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THE FIRST SEVEN DIVISIONS

_McCLELLAND, GOODCHILD & STEWART, Ltd._

[Illustration: Map showing the first seven days of the retreat from
Mons, with the routes followed by each Division. The dates given refer
to the nights during which the troops rested, the days being spent in
marching.

  1st Division Violet
  2nd Division Green
  3rd Division Blue
  5th Division Red

Approximate scale 7 miles to an inch.]




_The First Seven Divisions_

_Being a detailed account of the fighting from Mons to Ypres_

_By Ernest W. Hamilton_
(_Late Captain 11th Hussars_)

_WITH MAPS_

_TORONTO:
McCLELLAND, GOODCHILD & STEWART. Ltd._

_Printed in Great Britain_




PREFACE


The 1st Expeditionary Force to leave England consisted of the 1st A.C.
(1st and 2nd Divisions) and the 2nd A.C. (3rd and 5th Divisions).

The 4th Division arrived in time to prolong the battle-front at Le
Cateau, but it missed the terrible stress of the first few days, and
can therefore hardly claim to rank as part of the 1st Expeditionary
Force in the strict sense. The 6th Division did not join till the
battle of the Aisne. These two divisions then formed the 3rd A.C.

In the following pages the doings of the 3rd A.C. are only very lightly
touched upon, not because they are less worthy of record than those of
the 1st and 2nd A.C., but simply because they do not happen to have
come within the field of vision of the narrator.

The 7th Division's doings are dealt with because these were
inextricably mixed up with the operations of the 1st A.C. east
of Ypres. The 3rd A.C., on the other hand, acted throughout as
an independent unit, and had no part in the Ypres and La Bassee
fighting with which these pages are attempting to deal.

The main point aimed at is accuracy; no attempt is made to magnify
achievements, or to minimise failures.

It must, however, be clearly understood that the mention from time to
time of certain battalions as having been driven from their trenches
does not in the smallest degree suggest inefficiency on the part of
such battalions. It is probable that every battalion in the British
Force has at some time or another during the past twelve months been
forced to abandon its trenches. A battalion is driven from its trenches
as often as not owing to insupportable shell-fire concentrated on a
particular area. Such trenches may be afterwards retaken by another
battalion under entirely different circumstances, and in any case in
the absence of shell-fire. That goes without saying. It may, therefore,
quite easily happen that lost trenches may be retaken by a battalion
which is inferior in all military essentials to the battalion which was
driven out of the same trenches the day before, or earlier in the same
day, as the case may be.

I wish to take this opportunity of expressing the great obligations
under which I lie to the many officers who have so kindly assisted me
in the compilation of this work.




CONTENTS



                                                         PAGE

PREFACE                                                     v

BEFORE MONS                                                 1

THE BATTLE OF MONS                                         12

THE RETREAT FROM MONS (LANDRECIES AND MAROILLES)           33

THE LE CATEAU PROBLEM                                      50

LE CATEAU                                                  55

THE RETREAT FROM LE CATEAU (VILLERS-COTTERETS AND NERY)    66

THE ADVANCE TO THE AISNE                                   84

THE PASSAGE OF THE AISNE                                   96

TROYON (VERNEUIL AND SOUPIR)                              103

THE AISNE                                                 120

MANUVRING WESTWARD                                        141

FROM ATTACK TO DEFENCE                                    159

THE BIRTH OF THE YPRES SALIENT                            162

THE STAND OF THE FIFTH DIVISION                           180

NEUVE CHAPELLE                                            192

PILKEM                                                    203

THE SECOND ADVANCE                                        209

THE FIGHTING AT KRUISEIK                                  218

THE LAST OF KRUISEIK                                      230

ZANDVOORDE                                                249

GHELUVELT                                                 257

MESSINES AND WYTSCHATE                                    265

KLEIN ZILLEBEKE                                           278

THE RELIEF OF THE SEVENTH DIVISION                        285

ZWARTELEN                                                 294

THE PRUSSIAN GUARD ATTACK                                 303

EPITAPH                                                   310




The following abbreviations are used:--

  The C. in C. = Field Marshal Sir John French
  A.C.         = Army Corps
  C.B.         = Cavalry Brigade
  K.O.S.B.     = King's Own Scottish Borderers
  K.O.Y.L.I.   = King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry
  K.R.R.       = King's Royal Rifles (60th)




LIST OF MAPS


Showing the first seven days of the        _Facing Title Page_
retreat from Mons, with the routes
followed by each division.

Showing disposition of troops at             _Facing page_ 12
the battle of Mons.

Showing line occupied by British                          102
troops after the battle of the Aisne.

Ypres and district                                        162




THE FIRST SEVEN DIVISIONS




BEFORE MONS


When an entire continent has for eighteen months been convulsed by
military operations on so vast a scale as almost to baffle imagination,
the individual achievements of this division or of that division are
apt to fade quickly out of recognition. Fresh scenes peopled by fresh
actors hold the public eye, and, in the quick passage of events, the
lustre of bygone deeds soon gets blurred. People forget. But when the
deeds are such as to bring a thrill of national pride; when they set up
an all but unique standard of valour for future generations to live up
to, it is best not to forget.

On the outbreak of war with Germany on August 3rd, 1914, the British
Army was so small as to be a mere drop in the ocean of armed men who
were hurrying to confront one another on the plains of Belgium. It was
derisively described as "contemptible." And yet, in the first three
months of the war, this little army, varying in numbers from 80,000 to
130,000, may justly claim to have in some part moulded the history of
Europe. It was the deciding factor in a struggle where the sides--at
first--were none too equally matched. For this alone its deeds are
worthy of record, and they are worthy of record too for another reason.
They represent the supreme sacrifice in the interests of the national
honour of what was familiarly known as our "regular army." Since the
outbreak of the war, fresh armies have arisen, of new and unprecedented
proportions. The members of these new armies are as familiar now to the
public eye as the representatives of the old regular army are scarce.
With the doings of these new armies the present pages have no concern.
They are, it is true, the expression of a spirit of patriotism and duty
so remarkable that their voluntary growth must for ever stand out as
one of the grandest monuments in the history of Britain. But they form
no part of the subject matter of these pages, which deal solely with
the way in which the old regular army, led by the best in the land,
saved the national honour in the acutest crisis in history, and
practically ceased to exist in the doing of it.

The regular army, small as it was, did not lie under the hands of those
who would use it. Much of it was far away across the seas, guarding the
outposts of the Empire. A certain proportion, however, was at hand, and
with a smoothness and expedition which silenced, no less than it
amazed, the critics of our military administration, 50,000 infantry,
with its artillery and five brigades of cavalry, were shipped off to
France almost before the public had realized that we were at war. From
Havre or Boulogne, as the case might be, these troops either marched or
were trained northwards; shook themselves into shape; gradually assumed
the form of two army corps of two divisions each, of which the 1st
Division was on the right and the 5th on the left (the 4th Division
having not yet arrived), and in this formation faced the Belgian
frontier to meet and check the invaders.

The two advancing forces met at Mons, or, to be more accurate, the
British force took up a defensive position at Mons--in conformity with
the pre-arranged plan of extending the French line westwards--and there
waited.

From this time on, the doings of the Expeditionary Force become
historically interesting, and its movements are worthy of study in
detail. In the first instance, however, in order to arrive at a proper
understanding of the circumstances which governed the position of the
British troops on the occasion of their first stand, and which
afterwards dictated the line of retreat and the roads to be followed in
that retreat, and the successive points at which the retreating army
faced about and fought, it is desirable to get a general grasp of the
geographical side of things. The Germans were advancing from the
north-east on Paris; that was their avowed intention; there was no
secret about it; the leaders openly proclaimed their intentions; the
soldiers advertised the fact in chalk legends scribbled on the doors of
the houses; and--as the fashion is with Germans in arms--they were
taking the most direct route to their objective, their artillery and
transport following the great main roads that shoot out north-eastward
from Paris towards Brussels, with their infantry swarming in endless
thousands along the smaller collateral roads. Here and there, at
intervals of from twenty to thirty miles, this system of parallel roads
running north-east from Paris is crossed by other main roads running at
right angles and forming, as it were, a skeleton check with the point
of the diamond to the north. These main cross-roads had, in
anticipation, been selected for the lines of defence along which our
troops should turn and fight if necessary, for though it is laid down
in the text-books of the wise that a line of defence must not run along
a main road, such a road has obvious value for purposes of correct
alignment. As the German advance was from the north-east, it is
self-evident that the line of resistance or defence had to extend from
north-west to south-east.

When our troops, by forced marches, reached Mons on August 22nd, 1914,
the primary business of the British Force was to prolong the French
line of resistance in a north-westerly direction. The natural country
feature which was geographically indicated for this purpose was the
high road which runs from Charleroi through Binche to Mons, and this
was the line for which our troops were originally destined. In effect,
however, this line proved to be impracticable, for the simple reason
that, when we reached it, the Germans were already in possession of
Charleroi, and the French on our right had fallen back beyond the point
of prolongation of this line. For the British Force in these
circumstances to have occupied the Mons--Charleroi road would have laid
it open to the very great risk--if not certainty--of being cut off and
completely isolated. In these circumstances there was no alternative
but to range our 1st A.C. along the Mons--Beaumont road, in rear of the
original position contemplated, while the 2nd A.C. lined the canal
between Mons and Conde. The position was not ideal, the formation being
that of a broad arrow, with the two Army Corps practically at right
angles to one another. However, it was the best that offered in the
peculiar circumstances of the case. As it turned out in the end, the
entire attack at Mons fell on the 2nd A.C., which lay back at an angle
of forty-five degrees from the general line of defence. The battle of
Mons may, therefore, in a sense be looked upon as an attempt at a
flanking or enveloping movement on the part of the enemy, which was
frustrated by the interposition of our troops.

In view of the fact that the scene of the first shock with the enemy
was fixed by necessity and not by choice, the Mons canal may be
considered as a fortunate feature in the landscape. It ran sufficiently
true to the required line to offer an obvious line of defence, and an
ideal one, except for the flagrant defect that, after running from
Conde to Mons in a mathematically straight line, on reaching the town
it flings off to the north in a loop some two miles long by one and a
half miles across. This loop, as well as the straight reach to Conde,
was occupied by our troops. The formation of the British army, then,
was not only that of a broad arrow, but of a broad arrow with a loop
two miles long by a mile and a half across projecting from the point.
Such a position could obviously not be held for long, and Sir Horace
Smith-Dorrien, recognizing this, had prepared in advance a second and
more defensible line running through Frameries, Paturages, Wasmes and
Boussu. To this second line the troops were to fall back as soon as the
salient became untenable. A glance at the map will serve to show that
the effect of swinging back the right of the 2nd A.C. to this new
position would be to at once bring the whole British Army into line,
with a frontage facing the advance of the enemy from the north-east. In
view, however, of the preparedness of the Germans and the comparative
unpreparedness of the Allies, time was a factor in the case of the very
first importance, and therefore the passage of the canal had to be
opposed, if only for purposes of delay. It is important, however, to
keep in mind that the real line which it was intended to defend at Mons
was this second line. The intention was never carried out, because it
was anticipated by an unexpected and most unwelcome order to retire in
conformity with French movements on the right, which upset all plans.

In the meanwhile, the enemy's entry into Mons itself had to be delayed
as long as possible, which meant that the canal salient, bad as it was,
had perforce to be defended. This dangerous but most responsible duty
was entrusted to Sir Hubert Hamilton with his 3rd Division, and, as a
matter of fact, the battle of Mons in the end proved to be practically
confined to the three brigades of this division.

The disposition of the division was as follows:

General Shaw, with the 9th Brigade, was posted along the western face
of the canal loop, his right-hand battalion being the 4th R. Fusiliers,
who held the line from the Nimy bridge, at Lock 6, to the Ghlin bridge.
To the left of the R. Fusiliers, were the R. Scots Fusiliers, and
beyond them again half the Northumberland Fusiliers reaching as far as
Jemappes. The Lincolns and the rest of the Northumberland Fusiliers
formed the reserve to the brigade and were at Cuesmes in rear of the
canal.

On the right of the 9th Brigade was the 8th Brigade, occupying the
north-east face of the canal salient. Of this brigade the 4th Middlesex
on the left took up the line from the R. Fusiliers east of the Nimy
bridge, and carried it on as far as the bridge and railway station at
Obourg. Between Obourg and St. Symphorien were the 1st Gordon
Highlanders, and on their right, thrown back so as to link up with the
left of the 1st A.C., were the 2nd Royal Scots. The Royal Irish
Regiment formed the brigade reserve at Hyon, and the 7th Brigade the
divisional reserve at Cipley. So much then for the salient itself on
which, as it turned out, the enemy's attack was mainly focussed. On the
left of the 3rd Division, along the straight reach of the canal which
runs to Conde, was Sir Charles Fergusson's 5th Division. Of this
division we need only concern ourselves with the 13th Brigade, which
continued the line of defence on the left of the 9th Brigade, the R.
West Kents holding the ground from Mariette to Lock 5 at St. Ghislain,
with the K.O.S.B. extended beyond them as far as Lock 4 at Les
Herbieres. The K.O.Y.L.I. and Duke of Wellington's Regiment were in
reserve. On the left of the K.O.S.B. was the E. Surrey Regiment and
beyond again the 14th and 15th Brigades. Later on the line was still
further extended to the west by the 19th Brigade, which arrived during
the afternoon of the 23rd.

Such then was the disposition of the 2nd A.C. The 1st A.C. lay back, as
has been explained, almost at right angles to the line of the canal,
along the two roads that branch off from Mons to Beaumont and Maubeuge
respectively. On the first-named road was the 1st Division reaching as
far as Grand Reng. This division, however, as events turned out, was
merely a spectator of the operations of August 23rd. The 2nd Division
was very much scattered, the 6th Brigade being at Givry, and the 5th at
Bougnies, while of the 4th Brigade the two Coldstream Battalions were
at Harveng and the rest of the brigade at Quevy.

The gap between the 1st and 2nd A.C. was patrolled by the 2nd C.B., an
operation which brought about the first actual collision between
British and German troops. This was on the 22nd near Villers St.
Ghislain, when Captain Hornby with a squadron of the 4th Dragoon Guards
fell in with a column of Uhlans, which he promptly charged and very
completely routed, capturing a number of prisoners.

The rest of our cavalry was spread along the Binche road as a covering
screen for the 1st A.C., with the exception of the 4th C.B. which was
at Haulchin cross-roads, guarding the approach to that place from the
direction of Binche, and at the same time keeping up a communication
between the 1st and 2nd Divisions.

Such then was, generally speaking, the position on August 22nd. During
that night, however, all the cavalry was withdrawn from the Binche road
and moved across to the left of our line, where they took up a position
guarding that flank along the two roads running north and south through
Thulin and Eloges to Andregnies. The 4th C.B., having the shortest
journey to make, went four miles further west again to Quiverain. This
change of position meant a twenty mile night march for the cavalry on
the top of a hard day's patrol work, and the journey took them from six
o'clock in the evening till two o'clock the following morning.




THE BATTLE OF MONS


The morning of the 23rd opened sunny and bright. The weather was set
fair with a breeze from the east, a cloudless sky, and the promise of
great heat at midday. A pale blue haze rounded off the distance, and
softened the outlines of the tall, gaunt chimney stacks with which the
entire country is dotted.

With the first streak of dawn came the first German shell. It was
evident from the outset that the canal loop had been singled out as the
object of the enemy's special attentions. Its weakness from the
defensive point of view was clearly as well known to them as it was to
our own Generals. It was also fairly obvious to both sides that, if the
enemy succeeded in crossing the canal in the neighbourhood of the
salient, the line of defence along the straight reach to Conde would
have to be abandoned. The straight reach of the canal was therefore,
for the time being, neglected, and all efforts confined to the salient.
 The bombardment increased in volume as the morning advanced and as
fresh German batteries arrived on the scene, and at 8 a.m. came the
first infantry attack.

[Illustration: Map showing disposition of troops at the battle of Mons.
Approximate scale 2 miles to an inch.]

This first attack was launched against the north-west corner of the
canal loop, the focus-point being--as had been anticipated--the Nimy
bridge, on which the two main roads from Lens and Soignies converge.
The attack, however, soon became more general and the pressure quickly
extended for a good mile and a half to either side of the Nimy bridge,
embracing the railway bridge and the Ghlin bridge to the left of it,
and the long reach to the Obourg bridge on the right.

The northern side of the canal is here dotted, throughout the entire
length of the attacked position, with a number of small fir plantations
which proved of inestimable value to the enemy for the purpose of
masking their machine-gun fire, as well as for massing their infantry
preparatory to an attack.

About nine o'clock the German infantry attack, which had been
threatening for some time past, took definite shape and four battalions
were suddenly launched upon the head of the Nimy bridge. The bridge was
defended by a single company of the R. Fusiliers under Captain
Ashburner and a machine-gun in charge of Lieut. Dease.

The Germans attacked in close column, an experiment which, in this case
proved a conspicuous failure, the leading sections going down as one
man before the concentrated machine-gun and rifle fire from the bridge.
The survivors retreated with some haste behind the shelter of one of
the plantations, where they remained for half an hour. Then the attack
was renewed, this time in extended order. The alteration in the
formation at once made itself felt on the defenders. This time the
attack was checked but not stopped. Captain Ashburner's company on the
Nimy bridge began to be hard pressed and 2nd Lieut. Mead was sent up
with a platoon to its support. Mead was at once wounded--badly wounded
in the head. He had it dressed in rear and returned to the firing line,
to be again almost immediately shot through the head and killed.
Captain Bowdon-Smith and Lieut. Smith then went up to the bridge with
another platoon. Within ten minutes both had fallen badly wounded.
Lieut. Dease who was working the machine-gun had already been hit three
times. Captain Ashburner was wounded in the head, and Captain Forster,
in the trench to the right of him, had been shot through the right arm
and stomach. The position on the Nimy bridge was growing very
desperate, and it was equally bad further to the left, where Captain
Byng's company on the Ghlin bridge was going through a very similar
experience. Here again the pressure was tremendous and the Germans made
considerable headway, but could not gain the bridges, Pte. Godley with
his machine-gun sticking to his post to the very end, and doing
tremendous execution. The defenders too had most effective support from
the 107th Battery R.F.A. entrenched behind them, the Artillery Observer
in the firing line communicating the enemy's range with great accuracy.

To the right of the Nimy bridge the 4th Middlesex were in the meanwhile
putting up a no less stubborn defence, and against equally desperate
odds. Major Davey, whose company was on the left, in touch with the
right of the R. Fusiliers, had fallen wounded early in the day, and the
position at that point finally became so serious that Major Abell's
company was rushed up from reserve to its support. During this advance
Major Abell himself, Captain Knowles and 2nd Lieut. Henstock were
killed, and a third of the rank and file fell, but the balance
succeeded in reaching the firing line trenches and--with this
stiffening added--the position was successfully held for the time
being.

Captain Oliver's company, in the centre of the Middlesex line, was also
very hard pressed, and Col. Cox sent up two companies of the R. Irish
Regiment (who were in reserve at Hyon) to its support, another half
company of the same regiment being at the same time sent to strengthen
the right of the Middlesex line at the Obourg bridge, where Captain Roy
had already been killed and Captain Glass wounded. The Gordons, on the
right of the Middlesex, also suffered severely, but the Royal Scots
beyond them were just outside of the zone of pressure, and their
casualties were few.

The attack along the straight reach of the canal towards Conde was less
violent, and was not pressed till much later in the day. Here, lining
the canal towards the west, was the 5th Division (13th, 14th and 15th
Brigades). On the right of this division and in touch with the
Northumberland Fusiliers, who were the left-hand battalion of the 9th
Brigade (in the 3rd Division) were the 1st R. West Kents. This
battalion had on the previous day, in its capacity as advance guard to
the brigade, been thrown forward as a screen some distance to the north
of the canal, where it sustained some fifty casualties, Lieuts.
Anderson and Lister being killed and 2nd Lieut. Chitty wounded.
Eventually, as the enemy advanced, the battalion was withdrawn to the
south side of the canal, and on the 23rd it occupied the reach from
Mariette on the east to the Pommeroeul--St. Ghislain road on the west,
where two companies held the bridge at the lock. This position,
however, was not seriously pressed, and the battalion had few further
casualties during the day, though Captain Buchanon-Dunlop had the
misfortune to be wounded by a shell at the outset of the attack.

Towards midday the attack against the straight reach of the canal
became general. The whole line was shelled, and the German infantry,
taking advantage of the cover afforded by the numerous fir
plantations--which here, as at Nimy, dotted the north side of the
canal--worked up to within a few hundred yards of the water, and from
the cover of the trees maintained a constant rifle and machine-gun fire
on the defenders.

About 3 o'clock in the afternoon the 19th Brigade under General
Drummond arrived from Valenciennes and took up a position on the
extreme left of our front, extending the line of the 5th Division as
far as Conde itself, on the outskirts of which town were the 1st
Cameronians, with the 2nd Middlesex on their right, and the 2nd R.
Welsh Fusiliers again beyond.

They were hardly in position before the action became general all along
the line of the canal.

The most serious attack in this quarter was on the bridge at Les
Herbieres, held by the 2nd K.O.S.B. This regiment had thrown one
company forward on the north side, along the Pommeroeul road, with the
remaining companies lining the south bank of the canal, and the
machine-guns dominating the situation on the north side of the canal
from the top storey of the highest house on the south side. The
dispositions for defence were good, but on the other hand the K.O.S.B.
were throughout the action a good deal harassed by a thick wood running
up close to the north bank, in which the Germans were able to
concentrate without coming under observation. Several times their
infantry were seen massing on the edge of this wood with a view to a
charge, but on each occasion the attack died away under the rifle fire
from the Pommeroeul road and canal bank, and the machine-gun fire from
the tall house beyond.

In the meanwhile, though undoubtedly inflicting very heavy losses on
the enemy, the K.O.S.B. were losing men all the time, Captain Spencer,
Captain Kennedy and Major Chandos-Leigh being early among the
casualties. Curiously enough, the machine-gun position, though
sufficiently conspicuous, was not located by the enemy for some
considerable time, but eventually it became the object of much
attention. In the end, however, it was luckily able to withdraw without
loss, being more fortunate in this respect than the machine-gun section
of the K.O.Y.L.I. on the right under Lieut. Pepys, that officer being
the first man killed in action in the battalion, if not in the whole
division.

The Germans, in spite of all efforts, were able to make no material
headway along the straight canal, nor was the advantage of the fighting
in that quarter by any means on their side, but with the abandonment of
the Nimy salient the withdrawal of the troops to the left of it became
imperative, for reasons already explained, and in the evening the 5th
Division received the order to retire. This was not till long after the
3rd Division had abandoned the Nimy salient. The three brigades of this
latter division, after putting up a heroic defence and suffering very
severe casualties, got the order to retire at 3 p.m., whereupon the R.
Fusiliers fell slowly back through Mons to Hyon, and the R. Scots
Fusiliers, who had put up a great fight at Jemappes, through Flenu. The
blowing up of the Jemappes bridge gave a lot of trouble. Corpl. Jarvis,
R.E., worked at it for one and a half hours, continuously under fire,
before he eventually managed to get it destroyed under the very noses
of the Germans. He got a private of the R. Scots Fusiliers, named
Heron, to help him, who got the D.C.M. Jarvis got the Victoria Cross.

The retirement of the R. Fusiliers from their dangerous position along
the western boundary of the salient was not an easy matter. Before
cover could be got they had to cross 250 yards of flat open ground
swept at very close range by shrapnel and machine-gun fire. Dease had
now been hit five times and was quite unable to move. Lieut. Steele,
who was the only man in the whole section who had not been killed or
wounded, caught him up in his arms and carried him across the fire zone
to a place of safety beyond, where however he later on succumbed to his
wounds. Dease was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross, as also was
Pte. Godley for his machine-gun work on the Ghlin bridge.

The 9th Brigade after abandoning the salient remained in the open
fields near the Mons hospital till two o'clock in the morning, when it
continued its retirement towards Frameries. The wounded were left in
the Mons hospital. At Flenu the R. Scots Fusiliers lingered rather too
long, and were caught near the railway junction by some very mobile
machine-guns, which caused a number of casualties, Captain Rose being
killed, and several other officers wounded.

By dusk the new line running through Montreuil, Boussu, Wasmes,
Paturages and Frameries had been taken up by the greater part of the
2nd A.C., but the two extremities, _i.e._, the 14th, 15th and 19th
Brigades on the left and the 8th Brigade on the right, remained in
their original positions till the middle of the night. The latter
brigade then retired through Nouvelles and Quevy to Amfroipret, just
beyond Bavai, where it bivouacked. This brigade in common with the 9th
Brigade had suffered very severely, the Middlesex alone having lost 15
officers and 353 rank and file.

By night the Germans had completed their pontoon bridges across the
canal, and it became evident that they were advancing in great force in
the direction of Frameries, Paturages and Wasmes. Sir Horace realized
that the 3rd Division had been too severely knocked about during the
day to hold the position unaided for long against the weight of troops
known to be advancing. He accordingly motored over to the C. in C. to
ask for the loan of the 5th Brigade which was at Bougnies, four miles
off, and on the main road to Frameries. This was readily granted him,
and without delay the 5th Brigade set out, half of it remaining in
Frameries, and the other half passing on to Paturages.

In the meanwhile, however, came a most unwelcome change of programme.
The first line in the Mons salient had been obviously untenable for
long, and had been recognized as such by our commanders, but the line
now held was a different matter altogether, and there was every
reasonable expectation that it could be successfully defended, at any
rate for a very considerable time. At 2 a.m., however, Sir Horace
received the order to abandon it and retire without delay to the
Valenciennes to Maubeuge road, as the French on our right were
retreating. Not only was this unexpected order highly distasteful to
the soldier-spirit of the corps, but it involved difficulties of a
grave nature with regard to the clearance of the transport and
impedimenta generally, and severe and costly rear-guard actions seemed
inevitable. At Paturages the Oxfordshire L.I. from the newly-arrived
5th Brigade was detailed for this duty, and dug itself in in rear of
the town, while the 3rd Division continued its retirement to Bermeries.
The Germans, however, contented themselves with shelling and then
occupying the town, and made no attempt to follow through on the far
side--a matter for pronounced congratulation, the position of the 5th
Brigade being very bad and its line of retreat worse. It is to be
supposed that the attractions of the town were for the moment stronger
than the lust of battle. There also can be no question but that the
Germans lost very heavily in their advance on Frameries and Paturages,
the British shrapnel being beautifully timed, and knocking the
attacking columns to pieces.

At noon the 5th Brigade returned to its own division at Bavai, the 23rd
Brigade R.F.A. remaining behind at Paturages to give all the exits from
the town an hour's bombardment, in case the German pursuit might become
too pressing.

In the cobbled streets of Bavai a fine confusion was found to
reign--companies without regiments and officers without companies, and
various units mixed up anyhow. The Staff officers had their hands very
full.

In the meantime, while Frameries and Paturages were being occupied by
the enemy with little or no infantry opposition, and with little
attempt on the part of the enemy at further pursuit, the market square
at Wasmes presented a very different scene. This town had been shelled
from daybreak, the enemy's fire being replied to with magnificent
courage and with the most conspicuous success by a single howitzer
battery standing out by itself half a mile from the town. An officer,
perched on the top of one of the huge slag heaps with which the country
is dotted, was able to direct operations with the highest degree of
accuracy, and rendered services to the retreating force which are
beyond estimation.

At ten o'clock the German infantry attacked the town with the utmost
confidence, advancing through the narrow streets in close column. A
certain surprise, however, awaited them. In the town, lining the market
square and the streets to either side, were the K.O.Y.L.I., the R. West
Kents, the Bedfords and the Duke of Wellington's Regiment, these
regiments having been detailed for rear-guard work and having
successfully withstood the bombardment. The heads of the German
columns, the moment they appeared in sight, were met by a concentrated
rifle and machine-gun fire and were literally mown down like grass.
Their losses were enormous. Time after time they were driven back, and
time after time they advanced again with splendid but useless courage.
After two hours' fighting in the streets, during which the enemy was
able to make no headway, our troops, having fulfilled their duty as
rear-guard, were able to withdraw in good order to St. Vaast, which was
reached at dusk. The losses on our side were heavy. The R. West Kents
alone had Major Pack-Beresford, Captain Philips, and Lieuts. Sewell and
Broadwood killed, and several other officers wounded. The Duke of
Wellington's also lost heavily. Sergt. Spence of that regiment
distinguished himself very greatly. During one of the German advances
he was badly wounded, but ignoring his wounds he charged with a platoon
down one of the narrow streets to the right of the square, and drove
the enemy clean out of the town with great loss. He was awarded the
D.C.M. as was also Sergt. Hunt of the Bedfords.

Further west, at the extreme left of our line, the retirement was
effected with even greater difficulty than at Wasmes. The second line
of defence through Montreuil, Boussu, Wasmes, Paturages and
Frameries--which in effect merely constituted a change of front with
the right thrown half back--of necessity left the western end of our
line in close proximity to the enemy's advance. In other words, the
further west the greater the difficulty of retiring on account of the
closer presence of the enemy. The 14th, 15th and 19th Brigades, with a
view to conforming to the general direction of the second line of
defence, had remained north of the Valenciennes--Mons road and railway
throughout the night of the 23rd. In the morning, when the order to
retire to the Valenciennes road came, the 15th and 19th Brigades
crossed the railway at Quiverain, and the 14th at Thulin, but by this
time the enemy was close upon their heels. The 1st Cavalry Division was
able to help their retirement to a certain extent by dismounting and
lining the railway embankment, from which position they got the
advancing Germans in half flank, and did considerable execution. By
11.30, however, they too had been forced to retire to Andregnies. An
urgent message now arrived from Sir Charles Fergusson, commanding the
5th Division, saying that he could not possibly extricate his division
unless prompt and effective help was given by the cavalry. On receiving
this message, General de Lisle, who was at Andregnies, sent off the
18th Hussars to the high ground along the Quiverain to Eloges road with
orders to there dismount and make the most of the ground. The 119th
Battery R.F.A. was at this time just south-west of Eloges, and L
Battery R.H.A. just north-east of Andregnies, both being on the main
road to Angre and about three miles apart. The 4th Dragoon Guards and
9th Lancers were in Andregnies itself.

No sooner were his dispositions made than the German columns were seen
advancing from the direction of Quiverain towards Andregnies. De Lisle
told the two regiments in the village that they had got to stop the
advance at all costs, even if it entailed a charge. The very suggestion
of a charge never fails to act as a tonic to any British cavalry
regiment, and in great elation of spirits the two cavalry regiments
debouched from the village, the 4th Dragoon Guards making their exit
from the left, and the two squadrons of the 9th Lancers from the right.

The enemy were now seen some 2,000 yards away, the intervening ground
being mainly stubble fields in which the corn stooks were still
standing. The Germans no sooner saw the cavalry advancing with the
evident intention of charging than they scattered in every direction,
taking shelter behind the corn stooks and any other cover that
presented itself, and opening fire from these positions. The cavalry
advanced in the most perfect order, and was on the point of making a
final charge when it became evident that this was impossible owing to a
wire fence which divided two of the stubble fields.

With great coolness and presence of mind, the two C.O.'s, Col. Mullens
of the 4th Dragoon Guards, and Col. Campbell of the 9th Lancers,
without pausing, wheeled their troops to the right, and took cover
behind some big slag heaps, where they dismounted under shelter. From
this position the cavalry opened a galling fire on the advancing
Germans, the two batteries on the Angre road joining in. The original
scheme of charging the enemy having been frustrated, it now became
necessary to get fresh orders from Head Quarters, and Col. Campbell
accordingly galloped back across the open, in full view of the enemy
and under a salute of bullets, to see the Brigadier, leaving Captain
Lucas-Tooth in command of the two squadrons of the 9th Lancers.

For four hours the fight was kept up, the led horses being gradually
withdrawn into safety, while the dismounted cavalry with their two
attendant batteries held the enemy in check. During the whole of this
period the Germans were quite unable to advance beyond the wire fence
which had so suddenly changed a proposed charge into a dismounted
attack. Captain Lucas-Tooth was awarded the D.S.O. for the gallantry
with which he conducted this defence, and for the great coolness and
skill with which he withdrew his men and horses.

General de Lisle's object having now been achieved, the dismounted men
were gradually withdrawn. During the course of one of these
withdrawals, Captain Francis Grenfell, 9th Lancers, noticed Major
Alexander of the 119th Battery in difficulties with regard to the
withdrawal of his guns. All his horses had been killed, and almost
every man in the detachment was either killed or wounded. Captain
Grenfell offered assistance which was gladly accepted, and presently he
returned with eleven officers of his regiment and some forty men. The
ground was very heavy and the guns had to be run back by hand under a
ceaseless fire, but they were all saved, Major Alexander, Captain
Grenfell and the rest of the officers working as hard as the men.
Captain Grenfell was already wounded when he arrived, and was again hit
while manhandling one of the guns, but he declined to retire till they
were all saved. For this fine performance, Major Alexander and Captain
Grenfell[1] were each awarded the Victoria Cross, Sergts. Turner and
Davids getting the D.C.M. Others no doubt merited it too, but where so
many were deserving it was hard to discriminate.

        [1] Of this famous fighting family the twins Captain Rivy and
        Captain Francis Grenfell have both been killed during the
        present war. Their elder brother, R. S. Grenfell, was killed
        at Omdurman during the Egyptian campaign, and their cousin
        Claud Grenfell at Spion Kop, in the Boer war. Two other
        cousins, the Honourable J. Grenfell and Honourable G.
        Grenfell, have also fallen in the present war. Lieut.-Col.
        Cecil Grenfell, a brother of the twins, is at the moment of
        writing fighting in the Dardanelles.

We may now consider the retirement of the 2nd A.C. to the Valenciennes
to Maubeuge road to have been successfully effected; and the fall of
night saw this corps dotted at intervals along this road between
Jerlain and Bavai.

While they are there, enjoying their few hours' respite from marching
and fighting, it may be well to cast a retrospective glance at the
doings of the 1st A.C. This corps had so far had little serious
fighting, but it had been very far from inactive, and in point of fact,
it had probably covered more ground in the way of marching and
counter-marching than its partner, owing to repeated scares of enemy
attacks which did not materialize. At daybreak on the 24th, the 2nd
Division was ordered to make a demonstration in the direction of Binche
with a view to diverting attention from the retirement of the 2nd A.C.
The 2nd Division now consisted of the 4th and 6th Brigades only, the
5th Brigade having, as we know, gone to Frameries and Paturages to help
the 3rd Division. These two brigades, then, advanced at daybreak in the
direction of Binche to the accompaniment of a tremendous cannonade, in
which the artillery of the 1st Division joined from the neighbourhood
of Pleissant. There was a great noise and a vigorous artillery response
from the enemy, but not much else, and after an hour or so the 2nd
Division returned to the Mons--Maubeuge road, where it entrenched. Here
it remained for some four hours, when it retired to the Quevy road and
again entrenched. Nothing, however, in the way of a serious attack
occurred, and at five o'clock in the evening it fell back to its
appointed place just east of Bavai. The 1st Division shortly afterwards
arrived at Feignies and Longueville, and the whole British Army was
once more in line between Jerlain and Maubeuge, with Bavai as the
dividing point between the two A.C.'s.




THE RETREAT FROM MONS


In modern warfare the boundary line between the words "victory" and
"defeat" is not easy to fix. It is perhaps particularly difficult to
fix in relation to the part played by any arbitrarily selected group of
regiments; the fact being that the value of results achieved can only
be truly gauged from the standpoint of their conformity with the
general scheme. So thoroughly is this now understood that the word
"victory" or "defeat" is seldom used by either side in connection with
individual actions, except in relation to the strategical bearing of
such actions on the ultimate aims of the War Council.

The name of Mons will always be associated in the public mind with the
idea of retreat, and retreat is the traditional companion of defeat.
Incidentally, too, retreat is bitterly distasteful both to the soldier
and the onlooking public. It must be borne in mind, however, that
retreat is a more difficult operation than advance, and that when a
retreat is achieved with practically intact forces, capable of an
immediate advance when called upon, and capable of making considerable
captures of guns and prisoners in the process of advance, a great deal
of hesitation is needed before the word "defeat" can be definitely
associated with such results.

During the first three months of the war the general idea on both sides
was to stretch out seawards, and so overlap the western flank of the
opposing army. At the moment of the arrival of the British Force on the
Belgian frontier, Germany had outstripped France in this race to the
west, and there was a very real danger of the French Army being
outflanked; so much so, in fact, that in order to avoid any such
calamity, a rearrangement of the French pieces seemed called for, to
the necessary prejudice of the general scheme. However, at the
psychological moment, the much-discussed British Force materialized and
became a live obstacle in the path of the German outflanking movement.
Its allotted task was to baulk this movement, while the French
combination in rear was being smoothly unfolded.

It is now a matter of history that this was done. The German outflanking
movement failed; Von Kluck's right wing was held in check; and the
British Force fell back unbroken and fighting all the way, while the
French dispositions further south and west were systematically and
securely shaping for success.

Was Mons, then, a defeat? For forty-eight hours the British had held up
the German forces north of the Maubeuge--Valenciennes road; the left of
the French Army had been effectively protected, and--over and above
all--the British Force had succeeded in retiring in perfect order and
intact, except for the ordinary wear and tear of battle. It had "done
its job;" it had accomplished the exact purpose for which it had been
put in the field, and it had withdrawn thirty-five miles, or
thereabouts, to face about and repeat the operation.

