



Produced by Chuck Greif and the Online Distributed
Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This book was
produced from scanned images of public domain material
from the Google Print project.)








PRICE $6.00

62D CONGRESS

SENATE {DOCUMENT

_2d Session_

{NO. 933




LOSS OF THE
STEAMSHIP "TITANIC"

REPORT

OF A FORMAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE
CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE FOUNDERING
ON APRIL 15, 1912, OF THE BRITISH
STEAMSHIP "TITANIC," OF LIVERPOOL,
AFTER STRIKING ICE IN OR NEAR LATITUDE
41 deg. 46' N., LONGITUDE 50 deg. 14' W.,
NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN, AS CONDUCTED
BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

[Illustration: colophon]

PRESENTED BY MR. SMITH OF MICHIGAN
AUGUST 20, 1912.--Ordered to be printed with illustrations

WASHINGTON

1912




TABLE OF CONTENTS.


                                                                    Page.

  Introduction                                                         7

  I. Description of the ship                                          10
         The White Star Co.                                           10
         The steamship Titanic                                        11
         Detailed description                                         13
         Water-tight compartments                                     14
         Decks and accommodation                                      16
         Structure                                                    23
         Life-saving appliances                                       25
         Pumping arrangements                                         26
         Electrical installation                                      27
         Machinery                                                    29
         General                                                      31
         Crew and passengers                                          32

  II. Account of the ship's journey across the Atlantic, the messages
       she received, and the disaster                                 32
         The sailing orders                                           32
         The route followed                                           33
         Ice messages received                                        35
         Speed of the ship                                            39
         The weather conditions                                       40
         Action that should have been taken                           40
         The collision                                                41

  III. Description of the damage to the ship and of its gradual
        and final effect, with observations thereon                   42
         Extent of the damage                                         42
         Time in which the damage was done                            42
         The flooding in the first 10 minutes                         42
         Gradual effect of the damage                                 43
         Final effect of the damage                                   44
         Observations                                                 45
         Effect of additional subdivision upon floatation             46

  IV. Account of the saving and rescue of those who survived          48
         The boats                                                    48
         Conduct of Sir C. Duff Gordon and Mr. Ismay                  53
         The third-class passengers                                   53
         Means taken to procure assistance                            54
         The rescue by the steamship "Carpathia"                      54
         Numbers saved                                                55

  V. The circumstances in connection with the steamship "Californian" 56

  VI. The Board of Trade's administration                             60

  VII. Finding of the court                                           77

  VIII. Recommendations                                               85
         Water-tight subdivision                                      85
         Lifeboats and rafts                                          86
         Manning the boats and boat drills                            87
         General                                                      87




REPORT ON THE LOSS OF THE STEAMSHIP "TITANIC."

THE MERCHANTS SHIPPING ACTS, 1894 TO 1906.

     In the matter of the formal investigation held at the Scottish
     Hall, Buckingham Gate, Westminster, on May 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14,
     15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24, June 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12,
     13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29; at the Caxton
     Hall, Caxton Street, Westminster, on July 1 and 3; and at the
     Scottish Hall, Buckingham Gate, Westminster, on July 30, 1912,
     before the Right Hon. Lord Mersey, Wreck Commissioner, assisted by
     Rear Admiral the Hon. S. A. Gough-Calthorpe, C. V. O., R. N.; Capt.
     A. W. Clarke; Commander F. C. A. Lyon, R. N. R.; Prof. J. H. Biles,
     D. Sc., LL. D. and Mr. E. C. Chaston, R. N. R., as assessors, into
     the circumstances attending the loss of the steamship _Titanic_, of
     Liverpool, and the loss of 1,490 lives in the North Atlantic Ocean,
     in lat. 41 deg. 46' N., long. 50 deg. 14' W. on April 15 last.


REPORT OF THE COURT.

The court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the
above-mentioned shipping casualty, finds, for the reasons appearing in
the annex hereto, that the loss of the said ship was due to collision
with an iceberg, brought about by the excessive speed at which the ship
was being navigated.

Dated this 30th day of July, 1912.

MERSEY,
_Wreck Commissioner_.

We concur in the above report.

ARTHUR GOUGH-CALTHORPE,

A. W. CLARKE,

F. C. A. LYON,

J. H. BILES,

EDWARD C. CHASTON,

_Assessors_.




LOSS OF THE STEAMSHIP "TITANIC."

     REPORT OF A FORMAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING
     THE FOUNDERING ON APRIL 15, 1912, OF THE BRITISH STEAMSHIP TITANIC,
     OF LIVERPOOL, AFTER STRIKING ICE IN OR NEAR LATITUDE 41 deg. 46' N.,
     LONGITUDE 50 deg. 14' W., NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN, WHEREBY LOSS OF LIFE
     ENSUED.


ANNEX TO THE REPORT.




INTRODUCTION.


On April 23, 1912, the Lord Chancellor appointed a wreck commissioner
under the merchant shipping acts, and on April 26 the home secretary
nominated five assessors. On April 30 the board of trade requested that
a formal investigation of the circumstances attending the loss of the
steamship _Titanic_ should be held, and the court accordingly commenced
to sit on May 2. Since that date there have been 37 public sittings, at
which 97 witnesses have been examined, while a large number of
documents, charts, and plans have been produced. The 26 questions
formulated by the board of trade, which are set out in detail below,
appear to cover all the circumstances to be inquired into. Briefly
summarized, they deal with the history of the ship, her design,
construction, size, speed, general equipment, life-saving apparatus,
wireless installation, her orders and course, her passengers, her crew,
their training, organization and discipline; they request an account of
the casualty, its cause and effect, and of the means taken for saving
those on board the ship; and they call for a report on the efficiency of
the rules and regulations made by the board of trade under the merchant
shipping acts and on their administration, and, finally, for any
recommendations to obviate similar disasters which may appear to the
court to be desirable. The 26 questions, as subsequently amended, are
here attached:

1. When the _Titanic_ left Queenstown on or about April 11 last--

(_a_) What was the total number of persons employed in any capacity on
board her, and what were their respective ratings?

(_b_) What was the total number of her passengers, distinguishing sexes
and classes, and discriminating between adults and children?

2. Before leaving Queenstown on or about April 11 last did the _Titanic_
comply with the requirements of the merchant shipping acts, 1894-1906,
and the rules and regulations made thereunder with regard to the safety
and otherwise of "passenger steamers" and "emigrant ships"?

3. In the actual design and construction of the _Titanic_ what special
provisions were made for the safety of the vessel and the lives of those
on board in the event of collisions and other casualties?

4. Was the _Titanic_ sufficiently and efficiently officered and manned?
Were the watches of the officers and crew usual and proper? Was the
_Titanic_ supplied with proper charts?

5. What was the number of the boats of any kind on board the _Titanic_?
Were the arrangements for manning and launching the boats on board the
_Titanic_ in case of emergency proper and sufficient? Had a boat drill
been held on board; and, if so, when? What was the carrying capacity of
the respective boats?

6. What installations for receiving and transmitting messages by
wireless telegraphy were on board the _Titanic_? How many operators were
employed on working such installations? Were the installations in good
and effective working order, and were the number of operators sufficient
to enable messages to be received and transmitted continuously by day
and night?

7. At or prior to the sailing of the _Titanic_ what, if any,
instructions as to navigation were given to the master or known by him
to apply to her voyage? Were such instructions, if any, safe, proper,
and adequate, having regard to the time of year and dangers likely to be
encountered during the voyage?

8. What was in fact the track taken by the _Titanic_ in crossing the
Atlantic Ocean? Did she keep to the track usually followed by liners on
voyages from the United Kingdom to New York in the month of April? Are
such tracks safe tracks at that time of the year? Had the master any,
and, if so, what, discretion as regards the track to be taken?

9. After leaving Queenstown on or about April 11 last did information
reach the _Titanic_ by wireless messages or otherwise by signals of the
existence of ice in certain latitudes? If so, what were such messages or
signals and when were they received, and in what position or positions
was the ice reported to be, and was the ice reported in or near the
track actually being followed by the _Titanic_? Was her course altered
in consequence of receiving such information; and, if so, in what way?
What replies to such messages or signals did the _Titanic_ send, and at
what times?

10. If at the times referred to in the last preceding question or later
the _Titanic_ was warned of or had reason to suppose she would encounter
ice, at what time might she have reasonably expected to encounter it?
Was a good and proper lookout for ice kept on board? Were any, and, if
so, what, directions given to vary the speed; if so, were they carried
out?

11. Were binoculars provided for and used by the lookout men? Is the use
of them necessary or usual in such circumstances? Had the _Titanic_ the
means of throwing searchlights around her? If so, did she make use of
them to discover ice? Should searchlights have been provided and used?

12. What other precautions were taken by the _Titanic_ in anticipation
of meeting ice? Were they such as are usually adopted by vessels being
navigated in waters where ice may be expected to be encountered?

13. Was ice seen and reported by anybody on board the _Titanic_ before
the casualty occurred? If so, what measures were taken by the officer on
watch to avoid it? Were they proper measures and were they promptly
taken?

14. What was the speed of the _Titanic_ shortly before and at the moment
of the casualty? Was such speed excessive under the circumstances?

15. What was the nature of the casualty which happened to the _Titanic_
at or about 11.45 p. m. on April 14 last? In what latitude and longitude
did the casualty occur?

16. What steps were taken immediately on the happening of the casualty?
How long after the casualty was its seriousness realized by those in
charge of the vessel? What steps were then taken? What endeavors were
made to save the lives of those on board and to prevent the vessel from
sinking?

17. Was proper discipline maintained on board after the casualty
occurred?

18. What messages for assistance were sent by the _Titanic_ after the
casualty, and at what times, respectively? What messages were received
by her in response, and at what times, respectively? By what vessels
were the messages that were sent by the _Titanic_ received, and from
what vessels did she receive answers? What vessels other than the
_Titanic_ sent or received messages at or shortly after the casualty in
connection with such casualty? What were the vessels that sent or
received such messages? Were any vessels prevented from going to the
assistance of the _Titanic_ or her boats owing to messages received from
the _Titanic_ or owing to any erroneous messages being sent or received?
In regard to such erroneous messages, from what vessels were they sent
and by what vessels were they received, and at what times, respectively?

19. Was the apparatus for lowering the boats on the _Titanic_ at the
time of the casualty in good working order? Were the boats swung out,
filled, lowered, or otherwise put into the water and got away under
proper superintendence? Were the boats sent away in seaworthy condition
and properly manned, equipped, and provisioned? Did the boats, whether
those under davits or otherwise, prove to be efficient and serviceable
for the purpose of saving life?

20. What was the number of (_a_) passengers, (_b_) crew taken away in
each boat on leaving the vessel? How was this number made up, having
regard to (1) sex, (2) class, (3) rating? How many were children and how
many adults? Did each boat carry its full load; and if not, why not?

21. How many persons on board the _Titanic_ at the time of the casualty
were ultimately rescued and by what means? How many lost their lives
prior to the arrival of the steamship _Carpathia_ in New York? What was
the number of passengers distinguishing between men and women and adults
and children of the first, second, and third classes, respectively, who
were saved? What was the number of the crew, discriminating their
ratings and sex, that were saved? What is the proportion which each of
these numbers bears to the corresponding total number on board
immediately before the casualty? What reason is there for the
disproportion, if any?

22. What happened to the vessel from the happening of the casualty until
she foundered?

23. Where and at what time did the _Titanic_ founder?

24. What was the cause of the loss of the _Titanic_, and of the loss of
life which thereby ensued or occurred? What vessels had the opportunity
of rendering assistance to the _Titanic_; and if any, how was it that
assistance did not reach the _Titanic_ before the steamship _Carpathia_
arrived? Was the construction of the vessel and its arrangements such as
to make it difficult for any class of passengers or any portion of the
crew to take full advantage of any of the existing provisions for
safety?

25. When the _Titanic_ left Queenstown, on or about April 11 last, was
she properly constructed and adequately equipped as a passenger steamer
and emigrant ship for the Atlantic service?

26. The court is invited to report upon the rules and regulations made
under the merchant shipping acts, 1894-1906, and the administration of
those acts and of such rules and regulations, so far as the
consideration thereof is material to this casualty, and to make any
recommendations or suggestions that it may think fit, having regard to
the circumstances of the casualty with a view to promoting the safety of
vessels and persons at sea.

In framing this report it has seemed best to divide it into sections in
the following manner:

First. A description of the ship as she left Southampton on April 10 and
of her equipment, crew, and passengers.

Second. An account of her journey across the Atlantic, of the messages
she received and of the disaster.

Third. A description of the damage to the ship and of its gradual and
final effect with observations thereon.

Fourth. An account of the saving and rescue of those who survived.

Fifth. The circumstances in connection with the steamship _Californian_.

Sixth. An account of the board of trade's administration.

Seventh. The finding of the court on the questions submitted; and

Eighth. The recommendations held to be desirable.




I.--DESCRIPTION OF THE SHIP.


THE WHITE STAR LINE.

The _Titanic_ was one of a fleet of 13 ships employed in the transport
of passengers, mails, and cargo between Great Britain and the United
States, the usual ports of call for the service in which she was engaged
being Southampton, Cherbourg, Plymouth, Queenstown, and New York.

The owners are the Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. (Ltd.), usually known as
the White Star Line, a British registered company, with a capital of
L750,000, all paid up, the directors being Mr. J. Bruce Ismay
(chairman), the Right Hon. Lord Pirrie, and Mr. H. A. Sanderson.

The company are owners of 29 steamers and tenders; they have a large
interest in 13 other steamers, and also own a training sailing ship for
officers.

All the shares of the company, with the exception of eight held by
Messrs. E. C. Grenfell, Vivian H. Smith, W. S. M. Burns, James Gray, J.
Bruce Ismay, H. A. Sanderson, A. Kerr, and the Right Hon. Lord Pirrie,
have, since the year 1902, been held by the International Navigation Co.
(Ltd.), of Liverpool, a British registered company, with a capital of
L700,000, of which all is paid up, the directors being Mr. J. Bruce
Ismay (chairman), and Messrs. H. A. Sanderson, Charles F. Torrey, and H.
Concannon.

The debentures of the company, L1,250,000, are held mainly, if not
entirely, in the United Kingdom by the general public.

The International Navigation Co. (Ltd.), of Liverpool, in addition to
holding the above-mentioned shares of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Co.
(Ltd.), is also the owner of--

1. Practically the whole of the issued share capital of the British &
North Atlantic Steam Navigation Co. (Ltd.), and the Mississippi &
Dominion Steamship Co. (Ltd.), (the Dominion Line).

2. Practically the whole of the issued share capital of the Atlantic
Transport Co. (Ltd), (the Atlantic Transport Line).

3. Practically the whole of the issued ordinary share capital and about
one-half of the preference share capital of Frederick Leyland & Co.
(Ltd.), (the Leyland Line).

As against the above-mentioned shares and other property, the
International Navigation Co. (Ltd.) have issued share lien certificates
for L25,000,000.

Both the shares and share lien certificates of the International
Navigation Co. (Ltd.) are now held by the International Mercantile
Marine Co. of New Jersey, or by trustees for the holders of its
debenture bonds.


THE STEAMSHIP "TITANIC."

The _Titanic_ was a three-screw vessel of 46,328 tons gross and 21,831
net register tons, built by Messrs. Harland & Wolff for the White Star
Line service between Southampton and New York. She was registered as a
British steamship at the port of Liverpool, her official number being
131,428. Her registered dimensions were--

                                                                     Feet
    Length                                                          852.50
    Breadth                                                          92.50
    Depth from top of keel to top of beam at lowest point of
     sheer of C deck, the highest deck which extends
     continuously from bow to stern                                  64.75
    Depth of hold                                                    59.58
    Height from B to C deck                                           9.00
    Height from A to B deck                                           9.00
    Height from boat to A deck                                        9.50
    Height from boat deck to water line amidships at time of
     accident, about                                                 60.50
                                                                    ======
    Displacement at 34 feet 7 inches is                     tons    52,310

The propelling machinery consisted of two sets of four-cylinder
reciprocating engines, each driving a wing propeller, and a turbine
driving the center propeller. The registered horsepower of the
propelling machinery was 50,000. The power which would probably have
been developed was at least 55,000.

_Structural arrangements._--The structural arrangements of the _Titanic_
consisted primarily of--

(1) An outer shell of steel plating, giving form to the ship up to the
top decks.

(2) _Steel decks._--These were enumerated as follows:

  ---------------------------------------+---------+-------------------
                                         |         | Distance
                                         | Height  | from 34 feet
                                         | to next | 7 inches water
                                         | deck    | line amidships.
                                         | above.  +---------+---------
                                         |         | Above.  | Below.
  ---------------------------------------+---------+---------+---------
                                         |_Ft. in._|_Ft. in._|_Ft. in._
  Boat deck, length about 500 feet       |         |   58 0  |
  A deck, length about 500 feet          |    9 6  |   48 6  |
  B deck, length about 550 feet, with    |         |         |
    125 feet forecastle and 105 feet poop|    9 0  |   39 6  |
  C deck, whole length of ship           |    9 0  |   30 6  |
  D deck, whole length of ship           |   10 6  |   20 0  |
                                         |         |(Tapered |
                                         |         | down at |
                                         |         |  ends.) |
  E deck, whole length of ship           |    9 0  |   11 0  |
  F deck, whole length of ship           |    8 6  |    2 6  |
  G deck, 190 feet forward of boilers,   |         |         |
    210 feet aft of machinery            |    8 0  |         |    5 6
  Orlop deck, 190 feet forward of        |         |         |
    boilers, 210 feet aft of machinery   |    8 0  |         |   13 6
  ---------------------------------------+---------+---------------------

C, D, E, and F were continuous from end to end of the ship. The decks
above these were continuous for the greater part of the ship, extending
from amidships both forward and aft. The boat deck and A deck each had
two expansion joints, which broke the strength continuity. The decks
below were continuous outside the boiler and engine rooms and extended
to the ends of the ship. Except in small patches none of these decks was
water-tight in the steel parts, except the weather deck and the orlop
deck aft.

(3) _Transverse vertical bulkheads._--There were 15 transverse
water-tight bulkheads, by which the ship was divided in the direction of
her length into 16 separate compartments. These bulkheads are referred
to as "A" to "P," commencing forward.

The water-tightness of the bulkheads extended up to one or other of the
decks D or E; the bulkhead A extended to C, but was only water-tight to
D deck. The position of the D, E, and F decks, which were the only ones
to which the water-tight bulkheads extended, was in relation to the
water line (34 feet 7 inches draft) approximately as follows:

  --------+-------------------------------
          |   Height above water line
          |     (34 feet 7 inches).
          |---------+---------------------
          | Lowest  |         |
          | part    |         |
          | amid-   | At bow. | At stern.
          | ships.  |         |
  --------+---------+---------+-----------
          |_Ft. in._|_Ft. in._| _Ft. in._
   D      |   20 0  |   33 0  |   25 0
   E      |   11 0  |   24 0  |   16 0
   F      |    2 6  |   15 6  |    7 6
  --------+---------+---------------------

These were the three of the four decks which, as already stated, were
continuous all fore and aft. The other decks, G and orlop, which
extended only along a part of the ship, were spaced about 8 feet apart.
The G deck forward was about 7 feet 6 inches above the water line at the
bow and about level with the water line at bulkhead D, which was at the
fore end of boilers. The G deck aft and the orlop deck at both ends of
the vessel were below the water line. The orlop deck abaft of the
turbine engine room and forward of the collision bulkhead was
water-tight. Elsewhere, except in very small patches, the decks were not
water-tight. All the decks had large openings or hatchways in them in
each compartment, so that water could rise freely through them.

There was also a water-tight inner bottom, or tank top, about 5 feet
above the top of the keel, which extended for the full breadth of the
vessel from bulkhead A to 20 feet before bulkhead P, i.e., for the whole
length of the vessel except a small distance at each end. The transverse
water-tight divisions of this double bottom practically coincided with
the water-tight transverse bulkheads; there was an additional
water-tight division under the middle of the reciprocating engine-room
compartment (between bulkheads K and L). There were three longitudinal
water-tight divisions in the double bottom, one at the center of the
ship, extending for about 670 feet, and one on each side, extending for
447 feet.

All the transverse bulkheads were carried up water-tight to at least the
height of the E deck. Bulkheads A and B, and all bulkheads from K (90
feet abaft amidships) to P, both inclusive, further extended water-tight
up to the underside of D deck. A bulkhead further extended to C deck,
but it was water-tight only to D deck.

Bulkheads A and B forward, and P aft, had no openings in them. All the
other bulkheads had openings in them, which were fitted with water-tight
doors. Bulkheads D to O, both inclusive, had each a vertical sliding
water-tight door at the level of the floor of the engine and boiler
rooms for the use of the engineers and firemen. On the Orlop deck there
was one door, on bulkhead N, for access to the refrigerator rooms. On G
deck there were no water-tight doors in the bulkheads. On both the F and
E decks nearly all the bulkheads had water-tight doors, mainly for
giving communication between the different blocks of passenger
accommodation. All the doors, except those in the engine-rooms and
boiler rooms, were horizontal sliding doors workable by hand, both at
the door and at the deck above.

There were 12 vertical sliding water-tight doors which completed the
water-tightness of bulkheads D to O, inclusive, in the boiler and engine
rooms. Those were capable of being simultaneously closed from the
bridge. The operation of closing was intended to be preceded by the
ringing from the bridge of a warning bell.

These doors were closed by the bringing into operation of an electric
current and could not be opened until this current was cut off from the
bridge. When this was done the doors could only be opened by a
mechanical operation manually worked separately at each door. They
could, however, be individually lowered again by operating a lever at
the door. In addition, they would be automatically closed, if open,
should water enter the compartment. This operation was done in each case
by means of a float, actuated by the water, which was in either of the
compartments which happened to be in the process of being flooded.

There were no sluice valves or means of letting water from one
compartment to another.


DETAILED DESCRIPTION.

The following is a more detailed description of the vessel, her
passenger and crew accommodation, and her machinery.


WATER-TIGHT COMPARTMENTS.

The following table shows the decks to which the bulkheads extended, and
the number of doors in them:

  +---------+---------+------------+---------+-------+-------+
  |         |         |   Engine   |         |       |       |
  |         | Extends | and boiler |         |       |       |
  |Bulkhead |  up to  |spaces (all |Orlop to |F to E |E to D |
  | letter. |  under- | controlled |G deck.  | deck. | deck. |
  |         | side of |    from    |         |       |       |
  |         |  deck.  |  bridge).  |         |       |       |
  +---------+---------+------------+---------+-------+-------+
  |   A     |   C     |    ...     |   ...   |  ...  |  ...  |
  |   B     |   D     |    ...     |   ...   |  ...  |  ...  |
  |   C     |   E     |    ...     |   ...   |   1   |  ...  |
  |   D     |   E     |   [1]1     |   ...   |   1   |  ...  |
  |   E     |   E     |   [2]1     |   ...   |  ...  |  ...  |
  |   F     |   E     |   [2]1     |   ...   |   2   |  ...  |
  |   G     |   E     |   [2]1     |   ...   |  ...  |  ...  |
  |   H     |   E     |   [2]1     |   ...   |   2   |  ...  |
  |   J     |   E     |   [2]1     |   ...   |   2   |  ...  |
  |   K     |   D     |      1     |   ...   |  ...  |   2   |
  |   L     |   D     |      1     |   ...   |  ...  |   2   |
  |   M     |   D     |      1     |   ...   |   1   |   2   |
  |   N     |   D     |      1     |     1   |   1   |   2   |
  |   O     |   D     |      1     |   ...   |  ...  |   1   |
  |   P     |   D     |    ...     |   ...   |  ...  |  ...  |
  +---------+---------+------------+---------+-------+-------+


The following table shows the actual contents of each separate
water-tight compartment. The compartments are shown in the left column,
the contents of each compartment being read off horizontally. The
contents of each water-tight compartment is separately given in the deck
space in which it is:

  -------+---------+----------+----------+-----------+-----------+---------
         | Length  |          |          |           |           |
         |of each  |          |          |           |           |
         | water-  |          |  Orlop   |           |           |
         | tight   |          |          |           |           |
  Water- |compart- |          |  to G    |  G to F   |  F to E   | E to D
  tight  |  ment   |          |          |           |           |
 compart-| in fore |  Hold.   |  deck.   |   deck.   |   deck.   |  deck.
    ment | and aft |          |          |           |           |
         | direc-  |          |          |           |           |
         | tion.   |          |          |           |           |
  -------+---------+----------+----------+-----------+-----------+---------
         |_Feet._  |          |          |           |           |
 Bow to A|     46  |Forepeak  |Forepeak  |Forepeak   |Forepeak   |Forepeak
         |         |tank (not |storeroom.|storeroom. |storeroom. |storeroom.
         |         |used      |          |           |           |
         |         |excepting |          |           |           |
         |         |for       |          |           |           |
         |         |trimming  |          |           |           |
         |         |ship).    |          |           |           |
  A-B    |     45  |Cargo     |Cargo.    |Living     |Living     |Living
         |         |          |          |spaces for |spaces for |spaces for
         |         |          |          |firemen,   |firemen.   |firemen.
         |         |          |          |etc.       |           |
  B-C    |     51  |   do     |  do      |Third-class|Third-class|Third-class
         |         |          |          |passenger  |passenger  |passenger
         |         |          |          |accommo-   |accommo-   |and seamen's
         |         |          |          |dation.    |dation.    |spaces.
  C-D    |     51  |Alternati-|Luggage   |Baggage,   |  do       |Third-class
         |         |vely coal |and       |squash     |           |passenger
         |         |and cargo.|mails.    |rackets, & |           |accommo-
         |         |          |          |third-class|           |dation.
         |         |          |          |passengers.|           |
  D-E    |     54  |No. 6     |No. 6     |Coal and   |   do      |First-class
         |         |boiler    |boiler    |boiler     |           |passenger
         |         |room.     |room.     |casing.    |           |accommo-
         |         |          |          |           |           |dation.
  E-F    |     57  |No. 5     |No. 5     |Coal bunker|Linen rooms|   Do.
         |         |boiler    |boiler    |and boiler |and        |
         |         |room.     |room.     |casing and |swimming   |
         |         |          |          |swimming   |bath.      |
         |         |          |          |bath.      |           |
  F-G    |     57  |No. 4     |No. 4     |Coal bunker|Steward's, |First-class
         |         |boiler    |boiler    | and boiler| Turkish   | and
         |         |room.     |room.     | casing.   | baths,    | stewards.
         |         |          |          |           | etc.      |
  G-H    |     57  |No. 3     |No. 3     |   do.     | Third-    |First and
         |         |boiler    |boiler    |           | class     | second
         |         |room.     |room.     |           | saloon.   | class and
         |         |          |          |           |           | stewards.
  H-J    |     60  |No. 2     |No. 2     |   do.     |   do.     |First class.
         |         |boiler    |boiler    |           |           |
         |         |room.     |room.     |           |           |
  J-K    |     35  |No. 1     |No. 1     |   do.     |Third-class|First class
         |         |boiler    |boiler    |           | galley,   | and
         |         |room.     |room.     |           | stewards, | stewards.
         |         |          |          |           | etc.      |
  K-L    |     69  |Recipro-  |Recipro-  |Reciprocat-|Engineers' |First class
         |         | cating-  | cating-  |ing-engine | and       | and
         |         | engine   | engine   |room       | recipro-  | engineers'
         |         |room.     |room.     |casing,    | cating-   | mess, etc.
         |         |          |          | workshop  | engine    |
         |         |          |          | and       | casing.   |
         |         |          |          | engineers'|           |
         |         |          |          | stores.   |           |
  L-M    |     57  |Turbine-  |Turbine-  |Turbine-   |Second-    |Second class
         |         |engine    |engine    |engine room|class-     |and stewards
         |         |room.     |room.     |casing and | turbine-  | etc.
         |         |          |          | small     |engine room|
         |         |          |          | stewards' |  casing.  |
         |         |          |          | stores.   |           |
  M-N    |     63  |Electric- |Provisions|Provisions.|Second     |Second and
         |         |engine    |and elect-|           |class      |third class.
         |         |room.     |ric engine|           |           |
         |         |          | casing.  |           |           |
  N-O    |     54  |Tunnel    |Refrigera-|Third class|   do      |   Do.
         |         |          |ted cargo.|           |           |
  O-P    |     57  |   do     |Cargo     |   do      |Third class|Third class.
  P to   |         |Afterpeak |Afterpeak |Stores     |Stores     |Stores.
   stern |         | tank for | tank for |           |           |
         |         | trimming | trimming |           |           |
         |         | ship.    | ship.    |           |           |
  -------+---------+----------+----------+-----------+-----------+------------

The vessel was constructed under survey of the British Board of Trade
for a passenger certificate, and also to comply with the American
immigration laws.

Steam was supplied from six entirely independent groups of boilers in
six separate water-tight compartments. The after boiler room No. 1
contained five single-ended boilers. Four other boiler rooms, Nos. 2, 3,
4, and 5, each contained five double-ended boilers. The forward boiler
room, No. 6, contained four double-ended boilers. The reciprocating
engines and most of the auxiliary machinery were in a seventh separate
water-tight compartment aft of the boilers; the low-pressure turbine,
the main condensers, and the thrust blocks of the reciprocating engine
were in an eighth separate water-tight compartment. The main electrical
machinery was in a ninth separate water-tight compartment immediately
abaft the turbine engine room. Two emergency steam-driven dynamos were
placed on the D deck, 21 feet above the level of the load water line.
These dynamos were arranged to take their supply of steam from any of
the three of the boiler rooms Nos. 2, 3, and 5, and were intended to be
available in the event of the main dynamo room being flooded.

The ship was equipped with the following:

(1) Wireless telegraphy.

(2) Submarine signaling.

(3) Electric lights and power systems.

(4) Telephones for communication between the different working positions
in the vessel. In addition to the telephones, the means of communication
included engine and docking telegraphs, and duplicate or emergency
engine-room telegraph, to be used in the event of any accident to the
ordinary telegraph.

(5) Three electric elevators for taking passengers in the first class up
to A deck, immediately below the boat deck, and one in the second class
for taking passengers up to the boat deck.

(6) Four electrically driven boat winches on the boat deck for hauling
up the boats.

(7) Life-saving appliances to the requirements of the board of trade,
including boats and life belts.

(8) Steam whistles on the two foremost funnels, worked on the
Willett-Bruce system of automatic control.

(9) Navigation appliances, including Kelvin's patent sounding machines
for finding the depth of water under the ship without stopping; Walker's
taffrail log for determining the speed of the ship; and flash signal
lamps fitted above the shelters at each of the navigating bridge for
Morse signaling with other ships.


DECKS AND ACCOMMODATION.

