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RULERS OF INDIA

Edited by
Sir William Wilson Hunter, K.C.S.I, C.I.E.
M.A. (Oxford): Ll.D. (Cambridge)

LORD CLIVE

London
Henry Frowde
Oxford University Press Warehouse
Amen Corner, E.C.

New York
Macmillan & Co., 66 Fifth Avenue


[Illustration: The Indian Empire]



RULERS OF INDIA
LORD CLIVE

by

COLONEL G. B. MALLESON, C.S.I.







Oxford
At The Clarendon Press: 1893

Oxford
Printed at the Clarendon Press
By Horace Hart, Printer to the University


{5}


PREFACE


The following list represents the works of the last century which I
have consulted to write this _Life of Lord Clive_:

Orme's _History of Indostan_ (original edition); _The Siyaru-l
Muta-akherin_ of Ghulam Husain Khan (Review of Modern Times),
translated copy; Cambridge's _War in India_ (containing the Journal
of Stringer Lawrence); _The Memoir of Dupleix_ (in French); Grose's
_Voyage to the East Indies_; Ive's _Voyage and Historical Narrative_;
_Transactions in India from the commencement of the French War in
1756_ (published in 1786); Caraccioli's _Life of Lord Clive_;
Vansittart's _Narrative of the Transactions in Bengal_; Ironside's
_Narrative of the Military Transactions in Bengal in 1760-1_;
Verelst's _English Government in Bengal_; some numbers of the
_Asiatic Annual Register_; Kindersley's _Letters_; and Scrafton's
_Letters_; and, for the earlier period--that displaying the period
immediately preceding and following the dawn of genius--the recently
written extracts from the Madras records by Mr. G. W. Forrest.

Of works of scarcely less value published during the present century,
I have consulted the admirable volumes by Colonel Mark Wilks, which
bring the _History of Southern India_ down to the storming of
Seringapatam in 1799; _The Journal of Captain Dalton_, {6}one of the
heroes of Trichinopoli, written at the period of Clive's early
victories, but only given to the world, with a memoir of his career,
in 1886; Lord Stanhope's _History of England_; Malcolm's _Life of
Clive_; and above all, that mine of wealth to a searcher into the
details of Clive's services in Bengal, Colonel Broome's _History of
the Bengal Army_. Colonel Broome was my intimate and valued friend.
He knew more about the history of the rise of the English in India
than any man I ever met. He had made the subject a life-study. He had
read every tract, however old, every letter, however difficult to
decipher, every record of the period up to and beyond the time of Job
Charnock, and he was a past-master of his subject. He had collected
an enormous mass of materials, the more bulky of which were dispersed
at his untimely death. But I have seen and handled them, and I can
state most positively, from my own knowledge, that every item of
importance culled from them is contained in the admirable volume to
which I have referred, and which was published in 1850. There is,
alas, only that volume. Colonel Broome had set apart a vast mass of
materials for his second, and had resolved to complete the work at
Simla, to which place he was proceeding for the summer of, I think,
1870. But, in the course of transit, the box containing the materials
was mysteriously spirited away, and I have not heard that it was ever
found. From the nature of the documents collected I cannot but regard
the loss as irreparable.

G. B. MALLESON.


{7}


CONTENTS


CHAP.                                                          PAGES
   I. EARLY YEARS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    9-15

  II. SOUTHERN INDIA IN 1744 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   16-22

 III. HOW THE WAR IN THE KARNATIK AFFECTED THE FRENCH AND
      ENGLISH SETTLEMENTS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   23-31

  IV. HOW THE FORTUNES OF ROBERT CLIVE WERE AFFECTED BY THE
      HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH IN SOUTHERN
      INDIA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   32-41

   V. CLIVE DECIDES FOR THE CAREER OF A SOLDIER  . . . . . .   42-50

  VI. THE FIRST YEAR OF SOLDIERING AT TRICHINOPOLI AND ARCOT   51-59

 VII. 'THE SWELL AND DASH OF A MIGHTY WAVE'  . . . . . . . .   60-74

VIII. CLIVE IN ENGLAND; AND IN BENGAL  . . . . . . . . . . .   75-89

  IX. THE BATTLE OF PLASSEY  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   90-106

   X. HOW CLIVE DEALT WITH THE SPOILS OF PLASSEY: HIS
      DEALINGS WITH MIR JAFAR; WITH THE PRINCES OF SOUTHERN
      INDIA; WITH THE DUTCH  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  107-137

  XI. THE SECOND VISIT OF CLIVE TO ENGLAND . . . . . . . . .  138-148

 XII. THE REIGN OF MISRULE IN BENGAL . . . . . . . . . . . .  149-158

XIII. THE PURIFYING OF BENGAL  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  159-170

 XIV. THE POLITICAL AND FOREIGN POLICY OF LORD CLIVE: HIS
      ARMY-ADMINISTRATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES . . . . . . .  171-191

  XV. THE RETURN OF THE CONQUEROR-STATESMAN, AND THE
      RECEPTION ACCORDED TO HIM BY HIS COUNTRYMEN: HIS
      STRUGGLES; AND HIS DEATH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  192-212

      INDEX  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  213-229




_NOTE_

The orthography of proper names follows the system adopted by the
Indian Government for the _Imperial Gazetteer of India_. That system,
while adhering to the popular spelling of very well-known places,
such as Punjab, Poona, Deccan, &c., employs in all other cases the
vowels with the following uniform sounds:--

_a_, as in wom_a_n: _a_, as in f_a_ther: _i_, as in k_i_n: _i_, as in
intr_i_gue: _o_, as in c_o_ld: _u_, as in b_u_ll: _u_, as in r_u_ral.


{9}


LORD CLIVE




CHAPTER I
EARLY YEARS


Towards the close of the year 1744 there landed at Madras, as writer
in the service of the East India Company, a young Englishman just
entering the twentieth year of his existence, named Robert Clive.

The earlier years of the life of this young man had not been
promising. Born at Styche, near Market Drayton, in Shropshire, he had
been sent, when three years old, to be cared for and educated at
Manchester, by a gentleman who had married his mother's sister, Mr.
Bayley of Hope Hall. The reason for this arrangement, at an age so
tender, is not known. One seeks for it in vain in the conduct and
character of his parents; for although his father is described as
irascible and violent, his mother was remarkable for her good sense
and sweet temper. To her, Clive was wont to say, he owed more than to
all his schools. But he could have seen but little of her in those
early days, for his home was always with the Bayleys, even after the
death of Mr. Bayley, and he was ever treated {10}there with kindness
and consideration. After one or two severe illnesses, which, it is
said, affected his constitution in after life, the young Robert,
still of tender years, was sent to Dr. Eaton's private school at
Lostocke in Cheshire: thence, at eleven, he was removed to Mr.
Burslem's at Market Drayton. With this gentleman he remained a few
years, and was then sent to have a brief experience of a public
school at Merchant Taylors'. Finally, he went to study at a private
school kept by Mr. Sterling in Hertfordshire. There he remained
until, in 1743, he was nominated to be a writer in the service of the
East India Company.

The chief characteristics of Robert Clive at his several schools had
been boldness and insubordination. He would not learn; he belonged to
a 'fighting caste'; he was the leader in all the broils and escapades
of schoolboy life; the terror of the masters; the spoiled darling of
his schoolmates. He learned, at all events, how to lead: for he was
daring even to recklessness; never lost his head; was calmest when
the danger was greatest; and displayed in a hundred ways his
predilection for a career of action.

It is not surprising, then, that he showed the strongest aversion to
devote himself to the study which would have qualified him to follow
his father's profession. A seat at an attorney's desk, and the
drudgery of an attorney's life, were to him as distasteful as they
proved to be, at a later period, to the eldest son of Isaac Disraeli.
He would have a career which promised action. If such were not open
to him {11}in his native land, he would seek for it in other parts of
the world. When, then, his father, who had some interest, and who had
but small belief in his eldest son, procured for him the appointment
of writer in the service of the East India Company, Robert Clive
accepted it with avidity.

Probably if he had had the smallest idea of the nature of the duties
which were associated with that office, he would have refused it with
scorn. He panted, I have said, for a life of action: he accepted a
career which was drudgery under a tropical sun, in its most
uninteresting form. The Company in whose service he entered was
simply a trading corporation. Its territory in India consisted of but
a few square miles round the factories its agents had established,
and for which they paid an annual rental to the native governments.
They had but a small force, composed principally of the children of
the soil, insufficiently armed, whose chief duties were escort duties
and the manning of the ill-constructed forts which protected the
Company's warehouses. The idea of aggressive warfare had never
entered the heads even of the boldest of the English agents. They
recognized the native ruler of the province in which lay their
factories as their overlord, and they were content to hold their
lands from him on the condition of protection on his part, and of
good behaviour and punctual payment of rent on their own. For the
combative energies of a young man such as Robert Clive there was
absolutely no field on Indian soil. The duties devolving on a writer
were {12}the duties of a clerk; to keep accounts; to take stock; to
make advances; to ship cargoes; to see that no infringement of the
Company's monopoly should occur. He was poorly paid; his life was a
life of dull routine; and, although after many years of toil the
senior clerks were sometimes permitted to trade on their own account
and thus to make large fortunes, the opportunity rarely came until
after many years of continuous suffering, and then generally when the
climate had exhausted the man's energies.

To a young man of the nature of Robert Clive such a life could not be
congenial. And, in fact, he hated it from the outset. He had left
England early in 1743; his voyage had been long and tiring: the ship
on which he sailed had put in at Rio, and was detained there nine
months; it remained anchored for a shorter period in St. Simon's Bay;
and finally reached Madras only at the close of 1744. The delays thus
occurring completely exhausted the funds of the young writer: he was
forced to borrow at heavy interest from the captain: the friend at
Madras, to whom he had letters of introduction, had quitted that
place. The solitary compensating advantage was this, that his stay at
Rio had enabled him to pick up a smattering of Portuguese.

We see him, at length arrived, entering upon those hard and
uninteresting duties to undertake which he had refused a life of far
less drudgery in England in a congenial climate and under a sun more
to be desired than dreaded. Cast loose in the profession he had
{13}selected, separated from relatives and friends, he had no choice
but to enter upon the work allotted to him. This he did sullenly and
with no enthusiasm. How painful was even this perfunctory
performance; how keenly he felt the degradation--for such he deemed
it--may be judged from the fact recorded by his contemporaries and
accepted by the world, that for a long time he held aloof from his
companions and his superiors. These in their turn ceased after a time
to notice a young man so resolute to shun them. And although with
time came an approach to intercourse, there never was cordiality. It
is doubtful, however, whether in this description there has not
mingled more than a grain of exaggeration. We have been told of his
wayward nature: we have read how he insulted a superior functionary,
and when ordered by the Governor to apologize, complied with the
worst possible grace: how, when the pacified superior, wishing to
heal the breach, asked him to dinner, he refused with the words that
although the Governor had ordered him to apologize, he did not
command him to dine with him: how, one day, weary of his monotonous
existence, and suffering from impecuniosity, he twice snapped a
loaded pistol at his head; how, on both occasions, there was a
misfire; how, shortly afterwards, a companion, entering the room, at
Clive's request pointed the pistol outside the window and pulled the
trigger; how the powder ignited, and how then Clive, jumping to his
feet, exclaimed, 'I feel I am reserved for better things.'

{14}These stories have been told with an iteration which would seem
to stamp them as beyond contradiction. But the publication of Mr.
Forrest's records of the Madras Presidency (1890) presents a view
altogether different. The reader must understand that the Board at
Fort St. David--at that time the ruling Board in the Madras
Presidency--is reporting, for transmission to Europe, an account of a
complaint of assault made by the Rev. Mr. Fordyce against Clive.

It would appear from this that Mr. Fordyce was a coward and a bully,
besides being in many other respects an utterly unfit member of
society. It had come to Clive's ears that this man had said of him,
in the presence of others, that he, Clive, was a coward and a
scoundrel; that the reverend gentleman had shaken his cane over him
in the presence of Mr. Levy Moses; and had told Captain Cope that he
would break every bone in his (Clive's) skin. In his deposition Clive
stated that these repeated abuses so irritated him, 'that he could
not forbear, on meeting Mr. Fordyce at Cuddalore, to reproach him
with his behaviour, which, he told him, was so injurious he could
bear it no longer, and thereupon struck him two or three times with
his cane, which, at last Mr. Fordyce returned and then closed in with
him, but that they were presently parted by Captain Lucas.'

The Board, in giving its judgement on the case, recapitulated the
many offences committed by Mr. Fordyce, the great provocation he had
given to Clive, and suspended him. With regard to Clive they
{15}recorded: 'lest the same,' the attack on Fordyce, 'should be to
Mr. Clive's prejudice, we think it not improper to assure you that he
is generally esteemed a very quiet person and no ways guilty of
disturbances.' It is to be inferred from this account that, far from
deserving the character popularly assigned to him, Clive, in the
third year of his residence in India, was regarded by his superiors
as a very quiet member of society.

Still, neither the climate nor the profession suited him. 'I have not
enjoyed,' he wrote to one of his cousins, 'a happy day since I left
my native country.' In other letters he showed how he repented
bitterly of having chosen a career so uncongenial. Gradually,
however, he realized the folly of kicking against the pricks. He
associated more freely with his colleagues, and when the Governor,
Mr. Morse, sympathizing with the young man eating out his heart from
ennui, opened to him the door of his considerable library, he found
some relief to his sufferings. These, at last, had reached their
term. Before Clive had exhausted all the books thus placed at his
disposal, events occurred which speedily opened to him the career for
which he had panted.


{16}


CHAPTER II
SOUTHERN INDIA IN 1744


It will contribute to the better understanding of the narrative of
the events which plunged the English into war in 1745, if we take a
bird's-eye view of the peninsula generally, particularly of the
southern portion, as it appeared in the year preceding.

Of India generally it is sufficient to say that from the year 1707,
when the Emperor Aurangzeb died, authority had been relaxing to an
extent which was rapidly bringing about the disruption of the bonds
that held society together. The invasion of Nadir Shah followed by
the sack of Delhi in 1739 had given the Mughal dynasty a blow from
which it never rallied. Thenceforward until 1761, when the third
battle of Panipat completed the catastrophe, the anarchy was almost
universal. Authority was to the strongest. The Sallustian motto,
'Alieni appetens sui profusus,' was the rule of almost every noble;
the agriculturists had everywhere abundant reason to realize 'that
the buffalo was to the man who held the bludgeon.'[1]

[Footnote 1: The late Lord Lawrence used to tell me that when he was
Acting Magistrate and Collector of Panipat in 1836, the natives were
in the habit of describing the lawlessness of the period which ceased
in 1818 by using the expressive phrase I have quoted.]

{17}The disorder had extended to the part of India south of the
Vindhyan range which was then known under the comprehensive term of
the Deccan. When Aurangzeb had conquered many Subahs, or provinces,
of Southern India, he had placed them under one officer, to be
nominated by the Court of Delhi, and to be called Subahdar, or chief
of the province. As disorder spread after his death the Subahdars and
inferior chiefs generally began to secure themselves in the provinces
they administered. The invasion of Nadir Shah made the task generally
easy. In the Deccan especially, Chin Kilich Khan, the chief of a
family which had served with consideration under Akbar and his
successors, whose father had been a favourite of Aurangzeb, who had
himself served under that sovereign, and who had obtained from the
successors of Aurangzeb the titles of Nizam-ul-Mulk and Asaf Jah,
took steps to make the Subahdarship of Southern India hereditary in
his family. The territories comprehended under the term 'Deccan' did
not, it must be understood, include the whole of Southern India.
Mysore, Travancore, Cochin were independent. But they comprehended
the whole of the territories known now as appertaining to the Nizam,
with some additions; the country known as the 'Northern Circars'; and
the Karnatik.

But the Karnatik was not immediately under the government of the
Subahdar. It was a subordinate territory, entrusted to a Nawab,
bounded to the north by the river Gundlakamma; on the west by the
chain {18}of mountains which separate it from Mysore; to the south by
the possessions of the same kingdom (as it then was) and by Tanjore;
to the east by the sea. I have not mentioned the kingdom of
Trichinopoli to the south, for the Nawabs of the Karnatik claimed
that as their own, and, as we shall see, had occupied the fortress of
that name during the period, prior to 1744, of which I am writing.

It will be seen then, that, at this period, whilst the nominal ruler
of the Deccan was Chin Kilich Khan, better known as Nizam-ul-Mulk, as
I shall hereafter style him, the Nawab of the Karnatik, who ruled the
lands bordering on the sea, including the English settlement of
Madras and the French settlement of Pondicherry, was a very powerful
subordinate. The office he held had likewise come to be regarded as
hereditary. And it was through the failure of the hereditary line,
that the troubles came, which gave to Robert Clive the opportunity to
develop the qualities which lay dormant within him.

Before I proceed to describe those events, it seems advisable to say
a few words regarding the two settlements to which I have just
referred; of the principles which actuated their chiefs; and of the
causes which brought them into collision.

The English had made a first settlement on the Coromandel coast in
the year 1625 at a small place, some thirty-six miles to the south of
Madras, known now as Armagon. Seven years later they obtained from
the Raja of Bisnagar a small grant of land, called {19}by the natives
Chennapatanam from the village contained thereon. They re-named the
place Madras, and built there a fort round their storehouses which
they named Fort St. George. In 1653 the Company in London raised the
agency at Madras to the position and rank of a Presidency. Towards
the end of the seventeenth century the establishment there counted a
population of 300,000 souls. In 1744 the town consisted of three
divisions: that to the south (the White Town) extending about four
hundred yards in length from north to south, and about one hundred
yards in breadth. There resided the Europeans, mainly English. They
had there about fifty houses, two churches, one of them Catholic;
likewise the residence of the chief of the factory. All these were
within the enclosure called Fort St. George. That somewhat pompous
title represented merely a slender wall, defended by four bastions
and as many batteries, very slight and defective in their
construction, and with no outworks to defend them. This division was
generally known as the 'White Town.' To the north of it, and
contiguous, was another division, much larger and worse fortified,
principally tenanted by Armenian and Indian merchants, called the
Black Town. Beyond this, again to the north, was a suburb, where the
poorer natives resided. These three divisions formed Madras. There
were likewise to the south, about a mile distant from the White Town,
two other large villages, inhabited solely by natives; but these were
not included within that term. The English at this period did not
exceed {20}three hundred in number, and of these two-thirds were
soldiers, but few of whom had seen a shot fired.[2]

[Footnote 2: Vide Orme's _History of Indostan_ (Edition 1773), vol.
i. p. 65.]

The English colony in Madras was a trading colony. Not one of its
members, up to this period, had the smallest thought of embroiling
their presidency in the disputes which were frequent amongst the
native chieftains. They wished to be let alone; to remain at peace;
to conciliate friendship and goodwill. They were content to
acknowledge the lords of the soil as their masters; to pay for the
protection they enjoyed at their hands by a willing obedience; to
ward off their anger by apologies and presents.

But there was a French colony also on the same coast, and in that a
different policy had begun to prevail. In the year 1672 the King of
Bijapur had sold to some French traders, led by a very remarkable
man, Francis Martin, a tract of land on the Coromandel coast,
eighty-six miles to the south-south-west of Madras. On this tract,
close to the sea, was a little village called by the natives
Puducheri. This the French settlers enlarged and beautified, and made
their chief place of residence and trade. By degrees the name was
corrupted to Pondicherry, a title under which it became famous, and
under which it is still known.

So long as M. Martin lived, the policy of the French settlers was
similar to that of the English at Madras. Nor did it immediately
change when Martin died (December 30, 1706). Up to 1735, when M.
Benoit {21}Dumas was appointed Governor-General of the French
possessions in India (for they had besides possessions on the Malabar
coast and at Chandranagar, on the Hugli, in Bengal) it was in no way
departed from. M. Dumas, however, almost immediately after his
assumption of office, adopted the policy of allying himself closely
with native princes; of taking part in their wars; with the view of
reaping therefrom territorial and pecuniary advantage. This policy,
of which he was the inventor, was, we shall see, carried to the most
extreme length by his successor, M. Dupleix.

It will clear the ground for the reader if we add that the prosperity
of the rival settlements was greatly affected by the action of their
respective principals in Europe. On this point all the advantages lay
with the English. For, whilst the Company of the Indies at Paris,
and, it must be added, the French Government likewise, starved their
dependency in India, and supplied them with inefficient and often
ill-timed assistance, the East India Company, and the Government of
the King of England, made a far better provision for the necessities
of Madras.

It must, however, in candour be admitted that at the outset the
French were better supplied with men and money than the English.
Until the importance of the quarrel was recognized in Europe it
became then a contest between the natural qualities of the men on the
spot--a test of the capabilities of the races they represented.

{22}I turn now, after this brief explanation of the position in
Southern India in 1744, to describe the causes which led to the
catastrophe which supervened very shortly after the arrival in India
of the hero of this history.


{23}


CHAPTER III
HOW THE WAR IN THE KARNATIK AFFECTED THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH
SETTLEMENTS


The trouble came from the Karnatik. The family of the chief who had
held the position of Nawab at the time of the death of Aurangzeb had
adopted the new fashion, then becoming universal, of making the post
hereditary in his family. Saadat-ulla Khan, the Nawab in question,
had himself been regularly appointed in 1710 by the court of Delhi.
After a peaceful rule of twenty-two years he had died (1732) without
issue, after having appointed his nephew, Dost Ali, to succeed him as
Nawab, the younger brother of Dost Ali, Bakar Ali, to be governor of
the fort and district of Vellore; and Ghulam Husen, the nephew of his
favourite wife, better known as Chanda Sahib, to be Diwan, or prime
minister, to his successor.

These dispositions were carried out. But they were by no means
pleasing to the Subahdar of the Deccan, the Nizam-ul-Mulk to whom the
reader has been introduced. That eminent nobleman was not content
that his subordinates should act as he was prepared to act himself.
His sanction had not been {24}obtained to the transaction. He used
then his influence at Delhi to prevent the confirmation which, even
in those disturbed times, every chieftain sought to obtain for every
act of spoliation. For the moment he proceeded no further. He was
content to leave Dost Ali in the position of a nobleman ruling
without the authority of his liege lord, himself, or of the master of
both, the court of Delhi.

Nizam-ul-Mulk had justly thought that time would avenge him. Four
years after his accession, the death of the ruler of Trichinopoli
induced Dost Ali to send an army under his son Safdar Ali and his
Diwan Chanda Sahib, to capture that fortress. Under the pretence of
collecting revenue these two princes visited Madras and Pondicherry
in their progress southwards, and at the latter place Chanda Sahib
entered into those intimate relations with the French which were to
influence greatly the events which were to follow. They proceeded
thence to Trichinopoli and took possession of the fortress, the
widowed queen having, it is said, fallen in love with Chanda Sahib.
The latter remained there as governor, whilst Safdar Ali returned to
his father at Arcot.

The new Diwan appointed in the place of Chanda Sahib, Mir Asad, began
at once to insinuate charges of ambition against his predecessor, and
expressed his opinion that Chanda Sahib, once ruler of Trichinopoli,
would not easily let go his hold. In this opinion he was supported by
the Nawab's eldest son, Safdar Jang. Doubtless they were right, but
their {25}utterances, freely expressed, served only to put Chanda
Sahib on his guard; and he commenced to store the fortress with
provisions.

The acquisition of Trichinopoli by the Nawab of the Karnatik had
served only to inflame the mind of his liege lord, Nizam-ul-Mulk,
against him. For a time, however, the disorders in Northern India,
the threatened invasion of Nadir Shah, and, finally, that invasion,
held his hand. At last, however, his wrath over-mastered his
judgement, and, in 1739, at the very time when the invasion of Nadir
Shah was in full swing, he gave permission to the Marathas to attack
Trichinopoli. In May of the following year, 1740, consequently, a
Maratha army of 10,000 men, led by Raghuji Bhonsla, entered the
Karnatik, met the hurriedly raised force of Dost Ali at the
Damalcherri Pass, defeated it with great slaughter, and took prisoner
the Diwan, Mir Asad. Dost Ali was among the slain. The victors, then,
listening to the persuasions of their prisoner, the Diwan, agreed to
quit the province on receiving a payment, at stated intervals, of a
total sum of ten million of rupees. Safdar Ali was then proclaimed
Nawab at Arcot, and Chanda Sahib proceeded thither to do him homage.

During the preceding two years the French governor of Pondicherry, M.
Dumas, had so strengthened the fortifications of that town, that it
had come to be regarded by the natives as impregnable. During the
Maratha invasion, then, Chanda Sahib {26}had sent thither his family,
and his example had been followed by Safdar Ali. After the
installation of the latter at Arcot, the two princes proceeded to
visit the French governor, who gave them a magnificent reception. On
leaving, Safdar Ali took with him his family, whilst Chanda Sahib,
still suspecting danger, directed his own wives to remain at
Pondicherry until events should more clearly develop themselves.

He had not to wait long. Safdar Ali, jealous of his prosperity, had
induced the Marathas, never unwilling, to make a fresh incursion into
the Karnatik, and to dispose of Chanda Sahib. In December of the same
year then, just four years before Clive landed in India, those
warriors entered the province, so deceived Chanda Sahib as to induce
him to sell them the ample stores of grain he had collected, and, as
soon as they had received them, laid siege to Trichinopoli. Chanda
Sahib sustained a siege of nearly three months with great resolution,
but then, his remaining stores of grain having been exhausted, was
forced to surrender (March 26, 1741). The Marathas, having plundered
the town, departed for Satara, taking with them Chanda Sahib in close
custody, and leaving one of their most famous leaders, of whom we
shall hear further, Morari Rao, with 14,000 of their best troops, to
guard the place, and to act as discretion or greed might suggest.

The events I have recorded had encouraged among the nobles of the
province a spirit of disorder in {27}sympathy with the times. No man
felt quite safe. Safdar Ali himself, but half reassured, sent for
safety his family to the custody of the English at Madras, whilst,
quitting the comparatively defenceless Arcot, he took up his abode in
the strong fortress of Vellore. There his treasures had been stored,
and there Murtiza Ali, who had married his sister, was governor. This
man was treacherous, cowardly, and very ambitious. No sooner had he
understood that his relationship by marriage did not shield him from
the payment of money due to the Nawab, than he proceeded to debauch
the army, and to enlist on his side the neighbouring nobles. He then
poisoned his brother-in-law. The poison not taking immediate effect,
he persuaded a Patan to stab the Nawab to the heart. He then declared
himself Nawab.

He was proclaimed alike at Vellore and Arcot. But his usurpation did
not last long. Even in those days there was a public conscience, and
the murder he had committed had been too brutal not to arouse
indignation. The army rose against him. Fearing for his life, he
disguised himself in woman's clothes, and escaped to Vellore.

On the flight of Murtiza Ali becoming known the army proclaimed
Saiyud Muhammad Khan, the son of Safdar Ali, then residing at Madras
under the protection of the English, to be Nawab. The young prince
and his mother were at once removed to the fort of Wandiwash, the
ruler of which had married his father's sister.

{28}It was this moment that Nizam-ul-Mulk chose as the time to
intervene. Entering Arcot at the head of a large army (March, 1743)
he completely pacified the province; then, marching on Trichinopoli,
compelled the Marathas to yield it and to evacuate the Karnatik.
Possessing himself of the person of the newly proclaimed Nawab, whom
he declined to recognize, he proclaimed his own commander-in-chief,
Khoja Abdullah, to be Nawab of the Karnatik, and then returned to
Golconda.

Unfortunately for the peace of the province Khoja Abdullah, a strong
man, never took up the government of the Karnatik. He had returned
with his master to Golconda, and had made there his preparations to
set out. On the very morning which he had chosen for that purpose he
was found dead in his bed. It was clear that he had been poisoned.
Suspicion fell at once upon the nobleman who had originally been an
urgent candidate for the office, and who now obtained it. He was an
experienced soldier of good family, whose name was Anwar-ud-din.

Nizam-ul-Mulk knew that the appointment would not be popular in the
province so long as there should remain alive any member of the
family of Saadat-ulla. He had therefore announced that the
appointment of Anwar-ud-din was provisional, and that the young
prince, Saiyud Muhammad, already proclaimed Nawab, should succeed to
that post on his arriving at the age of manhood, remaining during the
interval under the guardianship of Anwar-ud-din, {29}to be by him
instructed in the art of governing. Anwar-ud-din promised to carry
out the will of his liege lord, and on his arrival in the Karnatik,
assigned to the young prince the fort of Arcot, with a sufficient
retinue of Patan soldiers. There the boy remained, treated with the
deference due to his position.

But he was doomed. A few weeks after his arrival at Arcot it devolved
upon him to preside at the wedding of one of his near relations.
Amongst those who came to the ceremony was the murderer of his
father, Murtiza Ali, laden with presents for the bridegroom. Strange
as it may seem, the murderer was courteously received. But shortly
after his entrance within the fort an unseemly disturbance was
created by the disorderly entrance into the presence of thirteen
Patan soldiers, who insolently demanded payment of the arrears they
alleged to be due to them. With some difficulty they were forcibly
ejected. But in the evening, as Anwar-ud-din approached, attended by
his courtiers and preceded by his guards, these thirteen Patans
managed to mingle with the latter, and one of them, rushing towards
the dais on which was the chair occupied by the young prince,
ascended the steps leading to it, and, in a supplicatory attitude,
made as though he would throw himself at his feet and demand pardon
for the offence of the morning. But instead of this he plunged his
dagger, which he had concealed on his person, into the prince's
heart. He was almost instantly cut down by the attendants. The
confusion was extreme. Suddenly it was {30}discovered that Murtiza
Ali had quitted the fort, had mounted his horse, and, accompanied by
his armed followers, had galloped towards Vellore. Suspicion
naturally fell upon this proved murderer, and the nobles generally
endeavoured to exculpate themselves at his expense.

But suspicion fell likewise upon Anwar-ud-din. Who, so much as he,
would benefit by the death of Saiyud Muhammad? He was practically
only guardian to the young prince, bound to resign his office as soon
as the latter should attain his majority. Nor were these suspicions
lessened when it was found that Nizam-ul-Mulk at once transmitted to
Anwar-ud-din a complete commission as Nawab of Arcot. Vainly did the
Nawab deny all complicity in the bloody deed. Murtiza Ali was silent.
'It was supposed,' wrote Mr. Orme, 'that the only proofs he could
have brought against Anwar-ud-din would at the same time have
condemned himself.' And this probably was true.

Such then was the political position in Southern India when Clive
landed at Madras in 1744. The titular Emperor of Delhi was Muhammad
Shah, still reeling under the consequences of the invasion of Nadir
Shah and the sack of Delhi but five short years previously. The
Subahdar of the Deccan was still Nizam-ul-Mulk, possessing sufficient
influence to have secured the succession in Southern India for his
second son, Nasir Jang.[1] The Nawab of the Karnatik, {31}styled
officially, of Arcot, was a stranger to the province, the unpopular
and suspected Anwar-ud-din. His authority there was not very secure.
There were many pretenders waiting for the first mishap: amongst them
his confederate in the murder of Saiyud Muhammad; Chanda Sahib, still
in confinement at Satara; and many others. The elements of danger
abounded everywhere. There were few petty chiefs who did not dub
themselves 'Nawabs,' and aspire to positions higher than those held
by them at the moment. The match alone was wanting to produce a
general flame.

[Footnote 1: Elliot's _History of India as told by its own
Historians_, vol. viii. p. 113.]

Under ordinary circumstances this state of affairs would not
necessarily have affected the European settlers on the coast. But for
them, too, the crisis was approaching. In 1740 the death of the
Emperor, Charles VI, had thrown the greater part of Europe into a
blaze. Three years later England had entered the field as an upholder
of the Pragmatic Sanction. The news of this intervention, which
necessitated war with France, reached India towards the close of
1744, and immediately affected the relations towards one another of
the rival settlements on the Coromandel coast.


{32}


CHAPTER IV
HOW THE FORTUNES OF ROBERT CLIVE WERE AFFECTED BY THE HOSTILITIES
BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH IN SOUTHERN INDIA


The events narrated in the second and third chapters must be studied
by the reader who wishes to understand the India of 1744-65--the
India which was to be the field for the exercise of the energies of
the hero of this biography. It was an India, he will see, differing
in all respects from the India of the present day: an India which may
not improperly be termed an Alsatia, in which, as we have seen,
murder was rampant, and every man fought for his own hand. What it
then was it would be again were the English to leave the people to
their own devices.

In the autumn of 1744 the Governor of Pondicherry, M. Dupleix, who
had succeeded Dumas in October, 1741, received a despatch from his
Directors notifying that a war with England was impending; requiring
him to diminish his expenditure; to cease to continue to fortify
Pondicherry; and to act with the greatest caution. A little later
they wrote to say that war had actually been declared, that they had
instructed {33}the Governor of the Isle of France to proceed to the
Indian Seas with a squadron he was preparing; and that they required
him to second that officer, M. de la Bourdonnais, in his enterprise.
Fearing, however, that La Bourdonnais might arrive off the coast only
after some mischief had been done, they specially urged Dupleix to
endeavour to arrange with the Governor of Madras that the war in
Europe should not extend to the two settlements in India.

Similarly, the Governor of Madras, Mr. Morse, had received
information and instructions from his masters. They were, however, of
a nature differing in some respects from those received by the French
authorities. They were to the effect that war had been declared; that
he might at any moment expect the arrival of Commodore Barnett with a
strong squadron off Madras, and that that squadron would be employed
for the annihilation of the French commerce and the destruction of
their possessions. It is easy to see, then, that when Morse received
from the French Governor a proposal that the two settlements should
preserve neutrality, he was compelled to decline it.

Thus threatened, for the reply of Mr. Morse led him to believe that
the English would use their advantage to the utmost, Dupleix appealed
to the common suzerain of the two settlements, to the Nawab
Anwar-ud-din. He reminded him of the long-standing friendship between
the rulers of the French settlement and his predecessors; how the
French, in times of danger and difficulty, had ever extended their
hospitality to the {34}Nawabs and their friends; and represented in a
striking manner the disadvantage which must accrue to the rulers of
the Karnatik if the foreign settlements were to be permitted to wage
war upon one another, for the reason that their respective nations
had quarrelled in Europe. The mind of the Nawab was much impressed by
this cogent reasoning. He had no idea of the fighting qualities of
the settlers. They had up to that time behaved as peaceful traders,
deferential to the lords of the soil. He would that they should
remain so. He therefore informed Mr. Morse that he would not permit
an infraction of the peace between the two nations on the soil of the
Karnatik.

For the moment the plague was stayed. Commodore Barnett's squadron
arrived, intercepted and captured the French merchantmen, but could
not attempt anything against Pondicherry. In April, 1746, Barnett
died, and the command devolved upon Commodore Peyton. In June of the
same year Peyton heard that some French vessels had been seen off
Ceylon. They must be, he thought, the squadron of La Bourdonnais. He
proceeded, then, to cruise off Negapatam to intercept it. On July 6,
the two squadrons came in contact. They fought that afternoon and the
next morning. After an indecisive combat on the 7th, the English
commodore, finding that one of his best ships had sprung a leak,
sheered off, and made sail for Trincomalee, leaving to the Frenchmen
all the honours and advantage of the day. On the evening of the 8th
of July the French squadron anchored off Pondicherry.

{35}The result of the conference between the Admiral of the fleet and
the Governor of Pondicherry was a resolution that the former should
attack Madras, aided by the soldiers supplied by the latter. On the
evening of the 12th of September, 1745, the French fleet sailed for
Madras, arrived within cannon-shot of the English fort on the 15th at
mid-day; La Bourdonnais then landed 1,100 European soldiers, some
sipahis, and a few Africans, and summoned the place to surrender.

Madras was in no position to resist him. The only chance possessed by
Mr. Morse of saving the fort had lain in his obtaining from the Nawab
the protection which the latter had afforded to Pondicherry when he
himself had threatened that town. He had applied for that protection,
but in such a manner as to ensure the rejection of his prayer. He had
sent his messenger empty-handed into the presence of Anwar-ud-din, to
demand as a right the protection which that nobleman had granted to
Dupleix as a favour. The Nawab, probably waiting for the presents
which, as an Indian prince, he expected from the petitioner, had
given no reply when the fleet of La Bourdonnais appeared before
Madras on the 15th of September.

On the evening of the 19th the Governor sent a messenger to La
Bourdonnais to treat. After much negotiation it was agreed that at
noon of the day at which they had arrived, September 21, Fort St.
George and the town of Madras should be surrendered to the French;
that the English garrison and all the English {36}in the town should
become prisoners of war; that the civil functionaries should be set
free on their parole that they should not carry arms against France
until they should be regularly exchanged. There were other secret
conditions, but it is unnecessary to the narrative to refer to
these.[1]

[Footnote 1: For a correct account of these see the author's _History
of the French in India_, a new edition of which is about to appear.]

The capture of Madras by the French took completely by surprise the
Nawab Anwar-ud-din. On learning the movements of the French against
that place he had despatched a special messenger ordering them to
desist. The letter he conveyed reached Dupleix after Madras had been
conquered, but whilst it remained still in the hands of La
Bourdonnais. For a time he temporized with the Nawab, whilst he
endeavoured to bring La Bourdonnais, with whom he had difficulties as
to the disposal of the place, to reason. A terrific storm heralding
the north-east monsoon settled the second question by compelling the
French admiral to sail for the islands with the remnant of the fleet
it had scattered. On the 29th of October, Dupleix was sole director
of French interests in India and on the Indian seas. His negotiations
with the Nawab were of a more complicated character. I lay particular
stress upon them here because it was his action with reference to
that potentate which inverted the position theretofore held between
the native of India and the European; which called into the field the
brilliant military qualities of Clive; {37}which necessitated the
long struggle for predominance in Southern India between France and
England.

