



Produced by David Widger




PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT, complete

by U. S. Grant




PREFACE.

"Man proposes and God disposes."  There are but few important events in
the affairs of men brought about by their own choice.

Although frequently urged by friends to write my memoirs I had
determined never to do so, nor to write anything for publication.  At
the age of nearly sixty-two I received an injury from a fall, which
confined me closely to the house while it did not apparently affect my
general health. This made study a pleasant pastime.  Shortly after, the
rascality of a business partner developed itself by the announcement of
a failure.  This was followed soon after by universal depression of all
securities, which seemed to threaten the extinction of a good part of
the income still retained, and for which I am indebted to the kindly act
of friends.  At this juncture the editor of the Century Magazine asked
me to write a few articles for him. I consented for the money it gave
me; for at that moment I was living upon borrowed money.  The work I
found congenial, and I determined to continue it.  The event is an
important one for me, for good or evil; I hope for the former.

In preparing these volumes for the public, I have entered upon the task
with the sincere desire to avoid doing injustice to any one, whether on
the National or Confederate side, other than the unavoidable injustice
of not making mention often where special mention is due.  There must be
many errors of omission in this work, because the subject is too large
to be treated of in two volumes in such way as to do justice to all the
officers and men engaged.  There were thousands of instances, during the
rebellion, of individual, company, regimental and brigade deeds of
heroism which deserve special mention and are not here alluded to.  The
troops engaged in them will have to look to the detailed reports of
their individual commanders for the full history of those deeds.

The first volume, as well as a portion of the second, was written before
I had reason to suppose I was in a critical condition of health.  Later
I was reduced almost to the point of death, and it became impossible for
me to attend to anything for weeks.  I have, however, somewhat regained
my strength, and am able, often, to devote as many hours a day as a
person should devote to such work.  I would have more hope of satisfying
the expectation of the public if I could have allowed myself more time.
I have used my best efforts, with the aid of my eldest son, F. D. Grant,
assisted by his brothers, to verify from the records every statement of
fact given.  The comments are my own, and show how I saw the matters
treated of whether others saw them in the same light or not.

With these remarks I present these volumes to the public, asking no
favor but hoping they will meet the approval of the reader.

U. S.  GRANT.

MOUNT MACGREGOR, NEW YORK, July 1, 1885.


CONTENTS

VOLUME I.

CHAPTER I. ANCESTRY--BIRTH--BOYHOOD.

CHAPTER II. WEST POINT--GRADUATION.

CHAPTER III. ARMY LIFE--CAUSES OF THE MEXICAN WAR--CAMP SALUBRITY.

CHAPTER IV. CORPUS CHRISTI--MEXICAN SMUGGLING--SPANISH RULE IN MEXICO
--SUPPLYING TRANSPORTATION.

CHAPTER V. TRIP TO AUSTIN--PROMOTION TO FULL SECOND-LIEUTENANT--ARMY OF
OCCUPATION.

CHAPTER VI. ADVANCE OF THE ARMY--CROSSING THE COLORADO--THE RIO GRANDE.

CHAPTER VII. THE MEXICAN WAR--THE BATTLE OF PALO ALTO--THE BATTLE OF
RESACA DE LA PALMA--ARMY OF INVASION--GENERAL TAYLOR--MOVEMENT ON
CAMARGO.

CHAPTER VIII. ADVANCE ON MONTEREY--THE BLACK FORT--THE BATTLE OF
MONTEREY--SURRENDER OF THE CITY.

CHAPTER IX. POLITICAL INTRIGUE--BUENA VISTA--MOVEMENT AGAINST VERA CRUZ
--SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF VERA CRUZ.

CHAPTER X. MARCH TO JALAPA--BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO--PEROTE--PUEBLA--SCOTT
AND TAYLOR.

CHAPTER XI. ADVANCE ON THE CITY OF MEXICO--BATTLE OF CONTRERAS--ASSAULT
AT CHURUBUSCO--NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE--BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY
--STORMING OF CHAPULTEPEC--SAN COSME--EVACUATION OF THE CITY--HALLS OF
THE MONTEZUMAS.

CHAPTER XII. PROMOTION TO FIRST LIEUTENANT--CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF
MEXICO--THE ARMY--MEXICAN SOLDIERS--PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

CHAPTER XIII. TREATY OF PEACE--MEXICAN BULL FIGHTS--REGIMENTAL
QUARTERMASTER--TRIP TO POPOCATAPETL--TRIP TO THE CAVES OF MEXICO.

CHAPTER XIV. RETURN OF THE ARMY--MARRIAGE--ORDERED TO THE PACIFIC COAST
--CROSSING THE ISTHMUS--ARRIVAL AT SAN FRANCISCO.

CHAPTER XV. SAN FRANCISCO--EARLY CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCES--LIFE ON THE
PACIFIC COAST--PROMOTED CAPTAIN--FLUSH TIMES IN CALIFORNIA.

CHAPTER XVI. RESIGNATION--PRIVATE LIFE--LIFE AT GALENA--THE COMING
CRISIS.

CHAPTER XVII. OUTBREAK OF THE REBELLION--PRESIDING AT A UNION MEETING
--MUSTERING OFFICER OF STATE TROOPS--LYON AT CAMP JACKSON--SERVICES
TENDERED TO THE GOVERNMENT.

CHAPTER XVIII. APPOINTED COLONEL OF THE 21ST ILLINOIS--PERSONNEL OF THE
REGIMENT--GENERAL LOGAN--MARCH TO MISSOURI--MOVEMENT AGAINST HARRIS AT
FLORIDA, MO.--GENERAL POPE IN COMMAND--STATIONED AT MEXICO, MO.

CHAPTER XIX. COMMISSIONED BRIGADIER-GENERAL--COMMAND AT IRONTON, MO.
--JEFFERSON CITY--CAPE GIRARDEAU--GENERAL PRENTISS--SEIZURE OF PADUCAH
--HEADQUARTERS AT CAIRO.

CHAPTER XX. GENERAL FREMONT IN COMMAND--MOVEMENT AGAINST BELMONT--BATTLE
OF BELMONT--A NARROW ESCAPE--AFTER THE BATTLE.

CHAPTER XXI. GENERAL HALLECK IN COMMAND--COMMANDING THE DISTRICT OF
CAIRO--MOVEMENT ON FORT HENRY--CAPTURE OF FORT HENRY.

CHAPTER XXII. INVESTMENT OF FORT DONELSON--THE NAVAL OPERATIONS--ATTACK
OF THE ENEMY--ASSAULTING THE WORKS--SURRENDER OF THE FORT.

CHAPTER XXIII. PROMOTED MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS--UNOCCUPIED
TERRITORY--ADVANCE UPON NASHVILLE--SITUATION OF THE TROOPS--CONFEDERATE
RETREAT--RELIEVED OF THE COMMAND--RESTORED TO THE COMMAND--GENERAL
SMITH.

CHAPTER XXIV. THE ARMY AT PITTSBURG LANDING--INJURED BY A FALL--THE
CONFEDERATE ATTACK AT SHILOH--THE FIRST DAY'S FIGHT AT SHILOH--GENERAL
SHERMAN--CONDITION OF THE ARMY--CLOSE OF THE FIRST DAY'S FIGHT--THE
SECOND DAY'S FIGHT--RETREAT AND DEFEAT OF THE CONFEDERATES.

CHAPTER XXV. STRUCK BY A BULLET--PRECIPITATE RETREAT OF THE
CONFEDERATES--INTRENCHMENTS AT SHILOH--GENERAL BUELL--GENERAL JOHNSTON
--REMARKS ON SHILOH.

CHAPTER XXVI. HALLECK ASSUMES COMMAND IN THE FIELD--THE ADVANCE UPON
CORINTH--OCCUPATION OF CORINTH--THE ARMY SEPARATED.

CHAPTER XXVII. HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO MEMPHIS--ON THE ROAD TO MEMPHIS
--ESCAPING JACKSON--COMPLAINTS AND REQUESTS--HALLECK APPOINTED
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF--RETURN TO CORINTH--MOVEMENTS OF BRAGG--SURRENDER
OF CLARKSVILLE--THE ADVANCE UPON CHATTANOOGA--SHERIDAN COLONEL OF A
MICHIGAN REGIMENT.

CHAPTER XXVIII. ADVANCE OF VAN DORN AND PRICE--PRICE ENTERS IUKA--BATTLE
OF IUKA.

CHAPTER XXIX. VAN DORN'S MOVEMENTS--BATTLE OF CORINTH--COMMAND OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE.

CHAPTER XXX. THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST VICKSBURG--EMPLOYING THE FREEDMEN
--OCCUPATION OF HOLLY SPRINGS--SHERMAN ORDERED TO MEMPHIS--SHERMAN'S
MOVEMENTS DOWN THE MISSISSIPPI--VAN DORN CAPTURES HOLLY SPRINGS
--COLLECTING FORAGE AND FOOD.

CHAPTER XXXI. HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO HOLLY SPRINGS--GENERAL MCCLERNAND IN
COMMAND--ASSUMING COMMAND AT YOUNG'S POINT--OPERATIONS ABOVE VICKSBURG
--FORTIFICATIONS ABOUT VICKSBURG--THE CANAL--LAKE PROVIDENCE--OPERATIONS
AT YAZOO PASS.

CHAPTER XXXII. THE BAYOUS WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI--CRITICISMS OF THE
NORTHERN PRESS--RUNNING THE BATTERIES--LOSS OF THE INDIANOLA
--DISPOSITION OF THE TROOPS.

CHAPTER XXXIII. ATTACK ON GRAND GULF--OPERATIONS BELOW VICKSBURG.

CHAPTER XXXIV. CAPTURE OF PORT GIBSON--GRIERSON'S RAID--OCCUPATION OF
GRAND GULF--MOVEMENT UP THE BIG BLACK--BATTLE OF RAYMOND.

CHAPTER XXXV. MOVEMENT AGAINST JACKSON--FALL OF JACKSON--INTERCEPTING
THE ENEMY--BATTLE OF CHAMPION'S HILL.

CHAPTER XXXVI. BATTLE OF BLACK RIVER BRIDGE--CROSSING THE BIG BLACK
--INVESTMENT OF VICKSBURG--ASSAULTING THE WORKS.

CHAPTER XXXVII. SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

CHAPTER XXXVIII. JOHNSTON'S MOVEMENTS--FORTIFICATIONS AT HAINES'S BLUFF
--EXPLOSION OF THE MINE--EXPLOSION OF THE SECOND MINE--PREPARING FOR THE
ASSAULT--THE FLAG OF TRUCE--MEETING WITH PEMBERTON--NEGOTIATIONS FOR
SURRENDER--ACCEPTING THE TERMS--SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG.

CHAPTER XXXIX. RETROSPECT OF THE CAMPAIGN--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS--PROPOSED
MOVEMENT UPON MOBILE--A PAINFUL ACCIDENT--ORDERED TO REPORT AT CAIRO.



Volume one begins:




CHAPTER I.

ANCESTRY--BIRTH--BOYHOOD.

My family is American, and has been for generations, in all its
branches, direct and collateral.

Mathew Grant, the founder of the branch in America, of which I am a
descendant, reached Dorchester, Massachusetts, in May, 1630.  In 1635 he
moved to what is now Windsor, Connecticut, and was the surveyor for that
colony for more than forty years.  He was also, for many years of the
time, town clerk.  He was a married man when he arrived at Dorchester,
but his children were all born in this country.  His eldest son, Samuel,
took lands on the east side of the Connecticut River, opposite Windsor,
which have been held and occupied by descendants of his to this day.

I am of the eighth generation from Mathew Grant, and seventh from
Samuel.  Mathew Grant's first wife died a few years after their
settlement in Windsor, and he soon after married the widow Rockwell,
who, with her first husband, had been fellow-passengers with him and his
first wife, on the ship Mary and John, from Dorchester, England, in
1630.  Mrs. Rockwell had several children by her first marriage, and
others by her second.  By intermarriage, two or three generations later,
I am descended from both the wives of Mathew Grant.

In the fifth descending generation my great grandfather, Noah Grant, and
his younger brother, Solomon, held commissions in the English army, in
1756, in the war against the French and Indians.  Both were killed that
year.

My grandfather, also named Noah, was then but nine years old. At the
breaking out of the war of the Revolution, after the battles of Concord
and Lexington, he went with a Connecticut company to join the
Continental army, and was present at the battle of Bunker Hill.  He
served until the fall of Yorktown, or through the entire Revolutionary
war.  He must, however, have been on furlough part of the time--as I
believe most of the soldiers of that period were--for he married in
Connecticut during the war, had two children, and was a widower at the
close.  Soon after this he emigrated to Westmoreland County,
Pennsylvania, and settled near the town of Greensburg in that county.
He took with him the younger of his two children, Peter Grant.  The
elder, Solomon, remained with his relatives in Connecticut until old
enough to do for himself, when he emigrated to the British West Indies.

Not long after his settlement in Pennsylvania, my grandfather, Captain
Noah Grant, married a Miss Kelly, and in 1799 he emigrated again, this
time to Ohio, and settled where the town of Deerfield now stands.  He
had now five children, including Peter, a son by his first marriage.  My
father, Jesse R. Grant, was the second child--oldest son, by the second
marriage.

Peter Grant went early to Maysville, Kentucky, where he was very
prosperous, married, had a family of nine children, and was drowned at
the mouth of the Kanawha River, Virginia, in 1825, being at the time one
of the wealthy men of the West.

My grandmother Grant died in 1805, leaving seven children.  This broke
up the family.  Captain Noah Grant was not thrifty in the way of "laying
up stores on earth," and, after the death of his second wife, he went,
with the two youngest children, to live with his son Peter, in
Maysville.  The rest of the family found homes in the neighborhood of
Deerfield, my father in the family of judge Tod, the father of the late
Governor Tod, of Ohio.  His industry and independence of character were
such, that I imagine his labor compensated fully for the expense of his
maintenance.

There must have been a cordiality in his welcome into the Tod family,
for to the day of his death he looked upon judge Tod and his wife, with
all the reverence he could have felt if they had been parents instead of
benefactors.  I have often heard him speak of Mrs. Tod as the most
admirable woman he had ever known.  He remained with the Tod family only
a few years, until old enough to learn a trade.  He went first, I
believe, with his half-brother, Peter Grant, who, though not a tanner
himself, owned a tannery in Maysville, Kentucky.  Here he learned his
trade, and in a few years returned to Deerfield and worked for, and
lived in the family of a Mr. Brown, the father of John Brown--"whose
body lies mouldering in the grave, while his soul goes marching on."  I
have often heard my father speak of John Brown, particularly since the
events at Harper's Ferry.  Brown was a boy when they lived in the same
house, but he knew him afterwards, and regarded him as a man of great
purity of character, of high moral and physical courage, but a fanatic
and extremist in whatever he advocated.  It was certainly the act of an
insane man to attempt the invasion of the South, and the overthrow of
slavery, with less than twenty men.

My father set up for himself in business, establishing a tannery at
Ravenna, the county seat of Portage County.  In a few years he removed
from Ravenna, and set up the same business at Point Pleasant, Clermont
County, Ohio.