The boat deck was an uncovered deck, on which the boats were placed. At
its lowest point it was about 92 feet 6 inches above the keel. The
overall length of this deck was about 500 feet. The forward end of it
was fitted to serve as the navigating bridge of the vessel and was 190
feet from the bow. On the after end of the bridge was a wheel house,
containing the steering wheel and a steering compass. The chart room was
immediately abaft this. On the starboard side of the wheel house and
funnel casing were the navigating room, the captain's quarters, and some
officers' quarters. On the port side were the remainder of the officers'
quarters. At the middle line abaft the forward funnel casing were the
wireless-telegraphy rooms and the operators' quarters. The top of the
officers' house formed a short deck. The connections from the Marconi
aerials were made on this deck, and two of the collapsible boats were
placed on it. Aft of the officers' house were the first-class
passengers' entrance and stairways and other adjuncts to the passengers'
accommodation below. These stairways had a minimum effective width of 8
feet. They had assembling landings at the level of each deck, and three
elevators communicating from E to A decks, but not to the boat deck,
immediately on the fore side of the stairway.

All the boats except two Engelhardt life rafts were carried on this
deck. There were seven lifeboats on each side, 30 feet long, 9 feet
wide. There was an emergency cutter, 25 feet long, on each side at the
fore end of the deck. Abreast of each cutter was an Engelhardt life
raft. One similar raft was carried on the top of the officers' house on
each side. In all there were 14 lifeboats, 2 cutters, and 4 Engelhardt
life rafts.

The forward group of four boats and one Engelhardt raft were placed on
each side of the deck alongside the officers' quarters and the
first-class entrance. Further aft at the middle line on this deck was
the special platform for the standard compass. At the after end of this
deck was an entrance house for second-class passengers with a stairway
and elevator leading directly down to F deck. There were two vertical
iron ladders at the after end of this deck leading to A deck for the use
of the crew. Alongside and immediately forward of the second-class
entrance was the after group of lifeboats, four on each side of the
ship.

In addition to the main stairways mentioned there was a ladder on each
side amidships giving access from the A deck below. At the forward end
of the boat deck there was on each side a ladder leading up from A deck
with a landing there, from which by a ladder access to B deck could be
obtained direct. Between the reciprocating engine casing and the third
funnel casing there was a stewards' stairway, which communicated with
all the decks below as far as E deck. Outside the deck houses was
promenading space for first-class passengers.

_A deck._--The next deck below the boat deck was A deck. It extended
over a length of about 500 feet. On this deck was a long house extending
nearly the whole length of the deck. It was of irregular shape, varying
in width from 24 feet to 72 feet. At the forward end it contained 34
staterooms and abaft these a number of public rooms, etc., for
first-class passengers, including two first-class entrances and
stairway, reading room, lounge, and the smoke room. Outside the deck
house was a promenade for first-class passengers. The forward end of it
on both sides of the ship, below the forward group of boats and for a
short distance farther aft, was protected against the weather by a steel
screen, 192 feet long, with large windows in it. In addition to the
stairway described on the boat deck, there was near the after end of the
A deck and immediately forward of the first-class smoke room another
first-class entrance, giving access as far down as C deck. The
second-class stairway at the after end of this deck (already described
under the boat deck) had no exit on to the A deck. The stewards'
staircase opened onto this deck.

_B deck._--The next lowest deck was B deck, which constituted the top
deck of the strong structure of the vessel, the decks above and the side
plating between them being light plating. This deck extended
continuously for 550 feet. There were breaks or wells both forward and
aft of it, each about 50 feet long. It was terminated by a poop and
forecastle. On this deck were placed the principal staterooms of the
vessel, 97 in number, having berths for 198 passengers, and aft of these
was the first-class stairway and reception room, as well as the
restaurant for first-class passengers and its pantry and galley.
Immediately aft of this restaurant were the second-class stairway and
smoke room. At the forward end of the deck outside the house was an
assembling area, giving access by the ladders, previously mentioned,
leading directly to the boat deck. From this same space a ladderway led
to the forward third-class promenade on C deck. At the after end of it
were two ladders giving access to the after third-class promenade on C
deck. At the after end of this deck, at the middle line, was placed
another second-class stairway, which gave access to C, D, E, F, and G
decks.

At the forward end of the vessel, on the level of the B deck, was
situated the forecastle deck, which was 125 feet long. On it were
placed the gear for working the anchors and cables and for warping (or
moving) the ship in dock. At the after end, on the same level, was the
poop deck, about 105 feet long, which carried the after-warping
appliances and was a third-class promenading space. Arranged above the
poop was a light docking bridge, with telephone, telegraphs, etc.,
communicating to the main navigating bridge forward.

_C deck._--The next lowest deck was C deck. This was the highest deck
which extended continuously from bow to stern. At the forward end of it,
under the forecastle, was placed the machinery required for working the
anchors and cables and for the warping of the ship referred to on B deck
above. There were also the crew's galley and the seamen's and firemen's
mess-room accommodation, where their meals were taken. At the after end
of the forecastle, at each side of the ship, were the entrances to the
third-class spaces below. On the port side, at the extreme after end and
opening onto the deck, was the lamp room. The break in B deck between
the forecastle and the first-class passenger quarters formed a well
about 50 feet in length, which enabled the space under it on C deck to
be used as a third-class promenade. This space contained two hatchways,
the No. 2 hatch, and the bunker hatch. The latter of these hatchways
gave access to the space allotted to the first and second class baggage
hold, the mails, specie and parcel room, and to the lower hold, which
was used for cargo or coals. Abaft of this well there was a house 450
feet long and extending for the full breadth of the ship. It contained
148 staterooms for first class, besides service rooms of various kinds.
On this deck, at the forward first-class entrance, were the purser's
office and the inquiry office, where passengers' telegrams were received
for sending by the Marconi apparatus. Exit doors through the ship's side
were fitted abreast of this entrance. Abaft the after end of this long
house was a promenade at the ship's side for second-class passengers,
sheltered by bulwarks and bulkheads. In the middle of the promenade
stood the second-class library. The two second-class stairways were at
the ends of the library, so that from the promenade access was obtained
at each end to a second-class main stairway. There was also access by a
door from this space into each of the alleyways in the first-class
accommodation on each side of the ship and by two doors at the after end
into the after well. This after well was about 50 feet in length and
contained two hatchways called No. 5 and No. 6 hatches. Abaft this well,
under the poop, was the main third-class entrance for the after end of
the vessel leading directly down to G deck, with landings and access at
each deck. The effective width of this stairway was 16 feet to E deck.
From E to F it was 8 feet wide. Aft of this entrance on B deck were the
third-class smoke room and the general room. Between these rooms and the
stern was the steam steering gear and the machinery for working the
after-capstan gear, which was used for warping the after end of the
vessel. The steam steering gear had three cylinders. The engines were in
duplicate to provide for the possibility of breakdown of one set.

_D deck._--The general height from D deck to C deck was 10 feet 6
inches, this being reduced to 9 feet at the forward end, and 9 feet 6
inches at the after end, the taper being obtained gradually by
increasing the sheer of the D deck. The forward end of this deck
provided accommodation for 108 firemen, who were in two separate
watches. There was the necessary lavatory accommodation, abaft the
firemen's quarters at the sides of the ship. On each side of the middle
line immediately abaft the firemen's quarters there was a vertical
spiral staircase leading to the forward end of a tunnel, immediately
above the tank top, which extended from the foot of the staircase to the
forward stokehole, so that the firemen could pass direct to their work
without going through any passenger accommodation or over any passenger
decks. On D deck abaft of this staircase was the third class promenade
space which was covered in by C deck. From this promenade space there
were 4 separate ladderways with 2 ladders, 4 feet wide to each. One
ladderway on each side forward led to C deck, and one, the starboard,
led to E deck and continued to F deck as a double ladder and to G deck
as a single ladder. The two ladderways at the after end led to E deck on
both sides and to F deck on the port side. Abaft this promenade space
came a block of 50 first-class staterooms. This surrounded the forward
funnel. The main first-class reception room and dining saloon were aft
of these rooms and surrounded the No. 2 funnel. The reception room and
staircase occupied 83 feet of the length of the ship. The dining saloon
occupied 112 feet, and was between the second and third funnels. Abaft
this came the first-class pantry, which occupied 56 feet of the length
of the ship. The reciprocating engine hatch came up through this pantry.

Aft of the first-class pantry, the galley, which provides for both first
and second class passengers, occupied 45 feet of the length of the ship.
Aft of this were the turbine engine hatch and the emergency dynamos.
Abaft of and on the port side of this hatch were the second-class pantry
and other spaces used for the saloon service of the passengers. On the
starboard side abreast of these there was a series of rooms used for
hospitals and their attendants. These spaces occupied about 54 feet of
the length. Aft of these was the second-class saloon occupying 70 feet
of the length. In the next 88 feet of length there were 38 second-class
rooms and the necessary baths and lavatories. From here to the stern was
accommodation for third-class passengers and the main third-class
lavatories for the passengers in the after end of the ship. The
water-tight bulkheads come up to this deck throughout the length from
the stern as far forward as the bulkhead dividing the after boiler room
from the reciprocating engine room. The water-tight bulkhead of the two
compartments abaft the stem was carried up to this deck.

_E deck._--The water-tight bulkheads, other than those mentioned as
extending to D deck, all stopped at this deck. At the forward end was
provided accommodation for three watches of trimmers, in three separate
compartments, each holding 24 trimmers. Abaft this, on the port side,
was accommodation for 44 seamen. Aft of this, and also on the starboard
side of it, were the lavatories for crew and third-class passengers;
further aft again came the forward third-class lavatories. Immediately
aft of this was a passageway right across the ship communicating
directly with the ladderways leading to the decks above and below and
gangway doors in the ship's side. This passage was 9 feet wide at the
sides and 15 feet at the center of the ship.

From the after end of this cross passage main alleyways on each side of
the ship ran right through to the after end of the vessel. That on the
port side was about 8-1/2 feet wide. It was the general communication
passage for the crew and third-class passengers and was known as the
working passage. In this passage at the center line in the middle of the
length of the ship direct access was obtained to the third-class dining
rooms on the deck below by means of a ladderway 20 feet wide. Between
the working passage and the ship's side was the accommodation for the
petty officers, most of the stewards, and the engineers' mess room. This
accommodation extended for 475 feet. From this passage access was
obtained to both engine rooms and the engineers' accommodation, some
third-class lavatories and also some third-class accommodation at the
after end. There was another cross passage at the end of this
accommodation about 9 feet wide, terminating in gangway doors on each
side of the ship. The port side of it was for third-class passengers and
the starboard for second class. A door divided the parts, but it could
be opened for any useful purpose, or for an emergency. The second-class
stairway leading to the boat deck was in the cross passageway.

The passage on the starboard side ran through the first and then the
second-class accommodation, and the forward main first-class stairway
and elevators extended to this deck, whilst both the second-class main
stairways were also in communication with this starboard passage. There
were 4 first-class, 8 first or second alternatively, and 19 second-class
rooms leading off this starboard passage.

The remainder of the deck was appropriated to third-class accommodation.
This contained the bulk of the third-class accommodation. At the forward
end of it was the accommodation for 53 firemen constituting the third
watch. Aft of this in three water-tight compartments there was
third-class accommodation extending to 147 feet. In the next water-tight
compartment were the swimming bath and linen rooms. In the next
water-tight compartments were stewards' accommodation on the port side,
and the Turkish baths on the starboard side. The next two water-tight
compartments each contained a third-class dining room.

The third-class stewards' accommodation, together with the third-class
galley and pantries, filled the water-tight compartment. The engineers'
accommodation was in the next compartment directly alongside the casing
of the reciprocating engine room. The next 3 compartments were allotted
to 64 second-class staterooms. These communicated direct with the
second-class main stairways. The after compartments contained
third-class accommodation. All spaces on this deck had direct ladderway
communication with the deck above, so that if it became necessary to
close the water-tight doors in the bulkheads an escape was available in
all cases. On this deck in the way of the boiler rooms were placed the
electrically driven fans which provided ventilation to the stokeholes.

_G deck._--The forward end of this deck had accommodation for 15 leading
firemen and 30 greasers. The next water-tight compartment contained
third-class accommodation in 26 rooms for 106 people. The next
water-tight compartment contained the first-class baggage room, the
post-office accommodation, a racquet court, and 7 third-class rooms for
34 passengers. From this point to the after end of the boiler room the
space was used for the 'tween deck bunkers. Alongside the reciprocating
engine room were the engineers' stores and workshop. Abreast of the
turbine engine room were some of the ship's stores. In the next
water-tight compartment abaft the turbine room were the main body of the
stores. The next two compartments were appropriated to 186 third-class
passengers in 60 rooms; this deck was the lowest on which any passengers
or crew were carried.

Below G deck were two partial decks, the orlop and lower orlop decks,
the latter extending only through the fore peak and No. 1 hold; on the
former deck, abaft the turbine engine room, were some storerooms
containing stores for ship's use.

Below these decks again came the inner bottom, extending fore-and-aft
through about nine-tenths of the vessel's length, and on this were
placed the boilers, main and auxiliary machinery, and the electric-light
machines. In the remaining spaces below G deck were cargo holds or
'tween decks, seven in all, six forward and one aft. The firemen's
passage, giving direct access from their accommodation to the forward
boiler room by stairs at the forward end, contained the various pipes
and valves connected with the pumping arrangements at the forward end of
the ship, and also the steam pipes conveying steam to the windlass gear
forward and exhaust steam pipes leading from winches and other deck
machinery. It was made thoroughly water-tight throughout its length, and
at its after end was closed by a water-tight vertical sliding door of
the same character as other doors on the inner bottom. Special
arrangements were made for pumping this space out, if necessary. The
pipes were placed in this tunnel to protect them from possible damage by
coal or cargo, and also to facilitate access to them.

On the decks was provided generally, in the manner above described,
accommodation for a maximum number of 1,034 first-class passengers, and
at the same time 510 second-class passengers and 1,022 third-class
passengers. Some of the accommodation was of an alternative character
and could be used for either of two classes of passengers. In the
statement of figures the higher alternative class has been reckoned.
This makes a total accommodation for 2,566 passengers.

Accommodation was provided for the crew as follows: About 75 of the deck
department, including officers and doctors, 326 of the engine-room
department, including engineers, and 544 of the victualing department,
including pursers and leading stewards.

_Access of passengers to the boat deck._--The following routes led
directly from the various parts of the first-class passenger
accommodation to the boat deck: From the forward ends of A, B, C, D, and
E decks by the staircase in the forward first-class entrance direct to
the boat deck. The elevators led from the same decks as far as A deck,
where further access was obtained by going up the top flight of the main
staircase.

The same route was available for first-class passengers forward of
midships on B, C, and E decks.

First-class passengers abaft midships on B and C decks could use the
staircase in the after main entrance to A deck, and then could pass out
onto the deck and by the midships stairs beside the house ascend to the
boat deck. They could also use the stewards' staircase between the
reciprocating-engine casing and Nos. 1 and 2 boiler casing, which led
direct to the boat deck. This last route was also available for
passengers on E deck in the same divisions who could use the forward
first-class main stairway and elevators.

Second-class passengers on D deck could use their own after stairway to
B deck and could then pass up their forward stairway to the boat deck,
or else could cross their saloon and use the same stairway throughout.

Of the second-class passengers on E deck, those abreast of the
reciprocating-engine casing, unless the water-tight door immediately
abaft of them was closed, went aft and joined the other second-class
passengers. If, however, the water-tight door at the end of their
compartment was closed, they passed through an emergency door into the
engine room and directly up to the boat deck by the ladders and gratings
in the engine-room casing.

The second-class passengers on E deck in the compartment abreast the
turbine casing on the starboard side, and also those on F deck on both
sides below could pass through M water-tight bulkhead to the forward
second-class main stairway. If this door were closed, they could pass by
the stairway up to the serving space at the forward end of the
second-class saloon and go into the saloon and thence up the forward
second-class stairway.

Passengers between M and N bulkheads on both E and F decks could pass
directly up to the forward second-class stairway to the boat deck.

Passengers between N and O bulkheads on D, E, F, and G decks could pass
by the after second-class stairway to B deck and then cross to the
forward second-class stairway and go up to the boat deck.

Third-class passengers at the fore end of the vessel could pass by the
staircases to C deck in the forward well and by ladders on the port and
starboard sides at the forward end of the deck houses, thence direct to
the boat deck outside the officers' accommodation. They might also pass
along the working passage on E deck and through the emergency door to
the forward first-class main stairway, or through the door on the same
deck at the forward end of the first-class alleyway and up the
first-class stairway direct to the boat deck.

The third-class passengers at the after end of the ship passed up their
stairway to E deck and into the working passage and through the
emergency doors to the two second-class stairways and so to the boat
deck, like second-class passengers. Or, alternatively, they could
continue up their own stairs and entrance to C deck, thence by the two
ladders at the after end of the bridge onto the B deck and thence by the
forward second-class stairway direct to the boat deck.

_Crew._--From each boiler room an escape or emergency ladder was
provided direct to the boat deck by the fidleys, in the boiler casings,
and also into the working passage on E deck, and thence by the stair
immediately forward of the reciprocating-engine casing, direct to the
boat deck.

From both the engine rooms ladders and gratings gave direct access to
the boat deck.

From the electric engine room, the after tunnels, and the forward pipe
tunnels escapes were provided direct to the working passage on E deck
and thence by one of the several routes already detailed from that
space.

From the crew's quarters they could go forward by their own staircases
into the forward well and thence, like the third-class passengers, to
the boat deck.

The stewards' accommodation being all connected to the working passage
or the forward main first-class stairway, they could use one of the
routes from thence.

The engineers' accommodation also communicated with the working passage,
but as it was possible for them to be shut between two water-tight
bulkheads, they had also a direct route by the gratings in the
engine-room casing to the boat deck.

On all the principal accommodation decks the alleyways and stairways
provided a ready means of access to the boat deck, and there were clear
deck spaces in way of all first, second, and third class main entrances
and stairways on boat deck and all decks below.


STRUCTURE.

The vessel was built throughout of steel and had a cellular double
bottom of the usual type, with a floor at every frame, its depth at the
center line being 63 inches, except in way of the reciprocating
machinery, where it was 78 inches. For about half of the length of the
vessel this double bottom extended up the ship's side to a height of 7
feet above the keel. Forward and aft of the machinery space the
protection of the inner bottom extended to a less height above the keel.
It was so divided that there were four separate water-tight compartments
in the breadth of the vessel. Before and abaft the machinery space there
was a water-tight division at the center line only, except in the
foremost and aftermost tanks. Above the double bottom the vessel was
constructed of the usual transverse frame system, reenforced by web
frames, which extended to the highest decks.

At the forward end the framing and plating was strengthened with a view
to preventing panting and damage when meeting thin harbor ice.

Beams were fitted on every frame at all decks from the boat deck
downward. An external bilge keel about 300 feet long and 25 inches deep
was fitted along the bilge amidships.

The heavy ship's plating was carried right up to the boat deck, and
between the C and B decks was doubled. The stringer or edge plate of the
B deck was also doubled. This double plating was hydraulic riveted.

All decks were steel plated throughout.

The transverse strength of the ship was in part dependent on the 15
transverse water-tight bulkheads, which were specially stiffened and
strengthened to enable them to stand the necessary pressure in the event
of accident, and they were connected by double angles to decks, inner
bottom, and shell plating.

The two decks above the B deck were of comparatively light scantling,
but strong enough to insure their proving satisfactory in these
positions in rough weather.

_Water-tight subdivision._--In the preparation of the design of this
vessel it was arranged that the bulkheads and divisions should be so
placed that the ship would remain afloat in the event of any two
adjoining compartments being flooded and that they should be so built
and strengthened that the ship would remain afloat under this condition.
The minimum freeboard that the vessel would have in the event of any two
compartments being flooded was between 2 feet 6 inches and 3 feet from
the deck adjoining the top of the water-tight bulkheads. With this
object in view, 15 water-tight bulkheads were arranged in the vessel.
The lower part of C bulkhead was doubled and was in the form of a
cofferdam. So far as possible the bulkheads were carried up in one plane
to their upper sides, but in cases where they had for any reason to be
stepped forward or aft, the deck, in way of the step, was made into a
water-tight flat, thus completing the water-tightness of the
compartment. In addition to this, G deck in the after peak was made a
water-tight flat. The orlop deck between bulkheads which formed the top
of the tunnel was also water-tight. The orlop deck in the forepeak tank
was also a water-tight flat. The electric-machinery compartment was
further protected by a structure some distance in from the ship's side,
forming six separate water-tight compartments, which were used for the
storage of fresh water.

Where openings were required for the working of the ship in these
water-tight bulkheads they were closed by water-tight sliding doors
which could be worked from a position above the top of the water-tight
bulkhead, and those doors immediately above the inner bottom were of a
special automatic closing pattern, as described below. By this
subdivision there were in all 73 compartments, 29 of these being above
the inner bottom.

_Water-tight doors._--The doors (12 in number) immediately above the
inner bottom were in the engine and boiler room spaces. They were of
Messrs. Harland & Wolff's latest type, working vertically. The doorplate
was of cast iron of heavy section, strongly ribbed. It closed by
gravity, and was held in the open position by a clutch which could be
released by means of a powerful electromagnet controlled from the
captain's bridge. In the event of accident, or at any time when it might
be considered desirable, the captain or officer on duty could, by simply
moving an electric switch, immediately close all these doors. The time
required for the doors to close was between 25 and 30 seconds. Each door
could also be closed from below by operating a hand lever fitted
alongside the door. As a further precaution floats were provided beneath
the floor level, which, in the event of water accidentally entering any
of the compartments, automatically lifted and thus released the
clutches, thereby permitting the doors in that particular compartment to
close if they had not already been dropped by any other means. These
doors were fitted with cataracts, which controlled the speed of closing.
Due notice of closing from the bridge was given by a warning bell.

A ladder or escape was provided in each boiler room, engine room, and
similar water-tight compartment, in order that the closing of the doors
at any time should not imprison the men working therein.

The water-tight doors on E deck were of horizontal pattern, with
wrought-steel doorplates. Those on F deck and the one aft on the Orlop
deck were of similar type, but had cast-iron doorplates of heavy
section, strongly ribbed. Each of the between-deck doors, and each of
the vertical doors on the tank top level could be operated by the
ordinary hand gear from the deck above the top of the water-tight
bulkhead, and from a position on the next deck above, almost directly
above the door. To facilitate the quick closing of the doors, plates
were affixed in suitable positions on the sides of the alleyways,
indicating the positions of the deck plates, and a box spanner was
provided for each door, hanging in suitable clips alongside the deck
plate.

_Ship's side doors._--Large side doors were provided through the side
plating, giving access to passengers' or crew's accommodation as
follows:

On the saloon (D) deck on the starboard side in the forward third-class
open space, one baggage door.

In way of the forward first-class entrance, two doors close together on
each side.

On the upper (E) deck, one door each side at the forward end of the
working passage.

On the port side abreast the engine room, one door leading into the
working passage. One door each side on the port and starboard sides aft
into the forward second-class entrance.

All the doors on the upper deck were secured by lever handles, and were
made water-tight by means of rubber strips. Those on the saloon deck
were closed by lever handles, but had no rubber.

_Accommodation ladder._--One teak accommodation ladder was provided, and
could be worked on either side of the ship in the gangway door opposite
the second-class entrance on the upper deck (E). It had a folding
platform and portable stanchions, hand rope, etc. The ladder extended to
within 3 feet 6 inches of the vessel's light draft, and was stowed
overhead in the entrance abreast the forward second-class main
staircase. Its lower end was arranged so as to be raised and lowered
from a davit immediately above.

_Masts and rigging._--The vessel was rigged with two masts and fore and
aft sails. The two pole masts were constructed of steel, and stiffened
with angle irons. The poles at the top of the mast were made of teak.

A lookout cage, constructed of steel, was fitted on the foremast at a
height of about 95 feet above the water line. Access to the cage was
obtained by an iron vertical ladder inside of the foremast, with an
opening at C deck and one at the lookout cage. An iron ladder was fitted
on the foremast from the hounds to the masthead light.


LIFE-SAVING APPLIANCES.

_Life buoys._--Forty-eight, with beckets, were supplied, of pattern
approved by the board of trade. They were placed about the ship.

_Life belts._--Three thousand five hundred and sixty life belts, of the
latest improved overhead pattern, approved by the board of trade, were
supplied and placed on board the vessel and there inspected by the board
of trade. These were distributed throughout all the sleeping
accommodation.

_Lifeboats._--Twenty boats in all were fitted on the vessel, and were of
the following dimensions and capacities:

     Fourteen wood lifeboats, each 30 feet long by 9 feet 1 inch broad
     by 4 feet deep, with a cubic capacity of 655.2 cubic feet,
     constructed to carry 65 persons each.

     Emergency boats:

     One wood cutter, 25 feet 2 inches long by 7 feet 2 inches broad by
     3 feet deep, with a cubic capacity of 326.6 cubic feet, constructed
     to carry 40 persons.

     One wood cutter, 25 feet 2 inches long by 7 feet 1 inch broad by 3
     feet deep, with a cubic capacity of 322.1 cubic feet, constructed
     to carry 40 persons.

     Four Engelhardt collapsible boats, 27 feet 5 inches long by 8 feet
     broad by 3 feet deep, with a cubic capacity of 376.6 cubic feet,
     constructed to carry 47 persons each.

     Or a total of 11,327.9 cubic feet for 1,178 persons.

The lifeboats and cutters were constructed as follows:

The keels were of elm. The stems and stern posts were of oak. They were
all clinker built of yellow pine, double fastened with copper nails,
clinched over rooves. The timbers were of elm, spaced about 9 inches
apart, and the seats pitch pine, secured with galvanized-iron double
knees. The buoyancy tanks in the lifeboats were of 18 ounce copper, and
of capacity to meet the board of trade requirements.

The lifeboats were fitted with Murray's disengaging gear, with
arrangements for simultaneously freeing both ends if required. The gear
was fastened at a suitable distance from the forward and after ends of
the boats, to suit the davits. Life lines were fitted round the gunwales
of the lifeboats. The davit blocks were treble for the lifeboats and
double for the cutters. They were of elm, with lignum vitae roller
sheaves, and were bound inside with iron, and had swivel eyes. There
were manila rope falls of sufficient length for lowering the boats to
the vessel's light draft, and when the boats were lowered, to be able to
reach the boat winches on the boat deck.

The lifeboats were stowed on hinged wood chocks on the boat deck, by
groups of three at the forward and four at the after ends. On each side
of the boat deck the cutters were arranged forward of the group of three
and fitted to lash outboard as emergency boats. They were immediately
abaft the navigating bridge.

The Engelhardt collapsible lifeboats were stowed abreast of the cutters,
one on each side of the ship, and the remaining two on top of the
officers' house, immediately abaft the navigating bridge.

The boat equipment was in accordance with the board of trade
requirements. Sails for each lifeboat and cutter were supplied and
stowed in painted bags. Covers were supplied for the lifeboats and
cutters, and a sea anchor for each boat. Every lifeboat was furnished
with a special spirit boat compass and fitting for holding it; these
compasses were carried in a locker on the boat deck. A provision tank
and water beaker were supplied to each boat.

_Compasses._--Compasses were supplied as follows:

One Kelvin standard compass, with azimuth mirror on compass platform.

One Kelvin steering compass inside of wheelhouse.

One Kelvin steering compass on captain's bridge.

One light card compass for docking bridge.

Fourteen spirit compasses for lifeboats.

All the ships' compasses were lighted with oil and electric lamps. They
were adjusted by Messrs. C. J. Smith, of Southampton, on the passage
from Belfast to Southampton and Southampton to Queenstown.

_Charts._--All the necessary charts were supplied.

_Distress signals._--These were supplied of number and pattern approved
by Board of Trade--i. e., 36 socket signals in lieu of guns, 12 ordinary
rockets, 2 Manwell Holmes deck flares, 12 blue lights, and 6 lifebuoy
lights.


PUMPING ARRANGEMENTS.

The general arrangement of piping was designed so that it was possible
to pump from any flooded compartment by two independent systems of
10-inch mains having cross connections between them. These were
controlled from above by rods and wheels led to the level of the
bulkhead deck. By these it was possible to isolate any flooded space,
together with any suctions in it. If any of these should happen
accidentally to be left open, and consequently out of reach, it could be
shut off from the main by the wheel on the bulkhead deck. This
arrangement was specially submitted to the Board of Trade and approved
by them.

The double bottom of the vessel was divided by 17 transverse water-tight
divisions, including those bounding the fore and aft peaks, and again
subdivided by a center fore-and-aft bulkhead, and two longitudinal
bulkheads, into 46 compartments. Fourteen of these compartments had
8-inch suctions, 23 had 6-inch suctions, and 3 had 5-inch suctions
connected to the 10-inch ballast main suction; 6 compartments were used
exclusively for fresh water.

The following bilge suctions were provided for dealing with water above
the double bottom, viz, in No. 1 hold two 3-1/2-inch suctions, No. 2
hold two 3-1/2-inch and 2 3-inch suctions, bunker hold, two 3-1/2-inch
and two 3-inch suctions.

The valves in connection with the forward bilge and ballast suctions
were placed in the firemen's passage, the water-tight pipe tunnel
extending from No. 6 boiler room to the after end of No. 1 hold. In this
tunnel, in addition to two 3-inch bilge suctions, one at each end, there
was a special 3-1/2-inch suction with valve rod led up to the lower deck
above the load line, so as always to have been accessible should the
tunnel be flooded accidentally.

In No. 6 boiler room there were three 3-1/2-inch, one 4-1/2-inch, and
two 3-inch suctions.

In No. 5 boiler room there were three 3-1/2-inch, one 5-inch, and two
3-inch suctions.

In No. 4 boiler room there were three 3-1/2-inch, one 4-1/2-inch, and
two 3-inch suctions.

In No. 3 boiler room there were three 3-1/2-inch, one 5-inch, and two
3-inch suctions.

In No. 2 boiler room there were three 3-1/2-inch, one 5-inch, and two
3-inch suctions.

In No. 1 boiler room there were two 3-1/2-inch, one 5-inch, and two
3-inch suctions.

In the reciprocating engine room there were two 3-1/2-inch, six 3-inch,
two 18-inch, and two 5-inch suctions.

In the turbine engine room there were two 3-1/2-inch, three 3-inch, two
18-inch, two 5-inch, and one 4-inch suctions.

In the electric engine room there were four 3-1/2-inch suctions.

In the storerooms above the electric engine room there was one 3-inch
suction.

In the forward tunnel compartment there were two 3-1/2-inch suctions.

In the water-tight flat over the tunnel compartment there were two
3-inch suctions.

In the tunnel after compartment there were two 3-1/2-inch suctions.

In the water-tight flat over the tunnel after compartment there were two
3-inch suctions.


ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION.

_Main generating sets._--There were four engines and dynamos, each
having a capacity of 400 kilowatts at 100 volts and consisting of a
vertical three-crank compound-forced lubrication inclosed engine of
sufficient power to drive the electrical plant.

The engines were direct-coupled to their respective dynamos.