When day succeeded day and the Nawab gradually came to the conviction
that the audacious ruler of the French settlement had no real
intention of transferring to him the conquest La Bourdonnais had
made, he resolved to take it by force. He sent, therefore, his eldest
son, Ma'afuz Khan, with a force of about 10,000 men, mostly cavalry,
to enforce his demand. But, in face of the small French garrison
occupying the place, these men soon discovered that they were
powerless. When, with a great display of vigour, they had mastered
the positions which secured a supply of water to the town, the
garrison made a sortie and retook them. That was the first awakening.
The second was more startling, more pregnant with consequences. A
small force of 230 Europeans and 700 natives, sent by Dupleix under
the command of a trusted officer named Paradis to relieve Madras,
encountered the entire army of Ma'afuz Khan on the banks of the river
Adyar, close to the village of Maliapur, then and to the present day
known as St. Thome,[2] defeated it with great slaughter, the
Frenchmen wading breast-high through the water to attack the soldiers
of the Nawab. This victory, few in numbers as were the victors, must
ever be regarded as pre-eminently a decisive battle. It brought into
view, {38}silently but surely, the possibility of the conquest of
India by one or other of the two European powers on the Coromandel
coast.

[Footnote 2: From the fact identified by Bishop Heber and Professor
H. H. Wilson, that it is the place where the Apostle St. Thomas is
said to have been martyred on December 5, A.D. 58.]

In a narrower sense it confirmed the possession of Madras to Dupleix.
Thenceforth, as far as his eye could see, he had nought to fear in
India. On the 9th of November Paradis entered Madras; he made there
new provisions for the conquered English, confiscating all the
merchandize that had been found within the town by La Bourdonnais. He
then ordered all the English who should decline to take an oath of
allegiance to the French governor within four days to quit the town;
the English officials he permitted to dispose of their property; then
to remove to Pondicherry as prisoners on parole. There were some
amongst them who, possibly prescient of the future, declined to
subscribe to terms which would tie their hands. These escaped to Fort
St. David, a small fort purchased by the English in 1691, close to
the important town of Gudalur, sixteen miles to the south of
Pondicherry. Amongst these was the young writer who had had but
two years' experience of India, and who was called Robert Clive.

Hardly had that young writer reached Fort St. David than he was
called upon to share in its defence. It very soon became evident that
the policy of Dupleix was a root-and-branch policy; that he was
resolved to expel the English from all their settlements. With
respect to Fort St. David, however, he was foiled partly by the
stupidity of his generals, partly by the {39}island stubbornness of
the defenders. Four times did the French endeavour to take that small
fort; four times, owing to circumstances upon which it is not
necessary to enter, did they fail. Meanwhile there arrived an English
squadron under Admiral Griffin, and later, to reinforce him, a fleet
and army under Admiral Boscawen (August 11, 1748). By this arrival
the positions of the rivals on the coast became inverted. From being
besiegers the French became the besieged. For Boscawen at once laid
siege to Pondicherry.

Then began (August 19, 1748) the first siege of Pondicherry by the
English troops, assisted to a certain extent by those of the Nawab.
Many gallant deeds were performed on both sides. For a time Paradis
was the soul of the defence. When he was killed, which happened
whilst making a sortie on the 11th of September, the entire labour of
directing the necessary measures fell upon Dupleix. In the attack
were many good men and true. Boscawen himself gave an example of
daring which was universally followed. Amongst those who were
specially remarked was the hero of this book. A contemporary writer,
whose journal[3] of the siege is before me, remarks regarding that
young writer, that he 'served in the trenches on this occasion, and
by his gallant conduct gave the first prognostic of that high
military spirit, which was the spring of his future actions, and the
principal source of the decisive intrepidity {40}and elevation of
mind, which were his characteristic endowments.' The efforts of the
besiegers shattered, however, before the sturdy defence of the
French. On the 17th of October the English were forced to raise the
siege, leaving dead from the fire of the enemy or from sickness 1065
men. The English fleet remained for a year off the coast, and then
sailed for England: the garrison, formerly the garrison of Madras and
of Fort St. David, retired to the latter place, carrying with it
Robert Clive, soon to be joined there by one of the most
distinguished men whose careers have illustrated the history of the
English in India, Major Stringer Lawrence.[4]

[Footnote 3: See _Asiatic Annual Register_ for 1802.]

[Footnote 4: Major Lawrence had arrived from England on the 13th of
January 1747, commissioned to command all the Company's troops in
India. From Mr. Forrest's Madras Records we find that his salary as
Major was 300 pounds per annum, and 50 pagodas per month for other
allowances, besides 70 pounds per annum as third in Council. It was
he who had repulsed the fourth attack made by the French on Fort St.
David in the spring of that year. In the early days of the siege of
Pondicherry he had had the misfortune to be taken prisoner. Released
by the conditions of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, he then resumed
command at Fort St. David.]

It is probable that, after the raising of the siege of Pondicherry,
the French would have resumed their operations against Fort St.
David, for, early in 1749, reinforcements in men and money had
reached them. But before they could move, information reached them
that, on the 7th of October, 1748, peace had been signed between the
two nations at Aix-la-Chapelle. By the terms of this treaty the
conquests made by the two countries were to be restored. The French,
{41}therefore, instead of renewing their attack on Fort St. David,
were compelled to restore Madras, its fortifications undermined, and
its storehouses empty.[5] This restoration was the more distasteful
to them, when they found, as they very soon found, that from the
force of events, the hostilities which had ceased in Europe were, by
virtue of a legal fiction, to be continued in India. They were still
to fight the battle for supremacy, not as principals, but as allies
of the native princes who, in the disorder accompanying the
catastrophe of the Mughal empire, fought for their own hand, against
the native allies of the English.

[Footnote 5: Forrest, page 4. The report which he gives _in extenso_,
minuted by the Council of the Madras Presidency, runs as follows:
'The condition we have received it (Madras) in is indeed very
indifferent, the French having undermined the fortifications, and
rifled it of all useful and valuable stores.'

The official statement is quite opposed to the private accounts
hitherto accepted as true.]


{42}


CHAPTER V
CLIVE DECIDES FOR THE CAREER OF A SOLDIER


Before the conditions of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle had become
known in India, the English governor of Fort St. David had despatched
thence a small force of 430 Englishmen and 1000 sipahis to assist the
ex-Raja of Tanjore, who had been dethroned for gross misconduct, to
recover his kingdom. That, at least, was the nominal reason. The
ambition to obtain for the English possession of Devikota, a fort on
the river Coleroon, at the point where that river runs into the sea,
was the true cause of the action. The force was commanded by Captain
Cope, an officer of inferior merit. Clive accompanied it as a
volunteer. The expedition failed from causes which it was impossible
to combat. The ex-Raja had no partisans, and the season was that of
the monsoon-storms.

Still the idea was too popular to be abandoned. After the treaty
between the two nations had reached India the expedition was
therefore resumed. This time Major Lawrence, released by the action
of that treaty, assumed the command. He took with him the entire
available European force of the Company, leaving only a few to man
the defences, and giving Clive a commission for the time only, to
accompany {43}him as lieutenant, proceeded to Devikota by sea, landed
his troops, and commenced to batter the place. On the morning of the
fourth day a practicable breach was pronounced, and a storming party
was ordered. By his conduct Clive had already won the esteem of
Lawrence,[1] and it was to him that he gave command of the party.

[Footnote 1: The partiality which induced Lawrence to entrust Clive
with so important a duty is to be found under his own hand. 'A man of
undaunted resolution,' he writes in his memoirs, 'of a cool temper,
and a presence of mind which never left him in the greatest danger.
Born a soldier, for, without a military education of any sort or much
conversing with any of the profession, from his judgement and good
sense, he led an army like an experienced officer and a brave
soldier, with a prudence that certainly warranted success. This young
man's early genius surprised and engaged my attention, as well before
as at the siege of Devikota, where he behaved in courage and
judgement much beyond what could have been expected from his years,
and his success afterwards confirmed what I had said to so many
people concerning him.' Cambridge's _War in India_, pp. 18-19.]

To lead a storming party is an honour full of danger. So found Clive
on this occasion. Of the twenty-nine Europeans who composed it,
twenty-six were swept away by the enemy's horsemen, the sipahis
halting and witnessing the deed. Clive with the three survivors
managed to join the main body which was advancing under Lawrence, and
this body, repulsing a charge of cavalry which endeavoured to thwart
it, pushed vigorously on, and stormed Devikota. Abandoning the cause
of the ex-Raja, Lawrence then made a treaty with the powers that
were, in virtue of which Devikota was ceded to the East India
Company, and the Raja paid all the expenses of the {44}war. The force
returned to Fort St. David to find the fleet of Admiral Boscawen
still off the coast.

But, during the absence of the English troops, there had occurred in
the Karnatik one of those revolutions which were not uncommon in the
days of the dissolution of the Mughal empire.

On the 17th of April, 1748, the titular King of Delhi, Muhammad Shah,
had died. His son, Ahmad Shah, had succeeded him. Rather less than a
month later, the Subahdar of the Deccan, the famous Nizam-ul-Mulk,
also died. He had in his lifetime arranged that the succession to the
inheritance of the Deccan should devolve upon his second son, Nasir
Jang, and Ahmad Shah at once confirmed the nomination.[2] But those
were not the days when a succession to vast power and great
territories went unopposed. A claimant to the sovereignty of the
Deccan soon appeared in the person of Muzaffar Jang, grandson of the
late Subahdar, and at the moment holding the government of Bijapur.
Not sufficiently powerful to press his claim without assistance
Muzaffar Jang proceeded at once to Satara, enlisted the Marathas in
his cause, persuaded them to release Chanda Sahib, and to supply him
with troops. The arrangement between the two princes was that, in
case of success, Muzaffar Jang should become Subahdar of the Deccan,
Chanda Sahib Nawab of the Karnatik. It is necessary to state these
facts clearly, because the war, thus initiated, formed the basis of
the continued hostilities {45}between the French and English after
peace had been proclaimed in Europe.

[Footnote 2: Elliott's _History of India_, pp. 112-3, vol. viii.]

The reader may recollect that in the earlier part of this book[3] I
have shown how Chanda Sahib had formed a very high opinion of the
French and how he had cultivated their friendship. Resolving now to
avail himself of former favours, he made overtures to Dupleix, and
obtained from him promise of substantial assistance. These promises
were kept, and, towards the end of July, 1749, a detachment of French
soldiers joined the armies of the two conspirators at the Damalcherri
Pass. A few days later (August 3) they met at Ambur the army of
Anwar-ud-din, completely defeated it, slew Anwar-ud-din himself, took
prisoner his eldest son, the Ma'afuz Khan who had been defeated by
Paradis at St. Thome, and forced the second son, Muhammad Ali, to
save himself by flight to Trichinopoli. Marching straight to Arcot,
Muzaffar Jang proclaimed himself Subahdar of the Deccan, and Chanda
Sahib to be Nawab of Arcot. As the French had espoused the cause of
Chanda Sahib it was natural that the English should sustain the
claims of the rival. This rival was Muhammad Ali, the son of the late
Nawab, just escaped from the field of Ambur. The two pretenders,
whose cause had been adopted by the French, then proceeded to
Pondicherry. There Dupleix, whose vision on political matters was
remarkably clear, insisted that before committing themselves
{46}further, they should rid themselves of the only possible rival
then at large, and should march against Trichinopoli. This they
hesitated to do so long as the English fleet should remain off the
coast.

[Footnote 3: Chapter III.]

This was the situation when Lawrence and Clive returned from the
storming of Devikota. The chief of the English settlement was then
Mr. Floyer, a gentleman who had a great dread of responsibility. The
fighting party in the Council of Fort St. David urged that Muhammad
Ali should be supported, that the English fleet should remain off the
coast, and that Trichinopoli should be defended. The admiral declared
his willingness to remain if Mr. Floyer would only ask him. But
Floyer shrank from the responsibility. Consequently the fleet sailed
on the 1st of November, leaving behind 300 men as an addition to the
garrison.

The very day after the disappearance of the English fleet had become
known (November 2), Muzaffar Jang and Chanda Sahib, with their French
allies, marched towards Trichinopoli. But the two Indian princes had
been most improvident. They had spent all their funds. To obtain more
they assailed the strong fortress of Tanjore, captured one of the
gates of the fortress, and forced the Raja to agree to pay them very
large sums. But the wily prince, learning that Nasir Jang was
marching to his aid, managed to delay the chief payment until he had
ascertained that the Subahdar was within striking distance of the
place. He then point-blank refused to hand over {47}the money. The
news of the approach of Nasir Jang spread disorder in the ranks of
the armies of Muzaffar Jang and Chanda Sahib, and they hurriedly
retreated on Pondicherry.

Scenes of indescribable turmoil followed. In one of the skirmishes
that ensued there occurred an event which, unpromising as it appeared
at the outset, proved the means of the temporary accomplishment of
the plans of the two conspirators. In a skirmish Muzaffar Jang was
taken prisoner and placed in irons by the Subahdar. When in that
position, however, he managed to corrupt three of the principal
chiefs who followed the banner of that prince. Their schemes were
communicated to Chanda Sahib and to his French allies. The result was
that when the two rival armies joined battle at a place sixteen miles
from the strong fortress of Gingi, which, meanwhile, the French under
Bussy had captured, Nasir Jang's own levies turned against him and
slew him; released Muzaffar Jang, and acknowledged him Subahdar of
the Deccan.

This event occurred on the 16th of December, 1750. Chanda Sahib
himself carried the news of the accomplished revolution from the
battlefield to Pondicherry. The new Subahdar followed him, and, for a
while, French interests seemed predominant in the Karnatik. Then, for
a moment, the tide seemed to ebb. On his way to Aurangabad Muzaffar
Jang was slain by the very three conspirators who had compassed the
death of his predecessor. The French {48}troops with the force,
commanded by the energetic Bussy, speedily avenged his death, and
caused Salabat Jang, the third son of the late Nizam-ul-Mulk, to be
proclaimed his successor. As Bussy with a force of French troops was
to remain with him as his protector, it seemed as though French
influence was destined to remain predominant in Southern India.

And so but for one man it would have remained, increasing its
strength until its roots had spread far and wide below the surface.
This, we believe, is the true lesson of the early part of this
biography. It was one man's genius which, meeting the French on the
ground of their own selection, seized their idea, made it his own,
and worked it to their destruction. It was Clive who hoisted Dupleix
with his own petard. We shall now see how.

After the return of the troops from the conquest of Devikota, the
Government of Fort St. David had appointed Clive to be Commissary of
the forces. Before, however, he could assume the duties of the office
he had fallen sick, and had been sent by the doctors for a cruise in
the Bay of Bengal. On his return thence in the early days of 1751 he
found great demands on his activity. It devolved on him to equip a
force of 280 English and 300 sipahis, ordered, under Cope, to proceed
to Trichinopoli, still threatened by the French and their allies.
This accomplished, Clive was directed to accompany, as Commissary, a
larger force of 500 English, 1000 sipahis, and 100 Africans, ordered,
under Captain Gingens, for Volkonda, 38 miles {49}to the
north-north-east of Trichinopoli, there to intercept a French force
marching in that direction.

Gingens was not a strong officer, and by gross mismanagement he
allowed the French to get the better of him. Clive, whose soldier's
eye and martial instincts disapproved entirely of the evils he could
not, from his position, prevent,[4] then and there quitted the force
and returned to Fort St. David.

[Footnote 4: Captain Dalton, who served under Captain Gingens, writes
of him in his journal as 'a man of unfortunately jealous temper which
made him mistrust the goodwill of any who offered to give him
advice.' Vide _Memoir of Captain Dalton_, 1886, pp. 93-4.]

The return of Clive was opportune. The new Governor, Mr. Saunders, a
man of a large and comprehensive intellect, was waiting the arrival
of troops from England to fit out a new expedition of 80 Englishmen
and 300 sipahis to convoy provisions to Trichinopoli. He had no
officer, however, to whom he dared entrust the command. A civilian of
his Council, Mr. Pigot, was then deputed to lead the force the first
forty miles, when it would be beyond the reach of hostile attack, and
Clive volunteered to go with him. The force set out in July, 1751,
and on the third day reached Verdachelam, the point indicated. Thence
the two English civilians turned back as had been arranged, and,
though attacked on the way by a swarm of native horsemen, reached
Fort St. David in safety. The detachment then marched through a safe
country to Trichinopoli.

A few days later fresh troops arrived from England. Mr. Saunders was
anxious to despatch these to {50}reinforce the troops under Gingens,
but again the same difficulty presented itself. Meanwhile Clive had
deliberately considered his position. As a civilian, he had had a
career which did not satisfy him. As Commissary, it had been his fate
to witness the inefficient leading of others, without any authority
to interfere. He felt within him the power to command. His transfer
to the military service would, he saw, relieve the Governing Council
from a great difficulty, and give him, possibly, a command which he
could exercise for the benefit of his country. Very soon did he
decide. Mr. Saunders, whose appreciation of him was not inferior to
that of Major Lawrence, sanctioned the transfer of his name to the
military list, bestowed upon him the commission of captain,[5] and
directed him to proceed at once, with a detachment of the few troops
available, to Devikota, to place himself there under the orders of
Captain Clarke, whose total force would thus be augmented to 100
English, 50 sipahis, and one field-piece. The two officers were then
to march with this detachment to Trichinopoli. There Clive was to
take stock of the position and report to Mr. Saunders.

[Footnote 5: The order of appointing Clive ran as follows:--'Mr.
Robert Clive, who has lately been very serviceable in conducting
several parties to camp, offering to go, without any consideration of
pay, provided we will give him a Brevet to entitle him to the rank of
a Captain, as he was an Officer at the Siege of Pondichery, and
almost the whole time of the War, and distinguished himself on many
occasions, it is conceived that this Officer may be of some service,
and, therefore, now ordered that a Brevet be drawn out, and given
him.' Forrest.]

This happened towards the end of July, 1751.


{51}


CHAPTER VI
THE FIRST YEAR OF SOLDIERING AT TRICHINOPOLI AND ARCOT


The state of affairs in Trichinopoli was sufficient to cause
considerable alarm as to the result of the war. Chanda Sahib was
besieging that fortress with a very large native force, aided by 900
Frenchmen. His rival, Muhammad Ali, depended solely on the 600
English who were assisting him, for of his own troops there were but
5000, and of these 2000 were horsemen.

But that which most impressed Clive when he arrived there with
Captain Clarke early in August was the depression which filled the
minds of the native prince and the English soldiers. The treasury of
Muhammad Ali was exhausted, and he despaired of success. The English
soldiers had no confidence in their leaders, and, with a few
exceptions,[1] the leaders had no confidence in themselves. To rouse
leaders and men from their apathy Clive felt that something startling
must be attempted. Not indeed at Trichinopoli, for Captain Gingens,
who commanded there, though a brave man, was scarcely equal to taking
{52}a bold initiative in face of the preponderating troops of the
enemy. Alike at school, and in his researches in the Governor's
library at Madras, Clive had read of the achievements of great
commanders who, pressed hard by enemies at home, had changed the fate
of the campaign by carrying the war into the enemy's country. What an
opportunity for such a strategy where he was! To take Trichinopoli
Chanda Sahib had massed all, or nearly all, his available troops
before that place, leaving the capital of the Karnatik, Arcot,
absolutely denuded of trustworthy fighting men. The true method of
relieving the former place was to seize and hold the latter.
Impressed with this idea, Clive returned to Fort St. David and
communicated it to Mr. Saunders. This large-minded man embraced the
plan with fervour, and although at the two principal places held by
the English, Madras and Fort St. David, he had but 350 English
soldiers, he resolved to risk 200 of them on the expedition.[2] The
command of it he gave to Clive, but one month before a simple
civilian, and despatched him forthwith to Madras, to march thence
with his raw levies, most of them recently arrived from England.

[Footnote 1: One of these exceptions was Captain John Dalton, whose
journal, published in 1886 (Messrs. W. H. Allen & Co.), adds much to
our knowledge of the individuals engaged in the campaign.]

[Footnote 2: Forrest, page 10. The Board unanimously concurred with
Mr. Saunders.]

It was on the 26th of August, 1751, that Clive set forth from Madras
on the march which was to bring to him immortal fame, and to secure
for his countrymen the first footing on the ladder which was to
conduct them to empire. He had with him 200 English {53}soldiers, 300
sipahis, and three small field-pieces. Of his eight officers, four
were volunteers from the civil service who, with two of the others,
had never been under fire. On the 29th the little force reached
Kanchipuram, 42 miles from Madras and 27 from Arcot. There he learned
that that place was garrisoned by about 1200 native soldiers, that
the discipline was lax, and that a surprise was quite feasible; but
that the place itself was capable of a good defence. He did not wait
longer. Setting out in a terrible storm, he reached the vicinity of
Arcot on the 31st, surprised the fort, and compelled the town to
surrender, without losing a single man. Having taken measures to
store provisions, he marched on the 4th September to the mud fort of
Timeri, frightened the 600 native soldiers encamped there into
retreating, and returned. Two days later, having been informed that
the enemy had again gathered there to the number of 2000, he marched
again against them, attacked and completely defeated them. From want
of heavy guns he did not take the fort.

Relieved from the chances of immediate attack, Clive returned to
improve, as far as he could, the defences of the place he had
captured. One of his first acts had been to write to Madras for some
18-pounder guns. These were at once despatched. But the enemy, now
fully awake, attempted to intercept them at Kanchipuram. To save his
guns Clive marched thither with all his force except 80 men. He did
save the guns, but the enemy, profiting by his {54}absence, attacked
Arcot with all their available numbers. The garrison, however, small
as it was (30 Englishmen and 50 sipahis), had become imbued with
their leader's spirit. They repulsed the attack, Clive brought the
guns into the fort, and the enemy dispersed.

Meanwhile the news of the brilliant enterprise had spread far and
wide; had brought hope to the defenders of Trichinopoli, and alarm
and irritation to Chanda Sahib and his French allies. More even than
that. The important kingdom of Mysore, the ruler of which had been
long pressed by the rival combatants, declared now in favour of
Muhammad Ali, and sent an army under its Dalwai (Prime Minister) to
assist him. The native chiefs who ruled the territories which
connected the beleaguered town with the eastern coast followed the
example of Mysore;--an enormous gain, for it ensured the safety of
the English convoys from the coast. Greatly impressed with these
defections, Chanda Sahib at once despatched 3000 of his best troops
to join the forces which his son, Raja Sahib, was commanding in North
Arcot. There they would be joined by 150 Frenchmen. One of Clive's
objects had thus been already attained. The capture of Arcot had
enormously weakened the enemy's attack: had more than proportionately
increased the strength of the defence of Trichinopoli.

The eyes of India south of the great Vindhyan range were now turned
upon Arcot. Upon its successful or unsuccessful defence depended the
future in India of the two European nations which, though
{55}nominally at peace, were warring desperately against each other.
The siege began on the 23rd of September. It was characterized by
extraordinary tenacity, great daring, infinite powers of resource, on
the part of Clive and the defenders. The sipahis vied with the
English alike in courage and in capacity to withstand fatigue,
hunger, and thirst. Their self-denial, displayed when they insisted
that the water which was brought to them under much difficulty should
be offered first to their European comrades, went the round of the
world. It gave evidence of the cordiality which was to exist for a
century, and to be renewed in 1861-2 under conditions more favourable
than ever. At length, after more than seven weeks of continuous
pounding, the breach became practicable. The rumour that the great
Maratha soldier, Morari Rao, was approaching the place to lend a hand
to Clive, determined Raja Sahib to utilize his advantage without
delay. On the 14th of November he sent every available man to the
breach. The garrison, enfeebled though they were by privations, few
in number from their losses, separated by the necessities of the
defence, met their assailants with a courage as stern, a resolution
as dogged, as that which, in difficult circumstances, English
soldiers have always displayed. After an hour's fierce fighting, in
which the French took no part, the besiegers fell back, beaten,
baffled, and humiliated. At two o'clock that afternoon they begged to
be allowed to bury their dead. At two o'clock the following morning
they disappeared in the direction of Vellore.

{56}Thus ended the siege of Arcot. It had lasted fifty days. The
manner in which it ended gave the English, and especially the English
leader, a prestige which had an enormous effect on the campaigns that
followed. What a great thing this much-abused 'prestige' is in India
was illustrated by the fact that the minds of the native princes and
peoples all over the southern part of the peninsula turned to Clive
as to a master whom they would follow to the death. He inverted the
positions of the two nations, confounded by his brilliant action the
schemes of Dupleix, and, very soon afterwards, was able to impose his
will, representing the will of the English nation, upon all the
native princes who ruled or reigned in the territories of Haidarabad
and the Karnatik.

For--another great feature in the character of this man--Clive never
left a work half-finished. The blow, he felt, was weak and paltry
unless it were driven home. So he felt, so he acted, on this
occasion. On the 19th he took Timeri, the fort which had before
baffled him. Joined then by Morari Rao with 1000 Maratha horsemen, he
marched on Arni, seventeen miles south of Arcot, to attack Raja
Sahib, who had taken post there with the army which had lately
besieged him, reinforced by French troops just arrived from
Pondicherry. The superiority in numbers of the force of Raja Sahib
was so great that, when he noted the approach of Clive, he turned to
meet him. Clive halted where he was. He had recognized that his
position was excellent for defence, covered in front {57}by
rice-fields impracticable for guns, on the right by a village, and on
the left by a grove of palm-trees. There he ranged his troops to meet
the threatened attack.

It came very quickly, for the space between the two forces was but
300 yards. The enemy had discovered a narrow causeway leading across
the marshy ground to the village on Clive's right. Heralding their
approach with an advance of cavalry, they directed a portion of their
horsemen to assail the village on the right; another portion to drive
Morari Rao from the grove; whilst the main body of the infantry
should cross the causeway. The last-named was a dangerous operation
in the face of a man like Clive, for whilst the narrowness of the
causeway rendered the advance slow, it gave time to Clive to
concentrate upon it the fire of his guns. And this he did. For a time
the French, who led the attack, marched boldly. At length they came
under the full fire of the guns. It was the story of the bridge of
Arcola, but there was no Bonaparte to lead them on. They hesitated,
halted, then fell back with precipitation; and, quitting the
causeway, formed on the rice-fields, almost touching the cavalry on
their left, who were fighting fiercely to gain an entrance into the
village. This was the supreme moment, and Clive's genius utilized it
to the utmost. Whilst the enemy were busily engaged on the right and
left, their centre still reeling under the losses sustained on the
causeway, he detached a body of English soldiers into the
{58}village, directing them to seize the head of the causeway, and,
traversing it rapidly with a portion of the sipahis, to dash on the
enemy's centre, and seize their guns. Well was he served. No sooner
did the enemy perceive the English on the causeway than a panic
struck their centre, and they hastened to fall back. The panic
communicated itself to the two wings, already severely handled; they
too let go their hold, and turned to follow their comrades. True to
the principle referred to in a preceding page, Clive pressed them
hardly, not staying pursuit until darkness rendered it fruitless. The
record of this, his first real battle, fought against more than
double his numbers, was a splendid one. Whilst his own losses were
but eight sipahis of his own force, and some fifty horsemen of his
Maratha allies, there were killed or wounded fifty Frenchmen and
about three times that number of the natives. Whilst the English had
fought mostly under cover, the enemy had had the disadvantage of
being exposed, especially on the causeway.

Fit sequel to the defence of Arcot was this fight at Arni. It
dispersed the army of Raja Sahib, caused many of his soldiers, always
in the East inclined to side with the strongest, to desert to the
victors; it induced the ruler of the fort of Arni to declare for
Muhammad Ali; and it deprived the enemy of their military chest. From
its field Clive marched rapidly on Kanchipuram, took possession,
after a short siege, of the strong pagoda which, meanwhile, had been
{59}seized by the enemy; then, having placed in Arcot a sufficient
garrison, returned to Madras, thence to Fort St. David, having
carried out to the letter the programme he had submitted at the
latter place to Governor Saunders.

Well had he done it. The army of Chanda Sahib, doubled up by the
terrible blow struck in the very centre of his possessions, still
indeed held the position before Trichinopoli, but, from an enemy
confident, boastful, certain of ultimate success, he had become an
enemy timid, irresolute, doubtful of the issue, shrinking from his
own shadow. The prestige gained by the young Englishman paralyzed his
vitality. It required apparently but one more blow to complete his
demoralization. The one condition of that blow was that it must be
struck quickly, suddenly, before the enemy should have time to
recover. Considerations such as these, we may be sure, formed the
staple of the conversations at Fort St. David between the young
captain and the Governor after the return of the former from Arcot.


{60}


CHAPTER VII
'THE SWELL AND DASH OF A MIGHTY WAVE'[1]


[Footnote 1: 'The battle of Napoleon was the swell and dash of a
mighty wave before which the barrier yielded, and the roaring flood
poured onwards, covering all things.' Sir W. Napier's _Peninsular
War_.]

But there was one distinguished actor in the events I have recorded
who was by no means inclined to sit passively under the severe blow
which had but just upset all his calculations. This man was Dupleix,
the Governor of Pondicherry. The plan of taking Trichinopoli had been
his plan. To take that place he had used all the resources open to
him: he had, in fact, for that purpose pawned the resources of
Pondicherry. But one thing he had not done. He had not removed from
the court of the Subahdar the one competent general, Bussy-Castelnau,
generally known as Bussy, to carry out his ideas. He had bent all his
hopes on Law of Lauriston, nephew of the famous Scotch financier, and
who commanded the French troops before Trichinopoli. He leant,
however, on a reed, on which, when a man leaneth, it pierces
his hand. As a soldier under command Law was excellent. As a
Commander-in-chief he was pitiable, dreading responsibility,
timid, nervous, wanting in {61}every quality of a general. At the
moment Dupleix did not know this. He had seen Law fight well and
gallantly at the siege of Pondicherry: he had known him full of
self-confidence, and he had believed him capable of great things.

When, then, Clive struck that blow at the middlepiece of the Karnatik
dominion, which paralyzed the army before Trichinopoli, Dupleix,
whose brain had not been paralyzed, sent the most pressing orders to
Law not to care for events passing at Arcot, but to redouble his
efforts against the fortress he was besieging; to use every effort to
take the place before Clive's unexpected blow should produce its
natural consequences. To accomplish this end he despatched to him a
battering-train and all the Frenchmen he had available.

Dupleix could transmit his orders, but he could not send with them
the daring spirit which inspired them. Law had before Trichinopoli
900 French soldiers, of excellent quality, 2000 sipahis trained in
the French fashion, and the army of Chanda Sahib. It was a force to
attempt anything with in India. If a superior officer on the spot had
said to Law 'Attack!' he would have attacked with conspicuous
courage. But it was the weakness of his nature that, being in
command, he could not say the word himself. Therefore he did nothing.

But to Clive, recognizing all that was possible, ignorant only of the
character of the French commander, the situation seemed full of
danger. He {62}must strike again, and strike immediately. The
successful blow at the middlepiece must be followed up by a blow at
the head. That head was Trichinopoli. He prepared therefore, as soon
as the recruits expected from England should arrive, to march to that
place, and compel the raising of the siege.

Dupleix had divined all this. Once again was this young Englishman to
baffle him. As Law would not act he must devise some other means to
defeat him. Why, he said to himself, should I not take a leaf from
the Englishman's book, reconquer Arcot, possibly attack Madras, and
make it evident to the native princes that Pondicherry is still the
stronger? The idea pleased him, and he proceeded, in the most secret
manner, to act upon it.

Incited by the urgent requests and promises of Dupleix, Raja Sahib,
the beaten of Arni, quietly levied troops, and joined by a body of
400 Frenchmen, appeared suddenly before Punamallu on the 17th of
January. Punamallu is a town and fort in the Chengalpat district,
thirteen miles west-south-west from Madras. The town, but not the
fort, fell at once into the hands of the enemy. Had the allies then
marched on Madras they might have taken it, for it had but a garrison
of 100 men. They preferred, however, to march on Kanchipuram. There
they repaired the damages the English had done to the defences of the
great pagoda, and, leaving 300 sipahis to defend it, marched to
Vendalur, twenty-five miles to the south of Madras, and established
there a {63}fortified camp, whence they levied contributions on the
surrounding country. Their plan was so to coerce northern Arcot as to
compel the English to quit Trichinopoli, to save it.

They had succeeded in thoroughly alarming alike the English and the
petty chieftains in alliance with them when information of their
action reached Fort St. David. There Clive and Saunders were busily
engaged in preparing for the new expedition which the former was to
lead, as soon as the drafts from England should arrive, to the relief
of Trichinopoli. The information changed all their plans. Saunders at
once sent a pressing message to Bengal to despatch all available
English soldiers to Madras. Thither Clive proceeded; took command of
the 100 Englishmen forming its garrison; and ordered from Arcot
four-fifths of the troops stationed there. On the 20th of February
the troops from Bengal arrived: on the 21st the Arcot garrison was
within a march of Madras. On the following morning Clive quitted that
fort, and, joined as he marched forth by the men from Arcot, took the
direction of Vendalur, having, all told, 380 Englishmen, 1300
sipahis, and six field-pieces. His movements, however, had become
known to the enemy. These, therefore, had quitted Vendalur on the
night of the 21st; had marched by various routes to Kanchipuram; and,
re-uniting there, had pushed with all speed towards Arcot. There they
had made arrangements to be received, but their plot had been
discovered, and {64}finding their signals unanswered, they had
marched to Kaveripak, a town ten miles to the east of Arcot. There,
in front of the town, they encamped, in a position previously
carefully chosen as the one most likely to invite surprise, for which
they proceeded to thoroughly prepare themselves.

Clive, meanwhile, had been marching on Vendalur. He had made some way
thither when scouts reached him with the news that the birds had
flown, and in different directions. To gain further information he
continued his march and reached Vendalur. After staying there five
hours certain information reached him that he would find the enemy at
Kanchipuram. Thither he proceeded, and there he arrived at four
o'clock on the morning of the 23rd, having made a forced march, with
a rest of five hours, of forty-five miles. It was then nine o'clock
in the morning, and he resolved to rest for the day.

But, after his men had slept a few hours, the anxiety of Clive
regarding Arcot impelled him to break their slumbers, and order them
forward. They set out accordingly about one o'clock, and about sunset
came in sight of Kaveripak, but not of the French hidden in front of
it. The French leader, in fact, had laid his plans with the greatest
skill. A thick mango-grove, covered along two sides by a ditch and
bank, forming almost a redoubt, roughly fortified along the faces by
which the English must advance, covered the ground about 250 yards to
the left of the road looking eastwards. There the French {65}had
placed, concealed from view, their battery of nine guns and a portion
of their best men. About a hundred yards to the right of the road,
also looking eastwards, was a dry watercourse, along the bed of which
troops could march, sheltered, to a great extent, from hostile fire.
In this were massed the rest of the infantry, native and European.
The cavalry was in the rear, hidden by the grove, ready to be
launched on the enemy when they should reach the ground between the
watercourse and the grove. The men were on the alert, expecting
Clive.

The space at my disposal will not permit me to give the details of
the remarkable battle[2] which followed. It must suffice to say that
no battle that was ever fought brought into greater prominence the
character of its commander. In the fight before Kaveripak we see
Clive at his best. He had marched straight into the trap, and,
humanly speaking, was lost. It was his cool courage, his calmness in
danger, his clearness of mind in circumstances of extraordinary
difficulty, his wonderful accuracy of vision, the power he possessed
of taking in every point of a position, and of at once utilizing his
knowledge, that saved him. He was, I repeat, lost. He had entered the
trap, and its doors were fast closing upon him. Bravely did his men
fight to extricate him from the danger. Their efforts were
unavailing. Soon it came about that the necessity to retreat
{66}entered almost every mind but his own. Even the great historian
of the period, Mr. Orme, wrote that 'prudence counselled retreat.'
But to the word prudence Clive applied a different meaning. To him
prudence was boldness. What was to become of the British prestige, of
the British position in Southern India, if he, without cavalry, were
to abandon the field to an enemy largely provided with that arm, and
who would be urged to extraordinary energy by the fact that the
unconquered hero of Arcot had fled before them?

[Footnote 2: The reader who would care to read such a detailed
account will find it in the writer's _Decisive Battles of India_, ch.
ii.]

No: he would think only of conquering; and he conquered. After four
hours of fighting, all to his disadvantage, he resolved to act, _in
petto_, on the principle he had put into action when he first seized
Arcot. He would carry the war into the enemy's position. By a very
daring experiment he discovered that the rear of the wooded redoubt
occupied by the French had been left unguarded. With what men were
available he stormed it; took the enemy by surprise, the darkness
wonderfully helping him; and threw them into a panic. Of this panic
he promptly took advantage; forced the Frenchmen to surrender; then
occupied their strong position, and halted, waiting for the day. With
the early morn he pushed on and occupied Kaveripak. The enemy had
disappeared. The corpses of fifty Frenchmen and the bodies of 300
wounded showed how fierce had been the fight. He had, too, many
prisoners. His own losses were heavy: forty English and thirty
sipahis. {67}But he had saved Southern India. He had completely
baffled the cunningly devised scheme of Dupleix.

