision to Lysander (ix, 32, 3).

The story of Aristodemus, the harmost of Oreus in Eubœa, evinces that
no justice could be obtained against any of their enormities from
the ephors of Sparta. That harmost, among many other acts of brutal
violence, seized a beautiful youth, son of a free citizen at Oreus,
out of the palæstra,—carried him off,—and after vainly endeavoring
to overcome his resistance, put him to death. The father of the
youth went to Sparta, made known the atrocities, and appealed to
the ephors and Senate for redress. But a deaf ear was turned to his
complaints, and in anguish of mind he slew himself. Indeed, we know
that these Spartan authorities would grant no redress, not merely
against harmosts, but even against private Spartan citizens, who
had been guilty of gross crime out of their own country. A Bœotian
near Leuktra, named Skedasus, preferred complaint that two Spartans,
on their way from Delphi, after having been hospitably entertained
in his house, had first violated, and afterwards killed, his two
daughters; but even for so flagitious an outrage as this, no redress
could be obtained.[319] Doubtless, when a powerful foreign ally, like
the Persian satrap Pharnabazus,[320] complained to the ephors of the
conduct of a Lacedæmonian harmost or admiral, his representations
would receive attention; and we learn that the ephors were thus
induced not merely to recall Lysander from the Hellespont, but to put
to death another officer, Thorax, for corrupt appropriation of money.
But for a private citizen in any subject city, the superintending
authority of Sparta would be not merely remote but deaf and
immovable, so as to afford him no protection whatever, and to leave
him altogether at the mercy of the harmost. It seems, too, that
the rigor of Spartan training, and peculiarity of habits, rendered
individual Lacedæmonians on foreign service more self-willed, more
incapable of entering into the customs or feelings of others, and
more liable to degenerate when set free from the strict watch of
home,—than other Greeks generally.[321]

  [319] Plutarch, Amator. Narration, p. 773; Plutarch, Pelopidas,
  c. 20. In Diodorus (xv, 54) and Pausanias, (ix, 13, 2), the
  damsels thus outraged are stated to have slain themselves.
  Compare another story in Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 56, 57.

  [320] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19.

  [321] This seems to have been the impression not merely of
  the enemies of Sparta, but even of the Spartan authorities
  themselves. Compare two remarkable passages of Thucydides, i,
  77, and i, 95. Ἄμικτα γὰρ (says the Athenian envoy at Sparta) τά
  τε καθ᾽ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς νόμιμα τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχετε, καὶ προσέτι εἷς
  ἕκαστος ἐξιὼν οὔτε τούτοις χρῆται, οὐθ᾽ οἷς ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλὰς νομίζει.

  After the recall of the regent Pausanias and of Dorkis from the
  Hellespont (in 477 B.C.), the Lacedæmonians refuse to send
  out any successor, φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσιν οἱ ἐξιόντες χείρους
  γίγνωνται, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ Παυσανίᾳ ἐνεῖδον, etc. (i, 95.)

  Compare Plutarch, Apophtheg. Laconic. p. 220 F.

Taking all these causes of evil together,—the dekarchies, the
harmosts, and the overwhelming dictatorship of Lysander,—and
construing other parts of the Grecian world by the analogy of Athens
under the Thirty,—we shall be warranted in affirming that the first
years of the Spartan Empire, which followed upon the victory of
Ægospotami, were years of all-pervading tyranny and multifarious
intestine calamity, such as Greece had never before endured. The
hardships of war, severe in many ways, were now at an end, but they
were replaced by a state of suffering not the less difficult to bear
because it was called peace. And what made the suffering yet more
intolerable was, that it was a bitter disappointment, and a flagrant
violation of promises proclaimed, repeatedly and explicitly, by the
Lacedæmonians themselves.

For more than thirty years preceding,—from times earlier than the
commencement of the Peloponnesian war,—the Spartans had professed to
interfere only for the purpose of liberating Greece, and of putting
down the usurped ascendency of Athens. All the allies of Sparta
had been invited into strenuous action,—all those of Athens had
been urged to revolt,—under the soul-stirring cry of “Freedom to
Greece.” The earliest incitements addressed by the Corinthians to
Sparta in 432 B.C., immediately after the Korkyræan dispute, called
upon her to stand forward in fulfilment of her recognized function
as “Liberator of Greece,” and denounced her as guilty of connivance
with Athens if she held back.[322] Athens was branded as the “despot
city;” which had already absorbed the independence of many Greeks,
and menaced that of all the rest. The last formal requisition borne
by the Lacedæmonian envoys to Athens in the winter immediately
preceding the war, ran thus,—“If you desire the continuance of
peace with Sparta, restore to the Greeks their autonomy.”[323] When
Archidamus, king of Sparta, approached at the head of his army to
besiege Platæa, the Platæans laid claim to autonomy as having been
solemnly guaranteed to them by King Pausanias after the great victory
near their town. Upon which Archidamus replied,—“Your demand is
just; we are prepared to confirm _your_ autonomy,—but we call upon
you to aid us in securing the like for those other Greeks who have
been enslaved by Athens. This is the sole purpose of our great
present effort.”[324] And the banner of general enfranchisement,
which the Lacedæmonians thus held up at the outset of the war,
enlisted in their cause encouraging sympathy and good wishes
throughout Greece.[325]

  [322] Thucyd. i, 69. οὐ γὰρ ὁ δουλωσάμενος, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ δυνάμενος μὲν
  παῦσαι, περιορῶν δὲ, ἀληθέστερον αὐτὸ δρᾷ, εἴπερ καὶ τὴν ἀξίωσιν
  τῆς ἀρετῆς ὡς ἐλευθερῶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα φέρεται.

  To the like purpose the second speech of the Corinthian envoys
  at Sparta, c. 122-124—μὴ μέλλετε Ποτιδαιάταις τε ποιεῖσθαι
  τιμωρίαν. ... καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μετελθεῖν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, etc.

  [323] Thucyd. i, 139. Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, Panegyr. c. 34,
  s. 140; Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 121; Or. xiv, (Plataic.) s. 43.

  [324] Thucyd. ii, 72. Παρασκευὴ δὲ τόσηδε καὶ πόλεμος γεγένηται
  αὐτῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐλευθερώσεως.

  Read also the speech of the Theban orator, in reply to the
  Platæan, after the capture of the town by the Lacedæmonians (iii,
  63).

  [325] Thucyd. ii, 8. ἡ δὲ εὔνοια παρὰ πολὺ ἐποίει τῶν ἀνθρώπων
  μᾶλλον ἐς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ἄλλως τε καὶ προειπόντων ὅτι τὴν
  Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦσιν.

  See also iii, 13, 14—the speech of the envoys from the revolted
  Mitylênê, to the Lacedæmonians.

  The Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas with his fleet, is announced as
  crossing over the Ægean to Ionia for the purpose of “liberating
  Greece;” accordingly, the Samian exiles remonstrate with him
  for killing his prisoners, as in contradiction with that object
  (iii, 32)—ἔλεγον οὐ καλῶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦν αὐτὸν, εἰ ἄνδρας
  διέφθειρεν, etc.

But the most striking illustration by far, of the seductive promises
held out by the Lacedæmonians, was afforded by the conduct of
Brasidas in Thrace, when he first came into the neighborhood of the
Athenian allies during the eighth year of the war (424 B.C.). In his
memorable discourse addressed to the public assembly at Akanthus, he
takes the greatest pains to satisfy them that he came only for the
purpose of realizing the promise of enfranchisement proclaimed by
the Lacedæmonians at the beginning of the war.[326] Having expected,
when acting in such a cause, nothing less than a hearty welcome,
he is astonished to find their gates closed against him. “I am come
(said he) not to injure, but to liberate the Greeks; after binding
the Lacedæmonian authorities by the most solemn oaths, that all
whom I may bring over shall be dealt with as autonomous allies.
We do not wish to obtain you as allies either by force or fraud,
but to act as your allies at a time when you are enslaved by the
Athenians. You ought not to suspect my purposes, in the face of these
solemn assurances; least of all ought any man to hold back through
apprehension of private enmities, and through fear lest I should put
the city into the hands of a few chosen partisans. I am not come to
identify myself with local faction: I am not the man to offer you
an unreal liberty by breaking down your established constitution,
for the purpose of enslaving either the Many to the Few, or the
Few to the Many. That would be more intolerable even than foreign
dominion; and we Lacedæmonians should incur nothing but reproach,
instead of reaping thanks and honor for our trouble. We should draw
upon ourselves those very censures, upon the strength of which we
are trying to put down Athens; and that, too, in aggravated measure,
worse than those who have never made honorable professions; since to
men in high position, specious trick is more disgraceful than open
violence.[327]—If (continued Brasidas) in spite of my assurances,
you still withhold from me your coöperation, I shall think myself
authorized to constrain you by force. We should not be warranted in
forcing freedom on any unwilling parties, except with a view to some
common good. But as we seek not empire for ourselves,—as we struggle
only to put down the empire of others,—as we offer autonomy to each
and all,—so we should do wrong to the majority if we allowed you to
persist in your opposition.”[328]

  [326] Thucyd. iv, 85. Ἡ μὲν ἔκπεμψίς μου καὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς ὑπὸ
  Λακεδαιμονίων, ὦ Ἀκάνθιοι, γεγένηται τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπαληθεύουσα ἣν
  ἀρχόμενοι τοῦ πολέμου προείπομεν, ~Ἀθηναίοις ἐλευθεροῦντες τὴν
  Ἑλλάδα πολεμήσειν~.

  [327] Thucyd. iv, 85. Αὐτός τε οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ, ἐπ᾽ ἐλευθερώσει δὲ
  τῶν Ἑλλήνων παρελήλυθα, ὅρκοις τε Λακεδαιμονίων καταλαβὼν τὰ τέλη
  τοῖς μεγίστοις, ἦ μὴν οὓς ἂν ἔγωγε προσαγάγωμαι ξυμμάχους ἔσεσθαι
  αὐτονόμους.... Καὶ εἴ τις ἰδίᾳ τινὰ δεδιὼς ἄρα, μὴ ἐγώ τισι
  προσθῶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀπρόθυμός ἐστι, ~πάντων μάλιστα πιστευσάτω. Οὐ
  γὰρ συστασιάσων ἥκω~, οὐδὲ ἀσαφῆ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν νομίζω ἐπιφέρειν,
  εἰ, ~τὸ πάτριον παρεὶς, τὸ πλέον τοῖς ὀλίγοις~, ἢ τὸ ἔλασσον τοῖς
  πᾶσι, δουλώσαιμι. ~Χαλεπώτερα γὰρ ἂν τῆς ἀλλοφύλου ἀρχῆς εἴη~,
  καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις οὐκ ἂν ἀντὶ πόνων χάρις καθίσταιτο,
  ἀντὶ δὲ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης αἰτία μᾶλλον· ~οἷς τε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους
  ἐγκλήμασι καταπολεμοῦμεν, αὐτοὶ ἂν φαινοίμεθα ἐχθίονα ἢ ὁ μὴ
  ὑποδείξας ἀρετὴν κατακτώμενοι~.

  [328] Thucyd. iv, 87. Οὐδὲ ὀφείλομεν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὴ ~κοινοῦ
  τινος αγαθοῦ αἰτίᾳ τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους ἐλευθεροῦν. Οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἀρχῆς
  ἐφιέμεθα~, παῦσαι δὲ μᾶλλον ἑτέρους σπεύδοντες τοὺς πλείους
  ἂν ἀδικοῖμεν, ~εἰ ξύμπασιν αὐτονομίαν ἐπιφέροντες~ ὑμᾶς τοὺς
  ἐναντιουμένους περιΐδοιμεν. Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.)
  s. 140, 141.

Like the allied sovereigns of Europe in 1813, who, requiring the
most strenuous efforts on the part of the people to contend against
the Emperor Napoleon, promised free constitutions and granted
nothing after the victory had been assured,—the Lacedæmonians
thus held out the most emphatic and repeated assurances of general
autonomy in order to enlist allies against Athens; disavowing, even
ostentatiously, any aim at empire for themselves. It is true, that
after the great catastrophe before Syracuse, when the ruin of Athens
appeared imminent, and when the alliance with the Persian satraps
against her was first brought to pass, the Lacedæmonians began to
think more of empire,[329] and less of Grecian freedom; which,
indeed, so far as concerned the Greeks on the continent of Asia,
was surrendered to Persia. Nevertheless the old watchword still
continued. It was still currently believed, though less studiously
professed, that the destruction of the Athenian empire was aimed at
as a means to the liberation of Greece.[330]

  [329] Feelings of the Lacedæmonians during the winter immediately
  succeeding the great Syracusan catastrophe (Thuc. viii. 2)—καὶ
  καθελόντες ἐκείνους (the Athenians) αὐτοὶ τῆς πάσης Ἑλλάδος ἤδη
  ἀσφαλῶς ἡγήσεσθαι.

  [330] Compare Thucyd. viii, 43, 3; viii, 46, 3.

The victory of Ægospotami with its consequences cruelly undeceived
every one. The language of Brasidas, sanctioned by the solemn oaths
of the Lacedæmonian ephors, in 424 B.C.—and the proceedings
of the Lacedæmonian Lysander in 405-404 B.C., the commencing
hour of Spartan omnipotence,—stand in such literal and flagrant
contradiction, that we might almost imagine the former to have
foreseen the possibility of such a successor, and to have tried to
disgrace and disarm him beforehand. The dekarchies of Lysander
realized that precise ascendency of a few chosen partisans which
Brasidas repudiates as an abomination worse than foreign dominion;
while the harmosts and garrison, installed in the dependent cities
along with the native decemvirs, planted the second variety of
mischief as well as the first, each aggravating the other. Had the
noble-minded Kallikratidas gained a victory at Arginusæ, and lived
to close the war, he would probably have tried, with more or less of
success, to make some approach to the promises of Brasidas. But it
was the double misfortune of Greece, first that the closing victory
was gained by such an admiral as Lysander, the most unscrupulous
of all power-seekers, partly for his country, and still more for
himself,—next, that the victory was so decisive, sudden and
imposing, as to leave no enemy standing, or in a position to insist
upon terms. The fiat of Lysander, acting in the name of Sparta,
became omnipotent, not merely over enemies, but over allies; and
to a certain degree even over the Spartan authorities themselves.
There was no present necessity for conciliating allies,—still
less for acting up to former engagements; so that nothing remained
to oppose the naturally ambitious inspirations of the Spartan
ephors, who allowed the admiral to carry out the details in his own
way. But former assurances, though Sparta was in a condition to
disregard them, were not forgotten by others; and the recollection
of them imparted additional bitterness to the oppressions of the
decemvirs and harmosts.[331] In perfect consistency with her misrule
throughout Eastern Greece,[332] too, Sparta identified herself with
the energetic tyranny of Dionysius at Syracuse, assisting both to
erect and to uphold it; a contradiction to her former maxims of
action which would have astounded the historian Herodotus.

  [331] This is emphatically set forth in a fragment of Theopompus
  the historian, preserved by Theodorus Metochita, and printed at
  the end of the collection of the Fragments of Theopompus the
  historian, both by Wichers and by M. Didot. Both these editors,
  however, insert it only as Fragmentum Spurium, on the authority
  of Plutarch (Lysander, c. 13), who quotes the same sentiment
  from the comic writer Theopompus. But the passage of Theodorus
  Metochita presents the express words Θεόπομπος ὁ ἱστορικός.
  We have, therefore, his distinct affirmation against that of
  Plutarch; and the question is, which of the two we are to believe.

  Now if any one will read attentively the so-called Fragmentum
  Spurium as it stands at the end of the collections above referred
  to, he will see (I think) that it belongs much more naturally
  to the historian than to the comic writer. It is a strictly
  historical statement, illustrated by a telling, though coarse,
  comparison. The Fragment is thus presented by Theodorus Metochita
  (Fragm. Theopomp. 344, ed. Didot).

  Θεόπομπος ὁ ἱστορικὸς ἀποσκώπτων εἰς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, εἴκαζεν
  αὐτοὺς ταῖς φαύλαις καπηλίσιν, αἳ τοῖς χρωμένοις ἐγχέουσαι
  τὴν ἀρχὴν οἶνον ἡδύν τε καὶ εὔχρηστον σοφιστικῶς ἐπὶ τῇ λήψει
  τοῦ ἀργυρίου, μεθύστερον φαυλόν τινα καὶ ἐκτροπίαν καὶ ὀξίνην
  κατακρινῶσι καὶ παρέχονται· καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους τοίνυν
  ἔλεγε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκείναις τρόπον, ἐν τῷ κατὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων
  πολέμῳ, τὴν ἀρχὴν ἡδίστῳ πόματι τῆς ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἐλευθερίας καὶ
  προγράμματι καὶ κηρύγματι τοὺς Ἕλληνας δελεάσαντας, ὕστερον
  πικρότατα σφίσιν ἐγχέαι καὶ ἀηδέστατα κράματα βιοτῆς ἐπωδύνου καὶ
  χρήσεως πραγμάτων ἀλγεινῶν, πάνυ τοι κατατυραννοῦντας τὰς πόλεις
  δεκαρχίαις καὶ ἁρμοσταῖς βαρυτάτοις, καὶ πραττομένους, ἃ δυσχερὲς
  εἶναι σφόδρα καὶ ἀνύποιστον φέρειν, καὶ ἀποκτιννύναι.

  Plutarch, ascribing the statement to the comic Theopompus,
  affirms him to be silly (ἔοικε ληρεῖν) in saying that the
  Lacedæmonian empire began by being sweet and pleasant, and
  afterwards was corrupted and turned into bitterness and
  oppression; whereas the fact was, that it was bitterness and
  oppression from the very first.

  Now if we read the above citation from Theodorus, we shall see
  that Theopompus did not really put forth that assertion which
  Plutarch contradicts as silly and untrue.

  What Theopompus stated was, that the first Lacedæmonians, _during
  the war against Athens_, tempted the Greeks with a most delicious
  draught and _programme_ and _proclamation_ of freedom from the
  rule of Athens,—and that they afterwards poured in the most
  bitter and repulsive mixtures of hard oppression and tyranny, etc.

  The sweet draught is asserted to consist—not, as Plutarch
  supposes, in the first taste of the actual Lacedæmonian empire
  after the war, but—in the seductive promises of freedom held
  out by them to the allies _during the war_. Plutarch’s charge of
  ἔοικε ληρεῖν has thus no foundation. I have written δελεάσαντας
  instead of δελεάσοντας which stands in Didot’s Fragment, because
  it struck me that this correction was required to construe the
  passage.

  [332] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegr.) s. 145; Or. viii, (de Pace) s.
  122; Diodor. xiv, 10-44; xv, 23. Compare Herodot. v, 92; Thucyd.
  i, 18; Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 144.

The empire of Sparta thus constituted at the end of 405 B.C.,
maintained itself in full grandeur for somewhat above ten years,
until the naval battle of Knidus,[333] in 394 B.C. That defeat
destroyed her fleet and maritime ascendency, yet left her in
undiminished power on land, which she still maintained until her
defeat by the Thebans[334] at Leuktra in 371 B.C. Throughout all
this time, it was her established system to keep up Spartan harmosts
and garrisons in the dependent cities on the continent as well as in
the islands. Even the Chians, who had been her most active allies
during the last eight years of the war, were compelled to submit
to this hardship; besides having all their fleet taken away from
them.[335] But the native dekarchies, though at first established
by Lysander universally throughout the maritime dependencies, did
not last as a system so long as the harmosts. Composed as they were
to a great degree of the personal nominees and confederates of
Lysander, they suffered in part by the reactionary jealousy which
in time made itself felt against his overweening ascendency. After
continuing for some time, they lost the countenance of the Spartan
ephors, who proclaimed permission to the cities (we do not precisely
know when) to resume their preëxisting governments.[336] Some of the
dekarchies thus became dissolved, or modified in various ways, but
several probably still continued to subsist, if they had force enough
to maintain themselves; for it does not appear that the ephors ever
systematically put them down, as Lysander had systematically set them
up.

  [333] Isokrates, Panathen. s. 61. Σπαρτιᾶται μὲν γὰρ ἔτη δέκα
  μόλις ἐπεστάτησαν αὐτῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ πέντε καὶ ἑξήκοντα συνεχῶς
  κατέσχομεν τὴν ἀρχήν. I do not hold myself bound to make out the
  exactness of the chronology of Isokrates. But here we may remark
  that his “hardly ten years” is a term, though less than the truth
  by some months, if we may take the battle of Ægospotami as the
  beginning, is very near the truth if we take the surrender of
  Athens as the beginning, down to the battle of Knidus.

  [334] Pausanias, viii, 52, 2; ix, 6, 1.

  [335] Diodor. xiv, 84; Isokrates, Orat. viii, (de Pace) s. 121.

  [336] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 2.

  Lysander accompanied King Agesilaus (when the latter was going
  to his Asiatic command in 396 B.C.). His purpose was—ὅπως
  τὰς δεκαρχίας τὰς κατασταθείσας ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν,
  ἐκπεπτωκυίας δὲ διὰ τοὺς ἐφόρους, οἱ τὰς πατρίους πολιτείας
  παρήγγειλαν, πάλιν καταστήσειε μετ᾽ Ἀγησιλάου.

  It shows the careless construction of Xenophon’s Hellenica, or
  perhaps his reluctance to set forth the discreditable points of
  the Lacedæmonian rule, that this is the first mention which he
  makes (and that too, indirectly) of the dekarchies, nine years
  after they had been first set up by Lysander.

The government of the Thirty at Athens would never have been
overthrown if the oppressed Athenians had been obliged to rely
on a tutelary interference of the Spartan ephors to help them in
overthrowing it. My last volume has shown that this nefarious
oligarchy came to its end by the unassisted efforts of Thrasybulus
and the Athenian democrats themselves. It is true, indeed, that the
arrogance and selfishness of Sparta and of Lysander had alienated
the Thebans, Corinthians, Megarians, and other neighboring allies,
and induced them to sympathize with the Athenian exiles against the
atrocities of the Thirty,—but they never rendered any positive
assistance of moment. The inordinate personal ambition of Lysander
had also offended King Pausanias and the Spartan ephors, so that
they too became indifferent to the Thirty, who were his creatures.
But this merely deprived the Thirty of that foreign support which
Lysander, had he still continued in the ascendent, would have
extended to them in full measure. It was not the positive cause
of their downfall. That crisis was brought about altogether by
the energy of Thrasybulus and his companions, who manifested such
force and determination as could not have been put down without
an extraordinary display of Spartan military power; a display not
entirely safe when the sympathies of the chief allies were with
the other side,—and at any rate adverse to the inclinations of
Pausanias. As it was with the Thirty at Athens, so it probably
was also with the dekarchies in the dependent cities. The Spartan
ephors took no steps to put them down; but where the resistance of
the citizens was strenuous enough to overthrow them, no Spartan
intervention came to prop them up, and the harmost perhaps received
orders not to consider his authority as indissolubly linked with
theirs. The native forces of each dependent city being thus left to
find their own level, the decemvirs, once installed, would doubtless
maintain themselves in a great number; while in other cases they
would be overthrown,—or, perhaps, would contrive to perpetuate their
dominion by compromise and alliance with other oligarchical sections.
This confused and unsettled state of the dekarchies,—some still
existing, others half-existing, others again defunct,—prevailed in
396 B.C., when Lysander accompanied Agesilaus into Asia, in the
full hope that he should have influence enough to reorganize them
all.[337] We must recollect that no other dependent city would
possess the same means of offering energetic resistance to its local
decemvirs, as Athens offered to the Thirty; and that the insular
Grecian cities were not only feeble individually, but naturally
helpless against the lords of the sea.[338]

  [337] Compare the two passages of Xenophon’s Hellenica, iii, 4,
  7; iii, 5, 13.

  Ἅτε συντεταραγμένων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ οὔτε
  δημοκρατίας ἔτι οὔσης, ὥσπερ ἐπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων, οὔτε δεκαρχίας, ὥσπερ
  ἐπὶ Λυσάνδρου.

  But that some of these dekarchies still continued, we know from
  the subsequent passage. The Theban envoys say to the public
  assembly at Athens, respecting the Spartans:—

  Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οὓς ὑμῶν ἀπέστησαν φανεροί εἰσιν ἐξηπατηκότες· ὑπό
  τε γὰρ τῶν ἁρμοστῶν ~τυραννοῦνται~, καὶ ὑπὸ δέκα ἀνδρῶν, οὓς
  Λύσανδρος κατέστησεν ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει—where the decemvirs are
  noted as still subsisting, in 395 B.C. See also Xen. Agesilaus,
  i, 37.

  [338] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 15.

Such then was the result throughout Greece, when that long war,
which had been undertaken in the name of universal autonomy, was
terminated by the battle of Ægospotami. In place of imperial Athens
was substituted, not the promised autonomy, but yet more imperial
Sparta. An awful picture is given by the philo-Laconian Xenophon,
in 399 B.C., of the ascendency exercised throughout all the
Grecian cities, not merely by the ephors and the public officers,
but even by the private citizens, of Sparta. “The Lacedæmonians
(says he in addressing the Cyreian army) are now the presidents of
Greece; and even any single private Lacedæmonian can accomplish
what he pleases.”[339] “All the cities (he says in another place)
then obeyed whatever order they might receive from a Lacedæmonian
citizen.”[340] Not merely was the general ascendency thus omnipresent
and irresistible, but it was enforced with a stringency of detail,
and darkened by a thousand accompaniments of tyranny and individual
abuse, such as had never been known under the much-decried empire of
Athens.

  [339] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 12. Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἐγγὺς αἱ Ἑλληνίδες
  πόλεις· (this was spoken at Kalpê in Bithynia) τῆς δὲ Ἑλλάδος
  Λακεδαιμόνιοι προεστήκασιν· ~ἱκανοὶ δέ εἰσι καὶ εἷς ἕκαστος
  Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅ,τι βούλονται διαπράττεσθαι~.

  [340] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 5. Πᾶσαι γὰρ τότε αἱ πόλεις ἐπείθοντο,
  ὅ,τι Λακεδαιμόνιος ἀνὴρ ἐπιτάττοι.

We have more than one picture of the Athenian empire, in speeches
made by hostile orators who had every motive to work up the strongest
antipathies in the bosoms of their audience against it. We have the
addresses of the Corinthian envoys at Sparta when stimulating the
Spartan allies to the Peloponnesian war,[341]—that of the envoys
from Mitylênê delivered at Olympia to the Spartan confederates,
when the city had revolted from Athens and stood in pressing need
of support,—the discourse of Brasidas in the public assembly at
Akanthus,—and more than one speech also from Hermokrates, impressing
upon his Sicilian countrymen hatred as well as fear of Athens.[342]
Whoever reads these discourses, will see that they dwell almost
exclusively on the great political wrong inherent in the very fact of
her empire, robbing so many Grecian communities of their legitimate
autonomy, over and above the tribute imposed. That Athens had thus
already enslaved many cities, and was only watching for opportunities
to enslave many more, is the theme upon which they expatiate. But
of practical grievances,—of cruelty, oppression, spoliation,
multiplied exiles, etc., of high-handed wrong committed by individual
Athenians,—not one word is spoken. Had there been the smallest
pretext for introducing such inflammatory topics, how much more
impressive would have been the appeal of Brasidas to the sympathies
of the Akanthians! How vehement would have been the denunciations of
the Mitylenæan envoys, in place of the tame and almost apologetic
language which we now read in Thucydides! Athens extinguished the
autonomy of her subject-allies, and punished revolters with severity,
sometimes even with cruelty. But as to other points of wrong, the
silence of accusers, such as those just noticed, counts as a powerful
exculpation.

  [341] Thucyd. i, 68-120.

  [342] Thucyd. iii, 9; iv, 59-85; vi, 76.

The case is altered when we come to the period succeeding the
battle of Ægospotami. Here indeed also, we find the Spartan empire
complained of (as the Athenian empire had been before), in contrast
with that state of autonomy to which each city laid claim, and which
Sparta had not merely promised to ensure, but set forth as her only
ground of war. Yet this is not the prominent grievance,—other topics
stand more emphatically forward. The decemvirs and the harmosts (some
of the latter being Helots), the standing instruments of Spartan
empire, are felt as more sorely painful than the empire itself;
as the language held by Brasidas at Akanthus admits them to be
beforehand. At the time when Athens was a subject-city under Sparta,
governed by the Lysandrian Thirty and by the Lacedæmonian harmost
in the acropolis,—the sense of indignity arising from the fact of
subjection was absorbed in the still more terrible suffering arising
from the enormities of those individual rulers whom the imperial
state had set up. Now Athens set up no local rulers,—no native
Ten or native Thirty,—no resident Athenian harmosts or garrisons.
This was of itself an unspeakable exemption, when compared with
the condition of cities subject, not only to the Spartan empire,
but also under that empire to native decemvirs like Kritias, and
Spartan harmosts like Aristarchus or Aristodemus. A city subject to
Athens had to bear definite burdens enforced by its own government,
which was liable in case of default or delinquency to be tried
before the popular Athenian Dikastery. But this same dikastery (as
I have shown in a former volume, and as is distinctly stated by
Thucydides)[343] was the harbor of refuge to each subject-city; not
less against individual Athenian wrong-doers than against misconduct
from other cities. Those who complained of the hardship suffered by
a subject-city, from the obligation of bringing causes to be tried
in the dikastery of Athens,—even if we take the case as they state
it, and overlook the unfairness of omitting those numerous instances
wherein the city was thus enabled to avert or redress wrong done to
its own citizens,—would have complained both more loudly and with
greater justice of an ever-present Athenian harmost; especially
if there were coexistent a native government of Ten oligarchs,
exchanging with him guilty connivances, like the partnership of the
Thirty at Athens with the Lacedæmonian harmost Kallibius.[344]

  [343] See the remarkable speech of Phrynichus in Thucyd. viii,
  48, 5, which I have before referred to.

  [344] Xen. Hellen. ii, 3, 14. Compare the analogous case of
  Thebes, after the Lacedæmonians had got possession of the Kadmeia
  (v. 2, 34-36).

In no one point can it be shown that the substitution of Spartan
empire in place of Athenian was a gain, either for the subject-cities
or for Greece generally; while in many points, it was a great and
serious aggravation of suffering. And this abuse of power is the
more deeply to be regretted, as Sparta enjoyed after the battle of
Ægospotami a precious opportunity,—such as Athens had never had,
and such as never again recurred,—of reorganizing the Grecian
world on wise principles, and with a view to Pan-hellenic stability
and harmony. It is not her greatest sin to have refused to grant
universal autonomy. She had indeed promised it; but we might pardon a
departure from specific performance, had she exchanged the boon for
one far greater, which it was within her reasonable power, at the
end of 405 B.C., to confer. That universal town autonomy, towards
which the Grecian instinct tended, though immeasurably better than
universal subjection, was yet accompanied by much internal discord,
and by the still more formidable evil of helplessness against any
efficient foreign enemy. To ensure to the Hellenic world external
safety as well as internal concord, it was not a new empire which
was wanted, but a new political combination on equitable and
comprehensive principles; divesting each town of a portion of its
autonomy, and creating a common authority, responsible to all, for
certain definite controlling purposes. If ever a tolerable federative
system would have been practicable in Greece, it was after the
battle of Ægospotami. The Athenian empire,—which, with all its
defects, I believe to have been much better for the subject-cities
than universal autonomy would have been,—had already removed many
difficulties, and shown that combined and systematic action of
the maritime Grecian world was no impossibility. Sparta might now
have substituted herself for Athens, not as heir to the imperial
power, but as president and executive agent of a new Confederacy of
Delos,—reviving the equal, comprehensive, and liberal principles, on
which that confederacy had first been organized.

It is true that sixty years before, the constituent members of the
original synod at Delos had shown themselves insensible to its value.
As soon as the pressing alarm from Persia had passed over, some had
discontinued sending deputies, others had disobeyed requisitions,
others again had bought off their obligations, and forfeited their
rights as autonomous and voting members, by pecuniary bargain
with Athens; who, being obliged by the duties of her presidency
to enforce obedience to the Synod against all reluctant members,
made successively many enemies, and was gradually converted, almost
without her own seeking, from President into Emperor, as the only
means of obviating the total dissolution of the Confederacy. But
though such untoward circumstances had happened before, it does not
follow that they would now have happened again, assuming the same
experiment to have been retried by Sparta, with manifest sincerity
of purpose and tolerable wisdom. The Grecian world, especially the
maritime portion of it, had passed through trials not less painful
than instructive, during this important interval. Nor does it seem
rash to suppose, that the bulk of its members might now have been
disposed to perform steady confederate duties, at the call and under
the presidency of Sparta, had she really attempted to reorganize a
liberal confederacy, treating every city as autonomous and equal,
except in so far as each was bound to obey the resolutions of the
general synod. However impracticable such a scheme may appear,
we must recollect that even Utopian schemes have their transient
moments, if not of certain success, at least of commencement
not merely possible but promising. And my belief is, that had
Kallikratidas, with his ardent Pan-hellenic sentiment and force of
resolution, been the final victor over imperial Athens, he would
not have let the moment of pride and omnipotence pass over without
essaying some noble project like that sketched above. It is to be
remembered that Athens had never had the power of organizing any
such generous Pan-hellenic combination. She had become depopularized
in the legitimate execution of her trust, as president of the
Confederacy of Delos, against refractory members;[345] and had been
obliged to choose between breaking up the Confederacy, and keeping
it together under the strong compression of an imperial chief. But
Sparta had not yet become depopularized. She now stood without
competitor as leader of the Grecian world, and might at that moment
have reasonably hoped to carry the members of it along with her to
any liberal and Pan-hellenic organization, had she attempted it with
proper earnestness. Unfortunately she took the opposite course, under
the influence of Lysander; founding a new empire far more oppressive
and odious than that of Athens, with few of the advantages, and none
of the excuses, attached to the latter. As she soon became even
more unpopular than Athens, her moment of high tide, for beneficent
Pan-hellenic combination, passed away also,—never to return.

  [345] Such is the justification offered by the Athenian envoy
  at Sparta, immediately before the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. i,
  75, 76). And it is borne out in the main by the narrative of
  Thucydides himself (i, 99).

Having thus brought all the maritime Greeks under her empire, with
a tribute of more than one thousand talents imposed upon them,—and
continuing to be chief of her landed alliance in Central Greece,
which now included Athens as a simple unit,—Sparta was the
all-pervading imperial power in Greece.[346] Her new empire was
organized by the victorious Lysander; but with so much arrogance, and
so much personal ambition to govern all Greece by means of nominees
of his own, decemvirs and harmosts,—that he raised numerous rivals
and enemies, as well at Sparta itself as elsewhere. The jealousy
entertained by king Pausanias, the offended feelings of Thebes and
Corinth, and the manner in which these new phenomena brought about
(in spite of the opposition of Lysander) the admission of Athens as
a revived democracy into the Lacedæmonian confederacy,—has been
already related.

  [346] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 3. πάσης τὴς Ἑλλάδος προστάται, etc.

In the early months of 403 B.C., Lysander was partly at home, partly
in Attica, exerting himself to sustain the falling oligarchy of
Athens against the increasing force of Thrasybulus and the Athenian
exiles in Peiræus. In this purpose he was directly thwarted by
the opposing views of king Pausanias, and three out of the five
ephors.[347] But though the ephors thus checked Lysander in regard
to Athens, they softened the humiliation by sending him abroad to
a fresh command on the Asiatic coast and the Hellespont; a step
which had the farther advantage of putting asunder two such marked
rivals as he and Pausanias had now become. That which Lysander had
tried in vain to do at Athens, he was doubtless better able to do
in Asia, where he had neither Pausanias nor the ephors along with
him. He could lend effective aid to the dekarchies and harmosts in
the Asiatic cities, against any internal opposition with which they
might be threatened. Bitter were the complaints which reached Sparta,
both against him and against his ruling partisans. At length the
ephors were prevailed upon to disavow the dekarchies; and to proclaim
that they would not hinder the cities from resuming their former
governments at pleasure.[348]

  [347] Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 28-30.

  [348] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 2.

But all the crying oppressions set forth in the complaints of the
maritime cities would have been insufficient to procure the recall
of Lysander from his command in the Hellespont, had not Pharnabazus
joined his remonstrances to the rest. These last representations so
strengthened the enemies of Lysander at Sparta, that a peremptory
order was sent to recall him. Constrained to obey, he came back to
Sparta; but the comparative disgrace, and the loss of that boundless
power which he had enjoyed on his command was so insupportable
to him, that he obtained permission to go on a pilgrimage to the
temple of Zeus Ammon in Libya, under the plea that he had a vow
to discharge.[349] He appears also to have visited the temples
of Delphi and Dodona,[350] with secret ambitious projects which
will be mentioned presently. This politic withdrawal softened the
jealousy against him, so that we shall find him, after a year or
two, reëstablished in great influence and ascendency. He was sent as
Spartan envoy, at what precise moment we do not know, to Syracuse,
where he lent countenance and aid to the recently established
despotism of Dionysius.[351]

  [349] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 19, 20, 21.

  The facts, which Plutarch states respecting Lysander, cannot be
  reconciled with the chronology which he adopts. He represents
  the recall of Lysander at the instance of Pharnabazus, with all
  the facts which preceded it, as having occurred prior to the
  reconstitution of the Athenian democracy, which event we know to
  have taken place in the summer of 403 B.C.

  Lysander captured Samos in the latter half of 404 B.C., after the
  surrender of Athens. After the capture of Samos, he came home in
  triumph, in the autumn of 404 B.C. (Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9). He
  was at home, or serving in Attica, in the beginning of 403 B.C.
  (Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 30).

  Now when Lysander came home at the end of 404 B.C., it was his
  triumphant return; it was not a recall provoked by complaints of
  Pharnabazus. Yet there can have been no other return before the
  restoration of the democracy at Athens.

  The recall of Lysander must have been the termination, not of
  this command, but of a subsequent command. Moreover, it seems
  to me necessary, in order to make room for the facts stated
  respecting Lysander as well as about the dekarchies, that we
  should suppose him to have been again sent out (after his quarrel
  with Pausanias in Attica) in 403 B.C., to command in Asia. This
  is nowhere positively stated, but I find nothing to contradict
  it, and I see no other way of making room for the facts stated
  about Lysander.

  It is to be noted that Diodorus has a decided error in chronology
  as to the date of the restoration of the Athenian democracy. He
  places it in 401 B.C. (Diod. xiv, 33), two years later than its
  real date, which is 403 B.C.; thus lengthening by two years the
  interval between the surrender of Athens and the reëstablishment
  of the democracy. Plutarch also seems to have conceived that
  interval as much longer than it really was.

  [350] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 25.

  [351] Plutarch, Lysander, c. 2.

The position of the Asiatic Greeks, along the coast of Ionia, Æolis,
and the Hellespont, became very peculiar after the triumph of Sparta
at Ægospotami. I have already recounted how, immediately after the
great Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, the Persian king had
renewed his grasp upon those cities, from which the vigorous hand of
Athens had kept him excluded for more than fifty years; how Sparta,
bidding for his aid, had consented by three formal conventions to
surrender them to him, while her commissioner Lichas even reproved
the Milesians for their aversion to this bargain; how Athens also,
in the days of her weakness, competing for the same advantage, had
expressed her willingness to pay the same price for it.[352] After
the battle of Ægospotami, this convention was carried into effect;
though seemingly not without disputes between the satrap Pharnabazus
on one side, and Lysander and Derkyllidas on the other.[353] The
latter was Lacedæmonian harmost at Abydos, which town, so important
as a station on the Hellespont, the Lacedæmonians seem still to have
retained. But Pharnabazus and his subordinates acquired more complete
command of the Hellespontine Æolis and of the Troad, than ever they
had enjoyed before, both along the coast and in the interior.[354]

  [352] Thucyd. viii, 5, 18-37, 56-58, 84.

  [353] Plutarch, Lysander, c. 19, 20; Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 9.

  [354] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 13.

Another element, however, soon became operative. The condition of
the Greek cities on the coast of Ionia, though according to Persian
regulations they belonged to the satrapy of Tissaphernes, was now
materially determined,—first, by the competing claims of Cyrus, who
wished to take them away from him, and tried to get such transfer
ordered at court,—next, by the aspirations of that young prince to
the Persian throne. As Cyrus rested his hope of success on Grecian
coöperation, it was highly important to him to render himself
popular among the Greeks, especially on his own side of the Ægean.
Partly his own manifestations of just and conciliatory temper,
partly the bad name and known perfidy of Tissaphernes, induced the
Grecian cities with one accord to revolt from the latter. All threw
themselves into the arms of Cyrus, except Miletus, where Tissaphernes
interposed in time, slew the leaders of the intended revolt, and
banished many of their partisans. Cyrus, receiving the exiles with
distinguished favor, levied an army to besiege Miletus and procure
their restoration; while he at the same time threw strong Grecian
garrisons into the other cities to protect them against attack.[355]

  [355] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 8.

This local quarrel was, however, soon merged in the more
comprehensive dispute respecting the Persian succession. Both parties
were found on the field of Kunaxa; Cyrus with the Greek soldiers
and Milesian exiles on one side,—Tissaphernes on the other. How
that attempt, upon which so much hinged in the future history both
of Asia Minor and of Greece, terminated, I have already recounted.
Probably the impression brought back by the Lacedæmonian fleet which
left Cyrus on the coast of Syria, after he had surmounted the most
difficult country without any resistance, was highly favorable to
his success. So much the more painful would be the disappointment
among the Ionian Greeks when the news of his death was afterwards
brought; so much the greater their alarm, when Tissaphernes, having
relinquished the pursuit of the Ten Thousand Greeks at the moment
when they entered the mountains of Karduchia, came down as victor to
the seaboard; more powerful than ever,—rewarded[356] by the Great
King, for the services which he had rendered against Cyrus, with
all the territory which had been governed by the latter, as well
as with the title of commander-in-chief over all the neighboring
satraps,—and prepared not only to reconquer, but to punish, the
revolted maritime cities. He began by attacking Kymê;[357] ravaging
the territory, with great loss to the citizens, and exacting from
them a still larger contribution, when the approach of winter
rendered it inconvenient to besiege their city.

  [356] Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 19; ii, 4, 8; Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 3;
  iii, 3, 13.

  [357] Diodor. xiv, 35.

In such a state of apprehension, these cities sent to Sparta, as the
great imperial power of Greece, to entreat her protection against
the aggravated slavery impending over them.[358] The Lacedæmonians
had nothing farther to expect from the king of Persia, with whom
they had already broken the peace by lending aid to Cyrus. Moreover,
the fame of the Ten Thousand Greeks, who were now coming home along
the Euxine towards Byzantium, had become diffused throughout Greece,
inspiring signal contempt for Persian military efficiency, and hopes
of enrichment by war against the Asiatic satraps. Accordingly, the
Spartan ephors were induced to comply with the petition of their
Asiatic countrymen, and to send over to Asia Thimbron at the head
of a considerable force: two thousand Neodamodes (or Helots who had
been enfranchised) and four thousand Peloponnesians heavy-armed,
accompanied by three hundred Athenian horsemen, out of the number of
those who had been adherents of the Thirty, four years before; an
aid granted by Athens at the special request of Thimbron. Arriving
in Asia during the winter of 400-399 B.C., Thimbron was reinforced
in the spring of 399 B.C. by the Cyreian army, who were brought
across from Thrace as described in my last chapter, and taken into
Lacedæmonian pay. With this large force he became more than a
match for the satraps, even on the plains where they could employ
their numerous cavalry. The petty Grecian princes of Pergamus and
Teuthrania, holding that territory by ancient grants from Xerxes to
their ancestors, joined their troops to his, contributing much to
enrich Xenophon at the moment of his departure from the Cyreians.
Yet Thimbron achieved nothing worthy of so large an army. He not
only miscarried in the siege of Larissa, but was even unable to
maintain order among his own soldiers, who pillaged indiscriminately
both friends and foes.[359] Such loud complaints were transmitted to
Sparta of his irregularities and inefficiency, that the ephors first
sent him order to march into Karia, where Tissaphernes resided,—and
next, before that order was executed, despatched Derkyllidas to
supersede him; seemingly in the winter 399-398 B.C. Thimbron on
returning to Sparta was fined and banished.[360]

  [358] Diodor. _ut sup._

  [359] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 5-8; Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 8-16.

  [360] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 8; Diodor. xiv, 38.

It is highly probable that the Cyreian soldiers, though excellent in
the field, yet having been disappointed of reward for the prodigious
toils which they had gone through in their long march, and having
been kept on short allowance in Thrace, as well as cheated by
Seuthes,—were greedy, unscrupulous, and hard to be restrained, in
the matter of pillage; especially as Xenophon, their most influential
general, had now left them. Their conduct greatly improved under
Derkyllidas. And though such improvement was doubtless owing partly
to the superiority of the latter over Thimbron, yet it seems also
partly ascribable to the fact that Xenophon, after a few months of
residence at Athens, accompanied him to Asia, and resumed the command
of his old comrades.[361]

  [361] There is no positive testimony to this; yet such is my
  belief, as I have stated at the close of the last chapter. It
  is certain that Xenophon was serving under Agesilaus in Asia
  three years after this time; the only matter left for conjecture
  is, at what precise moment he went out the second time. The
  marked improvement in the Cyreian soldiers, is one reason for
  the statement in the text; another reason is, the great detail
  with which the military operations of Derkyllidas are described,
  rendering it probable that the narrative is from an eye-witness.

Derkyllidas was a man of so much resource and cunning, as to have
acquired the surname of Sisyphus.[362] He had served throughout all
the concluding years of the war, and had been harmost at Abydus
during the naval command of Lysander, who condemned him, on the
complaint of Pharnabazus, to the disgrace of public exposure with
his shield on his arm;[363] this was (I presume) a disgrace, because
an officer of rank always had his shield carried for him by an
attendant, except in the actual encounter of battle. Having never
forgiven Pharnabazus for thus dishonoring him, Derkyllidas now took
advantage of a misunderstanding between that satrap and Tissaphernes,
to make a truce with the latter, and conduct his army, eight thousand
strong, into the territory of the former.[364] The mountainous region
of Ida generally known as the Troad,—inhabited by a population
of Æolic Greeks (who had gradually Hellenized the indigenous
inhabitants), and therefore known as the Æolis of Pharnabazus,—was
laid open to him by a recent event, important in itself as well as
instructive to read.

  [362] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 8; Ephorus, ap. Athenæ. xi, p. 500.

  [363] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 9. ἐστάθη τὴν ἀσπίδα ἔχων.

  [364] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 10; iii, 2, 28.

The entire Persian empire was parcelled into so many satrapies;
each satrap being bound to send a fixed amount of annual tribute,
and to hold a certain amount of military force ready, for the court
at Susa. Provided he was punctual in fulfilling these obligations,
little inquiry was made as to his other proceedings, unless in the
rare case of his maltreating some individual Persian of high rank. In
like manner, it appears, each satrapy was divided into sub-satrapies
or districts; each of these held by a deputy, who paid to the
satrap a fixed tribute and maintained for him a certain military
force,—having liberty to govern in other respects as he pleased.
Besides the tribute, however, presents of undefined amount were of
constant occurrence, both from the satrap to the king, and from the
deputy to the satrap. Nevertheless, enough was extorted from the
people (we need hardly add), to leave an ample profit both to the one
and to the other.[365]

  [365] See the description of the satrapy of Cyrus (Xenoph. Anab.
  i, 9, 19, 21, 22). In the main, this division and subdivision of
  the entire empire into revenue-districts, each held by a nominee
  responsible for payment of the rent or tribute, to the government
  or to some higher officer of the government—is the system
  prevalent throughout a large portion of Asia to the present day.

This region, called Æolis, had been entrusted by Pharnabazus to a
native of Dardanus named Zênis, who, after holding the post for some
time and giving full satisfaction, died of illness, leaving a widow
with a son and daughter still minors. The satrap was on the point
of giving the district to another person, when Mania, the widow of
Zênis, herself a native of Dardanus, preferred her petition to be
allowed to succeed her husband. Visiting Pharnabazus with money
in hand, sufficient not only to satisfy himself, but also to gain
over his mistresses and his ministers,[366]—she said to him,—“My
husband was faithful to you, and paid his tribute so regularly as to
obtain your thanks. If I serve you no worse than he, why should you
name any other deputy? If I fail in giving you satisfaction, you can
always remove me, and give the place to another.” Pharnabazus granted
her petition, and had no cause to repent it. Mania was regular in
her payment of tribute,—frequent in bringing him presents,—and
splendid, beyond any of his other deputies, in her manner of
receiving him whenever he visited the district.

  [366] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 10. Ἀναζεύξασα τὸν στόλον, καὶ χρήματα
  λαβοῦσα, ὥστε καὶ αὐτῷ Φαρναβάζῳ δοῦναι, καὶ ταῖς παλλακίσιν
  αὐτοῦ χαρίσασθαι καὶ τοῖς δυναμένοις μάλιστα παρὰ Φαρναβάζῳ,
  ἐπορεύετο.

Her chief residence was at Skêpsis, Gergis, and Kebrên,—inland
towns, strong both by position and by fortification, amidst the
mountainous region once belonging to the Teukri Gergithes. It was
here too that she kept her treasures, which, partly left by her
husband, partly accumulated by herself, had gradually reached an
enormous sum. But her district also reached down to the coast,
comprising among other towns the classical name of Ilium, and
probably her own native city, the neighboring Dardanus. She
maintained, besides, a large military force of Grecian mercenaries
in regular pay and excellent condition, which she employed both
as garrison for each of her dependent towns, and as means for
conquest in the neighborhood. She had thus reduced the maritime
towns of Larissa, Hamaxitus, and Kolônæ, in the southern part of
the Troad; commanding her troops in person, sitting in her chariot
to witness the attack, and rewarding every one who distinguished
himself. Moreover, when Pharnabazus undertook an expedition against
the predatory Mysians or Pisidians, she accompanied him, and her
military force formed so much the best part of his army, that he
paid her the highest compliments, and sometimes condescended to ask
her advice.[367] So, when Xerxes invaded Greece, Artemisia, queen of
Halikarnassus, not only furnished ships among the best appointed in
his fleet, and fought bravely at Salamis, but also, when he chose to
call a council, stood alone, in daring to give him sound opinions
contrary to his own leanings; opinions which, fortunately for the
Grecian world, he could bring himself only to tolerate, not to
follow.[368]

  [367] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 15.

  [368] Herod. viii, 69.

Under an energetic woman like Mania, thus victorious and
well-provided, Æolis was the most defensible part of the satrapy of
Pharnabazus, and might probably have defied Derkyllidas, had not a
domestic traitor put an end to her life. Her son-in-law, Meidias,
a Greek of Skêpsis, with whom she lived on terms of intimate
confidence—“though she was scrupulously mistrustful of every one
else, as it is proper for a despot to be,”[369]—was so inflamed by
his own ambition and by the suggestions of evil counsellors, who
told him it was a shame that a woman should thus be ruler while
he was only a private man, that he strangled her in her chamber.
Following up his nefarious scheme, he also assassinated her son, a
beautiful youth of seventeen. He succeeded in getting possession of
the three strongest places in the district, Kebrên, Skêpsis, and
Gergis, together with the accumulated treasure of Mania; but the
commanders in the other towns refused obedience to his summons, until
they should receive orders from Pharnabazus. To that satrap Meidias
instantly sent envoys, bearing ample presents, with a petition that
the satrap would grant to him the district which had been enjoyed by
Mania. Pharnabazus, repudiating the presents, sent an indignant reply
to Meidias,—“Keep them until I come to seize them, and seize you,
too, along with them. I would not consent to live, if I were not to
avenge the death of Mania.”[370]

  [369] Such is the emphatic language of Xenophon (Hellen. iii, 1,
  14)—Μειδίας, θυγατρὸς ἀνὴρ αὐτῆς ὢν, ἀναπτερωθεὶς ὑπό τινων, ὡς
  αἰσχρὸν εἴη, γυναῖκα μὲν ἄρχειν, αὐτὸν δ᾽ ἰδιώτην εἶναι, ~τοὺς
  μὲν ἄλλους μάλα φυλαττομένης αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ ἐν τυραννίδι προσήκει~,
  ἐκείνῳ δὲ πιστευούσης καὶ ἀσπαζομένης, ὥσπερ ἂν γυνὴ γαμβρὸν
  ἀσπάζοιτο,—εἰσελθὼν ἀποπνῖξαι αὐτὴν λέγεται.

  For the illustration of this habitual insecurity in which the
  Grecian despot lived, see the dialogue of Xenophon called
  Hieron (i, 12; ii, 8-10; vii, 10). He particularly dwells upon
  the multitude of family crimes which stained the houses of the
  Grecian despots; murders by fathers, sons, brothers, wives, etc.
  (iii, 8).

  [370] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 13.

At that critical moment, prior to the coming of the satrap,
Derkyllidas presented himself with his army, and found Æolis
almost defenceless. The three recent conquests of Mania,—Larissa,
Hamaxitus, and Kolônæ, surrendered to him as soon as he appeared;
while the garrisons of Ilium and some other places, who had taken
special service under Mania, and found themselves worse off now
that they had lost her, accepted his invitation to renounce Persian
dependence, declare themselves allies of Sparta, and hold their
cities for him. He thus became master of most part of the district,
with the exception of Kebrên, Skêpsis, and Gergis, which he was
anxious to secure before the arrival of Pharnabazus. On arriving
before Kebrên, however, in spite of this necessity for haste, he
remained inactive for four days,[371] because the sacrifices were
unpropitious; while a rash, subordinate officer, hazarding an
unwarranted attack during this interval, was repulsed and wounded.
The sacrifices at length became favorable, and Derkyllidas was
rewarded for his patience. The garrison, affected by the example
of those at Ilium and the other towns, disobeyed their commander,
who tried to earn the satrap’s favor by holding out and assuring to
him this very strong place. Sending out heralds to proclaim that
they would go with Greeks and not with Persians, they admitted the
Lacedæmonians at once within the gates. Having thus fortunately
captured, and duly secured this important town, Derkyllidas marched
against Skêpsis and Gergis, the former of which was held by Meidias
himself; who, dreading the arrival of Pharnabazus, and mistrusting
the citizens within, thought it best to open negotiations with
Derkyllidas. He sent to solicit a conference, demanding hostages
for his safety. When he came forth from the town, and demanded from
the Lacedæmonian commander on what terms alliance would be granted
to him, the latter replied,—“On condition that the citizens shall
be left free and autonomous;” at the same time marching on, without
waiting either for acquiescence or refusal, straight up to the
gates of the town. Meidias, taken by surprise, in the power of the
assailants, and aware that the citizens were unfriendly to him, was
obliged to give orders that the gates should be opened; so that
Derkyllidas found himself by this manœuvre in possession of the
strongest place in the district without either loss or delay,—to the
great delight of the Skepsians themselves.[372]

  [371] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 18; Diodor. xiv, 38.

  The reader will remark here how Xenophon shapes the narrative
  in such a manner as to inculcate the pious duty in a general of
  obeying the warnings furnished by the sacrifice,—either for
  action or for inaction. I have already noticed (in my preceding
  chapters) how often he does this in the Anabasis.

  Such an inference is never (I believe) to be found suggested in
  Thucydides.

  [372] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 20-23.

Derkyllidas, having ascended the acropolis of Skêpsis to offer a
sacrifice of thanks to Athênê, the great patron goddess of Ilium
and most of the Teukrian towns,—caused the garrison of Meidias
to evacuate the town forthwith, and consigned it to the citizens
themselves, exhorting them to conduct their political affairs as
became Greeks and freemen. This proceeding, which reminds us of
Brasidas in contrast with Lysander, was not less politic than
generous; since Derkyllidas could hardly hope to hold an inland
town in the midst of the Persian satrapy except by the attachments
of the citizens themselves. He then marched away to Gergis, still
conducting along with him Meidias, who urgently entreated to be
allowed to retain that town, the last of his remaining fortresses.
Without giving any decided answer, Derkyllidas took him by his
side, and marched with him at the head of his army, arrayed only in
double file, so as to carry the appearance of peace, to the foot
of the lofty towers of Gergis. The garrison on the walls, seeing
Meidias along with him, allowed him to approach without discharging
a single missile. “Now, Meidias (said he), order the gates to be
opened, and show me the way in, to the temple of Athênê, in order
that I may there offer sacrifice.” Again Meidias was forced, from
fear of being at once seized as a prisoner, to give the order; and
the Lacedæmonian forces found themselves in possession of the town.
Derkyllidas, distributing his troops around the walls, in order to
make sure of his conquest, ascended to the acropolis to offer his
intended sacrifice; after which he proceeded to dictate the fate
of Meidias, whom he divested of his character of prince and of his
military force,—incorporating the latter in the Lacedæmonian army.
He then called upon Meidias to specify all his paternal property,
and restored to him the whole of what he claimed as such, though the
bystanders protested against the statement given in as a flagrant
exaggeration. But he laid hands on all the property, and all the
treasures of Mania,—and caused her house, which Meidias had taken
for himself, to be put under seal,—as lawful prey; since Mania had
belonged to Pharnabazus,[373] against whom the Lacedæmonians were
making war. On coming out after examining and verifying the contents
of the house, he said to his officers, “Now, my friends, we have here
already worked out pay for the whole army, eight thousand men, for
nearly a year. Whatever we acquire besides, shall come to you also.”
He well knew the favorable effect which this intelligence would
produce upon the temper, as well as upon the discipline, of the
army—especially upon the Cyreians, who had tasted the discomfort of
irregular pay and poverty.