During the minority of my father, the West afforded but poor facilities
for the most opulent of the youth to acquire an education, and the
majority were dependent, almost exclusively, upon their own exertions
for whatever learning they obtained.  I have often heard him say that
his time at school was limited to six months, when he was very young,
too young, indeed, to learn much, or to appreciate the advantages of an
education, and to a "quarter's schooling" afterwards, probably while
living with judge Tod.  But his thirst for education was intense.  He
learned rapidly, and was a constant reader up to the day of his death in
his eightieth year.  Books were scarce in the Western Reserve during his
youth, but he read every book he could borrow in the neighborhood where
he lived.  This scarcity gave him the early habit of studying everything
he read, so that when he got through with a book, he knew everything in
it.  The habit continued through life.  Even after reading the daily
papers--which he never neglected--he could give all the important
information they contained.  He made himself an excellent English
scholar, and before he was twenty years of age was a constant
contributor to Western newspapers, and was also, from that time until he
was fifty years old, an able debater in the societies for this purpose,
which were common in the West at that time.  He always took an active
part in politics, but was never a candidate for office, except, I
believe, that he was the first Mayor of Georgetown.  He supported
Jackson for the Presidency; but he was a Whig, a great admirer of Henry
Clay, and never voted for any other democrat for high office after
Jackson.

My mother's family lived in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, for several
generations.  I have little information about her ancestors.  Her family
took no interest in genealogy, so that my grandfather, who died when I
was sixteen years old, knew only back to his grandfather.  On the other
side, my father took a great interest in the subject, and in his
researches, he found that there was an entailed estate in Windsor,
Connecticut, belonging to the family, to which his nephew, Lawson Grant
--still living--was the heir.  He was so much interested in the subject
that he got his nephew to empower him to act in the matter, and in 1832
or 1833, when I was a boy ten or eleven years old, he went to Windsor,
proved the title beyond dispute, and perfected the claim of the owners
for a consideration--three thousand dollars, I think.  I remember the
circumstance well, and remember, too, hearing him say on his return that
he found some widows living on the property, who had little or nothing
beyond their homes.  From these he refused to receive any recompense.

My mother's father, John Simpson, moved from Montgomery County,
Pennsylvania, to Clermont County, Ohio, about the year 1819, taking with
him his four children, three daughters and one son.  My mother, Hannah
Simpson, was the third of these children, and was then over twenty years
of age.  Her oldest sister was at that time married, and had several
children.  She still lives in Clermont County at this writing, October
5th, 1884, and is over ninety ears of age.  Until her memory failed her,
a few years ago, she thought the country ruined beyond recovery when the
Democratic party lost control in 1860.  Her family, which was large,
inherited her views, with the exception of one son who settled in
Kentucky before the war.  He was the only one of the children who
entered the volunteer service to suppress the rebellion.

Her brother, next of age and now past eighty-eight, is also still living
in Clermont County, within a few miles of the old homestead, and is as
active in mind as ever.  He was a supporter of the Government during the
war, and remains a firm believer, that national success by the
Democratic party means irretrievable ruin.

In June, 1821, my father, Jesse R. Grant, married Hannah Simpson.  I was
born on the 27th of April, 1822, at Point Pleasant, Clermont County,
Ohio.  In the fall of 1823 we moved to Georgetown, the county seat of
Brown, the adjoining county east.  This place remained my home, until at
the age of seventeen, in 1839, I went to West Point.

The schools, at the time of which I write, were very indifferent.  There
were no free schools, and none in which the scholars were classified.
They were all supported by subscription, and a single teacher--who was
often a man or a woman incapable of teaching much, even if they imparted
all they knew--would have thirty or forty scholars, male and female,
from the infant learning the A B C's up to the young lady of eighteen
and the boy of twenty, studying the highest branches taught--the three
R's, "Reading, 'Riting, 'Rithmetic."  I never saw an algebra, or other
mathematical work higher than the arithmetic, in Georgetown, until after
I was appointed to West Point.  I then bought a work on algebra in
Cincinnati; but having no teacher it was Greek to me.

My life in Georgetown was uneventful.  From the age of five or six until
seventeen, I attended the subscription schools of the village, except
during the winters of 1836-7 and 1838-9.  The former period was spent in
Maysville, Kentucky, attending the school of Richardson and Rand; the
latter in Ripley, Ohio, at a private school.  I was not studious in
habit, and probably did not make progress enough to compensate for the
outlay for board and tuition.  At all events both winters were spent in
going over the same old arithmetic which I knew every word of before,
and repeating:  "A noun is the name of a thing," which I had also heard
my Georgetown teachers repeat, until I had come to believe it--but I
cast no reflections upon my old teacher, Richardson. He turned out
bright scholars from his school, many of whom have filled conspicuous
places in the service of their States.  Two of my contemporaries there
--who, I believe, never attended any other institution of learning--have
held seats in Congress, and one, if not both, other high offices; these
are Wadsworth and Brewster.

My father was, from my earliest recollection, in comfortable
circumstances, considering the times, his place of residence, and the
community in which he lived.  Mindful of his own lack of facilities for
acquiring an education, his greatest desire in maturer years was for the
education of his children. Consequently, as stated before, I never
missed a quarter from school from the time I was old enough to attend
till the time of leaving home.  This did not exempt me from labor.  In
my early days, every one labored more or less, in the region where my
youth was spent, and more in proportion to their private means.  It was
only the very poor who were exempt.  While my father carried on the
manufacture of leather and worked at the trade himself, he owned and
tilled considerable land.  I detested the trade, preferring almost any
other labor; but I was fond of agriculture, and of all employment in
which horses were used.  We had, among other lands, fifty acres of
forest within a mile of the village.  In the fall of the year choppers
were employed to cut enough wood to last a twelve-month.  When I was
seven or eight years of age, I began hauling all the wood used in the
house and shops.  I could not load it on the wagons, of course, at that
time, but I could drive, and the choppers would load, and some one at
the house unload.  When about eleven years old, I was strong enough to
hold a plough.  From that age until seventeen I did all the work done
with horses, such as breaking up the land, furrowing, ploughing corn and
potatoes, bringing in the crops when harvested, hauling all the wood,
besides tending two or three horses, a cow or two, and sawing wood for
stoves, etc., while still attending school.  For this I was compensated
by the fact that there was never any scolding or punishing by my
parents; no objection to rational enjoyments, such as fishing, going to
the creek a mile away to swim in summer, taking a horse and visiting my
grandparents in the adjoining county, fifteen miles off, skating on the
ice in winter, or taking a horse and sleigh when there was snow on the
ground.

While still quite young I had visited Cincinnati, forty-five miles away,
several times, alone; also Maysville, Kentucky, often, and once
Louisville.  The journey to Louisville was a big one for a boy of that
day.  I had also gone once with a two-horse carriage to Chilicothe,
about seventy miles, with a neighbor's family, who were removing to
Toledo, Ohio, and returned alone; and had gone once, in like manner, to
Flat Rock, Kentucky, about seventy miles away.  On this latter occasion
I was fifteen years of age.  While at Flat Rock, at the house of a Mr.
Payne, whom I was visiting with his brother, a neighbor of ours in
Georgetown, I saw a very fine saddle horse, which I rather coveted, and
proposed to Mr. Payne, the owner, to trade him for one of the two I was
driving.  Payne hesitated to trade with a boy, but asking his brother
about it, the latter told him that it would be all right, that I was
allowed to do as I pleased with the horses.  I was seventy miles from
home, with a carriage to take back, and Mr. Payne said he did not know
that his horse had ever had a collar on.  I asked to have him hitched to
a farm wagon and we would soon see whether he would work.  It was soon
evident that the horse had never worn harness before; but he showed no
viciousness, and I expressed a confidence that I could manage him.  A
trade was at once struck, I receiving ten dollars difference.

The next day Mr. Payne, of Georgetown, and I started on our return.  We
got along very well for a few miles, when we encountered a ferocious dog
that frightened the horses and made them run.  The new animal kicked at
every jump he made.  I got the horses stopped, however, before any
damage was done, and without running into anything.  After giving them a
little rest, to quiet their fears, we started again.  That instant the
new horse kicked, and started to run once more.  The road we were on,
struck the turnpike within half a mile of the point where the second
runaway commenced, and there there was an embankment twenty or more feet
deep on the opposite side of the pike.  I got the horses stopped on the
very brink of the precipice.  My new horse was terribly frightened and
trembled like an aspen; but he was not half so badly frightened as my
companion, Mr. Payne, who deserted me after this last experience, and
took passage on a freight wagon for Maysville.  Every time I attempted
to start, my new horse would commence to kick.  I was in quite a dilemma
for a time.  Once in Maysville I could borrow a horse from an uncle who
lived there; but I was more than a day's travel from that point.
Finally I took out my bandanna--the style of handkerchief in universal
use then--and with this blindfolded my horse.  In this way I reached
Maysville safely the next day, no doubt much to the surprise of my
friend.  Here I borrowed a horse from my uncle, and the following day we
proceeded on our journey.

About half my school-days in Georgetown were spent at the school of John
D. White, a North Carolinian, and the father of Chilton White who
represented the district in Congress for one term during the rebellion.
Mr. White was always a Democrat in politics, and Chilton followed his
father.  He had two older brothers--all three being school-mates of mine
at their father's school--who did not go the same way.  The second
brother died before the rebellion began; he was a Whig, and afterwards a
Republican.  His oldest brother was a Republican and brave soldier
during the rebellion.  Chilton is reported as having told of an earlier
horse-trade of mine.  As he told the story, there was a Mr. Ralston
living within a few miles of the village, who owned a colt which I very
much wanted.  My father had offered twenty dollars for it, but Ralston
wanted twenty-five.  I was so anxious to have the colt, that after the
owner left, I begged to be allowed to take him at the price demanded.
My father yielded, but said twenty dollars was all the horse was worth,
and told me to offer that price; if it was not accepted I was to offer
twenty-two and a half, and if that would not get him, to give the
twenty-five.  I at once mounted a horse and went for the colt.  When I
got to Mr. Ralston's house, I said to him:  "Papa says I may offer you
twenty dollars for the colt, but if you won't take that, I am to offer
twenty-two and a half, and if you won't take that, to give you
twenty-five."  It would not require a Connecticut man to guess the price
finally agreed upon.  This story is nearly true.  I certainly showed
very plainly that I had come for the colt and meant to have him.  I
could not have been over eight years old at the time.  This transaction
caused me great heart-burning. The story got out among the boys of the
village, and it was a long time before I heard the last of it.  Boys
enjoy the misery of their companions, at least village boys in that day
did, and in later life I have found that all adults are not free from
the peculiarity.  I kept the horse until he was four years old, when he
went blind, and I sold him for twenty dollars.  When I went to Maysville
to school, in 1836, at the age of fourteen, I recognized my colt as one
of the blind horses working on the tread-wheel of the ferry-boat.

I have describes enough of my early life to give an impression of the
whole.  I did not like to work; but I did as much of it, while young, as
grown men can be hired to do in these days, and attended school at the
same time.  I had as many privileges as any boy in the village, and
probably more than most of them.  I have no recollection of ever having
been punished at home, either by scolding or by the rod.  But at school
the case was different.  The rod was freely used there, and I was not
exempt from its influence.  I can see John D. White--the school teacher
--now, with his long beech switch always in his hand.  It was not always
the same one, either.  Switches were brought in bundles, from a beech
wood near the school house, by the boys for whose benefit they were
intended.  Often a whole bundle would be used up in a single day.  I
never had any hard feelings against my teacher, either while attending
the school, or in later years when reflecting upon my experience.  Mr.
White was a kindhearted man, and was much respected by the community in
which he lived.  He only followed the universal custom of the period,
and that under which he had received his own education.



CHAPTER II.

WEST POINT--GRADUATION.

In the winter of 1838-9 I was attending school at Ripley, only ten miles
distant from Georgetown, but spent the Christmas holidays at home.
During this vacation my father received a letter from the Honorable
Thomas Morris, then United States Senator from Ohio.  When he read it he
said to me, "Ulysses, I believe you are going to receive the
appointment."  "What appointment?"  I inquired.  "To West Point; I have
applied for it."  "But I won't go," I said.  He said he thought I would,
AND I THOUGHT SO TOO, IF HE DID.  I really had no objection to going to
West Point, except that I had a very exalted idea of the acquirements
necessary to get through.  I did not believe I possessed them, and could
not bear the idea of failing.  There had been four boys from our
village, or its immediate neighborhood, who had been graduated from West
Point, and never a failure of any one appointed from Georgetown, except
in the case of the one whose place I was to take.  He was the son of Dr.
Bailey, our nearest and most intimate neighbor.  Young Bailey had been
appointed in 1837.  Finding before the January examination following,
that he could not pass, he resigned and went to a private school, and
remained there until the following year, when he was reappointed.
Before the next examination he was dismissed.  Dr. Bailey was a proud
and sensitive man, and felt the failure of his son so keenly that he
forbade his return home.  There were no telegraphs in those days to
disseminate news rapidly, no railroads west of the Alleghanies, and but
few east; and above all, there were no reporters prying into other
people's private affairs.  Consequently it did not become generally
known that there was a vacancy at West Point from our district until I
was appointed.  I presume Mrs. Bailey confided to my mother the fact
that Bartlett had been dismissed, and that the doctor had forbidden his
son's return home.

The Honorable Thomas L. Hamer, one of the ablest men Ohio ever produced,
was our member of Congress at the time, and had the right of nomination.
He and my father had been members of the same debating society (where
they were generally pitted on opposite sides), and intimate personal
friends from their early manhood up to a few years before.  In politics
they differed. Hamer was a life-long Democrat, while my father was a
Whig. They had a warm discussion, which finally became angry--over some
act of President Jackson, the removal of the deposit of public moneys, I
think--after which they never spoke until after my appointment.  I know
both of them felt badly over this estrangement, and would have been glad
at any time to come to a reconciliation; but neither would make the
advance.  Under these circumstances my father would not write to Hamer
for the appointment, but he wrote to Thomas Morris, United States
Senator from Ohio, informing him that there was a vacancy at West Point
from our district, and that he would be glad if I could be appointed to
fill it.  This letter, I presume, was turned over to Mr. Hamer, and, as
there was no other applicant, he cheerfully appointed me.  This healed
the breach between the two, never after reopened.

Besides the argument used by my father in favor of my going to West
Point--that "he thought I would go"--there was another very strong
inducement.  I had always a great desire to travel.  I was already the
best travelled boy in Georgetown, except the sons of one man, John
Walker, who had emigrated to Texas with his family, and immigrated back
as soon as he could get the means to do so.  In his short stay in Texas
he acquired a very different opinion of the country from what one would
form going there now.

I had been east to Wheeling, Virginia, and north to the Western Reserve,
in Ohio, west to Louisville, and south to Bourbon County, Kentucky,
besides having driven or ridden pretty much over the whole country
within fifty miles of home.  Going to West Point would give me the
opportunity of visiting the two great cities of the continent,
Philadelphia and New York.  This was enough.  When these places were
visited I would have been glad to have had a steamboat or railroad
collision, or any other accident happen, by which I might have received
a temporary injury sufficient to make me ineligible, for a time, to
enter the Academy.  Nothing of the kind occurred, and I had to face the
music.

Georgetown has a remarkable record for a western village.  It is, and
has been from its earliest existence, a democratic town.  There was
probably no time during the rebellion when, if the opportunity could
have been afforded, it would not have voted for Jefferson Davis for
President of the United States, over Mr. Lincoln, or any other
representative of his party; unless it was immediately after some of
John Morgan's men, in his celebrated raid through Ohio, spent a few
hours in the village.  The rebels helped themselves to whatever they
could find, horses, boots and shoes, especially horses, and many ordered
meals to be prepared for them by the families.  This was no doubt a far
pleasanter duty for some families than it would have been to render a
like service for Union soldiers.  The line between the Rebel and Union
element in Georgetown was so marked that it led to divisions even in the
churches.  There were churches in that part of Ohio where treason was
preached regularly, and where, to secure membership, hostility to the
government, to the war and to the liberation of the slaves, was far more
essential than a belief in the authenticity or credibility of the Bible.
There were men in Georgetown who filled all the requirements for
membership in these churches.