In attaching the label to such a performance, neither "victory" nor
"defeat" is a word that quite fits. Such crude classifications are
relics of primordial standards when scalps and loot were the only
recognized marks of victory. To-day, generals commanding armies rather
search for honour in the field of duty--duty accomplished, orders
obeyed. These simple formulae have always been the watchwords of the
soldier-unit, whether that unit be a man, a platoon, a company or a
regiment. Now, with the limitless increase in the size of armaments, a
unit may well be an Army Corps, or even a combination of Army Corps,
and the highest aim of the general officer commanding such a unit must
be--as of old--fulfilment of duty, obedience to orders.

To the Briton, then, dwelling in mind on the battle of Mons, the
reflection will always come with a certain pleasant flavour that the
British Army was a unit which "did its job," and did it in a way worthy
of the highest British traditions. More than this it is not open to
man--whether military or civilian--to do.

The British Army continued its retreat from the Maubeuge road in the
early morning of the 25th. The original intention of the C. in C. had
been to make a stand along this road. That, however, was when the
numbers opposed to him were supposed to be very much less than they
ultimately turned out to be. Now it was known that there were three
Army Corps on his heels, to say nothing of an additional flanking corps
that was said to be working up from the direction of Tournai. This last
was quite an ugly factor in the case, as it opened the possibility of
the little British Force being hemmed in against Maubeuge and
surrounded. The road system to the rear, too, was sketchy, and by no
means well adapted to a hurried retreat--especially east of Bavai; nor
was the country itself suitable for defence, the standing crops greatly
limiting the field of fire. All things considered, it was decided not
to fight here, but to get back to the Cambrai to Le Cateau road, and
make that the next line of resistance.

Accordingly, about four o'clock on the morning of the 25th, the whole
army turned its face southward once more. The 5th Division, which
during the process of retirement had geographically changed places
with the 3rd Division, travelled by the mathematically straight Roman
road which runs to Le Cateau, along the western edge of the Foret de
Mormal, while the 3rd Division took the still more western route by Le
Quesnoy and Solesme, their retreat being effectively covered by the
1st and 3rd C.B. At Le Quesnoy the cavalry, thinking that the enemy's
attentions were becoming too pressing, dismounted and lined the
railway embankment, which offered fine cover for men and horses. From
here the Germans could be plainly seen advancing diagonally across the
fields in innumerable short lines, which the cavalry fire was able to
enfilade and materially check.

In the meanwhile the 1st A.C., which had throughout formed the eastern
wing of the army, had perforce to put up with the eastern line of
retreat on the far side of the Foret de Mormal, a circumstance
which--owing to the longer and more roundabout nature of the route
followed--was not without its effect on the subsequent battle of Le
Cateau. The six brigades belonging to the last named corps started at
all hours of the morning between 4 and 8.30, at which latter hour the
2nd Brigade--the last to leave--quitted its billets at Feignies and
marched to Marbaix. The 1st Brigade went to Taisnieres, the 4th to
Landrecies, the 6th to Maroilles, while the 5th got no farther than
Leval, having had a scare and a consequent set-back at Pont-sur-Sambre.

Here then we may leave the 1st A.C. on the night of the 25th,
considerably scattered, and separated by distances varying from ten to
thirty miles from its partner, which was at the time making
preparations to put up a fight along the Cambrai--Le Cateau road.

The original scheme agreed between the C. in C. and his two Army Corps
commanders, had been that the 2nd Division should pass on westward
across the river at Landrecies and link up with the 5th Division at Le
Cateau, blowing up behind it the bridges at Landrecies and Catillon.
This scheme was upset by the activity of the enemy on the east side of
the Foret de Mormal, rear-guard actions being forced upon each of the
three divisional brigades at Pont-sur-Sambre, Landrecies and Maroilles
respectively. These rear-guard actions, coupled with the longer and
worse roads they had to follow, in the end so seriously delayed the
retirement of the 2nd Division as to entirely put out of court any
question of their co-operation with the 2nd A.C. at Le Cateau on the
26th.

The 4th Brigade got the nearest at Landrecies, but it got there dead
beat and then had to fight all night. The 1st Division was a good
thirty miles off at Marbaix and Taisnieres, where it had its hands
sufficiently full with its own affairs. This division may, therefore,
for the moment, be put aside as a negligible quantity in the very
critical situation which was developing west of the Sambre. The
movements of the 2nd Division were not only more eventful in
themselves, but were of far greater practical interest to the commander
of the 2nd A.C. in his endeavour to successfully withdraw his harassed
Mons army. We may, therefore, follow this division in rather closer
detail during the day and night of the 25th.

In reckoning the miscarriage of the arrangements originally planned, it
must not be lost sight of that the march from the Bavai road to the Le
Cateau road was the longest to be accomplished during the retreat. From
Bavai to Le Cateau is twenty-two miles as the crow flies. It is
probable that the 5th Division, following the straight Roman road, did
not greatly exceed this distance, but to the route of the 3rd Division
it is certainly necessary to add another five miles, and to that of the
2nd Division, ten. In reflecting that the pursuing Germans had to cover
the same distance, the following facts must be borne in mind. The
training of our military schools has always been based to a very great
extent on the experience of the previous war. The equipment of our
military menage is also largely designed to meet the exigencies of a
war on somewhat similar lines to that of the last. Our wars for sixty
years past have been "little wars" fought in far-off countries more or
less uncivilized; and the probability of our armies fighting on
European soil has always been considered as remote. Germany, on the
other hand, has had few "little wars," but has, on the other hand, for
many years been preparing for the contingency of a war amidst European
surroundings. As a consequence, her army equipment at the outbreak of
war was constructed primarily with a view to rapid movements on paved
and macadamized roads; certainly ours was not. The German advance was
therefore assisted by every known device for facilitating the rapid
movement of troops along the roads of modern civilization. Later on, by
requisitioning the motor-lorries and vans of trading firms, we placed
ourselves on more or less of an equal footing in this respect, but that
was not when the necessity for rapid movement was most keenly felt. The
Germans reaped a double advantage, for not only were they capable of
quicker movement, but they were also able to overtake our rear-guards
with troops that were not jaded with interminable marching.

It must also be borne in mind that a pursuing force marches straight to
its objective with a minimum of exhaustion in relation to the work
accomplished, an advantage which certainly cannot be claimed for a
retreating force which has to turn and fight.

We may now return to the 2nd Division, setting out from La Longueville
on its stupendous undertaking. At first the whole division followed the
one road by the eastern edge of the Foret de Mormal, the impedimenta in
front, the troops plodding behind. This road was choked from end to end
with refugees and their belongings, chiefly from Maubeuge and district,
and the average pace of the procession was about two miles an hour. An
order came to hurry up so that the bridges over the Sambre could be
blown up before the Germans came; but it was waste of breath. The
troops were dead beat. Though they had so far had no fighting, they had
done a terrible amount of marching, counter-marching and digging during
the past four days, and they were dead beat. The reservists' boots were
all too small, and their feet swelled horribly. Hundreds fell out from
absolute exhaustion. The worst cases were taken along in the transport
wagons; the rest became stragglers, following along behind as best they
were able. Some of the cavalry that saw them pass said that their eyes
were fixed in a ghastly stare, and they stumbled along like blind men.
At Leval the division split up, the 4th Brigade taking the road to
Landrecies, and the 6th that to Maroilles. The 5th Brigade, which was
doing rear-guard to the division, got no farther than Leval, where it
prepared to put up a fight along the railway line; for there was a
scare that the Germans were very close behind. The Oxfordshire Light
Infantry were even sent back along the road they had already travelled
to Pont-sur-Sambre, where they entrenched. The Germans, however, did
not come.


THE FIGHT AT LANDRECIES

The 4th (Guards') Brigade reached Landrecies at 1 p.m. This brigade had
made the furthest progress towards the contemplated junction with the
2nd A.C., and they were very tired. They went into billets at once,
some in the barracks, some in the town. They had about four hours'
rest; then there came an alarm that the Germans were advancing on the
town, and the brigade got to its feet. The four battalions were split
up into companies--one to each of the exits from the town. The
Grenadiers were on the western side; the 2nd Coldstream on the south
and east; and the 3rd Coldstream to the north and north-west. The Irish
Guards saw to the barricading of the streets with transport wagons and
such-like obstacles. They also loop-holed the end houses of the streets
facing the country.

As a matter of fact the attack did not take place till 8.30 p.m., and
then it was entirely borne by two companies of the 3rd Battalion
Coldstream Guards. At the north-west angle of the town there is a
narrow street, known as the Faubourg Soyere. Two hundred yards from the
town this branches out into two roads, each leading into the Foret de
Mormal. Here, at the junction of the roads, the Hon. A. Monck's company
had been stationed. The sky was very overcast, and the darkness fell
early. Shortly after 8.30 p.m. infantry was heard advancing from the
direction of the forest; they were singing French songs, and a
flashlight turned upon the head of the column showed up French
uniforms. It was not till they were practically at arms' length that a
second flashlight detected the German uniforms in rear of the leading
sections. The machine-gun had no time to speak before the man in charge
was bayoneted and the gun itself captured. A hand-to-hand fight in the
dark followed, in which revolvers and bayonets played the principal
part, the Coldstream being gradually forced back by weight of numbers
towards the entrance to the town. Here Captain Longueville's company
was in reserve in the Faubourg Soyere itself, and through a heavy fire
he rushed up his men to the support of Captain Monck.

The arrival of the reserve company made things rather more level as
regards numbers, though--as it afterwards transpired--the Germans were
throughout in a majority of at least two to one. Col. Feilding and
Major Matheson now arrived on the spot, and took over control. Inspired
by their presence and example, the two Coldstream companies now
attacked their assailants with great vigour and drove them back with
considerable loss into the shadows of the forest. From here the Germans
trained a light field-gun on to the mouth of the Faubourg Soyere, and,
firing shrapnel and star-shell at point-blank range, made things very
unpleasant for the defenders. Flames began to shoot up from a wooden
barn at the end of the street, but were quickly got under, with much
promptitude and courage, by a private of the name of Wyatt, who twice
extinguished them under a heavy fire. A blaze of light at this point
would have been fatal to the safety of the defenders, and Wyatt, whose
act was one involving great personal danger, was subsequently awarded
the Victoria Cross for this act, and for the conspicuous bravery which
he displayed a week later when wounded at Villers-Cotteret.

In the meanwhile Col. Feilding had sent off for a howitzer, which duly
arrived and was aimed at the flash of the German gun. By an
extraordinary piece of marksmanship, or of luck, as the case may be,
the third shot got it full and the field-gun ceased from troubling. The
German infantry thereupon renewed their attack, but failed to make any
further headway during the night, and in the end went off in their
motor-lorries, taking their wounded with them.

It turned out that the attacking force, consisting of a battalion of
1,200 men, with one light field-piece, had been sent on in these
lorries in advance of the general pursuit, with the idea of seizing
Landrecies and its important bridge before the British could arrive
and link up with the 2nd A.C. The attack _qua_ attack failed
conspicuously, inasmuch as the enemy was driven back with very heavy
loss; but it is possible that it accomplished its purpose in helping
to prevent the junction of the two A.C.'s. This, however, is in a
region of speculation, which it is profitless to pursue further.

The Landrecies fight lasted six hours and was a very brilliant little
victory for the 3rd Coldstream; but it was expensive. Lord Hawarden
and the Hon. A. Windsor-Clive were killed, and Captain Whitehead,
Lieut. Keppel and Lieut. Rowley were wounded. The casualties among the
rank and file amounted to 170, of whom 153 were left in the hospital
at Landrecies. The two companies engaged fought under particularly
trying conditions, and many of the rank and file showed great
gallantry. Conspicuous amongst these were Sergt. Fox and Pte. Thomas,
each of whom was awarded the D.C.M. The German losses were, of course,
unascertainable, but they were undoubtedly very much higher than ours.

At 3.30 a.m. on the 26th, just as the 2nd A.C. in their trenches ten
miles away to the west were beginning to look northward for the enemy,
the 4th Brigade left Landrecies and continued its retirement down the
beautiful valley of the Sambre.


MAROILLES

On the same night the town of Maroilles further east was the scene of
another little fight. About 10 p.m. a report arrived that the main
German column was advancing on the bridge over the Petit Helpe and that
the squadron of the 15th Hussars which had been left to guard the
bridge was insufficient for the purpose. The obstruction of this bridge
was a matter of the very first importance, as its passage would have
opened up a short cut for the Germans, by which they might easily have
cut off the 4th Brigade south of Landrecies. Accordingly the 1st Berks
were ordered off back along the road they had already travelled to hold
the position at all costs. The ground near the bridge here is very
swampy, and the only two approaches are by means of raised causeways,
one of which faces the bridge, while the other lies at right angles.
Along this latter the Berks crept up, led by Col. Graham.

The night was intensely dark, and the causeway very narrow, and bounded
on each side by a deep fosse, into which many of the men slipped. The
Germans, as it turned out, had already forced the bridge, and were in
the act of advancing along the causeway; and in the pitch blackness of
the night the two forces suddenly bumped one into the other. Neither
side had fixed bayonets, for fear of accidents in the dark, and in the
scrimmage which followed it was chiefly a case of rifle-butts and
fists. At this game the Germans proved no match for our men, and were
gradually forced back to the bridge-head, where they were held for the
remainder of the night.

In the small hours of the morning the Germans, who turned out not to be
the main column, but only a strong detachment, threw up the sponge and
withdrew westward towards the Sambre, following the right bank of the
Petit Helpe. Whereupon the 1st Berks--having achieved their
purpose--followed the rest of the 2nd Division along the road to
Etreux.




THE LE CATEAU PROBLEM


It is necessary now to cast a momentary eye upon the general situation
of the British forces on the night of August 25th. The 3rd and 5th
Divisions, in spite of the severe fighting of the 23rd and 24th, and in
spite of great exhaustion, had successfully accomplished the arduous
march to the Le Cateau position. The 19th Brigade and the 4th Division,
the latter fresh from England, were already there, extending the
selected line towards the west. So far, so good. The 1st and 2nd
Divisions, however, owing to causes which have already been explained,
were not in a position to co-operate; and it was clear that, if battle
was to be offered at Le Cateau, the already battered 2nd A.C.
(supplemented by the newly-arrived troops) would have to stand the
shock single-handed.

A consideration of these facts induced the C. in C. to change his
original intention of making a stand behind the Le Cateau road, and he
decided to continue his retirement to the single line of rail which
runs from St. Quentin to Roisel, where his force would be once more in
line. This change of plan he communicated to his two Army Corps
commanders, Sir Douglas Haig and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. The former
fell in with it gladly; the latter, however, was not to the same extent
a free agent, and he returned word that, in view of the immense
superiority in numbers of the German forces, which were practically
treading on his heels, and of the necessarily slow progress made by his
tired troops, it was impossible to continue his retirement, and that he
had no alternative but to turn and fight. To which the C. in C. replied
that he must do the best he could, but that he could give him no
support from the 1st A.C., that corps being effectively cut off by
natural obstacles from the scene of action. As a matter of fact the 1st
Division was a good thirty miles away to the east at Marbaix and
Taisnieres. The 2nd Division was nearer, but very much scattered, the
5th Brigade--owing to rear-guard scares--being still twenty miles behind
at Leval, and quite out of the reckoning, as far as the impending
battle was concerned. The 4th Brigade, on the other hand, in spite of
its all-night fight at Landrecies, might, by super-human efforts, have
crossed the Sambre during the night at the little village of Ors, and
reached the flank of the Le Cateau battlefield towards eight on the
following morning; but the wisdom of such a move would have been more
than questionable in view of the complete exhaustion of the troops,
and, in point of fact, no such order reached the brigade. The orders
were to fall back on St. Quentin, and by the time the first shot was
fired at Le Cateau, the brigade was well on its way to Etreux.

Four miles further east, at Maroilles, the order to retire raised some
doubts and a certain difference of opinion among the various commanders
of the 6th Brigade as to the best route to be followed in order to
arrive at the St. Quentin position. Local opinion was divided, and, in
the end, the commanders assembled at midnight in the cemetery to decide
the point, with the result that it was arranged that each C.O. should
follow the road that seemed best to him.

It will be seen then that the disposition of the 1st A.C. was such that
the C. in C. by no means overstated the case when he told Sir Horace
that he could give him no help from that quarter. The position of the
2nd A.C. was now very nearly desperate, and it is to be doubted whether
Sir Horace or the C. in C. himself saw the dawn break on August 26th
with any real hope at heart that the three divisions west of the Sambre
could be saved from capture or annihilation.

On paper the extrication of Sir Horace's force seemed in truth an
impossibility. Three British divisions, very imperfectly entrenched,
were awaiting the onset of seven German divisions, flushed with
uninterrupted victory, and backed up by an overwhelming preponderance
in artillery. Both flanks of the British force were practically in the
air, the only protection on the right being the 1st and 3rd C.B. at Le
Souplet, and on the left Allenby with another two Cavalry Brigades at
Seranvillers. As a buffer against the German army corps which was
threatening the British flank from Tournai, two Cavalry Brigades were
clearly a negligible quantity. Desperate diseases call for desperate
remedies, and the C. in C. had recourse to the only expedient in which
lay a hope of salvation from the threatened flank attack, should it
come.

General Sordet was at Avesnes with three divisions of French cavalry,
and the C. in C.--with all the persuasion possible--put the urgency of
the situation before him. The railways were no help; they ran all
wrong; cavalry alone could save the situation; would he go? General
Sordet--with the permission of his chief--went. It was a forty mile
march, and cavalry horses were none too fresh in those days. Still he
went, and in the end did great and gallant work; but not on the morning
of the 26th. On that fateful day--or at least on the morning of that
fateful day--his horses were ridden to a standstill, and he could do
nothing.




LE CATEAU


The battle of August 26th is loosely spoken of as the Cambrai--Le
Cateau battle, but, as a matter of fact, the British troops were never
within half a dozen miles of Cambrai, nor, for that matter, were they
actually at Le Cateau itself. The 5th Division on the right reached
from a point halfway between Le Cateau and Reumont to Troisvilles, the
15th Brigade, which was its left-hand brigade, being just east of that
place. Then came the three brigades of the 3rd Division, the 9th
Brigade being north of Troisvilles, the 8th Brigade on the left of it
north of Audencourt, with the 7th Brigade curled round the northern
side of Caudry in the form of a horseshoe. Beyond was the 4th Division
at Hautcourt. The whole frontage covered about eight miles, and for
half that distance ran along north of the Cambrai to St. Quentin
railway.

The 4th Division, under Gen. Snow, had just arrived from England; and
these fresh troops were already in position when the Mons army
straggled in on the night of the 25th and was told off to its various
allotted posts by busy staff officers. The allotted posts did not turn
out to be all that had been hoped for. Trenches, it is true, had been
prepared (dug by French woman labour!), but many faced the wrong way,
and all were too short. The short ones could be lengthened, but the
others had to be redug. The men were dead beat: the ground baked hard,
and there were no entrenching tools--these having long ago been thrown
away. Picks were got from the farms and the men set to work as best
they could, but of shovels there were practically none, and in the
majority of cases the men scooped up the loosened earth with mess-tins
and with their hands. The result was, trenches by courtesy, but poor
things to stand between tired troops and the terrific artillery fire to
which they were presently to be subjected.

The battle of Le Cateau was in the main an artillery duel, and a very
unequal one at that. The afternoon infantry attack was only sustained
by certain devoted regiments who failed to interpret with sufficient
readiness the order to retire. Some of these regiments--as the price of
their ignorance of how to turn their backs to the foe--were all but
annihilated. But this is a later story. Up to midday the battle was a
mere artillery duel. Our infantry lined their inadequate trenches and
were bombarded for some half a dozen hours on end. Our artillery
replied with inconceivable heroism, but they were outnumbered by at
least five to one. They also--perhaps with wisdom--directed their fire
more at the infantry than at the opposing batteries. The former could
be plainly seen massing in great numbers on the crest of the ridge some
two thousand yards away, and advancing in a succession of lines down
the <DW72> to the hidden ground below. They presented a tempting target,
and their losses from our shrapnel must have been enormous. By the
afternoon, however, many of our batteries had been silenced, and the
German gunners had it more or less their own way. The sides were too
unequal. Our infantry then became mere targets--_Kanonen Futter_.
It was an ordeal of the most trying description conceivable, and one
which can only arise where the artillery of one side is hopelessly
outnumbered by that of the other; and it is to be doubted whether any
other troops in the world would have stood it as long as did the 2nd
A.C. at Le Cateau. The enemy's bombardment was kept up till midday.
Then it slackened off so as to allow of the further advance of their
infantry, who by this time had pushed forward into the concealment of
the low ground, just north of the main road. By this time some of the
5th Division had begun to dribble away. That awful gun fire, to which
our batteries were no longer able to reply, coupled with the
insufficient trenches, was too much for human endurance. Sir Charles
Fergusson, the Divisional General, with an absolute disregard of
personal danger, galloped about among the bursting shells exhorting the
division to stand fast. An eye-witness said that his survival through
the day was nothing short of a miracle. It was a day indeed when the
entire Staff from end to end of the line worked with an indefatigable
heroism which could not be surpassed. In the 19th Brigade, for
instance, Captain Jack, 1st Cameronians, was the sole survivor of the
Brigade Staff at the end of the day, and this was through no fault of
his. While supervising the retirement of the Argyll and Sutherlands, he
coolly walked up and down the firing line without a vestige of
protection, but by some curious law of chances was not hit. He was
awarded a French decoration.

In spite of all, however, by 2.30 p.m., the right flank of the 5th
Division had been turned, the enemy pressing forward into the gap
between the two Army Corps, and Sir Charles sent word that the Division
could hold its ground no longer. Sir Horace sent up all the available
reserves he had, viz., the 1st Cameronians and 2nd R. Welsh Fusiliers
from the 19th Brigade, together with a battery, and these helped
matters to some extent, but the immense numerical superiority of the
enemy made anything in the nature of a prolonged stand impossible, and
at 3 p.m. he ordered a general retirement. This was carried out in
fairly good order by the 3rd and 4th Divisions, which had been less
heavily attacked. The withdrawal of the 5th Division was more
irregular, and the regiments which stuck it to the end--becoming
practically isolated by the withdrawal of other units to right and
left--suffered very severely.

This irregularity in retirement was noticeable all along the
battle-front, some battalions grasping the meaning of the general order
to retire with more readiness than others. Among those in the 5th
Division who were slow to interpret the signal were the K.O.S.B. and
the K.O.Y.L.I.

These two 13th Brigade battalions were next one another just north of
Reumont, with the Manchester Regiment on the right of the K.O.Y.L.I. It
was common talk among the men of the 5th Division that the French were
coming up in support, and that, therefore, there must be no giving way.
The French in question were--and only could be--Gen. Sordet's cavalry,
who, at the time, were plodding away in rear on their forty mile trek
to the left flank of our army, and who could never under any
circumstances have been of help to the 5th Division on the right of the
Le Cateau battle-front. However, that was the rumour and they held on.
Some of the K.O.S.B. in the first line trenches saw some men on their
flank retiring, and, thinking it was a general order, followed suit.
Col. Stephenson personally re-conducted them back to their trenches. He
was himself almost immediately afterwards knocked out by a shell; but
the force of example had its effect, and there was no more retiring
till the general order to that effect was unmistakable. This was about
three o'clock. The final retirement of those battalions which had held
on till the enemy was on the top of them was very difficult, and very
costly in casualties, as they were mowed down by shrapnel and
machine-gun fire the moment they left their trenches. It was during
this retirement that Corpl. Holmes, of the K.O.Y.L.I, won his Victoria
Cross by picking up a wounded comrade and carrying him over a mile
under heavy fire. Another Victoria Cross in the same battalion was won
that day by Major Yate under very dramatic circumstances. His company
had been in the second line of trenches during the bombardment, and had
suffered terribly from the enemy's shell-fire directed at one of our
batteries just behind. When the German infantry came swarming up in the
afternoon, there were only nineteen sound men left in the company.
These nineteen kept up their fire to the last moment and then left the
trench and charged, headed by Major Yate. There could be but one
result. Major Yate fell mortally wounded, and his gallant band of
Yorkshiremen ceased to exist. It was the Thermopylae of B Company, 2nd
K.O.Y.L.I. This battalion lost twenty officers and six hundred men
during the battle, and was probably the heaviest sufferer in the 5th
Division. It stuck it till the last moment and the enemy got round its
right flank.

The 3rd Division line, further west, was also forced about three
o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy in great numbers broke through
towards Troisvilles, to the right of the 9th Brigade, causing the whole
division to retire. The actual order to retire in this case was passed
down by word of mouth from right to left by galloping Staff officers,
who--in the pandemonium that was reigning--were unable to get in touch
with all the units of each battalion. As a result the retirement was
necessarily irregular, and--as in the case of the 5th Division--the
battalions that "stuck it" longest found themselves isolated and in
time surrounded. This was the case with the 1st Gordon Highlanders, in
the 8th Brigade, to whom the order to retire either never penetrated,
or to whom it was too distasteful to be acted upon with promptitude.
The exact circumstances of the annihilation of this historic battalion
will never be known till the war is over, but the nett result was that
it lost 80 per cent. of its strength in killed, wounded and missing.
The same fate overtook one company of the 2nd R. Scots in the same
brigade. This company was practically wiped out and the battalion as a
whole had some 400 casualties in killed and wounded. The whole
division, in fact, suffered very severely in carrying out the
retirement, the ground to the rear being very open and exposed, and the
enemy's rifle and machine-gun fire incessant. The village of Audencourt
had been heavily shelled all day and was a mass of blazing ruins,
effectually barring any retirement by the high road, and forcing the
retreating troops to take to the open country. Once, however, behind
the railway, the retreat became more organized, and a series of small
rear-guard fights were put up from behind the shelter of the
embankment.

The 23rd Brigade R.F.A., under Col. Butler, put in some most efficient
work at this period, and materially assisted the retirement of the 8th
Brigade. With remarkable coolness the gunners, entirely undisturbed by
the general confusion reigning, continued to drop beautifully-timed
shells among the advancing German infantry. The work of the artillery,
in fact, all along the line was magnificent, and deeds of individual
heroism were innumerable. The 37th Battery, for instance, kept up its
shrapnel-fire on the advancing lines of Germans till these were within
300 yards of its position. Then Captain Reynolds, with some volunteer
drivers, galloped up with two teams, and hitched them on to the two
guns which had not been knocked out. Incredible as it may appear, in
view of the hail of bullets directed at them, one of these guns was got
safely away. The other was not. Captain Reynolds and Drivers Luke and
Brain were given the Victoria Cross for this exploit. Sergt. Browne, of
the same battery, got the D.C.M. The 80th Battery was another that
distinguished itself by exceptional gallantry at Ligny during the
retreat, and three of its N.C.O.'s won the D.C.M. Near the same place
the 135th Battery also covered itself with glory. In fact, it is not
too much to say that the situation on the afternoon of August 26th was
very largely saved by the splendid heroism of our Field Artillery; and
for the exploits of this branch of the service alone the battle of Le
Cateau must always stand out as a bright spot in the annals of British
arms.

The Germans did not pursue the 3rd Division beyond the line of the
villages above named. In the case of the 5th Division there was no
pursuit at all, in the strict sense of the term. That is to say, there
were no rear-guard actions. The division made its way through Reumont,
to the continuation of the straight Roman road by which it had reached
Le Cateau, and down this road it continued its retreat unmolested. Rain
began to fall heavily and numbers of the men, heedless alike of rain or
of pursuing Germans, dropped like logs by the roadside and slept.

The extrication of the Le Cateau army from a position which, on paper,
was all but hopeless, was undoubtedly a very fine piece of generalship
on the part of Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. The C. in C. in his despatch
wrote: "I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of
the army under my command, on the morning of August 26th, could never
have been accomplished unless a commander of rare and unusual coolness,
intrepidity and determination had been present to personally conduct
the operation."




THE RETREAT FROM LE CATEAU


Le Cateau may without shame be accepted as a defeat. There was at no
time, even in anticipation, the possibility of victory. It was an
affair on altogether different lines to that of Mons. At Mons the
British Army had been set a definite task, which it had cheerfully
faced, and which it had carried through with credit to itself and with
much advantage to its ally. Its ultimate retirement had only been in
conformity with the movements of that ally. Everything worked according
to book.

But Le Cateau was quite another affair. Here we find half the British
force temporarily cut off from the other half by _force majeure_,
and turning at bay on a pursuer whom it could no longer escape. There
was never any question of victory. The disparity in numbers and in
armament left no room for illusions on that score. Searching deep below
the surface, we might perhaps find that the main factor in deciding
that Briton and German should cross swords at Le Cateau was the
primitive impulse--always strong in the Anglo-Saxon breed--to face an
ugly crisis and die fighting. In the event the British force faced the
foe, and fought, but it did not die--as an army; a result due to
consummate generalship on the part of the Army Corps Commander, aided
by a strange laxity, or over-caution, as the case may be, on the part
of the enemy.

Why the Germans did not pursue with more vigour will never be known
till the history of this period comes to be written from the German
side. The failure to pursue after Mons is intelligible. While the 2nd
A.C. was defending the group of manufacturing towns north of the
Valenciennes road, the 1st A.C. on the right was thrown forward in
echelon, and formed a standing menace to the left flank of the
advancing enemy. A too eager pursuit, in advance of the general line,
might well have resulted in the isolation and capture of the German
right.

At Le Cateau, however, there was no such risk. Here the German attack
had been mainly concentrated against the 5th Division, evidently with
the idea of turning the British right flank, and forcing in a wedge
between the 1st and 2nd Army Corps. This was in effect done, and all
that remained was for the Germans to push their advantage home in order
to separate, at any rate, a large percentage of the 2nd A.C. from the
main body on its left. This could have been effected without any fear
of a flank attack from the 1st A.C, that corps being at the time far
too scattered and distant to make any concerted move; and in any case
being hopelessly cut off by the Sambre.

Why this programme was not carried through to its consummation can only
be guessed at. It may be that the enemy had only imperfect information
as to the movements of the 1st A.C.; or it may be that they were
deterred by the knowledge that General d'Amade was hurrying up on their
right flank from the direction of Arras with the 61st and 62nd Reserve
Divisions; or it may be again that the advancing troops had been too
roughly handled by the British at bay to allow of pursuit. This last
hypothesis is not only the most flattering to British self-esteem, but
it is also eminently possible. In any case the fact remains that they
did not pursue. Sir Horace, on the other hand, had no idea of letting
this supineness on the part of the enemy influence his own policy.

The troops were kept moving. On the afternoon of the 26th, the 5th
Division managed to get back as far as Estrees, and the 3rd Division to
Vermand and Hargicourt, each arriving at its destination about dark.
The weather was very bad, and the majority of the men were crowded into
farm-barns, but many dropped by the roadside where they were and slept,
heedless of the pouring rain.

On the far side of the river the 4th and 6th Brigades, whom we last saw
at Landrecies and Maroilles, got to Etreux and Hannappes respectively
about 2 p.m., and bivouacked by the roadside; but the 5th Brigade,
moving by way of Taisnieres and Prisclies, could get no further than
Barzy, and was therefore still far behind the line of the 2nd A.C.
retreat, and, in fact, of its own division. The 2nd Brigade got to Oisy
without mishap. The 1st Brigade was not so fortunate, the Munster
Fusiliers being overtaken at Bergues and captured _en masse_ with
the exception of some 150 who escaped with the aid of the 15th Hussars.
Two guns of the 118th Battery, which were with them were captured at
the same time. A mile or two further south, on the high ground just
beyond Etreux, the brigade was again attacked, the Black Watch, who
were then doing rear-guard, coming under a severe artillery fire. This
was most effectively replied to by the 117th Battery under Major
Packard and the pursuit was checked. The battery in withdrawing was
charged by a squadron of German cavalry, but the charge died away under
the fire of the Black Watch.

The story of the rescue of the Munsters by the 15th Hussars is one of
which the latter regiment may well be proud. Two troops only of the
15th Hussars were engaged, and yet the number of honours that fell to
them is remarkable. Mr. Nicholson got the Cross of the Legion of
Honour, Sergt. Papworth got the Victoria Cross, and Sergt. Blishen,
Corpl. Shepherd and Corpl. Aspinall the D.C.M.

The story of this affair is as follows: It was reported to the General
commanding that the Munster Fusiliers were in trouble, and the 15th
Hussars, who were acting as divisional cavalry, were sent back to help.
The country in the neighbourhood of Bergues is a difficult one, being
traversed by numerous narrow byways cutting in all directions, and the
15th Hussars, not knowing just where the Munster Fusiliers were,
separated into troops and beat the country northwards. Just south of
Bergues, where the road from that place meets the main road to La
Capelle, Mr. Nicholson's troop found 150 of the Munster Fusiliers in
great difficulties, with some Germans in pursuit not 200 yards distant.
He at once dismounted the troop and, sending the horses off for shelter
to a farmyard behind, lined the hedges on the side of the main road and
opened fire on the Germans. These retired to a farm some 200 yards up
the road, from which they presently brought a machine-gun to bear on
the hedges, and under cover of this they shortly afterwards emerged,
driving a herd of cattle before them down the road. The Hussars,
however, shot down both cattle and Germans and sent the survivors
scuttling back once more into the farm.

In the meanwhile the Hon. E. Hardinge's troop, having heard the
firing, arrived on the scene from another direction and--also
dismounting--crept up to a position from which they could command
the farmyard, and opened fire on the Germans massed inside, doing
tremendous execution at first, as it was a complete surprise. The
Germans, however, quickly recovered themselves and returned the fire
with machine-guns. Almost at the first discharge Mr. Hardinge fell
mortally wounded, and Sergt. Papworth took over command of the troop.

Bodies of the enemy were now seen advancing on all sides, and it was
obvious that, if the little British force was to escape being
surrounded, it was time to move. There is always a disposition on such
occasions for very tired men to throw up the sponge and surrender. In
the present instance, however, any such inclination was summarily
checked by the energy and determination of Mr. Nicholson and Sergt.
Papworth, who, taking prompt charge of the situation, brought the whole
party--Munsters and all--safely out of the difficulty. They had to put
in twenty-eight miles of steady marching before they finally caught up
with their division.

On the 27th the retreat was resumed, the troops starting as usual in
the small hours of the morning. The 1st Division, in place of following
the route taken by the 2nd Division, crossed the Sambre and went
through Wassigny to Hauteville; the 2nd Division went to Mont d'Origny,
and the 3rd and 5th Divisions joined up at Ham, the former, which had
been greatly harassed and delayed throughout by hostile cavalry and
horse artillery, arriving some hours after the other. On arrival at its
destination the whole division dropped by the side of the road and
slept.

Next morning the whole 2nd A.C. followed the one road from Ham to
Noyon, the 5th Division, which was still some hours ahead of the 3rd,
passing on through Noyon to Pommeraye, where it billeted.

On the other side of the river the two divisions of the 1st A.C. also
joined up and went through La Fere to the group of villages to the
south of that place, where they billeted, the 1st Brigade at St.
Gobain, the 2nd at Fresancourt, the 4th at Berlancourt, the 5th at
Servais and the 6th at Deuillet and Amigny.

The monotony of retreat was in some part relieved by several rear-guard
brushes during the day between the 3rd and 5th C.B. on the one hand and
some Prussian Uhlans of the Guard on the other, in one and all of which
the honours rested very emphatically with the British cavalry.

The 29th August, 1914, will probably be imprinted for ever in the minds
of those who took part in the famous Mons retreat, for on this day the
troops rested. For eight days they had now been marching practically
without ceasing and the feet of many were literally stripped of skin;
they had dug trenches innumerable and had fought various engagements,
great and small, for the most part in the blazing heat of an
exceptionally hot August, and with a minimum of sleep and food. But on
the 29th they rested.

The whole Expeditionary Force was now once more in touch, and, with its
arrival at the La Fere line, the acute pressure of the retreat may be
said to have been at an end. The various divisions were re-organized;
mixed up brigades were once more sorted out; stragglers and
"temporarily attached" restored to their lost battalions, and the whole
force put into ship-shape working order. Gen. Sordet, who had rendered
incalculable service with his cavalry on our left flank, was now
relieved by the 6th French Army, which came into position on our left
in the neighbourhood of Roye, while the 5th French Army continued our
line towards the east. The British Army, in fact, refreshed by its rest
on the 29th, was now in perfect trim to turn and fight at any moment.
But this was not to be for awhile yet. Gen. Joffre's scheme called for
a still further retirement.

At 1 p.m. on the 29th the French Generalissimo visited the C. in C. at
his Head Quarters at Compiegne and explained to him the outline of his
plan. Sir Douglas Haig, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien and Gen. Allenby were
also present. As a result of this conference, the bridges over the Oise
were blown up (an operation which again cost us some good lives from
among the R.E.), and the British force retired another twenty miles to
a line north of the Aisne, between Soissons and Compiegne.

The 2nd A.C. set out on this march about 3 p.m.; the 1st A.C. followed
some twelve hours later, marching in one column through the Foret de
St. Gobain, after which it divided up, the 1st Division going to
L'Allemande and the 2nd Division to Passy.

On the morning of the 31st the march was once more resumed, the 2nd
Division leaving at 6.30 a.m. and marching via Pernaut and Cutry to
Soucy, which was reached at 4.30 p.m., while the 1st Division retired
to Missy-a-Bois.