These four main sets were situated in a separate water-tight compartment
about 63 feet long by 24 feet high, adjoining the after end of the
turbine room at the level of the inner bottom.

Steam to the electric engines was supplied from two separate lengths of
steam pipes, connecting on the port side to the five single-ended
boilers in compartment No. 1 and two in compartment No. 2, and on the
starboard side to the auxiliary steam pipe which derived steam from the
five single-ended boilers in No. 1 compartment, two in No. 2, and two in
No. 4. By connections at the engine room forward bulkhead steam could be
taken from any boiler in the ship.

_Auxiliary generating sets._--In addition to the four main generating
sets, there were two 30-kilowatt engines and dynamos situated on a
platform in the turbine engine room casing on saloon deck level, 20 feet
above the water line. They were the same general type as the main sets.

These auxiliary emergency sets were connected to the boilers by means of
a separate steam pipe running along the working passage above E deck,
with branches from three boiler rooms, Nos. 2, 3, and 5, so that should
the main sets be temporarily out of action the auxiliary sets could
provide current for such lights and power appliances as would be
required in the event of emergency.

_Electric lighting._--The total number of incandescent lights was
10,000, ranging from 16 to 100 candlepower, the majority being of
Tantallum type, except in the cargo spaces and for the portable
fittings, where carbon lamps were provided. Special dimming lamps of
small amount of light were provided in the first-class rooms.

_Electric heating and power and mechanical ventilation._--Altogether 562
electric heaters and 153 electric motors were installed throughout the
vessel, including six 50-hundredweight and two 30-hundredweight cranes,
four 3-ton cargo winches, and four 15-hundredweight boat winches.

There were also four electric passenger lifts, three forward of the
first-class main entrance and one in the second-class forward entrance,
each to carry 12 persons.

_Telephones._--Loud speaking telephones of navy pattern were fitted for
communication between the following:

Wheelhouse on the navigating bridge and the forecastle.

Wheelhouse on the navigating bridge and the lookout station on the
crow's nest.

Wheelhouse on the navigating bridge and the engine room.

Wheelhouse on the navigating bridge and the poop.

Chief engineer's cabin and the engine room.

Engine room and Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 stokeholds.

These were operated both from the ship's lighting circuit, through a
motor generator, and alternatively by a stand-by battery, which by means
of an automatic switch could be introduced in the circuit should the
main supply fail.

There was also a separate telephone system for intercommunication
between a number of the chief officials and service rooms, through a
50-line exchange switchboard.

A number of the pantries and galleys were also in direct telephonic
communication.

_Wireless telegraphy._--The wireless telegraphy system was worked by a
Marconi 5-kilowatt motor generator. The house for the Marconi
instruments was situated on the boat deck close to the bridge. There
were four parallel aerial wires extended between the masts, fastened to
light booms; from the aerials the connecting wires were led to the
instruments in the house. There were two complete sets of apparatus, one
for the transmitting and one for receiving messages, the former being
placed in a sound-proof chamber in one corner of the wireless house.

There was also an independent storage battery and coil, in event of the
failure of the current supply, which came from the ship's dynamos.

_Submarine signaling._--The Submarine Signal Co.'s apparatus was
provided for receiving signals from the submarine bells. Small tanks
containing the microphones were placed on the inside of the hull of the
vessel on the port and starboard sides below the water level, and were
connected by wires to receivers situated in the navigating room on the
port side of the officer's deck house.

_Various._--The whistles were electrically actuated on the Willett Bruce
system. The boiler-room telegraphs, stoking indicators, rudder
indicators, clocks and thermostats were also electrical. The water-tight
doors were released by electric magnets.

_Emergency circuit._--A separate and distinct installation was fitted in
all parts of the vessel, deriving current from the two 30-kilowatt sets
above mentioned, so that in the event of the current from the main
dynamos being unavailable an independent supply was obtainable.
Connected to the emergency circuit were above 500 incandescent lamps
fitted throughout all passenger, crew, and machinery compartments, at
the end of passages, and near stairways, also on the boat deck, to
enable anyone to find their way from one part of the ship to the other.

The following were also connected to the emergency circuit by means of
change-over switches: Five arc lamps, seven cargo and gangway lanterns,
Marconi apparatus, mast, side, and stern lights, and all lights on
bridge, including those for captain's, navigating, and chart rooms,
wheelhouse, telegraphs and Morse signaling lanterns, and four
electrically-driven boat winches. These latter, situated on the boat
deck, were each capable of lifting a load of 15 hundredweight at a speed
of 100 feet per minute.

_Ventilating._--There were 12 electrically-driven fans for supplying air
to the stokeholds, 6 electrically-driven fans for engine and turbine
room ventilation. There were fans for engine and boiler rooms.


MACHINERY.

_Description._--The propelling machinery was of the combination type,
having two sets of reciprocating engines driving the wing propellers and
a low-pressure turbine working the center propeller. Steam was supplied
by 24 double-ended boilers and 5 single-ended boilers, arranged for a
working pressure of 215 pounds per square inch. The turbine was placed
in a separate compartment aft of the reciprocating-engine room and
divided from it by a water-tight bulkhead. The main condensers, with
their circulating pumps and air pumps, were placed in the turbine room.
The boilers were arranged in six water-tight compartments, the
single-ended boilers being placed in the one nearest the main engines,
the whole being built under board of trade survey for passenger
certificate.

_Reciprocating engines._--The reciprocating engines were of the
four-crank triple-expansion type. Each set had four inverted,
direct-acting cylinders, the high-pressure having a diameter of 54
inches, the intermediate pressure of 84 inches, and each of the two
low-pressure cylinders of 97 inches, all with a stroke of 6 feet 3
inches. The valves of the high-pressure and intermediate cylinders were
of the piston type, and the low-pressure cylinder had double-ported
slide valves, fitted with Stephenson link motion. Each engine was
reversed by a Brown type of direct-acting steam and hydraulic engine.
There was also a separate steam-driven high-pressure pump fitted for
operating either or both of the reversing engines. This alternative
arrangement was a stand-by in case of breakdown of the steam pipes to
these engines.

_Turbine._--The low-pressure turbine was of the Parsons reaction type,
direct coupled to the center line of shafting and arranged for driving
in the ahead direction only. It exhausted to the two condensers, placed
one on each side of it. A shut-off valve was fitted in each of the
eduction pipes leading to the condensers. An emergency governor was
fitted and arranged to shut off steam to the turbine and simultaneously
change over the exhaust from the reciprocating engines to the
condensers, should the speed of the turbine become excessive through the
breaking of a shaft or other accident.

_Boilers._--All the boilers were 15 feet 9 inches in diameter, the 24
double-ended boilers being 20 feet long, and the single-ended 11 feet 9
inches long. Each double-ended boiler had six and each single-ended
boiler three furnaces, with a total heating surface of 144,142 square
feet and a grate surface of 3,466 square feet. The boilers were
constructed in accordance with the rules of the board of trade for a
working pressure of 215 pounds per square inch. They were arranged for
working under natural draft, assisted by fans, which blew air into the
open stokehold.

_Auxiliary steam pipes._--The five single-ended boilers and those in
boiler rooms Nos. 2 and 4 had separate steam connections to the pipe
supplying steam for working the auxiliary machinery, and the five
single-ended boilers and the two port boilers in boiler room No. 2 had
separate steam connections to the pipe supplying steam for working the
electric-light engines. A cross connection was also made between the
main and auxiliary pipes in the reciprocating-engine room, so that the
auxiliaries could be worked from any boiler in the ship. Steam pipes
also were led separately from three of the boiler rooms (Nos. 2, 3, 5)
above the water-tight bulkheads and along the working passage to the
emergency electric-light engines placed above the load line in the
turbine room. Pipes were also led from this steam supply to the pumps in
the engine room, which were connected to the bilges throughout the ship.

_Main steam pipes._--There were two main lines of steam pipes led to the
engine room, with shut-off valves at three of the bulkheads. Besides the
shut-off valves at the engine-room bulkhead, a quick-acting emergency
valve was fitted on each main steam pipe, so that the steam could at
once be shut off in case of rupture of the main pipe.

_Condensing plant and pumps._--There were two main condensers, having a
combined cooling surface of 50,550 square feet, designed to work under a
vacuum of 28 inches with cooling water at 60 deg. F. The condensers were
pear shaped in section, and built of mild steel plates.

Four gun-metal centrifugal pumps were fitted for circulating water
through the condensers. Each pump had suction and discharge pipes of
29-inch bore, and was driven by a compound engine. Besides the main sea
suctions, two of the pumps had direct bilge suctions from the turbine
room and the other two from the reciprocating-engine room. The bilge
suctions were 18 inches diameter. Four of Weir's "Dual" air pumps were
fitted, two to each condenser, and discharged to two feed tanks placed
in the turbine engine room.

_Bilge and ballast pumps._--The ship was also fitted with the following
pumps: Five ballast and bilge pumps, each capable of discharging 250
tons of water per hour; three bilge pumps, each of 150 tons per hour
capacity.

One ash ejector was placed in each of the large boiler compartments to
work the ash ejectors, and to circulate or feed the boilers as required.
This pump was also connected to the bilges, except in the case of three
of the boiler rooms, where three of the ballast and bilge pumps were
placed. The pumps in each case had direct bilge suctions as well as a
connection to the main bilge pipe, so that each boiler room might be
independent. The remainder of the auxiliary pumps were placed in the
reciprocating and turbine engine rooms. Two ballast pumps were placed in
the reciprocating-engine room, with large suctions from the bilges
direct and from the bilge main. Two bilge pumps were also arranged to
draw from bilges. One bilge pump was placed in the turbine room and one
of the hot salt-water pumps had a connection from the bilge main pipe
for use in emergency. A 10-inch main ballast pipe was carried fore and
aft through the ship with separate connections to each tank, and with
filling pipes from the sea connected at intervals for trimming purposes.
The five ballast pumps were arranged to draw from this pipe. A double
line of bilge main pipe was fitted forward of No. 5 boiler room and aft
of No. 1.


GENERAL.

There were four elliptical-shaped funnels; the three forward ones took
the waste gases from the boiler furnaces, and the after one was placed
over the turbine hatch and was used as a ventilator. The galley funnels
were led up this funnel. The uptakes by which the waste gases were
conveyed to the funnels were united immediately above the water-tight
bulkhead which separated the boiler rooms.

All overhead discharge from the circulating pumps, ballast pumps, bilge
pumps, etc., were below the deep load line, but above the light line.

The boilers were supported in built steel cradles, and were stayed to
the ship's side and to each other athwart ships by strong steel stays.
Built steel chocks were also fitted to prevent movement fore and aft.

Silent blow-offs from the main steam pipes were connected direct to both
condensers.


CREW AND PASSENGERS.

When the _Titanic_ left Queenstown on April 11 the total number of
persons employed on board in any capacity was 885.

The respective ratings of these persons were as follows:

    Deck department            66
    Engine department         325
    Victualing department     494
                             ----
                              885

Eight bandsmen were included in the second-class passenger list.

In the deck department the master, Edward Charles Smith, held an extra
master's certificate; Chief Officer H. F. Wilde held an ordinary
master's certificate; First Officer W. M. Murdock held an ordinary
master's certificate; Second Officer C. H. Lightoller held an extra
master's certificate; Third Officer H. J. Pitman held an ordinary
master's certificate; Fourth Officer J. G. Boxall held an extra master's
certificate; Fifth Officer H. G. Lowe held an ordinary master's
certificate; Sixth Officer J. P. Moody held an ordinary master's
certificate.

In the engine department were included the chief engineer and 7 senior
and 17 assistant engineers.

In the victualing department there were 23 women employed.

The total number of passengers on board was 1,316.

    ------------------------------------------------------
                         Male.       Female.       Total.
    ------------------------------------------------------
    Of these--
      First class        180           145          325
      Second class       179           106          285
      Third class        510           196          706
                                                  -----
                                                  1,316
    ------------------------------------------------------

Of the above 6 children were in the first class; 24 children were in the
second class; 79 children were in the third class; or 109 in all.

About 410 of the third-class passengers were foreigners, and these, with
the foreigners in the first and second class and in the victualing
department, would make a total of nearly 500 persons on board who were
presumably not English speaking, so far as it is possible to ascertain.
The disposition of the different classes of passengers and of the crew
in the ship has already been described (pp. 10-15). In all, 2,201
persons were on board.




II. ACCOUNT OF THE SHIP'S JOURNEY ACROSS THE ATLANTIC, THE MESSAGES SHE
RECEIVED, AND THE DISASTER.


THE SAILING ORDER.

The masters of vessels belonging to the White Star Line are not given
any special "sailing orders" before the commencement of any particular
voyage. It is understood, however, that the "tracks" or "lane routes"
proper to the particular time of the year, and agreed upon by the great
steamship companies, are to be generally adhered to. Should any master
see fit during this passage to deviate from his route he has to report
on and explain this deviation at the end of his voyage. When such
deviation has been in the interests of safety, and not merely to shorten
his passage, his action has always been approved of by the company.

A book of general ship's rules and uniform regulations is also issued by
the company as a guide; there are in this book no special instructions
in regard to ice, but there is a general instruction that the safety of
the lives of the passengers and ship are to be the first consideration.

Besides the book of ship's rules, every master when first appointed to
command a ship is addressed by special letter from the company, of which
the following passage is an extract:

     You are to dismiss all idea of competitive passages with other
     vessels and to concentrate your attention upon a cautious, prudent,
     and ever-watchful system of navigation, which shall lose time or
     suffer any other temporary inconvenience rather than incur the
     slightest risk which can be avoided.

Mr. Sanderson, one of the directors, in his evidence says with reference
to the above letter:

     We never fail to tell them in handing them these letters that we do
     not wish them to take it as a mere matter of form; that we wish
     them to read these letters, and to write an acknowledgment to us
     that they have read them, and that they will be influenced by what
     we have said in those letters.


THE ROUTE FOLLOWED.

The _Titanic_ left Southampton on Wednesday, April 10, and after calling
at Cherbourg, proceeded to Queenstown, from which port she sailed on the
afternoon of Thursday, April 11, following what was at that time the
accepted outward-bound route for mail steamers from the Fastnet Light,
off the southwest coast of Ireland, to the Nantucket Shoal light vessel,
off the coast of the United States. It is desirable here to explain that
it has been, since 1899, the practice, by common agreement between the
great North Atlantic steamship companies, to follow lane routes, to be
used by their ships at the different seasons of the year. Speaking
generally, it may be said that the selection of these routes has
hitherto been based on the importance of avoiding as much as possible
the areas where fog and ice are prevalent at certain seasons, without
thereby unduly lengthening the passage across the Atlantic, and also
with the view of keeping the tracks of "outward" and "homeward" bound
mail steamers well clear of one another. A further advantage is that, in
case of a breakdown, vessels are likely to receive timely assistance
from other vessels following the same route. The decisions arrived at by
the steamship companies referred to above have, from time to time, been
communicated to the Hydrographic Office, and the routes have there been
marked on the North Atlantic route charts printed and published by the
Admiralty; and they have also been embodied in the sailing directions.

Before the _Titanic_ disaster the accepted mail steamers outward track
between January 15 and August 14 followed the arc of a great circle
between the Fastnet Light and a point in latitude 42 deg. N. and 47 deg. W.
(sometimes termed the "turning point"), and from thence by Rhumb Line so
as to pass just south of the Nantucket Shoal light vessel, and from this
point on to New York. This track, usually called the outward southern
track, was that followed by the _Titanic_ on her journey.

An examination of the North Atlantic route chart shows that this track
passes about 25 miles south (that is outside) of the edge of the area
marked "field ice between March and July," but from 100 to 300 miles to
the northward (that is inside) of the dotted line on the chart marked,
"Icebergs have been seen within this line in April, May, and June."

That is to say, assuming the areas indicated to be based on the
experience of many years, this track might be taken as passing clear of
field ice under the usual conditions of that time of year, but well
inside the area in which icebergs might be seen.

It is instructive here to remark that had the "turning point" been in
longitude 45 deg. W. and latitude 38 deg. N., that is some 240 miles to the
south-eastward, the total distance of the passage would only have been
increased by about 220 miles, or some 10 hours' steaming for a 22-knot
ship. This is the route which was provisionally decided on by the great
trans-Atlantic companies subsequent to the _Titanic_ disaster.

It must not be supposed that the lane routes referred to had never been
changed before. Owing to the presence of ice in 1903, 1904, and 1905
from about early in April to mid-June or early in July, westward-bound
vessels crossed the meridian of 47 deg. W. in latitude 41 deg. N., that is 60
miles further south than the then accepted track.

The publications known as "Sailing Directions," compiled by the
hydrographic office at the Admiralty, indicate the caution which it is
necessary to use in regions where ice is likely to be found.

The following is an extract from one of these books, named "United
States Pilot (East Coast)," Part I (second edition, 1909, p. 34),
referring to the ocean passages of the large trans-Atlantic mail and
passenger steamers:

     To these vessels one of the chief dangers in crossing the Atlantic
     lies in the probability of encountering masses of ice, both in the
     form of bergs and of extensive fields of solid compact ice,
     released at the breaking up of winter in the Arctic regions, and
     drifted down by the Labrador current across their direct route. Ice
     is more likely to be encountered in this route between April and
     August, both months inclusive, than at other times, although
     icebergs have been seen at all seasons northward of the parallel of
     43 deg. N., but not often so far south after August.

     These icebergs are sometimes over 200 feet in height and of
     considerable extent. They have been seen as far south as latitude
     39 deg. N., to obtain which position they must have crossed the Gulf
     Stream impelled by the cold Arctic current underrunning the warm
     waters of the Gulf Stream. That this should happen is not to be
     wondered at when it is considered that the specific gravity of
     fresh-water ice, of which these bergs are composed, is about
     seven-eighths that of sea water; so that, however vast the berg may
     appear to the eye of the observer, he can in reality see one-eighth
     of its bulk, the remaining seven-eighths being submerged and
     subject to the deep-water currents of the ocean. The track of an
     iceberg is indeed directed mainly by current, so small a portion of
     its surface being exposed to the action of the winds that its
     course is but slightly retarded or deflected by moderate breezes.
     On the Great Bank of Newfoundland bergs are often observed to be
     moving south or southeast; those that drift westward of Cape Race
     usually pass between Green and St. Pierre Banks.

     The route chart of the North Atlantic, No. 2058, shows the limits
     within which both field ice and icebergs may be met with, and where
     it should be carefully looked out for at all times, but especially
     during the spring and summer seasons. From this chart it would
     appear that whilst the southern and eastern limits of field ice are
     about latitude 42 deg. N., and longitude 45 deg. W., icebergs may be met
     with much farther from Newfoundland; in April, May, and June they
     have been seen as far South as latitude 39 deg. N. and as far east as
     longitude 38 deg. 30' W."

And again, on page 35:

     It is, in fact, impossible to give, within the outer limits named,
     any distinct idea of where ice may be expected, and no rule can be
     laid down to insure safe navigation, as its position and the
     quantity met with differs so greatly in different seasons.
     Everything must depend upon the vigilance, caution, and skill with
     which a vessel is navigated when crossing the dangerous ice-bearing
     regions of the Atlantic Ocean.

Similar warnings as to ice are also given in the "Nova Scotia (Southeast
Coast) and Bay of Fundy Pilot" (sixth edition, 1911), which is also
published by the hydrographic office.

Both the above quoted books were supplied to the master of the _Titanic_
(together with other necessary charts and books) before that ship left
Southampton.

The above extracts show that it is quite incorrect to assume that
icebergs had never been encountered or field ice observed so far south,
at the particular time of year when the _Titanic_ disaster occurred; but
it is true to say that the field ice was certainly at that time farther
south than it has been seen for many years.

It may be useful here to give some definitions of the various forms of
ice to be met with in these latitudes, although there is frequently some
confusion in their use.

An iceberg may be defined as a detached portion of a polar glacier
carried out to sea. The ice of an iceberg formed from a glacier is of
quite fresh water. Only about an eighth of its mass floats above the
surface of sea water.

A "growler" is a colloquial term applied to icebergs of small mass,
which therefore only show a small portion above the surface. It is not
infrequently a berg which has turned over, and is therefore showing what
has been termed "black ice" or, more correctly, dark-blue ice.

Pack ice is the floating ice which covers wide areas of the polar seas,
broken into large pieces, which are driven ("packed") together by wind
and current, so as to form a practically continuous sheet. Such ice is
generally frozen from sea water, and not derived from glaciers.

Field ice is a term usually applied to frozen sea water floating in much
looser form than pack ice.

An icefloe is the term generally applied to the same ice (i.e., field
ice) in a smaller quantity.

A floe berg is a stratified mass of floe ice (i.e., sea-water ice).


ICE MESSAGES RECEIVED.

The _Titanic_ followed the outward southern track until Sunday, April
14, in the usual way. At 11.40 p. m. on that day she struck an iceberg
and at 2.20 a. m. on the next day she foundered.

At 9 a. m. (_Titanic_ time) on that day a wireless message from the
steamship _Caronia_ was received by Capt. Smith. It was as follows:

       *       *       *       *       *

CAPTAIN, _Titanic_:

West-bound steamers report bergs, growlers, and field ice in 42 deg. N.,
from 49 deg. to 51 deg. W., April 12. Compliments.

BARR.

       *       *       *       *       *

It will be noticed that this message referred to bergs, growlers, and
field ice sighted on April 12--at least 48 hours before the time of the
collision. At the time this message was received the _Titanic's_
position was about latitude 43 deg. 35' N. and longitude 43 deg. 50' W. Capt.
Smith acknowledged the receipt of this message.

At 1.42 p. m., a wireless message from the steamship _Baltic_ was
received by Capt. Smith. It was as follows:

       *       *       *       *       *

CAPT. SMITH, _Titanic_:

Have had moderate, variable winds and clear, fine weather since leaving.
Greek steamer _Athenai_ reports passing icebergs and large quantities of
field ice to-day in latitude 41 deg. 51' N., longitude 49 deg. 52' W. Last night
we spoke German oiltank steamer _Deutschland_, Stettin to Philadelphia,
not under control, short of coal, latitude 40 deg. 42' N., longitude 55 deg. 11'
W. Wishes to be reported to New York and other steamers. Wish you and
_Titanic_ all success.

COMMANDER.

       *       *       *       *       *

At the time this message was received the _Titanic_ position was about
42 deg. 35' N., 45 deg. 50' W. Capt. Smith acknowledged the receipt of this
message also.

Mr. Ismay, the managing director of the White Star Line, was on board
the _Titanic_, and it appears that the master handed the _Baltic's_
message to Mr. Ismay almost immediately after it was received. This no
doubt was in order that Mr. Ismay might know that ice was to be
expected. Mr. Ismay states that he understood from the message that they
would get up to the ice "that night." Mr. Ismay showed this message to
two ladies, and it is therefore probable that many persons on board
became aware of its contents. This message ought in my opinion to have
been put on the board in the chart room as soon as it was received. It
remained, however, in Mr. Ismay's possession until 7.15 p. m., when the
master asked Mr. Ismay to return it. It was then that it was first
posted in the chart room.

This was considerably before the time at which the vessel reached the
position recorded in the message. Nevertheless, I think it was irregular
for the master to part with the document, and improper for Mr. Ismay to
retain it, but the incident had, in my opinion, no connection with or
influence upon the manner in which the vessel was navigated by the
master.

It appears that about 1.45 p. m. (_Titanic_ time) on the 14th a message
was sent from the German steamer _Amerika_ to the Hydrographic Office in
Washington, which was in the following terms:

     _Amerika_ passed two large icebergs in 41 deg. 27' N., 50 deg. 8' W., on
     April 14.

This was a position south of the point of the _Titanic's_ disaster. The
message does not mention at what hour the bergs had been observed. It
was a private message for the hydrographer at Washington, but it passed
to the _Titanic_ because she was nearest to Cape Race, to which station
it had to be sent in order to reach Washington. Being a message
affecting navigation, it should in the ordinary course have been taken
to the bridge. So far as can be ascertained, it was never heard of by
anyone on board the _Titanic_ outside the Marconi room. There were two
Marconi operators in the Marconi room, namely, Phillips, who perished,
and Bride, who survived and gave evidence. Bride did not receive the
_Amerika_ message nor did Phillips mention it to him, though the two had
much conversation together after it had been received. I am of opinion
that when this message reached the Marconi room it was put aside by
Phillips to wait until the _Titanic_ would be within call of Cape Race
(at about 8 or 8.30 p. m.), and that it was never handed to any officer
of the _Titanic_.

At 5.50 p. m. the _Titanic's_ course (which had been S. 62 deg. W.) was
changed to bring her on a westerly course for New York. In ordinary
circumstances this change in her course should have been made about half
an hour earlier, but she seems on this occasion to have continued for
about 10 miles longer on her southwesterly course before turning, with
the result that she found herself, after altering course at 5.50 p. m.,
about 4 or 5 miles south of the customary route on a course S. 86 deg. W.
true. Her course, as thus set, would bring her at the time of the
collision to a point about 2 miles to the southward of the customary
route and 4 miles south and considerably to the westward of the
indicated position of the _Baltic's_ ice. Her position at the time of
the collision would also be well to the southward of the indicated
position of the ice mentioned in the _Caronia_ message. This change of
course was so insignificant that in my opinion it can not have been made
in consequence of information as to ice.

In this state of things, at 7.30 p.m. a fourth message was received, and
is said by the Marconi operator Bride to have been delivered to the
bridge. This message was from the steamship _Californian_ to the
steamship _Antillian_, but was picked up by the _Titanic_. It was as
follows:

       *       *       *       *       *

To CAPTAIN, _Antillian_:

Six-thirty p. m., apparent ship's time; latitude 42 deg. 3' N., longitude
49 deg. 9' W. Three large bergs 5 miles to southward of us. Regards.

LORD.

       *       *       *       *       *

Bride does not remember to what officer he delivered this message.

By the time the _Titanic_ reached the position of the collision (11.40
p. m.) she had gone about 50 miles to the westward of the indicated
position of the ice mentioned in this fourth message. Thus it would
appear that before the collision she had gone clear of the indicated
positions of ice contained in the messages from the _Baltic_ and
_Californian_. As to the ice advised by the _Caronia_ message, so far as
it consisted of small bergs and field ice, it had before the time of the
collision possibly drifted with the Gulf Stream to the eastward; and so
far as it consisted of large bergs (which would be deep enough in the
water to reach the Labrador current) it had probably gone to the
southward. It was urged by Sir Robert Finlay, who appeared for the
owners, that this is strong evidence that the _Titanic_ had been
carefully and successfully navigated so as to avoid the ice of which she
had received warning. Mr. Ismay, however, stated that he understood from
the _Baltic_ message that "we would get up to the ice that night."

There was a fifth message received in the Marconi room of the _Titanic_
at 9.40 p. m. This was from a steamer called the _Mesaba_. It was in the
following terms:

     _From "Mesaba" to "Titanic" and all east-bound ships_:

     Ice report in latitude 42 deg. N. to 41 deg. 25' N., longitude 49 deg. to
     longitude 50 deg. 30' W. Saw much heavy pack ice and great number large
     icebergs. Also field ice. Weather good, clear.

This message clearly indicated the presence of ice in the immediate
vicinity of the _Titanic_, and if it had reached the bridge would
perhaps have affected the navigation of the vessel. Unfortunately, it
does not appear to have been delivered to the master or to any of the
officers. The Marconi operator was very busy from 8 o'clock onward
transmitting messages via Cape Race for passengers on board the
_Titanic_, and the probability is that he failed to grasp the
significance and importance of the message, and put it aside until he
should be less busy. It was never acknowledged by Capt. Smith, and I am
satisfied that it was not received by him. But, assuming Sir Robert
Finlay's contentions to be well founded that the Titanic had been
navigated so as to avoid the _Baltic_ and the _Californian_ ice, and
that the _Caronia_ ice had drifted to the eastward and to the southward,
still there can be no doubt, if the evidence of Mr. Lightoller, the
second officer, is to be believed, that both he and the master knew that
the danger of meeting ice still existed. Mr. Lightoller says that the
master showed him the _Caronia_ message about 12.45 p. m. on April 14,
when he was on the bridge. He was about to go off watch, and he says he
made a rough calculation in his head which satisfied him that the
_Titanic_ would not reach the position mentioned in the message until he
came on watch again at 6 p. m. At 6 p. m. Mr. Lightoller came on the
bridge again to take over the ship from Mr. Wilde, the chief officer
(dead). He does not remember being told anything about the _Baltic_
message, which had been received at 1.42 p. m. Mr. Lightoller then
requested Mr. Moody, the sixth officer (dead), to let him know "at what
time we should reach the vicinity of ice," and says that he thinks Mr.
Moody reported "about 11 o'clock." Mr. Lightoller says that 11 o'clock
did not agree with a mental calculation he himself had made and which
showed 9.30 as the time. This mental calculation he at first said he had
made before Mr. Moody gave him 11 o'clock as the time, but later on he
corrected this, and said his mental calculation was made between 7 and 8
o'clock, and after Mr. Moody had mentioned 11. He did not point out the
difference to him, and thought that perhaps Mr. Moody had made his
calculations on the basis of some "other" message. Mr. Lightoller
excuses himself for not pointing out the difference by saying that Mr.
Moody was busy at the time, probably with stellar observations. It is,
however, an odd circumstance that Mr. Lightoller, who believed that the
vicinity of ice would be reached before his watch ended at 10 p.m.,
should not have mentioned the fact to Mr. Moody, and it is also odd that
if he thought that Mr. Moody was working on the basis of some "other"
message, he did not ask what the other message was or where it came
from. The point, however, of Mr. Lightoller's evidence is that they both
thought that the vicinity of ice would be reached before midnight. When
he was examined as to whether he did not fear that on entering the
indicated ice region he might run foul of a growler (a low-lying berg)
he answers: "No, I judged I should see it with "sufficient distinctness"
and at a distance of a "mile and a half, more probably 2 miles." He then
adds:

     In the event of meeting ice there are many things we look for. In
     the first place, a slight breeze. Of course, the stronger the
     breeze the more visible will the ice be, or, rather, the breakers
     on the ice.

He is then asked whether there was any breeze on this night, and he
answers:

     When I left the deck at 10 o'clock there was a slight breeze. Oh,
     pardon me, no; I take that back. No, it was calm, perfectly calm--

And almost immediately afterwards he describes the sea as "absolutely
flat." It appeared, according to this witness, that about 9 o'clock the
master came on the bridge and that Mr. Lightoller had a conversation
with him which lasted half an hour. This conversation, so far as it is
material, is described by Mr. Lightoller in the following words:

     We commenced to speak about the weather. He said, "there is not
     much wind." I said, "No, it is a flat calm," as a matter of fact.
     He repeated it, he said, "A flat calm." I said, "Quite flat; there
     is no wind." I said something about it was rather a pity the breeze
     had not kept up whilst we were going through the ice region. Of
     course, my reason was obvious: he knew I meant the water ripples
     breaking on the base of the berg * * * We then discussed the
     indications of ice. I remember saying, "In any case, there will be
     a certain amount of reflected light from the bergs." He said, "Oh,
     yes, there will be a certain amount of reflected light." I said or
     he said--blue was said between us--that even though the blue side
     of the berg was towards us, probably the outline, the white
     outline, would give us sufficient warning, that we should be able
     to see it at a good distance, and as far as we could see, we should
     be able to see it. Of course, it was just with regard to that
     possibility of the blue side being toward us, and that if it did
     happen to be turned with the purely blue side toward us, there
     would still be the white outline.