Yet this far-off western village, with a population, including old and
young, male and female, of about one thousand--about enough for the
organization of a single regiment if all had been men capable of bearing
arms--furnished the Union army four general officers and one colonel,
West Point graduates, and nine generals and field officers of
Volunteers, that I can think of. Of the graduates from West Point, all
had citizenship elsewhere at the breaking out of the rebellion, except
possibly General A. V. Kautz, who had remained in the army from his
graduation.  Two of the colonels also entered the service from other
localities.  The other seven, General McGroierty, Colonels White, Fyffe,
Loudon and Marshall, Majors King and Bailey, were all residents of
Georgetown when the war broke out, and all of them, who were alive at
the close, returned there.  Major Bailey was the cadet who had preceded
me at West Point.  He was killed in West Virginia, in his first
engagement.  As far as I know, every boy who has entered West Point from
that village since my time has been graduated.

I took passage on a steamer at Ripley, Ohio, for Pittsburg, about the
middle of May, 1839.  Western boats at that day did not make regular
trips at stated times, but would stop anywhere, and for any length of
time, for passengers or freight.  I have myself been detained two or
three days at a place after steam was up, the gang planks, all but one,
drawn in, and after the time advertised for starting had expired.  On
this occasion we had no vexatious delays, and in about three days
Pittsburg was reached.  From Pittsburg I chose passage by the canal to
Harrisburg, rather than by the more expeditious stage.  This gave a
better opportunity of enjoying the fine scenery of Western Pennsylvania,
and I had rather a dread of reaching my destination at all.  At that
time the canal was much patronized by travellers, and, with the
comfortable packets of the period, no mode of conveyance could be more
pleasant, when time was not an object.  From Harrisburg to Philadelphia
there was a railroad, the first I had ever seen, except the one on which
I had just crossed the summit of the Alleghany Mountains, and over which
canal boats were transported.  In travelling by the road from
Harrisburg, I thought the perfection of rapid transit had been reached.
We travelled at least eighteen miles an hour, when at full speed, and
made the whole distance averaging probably as much as twelve miles an
hour.  This seemed like annihilating space.  I stopped five days in
Philadelphia, saw about every street in the city, attended the theatre,
visited Girard College (which was then in course of construction), and
got reprimanded from home afterwards, for dallying by the way so long.
My sojourn in New York was shorter, but long enough to enable me to see
the city very well.  I reported at West Point on the 30th or 31st of
May, and about two weeks later passed my examination for admission,
without difficulty, very much to my surprise.

A military life had no charms for me, and I had not the faintest idea of
staying in the army even if I should be graduated, which I did not
expect.  The encampment which preceded the commencement of academic
studies was very wearisome and uninteresting.  When the 28th of August
came--the date for breaking up camp and going into barracks--I felt as
though I had been at West Point always, and that if I staid to
graduation, I would have to remain always.  I did not take hold of my
studies with avidity, in fact I rarely ever read over a lesson the
second time during my entire cadetship.  I could not sit in my room
doing nothing.  There is a fine library connected with the Academy from
which cadets can get books to read in their quarters.  I devoted more
time to these, than to books relating to the course of studies.  Much of
the time, I am sorry to say, was devoted to novels, but not those of a
trashy sort.  I read all of Bulwer's then published, Cooper's,
Marryat's, Scott's, Washington Irving's works, Lever's, and many others
that I do not now remember.  Mathematics was very easy to me, so that
when January came, I passed the examination, taking a good standing in
that branch.  In French, the only other study at that time in the first
year's course, my standing was very low.  In fact, if the class had been
turned the other end foremost I should have been near head.  I never
succeeded in getting squarely at either end of my class, in any one
study, during the four years.  I came near it in French, artillery,
infantry and cavalry tactics, and conduct.

Early in the session of the Congress which met in December, 1839, a bill
was discussed abolishing the Military Academy.  I saw in this an
honorable way to obtain a discharge, and read the debates with much
interest, but with impatience at the delay in taking action, for I was
selfish enough to favor the bill.  It never passed, and a year later,
although the time hung drearily with me, I would have been sorry to have
seen it succeed.  My idea then was to get through the course, secure a
detail for a few years as assistant professor of mathematics at the
Academy, and afterwards obtain a permanent position as professor in some
respectable college; but circumstances always did shape my course
different from my plans.

At the end of two years the class received the usual furlough, extending
from the close of the June examination to the 28th of August.  This I
enjoyed beyond any other period of my life.  My father had sold out his
business in Georgetown--where my youth had been spent, and to which my
day-dreams carried me back as my future home, if I should ever be able
to retire on a competency.  He had moved to Bethel, only twelve miles
away, in the adjoining county of Clermont, and had bought a young horse
that had never been in harness, for my special use under the saddle
during my furlough.  Most of my time was spent among my old
school-mates--these ten weeks were shorter than one week at West Point.

Persons acquainted with the Academy know that the corps of cadets is
divided into four companies for the purpose of military exercises.
These companies are officered from the cadets, the superintendent and
commandant selecting the officers for their military bearing and
qualifications.  The adjutant, quartermaster, four captains and twelve
lieutenants are taken from the first, or Senior class; the sergeants
from the second, or junior class; and the corporals from the third, or
Sophomore class.  I had not been "called out" as a corporal, but when I
returned from furlough I found myself the last but one--about my
standing in all the tactics--of eighteen sergeants.  The promotion was
too much for me.  That year my standing in the class--as shown by the
number of demerits of the year--was about the same as it was among the
sergeants, and I was dropped, and served the fourth year as a private.

During my first year's encampment General Scott visited West Point, and
reviewed the cadets.  With his commanding figure, his quite colossal
size and showy uniform, I thought him the finest specimen of manhood my
eyes had ever beheld, and the most to be envied.  I could never resemble
him in appearance, but I believe I did have a presentiment for a moment
that some day I should occupy his place on review--although I had no
intention then of remaining in the army.  My experience in a horse-trade
ten years before, and the ridicule it caused me, were too fresh in my
mind for me to communicate this presentiment to even my most intimate
chum.  The next summer Martin Van Buren, then President of the United
States, visited West Point and reviewed the cadets; he did not impress
me with the awe which Scott had inspired.  In fact I regarded General
Scott and Captain C. F. Smith, the Commandant of Cadets, as the two men
most to be envied in the nation.  I retained a high regard for both up
to the day of their death.

The last two years wore away more rapidly than the first two, but they
still seemed about five times as long as Ohio years, to me.  At last all
the examinations were passed, and the members of the class were called
upon to record their choice of arms of service and regiments.  I was
anxious to enter the cavalry, or dragoons as they were then called, but
there was only one regiment of dragoons in the Army at that time, and
attached to that, besides the full complement of officers, there were at
least four brevet second lieutenants.  I recorded therefore my first
choice, dragoons; second, 4th infantry; and got the latter.  Again there
was a furlough--or, more properly speaking, leave of absence for the
class were now commissioned officers--this time to the end of September.
Again I went to Ohio to spend my vacation among my old school-mates; and
again I found a fine saddle horse purchased for my special use, besides
a horse and buggy that I could drive--but I was not in a physical
condition to enjoy myself quite as well as on the former occasion.  For
six months before graduation I had had a desperate cough ("Tyler's grip"
it was called), and I was very much reduced, weighing but one hundred
and seventeen pounds, just my weight at entrance, though I had grown six
inches in stature in the mean time.  There was consumption in my
father's family, two of his brothers having died of that disease, which
made my symptoms more alarming.  The brother and sister next younger
than myself died, during the rebellion, of the same disease, and I
seemed the most promising subject for it of the three in 1843.

Having made alternate choice of two different arms of service with
different uniforms, I could not get a uniform suit until notified of my
assignment.  I left my measurement with a tailor, with directions not to
make the uniform until I notified him whether it was to be for infantry
or dragoons.  Notice did not reach me for several weeks, and then it
took at least a week to get the letter of instructions to the tailor and
two more to make the clothes and have them sent to me.  This was a time
of great suspense.  I was impatient to get on my uniform and see how it
looked, and probably wanted my old school-mates, particularly the girls,
to see me in it.

The conceit was knocked out of me by two little circumstances that
happened soon after the arrival of the clothes, which gave me a distaste
for military uniform that I never recovered from.  Soon after the
arrival of the suit I donned it, and put off for Cincinnati on
horseback.  While I was riding along a street of that city, imagining
that every one was looking at me, with a feeling akin to mine when I
first saw General Scott, a little urchin, bareheaded, footed, with dirty
and ragged pants held up by bare a single gallows--that's what
suspenders were called then--and a shirt that had not seen a wash-tub
for weeks, turned to me and cried:  "Soldier! will you work?  No,
sir--ee; I'll sell my shirt first!!" The horse trade and its dire
consequences were recalled to mind.

The other circumstance occurred at home.  Opposite our house in Bethel
stood the old stage tavern where "man and beast" found accommodation,
The stable-man was rather dissipated, but possessed of some humor.  On
my return I found him parading the streets, and attending in the stable,
barefooted, but in a pair of sky-blue nankeen pantaloons--just the color
of my uniform trousers--with a strip of white cotton sheeting sewed down
the outside seams in imitation of mine.  The joke was a huge one in the
mind of many of the people, and was much enjoyed by them; but I did not
appreciate it so highly.

During the remainder of my leave of absence, my time was spent in
visiting friends in Georgetown and Cincinnati, and occasionally other
towns in that part of the State.



CHAPTER III.

ARMY LIFE--CAUSES OF THE MEXICAN WAR--CAMP SALUBRITY.

On the 30th of September I reported for duty at Jefferson Barracks, St.
Louis, with the 4th United States infantry.  It was the largest military
post in the country at that time, being garrisoned by sixteen companies
of infantry, eight of the 3d regiment, the remainder of the 4th.
Colonel Steven Kearney, one of the ablest officers of the day, commanded
the post, and under him discipline was kept at a high standard, but
without vexatious rules or regulations.  Every drill and roll-call had
to be attended, but in the intervals officers were permitted to enjoy
themselves, leaving the garrison, and going where they pleased, without
making written application to state where they were going for how long,
etc., so that they were back for their next duty.  It did seem to me, in
my early army days, that too many of the older officers, when they came
to command posts, made it a study to think what orders they could
publish to annoy their subordinates and render them uncomfortable.  I
noticed, however, a few years later, when the Mexican war broke out,
that most of this class of officers discovered they were possessed of
disabilities which entirely incapacitated them for active field service.
They had the moral courage to proclaim it, too.  They were right; but
they did not always give their disease the right name.

At West Point I had a class-mate--in the last year of our studies he was
room-mate also--F. T. Dent, whose family resided some five miles west of
Jefferson Barracks.  Two of his unmarried brothers were living at home
at that time, and as I had taken with me from Ohio, my horse, saddle and
bridle, I soon found my way out to White Haven, the name of the Dent
estate.  As I found the family congenial my visits became frequent.
There were at home, besides the young men, two daughters, one a school
miss of fifteen, the other a girl of eight or nine.  There was still an
older daughter of seventeen, who had been spending several years at
boarding-school in St. Louis, but who, though through school, had not
yet returned home.  She was spending the winter in the city with
connections, the family of Colonel John O'Fallon, well known in St.
Louis.  In February she returned to her country home.  After that I do
not know but my visits became more frequent; they certainly did become
more enjoyable.  We would often take walks, or go on horseback to visit
the neighbors, until I became quite well acquainted in that vicinity.
Sometimes one of the brothers would accompany us, sometimes one of the
younger sisters.  If the 4th infantry had remained at Jefferson Barracks
it is possible, even probable, that this life might have continued for
some years without my finding out that there was anything serious the
matter with me; but in the following May a circumstance occurred which
developed my sentiment so palpably that there was no mistaking it.

The annexation of Texas was at this time the subject of violent
discussion in Congress, in the press, and by individuals.  The
administration of President Tyler, then in power, was making the most
strenuous efforts to effect the annexation, which was, indeed, the great
and absorbing question of the day.  During these discussions the greater
part of the single rifle regiment in the army--the 2d dragoons, which
had been dismounted a year or two before, and designated "Dismounted
Rifles"--was stationed at Fort Jessup, Louisiana, some twenty-five miles
east of the Texas line, to observe the frontier.  About the 1st of May
the 3d infantry was ordered from Jefferson Barracks to Louisiana, to go
into camp in the neighborhood of Fort Jessup, and there await further
orders.  The troops were embarked on steamers and were on their way down
the Mississippi within a few days after the receipt of this order.
About the time they started I obtained a leave of absence for twenty
days to go to Ohio to visit my parents.  I was obliged to go to St.
Louis to take a steamer for Louisville or Cincinnati, or the first
steamer going up the Ohio River to any point.  Before I left St. Louis
orders were received at Jefferson Barracks for the 4th infantry to
follow the 3d.  A messenger was sent after me to stop my leaving; but
before he could reach me I was off, totally ignorant of these events.  A
day or two after my arrival at Bethel I received a letter from a
classmate and fellow lieutenant in the 4th, informing me of the
circumstances related above, and advising me not to open any letter post
marked St. Louis or Jefferson Barracks, until the expiration of my
leave, and saying that he would pack up my things and take them along
for me.  His advice was not necessary, for no other letter was sent to
me.  I now discovered that I was exceedingly anxious to get back to
Jefferson Barracks, and I understood the reason without explanation from
any one.  My leave of absence required me to report for duty, at
Jefferson Barracks, at the end of twenty days.  I knew my regiment had
gone up the Red River, but I was not disposed to break the letter of my
leave; besides, if I had proceeded to Louisiana direct, I could not have
reached there until after the expiration of my leave.  Accordingly, at
the end of the twenty days, I reported for duty to Lieutenant Ewell,
commanding at Jefferson Barracks, handing him at the same time my leave
of absence.  After noticing the phraseology of the order--leaves of
absence were generally worded, "at the end of which time he will report
for duty with his proper command"--he said he would give me an order to
join my regiment in Louisiana.  I then asked for a few days' leave
before starting, which he readily granted.  This was the same Ewell who
acquired considerable reputation as a Confederate general during the
rebellion.  He was a man much esteemed, and deservedly so, in the old
army, and proved himself a gallant and efficient officer in two wars
--both in my estimation unholy.

I immediately procured a horse and started for the country, taking no
baggage with me, of course.  There is an insignificant creek--the
Gravois--between Jefferson Barracks and the place to which I was going,
and at that day there was not a bridge over it from its source to its
mouth.  There is not water enough in the creek at ordinary stages to run
a coffee mill, and at low water there is none running whatever.  On this
occasion it had been raining heavily, and, when the creek was reached, I
found the banks full to overflowing, and the current rapid.  I looked at
it a moment to consider what to do.  One of my superstitions had always
been when I started to go any where, or to do anything, not to turn
back, or stop until the thing intended was accomplished.  I have
frequently started to go to places where I had never been and to which I
did not know the way, depending upon making inquiries on the road, and
if I got past the place without knowing it, instead of turning back, I
would go on until a road was found turning in the right direction, take
that, and come in by the other side.  So I struck into the stream, and
in an instant the horse was swimming and I being carried down by the
current.  I headed the horse towards the other bank and soon reached it,
wet through and without other clothes on that side of the stream.  I
went on, however, to my destination and borrowed a dry suit from my
--future--brother-in-law.  We were not of the same size, but the clothes
answered every purpose until I got more of my own.

