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THE OREGON QUESTION.

BY

ALBERT GALLATIN.


NEW YORK:
BARTLETT & WELFORD, 7 ASTOR HOUSE.

1846.


R. CRAIGHEAD, PRINTER, 112 FULTON STREET, NEW YORK.




THE OREGON QUESTION.




NUMBER I.


I had been a pioneer in collecting facts and stating the case. The only
materials within my reach consisted of the accounts of voyages
previously published, (including that of Maurelle, in Barrington's
Miscellanies), of the varied and important information derived from
Humboldt's New Spain, and of the voyage of the Sutil and Mexicano, the
introduction to which contains a brief official account of the Spanish
discoveries. The statement of the case was the best I was able to make
with the materials on hand, and may be found defective in many respects.
Since that time manuscript journals of several of the voyages have been
obtained at Madrid. New facts have thus been added; others have been
better analyzed, and some errors rectified. Arguments which had been
only indicated have been enforced, and new views have been suggested.
The subject, indeed, seems to be exhausted; and it would be difficult to
add anything to the able correspondence between the two Governments
which has been lately published.

Ministers charged with diplomatic discussions are not, however, in those
official papers intended for publication, to be considered as
philosophers calmly investigating the questions, with no other object
but to elicit truth. They are always, to a certain extent, advocates,
who use their best endeavors to urge and even strain the reasons that
may be alleged in favor of the claims set up by their Governments; and
in the same manner to repel, if not to deny, all that may be adduced by
the other party. Such official papers are in fact appeals to public
opinion, and generally published when there remains no hope to conclude
for the present an amicable arrangement.

But, though acting in that respect as advocates, diplomatists are
essentially ministers of peace, whose constant and primary duty is
mutually to devise conciliatory means for the adjustment of conflicting
pretensions, for the continuance of friendly relations, for preventing
war, or for the restoration of peace. It has unfortunately happened that
on this occasion, both Governments have assumed such absolute and
exclusive grounds as to have greatly increased, at least for the
present, the obstacles to an amicable arrangement.

It is morally impossible for the bulk of the people of any country
thoroughly to investigate a subject so complex as that of the respective
claims to the Oregon territory; and, for obvious reasons, it is much
less understood by the great mass of the population in England than in
the United States. Everywhere, when the question is between the country
and a foreign nation, the people at large, impelled by natural and
patriotic feelings, will rally around their Government. For the
consequences that may ensue, those who are entrusted with the direction
of the foreign relations are alone responsible. Whatever may be the
cause, to whomsoever the result may be ascribed, it appears from the
general style of the periodical press, that, with few exceptions, the
people, both in Great Britain and in the United States, are imbued with
the belief that the contested territory belongs exclusively to
themselves, and that any concession which might be made would be a boon
to the other party. Such opinions, if sustained by either Government and
accompanied by corresponding measures, must necessarily lead to
immediate collisions, and probably to war. Yet, a war so calamitous in
itself, so fatal to the general interests of both countries, is almost
universally deprecated, without distinction of parties, by all the
rational men who are not carried away by the warmth of their feelings.

In the present state of excitement, an immediate amicable arrangement
is almost hopeless; time is necessary before the two Governments can be
induced to recede from their extreme pretensions. In the meanwhile,
nothing, as it seems to me, should for the present be done, which might
increase the excitement, aggravate the difficulties, or remove the only
remaining barrier against immediate collision.

The United States claim a right of sovereignty over the whole territory.
The pretensions of the British Government, so far as they have been
heretofore exhibited, though not extending to a claim of absolute
sovereignty over the whole, are yet such as cannot be admitted by the
United States, and, if persisted in, must lead to a similar result.

If the claim of Great Britain be properly analyzed, it will be found
that, although she has incidentally discussed other questions, she in
fact disregards every other claim but that of actual occupancy, and that
she regards as such the establishment of trading factories by her
subjects. She accordingly claims a participation in the navigation of
the river Columbia, and would make that river the boundary between the
two Powers. This utter disregard of the rights of discovery,
particularly of that of the mouth, sources, and course of a river, of
the principle of contiguity, and of every other consideration whatever,
cannot be admitted by the United States. The offer of a detached
defenceless territory, with a single port, and the reciprocal offers of
what are called free ports, cannot be viewed but as derisory. An
amicable arrangement by way of compromise cannot be effected without a
due regard to the claims advanced by both parties, and to the expediency
of the dividing line.[1]

An equitable division must have reference not only to the extent of
territory, but also to the other peculiar advantages attached to each
portion respectively.

From and including Fuca Straits, the country extending northwardly
abounds with convenient sea-ports. From the 42d degree of latitude to
those Straits, there is but one port of any importance, the mouth of the
River Columbia; and this is of difficult and dangerous access, and
cannot admit ships of war of a large size. It is important only as a
port of exports. As one of common resort for supplies, or asylum, in
case of need, for the numberless American vessels engaged in the
fisheries or commerce of the Pacific, it would be almost useless, even
if in the exclusive possession of the United States. It must also be
observed that the navigable channel of the river, from its mouth to
Puget's Island, is, according to Vancouver, close along the northern
shore. Great Britain proposes that the river should be the boundary, and
that the United States should be content with the possession of the port
it offered, in common with herself. It is really unnecessary to dwell on
the consequences of such an arrangement. It is sufficient to say that,
in case of war between the two countries, it would leave the United
States without a single port, and give to Great Britain the indisputable
and exclusive control over those seas and their commerce.

The first and indispensable step towards an amicable arrangement
consists in the investigation, not so much of the superiority of one
claim over the other, as of the question whether there be sufficient
grounds to sustain the exclusive pretensions of either Government.

If the claim of the United States to the whole of the contested
territory can be sustained against Great Britain, or if the pretensions
of this Power can to their full extent be maintained against the United
States, it must be, by either party assuming that the other has no
opposite claim of any kind whatever, that there are no doubtful and
debatable questions pending between the two countries. This, if true and
maintained, must necessarily lead to war, unless one of the two Powers
should yield what it considers as its absolute right. But, if there be
any such debatable questions, the way is still open for negotiations;
and both powers may recede from their extreme pretensions, without any
abandonment of positive rights, without disgrace, without impairing
national honor and dignity.

It has been asserted that the title of the United States to the whole
Oregon territory was maintained by irrefragable facts and arguments.
These must be sought for in the correspondence lately published. They
consist--first, of the assertion of the ancient claim of Spain to the
absolute sovereignty over the whole north-west coast of America as far
north as the 61st degree of north latitude. Secondly, of the cumulated
proofs which sustain the claims of the United States to the various
portions of the territory (whether in their own right, or as derived
from the acquisition of Louisiana and the Spanish discoveries), and of
the refutation of the arguments adduced by the other party. The first
mentioned position would, if it could be sustained, be sufficient to
prove, and is, as I think, the only one that could prove, the absolute
and complete right of the United States to the whole contested
territory.

It is undoubtedly true that "Spain considered the northwest coast of
America as exclusively her own;" that this claim "had been asserted by
her, and maintained with the most vigilant jealousy, ever since the
discovery of the American continent, or nearly three centuries, as far
north as her settlements or missions extended." There were two ways of
examining the soundness of that claim; an investigation of the
principles on which it was founded, and an appeal to precedents. The
Secretary of State has abstained from discussing the principle; but he
has said that the claim of Spain to sovereignty "had never been
seriously questioned by any European nation: that it had been acquiesced
in by all European Governments." This appears to me the most vulnerable
part of his arguments.

The early charters of the British monarchs to the colonies bordering on
the Atlantic, extended from sea to sea, from the Atlantic to the Pacific
ocean, with the single exception which excluded from the grants the
places actually occupied by the subjects of any Christian nation. The
right of prior occupancy was recognized; but the general claim of Spain
to the sovereignty of the whole coast bordering on the Pacific was
utterly disregarded. Had that claim been considered as unquestionable,
had it been acquiesced in, it never could have been supposed that, in
any case whatever, England could have a right to bestow on her subjects
a single foot of land bordering on the Pacific.

Coming down to modern times, the only nations which have set up any
claims or attempted any settlements on the Pacific, north of the
country actually occupied by the Spaniards, are Russia, Great Britain,
and the United States. All three have asserted claims to the
northwestern coasts of America, irreconcilable with the universal
sovereignty claimed by Spain: Russia and England, from the time when
their flags first floated along the coast and their subjects landed on
its shores; the United States from a similar date, or at least from the
time when they acquired Louisiana.

If the right of Spain was absolute and exclusive to the whole, there was
no reason why it should not have extended beyond the 61st degree of
latitude. The right of Russia was founded only on her discoveries and
the establishment of some trading factories. She respected the right of
Spain only as far as it did not interfere with her own claim. She has,
in fact, extended this more than six degrees further south; and to this
the United States, who had acquired all the rights of Spain, have
assented by a solemn treaty. Whatever might be the boundary acquiesced
in by Spain, it was not Russia which recognized the claim of Spain; it
was Spain which recognized that her claim was not unlimited. And, let it
be also observed, that, since Spain still claimed as far north as the
61st degree of north latitude (the southern limit of the Russian
factories when first visited by Spanish navigators), the United States,
if they believed the Spanish right absolute and exclusive, ought not to
have ceded to Russia a country extending more than six degrees of
latitude along the shores of the Pacific.

Great Britain contested the exclusive claim of Spain from the year 1778,
the date of Cook's third voyage; and he was the first British navigator
that had for more than two centuries appeared on those coasts. This
doctrine she has maintained ever since. She did not resist the exclusive
claim of Spain by virtue of the Nootka convention, but prior to it. It
was on that ground that she imperiously demanded indemnity and
restoration for the property and factory of one of her subjects, which
had been forcibly taken by the Spanish Government. She even threatened
war; and the Nootka convention was the result of those transactions.
Whatever construction may at this time be given to that instrument, it
is certain at least that Spain by it conceded a portion of the absolute
and sovereign right she had till then asserted; that she yielded the
right of trade with the natives on all that part of the coast lying
north of her actual settlements; and that, by suffering the ultimate
right of sovereignty to remain in abeyance, she made that pretension
questionable which she had contended could not be called in question.

With respect to the United States, without recurring to former
negotiations which were not attended with any result, it is sufficient
to advert to the convention between them and Great Britain of the year
1818, concluded prior to the date of the treaty by which they acquired
the claims of Spain to the territory north of the 42d degree of north
latitude.

The United States at that time distinctly claimed, in their own right
and independent of the Spanish claims, that the boundary along the 49th
parallel, which had been agreed on as that between them and Great
Britain, from the Lake of the Woods to the Stony Mountains, should be
extended to the Pacific. To this division of territory Great Britain
would not accede; and the provision for a joint occupancy during the
next ensuing years was substituted. A clause was inserted that the
agreement should not be taken to affect the claims of any other Power or
State to any part of the country west of the Stony Mountains. This
provision clearly referred to the claims of Russia and Spain. The
northern and southern boundaries of the country, which the two
contracting parties might claim, were left undefined: Great Britain
probably thought herself bound by the Nootka convention to respect the
Spanish claims to the extent provided by that instrument: the United
States could not but recognize those derived from discovery, with which
they were at that time but imperfectly acquainted, since their own
claims were in a great degree derived from a similar source. But the
convention decisively proves that the United States did not acquiesce in
the antiquated claim of Spain to the absolute and exclusive sovereignty
of the whole country; since, if they had recognized that prior claim to
the whole, they could have had none whatever to any portion of it.

It is therefore undeniable that the assertion of the Spanish claim of
absolute sovereignty cannot be sustained by a presumed acquiescence on
the part of the only nations which now claim the country. It may
perhaps be said that their opposition came too late, and that they
neglected too long to protest against the Spanish pretension on the
Pacific. No stress will be laid on Drake's voyage, which had a warlike
character. But the British charters to their colonies show that those
pretensions were disregarded at a very early date. There was no occasion
for opposition or direct denial, with respect to the Pacific, until the
attention of other nations was directed towards that remote country.
This was neglected because all the commercial nations were, in their
attempts to colonize, or to conquer the foreign and till then unexplored
regions, attracted by countries far more accessible, and were
exclusively engaged in pursuits much more important. The East Indies and
the West India Islands offered a vast and lucrative field for commercial
enterprise and territorial acquisition. With respect to the continent of
America, France, England, and Holland most naturally planted their
colonies on the nearest opposite shores of the Atlantic; and they did it
in opposition to the pretended claim of Spain, which extended to the
whole of America. Although strenuously engaged in extending those
colonies westwardly, these, in the year 1754, twenty years only before
Cook's third voyage, hardly extended beyond the Mississippi. What
immediate interest could then have impelled either France or England to
enter a formal protest against the antiquated claim of Spain to a
country with which they had never attempted even to trade? And what
opportunity had occurred for doing it prior to Cook's voyage?

But, what is still more conclusive, the country in question was equally
neglected by Spain herself. Some exploring voyages, few of which are
authentic, were indeed made by Spanish navigators; and the claims which
may be derived from their discoveries have now been transferred to the
United States, so far as discovery alone can give a claim, and no
further. But, during more than two centuries that Spain had no
competitor on the Pacific, there was on her part no occupancy, no
settlement, or attempt to make a settlement. She had some missions on
the western coast of the peninsula of California: but her missions or
settlements in Northern or New California are of quite recent date; that
of the most southern (San Diego) in 1769, and that of the most northern
(San Francisco) in 1776, two years only before Cook's arrival at Nootka
Sound.

In point of fact, the contested territory had been utterly neglected by
Spain. All the energies, such as they were, of her Mexican colonies were
much more advantageously applied to the improvement of the vast and rich
countries which they had conquered, principally to the discovery and
working of the richest and most productive mines of the precious metals
as yet known.

Anson's expedition was purely military, and confined to southern
latitudes. But the narrative drew the public attention towards the
Pacific ocean, and gave a new impulse to the spirit of discovery. Almost
immediately after the peace of 1763 voyages were undertaken for that
purpose by the Governments of England and France: the Pacific was
explored: the Russians on the other hand had, more than thirty years
before, ascertained the continuity of the American continent from
Behring's Straits to Mount St. Elias. It was then, and not till then,
that Spain, or rather the Mexican Government, awakening from its long
lethargy, extended its missions to New California. In the year 1774,
Perez, with his pilot, Martinez, sailed as far north as the northern
extremity of Queen Charlotte's Island, having anchored in Nootka Sound,
and, as Martinez asserts, perceived the entrance of Fuca's Straits. New
and important discoveries were made by Quadra and Heceta in the year
1775. The sequel is well known.