The consequences of the battle were immediately apparent. Northern
Arcot having been freed from enemies, Clive returned to Fort St.
David, reached that place the 11th of March, halted there for three
days, and was about to march to strike a blow at the other extremity,
Trichinopoli, when there arrived from England his old and venerated
chief, Stringer Lawrence. The latter naturally took command, and two
days later the force Clive had raised, and of which he was now second
in command, started with a convoy for Trichinopoli. On the 26th it
was met eighteen miles from that fortress by an officer sent thence
to inform Lawrence that the French had despatched a force to
intercept him at Koiladi, close to and commanding his line of
advance. By great daring, Lawrence made his way until he had passed
beyond the reach of the guns of the badly-commanded enemy and the
fort, and before daybreak of the following morning was joined by a
small detachment of the garrison: another, of greater force, met him
a little later. He had, in fact, practically effected a junction with
the beleaguered force at the outpost of Elmiseram when he learned
that the French were marching against him. They contented themselves,
however, with a fierce cannonade: for, as Clive advanced to
cover the movement of the rest of the force, they drew back, and
Lawrence, with his troops, and the convoy he was escorting, entered
{68}Trichinopoli. The French commander was so impressed by this feat
of arms, which gave the defenders, now assisted by Morari Rao and the
Dalwai of Mysore, a strength quite equal to his own, that he fell
back into the island of Seringham. There he was faced on one side by
Lawrence. To cut off his communications with the country on the
further side of the river Kolrun, Lawrence despatched Clive[3] with
400 English and some 700 sipahis, accompanied by some Maratha and
Tanjore cavalry, to occupy the village of Samiaveram, a village
commanding with three others the exit from the island on the only
practicable route. Clive set out on the 7th of April, occupied
Samiaveram the same day, and, two days later, made his position
stronger by storming and occupying the pagoda of Mansurpet, and the
mud fort of Lalgudi. There still remained Paichanda. The occupation
of this would complete the investment of the island on that side.

[Footnote 3: It is a striking testimony to the prestige Clive had
already acquired with the native princes that when Muhammad Ali, the
Dalwai, and Morari Rao were consulted by Lawrence as to co-operating
in the expedition, they consented only on the condition that Clive
should command.]

Meanwhile Dupleix, thoroughly disgusted with Law had despatched M.
d'Auteuil with a small force to take command in his place. Whilst
Clive was engaged in occupying the two places he had stormed, and was
preparing to attack the third, d'Auteuil was approaching the town of
Utatur, fifteen miles beyond Samiaveram, the headquarters of Clive.
He arrived {69}there on the 13th of April, and although his force--
120 Frenchmen, 500 sipahis, and four field-pieces--was far inferior
to that of Clive, he resolved to make a flank-march to the river and
open communications with Law. He sent messengers to warn that officer
of his intention, and to beg him to despatch troops to meet him. But
Clive captured one of these messengers, and resolved to foil his
plans.

D'Auteuil had set out on the morning of the 14th, but had not
proceeded far when he noticed the English force barring the way, and
returned promptly to Utatur. Clive then fell back on Samiaveram.

There was a strongly fortified pagoda, named Paichanda, on the north
bank of the Kolrun, forming the principal gateway into the island of
Seringham, which Clive had intended to take, but which, owing to the
movements of d'Auteuil, he had not yet attempted. On receiving the
message from d'Auteuil of which I have spoken, Law had resolved to
debouch by this gateway, and fall on Clive whilst he should be
engaged with d'Auteuil. But, when the time for action came, unable to
brace himself to an effort which might have succeeded, but which
possessed some element of danger, he despatched only eighty
Europeans, of whom one-half were English deserters, and 700 sipahis,
to march by the portal named, advance in the dark of the night to
Samiaveram, and seize that place whilst Clive should be occupied
elsewhere. The knowledge of English possessed by {70}the deserters
would, he thought, greatly facilitate the task.

His plan very nearly succeeded to an extent he had never
contemplated. Clive had returned from his demonstration against
d'Auteuil, and, worn out and weary, had laid himself down to sleep in
a caravanserai behind the smaller of the two pagodas occupied as
barracks by his men. They also slept. This was the position within
the village when a spy, sent forward by the leader of the surprising
party, returned with the information that Clive and his men were
there, and were sleeping. This news decided the commander to press on
and to seize the great Englishman where he lay. By means of his
deserters he deceived the sentries. One of the former, an Irishman,
informed the tired watchmen that he had been sent by Lawrence to
strengthen Clive. The party was admitted, and one of the garrison was
directed to lead its members to their quarters. They marched quietly
through the lines of sleeping Marathas and sipahis till they reached
the lesser pagoda. There they were again challenged. Their reply was
a volley through its open doors on the prostrate forms within it.
They went on then to the caravanserai and repeated their action
there.

Again was Clive surprised. Once more were the coolness, the clearness
of intellect, the self-reliance, of one man pitted against the craft
and wiles of his enemies. Once again did the one man triumph. He was,
I repeat, as much surprised as the least of his {71}followers. Let
the reader picture to himself the situation. To wake up in darkness
and find an enemy, whose numbers were unknown, practically in
possession of the centre of the town, in the native inn of which he
had gone peacefully to sleep but two hours before; his followers
being shot down; some of them scared; all just awakening; none of
them cognizant of the cause of the uproar; many of the intruders of
the same nation, speaking the same language as himself; all this
occurring in the sandy plains of India: surely such a situation was
sufficient to test the greatest, the most self-reliant, of warriors.
It did not scare Clive. In one second his faculties were as clear as
they had ever been in the peaceful council chamber. He recognized, on
the instant, that the attackers had missed their mark. They had
indeed fired a volley into the caravanserai in which he had lain with
his officers, and had shattered the box which lay at his feet and
killed the sentry beside him, but they had not stopped to finish
their work. Instantly Clive ran into one of the pagodas, ordered the
men there, some two hundred, to follow him, and formed them alongside
of a large body of sipahis who were firing volleys in every
direction, whom he believed to be his own men. To them he went,
upbraided them for their purposeless firing, and ordered them to
cease. But the men were not his men, but French sipahis. Before he
had recognized the fact, one of them made a cut at him with his
talwar, and wounded him. Still thinking they were {72}his own men,
Clive again urged them to cease fire. At the moment there came up six
Frenchmen, who summoned him to surrender. Instantly he recognized the
situation. Instantly his clear brain asserted itself. Drawing himself
up he told the Frenchmen that it was for them and not for him to talk
of surrender; bade them look round and they would see how they were
surrounded. The men, scared by his bearing, ran off to communicate
the information to their commander. Clive then proceeded to the other
pagoda to rally the men posted there. The French sipahis took
advantage of his absence to evacuate the town. The Frenchmen and the
European deserters meanwhile had occupied the lesser pagoda. They had
become by this time more scared than the surprised English. Their
leader had recognized that he was in a trap. His mental resources
brought to him no consolation in his trouble. He waited quietly till
the day broke, and then led his men into the open. But Clive had
waited too; and when the Frenchmen emerged, he received them with a
volley which shot down twelve of them. They hurried back to their
place of shelter, when Clive, wishing to stop the effusion of blood,
me to the front, pointed out to them their hopeless position, and
offered them terms. One of them, an Irishman, levelled his musket at
Clive, and fired point-blank at him. The ball missed Clive, but
traversed the bodies of two sergeants behind him. The French
commander showed his disapproval of the act by surrendering with his
whole force. Clive had {73}sent the Marathas and the cavalry to
pursue the French sipahis. These caught them, and cut them up, it is
said, to a man.

Thus ended the affair at Samiaveram. I have been particular in giving
the details which illustrate the action of Clive, because they bring
home to the reader the man as he was: a man not to be daunted, clear
and cool-headed under the greatest difficulties; a born leader;
resolute in action; merciful as soon as the difficulties had been
overcome: a man, as Carlyle wrote of another, not less distinguished
in his way, 'who will glare fiercely on an object, and see through
it, and conquer it; for he has intellect, he has will, force beyond
other men.'

The end was now approaching. On the 15th of May, Clive captured
Paichanda. He then marched on Utatur, forced d'Auteuil to retreat on
Volkonda, and, following him thither, compelled him (May 29) to
surrender. Three days later Law followed his example. The entire
French force before Trichinopoli gave itself up to Major Lawrence.
Its native allies did the same. The one regrettable circumstance in
the transaction was the murder of Chanda Sahib at the instance of his
rival.

After this, Clive returned to Fort St. David; was employed during the
fall of the year in reducing places which still held out against the
Nawab. This campaign tried his constitution, already somewhat
impaired, very severely, and on its conclusion, in the beginning of
October, he proceeded to Madras to rest {74}from his labours. There
he married Miss Maskeleyne, the sister of a fellow-writer, with whom,
in the earlier days of his Indian life, he had contracted a
friendship. But his health continued to deteriorate, and he was
forced to apply for leave to visit Europe. This having been granted,
he quitted Madras in February, 1753, full of glory. His character had
created his career. But for his daring, his prescience, his genius,
and his great qualities as a soldier, it is more than probable that
Dupleix would have succeeded in establishing the basis of a French
empire in Southern India.


{75}


CHAPTER VIII
CLIVE IN ENGLAND; AND IN BENGAL


The visit of Clive to England was scarcely the success hoped for. His
fame had preceded him, and the Court of Directors had assured him,
through the Governor of Madras, that they had 'a just sense of his
services.' Perhaps the person who had been the most astonished at his
brilliant success was his own father. He had remarked, when he first
heard of his victories, that 'the booby had some sense after all.'
But then it must be recollected that the father had seen but little
of the boy during his childhood and growing years, and that his
unfavourable impression had been derived probably from the aversion
shown by the lad to enter his own profession. But even he, now, was
prepared to follow the stream, and give a hearty reception to the
defender of Arcot. So, at first, Clive was feted and toasted in a
manner which must have convinced him that his services were
appreciated. The Court of Directors carried out the promise I have
referred to by giving a great banquet in his honour, and by voting
him a diamond-hilted sword as a token {76}of their esteem. This
honour, however, Clive declined unless a similar decoration were also
bestowed upon the chief under whom he had first served, Major
Stringer Lawrence.

Clive had earned sufficient money to live with great comfort in
England. He did not look forward then to return to India as an
absolute certainty. Rather he desired to enter Parliament, and await
his opportunity. It happened that the year following his arrival the
dissolution of the existing Parliament gave him an opportunity of
contesting the borough of St. Michael in Cornwall. He was returned as
a supporter of Mr. Fox, but the return was petitioned against, and
although the Committee reported in his favour, the House decided,
from a purely party motive, to unseat him. This disappointment
decided Clive. He had spent much money, and with this one result--to
be thwarted in his ambition. He resolved then to return to the seat
of his early triumphs, and applied to the Court for permission to
that effect.

The Court not only granted his request, but obtained for him the
commission of lieutenant-colonel in the royal army, and named him
Governor and Commander of Fort St. David, with succession to the
Governorship of Madras.

Clive took with him to India three companies of artillery and 300
infantry. He was instructed to convey them to Bombay, and, joined by
all the available troops of the Company and their Maratha allies, to
endeavour to wrest the Deccan from French {77}influence. But, just as
he was sailing, he discovered that, through royal influence, Colonel
Scott of the Engineers, then on the spot, had been nominated to the
command, with himself as his second. Not caring to take part in an
expedition in which his own voice would not be the decisive voice,
Clive was anxious to proceed to take up his government at Fort St.
David, when, on his arrival, he learned the death of Colonel Scott.
This event recalled him to the original plan. But another
complication ensued. Very shortly before he had arranged to march
there came the information that the French and English on the
Coromandel coast had entered into a treaty, binding on the two
nations in India, not to interfere in the warlike operations of
native princes. The Deccan project, therefore, had to be abandoned.

Another promptly took its place. A small fort built by the great
Sivaji on a small island in the harbour of Viziadrug, called by the
Muhammadans Gheria, had for many years past been made the
headquarters of a hereditary pirate-chief, known to the world as
Angria. This man had perpetrated much evil, seizing territories,
plundering towns, committing murders, robbing peaceful vessels, and
had made his name feared and detested along the entire length of the
Malabar coast. The necessity to punish him had long been admitted
alike by the Marathas and the English. The year preceding the Bombay
Government had despatched Commodore Jones with a squadron to attack
Angria's possessions. Jones accomplished {78}something, but on
arriving before Dabhol he was recalled on the ground that the season
was too late for naval operations on that coast.

In the autumn of the following year Admiral Watson came out to assume
command of the squadron. It had by this time become more than ever
necessary to bring the affair to a definite conclusion, and, as Clive
and his troops were on the spot, the Bombay Government, acting with
the Marathas, resolved to despatch the fleet and army to destroy the
piratical stronghold. Of the expedition, which reached its
destination in February, it is sufficient to state that in two days
it destroyed Gheria. Thence Clive pursued his voyage to the
Coromandel coast, and arrived at Fort St. David on the 20th of June.

On that very day there occurred in Calcutta the terrible tragedy of
the Black Hole. The Subahdar of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, the Nawab
Siraj-ud-daula, had, for some fancied grievance, prompted probably by
the hope of plunder, seized the English factory at Kasimbazar, near
his capital of Murshidabad, plundered it, imprisoned the garrison,
and had thence marched against Calcutta. He attacked that settlement
on the 15th of June, and after a siege of four days, conducted with
great want of leading on the part of the English, obtained possession
of it. The English Governor, Mr. Drake, the senior military officer,
and many others, had fled for refuge on board the ships in the river
Hugli, which immediately had weighed anchor and stood downwards,
leaving about 145 men, some of {79}them high in office, and one lady,
Mrs. Carey, a prey to the enemy. These were seized and taken before
the Nawab and his commander of the forces, Mir Jafar by name. The
Nawab spoke kindly to them, and ordered that they should be guarded
for the night, having no intention whatever, there is the strongest
reason to believe, that any harm should befall them. But, owing to
the natural cruelty or indifference of their guards, they were
thrust, after the departure of the Nawab, into a small room, about
eighteen feet square, ill ventilated, and just capable of receiving
them when packed together so closely as to render death certain to
the majority. Vainly did they remonstrate; vainly did they send a
message to the Nawab: he was asleep, and no one dared to awaken him.
Into that hole they were locked, and in it they remained until the
light of day showed that the pestiferous atmosphere had been fatal to
all of them except twenty-three. These were then released and taken
before the Nawab. Far from expressing regret for the sufferings of
which he had been the involuntary cause, the Nawab questioned them
only about the place in which their treasure had been hidden. For, so
far, he had been greatly disappointed at the result of his raid.

The story of the capture of Kasimbazar reached Madras on the 15th of
July. The Governor immediately despatched a detachment of 230
European troops for the Hugli, under command of Major Kilpatrick, and
this detachment reached its position off {80}the village of Falta on
the 2nd of August. For the moment we must leave it there.

It was not until three days after the arrival of Kilpatrick at Falta
that information of the Black Hole outrage reached Madras. The
position there was critical. The Governor was in daily expectation of
hearing that war had been declared with France, and he had already
parted with a large detachment of his best troops. The question was
whether, in the presence of the possible danger likely to arise from
France, he should still further denude the Presidency he
administered. The discussion was long. Happily it was finally
resolved to despatch to the Hugli every available ship and man. The
discussion as to the choice of the commander was still more
prolonged; but, after others had insisted on their rights, it was
finally determined to commit the command of the land-forces to
Clive--who had been summoned from Fort St. George to the
consultation--in subordination, however, to Admiral Watson,
commanding the squadron. It was not until the second week of October
that every detail was settled, nor until the 16th of that month that
the fleet sailed for the Hugli. The first ship reached the river, off
Falta, the 11th of December. But with the exception of two, one laden
with stores, the other grounding off Cape Palmyras, but both of which
joined at a later period, the others reached their destination at
periods between the 17th and 27th of that month.

The land-forces at the disposal of Clive consisted, {81}including the
few remnants of Kilpatrick's detachment,[1] which had suffered
greatly from disease, of 830 Europeans, 1200 sipahis, and a detail of
artillery. One ship, containing over 200, had not arrived, and many
were on the sick-list.

[Footnote 1: Orme states that one-half of them had died and that only
thirty were fit for duty.]

On the 17th of December Watson had written to the Nawab to demand
redress for the losses suffered by the Company, but no answer had
been vouchsafed. As soon then as all the ships, the two spoken of
excepted, had assembled off Falta, Watson wrote again to inform him
that they should take the law into their own hands. On the 27th the
fleet weighed anchor, and stood upwards. On the 29th it anchored off
Maiapur, a village ten miles below the fort of Baj-baj. It was
obvious to both commanders that that fort must be taken; but a
difference of opinion occurred as to the mode in which it should be
assailed, Clive advocating the proceeding by water, and landing
within easy distance of the place, Watson insisting that the troops
should land near Maiapur, and march thence. Clive, much against his
own opinion, followed this order. Landing, he covered the ten miles,
and posted his troops in two villages whence it would be easy to
attack the fort on the morrow. The troops, tired with the march, and
fearing no enemy, then lay down to sleep. But the Governor of
Calcutta, Manikchand, had reached Baj-baj that very morning with a
force of 2000 foot and 1500 horse. He had noted, unseen, all {82}the
dispositions of Clive, and at nightfall he sallied forth to surprise
him. The surprise took effect, in the sense that it placed the
English force in very great danger. But it was just one of those
situations in which Clive was at his very best. He recognized on the
moment that if he were to cause his troops to fall back beyond reach
of the enemy's fire, there would be a great danger of a panic. He
ordered therefore the line to stand firm where it was, whilst he
detached two platoons, from different points, to assail the enemy.
One of these suffered greatly from the enemy's fire, but the
undaunted conduct of the English in pressing on against superior
numbers so impressed the native troops that they fell back, despite
the very gallant efforts of their officers to rally them. Clive was
then able to form his main line in an advantageous position, and a
shot from one of his field-pieces grazing the turban of Manikchand,
that chief gave the signal to retire. That night the fort of Baj-baj
was taken by a drunken sailor, who, scrambling over the parapet,
hailed to his comrades to join him. They found the place abandoned.

On the 2nd of January Calcutta surrendered to Clive. A great
altercation took place between that officer and Watson as to the
appointment of Governor of that town. Watson had actually nominated
Major Eyre Coote, but Clive protested so strongly that, eventually,
Watson himself took possession, and then handed the keys to Mr.
Drake, the same Drake who had so shamefully abandoned the place at
the time of {83}Siraj-ud-daula's attack. Three days later Clive
stormed the important town of Hugli, once a Portuguese settlement,
afterwards held by the English, but at the time occupied for the
Nawab.

Meanwhile that prince, collecting his army, numbering about 40,000
men of sorts, was marching to recover his lost conquest. To observe
him Clive took a position at Kasipur, a suburb of Calcutta, now the
seat of a gun-factory. As the Nawab approached, the English leader
made as though he would attack him, but finding him prepared, he drew
back to await a better opportunity. By the 3rd of February the entire
army of the Nawab had encamped just beyond the regular line of the
Maratha ditch. Thither Clive despatched two envoys to negotiate with
the Nawab, but finding that they were received with contumely and
insult, he borrowed some sailors from the Admiral, and, obtaining his
assent to the proposal, resolved to attack him before dawn of the
next day. Accordingly at three o'clock on the morning of the 4th of
February, Clive broke up, and, under cover of one of those dense fogs
so common in Bengal about Christmastime, penetrated within the
Nawab's camp. Again was he in imminent danger. For when, at six
o'clock, the fog lifted for a few seconds, he found the enemy's
cavalry massed along his flank. They were as surprised at the
proximity as was Clive himself, and a sharp volley sent them
scampering away. The fog again descended: Clive knew not exactly
where he was; his men were becoming confused; and Clive {84}knew that
the step from confusion to panic was but a short one. But he never
lost his presence of mind. He kept his men together; and when, at
eight o'clock, there was a second lifting of the fog, and he
recognized that he was in the very centre of the enemy's camp, he
marched boldly forward, and not only extricated his troops, but so
impressed the Nawab that he drew off his army, and on the 9th signed
a treaty, by which he covenanted to grant to the English more than
their former privileges, and promised the restoration of the property
he had seized at the capture of Calcutta. This accident of the fog
and its consequences form, indeed, the keynote to the events that
followed. The circumstances connected with it completely dominated
the mind of the Nawab; instilled into his mind so great a fear of the
English leader that he came entirely under his influence, and, though
often kicking against it, remained under it to the end. This feeling
was increased when, some weeks later, Clive, learning that war had
been declared between France and England, attacked and conquered the
French settlement of Chandranagar (March 23), in spite of the Nawab's
prohibition. He displayed it to the world a little later, by
dismissing from his court and exiling to a place a hundred miles
distant from it a small detachment of French troops which he had
there in his pay, commanded by the Law who had so misconducted the
siege of Trichinopoli, and by recalling his army from Plassey, where
he had posted it, to a point nearer to his capital.

{85}Of Siraj-ud-daula something must be said. The province which he
ruled from his then capital of Murshidabad had been one of the great
fiefs which the dissolution of the Mughal Empire had affected. The
family which had ruled it in 1739 had had the stamp of approval from
Delhi. But when the invasion of Nadir Shah in that year overthrew for
the time the authority of the Mughal, an officer named Ali Vardi
Khan, who had risen from the position of a menial servant to be
Governor of Bihar, rose in revolt, defeated and slew the
representative of the family nominated by the Mughals in a battle at
Gheria, in January, 1741, and proclaimed himself Subahdar. Ali Vardi
Khan was a very able man. Having bribed the shadow sitting on the
throne of Akbar and Aurangzeb to recognize him as Subahdar of Bengal,
Bihar, and Orissa, he ruled wisely and well. On his death in 1756 he
had been succeeded by his youthful grandson, the Siraj-ud-daula, who,
as we have seen, had come, so fatally for himself, under the
influence of Clive.

For all the actions of Clive at this period prove that he was
resolved to place matters in Bengal on such a footing as would render
impossible atrocities akin to that of the Black Hole. Were he to quit
Bengal, he felt, after accomplishing the mission on which he had been
sent, and that mission only, what security was there that the
Subahdar would not return to wreak a vengeance the more bitter from
the mortifications he had had to endure? No, there {86}was but one
course he could safely pursue. He must place the Company's affairs on
a solid and secure footing. Already he had begun to feel that such a
footing was impossible so long as Siraj-ud-daula remained ruler of
the three provinces. As time went on the idea gathered strength,
receiving daily, as it did, fresh vitality from the discovery that
among the many noblemen and wealthy merchants who surrounded the
Subahdar there were many ready to betray him, to play into his own
hand, to combine with himself as against a common foe.

Soon his difficulty was to choose the man with whom he should ally
himself. Yar Lutf Khan, a considerable noble, and a divisional
commander of the Siraj-ud-daula's army, made, through Mr. Watts, the
English agent at Kasimbazar, the first offer of co-operation, on the
sole condition that he should become Subahdar. It was followed by
another from a man occupying a still higher position, from the
Bakhshi, or Commander-in-chief, Mir Jafar Khan. This Clive accepted,
receiving at the same time offers of adhesion from Raja Dulab Rao;
from other leading nobles, and from the influential bankers and
merchants of Murshidabad.

Then began those negotiations one detail of which has done so much to
stain the name of the great soldier. The contracting parties employed
in their negotiations one Aminchand, a Calcutta merchant of
considerable wealth, great address, unbounded cunning, and absolutely
without a conscience. When {87}the plot was at its thickest, this
man--who was likewise betraying the confidence which Siraj-ud-daula
bestowed upon him, when the least word would have rendered it
abortive--informed the Calcutta Select Committee, through Mr. Watts,
that unless twenty lakhs of rupees were secured to him in the
instrument which formed the bond of the confederates, he would at
once disclose to the Subahdar the plans of the conspirators. The
inevitable result of this disclosure would have been ruin to all the
conspirators; death to many of them. To baffle the greed of this
blackmailer, Clive caused two copies of the document to be drawn up,
from one of which the name of Aminchand was omitted. To disarm his
suspicions, the false document was shown him. This latter all the
contracting parties had signed, with the exception of Admiral Watson,
who demurred, but who, according to the best recollection of Clive in
his evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons, did not
object to have his name attached thereto by another.[2]

[Footnote 2: These are the facts of the transaction: they will be
commented upon in a future page. Vide comment near the end of Chapter
X.]

Space would fail were I to detail the various modes employed by the
confederates to produce on the mind of Siraj-ud-daula the conviction
that his only safety lay in battle with the English. He had tried
many methods to escape the dilemma, to rid himself of the heavy hand
of Clive. He had made overtures to Bussy at Haidarabad; to the
Marathas; to the Court {88}of Delhi; to the Nawab-Wazir of Oudh. But
every proposed combination had fallen through. He had quarrelled with
Mir Jafar, with his chief nobles, with the bankers. He had suspected
treachery, but had never been quite certain. At last, on the
thirteenth of June, information was brought to him that the English
agent, Mr. Watts, and his subordinates, had fled from Kasimbazar,
after an interview with Mir Jafar, at the time in his disfavour. Then
he gave way: then he realized that, without the aid of his nobles, he
was helpless: then he guessed the whole plot; the schemes of Clive;
the treason of his own people: then he turned to Mir Jafar for
reconciliation, imploring him not to abandon him in his distress. Mir
Jafar and the other nobles, most of whom were in the plot, all swore
fealty and obedience, Mir Jafar leading the way. They would risk
everything for the Subahdar. They would drive back the cursed
English, and free Bengal from their influence. Recovering his
equanimity from these assurances, Siraj-ud-daula ordered his army to
march to an intrenched camp he had prepared near the village of
Plassey, in the island of Kasimbazar,[3] twenty-two miles distant.
There was some difficulty regarding the arrears of pay of his men,
failing the settlement of which they refused to march. But, with
friendly assistance {89}this difficulty was overcome; the army set
out three days later for its destination, and arrived in the
intrenched camp on the 21st of June.

[Footnote 3: Kasimbazar is called an island because whilst the base
of the triangle which composes it is watered by the Ganges, the
western side, on which lies Plassey, is watered by the Bhagirathi;
the eastern by the Jalangi.]

I propose now briefly to record the movements of Clive: then to
describe the decisive battle which followed his arrival on the
island.


{90}


CHAPTER IX
THE BATTLE OF PLASSEY


Meanwhile Clive had made every preparation for the advance of his
army. A considerable portion of it had been stationed at
Chandranagar. To that place he despatched on the 12th of June all the
soldiers available, and 150 sailors lent him by the Admiral, leaving
Calcutta guarded by a few sick Europeans, some sipahis to look after
the French prisoners, and a few gunners to man the guns on the
ramparts. On the 13th he quitted Chandranagar, the Europeans, with
the guns, munitions, and stores, proceeding by water in 200 boats,
towed by natives against the stream, the sipahis marching along the
right bank of the river, on the highroad made by the Mughal
Government from Hugli to Patna.[1] The force consisted, all told, of
about 900 Europeans, 200 men of mixed native and Portuguese blood who
served with the Europeans, a small detail of lascars, and 2100
sipahis. The artillery consisted of eight six-pounders and two small
howitzers.

[Footnote 1: Vide Broome's _History of the Bengal Army_, p. 137.]

{91}The day after the force had set out Clive despatched to the
Subahdar a communication tantamount to a declaration of war; and he
proceeded, as he approached the enemy's camp, to act as though such a
declaration had been accepted. On the 16th he reached Palti, a town
on the western bank of the Kasimbazar river about six miles above its
junction with the Jalangi. Twelve miles higher up he came within
striking distance of Katwa, the Governor of which was supposed to be
one of the conspirators. Clive, expecting that the opposition would
not be serious, despatched to occupy it, on the 17th, 200 Europeans
and 500 sipahis, under Major Eyre Coote. But either the Governor had
changed his mind or he had only feigned compliance, for he prepared
to resist Coote's attack. Coote at once made preparations for an
assault, and took such dispositions, that the garrison, recognizing
the futility of resistance, and fearing to be cut off, evacuated the
place, leaving large supplies in the hands of the victors.

The next day, the 18th, a terrific storm raging, the force halted.
The day following, Clive, who had committed himself to the enterprise
mainly on the conviction that Mir Jafar would support him, received a
letter from that nobleman, informing him that he had feigned
reconciliation with the Subahdar and had taken an oath not to assist
the English, but adding that 'the purport of his convention with them
must be carried into execution.' This strange letter from the man
upon whose co-operation he particularly {92}depended led Clive to
doubt whether, after all, Mir Jafar might not betray him. Under this
possibility, the sense of the extreme danger of the enterprise in
which he was engaged revealed itself to him more clearly than it had
ever presented itself before. To cross an unfordable river in the
face of a vastly superior enemy, at a distance of 150 miles from all
support, would, he felt, be a most hazardous undertaking. Should Mir
Jafar be faithless to him, as he had appeared to be to his master,
and should the English force be defeated, there would scarcely
survive a man to tell the tale. Again would Calcutta be in
jeopardy--this time probably beyond redemption. Under the influence
of such thoughts he resolved not to cross the river until he should
receive from Mir Jafar more definite assurances.

The next day, the 20th, a messenger arrived from his agent, Mr.
Watts, who was then at Kalna, carrying a letter to the effect that
before he quitted Murshidabad he had been engaged in an interview
with Mir Jafar and his son, when there entered some emissaries of the
Subahdar; that, in the presence of these, Mir Jafar had denounced Mr.
Watts as a spy, and had threatened to destroy the English if they
should attempt to cross the Bhagirathi. This letter decided Clive. He
resolved to summon a Council of War.

There came to that Council, about noon of the 21st of June, the
following officers: Colonel Clive, Majors Kilpatrick and Grant,
Captains Gaupp, {93}Rumbold, Fischer, Palmer, Le Beaume, Waggonner,
Corneille, and Jennings, Captain-Lieutenants Parshaw and
Molitore;--Major Eyre Coote, Captains Alexander Grant, Cudmore,
Armstrong, Muir, Campbell, and Captain-Lieutenant Carstairs. The
question submitted to them was: 'whether under existing
circumstances, and without other assistance, it would be prudent to
cross the river and come to action at once with the Nawab, or whether
they should fortify themselves at Katwa, and wait till the monsoon
was over, when the Marathas or some other country power might be
induced to join them.' Contrary to the usual custom, Clive spoke
first, the others following according to seniority. Clive spoke and
voted against immediate action. He was supported by the twelve
officers whose names immediately follow his own name in the list I
have given, and opposed by the owners of the seven last names, Major
Eyre Coote speaking very emphatically in favour of action; the
majority of the Council, we thus see, siding with Clive.

The subsequent career of Eyre Coote, especially in Southern India,
proved very clearly that as a commander in the field he fell far
short of Robert Clive, but on this occasion he was the wiser of the
two. Some years later Clive, giving his evidence before a Select
Committee of the House of Commons, emphatically stated that had he
abided by the decision of the Council it would have caused the ruin
of the East India Company. As it was, he reconsidered his vote the
moment the Council was over. It is said that he {94}sat down under a
clump of trees, and began to turn over in his mind the arguments on
both sides. He was still sitting when a despatch from Mir Jafar[2]
reached him, containing favourable assurances. Clive then resolved to
fight. All doubt had disappeared from his mind. He was again firm,
self-reliant, confident. Meeting Eyre Coote as he returned to his
quarters, he simply informed him that he had changed his mind and
intended to fight, and then proceeded to dictate in his own tent the
orders for the advance.

[Footnote 2: Vide Ives's _Voyage and Historical Narrative_, p. 150.
Mr. Ives was surgeon of the _Kent_ during the expedition to Bengal,
and was a great friend of Admiral Watson.]

At sunrise on the 22nd the force commenced the passage of the river.
By four o'clock it was safe on the other side. Here a letter was
received from Mir Jafar, informing Clive of the contemplated
movements of the Nawab. Clive replied that he 'would march to Plassey
without delay, and would the next morning advance six miles further
to the village of Daudpur, but if Mir Jafar did not join him there,
he would make peace with the Nawab.' Two hours later, about sunset,
he commenced his march amid a storm of heavy rain which wetted the
men to the skin. In all respects, indeed, the march was particularly
trying, for the recent rains had inundated the country, and for eight
hours the troops had to follow the line of the river, the water
constantly reaching their waists. They reached Plassey, a distance of
fifteen miles, at one o'clock on the morning of the 23rd of June, and
lay {95}down to sleep in a mango-grove, the sound of drums and other
music in the camp of the Nawab solacing rather than disturbing them.
The Subahdar had reached his headquarters twelve hours before them.

The mango-tope in which the English were resting was but a mile
distant from the intrenched position occupied by Siraj-ud-daula's
army. It was about 800 yards in length and 300 in breadth, the trees
planted in regular rows. All round it was a bank of earth, forming a
good breastwork. Beyond this was a ditch choked with weeds and
brambles. The length of the grove was nearly diagonal to the river,
the north-west angle being little more than 50 yards from the bank,
whilst at the south-west corner it was more than 200 yards distant. A
little in advance, on the bank of the river, stood a hunting-box
belonging to the Nawab, encompassed by a wall of masonry. In this,
during the night, Clive placed 200 Europeans and 300 natives, with
two field-pieces. But in the morning he withdrew the greater part of
them.[3] He had with him 950 European infantry and artillery, 200
topasses, men of mixed race, armed and equipped as Europeans, 50
sailors with seven midshipmen attached, 2100 sipahis, a detail of
lascars, and the field-pieces already mentioned.

[Footnote 3: Vide Orme's _History of India_, and Broome's _History of
the Bengal Army_.]

On the spot which the Nawab had selected for his intrenched camp the
river makes a bend in the form of a horseshoe, with the points much
contracted, {96}forming a peninsula of about three miles in
circumference, the neck of which was less than a quarter of a mile in
breadth. The intrenchment commenced a little below the southern point
of this gorge, resting on the river, and extending inland for about
200 yards, and sweeping thence round to the north for about three
miles. At this angle was a redoubt, on which the enemy had mounted
several pieces of cannon. About 300 yards to the eastward of this
redoubt was a hillock covered with jungle, and about 800 yards to the
south, nearer Clive's grove, was a tank, and 100 yards further south
was a second and larger one. Both of these were surrounded by large
mounds of earth, and, with the hillock, formed important positions
for either army to occupy. The Subahdar's army was encamped partly in
this peninsula, partly in rear of the intrenchment. He had 50,000
infantry of sorts, 18,000 horse of a better quality, and 53 guns,
mostly 32, 24, and 18-pounders. The infantry was armed chiefly with
matchlocks, swords, pikes, bows and arrows, and possessed little or
no discipline; the cavalry was well-trained and well-mounted; the
guns were mounted on large platforms, furnished with wheels, and
drawn by forty or fifty yoke of powerful oxen, assisted by elephants.
But the most efficient portion of his force was a small party of
forty to fifty Frenchmen, commanded by M. St. Frais, formerly one of
the Council of Chandranagar. This party had attached to it four light
field-pieces.[4]

[Footnote 4: For these details see Orme, Broome, Clive's _Evidence
before the Committee of the House of Commons_, Clive's _Report to the
Court of Directors_, Sir Eyre Coote's _Narrative_, and Ives's _Voyage
and Historical Narrative_. The account which follows is based
entirely on these authorities.]

{97}At daybreak on the 23rd of June the Nawab moved his entire army
out of the intrenchment and advanced towards the position occupied by
Clive, the several corps marching in compact order. In front was St.
Frais, who took post at the larger tank, that nearest Clive's grove.
On a line to his right, near the river, were a couple of heavy guns,
under the orders of a native officer. Behind these two advanced
parties, and within supporting distance, was a chosen body of 5000
horse and 7000 foot, under the immediate command of the Nawab's most
faithful general, Mir Madan.[5] The rest of the Nawab's army extended
in a curve, its right resting on the hillock near the camp; thence
sweeping round in dense columns of horse and foot to the eastward of
the south-east angle of the grove. Here, nearest to the English, were
placed the troops of Mir Jafar, then those of Yar Lutf Khan, beyond
these Raja Dulab Ram. The English within the grove were thus almost
surrounded by the river and the enemy; but in view of the promised
treachery of Mir Jafar, the greatest danger was to be apprehended
from their immediate front, viz. from St. Frais, with his little body
of Frenchmen, and from Mir Madan.

[Footnote 5: See Elliot's _History of India_, vol. viii. p. 428.]

From the roof of the hunting-house Clive watched his enemy take up
the positions which would hold {98}him, if their generals were true
to their master, in a vice. 'They approached apace,' he wrote in a
letter of July 26 to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors,
'and by six began to attack us with a number of heavy cannon,
supported by the whole army, and continued to play on us very briskly
for several hours, during which our situation was of the utmost
service to us, being lodged in a large grove, with good mud banks. To
succeed in an attempt on their cannon was next to impossible, as they
were planted in a manner round us, and at considerable distances from
each other. We therefore remained quiet in our post, in expectation
of a successful attack upon their camp at night. About noon the enemy
drew off their artillery and returned to their camp.'

So far, up to mid-day, we have the outline of the fight as narrated
by Clive; it is, however, but an outline. It would seem that the
action commenced by a discharge of one of the four guns of St. Frais.
This discharge killed one and wounded another of the men of the
European battalion. Immediately afterwards the whole of the enemy's
guns opened fire, but their shots flew high, and did but little
mischief. Clive meanwhile had drawn up his troops in line in front of
the grove, their left resting on the hunting-box, with the exception
of two guns and two howitzers which he had posted at some brick-kilns
some 200 yards in front of the hunting-box spoken of. These, as soon
as the enemy opened, replied promptly and effectively. The remaining
six guns, placed three on {99}each flank of the European battalion
which formed the centre of his line, answered the heavy batteries of
the enemy, but, from their small calibre, made but little impression.

After a cannonade of half an hour, the English having lost ten
Europeans and twenty sipahis in killed and wounded, Clive withdrew
them under shelter of the grove, leaving one detachment at the
brick-kilns, another at the hunting-box. This retrograde movement
greatly encouraged the enemy. They brought their guns much nearer,
and their fire became more vigorous and sustained. But its effect was
less fatal, for the English troops were protected by the trees and
the mud bank, and, sitting down, were but little exposed. This
warfare continued till about eleven o'clock, the casualties being far
greater on the side of the Nawab's army than among the English. Then
Clive summoned his principal officers to a conference, and it was
resolved that the troops should occupy their existing positions until
midnight, and should then attack the Nawab's camp. We may regard the
close of the conference as occurring about the same time as the
withdrawal of the enemy's artillery indicated by Clive in the above
extract from his despatch.