Further on Mr. Lightoller says that he told the master nothing about his
own calculation as to coming up with the ice at 9.30 or about Mr.
Moody's calculation as to coming up with it at 11.

The conversation with the master ended with the master saying, "If it
becomes at all doubtful let me know at once; I will be just inside."
This remark Mr. Lightoller says undoubtedly referred to ice.

At 9.30 the master went to his room, and the first thing that Mr.
Lightoller did afterwards was to send a message to the crow's nest "to
keep a sharp lookout for ice, particularly small ice and growlers,"
until daylight. There seems to be no doubt that this message was in fact
sent, and that it was passed on to the next lookouts when they came on
watch. Hitchins, the quartermaster, says he heard Mr. Lightoller give
the message to Mr. Moody, and both the men in the crow's nest at the
time (Jewell and Symons) speak to having received it. From 9.30 to 10
o'clock, when his watch ended, Mr. Lightoller remained on the bridge
"looking out for ice." He also said that the night order book for the
14th had a footnote about keeping a sharp lookout for ice, and that this
note was "initialed by every officer." At 10 o'clock Mr. Lightoller
handed over the watch to Mr. Murdoch, the first officer (dead), telling
him that "we might be up around the ice any time now." That Mr. Murdoch
knew of the danger of meeting ice appears from the evidence of Hemming,
a lamp trimmer, who says that about 7.15 p. m. Mr. Murdoch told him to
go forward and see the forescuttle hatch closed--

     as we are in the vicinity of ice and there is a glow coming from
     that, and I want everything dark before the bridge.

The foregoing evidence establishes quite clearly that Capt. Smith, the
master; Mr. Murdoch, the first officer; Mr. Lightoller, the second
officer; and Mr. Moody, the sixth officer, all knew on the Sunday
evening that the vessel was entering a region where ice might be
expected; and this being so, it seems to me to be of little importance
to consider whether the master had by design or otherwise succeeded in
avoiding the particular ice indicated in the three messages received by
him.


SPEED OF THE SHIP.

The entire passage had been made at high speed, though not at the ship's
maximum, and this speed was never reduced until the collision was
unavoidable. At 10 p. m. the ship was registering 45 knots every two
hours by the Cherub log.

The quartermaster on watch aft when the _Titanic_ struck states that the
log, reset at noon, then registered 260 knots, and the fourth officer,
when working up the position from 7.30 p. m. to the time of the
collision, states he estimated the _Titanic's_ speed as 22 knots, and
this is also borne out by evidence that the engines were running
continuously at 75 revolutions.


THE WEATHER CONDITIONS.

From 6 p. m. onward to the time of the collision the weather was
perfectly clear and fine. There was no moon, the stars were out, and
there was not a cloud in the sky. There was, however, a drop in
temperature of 10 deg. in slightly less than two hours, and by about 7.30 p.
m. the temperature was 33 deg. F., and it eventually fell to 32 deg. F. That
this was not necessarily an indication of ice is borne out by the
sailing directions. The Nova Scotia (S. E. Coast) and Bay of Fundy Pilot
(sixth edition, 1911, p. 16) says:

     No reliance can be placed on any warning being conveyed to a
     mariner by a fall of temperature, either of the air or sea, on
     approaching ice. Some decrease in temperature has occasionally been
     recorded, but more often none has been observed.

Sir Ernest Shackleton was, however, of opinion that--

     if there was no wind and the temperature fell abnormally for the
     time of the year, I would consider that I was approaching an area
     which might have ice in it.


ACTION THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN.

The question is what ought the master to have done. I am advised that
with the knowledge of the proximity of ice which the master had, two
courses were open to him: The one was to stand well to the southward
instead of turning up to a westerly course; the other was to reduce
speed materially as night approached. He did neither. The alteration of
the course at 5.50 p. m. was so insignificant that it can not be
attributed to any intention to avoid ice. This deviation brought the
vessel back to within about 2 miles of the customary route before 11.30
p. m. And there was certainly no reduction of speed. Why, then, did the
master persevere in his course and maintain his speed? The answer is to
be found in the evidence. It was shown that for many years past, indeed,
for a quarter of a century or more, the practice of liners using this
track when in the vicinity of ice at night had been in clear weather to
keep the course, to maintain the speed and to trust to a sharp lookout
to enable them to avoid the danger. This practice, it was said, had been
justified by experience, no casualties having resulted from it. I accept
the evidence as to the practice and as to the immunity from casualties
which is said to have accompanied it. But the event has proved the
practice to be bad. Its root is probably to be bound in competition and
in the desire of the public for quick passages rather than in the
judgment of navigators. But unfortunately experience appeared to justify
it. In these circumstances I am not able to blame Capt. Smith. He had
not the experience which his own misfortune has afforded to those whom
he has left behind, and he was doing only that which other skilled men
would have done in the same position. It was suggested at the bar that
he was yielding to influences which ought not to have affected him; that
the presence of Mr. Ismay on board and the knowledge which he perhaps
had of a conversation between Mr. Ismay and the chief engineer at
Queenstown about the speed of the ship and the consumption of coal
probably induced him to neglect precautions which he would otherwise
have taken. But I do not believe this. The evidence shows that he was
not trying to make any record passage or indeed any exceptionally quick
passage. He was not trying to please anybody, but was exercising his own
discretion in the way he thought best. He made a mistake, a very
grievous mistake, but one in which, in face of the practice and of past
experience, negligence can not be said to have had any part; and in the
absence of negligence it is, in my opinion, impossible to fix Capt.
Smith with blame. It is, however, to be hoped that the last has been
heard of the practice and that for the future it will be abandoned for
what we now know to be more prudent and wiser measures. What was a
mistake in the case of the _Titanic_ would without doubt be negligence
in any similar case in the future.


THE COLLISION.

Mr. Lightoller turned over the ship to Mr. Murdoch, the first officer,
at 10 o'clock, telling him that the ship was within the region where ice
had been reported. He also told him of the message he had sent to the
crow's nest, and of his conversation with the master, and of the
latter's orders.

The ship appears to have run on, on the same course, until, at a little
before 11.40, one of the lookouts in the crow's nest struck three blows
on the gong, which was the accepted warning for something ahead,
following this immediately afterward by a telephone message to the
bridge "Iceberg right ahead." Almost simultaneously with the three-gong
signal Mr. Murdoch, the officer of the watch, gave the order
"Hard-a-starboard," and immediately telegraphed down to the engine room
"Stop. Full speed astern." The helm was already "hard over," and the
ship's head had fallen off about two points to port, when she collided
with an iceberg well forward on her starboard side.

Mr. Murdoch at the same time pulled the lever over which closed the
water-tight doors in the engine and boiler rooms.

The master "rushed out" onto the bridge and asked Mr. Murdoch what the
ship had struck.

Mr. Murdoch replied:

     An iceberg, sir. I hard-a-starboarded and reversed the engines, and
     I was going to hard-a-port round it, but she was too close. I could
     not do any more. I have closed the water-tight doors.

From the evidence given it appears that the _Titanic_ had turned about
two points to port before the collision occurred. From various
experiments subsequently made with the steamship _Olympic_, a sister
ship to the _Titanic_, it was found that traveling at the same rate as
the _Titanic_, about 37 seconds would be required for the ship to change
her course to this extent after the helm had been put hard-a-starboard.
In this time the ship would travel about 466 yards, and allowing for the
few seconds that would be necessary for the order to be given, it may be
assumed that 500 yards was about the distance at which the iceberg was
sighted either from the bridge or crow's nest.

That it was quite possible on this night, even with a sharp lookout at
the stemhead, crow's nest, and on the bridge, not to see an iceberg at
this distance is shown by the evidence of Capt. Rostron, of the
_Carpathia_.

The injuries to the ship, which are described in the next section, were
of such a kind that she foundered in 2 hours and 40 minutes.




III.--DESCRIPTION OF THE DAMAGE TO THE SHIP AND OF ITS GRADUAL AND FINAL
EFFECT, WITH OBSERVATIONS THEREON.


The damage done to the ship was as follows:


EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE.

The collision with the iceberg, which took place at 11.40 p. m., caused
damage to the bottom of the starboard side of the vessel at about 10
feet above the level of the keel, but there was no damage above this
height. There was damage in--

The forepeak, No. 1 hold, No. 2 hold, No. 3 hold, No. 6 boiler room, No.
5 boiler room.

The damage extended over a length of about 300 feet.


TIME IN WHICH THE DAMAGE WAS DONE.

As the ship was moving at over 20 knots, she would have passed through
300 feet in less than 10 seconds, so that the damage was done in about
this time.


THE FLOODING IN FIRST TEN MINUTES.

At first it is desirable to consider what happened in the first 10
minutes.

The forepeak was not flooded above the orlop deck--i.e., the peak tank
top, from the hole in the bottom of the peak tank.

In No. 1 hold there was 7 feet of water.

In No. 2 hold five minutes after the collision water was seen rushing in
at the bottom of the firemen's passage on the starboard side, so that
the ship's side was damaged abaft of bulkhead B sufficiently to open the
side of the firemen's passage, which was 3-1/2 feet from the outer skin
of the ship, thereby flooding both the hold and the passage.

In No. 3 hold the mail room was filled soon after the collision. The
floor of the mail room is 24 feet above the keel.

In No. 6 boiler room, when the collision took place, water at once
poured in at about 2 feet above the stokehold plates, on the starboard
side, at the after end of the boiler room. Some of the firemen
immediately went through the water-tight door opening to No. 5 boiler
room because the water was flooding the place. The water-tight doors in
the engine rooms were shut from the bridge almost immediately after the
collision. Ten minutes later it was found that there was water to the
height of 8 feet above the double bottom in No. 6 boiler room.

No. 5 boiler room was damaged at the ship's side in the starboard
forward bunker at a distance of 2 feet above the stokehold plates, at 2
feet from the water-tight bulkhead between Nos. 5 and 6 boiler rooms.
Water poured in at that place as it would from an ordinary fire hose. At
the time of the collision this bunker had no coal in it. The bunker door
was closed when water was seen to be entering the ship.

In No. 4 boiler room there was no indication of any damage at the early
stages of the sinking.


GRADUAL EFFECT OF THE DAMAGE.

It will thus be seen that all the six compartments forward of No. 4
boiler room were open to the sea by damage which existed at about 10
feet above the keel. At 10 minutes after the collision the water seems
to have risen to about 14 feet above the keel in all these compartments
except No. 5 boiler room. After the first ten minutes the water rose
steadily in all these six compartments. The forepeak above the peak tank
was not filled until an hour after the collision, when the vessel's bow
was submerged to above C deck. The water then flowed in from the top
through the deck scuttle forward of the collision bulkhead. It was by
this scuttle that access was obtained to all the decks below C down to
the peak tank top on the orlop deck.

At 12 o'clock water was coming up in No. 1 hatch. It was getting into
the firemen's quarters and driving the firemen out. It was rushing round
No. 1 hatch on G deck and coming mostly from the starboard side, so that
in 20 minutes the water had risen above G deck in No. 1 hold.

In No. 2 hold about 40 minutes after the collision the water was coming
in to the seamen's quarters on E deck through a burst fore and aft
wooden bulkhead of a third-class cabin opposite the seamen's wash place.
Thus, the water had risen in No. 2 hold to about 3 feet above E deck in
40 minutes.

In No. 3 hold the mail room was afloat about 20 minutes after the
collision. The bottom of the mail room which is on the orlop deck, is 24
feet above the keel.

The water-tight doors on F deck at the fore and after ends of No. 3
compartment were not closed then.

The mail room was filling and water was within 2 feet of G deck, rising
fast when the order was given to clear the boats.

There was then no water on F deck.

There is a stairway on the port side on G deck which leads down to the
first-class baggage room on the orlop deck immediately below. There was
water in this baggage room 25 minutes after the collision. Half an hour
after the collision water was up to G deck in the mail room.

Thus the water had risen in this compartment to within 2 feet of G deck
in 20 minutes, and above G deck in 25 to 30 minutes.

No. 6 boiler room was abandoned by the men almost immediately after the
collision. Ten minutes later the water had risen to 8 feet above the top
of the double bottom, and probably reached the top of the bulkhead at
the after end of the compartment, at the level of E deck, in about one
hour after the collision.

In No. 5 boiler room there was no water above the stokehold plates,
until a rush of water came through the pass between the boilers from the
forward end, and drove the leading stoker out.

It has already been shown in the description of what happened in the
first 10 minutes, that water was coming into No. 5 boiler room in the
forward starboard bunker at 2 feet above the plates in a stream about
the size of a deck hose. The door in this bunker had been dropped
probably when water was first discovered, which was a few minutes after
the collision. This would cause the water to be retained in the bunker
until it rose high enough to burst the door which was weaker than the
bunker bulkhead. This happened about an hour after the collision.

_No. 4 boiler room._--One hour and 40 minutes after the collision water
was coming in forward, in No. 4 boiler room, from underneath the floor
in the forward part, in small quantities. The men remained in that
stokehold till ordered on deck.

_Nos. 3, 2, and 1 boiler rooms._--When the men left No. 4 some of them
went through Nos. 3, 2, and 1 boiler rooms into the reciprocating engine
room, and from there on deck. There was no water in the boiler rooms
abaft No. 4 one hour 40 minutes after the collision (1.20 a. m.), and
there was then none in the reciprocating and turbine engine rooms.

_Electrical engine room and tunnels._--There was no damage to these
compartments.

From the foregoing it follows that there was no damage abaft No. 4
boiler room.

All the water-tight doors aft of the main engine room were opened after
the collision.

Half an hour after the collision the water-tight doors from the engine
room to the stokehold were opened as far forward as they could be to No.
4 boiler room.


FINAL EFFECT OF THE DAMAGE.

The later stages of the sinking can not be stated with any precision,
owing to a confusion of the times which was natural under the
circumstances.

The forecastle deck was not under water at 1.35 a. m. Distress signals
were fired until two hours after the collision (1.45 a. m.). At this
time the fore deck was under water. The forecastle head was not then
submerged though it was getting close down to the water, about half an
hour before she disappeared (1.50 a. m.).

When the last boat, lowered from davits (D), left the ship, A deck was
under water, and water came up the stairway under the boat deck almost
immediately afterwards. After this the other port collapsible (B), which
had been stowed on the officers' house, was uncovered, the lashings cut
adrift, and she was swung round over the edge of the coamings of the
deckhouse on to the boat deck.

Very shortly afterwards the vessel, according to Mr. Lightoller's
account, seemed to take a dive, and he just walked into the water. When
he came to the surface all the funnels were above the water.

Her stern was gradually rising out of the water, and the propellers were
clear of the water. The ship did not break in two, and she did,
eventually, attain the perpendicular, when the second funnel from aft
about reached the water. There were no lights burning then, though they
kept alight practically until the last.

Before reaching the perpendicular, when at an angle of 50 deg. or 60 deg., there
was a rumbling sound which may be attributed to the boilers leaving
their beds and crashing down on to or through the bulkheads. She became
more perpendicular and finally absolutely perpendicular, when she went
slowly down.

After sinking as far as the after part of the boat deck she went down
more quickly. The ship disappeared at 2.20 a. m.


OBSERVATIONS.

I am advised that the _Titanic_ as constructed could not have remained
afloat long with such damage as she received. Her bulkheads were spaced
to enable her to remain afloat with any two compartments in
communication with the sea. She had a sufficient margin of safety with
any two of the compartments flooded which were actually damaged.

In fact, any three of the four forward compartments could have been
flooded by the damage received without sinking the ship to the top of
her bulkheads.

Even if the four forward compartments had been flooded the water would
not have got into any of the compartments abaft of them though it would
have been above the top of some of the forward bulkheads. But the ship,
even with these four compartments flooded, would have remained afloat.
But she could not remain afloat with the four compartments and the
forward boiler room (No. 6) also flooded.

The flooding of these five compartments alone would have sunk the ship
sufficiently deep to have caused the water to rise above the bulkhead at
the after end of the forward boiler room (No. 6) and to flow over into
the next boiler room (No. 5), and to fill it up until in turn its after
bulkhead would be overwhelmed and the water would thereby flow over and
fill No. 4 boiler room, and so on in succession to the other boiler
rooms till the ship would ultimately fill and sink.

It has been shown that water came into the five forward compartments to
a height of about 14 feet above the keel in the first 10 minutes. This
was at a rate of inflow with which the ship's pumps could not possibly
have coped, so that the damage done to these five compartments alone
inevitably sealed the doom of the ship.

The damage done in the boiler rooms Nos. 4 and 5 was too slight to have
hastened appreciably the sinking of the ship, for it was given in
evidence that no considerable amount of water was in either of these
compartments for an hour after the collision. The rate at which water
came into No. 6 boiler room makes it highly probable that the
compartment was filled in not more than an hour, after which the flow
over the top of the bulkhead between 5 and 6 began and continued till
No. 5 was filled.

It was shown that the leak in No. 5 boiler room was only about equal to
the flow of a deck hose pipe about 3 inches in diameter.

The leak in No. 4, supposing that there was one, was only enough to
admit about 3 feet of water in that compartment in 1 hour 40 minutes.

Hence the leaks in Nos. 4 and 5 boiler rooms did not appreciably hasten
the sinking of the vessel.

The evidence is very doubtful as to No. 4 being damaged. The pumps were
being worked in No. 5 soon after the collision. The 10-inch leather
special suction pipe which was carried from aft is more likely to have
been carried for use in No. 5 than No. 4 because the doors were ordered
to be opened probably soon after the collision when water was known to
be coming into No. 5. There is no evidence that the pumps were being
worked in No 4.

The only evidence possibly favorable to the view that the pipe was
required for No 4, and not for No. 5, is that Scott, a greaser, says
that he saw engineers dragging the suction pipe along one hour after the
collision. But even as late as this it may have been wanted for No. 5
only.

The importance of the question of the damage to No. 5 is small because
the ship as actually constructed was doomed as soon as the water in No.
6 boiler room and all compartments forward of it entered in the
quantities it actually did.

It is only of importance in dealing with the question of what would have
happened to the ship had she been more completely subdivided.

It was stated in evidence that if No. 4 had not been damaged or had only
been damaged to an extent within the powers of the pumps to keep under,
then, if the bulkheads had been carried to C deck, the ship might have
been saved. Further methods of increased subdivision and their effect
upon the fate of the ship are discussed later.

Evidence was given showing that after the water-tight doors in the
engine and boiler rooms had been all closed, except those forward of No.
4 group of boilers, they were opened again, and there is no evidence to
show that they were again closed. Though it is probable that the
engineers who remained below would have closed these doors as the water
rose in the compartments, yet it was not necessary for them to do this,
as each door had an automatic closing arrangement which would have come
into operation immediately a small amount of water came through the
door.

It is probable, however, that the life of the ship would have been
lengthened somewhat if these doors had been left open, for the water
would have flowed through them to the after part of the ship, and the
rate of flow of the water into the ship would have been for a time
reduced as the bow might have been kept up a little by the water which
flowed aft.

It is thus seen that the efficiency of the automatic arrangements for
the closing of the water-tight doors, which was questioned during the
inquiry, had no important bearing on the question of hastening the
sinking of the ship, except that, in the case of the doors not having
been closed by the engineers, it might have retarded the sinking of the
ship if they had not acted. The engineers would not have prevented the
doors from closing unless they had been convinced that the ship was
doomed. There is no evidence that they did prevent the doors from
closing.

The engineers were applying the pumps when Barrett, leading stoker, left
No. 5 boiler room, but even if they had succeeded in getting all the
pumps in the ship to work they could not have saved the ship or
prolonged her life to any appreciable extent.


EFFECT OF SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL SUBDIVISION UPON FLOATATION.

_Water-tight decks._--It is in evidence that advantage might be obtained
from the point of view of greater safety in having a water-tight deck.

Without entering into the general question of the advantage of
water-tight decks for all ships, it is desirable to form an opinion in
the case of the _Titanic_ as to whether making the bulkhead deck
water-tight would have been an advantage in the circumstances of the
accident, or in case of accident to ships of this class.

I am advised that it is found that with all the compartments certainly
known to have been flooded, viz., those forward of No. 4 boiler room,
the ship would have remained afloat if the bulkhead deck had been a
water-tight deck. If, however, No. 4 boiler room had also been flooded
the ship would not have remained afloat unless, in addition to making
the bulkhead deck water-tight, the transverse bulkhead abaft of No. 4
boiler room had been carried up to D deck.

To make the bulkhead deck effectively water-tight for this purpose it
would have been necessary to carry water-tight trunks round all the
openings in the bulkhead deck up to C deck.

It has been shown that with the bulkhead abaft No. 5 boiler room carried
to C deck the ship would have remained afloat if the compartments
certainly known to have been damaged had been flooded.

I do not desire to express an opinion upon the question whether it would
have conduced to safety in the case of the _Titanic_ if a water-tight
deck had been fitted below the water line, as there may be some
objections to such a deck. There are many considerations involved, and I
think that the matter should be dealt with by the bulkhead committee for
ships in general.

_Longitudinal subdivision._--The advantages and disadvantages of
longitudinal subdivision by means of water-tight bunker bulkheads were
pointed out in evidence.

While not attempting to deal with this question generally for ships, I
am advised that if the _Titanic_ had been divided in the longitudinal
method, instead of in the transverse method only, she would have been
able, if damaged as supposed, to remain afloat, though with a list which
could have been corrected by putting water ballast into suitable places.

This subject is one, however, which again involves many considerations,
and I think that for ships generally the matter should be referred to
the bulkhead committee for their consideration and report.

_Extending double bottom up the sides._--It was shown in evidence that
there would be increased protection in carrying the double bottom higher
up the side than was done in the _Titanic_, and that some of the boiler
rooms would probably not then have been flooded, as water could not have
entered the ship except in the double bottom.

In the case of the _Titanic_ I am advised that this would have been an
advantage, but it was pointed out in evidence that there are certain
disadvantages which in some ships may outweigh the advantages.

In view of what has already been said about the possible advantages of
longitudinal subdivision, it is unnecessary further to discuss the
question of carrying up the double bottom in ships generally. This
matter should also be dealt with by the bulkhead committee.

_Water-tight doors._--With reference to the question of the water-tight
doors of the ship, there does not appear to have been any appreciable
effect upon the sinking of the ship caused by either shutting or not
shutting the doors. There does not appear to have been any difficulty in
working the water-tight doors. They appear to have been shut in good
time after the collision.

But in other cases of damage in ships constructed like the _Titanic_, it
is probable that the efficiency of the closing arrangement of the
water-tight doors may exert a vital influence on the safety of the ship.
It has been represented that in future consideration should be given to
the question--

     as to how far bulkhead should be solid bulkheads, and how far there
     should be water-tight doors, and, if there should be water-tight
     doors, how far they may or may not be automatically operated.

This again is a question on which it is not necessary here to express
any general opinion, for there are conflicting considerations which vary
in individual cases. The matter, however, should come under the
effective supervision of the board of trade much more than it seems to
come at present, and should be referred to the bulkhead committee for
their consideration with a view to their suggesting in detail where
doors should or should not be allowed, and the type of door which should
be adopted in the different parts of ships.

[Illustration: S.S. "TITANIC."

     NOTE.--The vertical letters signify the different decks. The
     horizontal letters signify the water-tight bulkheads. The heavy
     line shows the top of the water-tight bulkheads. The crosshatched
     compartments are those opened to the sea at the time of the
     collision with the iceberg.]




IV.--ACCOUNT OF THE SAVING AND RESCUE OF THOSE WHO SURVIVED.


THE BOATS.

The _Titanic_ was provided with 20 boats. They were all on the boat
deck. Fourteen were life boats. These were hung inboard in davits, 7 on
the starboard side and 7 on the port side, and were designed to carry 65
persons each. Two were emergency boats. These were also in davits, but
were hung outboard, one on the starboard side and one on the port side,
and were designed to carry 40 persons each. The remaining 4 boats were
Engelhardt or collapsible boats. Two of these were stowed on the boat
deck and 2 on the roof of the officers' quarters, and were designed to
carry 47 persons each. Thus the total boat accommodation was for 1,178
persons. The boats in davits were numbered, the odd numbers being on the
starboard side and the even numbers on the port side. The numbering
began with the emergency boats, which were forward, and ran aft. Thus
the boats on the starboard side were numbered 1 (an emergency boat), 3,
5, 7, 9, 11, 13, and 15 (lifeboats), and those on the port side 2 (an
emergency boat), 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16 (lifeboats). The
collapsible boats were lettered, A and B being on the roof of the
officers' quarters and C and D being on the boat deck; C was abreast of
No. 1 (emergency boat) and D abreast of No. 2 (emergency boat). Further
particulars as to the boats will be found on page 18.

In ordinary circumstances all these boats (with the exception of 1 and
2) were kept covered up, and contained only a portion of their
equipment, such as oars, masts, and sails, and water; some of the
remaining portion, such as lamps, compasses, and biscuits being stowed
in the ship in some convenient place, ready for use when required. Much
examination was directed at the hearing to showing that some boats left
the ship without a lamp and others without a compass, and so on, but in
the circumstances of confusion and excitement which existed at the time
of the disaster this seems to me to be excusable.

Each member of the crew had a boat assigned to him in printed lists,
which were posted up in convenient places for the men to see; but it
appeared that in some cases the men had not looked at these lists and
did not know their respective boats.

There had been no proper boat drill nor a boat muster. It was explained
that great difficulty frequently exists in getting firemen to take part
in a boat drill. They regard it as no part of their work. There seem to
be no statutory requirements as to boat drills or musters, although
there is a provision (sec. 9 of the merchant shipping act of 1906) that
when a boat drill does take place the master of the vessel is, under a
penalty, to record the fact in his log. I think it is desirable that the
board of trade should make rules requiring boat drills and boat musters
to be held of such a kind and at such times as may be suitable to the
ship and to the voyage on which she is engaged. Boat drill, regulated
according to the opportunities of the service, should always be held.

It is perhaps worth recording that there was an inspection of the boats
themselves at Southampton by Mr. Clarke, the emigration officer, and
that, as a result, Mr. Clarke gave his certificate that the boats were
satisfactory. For the purpose of this inspection two of the boats were
lowered to the water and crews exercised in them.

The collision took place at 11.40 p. m. (ship's time). About midnight it
was realized that the vessel could not live, and at about 12.05 the
order was given to uncover the 14 boats under davits. The work began on
both sides of the ship under the superintendence of five officers. It
did not proceed quickly at first; the crew arrived on the boat deck only
gradually, and there was an average of not more than three deck hands to
each boat. At 12.20 the order was given to swing out the boats, and this
work was at once commenced. There were a few passengers on the deck at
this time. Mr. Lightoller, who was one of the officers directing
operations, says that the noise of the steam blowing off was so great
that his voice could not be heard, and that he had to give directions
with his hands.

Before this work had been begun, the stewards were rousing the
passengers in their different quarters, helping them to put on
life-belts and getting them up to the boat deck. At about 12.30 the
order was given to place women and children in the boats. This was
proceeded with at once and at about 12.45 Mr. Murdoch gave the order to
lower No. 7 boat (on the starboard side) to the water. The work of
uncovering, filling, and lowering the boats was done under the following
supervision: Mr. Lowe, the fifth officer, saw to Nos. 1, 3, 5, and 7;
Mr. Murdoch (lost) saw also to 1 and 7 and to A and C. Mr. Moody (lost)
looked after Nos. 9, 11, 13, and 15. Mr. Murdoch also saw to 9 and 11.
Mr. Lightoller saw to Nos. 4, 6, 8, B, and D. Mr. Wilde (lost) also saw
to 8 and D. Mr. Lightoller and Mr. Moody saw to 10 and 16 and Mr. Lowe
to 12 and 14. Mr. Wilde also assisted at No. 14, Mr. Boxall helping
generally.

The evidence satisfies me that the officers did their work very well and
without any thought of themselves. Capt. Smith, the master, Mr. Wilde,
the chief officer, Mr. Murdoch, the first officer, and Mr. Moody, the
sixth officer, all went down with the ship while performing their
duties. The others, with the exception of Mr. Lightoller, took charge of
boats and thus were saved. Mr. Lightoller was swept off the deck as the
vessel went down and was subsequently picked up.

So far as can be ascertained the boats left the ship at the following
times, but I think it is necessary to say that these, and, indeed, all
the times subsequent to the collision which are mentioned by the
witnesses, are unreliable.

    ---------------------------------------
    | No.  | Starboard |  No. | Port side.|
    |      |  Side.    |      |           |
    -------------------|------------------|
    |      | _a. m._   |      | _a. m._   |
    |   7  |  12.46    |   6  |  12.55    |
    |   5  |  12.55    |   8  |   1.10    |
    |   3  |   1.0     |  10  |   1.20    |
    |   1  |   1.10    |  12  |   1.25    |
    |   9  |   1.20    |  14  |   1.30    |
    |  11  |   1.25    |  16  |   1.35    |
    |  13  |   1.35    |   2  |   1.45    |
    |  15  |   1.35    |   4  |   1.56    |
    |   C  |   1.40    |   D  |   2.05    |
    |[1]A  |           |[3]B  |           |
    ---------------------------------------

As regards the collapsible boats, C and D were properly lowered; as to A
and B, which were on the roof of the officers' house, they were left
until the last. There was difficulty in getting these boats down to the
deck, and the ship had at this time a list. Very few of the deck hands
were left in the ship, as they had nearly all gone to man the lifeboats,
and the stewards and firemen were unaccustomed to work the collapsible
boats. Work appears to have been going on in connection with these two
boats at the time that the ship sank. The boats seem to have floated
from the deck and to have served in the water as rafts.