But on what foundation did the claim of Spain rest? If she had indeed an
absolute right to the whole country bordering on the Pacific, derived
either from natural or international law, or from usages generally
recognized, it matters but little, as respects right, whether other
nations had acquiesced in, or opposed her claim. If there was no
foundation for that absolute and exclusive right of sovereignty, Spain
could transfer nothing more to the United States than the legitimate
claims derived from her discoveries.

The discovery gives an incipient claim not only to the identical spot
thus discovered, but to a certain distance beyond it. It has been
admitted that the claim extends generally, though not universally, as
far inland as the sources of rivers emptying into the sea where the
discovery has been made. The distance to which the right or claim
extends along the sea shore may not be precisely defined, and may vary
according to circumstances. But it never can be unlimited; it has never
been recognized beyond a reasonable extent. Spain was the first European
nation which discovered and occupied Florida. A claim on that account to
the absolute sovereignty over the whole of the Atlantic shores as far as
Hudson's Bay, or the 60th degree of latitude, would strike every one as
utterly absurd. A claim on the part of Spain to the sovereignty of all
the shores of the Pacific, derived from her having established missions
in California, would be similar in its nature and extent, and equally
inadmissible. It cannot be sustained as a natural right, nor by the
principles of international law, nor by any general usage or precedent.
The claim of Spain rested on no such grounds.

It was derived from the bull of Pope Alexander VI., which the Spanish
monarchs obtained in the year 1493, immediately after the discovery of
America by Columbus. By virtue of that bull, combined with another
previously granted to Portugal, and with modifications respecting the
division line between the two Powers, the Pope granted to them the
exclusive sovereignty over all the discoveries made or to be made in all
the heathen portions of the globe, including, it must be recollected,
all the countries in America bordering on the Atlantic, as well as those
on the Pacific ocean. Yet, even at that time, the Catholic Kings of
England, and France did not recognize the authority of the Pope on such
subjects; as evidently appears by the voyages of Cabot under the orders
of Henry VII. of England, and of Cartier under those of the King of
France, Francis I. Subsequently, the colonies planted by both countries,
from Florida to Hudson's Bay, were a practical and continued protest and
denial of the Spanish claim of absolute sovereignty over the whole of
America: whilst the acquiescence of Spain was tantamount to an
abandonment of that claim where it was resisted. Ridiculous as a right
derived from such a source may appear at this time, it was not then thus
considered by Spain; and the western boundary of Brazil is to this day
regulated by the division line prescribed by the Pope.

I am not aware of any other principle by which the claim ever was or
can be sustained, unless it be the idle ceremony of taking possession,
as it is called. The celebrated Spaniard who first discovered the
Pacific ocean, "Balboa, advancing up to the middle in the waves, with
his buckler and sword, took possession of that ocean in the name of the
King his master, and vowed to defend it, with his arms, against all his
enemies."--(_Robertson._)

I have dwelt longer on this subject than it may seem to deserve. The
assertion of the solidity of this ancient exclusive Spanish claim has
had an apparent effect on public opinion fatal to the prospect of an
amicable arrangement. I am also fully satisfied that the resort to
vulnerable arguments, instead of strengthening, has a tendency to lessen
the weight of the multiplied proofs, by which the superiority of the
American over the British claim has been so fully established.

FOOTNOTE:

[1] I allude here only to the compromise proposed by Great Britain. Her
actual claim, as explicitly stated by herself, is to the whole
territory, limited to a right of joint occupancy, in common with other
States, leaving the right of exclusive dominion in abeyance.




NUMBER II.


It has, it is believed, been conclusively proved that the claim of the
United States to absolute sovereignty over the whole Oregon territory,
in virtue of the ancient exclusive Spanish claim, is wholly unfounded.
The next question is, whether the other facts and arguments adduced by
either party establish a complete and absolute title of either to the
whole; for the United States claim it explicitly; and, although the
British proposal of compromise did yield a part, yet her qualified claim
extends to the whole. It has been stated by herself in the following
words: "Great Britain claims no exclusive sovereignty over any portion
of that territory. Her present claim, not in respect to any part, but to
the whole, is limited to a right of joint occupancy, in common with
other States, leaving the right of exclusive dominion in abeyance." And,
again: "The qualified rights which Great Britain now possesses over the
whole of the territory in question, embrace the right to navigate the
waters of those countries, the right to settle in and over any part of
them, and the right freely to trade with the inhabitants and occupiers
of the same. * * * * * * It is fully admitted that the United States
possess the same rights; but beyond they possess none."

In the nature of things, it seems almost impossible that a complete and
absolute right to any portion of America can exist, unless it be by
prescriptive and undisputed _actual_ possession and settlements, or by
virtue of a treaty.

At the time when America was discovered, the law of nations was
altogether unsettled. More than a century elapsed before Grotius
attempted to lay its foundation on Natural Law and the moral precepts of
Christianity; and, when sustaining it by precedents, he was compelled to
recur to Rome and Greece. It was in reality a new case, to which no
ancient precedents could apply,[2] for which some new rules must be
adopted. Gradually, some general principles were admitted, never
universally, in their nature vague and often conflicting. For instance,
discovery varies, from the simple ascertaining of the continuity of
land, to a minute exploration of its various harbors, rivers, &c.; and
the rights derived from it may vary accordingly, and may occasionally be
claimed to the same district by different nations. There is no precise
rule for regulating the time after which the neglect to occupy would
nullify the right of prior discovery; nor for defining the extent of
coast beyond the spot discovered to which the discoverer may be
entitled, or how far inland his claim extends. The principle most
generally admitted was, that, in case of a river, the right extended to
the whole country drained by that river and its tributaries. Even this
was not universally conceded. This right might be affected by a
simultaneous or prior discovery and occupancy of some of the sources of
such river by another party; or it might conflict with a general claim
of contiguity. This last claim, when extending beyond the sources of
rivers discovered and occupied, is vague and undefined: though it would
seem that it cannot exceed in breadth that of the territory on the coast
originally discovered and occupied. A few examples will show the
uncertainty resulting from those various claims, when they conflicted
with each other.

The old British charters extending from sea to sea have already been
mentioned. They were founded, beyond the sources of the rivers emptying
into the Atlantic, on no other principle than that of contiguity or
continuity. The grant in 1621 of Nova Scotia, by James the First, is
bounded on the north by the river St. Lawrence, though Cartier had more
than eighty-five years before discovered the mouth of that river and
ascended it as high up as the present site of Montreal, and the French
under Champlain had several years before 1621 been settled at Quebec.
But there is another case more important, and still more in point.

The few survivors of the disastrous expedition of Narvaez, who, coming
from Florida, did in a most extraordinary way reach Culiacan on the
Pacific, were the first Europeans who crossed the Mississippi. Some
years later, Ferdinand de Soto, coming also from Florida, did in the
year 1541 reach and cross the Mississippi, at some place between the
mouth of the Ohio and that of the Arkansas. He explored a portion of the
river and of the adjacent country; and, after his death, Moscoso, who
succeeded him in command, did, in the year 1543, build seven brigantines
or barques, in which, with the residue of his followers, he descended
the Mississippi, the mouth of which he reached in seventeen days. Thence
putting to sea with his frail vessels, he was fortunate enough to reach
the Spanish port of Panuco, on the Mexican coast. The right of discovery
clearly belonged to Spain; but she had neglected for near one hundred
and fifty years to make any settlement on the great river or any of its
tributaries. The French, coming from Canada, reached the Mississippi in
the year 1680, and ascended it as high up as St. Anthony's Falls; and La
Salle descended it in 1682 to its mouth. The French Government did, in
virtue of that second discovery, claim the country, subsequently founded
New Orleans, and formed several other settlements in the interior, on
the Mississippi or its waters. Spain almost immediately occupied
Pensacola and Nacogdoches, in order to check the progress of the French
eastwardly and westwardly; but she did not attempt to disturb them in
their settlements on the Mississippi and its tributaries. We have here
the proof of a prior right of discovery being superseded, when too long
neglected, by that of actual occupancy and settlement.

The French, by virtue of having thus discovered the mouth of the
Mississippi, of having ascended it more than fifteen hundred miles, of
having explored the Ohio, the Wabash, and the Illinois, from their
respective mouths to their most remote sources, and of having formed
several settlements as above mentioned, laid claim to the whole country
drained by the main river and its tributaries. They accordingly built
forts at Le Boeuf, high up the Alleghany river, and on the site where
Pittsburgh now stands. On the ground of discovery or settlement, Great
Britain had not the slightest claim. General, then Colonel Washington,
was the first who, at the age of twenty-two, and in the year 1754,
planted the British banner on the Western waters. The British claim was
founded principally on the ground of contiguity, enforced by other
considerations. The strongest of these was, that it could not consist
with natural law, that the British colonies, with a population of near
two millions, should be confined to the narrow belt of land between the
Atlantic and the Alleghany Mountains, and that the right derived from
the discovery of the main river should be carried to such an extent as
to allow the French colonies, with a population of fifty thousand,
rightfully to claim the whole valley of the Mississippi. The contest was
decided by the sword. By the treaty of peace of 1763, the Mississippi,
with the exception of New Orleans and its immediate vicinity, was made
the boundary. The French not only lost all that part of the valley which
lay east of that river, but they were compelled to cede Canada to Great
Britain.

It may, however, happen that all the various claims from which a title
may be derived, instead of pertaining to several Powers, and giving rise
to conflicting pretensions, are united and rightfully belong to one
nation alone. This union, if entire, may justly be considered as giving
a complete and exclusive title to the sovereignty of that part of the
country embraced by such united claims.

The position assumed by the British Government, that those various
claims exclude each other, and that the assertion of one forbids an
appeal to the others, is obviously untenable. All that can be said in
that respect is, that if any one claim is alone sufficient to establish
a complete and indisputable title, an appeal to others is superfluous.
Thus far, and no farther, can the objection be maintained. The argument
on the part of the United States in reality was, that the Government
considered the title derived from the ancient exclusive Spanish claim as
indisputable; but that, if this was denied, all the other just claims of
the United States taken together constituted a complete title, or at
least far superior to any that could be adduced on the part of Great
Britain.

It is not intended to enter into the merits of the question, which has
been completely discussed, since the object of this paper is only to
show that there remain on both sides certain debatable questions; and
that therefore both Governments may, if so disposed, recede from some
of their pretensions, without any abandonment of positive rights, and
without impairing national honor and dignity.

Although Great Britain seems, in this discussion, to have relied almost
exclusively on the right derived from actual occupancy and settlement,
she cannot reject absolutely those derived from other sources. She must
admit that, both in theory and practice, the claims derived from prior
discovery, from contiguity, from the principle which gives to the first
discoverer of the mouth of a river and of its course a claim to the
whole country drained by such river, have all been recognized to a
certain, though not well-defined extent, by all the European nations
claiming various portions of America. And she cannot deny the facts,
that (as Mr. Greenhow justly concludes) the seashore had been generally
examined from the 42d, and minutely from the 45th to the 48th degree of
latitude, Nootka Sound discovered, and the general direction of the
coast from the 48th to the 58th degree of latitude ascertained, by the
Spanish expeditions, in the years 1774 and 1775, of Perez, Heceta, and
Bodego y Quadra; that the American Captain Gray was the first who, in
1792, entered into and ascertained the existence of the River Columbia,
and the place where it empties into the sea; that, prior to that
discovery, the Spaniard Heceta was the first who had been within the
bay, called Deception Bay by Meares, into which the river does empty;
that, of the four navigators who had been in that bay prior to Gray's
final discovery, the Spaniard Heceta and the American Gray were the only
ones who had asserted that a great river emptied itself into that bay,
Heceta having even given a name to the river (St. Roc), and the entrance
having been designated by his own name (Ensennada de Heceta), whilst the
two English navigators, Meares and Vancouver, had both concluded that no
large river had its mouth there; that, in the year 1805, Lewis and
Clarke were the first who descended the river Columbia, from one of its
principal western sources to its mouth; that the first actual occupancy
in that quarter was by Mr. Astor's company, on the 24th of March, 1811,
though Mr. Thompson, the astronomer of the British Northwest Company,
who arrived at Astoria on the 15th of July, may have wintered on or near
some northern source of the river in 52 degrees north latitude; that
amongst the factories established by that American company one was
situated at the confluence of the Okanagan with the Columbia, in about
49 degrees of latitude; that the 42d degree is the boundary, west of the
Stony Mountains, established by treaty between Spain, now Mexico, and
the United States; that the 49th degree is likewise the boundary, from
the Lake of the Woods to the Stony Mountains, established by treaty
between Great Britain and the United States; and that therefore the
right of the United States, which may be derived from the principle of
contiguity or continuity, embraces the territory west of the Stony
Mountains contained between the 42d and 49th degrees of latitude.

Omitting other considerations which apply principally to the territory
north of Fuca Straits, where the claims of both parties are almost
exclusively derived from their respective discoveries, including those
of Spain, it may be rationally inferred from the preceding enumeration
that there remain various questions which must be considered by Great
Britain as being still doubtful and debatable, and that she may
therefore, without any abandonment of positive rights, recede from the
extreme pretensions which she has advanced in the discussion respecting
a division of the territory. But, although conjectures may be formed,
and the course pursued by the Government of the United States may have
an influence on that which Great Britain will adopt, it does not belong
to me to discuss what that Government may or will do. This paper is
intended for the American, and not for the English public; and my
attention has been principally directed to those points which may be
considered by the United States as doubtful and debatable.

It was expressly stipulated that nothing contained in the conventions of
1818 and 1827 should be construed to impair, _or in any manner affect_,
the claims which either of the contracting parties may have to any part
of the country westward of the Stony or Rocky Mountains. After the most
cool and impartial investigation of which I am capable, I have not been
able to perceive any claim on the part of Great Britain, or debatable
question, respecting the territory south of Fuca's Straits, but the
species of occupancy by the British Fur companies between the year 1813
and October 20th, 1818; and this must be considered in connection with
the restoration of "all territory, places, and possessions whatsoever,
taken by either party from the other during the war," provided for by
the treaty of Ghent. To this branch of the subject belongs also the
question whether the establishment of trading factories with Indians may
eventually give a right to sovereignty. My opinion was expressed in the
American counter-statement of the case, dated 19th December, 1826: "It
is believed that mere factories, established solely for the purpose of
trafficking with the natives, and without any view to cultivation and
permanent settlement, cannot, of themselves, and unsupported by any
other consideration, give any better title to dominion and absolute
sovereignty than similar establishments made in a civilized country."
However true this may be as an abstract proposition, it must be admitted
that, practically, the modest British factory at Calcutta has gradually
grown up into absolute and undisputed sovereignty over a population of
eighty millions of people.