The 3rd A.C. took a wrong turn near Vellerie this day and for a time
lost themselves, but in the end joined up with the new line, which
reached--broadly speaking--from Crepy to Villers-Cotterets.


VILLERS-COTTERETS

At the latter place we were again forced into a rear-guard action. At
nine o'clock the 4th (Guards') Brigade, which was acting rear-guard,
was overtaken at Soucy, where--in accordance with orders--it had faced
about while the 2nd Division was having a two hours' halt for rest and
dinner. It was no case of surprise, the brigade being thoroughly
prepared and, indeed, expecting to have to hold the enemy in check.

Dispositions were therefore made accordingly. The 2nd Grenadiers and
3rd Coldstream held the ground from Montgobert to Soucy, with the
Coldstream lining the long grass ride that runs through the woods at
Haramont. They were supported by two batteries of the 41st Brigade
R.F.A. The 2nd Coldstream and Irish Guards were posted in rear of the
first line along the northern edge of the Foret de Villers-Cotterets,
at the base of the ridge known as the Rond de la Reine.

The enemy commenced by shelling the front line, and shelling it with
such accuracy that Gen. Scott-Ker ordered the Grenadiers and 3rd
Coldstream to fall back through the 2nd line and take up a position in
rear. This was done, but subsequently these two battalions were
brought up into line with the Irish Guards along the northern edge of
the wood, whilst the 2nd Coldstream were sent back to take up a
covering position in rear of the wood, along the railway east and west
of Villers-Cotterets Halte. Such was the position without much change
up to midday, when the enemy's attack began to slacken and shortly
afterwards they appeared to have had enough of it and drew off. The
4th Brigade thereupon resumed its march as far as Thury, which was
reached about 10.30 p.m. Their casualties in this action amounted to
over 300. The Irish Guards had Col. the Hon. G. Morris and Lieut.
Tisdall killed; Major Crichton and Lord Castlerosse wounded. In the
Grenadiers the Hon. J. Manners and Lieut. McDougall were killed, and
in the Coldstream, Lieut. G. Lambton was killed and Captain Burton and
Captain Tritton wounded. The Brigadier-Gen. Scott-Ker was himself
badly wounded in the thigh, and the command of the brigade was taken
over by Col. Corry.


NERY

The same morning witnessed a very heroic little action at Nery. During
the preceding night the 1st C.B. had billeted in this little village,
together with L Battery R.H.A., which was attached to the brigade. The
village lies low in a broken and hilly country. To the south and east
of it the ground rises suddenly and very steeply, forming a long ridge
which juts out into the plain from the north. Along these heights
Lieut. Tailby, of the 11th Hussars, was patrolling in the early
morning, and in a very thick fog, when he suddenly bumped right into a
column of German cavalry. He had hardly time to gallop back and warn
the brigade before shot and shell began to fly thickly into the
village. The German force, as it afterwards turned out, consisted of
no less than six cavalry regiments, with two batteries of six guns
each attached; and there is reason to believe that they were just as
surprised at the encounter as was the 1st C.B. However that may be,
the advantage in position, as well as in numbers, was greatly on the
side of the Germans, who, from the heights they were on, completely
dominated the ground below. Even the sun favoured them, for when that
broke through about five o'clock, it was at the backs of the enemy and
full in the faces of the defenders.

The lifting of the fog soon cleared up any doubts in the minds of all
concerned as to how matters stood. On the heights above, with the sun
behind them, were the six German regiments, dismounted, with their
twelve guns. Down below in an open orchard on the western side of the
village were the Bays and L Battery R.H.A. They were still in the
position in which they had bivouacked the night previous. Beyond them
were the 5th Dragoon Guards. The 11th Hussars were on the south-east
side of the village nearest the enemy, but more or less hidden from
view and protected from the enemy's fire by the lie of the land.

Then began one of those rare episodes which will live for ever in
history and romance.

The position of L Battery had not been chosen with a view to action.
Except for the fog, it would never have been caught there; but having
been caught there it accepted the situation. Owing to the broken nature
of the ground, only three of its guns could be brought to bear on the
enemy's position, but these three were quickly at work. The Bays, who
were the regiment chiefly in the line of fire, got their horses into
safety and then joined in with rifle and machine-gun fire, taking what
shelter they could; but this did not amount to much, and the sun was in
their eyes. None of these disadvantages made themselves felt in the
case of the 11th Hussars, who, from their sheltered position, were able
to bring a most effective machine-gun fire to bear on the flank of the
Germans. Their doings, however, we may pass by. The focus-point of
German attention was the little Horse Artillery Battery down in the
apple-orchard. This now became the target for a perfect tornado of shot
and shell, and at a range of only 400 yards. Two of the three guns were
quickly knocked out, and the fire of batteries, rifles and maxims
became concentrated on the one that remained.

Men and officers combined to serve this one gun. Captain Bradbury, in
command, had one leg taken off by a shell, but he propped himself up,
and continued to direct the fire till he fell dead. Lieut. Campbell
died beside him, as did also Brig.-Major Cawley, who came up with
orders from Head Quarters. Lieut. Gifford and Lieut. Mundy both fell
wounded, and Sergt.-Major Dorrell took over command. With the support
of Sergt. Nelson, Gunner Darbyshire and Driver Osborne he cheerfully
continued this absurd and unequal duel.

In the meanwhile the 5th Dragoon Guards had been ordered to work round
to the north-east, in order to make a diversion from that flank. This
they were able to do to a certain extent, though at some cost, Col.
Ansell being shot through the head and killed at the very outset. The
regiment, however, were not strong enough, single-handed, to make more
than a demonstration, and the whole situation was far from promising
when, by the mercy of Providence, the 4th C.B. most unexpectedly
arrived on the scene from the direction of Compiegne. These lost no
time in dismounting and joining up with the 5th Dragoon Guards, the
four combined regiments pouring a steady fire into the flank of the
enemy.

This new development entirely changed the aspect of affairs, and,
finding the situation getting rather too hot for them, the Germans made
off hurriedly in the direction of Verrines, abandoning eight of their
guns and a maxim.

They tried in the first instance to man-handle their guns out of
action, but the steady fire of the cavalry on their flank, supplemented
now by a frontal fire from the Bays, who had by this time installed
their machine-gun in the Sugar Factory to the west of the village,
proved too much for them, and they abandoned the attempt. The whole
affair had so far lasted little over an hour; but the last word had yet
to be said, for the 11th Hussars jumped on to their horses, galloped
off in pursuit and captured fifty horses and a number of prisoners. The
German casualties in killed and wounded were also considerable, and on
our side the troops in the open orchard suffered very severely. The
Bays showed great daring and activity throughout, Mr. de Crespigny
particularly distinguishing himself. They lost seven officers, and out
of L Battery only three men emerged unwounded. To the survivors of this
battery, however, it must for ever be a source of gratification to
reflect that the last shot in that preposterous duel was fired by the
battered and bloodstained thirteen-pounder down in the apple-orchard,
and that it was fired at the backs of the enemy.

Captain Bradbury, Sergt.-Major Dorrell and Sergt. Nelson were awarded
the Victoria Cross, the former posthumously. The last two named were
also given their commissions. Lieut. Gifford got the Cross of the
Legion of Honour, and the entire battery earned a name which will live
as long as history.

There is a sequel to this gallant little affair which is sufficiently
satisfactory to record. The 1st and 4th C.B. billeted that night at
Borest, and continued their progress south next day through the Foret
d'Ermenonville. Here, abandoned among the birch trees of the forest,
they found two of the guns which the Germans had succeeded in getting
away from Nery. It was a small incident, but very satisfactory as a
finale.




THE ADVANCE TO THE AISNE


On the following day, September 2nd, the British Force found itself
facing the Marne from the north bank, and the whole of September 3rd
was occupied in getting the troops across, an operation of some little
delicacy, as it involved in many cases the exposure of our flank to the
enemy. During the process of transit the whole of the British
cavalry--which had hitherto been distributed along the length of our
line--was concentrated by the river side in the open ground at Gournay.
By nightfall the whole force was on the south side and the bridges had
been blown up.

The following day saw the end of the great retreat. There was, it was
true, a further retirement of some twelve miles to a line running from
Lagny to Courtagon, but this last proved to be the southernmost point
of France which our troops were destined to see.

The British Army had now in twelve days covered a distance from Mons of
140 miles as the crow flies, and of considerably more as troops march.
During these twelve days two pitched battles had been fought, in
addition to many rear-guard actions and cavalry skirmishes. The bulk of
the fighting had so far fallen on the 2nd A.C., whose casualties
already amounted to 350 officers and 9,200 men. However, the long,
demoralizing retreat had now at last reached the turning-point. At
Rebaix we picked up 2,000 fresh troops belonging to the 6th Division.
These had been trained up from the mouth of the Loire, Havre being no
longer reckoned safe, and were a welcome stiffening to the footsore
veterans from Mons.

The period that follows is familiarly known as the battle of the Marne,
a broad classification which--as such--is allowable, but which is apt
to mislead. In the strict sense there was no battle during the British
advance. The fighting that took place between September 5th and
September 14th was desultory, and was chiefly in the nature of
independent and--to a great extent--disconnected engagements, mostly of
the advance guard and rear-guard type. The tributaries of the Marne,
the Grand Morin and the Petit Morin were each defended, the latter as
stubbornly as was the Marne itself, and, in point of fact, some of the
hardest fighting which the advancing army met with was on the 10th,
after the Marne had been left well behind.

The advance at first was slow and cautious. When an army has for
fourteen days been systematically falling back before an enemy, the
only casualties within its ken are its own. It may be assumed--and with
every right--that there are also killed and wounded among the pursuing
force. But they are never seen. Only khaki-clad figures fill the field
ambulances; only khaki-clad figures are left behind in the hospitals,
and in the cemeteries and roadside trenches. The ever-swelling roll of
"missing" is all on one side. There are no missing among those who
pursue. In such circumstances, to the tired soldier-mind the pursuing
enemy becomes in time invested with a species of invulnerability. At
the end of fourteen days that enemy has assumed an altogether
fictitious value for evil; it becomes a death-dealing engine,
relentlessly sweeping up wounded and stragglers, and itself showing no
scars; it inspires an all but superstitious dread. To such a frame of
mind the sight of a few grey-clad figures stretched upon the ground and
a few groups of grey-clad prisoners marching to the rear acts as a very
salutary tonic. The scales drop from the eyes; the glamour of the
unknown fades away, and the enemy sinks from its apotheosis to the
level of mere mortal clay.

It took two days for this new spirit to get hold of the British force
feeling its way northward. Then it got confidence and began to push;
and in exact ratio to the vigour of its push was the tale of prisoners
and guns captured.

The turn of the tide came on September 5th. On that day General Joffre
told the C. in C. that he was going to take the offensive. The German
advance had--as all the world now knows--swerved off from Paris towards
the south-east, thereby half exposing its right flank to the 6th French
Army. Gen. Joffre quickly made the exposure complete by wheeling that
army towards the east, at the same time throwing forward the left of
his line. Von Kluck was quick to realize that he was in a tight place,
and with characteristic promptitude cleared out northwards.

The pursued army spun on its heels and followed, but followed at first
with an excess of caution which was perhaps excusable in a tired army
to whom anything but retreat was a new experience.

At the moment of the above surprising change in the tide of war, the
6th French Army line ran due north and east from Ermenonville to Lagny.
This line was pressing eastward. The British force lay between Lagny
and Courtagon, facing north, and in a continuation of the same line on
our right came Conneau's cavalry and the 6th French Army.

September 6th, which was practically the first day of the advance, saw
little fighting, our troops advancing some ten miles only to the line
of the Grand Morin, which was not defended with any great show of
vigour. We took a few prisoners only, and some maxims.

On the 7th there was much more doing, but it was chiefly cavalry work.
McCracken's 7th Brigade, however, met with a fairly stubborn resistance
at Coulommiers, in the course of which the S. Lancs sustained a good
many casualties. De Lisle's 2nd C.B. was, as usual, in the forefront of
all that was doing. This brigade got in touch with the enemy soon after
leaving Fretoy. The 9th Lancers, who were doing advance guard to the
brigade, pushed on, however, with great boldness, till they reached the
village of Moncel, which was found to be in occupation of German
cavalry. Without a moment's hesitation, and without any knowledge of
the strength opposed to it, the leading troop took the village at a
gallop and cleared it of the enemy. They were, however, themselves
compelled shortly afterwards to withdraw, as two fresh squadrons of the
enemy--who proved to be the 1st Guard Dragoons--came down on the
village from the north. At the same time a third squadron appeared to
the west of the village. These new arrivals were at once charged by
Col. Campbell and Major Beale-Brown at top speed with a troop and half
of the 9th Lancers. They rode clean through the Germans, who faced the
charge, and then--wheeling to the right--the Lancers joined up with the
troop that had already entered the village.

The Germans now retreated to the north side of the village. In
anticipation of this movement a squadron of the 18th Hussars had
already been posted dismounted among the corn stooks on that side.
These now opened fire on the retiring Germans, some seventy of whom
turned and charged the dismounted Hussars in line. The latter with
great nerve and steadiness let the Dragoons get within 100 yards of
them, and then practically annihilated them with a volley. Only a dozen
escaped.

The casualties among the 2nd C.B. were not heavy, but Col. Campbell,
while leading the charge south of the village, was wounded in the arm
by a lance. Captain Reynolds at the same time was very badly wounded in
the shoulder, and Lieut. Allfrey, while trying to extract the lance
from the wound, was killed.

The general order was now for the British Army to advance to the
north-east in the direction of Chateau Thierry and so try and reach the
Marne. The country round here, however, was very difficult, especially
in the thickly-wooded neighbourhood of the Petit Morin, and the advance
was at first slow and cautious. The 8th Brigade on reaching the valley
of the Petit Morin met with a strong resistance, which gave it some
trouble before it managed to cross at Orly, where the enemy had left
six machine-guns strongly posted on the opposing <DW72>. However, after
J Battery R.H.A.--which had displayed the greatest gallantry throughout
these operations--had pounded the position for some time, the 4th
Middlesex under Col. Hull (now the only colonel left in the 8th
Brigade) and the R. Scots drew up on the edge of the wood topping the
narrow valley, and at a given signal dashed down the <DW72> to the
bridge and up the far side; whereupon the Germans made off, abandoning
their machine-guns, and the position was won.

In the course of this advance the R. Scots lost 2nd Lieut. Hewat, who
was killed, and Lieut. Hay, who was badly wounded by two bullets in the
side, but the casualties among the rank and file were not heavy. They
captured some 200 prisoners in the village of Orly. The 2nd Division at
La Tretoire met with a very similar resistance, but here the 2nd and
3rd Coldstream and some of the cavalry managed to get across higher up
at La Force, and turned the flank of the resistance. The enemy's
defence--as at Orly--proved to emanate from few men but many mobile
machine-guns, which, by the time the passage had been forced, were far
beyond pursuit or capture, but which had been as effective for purposes
of obstruction as a brigade. The Coldstream did not dislodge the enemy
without casualties, among those wounded being the Hon. C. Monk, Lieut.
Trotter, Sir R. Corbet and 2nd Lieut. Jackson.

On the same day on the right of the line the Black Watch and the
Camerons, the latter of whom had now been appointed to the 1st Brigade
vice the Munster Fusiliers, did some very fine work between Bellot and
Sabloniere, and took a quantity of prisoners; but they had to fight
hard for them, and both regiments had a number of casualties, Captain
Dalgleish and the Hon. M. Drummond in the Black Watch being killed. The
1st C.B. co-operated with the two Scotch regiments by attacking the
village of Sabloniere, which was finally captured, together with many
prisoners, by the 11th Hussars. In addition to this little cavalry
success, the 3rd and 5th C.B. each had an encounter this day with
German cavalry, and in both instances maintained the unquestioned
superiority of the British in this particular arm of the service.

At five o'clock on the morning of the 9th the 2nd A.C. started out for
the Marne. The whole A.C. had to cross by the one bridge at Chailly, so
the operation was a protracted one, but by dark they were all across
and had pushed ahead some miles north of the river. A German battery on
the heights above Nanteint was attacked with great determination and
captured by the Lincolns during this advance, the Germans sticking with
great gallantry to their guns till every man of the battery had been
killed or wounded.

The 3rd A.C, on the left of the 2nd, had considerable trouble in
crossing at La Ferte. Here the bridge had been destroyed, and the north
bank was strongly held by the enemy (with machine-guns as usual). The
R.E. came to the rescue with a pontoon bridge, but the German fire was
persistent, and it was night before the bridge was completed.

The 1st A.C. in the meanwhile had crossed at Chateau Thierry, but not
without some destructive opposition from machine-guns.

On the morning of the 10th the advance became a race between the 5th
and the 2nd Divisions. These two set out northwards at 5 a.m. covered
by Gough with the 3rd and 5th C.B. The 3rd Division had been stopped at
Germigny, and had consequently fallen behind, and the 4th and 6th
Divisions--as we have seen--had to put up with a long wait at La Ferte.
The advance was therefore in the shape of a wedge, the effect of which
was to threaten the flank of the Germans in front of the 6th French
Army and cause them to retire with considerable haste. By midday,
however, the 3rd Division on our left had all but come up into line,
and the formation became more orthodox again. Our aeroplanes, favoured
by beautiful weather, were now doing fine work, and, by the information
they gave, made it possible to push the advance right up to the line of
the Ourcq. There was little serious opposition, but desultory fighting
took place here and there all along the line, and at Montreuil the
Cornwalls suffered some serious losses.

We captured a number of prisoners during this advance to the Ourcq. The
9th Brigade alone took 600 north of Germigny, and at Haute Vesnes the
6th Brigade captured 400 and put as many more _hors de combat_,
the 1st K.R.R., who were well supported by the 50th Battery R.F.A.,
being the main contributors to this result. In all, we took over 2,000
prisoners that day and many guns. The woods were everywhere full of
stragglers, many of whom were only too glad to surrender. Others,
however, put up a fight and were only taken after a stubborn
resistance.

On the 11th Gen. Joffre shifted the advance half a point to the east,
the effect of which was to narrow the front of the British troops and
so cause a good deal of congestion on the few roads at our disposal.

On this day a sudden and very abominable change came over the weather,
the wind chopping round to the north-west, and the temperature dropping
in one day from great heat to bitter cold. Rain fell continuously, and
there was wide-spread lamentation over the greatcoats thrown away in
the heat of the Mons retreat.




THE PASSAGE OF THE AISNE


On September 12th the battle of the Aisne may be said to have begun.
The first and second stages of the war, the retreat from Mons, and the
advance from the Grand Morin, were of the past. The third stage--the
passage and occupation of the Aisne by our troops--covers a period of
some four weeks, the greater part of which was, comparatively speaking,
barren of incident. The first three days, however, were eventful, and
the 14th saw one of the most stubbornly contested battles of the war.
This will be dealt with in its place.

The 12th saw the first real check to our fifty-mile advance. Very early
in the day it became apparent to our commanders that the retreat of the
Germans had been in accordance with a plan pre-arranged (in the event
of certain happenings) and that the pursued now definitely stood at
bay. The situation was not one to encourage a reckless offensive. A
wide valley some two miles across, down the centre of which wound the
sluggish Aisne, now swollen and discoloured by the rains; steep
down-like bluffs on either side of the valley, furrowed by deep-cut
roads that twisted down to the lower ground--the bluffs in many places
thickly and picturesquely wooded. To the west Soissons, to the east
Rheims; and in face, on the opposite <DW72>, the great German Army. It
was not known at the time that, on the Craonne plateau crowning the
<DW72>s opposite, the forethought of the Germans had prepared in advance
a complete system of very elaborate trenches, of a kind then new to
warfare, but since horribly familiar. These were supplemented in many
cases by the old stone quarries and caves which run the length of the
heights.

Such was the scene in which the German and the Allied armies were
destined to face one another for over a year, dealing out ceaseless
death, desolation and pain, and gaining no fraction of military
advantage for either side. That this was so is now history, but on
September 12th, 1914, the future was still the future, and neither side
had as yet had experience of the dead-wall method of fighting which has
ever since characterized the Great War. The British commanders
therefore, and the troops under them, prepared to push on with all the
enthusiasm inspired by the events of the past week.

The first honours in the opening of this new act of the war-drama fell
to the 1st C.B. who in the early hours of the morning were ordered to
get possession of the village of Braine, a place of some importance, as
it commanded the only road down to Missy on the southern side of the
valley. The place was held by a battalion of German infantry, the
houses loop-holed, and the streets barricaded. The 1st C.B. advanced
from Cerseuil to the edge of the valley, and, leaving their horses on
the high ground, made down the <DW72> to the river on foot. The place
was stubbornly defended, and was not taken without a certain amount of
loss on our side, Captain Springfield in the Bays being killed, and
Captain Pinching wounded, but after some rather fierce house-to-house
fighting in the main street, the place was eventually captured and
cleared of the enemy by nine o'clock, the German casualties amounting
to some 300.

Sir Hubert Hamilton thereupon advanced the 3rd Division to Brenelle,
while Sir Charles Fergusson passed on with the 5th Division through the
captured village of Braine to Sermoise. Away on the right the 1st and
2nd Divisions advanced as far as Courcelles and Vauxcere.

The first infantry division to come into action in the Aisne valley
was the 4th, under Gen. Snow, who--having crossed the Ourcq
unopposed--arrived at Buzancy on the morning of the 12th and found the
right of the 6th French Army bombarding the Germans, who were in
occupation of the Mont de Paris, just south of Soissons. Snow at once
chimed in with his own guns, and a tremendous artillery duel resulted,
in which the Germans after a time threw up the sponge and made off
across the Soissons bridge, which they destroyed behind them.

The 3rd and 5th C.B. were in the meantime at Chaudun awaiting
developments.

The south side of the Aisne was now clear of the enemy, and the problem
arose as to how best to get our troops across. The weather was still as
bad as could be, with a bitter cold driving rain from the north-west
which made any air reconnaissance an impossibility. It was essential,
however, to learn the state of the bridges, so other means had to be
devised. The Missy bridge was of especial importance, and Lieut.
Pennycuik, R.E., volunteered to find out all about this by floating
down the river on an improvised raft. This he succeeded in doing, at no
little risk to himself, and reported the bridge practically destroyed,
the north end having been blown up. The bridge at Conde was intact but
inaccessible, the long, straight approach to it being open to
concentrated machine-gun fire throughout. It had obviously been left as
a bait, and to have attempted it would have been to have played
straight into the enemy's hands. The question was, in fact, discussed
between the C. in C. and Sir Horace, but they decided that, as its
capture could only be effected at a great sacrifice of life, and as its
possession was strategically of very little value to the enemy, it
should be left alone.

On our extreme right near Bourg there was no trouble about crossing,
the aqueduct, which here carries the canal across the river, having
survived the attempts of the enemy to blow it up; and by this the 1st
Division and some of the cavalry and artillery crossed easily enough
during the middle of the day on the 13th, and pushed forward some three
or four miles along the Laon road. The rest of the cavalry crossed
further up the river at Villers. This wing of the army met with very
little systematic opposition, but desultory shell-fire and machine-gun
fire was going on all the time, and the 1st Scots Guards had some
casualties, Houldsworth being killed and Monckton and Balfour wounded.

By nightfall the 1st Brigade had reached Moulins, the 2nd and 3rd
Brigades being at Geny. The 5th Brigade had succeeded in reaching Pont
d'Arcy by 9 a.m., but found the bridge there destroyed, one solitary
girder partly submerged alone remaining, and by this they scrambled
across in single file, with a blind shell-fire playing all around.
Single girders, however, are not recognized as a military means of
communication, so the R.E. set to work to build a pontoon bridge
alongside.

The 4th Brigade, on the left of the 2nd Division, had the worst time
this day; they made an attempt to cross at Chavonne itself, but were
vigorously opposed, the enemy being in possession of the village, and
keeping up a ceaseless machine-gun fire which cost us some good men.
The Irish Guards were the chief sufferers, especially in officers,
Captain Berners, Lord Guernsey and Lord Arthur Hay being killed.
However, late in the afternoon, some of the 2nd Coldstream got
themselves ferried across in a small boat which was found--minus
oars--higher up the river, whereupon the enemy, who as usual were weak
in numbers, but strong in machine-guns, made off. The rest of the
brigade then crossed in single file by the remains of the bridge,
which--like that at Pont d'Arcy--still offered a shaky foothold from
shore to shore.

[Illustration: Map showing line occupied by British troops after the
battle of the Aisne. Approximate scale 3 miles to an inch.]




TROYON


The 14th of September probably saw more real fighting in the
old-fashioned sense than any other day in which the British troops had
been engaged. The whole line covering a frontage of twenty miles was
involved, but the fiercest conflict was always on the right with the
1st A.C. This day's fighting is sometimes referred to as the battle of
the Aisne, and sometimes as the battle of Troyon. The former is too
indefinite, in view of the protracted fighting on the river of that
name; the latter is too parochial. In real truth there were four
distinct but synchronous battles taking place that day along our front,
viz., at Troyon, Verneuil, Soupir and Chivres. The most sanguinary,
and undoubtedly the most important as far as results go, was the first
of these. It may fairly be said that the British victory at Troyon on
September 14th was one of the most brilliant achievements of the War.
The generalship displayed was of a high order, and the troops engaged
behaved with the greatest steadiness and courage.

Proceedings commenced at the very first streak of dawn. General
Bulfin's 2nd Brigade, which had got as far as Moulins on the 13th, set
out at four o'clock on the following morning along the road to
Vendresse. This road runs between the wooded downs on either side, and
the idea was to bring the rest of the 1st Division along it as soon as
the heights to right and left had been cleared. Half a mile short of
Vendresse the R. Sussex, the 60th and the Northamptons scaled the downs
to the right of the road, and deployed in the order named, the Sussex
on the left, the 60th in the middle, and the Northamptons on the right,
just east of Troyon. Beyond the Northamptons were the 1st Coldstream,
who had been detached from the 1st Brigade. The Loyal N. Lancashire
Regiment remained in reserve down at Vendresse, and about six o'clock
the other three battalions of the 1st Brigade came marching through
them, along the road towards Cerny. About half a mile further on, these
three battalions scaled the heights on the left of the road, so as to
continue the line of the 2nd Brigade, which was on the right of the
road. Here they deployed and remained till the 3rd Brigade came up on
their left some three hours later.

The day was a particularly unpleasant one. There was a cold and
persistent rain from the north-west right in the faces of the British,
and accompanied by a kind of fog which made it impossible to see
clearly for more than a couple of hundred yards ahead, and which was
responsible for a good deal of unfortunate confusion through the day as
to the identity of friend and foe. It also, as may be supposed, greatly
increased the difficulty of our Gunners, who found it impossible to
locate the enemy accurately, or to get exact information as to the
correctness of their range.

Having dealt with the disposition of the three brigades of the 1st
Division, we can now turn to the actual fight at Troyon. The main
objective of our attack here was the Sugar Factory which stands near
the five cross-roads on the Chemin des Dames. The Factory itself was
very strongly held with machine-guns, and was flanked by two batteries
of artillery. For a quarter of a mile on each side of it were the
German trenches, on the one side running along the Chivy road, and on
the other along the Chemin des Dames, the two forming an obtuse angle
with the apex at the Factory itself. In addition, the enemy had four
big eleven-inch guns behind their line, the fire from which greatly
harassed our troops all through these operations as they completely
outranged our batteries. The approach to this position was over turnip
and beet fields, very wet and sticky with clay, and sloping gently
upwards towards the Factory. As long as the 2nd Brigade was on the
steep sides of the downs it was comparatively sheltered from the
enemy's fire, but the moment this sloping plateau was reached, a
tremendous fire burst upon it at close range from rifles, machine-guns,
and from two batteries of artillery, which were in position behind the
trenches along the Chemin des Dames.

It is difficult to conceive of conditions more unfavourable for attack:
a driving rain in the faces of the assailants, an entrenched enemy, and
an uphill approach across clay fields saturated with wet and two feet
deep in beet plants. However, the order was to advance, so undeterred
by the gaps ploughed in their ranks, the brigade pressed steadily on.
The objective of the R. Sussex on the left was the enemy's trenches
along the Chivy road. Towards this they pushed on at the slow plodding
tramp which was the best pace which could be raised in the
circumstances, till they reached the comparative shelter of a sunken
lane. In this lane the R. Sussex machine-gun section was able to get a
position from which it could partially enfilade the Chivy road
trenches, and so effective was its fire from this angle, that after a
time a white flag was raised, and several hundred Germans were seen
running forward with their hands up. Col. Montresor and many other
officers and men of the Sussex left the lane to accept this surrender,
whereupon the enemy, from the Factory itself and from the trenches to
right and left of it, poured a deadly fire into the confused mass of
Germans and British, mowing them down in scores. In this indiscriminate
massacre the R. Sussex lost very heavily, Col. Montresor, Maj. Cookson,
and Lieuts. Daun and Hughes being killed, and Captain Cameron wounded.
The Germans too suffered severely, but about 200 of them were got
safely into the lane and sent off to the rear with a platoon as escort.

The R. Sussex being now very considerably reduced in numbers, the Loyal
N. Lancashires were brought up from reserve, one company being sent to
support the Sussex, while two and a half companies came up on the right
of the 60th, _i.e._, between the 60th and the Northamptons. These
two and a half companies being fresh troops were now ordered to attack
the Sugar Factory. The position of the Factory and the lie of the
ground has already been described. The Loyal N. Lancashires, in order
to carry out the attack as ordered, had to advance over a quarter of a
mile of open ground under fire, not only from their front, but from
both flanks as well, on account of the angle formed by the German
trenches to right and left of the Factory. Their casualties during this
advance were terrible. The C.O., Maj. Lloyd, and his Adjutant, Captain
Howard-Vyse, were killed in the first rush. Fifty per cent. of the men
fell in crossing that fire-swept zone, but the remainder carried
steadily on and, at the point of the bayonet, drove out the enemy and
captured the Factory, an achievement which must undoubtedly rank as one
of the finest of the War.

The R. Sussex now pushed forward again, and Lieut. Dashwood, the
machine-gun officer, got his maxims into the Factory, and from there
enfiladed the two German batteries along the Chemin des Dames. At the
same time some of the R. Sussex and the 6oth crept up along the road
leading from Vendresse to the Factory, till they were in a position
to enfilade the German trenches to the east of it. This manoeuvre
produced an immediate surrender, the Germans leaving their trenches and
hoisting the white flag. Warned, however, by their experience earlier
in the day, the British remained prudently under cover of the road, and
it was as well they did, for the two German batteries in rear of the
trenches at once began bombarding this new situation at point-blank
range, with the result that, while the British in the road took no
harm, the unfortunate Germans who had tried to surrender were
practically wiped out by their own people.

This patriotic act was destined to be the last that these particular
batteries performed, for Lieut. Dashwood with the Sussex machine-guns
got on to them from the Factory and rendered them incapable of further
damage. The horses were all killed, and such gunners as survived made
off, abandoning the guns.

The Factory itself was not held, being of no military value and
presenting a first-class target for the German artillery. Lieut.
Dashwood withdrew his machine-guns to a farm-house some 200 yards down
the road, and from this point was able to do considerable execution on
the retreating enemy. He was soon, however, located, and Lieut. Pelham,
who was assisting him, was killed. The section, however, ultimately
managed to get away safely and rejoin its battalion. The vacated
Factory was at once heavily bombarded by the enemy, and our troops
derived no little satisfaction from seeing shell after shell drop where
they were not.

The victory of Troyon was now complete, and it was one of which the
troops engaged had every reason to be proud. The results, too, were
very far-reaching, the position thus gained being never afterwards
wrested from the British troops during their stay at the Aisne.

The casualty list in this sanguinary little fight was a heavy one. The
Loyal N. Lancashires lost 15 officers, including their C.O. and
Adjutant, and over 500 rank and file. The value of their gallant
performance was, however, officially recognized, and Captain Spread,
who displayed great courage throughout the day, received the Military
Cross. The R. Sussex lost 250 rank and file and 9 officers, also
including their Colonel, while in the 60th, Major Foljambe, Captain
Cathcart, Lieut. Bond and 2nd Lieuts. Forster, Thompson and Davison
were killed.

Whilst the 2nd Brigade plus the 1st Coldstream had been engaged with
the Factory and the German entrenchments along the Chemin des Dames
side of it, the Black Watch and Camerons were busy dislodging the
other German wing from their trenches along the Chivy road. This again
was a costly affair. The Camerons were enfiladed at close range by the
German artillery on the other side of the Factory, and had lanes torn
through their ranks. Col. Grant-Duff was killed while heading a
bayonet charge of the Black Watch, side by side with his Adjutant,
Captain Rowan Hamilton. The 1st Scots Guards, who were on the hill
between Vendresse and Troyon, also lost their C.O. as well as their
second in command, Col. Lowther being wounded and Major Garnier
killed, as were also Lieuts. Inigo Jones and Thornhill. Sir V.
Mackenzie and Lieut. Stirling-Stuart were wounded at the same time.
The Scotsmen, however, did not mean stopping that day, and in spite of
desperate losses the Chivy road trenches were finally carried at the
point of the bayonet and a number of prisoners taken. But it cost the
1st Brigade 49 officers and 1,100 rank and file.

Much of the success during this day was due to the gallant behaviour of
the 116th Battery R.F.A. attached to the 1st Brigade. At an early
period in the day this battery, for fear of misdirection in the mist,
had worked its guns up into a dangerously exposed position close to the
firing line. From here they were able to work great damage to the
German defences, but, as a natural consequence, themselves suffered
severely in the process. Major Nicholson, in command of the battery,
had been wounded early in the morning while reconnoitring for this
position, the command then devolving upon Captain Oliver, who took the
battery into action. Some 1,200 rounds were fired during the day, and
replenishment of ammunition had to be done entirely by hand, all spare
men and drivers being led up in relays by Lieut. Gardiner. The battery
remained exposed to a very galling fire till after nightfall, when it
was withdrawn by order of Col. Geddes, commanding the 25th Brigade
R.F.A., as its position was in front of the infantry line actually
occupied. Lieut. Simson, well known as a Rugby International, was
killed during the operation. Great courage and devotion to duty was
shown by Bombardier Collins, the battery telephonist, who, though
painfully wounded early in the proceedings, continued at his post
throughout the day. The battery was warmly thanked and praised by
General Maxse, commanding the 1st Brigade, for the assistance it had
given him.

By noon the 1st and 2nd Brigades were extended in a straight line
running east and west through the Factory. Eventually, however, the
line which was actually occupied and entrenched and maintained
throughout the Aisne period against incessant counter-attacks had its
right resting on the Chemin des Dames half a mile east of the Factory,
and from there inclined gradually backwards till it reached the river
east of Soissons. When we consider that the position won this day on
the Chemin des Dames was four miles north of the river, the oblique
line thereafter held by the British troops was a lasting monument to
the remarkable achievement of the 1st Division on September 14th.

There can be no shadow of doubt that the Germans were completely taken
by surprise by the unexpected rapidity of the 1st Division's advance.
It was a fine piece of generalship, and had Sir Douglas Haig only had
fresh troops to bring up from reserve, it is probable that the Germans
would have been swept back another mile or two.

Fresh reserve troops, however, were too great a luxury for our small
force. The Loyal N. Lancashires had in the morning been the reserve
battalion to the 2nd Brigade, and of these fifty per cent. had fallen.
Some of the R. Sussex and 1st Coldstream, as a matter of fact, did
penetrate as far as Cerny, following the road from Troyon which cuts
through the high ground beyond in a narrow defile. This road was
literally choked with the enemy's dead. At Cerny they found every
symptom of confusion and surprise, abandoned kits, baggage and
munitions, and no sign of organized resistance. The detachment,
however, was small, and as it was unsupported on either flank it was
deemed wise to retire.


VERNEUIL

We can now move across on to the next range of heights to the left, and
see how it there fared with the 3rd and 5th Brigades. Here matters were
neither so eventful nor so decisive as on the Troyon ridge. It was ten
o'clock before the 3rd Brigade came up into line, and was ordered to
extend to the left and join up with the right of the 2nd Division,
which was in the neighbourhood of Braye. While carrying out this order
and when within a mile or so of Verneuil, they suddenly came up against
two strong German columns which were advancing with some unknown
object. The rest of the day's proceedings in this quarter may be
briefly described as a series of attacks and counter-attacks, which
lasted all through the day, between these two German columns and our
3rd, 5th and 6th Brigades. In the fiercely contested combat between
these two forces honours were during the earlier part of the day fairly
easy, but towards dusk the Germans sensibly weakened, both in attack
and defence, and the British troops undoubtedly had the last word.

The most conspicuous episode in this section of the fighting was a
really great performance on the part of an Edinburgh man named Wilson,
in the Highland Light Infantry. That battalion had just made a most
successful and dramatic charge, led by Sir Archibald Gibson-Craig and
Lieut. Powell (both killed), and had established itself in a forward
position with its left on a small wood. From this wood a German
machine-gun began playing on the ranks of the battalion with such
disastrous accuracy that it soon became clear that either the
machine-gun must be silenced or the position evacuated. Pte. Wilson
thought the former alternative preferable, and, getting a K.R.R. man to
go with him, crept out towards the wood. The K.R.R. man was shot almost
at once, but, quite undeterred, Wilson went on alone, killed the German
officer and six men, and single-handed captured the machine-gun and two
and a half cases of ammunition. It need scarcely be said that he got
the Victoria Cross.