The following table shows the numbers of the male crew, male passengers,
and women and children who, according to the evidence, left the ship in
each boat. In three or four instances the numbers of women and children
are only arrived at by subtracting the numbers of crew and male
passengers from the total said to be in the boat (these are in
italics). In each case the lowest figures given are taken:

  Key
  A: Starboard side boat. No.
  B: Men of crew.
  C: Men passengers.
  D: Women and children.
  E: Total.
  F: Port side boat No.
  G: Men of crew.
  H: Men passengers.
  I: Women and children.
  J: Total

  +------+----+----+------+----++------+---+----+------+----+
  |  A   |  B |  C |   D  |  E ||   F  | G |  H |   I  |  J |
  +------+----+----+------+----++------+---+----+------+----+
  |   7  |  3 |  4 | _20_ | 27 ||   6  | 2 |  2 | _24_ | 28 |
  |   5  |  5 |  6 |  30  | 41 ||   8  | 4 |    |  35  | 39 |
  |   3  | 15 | 10 | _25_ | 50 ||  10  | 5 |    |  50  | 55 |
  |   1  |  7 |  3 |   2  | 12 ||   2  | 4 |  1 |  21  | 26 |
  |   9  |  8 |  6 |  42  | 56 ||  12  | 2 |    |  40  | 42 |
  |  11  |  9 |  1 |  60  | 70 ||  14  | 8 |    |  53  | 63 |
  |  13  |  5 |    |  59  | 64 ||  16  | 6 |    |  50  | 56 |
  |  15  | 13 |  4 | _53_ | 70 ||   4  | 4 |    |  36  | 40 |
  |   C  |  5 |  2 |  64  | 71 ||   D  | 2 |  2 |  40  | 44 |
  | A[1] |    |    |      |    || B[1] |   |    |      |    |
  +------+----+----+------+----++------+---+----+------+----+
  |Total | 70 | 36 | 355  |461 ||      |37 |  7 | 349  |393 |
  +------+----+----+------+----++------+---+----+------+----+

  General total:
     Men of crew              107
     Men passengers            43
     Women and children       704

This shows in all 107 men of the crew, 43 male passengers, and 704 women
and children, or a total of 854 in 18 boats. In addition, about 60
persons, two of whom were women, were said to have been transferred,
subsequently, from A and B collapsible boats to other boats, or rescued
from the water, making a total of 914 who escaped with their lives. It
is obvious that these figures are quite unreliable, for only 712 were in
fact saved by the _Carpathia_, the steamer which came to the rescue at
about 4 a. m., and all the boats were accounted for. Another remarkable
discrepancy is that, of the 712 saved, 189 were in fact men of the crew,
129 were male passengers, and 394 were women and children. In other
words, the real proportion of women to men saved was much less than the
proportion appearing in the evidence from the boats. Allowing for those
subsequently picked up, of the 712 persons saved only 652 could have
left the _Titanic_ in boats, or an average of about 36 per boat. There
was a tendency in the evidence to exaggerate the numbers in each boat,
to exaggerate the proportion of women to men, and to diminish the number
of crew. I do not attribute this to any wish on the part of the
witnesses to mislead the court, but to a natural desire to make the best
case for themselves and their ship. The seamen who gave evidence were
too frequently encouraged when under examination in the witness box to
understate the number of crew in the boats. The number of crew actually
saved was 189, giving an average of 10 per boat, and if from this figure
the 58 men of the 60 persons above mentioned be deducted the average
number of crew leaving the ship in the boats must still have been at
least 7. The probability, however, is that many of the 60 picked up were
passengers.

The discipline both among passengers and crew during the lowering of the
boats was good, but the organization should have been better, and if it
had been it is possible that more lives would have been saved.

The real difficulty in dealing with the question of the boats is to find
the explanation of so many of them leaving the ship with comparatively
few persons in them. No. 1 certainly left with only 12; this was an
emergency boat with a carrying capacity of 40. No. 7 left with only 27,
and No. 6 with only 28; these were lifeboats with a carrying capacity of
65 each; and several of the others, according to the evidence, and
certainly according to the truth, must have left only partly filled.
Many explanations are forthcoming, one being that the passengers were
unwilling to leave the ship. When the earlier boats left, and before the
_Titanic_ had begun materially to settle down, there was a drop of 65
feet from the boat deck to the water, and the women feared to get into
the boats. Many people thought that the risk in the ship was less than
the risk in the boats. This explanation is supported by the evidence of
Capt. Rostron, of the _Carpathia_. He says that after those who were
saved got on board his ship he was told by some of them that when the
boats first left the _Titanic_ the people "really would not be put in
the boats; they did not want to go in." There was a large body of
evidence from the _Titanic_ to the same effect, and I have no doubt that
many people, particularly women, refused to leave the deck for the
boats. At one time the master appears to have had the intention of
putting the people into the boats from the gangway doors in the side of
the ship. This was possibly with a view to allay the fears of the
passengers, for from these doors the water could be reached by means of
ladders, and the lowering of some of the earlier boats when only partly
filled may be accounted for in this way. There is no doubt that the
master did order some of the partly filled boats to row to a position
under one of the doors with the object of taking in passengers at that
point. It appears, however, that these doors were never opened. Another
explanation is that some women refused to leave their husbands. It is
said further that the officers engaged in putting the people into the
boats feared that the boats might buckle if they were filled; but this
proved to be an unfounded apprehension, for one or more boats were
completely filled and then successfully lowered to the water.

At 12.35 the message from the _Carpathia_ was received announcing that
she was making for the _Titanic_. This probably became known and may
have tended to make the passengers still more unwilling to leave the
ship, and the lights of a ship (the _Californian_) which were seen by
many people may have encouraged the passengers to hope that assistance
was at hand. These explanations are perhaps sufficient to account for so
many of the lifeboats leaving without a full boat load; but I think,
nevertheless, that if the boats had been kept a little longer before
being lowered, or if the after gangway doors had been opened, more
passengers might have been induced to enter the boats. And if women
could not be induced to enter the boats, the boats ought then to have
been filled up with men. It is difficult to account for so many of the
lifeboats being sent from the sinking ship, in a smooth sea, far from
full. These boats left behind them many hundreds of lives to perish. I
do not, however, desire these observations to be read as casting any
reflection on the officers of the ship or on the crew who were working
on the boat deck. They all worked admirably, but I think that if there
had been better organization the results would have been more
satisfactory.

I heard much evidence as to the conduct of the boats after the _Titanic_
sank and when there must have been many struggling people in the water,
and I regret to say that in my opinion some, at all events, of the boats
failed to attempt to save lives when they might have done so, and might
have done so successfully. This was particularly the case with boat No.
1. It may reasonably have been thought that the risk of making the
attempt was too great; but it seems to me that if the attempt had been
made by some of these boats it might have been the means of saving a few
more lives. Subject to these few adverse comments, I have nothing but
praise for both passengers and crew. All the witnesses speak well of
their behavior. It is to be remembered that the night was dark, the
noise of the escaping steam was terrifying, the peril, though perhaps
not generally recognized, was imminent and great, and many passengers
who were unable to speak or to understand English were being collected
together and hurried into the boats.


CONDUCT OF SIR C. DUFF GORDON AND MR. ISMAY.

An attack was made in the course of the inquiry on the moral conduct of
two of the passengers, namely, Sir Cosmo Duff Gordon and Mr. Bruce
Ismay. It is no part of the business of the court to inquire into such
matters, and I should pass them by in silence if I did not fear that my
silence might be misunderstood. The very gross charge against Sir Cosmo
Duff Gordon that, having got into No. 1 boat, he bribed the men in it to
row away from drowning people is unfounded. I have said that the members
of the crew in that boat might have made some attempt to save the people
in the water, and that such an attempt would probably have been
successful; but I do not believe that the men were deterred from making
the attempt by any act of Sir Cosmo Duff Gordon's. At the same time I
think that if he had encouraged the men to return to the position where
the _Titanic_ had foundered they would probably have made an effort to
do so and could have saved some lives.

As to the attack on Mr. Bruce Ismay, it resolved itself into the
suggestion that, occupying the position of managing director of the
steamship company, some moral duty was imposed upon him to wait on board
until the vessel foundered. I do not agree. Mr. Ismay, after rendering
assistance to many passengers, found C collapsible, the last boat on the
starboard side, actually being lowered. No other people were there at
the time. There was room for him and he jumped in. Had he not jumped in
he would merely have added one more life, namely, his own, to the number
of those lost.


THE THIRD-CLASS PASSENGERS.

It had been suggested before the inquiry that the third-class passengers
had been unfairly treated; that their access to the boat deck had been
impeded, and that when at last they reached that deck the first and
second class passengers were given precedence in getting places in the
boats. There appears to have been no truth in these suggestions. It is
no doubt true that the proportion of third-class passengers saved falls
far short of the proportion of the first and second class, but this is
accounted for by the greater reluctance of the third-class passengers to
leave the ship, by their unwillingness to part with their baggage, by
the difficulty of getting them up from their quarters, which were at the
extreme ends of the ship, and by other similar causes. The interests of
the relatives of some of the third-class passengers who had perished
were in the hands of Mr. Harbinson, who attended the inquiry on their
behalf. He said at the end of his address to the court:

     I wish to say distinctly that no evidence has been given in the
     course of this case which would substantiate a charge that any
     attempt was made to keep back the third-class passengers. * * * I
     desire further to say that there is no evidence that when they did
     reach the boat deck there was any discrimination practiced either
     by the officers or the sailors in putting them into the boats.

I am satisfied that the explanation of the excessive proportion of
third-class passengers lost is not to be found in the suggestion that
the third-class passengers were in any way unfairly treated. They were
not unfairly treated.


MEANS TAKEN TO PROCURE ASSISTANCE.

As soon as the dangerous condition of the ship was realized, messages
were sent by the master's orders to all steamers within reach. At 12.15
a. m. the distress signal CQD was sent. This was heard by several
steamships and by Cape Race. By 12.25 Mr. Boxall, the fourth officer,
had worked out the correct position of the _Titanic_, and then another
message was sent: "Come at once, we have struck a berg." This was heard
by the Cunard steamer _Carpathia_, which was at this time bound from New
York to Liverpool and 58 miles away. The _Carpathia_ answered, saying
that she was coming to the assistance of the _Titanic_. This was
reported to Capt. Smith on the boat deck. At 12.26 a message was sent
out, "Sinking; can not hear for noise of steam." Many other messages
were also sent, but as they were only heard by steamers which were too
far away to render help, it is not necessary to refer to them. At 1.45 a
message was heard by the _Carpathia_, "Engine-room full up to boilers."
The last message sent out was "CQ" which was faintly heard by the
steamer _Virginian_. This message was sent at 2.17. It thus appears that
the Marconi apparatus was at work until within a few minutes of the
foundering of the _Titanic_.

Meanwhile Mr. Boxall was sending up distress signals from the deck.
These signals (rockets) were sent off at intervals from a socket by No.
1 emergency boat on the boat deck. They were the ordinary distress
signals, exploding in the air and throwing off white stars. The firing
of these signals began about the time that No. 7 boat was lowered (12.45
a. m.), and it continued until Mr. Boxall left the ship at about 1.45.

Mr. Boxall was also using a Morse light from the bridge in the direction
of a ship whose lights he saw about half a point on the port bow of the
_Titanic_ at a distance, as he thought, of about 5 or 6 miles. He got no
answer. In all, Mr. Boxall fired about eight rockets. There appears to
be no doubt that the vessel whose lights he saw was the _Californian_.
The evidence from the _Californian_ speaks of eight rockets having been
seen between 12.30 and 1.40. The _Californian_ heard none of the
_Titanic's_ messages; she had only one Marconi operator on board and he
was asleep.


THE RESCUE BY THE STEAMSHIP "CARPATHIA."

On the 15th of April the steamship _Carpathia_, 13,600 tons gross, of
the Cunard Line, Mr. Arthur Henry Rostron, master, was on her passage
to Liverpool from New York. She carried some 740 passengers and 325
crew.

On receipt of the _Titanic_'s first distress message the captain
immediately ordered the ship to be turned around and driven at her
highest speed (17-1/2 knots) in the direction of the _Titanic_. He also
informed the _Titanic_ by wireless that he was coming to her assistance,
and he subsequently received various messages from her. At about 2.40 a.
m. he saw a green flare which, as the evidence shows, was being sent up
by Mr. Boxall in No. 2 boat. From this time until 4 a. m. Capt. Rostron
was altering his course continually in order to avoid icebergs. He fired
rockets in answer to the signals he saw from Boxall's boat. At 4 o'clock
he considered he was practically up to the position given and he stopped
his ship at 4.05. He sighted the first boat (No. 2) and picked her up at
4.10. There was then a large number of icebergs around him, and it was
just daylight. Eventually he picked up in all 13 lifeboats, two
emergency boats, and two collapsible boats, all of which were taken on
board the _Carpathia_, the other boats being abandoned as damaged or
useless. From these boats he took on board 712 persons, one of whom died
shortly afterwards. The boats were scattered over an area of 4 or 5
miles, and it was 8 a. m. before they had all been picked up. He saw
very little wreckage when he got near to the scene of the disaster, only
a few deck chairs, cork life belts, etc., and only one body. The
position was then 41 deg. 46' N., 50 deg. 14' W.

The _Carpathia_ subsequently returned to New York with the passengers
and crew she had rescued.

The court desires to record its great admiration of Capt. Rostron's
conduct. He did the very best that could be done.


NUMBERS SAVED.

The following were the numbers saved:

  First class:
    Adult males                       57 out of 175, or 32.57 per cent.
    Adult females                    140 out of 144, or 97.22 per cent.
    Male children (all saved)          5
    Female children (all saved)        1
                                   -----
                                     203 out of 325, or 62.46 per cent.

  Second class:
    Adult males                       14 out of 168, or 8.33 per cent.
    Adult females                     80 out of 93, or 86.02 per cent.
    Male children (all saved)         11
    Female children (all saved)       13
                                   -----
                                     118 out of 285, or 41.40 per cent.

  Third class:
    Adult males                       75 out of 462, or 16.23 per cent.
    Adult females                     76 out of 165, or 46.06 per cent.
    Male children                     13 out of 48, or 27.08 per cent.
    Female children                   14 out of 31, or 45.16 per cent.
                                   -----
                                     178 out of 706, or 25.21 per cent.

  Total                              499 out of 1,316, or 37.94 per cent.

  Crew saved:
    Deck department                     43 out of 66, or 65.15 per cent.
    Engine-room department              72 out of 325, or 22.15 per cent.
    Victualing department
      (including 20 women out of 23)    97 out of 494, or 19.63 per cent.
                                      ----
       Total                           212 out of 885, or 23.95 per cent.

       Total on board saved            711 out of 2,201, or 32.30 per cent.

  Passengers and crew:
    Adult males                        338 out of 1,667, or 20.27 per cent.
    Adult females                      316 out of 425, or 74.35 per cent.
    Children                            57 out of 109, or 52.29 per cent.
                                      ----
      Total                            711 out of 2,201, or 32.30 per cent.




V.--THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN CONNECTION WITH THE STEAMSHIP "CALIFORNIAN."


It is here necessary to consider the circumstances relating to the
steamship _Californian_.

On the 14th of April the steamship _Californian_, of the Leyland Line,
Mr. Stanley Lord, master, was on her passage from London, which port she
left on April 5, to Boston, United States, where she subsequently
arrived on April 19. She was a vessel of 6,223 tons gross and 4,038 net.
Her full speed was 12-1/2 to 13 knots. She had a passenger certificate,
but was not carrying any passengers at the time. She belonged to the
International Mercantile Marine Co., the owners of the _Titanic_.

At 7.30 p.m., ship's time, on April 14, a wireless message was sent from
this ship to the _Antillian_:

       *       *       *       *       *

To CAPTAIN, _Antillian_:

Six thirty p.m., apparent ship's time, latitude 42 deg. 3' N., longitude 49 deg.
9' W. Three large bergs, 5 miles to southward of us. Regards.

LORD.

       *       *       *       *       *

The message was intercepted by the _Titanic_, and when the Marconi
operator (Evans) of the _Californian_ offered this ice report to the
Marconi operator of the _Titanic_, shortly after 7.30 p. m., the latter
replied:

     It is all right. I heard you sending it to the _Antillian_, and I
     have got it.

The _Californian_ proceeded on her course S. 89 deg. W. true until 10.20 p.
m., ship's time, when she was obliged to stop and reverse engines
because she was running into field ice, which stretched as far as could
then be seen to the northward and southward.

The master told the court that he made her position at that time to be
42 deg. 5' N., 57 deg. 7' W. This position is recorded in the log book, which
was written up from the scrap log book by the chief officer. The scrap
log is destroyed. It is a position about 19 miles N. by E. of the
position of the _Titanic_ when she foundered, and is said to have been
fixed by dead reckoning and verified by observations. I am satisfied
that this position is not accurate. The master "twisted her head" to E.
N. E. by the compass and she remained approximately stationary until
5.15 a. m. on the following morning. The ship was slowly swinging around
to starboard during the night.

At about 11 p. m. a steamer's light was seen approaching from the
eastward. The master went to Evans's room and asked what ships he had.
The latter replied: "I think the _Titanic_ is near us. I have got her."
The master said: "You had better advise the _Titanic_ we are stopped and
surrounded with ice." This Evans did, calling up the _Titanic_ and
sending: "We are stopped and surrounded by ice." The _Titanic_ replied:
"Keep out." The _Titanic_ was in communication with Cape Race, which
station was then sending messages to her. The reason why the _Titanic_
answered "keep out" was that her Marconi operator could not hear what
Cape Race was saying, as from her proximity the message from the
_Californian_ was much stronger than any message being taken in by the
_Titanic_ from Cape Race, which was much farther off. Evans heard the
_Titanic_ continuing to communicate with Cape Race up to the time he
turned in at 11.30 p. m.

The master of the _Californian_ states that when observing the
approaching steamer as she got nearer he saw more lights, a few deck
lights, and also her green side light. He considered that at 11 o'clock
she was approximately 6 or 7 miles away, and at some time between 11 and
11.30 he first saw her green light; she was then about 5 miles off. He
noticed that about 11.30 she stopped. In his opinion this steamer was of
about the same size as the _Californian_--a medium-sized steamer,
"something like ourselves."

From the evidence of Mr. Groves, third officer of the _Californian_, who
was the officer of the first watch, it would appear that the master was
not actually on the bridge when the steamer was sighted.

Mr. Groves made out two masthead lights; the steamer was changing her
bearing slowly as she got closer, and as she approached he went to the
chart room and reported this to the master; he added, "She is evidently
a passenger steamer." In fact, Mr. Groves never appears to have had any
doubt on this subject. In answer to a question during his examination,
"Had she much light?" he said, "Yes, a lot of light. There was
absolutely no doubt of her being a passenger steamer, at least in my
mind."

Gill, the assistant donkey man of the _Californian_, who was on deck at
midnight, said, referring to this steamer: "It could not have been
anything but a passenger boat, she was too large."

By the evidence of Mr. Groves, the master, in reply to his report, said:
"Call her up on the Morse lamp, and see if you can get any answer." This
he proceeded to do. The master came up and joined him on the bridge and
remarked: "That does not look like a passenger steamer." Mr. Groves
replied: "It is, sir. When she stopped her lights seemed to go out, and
I suppose they have been put out for the night." Mr. Groves states that
these lights went out at 11.40, and remembers that time because "one
bell was struck to call the middle watch." The master did not join him
on the bridge until shortly afterwards, and consequently after the
steamer had stopped.

In his examination Mr. Groves admitted that if this steamer's head was
turning to port after she stopped, it might account for the diminution
of lights, by many of them being shut out. Her steaming lights were
still visible and also her port side light.

The captain only remained upon the bridge for a few minutes. In his
evidence he stated that Mr. Groves had made no observations to him
about the steamer's deck lights going out. Mr. Groves's Morse signaling
appears to have been ineffectual (although at one moment he thought he
was being answered), and he gave it up. He remained on the bridge until
relieved by Mr. Stone, the second officer, just after midnight. In
turning the _Californian_ over to him, he pointed out the steamer and
said: "she has been stopped since 11.40; she is a passenger steamer. At
about the moment she stopped she put her lights out." When Mr. Groves
was in the witness box the following questions were put to him by me:

     Speaking as an experienced seaman and knowing what you do know now,
     do you think that steamer that you know was throwing up rockets,
     and that you say was a passenger steamer, was the _Titanic_?--Do I
     think it? Yes. From what I have heard subsequently? Yes. Most
     decidedly I do, but I do not put myself as being an experienced
     man. But that is your opinion as far as your experience goes?--Yes,
     it is, my lord.

Mr. Stone states that the master, who was also up (but apparently not on
the bridge), pointed out the steamer to him with instructions to tell
him if her bearings altered or if she got any closer; he also stated
that Mr. Groves had called her up on the Morse lamp and had received no
reply.

Mr. Stone had with him during the middle watch an apprentice named
Gibson, whose attention was first drawn to the steamer's lights at about
12.20 a. m. He could see a masthead light, her red light (with glasses),
and a "glare of white lights on her afterdeck." He first thought her
masthead light was flickering and next thought it was a Morse light,
"calling us up." He replied, but could not get into communication, and
finally came to the conclusion that it was, as he had first supposed,
the masthead light flickering. Sometime after 12.30 a. m., Gill, the
donkey man, states that he saw two rockets fired from the ship which he
had been observing, and about 1.10 a. m., Mr. Stone reported to the
captain by voice pipe, that he had seen five white rockets from the
direction of the steamer. He states that the master answered, "Are they
company's signals?" and that he replied, "I do not know, but they appear
to me to be white rockets." The master told him to "go on Morsing," and,
when he received any information, to send the apprentice down to him
with it. Gibson states that Mr. Stone informed him that he had reported
to the master, and that the master had said the steamer was to be called
up by Morse light. This witness thinks the time was 12.55; he at once
proceeded again to call the steamer up by Morse. He got no reply, but
the vessel fired three more white rockets; these rockets were also seen
by Mr. Stone.

Both Mr. Stone and the apprentice kept the steamer under observation,
looking at her from time to time with their glasses. Between 1 o'clock
and 1.40 some conversation passed between them. Mr. Stone remarked to
Gibson: "Look at her now, she looks very queer out of water, her lights
look queer." He also is said by Gibson to have remarked, "A ship is not
going to fire rockets at sea for nothing;" and admits himself that he
may possibly have used that expression.

Mr. Stone states that he saw the last of the rockets fired at about
1.40, and after watching the steamer for some 20 minutes more he sent
Gibson down to the master.

     I told Gibson to go down to the master, and be sure and wake him,
     and tell him that altogether we had seen eight of these white
     lights like white rockets in the direction of this other steamer;
     that this steamer was disappearing in the southwest, that we had
     called her up repeatedly on the Morse lamp and received no
     information whatsoever.

Gibson states that he went down to the chart room and told the master;
that the master asked him if all the rockets were white, and also asked
him the time. Gibson stated that at this time the master was awake. It
was five minutes past two, and Gibson returned to the bridge to Mr.
Stone and reported. They both continued to keep the ship under
observation until she disappeared. Mr. Stone describes this as "A
gradual disappearing of all her lights, which would be perfectly natural
with a ship steaming away from us."

At about 2.40 a. m. Mr. Stone again called up the master by voice pipe
and told him that the ship from which he had seen the rockets come had
disappeared bearing SW. 1/2 W., the last he had seen of the light; and
the master again asked him if he was certain there was no color in the
lights. "I again assured him they were all white, just white rockets."
There is considerable discrepancy between the evidence of Mr. Stone and
that of the master. The latter states that he went to the voice pipe at
about 1.15, but was told then of a white rocket (not five white
rockets). Moreover, between 1.30 and 4.30, when he was called by the
chief officer (Mr. Stewart), he had no recollection of anything being
reported to him at all, although he remembered Gibson opening and
closing the chart-room door.

Mr. Stewart relieved Mr. Stone at 4 a. m. The latter told him he had
seen a ship 4 or 5 miles off when he went on deck at 12 o'clock, and at
1 o'clock he had seen some white rockets, and that the moment the ship
started firing them she started to steam away. Just at this time (about
4 a. m.) a steamer came in sight with two white masthead lights and a
few lights amidships. He asked Mr. Stone whether he thought this was the
steamer which had fired rockets, and Mr. Stone said he did not think it
was. At 4.30 he called the master and informed him that Mr. Stone had
told him he had seen rockets in the middle watch. The master said, "Yes,
I know; he has been telling me." The master came at once on to the
bridge, and apparently took the fresh steamer for the one which had
fired rockets, and said, "She looks all right; she is not making any
signals now." This mistake was not corrected. He, however, had the
wireless operator called.

At about 6 a. m. Capt. Lord heard from the _Virginian_ that the
"_Titanic_ had struck a berg, passengers in boats, ship sinking;" and he
at once started through the field ice at full speed for the position
given.

Capt. Lord stated that about 7.30 a. m. he passed the _Mount Temple_,
stopped, and that she was in the vicinity of the position given him as
where the _Titanic_ had collided (lat. 41 deg. 46' N.; long. 50 deg. 14' W.). He
saw no wreckage there, but did later on near the _Carpathia_, which ship
he closed soon afterwards, and he stated that the position where he
subsequently left this wreckage was 41 deg. 33' N.; 50 deg. 1' W. It is said in
the evidence of Mr. Stewart that the position of the _Californian_ was
verified by stellar observations at 7.30 p. m. on the Sunday evening,
and that he verified the captain's position given when the ship stopped
(42 deg. 5' N.; 50 deg. 7' W.) as accurate on the next day. The position in
which the wreckage was said to have been seen on the Monday morning was
verified by sights taken on that morning.

All the officers are stated to have taken sights, and Mr. Stewart in his
evidence remarks that they all agreed. If it is admitted that these
positions were correct, then it follows that the _Titanic_'s position as
given by that ship when making the CQD. signal was approximately S.
16 deg. W. (true), 19 miles from the _Californian_; and further that the
position in which the _Californian_ was stopped during the night, was 30
miles away from where the wreckage was seen by her in the morning, or
that the wreckage had drifted 11 miles in a little more than five hours.

There are contradictions and inconsistencies in the story as told by the
different witnesses. But the truth of the matter is plain. The _Titanic_
collided with the berg at 11.40. The vessel seen by the _Californian_
stopped at this time. The rockets sent up from the _Titanic_ were
distress signals. The _Californian_ saw distress signals. The number
sent up by the _Titanic_ was about eight. The _Californian_ saw eight.
The time over which the rockets from the _Titanic_ were sent up was from
about 12.45 to 1.45 o'clock. It was about this time that the
_Californian_ saw the rockets. At 2.40 Mr. Stone called to the master
that the ship from which he had seen the rockets had disappeared. At
2.20 a. m. the _Titanic_ had foundered. It was suggested that the
rockets seen by the _Californian_ were from some other ship, not the
_Titanic_. But no other ship to fit this theory has ever been heard of.

These circumstances convince me that the ship seen by the _Californian_
was the _Titanic_, and if so, according to Capt. Lord, the two vessels
were about 5 miles apart at the time of the disaster. The evidence from
the _Titanic_ corroborates this estimate, but I am advised that the
distance was probably greater, though not more than 8 to 10 miles. The
ice by which the _Californian_ was surrounded was loose ice extending
for a distance of not more than 2 or 3 miles in the direction of the
_Titanic_. The night was clear and the sea was smooth. When she first
saw the rockets, the _Californian_ could have pushed through the ice to
the open water without any serious risk and so have come to the
assistance of the _Titanic_. Had she done so she might have saved many
if not all of the lives that were lost.




VI.--THE BOARD OF TRADE'S ADMINISTRATION.


The court was invited by the board of trade--

     "to report upon the rules and regulations made under the merchant
     shipping acts, 1894-1906, and the administration of those acts, and
     of such rules and regulations so far as the consideration thereof
     is material to this casualty" (No. 26 of the questions submitted to
     the court by the board of trade).

Charges were made against the board of trade during the progress of the
inquiry of a twofold kind. First, it was said that the board had been
negligent in that they had failed to keep up to date their rules and
regulations relating generally to the provision of life-saving
appliances at sea, and, secondly, it was said that their officials had
in the particular instance of the _Titanic_ failed to exercise due care
in the supervision of the vessel's plans and the inspection of the work
done upon her.

With reference to the first of these charges, it was reduced in the
course of the inquiry to a charge of neglect to keep the board's scale
for the provision of lifeboat accommodation up to date. The
circumstances are these: In March, 1886, the board appointed a
departmental committee, consisting of three of their principal
officers, to inquire into the question of boats, rafts, and life-saving
apparatus carried by sea-going merchant ships. In their report this
committee pointed out that, as regards boats for ocean-going steamers
carrying large numbers of passengers, the boats would be of little use
in saving life (although they might for a time prolong its existence)
unless succor were at hand from other ships or from proximity to shore;
and speaking with special reference to passenger steam vessels carrying
emigrants across the Atlantic to ports on the east coast of North
America, they said as follows:

     Considering the number of vessels employed in this trade, and the
     large number of passengers they carry, and also taking into
     consideration the stormy character of the ocean they have to cross,
     and the thick and foggy weather encountered, we think this class is
     the most important of any, and we can not pass over the fact that
     of late years this traffic has been carried on with remarkable
     immunity from loss of life.

     The boat accommodation these vessels are forced to carry when
     sailing with emigrants is regulated by the scale in the passengers
     act, 1855, which provides for boat accommodation for 216 people as
     a maximum, so that, supposing a vessel leaves with 1,000 passengers
     and 200 crew under the present statutory requirements, she need
     only carry sufficient boat accommodation for 216 of these people.
     Thus it will be seen that the boats carried by this class of
     vessels are also quite inadequate as an effectual means of saving
     life should a disaster happen to a ship with her full complement of
     passengers on board. We are glad to be able to say that there are
     many liberal and careful shipowners who do all in their power to
     provide for the safety of their passengers by equipping their
     vessels with boats far in excess of the number required by statute.
     But, at the same time, there are others carrying large numbers of
     emigrants who do no more than they are required to do by law.

     We have gone into this question with reference to this class of
     vessels very fully, and have visited many of them, and we think
     that the boats required by act should be increased 100 per cent.,
     and in addition to them that the owners should be induced to carry
     sufficient collapsible boats and approved rafts, so that each ship
     shall have sufficient life-saving gear for all on board at any one
     time, provided, as said before, that no ship need carry more boat
     accommodation than is sufficient for all on board at that time.

In 1887 a select committee of the House of Commons, of which Lord
Charles Beresford was the chairman, was appointed to report on saving
life at sea, and they found in their report--

     That many passenger ships could not, without great inconvenience,
     carry so many of the ordinary wooden boats as would suffice to
     carry the whole of the passengers and crew with safety in bad
     weather. Under such circumstances the crew would not be sufficient
     to man so many boats; nor could they all be got into the water in
     sufficient time in the event of very rapid foundering. Having
     regard, however, to the fact that accidents occur probably as often
     in moderate weather as in bad, and having regard also to the fact
     that the very cause of the accident frequently incapacitates many
     of the boats, and to the further fact that an insufficiency of
     boats undoubtedly tends to cause panic, we are of opinion that all
     sea-going passenger ships should be compelled by law to carry such
     boats, and other life-saving apparatus, as would in the aggregate
     best provide for the safety of all on board in moderate weather.