The questions which, as it appears to me, may be allowed by the United
States to be debatable, and therefore to make it questionable whether
they have a complete right to the whole Oregon territory, are:

1st. The Nootka convention, which applies to the whole, and which,
though not of primary importance, is nevertheless a fact, and the
inferences drawn from it a matter of argument.

2dly. The discovery of the Straits of Fuca.

3dly. North of those straits; along the sea shores, the discoveries of
the British contrasted with those of the American and Spanish
navigators; in the interior, the question whether the discovery of the
mouth and the navigation of one of its principal branches, from its
source to the mouth of the river, implies without exception a complete
right to the whole country drained by all the tributaries of such river;
and also the British claim to the whole territory drained by Frazer's
river--its sources having been discovered in 1792 by Sir Alexander
Mackenzie, factories having been established upon it by the British as
early as the year 1806, and the whole river thence to its mouth having
been for a number of years exclusively navigated by British subjects.

It appears to me sufficient generally to suggest the controverted
points. That which relates to Fuca's Straits is the most important, and
deserves particular consideration.

If Fuca's voyage in 1592 could be proved to be an authentic document,
this would settle at once the question in favor of the United States;
but the voyage was denied in the introduction to the voyage of the Sutil
and Mexicano. This was an official document, published under the
auspices of the Spanish Government, and intended to vindicate Spain
against the charges, that she had contributed nothing to the advancement
of geography in those quarters. This negative evidence was confirmed by
Humboldt, who says that no trace of such voyage can be found in the
archives of Mexico. Unwilling to adduce any doubtful fact, I abstained
from alluding to it in the statement of the American case in 1826. Later
researches show that, although recorded evidences remain of the voyages
of Gali from Macao to Acapulco in 1584, of the Santa Anna (on board of
which was, as he says, Fuca himself) from Manilla to the coast of
California, where she was captured in 1587 by Cavendish, and of Vizcaino
in 1602-1603, and even of Maldonado's fictitious voyage in 1588, yet no
trace has been found in Spain or Mexico of Fuca's, or any other similar
voyage, in 1692, or thereabout.

On reading with attention the brief account published by Purchas, I will
say that the voyage itself has much internal evidence of its truth, but
that the inference or conclusion throws much discredit on the whole. The
only known account of the voyage is that given verbally at Venice in
1596, by Fuca, a Greek pilot, to Mr. Lock, a respectable English
merchant, who transmitted it to Purchas.

Fuca says that he had been sent by the Viceroy of Mexico to discover the
straits of Anian and the passage thereof into the sea, which they called
the North Sea, which is _our Northwest Sea_; that between 47 and 48
degrees of latitude he entered into a broad inlet, through which he
sailed more than twenty days; and, being then come into the North Sea
already, and not being sufficiently armed, he returned again to
Acapulco. He offered then to Mr. Lock to go into England and serve her
Majesty in a voyage for the discovery perfectly of the Northwest passage
into the South Sea. If it be granted that the inlet through which he
had sailed was really the same as the straits which now bear his name,
that sea into which he emerged, and which he asserts to be _our
Northwest Sea_, must have been that which is now called Queen
Charlotte's Sound, north of Quadra and Vancouver's Island, in about 51
degrees of latitude. _Our Northwest Sea_ was that which washes the
shores of Newfoundland and Labrador, then universally known as far north
as the vicinity of the 60th degree of latitude. Hudson's Straits had not
yet been discovered, and the discovery of Davis's Straits might not be
known to Fuca. But no navigator at that time, who, like he, had sailed
across both the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans, could be ignorant that
the northern extremity of Newfoundland, which lies nearly in the same
latitude as the northern entrance of Fuca's Straits, is situated sixty
or seventy degrees of longitude east of that entrance. The only way to
reconcile the account with itself is, to suppose that Fuca believed that
the continent of America did not, on the side of the Atlantic, extend
further north than about the 60th degree, and was bounded northwardly by
an open sea, which extended as far west as the northern extremity of the
inlet through which he had sailed. It is true nevertheless that, between
the years 1774 and 1792, there was a prevailing opinion amongst the
navigators that Fuca had actually discovered an inlet leading towards
the Atlantic. Prior to the year 1787 they were engaged in seeking for
it, and the Spaniards had for that purpose explored in vain the sea
coast lying south of the 48th degree; for it is well known that Fuca's
entrance lies between the 48th and 49th, and not between the 47th and
48th degrees of latitude, as he had announced.

The modern discovery of that inlet is due to Captain Barclay, an
Englishman, commanding the Imperial Eagle, a vessel owned by British
merchants, but which was equipped at, and took its departure from
Ostend, and which sailed under the flag of the Austrian East India
Company. The British Government, which has objected to the American
claim derived from Captain Gray's discovery of the mouth of the river
Columbia, on the ground that he was a private individual, and that his
vessel was not a public ship, cannot certainly claim anything in virtue
of a discovery by a private Englishman, sailing under Austrian colors.
In that case, and rejecting Fuca's voyage, neither the United States nor
England can lay any claim on account of the discovery of the straits.

Subsequently, the Englishman, Meares, sailing under the Portuguese flag,
penetrated, in 1768, about ten miles into the inlet, and the American,
Gray, in 1789, about fifty miles. The pretended voyage of the sloop
Washington throughout the straits, under the command of either Gray or
Kendrick, has no other foundation than an assertion of Meares, on which
no reliance can be placed.

In the year 1790 (1791 according to Vancouver) the Spaniards, Elisa and
Quimper, explored the straits more than one hundred miles, discovering
the Port Discovery, the entrance of Admiralty Inlet, the Deception
Passage, and the Canal de Haro. In 1792 Vancouver explored and surveyed
the straits throughout, together with their various bays and harbors.
Even there he had been preceded in part by the Sutil and Mexicano; and
he expresses his regret that they had advanced before him as far as the
Canal del Rosario.

Under all the circumstances of the case, it cannot be doubted that the
United States must admit that the discovery of the straits, and the
various inferences which may be drawn from it, are doubtful and
debatable questions.

That which relates to a presumed agreement of Commissioners appointed
under the treaty of Utrecht, by which the northern boundary of Canada
was, from a certain point north of Lake Superior, declared to extend
westwardly along the 49th parallel of latitude, does not appear to me
definitively settled. As this had been assumed many years before, as a
positive fact, and had never been contradicted, I also assumed it as
such and did not thoroughly investigate the subject. Yet I had before me
at least one map (name of publisher not recollected), of which I have a
vivid recollection, on which the dividing lines were distinctly marked
and expressly designated, as being in conformity with the agreement of
the Commissioners under the treaty of Utrecht. The evidence against the
fact, though in some respects strong, is purely negative. The line,
according to the map, extended from a certain point near the source of
the river Saguenay, in a westerly direction, to another designated
point on another river emptying either into the St Lawrence or James's
Bay; and there were, in that way, four or five lines following each
other, all tending westwardly, but with different inclinations
northwardly or southwardly, and all extending, from some apparently
known point on a designated river, to another similar point on another
river; the rivers themselves emptying themselves, some into the river
St. Lawrence and others into James's Bay or Hudson's Bay, until, from a
certain point lying north of Lake Superior, the line was declared to
extend along the 49th degree of latitude, as above stated. It was with
that map before me that the following paragraph was inserted in the
American statement of December, 1826:


     "The limits between the possessions of Great Britain in North
     America, and those of France in the same quarter, namely, Canada
     and Louisiana, were determined by Commissioners appointed in
     pursuance of the treaty of Utrecht. From the coast of Labrador to a
     certain point North of Lake Superior, those limits were fixed
     according to certain metes and bounds; and from that point the line
     of demarcation was agreed to extend indefinitely due west, along
     the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude. It was in conformity
     with that arrangement that the United States did claim that
     parallel as the northern boundary of Louisiana. It has been
     accordingly thus settled, as far as the Stony Mountains, by the
     convention of 1818 between the United States and Great Britain; and
     no adequate reason can be given why the same boundary should not be
     continued as far as the claims of the United States do extend, that
     is to say, as far as the Pacific ocean."


It appears very extraordinary that any geographer or map-maker should
have invented a dividing line, with such specific details, without
having sufficient grounds for believing that it had been thus determined
by the Commissioners under the treaty of Utrecht. It is also believed
that Douglass' Summary (not at this moment within my reach) adverts to
the portion of the line from the coast of Labrador to the Saguenay.
Finally, the allusion to the 49th parallel, as a boundary fixed in
consequence of the treaty of Utrecht, had been repeatedly made in the
course of preceding negotiations, as well as in the conferences of that
of the year 1826; and there is no apparent motive, if the assertion was
known by the British negotiators not to be founded in fact, why they
should not have at once denied it. It may be, however, that the
question having ceased to be of any interest to Great Britain since the
acquisition of Canada, they had not investigated the subject. It is of
some importance, because, if authenticated, the discussion would be
converted from questions respecting undefined claims, into one
concerning the construction of a positive treaty or convention.

It is sufficiently clear that, under all the circumstances of the case,
an amicable division of the territory, if at all practicable, must be
founded in a great degree on expediency. This of course must be left to
the wisdom of the two Governments. The only natural, equitable, and
practicable line which has occurred to me, is one which, running through
the middle of Fuca Straits, from its entrance to a point on the main,
situated south of the mouth of Frazer's river, should leave to the
United States all the shores and harbors lying south, and to Great
Britain all those north of that line, including the whole of Quadra and
Vancouver's Island. It would be through Fuca's Straits a nearly easterly
line, along the parallel of about 48½ degrees, leaving to England the
most valuable and permanent portion of the fur trade, dividing the
sea-coast as nearly as possible into two equal parts, and the ports in
the most equitable manner. To leave Admiralty Inlet and its Sounds to
Great Britain, would give her a possession in the heart of the American
portion of the territory. Whether from the point where the line would
strike the main, it should be continued along the same parallel, or run
along the 49th, is a matter of secondary importance.

If such division should take place, the right of the inhabitants of the
country situated on the upper waters of the Columbia to the navigation
of that river to its mouth, is founded on natural law; and the principle
has almost been recognized as the public law of Europe. Limited to
commercial purposes, it might be admitted, but on the express condition
that the citizens of the United States should in the same manner, and to
the same extent, have the right to navigate the river St. Lawrence.

But I must say that, whatever may be the ultimate destinies of the
Oregon territory, I would feel great regret in seeing it in any way
divided. An amicable division appears to me without comparison
preferable to a war for that object between the two countries. In every
other view of the subject it is highly exceptionable. Without adverting
for the present to considerations of a higher nature, it may be
sufficient here to observe, that the conversion of the northern part of
the territory into a British colony would in its effects make the
arrangement very unequal. The United States are forbidden by their
Constitution to give a preference to the ports of one State over those
of another. The ports within the portion of territory allotted to the
United States would of course remain open to British vessels; whilst
American vessels would be excluded from the ports of the British colony,
unless occasionally admitted by special acts depending on the will of
Great Britain.

FOOTNOTE:

[2] Grotius, however, sustains the right of occupation by a maxim of the
Civil Roman Code.




NUMBER III.


Beyond the naked assertion of an absolute right to the whole territory,
so little in the shape of argument has been adduced, and so much warmth
has been exhibited in the discussion of the subject, that it cannot be
doubted that the question has now become, on both sides, one of feeling
rather than of right. This, in America, grows out of the fact that, in
this contest with a European nation, the contested territory is in
America and not in Europe. It is identical with the premature official
annunciation, that the United States could not acquiesce in the
establishment of any new colony in North America by any European nation.
This sentiment was already general at the time when it was first
publicly declared; and now that it has been almost universally avowed,
there can be no impropriety in any private citizen to say, as I now do,
that I share in that feeling to its full extent. For the Americans,
Oregon is or will be home: for England, it is but an outpost, which may
afford means of annoyance, rather than be a source of real power. In
America all have the same ultimate object in view; we differ only with
respect to the means by which it may be attained.

Two circumstances have had a tendency to nourish and excite these
feelings. The British fur companies, from their position, from their
monopolizing character, from their natural influence upon the Indians,
and from that, much greater than might have been expected, which they
have constantly had upon the British Government in its negotiations with
the United States, have for sixty years been a perpetual source of
annoyance and collisions. The vested interests of the Hudson Bay Company
are at this moment the greatest obstacle to an amicable arrangement. It
is at the same time due to justice to say that, as far as is known, that
company has acted in Oregon in conformity with the terms of the
convention, and that its officers have uniformly treated the Americans,
whether visitors or emigrants, not only courteously, but with great
kindness.

If the British colonies on the continent of America were an independent
country, or were they placed in their commercial relations, at least
with the United States, on the same footing as the British possessions
in Europe, these relations would be regulated by the reciprocal
interests and wants of the parties immediately concerned. Great Britain
has an undoubted right to persist in her colonial policy; but the result
has been extremely vexatious, and to the United States injurious. All
this is true. But feelings do not confer a right, and the indulgence of
excited feelings is neither virtue nor wisdom.

The Western States have no greater apparent immediate interest in the
acquisition of Oregon than the States bordering on the Atlantic. These
stand in greater need of an outlet for their surplus emigrating
population, and to them exclusively, will for the present, the benefit
accrue of ports on the Pacific, for the protection of the numerous
American ships employed in the fisheries and commerce of that ocean. It
is true that in case of war the inhabitants of the Western States will
not, if a naval superiority shall be obtained on the Upper Lakes, feel
those immediate calamities of war to which the country along the
seashore is necessarily exposed; but no section of the United States
will be more deeply affected, by the impossibility of finding during the
war a market for the immense surplus of its agricultural products. It
must also be remembered that a direct tax has heretofore been found as
productive as the aggregate of all the other internal taxes levied by
the General Government; that, in case of war, it must necessarily be
imposed; and that, as it must, in conformity with the Constitution, be
levied in proportion to the respective population of the several States,
it will be much more oppressive on those which have not yet accumulated
a large amount of circulating or personal capital. The greater degree of
excitement which prevails in the West is due to other and more powerful
causes than a regard for self-interest.