For, scarcely was the conference over, than the skies poured down a
fierce shower, such as occurs often during the rainy season, which
lasted an hour. Then it was that the enemy's artillery fire slackened
by degrees almost to the point of ceasing, for the rain had damaged
their ammunition, left almost completely {100}without cover. Clive
had been more careful of his powder, so that when the enemy's horse,
believing the English guns as powerless as their own, advanced
towards the grove to charge, they were received with a fire which
emptied many a saddle, and sent them reeling back. In this charge Mir
Madan, previously referred to, was killed.[6]

[Footnote 6: Elliot states, on the authority of the J'ami'ut
Taw'ari'kh, that he was accidentally struck by a cannon-ball.
_History of India_, vol. viii. p. 427.]

The death of this brave and faithful soldier greatly disheartened the
Subahdar. He sent for Mir Jafar, and implored him to remain faithful
to his oath. Taking off his turban and casting it at the feet of his
uncle,[7] he exclaimed in humble tones, 'Jafar, that turban thou must
defend.' Mir Jafar promised, but instead of performing, the
degenerate Muhammadan returned to his confederates and sent a
despatch to Clive, informing him of all that had passed, and begging
him to push on immediately, or, if that were impossible, not to fail
to attack during the night. His letter did not reach Clive till late
in the evening. Meanwhile other influences had been at work to bring
about a similar result.

[Footnote 7: Mir Jafar had married the sister of Ali Vardi Khan, the
Nawab's father.]

It is impossible not to feel sympathy for the youthful prince,
surrounded by traitors, his one true adherent killed. Scarcely had
Mir Jafar quitted him when there came to him another traitor, Raja
Dulab Ram, who commanded the army corps nearest to the position
{101}he had taken. The Raja found his master in a state of great
agitation. The English were showing themselves in the open; his own
men were giving way; hope was vanishing quickly. Instead of
encouraging the Subahdar to fight it out, the treacherous Raja gave
fuel to his fears, told him the day was lost, and urged him to flee
to Murshidabad. In an evil hour for his dynasty and for himself,
Siraj-ud-daula yielded to his persuasions, and, ordering his troops
to retire within the intrenchment, mounted a swift dromedary, and
fled, accompanied by 2000 horsemen, to his capital.

It was then two o'clock. The first hour since Clive's conference had
been marked by the heavy rain; the second by the repulse of the
Subahdar's horsemen; the following up of the repulsed attack; the
conversations of the Subahdar with his two treacherous generals. By
two o'clock the enemy's attack had completely ceased, and they were
observed yoking their oxen preparatory to withdrawing within the
intrenchment as the Subahdar had ordered. There remained only on the
ground that body of forty gallant Frenchmen under St. Frais, whom I
have described as occupying the ground about the larger tank, that
nearest to the grove. The post was an important one, for from it the
English could have taken the retreating enemy in flank, and have
inflicted heavy loss upon them. St. Frais was nearly isolated, but
he, too, had seen the advantage the English would derive from
occupying the position, and, faithful amid the faithless, he, with
the gallantry of his nation, {102}resolved to defend it until it
should be no longer defensible.

There was with the army a very gallant officer, Major James
Kilpatrick, who had greatly distinguished himself in Southern India,
and who, on this occasion, commanded the Company's troops. Kilpatrick
had noted the firm front displayed by St. Frais, the great advantage
to be derived from occupying the position he held, the disadvantage
of leaving him to hold it whilst the English force should advance. He
resolved, then, to expel him: so sending word to Clive of his
intentions, and of the reason which prompted his action, he marched
with two companies towards St. Frais.

Clive, meanwhile, seeing the enemy's attack broken, yet deeming it
better, not having received Mir Jafar's letter, to wait till the sun
should have descended before making the decisive attack, had
proceeded to the hunting-box to rest after so many hours of fatigue
and excitement, to be followed, he believed, by many more, having
first given orders that he should be informed of any change that
might occur in the enemy's position. He was there when the message of
Kilpatrick reached him. Rising, he hurried to the spot, met
Kilpatrick as he was advancing to the assault, reprimanded him for
having taken such a step without orders, but seeing him so far
forward, he took himself the command of the detachment, sending back
Kilpatrick to the grove to bring the remainder of the troops. When
St. Frais recognized {103}the earnestness of the English, and that he
was entirely without support, he evacuated the post, and retreated to
the redoubt at the corner of the intrenchment. There he placed his
guns ready for action.[8]

[Footnote 8: This episode is not specially mentioned by Clive, but it
rests on irrefragable evidence. Vide Orme, vol. ii. p. 176: see also
Sir Eyre Coote's _Narrative_; also Malcolm's _Life of Lord Clive_,
vol. i. p. 260.]

Meanwhile, whilst the English force was thus advancing, the army
corps commanded by Mir Jafar was observed to linger behind the rest
of the retreating enemy. It was noticed, further, that when it had
advanced almost abreast of the northern line of the grove, it faced
to its left and advanced in that direction. For a time it seemed to
the English officers as though the troops composing it were about to
make a raid on their baggage, and a party with a field-piece was sent
forward to check them. The corps then halted, remained so for a time,
then slowly retired, taking, however, a direction which led it apart
from the other corps of the enemy. We shall return to them in a few
moments.

Whilst this corps was executing the manoeuvre I have described, Clive
had advanced to a position whence he could cannonade the enemy's
camp. The effect of this fire was to cause great loss and confusion
amongst the troops of the Subahdar, at the same time that the
English, giving, by their advance, their flank to the French in the
redoubt, suffered also. To put {104}an end to this cross-fire Clive
saw that the one remedy was to storm the redoubt. He was unwilling,
however, to risk his troops in a severe contest with the French so
long as the army corps, the movements of which I have described in
the preceding paragraph, should continue to occupy its apparently
threatening position. That corps might be the corps of Mir Jafar, but
there was no certainty that it was so, for Clive had not then
received Mir Jafar's letter, nor was he aware of the flight of the
Nawab. It was just at this critical moment that he observed the corps
in question making the retrograde movement I have referred to. Then
all doubt was over in his mind. It must, he was convinced, be the
corps of his adherent. Certain now that he would not be molested, he
hurled his troops against the redoubt and the hillock to the east of
it. St. Frais displayed a bold front, but, abandoned almost
immediately by his native allies, and deeming it wiser to preserve
his handful of Europeans for another occasion, he evacuated the
redoubt, leaving his field-pieces behind him. His resistance was the
last opposition offered to the English. The clocks struck five as he
fell back, thus tolling the memorable hour which gave to England the
richest province in India; which imposed upon her the necessity to
advance upwards from its basis until she should reach the rocky
region called with some show of reason the 'Glacis of the Fortress of
Hindustan.'

Just as the beaten and betrayed army was moving {105}off with its
impedimenta, its elephants, its camels, leaving to be scrambled for
an enormous mass of baggage, stores, cattle, and camp equipage, Clive
received messengers from Mir Jafar requesting an interview. Clive
replied by appointing a meeting for the morrow at Daudpur, a village
twenty miles to the south of Murshidabad. Thither the bulk of the
troops, their spirits cheered by the promise made them that they
would receive a liberal donation in money, marched that evening;
whilst a detachment under Eyre Coote went forward in pursuit, to
prevent the enemy from rallying. After a short halt, to enable the
commissariat to exchange their small and worn-out bullocks for the
splendid oxen of the Subahdar, the troops pressed on, and at eight
o'clock the entire force was united at Daudpur.

Such was the battle of Plassey. The loss of the English force was
extremely small, amounting to seven Europeans and sixteen sipahis
killed, and thirteen Europeans and thirty-six sipahis wounded. No
officer was killed: two were wounded, but their names are not
recorded. A midshipman of the _Kent_, Shoreditch by name, was shot in
the thigh, whilst doing duty with the artillery. The enemy's
casualties were far greater. It was calculated to be, in killed and
wounded, about a thousand, including many officers. They had been far
more exposed than the English. Writing, in the letter already
referred to, of the phases of the action between two and five
o'clock, Clive states that their horse exposed {106}themselves a
great deal; that 'many of them were killed, amongst the rest four or
five officers of the first distinction.'

Clive had gained his victory. We have now to record the use that he
made of it.


{107}


CHAPTER X
HOW CLIVE DEALT WITH THE SPOILS OF PLASSEY: HIS DEALINGS WITH MIR
JAFAR; WITH THE PRINCES OF SOUTHERN INDIA; WITH THE DUTCH


The following morning Clive despatched Mr. Scrafton and Omar Beg[1]
to escort Mir Jafar to his camp. The time had arrived when one at
least of the spoils of Plassey was to be distributed.

[Footnote 1: Omar Beg was a confidential agent of Mir Jafar, attached
to Clive's person.]

Long previous to the battle Clive had received various proposals from
the three general officers who had commanded the three principal army
corps at Plassey. First, Yar Lutf Khan had made him a bid, his main
condition being that he should be proclaimed Subahdar.[2] Then Mir
Jafar outbad him, bringing with him Raja Dulab Ram, who would be
content with the office of Finance Minister under the Mir. It had
been arranged that whilst Mir Jafar should be proclaimed Subahdar of
the three provinces, he should confirm to the English all the
advantages ceded by Siraj-ud-daula in the preceding February; should
grant to the Company all the lands lying to the south of Calcutta,
together with a slip of ground, {108}600 yards wide, all round the
outside of the Maratha Ditch;[3] should cede all the French factories
and establishments in the province; should pledge himself that
neither he nor his successors in the office of Subahdar should erect
fortifications below the town of Hugli; whilst he and they should
give to, and require from, the English, support in case of
hostilities from any quarter. Mir Jafar covenanted likewise to make
very large payments to the Company and others under the name of
restitution for the damages they had suffered since the first attack
on Calcutta; others also under the title of gratification for
services to be rendered in placing him on the _masnad_.[4] In the
former category were reckoned one karor, or ten millions, of rupees
to be paid to the Company; ten lakhs to the native inhabitants of
Calcutta, seven lakhs to the Armenians. Under the second head
payments were to be made to the army, the squadron, and the members
of the Special Committee of Calcutta, to the extent noted below.[5]

[Footnote 2: Subahdar was the correct official title of the governor,
or, as he is popularly styled, the Nawab, of Bengal.]

[Footnote 3: It must be recollected that in those days the Marathas
were regarded as serious and formidable enemies. It was against their
depredations that the ditch round Calcutta, known as the 'Maratha
Ditch,' had been dug.]

[Footnote 4: _Masnad_, a cushion, signifying the seat of supreme
authority.]

[Footnote 5: The Squadron was to receive 2,500,000 rupees; the Army,
the same; Mr. Drake, Governor of Calcutta (the same who had quitted
Calcutta and his companions to take shelter on board ship at the time
of Siraj-ud-daula's attack), 280,000; Colonel Clive, as second in the
Select Committee (appointed before the war to negotiate with Mir
Jafar), 280,000; Major Kilpatrick, Mr. Watts, and Mr. Becher, as
members of the said Committee, 240,000 each. I may here state in
anticipation that, in addition to these sums, the following private
donations were subsequently given, viz.: to Clive, 1,600,000 rupees;
to Watts, 300,000; to the six members of Council, 100,000 each; to
Walsh, Clive's secretary and paymaster to the Madras troops, 500,000;
to Scrafton, 200,000; to Lushington, 50,000; to Major A. Grant,
commanding the detachment of H.M.'s 39th regiment, 100,000.]

{109}The first of these contracts, now become binding, was to be
carried out on the morning of the 24th of June, at the interview
between the two principal parties, Clive and Mir Jafar. It has
occurred to me that the reader may possibly care to know something
more, little though it be, of the antecedents of this general, who,
to his own subsequent unhappiness, betrayed his master for his own
gain.

Mir Muhammad Jafar was a nobleman whose family had settled in Bihar.
He had taken service under, had become a trusted officer of, Ali
Vardi Khan, the father of Siraj-ud-daula, and had married his sister.
On his death, he had been made Bakhshi, or Commander-in-chief, of the
army, and, in that capacity, had commanded it when it took Calcutta
in June, 1756.[6] Between himself and his wife's nephew,
Siraj-ud-daula, there had never been any cordiality. The latter, with
the insolence of untamed and uneducated youth, had kicked against the
authority of his uncle; had frequently insulted him; and had even
removed him from his office. Mir Jafar had felt these slights
bitterly. {110}Living, as he was, in an age of revolution, dynasties
falling about him, the very throne of Delhi the appanage of the
strongest, he felt no compunction in allying himself with the
foreigner to remove from the throne--for it was virtually a
throne--of Murshidabad the man who alternately insulted and fawned
upon him. Little did he know, little even did he reck, the price he
would have to pay. Fortunately for his peace of mind at the moment
the future was mercifully hidden from him. But those who are familiar
with the history of Bengal after the first departure thence of Clive
for England will admit that never did treason so surely find its own
punishment as did the treason of Mir Jafar.

[Footnote 6: There can be no doubt about this. 'About five o'clock
the Nawab entered the fort, carried in an open litter, attended by
Mir Jafar Khan, his Bakhshi or General-in-chief, and the rest of his
principal officers.' He was present when the English were brought
before the Nawab: vide Broome, p. 66. Orme, vol. ii. p. 73, makes a
similar statement.]

But he is approaching now, with doubt and anxiety as to his
reception, the camp in which he is to receive from his confederate
the reward of treason, or reproaches for his want of efficient
co-operation on the day preceding. On reaching the camp, writes the
contemporaneous historian of the period,[7] 'he alighted from his
elephant, and the guard drew out and rested their arms, to receive
him with the highest honours. Not knowing the meaning of this
compliment, he drew back, as if he thought it a preparation to his
destruction; but Colonel Clive, advancing hastily, embraced him, and
saluted him Subahdar of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, which removed his
fears.' They discoursed then for about an hour. Clive pressed upon
him the great necessity of proceeding at once to {111}Murshidabad to
look after Siraj-ud-daula, and to prevent the plunder of the
treasury. The new Subahdar assented, and, returning to his army, set
out and arrived at the capital the same evening. Clive, having sent
friendly letters to the other chief conspirators, made a short march
of six miles to the village of Bapta, and encamped there for the
evening. At noon the day following he proceeded to Madhupur, whence
he despatched Messrs. Watts and Walsh, with an escort of 100 sipahis,
to arrange for the payments noted in a preceding page. These soon
found that the treasury was not at the moment equal to the demand.
They arranged accordingly that one moiety should be paid down: of
this moiety two-thirds in hard coin, one-third in jewels and plate;
that the second moiety should be discharged by three equal payments,
extending over three years.

[Footnote 7: Orme, vol. ii. p. 178.]

Whilst these negotiations were progressing, Clive, having ascertained
that the other chief conspirators had accepted the terms offered to
them, entered the city of Murshidabad (July 29), attended by 200
Europeans and 300 sipahis, and took up his quarters in the palace of
Muradbagh, his followers encamping in the garden attached to it. Here
he was waited upon by Miran, the eldest son of Mir Jafar, and with
him he proceeded to the Subahdar's palace, where Mir Jafar and his
principal officers were waiting to receive him. Clive, after saluting
Mir Jafar, led him to the _masnad_, and, despite some affected
unwillingness on the part of the Mir, seated him upon it, hailed him
with the usual {112}forms as Subahdar, offering at the same time a
nazar of 100 _ashrafis_.[8] He then, through an interpreter,
addressed the assembled nobles, congratulated them on the change of
masters, and urged them to be faithful to Mir Jafar. The usual
ceremonies followed, and the new ruler was publicly proclaimed
throughout the city.

[Footnote 8: The value of an _ashrafia_, at a later period called by
the English 'Gold Muhr,' was about 1_l_. 11_s_. 8_d_. A 'nazar' is a
gift offered and received when people of rank pay their respects to a
prince. It is more properly called 'Nazrana.']

It is impossible to quit this subject without recording, as briefly
as possible, the fate of the relative Mir Jafar had betrayed and
supplanted. Siraj-ud-daula, fleeing, as we have seen, from the field
of Plassey, had reached Murshidabad the same night. The next morning
the news of the total rout of his army reached him. He remained in
his palace till dusk, then, accompanied by his favourite wife, he
embarked on a boat, hoping to find refuge in the camp of M. Law, who
was advancing from Bhagalpur. But at Rajmahal the strength of the
rowers gave out, and the young prince rested for the night in the
buildings of a deserted garden. There he was discovered, and, taken
back, was made over to Mir Jafar. The interview which followed will
recall to the English historical student the scene between James II
and the Duke of Monmouth. There was the same vain imploring for life
on the one side, the same inexorable refusal on the other. That same
night Siraj-ud-daula was stabbed to death in his cell.

{113}Another scene, scarcely less revolting in its details, had
occurred the preceding day. I have mentioned the two treaties made by
the conspirators, the one the real treaty, the other a counterpart,
drawn up to deceive Aminchand. In the distribution of the plunder it
had become necessary to disclose the truth to the wily Bengal
speculator. For him there need be but little pity. Entrusted with the
secrets of the conspirators, he had threatened to betray them unless
twenty lakhs of rupees should be secured to him in the general
agreement. He was, in a word--to use an expression much in use at the
present day--a 'blackmailer.' Clive and the officers with whom he was
acting thought it justifiable to deceive such a man. The hour of his
awakening had now arrived. The two treaties were produced, and
Aminchand was somewhat brutally informed by Mr. Scrafton that the
treaty in which his name appeared was a sham; that he was to have
nothing. The sudden shock is said to have alienated his reason. But
if so, the alienation was only temporary. He proceeded on a
pilgrimage to Malda, and for a time abstained from business. But the
old records of Calcutta show that he soon returned to his trade, for
his name appears in many of the transactions in which the English
were interested after the departure of Clive.

Nor was the dealing with Aminchand the only matter connected with the
distribution of the spoil which caused ill-feeling. There had been
much bitterness stirred up in the army by the fact that the
{114}sailors who had fought at Plassey should receive their share of
the amount promised to the navy in addition to that which would
accrue to them as fighting men. A mixed Committee, composed of
representatives of each branch of the military service, had decided
against the claims of the sailors to draw from both sources, and
Clive was appealed to to confirm it. But Clive, who, in matters of
discipline, was unbending, overruled the decision of the Committee,
placed its leader, Captain Armstrong, under arrest, and dissolved the
Committee. In a dignified letter Clive pointed out to the Committee
their error, and drew from them an apology. But the feeling rankled.
It displayed itself a little later in the acquittal of Captain
Armstrong by a court-martial. In other respects the distribution of
the money was harmful, for it led to excesses among officers and men,
and, consequently, to a large increase of mortality.

Meanwhile the new Subahdar began to find that the State-cushion was
not altogether a bed of roses. The enormous sums demanded by his
English allies, and by other adherents, had forced him, as soon as
Clive had left for Calcutta, to apply the screw to the wealthier of
his new subjects. Even his fellow-conspirators felt the burden. Raja
Dulab Ram, whom he had made Finance Minister, with the right to
appropriate to himself five per cent. on all payments made by the
Treasury, retired in dudgeon to his own palace, summoned his friends,
and refused all intercourse with Mir Jafar. The Raja of Purniah and
the Governor of {115}Bihar went into rebellion. The disaffection
reached even the distant city of Dhaka, where the son of Sarfaraz,
the representative of the ancient family ruling in Bengal, lived in
retirement and hope. Under these circumstances Mir Jafar, though he
well knew what it would cost him, made an application for assistance
to Clive.

The English leader had expected the application. He had recognized
long before that, in the East, power depends mainly on the length of
the purse, and that, from having exhausted his treasury, Mir Jafar
would be forced to sue to him _in forma pauperis_. Clive had studied
the situation in all its aspects. The blow he had given to native
rule by the striking down of the late Subahdar had rendered absolute
government, such as that exercised by Siraj-ud-daula, impossible.
Thenceforth it had become indispensable that the English should
supervise the native rule, leaving to the Subahdar the initiative and
the semblance. Clive had reason to believe that whilst Mir Jafar
would be unwilling to play such a role, he would yet, under pressure,
play it. He had seen that the new ruler was so enamoured of the
paraphernalia of power that, rather than renounce it, he would agree
to whatever terms he might impose which would secure for him nominal
authority. There was but one point regarding which he had doubts, and
that was whether the proud Muhammadan nobles to whom, in the days of
the glories of the Mughal empire, great estates had been granted in
Bengal, would tamely submit to a system {116}which would give to the
Western invaders all the actual power, and to the chief of their own
class and religion only the outer show.

The application from Mir Jafar, then, found Clive in the mood to test
this question. Mir Jafar had thrown himself into his hands; he would
use the chance to make it clear that he himself intended to be the
real master, whilst prepared to render to the Subahdar the respect
and homage due to his position. Accordingly he started at once
(November 17) for Murshidabad with all his available troops, now
reduced at Calcutta to 400 English and 1300 sipahis, and reached that
place on the 25th, bringing with him the disaffected Raja of Purniah.
His peace he made with the Mir Jafar; then, joined by the 250
Europeans he had left at Kasimbazar, he proceeded to Rajmahal, and
encamped there close to the army of the Subahdar, who had marched it
thither with the object of coercing Bihar.

This was Clive's opportunity. Bihar was very restive, and the
Subahdar could not coerce its nobles without the aid of the English.
Clive declined to render that aid unless the Subahdar should, before
one of his soldiers marched, pay up all the arrears due to the
English, and should execute every article of the treaty he had
recently signed. For Mir Jafar the dilemma was terrible. He had not
the money; he had made enemies by his endeavours to raise it. In this
trouble he bethought him of Raja Dulab Ram, recently his Finance
Minister, but whom {117}he had subsequently alienated. Through
Clive's mediation a reconciliation was patched up with the Raja. Then
the matter was arranged in the manner Clive had intended it should
be, by giving the English a further hold on the territories of the
Subahdar.

It was agreed that Clive should receive orders on the treasury of
Murshidabad for twelve and a half lakhs of rupees; assignments on the
revenues of Bardwan, Kishangarh, and Hugli for ten and a half: for
the payments becoming due in the following April, assignments on the
same districts for nineteen lakhs: then the cession of the lands
south of Calcutta, so long deferred, was actually made--the annual
rental being the sum of 222,958 rupees. These arrangements having
been completed, Clive accompanied the Subahdar to the capital of
Bihar, the famous city of Patna. There they both remained, the
Subahdar awaiting the receipt of the imperial patents confirming him
in his office; Clive resolved, whatever were the personal
inconvenience to himself, not to quit Patna so long as the Subahdar
should remain there. They stayed there three months, a period which
Clive utilized to the best advantage, as it seemed to him at the
moment, of his countrymen. The province of Bihar was the seat of the
saltpetre manufacture. It was a monopoly[9] farmed to agents, who
re-sold the saltpetre on terms bringing very large profits. Clive
proposed to the {118}Subahdar that the East India Company should
become the farmers, and offered a higher sum than any at which the
monopoly had been previously rated. Mir Jafar was too shrewd a man
not to recognize the enormous advantages which must accrue to his
foreign protectors by his acquiescence in a scheme which would place
in their hands the most important trade in the country. But he felt
the impossibility of resistance. He was a bird in the hands of the
fowler, and he agreed.

[Footnote 9: The possession of this monopoly became the cause of the
troubles which followed the departure of Clive, and led to the
life-and-death struggle with Mir Kasim.]

At length (April 14) the looked-for patents arrived. Accompanying
that which gave to the usurpation of Mir Jafar the imperial sanction
was a patent for Clive, creating him a noble of the Mughal empire,
with the rank and title of a Mansabdar[10] of 6000 horse. The
investiture took place the day following. Then, after marching to
Barh, the two armies separated, the Subahdar proceeding to
Murshidabad; Clive, after a short stay at that place, to Calcutta.

[Footnote 10: For the nature of Mansab, and the functions of the
holder of a Mansab (or Mansabdar) the reader is referred to
Blochmann's _Ain-i-Akbari_. By the original regulations of Akbar, who
founded the order, the Mansabdars ranked from the Dahbashi, often
Commander-in-Chief, to the Doh Hazari, Commander of 10,000 horse, to
the Mansabdars of 6000 downwards. Vide _Ain-i-Akbari_ (Blochmann's),
p. 237 and onwards.]

Clive had returned to Calcutta, May 24, absolute master of the
situation. He had probed to the bottom the character of the Subahdar,
and had realized that so long as he himself should remain in India,
and Mir Jafar on the _masnad_, the English need fear no attack. But,
in the East, one man's life, especially {119}life of a usurper, is
never secure. In those days the risks he incurred were infinitely
greater than they are now. Clive had noted the ill-disguised
impatience of several of the powerful nobles, more especially that of
Miran, the son, and of Mir Kasim, the son-in-law, of the Subahdar. He
had left, then, the greater part of his English soldiers at
Kasimbazar, close to the native capital, to watch events, whilst he
returned to Calcutta to trace there the plan of a fortress which
would secure the English against attack. The fort so traced, received
the name of its predecessor, built by Job Charnock in the reign of
King William III, and called after him, Fort William.

Nearly one month later, June 20, there arrived from England
despatches, penned after learning the recapture of Calcutta, but
before any knowledge of the events which had followed that recapture,
ordering a new constitution for the administering of the Company's
possessions in Bengal. The text of the constitution, ridiculous under
any circumstances, was utterly unadapted to the turn events had
taken. It nominated ten men, not one of whom was competent for the
task, to administer the affairs of Bengal. The name of Clive was not
included amongst the ten names. It was not even mentioned.
Fortunately for the Company, the ten men nominated had a clearer idea
of their own fitness than had their honourable masters. With one
consent, they represented the true situation to the Court of
Directors, and then, with the same unanimity, requested Clive {120}to
accept the office of President, and to exercise its functions, until
the pleasure of the Court should be known. Clive could not but accede
to their request.

For, indeed, it was no time for weak administration and divided
counsels. Again had the French attempted to recover the position in
Southern India which Clive had wrested from them. Count Lally, one of
the brilliant victors of Fontenoy, had been sent to Pondicherry with
a considerable force, and the news had just arrived that he was
marching on Tanjore, having recalled Bussy and his troops from the
court of the Subahdar of the Deccan. With the news there had come
also a request that the Government of Bengal would return to the
sister Presidency the troops lent to her by the latter in the hour of
the former's need to recover Calcutta.

Clive felt all the urgency of the request; the possible danger of
refusing to comply with it; the full gravity of the situation at
Madras. He also was one of those who had been lent. If the troops
were to return, it was he who should lead them back. But he felt
strongly that his place, and their place also, was in Bengal.
Especially was it so in the presence of the rumours, already
circulating, of great successes achieved by Lally, and by the French
fleet. Such rumours, followed by his departure, would certainly
incite the nobles of Bengal and Bihar, with or without Mir Jafar, to
strike for the independence which they felt, one and all, he had
wrested from them.

Matters, indeed, in the provinces of Bengal and {121}Bihar had come
to bear a very threatening aspect. The treasury of Mir Jafar was
exhausted by his payments; his nobles were disaffected; the moneyed
classes bitterly hostile. Threatened on his northern frontier by a
rebellious son of the King of Delhi and by the Nawab-Wazir of Oudh,
Mir Jafar was in the state of mind which compels men of his stamp to
have recourse to desperate remedies. For a moment he thought
seriously of calling the Marathas to his assistance. Then the
conviction forced itself upon him that the remedy would be worse than
the disease, and he renounced the idea. At last, when the army of the
rebel prince had penetrated within Bihar, and was approaching Patna,
he resigned himself to the inevitable, and besought abjectly the
assistance of Clive.

Clive had resolved to help him when affairs in Southern India reached
a point which required his immediate attention. A letter from the
Raja of Vizianagram reached him, informing him that the effect of the
recall by Lally from Aurangabad of the troops under Bussy had been to
leave the Northern Sirkars[11] without sufficient protection; that he
and other Rajas had risen in revolt, and urgently demanded the
despatch thither of some English troops, by whose aid they could
expel the few Frenchmen left there. It was characteristic of Clive to
seize the points of a difficult situation. Few men who had to meet on
their front a dangerous invasion, would have dared to despatch, to a
distant point, the troops he {122}had raised to repel that invasion,
remaining himself to meet it from resources he would improvise. But,
without a moment's hesitation or a solitary misgiving, Clive
recognized that the opportunity had come to him to complete the work
he had begun, six years before, in Southern India; that a chance
presented itself to transfer the great influence exercised by Bussy
at the court of the Subahdar of the Deccan to his own nation. Leaving
to himself then the care of Bengal and Bihar he directed a trusted
officer, Colonel Forde, to proceed (October 12) with 500 Europeans,
2000 sipahis, and some guns to Vizagapatam, to unite there with the
Raja's troops, to take command; and to expel the French from the
Northern Sirkars: then, if it were possible, to assume at the court
of the Subahdar the influence which the French had till then
exercised. It is only necessary here to say that Forde, who was one
of the great Indian soldiers of the century, carried both points with
skill and discretion. He beat the French in detail, and compelled
them to yield their fortresses; and, when the Subahdar marched to
their aid, he succeeded, with rare tact, in inducing him to cede to
the English the whole of the territories he had conquered, and to
transfer the paramount influence at his court to the English. The
victories of Forde laid the foundation of a predominance which,
placed some forty years later on a definite basis by the great
Marquess Wellesley, exists to the present day. It is not too much to
assert that this splendid result was due to {123}the unerring
sagacity, the daring under difficult circumstances, of Robert Clive.

[Footnote 11: The districts of Ganjam, Vizagapatam, Godavari, and
Krishna.]

Meanwhile the solicitations of Mir Jafar increased in importunity.
Even the Great Mughal called upon Clive, as a Mansabdar, to assist
him to repress the rebellion of his son. Clive did not refuse. As
soon as his preparation had been completed, he set out, February,
1759, for Murshidabad with 450 Europeans and 2500 sipahis, leaving
the care of Calcutta to a few sick and invalids. He reached
Murshidabad the 8th of March, and, accompanied by the Mir Jafar's
army, entered Patna on the 8th of April. But the rumour of his march
had been sufficient. Four days before the date mentioned the
rebellious prince evacuated his positions before the city, and,
eventually, sought refuge in Bundelkhand. Clive entered Patna in
triumph; put down with a strong hand the disturbances in its
vicinity; and then returned to Calcutta, in time enough to hear of
the victorious course of Forde, although not of its more solid
result.

Before he had quitted Patna, Mir Jafar had conferred upon him, as a
personal jagir,[12] the Zamindari {124}of the entire districts south
of Calcutta then rented by the East India Company.

[Footnote 12: A jagir is, literally, land given by a government as a
reward for services rendered. A Zamindari, under the Mughal
government, meant a tract, or tracts of land held immediately of the
government on condition of paying the rent of it. By the deed given
to Clive, the East India Company, which had agreed to pay the rents
of those lands to the Subahdar, would pay them to Clive to whom the
Subahdar had, by this deed, transferred his rights. It may here be
added that the Company denied the right of Clive to the rents which
amounted to 30,000 pounds per annum, and great bitterness ensued. The
matter was ultimately compromised.]

Clive had scarcely returned to Calcutta when there ensued
complications with the Dutch.

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Holland had posed in
the East as a rival, often a successful rival, of the three nations
which had attempted to found settlements in those regions. She had
established a monopoly of trade with the Moluccas, had possessed
herself of several islands in the vicinity of the Straits, had
expelled Portugal from Malacca (1641), from Ceylon (1658), from the
Celebes (1663), and from the most important of her conquests on the
coasts of Southern India (1665). In the beginning of the eighteenth
century the Dutch-Indian Company possessed in the east seven
administrations; four directorial posts; four military commands; and
four factories. The Company was rich, and had but few debts.

Amongst the minor settlements it had made was the town of Chinsurah,
on the Hugli, twenty miles above Calcutta. Chinsurah was a
subordinate station, but, until the contests between the Nawab and
the English, it had been a profitable possession. We have seen how,
under the pressure of Clive, Mir Jafar had made to the English some
important trade-concessions. It was certain that sooner or later,
these would affect the trade, the profits, and the self-respect, of
the European rivals of Great Britain. Prominent as traders amongst
these were the Dutch. Amongst {125}the changes which they felt most
bitterly were (1) the monopoly, granted to the English, of the
saltpetre trade; (2) the right to search all vessels coming up the
Hugli; (3) the employment of no other than English pilots. These
injuries, as they considered them, rankled in their breasts, and they
resolved to put a stop to them. To effect that purpose they entered
into secret negotiations with Mir Jafar. These, after a time, ended
in the entering into an agreement in virtue of which, whilst the
Dutch covenanted to despatch to the Hugli a fleet and army
sufficiently strong to expel the English from Bengal, the Subahdar
pledged himself to prepare with the greatest secrecy an army to
co-operate with them. This agreement was signed in November, 1758,
just after Clive had despatched Forde, with all the troops then
available, to the Northern Sirkars, but before his march to Patna,
recorded, with its consequences, in the preceding pages. The secret
had been well kept, for Clive had no suspicion of the plot. He knew
he had the Subahdar in the hollow of his hand, so far as related to
the princes of the soil; he knew the French were powerless to aid the
Subahdar: and he never thought of the little settlement of Chinsurah.

In the month of June, 1759, just following the return of Clive to
Calcutta, the Mir Jafar received from the Dutch a secret intimation
that their plans were approaching maturity. He stayed then but a
short time at the English seat of government, but returned
{126}thither in October, to be at hand when the expected crisis
should occur. Meanwhile rumours had got about that a considerable
Dutch fleet was approaching the Hugli, and, in fact, a large Dutch
vessel, with Malayan soldiers, did arrive at Diamond Harbour. Clive
had at once demanded from the Dutch authorities an explanation, at
the same time that he innocently apprised Mir Jafar of the
circumstance, and of the rumour. The Dutch authorities explained that
the ship had been bound for Nagapatnam, but had been forced by stress
of weather to seek refuge in the Hugli.

In October, whilst Mir Jafar was actually in Calcutta, the Dutch made
their spring. It was a very serious attack, for the Dutch had four
ships, carrying each thirty-six guns; two, each carrying twenty-six;
one, carrying sixteen, and had on board these 700 European soldiers
and 800 Malays: at Chinsurah they had 150 Europeans, and a fair
number of native levies: behind them they had the Subahdar. To meet
them Clive had but three Indiamen, each carrying thirty guns, and a
small despatch-boat. Of soldiers, he had, actually in Calcutta and
the vicinity, 330 Europeans, and 1200 sipahis. The nearest of the
detachments in the country was too distant to reach the scene of
action in time to take part in the impending struggle. There was aid,
however, approaching, that he knew not of.

Clive revelled in danger. In its presence his splendid qualities
shone forth with a brilliancy which {127}has never been surpassed.
His was the soul that animated the material figures around him. His
the daring with which he could inspire his subordinates; imbue them
with his own high courage; and make them, likewise, 'conquer the
impossible.'

His conduct on the occasion I am describing is pre-eminently worthy
of study. A short interview with Mir Jafar filled his mind with grave
suspicions. He did not show them. He even permitted Mir Jafar to
proceed to Hugli to have an interview with the Dutch authorities. But
when the Subahdar despatched to him from that place a letter in which
he stated that he had simply granted to the Dutch some indulgences
with respect to their trade, he drew the correct conclusion, and
prepared to meet the double danger.

In his summary of the several courses he would have to adopt he
dismissed altogether the Subahdar from his mind. Him he feared not.
With the Dutch he would deal and deal summarily. He had already
despatched special messengers to summon every available man from the
outposts. He now called out the militia, 300 men, five-sixths of whom
were Europeans, to defend the town and fort; he formed half a troop
of volunteer horsemen, and enlisted as volunteer infantry all the men
who could not ride; he ordered the despatch-boat to sail with all
speed to the Arakan coast, where she would find a squadron under
Admiral Cornish ready to send him aid; he ordered up, to lie just
below the fort, the three Indiamen of {128}which I have spoken: he
strengthened the two batteries commanding the most important passages
of the river near Calcutta, and mounted guns on the nascent Fort
William. Then, when he had completed all that 'Prudentia' could
suggest, the rival goddess, 'Fortuna'[13] smiled upon him. Just as he
was completing his preparations, Colonel Forde and Captain Knox,
fresh from the conquest of the Northern Sirkars, arrived to
strengthen his hand. To the former Clive assigned the command of the
whole of his available force in the field: to the latter, the charge
of the two batteries.

[Footnote 13: 'Nullum numen abest si sit Prudentia; nos te, Nos
facimus Fortuna, deam.' _Juvenal_.]

Up to that period the Dutch had endeavoured to pose as peaceful
traders. But no sooner had their negotiations with Mir Jafar been
completed, and they had received his permission to ascend to
Chinsurah, than they threw off the mask, and sent an ultimatum to
Clive threatening vengeance unless the English should renounce their
claim of the right of search, and redress the other grievances they
enumerated. Clive replied that in all his actions he had been guided
by the authority vested in him by the Subahdar, the representative of
the Great Mughal; that he was powerless in the matter; but that if
they would refer their complaints to the Subahdar, he would gladly
act the part of mediator. The Dutch commander, however, paid no heed
to this somewhat vague reply, but acted as though it were a
{129}declaration of war. For, on receipt of Clive's letter he
attacked and captured seven small vessels lying off Falta, among them
the despatch-boat above referred to, tore down the English colours,
and transferred the guns and material to their own ships. Then,
having plundered the few houses on the riverbanks, he continued his
upward course, with his ships, although, from the want of pilots,
their progress was necessarily slow.

Clive, on hearing of these demonstrations, prepared to act on the
instant. First, he sent a despatch to the Subahdar, telling him that
the quarrel between the two European nations must be fought out
alone, adding, however, to test Mir Jafar, a paragraph to the effect
that the Subahdar would convince him of his sincerity and attachment
if he would directly surround their (the Dutch) subordinates, and
distress them in 'the country to the utmost.' Then he ordered Forde
to occupy Barnagar on the left bank of the Hugli, five miles from
Calcutta; to cross thence with his troops and four field-pieces to
Shirirampur, nine miles distant; to be ready, either there or beyond
it, to intercept the Dutch troops, in the event of their trying to
reach Chinsurah by land. Then, learning that the Dutch ships had
progressed as far as the Sankral reach, just below the fire of the
English batteries, and were landing their troops with directions to
march directly on Chinsurah, he issued orders for immediate action.