As a result of these reports, the merchant shipping (life-saving
appliances) act, 1888, appears to have been passed, under which rules
were made by the board of trade at different dates. The merchant
shipping act, 1894, repealed the act of 1888, and substituted therefor
sections 427 to 431 and the seventeenth schedule of the new act. Under
this act (1894) a table showing the minimum number of boats to be placed
under davits and their minimum cubic contents was issued by the board.
It was dated March 9, 1894, and came into operation on June 1 of that
year. This table was based on the gross tonnage of the vessels to which
it was to apply, and not upon the numbers carried, and it provided that
the number of boats and their capacity should increase as the tonnage
increased. The table, however, stopped short at the point where the
gross tonnage of the vessels reached "10,000 and upwards." As to all
such vessels, whatever their size might be, the minimum number of boats
under davits was fixed by the table at 16, with a total minimum capacity
of 5,500 cubic feet.

But as regarded emigrant steamships there was a rule which provided that
if the boats under davits required by the table did not furnish
sufficient accommodation for all on board, then additional boats of
approved description (whether under davits or not) or approved life
rafts should be carried, and that these additional boats or rafts should
be of at least such carrying capacity that they and the boats required
by the table should provide together in vessels of 5,000 tons and
upwards three-fourths more than the minimum cubic contents required by
the table, so that in the case of an emigrant ship such as the _Titanic_
the requirements under the rules and table together exacted a provision
of 9,625 cubic feet of lifeboat and raft accommodation (5,500 feet in
boats under davits with three-fourths, namely, 4,125, added). Taken at
10 cubic feet per person, this would be equivalent to a provision for
962 persons. No doubt at the time these rules were made and this table
was drawn up it was thought that, having regard to the size of vessels
then built and building, it was unnecessary to carry the table further.
The largest emigrant steamer then afloat was the _Lucania_, of 12,952
tons.

In the report of the select committee of the House of Commons a
reference to water-tight bulkheads had been made, which was in the
following terms:

     Though the question of construction was clearly not included in the
     reference to the committee, still they think it only right to
     state, after having heard the evidence, that the proper placing of
     bulkheads, so as to enable a ship to keep afloat for some length of
     time after an accident has occurred, is most important for saving
     life at sea, and a thing upon which the full efficiency of
     life-saving appliances largely depends.

This passage probably explains the insertion in the board of trade's
rules for life-saving appliances of rule No. 12, which is as follows:

     _Water-tight compartments._--When ships of any class are divided
     into efficient water-tight compartments to the satisfaction of the
     board of trade, they shall only be required to carry additional
     boats, rafts and buoyant apparatus of one-half of the capacity
     required by these rules, but the exemption shall not extend to life
     jackets or similar approved articles of equal buoyancy suitable to
     be worn on the person.

If this rule had become applicable to the _Titanic_, then the total
cubical lifeboat or raft accommodation which she would have been
required to carry would not have been more than 7,562 (equivalent to
accommodation for 756 persons). It did not, however, become applicable
for the owners never required the board of trade to express any opinion
under the rule as to the efficiency of the water-tight compartments. The
_Titanic_, in fact, carried boat accommodation for 1,178 persons, a
number far in excess of the requirements of the table and rules, and
therefore no concession under rule 12 was needed. Speaking generally,
recourse to this rule (12) by shipowners has been so insignificant that
the rule itself may be regarded as of no practical account.

The foregoing rules with the table were laid before Parliament in the
usual way, and so received the required statutory sanction.

After 1894 steamers were built of a much larger tonnage than 10,000, the
increase culminating in the _Titanic_, with a gross tonnage of 46,328.
As the vessels built increased in size, one would have thought the
necessity for increased lifeboat accommodation would grow; but the rules
and table remained stationary and nothing was done to them by way of
change. The explanation of this long delay (from 1894-1912) was given
before me by Sir Alfred Chalmers, who had served under the board of
trade as nautical adviser from 1896 to August, 1911. He is now retired.
I think it will be well if I give his explanation in his own words. He
says:

     I considered the matter very closely from time to time. I first of
     all considered the record of the trade--that is to say, the record
     of the casualties--and to see what immunity from loss there was. I
     found it was the safest mode of travel in the world, and I thought
     it was neither right nor the duty of a state department to impose
     regulations upon that mode of travel as long as the record was a
     clean one. Secondly, I found that as ships grew bigger there were
     such improvements made in their construction that they were
     stronger and better ships, both from the point of view of
     water-tight compartments and also absolute strength, and I
     considered that that was the road along which the shipowners were
     going to travel, and that they should not be interfered with. I
     then went to the maximum that is down in the table, 16 boats and
     upward, together with the supplementary boats, and I considered
     from my experience that that was the maximum number that could be
     rapidly dealt with at sea and that could be safely housed without
     incumbering the vessel's decks unduly. In the next place I
     considered that the traffic was very safe on account of the routes,
     the definite routes being agreed upon by the different companies,
     which tended to lessen the risk of collision and to avoid ice and
     fog. Then again, there was the question of wireless telegraphy,
     which had already come into force on board of these passenger
     ships. I was seized of the fact that in July, 1901, the _Lucania_
     had been fitted with wireless telegraphy, and the Cunard Line
     generally fitted it during that year to all their ships. The Allan
     Line fitted it in 1902, and I am not sure that in 1904 it had not
     become quite general on the trans-Atlantic ships. That, of course,
     entered into my consideration as well. Then another point was the
     manning. It was quite evident to me that if you went on crowding
     the ships with boats you would require a crew which were not
     required otherwise for the safe navigation of the ship, or for the
     proper upkeep of the ship, but you are providing a crew which would
     be carried uselessly across the ocean, that never would be required
     to man the boats. Then the last point, and not the least, was this,
     that the voluntary action of the owners was carrying them beyond
     the requirements of our scale, and when voluntary action on the
     part of shipowners is doing that, I think that any state department
     should hold its hand before it steps in to make a hard and fast
     scale for that particular type of shipping. I considered that that
     scale fitted all sizes of ships that were then afloat, and I did
     not consider it necessary to increase it, and that was my advice to
     Sir Walter Howell.

I appreciate this explanation, and I think there is much force in it. At
the same time, it seems to me that it does not justify the delay. Even
taking all these matters into consideration, it can not be that the
provision for boat accommodation made in 1894 for vessels of 10,000 tons
and upward remained sufficient to 1910, when vessels of 45,000 tons were
being built. Two considerations demonstrate this. The first is that some
shipowners recognized the insufficiency of the requirements of the board
of trade, and voluntarily exceeded those requirements by providing
larger boat accommodation than the old rules and table exacted. The
second is that shortly before Sir Alfred Chalmers left the board of
trade, the board had begun to direct attention to the amending of their
rules in this connection.

It appears that in November, 1910, a question was asked in the House of
Commons as to whether the attention of the president of the board of
trade had been called to the fact that the _Olympic_, a sister ship of
the _Titanic_, was provided with 14 lifeboats only. The answer given was
that the _Olympic_ (which was then in course of construction) would
carry 14 lifeboats and two ordinary boats of an aggregate capacity of
9,752 cubic feet, which was in excess of the requirements of the
statutory rules. On February 15, 1911, a further question was asked as
to the date of the last regulations, and whether, having regard to the
increased tonnage of modern ships, the desirability of revising the
regulations would be considered by the board of trade. The answer by the
president was:

     Those regulations were last revised in 1894. The question of their
     further revision is engaging the serious attention of the board of
     trade, and I have decided to refer the matter to the merchant
     shipping advisory committee for consideration and advice.

Three days afterwards, namely, on February 18, 1911, a circular letter
was sent out by the board of trade to the board's principal officers at
Liverpool, London, and Glasgow asking each of those gentlemen to draft
such an extension of the existing boat scale as he might think
satisfactory and reasonable for the conditions of large passenger
steamers. This circular letter was answered by the principal officer in
Glasgow (Mr. Harris) on February 24, 1911, by the principal officer in
London (Mr. Park) on February 27, 1911, and by the principal officer in
Liverpool (Mr. Young) on March 3, 1911. It is sufficient to say of these
answers that they all suggested a large extension of the statutory
requirements.

Meanwhile, namely, on February 28, 1911, Mr. Archer, the board of
trade's principal ship surveyor, had also drawn up a scale. This was a
more exacting scale than that of any of the three principal officers. By
his scale a vessel of the tonnage of the _Titanic_ would have had to
carry boat accommodation equivalent to at least 24,937 cubic feet, which
would have been sufficient to hold all and more than all the persons who
were on board at the time of the disaster (2,201). It would not,
however, have been nearly sufficient to have held all that the vessel
might lawfully have carried, viz, 3,547, and it is to be observed with
reference to Mr. Archer's scale that in it he suggests an extension of
rule 12, by which (if the vessel were divided into efficient water-tight
compartments) the total boat accommodation might be reduced much more
than rule 12 as it stands would permit. If this reduction be taken into
account, the boat accommodation would fall so that it would be
sufficient only for 1,750 persons. Mr. Archer's view was that shipowners
should be encouraged to increase the floatability of the ships they
built, and that the way to encourage them was to relax the legal
requirements as to boats as their plans advanced in that direction. The
great object was so to build the ship that in the event of a disaster
she would be her own lifeboat.[4]

Having obtained these four reports, the board of trade, on April 4,
1911, submitted the matter to their advisory committee, and obtained the
committee's report on July 4, 1911. The following are copies (with
omissions of immaterial passages) of the board of trade's letter of
April 4, 1911, and of the advisory committee's report of July 4, 1911:

       *       *       *       *       *

BOARD OF TRADE, MARINE DEPARTMENT,

7 WHITEHALL GARDENS,

_London, SW., April 4, 1911_.

SIR: I am directed by the board of trade to inclose herewith, for the
information of the merchant shipping advisory committee, a copy of a
question asked in the House of Commons on February 15 and of the answer
given by the president of the board of trade with reference to the
life-saving appliances rules made under section 427 of the merchant
shipping act, 1894.

The board are of opinion that the table in the appendix to the rules
should be extended upward in the form indicated in the accompanying
scale, so as to provide for vessels of tonnage up to 50,000 tons gross
and upward.

It appears to the board that the number of boats and the boat capacity
need not necessarily increase in a regular proportion according to the
increase in tonnage, and that due regard should be paid to what is
reasonable and practicable in passenger steamers exceeding 10,000 tons.
* * *

I am to state that the board would be obliged if the merchant shipping
advisory committee would be so good as to suggest in what manner the
scale (see accompanying copy) should be continued upward, having due
regard to the considerations indicated above.

I am further to state that the board would be glad to learn whether the
advisory committee are of opinion that rule 12 should or should not be
revised so as to exempt altogether from the requirement of additional
boats or rafts those vessels which are divided into efficient
water-tight compartments to the satisfaction of the board of trade. * *
*

I am, etc.,

WALTER J. HOWELL.

The SECRETARY,

_Merchant Shipping Advisory Committee_

       *       *       *       *       *

MERCHANT SHIPPING ADVISORY COMMITTEE,

_July 4, 1911_.

SIR: We have the honor to report that your letter of April 4 with
reference to the minimum number of lifeboats to be earned on vessels of
10,000 tons gross tonnage and upward, and your letter of May 17 on the
subject of the depth of lifeboats, have been very carefully considered
by the merchant shipping advisory committee and that it was unanimously
decided at a meeting held on the 29th ultimo to adopt the report of a
subcommittee which was specially appointed to inquire into these
questions.

A copy of the report is accordingly forwarded herewith, and the
committee desire us to suggest for the consideration of the board of
trade that effect should be given to the recommendations contained in
it.

We are, etc.,

NORMAN HILL, _Chairman_.

R. W. MATTHEW, _Secretary_.

SIR WALTER J. HOWELL,

_Assistant Secretary Marine Department, Board of Trade_.

       *       *       *       *       *

REPORT OF THE LIFE-SAVING APPLIANCES SUBCOMMITTEE TO THE MERCHANT
SHIPPING ADVISORY COMMITTEE.

In accordance with the decision of the merchant shipping advisory
committee, at their meeting on Friday, April 28, we have given careful
consideration to the latter of April 4 from the board of trade, in which
the committee were asked to advise: (1) As to the manner in which the
table in the appendix to the Life-Saving Appliances Rules should be
extended so as to provide for vessels of tonnage up to 50,000 tons gross
and upward; and (2) as to whether rule 12 should or should not be
revised so as to exempt altogether from the requirement of additional
boats and (or) rafts, those vessels which are divided into efficient
water-tight compartments to the satisfaction of the board of trade.

In considering these questions, we have had specially in mind the fact
that the number of passengers carried does not necessarily increase in
proportion to the increase in the tonnage of the vessel. This is
particularly true in the case of vessels exceeding 10,000 tons, a type
of vessel which is practically only built to provide special
accommodation for large numbers of first and second class passengers.

Similarly there is no fixed relation between the tonnage of vessels and
the deck space available for the carrying of lifeboats under davits.
Increase in the length of a vessel is only one of the factors, and often
not the most material factor contributing to the increase in its
tonnage, and it should also be remembered, in estimating the space
available for the launching of lifeboats, that it is impossible to place
davits forward of the bridge, and very undesirable to have them on the
quarters of the vessel.

We are strongly of opinion that every encouragement should be given to
secure the provision of vessels which by their construction have been
rendered as unsinkable as possible, and which are provided with
efficient means for communicating with the shore or with other vessels
in case of disaster.

In view of these considerations, we have agreed upon the following
recommendations:

1. That it is questionable whether it is practicable to increase the
number of davits.

2. That any increase in the number of lifeboats to be carried can
probably be best effected by providing for the launching of further
boats from the existing davits.

3. That the table should be extended in the manner indicated below,
viz.:

  -------------------------+-------------+---------------+----------------
                           |             |    Minimum    |
                           |             |   number of   | Total minimum
                           |   Minimum   |  additional   |      cubic
                           |  number of  |  boats to be  |  contents of
        Gross tonnage.     | boats to be |    readily    | boats required
                           | placed under|   available   |       by
                           |   davits.   | for attachment|    columns
                           |             |   to davits.  |    2 and 3.
  -------------------------+-------------+---------------+----------------
                           |             |               |  _Cubic feet._
  10,000 and under 12,000  |       16    |       ----    |        5,500
  12,000 and under 20,000  |       16    |         2     |        6,200
  20,000 and under 35,000  |       16    |         4     |        6,900
  35,000 and under 45,000  |       16    |         6     |        7,600
  45,000 and upward        |       16    |         8     |        8,300
  -------------------------+-------------+---------------+----------------

It is further recommended that all passenger vessels of 10,000 tons
gross tonnage and upward should be required to be fitted with wireless
telegraphy apparatus.

4. That the rules should be amended so as to admit of decked lifeboats
of an approved type being stowed on top of one another or under an open
lifeboat, subject to suitable arrangements being made for launching
promptly the boats so stowed.

5. That the additional boats and rafts required under the provisions of
Division A, class 1(d) of the Life-Saving Appliances Rules shall be of
at least such carrying capacity that they, and the boats required by
columns 2 and 3 of the above table, provide together three-fourths more
than the minimum cubic contents required by column 4 of that table.

6. That vessels divided into efficient water-tight compartments to the
satisfaction of the board of trade should (provided they are fitted with
wireless telegraphy apparatus) be exempt from the requirement of
additional boats and (or) rafts. The committee suggest, in this
connection, that the board of trade should review the requirements
designed to attain the standards as to water-tight compartments at
present enforced by them under rule 12, having regard to the
developments of shipbuilding since the report of the committee on the
spacing and construction of water-tight bulkheads.

We have also had before us the board's further letter of May 17
inquiring whether, in the opinion of the advisory committee, it would be
advisable to prescribe a maximum depth for lifeboats as compared with
their breadth, and, if so, what that proportion should be.

In connection with this letter we have been supplied by the board of
trade with reports from their principal officers in Great Britain,
giving the dimensions and cubic capacities of the various kinds of boats
on five typical ships in each of eight ports.

We recommend that the board should be advised to alter the Life-Saving
Appliances Rules so as to provide that, in future, the depth of
lifeboats supplied to a British merchant vessel shall not exceed 44 per
cent. of their breadth.

    NORMAN HILL.
    S. CROSS.
    GEO. N. HAMPSON.
    T. ROYDEN.
    THOMAS SPENCER.
    A. M. CARLISLE.
    WM. THEODORE DOXFORD.
    ROBERT A. OGILVIE.
    T. ROME.
    J. HAVELOCK WILSON.

       *       *       *       *       *

It will be observed that if effect had been given by the board of trade
to the report of the advisory committee the requirements for a vessel of
the size of the _Titanic_ would have reached 14,525 cubic feet (8,300
plus three-fourths of 8,300, namely, 6,225), with, however, this
qualification that if the vessel were divided into efficient water-tight
compartments (as she probably was) and fitted with wireless telegraphy
(as she certainly was) a provision of a boat capacity of 8,300 cubic
feet, equivalent to space for 830 persons, would have been legally
sufficient. This would have been much less than the accommodation with
which the _Titanic_ when she put to sea was, in fact, provided (namely,
for 1,178 persons).

Effect, however, was not given to the report. A question arose with
reference to the dimensions of lifeboats, and it was thought better to
get that question settled before proceeding to revise the rules. The
examination of this question involved making several experiments which
caused delay; and it was not until April 16, 1912, that a reply was sent
by the board of trade to the advisory committee. It will be noticed that
the date of this reply is just after the disaster to the _Titanic_
became known. I am, however, quite satisfied that instructions for the
preparation of this letter had been given in the offices of the board of
trade some days before the 16th, and that the letter was not sent in
consequence of the disaster. It is desirable to set it out.

       *       *       *       *       *

BOARD OF TRADE, MARINE DEPARTMENT,

7 WHITEHALL GARDENS,

_London, S. W., April 16, 1912_.

SIR: With reference to your letter of the 4th July last respecting
certain questions raised in connection with the proposed revision of the
Life-Saving Appliances Rules, I am directed by the board of trade to
state, for the information of the advisory committee, that they have
given very careful consideration to the report of the life-saving
appliances subcommittee which was forwarded with your letter.

As regards the recommendations with reference to the proposed extension
of the table (appendix to the Life Saving Appliances Rules) showing the
minimum number of boats to be placed under davits, the board are glad to
observe that the committee agree that alterations and additions are now
necessary to meet the changed conditions due to recent developments in
the size of passenger steamships and in the number of persons which
these vessels can accommodate.

The board of trade note that the gradations of tonnage in the extension
of the scale suggested by the advisory committee are not the same as
those in the form of scale submitted to them by the board; while the
increase in the number of boats is not in the number to be placed under
davits, but in the number of additional boats required to be readily
available for attachments to davits. It is observed that the committee
hold the view that "it is questionable whether it is practicable to
increase the number of davits," and "that any increase in the number of
lifeboats to be carried can probably be best effected by providing for
the launching of further boats from the existing davits."

The board presume that, in arriving at these conclusions, the committee
have had regard to ships already built rather than to new ships, as they
see no reason why there would be any difficulty in having more than
eight pairs of davits on each side of the ship, provided that the
requirements of Life-Saving Appliances Rules were known before the plans
were prepared.

The board are of opinion that a very careful and thorough revision of
the table should now be made, and I am to transmit herewith a copy of a
memorandum and tables prepared by the professional advisor to the marine
department, containing a full and considered opinion on the subject of
the extension of the boat scale and cognate questions.

As regards the proposed amendment of the rules, so as to admit of decked
lifeboats of an approved type being stowed one above another, or under
an open lifeboat, I am to state that this question is now under
consideration, and a communication will be addressed to you shortly on
the subject.

With reference to the advisory committee's recommendation regarding the
amendment of rule 12 of the general rules, the board desire me to state
that the questions raised in the recommendation are of wide application
and of such importance that the board do not think that they can be
adequately considered except by a committee of equal standing to the
committee which reported in 1891 on the spacing and construction of
water-tight bulkheads in the mercantile marine. The board have the
question of the appointment of a committee under consideration.

In connection with the advisory committee's recommendation that the
depth of lifeboats shall not exceed 44 per cent. of their breadth, I am
to transmit herewith, for their consideration, a draft amendment of
rules Nos. 1, 2, and 3 of the general rules with reference to the
construction of ships' boats.

The board have made full inquiry into the question of the construction
of ships' boats, and obtained some useful information as to the average
depth of boat which is deemed desirable for safety and utility, and the
ratio of that depth to the breadth, and they attach so much importance
to this element of boat construction that they think it should receive
the careful attention of the committee. The board think that the
committee, in the light of this additional information, may reconsider
the opinions expressed on this point in their letter of July 4.

I am therefore to transmit herewith copies of memoranda by the
professional adviser to the marine department and the acting principal
ship surveyor.

The board desire me to state that they would be glad to be furnished
with the advisory committee's views as to the application of the
proposed new rules and boat scale, e. g., whether they should apply to
ships already built, and if so, to what extent. They regard it as of
great importance, on the one hand, that all British vessels should be
provided with a proper and sufficient equipment of life-saving
appliances, and, on the other, that regulations should not be enforced
without notice which would necessitate important structural alterations
and consequent heavy expense in vessels already built.

I am to add that in order to make the constitution of the committee,
when considering this question, agree with that of the statutory
life-saving appliances committee indicated in the seventeenth schedule
to the merchant shipping act, 1894, the board have followed the course
adopted on previous occasions, and have invited Lloyd's Register of
British and Foreign Shipping and the Institute of London Underwriters to
select a representative who will be available to sit on the advisory
committee when the question is under consideration.

I am, etc.,

WALTER J. HOWELL.

The SECRETARY,

_Merchant Shipping Advisory Committee_,

_7, Whitehall Gardens, S. W_.

       *       *       *       *       *

EXTENSION OF LIFE-SAVING APPARATUS TABLES.

It will be seen that I have given priority in importance to the form of
ships' boats rather than to their number on the principle that a few
reliable boats are of greater value than a large number of indifferent
ones; but if the former desirable condition can be obtained by the
proposed alterations in our rules as to measurement, etc., we are freer
to approach the question of adding to the number of boats provided for
in the existing tables.

As with the question of ratio D: B dealt with by the advisory committee
last year, so with the question of boat increase and relative increase
of cubic capacity dealt with by them on the same occasion, perhaps the
board might inform the committee that they are not satisfied that a
slightly different recommendation might not have been made had the
matter been still further considered at the time.

Referring to the table of boat capacities computed by them particularly
it might be helpful if the board laid before them for consideration the
table, which I attach hereto and submit, as showing a more reasonable
proportionate increase in capacity than appears so far, in my opinion,
in the other papers before us. It will be seen in this statement that
the number of boats recommended by the advisory committee is practically
retained, but the unit of increase in capacity is put at 300 cubic feet.

Perhaps I should state here what actuated me in fixing upon this rate of
increase. I realized that in all probability it would become the
practice on these large liners to provide boats under davits which would
contain the entire cubic feet required by the L. S. A. Rules, that
is--the quantity required by rule under davits plus the addition of
three-fourths and it occurred to me that if, after the figure 5,500
cubic feet the increase of capacity were uniform and moderate it would
result in a total at 1-3/4 which would by incidence fit in with the
scale of boats already recommended as requisite in the report of the
advisory committee and in my own, i. e., assuming that the boats are of
500 cubic feet. Example: Take a vessel of 30,000 tons and under 35,000
tons, according to the table I submit she would be required to have by
the 1-3/4 rule a total boat capacity of 12,500 cubic feet which at 500
cubic feet per boat equals 24 boats nearly. There should be no
difficulty on the large ships in carrying this quantity under davits, i.
e., 18 directly under davits and six boats inboard.

Please see incidental table attached.

(Mr. A. H. Young, professional adviser of the board of trade.)

MARCH 28, 1912.

       *       *       *       *       *


_Proposed extension of boat scale._

  ---------------------------+----------+------------------
                             |          |      Minimum
                             |          |    total cubic
                             |          |    contents of
           Gross tons.       |  Boats.  |       boats
                             |          |    required to
                             |          |    be carried
                             |          |       under
                             |          |      davits.
  ---------------------------+----------+------------------
                             |          |   _Cubic feet._
  10,000 and under 12,000    |    16    |       5,500
  12,000 and under 15,000    |    18    |       5,800
  15,000 and under 20,000    |    20    |       6,100
  20,000 and under 25,000    |    22    |       6,400
  25,000 and under 30,000    |    24    |       6,700
  30,000 and under 35,000    |    24    |       7,000
  35,000 and under 40,000    |    24    |       7,300
  40,000 and under 45,000    |    24    |       7,600
  45,000 and under 50,000    |    26    |       7,900
  50,000 and upward          |    26    |       8,200
  ---------------------------+----------+------------------

Please see the accompanying incidental table showing how this number of
boats can provide for the three-quarters additional capacity also, if of
about 500 cubic feet per boat to 600 cubic feet.

A. H. Y.

       *       *       *       *       *

_Table of incidence (informative)._

  -----------------------+------+-----+-----------+------+-----------
                         |      |     |           |      |Equivalent
                         |      |     |           |      |  boats.
                         |Number|Cubic|Cubic feet |Total |-----+-----
        Gross tons.      |  of  |feet.|additional.|cubic | At  | At
                         |boats.|     |           | feet | 500 | 600
                         |      |     |           | at   |cubic|cubic
                         |      |     |           |1-3/4.|feet.|feet.
  -----------------------+------+-----+-----------+------+-----+-----
  10,000 and under 12,000|  16  |5,500|   4,125   | 9,625|  19 |  16
  12,000 and under 15,000|  18  |5,800|   4,350   |10,150|  20 |  16
  15,000 and under 20,000|  20  |6,100|   4,575   |10,675|  21 |  18
  20,000 and under 25,000|  22  |6,400|   4,800   |11,200|  22 |  19
  25,000 and under 30,000|  24  |6,700|   5,025   |11,725|  24 |  20
  30,000 and under 35,000|  24  |7,000|   5,250   |12,250|  24 |  20
  35,000 and under 40,000|  24  |7,300|   5,475   |12,775|  25 |  21
  40,000 and under 45,000|  24  |7,600|   5,700   |13,300|  26 |  22
  45,000 and under 50,000|  26  |7,900|   5,925   |13,825|  27 |  23
  50,000 and upward      |  26  |8,200|   6,150   |14,350|  28 |  24
  -----------------------+------+-----+-----------+------+-----+-----

One-fourth of the above boats may be carried inboard, but they should
not exceed 500 cubic feet in capacity, so that they may be readily drawn
up to the davits.

A. H. Y.

MARCH 30, 1912.

       *       *       *       *       *

DRAFT AMENDMENT OF GENERAL RULES.

(1) _Boats._--All boats shall be constructed and properly equipped as
provided by these rules, and shall be of such form and proportions that
they shall have sufficient freeboard, and ample stability in a seaway,
when loaded with their full complement of persons and equipment.

All thwart and side seats must be fitted as low in the boat as
practicable, and bottom boards must be fitted so that the thwarts shall
not be more than 2 feet 9 inches above them.

All boats and other life-saving appliances are to be kept ready for use
to the satisfaction of the board of trade. Internal buoyancy apparatus
may be constructed of wood, or of copper or yellow metal of not less
than 18 ounces to the superficial foot, or of other durable material.

     SECTION (A). A boat of this section shall be a lifeboat of
     whaleboat form, properly constructed of wood or metal, having for
     every 10 cubic feet of her capacity, computed as in rule (2), at
     least 1 cubic foot of strong and serviceable inclosed air-tight
     compartments, so constructed that water can not find its way into
     them. In the case of metal boats an addition will have to be made
     to the cubic capacity of the air-tight compartments, so as to give
     them buoyancy equal to that of the wooden boat.

     SEC. (B). A boat of this section shall be a lifeboat, of whaleboat
     form properly constructed of wood or metal, having inside and
     outside buoyancy apparatus together equal in efficiency to the
     buoyancy apparatus provided for a boat of section (A). At least
     one-half of the buoyancy apparatus must be attached to the outside
     of the boat.

     SEC. (C). A boat of this section shall be a lifeboat, properly
     constructed of wood or metal, having some buoyancy apparatus
     attached to the inside and (or) outside of the boat, equal in
     efficiency to one-half of the buoyancy apparatus provided for a
     boat of section (A) or section (B). At least one-half of the
     buoyancy apparatus must be attached to the outside of the boat.

     SEC. (D). A boat of this section shall be a properly constructed
     boat of wood or metal.

     SEC. (E). A boat of this section shall be a boat of approved
     construction, form, and material, and may be collapsible.

(2) _Cubic capacity._--The cubic capacity of an open boat and of a deck
boat of section (D) or section (E) shall be ascertained by multiplying
the product of the length, breadth, and depth by 6, subject, however, to
the following provisions:

The length shall be measured from the foreside of the rabbet on the stem
to the afterside of the rabbet on the sternpost, and the breadth shall
be measured from the outside of plank to the outside of plank amidships.
The actual depth shall be measured from the top of the gunwale to the
top of the bottom plank next to the keel, but the depth used in
calculating the cubic capacity shall not in any case exceed 3.6 feet;
and if the actual depth measured is equal to or less than 3.6 feet, the
depth used in calculating the cubic capacity shall not exceed 45 per
cent of the breadth measured, as indicated above.

If the oars are pulled in rowlocks, the bottom of the rowlock is to be
considered as the gunwale in measuring the depth of the boat.

If any question is raised requiring absolute accuracy, the cubic
capacity of a boat shall be ascertained by Stirling's rule, subject to
the foregoing provisions as to depth.

(3) _Number of persons for boats._--(_A_) Subject to the provisions of
paragraphs (_b_) (_c_) and (_d_) of this clause the number of persons[5]
an open boat of section (A) shall be deemed fit to carry shall be the
number of cubic feet ascertained as in rule (2) divided by 10, and the
number of persons[6] an open boat of section (B) or section (C), or an
open or decked boat of section (D) or section (E) shall be deemed fit to
carry shall be the number of cubic feet ascertained as in rule (2)
divided by 8. The space in the boat shall be sufficient for the seating
of the persons carried in it and for the proper use of the oars.

(_B_) An open boat of section (A) or section (B) or section (C) or
section (D) or section (E) shall not be deemed to be fit to carry the
number of persons ascertained as in paragraph (_A_) of this clause
unless the boat is so constructed that it has a mean sheer of at least
half an inch for each foot of its length and that the boat's half-girth
amidships measured outside the planking from the side of the keel to
the top of the gunwale is at least equal to nine-tenths of the sum of
the boat's depth inside and half its maximum breadth amidships, and that
the mean of the half-girths measured in the same manner at two points,
one-quarter of the length of the boat from the stem and sternpost,
respectively, is at least equal to eight-tenths of the sum of the depth
inside and half the maximum breadth amidships.

(_C_)--A decked boat of section (D) or section (E) shall not be deemed
to be fit to carry the number of persons ascertained as in paragraph
(_A_) of this clause, unless the top of the deck amidships is at a
height above the water approved by the board of trade, when the boat is
so loaded.

(_D_)--If the surveyor is doubtful as to the number of persons any open
or decked boat is fit to carry, he may require the boat to be tested
afloat with the intended number of persons on board.

(_E_)--The rules numbers 1, 2, and 3, as now amended, are not to be
retrospective, and are to apply only to boats built after.


SHIP'S BOATS.