Bordering through the whole of their northern frontier on the British
possessions, the Western people have always been personally exposed to
the annoyances and collisions already alluded to; and it may be that the
hope of getting rid of these by the conquest of Canada has some
influence upon their conduct. Independent of this, the indomitable
energy of this nation has been and is nowhere displayed so forcibly as
in the new States and settlements. It was necessarily directed towards
the acquisition of land and the cultivation of the soil. In that respect
it has performed prodigies. Three millions of cultivators of the soil
are now found between the Lakes and the Ohio, where, little more than
fifty years before, save only three or four half Indian French
settlements, there was not a single white inhabitant. Nothing now seems
impossible to those men; they have not even been sobered by fresh
experience. Attempting to do at once, and without an adequate capital,
that which should have been delayed five-and-twenty years, and might
have then been successfully accomplished, some of those States have had
the mortification to find themselves unable to pay the interest on the
debt they had contracted, and obliged to try to compound with their
creditors. Nevertheless, undiminished activity and locomotion are still
the ruling principles: the Western people leap over time and distance;
ahead they must go; it is their mission. May God speed them, and may
they thus quietly take possession of the entire contested territory!

All this was as well known to the British Government as to ourselves. A
public and official declaration by the President of the United States
was unnecessary and at least premature. Mr. Rush's correspondence of
1824 bears witness of its unfortunate effect on the negotiations of that
year. These feelings had gradually subsided. But, whatever may be the
cause, the fact that an extraordinary excitement on this subject has
manifested itself, and does now exist on both sides, cannot be denied.
Time is absolutely necessary in order that this should subside. Any
precipitate step now taken by either Government would be attended with
the most fatal consequences. That which, if done some years ago, might
have been harmless, would now be highly dangerous, and should at least
be postponed for the present.

The first incipient step recommended by the Executive is, to give the
notice that the convention of 1827 shall expire at the end of one year.
This measure at this time, and connected with the avowed intention of
assuming exclusive sovereignty over the whole territory, becomes a
question of peace or war.

The conventions of 1818 and 1827, whilst reserving the rights of both
parties, allowed the freedom of trade and navigation throughout the
whole territory to remain common to both; and the citizens or subjects
of both powers were permitted to occupy any part of it. The
inconveniences of that temporary arrangement were well understood at the
time. The British fur companies had established factories on the banks,
and even south of the river Columbia, within the limits of that portion
of the country which the United States had, whenever the subject was
discussed, claimed as belonging exclusively to them. The conditions of
the agreement were nominally reciprocal; but, though they did not give,
yet they did in fact leave the British company in the exclusive
possession of the fur trade. This could not be prevented otherwise than
by resorting to actual force: the United States were not then either
ready or disposed to run the risks of a war for that object; and it was
thought more eligible, that the British traders should remain on the
territory of the United States, by virtue of a compact and with their
consent, than in defiance of their authority. It is but very lately that
the Americans have begun to migrate to that remote country: a greater
number will certainly follow; and they have under the convention a
perfect right to occupy and make settlements in any part of the
territory they may think proper, with the sole exception of the spots
actually occupied by the British company.

What is then the object in view, in giving the notice at this time? This
has been declared without reserve by the President: "At the end of the
year's notice, should Congress think it proper to make provision for
giving that notice, we shall have reached a period when the national
rights in Oregon must either be abandoned or firmly maintained. That
they cannot be abandoned without a sacrifice of both national honor and
interests, is too clear to admit of doubt." And it must be recollected
that this candid avowal has been accompanied by the declaration that
"our title to the whole Oregon territory had been asserted and, as was
believed, maintained by irrefragable facts and arguments." Nothing can
be more plain and explicit. The exclusive right of the United States to
absolute sovereignty over the whole territory must be asserted and
maintained.

It may not be necessary for that purpose to drive away the British fur
company, nor to prevent the migration into Oregon of British emigrants
coming from the British dominions. The company may, if deemed expedient,
be permitted to trade as heretofore with the Indians. British emigrants
may be treated in the same manner as the other sixty or eighty thousand
who already arrive yearly in the United States. They may at their option
be naturalized, or remain on the same footing as foreigners in other
parts of the Union. In this case they will enjoy no political rights;
they will not be permitted to own American vessels and to sail under the
American flag; the permission to own real property seems, so long as
Oregon remains a territory, to depend on the will of Congress. Thus far
collision may be avoided.

But no foreign jurisdiction can be permitted, from the moment when the
sovereignty of the United States over the whole territory shall be
asserted and maintained. To this, all those who reside in the territory
must submit. After having taken the decisive step of giving the notice,
the United States cannot, as the President justly states, abandon the
right of sovereignty without a sacrifice of national honor.

It had been expressly agreed by the convention that nothing contained in
it should affect the claims of either party to the territory. The
all-important question of sovereignty remained therefore in abeyance.
Negotiations for a division of the territory have failed: the question
of sovereignty remains undecided, as it was prior to the convention. If
the United States exercise the reserved right to put an end to the
convention, and if, from the time when it shall have expired, they
peremptorily assume the right of sovereignty over the whole, it cannot
be doubted that Great Britain will at once resist. She will adhere to
the principle she had asserted prior to the Nootka convention, and has
ever since maintained, that actual occupancy can alone give a right to
the country. She will not permit the jurisdiction of the United States
to be extended over her subjects: she will oppose the removal, arrest,
or exercise of any other legal process, against her justices of the
peace, against any other officers who directly or indirectly act under
her authority, against any of her subjects; and she will continue to
exercise her jurisdiction over all of them throughout the whole
territory. Whatever either Power asserts must be maintained: military
occupation and war must necessarily ensue.

A portion of the people, both in the West and elsewhere, see clearly
that such must be the consequence of giving the notice. Such men openly
avow their opinions, prefer war to a longer continuation of the present
state of things, are ready to meet all the dangers and calamities of the
impending conflict, and to adopt at once all the measures which may
ensure success. With them, the discussion brings at once the question to
its true issue: Is war necessary for the object they have in view? Or
may it not be attained by peaceable means? It is a question of war or
peace, and it is fairly laid before the nation.

But many respectable men appear to entertain hopes that peace may still
be preserved after the United States shall have assumed, or attempted to
assume, exclusive sovereignty. The reverse appears to me so clear, so
obvious, so inevitable, that I really cannot understand on what grounds
these hopes are founded.

Is it thought that the President will not, after the assent of Congress
has been obtained (and whether immediately or at the end of this
session, is quite immaterial), give the notice which he has asked
Congress to authorize? Or is it supposed that a change in the form
which, in order to avoid responsibility, would give him a discretionary
power, could lead to a different result, or be anything else but a
transfer by Congress to the Executive of the power to declare war?

Can it be presumed that when, after the expiration of the term of
notice, the convention shall have been abrogated, the President will not
assert and maintain the sovereignty claimed by the United States? I have
not the honor of a personal acquaintance with him; I respect in him the
First Magistrate of the Nation; and he is universally represented as of
irreproachable character, sincere, and patriotic. Every citizen has a
right to differ with him in opinion: no one has that of supposing that
he says one thing and means another. I feel an intimate conviction of
his entire sincerity.

Is it possible that any one, who does not labor under a singular
illusion, can believe that England will yield to threats and defiance
that which she has refused to concede to our arguments? Reverse the
case: Suppose for a moment that Great Britain was the aggressor, and had
given the notice; declaring, at the same time, that, at the expiration
of the year, she would assume exclusive sovereignty over the whole
country, and oppose the exercise of any whatever by the United States:
is there any American, even amongst those who set the least value on the
Oregon territory, and are most sincerely desirous of preserving peace,
who would not at once declare that such pretension on the part of Great
Britain was outrageous and must be resisted?

It is not certainly the interest of Great Britain to wage war against
the United States, and it may be fairly presumed that the British
Government has no such wish. But England is, as well as the United
States, a great, powerful, sensitive, and proud nation. Every effusion
of the British press which displays hostility to the United States,
produces an analogous sentiment, and adds new fuel to excitement in
America. A moment's reflection will enable us to judge of the inevitable
effect of an offensive and threatening act, emanating from our
Government; an act which throws, in the face of the world, the gauntlet
of defiance to Great Britain. Her claims and views, as laid down in her
statement of December, 1826, remove every doubt respecting the steps she
will take. "Great Britain claims no exclusive sovereignty over any
portion of that territory. Her present claim, not in respect to any
part, but to the whole, is limited to a right of joint occupancy in
common with other States, leaving the right of exclusive dominion in
abeyance. * * * * The pretensions of Great Britain tend to the mere
maintenance of her own rights, _in resistance to the exclusive
character_ of the pretensions of the United States. * * * * These rights
embrace the right to navigate the waters of those countries, _the right
to settle in and over any part of them_, and the right freely to trade
with the inhabitants and occupiers of the same. It is fully _admitted_
that the _United States possess the same rights_. But beyond these
rights, they possess none. To the interests and establishments which
British industry and enterprise have created Great Britain owes
protection. _That protection will be given_, both as regards settlement
and freedom of trade and navigation, with every attention not to
infringe the co-ordinate rights of the United States."

Thus, the United States declare that they give notice of the abrogation
of the convention, with the avowed determination of asserting their
assumed right of absolute and _exclusive sovereignty_ over the whole
territory of Oregon. And Great Britain has explicitly declared that her
pretensions were, _in resistance_ to the _exclusive_ character of those
of the United States; and that protection will be given both as regards
settlement and freedom of trade and navigation to the interests and
establishments which British industry and enterprise have created.

How war can be avoided, if both Powers persist in their conflicting
determinations, is incomprehensible. Under such circumstances
negotiation is morally impossible during the year following the notice.
To give that notice, with the avowed determination to assume exclusive
sovereignty at the end of the year, is a decisive, most probably an
irretrievable, step. "After that period the United States cannot abandon
their right of sovereignty without a sacrifice of national honor."

The question of sovereignty has never been decided. Simply to give
notice of the abrogation of the convention, would leave the question in
the same situation: it would remain in abeyance. But when the President
has recommended that the notice should be given with the avowed object
of assuming exclusive sovereignty, an Act of Congress, in compliance
with his recommendation, necessarily implies an approbation of the
object for which it is given. If the notice should be given, the only
way to avoid that implication and its fatal consequences, is to insert
in it, an explicit declaration, that the sovereignty shall not be
assumed. But then why give the notice at all? A postponement is far
preferable, unless some other advantage shall be obtained by the
abrogation of the convention. This must be examined, and it is necessary
to inquire whether any and what measures may be adopted, without any
violation of the convention, that will preserve the rights and
strengthen the position of the United States.




NUMBER IV.


The acts which the government of the United States may do, in conformity
with the convention, embrace two objects: the measures applicable to the
territory within their acknowledged limits which may facilitate and
promote migration; and those which are necessary for the protection of
their citizens residing in the Oregon territory.

It is a remarkable fact that, although the convention has now been in
force twenty-seven years, Congress has actually done nothing with
respect to either of those objects. Enterprising individuals have,
without any aid or encouragement by Government, opened a wagon-road
eighteen hundred miles in length, through an arid or mountainous region,
and made settlements on or near the shores of the Pacific, without any
guaranty for the possession of the land improved by their labors. Even
the attempt to carry on an inland trade with the Indians of Oregon has
been defeated, by the refusal to allow a drawback of the high duties
imposed on the importation of foreign goods absolutely necessary for
that commerce. Thus the fur trade has remained engrossed by the Hudson
Bay Company; missionaries were, till very lately, almost the only
citizens of the United States to be found in Oregon; the United States,
during the whole of that period, have derived no other advantage from
the convention than the reservation of their rights, and the express
provision that these should in no way be affected by the continuance of
the British factories in the territory. And, now that the tide of
migration has turned in their favor, they are suddenly invited to assume
a hostile position, to endure the calamities and to run the chances and
consequences of war, in order to gain an object which natural and
irresistible causes, if permitted to operate, cannot fail ultimately to
attain.

The measures applicable to the territory within the acknowledged limits
of the U. States have generally been recommended by the President. A
very moderate appropriation will be sufficient to improve the most
difficult portions of the road: and block-houses or other temporary
works, erected in proper places and at convenient distances, and
garrisoned by a portion of the intended additional force, will protect
and facilitate the progress of the emigrants. However uninviting may be
the vast extent of prairies, destitute of timber, which intervene
between the western boundary of the State of Missouri and the country
bordering on the Stony Mountains, it seems impossible that there should
not be found some more favored spots where settlements may be formed. If
these were selected for military posts, and donations of land were made
to actual settlers in their vicinity, a series of villages, though
probably not a continuity of settlements, would soon arise through the
whole length of the road. The most important place, that which is most
wanted, either as a place of rest for the emigrants, or for military
purposes, is one in the immediate vicinity of the Stony Mountains.
Reports speak favorably of the fertility of the soil in some of the
valleys of the upper waters, within our limits--of Bear's river, of the
Rio Colorado, and of some of the northern branches of the river Platte.
There, also, the seat of justice might be placed of the new territory,
whose courts should have superior jurisdiction over Oregon.

The measures which the United States have a right to carry into effect
within the territory of Oregon must now be considered.

The only positive condition of the convention is, that the territory in
question shall, together with its harbors, bays, and creeks, and the
navigation of all rivers within the same, be free and open to vessels,
citizens, and subjects of the two Powers.

For the construction put on this article by Great Britain, it is
necessary to recur again to the statement of her claim, as given by
herself, and to her own acts subsequent to the convention.

The acts of England, subsequent to the convention of 1818, are to be
found in the various charters of the Hudson Bay Company (observing that
some of their most important provisions, though of a much earlier date,
stand unrepealed), and in the act of Parliament of the year 1821, which
confirms and extends a prior one of the year 1803. It must also be
recollected that, by grants or acts subsequent to the convention, the
ancient Hudson Bay Company and the Northwest Company of Montreal have
been united together, preserving the name of Hudson Bay Company.

This Company was and remains a body corporate and politic, with
provisions for the election of a Governor and other officers, who direct
its business; and amongst other powers, the Company is empowered to
build fortifications for the defence of its possessions, as well as to
make war or peace with all nations or people, not Christian, inhabiting
their territories, which now embrace the entire Oregon. By the act of
Parliament of 1821, the jurisdiction of the courts of Upper Canada is
extended, in all civil and criminal cases, to the Oregon territory;
provision is made for the appointment of justices of the peace within
the said territory, with a limited jurisdiction, and power to act as
Commissioners in certain cases, and to convey offenders to Upper Canada.

It must also be observed that, although the Company is forbidden to
claim any exclusive trade with the Indians, to the prejudice or
exclusion of any citizen of the United States who may be engaged in the
same trade, yet the jurisdiction above mentioned is, by the letter of
the act, extended to any persons whatsoever residing or being within the
said territory. The British Plenipotentiaries did, however, explicitly
declare, in the course of the negotiations of 1826-1827, that the act
had no other object but the maintenance of order amongst British
subjects, and had never been intended to apply to citizens of the United
States.