Recognizing on the instant that, by landing, the {130}enemy's troops
had severed themselves from their base--the ships--he despatched Knox
to join Forde, and sent information to the latter of the probable
route the enemy's troops would take, leaving it to him to deal with
them as he might consider advisable. Then he sent orders to Commodore
Wilson, the senior of the captains of the Indiamen, to demand from
the Commander of the Dutch squadron a full apology for the insults he
and his subordinates had been guilty of, the return of the
individuals and of the plunder he and they had taken, and their
immediate departure from the Hugli. Failing prompt compliance with
all these demands, Wilson was to attack the enemy's squadron.

The scene that followed deserves to rank with the most glorious
achievements of English sailors. The three captains were all built in
the heroic mould. Not one of them felt a doubt of victory when they
were ordered to attack a squadron in all respects more than double in
numbers and weight of metal to their own. It must suffice here to
say[14] that, the proposal of the English Commodore having been
refused by the Dutch, the English captains bore down upon the enemy;
after a contest of little more than two hours, captured or sank six
of their ships; the seventh, hurrying out to sea, fell into the hands
of two ships of war, then entering the river. Well {131}might the
victors exclaim, in the language of our great national poet:--

                       'O, such a day,
  So fought, so followed, and so fairly won,
  Came not till now to dignify the times,
  Since Caesar's fortunes.'

[Footnote 14: For a detailed account of this action see the author's
_Decisive Battles of India_.]

This success left the Dutch soldiers, then on their way to Chinsurah,
absolutely without a base. They could only find safety in success,
and success was denied them. They were first repulsed by Forde in an
attack they made on a position he had taken at Chandranagar, and the
next day almost destroyed by the same gallant officer, joined by
Knox, in a battle at the village of Biderra, nearly midway between
Chandranagar and Chinsurah. Few victories have been more decisive. Of
the 700 Europeans and 800 Malays landed from the ships, 120 of the
former and 200 of the latter were left dead on the field; 300, in
about equal proportions, were wounded; and the remainder, with the
exception of 60 Dutch and 250 Malays, were taken prisoners. Forde had
under his command on this eventful day (November 25) 320 Europeans,
800 sipahis, and 50 European volunteer cavalry. The previous day,
reckoning that he would have to fight the enemy with his inferior
numbers, he had sent a note to Clive asking for implicit
instructions. Clive, who was playing whist when the note reached him,
knowing with whom he was dealing, wrote across it, in pencil: 'Dear
Forde, Fight them immediately: I will send you the order {132}in
Council to-morrow,' and sent back the messenger with it.

The two victories were in all respects decisive. Never again did the
Dutch trouble the tranquillity of India. Mir Jafar was cowed. Three
days after the victory of Biderra, his son, Miran, arrived from
Murshidabad with 6,000 horse, for the purpose, he explained, of
exterminating the Dutch. Clive, always merciful in victory, gave to
these, against their baffled confederate, the protection which he
considered due to a foe no longer to be dreaded.

Clive now regarded the British position in Bengal so secure that he
might return to England to enjoy there the repose and the position he
had acquired. He had compressed into three years achievements the
most momentous, the most marvellous, the most enduring, recorded in
the history of his country. Landing with a small force below Calcutta
in the last days of 1756, he had compelled the Subahdar, who had been
responsible for the Black Hole tragedy, though guiltless of designing
it,[15] to evacuate Calcutta, to witness without interfering his
capture of Chandranagar. Determined, then, in the interests of his
country, to place matters in Bengal on such a footing that a
repetition of the tragedy of 1756 should be impossible, he resolved
to replace Siraj-ud-daula, himself the son of a usurper, by a native
chieftain {133}who should owe everything to the English, and who
would probably allow himself to be guided by them in his policy. To
this end he formed a conspiracy among his nobles, fomented discontent
among his people, and finally forced him to appeal to arms. At
Plassey Clive risked everything on the fidelity to himself of the
conspirators with whom he had allied himself. They were faithful. He
gained the battle, not gloriously but decisively, and became from the
morrow of the victory the lord paramount of the noble whom he placed
then on the _masnad_. Possibly it was partly policy which impelled
him to give his nominee no chance from the beginning. Certain it is,
that Mir Jafar was, from the moment of his accession, so handicapped
by the compulsion to make to his allies enormous payments, that his
life, from that moment to the hour of his deposition, presently to be
related, was not worth living. The commercial concessions which Clive
had forced from him gave the English an _imperium in imperio_. But
the Subahdar was in the toils. When invasion came from the north he
tried his utmost to avoid asking for the aid of Clive. But Clive,
who had sent his best soldiers to conquer the Northern Sirkars,
and to establish permanent relations with the Subahdar of the
Deccan--relations which secured to England a permanent predominance
in the most important districts of southern India--was indispensable.
His assistance, given in a manner which could not fail to impress the
natives of India--for the enemy fled at his approach--riveted the
{134}chains on the Subahdar. Then came the invasion of the Dutch. For
the first time a superior hostile force of Europeans landed on the
shores of British India. The Subahdar, anxious above all things to
recover his freedom of action, promised them his assistance. Clive
shone out here, more magnificently than he had shone before, as the
undaunted hero. Disdaining to notice the action of the Subahdar, he
gave all his attention to the European invaders; with far inferior
means he baffled their schemes; and crushed them in a manner such as
would make them, and did make them, remember and repent the audacity
which had allowed them to imagine that they could impose their will
on the victor of Kaveripak and Plassey. He had made the provinces he
had conquered secure, if only the rule which was to follow his own
should be based on justice, against the native rulers; secure for
ever against European rivals assailing it from the sea.

[Footnote 15: Siraj-ud-daula had given instructions that the
prisoners should be safely cared for, and had then gone to sleep. It
was the brutality of his subordinate officers which caused the
catastrophe.]

That, during this period, he had committed faults, is only to say
that he was human. But, unfortunately, some of his faults were so
grave as to cast a lasting stain on a career in many respects worthy
of the highest admiration. The forging of the name of Admiral Watson,
although the name was attached to the deed with, it is believed, his
approval,[16] was a crime light in comparison with the purpose for
which it {135}was done--the deceiving of the Bengali, Aminchand. It
is true that Aminchand was a scoundrel, a blackmailer, a man who had
said: 'Pay me well, or I will betray your secrets.' But that was no
reason why Clive should fight him with his own weapons: should
descend to the arena of deceit in which the countrymen of Aminchand
were past-masters. Possibly the atmosphere he breathed in such
society was answerable, to a great extent, for this deviation from
the path of honour. But the stain remains. No washing will remove it.
It affected him whilst he still lived, and will never disappear.

[Footnote 16: In his evidence before the Committee of the House of
Commons Clive said regarding the fictitious treaty: 'It was sent to
Admiral Watson, who objected to the signing of it; but, to the best
of his remembrance, gave the gentleman who carried it (Mr.
Lushington) leave to sign his name upon it.']

Then again, as to his dealings with Siraj-ud-daula and Mir Jafar. The
whole proceedings of Clive after his capture of Calcutta prove that
he intended to direct all his policy to the removal of that young
prince from the _masnad_. Some have thought that the Black Hole
tragedy was the cause of this resolve. But this can hardly be so, for
Mir Jafar, the commander-in-chief of the army which seized Calcutta
in 1756, was equally implicated in that transaction. The suggestion
that Siraj-ud-daula was intriguing with the French at Haidarabad is
equally untenable, for Clive knew he had little cause to fear their
hostility. Clive not only expelled that prince, but, by his policy,
his extortions, his insistance to obtain control of the saltpetre
traffic, rendered it impossible for his successor to govern. Success
attended his policy so long as he remained on the spot to control his
subordinates, but it was inevitable that, sooner or later, there
would come {136}a revulsion. The warlike natives of Bihar had not
been conquered, and they knew it. They had helped Clive, not that
they should become subject to the foreigner from the sea, but that
they might have a native ruler whom they trusted, in place of one
whom they disliked. When they realized that the result of this change
was not only subjection to the islanders, but impoverishment to
themselves, they broke into what was called rebellion, and showed on
many a bloody field that it was not they, only Siraj-ud-daula, who
had been conquered at Plassey.

This was the most dangerous legacy of the policy and action of Clive.
He recognized its shadowy existence. He wrote to his successor, Mr.
Vansittart, when he transferred to him his own office, that the only
danger he had to dread in Bengal was that which might arise from
venality and corruption. He might have added that the spoils of
Plassey had created a state of society in which those vices were
prominent; that the saltpetre monopoly, with the duties and
exemptions which had followed its acquisition, had confirmed them.
The Subahdar himself recognized the new danger which would follow the
departure of Clive. In his mind he was the moderator who, satisfied
himself, would have stayed the hands of others. To quiet the
newcomers there would be fresh rapacity, more stringent despoilings.
He felt, to use the expression of the period when Clive quitted
Bengal, that 'the soul was departing from the body.'

Clive made over charge to Mr. Holwell, of Black {137}Hole notoriety,
pending the arrival of Mr. Vansittart, the 15th of February, 1760.
With the sanction of the Court he had nominated Major Calliaud to be
Commander of the Forces. Four members of his Council retired about
the same time as himself.


{138}


CHAPTER XI
THE SECOND VISIT OF CLIVE TO ENGLAND


During his administration of four years in Bengal Clive had been
greatly hampered by the contradictory orders he had received from the
Court of Directors. In that Court there were four parties: the party
of alarmists at the aggrandizement of the Company's possessions in
India; the party of progressists; the middle party, composed of men
who would retain all that had been conquered, but who, not
understanding the necessity which often compels a conqueror to
advance that he may retain, would on no account sanction the
proceeding of a step further; a fourth party bent only on acquiring
plunder. As one or other of these parties obtained preponderance in
the Court, so did the orders transmitted to India take their colour.
In those days, it must be remembered, there was no Board of Control
to regulate and, if necessary, to modify, even entirely to alter, the
rulings of the General Court. Thus it was that the agent on the spot,
finding the orders from England constantly changing, was driven to
rely upon his own judgement, and to act on his own responsibility.
This did not signify so much so long as there was, on the spot,
{139}holding supreme authority, a Clive or a Warren Hastings. But
when the local chief authority was in the hands of men wanting alike
in intellect, in high principle, and in nerve, the situation was
likely to become dangerous in the extreme.

For the moment, when Clive quitted India, the situation was tranquil.
But it might become at any moment the reverse. Therefore it was that
Clive had recommended as his successor a man whom he believed he had
sounded to the core, and in whom he had found one after his own
heart. But there is no proverb more true than that contained in the
criticism passed by Tacitus on Galba, 'Omnium consensu capax imperii,
nisi imperasset.' We shall see presently how the conduct of
Vansittart corresponded to this aphorism.

A little more than a year before quitting the shores of Bengal, Clive
had addressed to Mr. Pitt, afterwards Lord Chatham, then Secretary of
State, a letter (January 7, 1759) in which he had represented the
difficulties of the actual situation, and had suggested a mode of
dealing with them. He had described the actual Subahdar as a man
attached to the English, and as likely to continue that attachment
'while he has no other support,' but totally uninfluenced by feelings
of gratitude, feelings not common to his race. On the other hand, he
was advanced in years; his son, Miran, was utterly unworthy, so
unworthy 'that it will be almost unsafe trusting him with the
succession.' He added immediately, as though prescient of the events
{140}which were to follow, 'In case of their,' the native princes,
'daring to be troublesome,' they--a body of 2000 English soldiers--
would 'enable the Company to take the sovereignty upon themselves.'
After detailing how the transfer would be easy, and palatable, rather
than otherwise, to the natives generally, Clive proceeded to
represent that so large a sovereignty might possibly be an object too
extensive for a mercantile company, and to suggest that it might be
worthy of consideration whether the Crown should not take the matter
in hand. The points he urged were the following: First, the ease with
which the English 'could take absolute possession of these rich
kingdoms, and that with the Mughal's own consent, on condition of
paying him less than a fifth of the revenues thereof.' There would
remain a surplus of two millions, besides most valuable productions
of nature and art. He dwelt, secondly, on the influence in Europe
which would thereby accrue to England, and the enormous increase of
prestige and of the advantages which prestige conveys, on the spot.
He added that a small force of European troops would be sufficient,
as he could enlist any number of sipahis, who 'will very readily
enter our service.' This letter he transmitted by the hands of Mr.
Walsh, his secretary during the campaign of Plassey and the year
following, and whom he describes as 'a thorough master of the
subject,' 'able to explain to you the whole design and the facility
with which it may be executed.'

Mr. Pitt received the letter, but was deterred from {141}acting upon
it by difficulties which arose in his mind from his want of knowledge
of India and of matters connected with that country. To the son of a
man whose father had been Governor of Madras in the days when the
English were the humble lessees of the lords of the soil, the
proposition to become masters of territories far larger and richer
than their island home, seemed beset with difficulties which, if it
may be said without disrespect to his illustrious memory, existed
solely in his own imagination--for they have since been very easily
overcome.

The letter served to make Clive personally known to the great
statesman when he landed in England in September or October, 1760. He
had returned a very rich man; he was full of ambition; his fame as a
soldier had spread all over the kingdom. Pitt, shortly before his
arrival (1758), had spoken of him in the House of Commons as a
'Heaven-born General,' as the only officer, by land or sea, who had
sustained the reputation of the country and added to its glory. The
King himself, George II, when the Commander-in-chief had proposed to
him to send the young Lord Dunmore to learn the art of war under
Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, had replied, 'What can he get by
attending the Duke of Brunswick? If he want to learn the art of war,
let him go to Clive.' These expressions show at least the temper of
the times, the feelings which would inspire the welcome which England
would give to her latest hero. And yet the welcome itself fell far
short of that which Clive had {142}anticipated. From the Crown there
was no immediate recognition; from the Court of Directors, a hostile
section of which held the supremacy, he received worse than neglect.
Almost their first act was to dispute his right to the jagir which
Mir Jafar had bestowed upon him.[1] From the general public there was
no demonstration. Clive felt that in England as in India he would
have to fight his way upwards.

[Footnote 1: See Chapter X, footnote 12.]

His health was not very good. He suffered from rheumatism, which had
assailed him in Bengal, and which bore a strong resemblance to
rheumatic gout. Scarcely had he recovered from this malady when he
was assailed by the insidious disease which, afterwards, but rarely
left him. This caused a depression of spirits which gradually wore
out his body. As a boy he had suffered at intervals from similar
attacks. They increased now in intensity, baffling the physicians who
attended him. He bore up bravely, however, and pushed forward with
his wonted energy the ambitious plans he had formed in the intervals
of quiet and repose.

At the age of thirty-five, with an enormous fortune, great ambition,
and sanguine hopes for the future, Clive trusted that the illness he
suffered from would eventually yield to treatment, and he entered on
his campaign in England with the confidence in himself which had been
one secret of his success in India. He had hoped, on his arrival, to
have been at once raised to the House of Peers. But the honours of
the {143}Crown, long delayed, took the shape only of an Irish
peerage. With this he was forced to be content, and, being debarred
from the Upper House, made all his arrangements to become a member of
the Lower. He speedily obtained a seat in that House.

Possibly he marred his prospects by the line which he took in
politics. In October, 1760, George II had died. The new King, whose
proudest boast was that he had been born an Englishman, made Lord
Bute Secretary of State. Soon after Pitt resigned, because the rest
of the Ministry refused to support him in his policy of going to war
with Spain, the Duke of Newcastle still remaining nominal head of the
Cabinet. In 1762 the Duke resigned, and Lord Bute became Prime
Minister. Sir John Malcolm states that Lord Clive was offered his own
terms if he would support the Bute Ministry. But Clive had given his
mental adhesion in another quarter, and therefore refused his
support, and was, it is stated, treated coldly in consequence.[2]

[Footnote 2: Vide Malcolm's _Clive_, vol. ii. p. 203: also Gleig, p.
134. There would seem to be some mistake as to the reason given by
Mr. Gleig for his statement that Clive refused his support to the
Bute Administration because of his devotion to George Grenville; for
George Grenville held the post of one of the principal Secretaries of
State in Lord Bute's Ministry.]

Though not a supporter of the Bute Administration, Clive did not
refrain from volunteering to it his advice when the preliminaries of
peace between France and England were under discussion. Both Powers
were resolved that the peace should extend to their possessions in
India. Clive wrote therefore to {144}Lord Bute suggesting the terms
upon which, in his opinion, it was absolutely necessary for the
safety of the East India Company he should insist. Prominent among
these were (1) the absolute limitation of the number of troops the
French might retain in Southern India, and (2) a prohibition to admit
into Bengal Frenchmen other than those engaged in commercial
enterprises. Lord Bute so far followed the advice as to induce the
French to agree not to maintain troops either in Bengal or the
Northern Sirkars. But when he would go further, and, on the
suggestion of Mr. Lawrence Sulivan, Chairman of the Court of
Directors, make the recognition of certain native princes a clause in
the projected treaty between the two Powers, Clive, with his habitual
prescience, denounced the clause as fraught with consequences most
disastrous to the position of England in India, and persuaded the
Minister to withdraw it.

The gentleman above referred to, Mr. Lawrence Sulivan, had become,
from pure motives of jealousy, one of the bitterest enemies of Clive.
Sulivan had served in India without distinction, but had succeeded in
amassing there a handsome fortune, and being a man of bold address
and pushing manners, had become a Director of the Company. Whilst
Clive was still in India Sulivan had professed the most unbounded
admiration for him and his achievements, and, by thus professing, had
obtained the support of the followers of Clive when he made a bid for
the Chairmanship of the Court. This he secured, and, being a man
{145}of considerable self-assertion and determination, succeeded in
becoming the dictator of the Council. Up to that time he had given
his support to Clive, but no sooner did he hear of the departure of
his hero for England, than, dreading the effect of his arrival upon
his own influence, he had become his most bitter opponent. He it was
who stimulated his colleagues to object to the donation of the jagir
to Clive, mentioned in a previous page. The grounds to the objection
were rather hinted at than expressed, for in those days the Court
could not deny the right of the Subahdar to bestow, or of Clive to
accept, so handsome a gift. The real motive was to exclude Clive from
a seat in the India House, and for a time Sulivan succeeded.

The hostility of Sulivan found an outcome in the progress of
political affairs. Clive had voted against the Peace of Paris
(February 10, 1763). Lord Bute, indignant at the opposition his
measure encountered, had made his power felt by dismissing three
dukes from their lord-lieutenancies, and he was very angry with
Clive. He then sought and obtained the alliance of Sulivan to crush
him. Up to that point Clive had remained quiescent; but at this new
outrage he turned. Very shortly afterwards Sulivan came before the
Court of Proprietors for re-election. To defeat him Clive had
purchased a large amount of India Stock and divided it amongst his
friends. At the show of hands there was a large majority against
Sulivan, but when the ballot-box was appealed to the position was
reversed, and Sulivan and his majority were returned. {146}For the
moment Clive's defeat was crushing, and he prepared to meet the
consequences of it. His opponents did not delay to show their hands.
Again was the question of the jagir mooted. The eminent counsel
employed by Clive gave an opinion that the Court had no case.
However, the Sulivan party persevered. Just on the eve of the trial,
however, there came news from India which produced a revolution of
opinion in the Court. The reports from Calcutta showed that the
combined avarice, greed, misgovernment, and tyranny of the civil
authorities left by Clive in Calcutta had produced a general
uprising; had almost undone the great work Clive had accomplished;
that there was no one on the spot who could be trusted to restore
order; but that unless such a task were committed to a competent man,
the possessions of the Company in Bengal would be in the greatest
danger. This intelligence caused a panic in the India House.
Instinctively the name of Clive came uppermost to every lip. The
Proprietors were summoned to meet in full Court. Panic-stricken, they
forced upon Clive the office, not merely of President, but of
Governor-General, with very full powers. That their conduct regarding
the jagir might not be pleaded by him as an objection to accept
office, the Proprietors passed a resolution that the proceedings
regarding the jagir should be stopped, and that the right of Clive to
it should be officially recognized.

This was indeed a triumph. The policy, _reculer pour mieux sauter_,
had been eminently justified. {147}But Clive was as generous in
victory as he had been great in defeat. He declined to profit by the
enthusiasm of the Proprietors. Declaring that he had a proposal to
make regarding the jagir, which he was confident the Court would
accept, he proceeded to declare that it would be impossible for him
to proceed to India leaving behind him a hostile Court and a hostile
chairman; that at least the existing chairman must be changed. He
carried the Proprietors with him, and measures were taken for a fresh
election.

This election took place on the 25th of April, 1764. At it one-half
of the candidates proposed by Sulivan were defeated, he himself being
returned by a majority of one only. The chairman and deputy-chairman
elected were both supporters of Clive. In the interval (March, 1764)
Clive had been nominated Governor-General and Commander-in-chief of
Bengal. To draw the fangs of the Council in Calcutta, four gentlemen
were nominated to form with him a Select Committee authorized to act
on their own authority, without reference to the Council.

One word, before the great man returns to the scenes of his triumphs,
clothed with the fullest authority, regarding the instrument used by
Mr. Sulivan and his friends to torture him. No sooner had the new
Court been elected than Clive made to it his suggestion regarding the
jagir. He proposed, and the Court agreed, that for a period of ten
years, the company should pay to him the full amount of the jagir
rents, unless he should die before, when the {148}payments would
cease; the ultimate disposal of the jagir to be made when the
occasion should arise.

These matters having been settled, the officers to serve under him
having been selected by himself, Clive, attended by two of the four
members who had been appointed by the Court to accompany him, Messrs.
Sumner and Sykes, embarked for Calcutta the 4th of June, 1764. Lady
Clive did not go with him. She had to remain in England to
superintend the education of her children.


{149}


CHAPTER XII
THE REIGN OF MISRULE IN BENGAL


Clive had chosen Mr. Vansittart to succeed him as President of the
Council in Bengal because he believed he had recognized in him a man
who would do all in his power to put down the growing system of
venality and corruption. I have already shown how he had written to
him before he quitted India. The words he had used were: 'The
expected reinforcements will, in my opinion, put Bengal out of all
danger but that of venality and corruption.' But Clive had not
sufficiently considered that the very fact that the new President had
been selected from Madras instead of from amongst the men who had
served under his immediate orders was likely to cause jealousy among
the latter; that Vansittart, notwithstanding his estimated lofty
moral nature,[1] had no strength of character; {150}no such
persuasive powers as could win men to his side; no pre-eminent
abilities; no force of will, such as Clive himself would have
displayed, to dominate or, in case of great emergency, to suspend a
refractory colleague. He was but one of the herd, well-meaning,
opposed in principle to the venality and corruption then in vogue,
but, in every sense of the term, ordinary. Even with respect to the
two vices he denounced, he was an untried and untempted man.

[Footnote 1: One anecdote will demonstrate the extent of the 'lofty
moral nature' attributed by Clive to Mr. Vansittart. After Clive had
been a year or so in England he wrote to Vansittart requesting him to
select for him and despatch to him an elephant, as he wished to
present one to the King. Vansittart chose and despatched the elephant
for presentation to his Majesty, not as a gift from Clive, but as
from himself.]

His capacity for rule was put to the test very soon after he had
assumed the reins of office. Those reins had not, as I have said,
been handed to him by Clive. He had taken them from Mr. Holwell at
the very end of July (1760). In the interval an event had occurred
which had changed the general position in Bengal. Five months after
Clive had quitted Calcutta (July 2, 1760) Miran, the only son of the
Subahdar, Mir Jafar, was struck dead by lightning. The reader may
recollect the passage in his letter to Mr. Pitt, wherein Clive
referred to this young man. He had described him as 'so cruel,
worthless a young fellow, and so apparently an enemy to the English,
that it will be almost unsafe trusting him with the succession.' If
another successor, with an unquestionable title, had been immediately
available, the death of Miran would have been no calamity. But there
was no such successor. The next son in order of succession had seen
but thirteen summers. Outside of that boy and his younger brothers
were many claimants, not one of them with an indefeasible title. Mir
Jafar himself {151}was older even than his years. It devolved then,
with the tacit consent of the nobles, on the Council at Calcutta, to
nominate the successor to Miran. Such was the state of affairs when
Mr. Vansittart arrived, and took his seat as President of the
Council.

It happened that there were in Bengal at this time two officers who
had rendered conspicuous service to the State, Majors Calliaud and
Knox. During the very month in which Clive had quitted Calcutta,
these officers had marched with such English troops and sipahis as
were available, to assist in the repelling of an invasion made by the
titular King of Delhi, prompted, it was believed, by Miran, and had
repulsed, with great loss to the enemy, an attempt made to storm the
city of Patna. Vansittart, who knew Calliaud well alike as a friend
and as a man trusted by Clive, summoned him to attend the Council
upon the deliberations of which the future of Bengal depended. The
discussions were long and somewhat heated. The party in the Council
which represented most accurately the opinions of Clive, as rendered
in his letter to Mr. Pitt, already referred to,[2] was of opinion
that whilst Mir Jafar should be allowed to reign during the remainder
of his life, opportunity should be taken of his death to transfer the
direct {152}administration to the English. If this opportunity had
been taken to carry out some such policy it is probable that the
evils which followed would have been avoided.

[Footnote 2: Clive's letter had been written during the life of
Miran. After detailing his character and the growing infirmities of
Mir Jafar, he had added: 'so small a body as 2000 Europeans will
secure us against any apprehensions from either the one or the other;
and, in case of their daring to be troublesome, enable the Company to
take the sovereignty upon themselves.']

The discussions were still proceeding when there arrived an envoy
from the Subahdar, his son-in-law, Mir Muhammad Kasim, a man of
ability, tact, great persuasive powers, no scruple, and, in a certain
sense, a patriot. Mir Kasim had coveted the succession vacant by the
death of Miran. He had divined the plans of the English; he hated
them as the enemies of the race of conquerors who had ruled Bengal
and its people for centuries. He despised them as venal: and he had
resolved to use them for his own advantage. He had brought with him a
bag full of promises, and, though nominally the representative of Mir
Jafar, had come resolved to work for his own interests.

Admitted into the secret deliberations of the Council, Mir Kasim soon
realized that, with the single exception of Major Calliaud, he could
buy them all. Even the scrupulousness of Mr. Vansittart vanished
before his golden arguments. He bought them. For certain specified
sums of money to be paid by him to each member of Council,[3] these
official Englishmen covenanted to dethrone their ally of Plassey, Mir
Jafar, and to seat on the _masnad_ his son-in-law, Mir Kasim. Three
days after the signature of the treaty Mir {153}Kasim set out to make
his preparations for the coming event, and two days afterwards Mr.
Vansittart started for Murshidabad to break the news to Mir Jafar.
His very first official act had been a violation of the principle
prescribed to him by Clive as the one the non-indulgence in which
would secure the English from all danger.

[Footnote 3: He included even Major Calliaud, but without the
consent, and after the departure from India, of that officer.]

The events which followed must be stated very briefly. Vansittart
obtained from Mir Jafar his resignation. The one condition stipulated
by the old man was that thenceforth he should reside, under the
protection of the English, at Calcutta, or in its immediate vicinity.
For that city he started the following morning (September 19). Mir
Kasim proceeded to Patna to complete the arrangements which had
followed the repulse of the invasion of Bihar by the troops of Shah
Alim, and was there formally installed by Shah Alim himself as
Subahdar of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa.

Mir Kasim possessed all the capacities of a ruler. He knew thoroughly
the evils under which the three provinces were groaning, and he
proceeded with all the energy of a nature which never tired to reform
them. He moved his capital to Mungir, a town with a fortress, on the
right bank of the Ganges, commanding Northern and Eastern Bihar, and
nearly midway between Calcutta and Benares. He then proceeded to
reform his infantry on the English system, enlisting in his service
two well-known soldiers of mixed or Armenian descent, Samru and
{154}Markar, to command brigades of their own, and to aid in the
training of the other soldiers. So far he achieved success. But when
he proceeded to alleviate the misery of his people, he found that the
fatal gift of the salt monopoly enabled the English to thwart all his
efforts. For not only did the English use the authority they
possessed to the great impoverishment of the soil, but they gave to
their friends and dependents licences exempting from the payment of
duty in such profusion, that the people of Bengal and Bihar suffered
to an extent such as, in the present day, can with difficulty be
credited. Never, on the one side, was there so insatiable a
determination to become rich, no matter what misery might be thereby
caused to others; never, on the other, a more honest endeavour, by
sacrifices of any kind, to escape the ruin caused by such cruel
exactions.

At last, when he had exhausted appeal after appeal to the Calcutta
authorities, Mir Kasim recognized that his only chance of escape from
the pressure too hard to be borne, was to appeal to the God of
Battles. He was ready; the English, he believed, were not. He had
excellent fighting material; generals who would not betray him. On
the other hand, he knew that Clive and Calliaud had quitted India,
and he did not believe that either had his equal amongst the men on
the spot. Accordingly, just after he had received a demand from
Calcutta, compliance with which would have completed the ruin then
{155}impending, he took the bold step of abolishing all transit
duties, and of establishing free-trade throughout his territories.
Anticipating the consequences of this bold act, he notified to his
generals to be prepared for any movement the English might make.

Here, in the space allotted,[4] it must suffice to state that the
English, amazed that such a worm as the Subahdar of the three
provinces should dare to question their commands, sent two of their
number to remonstrate with him. But, whilst they were negotiating,
another Englishman, one of their own clique, a civil officer named
Ellis, furious at the idea of stooping to negotiate, made
preparations to seize the important city of Patna. At the head of a
small force he did surprise (June 25, 1763) that city during the
hours before daybreak, but the garrison of the citadel and of a large
stone building refused to admit him. Little caring for this, he
permitted his men to disperse to plunder. Meanwhile the commander of
the Subahdar's troops, Mir Mehdi Khan, had started for Mungir to
represent to his master the turn events had taken. On his way
thither, a few miles from the city, he encountered the troops in his
master's service commanded by Markar, the Armenian. Markar, as in
duty bound, at once marched on Patna, found the English still
plundering, drove them out of the city, and forced them to take
refuge in a factory outside of it. {156}There he besieged them, and
thence he forced them to retreat (June 29). Meanwhile the Subahdar
had despatched his other brigade, under Samru, to Baksar, to cut off
the retreat of the English, whilst he urged Markar to follow them up.
Markar followed, caught, and attacked them between the two
places--the 1st of July--and completely defeated them. The English,
of whom there were 300, aided by 2,500 natives, fought with their
usual courage; but they were badly led, were discouraged, and were
completely beaten. Those who did not fall on the field were taken
prisoners, re-conveyed to Patna, and were there eventually put to
death.

[Footnote 4: For a detailed account of the events preceding and
following this action on the part of Mir Kasim, the reader is
referred to the author's _Decisive Battles of India_, New Edition,
pp. 133-174.]

Such was the mode in which the war began. Had not the English
possessed, though they knew it not until experience had taught them,
a commander not inferior to any of the men who had done so much for
the glory of their country in the East, it is probable that Mir
Kasim, who, according to a contemporary writer,[5] 'was trained to
arms,' and who 'united the gallantry of the soldier with the sagacity
of the statesman,' would have driven them to their ships.

[Footnote 5: The author of an admirable book, written at the time,
entitled, _Transactions in India from 1756 to 1783_.]

From such a fate they were saved by the skill, the devotion, the
supreme military talents of Major John Adams. This officer, placed in
command, defeated Mir Kasim's army, after a very bloody battle, at
Katwa (July 19); again, a few days later, after a most stubborn
resistance, at Gheria. But neither {157}of these battles was decisive
of the war. When, however, the month following, Adams stormed the
immensely strong position of Undwa Nala, defended by 40,000 men, and
captured 100 pieces of cannon, Mir Kasim recognized that the war was
over. He made no attempt to defend either Rajmahal, Mungir, or Patna.
On the fall of the latter city (November 6) he fled to Oudh to take
refuge there with the Nawab-Wazir, and to instigate him to espouse
his cause.

It is only necessary to add that he succeeded in persuading that
prince to attempt the venture. He attempted it, however, only to
repent his audacity, for, after much manoeuvring, the English, led by
Munro, afterwards Sir Hector--who, after an interval of the incapable
Carnac, had succeeded Adams, killed by the climate and the fatigues
of the campaign--inflicted a crushing defeat upon him on the plains
of Baksar (October 23, 1764); then Munro, pursuing his victorious
course, occupied successively Benares, Chanar, and Allahabad. In
March, 1765, the English overran Oudh, occupying Lucknow and
Faizabad; then went on to beat the enemy at Karra, and again at Kalpi
on the Jumna. Then the Nawab-Wazir, 'a hopeless wanderer,' threw
himself on the mercy of the conquerors. These behaved to him with
conspicuous generosity, repaid by his successors in late years. The
English frontier was, however, not the less advanced, practically, as
far as Allahabad. Such was the military position when Clive returned
to Calcutta as Governor in May, 1765.

{158}Meanwhile the English, on the outbreak of the war with Mir
Kasim, had restored Mir Jafar, receiving the usual gratuities for
themselves and stipulating for exemptions from all duties except two
and a half per cent. on salt. As for Mir Kasim, it is only necessary
to add that he died some years later at Delhi in extreme poverty.
With all his faults he was a patriot.


{159}


CHAPTER XIII
THE PURIFYING OF BENGAL


When Clive quitted England for Bengal (June 4, 1764) he knew only
that the war with Mir Kasim was raging, and that Mir Jafar had been
reinstated in his position. It was not until he reached Madras, the
10th of April following, that he learned that Mir Kasim had been
finally defeated, that his followers had submitted, that Mir Jafar
was dead, and that the Nawab-Wazir of Oudh had thrown himself on the
clemency of the English. In the interval of twenty-three days which
elapsed before his arrival in Calcutta (May 3), he had time, in
consultation with the two members of the Select Committee who
accompanied him, Messrs. Sykes and Sumner, to deliberate regarding
the course of action which it would behove him to adopt on his
arrival there.[1]

[Footnote 1: The other two were General Carnac and Mr. Verelst.]

One of his first acts on arrival was to remodel the army. He placed
General Carnac at its head, divided the European infantry into three
battalions, gave regimental commands to two officers who had
accompanied him from England, and regulated all the {160}superior
appointments in a manner the best adapted, in his opinion, to secure
efficiency.

He dealt likewise with the Civil Service. Nothing had impressed Clive
more than the evil effects of the predominance of venality and
corruption during the rule which had followed his first departure,
and he was resolved to put them down with a strong hand. He found, on
his landing, a subject which gave him the opportunity he desired for
showing publicly the bent of the line of conduct he intended to
pursue.

Four months before his return, Mir Jafar, worn out by anxiety and
trouble, had passed away. His position had become degraded, even in
his own eyes. From having been, as he was on the morrow of Plassey,
the lord of three rich provinces, he had become, to use the words of
a contemporary Englishman,[2] 'a banker for the Company's servants,
who could draw upon him as often and to as great an amount as they
pleased.'

[Footnote 2: Mr. Scrafton. See Scrafton's _Letters_.]

We have seen how the members of Council had benefited pecuniarily by
the elevation of Mir Jafar to the _masnad_ in 1757; by that of his
successor in 1763; by Mir Jafar's re-elevation the same year. The
opportunity of again selecting a successor was not to be passed over
without their once again plunging their hands in the treasury of
Murshidabad. They found that there were two candidates for the vacant
office, the son of Miran, and therefore grandson of Mir Jafar, and
the eldest surviving son of that {161}Nawab. The decision arrived at
by the Council, then reduced by vacancies to eight members, was to
sell the succession to the candidate who should bid the highest price
for it. They decided in favour of the son of Mir Jafar, for, although
illegitimate, he was of an age at which he could act on his own
authority; the other was a minor, whose revenues would have to be
accounted for. In return for their complaisance, it was agreed that
they should receive a sum of money, to be divided as they might
arrange, close upon ten lakhs of rupees; in addition, there was to be
paid another sum, just over ten lakhs, for secret services rendered
by one of their number, Mr. Gideon Johnstone, and by a Muhammadan,
Muhammad Riza Khan, who also, in pursuance of the arrangement, was
nominated Deputy-Nawab. This shameful bargain was signed, sealed, and
delivered on the 25th of February, little more than two months before
Lord Clive landed.

An order from the India Office, which reached Calcutta just thirteen
days before the death of Mir Jafar, and which prohibited--by a new
covenant, to be signed by all the Civil Servants in India--the
acceptance by such servants of presents of any kind from the natives
of India, greatly strengthened the hands of Clive in dealing with
this transaction. Finding that in the Council itself he would be
subjected to much cavilling, he at once superseded its action by
declaring (May 7) that the Select Committee[3] had been constituted.
He then, with that Committee, {162}assumed the whole powers of the
Government, took an oath of secrecy, and had a similar oath
administered to the only two of his colleagues who were present. He
then set himself to examine all the matters connected with the
succession to the office of Subahdar of the three provinces.

[Footnote 3: See Chapter XI.]

He had to deal with men whom a long course of corruption had rendered
absolutely shameless. Charged by Clive with having violated the
orders of their masters in accepting presents after such acceptance
had been prohibited, they replied that they had taken Clive himself
as their model, and referred to his dealings with Mir Jafar in 1757,
and afterwards at Patna, when he accepted the famous jagir. The reply
naturally was that such presents were then permitted, whereas now
they were forbidden. Clive added, among other reasoning, that then
there was a terrible crisis; that for the English and Mir Jafar it
was then victory or destruction, whereas now there was no crisis; the
times were peaceful, the succession required no interference. He
again charged the members of Council with having put up the Subahdar
for sale to the highest bidder, in order that they might put the
price of it into their own pockets, and with having used indecent
haste to complete the transaction before his arrival.