  [373] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 26. Εἶπέ μοι, ἔφη, Μανία δὲ τίνος ἦν;
  Οἱ δὲ πάντες εἶπον, ὅτι Φαρναβάζου. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ἐκείνης, ἔφη,
  Φαρναβάζου; Μάλιστα, ἔφασαν. Ἡμέτερ᾽ ἂν εἴη, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ κρατοῦμεν·
  πολέμιος γὰρ ἡμῖν Φαρνάβαζος.

  Two points are remarkable here. 1. The manner in which Mania,
  the administratrix of a large district, with a prodigious
  treasure and a large army in pay, is treated as _belonging_ to
  Pharnabazus—as the servant or slave of Pharnabazus. 2. The
  distinction here taken between public property and private
  property, in reference to the laws of war and the rights of the
  conqueror. Derkyllidas lays claim to that which had belonged to
  Mania (or to Pharnabazus); but _not_ to that which had belonged
  to Meidias.

  According to the modern rules of international law, this
  distinction is one allowed and respected, everywhere except
  at sea. But in the ancient world, it by no means stood out so
  clearly or prominently; and the observance of it here deserves
  notice.

“And where am I to live?” asked Meidias, who found himself turned
out of the house of Mania. “In your rightful place of abode, to be
sure (replied Derkyllidas); in your native town Skêpsis, and in
your paternal house.[374]” What became of the assassin afterwards,
we do not hear. But it is satisfactory to find that he did not reap
the anticipated reward of his crime; the fruits of which were an
important advantage to Derkyllidas and his army,—and a still more
important blessing to the Greek cities which had been governed by
Mania,—enfranchisement and autonomy.

  [374] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 28.

  Thus finishes the interesting narrative about Mania, Meidias, and
  Derkyllidas. The abundance of detail, and the dramatic manner, in
  which Xenophon has worked it out, impress me with a belief that
  he was actually present at the scene.

This rapid, easy, and skilfully managed exploit,—the capture of nine
towns in eight days,—is all which Xenophon mentions as achieved
by Derkyllidas during the summer. Having acquired pay for so many
months, perhaps the soldiers may have been disposed to rest until
it was spent. But as winter approached, it became necessary to find
winter quarters, without incurring the reproach which had fallen upon
Thimbron of consuming the substance of allies. Fearing, however, that
if he changed his position, Pharnabazus would employ the numerous
Persian cavalry to harass the Grecian cities, he tendered a truce,
which the latter willingly accepted. For the occupation of Æolis by
the Lacedæmonian general was a sort of watch-post (like Dekeleia to
Athens,) exposing the whole of Phrygia near the Propontis (in which
was Daskylium the residence of Pharnabazus) to constant attack.[375]
Derkyllidas accordingly only marched through Phrygia, to take up his
winter quarters in Bithynia, the north-western corner of Asia Minor,
between the Propontis and the Euxine; the same territory through
which Xenophon and the Ten Thousand had marched, on their road from
Kalpê to Chalkêdon. He procured abundant provisions and booty,
slaves as well as cattle, by plundering the Bithynian villages; not
without occasional losses on his own side, by the carelessness of
marauding parties.[376]

  [375] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 1. νομίζων τὴν Αἰολίδα ἐπιτετειχίσθαι
  τῇ ἑαυτοῦ οἰκήσει Φρυγίᾳ.

  The word ἐπιτειχίζειν is capital and significant, in Grecian
  warfare.

  [376] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 2-5.

One of these losses was of considerable magnitude. Derkyllidas had
obtained from Seuthes in European Thrace (the same prince of whom
Xenophon had so much reason to complain) a reinforcement of three
hundred cavalry and two hundred peltasts,—Odrysian Thracians. These
Odrysians established themselves in a separate camp, nearly two miles
and a half from Derkyllidas, which they surrounded with a palisade
about man’s height. Being indefatigable plunderers, they prevailed
upon Derkyllidas to send them a guard of two hundred hoplites,
for the purpose of guarding their separate camp with the booty
accumulated within it. Presently the camp became richly stocked,
especially with Bithynian captives. The hostile Bithynians, however,
watching their opportunity when the Odrysians were out marauding,
suddenly attacked at daybreak the two hundred Grecian hoplites in
the camp. Shooting at them over the palisade with darts and arrows,
they killed and wounded some, while the Greeks with their spears
were utterly helpless, and could only reach their enemies by pulling
up the palisade and charging out upon them; but the light-armed
assailants, easily evading the charge of warriors with shield and
spear, turned round upon them when they began to retire, and slew
several before they could get back. In each successive sally the same
phenomena recurred, until at length all the Greeks were overpowered
and slain, except fifteen of them, who charged through the Bithynians
in the first sally, and marched onward to join Derkyllidas, instead
of returning with their comrades to the palisade. Derkyllidas lost no
time in sending a reinforcement, which, however, came too late, and
found only the naked bodies of the slain. The victorious Bithynians
carried away all their own captives.[377]

  [377] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 4.

At the beginning of spring the Spartan general returned to Lampsakus,
where he found Arakus and two other Spartans, just arrived out as
commissioners sent by the ephors. Arakus came with instructions to
prolong the command of Derkyllidas for another year; as well as to
communicate the satisfaction of the ephors with the Cyreian army,
in consequence of the great improvement in their conduct, compared
with the year of Thimbron. He accordingly assembled the soldiers,
and addressed them in a mingled strain of praise and admonition;
expressing his hope that they would continue the forbearance which
they had now begun to practise towards all Asiatic allies. The
commander of the Cyreians (probably Xenophon himself), in his reply,
availed himself of the occasion to pay a compliment to Derkyllidas.
“We (said he) are the same men now as we were in the previous year;
but we are under a different general; you need not look farther
for the explanation.[378]” Without denying the superiority of
Derkyllidas over his predecessor, we may remark that the abundant
wealth of Mania, thrown into his hands by accident (though he showed
great ability in turning the accident to account), was an auxiliary
circumstance, not less unexpected than weighty, for ensuring the good
behavior of the soldiers.

  [378] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 6, 7.

  Morus supposes (I think, with much probability) that ὁ τῶν
  Κυρείων προεστηκὼς here means Xenophon himself.

  _He_ could not with propriety advert to the fact that he himself
  had not been with the army during the year of Thimbron.

It was among the farther instructions of Arakus to visit all the
principal Asiatic Greeks, and report their condition at Sparta;
and Derkyllidas was pleased to see them entering on this survey
at a moment when they would find the cities in undisturbed peace
and tranquillity.[379] So long as the truce continued both with
Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, these cities were secure from
aggression, and paid no tribute; the land-force of Derkyllidas
affording to them a protection[380] analogous to that which had
been conferred by Athens and her powerful fleet, during the interval
between the formation of the Confederacy of Delos and the Athenian
catastrophe at Syracuse. At the same time, during the truce, the
army had neither occupation nor subsistence. To keep it together and
near at hand, yet without living at the cost of friends, was the
problem. It was accordingly with great satisfaction that Derkyllidas
noticed an intimation accidentally dropped by Arakus. Some envoys
(the latter said) were now at Sparta from the Thracian Chersonesus
(the long tongue of land bordering westward on the Hellespont),
soliciting aid against their marauding Thracian neighbors. That
fertile peninsula, first hellenized a century and a half before by
the Athenian Miltiades, had been a favorite resort for Athenian
citizens, many of whom had acquired property there during the naval
power of Athens. The battle of Ægospotami dispossessed and drove
home these proprietors, at the same time depriving the peninsula
of its protection against the Thracians. It now contained eleven
distinct cities, of which Sestos was the most important; and its
inhabitants combined to send envoys to Sparta, entreating the ephors
to send out a force for the purpose of building a wall across the
isthmus from Kardia to Paktyê; in recompense for which (they said)
there was fertile land enough open to as many settlers as chose to
come, with coast and harbors for export close at hand. Miltiades, on
first going out to the Chersonese, had secured it by constructing a
cross-wall on the same spot, which had since become neglected during
the period of Persian supremacy; Perikles had afterwards sent fresh
colonists, and caused the wall to be repaired. But it seems to have
been unnecessary while the Athenian empire was in full vigor,—since
the Thracian princes had been generally either conciliated, or kept
off, by Athens, even without any such bulwark.[381] Informed that
the request of the Chersonesites had been favorably listened to at
Sparta, Derkyllidas resolved to execute their project with his own
army. Having prolonged his truce with Pharnabazus, he crossed the
Hellespont into Europe, and employed his army during the whole summer
in constructing this cross-wall, about four and a quarter miles in
length. The work was distributed in portions to different sections of
the army, competition being excited by rewards for the most rapid and
workmanlike execution; while the Chersonesites were glad to provide
pay and subsistence for the army, during an operation which provided
security for all the eleven cities, and gave additional value to
their lands and harbors. Numerous settlers seem to have now come in,
under Lacedæmonian auspices,—who were again disturbed, wholly or
partially, when the Lacedæmonian maritime empire was broken up a few
years afterwards.[382]

  [379] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 9. ἔπεμψεν αὐτοὺς ἀπ᾽ ~Ἐφέσου~ διὰ
  τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων, ἡδόμενος ὅτι ἔμελλον ὄψεσθαι τὰς πόλεις ἐν
  εἰρήνῃ εὐδαιμονικῶς διαγούσας. I cannot but think that we ought
  here to read ἐπ᾽ Ἐφέσου, not ἀπ᾽ Ἐφέσου; or else ἀπὸ Λαμψάκου.

  It was at Lampsakus that this interview and conversation between
  Derkyllidas and the commissioners took place. The commissioners
  were to be sent from Lampsakus to Ephesus through the Grecian
  cities.

  The expression ἐν εἰρήνῃ εὐδαιμονικῶς διαγούσας has reference to
  the foreign relations of the cities, and to their exemption from
  annoyance by Persian arms,—without implying any internal freedom
  or good condition. There were Lacedæmonian harmosts in most of
  them, and dekarchies half broken up or modified in many; see the
  subsequent passages (iii, 2, 20; iii, 4, 7; iv, 8, 1)

  [380] Compare Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 5.

  [381] Herodot. vi, 36; Plutarch, Perikles, c. 19; Isokrates, Or.
  v, (Philipp.) s. 7.

  [382] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 10; iv, 8, 5. Diodor. xiv, 38.

On returning to Asia in the autumn, after the completion of this
work, which had kept his army usefully employed and amply provided
during six months, Derkyllidas undertook the siege of Artaneus, a
strong post (on the continental coast eastward of Mitylênê) occupied
by some Chian exiles, whom the Lacedæmonian admiral Kratesippidas
had lent corrupt aid in expelling from their native island a few
years before.[383] These men, living by predatory expeditions against
Chios and Ionia, were so well supplied with provisions that it cost
Derkyllidas a blockade of eight months before he could reduce it. He
placed in it a strong garrison well supplied, that it might serve him
as a retreat in case of need,—under an Achæan named Drako, whose
name remained long terrible from his ravages on the neighboring plain
of Mysia.[384]

  [383] Diodor. xiii, 65.

  [384] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 11; Isokrates, Or. iv. (Panegyr.) s.
  167.

Derkyllidas next proceeded to Ephesus, where orders presently reached
him from the ephors, directing him to march into Karia and attack
Tissaphernes. The temporary truce which had hitherto provisionally
kept off Persian soldiers and tribute-gatherers from the Asiatic
Greeks, was now renounced by mutual consent. These Greeks had sent
envoys to Sparta, assuring the ephors that Tissaphernes would be
constrained to renounce formally the sovereign rights of Persia,
and grant to them full autonomy, if his residence in Karia were
vigorously attacked. Accordingly Derkyllidas marched southward
across the Mæander into Karia, while the Lacedæmonian fleet under
Pharax coöperated along the shore. At the same time Tissaphernes,
on his side, had received reinforcements from Susa, together with
the appointment of generalissimo over all the Persian force in Asia
Minor; upon which Pharnabazus (who had gone up to court in the
interval to concert more vigorous means of prosecuting the war, but
had now returned)[385] joined him in Karia, prepared to commence
vigorous operations for the expulsion of Derkyllidas and his army.
Having properly garrisoned the strong places, the two satraps crossed
the Mæander at the head of a powerful Grecian and Karian force, with
numerous Persian cavalry, to attack the Ionian cities. As soon as
he heard this news, Derkyllidas came back with his army from Karia,
to cover the towns menaced. Having recrossed the Mæander, he was
marching with his army in disorder, not suspecting the enemy to be
near, when on a sudden he came upon their scouts, planted on some
sepulchral monuments in the road. He also sent some scouts up to
the neighboring monuments and towers, who apprised him that the two
satraps, with their joint force in good order, were planted here to
intercept him. He immediately gave orders for his hoplites to form
in battle array of eight deep, with the peltasts, and his handful
of horsemen, on each flank. But such was the alarm caused among his
troops by this surprise, that none could be relied upon except the
Cyreians and the Peloponnesians. Of the insular and Ionian hoplites,
from Priênê and other cities, some actually hid their arms in the
thick standing corn, and fled; others, who took their places in
the line, manifested dispositions which left little hope that they
would stand a charge; so that the Persians had the opportunity of
fighting a battle not merely with superiority of number, but also
with advantage of position and circumstances. Pharnabazus was anxious
to attack without delay. But Tissaphernes, who recollected well the
valor of the Cyreian troops, and concluded that all the remaining
Greeks were like them, forbade it; sending forward heralds to demand
a conference. As they approached, Derkyllidas, surrounding himself
with a body-guard of the finest and best-equipped soldiers,[386]
advanced to the front of the line to meet them; saying that he,
for his part, was prepared to fight,—but since a conference was
demanded, he had no objection to grant it, provided hostages were
exchanged. This having been assented to, and a place named for
conference on the ensuing day, both armies were simultaneously
withdrawn; the Persians to Tralles, the Greeks to Leukophrys,
celebrated for its temple of Artemis Leukophryne.[387]

  [385] Diodor. xiv, 39.

  [386] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 18.

  In the Anabasis (ii, 3, 3) Xenophon mentions the like care
  on the part of Klearchus, to have the best armed and most
  imposing soldiers around him, when he went to his interview with
  Tissaphernes.

  Xenophon gladly avails himself of the opportunity, to pay an
  indirect compliment to the Cyreian army.

  [387] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 19; Diodor. xiv, 39.

This backwardness on the part of Tissaphernes even at a time when he
was encouraged by a brother satrap braver than himself, occasioned
to the Persians the loss of a very promising moment, and rescued the
Grecian army out of a position of much peril. It helps to explain
to us the escape of the Cyreians, and the manner in which they were
allowed to cross rivers and pass over the most difficult ground
without any serious opposition; while at the same time it tended to
confirm in the Greek mind the same impressions of Persian imbecility
as that escape so forcibly suggested.

The conference, as might be expected, ended in nothing.
Derkyllidas required on behalf of the Asiatic Greeks complete
autonomy,—exemption from Persian interference and tribute; while the
two satraps on their side insisted that the Lacedæmonian army should
be withdrawn from Asia, and the Lacedæmonian harmosts from all the
Greco-Asiatic cities. An armistice was concluded, to allow time for
reference to the authorities at home; thus replacing matters in the
condition in which they had been at the beginning of the year.[388]

  [388] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 20.

Shortly after the conclusion of this truce, Agesilaus, king of
Sparta, arrived with a large force, and the war in all respects began
to assume larger proportions,—of which more in the next chapter.

But it was not in Asia alone that Sparta had been engaged in war. The
prostration of the Athenian power had removed that common bond of
hatred and alarm which attached the allies to her headship; while her
subsequent conduct had given positive offence, and had even excited
against herself the same fear of unmeasured imperial ambition which
had before run so powerfully against Athens. She had appropriated
to herself nearly the whole of the Athenian maritime empire, with
a tribute scarcely inferior, if at all inferior, in amount. How
far the total of one thousand talents was actually realised during
each successive year, we are not in a condition to say; but such
was the assessment imposed and the scheme laid down by Sparta for
her maritime dependencies,—enforced too by omnipresent instruments
of rapacity and oppression, decemvirs and harmosts, such as Athens
had never paralleled. When we add to this great maritime empire
the prodigious ascendency on land which Sparta had enjoyed before,
we shall find a total of material power far superior to that which
Athens had enjoyed, even in her day of greatest exaltation, prior to
the truce of 445 B.C.

This was not all. From the general dulness of character pervading
Spartan citizens, the full resources of the state were hardly ever
put forth. Her habitual short-comings at the moment of action are
keenly criticised by her own friends, in contrast with the ardor and
forwardness which animated her enemies. But at and after the battle
of Ægospotami, the entire management of Spartan foreign affairs
was found in the hands of Lysander; a man not only exempt from the
inertia usual in his countrymen, but of the most unwearied activity
and grasping ambition, as well for his country as for himself. Under
his direction the immense advantages which Sparta enjoyed from her
new position were at once systematized and turned to the fullest
account. Now there was enough in the new ascendency of Sparta, had
it been ever so modestly handled, to spread apprehension through the
Grecian world. But apprehension became redoubled, when it was seen
that her ascendency was organized and likely to be worked by her
most aggressive leader for the purposes of an insatiable ambition.
Fortunately for the Grecian world, indeed, the power of Sparta did
not long continue to be thus absolutely wielded by Lysander, whose
arrogance and overweening position raised enemies against him at
home. Yet the first impressions received by the allies respecting
Spartan empire, were derived from his proceedings and his plans
of dominion, manifested with ostentatious insolence; and such
impressions continued, even after the influence of Lysander himself
had been much abated by the counterworking rivalry of Pausanias and
others.

While Sparta separately had thus gained so much by the close of the
war, not one of her allies had received the smallest remuneration or
compensation, except such as might be considered to be involved in
the destruction of a formidable enemy. Even the pecuniary result
or residue which Lysander had brought home with him (four hundred
and seventy talents remaining out of the advances made by Cyrus),
together with the booty acquired at Dekeleia, was all detained by
the Lacedæmonians themselves. Thebes and Corinth indeed presented
demands, in which the other allies did not (probably durst not) join,
to be allowed to share. But though all the efforts and sufferings
of the war had fallen upon these allies no less than upon Sparta,
the demands were refused, and almost resented as insults.[389] Hence
there arose among the allies not merely a fear of the grasping
dominion, but a hatred of the monopolizing rapacity, of Sparta.
Of this new feeling, an early manifestation, alike glaring and
important, was made by the Thebans and Corinthians, when they refused
to join Pausanias in his march against Thrasybulus and the Athenian
exiles in Peiræus,[390]—less than a year after the surrender of
Athens, the enemy whom these two cities had hated with such extreme
bitterness down to the very moment of surrender. Even Arcadians and
Achæans too, habitually obedient as they were to Lacedæmon, keenly
felt the different way in which she treated them, as compared with
the previous years of war, when she had been forced to keep alive
their zeal against the common enemy.[391]

  [389] Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 5, 5; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 27; Justin,
  v, 10.

  [390] Xen. Hellen. ii, 4, 30.

  [391] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 12. Κορινθίους δὲ καὶ Ἄρκαδας καὶ
  Ἀχαίους τί φῶμεν; οἱ ἐν μὲν τῷ πρὸς ὑμᾶς (it is the Theban
  envoys who are addressing the public assembly at Athens) πολέμῳ
  ~μάλα λιπαρούμενοι ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων~ (the Lacedæmonians), πάντων καὶ
  πόνων καὶ κινδύνων καὶ δαπανημάτων μετεῖχον· ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἔπραξαν
  ἃ ἐβούλοντο οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ποίας ἢ ἀρχῆς ἢ τιμῆς ἢ ποίων
  χρημάτων μεταδεδώκασιν αὐτοῖς; ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν εἱλώτας ἁρμοστὰς
  καθιστάναι, τῶν δὲ ξυμμάχων ἐλευθέρων ὄντων, ἐπεὶ εὐτύχησαν,
  δεσπόται ἀναπεφῄνασιν.

The Lacedæmonians were however strong enough not merely to despise
this growing alienation of their allies, but even to take revenge
upon such of the Peloponnesians as had incurred their displeasure.
Among these stood conspicuous the Eleians; now under a government
called democratical, of which the leading man was Thrasydæus,—a
man who had lent considerable aid in 404 B.C. to Thrasybulus and
the Athenian exiles in Peiræus. The Eleians, in the year 420 B.C.,
had been engaged in a controversy with Sparta,—had employed their
privileges as administrators of the Olympic festival to exclude
her from attendance on that occasion,—and had subsequently been in
arms against her along with Argos and Mantineia. To these grounds of
quarrel, now of rather ancient date, had been added afterwards, a
refusal to furnish aid in the war against Athens since the resumption
of hostilities in 414 B.C., and a recent exclusion of king Agis,
who had come in person to offer sacrifice and consult the oracle
of Zeus Olympius; such exclusion being grounded on the fact that
he was about to pray for victory in the war then pending against
Athens, contrary to the ancient canon of the Olympic temple, which
admitted no sacrifice or consultation respecting hostilities of Greek
against Greek.[392] These were considered by Sparta as affronts;
and the season was now favorable for resenting them, as well as
for chastising and humbling Elis.[393] Accordingly Sparta sent an
embassy, requiring the Eleians to make good the unpaid arrears
of the quota assessed upon them for the cost of the war against
Athens; and farther,—to relinquish their authority over their
dependent townships or Periœki, leaving the latter autonomous.[394]
Of these dependencies there were several, no one very considerable
individually, in the region called Triphylia, south of the river
Alpheus, and north of the Neda. One of them was Lepreum, the autonomy
of which the Lacedæmonians had vindicated against Elis in 420 B.C.,
though during the subsequent period it had again become subject.

  [392] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 22.

  Τούτων δ᾽ ὕστερον, καὶ Ἄγιδος πεμφθέντος θῦσαι τῷ Διῒ κατὰ
  μαντείαν τινὰ, ἐκώλυον οἱ Ἠλεῖοι μὴ προσεύχεσθαι νίκην πολέμου,
  λέγοντες, ὡς καὶ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εἴη οὕτω νόμιμον, μὴ χρηστηριάζεσθαι
  τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐφ᾽ Ἑλλήνων πολέμῳ· ὥστε ἄθυτος ἀπῆλθεν.

  This canon seems not unnatural, for one of the greatest
  Pan-hellenic temples and establishments. Yet it was not
  constantly observed at Olympia (compare another example—Xen.
  Hellen. iv, 7, 2); nor yet at Delphi, which was not less
  Pan-hellenic than Olympia (see Thucyd. i, 118). We are therefore
  led to imagine that it was a canon which the Eleians invoked only
  when they were prompted by some special sentiment or aversion.

  [393] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 23. Ἐκ τούτων οὖν πάντων ὀργιζομένοις,
  ἔδοξε τοῖς ἐφόροις καὶ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ~σωφρονίσαι αὐτούς~.

  [394] Diodorus (xiv, 17) mentions this demand for the arrears;
  which appears very probable. It is not directly noticed by
  Xenophon, who however mentions (see the passage cited in the note
  of page preceding) the general assessment levied by Sparta upon
  all her Peloponnesian allies during the war.

The Eleians refused compliance with the demand thus sent, alleging
that their dependent cities were held by the right of conquest.
They even retorted upon the Lacedæmonians the charge of enslaving
Greeks;[395] upon which Agis marched with an army to invade their
territory, entering it from the north side where it joined Achaia.
Hardly had he crossed the frontier river Larissus and begun his
ravages, when an earthquake occurred. Such an event, usually
construed in Greece as a divine warning, acted on this occasion so
strongly on the religious susceptibilities of Agis, that he not only
withdrew from the Eleian territory, but disbanded his army. His
retreat gave so much additional courage to the Eleians, that they
sent envoys and tried to establish alliances among those cities which
they knew to be alienated from Sparta. Not even Thebes and Corinth,
however, could be induced to assist them; nor did they obtain any
other aid except one thousand men from Ætolia.

  [395] Diodor. xiv, 17.

  Diodorus introduces in these transactions King Pausanias, not
  King Agis, as the acting person.

  Pausanias states (iii, 8, 2) that the Eleians, in returning a
  negative answer to the requisition of Sparta, added that they
  would enfranchise their Periœki, when they saw Sparta enfranchise
  her own. This answer appears to me highly improbable, under the
  existing circumstances of Sparta and her relations to the other
  Grecian states. Allusion to the relations between Sparta and her
  Periœki was a novelty, even in 371 B.C., at the congress which
  preceded the battle of Leuktra.

In the next summer Agis undertook a second expedition, accompanied
on this occasion by all the allies of Sparta; even by the Athenians,
now enrolled upon the list. Thebes and Corinth alone stood aloof. On
this occasion he approached from the opposite or southern side, that
of the territory once called Messenia; passing through Aulon, and
crossing the river Neda. He marched through Triphylia to the river
Alpheius, which he crossed, and then proceeded to Olympia, where he
consummated the sacrifice from which the Eleians had before excluded
him. In his march he was joined by the inhabitants of Lepreum,
Makistus, and other dependent towns, which now threw off their
subjection to Elis. Thus reinforced, Agis proceeded onward towards
the city of Elis, through a productive country under flourishing
agriculture, enriched by the crowds and sacrifices at the neighboring
Olympic temple, and for a long period unassailed. After attacking,
not very vigorously, the half-fortified city,—and being repelled
by the Ætolian auxiliaries,—he marched onward to the harbor called
Kyllênê, still plundering the territory. So ample was the stock of
slaves, cattle, and rural wealth generally, that his troops not only
acquired riches for themselves by plunder, but were also joined by
many Arcadian and Achæan volunteers, who crowded in to partake of the
golden harvest.[396]

  [396] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 23, 26; Diodor. xiv, 17.

The opposition or wealthy oligarchical party in Elis availed
themselves of this juncture to take arms against the government;
hoping to get possession of the city, and to maintain themselves in
power by the aid of Sparta. Xenias their leader, a man of immense
wealth, with several of his adherents, rushed out armed, and assailed
the government-house, in which it appears that Thrasydæus and his
colleagues had been banqueting. They slew several persons, and among
them one, whom, from great personal resemblance, they mistook for
Thrasydæus. The latter was however at that moment intoxicated, and
asleep in a separate chamber.[397] They then assembled in arms in the
market-place, believing themselves to be masters of the city; while
the people, under the like impression that Thrasydæus was dead, were
too much dismayed to offer resistance. But presently it became known
that he was yet alive; the people crowded to the government-house
“like a swarm of bees,”[398] and arrayed themselves for his
protection as well as under his guidance. Leading them forth at once
to battle, he completely defeated the oligarchical insurgents, and
forced them to flee for protection to the Lacedæmonian army.

  [397] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 27; Pausanias, iii, 8, 2; v, 4, 5.

  The words of Xenophon are not very clear—Βουλόμενοι δὲ οἱ περὶ
  Ξενίαν τὸν λεγόμενον μεδίμνῳ ἀπομετρήσασθαι τὸ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς
  ἀργύριον (τὴν πόλιν) δι᾽ αὐτῶν προσχωρῆσαι Λακεδαιμονίοις,
  ἐκπεσόντες ἐξ οἰκίας ξίφη ἔχοντες σφαγὰς ποιοῦσι, καὶ ἄλλους τέ
  τινας κτείνουσι, καὶ ὅμοιόν τινα Θρασυδαίῳ ἀποκτείναντες, τῷ τοῦ
  δήμου προστάτῃ, ᾤοντο Θρασυδαῖον ἀπεκτονέναι.... Ὁ δὲ Θρασυδαῖος
  ἔτι καθεύδων ἐτύγχανεν, οὗπερ ἐμεθύσθη.

  Both the words and the narrative are here very obscure. It seems
  as if a sentence had dropped out, when we come suddenly upon the
  mention of the drunken state of Thrasydæus, without having before
  been told of any circumstance either leading to or implying this
  condition.

  [398] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 28.

Agis presently evacuated the Eleian territory, yet not without
planting a Lacedæmonian harmost and a garrison, together with Xenias
and the oligarchical exiles, at Epitalium, a little way south of
the river Alpheius. Occupying this fort (analogous to Dekeleia in
Attica), they spread ravage and ruin all around throughout the autumn
and winter, to such a degree, that in the early spring, Thrasydæus
and the Eleian government were compelled to send to Sparta and
solicit peace. They consented to raze the imperfect fortifications of
their city, so as to leave it quite open. They farther surrendered
their harbor of Kyllênê with their ships of war, and relinquished
all authority over the Triphylian townships, as well as over Lasion,
which was claimed as an Arcadian town.[399] Though they pressed
strenuously their claim to preserve the town of Epeium (between the
Arcadian town of Heræa and the Triphylian town of Makistus), on the
plea that they had bought it from its previous inhabitants at the
price of thirty talents paid down,—the Lacedæmonians, pronouncing
this to be a compulsory bargain imposed upon weaker parties by force,
refused to recognize it. The town was taken away from them, seemingly
without any reimbursement of the purchase money either in part or
in whole. On these terms the Eleians were admitted to peace, and
enrolled again among the members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy.[400]

  [399] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 30. There is something perplexing in
  Xenophon’s description of the Triphylian townships which the
  Eleians surrendered. First, he does not name Lepreum or Makistus,
  both of which nevertheless had joined Agis on his invasion,
  and were the most important places in Triphylia (iii, 2, 25).
  Next, he names Letrini, Amphidoli, and Marganeis, as Triphylian;
  which yet were on the north of the Alpheius, and are elsewhere
  distinguished from Triphylian. I incline to believe that the
  words in his text, καὶ τὰς Τριφυλίδας πόλεις ἀφεῖναι, must be
  taken to mean Lepreum and Makistus, perhaps with some other
  places which we do not know; but that a καὶ after ἀφεῖναι, has
  fallen out of the text, and that the cities, whose names follow,
  are to be taken as _not_ Triphylian. Phrixa and Epitalium were
  both south, but only just south, of the Alpheius; they were not
  on the borders of Triphylia,—and it seems doubtful whether they
  were properly Triphylian.

  [400] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 30; Diodor. xiv, 34; Pausan. iii, 8, 2.

  This war between Sparta and Elis reaches over three different
  years; it began in the first, occupied the whole of the second,
  and was finished in the third. Which years these three were (out
  of the seven which separate B.C. 403-396), critics have not been
  unanimous.

  Following the chronology of Diodorus, who places the beginning of
  the war in 402 B.C., I differ from Mr. Clinton, who places it in
  401 B.C. (Fasti Hellen. ad ann.), and from Sievers (Geschichte
  von Griechenland bis zur Schlacht von Mantinea, p. 382), who
  places it in 398 B.C.

  According to Mr. Clinton’s view, the principal year of the war
  would have been 400 B.C., the year of the Olympic festival.
  But surely, had such been the fact, the coincidence of war in
  the country with the Olympic festival, must have raised so many
  complications, and acted so powerfully on the sentiments of all
  parties, as to be specifically mentioned. In my judgment, the war
  was brought to a close in the early part of 400 B.C., before the
  time of the Olympic festival arrived. Probably the Eleians were
  anxious, on this very ground, to bring it to a close before the
  festival did arrive.

  Sievers, in his discussion of the point, admits that the date
  assigned by Diodorus to the Eleian war, squares both with the
  date which Diodorus gives for the death of Agis, and with
  that which Plutarch states about the duration of the reign of
  Agesilaus,—better than the chronology which he himself (Sievers)
  prefers. He founds his conclusion on Xenophon, Hell. iii, 2, 21.
  Τούτων δὲ πραττομένων ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ ὑπὸ Δερκυλλίδα, Λακεδαιμόνιοι
  κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον πάλαι ὀργιζόμενοι τοῖς Ἠλείοις, etc.

  This passage is certainly of some weight; yet I think in the
  present case it is not to be pressed with rigid accuracy as to
  date. The whole third Book down to these very words, has been
  occupied entirely with the course of Asiatic affairs. Not a
  single proceeding of the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus, since
  the amnesty at Athens, has yet been mentioned. The command
  of Derkyllidas included only the last portion of the Asiatic
  exploits, and Xenophon has here loosely referred to it as if it
  comprehended the whole. Sievers moreover compresses the whole
  Eleian war into one year and a fraction; an interval, shorter, I
  think, than that which is implied in the statements of Xenophon.

The time of the Olympic festival seems to have been now approaching,
and the Eleians were probably the more anxious to obtain peace
from Sparta, as they feared to be deprived of their privilege
as superintendents. The Pisatans,—inhabitants of the district
immediately around Olympia,—availed themselves of the Spartan
invasion of Elis to petition for restoration of their original
privilege, as administrators of the temple of Zeus at Olympia with
its great periodical solemnity,—by the dispossession of the Eleians
as usurpers of that privilege. But their request met with no success.
It was true indeed that such right had belonged to the Pisatans in
early days, before the Olympic festival had acquired its actual
Pan-hellenic importance and grandeur; and that the Eleians had only
appropriated it to themselves after conquering the territory of
Pisa. But taking the festival as it then stood, the Pisatans, mere
villagers without any considerable city, were incompetent to do
justice to it, and would have lowered its dignity in the eyes of all
Greece.

Accordingly the Lacedæmonians, on this ground, dismissed the
claimants, and left the superintendence of the Olympic games still in
the hands of the Eleians.[401]

  [401] Xen. Hellen. iii, 2, 31.

This triumphant dictation of terms to Elis, placed the Lacedæmonians
in a condition of overruling ascendency throughout Peloponnesus, such
as they had never attained before. To complete their victory, they
rooted out all the remnants of their ancient enemies the Messenians,
some of whom had been planted by the Athenians at Naupaktus, others
in the island of Kephallenia. All of this persecuted race were
now expelled, in the hour of Lacedæmonian omnipotence, from the
neighborhood of Peloponnesus, and forced to take shelter, some in
Sicily, others at Kyrênê.[402] We shall in a future chapter have to
commemorate the turn of fortune in their favor.

  [402] Diodor. xiv, 34; Pausan. iv, 26, 2. 2




CHAPTER LXXIII.

AGESILAUS KING OF SPARTA.—THE CORINTHIAN WAR.


The close of the Peloponnesian war, with the victorious organization
of the Lacedæmonian empire by Lysander, has already been described as
a period carrying with it increased sufferings to those towns which
had formerly belonged to the Athenian empire, as compared with what
they had endured under Athens,—and harder dependence, unaccompanied
by any species of advantage, even to those Peloponnesians and inland
cities which had always been dependent allies of Sparta. To complete
the melancholy picture of the Grecian world during these years, we
may add (what will be hereafter more fully detailed) that calamities
of a still more deplorable character overtook the Sicilian Greeks;
first, from the invasion of the Carthaginians, who sacked Himera,
Selinus, Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina,—next from the overruling
despotism of Dionysius at Syracuse.

Sparta alone had been the gainer; and that to a prodigious
extent, both in revenue and power. It is from this time, and from
the proceedings of Lysander, that various ancient authors dated
the commencement of her degeneracy, which they ascribe mainly
to her departure from the institutions of Lykurgus by admitting
gold and silver money. These metals had before been strictly
prohibited; no money being tolerated except heavy pieces of iron,
not portable except to a very trifling amount. That such was the
ancient institution of Sparta, under which any Spartan having in
his possession gold and silver money, was liable, if detected, to
punishment, appears certain. How far the regulation may have been in
practice evaded, we have no means of determining. Some of the ephors
strenuously opposed the admission of the large sum brought home by
Lysander as remnant of what he had received from Cyrus towards the
prosecution of the war. They contended that the admission of so much
gold and silver into the public treasury was a flagrant transgression
of the Lykurgean ordinances. But their resistance was unavailing and
the new acquisitions were received; though it still continued to be a
penal offence (and was even made a capital offence, if we may trust
Plutarch) for any individual to be found with gold and silver in his
possession.[403] To enforce such a prohibition, however, even if
practicable before, ceased to be practicable so soon as these metals
were recognized and tolerated in the possession, and for the purposes
of the government.

  [403] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 17. Compare Xen. Rep. Laced. vii, 6.

  Both Ephorus and Theopompus recounted the opposition to the
  introduction of gold and silver into Sparta, each mentioning the
  name of one of the ephors as taking the lead in it.

  There was a considerable body of ancient sentiment, and that too
  among high-minded and intelligent men, which regarded gold and
  silver as a cause of mischief and corruption, and of which the
  stanza of Horace (Od. iii, 3) is an echo:—

    Aurum irrepertum, et sic melius situm
    Cum terra celat, spernere fortior
      Quam cogere humanos in usus,
        Omne sacrum rapiente dextrâ.


There can be no doubt that the introduction of a large sum of coined
gold and silver into Sparta was in itself a striking and important
phenomenon, when viewed in conjunction with the peculiar customs and
discipline of the state. It was likely to raise strong antipathies in
the bosom of an old fashioned Spartan, and probably king Archidamus,
had he been alive, would have taken part with the opposing ephors.
But Plutarch and others have criticised it too much as a phenomenon
by itself; whereas, it was really one characteristic mark and
portion of a new assemblage of circumstances, into which Sparta had
been gradually arriving during the last years of the war, and which
were brought into the most effective action by the decisive success
at Ægospotami. The institutions of Lykurgus, though excluding all
Spartan citizens, by an unremitting drill and public mess, from trade
and industry, from ostentation, and from luxury,—did not by any
means extinguish in their bosoms the love of money;[404] while it had
a positive tendency to exaggerate, rather than to abate, the love
of power. The Spartan kings, Leotychides and Pleistoanax, had both
been guilty of receiving bribes; Tissaphernes had found means (during
the twentieth year of the Peloponnesian war) to corrupt not merely
the Spartan admiral Astyochus, but also nearly all the captains of
the Peloponnesian fleet, except the Syracusan Hermokrates; Gylippus,
as well as his father Kleandrides, had degraded himself by the like
fraud; and Anaxibius at Byzantium was not at all purer. Lysander,
enslaved only by his appetite for dominion, and himself a remarkable
instance of superiority to pecuniary corruption, was thus not the
first to engraft that vice on the minds of his countrymen. But though
he found it already diffused among them, he did much to impart
to it a still more decided predominance, by the immense increase
of opportunities, and enlarged booty for peculation, which his
newly-organized Spartan empire furnished. Not merely did he bring
home a large residue in gold and silver, but there was a much larger
annual tribute imposed by him on the dependent cities, combined
with numerous appointments of harmosts to govern these cities. Such
appointments presented abundant illicit profits, easy to acquire, and
even difficult to avoid, since the decemvirs in each city were eager
thus to purchase forbearance or connivance for their own misdeeds.
So many new sources of corruption were sufficient to operate most
unfavorably on the Spartan character, if not by implanting any fresh
vices, at least by stimulating all its inherent bad tendencies.

  [404] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 23.

  Ἀποβέβηκε δὲ τοὐνάντιον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τοῦ συμφέροντος· τὴν μὲν γὰρ
  πόλιν πεποίηκεν ἀχρήματον, τοὺς δ᾽ ἰδιώτας φιλοχρημάτους.

To understand the material change thus wrought in it, we have only
to contrast the speeches of king Archidamus and of the Corinthians,
made in 432 B.C. at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, with
the state of facts at the end of the war,—during the eleven years
between the victory of Ægospotami and the defeat of Knidus (405-394
B.C.). At the former of the two epochs, Sparta had no tributary
subjects, nor any funds in her treasury, while her citizens were
very reluctant to pay imposts.[405] About 334 B.C., thirty-seven
years after her defeat at Leuktra and her loss of Messenia, Aristotle
remarks the like fact, which had then again become true;[406] but
during the continuance of her empire between 405 and 394 B.C.,
she possessed a large public revenue, derived from the tribute of
the dependent cities. In 432 B.C., Sparta is not merely cautious
but backward; especially averse to any action at a distance from
home.[407] In 404 B.C., after the close of the war, she becomes
aggressive, intermeddling, and ready for dealing with enemies, or
making acquisitions remote as well as near.[408] In 432 B.C., her
unsocial and exclusive manners, against the rest of Greece, with
her constant expulsion of other Greeks from her own city, stand
prominent among her attributes;[409] while at the end of the war, her
foreign relations had acquired such great development as to become
the principal matter of attention for her leading citizens as well
as for her magistrates; so that the influx of strangers into Sparta,
and the efflux of Spartans into other parts of Greece became constant
and inevitable. Hence the strictness of the Lykurgean discipline gave
way on many points, and the principal Spartans especially struggled
by various shifts to evade its obligations. It was to these leading
men that the great prizes fell, enabling them to enrich themselves
at the expense either of foreign subjects or of the public treasury,
and tending more and more to aggravate that inequality of wealth
among the Spartans which Aristotle so emphatically notices in his
time;[410] since the smaller citizens had no similar opportunities
opened to them, nor any industry of their own, to guard their
properties against gradual subdivision and absorption, and to keep
them in a permanent state of ability to furnish that contribution
to the mess-table, for themselves and their sons, which formed the
groundwork of Spartan political franchise. Moreover, the spectacle
of such newly-opened lucrative prizes,—accessible only to that
particular section of influential Spartan families who gradually
became known apart from the rest under the title of the Equals
or Peers,—embittered the discontent of the energetic citizens
beneath that privileged position, in such a manner as to menace the
tranquillity of the state,—as will presently be seen. That sameness
of life, habits, attainments, aptitudes, enjoyments, fatigues, and
restraints, which the Lykurgean regulations had so long enforced,
and still continued to prescribe,—divesting wealth of its principal
advantages, and thus keeping up the sentiment of personal equality
among the poorer citizens,—became more and more eluded by the
richer, through the venality as well as the example of ephors and
senators;[411] while for those who had no means of corruption, it
continued unrelaxed, except in so far as many of them fell into a
still more degraded condition by the loss of their citizenship.

  [405] Thucyd. i, 80. ἀλλὰ πολλῷ ἔτι πλέον τούτου (χρημάτων)
  ἐλλείπομεν, καὶ οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ ἔχομεν, οὔτε ἑτοίμως ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων
  φέρομεν.

  [406] Aristotel. Polit. ii, 6, 23. Φαύλως δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰ
  κοινὰ κρήματα τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ τῆς πόλεώς
  ἐστιν οὐδὲν, πολέμους μεγάλους ἀναγκαζομένους φέρειν· εἰσφέρουσί
  τε κακῶς, etc.

  Contrast what Plato says in his dialogue of Alkibiades, i, c.
  39, p. 122 E. about the great quantity of gold and silver then
  at Sparta. The dialogue must bear date at some period between
  400-371 B.C.

  [407] See the speeches of the Corinthian envoys and of King
  Archidamus at Sparta (Thucyd. i, 70-84; compare also viii, 24-96).

  [408] See the criticisms upon Sparta, about 395 B.C. and 372 B.C.
  (Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 5, 11-15; vi, 3, 8-11).

  [409] Thucyd. i, 77. Ἄμικτα γὰρ τά τε καθ᾽ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς νόμιμα
  τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχετε, etc. About the ξενηλασίαι of the Spartans—see
  the speech of Perikles in Thucyd. i, 138.

  [410] Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 10.

  [411] Aristot. Politic. ii, 6, 16-18; ii, 7, 3.

It is not merely Isokrates,[412] who attests the corruption wrought
in the character of the Spartans by the possession of that foreign
empire which followed the victory of Ægospotami,—but also their
earnest panegyrist Xenophon. After having warmly extolled the laws
of Lykurgus or the Spartan institutions, he is constrained to admit
that his eulogies, though merited by the past, have become lamentably
inapplicable to that present which he himself witnessed. “Formerly
(says he,[413]) the Lacedæmonians used to prefer their own society
and moderate way of life at home, to appointments as harmosts in
foreign towns, with all the flattery and all the corruption attending
them. Formerly, they were afraid to be seen with gold in their
possession; now, there are some who make even an ostentatious display
of it. Formerly, they enforced their (Xenêlasy or) expulsion of
strangers, and forbade foreign travel, in order that their citizens
might not be filled with relaxed habits of life from contact with
foreigners; but now, those who stand first in point of influence
among them, study above all things to be in perpetual employment as
harmosts abroad. There was a time when they took pains to be worthy
of headship; but now they strive much rather to get and keep the
command, than to be properly qualified for it. Accordingly, the
Greeks used in former days to come and solicit, that the Spartans
would act as their leaders against wrong-doers; but now they are
exhorting each other to concert measures for shutting out Sparta from
renewed empire. Nor can we wonder that the Spartans have fallen into
this discredit, when they have manifestly renounced obedience both to
the Delphian god, and to the institutions of Lykurgus!”

  [412] Isokrates, de Pace, s. 118-127.

  [413] Xen. de Republ. Laced. c. 14.

  Οἶδα γὰρ πρότερον μὲν Λακεδαιμονίους αἱρουμένους, οἴκοι τὰ
  μέτρια ἔχοντας ἀλλήλοις συνεῖναι μᾶλλον, ἢ ἁρμόζοντας ἐν ταῖς
  πόλεσι καὶ κολακευομένους διαφθείρεσθαι. Καὶ πρόσθεν μὲν οἶδα
  αὐτοὺς φοβουμένους, χρύσιον ἔχοντας φαίνεσθαι· νῦν δ᾽ ἔστιν οὓς
  καὶ καλλωπιζομένους ἐπὶ τῷ κεκτῆσθαι. Ἐπίσταμαι δὲ καὶ πρόσθεν
  τούτου ἕνεκα ξενηλασίας γιγνομένας, καὶ ἀποδημεῖν οὐκ ἐξόν, ὅπως
  μὴ ῥᾳδιουργίας οἱ πολῖται ἀπὸ τῶν ξένων ἐμπίμπλαιντο· νῦν δ᾽
  ἐπίσταμαι τοὺς δοκοῦντας πρώτους εἶναι ἐσπουδακότας ὡς μηδεπότε
  παύωνται ἁρμόζοντες ἐπὶ ξένης. Καὶ ἦν μὲν, ὅτε ἐπεμελοῦντο, ὅπως
  ἄξιοι εἶεν ἡγεῖσθαι· νῦν δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον πραγματεύονται, ὅπως
  ἄρξουσιν, ἢ ὅπως ἄξιοι τούτου ἔσονται. Τοιγαροῦν οἱ Ἕλληνες
  πρότερον μὲν ἰόντες εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐδέοντο αὐτῶν, ἡγεῖσθαι ἐπὶ
  τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἀδικεῖν· νῦν δὲ πολλοὶ παρακαλοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ~ἐπὶ
  τὸ διακωλύειν ἄρξαι πάλιν αὐτούς~. Οὐδὲν μέντοι δεῖ θαυμάζειν
  τούτων τῶν ἐπιψόγων αὐτοῖς γιγνομένων, ἐπειδὴ φανεροί εἰσιν οὔτε
  τῷ θεῷ πειθόμενοι οὔτε τοῖς Λυκούργου νόμοις.

  The expression, “taking measures to hinder the Lacedæmonians
  from again exercising empire,”—marks this treatise as probably
  composed some time between their naval defeat at Knidus, and
  their land-defeat at Leuktra. The former put an end to their
  maritime empire,—the latter excluded them from all possibility
  of recovering it; but during the interval between the two, such
  recovery was by no means impossible.

This criticism (written at some period between 394-371 B.C.) from
the strenuous eulogist of Sparta is highly instructive. We know from
other evidences how badly the Spartan empire worked for the subject
cities; we here learn how badly it worked for the character of the
Spartans themselves, and for those internal institutions which even
an enemy of Sparta, who detested her foreign policy, still felt
constrained to admire.[414] All the vices, here insisted upon by
Xenophon, arise from various incidents connected with her empire.
The moderate, home-keeping, old-fashioned, backward disposition,—of
which the Corinthians complain,[415] but for which king Archidamus
takes credit, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war,—is found
exchanged, at the close of the war, for a spirit of aggression
and conquest, for ambition public as well as private, and for
emancipation of the great men from the subduing[416] equality of the
discipline enacted by Lykurgus.

  [414] The Athenian envoy at Melos says,—Λακεδαιμόνιοι γὰρ πρὸς
  μὲν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἐπιχώρια νόμιμα, πλεῖστα ἀρετῇ χρῶνται·
  πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀλλους—ἐπιφανέστατα ὧν ἴσμεν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα καλὰ
  νομίζουσι, τὰ δὲ ξυμφέροντα δίκαια (Thucyd. v. 105). A judgment
  almost exactly the same, is pronounced by Polybius (vi, 48).

  [415] Thucyd. i, 69, 70, 71, 84. ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν τὰ
  ἐπιτηδεύματα—ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς μελλητὰς καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς
  ἐνδημοτάτους: also viii, 24.

  [416] Σπάρτην δαμασίμβροτον (Simonides ap. Plutarch. Agesilaum,
  c. 1).

Agis the son of Archidamus (426-399 B.C.), and Pausanias son of
Pleistoanax (408-394 B.C.), were the two kings of Sparta at the end
of the war. But Lysander, the admiral or commander of the fleet, was
for the time[417] greater than either of the two kings, who had the
right of commanding only the troops on land. I have already mentioned
how his overweening dictation and insolence offended not only
Pausanias, but also several of the ephors and leading men at Sparta,
as well as Pharnabazus the Persian satrap; thus indirectly bringing
about the emancipation of Athens from the Thirty, the partial
discouragement of the dekarchies throughout Greece, and the recall
of Lysander himself from his command. It was not without reluctance
that the conqueror of Athens submitted to descend again to a private
station. Amidst the crowd of flatterers who heaped incense on him
at the moment of his omnipotence, there were not wanting those who
suggested that he was much more worthy to reign than either Agis or
Pausanias; that the kings ought to be taken, not from the first-born
of the lineage of Eurysthenês and Proklês, but by selection out of
all the Herakleids, of whom Lysander himself was one;[418] and that
the person elected ought to be not merely a descendant of Hêraklês,
but a worthy parallel of Hêraklês himself, while pæans were sung to
the honor of Lysander at Samos,[419]—while Chœrilus and Antilochus
composed poems in his praise,—while Antimachus (a poet highly
esteemed by Plato) entered into a formal competition of recited epic
verses called _Lysandria_, and was surpassed by Nikêratus, there was
another warm admirer, a rhetor or sophist of Halikarnassus, named
Kleon,[420] who wrote a discourse proving that Lysander had well
earned the regal dignity,—that personal excellence ought to prevail
over legitimate descent, and that the crown ought to be laid open
to election from the most worthy among the Herakleids. Considering
that rhetoric was neither employed nor esteemed at Sparta, we cannot
reasonably believe that Lysander really ordered the composition
of this discourse as an instrument of execution for projects
preconceived by himself, in the same manner as an Athenian prosecutor
or defendant before the dikastery used to arm himself with a speech
from Lysias or Demosthenes. Kleon would make his court professionally
through such a prose composition, whether the project were first
recommended by himself, or currently discussed among a circle of
admirers; while Lysander would probably requite the compliment by a
reward not less munificent than that which he gave to the indifferent
poet Antilochus.[421] And the composition would be put into the
form of an harangue from the admiral to his countrymen, without any
definite purpose that it should be ever so delivered. Such hypothesis
of a speaker and an audience was frequent with the rhetors in their
writings, as we may see in Isokrates,—especially in his sixth
discourse, called Archidamus.

  [417] See an expression of Aristotle (Polit. ii, 6, 22) about
  the function of admiral among the Lacedæmonians,—ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς
  βασιλεῦσιν, οὖσι στρατηγοῖς ἀϊδίοις, ἡ ναυαρχία σχεδόν ἑτέρα
  βασιλεία καθέστηκε.

  This reflection,—which Aristotle intimates that he has borrowed
  from some one else, though without saying from whom,—must in
  all probability have been founded upon the case of Lysander;
  for never after Lysander, was there any Lacedæmonian admiral
  enjoying a power which could by possibility be termed exorbitant
  or dangerous. We know that during the later years of the
  Peloponnesian war, much censure was cast upon the Lacedæmonian
  practice of annually changing the admiral (Xen. Hellen. i, 6, 4).

  The Lacedæmonians seem to have been impressed with these
  criticisms, for in the year 395 B.C. (the year before the battle
  of Knidus) they conferred upon King Agesilaus, who was then
  commanding the land army in Asia Minor, the command of the fleet
  also—in order to secure unity of operations. This had never been
  done before (Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 28).

  [418] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 24. Perhaps he may have been simply
  a member of the tribe called Hylleis, who, probably, called
  themselves Herakleids. Some affirmed that Lysander wished to
  cause the kings to be elected out of all the Spartans, not simply
  out of the Herakleids. This is less probable.

  [419] Duris ap. Athenæum, xv, p. 696.

  [420] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 18; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 20.

  [421] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 17.

Either from his own ambition, or from the suggestions of others,
Lysander came now to conceive the idea of breaking the succession
of the two regal families, and opening for himself a door to reach
the crown. His projects have been characterized as revolutionary;
but there seems nothing in them which fairly merits the appellation,
in the sense which that word now bears, if we consider accurately
what the Spartan kings were in the year 400 B.C. In this view the
associations connected with the title of king, are to a modern
reader misleading. The Spartan kings were not kings at all, in any
modern sense of the term; not only they were not absolute, but they
were not even constitutional kings. They were not sovereigns, nor
was any Spartan their subject; every Spartan was the member of a
free Grecian community. The Spartan king did not govern; nor did he
reign, in the sense of having government carried on in his name and
by his delegates. The government of Sparta was carried on by the
ephors, with frequent consultation of the senate, and occasional,
though rare appeals, to the public assembly of citizens. The Spartan
king was not legally inviolable. He might be, and occasionally was,
arrested, tried, and punished for misbehavior in the discharge of
his functions. He was a self-acting person, a great officer of
state; enjoying certain definite privileges, and exercising certain
military and judicial functions, which passed as an _universitas_ by
hereditary transmission in his family; but subject to the control of
the ephors as to the way in which he performed these duties.[422]
Thus, for example, it was his privilege to command the army when
sent on foreign service; yet a law was made, requiring him to take
deputies along with him, as a council of war, without whom nothing
was to be done. The ephors recalled Agesilaus when they thought fit;
and they brought Pausanias to trial and punishment, for alleged
misconduct in his command.[423] The only way in which the Spartan
kings formed part of the sovereign power in the state, or shared in
the exercise of government properly so called, was that they had
votes _ex officio_ in the Senate, and could vote there by proxy
when they were not present. In ancient times, very imperfectly
known, the Spartan kings seem really to have been sovereigns; the
government having then been really carried on by them, or by their
orders. But in the year 400 B.C., Agis and Pausanias had become
nothing more than great and dignified hereditary officers of state,
still bearing the old title of their ancestors. To throw open these
hereditary functions to all the members of the Herakleid Gens, by
election from their number, might be a change better or worse; it
was a startling novelty (just as it would have been to propose, that
any of the various priesthoods, which were hereditary in particular
families, should be made elective), because of the extreme attachment
of the Spartans to old and sanctified customs; but it cannot
properly be styled revolutionary. The ephors, the senate, and the
public assembly, might have made such a change in full legal form,
without any appeal to violence; the kings might vote against it,
but they would have been outvoted. And if the change had been made,
the Spartan government would have remained, in form as well as in
principle, just what it was before; although the Eurystheneid and
Prokleid families would have lost their privileges. It is not meant
here to deny that the Spartan kings were men of great importance in
the state, especially when (like Agesilaus) they combined with their
official station a marked personal energy. But it is not the less
true, that the associations, connected with the title of _king_ in
the modern mind, do not properly apply to them.

  [422] Aristotle (Polit. v, 1, 5) represents justly the schemes
  of Lysander as going πρὸς τὸ μέρος τι κινῆσαι τῆς πολιτείας·
  οἷον ἀρχήν τινα καταστῆσαι ἢ ἀνελεῖν. The Spartan kingship is
  here regarded as ἀρχή τις—one office of state, among others.
  But Aristotle regards Lysander as having intended to destroy the
  kingship—καταλῦσαι τὴν βασιλείαν—which does not appear to have
  been the fact. The plan of Lysander was to retain the kingship,
  but to render it elective instead of hereditary. He wished to
  place the Spartan kingship substantially on the same footing, as
  that on which the office of the kings or suffetes of Carthage
  stood; who were not hereditary, nor confined to members of the
  same family or Gens, but chosen out of the principal families or
  Gentes. Aristotle, while comparing the βασιλεῖς at Sparta with
  those at Carthage, as being generally analogous, pronounces in
  favor of the Carthaginian election as better than the Spartan
  hereditary transmission. (Arist. Polit. ii, 8, 2.)