It is perfectly clear that, since it has been fully admitted that the
United States possess the same rights over the territory as Great
Britain, they are fully authorized, under the convention, to enjoy all
the rights which Great Britain claims for herself, and to exercise that
jurisdiction which she has assumed as being consistent with the
convention.

The citizens of the United States have, therefore, at this time a full
and acknowledged right to navigate the waters of the Oregon territory,
_to settle in and over any part of it_, and freely to trade with the
inhabitants and occupiers of the same. And the Government of the United
States is likewise fully authorized to incorporate any company or
association of men for the purpose of trading or of occupying and
settling the country; to extend the jurisdiction of the courts of any of
its territories lying within its acknowledged limits, in all civil and
criminal cases, to the territory aforesaid; to appoint within the same
justices of the peace and such other officers as may be necessary for
carrying the jurisdiction into effect; and also to make war and peace
with the Indian inhabitants of the territory, including the incidental
power to appoint agents for that purpose.

On the other hand, it seems to be understood that, so long as the
convention remains in force, neither Government shall lay duties in the
Territory on tonnage, merchandise, or commerce; nor exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over any portion of it; and that the citizens and subjects
of the two Powers, residing in or removing to the territory, shall be
amenable only to the jurisdiction of their own country respectively.

It has been contended by the British Government that the establishment
of any military post, or the introduction of any regular force under a
national flag, by either Power, would be an act of exclusive
sovereignty, which could not be permitted to either whilst the
sovereignty remained in abeyance. Under existing circumstances, it is
believed that such an act would be highly dangerous, and prove
unfavorable to the United States.

But the establishment by the United States of a Territorial Government
over Oregon is also objected to on the same principle. The want of such
government appears to be the only serious inconvenience attending a
continuance of the convention, and requires special consideration.

The United States have the same right as Great Britain, and are equally
bound, to protect their citizens residing in the Oregon territory, in
the exercise of all the rights secured to them by the convention. It has
been fully admitted that these rights embrace the right to settle in and
over any part of the territory, and that they are to be, in all cases
whatever, amenable only to the jurisdiction of their own country. The
subjects of Great Britain, who are not in the employ of the Hudson Bay
Company, are forbidden to trade with the natives; and the company does
in fact control and govern all the British subjects residing in the
territory. This gives a strong guaranty against the violation, by rash
individuals, of the rights of the citizens of the United States. Should
any of them, however, be disturbed in the exercise of their legitimate
rights, and the company should be unable or unwilling to relieve and
indemnify them, the United States would be justly entitled to appeal to
the British Government for the redress of a violation of rights secured
by the convention; for the British Government has preserved a control
over the Hudson Bay Company, and does in fact, through it, govern the
British subjects who reside in the territory.

The United States are placed, in that respect, in a very different
situation. It is not believed that the General Government is authorized
to incorporate, as a political body, a commercial company, with such
powers as would give it an efficient control over the private citizens
residing in the territory. Such delegation of powers, either by any of
the States or by Congress, is wholly inconsistent with our institutions.
The United States may indeed give to their citizens in Oregon a regular
and complete judiciary system; and they may also extend to them, as the
British Government has done on its part, the laws of an adjacent
territory. But an executive local power is wanted in this case, as it is
everywhere else, under any form of government whatever, to cause the
laws to be executed, and to have that general control which is now
exercised, through the Hudson Bay Company, by the British Government.
There are, besides, various acts of a public though local nature, such
as opening roads, making bridges, erecting block-houses for protection
against the natives, providing for the destitute, &c., all which are
performed by the Hudson Bay Company, and cannot be accomplished by
insulated individuals, bound by no legal association or government.

Whether any measures may be devised, other than a territorial
government, that will be sufficient for the purpose intended; whether
all the American citizens residing in Oregon might not be incorporated
and made a body politic, with powers equivalent to those vested in the
Hudson Bay Company, and with the reservation by the General Government
of a check or control analogous to that reserved by the Government of
Great Britain, are questions worthy of serious consideration. But Great
Britain has the same interest as the United States to prevent collision
during the continuance of the convention; and it is believed that, if
negotiations should be renewed, with an equal and sincere desire on both
sides to preserve friendly relations, there would be no difficulty at
this time in coming to an understanding on the subject. It would seem
sufficient that this should be accompanied with provisions, preventing
the possibility of the powers exercised by the United States being ever
applied to British subjects, and with an explicit declaration that these
powers should never be construed as an admission by Great Britain of any
claim of the United States to exclusive sovereignty.

There is another important subject which has not, it is believed, ever
been discussed by the two Powers. This is the claim to the ownership of
the places settled and improved under the convention. It seems to me
that, on the principles of both natural and international law, these
rights, to a defined extent, should be respected by each Power
respectively, whose sovereignty over the portion of the territory in
which such improved settlements may be situated will ultimately be
recognized. It appears also that the United States may, in conformity
with the convention, and without affecting in any shape the claims
advanced by Great Britain, pass a law declaring that they abandon or
grant without warranty, to such of their citizens as shall have made
actual and bonâ fide settlements in any part of Oregon, under the
convention, all the rights of and claims to the ownership of the soil,
on which such settlements shall have been made, which the United States
may now or hereafter claim or acquire: limiting and defining the extent
of the grant in the same manner as would be done if such grant was
absolute; and promising that the title should be confirmed, in case and
whenever the sovereignty of the United States was recognized or asserted
and maintained.

The prolongation, in 1827, of the convention of 1818, was evidently
intended as a temporary measure, since it was made revocable at the will
of either party. The plenipotentiaries of the two Powers had been unable
to agree on the terms of a definitive arrangement, or even in defining
with precision the conditions on which the convention of 1818 might be
continued for a determinate period. It will be seen, by reference to the
protocols and correspondence, that, although it was generally admitted
that neither party ought during such continuance to exercise any
exclusive sovereignty over the territory, the American Plenipotentiary
declined to agree to any convention containing an express provision to
that effect, or accompanied by the insertion in the protocol of a
declaration for the same purpose by the British Plenipotentiaries. The
reason was not only because an exclusive right over Astoria and its
dependencies was claimed by the United States, but principally because
it was anticipated that, in order to have in fact an authority equal to
that exercised by the Hudson Bay Company, it would become necessary for
the United States to perform acts which the British Government might
contend to be forbidden by such express provision or declaration. The
consequence was, that the convention recognizes some certain rights, and
imposes no positive restrictions but only such, as may be supposed to be
implied in the clause which declares, that nothing contained in it
should be construed to impair or affect the claims of either party. The
probability that it might become necessary for the United States to
establish a territory or some sort of government over their own citizens
was explicitly avowed; the deficiencies of the renewed convention of
1827, and the inconveniences which might ensue, were fully understood;
and the continuance of that of 1818, made revokable at will, was agreed
on, with the hope that the two Powers would embrace an early
opportunity, if not to make a definitive arrangement, at least to
substitute for the convention another, defining with precision the acts
which both parties should be allowed or forbidden to perform so long as
the sovereignty remained in abeyance.

The inconveniences alluded to have been fairly stated in this paper, and
some of the means by which they may be avoided have been suggested. It
is not, therefore, on account of the intrinsic value of the convention
that its abrogation is objectionable and dangerous. It is because
nothing is substituted in its place; it is because, if the two Powers
are not yet prepared to make a definitive agreement, it becomes the duty
of both Governments, instead of breaking the only barrier which still
preserves peace, to substitute for the existing convention one adapted
to the present state of things, and which shall prevent collisions until
the question of sovereignty shall have been settled. The inconveniences
which were only anticipated have become tangible, from the time when
American citizens, whom the United States are bound to protect, began to
make settlements in the territory of Oregon. The sudden transition, from
an agreement however defective to a promiscuous occupancy, without any
provisions whatever that may prevent collisions, is highly dangerous.
When this is accompanied by an avowed determination on the part of the
United States to assume that exclusive sovereignty which Great Britain
has positively declared she would resist, War becomes inevitable.




NUMBER V.


It may not be possible to calculate, with any degree of certainty, the
number of citizens of the United States who, aided by these various
measures, will, within any given period, remove to the territory beyond
the Stony Mountains. It is certain that this number will annually
increase, and keep pace with the rapid increase of the population of the
Western States. It cannot be doubted that ultimately, and at no very
distant time, they will have possession of all that is worth being
occupied in the territory. On what principle, then, will the right of
sovereignty be decided?

It may, however, be asked whether, if this be the inevitable consequence
of the continuance of the convention, England will not herself give
notice that it shall be abrogated. It might be sufficient to answer that
we must wait till that notice shall have been given, and the subsequent
measures which England means to adopt shall have been made known to us,
before we assume rashly a hostile position. The United States may govern
themselves; although they may irritate Great Britain, they cannot
control the acts of her Government. The British Government will do
whatever it may think proper; but for the consequences that may ensue it
will be alone responsible. Should the abrogation of the convention on
her part be followed by aggressive measures; should she assume exclusive
possession over Oregon or any part of it, as it is now proposed that the
United States should do, America will then be placed in a defensive
position; the war, if any should ensue, will be one unprovoked by her, a
war purely of defence, which will be not only sustained, but approved
by the unanimous voice of the nation. We may, however, be permitted to
examine what motive could impel England, what interest she might have,
either in annulling the convention or in adopting aggressive measures.

When it is recommended that the United States should give notice of the
abrogation of the convention, it is with the avowed object of adopting
measures forbidden by the convention, and which Great Britain has
uniformly declared she would resist. But, according to the view of the
subject uniformly taken by her, from the first time she asserted the
rights she claims to this day, the simple abrogation of her convention
with the United States will produce no effect whatever on the rights,
relations, and position of the two Powers. Great Britain, from the date
at least of Cook's third voyage, and prior to the Nootka convention, did
deny the exclusive claim of Spain, and assert that her subjects had, in
common with those of other States, the right freely to trade with the
natives, and to settle in any part of the Northwestern coast of America,
not already occupied by the subjects of Spain. The Nootka convention was
nothing more than the acquiescence, on the part of Spain, in the claims
thus asserted by Great Britain, leaving the sovereignty in abeyance. And
the convention between the United States and Great Britain is nothing
more nor less than a temporary recognition of the same principle, so far
as the two parties were concerned. England had, prior to that
convention, fully admitted that the United States possessed the same
rights as were claimed by her. The abrogation of the convention by her
will leave those rights precisely in the same situation as they now
stand, and as they stood prior to the convention. It cannot therefore be
perceived what possible benefit could accrue to Great Britain from her
abrogation of that instrument; unless, discarding all her former
declarations, denying all that she has asserted for more than sixty
years, retracting her admission of the equal rights of the United States
to trade, to occupy, and to make settlements in any part of the country,
she should, without cause or pretext, assume, as is now threatened on
the part of the United States, exclusive sovereignty over the whole or
part of the territory. It may be permitted to believe that the British
Government entertains no such intention.

It may also be observed that England has heretofore evinced no
disposition whatever to colonize the territory in question. She has,
indeed, declared most explicitly her determination to protect the
British interests that had been created by British enterprise and
capital in that quarter. But, by giving a monopoly of the fur trade to
the Hudson Bay Company, she has virtually arrested private efforts on
the part of British subjects. Her Government has been in every other
respect altogether inactive, and apparently careless about the ultimate
fate of Oregon. The country has been open to her enterprise at least
fifty years; and there are no other British settlements or interests
within its limits than those vested in, or connected with the Hudson Bay
Company. Whether the British Government will hereafter make any effort
towards that object cannot be known; but as long as this right to
colonize Oregon shall remain common to both Powers, the United States
have nothing to apprehend from the competition.

The negotiations on that subject between the two Governments have been
carried on, on both sides, with perfect candor. The views and intentions
of both parties were mutually communicated without reserve. The
conviction on the part of America that the country must ultimately be
occupied and settled by her agricultural emigrants, was used as an
argument why, in case of a division of the territory, the greater share
should be allotted to the United States. The following quotation, from
the American statement of the case of December, 1826, proves that this
expectation was fairly avowed at the time:


     "If the present state of occupancy is urged on the part of Great
     Britain, the probability of the manner in which the territory west
     of the Rocky Mountains must be settled belongs also essentially to
     the subject. Under whatever nominal sovereignty that country may be
     placed, and whatever its ultimate destinies may be, it is nearly
     reduced to a certainty that it will be almost exclusively peopled
     by the surplus population of the United States. The distance from
     Great Britain, and the expense incident to emigration, forbid the
     expectation of any being practicable from that quarter but on a
     comparatively small scale. Allowing the rate of increase to be the
     same in the United States and in the North American British
     possessions, the difference in the actual population of both is
     such that the progressive rate which would, within forty years, add
     three millions to these, would within the same time give a positive
     increase of more than twenty millions to the United States. And if
     circumstances, arising from localities and habits, have given
     superior facilities to British subjects of extending their commerce
     with the natives, and to that expansion which has the appearance,
     and the appearance only, of occupancy, the slower but sure progress
     and extension of an agricultural population will be regulated by
     distance, by natural obstacles, and by its own amount."


There was no exaggeration in that comparative view; the superiority of
the progressive increase of population in the United States was, on the
contrary, underrated. The essential difference is, that migration from
the United States to Oregon is the result of purely natural causes,
whilst England, in order to colonize that country, must resort to
artificial means. The number of American emigrants may not, during the
first next ensuing years, be as great as seems to be anticipated. It
will at first be limited by the amount of provisions with which the
earlier settlers can supply them during the first year, and till they
can raise a crop themselves; and the rapidity with which a new country
may be settled is also lessened where maize cannot be profitably
cultivated.

Whether more or less prompt, the result is nevertheless indubitable. The
snowball sooner or later becomes an avalanche: where the cultivator of
the soil has once made a permanent establishment game and hunters
disappear; within a few years the fur trade will have died its natural
death, and no vestige shall remain, at least south of Fuca's Straits, of
that temporary occupancy, of those vested British interests, which the
British Government is now bound to protect. When the whole territory
shall have thus fallen in the possession of an agricultural industrious
population, the question recurs, by what principle will then the right
of sovereignty, all along kept in abeyance, be determined?

The answer is obvious. In conformity with natural law, with that right
of occupancy for which Great Britain has always contended, the occupiers
of the land, the inhabitants of the country, from whatever quarter they
may have come, will be of right as well as in fact the sole legitimate
sovereigns of Oregon. Whenever sufficiently numerous, they will decide
whether it suits them best to be an independent nation or an integral
part of our great Republic. There cannot be the slightest apprehension
that they will choose to become a dependent colony; for they will be the
most powerful nation bordering on the American shores of the Pacific,
and will not stand in need of protection against either their Russian or
Mexican neighbors. Viewed as an abstract proposition, Mr. Jefferson's
opinion appears correct, that it will be best for both the Atlantic and
the Pacific American nations, whilst entertaining the most friendly
relations, to remain independent rather than to be united under the same
Government. But this conclusion is premature; and the decision must be
left to posterity.