Clive could at the moment do no more than expose these men, now
practically powerless. He forced them, however, to sign the new
covenants. But his treatment of them rankled in their minds. They
{163}became his bitterest enemies, and from that time forward used
all the means at their disposal to harass, annoy, and thwart him.
When, finally, he drove them from the seats they had disgraced, in
the manner presently to be related, they carried their bitterness,
their reckless audacity, and their slanderous tongues to England,
there to vent their spleen on the great founder of British India.

Having silenced these corrupt men, Clive turned his attention to the
best means of regulating, on fair terms, commercial interests between
the native and the foreigner. He soon recognized that the task of
Hercules when he was set to cleanse the stables of King Augeas was
light in comparison with the task he had undertaken. In the first
place he was greatly hampered by the permission which the Court of
Directors had granted to their Civil Servants to engage in private
trade. So poorly paid were they, indeed, that private trade, or a
compensation for it, had become necessary to them to enable them to
live decently. The proposed compensation was afterwards adopted of
fixing their salaries on a scale which would take away all temptation
to indulge in other methods of obtaining money. Vainly did Clive
press upon the Court the adoption of this alternative. Amongst our
countrymen there is one class whose business it is to rule; but there
are often other classes which aspire to that privilege, and which
seize the opportunity afforded them to exercise power, but whose
members possess neither the education, the enlightenment, nor the
turn {164}of mind to do so with success. Of this latter class were
the men who had become the Directors of the East India Company. These
men possessed no prescience; they were quite unable to make a correct
forecast; they could consider only the present, and that dimly. They
could not realize that the world was not standing still, and they
would have denounced that man as a madman who should have told them
that the splendid daring of Clive had made them the inheritors of the
Mughal empire. Seeing only as far as the tips of their noses, these
men declined to increase the salaries of their servants or to
prohibit private trade.

Hercules could bend to his process of cleansing the stables of the
King of Elis, the rivers Alpheus and Peneus. Clive could not bend the
Court of Directors. The consequence was that his labour was great,
his success incomplete. The utmost he could do, and did do, was to
issue an order abrogating the privilege, used by the Civil Servants
to the ruin of the children of the soil, to grant passes for the
transit of merchandize free of duty; restricting such privilege to
certain authorities named and defined. Upon the private trade of the
civilians he imposed restrictions which minimized as far as was
possible, short of its abolition, the evils resulting from permission
to trade, bringing it in fact to a great extent under the control of
the Government. In both these respects his reforms were wider, and
went deeper, than those which Mir Kasim had vainly asked from Mr.
Vansittart and his Council.

With regard to the salt monopoly, Clive had made {165}investigations
which proved that the trade in that commodity had been conducted in a
manner which, whilst securing enormous profits for the few, had
pressed very hardly on the many. He endeavoured to reduce this evil
by placing the trade on a settled basis which, whilst it would secure
to the natives a supply of the article at a rate not in excess of
that which the poor man could afford, would secure to the servants of
the Company fixed incomes on a graduated scale. His scheme, he knew,
was far from being perfect, but it was the best he could devise in
the face of the refusal of the India Office to increase salaries, and
certainly it was a vast improvement on the system it superseded.
Whilst it secured to the Company's servants in all departments an
adequate, even a handsome, income, it reduced the price of salt to
the natives to an amount from ten to fifteen per cent. below the
average price to them of the preceding twenty years.

This accomplished, Clive proceeded to reconstitute the Calcutta
Council. According to the latest orders then in existence this
Council was composed of a president and sixteen members: but the fact
of a man being a member of Council did not prevent him from accepting
an agency in other parts of the Company's territories. The result was
that many of the members held at the same time executive and
supervising offices. They controlled, as councillors, the actions
which they had performed as agents. There had been in consequence
great laxity, much wrongdoing, complete failure of justice. Clive
remedied {166}this evil by ruling that a member of Council should be
that and nothing more. He encountered great opposition, even amongst
the members of the Select Committee, but he carried through his
scheme.

Of this Select Committee it may here be stated that Clive used its
members solely as a consultative committee. Those members had their
duties, not always in Calcutta. Thus, whilst Carnac was with the
army, Sykes acted at Murshidabad as the Governor's agent; Verelst
supervised the districts of Burdwan and Mednipur: Mr. Sumner alone
remained with Clive. This gentleman had been nominated to succeed
Clive in case of his death or resignation. But it had become evident
to Clive long before the period at which we have arrived that he was
in every way unfitted for such an office. Infirm of purpose,
sympathizing to a great extent with the corrupt party, wanting in
energy, Sumner had given Clive but a slack support. This was the case
especially in the matter of the reform of the Council just narrated.

Pursuing his inquiries Clive soon discovered that the administration
of the civil districts and divisions by the Company's officers had
been as faulty and corrupt as it well could be. The case, after
examination and report, was tersely put by the Court of Directors in
their summary of the state of Bengal on his arrival there. They
described the three provinces, Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, as 'a
_subah_'[4] disarmed, with {167}a revenue of almost two millions
sterling, at the mercy of our servants, who had adopted an unheard-of
ruinous principle, of an interest distinct from that of the Company.
This principle showed itself in laying their hands upon everything
they did not deem the Company's property. To reform the abuses so
described Clive invoked the assistance of those who ought to have
been immediately concerned in the introduction of juster
administration. He invited the young Nawab and his councillors to
Calcutta, and held with them long conferences. The disclosures which
followed more than confirmed the worst fears he had entertained
regarding the all but universal corruption of the members of the
Civil Service. It was in consequence of these disclosures that he
compelled the retirement from the Council, as he had found it
composed on his arrival, of five of its members, and suspended the
remaining three. He filled up the vacancies thus caused by indenting
on Madras for a sufficient number of civilians to raise the total
number of councillors to twelve.

[Footnote 4: The word 'Subah' is used here to mean one of the large
divisions of the Mughal empire.]

These sweeping reforms produced their natural effect. Clive became
hated. The civilians and their friends and accomplices acted
according as their natures were dominated by fear or by love of
revenge. Of the former, one, greatly inculpated, the chief agent of
Patna, committed suicide. Of the latter, many formed amongst
themselves an association, of which the following were some of the
principal articles:--'all visits to the Governor were forbidden; no
{168}invitations from him or from the members of the Select Committee
were to be accepted; the gentlemen coming from Madras were to be
treated with neglect and contempt; every member who should deviate
from these rules would be denounced and avoided.' At a later period
their hostility indicated itself in a more serious manner.

Of the young Subahdar Clive formed but a poor opinion. He seemed to
him a nullity. The one man of ability about him, the minister
Muhammad Riza Khan, the chief of those who had been bribed to raise
him to the _masnad_, was absolutely without scruple. Clive was most
unwilling to trust the political education of the Subahdar to such a
man, or to others about him who possessed his unscrupulousness but
did not share his ability. But it was difficult to discover a better
man; and Clive had ultimately to be content with the endeavour to
lessen his influence by associating with him Raja Dulab Ram--the
general who had conspired with Mir Jafar before Plassey--and with the
head of the great banking-house of the Set family. But the influence
of Riza was too deeply founded to be lightly shaken.

The introduction of the reforms I have noted caused a great strain on
the constitution of the illustrious man whose iron will carried them
through. He had to fight against a faction of interested men,
assailed by abuse, thwarted by opposition, and opposed secretly by at
least one of the colleagues sent to support him. He was absolutely
alone in the contest. {169}But his brave heart and his resolute will
carried him through. It was far more trying than fighting a battle,
or planning and carrying through a campaign. In those cases there is
always the excitement of constant action; the daily, often hourly,
survey of the positions; the _certaminis gaudia_ so eloquently
described by Attila; 'the holiday,' as that great conqueror called
it, 'of the battle-field.' In the daily examinations of deeds which
call a blush to the cheek, and of devising measures to repress them
in the future, Clive found none of these excitements. But though the
work was dreary and heartrending, though, by reason of the opposition
he encountered, it called into action all his mental vigour, all his
intelligence, all his determination, it was terribly exhausting. It
wore him out. Well might Sir John Malcolm write that it may be
questioned 'whether any of Clive's many and great achievements called
forth more of that active energy and calm firmness for which he was
distinguished than was evinced in effecting the reform of the Civil
Service of Bengal.'

There accompanied, moreover, in all his civil contests, another
mental trial. From causes which have been stated none of the reforms,
he constantly felt, could be stamped as 'thorough.' They were none of
them complete. He did much; he broke down corruption; he laid the
foundation for a permanent and perfect reform; he checked an enormous
evil; he infused a healthier tone into the younger members of the
service; he aided largely towards {170}the rehabilitation of the
British name, then sunk deep in the mire. But the want of intuition,
of foresight, of the Court of Directors rendered it impossible for
him to do more. That ultimate aim was to come after him; his
principles were to triumph; his harassing work had not been done in
vain. It was by adopting in their entirety the principles of Lord
Clive that the Civil Service of India became one of the noblest
services the world has ever seen; pure in its honour; devoted in the
performance of its duties; conspicuous for its integrity and ability.
It has produced men whose names would have given lustre to any
administration in the world, and it continues to produce them still.
The work of a great man lives after him. There is not a member of the
Civil Service of India who does not realize that for them Clive did
not live in vain.

Our admiration for him at this epoch of his career will be the
greater when we realize that the administrative reforms I have
mentioned were only a part of the duties which devolved upon him.
Simultaneously with the dealing with them he had to devote his time
and attention to other matters of the first importance. To the
consideration of these I shall ask the reader's attention in the next
chapter.


{171}


CHAPTER XIV
THE POLITICAL AND FOREIGN POLICY OF LORD CLIVE: HIS
ARMY-ADMINISTRATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES


On the 25th of June Clive started on his tour northward. His presence
was urgently needed on the frontier, for he had to deal with two
humiliated princes, the Nawab-Wazir of Oudh, and the actual inheritor
of the empire of the Mughal, Shah Alim, now a houseless fugitive, his
capital occupied by the Afghans, possessing no resources but such as
might accrue from the title which he bore.

At Murshidabad, which he took on his way upwards, Clive had to settle
with the young Subahdar the system which it would be incumbent upon
him to introduce into the three provinces, as governor under the
over-lordship of the English. The positions of the native ruler and
the western foreigner had become completely inverted since the
period, only nine years distant, when Siraj-ud-daula marched against
Calcutta to expel thence those who were his vassals. The system to be
imposed now on the Subahdar provided that he should become a
{172}Nawab-Nazim, responsible for the peace and for the maintenance
of public order in the three provinces, for the administration of
justice, and for the enforcing of obedience to the law; that there
should be a Diwan, or chief minister, empowered to collect the yearly
revenue of the provinces, responsible for all disbursements, and for
the payment of the surplus into the Imperial treasury. This system
had prevailed in the time of the Emperor Aurangzeb. But there was
this important difference. In Clive's scheme, whilst Nujm-ud-daula
would be Nawab-Nazim, the East India Company would occupy, from that
time forth and for ever, the position of Diwan; and the Imperial
treasury would be the treasury of the Company. The scheme was agreed
to by the young Nawab and his surroundings. But in working it, one
part was found to place a power that would be abused in the hands of
the Nawab-Nazim. Accordingly, a few months later, that prince was
relieved of the responsibility for the maintenance of the public
peace, for the administration of justice, and for the enforcing of
obedience to the law. In a word, the Company became the rulers of the
three provinces, the Nawab-Nazim a cypher. Nay, more, the sum of
money which the Nawab-Nazim was to have at his disposal was limited
to fifty-three lakhs of rupees; from this he was to defray the entire
expenses of his court. Was it for such a result, might the shade of
Mir Jafar inquire, that the nobles of the three provinces combined to
betray Siraj-ud-daula?

{173}After having thus settled the affairs of the Company at
Murshidabad, Clive proceeded by way of Patna to Benares, to meet
there his friend General Carnac and the suppliant Nawab-Wazir of
Oudh. This interview was, in the eyes of Clive, likely to be fraught
with the most important consequences, for he was bent on the securing
of a frontier for the English possessions such as would offer the
best points of defence against invasion; for, in his view, it was to
be permanent.

It ought not to be attributed as a great political fault to Clive
that his mind had not realized the fact that to maintain it is often
necessary to advance. In a word, it would be most unfair to judge the
action of 1765-6 by the lights of the experience of the century which
followed. Up to the year 1757 the unwarlike inhabitants of Bengal had
been the prey of the Mughal or the Maratha. But in 1765, so far as
could be judged, neither was to be feared. The Maratha power had
suffered in 1761, on the field of Panipat, near Delhi, one of the
most crushing defeats ever inflicted on a people, and Clive had no
power of divining that the genius of a young member of one of their
ruling families, who escaped wounded from the field, would, in a few
years, raise the Maratha power to more than its pristine greatness.
As for the Mughal, his power was gone for ever; the representative
prince was at the very moment a fugitive at Allahabad, not possessed
of a stiver. What was there to be feared from him or from his family?
In the {174}three provinces the English possessed the richest parts
of India. It was surely good policy, he argued, if he could by treaty
with his neighbours, and by occupying the salient points which
covered them, render them unassailable.

After some preliminary conversation with the Nawab-Wazir, Clive found
that it would be necessary to proceed to Allahabad to confer there
with the titular emperor, Shah Alim. He found that prince full of
ideas as to the possibility of recovering with the aid of Clive his
lost possessions in the north-west. Nothing was further from Clive's
mind than an enterprise of that character, and, with his accustomed
tact he soon convinced the two princes that it was necessary first to
settle the English frontier before discussing any other subject. He
then proceeded to develop his plan. He demanded the cession of the
fortress of Chanar to the English; the provinces of Karra and
Allahabad to the Emperor, to be held, on his behalf, by the English;
the payment by the Nawab-Wazir of fifty lakhs, for the expenses of
the war just concluded; an engagement from him never to employ or
give protection to Mir Kasim or to Samru; permission to the East
India Company to trade throughout his dominions, and to establish
factories within them. The Nawab-Wazir agreed to every clause except
to that regarding the factories. He had observed, he stated, that
whenever the English established a footing in a country, even though
it were only by means of a commercial {175}factory, they never budged
from it; their countrymen followed them; and in the end they became
masters of the place. He then pointed out how, in nine years, the
small factory of Calcutta had absorbed the three provinces, and was
now engaged in swallowing up places beyond their border. He would
not, he finally declared, submit his dominions to the same chance.
Recognizing his earnestness, and having really no desire to plant
factories in Oudh, Clive wisely gave way on that one point. He
carried, however, all the other points. It was further arranged that
the Zamindar of Benares, who had befriended the English during the
war, should retain his possessions in subordination to the
Nawab-Wazir; that a treaty of mutual support should be signed between
the English, the Nawab-Wazir, and the Subahdar of the three
provinces; and that should English troops be required to fight for
the defence of the Nawab-Wazir's country, he should defray all their
expenses.

Subsequently at Chapra, in Bihar, Clive met the Nawab-Wazir, the
representative of Shah Alim, agents from the Jat chiefs of Agra, and
others from the Rohilla chiefs of Rohilkhand. The avowed purpose of
the meeting was to form a league against Maratha aggression, it
having been recently discovered that that people had entered into
communications with Shah Alim for the purpose of restoring him to his
throne. Then it was that the question of the English frontier was
discussed. It was eventually agreed that one {176}entire brigade
should occupy Allahabad, to protect that place and the adjoining
district of Karra;[1] that a strong detachment of the second brigade
should occupy Chanar; two battalions Benares; and one Lucknow. On his
side the Emperor granted firmans bestowing the three provinces upon
the East India Company 'as a free gift without the association of any
other person,' subject to an annual payment to himself and successors
of twenty-six lakhs of rupees, and to the condition that the Company
should maintain an army for their defence.

[Footnote 1: Karra was a very important division and city in the time
of the Mughals, and is repeatedly referred to by the native
historians whose records appear in Sir H. Elliot's history. See vols.
ii, iii, iv, v and viii. The city is now in ruins.]

On the 19th of May following the Subahdar of the three provinces
died. The arrangements made by Clive had deprived the position of all
political importance. The individuality of the person holding that
once important office was therefore of little importance. The next
heir, a brother, naturally succeeded. The only change made on the
occasion was the reduction of the allowance for all the expenses of
the office from fifty-three to forty-one lakhs of rupees.

On one point Clive continued firm. Although, practically, the English
had now become the masters of the three provinces, the Subahdar only
the show-figure, he insisted that the former should still remain in
the background. The revenue was still to be collected in {177}the
name, and nominally on behalf of the native prince. The utmost he
would permit in a contrary direction was to appoint English
supervisors, to see that the native collectors did their duty. Beyond
that he would not go. In the eyes of the world of India the three
provinces were to continue a _Subah_, administered by a Subahdar. The
control of the English was to remain a matter for arrangement with
the actual ruler, their real power only to be prominently used when
occasion might require, and then, likewise, in the name of the
Subahdar.

We have fortunately from his own hand the principles which guided
him, and which he hoped would guide his successors, in their
relations to the other powers of India. In a State paper[2] written
before his departure, he thus expressed his views: 'Our possessions
should be bounded by the provinces.' 'We should studiously maintain
peace; it is the groundwork of our prosperity. Never consent to act
offensively against any Powers except in defence of our own, the
King's, or the Nawab-Wazir's dominions, as stipulated by treaty; and,
above all things, be assured that a march to Delhi would be not only
a vain and fruitless project, but attended with destruction to your
own army, and perhaps put a period to the very being of the Company
in Bengal.' In a word, to borrow the criticism of the author from
whose work I have quoted, 'the English were to lie snugly
{178}ensconced in the three provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa.
The frontier of Oudh was to form a permanent barrier against all
further progress.' Such a policy might commend itself to the
theorist, but it was not fitted for the rough throes of an empire in
dissolution, its several parts disputed by adventurers. Within a
single decade it was blown to the winds.[3]

[Footnote 2: _Early Records of British India_, by Talboys Wheeler. In
this interesting work the paper quoted from is given _in extenso_.]

[Footnote 3: Wheeler.]

There is one subject upon which it becomes me to touch slightly
before considering the army administration. During one of his visits
to Murshidabad it was discovered that, in his will, the late
Subahdar, Mir Jafar, had bequeathed five lakhs of rupees to Clive.
The discovery was made after Clive, in common with the other servants
of the Company, had bound himself not to accept any presents from
natives of India. He could not therefore take the legacy himself. But
the money was there--practically to be disposed of as he might
direct. He resolved, with the approval of his Council, to constitute
with it a fund for the relief of the officers and men of the
Company's army who might be disabled by wounds or by the climate.
Thus was formed the institution which, under the title of 'Lord
Clive's Fund,' served to bring help and consolation to many poor and
deserving servants of the Company for nearly a century. By a strange
freak of fortune this fund reverted, in 1858, on the transfer of
India to the Crown, to the descendants of the very man who could not,
or believed he could not, accept it, when bequeathed to him, for
himself.

{179}Whilst dealing with the internal administration of the country,
and arranging for the protection of its frontier, Clive had not been
unmindful of the other duty strongly impressed upon him by the Court
of Directors, that of examining the pay and allowances of their
military officers, with special reference to an allowance known as
Batta. Batta, in a military sense, represented the extra sum or
allowance granted to soldiers when on field duty. Practically it had
been granted on the following principle. Officers had been allowed a
fixed monthly pay and allowances, not including batta, when they were
serving in garrison. When they took the field they drew an extra sum
as batta, known as full batta; but when they were detached to an
out-station, not being actually in the field, they drew only half
that amount, which was called half-batta. After the battle of
Plassey, Mir Jafar, in the profusion of his gratitude, had bestowed
upon the officers an additional sum equal to full batta. This was
called 'double batta,' and as long as the army was in the field,
fighting for the interests of that chief, he continued, with the
sanction of the Council of Calcutta, to disburse that allowance. Mir
Kasim, on his succession, had expressed his intention to continue
this payment, and had assigned to the Company, for that purpose
amongst others, the revenues of three districts. But the Court of
Directors, not fully realizing that the transaction with Mir Kasim
was one eminently advantageous to themselves, and forgetting that the
receipt of the revenues of the three provinces {180}was accompanied
by an obligation, chose to forget the latter point, and accepting the
revenues, issued peremptory orders to discontinue the disbursement of
double batta. This order seemed so unjust that the then Council of
Calcutta (1762), on receiving it, went thoroughly into the question,
and, in a despatch to the Court, submitted the case for the officers
in the strongest terms. The reply of the Court adds one proof to many
of the unfitness of men not belonging to the ruling class to exercise
supreme authority. The Directors refused the prayer of their servants
on grounds which, by no artifice of despatch-writing, could be made
to apply to the circumstances of the case.

That reply was dated the 9th of March, 1763. Just one month earlier
the Calcutta Council had appointed a Special Committee on the spot to
examine and report upon the question. But before the Committee could
complete its inquiries there broke out that war with Mir Kasim, which
called for the extraordinary exertions of the class whose claims were
under examination. The services of Majors Adams and Carnac, two of
the members of the Committee, were required in the field, and it was
by the splendid exertions of the former and his officers that the
Company was rescued from imminent peril. The inquiry dropped during
the war.

But although the splendid exertions of the officers saved British
interests in 1763, the Court of Directors did not the less persist in
resolving to curtail their {181}allowances. On the 1st of June, 1764,
whilst the army, having conquered Mir Kasim, stood opposed to the
forces of the Nawab-Wazir of Oudh, they despatched the most precise
orders that the allowance of double batta should be discontinued from
the date of the receipt of their order. Probably the Court of
Directors was the only ruling body in the world which would have
dared to issue an order greatly curtailing allowances to an army in
the field, opposed to greatly superior forces whose triumph would
mean destruction to the Company. But this is but one instance of the
dogged incapacity to rule with which the history of the Court of
Directors abounds.

When the despatch reached India the army had but just gained the
bloody and decisive battle of Baksar. The Calcutta Council dared not,
at such a moment, carry out the orders of the Court. There were other
reasons for delay. Lord Clive was on his way from England, and to
him, probably, special instructions had been given.

We have seen the course which Lord Clive pursued with reference to
the other branches of the administration. It was the end of the year
1765 before he touched the army. Then he issued instructions that
from the 1st of January, 1766, the double batta should be withdrawn,
except as regarded the second brigade, then stationed at Allahabad.
This brigade, on account of the high prices of provisions at the
station, and the expense of procuring the necessary supplies from
Europe, was to be allowed double batta in the field, {182}and the old
original single batta in cantonments or in garrison, until it should
be recalled within the provinces. This rule was to be applied to all
troops beyond the Karmnasa. Clive directed further that the rest of
the army should receive single batta when marching or in the field,
and half single batta when in cantonment or in garrison, as at Mungir
or Patna; but when at Calcutta or within the Presidency division the
officers would receive no batta at all, but free quarters in lieu of
it.

The order was badly received by the officers. They had enjoyed the
privilege of double batta and its accessories so long that they had
come to regard such allowances as their right by prescription. They
at once memorialized the Government with a view to obtain a
modification. But the reply Clive invariably gave them was to the
effect that the orders of the Court had left him no option in the
matter. Driven into a corner, their regard for their interests got
the better of their sense of discipline. The officers of the several
brigades and regiments entered into a correspondence with one
another, formed committees, and decided to wrench by force the
rights, as they deemed them, of which the order of the Court had
deprived them. In a word, the European army of India, officers and
men--for the men were prepared to follow the lead of the
officers--combined against the Government.

Space will not permit me, nor is it requisite, that I should detail
the measures they adopted to bend the {183}Government to their will.
It must suffice to state that the mutiny was of a most formidable
character. So complete was the organization of the conspiring
officers, so well laid were their plans, so secret had been their
measures, that, during the period of four months the organization was
in progress, not a single whisper of it had reached the Government.
Clive received the first intimation of it when he was officially
informed of it by the commander of the first brigade--a man who
sympathized with the movement and desired its success. At the moment
the conspirators were ready for action. That they possessed the
sympathy of the members of the Civil Service was shown by the fact
that the latter subscribed 140,000 rupees to aid the movement, and
supplied the conspirators with copies of the proceedings of the
Government.

Formidable as was the situation no living man was so well qualified
to deal with it as was Clive. In the hour of danger he soared above
his fellows. The danger here was greater than the danger of Arcot;
than at the surprises of Kaveripak and of Samiaveram; than during the
hour of doubt at Plassey. His opponents were his own men--men whom he
had led to victory. They possessed all the fortified places, the
guns, the material of war. From the frontier came rumours of the
advance of a Maratha army, 60,000 strong, to wrest Allahabad and
Karra from his hand. But there he was, the same cool, patient,
defiant man he had been when confronted by the bayonets of the
{184}French at Kaveripak and Samiaveram. He knew that the Government
he represented was in the most imminent danger, that if the mutineers
should move forward, he had not the means to oppose them.

The manner in which Clive met this danger is a lesson for all time.
Not for an instant did he quail. Never was he more resolved to carry
out the orders he had issued regarding batta than when he was told,
that, in the presence of the enemy on the frontier, the officers
would resign their commissions if the order were not withdrawn.

For the moment, fortunately, the conspirators had resolved to await
his action. He, then, would take the initiative. On the very day when
he received the report of the existence of the conspiracy he formed a
committee, composed of himself, General Carnac, and Mr. Sykes, to
carry out the plan of action he had formed. First, he and they
resolved to send immediately to Madras for officers. Then they passed
a resolution declaring that any officer resigning his commission
should be debarred from serving the Company in any capacity, and sent
copies of it to the several brigades for distribution to all
concerned. Clive then hurried to Murshidabad; he addressed the
recalcitrant officers stationed there; spoke to them in terms firm,
yet conciliatory; told them they were acting very wrongly and very
foolishly; that they were infringing the very discipline which they
knew to be the mainstay of an army; that although immediate success
might be theirs, they must be beaten {185}in the long run; that such
conduct could only be pardoned on condition of immediate submission.
Touched by the language of the man who had been to them an object of
veneration, all the officers, two young lieutenants excepted,
hesitated--then submitted absolutely. This success was followed by
similar results at the other stations in the Presidency division,
visited by Carnac and Sykes. In that division only two captains and a
lieutenant continued recalcitrant.

There remained then only the important centres of Mungir, Bankipur
(Patna), and Allahabad, the officers stationed there being bound to
each other by the most solemn engagements. At the first-named of
these places the Commandant was Sir Robert Fletcher, himself a
well-wisher to the plot. When the officers there simultaneously
tendered their resignation, agreeing to serve for fifteen days longer
without pay, Fletcher received them with sympathy, and told them he
would forward their letter to headquarters. At Bankipur, then the
military cantonment of Patna, the commandant, Sir R. Barker, one of
the superior officers who had accompanied Clive from England, acted
far differently. Before replying, he communicated with Lord Clive,
then at Murshidabad, and received from him instructions to place
under arrest every officer whose conduct should seem to him to come
under the construction of mutiny, and to detain such at Bankipur
until it might be possible to convene a general court-martial to try
them. To render {186}complete the necessary numbers of field-officers
Clive promoted on the spot two officers known to be loyal. The
Bankipur officers followed, nevertheless, the conduct of their
comrades at Mungir, and resigned in a body. Barker not only declined
to accept those resignations, but arrested four of the ringleaders,
and despatched them by water to Calcutta. This bold action paralyzed
the recalcitrants, and followed up as it was by the journey of Clive
to Mungir, accompanied by some officers who had come round from
Madras, it dealt a blow to the mutineers from which they never
completely rallied.

But at Allahabad the danger was still more menacing. There and at the
station of Surajpur, only two officers, Colonel Smith, and a Major of
the same name, were absolutely untainted: four were but slightly so,
and could be depended upon to act with the Smiths in an emergency;
all the others had pledged themselves to 'the cause.' Those of the
latter stationed at Allahabad displayed their disaffection in the
usual manner, whereupon Major Smith, commanding there, calling on the
sipahis to support him, placed under arrest every officer in the
place, the four slightly tainted officers excepted. He then informed
the mutinous officers that he would shoot down without mercy any and
every officer who should break his arrest. This action was most
effective. All the officers but six submitted and were allowed to
return to duty. The six were deported to Patna, to be tried there. A
similar course was followed by Colonel Smith at {187}Surajpur, with
the result, however, that nearly one half of the officers remained
recalcitrant, and were despatched under arrest to Calcutta.

Meanwhile, at Mungir, the officers continued in a thorough state of
disorganization, the commander, Sir Robert Fletcher, encouraging
them. The day before Clive's arrival, an officer whom he had sent in
advance, Colonel Champion, surprising the officers in full conclave,
learned from them that they desired to recount their grievances to
Clive in person. On learning this Clive directed them to parade with
their men the following morning, giving directions simultaneously to
Champion, to bring to the ground two battalions of sipahis, under the
command of Captain F. Smith, an officer known to be loyal. Then a
very curious circumstance happened. Smith had but just entered the
fort with his sipahis when he noticed that the Europeans, infantry
and artillery, were turning out to mutiny. Without a moment's
hesitation he marched towards them with his sipahis; seized, by a
bold strategic movement, a mound which was the key of the position,
completely dominating the ground on which the Europeans were drawn
up. The latter, who were on the point of quitting the fort, noting
the commanding position occupied by the sipahis, halted and
hesitated. Smith took advantage of the pause thus caused to tell them
that unless they should retire instantly to their barracks he would
fire upon them. At the moment Sir R. Fletcher came up, began to
encourage the revolters, and to distribute {188}money amongst them;
suddenly, however, taking in the exact position, he changed his tone,
ordered the recalcitrant officers to leave the fort within two hours,
and reported the whole circumstance to Lord Clive. The officers left
at once, and the incident closed for the day; but when, the following
morning, Clive entered the fort, and addressed the assembled soldiers
on the wickedness of their conduct, praised and rewarded the sipahis
for their behaviour, the men gave way. The mutiny, as far as Mungir
was concerned, was over. Meanwhile the officers expelled by Fletcher
had encamped within a short distance of Mungir, resolved to wait
there the arrival of their comrades from other stations. But they had
to deal with a man who would stand no trifling. Clive despatched to
them an order to set out forthwith for Calcutta; and to quicken their
movements he sent a detachment of sipahis to see that his order was
obeyed. After that there was no more mutiny at Mungir, or in the
stations dependent upon it.

At Bankipur the officers, notwithstanding the action of Sir R.
Barker, previously noted, had sent their commissions _en bloc_ to
Lord Clive. But the news of the occurrences at Mungir startled and
frightened them. When, then, Lord Clive arrived at Patna, he found
the officers penitent and humble, and that his only task was to
pardon. There, too, he learned with pleasure the successful action of
the two Smiths at Allahabad and Surajpur. He remained then at Patna,
to crush the last embers of the mutiny, and to arrange {189}for the
bringing to justice of the ringleaders. This last task he performed
in a manner which tempered justice with mercy. Fletcher, who had
played a double part, and whose actions were prompted by personal
greed, was brought to a court-martial and cashiered. Five other
officers were deported, but of these, one, John Neville Parker, was
reinstated in 1769, and survived to render glorious service to the
Company, giving his life for his masters in 1781.

The comparative ease with which Clive suppressed this formidable
conspiracy was due to one cause alone. No sooner did Clive hear of
the combination than, instead of waiting to be attacked, he seized
the initiative: the mutineers allowed him to strike the first blow;
standing on the defensive in their isolated positions, they gave the
opportunity to Clive to destroy them in detail. It was the action
which Napoleon employed against the Austrians in 1796, 1805, and in
1809. It is useless to speculate what might have been the result if
Clive had stood, as the majority of men would have stood, on the
defensive. By the opposite course he not only saved the situation,
but achieving a very decisive victory, struck a blow at
insubordination which gave an altered tone to the officers of the
army, then as much hankering after ungodly pelf as were their
brethren in the Civil Service. Never, throughout his glorious career
as a soldier, did Clive's character and his conduct stand higher than
when, in dealing out punishment for the {190}mutiny which he, and he
alone, had suppressed, he remembered the former services of the
soldiers who had been led away, and gave them all, a few
incorrigibles excepted, the opportunity to retrieve their characters
on future fields of battle.

The task of Clive in India had now been accomplished. Thoroughly had
he carried through the mission entrusted to him. He had cleansed, as
far as was possible, the Augean stable. He had given himself no
recreation: he was completely worn out. He had announced to the Court
of Directors so far back as 1765 his intention to resign as soon as
he could do so without inconvenience to the public interests. The
Court, in reply, whilst most handsomely acknowledging his services,
had begged him to devote yet one year to India. When that letter
reached him, December 1766, he had already accomplished all that,
with the means and powers at his disposal, it was possible to carry
through. He felt then that, broken in health, he might retire with
honour from the country he had won for England. Having penned a
valuable minute, laying down the principles which should guide the
policy of his successor, based upon his own action during the
preceding three years, he made over to one of his colleagues of the
Select Committee, Mr. Verelst,[4] the office of Governor, and
nominating Colonel Richard Smith, then on the frontier, to {191}be
Commander-in-chief, Mr. Sykes, Mr. Carter, and Mr. Beecher, to form,
with the Governor, the Select Committee, he bade farewell to his
friends, and, on the 29th of January, 1767, embarked on board the
good ship _Britannia_ for England.

[Footnote 4: Mr. Sumner, whose weak character I have described, and
who had been designated Lord Clive's successor, had been forced to
resign his seat on the Select Committee.]


{192}


CHAPTER XV
THE RETURN OF THE CONQUEROR-STATESMAN, AND THE RECEPTION ACCORDED TO
HIM BY HIS COUNTRYMEN: HIS STRUGGLES; AND HIS DEATH


One of the ablest and most impartial of English historians, the fifth
Earl Stanhope, has thus summed up his appreciation of the results of
the second administration of Clive in India: 'On the whole it may be
said that his second command was not less important for reform than
his first had been for conquest. By this the foundations, at least,
of good government were securely laid. And the results would have
been greater still could Clive have remained longer at his post.' It
was impossible he could remain. In December, 1766, his weakness was
so great as to disable him from writing. He required rest, and as we
have seen he embarked for England at the close of the month
following, to find there, alas! no rest, but, on the contrary, the
bitterest, the most persistent, the most unscrupulous enemies; their
attacks prompted by the corrupt officials whom he had driven from the
posts they had abused, and who were able, nevertheless, to enlist in
their vile {193}persecution statesmen of great renown holding high
office under the Crown.

It is a pitiful tale, this persecution of a man who had rendered the
most magnificent services to his country. The one blot minute
investigation had been able to find in his career was the treatment
of Aminchand. But Aminchand was a blackmailer who had threatened to
betray a state-secret of enormous importance unless he were paid a
sum out of all proportion to the services he rendered. Such a man
deserves no commiseration. His treachery, if Clive had refused to
subscribe to his terms, would have involved the death of thousands,
and might have driven the English out of Bengal. Clive fought him
with the same Asiatic weapon Aminchand had levelled against himself,
and beat him. That his action was wrong in morals, unworthy of his
lofty nature, is unquestionable. But it is not so certain that, under
similar pressure, in circumstances so critical, those who most
bitterly denounced him would have acted otherwise. Some writers have
averred, and until recently it has been accepted, that the deceit
drove Aminchand to madness. But inquiry has dissipated this fiction.
He was, it is true, startled into insensibility by the discovery of
the fact that he had been imposed upon, but, after visiting the
shrine of a famous saint in Malwa, he returned to his business in
Calcutta and prospered till his death. As to the other part of the
same transaction, the signing of the name of Admiral Watson, Clive
stated on oath, in his evidence {194}before the House of Commons,
that although the admiral had refused to sign the document, he had,
to the best of his belief, permitted Mr. Lushington to affix his
name; and certainly amongst those who benefited by the transaction
was Admiral Watson himself, who, after the triumph of the
conspirators, claimed even more than he received. But it was on these
two points that the miscreants whom Clive, in his second
administration, had driven from the posts they had sullied, and their
allies, based a persecution which tortured the enfeebled frame of the
conqueror.

Clive's real fault in the eyes of the leaders of the persecution was
that he had become rich himself, and had prevented them from
fattening on the plunder of the country he had conquered. To most
men, in fact to all but a very few men, in England and in France,
India was a _terra incognita_ whither a certain few repaired young,
and whence they returned, in the prime of their manhood, rich, and
often with a great reputation. Why was it that such men were at once
subjected to the vilest persecution? The fact that they were so is
incontestable. Clive himself and Warren Hastings, whose reputation
has recently been splendidly vindicated by two great Englishmen,[1]
are cases in point in England; Dupleix and La Bourdonnais and Lally,
in France. It is the saddest of sad stories; the men who had rendered
the most brilliant {195}services to their respective countries
finding their bitterest enemies often amongst the Ministers of the
Crown. There is little to discriminate between the conduct of
parliamentary England and despotic France except in the degree of
misery and punishment to which they alike subjected the most
illustrious of their countrymen who had served in India.

[Footnote 1: Sir Fitzjames Stephen in the case of Nanda-Kumar: Sir
John Strachey in reference to the charges respecting Oudh and
Rohilkhand.]

To return. It will be remembered that in his second administration
Clive had purified the Civil Service of Bengal. The corrupt men whom
he had ejected had returned to England whilst he was still in India,
the charges made against them accompanying or preceding them in the
despatches transmitted to the Court of Directors. On receiving these
despatches the Court, having taken the opinions of their own lawyers
and of those of the Crown, resolved to bring the culprits to trial
for having accepted presents from the natives after they had received
the order from the Court making such acceptance penal. But the
inculpated men were rich and they resolved to appeal from the
Directors to the Proprietors. There had been a difference between
these two bodies as to whether the annual dividends should be
increased from ten, the amount recommended by the Court, to twelve
and a half per cent. At the annual meeting the votes of the men
dismissed by Clive enabled the Proprietors to carry their point. The
corrupt clique utilized this victory by proposing and carrying a
resolution that the prosecutions instituted against them should be
dismissed. This was accordingly done.