  [423] Thucyd. v, 63; Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 25; iv, 2, 1.

To carry his point at Sparta, Lysander was well aware that agencies
of an unusual character must be employed. Quitting Sparta soon after
his recall, he visited the oracles of Delphi, Dodona, and Zeus Ammon
in Libya,[424] in order to procure, by persuasion or corruption,
injunctions to the Spartans, countenancing his projects. So great was
the general effect of oracular injunctions on the Spartan mind, that
Kleomenes had thus obtained the deposition of king Demaratus, and the
exiled Pleistoanax, his own return;[425] bribery having been in both
cases the moving impulse. But Lysander was not equally fortunate.
None of these oracles could be induced, by any offers, to venture
upon so grave a sentence as that of repealing the established law of
succession to the Spartan throne. It is even said that the priests of
Ammon, not content with refusing his offers, came over to Sparta to
denounce his proceeding; upon which accusation Lysander was put on
his trial, but acquitted. The statement that he was thus tried and
acquitted, I think untrue. But his schemes so far miscarried,—and
he was compelled to resort to another stratagem, yet still appealing
to the religious susceptibilities of his countrymen. There had been
born some time before, in one of the cities of the Euxine, a youth
named Silenus, whose mother affirmed that he was the son of Apollo;
an assertion which found extensive credence, notwithstanding various
difficulties raised by the sceptics. While making at Sparta this new
birth of a son to the god, the partisans of Lysander also spread
abroad the news that there existed sacred manuscripts and inspired
records, of great antiquity, hidden and yet unread, in the custody
of the Delphian priests; not to be touched or consulted until some
genuine son of Apollo should come forward to claim them. With the
connivance of some among the priests, certain oracles were fabricated
agreeable to the views of Lysander. The plan was concerted that
Silenus should present himself at Delphi, tender the proofs of his
divine parentage, and then claim the inspection of these hidden
records; which the priests, after an apparently rigid scrutiny,
were prepared to grant. Silenus would then read them aloud in the
presence of all the spectators; and one would be found among them,
recommending to the Spartans to choose their kings out of all the
best citizens.[426]

  [424] Diodor. xiv, 13; Cicero, de Divinat. i, 43, 96; Cornel.
  Nepos, Lysand. c. 3.

  [425] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 25, from Ephorus. Compare Herodot. vi,
  66; Thucyd. v, 12.

  [426] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 26.

So nearly did this project approach to consummation, that Silenus
actually presented himself at Delphi, and put in his claim. But one
of the confederates either failed in his courage, or broke down,
at the critical moment; so that the hidden records still remained
hidden. Yet though Lysander was thus compelled to abandon his plan,
nothing was made public about it until after his death. It might
probably have succeeded, had he found temple-confederates of proper
courage and cunning,—when we consider the profound and habitual
deference of the Spartans to Delphi; upon the sanction of which
oracle the Lykurgean institutions themselves were mainly understood
to rest. And an occasion presently arose, on which the proposed
change might have been tried with unusual facility and pertinence;
though Lysander himself, having once miscarried, renounced his
enterprise, and employed his influence, which continued unabated,
in giving the sceptre to another instead of acquiring it for
himself,[427]—like Mucian in reference to the emperor Vespasian.

  [427] Tacit. Histor. i, 10. “Cui expeditius fuerit tradere
  imperium, quam obtinere.”

  The general fact of the conspiracy of Lysander to open for
  himself a way to the throne, appears to rest on very sufficient
  testimony,—that of Ephorus; to whom perhaps the words φασί τινες
  in Aristotle may allude, where he mentions this conspiracy as
  having been narrated (Polit. v, 1, 5). But Plutarch, as well as
  K. O. Müller (Hist. of Dorians, iv, 9, 5) and others, erroneously
  represent the intrigues with the oracle as being resorted to
  after Lysander returned from accompanying Agesilaus to Asia;
  which is certainly impossible, since Lysander accompanied
  Agesilaus out, in the spring of 396 B.C.—did not return to
  Greece until the spring of 395 B.C.—and was then employed,
  with an interval not greater than four or five months, on that
  expedition against Bœotia wherein he was slain.

  The tampering of Lysander with the oracle must undoubtedly have
  taken place prior to the death of Agis,—at some time between 403
  B.C. and 399 B.C. The humiliation which he received in 396 B.C.
  from Agesilaus might indeed have led him to revolve in his mind
  the renewal of his former plans; but he can have had no time to
  do anything towards them. Aristotle (Polit. v, 6, 2) alludes
  to the humiliation of Lysander by the kings as an example of
  incidents _tending_ to raise disturbance in an aristocratical
  government; but this humiliation, probably, alludes to the manner
  in which he was thwarted in Attica by Pausanias in 403 B.C.—which
  proceeding is ascribed by Plutarch to both kings, as well as to
  their jealousy of Lysander (see Plutarch, Lysand. c. 21)—not to
  the treatment of Lysander by Agesilaus in 396 B.C. The mission of
  Lysander to the despot Dionysius at Syracuse (Plutarch, Lysand.
  c. 2) must also have taken place prior to the death of Agis in
  399 B.C.; whether before or after the failure of the stratagem at
  Delphi, is uncertain; perhaps after it.

It was apparently about a year after the campaigns in Elis, that
king Agis, now an old man, was taken ill at Heræa in Arcadia, and
carried back to Sparta, where he shortly afterwards expired. His
wife Mimæa had given birth to a son named Leotychides, now a youth
about fifteen years of age.[428] But the legitimacy of this youth
had always been suspected by Agis, who had pronounced, when the
birth of the child was first made known to him, that it could not be
his. He had been frightened out of his wife’s bed by the shock of an
earthquake, which was construed as a warning from Poseidon, and was
held to be a prohibition of intercourse for a certain time; during
which interval Leotychides was born. This was one story; another was,
that the young prince was the son of Alkibiades, born during the
absence of Agis in his command at Dekeleia. On the other hand, it
was alleged that Agis, though originally doubtful of the legitimacy
of Leotychides, had afterwards retracted his suspicions, and fully
recognized him; especially, and with peculiar solemnity, during
his last illness.[429] As in the case of Demaratus about a century
earlier,[430]—advantage was taken of these doubts by Agesilaus, the
younger brother of Agis, powerfully seconded by Lysander, to exclude
Leotychides, and occupy the throne himself.

  [428] The age of Leotychides is approximately marked by the
  date of the presence of Alkibiades at Sparta 414-413 B.C. The
  mere rumor, true or false, that this young man was the son of
  Alkibiades, may be held sufficient as chronological evidence to
  certify his age.

  [429] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2; Pausanias, iii, 8, 4; Plutarch,
  Agesilaus, c. 3.

  [430] Herodot. v, 66.

Agesilaus was the son of king Archidamus, not by Lampito the mother
of Agis, but by a second wife named Eupolia. He was now at the
mature age of forty,[431] and having been brought up without any
prospect of becoming king,—at least until very recent times,—had
passed through the unmitigated rigor of Spartan drill and training.
He was distinguished for all Spartan virtues; exemplary obedience
to authority, in the performance of his trying exercises, military
as well as civil,—intense emulation, in trying to surpass every
competitor,—extraordinary courage, unremitting energy, as well as
facility in enduring hardship,—perfect simplicity and frugality
in all his personal habits,—extreme sensibility to the opinion of
his fellow-citizens. Towards his personal friends or adherents,
he was remarkable for fervor of attachment, even for unscrupulous
partisanship, with a readiness to use all his influence in screening
their injustices or short-comings; while he was comparatively
placable and generous in dealing with rivals at home, notwithstanding
his eagerness to be first in every sort of competition.[432] His
manners were cheerful and popular, and his physiognomy pleasing;
though in stature he was not only small but mean, and though he
labored under the additional defect of lameness on one leg,[433]
which accounts for his constant refusal to suffer his statue to be
taken.[434] He was indifferent to money, and exempt from excess of
selfish feeling, except in his passion for superiority and power.

  [431] I confess I do not understand how Xenophon can say, in
  his Agesilaus, i, 6, Ἀγησίλαος τοίνυν ἔτι μὲν νέος ὢν ἔτυχε
  τῆς βασιλείας. For he himself says (ii, 28), and it seems
  well established, that Agesilaus died at the age of above 80
  (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 40); and his death must have been about 360
  B.C.

  [432] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 2-5; Xenoph. Agesil. vii, 3;
  Plutarch, Apophth. Laconic. p. 212 D.

  [433] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2; Xenoph. Agesil. viii, 1.

  It appears that the mother of Agesilaus was a very small woman,
  and that Archidamus had incurred the censure of the ephors, on
  that especial ground, for marrying her.

  [434] Xenoph. Agesil. xi, 7; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2.

In spite of his rank as brother of Agis, Agesilaus had never yet
been tried in any military command, though he had probably served
in the army either at Dekeleia or in Asia. Much of his character,
therefore, lay as yet undisclosed. And his popularity may perhaps
have been the greater at the moment when the throne became vacant,
inasmuch as, having never been put in a position to excite jealousy,
he stood distinguished only for accomplishments, efforts, endurances,
and punctual obedience, wherein even the poorest citizens were his
competitors on equal terms. Nay, so complete was the self-constraint,
and the habit of smothering emotions, generated by a Spartan
training, that even the cunning Lysander himself did not at this time
know him. He and Agesilaus had been early and intimate friends,[435]
both having been placed as boys in the same herd or troop for the
purposes of discipline; a strong illustration of the equalizing
character of this discipline, since we know that Lysander was of
poor parents and condition.[436] He made the mistake of supposing
Agesilaus to be of a disposition particularly gentle and manageable;
and this was his main inducement for espousing the pretensions of the
latter to the throne, after the decease of Agis. Lysander reckoned,
if by his means Agesilaus became king, on a great increase of his own
influence, and especially on a renewed mission to Asia, if not as
ostensible general, at least as real chief under the tutelar headship
of the new king.

  [435] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 2.

  [436] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 2.

Accordingly, when the imposing solemnities which always marked the
funeral of a king of Sparta were terminated,[437] and the day arrived
for installation of a new king, Agesilaus, under the promptings of
Lysander, stood forward to contest the legitimacy and the title of
Leotychides, and to claim the sceptre for himself,—a true Herakleid,
brother of the late king Agis. In the debate, which probably took
place not merely before the ephors and the senate but before the
assembled citizens besides, Lysander warmly seconded his pretensions.
Of this debate unfortunately we are not permitted to know much.
We cannot doubt that the mature age and excellent reputation of
Agesilaus would count as a great recommendation, when set against
an untried youth; and this was probably the real point (since the
relationship of both was so near) upon which decision turned;[438]
for the legitimacy of Leotychides was positively asseverated by his
mother Timæa,[439] and we do not find that the question of paternity
was referred to the Delphian oracle, as in the case of Demaratus.

  [437] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 1.

  [438] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3;
  Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2; Xen. Agesil. 1, 5—κρίνασα ἡ πόλις
  ἀνεπικλητότερον εἶναι Ἀγησίλαον καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ, etc.

  [439] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 2. This statement contradicts the talk
  imputed to Timæa by Duris (Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Plutarch,
  Alkibiad. c. 23).

There was, however, one circumstance which stood much in the way
of Agesilaus,—his personal deformity. A lame king of Sparta had
never yet been known. And if we turn back more than a century
to the occurrence of a similar deformity in one of the Battiad
princes at Kyrênê,[440] we see the Kyrenians taking it so deeply to
heart, that they sent to ask advice from Delphi, and invited over
the Mantineian reformer Demônax. Over and above this sentiment of
repugnance, too, the gods had specially forewarned Sparta to beware
of “a lame reign.” Deiopeithes, a prophet and religious adviser of
high reputation, advocated the cause of Leotychides. He produced an
ancient oracle, telling Sparta, that “with all her pride she must
not suffer a lame reign to impair her stable footing;[441] for if
she did so, unexampled suffering and ruinous wars would long beset
her.” This prophecy had already been once invoked, about eighty years
earlier,[442] but with a very different interpretation. To Grecian
leaders, like Themistokles or Lysander, it was an accomplishment of
no small value to be able to elude inconvenient texts or intractable
religious feelings, by expository ingenuity. And Lysander here raised
his voice (as Themistokles had done on the momentous occasion before
the battle of Salamis),[443] to combat the professional expositors;
contending that by “a lame reign,” the god meant, not a bodily defect
in the king,—which might not even be congenital, but might arise
from some positive hurt,[444]—but the reign of any king who was not
a genuine descendant of Hêraklês.

  [440] Herodot. iv, 161. Διεδέξατο δὲ τὴν βασιληΐην τοῦ
  Ἀρκεσίλεω ὁ παῖς Βάττος, χωλός τε ἐὼν καὶ οὐκ ἀρτίπους. Οἱ δὲ
  Κυρηναῖοι ~πρὸς τὴν καταλαβοῦσαν συμφορὴν~ ἔπεμπον ἐς Δελφοὺς,
  ἐπειρησομένους ὅντινα τρόπον καταστησάμενοι κάλλιστα ἂν οἰκέοιεν.

  [441] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 22; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Pausanias,
  iii, 8, 5.

  [442] Diodor. xi, 50.

  [443] Herodot. vii, 143.

  [444] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 3. ὡς οὐκ οἴοιτο τὸν θεὸν τοῦτο
  κελεύειν φυλάξασθαι, ~μὴ προσπταίσας τις χωλεύσῃ~, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον,
  μὴ οὐκ ὢν τοῦ γένους βασιλεύσῃ.

  Congenital lameness would be regarded as a mark of divine
  displeasure, and therefore a disqualification from the throne,
  as in the case of Battus of Kyrênê above noticed. But the
  words χωλὴ βασίλεια were general enough to cover both the
  cases,—superinduced as well as congenital lameness. It is upon
  this that Lysander founds his inference—that the god did not
  mean to allude to bodily lameness at all.

The influence of Lysander,[445] combined doubtless with a
preponderance of sentiment already tending towards Agesilaus, caused
this effort of interpretative subtlety to be welcomed as convincing,
and led to the nomination of the lame candidate as king. There was,
however, a considerable minority, to whom this decision appeared a
sin against the gods and a mockery of the oracle. And though the
murmurs of such dissentients were kept down by the ability and
success of Agesilaus during the first years of his reign; yet when,
in his ten last years, calamity and humiliation were poured thickly
upon this proud city, the public sentiment came decidedly round to
their view. Many a pious Spartan then exclaimed, with feelings of
bitter repentance, that the divine word never failed to come true at
last,[446] and that Sparta was justly punished for having wilfully
shut her eyes to the distinct and merciful warning vouchsafed to her,
about the mischiefs of a “lame reign.”[447]

  [445] Pausanias, iii, 8, 5; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 3; Plutarch,
  Lysand. c. 22; Justin, vi, 2.

  [446]

    Ἴδ᾽ οἷον, ὦ παῖδες, προσέμιξεν ἄφαρ
    Τοὔπος τὸ θεοπρόπον ἡμῖν
    Τῆς παλαιφάτου προνοίας,
    Ὅ τ᾽ ἔλακεν, etc.

  This is a splendid chorus of the Trachiniæ of Sophokles (822)
  proclaiming their sentiments on the awful death of Hêraklês, in
  the tunic of Nessus, which has just been announced as about to
  happen.

  [447] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30; Plutarch, Compar. Agesil. and
  Pomp. c. 1. Ἀγησίλαος δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν ἔδοξε λαβεῖν, οὔτε τὰ
  πρὸς θεοὺς ἄμεμπτος, οὔτε τὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, κρίνας νοθείας
  Λεωτυχίδην, ὃν υἱὸν αὑτοῦ ἀπέδειξεν ὁ ἀδελφὸς γνήσιον, τὸν δὲ
  χρησμὸν κατειρωνευσάμενος τὸν περὶ τῆς χωλότητος. Again, ib. c.
  2. δι᾽ Ἀγησίλαον ἐπεσκότησε τῷ χρησμῷ Λύσανδρος.

Besides the crown, Agesilaus at the same time acquired the large
property left by the late king Agis; an acquisition which enabled
him to display his generosity by transferring half of it at once
to his maternal relatives,—for the most part poor persons.[448]
The popularity acquired by this step was still farther increased
by his manner of conducting himself towards the ephors and senate.
Between these magistrates and the kings, there was generally a bad
understanding. The kings, not having lost the tradition of the
plenary power once enjoyed by their ancestors, displayed as much
haughty reserve as they dared, towards an authority now become
essentially superior to their own. But Agesilaus,—not less from
his own preëstablished habits, than from anxiety to make up for the
defects of his title,—adopted a line of conduct studiously opposite.
He not only took pains to avoid collision with the ephors, but showed
marked deference both to their orders and to their persons. He rose
from his seat whenever they appeared; he conciliated both ephors and
senators by timely presents.[449] By such judicious proceeding, as
well as by his exact observance of the laws and customs,[450] he was
himself the greatest gainer. Combined with that ability and energy
in which he was never deficient, it ensured to him more real power
than had ever fallen to the lot of any king of Sparta; power not
merely over the military operations abroad which usually fell to
the kings,—but also over the policy of the state at home. On the
increase and maintenance of that real power, his chief thoughts were
concentrated; new dispositions generated by kingship, which had never
shown themselves in him before. Despising, like Lysander, both money,
luxury, and all the outward show of power,—he exhibited, as a king,
an ultra-Spartan simplicity, carried almost to affectation, in diet,
clothing, and general habits. But like Lysander also, he delighted
in the exercise of dominion through the medium of knots or factions
of devoted partisans, whom he rarely scrupled to uphold in all their
career of injustice and oppression. Though an amiable man, with
no disposition to tyranny, and still less to plunder, for his own
benefit,—Agesilaus thus made himself the willing instrument of both,
for the benefit of his various coadjutors and friends, whose power
and consequence he identified with his own.[451]

  [448] Xen. Agesil. iv, 5; Plutarch, Ages. c. 4.

  [449] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 4.

  [450] Xen. Agesil. vii, 2.

  [451] Isokrates, Orat. v, (Philipp.) s. 100; Plutarch, Agesilaus,
  c. 3, 13-23; Plutarch, Apophthegm. Laconica, p. 209 F—212 D.

  See the incident alluded to by Theopompus ap. Athenæum, xiii, p.
  609.

At the moment when Agesilaus became king, Sparta was at the maximum
of her power, holding nearly all the Grecian towns as subject allies,
with or without tribute. She was engaged in the task (as has already
been mentioned) of protecting the Asiatic Greeks against the Persian
satraps in their neighborhood. And the most interesting portion
of the life of Agesilaus consists in the earnestness with which
he espoused, and the vigor and ability with which he conducted,
this great Pan-hellenic duty. It will be seen that success in his
very promising career was intercepted[452] by his bad, factious
subservience to partisans, at home and abroad,—by his unmeasured
thirst for Spartan omnipotence,—and his indifference or aversion
to any generous scheme of combination with the cities dependent on
Sparta.

  [452] Isokrates (Orat. v, _ut sup._) makes a remark in substance
  the same.

His attention, however, was first called to a dangerous internal
conspiracy with which Sparta was threatened. The “lame reign” was
as yet less than twelve months old, when Agesilaus, being engaged
in sacrificing at one of the established state solemnities, was
apprised by the officiating prophet, that the victims exhibited
menacing symptoms, portending a conspiracy of the most formidable
character. A second sacrifice gave yet worse promise; and on the
third, the terrified prophet exclaimed, “Agesilaus, the revelation
before us imports that we are actually in the midst of our enemies.”
They still continued to sacrifice, but victims were now offered to
the averting and preserving gods, with prayers that these latter,
by tutelary interposition, would keep off the impending peril. At
length, after much repetition, and great difficulty, favorable
victims were obtained; the meaning of which was soon made clear. Five
days afterwards, an informer came before the ephors, communicating
the secret, that a dangerous conspiracy was preparing, organized by a
citizen named Kinadon.[453]

  [453] Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 3, 4.

The conspirator thus named was a Spartan citizen, but not one of
that select number called The Equals or The Peers. It has already
been mentioned that inequalities had been gradually growing up
among qualified citizens of Sparta, tending tacitly to set apart
a certain number of them under the name of The Peers, and all the
rest under the correlative name of The Inferiors. Besides this,
since the qualification of every family lasted only so long as the
citizen could furnish a given contribution for himself and his sons
to the public mess-table, and since industry of every kind was
inconsistent with the rigid personal drilling imposed upon all of
them,—the natural consequence was, that in each generation a certain
number of citizens became disfranchised and dropped off. But these
disfranchised men did not become Periœki or Helots. They were still
citizens, whose qualification, though in abeyance, might be at any
time renewed by the munificence of a rich man;[454] so that they too,
along with the lesser citizens, were known under the denomination of
The Inferiors. It was to this class that Kinadon belonged. He was
a young man of remarkable strength and courage, who had discharged
with honor his duties in the Lykurgean discipline,[455] and had
imbibed from it that sense of personal equality, and that contempt
of privilege, which its theory as well as its practice suggested.
Notwithstanding all exactness of duty performed, he found that the
constitution, as practically worked, excluded him from the honors and
distinctions of the state; reserving them for the select citizens
known under the name of Peers. And this exclusion had become more
marked and galling since the formation of the Spartan empire after
the victory of Ægospotami; whereby the number of lucrative posts
(harmosties and others) all monopolized by the Peers, had been so
much multiplied. Debarred from the great political prizes, Kinadon
was still employed by the ephors, in consequence of his high spirit
and military sufficiency, in that standing force which they kept
for maintaining order at home.[456] He had been the agent ordered
on several of those arbitrary seizures which they never scrupled to
employ towards persons whom they regarded as dangerous. But this
was no satisfaction to his mind; nay, probably, by bringing him
into close contact with the men in authority, it contributed to
lessen his respect for them. He desired “to be inferior to no man
in Sparta,”[457] and his conspiracy was undertaken to realize this
object by breaking up the constitution.

  [454] See Vol. II, Ch. vi, p. 359 of this History.

  [455] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 5. Οὗτος (Kinadon) δ᾽ ἦν νεανίσκος καὶ
  τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εὔρωστος, οὐ μέντοι τῶν ὁμοίων.

  The meaning of the term Οἱ ὅμοιοι fluctuates in Xenophon;
  it sometimes, as here, is used to signify the privileged
  Peers—again De Repub. Laced. xiii, 1; and Anab. iv, 6, 14.
  Sometimes again it is used agreeably to the Lykurgean theory;
  whereby every citizen, who rigorously discharged his duty in the
  public drill, belonged to the number (De Rep. Lac. x, 7).

  There was a variance between the theory and the practice.

  [456] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9. Ὑπηρετήκει δὲ καὶ ἄλλ᾽ ἤδη ὁ
  Κινάδων τοῖς Ἐφόροις τοιαῦτα. iii, 3, 7. Οἱ συντεταγμένοι ἡμῶν
  (Kinadon says) αὐτοὶ ὅπλα κεκτήμεθα.

  [457] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 11. μηδενὸς ἥττων εἶναι τῶν ἐν
  Λακεδαίμονι—was the declaration of Kinadon when seized and
  questioned by the ephors concerning his purposes. Substantially
  it coincides with Aristotle (Polit. v, 6, 2)—ἢ ὅταν ἀνδρώδης τις
  ὢν μὴ μετέχῃ τῶν τιμῶν, οἷον Κινάδων ὁ τὴν ἐπ᾽ Ἀγησιλάου συστήσας
  ἐπίθεσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας.

It has already been mentioned that amidst the general insecurity
which pervaded the political society of Laconia, the ephors
maintained a secret police and system of espionage which reached its
height of unscrupulous efficiency under the title of the Krypteia.
Such precautions were now more than ever requisite; for the changes
in the practical working of Spartan politics tended to multiply the
number of malcontents, and to throw the Inferiors as well as the
Periœki and the Neodamodes (manumitted Helots), into one common
antipathy with the Helots, against the exclusive partnership of the
Peers. Informers were thus sure of encouragement and reward, and the
man who now came to the ephors either was really an intimate friend
of Kinadon, or had professed himself such in order to elicit the
secret. “Kinadon (said he to the ephors) brought me to the extremity
of the market-place, and bade me count how many Spartans there were
therein. I reckoned up about forty, besides the king, the ephors and
the senators. Upon my asking him why he desired me to count them,
he replied,—Because these are the men, and the only men, whom you
have to look upon as enemies;[458] all others in the market-place,
more than four thousand in number, are friends and comrades. Kinadon
also pointed out to me the one or two Spartans whom we met in the
roads, or who were lords in the country districts, as our only
enemies; every one else around them being friendly to our purpose.”
“How many did he tell you were the accomplices actually privy to
the scheme?”—asked the ephors. “Only a few (was the reply); but
those thoroughly trustworthy; these confidants themselves, however,
said that all around them were accomplices,—Inferiors, Periœki,
Neodamodes, and Helots, all alike; for whenever any one among the
classes talked about a Spartan, he could not disguise his intense
antipathy,—he talked as if he could eat the Spartans raw.”[459]

  [458] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 5.

  [459] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 6. Αὐτοὶ μέντοι πᾶσιν ἔφασαν
  συνειδέναι καὶ εἵλωσι καὶ νεοδαμώδεσι, καὶ τοῖς ὑπομείοσι καὶ
  τοῖς περιοίκοις· ὅπου γὰρ ἐν τούτοις τις λόγος γένοιτο περὶ
  Σπαρτιατῶν, οὐδένα δύνασθαι κρύπτειν τὸ μὴ οὐχ ἡδέως ἂν ~καὶ ὠμῶν
  ἐσθίειν αὐτῶν~.

  The expression is Homeric—ὠμὸν βεβρώθοις Πρίαμον, etc. (Iliad.
  iv, 35). The Greeks did not think themselves obliged to restrain
  the full expression of vindictive feeling. The poet Theognis
  wishes, “that he may one day come to drink the blood of those who
  had ill-used him” (v. 349 Gaisf.).

“But how (continued the ephors) did Kinadon reckon upon getting
arms?” “His language was (replied the witness)—We of the standing
force have our own arms all ready; and here are plenty of knives,
swords, spits, hatchets, axes and scythes—on sale in this
market-place, to suit an insurgent multitude; besides, every man
who tills the earth, or cuts wood and stone, has tools by him which
will serve as weapons in case of need; especially in a struggle with
enemies themselves unarmed.” On being asked what was the moment fixed
for execution, the witness could not tell; he had been instructed
only to remain on the spot, and be ready.[460]

  [460] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 7. ὅτι ἐπιδημεῖν οἱ παρηγγελμένον εἴη.

It does not appear that this man knew the name of any person
concerned, except Kinadon himself. So deeply were the ephors alarmed,
that they refrained from any formal convocation even of what was
called the Lesser Assembly,—including the senate, of which the
kings were members _ex officio_, and, perhaps, a few other principal
persons besides. But the members of this assembly were privately
brought together to deliberate on the emergency; Agesilaus, probably,
among them. To arrest Kinadon at once in Sparta appeared imprudent;
since his accomplices, of number as yet unknown, would be thus
admonished either to break out in insurrection, or at least to make
their escape. But an elaborate stratagem was laid for arresting him
out of Sparta, without the knowledge of his accomplices. The ephors,
calling him before them, professed to confide to him (as they had
done occasionally before) a mission to go to Aulon (a Laconian town
on the frontier towards Arcadia and Triphylia) and there to seize
some parties designated by name in a formal skytalê or warrant;
including some of the Aulonite Periœki,—some Helots,—and one
other person by name, a woman of peculiar beauty, resident at the
place, whose influence was understood to spread disaffection among
all the Lacedæmonians who came thither, old as well as young.[461]
When Kinadon inquired what force he was to take with him on the
mission, the ephors, to obviate all suspicion that they were picking
out companions with views hostile to him, desired him to go to the
Hippagretês (or commander of the three hundred youthful guards called
horsemen, though they were not really mounted) and ask for the first
six or seven men of the guard[462] who might happen to be in the way.
But they (the ephors) had already held secret communication with the
Hippagretês, and had informed him both whom they wished to be sent,
and what the persons sent were to do. They then despatched Kinadon
on his pretended mission telling him that they should place at his
disposal three carts, in order that he might more easily bring home
the prisoners.

  [461] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 8. Ἀγαγεῖν δὲ ἐκέλευον καὶ τὴν
  γυναῖκα, ἣ καλλίστη μὲν ἐλέγετο αὐτόθι εἶναι, λυμαίνεσθαι
  δ᾽ ἐῴκει τοὺς ἀφικνουμένους Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ πρεσβυτέρους καὶ
  νεωτέρους.

  [462] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9, 10.

  The persons called Hippeis at Sparta, were not mounted; they were
  a select body of three hundred youthful citizens, employed either
  on home police or on foreign service.

  See Herodot. viii, 124; Strabo, x, p. 481; K. O. Müller, History
  of the Dorians, B. iii, ch. 12, s. 5, 6.

Kinadon began his journey to Aulon, without the smallest suspicion
of the plot laid for him by the ephors; who, to make their purpose
sure, sent an additional body of the guards after him, to quell any
resistance which might possibly arise. But their stratagem succeeded
as completely as they could desire. He was seized on the road, by
those who accompanied him ostensibly for his pretended mission.
These men interrogated him, put him to the torture,[463] and heard
from his lips the names of his accomplices; the list of whom they
wrote down, and forwarded by one of the guards to Sparta. The ephors,
on receiving it, immediately arrested the parties principally
concerned, especially the prophet Tisamenus; and examined them along
with Kinadon, as soon as he was brought prisoner. They asked the
latter, among other questions, what was his purpose in setting on
foot the conspiracy; to which he replied,—“I wanted to be inferior
to no man at Sparta.” His punishment was not long deferred. Having
been manacled with a clog round his neck to which his hands were
made fast,—he was in this condition conducted round the city, with
men scourging and pricking him during the progress. His accomplices
were treated in like manner, and at length all of them were put to
death.[464]

  [463] Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 9.

  Ἔμελλον δὲ οἱ συλλαβόντες αὐτὸν μὲν κατέχειν, τοὺς δὲ ξυνειδότας
  ~πυθόμενοι αὐτοῦ γράψαντες ἀποπέμπειν~ τὴν ταχίστην τοῖς ἐφόροις.
  Οὕτω δ᾽ εἶχον οἱ ἔφοροι πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥστε καὶ μορὰν ἱππέων
  ἔπεμψαν τοῖς ἐπ᾽ Αὐλῶνος. Ἐπεὶ δ᾽ εἰλημμένου τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἧκεν
  ἱππεὺς, ~φέρων τὰ ὀνόματα ὧν Κινάδων ἀπέγραψε~, παραχρῆμα τόν τε
  μάντιν Τισάμενον καὶ τοὺς ἐπικαιριωτάτους ξυνελάμβανον. Ὡς δ᾽
  ἀνήχθη ὁ Κινάδων, καὶ ἠλέγχετο, καὶ ὡμολόγει πάντα, καὶ ~τοὺς
  ξυνειδότας ἔλεγε~, τέλος αὐτὸν ἤροντο, τί καὶ βουλόμενος ταῦτα
  πράττοι;

  Polyænus (ii, 14, 1) in his account of this transaction,
  expressly mentions that the Hippeis or guards who accompanied
  Kinadon, put him to the torture (στρεβλώσαντες) when they seized
  him, in order to extort the names of his accomplices. Even
  without express testimony, we might pretty confidently have
  assumed this. From a man of spirit like Kinadon, they were not
  likely to obtain such betrayal without torture.

  I had affirmed that in the description of this transaction given
  by Xenophon, it did not appear whether Kinadon was able to write
  or not. My assertion was controverted by Colonel Mure (in his
  Reply to my Appendix), who cited the words φέρων τὰ ὀνόματα ὧν
  Κινάδων ~ἀπέγραψε~, as containing an affirmation from Xenophon
  that Kinadon could write.

  In my judgment, these words, taken in conjunction with what
  precedes, and with the probabilities of the fact described, do
  not contain such an affirmation.

  The guards were instructed to seize Kinadon, and after _having
  heard from Kinadon who his accomplices were, to write the names
  down and send them to the ephors_. It is to be presumed that they
  executed these instructions as given; the more so, as what they
  were commanded to do, was at once the safest and the most natural
  proceeding. For Kinadon was a man distinguished for personal
  _stature and courage_ (τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εὔρωστος, iii, 3,
  5) so that those who seized him would find it an indispensable
  precaution to pinion his arms. Assuming even that Kinadon could
  write,—yet, if he were to write, he must have his right arm
  free. And why should the guards take this risk, when all which
  the ephors required was, that Kinadon should _pronounce_ the
  names, to be written down by others? With a man of the qualities
  of Kinadon, it probably required the most intense pressure to
  force him to betray his comrades, even by word of mouth; it would
  probably be more difficult still, to force him to betray them by
  the more deliberate act of writing.

  I conceive that ἧκεν ἱππεὺς, φέρων τὰ ὀνόματα ὧν ὁ Κινάδων
  ἀπέγραψε is to be construed with reference to the preceding
  sentence, and announces the carrying into effect of the
  instructions then reported as given by the ephors. “A guard came,
  bearing the names of those whom Kinadon had given in.” It is not
  necessary to suppose that Kinadon had written down these names
  with his own hand.

  In the beginning of the Oration of Andokides (De Mysteriis),
  Pythonikus gives information of a mock celebration of the
  mysteries, committed by Alkibiades and others; citing as his
  witness the slave Andromachus; who is accordingly produced, and
  states to the assembly _vivâ voce_ what he had seen and who
  were the persons present—Πρῶτος μὲν οὗτος (Andromachus) ταῦτα
  εμήνυσε, καὶ ~ἀπέγραψε τούτους~ (s. 13). It is not here meant to
  affirm that the slave Andromachus wrote down the names of these
  persons, which he had the moment before publicly announced to the
  assembly. It is by the words ἀπέγραψε τούτους that the orator
  describes the public oral announcement made by Andromachus, which
  was formally taken note of by a secretary, and which led to legal
  consequences against the persons whose names were given in.

  So again, in the old law quoted by Demosthenes (adv. Makast. p.
  1068), Ἀπογραφέτω δὲ τὸν μὴ ποιοῦντα ταῦτα ὁ βουλόμενος πρὸς τὸν
  ἄρχοντα; and in Demosthenes adv. Nikostrat. p. 1247. Ἃ ἐκ τῶν
  νόμων τῷ ἰδιώτῃ τῷ ἀπογράφαντι γίγνεται, τῇ πόλει ἀφίημι: compare
  also Lysias, De Bonis Aristophanis, Or. xix, s. 53; it is not
  meant to affirm that ὁ ἀπογράφων was required to perform his
  process in writing, or was necessarily able to write. A citizen
  who could not write might do this, as well as one who could. He
  _informed against_ a certain person as delinquent; he _informed
  of_ certain articles of property, as belonging to the estate
  of one whose property had been confiscated to the city. The
  information, as well as the name of the informer, was taken down
  by the official person,—whether the informer could himself write
  or not.

  It appears to me that Kinadon, having been interrogated,
  _told_ to the guards who first seized him, the names of his
  accomplices,—just as he _told_ these names afterwards to the
  ephors (καὶ τοῦς ξυνειδότας ~ἔλεγε~); and this, whether he was,
  or was not, able to write; a point, which the passage of Xenophon
  noway determines.

  [464] Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 3, 11.

Such is the curious narrative, given by Xenophon, of this
unsuccessful conspiracy. He probably derived his information from
Agesilaus himself; since we cannot easily explain how he could have
otherwise learnt so much about the most secret manœuvres of the
ephors, in a government proverbial for constant secrecy, like that of
Sparta. The narrative opens to us a glimpse, though sadly transient
and imperfect, of the internal dangers of the Spartan government. We
were aware, from earlier evidences, of great discontent prevailing
among the Helots, and to a certain extent among the Periœki. But
the incident here described presents to us the first manifestation
of a body of malcontents among the Spartans themselves; malcontents
formidable both from energy and position, like Kinadon and the
prophet Tisamenus. Of the state of disaffected feeling in the
provincial townships of Laconia, an impressive proof is afforded by
the case of that beautiful woman who was alleged to be so active
in political proselytism at Aulon; not less than by the passionate
expressions of hatred revealed in the deposition of the informer
himself. Though little is known about the details, yet it seems that
the tendency of affairs at Sparta was to concentrate both power
and property in the hands of an oligarchy ever narrowing among the
citizens; thus aggravating the dangers at home, even at the time when
the power of the state was greatest abroad, and preparing the way for
that irreparable humiliation which began with the defeat of Leuktra.

It can hardly be doubted that much more wide-spread discontent came
to the knowledge of the ephors than that which is specially indicated
in Xenophon. And such discovery may probably have been one of the
motives (as had happened in 424 B.C. on occasion of the expedition
of Brasidas into Thrace) which helped to bring about the Asiatic
expedition of Agesilaus, as an outlet for brave malcontents on
distant and lucrative military service.

Derkyllidas had now been carrying on war in Asia Minor for near three
years, against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, with so much efficiency
and success, as both to protect the Asiatic Greeks on the coast, and
to intercept all the revenues which those satraps either transmitted
to court or enjoyed themselves. Pharnabazus had already gone up to
Susa (during his truce with Derkyllidas in 397 B.C.), and besides
obtaining a reinforcement which acted under himself and Tissaphernes
in 396 B.C. against Derkyllidas in Lydia, had laid schemes for
renewing the maritime war against Sparta.[465]

  [465] Diodor. xiv, 39; Xen. Hellen. iii, 3, 13.

It is now that we hear again mentioned the name of Konon, who, having
saved himself with nine triremes from the defeat of Ægospotami,
had remained for the last seven years under the protection of
Evagoras, prince of Salamis, in Cyprus. Konon, having married at
Salamis, and having a son[466] born to him there, indulged but faint
hopes of ever returning to his native city, when, fortunately for
him as well as for Athens, the Persians again became eager for an
efficient admiral and fleet on the coast of Asia Minor. Through
representations from Pharnabazus, as well as from Evagoras in
Cyprus,—and through correspondence of the latter with the Greek
physician Ktesias, who wished to become personally employed in the
negotiation, and who seems to have had considerable influence with
queen Parysatis,[467]—orders were obtained, and funds provided, to
equip in Phœnicia and Kilikia a numerous fleet, under the command of
Konon. While that officer began to show himself, and to act with such
triremes as he found in readiness (about forty in number) along the
southern coast of Asia Minor from Kilikia to Kaunus,[468]—further
preparations were vigorously prosecuted in the Phœnician ports, in
order to make up the fleet to three hundred sail.[469]

  [466] Lysias, Orat. xix, (De Bonis Aristophanis) s. 38.

  [467] See Ktesias, Fragmenta, Persica, c. 63, ed. Bähr; Plutarch,
  Artax. c. 21.

  We cannot make out these circumstances with any distinctness;
  but the general fact is plainly testified, and is besides very
  probable. Another Grecian surgeon (besides Ktesias) is mentioned
  as concerned,—Polykritus of Mendê; and a Kretan dancer named
  Zeno,—both established at the Persian court.

  There is no part of the narrative of Ktesias, the loss of which
  is so much to be regretted as this; relating transactions, in
  which he was himself concerned, and seemingly giving original
  letters.

  [468] Diodor. xiv, 39-79.

  [469] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 1.

It was by a sort of accident that news of such equipment reached
Sparta,—in an age of the world when diplomatic residents were as
yet unknown. A Syracusan merchant named Herodas, having visited
the Phœnician ports for trading purposes, brought back to Sparta
intelligence of the preparations which he had seen, sufficient to
excite much uneasiness. The Spartans were taking counsel among
themselves, and communicating with their neighboring allies, when
Agesilaus, at the instance of Lysander, stood forward as a volunteer
to solicit the command of a land-force for the purpose of attacking
the Persians in Asia. He proposed to take with him only thirty
full Spartan citizens or peers, as a sort of Board or Council of
Officers; two thousand Neodamodes or enfranchised Helots, whom the
ephors were probably glad to send away, and who would be selected
from the bravest and most formidable; and six thousand hoplites from
the land-allies, to whom the prospect of a rich service against
Asiatic enemies would be tempting. Of these thirty Spartans, Lysander
intended to be the leader; and thus, reckoning on his preëstablished
influence over Agesilaus, to exercise the real command himself,
without the name. He had no serious fear of the Persian arms, either
by land or sea. He looked upon the announcement of the Phœnician
fleet to be an empty threat, as it had so often proved in the mouth
of Tissaphernes during the late war; while the Cyreian expedition
had inspired him further with ardent hopes of another successful
Anabasis, or conquering invasion of Persia from the sea-coast
inwards. But he had still more at heart to employ his newly-acquired
ascendency in reëstablishing everywhere the dekarchies, which had
excited such intolerable hatred and exercised so much oppression,
that even the ephors had refused to lend positive aid in upholding
them, so that they had been in several places broken up or
modified.[470] If the ambition of Agesilaus was comparatively less
stained by personal and factious antipathies, and more Pan-hellenic
in its aim, than that of Lysander,—it was at the same time yet more
unmeasured in respect to victory over the Great King, whom he dreamed
of dethroning, or at least of expelling from Asia Minor and the
coast.[471] So powerful was the influence exercised by the Cyreian
expedition over the schemes and imagination of energetic Greeks: so
sudden was the outburst of ambition in the mind of Agesilaus, for
which no one before had given him credit.

  [470] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 2.

  [471] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 1. ἐλπίδας ἔχοντα μεγάλας αἱρήσειν
  βασιλέα, etc. Compare iv, 2, 3.

  Xen. Agesilaus, i, 36. ἐπινοῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων καταλύσειν τὴν ἐπὶ τὴν
  Ἑλλάδα στρατεύσασαν πρότερον ἀρχήν, etc.

Though this plan was laid by two of the ablest men in Greece, it
turned out to be rash and improvident, so far as the stability of the
Lacedæmonian empire was concerned. That empire ought to have been
made sure by sea, where its real danger lay, before attempts were
made to extend it by new inland acquisitions. And except for purposes
of conquest, there was no need of farther reinforcements in Asia
Minor; since Derkyllidas was already there with a force competent
to make head against the satraps. Nevertheless, the Lacedæmonians
embraced the plan eagerly; the more so, as envoys were sent from many
of the subject cities, by the partisans of Lysander and in concert
with him, to entreat that Agesilaus might be placed at the head of
the expedition, with as large a force as he required.[472]

  [472] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 5.

No difficulty probably was found in levying the proposed number
of men from the allies, since there was great promise of plunder
for the soldiers in Asia. But the altered position of Sparta with
respect to her most powerful allies was betrayed by the refusal of
Thebes, Corinth, and Athens to take any part in the expedition. The
refusal of Corinth, indeed, was excused professedly on the ground
of a recent inauspicious conflagration of one of the temples in the
city; and that of Athens, on the plea of weakness and exhaustion not
yet repaired. But the latter, at least, had already begun to conceive
some hope from the projects of Konon.[473]

  [473] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 5; Pausan. iii, 9, 1.

The mere fact that a king of Sparta was about to take the command
and pass into Asia, lent peculiar importance to the enterprise. The
Spartan kings, in their function of leaders of Greece, conceived
themselves to have inherited the sceptre of Agamemnon and
Orestes;[474] and Agesilaus, especially, assimilated his expedition
to a new Trojan war,—an effort of united Greece, for the purpose of
taking vengeance on the common Asiatic enemy of the Hellenic name.
The sacrifices having been found favorable, Agesilaus took measures
for the transit of the troops from various ports to Ephesus. But
he himself, with one division, touched in his way at Geræstus, the
southern point of Eubœa; wishing to cross from thence and sacrifice
at Aulis, (the port of Bœotia nearly opposite to Geræstus on the
other side of the strait) where Agamemnon had offered his memorable
sacrifice immediately previous to departure for Troy. It appears
that he both went to the spot, and began the sacrifice, without
asking permission from the Thebans; moreover, he was accompanied
by his own prophet, who conducted the solemnities in a manner not
consistent with the habitual practice of the temple or chapel of
Artemis at Aulis. On both these grounds, the Thebans, resenting the
proceeding as an insult, sent a body of armed men, and compelled
him to desist from the sacrifice.[475] Not taking part themselves
in the expedition, they probably considered that the Spartan king
was presumptuous in assuming to himself the Pan-hellenic character
of a second Agamemnon; and they thus inflicted a humiliation which
Agesilaus never forgave.

  [474] Herodot. i, 68; vii, 159; Pausan. iii, 16, 6.

  [475] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 3, 4; iii, 5, 5; Plutarch, Agesilaus,
  c. 6; Pausan. iii, 9, 2.

Agesilaus seems to have reached Asia about the time when Derkyllidas
had recently concluded his last armistice with Tissaphernes and
Pharnabazus; an armistice, intended to allow time for mutual
communication both with Sparta and the Persian court. On being asked
by the satrap what was his purpose in coming, Agesilaus merely
renewed the demand which had before been made by Derkyllidas—of
autonomy for the Asiatic Greeks. Tissaphernes replied by proposing a
continuation of the same armistice, until he could communicate with
the Persian court,—adding that he hoped to be empowered to grant the
demand. A fresh armistice was accordingly sworn to on both sides,
for three months; Derkyllidas (who with his army came now under the
command of Agesilaus) and Herippidas being sent to the satrap to
receive his oath, and take oaths to him in return.[476]

  [476] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 5, 6; Xen. Agesilaus, i, 10.

  The term of three months is specified only in the latter passage.
  The former armistice of Derkyllidas had probably not expired when
  Agesilaus first arrived.

While the army was thus condemned to temporary inaction at Ephesus,
the conduct and position of Lysander began to excite intolerable
jealousy in the superior officers; and most of all Agesilaus. So
great and established was the reputation of Lysander,—whose statue
had been erected at Ephesus itself in the temple of Artemis,[477] as
well as in many other cities,—that all the Asiatic Greeks looked
upon him as the real chief of the expedition. That he should be
real chief, under the nominal command of another, was nothing more
than what had happened before, in the year wherein he gained the
great victory of Ægospotami,—the Lacedæmonians having then also
sent him out in the ostensible capacity of secretary to the admiral
Arakus, in order to save the inviolability of their own rule, that
the same man should not serve twice as admiral.[478] It was through
the instigation of Lysander, and with a view to his presence,
that the decemvirs and other partisans in the subject cities had
sent to Sparta to petition for Agesilaus; a prince as yet untried
and unknown. So that Lysander,—taking credit, with truth, for
having ensured to Agesilaus first the crown, next this important
appointment,—intended for himself, and was expected by others, to
exercise a fresh turn of command, and to renovate in every town
the discomfited or enfeebled dekarchies. Numbers of his partisans
came to Ephesus to greet his arrival, and a crowd of petitioners
were seen following his steps everywhere; while Agesilaus himself
appeared comparatively neglected. Moreover, Lysander resumed all
that insolence of manner which he had contracted during his former
commands, and which on this occasion gave the greater offence, since
the manner of Agesilaus was both courteous and simple in a peculiar
degree.[479]

  [477] Pausan. vi, 3, 6.

  [478] Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 7. This rule does not seem to have been
  adhered to afterwards. Lysander was sent out again as commander
  in 403 B.C. It is possible, indeed, that he may have been again
  sent out as nominal secretary to some other person named as
  commander.

  [479] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 7.

The thirty Spartan counsellors, over whom Lysander had been named
to preside, finding themselves neither consulted by him, nor
solicited by others, were deeply dissatisfied. Their complaints
helped to encourage Agesilaus, who was still more keenly wounded
in his own personal dignity, to put forth a resolute and imperious
strength of will, such as he had not before been known to possess.
He successively rejected every petition preferred to him by or
through Lysander; a systematic purpose which, though never formally
announced,[480] was presently discerned by the petitioners, by the
Thirty, and by Lysander himself. The latter thus found himself not
merely disappointed in all his calculations, but humiliated to
excess, though without any tangible ground of complaint. He was
forced to warn his partisans, that his intervention was an injury
and not a benefit to them; that they must desist from obsequious
attentions to him, and must address themselves directly to Agesilaus.
With that prince he also remonstrated on his own account,—“Truly,
Agesilaus, you know how to degrade your friends.”—“Ay, to be sure
(was the reply), those among them who want to appear greater than I
am; but such as seek to uphold me, I should be ashamed if I did not
know how to repay with due honor.”—Lysander was constrained to admit
the force of this reply, and to request, as the only means of escape
from present and palpable humiliation, that he might be sent on some
mission apart; engaging to serve faithfully in whatever duty he might
be employed.[481]

  [480] The sarcastic remarks which Plutarch ascribes to Agesilaus,
  calling Lysander “my meat-distributor” (κρεοδαίτην), are not
  warranted by Xenophon, and seem not to be probable under the
  circumstances (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 23; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 8).

  [481] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 7-10; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 7-8;
  Plutarch, Lysand. c. 23.

  It is remarkable that in the Opusculum of Xenophon, a special
  Panegyric called _Agesilaus_, not a word is said about this
  highly characteristic proceeding between Agesilaus and Lysander
  at Ephesus; nor indeed is the name of Lysander once mentioned.

This proposition, doubtless even more agreeable to Agesilaus than to
himself, being readily assented to, he was despatched on a mission
to the Hellespont. Faithful to his engagement of forgetting past
offences and serving with zeal, he found means to gain over a Persian
grandee named Spithridates, who had received some offence from
Pharnabazus. Spithridates revolted openly, carrying a regiment of
two hundred horse to join Agesilaus; who was thus enabled to inform
himself fully about the satrapy of Pharnabazus, comprising the
territory called Phrygia, in the neighborhood of the Propontis and
the Hellespont.[482]

  [482] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 10.

The army under Tissaphernes had been already powerful at the moment
when his timidity induced him to conclude the first armistice with
Derkyllidas. But additional reinforcements, received since the
conclusion of the second and more recent armistice, had raised him
to such an excess of confidence, that even before the stipulated
three months had expired, he sent to insist on the immediate
departure of Agesilaus from Asia, and to proclaim war forthwith,
if such departure were delayed. While this message, accompanied by
formidable reports of the satrap’s force, filled the army at Ephesus
with mingled alarm and indignation, Agesilaus accepted the challenge
with cheerful readiness; sending word back that he thanked the satrap
for perjuring himself in so flagrant a manner, as to set the gods
against him and ensure their favor to the Greek side.[483] Orders
were forthwith given, and contingents summoned from the Asiatic
Greeks, for a forward movement southward, to cross the Mæander, and
attack Tissaphernes in Karia, where he usually resided. The cities on
the route were required to provide magazines, so that Tissaphernes,
fully anticipating attack in this direction, caused his infantry to
cross into Karia, for the purpose of acting on the defensive; while
he kept his numerous cavalry in the plain of the Mæander, with a
view to overwhelm Agesilaus, who had no cavalry, in his march over
that level territory towards the Karian hills and rugged ground. But
the Lacedæmonian king, having put the enemy on this false scent,
suddenly turned his march northward towards Phrygia and the satrapy
of Pharnabazus. Tissaphernes took no pains to aid his brother satrap,
who on his side had made few preparations for defence. Accordingly
Agesilaus, finding little or no resistance, took many towns and
villages, and collected abundance of provisions, plunder, and slaves.
Profiting by the guidance of the revolted Spithridates, and marching
as little as possible over the plains, he carried on lucrative
and unopposed incursions as far as the neighborhood of Daskylium,
the residence of the satrap himself, near the Propontis. Near the
satrapic residence, however, his small body of cavalry, ascending an
eminence, came suddenly upon an equal detachment of Persian cavalry,
under Rhathines and Bagæus; who attacked them vigorously, and drove
them back with some loss, until they were protected by Agesilaus
himself coming up with the hoplites. The effect of such a check (and
there were probably others of the same kind, though Xenophon does
not specify them) on the spirits of the army was discouraging. On
the next morning, the sacrifices being found unfavorable for farther
advance, Agesilaus gave orders for retreating towards the sea. He
reached Ephesus about the close of autumn; resolved to employ the
winter in organizing a more powerful cavalry, which experience proved
to be indispensable.[484]

  [483] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 11, 12; Xen. Agesil. i, 12-14;
  Plutarch, Agesil. c. 9.

  [484] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 13-15; Xen. Agesil. i, 23. Ἐπεὶ μέντοι
  οὐδὲ ἐν τῇ Φρυγίᾳ ἀνὰ τὰ πεδία ἐδύνατο στρατεύεσθαι, διὰ τὴν
  Φαρναβάζου ἱππείαν, etc.

  Plutarch, Agesil. c. 9.

  These military operations of Agesilaus are loosely adverted to in
  the early part of c. 79 of the fourteenth Book of Diodorus.

This autumnal march through Phrygia was more lucrative than glorious.
Yet it enables Xenophon to bring to view different merits of his
hero Agesilaus; in doing which he exhibits to us ancient warfare
and Asiatic habits on a very painful side. In common both with
Kallikratidas and Lysander, though not with the ordinary Spartan
commanders, Agesilaus was indifferent to the acquisition of money for
himself. But he was not the less anxious to enrich his friends, and
would sometimes connive at unwarrantable modes of acquisition for
their benefit. Deserters often came in to give information of rich
prizes or valuable prisoners; which advantages, if he had chosen,
he might have appropriated to himself. But he made it a practice
to throw both the booty and the honor in the way of some favorite
officer; just as we have seen (in a former chapter) that Xenophon
himself was allowed by the army to capture Asidates and enjoy a large
portion of his ransom.[485] Again, when the army in the course of
its march was at a considerable distance from the sea, and appeared
to be advancing farther inland, the authorized auctioneers, whose
province it was to sell the booty, found the buyers extremely slack.
It was difficult to keep or carry what was bought, and opportunity
for resale did not seem at hand. Agesilaus, while he instructed
the auctioneers to sell upon credit, without insisting on ready
money,—at the same time gave private hints to a few friends that he
was very shortly about to return to the sea. The friends thus warned,
bidding for the plunder on credit and purchasing at low prices, were
speedily enabled to dispose of it again at a seaport, with large
profits.[486]

  [485] Xen. Agesil. i, 19; Xen. Anabas. vii, 8, 20-23; Plutarch,
  Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p 809, B. See above, Chapter lxxii, of
  this History.

  [486] Xen. Agesil. i, 18. πάντες παμπλήθη χρήματα ἔλαβον.

We are not surprised to hear that such lucrative graces procured for
Agesilaus many warm admirers; though the eulogies of Xenophon ought
to have been confined to another point in his conduct, now to be
mentioned. Agesilaus, while securing for his army the plunder of the
country over which he carried his victorious arms, took great pains
to prevent both cruelty and destruction of property. When any town
surrendered to him on terms, his exactions were neither ruinous nor
grossly humiliating.[487] Amidst all the plunder realized, too, the
most valuable portion was the adult natives of both sexes, hunted
down and brought in by the predatory light troops of the army, to
be sold as slaves. Agesilaus was vigilant in protecting these poor
victims from ill-usage; inculcating upon his soldiers the duty, “not
of punishing them like wrong-doers, but simply of keeping them under
guard as men.[488]” It was the practice of the poorer part of the
native population often to sell their little children for exportation
to travelling slave-merchants, from inability to maintain them. The
children thus purchased, if they promised to be handsome, were often
mutilated, and fetched large prices as eunuchs, to supply the large
demand for the harems and religious worship of many Asiatic towns.
But in their haste to get out of the way of a plundering army, these
slave-merchants were forced often to leave by the way-side the little
children whom they had purchased, exposed to the wolves, the dogs, or
starvation. In this wretched condition, they were found by Agesilaus
on his march. His humane disposition prompted him to see them carried
to a place of safety, where he gave them in charge of those old
natives whom age and feebleness had caused to be left behind as
not worth carrying off. By such active kindness, rare, indeed, in a
Grecian general, towards the conquered, he earned the gratitude of
the captives, and the sympathies of every one around.[489]

  [487] Xen. Agesil. i, 20-22.

  [488] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 19; Xen. Agesil. i, 28. τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν
  λῃστῶν ἁλισκομένους βαρβάρους.

  So the word λῃστὴς, used in reference to the fleet, means the
  commander of a predatory vessel or privateer (Xen. Hellen. ii, 1,
  30).