It has been attempted in these papers to prove--

1. That neither of the two Powers has an absolute and indisputable right
to the whole contested territory; that each may recede from its extreme
pretensions without impairing national honor or wounding national pride;
and that the way is therefore still open for a renewal of negotiations.

2. That the avowed object of the United States, in giving notice of the
abrogation of the convention, is the determination to assert and
maintain their assumed right of absolute and exclusive sovereignty over
the whole territory; that Great Britain is fully committed on that
point, and has constantly and explicitly declared that such an attempt
would be resisted, and the British interests in that quarter be
protected; and that war is therefore the unavoidable consequence of such
a decisive step--a war not only necessarily calamitous and expensive,
but in its character aggressive, not justifiable by the magnitude and
importance of its object, and of which the chances are uncertain.

3. That the inconveniences of the present state of things may in a great
degree be avoided; that, if no war should ensue, they will be the same,
if not greater, without than under a convention; that not a single
object can be gained by giving the notice at this time, unless it be to
do something not permitted by the present convention, and therefore
provoking resistance and productive of war. If a single other advantage
can be gained by giving the notice, let it be stated.

4th. That it has been fully admitted by Great Britain that, whether
under or without a convention, the United States have the same rights as
herself, to trade, to navigate, and to occupy and make settlements in
and over every part of the territory; and that, if this state of things
be not disturbed, natural causes must necessarily give the whole
territory to the United States.

Under these circumstances, it is only asked, that the subject may be
postponed for the present; that Government should not commit itself by
any premature act or declaration; that, instead of increasing the
irritation and excitement which exist on both sides, time be given for
mutual reflection, and for the subdual or subsidence of angry and
violent feelings. Then, and then only, can the deliberate opinion of the
American people on this momentous question be truly ascertained. It is
not perceived how the postponement for the present and for a time can,
in any shape or in the slightest degree, injure the United States.

It is certainly true that England is very powerful, and has often abused
her power, in no case in a more outrageous manner than by the
impressment of seamen, whether American, English, or other foreigners,
sailing under and protected by the American flag. I am not aware that
there has ever been any powerful nation, even in modern times, and
professing Christianity, which has not occasionally abused its power.
The United States, who always appealed to justice during their early
youth, seem, as their strength and power increase, to give symptoms of a
similar disposition. Instead of useless and dangerous recriminations,
might not the two nations, by their united efforts, promote a great
object, and worthy of their elevated situation?

With the single exception of the territory of Oregon, which extends from
42 to 54° 40´ north latitude, all the American shores of the Pacific
Ocean, from Cape Horn to Behring's Straits, are occupied, on the north
by the factories of the Russian Fur Company, southwardly by
semi-civilized States, a mixture of Europeans of Spanish descent and of
native Indians, who, notwithstanding the efforts of enlightened,
intelligent, and liberal men, have heretofore failed in the attempt to
establish governments founded on law, that might ensure liberty,
preserve order, and protect persons and property. It is in Oregon alone
that we may hope to see a portion of the western shores of America
occupied and inhabited by an active and enlightened nation, which may
exercise a moral influence over her less favored neighbors, and extend
to them the benefits of a more advanced civilisation. It is on that
account that the wish has been expressed that the Oregon territory may
not be divided. The United States and England are the only Powers who
lay any claim to that country, the only nations which may and must
inhabit it. It is not, fortunately, in the power of either Government to
prevent this taking place; but it depends upon them, whether they shall
unite in promoting the object, or whether they shall bring on both
countries the calamities of an useless war, which may <DW44> but not
prevent the ultimate result. It matters but little whether the
inhabitants shall come from England or from the United States. It would
seem that more importance might be attached to the fact that, within a
period of fifteen years, near one million of souls are now added to the
population of the United States by migrations from the dominions of
Great Britain; yet, since permitted by both Powers, they may be presumed
to be beneficial to both. The emigrants to Oregon, whether Americans or
English, will be united together by the community of language and
literature, of the principles of law, and of all the fundamental
elements of a similar civilisation.

The establishment of a kindred and friendly Power on the North-west
Coast of America is all that England can expect, all perhaps that the
United States ought to desire. It seems almost incredible that, whilst
that object may be attained by simply not impeding the effect of natural
causes, two kindred nations, having such powerful motives to remain at
peace, and standing at the head of European and American civilisation,
should, in this enlightened age, give to the world the scandalous
spectacle, perhaps not unwelcome to some of the beholders, of an
unnatural and an unnecessary war; that they should apply all their
faculties and exhaust their resources in inflicting, each on the other,
every injury in their power, and for what purpose? The certain
consequence, independent of all the direct calamities and miseries of
war, will be a mutual increase of debt and taxation, and the ultimate
fate of Oregon will be the same as if the war had not taken place.




APPENDIX.


WAR EXPENSES.

Those expenses may be arranged under three heads: 1st. Such as are of a
permanent nature, and should be considered as belonging to the Peace
establishment of the country. 2dly. Those which should be adopted when
there is an impending danger of war. 3dly. Those which actual war
renders necessary.

To the first class belong all those, which provide for objects that
require considerable time to be executed, and cannot, without great
difficulty, be accomplished pending a war. Such are fortifications,
building ships of war including steamers, accumulating materials for the
same purpose, Navy Yards, providing a sufficient artillery, and other
important objects of the ordnance department. It may be taken for
granted, that Government has done, or will do all that is necessary and
practicable in that respect.

The preparatory measures which should be adopted, when there is danger
of war, are those respecting which the greatest variety of opinions must
be expected. It has been repeatedly asserted, that such is the structure
of our Government, that it never will or can prepare for war, till after
it has actually commenced; that is to say, that, because Congress was
dilatory in making effectual provision for carrying on the last war
against Great Britain, and because the Administration, at the time when
it was declared, was inefficient and not well calculated for conducting
it, the United States are bound for ever to incur, at the commencement
of every war, the disasters of one or two years, before they can be
induced to put on their armor. The past is irrevocable and of no other
use, than as far as it may teach us to avoid the faults that were
formerly committed. When our Government relies on the people for being
sustained in making war, its confidence must be entire. They must be
told the whole truth; and if they are really in favor of war, they will
cheerfully sustain Government in all the measures necessary to carry it
into effect. The frank annunciation of the necessity of such measures is
called, "creating a panic." It is not the first time that under similar
circumstances the same language has been held. If there be no danger or
intention of making war, those create a panic, who proclaim a
determination to assert the exclusive sovereignty of the United States
over the whole contested territory, with the full knowledge that Great
Britain has uniformly and explicitly declared, that she would resist any
such attempt. If instead of telling the people the whole truth, the
attempt to conceal from them the necessity of the measures requisite for
carrying on the war should be successful, a reaction in the public
sentiment will most certainly take place, whenever it will have become
impossible to delay any longer the heavy burden of taxation, for which
the Nation had not been prepared.

I will not dwell on the necessary preparations of a military character,
otherwise than by referring to some notorious facts.

The primary causes of the disastrous results of the campaign of 1812,
were the want of a naval force on the Lakes, and that of a sufficient
regular force. Government had obtained a correct statement of the
regular force of the British in Canada, with the exception of the
garrison of Quebec. This last was estimated at about three thousand men,
and could not be lessened without great inconvenience and some danger.
The regular force at Montreal, St. John's, and Three Rivers, amounted to
1130 men; that in the whole of Upper Canada, to 720. The act to raise an
additional military force of 25,000 men was passed on the 11th of
January, 1812. The selection of the officers was not completed before
the termination of that year; the recruiting service was not organized
in time; the enlistments for the regular army fell short of the most
moderate calculation; and the total number recruited was so small, as to
render it impossible to strike a decisive blow on any one of the most
important points from Montreal upwards, insignificant as was the force
by which they were defended. The volunteer act was also extremely
unproductive. At that time the treasury was amply supplied; and the want
was not that of money, but of a regular force.

Such force cannot be raised without money; and yet it will be admitted
that it would be extremely difficult to induce Congress to lay internal
taxes or duties before war was declared or certain. In order to provide
means for having an additional regular force ready to act as soon as
actual war takes place, a loan and Treasury notes must be resorted to.
But it is deemed absolutely necessary, that the internal taxes should be
imposed simultaneously with the declaration of war, and that provision
should be made for their immediate collection. With the exception of the
act for doubling the duties on importations, Congress did not pass any
law for imposing any new taxes or duties, till more than one year after
the declaration of the last war; nor did it even lay a second direct tax
in the year 1814. It was not till after public credit was ruined, after
Treasury notes which were had due remained unpaid, and after Mr. Dallas
had been placed at the head of the Treasury, that at last the laws for
imposing a double direct tax, for increasing the rate of the existing
internal duties, and for laying new ones, were enacted. The peace was
ratified immediately after; and in point of fact, no more than 3,877,000
dollars were paid in the Treasury before the end of the war, on account
of the direct tax and all other internal taxes or duties. There were
received from the same sources 20,654,000 dollars in the years 1815,
1816 and 1817.

The preparatory measures necessary, in order to insure an immediate
collection of internal taxes, whenever the laws imposing such taxes
shall have been passed, are those on which I may speak with confidence.
These consist simply in a previous organization of the machinery
necessary for the collection of every species of internal taxes, and the
assessment of a direct tax. The proper selection of the numerous
officers necessary for the collection always consumes several months. A
previous selection and appointment of those officers would obviate that
difficulty, and would cost nothing, as though appointed they should
receive no pay till called into actual service; this would be the
natural consequence of the manner in which collectors are paid, this
being a per centage on the money collected. The only other necessary
measure in that respect, is that the Secretary of the Treasury should,
at the time of their appointment, supply the collectors with all the
necessary forms of keeping and rendering their accounts.

The assessment in each State of the taxable property of every individual
who possesses such property, is the only operation which requires
considerable time and causes a proportionate delay. This cannot be
otherwise obviated than by making that assessment a preparatory measure,
to be completed before actual war takes place.

In order to facilitate and hasten the process of assessment, I
undertook, in the year 1812, to apportion the direct tax on the several
Counties and State Districts in each State; and the Act of 2d August,
1813, which laid a direct tax of three millions of dollars, was passed
in conformity with that apportionment The process was easy for every
State in which there was a direct State tax; but though derived from the
best data that could be collected, it was defective and partly arbitrary
for the States in which there was no State tax. As there is at present
hardly any (if any) State which has not laid a direct State tax, this
mode may be adopted for the proposed preparatory assessment. This will
reduce the duty of the assessors to the assessment of the quota of each
County or District, on the several individuals liable to the tax, and
the total expense of the assessment to a sum not exceeding probably two
hundred thousand dollars. A more regular and correct assessment will, of
course, be provided for, with respect to the direct taxes which may be
laid after the first year of the war.

The only objection is that of the expense, which would prove useless if
the tax should not be laid, or in other words, if war should not take
place; but certainly this is too small an item to deserve consideration.

This organization, easy and cheap as it is, is all that is necessary in
order to secure an immediate collection of a direct and other internal
taxes and duties, from the moment when they shall have been imposed by
Congress.

The probable annual expenses which must be incurred in a war with
England, and the resources for defraying them, are the next objects of
inquiry.

It is extremely difficult to draw any correct inference from the
expenses of the last war with England: the amount of the arrearages due
on account of the military services at the time when the peace was
ratified, is not stated with precision in any of the public documents
which I have seen. Although the laws show the number of men voted, that
of those actually raised has never to my knowledge been officially
stated. There can be no doubt that the want of a proper organization
increased the amount of expenditure much beyond that which would have
been sufficient under a regular and efficient system. This has
undoubtedly been much improved; yet the expenses incurred in the
Seminole war, compared with the number of men employed and that of the
hostile Indians, show that either there are still some defects in the
organization, or that there were great abuses in the execution.

The payments from the Treasury for the military department, embracing
only those for the army proper, militia and volunteers, and exclusive of
those for fortifications and the Indian department, amounted for the
year 1813 to 18,936,000 dollars, and for the year 1814 to 20,508,000
dollars. The disbursements for the navy are stated at 6,446,000 and
7,311,000 dollars for these two years respectively. By comparing the
reports of the Secretaries of the Treasury of December 1815, 1816, 1817,
it would appear that the arrearages due on 1st January, 1815, exceeded
ten millions of dollars: and it seems certain that the actual war
expenses of 1814 could not have fallen short of 35 to 40 millions of
dollars. It has been asserted that the regular force during that year
amounted to 35,000 men.

The population of the United States has nearly trebled during the
thirty-four years which have elapsed since that in which the last war
against England was declared. Their wealth and resources have increased
in the same ratio; and that, in case of war, these should be brought
into action as promptly as possible, admits of no doubt. Once engaged in
the conflict, to make the war as efficient as possible will shorten its
duration, and can alone secure honorable terms of peace. I have not the
documents necessary for making an approximate estimate of the annual
expenses of a war with Great Britain; and if I had, I could not at this
time perform that amount of labor which is absolutely necessary in order
to draw correct inferences. Taking only a general view of the subject,
and considering the great difference of expense in keeping a navy in
active service, between one of eight frigates and one of ten ships of
the line, fourteen frigates and a competent number of steamers; that
Texas and Oregon are additional objects of defence; that the extensive
system of fortifications which has been adopted will require about
fifteen thousand additional men; and that, in order to carry a
successful and decisive war against the most vulnerable portion of the
British dominions, a great disposable regular force is absolutely
necessary; I am very sure that I fall below the mark in saying that,
after the first year of the war, and when the resources of the country
shall be fully brought into action, the annual military and naval
expenses will amount to sixty or seventy millions of dollars. To this
must be added the expenses for all other objects, which, for the year
ending on the 30th of June, 1845, amounted to near fifteen millions, but
which the Secretary of the Treasury hopes may be reduced to eleven
millions and a half. The gross annual expenses for all objects will be
estimated at seventy-seven millions; to be increased annually by the
annual interest on each successive loan.

In order to ascertain the amount of new revenue and loans required to
defray that expense, the first question which arises, is the diminution
of the revenue derived from customs, which will be the necessary
consequence of the war.