{196}Two months later, July 14, Clive landed in England. He was well
received. The King and Queen admitted him to private audiences. The
Court of Directors received him in full conclave, immediately after
his reception by their Majesties, thanked him for his splendid
achievements, and immediately convened a general Court to confirm the
proposal that the jagir, granted him by Mir Jafar, should be
confirmed to him for an additional ten years. This resolution was
unanimously passed.

So far there was no sign of the coming storm. Not a sound of the
distant hurricane had been wafted to the ears of Clive. He had
returned as ambitious as he ever had been, resolved to devote to the
service of his country the energies he had displayed in the East.
Already he had made arrangements to secure seats for himself and for
six of his relatives, when, to rest before the elections should take
place, he started for Paris (January, 1768) with Lady Clive and a
small party. He was very confident in the future. He had received
personally the King's commands to lay before his Majesty his ideas of
the Company's affairs both at home and abroad, with a promise of his
Majesty's countenance and protection in anything he might attempt for
the good of the nation and the Company. He had seen so much of what
he called 'the ignorance and obstinacy' of the Court of Directors,
who, he stated in a letter to his successor, Mr. Verelst, 'are
universally despised and hated,' that he felt sure his would be the
hand, in the coming meeting of the Court {197}of Proprietors, to stay
their fall or to renew their vitality. In a word, his confidence was
never greater, never did he feel more assured regarding the future.

Yet, during this confidence of the soul, this longing for political
warfare, his nearest friends could easily detect that he had not
sufficiently recovered from the strain of his last three years in
India. His body did not respond to the call of the ever active brain.
His friends and his physicians urged him then to take a complete rest
and holiday of fourteen to fifteen months in France. With difficulty
they induced him to stay eight months. Then he returned to find that
he and his six relatives had, in his absence, been elected Members of
Parliament.

His return produced a renewal of the activity of his enemies. They
filled London with stories of his rapacity. Sir Robert Fletcher,
whose shameful conduct during the mutiny of the officers I have
recorded, wrote against him a pamphlet which irritated him greatly.
He was hardly to be prevented from answering it. There were other
considerations which, at this time, affected his career. When the
general election at which he and his friends were returned had taken
place, the Ministry was presided over by the Duke of Grafton, Lord
Chatham being Lord Privy Seal and Lord North Chancellor of the
Exchequer. At the end of 1769 Chatham was forced by the state of his
health, which had long been bad, to resign; and in the January of the
year following, the Duke of Grafton resigned and was succeeded as
First Lord of the Treasury {198}by Lord North. Clive had not posed as
a supporter of either of these administrations. He had declared
himself to be a supporter of George Grenville, the head of the
Grenville Whigs, who were then in opposition. It has been claimed[2]
for him that Clive declined to commit himself to any party of the
Indian policy of which he was ignorant. But none of the members of
Lord North's Cabinet knew anything of India, and if Clive, commanding
seven votes, had been asked to join it, he might have educated his
colleagues on the subject. An opportunity of following such a course
seemed to occur when Mr. Wedderburn, an able lawyer and a personal
ally of Clive, joined the North Ministry, but Clive remained staunch
to the Grenville connexion, exercising but little influence, and
exposed all the time to the bitter shafts of his enemies, which
increased every day in intensity and venom. To make the situation
still less endurable George Grenville died (November, 1770).

[Footnote 2: Malcolm's _Clive_.]

Meanwhile affairs in India were not progressing satisfactorily. In
Bengal, indeed, Mr. Verelst, acting on the lines laid down by Clive,
had with the support of his colleagues succeeded in maintaining peace
and prosperity. But in Madras, the incursions of Haidar Ali, an
adventurer who by sheer ability and daring had climbed to the highest
place in the kingdom of Mysore, had caused the English in that
Presidency severe losses, and forced them to incur an expenditure
which deprived the Proprietors of Indian {199}Stock of all chance of
dividends for some time to come. To meet this financial embarrassment
the Crown and the Company could dream of no other device than the
futile one of sending to India three commissioners, who, under the
name of Supervisors, should have full power over all the other
servants of the Company. They nominated accordingly Mr. Vansittart,
who, from having been the warmest friend of Clive, had become his
bitterest opponent; and who, but for the successful opposition of
Clive and his friends, would have been appointed Governor in
succession to Mr. Verelst. With him they associated Mr. Scrafton, an
old and valued servant of the Company; and Colonel Forde, the
conqueror of the Northern Sirkars and of Biderra--both intimate
friends and adherents of Clive. These gentlemen sailed in the
_Aurora_ frigate in the autumn of 1769. The _Aurora_ reached the Cape
in safety, but was never heard of after she had quitted Simon's Bay.
It was supposed that she foundered at sea.

Some considerable time elapsed before it had been realized in England
that the Supervisors had failed them, and that it would be necessary
to take other measures to remedy existing evils. Meanwhile events had
happened which increased the necessity for immediate and effective
action. In 1770 the three provinces were visited by a famine
exceeding in intensity all the famines of preceding ages. There had
been, in years gone by, no beneficent strangers from the West to
make, as in later years, provision for the {200}occurrence of so
great a calamity. The rains had failed; the water in the tanks had
dried up; the rice-fields had become parched and dry. There were but
few stores handy to enable the foreigner to disburse the necessary
grain. It was the first famine-experience of the English, and they
too had made no provision for it. The misery was terrible. The large
centres of industry, the only places where there was a chance of
obtaining food, became thronged with the dying and the dead. The
rivers floating corpses to the sea became so tainted that the very
fish ceased to be wholesome food. In summing up, two years later, the
effects of the famine on the population, the Governor-General in
Council declared that in some places one-half, and, on the whole,
one-third of the inhabitants had been destroyed. It need scarcely be
added that this terrible calamity affected the Proprietors of East
India Stock in a manner, to them the most vital:--it destroyed their
prospects of large dividends.

To remedy this evil the brains of the Court of Directors could devise
no other scheme than that which the foundering of the _Aurora_ had
previously baffled: they would send out other Supervisors. But Lord
North had taken the matter in hand. He brought in a bill providing
for the constitution in Calcutta of a Supreme Court, to consist of a
Chief Justice and three Puisne judges, appointed by the Crown; giving
to the Governor of Bengal authority over the two other Presidencies,
with the title of {201}Governor-General, to be assisted and
controlled by a Council of five members. The great blot of this bill
was the clause which gave a controlling power to the Council. The
Governor-General had in it but one vote, and in case of equality, a
casting-vote. Mr. Warren Hastings who, twelve months before, had
succeeded Mr. John Cartier[3] as Governor, was appointed first
Governor-General of India.

[Footnote 3: Mr. Cartier had succeeded Mr. Verelst in 1769.]

The war with Haidar Ali and the famine in Bengal had brought India
and Indian matters very prominently into the parliamentary
discussions of 1771, 1772 and 1773, and during these the name of Lord
Clive had not been spared. The attacks against him were led
principally by General Burgoyne, a natural son of Lord Bingley, best
known in history as the commander who surrendered a British army,
5,791 strong, to the American colonists.[4] In April, 1772, this
officer had become Chairman of a Select Committee composed of
thirty-one members, to inquire and report on Indian affairs. Another
Committee, called Secret, and composed of thirteen members nominated
by ballot, was appointed, on the motion of Lord North, in November of
the same year, to take into consideration the whole state of the
Company's affairs. Into the other proceedings of these committees
this volume has no cause to enter; but they had scarcely been
constituted when they began to let fly their arrows at Lord Clive.
The chief cause of these attacks {202}is so well stated by the
sober-minded historian,[5] that I cannot refrain from quoting his
remarks. 'Besides the public wrongs of which he (Lord Clive) stood
accused, there was also, it may be feared, a feeling of personal envy
at work against him. His vast wealth became a more striking mark for
calumny when contrasted with the financial embarrassments of the
Directors in whose service he had gained it. And his profusion, as
ever happens, offended far more persons than it pleased. He had
bought the noble seat of Claremont from the Duchess Dowager of
Newcastle, and was improving it at lavish cost. He had so far
invested money in the smaller boroughs that he could reckon on
bringing into Parliament a retinue of six or seven friends or
kinsmen. Under such circumstances the Select Committee, over which
Burgoyne presided, made Clive their more especial object of attack.
They drew forth into the light of day several transactions certainly
not well formed to bear it, as the forgery of Admiral Watson's
signature, and the fraud practised on Aminchand. But at the same time
they could not shut out the lustre of the great deeds he had
performed. Clive himself was unsparingly questioned, and treated with
slight regard. As he complains, in one of his speeches: "I their
humble servant, the Baron of Plassey, have been examined by the
Select Committee more like a sheep-stealer than a member of this
House." And he adds, with perfect truth: "I am sure, Sir, if I had
any sore {203}places about me, they would have been found: they have
probed me to the bottom; no lenient plasters have been applied to
heal; no, Sir, they were all of the blister kind, prepared with
Spanish flies and other provocatives."'

[Footnote 4: At Saratoga, October 17, 1777.]

[Footnote 5: Lord Stanhope's _History of England_, vol. vii. pp.
353-4.]

Throughout these attacks Clive never lost his calmness or his
presence of mind. Never once did his lofty spirit quail. He stood
there still the unconquered hero, ready to meet every charge,
sometimes retorting, but always nobly, on his adversaries. His
friends rallied gallantly round him. His particular friend, Mr.
Wedderburn, then Solicitor-General, gave him a support as valuable as
it was unstinted. When his administration in Bengal was spoken of by
his old enemy, Mr. Sulivan, in the House in a manner which, whilst
not directly attacking it, conveyed the impression that there was a
great deal more in the background, Clive went through every phase of
his career in Bengal, defending his own action in a style which
gained for him admiration. It was not, however, until the month of
May, 1773, that General Burgoyne defined the vague charges which had
theretofore supplied the place of argument, and brought them forward,
as a vote of censure, in three resolutions. These resolutions ran as
follows: (1) 'that all acquisitions made under the influence of a
military force, or by treaty with foreign princes, did of right
belong to the State'; (2) 'that to appropriate acquisitions so made
to the private emoluments of persons entrusted with any civil or
military power {204}of the State is illegal'; (3) 'that very great
sums of money, and other valuable property, had been acquired in
Bengal from princes and others of that country by persons entrusted
with the civil and military powers of the State by means of such
powers; which sums of money and valuable property have been
appropriated to the private use of such persons.'

These resolutions named nobody. But in the speech in which they were
introduced Burgoyne took care that there should be no doubt as to the
person against whom they were directed. He dwelt, with a bitterness
not to be surpassed, on all the delinquencies, real and imaginary, of
the conqueror of Bengal. He traced all the misfortunes which had
subsequently happened to the Company to the treasonable compact which
had dethroned Siraj-ud-daula and placed Mir Jafar on his seat, and
denounced the conduct of the authors of that transaction as 'black
perfidy.' He denounced, also, in terms equally severe, the treatment
of Aminchand; the forging of the name of Admiral Watson; the
agreement, which, he said, had extorted from Mir Jafar enormous sums,
under the guise of presents, to the leading servants of the Company
in Bengal. On the second administration of Clive, which was really a
long struggle against the corruption by which he was surrounded,
Burgoyne railed as bitterly and as unsparingly. Nor was he content
with merely railing. Before he sat down he declared that if the House
should pass his resolutions he would not stop there, but would
proceed to follow them up with others, his {205}object being to
compel those who had acquired large sums of money in the manner he
had denounced to make a full and complete restitution.

The Solicitor-General, Wedderburn, conducted the defence for Clive,
and it was noticeable that the party styled 'the King's Friends,'
amongst many others, gave him their support. The Attorney-General,
Thurlow, supported Burgoyne, and the Prime Minister, Lord North,
voted with him. The voting on these resolutions did not, however,
indicate the real sense of the House, for many of those who supported
them thought it would be better for the cause of Clive that the
further resolutions threatened by Burgoyne should be proceeded with
in order that a decisive vote should be taken on a motion implicating
Clive by name rather than on resolutions of a vague and general
character. The resolutions, then, were carried.

Burgoyne then proceeded, as he had promised, to follow up his
victory. On the 17th of May he brought forward the following
resolution: 'That it appears to this House that the Right Honourable
Robert, Lord Clive, Baron of Plassey, in the kingdom of Ireland,
about the time of the deposition of Siraj-ud-daula, and the
establishment of Mir Jafar on the _masnad_, through the influence of
the powers with which he was entrusted as member of the Select
Committee and Commander-in-chief of the British forces, did obtain
and possess himself of two lakhs of rupees as Commander-in-chief, a
further sum of two lakhs and eighty thousand rupees as member of the
Select {206}Committee, and a further sum of sixteen lakhs or more,
under the denomination of a private donation, which sums, amounting
together to twenty lakhs and eighty thousand rupees, were of value,
in English money, of two hundred and thirty-four thousand pounds; and
that in so doing the said Robert Clive abused the power with which he
was entrusted, to the evil example of the servants of the public, and
to the dishonour and detriment of the State.'

No one could say that these charges were not sufficiently pointed.
Clive met them with his accustomed resolution. He rejoiced that the
real issue had come at last; that the great jury of the nation, the
House of Commons, was, after so long an interval devoted to calumny,
to abuse, to vague and shadowy charges, to record its vote on the
real question. On their decision on this resolution he would stand or
fall. The alternative which his fiercest fights had presented to him,
the necessity to conquer or to be disgraced, was presented to him
here. He had won those fights by the exercise rather of his lofty
moral qualities than by his skill as a soldier, and by the exercise
of the same qualities he would win this one also. And he did win it.
After Burgoyne, introducing his resolution, had traversed the same
ground he had followed in the preceding resolutions, and had
concluded by calling upon the House, like the old Roman heroes, 'to
strike when the justice of the State requires it,' Clive rose to
defend himself. Recapitulating the services he had rendered, he
reminded the {207}House that the transactions in Bengal, upon which
Burgoyne relied for a conviction, had been known in their general
tenour to the Company and the Crown when they had thanked him, not
once but repeatedly, for his services. He proceeded then to expose
the interested and revengeful motives of the clique which had
instigated the attack, not sparing even those in high places who,
from various causes, had allowed themselves to sanction it. Turning
from that point, he asked prominent attention to the fact that the
India Office, now his accuser, had almost forced him to proceed for
the second time to Bengal, and had expressed a deep regret that his
health had not allowed him to stay there longer. 'After certificates
such as these,' he added, 'am I to be brought here like a criminal,
and the very best parts of my conduct construed into crimes against
the State?' Stating then that the resolution, if carried, would
reduce him to depend on his paternal inheritance of 500 pounds per
annum, he continued: 'But on this I am content to live; and perhaps I
shall find more real content of mind and happiness than in the
trembling affluence of an unsettled fortune. But, Sir, I must make
one more observation. If the definition of the hon. gentleman
(Colonel Burgoyne) and of this House, that the State, as expressed in
these resolutions, is, _quoad hoc_, the Company, then, Sir, every
farthing I enjoy is granted to me. But to be called upon, after
sixteen years have elapsed, to account for my conduct in this manner,
and after an uninterrupted enjoyment of my {208}property, to be
questioned, and considered as obtaining it unwarrantably, is hard
indeed; it is a treatment I should not think the British Senate
capable of. But if such should be the case, I have a conscious
innocence within me that tells me my conduct is irreproachable.
_Frangas non flectes._[6] My enemies may take from me what I have;
they may, as they think, make me poor, but I shall be happy. I mean
not this as my defence, though I have done for the present. My
defence will be heard at that bar, but before I sit down I have one
request to make to this House: that when they come to decide upon my
honour, they will not forget their own.'

[Footnote 6: 'You may break, but you shall not bend, me.']

The debate was adjourned, and in the few days following some
witnesses gave evidence at the bar of the House. Lord Clive's
evidence, given before the Select Committee, was also read there. In
the debate that followed, Mr. Stanley proposed to omit the words
inculpating the honour of Clive. Mr. Fuller seconded this amendment,
going even further, and striking out the sentence referring to the
exercise of undue influence. His suggestion was accepted, and the
House proceeded to discuss the amendment as so altered. After a
protracted debate the division was called for, when it was found that
155 members had voted for the amendment and 95 against it. This
victory stripped Burgoyne's resolutions of all their sting. Vainly
did a member of his party attempt to restore the battle by moving
that Clive had abused the {209}powers intrusted to him in acting as
he avowedly had acted. The House refused to re-open that question.
Finally, at five o'clock in the morning, the House passed the
following resolution, which consummated the defeat of Burgoyne: 'That
Robert, Lord Clive, did, at the same time, render great and
meritorious services to his country.' On this conclusion to the
violent attacks on Clive, Lord Stanhope, well versed in Parliamentary
procedure, thus wrote: 'Such a vote might be deemed almost a verdict
of acquittal. Certainly, at least, it showed a wise reluctance to
condemn. It closed the whole case, and Clive had no further
Parliamentary attack to fear.'

But though the victory was gained, the struggle affecting the
personal honour and fortune of a proud and sensitive man had made
deep inroads upon the constitution of one who had been long suffering
from the acute agony caused by the malady contracted in India. Freed
from the attack of his enemies, he might, had his health been only
tolerable, have looked forward to a high command in the war just
about to break out with the colonists of North America. There he
would have been in his place; there, under the influence of constant
action, he would have forgotten his troubles; even his oft-recurring
spasms might have disappeared. But, after the Parliamentary contest
was over, with the waning of the ever-present excitement, his health
became worse. In vain did he repair to Bath to try the effect of its
waters. In vain, finding that for him the virtues of the Bath waters
had {210}departed, did he proceed to the Continent for travel. Rest
came not. A complication of disorders prevented sleep, and travel
failed to remedy the evil. His mind had no longer the sustaining
power which in former days had enabled him to meet with tranquillity
the frowns of Fortune. He returned to England in 1774, and shortly
afterwards, in November of that year, when apparently thoroughly
conscious,[7] fell by his own hand. 'To the last,' wrote Lord
Stanhope, 'he appears to have retained his serene demeanour and stern
dominion of his will.' It is difficult for us who have followed his
career to realise the terrible upsetting of the balance of the great
brain which had brought such an act within the bounds of possibility.

[Footnote 7: Lord Stanhope relates a story regarding the manner of
Clive's death, told by the Earl of Shelburne, afterwards the first
Marquis of Lansdowne, to the person from whom he (Lord Stanhope)
received it. 'It so chanced, that a young lady, an attached friend of
his (Clive's) family, was then upon a visit at his house in Berkeley
Square, and sat writing a letter, in one of its apartments. Seeing
Lord Clive walk through, she called him to come and mend her pen.
Lord Clive obeyed her summons, and taking out his penknife fulfilled
her request; after which, passing on to another chamber, he turned
the same knife against himself.']

'Such was the end,' says a French writer, 'of one of the men who did
the most for the greatness of England.' That foreign verdict is at
least incontestable. Caesar conquered Gaul for his country; Hannibal
caused unrest to Rome for nearly a quarter of a century; Wellington
drove the French from Portugal and Spain. The achievement of Clive
was more splendid than any one of these. He founded for this little
island in the {211}Atlantic a magnificent empire; an empire famous in
antiquity, renowned since the time of Alexander, whose greatest
sovereign had been the contemporary of Queen Elizabeth, more
enlightened than any of her predecessors, more tolerant, a more
far-sighted statesman even than she. He was, according to Lord
Stanhope, emphatically 'a great man.' But he was more than a great
man. Like Caius Julius, he united two personalities; he was a great
statesman and a great soldier. He was a man of thought as well as a
man of action. No administration surpasses, in the strength of will
of the administrator, in excellence of design, in thoroughness of
purpose, and, as far as his masters would permit, in thoroughness of
action, his second administration of Bengal. No general who ever
fought displayed greater calmness in danger, more coolness of brain,
than did Clive at Kaveripak, at Samiaveram, at Calcutta, when, on the
fog rising, he found himself enveloped by the Subahdar's army, 40,000
strong. Nothing daunted him; nothing clouded his judgement; his
decision, the decision of the moment, was always right. In a word, he
was a born master of men.

But, says the moralist, he committed faults, and at once the false
treaty made with Aminchand is thrown into the face of the historian.
Yes, he did do it; and not only that, he stated in his evidence
before the House of Commons that if he were again under the same
circumstances he would do it again. None of his detractors had had
the opportunity of judging of {212}the terrible issues which the
threatened treachery of Aminchand had opened to his vision. Upon the
decision of Clive rested the lives of thousands. To save those lives
there appeared to him but one sure method available, and that was to
deceive the deceiver. I think his decision was a wrong one, but it
should always be remembered that, as Clive stated before the
Committee, he had no interested motive in doing what he did do; he
did it with the design of disappointing a rapacious man and of
preventing the consequences of his treachery. He was in a position of
terrible responsibility, and he acted to save others. Let the stern
moralist stand in the same position as that in which Clive stood, and
it is just possible he might think as Clive thought. At all events,
this one fault, for fault it was, cannot or ought not to be set up as
a counterweight against services which have given this island the
highest position amongst all the nations of the earth. The House of
Commons, after a long debate, condoned it. Might not Posterity, the
Posterity which has profited by that very fault, be content to follow
the lead of the House of Commons? With all his faults, Clive was 'one
of the men who did the most for the greatness of England.' That fact
is before us every day. His one fault hastened his death, from the
handle it gave to the envious and the revengeful, and took from him
the chance of gaining fresh laurels in America. May not the
ever-living fact of his services induce us to overlook, to blot out
from the memory, that one mistake, which he so bitterly expiated in
his lifetime?


{213}


INDEX


ADAMS, Major John, defeated Mir Kasim at Katwa, 156:
    at Gheria, 156:
  stormed strong position of Undwa Nala, 157:
  his death, 157:
  fought against Mir Kasim, 180.

AHMAD SHAH, succeeded on the death of his father, Muhammad Shah, 44.

AIN-I-AKBARI, Blochmann's, quoted, 118_n_.

AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, Peace of, 40 and _n_., 42.

AKBAR, mentioned, 17, 85, 118_n_.

ALI VARDI KHAN, Governor of Bihar, 85:
  battle of Gheria, 85:
  proclaimed himself Subahdar, 85:
  died, 85:
  succeeded by his grandson, Siraj-ud-daula, 85.

ALLAHABAD, occupied by the English, 157, 174:
  conference at, 174:
  clauses of Clive's demand at, 174.

AMBUR, Anwar-ud-din defeated and slain at, 45.

AMERICA, war with colonists of North, 209.

AMINCHAND, Calcutta merchant, 86:
  negotiated for Clive and his allies, 86:
  betrayed Siraj-ud-daula's confidence, 87:
  demanded 20 lakhs of rupees, 87:
  his name omitted from false document by Clive, 87, 134, 135, 193,
    202, 204, 211:
  informed by Mr. Scrafton that he was to receive nothing, 113:
  his pilgrimage to Malda, 113, 193:
  returned to his business in Calcutta, 113, 193.

ANGRIA, pirate chief at Gheria, 77:
  his plunderings, 77:
  Commodore Jones sent to attack, 77:
  defeated by Watson and Clive, 78.

ANWAR-UD-DIN, suspected poisoner of Khoja Abdullah, 28:
  appointed provisionally Nawab, a guardian of the young prince,
    Saiyud Muhammad, 28:
  suspected murderer of the young prince, 30:
  Nawab of Arcot, 31:
  appealed to by Dupleix, 33:
  attempted to prevent hostilities, 34:
  capture of Madras took him by surprise, 36:
  tried to regain Madras, but failed, 39:
  finally regained Madras, 41:
  slain, 45.

ARCOLA, story of the bridge of, compared to the battle of Arni, 57.

ARCOT, Dost Ali at, 24:
  Safdar Ali proclaimed Nawab at, 25:
  Murtiza Ali declared himself Nawab at, 27:
  Nizam-ul-Mulk with his army entered, 28:
  Saiyud Muhammad murdered at, 29:
  left almost undefended, 52:
  taken by Clive, 53:
  attacked by the French, 54:
  French dispersed by Clive at, 54:
  siege of, 55:
  strong garrison placed in, 59:
  Arcot mentioned, 183.

ARMAGON, English Settlement on the Coromandel Coast, 18.

ARMSTRONG, Captain, at Council of War, 93:
  arrested by Clive, 114:
  acquitted by court-martial, 114.

ARMY ADMINISTRATION, 179-90.

ARNI, battle of, 56-58:
  French defeated at, 58:
  its ruler declared for Muhammad Ali, 58.

ASAF JAH, title granted to the family of Chin Kilich Khan, 17.

_Asiatic Annual Register_, quoted, 39_n_.

AURANGZEB, died in 1707, 16:
  placed the Subahs he had conquered under a Subahdar, or chief, 17:
  mentioned, 85, 172.

_Aurora_, frigate, in which Supervisors sailed, lost, 199.


BAJ-BAJ, fort near Maiapur, taken by Clive, 82.

BAKAR ALI, Governor of Vellore, 23.

BAKHSHI, Siraj-ud-daula's Commander-in-chief, 86.

BAKSAR, battle of, 157, 181.

BANKIPUR, military cantonment of Patna, 185:
  Sir R. Barker commandant at, 185:
  ringleaders arrested at, 186.

BAPTA, Clive encamped at, 111.

BARDWAN, revenue of, granted money to Clive, 117.

BARH, Clive and Mir Jafar marched to, 118.

BARKER, Sir R., commandant at Bankipur, 185:
  arrested ringleaders at Bankipur, 186.

BARNETT, Commodore, in command of squadron, 33:
  died, 34.

BATH, Clive went to take the waters at, 209.

BATTA, 179:
  Mir Jafar's double batta, 179:
  discontinued, 180, 181:
  double batta at Allahabad, 181:
  single batta, 182.

BAYLEY, Mr., Robert Clive's uncle at Manchester, 9.

BEECHER, Mr., Member of Select Committee, 191.

BENARES, occupied by the English, 157:
  interview between Clive, General Carnac, and Nawab-Wazir of Oudh
    at, 173:
  Zamindar of, 175.

BENGAL, Clive in, 85:
  state of affairs in, 132:
  Clive's achievements in, 133-6:
  position of Bengal, 173.

BHAGIRATHI, 92.

BIDERRA, Dutch defeated by Forde and Knox at, 131.

BIHAR, Ali Vardi Khan, Governor of, 85:
  Governor of, rebelled against Mir Jafar, 115:
  Clive and Mir Jafar at, 117:
  seat of saltpetre manufacture, 117:
  Mir Jafar yields it to East India Company, 118.

BIJAPUR, king of, sold Puducheri to the French in 1672, named
    afterwards Pondicherry, 20:
  Muzaffar Jang, Governor of, 44.

BISNAGAR, Raja of, granted a small portion of land, called
  Chennapatanam, to the English, 18, 19.

BLACK HOLE of Calcutta, 78, 79, 85, 132.

BLOCHMANN'S _Ain-i-Akbari_, quoted, 118_n_.

BOSCAWEN, Admiral, in command of fleet, 39:
  laid siege to Pondicherry, 39:
  sailed for England, 40.

BOURDONNAIS, M. de la, sent in command of a squadron, 33:
  landed at Madras, 35, 194:
  captured Madras, 35:
  treaty, 35.

_Britannia_, ship on board which Clive returned to England, 191.

BROOME'S _History of the Bengal Army_, 90_n_., 95_n_., 96_n_.,
    109_n_.

BURGOYNE, General, 201 and _n_.:
  led attacks on Clive, 201, 203-9.

BURSLEM'S, Mr., school at Market Drayton, to which Clive went when he
    was eleven, 10.

BUSSY-CASTELNAU, captured Gingi for the French, 47:
  avenged the death of Muzaffar Jang, and caused Salabat Jang to be
    proclaimed successor, 48:
  retained at Dupleix's court, 60:
  overtures with Siraj-ud-daula at Haidarabad, 87.

BUTE, Lord, Secretary of State, 143:
  Prime Minister, 143:
  Clive's suggestions to, 144:
  indignant at Clive's opposition, 145.


CALCUTTA, Black Hole of, 78-9:
  Manikchand, Governor of, 81:
  surrendered to Clive, 82:
  Watson took possession and handed keys to Drake, 82:
  Select Committee of, 87:
  Council of, 165, 179, 180.

CALLIAUD, Major, Commander of the Forces, 137:
  fought against the King of Delhi and defended Patna, 151:
  summoned to attend Council, 151.

CAMBRIDGE'S _War in India_, quoted, 43_n_.

CAMPBELL, Captain, at Council of War, 93.

CAREY, Mrs., among the prisoners in the Black Hole of Calcutta, 79.

CARNAC, General, 157:
  placed by Clive at head of army, 159, 166:
  met Clive at Benares, 173:
  fought against Mir Kasim, 180.

CARSTAIRS, Capt.-Lieut., at Council of War, 93.

CARTER, Mr., Member of Select Committee, 191.

CARTIER, Governor after Verelst, 201 and _n_.

CHAMPION, Colonel, 187.

CHANAR, occupied by the English, 157:
  ceded to the English, 174.

CHANDA SAHIB appointed Diwan by Saadat-ulla-Khan, 23:
  sent with Safdar Ali to capture Trichinopoli, 24:
  remained as Governor, 24:
  went to Arcot to do homage to Safdar Ali, 25:
  suspecting danger, left his family at Pondicherry, 26:
  kept up the siege of Trichinopoli for three months, 26:
  surrendered, 26:
  taken off in custody, 26:
  at Satara, 31:
  released, 44:
  Nawab of Arcot, 45:
  marched to Trichinopoli, 46:
  retreated to Pondicherry, 47:
  besieged Trichinopoli, 51:
  sent troops to join his son, Raja Sahib, at North Arcot, 54:
  defeated, 56-8:
  his army still in position before Trichinopoli, but much weakened,
    59:
  murdered, 73.

CHANDRANAGAR, taken by Clive, 84:
  Clive's troops stationed at, 90:
  Dutch defeated at, 131.

CHAPRA, in Bihar, meeting at, 175.

CHARLES VI, died in 1740, 31.

CHENNAPATANAM, granted to the English by the Raja of Bisnagar, 18-19:
  renamed Madras, 19:
  Fort St. George built, 19:
  Madras raised to a Presidency, 19:
  population at the end of 17th century, 19:
  constitution of the town in 1744, 19.

CHIN KILICH KHAN, took steps to make the Subahdarship hereditary in
    his family, 17, 23:
  obtained titles of Nizam-ul-Mulk and Asaf Jah, 17:
  ruler of Deccan, 18.

CIVIL SERVICE, reformed by Clive, 160, 169-70.

CLAREMONT, bought by Clive, 202.

CLARKE, Captain, in command at Devikota, 50:
  at Trichinopoli, 51.

CLIVE, Robert, arrived at Madras as a writer in the service of the
    East India Company in 1744, 9, 10, 11, 30:
  his early years not promising, 9:
  born at Styche, 9:
  sent to his uncle, Mr. Bayley, at Manchester when three years old,
    9:
  sent to school at Lostocke, 10:
  removed to Market Drayton, 10:
  brief experience of public school-life at Merchant Taylors', 10:
  private school in Hertfordshire till appointed writer, 10:
  his character at his several schools, 10:
  belonged to a 'fighting caste,' 10:
  learned to lead, 10:
  life of an attorney distasteful to him, 10:
  duties and life of a writer not congenial to Clive, 12-13:
  left England in 1743, 12:
  delayed at Rio for nine months, 12:
  insulted a superior functionary, 13:
  assaulted by the Rev. Mr. Fordyce, 14:
  regarded as a quiet member of society by his superiors, 15:
  Mr. Morse, Governor at Madras, befriended him, 15:
  state of India when Clive arrived described, 16-30:
  Clive's fortunes affected by the hostilities between the French and
    the English, 32-41:
  conspicuous in the first siege of Pondicherry, 39:
  retired to Fort St. David, 40:
  joined the expedition to Devikota as a volunteer, 42:
  under Major Lawrence stormed Devikota, which was ceded to the East
    India Company, 43:
  situation when Clive returned from Devikota described, 45-48:
  appointed Commissary of the Forces, 48:
  ill and ordered for a cruise, 48:
  on his return he equipped a force for Trichinopoli, 48:
  accompanied a larger force to Volkonda, 49:
  objecting to Captain Gingen's commands and mismanagement he
    returned to Fort St. David, 49:
  volunteered to go with Mr. Pigot to accompany a force with
    provisions to Trichinopoli, 49:
  went as far as Verdachelam, 49:
  returned to Fort St. David, 49:
  determined to become a soldier, 50:
  Governor of Madras gave him the commission of captain, 50:
  directed him to go to Devikota with troops and join Capt. Clarke,
    50:
    and report from Trichinopoli to Mr. Saunders, 50:
  Clive impressed by the depressed condition of the native prince and
    English soldiers, 51:
  resolved to remedy conditions, 51, 52:
  returned to Fort St. David to consult Mr. Saunders, 52:
  despatched to Madras with 200 soldiers, 52: 300 sipahis, 53:
  reached Kanchipuram, 53:
  went on to Arcot, 53:
  defeated the natives at Timeri, 53:
  sent for guns from Madras, 53:
  guns intercepted at Kanchipuram, 53:
  marched to save the guns, and in his absence the enemy attacked
    Arcot, 54:
  brought the guns into the fort and the enemy dispersed, 54:
  siege of Arcot, 55:
  took Timeri, 56:
  marched to Arni to attack Raja Sahib, 56:
  dispersed the enemy, 58:
  marched to Kanchipuram and took possession, 58:
  returned to Madras and then to Fort St. David, 59:
  Dupleix attempting to reconquer Arcot, Clive was sent with troops
    to meet him, 63:
  reached Vendalur and marched on to Kanchipuram, 64:
  after a short halt, proceeded to Kaveripak, where the French were
    concealed, 64, 65: battle, 66: Clive won, 66:
  baffled Dupleix, 67:
  returned to Fort St. David, 67:
  prepared to go to Trichinopoli, 67:
  despatched by Lawrence to occupy Samiaveram, 68:
  his engagements with d'Auteuil, 68, 69:
  Clive surprised at Samiaveram, 70:
  defeated the enemy, 72, 73:
  captured Paichanda, 73:
  forced d'Auteuil to surrender at Volkonda, 73:
  Clive returned to Fort St. David, 73:
  proceeded to Madras for rest, 73:
  married Miss Maskeleyne, 74:
  left Madras on sick-leave, 74:
  Clive in England, 75:
  Court of Directors gave him a great banquet, 75:
  voted him a diamond-hilted sword, 75:
  stood for St, Michael, returned as supporter of Mr. Fox, 76:
  unseated, 76:
  returned to India, 76:
  appointed Lieut.-Colonel, and named Governor and Commander of Fort
    St. David, with succession to the Governorship of Madras, 76:
  took troops to India with instructions to convey them to Bengal,
    76:
  Clive and his troops attacked and destroyed Gheria, 78:
  went along the Coromandel Coast back to Fort St. David, 78:
  Clive sent to the Hugli, 80:
  landed near Maiapur, marched to Baj-baj, 81:
  surprised in the night by Manikchand, Governor of Calcutta, 82:
  Calcutta surrendered to Clive, 82:
  Admiral Watson took possession, 82:
  Clive stormed Hugli, 83:
  treaty with the Nawab, 84:
  conquered Chandranagar, 84:
  Clive's dealings with Siraj-ud-daula, 85-88:
  preparations for war, 90:
  the battle of Plassey, 91-106:
  English loss small, 105:
  Clive's great victory, 105, 106:
  Clive's dealings with Mir Jafar, 109-11, 115-23:
    with Aminchand, 113:
  spoils of Plassey disputed, 113-7:
  created Mansabdar, 118:
  his dealings with the Princes of Southern India, 123:
  the Dutch invasion, 124-30:
  defeat of the Dutch, 130-2:
  Clive's achievements in Bengal, 133-7:
  leaves Bengal 1760, 137:
  Clive's second visit to England, 138-48:
  Clive's letter to Mr. Pitt, 139-41:
  Clive's fame as a soldier, 141:
  did not receive a warm welcome, 142:
  ill health, 142:
  made an Irish peer, 143:
  not a supporter of the Bute Administration, 143:
  Mr. Lawrence Sulivan, enemy of Clive, 144:
  Sulivan's objection to the donation of the jagir to Clive, 145:
  Clive voted against the Peace of Paris, 145:
  Sulivan tried to exclude Clive from a seat in the India House, 145:
  Clive defeated, 146:
  disturbance in Calcutta caused a panic in the India House, 146:
  Clive urged to accept the office of Governor-General, 146:
  fresh election by the Court of Proprietors, and Clive returned,
    147:
  Clive's proposal regarding the jagir, 147:
  Clive started for India, 148:
  Clive appointed Vansittart to succeed him as President of the
    Council in Bengal, 149:
  disturbances arose about the successor to Miran, who had died
    suddenly, 150-1:
  war broke out, 156:
  Clive returned to Calcutta, 157:
  remodelled the army and the Civil Service, 159-60:
  presents from the Natives to Civil Servants prohibited, 161:
  Clive's dealings with the corrupt faction, 162-3:
  his attempts to improve the Company's trade, 163-5:
  re-constitution of the Calcutta Council, 165-6:
  the Select Committee, 166:
  his attempts to reform civil administration, 166-7:
  Clive hated, 167:
  his good influence over the younger members of the service, 169:
  Clive's tour northward, 171:
  Clive's instructions to the young Subahdar at Murshidabad, 171,
    172:
  he proceeded to Benares, 173:
  after an interview with Nawab-Wazir, they proceeded to Allahabad to
    confer with Shah Alim, 174:
  Clive's demands, 174:
  Nawab-Wazir granted all except the one regarding factories, 174-5:
  the meeting at Chapra, 175:
  league formed against Maratha aggression, 175:
  question of the English frontier discussed, 175-6:
  Clive's views regarding the Subah, the English to keep in the
    background, the power to be in the hands of the Subahdar, 176-7:
  'Lord Clive's Fund,' 178:
  Clive's army administration, 179-89:
  'double batta,' 179, 181-2:
  conspiracy in the army, 184-9:
  Clive's mode of suppressing it, 189:
  Clive resigned in 1766, and returned to England in 1767, 191:
  his persecutions, 192-6, 201-9:
  visit to Paris, 196:
  on return to England found he was elected Member of Parliament,
    197:
  affairs in India unsatisfactory, 198-201:
  attacks on Clive, 201-9:
  his acquittal, 209:
  went to Bath to try the waters, 209:
  went abroad, 210:
  returned to England, 210:
  his death, 210:
  comments on the life of Clive, 211, 212.