Another Victoria Cross earned this day by another Scotsman was little
less remarkable, though of an entirely different order.

Pte. Tollerton, a fine, powerful man in the Scottish Rifles, noticed an
officer fall badly wounded in the firing line. Though himself wounded
both in the head and hand, Tollerton carried the officer to a place of
safety, after which he himself returned to the firing line and there
remained fighting, in spite of his wounds, throughout the day. At dusk
he returned to the wounded officer. In the meanwhile the firing line
had fallen back, with the result that Tollerton and the officer were
left behind. The latter was quite incapable of moving, and Tollerton
remained with him for three days and nights, till eventually both were
rescued.


SOUPIR

Once more it is necessary to shift our scene still more to the left and
nearer again to the Aisne, where the Cour de Soupir farm stands on the
crest of the river bluff.

The capture of this position was the work of the Guards' Brigade. At 8
a.m., at the time when the 1st and 2nd Brigades were in the very thick
of their fight at Troyon, the 2nd Division, which was still on the
south side of the river, began to cross by the new pontoon bridge at
Pont d'Arcy, the 6th Brigade moving up the valley to Braye, while the
5th Brigade fought its way up the wooded <DW72>s above Soupir. These
last two brigades, as we have seen, linked up with the 3rd Brigade in
the neighbourhood of Verneuil.

The 4th Brigade went down the right bank of the river as far as
Chavonne, where it remained till midday, when it got the order to scale
the heights in support of the 5th Brigade, which was reported in
difficulties. Accordingly the 3rd Coldstream and Irish Guards forced
their way up through the woods north of Soupir, while the 2nd
Grenadiers and two companies of the 2nd Coldstream made for the hamlet
of Les Grouins on the left, where the idea was that they were to get in
touch with the 1st Cavalry Division, which was also reported in
difficulties. The other two companies 2nd Coldstream stayed in reserve,
in a wood clearing on the bluff, half a mile south of La Cour de Soupir
farm.

The track from Chavonne to the farm zigzags steeply up the bluff above
the river through thick woods. Up this track, now ankle-deep in mud,
the Guards scrambled in column of fours till they reached the flatter
ground above, where they at once came under very heavy fire from the
neighbourhood of the farm. Col. Feilding, who was acting Brigadier,
thereupon deployed the two battalions to the left, and, as soon as the
Grenadiers had come up into line on their left flank, the three
battalions charged through the mist and rain in the direction of La
Cour de Soupir farm. As had been the case with the 2nd Brigade, they
were met by a very severe machine-gun and rifle fire at close range,
the moment they emerged on to the flatter ground above, and their
casualties were very considerable; but, notwithstanding, they kept
going, captured the farm and trenches and drove out the enemy with
heavy loss.

An unfortunate incident, very similar in many respects to that which
had befallen the R. Sussex at Troyon, occurred during the capture of
these trenches, and was responsible for the deaths of many good men.

Just to the left of the farm a number of Germans were seen advancing
with hands up and white flags. Some of the 3rd Coldstream went out to
accept the surrender, whereupon a second line of Germans sprang up,
and, firing on friend and foe alike, mowed them down indiscriminately.

There can be little doubt that both this and the Troyon incident on the
same day were not acts of deliberate treachery on the part of the
Germans, but were purely "no surrender" demonstrations, and were
probably aimed more at their compatriots than at the British.

In this engagement the 3rd Coldstream lost Captain Banbury, Lieut.
Ives, Lieut. Bingham, Lieut. P. Wyndham, Captain Vaughan and Lieut.
Fane, of whom the first four were killed, and 160 rank and file. The
position gained, however, was never afterwards lost, but, from
September 14th on, was held by the Guards' Brigade for twenty-nine
consecutive days, in the face of a rapid succession of counter-attacks
of the fiercest description, this position being singled out by the
Germans for their most determined efforts at recapture.




THE AISNE


The meteoric advance of the 1st A.C. on the 14th had left the western
wing of the British force far behind. Had the 2nd A.C. had the luck to
find a bridge which had defied destruction--as was the case at
Bourg--there is no knowing but that they might have pushed forward
shoulder to shoulder with the 1st A.C. and established themselves on
the heights beyond. No such good fortune, however, was theirs. At
Venizel, Missy and Vailly the bridges had been successfully demolished
and the approaches to the river were everywhere difficult, especially
at Missy, where for three-quarters of a mile the ground on the south
side of the river lies flat and exposed. The bridge at Conde, as has
already been explained, was intact--had, in fact, been designedly left
so by the enemy--and for that very reason was outside of consideration
as far as the problem of crossing the river was concerned. It became,
therefore, a matter for the R.E., and with characteristic promptitude
that indefatigable corps started in on its work of repair and
construction. The work had to be carried out under no small
difficulties, and to the accompaniment of a systematic shelling, the
enemy on the heights beyond having the exact range of the river. There
were considerable casualties among the Engineers. By midday, however,
on the 14th the work was practically completed, the road bridges at
Venizel, Missy and Vailly, and the railway bridge east of Venizel,
having been repaired, in addition to which eight pontoon bridges had
been thrown over the river at varying intervals. This was good work on
the part of the R.E., nor did their labours begin and end with the work
of repair and construction. Captain Johnstone[2] and Lieut. Flint
worked below Missy all through this day up to seven o'clock in the
evening, bringing back the wounded on rafts and returning with
ammunition--all the time under fire. The former got the Victoria Cross
for this; the latter the D.S.O.

        [2] Killed June 6th, 1915.

Handicapped though they were in comparison with the 1st A.C. by the
lack of a negotiable bridge, the three divisions at the Soissons end of
the line were by no means disposed to sit still while the Sappers were
working at their pontoon. The 11th Brigade (in the 4th Division) got
itself ferried across below Venizel early in the day, and lost no time
in getting into its position to the west of Bucy, where it dug itself
in near St. Marguerite. At midday the 12th Brigade were able to cross
by the repaired road bridge at Venizel and they at once linked up with
the 11th Brigade at Bucy, just in time to take part in an attack which
was made upon the Vregny heights opposite at 2 p.m. Meanwhile a pontoon
bridge was being built close to the Venizel road bridge, and by 5.30
this, too, was finished, and the 10th Brigade crossed and completed the
concentration of the 4th Division.

A mile higher up, at Missy, the 5th Division was in the meantime
experiencing great difficulty in getting to the river, the flat ground
approaching it being swept by a murderous fire from the far side. The
13th Brigade, in fact, was foiled in all its attempts in this
direction, and remained throughout the day at Sermoise. The 14th
Brigade, however, managed to cross early in the afternoon at Moulins
des Roches and with all the speed possible linked up with the 4th
Division on its left, arriving at its post just in time to help in
repelling a strong German counter-attack, which was launched against
our lines at three o'clock. These two brigades in retaliation made
repeated attacks on the Chivres heights during the afternoon, but
without success, and at night they fell back to St. Marguerite.

The 3rd Division reached the river at Vailly. Here the bridge had been
blown up, but a single plank bridged the gap made at the north end, and
by this the 8th and 9th Brigades got across in single file. The 7th
Brigade in the meanwhile was getting across on rafts--three men at a
time--a slow and tiresome business, which occupied the whole day. It
was midday by the time the 9th Brigade, which followed the 8th, had
crossed by the single plank above-mentioned, but they pushed forward at
once and secured the heights opposite, the R. Fusiliers establishing
themselves well forward on the Maison Rouge spur to the left, and the
Lincolns on the Ostel spur, within half a mile of La Cour de Soupir
farm held by the Guards. Here they remained all night, but at seven
o'clock next morning the R. Fusiliers were heavily attacked and driven
back to the Maison Rouge farm, with the loss from among their officers
of Captain Byng, Captain Cole, Captain Attwood and 2nd Lieut. Hobbs.
The Northumberland Fusiliers, who had pushed forward along the road up
the wooded valley between the spurs, also had serious casualties, and
had to withdraw. The Lincolns at the same time were driven from the
Ostel spur and by 1 p.m. had re-crossed the river to the south side.

Once more, after another very wet night, the 5th Division on the 15th
attacked the Chivres heights, and, once more failing, had to fall back
to a line from St. Marguerite to the bank of the river between Sermoise
and Conde. There they dug themselves in and there they remained till
the end of the Aisne battle. The position was very bad from a strategic
point of view, as it was on the low ground by the river, with the
Germans only 400 yards away on the heights beyond; but it was the best
that could be done. The 5th Division was greatly upset at its second
failure to take the Chivres heights. It did not realize (as, indeed,
who did at that time?) that the Allied advance had reached its farthest
north, and that the Chivres heights were to remain untaken by either
French or English for very many months to come.

The failure of the British left to advance encouraged the Germans to
deliver counter-attacks all along the line, especially against the
advanced position held by the 1st A.C. These, however, failed just as
completely as had our own attempt to advance on the left. Several very
determined attacks were made against the Guards' Brigade at the Soupir
farm, but all were repulsed with heavy loss.

The enemy was all this time steadily outranging our artillery with its
big eleven-inch guns, popularly known as "Black Marias." The difficulty
of properly entrenching against this long-range cannonade was greatly
increased by the scarcity of proper tools, but, by means of a mixed
assortment of implements, borrowed from the farms, a certain amount of
protection was secured, and this was steadily improved upon from day to
day. It began to be realized by now, by all parties concerned, that
these entrenchments were likely to be rather more permanent than the
emergency ditches scooped out with hands and mess-tins at Mons and Le
Cateau, and in point of fact the line held at this time remained
practically unchanged till the removal of the troops to Flanders.

On the right the 1st A.C. held the ground from the Chemin des Dames
through Chivy to La Cour de Soupir. On their left was the 3rd Division
about a mile to the north of Vailly. Then came the gap caused by the
bridge at Conde being in the German hands. Beyond this the 5th
Division--as we have seen--held the ground from the bend in the river
east of Missy to St. Marguerite; and beyond St. Marguerite the 4th
Division joined up with the 6th French Army. The 6th Division arrived
at this time, thus technically completing General Pulteney's 3rd A.C.
As a matter of fact, however, the C. in C., at the first, utilized the
greater part of this division to strengthen the 1st A.C. on the right,
where the greatest German pressure was being felt, the remainder being
held in reserve.

About noon on the 16th, the line held by the Guards' Brigade at the
Soupir farm, always the special object of German attention, was treated
to an exceptionally violent bombardment. So accurate, in fact, was this
fire, that the Brigadier-General ordered a temporary retirement to the
shelter of the road behind and below. Very shortly after this
retirement had taken place, it was seen that a barn at one end of the
farm buildings, which had just been vacated, was on fire. This barn was
being used as a temporary hospital, and in it at the time were some
fifty wounded Germans. It was clearly a case for very prompt action and
very risky action, but there was no hesitation about it. Without the
loss of a moment, Major Matheson, who at the time was commanding the
3rd Coldstream, called for volunteers, and accompanied by Major Steele
and Drs. Huggan and Shields and some men of No. I Company under Lord
Feilding, he rushed forward through the shell-fire to the blazing
building. All concerned worked with such goodwill that every wounded
man was successfully got into safety and with few casualties on our
side, but a few minutes later Dr. Huggan, who had been very active in
the rescue work, was killed by a shell which burst in a quarry into
which some of the wounded had been carried. The same shell killed
twelve others, including three officers of the 52nd Oxford Light
Infantry who were attached at the time to the Guards' Brigade, and
wounded fifty more. Dr. Huggan, who was best known as a Scotch
International football player, had greatly distinguished himself on
former occasions, both at Landrecies and Villers-Cotterets, by his
courage and devotion to the wounded. He was buried in the garden of the
farm.

The 16th was otherwise an uneventful day, but on the 17th there was a
good deal of fighting here and there, enlivened by some fine individual
acts of bravery and devotion.

An incident on the right of our line at this time attracted much
attention on account of the German methods which it disclosed--methods
with which we afterwards became much more familiar. At the village of
Troyon a captain and two subalterns and 160 men of the Northamptons had
entrenched themselves by the roadside some distance ahead of the main
body. Two hundred and fifty yards to their front, and separated from
them by a turnip field, was a German entrenchment containing from 400
to 500 men. For five days the Northants men had to remain in trenches
which were knee deep in water. Rain fell ceaselessly, and on the 17th
seemed to come down harder than ever. Ague appeared among the men, and
considerably reduced their effective strength. On the 15th the captain
in command showed himself for a moment above the trench and was at once
killed. Shortly afterwards the senior lieutenant was also killed. The
command then devolved upon the junior lieutenant, who had less than a
year's service.

On the 17th--to the surprise of all--the Germans were seen advancing
across the turnip field holding up their hands. It was to be assumed
that they too had had enough of their water-logged trenches. The
Northamptons, naturally gratified at this surrender, left the trench to
meet them. When, however, the German officer saw how few men they had
to deal with, he changed his mind and ordered his men to charge. The
young lieutenant promptly shot the German officer and a sergeant with
his revolver, but was himself immediately shot down, though, strange to
say, not killed. The affair, however, would obviously have gone very
badly for the Northamptons, who were outnumbered by three or four to
one, if the 1st Queen's, who had been looking on from the right flank,
suspecting foul play, had not promptly brought their machine-gun to
bear on the situation. The 1st Coldstream were also quickly on the
spot, and the German force was accounted for to a man.

Further west, in the Soupir district, the Guards' Brigade, who seemed
specially singled out at this period for all the enemy's most ferocious
attacks, were given a particularly bad time on this day. All attacks,
however, were beaten off with severe loss to the enemy.

One incident is worth recording. North of Chavonne, where the 2nd
Grenadiers were posted, there was a barn from which some snipers were
keeping up a very irritating fire on the battalion. There was no
artillery available at the moment for its destruction, and yet its
destruction was of all things most desirable for the safety of the
battalion. While the problem was under consideration, Corpl. Thomas, of
the 2nd Grenadiers, decided on a line of action. They were in a
wheat-field in which the sheaves were stacked ready for carting. With a
couple of comrades whom he persuaded to accompany him, he left the
trenches, caught up a sheaf in each hand, and raced full tilt for the
barn. There they piled up the sheaves against the wood-work, set fire
to them and raced back again. Not a man of the party was touched,
though both coming and going they ran through a hail of bullets. It is
satisfactory to record that the barn burnt bravely and that the enemy
retired with some rapidity. Later on, on November 6th, this same
Grenadier, then a sergeant, gained the D.C.M. for another act of
conspicuous gallantry.

The British force had now been five days on the Aisne, and had lost an
average of 2,000 men per day. On the 17th, one of the 2,000 to fall for
his country was Captain Wright, R.E. He was only a unit--one out of a
host that fell; but he stands out, both on account of the manner of his
death and because only a short three weeks before he had gained the
Victoria Cross for great gallantry during the destruction of one of the
bridges over the Mons canal. On this occasion the 5th C.B. had to get
across to the south side of the river. Now that further advance was for
the time being out of the question, the north side of the Aisne was
clearly no place for cavalry. So the 5th C.B. had to get back across
the pontoon bridge at Vailly. The bridge itself and both banks were
under shell-fire, but Captain Wright, who was responsible for the
bridge, considered himself equally responsible for the safety of those
who crossed. The casualties among the cavalry were not many; but there
were some; and it was while helping one of these wounded men into
shelter that Captain Wright was killed.

On the night following, there was another gallant death among the
Sappers. It was highly important to establish telephonic communication
between the 9th Brigade on the north bank and Divisional Head Quarters
on the south bank. There was no bridge and there was no boat. The river
was swollen, sixty yards across and very uninviting. A private in the
R.E. volunteered to try and swim across with a line; but he was a
married man, and Lieut. Hutton, R.E., would not allow it. He himself
took the line, plunged into the river, and very nearly got across, but
was sucked under by the eddies and drowned.

Another act this day which gained no Victoria Cross was that of Captain
Everlegh, of the 52nd Oxford Light Infantry, who left the shelter of
his trench to help a wounded animal, and was killed by a shell in so
doing. It does not detract from the nobility of the act that the animal
in question was only a pig.

The German attack was still mainly confined to the right end of our
line, where the Germans ceaselessly, and always unsuccessfully, tried
to drive the 1st A.C. from the heights on which they had established
themselves in the first day's fighting. The Germans lost very heavily
in these attacks and our own casualties were far from light. On the
20th the Aisne casualty list had mounted up to 561 officers and 13,000
men. In order to make up deficiencies, the C. in C. decided to send up
the 18th Brigade, out of the 6th Division, just arrived, to support the
2nd Brigade on the extreme right of our line.

The 18th Brigade, on its arrival, took up a position between the 2nd
Brigade and the French, with the W. Yorks as its right-hand battalion.
It was this battalion's first day's fighting, and its initiation was a
particularly cruel one, for the French troops, who should have
protected its right, coolly went away to their dinner, leaving the
flank of the W. Yorks absolutely unprotected, with the result that they
found themselves mercilessly enfiladed and driven from their trenches
with considerable loss. The Sherwood Foresters, also in the 18th
Brigade, were in reserve down a steep <DW72> in rear of the W. Yorks
trenches. They were lying down in groups, talking over the prospects of
their first day in the fighting line, when the news of the disaster
above reached them. Without waiting to get into any formation, they
jumped to their feet and charged up the <DW72>. The officers were so far
ahead as to be conspicuous, and nearly half of their number fell, but
the survivors charged home, and, supported by some of the 4th Dragoon
Guards, dismounted, led by Major Bridges, they joined up with the W.
Yorks and re-took the lost trenches. The French, returning hurriedly
from their dinner, full of apologies for their absence, and anxious to
make reparation, put in some useful work with the bayonet on our flank.

This little affair cost us six hundred men, the Sherwood Foresters
alone losing fourteen officers.

Between September 20th and 25th the battle of the Aisne seemed on the
high road to die of inanition. It had come in like a lion; it went out
like a very small lamb. When we use the term "battle of the Aisne" we
are, of course, talking parochially. The Aisne battle has now been
raging for an indefinite number of months over a front of a hundred
miles. For us, however, the meaning of the term does not extend beyond
the four weeks during which British and German troops faced one another
between Soissons and Bourg. This is the only battle of the Aisne we are
at present concerned with, and this battle began to get very quiet and
uneventful. The weather, however, took a turn for the better, the wind
shifting round out of the north-west, and sunshine once more took the
place of the bitter rain storms of the past fortnight.

On the 25th, German activity was to some extent revived by the arrival
of 200,000 reinforcements from Brussels and from the neighbourhood of
Verdun. These came up by train by way of Liege and Valenciennes, and
were distributed at various points along the enemy's right. The Verdun
troops were reported very weary. The stimulus afforded by the arrival
of these new troops was, however, merely sporadic, and from the point
of view of public interest the Aisne battle may be said to have shot
its bolt. Its waning days were, however, illuminated by one individual
act of such remarkable courage that the history of the Aisne period
would scarcely be complete without it.

On the morning of the 28th, while the 2nd Coldstream were on the left
of the 4th Brigade at what was known as the Tunnel post, the men of
Captain Follett's company were sent out in a very thick mist to
reconnoitre. It was a risky undertaking, for the German lines were very
close. Suddenly the mist lifted, and two out of the three were
instantly shot, the third getting home with only a graze. As leaving
them where they lay meant fourteen hours' exposure before they could be
got in under cover of darkness, Pte. Dobson volunteered to try and get
them in at once. The undertaking appeared on the face of it an absolute
impossibility, as it involved crossing a good deal of open ground in
full view of the enemy. However, Dobson crawled out and managed to
reach the men, one of whom he found dead, and the other wounded in
three places. He applied first-aid dressings and then crawled back. A
few minutes later he crawled out again, this time in company with
Corpl. Brown, the two men dragging a stretcher between them on which
the wounded man was placed and dragged back into safety, none of the
three being hit. It need scarcely be added that Dobson got the Victoria
Cross for this most remarkable performance, Corpl. Brown being awarded
the D.C.M.

Towards the end of September operations in the Champagne country, as
has been said, were beginning to stagnate. The Aisne had ceased to be a
battlefield on which contending forces strove for position, and met in
open shock on the downs, or in the beet fields. It had degenerated into
a scene of mutual siege, where, in parallel lines of trenches, two
armies were content to sit down and block progress. In view of the
steady decrease in the distance between the hostile trenches, artillery
operations had gradually assumed a more or less complimentary character
and the game of war became restricted to sniping and construction work.
With each succeeding day the position became more and more aggravated
as trenches were made deeper and more secure, and entanglements of all
kinds reduced still further the possibility of surprise or assault. For
the soldier on duty such operations have but little interest; for the
historian or the student of war they have none. We may, therefore, turn
without reluctance to the more general situation, which by now was
rapidly beginning to develop in interest.

The end of September and the beginning of October found both the
Germans and the Allied Armies extending their flanks westward. As
growing familiarity with the trench system of warfare began to make it
clear to both sides that no further progress was possible by means of
direct pressure, the German and Allied leaders began to scent a more
favourable outlet for their energies on the western flank of
operations, where--and where only--a roadway still lay open. The
gradual shifting of German troops westward, or, to be more accurate,
north-westward, could have no meaning but that of an attempt to force
their way into France along the flat plains of Western Flanders; and
no sooner was such an intention made plain than a corresponding
movement was made by the Allies in an endeavour to forestall the enemy
and envelop his flank before he could extend it. It was clear that the
German move postulated the speedy capture of Antwerp, as the fall of
that fortress was a necessary preliminary to any extended movement
along the Belgian seaboard. A considerable British force was in
process of being sent to Antwerp, and in addition to this force, the
7th Division and 3rd Cavalry Division were landed at Zeebrugge on
October 7th, with a view to co-operating either with the Antwerp
troops or with the main Allied Army as circumstances dictated.

A consideration of these several important factors in the situation
suggested to the C. in C. the desirability of entrusting the western
extension movement, in the first instance, to the British Army at the
moment occupying the Aisne trenches. Not only would such an exchange of
positions greatly increase the facilities for bringing up supplies and
for communications generally with England, but, in the event of the
co-operation of the 7th and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, it would have the
advantage of putting that detached body of troops in touch with the
left of the main British Army and so of consolidating the command.

General Joffre at first demurred, on account of the obvious objections
attending the transfer from one set of troops to another of trenches
situated so very close to those of the enemy as were ours on the Aisne,
such transfer only being possible at night and under the strictest
precautions. The C. in C, however, was insistent, and in the end the
French General was persuaded that the advantages of the plan outweighed
the drawbacks. There can be no question now but that the judgment of
the C. in C. was fully endorsed by the event.

The transfer of troops was begun on October 3rd, on which day the
cavalry set out by road for Flanders, and two days later the 2nd A.C.
started entraining for St. Omer at Pont Ste. Maxence and Soissons.
Nothing could have been more auspicious than the start of the cavalry
as they turned their backs on the Aisne valley. The heavy rains of
mid-September had been succeeded by a spell of magnificent weather, and
on the morning of the 3rd it was at its best. The sun shone out of a
clear sky, and, slanting over the backs of the men as they rode, fell
full on the wooded <DW72>s above Le Moncel and Chivres, where the tints
of autumn were already beginning to show among the green. Below, down
the valley, the winding Aisne showed up here and there, reflecting back
the blue of the sky. The spirits of all ranks were in tune with the
weather and the scene. Trench warfare offers no opportunities to
cavalry--as cavalry--and the change westward at any rate carried with
it the promise of increased action.




MANOEUVRING WESTWARD


General Foch, with his Head Quarters at Doulens, at this time commanded
all the French troops north of Noyon, and the Flanders plan of campaign
was arranged between him and the C. in C. as follows: The 2nd A.C. was
to occupy the canal line from Aire to Bethune, and the 3rd A.C. on
arrival was to extend that line northward. The road running from
Bethune to Lille was to be the dividing line between French and
British, and the aim of the British force was to be to wheel to the
right and so menace the flank of the Germans facing the 21st French
Army Corps under General Maistre. The 7th Division and the 3rd Cavalry
Division from Belgium were to co-operate in this general wheeling
movement as circumstances permitted.

This scheme, as things turned out, was destined to be entirely upset by
the fall of Antwerp on October 9th. For the first week it worked
admirably, and the cavalry patrols and infantry outposts opposed to us
fell back--as had been anticipated--before our advance. Then German
reinforcements began to come up. Four Army Corps were railed up from
the eastern frontier, to which were presently added some 90,000 troops
released by the fall of Antwerp.

However, before these things happened, we had made some progress from
our original line in an attempt to carry out the formulated scheme. On
October 11th the detrainment of the 2nd A.C. was completed and Sir
Horace moved his two divisions into position between Aire and Bethune.
On October 12th the 3rd A.C, under General Pulteney, arrived at St.
Omer and moved forward to Hazebrouck. The moment this Army Corps was in
position Sir Horace made the first move in the contemplated sweep by
pushing forward the 3rd Division, which was on the left of the 2nd A.C,
with orders to cross the Lawe Canal, which the enemy was reported to be
holding in force. The advance was carried out with but little serious
opposition, except in the neighbourhood of the locks at Etroa, where
the 2nd R. Scots in the 8th Brigade met with a stubborn resistance, in
the course of which Lieut. Trotter was killed and Captain Croker (in
command of the battalion) and Captain Heathcote badly wounded. The
battalion, however, in spite of losses, continued to advance with great
gallantry to the line of the canal, which Captain Tanner and Lieut.
Cazenove, with the leading company, eventually succeeded in crossing by
the lock-gates, an exploit for which the former received the D.S.O. and
the latter the Military Cross. The defenders thereupon at once gave
way, suffering heavily in their retirement from the rifle fire of the
4th Middlesex on the right.

On the following morning the 3rd Division advance was renewed, the
brigade chiefly concerned being once again the 8th, in the centre. This
brigade set out at 6.30, the Middlesex being on the right, the R. Scots
in the centre, and the 1st Gordon Highlanders on the left.

The country was dead flat, and the advance very slow owing to the
innumerable water-<DW18>s with which the country is intersected and which
could only be crossed by means of planks or ladders borrowed from the
farms.

About midday the Middlesex captured the village of Croix Barbee and the
R. Scots performed the same office by Pont de Hem, but shortly
afterwards further advance was checked, the enemy being found in
considerable force and strongly entrenched, and the country offering no
sort of cover. The brigade, however, though unable to advance, refused
to retire, and very fierce fighting ensued, in the course of which the
enemy made two most determined counter-attacks, one on Lieut.
Henderson's Company on the left of the R. Scots, and one on Captain
Passy's Company on the left of the Middlesex line. Both these attacks
were repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy, but the casualties on our
side were also severe, Lieut. Henderson--who was awarded the Cross of
the Legion of Honour for the great gallantry which he displayed
throughout these operations--being badly wounded, and Captain Passy's
Company being reduced to the dimensions of a platoon. By nightfall the
R. Scots had lost, during the day, 9 officers and close on 400 men.
Second-Lieuts. Hewitt, Kerr and Snead-Cox had been killed, and of
Captain Morrison's Company all the officers and 175 rank and file had
been either killed or wounded.

The losses in the Middlesex were almost as severe, Lieut. Coles, among
others, being killed and Major Finch and Captain Passy severely
wounded. Both battalions, however, maintained their ground with the
utmost determination.

On the 14th some more of the actors in the approaching drama began to
fall into their allotted places. The immortal 7th Division reached
Ypres from Dixmude at midday and went into billets. The 3rd Cavalry
Division arrived at the same time and from the same quarter, and split
up, the 6th C.B. going to Wytschate and the 7th C.B. to Kemmel. The
original Cavalry Brigades had now been re-organized, de Lisle taking
over the 1st Division from Allenby, Gough retaining the second, and
both divisions forming a "Cavalry Corps" under General Allenby. The 3rd
Cavalry Division, on the other hand, had no part or parcel in this
Cavalry Corps, being a separate and independent organization, under
General the Hon. J. Byng.

During the day the Cavalry Corps captured the high ground above Bethune
after some stiff fighting, while the 3rd A.C. advanced and occupied
Bailleul, which was found to be full of German wounded. The 9th Brigade
on the left of the 3rd Division was still pushing ahead, but the 8th
Brigade was found to have got too far in advance of the troops further
north, who had the bigger sweep to make, and General Doran, the
Brigadier, ordered the brigade to entrench where it was, the R. Irish
Regiment under Major Daniell being brought up from reserve to fill the
gaps made the previous day in the ranks of the 4th Middlesex and 2nd R.
Scots.

Sir Hubert Hamilton, the Divisional General, shortly afterwards came
along on foot to inspect the trenches, disregarding warnings as to the
great danger he was running. He proceeded on foot down the Richebourg
Road, which was swept by shell-fire, in company with Captain Strutt,
commanding the R. Scots, and was almost immediately killed by a shell,
Captain Strutt being at the same time rendered unconscious. The
General's A.D.C., Captain Thorp, ran forward and knelt by Sir Hubert's
body, trying to screen it from the shells which were now falling
thickly on the road. Captain Strutt shortly afterwards recovered
consciousness, but was almost immediately severely wounded by another
shell, and the command of the R. Scots devolved on Lieut. Cazenove.
This battalion had now lost 15 officers and over 500 men in the last
three days' operations, but its casualties were to a certain extent
repaired by the timely arrival of a draft of 180 men and several
officers from home.

While the 3rd Division was thus pushing slowly ahead in the face of
great natural difficulties, the 5th Division was being heavily engaged
in the neighbourhood of Givenchy. Little forward progress was either
asked for or expected from this division, the canal south of Givenchy
having been, from the first, the selected pivot of the proposed
wheeling movement. It was also a matter of common knowledge that the
Germans were in far greater strength here than they were further north,
the original idea of the wheeling movement having been, in fact,
entirely based on the knowledge of the gradually diminishing strength
of the German forces as they stretched northwards.

The first regiment to take a conspicuous part in the terrific fighting
which for three weeks raged round Givenchy was the Dorsets. This was
on the 13th, _i.e._, on the same day on which the 8th Brigade made its
advance to Croix Barbee and Pont de Hem.

It was a miserable day, foggy and wet. The Dorsets were on the extreme
right of our army, in a line of trenches on the low ground between
Givenchy and the canal. The attack was pressed with great vigour by the
enemy, and the 1st Bedfords, on the left of the Dorsets, were driven
out of the village of Givenchy. The left flank of the Dorsets was now
exposed to enfilading fire from the ridge on which Givenchy stands, and
their position was distinctly precarious. Some of the left-hand
trenches were all but surrounded, the enemy having pressed forward into
the gap at Givenchy, and from thence bearing down on the flank of the
Dorsets. That regiment, however, held on with the utmost tenacity and
successfully defended its position against repeated and most determined
attacks; but the position was distinctly critical, and it was felt to
be essential that orders of some sort should be received from Brigade
Head Quarters. The telephonic communication had unfortunately been cut
and there was no means of getting a message through except by hand,
which, in the circumstances, seemed an all but impossible undertaking.
A private of the name of Coombs, however, volunteered to try, and on
the outward voyage actually got through untouched, but on returning
with the necessary orders he was shot clean through the chest, but
continued running for another 200 yards till he had delivered his
message.

The orders received were that the Dorsets were to hold on, and this
they continued to do, and with such good results that about 10 a.m. a
long line of Germans was seen advancing with hands up and a white flag.
The Dorsets left their trenches to accept this surrender and were
instantly raked from end to end by concealed machine-guns from beyond
the canal. These machine-guns had evidently been trained on the
Dorsets' position in anticipation of that which actually happened,
proving beyond any question that the whole thing was one carefully
thought-out piece of treachery. The Dorsets being got fairly in line,
and fully exposed to the concentrated fire of several machine-guns,
literally fell in hundreds. Major Roper was killed and Col. Bols was
shot through the back and actually taken prisoner, but in the
subsequent confusion he managed to crawl away and rejoin what was left
of his battalion. The most unsatisfactory part of the whole affair was,
that if the French Territorials on the south side of the canal,
_i.e._, on the right of the Dorsets, had been where they ought to
have been, that which happened never could have happened; but instead
of being up in line, for some unexplained reason they were a quarter of
a mile behind.

The loss, however, was limited--as a loss--to the treacherous massacre
of several hundred gallant men, and the capture of two of the
supporting guns. The Gunners, as usual, behaved with the utmost
gallantry, but they too came under the same enfilading fire as the
Dorsets and every man of the detachment except Captain Boscawen fell
either killed or wounded. Two of the guns were captured, but, with
this, the material advantage gained by the enemy began and ended, for
the 1st Cheshires were brought up from reserve and, with their
co-operation, the morning's line was re-occupied. The Cheshires,
however, themselves suffered considerably, among their casualties being
their C.O., Col. Vandeleur, who was killed while leading the attack.[3]

        [3] Col. Vandeleur, while leading the Cheshires at Givenchy,
        was _not_ killed as originally reported, but was wounded,
        fell into the hands of the Germans and finally escaped to
        England.

On the 15th, as though in fury at the loss of their gallant General,
the 3rd Division, now under the command of General Mackenzie, fought
with a dash and determination which were irresistible. Their advance
was continually checked by the country <DW18>s, but, in spite of these
hampering obstacles, the Germans were everywhere driven back with heavy
loss. The 4th Middlesex and the 2nd R. Scots again did particularly
good work, and, further north, in the 9th Brigade, the R. Fusiliers and
the Northumberland Fusiliers gained high praise from the A.C. Commander
for the vigour and activity with which they pushed forward in the face
of strong opposition.

Conneau's cavalry, filling the eight-mile gap between the two Army
Corps, also made good progress, as did the 3rd A.C., on the left. In
the case of the latter Army Corps the 6th Division succeeded in
reaching Sailly without encountering serious opposition, while the 4th
Division got as far as Nieppe. The 2nd A.C., in its attempt to wheel,
had so far advanced its left flank three miles in the last four days at
a cost of 90 officers and 2,000 men. It had, however, inflicted very
heavy losses on the enemy.

On the 16th the 3rd Division continued the wheeling movement with
little opposition till it reached the village of Aubers, which was
found to be strongly held, and where it was brought up short.

So much for the present as regards the general movement forward of the
four divisions of infantry working south of Le Gheir. The attempt to
drive the enemy back was destined to prove abortive, but this was not
generally recognized by October 17th, and the idea was still to push
our troops forward. This general desire to advance soon communicated
itself to the 15th Brigade, on the extreme right of the British line at
Givenchy, which had so far been looked upon as the pivot on which the
left was to sweep round, and on the morning of the 17th the brigade was
ordered to push ahead. During the night of the 16th the 1st Devons had
taken over the trenches just north of the canal in which the Dorsets
had suffered such terrible casualties three days earlier. The 1st
Bedfords were on their left, and on their right, of course, were the
French Territorials south of the canal.

At 5 a.m. on the morning of the 17th a great bombardment was
concentrated upon Givenchy, and the Germans were soon shelled out of
that place, which had been in their possession since the 13th. A
general advance was thereupon ordered.

As a precaution against the calamity which had overtaken the Dorsets,
the Devons put one company on the south side of the canal. This company
was in touch with the French Territorials--so long as these latter kept
up in line, which, as it proved, was not for long. The advance was made
under considerable difficulties, as the country afforded no natural
cover, and the enemy was found to be in far greater force than had been
anticipated. However, in spite of a most continued and stubborn
resistance, the Devons, in obedience to orders, succeeded in advancing
their position 1,000 yards, and held on there till dusk, waiting for
the French Territorials on their right and the regiment on their left
to come up into line. These, however, failed to arrive, and it soon
became clear that for the Devons to remain isolated at the point to
which they penetrated could only result in the capture of the entire
battalion. Their retirement, however, in the circumstances, was a
matter of extreme difficulty, the country being quite flat and entirely
destitute of cover. The enemy were favoured by an exceptionally clear
field for their fire, and all their attention was naturally focussed on
the one battalion which had dared to push so far ahead. The men were
sheltering as best they could in ditches and behind haystacks, of which
there was fortunately a fair sprinkling. When the order came to retire
some crept away under shelter of the hedges; others had not even this
cover, and had to take their chance in the open.

One detachment of some forty men were sheltering behind a large
haystack in the open. They were quickly located, and shrapnel and
machine-gun fire was concentrated on the haystack, which soon began to
dwindle under the hail of missiles. Lieut. Worrall, who was one of the
party, thereupon set fire to the haystack, and told the men to make a
bolt for it singly, under cover of the smoke. This they successfully
did, and with few further casualties--all but Sergt. Harris and another
man, who were wounded and could not move. The haystack was now
beginning to blaze fiercely and it was clear the men could not be left.
Lieut. Worrall picked up Sergt. Harris and carried him 400 yards across
the open to the shelter of the canal bank, where he left him. Then he
went back for the other man.

In the meanwhile the line further north was still making a certain
progress. At Lorgies a party of the K.O.S.B. Cyclists, under Corpl.
Wheeler, rode right into the enemy outposts. They promptly dismounted,
and, opening fire, held the enemy for half an hour till the brigade
(the 13th) arrived on the scene and captured the place. Still further
north again Gen. Shaw and his 9th Brigade was as usual fairly active.
About 4 p.m. the R. Scots Fusiliers and the Northumberland Fusiliers
attacked and carried the village of Aubers with the bayonet, completely
routing the occupying troops; and a little later the R. Fusiliers and
Lincolns performed the same office by the village of Herlies.