  [489] Xen. Agesil. i, 21. Καὶ πολλάκις μὲν προηγόρευε τοῖς
  στρατιώταις ~τοὺς ἁλισκομένους μὴ ὡς ἀδίκους τιμωρεῖσθαι,
  ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀνθρώπους ὄντας φυλάσσειν~. Πολλάκις δὲ, ὅποτε
  μεταστρατοπεδεύοιτο, ~εἰ αἴσθοιτο καταλελειμμένα παιδάρια μικρὰ
  ἐμπόρων, (ἃ πολλοὶ ἐπώλουν, διὰ τὸ νομίζειν μὴ δύνασθαι ἂν φέρειν
  αὐτὰ καὶ τρέφειν)~ ἐπεμέλετο καὶ τούτων, ὅπως συγκομίζοιτό ποι·
  τοῖς δ᾽ αὖ διὰ γῆρας καταλελειμμένοις αἰχμαλώτοις προσέταττεν
  ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αὐτῶν, ὡς μήτε ὑπὸ κυνῶν, μήθ᾽ ὑπὸ λύκων,
  διαφθείροιντο. Ὥστε οὐ μόνον οἱ πυνθανόμενοι ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ
  αὐτοὶ οἱ ἁλισκόμενοι εὐμενεῖς αὐτῷ ἐγίγνοντο.

  Herodotus affirms that the Thracians also sold their children for
  exportation,—πωλεῦσι τὰ τέχνα ἐπ᾽ ἐξαγωγῇ (Herod. v, 6): compare
  Philostratus, Vit. Apollon. viii, 7-12, p. 346; and Ch. xvi, Vol.
  III, p. 216 of this History.

  Herodotus mentions the Chian merchant Panionius (like the
  “_Mitylenæus mango_” in Martial,—“Sed Mitylenæi roseus mangonis
  ephebus” Martial, vii, 79)—as having conducted on a large scale
  the trade of purchasing boys, looking out for such as were
  handsome, to supply the great demand in the East for eunuchs,
  who were supposed to make better and more attached servants.
  Herodot. viii, 105. ὅκως γὰρ κτήσαιτο (Panionius) παῖδας εἴδεος
  ἐπαμμένους, ἐκτάμνων ἀγινέων ἐπώλεε ἐς Σάρδις τε καὶ Ἔφεσον
  χρημάτων μεγάλων· παρὰ γὰρ τοῖσι βαρβάροισι τιμιώτεροί εἰσι οἱ
  εὐνοῦχοι, πίστιος εἵνεκα τῆς πάσης, τῶν ἐνορχίων. Boys were
  necessary, as the operation was performed in childhood or
  youth,—παῖδες ἐκτομίαι (Herodot. vi, 6-32: compare iii, 48).
  The Babylonians, in addition to their large pecuniary tribute,
  had to furnish to the Persian court annually five hundred παῖδας
  ἐκτομίας (Herodot. iii, 92). For some farther remarks on the
  preference of the Persians both for the persons and the services
  of εὐνοῦχοι, see Dio Chrysostom, Orat. xxi, p. 270; Xenoph.
  Cyropæd. vii, 5, 61-65. Hellanikus (Fr. 169, ed. Didot) affirmed
  that the Persians had derived both the persons so employed, and
  the habit of employing them, from the Babylonians.

  When Mr. Hanway was travelling near the Caspian, among the
  Kalmucks, little children of two or three vears of age, were
  often tendered to him for sale, at two rubles per head (Hanway’s
  Travels, ch. xvi, pp. 65, 66).

This interesting anecdote, imparting a glimpse of the ancient world
in reference to details which Grecian historians rarely condescend
to unveil, demonstrates the compassionate disposition of Agesilaus.
We find in conjunction with it another anecdote, illustrating the
Spartan side of his character. The prisoners who had been captured
during the expedition were brought to Ephesus, and sold during
the winter as slaves for the profit of the army. Agesilaus,—being
then busily employed in training his troops to military
efficiency, especially for the cavalry service during the ensuing
campaign,—thought it advisable to impress them with contempt for the
bodily capacity and prowess of the natives. He therefore directed the
heralds who conducted the auction, to put the prisoners up to sale
in a state of perfect nudity. To have the body thus exposed, was a
thing never done, and even held disgraceful by the native Asiatics;
while among the Greeks the practice was universal for purposes of
exercise,—or at least, had become universal during the last two or
three centuries,—for we are told that originally the Asiatic feeling
on this point had prevailed throughout Greece. It was one of the
obvious differences between Grecian and Asiatic customs,[490]—that
in the former, both the exercises of the palæstra, as well as the
matches in the solemn games, required competitors of every rank
to contend naked. Agesilaus himself stripped thus habitually;
Alexander, prince of Macedon, had done so, when he ran at the Olympic
stadium,[491]—also the combatants out of the great family of the
Diagorids of Rhodes, when they gained their victories in the Olympic
pankratium,—and all those other noble pugilists, wrestlers, and
runners, descended from gods and heroes, upon whom Pindar pours forth
his complimentary odes.

  [490] Herodot. i, 10. παρὰ γὰρ τοῖσι Λυδοῖσι, σχεδὸν δὲ παρὰ
  τοῖσι ἄλλοισι βαρβάροισι, καὶ ἄνδρα ὀφθῆναι γυμνόν, ἐς αἰσχύνην
  μεγάλην φέρει. Compare Thucyd. i, 6; Plato, Republic, v, 3, p.
  452, D.

  [491] Herodot. v, 22.

On this occasion at Ephesus, Agesilaus gave special orders to put up
the Asiatic prisoners to auction naked; not at all by way of insult,
but in order to exhibit to the eye of the Greek soldier, as he
contemplated them, how much he gained by his own bodily training and
frequent exposure, and how inferior was the condition of men whose
bodies never felt the sun or wind. They displayed a white skin, plump
and soft limbs, weak and undeveloped muscles, like men accustomed to
be borne in carriages instead of walking or running; from whence we
indirectly learn that many of them were men in wealthy circumstances.
And the purpose of Agesilaus was completely answered; since his
soldiers, when they witnessed such evidences of bodily incompetence,
thought that “the enemies against whom they had to contend were not
more formidable than women.”[492] Such a method of illustrating the
difference between good and bad physical training, would hardly have
occurred to any one except a Spartan, brought up under the Lykurgean
rules.

  [492] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 19. Ἡγούμενος δὲ, καὶ τὸ καταφρονεῖν
  τῶν πολεμίων ῥώμην τινὰ ἐμβάλλειν πρὸς τὸ μάχεσθαι, προεῖπε
  τοῖς κήρυξι, τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν λῃστῶν ἁλισκομένους βαρβάρους γυμνοὺς
  πωλεῖν. Ὁρῶντες οὖν οἱ στρατιῶται λευκοὺς μὲν, ~διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε
  ἐκδύεσθαι~, μαλακοὺς δὲ καὶ ἀπόνους, διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ ἐπ᾽ ὀχημάτων
  εἶναι, ἐνόμισαν, οὐδὲν διοίσειν τὸν πόλεμον ἢ εἰ γυναιξὶ δέοι
  μάχεσθαι.

  Xen. Agesil. i, 28—where he has it—πίονας δὲ καὶ ἀπόνους, διὰ
  τὸ ἀεὶ ἐπ᾽ ὀχημάτων εἶναι (Polyænus, ii, 1, 5; Plutarch, Agesil.
  c. 9).

  Frontinus (i, 18) recounts a proceeding somewhat similar on the
  part of Gelon, after his great victory over the Carthaginians
  at Himera in Sicily:—“Gelo Syracusarum tyrannus, bello adversus
  Pœnos suscepto, cum multos cepisset, infirmissimum quemque
  præcipue ex auxiliaribus, qui nigerrimi erant, nudatum in
  conspectu suorum produxit, ut persuaderet contemnendos.”

While Agesilaus thus brought home to the vision of his soldiers the
inefficiency of untrained bodies, he kept them throughout the winter
under hard work and drill, as well in the palæstra as in arms. A
force of cavalry was still wanting. To procure it, he enrolled all
the richest Greeks in the various Asiatic towns, as conscripts to
serve on horseback; giving each of them leave to exempt himself,
however, by providing a competent substitute and equipment,—man,
horse, and arms.[493] Before the commencement of spring, an adequate
force of cavalry was thus assembled at Ephesus, and put into
tolerable exercise. Throughout the whole winter, that city became a
place of arms, consecrated to drilling and gymnastic exercises. On
parade as well as in the palæstra, Agesilaus himself was foremost in
setting the example of obedience and hard work. Prizes were given
to the diligent and improving among hoplites, horsemen, and light
troops; while the armorers, braziers, leather-cutters, etc.,—all
the various artisans, whose trade lay in muniments of war, were in
the fullest employment. “It was a sight full of encouragement (says
Xenophon, who was doubtless present and took part in it), to see
Agesilaus and the soldiers leaving the gymnasium, all with wreaths on
their heads, and marching to the temple of Artemis to dedicate their
wreaths to the goddess.”[494]

  [493] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 15; Xen. Agesil. i, 23. Compare what
  is related about Scipio Africanus—Livy, xxix, 1.

  [494] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 17, 18; Xen. Agesil. i, 26, 27.

Before Agesilaus was in condition to begin his military operations
for the spring, the first year of his command had passed over.
Thirty fresh counsellors reached Ephesus from Sparta, superseding
the first thirty under Lysander, who forthwith returned home. The
army was now not only more numerous, but better trained, and more
systematically arranged than in the preceding campaign. Agesilaus
distributed the various divisions under the command of different
members of the new Thirty; the cavalry being assigned to Xenoklês,
the Neodamode hoplites to Skythês, the Cyreians to Herippidas, the
Asiatic contingents to Migdon. He then gave out that he should march
straight against Sardis. Nevertheless, Tissaphernes, who was in
that place, construing this proclamation as a feint, and believing
that the real march would be directed against Karia, disposed his
cavalry in the plain of the Mæander as he had done in the preceding
campaign; while his infantry were sent still farther southward within
the Karian frontier. On this occasion, however, Agesilaus marched
as he had announced, in the direction of Sardis. For three days he
plundered the country without seeing an enemy; nor was it until the
fourth day that the cavalry of Tissaphernes could be summoned back to
oppose him; the infantry being even yet at a distance. On reaching
the banks of the river Paktôlus, this Persian cavalry found the Greek
light troops dispersed for the purpose of plunder, attacked them
by surprise, and drove them in with considerable loss. Presently,
however, Agesilaus came up, and ordered his cavalry to charge,
anxious to bring on a battle before the Persian infantry could arrive
in the field. In efficiency, it appears, the Persian cavalry was a
full match for his cavalry, and in number apparently superior. But
when he brought up his infantry, and caused his peltasts and younger
hoplites to join the cavalry in a vigorous attack,—victory soon
declared on his side. The Persians were put to flight and many of
them drowned in the Paktôlus. Their camp, too, was taken, with a
valuable booty; including several camels, which Agesilaus afterwards
took with him into Greece. This success ensured to him the unopposed
mastery of all the territory around Sardis. He carried his ravages
to the very gates of that city, plundering the gardens and ornamented
ground, proclaiming liberty to those within, and defying Tissaphernes
to come out and fight.[495]

  [495] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 21-24; Xen. Agesil. i, 32, 33;
  Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10.

  Diodorus (xiv, 80) professes to describe this battle; but his
  description is hardly to be reconciled with that of Xenophon,
  which is better authority. Among other points of difference,
  Diodorus affirms that the Persians had fifty thousand infantry;
  and Pausanias also states (iii, 9, 3) that the number of Persian
  infantry in this battle was greater than had ever been got
  together since the times of Darius and Xerxes Whereas, Xenophon
  expressly states that the Persian infantry had not come up, and
  took no part in the battle.

The career of that timid and treacherous satrap now approached its
close. The Persians in or near Sardis loudly complained of him as
leaving them undefended, from cowardice and anxiety for his own
residence in Karia; while the court of Susa was now aware that
the powerful reinforcement which had been sent to him last year,
intended to drive Agesilaus out of Asia, had been made to achieve
absolutely nothing. To these grounds of just dissatisfaction was
added a court intrigue; to which, and to the agency of a person yet
more worthless and cruel than himself, Tissaphernes fell a victim.
The queen mother, Parysatis, had never forgiven him for having been
one of the principal agents in the defeat and death of her son Cyrus.
Her influence being now reëstablished over the mind of Artaxerxes,
she took advantage of the existing discredit of the satrap to get an
order sent down for his deposition and death. Tithraustes, the bearer
of this order, seized him by stratagem at Kolossæ in Phrygia, while
he was in the bath, and caused him to be beheaded.[496]

  [496] Plutarch. Artaxerx. c. 23; Diodor. xiv, 80; Xen. Hellen.
  iii, 4, 25.

The mission of Tithraustes to Asia Minor was accompanied by increased
efforts on the part of Persia for prosecuting the war against Sparta
with vigor, by sea as well as by land; and also for fomenting
the anti-Spartan movement which burst out into hostilities this
year in Greece. At first, however, immediately after the death of
Tissaphernes, Tithraustes endeavored to open negotiations with
Agesilaus, who was in military possession of the country around
Sardis, while that city itself appears to have been occupied by
Ariæus, probably the same Persian who had formerly been general
under Cyrus, and who had now again revolted from Artaxerxes.[497]
Tithraustes took credit to the justice of the king for having
punished the late satrap; out of whose perfidy (he affirmed) the
war had arisen. He then summoned Agesilaus, in the king’s name, to
evacuate Asia, leaving the Asiatic Greeks to pay their original
tribute to Persia, but to enjoy complete autonomy, subject to that
one condition. Had this proposition been accepted and executed,
it would have secured these Greeks against Persian occupation or
governors; a much milder fate for them than that to which the
Lacedæmonians had consented in their conventions with Tissaphernes
sixteen years before,[498] and analogous to the position in which
the Chalkidians of Thrace had been placed with regard to Athens,
under the peace of Nikias;[499] subject to a fixed tribute, yet
autonomous,—with no other obligation or interference. Agesilaus
replied that he had no power to entertain such a proposition without
the authorities at home, whom he accordingly sent to consult. But
in the interim he was prevailed upon by Tithraustes to conclude an
armistice for six months, and to move out of his satrapy into that
of Pharnabazus; receiving a contribution of thirty talents towards
the temporary maintenance of the army.[500] These satraps generally
acted more like independent or even hostile princes, than coöperating
colleagues; one of the many causes of the weakness of the Persian
empire.

  [497] Xen. Hellen. iii, 14, 25; iv, 1, 27.

  [498] Thucyd. viii, 18, 37, 58.

  [499] Thucyd. v, 18, 5.

  [500] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 26; Diodor. xiv, 80. ἑξαμηνιαίους
  ἀνοχάς.

When Agesilaus had reached the neighborhood of Kymê, on his march
northward to the Hellespontine Phrygia, he received a despatch from
home, placing the Spartan naval force in the Asiatic seas under
his command, as well as the land-force, and empowering him to name
whomsoever he chose as acting admiral.[501] For the first time
since the battle of Ægospotami, the maritime empire of Sparta was
beginning to be threatened, and increased efforts on her part were
becoming requisite. Pharnabazus, going up in person to the court
of Artaxerxes, had by pressing representations obtained a large
subsidy for fitting out a fleet in Cyprus and Phœnicia, to act under
the Athenian admiral Konon against the Lacedæmonians.[502] That
officer,—with a fleet of forty triremes, before the equipment of
the remainder was yet complete,—had advanced along the southern
coast of Asia Minor to Kaunus, at the south-western corner of the
peninsula, on the frontier of Karia and Lykia. In this port he was
besieged by the Lacedæmonian fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes
under Pharax. But a Persian reinforcement strengthened the fleet
of Konon to eighty sail, and put the place out of danger; so that
Pharax, desisting from the siege, retired to Rhodes.

  [501] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 27.

  [502] Diodor. xiv, 39, Justin, vi, 1.

The neighborhood of Konon, however, who was now with his fleet of
eighty sail near the Chersonesus of Knidus, emboldened the Rhodians
to revolt from Sparta. It was at Rhodes that the general detestation
of the Lacedæmonian empire, disgraced in so many different cities by
the local dekarchies and by the Spartan harmosts, first manifested
itself. And such was the ardor of the Rhodian population, that their
revolt took place while the fleet of Pharax was (in part at least)
actually in the harbor, and they drove him out of it.[503] Konon,
whose secret encouragements had helped to excite this insurrection,
presently sailed to Rhodes with his fleet, and made the island his
main station. It threw into his hands an unexpected advantage;
for a numerous fleet of vessels arrived there shortly afterwards,
sent by Nephareus, the native king of Egypt (which was in revolt
against the Persians), with marine stores and grain to the aid of
the Lacedæmonians. Not having been apprized of the recent revolt,
these vessels entered the harbor of Rhodes as if it were still a
Lacedæmonian island; and their cargoes were thus appropriated by
Konon and the Rhodians.[504]

  [503] Diodor. xiv, 79. Ῥόδιοι δὲ ἐκβαλόντες τὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων
  στόλον, ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ τὸν Κόνωνα προσεδέξαντο
  μετὰ τοῦ στόλου παντὸς εἰς τὴν πόλιν.

  Compare Androtion apud Pausaniam, vi, 7, 2.

  [504] Diodor. xiv, 79; Justin (vi, 2) calls this native Egyptian
  king _Hercynion_.

  It seems to have been the uniform practice, for the corn-ships
  coming from Egypt to Greece to halt at Rhodes (Demosthen. cont.
  Dionysodor p. 1285: compare Herodot. ii, 182).

In recounting the various revolts of the dependencies of Athens
which took place during the Peloponnesian war, I had occasion to
point out more than once that all of them took place not merely in
the absence of any Athenian force, but even at the instigation (in
most cases) of a present hostile force,—by the contrivance of a
local party,—and without privity or previous consent of the bulk
of the citizens. The present revolt of Rhodes, forming a remarkable
contrast on all these points, occasioned the utmost surprise and
indignation among the Lacedæmonians. They saw themselves about to
enter upon a renewed maritime war, without that aid which they had
reckoned on receiving from Egypt, and with aggravated uncertainty
in respect to their dependencies and tribute. It was under this
prospective anxiety that they took the step of nominating Agesilaus
to the command of the fleet as well as of the army, in order to
ensure unity of operations;[505] though a distinction of functions,
which they had hitherto set great value upon maintaining, was thus
broken down,—and, though the two commands had never been united in
any king before Agesilaus.[506] Pharax, the previous admiral, was
recalled.[507]

  [505] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 27.

  [506] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10; Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 22.

  [507] The Lacedæmonian named Pharax, mentioned by Theopompus
  (Fragm. 218, ed. Didot: compare Athenæus, xii, p. 536) as a
  profligate and extravagant person, is more probably an officer
  who served under Dionysius in Sicily and Italy, about forty years
  after the revolt of Rhodes. The difference of time appears so
  great, that we must probably suppose two different men bearing
  the same name.

But the violent displeasure of the Lacedæmonians against the revolted
Rhodians was still better attested by another proceeding. Among
all the great families at Rhodes, none were more distinguished
than the Diagoridæ. Its members were not only generals and high
political functionaries in their native island, but had attained
even Pan-hellenic celebrity by an unparalleled series of victories
at the Olympic and other great solemnities. Dorieus, a member of
this family, had gained the victory in the pankration at Olympia
on three successive solemnities. He had obtained seven prizes in
the Nemean, and eight in the Isthmian games. He had carried off the
prize at one Pythian solemnity without a contest,—no one daring
to stand up against him in the fearful struggle of the pankration.
As a Rhodian, while Rhodes was a subject ally of Athens during the
Peloponnesian war, he had been so pronounced in his attachment to
Sparta as to draw on himself a sentence of banishment; upon which he
had retired to Thurii, and had been active in hostility to Athens
after the Syracusan catastrophe. Serving against her in ships
fitted out at his own cost, he had been captured in 407 B.C. by the
Athenians, and brought in as prisoner to Athens. By the received
practice of war in that day, his life was forfeited; and over and
above such practice, the name of Dorieus was peculiarly odious to the
Athenians. But when they saw before the public assembly a captive
enemy, of heroic lineage, as well as of unrivalled athletic majesty
and renown, their previous hatred was so overpowered by sympathy and
admiration, that they liberated him by public vote, and dismissed him
unconditionally.[508]

  [508] Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 19.

  Compare a similar instance of merciful dealing, on the part
  of the Syracusan assembly, towards the Sikel prince Duketius
  (Diodor. xi, 92).

This interesting anecdote, which has already been related in
my eighth volume,[509] is here again noticed as a contrast to
the treatment which the same Dorieus now underwent from the
Lacedæmonians. What he had been doing since, we do not know; but
at the time when Rhodes now revolted from Sparta, he was not only
absent from the island, but actually in or near Peloponnesus.
Such, however, was the wrath of the Lacedæmonians against Rhodians
generally, that Dorieus was seized by their order, brought to Sparta,
and there condemned and executed.[510] It seems hardly possible that
he can have had any personal concern in the revolt. Had such been
the fact, he would have been in the island,—or would at least have
taken care not to be within the reach of the Lacedæmonians when the
revolt happened. Perhaps, however, other members of the Diagoridæ,
his family, once so much attached to Sparta, may have taken part in
it; for we know, by the example of the Thirty at Athens, that the
Lysandrian dekarchies and Spartan harmosts made themselves quite
as formidable to oligarchical as to democratical politicians, and
it is very conceivable that the Diagoridæ may have become less
philo-Laconian in their politics.

  [509] Hist. of Greece, Vol. VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 159.

  [510] Pausanias, vi, 7, 2.

This extreme difference in the treatment of the same man by Athens
and by Sparta raises instructive reflections. It exhibits the
difference both between Athenian and Spartan sentiment, and between
the sentiment of a multitude and that of a few. The grand and
sacred personality of the Hieronike Dorieus, when exhibited to
the senses of the Athenian multitude,—the spectacle of a man in
chains before them, who had been proclaimed victor and crowned on
so many solemn occasions before the largest assemblages of Greeks
ever brought together,—produced an overwhelming effect upon their
emotions; sufficient not only to efface a strong preëstablished
antipathy founded on active past hostility, but to countervail
a just cause of revenge, speaking in the language of that day.
But the same appearance produced no effect at all on the Spartan
ephors and senate; not sufficient even to hinder them from putting
Dorieus to death, though he had given them no cause for antipathy
or revenge, simply as a sort of retribution for the revolt of the
island. Now this difference depended partly upon the difference
between the sentiment of Athenians and Spartans, but partly also
upon the difference between the sentiment of a multitude and that of
a few. Had Dorieus been brought before a select judicial tribunal
at Athens, instead of before the Athenian public assembly,—or, had
the case been discussed before the assembly in his absence,—he
would have been probably condemned, conformably to usage, under the
circumstances; but the vehement emotion worked by his presence upon
the multitudinous spectators of the assembly, rendered such a course
intolerable to them. It has been common with historians of Athens
to dwell upon the passions of the public assembly as if it were
susceptible of excitement only in an angry or vindictive direction;
whereas, the truth is, and the example before us illustrates, that
they were open-minded in one direction as well as in another,
and that the present emotion, whatever it might be, merciful or
sympathetic as well as resentful, was intensified by the mere fact of
multitude. And thus, where the established rule of procedure happened
to be cruel, there was some chance of moving an Athenian assembly to
mitigate it in a particular case, though the Spartan ephors or senate
would be inexorable in carrying it out,—if, indeed, they did not, as
seems probable in the case of Dorieus, actually go beyond it in rigor.

While Konon and the Rhodians were thus raising hostilities against
Sparta by sea, Agesilaus, on receiving at Kymê the news of his
nomination to the double command, immediately despatched orders
to the dependent maritime cities and islands, requiring the
construction and equipment of new triremes. Such was the influence
of Sparta, and so much did the local governments rest upon its
continuance, that these requisitions were zealously obeyed. Many
leading men incurred considerable expense, from desire to acquire
his favor; so that a fleet of one hundred and twenty new triremes
was ready by the ensuing year. Agesilaus, naming his brother-in-law,
Peisander, to act as admiral, sent him to superintend the
preparations; a brave young man, but destitute both of skill and
experience.[511]

  [511] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 28, 29; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10.

Meanwhile, he himself pursued his march (about the beginning of
autumn) towards the satrapy of Pharnabazus,—Phrygia south and
south-east of the Propontis. Under the active guidance of his new
auxiliary, Spithridates, he plundered the country, capturing some
towns, and reducing others to capitulate; with considerable advantage
to his soldiers. Pharnabazus, having no sufficient army to hazard a
battle in defence of his satrapy, concentrated all his force near
his own residence at Daskylium, offering no opposition to the march
of Agesilaus; who was induced by Spithridates to traverse Phrygia
and enter Paphlagonia, in hopes of concluding an alliance with the
Paphlagonian prince Otys. That prince, in nominal dependence on
Persia, could muster the best cavalry in the Persian empire. But
he had recently refused to obey an invitation from the court at
Susa, and he now not only welcomed the appearance of Agesilaus, but
concluded an alliance with him, strengthening him with an auxiliary
body of cavalry and peltasts. Anxious to requite Spithridates for
his services, and vehemently attached to his son, the beautiful
youth Megabates,—Agesilaus persuaded Otys to marry the daughter
of Spithridates. He even caused her to be conveyed by sea in a
Lacedæmonian trireme,—probably from Abydos to Sinôpê.[512]

  [512] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 1-15.

  The negotiation of this marriage by Agesilaus is detailed in a
  curious and interesting manner by Xenophon. His conversation
  with Otys took place in the presence of the thirty Spartan
  counsellors, and probably in the presence of Xenophon himself.

  The attachment of Agesilaus to the youth Megabazus or Megabates,
  is marked in the Hellenica (iv, 1, 6-28)—but is more strongly
  brought out in the Agesilaus of Xenophon (v, 6), and in Plutarch,
  Agesil. c. 11.

  In the retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks (five years before)
  along the southern coast of the Euxine, a Paphlagonian prince
  named Korylas is mentioned (Xen. Anab. v, 5, 22; v, 6, 8).
  Whether there was more than one Paphlagonian prince—or whether
  Otys was successor of Korylas—we cannot tell.

Reinforced by the Paphlagonian auxiliaries, Agesilaus prosecuted
the war with augmented vigor against the satrapy of Pharnabazus. He
now approached the neighborhood of Daskylium, the residence of the
satrap himself, inherited from his father Pharnakês, who had been
satrap before him. This was a well-supplied country, full of rich
villages, embellished with parks and gardens for the satrap’s hunting
and gratification: the sporting tastes of Xenophon lead him also to
remark that there were plenty of birds for the fowler, with rivers
full of fish.[513] In this agreeable region Agesilaus passed the
winter. His soldiers, abundantly supplied with provisions, became so
careless, and straggled with so much contempt of their enemy, that
Pharnabazus, with a body of four hundred cavalry and two scythed
chariots, found an opportunity of attacking seven hundred of them by
surprise; driving them back with considerable loss, until Agesilaus
came up to protect them with the hoplites.

  [513] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 16-33.

This partial misfortune, however, was speedily avenged. Fearful of
being surrounded and captured, Pharnabazus refrained from occupying
any fixed position. He hovered about the country, carrying his
valuable property along with him, and keeping his place of encampment
as secret as he could. The watchful Spithridates, nevertheless,
having obtained information that he was encamped for the night in
the village of Kanê, about eighteen miles distant, Herippidas (one
of the thirty Spartans) undertook a night-march with a detachment
to surprise him. Two thousand Grecian hoplites, the like number of
light-armed peltasts, and Spithridates with the Paphlagonian horse,
were appointed to accompany him. Though many of these soldiers
took advantage of the darkness to evade attendance, the enterprise
proved completely successful. The camp of Pharnabazus was surprised
at break of day; his Mysian advanced guards were put to the sword,
and he himself, with all his troops, was compelled to take flight
with scarcely any resistance. All his stores, plate, and personal
furniture, together with a large baggage-train and abundance of
prisoners, fell into the hands of the victors. As the Paphlagonians
under Spithridates formed the cavalry of the victorious detachment,
they naturally took more spoil and more prisoners than the infantry.
They were proceeding to carry off their acquisitions, when Herippidas
interfered and took everything away from them; placing the entire
spoil of every description, under the charge of Grecian officers, to
be sold by formal auction in a Grecian city; after which the proceeds
were to be distributed or applied by public authority. The orders of
Herippidas were conformable to the regular and systematic proceeding
of Grecian officers; but Spithridates and the Paphlagonians were
probably justified by Asiatic practice in appropriating that which
they had themselves captured. Moreover, the order, disagreeable
in itself, was enforced against them with Lacedæmonian harshness
of manner,[514] unaccompanied by any guarantee that they would be
allowed, even at last, a fair share of the proceeds. Resenting the
conduct of Herippidas as combining injury with insult, they deserted
in the night and fled to Sardis, where the Persian Ariæus was in
actual revolt against the court of Susa. This was a serious loss, and
still more serious chagrin, to Agesilaus. He was not only deprived of
valuable auxiliary cavalry, and of an enterprizing Asiatic informant;
but the report would be spread that he defrauded his Asiatic allies
of their legitimate plunder, and others would thus be deterred from
joining him. His personal sorrow too was aggravated by the departure
of the youth Megabazus, who accompanied his father Spithridates to
Sardis.[515]

  [514] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 11. πικρὸς ὢν ἐξεταστὴς τῶν κλαπέντων,
  etc.

  [515] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 27; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 11.

  Since the flight of Spithridates took place secretly by night,
  the scene which Plutarch asserts to have taken place between
  Agesilaus and Megabazus cannot have occurred on the departure of
  the latter, but must belong to some other occasion; as, indeed,
  it seems to be represented by Xenophon (Agesil. v, 4).

It was towards the close of this winter that a personal conference
took place between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus, managed by the
intervention of a Greek of Kyzikus named Apollophanês; who was
connected by ties of hospitality with both, and served to each as
guarantee for the good faith of the other. We have from Xenophon,
himself probably present, an interesting detail of this interview.
Agesilaus, accompanied by his thirty Spartan counsellors, being the
first to arrive at the place of appointment, all of them sat down
upon the grass to wait. Presently came Pharnabazus, with splendid
clothing and retinue. His attendants were beginning to spread fine
carpets for him, when the satrap, observing how the Spartans were
seated, felt ashamed of such a luxury for himself, and sat down
on the grass by the side of Agesilaus. Having exchanged salutes,
they next shook hands; after which Pharnabazus, who as the older
of the two had been the first to tender his right hand, was also
the first to open the conversation. Whether he spoke Greek well
enough to dispense with the necessity of an interpreter, we are not
informed. “Agesilaus (said he), I was the friend and ally of you
Lacedæmonians while you were at war with Athens; I furnished you with
money to strengthen your fleet, and fought with you myself ashore on
horseback, chasing your enemies into the sea. You cannot charge me
with having ever played you false, like Tissaphernes, either by word
or deed. Yet, after this behavior, I am now reduced by you to such a
condition, that I have not a dinner in my own territory, except by
picking up your leavings, like the beasts of the field. I see the
fine residences, parks, and hunting-grounds, bequeathed to me by my
father, which formed the charm of my life, cut up or burnt down by
you. Is this the conduct of men mindful of favors received, and eager
to requite them? Pray answer me this question; for, perhaps, I have
yet to learn what is holy and just.”

The thirty Spartan counsellors were covered with shame by this
emphatic appeal. They all held their peace; while Agesilaus, after
a long pause, at length replied,—“You are aware, Pharnabazus, that
in Grecian cities, individuals become private friends and guests of
each other. Such guests, if the cities to which they belong go to
war, fight with each other, and sometimes by accident even kill each
other, each in behalf of his respective city. So then it is that we,
being at war with your king, are compelled to hold all his dominions
as enemy’s land. But in regard to you, we would pay any price to
become your friends. I do not invite you to accept us as masters,
in place of your present master; I ask you to become our ally, and
to enjoy your own property as a freeman—bowing before no man and
acknowledging no master. Now freedom is in itself a possession of the
highest value. But this is not all. We do not call upon you to be a
freeman, and yet poor. We offer you our alliance, to acquire fresh
territory, not for the king, but for yourself; by reducing those who
are now your fellow-slaves to become your subjects. Now tell me,—if
you thus continue a freeman and become rich, what can you want
farther to make you a thoroughly prosperous man?”

“I will speak frankly to you in reply (said Pharnabazus). If the king
shall send any other general, and put me under him, I shall willingly
become your friend and ally. But if he imposes the duty of command on
me, so strong is the point of honor, that I shall continue to make
war upon you to the best of my power. Expect nothing else.”[516]

  [516] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 38. Ἐὰν μέντοι μοι τὴν ἀρχὴν προστάττῃ,
  τοιοῦτόν τι, ὡς ἔοικε, φιλοτιμία ἐστὶ, εὖ χρὴ εἰδέναι, ὅτι
  πολεμήσω ὑμῖν ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι ἄριστα.

  Compare about φιλοτιμία, Herodot. iii, 53.

Agesilaus, struck with this answer, took his hand and said,—“Would
that with such high-minded sentiments you _could_ become our friend!
At any rate, let me assure you of this,—that I will immediately quit
your territory; and for the future, even should the war continue, I
will respect both you and all your property, as long as I can turn my
arms against any other Persians.”

Here the conversation closed; Pharnabazus mounted his horse, and
rode away. His son by Parapita, however,—at that time still
a handsome youth,—lingered behind, ran up to Agesilaus, and
exclaimed,—“Agesilaus, I make you my guest.”—“I accept it with all
my heart,”—was the answer. “Remember me by this,”—rejoined the
young Persian,—putting into the hands of Agesilaus the fine javelin
which he carried. The latter immediately took off the ornamental
trappings from the horse of his secretary Idæus, and gave them as a
return present; upon which the young man rode away with them, and
rejoined his father.[517]

  [517] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 29-41; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 13, 14;
  Xen. Agesil. iii, 5.

There is a touching interest and emphasis in this interview as
described by Xenophon, who here breathes into his tame Hellenic
chronicle something of the romantic spirit of the Cyropædia. The
pledges exchanged between Agesilaus and the son of Pharnabazus
were not forgotten by either. The latter,—being in after days
impoverished and driven into exile by his brother, during the
absence of Pharnabazus in Egypt,—was compelled to take refuge in
Greece; where Agesilaus provided him with protection and a home,
and even went so far as to employ influence in favor of an Athenian
youth, to whom the son of Pharnabazus was attached. This Athenian
youth had outgrown the age and size of the boy-runners in the Olympic
stadium; nevertheless Agesilaus, by strenuous personal interference,
overruled the reluctance of the Eleian judges, and prevailed upon
them to admit him as a competitor with the other boys.[518] The
stress laid by Xenophon upon this favor illustrates the tone of
Grecian sentiment, and shows us the variety of objects which personal
ascendency was used to compass. Disinterested in regard to himself,
Agesilaus was unscrupulous both in promoting the encroachments, and
screening the injustices, of his friends.[519] The unfair privilege
which he procured for this youth, though a small thing in itself,
could hardly fail to offend a crowd of spectators familiar with the
established conditions of the stadium, and to expose the judges to
severe censure.

  [518] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 40. πάντ᾽ ἐποίησεν, ὅπως ἂν δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον
  ἐγκριθείη εἰς τὸ στάδιον ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ, μέγιστος ὢν παίδων.

  [519] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 5-13.

Quitting the satrapy of Pharnabazus,—which was now pretty well
exhausted, while the armistice concluded with Tithraustes must have
expired,—Agesilaus took up his camp near the temple of Artemis, at
Astyra in the plain of Thêbê (in the region commonly known as Æolis),
near the Gulf of Elæus. He here employed himself in bringing together
an increased number of troops, with a view to penetrate farther
into the interior of Asia Minor during the summer. Recent events
had greatly increased the belief entertained by the Asiatics in his
superior strength; so that he received propositions from various
districts in the interior, inviting his presence, and expressing
anxiety to throw off the Persian yoke. He sought also to compose
the dissensions and misrule which had arisen out of the Lysandrian
dekarchies in the Greco-Asiatic cities, avoiding as much as possible
sharp inflictions of death or exile. How much he achieved in this
direction, we cannot tell,[520] nor can it have been possible,
indeed, to achieve much, without dismissing the Spartan harmosts and
lessening the political power of his own partisans; neither of which
he did.

  [520] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 41; Xen. Agesil. i, 35-38; Plutarch,
  Agesil. c. 14, 15; Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 100.

His plans were now all laid for penetrating farther than ever into
the interior, and for permanent conquest, if possible, of the western
portion of Persian Asia. What he would have permanently accomplished
towards this scheme, cannot be determined; for his aggressive march
was suspended by a summons home, the reason of which will appear in
the next chapter.

Meanwhile, Pharnabazus had been called from his satrapy to go and
take the command of the Persian fleet in Kilikia and the south of
Asia Minor, in conjunction with Konon. Since the revolt of Rhodes
from the Lacedæmonians, (in the summer of the preceding year,
395 B.C.) that active Athenian had achieved nothing. The burst
of activity, produced by the first visit of Pharnabazus at the
Persian court, had been paralyzed by the jealousies of the Persian
commanders, reluctant to serve under a Greek,—by peculation of
officers who embezzled the pay destined for the troops,—by mutiny
in the fleet from absence of pay,—and by the many delays arising
while the satraps, unwilling to spend their own revenues in the war,
waited for orders and remittances from court.[521] Hence Konon had
been unable to make any efficient use of his fleet, during those
months when the Lacedæmonian fleet was increased to nearly double its
former number. At length he resolved,—seemingly at the instigation
of his countrymen at home[522] as well as of Euagoras prince of
Salamis in Cyprus, and through the encouragement of Ktesias, one
of the Grecian physicians resident at the Persian court,—on going
himself into the interior to communicate personally with Artaxerxes.
Landing on the Kilikian coast, he crossed by land to Thapsakus on
the Euphrates (as the Cyreian army had marched), from whence he
sailed down the river in a boat to Babylon. It appears that he did
not see Artaxerxes, from repugnance to that ceremony of prostration
which was required from all who approached the royal person. But his
messages, transmitted through Ktesias and others,—with his confident
engagement to put down the maritime empire of Sparta and counteract
the projects of Agesilaus, if the Persian forces and money were put
into efficient action,—produced a powerful effect on the mind of
the monarch; who doubtless was not merely alarmed at the formidable
position of Agesilaus in Asia Minor, but also hated the Lacedæmonians
as main agents in the aggressive enterprise of Cyrus. Artaxerxes not
only approved his views, but made to him a large grant of money, and
transmitted peremptory orders to the coast that his officers should
be active in prosecuting the maritime war.

  [521] Compare Diodor. xv, 41 _ad fin._; and Thucyd. viii, 45.

  [522] Isokrates (Or. viii, De Pace, s. 82) alludes to “many
  embassies” as having been sent by Athens to the king of Persia,
  to protest against the Lacedæmonian dominion. But this mission of
  Konon is the only one which we can verify, prior to the battle of
  Knidus.

  Probably Dennis, the son of Pyrilampês, an eminent citizen and
  trierarch of Athens, must have been one of the companions of
  Konon in this mission. He is mentioned in an oration of Lysias
  as having received from the Great King a present of a golden
  drinking-bowl or φιάλη; and I do not know on what other occasion
  he can have received it, except in this embassy (Lysias, Or. xix,
  De Bonis Aristoph. s. 27).

What was of still greater moment, Konon was permitted to name any
person whom he chose, as admiral jointly with himself. It was by his
choice that Pharnabazus was called from his satrapy, and ordered to
act jointly as commander of the fleet. This satrap, the bravest and
most straightforward among all the Persian grandees, and just now
smarting with resentment at the devastation of his satrapy[523] by
Agesilaus, coöperated heartily with Konon. A powerful fleet, partly
Phœnician, partly Athenian or Grecian, was soon equipped, superior
in number even to the newly-organized Lacedæmonian fleet under
Peisander.[524] Euagoras, prince of Salamis in Cyprus,[525] not only
provided many triremes, but served himself, personally, on board.

  [523] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 6.

  [524] The measures of Konon and the transactions preceding the
  battle of Knidus, are very imperfectly known to us; but we may
  gather them generally from Diodorus, xiv, 81; Justin, vi, 3, 4;
  Cornelius Nepos, Vit. Conon. c. 2, 3; Ktesiæ Fragment, c. 62, 63,
  ed. Bähr.

  Isokrates (Orat. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 165; compare Orat. ix,
  (Euagor.) s. 77) speaks loosely as to the duration of time that
  the Persian fleet remained blocked up by the Lacedæmonians before
  Konon obtained his final and vigorous orders from Artaxerxes,
  unless we are to understand his _three years_ as referring to
  the first news of outfit of ships of war in Phœnicia, brought to
  Sparta by Herodas, as Schneider understands them; and even then
  the statement that the Persian fleet remained πολιορκούμενον
  for all this time, would be much exaggerated. Allowing for
  exaggeration, however, Isokrates coincides generally with the
  authorities above noticed.

  It would appear that Ktesias the physician obtained about this
  time permission to quit the court of Persia and come back to
  Greece. Perhaps he may have been induced (like Demokêdes of
  Kroton, one hundred and twenty years before) to promote the views
  of Konon in order to get for himself this permission.

  In the meagre abstract of Ktesias given by Photius (c. 63)
  mention is made of some Lacedæmonian envoys who were now going up
  to the Persian court, and were watched or detained on the way.
  This mission can hardly have taken place before the battle of
  Knidus; for then Agesilaus was in the full tide of success, and
  contemplating the largest plans of aggression against Persia. It
  must have taken place, I presume, after the battle.

  [525] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Euagoras) s. 67. Εὐαγόρου δὲ ~αὑτόν
  τε παρασχόντος~, καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως τὴν πλείστην παρασκευάσαντος.
  Compare s. 83 of the same oration. Compare Pausanias, i, 3, 1.

It was about the month of July, 394 B.C., that Pharnabazus and
Konon brought their united fleet to the south-western corner of Asia
Minor; first, probably, to the friendly island of Rhodes, next,
off Loryma[526] and the mountain called Dorion on the peninsula of
Knidus.[527] Peisander, with the fleet of Sparta and her allies,
sailed out from Knidus to meet them, and both parties prepared for
a battle. The numbers of the Lacedæmonians are reported by Diodorus
at eighty-five triremes; those of Konon and Pharnabazus at above
ninety. But Xenophon, without particularizing the number on either
side, seems to intimate the disparity as far greater; stating that
the entire fleet of Peisander was considerably inferior even to the
Grecian division under Konon, without reckoning the Phœnician ships
under Pharnabazus.[528] In spite of such inferiority, Peisander did
not shrink from the encounter. Though a young man without military
skill, he possessed a full measure of Spartan courage and pride;
moreover,—since the Spartan maritime empire was only maintained by
the assumed superiority of his fleet,—had he confessed himself
too weak to fight, his enemies would have gone unopposed around
the islands to excite revolt. Accordingly, he sailed forth from
the harbor of Knidus. But when the two fleets were ranged opposite
to each other, and the battle was about to commence,—so manifest
and alarming was the superiority of the Athenians and Persians,
that his Asiatic allies on the left division, noway hearty in the
cause, fled almost without striking a blow. Under such discouraging
circumstances, he nevertheless led his fleet into action with the
greatest valor. But his trireme was overwhelmed by numbers, broken
in various places by the beaks of the enemy’s ships, and forced back
upon the land, together with a large portion of his fleet. Many of
the crews jumped out and got to land, abandoning their triremes to
the conquerors. Peisander, too, might have escaped in the same way;
but disdaining either to survive his defeat or to quit his ship, fell
gallantly fighting aboard. The victory of Konon and Pharnabazus was
complete. More than half of the Spartan ships were either captured
or destroyed, though the neighborhood of the land enabled a large
proportion of the crews to escape to Knidus, so that no great number
of prisoners were taken.[529] Among the allies of Sparta, the chief
loss of course fell upon those who were most attached to her cause;
the disaffected or lukewarm were those who escaped by flight at the
beginning.

  [526] Diodor. xiv, 83. διέτριβον περὶ Λώρυμα τῆς Χερσονήσου.

  It is hardly necessary to remark, that the word _Chersonesus_
  here (and in xiv, 89) does not mean the peninsula of Thrace
  commonly known by that name, forming the European side of the
  Hellespont,—but the peninsula on which Knidus is situated.

  [527] Pausan. vi, 3, 6. περὶ Κνίδον καὶ ὄρος τὸ Δώριον
  ὀνομαζόμενον.

  [528] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 12. Φαρνάβαζον, ναύαρχον ὄντα, ξὺν
  ταῖς Φοινίσσαις εἶναι. Κόνωνα δὲ, τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἔχοντα, τετάχθαι
  ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ. Ἀντιπαραταξαμένου δὲ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου, καὶ ~πολὺ
  ἐλαττόνων αὐτῷ τῶν νεῶν φανεισῶν τῶν αὑτοῦ τοῦ μετὰ Κόνωνος
  Ἑλληνικοῦ~, etc.

  [529] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 10-14; Diodor. xiv, 83; Cornelius
  Nepos, Conon, c. 4; Justin, vi, 3.

Such was the memorable triumph of Konon at Knidus; the reversal of
that of Lysander at Ægospotami eleven years before. Its important
effects will be recounted in the coming chapter.




CHAPTER LXXIV.

FROM THE BATTLE OF KNIDUS TO THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF
ATHENS.


Having in my last chapter carried the series of Asiatic events down
to the battle of Knidus, in the beginning of August, B.C. 394, at
which period war was already raging on the other side of the Ægean,
in Greece Proper,—I now take up the thread of events from a period
somewhat earlier, to show how this last-mentioned war, commonly
called the Corinthian war, began.

At the accession of Agesilaus to the throne, in 398 B.C., the power
of Sparta throughout all Greece from Laconia to Thessaly, was greater
than it had ever been, and greater than any Grecian state had ever
enjoyed before. The burden of the long war against Athens she had
borne in far less proportion than her allies; its fruits she had
reaped exclusively for herself. There prevailed consequently among
her allies a general discontent, which Thebes as well as Corinth
manifested by refusing to take part in the recent expeditions;
either of Pausanias against Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles in
Peiræus,—or of Agis against the Eleians,—or of Agesilaus against
the Persians in Asia Minor. The Eleians were completely humbled
by the invasions of Agis; all the other cities in Peloponnesus,
from apprehension, from ancient habit, and from being governed by
oligarchies who leaned on Sparta for support, were obedient to her
authority,—with the single exception of Argos, which remained, as
before, neutral and quiet, though in sentiment unfriendly. Athens
was a simple unit in the catalogue of Spartan allies, furnishing
her contingent, like the rest, to be commanded by the xenâgus,—or
officer sent from Sparta for the special purpose of commanding such
foreign contingents.

In the northern regions of Greece, the advance of Spartan power
is yet more remarkable. Looking back to the year 419 B.C. (about
two years after the peace of Nikias), Sparta had been so unable to
protect her colony of Herakleia, in Trachis on the Maliac Gulf,
near the strait of Thermopylæ, that the Bœotians were obliged
to send a garrison thither, in order to prevent it from falling
into the hands of Athens. They even went so far as to dismiss the
Lacedæmonian harmost.[530] In the winter of 409-408 B.C., another
disaster had happened at Herakleia, in which the Lacedæmonian harmost
was slain.[531] But about 399 B.C., we find Sparta exercising an
energetic ascendency at Herakleia, and even making that place a
central post for keeping down the people in the neighborhood of Mount
Œta and a portion of Thessaly. Herippidas, the Lacedæmonian, was sent
thither to repress some factious movements, with a force sufficient
to enable him to overawe the public assembly, to seize the obnoxious
party in the place, and to put them to death, five hundred in number,
outside of the gates.[532] Carrying his arms farther against the
Œtæans and Trachinians in the neighborhood, who had been long at
variance with the Laconian colonists at Herakleia, he expelled them
from their abodes, and forced them to migrate with their wives and
children into Thessaly.[533] Hence, the Lacedæmonians were enabled
to extend their influence into parts of Thessaly, and to place a
harmost with a garrison in Pharsalus, resting upon Herakleia as a
basis,—which thus became a position of extraordinary importance for
their dominion over the northern regions.

  [530] Thucyd. v, 52.

  [531] Xen. Hellen. i, 2, 18.

  [532] Diodor. xiv, 38; Polyæn. ii, 21.

  [533] Diodorus, _ut sup._; compare xiv, 81. τοὺς Τραχινίους
  φεύγοντας ἐκ τῶν πατρίδων ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, etc.

With the real power of Sparta thus greatly augmented on land, in
addition to her vast empire at sea, bringing its ample influx of
tribute,—and among cities who had not merely long recognized her
as leader, but had never recognized any one else,—it required an
unusual stimulus to raise any formidable hostile combination against
her, notwithstanding a large spread of disaffection and antipathy.
The stimulus came from Persia, from whose treasures the means had
been before furnished to Sparta herself for subduing Athens. The
news that a formidable navy was fitting out in Phœnicia, which had
prompted the expedition of Agesilaus in the spring of 396 B.C., was
doubtless circulated and heard with satisfaction among the Grecian
cities unfriendly to Sparta; and the refusal of Thebes, Corinth, and
Athens, to take service under that prince,—aggravated in the case
of the Thebans by a positive offence given to him on the occasion of
his sacrifice at Aulis,—was enough to warn Sparta of the dangerous
sentiments and tendencies by which she was surrounded near home.

It was upon these tendencies that the positive instigation and
promises of Persia were brought to bear, in the course of the
following year; and not merely promises, but pecuniary supplies,
with news of revived naval warfare threatening the insular dominion
of Sparta. Tithraustes, the new satrap, who had put to death and
succeeded Tissaphernes, had no sooner concluded the armistice
mentioned above, and prevailed upon Agesilaus to remove his army
into the satrapy of Pharnabazus, than he employed active measures
for kindling war against Sparta in Greece, in order to create a
necessity for the recall of Agesilaus out of Asia. He sent a Rhodian
named Timokrates into Greece, as envoy to the cities most unfriendly
to the Lacedæmonians, with a sum of fifty talents;[534] directing
him to employ this money in gaining over the leading men in these
cities, and to exchange solemn oaths of alliance and aid with
Persia, for common hostility against Sparta. The island of Rhodes
having just revolted from the Spartan dominion, had admitted Konon
with the Persian fleet (as I have mentioned in the last chapter),
so that probably the Rhodian envoy was on a mission to Tithraustes
on behalf of his countrymen. He was an appropriate envoy on this
occasion, as having an animated interest in raising up new enemies
to Sparta, and as being hearty in stirring up among the Thebans and
Corinthians the same spirit which had led to the revolt of Rhodes.
The effect which that revolt produced in alarming and exasperating
the Spartans, has been already noticed; and we may fairly presume
that its effect on the other side, in encouraging their Grecian
enemies, was considerable. Timokrates visited Thebes, Corinth, and
Argos, distributing his funds. He concluded engagements on behalf
of the satrap, with various leading men in each, putting them into
communication with each other; Ismenias, Androkleidas, and others in
Thebes,—Timolaus and Polyanthes at Corinth,—Kylon and others at
Argos. It appears that he did not visit Athens; at least, Xenophon
expressly says that none of his money went there. The working of this
mission,—coupled, we must recollect, with the renewed naval warfare
on the coast of Asia, and the promise of a Persian fleet against
that of Sparta,—was soon felt in the more pronounced manifestation
of anti-Laconian sentiments in these various cities, and in the
commencement of attempts to establish alliance between them.[535]

  [534] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 1. Πέμπει Τιμοκράτην Ῥόδιον εἰς τὴν
  Ἑλλάδα, δοὺς χρυσίον ἐς πεντήκοντα τάλαντα ἀργυρίου, καὶ κελεύει
  πειρᾶσθαι, πιστὰ τὰ μέγιστα λαμβάνοντα, διδόναι τοῖς προεστηκόσιν
  ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τε πόλεμον ἐξοίσειν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους.

  Timokrates is ordered to give the money; yet not absolutely, but
  only on a certain condition, in case he should find that such
  condition could be realized; that is, if by giving it he could
  procure from various leading Greeks sufficient assurances and
  guarantees that they would raise war against Sparta. As this was
  a matter more or less doubtful, Timokrates is ordered to _try
  to give the money for this purpose_. Though the construction of
  πειρᾶσθαι couples it with διδόναι, the sense of the word more
  properly belongs to ἐξοίσειν—which designates the purpose to be
  accomplished.

  [535] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 2; Pausan. iii, 9, 4; Plutarch,
  Artaxerxes, c. 20.

With that Laconian bias which pervades his Hellenica, Xenophon
represents the coming war against Sparta, as if it had been brought
about mainly by these bribes from Persia to the leading men in
these various cities. I have stated on more than one occasion, that
the average public morality of Grecian individual politicians in
Sparta, Athens, and other cities, was not such as to exclude personal
corruption; that it required a morality higher than the average, when
such temptation was resisted,—and a morality considerably higher
than the average, if it were systematically resisted, and for a long
life, as by Perikles and Nikias. There would be nothing therefore
surprising, if Ismenias and the rest had received bribes under the
circumstances here mentioned. But it appears highly improbable that
the money given by Timokrates could have been a bribe; that is,
given privately, and for the separate use of these leaders. It was
furnished for the promotion of a certain public object, which could
not be accomplished without heavy disbursements; it was analogous
to that sum of thirty talents which (as Xenophon himself tells us)
Tithraustes had just given to Agesilaus, as an inducement to carry
away his army into the satrapy of Pharnabazus (not as a present for
the private purse of the Spartan king, but as a contribution to
the wants of the army),[536] or to that which the satrap Tiribazus
gave to Antalkidas afterwards,[537] also for public objects.
Xenophon affirms, that Ismenias and the rest, having received these
presents from Timokrates, accused the Lacedæmonians and rendered
them odious,—each in his respective city.[538] But it is certain,
from his own showing, that the hatred towards them existed in these
cities, before the arrival of Timokrates. In Argos, such hatred was
of old standing; in Corinth and Thebes, though kindled only since the
close of the war, it was not the less pronounced. Moreover, Xenophon
himself informs us, that the Athenians, though they received none of
the money,[539] were quite as ready for war as the other cities. If
we therefore admit his statement as a matter of fact, that Timokrates
gave private presents to various leading politicians, which is by no
means improbable,—we must dissent from the explanatory use which he
makes of this fact by setting it out prominently as the cause of the
war. What these leading men would find it difficult to raise was,
not hatred to Sparta, but confidence and courage to brave the power
of Sparta. And for this purpose the mission of Timokrates would be
a valuable aid, by conveying assurances of Persian coöperation and
support against Sparta. He must have been produced publicly either
before the people, the senate, or at least the great body of the
anti-Laconian party in each city. And the money which he brought with
him, though a portion of it may have gone in private presents, would
serve to this party as the best warrant for the sincerity of the
satrap.

  [536] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 26.

  [537] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 16.

  [538] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 2. Οἱ μὲν δὴ δεξάμενοι τὰ χρήματα ἐς
  τὰς οἰκείας πόλεις διέβαλλον τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους· ἐπεὶ δὲ ταύτας
  ἐς μῖσος αὐτῶν προήγαγον, συνίστασαν καὶ τὰς μεγίστας πόλεις πρὸς
  ἀλλήλας.

  [539] Xenophon, _ut sup._

  Pausanias (iii, 9, 4) names some Athenians as having received
  part of the money. So Plutarch also, in general terms (Agesil. c.
  15).

  Diodorus mentions nothing respecting either the mission or the
  presents of Timokrates.

Whatever negotiations may have been in progress between the cities
visited by Timokrates, no union had been brought about between them
when the war, kindled by an accident, broke out as a “Bœotian
war,”[540] between Thebes and Sparta separately. Between the Opuntian
Lokrians and the Phokians, north of Bœotia, there was a strip of
disputed border land; respecting which the Phokians, imputing
wrongful encroachment to the Lokrians, invaded their territory. The
Lokrians, allied with Thebes, entreated her protection; upon which
a body of Bœotians invaded Phokis; while the Phokians on their
side threw themselves upon Lacedæmon, invoking her aid against
Thebes.[541] “The Lacedæmonians (says Xenophon) were delighted to
get a pretence for making war against the Thebans,—having been long
angry with them on several different grounds. They thought that the
present was an excellent time for marching against them, and putting
down their insolence; since Agesilaus was in full success in Asia,
and there was no other war to embarrass them in Greece.”[542] The
various grounds on which the Lacedæmonians rested their displeasure
against Thebes, begin from a time immediately succeeding the close of
the war against Athens, and the sentiment was now both established
and vehement. It was they who now began the Bœotian war; not the
Thebans, nor the bribes brought by Timokrates.

  [540] Πόλεμος Βοιωτικός (Diodor. xiv, 81).

  [541] Xenophon (Hellen. iii, 5, 3) says,—and Pausanias (iii, 9,
  4) follows him,—That the Theban leaders, wishing to bring about
  a war with Sparta, and knowing that Sparta would not begin it,
  purposely incited the Lokrians to encroach upon this disputed
  border, in order that the Phokians might resent it, and that thus
  a war might be lighted up. I have little hesitation in rejecting
  this version, which I conceive to have arisen from Xenophon’s
  philo-Laconian and miso-Theban tendency, and in believing that
  the fight between the Lokrians and Phokians, as well as that
  between the Phokians and Thebans, arose without any design on the
  part of the latter to provoke Sparta. So Diodorus recounts it, in
  reference to the war between the Phokians and the Thebans; for
  about the Lokrians he says nothing (xiv, 81).