The salient feature of the reports of the board's officers on this
subject is the consensus of opinion that the form of a boat is the chief
factor to be considered in determining its value as a life-saving
appliance.

It has been found that while there are many boats of good form supplied
to ships, there is yet a large proportion where the boats are not only
not so good, but which can only be regarded as unsafe if they had on
board anything approaching the number of persons for which they measure.

It is the latter type we are chiefly concerned with; how is it that the
form has so deteriorated as to create this concern in our minds? I think
the cause is not far to seek; it appears to be the outcome of (1) the
shipowner's desire to carry the maximum number of persons in the minimum
number of boats; (2) in the efforts of the ship-builder, as a rule, to
carry out the specification in which he has contracted to supply the
owners with boats at a price, often very low, and naturally he does not
sublet his contract with the boatbuilder at a loss; (3) the aim of the
competing boatbuilder, which is to build his boats at as little cost
price as possible, and yet to provide accommodation for the prescribed
number of persons. He is probably limited as to length, and therefore
relies on the breadth and depth; in this direction, he is
unintentionally assisted by the board's rule for measurement, viz, L x B
x D x .6/10 or 8; so long, therefore, as he can obtain his breadth at
one point for measurement purposes, it is quite immaterial to him how
soon he fines away to the ends, with the result that the stability of
the boat becomes almost entirely dependent upon the form of a very
limited midship section, or the still smaller proportion of same that
would be under water when in the loaded condition.

The boatbuilder may be further restricted as to breadth, and, therefore,
he again detracts from the form a boat should have by dispensing with
sheer and increasing the depth from keel to gunwale amidships. This
method of building boats enables him to obtain the capacity required by
the owner at the expense of the boat's stability and utility.

No doubt when the life-saving appliances rules came into being the
divisors 10 and 8 for the different sections were deemed safe on the
supposition that the usual full form of boat would not be largely
departed from. Experience has shown, however, that form is frequently
sacrificed for the unworthy objects referred to above, and it follows,
therefore, that either the form should be improved or a heavier divisor
laid down.

It would, I think, be more effective to deal with form and devise a rule
by which we can insure that a boat will be reasonably safe with its
load, not merely in smooth water, as in our recent test, but in a
seaway. It is essential, therefore, to draw the attention of the
advisory committee to the value the board attach to form, and
particularly to that part of it under water, emphasizing the great
necessity there is for an increase to the bearing surface of the
under-water portion of boats, and this end can, no doubt, be best
attained by the putting into practice of the suggestions made by the
principal ship surveyor for amending the rules and which aim at
prolonging the form or fullness of dimension of the midship body under
water well toward the ends of the boat. It is well known that by
extending the body in this way greater buoyancy and stability are
secured without materially affecting the speed. It is often supposed
that defective stability due to bad form can be rectified by the
disposition of the persons or things, but anyone with real experience of
boats in a seaway can not fail to realize that this is the wrong
principle to work on. Granted, therefore, that the question of form must
take priority, how can it be best attained? And if we refer to Mr.
Archer's method of measurement, as stated in his amendment to the rules,
it will be seen how simple and effective it is. For the purpose of
illustration, we might take the model of a ship's boat obtained through
the board's surveyors at Glasgow, the dimensions of which enlarged to
scale represent a boat of L B D/30.0 x 8.5 x 3.5 and is an embodiment of
the proportions amidships and at quarter distance from each end proposed
by Mr. Archer.

It can not be too strongly urged that for a ship's lifeboat to be fit to
carry the number of persons it measures for in any degree of safety,
whenever it may be required at sea, the under-water or bearing surface
should be carried out to the ends as much as possible and all straight
lines avoided. The bows of many of the existing types of boat are
examples of the worst possible form for safety, and the counters are as
bad, if they can be said to have any.

_Depth._--It appears from the reports that the most generally approved
ratio of depth to the breadth is 4/10. This has been established not
only by our long experience, but by the numerous tests recently
conducted by the board's surveyors at various ports, and the attention
of the advisory committee might be drawn to this fact.

It is, of course, necessary also to have a good freeboard, but a
well-proportioned boat does not require so much freeboard as the
commoner type, as with proper sheer and under-water surface she is easy
in a seaway. If the gunwale is too high, there is loss of power over
the oars, which is serious when for the safety of the boat she is
required to be kept head-on to sea, and with a fresh breeze, even in a
good boat, this is not always an easy matter.

It is a matter for consideration that at the tests made by our surveyors
the conditions were most favorable, being usually in smooth water of a
sheltered dock, and, in not a few instances, considerable anxiety was
felt for the safety of those on board when crowded in accordance to the
existing rules. If it was thus in smooth water, one dare hardly
contemplate the results in a seaway. If the shipowner does not see to it
that a safe type of boat is provided, then the number of persons to be
accommodated in boats which do not come up to the proportions deemed
safe by the board of trade should be very considerably curtailed.

A. H. Y.

MARCH 23, 1912.

       *       *       *       *       *

CONSTRUCTION OF SHIP'S BOATS.

It will, I think, be useful to consider the principal factors that
govern the dimensions of boats forming part of the life-saving apparatus
in merchant ships.

The minimum number and capacity of boats are determined by the
regulations, and the capacity is determined by the product of the
length, breadth, and depth of the boats. As the space on the ship in
which to stow the boats is generally limited, it is generally found
easier to increase their depth than the length or breadth, and this is
further encouraged, I believe, by the cost of boats being quoted at so
much per foot in length. The builder or owner determines the dimensions
of the boat; the boatbuilder is concerned merely with the construction
and, in most cases, usually their form or lines.

Attention has been called by the mark lane surveyors to the form and
proportions of the boats used in the Royal navy. The proportion of depth
to breadth is greater than is apparent from the particulars given, as
all boats larger than a 30-foot gig have 6-1/2-inch washboards above the
gunwale, and even the gigs and many of the smaller boats have portable
washboards. It must also be remembered that all the navy boats are
square-sterned, except the whaleboat, and are designed with easy lines
so as to make good sailers; no air cases are fitted, and the seats are
kept very low. The boats are not provided simply as life-saving
appliances; as a matter of fact, the life-saving equipment of a warship
is extremely small. It is true that each type of boat is given a certain
"life-saving capacity," which is ascertained by crowding in as many men
as practicable with boat in still water and all equipment on board. This
number agrees closely with that obtained by the board's rule L x B x D x
.6/8. These boats, moreover, have a much smaller freeboard than is
considered desirable in the merchant navy; but the occupants are all
under discipline and in charge of experienced seamen. In the mercantile
marine it may, and often does, happen, that the boats are crowded with
panic-stricken men, women, and children, and instances have occurred, I
believe, wherein there has not been a single man in the boat who has
ever handled an oar before. Having these points in view, I do not agree
that the navy type of boat is the most suitable for our purpose.

The chief desiderata in a ship's boat as a life-saving appliance are,
(1) to carry the maximum number of people without overcrowding; and with
(2) a reasonable amount of stability and freeboard; (3) and without
undue interference with the use of oars.

(1) Is almost wholly dependent on the length and breadth of the boat;
provided (2) is satisfied; depth has very little influence on it. For
example, take a boat 30 x 9 x 3.5, 567 cubic feet by our rule, as a
section (D) or (E) boat it should carry 567/8 = 72 people; such a boat
should allow 30 x 9 x 8/72 = 3 square feet of area per person at the
gunwale, which should be ample if all sit in the bottom who can not find
seating room on the side benches or thwarts.

(2) Stability and freeboard are dependent upon the boat's breadth,
depth, and form. The element of length does not enter into it, and it
would be most unreasonable to limit the ratio of length to breadth, as
suggested from Liverpool, or to limit the depth to the cube root of the
length, as proposed by one of the London surveyors. Mr. Gemmell gives
particulars, M. 26,298, of four boats tested, which proved to have ample
accommodation and stability for the complements allowed by the
regulations; the ratio of depth to breadth varied from 0.41 to 0.45.

Capt. O'Sullivan also reported five boats which he tested with ratios of
D to B, varying from 0.4 to 0.44, all except one being satisfactory, the
exception being rather tender and overcrowded, due to poor lines. The
freeboards of all these boats when loaded were, I think, sufficient.
The depth in no case exceeded 3.6, and only in one case did the ratio
exceed 0.44.

The surveyors, Liverpool, tested a boat 3.75 deep and having a ratio of
D/b = 0.41, which proved satisfactory.

Capt. Griffiths tested a boat 4.1 deep, having a ratio D/b = 0.455,
which he considered to be unsafe with the full complement on board.

The consensus of opinion is that the depth should not exceed 3 feet 5
inches or 3 feet 6 inches, and the ratio of D/b should not exceed 0.44.
This, however, is not sufficient to guarantee sufficient seating and
stability. Capt. Clarke tested a boat 24.4 x 6.55 x 2.45, which was very
unsafe with the rule complement on board. The ratio D/b is only 0.38 in
this case. It will be seen, however, that this craft has exceptionally
fine lines and is evidently quite unsuited to carry the rule complement.
It is quite evident that the form of the boat must be taken into
account.

The dimensions of boats vary so greatly that generally the boat builder
builds his boats "to the eye," using only a midship mold; it follows
that the forms of boats of the same dimensions will vary considerably
and with different workmen. Something more is required than a limitation
in the ratio of depth to breadth. It is desirable that the sheer should
be ample, and the form not unduly fined away within the midship half
length. From consideration of the particulars and lines of the boats
mentioned in the surveyor's reports, I think a simple rule to regulate
the form may be devised such as I will indicate later.

It is, I think, necessary to limit the depth as a factor for
ascertaining the number to be accommodated. The increase of depth beyond
a certain point, while unduly increasing the number of people that may
be carried, increases proportionately the required air case capacity, to
meet which the seats have to be raised with a corresponding increase in
the height of the center of gravity and decrease in the stability and
difficulty in rowing. A boat 3.6 deep would have the thwarts about 3
feet above the bottom, and any increase in this height makes it very
difficult for any ordinary man to row when sitting down. In rough sea
the men would have very little control over the oars if standing up. A
further objection to the very deep boat is its small stability in the
light condition. It is not, I believe, an unusual occurrence for such
boats to capsize in rough weather, before the passengers or crew can be
got into them, and I have myself seen such a boat capsize in dock with
only two men in it; due to lumpy water and a stiff breeze catching it on
the beam when coming out of the shelter afforded by the dock wall.

I do not think, however, any limit of depth should be imposed, except as
a measure of capacity. Any rules that may be devised should be such as
are of easy and ready application, and which will not bear harshly on
the boats that have already been accepted. I therefore suggest that the
present rules will sufficiently meet the case, with the following
modification.

In no case should the depth to be used in general rule (2) exceed 3.6
feet and 45 per cent of the breadth. In all cases where the actual depth
is 45 per cent of the breadth or less, the maximum number of persons, as
ascertained by rule (3) should not be allowed unless the boat has been
found capable of carrying that number by actual test in the water, or
unless the boat has at least 1/2 inch of sheer per foot of length, and
the half-girth amidships, measured outside the plank, from the side of
the keel to the top of the gunwale, is at least 90 per cent of the sum
of the depth and the half breadth, and the mean of the half girths as
similarly measured at one quarter the boat's length from the stem and
stern post are at least 80 per cent of the sum of the midship depth and
half breadth.

The thwarts and side benches should be kept as low as practicable, and
the bottom boards should be so fitted that the height of the thwarts
above them will not exceed 2 feet 9 inches.

A. J. D.

JANUARY 27, 1912.

(Mr. A. J. Daniel, acting principal Ship Surveyor to the Board of
Trade.)

       *       *       *       *       *

It should be stated that the new committee on bulkheads mentioned in the
paragraphs of this letter which deals with rule 12 has now been formed.

Subsequently Sir Walter Howell wrote and sent three letters to the
Advisory Committee which were as follows:

BOARD OF TRADE, MARINE DEPARTMENT, 7 WHITEHALL GARDENS,

_London, S. W., April 20, 1912_.

SIR: With reference to previous correspondence between the department
and your committee respecting the revision of the statutory rules for
life-saving appliances on British ships, and particularly to the letter
from this department of April 16, I am directed by the board of trade
to state that as an entirely new situation has been created by the
recent disaster to the steamship _Titanic_ they assume that the
committee, in reconsidering the matter in connection with the
suggestions already put before them by the board will have full regard
to this new situation, and the facts of the disaster so far as
ascertained.

As you are doubtless aware, suggestions have been made in the House of
Commons and elsewhere to the effect that, in view of the loss of the
_Titanic_, action should be taken by the board of trade in regard to
certain questions other than those expressly dealt with in the
life-saving appliances rules, e.g., in regard to (1) steamship routes in
the North Atlantic; (2) the speed of steamers where there may be dangers
to navigation; and (3) the provision and use of searchlights on large
passenger steamers; and the board would be glad to know the committee's
views in regard to these, and any other suggestions which may have come
to their knowledge, intended to diminish the risk, or to mitigate the
effects of accidents to passenger vessels at sea.

I am, etc.,

WALTER J. HOWELL.

The SECRETARY,

_Merchant Shipping Advisory Committee_.

       *       *       *       *       *

BOARD OF TRADE, MARINE DEPARTMENT,

_7 Whitehall Gardens, London, S. W., April 24, 1912_.

SIR: With reference to previous correspondence between this department
and your committee respecting the revision of the statutory rules for
life-saving appliances on British ships, and particularly to the letter
from this department of April 16, in which you were informed that the
question of the proposed amendment of the rules so as to admit of decked
lifeboats being stowed one above another or one under an open lifeboat,
was under consideration, I am directed by the board of trade to state,
for the information of your committee, that the board of trade will be
glad if the committee will consider whether any, and if so what,
amendments of the rules, and in particular of the rule of April 19,
1910, and the rule of June 14, 1911, are, in their opinion, desirable
with the object of supplementing the boats immediately under davits by
as much additional boat accommodation as is practicable, having regard
to the new situation which has been created by the recent disaster to
the steamship _Titanic_.

A plan illustrating the principle is being prepared so as to be in
readiness for your committee by Friday.

I am, etc.,

WALTER J. HOWELL.

The SECRETARY,

_Merchant Shipping Advisory Committee_.

       *       *       *       *       *

BOARD OF TRADE, MARINE DEPARTMENT,

7, WHITEHALL GARDENS,

_London, S. W., April 25, 1912_.

SIR: With reference to previous correspondence respecting the proposed
revision of the statutory regulations as to boats and life-saving
appliances on ships, I am directed by the board of trade to state, for
the information of the merchant shipping advisory committee, that, apart
from the questions which have been raised regarding the boat
accommodation on vessels over 10,000 tons, it seems desirable to
consider whether the provision of boats and other life-saving appliances
required by the rules in the case of vessels under 10,000 tons is
satisfactory, or whether the rules or the boat scale should be altered
in respect of their application to such vessels; and the board would be
glad to be favored with the observations of the committee on this point
in addition to those that have already been referred to them.

I am, etc.,

WALTER J. HOWELL.

The SECRETARY,

_Merchant Shipping Advisory Committee_.

       *       *       *       *       *

To these letters the advisory committee sent the following answer:

       *       *       *       *       *

MERCHANT SHIPPING ADVISORY COMMITTEE,

7, WHITEHALL GARDENS,

_London, S. W., April 27, 1912_.

SIR: We are desired by the merchant shipping advisory committee to
inform you that your letters of the 16th, 20th, 24th, and 25th instant
were brought before the committee at a meeting held yesterday.

The committee fully recognize that the proved impossibility of keeping
such a vessel as the _Titanic_ afloat after a collision with ice until
the arrival of outside succor has created an entirely new situation
which was neither in the contemplation of the board of trade nor of the
committee in the consideration of the extension of the existing boat
scale in regard to vessels of 10,000 tons and upward.

In advising on such extension in July last, the committee aimed at
providing ample boat accommodation on large passenger vessels in
accordance with the principles that were adopted by the original
life-saving appliances committee, and which principles had apparently
been fully justified by many years of experience. It is with
satisfaction that the committee note that the board of trade, apart from
the new possibilities demonstrated by the loss of the _Titanic_, agreed
in the essentials with the recommendation of the committee.

In face of the new facts, the committee at their meeting yesterday
reopened entirely the question of the revision of the boat scale for
large passenger vessels with a view of providing the maximum of
protection for the passengers and crew in the event of an overwhelming
disaster, whilst at the same time maintaining the principles in regard
to the stability and sea-going qualities of the ship itself, and to the
prompt and efficient handling of the boats carried under the existing
scale, which hitherto have proved not only essential to safety, but also
adequate for all ordinary emergencies. The questions involved are not
free from difficulty, but they will receive the immediate attention of
the committee. Pending their consideration, the committee note that
assurances have been received by the board of trade from representatives
of most of the large passenger lines to the effect that every effort
will be made to equip their vessels, at the earliest possible moment,
with boats and rafts sufficient to accommodate all persons on board.

In regard to the recommendation forwarded with the committee's letter of
July 4 last, that the board of trade should, having regard to the
developments in ship building since the report of the committee of 1891
on spacing and construction of water-tight bulkheads, review the
requirements designed to attain the standards at present enforced under
rule 12, the advisory committee note that the board of trade have under
consideration the appointment of a committee of equal standing to that
of the committee of 1891. In view of the great importance of this
question the advisory committee desire us respectfully to urge that such
a committee be appointed at as early a date as possible.

The subject of the general revision of the statutory regulations as to
boats and life-saving appliances on all ships, which, apart from the
questions regarding the boat accommodation on vessels over 10,000 tons,
is for the first time referred to the advisory committee by the letter
of the 25th instant, together with the particular questions raised in
the letters of the 16th, 20th, and 24th instant, are also receiving the
immediate attention of the committee.

At yesterday's meeting subcommittees were appointed to give immediate
consideration to the subjects requiring detailed examination. These
subcommittees will pursue their inquiries concurrently, and we are
desired by the advisory committee to inform you that their investigation
into the revision of the life-saving appliances rules will be proceeded
with as expeditiously as possible.

We are, etc.,

NORMAN HILL, _Chairman_.

R. W. MATTHEW, _Secretary_.

Sir WALTER J. HOWELL, K. C. B.,

_Assistant Secretary Marine Department,

Board of Trade_.

       *       *       *       *       *

This letter was acknowledged by the board of trade on May 10, 1912, as
follows:

       *       *       *       *       *

BOARD OF TRADE, MARINE DEPARTMENT,

7, WHITEHALL GARDENS,

_London, S. W., May 10, 1912_.

SIR: I am directed by the board of trade to acknowledge the receipt of,
and to thank you for, your letter of April 27, stating that their
letters of April 16, 20, 24, and 25 have been considered by the merchant
shipping advisory committee.

The board observes with satisfaction that, in view of the entirely new
situation which has arisen, the advisory committee have decided to
reopen the question of the revision of the table in the life-saving
appliances rules in so far as it governs the boat accommodation in
vessels over 10,000 tons gross. The board are further glad to observe
that the question of a general revision of the life-saving appliances
rules is also under consideration by the committee, and in this
connection they presume that, in considering the question of a general
revision of the rules including the table, the committee will consider
the principles on which the requirements as to boat accommodation should
be based, including, inter alia, whether the table should continue to be
based on tonnage. Any conclusion reached by the committee on this
question would naturally affect the revision of the present table as
applying to vessels of more than 10,000 tons, upon which the committee
has already been engaged.

The board agree with the view expressed by the advisory committee that
the appointment of another committee on the spacing and construction of
water-tight bulkheads is desirable. Steps have already been taken by the
president to form such a committee, and he hopes to be able to announce
the names within a few days. A further communication on this point will
be addressed to the committee in the course of a few days.

The board are glad to note that subcommittees have been appointed to
deal concurrently with the subjects requiring detailed consideration in
connection with the revision of the life-saving appliances rules.

The board desire me to add that they assume that the committee, in
considering the matters referred to them, will have regard to all
important aspects of the question of life-saving appliances, whether
expressly dealt with in the statutory rules or not, and in particular to
the essential question of the adequacy of the provision for lowering and
manning the boats and rafts carried by vessels.

I am, etc.,
WALTER J. HOWELL.


The SECRETARY,

_Merchant Shipping Advisory Committee,

7, Whitehall Gardens, S. W._

       *       *       *       *       *

This finishes the history of the action of the board of trade in
relation to the provision of boat accommodation on emigrant ships. The
outstanding circumstance in it is the omission, during so many years, to
revise the rules of 1894 and this, I think, was blameable,
notwithstanding the excuse or explanation put forward by Sir Alfred
Chalmers. I am, however, doubtful whether even if the rules had been
revised the change would have been such as to have required boat
accommodation which would have increased the number of lives saved.
Having regard to the recommendations of the advisory committee, the
board of trade would probably not have felt justified in making rules
which would have required more boat accommodation than that with which
the _Titanic_ was actually provided; and it is not to be forgotten that
the _Titanic_ boat accommodation was utilized to less than two-thirds of
its capacity. These considerations, however, afford no excuse for the
delay of the board of trade.

The gross tonnage of a vessel is not, in my opinion, a satisfactory
basis on which to calculate the provision of boat accommodation.
Hitherto, I believe, it has been accepted as the best basis by all
nations. But there seems much more to be said in favor of making the
number of lives carried the basis and for providing boat or raft
accommodation for all on board. Rule 12 of the life-saving appliances
rules of 1902, which deals with water-tight compartments and boat
accommodation, ought to be abolished. The provision of such compartments
is of supreme importance, but it is clear that it should not be sought
at the expense of a decrease in boat accommodation. When naval
architects have devised practical means for rendering ships unsinkable,
the question of boat accommodation may have to be reconsidered, but
until that time arrives boat accommodation should, where practicable, be
carried for all on board. This suggestion may be thought by some to be
extravagant. It has never been enforced in the mercantile marine of
Great Britain, nor as far as I know in that of any foreign nation. But
it appears, nevertheless, to be admitted by all that it is possible
without undue inconvenience or undue interference with commerce to
increase considerably in many cases the accommodation hitherto carried,
and it seems, therefore, reasonable that the law should require an
increase to be made. As far as foreign-going passenger and emigrant
steamships are concerned, I am of opinion that, unless justification be
shown for deviating from this course, such ships should carry boats or
rafts for all on board.

With reference to the second branch of the complaint against the board
of trade, namely that their officials had failed to exercise due care in
the supervision of the vessel's plans and in the inspection of the work
done upon her, the charges broke down. Suggestions were made that the
board's requirements fell short of those of Lloyd's Registry; but no
evidence was forthcoming to support the suggestions. The investigation
of the charges took much time, but it only served to show that the
officials had discharged their duties carefully and well.


POWERS OF THE BOARD OF TRADE AS REGARDS THE SUPERVISION OF DESIGNS OF
VESSELS.

The _Titanic_ was efficiently designed and constructed to meet the
contingencies which she was intended to meet.

The bulkheads were of ample strength. They were sufficiently closely
spaced and were carried up in the vessel to a height greater than
sufficient to meet the requirements of the 1891 bulkheads committee.

But I am advised that the ship could have been further subdivided so
that she would probably have remained afloat longer than she did. The
board of trade have, however, apparently no power to exercise any real
supervision in the matter of subdivision. All they have express power to
insist upon in this connection with respect to any steam vessel is that
there shall be four water-tight bulkheads--a provision quite inadequate
for safety in a collision damaging the vessel abaft the collision
bulkhead. They can also, if invited by the shipowner (but not
otherwise), exercise supervision under rule 12. This supervision, I am
told, they have been invited to exercise in only 103 cases over a period
of 18 years. In 69 of these cases the board have expressed their
satisfaction with the subdivision provided. It seems to me that the
board should be empowered to require the production of the designs of
all passenger steamers at an early period of their construction and to
direct such alterations as may appear to them to be necessary and
practicable for the purpose of securing proper water-tight subdivision.




VII. FINDING OF THE COURT.


It is now convenient to answer the 26 questions submitted by the board
of trade.

1. When the _Titanic_ left Queenstown on or about April 11 last: (_a_)
What was the total number of persons employed in any capacity on board
her, and what were their respective ratings? (_b_) What was the total
number of her passengers, distinguishing sexes and classes, and
discriminating between adults and children?

Answer. (_a_) The total number of persons employed in any capacity on
board the _Titanic_ was 885.

The respective ratings of these persons were as follows:

    Deck department             66
    Engine department          325
    Victualing department      494
                               ---
                               885

N. B.--The eight bandsmen are not included in this number, as their
names appear in the second class passenger list.

(_b_) The total number of passengers was 1,316. Of these:

    ------------------+---------+----------+--------
                      |  Male.  |  Female. | Total.
    ------------------+---------+----------+--------
    First class       |   180   |   145    |   325
    Second class      |   179   |   106    |   285
    Third class       |   510   |   196    |   706
                      |         |          +--------
                      |         |          | 1,316
    ------------------+---------+----------+--------

Of the above, 6 children were in the first class, 24 in the second class
and 79 in the third class. Total, 109.

2. Before leaving Queenstown on or about April 11 last did the _Titanic_
comply with the requirements of the merchant shipping acts, 1894-1906,
and the rules and regulations made thereunder with regard to the safety
and otherwise of "passenger steamers" and "emigrant ships?"

Answer. Yes.

3. In the actual design and construction of the _Titanic_ what special
provisions were made for the safety of the vessel and the lives of those
on board in the event of collisions and other casualties?

Answer. These have been already described.

4. (_a_) Was the _Titanic_ sufficiently and efficiently officered and
manned? (_b_) Were the watches of the officers and crew usual and
proper? (_c_) Was the _Titanic_ supplied with proper charts?

Answer. (_a_) Yes. (_b_) Yes. (_c_) Yes.

5. (_a_) What was the number of the boats of any kind on board the
_Titanic_? (_b_) Were the arrangements for manning and launching the
boats on board the _Titanic_ in case of emergency proper and sufficient?
(_c_) Had a boat drill been held on board, and if so, when? (_d_) What
was the carrying capacity of the respective boats?

Answer. (_a_) 2 Emergency boats, 14 lifeboats, 4 Engelhardt boats. (_b_)
No, but see page 38. (_c_) No. (_d_) The carrying capacity of the 2
emergency boats was for 80 persons; 14 lifeboats was for 910 persons; 4
Engelhardt boats was for 188 persons; or a total of 1,178 persons.

6. (_a_) What installations for receiving and transmitting messages by
wireless telegraphy were on board the _Titanic_? (_b_) How many
operators were employed on working such installations? (_c_) Were the
installations in good and effective working order, and were the number
of operators sufficient to enable messages to be received and
transmitted continuously by day and night?

Answer. (_a_) A Marconi 5-kilowatt motor generator with two complete
sets of apparatus supplied from the ship's dynamos, with an independent
storage battery and coil for emergency, was fitted in a house on the
boat deck. (_b_) Two. (_c_) Yes.

7. (_a_) At or prior to the sailing of the _Titanic_ what, if any,
instructions as to navigation were given to the master or known by him
to apply to her voyage? (_b_) Were such instructions, if any, safe,
proper, and adequate, having regard to the time of year and dangers
likely to be encountered during the voyage?

Answer. (_a_) No special instructions were given, but he had general
instructions contained in the book of Rules and Regulations supplied by
the company. (See p. 24.) (_b_) Yes, but having regard to subsequent
events they would have been better if a reference had been made to the
course to be adopted in the event of reaching the region of ice.

8. (_a_) What was in fact the track taken by the _Titanic_ in crossing
the Atlantic Ocean? (_b_) Did she keep to the track usually followed by
liners on voyages from the United Kingdom to New York in the month of
April? (_c_) Are such tracks safe tracks at that time of the year? (_d_)
Had the master any, and if so, what discretion as regards the track to
be taken?

Answer. (_a_) The outward southern track from Queenstown to New York,
usually followed in April by large steam vessels. (See page 24.) (_b_)
Yes, with the exception that instead of altering her course on
approaching the position 42 deg. N. 47 deg. W., she stood on on her previous
course for some 10 miles farther southwest, turning to S. 86 deg. W. true at
5.50 p.m. (_c_) The outward and homeward bound southern tracks were
decided on as the outcome of many years' experience of the normal
movement of ice. They were reasonably safe tracks for the time of year,
provided, of course, that great caution and vigilance when crossing the
ice region were observed. (_d_) Yes. Capt. Smith was not fettered by any
orders to remain on the track should information as to the position of
ice make it, in his opinion, undesirable to adhere to it. The fact,
however, of lane routes having been laid down for the common safety of
all would necessarily influence him to keep on (or very near) the
accepted route, unless circumstances as indicated above should induce
him to deviate largely from it.

9. (_a_) After leaving Queenstown on or about the 11th April last, did
information reach the _Titanic_ by wireless messages or otherwise by
signals of the existence of ice in certain latitudes? (_b_) If so, what
were such messages or signals and when were they received, and in what
position or positions was the ice reported to be, and was the ice
reported in or near the track actually being followed by the _Titanic_?
(_c_) Was her course altered in consequence of receiving such
information, and, if so, in what way? (_d_) What replies to such
messages or signals did the _Titanic_ send, and at what times?

Answer. (_a_) Yes. (_b_) See particulars of ice messages already set out
(pp. 26-28). (_c_) No; her course was altered as hereinbefore described,
but not in consequence of the information received as to ice. (_d_) The
material answers were--

At 12.55 p.m. steamship _Titanic_:

       *       *       *       *       *

To COMMANDER, _Baltic_.

Thanks for your message and good wishes. Had fine weather since leaving.

SMITH.

       *       *       *       *       *

At 1.26 p.m. steamship _Titanic_:

       *       *       *       *       *

To CAPTAIN, _Caronia_.

Thanks for message and information. Have had variable weather
throughout.

SMITH.

       *       *       *       *       *

10. (_a_) If at the times referred to in the last preceding question or
later the _Titanic_ was warned of or had reason to suppose she would
encounter ice, at what time might she have reasonably expected to
encounter it? (_b_) Was a good and proper lookout for ice kept on board?
(_c_) Were any, and, if so, what, directions given to vary the speed--if
so, were they carried out?

Answer. (_a_) At, or even before, 9.30 p.m. ship's time, on the night of
the disaster. (_b_) No. The men in the crow's nest were warned at 9.30
p.m. to keep a sharp lookout for ice; the officer of the watch was then
aware that he had reached the reported ice region, and so also was the
officer who relieved him at 10 p.m. Without implying that those actually
on duty were not keeping a good lookout, in view of the night being
moonless, there being no wind and perhaps very little swell, and
especially in view of the high speed at which the vessel was running, it
is not considered that the lookout was sufficient. An extra lookout
should, under the circumstances, have been placed at the stemhead, and a
sharp lookout should have been kept from both sides of the bridge by an
officer. (_c_) No directions were given to reduce speed.

11. (_a_) Were binoculars provided for and used by the lookout men?
(_b_) Is the use of them necessary or usual in such circumstances? (_c_)
Had the _Titanic_ the means of throwing searchlights around her? (_d_)
If so, did she make use of them to discover ice? (_e_) Should
searchlights have been provided and used?