Before I returned I mustered up courage to make known, in the most
awkward manner imaginable, the discovery I had made on learning that the
4th infantry had been ordered away from Jefferson Barracks.  The young
lady afterwards admitted that she too, although until then she had never
looked upon me other than as a visitor whose company was agreeable to
her, had experienced a depression of spirits she could not account for
when the regiment left.  Before separating it was definitely understood
that at a convenient time we would join our fortunes, and not let the
removal of a regiment trouble us.  This was in May, 1844.  It was the
22d of August, 1848, before the fulfilment of this agreement.  My duties
kept me on the frontier of Louisiana with the Army of Observation during
the pendency of Annexation; and afterwards I was absent through the war
with Mexico, provoked by the action of the army, if not by the
annexation itself. During that time there was a constant correspondence
between Miss Dent and myself, but we only met once in the period of four
years and three months.  In May, 1845, I procured a leave for twenty
days, visited St. Louis, and obtained the consent of the parents for the
union, which had not been asked for before.

As already stated, it was never my intention to remain in the army long,
but to prepare myself for a professorship in some college.  Accordingly,
soon after I was settled at Jefferson Barracks, I wrote a letter to
Professor Church--Professor of Mathematics at West Point--requesting him
to ask my designation as his assistant, when next a detail had to be
made. Assistant professors at West Point are all officers of the army,
supposed to be selected for their special fitness for the particular
branch of study they are assigned to teach.  The answer from Professor
Church was entirely satisfactory, and no doubt I should have been
detailed a year or two later but for the Mexican War coming on.
Accordingly I laid out for myself a course of studies to be pursued in
garrison, with regularity, if not persistency.  I reviewed my West Point
course of mathematics during the seven months at Jefferson Barracks, and
read many valuable historical works, besides an occasional novel.  To
help my memory I kept a book in which I would write up, from time to
time, my recollections of all I had read since last posting it.  When
the regiment was ordered away, I being absent at the time, my effects
were packed up by Lieutenant Haslett, of the 4th infantry, and taken
along.  I never saw my journal after, nor did I ever keep another,
except for a portion of the time while travelling abroad.  Often since a
fear has crossed my mind lest that book might turn up yet, and fall into
the hands of some malicious person who would publish it.  I know its
appearance would cause me as much heart-burning as my youthful
horse-trade, or the later rebuke for wearing uniform clothes.

The 3d infantry had selected camping grounds on the reservation at Fort
Jessup, about midway between the Red River and the Sabine.  Our orders
required us to go into camp in the same neighborhood, and await further
instructions.  Those authorized to do so selected a place in the pine
woods, between the old town of Natchitoches and Grand Ecore, about three
miles from each, and on high ground back from the river.  The place was
given the name of Camp Salubrity, and proved entitled to it. The camp
was on a high, sandy, pine ridge, with spring branches in the valley, in
front and rear.  The springs furnished an abundance of cool, pure water,
and the ridge was above the flight of mosquitoes, which abound in that
region in great multitudes and of great voracity.  In the valley they
swarmed in myriads, but never came to the summit of the ridge.  The
regiment occupied this camp six months before the first death occurred,
and that was caused by an accident.

There was no intimation given that the removal of the 3d and 4th
regiments of infantry to the western border of Louisiana was occasioned
in any way by the prospective annexation of Texas, but it was generally
understood that such was the case. Ostensibly we were intended to
prevent filibustering into Texas, but really as a menace to Mexico in
case she appeared to contemplate war.  Generally the officers of the
army were indifferent whether the annexation was consummated or not; but
not so all of them.  For myself, I was bitterly opposed to the measure,
and to this day regard the war, which resulted, as one of the most
unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation.  It was an
instance of a republic following the bad example of European monarchies,
in not considering justice in their desire to acquire additional
territory.  Texas was originally a state belonging to the republic of
Mexico.  It extended from the Sabine River on the east to the Rio Grande
on the west, and from the Gulf of Mexico on the south and east to the
territory of the United States and New Mexico--another Mexican state at
that time--on the north and west.  An empire in territory, it had but a
very sparse population, until settled by Americans who had received
authority from Mexico to colonize. These colonists paid very little
attention to the supreme government, and introduced slavery into the
state almost from the start, though the constitution of Mexico did not,
nor does it now, sanction that institution.  Soon they set up an
independent government of their own, and war existed, between Texas and
Mexico, in name from that time until 1836, when active hostilities very
nearly ceased upon the capture of Santa Anna, the Mexican President.
Before long, however, the same people--who with permission of Mexico had
colonized Texas, and afterwards set up slavery there, and then seceded
as soon as they felt strong enough to do so--offered themselves and the
State to the United States, and in 1845 their offer was accepted.  The
occupation, separation and annexation were, from the inception of the
movement to its final consummation, a conspiracy to acquire territory
out of which slave states might be formed for the American Union.

Even if the annexation itself could be justified, the manner in which
the subsequent war was forced upon Mexico cannot.  The fact is,
annexationists wanted more territory than they could possibly lay any
claim to, as part of the new acquisition. Texas, as an independent
State, never had exercised jurisdiction over the territory between the
Nueces River and the Rio Grande. Mexico had never recognized the
independence of Texas, and maintained that, even if independent, the
State had no claim south of the Nueces.  I am aware that a treaty, made
by the Texans with Santa Anna while he was under duress, ceded all the
territory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande--, but he was a prisoner
of war when the treaty was made, and his life was in jeopardy.  He knew,
too, that he deserved execution at the hands of the Texans, if they
should ever capture him.  The Texans, if they had taken his life, would
have only followed the example set by Santa Anna himself a few years
before, when he executed the entire garrison of the Alamo and the
villagers of Goliad.

In taking military possession of Texas after annexation, the army of
occupation, under General Taylor, was directed to occupy the disputed
territory.  The army did not stop at the Nueces and offer to negotiate
for a settlement of the boundary question, but went beyond, apparently
in order to force Mexico to initiate war.  It is to the credit of the
American nation, however, that after conquering Mexico, and while
practically holding the country in our possession, so that we could have
retained the whole of it, or made any terms we chose, we paid a round
sum for the additional territory taken; more than it was worth, or was
likely to be, to Mexico.  To us it was an empire and of incalculable
value; but it might have been obtained by other means.  The Southern
rebellion was largely the outgrowth of the Mexican war.  Nations, like
individuals, are punished for their transgressions.  We got our
punishment in the most sanguinary and expensive war of modern times.

The 4th infantry went into camp at Salubrity in the month of May, 1844,
with instructions, as I have said, to await further orders.  At first,
officers and men occupied ordinary tents.  As the summer heat increased
these were covered by sheds to break the rays of the sun.  The summer
was whiled away in social enjoyments among the officers, in visiting
those stationed at, and near, Fort Jessup, twenty-five miles away,
visiting the planters on the Red River, and the citizens of Natchitoches
and Grand Ecore.  There was much pleasant intercourse between the
inhabitants and the officers of the army.  I retain very agreeable
recollections of my stay at Camp Salubrity, and of the acquaintances
made there, and no doubt my feeling is shared by the few officers living
who were there at the time.  I can call to mind only two officers of the
4th infantry, besides myself, who were at Camp Salubrity with the
regiment, who are now alive.

With a war in prospect, and belonging to a regiment that had an unusual
number of officers detailed on special duty away from the regiment, my
hopes of being ordered to West Point as instructor vanished.  At the
time of which I now write, officers in the quartermaster's, commissary's
and adjutant--general's departments were appointed from the line of the
army, and did not vacate their regimental commissions until their
regimental and staff commissions were for the same grades.  Generally
lieutenants were appointed to captaincies to fill vacancies in the staff
corps.  If they should reach a captaincy in the line before they arrived
at a majority in the staff, they would elect which commission they would
retain.  In the 4th infantry, in 1844, at least six line officers were
on duty in the staff, and therefore permanently detached from the
regiment.  Under these circumstances I gave up everything like a special
course of reading, and only read thereafter for my own amusement, and
not very much for that, until the war was over.  I kept a horse and
rode, and staid out of doors most of the time by day, and entirely
recovered from the cough which I had carried from West Point, and from
all indications of consumption.  I have often thought that my life was
saved, and my health restored, by exercise and exposure, enforced by an
administrative act, and a war, both of which I disapproved.

As summer wore away, and cool days and colder nights came upon us, the
tents. We were occupying ceased to afford comfortable quarters; and
"further orders" not reaching us, we began to look about to remedy the
hardship.  Men were put to work getting out timber to build huts, and in
a very short time all were comfortably housed--privates as well as
officers.  The outlay by the government in accomplishing this was
nothing, or nearly nothing.  The winter was spent more agreeably than
the summer had been.  There were occasional parties given by the
planters along the "coast"--as the bottom lands on the Red River were
called.  The climate was delightful.

Near the close of the short session of Congress of 1844-5, the bill for
the annexation of Texas to the United States was passed.  It reached
President Tyler on the 1st of March, 1845, and promptly received his
approval.  When the news reached us we began to look again for "further
orders."  They did not arrive promptly, and on the 1st of May following
I asked and obtained a leave of absence for twenty days, for the purpose
of visiting--St. Louis.  The object of this visit has been before
stated.

Early in July the long expected orders were received, but they only took
the regiment to New Orleans Barracks.  We reached there before the
middle of the month, and again waited weeks for still further orders.
The yellow fever was raging in New Orleans during the time we remained
there, and the streets of the city had the appearance of a continuous
well-observed Sunday.  I recollect but one occasion when this observance
seemed to be broken by the inhabitants.  One morning about daylight I
happened to be awake, and, hearing the discharge of a rifle not far off,
I looked out to ascertain where the sound came from.  I observed a
couple of clusters of men near by, and learned afterwards that "it was
nothing; only a couple of gentlemen deciding a difference of opinion
with rifles, at twenty paces."  I do not remember if either was killed,
or even hurt, but no doubt the question of difference was settled
satisfactorily, and "honorably," in the estimation of the parties
engaged.  I do not believe I ever would have the courage to fight a
duel.  If any man should wrong me to the extent of my being willing to
kill him, I would not be willing to give him the choice of weapons with
which it should be done, and of the time, place and distance separating
us, when I executed him.  If I should do another such a wrong as to
justify him in killing me, I would make any reasonable atonement within
my power, if convinced of the wrong done.  I place my opposition to
duelling on higher grounds than here stated.  No doubt a majority of the
duels fought have been for want of moral courage on the part of those
engaged to decline.

At Camp Salubrity, and when we went to New Orleans Barracks, the 4th
infantry was commanded by Colonel Vose, then an old gentleman who had
not commanded on drill for a number of years.  He was not a man to
discover infirmity in the presence of danger.  It now appeared that war
was imminent, and he felt that it was his duty to brush up his tactics.
Accordingly, when we got settled down at our new post, he took command
of the regiment at a battalion drill.  Only two or three evolutions had
been gone through when he dismissed the battalion, and, turning to go to
his own quarters, dropped dead.  He had not been complaining of ill
health, but no doubt died of heart disease.  He was a most estimable
man, of exemplary habits, and by no means the author of his own disease.



CHAPTER IV.

CORPUS CHRISTI--MEXICAN SMUGGLING--SPANISH RULE IN MEXICO--SUPPLYING
TRANSPORTATION.

Early in September the regiment left New Orleans for Corpus Christi, now
in Texas.  Ocean steamers were not then common, and the passage was made
in sailing vessels.  At that time there was not more than three feet of
water in the channel at the outlet of Corpus Christi Bay; the
debarkation, therefore, had to take place by small steamers, and at an
island in the channel called Shell Island, the ships anchoring some
miles out from shore. This made the work slow, and as the army was only
supplied with one or two steamers, it took a number of days to effect
the landing of a single regiment with its stores, camp and garrison
equipage, etc.  There happened to be pleasant weather while this was
going on, but the land-swell was so great that when the ship and steamer
were on opposite sides of the same wave they would be at considerable
distance apart.  The men and baggage were let down to a point higher
than the lower deck of the steamer, and when ship and steamer got into
the trough between the waves, and were close together, the load would be
drawn over the steamer and rapidly run down until it rested on the deck.

After I had gone ashore, and had been on guard several days at Shell
Island, quite six miles from the ship, I had occasion for some reason or
other to return on board.  While on the Suviah--I think that was the
name of our vessel--I heard a tremendous racket at the other end of the
ship, and much and excited sailor language, such as "damn your eyes,"
etc.  In a moment or two the captain, who was an excitable little man,
dying with consumption, and not weighing much over a hundred pounds,
came running out, carrying a sabre nearly as large and as heavy as he
was, and crying, that his men had mutinied.  It was necessary to sustain
the captain without question, and in a few minutes all the sailors
charged with mutiny were in irons.  I rather felt for a time a wish that
I had not gone aboard just then.  As the men charged with mutiny
submitted to being placed in irons without resistance, I always doubted
if they knew that they had mutinied until they were told.

By the time I was ready to leave the ship again I thought I had learned
enough of the working of the double and single pulley, by which
passengers were let down from the upper deck of the ship to the steamer
below, and determined to let myself down without assistance.  Without
saying anything of my intentions to any one, I mounted the railing, and
taking hold of the centre rope, just below the upper block, I put one
foot on the hook below the lower block, and stepped off just as I did so
some one called out "hold on."  It was too late.  I tried to "hold on"
with all my might, but my heels went up, and my head went down so
rapidly that my hold broke, and I plunged head foremost into the water,
some twenty-five feet below, with such velocity that it seemed to me I
never would stop.  When I came to the surface again, being a fair
swimmer, and not having lost my presence of mind, I swam around until a
bucket was let down for me, and I was drawn up without a scratch or
injury. I do not believe there was a man on board who sympathized with
me in the least when they found me uninjured.  I rather enjoyed the joke
myself. The captain of the Suviah died of his disease a few months later,
and I believe before the mutineers were tried.  I hope they got clear,
because, as before stated, I always thought the mutiny was all in the
brain of a very weak and sick man.

After reaching shore, or Shell Island, the labor of getting to Corpus
Christi was slow and tedious.  There was, if my memory serves me, but
one small steamer to transport troops and baggage when the 4th infantry
arrived.  Others were procured later.  The distance from Shell Island to
Corpus Christi was some sixteen or eighteen miles.  The channel to the
bay was so shallow that the steamer, small as it was, had to be dragged
over the bottom when loaded.  Not more than one trip a day could be
effected.  Later this was remedied, by deepening the channel and
increasing the number of vessels suitable to its navigation.

Corpus Christi is near the head of the bay of the same name, formed by
the entrance of the Nueces River into tide-water, and is on the west
bank of that bay.  At the time of its first occupancy by United States
troops there was a small Mexican hamlet there, containing probably less
than one hundred souls. There was, in addition, a small American trading
post, at which goods were sold to Mexican smugglers.  All goods were put
up in compact packages of about one hundred pounds each, suitable for
loading on pack mules.  Two of these packages made a load for an
ordinary Mexican mule, and three for the larger ones.  The bulk of the
trade was in leaf tobacco, and domestic cotton-cloths and calicoes.  The
Mexicans had, before the arrival of the army, but little to offer in
exchange except silver.  The trade in tobacco was enormous, considering
the population to be supplied.  Almost every Mexican above the age of
ten years, and many much younger, smoked the cigarette.  Nearly every
Mexican carried a pouch of leaf tobacco, powdered by rolling in the
hands, and a roll of corn husks to make wrappers.  The cigarettes were
made by the smokers as they used them.