  The subsequent events, as recounted by Xenophon himself, show
  that the Spartans were not only ready in point of force, but
  eager in regard to will, to go to war with the Thebans; while the
  latter were not at all ready to go to war with Sparta. They had
  not a single ally; for their application to Athens, in itself
  doubtful, was not made until after Sparta had declared war
  against them.

  [542] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 5. Οἱ μέντοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι ~ἄσμενοι
  ἔλαβον πρόφασιν στρατεύειν ἐπὶ τοὺς Θηβαίους, πάλαι ὀργιζόμενοι~
  αὐτοῖς, τῆς τε ἀντιλήψεως τῆς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος δεκάτης ἐν Δεκελείᾳ,
  καὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ μὴ ἐθελῆσαι ἀκολουθῆσαι· ᾐτιῶντο δ᾽
  αὐτοὺς, καὶ Κορινθίους πεῖσαι μὴ συστρατεύειν. Ἀνεμιμνήσκοντο δὲ
  καὶ, ὡς θύοντ᾽ ἐν Αὐλίδι τὸν Ἀγησίλαον οὐκ εἴων, καὶ τὰ τεθυμένα
  ἱερὰ ὡς ἔῤῥιψαν ἀπὸ τοῦ βωμοῦ· καὶ ὅτι οὐδ᾽ εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν
  συνεστράτευον Ἀγησιλάῳ. Ἐλογίζοντο δὲ καὶ καλὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἐξάγειν
  στρατιὰν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς, καὶ παῦσαι τῆς ἐς αὐτοὺς ὕβρεως· τά τε γὰρ
  ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ καλῶς σφίσιν ἔχειν, κρατοῦντος Ἀγησιλάου, καὶ ἐν τῇ
  Ἑλλάδι οὐδένα ἄλλον πόλεμον ἐμποδὼν σφίσιν εἶναι. Compare vii, 1,
  34.

  The description here given by Xenophon himself,—of the
  past dealing and established sentiment between Sparta and
  Thebes,—refutes his allegation, that it was the bribes brought
  by Timokrates to the leading Thebans which first blew up the
  hatred against Sparta; and shows farther, that Sparta did not
  need any circuitous manœuvres of the Thebans, to furnish her with
  a pretext for going to war.

The energetic and ambitious Lysander, who had before instigated the
expedition of Agesilaus across the Ægean, and who had long hated
the Thebans,—was among the foremost advisers of the expedition now
decreed by the ephors against Thebes,[543] as well as the chief
commander appointed to carry it into execution. He was despatched
with a small force to act on the north of Bœotia. He was directed
to start from Herakleia, the centre of Lacedæmonian influence in
those regions,—to muster the Herakleots, together with the various
dependent populations in the neighborhood of Œta, Œtæans, Malians,
Ænianes, etc.—to march towards Bœotia, taking up the Phokians
in his way,—and to attack Haliartus. Under the walls of this
town king Pausanias engaged to meet him on a given day, with the
native Lacedæmonian force and the Peloponnesian allies. For this
purpose, having obtained favorable border sacrifices, he marched
forth to Tegea, and there employed himself in collecting the allied
contingents from Peloponnesus.[544] But the allies generally were
tardy and reluctant in the cause; while the Corinthians withheld
all concurrence and support,[545]—though neither did they make any
manifestation in favor of Thebes.

  [543] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 28.

  [544] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 6, 7.

  [545] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 23.

  The conduct of the Corinthians here contributes again to refute
  the assertion of Xenophon about the effect of the bribes of
  Timokrates.

Finding themselves thus exposed to a formidable attack on two sides,
from Sparta at the height of her power, and from a Spartan officer
of known ability,—being, moreover, at the same time without a
single ally,—the Thebans resolved to entreat succor from Athens. A
Theban embassy to Athens for any purpose, and especially for this
purpose, was itself among the strongest marks of the revolution which
had taken place in Grecian politics. The antipathy between the
two cities had been so long and virulent, that the Thebans, at the
close of the war, had endeavored to induce Sparta to root out the
Athenian population. Their conduct subsequently had been favorable
and sympathizing towards Thrasybulus in his struggle against the
Thirty, and that leader had testified his gratitude by dedicating
statues in the Theban Herakleion.[546] But it was by no means clear
that Athens would feel herself called upon, either by policy or by
sentiment, to assist them in the present emergency; at a moment when
she had no Long Walls, no fortifications at Peiræus, no ships, nor
any protection against the Spartan maritime power.

  [546] Pausanias, ix, 11, 4.

It was not until Pausanias and Lysander were both actually engaged in
mustering their forces, that the Thebans sent to address the Athenian
assembly. The speech of the Theban envoy sets forth strikingly the
case against Sparta as it then stood. Disclaiming all concurrence
with that former Theban deputy, who, without any instructions, had
taken on himself to propose, in the Spartan assembly of allies,
extreme severity towards the conquered Athenians,—he reminded the
Athenians that Thebes had by unanimous voice declined obeying the
summons of the Spartans, to aid in the march against Thrasybulus
and the Peiræus; and that this was the first cause of the anger
of the Spartans against her. On that ground, then, he appealed to
the gratitude of democratical Athens against the Lacedæmonians.
But he likewise invoked against them, with yet greater confidence,
the aid of oligarchical Athens,—or of those who at that time had
stood opposed to Thrasybulus and the Peiræus; for it was Sparta who,
having first set up the oligarchy at Athens, had afterwards refused
to sustain it, and left its partisans to the generosity of their
democratical opponents, by whom alone they were saved harmless.[547]
Of course Athens was eager, if possible (so he presumed), to regain
her lost empire; and in this enterprise he tendered the cordial
aid of Thebes as an ally. He pointed out that it was by no means
an impracticable enterprise; looking to the universal hatred which
Sparta had now drawn upon herself, not less on the part of ancient
allies than of prior enemies. The Athenians knew by experience that
Thebes could be formidable as a foe; she would now show that she
could be yet more effective as a friend, if the Athenians would
interfere to rescue her. Moreover, she was now about to fight, not
for Syracusans or Asiatics, but for her own preservation and dignity.
“We hesitate not to affirm, men of Athens (concluded the Theban
speaker), that what we are now invoking at your hands is a greater
benefit to you than it is to ourselves.”[548]

  [547] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 9.

  Πολὺ δ᾽ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦμεν, ὅσοι τῶν ἐν ἄστει ἐγένεσθε, προθύμως
  ἐπὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἰέναι. Ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ, καταστήσαντες ὑμᾶς ἐς
  ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ ἐς ἔχθραν τῷ δήμῳ, ἀφικόμενοι πολλῇ δυνάμει, ὡς
  ὑμῖν σύμμαχοι, παρέδοσαν ὑμᾶς τῷ πλήθει· ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις
  εἶναι, ἀπολώλατε, ὁ δὲ δῆμος οὑτοσὶ ὑμᾶς ἔσωσε.

  [548] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 9, 16.

Eight years had now elapsed since the archonship of Eukleides and
the renovation of the democracy after the crushing visitation of
the Thirty. Yet we may see, from the important and well-turned
allusion of the Theban speaker to the oligarchical portion of the
assembly, that the two parties still stood in a certain measure
distinguished. Enfeebled as Athens had been left by the war, she
had never since been called upon to take any decisive and emphatic
vote on a question of foreign policy; and much now turned upon the
temper of the oligarchical minority, which might well be conceived
likely to play a party game and speculate upon Spartan countenance.
But the comprehensive amnesty decreed on the reëstablishment of the
democratical constitution,—and the wise and generous forbearance
with which it had been carried out, in spite of the most torturing
recollections,—were now found to have produced their fruits.
Majority and minority,—democrats and oligarchs,—were seen
confounded in one unanimous and hearty vote to lend assistance to
Thebes, in spite of all risk from hostility with Sparta. We cannot
indeed doubt that this vote was considerably influenced also by the
revolt of Rhodes, by the reappearance of Konon with a fleet in the
Asiatic seas, and by private communications from that commander
intimating his hope of acting triumphantly against the maritime power
of Sparta, through enlarged aid from Persia. The vote had thus a
double meaning. It proclaimed not merely the restored harmony between
democrats and oligarchs at Athens, but also their common resolution
to break the chain by which they were held as mere satellites and
units in the regiment of Spartan allies, and to work out anew the
old traditions of Athens as a self-acting and primary power, at
least,—if not once again an imperial power. The vote proclaimed
a renovated life in Athens, and its boldness under the existing
weakness of the city, is extolled two generations afterwards by
Demosthenes.[549]

  [549] Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 28, p. 258; also Philipp. i, c. 7,
  p. 44. Compare also Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo, s. 15).

After having heard the Theban orator (we are told even by the
philo-Laconian Xenophon),[550] “very many Athenian citizens rose
and spoke in support of his prayer, and the whole assembly with one
accord voted to grant it.” Thrasybulus proposed the resolution, and
communicated it to the Theban envoys.

  [550] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 16. Τῶν δ᾽ Ἀθηναίων παμπολλοὶ μὲν
  ξυνηγόρευον, πάντες δ᾽ ἐψηφίσαντο βοηθεῖν αὐτοῖς.

He told them that Athens knew well the risk which she was incurring
while Peiræus was undefended; but nevertheless she was prepared to
show her gratitude by giving more in requital than she had received;
for she was prepared to give the Thebans positive aid, in case they
were attacked—while the Thebans had done nothing more for _her_ than
to refuse to join in an aggressive march against her.[551]

  [551] Xen. Hellen. _ut sup._

  Pausanias (iii, 9, 6) says that the Athenians sent envoys to the
  Spartans to entreat them not to act aggressively against Thebes,
  but to submit their complaint to equitable adjustment. This seems
  to me improbable. Diodorus (xiv, 81) briefly states the general
  fact in conformity with Xenophon.

Without such assurance of succor from Athens, it is highly probable
that the Thebans might have been afraid to face, single-handed,
Lysander and the full force of Sparta. But they now prepared for a
strenuous defence. The first approach of Lysander with his army of
Herakleots, Phokians, and others, from the north, was truly menacing;
the more so, as Orchomenus, the second city next to Thebes in the
Bœotian confederacy, broke off its allegiance and joined him. The
supremacy of Thebes over the cities composing the Bœotian confederacy
appears to have been often harsh and oppressive, though probably not
equally oppressive towards all, and certainly not equally odious to
all. To Platæa on the extreme south of Bœotia, it had been long
intolerable, and the unhappy fate of that little town has saddened
many pages of my preceding volumes; to Orchomenus, on the extreme
north, it was also unpalatable,—partly because that town stood next
in power and importance to Thebes,—partly because it had an imposing
legendary antiquity, and claimed to have been once the ascendant city
receiving tribute from Thebes. The Orchomenians now joined Lysander,
threw open to him the way into Bœotia, and conducted him with his
army, after first ravaging the fields of Lebadeia, into the district
belonging to Haliartus.[552]

  [552] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 17; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 28.

Before Lysander quitted Sparta, the plan of operations concerted
between him and Pausanias, was that they should meet on a given
day in the territory of Haliartus. And in execution of this plan
Pausanias had already advanced with his Peloponnesian army as far
as Platæa in Bœotia. Whether the day fixed between them had yet
arrived, when Lysander reached Haliartus, we cannot determine with
certainty. In the imperfection of the Grecian calendar, a mistake on
this point would be very conceivable,—as had happened between the
Athenian generals Hippokrates and Demosthenes in those measures which
preceded the battle of Delium in 424 B.C.[553] But the engagement
must have been taken by both parties, subject to obstructions in the
way,—since each would have to march through a hostile country to
reach the place of meeting. The words of Xenophon, however, rather
indicate that the day fixed had not arrived; nevertheless, Lysander
resolved at once to act against Haliartus, without waiting for
Pausanias. There were as yet only a few Thebans in the town, and he,
probably, had good reasons for judging that he would better succeed
by rapid measures, before any more Thebans could arrive, than by
delaying until the other Spartan army should join him; not to mention
anxiety that the conquest should belong to himself exclusively,
and confidence arising from his previous success at Orchomenus.
Accordingly, he sent in an invitation to the Haliartians to follow
the example of the Orchomenians, to revolt from Thebes, and to stand
upon their autonomy under Lacedæmonian protection. Perhaps there may
have been a party in the town disposed to comply. But the majority,
encouraged too by the Thebans within, refused the proposition; upon
which Lysander marched up to the walls and assaulted the town. He was
here engaged, close by the gates, in examining where he could best
effect an entrance, when a fresh division of Thebans, apprised of
his proceedings, was seen approaching from Thebes, at their fastest
pace,—cavalry, as well as hoplites. They were probably seen from
the watch-towers in the city earlier than they became visible to
the assailants without; so that the Haliartians, encouraged by the
sight, threw open their gates, and made a sudden sally. Lysander,
seemingly taken by surprise, was himself slain among the first, with
his prophet by his side, by a Haliartian hoplite named Neochôrus. His
troops stood some time, against both the Haliartians from the town,
and the fresh Thebans who now came up. But they were at length driven
back with considerable loss, and compelled to retreat to rugged and
difficult ground at some distance in their rear. Here, however, they
made good their position, repelling their assailants with the loss of
more than two hundred hoplites.[554]

  [553] Thucyd. iv, 89. γενομένης διαμαρτίας τῶν ἡμερῶν, etc.

  [554] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 18, 19, 20; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 28,
  29; Pausan. iii, 5, 4.

  The two last differ in various matters from Xenophon, whose
  account, however, though brief, seems to me to deserve the
  preference.

The success here gained, though highly valuable as an encouragement
to the Thebans, would have been counterbalanced by the speedy
arrival of Pausanias, had not Lysander himself been among the
slain. But the death of so eminent a man was an irreparable loss to
Sparta. His army, composed of heterogeneous masses, both collected
and held together by his personal ascendency, lost confidence and
dispersed in the ensuing night.[555] When Pausanias arrived soon
afterwards, he found no second army to join with him. Yet his own
force was more than sufficient to impress terror on the Thebans,
had not Thrasybulus, faithful to the recent promise, arrived with
an imposing body of Athenian hoplites, together with cavalry under
Orthobulus[556]—and imparted fresh courage as well as adequate
strength to the Theban cause.

  [555] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 21. ἀπεληλυθότας ἐν νυκτὶ τούς τε
  Φωκέας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας οἴκαδε ἑκάστους, etc.

  [556] Lysias, Or. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 15, 16.

Pausanias had first to consider what steps he would take to recover
the bodies of the slain,—that of Lysander among them; whether he
would fight a battle and thus take his chance of becoming master
of the field,—or send the usual petition for burial-truce, which
always implied confession of inferiority. On submitting the point
to a council of officers and Spartan elders, their decision as well
as his own was against fighting; not, however, without an indignant
protest from some of the Spartan elders. He considered that the whole
original plan of operations was broken up, since not only the great
name and genius of Lysander had perished, but his whole army had
spontaneously disbanded; that the Peloponnesian allies were generally
lukewarm and reluctant, not to be counted upon for energetic behavior
in case of pressing danger; that he had little or no cavalry,[557]
while the Theban cavalry was numerous and excellent; lastly, that
the dead body of Lysander himself lay so close to the walls of
Haliartus, that even if the Lacedæmonians were victorious, they could
not carry it off without serious loss from the armed defenders in
their towers.[558] Such were the reasons which determined Pausanias
and the major part of the council to send and solicit a truce. But
the Thebans refused to grant it except on condition that they should
immediately evacuate Bœotia. Though such a requisition was contrary
to the received practice of Greece,[559] which imposed on the victor
the duty of granting the burial-truce unconditionally, whenever it
was asked and inferiority thus publicly confessed,—nevertheless,
such was the reluctant temper of the army, that they heard not merely
with acquiescence, but with joy,[560] the proposition of departing.
The bodies were duly buried,—that of Lysander in the territory of
Panopê, immediately across the Phokian border, but not far from
Haliartus. And no sooner were these solemnities completed, than the
Lacedæmonian army was led back to Peloponnesus; their dejection
forming a mournful contrast to the triumphant insolence of the
Thebans, who watched their march and restrained them, not without
occasional blows, from straggling out of the road into the cultivated
fields.[561]

  [557] Accordingly we learn from an oration of Lysias, that the
  service of the Athenian horsemen in this expedition, who were
  commanded by Orthobulus, was judged to be extremely safe and
  easy; while that of the hoplites was dangerous (Lysias, Orat.
  xvi, pro Mantith. s. 15).

  [558] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 23. Κορίνθιοι μὲν παντάπασιν οὐκ
  ἠκολούθουν αὐτοῖς, οἱ δὲ παρόντες οὐ προθύμως στρατεύοιντο, etc.

  [559] See the conduct of the Thebans on this very point (of
  giving up the slain at the solicitation of the conquered
  Athenians for burial) after the battle of Delium, and the
  discussion thereupon,—in this History, Vol. VI, ch. liii, p. 393
  _seq._

  [560] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 24. Οἱ δὲ ἄσμενοί τε ταῦτα ἤκουσαν,
  etc.

  [561] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 24.

The death of Lysander produced the most profound sorrow and
resentment at Sparta. On returning thither, Pausanias found himself
the subject of such virulent accusation, that he thought it prudent
to make his escape, and take sanctuary in the temple of Athênê Alea,
at Tegea. He was impeached, and put on trial during his absence, on
two counts; first, for having been behind the time covenanted, in
meeting Lysander at Haliartus; next for having submitted to ask a
truce from the Thebans, instead of fighting a battle for the purpose
of obtaining the bodies of the slain.

As far as there is evidence to form a judgment, it does not appear
that Pausanias was guilty upon either of the two counts. The first
is a question of fact; and it seems quite as likely that Lysander
was before his time, as that Pausanias was behind his time, in
arriving at Haliartus. Besides, Lysander, arriving there first,
would have been quite safe, had he not resolved to attack without
delay; in which the chances of war turned out against him; though
the resolution in itself may have been well conceived. Next, as to
the truce solicited for burying the dead bodies,—it does not appear
that Pausanias could with any prudence have braved the chances of a
battle. The facts of the case,—even as summed up by Xenophon, who
always exaggerates everything in favor of the Spartans,—lead us to
this conclusion. A few of the Spartan elders would doubtless prefer
perishing on the field of battle, to the humiliation of sending in
the herald to ask for a truce. But the mischief of fighting a battle
under the influence of such a point of honor, to the exclusion of
a rational estimate of consequences, will be seen when we come to
the battle of Leuktra, where Kleombrotus, son of Pausanias was thus
piqued into an imprudence (at least this is alleged as one of the
motives) to which his own life and the dominion of Sparta became
forfeit.[562] Moreover, the army of Pausanias, comprising very few
Spartans, consisted chiefly of allies who had no heart in the cause,
and who were glad to be required by the Thebans to depart. If he
had fought a battle and lost it, the detriment to Sparta would have
been most serious in every way; whereas, if he had gained a victory,
no result would have followed except the acquisition of the bodies
for burial; since the execution of the original plan had become
impracticable through the dispersion of the army of Lysander.

  [562] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 5.

Though a careful examination of the facts leads us (and seems also
to have led Xenophon[563]) to the conclusion that Pausanias was
innocent, he was nevertheless found guilty in his absence. He was in
great part borne down by the grief felt at Sparta for the loss of
Lysander, with whom he had been before in political rivalry, and for
whose death he was made responsible. Moreover, the old accusation
was now revived against him,[564]—for which he had been tried,
and barely acquitted, eight years before,—of having tolerated the
reëstablishment of the Athenian democracy at a time when he might
have put it down. Without doubt this argument told prodigiously
against him at the present juncture, when the Athenians had just
now, for the first time since the surrender of their city, renounced
their subjection to Sparta and sent an army to assist the Thebans in
their defence. So violent was the sentiment against Pausanias, that
he was condemned to death in his absence, and passed the remainder of
his life as an exile in sanctuary at Tegea. His son, Agesipolis, was
invested with the sceptre in his place.

  [563] The traveller Pausanias justifies the prudence of his regal
  namesake in avoiding a battle, by saying that the Athenians
  were in his rear, and the Thebans in his front; and that he was
  afraid of being assailed on both sides at once, like Leonidas at
  Thermopylæ and like the troops enclosed in Sphakteria (Paus. iii,
  5, 5).

  But the matter of fact, on which this justification rests,
  is contradicted by Xenophon, who says that the Athenians had
  actually joined the Thebans, and were in the same ranks—ἐλθόντες
  ξυμπαρετάξαντο (Hellen. iii, 5, 22).

  [564] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 25. Καὶ ὅτι τὸν δῆμον τῶν Ἀθηναίων
  λαβὼν ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ ἀνῆκε, etc. Compare Pausanias, iii, 5, 3.

A brief remark will not be here misplaced. On no topic have Grecian
historians been more profuse in their reproaches, than upon the
violence and injustice of democracy, at Athens and elsewhere, in
condemning unsuccessful, but innocent generals. Out of the many cases
in which this reproach is advanced, there are very few wherein it
has been made good; but even if we grant it to be valid against
Athens and her democracy, the fate of Pausanias will show us that
the ephors and senate of anti-democratical Sparta were capable of
the like unjust misjudgment. Hardly a single instance of Athenian
condemnation occurs, which we can so clearly prove to be undeserved,
as this of a Spartan king.

Turning from the banished king to Lysander,—the Spartans had indeed
valid reasons for deploring the fall of the latter. He had procured
for them their greatest and most decisive victories, and the time was
coming when they needed his services to procure them more; for he
left behind him no man of equal warlike resource, cunning, and power
of command. But if he possessed those abilities which powerfully
helped Sparta to triumph over her enemies, he at the same time did
more than any man to bring her empire into dishonor, and to render
its tenure precarious. His decemviral governments or dekarchies,
diffused through the subject cities, and each sustained by a
Lacedæmonian harmost and garrison, were aggravations of local tyranny
such as the Grecian world had never before undergone. And though the
Spartan authorities presently saw that he was abusing the imperial
name of the city for unmeasured personal aggrandizement of his own,
and partially withdrew their countenance from his dekarchies,—yet
the general character of their empire still continued to retain the
impress of partisanship and subjugation which he had originally
stamped upon it. Instead of that autonomy which Sparta had so
repeatedly promised, it became subjection every way embittered. Such
an empire was pretty sure to be short-lived; but the loss to Sparta
herself, when her empire fell away, is not the only fault which the
historian of Greece has to impute to Lysander. His far deeper sin
consists in his having thrown away an opportunity,—such as never
occurred either before or afterwards,—for organizing some permanent,
honorable, self-maintaining, Pan-hellenic combination under the
headship of Sparta. This is (as I have before remarked) what a man
like Kallikratidas would have attempted, if not with far-sighted
wisdom, at least with generous sincerity, and by an appeal to the
best veins of political sentiment in the chief city as well as in
the subordinates. It is possible that with the best intentions even
he might have failed; so strong was the centrifugal instinct in the
Grecian political mind. But what we have to reproach in Lysander is,
that he never tried; that he abused the critical moment of cure for
the purpose of infusing new poison into the system; that he not only
sacrificed the interests of Greece to the narrow gains of Sparta,
but even the interests of Sparta to the still narrower monopoly of
dominion in his own hands. That his measures worked mischievously not
merely for Greece, but for Sparta herself, aggravating all her bad
tendencies,—has been already remarked in the preceding pages.

That Lysander, with unbounded opportunities of gain, both lived
and died poor, exhibits the honorable side of his character. Yet
his personal indifference to money seems only to have left the
greater space in his bosom for that thirst of power which made him
unscrupulous in satiating the rapacity, as well as in upholding
the oppressions, of coadjutors like the Thirty at Athens and the
decemvirs in other cities. In spite of his great success and ability
in closing the Peloponnesian war, we shall agree with Pausanias[565]
that he was more mischievous than profitable even to Sparta,—even
if we take no thought of Greece generally. What would have been the
effect produced by his projects in regard to the regal succession,
had he been able to bring them to bear, we have no means of
measuring. We are told that the discourse composed and addressed
to him by the Halicarnassian rhetor Kleon, was found after his
death among his papers by Agesilaus; who first learnt from it, with
astonishment and alarm, the point to which the ambition of Lysander
had tended, and was desirous of exposing his real character by
making the discourse public,—but was deterred by dissuasive counsel
of the ephor Lakratidas. But this story (attested by Ephorus[566])
looks more like an anecdote of the rhetorical schools than like a
reality. Agesilaus was not the man to set much value on sophists or
their compositions; nor is it easy to believe that he remained so
long ignorant of those projects which Lysander had once entertained
but subsequently dropped. Moreover the probability is, that Kleon
himself would make the discourse public as a sample of his own
talents, even in the lifetime of Lysander; not only without shame,
but as representing the feelings of a considerable section of readers
throughout the Grecian world.

  [565] Pausanias, ix, 32, 6.

  [566] Ephorus, Fr. 127, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Lysander, c. 30.

Most important were the consequences which ensued from the death of
Lysander and the retreat of Pausanias out of Bœotia. Fresh hope and
spirits were infused into all the enemies of Sparta. An alliance was
immediately concluded against her by Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and
Argos. Deputies from these four cities were appointed to meet at
Corinth, and to take active measures for inviting the coöperation of
fresh allies; so that the war which had begun as a Bœotian war, now
acquired the larger denomination of Corinthian war, under which it
lasted until the peace of Antalkidas. The alliance was immediately
strengthened by the junction of the Eubœans,—the Akarnanians,—the
Ozolian Lokrians,—Ambrakia and Leukas (both particularly attached to
Corinth),—and the Chalkidians of Thrace.[567]

  [567] Diodor. xiv, 81, 82; Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 17.

We now enter upon the period when, for the first time, Thebes begins
to step out of the rank of secondary powers, and gradually raises
herself into a primary and ascendant city in Grecian politics.
Throughout the Peloponnesian war, the Thebans had shown themselves
excellent soldiers, both on horseback and on foot, as auxiliaries
to Sparta. But now the city begins to have a policy of its own, and
individual citizens of ability become conspicuous. While waiting
for Pelopidas and Epaminondas, with whom we shall presently become
acquainted, we have at the present moment Ismenias; a wealthy Theban,
a sympathizer with Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles eight years
before, and one of the great organizers of the present anti-Spartan
movement; a man, too, honored by his political enemies,[568] when
they put him to death fourteen years afterwards, with the title of “a
great wicked man,”—the same combination of epithets which Clarendon
applies to Oliver Cromwell.

  [568] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 36. Ὁ δ᾽ (Ismenias) ἀπελογεῖτο μὲν πρὸς
  πάντα ταῦτα, οὐ μέντοι ἔπειθέ γε τὸ μὴ οὐ μεγαλοπράγμων τε καὶ
  κακοπράγμων εἶναι.

  It is difficult to make out anything from the two allusions
  in Plato, except that Ismenias was a wealthy and powerful man
  (Plato, Menon, p. 90 B; Republ. i. p. 336 A.).

It was Ismenias, who, at the head of a body of Bœotians and Argeians,
undertook an expedition to put down the Spartan influence in the
regions north of Bœotia. At Pharsalus in Thessaly, the Lacedæmonians
had an harmost and garrison; at Pheræ, Lykophron the despot was
their ally; while Larissa, with Medius the despot, was their
principal enemy. By the aid of the Bœotians, Medius was now enabled
to capture Pharsalus; Larissa, with Krannon and Skotusa, was received
into the Theban alliance,[569] and Ismenias obtained also the more
important advantage of expelling the Lacedæmonians from Herakleia.
Some malcontents, left after the violent interference of the Spartan
Herippidas two years before, opened the gates of Herakleia by
night to the Bœotians and Argeians. The Lacedæmonians in the town
were put to the sword, but the other Peloponnesian colonists were
permitted to retire in safety; while the old Trachinian inhabitants,
whom the Lacedæmonians had expelled to make room for their new
settlers, together with the Œtæans, whom they had driven out of the
districts in the neighborhood,—were now called back to repossess
their original homes.[570] The loss of Herakleia was a serious blow
to the Spartans in those regions,—protecting Eubœa in its recent
revolt from them, and enabling Ismenias to draw into his alliance the
neighboring Malians, Ænianes, and Athamanes,—tribes stretching along
the valley of the Spercheius westward to the vicinity of Pindus.
Assembling additional troops from these districts (which, only a
few months before, had supplied an army to Lysander[571]), Ismenias
marched against the Phokians, among whom the Spartan Lakisthenes had
been left as harmost in command. After a severe battle, this officer
with his Phokians was defeated near the Lokrian town of Naryx; and
Ismenias came back victorious to the synod at Corinth.[572]

  [569] Diodor. xiv, 82; Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 3; Xen. Agesil. ii, 2.

  [570] Diodor. xiv, 38-82.

  [571] Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 5, 6.

  [572] Diodor. xiv, 82.

By such important advantages, accomplished during the winter of
395-394 B.C., the prospects of Grecian affairs as they stood in the
ensuing spring became materially altered. The allies assembled at
Corinth, full of hope, and resolved to levy a large combined force
to act against Sparta; who on her side seemed to be threatened with
the loss of all her extra-Peloponnesian land-empire. Accordingly,
the ephors determined to recall without delay Agesilaus with his
army from Asia, and sent Epikydidas with orders to that effect.
But even before this reinforcement could arrive, they thought it
expedient to muster their full Peloponnesian force and to act
with vigor against the allies at Corinth, who were now assembling
in considerable numbers. Aristodemus,—guardian of the youthful
king Agesipolis son of Pausanias, and himself of the Eurystheneid
race,—marched at the head of a body of six thousand Lacedæmonian
hoplites;[573] the Spartan xenâgi (or officers sent on purpose to
conduct the contingents from the outlying allies), successively
brought in three thousand hoplites from Elis, Triphylia, Akroreia,
and Lasion,—fifteen hundred from Sikyon,—three thousand from
Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis. None were sent from Phlias,
on the plea (true or false[574]) that in that city the moment was one
of solemnity and holy truce. There were also hoplites from Tegea,
Mantineia, and the Achæan towns, but their number is not given; so
that we do not know the full muster-roll on the Lacedæmonian side.
The cavalry, six hundred in number, were all Lacedæmonian; there
were, moreover, three hundred Kretan bowmen,—and four hundred
slingers from different rural districts of Triphylia.[575]

  [573] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 16. Xenophon gives this total of six
  thousand as if it were of Lacedæmonians _alone_. But if we follow
  his narrative, we shall see that there were unquestionably
  in the army troops of Tegea, Mantineia, and the Achæan towns
  (probably also some of other Arcadian towns,) present in the
  battle (iv, 2, 13, 18, 20). Can we suppose that Xenophon meant
  to include _these_ allies in the total of six thousand, along
  with the Lacedæmonians,—which is doubtless a large total for
  Lacedæmonians alone? Unless this supposition be admitted,
  there is no resource except to assume an omission, either of
  Xenophon himself, or of the copyist; which omission in fact Gail
  and others do suppose. On the whole, I think they are right;
  for the number of hoplites on both sides would otherwise be
  prodigiously unequal; while Xenophon says nothing to imply that
  the Lacedæmonian victory was gained in spite of great inferiority
  of number, and something which even implies that it must have
  been nearly equal (iv, 2, 13),—though he is always disposed to
  compliment Sparta wherever he can.

  [574] From a passage which occurs somewhat later (iv, 4, 15),
  we may suspect that this was an excuse, and that the Phliasians
  were not very well affected to Sparta. Compare a similar case of
  excuse ascribed to the Mantineians (v, 2, 2).

  [575] Diodorus (xiv, 83) gives a total of twenty-three thousand
  foot and five hundred horse, on the Lacedæmonian side, but
  without enumerating items. On the side of the confederacy he
  states a total of more than fifteen thousand foot and five
  hundred horse (c. 82).

The allied force of the enemy was already mustered near Corinth;
six thousand Athenian hoplites,—seven thousand Argeian,—five
thousand Bœotian, those from Orchomenus being absent,—three thousand
Corinthian,—three thousand from the different towns of Eubœa; making
twenty-four thousand in all. The total of cavalry was fifteen hundred
and fifty; composed of eight hundred Bœotian, six hundred Athenian,
one hundred from Chalkis in Eubœa, and fifty from the Lokrians. The
light troops also were numerous,—partly Corinthian, drawn probably
from the serf-population which tilled the fields,[576]—partly
Lokrians, Malians, and Akarnanians.

  [576] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 17. Καὶ ψιλὸν δὲ, ξὺν τοῖς τῶν
  Κορινθίων, πλέον ἦν, etc. Compare Hesychius, v, Κυνόφαλοι;
  Welcker, Præfat. ad. Theognidem, p. xxxv; K. O. Müller, History
  of the Dorians, iii, 4, 3.

The allied leaders, holding a council of war to arrange their plans,
came to a resolution that the hoplites should not be drawn up in
deeper files than sixteen men,[577] in order that there might be no
chance of their being surrounded; and that the right wing, carrying
with it command for the time, should be alternated from day to day
between the different cities. The confidence which the events of the
last few months had infused into these leaders, now for the first
time acting against their old leader Sparta, is surprising. “There
is nothing like marching to Sparta (said the Corinthian Timolaus)
and fighting the Lacedæmonians at or near their own home. We must
burn out the wasps in their nest, without letting them come forth
to sting us. The Lacedæmonian force is like that of a river; small
at its source, and becoming formidable only by the affluents which
it receives, in proportion to the length of its course.”[578] The
wisdom of this advice was remarkable; but its boldness was yet more
remarkable, when viewed in conjunction with the established feeling
of awe towards Sparta. It was adopted by the general council of the
allies; but unfortunately the time for executing it had already
passed; for the Lacedæmonians were already in march and had crossed
their own border. They took the line of road by Tegea and Mantineia
(whose troops joined the march), and advanced as far as Sikyon,
where probably all the Arcadian and Achæan contingents were ordered
to rendezvous.

  [577] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 13; compare iv, 2, 18,—where he says
  of the Thebans—~ἀμελήσαντες~ τοῦ ἐς ἑκκαίδεκα, βαθεῖαν παντελῶς
  ἐποιήσαντο τὴν φάλαγγα, etc., which implies and alludes to the
  resolution previously taken.

  [578] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 11, 12.

The troops of the confederacy had advanced as far as Nemea when
they learnt that the Lacedæmonian army was at Sikyon; but they then
altered their plan, and confined themselves to the defensive. The
Lacedæmonians on their side crossed over the mountainous post called
Epieikia, under considerable annoyance from the enemy’s light troops,
who poured missiles upon them from the high ground. But when they
had reached the level country, on the other side, along the shore
of the Saronic Gulf, where they probably received the contingents
from Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis,—the whole army thus
reinforced marched forward without resistance, burning and ravaging
the cultivated lands. The confederates retreated before them, and at
length took up a position close to Corinth, amidst some rough ground
with a ravine in their front.[579] The Lacedæmonians advanced forward
until they were little more than a mile distant from this position,
and there encamped.

  [579] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 14, 15.

  In the passage,—καὶ οἱ ἕτεροι μέντοι ~ἐλθόντες~
  κατεστρατοπεδεύσαντο, ἔμπροσθεν ποιησάμενοι τὴν χαράδραν,—I
  apprehend that ἀπελθόντες (which is sanctioned by four MSS.,
  and preferred by Leunclavius) is the proper reading, in place
  of ~ἐλθόντες~. For it seems certain that the march of the
  confederates was one of retreat, and that the battle was fought
  very near to the walls of Corinth; since the defeated troops
  sought shelter within the town, and the Lacedæmonian pursuers
  were so close upon them, that the Corinthians within were afraid
  to keep open the gates. Hence we must reject the statement of
  Diodorus,—that the battle was fought on the banks of the river
  Nemea (xiv, 83) as erroneous.

  There are some difficulties and obscurities in the description
  which Xenophon gives of the Lacedæmonian march. His words
  run—ἐν τούτῳ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ δὴ Τεγεάτας παρειληφότες
  καὶ Μαντινέας, ~ἐξῄεσαν τὴν ἀμφίαλον~. These last three words
  are not satisfactorily explained. Weiske and Schneider construe
  τὴν ἀμφίαλον (very justly) as indicating the region lying
  immediately on the Peloponnesian side of the isthmus of Corinth
  and having the Saronic Gulf on one side, and the Corinthian Gulf
  on the other; in which was included Sikyon. But then it would
  not be correct to say, that “the Lacedæmonians had gone out by
  the bimarine way.” On the contrary, the truth is, that “they
  had gone out into the bimarine road or region,—which meaning
  however would require a preposition—ἐξῄεσαν ~εἰς~ τὴν ἀμφίαλον.
  Sturz in his Lexicon (v. ἐξιέναι) renders τὴν ἀμφίαλον—_viam ad
  mare_—which seems an extraordinary sense of the word, unless
  instances were produced to support it; and even if instances were
  produced, we do not see why the way from Sparta to Sikyon should
  be called by that name; which would more properly belong to the
  road from Sparta down the Eurotas to Helos.

  Again, we do not know distinctly the situation of the point or
  district called τὴν Ἐπιεικίαν (mentioned again, iv, 4, 13). But
  it is certain from the map, that when the confederates were
  at Nemea, and the Lacedæmonians at Sikyon,—the former must
  have been exactly placed so as to intercept the junction of
  the contingents from Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Hermionê, with the
  Lacedæmonian army. To secure this junction, the Lacedæmonians
  were obliged to force their way across that mountainous region
  which lies near Kleônæ and Nemea, and to march in a line
  pointing from Sikyon down to the Saronic Gulf. Having reached
  the other side of these mountains near the sea, they would be in
  communication with Epidaurus and the other towns of the Argolic
  peninsula.

  The line of march which the Lacedæmonians would naturally
  take from Sparta to Sikyon and Lechæum, by Tegea, Mantineia,
  Orchomenus, etc., is described two years afterwards in the case
  of Agesilaus (iv, 5, 19).

After an interval seemingly of a few days, the Bœotians, on the day
when their turn came to occupy the right wing and to take the lead,
gave the signal for battle.[580] The Lacedæmonians, prevented by
the wooded ground from seeing clearly, were only made aware of the
coming attack by hearing the hostile pæan. Taking order of battle
immediately, they advanced forward to meet the assailants when within
a furlong of their line. In each army, the right division took the
lead,—slanting to the right, or keeping the left shoulder forward,
according to the tendency habitual with Grecian hoplites, through
anxiety to keep the right or unshielded side from being exposed
to the enemy, and at the same time to be protected by the shield
of a right-hand neighbor.[581] The Lacedæmonians in the one army,
and the Thebans in the other, each inclined themselves, and caused
their respective armies to incline also, in a direction slanting
to the right, so that the Lacedæmonians on their side considerably
outflanked the Athenians on the opposite left. Out of the ten tribes
of Athenian hoplites, it was only the six on the extreme left who
came into conflict with the Lacedæmonians; while the remaining four
contended with the Tegeans who stood next to the Lacedæmonians on
their own line. But the six extreme Athenian tribes were completely
beaten, and severely handled, being taken in flank as well as in
front by the Lacedæmonians. On the other hand, the remaining four
Athenian tribes vanquished and drove before them the Tegeans; and
generally, along all the rest of the line, the Thebans, Argeians, and
Corinthians were victorious,—except where the troops of the Achæan
Pellênê stood opposed to those of the Bœotian Thespiæ, where the
battle was equal and the loss severe on both sides. The victorious
confederates, however, were so ardent and incautious in pursuit, as
to advance a considerable distance and return with disordered ranks;
while the Lacedæmonians, who were habitually self-restraining in
this particular, kept their order perfectly, attacking the Thebans,
Argeians, and Corinthians to great advantage when returning to their
camp. Several of the Athenian fugitives obtained shelter within the
walls of Corinth; in spite of the opposition of the philo-Laconian
Corinthians, who insisted upon shutting the gates against them, and
opening negotiations with Sparta. The Lacedæmonians however came so
near that it was at last thought impossible to keep the gates open
longer. Many of the remaining confederates were therefore obliged to
be satisfied with the protection of their ancient camp;[582] which
seems, however, to have been situated in such defensible ground,[583]
that the Lacedæmonians did not molest them in it.

  [580] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 18. The coloring which Xenophon puts
  upon this step is hardly fair to the Thebans, as is so constantly
  the case throughout his history. He says that “they were in no
  hurry to fight” (οὐδέν τι κατήπειγον τὴν μάχην ξυνάπτειν) so
  long as they were on the left, opposed to the Lacedæmonians on
  the opposite right; but that as soon as they were on the right
  (opposed to the Achæans on the opposite left), they forthwith
  gave the word. Now it does not appear that the Thebans had
  any greater privilege on the day when they were on the right,
  than the Argeians or Athenians had when each were on the right
  respectively. The command had been determined to reside in the
  right division, which post alternated from one to the other; why
  the Athenians or Argeians did not make use of this post to order
  the attack, we cannot explain.

  So again, Xenophon says, that in spite of the resolution taken by
  the Council of War to have files sixteen deep, and no more,—the
  Thebans made their files much deeper. Yet it is plain, from his
  own account, that no mischievous consequences turned upon this
  greater depth.

  [581] See the instructive description of the battle of
  Mantineia—in Thucyd. v, 71.

  [582] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 20-23.

  The allusion to this incident in Demosthenes (adv. Leptinem, c.
  13, p. 472) is interesting, though indistinct.

  [583] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 19. καὶ γὰρ ἦν λάσιον τὸ χωρίον—which
  illustrates the expression in Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo)
  s. 20. ἐν Κορίνθῳ χωρίων ἰσχυρῶν κατειλημμένων.

So far as the Lacedæmonians separately were concerned, the battle
of Corinth was an important victory, gained (as they affirmed) with
the loss of only eight men, and inflicting heavy loss upon the
Athenians in the battle, as well as upon the remaining confederates
in their return from pursuit. Though the Athenian hoplites suffered
thus severely, yet Thrasybulus their commander,[584] who kept the
field until the last, with strenuous efforts to rally them, was
not satisfied with their behavior. But on the other hand, all the
allies of Sparta were worsted, and a considerable number of them
slain. According to Diodorus, the total loss on the Lacedæmonian side
was eleven hundred; on the side of the confederates twenty-eight
hundred.[585] On the whole, the victory of the Lacedæmonians was
not sufficiently decisive to lead to important results, though it
completely secured their ascendency within Peloponnesus. We observe
here, as we shall have occasion to observe elsewhere, that the
Peloponnesian allies do not fight heartily in the cause of Sparta.
They seem bound to her more by fear than by affection.

  [584] Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 19.

  Plato in his panegyrical discourse (Menexenus, c. 17, p. 245
  E.) ascribes the defeat and loss of the Athenians to “bad
  ground”—χρησαμένων δυσχωρίᾳ.

  [585] Diodor. xiv, 83.

  The statement in Xenophon (Agesil. vii, 5) that near ten thousand
  men were slain on the side of the confederates, is a manifest
  exaggeration; if indeed the reading be correct.

The battle of Corinth took place about July 394 B.C., seemingly
about the same time as the naval battle near Knidus (or perhaps a
little earlier), and while Agesilaus was on his homeward march after
being recalled from Asia. Had the Lacedæmonians been able to defer
the battle until Agesilaus had come up so as to threaten Bœotia on
the northern side, their campaign would probably have been much more
successful. As it is, their defeated allies doubtless went home in
disgust from the field of Corinth, so that the confederates were now
enabled to turn their whole attention to Agesilaus.

That prince had received in Asia his summons of recall from the
ephors with profound vexation and disappointment, yet at the same
time with patriotic submission. He had augmented his army, and
was contemplating more extensive schemes of operations against the
Persian satrapies in Asia Minor. He had established such a reputation
for military force and skill, that numerous messages reached him
from different inland districts, expressing their anxiety to be
emancipated from Persian dominion; and inviting him to come to their
aid. His ascendency was also established over the Grecian cities
on the coast, whom he still kept under the government of partisan
oligarchies and Spartan harmosts,—yet seemingly with greater
practical moderation, and less license of oppression, than had marked
the conduct of these men when they could count upon so unprincipled
a chief as Lysander. He was thus just now not only at a high pitch
of actual glory and ascendency, but nourishing yet brighter hopes of
farther conquests for the future. And what filled up the measure of
his aspirations,—all the conquests were to be made at the expense,
not of Greeks, but of the Persians. He was treading in the footsteps
of Agamemnon, as Pan-hellenic leader against a Pan-hellenic enemy.

All these glorious dreams were dissipated by Epikydidas, with his
sad message, and peremptory summons, from the ephors. In the chagrin
and disappointment of Agesilaus we can sincerely sympathize; but
the panegyric which Xenophon and others pronounce upon him for his
ready obedience is altogether unreasonable.[586] There was no merit
in renouncing his projects of conquest at the bidding of the ephors;
because, if any serious misfortune had befallen Sparta at home, none
of those projects could have been executed. Nor is it out of place to
remark, that even if Agesilaus had not been recalled, the extinction
of the Lacedæmonian naval superiority by the defeat of Knidus, would
have rendered all large plans of inland conquest impracticable. On
receiving his orders of recall, he convened an assembly both of his
allies and of his army, to make known the painful necessity of his
departure; which was heard with open and sincere manifestations of
sorrow. He assured them that as soon as he had dissipated the clouds
which hung over Sparta at home, he should come back to Asia without
delay, and resume his efforts against the Persian satraps; in the
interim he left Euxenus, with a force of four thousand men for their
protection. Such was the sympathy excited by his communication,
combined with esteem for his character, that the cities passed a
general vote to furnish him with contingents of troops for his march
to Sparta. But this first burst of zeal abated, when they came to
reflect that it was a service against Greeks; not merely unpopular
in itself, but presenting a certainty of hard fighting with little
plunder. Agesilaus tried every means to keep up their spirits, by
proclaiming prizes both to the civic soldiers and to the mercenaries,
to be distributed at Sestus in the Chersonesus, as soon as they
should have crossed into Europe,—prizes for the best equipment, and
best disciplined soldiers in every different arm.[587] By these means
he prevailed upon the bravest and most effective soldiers in his
army to undertake the march along with him; among them many of the
Cyreians, with Xenophon himself at their head.

  [586] Xen. Agesil. i, 37; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 15. Cornelius
  Nepos (Agesilaus, c. 4) almost translates the Agesilaus of
  Xenophon; but we can better feel the force of _his_ panegyric,
  when we recollect that he had had personal cognizance of the
  disobedience of Julius Cæsar in his province to the orders of the
  Senate, and that the omnipotence of Sylla and Pompey in their
  provinces were then matter of recent history. “Cujus exemplum
  (says Cornelius Nepos about Agesilaus) utinam imperatores nostri
  sequi voluissent!”

  [587] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 2-5; Xen. Agesil. i, 38; Plutarch,
  Agesil. c. 16.

Though Agesilaus, in leaving Greece, had prided himself on hoisting
the flag of Agamemnon, he was now destined against his will to tread
in the footsteps of the Persian Xerxes in his march from the Thracian
Chersonese through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, to Thermopylæ
and Bœotia. Never, since the time of Xerxes, had any army undertaken
this march; which now bore an Oriental impress, from the fact that
Agesilaus brought with him some camels, taken in the battle of
Sardis.[588] Overawing or defeating the various Thracian tribes, he
reached Amphipolis on the Strymon where he was met by Derkyllidas,
who had come fresh from the battle of Corinth and informed him of
the victory. Full as his heart was of Pan-hellenic projects against
Persia, he burst into exclamations of regret on hearing of the death
of so many Greeks in battle, who could have sufficed, if united,
to emancipate Asia Minor.[589] Sending Derkyllidas forward to Asia
to make known the victory to the Grecian cities in his alliance,
he pursued his march through Macedonia and Thessaly. In the latter
country, Larissa, Krannon, and other cities in alliance with Thebes,
raised opposition to bar his passage. But in the disunited condition
of this country, no systematic resistance could be organized against
him. Nothing more appeared than detached bodies of cavalry, whom he
beat and dispersed, with the death of Polycharmus, their leader. As
the Thessalian cavalry, however, was the best in Greece, he took
great pride in having defeated them with cavalry disciplined by
himself in Asia; backed, however, it must be observed, by skilful and
effective support from his hoplites.[590] After having passed the
Achæan mountains or the line of Mount Othrys, he marched the rest of
the way without opposition, through the strait of Thermopylæ to the
frontier of Phokis and Bœotia.

  [588] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 24.

  [589] Xenoph. Agesil. vii, 5; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 16.

  [590] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 4-9; Diodor. xiv, 83.

In this latter part of his march, Agesilaus was met by the ephor
Diphridas in person, who urged him to hasten his march as much
as possible, and attack the Bœotians. He was further joined by
two Lacedæmonian regiments[591] from Corinth, and by fifty young
Spartan volunteers as a body-guard, who crossed by sea from Sikyon.
He was reinforced also by the Phokians and the Orchomenians,—in
addition to the Peloponnesian troops who had accompanied him to
Asia, the Asiatic hoplites, the Cyreians, the peltasts, and the
cavalry, whom he had brought with him from the Hellespont, and some
fresh troops collected in the march. His army was thus in imposing
force when he reached the neighborhood of Chæroneia on the Bœotian
border. It was here that they were alarmed by an eclipse of the
sun, on the fourteenth of August, 394 B.C.; a fatal presage, the
meaning of which was soon interpreted for them by the arrival of a
messenger bearing news of the naval defeat of Knidus, with the death
of Peisander, brother-in-law of Agesilaus. Deeply was the latter
affected by this irreparable blow. He foresaw that, when known, it
would spread dismay and dejection among his soldiers, most of whom
would remain attached to him only so long as they believed the cause
of Sparta to be ascendant and profitable.[592] Accordingly, he
resolved, being now within a day’s march of his enemies, to hasten
on a battle without making known the bad news. Proclaiming that
intelligence had been received of a sea-fight having taken place, in
which the Lacedæmonians had been victorious, though Peisander himself
was slain,—he offered a sacrifice of thanksgiving and sent round
presents of congratulation,—which produced an encouraging effect,
and made the skirmishers especially both forward and victorious.

  [591] Plutarch (Agesil. c. 17; compare also Plutarch, Apophth.
  p. 795, as corrected by Morus ad Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 15) states
  two moræ or regiments as having joined Agesilaus from Corinth;
  Xenophon alludes only to one, besides that mora which was in
  garrison at Orchomenus (Hellen. iv, 3, 15; Agesil. ii, 6).

  [592] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 13.

  Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀγησίλαος πυθόμενος ταῦτα, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον χαλεπῶς
  ἔφερεν· ἐπεὶ μέντοι ἐνεθυμήθη, ὅτι τοῦ στρατεύματος τὸ πλεῖστον
  εἴη αὐτῷ, οἷον ἀγαθῶν μὲν γιγνομένων ἡδέως μετέχειν, εἰ δέ τι
  χαλεπὸν ὁρῷεν, οὐκ ἀνάγκην εἶναι κοινωνεῖν αὐτοῖς, etc.

  These indirect intimations of the real temper even of the
  philo-Spartan allies towards Sparta are very valuable when coming
  from Xenophon, as they contradict all his partialities, and are
  dropped here almost reluctantly, from the necessity of justifying
  the conduct of Agesilaus in publishing a false proclamation to
  his army.

To his enemies, now assembled in force on the plain of Korôneia,
the real issue of the battle of Knidus was doubtless made known,
spreading hope and cheerfulness through their ranks; though we are
not informed what interpretation they put upon the solar eclipse.
The army was composed of nearly the same contingents as those who
had recently fought at Corinth, except that we hear of the Ænianes
in place of the Malians; but probably each contingent was less
numerous, since there was still a necessity for occupying and
defending the camp near Corinth. Among the Athenian hoplites, who had
just been so roughly handled in the preceding battle, and who were
now drafted off by lot to march into Bœotia, against both a general
and an army of high reputation,—there prevailed much apprehension
and some reluctance; as we learn from one of them, Mantitheus, who
stood forward to volunteer his services, and who afterwards makes
just boast of it before an Athenian dikastery.[593] The Thebans and
Bœotians were probably in full force, and more numerous than at
Corinth, since it was their own country which was to be defended.
The camp was established in the territory of Korôneia, not far from
the great temple of Itonian Athênê, where the Pambœotia, or general
Bœotian assemblies were held, and where there also stood the trophy
erected for the great victory over Tolmides and the Athenians, about
fifty years before.[594] Between the two armies there was no great
difference of numbers, except as to the peltasts, who were more
numerous in the army of Agesilaus, though they do not seem to have
taken much part in the battle.

  [593] Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 20. φοβουμένων
  ἁπάντων εἰκότως, etc.

  [594] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19.

Having marched from Chæroneia, Agesilaus approached the plain of
Korôneia from the river Kephissus, while the Thebans met him from
the direction of Mount Helikon. He occupied the right wing of his
army, the Orchomenians being on the left, and the Cyreians with the
Asiatic allies in the centre. In the opposite line, the Thebans were
on the right, and the Argeians on the left. Both armies approached
slowly and in silence until they were separated only by an interval
of a furlong, at which moment the Thebans on the right began the
war-shout, and accelerated their march to a run,—the rest of the
line following their example. When they got within half a furlong
of the Lacedæmonians, the centre division of the latter, under
the command of Herippidas (comprising the Cyreians, with Xenophon
himself, and the Asiatic allies) started forward on their side, and
advanced at a run to meet them; seemingly, getting beyond their
own line,[595] and coming first to cross spears with the enemy’s
centre. After a sharp struggle, the division of Herippidas was
here victorious, and drove back its opponents. Agesilaus, on his
right, was yet more victorious, for the Argeians opposed to him,
fled without even crossing spears. These fugitives found safety
on the high ground of Mount Helikon. But on the other hand, the
Thebans on their own right completely beat back the Orchomenians,
and pursued them so far as to get to the baggage in the rear of the
army. Agesilaus, while his friends around were congratulating him
as conqueror, immediately wheeled round to complete his victory by
attacking the Thebans; who, on their side also faced about, and
prepared to fight their way, in close and deep order, to rejoin their
comrades on Helikon. Though Agesilaus might have let them pass, and
assailed them in the rear with greater safety and equal effect, he
preferred the more honorable victory of a conflict face to face.
Such is the coloring which his panegyrist, Xenophon,[596] puts upon
his manœuvre. Yet we may remark that if he had let the Thebans pass,
he could not have pursued them far, seeing that their own comrades
were at hand to sustain them,—and also that having never yet fought
against the Thebans, he had probably no adequate appreciation of
their prowess.

  [595] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 17. ἀντεξέδραμον ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀγησιλάου
  φάλαγγος, etc.

  [596] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 19; Xen. Agesil. ii, 12.

The crash which now took place was something terrific beyond all
Grecian military experience,[597] leaving an indelible impression
upon Xenophon, who was personally engaged in it. The hoplites on
both sides came to the fiercest and closest bodily struggle, pushing
shields against each other, with all the weight of the incumbent mass
behind impelling forward the foremost ranks,—especially in the deep
order of the Thebans. The shields of the foremost combatants were
thus stove in, their spears broken, and each man was engaged in such
close embrace with his enemy, that the dagger was the only weapon
which he could use. There was no systematic shout, such as usually
marked the charge of a Grecian army; the silence was only broken by a
medley of furious exclamations and murmurs.[598] Agesilaus himself,
who was among the front ranks, and whose size and strength were by
no means on a level with his personal courage, had his body covered
with wounds from different weapons,[599]—was trodden down,—and only
escaped by the devoted courage of those fifty Spartan volunteers
who formed his body-guard. Partly from his wounds, partly from the
irresistible courage and stronger pressure of the Thebans, the
Spartans were at length compelled to give way, so far as to afford a
free passage to the former, who were thus enabled to march onward
and rejoin their comrades; not without sustaining some loss by
attacks on their rear.[600]

  [597] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 16; Xen. Agesil. ii, 9.

  Διηγήσομαι δὲ καὶ τὴν μάχην· καὶ γὰρ ἐγένετο οἵα οὐκ ἄλλη τῶν γ᾽
  ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν.

  [598] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 19; Xen. Agesil. ii, 12.

  Καὶ συμβαλόντες τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐωθοῦντο, ἐμάχοντο, ἀπέκτεινον,
  ἀπέθνησκον. Καὶ κραυγὴ μὲν οὐδεμία παρῆν, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ σιγή· φωνὴ
  δέ τις ἦν τοιαύτη, οἵαν ὀργή τε καὶ μάχη παράσχοιτ᾽ ἄν.

  [599] Xen. Agesil. ii, 13. Ὁ δὲ, καίπερ πολλὰ τραύματα ἔχων
  πάντοσε καὶ παντοίοις ὅπλοις, etc.

  Plutarch, Agesil. c. 18.

  [600] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 19; Xen. Agesil. ii, 12.