Aubers stands on the crest of the ridge which faces Neuve Chapelle.
Herlies, on the other hand, lies at the foot of a long, gradual <DW72>
of open, cultivated land. The village was defended on the west side by
a semi-circular line of trenches, protected by barbed wire
entanglements. The defenders had also a Horse Artillery Battery and--as
usual--a great number of machine-guns posted here and there in any
suitable buildings. The two attacking battalions, on the other hand,
were supported by a R.F.A. battery and a section of howitzers. These
did admirable preliminary work, and at dusk the two regiments--Lincolns
on right, R. Fusiliers on left--charged the trenches, carried them
hot-handed and pursued the Germans into the village. Here further
pursuit was unfortunately checked by the too great activity of our own
artillery, but the position won was occupied and held for six days. The
Lincolns, who were the chief sufferers, lost seventy-five men and two
officers during this attack.

Further north, Conneau's cavalry added their share to the day's work by
capturing Fromelles, so that there was an appreciable advance all
round, which would have been greater still had not the 7th Brigade,
which was on the right of the 3rd Division, failed to take the village
of Illies.

The position then at night on the 17th was that the pivot point
remained on the canal, south of Givenchy. From that point the line of
the 2nd A.C. curved round behind La Bassee and through Violaines, after
which it zig-zagged towards the north-east in an irregular salient, the
3rd A.C. being thrown back on its left.

Such was still the state of things on the morning of the 18th, when the
Germans--having been reinforced during the night by the XIII. Division
of the VII. Corps--made counter-attacks all along the line of the 2nd
A.C. All these were repulsed with loss to the enemy, but our own line
made no advance, the stumbling-block being still Illies, which
continued to defy capture by the 7th Brigade.

At dusk the undefeated 9th Brigade stormed and took the trenches one
mile north-east of Illies, but as they were unsupported on either
flank, they had to abandon the position and fall back. The 1st R. Scots
Fusiliers did particularly good work on this occasion, and suffered
correspondingly, Captain Burt and Lieuts. Cozens-Brooke, the Hon. J.
Doyle, and Fergusson-Barton being killed, and six other officers
wounded. In the meanwhile Conneau had advanced from Fromelles and
attacked Fournes, but this attack failed.

Meanwhile, in the Armentieres district, the 3rd A.C. was making great
efforts to play up to its allotted part in the wheel to the south, the
4th Division being north of Armentieres, the 6th Division south of it.
The centre of interest was still to the south of Armentieres, the
concentration of German troops north of that town being still only in
process of development. For the moment, then, we can neglect affairs
further north, and follow the attempted wheeling movement of the troops
south of Armentieres to its furthest point east.

On the afternoon of the 18th the 16th Brigade captured Radinghem, the
two battalions chiefly concerned being the 2nd Lancs. and Yorks. and
the 1st Buffs. These two battalions, who were on the right of the 6th
Division, gallantly stormed and carried the village and then--in the
impetuosity of success and enterprise--followed on beyond after the
retreating Germans. Here, in pushing forward through an impenetrable
wood, they suddenly found themselves swept from all sides by concealed
machine-guns, which literally rained bullets on them. The casualties
here were very high, the Lancs. and Yorks. alone losing 11 officers and
400 men. Col. Cobbold and Major Bailey, however, who displayed the
greatest coolness and courage throughout, succeeded in withdrawing the
remains of the battalion in good order and getting it back to
Radinghem.

The two battalions, in spite of their heavy losses, retained possession
of this village throughout the night, though--had the Germans
counter-attacked in force--things might have gone badly with them, as
they were two miles ahead of the rest of the division.




FROM ATTACK TO DEFENCE


It was now generally recognized that the wheeling movement originally
contemplated was an impossibility. Between Armentieres and Givenchy the
3rd, 5th, and 6th Divisions, and Conneau's cavalry, which was acting
with them, had opposed to them the II., IV., VII. and IX. German
Cavalry Divisions, several battalions of Jaegers, the XIII. Division of
the VII. A.C., a brigade of the III. A.C., and the whole of the XIV.
A.C., which had recently moved north from in front of the 21st French
Army. They were therefore sufficiently outnumbered, even at this
period, to put any idea of further advance quite out of the question.
It now became merely a matter of holding on to that which they had
got--if possible.

The 2nd A.C. front, owing to the irregularity of the advance, was of a
zig-zag character, and on the night of the 19th Sir Horace ordered a
slight retirement so as to straighten out the line. It was quickly
evidenced that this step was not taken a moment too soon, for on the
following day the Germans, confident in the sufficiency of their
numbers, attacked all along the line, and succeeded in re-capturing Le
Pilly, and with it the whole of the R. Irish Regiment. This was
something of a disaster, but luckily the attack was not equally
successful elsewhere. The 1st Cheshires, though attacked with great
vigour, held their ground unshaken throughout this day and the next,
and inflicted heavy loss on the enemy. Two platoons of the R.
Fusiliers, who were sent up to establish communication between Herlies
and the R. Irish Regiment at Le Pilly, were caught in flank, owing to
the capture of the latter place, and suffered severely, Captain Carey,
in command, being killed.

The 9th Brigade, which had throughout these operations been on the left
of the 3rd Division, was now temporarily transferred to the 3rd A.C.,
whose line, reaching as it did from Radinghem to Le Gheir, was
considered by the C. in C. to be too thin for safety. The removal of
this brigade had the effect of widening the gap between the 2nd and 3rd
A.C.'s by a further four or five miles, and the responsibilities of
Conneau's cavalry were correspondingly increased, the left of the 2nd
A.C. now stopping short at Riez, which was held by the 1st Gordons. The
weakening of the 2nd A.C. by the borrowing of one of its brigades and
the capture of one of its battalions was made up to it in some measure
by the arrival of the Lahore Division of Indians, under General Watkis,
which took up a position in rear of it at Neuve Chapelle.

With the additional assistance which had been lent him, Gen. Pulteney
was everywhere successful in holding his ground. At one moment in the
day the enemy succeeded in getting possession of Le Gheir, but as the
loss of this place would have laid bare the flank of the cavalry at St.
Yves, Gen. Hunter-Weston decided that it must be retaken at any cost,
and the work was entrusted to the K.O. Regiment and the Lancs.
Fusiliers. These two battalions, finely handled by Col. Butler, of the
Lancs. Fusiliers, proved themselves quite equal to the call made upon
them, and not only re-captured the lost trenches, but took 200
prisoners and released 40 of our own men who had been captured.




THE BIRTH OF THE YPRES SALIENT


It is necessary now to turn for the moment to the scene further north,
where a mild interest was beginning to be displayed in England in the
war-clouds which were gathering round the picturesque and historical
Flemish town of Ypres. It will be remembered that, on the 14th, Sir
Henry Rawlinson, with the 7th Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division,
had reached Ypres from Dixmude. On their first arrival, the 3rd Cavalry
Division had been sent south of Ypres, the 6th C.B. going to Wytschate
and the 7th C.B. to Kemmel; but as the Cavalry Corps under General
Allenby gradually drew up from the direction of Bethune, the 6th and
7th C.B. (3rd Cavalry Division) were withdrawn to the north side of
Ypres, where they worked the ground between Zonnebeke and the Foret
d'Houlthust, filling, in fact--as well as might be--the gap between the
French Cavalry to the north and the left of the 7th Division. This
latter division, since its arrival, had pushed forward with little or
no opposition to a convex position some six miles east of Ypres, which
embraced the villages of Zonnebeke, Kruiseik and Zandvoorde. South of
Zandvoorde there was a considerable hiatus, Allenby's Cavalry Corps,
which had unexpectedly found itself opposed by the XIX. Saxon Corps and
three divisions of German Cavalry, having not yet got into proper touch
with the right of the 7th Division. This, however, in view of the fact
that the 7th Division was on the outside of the wheeling movement, and
had therefore the bigger sweep to make, was a matter of little moment,
and one which would have speedily righted itself at a later stage, had
the original plan been successfully carried through. A matter of more
moment at the time was that the 22nd Brigade, on the left of the 7th
Division at Zonnebeke, was considerably in arrear of the 20th Brigade
at Kruiseik, whereas the converse should have been the case.
Accordingly, in the early morning of the 19th, the 22nd Brigade was
ordered to advance from Zonnebeke in the direction of the straight road
connecting Roulers and Menin, so as to bring the left shoulder of the
7th Division well forward. When this had been done, the 20th and 21st
Brigade were to join in the general advance.

[Illustration: Ypres and its surroundings.]

The main idea on the extreme left of our line, at the moment, was to
seize the bridge over the River Lys at Menin, and so impede the further
advance of the German reinforcements which were being steadily railed
up from the direction of Lille. In the event it turned out that the
manoeuvre was impracticable owing to the insufficiency in numbers of
the British force operating east of Ypres. This force, it will be
understood, consisted, at the time, of the 7th Division alone,
supported by two cavalry brigades on its left flank, whereas the
Germans had by the 19th concentrated on the spot a force of five or six
times this magnitude. However, in the intention lies the explanation of
the subsequent Ypres salient. The original idea was strategically
sound, but it was frustrated owing to the difficulty and consequent
delay in concentration which accompanied the transfer of the British
force from the Aisne to its new field of operation in Flanders. It was
a race as to which army could concentrate with the greatest rapidity,
and the Germans--having by far the easier task and by far the shorter
road to travel--got in first.

At 5 a.m., then, on the 19th, the 22nd Brigade set out from Zonnebeke
on its forward movement, the 2nd Queen's on the left, the 1st R. Welsh
Fusiliers in the centre, and the 2nd Warwicks on the right, the 1st S.
Staffords being in reserve.

This 22nd Brigade, as it turned out, was the only one in the 7th
Division which was destined to do any fighting this day. The 20th
Brigade, which was at Kruiseik, some couple of miles in advance of the
22nd, never really came into action. As a matter of fact, they were in
the act of deploying for an attack on Ghelowe about 11 a.m., when news
was brought by an airman that two fresh German Army Corps had suddenly
made their appearance, moving up from the direction of Courtrai. As far
as this brigade was concerned, then, the original order to advance was
cancelled, it being clearly impracticable for one division to take the
offensive against four. By this time, however, the 22nd Brigade had
advanced some six miles from Zonnebeke to the neighbourhood of the
straight road and the parallel railway which connect Roulers and Menin.
The news of the unexpected reinforcement of the enemy in front was duly
communicated to General Lawford, commanding the brigade, and he at once
ordered the retirement of his four battalions. This order reached the
Queen's and the Warwicks about 11.30, but did not penetrate through to
the R. Welsh Fusiliers, who accordingly pressed on towards Ledeghem,
quite ignorant of the new development, or of the fact that they were
unsupported by the battalions on either flank. Ledeghem was found to be
very strongly occupied, and on reaching the high road from Roulers to
Menin, just short of the railway, the battalion found itself not only
attacked in force from in front, but at the same time enfiladed from
the direction of the main road on the left, and very heavily shelled
from Keselburg on the right front. To this artillery fire there was no
response whatever from our own gunners, who, it is to be presumed, were
in ignorance of the single-handed advance of the R. Welsh Fusiliers,
and had withdrawn with the rest of the brigade. The German artillery
accordingly had it all its own way, and their shrapnel played havoc in
the ranks of the gallant Welshmen. Nine officers[4] had already fallen
when at 1.20 the order to retire reached the C.O. The order now was
that the battalion was to withdraw to a ridge in rear, near the
windmill at Dadizeele, and there act rear-guard to the rest of the
brigade. This order was carried out without any great further loss, the
enemy showing no disposition at the moment to advance, and eventually
the brigade reached Zonnebeke in the dusk of the evening.

        [4] In this engagement Captain Kingston, Captain Lloyd, Captain
        Brennan and Lieut. Chance were killed, and Major Gabbett,
        Captain St. John, Captain Skaife and Lieuts. Jones and Naylor
        were wounded.

Throughout that night a constant stream of refugees passed through
Zonnebeke on their way westward from Roulers, which was burning. These
were all subjected to examination, but their number was too great to
make close examination possible, and that many spies got through among
them is unquestionable.

It very soon became apparent that the newly-arrived German troops had
no intention of letting the grass grow under their feet. During the
night they had put behind them the six miles which separate Ledeghem
from Zonnebeke, and at eleven o'clock on the morning of the 20th they
started bombarding the latter place. Once more fate elected that the R.
Welsh Fusiliers should stand in the path of the attack. They were now
on the left of the 22nd Brigade, and they were attacked not only from
the direction of the road, but from their left flank, which was very
much exposed, the line of the cavalrymen north of the road being even
more extended than that of the 7th Division. However, in spite of
everything, they held their ground with great determination throughout
this day and the next. Their losses, however, were again very severe
indeed. This was, in fact, the first of the 7th Division battalions to
undergo that gradual process of annihilation which was destined in time
to be the fate of all. The extreme tension of the situation at
Zonnebeke was in some part relieved by the arrival on the scene, during
the night, of the 4th (Guards) Brigade, who took over the ground north
of the Zonnebeke road from the cavalry. This brigade formed part of the
1st A.C. which had arrived at St. Omer from the Aisne on the 17th and
18th, and had been billeted outside Ypres on the night of the 19th.

The question as to how best to dispose of this 1st A.C. was an
extremely delicate one. The numerical weakness of the Cavalry Corps,
holding the Wytschate and Messines line, suggested strongly that it
would be of the greatest use in that area. On the other hand was the
very grave danger of the Allies' left flank being turned by the sudden
advance of fresh German forces north and east of Ypres, of sufficient
strength to break through the very thin line guarding that quarter. In
this dilemma, the C. in C., with consummate judgment, decided to send
Sir Douglas Haig's Army Corps to the northern side of Ypres. The wisdom
of this step became apparent on the very next day, that is on the day
when the 22nd Brigade advanced to the Roulers-Menin road, and were
forced back by the unexpected appearance of two Army Corps whose
presence was unknown to our air-scouts. These fresh German forces as we
have seen, pursued the 22nd Brigade as far as Zonnebeke, and there
attacked our line with the utmost determination on the 20th and 21st.
On the first of these two days, the brigade, as already described,
managed to hold its own--though at great sacrifice--but the German
attacking force was all the time being augmented, while our defensive
force, owing to continuous losses, was getting weaker; and it is hardly
conceivable that the enemy's advance could have been checked for
another twenty-four hours, except for the timely arrival of the 1st
A.C.

As soon as the destination of this corps had been decided on between
the C. in C. and Sir Douglas Haig, the latter hurried forward the
Guards' Brigade to the assistance of the 7th Division, and these--as
has already been explained--came up into line on the left of the R.
Welsh Fusiliers on the night of the 20th, and were unquestionably very
largely instrumental in preventing something in the nature of a
_debacle_ on the 21st.

On that morning the enemy renewed the attack in great force at
daybreak, and kept up a succession of violent assaults till four in the
afternoon. The Welsh Fusiliers were again in the very path of the
attack, but the presence of the Guards' Brigade on their left, north of
the Zonnebeke road, just made the difference. With this backing, they
successfully held out from daybreak till 4 p.m., by which time their
trenches had been wholly annihilated and a retirement became necessary.
Their difficulties were increased by the giving out of their
ammunition, but the situation was to some extent saved by the gallantry
of Sergt.-Drummer Chapman, who brought up fresh supplies under a very
heavy fire. Another Welsh Fusilier who won great distinction during the
day was Pte. Blacktin, who was awarded the D.C.M. for the continued
heroism with which he attended to the wounded throughout the two days'
fighting. Of these there were now, unfortunately, only too many, the
Welsh Fusiliers having--in three successive days' fighting--lost 23
officers and 750 men. Their retirement in the evening was assisted by
the 2nd Queen's, who (with the exception of one company, which was away
to the right, supporting the Northumberland Hussars between the 22nd
and 21st Brigade) were in the second line. This battalion too suffered
severely during the operations, Lieuts. Ingram and Ive being killed,
and Major Whinfield, Lieuts. Heath, Haigh, Williams and Gabb wounded.
They effectively, however, checked the further advance of the enemy. By
a piece of good fortune the S. Staffords, on the right of the Welsh
Fusiliers, were also in a position to give the advancing Germans a very
bad time. They had a body of expert shots posted in the upper windows
of St. Joseph's school, from which point of vantage they were able to
get the Germans in flank. The school was being shelled all the time,
but was not hit. During the night which followed, however--a night of
exceptional darkness--the Germans found an opportunity of pushing
forward round the left flank of the S. Staffords, but without
succeeding in dislodging them, till an order arrived at four o'clock in
the morning for their retirement, as they were ahead of the line.

In the meanwhile the Guards' Brigade, north of the road, had not been
idle, and it is not too much to say that, except for the arrival of
this brigade in the very nick of time, the position would have been
very nearly desperate. As it was, however, their presence at once made
itself felt. The fire of the S. Staffords from the right, the Guards'
Brigade from the left, and the 2nd Queen's from in face, was more than
the German advance was prepared at the moment to push forward against,
and it came to a standstill. The Guards' casualties were considerable,
especially in the case of the 3rd Coldstream, who had the Hon. C. Monck
and Lieut. Waller killed, and Colonel Feilding, Lieut. Darrell and
Lieut. Leese wounded. Lord Feilding was given the D.S.O. for
conspicuous gallantry on this occasion. The 52nd Oxford Light Infantry,
acting with the Guards' Brigade, proved in every way worthy of the
association, and fully lived up to its great fighting reputation.
Amongst those who particularly distinguished themselves in this
regiment during the fight were Lieut. Spencer, Corpl. Hodges and Pte.
Hastings.

In the events of these three days is to be found the origin of the
singular bulge, or--in military parlance--salient, which throughout
October characterized the disposition of our forces east of Ypres. By
the unexpected appearance to our front of 80,000 fresh German troops,
our contemplated progress eastward had perforce to be replaced, on the
spur of the moment, by a grim determination to hold on as long as
possible to the ground we had already won. This was, no doubt, a
natural desire, but its fruit was unsound.

On the evening of October 21st the position was that the 21st Brigade
at Becelaere and the 20th at Kruiseik and Zandvoorde were still very
considerably ahead of the 22nd, which, as we have seen, had been driven
back to Zonnebeke. North of Zonnebeke the line of the 1st Division fell
still further back, facing, in fact, very nearly due north, while south
of Zandvoorde there was no line at all, the 7th Division here ending in
space, for reasons already given. Later on the 3rd Cavalry
Division--when released from its duties north of Zonnebeke--were
detailed for the duty of keeping up the communication between
Zandvoorde and the Cavalry Corps far back at Hollebeke, Wytschate and
Messines, but even so, the line they occupied fell back almost at
right angles from our true front, and was a constant source of anxiety.
For a General voluntarily to relinquish ground already won is probably
the supreme act of renunciation, at the same time it is obvious that
three sides of a square are longer than the fourth side, and therefore
require more men for their defence, and it is no exaggeration to say
that between October 20th and 26th the Ypres salient bore a perilous
resemblance to three sides of a square.

The timely arrival of the 1st A.C. had undoubtedly saved the situation
for the moment, as far as the German attempt to break through at
Zonnebeke was concerned, but the position was still one for the very
gravest anxiety. Even with the addition of the 1st A.C. we had only
three infantry divisions and two cavalry brigades with which to defend
the entire front from Bixschoote, due north of Ypres, to Hollebeke,
nearly due south of it. From Bixschoote to Hollebeke, as the crow
flies, is a matter of some eight miles, but, as our front at that time
jutted out as far as Becelaere, six miles east of Ypres, it may be
reckoned that the frontage to be defended was not less than sixteen
miles in length. The strength of the enemy--that is to say, of the
force which was immediately pressing forward at this moment on the
Ypres frontage--may be approximately reckoned at 100,000; and had the
German General at this juncture pushed his forces along all the main
avenues to Ypres, it is difficult to see how he could have been held
back. The line of defence was ridiculously extended--extended indeed
far beyond the recognized limits of effective resistance, and there
were no reserves available with which to strengthen any threatened
spot. Every fighting man was in the long, thin line that swept round in
that uncomfortable curve from Bixschoote to Hollebeke. The 89th French
Territorial Division was, it is true, in general reserve, at
Poperinghe, but this division was composed entirely of untried troops
who could in no sense claim to be comparable to the French regulars.
The 87th French Territorial Division, again, had as much as it could do
to attend to its own affairs north of Ypres, and was not to be counted
on as a source of reinforcement.

From this time on, the whole of our line north of the Zonnebeke road
was gradually taken over by the 1st A.C., the 6th and 7th C.B., who had
so far been responsible for that section of the front, being thereby
released and retiring to Hooge, from which point, for the time being,
they acted as a kind of mobile reserve--the fan-like arrangement of
roads which branches out eastward from Ypres enabling them to be sent
with the least possible delay to any threatened point on the front.

For purposes of descriptive clearness, it may perhaps be pardonable,
even at the risk of labouring the point a little, to call attention
once more to the fact that the British force in Flanders now consisted
of two distinct and separate armies, which we may call the North and
South Army. The South Army was made up of the 2nd A.C., the 3rd A.C.,
and the 19th Brigade, and was supported by Conneau's cavalry, which
operated between these two Army Corps, and by the Lahore Indians in
rear. The line of this army extended as far north as Le Gheir, or,
rather, let us say, Ploegsteert, to which place the left of the 3rd
A.C. shortly withdrew.

The North Army consisted of the 1st A.C. and the 7th Division,
supported by the 3rd Cavalry Division, and the southernmost point in
its charge at the moment was Hollebeke, or, to be more precise, the
canal which turns off sharply towards Ypres just north of Hollebeke.
The eight miles gap between the North Army and the South Army was held
by the Cavalry Corps under Allenby.

The terrific fighting, then, of the end of October and beginning of
November may be considered as taking place in three distinct sections,
viz.--the South Army, the Cavalry Corps, and the North Army. The
latter, it may be added, had the 89th French Territorial Division in
support, and Gen. Bidon, with the 87th French Territorial Division, on
its left, north of Ypres.

The fact that the 1st A.C. had arrived on the scene absolutely at the
psychological moment in order to avert disaster, was made abundantly
clear, not only by the effective support which the 2nd Division of that
Army Corps was able to lend north of the Zonnebeke road on the 21st,
but also by the immediate demand which arose further south for the
services of the released 3rd Cavalry Division. These two Cavalry
Brigades, it will be remembered, had been replaced on the night of the
20th by the 2nd Division, who had taken over their position north of
the Zonnebeke road.

At 1 p.m. on the following day, that is, at the same time that the
Welsh Fusiliers were being so fiercely attacked along the Zonnebeke
road, news arrived that Gough's 2nd Cavalry Division was being very
hard pressed, and had been forced to fall back on Messines. This left a
gap, or--to be more accurate--widened the gap on the right of the 7th
Division at Zandvoorde, and the 6th C.B. (10th Hussars, Royals, and 3rd
Dragoon Guards) were sent off to fill it, as well as might be, by
occupying the two canal crossings north of Hollebeke. This they did
with success, and the 10th Hussars and 4th Hussars (from the 3rd C.B.)
even attacked the Chateau de Hollebeke itself, but were unable to take
it, on account of its being still under fire from our own artillery.
Later on in the evening, however, it was felt that the line south-west
of Zandvoorde was dangerously open, and the 6th C.B. was shifted in
that direction, the 10th Hussars at 3 o'clock in the morning taking
over the Zandvoorde trenches from the 2nd Scots Guards in the 20th
Brigade. The 7th C.B. went into reserve at St. Eloi, where it remained
for the night. In the meanwhile the C. in C. had sent up the 7th Indian
Brigade to help support Gough.

This transfer of the Zandvoorde trenches into the keeping of the 3rd
Cavalry Division was the first abridgement of the immense frontage
(from Zonnebeke to south of Zandvoorde) held by the 7th Division. From
this time on, till the moment when they were permanently abandoned, it
will be found that these Zandvoorde trenches were in the occupation
either of the 6th C.B. or the 7th C.B. They formed the most dangerous
position in the whole line of defence, being in the form of a
promontory which jutted out defiantly into the enemy's country. The 3rd
Cavalry Division suffered very severely during its nine days' defence
of these deadly trenches, the 10th Hussars, who were perhaps the worst
sufferers, losing on the very first day of occupation Col. Barnes,
Major Mitford and Captain Stewart.




THE STAND OF THE FIFTH DIVISION[5]


In the meanwhile, further south, at and around Givenchy, a situation
was developing which in point of dramatic interest, and as a test of
indomitable resolution, bid fair to rival the defence of Ypres. From
Givenchy to Le Gheir the 2nd and 3rd A.C. had now definitely assumed
the defensive, and the story of how that defence was maintained in the
face of overwhelming odds, and under conditions of extreme difficulty
and fatigue, is one of which Britain may ever be justly proud.

        [5] 13th, 14th and 15th Brigades.

The 21st French Army was, throughout these La Bassee operations,
responsible for the ground up to the canal south of Givenchy. From that
point the 5th Division took up the line; then came the 3rd Division,
then the 6th, and finally, with its left resting on Le Gheir, the 4th
Division. Behind the 5th and 3rd Divisions were the Indians.

Between Le Gheir and Zandvoorde, which we may take as the southernmost
point of the arm of Ypres, was Allenby's Cavalry Corps.

In the case of the South Army, as with the Army of Ypres, the impetus
of the first advance had carried our troops to a line which was only
afterwards maintained under great strain, in the face of the masses of
troops which the enemy were gradually concentrating in this particular
area. La Bassee and Ypres became, for the time being, the two points on
which German attention was specially riveted. With the avowed intention
of breaking through to Calais by one or other of these routes, troops
were being systematically railed up from the east and massed along the
Belgian frontier. It was officially computed that by October 20th there
were 250,000 German troops north of La Bassee, and that by the middle
of November that number had been increased to 750,000.

The fact that it was the British Army which stood between this vast
mass of armed men and its projected advance was in all probability not
entirely a matter of chance. If the attempt to break through either at
Ypres or La Bassee had succeeded, the little British force would either
have been wiped out, or hopelessly disgraced in the eyes of its allies.
In either case the prestige of England would have received a rude
shock; and, with a German base established at Calais, she would have
been in imminent danger of losing something more than prestige.

The fact, then, that the Kaiser's selected road to Calais or Paris, as
the case might be, lay through the thirty miles of front held by the
British troops, was in all probability part of a carefully-thought-out
plan. One factor in the case, however, had been overlooked, or at least
under-rated, viz.--the indomitable tenacity of the British soldier in
the face of difficulties. Of this essentially British quality the
Germans had as yet had no practical experience. At Mons and Le Cateau
we had dropped back before their onslaughts--dropped back, it is true,
in obedience to orders, and in conformity with a pre-arranged plan.
Still, we had dropped back. At the Aisne there had been no serious
attempt on the part of the enemy to break through our lines. Such had
not been part of the German programme at the moment. It was therefore
not wholly unnatural, that the very thin British line between Givenchy
and Ypres, should have been reckoned at German Head Quarters as being
penetrable at any point where sufficient pressure was brought to bear.

In the face of beliefs such as these, the stone-wall resistance put up
by our three war-worn Army Corps must have been a source of equal
astonishment and exasperation to the wire-pullers in Berlin. To the
Britisher it must always bring a thrill of justifiable pride. Many of
the regiments engaged were technically "annihilated." Their officers
went; their senior N.C.O.'s went; they were worn to the last stage of
mental and physical exhaustion by sleeplessness, and by unceasing
digging and fighting. And still they held on. There were no "hands
uppers" among these men from Britain. We gave ground, of course, both
in the La Bassee area and at Ypres. In the latter case a withdrawal of
some kind was dictated by every consideration of military prudence. The
original bulge was a danger from every point of view, and with no
compensating advantage. It thinned our line and laid us open at all
times to the risk of enfilading attacks from north and south.

At La Bassee, too, we had got too far ahead, and from the military
point of view we lost nothing by falling back a few miles. But from the
three points in the line of vital strategical importance, Givenchy,
Ploegsteert and Klein Zillebeke, we were never driven. Those points
were held on to with a stubborn determination which nothing could break
through; and to the battalions on whose shoulders fell the main weight
of this burden is due the homage of all who stayed at home. It is not
suggested that there was an entirely uniform standard of excellence
throughout all the units engaged. Any attempt to make such a
representation would be a gross injustice to those battalions which
stand out, and which have for ever immortalized themselves, and the
honour of British arms, by an indomitable resistance which can find few
parallels in the history of war.

But at first we got too far ahead at La Bassee as at Ypres, and this
soon became very clear. During a thick fog on the morning of the 21st,
some of the 5th Division were driven out of their trenches; and in lieu
of making any attempt to retake the trenches so lost, Gen. Morland--who
on Sir Charles Fergusson's promotion had taken over command of the
division--thought it advisable to readjust the entire line.

Further north, just east of Fromelles, the 19th Brigade had also to
give ground. They fought all through this day with great gallantry, but
their losses were very heavy, and, in spite of all efforts, by evening
they had been forced back over a mile. The Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders were specially conspicuous on this occasion; they fought
with indomitable valour, and it was only with the greatest reluctance
that in the end they obeyed the order to abandon their trenches. In
Sergt. Ross's platoon eighty per cent. had been killed or wounded, but
the gallant sergeant still refused to give way.

This succession of small reverses was, of course, disappointing in view
of the anticipations of the week before, but they brought home to all
concerned a thorough realization of the change of outlook. This was
still further emphasized by the shifting northwards of the 3rd A.C., a
step which was rendered necessary by the obvious inadequacy of the
Cavalry Corps numbers for the frontage allotted to it. By this move
that frontage was appreciably shortened, but the gap between the 2nd
and 3rd A.C. was correspondingly widened, and the difficulty of
Conneau's gallant but highly tried corps of cavalry was proportionately
increased. The effect on the Frenchmen was at once felt, these being
driven out of Fromelles on the following afternoon with very heavy
loss. On the same afternoon the 5th Division again suffered severely.
The Cheshires were driven out of Violaines, and the Dorsets--terribly
thinned though they had been by the fighting of the 13th--seeing them
hard pressed, left their trenches and dashed up in support, but the
odds were too heavy and both were driven back with loss. The Germans
thereupon occupied Rue du Marais, a little village on the northern
<DW72> of the Givenchy ridge, but their advantage was short-lived, for
they were promptly counter-attacked by the Manchesters and Worcesters
and driven out again.

In the meanwhile the Devons had been forced to fall back some two miles
from Canteleux, which they had now occupied for three days, to
Givenchy, the former place having been formed into an untenable salient
by the withdrawal of the troops on either flank.

In the evening General Morland told Sir Horace that the 5th Division
was completely worn out with constant digging and fighting, and that he
doubted whether they could withstand another attack. The 2nd A.C. had
already in the last ten days lost 5,000 men, to which the 5th Division
had contributed more than its share. This division had, in fact, from
first to last had a most trying time. It had borne the brunt of the
fighting at Le Cateau, and at the Aisne it had struck what proved to be
by far the most difficult crossing. It had subsequently throughout the
Aisne fighting been forced to occupy trenches in the low ground by the
river, which were throughout dominated by the German artillery on the
heights beyond. Then, within one week of leaving the Aisne trenches,
they were once more engaged in ceaseless battling day and night against
superior numbers, for on the several battalions of this division in
turn devolved the paramount duty of holding the Givenchy position at
all costs.

That night Sir Horace motored twenty-five miles over to St. Omer to
explain the situation to the C. in C., who was most sympathetic and
promised that he would send all that he could spare of the Lahore
Indians to be at Estaires at eight o'clock next morning, with a rider
to the effect that they were not to be used except in emergency, as
they were destined for other work. As a matter of fact they were not
used, the 5th Division proving equal to the occasion without foreign
assistance.

Throughout the 23rd, 24th and 25th the Germans continued to attack
Givenchy with the utmost persistence, but without succeeding in
dislodging the Devons. That gallant regiment, however, was becoming
very weak in officers. During their three days at Canteleux, Captain
Chichester and Lieut. Ridgers had been killed, and Col. Gloster and
Lieut. Tillett wounded. Then on the 24th, Lieut. Ainslie was killed,
and on the following day Captain Besley and Lieut. Quick were killed,
the latter while running to the next regiment to tell them that the
Devons meant holding on and that they must do the same. On the 20th
they relieved the Manchesters at Festubert. The latter regiment, during
its occupation of Festubert, had held its difficult position with
magnificent determination and had won two Victoria Crosses, 2nd Lieut.
Leach and Sergt. Hogan being each awarded the Cross for valour.

On the following day, the whole line in the neighbourhood of Festubert
was subjected to a particularly infernal shelling, every known species
of missile being hurled against it. The Devons stood firm through it
all, but the regiment on their left--an Indian regiment for the first
time in the firing line--found it too much for them, and after having
lost most of their officers they retired, their trenches being at once
occupied by the enemy. This made the position of the Devons very
precarious. With as little delay as possible the reserve company of the
regiment under Lieut. Hancock and Lieut. Dunsterville was brought up,
and with great gallantry the company attacked and drove the Germans out
of the right-hand section of the lost trenches, the 58th Vaughan Rifles
at the same time retaking the left-hand section. Both Lieut. Hancock
and Lieut. Dunsterville were killed during the charge, and Lieut.
Ditmas thereupon took over command of the company, but he himself was
subsequently killed, after displaying conspicuous gallantry. On the
31st, as a part of the general process of transfer, the Devons were at
length relieved, after sixteen days of almost continuous fighting. They
received a great ovation from the other troops on their withdrawal.
Lieut.-Col. Gloster was given the C.M.G. and Lieut. Worrall the
Military Cross. Other officers who showed conspicuous ability and
daring were Lieuts. Lang, Prior and Alexander. Sergt.-Major Webb, who
on several occasions had given proof of remarkable courage and
coolness, got the D.C.M., as also did Lance-Corpl. Simmons and Pte.
Worsfold, the latter of whom greatly distinguished himself by carrying
numerous messages at Festubert after the telegraphic communication was
cut.

We have now, however, got considerably ahead of the general situation,
from which we digressed on October 22nd in order to keep in touch with
the position at and around Givenchy. We must therefore once more take
up the thread at that date.

During the 23rd, 24th and 25th there was no movement of marked
importance in the southern area, but continuous attacks all along the
line still further reduced the number and vitality of the 5th
Division, and by the evening of the 25th it was rapidly becoming
evident to all concerned that the condition of that division, and
indeed of the entire 2nd A.C. in greater or less degree, was extremely
serious. The casualties of this Army Corps since its arrival in
Flanders now amounted to 350 officers and 8,204 men, and those that
survived were in a state of extreme exhaustion both mental and
physical.

Sir Horace summoned General Maude, Col. Martyn (who had taken over
the command of the 13th Brigade when Col. Hickie had been invalided
home on October 13th), and Count Gleichen, the three Brigadiers of
the 5th Division, to meet General Morland, and all agreed that the
situation was very grave indeed, and that human endurance was nearly
at the breaking point. General Maude (14th Brigade), however,
reported that Col. Ballard was determined to hold the canal trenches
with the Norfolks to the last gasp, and that the Devons next the
Norfolks at Givenchy were equally resolute, though terribly thinned
by casualties. All, however, agreed that however willing the spirit
might be, the flesh was too weak to make any prolonged resistance.
The Generals themselves were well-nigh worn out with the ceaseless
strain, and with want of sleep, their nights being largely occupied
in motoring hither and thither for purposes of consultation with
other commanders. Two or three hours' sleep in a night was a luxury.
Luckily the Germans--accurate as their information usually was--seem
to have failed to realize the extreme exhaustion of the troops facing
them at this part of the line, otherwise the history of events might
have been different.




NEUVE CHAPELLE


The 3rd Division had perhaps, if anything, been so far less highly
tried in the way of ceaseless fighting against odds than the 5th
Division, but any deficiency in this respect was fully made up to them
by the fighting at Neuve Chapelle on the 25th, 26th and 27th.

This very costly three days' fighting opened on the night of the 25th,
during a heavy downpour of rain which succeeded a beautiful day, by a
furious attack, from the neighbourhood of the Bois de Biez, on the left
of the 7th Brigade and the right of the 8th Brigade. This wood, which
played a prominent part in these three days' fighting, lies about half
a mile to the south-east of Neuve Chapelle, in the centre of the
equilateral triangle formed by that place, Aubers and Illies. The
Germans advanced out of the wood with great courage and with every
appearance of meaning business, but the 7th Brigade and the 15th Sikhs,
who had taken over from Conneau's cavalry the day before, managed to
stand their ground, and in the end drove the enemy back with very heavy
loss, though themselves suffering severely, the Sikhs, who fought
superbly, alone losing 200 in officers and men.

The 8th Brigade was not so fortunate, the R. Irish Rifles, who were the
right-hand battalion, being driven out of their trenches, which lay
north of the La Bassee road on the east side of the village. The
situation for the moment was critical, but the lost trenches were very
gallantly retaken by the 4th Middlesex, led by Col. Hull, and the 4th
R. Fusiliers. The latter battalion suffered considerably in the
operation, Lieuts. Hope-Johnstone and Waller being killed. This
battalion had now only 200 men left. The whole of the 9th Brigade, in
fact, had been reduced to mere skeletons. This brigade (Shaw's) had a
magnificent record behind it.[6] From the time when, at Mons, it had
borne the brunt of the German attack and put up such a magnificent
defence, it had never failed in any task for which it had been called
upon; and it is possible that its great fighting reputation and the
cheerfulness with which it undertook any duty assigned it, coupled with
the undoubted military talents of its Brigadier, had earned for it
rather more than its fair share of difficult and dangerous work. During
the past fortnight it had fought with great gallantry and with
invariable success, and during that short period it had lost 54
officers and 1,400 men.