Up to the time of which I write, and for years afterwards--I think until
the administration of President Juarez--the cultivation, manufacture and
sale of tobacco constituted a government monopoly, and paid the bulk of
the revenue collected from internal sources.  The price was enormously
high, and made successful smuggling very profitable.  The difficulty of
obtaining tobacco is probably the reason why everybody, male and female,
used it at that time.  I know from my own experience that when I was at
West Point, the fact that tobacco, in every form, was prohibited, and
the mere possession of the weed severely punished, made the majority of
the cadets, myself included, try to acquire the habit of using it.  I
failed utterly at the time and for many years afterward; but the
majority accomplished the object of their youthful ambition.

Under Spanish rule Mexico was prohibited from producing anything that
the mother-country could supply.  This rule excluded the cultivation of
the grape, olive and many other articles to which the soil and climate
were well adapted.  The country was governed for "revenue only;" and
tobacco, which cannot be raised in Spain, but is indigenous to Mexico,
offered a fine instrumentality for securing this prime object of
government.  The native population had been in the habit of using "the
weed" from a period, back of any recorded history of this continent.
Bad habits--if not restrained by law or public opinion--spread more
rapidly and universally than good ones, and the Spanish colonists
adopted the use of tobacco almost as generally as the natives.  Spain,
therefore, in order to secure the largest revenue from this source,
prohibited the cultivation, except in specified localities--and in these
places farmed out the privilege at a very high price.  The tobacco when
raised could only be sold to the government, and the price to the
consumer was limited only by the avarice of the authorities, and the
capacity of the people to pay.

All laws for the government of the country were enacted in Spain, and
the officers for their execution were appointed by the Crown, and sent
out to the New El Dorado.  The Mexicans had been brought up ignorant of
how to legislate or how to rule. When they gained their independence,
after many years of war, it was the most natural thing in the world that
they should adopt as their own the laws then in existence.  The only
change was, that Mexico became her own executor of the laws and the
recipient of the revenues.  The tobacco tax, yielding so large a revenue
under the law as it stood, was one of the last, if not the very last, of
the obnoxious imposts to be repealed.  Now, the citizens are allowed to
cultivate any crops the soil will yield.  Tobacco is cheap, and every
quality can be produced. Its use is by no means so general as when I
first visited the country.

Gradually the "Army of Occupation" assembled at Corpus Christi.  When it
was all together it consisted of seven companies of the 2d regiment of
dragoons, four companies of light artillery, five regiments of infantry
--the 3d, 4th, 5th, 7th and 8th--and one regiment of artillery acting as
infantry--not more than three thousand men in all.  General Zachary
Taylor commanded the whole.  There were troops enough in one body to
establish a drill and discipline sufficient to fit men and officers for
all they were capable of in case of battle.  The rank and file were
composed of men who had enlisted in time of peace, to serve for seven
dollars a month, and were necessarily inferior as material to the
average volunteers enlisted later in the war expressly to fight, and
also to the volunteers in the war for the preservation of the Union.
The men engaged in the Mexican war were brave, and the officers of the
regular army, from highest to lowest, were educated in their profession.
A more efficient army for its number and armament, I do not believe ever
fought a battle than the one commanded by General Taylor in his first
two engagements on Mexican--or Texan soil.

The presence of United States troops on the edge of the disputed
territory furthest from the Mexican settlements, was not sufficient to
provoke hostilities.  We were sent to provoke a fight, but it was
essential that Mexico should commence it.  It was very doubtful whether
Congress would declare war; but if Mexico should attack our troops, the
Executive could announce, "Whereas, war exists by the acts of, etc.,"
and prosecute the contest with vigor.  Once initiated there were but few
public men who would have the courage to oppose it.  Experience proves
that the man who obstructs a war in which his nation is engaged, no
matter whether right or wrong, occupies no enviable place in life or
history.  Better for him, individually, to advocate "war, pestilence,
and famine," than to act as obstructionist to a war already begun.  The
history of the defeated rebel will be honorable hereafter, compared with
that of the Northern man who aided him by conspiring against his
government while protected by it.  The most favorable posthumous history
the stay-at-home traitor can hope for is--oblivion.

Mexico showing no willingness to come to the Nueces to drive the
invaders from her soil, it became necessary for the "invaders" to
approach to within a convenient distance to be struck. Accordingly,
preparations were begun for moving the army to the Rio Grande, to a
point near Matamoras.  It was desirable to occupy a position near the
largest centre of population possible to reach, without absolutely
invading territory to which we set up no claim whatever.

The distance from Corpus Christi to Matamoras is about one hundred and
fifty miles.  The country does not abound in fresh water, and the length
of the marches had to be regulated by the distance between water
supplies.  Besides the streams, there were occasional pools, filled
during the rainy season, some probably made by the traders, who
travelled constantly between Corpus Christi and the Rio Grande, and some
by the buffalo. There was not at that time a single habitation,
cultivated field, or herd of domestic animals, between Corpus Christi
and Matamoras.  It was necessary, therefore, to have a wagon train
sufficiently large to transport the camp and garrison equipage,
officers' baggage, rations for the army, and part rations of grain for
the artillery horses and all the animals taken from the north, where
they had been accustomed to having their forage furnished them.  The
army was but indifferently supplied with transportation.  Wagons and
harness could easily be supplied from the north but mules and horses
could not so readily be brought.  The American traders and Mexican
smugglers came to the relief.  Contracts were made for mules at from
eight to eleven dollars each.  The smugglers furnished the animals, and
took their pay in goods of the description before mentioned.  I doubt
whether the Mexicans received in value from the traders five dollars per
head for the animals they furnished, and still more, whether they paid
anything but their own time in procuring them.  Such is trade; such is
war.  The government paid in hard cash to the contractor the stipulated
price.

Between the Rio Grande and the Nueces there was at that time a large
band of wild horses feeding; as numerous, probably, as the band of
buffalo roaming further north was before its rapid extermination
commenced.  The Mexicans used to capture these in large numbers and
bring them into the American settlements and sell them.  A picked animal
could be purchased at from eight to twelve dollars, but taken at
wholesale, they could be bought for thirty-six dollars a dozen.  Some of
these were purchased for the army, and answered a most useful purpose.
The horses were generally very strong, formed much like the Norman
horse, and with very heavy manes and tails.  A number of officers
supplied themselves with these, and they generally rendered as useful
service as the northern animal in fact they were much better when
grazing was the only means of supplying forage.

There was no need for haste, and some months were consumed in the
necessary preparations for a move.  In the meantime the army was engaged
in all the duties pertaining to the officer and the soldier.  Twice,
that I remember, small trains were sent from Corpus Christi, with
cavalry escorts, to San Antonio and Austin, with paymasters and funds to
pay off small detachments of troops stationed at those places.  General
Taylor encouraged officers to accompany these expeditions.  I
accompanied one of them in December, 1845.  The distance from Corpus
Christi to San Antonio was then computed at one hundred and fifty miles.
Now that roads exist it is probably less.  From San Antonio to Austin we
computed the distance at one hundred and ten miles, and from the latter
place back to Corpus Christi at over two hundred miles.  I know the
distance now from San Antonio to Austin is but little over eighty miles,
so that our computation was probably too high.

There was not at the time an individual living between Corpus Christi
and San Antonio until within about thirty miles of the latter point,
where there were a few scattering Mexican settlements along the San
Antonio River.  The people in at least one of these hamlets lived
underground for protection against the Indians.  The country abounded in
game, such as deer and antelope, with abundance of wild turkeys along
the streams and where there were nut-bearing woods.  On the Nueces,
about twenty-five miles up from Corpus Christi, were a few log cabins,
the remains of a town called San Patricio, but the inhabitants had all
been massacred by the Indians, or driven away.

San Antonio was about equally divided in population between Americans
and Mexicans.  From there to Austin there was not a single residence
except at New Braunfels, on the Guadalupe River.  At that point was a
settlement of Germans who had only that year come into the State.  At
all events they were living in small huts, about such as soldiers would
hastily construct for temporary occupation.  From Austin to Corpus
Christi there was only a small settlement at Bastrop, with a few farms
along the Colorado River; but after leaving that, there were no
settlements except the home of one man, with one female slave, at the
old town of Goliad.  Some of the houses were still standing.  Goliad had
been quite a village for the period and region, but some years before
there had been a Mexican massacre, in which every inhabitant had been
killed or driven away.  This, with the massacre of the prisoners in the
Alamo, San Antonio, about the same time, more than three hundred men in
all, furnished the strongest justification the Texans had for carrying
on the war with so much cruelty.  In fact, from that time until the
Mexican war, the hostilities between Texans and Mexicans was so great
that neither was safe in the neighborhood of the other who might be in
superior numbers or possessed of superior arms.  The man we found living
there seemed like an old friend; he had come from near Fort Jessup,
Louisiana, where the officers of the 3d and 4th infantry and the 2d
dragoons had known him and his family.  He had emigrated in advance of
his family to build up a home for them.



CHAPTER V.

TRIP TO AUSTIN--PROMOTION TO FULL SECOND LIEUTENANT--ARMY OF OCCUPATION.

When our party left Corpus Christi it was quite large, including the
cavalry escort, Paymaster, Major Dix, his clerk and the officers who,
like myself, were simply on leave; but all the officers on leave, except
Lieutenant Benjamin--afterwards killed in the valley of Mexico
--Lieutenant, now General, Augur, and myself, concluded to spend their
allotted time at San Antonio and return from there.  We were all to be
back at Corpus Christi by the end of the month.  The paymaster was
detained in Austin so long that, if we had waited for him, we would have
exceeded our leave.  We concluded, therefore, to start back at once with
the animals we had, and having to rely principally on grass for their
food, it was a good six days' journey.  We had to sleep on the prairie
every night, except at Goliad, and possibly one night on the Colorado,
without shelter and with only such food as we carried with us, and
prepared ourselves.  The journey was hazardous on account of Indians,
and there were white men in Texas whom I would not have cared to meet in
a secluded place. Lieutenant Augur was taken seriously sick before we
reached Goliad and at a distance from any habitation.  To add to the
complication, his horse--a mustang that had probably been captured from
the band of wild horses before alluded to, and of undoubted longevity at
his capture--gave out. It was absolutely necessary to get for ward to
Goliad to find a shelter for our sick companion.  By dint of patience
and exceedingly slow movements, Goliad was at last reached, and a
shelter and bed secured for our patient.  We remained over a day, hoping
that Augur might recover sufficiently to resume his travels.  He did
not, however, and knowing that Major Dix would be along in a few days,
with his wagon-train, now empty, and escort, we arranged with our
Louisiana friend to take the best of care of the sick lieutenant until
thus relieved, and went on.

I had never been a sportsman in my life; had scarcely ever gone in
search of game, and rarely seen any when looking for it.  On this trip
there was no minute of time while travelling between San Patricio and
the settlements on the San Antonio River, from San Antonio to Austin,
and again from the Colorado River back to San Patricio, when deer or
antelope could not be seen in great numbers. Each officer carried a
shot-gun, and every evening, after going into camp, some would go out
and soon return with venison and wild turkeys enough for the entire
camp.  I, however, never went out, and had no occasion to fire my gun;
except, being detained over a day at Goliad, Benjamin and I concluded to
go down to the creek--which was fringed with timber, much of it the
pecan--and bring back a few turkeys.  We had scarcely reached the edge
of the timber when I heard the flutter of wings overhead, and in an
instant I saw two or three turkeys flying away.  These were soon
followed by more, then more, and more, until a flock of twenty or thirty
had left from just over my head.  All this time I stood watching the
turkeys to see where they flew--with my gun on my shoulder, and never
once thought of levelling it at the birds.  When I had time to reflect
upon the matter, I came to the conclusion that as a sportsman I was a
failure, and went back to the house.  Benjamin remained out, and got as
many turkeys as he wanted to carry back.

After the second night at Goliad, Benjamin and I started to make the
remainder of the journey alone.  We reached Corpus Christi just in time
to avoid "absence without leave."  We met no one not even an Indian
--during the remainder of our journey, except at San Patricio.  A new
settlement had been started there in our absence of three weeks, induced
possibly by the fact that there were houses already built, while the
proximity of troops gave protection against the Indians.  On the evening
of the first day out from Goliad we heard the most unearthly howling of
wolves, directly in our front.  The prairie grass was tall and we could
not see the beasts, but the sound indicated that they were near.  To my
ear it appeared that there must have been enough of them to devour our
party, horses and all, at a single meal.  The part of Ohio that I hailed
from was not thickly settled, but wolves had been driven out long before
I left.  Benjamin was from Indiana, still less populated, where the wolf
yet roamed over the prairies.  He understood the nature of the animal
and the capacity of a few to make believe there was an unlimited number
of them.  He kept on towards the noise, unmoved.  I followed in his
trail, lacking moral courage to turn back and join our sick companion.
I have no doubt that if Benjamin had proposed returning to Goliad, I
would not only have "seconded the motion" but have suggested that it
was very hard-hearted in us to leave Augur sick there in the first
place; but Benjamin did not propose turning back.  When he did speak it
was to ask: "Grant, how many wolves do you think there are in that
pack?" Knowing where he was from, and suspecting that he thought I would
over-estimate the number, I determined to show my acquaintance with the
animal by putting the estimate below what possibly could be correct, and
answered:  "Oh, about twenty," very indifferently.  He smiled and rode
on.  In a minute we were close upon them, and before they saw us.  There
were just TWO of them.  Seated upon their haunches, with their mouths
close together, they had made all the noise we had been hearing for the
past ten minutes.  I have often thought of this incident since when I
have heard the noise of a few disappointed politicians who had deserted
their associates.  There are always more of them before they are
counted.

A week or two before leaving Corpus Christi on this trip, I had been
promoted from brevet second-lieutenant, 4th infantry, to full
second-lieutenant, 7th infantry.  Frank Gardner,(*1) of the 7th, was
promoted to the 4th in the same orders.  We immediately made application
to be transferred, so as to get back to our old regiments.  On my
return, I found that our application had been approved at Washington.
While in the 7th infantry I was in the company of Captain Holmes,
afterwards a Lieutenant-general in the Confederate army. I never came in
contact with him in the war of the Rebellion, nor did he render any very
conspicuous service in his high rank.  My transfer carried me to the
company of Captain McCall, who resigned from the army after the Mexican
war and settled in Philadelphia.  He was prompt, however, to volunteer
when the rebellion broke out, and soon rose to the rank of major-general
in the Union army.  I was not fortunate enough to meet him after he
resigned. In the old army he was esteemed very highly as a soldier and
gentleman. Our relations were always most pleasant.

The preparations at Corpus Christi for an advance progressed as rapidly
in the absence of some twenty or more lieutenants as if we had been
there.  The principal business consisted in securing mules, and getting
them broken to harness.  The process was slow but amusing.  The animals
sold to the government were all young and unbroken, even to the saddle,
and were quite as wild as the wild horses of the prairie.  Usually a
number would be brought in by a company of Mexicans, partners in the
delivery.  The mules were first driven into a stockade, called a corral,
inclosing an acre or more of ground.  The Mexicans,--who were all
experienced in throwing the lasso,--would go into the corral on
horseback, with their lassos attached to the pommels of their saddles.
Soldiers detailed as teamsters and black smiths would also enter the
corral, the former with ropes to serve as halters, the latter with
branding irons and a fire to keep the irons heated.  A lasso was then
thrown over the neck of a mule, when he would immediately go to the
length of his tether, first one end, then the other in the air.  While
he was thus plunging and gyrating, another lasso would be thrown by
another Mexican, catching the animal by a fore-foot.  This would bring
the mule to the ground, when he was seized and held by the teamsters
while the blacksmith put upon him, with hot irons, the initials "U. S."
Ropes were then put about the neck, with a slipnoose which would tighten
around the throat if pulled.  With a man on each side holding these
ropes, the mule was released from his other bindings and allowed to
rise.  With more or less difficulty he would be conducted to a picket
rope outside and fastened there.  The delivery of that mule was then
complete. This process was gone through with every mule and wild horse
with the army of occupation.