Answer. (_a_) No. (_b_) No. (_c_) No. (_d_) No. (_e_) No; but
searchlights may at times be of service. The evidence before the court
does not allow of a more precise answer.

12. (_a_) What other precautions were taken by the _Titanic_ in
anticipation of meeting ice? (_b_) Were they such as are usually adopted
by vessels being navigated in waters where ice may be expected to be
encountered?

Answer. (_a_) Special orders were given to the men in the crow's nest to
keep a sharp lookout for ice, particularly small ice and growlers. The
fore-scuttle hatch was closed to keep everything dark before the bridge.
(_b_) Yes; though there is evidence to show that some masters would have
placed a lookout at the stemhead of the ship.

13. (_a_) Was ice seen and reported by anybody on board the _Titanic_
before the casualty occurred? (_b_) If so, what measures were taken by
the officer on watch to avoid it? (_c_) Were they proper measures and
were they promptly taken?

Answer. (_a_) Yes; immediately before the collision. (_b_) The helm was
put hard astarboard and the engines were stopped and put full speed
astern. (_c_) Yes.

14. (_a_) What was the speed of the _Titanic_ shortly before and at the
moment of the casualty? (_b_) Was such speed excessive under the
circumstances?

Answer. (_a_) About 22 knots. (_b_) Yes.

15. (_a_) What was the nature of the casualty which happened to the
_Titanic_ at or about 11.45 p.m. on April 14 last? (_b_) In what
latitude and longitude did the casualty occur?

Answer. (_a_) A collision with an iceberg which pierced the starboard
side of the vessel in several places below the water line between the
forepeak tank and No. 4 boiler room. (_b_) In latitude 41 deg. 46' N.,
longitude 50 deg. 14' W.

16. (_a_) What steps were taken immediately on the happening of the
casualty? (_b_) How long after the casualty was its seriousness realized
by those in charge of the vessel (_c_) What steps were then taken?
(_d_) What endeavors were made to save the lives of those on board, and
to prevent the vessel from sinking?

Answer. (_a_) The 12 water-tight doors in the engine and boiler rooms
were closed from the bridge, some of the boiler fires were drawn, and
the bilge pumps abaft No. 6 boiler room were started. (_b_) About 15 to
20 minutes. (_c_) and (_d_) The boats were ordered to be cleared away.
The passengers were roused and orders given to get them on deck, and
life belts were served out. Some of the water-tight doors, other than
those in the boiler and engine rooms, were closed. Marconigrams were
sent out asking for help. Distress signals (rockets) were fired, and
attempts were made to call up by Morse a ship whose lights were seen.
Eighteen of the boats were swung out and lowered, and the remaining two
floated off the ship and were subsequently utilized as rafts.

17. Was proper discipline maintained on board after the casualty
occurred?

Answer. Yes.

18. (_a_) What messages for assistance were sent by the _Titanic_ after
the casualty, and at what times respectively? (_b_) What messages were
received by her in response, and at what times respectively? (_c_) By
what vessels were the messages that were sent by the _Titanic_ received,
and from what vessels did she receive answers? (_d_) What vessels other
than the _Titanic_ sent or received messages at or shortly after the
casualty in connection with such casualty? (_e_) What were the vessels
that sent or received such messages? (_f_) Were any vessels prevented
from going to the assistance of the _Titanic_ or her boats owing to
messages received from the _Titanic_ or owing to any erroneous messages
being sent or received? (_g_) In regard to such erroneous messages, from
what vessels were they sent and by what vessels were they received, and
at what times respectively?

(_a_) (_b_) (_c_) (_d_) and (_e_) are answered together. (_f_) Several
vessels did not go, owing to their distance. (_g_) There were no
erroneous messages.

  -----------+---------------+-----------------------------------------------
   New York  | Titanic time  |
     time.   |(approximated).|             Communications.
  -----------+---------------+-----------------------------------------------
  10.25 p. m.| 12.15 a. m.   | La Provence receives Titanic distress signals.
             |               |
    Do       |   do          | Mount Temple heard Titanic sending CQD.
             |               |   Says require assistance. Gives
             |               |   position. Can not hear me. Advise
             |               |   my captain his position 41.46 N.,
             |               |   50.24 W.
             |               |
    Do       |   do          | Cape Race hears Titanic giving position
             |               |   on CQD. 41.44 N., 50.24 W.
             |               |
  10.28 p. m.| 12.18 a. m.   | Ypiranga hears CQD. from Titanic. Titanic
             |               |   gives CQD. here. Position 41.44 N.,
             |               |   50.24 W. Require assistance (calls
             |               |   about 10 times).
             |               |
  10.35 p. m.| 12.25 a. m.   | CQD. call received from Titanic by Carpathia.
             |               |   Titanic said, "Come at once. We have
             |               |   struck a berg. It's a CQD. OM. Position
             |               |   41.46 N., 50.14 W."
             |               |
    Do       |   do          | Cape Race hears M. G. Y. (Titanic) give
             |               |   corrected position 41.46 N., 50.14 W.
             |               |   Calling him; no answer.
             |               |
  10.36 p. m.| 12.25 a. m.   | M. G. Y. (Titanic) says CQD. Here corrected
             |               |   position 41.46 N., 50.14 W.
             |               |   Require immediate assistance. We have
             |               |   collision with iceberg. Sinking.
             |               |   Can nothing hear for noise of steam.
             |               |   Sent about 15 to 20 times to Ypiranga.
             |               |
  10.37 p. m.| 12.27 a. m.   | Titanic sends following: "I require
             |               |   assistance immediately. Struck by iceberg
             |               |   in 41.46 N., 50.14 W."
             |               |
  10.40 p. m.| 12.30 a. m.   | Titanic gives his position to Frankfurt,
             |               |   and says, "Tell your captain to come
             |               |   to our help. We are on the ice."
             |               |
    Do       |   do          | Caronia sent CQ message to M. B. C. (Baltic)
             |               |   and CQD: M. G. Y. (Titanic) struck
             |               |   iceberg, require immediate assistance.
             |               |
    Do       |               | Mount Temple hears M. G. Y. (Titanic) still
             |               |   calling CQD. Our captain reverses
             |               |   ship. We are about 50 miles off.
             |               |
  10.46 p. m.| 12.36 a. m.   | D. K. F. (Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm) calls
             |               |   M. G. Y. (Titanic) and gives position
             |               |   at 12 a. m. 39.47 N., 50.10 W.  M. G. Y.
             |               |   (Titanic) says, "Are you coming to our?"
             |               |   D. F. T. (Frankfurt) says, "What is the
             |               |   matter with u?" M. G. Y. (Titanic) "We have
             |               |   collision with iceberg. Sinking. Please
             |               |   tell captain to come." D. F. T.
             |               |   (Frankfurt) says, "O. K. will tell."
             |               |
  10.48 p. m.| 12.38 a. m.   | Mount Temple hears Frankfurt give M. G. Y.
             |               |   (Titanic) his position, 39.47 N., 52.10 W.
  10.55 p. m.|  12.45 a. m.  | Titanic calls Olympic SOS.
             |               |
  11 p. m.   |  12.50 a. m.  | Titanic calls CQD. and says, "I
             |               |   require immediate assistance. Position
             |               |   41.46 N., 50.14 W." Received by Celtic.
  11.03 p. m.|  12.53 a. m.  | Caronia to M. B. C. (Baltic) and SOS.,
             |               |   M. G. Y.(Titanic) CQD. in 41.46 N.,
             |               |   50.14 W. Wants immediate assistance."
             |               |
  11.10 p. m.|   1 a. m.     | M. G. Y. gives distress signal. D. D. C.
             |               |   replies. M. G. Y.'s position 41.46 N.,
             |               |   50.14 W. Assistance from D. D. C. not
             |               |   necessary, as M. K. C. shortly
             |               |   afterwards answers distress call.
             |               |
    Do.      |   do.         | Titanic replies to Olympic, and gives
             |               |   his position as 41.46 N., 50.14 W., and
             |               |   says, "We have struck an iceberg."
             |               |
  11.12 p. m.|   1.02 a. m.  | Titanic calls Asian and said, "Want
             |               |   immediate assistance." Asian answered
             |               |   at once and received Titanic's position
             |               |   as 41.46 N., 50.14 W., which he immediately
             |               |   takes to the bridge. Captain instructs
             |               |   operator to have Titanic's position repeated.
             |               |
    Do.      |   do.         | Virginian calls Titanic, but gets no response.
             |               |   Cape Race tells Virginian to report to his
             |               |   captain the Titanic has struck iceberg
             |               |   and requires immediate assistance.
             |               |
  11.20 p. m.|   1.10 a. m.  | Titanic to M. K. C. (Olympic), "We are in
             |               |   collision with berg. Sinking head
             |               |   down; 41.46 N., 50.14 W. Come soon
             |               |   as possible."
             |               |
    Do.      |   do.         | Titanic to M. K. C. (Olympic), captain says,
             |               |   "Get your boats ready.  What is
             |               |   your position?"
             |               |
  11.25 p. m.|   1.15 a. m.  | Baltic to Caronia, "Please tell Titanic
             |               |   we are making toward her."
             |               |
  11.30 p. m.|   1.20 a. m.  | Virginian hears M. C. E. (Cape Race) inform
             |               |   M. G. Y. (Titanic) "that we are going to
             |               |   his assistance. Our position 170 miles
             |               |   north of Titanic."
             |               |
  11.35 p. m.|   1.25 a. m.  | Caronia tells Titanic, "Baltic coming
             |               |   to your assistance."
             |               |
    Do.      |   do.         | Olympic sends position to Titanic 4.24
             |               |   a. m. GMT. 40.52 N., 61.18 W.
             |               |   "Are you steering southerly to meet us?"
             |               |   Titanic replies, "We are putting
             |               |   the women off in the boats."
             |               |
    Do.      |   do.         | Titanic and Olympic work together.
             |               |
  11.37 p. m.|   1.27 a. m.  | M. G. Y. (Titanic) says, "We are putting
             |               |   the women off in the boats."
             |               |
  11.40 p. m.|   1.30 a. m.  | Titanic tells Olympic, "We are putting
             |               |   passengers off in small boats."
             |               |
  11.45 p. m.|   1.35 a. m.  | Olympic asks Titanic what weather he had.
             |               |   Titanic replies, "Clear and calm."
             |               |
    Do.      |   do.         | Baltic hears Titanic say "Engine room
             |               |   getting flooded."
             |               |
    Do.      |   do.         | Mount Temple hears DFT. (Frankfurt) ask
             |               |   "Are there any boats around
             |               |   you already."   No reply.
             |               |
  11.47 p. m.|   1.37 a. m.  | Baltic tells Titanic, "We are rushing
             |               |   to you."
             |               |
  11.50 p. m.|   1.40 a. m.  | Olympic to Titanic, "Am lighting up
             |               |   all possible boilers as fast as can."
             |               |
     Do.     |   do.         | Cape Race says to Virginian: "Please
             |               |   tell your captain this: 'The Olympic
             |               |   is making all speed for Titanic, but
             |               |   his (Olympic's) position is 40.32 N.,
             |               |   61.18 W. You are much nearer to Titanic.
             |               |   The Titanic is already putting women off
             |               |   in the boats, and he says the weather
             |               |   there is calm and clear.' The Olympic is
             |               |   the only ship we have heard say, 'Going to
             |               |   the assistance of the Titanic. The others
             |               |   must be a long way from the Titanic.'"
             |               |
  11.55 p. m.|   1.45 a. m.  | Last signals heard from Titanic by
             |               |   Carpathia, "Engine-room full up to
             |               |   boilers."
             |               |
    Do.      |   do.         | Mount Temple hears DFT. (Frankfurt)
             |               |   calling  MGY. (Titanic). No reply.
             |               |
  11.57 p. m.|   1.47 a. m.  | Caronia hears MGY. (Titanic),
             |               |   though signals unreadable still.
             |               |
  11.58 p. m.|   1.48 a. m.  | Asian heard Titanic call SOS. Asian
             |               |   answers Titanic but receives no
             |               |   answer.
             |               |
  Midnight.  |   1.50 a. m.  | Caronia hears Frankfurt working to
             |               |   Titanic. Frankfurt according to position
             |               |   172 miles from MGY. (Titanic) at time
             |               |   first SOS. sent out.
             |               |
  12.05 a. m.|   1.55 a. m.  | Cape Race says to Virginian "We have not
             |               |   heard Titanic for about half
             |               |   an hour. His power may be gone."
             |               |
  12.10 a. m.|   2 a. m.     | Virginian hears Titanic calling very
             |               |   faintly, his power being very greatly
             |               |   reduced.
             |               |
  12.20 a. m.|   2.10 a. m.  | Virginian hears 2 v's signaled faintly
             |               |   in spark similar to Titanic's, probably
             |               |   adjusting spark.
             |               |
  12.27 a. m.|   2.17 a. m.  | Virginian hears Titanic call CQ, but unable
             |               |   to read him. Titanic's signals end very
             |               |   abruptly, as power suddenly switched off.
             |               |   His spark rather blurred or ragged. Called
             |               |   MGY. (Titanic) and suggested he should try
             |               |   emergency set, but heard no response.
             |               |
  12.30 a. m.|   2.20 a. m.  | Olympic, his sigs. strong, asked him if he
             |               |   had heard anything about MGY. (Titanic). He
             |               |   says, "No. Keeping strict watch, but hear
             |               |   nothing more from MGY. (Titanic)." No reply
             |               |   from him.
             |               |
  12.52 a. m.|               | This was the official time the Titanic
             |               |   foundered 41.46 N., 50.14 W., as given
             |               |   by the Carpathia in message to the Olympic;
             |               |   about 2.20 a. m.
             |               |
   1.15 a. m.|               | Virginian exchanges signals Baltic. He
             |               |   tries send us MSG. for MGY. (Titanic),
             |               |   but his signals died utterly away.
             |               |
   1.25 a. m.|               | Mount Temple hears MPA. (Carpathia) send,
             |               |   "If you are there we are firing rockets."
             |               |
   1.35 a. m.|               | Baltic sent 1 MSG, to Virginian for Titanic.
             |               |
   1.40 a. m.|               | MPA. (Carpathia) calling MGY. (Titanic).
             |               |
   1.58 a. m.|               | SBA. (Birma) thinks he hears Titanic so
             |               |   sends, "Steaming full speed for you. Shall
             |               |   arrive you 6 in morning. Hope you are
             |               |   safe. We are only 50 miles now."
             |               |
   2 a. m.   |               | MPA. (Carpathia) calling MGY. (Titanic).
             |               |
     Do.     |               | Have not heard Titanic since 11.50 p. m.
             |               |   Received from Ypiranga.
             |               |
   2.28 a. m.|               | La Provence to Celtic, "Nobody has heard the
             |               |   Titanic for about 2 hours."
             |               |
   3.24 a. m.|               | SBA. (Birma) says we are 30 miles S. W. off
             |               |   Titanic.
             |               |
   3.36 a. m.|               | Celtic sends message to Caronia for the
             |               |   Titanic. Caronia after trying for two
             |               |   hours to get through to the Titanic tells
             |               |   the Celtic impossible to clear his message
             |               |   to Titanic. Celtic then cancels message.
  3.45 a. m. |               | Californian exchanges signals with MLQ.
             |               |   (Mount Temple). He gave position
             |               |   of Titanic.
             |               |
  4.10 a. m. |               | Californian receives MSG. from MGN.
             |               |   (Virginian).
             |               |
  5.5 a. m.  |               | Baltic signals MPA. (Carpathia).
             |               |
  5.40 a. m. |               | Parisian hears weak signals from MPA.
             |               |   (Carpathia) or some station saying
             |               |   Titanic struck iceberg. Carpathia
             |               |   has passengers from lifeboats.
             |               |
    Do.      |               | Olympic Tr Asian, with German oil tank
             |               |   in tow for Halifax asked what
             |               |   news of MGY. (Titanic). Sends
             |               |   service later saying heard MGY. (Titanic)
             |               |   _v._ faint wkg. C. Race up to 10 p. m.,
             |               |   local time. Finished calling SOS.
             |               |   midnight.
             |               |
  6.5 a. m.  |               | Parisian exchanges TRs Virginian O. K. nil.
             |               |   Informed Capt. Haines what I heard passing
             |               |   between ships regarding Titanic, and he
             |               |   decided not to return as M. P. A.
             |               |   (Carpathia) was there, and Californian
             |               |   was 50 miles astern of us, but requested
             |               |   me to stand by in case required.
             |               |
  6.45 a. m. |               | Mount Temple hears M. P. A. (Carpathia)
             |               |   report rescued 20 boat loads.
             |               |
  7.7 a. m.  |               | Baltic sends following to Carpathia: "Can
             |               |   I be of any assistance to you as
             |               |   regards taking some of the passengers
             |               |   from you? Will be in position about 4.30.
             |               |   Let me know if you alter your position."
             |               |
  7.10 a. m. |               | Baltic in communication with M. P. A.
             |               |   (Carpathia). Exchanged traffic _re_
             |               |   passengers, and get instructions to
             |               |   proceed to Liverpool.
             |               |
  7.15 a. m. |               | Baltic turns round for Liverpool, having
             |               |   steamed 134 miles W. toward Titanic.
             |               |
  7.40 a. m. |               | Mount Temple hears M. P. A. (Carpathia)
             |               |   call CQ. and say, "No need to std. bi
             |               |   him. Advise my captain, who has been
             |               |   cruising round the icefield
             |               |   with no result. Ship reversed."
             |               |
  7.45 a. m. |               | Olympic sent M. S. G. to owners, New
             |               |   York via Sable Island, saying
             |               |   "Have not communicated with Titanic
             |               |   since midnight."
             |               |
  7.55 a. m. |               | Carpathia replies to Baltic, "Am
             |               |   proceeding to Halifax or New York
             |               |   full speed. You had better proceed to
             |               |   Liverpool. Have about 800 passengers
             |               |   on board."
             |               |
  8 a. m.    |               | Carpathia to Virginian: "We are leaving
             |               |   here with all on board about 800
             |               |   passengers. Please return to your
             |               |   northern course."
  -----------+---------------+--------------------------------------------

19. (_a_) Was the apparatus for lowering the boats on the _Titanic_ at
the time of the casualty in good working order? (_b_) Were the boats
swung out, filled, lowered, or otherwise put into the water and got away
under proper superintendence? (_c_) Were the boats sent away in
seaworthy condition and properly manned, equipped, and provisioned?
(_d_) Did the boats, whether those under davits or otherwise, prove to
be efficient and serviceable for the purpose of saving life?

Answer. (_a_) Yes. (_b_) Yes. (_c_) The 14 lifeboats, 2 emergency boats,
and C and D collapsible boats were sent away in a seaworthy condition,
but some of them were possibly undermanned. The evidence on this point
was unsatisfactory. The total number of crew taken on board the
_Carpathia_ exceeded the number which would be required for manning the
boats. The collapsible boats A and B appear to have floated off the ship
at the time she foundered. The necessary equipment and provisions for
the boats were carried in the ship, but some of the boats, nevertheless,
left without having their full equipment in them. (_d_) Yes.

20. (_a_) What was the number of (_a_) passengers, (_b_) crew taken away
in each boat on leaving the vessel? (_b_) How was this number made up,
having regard to (1) sex, (2) class, and (3) rating? (_c_) How many were
children and how many adults? (_d_) Did each boat carry its full load
and, if not, why not?

Answer. (_a_) (_b_) (_c_) It is impossible exactly to say how many
persons were carried in each boat or what was their sex, class, and
rating, as the totals given in evidence do not correspond with the
numbers taken on board the _Carpathia_. The boats eventually contained
in all 712 persons, made up as shown in the answer to question 21. (_d_)
No. At least 8 boats did not carry their full loads for the following
reasons: (1) Many people did not realize the danger or care to leave the
ship at first. (2) Some boats were ordered to be lowered with an idea
of their coming around to the gangway doors to complete loading. (3) The
officers were not certain of the strength and capacity of the boats in
all cases (and see p. 39).

21. (_a_) How many persons on board the _Titanic_ at the time of the
casualty were ultimately rescued and by what means? (_b_) How many lost
their lives prior to the arrival of the steamship _Carpathia_ in New
York? (_c_) What was the number of passengers, distinguishing between
men and women and adults and children of the first, second, and third
classes, respectively, who were saved? (_d_) What was the number of the
crew, discriminating their ratings and sex, that were saved? (_e_) What
is the proportion which each of these numbers bears to the corresponding
total number on board immediately before the casualty? (_f_) What reason
is there for the disproportion, if any?

Answer. (_a_) Seven hundred and twelve, rescued by _Carpathia_ from the
boats. (_b_) One. (_c_) (_d_) and (_e_) are answered together.

The following is a list of the saved:

  First class:
    Adult males                      57 out of 175, or 32.57 per cent.
    Adult females                   140 out of 144, or 97.22 per cent.
    Male children (all saved)         5
    Female children (all saved)       1
                                   ----
                                    203 out of 325, or 62.46 per cent.
                                   ====
  Second class:
    Adult males                      14 out of 168, or 8.33 per cent.
    Adult females                    80 out of 93, or 86.02 per cent.
    Male children (all saved)        11
    Female children (all saved)      13
                                    ---
                                    118 out of 285, or 41.40 per cent.
                                   ====
  Third class:
    Adult males                      75 out of 462, or 16.23 per cent.
    Adult females                    76 out of 165, or 46.06 per cent.
    Male children                    13 out of 48, or 27.08 per cent.
    Female children                  14 out of 31, or 45.16 per cent.
                                    ---
                                    178 out of 706, or 25.21 per cent.
                                   ====

      Total passengers              499 out of 1,316, or 37.94 per cent.
                                   ====
  Crew saved:
    Deck department                  43 out of 66, or 65.15 per cent.
    Engine-room department           72 out of 325, or 22.15 per cent.
    Victualing department            97 out of 494, or 19.63 per cent.
    Including women                  20 out of 23, or 86.95 per cent.
                                    ---
                                    212 out of 885, or 23.95 per cent.
                                   ====

      Total on board saved          711 out of 2,201, or 32.30 per cent.

(_f_) The disproportion between the numbers of the passengers saved in
the first, second, and third classes is due to various causes, among
which the difference in the position of their quarters and the fact that
many of the third-class passengers were foreigners, are perhaps the most
important. Of the Irish emigrants in the third class a large proportion
was saved. The disproportion was certainly not due to any discrimination
by the officers or crew in assisting the passengers to the boats. The
disproportion between the numbers of the passengers and crew saved is
due to the fact that the crew, for the most part, all attended to their
duties to the last, and until all the boats were gone.

22. What happened to the vessel from the happening of the casualty until
she foundered?

Answer. A detailed description has already been given (see pp. 32-34).

23. Where and at what time did the _Titanic_ founder?

Answer. Two twenty a. m. (ship's time) April 15. Latitude 41 deg. 46' N.,
longitude 50 deg. 14' W.

24. (_a_) What was the cause of the loss of the _Titanic_ and of the
loss of life which thereby ensued or occurred? (_b_) What vessels had
the opportunity of rendering assistance to the _Titanic_ and, if any,
how was it that assistance did not reach the _Titanic_ before the
steamship _Carpathia_ arrived? (_c_) Was the construction of the vessel
and its arrangements such as to make it difficult for any class of
passenger or any portion of the crew to take full advantage of any of
the existing provisions for safety?

Answer. (_a_) Collision with an iceberg and the subsequent foundering of
the ship. (_b_) The _Californian_. She could have reached the _Titanic_
if she had made the attempt when she saw the first rocket. She made no
attempt. (_c_) No.

25. When the _Titanic_ left Queenstown on or about April 11 last was she
properly constructed and adequately equipped as a passenger steamer and
emigrant ship for the Atlantic service?

Answer. Yes.

26. The court is invited to report upon the rules and regulations made
under the merchant shipping acts, 1894-1906, and the administration of
those acts and of such rules and regulations, so far as the
consideration thereof is material to this casualty, and to make any
recommendations or suggestions that it may think fit, having regard to
the circumstances of the casualty, with a view to promoting the safety
of vessels and persons at sea.

Answer. An account of the board of trade's administration has already
been given and certain recommendations are subsequently made.




VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS.


The following recommendations are made. They refer to foreign-going
passenger and emigrant steamships:


WATER-TIGHT SUBDIVISION.

1. That the newly appointed bulkhead committee should inquire and
report, among other matters, on the desirability and practicability of
providing ships with (_a_) a double skin carried up above the water
line, or, as an alternative, with (_b_) a longitudinal, vertical,
water-tight bulkhead on each side of the ship, extending as far forward
and aft as convenient, or (_c_) with a combination of (_a_) and (_b_).
Any one of the three (_a_), (_b_), and (_c_) to be in addition to
water-tight transverse bulkheads.

2. That the committee should also inquire and report as to the
desirability and practicability of fitting ships with (_a_) a deck or
decks at a convenient distance or distances above the water line which
shall be water-tight throughout a part or the whole of the ship's
length; and should in this connection report upon (_b_) the means by
which the necessary openings in such deck or decks should be made
water-tight, whether by water-tight doors or water-tight trunks or by
any other and what means.

3. That the committee should consider and report generally on the
practicability of increasing the protection given by subdivision, the
object being to secure that the ship shall remain afloat with the
greatest practicable proportion of her length in free communication with
the sea.

4. That when the committee has reported upon the matters before
mentioned, the board of trade should take the report into their
consideration and to the extent to which they approve of it should seek
statutory powers to enforce it in all newly built ships, but with a
discretion to relax the requirements in special cases where it may seem
right to them to do so.

5. That the board of trade should be empowered by the legislature to
require the production of the designs and specifications of all ships in
their early stages of construction and to direct such amendments of the
same as may be thought necessary and practicable for the safety of life
at sea in ships. (This should apply to all passenger-carrying ships.)


LIFEBOATS AND RAFTS.

6. That the provision of lifeboat and raft accommodation on board such
ships should be based on the number of persons intended to be carried in
the ship and not upon tonnage.

7. That the question of such accommodation should be treated
independently of the question of the subdivision of the ship into
water-tight compartments. (This involves the abolition of rule 12 of the
Life Saving Appliances Rules of 1902.)

8. That the accommodation should be sufficient for all persons on board
with, however, the qualification that in special cases where, in the
opinion of the board of trade, such provision is impracticable, the
requirements may be modified as the board may think right. (In order to
give effect to this recommendation changes may be necessary in the sizes
and types of boats to be carried and in the method of stowing and
floating them. It may also be necessary to set apart one or more of the
boat decks exclusively for carrying boats and drilling the crew, and to
consider the distribution of decks in relation to the passengers'
quarters. These, however, are matters of detail to be settled with
reference to the particular circumstance affecting the ship.)

9. That all boats should be fitted with a protective continuous fender,
to lessen the risk of damage when being lowered in a seaway.

10. That the board of trade should be empowered to direct that one or
more of the boats be fitted with some form of mechanical propulsion.

11. That there should be a board of trade regulation requiring all boat
equipment (under secs. 5 and 6, p. 15, of the rules, dated February,
1902, made by the board of trade under sec. 427, merchant shipping act,
1894) to be in the boats as soon as the ship leaves harbor. The sections
quoted above should be amended so as to provide also that all boats and
rafts should carry lamps and pyrotechnic lights for purposes of
signaling. All boats should be provided with compasses and provisions,
and should be very distinctly marked in such a way as to indicate
plainly the number of adult persons each boat can carry when being
lowered.

12. That the board of trade inspection of boats and life-saving
appliances should be of a more searching character than hitherto.


MANNING THE BOATS AND BOAT DRILLS.

13. That in cases where the deck hands are not sufficient to man the
boats enough other members of the crew should be men trained in boat
work to make up the deficiency. These men should be required to pass a
test in boat work.

14. That in view of the necessity of having on board men trained in boat
work, steps should be taken to encourage the training of boys for the
merchant service.

15. That the operation of section 115 and section 134 (_a_) of the
merchant shipping act, 1894, should be examined, with a view to amending
the same so as to secure greater continuity of service than hitherto.

16. That the men who are to man the boats should have more frequent
drills than hitherto. That in all ships a boat drill, a fire drill, and
a water-tight door drill should be held as soon as possible after
leaving the original port of departure and at convenient intervals of
not less than once a week during the voyage. Such drills to be recorded
in the official log.

17. That the board of trade should be satisfied in each case before the
ship leaves port that a scheme has been devised and communicated to each
officer of the ship for securing an efficient working of the boats.


GENERAL.

18. That every man taking a lookout in such ships should undergo a sight
test at reasonable intervals.

19. That in all such ships a police system should be organized so as to
secure obedience to orders, and proper control and guidance of all on
board in times of emergency.

20. That in all such ships there should be an installation of wireless
telegraphy, and that such installation should be worked with a
sufficient number of trained operators to secure a continuous service by
night and day. In this connection regard should be had to the
resolutions of the International Conference on Wireless Telegraphy
recently held under the presidency of Sir H. Babington Smith. That where
practicable a silent chamber for "receiving" messages should form part
of the installation.

21. That instruction should be given in all steamship companies'
regulations that when ice is reported in or near the track the ship
should proceed in the dark hours at a moderate speed or alter her course
so as to go well clear of the danger zone.

22. That the attention of masters of vessels should be drawn by the
board of trade to the effect that under the maritime conventions act,
1911, it is a misdemeanor not to go to the relief of a vessel in
distress when possible to do so.

23. That the same protection as to the safety of life in the event of
casualty which is afforded to emigrant ships by means of supervision and
inspection should be extended to all foreign-going passenger ships.

24. That (unless already done) steps should be taken to call an
international conference to consider and as far as possible to agree
upon a common line of conduct in respect of (_a_) the subdivision of
ships; (_b_) the provision and working of life-saving appliances; (_c_)
the installation of wireless telegraphy and the method of working the
same; (_d_) the reduction of speed or the alteration of course in the
vicinity of ice; and (_e_) the use of searchlights.

MERSEY,

_Wreck Commissioner_.

We concur.

ARTHUR GOUGH-CALTHORPE,

A. W. CLARKE,

F. C. A. LYON,

J. H. BILES,

EDWARD C. CHASTON,

_Assessors_.

JULY 30, 1912.


FOOTNOTES:

[1] There was another water-tight door at the after end of the
water-tight passage through the bunker immediately aft of D bulkhead.
This door and the one on the D bulkhead formed a double protection to
the forward boiler room.

[2] The water-tight doors for these bulkheads were not on them, but were
at the end of a water-tight passage (about 9 feet long), leading from
the bulkhead through the bunker into the compartment.

[3] Floated off when the ship sank and was utilized as a raft.

[4] It may be mentioned that Mr. Archer stated in the witness box that
since the disaster to the Titanic he had modified his views and thought
that rule 12 should be discontinued.

[5] See rule of June 14, 1911.

[6] See rule of June 14, 1911.








End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Loss of the Steamship 'Titanic', by
British Government

*** 