        [6] 4th R. Fusiliers, 1st R. Scots Fusiliers, Northumberland
        Fusiliers and the Lincolnshire Regiment.

On the following day the attack was renewed, the Germans suddenly
swarming once again out of the Bois de Biez opposite, and the R. Irish
Rifles were again driven in, their trenches being at once occupied by
the enemy, many of whom entered the town and remained there throughout
the day.

The 7th Brigade on the right and the 9th Brigade on the left now had
the Germans wedged in between them. The Northumberland Fusiliers (the
old Fighting Fifth) on the right of the 9th Brigade, now found the
position untenable in the weak numerical condition to which they had
been reduced, and they were compelled to withdraw to the western side
of the town. During this withdrawal, which was carried out in excellent
order, Corpl. Fisk found time to extinguish some flames which were
enveloping the limber of one of our guns--a gallant act performed under
very heavy fire for which he was given the D.C.M.

On the night of the 26th the position at Neuve Chapelle was a curious
one. The enemy were in possession of all the trenches on the north-east
side of the town, but on the south-east side the Wiltshire Regiment,
the R. West Kents, the K.O.Y.L.I. and the East Surrey were still
holding their ground, in advance of the town. The rest of the 3rd
Division were thrown back behind the town.

About 11 a.m. on the 27th the usual morning attack was made on the
Wiltshire Regiment, whose left flank was now, of course, quite
unprotected, and by noon they too had been forced to retire, the
Germans in great numbers following closely on their heels. The position
of the R. West Kents was now most precarious, as they had the enemy on
three sides of them, and it seemed inevitable that they must follow the
example of the several regiments on their left, who had been
successively forced to give way. Such, however, was not their opinion,
and, undismayed by the apparent hopelessness of their position, they
promptly set about preparing a defence which proved to be one of the
most remarkable of the campaign. Major Buckle, who was in command, on
seeing the Wiltshires forced back, at once made his way to the left of
his battalion in order to reorganize the formation so as to meet the
altered conditions, but he was almost immediately killed, Captain
Legard being killed at the same time and Lieuts. Williams and Holloway
wounded. All the company officers on the left flank were now down, but
the new movement was carried out under the direction of Sergt.-Major
Penny and Sergt.-Major Crossley, the reserve company wheeling to its
left, while the left of the firing line threw back its flank, so as to
present a convex face to the position now occupied by the enemy. All
this was carried out under a murderous fire. In this formation the
battalion held on till the evening, when our troops in rear of the town
counter-attacked with momentary success. This success was mainly
brought about by the 47th Sikhs and the 9th Bhopal Regiment, who made a
fine dash into the town from the direction of Croix Barbee, the
first-named regiment showing great courage, but they both suffered
heavy losses from the ubiquitous German machine-guns in the houses. At
the same time three groups of the French Cyclist Corps made an attack
from the Pont Logis side. The impetus of these combined attacks drove
the Germans back for the time being, and indeed for the whole of that
night, but their concealed machine-guns continued to play havoc in the
ranks of the assailants, and in the early morning of the 28th the
attacking force had to fall back, the Germans once more re-occupying
the town.

The position of the R. West Kents was now as bad again as ever, and
once more half the battalion had to face about to its left flank and
rear. The execution of this movement again took its toll of officers,
Captain Battersby and Lieut. Gore being killed, and Lieut.
Moulton-Barratt wounded. The battalion had now lost twelve out of the
fourteen officers with which it had gone into these trenches, 2nd
Lieut. White and 2nd Lieut. Russell alone being left, and on these two
it now devolved to maintain the spirit of the corps. The remarkable
position had by this time developed that practically the whole of Neuve
Chapelle was in the hands of the enemy, with the exception of the
little south-east corner by the La Bassee road, which was still
stubbornly held by the undefeated R. West Kents. On the other side of
the La Bassee road, and in the angle which that road makes with the
Richebourg road, the K.O.Y.L.I. were still standing firm with the East
Surrey beyond them, but these last two regiments were not so hardly
pressed, the main attack being always on the eastern side of the main
La Bassee road.

We must now take a glance at the Neuve Chapelle position from the
larger military point of view. The counter-attacks on the 27th had
failed mainly owing to the exhaustion and insufficiency of the troops
employed. The place, however, being of considerable strategic
importance (to us), the Divisional Head Quarters determined that it
could not be left in the hands of the enemy, and an attack on a more
important scale was therefore organized for the following day. Sir
Horace motored across at night and saw General Conneau, who told him
that in addition to the six hundred Chasseurs already in the line, he
could lend him a regiment of dismounted cavalry and nine batteries of
artillery. The C. in C. also sent him the 2nd C.B. under Col. Mullens,
of which the 4th Dragoon Guards arrived on the evening of the 27th, the
9th Lancers and 18th Hussars during the early part of the night. The
whole were placed under the command of General McCracken of the 7th
Brigade, to whom the details of the attack on the following day were
entrusted.

At 8 a.m. on the 28th, some two hours after the Indians and French
cyclists had been forced to retire, proceedings were started with a
general bombardment of the village. This was a matter of some little
delicacy on account of the position still held by the R. West Kents and
K.O.Y.L.I., and the difficulty was not made lighter by the fog which
lay thick on the plain in the early hours of the morning. In the
circumstances the accuracy of the French artillery was remarkable. The
north side of the village was given a great bombardment, and at eleven
o'clock the sun came through, the fog cleared, and the infantry attack
began. The artillery had now played its part, but, to assist in the
assault, one gun of the 41st Battery was pushed forward to the junction
of the Armentieres and La Bassee roads. From this point of vantage it
was able to work considerable execution on the German infantry massed
in the north-east corner of the village, but, as an inevitable
consequence, was itself singled out for special attention on the part
of the enemy. At the same time, as the attack became more general, its
sphere of usefulness became greatly circumscribed, and finally Lieut.
Lowell, who was in command, resolved to make an attempt to report the
position to his C.O. with a view to getting further instructions. To do
this, however, it was necessary to leave his shelter and negotiate a
hundred yards of bullet-swept road. He was hit almost at once, but kept
on his way till a second bullet brought him down in the road. A gunner
of the name of Spicer thereupon ran out to get him under cover, but was
himself at once knocked over, and subsequently died. Bomb. Bloomfield
then went out to the assistance of his officer and comrade, and was
fortunate enough to get them both under cover without himself being
wounded.

In the meanwhile, the infantry attack was gallantly pressed home, the
47th Sikhs and the 2nd C.B. (on foot) fighting splendidly from street
to street. In spite of all, however, the attack once more failed, and
at 5 p.m. the Germans were still in possession of the village, always
excepting the one small corner still held by the R. West Kents and
K.O.Y.L.I.

The anticlimax of the whole thing, and a cause for reflection as to the
objects for which modern armies fight one another, is furnished by the
fact that in the evening the Germans quietly vacated the town,
apparently realizing--after the sacrifice of some 5,000 men--that the
position was either untenable, or was not worth the cost of keeping.
Our losses in the last day's fighting alone amounted to 65 officers and
1,466 men. The heroes of the three days' fighting were of course the R.
West Kents, who immortalized themselves by a performance which in many
ways must be unique. The two surviving officers, 2nd Lieuts. White and
Russell, were each awarded the D.S.O., and were, in addition, the
subjects of some particularly flattering remarks on the part of Sir
Horace. The two Sergt.-Majors above referred to were each given the
D.C.M., as also was Sergt. Stroud and Pte. Alison. At 2 a.m. on the
29th, the battalion was finally relieved by the Seaforths, having lost
over 300 men in the Neuve Chapelle trenches.

This affair of Neuve Chapelle marks the close of the 2nd A.C.
operations in the La Bassee district. On the 31st the British troops
began to be formally relieved by General Willcocks and his Indians.
This corps had now been augmented by the arrival of the Ferozapore
Brigade, to be followed almost immediately by the Secunderabad Cavalry
Brigade and the Jodhpur Lancers. By 10 a.m. on the 31st the transfer of
positions was complete, and Sir Horace and his gallant but war-worn
A.C. withdrew to Hazebrouck. A certain proportion of the 2nd A.C. was
afterwards called upon to support General Willcocks, but for the most
part we shall, in the future, find them co-operating with the 1st A.C.
and the 7th Division in the neighbourhood of Ypres.

As far, then, as this record of events goes, we may now bid farewell to
the fighting area between Armentieres and La Bassee, and follow
exclusively the events east and south of Ypres. These were destined to
develop into a succession of battles, in which small numbers of British
troops successfully opposed large numbers of German troops, and the
details of which furnish, in the words of Sir J. French, "one of the
most glorious chapters in the annals of the British Army."




PILKEM


Having now taken a permanent farewell of the fighting in the La Bassee
area, with a view to following uninterruptedly the more exciting
situation which had gradually been developing around Ypres it becomes
necessary once more to pick up the thread of the northern doings where
it was dropped.

It will be remembered that on Oct. 19th, 20th and 21st there had been
very fierce fighting in and around Zonnebeke, where the enemy made
persistent efforts to break through to Ypres--efforts which were
frustrated by the timely arrival of the 1st A.C. on the night of the
20th, This Army Corps during the night took over the entire line from
Bixschoote to Zonnebeke, and on the 21st the Guards' Brigade, on the
right of this line, was able to contribute largely to the repulse of
the German attack.

On the 22nd the pressure was shifted to the left of the 1st A.C. line,
the 1st Brigade being attacked in great force at Pilkem from the
direction of Staden. The Germans advanced to their attack with the
utmost determination and with a complete disregard of danger, singing
"_Die wacht am Rhein_" and waving their rifles over their heads. The
focus-point of the attack was the position occupied by the Camerons,
who eventually, by sheer weight of numbers, were driven back, but not
before they had taken an appalling toll of the enemy, 1,500 of the
latter being found dead upon the ground the following day.

General Lomax, commanding the division, had no idea of leaving the
enemy in peace to enjoy this temporary triumph, and at nine o'clock on
the same evening the 2nd Brigade, which was billeted some eight or nine
miles to the south at the village of Boesinghe, received orders to
retake the lost trenches. The R. Sussex regiment was left at Boesinghe,
but the remaining three battalions, viz., the 1st Loyal N. Lancashires,
the 2nd K.R.R. (60th) and the 1st Northamptons, set out and marched all
night to the little village of Pilkem, which was reached at 5 a.m.

The brigade, which had had no food all night, was given no time for
rest or breakfast, but was ordered to attack the trenches at once. In
the brigade order of October 28th, dealing with this action, General
Bulfin, the Brigadier, singles out the 1st Loyal N. Lancashire Regiment
for special praise. It may, therefore, be allowable to confine our
description of the action to a brief review of the part played by this
battalion, which, it will be remembered, had behaved with such
remarkable gallantry at the battle of Troyon.

At 6 o'clock, in the dim light of an autumn morning, the brigade set
out from Pilkem. The lost trenches lay more or less parallel to the
Bixschoote to Langemarck road, a mile to the north of Pilkem. The
attacking troops advanced in line, the K.R.R. being on the left, the
Loyal N. Lancashires in the centre, with the Northamptons on the right.
The 2nd S. Staffords and the 1st Queen's (from the 3rd Brigade) were in
support. In this order they advanced to within 300 yards of the
trenches, where they began to come under a very heavy rifle fire. Major
Carter,[7] commanding the L. N. Lancashires, decided to charge at once
with the bayonet, and he sent a message to this effect to the K.R.R. on
his left, asking them to advance with him. This, however, they were
unable to do, and Major Carter accordingly decided to attack alone.
Captain Henderson, with the machine-gun section, pushed forward to a
very advanced position on the left, from which he was able to get a
clear field for his guns, and the battalion formed up for the attack.
Captain Crane's and Captain Prince's companies were in the first line;
the other two were in support. The order to fix bayonets was given; a
bugler sounded the "Charge," and with loud cheers the battalion dashed
forward, and in less than ten minutes had carried the trenches and
cleared them of the enemy. Six hundred prisoners were taken, a number
which might have been increased but that further pursuit was checked by
our own artillery.

        [7] Major Carter, D.S.O., was killed on November 10th, 1914. He
        was the third O.C. the Loyal N. Lancs, to be killed in action,
        Col. Lloyd having fallen on September 14th and Col. Knight at
        the battle of the Marne.

During this most gallant charge on the part of the Loyal N.
Lancashires, the Queen's and Northamptons on the right advanced and
occupied the inn at the cross-roads, where the road from Pilkem joins
the main road to Langemarck.

The victory was now complete. The L. N. Lancashires lost 6 officers and
150 men killed and wounded. They won, however, very high praise from
the Brigadier and from General Lomax, the Divisional General. Captain
Henderson was awarded the Military Cross for

    "conspicuous gallantry and ability on Oct. 23rd, when, with his
    machine-gun detachment, he performed most valuable services in the
    final attack and charge, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. He
    pushed his guns close up to a flank, and helped in a great degree
    to clear the enemy's trenches."

One cannot convey a sense of the really remarkable nature of this
performance better than by quoting the words of General Bulfin in the
G.O. already referred to. "In spite," it says, "of the stubborn
resistance offered by the German troops, the object of the engagement
was accomplished, but not without many casualties in the brigade. By
nightfall the trenches previously captured by the Germans had been
re-occupied, about 600 prisoners captured, and fully 1,500 German dead
were lying out in front of our trenches. The Brigadier-General
congratulates the L. N. Lancashires, the Northamptons and the K.R.R.
but desires especially to commend the fine soldierlike spirit of the L.
N. Lancashires, which advancing steadily under heavy shell and rifle
fire, and aided by its machine-guns, were enabled to form up within a
comparatively short distance of the enemy's trenches. Fixing bayonets,
the battalion then charged, carried the trenches, and then occupied
them, and to them must be allotted the majority of the prisoners
captured. The Brigadier-General congratulates himself on having in his
brigade a battalion which, after marching the whole of the previous
night, without food or rest, was able to maintain its splendid record
in the past by the determination and self-sacrifice displayed in this
action."




THE SECOND ADVANCE


The 2nd Brigade remained in the position it had captured for
twenty-four hours, when it was relieved by the French. In fact during
the night of the 23rd and the morning of the 24th the entire line from
Bixschoote to Zonnebeke, which the 1st A.C. had taken over from the 3rd
Cavalry Division three days earlier, was in turn taken over from them
by the French, a Division of the 87th Territorials relieving the 1st
Division between Bixschoote and Langemarck, and the 18th Corps of the
9th French Army taking the place of the 2nd Division from Langemarck to
Zonnebeke.

The 1st Division went into reserve at Ypres, whilst the 2nd Division
moved down to its right across the Zonnebeke road, and took over the
position of the 22nd Brigade, which also went back into reserve with
its numbers sadly thinned by the fighting of the last three days.

On the following night the 1st Division came up on the right of the 2nd
Division and took over the line from west of Reutel to the Menin road,
thus relieving the 7th Division of any further responsibility north of
that road.

This proved to be the final shuffle of the Ypres defence force, and the
positions now taken over proved--broadly speaking--to be permanent. It
will be well, therefore, for a thorough understanding of what followed,
that these positions should be clearly fixed in the reader's mind. They
were as follows: North of the Zonnebeke road the French had now taken
over entire charge. From the Zonnebeke road to a point near the
race-course in the Polygon wood, west of Reutel, was the 2nd Division;
on its right, reaching to the Menin road, was the 1st Division, and
from the Menin road to Zandvoorde the 7th Division, with the 3rd
Cavalry Division in the Zandvoorde trenches. So far, so good. Our line
was everywhere strengthened and consolidated. Between Zonnebeke and
Zandvoorde three divisions now occupied the ground hitherto held by the
three brigades of the 7th Division; but, on the other hand, fresh
German troops were daily arriving in their thousands at Roulers and
Menin, and though the line of our resistance might be stronger, the
pressure of attack was correspondingly increased.

The shortening and thickening of our line was not, as events proved,
accomplished one moment too soon, for on the morning of the 24th the
British position was attacked all along its length with a determination
which could hardly have been withstood by the attenuated line of a week
before.

The 2nd Battalion of the Warwickshire Regiment accomplished a fine
achievement on this morning. At dawn they were marched away from
Zonnebeke to retake the trenches south of Reutel out of which the
Wiltshire Regiment had been shelled. The operation entailed an advance
of a mile over ground which was constantly under fire. The final act
was the rushing of the German position, the nucleus of which was a
small detached farm-house in which were several machine-guns. Col.
Loring, who had already been wounded, himself led this last charge and
fell dead in the act. The house, however, was captured and the whole
German position rushed and occupied, the enemy being driven out with
very considerable loss. The Warwicks lost 105 men and several officers.

Almost at the same moment a very similar act, in many respects, was
performed by Captain Dunlop's company of the 1st S. Staffords, which it
will be remembered had been detached from its battalion on the 21st for
the support of the Northumberland Hussars. Here again a farm-house
bristling with machine-guns had to be rushed, and here again in the
very moment of victory the leader fell dead.

These single company engagements were a special characteristic of the
fighting at this period. Owing to our scarcity of men, it was seldom
that an entire battalion could be spared for purposes of support, and
single companies were consequently sent hither and thither to do the
work of battalions--to fill gaps, strengthen weak spots, and even--as
sometimes happened--to retake lost positions and drive back parties of
the enemy which had broken through. A case in point on this very
morning of October 24th was that of No. 4 Company 1st Grenadier Guards.
The circumstances here were that the Germans had succeeded in breaking
through the right flank of the 21st Brigade, and, as serious
consequences threatened, a counter-attack was ordered to be made by
Major Colby with No. 4 Company of the Grenadiers, who were at the time
on the left of the 20th Brigade. The undertaking in this case was an
extremely difficult and dangerous one, both on account of the numerical
insufficiency of a single company for the task assigned it, and also
because the attack entailed the negotiation of our own barbed wire
entanglement. This entanglement, it need scarcely be said, was under a
very constant fire from the enemy, making the undertaking, on the face
of it, almost a hopeless one. However, it was done. The Grenadiers
crawled through, over or under the wire, reformed on the far side,
charged and drove the enemy back once more to their own lines. The
losses of the Grenadiers were very severe, and, as in the case of the
other two companies, the leader, Major Colby, fell dead at the head of
his men. Lieut. Antrobus was also killed and Captain Leatham was
severely wounded. In the meanwhile the 5th Brigade had been brought up
from reserve and completed the rout of the enemy.

On the same morning the 6th Brigade, which had taken over the position
of the 22nd Brigade south of the Zonnebeke road, began pushing forward
with the ambitious view of re-occupying the advance trenches originally
held by the 7th Division along the Paschendael--Becelaere road. The 1st
Berkshire Regiment, under Col. Graham, was on the left of the brigade
next the road, with the King's Regiment on its right, the other two
battalions being in support. In this formation the brigade now advanced
with such dash and vigour as completely to outstrip the troops to right
and left. The woods in front were full of Germans; every yard gained
had to be fought for, and there were considerable casualties, Col.
Bannatyne, of the King's, being amongst those killed. However, the
brigade made its point and got into the old trenches, but as the French
on the north side of the road had not succeeded in making the same
progress, the position was a precarious one, and two companies of the
Berkshire Regiment had to be thrown back almost at right angles, that
is to say, parallel with the road, in order to cover the half mile
which separated them. The performance of this regiment was a distinctly
meritorious one, several guns being captured as well as prisoners, and
it was duly recognized as such in high quarters, Lieut. Nicholson and
Lieut. Hanbury-Sparrow getting the D.S.O. for their conduct on this
occasion, while Sergt.-Major Smith, Sergt. Taylor and Pte. Bossom were
awarded the D.C.M.

The push and enterprise of this regiment on the 24th roused the
activity and emulation of the whole division, which, on the following
morning, was ordered to advance against Reutel. The attack opened with
a furious bombardment of that place by our artillery, and in the
afternoon the 4th Brigade was ordered to clear the Polygon wood, the
object now being to bring up the 4th and 5th Brigades in line with the
6th.

The 4th Brigade advanced with the Irish Guards and 2nd Grenadiers in
the front line, the two Coldstream battalions being in support. Night
fell before any great advance could be made. The night was one of
torrential rain, which the troops passed in the extremity of misery
waiting for the dawn. The attack was then resumed, the 2nd Coldstream
coming up into line between the Irish Guards and the Grenadiers. Later
on the 3rd Coldstream were also brought up into line on the right of
the Grenadiers. The 5th Brigade was on the right of the 4th. Good
progress was made, and the line with the 6th Brigade having been
established, the men dug themselves in at dusk. This wearisome but
highly necessary step had hardly been completed before a furious
counter-attack was made at 10 p.m. It was, however, repulsed with loss,
and the 2nd Division, cold, wet and weary, remained unmolested for the
rest of the night.

This successful advance on the 26th was--as far as this chronicle is
concerned--the last act of the 4th (Guards) Brigade as an integral
unit. From this time on, the 2nd Grenadiers and the Irish Guards will
be found acting quite independently in another part of the field, under
the command of Lord Cavan, while the 2nd and 3rd Coldstream remained in
the Polygon wood trenches under Col. Pereira. Later on these two
Coldstream battalions were joined by the remnant of the 1st Battalion
from the 1st Brigade, so that the regiment was, in fact, consolidated.
It is important in view of subsequent events to keep this clearly in
mind. The Coldstream--with the exception of the 1st Battalion--will not
again appear in these pages as actors in the great Ypres drama. But
though not directly under the limelight, the role allotted to them
henceforth was probably as trying as that to which any regiment could
be subjected. For twenty-two consecutive days from the date of the
advance they occupied the Polygon wood trenches. In the case of the 3rd
Battalion these trenches zig-zagged along the eastern edge of the wood,
while the 2nd Battalion trenches ran through the wood itself and were
straight. In each case the general lie was north and south, in contrast
to the trenches of the 6th Brigade on their left, which faced
north-east, making, in fact, the first bend back in the Ypres salient.
These Polygon wood trenches proved most abominably wet even for
Flanders, the neighbourhood abounding in springs which kept them half
full of water even in dry weather. Here the Coldstreamers stayed
unrelieved for over three weeks, up to their knees in water, under
ceaseless shell-fire, and sniped at with horrible precision on every
occasion when they raised their heads. To add to the unpleasantness of
the position, the woods in front were thick with unburied Germans, from
which the whole atmosphere was polluted. Luckily during the whole of
their tenure the wind blew from westerly quarters, which while it
brought abominably wet weather, nevertheless blew the tainted air in
the direction of the enemy.




THE FIGHTING AT KRUISEIK


While four of the Guards' battalions were thus pushing their way
through the Polygon wood near Reutel, the two Guards' battalions in the
20th Brigade were enacting a small drama of their own at the village of
Kruiseik, south of the Menin road. Here two companies of the Scots
Guards, and the King's Company, 1st Grenadiers, had been posted in some
advance trenches east of the village in the direction of the country
road running from the village of Vieux Chien to Werwick. About 8.30 at
night these advance trenches were attempted by peculiarly German
methods. Through the intense darkness that reigned that night, and
through the torrential rain, the enemy crept up close to our lines with
the aid of every device known to twentieth century warfare. Some said
they had come to surrender, others said they were the S. Staffords, and
others again called appealingly for Captain Paynter, who was, in actual
fact, in command of the right-hand of the two Scots Guards companies.
That officer's response, however, took the form of a well-directed
fire, and the friendly inquirers departed with some haste. Lord Claud
Hamilton (1st Grenadiers), who was in charge of the machine-gun
section, was also undeceived by the friendliness of the visitors, and
his maxims contributed to the haste of their departure. This officer
had now been seven days and nights, unrelieved, in the machine-gun
trenches, and the coolness and resource which he displayed during that
period gained for him the D.S.O. He was relieved early on the morning
following this night attack by an officer of the Scots Guards, who was
killed the same day.

The inhospitable reception of the enemy above described made the night
attack a distinct failure as far as Captain Paynter's company was
concerned. The left-hand trenches were less fortunate. It may be that
they were more unsuspecting, or perhaps the British accent of the
figures advancing through the darkness was purer on the left than on
the right. In any event a report reached the battalion headquarters in
rear about nine o'clock that these trenches had been rushed and all the
occupants killed. On receipt of this news the two reserve companies of
the Scots Guards were sent up under Major the Hon. H. Fraser to
investigate, and if necessary to retake the lost trenches. These two
companies filed silently through the main street of Kruiseik, keeping
close under the shadow of the houses on either side. Not a light was
burning, and not a sound was to be heard.

At the far end of the village Major Fraser halted the column, and went
forward alone to try and get in touch with Captain Paynter in the
right-hand forward trenches, and find out from him what the truth of
the matter really was. He managed after a time to find that officer,
who assured him that not only were his own trenches still uncaptured,
but that he had every intention of keeping them so. As to the trenches
on his left he knew nothing. With this information Major Fraser made
his way back to the east end of the village, where he had left his men.
He decided to investigate for himself the truth as to the left-hand
trenches, and, accordingly, accompanied by Lieut. Holbeche, in the
capacity of guide, and forty men, he crept down the cinder track which
led from the road to the trenches in question. The trenches were in
absolute silence, and he was beginning to doubt the story of their
occupation, when suddenly a flashlight was turned on to his party, a
word of command rang out, and a volley broke the stillness of the
night. Major Fraser gave the word to charge, and the little party
dashed forward with fixed bayonets, but they were shot down before the
trenches were reached. Major Fraser was killed and Lieut. Holbeche
severely wounded, and of the whole party only four returned.

In the meanwhile the rest of the two companies which had been waiting
at the end of the village street noticed a light in a house standing by
itself in the fields. Lord Dalrymple and Captain Fox held a
consultation and decided to surround it. When this was done, Sergt.
Mitchell, with great courage, went up to the door and knocked. It was
flung open and he was at once shot dead. The house, however, was well
surrounded, and all within it were taken prisoners. They numbered over
two hundred, including seven officers, and they were promptly sent to
the rear under escort. Further back, however, the prisoners were
transferred to the custody of some of the 2nd Queen's, and the Scots
Guards escort rejoined the two companies at the end of the village,
whereupon the lost trenches were attacked and re-captured, and
connection once more established with Captain Paynter.[8] This was not
effected without considerable further loss. In addition to those
already mentioned, Lieuts. Gladwin and Dormer were killed, and Col.
Bolton, Lord Dalrymple, Captain Fox, Lord G. Grosvenor, and the Hon. J.
Coke were all wounded, and, in the darkness of the night, fell into the
enemy's hands. The 2nd Scots Guards in all lost nine officers during
this night's fighting. On the following day the battalion was ordered
to abandon the Kruiseik trenches, and was taken back into reserve,
mustering only 450.

        [8] Captain Paynter and Captain Fox got the D.S.O. for their
        share in the night's work.

The withdrawal of the 2nd Scots Guards from the trenches east of
Kruiseik, which it had cost them so dearly to hold, marks the first
step in our retirement from the advanced position we had taken up,
following the forward movement of October 19th, and consequently the
first step in the straightening out of the salient bulge. They were not
replaced, and this ground passed permanently out of our hands.

The King's Company, 1st Grenadiers, which, it will be remembered, were
also posted in the advance trenches east of Kruiseik, by some means
failed to receive the order to withdraw, with the result that, on the
afternoon of the 26th, they found themselves absolutely isolated, and
cut off from their army by the better part of half a mile. The
position, on the face of it, appeared absolutely hopeless, as the
Germans were by this time in occupation of the village of Kruiseik
itself. However, as the Guards, like the Samurai, do not surrender
while yet unwounded, they faced the situation, and actually fought
their way back through the main street of the village. The Germans had
machine-guns in the windows of the houses, but for once in a way these
weapons were less effective than usual, and in the evening the company
rejoined its battalion, considerably thinned in numbers, but
triumphant. Lieut. Somerset was the only officer killed during this
retirement.

The night of the 25th was a bad one in every way for the 20th Brigade,
and the wastage of life owing to the darkness, and the rain, and the
impossibility of distinguishing friend from foe, is not good to think
upon. Here is another instance.

The 1st S. Staffords were attached for the moment to the 20th Brigade,
to which brigade they were acting reserve. Before the Scots Guards had
recovered the lost trenches, that is to say, while these and the
buildings in rear of them were still in the occupation of the enemy,
Captain Ransford was ordered up with a platoon of the S. Staffords to
reinforce the firing line. In carrying out this order he came under
fire both from the Germans in front and from our own troops in rear,
and the whole detachment was practically wiped out. Captain Ransford
himself, with great courage, went forward alone through the
impenetrable darkness to try and sift the position, and discover who
was who, but he fell in the attempt and was seen no more. There is
consolation in the probability that losses owing to mistaken identity
were not confined to our side.

The 1st S. Staffords during the confused and sanguinary fighting of
these two days, that is to say, the 25th and 26th, lost 13 officers and
440 rank and file. As has so often happened in this war, the battalion
in reserve was called upon for much of the most strenuous work, and in
this particular case the S. Staffords had at one time or another to
support each of the four units of the 20th Brigade. Much of this work
was of a particularly difficult and dangerous nature, and in the
darkness and confusion that prevailed the various units were apt at
times to get very greatly mixed up, and to lapse into the condition of
sheep without any accredited shepherd.

At one very critical moment in the ebb and flow of battle, it happened
that the C.O., Col. Ovens, who was at the time in an advanced position
with two companies of the S. Staffords, noticed a mob of some 300
men of these mixed units retiring on his left. He sent off Captain
White, the Quarter-Master of the regiment, to find out the cause.
The reply was that an order had been received to retire. Captain
White--suspecting German methods, or, at any rate, suspecting that the
order originated with someone who was interested in its fulfilment--by
super-human efforts succeeded in rallying the men and leading them
back into the firing line, an act which beyond any question had a
marked effect on the fortunes of the day, or, rather, of the night.

The desperate fighting of this period at and around Kruiseik will
always be associated with the 20th Brigade. The other two brigades in
the 7th Division were shifted about, as occasion required, to various
points between Zonnebeke and Zandvoorde; but from October 19th to the
29th, the 20th Brigade operated at Kruiseik alone. The gradual
annihilation of this splendid brigade--possibly the finest in the whole
army--forms a story which is no less stirring than it is tragic. The
tragedy is obvious, but it is relieved by the thought of the superb
devotion of each of the battalions that formed the command of General
Ruggles-Brise. Each battalion, in its own allotted sphere, fought to a
finish. Each battalion in its turn furnished an example of unflinching
heroism which is an epic in itself. They not only fought till there
were no more left to fight, but they fought up to the very end with
success. It must have been a consolation to their gallant Brigadier,
when in the end he was carried off the field with a shattered thigh, to
feel that he had survived long enough to share in a glory which will
never be excelled.

The worst sufferer in the early days of the Kruiseik fighting was
the 2nd Battalion of the Border Regiment. The experiences of this
regiment are of the highest interest, as being typical of the
hold-on-at-all-costs spirit which animated the British force during
the period of the German advance, and which was responsible for the
miscarriage of all the desperate efforts of the enemy to break
through. On October 22nd the battalion was posted along the road from
Zandvoorde, at the point where it cuts the Kruiseik--Werwick road.
Their trenches formed an ugly salient, which was commanded on three
sides by the enemy's artillery, and at which particularly accurate
practice could be, and was, made by the German batteries posted on the
America ridge, about a mile to the south-east. Their instructions were
to hold on to these trenches _at all costs_ till relieved. They
did hold on, and on the 27th they were relieved--at least, those of
them that were left. Their relaxation during those six days consisted
in counting the shells directed at them, and speculating as to the
accuracy of the next shot. The constant prayer of every officer and
man was for an infantry attack of some sort--German or British. The
prayer was not answered. Their orders were to hold on at all costs
till relieved. They were not relieved, so they held on. On the 24th,
25th and 26th the shells fell in or around their trenches at the rate
of two per minute from dawn till dark. Their casualties from this
shell-fire averaged 150 a day and the enemy's guns fired unchallenged
and unmolested by our own artillery. In those days the numerical
superiority of the German artillery was overwhelming, and, as an
inevitable consequence, our infantry afforded them passive but
diminishing targets. In the case of the Border Regiment the target
diminished rapidly. On the 23rd Captain Gordon and 2nd Lieut. Clancy
were killed; on the 25th Major Allen and Lieut. Warren were killed,
and Lieut. Clegg wounded; on the 26th Captain Lees, Captain
Cholmondeley, Captain Andrews and Lieut. Surtees were killed, and
Major Bosanquet and Lieut. Bevis were wounded. On the 27th the 300 men
that remained were relieved--for the moment.

On the afternoon of the 26th the pressure against this battalion became
so severe, and their casualties were so high, that at two o'clock
General Kavanagh was ordered to make a demonstration with the 7th C.B.
in the direction of Zandvoorde, with a view to diverting some of the
pressure. The 1st Life Guards were already in occupation of the
Zandvoorde trenches, and the demonstration was entrusted to the Blues,
who were, at the time, the reserve regiment to the brigade. The Blues
were at Klein Zillebeke when the order arrived, and they at once got
mounted and galloped along the road that connects that place with
Zandvoorde. Lord Alastair Ker's squadron, which was leading, rode right
through the 1st Life Guards trenches, and, turning to the right at the
top of the ridge, dismounted and opened fire. Their squadron
immediately came under a heavy fire and its casualties were
considerable. In the meanwhile the other two squadrons of the Blues
(Captain Brassey's and Captain Harrison's), dismounted behind the Life
Guards, and advanced to the top of the ridge on foot, supporting the
fire of the leading squadron. The demonstration was kept up till
darkness fell, when the regiment, having carried out its orders with
complete success, retired to a chateau between Klein Zillebeke and
Hollebeke, where it billeted for the night. Lord Alastair Ker and
Trooper Nevin were both decorated for their gallantry on this occasion.

The continuation of the Zandvoorde trenches further south was still in
the occupation of the 10th Hussars. These were heavily shelled all
through the day, and the casualties among their officers continued to
be on a high scale, Sir F. Rose and Lieut. Turnor being killed, and
Major Crichton wounded.




THE LAST OF KRUISEIK


The next two days were days of comparative calm--the lull before the
desperate storm which was preparing to break upon the British force.
On the morning of the 27th, the 6th Brigade, on the left of our line,
which had so successfully pushed forward its position on the 24th,
made a still further advance, the 1st K.R.R. on this occasion being
the left-hand battalion, with the 1st S. Staffords on its right. The
1st Berks and the King's Regiment were in support. The movement was
again a complete success, the brigade advancing as far as the
Paschendael--Becelaere road and occupying the crest of the ridge along
which this road runs. Here the K.R.R. came under a very heavy
shell-fire, and Prince Maurice of Battenberg and Captain Wells were
killed, Captain Willis, Captain Llewellyn and 2nd Lieuts. Hone and
Sweeting being wounded at the same time. The ground gained was,
however, successfully held for the time being. The effect of this
advance was to give a slightly concave formation to the eastern face
of the Ypres salient, the two extremities now projecting beyond the
centre trenches in the Polygon wood. This curious formation, however,
was very temporary, both of the horns so formed having shortly to
withdraw. The withdrawal of the southern horn was begun on the night
of the 26th, during the events already narrated. We may now consider
the subsequent events which led to its complete disappearance.

In the very small hours of the same morning on which the 6th Brigade
advanced--before daylight, in fact--the 1st Scots Guards marched down
the Menin road to resume its place in the 1st Brigade. At Gheluvelt the
battalion deployed to the north of the road, and at once came under the
blind shell-fire which ceased not night or day in this particular area.
Captain Hamilton and Captain Balfour were killed, and Lieuts. Wickham
and Roberts wounded. The battalion, however, worked its way up to its
position on the left of the 1st Coldstream, and there awaited events.
How dramatic those events were destined to prove was little suspected
at the time.

A few hours later the 20th Brigade, returning from its one night's rest
in the outskirts of Ypres, followed them down the same road, and filed
into the shelter-trenches south of the road. Here they stayed till 5
p.m. on the 28th, when they continued their march down the high road
through Gheluvelt, and took over the trenches just west and south of
the Kruiseik cross-roads.

Here for the moment we may leave them in order to take a glance at the
general situation.

The day which followed, that is to say October 29th, was the first of
the five days during which the Kaiser was present in person with his
troops opposite Ypres. He had arrived with the avowed intention of
stimulating the army to one supreme, irresistible effort which would
carry all before it, and open the coveted road to Calais to the mass of
troops now concentrated at Roulers and Menin.

The occasion was signalized on the morning of the 29th by a grand
assault along and on each side of the Menin road. This broad highroad
was the most direct and obvious route to Ypres, and the Germans--as
their way is--went straight for the shortest cut. There was no secret
about the enterprise; it was, in fact, known among all ranks of the
British Army, and even published in some of the general orders of the
evening before, that the XXVII. German Reserve Corps would attack
Kruiseik and Zandvoorde at 5.30 a.m. on the 29th.

In the light of this general knowledge, subsequent events are not
wholly easy to understand. The attack came at the very hour which had
been announced, and--as far as Kruiseik was concerned--at the very
spot. Zandvoorde, as a matter of fact, was not implicated, and so can
be left out of the discussion.