Agesilaus thus remained master of the field of battle, having gained
a victory over his opponents taken collectively. But so far as
concerns the Thebans separately, he had not only gained no victory,
but had failed in his purpose of stopping their progress, and had
had the worst of the combat. His wounds having been dressed, he was
brought back on men’s shoulders to give his final orders, and was
then informed that a detachment of eighty Theban hoplites, left
behind by the rest, had taken refuge in the temple of Itonian Athênê
as suppliants. From generosity mingled with respect to the sanctity
of the spot, he commanded that they should be dismissed unhurt, and
then proceeded to give directions for the night-watch, as it was
already late. The field of battle presented a terrible spectacle;
Spartan and Theban dead lying intermingled, some yet grasping their
naked daggers, others pierced with the daggers of their enemies;
around, on the blood-stained ground, were seen broken spears, smashed
shields, swords and daggers scattered apart from their owners.[601]
He directed the Spartan and Theban dead to be collected in separate
heaps, and placed in safe custody for the night, in the interior
of his phalanx; the troops then took their supper, and rested for
the night. On the next morning, Gylis the Polemarch was ordered to
draw up the army in battle-array, to erect a trophy, and to offer
sacrifices of cheerfulness and thanksgiving, with the pipers solemnly
playing, according to Spartan fashion. Agesilaus was anxious to make
these demonstrations of victory as ostentatious as possible, because
he really doubted whether he had gained a victory. It was very
possible that the Thebans might feel confidence enough to renew the
attack, and try to recover the field of battle, with their own dead
upon it; which Agesilaus had, for that reason, caused to be collected
in a separate heap and placed within the Lacedæmonian line.[602] He
was, however, soon relieved from doubt by a herald coming from the
Thebans to solicit the customary truce for the burial of their dead;
the understood confession of defeat. The request was immediately
granted; each party paid the last solemnities to its own dead, and
the Spartan force was then withdrawn from Bœotia. Xenophon does not
state the loss on either side, but Diodorus gives it at six hundred
on the side of the confederates, three hundred and fifty on that of
the Lacedæmonians.[603]

  [601] Xen. Agesil. ii, 14. Ἐπεί γε μὴν ἔληξεν ἡ μάχη, παρῆν δὴ
  θεάσασθαι ἔνθα συνέπεσον ἀλλήλοις, τὴν μὲν γῆν αἵματι πεφυρμένην,
  νεκροὺς δὲ κειμένους φιλίους καὶ πολεμίους μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων, ἀσπίδας
  δὲ διατεθρυμμένας, δόρατα συντεθραυσμένα, ἐγχειρίδια γυμνὰ κουλεῶν
  τὰ μὲν χαμαί, τὰ δ᾽ ἐν σώμασι, τὰ δ᾽ ἔτι μετὰ χειρός.

  [602] Xen. Agesil. ii, 15. Τότε μὲν οὖν (καὶ γὰρ ἦν ἤδη ὀψέ)
  συνελκύσαντες ~τοὺς τῶν πολεμίων νεκροὺς~ εἴσω φάλαγγος,
  ἐδειπνοποιήσαντο καὶ ἐκοιμήθησαν.

  Schneider in his note on this passage, as well as ad. Xen.
  Hellen. iv, 3, 21—condemns the expression τῶν πολεμίων as
  spurious and unintelligible. But in my judgment, these words hear
  a plain and appropriate meaning, which I have endeavored to give
  in the text. Compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19.

  [603] Diodor. xiv, 84.

Disqualified as he was by his wounds for immediate action, Agesilaus
caused himself to be carried to Delphi, where the Pythian games were
at that moment going on. He here offered to Apollo the tithe of the
booty acquired during his two years’ campaigns in Asia; a tithe
equal to one hundred talents.[604] Meanwhile the polemarch Gylis
conducted the army first into Phokis, next on a predatory excursion
into the Lokrian territory, where the nimble attack of the Lokrian
light troops, amidst hilly ground, inflicted upon his troops a severe
check, and cost him his life. After this the contingents in the army
were dismissed to their respective homes, and Agesilaus himself, when
tolerably recovered, sailed with the Peloponnesians homeward from
Delphi across the Corinthian Gulf.[605] He was received at Sparta
with every demonstration of esteem and gratitude, which was still
farther strengthened by his exemplary simplicity and exact observance
of the public discipline; an exactness not diminished either by long
absence or enjoyment of uncontrolled ascendency. From this time
forward he was the effective leader of Spartan policy, enjoying an
influence greater than had ever fallen to the lot of any king before.
His colleague, Agesipolis, both young and of feeble character, was
won over by his judicious and conciliatory behavior, into the most
respectful deference.[606]

  [604] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 21; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19. The latter
  says—εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀπεκομίσθη ~Πυθίων ἀγομένων~, etc. Manso, Dr.
  Arnold, and others, contest the accuracy of Plutarch in this
  assertion respecting the time of year at which the Pythian games
  were celebrated, upon grounds which seem to me very insufficient.

  [605] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 22, 23; iv. 4, 1.

  [606] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 17, 20; Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 20.

Three great battles had thus been fought in the space of little
more than a month (July and August)—those of Corinth, Knidus,
and Korôneia; the first and third on land, the second at sea, as
described in my last chapter. In each of the two land-battles the
Lacedæmonians had gained a victory; they remained masters of the
field, and were solicited by the enemy to grant the burial-truce.
But if we inquire what results these victories had produced, the
answer must be that both were totally barren. The position of Sparta
in Greece as against her enemies had undergone no improvement. In
the battle of Corinth, her soldiers had indeed manifested signal
superiority, and acquired much honor. But at the field of Korôneia,
the honor of the day was rather on the side of the Thebans, who broke
through the most strenuous opposition, and carried their point of
joining their allies. And the purpose of Agesilaus (ordered by the
ephor Diphridas) to invade Bœotia, completely failed.[607] Instead of
advancing, he withdrew from Korôneia, and returned to Peloponnesus
across the gulf from Delphi; which he might have done just as well
without fighting this murderous and hardly contested battle. Even the
narrative of Xenophon, deeply  as it is both by his sympathies
and his antipathies, indicates to us that the predominant impression
carried off by every one from the field of Korôneia was that of the
tremendous force and obstinacy of the Theban hoplites,—a foretaste
of what was to come at Leuktra!

  [607] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 17. Cornelius Nepos, Agesil. c. 4.
  “Obsistere ei conati sunt Athenienses et Bœoti,” etc. They
  _succeeded_ in barring his way, and compelling him to retreat.

If the two land-victories of Sparta were barren of results, the case
was far otherwise with her naval defeat at Knidus. That defeat was
pregnant with consequences following in rapid succession, and of
the most disastrous character. As with Athens at Ægospotami,—the
loss of her fleet, serious as that was, served only as the
signal for countless following losses. Pharnabazus and Konon,
with their victorious fleet, sailed from island to island, and
from one continental seaport to another, in the Ægean, to expel
the Lacedæmonian harmosts, and terminate the empire of Sparta. So
universal was the odium which it had inspired, that the task was
found easy beyond expectation. Conscious of their unpopularity, the
harmosts in almost all the towns, on both sides of the Hellespont,
deserted their posts and fled, on the mere news of the battle of
Knidus.[608] Everywhere Pharnabazus and Konon found themselves
received as liberators, and welcomed with presents of hospitality.
They pledged themselves not to introduce any foreign force or
governor, nor to fortify any separate citadel, but to guarantee
to each city its own genuine autonomy. This policy was adopted
by Pharnabazus at the urgent representation of Konon, who warned
him that if he manifested any design of reducing the cities to
subjection, he would find them all his enemies; that each of them
severally would cost him a long siege; and that a combination would
ultimately be formed against him. Such liberal and judicious ideas,
when seen to be sincerely acted upon, produced a strong feeling of
friendship and even of gratitude, so that the Lacedæmonian maritime
empire was dissolved without a blow, by the almost spontaneous
movements of the cities themselves. Though the victorious fleet
presented itself in many different places, it was nowhere called
upon to put down resistance, or to undertake a single siege.
Kos, Nisyra, Teos, Chios, Erythræ, Ephesus, Mitylênê, Samos, all
declared themselves independent, under the protection of the new
conquerors.[609] Pharnabazus presently disembarked at Ephesus and
marched by land northward to his own satrapy; leaving a fleet of
forty triremes under the command of Konon.

  [608] Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-5.

  [609] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-3; Diodor. xiv, 84. About Samos, xiv,
  97.

  Compare also the speech of Derkyllidas to the Abydenes (Xen.
  Hellen. iv, 8, 4)—Ὅσῳ δὲ μᾶλλον αἱ ἄλλαι πόλεις ξὺν τῇ τύχῃ
  ἀπεστράφησαν ἡμῶν, τοσούτῳ ὄντως ἡ ὑμετέρα πιστότης μείζων φανείη
  ἄν, etc.

To this general burst of anti-Spartan feeling, Abydos, on the Asiatic
side of the Hellespont, formed the solitary exception. That town,
steady in hostility to Athens,[610] had been the great military
station of Sparta for her northern Asiatic warfare, during the last
twenty years. It was in the satrapy of Pharnabazus, and had been
made the chief place of arms by Derkyllidas and Agesilaus, for
their warfare against that satrap as well as for the command of the
strait. Accordingly, while it was a main object with Pharnabazus to
acquire possession of Abydos,—there was nothing which the Abydenes
dreaded so much as to become subject to him. In this view they
were decidedly disposed to cling to Lacedæmonian protection; and
it happened by a fortunate accident for Sparta, that the able and
experienced Derkyllidas was harmost in the town at the moment of
the battle of Knidus. Having fought in the battle of Corinth, he
had been sent to announce the news to Agesilaus, whom he had met on
his march at Amphipolis, and who had sent him forward into Asia to
communicate the victory to the allied cities;[611] neither of them at
that moment anticipating the great maritime defeat then impending.
The presence in Abydos of such an officer, who had already acquired
a high military reputation in that region, and was at marked enmity
with Pharnabazus,—combined with the standing apprehensions of the
Abydenes,—was now the means of saving a remnant at least of maritime
ascendency to Sparta. During the general alarm which succeeded the
battle of Knidus, when the harmosts were everywhere taking flight,
and when anti-Spartan manifestations often combined with internal
revolutions to overthrow the dekarchs or their substitutes, were
spreading from city to city,—Derkyllidas assembled the Abydenes,
heartened them up against the reigning contagion, and exhorted them
to earn the gratitude of Sparta by remaining faithful to her while
others were falling off; assuring them that she would still be found
capable of giving them protection. His exhortations were listened
to with favor. Abydos remained attached to Sparta, was put in a
good state of defence, and became the only harbor of safety for the
fugitive harmosts out of the other cities, Asiatic and European.

  [610] Ἐκ γὰρ Ἀβύδου, τῆς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ὑμῖν ἔχθρας—says
  Demosthenes in the Athenian assembly (cont. Aristokrat. c. 39, p.
  672; compare c. 52, p. 688).

  [611] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 2.

Having secured his hold upon Abydos, Derkyllidas crossed the strait
to make sure also of the strong place of Sestos, on the European
side, in the Thracian Chersonese.[612] In that fertile peninsula
there had been many new settlers, who had come in and acquired land
under the Lacedæmonian supremacy, especially since the building of
the cross-wall by Derkyllidas to defend the isthmus against Thracian
invasion. By means of these settlers, dependent on Sparta for the
security of their tenures,—and of the refugees from various cities
all concentrated under his protection,—Derkyllidas maintained his
position effectively both at Abydos and at Sestos; defying the
requisition of Pharnabazus that he should forthwith evacuate them.
The satrap threatened war, and actually ravaged the lands around
Abydos,—but without any result. His wrath against the Lacedæmonians,
already considerable, was so aggravated by disappointment when he
found that he could not yet expel them from his satrapy, that he
resolved to act against them with increased energy, and even to
strike a blow at them near their own home. For this purpose he
transmitted orders to Konon to prepare a commanding naval force for
the ensuing spring, and in the mean time to keep both Abydos and
Sestos under blockade.[613]

  [612] Lysander, after the victory of Ægospotami and the expulsion
  of the Athenians from Sestos, had assigned the town and district
  as a settlement for the pilots and Keleustæ aboard his fleet. But
  the ephors are said to have reversed the assignment, and restored
  the town to the Sestians (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14). Probably,
  however, the new settlers would remain in part upon the lands
  vacated by the expelled Athenians.

  [613] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 4-6.

As soon as spring arrived, Pharnabazus embarked on board a powerful
fleet equipped by Konon; directing his course to Melos, to various
islands among the Cyclades, and lastly to the coast of Peloponnesus.
They here spent some time on the coast of Laconia and Messenia,
disembarking at several points to ravage the country. They next
landed on the island of Kythêra, which they captured, granting
safe retirement to the Lacedæmonian garrison, and leaving in the
island a garrison under the Athenian Nikophêmus. Quitting then the
harborless, dangerous, and ill-provided coast of Laconia, they sailed
up the Saronic gulf to the isthmus of Corinth. Here they found the
confederates,—Corinthian, Bœotian, Athenian, etc., carrying on war
with Corinth as their central post, against the Lacedæmonians at
Sikyon. The line across the isthmus from Lechæum to Kenchreæ (the
two ports of Corinth) was now made good by a defensive system of
operations, so as to confine the Lacedæmonians within Peloponnesus;
just as Athens, prior to her great losses in 446 B.C., while
possessing both Megara and Pegæ, had been able to maintain the inland
road midway between them, where it crosses the high and difficult
crest of Mount Geraneia, thus occupying the only three roads by which
a Lacedæmonian army could march from the isthmus of Corinth into
Attica or Bœotia.[614] Pharnabazus communicated in the most friendly
manner with the allies, assured them of his strenuous support against
Sparta, and left with them a considerable sum of money.[615]

  [614] See Sir William Gell’s Itinerary of Greece, p. 4. Ernst
  Curtius—Peloponnesos—p. 25, 26, and Thucyd. i, 108.

  [615] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 7, 8; Diodor. xiv, 84.

The appearance of a Persian satrap with a Persian fleet, as master
of the Peloponnesian sea and the Saronic Gulf, was a phenomenon
astounding to Grecian eyes. And if it was not equally offensive to
Grecian sentiment, this was in itself a melancholy proof of the
degree to which Pan-hellenic patriotism had been stifled by the
Peloponnesian war and the Spartan empire. No Persian tiara had been
seen near the Saronic Gulf since the battle of Salamis; nor could
anything short of the intense personal wrath of Pharnabazus against
the Lacedæmonians, and his desire to revenge upon them the damage
inflicted by Derkyllidas and Agesilaus, have brought him now so far
away from his own satrapy. It was this wrathful feeling of which
Konon took advantage to procure from him a still more important boon.

Since 404 B.C., a space of eleven years, Athens had continued
without any walls around her seaport town Peiræus, and without any
Long Walls to connect her city with Peiræus. To this state she had
been condemned by the sentence of her enemies, in the full knowledge
that she could have little trade,—few ships either armed or
mercantile,—poor defence even against pirates, and no defence at all
against aggression from the mistress of the sea. Konon now entreated
Pharnabazus, who was about to go home, to leave the fleet under his
command, and to permit him to use it in rebuilding the fortifications
of Peiræus as well as the Long Walls of Athens. While he engaged to
maintain the fleet by contributions from the islands, he assured the
satrap that no blow could be inflicted upon Sparta so destructive
or so mortifying, as the renovation of Athens and Peiræus with their
complete and connected fortifications. Sparta would thus be deprived
of the most important harvest which she had reaped from the long
struggle of the Peloponnesian war. Indignant as he now was against
the Lacedæmonians, Pharnabazus sympathized cordially with these
plans, and on departing not only left the fleet under the command
of Konon, but also furnished him with a considerable sum of money
towards the expense of the fortifications.[616]

  [616] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 9, 10.

Konon betook himself to the work energetically and without delay.
He had quitted Athens in 407 B.C., as one of the joint admirals
nominated after the disgrace of Alkibiades. He had parted with his
countrymen finally at the catastrophe of Ægospotami in 405 B.C.,
preserving the miserable fraction of eight or nine ships out of that
noble fleet which otherwise would have passed entire into the hands
of Lysander. He now returned, in 393 B.C., as a second Themistokles,
the deliverer of his country, and the restorer of her lost strength
and independence. All hands were set to work; carpenters and masons
being hired with the funds furnished by Pharnabazus, to complete
the fortifications as quickly as possible. The Bœotians and other
neighbors lent their aid zealously as volunteers,[617]—the same who
eleven years before had danced to the sound of joyful music when
the former walls were demolished; so completely had the feelings
of Greece altered since that period. By such hearty coöperation
the work was finished during the course of the present summer and
autumn without any opposition; and Athens enjoyed again her fortified
Peiræus and harbor, with a pair of Long Walls, straight and parallel,
joining it securely to the city. The third, or Phalêric Wall (a
single wall stretching from Athens to Phalêrum), which had existed
down to the capture of the city by Lysander, was not restored; nor
was it indeed by any means necessary to the security either of the
city or of the port. Having thus given renewed life and security
to Peiræus, Konon commemorated his great naval victory by a golden
wreath in the acropolis, as well as by the erection of a temple in
Peiræus to the honor of the Knidian Aphroditê, who was worshipped
at Knidus with peculiar devotion by the local population.[618]
He farther celebrated the completion of the walls by a splendid
sacrifice and festival banquet. And the Athenian people not only
inscribed on a pillar a public vote gratefully recording the exploits
of Konon, but also erected a statue to his honor.[619]

  [617] Xen. Hellen. iv. 8, 10; Diodor. xiv. 85.

  Cornelius Nepos (Conon, c. 4) mentions fifty talents as a sum
  received by Konon from Pharnabazus as a present, and devoted by
  him to this public work. This is not improbable; but the total
  sum contributed by the satrap towards the fortifications must,
  probably, have been much greater.

  [618] Demosthen. cont. Androtion. p. 616. c. 21. Pausanias (i, 1,
  3) still saw this temple in Peiræus—very near to the sea; five
  hundred and fifty years afterwards.

  [619] Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 16. p. 477, 478; Athenæus, i,
  3; Cornelius Nepos, Conon, c. 4.

The importance of this event in reference to the future history of
Athens was unspeakable. Though it did not restore to her either
her former navy, or her former empire, it reconstituted her as a
city, not only self-determining, but even partially ascendant. It
reanimated her, if not into the Athens of Perikles, at least into
that of Isokrates and Demosthenes; it imparted to her a second
fill of strength, dignity, and commercial importance, during the
half century destined to elapse before she was finally overwhelmed
by the superior military force of Macedon. Those who recollect
the extraordinary stratagem whereby Themistokles had contrived
(eighty-five years before) to accomplish the fortification of Athens,
in spite of the base but formidable jealousy of Sparta and her
Peloponnesian allies, will be aware how much the consummation of the
Themistoklean project had depended upon accident. Now, also, Konon
in his restoration was favored by unusual combinations, such as no
one could have predicted. That Pharnabazus should conceive the idea
of coming over himself to Peloponnesus with a fleet of the largest
force, was a most unexpected contingency. He was influenced neither
by attachment to Athens, nor seemingly by considerations of policy,
though the proceeding was one really conducive to the interests
of Persian power,—but simply by his own violent personal wrath
against the Lacedæmonians. And this wrath probably would have been
satisfied, if, after the battle of Knidus, he could have cleared his
own satrapy of them completely. It was his vehement impatience, when
he found himself unable to expel his old enemy, Derkyllidas, from the
important position of Abydos, which chiefly spurred him on to take
revenge on Sparta in her own waters. Nothing less than the satrap’s
personal presence would have placed at the disposal of Konon either
a sufficient naval force, or sufficient funds for the erection of
the new walls, and the defiance of all impediment from Sparta. So
strangely did events thus run, that the energy, by which Derkyllidas
preserved Abydos, brought upon Sparta, indirectly, the greater
mischief of the new Kononian walls. It would have been better for
Sparta that Pharnabazus should at once have recovered Abydos as well
as the rest of his satrapy; in which case he would have had no wrongs
remaining unavenged to incense him, and would have kept on his own
side of the Ægean; feeding Konon with a modest squadron sufficient
to keep the Lacedæmonian navy from again becoming formidable on the
Asiatic side, but leaving the walls of Peiræus (if we may borrow
an expression of Plato) “to continue asleep in the bosom of the
earth.”[620]

  [620] Plato, Legg. vi, p. 778; καθεύδειν ἐᾷν ἐν τῇ γῇ κατακείμενα
  τὰ τείχη, etc.

But the presence of Konon with his powerful fleet was not the only
condition indispensable to the accomplishment of this work. It
was requisite further, that the interposition of Sparta should be
kept off, not merely by sea, but by land, and that, too, during
all the number of months that the walls were in progress. Now the
barrier against her on land was constituted by the fact, that the
confederate force held the cross line within the isthmus from Lechæum
to Kenchreæ, with Corinth as a centre.[621] But they were unable
to sustain this line even through the ensuing year,—during which
Sparta, aided by dissensions at Corinth, broke through it, as will
appear in the next chapter. Had she been able to break through it
while the fortifications of Athens were yet incomplete, she would
have deemed no effort too great to effect an entrance into Attica and
interrupt the work, in which she might very probably have succeeded.
Here, then, was the second condition, which was realized during
the summer and autumn of 393 B.C., but which did not continue to
be realized longer. So fortunate was it for Athens, that the two
conditions were fulfilled both together during this particular year!

  [621] The importance of maintaining these lines, as a protection
  to Athens against invasion from Sparta, is illustrated in Xen.
  Hellen. v, 4, 19, and Andokides, Or. iii, De Pace, s. 26.




CHAPTER LXXV.

FROM THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS TO THE PEACE OF
ANTALKIDAS.


The presence of Pharnabazus and Konon with their commanding force in
the Saronic Gulf, and the liberality with which the former furnished
pecuniary aid to the latter for rebuilding the full fortifications
of Athens, as well as to the Corinthians for the prosecution of the
war,—seem to have given preponderance to the confederates over
Sparta for that year. The plans of Konon[622] were extensive. He was
the first to organize for the defence of Corinth, a mercenary force
which was afterwards improved and conducted with greater efficiency
by Iphikrates; and after he had finished the fortifications of
Peiræus with the Long Walls, he employed himself in showing his
force among the islands, for the purpose of laying the foundations
of renewed maritime power for Athens. We even hear that he caused
an Athenian envoy to be despatched to Dionysius at Syracuse, with
the view of detaching that despot from Sparta, and bringing him
into connection with Athens. Evagoras, despot of Salamis in Cyprus,
the steady friend of Konon, was a party to this proposition, which
he sought to strengthen by offering to Dionysius his sister in
marriage.[623] There was a basis of sympathy between them arising
from the fact that Evagoras was at variance with the Phœnicians both
in Phœnicia and Cyprus, while Dionysius was in active hostilities
with the Carthaginians (their kinsmen and Colonists) in Sicily.
Nevertheless, the proposition met with little or no success. We find
Dionysius afterwards still continuing to act as an ally of Sparta.

  [622] Harpokration, v. ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ. Philochorus, Fragm.
  150, ed. Didot.

  [623] Lysias, Orat. xix, (De Bonis Aristophanis) s. 21.

Profiting by the aid received from Pharnabazus, the Corinthians
strengthened their fleet at Lechæum (their harbor in the Corinthian
Gulf) so considerably, as to become masters of the Gulf, and to
occupy Rhium, one of the two opposite capes which bound its narrow
entrance. To oppose them, the Lacedæmonians on their side were
driven to greater maritime effort. More than one naval action seems
to have taken place, in those waters where the prowess and skill
of the Athenian admiral Phormion had been so signally displayed at
the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. At length the Lacedæmonian
admiral Herippidas, who succeeded to the command of the fleet after
his predecessor Polemarchus had been slain in battle, compelled the
Corinthians to abandon Rhium, and gradually recovered his ascendency
in the Corinthian Gulf; which his successor Teleutias, brother of
Agesilaus, still farther completed.[624]

  [624] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 11.

While these transactions were going on (seemingly during the last
half of 393 B.C. and the full year of 392 B.C.), so as to put an
end to the temporary naval preponderance of the Corinthians,—the
latter were at the same time bearing the brunt of a desultory, but
continued, land-warfare against the garrison of Lacedæmonians and
Peloponnesians established at Sikyon. Both Corinth and Lechæum were
partly defended by the presence of confederate troops, Bœotians,
Argeians, Athenians, or mercenaries paid by Athens. But this did not
protect the Corinthians against suffering great damage, in their
lands and outlying properties, from the incursions of the enemy.

The plain between Corinth and Sikyon,—fertile and extensive
(speaking by comparison with Peloponnesus generally), and
constituting a large part of the landed property of both cities,
was rendered uncultivable during 393 and 392 B.C.; so that the
Corinthian proprietors were obliged to withdraw their servants and
cattle to Peiræum[625] (a portion of the Corinthian territory without
the Isthmus properly so called, north-east of the Akrokorinthus, in a
line between that eminence and the Megarian harbor of Pegæ). Here the
Sikyonian assailants could not reach them, because of the Long Walls
of Corinth, which connected that city by a continuous fortification
of twelve stadia (somewhat less than a mile and a half) with its
harbor of Lechæum. Nevertheless, the loss to the proprietors of
the deserted plain was still so great, that two successive seasons
of it were quite enough to inspire them with a strong aversion
to the war;[626] the more so, as the damage fell exclusively upon
them—their allies in Bœotia, Athens, and Argos, having as yet
suffered nothing. Constant military service for defence, with the
conversion of the city into a sort of besieged post, aggravated
their discomfort. There was another circumstance also, doubtless
not without influence. The consequences of the battle of Knidus had
been, first, to put down the maritime empire of Sparta, and thus to
diminish the fear which she inspired to the Corinthians; next, to
rebuild the fortifications, and renovate the shipping, commercial as
well as warlike, of Athens;—a revival well calculated to bring back
a portion of that anti-Athenian jealousy and apprehension which the
Corinthians had felt so strongly a few years before. Perhaps some
of the trade at Corinth may have been actually driven away by the
disturbance of the war, to the renewed fortifications and greater
security of Peiræus.

  [625] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 1; iv, 5, 1.

  [626] I dissent from Mr. Fynes Clinton as well as from M.
  Rehdantz (Vitæ Iphicratis, etc., c. 4, who in the main agrees
  with Dodwell’s Annales Xenophontei) in their chronological
  arrangement of these events.

  They place the battle fought by Praxitas within the Long Walls
  of Corinth in 393 B.C., and the destruction of the Lacedæmonian
  _mora_ or division by Iphikrates (the monthly date of which is
  marked by its having immediately succeeded the Isthmian games),
  in 392 B.C. I place the former event in 392 B.C.; the latter in
  390 B.C., immediately after the Isthmian games of 390 B.C.

  If we study the narrative of Xenophon, we shall find, that after
  describing (iv, 3) the battle of Korôneia (August 394 B.C.) with
  its immediate consequences, and the return of Agesilaus home,—he
  goes on in the next chapter to narrate the land-war about or near
  Corinth, which he carries down without interruption (through
  Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, of Book iv.) to 389 B.C.

  But in Chapter 8 of Book iv, he leaves the land-war, and takes up
  the naval operations, from and after the battle of Knidus (Aug.
  394 B.C.). He recounts how Pharnabazus and Konon came across the
  Ægean with a powerful fleet in the spring of 393 B.C., and how
  after various proceedings, they brought the fleet to the Saronic
  Gulf and the Isthmus of Corinth, where they must have arrived at
  or near midsummer 393 B.C.

  Now it appears to me certain, that these proceedings of
  Pharnabazus with the fleet, recounted in the eighth chapter,
  come, in point of date, _before_ the seditious movements and
  the _coup d’état_ at Corinth, which are recounted in the fourth
  chapter. At the time when Pharnabazus was at Corinth in midsummer
  393 B.C., the narrative of Xenophon (iv, 8, 8-10) leads us to
  believe that the Corinthians were prosecuting the war zealously,
  and without discontent: the money and encouragement which
  Pharnabazus gave them was calculated to strengthen such ardor. It
  was by aid of this money that the Corinthians fitted out their
  fleet under Agathinus, and acquired for a time the maritime
  command of the Gulf.

  The discontents against the war (recounted in chap. 4 _seq._)
  could not have commenced until a considerable time after the
  departure of Pharnabazus. They arose out of causes which only
  took effect after a long continuance,—the hardships of the
  land-war, the losses of property and slaves, the jealousy towards
  Attica and Bœotia as being undisturbed, etc. The Lacedæmonian
  and Peloponnesian aggressive force at Sikyon cannot possibly
  have been established before the autumn of 394 B.C., and was
  most probably placed there early in the spring of 393 B.C.
  Its effects were brought about, not by one great blow, but
  by repetition of ravages and destructive annoyance; and all
  the effects which it produced previous to midsummer 393 B.C.
  would be more than compensated by the presence, the gifts,
  and the encouragement of Pharnabazus with his powerful fleet.
  Moreover, after his departure, too, the Corinthians were at first
  successful at sea, and acquired the command of the Gulf, which,
  however, they did not retain for more than a year, if so much.
  Hence, it is not likely that any strong discontent against the
  war began before the early part of 392 B.C.

  Considering all these circumstances, I think it reasonable to
  believe that the _coup d’état_ and massacre at Corinth took place
  (not in 393 B.C., as Mr. Clinton and M. Rehdantz place it, but)
  in 392 B.C.; and the battle within the Long Walls rather later
  in the same year.

  Next, the opinion of the same two authors, as well as of
  Dodwell,—that the destruction of the Lacedæmonian _mora_ by
  Iphicrates took place in the spring of 392 B.C.,—is also, in my
  view, erroneous. If this were true, it would be necessary to pack
  all the events mentioned in Xenophon, iv, 4, into the year 393
  B.C.; which I hold to be impossible. If the destruction of the
  mora did not occur in the spring of 393 B.C., we know that it
  could not have occurred until the spring of 390 B.C.; that is,
  the next ensuing Isthmian games, two years afterwards. And this
  last will be found to be its true date; thus leaving full time,
  but not too much time, for the antecedent occurrences.

Fostered by this pressure of circumstances, the discontented
philo-Laconian or peace-party which had always existed at Corinth,
presently acquired sufficient strength, and manifested itself with
sufficient publicity to give much alarm to the government. The
Corinthian government had always been, and still was, oligarchical.
In what manner the administrators or the council were renovated, or
how long individuals continued in office, indeed, we do not know. But
of democracy, with its legal, popular assemblies, open discussions
and authoritative resolves, there was nothing.[627] Now the
oligarchical persons actually in power were vehemently anti-Laconian,
consisting of men who had partaken of the Persian funds and
contracted alliance with Persia, besides compromising themselves
irrevocably (like Timolaus) by the most bitter manifestations
of hostile sentiment towards Sparta. These men found themselves
menaced by a powerful opposition party, which had no constitutional
means for making its sentiments predominant, and for accomplishing
peaceably either a change of administrators or a change of public
policy. It was only by an appeal to arms and violence that such
a consummation could be brought about; a fact notorious to both
parties,—so that the oligarchical administrators, informed of the
meetings and conversations going on, knew well that they had to
expect nothing less than the breaking out of a conspiracy. That such
anticipations were well-founded, we gather even from the partial
recital of Xenophon; who states that Pasimêlus, the philo-Laconian
leader, was on his guard and in preparation,[628]—and counts it to
him as a virtue that shortly afterwards he opened the gates to the
Lacedæmonians.

  [627] Plutarch, Dion. c. 53.

  [628] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 2. Γνόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Βοιωτοὶ
  καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Κορινθίων οἵ τε τῶν παρὰ βασιλέως χρημάτων
  μετεσχηκότες, καὶ οἱ τοῦ πολέμου αἰτιώτατοι γεγενημένοι, ὡς,
  εἰ μὴ ἐκποδὼν ποιήσαιντο τοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν εἰρήνην τετραμμένους,
  κινδυνεύσει πάλιν ἡ πόλις λακωνίσαι—οὕτω δὴ καὶ σφαγὰς
  ἐπεχείρουν ποιεῖσθαι.

  iv, 4, 4. Οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι, ὑποπτεύσαντος Πασιμήλου τὸ μέλλον
  ἔσεσθαι, ἡσυχίαν ἔσχον ἐν τῷ Κρανίῳ· ὡς δὲ τῆς κραυγῆς ἤσθοντο,
  καὶ φεύγοντές τινες ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος ἀφίκοντο πρὸς αὐτούς, ἐκ
  τούτου ἀναδραμόντες κατὰ τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον, προσβαλόντας μὲν
  Ἀργείους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπεκρούσαντο, etc.

Anticipating such conspiracy, the government resolved to prevent
it by a _coup d’état_. They threw themselves upon the assistance
of their allies, invited in a body of Argeians, and made their
blow the more sure by striking it on the last day of the festival
called Eukleia, when it was least expected. Their proceeding, though
dictated by precaution, was executed with the extreme of brutal
ferocity aggravated by sacrilege; in a manner very different from the
deep-laid artifices recently practised by the Spartan ephors when
they were in like manner afraid of the conspiracy of Kinadon,—and
more like the oligarchical conspirators at Korkyra (in the third year
of the Peloponnesian war) when they broke into the assembled Senate,
and massacred Peithias, with sixty others in the senate-house.[629]
While the choice performers at Corinth were contending for the prize
in the theatre, with judges formally named to decide,—and while
the market-place around was crowded with festive spectators,—a
number of armed men were introduced, probably Argeians, with leaders
designating the victims whom they were to strike. Some of these
select victims were massacred in the market-place, others in the
theatre, and one even while sitting as a judge in the theatre.
Others again fled in terror to embrace the altars or statues in the
market-place,—which sanctuary, nevertheless, did not save their
lives. Nor was such sacrilege arrested,—repugnant as it was to
the feelings of the assembled spectators and to Grecian feelings
generally,—until one hundred and twenty persons had perished.[630]
But the persons slain were chiefly elderly men; for the younger
portion of the philo-Laconian party, suspecting some mischief, had
declined attending the festival, and kept themselves separately
assembled under their leader Pasimêlus in the gymnasium and
cyprus-grove called Kranium, just without the city-gates. We find,
too, that they were not only assembled, but actually in arms. For the
moment that they heard the clamor in the market-place, and learned
from some fugitives what was going on, they rushed up at once to
the Akrokorinthus (or eminence and acropolis overhanging the city)
and got possession of the citadel,—which they maintained with such
force and courage that the Argeians and the Corinthians, who took
part with the government, were repulsed in the attempt to dislodge
them. This circumstance, indirectly revealed in the one-sided
narrative of Xenophon, lets us into the real state of the city, and
affords good ground for believing that Pasimêlus and his friends were
prepared beforehand for an armed outbreak, but waited to execute it,
until the festival was over,—a scruple which the government, in
their eagerness to forestall the plot, disregarded,—employing the
hands and weapons of Argeians who were comparatively unimpressed by
solemnities peculiar to Corinth.[631]

  [629] Thucyd. iii, 70.

  [630] Diodorus (xiv, 86) gives this number, which seems very
  credible. Xenophon (iv, 4, 4) only says πολλοί.

  [631] In recounting this alternation of violence projected,
  violence perpetrated, recourse on the one side to a foreign
  ally, treason on the other by admitting an avowed enemy,—which
  formed the _modus operandi_ of opposing parties in the
  oligarchical Corinth,—I invite the reader to contrast it with
  the democratical Athens.

  At Athens, in the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, there were
  precisely the same causes at work, and precisely the same marked
  antithesis of parties, as those which here disturbed Corinth.
  There was first, a considerable Athenian minority who opposed
  the war with Sparta from the first; next, when the war began,
  the proprietors of Attica saw their lands ruined, and were
  compelled either to carry away, or to lose, their servants and
  cattle, so that they obtained no returns. The intense discontent,
  the angry complaints, the bitter conflict of parties, which
  these circumstances raised among the Athenian citizens,—not to
  mention the aggravation of all these symptoms by the terrible
  epidemic,—are marked out in Thucydides, and have been recorded
  in the fifth volume of this history. Not only the positive loss
  and suffering, but all other causes of exasperation, stood at a
  higher pitch at Athens in the early part of the Peloponnesian
  war, than at Corinth in 392 B.C.

  Yet what were the effects which they produced? Did the minority
  resort to a conspiracy,—or the majority to a _coup d’état_—or
  either of them to invitation of foreign aid against the other?
  Nothing of the kind. The minority had always open to them the
  road of pacific opposition, and the chance of obtaining a
  majority in the Senate or in the public assembly, which was
  practically identical with the totality of the citizens. Their
  opposition, though pacific as to acts, was sufficiently animated
  and violent in words and propositions, to serve as a real
  discharge for imprisoned angry passion. If they could not carry
  the adoption of their general policy, they had the opportunity
  of gaining partial victories which took off the edge of a fierce
  discontent; witness the fine imposed upon Perikles (Thucyd.
  ii, 65) in the year before his death, which both gratified and
  mollified the antipathy against him, and brought about shortly
  afterwards a strong reaction in his favor. The majority, on the
  other hand, knew that the predominance of its policy depended
  upon its maintaining its hold on a fluctuating public assembly,
  against the utmost freedom of debate and attack, within certain
  forms and rules prescribed by the constitution; attachment to
  the latter being the cardinal principle of political morality in
  both parties. It was this system which excluded on both sides the
  thought of armed violence. It produced among the democratical
  citizens of Athens that characteristic insisted upon by Kleon
  in Thucydides,—“constant and fearless security and absence of
  treacherous hostility among one another” (διὰ γὰρ τὸ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν
  ἀδεὲς καὶ ἀνεπιβούλευτον πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἐς τοὺς ξυμμάχους τὸ
  αὐτὸ ἔχετε—Thuc. iii, 37), the entire absence of which stands
  so prominently forward in these deplorable proceedings of the
  oligarchical Corinth. Pasimêlus and his Corinthian minority had
  no assemblies, dikasteries, annual Senate, or constant habit of
  free debate and accusation, to appeal to; their only available
  weapon was armed violence, or treacherous correspondence with a
  foreign enemy. On the part of the Corinthian government, superior
  or more skilfully used force, or superior alliance abroad, was
  the only weapon of defence, in like manner.

  I shall return to this subject in a future chapter, where I enter
  more at large into the character of the Athenians.

Though Pasimêlus and his friends were masters of the citadel, and had
repulsed the assault of their enemies, yet the _coup d’état_ had
been completely successful in overawing their party in the city, and
depriving them of all means of communicating with the Lacedæmonians
at Sikyon. Feeling unable to maintain themselves, they were besides
frightened by menacing omens, when they came to offer sacrifice,
in order that they might learn whether the gods encouraged them to
fight or not. The victims were found so alarming, as to drive them
to evacuate the post and prepare for voluntary exile. Many of them
(according to Diodorus five hundred)[632] actually went into exile;
while others, and among them Pasimêlus himself, were restrained by
the entreaties of their friends and relatives, combined with solemn
assurances of peace and security from the government; who now,
probably, felt themselves victorious, and were anxious to mitigate
the antipathies which their recent violence had inspired. These
pacific assurances were faithfully kept, and no farther mischief was
done to any citizen.

  [632] Diodor. xiv, 86; Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 5.

But the political condition of Corinth was materially altered, by an
extreme intimacy of alliance and communion now formed with Argos;
perhaps combined with reciprocal rights of intermarriage, and of
purchase and sale. The boundary pillars or hedges which separated the
two territories, were pulled up, and the city was entitled _Argos_
instead of _Corinth_ (says Xenophon); such was probably the invidious
phrase in which the opposition party described the very close
political union now formed between the two cities; upheld by a strong
Argeian force in the city and acropolis, together with some Athenian
mercenaries under Iphikrates, and some Bœotians as a garrison in
the port of Lechæum. Most probably the government remained still
Corinthian, and still oligarchical, as before. But it now rested upon
Argeian aid, and was therefore dependent chiefly upon Argos, though
partly also upon the other two allies.

To Pasimêlus and his friends such a state of things was intolerable.
Though personally they had no ill-usage to complain of, yet the
complete predominance of their political enemies was quite sufficient
to excite their most vehement antipathies. They entered into
secret correspondence with Praxitas, the Lacedæmonian commander at
Sikyon, engaging to betray to him one of the gates in the western
Long Wall between Corinth and Lechæum. The scheme being concerted,
Pasimêlus and his partisans got themselves placed,[633] partly by
contrivance and partly by accident, on the night-watch at this gate;
an imprudence, which shows that the government not only did not
maltreat them, but even admitted them to trust. At the moment fixed,
Praxitas,—presenting himself with a Lacedæmonian _mora_ or regiment,
a Sikyonian force, and the Corinthian exiles,—found the treacherous
sentinels prepared to open the gates. Having first sent in a trusty
soldier to satisfy him that there was no deceit,[634] he then
conducted all his force within the gates, into the mid-space between
the two Long Walls. So broad was this space, and so inadequate did
his numbers appear to maintain it, that he took the precaution of
digging a cross-ditch with a palisade to defend himself on the side
towards the city; which he was enabled to do undisturbed, since the
enemy (we are not told why) did not attack him all the next day.
On the ensuing day, however, Argeians, Corinthians, and Athenian
mercenaries under Iphikrates, all came down from the city in full
force; the latter stood on the right of the line, along the eastern
wall, opposed to the Corinthian exiles on the Lacedæmonian left;
while the Lacedæmonians themselves were on their own right, opposed
to the Corinthians from the city; and the Argeians, opposed to the
Sikyonians, in the centre.

  [633] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 8. καὶ κατὰ τύχην καὶ κατ᾽ ἐπιμέλειαν,
  etc.

  [634] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 8. Nothing can show more forcibly the
  Laconian bias of Xenophon, than the credit which he gives to
  Pasimêlus for his good faith towards the Lacedæmonians whom he
  was letting in; overlooking or approving his treacherous betrayal
  towards his own countrymen, in thus opening a gate which he
  had been trusted to watch. τὼ δ᾽ εἰσηγαγέτην, καὶ ~οὕτως ἁπλῶς
  ἀπεδειξάτην~, ὥστε ὁ εἰσελθὼν ἐξήγγειλε, πάντα εἶναι ἀδόλως,
  οἷάπερ ἐλεγέτην.

It was here that the battle began; the Argeians, bold from superior
numbers, attacked and broke the Sikyonians, tearing up the palisade,
and pursuing them down to the sea with much slaughter;[635] upon
which Pasimachus the Lacedæmonian commander of cavalry, coming to
their aid, caused his small body of horsemen to dismount and tie
their horses to trees, and then armed them with shields taken from
the Sikyonians, inscribed on the outside with the letter Sigma
(Σ). With these he approached on foot to attack the Argeians, who,
mistaking them for Sikyonians, rushed to the charge with alacrity;
upon which Pasimachus exclaimed,—“By the two gods, Argeians, these
Sigmas which you see here will deceive you;” he then closed with
them resolutely, but his number was so inferior that he was soon
overpowered and slain. Meanwhile, the Corinthian exiles on the left
had driven back Iphikrates with his mercenaries (doubtless chiefly
light troops) and pursued them even to the city gates; while the
Lacedæmonians, easily repelling the Corinthians opposed to them,
came out of their palisade, and planted themselves with their faces
towards the eastern wall, but at a little distance from it, to
intercept the Argeians on their return. The latter were forced to
run back as they could, huddling close along the eastern wall, with
their right or unshielded side exposed, as they passed, to the spears
of the Lacedæmonians. Before they could get to the walls of Corinth,
they were met and roughly handled by the victorious Corinthian
exiles. And even when they came to the walls, those within, unwilling
to throw open the gates for fear of admitting the enemy, contented
themselves with handing down ladders, over which the defeated
Argeians clambered with distress and difficulty. Altogether, their
loss in this disastrous retreat was frightful. Their dead (says
Xenophon) lay piled up like heaps of stones or wood.[636]

  [635] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4. 10. Καὶ τοὺς μὲν Σικυωνίους ἐκράτησαν
  καὶ διασπάσαντες τὸ σταύρωμα ἐδίωκον ἐπὶ θάλασσαν, καὶ ἐκεῖ
  πολλοὺς αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν.

  It would appear from hence that there must have been an open
  portion of Lechæum, or a space apart from (but adjoining to) the
  wall which encircled Lechæum, yet still within the Long Walls.
  Otherwise the fugitive Sikyonians could hardly have got down to
  the sea.

  [636] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 12. Οὕτως ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολλοὶ ἔπεσον, ὥστε
  εἰθισμένοι ὁρᾷν οἱ ἄνθρωποι σωροὺς σίτου, ξύλων, λίθου, τότε
  ἐθεάσαντο σωροὺς νεκρῶν.

  A singular form of speech.

This victory of Praxitas and the Lacedæmonians, though it did
not yet make them masters of Lechæum,[637] was, nevertheless,
of considerable importance. Shortly afterwards they received
reinforcements which enabled them to turn it to still better account.
The first measure of Praxitas was to pull down a considerable breadth
of the two walls, leaving a breach which opened a free passage for
any Lacedæmonian army from Sikyon to reach and pass the isthmus. He
then marched his troops through the breach, forward on the road to
Megara, capturing the two Corinthian dependencies of Krommyon and
Sidus on the Saronic gulf, in which he placed garrisons. Returning
back by the road south of Corinth, he occupied Epieikia on the
frontier of Epidaurus, as a protection to the territory of the latter
against incursions from Corinth,—and then disbanded his army.

  [637] Diodorus (xiv, 87) represents that the Lacedæmonians on
  this occasion surprised and held Lechæum, defeating the general
  body of the confederates who came out from Corinth to retake it.
  But his narrative of all these circumstances differs materially
  from that of Xenophon; whom I here follow in preference, making
  allowance for great partiality, and for much confusion and
  obscurity.

  Xenophon gives us plainly to understand, that Lechæum was <i>not</i>
  captured by the Lacedæmonians until the following year, by
  Agesilaus and Teleutias.

  It is to be recollected that Xenophon had particular means of
  knowing what was done by Agesilaus, and therefore deserves credit
  on that head,—always allowing for partiality. Diodorus does not
  mention Agesilaus in connection with the proceedings at Lechæum.

A desultory warfare was carried on during the ensuing winter and
spring between the opposite garrisons in Corinth and Sikyon. It
was now that the Athenian Iphikrates, in the former place, began
to distinguish himself at the head of his mercenary peltasts whom,
after their first organization by Konon, he had trained to effective
tactics under the strictest discipline, and whose movements he
conducted with consummate skill. His genius introduced improvements
both in their armor and in their clothing. He lengthened by one
half both the light javelin and the short sword, which the Thracian
peltasts habitually carried; he devised a species of leggings,
known afterwards by the name of Iphikratides; and he thus combined,
better than had ever been done before, rapid motion,—power of
acting in difficult ground and open order,—effective attack, either
by missiles or hand to hand, and dexterous retreat in case of
need.[638] As yet, he was but a young officer, in the beginning
of his military career.[639] We must therefore presume that these
improvements were chiefly of later date, the suggestions of his
personal experience; but even now, the successes of his light troops
were remarkable. Attacking Phlius, he entrapped the Phliasians into
an ambuscade, and inflicted on them a defeat so destructive that
they were obliged to invoke the aid of a Lacedæmonian garrison for
the protection of their city. He gained a victory near Sikyon,
and carried his incursions over all Arcadia, to the very gates of
the cities; damaging the Arcadian hoplites so severely, that they
became afraid to meet him in the field. His own peltasts, however,
though full of confidence against these Peloponnesian hoplites,
still retained their awe and their reluctance to fight against
Lacedæmonians;[640] who, on their side, despised them, but despised
their own allies still more. “Our friends fear these peltasts, as
children fear hobgoblins,”—said the Lacedæmonians, sarcastically,
endeavoring to set the example of courage by ostentatious
demonstrations of their own around the walls of Corinth.[641]

  [638] Diodor. xv, 44; Cornelius Nepos, Vit. Iphicrat. c.
  2; Polyæn. iii, 9, 10. Compare Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis,
  Chabriæ, et Timothei, c. 2, 7 (Berlin, 1845)—a very useful and
  instructive publication.

  In describing the improvements made by Iphikrates in the armature
  of his peltasts, I have not exactly copied either Nepos or
  Diodorus, who both appear to me confused in their statements.
  You would imagine, in reading their account (and so it has been
  stated by Weber, Prolegg. ad Demosth. cont. Aristokr. p. xxxv.),
  that there were no peltasts in Greece prior to Iphikrates;
  that he was the first to transform heavy-armed hoplites into
  light-armed peltasts, and to introduce from Thrace the light
  shield or _pelta_, not only smaller in size than the round ἀσπὶς
  carried by the hoplite, but also without the ἴτυς (or surrounding
  metallic rim of the ἀσπὶς) seemingly connected by outside bars
  or spokes of metal with the exterior central knob or projection
  (_umbo_) which the hoplite pushed before him in close combat. The
  _pelta_, smaller and lighter than the ἀσπὶς, was seemingly square
  or oblong and not round; though it had no ἴτυς, it often had thin
  plates of brass, as we may see by Xenophon, Anab. v, 2, 29, so
  that the explanation of it given in the Scholia ad Platon. Legg.
  vii, p. 813 must be taken with reserve.

  But Grecian peltasts existed before the time of Iphikrates (Xen.
  Hellen. i, 2, 1 and elsewhere); he did not first introduce them;
  he found them already there, and improved their armature. Both
  Diodorus and Nepos affirm that he lengthened the _spears_ of
  the peltasts to a measure half as long again as those of the
  hoplites (or twice as long, if we believe Nepos), and the swords
  in proportion—“ηὔξησε μὲν τὰ δόρατα ἡμιολίῳ μεγέθει—hastæ
  modum duplicavit.” Now this I apprehend to be not exact; nor is
  it true (as Nepos asserts) that the Grecian hoplites carried
  “short spears”—“brevibus hastis.” The spear of the Grecian
  hoplite was long (though not so long as that of the heavy and
  compact Macedonian phalanx afterwards became), and it appears
  to me incredible that Iphikrates should have given to his light
  and active peltast a spear twice as long, or half as long again,
  as that of the hoplite. Both Diodorus and Nepos have mistaken
  by making their comparison with the arms _of the hoplite_, to
  which the changes of Iphikrates had no reference. The peltast
  both before and after Iphikrates did not carry a _spear_, but
  a _javelin_, which he employed as a missile, to hurl, not to
  thrust; he was essentially an ἀκοντιστὴς or javelin-shooter (See
  Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 5, 14; vi, 1, 9). Of course the javelin
  might, in case of need, serve to thrust, but this was not its
  appropriate employment; _e converso_, the spear might be hurled
  (under advantageous circumstances, from the higher ground against
  an enemy below—Xen. Hellen. ii. 4, 15; v, 4, 52), but its proper
  employment was, to be held and thrust forward.

  What Iphikrates really did, was, to lengthen both the two
  offensive weapons which the peltast carried, before his
  time,—the javelin, and the sword. He made the javelin a longer
  and heavier weapon, requiring a more practised hand to throw—but
  also competent to inflict more serious wounds, and capable
  of being used with more deadly effect if the peltasts saw an
  opportunity of coming to close fight on advantageous terms.
  Possibly Iphikrates not only lengthened the weapon, but also
  improved its point and efficacy in other ways; making it more
  analogous to the formidable Roman _pilum_. Whether he made any
  alteration in the _pelta_ itself, we do not know.

  The name _Iphikratides_, given to these new-fashioned leggings or
  boots, proves to us that Wellington and Blucher are not the first
  eminent generals who have lent an honorable denomination to boots
  and shoes.

  [639] Justin, vi, 5.

  [640] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 16; Diodor. xiv, 91.

  Τοὺς μέντοι Λακεδαιμονίους οὕτως αὖ οἱ πελτασταὶ ἐδέδισαν, ὡς
  ἐντὸς ἀκοντίσματος οὐ προσῄεσαν τοῖς ὁπλίταις, etc.

  Compare the sentiment of the light troops in the attack of
  Sphakteria, when they were awe-struck and afraid at first to
  approach the Lacedæmonian hoplites—τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένοι ὡς ἐπὶ
  Λακεδαιμονίους, etc. (Thucyd. iv, 34).

  [641] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 17. ὥστε οἱ μὲν Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ
  ἐπισκώπτειν ἐτόλμων, ὡς οἱ σύμμαχοι φοβοῖντο τοὺς πελταστὰς,
  ὥσπερ μορμῶνας παιδάρια, etc.

  This is a camp-jest of the time, which we have to thank Xenophon
  for preserving.

The breach made in the Long Walls of Corinth by Praxitas had laid
open the road for a Peloponnesian army to march either into Attica
or Bœotia.[642] Fortunately for the Athenians, they had already
completed the rebuilding of their own Long Walls; but they were
so much alarmed by the new danger, that they marched with their
full force, and with masons and carpenters accompanying,[643] to
Corinth. Here, with that celerity of work for which they were
distinguished,[644] they in a few days reëstablished completely the
western wall; the more important of the two, since it formed the
barrier against the incursions of the Lacedæmonians from Sikyon. They
had then a secure position, and could finish the eastern wall at
their leisure; which they accordingly did, and then retired, leaving
it to the confederate troops in Corinth to defend.

  [642] Xenoph. Agesil. ii, 17. ἀναπετάσας τῆς Πελοποννήσου τὰς
  πύλας, etc.

  Respecting the Long Walls of Corinth, as part of a line
  of defence which barred ingress to, or egress from,
  Peloponnesus,—Colonel Leake remarks,—“The narrative of Xenophon
  shows the great importance of the Corinthian Long Walls in time
  of war. They completed a line of fortification from the summit
  of the Acro-Corinthus to the sea, and thus intercepted the most
  direct and easy communication from the Isthmus into Peloponnesus.
  For the rugged mountain, which borders the southern side of the
  Isthmian plain, has only two passes,—one, by the opening on the
  eastern side of Acro-Corinthus, which obliged an enemy to pass
  under the eastern side of Corinth, and was, moreover, defended
  by a particular kind of fortification, as some remains of walls
  still testify,—the other, along the shore at Cenchreiæ, which
  was also a fortified place in the hands of the Corinthians.
  Hence the importance of the pass of Cenchreiæ, in all operations
  between the Peloponnesians, and an enemy without the Isthmus.”
  (Leake, Travels in Morea, vol. iii, ch. xxviii, p. 254).

  Compare Plutarch, Aratus, c. 16; and the operations of
  Epaminondas as described by Diodorus, xv, 68.

  [643] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 18. ἐλθόντες ~πανδημεὶ~ μετὰ λιθολόγων
  καὶ τεκτόνων, etc. The word πανδημεὶ shows how much they were
  alarmed.

  [644] Thucyd. vi, 98.

This advantage, however,—a very material one,—was again overthrown
by the expedition of the Lacedæmonian king, Agesilaus, during the
same summer. At the head of a full Lacedæmonian and Peloponnesian
force, he first marched into the territory of Argos, and there spent
some time in ravaging all the cultivated plain. From hence he passed
over the mountain-road, by Tenea,[645] into the plain of Corinth,
to the foot of the newly-repaired Long Walls. Here his brother
Teleutias, who had recently superseded Herippidas as admiral in the
Corinthian Gulf, came to coöperate with him in a joint attack, by
sea and land, on the new walls and on Lechæum.[646] The presence of
this naval force rendered the Long Walls difficult to maintain, since
troops could be disembarked in the interval between them, where the
Sikyonians in the previous battle had been beaten and pursued down
to the sea. Agesilaus and Teleutias were strong enough to defeat the
joint force of the four confederated armies, and to master not only
the Long Walls, but also the port of Lechæum,[647] with its docks,
and the ships within them; thus breaking up the naval power of
Corinth in the Krissæan Gulf. Lechæum now became a permanent post of
hostility against Corinth, occupied by a Lacedæmonian garrison, and
occasionally by the Corinthian exiles, while any second rebuilding of
the Corinthian Long Walls by the Athenians became impossible. After
this important success, Agesilaus returned to Sparta. Neither he
nor his Lacedæmonian hoplites, especially the Amyklæans, were ever
willingly absent from the festival of the Hyakinthia; nor did he now
disdain to take his station in the chorus,[648] under the orders of
the choric conductor, for the pæan in honor of Apollo.

  [645] The words stand in the text of Xenophon,—εὐθὺς ἐκεῖθεν
  ὑπερβαλὼν κατὰ ~Τεγέαν~ εἰς Κόρινθον. A straight march from the
  Argeian territory to Corinth could not possibly carry Agesilaus
  by _Tegea_; Kœppen proposes ~Τενέαν~, which I accept, as
  geographically suitable. I am not certain, however, that it is
  right; the _Agesilaus_ of Xenophon has the words κατὰ τὰ στενά.

  About the probable situation of Tenea, see Colonel Leake, Travels
  in Morea, vol. iii, p. 321; also his Peloponnesiaca, p. 400.

  [646] Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 19—iv, 8, 10, 11.