The method of breaking them was less cruel and much more amusing.  It is
a well-known fact that where domestic animals are used for specific
purposes from generation to generation, the descendants are easily, as a
rule, subdued to the same uses.  At that time in Northern Mexico the
mule, or his ancestors, the horse and the ass, was seldom used except
for the saddle or pack.  At all events the Corpus Christi mule resisted
the new use to which he was being put.  The treatment he was subjected
to in order to overcome his prejudices was summary and effective.

The soldiers were principally foreigners who had enlisted in our large
cities, and, with the exception of a chance drayman among them, it is
not probable that any of the men who reported themselves as competent
teamsters had ever driven a mule-team in their lives, or indeed that
many had had any previous experience in driving any animal whatever to
harness.  Numbers together can accomplish what twice their number acting
individually could not perform.  Five mules were allotted to each wagon.
A teamster would select at the picket rope five animals of nearly the
same color and general appearance for his team.  With a full corps of
assistants, other teamsters, he would then proceed to get his mules
together.  In two's the men would approach each animal selected,
avoiding as far as possible its heels.  Two ropes would be put about the
neck of each animal, with a slip noose, so that he could be choked if
too unruly.  They were then led out, harnessed by force and hitched to
the wagon in the position they had to keep ever after.  Two men remained
on either side of the leader, with the lassos about its neck, and one
man retained the same restraining influence over each of the others.
All being ready, the hold would be slackened and the team started. The
first motion was generally five mules in the air at one time, backs
bowed, hind feet extended to the rear.  After repeating this movement a
few times the leaders would start to run.  This would bring the
breeching tight against the mules at the wheels, which these last seemed
to regard as a most unwarrantable attempt at coercion and would resist
by taking a seat, sometimes going so far as to lie down.  In time all
were broken in to do their duty submissively if not cheerfully, but
there never was a time during the war when it was safe to let a Mexican
mule get entirely loose.  Their drivers were all teamsters by the time
they got through.

I recollect one case of a mule that had worked in a team under the
saddle, not only for some time at Corpus Christi, where he was broken,
but all the way to the point opposite Matamoras, then to Camargo, where
he got loose from his fastenings during the night.  He did not run away
at first, but staid in the neighborhood for a day or two, coming up
sometimes to the feed trough even; but on the approach of the teamster
he always got out of the way.  At last, growing tired of the constant
effort to catch him, he disappeared altogether.  Nothing short of a
Mexican with his lasso could have caught him.  Regulations would not
have warranted the expenditure of a dollar in hiring a man with a lasso
to catch that mule; but they did allow the expenditure "of the mule," on
a certificate that he had run away without any fault of the
quartermaster on whose returns he was borne, and also the purchase of
another to take his place.  I am a competent witness, for I was
regimental quartermaster at the time.

While at Corpus Christi all the officers who had a fancy for riding kept
horses.  The animals cost but little in the first instance, and when
picketed they would get their living without any cost.  I had three not
long before the army moved, but a sad accident bereft me of them all at
one time.  A <DW52> boy who gave them all the attention they got
--besides looking after my tent and that of a class-mate and
fellow-lieutenant and cooking for us, all for about eight dollars per
month, was riding one to water and leading the other two.  The led
horses pulled him from his seat and all three ran away.  They never were
heard of afterwards.  Shortly after that some one told Captain Bliss,
General Taylor's Adjutant-General, of my misfortune.  "Yes; I heard
Grant lost five or six dollars' worth of horses the other day," he
replied.  That was a slander; they were broken to the saddle when I got
them and cost nearly twenty dollars.  I never suspected the <DW52> boy
of malicious intent in letting them get away, because, if they had not
escaped, he could have had one of them to ride on the long march then in
prospect.



CHAPTER VI.

ADVANCE OF THE ARMY--CROSSING THE COLORADO--THE RIO GRANDE.

At last the preparations were complete and orders were issued for the
advance to begin on the 8th of March.  General Taylor had an army of not
more than three thousand men.  One battery, the siege guns and all the
convalescent troops were sent on by water to Brazos Santiago, at the
mouth of the Rio Grande.  A guard was left back at Corpus Christi to
look after public property and to take care of those who were too sick
to be removed.  The remainder of the army, probably not more than twenty
five hundred men, was divided into three brigades, with the cavalry
independent.  Colonel Twiggs, with seven companies of dragoons and a
battery of light artillery, moved on the 8th.  He was followed by the
three infantry brigades, with a day's interval between the commands.
Thus the rear brigade did not move from Corpus Christi until the 11th of
March.  In view of the immense bodies of men moved on the same day over
narrow roads, through dense forests and across large streams, in our
late war, it seems strange now that a body of less than three thousand
men should have been broken into four columns, separated by a day's
march.

General Taylor was opposed to anything like plundering by the troops,
and in this instance, I doubt not, he looked upon the enemy as the
aggrieved party and was not willing to injure them further than his
instructions from Washington demanded.  His orders to the troops
enjoined scrupulous regard for the rights of all peaceable persons and
the payment of the highest price for all supplies taken for the use of
the army.

All officers of foot regiments who had horses were permitted to ride
them on the march when it did not interfere with their military duties.
As already related, having lost my "five or six dollars' worth of
horses" but a short time before I determined not to get another, but to
make the journey on foot.  My company commander, Captain McCall, had two
good American horses, of considerably more value in that country, where
native horses were cheap, than they were in the States. He used one
himself and wanted the other for his servant.  He was quite anxious to
know whether I did not intend to get me another horse before the march
began.  I told him No; I belonged to a foot regiment.  I did not
understand the object of his solicitude at the time, but, when we were
about to start, he said:  "There, Grant, is a horse for you."  I found
that he could not bear the idea of his servant riding on a long march
while his lieutenant went a-foot.  He had found a mustang, a three-year
old colt only recently captured, which had been purchased by one of the
<DW52> servants with the regiment for the sum of three dollars.  It was
probably the only horse at Corpus Christi that could have been purchased
just then for any reasonable price.  Five dollars, sixty-six and
two-thirds per cent. advance, induced the owner to part with the
mustang.  I was sorry to take him, because I really felt that, belonging
to a foot regiment, it was my duty to march with the men.  But I saw the
Captain's earnestness in the matter, and accepted the horse for the
trip.  The day we started was the first time the horse had ever been
under saddle. I had, however, but little difficulty in breaking him,
though for the first day there were frequent disagreements between us as
to which way we should go, and sometimes whether we should go at all.
At no time during the day could I choose exactly the part of the column
I would march with; but after that, I had as tractable a horse as any
with the army, and there was none that stood the trip better. He never
ate a mouthful of food on the journey except the grass he could pick
within the length of his picket rope.

A few days out from Corpus Christi, the immense herd of wild horses that
ranged at that time between the Nueces and the Rio Grande was seen
directly in advance of the head of the column and but a few miles off.
It was the very band from which the horse I was riding had been captured
but a few weeks before. The column was halted for a rest, and a number
of officers, myself among them, rode out two or three miles to the right
to see the extent of the herd.  The country was a rolling prairie, and,
from the higher ground, the vision was obstructed only by the earth's
curvature.  As far as the eye could reach to our right, the herd
extended.  To the left, it extended equally. There was no estimating the
number of animals in it; I have no idea that they could all have been
corralled in the State of Rhode Island, or Delaware, at one time.  If
they had been, they would have been so thick that the pasturage would
have given out the first day. People who saw the Southern herd of
buffalo, fifteen or twenty years ago, can appreciate the  size of the
Texas band of wild horses in 1846.

At the point where the army struck the Little Colorado River, the stream
was quite wide and of sufficient depth for navigation. The water was
brackish and the banks were fringed with timber. Here the whole army
concentrated before attempting to cross. The army was not accompanied by
a pontoon train, and at that time the troops were not instructed in
bridge building.  To add to the embarrassment of the situation, the army
was here, for the first time, threatened with opposition. Buglers,
concealed from our view by the brush on the opposite side, sounded the
"assembly," and other military calls.  Like the wolves before spoken of,
they gave the impression that there was a large number of them and that,
if the troops were in proportion to the noise, they were sufficient to
devour General Taylor and his army.  There were probably but few troops,
and those engaged principally in watching the movements of the
"invader."  A few of our cavalry dashed in, and forded and swam the
stream, and all opposition was soon dispersed.  I do not remember that a
single shot was fired.

The troops waded the stream, which was up to their necks in the deepest
part.  Teams were crossed by attaching a long rope to the end of the
wagon tongue passing it between the two swing mules and by the side of
the leader, hitching his bridle as well as the bridle of the mules in
rear to it, and carrying the end to men on the opposite shore.  The bank
down to the water was steep on both sides.  A rope long enough to cross
the river, therefore, was attached to the back axle of the wagon, and
men behind would hold the rope to prevent the wagon "beating" the mules
into the water.  This latter rope also served the purpose of bringing
the end of the forward one back, to be used over again.  The water was
deep enough for a short distance to swim the little Mexican mules which
the army was then using, but they, and the wagons, were pulled through
so fast by the men at the end of the rope ahead, that no time was left
them to show their obstinacy.  In this manner the artillery and
transportation of the "army of occupation" crossed the Colorado River.

About the middle of the month of March the advance of the army reached
the Rio Grande and went into camp near the banks of the river, opposite
the city of Matamoras and almost under the guns of a small fort at the
lower end of the town.  There was not at that time a single habitation
from Corpus Christi until the Rio Grande was reached.

The work of fortifying was commenced at once.  The fort was laid out by
the engineers, but the work was done by the soldiers under the
supervision of their officers, the chief engineer retaining general
directions.  The Mexicans now became so incensed at our near approach
that some of their troops crossed the river above us, and made it unsafe
for small bodies of men to go far beyond the limits of camp.  They
captured two companies of dragoons, commanded by Captains Thornton and
Hardee.  The latter figured as a general in the late war, on the
Confederate side, and was author of the tactics first used by both
armies.  Lieutenant Theodric Porter, of the 4th infantry, was killed
while out with a small detachment; and Major Cross, the assistant
quartermaster-general, had also been killed not far from camp.

There was no base of supplies nearer than Point Isabel, on the coast,
north of the mouth of the Rio Grande and twenty-five miles away.  The
enemy, if the Mexicans could be called such at this time when no war had
been declared, hovered about in such numbers that it was not safe to
send a wagon train after supplies with any escort that could be spared.
I have already said that General Taylor's whole command on the Rio
Grande numbered less than three thousand men.  He had, however, a few
more troops at Point Isabel or Brazos Santiago.  The supplies brought
from Corpus Christi in wagons were running short.  Work was therefore
pushed with great vigor on the defences, to enable the minimum number of
troops to hold the fort.  All the men who could be employed, were kept
at work from early dawn until darkness closed the labors of the day.
With all this the fort was not completed until the supplies grew so
short that further delay in obtaining more could not be thought of.  By
the latter part of April the work was in a partially defensible
condition, and the 7th infantry, Major Jacob Brown commanding, was
marched in to garrison it, with some few pieces of artillery.  All the
supplies on hand, with the exception of enough to carry the rest of the
army to Point Isabel, were left with the garrison, and the march was
commenced with the remainder of the command, every wagon being taken
with the army.  Early on the second day after starting the force reached
its destination, without opposition from the Mexicans.  There was some
delay in getting supplies ashore from vessels at anchor in the open
roadstead.



CHAPTER VII.

THE MEXICAN WAR--THE BATTLE OF PALO ALTO--THE BATTLE OF RESACA DE LA
PALMA--ARMY OF INVASION--GENERAL TAYLOR--MOVEMENT ON CAMARGO.

While General Taylor was away with the bulk of his army, the little
garrison up the river was besieged.  As we lay in our tents upon the
sea-shore, the artillery at the fort on the Rio Grande could be
distinctly heard.

The war had begun.

There were no possible means of obtaining news from the garrison, and
information from outside could not be otherwise than unfavorable.  What
General Taylor's feelings were during this suspense I do not know; but
for myself, a young second-lieutenant who had never heard a hostile gun
before, I felt sorry that I had enlisted.  A great many men, when they
smell battle afar off, chafe to get into the fray.  When they say so
themselves they generally fail to convince their hearers that they are
as anxious as they would like to make believe, and as they approach
danger they become more subdued.  This rule is not universal, for I have
known a few men who were always aching for a fight when there was no
enemy near, who were as good as their word when the battle did come.
But the number of such men is small.

On the 7th of May the wagons were all loaded and General Taylor started
on his return, with his army reinforced at Point Isabel, but still less
than three thousand strong, to relieve the garrison on the Rio Grande.
The road from Point Isabel to Matamoras is over an open, rolling,
treeless prairie, until the timber that borders the bank of the Rio
Grande is reached.  This river, like the Mississippi, flows through a
rich alluvial valley in the most meandering manner, running towards all
points of the compass at times within a few miles.  Formerly the river
ran by Resaca de la Palma, some four or five miles east of the present
channel.  The old bed of the river at Resaca had become filled at
places, leaving a succession of little lakes.  The timber that had
formerly grown upon both banks, and for a considerable distance out, was
still standing.  This timber was struck six or eight miles out from the
besieged garrison, at a point known as Palo Alto--"Tall trees" or
"woods."

Early in the forenoon of the 8th of May as Palo Alto was approached, an
army, certainly outnumbering our little force, was seen, drawn up in
line of battle just in front of the timber.  Their bayonets and
spearheads glistened in the sunlight formidably.  The force was composed
largely of cavalry armed with lances.  Where we were the grass was tall,
reaching nearly to the shoulders of the men, very stiff, and each stock
was pointed at the top, and hard and almost as sharp as a
darning-needle. General Taylor halted his army before the head of column
came in range of the artillery of the Mexicans.  He then formed a line
of battle, facing the enemy.  His artillery, two batteries and two
eighteen-pounder iron guns, drawn by oxen, were placed in position at
intervals along the line.  A battalion was thrown to the rear, commanded
by Lieutenant-Colonel Childs, of the artillery, as reserves.  These
preparations completed, orders were given for a platoon of each company
to stack arms and go to a stream off to the right of the command, to
fill their canteens and also those of the rest of their respective
companies.  When the men were all back in their places in line, the
command to advance was given.  As I looked down that long line of about
three thousand armed men, advancing towards a larger force also armed,
I thought what a fearful responsibility General Taylor must feel,
commanding such a host and so far away from friends.  The Mexicans
immediately opened fire upon us, first with artillery and then with
infantry.  At first their shots did not reach us, and the advance was
continued.  As we got nearer, the cannon balls commenced going through
the ranks.  They hurt no one, however, during this advance, because they
would strike the ground long before they reached our line, and
ricochetted through the tall grass so slowly that the men would see them
and open ranks and let them pass.  When we got to a point where the
artillery could be used with effect, a halt was called, and the battle
opened on both sides.

The infantry under General Taylor was armed with flint-lock muskets, and
paper cartridges charged with powder, buck-shot and ball.  At the
distance of a few hundred yards a man might fire at you all day without
your finding it out.  The artillery was generally six-pounder brass guns
throwing only solid shot; but General Taylor had with him three or four
twelve-pounder howitzers throwing shell, besides his eighteen-pounders
before spoken of, that had a long range.  This made a powerful armament.
The Mexicans were armed about as we were so far as their infantry was
concerned, but their artillery only fired solid shot.  We had greatly
the advantage in this arm.