At Kruiseik our line of defence was just in rear of the cross-roads,
about a quarter of a mile nearer Ypres than it had been on the 26th.
The six regiments in the front line which came in the path of the
attack were the 1st Grenadiers, 2nd Gordons and 2nd Scots Fusiliers
south of the road, and the Black Watch, 1st Coldstream and 1st Scots
Guards to the north of it. In reserve were the 2nd Scots Guards and the
Border Regiment, the latter being in Gheluvelt, the former to the south
of it.

At 5.30 then, with true military punctuality, the Germans made their
advance under cover of a thick fog, and, as subsequent events proved,
succeeded in getting past and behind our first line without opposition.
It is said that they marched in column of fours straight down the main
Menin road, which, for some reason only known to staff officers, does
not appear to have been in the charge of any of the first line troops.

However that may be, the fact remains that the Germans did get past,
without a shot being fired from either side, and established their
machine-guns in the houses along the roadside in rear; with the result
that the regiments next the road suddenly found themselves, without any
warning, assailed by a murderous machine-gun fire from both rear and
flank. To add to the unpleasantness of the situation, they were at the
same time vigorously shelled by our own artillery. Under this combined
attack the 1st Grenadiers next the road on the south side suffered very
severely. Colonel Earle was wounded almost at the first discharge, and
Major Stucley, who then took over command, was killed within a short
interval. Owing to the thickness of the fog it was a matter of great
difficulty to locate the enemy with any degree of accuracy, or to
return a fire which appeared to come from the direction of our own
reserves. Captain Rasch, who was now in command, accordingly decided to
withdraw the battalion into the woods to the south, leaving the enemy
to continue their fusilade at the empty trenches. With them went the
left flank company of the Gordons, under Captain Burnett. "C" Company
of the Gordons, which was on the right of Captain Burnett's company,
was comparatively clear of the fire from the rear, and did not withdraw
with the others. The subsequent exploits of this company were most
remarkable, and will be described later on.

The fog now suddenly lifted, the sun came through, and the situation
became comparatively clear to both sides. The Germans ceased their
fusilade from behind at the empty trenches, and began to press
southwards from the road, and westward from the direction of Menin, in
great numbers. To meet this new movement, the 1st Grenadiers and
Captain Burnett's company of the Gordons formed up and charged, driving
the enemy back to the road in considerable disorder. In the moment of
victory, however, they were heavily enfiladed from the trenches
recently occupied by Captain Burnett's company, and numbers fell. They
were again forced to withdraw to the south, the enemy following close
on their heels. Once more the Grenadiers and Gordons reformed, and once
more they drove the enemy back to the road, only to be themselves again
driven back by weight of numbers. It was at this moment that Lieut.
Brooke, of the Gordon Highlanders, who had been sent from the right
flank with a message, arrived on the scene and--seeing the overwhelming
superiority in numbers of the enemy--hurriedly collected a handful of
men from the rear (servants, cooks, orderlies, etc.), and led them
forward in a gallant attempt to do something towards equalizing
numbers. He and nearly all his men were killed, but he was subsequently
awarded the Victoria Cross for his action.

In the meanwhile the Grenadiers were fighting to a finish. Refusing to
be beaten or to give way, they fought up to the moment when the order
arrived for them to retire to Gheluvelt. This was about 10 a.m. By that
time 500 out of the 650 men who had gone into action had fallen, and
out of the sixteen officers only four were left. No. 4 Company--the
heroes of the successful charge on the 24th--alone lost 200 men, or, in
other words, were wiped out.

Of the officers, Major Stucley, Captain Rennie, Lord R. Wellesley, the
Hon. W. Forester and the Hon. A. Douglas-Pennant were killed, in
addition to which Col. Earle, the Hon. C. Ponsonby, Lieuts. Lambert,
Kenyon-Slaney and Powell were wounded. Lieut. Butt, the medical officer
attached, was killed while dressing Col. Earle's wounds. The casualties
of the Gordons were between two and three hundred.

While this had been going on south of the road, an almost identical
state of things prevailed on the north side where were stationed the
Black Watch and 1st Coldstream. These two battalions similarly found
themselves, without any warning, mowed down in the fog by machine-gun
fire from their rear and right flank. Gradually they too were forced
back, fighting every yard of the way, but powerless to stem the masses
of the enemy opposed to them. Both these battalions were practically
annihilated. The 1st Coldstream battalion, in fact, may be said to
have ceased to exist, for the time being, after this day. The remnant
was shortly afterwards absorbed into the 2nd and 3rd Battalions. That
remnant consisted of 180 rank and file; _no officers_ and no senior
N.C.O.

The right flank company of the 1st Scots Guards shared the fate of the
two battalions on its right. It became isolated, was surrounded by
masses of the enemy, and ceased to exist.

At 11 a.m. the 2nd Scots Fusiliers, who had been on the right of the
Gordons, and just outside of the pressure of the first attack, had in
their turn to fall back, Col. Uniacke with two companies of the Gordons
going forward again to aid them in their retirement.

About noon things were looking pretty serious; the Germans were
pressing on towards Gheluvelt in great numbers, both on the main road
itself and to the north and south of it, and it seemed doubtful whether
their impetus could be checked.

At this critical moment, a succession of incidents, small in
themselves, but powerful as a combination, brought about a marked
change in the fortunes of the day. It has already been mentioned that
"C" Company of the Gordons, under Captain R. S. Gordon, had remained
throughout the morning in its original trenches, the order to retire
not having reached it. Curiously enough, another small detachment to
its right was in a very similar position. This detachment consisted of
a platoon of the 2nd Queen's, and about a hundred men of other units,
under the command of Major Bottomley of the Queen's. The party had been
sent forward to reinforce the 20th Brigade, and, at the time of the
retirement, was in some dug-outs in a very advanced position on the
high ground near Kruiseik. As in the case of "C" Company of the
Gordons, the order to retire did not reach them, and they were left.
Here then were two distinct and quite independent detachments,
completely isolated, and cut off by a good half mile from the rest of
the brigade. It seemed as though their destruction was a foregone
conclusion. In the event, however, not only were they not destroyed,
but they were able, from their unsuspected positions, to work very
considerable havoc in the ranks of the enemy. It so happened that Major
Bottomley's party contained an unusual number of marksmen, including
Lieut. Wilson of the 2nd Queen's. These--quite regardless of their own
perilous position, or of the fire which they were sure to draw upon
themselves by their action--now laid themselves out to take advantage
of their advanced position to pick off the Germans to right and left.
The very audacity of the proceeding proved their saving, the enemy
finding it very hard to properly locate a fire which seemed to come
from their very midst. There was, however, some retaliation, and Lieut.
Wilson was eventually shot through the head and killed.

It cannot well be claimed that sniping such as this--however
effective--had any appreciable influence on the tide of battle, but
this claim can be justly made in the case of "C" Company of the 2nd
Gordons. This company's presence was equally unsuspected by the enemy,
and, soon after midday, a German battalion proceeded to mass in close
column within 300 yards of its position. Such a target was of course
unmissable, and within five minutes the German battalion was
annihilated, 850 dead and wounded being afterwards found on the spot
where it had concentrated.

It is satisfactory to be able to record that both these gallant
detachments successfully withdrew. Captain Gordon remained in his
position till dusk, when, by exercising great care, he succeeded in
rejoining his battalion. Major Bottomley actually remained in his
position till the night of the following day, _i.e._, the 30th,
when he succeeded in safely extricating his party from their perilous
position--a truly astonishing performance in view of the fact that the
Germans were not only round him, but were in actual occupation of the
trenches to right and left.

While this was taking place south of the road, the 1st Scots Guards,
north of the road, were gradually bringing about a change in the aspect
of the fight. It will be remembered that the two battalions between
them and the road, viz., the Black Watch and 1st Coldstream, had been
engulfed and overwhelmed in the German advance, a fate which had also
overtaken Captain de la Pasture's company of the 1st Scots Guards,
which was on the right of that battalion. In this crisis--for it was
undoubtedly an extremely critical moment--Captain Stephen, with a quick
grasp of the situation, brought up the reserve company of the Scots
Guards, together with some stragglers from the 1st Coldstream who had
escaped the carnage on the right. Facing his command half right, he
proceeded to pour volley after volley into the flank of the Germans
pressing forward between him and the road. Some of the Germans turned
to face this new attack, but the Guardsmen, fighting with superb
courage, held them off throughout the afternoon. During this memorable
performance on the part of Captain Stephen's company, the company
commander himself and Sir G. Ogilvy were killed, and the Hon. G.
Macdonald and Sir V. Mackenzie wounded. The 1st Scots Guards had now
lost 10 officers and 370 men since they had marched down the Menin road
two days before.[9] The battalion received great praise in high
quarters for the part it had played at this critical moment in the
fortunes of the day, and there can be little doubt that the tremendous
losses they had inflicted on the enemy had appreciably checked the
German advance.

        [9] Up to the end of January, 1915, the total casualties in the
        two battalions Scots Guards amounted to 2,888 of all ranks.

Captain Gordon's attack had taken the enemy on the left flank, and
Captain Stephen's on the right flank. They were yet to meet a still
more severe check from in front. In partial reserve on the hill on
which Gheluvelt stands, were detachments of the 2nd Gordon Highlanders,
2nd Scots Guards, 2nd Queen's, S. Wales Borderers and the Border
Regiment. It was about midday when the Germans, having forced their way
as described through the regiments next the Menin road, began pushing
forward towards Gheluvelt, the main body marching in column of fours
along the road from Gheluvelt itself, where the main road passes
through the village, the head of the advancing column was out of sight,
owing to a bend in the road at the foot of the hill. Captain Watson,
however, who was in charge of the machine-gun section of the Border
Regiment, managed to get a couple of maxims through a ploughed field
into some turnips on the north <DW72> of the hill. From here there was a
clear view of the road stretching away to Kruiseik, with the head of
the German column about 1,200 yards distant. On to this column both
machine-guns were now trained. The position was ideal for working
execution on the enemy, but it was in no way entrenched, and fully
exposed to the enemy's fire. The head of the enemy's column was soon
knocked to pieces, and, on the other hand, one of the Border Regiment
machine-guns was knocked out, but the other kept going till all the
ammunition was expended. In the meanwhile the German infantry advancing
south of the road had become visible to the several detachments
afore-mentioned, of whom Major Craufurd of the Gordons had assumed
temporary command, and these now opened a galling fire on the advancing
ranks, which they succeeded in throwing into considerable confusion.

This moment proved the turning-point in the day's battle. The frontal
fire from the Border Regiment's machine-guns and the above-named
detachments, coupled with the enfilading fire from the 1st Scots Guards
to the north of the road, brought the advancing force to a standstill,
which--when the reserves from Gheluvelt were advanced--quickly
developed into a retreat. The Germans fell back to Kruiseik, which they
occupied, and which from this date on remained in their hands. The 3rd
Brigade was brought forward to occupy the place of the Black Watch and
1st Coldstream north of the road, the 1st Scots Guards and the Camerons
retaining their original morning position.

This battle of the Kruiseik cross-roads had cost us very dear, some of
the finest battalions in the British Army being practically
annihilated, but there can be no question but that the losses of the
attacking forces were incomparably greater. It must be borne in mind
that the British forces which actually took part in this fight numbered
at the outside 5,000, while the attacking force consisted of an entire
Army Corps, that is to say, approximately, 24,000 infantry.

It may be interesting at this point, at the risk of forestalling
matters a little, to explain the gradual process of retirement by which
our line was straightened, and the bulge eliminated from our defensive
position. It is less easy to explain why the process was so gradual. We
may take our furthest advance east to have been on the 19th. On that
date the 22nd Brigade pushed forward as far as the Roulers-Menin
railway. There, however, they encountered very strong opposition, and
withdrew to Zonnebeke--a distance of six miles--on the same day. The
20th Brigade, however, did not take part in this retirement, and
entrenched themselves at the point to which they had advanced, east of
Kruiseik.

On the 24th the 6th Brigade made a second advance south of the
Zonnebeke road; and on the following day the Guards' Brigade fought its
way up into line on the right of the 6th Brigade, while the 5th and 1st
Brigades filled the gap between the Guards' Brigade and the 20th
Brigade at Kruiseik. These several advances resulted in a line of
defence which jutted out from Zonnebeke to Reutel, and then--after
passing east of Kruiseik and Zandvoorde--fell back quite suddenly, and
in an all but straight line, to Klein Zillebeke. Klein Zillebeke, and
Zonnebeke, then, were the starting-points to north and south of the
bulge, and it is significant that these two points have never been
lost; nor has our ultimate middle-of-November line, which ran along the
high ridge connecting these two places, ever been forced. But till this
obvious line of defence was reached, we lost ground on each occasion
that the enemy attacked in force.

On the 26th we were driven back from east of Kruiseik to a position
west of Kruiseik; on the 29th we lost Kruiseik and were driven back to
Gheluvelt; on the 30th we lost Zandvoorde; and on the 31st we lost
Gheluvelt, and were driven back to a new position nearer Veldhoek. On
November 2nd we were driven from this position, and our line was
retired another 300 yards towards Hooge. Here it remained till November
11th, when the Prussian Guard captured this position, but was unable to
drive us from the Veldhoek ridge. This ridge has, from that date to the
present moment, proved the _ne plus ultra_ of German advance, and
it is fairly safe to predict that it will so remain to the end, unless
voluntarily relinquished for sanitary or strategic reasons. This in
itself is a cause for congratulation and even triumph, but not so is
the thought of the many good men who laid down their lives between
Kruiseik and Veldhoek in the defence of the indefensible.

In reckoning up these successive retirements from the point of view of
military failure or success, or from the, perhaps, more interesting
point of view of the relative fighting merits of those who retired and
those who advanced, it is well to realize, from the start, the
tremendous disparity in numbers and freshness of the opposing forces.
The British commanders had, throughout this defence of Ypres, to ring
the changes, as between reserve and firing line, with battalions, and
sometimes even with companies. The German commanders could afford to do
it with Army Corps.

Day after day, the same British battalions, jaded, depleted of
officers, and gradually dwindling into mere skeletons, were called upon
to withstand the attacks of fresh and fresh troops. It was not merely
that the Germans had the superiority in numbers on each occasion when
they attacked. This, of course, must always be the privilege of the
attacking side; but they had also the unspeakable advantage of being
able at any time to direct a stream of fresh troops against any given
part of our thin, weary, battered line. Thus on October 29th the XXVII.
Reserve Corps attacked Kruiseik; on the 30th the XV. Army Corps
attacked Zandvoorde; on October 31st and November 1st we had the XIII.,
XXIV., and II. Bavarian Corps attacking the line from the Menin road to
Messines, to which on November 2nd must be added the XXVI. Army Corps.
By this time, however, the 16th French Army had come up, and did
something towards equalizing matters.

But again on November 11th, fifteen fresh battalions of the Prussian
Guard were brought up, and all that Sir Douglas Haig had to put in
their path were the remnants of the same unconquerable battalions that
had now been fighting, without intermission, for close on three months.




ZANDVOORDE


Following the loss of Kruiseik on the 29th came the loss of Zandvoorde
on the 30th. The particular section in the line of defence known as the
Zandvoorde trenches had from first to last been a death-trap, and had
proved particularly expensive to the 3rd Cavalry Division, whose
special privilege it had been to defend them. They curved round the
south-east side of the village, following the contours of the ridge,
and, being the most prominent feature in the entire Ypres salient, were
particularly susceptible to shell-fire from all quarters, except the
north. Their chief attraction, from the purely military point of view,
lay in the fact that they were on the crest of a ridge some 120 feet
high, which here juts out into the plain, and which faces the ridge of
about the same height a mile and a quarter away, on which Kruiseik
stands. Their weakness lay in the fact that they were practically
surrounded by the enemy, and were even open to attack from the
direction of Hollebeke, which lay due west of their southern extension.
In these circumstances their loss on the 30th was not wholly a matter
for regret.

At the moment of the final attack, the 7th C.B. (Household Cavalry) had
already been in these trenches for three days and nights, under a
ceaseless shell-fire from south and east, and occasionally even from
west. In the case of the machine-gun section of the Blues, under Lord
Worsley, that period was doubled, the detachment having been in the
advance trenches for six days and nights unrelieved.

There is reason to believe that the supreme attack on Zandvoorde
had originally been planned for the 29th, so as to take place
simultaneously with that on Kruiseik, but a delay in the arrival of the
XV. German Army Corps resulted in its postponement till the following
day. The expected reinforcements arrived during the night of the 29th
and--all being now according to arrangement--the attack took place at
daybreak on the following morning.

The attack took the form of a storm of shrapnel and high-explosives of
so terrific a nature that by nine o'clock the Household Cavalry
trenches had been literally blown to pieces, and the brigade was
forced to retire slowly down the hill, keeping up a covering fire as
it went. The retirement was effected in good order, but Lord Hugh
Grosvenor's squadron of the 1st Life Guards, "C" Squadron of the 2nd
Life Guards, and Lord Worsley's machine-gun section of the Blues did
not succeed in withdrawing with the rest of the brigade, and their
fate is still a matter of uncertainty. It is probable, however, that,
in the pandemonium which was reigning, the order to retire did not
reach them, and that those who survived the bombardment awaited the
infantry attack which followed, and fought it out to an absolute
finish. An officer in the R. Welsh Fusiliers' trenches, on the left of
the Zandvoorde trenches, subsequently described the defence put up
that day by the Household Cavalry as one of the finest feats of the
war. It may well be that untold deeds of heroism remain yet to be
recorded in connection with that morning's work.[10]

        [10] Among those missing on that morning was the Hon. Francis
        Lambton. He was subsequently reported to have been killed.

The R. Welsh Fusiliers were on the right of the 22nd Brigade and on the
left of the Household Cavalry, in trenches which curved back from the
Zandvoorde trenches and faced in the main north-west, whereas the
Zandvoorde trenches faced south-east. These trenches were at the best
ill-constructed affairs, and were weakened in the middle by a big gap
where the road from Zandvoorde to Becelaere passed through them.

The Zandvoorde trenches passed into the hands of the enemy soon after
nine, and the Germans at once swarmed into them and began making their
way along towards the north, till they reached a position from which
they could get the Welsh Fusiliers in flank. Then began the
annihilation of this very gallant regiment. From the moment that the
Zandvoorde trenches went, its position was hopeless, its right flank
being completely unprotected, and its own trenches disconnected and
ill-adapted for mutual protection. The regiment, however, fought as it
had fought on the 19th and again on the 20th and 21st. It fought, in
the words of the C. in C., "till every officer had been killed or
wounded; only ninety men rejoined the brigade." As a matter of fact,
the exact number of survivors out of a battalion which a fortnight
earlier had numbered 1,100 was 86, and these were shortly afterwards
absorbed into the 2nd Queen's, their only remaining officer being the
Quartermaster.

Among those that fell on that day were Captain Barker, Col. Cadogan and
his Adjutant, Lieut. Dooner. The latter was killed in a very gallant
attempt to cross the interval which divided the trenches, and
investigate the state of affairs on the right; and the Colonel fell in
an equally gallant attempt to rescue his subordinate after he had
fallen.

The position was now--as may be supposed--extremely serious, the enemy
being in complete possession of the Zandvoorde ridge. The 7th C.B.
(Household Cavalry), when it had fallen back in the morning, had
retired through the 6th C.B. and formed up in rear.

Its retreat had been greatly assisted by the magnificent work of the
two Horse Artillery Batteries attached, viz., "C" Battery, under Major
White, and "K" Battery, under Major Lamont. Both displayed the greatest
daring and activity, and the latter succeeded in completely knocking
out a German battery which was just coming into action on the
Zandvoorde ridge.

In the meanwhile, the only force which stood in the way of the enemy
was the 6th C.B., that is to say, three cavalry regiments, all
considerably weakened by fighting. The gravity of the situation lay in
the fact that if the Klein Zillebeke position went, there was nothing
further to prevent the enemy marching straight into Ypres, only three
miles distant, in which case the 1st A.C. and 7th Division would have
been irretrievably cut off from their base and supplies, and the
capture or annihilation of these three divisions would have inevitably
followed.

Accordingly Sir Douglas Haig, quick to realize that the events of the
next few hours would decide the making or marring of the campaign, sent
out an ultimatum to the effect that the line to which we had now been
driven, _i.e._, from Gheluvelt to the corner of the canal north of
Hollebeke, was to be held at all costs. Concurrently an urgent appeal
was sent to General Allenby to send up with all possible speed any and
all regiments available. Allenby sent the Scots Greys and the 3rd and
4th Hussars--all from different brigades. The Greys and the 3rd
Hussars arrived first on the scene, and passed across to the left flank
of the 6th C.B., filling up, in fact, the gap between that brigade and
General Bulfin's (2nd) Brigade on its left. The 4th Hussars, who had
further to come, arrived in time to take up a position on the right of
the Royals (who were the right-hand regiment of the 6th C.B.), and
carry on the line of defence beyond the railway. The position then was
that the line of the three regiments of the 6th C.B. was extended by
the 3rd Hussars and Greys on the left, and by the 4th Hussars on the
right.

The 7th C.B., who had concentrated at the little village of Zwartelen
in rear of the 6th C.B., now sent off two squadrons of the Blues to
support the Royals, who were holding the chateau at Hollebeke. This
chateau lies on the low ground to the east of the canal, whereas
Hollebeke itself is on the west side. The chateau was considerably in
advance of the line which was ordered to be held, and with Zandvoorde
gone was of no strategic importance. This combined force held off the
enemy for some hours, during which time Sergt. McLellan, of the Royals,
especially distinguished himself by several acts of great gallantry,
but by midday the chateau had to be abandoned and was occupied by
German infantry. Except for this loss, the cavalry line held its ground
throughout the day. There was no further infantry attack, but it had to
stand a severe shelling all through the afternoon, and its casualties
were numerous, among those of the 10th Hussars being Captain Kinkead,
Captain Fielden, Captain Stewart and the Hon. H. Baring.

The R. Sussex, too, in General Bulfin's 2nd Brigade, on the left of the
cavalry, came in for their full share of the bombardment and suffered
very severely, Col. Crispin and Lieuts. Croft, Marillier and Lousada
being killed.

At five o'clock in the afternoon the five cavalry regiments were
relieved by Lord Cavan's Brigade, the 2nd Grenadier Guards under Major
Lord Bernard Lennox[11] taking over the position on the canal--later on
to become famous under the name of Hill 60, while the Irish Guards
continued the line on their left. The line was still further
strengthened on the following morning by the addition of the
Oxfordshire Light Infantry from the 5th Brigade, and the 2nd Gordon
Highlanders from the 20th Brigade, these two battalions being added to
General Bulfin's command, which was on the left of Lord Cavan's.

        [11] Killed November, 1914.




GHELUVELT


October 31st may be said to have witnessed the supreme effort of the
enemy to break through to Ypres. The attack on this day was pressed
simultaneously along the whole of our front from Messines to the Menin
road, and lasted not only throughout the day but during the greater
part of the night. This tremendous battle, covering as it did a
frontage of twelve miles, can only be adequately described by cutting
it up into three sections, the first of which deals with the fight
along the Menin road, the second with the struggle at Klein Zillebeke,
and the third with the attack on the cavalry corps at Wytschate and
Messines.

We will deal first with the fight on the Menin road. Here, it will be
remembered, our troops had been forced back on the 29th from a line
just west of Kruiseik cross-roads to the Gheluvelt trenches,
three-quarters of a mile further back, and on the higher ridge on which
that village stands.

On the morning of the 31st the new position was in its turn attacked,
and under conditions which in many ways recalled the fight of two days
before. There was, however, this difference, that, while the attack of
the 29th had been in the nature of a surprise in the fog, and had been
unheralded by any previous cannonade, that of the 31st was preceded by
a bombardment which, in point of violence, threw into the shade
everything which the campaign had yet witnessed. The expenditure of
ammunition must have been colossal. This terrific discharge of missiles
commenced at daybreak, and gradually increased in volume up to eleven
o'clock, when it ceased and the infantry attack commenced.

The shell-fire had been mainly focussed on the 3rd and 22nd Brigades in
the neighbourhood of Gheluvelt. By the association of these two
Brigades, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the Queen's (R. West Surrey
Regiment) for the first time in history found themselves fighting side
by side. The occasion was an historic one, but not without a strong
note of tragedy, both battalions being in the direct track of the
bombardment, and suffering very severely. Each battalion, too, lost its
C.O. during the morning, Col. Pell of the 1st Battalion being killed
and Col. Coles of the 2nd Battalion wounded.

The tactics of the enemy in these Menin road attacks almost always
took the same form. All the batteries within the area would
concentrate on the road and on the trenches immediately to right and
left of the road, making these positions absolutely untenable. Then,
when the troops in the track of the shell-fire had fallen back dazed
into semi-unconsciousness by the inferno, they would drive a dense
mass of infantry into the gap, and so enfilade--and very often
surround--the trenches which were still occupied to right and left of
the gap. By this method, companies, and sometimes whole battalions,
which had stuck out the shell-fire, were overwhelmed and annihilated.

Such a fate on this occasion overtook the right flank company of the
South Wales Borderers just north of Gheluvelt. This company formed the
northern boundary of the gap caused by the bombardment, and the German
wedge, spreading out towards the right, bore down on it from three
sides. Major Lawrence, in command of the company, faced half the men
about and kept up the fight to the bitter end, but it was merely a
question of selling their lives as dearly as possible. The tide swept
over them and they ceased to exist.

The remaining companies of the South Wales Borderers managed to
maintain their ground till the line north of the road was
re-established in the following way.

At 1.30 the 2nd Worcestershire Regiment, who were in reserve at the six
cross-roads at the corner of the Polygon wood, a mile to the rear, were
ordered to retake the lost position. This they did in the following
very gallant manner, led by Major Hankey. They deployed in the woods
just to the rear of Gheluvelt, and, advancing in a series of short
rushes, charged right up to the line of the lost trenches. The last
rush had to be made across 200 yards of open ground in the face of a
terrific shrapnel fire. Over 100 of the Worcesters fell in this last
rush, but the remainder charged home and drove out the Germans with
heavy loss. The old trenches were found to have been filled in, but a
sunken road just in rear provided fair cover, and this the Worcesters
now lined, joining up their left with the right of the South Wales
Borderers. The Germans, however, were still in the village itself and
the position was at best a precarious one. They managed, however, to
hold on till dark.

The Worcesters lost 187 men in this short, brilliant charge. The
achievement was alluded to by the C. in C. as one of the finest in the
whole campaign, and one which saved the army from a very awkward
predicament.

The 1st Scots Guards, on the left of the South Wales Borderers again,
as on the 29th, stood firm throughout the day, and contributed in no
small measure to the ultimate repulse of the enemy. In the afternoon
one company of this battalion was detached to co-operate in the
counter-attack made by the Worcesters, and generally to re-establish
the broken line north of Gheluvelt. This they succeeded in doing, with
very able support from the 42nd Battery R.F.A., but in the doing of it
lost Captain Wickham and Major Vandeweyer, the former of whom was
killed.

Meanwhile another historic resistance was being put up south of the
road by the 2nd R. Scots Fusiliers. This battalion formed the southern
boundary of the gap, just as the South Wales Borderers formed the
northern boundary; and when the German infantry wedge was forced in, it
found its trenches very badly raked from the gardens of the chateau,
where the enemy had installed some machine-guns. General Watt, the
Brigadier, recognizing that the position of this regiment had now
become untenable, telephoned through to them to retire. The wire,
however, had been cut by shrapnel and the message did not arrive. Two
orderlies were thereupon successively dispatched to order their
retirement. Both were knocked over and again the order did not reach.
In the meanwhile, Col. Baird Smith, having received no order to retire,
continued to hold his ground with ever dwindling numbers, till in the
end the German masses swept over them, and another gallant British
battalion ceased to exist. Only seventy men, commanded by a junior
officer, escaped the carnage of that day.

Five months later, General Watt, addressing the officers and men at
Sailly, after another great performance by the same battalion, said
with reference to this occasion: "Col. Baird Smith, gallant soldier
that he was, decided and rightly to hold his ground, and the R. Scots
Fusiliers fought and fought till the Germans absolutely surrounded them
and swarmed into the trenches. I think it was perfectly splendid. Mind
you, it was no case of 'hands up' or any nonsense of that sort; it was
a fight to a finish. You may well be proud to belong to such a regiment
and I am proud to have you in my brigade."

To the south of the R. Scots Fusiliers, and in the same brigade, were
the 2nd Bedfords. This regiment, too, had suffered very severely during
the day, both its senior officers, Major Traill and Major Stares, being
killed, but the brigade order to retire had not failed to reach it, as
in the case of the Scotchmen, and it had been able to effect its
withdrawal in good order.

The Germans did not carry their advance beyond Gheluvelt. The ground
they had gained had only been won by a prodigious expenditure of
ammunition, followed by a reckless sacrifice of men, and their losses
had been enormous. Their further progress, too, was barred by the
troops which had been shelled out of the village in the morning. These
were now formed up half facing the road between Gheluvelt and Veldhoek,
and offered a successful bar to any further advance on the part of the
enemy. The Germans, however, did not relinquish their attempts to push
on to Veldhoek without further serious fighting, in the course of which
the 2nd Queen's sustained still further losses, their three senior
officers, Col. Coles, Major Croft and Major Bottomley falling wounded,
as well as Captain Weeding and Lieut. Philpot. Night fell without any
further advance on the part of the enemy. Gheluvelt itself, however, in
spite of the gallant counter-attack north of the road, during the
afternoon, may be considered as having been lost from this day on.




MESSINES AND WYTSCHATE


In order to avoid the confusion inseparable from a constant change of
scene, it will be best to deal briefly now with the doings at Messines
and Wytschate, after which the Klein Zillebeke section can monopolize
our attention up to the close of this little chronicle. In order to
pick up the thread where it was dropped, it will be necessary to go
back to the 30th. On that day General Allenby wired to Head Quarters
that his numbers were too weak to hold his position from the canal at
Hollebeke to the La Doune stream, south of Messines, for long unaided,
and the C. in C. at once responded by sending up four battalions from
the 2nd A.C. under General Shaw to his assistance. These, as will
presently be seen, arrived in the very nick of time to save the
situation. Pending their arrival, the cavalry had a truly colossal task
before them. They were absurdly outnumbered; they had opposed to them,
in the XXIV. and II. Bavarian Corps, some of the finest fighters in the
German Army, stimulated by the presence of the Kaiser himself, and they
were engaged in a form of warfare to which they had never been trained.
French reinforcements were being hurried up, it is true, but it was
reckoned that, at the earliest, they could not arrive in less than
forty-eight hours. During these forty-eight hours, could the cavalry,
with the assistance which had been sent up from the 2nd A.C.,
successfully oppose the pressure of two army corps? This was the
problem of the moment. We know now that it did succeed in doing so, but
even with this fact behind us as a matter of history, we may still--in
view of the extraordinary disparity in numbers--wonder as to how it was
done.

First let us deal with Messines, which was almost on the southern
boundary of the Cavalry Corps position. Here we find posted the 1st and
2nd C.B., or, to be more exact, these two brigades were in the trenches
to the east of that town, the Bays being on the north side, then the
9th Lancers and 4th Dragoon Guards, with the 5th Dragoon Guards to the
south. In reserve, in the second line, were the 18th and 11th Hussars.
The latter regiment had suffered severely from the bombardment on the
previous day, their trenches being completely blown in and many men
buried and killed. Amongst the officers, Lieuts. Chaytor and
Lawson-Smith had been killed, and Lieut.-Col. Pitman, Major Anderson
and the Hon. C. Mulholland wounded. Again, on the following day, the
regiment lost a very fine athlete, and a champion boxer, in Captain
Halliday, who was killed by a shell near the Convent.

In spite of an appalling bombardment, the regiments in the front line
held on all through the night of the 30th, and up to midday on the
31st. Then they began to be gradually driven back, and by 2 p.m. they
were all in the town. The retirement was effected in perfect order.
Corpl. Seaton, 9th Lancers, behaved with extraordinary courage during
this movement and was recommended for the Victoria Cross. With the idea
of helping the withdrawal of his regiment, he remained absolutely alone
in his trench working his machine-gun till the enemy were within twenty
yards. Incredible as it may appear, he then managed, thanks to great
coolness and presence of mind, to rejoin his regiment unwounded.

Once in the town, the cavalry lined the houses of the main street from
end to end, and there awaited developments. These took the form of a
cessation of the shelling and a very determined attempt on the part of
the Bavarians to take the town. They failed, however, to get across the
square, being shot down in numbers from the windows of the houses
opposite. A second and more carefully thought-out attack followed
later, and it is doubtful how this might have ended but for the
opportune arrival of the K.O.S.B. and the K.O.Y.L.I., one at each end
of the town. This reinforcement once more turned the scale against the
Bavarians, and for the second time they were driven back. Both the
infantry battalions engaged, in the words of General Allenby to Sir
Horace, "fought magnificently," but the K.O.Y.L.I. lost its CO., Col.
King, who was killed while leading that regiment to the attack. The
respite of the cavalry was short. The enemy was in over-powering force
and they were not to be denied. They now proceeded for five solid hours
to shell the place with every conceivable species of projectile known
to warfare. At 2 a.m. on the 31st the infantry attacked for the third
time.

In the meanwhile the only available reserve was being hurried up from
Neuve Eglise, as fast as motor-buses could bring it. This was the
London Scottish, which had arrived at the front the day previous, after
having been employed for some weeks at the base. They reached Messines
during the preliminary bombardment on the night of the 30th, and,
before going into action, were split up, half of the battalion joining
up with the K.O.S.B. at one end of the town, and the rest with the
K.O.Y.L.I. at the other. There was a full moon and a clear sky, and it
was as light as day, and it has been said that for picturesque effect
no incident in the war has equalled that night attack on Messines. An
additional interest was lent to the scene by the fact that the London
Scottish were the first Territorial battalion to be in action, and
there was some speculation as to how their conduct would compare with
that of the Regulars. It is now a matter of history that they acquitted
themselves as well as the most tried troops, and that under
exceptionally trying circumstances. If it be true that casualties in
killed and wounded are the barometer of a regiment's intrepidity, then
they indeed register high in the scale, for they lost 9 officers and
400 men in that first night's fighting. In any event they rendered very
valuable service in an acute emergency, and it is on record that in a
hand to hand bayonet encounter with the Bavarians, they actually drove
those noted warriors back. The odds, however, were altogether too great
against the little British force, and on the morning of November 1st
Messines passed into the hands of the enemy.

A feat so remarkable as to rival the deeds of Shaw, the Lifeguardsman,
was performed by Sergt.-Major Wright, of the Carabineers, during this
defence of Messines. This N.C.O., while carrying a message to Head
Quarters, found his path blocked by a part of the enemy. Without a
moment's hesitation he charged them and cut his way through, killing
five. Another Carabineer who behaved with repeated gallantry during
these operations was Pte. Meston, and both he and Sergt.-Major Wright
were given the D.C.M.

On the same night, _i.e._, the night of October 31st, Wytschate
shared the fate of Messines.

The 4th C.B. had succeeded in holding this place throughout the day,
but during the course of the night they found themselves very hard
pressed, and were gradually forced back. In this emergency the
Northumberland Fusiliers and Lincolns were ordered up to the support of
the cavalry.

These two 9th Brigade battalions had arrived at Kemmel during the
afternoon, having marched that day from Estaires, a distance of some
twelve miles. They were in billets, resting after their hard day's
work, when the message arrived, about one o'clock in the morning, to
the effect that they were required. Within an hour from the receipt of
the message both battalions were on the road, the Lincolns being the
first to arrive on the scene of action. The country was totally unknown
to the newcomers, but a cavalry sergeant was met who volunteered to
lead them to the position occupied by the enemy. Under his guidance
they entered the cutting through which the light railway, which runs
along the edge of the road from Kemmel to Wytschate, passes just before
it reaches the town. Here they became aware of a number of men moving
in their direction, who called out in excellent English and Hindustani
that they were British cavalry and Indians. Before the actual identity
of these men could, in the gloom of the night, be ascertained for
certain, the newcomers opened fire, both from the end of the cutting
and from the sides; and the Lincolns, who were closely packed in the
narrow defile, fell in numbers before they could be extricated. After
getting clear, they met the Northumberland Fusiliers advancing from the
direction of Kemmel, and together the two battalions formed up, and
with great gallantry once more attacked the entrance to the town. The
inequality in numbers, however, was too great. The Germans were
literally swarming in the town, and it was clear that General Shaw's
two battalions had been set to an impossible task. They retired to the
outskirts of the town, where they held on till daylight, lying in the
open fields. When dawn broke the London Scottish could be seen on their
right, but no troops on their left. The unpleasantness of the situation
was not in any way relieved by a heavy fire which our own artillery now
opened upon the two battalions, under the mistaken impression that they
were Germans. Many men were killed and wounded by this fire. In
conformity with the general plan of retiring to the Wulverghem road,
the Lincolns and Northumberland Fusiliers were now withdrawn, and
Wytschate went the way of Messines. The Lincolns lost 400 men and all
but 4 officers during this short night attack. Col. W. E. Smith was
specially commended for the great personal courage which he showed
during the attack, and for the skill with which he ultimately withdrew
his regiment. Lieut. Blackwood was awarded the D.S.O. for very
gallantly continuing to lead the attack after every officer senior to
himself had fallen. The losses of the Northumberland Fusiliers were not
quite so heavy, but were still very severe, especially in officers.