CLIVE'S _Evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons_,
    quoted, 96_n_., 135_n_.

CLIVE'S _Report to the Court of Directors_, quoted, 96_n_.

COCHIN, independent territory, 17.

COMMISSARY OF FORCES, Clive appointed, 48.

COOTE, Major Eyre, nominated Governor of Calcutta by Admiral Watson,
    82:
  Clive objected to the nomination, 82:
  sent by Clive to occupy Katwa, 91:
  at Council of War, 93:
  sent with a detachment, after Plassey, 105.

COOTE'S _Narrative_, quoted, 96_n_., 103_n_.

COPE, Captain, mentioned in the account of the assault against Clive
    by Mr. Fordyce, 14:
  commander of Force sent to help ex-Raja of Tanjore, 42:
  sent to Trichinopoli, 48.

CORNEILLE, Captain, at Council of War, 93.

CORNISH, Admiral, on the Arakan coast, 127.

COROMANDEL COAST, English Settlement at Armagon on the, 18.

COUNCIL OF WAR, 92-3:
  question submitted to, 93.

COURT OF DIRECTORS feted Clive on his return to England, 75-6:
  appointed Clive Lieut.-Colonel, and named him Governor and
    Commander of Fort St. David, with succession to Governorship of
    Madras, 76:
  Clive's letter to, 98, 105-6:
  appointed ten men to manage affairs in Bengal, 119:
  constitution of, 138:
  disputed Clive's right to the jagir, 142:
  granted to Civil Servants right to private trade, 163:
  summary of the state of Bengal by, 166-7:
  batta, 179-81:
  curtailed their allowances, 180, 181:
  received Clive well in England, 196:
  sent out supervisors, 199, 200.

CUDDALORE, Mr. Fordyce assaulted Clive at, 14.

CUDMORE, Captain, at Council of War, 93.


DABHOL, Commodore Jones recalled from, 78.

DAMALCHERRI, pass in the Karnatik, 25, 45.

DAUDPUR, 94:
  meeting between Mir Jafar and Clive at, 105:
  entire force united at, 105.

D'AUTEUIL, sent by Dupleix to take Law's place, 68:
  approached Utatur, 68:
  surprised Clive, 70:
  defeated by Clive, 73:
  retreated to Volkonda, 73:
  surrendered to Clive, 73.

DECCAN, territories belonging to, 17:
  territories independent of, 17.

_Decisive Battles of India_, by Colonel Malleson, 66_n_., 131_n_.,
    156_n_.

DELHI, sack of, 16, 30:
  Siraj-ud-daula's overtures to Court of, 88:
  Muhammad Shah, Emperor of, 30:
  King of, threatened rebellion against Mir Jafar, 121:
  invasion of, 151:
  defeated by Calliaud and Knox, 151:
  Mir Kasim died at, 158.

DEVIKOTA, English tried to possess the Fort of, 42:
  Clive sent to join Major Lawrence at, 50.

DHAKA in rebellion against Mir Jafar, 115.

DIAMOND HARBOUR, Dutch vessels at, 126.

DISRAELI, Isaac son of, mentioned, 10:
  life of an attorney as distasteful to him as to Robert Clive, 10.

DOST ALI, appointed to succeed Saadat-ulla Khan as Nawab of the
    Karnatik, 23:
  sent his son to capture Trichinopoli, where he was slain, 25:
  his son proclaimed Nawab, 25.

DRAKE, Mr., Governor at Calcutta, 78:
  fled to the Hugli, 78.

DRAYTON, Market, _see_ Market Drayton.

DULAB RAM, _see_ Raja Dulab Ram.

DUMAS, M. Benoit, Governor-General of French possessions in India,
    21:
  at Pondicherry, 25.

DUPLEIX, M., succeeded Dumas as Governor-General of French
    possessions, 21, 32, 60, 194:
  received instructions from the Directors on account of the
    impending war with England, 32:
  ordered to join M. de la Bourdonnais, 33:
  urged to arrange with the Government of Madras that the two
    settlements should preserve neutrality, but not granted, 33:
  he appealed to Anwar-ud-din, 33:
  hostility stopped in the Karnatik, 34:
  took Madras, 36:
  sole director of French interests, 36:
  sent a small force under Paradis to relieve Madras, 37:
  slaughter at St. Thome, 37:
  tried to expel the English from all their settlements, 38:
  siege of Pondicherry, 39:
  directed the defence, 39:
  attempted to take Trichinopoli, 60:
  sent Law in command of troops, 60: unsuccessful, 61:
  urged Raja Sahib to proceed to reconquer Arcot, and, if possible,
    attack Madras, 62:
  attacked Punamallu, 62:
  marched to Kanchipuram and Vendalur, 62:
  Raja Sahib's army met by Clive at Kaveripak, 64:
  Clive surrounded by the French, 65:
  defeated by Clive, 66:
  sent d'Auteuil to replace Law, 68.

DUTCH, monopoly of trade with the Moluccas, 124:
  various conquests in the East, 124:
  Dutch-Indian Company, 124:
  settlement at Chinsurah, 124:
  negotiations with Mir Jafar, 125:
  Dutch fleet approaching Hugli, 126:
  Clive demanded explanation from them, 126:
  invasion of the, 126-30:
  complete defeat of, 131.


_Early Records of British India_, by Talboys Wheeler, quoted, 177 and
    _n_.

EAST INDIA COMPANY, Clive, writer in the service of, 9, 10, 11:
  Bihar saltpetre manufacture farmed by, 118:
  Directors of, 164:
  Diwan of the three Provinces, 172.

EATON, Dr., private school at Lostocke, to which Clive was sent till
    he was eleven, 10.

ELLIOT'S _History of India_, quoted, 31_n_., 44_n_., 100_n_., 176_n_.

ELLIS, civil officer, prepared to seize Patna, 155:
  defeated, 156.

_Evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons_, by Clive,
    quoted, 96_n_., 134_n_.

EYRE COOTE, Major, _see_ COOTE.


FACTORIES, not to be established by the East India Company in Oudh,
    174:
  Nawab-Wazir's opinion of, 174-5.

FAIZABAD, occupied by the English, 157.

FALTA, Major Kilpatrick with troops at, 80:
  Admiral Watson's squadron at, 80:
  Dutch attack off, 129.

FAMINE in the three Provinces, 199-201.

FISCHER, Captain, at Council of War, 93.

FLETCHER, Sir Robert, Commandant at Mungir, 185, 187:
  tried by court-martial and cashiered, 189:
  his pamphlet, 197.

FORDE, Colonel, sent by Clive to Vizagapatam, 122:
  united with Raja's troops, 122:
  expelled French from northern Sirkars, 122:
  took their fortress, 122:
  secured the influence for the English, 122:
  fought against the Dutch, 128:
  occupied Barnagar, 129:
  marched to Shirirampur, 129:
  Knox joined him, 130:
  defeated Dutch, 131:
  appointed Supervisor, 199.

FORDYCE, Rev. Mr., his assault against Clive, as reported by the
    Board at Fort St. David, 14:
  suspended, 14.

FORREST'S _Records of the Madras Presidency_ (1890), 14, 40_n_.,
    41_n_., 50_n_., 52_n_.

FORT ST. DAVID, Board at, 14:
  English officials from Madras escaped to, 38:
  Clive helped to defend, 38:
  French tried to take, 39:
  Clive appointed Governor of, 76.

FORT ST. GEORGE, built at Madras, 19.

FORT WILLIAM, built by Job Charnock in the reign of King William III,
    119.

FOX, Mr., Clive a supporter of, 76.

FRAIS, M. St., _see_ ST. FRAIS.

FRENCH COLONY, at Pondicherry, 20:
  on the Malabar coast and at Chandranagar, in Bengal, 21.

FULLER, Mr., seconded amendment to the attack against Clive, 208.


GAUPP, Captain, at Council of War, 92.

GEORGE II, King, his opinion of Clive, 141:
  his death, 143.

GHERIA, fort at, 77:
  headquarters of Angria, pirate chief, 77:
  taken by Watson and Clive, 78:
  Ali Vardi Khan's battle at, 85.

GHULAM HUSEN, _see_ CHANDA SAHIB.

GINGENS, Captain, sent to Volkonda, 48:
  mismanaged affairs, 49:
  in command at Trichinopoli, 51.

GINGI, fortress of, 47:
  captured by the French, 47.

GOLKONDA, Nizam-ul-Mulk retired to, after taking Trichinopoli, 28.

GRAFTON, Duke of, at head of Ministry, 197:
  resigned, 197.

GRANT, Major, at Council of War, 92.

GRANT, Captain Alexander, at Council of War, 93.

GRENVILLE, George, 198:
  Clive a supporter of, 198:
  his death, 198.

GRIFFIN, Admiral, commanding squadron, 39.

GUDALUR, important town near Pondicherry, 38.

GUNDLAKAMMA, river in Madras, 17.


HAIDAR ALI, invaded Madras, 198, 201.

HAIDARABAD, overtures between Siraj-ud-daula and Bussy at, 87.

HASTINGS, Warren, mentioned, 194:
  first Governor-General of India, 201.

HEBER, Bishop, quoted, 37_n_.

HIGH-ROAD from Hugli to Patna made by Mughal Government, 90.

_History of England_, by Lord Stanhope, 202_n_.

_History of Indostan_, by Orme, quoted, 20_n_.

_History of India_, by Orme, quoted, 95_n_., 109_n_.

_History of India_, by Elliot, quoted, 31_n_., 44_n_., 100_n_.,
    176_n_.

_History of the Bengal Army_, by Broome, quoted, 90_n_., 95_n_.,
    110_n_.

_History of the French in India_, by Colonel Malleson, 36_n_.

HOLLAND, 124.

HOLWELL, Mr., in charge during Clive's absence, 136-7.

HOPE HALL, the residence of Mr. Bayley, where Clive was brought up,
    9.

HUGLI, river, fugitives in ships on the, 78:
  Major Kilpatrick sent with troops to, 79:
  Watson and Clive sent to, 80.

HUGLI, town, stormed by Clive, 83:
  revenue of, granted money to Clive, 117.


_Indostan, History of_, _see_ _History of Indostan_.

INDIA passed to the Crown, 178.

INDIA HOUSE, Sulivan excluded Clive from seat in, 145:
  proprietors forced the Governor-Generalship of Bengal on Clive,
    146:
  sent a new covenant to Calcutta, 161:
  refused to increase salaries, 165.

IVES'S _Voyage and Historical Narrative_, quoted, 94_n_., 96_n_.


JAGIR, conferred on Clive, 123 and _n_.:
  disputed by Court of Directors, 142, 145-7.

JALANGI, river, 91.

JENNINGS, Captain, at Council of War, 93.

JOHNSTONE, Mr. Gideon, received money for secret services, 161.

JONES, Commodore, sent to attack Angria, 77:
  recalled from Dabhol, 78.


KALNA, Mr. Watts at, 92.

KALPI, English victory at, 157.

KANCHIPURAM, Clive on his way to Arcot halted at, 53:
  guns intercepted at, 53:
  siege of, 58:
  taken by Clive, 58.

KARNATIK, territory of the Deccan, 17:
  not immediately under the Subahdar, 17:
  territory entrusted to a Nawab, 17:
  its boundaries, 17, 18:
  invasions and war in the, 21-31:
  Khoja Abdullah, Nawab of the, 28.

KARRA, English victory at, 157:
  held by the English, 174.

KASIMBAZAR, Mr. Watts, English agent at, 86:
  Siraj-ud-daula sent an army to Plassey, in the island of, 88 and
    _n_.:
  troops at, 116, 119.

KASIPUR, seat of gun-factory, 83:
  Clive at, 83.

KATWA, Major Eyre Coote sent to occupy, 91:
  battle of, 156.

KAVERIPAK, battle of, 64-6, 183, 211:
  Clive defeats the French and allies, 66:
  occupied by Clive, 66.

KHOJA ABDULLAH, proclaimed Nawab of the Karnatik, 28:
  poisoned, 28.

KILPATRICK, Major, sent from Madras to the Hugli, 79:
  reached Falta, 80:
  at Council of War, 92:
  in command of troops at Plassey, 102:
  marched against St. Frais, 102:
  joined by Clive, 102.

KISHANGARH, revenue of, granted money to Clive, 117.

KNOX, Captain, fought against the Dutch, 128:
  defeated the Dutch, 131:
  fought against the King of Delhi and defended Patna, 151.

KOILADI, French attempted to intercept Lawrence at, 67.

KOLRUN, River, 68, 69.


LALGUDI, mud fort of, taken by Clive, 68.

LALLY, Count, sent to Pondicherry, 120:
  marched to Tanjore, 120:
  recalled Bussy, 120:
  successes achieved by, 120, 194:
  left northern Sirkars unprotected, 121.

LASCARS, with Clive at Plassey, 90, 95.

LAW, of Lauriston, sent by Dupleix to Trichinopoli, 60:
  unsuccessful, 61:
  fought gallantly at Pondicherry, 61:
  replaced by d'Auteuil, 68:
  defeated by Clive at Paichanda, 69-73:
  surrendered, 73:
  sent by Clive near Chandranagar with troops, 84.

LAWRENCE, Major Stringer, in command at Fort St. David, 40_n_.:
  took a force to Devikota, with Clive as lieutenant, 43:
  stormed Devikota, 43:
  treaty, 43:
  returned to Fort St. David, 44:
  joined Clive, 67:
  started with Clive for Trichinopoli, 67:
  entered Trichinopoli, 68:
  assisted by Morari Rao and the Dalwai of Mysore, 68:
  sent Clive to occupy Samiaveram, 68.

LAWRENCE, Lord, quoted, 16_n_.

LE BEAUME, Captain, at Council of War, 93.

_Letters_, by Scrafton, quoted, 160_n_.

_Life of Clive_, by Malcolm, 103_n_.

'LORD CLIVE'S FUND,' 178.

LOSTOCKE, private school where Clive was educated till he was eleven,
    10.

LUCAS, Captain, mentioned in the account of the assault against Clive
    by Mr. Fordyce, 14.

LUCKNOW, occupied by the English, 157.

LUSHINGTON, affixed Admiral Watson's name to false document regarding
    Aminchand, 194.


MA'AFUZ KHAN, son of Anwar-ud-din, sent to demand Madras, 37:
  encountered Dupleix at Maliapur, St. Thome, 37:
  defeated, 37:
  taken prisoner, 45.

MADHUPUR, Clive despatched Watts and Walsh to, 111:
  Clive marched to, 111.

MADRAS, Robert Clive arrives as a writer in the service of the East
    India Service in 1744 at, 9, 30:
  Mr. Morse Governor at, 15, 33:
  originally Chennapatanam, 19:
  granted to the English and re-named Madras, 19:
  Fort St. George built, 19:
  raised to Presidency in 1653, 19:
  population at end of 17th century, 19:
  constitution of the town, 19:
  English trading colony, 20:
  French colony, 20:
  taken by the French, 35:
  restored, 41.

_Madras Presidency, Records of_, by Mr. Forrest, mentioned, 14,
    40_n_., 41_n_., 50_n_., 52_n_.

MAIAPUR, Watson and Clive at, 81.

MALCOLM, Sir John, mentioned, 143:
  quoted, 169:
  _Life of Clive_, 103_n_., 143_n_., 198_n_.

MALDA, Aminchand's pilgrimage to, 113.

MALIAPUR, battle between French and English at, 37.

MALLESON'S, Colonel, _History of the French in India_, 36_n_.:
  _Decisive Battles of India_, 66_n_., 130_n_., 156_n_.

MANCHESTER, Clive sent to his uncle to be brought up and educated at,
    9.

MANIKCHAND, Governor of Calcutta, 81:
  marched to Baj-baj, 81:
  retired, 82.

MANSURPET, pagoda of, taken by Clive, 68.

MARATHAS, took Trichinopoli, 25:
  invasion of, 25, 26:
  yielded Trichinopoli to Nizam-ul-Mulk, 28:
  overtures with Siraj-ud-daula, 87:
  Maratha ditch, 108:
  defeated at battle of Panipat, 173:
  advance of, 183.

MARKAR, the Armenian, commanded a special brigade, 154:
  sent to Patna, 155:
  drove the English out, 155:
  took English prisoners, 156.

MARKET DRAYTON, Clive sent to Mr. Burslem's school at, 10.

MARTIN, Francis, leader of the French traders on the Coromandel
    coast, 20, 21:
  died 1706, 20.

MASKELEYNE, Miss, married Clive, 74.

_Memoir of Captain Dalton_, quoted, 49_n_., 52_n_.

MERCHANT TAYLORS', Clive spent a short time at, 10.

MIRAN, son of Mir Jafar, 119:
  arrived with an army at Murshidabad, 132:
  struck dead by lightning, 150.

MIR ASAD, appointed Diwan in place of Chanda Sahib, 24:
  taken prisoner by the Marathas, 25.

MIR JAFAR, in command of Siraj-ud-daula's forces, 79:
  joined Clive, 86:
  quarrelled with Siraj-ud-daula, 88:
  reconciliation, 88:
  swore fealty and to fight against Clive, 88, 91:
  his interview with Mr. Watts, 92:
  renounced Watts as a spy, 92:
  threatened to destroy the English, 92:
  favourable despatch from, 94:
  position of his troops at Plassey, 97:
  his interview with Siraj-ud-daula, 100:
  lingering of his troops, 103:
  requested an interview with Clive, 105:
  escorted to the camp to be proclaimed Subahdar, 107:
  his conditions and agreements with Clive, 107-8:
  noble family in Bihar, 109:
  officer of Ali Vardi Khan, 109:
  married Ali Vardi Khan's sister, 109:
  Bakshi of the army, 109:
  took Calcutta, 109:
  his meeting with Clive, 110:
  went to Murshidabad, 111:
  received Clive, 111:
  proclaimed Subahdar, 112:
  applied to Clive for assistance, 115, 121:
  his army at Rajmahal, 116:
  attempt to coerce Bihar, 116-8:
  met Clive, 116:
  at Patna, 117:
  marched with Clive to Barh, 118:
  returned to Murshidabad, 118:
  treasury exhausted, 121:
  conferred the jagir of the Zamindari on Clive, 123:
  forced to resign, 153:
  to reside under English protection, 153:
  displaced by Mir Kasim, 153:
  restored by the English, 158, 159:
  his death, 159, 160:
  bequeathed money to Clive, 178:
  formation of Lord Clive's Fund, 178.

MIR KASIM, son-in-law of Mir Jafar, 119, 152:
  envoy of Mir Jafar, 152:
  wished to succeed Miran, 152:
  his bribery successful, 152:
  Mir Jafar to be displaced by, 152:
  proceeded to Patna, 153:
  installed as Subahdar, 153:
  good ruler, 153:
  removed his fortress to Mungir, 153:
  reformed his army, 154:
  abolished transit duties, 155:
  prepared for war, 155:
  his army under Markar set out for Patna, 155:
  drove the English away, 155:
  sent Samru to Baksar, 156:
  intercepted the English and beat them completely, 156:
  defeated at Katwa, 156:
  defeated at Gheria, 156:
  on the fall of Patna, took refuge at Oudh, 157:
  defeated at Baksar, 157:
  died at Delhi, 158.

MIR MADAN, Siraj-ud-daula's general, 97:
  killed at Plassey, 100.

MIR MEHDI KHAN, commanding Mir Jafar's troops, 155:
  went to Mungir to report to Mir Jafar, 155.

MOLITORE, Capt.-Lieut., at Council of War, 93.

MORARI RAO, famous Maratha soldier, left to guard Trichinopoli, 26:
  sent to help Clive at Arcot, 55:
  marched with Clive to Arni, 56:
  defeated the French, 57, 58:
  assisted Lawrence, 68.

MORSE, Mr., Governor of Madras, 15, 33:
  befriended Clive, 15:
  declined proposal from the French Governor that the two settlements
    should preserve neutrality, 33:
  demanded in vain for protection from Anwar-ud-din, 35.

MOSES, Mr. Levy, mentioned in the account of the complaint of the
    assault of Mr. Fordyce against Clive, 14.

MUGHAL DYNASTY receives a blow from which it never rallied, 16, 85,
    173:
  high-road from Hugli to Patna, 90.

MUGHAL, Great, called on Clive to help repress the rebellion of his
    son, 123.

MUHAMMAD ALI, forced to flee to Trichinopoli, 45:
  rival of Chanda Sahib in the Deccan, 45:
  at Trichinopoli, 51:
  his treasury exhausted, 51.

MUHAMMAD RIZA KHAN, nominated Deputy-Nawab, 161, 168.

MUHAMMAD SHAH, Emperor of Delhi, 30:
  died, 44.

MUIR, Captain, at Council of War, 93.

MUNGIR, Mir Kasim removed his capital to, 153:
  Sir Robert Fletcher at, 187:
  mutiny at, 187-8.

MUNRO, Sir Hector, his victory at Baksar, 157:
  occupied Benares, Chanar and Allahabad, 157:
  overran Oudh, 157:
  occupied Lucknow and Faizabad, 157:
  defeated enemy at Karra and Kalpi, 157:
  Nawab-Wazir of Oudh surrendered himself to, 157.

MURADBAGH, palace of, Clive at, 111.

MURSHIDABAD, capital of Siraj-ud-daula, 78, 85:
  bankers and merchants of, join Clive, 86:
  Mir Jafar's interview with Mr. Watts at, 92:
  Clive entered, 111:
  treasury of, granted money to Clive, 117:
  Clive at, 171.

MURTIZA ALI, Governor of Vellore, 27:
  poisoned his brother-in-law, 27:
  proclaimed himself Nawab, 27:
  his flight, 27:
  present at the royal wedding, 29:
  sudden disappearance, 30:
  suspected murderer of the young Prince, 30.

MUZAFFAR JANG, claimed succession to the Deccan, 44:
  Governor of Bijapur, 44:
  enlisted service of Marathas, 44:
  proclaimed himself Subahdar of the Deccan, 45:
  marched to Trichinopoli, 46:
  at Tanjore, 46, 47:
  retreated on Pondicherry, 47:
  taken prisoner, 47:
  released, 47:
  acknowledged Subahdar, 47:
  slain on his way to Aurangabad, 47.

MYSORE, an independent territory, 17:
  sent an army to assist Muhammad Ali, 54:
  assisted Lawrence at Trichinopoli, 68.


NADIR SHAH, invasion of, 16, 17, 25, 30, 85.

NEGAPATAM, squadron cruised off, 34.

NAPIER'S, Sir W., _Peninsular War_, quoted, 60_n_.

_Narrative_, Sir Eyre Coote's, quoted, 96_n_., 103_n_.

NASIR JANG, son of Nizam-ul-Mulk, succeeded in Southern India, 30,
    44:
  slain by his own levies, 47.

NEWCASTLE, Duke of, 143.

NEWCASTLE, Dowager Duchess of, sold Claremont to Clive, 202.

NIZAM-UL-MULK, title granted to the family of Chin Kilich Khan, 17:
  Nawab of the Karnatik, 18:
  Subahdar of the Deccan, 23:
  objected to the appointments in the Karnatik made by
    Saadat-ulla-Khan, 23:
  gave the Marathas permission to attack Trichinopoli, 25:
  entered Arcot with a large army, 28:
  marched on to Trichinopoli, 28:
  compelled the Marathas to yield, 28:
  proclaimed his own commander Khoja Abdullah to be Nawab of the
    Karnatik, 28:
  Nawab poisoned, 28:
  he appointed Anwar-ud-din, provisionally, and to act as guardian to
    Saiyud Muhammad, 28:
  died, 44.

NORTH, Lord, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 197:
  First Lord of the Treasury, 198:
  his Bill, 200-1.

'NORTHERN CIRCARS,' territory of the Deccan, 17.

NUJM-UD-DAULA, Nawab-Nazim, 172.


OMAR BEG, sent to escort Mir Jafar to Clive's camp, 107.

ORME, Mr., quoted, 20_n_., 30, 81_n_., 95_n_., 96_n_., 103_n_.,
    109_n_., 111_n_.

OUDH, overtures of Siraj-ud-daula to the Nawab-Wazir of, 88:
  Nawab-Wazir of, threatened rebellion against Mir Jafar, 121:
  Nawab-Wazir of, protects and aids Mir Kasim, 157:
  throws himself on the mercy of the English, 157, 159:
  Clive's dealings with Nawab-Wazir of, 171, 173-8.


PAICHANDA, taken by Clive, 73.

PALMER, Captain, at Council of War, 93.

PALMYRAS, Cape, 80.

PALTI, town on the Kasimbazar river, 91.

PANIPAT, battle of, mentioned, 16, 173.

PARADIS, sent by Dupleix to relieve Madras, 37:
  entered Madras, 38.

PARKER, John Neville, tried by court-martial, 189:
  reinstated, 189.

PARSHAW, Capt.-Lieut., at Council of War, 93.

PATNA, capital of Bihar, Clive accompanied Mir Jafar to, 117:
  Clive entered and subdued, 123:
  Mir Jafar conferred jagir on Clive at, 123:
  Patna stormed, 151:
  English plunders at, 155:
  Mir Kasim died at, 158.

PEACE OF PARIS, Clive voted against, 145.

PEERAGE, Clive raised to an Irish, 143.

_Peninsular War_, by Sir W. Napier, quoted, 60_n_.

PEYTON, Commodore, commanded squadron on Commodore Barnett's death,
    34:
  cruised off Negapatam, 34:
  sailed for Trincomalee, 34.

PIGOT, Mr., sent with provisions, 49.

PITT, Mr. (afterwards Lord Chatham), Secretary of State, 139:
  Clive's letter to, 139:
  Clive describes Miran as unfit to succeed, 139, 150:
  points urged in the letter, 140:
  Pitt unable to answer the letter, 141:
  Pitt's opinion of Clive, 141:
  resigned, 143:
  Lord Privy Seal, 197:
  resigned on account of ill health, 197.

PLASSEY, army recalled by Clive from, 84:
  Siraj-ud-daula sent an army to, 88:
  Clive's army reached, 94:
  battle of, 94-106, 183:
  spoils of Plassey, 107-17:
  effects of the spoils, 136.

PONDICHERRY, French settlement, 18:
  French squadron anchored off, 34:
  Dumas, Governor of, 25:
  siege of, 39-41:
  English officials from Madras sent as prisoners to, 38:
  siege of, 39:
  armies of Chanda Sahib and Muzaffar Jang retreated on, 47:
  Law distinguished at siege of, 61.

PRAGMATIC SANCTION, England upholder of, 31.

PROPRIETORS, Court of, 145-7.

PURNIAH, Raja of, rebelled against Mir Jafar, 114-5:
  went with Clive to Murshidabad to make peace with Mir Jafar, 116.


RAGHUJI BHONSLA, leader of the Marathas, 25.

RAJA DULAB RAM, joined Clive, 86:
  position of his troops at Plassey, 97:
  treacherously advised Siraj-ud-daula to flee from Plassey to
    Murshidabad, 101:
  Finance Minister, 107, 114:
  retired to his palace, 114:
  refused all intercourse with Mir Jafar, 114:
  reconciliation with Mir Jafar, 117, 168.

RAJA SAHIB, son of Chanda Sahib, in command at North Arcot, 54:
  joined by the French, 54:
  siege of Arcot, 55:
  retreated to Vellore, 55:
  defeated at Arni, 57-8:
  took Punamallu, 62:
  repaired damage at Kanchipuram, 62:
  encamped at Vendalur, 62-3:
  quitted Vendalur, 63:
  in ambush at Kaveripak, 64:
  remarkable battle of Kaveripak, 64-6:
  defeated by Clive, 66:
  retreated to Seringham, 68.

RAJMAHAL, Siraj-ud-daula discovered hiding at, 112:
  Mir Jafar and Clive at, 116.

RIO, Clive delayed for nine months at, 12:
  Clive picked up a little Portuguese at, 12.

RUMBOLD, Captain, at Council of War, 92.


SAADAT-ULLA KHAN, Nawab of the Karnatik, 23:
  died in 1732, 23:
  appointed Dost Ali, his nephew, to succeed, 23:
  Bakar Ali to be Governor of Vellore, 23:
  and Ghulam Husen or Chanda Sahib to be Diwan afterwards, 23.

SAFDAR ALI, son of Dost Ali, sent to capture Trichinopoli, 24:
  proclaimed Nawab, 25:
  persuaded Marathas to advance on the Karnatik, 26:
  siege of Trichinopoli, 26:
  surrendered, 26:
  sent his family to Madras, 27:
  took refuge at Vellore, 27:
  poisoned by his brother-in-law, 27:
  his son proclaimed Nawab by the army, 27.

SAIYUD MUHAMMAD KHAN, son of Safdar Ali, proclaimed Nawab, 27:
  Anwar-ud-din appointed his guardian, 28:
  murdered, 30.

SALABAT JANG, proclaimed Subahdar on the death of Muzaffar Jang, 48.

SALLUSTIAN MOTTO, quoted, 16.

SALT MONOPOLY, 164, 165.

SAMIAVERAM, occupied by Clive, 68:
  battle at, 69-72:
  Clive's victory, 73, 183, 211.

SAMRU, Armenian, in command of a special brigade, 153-4:
  sent to Baksar, 156.

SARFARAZ, son of, at Dhaka, in rebellion against Mir Jafar, 115.

SATARA, Chanda Sahib, prisoner at, 26, 31:
  Muzaffar Jang proceeded to, 44.

SAUNDERS, Mr., Governor of Fort St. David, 49:
  sent Clive under Mr. Pigot to take provisions to Trichinopoli, 49:
  gave Clive his captaincy, 50:
  sent him to Devikota, 50.

SCOTT, Colonel, nominated Commander, with Clive as second, 77:
  his death, 77.

SCRAFTON, Mr., sent to escort Mir Jafar to Clive's camp, 107:
  informed Aminchand of false document, 113:
  appointed Supervisor, 199:
  _Letters_, quoted, 160_n_.

SELECT COMMITTEE appointed, 147, 161, 191:
  opposition of, 166.

SERINGHAM, island to which French retreated from Trichinopoli, 68,
    69.

SET, banking-house of the Set family, 168.

SHAH ALIM, troops of, repulsed the invasion of Bihar, 153:
  installed Mir Kasim as Subahdar, 153:
  Clive's dealing with, 171:
  his capital occupied by the Afghans, 171:
  meeting with Clive at Allahabad, 174.

SIRAJ-UD-DAULA, Subahdar, 78:
  seized factory at Kasimbazar, 78:
  marched to Calcutta, 78:
  took possession, 78:
  Black Hole of Calcutta, 78-9:
  Murshidabad capital of, 78, 85:
  grandson of Ali Vardi Khan, 85:
  overtures to Bussy at Haidarabad, 87:
  to the Marathas, 87:
  to Delhi, 88:
  to Nawab-Wazir of Oudh, 88:
  quarrelled with Mir Jafar, 88:
  reconciliation with Mir Jafar to fight against Clive, 88:
  sent his army to Kasimbazar, 88:
  Clive sent declaration of war to, 91:
  at Plassey, 95:
  fled to Murshidabad, 101, 112:
  discovered hiding at Rajmahal, 112:
  made over to Mir Jafar, 112:
  interview with Mir Jafar, 112:
  stabbed, 112.

SIVAJI, built a fort at Gheria, 77.

SMITH, Captain F., 187:
  at Mungir, 187.

SMITH, Colonel, 186:
  commanding at Surajpur, 186:
  nominated Commander-in-chief by Clive, 191.

SMITH, Major, 186:
  commanding at Allahabad, 186:
  arrested officers, 186.

STANHOPE, Earl, quoted, 192, 209, 210 and _n_., 211:
  _History of England_, 202_n_.

STANLEY, Mr., proposed an amendment in the attack against Clive, 208.

ST. FRAIS, Mons., commanding French at Plassey, 96:
  formerly member of Council of Chandranagar, 96:
  commenced action at Plassey, 98:
  remained when Siraj-ud-daula fled, 101:
  met by Kilpatrick, 102:
  retreated, 103:
  his final resistance and death, 104.

STERLING, Mr., private school in Hertfordshire, where Clive went on
    leaving Merchant Taylors', until he was nominated writer in the
    service of the East India Company, 10.

STYCHE, Robert Clive born at, 9.

SUBAH, province, 17, 166, 177.

SUBAHDAR, chief of a subah or province, 17:
  Nizam-ul-Mulk, Subahdar of the Deccan, 23:
  on his death struggles for succession, 44-7:
  Ali Vardi Khan, Subahdar of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, 85:
  Siraj-ud-daula succeeded him, 85:
  attempts to dethrone the Subahdar, 86.

SULIVAN, Mr. Lawrence, Chairman of Court of Directors, 144:
  enemy of Clive, 144, 203:
  excluded Clive from seat in the India House, 145:
  elected at Court of Proprietors, 145:
  his candidates for second election defeated, 147.

SUMNER, Mr., accompanied Clive to Calcutta, 148, 159.

SURAJPUR, Colonel Smith stationed at, 186.

SYKES, accompanied Clive back to Calcutta, 148, 159:
  agent at Murshidabad, 166:
  member of Select Committee, 191.


TACITUS, quoted, 139.

TANJORE, troops sent from Fort St. David to help the ex-Raja, 42.

THOME, St., battle at, 37.

THURLOW, Attorney-General, supported Burgoyne in his attack against
    Clive, 205.

TIMERI, Clive's victory at, 53:
  Clive takes the fort of, 56.

_Transactions in India_, quoted, 156 and _n_.

TRAVANCORE, independent territory, 17.

TRICHINOPOLI, kingdom claimed by the Nawabs of the Karnatik, 18:
  death of the ruler of, 24:
  captured by Dost Ali, 24:
  Chanda Sahib, Governor of, 24:
  taken by the Marathas, 25:
  siege of, 26:
  surrender of, 26:
  yielded by the Marathas to Nizam-ul-Mulk, 28:
  Clive escorted troops on their way to, 49:
  sent with Major Lawrence to report from, 50:
  besieged by Chanda Sahib, 51:
  Law in command of French troops and sipahis before Trichinopoli,
    61.

TRINCOMALEE, the English squadron sailed away from the French to, 34.


UNDWA NALA, taken by Major Adams, 157.

UTATUR, d'Auteuil at, 68.


VANSITTART, successor to Clive, 136, 149:
  his character, 149-50:
  bribed by Mir Kasim, 152:
  forced Mir Jafar to resign, 153:
  appointed Supervisor, 199.

VELLORE, Safdar Ali took refuge at, 27:
  Murtiza Ali, Governor at, 27.

VENDALUR, French encampment at, 62-3:
  French quit, 63:
  Clive at, 64.

VERDACHELAM, the point to which Clive accompanied the troops with
    provisions for Trichinopoli, 49.

VERELST, appointed Governor by Clive, 190, 196, 198.

VIZAGAPATAM, Colonel Forde at, 122.

VIZIADRUG, harbour of, 77.

VIZIANAGRAM, letter to Clive demanding troops from Raja of, 121.

VOLKONDA, Clive sent under Captain Gingens to, 48:
  surrender of d'Auteuil at, 73.

_Voyage and Historical Narrative_, by Ives, quoted, 94_n_., 96_n_.


WAGGONNER, Captain, at Council of War, 93.

WALSH, sent with Watts to Madhupur, 111:
  Clive's secretary, 140:
  charged with the letter to Mr. Pitt, 140.

WANDIWASH, Saiyud Muhammad Khan and his mother sent to, 27.

_War in India_, by Cambridge, quoted, 43_n_.

WATSON, Admiral, in command of squadron, 78:
  destroyed Gheria, 78:
  sent to the Hugli, 80:
  arrived at Falta, 80-1:
  anchored at Maiapur, 81:
  nominated Major Eyre Coote, Governor of Calcutta, 82:
  took possession himself, 82:
  handed keys to Drake, 82:
  objected to sign false document regarding Aminchand's demand, 87.

WATTS, Mr., English agent at Kasimbazar, 86, 87:
  at Kalna, 92:
  his letter to Clive with news of Mir Jafar's faithlessness, 92:
  denounced as spy, 92:
  sent to Madhupur, 111.

WEDDERBURN, Mr., able lawyer and ally of Clive, 198:
  Solicitor-General, 203.

WELLESLEY, Marquess, mentioned, 122.

WHEELER, Talboys, quoted, 177 and _n_., 178_n_.

WHITE TOWN, a division of Madras, 19.

WILSON, Prof. H. H., quoted, 37_n_.

WILSON, Commodore, sent by Clive to demand apology from the Dutch,
    failing which, to attack their squadron, 130:
  Dutch refusal and consequent attack, 130:
  completely defeated Dutch, 131.

WRITER in the service of the East India Company, duties of, 12:
  Clive appointed, 10, 11, 12:
  not congenial to Clive, 12.


YAR LUTF KHAN, a commander in Siraj-ud-daula's army, 86:
  offered to join Clive to displace Siraj-ud-daula, and to become
    himself Subahdar, 86, 107:
  position of his troops at Plassey, 97.


ZAMINDARI, conferred on Clive by Mir Jafar, 123.



***