The actual receipts into the Treasury, arising from that source of
revenue, were in round numbers for the years 1812, 1813, 1814,
respectively 8,960,000, 13,225,000, and 6,000,000 of dollars; and the
nett revenue which accrued during those three years respectively
amounted to 13,142,000, 6,708,000, and 4,250,000 dollars. From the 1st
of July, 1812, the rate of duties on importations was doubled; and in
order to compare these receipts with those collected in peace time, they
must be reduced for those three years respectively, to 7,470,000,[3]
6,600,000 and 3,000,000; or, if the revenue accrued be compared (which
is the correct mode), to 9,850,000,[3] 3,354,000, and 2,125,000 dollars.
At that time the duties accrued were, on account of the credit allowed,
collected on an average only six or eight months later; and the
unexpected importations in the latter half of the year 1812 in American
vessels which arrived with British licenses, subsequent to the
declaration of war and to the act which doubled the rate of duties,
swelled considerably the receipts of the year 1813. It was only in 1814
that the full effect of the war on the revenue derived from that source
was felt.

The diminution in the amount of American and foreign tonnage employed in
the foreign trade of the United States is strongly exhibited by the
following statement:


Tonnage in foreign trade, U. S.   American ves.   Foreign ves.   Total.

      Year 1811                     948,207          33,203      981,450
       "   1812                     667,999          47,099      715,098
       "   1813                     237,348         113,827      351,175
       "   1814                      59,626          48,302      107,928


And it must be recollected that during the last nine months of 1814,
Great Britain was at peace with all the other Powers of Europe, and that
these were therefore neutrals. Yet they hardly ventured to trade with
us.

The amount of receipts into the Treasury derived from customs, as well
as that of the revenue accrued, exceeded, during the eleven years 1801
to 1811, 132,700,000 dollars, being an annual average of about
12,000,000 dollars. During the same eleven years the average amount of
tonnage employed in the foreign trade of the United States was 943,670
tons, of which 844,170 were in American, and 99,500 foreign vessels.

Thus in the year 1814, the revenue derived from customs had been
reduced to one fourth part (to nearly one sixth part, if compared
according to the revenue accrued, or amount of importations), the
tonnage employed in the foreign trade of the United States to nearly one
ninth; and that of the American vessels employed in that trade, to one
fourteenth part of their respective average amount during the eleven
years of peace.

The small American navy did during the last war with England all and
more than could have been expected. The fact was established to the
satisfaction of the world and of Great Britain herself, that the navy of
the United States, with a parity of force, was at least equal to that of
England. But the prodigious numerical superiority of the British navy
rendered it impossible for a few frigates to protect the commerce of the
United States, which was accordingly almost annihilated. We have now ten
ships of the line, and a proportionate number of frigates and smaller
vessels. The great numerical superiority of the British navy still
continues; and it cannot be doubted that, in case of war, every exertion
will be made by the British Government to maintain its superiority in
our seas and on our coasts. Still it is but a portion of her force that
can be employed in that way, and, taking every circumstance into
consideration, it may be confidently hoped that our commerce, though
much lessened, will be partially protected by our navy. Although the
actual diminution which will be experienced is altogether conjectural, I
think that no great error is to be apprehended in estimating the revenue
from customs, after the first year of the war, at about one half of its
present amount; and the whole revenue from that source, from the sale of
lands and all the branches of the existing income, at fourteen millions
of dollars; leaving to be provided for sixty to sixty-five millions,
besides the interest on loans, which, for a war of three years, may be
estimated at about six millions of dollars on an average. However
energetic and efficient Congress and the Executive may be, the resources
and strength of the nation can be but gradually brought forth: the
expenses will therefore be less during the first year, after which the
whole amount will be required and will be annually wanted. In reference
therefore to the second year of the war--


     Assuming the total war expenses at                  $65,000,000
     All the others at                                    12,000,000
                                                        ------------
                          In all,                        $77,000,000
     From which deduct for existing revenue,              14,000,000
                                                        ------------
     To be provided for by taxes and loans,              $63,000,000
     On the principle that the amount of annual taxes
       should be at least equal to the expenses of
       the peace establishment and the interest on
       the war loans, annual peace expenses at            27,000,000
     And for interest on the loans of 1st and 2d years,
       viz. 1st year 25, and 2d year 45 millions at
       7 per cent.                                         5,000,000
                                                        ------------
                          Together,                      $32,000,000
     From which deduct existing revenue,                  14,000,000
                                                        ------------
     Leaves to be provided for by new taxes, at least    $18,000,000
     And by loans,                                        45,000,000
                                                        ------------
                                                         $63,000,000


The estimate of 5,000,000 dollars for the interest of the loans the
second year after the war, is founded on the supposition that the direct
and other internal taxes or duties laid for the first year, together
with the existing revenue, and twenty-five millions borrowed by loans or
Treasury notes, will be sufficient to defray the expense incurred prior
to and during the first year of the war. The deficiency in the regular
force for that year must be supplied by large drafts of militia, which
will be as expensive at least as the regular soldiers whose place they
will supply.

But it appears very doubtful whether such a large sum as forty-five
millions can be raised annually by loans and Treasury notes. It is
necessary in the first place to correct some erroneous opinions
respecting the extent to which these notes may be kept in circulation,
and the legitimate objects to which they may be applied.

The Treasury notes were first introduced on my suggestion, which was no
new discovery, since they are a mere transcript of the Exchequer Bills
of Great Britain. As these have been resorted to for more than a
century, and have never become there a portion of the ordinary currency,
the extent to which they may be used for other purposes is well
ascertained, and bears always a certain ratio to the wealth of the
country and to the revenue of the State. Whether issued to the bank as
an anticipation of the revenue, or used by capitalists for short
investments, the gross amount has rarely exceeded twenty millions
sterling. Judging from past experience, the amount which may, in time of
war, be kept in circulation at par in the United States falls far short
of a proportionate sum.


     The amount of Treasury Notes issued during the years 1812
         and 1813 amounted to                        $8,930 000
     Of which there had been paid including interest $4,240 000


The amount in actual circulation was less than five millions, and thus
far they had been kept at par.

All the demands from the other departments had been met by the Treasury,
and there were but few, if any, outstanding arrears. Nothing had as yet
been collected on account of the direct tax and of the internal duties.
Besides the five millions of Treasury Notes, there had been paid into
the Treasury in the years 1812 and 1813, $28,740,000 on account of war
loans, and $22,283,000 from the customs. The balance in the Treasury
amounted to $5,196,542 on the 31st December, 1813.

The amount of Treasury Notes issued during the year 1814 amounted to
near eight millions, and there had been paid off during the same year,
including interest, $2,700,000; making an addition of about five
millions and a half, and the total amount outstanding about ten millions
and a half. The receipts during that year, on account of the direct tax
and internal duties, amounted to $3,877,000, from war loans to
$15,080,000, and from customs to only six millions. Before the end of
the year, Government was unable to pay the notes which had become due.
It is perfectly clear that, if new notes could not be issued in lieu of
those which had become due, it was because they had fallen below par,
and therefore that the amount outstanding was greater than the demand
for them. There was but one remedy, and it was very simple. A reduction
in that amount must be made, by funding at their market price a quantity
sufficient to re-establish the equilibrium. But all the banks west of
New England had in the meanwhile suspended their specie payments. A
period of anarchy in the currency of the country was the consequence,
and lasted till those payments were resumed in the year 1817.

The result of the suspension of specie payments in England was, that the
notes of the Bank of England became in fact a legal tender and the
standard of the currency. All the other banks were obliged to keep their
own notes on a par with those of that bank; and all that was necessary
in order to prevent a depreciation, was to regulate the issues of the
Bank of England, so as to keep them at par with gold and silver.
Nevertheless, the clamor for more currency prevailed; the bank found it
very convenient and profitable to issue notes which it was not obliged
to pay, and these finally depreciated twenty-five per cent. But in the
United States the banks were under no other control than that of the
several States respectively. The consequence was, that we had fifty and
more species of local currencies, varying in value in the different
States or districts of country, and from time to time in the same
district. The banks might with facility have resumed specie payments
during the first year of peace. The efforts of the Secretary of the
Treasury to induce them to resume proved unsuccessful; and the
resumption did not take place till after a new Bank of the United States
had been organized.

We have had two general suspensions of specie payments, the last at a
time of profound peace. I was then behind the scenes, had some agency in
restoring specie payments, and may speak on that subject with knowledge
and confidence. The obstacles came partly from the Banks, principally
from the Debtor interest, which excites sympathy and preponderates
throughout the United States. The mis-named Bank of the United States,
and the banks under its influence, were, it is true, a formidable
impediment; and this obstacle is now fortunately removed. Still the
continuance of specie payments stands, whenever a crisis occurs, on a
most precarious basis; and if any important place, especially New York,
happened to break, all the banks through the United States would
instantaneously follow the example. This is the most imminent danger to
which the Treasury of the United States will be exposed in time of war;
and what effect the Sub-Treasury system may produce in that respect
remains to be tested by experience.

It is impossible to draw any inference respecting Treasury Notes, from
what took place in the United States during the confused state of the
currency in the years 1815 and 1816. The taxes were paid everywhere with
the cheapest local currency, in Treasury Notes only in the places where
specie payments had been continued, or where bank notes were nearly at
par. The depreciation of the Treasury Notes was arrested by the fact,
that they might at all times be converted into a six or seven per cent.
stock; but in that case they became assimilated to a direct loan. They
never can become a general currency, on account of their varying value,
so long as they bear an interest and are made payable at some future
day. In order to give them that character, they should assume that of
bank notes, bearing no interest and payable on demand. It does not
require the gift of prophecy to be able to assert that, as the wants of
Government increased, such notes would degenerate into paper money to
the utter ruin of the public credit.

They may, however, be made a special currency for the purpose of paying
taxes as gold and silver, and to the exclusion of any other species of
paper currency. The amount which might be thus kept in circulation, in
addition to that wanted for short investments, would be limited by the
gross amount of the annual revenue, and bear but a small proportion to
it; since one thousand dollars, in silver or in any paper currency, are
sufficient to effect in one year fifty payments of the same amount.

Although the amount kept in circulation may fluctuate according to
circumstances, the fundamental principle is, that the issue of such
notes is an anticipation of the revenue, which, after it has reached the
maximum that may be kept in circulation without being depreciated, never
can be increased. Be the amount ten or twenty millions, the anticipation
may be continued, but not renewed; it is not an annual resource, but
one, the whole amount of which never can exceed that which may be kept
in circulation. The operation consists in re-issuing annually the
amount which is paid off in the year. Whenever, owing to incidental
fluctuations, the amount to be redeemed by the Treasury exceeds that
which may be re-issued, the difference must be immediately funded at the
market price of the notes, so as to keep them always at par or a little
above par.

It is evident, that if the direct tax and internal duties laid in
August, 1813, had been imposed in July, 1812; and if the acts of
January, 1815, which increased both, had been enacted in August, 1813;
there would have been an addition of at least eight millions to the
revenue of the years 1812 and 1813; the Treasury Notes which had become
due would have been paid, public credit would have been maintained, and
the amount of war loans lessened.

The principal causes of the fall of public stocks during a war, and of
the consequent necessity of borrowing on dearer terms, are a want of
confidence in Government, and the large amount of stocks thrown in the
market beyond the natural demand for them. The effect of this last cause
is remarkably illustrated by the fluctuations in the price of the stocks
of Great Britain, where it does not appear that there ever was a want of
confidence in the ability and fidelity of Government in fulfilling its
engagements. The British three per cents. are now, and were before the
war of American Independence, and before those which had their origin in
the French revolution, near par or at par. They fell gradually during
the war of independence, and were as low as fifty-four in February,
1782. The long war with France was attended with the same result, and
the three per cents. had fallen to fifty-five in July, 1812.
Notwithstanding the deranged state of the finances of the United States
in 1814, the American stocks had not fallen in the same proportion. Such
great depreciation is the result of the long continuance of a war. No
one can say what would have been its progress, had the last war with
England continued much longer.

There was not, however, at that time, at least in America, any want of
confidence in the Government: no one doubted that it would ultimately
faithfully discharge all its engagements. Although the General
Government is in no way responsible for the errors of any of the
individual States, it is nevertheless certain, that the credit of the
Union has been injured abroad by the failure of several of the States to
fulfil their engagements, and that no expectation can be entertained of
being able to borrow money in Europe. It is not less true that the
Administration will cease to enjoy the confidence of American
capitalists, if the measures it has recommended should be adopted and
productive of war. No one can doubt that, if that event should take
place, the Americans will fight in defence of their country, and none
with greater zeal and bravery than the people of the Western States.
During the last war, their militia and volunteers flocked either to the
Lakes, to New Orleans, or wherever there was danger; nor did they refuse
to take part in offensive operations, and to serve without the limits of
the United States. But men cannot, either there or elsewhere, afford to
render gratuitous services. Whether regulars, volunteers, or militia,
they must be fed, clothed, transported, supplied with arms and
artillery, and paid. There is as yet but very little active circulating
capital in the new States: they cannot lend; they, on the contrary, want
to borrow money. This can be obtained in the shape of loans only from
the capitalists of the Atlantic States. A recurrence to public documents
will show that all the loans of the last war were obtained in that
quarter.

Men of property are perhaps generally more timid than others, and
certainly all the quiet people, amongst whom the public stocks are
ultimately distributed, are remarkably cautious. Prudent capitalists,
who do not speculate, and consider public stocks only as convenient and
safe investments, will not advance money to Government so long as it is
controlled by men whom they consider as reckless, and as entertaining
rather lax opinions respecting public credit. Yet money will be
obtained, but on much dearer terms than if public confidence was
unimpaired. There will always be found bold speculators, who will
advance it at a premium--enhanced by the want of competition, and
proportionate to the risks they may be supposed to incur. Independent of
this, it is most certain that the rate of interest at which loans may be
obtained, will always be increased in proportion to their magnitude. The
only ways by which these difficulties may be obviated, or at least
lessened, are perfect fidelity in fulfilling the engagements of
Government; an economical, that is to say, a skilful application of the
public moneys to the most important objects, postponing all those which
are not immediately wanted, or are of inferior real utility; and an
increase of the amount of revenue derived from taxation. This has the
double advantage of diminishing the amount to be borrowed, and of
inspiring confidence to the money-lenders. In all cases, direct loans
will be preferable to, and prove a cheaper mode of raising money than
the over issues of Treasury Notes.

The Act of July, 1812, which doubled the duties on importations,
afforded a resource which, on account of the high rate at this time of
those duties, cannot now be resorted to. Duties may, however, be levied
on the importation of Tea and Coffee, and perhaps some other articles
now duty free. Other modifications may be found useful, but it may be
difficult to ascertain, even without any regard to protection, what are
the rates of duties which should be imposed in time of war on the
various imported articles, in order to render the revenue derived from
that source as productive as possible.