The dismounted cavalry line now retired to the Wulverghem to Kemmel
road, where they entrenched themselves, but their numbers were quite
inadequate for the frontage to be held. Pending the arrival of the
French, Sir Horace was ordered by the C. in C. to send up to their
assistance every available man from the 2nd A.C., which was recouping
at Pradelles. The Dorsets and Worcesters were accordingly sent to Neuve
Eglise, and the remaining seven and a half battalions--all
skeletons--were sent up to east of Bailleul under General Morland. Such
was the position on November 1st.

On this day the anxiously awaited 16th French Army began to arrive, the
troops being railed up at the rate of eighty train loads a day, and at
11 a.m. on the 2nd, both Messines and Wytschate were retaken by the
French with some assistance from our cavalry. Some of the 12th Lancers,
led by 2nd Lieut. Williams, of the Scots Greys, made a very brilliant
bayonet charge during the recapture of the latter town. The
above-mentioned officer was officially reported to have himself killed
eleven Germans on this occasion, and was awarded the D.S.O.

The French now officially took over from us the line from Messines on
the south to the canal on the north. It is interesting to note that,
between October 27th and November 11th, some 200,000 French infantry,
twenty regiments of cavalry and sixty pieces of heavy artillery reached
Ypres, Poperinghe, and Bailleul. It is difficult to conceive of any
more eloquent tribute to the astonishing performance of the thin little
khaki ribbon, which had for a fortnight wound round Ypres, than the
fact that this great force was found none too strong to hold one fourth
of the front over which our handful of men had so far successfully
resisted all the attempts of the enemy to break through. In calling
attention to these figures, it is not intended in any sense to draw
invidious comparisons between the relative merits of the French and
British soldier, or even to suggest that the British troops
accomplished a task of which the French would have been incapable. It
is generally admitted by all our commanders at the front that the
Frenchman as a fighter is unsurpassed, though his methods of fighting
are not the same as ours; and, allowing for the fact that, in cases
where the entire manhood of a nation fights, the average of individual
excellence must obviously be lower than when only a select body of
volunteers is engaged, for explanatory purposes with regard to the
disposition of troops, one may safely reckon a French and British
regiment as being of equal fighting value.

All that is aimed at, then, is to try and bring to the mind of the
reader, by a comparison of figures, some grasp of the immensity of the
performance of our troops east and south of Ypres, during the desperate
efforts of the enemy to break through in the last fortnight of October
and the first fortnight of November. It is worthy of note, too, that in
spite of the huge reinforcements brought up, no material advance was
made on the position taken over from us on November 1st. It is true
that on the day following, the newly-arrived French troops re-took
Wytschate and Messines, from which we had been driven, but they were
unable to hold those places, and the line along which they had found us
facing the enemy was never perceptibly advanced. The new line at the
beginning of November, held jointly by the French troops and British
cavalry, ran--roughly speaking--from Klein Zillebeke to Ploegsteert,
with a concave face which skirted Hollebeke, Wytschate, and Messines.
Our 1st Cavalry Division, supported by some units from the 2nd A.C.,
was withdrawn to Wulverghem, and the 2nd Cavalry Division went into
reserve at Bailleul. Neuve Eglise became our advanced base for that
part of the line, and was very quickly packed with British troops.

We have now taken a permanent farewell, as far as these pages are
concerned, of all occurrences south of the canal at Hollebeke. We have
seen the 2nd A.C. relieved by the Indians, and the Cavalry Corps
relieved by the French, and, with this change of guardianship, we have
seen two of the most important points in the line of defence pass out
of the keeping of the original Expeditionary Force.

Of that force the 1st A.C. alone (with the 7th Division, which it had
absorbed) still remained unrelieved east and south-east of Ypres. The
force, however, which now stood between the enemy and the possession of
Ypres, had by this time lost many of its distinctive characteristics.
The actual battalion units had become in most cases reduced to a mere
shadow of their original strength. The 7th Division had become part of
the 1st A.C., and several battalions of the 2nd A.C. were acting in
concert with this already mixed corps. Many of the brigades had been
broken up from their original constituents, and the fragments
consolidated into new and temporary brigades. Sir Horace was for the
moment an A.C. commander without an A.C., the remnants of his six
heroic brigades being scattered here and there along the whole front.

The first, and perhaps the most interesting, because the most
strenuous, epoch in the war--as far as it concerned the British
Force--was nearly closed; but not quite. Before that can be written of
it, some great deeds had yet to be done, and were done. The Germans
were still making continuous and determined efforts to break through to
Ypres by way of Klein Zillebeke, and to that particular zone of the
fighting our attention can henceforth be confined.




KLEIN ZILLEBEKE


When we last took leave of the Klein Zillebeke section of the
fighting line, on the night of October 30th, the cavalry position from
Klein Zillebeke to the canal had just been taken over by Lord Cavan
with the 2nd Grenadiers and Irish Guards, the former being on the
canal. On the left of the Irish Guards were the 2nd Gordon Highlanders,
with the Oxford Light Infantry in reserve, and beyond them the Sussex
and Northamptons, with their left joining up with the 22nd Brigade. On
the left of the 22nd Brigade was the 21st Brigade, with the 2nd R.
Scots Fusiliers on its extreme flank just south of the Menin road at
Gheluvelt. The 20th Brigade was in reserve.

During the morning the 3rd Cavalry Division was kept at Verbranden
Molen ready for emergencies, but about 1 p.m. orders were received for
it to go to the support of the 3rd C.B. at St. Eloi. Contradictory
orders were, however, afterwards received, and in the end the brigade
joined up with the 4th Hussars, and together they held the two bridges
over the canal at the bend just north of Hollebeke till nightfall. In
this action Sergt. Seddons, of the 4th Hussars, showed great gallantry
during the defence of the eastern bridge and was deservedly awarded the
D.C.M. In the meanwhile the 6th C.B. was sent along the Menin road so
as to be ready to co-operate with the 7th Division or the 1st A.C. in
case of need. That need--as will presently be seen--very quickly arose.

The original plan for this day had been to attack and retake the
Zandvoorde ridge, together with the trenches which had been lost the
day before, but the enemy's extreme activity rendered this
impracticable, and we were in the end forced to act purely on the
defensive.

We are now, be it remembered, dealing with the morning of October 31st,
the day on which the cavalry were driven out of Wytschate and Messines
and the 1st and 7th Divisions out of Gheluvelt. The terrific
bombardment of that morning has already been described. It was chiefly
concentrated on the Menin road, but the whole line from Gheluvelt to
the canal was involved.

The 2nd Brigade, which was between the two Guards' battalions and the
7th Division, had a curious experience during the morning. It survived
the bombardment, and when this slackened to allow the German infantry
to advance, it was still in its trenches and prepared to remain there.
About eight o'clock, however, General Bulfin summoned the four C.O.'s
of the brigade, and ordered a general retirement of the brigade to the
cross-roads at Zillebeke, about a mile in rear. This was duly carried
out, and without much loss on the part of the Sussex and Northamptons,
who were able to retire through the Zwartelen woods without coming
under observation. The 2nd Gordon Highlanders, however (attached
temporarily to the 2nd Brigade), were less fortunate. Their trenches
were in the open, running north-eastward from Klein Zillebeke farm
along the edge of the country lane known as the Brown Road, and, in
retiring, they had to cross a considerable tract of exposed ground,
during which they suffered very severely from machine-gun fire, Captain
McLean's company being practically wiped out.

It was afterwards freely rumoured that this order to retire had been
delivered to General Bulfin, as a Divisional Order, by a German dressed
in the uniform of a British Staff officer. Some colour is given to this
rumour by the extreme improbability of such an order having been
officially given after Sir Douglas Haig's ultimatum of the day before,
that the line which this apocryphal order caused to be abandoned was to
be held at all costs. In any event, it is a matter of history that
those concerned did not accept the retired position as a permanency,
and a counter-attack was quickly organized. The 6th C.B., which had
been waiting in reserve on the Menin road, was brought up as far as the
Basseville brook, where they deployed to the south, and, partly mounted
and partly dismounted, charged through the Zwartelen woods.
Simultaneously the Gordon Highlanders, now reduced to 300, and under
the command of Major Craufurd (Col. Uniacke having been knocked out by
a shell earlier in the day), charged on the right of the cavalry, with
the Oxford Light Infantry extending the line again on their right.
Before this united movement the Bavarian troops in the woods turned and
ran, but, true to their principles, continued to cover their retreat
with a heavy machine-gun fire. Two of these machine-guns were
successfully located, and the 6th C.B. menhandled a gun into the firing
line and knocked them both out in fine style. This broke the back of
the resistance. The Bavarians started surrendering, and the Gordon
Highlanders took a number of prisoners up to the time when Lieut.
Grahame was shot dead by an officer who had surrendered to him; after
that they took fewer.

The enemy losses were very heavy. Eight hundred and seventy prisoners
were taken during the day, and the number of killed and wounded in the
woods ran into several hundreds.

This charge--successful though it had been in clearing the Zwartelen
woods of the enemy--had not yet reinstated the 2nd Brigade in the line
which they had occupied in the morning, before the much-discussed order
to retire had arisen. General Bulfin therefore decided to try during
the night to regain the morning position. Accordingly at midnight,
under the full moon, and at the same time that the desperate battle was
raging round Messines and Wytschate eight miles to the south-west, the
2nd Brigade made their second counter-attack. This, as far as it went,
was a complete success. The trenches were carried and occupied, and the
Germans driven out. Unfortunately, however, the 22nd Brigade, on the
left, found themselves unable to get up into line, and, owing to their
left being unprotected, the 2nd Brigade battalions had one after the
other--in succession from the left--to fall back again.

These two attacks, _i.e._, the afternoon charge through the woods
and the midnight assault on the trenches, had now reduced the Gordons
to 3 officers and 110 men, and these were for the time being
amalgamated with the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, who were on their
right. The Irish Guards remained in their original position, on the
right of the Oxfordshire Light Infantry, but the 2nd Grenadiers were
relieved by French Territorials and went back into reserve.

The nett result of this terrible day's fighting was that our line was
pushed back everywhere, except at Klein Zillebeke and Zonnebeke, the
two points which marked the northern and southern limits of the Ypres
salient. The effect of the recapture of the Gheluvelt position by the
2nd Worcesters and 1st Scots Guards was neutralized by the cave in the
line south of that place, which rendered Gheluvelt untenable. It had
therefore to be abandoned. The loss of that place, however, was of no
material importance, as its abandonment had long been recognized as a
necessary step in the gradual straightening out of the Ypres salient.
The only serious effect of the new line was that Klein Zillebeke, which
for long had been the re-entering angle, so to speak, of the position,
now, by the retirements to right and left of it, was pushed forward
into a species of salient, and its vulnerability was thereby
appreciably increased. This increased vulnerability at once transformed
Klein Zillebeke into the centre of interest as far as this zone was
concerned, this little village being--for reasons already given--a spot
which at any and all costs had to be kept from the enemy. To Klein
Zillebeke and neighbourhood, then, we may not unreasonably look for
early developments.

One of the many unhappy incidents of this day's costly fighting was the
landing of a shell in the Divisional Head Quarters at Hooge, by which
General Lomax received wounds from which he subsequently died, General
Munro was rendered unconscious, and Col. Kerr and five staff officers
were killed.




THE RELIEF OF THE SEVENTH DIVISION


All through the 31st and morning following, the Irish Guards on the
right of the Gordon Highlanders were subjected to a relentless
shelling, and their casualties were considerable. On the morning of
November 1st both their machine-guns were knocked out, and at 3 p.m.
news came that they were retiring. Lord Cavan sent word for them to
hold on some 200 yards to the rear, and also for the French
Territorials between them and the canal at Hollebeke to hold on to
their position at all costs. This the French managed to do, with very
great credit to themselves, at the same time throwing back their left
so as to keep in touch with the new position.

The Germans at once occupied the Irish Guards' trenches, but luckily
did not realize the position sufficiently to pursue their advantage
further, otherwise the consequences might have been serious. As it was,
sufficient time was given for the 2nd Grenadiers and 7th C.B. to come
up in support, and with this stiffening the new line was held for the
rest of the day. But there was a cave at Klein Zillebeke.

The Irish Guards had 400 casualties during this and the previous day's
fighting, including 11 officers: Major Stepney, the Hon. A. Mulholland
and Lieuts. Coke and Mathieson being killed, and Col. Lord Ardee
(attached from the Grenadiers), the Hon. T. Vesey, the Hon. A.
Alexander, Lieuts. Fergusson, Gore-Langton, Lord Kingston, and Lord
Francis Scott (attached from Grenadiers), wounded. The last named
officer and Captain Orr-Ewing (attached from Scots Guards) were each
awarded the D.S.O. "for gallant and persistent attempts to rally the
battalion."

On the morning of November 2nd there was a renewal of the regulation
attack along the Menin road. This time the attack took the form of a
high-explosive bombardment of the barricade across the road at
Veldhoek. This was soon demolished and an infantry attack on the 1st
Brigade ensued, as a result of which that skeleton brigade yielded 300
yards of ground, but held on to the trenches in rear till nightfall.

Further south, about 11.30 on the same morning, a tremendous attack was
delivered against the 2nd Brigade, in the course of which Gen. Bulfin
was wounded and part of the line driven in. An urgent appeal for
support was sent to Lord Cavan, upon whom it now devolved to take over
command of Gen. Bulfin's four battalions, in addition to his own two.
He made his way with all speed to the scene of action, with a view to
discovering the extent of the mischief. This proved to be (so far) that
the Northamptons had been driven in, and that the enemy--following
up--had broken through in numbers into the Hooge woods. Beyond the
Northamptons, that is to say, on the left of his new command, the R.
Sussex were still standing firm. This regiment, however, was greatly
reduced in numbers, its casualties during the last four days having
averaged over a hundred per day. On the 30th Col. Crispin had been
killed; on the following day his successor, Major Green, had been
killed, and the regiment was at the moment under the command of Captain
Villiers. Lord Cavan found it in an extremely precarious situation,
owing to its weak numerical condition, and the envelopment of its right
flank, consequent upon the Northamptons' retirement. He thereupon
hurried up the 2nd Grenadiers from reserve as far as the Brown Road,
where he ordered them to leave their packs and go straight through the
wood towards the south-east with the bayonet.

These Ypres woods have all the appearance of an English copse wood,
that is to say, they are formed of some six years' growth of hazel and
ash, with standard oaks dotted about here and there. Incidentally they
were at this time full of pheasants, destined to be shot in normal
times by the Lords of the Chateaux of Hooge, Gheluvelt and Heronhage.
Precisely in the manner of a line of beaters driving game, the
Grenadiers now pushed through the thick undergrowth, and while the
pheasants rose before the advancing line, so did the Germans run. By
4.30 the wood was cleared and the morning line restored. The
Northamptons thereupon re-occupied their trenches, but they were not
destined to be left there in peace. About six in the evening the
Germans again attacked the same part of the line, this time advancing
with discordant yells, thinking, no doubt, to repeat their performance
of the morning. If so, the event must have come to them as something of
a surprise, for the Northamptons--profiting possibly by their previous
experience--coolly waited till the attacking party was within fifty
yards of the trenches, and then mowed them down. Not a German reached
the trenches, and over 200 dead were left on the ground.

At night the R. Sussex were brought back into reserve and the remnant
of the Gordons went back to the 20th Brigade, which brigade was at the
time in the grounds of the Hooge Chateau. In addition to their previous
losses, the Gordons had during the day lost their C.O., Major Craufurd,
who was wounded in the early morning. The position of Lord Cavan's
command was then, as follows: the Northamptons on the left, in touch
with the R. Welsh Fusiliers in the 7th Division; then the Oxfordshire
Light Infantry and the 2nd Grenadiers, who had become very much mixed
up, and on the right the Irish Guards. Beyond were the French
Territorials.

With the fall of night on the 2nd of November the acuteness of the five
days' crisis may be said to have passed. The all-highest War Lord had
come and gone; the supreme effort of the enemy to break through to
Ypres had been made, and had failed; the British force had come out of
the ordeal reduced to a shadow, and battered out of recognition, but
unconquered. The Kaiser's forces had fallen back sullen and--for the
time being--disheartened, realizing at last the hopelessness of the
task they had been set to accomplish. Their losses had been prodigious,
and though their repeated attacks had--at great sacrifice--forced back
the face of the Ypres salient some two miles, the only military effect
resulting therefrom was that the British force was at last in
occupation of the true line of defence dictated by military prudence
and the natural features of the country. From this line, that is to
say, the ridge some 150 feet in height which runs from the corner of
the canal at Hollebeke to Zonnebeke, they were never afterwards
dislodged.

The 3rd, 4th and 5th were in the main uneventful. November 5th was
chiefly memorable in this year, not for anti-Popish demonstrations, but
as the day on which the 7th Division--after three weeks' incessant
fighting--was temporarily relieved. During the three weeks in question
it had lost 356 officers out of a full complement of 400, and 9,664
rank and file out of a total of 12,000. Battalions had been reduced to
the dimensions of platoons, and had, in some cases, lost every
combatant officer.

The 7th Division's performance, during its three weeks east of Ypres,
will go down to history as one of the most remarkable achievements in
the records of war. Many other units had, by the second half of
November, lost as heavily in officers and men as had the twelve
battalions of the 7th Division--in one or two cases even more heavily;
but the losses of these had been distributed over three months; those
of the 7th Division were concentrated into three weeks. They had
been suddenly pitchforked into a position of the most supreme
responsibility. They found themselves more by chance than by design
standing in the road along which the War Lord had elected to make his
most determined efforts to reach Calais. These efforts came as a
succession of hammer-blows, which gave the defending force neither
rest nor respite, and to cope with which their numbers were
ludicrously insufficient. Their failure, however, would have spelt
disaster to the cause of the Allies, and--realizing this--they
actually achieved the impossible. There is something particularly
stirring in the thought of this small force beaten back step by step,
as fresh and fresh troops were hurled upon it day after day, and yet
never turning its back to the foe, never beaten, never despondent, and
never for a moment failing in the trust which had been imposed upon
it. The most remarkable feature about the 7th Division was that it had
no weak spot in its composition. Each one of its twelve battalions
lived up in every particular to the high standard of duty and
efficiency which the Division set itself from the beginning. The
troops were mostly veterans from abroad, who had been summoned back
from foreign service too late to take part in the earlier stages of
the war, and they may therefore in a sense be considered as picked
troops.[12]

[12]
        The 7th Division (Gen. Capper).
           20th Brigade (Gen. Ruggles-Brise), 1st Grenadiers.
            2nd Scots Guards, 2nd Battalion the Border Regiment.
            2nd Gordon Highlanders (old 92nd).

           21st Brigade (Gen. Watt), 2nd Yorkshire Regiment.
            2nd Bedfordshire Regiment, 2nd R. Scots Fusiliers.
            2nd Wiltshire Regiment.

           22nd Brigade (Gen. Lawford), 2nd R. Warwickshire Regiment.
            2nd Queen's (R. West Surrey Regiment), 1st R. Welsh
                  Fusiliers.
            1st S. Staffordshire Regiment.

The 7th and 15th Brigades from the 2nd A.C., who relieved the 7th
Division, were themselves sadly thinned in numbers. The 7th Brigade,
which took the place of the 20th Brigade, had, in fact, lost
seventy-four per cent. of its numbers during the fighting round La
Bassee, and was in almost as bad a plight as the 20th Brigade, which it
relieved. The 15th Brigade, which replaced the 22nd, was rather
stronger, having received drafts from home.

The 20th Brigade went back to Locre, and the 22nd to Bailleul. The
21st--which perhaps had suffered rather the least of the
three--remained for the time being in the trenches.

At night the 6th C.B. took over the trenches at Heronhage Chateau from
the 3rd Brigade, who had been having a rough time during the preceding
days, and these went back into reserve.




ZWARTELEN


November 6th saw a certain renewal of the enemy's activity. The day
opened very foggy, but by eleven o'clock there was a bright sun. In the
morning the French once more re-took Wytschate and Messines, but again
found them untenable, and in fact this was the last attempt on the part
of the Allies to occupy either of these two places.

The respite of the poor 22nd Brigade from the trenches was short-lived,
and the evening of the 6th saw them once more hurried up into the
firing line. This came about in the following way. The French had now
taken over all our trenches as far north as the Brown Road, our own
troops being pushed up to the left. North of the French were the Irish
Guards, and, beyond them, the 2nd Grenadiers. The French troops, who
had so far held their ground with splendid tenacity, now found the
position more than they could support. The German bombardment, with
which they as usual opened the day, was more than usually severe, and
lasted the whole morning, and about 2 p.m. it was followed by an
infantry attack before which the left of the French and the right of
the Irish Guards was driven in. As a result of this cave in the line,
the left of the Irish Guards, which remained in the trenches, suffered
considerably, Lord John Hamilton, Captain King-Harman and Lieut.
Woodroffe being killed. An urgent message was sent to Gen. Kavanagh to
bring up the 7th C.B., who were in readiness near Lord Cavan's Head
Quarters behind Zillebeke, and the 22nd Brigade was also wired for to
come up from Bailleul. The cavalry came galloping up to Zillebeke,
where they dismounted and advanced on foot along and astride of the
road from Zillebeke to Zwartelen, which runs along the foot of the
ridge ending in Hill 60. Just short of Zwartelen they deployed, the 1st
Life Guards on the left being told off to restore the Irish Guards'
position, while the 2nd Life Guards attacked the position from which
the French had been driven. The Blues were behind the centre of the
line in support.

The 1st Life Guards, under the Hon. A. Stanley, attacked the lost
trenches of the Irish Guards with the greatest vigour, and within an
hour had regained, at the point of the bayonet, the whole of the
position lost. The Hon. A. Stanley received the medal for Distinguished
Service for his conduct on this occasion, as did also Corpl. Baillie
and Corpl. Fleming. Sergt. Munn, of the Irish Guards, also got the
D.C.M. for rallying some men of his battalion and joining in the charge
of the 1st Life Guards.

In the meanwhile the Hon. Hugh Dawnay, commanding the 2nd Life Guards,
sent off "B" Squadron to connect up with the right of the 1st Life
Guards and clear the wood on the Klein Zillebeke ridge. "D" Squadron
was sent off to cover the right flank of the whole combined movement by
advancing along the edge of the Ypres to Armentieres railway, which is
separated from the wood by about 500 yards of open ground; while Major
Dawnay himself, with "C" Troop, attacked the village of Zwartelen, with
the Blues under Col. Wilson on his left, and some 300 of the French,
who--encouraged by the advance of the Household Cavalry--had reformed,
on his right, that is to say, between him and "D" Squadron on the
railway.

The whole scheme worked admirably. The attack by "B" Squadron on the
Klein Zillebeke ridge wood was entirely successful, the enemy being
driven out with loss and pursued for several hundred yards. The attack
on Zwartelen--though perhaps a more formidable undertaking--was no less
successful. The village was very strongly held, the houses in and
around being occupied and defended, and the Household Cavalry's advance
was met by a heavy rifle fire which caused many casualties, both Col.
Wilson and Major Dawnay being killed while leading their respective
regiments. In spite of heavy losses, however, the cavalrymen, with
great steadiness and determination, pressed home their attack, and, at
the point of the bayonet, carried the village and captured a number of
prisoners, "C" Troop of the 2nd Life Guards afterwards pushing right
through and occupying the trenches in the wood on the far side of the
village. Lieut. Stewart-Menzies, Corpl. Watt, Corpl. Moulsen and Corpl.
Anstice were all decorated for their gallantry during this brilliant
performance on the part of "C" Troop. The latter N.C.O. displayed the
greatest courage throughout the fight.

The success of the counter-attack was now to all appearances complete,
all the ground lost in the morning having been regained. At this
moment, however, the French on the right of "C" Troop again gave way,
leaving a gap into which the enemy at once pressed. The position of "C"
Troop was now greatly imperilled, and General Kavanagh ordered the
Blues, and "B" Squadron of the 2nd Life Guards, to cross the Verbranden
Molen road to its support. This was done, the Blues moving to the right
and occupying Zwartelen and Hill 60, and in these several positions the
combined force continued to fight out time; but some of the ground
which had been regained had to be abandoned.

The situation was saved by the arrival about 6 p.m. of the 22nd
Brigade, which had been hurried up from Bailleul in motor-buses. This
brigade now took over the Household Cavalry position at Zwartelen,
while the 2nd K.R.R., from the 2nd Brigade, relieved the squadron of
the 2nd Life Guards which was holding the railway on the right flank.

The Household Cavalry earned the very highest praise for their
performance on this afternoon. They were handled with great skill by
General Kavanagh, and the daring and dash of their advance undoubtedly
averted what might have proved a very serious calamity. They lost
seventeen officers during their advance, as follows:

In the 1st Life Guards the Hon. R. Wyndham (attached from the
Lincolnshire Yeomanry) was killed and the Hon. H. Denison, the Hon. E.
Fitzroy and Captain Hardy were wounded.

In the 2nd Life Guards the Hon. H. Dawnay, the Hon. A. O'Neill and
Lieut. Peterson were killed and the Hon. M. Lyon, Lieut. Jobson, Lieut.
Sandys and 2nd Lieut. Hobson were wounded.

In the Blues, Col. Wilson and Lieut. de Gunzberg were killed, and Lord
Gerard, Lord Northampton and Captain Brassey were wounded.

The enemy's bombardment of the morning, and the infantry attack of the
afternoon which followed, had by no means been confined to the area the
loss and recapture of which has just been described. The 2nd
Grenadiers, on the left of the Irish Guards, were as heavily attacked
as any, but they succeeded in maintaining their ground throughout both
morning and afternoon. Sergt. Thomas, who as Corpl. Thomas had so
distinguished himself at Chavonne, once again showed the material of
which he was made. His trench was subjected to a most appalling
shelling. Only two of his platoon remained unwounded; he himself had
twice been buried and the flank of his trench was exposed, but even in
this apparently impossible position he held on, and was still in proud
occupation of his trench when the arrival of the 7th C.B. and 22nd
Brigade once more drove back the enemy. Sergt. Holmes and Corpl.
Harrison in the same battalion also greatly distinguished themselves.

At daybreak on the 7th, in the dull, misty atmosphere of a November
morning, the 22nd Brigade deployed for an attempt to regain the
position of the day before. This brigade, owing to its depleted
condition, was now reduced to two composite battalions, the R. Welsh
Fusiliers and 2nd Queen's being amalgamated into one battalion under
the command of Captain Alleyne of the Queen's, and the Warwicks and S.
Staffords into the other, under the command of Captain Vallentin of the
S. Staffords. It is worthy of note that the brigade could furnish no
officers of higher rank than a Captain; also that both the officers
above-named fell on the second day of their command, Captain Alleyne
being badly wounded and Captain Vallentin killed. The latter was
posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross for the great gallantry he had
displayed in the command of his composite battalion.

The brigade deployed in four lines, of which the first two were formed
by the 2nd Queen's, who now numbered about 400. In this formation they
advanced till within 300 yards of the enemy's position, when the first
two lines joined up and charged. In spite of a heavy machine-gun fire,
which still further reduced the 400, the Queen's charged right home and
in rapid succession carried first one and then a second line of
trenches, the defenders being all bayoneted or put to flight. The
second of these two positions--the same, in fact, as had been captured
by the 2nd Life Guards the day before--proved to be too far ahead of
the general line and had to be abandoned, as it was persistently
enfiladed by machine-gun fire from a farm-house on the left; but the
first line was successfully held till night, when the battalion was
relieved. During this charge of the Queen's Lieut. Haigh was killed and
Captain Alleyne, Captain Roberts, Lieuts. Lang-Browne, Collis and
Pascoe were wounded. Three machine-guns were captured.

The 22nd Brigade was now reduced to four officers, that is to say, one
to each battalion, and at night they were finally relieved, and allowed
to return to the retirement from which they had been so rudely
summoned.

During this same day there was some severe fighting in the Polygon
wood, the Connaught Rangers being driven back and their trenches
captured. The flank of the Coldstream Brigade thus became threatened,
and for a time the position promised to be serious, but the 6th Brigade
on the Zonnebeke road came to the rescue, the lost trenches were
regained, and the continuity of the line once more established.

The morning of the 8th saw a renewal of the attempt to break through
along the Menin road. At the first assault the French and two companies
of the Loyal N. Lancashire Regiment in the first line were driven back,
and the flank of the 1st Scots Guards became exposed. As a result the
enemy was able to rake the trenches of the latter regiment with
machine-guns and their casualties were heavy, Lieuts. Cripps,
Stirling-Stuart, Monckton and Smith being killed. The battalion,
however, held on till the morning position was once more restored by
the two reserve companies of the Loyal N. Lancashires, who,
counter-attacking with great spirit and determination, drove back the
enemy from the position they had temporarily won.




THE PRUSSIAN GUARD ATTACK


From November 8th to 11th there was little fighting. It had been
apparently realized at length by the German commanders that the troops
they were at present employing were incapable of breaking the British
line, but at the back of that admission there was evidently still the
belief that the task was possible, provided the troops employed were
sufficiently good. Accordingly the Prussian Guard was sent for. Pending
the arrival of that invincible body there was a lull in the ceaseless
hammer of battle; and in the meanwhile the weather changed for the
worse. By the time the Prussian Guard was ready for its enterprise,
that is to say by November 11th, it was about as bad as it could be. A
strong west wind was accompanied by an icy rain, which fell all day in
torrents. Luckily the wind and rain were in the faces of the enemy, a
factor of no little importance.

The battle of November 11th may be looked upon as the last attempt but
one of the Germans to break through to Calais during the 1914 campaign.
The actual last serious attempt was on November 17th. On the 11th the
cannonade began at daybreak and was kept up till 9.30. In violence and
volume it rivalled that of October 31st. The entire front from Klein
Zillebeke to Zonnebeke was involved, the enemy's design being--as on
the 31st--to attack all along the front simultaneously so as to hamper
and <DW36> the British commanders in the use of the very limited
reserves at their disposal.

The newly-arrived troops were the 1st and 4th Brigade Prussian Guard,
and some battalions of the Garde Jaeger, in all fifteen battalions, and
to these was entrusted the main attack on the key of the position,
_i.e._, along, and north of, the Menin road.

The Prussian Guard attacked through Veldhoek, and in their advance
displayed the invincible courage for which they have ever been famed.
Such courage, however--though sufficiently sublime from the spectacular
point of view--cannot fail to be expensive, and the losses among these
gallant men were prodigious. It was afterwards said by a prisoner that
they had been deceived by the silence in our trenches into thinking
that the bombardment had cleared them, and so came on recklessly.
However, in spite of their losses, by sheer intrepidity and weight of
numbers, they succeeded in capturing all the front line trenches of the
1st Brigade, who were astride the Menin road between Veldhoek and
Hooge. In three places large bodies of the enemy succeeded in breaking
through, and in each case their success furnished a subject for
reflection as to the why and the wherefore of battles. For, having
succeeded in doing that which they had set out to do, they stood
huddled together in the plainest uncertainty as to how next to act, a
point which was speedily settled by the arrival of our reserves, who
fell upon the successful invaders and promptly annihilated them. One
party of some 700 were accounted for to a man by the Oxfordshire Light
Infantry, led by Col. Davies.

Another party which had broken through in the Polygon wood was
similarly dealt with by the Highland Light Infantry under Col.
Wolfe-Murray, an operation during which Lieut. Brodie won the Victoria
Cross for exceptional gallantry. This was the second Victoria Cross to
fall to this battalion,[13] which had indeed never failed in any
situation which it had been called upon to face. Gen. Willcocks, in
subsequently addressing the battalion, alluded with pride to "the
magnificent glory" with which it had fought, and concluded with the
remarkable words: "There is no position which the Highland Light
Infantry cannot capture."

        [13] Pte. Wilson had gained the honour on September 14th.

The nett result of the day's fighting was that the enemy gained some
500 yards of ground, which, from the military point of view, advantaged
them nothing, and the gaining of which had cost them some thousands of
their best men. The barrenness of the advance made cannot be better
illustrated than by the fact that it was the last step forward of the
invading army, till the asphyxiating gas was brought into play in the
spring of 1915.

On the 12th the 1st Brigade, which had borne the brunt of the Prussian
Guard attack, was taken back into reserve. It will be conceded that it
was about time.

This gallant Brigade, 4,500 strong in August, was now represented as
follows:

    1st Scots Guards: Captain Stracey and 69 men.
    Black Watch:      Captain Fortune and 109 men.
    Camerons:         Col. McEwen,
                      Major Craig-Browne,
                      Lieut. Dunsterville and 140 men.
    1st Coldstream:   No officers and 150 men.

The 6th C.B. was now reinforced by the arrival of the North Somerset
and Leicestershire Yeomanry Regiments. This strengthening was sorely
needed, the brigade having been practically without rest since its
arrival in Flanders. By the irony of fate the Hon. W. Cadogan, the
Colonel of the 10th Hussars, was killed on the very day when these
reinforcements arrived.

With this addition to its strength the brigade was now required to
find 800 rifles for its line of trenches along the Klein Zillebeke
ridge, and in addition to furnish a reserve of 400, who--when not
required--lived in burrows in the railway cutting at Hooge. Within a
week, however, the reserve became a luxury of the past, and the
brigade was called upon to find 1,200 rifles for the trenches.

On November 17th we come to the last serious attempt of the enemy,
during the 1914 campaign, to break through to Calais by way of Ypres.
This final effort can be dismissed in a few words. It was made south of
the Menin road by the XV. German Army Corps, and it took the form of
two infantry attacks, one at 1 p.m. and another at 4 p.m.; and it
failed utterly, the Germans leaving thousands of dead and wounded on
the ground just in front of our trenches, to which they had been
allowed to approach quite close.

The signal failure of this last spasmodic effort, and the subsequent
passivity of the enemy, points with some significance to the conclusion
that the position to which we had now been driven back along the
Zillebeke--Zonnebeke ridge was impregnable, and was recognized as such
by the enemy.

The 6th C.B. and the 2nd Grenadiers were the most prominent figures in
this victory of November 17th. In the course of the second attack the
10th Hussars and 3rd Dragoon Guards allowed the enemy to come within a
few yards of their trenches before they opened fire and mowed them down
in masses. The 10th Hussars, however, again suffered somewhat severely
in officers, the Hon. A. Annesley, Captain Peto, and Lieut. Drake being
killed. The newly-arrived North Somerset Yeomanry, under Col. Glyn,
behaved with the coolness and steadiness of veterans, and contributed
in no small degree to the repulse of the enemy's second attack.

The 2nd Grenadiers received the highest praise from Lord Cavan for
their part in this day's fighting. This battalion had now lost 30
officers and 1,300 men since the beginning of the campaign, and on the
following day it was sent back into reserve to recoup and reorganize.




EPITAPH


With the German failure of November 17th the first chapter in the Great
War may be considered closed. The desperate and all but uninterrupted
fighting which, for three months, followed the defence of the Mons
canal, was succeeded by a long lull, during which both sides were
busily engaged fighting a common foe. The winter of 1914 proved the
wettest in the memory of man, and ague, rheumatism, frost-bite,
gangrene and tetanus filled the hospitals with little less regularity
than had the shot and shell of the autumn. Then came the great battle
of Neuve Chapelle, and in another part of the world the grim struggles
of the Dardanelles. These are another story, and some day this will be
told; but great as may have been--and undoubtedly has been--the glory
won in other fields, nothing can ever surpass, as a story of simple,
sublime pluck, the history of the first three months of England's
participation in the Great War. The word "pluck" is used with
intention, for it conveys, perhaps, better than any other word a sense
of that indomitable spirit which is superior to every rub of adverse
fortune. There were no War Correspondents present with the First
Expeditionary Force. There was no wrapping of specially favoured deeds
in tinsel for the eyes of a cheap gallery. Even if the wrappers had
been present, the general standard was too high for invidious
selection. A mole-hill stands out on a plain, but makes no show in the
uplands. V.C.'s, it is true, were won; but for every one given a
hundred were earned. Military honours are the fruit of recommendation;
but when Generals, Colonels, Company Officers and Sergeants are no
more, the deed must be its own record; there is none left to recommend.

The grandeur of the doings of those First Seven Divisions lies, it may
well be, in their immunity from the play of a cheap flashlight--a
flashlight which too often distorts the perspective, and so illuminates
the wrong spot. There is a gospel in the very reticence of the records
of the regiments concerned--in the dignity with which, without any
blare of trumpets, they tell of the daily answer to the call of a duty
which balanced them ceaselessly on the edge of eternity. But it is
always told as of a simple response to the call of duty, and not as a
thing to be waved in the faces of an audience.

But, though unflattered and unsung, those early deeds in France and
Flanders can boast an epitaph which tells no lies, and which, in its
simple tragedy, is more eloquent than a volume of strained panegyrics.

The register of "missing" is an enigma; it may mean many things. But
the register of killed and wounded is no enigma. It tells, in the
simplest terms, a tale of death and mutilation faced and found at the
call of duty. Let us leave it at that.

The First Expeditionary Force is no more. The distinctive names and
numbers of the units that composed it still face one from the pages of
the "Army List;" but of the bronzed, cheery men who sailed in August,
1914, one third lie under the soil of France and Flanders. Of those
that remain, some have been relegated for ever--and of a cruel
necessity--to more peaceful pursuits; others--more hopefully
convalescent--are looking forward with eagerness to the day when they
will once more be fit to answer the call of duty and of country.


THE END


_Printed at The Chapel River Press, Kingston, Surrey._






End of Project Gutenberg's The First Seven Divisions, by Ernest W. Hamilton

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