  It was rather late in the autumn of 393 B.C. that the
  Lacedæmonian maritime operations in the Corinthian Gulf began,
  against the fleet recently equipped by the Corinthians out of the
  funds lent by Pharnabazus. First, the Lacedæmonian Polemarchus
  was named admiral; he was slain,—and his secretary Pollis, who
  succeeded to his command, retired afterwards wounded. Next came
  Herippidas to the command, who was succeeded by Teleutias. Now if
  we allow to Herippidas a year of command (the ordinary duration
  of a Lacedæmonian admiral’s appointment), and to the other two
  something less than a year, since their time was brought to
  an end by accidents,—we shall find that the appointment of
  Teleutias will fall in the spring or early summer of 391 B.C.,
  the year of this expedition of Agesilaus.

  [647] Andokides de Pace, s. 18; Xen. Hellen. iv, 4, 19.
  Παρεγένετο δὲ αὐτῷ (Ἀγησιλάῳ) καὶ ὁ ἁδελφὸς Τελευτίας κατὰ
  θάλασσαν, ἔχων τριήρεις περὶ δώδεκα· ὥστε μακαρίζεσθαι αὐτῶν τὴν
  μητέρα, ὅτι τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὧν ~ἔτεκεν ὁ μὲν κατὰ γῆν τὰ τείχη τῶν
  πολεμίων, ὁ δὲ κατὰ θάλασσαν τὰς ναῦς καὶ τὰ νεώρια ᾕρηκε~.

  This last passage indicates decidedly that Lechæum was not
  taken until this joint attack by Agesilaus and Teleutias. And
  the authority of Xenophon on the point is superior, in my
  judgment, to that of Diodorus (xiv, 86), who represents Lechæum
  to have been taken in the year before, on the occasion when the
  Lacedæmonians were first admitted by treachery within the Long
  Walls.

  The passage from Aristeides the rhetor, referred to by Wesseling,
  Mr. Clinton, and others, only mentions the _battle_ at
  Lechæum—_not the capture_ of the port. Xenophon also mentions a
  _battle_ as having taken place close to Lechæum, between the two
  long walls, on the occasion when Diodorus talks of the _capture_
  of Lechæum; so that Aristeides is more in harmony with Xenophon
  than with Diodorus.

  A few months prior to this joint attack of Agesilaus and
  Teleutias, the Athenians had come with an army, and with masons
  and carpenters, for the express purpose of rebuilding the Long
  Walls which Praxitas had in part broken down. This step would
  have been both impracticable and useless, if the Lacedæmonians
  had stood then in possession of Lechæum.

  There is one passage of Xenophon, indeed, which looks as if the
  Lacedæmonians had been in possession of Lechæum _before_ this
  expedition of the Athenians to reëstablish the Long Walls,—Αὐτοὶ
  (the Lacedæmonians) ~δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ Λεχαίου ὁρμώμενοι~ σὺν μόρᾳ
  καὶ τοῖς Κορινθίων φυγάσι, κύκλῳ περὶ τὸ ἄστυ τῶν Κορινθίων
  ἐστρατεύοντο (iv, 4, 17). But whoever reads attentively the
  sections from 15 to 19 inclusive, will see (I think) that this
  affirmation may well refer to a period after, and not before,
  the capture of Lechæum by Agesilaus; for it has reference to the
  general contempt shown by the Lacedæmonians for the peltasts
  of Iphikrates, as contrasted with the terror displayed by the
  Mantineians and others, of these same peltasts. Even if this
  were otherwise, however, I should still say that the passages
  which I have produced above from Xenophon show plainly that
  _he_ represents Lechæum to have been captured by Agesilaus and
  Teleutias; and that the other words, ἐκ τοῦ Λεχαίου ὁρμώμενοι,
  if they really implied anything inconsistent with this, must be
  regarded as an inaccuracy.

  I will add that the chapter of Diodorus, xiv, 86, puts into one
  year events which cannot all be supposed to have taken place in
  that same year.

  Had Lechæum been in possession and occupation by the
  Lacedæmonians in the year preceding the joint attack by Agesilaus
  and Teleutias, Xenophon would surely have mentioned it in iv,
  4, 14; for it was a more important post than Sikyon, for acting
  against Corinth.

  [648] Xen. Agesilaus, ii, 17.

It was thus that the Long Walls, though rebuilt by the Athenians in
the preceding year, were again permanently overthrown, and the road
for Lacedæmonian armies to march beyond the isthmus once more laid
open. So much were the Athenians and the Bœotians alarmed at this
new success, that both appear to have become desirous of peace, and
to have sent envoys to Sparta. The Thebans are said to have offered
to recognize Orchomenus (which was now occupied by a Lacedæmonian
garrison) as autonomous and disconnected from the Bœotian federation;
while the Athenian envoys seem to have been favorably received at
Sparta, and to have found the Lacedæmonians disposed to make peace
on better terms than those which had been proposed during the late
discussions with Tiribazus (hereafter to be noticed;) recognizing
the newly built Athenian walls, restoring Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros
to Athens, and guaranteeing autonomy to each separate city in the
Grecian world. The Athenian envoys at Sparta having provisionally
accepted these terms, forty days were allowed for reference to the
people of Athens; to which place Lacedæmonian envoys were sent as
formal bearers of the propositions. The Argeians and Corinthians,
however, strenuously opposed the thoughts of peace, urging the
Athenians to continue the war; besides which, it appears that many
Athenian citizens thought that large restitution ought to have been
made of Athenian property forfeited at the end of the late war,
and that the Thracian Chersonese ought to have been given back as
well as the three islands. On these and other grounds, the Athenian
people refused to sanction the recommendation of their envoys;
though Andokides, one of those envoys, in a discourse still extant,
earnestly advised that they should accept the peace.[649]

  [649] Our knowledge of the abortive negotiations adverted to in
  the text, is derived, partly from the third Oration of Andokides
  called de Pace,—partly from a statement contained in the
  Argument of that Oration, and purporting to be borrowed from
  Philochorus—Φιλόχορος μὲν οὖν λέγει καὶ ελθεῖν τοὺς πρέσβεις ἐκ
  Λακεδαίμονος, καὶ ἀπράκτους ἀνελθεῖν, μὴ πείσαντος τοῦ Ἀνδοκίδου.

  Whether Philochorus had any additional grounds to rest upon,
  other than this very oration itself, may appear doubtful. But at
  any rate, this important fragment (which I do not see noticed
  among the fragments of Philochorus in M. Didot’s collection)
  counts for some farther evidence as to the reality of the peace
  proposed and discussed, but not concluded.

  Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus make any mention of such mission to
  Sparta, or discussion at Athens, as that which forms the subject
  of the Andokidean oration. But on the other hand, neither of them
  says anything which goes to contradict the reality of the event;
  nor can we in this case found any strong negative inference
  on the mere silence of Xenophon, in the case of a pacific
  proposition which ultimately came to nothing.

  If indeed we could be certain that the oration of Andokides was
  genuine it would of itself be sufficient to establish the reality
  of the mission to which it relates. It would be sufficient
  evidence, not only without corroboration from Xenophon, but even
  against any contradictory statement proceeding from Xenophon.
  But unfortunately, the rhetor Dionysius pronounced this oration
  to be spurious; which introduces a doubt and throws us upon
  the investigation of collateral probabilities. I have myself a
  decided opinion (already stated more than once), that another
  out of the four orations ascribed to Andokides (I mean the
  fourth oration, entitled against Alkibiades) is spurious; and I
  was inclined to the same suspicion with respect to this present
  oration De Pace; a suspicion which I expressed in a former
  volume (Vol. V, Ch. xlv, p. 334). But on studying over again
  with attention this oration De Pace, I find reason to retract my
  suspicion, and to believe that the oration may be genuine. It has
  plenty of erroneous allegations as to matter of fact, especially
  in reference to times prior to the battle of Ægospotami; but not
  one, so far as I can detect, which conflicts with _the situation_
  to which the orator addresses himself,—nor which requires us to
  pronounce it spurious.

  Indeed, in considering _this situation_ (which is the most
  important point to be studied when we are examining the
  genuineness of an oration), we find a partial coincidence in
  Xenophon, which goes to strengthen our affirmative confidence.
  One point much insisted upon in the oration is, that the Bœotians
  were anxious to make peace with Sparta, and were willing to
  relinquish Orchomenus (s. 13-20). Now Xenophon also mentions,
  three or four months afterwards, the Bœotians as being anxious
  for peace, and as sending envoys to Agesilaus to ask on what
  terms it would be granted to them (Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 6). This
  coincidence is of some value in reference to the authenticity of
  the oration.

  Assuming the oration to be genuine, its date is pretty clearly
  marked, and is rightly placed by Mr. Fynes Clinton in 391 B.C.
  It was in the autumn or winter of that year, four years after
  the commencement of the war in Bœotia which began in 395 B.C.
  (s. 20). It was _after_ the capture of Lechæum, which took
  place in the summer of 391 B.C.—and _before_ the destruction
  of the Lacedæmonian _mora_ by Iphikrates, which took place in
  the spring of 390 _B.C._ For Andokides emphatically intimates,
  that at the moment when he spoke, _not one military success_
  had yet been obtained against the Lacedæmonians—καίτοι ποίας
  τινος ἂν ἐκεῖνοι παρ᾽ ἡμῶν εἰρήνης ἔτυχον, ~εἰ μίαν μόνον μάχην
  ἡττήθησαν~; (s. 19). This could never have been said _after_ the
  destruction of the Lacedæmonian _mora_, which made so profound
  a sensation throughout Greece, and so greatly altered the
  temper of the contending parties. And it seems to me one proof
  (among others) that Mr. Fynes Clinton has not placed correctly
  the events subsequent to the battle of Corinth, when I observe
  that he assigns the destruction of the _mora_ to the year 392
  B.C., a year _before_ the date which he rightly allots to the
  Andokidean oration. I have placed (though upon other grounds)
  the destruction of the _mora_ in the spring of 390 _B.C._, which
  receives additional confirmation from this passage of Andokides.

  Both Valckenaer and Sluiter (Lect. Andocid. c. x,) consider the
  oration of Andokides de Pace as genuine; Taylor and other critics
  hold the contrary opinion.

The war being thus continued, Corinth, though defended by a
considerable confederate force, including Athenian hoplites under
Kallias, and peltasts under Iphikrates, became much pressed by the
hostile posts at Lechæum as well as at Krommyon and Sidus,—and by
its own exiles as the most active of all enemies. Still, however,
there remained the peninsula and the fortification of Peiræum as
an undisturbed shelter for the Corinthian servants and cattle,
and a source of subsistence for the city. Peiræum was an inland
post north-east of Corinth, in the centre of that peninsula which
separates the two innermost recesses of the Krissæan Gulf,—the
bay of Lechæum on its south-west, the bay called Alkyonis, between
Kreusis and Olmiæ (now Psatho Bay), on its north-east. Across
this latter bay Corinth communicated easily, through Peiræum and
the fortified port of Œnoê, with Kreusis the port of Thespiæ in
Bœotia.[650] The Corinthian exiles now prevailed upon Agesilaus
to repeat his invasion of the territory, partly in order that
they might deprive the city of the benefits which it derived from
Peiræum,—partly in order that they might also appropriate to
themselves the honor of celebrating the Isthmian games, which were
just approaching. The Spartan king accordingly marched forth, at the
head of a force composed of Lacedæmonians and of the Peloponnesian
allies, first to Lechæum, and thence to the Isthmus, specially so
called; that is, the sacred precinct of Poseidon near Schœnus on the
Saronic Gulf, at the narrowest breadth of the Isthmus, where the
biennial Isthmian festival was celebrated.

  [650] Xen. Agesil. ii, 18.

It was the month of April, or beginning of May, and the festival had
actually begun, under the presidency of the Corinthians from the city
who were in alliance with Argos; a body of Argeians being present
as guards.[651] But on the approach of Agesilaus, they immediately
retired to the city by the road to Kenchreæ, leaving their sacrifices
half-finished. Not thinking fit to disturb their retreat, Agesilaus
proceeded first to offer sacrifice himself, and then took a position
close at hand, in the sacred ground of Poseidon, while the Corinthian
exiles went through the solemnities in due form, and distributed the
parsley wreaths to the victors. After remaining three days, Agesilaus
marched away to attack Peiræum. He had no sooner departed, than the
Corinthians from the city came forth, celebrated the festival and
distributed the wreaths a second time.

  [651] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 1; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 21.

  Xenophon, who writes his history in the style and language of
  a partisan, says that “_the Argeians_ celebrated the festival,
  Corinth having now become Argos.” But it seems plain that the
  truth was as I have stated in the text,—and that the Argeians
  stood by (with others of the confederates probably also) to
  protect the Corinthians of the city in the exercise of their
  usual privilege; just as Agesilaus, immediately afterwards, stood
  by to protect the Corinthian exiles while they were doing the
  same thing.

  The Isthmian games were _trietêric_, that is, celebrated in every
  alternate year; in one of the spring months, about April or
  perhaps the beginning of May (the Greek months being lunar, no
  one of them would coincide regularly with any one of our calendar
  months, year after year); and in the _second_ and _fourth_
  Olympic years. From Thucydides, viii, 9, 10, we know that this
  festival was celebrated in April 412 B.C.; that is, towards
  the end of the _fourth_ year of Olympiad 91, about two or three
  months before the festival of Olympiad 92.

  Dodwell (De Cyclis Diss. vi, 2, just cited), Corsini, (Diss.
  Agonistic. iv, 3), and Schneider in his note to this passage of
  Xenophon,—all state the Isthmian games to have been celebrated
  in the _first_ and _third_ Olympic years; which is, in my
  judgment, a mistake. Dodwell erroneously states the Isthmian
  games mentioned in Thucydides, viii, 9, to have been celebrated
  at the beginning of Olympiad 92, instead of the fourth quarter
  of the fourth year of Olympiad 91; a mistake pointed out by
  Krüger (_ad loc._) as well as by Poppo and Dr. Arnold; although
  the argumentation of the latter, founded upon the time of the
  Lacedæmonian festival of the Hyakinthia, is extremely uncertain.
  It is a still more strange idea of Dodwell, that the Isthmian
  games were celebrated at the same time as the Olympic games
  (Annal. Xenoph. ad ann. 392).

Peiræum was occupied by so numerous a guard, comprising Iphikrates
and his peltasts, that Agesilaus, instead of directly attacking
it, resorted to the stratagem of making a sudden retrograde march
directly towards Corinth. Probably, many of the citizens were at that
moment absent for the second celebration of the festival; so that
those remaining within, on hearing of the approach of Agesilaus,
apprehended a plot to betray the city to him, and sent in haste
to Peiræum to summon back Iphikrates with his peltasts. Having
learned that these troops had passed by in the night, Agesilaus
forthwith again turned his course and marched back to Peiræum, which
he himself approached by the ordinary road, coasting round along
the bay of Lechæum, near the Therma, or warm springs, which are
still discernible;[652] while he sent a mora or division of troops
to get round the place by a mountain-road more in the interior,
ascending some woody heights commanding the town, and crowned by
a temple of Poseidon.[653] The movement was quite effectual. The
garrison and inhabitants of Peiræum, seeing that the place had
become indefensible, abandoned it the next day with all their cattle
and property, to take refuge in the Heræum, or sacred ground of
Hêrê Akræa near the western cape of the peninsula. While Agesilaus
marched thither towards the coast in pursuit of them, the troops
descending from the heights attacked and captured Œnoê,[654]—the
Corinthian town of that name situated near the Alkyonian bay over
against Kreusis in Bœotia. A large booty here fell into their hands,
which was still farther augmented by the speedy surrender of all
in the Heræum to Agesilaus, without conditions. Called upon to
determine the fate of the prisoners, among whom were included men,
women, and children,—freemen and slaves,—with cattle and other
property,—Agesilaus ordered that all those who had taken part in
the massacre at Corinth, in the market-place, should be handed over
to the vengeance of the exiles; and that all the rest should be sold
as slaves.[655] Though he did not here inflict any harder measure
than was usual in Grecian warfare, the reader who reflects that this
sentence, pronounced by one on the whole more generous than most
contemporary commanders, condemned numbers of free Corinthian men and
women to a life of degradation, if not of misery,—will understand by
contrast the encomiums with which in my last volume I set forth the
magnanimity of Kallikratidas after the capture of Methymna; when he
refused, in spite of the importunity of his allies, to sell either
the Methymnæan or the Athenian captives,—and when he proclaimed the
exalted principle, that no free Greek should be sold into slavery by
any permission of his.[656]

  [652] See Ulrichs, Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland, chap.
  i, p. 3. The modern village and port of Lutráki derives its name
  from these warm springs, which are quite close to it and close to
  the sea, at the foot of the mountain of Perachora or Peiræum; on
  the side of the bay opposite to Lechæum, but near the point where
  the level ground constituting the Isthmus (properly so-called),
  ends,—and where the rocky or mountainous region, forming the
  westernmost portion of Geraneia (or the peninsula of Peiræum),
  begins. The language of Xenophon, therefore, when he comes to
  describe the back-march of Agesilaus is perfectly accurate,—ἤδη
  δ᾽ ἐκπεπερακότος αὐτοῦ τὰ θερμὰ ἐς τὸ πλατὺ τοῦ Λεχαίου, etc.
  (iv, 5, 8).

  [653] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 4.

  Xenophon here recounts how Agesilaus sent up ten men with fire
  in pans, to enable those on the heights to make fires and warm
  themselves; the night being very cold and rainy, the situation
  very high, and the troops not having come out with blankets or
  warm covering to protect them. They kindled large fires, and the
  neighboring temple of Poseidon was accidentally burnt.

  [654] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 5.

  This Œnoê must not be confounded with the Athenian town of that
  name, which lay on the frontiers of Attica towards Bœotia.

  So also the town of Peiræum here noticed must not be confounded
  with another Peiræum, which was also in the Corinthian territory,
  but on the Saronic Gulf, and on the frontiers of Epidaurus
  (Thucyd. viii, 10).

  [655] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 5-8.

  [656] Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 14. See Vol. VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 165 of
  this History.

  The sale of prisoners here directed by Agesilaus belies the
  encomiums of his biographers (Xen. Agesil. vii, 6; Cornel. Nep.
  Agesil. c. 5).

As the Lacedæmonians had been before masters of Lechæum, Krommyon,
and Sidus, this last success shut up Corinth on its other side,
and cut off its communication with Bœotia. The city not being in
condition to hold out much longer, the exiles already began to lay
their plans for surprising it by aid of friends within.[657] So
triumphant was the position of Agesilaus, that his enemies were all
in alarm, and the Thebans, as well as others, sent fresh envoys
to him to solicit peace. His antipathy towards the Thebans was so
vehement, that it was a great personal satisfaction to him to see
them thus humiliated. He even treated their envoys with marked
contempt, affecting not to notice them when they stood close by,
though Pharax, the proxenus of Thebes at Sparta, was preparing to
introduce them.

  [657] Xen. Agesil. vii, 6; Cornelius Nepos, Ages. c. 5.

  The story of Polyænus (iii, 9, 45) may perhaps refer to this
  point of time. But it is rare that we can verify his anecdotes or
  those of the other Tactic writers. M. Rehdantz strives in vain to
  find proper places for the sixty-three different stratagems which
  Polyænus ascribes to Iphikrates.

Absorbed in this overweening pride and exultation over conquered
enemies, Agesilaus was sitting in a round pavilion, on the banks
of the lake adjoining the Heræum,[658]—with his eyes fixed on
the long train of captives brought out under the guard of armed
Lacedæmonian hoplites, themselves the object of admiration to a crowd
of spectators,[659]—when news arrived, as if under the special
intervention of retributive Nemesis, which changed unexpectedly the
prospect of affairs.[660] A horseman was seen galloping up, his horse
foaming with sweat. To the many inquiries addressed, he returned no
answer, nor did he stop until he sprang from his horse at the feet
of Agesilaus; to whom, with sorrowful tone and features, he made his
communication. Immediately Agesilaus started up, seized his spear,
and desired the herald to summon his principal officers. On their
coming near, he directed them, together with the guards around, to
accompany him without a moment’s delay; leaving orders with the
general body of the troops to follow as soon as they should have
snatched some rapid refreshment. He then immediately put himself in
march; but he had not gone far when three fresh horsemen met and
informed him, that the task which he was hastening to perform had
already been accomplished. Upon this he ordered a halt and returned
to the Heræum; where on the ensuing day, to countervail the bad news,
he sold all his captives by auction.[661]

  [658] This Lake is now called Lake Vuliasmeni. Considerable
  ruins were noticed by M. Dutroyat, in the recent French survey,
  near its western extremity; on which side it adjoins the temple
  of Hêrê Akræa, or the Heræum. See M. Boblaye, Recherches
  Géographiques sur les Ruines de la Morée, p. 36; and Colonel
  Leake’s Peloponnesiaca, p. 399.

  [659] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 6.

  Τῶν δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων ἀπὸ τῶν ὅπλων σὺν τοῖς δόρασι παρηκολούθουν
  φύλακες τῶν αἰχμαλώτων, μάλα ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων θεωρούμενοι· οἱ γὰρ
  εὐτυχοῦντες καὶ κρατοῦντες ἀεί πως ἀξιοθέατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι.
  Ἔτι δὲ καθημένου τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου, καὶ ἐοικότος ἀγαλλομένῳ τοῖς
  πεπραγμένοις, ἱππεύς τις προσήλαυνε, καὶ μάλα ἰσχυρῶς ἱδρῶντι τῷ
  ἵππῳ· ὑπὸ πολλῶν δὲ ἐρωτώμενος ὅ,τι ἀγγέλλοι, οὐδενὶ ἀπεκρίνατο,
  etc.

  It is interesting to mark in Xenophon the mixture of
  Philo-Laconian complacency,—of philosophical reflection,—and
  of that care in bringing out the contrast of good fortune, with
  sudden reverse instantly following upon it, which forms so
  constant a point of effect with Grecian poets and historians.

  [660] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 22. ἔπαθε δὲ πρᾶγμα νεμεσητὸν, etc.

  [661] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 7-9.

This bad news,—the arrival of which has been so graphically
described by Xenophon, himself probably among the bystanders and
companions of Agesilaus,—was nothing less than the defeat and
destruction of a Lacedæmonian _mora_ or military division by the
light troops under Iphikrates. As it was an understood privilege of
the Amyklæan hoplites in the Lacedæmonian army always to go home,
even when on actual service, to the festival of the Hyakinthia,
Agesilaus had left all of them at Lechæum. The festival day being
now at hand, they set off to return. But the road from Lechæum to
Sikyon lay immediately under the walls of Corinth, so that their
march was not safe without an escort. Accordingly the polemarch
commanding at Lechæum, leaving that place for the time under watch by
the Peloponnesian allies, put himself at the head of the Lacedæmonian
_mora_ which formed the habitual garrison, consisting of six hundred
hoplites, and of a _mora_ of cavalry (number unknown)—to protect the
Amyklæans until they were out of danger from the enemy at Corinth.
Having passed by Corinth, and reached a point within about three
miles of the friendly town of Sikyon, he thought the danger over, and
turned back with his _mora_ of hoplites to Lechæum; still, however,
leaving the officer of cavalry with orders to accompany the Amyklæans
as much farther as they might choose, and afterwards to follow him on
the return march.[662]

  [662] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 11, 12.

Though the Amyklæans (probably not very numerous) were presumed to
be in danger of attack from Corinth in their march, and though the
force in that town was known to be considerable, it never occurred
to the Lacedæmonian polemarch that there was any similar danger for
his own _mora_ of six hundred hoplites; so contemptuous was his
estimate of the peltasts, and so strong was the apprehension which
these peltasts were known to entertain of the Lacedæmonians. But
Iphikrates, who had let the whole body march by undisturbed, when he
now saw from the walls of Corinth the six hundred hoplites returning
separately, without either cavalry or light troops, conceived the
idea,—perhaps, in the existing state of men’s minds, no one else
would have conceived it,—of attacking them with his peltasts as they
repassed near the town. Kallias, the general of the Athenian hoplites
in Corinth, warmly seconding the project, marched out his troops,
and arrayed them in battle order not far from the gates; while
Iphikrates with his peltasts began his attack upon the Lacedæmonian
_mora_ in flanks and rear. Approaching within missile distance,
he poured upon them a shower of darts and arrows, which killed or
wounded several, especially on the unshielded side. Upon this the
polemarch ordered a halt, directed the youngest soldiers to drive off
the assailants, and confided the wounded to the care of attendants to
be carried forward to Lechæum.[663] But even the youngest soldiers,
encumbered by their heavy shields, could not reach their nimbler
enemies, who were trained to recede before them. And when, after an
unavailing pursuit, they sought to resume their places in the ranks,
the attack was renewed, so that nine or ten of them were slain before
they could get back. Again did the polemarch give orders to march
forward; again the peltasts renewed their attack, forcing him to
halt; again he ordered the younger soldiers (this time, all those
between eighteen and thirty-three years of age, whereas on the former
occasion, it had been those between eighteen and twenty-eight) to
rush out and drive them off.[664] But the result was just the same:
the pursuers accomplished nothing, and only suffered increased loss
of their bravest and most forward soldiers, when they tried to
rejoin the main body. Whenever the Lacedæmonians attempted to make
progress, these circumstances were again repeated, to their great
loss and discouragement; while the peltasts became every moment more
confident and vigorous.

  [663] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 14. Τούτους μὲν ἐκέλευον τοὺς
  ὑπασπιστὰς ἀραμένους ἀποφέρειν ἐς Λέχαιον· ~οὗτοι καὶ μόνοι τῆς
  μόρας τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐσώθησαν~.

  We have here a remarkable expression of Xenophon,—“These were
  the only men in the mora who were _really and truly saved_.” He
  means, I presume, that they were the only men who were saved
  without the smallest loss of honor; being carried off wounded
  from the field of battle, and not having fled or deserted their
  posts. The others who survived, preserved themselves by flight;
  and we know that the treatment of those Lacedæmonians who ran
  away from the field (οἱ τρέσαντες), on their return to Sparta,
  was insupportably humiliating. See Xenoph. Rep. Laced. ix, 4;
  Plutarch, Agesil. c. 30. We may gather from these words of
  Xenophon, that a distinction was really made at Sparta between
  the treatment of these wounded men here carried off, and that of
  the other survivors of the beaten mora.

  The ὑπασπισταὶ, or shield-bearers, were, probably, a certain
  number of attendants, who habitually carried the shields of the
  officers (compare Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 39; Anab. iv, 2, 20),
  persons of importance, and rich hoplites. It seems hardly to
  be presumed that every hoplite had an ὑπασπιστὴς, in spite of
  what we read about the attendant Helots at the battle of Platæa
  (Herod. ix, 10-29) and in other places.

  [664] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5,15, 16. τὰ δέκα ἀφ᾽ ἥβης—τὰ
  πεντεκαίδεκα ἀφ᾽ ἥβης.

Some relief was now afforded to the distressed _mora_ by the coming
up of their cavalry, which had finished the escort of the Amyklæans.
Had this cavalry been with them at the beginning, the result might
have been different; but it was now insufficient to repress the
animated assaults of the peltasts. Moreover, the Lacedæmonian
horsemen were at no time very good, nor did they on this occasion
venture to push their pursuit to a greater range than the younger
hoplites could keep up with them. At length, after much loss in
killed and wounded, and great distress to all, the polemarch
contrived to get his detachment as far as an eminence about a quarter
of a mile from the sea and about two miles from Lechæum. Here,
while Iphikrates still continued to harass them with his peltasts,
Kallias also was marching up with his hoplites to charge them hand
to hand,—when the Lacedæmonians, enfeebled in numbers, exhausted in
strength, and too much dispirited for close fight with a new enemy,
broke and fled in all directions. Some took the road to Lechæum,
which place a few of them reached, along with the cavalry; the rest
ran towards the sea at the nearest point, and observing that some of
their friends were rowing in boats from Lechæum along the shore to
rescue them, threw themselves into the sea, to wade or swim towards
this new succor. But the active peltasts, irresistible in the pursuit
of broken hoplites, put the last hand to the destruction of the
unfortunate _mora_. Out of its full muster of six hundred, a very
small proportion survived to reënter Lechæum.[665]

  [665] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 17.

  Xenophon affirms the number of slain to have been about two
  hundred and fifty—ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς μάχαις καὶ τῇ φυγῇ ἀπέθανον
  περὶ πεντήκοντα καὶ διακοσίους. But he had before distinctly
  stated that the whole _mora_ marching back to Lechæum under the
  polemarch, was six hundred in number—ὁ μὲν πολέμαρχος σὺν τοῖς
  ὁπλίταις, οὖσιν ὡς ἑξακοσίοις, ἀπῄει πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ Λέχαιον (iv, 5,
  12). And it is plain, from several different expressions, that
  all of them were slain, excepting a very few survivors.

  I think it certain, therefore, that one or other of these two
  numbers is erroneous; either the original aggregate of six
  hundred is _above_ the truth,—or the total of slain, two hundred
  and fifty, is _below_ the truth. Now the latter supposition
  appears to me by far the more probable of the two. The
  Lacedæmonians, habitually secret and misleading in their returns
  of their own numbers (see Thucyd. v, 74), probably did not choose
  to admit publicly a greater total of slain than two hundred and
  fifty. Xenophon has inserted this in his history, forgetting that
  his own details of the battle refuted the numerical statement.
  The total of six hundred is more probable, than any smaller
  number, for the entire mora; and it is impossible to assign any
  reasons why Xenophon should overstate it.

The horseman who first communicated the disaster to Agesilaus, had
started off express immediately from Lechæum, even before the bodies
of the slain had been picked up for burial. The hurried movement of
Agesilaus had been dictated by the desire of reaching the field in
time to contend for the possession of the bodies, and to escape the
shame of soliciting the burial-truce. But the three horsemen who
met him afterwards, arrested his course by informing him that the
bodies had already been buried, under truce asked and obtained; which
authorized Iphikrates to erect his well-earned trophy on the spot
where he had first made the attack.[666]

  [666] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 8-10.

Such a destruction of an entire division of Lacedæmonian hoplites,
by light troops who stood in awe of them and whom they despised, was
an incident, not indeed of great political importance, but striking
in respect of military effect and impression upon the Grecian mind.
Nothing at all like it had occurred since the memorable capture of
Sphakteria, thirty-five years before; a disaster less considerable
in one respect, that the number of hoplites beaten was inferior by
one-third,—but far more important in another respect, that half the
division had surrendered as prisoners; whereas in the battle near
Corinth, though the whole mora (except a few fugitives) perished, it
does not seem that a single prisoner was taken. Upon the Corinthians,
Bœotians, and other enemies of Sparta, the event operated as a joyous
encouragement, reviving them out of all their previous despondency.
Even by the allies of Sparta, jealous of her superiority and bound
to her by fear more than by attachment, it was welcomed with
ill-suppressed satisfaction. But upon the army of Agesilaus (and
doubtless upon the Lacedæmonians at home) it fell like a sudden
thunderbolt, causing the strongest manifestations of sorrow and
sympathy. To these manifestations there was only one exception,—the
fathers, brothers, or sons of the slain warriors; who not only showed
no sorrow, but strutted about publicly with cheerful and triumphant
countenances, like victorious athletes.[667] We shall find the like
phenomenon at Sparta a few years subsequently, after the far more
terrible defeat at Leuktra; the relatives of the slain were joyous
and elate,—those of the survivors, downcast and mortified;[668] a
fact strikingly characteristic both of the intense mental effect
of the Spartan training, and of the peculiar associations which
it generated. We may understand how terrible was the contempt
which awaited a Spartan who survived defeat, when we find fathers
positively rejoicing that their sons had escaped such treatment by
death.

  [667] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 10. Ἅτε δὲ ἀήθους τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις
  γεγενημένης τῆς τοιαύτης συμφορᾶς, πολὺ πένθος ἦν κατὰ τὸ
  Λακωνικὸν στράτευμα, πλὴν ὅσων ἐτέθνασαν ἐν χώρᾳ ἢ υἱοὶ ἢ πατέρες
  ἢ ἀδελφοί· ~οὗτοι δὲ, ὥσπερ νικηφόροι, λαμπροὶ καὶ ἀγαλλόμενοι τῷ
  οἰκείῳ πάθει περιῄεσαν~.

  If any reader objects to the words which I have used in the text
  I request him to compare them with the Greek of Xenophon.

  [668] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 16.

Sorely was Agesilaus requited for his supercilious insult towards
the Theban envoys. When he at last consented to see them, after the
news of the battle, their tone was completely altered. They said
not a word about peace, but merely asked permission to pass through
and communicate with their countrymen in Corinth. “I understand
your purpose (said Agesilaus, smiling),—you want to witness the
triumph of your friends, and see what it is worth. Come along with
me, and I will teach you.” Accordingly, on the next day, he caused
them to accompany him while he marched his army up to the very gates
of Corinth,—defying those within to come out and fight. The lands
had been so ravaged, that there remained little to destroy. But
wherever there were any fruit-trees yet standing, the Lacedæmonians
now cut them down. Iphikrates was too prudent to compromise his
recent advantage by hazarding a second battle; so that Agesilaus had
only the satisfaction of showing that he was master of the field,
and then retired to encamp at Lechæum; from whence he sent back the
Theban envoys by sea to Kreusis. Having then left a fresh mora or
division at Lechæum, in place of that which had been defeated, he
marched back to Sparta. But the circumstances of the march betrayed
his real feelings, thinly disguised by the recent bravado of marching
up to the gates of Corinth. He feared to expose his Lacedæmonian
troops even to the view of those allies through whose territory he
was to pass; so well was he aware that the latter (especially the
Mantineians) would manifest their satisfaction at the recent defeat.
Accordingly, he commenced his day’s march before dawn, and did not
halt for the night till after dark; at Mantineia, he not only did
not halt at all, but passed by, outside of the walls, before day had
broken.[669] There cannot be a more convincing proof of the real
dispositions of the allies towards Sparta, and of the sentiment of
compulsion which dictated their continued adherence; a fact which we
shall see abundantly illustrated as we advance in the stream of the
history.

  [669] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 16.

The retirement of Agesilaus was the signal for renewed enterprise
on the part of Iphikrates; who retook Sidus and Krommyon, which had
been garrisoned by Praxitas,—as well as Peiræum and Œnoê, which had
been left under occupation by Agesilaus. Corinth was thus cleared
of enemies on its eastern and north-eastern sides. And though the
Lacedæmonians still carried on a desultory warfare from Lechæum,
yet such was the terror impressed by the late destruction of their
mora, that the Corinthian exiles at Sikyon did not venture to march
by land from that place to Lechæum, under the walls of Corinth,—but
communicated with Lechæum only by sea.[670] In truth, we hear of no
farther serious military operations undertaken by Sparta against
Corinth, before the peace of Antalkidas. And the place became so
secure, that the Corinthian leaders and their Argeian allies were
glad to dispense with the presence of Iphikrates. That officer had
gained so much glory by his recent successes, which the Athenian
orators[671] even in the next generation never ceased to extol,
that his temper, naturally haughty, became domineering; and he
tried to procure, either for Athens or for himself, the mastery of
Corinth,—putting to death some of the philo-Argeian leaders. We
know these circumstances only by brief and meagre allusion; but they
caused the Athenians to recall Iphikrates with a large portion of
his peltasts, and to send Chabrias to Corinth in his place.[672]

  [670] Xen. Hellen. iv, 5, 19.

  [671] Demosthenes—περὶ Συντάξεως—c. 8, p. 172.

  [672] Diodor. xiv, 92; Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 34.

  Aristeides (Panathen. p. 168) boasts that the Athenians were
  masters of the Acro-Corinthus, and might have kept the city as
  their own, but that they generously refused to do so.

It was either in the ensuing summer,—or perhaps immediately
afterwards during the same summer,—390 B.C., that Agesilaus
undertook an expedition into Akarnania; at the instance of the
Achæans, who threatened, if this were not done, to forsake the
Lacedæmonian alliance. They had acquired possession of the Ætolian
district of Kalydon, had brought the neighboring villagers into a
city residence, and garrisoned it as a dependence of the Achæan
confederacy. But the Akarnanians,—allies of Athens as well as
Thebes, and aided by an Athenian squadron at Œniadæ,—attacked them
there, probably at the invitation of a portion of the inhabitants,
and pressed them so hard, that they employed the most urgent
instances to obtain aid from Sparta. Agesilaus crossed the Gulf at
Rhium with a considerable force of Spartans and allies, and the full
muster of the Achæans. On his arrival the Akarnanians all took refuge
in their cities, sending their cattle up into the interior highlands,
to the borders of a remote lake. Agesilaus, having sent to Stratus to
require them not merely to forbear hostilities against the Achæans,
but to relinquish their alliance with Athens and Thebes, and to
become allies of Sparta,—found his demands resisted, and began to
lay waste the country. Two or three days of operations designedly
slack, were employed to lull the Akarnanians into security; after
which, by a rapid forced march, Agesilaus suddenly surprised the
remote spot in which their cattle and slaves had been deposited
for safety. He spent a day here to sell this booty; merchants,
probably, accompanying his army. But he had considerable difficulty
in his return march, from the narrow paths and high mountains
through which he had to thread his way. By a series of brave and
well-combined hill-movements,—which, probably, reminded Xenophon
of his own operations against the Karduchians in the retreat of the
Ten-Thousand,—he defeated and dispersed the Akarnanians, though
not without suffering considerably from the excellence of their
light troops. Yet he was not successful in his attack upon any
one of their cities, nor would he consent to prolong the war until
seed-time, notwithstanding earnest solicitation from the Achæans,
whom he pacified by engaging to return the next spring. He was,
indeed, in a difficult and dangerous country, had not his retreat
been facilitated by the compliance of the Ætolians; who calculated
(though vainly) on obtaining from him the recovery of Naupaktus,
then held (as well as Kalydon) by the Achæans.[673] Partial as the
success of this expedition had been, however, it inflicted sufficient
damage on the Akarnanians to accomplish its purpose. On learning that
it was about to be repeated in the ensuing spring, they sent envoys
to Sparta to solicit peace; consenting to abstain from hostilities
against the Achæans, and to enrol themselves as members of the
Lacedæmonian confederacy.[674]

  [673] Diodor. xv, 73.

  [674] Xen. Hellen. iv, 6, 1-14; iv, 7, 1.

It was in this same year that the Spartan authorities resolved on
an expedition against Argos, of which Agesipolis, the other king,
took the command. Having found the border sacrifices favorable, and
crossed the frontier, he sent forward his army to Phlius, where the
Peloponnesian allies were ordered to assemble; but he himself first
turned aside to Olympia, to consult the oracle of Zeus.

It had been the practice of the Argeians, seemingly on more than
one previous occasion,[675] when an invading Lacedæmonian army was
approaching their territory, to meet them by a solemn message,
intimating that it was the time of some festival (the Karneian, or
other) held sacred by both parties, and warning them not to violate
the frontier during the holy truce. This was in point of fact nothing
better than a fraud; for the notice was sent, not at the moment when
the Karneian festival (or other, as the case might be) ought to come
on according to the due course of seasons, but at any time when it
might serve the purpose of arresting a Lacedæmonian invasion. But
though the duplicity of the Argeians was thus manifest, so strong
were the pious scruples of the Spartan king, that he could hardly
make up his mind to disregard the warning. Moreover, in the existing
confusion of the calendar, there was always room for some uncertainty
as to the question, which was the true Karneian moon; no Dorian
state having any right to fix it imperatively for the others, as the
Eleians fixed the Olympic truce, and the Corinthians the Isthmian.
It was with a view to satisfy his conscience on this subject that
Agesipolis now went to Olympia, and put the question to the oracle
of Zeus,—whether he might with a safe religious conscience refuse
to accept the holy truce, if the Argeians should now tender it. The
oracle, habitually dexterous in meeting a specific question with a
general reply, informed him, that he might with a safe conscience
decline a truce demanded wrongfully and for underhand purposes.[676]
This was accepted by Agesipolis as a satisfactory affirmative.
Nevertheless, to make assurance doubly sure, he went directly
forward to Delphi, to put the same question to Apollo. As it would
have been truly embarrassing, however, if the two holy replies had
turned out such as to contradict each other, he availed himself of
the _præjudicium_ which he had already received at Olympia, and
submitted the question to Apollo at Delphi in this form: “Is thine
opinion on the question of the holy truce, the same as that of thy
father (Zeus)?” “Most decidedly the same,” replied the god. Such
double warranty, though the appeal was so drawn up as scarcely to
leave to Apollo freedom of speech,[677] enabled Agesipolis to return
with full confidence to Phlius, where his army was already mustered;
and to march immediately into the Argeian territory by the road of
Nemea. Being met on the frontier by two heralds with wreaths and in
solemn attire, who warned him that it was a season of holy truce,
he informed them that the gods authorized his disobedience to their
summons, and marched on into the Argeian plain.

  [675] Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 3. Οἱ δ᾽ Ἀργεῖοι, ἐπεὶ ἔγνωσαν οὐ
  δυνησόμενοι κωλύειν, ἔπεμψαν, ~ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν~, ἐστεφανωμένους
  δύο κήρυκας, ὑποφέροντας σπονδάς.

  [676] Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 2. Ὁ δὲ Ἀγησίπολις—ἐλθὼν εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν
  καὶ χρηστηριαζόμενος, ἐπηρώτα τὸν θεὸν, εἰ ὁσίως ἂν ἔχοι αὐτῷ,
  μὴ δεχομένῳ τὰς σπονδὰς τῶν Ἀργείων· ~ὅτι οὐχ ὁπότε καθήκοι
  ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ᾽ ὁπότε ἐμβάλλειν μέλλοιεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τότε
  ὑπέφερον τοὺς μῆνας~. Ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἐπεσήμαινεν αὐτῷ, ὅσιον εἶναι μὴ
  δεχομένῳ σπονδὰς ἀδίκως ἐπιφερομένας. Ἐκεῖθεν δ᾽ εὐθὺς πορευθεὶς
  εἰς Δελφοὺς, ἐπήρετο αὖ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, εἰ κἀκείνῳ δοκοίῃ περὶ τῶν
  σπονδῶν, καθάπερ τῷ πατρί. Ὁ δ᾽ ἀπεκρίνατο, ~καὶ μάλα κατὰ ταὐτά~.

  I have given in the text what I believe to be the meaning of
  the words ὑποφέρειν τοὺς μῆνας,—upon which Schneider has a
  long and not very instructive note, adopting an untenable
  hypothesis of Dodwell, that the Argeians on this occasion
  appealed to the sanctity of the Isthmian truce; which is not
  countenanced by anything in Xenophon, and which it belonged to
  the Corinthians to announce, not to the Argeians. The plural
  τοὺς μῆνας indicates (as Weiske and Manso understand it) that
  the Argeians sometimes put forward the name of one festival,
  sometimes of another. We may be pretty sure that the Karneian
  festival was one of them; but what the others were, we cannot
  tell. It is very probable that there were several festivals
  of common obligation either among all the Dorians, or between
  Sparta and Argos—πατρῴους τινας σπονδὰς ἐκ παλαιοῦ καθεστώσας
  τοῖς Δωριεῦσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους,—to use the language of Pausanias
  (iii, 5, 6). The language of Xenophon implies that the demand
  made by the Argeians, for observance of the Holy Truce, was in
  itself rightful, or rather, that it would have been rightful at
  a different season; but that they put themselves in the wrong by
  making it at an improper season and for a fraudulent political
  purpose.

  For some remarks on other fraudulent manœuvres of the Argeians,
  respecting the season of the Karneian truce, see Vol. VII. of
  this History, Ch. lvi, p. 66. The compound verb ~ὑποφέρειν~
  τοὺς μῆνας seems to imply the _underhand purpose_ with which
  the Argeians preferred their demand of the truce. What were the
  previous occasions on which they had preferred a similar demand,
  we are not informed. Two years before, Agesilaus had invaded
  and laid waste Argos; perhaps they may have tried, but without
  success, to arrest his march by a similar pious fraud.

  It is to this proceeding, perhaps, that Andokides alludes (Or.
  iii, De Pace, s. 27), where he says that the Argeians, though
  strenuous in insisting that Athens should help them to carry on
  the war for the possession of Corinth against the Lacedæmonians,
  had nevertheless made a separate peace with the latter, covering
  their own Argeian territory from invasion—αὐτοὶ δ᾽ ἰδίᾳ εἰρήνην
  ποιησάμενοι τὴν χώραν οὐ παρέχουσιν ἐμπολεμεῖν. Of this obscure
  passage I can give no better explanation.

  [677] Aristotel. Rhetoric, ii, 23. Ἡγήσιππος ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐπηρώτα
  τὸν θεόν, κεχρημένος πρότερον Ὀλυμπιᾶσιν, εἰ αὐτῷ ταὐτὰ δοκεῖ,
  ἅπερ τῷ πατρί, ~ὡς αἰσχρὸν ὂν τἀναντία εἰπεῖν~.

  A similar story about the manner of putting the question to
  Apollo at Delphi, after it had already been put to Zeus at
  Dodona, is told about Agesilaus on another occasion (Plutarch,
  Apophth. Lacon. p. 208 F.).

It happened that on the first evening after he had crossed the
border, the supper and the consequent libation having been just
concluded, an earthquake occurred; or, to translate the Greek phrase,
“the god (Poseidon) shook.” To all Greeks, and to Lacedæmonians
especially, this was a solemn event, and the personal companions of
Agesipolis immediately began to sing the pæan in honor of Poseidon;
the general impression among the soldiers being, that he would give
orders for quitting the territory immediately, as Agis had acted in
the invasion of Elis a few years before. Perhaps Agesipolis would
have done the same here, construing the earthquake as a warning that
he had done wrong, in neglecting the summons of the heralds,—had
he not been fortified by the recent oracles. He now replied, that
if the earthquake had occurred before he crossed the frontier, he
should have considered it as a prohibition; but as it came after his
crossing, he looked upon it as an encouragement to go forward.

So fully had the Argeians counted on the success of their warning
transmitted by the heralds, that they had made little preparation
for defence. Their dismay and confusion were very great; their
property was still outlying, not yet removed into secure places, so
that Agesipolis found much both to destroy and to appropriate. He
carried his ravages even to the gates of the city, piquing himself on
advancing a little farther than Agesilaus had gone in his invasion
two years before. He was at last driven to retreat by the terror
of a flash of lightning in his camp, which killed several persons.
And a project which he had formed, of erecting a permanent fort on
the Argeian frontier, was abandoned in consequence of unfavorable
sacrifices.[678]

  [678] Xen. Hellen. iv, 7, 7; Pausan. iii, 5, 6.

  It rather seems, by the language of these two writers, that they
  look upon the menacing signs, by which Agesipolis was induced
  to depart, as marks of some displeasure of the gods against his
  expedition.

Besides these transactions in and near the isthmus of Corinth, the
war between Sparta and her enemies was prosecuted during the same
years both in the islands and on the coast of Asia Minor; though our
information is so imperfect that we can scarcely trace the thread of
events. The defeat near Knidus (394 B.C.),—the triumphant maritime
force of Pharnabazus and Konon at the Isthmus of Corinth in the
ensuing year (393 B.C.),—the restoration of the Athenian Long Walls
and fortified port,—and the activity of Konon with the fleet among
the islands,[679]—so alarmed the Spartans with the idea of a second
Athenian maritime empire, that they made every effort to detach the
Persian force from the side of their enemies.

  [679] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 12. Compare Isokrates, Or. vii,
  (Areopag.) s. 13. ἁπάσης γὰρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑπὸ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν
  ὑποπεσούσης καὶ μετὰ τὴν Κόνωνος ναυμαχίαν καὶ μετὰ τὴν Τιμοθέου
  στρατηγίαν, etc. This oration, however, was composed a long while
  after the events (about B.C. 353—see Mr. Clinton’s Fast. H.,
  in that year); and Isokrates exaggerates; mistaking the break-up
  of the Lacedæmonian empire for a resumption of the Athenian.
  Demosthenes also (cont. Leptin. c. 16, p. 477) confounds the
  same two ideas, and even the Athenian vote of thanks to Konon,
  perpetuated on a commemorative column, countenanced the same
  impression,—ἐπειδὴ Κόνων ἠλευθέρωσε τοὺς Ἀθηναίων συμμάχους, etc.

The Spartan Antalkidas, a dexterous, winning and artful man,[680]
not unlike Lysander, was sent as envoy to Tiribazus (392 B.C.);
whom we now find as satrap of Ionia in the room of Tithraustes,
after having been satrap of Armenia during the retreat of the Ten
Thousand. As Tiribazus was newly arrived in Asia Minor, he had not
acquired that personal enmity against the Spartans, which the active
hostilities of Derkyllidas and Agesilaus had inspired to Pharnabazus
and other Persians. Moreover, jealousy between neighboring satraps
was an ordinary feeling, which Antalkidas now hoped to turn to the
advantage of Sparta. To counteract his projects, envoys were also
sent to Tiribazus, by the confederate enemies of Sparta, Athens,
Thebes, Corinth, and Argos; and Konon, as the envoy of Athens, was
incautiously despatched among the number. On the part of Sparta,
Antalkidas offered, first, to abandon to the king of Persia all
the Greeks on the continent of Asia; next, as to all the other
Greeks, insular as well as continental, he required nothing more
than absolute autonomy for each separate city, great and small.[681]
The Persian king (he said) could neither desire anything more for
himself, nor have any motive for continuing the war against Sparta,
when he should once be placed in possession of all the towns on
the Asiatic coast, and when he should find both Sparta and Athens
rendered incapable of annoying him, through the autonomy and disunion
of the Hellenic world. But to neither of the two propositions of
Antalkidas would Athens, Thebes, or Argos, accede. As to the first,
they repudiated the disgrace of thus formally abandoning the Asiatic
Greeks;[682] as to the second proposition, guaranteeing autonomy
to every distinct city of Greece, they would admit it only under
special reserves, which it did not suit the purpose of Antalkidas
to grant. In truth the proposition went to break up (and was framed
with that view) both the Bœotian confederacy under the presidency
of Thebes, and the union between Argos and Corinth; while it also
deprived Athens of the chance of recovering Lemnos, Imbros, and
Skyros,[683]—islands which had been possessed and recognized by her
since the first commencement of the confederacy of Delos; indeed the
two former, even from the time of Miltiades the conqueror of Marathon.

  [680] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

  [681] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 12-14.

  [682] Diodor. xiv, 110. He affirms that these cities strongly
  objected to this concession, five years afterwards, when the
  peace of Antalkidas was actually concluded; but that they were
  forced to give up their scruples and accept the peace including
  the concession, because they had not force to resist Persia and
  Sparta acting in hearty alliance.

  Hence we may infer with certainty, that they also objected to
  it during the earlier discussions, when it was first broached
  by Antalkidas; and that their objections to it were in part the
  cause why the discussions reported in the text broke off without
  result.

  It is true that Athens, during her desperate struggles in the
  last years of the Peloponnesian war, had consented to this
  concession, and even to greater, without doing herself any good
  (Thucyd. viii, 56). But she was not now placed in circumstances
  so imperious as to force her to be equally yielding.

  Plato, in the Menexenus (c. 17, p. 245), asserts that all the
  allies of Athens—Bœotians, Corinthians, Argeians, etc., were
  willing to surrender the Asiatic Greeks at the requisition of
  Artaxerxes; but that the Athenians alone resolutely stood out,
  and were in consequence left without any allies. The latter
  part of this assertion, as to the isolation of Athens from her
  allies, is certainly not true; nor do I believe that the allies
  took essentially different views from Athens on the point.
  The Menexenus, eloquent and complimentary to Athens, must be
  followed cautiously as to matters of fact. Plato goes the length
  of denying that the Athenians subscribed the convention of
  Antalkidas. Aristeides (Panathen. p. 172) says that they were
  forced to subscribe it, because all their allies abandoned them.

  [683] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 15.

Here commences a new era in the policy of Sparta. That she should
abnegate all pretension to maritime empire, is noway difficult to
understand—seeing that it had already been irrevocably overthrown
by the defeat of Knidus. Nor can we wonder that she should abandon
the Greeks on the Asiatic continent to Persian sway; since this
was nothing more than she had already consented to do in her
conventions with Tissaphernes and Cyrus during the latter years of
the Peloponnesian war,[684]—and consented, let us add, not under
any of that stringent necessity which at the same time pressed upon
Athens, but simply with a view to the maximum of victory over an
enemy already enfeebled. The events which followed the close of that
war (recounted in a former chapter) had indeed induced her to alter
her determination, and again to espouse their cause. But the real
novelty now first exhibited in her policy, is, the full development
of what had before existed in manifest tendency,—hostility against
all the partial land-confederacies of Greece, disguised under the
plausible demand of universal autonomy for every town, great or
small. How this autonomy was construed and carried into act, we
shall see hereafter; at present, we have only to note the first
proclamation of it by Antalkidas in the name of Sparta.

  [684] See a striking passage in the Or. xii, (Panathen.) of
  Isokrates, s. 110.

On this occasion, indeed, his mission came to nothing, from the
peremptory opposition of Athens and the others. But he was fortunate
enough to gain the approbation and confidence of Tiribazus; who saw
so clearly how much both propositions tended to promote the interests
and power of Persia, that he resolved to go up in person to court,
and prevail on Artaxerxes to act in concert with Sparta. Though not
daring to support Antalkidas openly, Tiribazus secretly gave him
money to reinforce the Spartan fleet. He at the same time rendered
to Sparta the more signal service of arresting and detaining Konon,
pretending that the latter was acting contrary to the interests of
the king.[685] This arrest was a gross act of perfidy, since Konon
not only commanded respect in his character of envoy,—but had been
acting with the full confidence, and almost under the orders, of
Pharnabazus. But the removal of an officer of so much ability,—the
only man who possessed the confidence of Pharnabazus,—was the most
fatal of all impediments to the naval renovation of Athens. It was
fortunate that Konon had had time to rebuild the Long Walls, before
his means of action were thus abruptly intercepted. Respecting his
subsequent fate, there exist contradictory stories. According to
one, he was put to death by the Persians in prison; according to
another, he found means to escape and again took refuge with Evagoras
in Cyprus, in which island he afterwards died of sickness.[686]
The latter story appears undoubtedly to be the true one. But it is
certain that he never afterwards had the means of performing any
public service, and that his career was cut short by this treacherous
detention, just at the moment when its promise was the most splendid
for his country.

  [685] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 16; Diodor. xiv, 85.

  [686] Lysias, Or. xix, (De Bon. Aristoph.) s. 41, 42, 44;
  Cornelius Nepos, Conon, c. 5; Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s.
  180.

Tiribazus, on going up to the Persian court, teems to have been
detained there for the purpose of concerting measures against
Evagoras, prince of Salamis in Cyprus, whose revolt from Persia was
now on the point of breaking out. But the Persian court could not
yet be prevailed upon to show any countenance to the propositions
of Sparta or of Antalkidas. On the contrary, Struthas, who was sent
down to Ionia as temporary substitute for Tiribazus, full of anxiety
to avenge the ravages of Agesilaus, acted with vigorous hostility
against the Lacedæmonians, and manifested friendly dispositions
towards Athens.

Thimbron (of whom we have before heard as first taking the command
of the Cyreian army in Asia Minor, after their return from Thrace)
received orders again to act as head of the Lacedæmonian forces in
Asia against Struthas. The new commander, with an army estimated
by Diodorus at eight thousand men,[687] marched from Ephesus into
the interior, and began his devastation of the territory dependent
on Persia. But his previous command, though he was personally
amiable,[688] had been irregular and disorderly, and it was soon
observed that the same defects were now yet more prominent,
aggravated by too liberal indulgence in convivial pleasures.
Aware of his rash, contemptuous, and improvident mode of attack,
Struthas laid a snare for him by sending a detachment of cavalry
to menace the camp, just when Thimbron had concluded his morning
meal in company with the flute-player Thersander,—the latter not
merely an excellent musician, but possessed of a full measure of
Spartan courage. Starting from his tent at the news, Thimbron,
with Thersander, waited only to collect the few troops immediately
at hand, without even leaving any orders for the remainder, and
hastened to repel the assailants; who gave way easily, and seduced
him into a pursuit. Presently Struthas himself, appearing with a
numerous and well-arrayed body of cavalry, charged with vigor the
disorderly detachment of Thimbron. Both that general and Thersander,
bravely fighting, fell among the first; while the army, deprived
of their commander as well as ill-prepared for a battle, made but
an ineffective resistance. They were broken, warmly pursued, and
the greater number slain. A few who contrived to escape the active
Persian cavalry, found shelter in the neighboring cities.[689]

  [687] Diodor. xiv. 99.