It must also be observed that if, on account of the credit then allowed
for the payment of duties on importations, the Treasury had, when the
war of 1812 commenced, a resource in the revenue previously accrued but
not yet collected, which does not now exist; on the other hand the
United States were still encumbered with a considerable portion of the
Revolutionary debt, and the payments on account of its principal and
interest amounted during the years 1812, 1813, 1814, to about
$11,000,000, whilst the annual interest on the now existing debt is less
than one million.

The direct tax of the year 1815 amounted to $6,000,000, and the revenue
which accrued during the same year, on the aggregate of internal duties,
as increased or imposed at the same time, amounted to about the same
sum. That year is also the most proper for a comparative view of the
revenue derived from each object. In the subsequent years the revival of
business increased the amount derived from the duties connected with the
commerce of the country, much beyond that which could be collected in
time of war; whilst, on the other hand, the excise on spirits was much
less productive. The nett revenue derived from internal duties, which
accrued during that year was in round numbers, about


     Excise on spirits             $2,750,000
     Licences to retailers            880,000
     Sales at auction                 780,000
     Stamp duties                     420,000
     Tax on carriages                 150,000
     Refined sugar                     80,000
     Several manufactured articles    840,000
     Household furniture               20,000
     Watches worn by individuals       80,000
                                   ----------
     Total                         $6,000,000


The three last items were those added on Mr. Dallas's recommendation to
the first items laid in 1813, but the rate of which was increased, also
on his recommendation. The manufactured articles not before taxed on
which the new duties were laid were, pig and bar iron, nails; wax and
tallow candles; hats, caps and umbrellas; paper and playing cards;
leather, saddles, bridles, boots and shoes; beer, ale and porter; snuff,
cigars and manufactured tobacco. This was the boldest measure proposed
by the Secretary, for these duties were from their nature intrinsically
obnoxious. Yet no voice was raised against them; and so far from
becoming unpopular, Mr. Dallas, by his courage and frankness, acquired a
well-earned popularity. No stronger proof can be adduced of the
propriety of telling the whole truth and placing an entire confidence in
the people.

The only important measure omitted at that time, was an Act of Congress
ordering that all the Treasury notes actually due and not paid should be
immediately funded at their nominal value; that is to say, that for
every one hundred dollars in Treasury notes, the same amount of funded
stock should be issued as it was necessary to give for one hundred
dollars in gold or silver. It was impossible to obtain a regular loan in
time, and on reasonable terms, for the purpose of defraying the war
expenses of the first six months of the year 1815. There was an absolute
necessity for recurring to Treasury notes for that purpose, and the
attention of the Treasury was forcibly directed to that object. But the
first and fundamental element of public credit is the faithful and
punctual fulfilment of the public engagements; and the payment of the
Treasury notes, when becoming due, was as necessary as that of the
interest of the funded debt, which never was suspended during the war.
As an immediate and considerable issue of Treasury notes was absolutely
necessary, it was not sufficient that they might be convertible into a
funded stock, which was already much below par, since that would be in
fact an issue of depreciated paper. The Act should, therefore, have
pledged the public faith, that if the Treasury notes were not discharged
in specie when they became due, they should be funded at their nominal
value on the same terms as above stated. Mr. Dallas to great energy
united pre-eminent talents, he wanted only experience; and I have no
doubt that, had the war continued, he would within six months have
adopted that course. If I have alluded here to this subject, it is on
account of the primary importance, if placed hereafter in a similar
difficult position, of adhering rigorously to those principles
respecting the legitimate use of Treasury notes and the punctual
discharge of every public engagement, which are absolutely necessary for
the maintenance of public credit.

Since a direct tax of six millions could be raised thirty years ago,
there can be no difficulty in raising one of nine millions at the very
beginning of the war: this must be gradually increased, but would be
most heavily felt if beyond eighteen millions. Should an equal sum be
raised by internal duties, the annual loans wanted after the first year
of the war would be lessened in the same proportion. The following
estimate may assist in forming a correct opinion on that subject:--


     The stamp duties, those on sales at auction, the
       licences of retailers, and the carriage tax,
       which accrued in the year 1815, amounted
       together to $2,230,000, and may be now estimated
       at twice as much                                    $4,460,000

     The aggregate annual value of leather, boots,
       shoes, and other manufactures of leather; of
       hats, caps and bonnets; snuff and cigars;
       paper and playing cards, manufactured in the
       United States, are estimated by the last census
       at fifty-three millions, a tax on which of ten
       per cent would give                                  5,300,000

     On the same authority, three millions pounds of
       spermaceti and wax candles would yield, at
       five cents per pound,                                  150,000

     Three millions two hundred and fifty thousand
       pounds of refined sugar, at the same rate              160,000

     Five hundred tons of pig and bar iron, nails and
       brads, at two dollars per ton                        1,000,000

     The gross amount of spirits and beer manufactured
       in the United States, is stated in the
       census at sixty-five millions of gallons; but
       the happy influence of the Temperance cause
       has probably reduced this amount to less than
       fifty millions, a tax on which of ten cents per
       gallon                                               5,000,000
                                                           ----------
                                                          $16,070,000


I have inserted only such articles as were heretofore taxed, and have no
means of indicating such other as might be added or preferred; nor must
I be understood as recommending any specially, or in reference to the
rates of duties to be imposed on any one.

It has been very generally asserted that men of property were averse to
the war because the losses and burthens which it must occasion fall
exclusively upon them; and that poor men were generally in favor of war,
because they had nothing to lose.

It is true that the first great loss, caused by the war, will fall
immediately on those interested in the maritime commerce of the United
States, either as owners, insurers, or in any way employed in it.
Considering the imminent danger to which is exposed the immense amount
of American property afloat on every sea, and the certain annihilation,
during the war, of the fisheries, of the commerce with Great Britain,
and of that with all the countries beyond Cape Horn and the Cape of Good
Hope, the American merchants may be alarmed at the prospect of a war,
the necessity of which they do not perceive. But if the apprehension of
immediate danger is more vividly felt, the calamitous effects of the war
on the agricultural interests are not less certain. The price of all the
products, of which large quantities are exported, must necessarily fall
so low that all the farmers must lessen the amount and with it their
income, whilst they must pay dearer for all the articles which they are
obliged to purchase. The distinction between rich and poor is vague. The
most numerous class in the United States is that of the men who are at
the same time owners and cultivators of the soil, and who have but
small properties and a very moderate income. Every diminution of this,
whether from the want of a market or from any additional tax, is in that
and the corresponding class of mechanics, attended with the privation of
the necessaries or comforts of life. The really rich, the capitalists
who have independent incomes, and are not obliged to engage in any of
the active pursuits of life, may, in any calamitous season, accumulate
less, or at most, must retrench only some luxuries. Thus the unavoidable
losses and burthens which are the consequences of a war, fall with the
greatest weight on those who derive their means of existence from the
pursuits of industry, and whose industry alone contributes to the
increase of the general wealth of the country.

But this is not all. Exclusive of those who, either as contractors, or
in some other way, are concerned with the large supplies wanted for the
support of the army and navy, there is a class of capitalists who are
enriched by the war. These are the money lenders, who shall have been
bold enough to take up the public loans: unless indeed it should be
intended to break public faith, and, on the return of peace, to question
the obligation to pay them, upon the pretence of their enormous profits.
What these profits are may be again illustrated by the example of Great
Britain.

It has already been seen that, whenever a war is one of long
continuance, the British Government may at first borrow at par, and ends
by being compelled to sell its stock at the rate of fifty per cent of
its nominal value; which gives for the whole of the war loans an average
of about 75 per cent. In point of fact that Government received in the
year 1812 less than 55 per cent; for the money actually received
consisted of bank notes, which had then depreciated twenty per cent; so
that the money lenders gave only that which was equivalent to forty-four
per cent, in gold or silver, of the nominal value of the stock which
they received. Besides receiving the interest on the nominal amount of
the stock till the principal shall have been paid, they might shortly
after the peace, and may now, receive from ninety-seven per cent to par,
in gold or silver, for that same stock for which they gave but
forty-four. Thus, assuming the public debt of Great Britain at eight
hundred thousand pounds sterling; not only was the whole of that
capital destroyed by the wars; not only are the British people subject
now, and it would seem for ever, to a burthen of taxes sufficient to pay
the interest on that debt; but of the eight hundred millions thus
consumed, only six hundred were received by the public, and the other
two hundred millions made the rich capitalists, who had advanced the
money, still richer.

There is another class of men who may occasionally derive wealth from a
war. Privateering consists in robbing of their property unarmed and
unresisting men, engaged in pursuits not only legitimate but highly
useful. It is nothing more nor less than legalized Piracy. For this the
United States are not responsible; and it must be admitted, that the
practice of all nations justifies them in resorting to those means, in
order to make the enemy feel the calamities of war. But the necessity of
resorting to means immoral in themselves affords an irrefragable
argument against precipitating the country into war for slight causes,
indeed against any war which is not purely in self defence.

It is equally untrue to assert that the poorer class of people, by which
must be meant all the laborers, or generally those who live on their
wages, have nothing to lose by the war.

In this, and other large cities, for every thousand merchants, or men of
capital who may be injured or thrown out of business, there are ten
thousand men living on wages, whose employment depends directly or
indirectly on the commerce of those cities. The number of common
laborers is proportionately less in the purely agricultural districts.
But it is evident that in both, a considerable number must be thrown out
of employment either by the destruction of commerce, or in consequence
of the lessened value and quantity of the agricultural products. And it
seems impossible that this should take place without affecting the rate
of wages, than which a more afflicting evil could not fall on the
community. There is no man of pure and elevated feelings who does not
ardently wish, that means could be devised to ameliorate the state of
society in that respect, so as that those who live by manual labor
should receive a more just portion of the profits, which are now very
unequally divided between them and their employers.

But even if the rate of wages was not materially affected, yet when it
is said that the poor have nothing to lose by war, it must be because
their lives are counted for nothing. Whether militia, regulars, or
sailors, the privates, the men who actually fight the battles, are
exclusively taken from amongst the poorer classes of society. Officers
are uniformly selected from the class which has some property or
influence. They indeed risk gallantly their lives, but with the hopes of
promotion and of acquiring renown and consideration. According to the
present system, at least of the regular army, it is extremely rare,
almost impossible that a private soldier should ever rise to the rank of
an officer. In the course of a war thousands are killed, more die of
diseases, and the residue, when disbanded, return home with habits
unfavorable to the pursuits of industry. And yet it is asserted that
they are predisposed for war, because they have nothing to lose.

As yet, however, we have had recourse only to voluntary enlistments for
raising a regular force; the pay or bounties must be increased in order
to obtain a sufficient number; and thus far to become a private soldier
has been a voluntary act. The calling of militia into actual service is
a modified species of conscription, and it has also been deemed a
sufficient burthen to limit the time of that service to six months.
Another plan is now contemplated by those who are so eager to plunge the
country into a war. Fearing that the sufficient number of men may not be
voluntarily raised, they propose that the militia should be divided into
two portions; those belonging to the first class shall, if called into
actual service, be bound to serve twelve months instead of six; and the
other portion shall be liable to furnish a number of recruits for the
army, not exceeding one tenth part of their total number. This last
provision seems to be borrowed from the Russian military code. The
Emperor of Russia requires each village to supply him with a certain
number of men, in proportion to that of the male population. In time of
war he requires, at the rate of three men for each hundred males, which
answers nearly to that of ten for every one hundred men enrolled in the
militia; and he also grants to the serfs the same privilege intended to
be allowed to a portion of the militia by the new project, that of
selecting the recruits amongst themselves.

If it be any consolation, it is certain that, although we may not
invade England, the evils arising from the war will be as sensibly and
more permanently felt by Great Britain than by the United States. Her
efforts must be commensurate with those of the United States, much
greater by sea in order to be efficient, in every respect more expensive
on account of her distance from the seat of war. Such is the rapidly
progressive state of America, that the industry of the people will, in a
few years of peace, have repaired the evils caused by the errors of
Government. England will remain burthened with additional debt and
taxation.

An aged man, who has for the last thirty years been detached from party
politics, and who has now nothing whatever to hope or to fear from the
world, has no merit in seeking only the truth and acting an independent
part. But I know too well, and have felt too much the influence of party
feeling, not to be fully aware that those men will be entitled to the
highest praise, who, being really desirous of preserving peace, shall on
this momentous occasion dare to act for themselves, notwithstanding the
powerful sympathies of party. Yet no sacrifice of principles is
required: men may remain firmly attached to those on which their party
was founded and which they conscientiously adopted. There is no
connexion between the principles or doctrines on which each party
respectively was founded, and the question of war or peace with a
foreign nation which is now agitated. The practice which has lately
prevailed to convert every subject, from the most frivolous to the most
important, into a pure party question, destroys altogether personal
independence, and strikes at the very roots of our institutions. These
usages of party, as they are called, make every man a slave, and
transfer the legitimate authority of the majority of the nation to the
majority of a party, and, consequently, to a minority of the sovereign
people. If it were permitted to appeal to former times, I would say
that, during the six years that I had the honor of a seat in Congress,
there were but two of those party meetings, called for the purpose of
deliberating upon the measures proper to be adopted. The first was after
the House had asserted its abstract right to decide on the propriety of
making appropriations necessary to carry a treaty into effect, whether
such appropriations should be made with respect to the treaty with
England of 1794. The other was in the year 1798, respecting the course
proper to be pursued after the hostile and scandalous conduct of the
French Directory. On both occasions we were divided; and on both the
members of the minority of each meeting were left at full liberty to
vote as they pleased, without being on that account proscribed or
considered as having abandoned the principles of the party. This, too,
took place at a time when, unfortunately, each party most erroneously
suspected the other of an improper attachment to one or the other of the
great belligerent foreign nations. I must say that I never knew a man
belonging to the same party as myself, and I have no reason to believe
that there was any in the opposite party, who would have sacrificed the
interests of the country to those of any foreign power. I am confident
that no such person is to be found now in our councils or amongst our
citizens; nor am I apt to suspect personal views, or apprehensive of the
effect these might produce. My only fear is that which I have expressed,
the difficulty for honorable men to disenthral themselves from those
party sympathies and habits, laudable and useful in their origin, but
which carried to excess become a tyranny, and may leave the most
important measures to be decided in the National Councils by an
enthusiastic and inflamed minority.

FOOTNOTE:

[3] Estimated for 1812.





End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Oregon Question, by Albert Gallatin

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