The artillery was advanced a rod or two in front of the line, and opened
fire.  The infantry stood at order arms as spectators, watching the
effect of our shots upon the enemy, and watching his shots so as to step
out of their way.  It could be seen that the eighteen-pounders and the
howitzers did a great deal of execution.  On our side there was little
or no loss while we occupied this position.  During the battle Major
Ringgold, an accomplished and brave artillery officer, was mortally
wounded, and Lieutenant Luther, also of the artillery, was struck.
During the day several advances were made, and just at dusk it became
evident that the Mexicans were falling back. We again advanced, and
occupied at the close of the battle substantially the ground held by the
enemy at the beginning.  In this last move there was a brisk fire upon
our troops, and some execution was done.  One cannon-ball passed through
our ranks, not far from me.  It took off the head of an enlisted man,
and the under jaw of Captain Page of my regiment, while the splinters
from the musket of the killed soldier, and his brains and bones, knocked
down two or three others, including one officer, Lieutenant Wallen,
--hurting them more or less.  Our casualties for the day were nine killed
and forty-seven wounded.

At the break of day on the 9th, the army under Taylor was ready to renew
the battle; but an advance showed that the enemy had entirely left our
front during the night.  The chaparral before us was impenetrable except
where there were roads or trails, with occasionally clear or bare spots
of small dimensions.  A body of men penetrating it might easily be
ambushed.  It was better to have a few men caught in this way than the
whole army, yet it was necessary that the garrison at the river should
be relieved.  To get to them the chaparral had to be passed.  Thus I
assume General Taylor reasoned.  He halted the army not far in advance
of the ground occupied by the Mexicans the day before, and selected
Captain C. F. Smith, of the artillery, and Captain McCall, of my
company, to take one hundred and fifty picked men each and find where
the enemy had gone.  This left me in command of the company, an honor
and responsibility I thought very great.

Smith and McCall found no obstruction in the way of their advance until
they came up to the succession of ponds, before described, at Resaca.
The Mexicans had passed them and formed their lines on the opposite
bank.  This position they had strengthened a little by throwing up dead
trees and brush in their front, and by placing artillery to cover the
approaches and open places.  Smith and McCall deployed on each side of
the road as well as they could, and engaged the enemy at long range.
Word was sent back, and the advance of the whole army was at once
commenced.  As we came up we were deployed in like manner.  I was with
the right wing, and led my company through the thicket wherever a
penetrable place could be found, taking advantage of any clear spot that
would carry me towards the enemy.  At last I got pretty close up without
knowing it.  The balls commenced to whistle very thick overhead, cutting
the limbs of the chaparral right and left.  We could not see the enemy,
so I ordered my men to lie down, an order that did not have to be
enforced.  We kept our position until it became evident that the enemy
were not firing at us, and then withdrew to find better ground to
advance upon.

By this time some progress had been made on our left.  A section of
artillery had been captured by the cavalry, and some prisoners had been
taken.  The Mexicans were giving way all along the line, and many of
them had, no doubt, left early.  I at last found a clear space
separating two ponds.  There seemed to be a few men in front and I
charged upon them with my company.

There was no resistance, and we captured a Mexican colonel, who had been
wounded, and a few men.  Just as I was sending them to the rear with a
guard of two or three men, a private came from the front bringing back
one of our officers, who had been badly wounded in advance of where I
was.  The ground had been charged over before.  My exploit was equal to
that of the soldier who boasted that he had cut off the leg of one of
the enemy.  When asked why he did not cut off his head, he replied:
"Some one had done that before."  This left no doubt in my mind but that
the battle of Resaca de la Palma would have been won, just as it was, if
I had not been there.  There was no further resistance. The evening of
the 9th the army was encamped on its old ground near the Fort, and the
garrison was relieved.  The siege had lasted a number of days, but the
casualties were few in number.  Major Jacob Brown, of the 7th infantry,
the commanding officer, had been killed, and in his honor the fort was
named. Since then a town of considerable importance has sprung up on the
ground occupied by the fort and troops, which has also taken his name.

The battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma seemed to us engaged, as
pretty important affairs; but we had only a faint conception of their
magnitude until they were fought over in the North by the Press and the
reports came back to us.  At the same time, or about the same time, we
learned that war existed between the United States and Mexico, by the
acts of the latter country.  On learning this fact General Taylor
transferred our camps to the south or west bank of the river, and
Matamoras was occupied.  We then became the "Army of Invasion."

Up to this time Taylor had none but regular troops in his command; but
now that invasion had already taken place, volunteers for one year
commenced arriving.  The army remained at Matamoras until sufficiently
reinforced to warrant a movement into the interior.  General Taylor was
not an officer to trouble the administration much with his demands, but
was inclined to do the best he could with the means given him.  He felt
his responsibility as going no further.  If he had thought that he was
sent to perform an impossibility with the means given him, he would
probably have informed the authorities of his opinion and left them to
determine what should be done.  If the judgment was against him he would
have gone on and done the best he could with the means at hand without
parading his grievance before the public.  No soldier could face either
danger or responsibility more calmly than he.  These are qualities more
rarely found than genius or physical courage.

General Taylor never made any great show or parade, either of uniform or
retinue.  In dress he was possibly too plain, rarely wearing anything in
the field to indicate his rank, or even that he was an officer; but he
was known to every soldier in his army, and was respected by all.  I can
call to mind only one instance when I saw him in uniform, and one other
when I heard of his wearing it, On both occasions he was unfortunate.
The first was at Corpus Christi.  He had concluded to review his army
before starting on the march and gave orders accordingly.  Colonel
Twiggs was then second in rank with the army, and to him was given the
command of the review.  Colonel and Brevet Brigadier-General Worth, a
far different soldier from Taylor in the use of the uniform, was next to
Twiggs in rank, and claimed superiority by virtue of his brevet rank
when the accidents of service threw them where one or the other had to
command.  Worth declined to attend the review as subordinate to Twiggs
until the question was settled by the highest authority.  This broke up
the review, and the question was referred to Washington for final
decision.

General Taylor was himself only a colonel, in real rank, at that time,
and a brigadier-general by brevet.  He was assigned to duty, however, by
the President, with the rank which his brevet gave him.  Worth was not
so assigned, but by virtue of commanding a division he must, under the
army regulations of that day, have drawn the pay of his brevet rank.
The question was submitted to Washington, and no response was received
until after the army had reached the Rio Grande.  It was decided against
General Worth, who at once tendered his resignation and left the army,
going north, no doubt, by the same vessel that carried it.  This kept
him out of the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma.  Either the
resignation was not accepted, or General Worth withdrew it before action
had been taken.  At all events he returned to the army in time to
command his division in the battle of Monterey, and served with it to
the end of the war.

The second occasion on which General Taylor was said to have donned his
uniform, was in order to receive a visit from the Flag Officer of the
naval squadron off the mouth of the Rio Grande.  While the army was on
that river the Flag Officer sent word that he would call on the General
to pay his respects on a certain day.  General Taylor, knowing that
naval officers habitually wore all the uniform the "law allowed" on all
occasions of ceremony, thought it would be only civil to receive his
guest in the same style.  His uniform was therefore got out, brushed up,
and put on, in advance of the visit.  The Flag Officer, knowing General
Taylor's aversion to the wearing of the uniform, and feeling that it
would be regarded as a compliment should he meet him in civilian's
dress, left off his uniform for this occasion.  The meeting was said to
have been embarrassing to both, and the conversation was principally
apologetic.

The time was whiled away pleasantly enough at Matamoras, while we were
waiting for volunteers.  It is probable that all the most important
people of the territory occupied by our army left their homes before we
got there, but with those remaining the best of relations apparently
existed.  It was the policy of the Commanding General to allow no
pillaging, no taking of private property for public or individual use
without satisfactory compensation, so that a better market was afforded
than the people had ever known before.

Among the troops that joined us at Matamoras was an Ohio regiment, of
which Thomas L. Hamer, the Member of Congress who had given me my
appointment to West Point, was major.  He told me then that he could
have had the colonelcy, but that as he knew he was to be appointed a
brigadier-general, he preferred at first to take the lower grade.  I
have said before that Hamer was one of the ablest men Ohio ever
produced.  At that time he was in the prime of life, being less than
fifty years of age, and possessed an admirable physique, promising long
life.  But he was taken sick before Monterey, and died within a few
days.  I have always believed that had his life been spared, he would
have been President of the United States during the term filled by
President Pierce.  Had Hamer filled that office his partiality for me
was such, there is but little doubt I should have been appointed to one
of the staff corps of the army--the Pay Department probably--and would
therefore now be preparing to retire.  Neither of these speculations is
unreasonable, and they are mentioned to show how little men control
their own destiny.

Reinforcements having arrived, in the month of August the movement
commenced from Matamoras to Camargo, the head of navigation on the Rio
Grande.  The line of the Rio Grande was all that was necessary to hold,
unless it was intended to invade Mexico from the North.  In that case
the most natural route to take was the one which General Taylor
selected.  It entered a pass in the Sierra Madre Mountains, at Monterey,
through which the main road runs to the City of Mexico.  Monterey itself
was a good point to hold, even if the line of the Rio Grande covered all
the territory we desired to occupy at that time.  It is built on a plain
two thousand feet above tide water, where the air is bracing and the
situation healthy.

On the 19th of August the army started for Monterey, leaving a small
garrison at Matamoras.  The troops, with the exception of the artillery,
cavalry, and the brigade to which I belonged, were moved up the river to
Camargo on steamers.  As there were but two or three of these, the boats
had to make a number of trips before the last of the troops were
up. Those who marched did so by the south side of the river.
Lieutenant-Colonel Garland, of the 4th infantry, was the brigade
commander, and on this occasion commanded the entire marching force.
One day out convinced him that marching by day in that latitude, in the
month of August, was not a beneficial sanitary measure, particularly for
Northern men.  The order of marching was changed and night marches were
substituted with the best results.

When Camargo was reached, we found a city of tents outside the Mexican
hamlet.  I was detailed to act as quartermaster and commissary to the
regiment.  The teams that had proven abundantly sufficient to transport
all supplies from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande over the level
prairies of Texas, were entirely inadequate to the needs of the
reinforced army in a mountainous country.  To obviate the deficiency,
pack mules were hired, with Mexicans to pack and drive them.  I had
charge of the few wagons allotted to the 4th infantry and of the pack
train to supplement them.  There were not men enough in the army to
manage that train without the help of Mexicans who had learned how.  As
it was the difficulty was great enough.  The troops would take up their
march at an early hour each day.  After they had started, the tents and
cooking utensils had to be made into packages, so that they could be
lashed to the backs of the mules.  Sheet-iron kettles, tent-poles and
mess chests were inconvenient articles to transport in that way.  It
took several hours to get ready to start each morning, and by the time
we were ready some of the mules first loaded would be tired of standing
so long with their loads on their backs. Sometimes one would start to
run, bowing his back and kicking up until he scattered his load; others
would lie down and try to disarrange their loads by attempting to get on
the top of them by rolling on them; others with tent-poles for part of
their loads would manage to run a tent-pole on one side of a sapling
while they would take the other.  I am not aware of ever having used a
profane expletive in my life; but I would have the charity to excuse
those who may have done so, if they were in charge of a train of Mexican
pack mules at the time.



CHAPTER VIII.

ADVANCE ON MONTEREY--THE BLACK FORT--THE BATTLE OF MONTEREY--SURRENDER
OF THE CITY.

The advance from Camargo was commenced on the 5th of September. The army
was divided into four columns, separated from each other by one day's
march.  The advance reached Cerralvo in four days and halted for the
remainder of the troops to come up.  By the 13th the rear-guard had
arrived, and the same day the advance resumed its march, followed as
before, a day separating the divisions.  The forward division halted
again at Marin, twenty-four miles from Monterey.  Both this place and
Cerralvo were nearly deserted, and men, women and children were seen
running and scattered over the hills as we approached; but when the
people returned they found all their abandoned property safe, which must
have given them a favorable opinion of Los Grengos--"the Yankees."  From
Marin the movement was in mass. On the 19th General Taylor, with his
army, was encamped at Walnut Springs, within three miles of Monterey.

The town is on a small stream coming out of the mountain-pass, and is
backed by a range of hills of moderate elevation.  To the north, between
the city and Walnut Springs, stretches an extensive plain.  On this
plain, and entirely outside of the last houses of the city, stood a
strong fort, enclosed on all sides, to which our army gave the name of
"Black Fort."  Its guns commanded the approaches to the city to the full
extent of their range.  There were two detached spurs of hills or
mountains to the north and northwest of the city, which were also
fortified.  On one of these stood the Bishop's Palace.  The road to
Saltillo leaves the upper or western end of the city under the fire of
the guns from these heights.  The lower or eastern end was defended by
two or three small detached works, armed with artillery and infantry.
To the south was the mountain stream before mentioned, and back of that
the range of foot-hills.  The plaza in the centre of the city was the
citadel, properly speaking.  All the streets leading from it were swept
by artillery, cannon being intrenched behind temporary parapets. The
house-tops near the plaza were converted into infantry fortifications by
the use of sand-bags for parapets.  Such were the defences of Monterey
in September, 1847.  General Ampudia, with a force of certainly ten
thousand men, was in command.

General Taylor's force was about six thousand five hundred strong, in
three divisions, under Generals Butler, Twiggs and Worth.  The troops
went into camp at Walnut Springs, while the engineer officers, under
Major Mansfield--a General in the late war--commenced their
reconnoissance.  Major Mansfield found that it would be practicable to
get troops around, out of range of the Black Fort and the works on the
detached hills to the north-west of the city, to the Saltillo road.
With this road in our possession, the enemy would be cut off from
receiving further supplies, if not from all communication with the
interior. General Worth, with his division somewhat reinforced, was
given the task of gaining possession of the Saltillo road, and of
carrying the detached works outside the city, in that quarter. He
started on his march early in the afternoon of the 20th.  The divisions
under Generals Butler and Twiggs were drawn up to threaten the east and
north sides of the city and the works on those fronts, in support of the
movement under General Worth. Worth's was regarded as the main attack on
Monterey, and all other operations were in support of it.  His march
this day was uninterrupted; but the enemy was seen to reinforce heavily
about the Bishop's Palace and the other outside fortifications on their
left.  General Worth reached a defensible position just out of range of
the enemy's guns on the heights north-west of the city, and bivouacked
for the night.  The engineer officers with him--Captain Sanders and
Lieutenant George G. Meade, afterwards the commander of the victorious
National army at the battle of Gettysburg--made a reconnoissance to the
Saltillo road under cover of night.

During the night of the 20th General Taylor had established a battery,
consisting of two twenty-four-pounder howitzers and a ten inch mortar,
at a point from which they could play upon Black Fort.  A natural
depression in the plain, sufficiently deep to protect men standing in it
from the fire from the fort, was selected and the battery established on
the crest nearest the enemy.  The 4th infantry, then consisting of but
six reduced companies, was ordered to support the artillerists while
they were intrenching themselves and their guns.  I was regimental
quartermaster at the time and was ordered to remain in charge of camp
and the public property at Walnut Springs.  It was supposed that the
regiment would return to its camp in the morning.