  [688] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 22. Ἦν δὲ οὗτος ἁνὴρ (Diphridas)
  ~εὔχαρίς τε οὐχ ἧττον τοῦ Θίμβρωνος~, μᾶλλόν τε συντεταγμένος,
  καὶ ἐγχειρητικώτερος, στρατηγός. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκράτουν αὐτοῦ αἱ τοῦ
  σώματος ἡδοναὶ, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ, πρὸς ᾧ εἴη ἔργῳ, τοῦτο ἔπραττεν.

  [689] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 18, 19.

This victory of Struthas, gained by the Persian cavalry, displays
a degree of vigor and ability which, fortunately for the Greeks,
was rarely seen in Persian operations. Our scanty information does
not enable us to trace its consequences. We find Diphridas sent out
soon after by the Lacedæmonians, along with the admiral Ekdikus, as
successor of Thimbron to bring together the remnant of the defeated
army, and to protect those cities which had contributed to form it.
Diphridas,—a man with all the popular qualities of his predecessor,
but a better and more careful officer,—is said to have succeeded to
some extent in this difficult mission. Being fortunate enough to take
captive the son-in-law of Struthas, with his wife, (as Xenophon had
captured Asidates,) he obtained a sufficiently large ransom to enable
him to pay his troops for some time.[690] But it is evident that his
achievements were not considerable, and that the Ionian Greeks on
the continent are now left to make good their position, as they can,
against the satrap at Sardis.

  [690] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21, 22.

The forces of Sparta were much required at Rhodes; which island (as
has been mentioned already) had revolted from Sparta about five years
before (a few months anterior to the battle of Knidus), dispossessed
the Lysandrian oligarchy, and established a democratical government.
But since that period, an opposition-party in the island had
gradually risen up, acquired strength, and come into correspondence
with the oligarchical exiles; who on their side warmly solicited
aid from Sparta, representing that Rhodes would otherwise become
thoroughly dependent on Athens. Accordingly, the Lacedæmonians sent
eight triremes across the Ægean under the command of Ekdikus; the
first of their ships of war which had crossed since the defeat of
Knidus.[691] Though the Perso-Athenian naval force in the Ægean had
been either dismissed or paralyzed since the seizure of Konon, yet
the Rhodian government possessed a fleet of about twenty triremes,
besides considerable force of other kinds; so that Ekdikus could
not even land on the island, but was compelled to halt at Knidus.
Fortunately, Teleutias the Lacedæmonian was now in the Corinthian
Gulf with a fleet of twelve triremes, which were no longer required
there; since Agesilaus and he had captured Lechæum a few months
before, and destroyed the maritime force of the Corinthians in those
waters. He was now directed to sail with his squadron out of the
Corinthian Gulf across to Asia, to supersede Ekdikus, and take the
command of the whole fleet for operations off Rhodes. On passing by
Samos, he persuaded the inhabitants to embrace the cause of Sparta,
and to furnish him with a few ships; after which he went onward to
Knidus, where, superseding Ekdikus, he found himself at the head
of twenty-seven triremes.[692] In his way from Knidus to Rhodes,
he accidentally fell in with the Athenian admiral Philokrates,
conducting ten triremes to Cyprus to the aid of Evagoras in his
struggle against the Persians. He was fortunate enough to carry
them all as prisoners into Knidus, where he sold the whole booty,
and then proceeded with his fleet, thus augmented to thirty-seven
sail, to Rhodes. Here he established a fortified post, enabling
the oligarchical party to carry on an active civil war. But he was
defeated in a battle,—his enemies being decidedly the stronger force
in the island, and masters of all the cities.[693]

  [691] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21.

  [692] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 23.

  Diodorus (xiv, 97) agrees in this number of twenty-seven
  triremes, and in the fact of aid having been obtained from Samos,
  which island was persuaded to detach itself from Athens. But
  he recounts the circumstances in a very different manner. He
  represents the oligarchical party in Rhodes as having risen in
  insurrection, and become masters of the island; he does not name
  Teleutias, but Eudokimus (Ekdikus?), Diphilus (Diphridas?), and
  Philodikus, as commanders.

  The statement of Xenophon deserves the greater credence, in my
  judgment. His means of information, as well as his interest,
  about Teleutias (the brother of Agesilaus) were considerable.

  [693] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 24-26.

  Although the three ancient Rhodian cities (Lindus, Ialysus,
  and Kameirus) had coalesced (see Diodor. xiii, 75) a few years
  before into the great city of Rhodes, afterwards so powerful and
  celebrated,—yet they still continued to exist, and apparently as
  fortified places. For Xenophon speaks of the democrats in Rhodes
  as ~τάς τε πόλεις~ ἔχοντας, etc.

  Whether the Philokrates here named as _Philokrates son of
  Ephialtes_, is the same person as the Philokrates accused in the
  Thirtieth oration of Lysias—cannot be certainly made out. It is
  possible enough that there might be two contemporary Athenians
  bearing this name, which would explain the circumstance that
  Xenophon here names the father Ephialtes—a practice occasional
  with him, but not common.

The alliance with Evagoras of Cyprus, in his contention against
Artaxerxes, was at this moment an unfortunate and perplexing
circumstance for Athens, since she was relying upon Persian aid
against Sparta, and since Sparta was bidding against her for it.
But the alliance was one which she could not lightly throw off.
For Evagoras had not only harbored Konon with the remnant of the
Athenian fleet after the disaster of Ægospotami, but had earned
a grant of citizenship and the honor of a statue at Athens, as a
strenuous auxiliary in procuring that Persian aid which gained
the battle of Knidus, and as a personal combatant in that battle,
before the commencement of his dissension with Artaxerxes.[694] It
would have been every way advantageous to Athens at this moment to
decline assisting Evagoras, since (not to mention the probability
of offending the Persian court) she had more than enough to employ
all her maritime force nearer home and for purposes more essential
to herself. Yet in spite of these very serious considerations of
prudence, the paramount feelings of prior obligation and gratitude,
enforced by influential citizens who had formed connections in
Cyprus, determined the Athenians to identify themselves with his
gallant struggles[695] (of which I shall speak more fully presently).
So little was fickleness, or instability, or the easy oblivion of
past feelings, a part of their real nature,—though historians have
commonly denounced it as among their prominent qualities.

  [694] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 67, 68, 82; Epistola
  Philippi ap. Demosthen. Orat. p. 161, c. 4.

  [695] Lysias, Orat. xix, (De Bonis Aristoph.) s. 27-44.

The capture of their squadron under Philokrates, however, and the
consequent increase of the Lacedæmonian naval force at Rhodes,
compelled the Athenians to postpone further aid to Evagoras, and
to arm forty triremes under Thrasybulus for the Asiatic coast; no
inconsiderable effort, when we recollect that four years before
there was scarcely a single trireme in Peiræus, and not even a
wall of defence around the place. Though sent immediately for the
assistance of Rhodes, Thrasybulus judged it expedient to go first
to the Hellespont; probably from extreme want of money to pay his
men. Derkyllidas was still in occupation of Abydos, yet there was no
Lacedæmonian fleet in the strait; so that Thrasybulus was enabled to
extend the alliances of Athens both on the European and the Asiatic
side,—the latter being under the friendly satrap, Pharnabazus.
Reconciling the two Thracian princes, Seuthes and Amadokus, whom he
found at war, he brought both of them into amicable relations with
Athens, and then moved forward to Byzantium. That city was already in
alliance with Athens; but on the arrival of Thrasybulus, the alliance
was still further cemented by the change of its government into a
democracy. Having established friendship with the opposite city of
Chalkêdon, and being thus master of the Bosphorus, he sold the tithe
of the commercial ships sailing out of the Euxine;[696] leaving
doubtless an adequate force to exact it. This was a striking evidence
of revived Athenian maritime power, which seems also to have been
now extended more or less to Samothrace, Thasus, and the coast of
Thrace.[697]

  [696] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 25-27.

  Polybius (iv, 38-47) gives instructive remarks and information
  about the importance of Byzantium and its very peculiar position,
  in the ancient world,—as well as about the dues charged on the
  merchant vessels going into, or coming out of, the Euxine,—and
  the manner in which these dues pressed upon general trade.

  [697] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 7.

From Byzantium, Thrasybulus sailed to Mitylênê, which was already
in friendship with Athens,—though Methymna and the other cities in
the island were still maintained by a force under the Lacedæmonian
harmost, Therimachus. With the aid of the Mitylenæans, and of the
exiles from other Lesbian cities, Thrasybulus marched to the borders
of Methymna, where he was met by Therimachus; who had also brought
together his utmost force, but was now completely defeated and slain.
The Athenians thus became masters of Antissa and Eresus, where they
were enabled to levy a valuable contribution, as well as to plunder
the refractory territory of Methymna. Nevertheless, Thrasybulus, in
spite of farther help from Chios and Mitylênê, still thought himself
not in a situation to go to Rhodes with advantage. Perhaps he was
not sure of pay in advance, and the presence of unpaid troops in an
exhausted island might be a doubtful benefit. Accordingly, he sailed
from <DW26>s along the western and southern coast of Asia Minor,
levying contributions at Halikarnassus[698] and other places, until
he came to Aspendus in Pamphylia; where he also obtained money and
was about to depart with it, when some misdeeds committed by his
soldiers so exasperated the inhabitants, that they attacked him by
night unprepared in his tent, and slew him.[699]

  [698] Lysias, Or. xxviii, cont. Erg. s. 1-20.

  [699] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 28-30; Diodor. xiv, 94.

  The latter states that Thrasybulus lost twenty-three triremes by
  a storm near <DW26>s,—which Xenophon does not notice, and which
  seems improbable.

Thus perished the citizen to whom, more than to any one else, Athens
owed not only her renovated democracy, but its wise, generous, and
harmonious working, after renovation. Even the philo-Laconian and
oligarchical Xenophon bestows upon him a marked and unaffected
eulogy.[700] His devoted patriotism in commencing and prosecuting the
struggle against the Thirty, at a time when they not only were at
the height of their power, but had plausible ground for calculating
on the full auxiliary strength of Sparta, deserves high admiration.
But the feature which stands yet more eminent in his character,—a
feature infinitely rare in the Grecian character, generally,—is,
that the energy of a successful leader was combined with complete
absence both of vindictive antipathies for the past, and of
overbearing ambition for himself. Content to live himself as a simple
citizen under the restored democracy, he taught his countrymen to
forgive an oligarchical party from whom they had suffered atrocious
wrongs, and set the example himself of acquiescing, in the loss of
his own large property. The generosity of such a proceeding ought
not to count for less, because it was at the same time dictated by
the highest political prudence. We find in an oration of Lysias
against Ergokles (a citizen who served in the Athenian fleet on
this last expedition), in which the latter is accused of gross
peculation,—insinuations against Thrasybulus, of having countenanced
the delinquency, though coupled with praise of his general character.
Even the words as they now stand are so vague as to carry little
evidence; but when we reflect that the oration was spoken after the
death of Thrasybulus, they are entitled to no weight at all.[701]

  [700] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 31. Καὶ Θρασύβουλος μὲν δὴ, μάλα δοκῶν
  ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν.

  [701] Lysias, cont. Ergo. Or. xxviii, s. 9.

  Ergokles is charged in this oration with gross abuse of power,
  oppression towards allies and citizens of Athens, and peculation
  for his own profit, during the course of the expedition of
  Thrasybulus; who is indirectly accused of conniving at such
  misconduct. It appears that the Athenians, as soon as they
  were informed that Thrasybulus had established the toll in the
  Bosphorus, passed a decree that an account should be sent home
  of all moneys exacted from the various cities, and that the
  colleagues of Thrasybulus should come home to go through the
  audit (s. 5); implying (so far as we can understand what is thus
  briefly noticed) that Thrasybulus himself should _not_ be obliged
  to come home, but might stay on his Hellespontine or Asiatic
  command. Ergokles, however, probably one of these colleagues,
  resented this decree as an insult, and advised Thrasybulus to
  seize Byzantium, to retain the fleet, and to marry the daughter
  of the Thracian prince Seuthes. It is also affirmed in the
  oration that the fleet had come home in very bad condition (s.
  2-4), and that the money, levied with so much criminal abuse, had
  been either squandered or fraudulently appropriated.

  We learn from another oration that Ergokles was condemned to
  death. His property was confiscated, and was said to amount to
  thirty talents, though he had been poor before the expedition;
  but nothing like that amount was discovered after the sentence of
  confiscation (Lysias, Or. xxx, cont. Philokrat. s. 3).

The Athenians sent Agyrrhius to succeed Thrasybulus. After the
death of the latter, we may conclude that the fleet went to Rhodes,
its original destination,—though Xenophon does not expressly say
so,—the rather, as neither Teleutias nor any subsequent Lacedæmonian
commander appears to have become master of the island, in spite of
the considerable force which they had there assembled.[702] The
Lacedæmonians, however, on their side, being also much in want of
money, Teleutias was obliged (in the same manner as the Athenians),
to move from island to island, levying contributions as he could.[703]

  [702] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 31.

  [703] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 2.

When the news of the successful proceedings of Thrasybulus at
Byzantium and the Hellespont, again establishing a toll for the
profit of Athens, reached Sparta, it excited so much anxiety, that
Anaxibius, having great influence with the ephors of the time,
prevailed on them to send him out as harmost to Abydos, in the room
of Derkyllidas, who had now been in that post for several years.
Having been the officer originally employed to procure the revolt
of the place from Athens (in 411 B.C.),[704] Derkyllidas had since
rendered service not less essential in preserving it to Sparta,
during the extensive desertion which followed the battle of Knidus.
But it was supposed that he ought to have checked the aggressive
plans of Thrasybulus; moreover, Anaxibius promised, if a small force
were entrusted to him, to put down effectually the newly-revived
Athenian influence. He was supposed to know well, those regions in
which he had once already been admiral, at the moment when Xenophon
and the Cyreian army first returned; the harshness, treachery, and
corruption, which he displayed in his dealing with that gallant
body of men, have been already recounted in a former chapter.[705]
With three triremes, and funds for the pay of a thousand mercenary
troops, Anaxibius accordingly went to Abydos. He began his operations
with considerable vigor, both against Athens and Pharnabazus. While
he armed a land-force, which he employed in making incursions on
the neighboring cities in the territory of that satrap,—he at the
same time reinforced his little squadron by three triremes out of
the harbor of Abydos, so that he became strong enough to seize the
merchant vessels passing along the Hellespont to Athens or to her
allies.[706] The force which Thrasybulus had left at Byzantium to
secure the strait revenues, was thus inadequate to its object without
farther addition.

  [704] Thucyd. viii, 61; compare Xenoph. Anab. v, 6, 24.

  [705] See above, Chapter lxxi, p. 156 of the present volume.

  [706] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 32, 83.

Fortunately, Iphikrates was at this moment disengaged at Athens,
having recently returned from Corinth with his body of peltasts, for
whom doubtless employment was wanted. He was accordingly sent with
twelve hundred peltasts and eight triremes, to combat Anaxibius in
the Hellespont; which now became again the scene of conflict, as it
had been in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war; the Athenians
from the European side, the Lacedæmonians from the Asiatic. At first
the warfare consisted of desultory privateering, and money-levying
excursions, on both sides.[707] But at length, the watchful genius
of Iphikrates discovered opportunity for a successful stratagem.
Anaxibius, having just drawn the town of Antandrus into his alliance,
had marched thither for the purpose of leaving a garrison in it,
with his Lacedæmonian and mercenary forces, as well as two hundred
hoplites from Abydos itself. His way lay across the mountainous
region of Ida, southward to the coast of the gulf of Adramyttium.
Accordingly, Iphikrates, foreseeing that he would speedily return,
crossed over in the night from the Chersonese, and planted himself
in ambush on the line of return march; at a point where it traversed
the desert and mountainous extremities of the Abydene territory, near
the gold mines of Kremastê. The triremes which carried him across
were ordered to sail up the strait on the next day, in order that
Anaxibius must be apprised of it, and might suppose Iphikrates to be
employed on his ordinary money-levying excursion.

  [707] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 35, 36. τὸ μὲν πρῶτον λῃστὰς
  διαπέμποντες ἐπολέμουν ἀλλήλοις ... Ὅπως δοκοίη, ὥσπερ εἰώθει,
  ἐπ᾽ ἀργυρολογίαν ἐπαναπεπλευκέναι.

The stratagem was completely successful. Anaxibius returned on the
next day, without the least suspicion of any enemy at hand, marching
in careless order and with long-stretched files, as well from the
narrowness of the mountain path as from the circumstance that he
was in the friendly territory of Abydos. Not expecting to fight, he
had unfortunately either omitted the morning sacrifice, or taken
no pains to ascertain that the victims were favorable; so Xenophon
informs us,[708] with that constant regard to the divine judgments
and divine warnings which pervades both the Hellenica and the
Anabasis. Iphikrates having suffered the Abydenes who were in the
van to pass, suddenly sprang from his ambush, to assault Anaxibius
with the Lacedæmonians and the mercenaries, as they descended the
mountain-pass into the plain of Kremastê. His appearance struck
terror and confusion into the whole army; unprepared in its
disorderly array for stedfast resistance,—even if the minds of
the soldiers had been ever so well strung,—against well-trained
peltasts, who were sure to prevail over hoplites not in steady
rank. To Anaxibius himself, the truth stood plain at once. Defeat
was inevitable, and there remained no other resource for him except
to die like a brave man. Accordingly, desiring his shield-bearer
to hand to him his shield, he said to those around him,—“Friends,
my honor commands me to die here; but do you hasten away, and save
yourselves, before the enemy close with us.” Such order was hardly
required to determine his panic-stricken troops, who fled with one
accord towards Abydos; while Anaxibius himself awaited firmly the
approach of the enemy, and fell gallantly fighting on the spot.
No less than twelve Spartan harmosts, those who had been expelled
from their various governments by the defeat of Knidus, and who had
remained ever since under Derkyllidas at Abydos, stood with the like
courage and shared his fate. Such disdain of life hardly surprises
us in conspicuous Spartan citizens, to whom preservation by flight
was “no true preservation” (in the language of Xenophon),[709] but
simply prolongation of life under intolerable disgrace at home. But
what deserves greater remark is, that the youth to whom Anaxibius
was tenderly attached and who was his constant companion, could not
endure to leave him, stayed fighting by his side, and perished by the
same honorable death.[710] So strong was the mutual devotion which
this relation between persons of the male sex inspired in the ancient
Greek mind. With these exceptions, no one else made any attempt to
stand. All fled, and were pursued by Iphikrates as far as the gates
of Abydos, with the slaughter of fifty out of the two hundred Abydene
hoplites, and two hundred of the remaining troops.

  [708] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 36. Ὁ Ἀναξίβιος ἀπεπορεύετο, ὡς μὲν
  ἐλέγετο, ~οὐδὲ τῶν ἱερῶν γεγενημένων αὐτῷ ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ~, ἀλλὰ
  καταφρονήσας, ὅτι διὰ φιλίας τε ἐπορεύετο καὶ ἐς πόλιν φιλίαν,
  καὶ ὅτι ἤκουε τῶν ἀπαντώντων, τὸν Ἰφικράτην ἀναπεπλευκέναι τῆς
  ἐπὶ Προικοννήσου, ἀμελέστερον ἐπορεύετο.

  [709] See the remarks a few pages back, upon the defeat and
  destruction of the Lacedæmonian mora by Iphikrates, near Lechæum,
  page 350.

  [710] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 39. Καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ μέντοι αὐτῷ
  παρέμεινε, καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ τῶν συνεληλυθότων ἐκ τῶν
  πόλεων ἁρμοστήρων ὡς δώδεκα μαχόμενοι συναπέθανον· οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι
  φεύγοντες ἔπιπτον.

This well-planned and successful exploit, while it added to the
reputation of Iphikrates, rendered the Athenians again masters of the
Bosphorus and the Hellespont, ensuring both the levy of the dues and
the transit of their trading vessels. But while the Athenians were
thus carrying on naval war at Rhodes and the Hellespont, they began
to experience annoyance nearer home, from Ægina.

That island (within sight as the eyesore of Peiræus, as Perikles was
wont to call it) had been occupied fifty years before by a population
eminently hostile to Athens, afterwards conquered and expelled by
her,—at last again captured in the new abode which they had obtained
in Laconia,—and put to death by her order. During the Peloponnesian
war, Ægina had been tenanted by Athenian citizens as outsettlers
or kleruchs; all of whom had been driven in after the battle of
Ægospotami. The island was then restored by Lysander to the remnant
of the former population,—as many of them at least as he could find.

These new Æginetans, though doubtless animated by associations highly
unfavorable to Athens, had nevertheless remained not only at peace,
but also in reciprocal commerce, with her, until a considerable time
after the battle of Knidus and the rebuilding of her Long Walls. And
so they would have continued, of their own accord,—since they could
gain but little, and were likely to lose all the security of their
traffic, by her hostility,—had they not been forced to commence
the war by Eteonikus, the Lacedæmonian harmost in the island;[711]
one amidst many examples of the manner in which the smaller Grecian
states were dragged into war, without any motive of their own, by the
ambition of the greater,—by Sparta as well as by Athens.[712] With
the concurrence of the ephors, Eteonikus authorized and encouraged
all Æginetans to fit out privateers for depredation on Attica; which
aggression the Athenians resented, after suffering considerable
inconvenience by sending a force of ten triremes to block up Ægina
from the sea, with a body of hoplites under Pamphilus to construct
and occupy a permanent fort in the island. This squadron, however,
was soon driven off (though Pamphilus still continued to occupy the
fort) by Teleutias, who came to Ægina on hearing of the blockade;
having been engaged, with the fleet which he commanded at Rhodes,
in an expedition among the Cyclades, for the purpose of levying
contributions. He seems to have been now at the term of his year of
command, and while he was at Ægina, his successor, Hierax, arrived
from Sparta, on his way to Rhodes, to supersede him. The fleet was,
accordingly, handed over to Hierax at Ægina, while Teleutias went
directly home to Sparta. So remarkable was his popularity among the
seamen, that numbers of them accompanied him down to the water-edge,
testifying their regret and attachment by crowning him with wreaths,
or pressing his hand. Some, who came down too late, when he was
already under weigh, cast their wreaths on the sea, uttering prayers
for his health and happiness.[713]

  [711] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 1. ὢν δὲ ~πάλιν~ ὁ Ἐτεόνικος ἐν τῇ
  Αἰγίνῃ, καὶ ἐπιμιξίᾳ χρωμένων τὸν πρόσθεν χρόνον τῶν Αἰγινητῶν
  πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἐπεὶ φανερῶς κατὰ θάλατταν ἐπολεμεῖτο
  ὁ πόλεμος, ξυνδόξαν καὶ τοῖς ἐφόροις, ἐφίησι ληΐζεσθαι τὸν
  βουλόμενον ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς.

  The meaning of the word πάλιν here is not easy to determine, since
  (as Schneider remarks) not a word had been said before about the
  presence of Eteonikus at Ægina. Perhaps we may explain it by
  supposing that Eteonikus found the Æginetans reluctant to engage in
  the war, and that he did not like to involve them in it without
  first going to Sparta to consult the ephors. It was on _coming
  back_ to Ægina (πάλιν) from Sparta, after having obtained the
  consent of the ephors (ξυνδόξαν καὶ τοῖς ἐφόροις), that he issued
  the letters of marque.

  Schneider’s note explains τὸν πρόσθεν χρόνον incorrectly, in my
  judgment.

  [712] Compare Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 8; Thucyd. iii, 13. The old
  Æginetan antipathy against Athens, when thus again instigated,
  continued for a considerable time. A year or two afterwards, when
  the philosopher Plato was taken to Ægina to be sold as a slave,
  it was death to any Athenian to land in the island (Aristides,
  Or. xlvi, p. 384; p. 306 Dindorf; Diogenes Laërt. iii, 19;
  Plutarch. Dion. c. 5).

  [713] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 3. Ὁ δὲ Τελευτίας, μακαριώτατα δὴ
  ἀπέπλευσεν οἴκαδε, etc.

  This description of the scene at the departure of Teleutias (for
  whom, as well as for his brother Agesilaus, Xenophon always
  manifests a marked sympathy) is extremely interesting. The
  reflection, too, with which Xenophon follows it up, deserves
  notice,—“I know well that in these incidents I am not recounting
  any outlay of money, or danger incurred, or memorable stratagem.
  But by Zeus, it _does_ seem to me worth a man’s while to reflect,
  by what sort of conduct Teleutias created such dispositions in
  his soldiers. This is a true man’s achievement, more precious
  than any outlay or any danger.”

  What Xenophon here glances at in the case of Teleutias, is the
  scheme worked out in detail in the romance of the Cyropædia (τὸ
  ἐθελοντῶν ἄρχειν—the exercising command in such manner as to
  have willing and obedient subjects)—and touched upon indirectly
  in various of his other compositions,—the Hiero, the Œconomicus,
  and portions of the Memorabilia. The _idéal_ of government, as
  it presented itself to Xenophon, was the paternal despotism, or
  something like it.

Hierax, while carrying back to Rhodes the remaining fleet which
Teleutias had brought from that island, left his subordinate Gorgôpas
as harmost at Ægina with twelve triremes; a force which protected
the island completely, and caused the fortified post occupied by
the Athenians under Pamphilus to be itself blocked up, insomuch
that after an interval of four months, a special decree was passed
at Athens to send a numerous squadron and fetch away the garrison.
As the Æginetan privateers, aided by the squadron of Gorgôpas, now
recommenced their annoyances against Attica, thirteen Athenian
triremes were put in equipment under Eunomus as a guard-squadron
against Ægina. But Gorgôpas and his squadron were now for the time
withdrawn, to escort Antalkidas, the new Lacedæmonian admiral sent
to Asia chiefly for the purpose of again negotiating with Tiribazus.
On returning back, after landing Antalkidas at Ephesus, Gorgôpas
fell in with Eunomus, whose pursuit, however, he escaped, landing at
Ægina just before sunset. The Athenian admiral, after watching for a
short time until he saw the Lacedæmonian seamen out of their vessels
and ashore, departed as it grew dark to Attica, carrying a light to
prevent his ships from parting company. But Gorgôpas, causing his men
to take a hasty meal, immediately reëmbarked and pursued; keeping
on the track by means of the light, and taking care not to betray
himself either by the noise of oars or by the chant of the Keleustês.
Eunomus had no suspicion of the accompanying enemy. Just after he
had touched land near cape Zostêr in Attica, when his men were in
the act of disembarking, Gorgôpas gave signal by trumpet to attack.
After a short action by moonlight, four of the Athenian squadrons
were captured, and carried off to Ægina; with the remainder, Eunomus
escaped to Peiræus.[714]

  [714] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 6-10.

This victory, rendering both Gorgôpas and the Æginetans confident,
laid them open to a stratagem skilfully planned by the Athenian
Chabrias. That officer, who seems to have been dismissed from Corinth
as Iphikrates had been before him, was now about to conduct a force
of ten triremes and eight hundred peltasts to the aid of Evagoras;
to whom the Athenians were thus paying their debt of gratitude,
though they could ill-spare any of their forces from home. Chabrias,
passing over from Peiræus at night, landed without being perceived
in a desert place of the coast of Ægina, and planted himself in
ambush with his peltasts at some little distance inland of the
Herakleion or temple of Hêraklês, amidst hollow ground suitable for
concealment. He had before made agreement with another squadron
and a body of hoplites under Demænetus; who arrived at daybreak and
landed at Ægina at a point called Tripyrgia, about two miles distant
from the Herakleion, but farther removed from the city. As soon as
their arrival became known, Gorgôpas hastened out of the city to
repel them, with all the troops he could collect, Æginetans as well
as marines out of the ships of war,—and eight Spartans who happened
to be his companions in the island. In their march from the city to
attack the new comers, they had to pass near the Herakleion, and
therefore near the troops in ambush; who, as soon as Gorgôpas and
those about him had gone by, rose up suddenly and attacked them in
the rear. The stratagem succeeded not less completely than that of
Iphikrates at Abydos against Anaxibius. Gorgôpas and the Spartans
near him were slain, the rest were defeated, and compelled to flee
with considerable loss back to the city.[715]

  [715] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 12, 13.

After this brilliant success, Chabrias pursued his voyage to Cyprus,
and matters appeared so secure on the side of Ægina, that Demænetus
also was sent to the Hellespont to reinforce Iphikrates. For some
time indeed, the Lacedæmonian ships at Ægina did nothing. Eteonikus,
who was sent as successor to Gorgôpas,[716] could neither persuade
nor constrain the seamen to go aboard, since he had no funds,
while their pay was in arrears; so that Athens with her coast and
her trading-vessels remained altogether unmolested. At length the
Lacedæmonians were obliged to send again to Ægina Teleutias, the most
popular and best-beloved of all their commanders, whom the seamen
welcomed with the utmost delight. Addressing them under the influence
of this first impression, immediately after he had offered sacrifice,
he told them plainly that he had brought with him no money, but that
he had come to put them in the way of procuring it; that he should
himself touch nothing until they were amply provided, and should
require of them to bear no more hardship or fatigue than he went
through himself; that the power and prosperity of Sparta had all
been purchased by willingly braving danger, as well as toil, in the
cause of duty; that it became valiant men to seek their pay, not by
cringing to any one, but by their own swords at the cost of enemies.
And he engaged to find them the means of doing this, provided they
would now again manifest the excellent qualities which he knew them
by experience to possess.[717]

  [716] So we may conclude from Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 13; Demænetus is
  found at the Hellespont v, 1, 26.

  [717] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 14-17.

This address completely won over the seamen, who received it with
shouts of applause; desiring Teleutias to give his orders forthwith,
and promising ready obedience. “Well, (said he), now go and get your
suppers, as you were intending to do; and then come immediately on
shipboard, bringing with you provisions for one day. Advance me thus
much out of your own means, that we may, by the will of the gods,
make an opportune voyage.”[718]

  [718] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 18. Ἄγετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, δειπνήσατε μὲν,
  ἅπερ καὶ ὡς ἐμέλλετε· προπαράσχετε δέ μοι μιᾶς ἡμέρας σῖτον·
  ἔπειτα δὲ ἥκετε ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς αὔτικα μάλα, ὅπως πλεύσωμεν, ἔνθα
  θεὸς ἐθέλει, ἐν καιρῷ ἀφιξόμενοι.

  Schneider doubts whether the words προπαράσχετε δέ μοι are
  correct. But they seem to me to bear a very pertinent meaning.
  Teleutias had no money; yet it was necessary for his purpose
  that the seamen should come furnished with one day’s provision
  beforehand. Accordingly he is obliged to ask _them_ to get
  provision for themselves, or to _lend it_, as it were, _to him_;
  though they were already so dissatisfied from not having received
  their pay.

In spite of the eminent popularity of Teleutias, the men would
probably have refused to go on board, had he told them beforehand
his intention of sailing with his twelve triremes straight into the
harbor of Peiræus. At first sight, the enterprise seemed insane,
for there were triremes in it more than sufficient to overwhelm
him. But he calculated on finding them all unprepared, with seamen
as well as officers in their lodgings ashore, so that he could not
only strike terror and do damage, but even realize half an hour’s
plunder before preparations could be made to resist him. Such was
the security which now reigned there, especially since the death of
Gorgôpas, that no one dreamt of an attack. The harbor was open, as
it had been forty years before, when Brasidas (in the third year of
the Peloponnesian war) attempted the like enterprise from the port of
Megara.[719] Even then, at the maximum of the Athenian naval power,
it was an enterprise possible, simply because every one considered it
to be impossible; and it only failed because the assailants became
terrified, and flinched in the execution.

A little after dark, Teleutias quitted the harbor of Ægina, without
telling any one whither he was going. Rowing leisurely, and allowing
his men alternate repose on their oars, he found himself before
morning within half a mile of Peiræus, where he waited until day was
just dawning, and then led his squadron straight into the harbor.
Everything turned out as he expected; there was not the least idea
of being attacked, nor the least preparation for defence. Not a
single trireme was manned or in fighting condition, but several were
moored without their crews, together with merchant-vessels, loaded
as well as empty. Teleutias directed the captains of his squadron
to drive against the triremes, and disable them; but by no means
to damage the beaks of their own ships by trying to disable the
merchant-ships. Even at that early hour, many Athenians were abroad,
and the arrival of the unexpected assailants struck every one with
surprise and consternation. Loud and vague cries transmitted the news
through all Peiræus, and from Peiræus up to Athens, where it was
believed that their harbor was actually taken. Every man having run
home for his arms, the whole force of the city rushed impetuously
down thither, with one accord,—hoplites as well as horsemen. But
before such succors could arrive, Teleutias had full time to do
considerable mischief. His seamen boarded the larger merchant-ships,
seizing both the men and the portable goods which they found aboard.
Some even jumped ashore on the quay (called the Deigma), laid hands
on the tradesmen, ship-masters, and pilots, whom they saw near, and
carried them away captive. Various smaller vessels with their entire
cargoes were also towed away; and even three or four triremes. With
all these Teleutias sailed safely out of Peiræus, sending some of
his squadron to escort the prizes to Ægina, while he himself with
the remainder sailed southward along the coast. As he was seen to
come out of Peiræus, his triremes were mistaken for Athenian, and
excited no alarm; so that he thus captured several fishing-boats,
and passage-boats coming with passengers from the islands to
Athens,—together with some merchantmen carrying corn and other
goods, at Sunium. All were carried safely into Ægina.[720]

  [719] Thucyd. ii, 94.

  [720] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 18-22.

The enterprise of Teleutias, thus admirably concerted and executed
without the loss of a man, procured for him a plentiful booty, of
which, probably not the least valuable portion consisted in the men
seized as captives. When sold at Ægina, it yielded so large a return
that he was enabled to pay down at once a month’s pay to his seamen;
who became more attached to him than ever, and kept the triremes
in animated and active service under his orders.[721] Admonished
by painful experience, indeed, the Athenians were now, doubtless,
careful both in guarding and in closing Peiræus; as they had become
forty years before after the unsuccessful attack of Brasidas. But in
spite of the utmost vigilance, they suffered an extent of damage from
the indefatigable Teleutias, and from the Æginetan privateers, quite
sufficient to make them weary of the war.[722]

  [721] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 24.

  [722] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 29.

  Even ten years after this, however, when the Lacedæmonian harmost
  Sphodrias marched from Thespiæ by night to surprise Peiræus, it
  was without gates on the land-side—ἀπύλωτος—or at least without
  any such gates as would resist an assault (Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 20).

We cannot doubt, indeed, that the prosecution of the war must have
been a heavy financial burthen upon the Athenians, from 395 B.C.
downward to 387 B.C. How they made good the cost, without any
contributory allies, or any foreign support, except what Konon
obtained during one year from Pharnabazus,—we are not informed.
On the revival of the democracy in 403 B.C., the poverty of the
city, both public and private, had been very great, owing to the
long previous war, ending with the loss of all Athenian property
abroad. At a period about three years afterwards, it seems that the
Athenians were in arrears, not merely for the tribute-money which
they then owed to Sparta as her subject allies, but also for debts
due to the Bœotians on account of damage done; that they were too
poor to perform in full the religious sacrifices prescribed for the
year, and were obliged to omit some even of the more ancient; that
the docks as well as the walls were in sad want of repair.[723] Even
the pay to those citizens who attended the public assemblies and
sat as dikasts in the dikasteries,—pay essential to the working of
the democracy,—was restored only by degrees; beginning first at one
obolus, and not restored to three oboli, at which it had stood before
the capture, until after an interval of some years.[724] It was at
this time too that the Theôric Board, or Paymasters for the general
expenses of public worship and sacrifice, was first established; and
when we read how much the Athenians were embarrassed for the means
of celebrating the prescribed sacrifices, there was, probably, great
necessity for the formation of some such office. The disbursements
connected with this object had been effected, before 403 B.C., not
by any special Board, but by the Hellenotamiæ, or treasurers of the
tribute collected from the allies, who were not renewed after 403
B.C. as the Athenian empire had ceased to exist.[725] A portion of
the money disbursed by the Theôric Board for the religious festivals,
was employed in the distribution of two oboli per head, called the
diobely, to all present citizens, and actually received by all,—not
merely by the poor, but by persons in easy circumstances also.[726]
This distribution was made at several festivals, having originally
begun at the Dionysia, for the purpose of enabling the citizens to
obtain places at the theatrical representations in honor of Dionysus;
but we do not know either the number of the festivals, or the amount
of the total sum. It was, in principle, a natural corollary of the
religious idea connected with the festival; not simply because the
comfort and recreation of each citizen, individually taken, was
promoted by his being enabled to attend the festival,—but because the
collective effect of the ceremony, in honoring and propitiating the
god, was believed to depend in part upon a multitudinous attendance
and lively manifestations.[727] Gradually, however, this distribution
of Theôric or festival-money came to be pushed to an abusive and
mischievous excess, which is brought before our notice forty years
afterwards, during the political career of Demosthenes. Until that
time, we have no materials for speaking of it; and what I here notice
is simply the first creation of the Theôric Board.

  [723] Lysias, Orat. xxx, cont. Nikomachum, s. 21-30.

  I trust this Oration so far as the matter of fact, that in the
  preceding year, some ancient sacrifices had been omitted from
  state-poverty; but the manner in which the speaker makes this
  fact tell against Nikomachus, may or may not be just.

  [724] Aristophan. Ecclesias. 300-310.

  [725] See the Inscription No. 147, in Boeckh’s Corpus Inscriptt.
  Græcor.—Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, ii, 7, p. 179, 180,
  Eng. transl.—and Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Publ. Græc. s. 77, p. 320.

  [726] Demosthenes, Philippic. iv, p. 141, s. 43; Demosth. Orat.
  xliv, cont. Leocharem, p. 1091, s. 48.

  [727] It is common to represent the festivals at Athens as
  if they were so many stratagems for feeding poor citizens at
  the public expense. But the primitive idea and sentiment of
  the Grecian religious festival—the satisfaction to the god
  dependent upon multitudinous spectators sympathizing and enjoying
  themselves together (ἄμμιγα πάντας)—is much anterior to the
  development of democracy at Athens. See the old oracles in
  Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 531, s. 66; Homer, Hymn. Apollin.
  147; K. F. Herrmann, Gottesdienstlich. Alterthümer der Griechen,
  s. 8.

The means of Athens for prosecuting the war, and for paying her
troops sent as well to Bœotia as to Corinth, must have been derived
mainly from direct assessments on property, called eisphoræ. And
some such assessments we find alluded to generally as having taken
place during these years; though we know no details either as to
frequency or amount.[728] But the restitution of the Long Walls and
of the fortifications of Peiræus by Konon, was an assistance not less
valuable to the finances of Athens than to her political power. That
excellent harbor, commodious as a mercantile centre, and now again
safe for the residence of metics and the importations of merchants,
became speedily a scene of animated commerce, as we have seen it
when surprised by Teleutias. The number of metics, or free resident
non-citizens, became also again large, as it had been before the time
of her reverses, and including a number of miscellaneous non-Hellenic
persons, from Lydia, Phrygia, and Syria.[729] Both the port-duties,
and the value of fixed property at Athens, was thus augmented so as
in part to countervail the costs of war. Nevertheless these costs,
continued from year to year, and combined with the damage done by
Æginetan privateers, were seriously felt, and contributed to dispose
the Athenians to peace.

  [728] See such direct assessments on property alluded to in
  various speeches of Lysias, Orat. xix. De Bonis Aristoph. s. 31,
  45, 63; Orat. xxvii. cont. Epikratem, s. 11; Orat. xxix. cont.
  Philokrat. s. 14.

  Boeckh (in his Public Econ. of Athens, iv, 4, p. 493, Engl.
  transl., which passage stands unaltered in the second edition
  of the German original recently published, p. 642) affirms that
  a proposition for the assessment of a direct property-tax of
  one-fortieth, or two and a half per cent., was made about this
  time by a citizen named Euripides, who announced it as intended
  to produce five hundred talents; that the proposition was at
  first enthusiastically welcomed by the Athenians, and procured
  for its author unbounded popularity; but that he was presently
  cried down and disgraced, because on farther examination the
  measure proved unsatisfactory and empty talk.

  Sievers also (Geschichte von Griech. bis zur Schlacht von
  Mantineia, pp. 100, 101) adopts the same view as Boeckh, that
  this was a real proposition of a property tax of two and a half
  per cent., made by Euripides. After having alleged that the
  Athenians in these times supplied their treasury by the most
  unscrupulous injustice in confiscating the property of rich
  citizens,—referring as proof to passages in the orators, none of
  which establishes his conclusion,—Sievers goes on to say,—“But
  that these violences did not suffice, is shown by the fact that
  the people caught with greedy impatience at other measures. Thus
  a new scheme of finance, which however was presently discovered
  to be insufficient or inapplicable, excited at first the most
  extravagant joy.” He adds in a note: “The scheme proceeded from
  Euripides; it was a property-tax of two and a half per cent. See
  Aristoph. Ecclesiaz. 823; Boeckh, Staatshaush. ii, p. 27.”

  In my judgment, the assertion here made by Boeckh and Sievers
  rests upon no sufficient ground. The passage of Aristophanes does
  not warrant us in concluding anything at all about a proposition
  for a property-tax. It is as follows:—

    Τὸ δ᾽ ἔναγχος οὐχ ἅπαντες ἡμεῖς ὤμνυμεν
    Τάλαντ᾽ ἔσεσθαι πεντακόσια τῇ πόλει
    Τῆς τεσσαρακοστῆς, ἣν ἐπόρισ᾽ Εὐριπίδης;
    Κεὐθὺς κατεχρύσου πᾶς ἀνὴρ Εὐριπίδην·
    Ὅτε δὴ δ᾽ ἀνασκοπουμένοις ἐφαίνετο
    Ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος, καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμ᾽ οὐκ ἤρκεσεν,
    Πάλιν κατεπίττου πᾶς ἀνὴρ Εὐριπίδην.

  What this “new financial scheme” (so Sievers properly calls
  it) was, which the poet here alludes to,—we have no means of
  determining. But I venture to express my decided conviction
  that it cannot have been a property-tax. The terms in which it
  is described forbid that supposition. It was a scheme which
  seemed at first sight exceedingly promising and gainful to
  the city, and procured for its author very great popularity;
  but which, on farther examination, proved to be mere empty
  boasting (ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος) How can this be said about any
  motion for a property-tax? That any financier should ever have
  gained extraordinary popularity by proposing a property-tax, is
  altogether inconceivable. And a proposition to raise the immense
  sum of five hundred talents (which Schömann estimates as the
  probable aggregate charge of the whole peace-establishment of
  Athens, Antiq. Jur. Public. Græc. s. 73, p. 313) at one blow by
  an assessment upon property! It would be as much as any financier
  could do to bear up against the tremendous _unpopularity_ of such
  a proposition; and to induce the assembly even to listen to him,
  were the necessity ever so pressing. How odious are propositions
  for direct taxation, we may know without recurring to the
  specific evidence respecting Athens; but if any man requires such
  specific evidence, he may find it abundantly in the Philippics
  and Olynthiacs of Demosthenes. On one occasion (De Symmoriis,
  Or. xiv. s. 33, p. 185) that orator alludes to a proposition for
  raising five hundred talents by direct property-tax as something
  extravagant, which the Athenians would not endure to hear
  mentioned.

  Moreover,—unpopularity apart,—the motion for a property-tax
  could scarcely procure credit for a financier, because it is of
  all ideas the most simple and obvious. Any man can suggest such a
  scheme. But to pass for an acceptable financier, you must propose
  some measure which promises gain to the state without such
  undisguised pressure upon individuals.

  Lastly, there is nothing _delusive_ in a property-tax,—nothing
  which looks gainful at first sight, and then turns out on farther
  examination (ἀνασκοπουμένοις) to be false or uncertain. It may,
  indeed, be more or less evaded; but this can only be known after
  it has been assessed, and when payment is actually called for.

  Upon these grounds I maintain that the τεσσαρακοστὴ proposed by
  Euripides was not a property-tax. What it was I do not pretend
  to say; but τεσσαρακοστὴ may have many other meanings; it might
  mean a duty of two and a half per cent. upon imports or exports,
  or upon the produce of the mines of Laureion; or it might mean
  a cheap coinage or base money, something in the nature of the
  Chian τεσσαρακοσταί (Thucyd. viii, 100). All that the passage
  really teaches us is, that some financial proposition was made by
  Euripides which at first seemed likely to be lucrative, but would
  not stand an attentive examination. It is not even certain that
  Euripides promised a receipt of five hundred talents; this sum is
  only given to us as a comic exaggeration of that which foolish
  men at first fancied. Boeckh in more than one place reasons
  (erroneously, in my judgment) as if this five hundred talents was
  a real and trustworthy estimate, and equal to two and a half per
  cent. upon the taxable property of the Athenians. He says (iv,
  8, p. 520, Engl. transl.) that “Euripides assumed as the basis
  of his proposal for levying a property-tax, a taxable capital
  of twenty thousand talents,”—and that “his proposition of
  one-fortieth was _calculated_ to produce five hundred talents.”
  No such conclusion can be fairly drawn from Aristophanes.

  Again, Boeckh infers from another passage in the same play
  of the same author, that a small direct property-tax of one
  five-hundredth part had been recently imposed. After a speech
  from one of the old women, calling upon a young man to follow
  her, he replies (v. 1006):—

    Ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη μοὔστίν, εἰ μὴ τῶν ἐμῶν
    Τὴν πεντακοσιόστην κατέθηκας τῇ πόλει.

  Boeckh himself admits (iv, 8, p. 520) that this passage is
  very obscure, and so I think every one will find it. Tyrwhitt
  was so perplexed by it that he altered ἐμῶν into ἐτῶν. Without
  presuming to assign the meaning of the passage, I merely contend
  that it cannot be held to justify the affirmation, as a matter
  of historical fact, that a property-tax of one-five-hundredth
  had been levied at Athens, shortly before the representation of
  Ekklesiazusæ.

  I cannot refrain here from noticing another inference drawn by
  Sievers from a third passage in this same play,—the Ekklesiazusæ
  (Geschichte Griechenlands vom Ende des Pelop. Kriegs bis zur
  Schlacht von Mantineia, p. 101.) He says,—“How melancholy is the
  picture of Athenian popular life, which is presented to us by the
  Ekklesiazusæ and the second Plutus, ten or twelve years after the
  restoration of the democracy! What an _impressive seriousness_
  (welch ein erschütternder Ernst) is expressed in the speech of
  Praxagora!” (v. 174 _seqq._).

  I confess that I find neither seriousness, nor genuine and
  trustworthy coloring, in this speech of Praxagora. It was a
  comic case made out for the purpose of showing that the women
  were more fit to govern Athens than the men, and setting forth
  the alleged follies of the men in terms of broad and general
  disparagement. The whole play is, throughout, thorough farce
  and full of Aristophanic humor. And it is surely preposterous
  to treat what is put into the mouth of Praxagora, the leading
  feminine character, as if it were historical evidence as to the
  actual condition or management of Athens. Let any one follow the
  speech of Praxagora into the proposition of reform which she is
  made to submit, and he will then see the absurdity of citing
  her discourse as if it were an harangue in Thucydides. History
  is indeed strangely transformed by thus turning comic wit into
  serious matter of evidence; and no history has suffered so much
  from the proceeding as that of Athens.

  [729] Xenoph. Hellen. v. 1, 19-24: compare vii, 1, 3, 4; Xenoph.
  De Vectigalibus, chapters i, ii, iii, etc.; Xenoph. De Repub.
  Athen. i, 17.

In the Hellespont also, their prospects were not only on the decline,
but had become seriously menacing. After going from Ægina to Ephesus
in the preceding year, and sending back Gorgôpas with the Æginetan
squadron, Antalkidas had placed the remainder of his fleet under his
secretary, Nikolochus, with orders to proceed to the Hellespont for
the relief of Abydos. He himself landed, and repaired to Tiribazus,
by whom he was conducted up to the court of Susa. Here he renewed
the propositions for the pacification of Greece,—on principles of
universal autonomy, abandoning all the Asiatic Greeks as subject
absolutely to the Persian king,—which he had tried in vain to carry
through two years before. Though the Spartans generally were odious
to Artaxerxes, Antalkidas behaved with so much dexterity[730] as to
gain the royal favor personally, while all the influence of Tiribazus
was employed to second his political views. At length they succeeded
in prevailing upon the king formally to adopt the peace, and to
proclaim war against any Greeks who should refuse to accede to it,
empowering the Spartans to enforce it everywhere as his allies and
under his sanction. In order to remove one who would have proved a
great impediment to this measure, the king was farther induced to
invite the satrap Pharnabazus up to court, and to honor him with his
daughter in marriage; leaving the satrapy of Daskylium under the
temporary administration of Ariobarzanes, a personal friend and guest
of Antalkidas.[731] Thus armed against all contingencies, Antalkidas
and Tiribazus returned from Susa to the coast of Asia Minor in the
spring of 387 B.C., not only bearing the formal diploma ratified by
the king’s seal, but commanding ample means to carry it into effect;
since, in addition to the full forces of Persia, twenty additional
triremes were on their way from Syracuse and the Greco-Italian towns,
sent by the despot Dionysius to the aid of the Lacedæmonians.[732]

  [730] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 22.

  [731] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 28.

  [732] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 25-27.

On reaching the coast, Antalkidas found Nikolochus with his fleet
of twenty-five sail blocked up in Abydos by the Athenians under
Iphikrates; who with thirty-two sail were occupying the European side
of the Hellespont. He immediately repaired to Abydos by land, and
took an early opportunity of stealing out by night with his fleet
up the strait towards the Propontis; spreading the rumor that he
was about to attack Chalkêdon, in concert with a party in the town.
But he stopped at Perkôtê, and lay hid in that harbor until he saw
the Athenian fleet (which had gone in pursuit of him upon the false
scent laid out) pass by towards Prokonnêsus. The strait being now
clear, Antalkidas sailed down it again to meet the Syracusan and
Italian ships, whom he safely joined. Such junction, with a view to
which his recent manœuvre had been devised, rendered him more than a
match for his enemies. He had further the good fortune to capture a
detached Athenian squadron of eight triremes, which Thrasybulus (a
second Athenian citizen of that name) was conducting from Thrace to
join the main Athenian fleet in the Hellespont. Lastly, additional
reinforcements also reached Antalkidas from the zealous aid of
Tiribazus and Ariobarzanes, insomuch that he found himself at the
head of no less than eighty triremes, besides a still greater number
which were under preparation in the various ports of Ionia.[733]

  [733] Diodor. xv, 2. These triremes were employed in the ensuing
  year for the prosecution of the war against Evagoras.

Such a fleet, the greatest which had been seen in the Hellespont
since the battle of Ægospotami, was so much superior to anything
which could be brought to meet it, and indicated so strongly the
full force of Persia operating in the interests of Sparta,—that the
Athenians began to fear a repetition of the same calamitous suffering
which they had already undergone from Lysander. A portion of such
hardship they at once began to taste. Not a single merchant-ship
reached them from the Euxine, all being seized and detained by
Antalkidas; so that their main supply of imported corn was thus cut
off. Moreover, in the present encouraging state of affairs, the
Æginetan privateers became doubly active in harassing the coasting
trade of Attica; and this combination, of actual hardship with
prospective alarm, created a paramount anxiety at Athens to terminate
the war. Without Athens, the other allies would have no chance of
success through their own forces; while the Argeians also, hitherto
the most obstinate, had become on their own account desirous of
peace, being afraid of repeated Lacedæmonian invasions of their
territory. That Sparta should press for a peace, when the terms of it
were suggested by herself, is not wonderful. Even to her, triumphant
as her position now seemed, the war was a heavy burden.[734]

  [734] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 28, 29.

Such was the general state of feeling in the Grecian world, when
Tiribazus summoned the contending parties into his presence, probably
at Sardis, to hear the terms of the convention which had just come
down from Susa. He produced the original edict, and having first
publicly exhibited the regal seal, read aloud as follows:—

“King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia, and the
islands of Klazomenæ and Cyprus, shall belong to him. He thinks it
just also, to leave all the other Hellenic cities autonomous, both
small and great,—except Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, which are to
belong to Athens, as they did originally. Should any parties refuse
to accept this peace, I will make war upon them, along with those who
are of the same mind, by land as well as by sea, with ships and with
money.”[735]

  [735] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 31.

  In this document there is the same introduction of the first
  person immediately following the third, as in the correspondence
  between Pausanias and Xerxes (Thucyd. i, 128, 129).

Instructions were given to all the deputies to report the terms of
this edict to their respective cities, and to meet again at Sparta
for acceptance or rejection. When the time of meeting arrived,[736]
all the cities, in spite of their repugnance to the abandonment
of the Asiatic Greeks, and partly also to the second condition,
nevertheless felt themselves overruled by superior force, and gave
a reluctant consent. On taking the oaths, however, the Thebans
tried indirectly to make good an exception in their own case, by
claiming to take the oath not only on behalf of themselves, but on
behalf of the Bœotian cities generally; a demand which Agesilaus in
the name of Sparta repudiated, as virtually cancelling that item
in the pacification whereby the small cities were pronounced to be
autonomous as well as the great. When the Theban deputy replied that
he could not relinquish his claim without fresh instructions from
home, Agesilaus desired him to go at once and consult his countrymen.
“You may tell them (said he) that if they do not comply, they will be
shut out from the treaty.”

  [736] Diodor. xiv, 110.

It was with much delight that Agesilaus pronounced this peremptory
sentence, which placed Thebes in so humiliating a dilemma. Antipathy
towards the Thebans was one of his strongest sentiments, and he
exulted in the hope that they would persist in their refusal so
that he would thus be enabled to bring an overwhelming force to
crush their isolated city. So eagerly did he thirst for the expected
triumph, that immediately on the departure of the Theban deputies,
and before their answer could possibly have been obtained, he
procured the consent of the ephors, offered the border-sacrifice,
and led the Spartan force out as far as Tegea. From that city he not
only despatched messengers in all directions to hasten the arrival of
the Periœki, but also sent forth the officers called xenâgi to the
cities of the Peloponnesian allies, to muster and bring together the
respective contingents. But in spite of all injunctions to despatch,
his wishes were disappointed. Before he started from Tegea, the
Theban deputies returned with the intimation that they were prepared
to take the oath for Thebes alone, recognizing the other Bœotian
cities as autonomous. Agesilaus and the Spartans were thus obliged
to be satisfied with the minor triumph, in itself very serious and
considerable, of having degraded Thebes from her federal headship,
and isolated her from the Bœotian cities.[737]

  [737] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 32, 33.

The unmeasured and impatient miso-Theban bitterness of Agesilaus,
attested here by his friend and panegyrist, deserves especial notice;
for it will be found to explain much of the misconduct of Sparta and
her officers during the ensuing years.

There yet remained one compliance for Agesilaus to exact. The Argeian
auxiliaries were not yet withdrawn from Corinth; and the Corinthian
government might probably think that the terms of the peace, leaving
their city autonomous, permitted them to retain or dismiss these
auxiliaries at their own discretion. But it was not so that Agesilaus
construed the peace; and his construction, right or wrong, was backed
by the power of enforcement. He sent to inform both Argeians and
Corinthians, that if the auxiliaries were not withdrawn, he would
march his army forthwith into both territories. No resistance could
be offered to his peremptory mandate. The Argeians retired from
Corinth; and the vehement philo-Argeian Corinthians,—especially
those who had been concerned in the massacre at the festival of the
Eukleia,—retired at the same time into voluntary exile, thinking
themselves no longer safe in the town. They found a home partly
at Argos, partly at Athens,[738] where they were most hospitably
received. Those Corinthians who had before been in exile, and who,
in concert with the Lacedæmonian garrison at Lechæum and Sikyon,
had been engaged in bitter hostility against their countrymen in
Corinth,—were immediately readmitted into the city. According to
Xenophon, their readmission was pronounced by the spontaneous voice
of the Corinthian citizens.[739] But we shall be more correct in
affirming, that it was procured by the same intimidating summons from
Agesilaus which had extorted the dismissal of the Argeians.[740]
The restoration of the exiles from Lechæum on the present occasion
was no more voluntary than that of the Athenian exiles had been
eighteen years before, at the Peloponnesian war,—or than that of the
Phliasian exiles was, two or three years afterwards.[741]

  [738] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 34; Demosthen. adv. Leptin. c. 13, p.
  473.

  [739] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 34. Οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι πολῖται ἕκοντες
  κατεδέχοντο τοὺς πρόσθεν φεύγοντας.

  [740] Such is in fact the version of the story in Xenophon’s
  Encomium upon Agesilaus (ii, 21), where it is made a matter of
  honor to the latter, that he would not consent to peace, except
  with a compulsory clause (ἠνάγκασε) that the Corinthian and
  Theban exiles should be restored. The Corinthian exiles had been
  actively coöperating with Agesilaus against Corinth. Of Theban
  exiles we have heard nothing; but it is very probable that there
  were several serving with Agesilaus,—and also pretty certain
  that he would insist upon their restoration.

  [741] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 8.





End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of History of Greece, Volume 9 (of 12), by 
George Grote

*** 