The point for establishing the siege battery was reached and the work
performed without attracting the attention of the enemy.  At daylight
the next morning fire was opened on both sides and continued with, what
seemed to me at that day, great fury.  My curiosity got the better of my
judgment, and I mounted a horse and rode to the front to see what was
going on.  I had been there but a short time when an order to charge was
given, and lacking the moral courage to return to camp--where I had been
ordered to stay--I charged with the regiment As soon as the troops were
out of the depression they came under the fire of Black Fort.  As they
advanced they got under fire from batteries guarding the east, or lower,
end of the city, and of musketry. About one-third of the men engaged in
the charge were killed or wounded in the space of a few minutes.  We
retreated to get out of fire, not backward, but eastward and
perpendicular to the direct road running into the city from Walnut
Springs.  I was, I believe, the only person in the 4th infantry in the
charge who was on horseback.  When we got to a lace of safety the
regiment halted and drew itself together--what was left of it.  The
adjutant of the regiment, Lieutenant Hoskins, who was not in robust
health, found himself very much fatigued from running on foot in the
charge and retreat, and, seeing me on horseback, expressed a wish that
he could be mounted also.  I offered him my horse and he accepted the
offer.  A few minutes later I saw a soldier, a quartermaster's man,
mounted, not far away.  I ran to him, took his horse and was back with
the regiment in a few minutes.  In a short time we were off again; and
the next place of safety from the shots of the enemy that I recollect of
being in, was a field of cane or corn to the north-east of the lower
batteries.  The adjutant to whom I had loaned my horse was killed, and I
was designated to act in his place.

This charge was ill-conceived, or badly executed.  We belonged to the
brigade commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Garland, and he had received
orders to charge the lower batteries of the city, and carry them if he
could without too much loss, for the purpose of creating a diversion in
favor of Worth, who was conducting the movement which it was intended
should be decisive.  By a movement by the left flank Garland could have
led his men beyond the range of the fire from Black Fort and advanced
towards the northeast angle of the city, as well covered from fire as
could be expected.  There was no undue loss of life in reaching the
lower end of Monterey, except that sustained by Garland's command.

Meanwhile Quitman's brigade, conducted by an officer of engineers, had
reached the eastern end of the city, and was placed under cover of the
houses without much loss.  Colonel Garland's brigade also arrived at the
suburbs, and, by the assistance of some of our troops that had reached
house-tops from which they could fire into a little battery covering the
approaches to the lower end of the city, the battery was speedily
captured and its guns were turned upon another work of the enemy.  An
entrance into the east end of the city was now secured, and the houses
protected our troops so long as they were inactive.  On the west General
Worth had reached the Saltillo road after some fighting but without
heavy loss.  He turned from his new position and captured the forts on
both heights in that quarter.  This gave him possession of the upper or
west end of Monterey.  Troops from both Twiggs's and Butler's divisions
were in possession of the east end of the town, but the Black Fort to
the north of the town and the plaza in the centre were still in the
possession of the enemy.  Our camps at Walnut Springs, three miles away,
were guarded by a company from each regiment.  A regiment of Kentucky
volunteers guarded the mortars and howitzers engaged against Black Fort.
Practically Monterey was invested.

There was nothing done on the 22d by the United States troops; but the
enemy kept up a harmless fire upon us from Black Fort and the batteries
still in their possession at the east end of the city.  During the night
they evacuated these; so that on the morning of the 23d we held
undisputed possession of the east end of Monterey.

Twiggs's division was at the lower end of the city, and well covered
from the fire of the enemy.  But the streets leading to the plaza--all
Spanish or Spanish-American towns have near their centres a square
called a plaza--were commanded from all directions by artillery.  The
houses were flat-roofed and but one or two stories high, and about the
plaza the roofs were manned with infantry, the troops being protected
from our fire by parapets made of sand-bags.  All advances into the city
were thus attended with much danger.  While moving along streets which
did not lead to the plaza, our men were protected from the fire, and
from the view, of the enemy except at the crossings; but at these a
volley of musketry and a discharge of grape-shot were invariably
encountered.  The 3d and 4th regiments of infantry made an advance
nearly to the plaza in this way and with heavy loss.  The loss of the 3d
infantry in commissioned officers was especially severe.  There were
only five companies of the regiment and not over twelve officers
present, and five of these officers were killed.  When within a square
of the plaza this small command, ten companies in all, was brought to a
halt.  Placing themselves under cover from the shots of the enemy, the
men would watch to detect a head above the sand-bags on the neighboring
houses.  The exposure of a single head would bring a volley from our
soldiers.

We had not occupied this position long when it was discovered that our
ammunition was growing low.  I volunteered to go back (*2) to the point
we had started from, report our position to General Twiggs, and ask for
ammunition to be forwarded.  We were at this time occupying ground off
from the street, in rear of the houses.  My ride back was an exposed
one.  Before starting I adjusted myself on the side of my horse furthest
from the enemy, and with only one foot holding to the cantle of the
saddle, and an arm over the neck of the horse exposed, I started at full
run.  It was only at street crossings that my horse was under fire, but
these I crossed at such a flying rate that generally I was past and
under cover of the next block of houses before the enemy fired.  I got
out safely without a scratch.

At one place on my ride, I saw a sentry walking in front of a house, and
stopped to inquire what he was doing there.  Finding that the house was
full of wounded American officers and soldiers, I dismounted and went
in.  I found there Captain Williams, of the Engineer Corps, wounded in
the head, probably fatally, and Lieutenant Territt, also badly wounded
his bowels protruding from his wound.  There were quite a number of
soldiers also.  Promising them to report their situation, I left,
readjusted myself to my horse, recommenced the run, and was soon with
the troops at the east end.  Before ammunition could be collected, the
two regiments I had been with were seen returning, running the same
gauntlet in getting out that they had passed in going in, but with
comparatively little loss.  The movement was countermanded and the
troops were withdrawn.  The poor wounded officers and men I had found,
fell into the hands of the enemy during the night, and died.

While this was going on at the east, General Worth, with a small
division of troops, was advancing towards the plaza from the opposite
end of the city.  He resorted to a better expedient for getting to the
plaza--the citadel--than we did on the east. Instead of moving by the
open streets, he advanced through the houses, cutting passageways from
one to another.  Without much loss of life, he got so near the plaza
during the night that before morning, Ampudia, the Mexican commander,
made overtures for the surrender of the city and garrison.  This stopped
all further hostilities.  The terms of surrender were soon agreed upon.
The prisoners were paroled and permitted to take their horses and
personal property with them.

My pity was aroused by the sight of the Mexican garrison of Monterey
marching out of town as prisoners, and no doubt the same feeling was
experienced by most of our army who witnessed it.  Many of the prisoners
were cavalry, armed with lances, and mounted on miserable little
half-starved horses that did not look as if they could carry their
riders out of town.  The men looked in but little better condition.  I
thought how little interest the men before me had in the results of the
war, and how little knowledge they had of "what it was all about."

After the surrender of the garrison of Monterey a quiet camp life was
led until midwinter.  As had been the case on the Rio Grande, the people
who remained at their homes fraternized with the "Yankees" in the
pleasantest manner.  In fact, under the humane policy of our commander,
I question whether the great majority of the Mexican people did not
regret our departure as much as they had regretted our coming.  Property
and person were thoroughly protected, and a market was afforded for all
the products of the country such as the people had never enjoyed before.
The educated and wealthy portion of the population here, as elsewhere,
abandoned their homes and remained away from them as long as they were
in the possession of the invaders; but this class formed a very small
percentage of the whole population.



CHAPTER IX.

POLITICAL INTRIGUE--BUENA VISTA--MOVEMENT AGAINST VERA CRUZ--SIEGE AND
CAPTURE OF VERA CRUZ.

The Mexican war was a political war, and the administration conducting
it desired to make party capital out of it.  General Scott was at the
head of the army, and, being a soldier of acknowledged professional
capacity, his claim to the command of the forces in the field was almost
indisputable and does not seem to have been denied by President Polk, or
Marcy, his Secretary of War.  Scott was a Whig and the administration
was democratic.  General Scott was also known to have political
aspirations, and nothing so popularizes a candidate for high civil
positions as military victories.  It would not do therefore to give him
command of the "army of conquest."  The plans submitted by Scott for a
campaign in Mexico were disapproved by the administration, and he
replied, in a tone possibly a little disrespectful, to the effect that,
if a soldier's plans were not to be supported by the administration,
success could not be expected.  This was on the 27th of May, 1846.  Four
days later General Scott was notified that he need not go to Mexico.
General Gaines was next in rank, but he was too old and feeble to take
the field.  Colonel Zachary Taylor--a brigadier-general by brevet--was
therefore left in command.  He, too, was a Whig, but was not supposed to
entertain any political ambitions; nor did he; but after the fall of
Monterey, his third battle and third complete victory, the Whig papers
at home began to speak of him as the candidate of their party for the
Presidency.  Something had to be done to neutralize his growing
popularity.  He could not be relieved from duty in the field where all
his battles had been victories:  the design would have been too
transparent.  It was finally decided to send General Scott to Mexico in
chief command, and to authorize him to carry out his own original plan:
that is, capture Vera Cruz and march upon the capital of the country.
It was no doubt supposed that Scott's ambition would lead him to
slaughter Taylor or destroy his chances for the Presidency, and yet it
was hoped that he would not make sufficient capital himself to secure
the prize.

The administration had indeed a most embarrassing problem to solve.  It
was engaged in a war of conquest which must be carried to a successful
issue, or the political object would be unattained.  Yet all the capable
officers of the requisite rank belonged to the opposition, and the man
selected for his lack of political ambition had himself become a
prominent candidate for the Presidency.  It was necessary to destroy his
chances promptly.  The problem was to do this without the loss of
conquest and without permitting another general of the same political
party to acquire like popularity.  The fact is, the administration of
Mr. Polk made every preparation to disgrace Scott, or, to speak more
correctly, to drive him to such desperation that he would disgrace
himself.

General Scott had opposed conquest by the way of the Rio Grande,
Matamoras and Saltillo from the first.  Now that he was in command of
all the forces in Mexico, he withdrew from Taylor most of his regular
troops and left him only enough volunteers, as he thought, to hold the
line then in possession of the invading army.  Indeed Scott did not deem
it important to hold anything beyond the Rio Grande, and authorized
Taylor to fall back to that line if he chose.  General Taylor protested
against the depletion of his army, and his subsequent movement upon
Buena Vista would indicate that he did not share the views of his chief
in regard to the unimportance of conquest beyond the Rio Grande.

Scott had estimated the men and material that would be required to
capture Vera Cruz and to march on the capital of the country, two
hundred and sixty miles in the interior.  He was promised all he asked
and seemed to have not only the confidence of the President, but his
sincere good wishes.  The promises were all broken.  Only about half the
troops were furnished that had been pledged, other war material was
withheld and Scott had scarcely started for Mexico before the President
undertook to supersede him by the appointment of Senator Thomas H.
Benton as lieutenant-general.  This being refused by Congress, the
President asked legislative authority to place a junior over a senior of
the same grade, with the view of appointing Benton to the rank of
major-general and then placing him in command of the army, but Congress
failed to accede to this proposition as well, and Scott remained in
command: but every general appointed to serve under him was politically
opposed to the chief, and several were personally hostile.

General Scott reached Brazos Santiago or Point Isabel, at the mouth of
the Rio Grande, late in December, 1846, and proceeded at once up the
river to Camargo, where he had written General Taylor to meet him.
Taylor, however, had gone to, or towards Tampico, for the purpose of
establishing a post there.  He had started on this march before he was
aware of General Scott being in the country.  Under these circumstances
Scott had to issue his orders designating the troops to be withdrawn
from Taylor, without the personal consultation he had expected to hold
with his subordinate.

General Taylor's victory at Buena Vista, February 22d, 23d, and 24th,
1847, with an army composed almost entirely of volunteers who had not
been in battle before, and over a vastly superior force numerically,
made his nomination for the Presidency by the Whigs a foregone
conclusion.  He was nominated and elected in 1848.  I believe that he
sincerely regretted this turn in his fortunes, preferring the peace
afforded by a quiet life free from abuse to the honor of filling the
highest office in the gift of any people, the Presidency of the United
States.

When General Scott assumed command of the army of invasion, I was in the
division of General David Twiggs, in Taylor's command; but under the new
orders my regiment was transferred to the division of General William
Worth, in which I served to the close of the war.  The troops withdrawn
from Taylor to form part of the forces to operate against Vera Cruz,
were assembled at the mouth of the Rio Grande preparatory to embarkation
for their destination.  I found General Worth a different man from any I
had before served directly under.  He was nervous, impatient and
restless on the march, or when important or responsible duty confronted
him.  There was not the least reason for haste on the march, for it was
known that it would take weeks to assemble shipping enough at the point
of our embarkation to carry the army, but General Worth moved his
division with a rapidity that would have been commendable had he been
going to the relief of a beleaguered garrison.  The length of the
marches was regulated by the distances between places affording a supply
of water for the troops, and these distances were sometimes long and
sometimes short.  General Worth on one occasion at least, after having
made the full distance intended for the day, and after the troops were
in camp and preparing their food, ordered tents struck and made the
march that night which had been intended for the next day.  Some
commanders can move troops so as to get the maximum distance out of them
without fatigue, while others can wear them out in a few days without
accomplishing so much. General Worth belonged to this latter class.  He
enjoyed, however, a fine reputation for his fighting qualities, and thus
attached his officers and men to him.

The army lay in camp upon the sand-beach in the neighborhood of the
mouth of the Rio Grande for several weeks, awaiting the arrival of
transports to carry it to its new field of operations.  The transports
were all sailing vessels.  The passage was a tedious one, and many of
the troops were on shipboard over thirty days from the embarkation at
the mouth of the Rio Grande to the time of debarkation south of Vera
Cruz. The trip was a comfortless one for officers and men.  The
transports used were built for carrying freight and possessed but
limited accommodations for passengers, and the climate added to the
discomfort of all.

The transports with troops were assembled in the harbor of Anton
Lizardo, some sixteen miles south of Vera Cruz, as they arrived, and
there awaited the remainder of the fleet, bringing artillery, ammunition
and supplies of all kinds from the North.  With the fleet there was a
little steam propeller dispatch-boat--the first vessel of the kind I had
ever seen, and probably the first of its kind ever seen by any one then
with the army.  At that day ocean steamers were rare, and what there
were were sidewheelers.  This little vessel, going through the fleet so
fast, so noiselessly and with its propeller under water out of view,
attracted a great deal of attention.  I recollect that Lieutenant Sidney
Smith, of the 4th infantry, by whom I happened to be standing on the
deck of a vessel when this propeller was passing, exclaimed, "Why, the
thing looks as if it was propelled by the force of circumstances."

Finally on the 7th of March, 1847, the little army of ten or twelve
thousand men, given Scott to invade a country with a population of seven
or eight millions, a mountainous country affording the greatest possible
natural advantages for defence, was all assembled and ready to commence
the perilous task of landing from vessels lying in the open sea.

The debarkation took place inside of the little island of Sacrificios,
some three miles south of Vera Cruz.  The vessels could not get anywhere
near shore, so that everything had to be landed in lighters or
surf-boats; General Scott had provided these before leaving the North.
The breakers were sometimes high, so that the landing was tedious.  The
men were got ashore rapidly, because they could wade when they came to
shallow water; but the camp and garrison equipage, provisions,
ammunition and all stores had to be protected from the salt water, and
therefore their landing took several days.  The Mexicans were very kind
to us, however, and threw no obstacles in the way of our landing except
an occasional shot from their nearest fort.  During the debarkation one
shot took off the head of Major Albertis.  No other, I believe, reached
anywhere near the same distance.  On the 9th of March the troops were
landed and the investment of Vera Cruz, from the Gulf of Mexico south of
the city to the Gulf again on the north, was soon and easily effected.
The landing of stores was continued until everything was got ashore.

Vera Cruz, at the time of which I write and up to 1880, was a walled
city.  The wall extended from the water's edge south of the town to the
water again on the north.  There were fortifications at intervals along
the line and at the angles. In front of the city, and on an island half
a mile out in the Gulf, stands San Juan de Ulloa, an enclosed
fortification of large dimensions and great strength for that period.
Against artillery of the present day the land forts and walls would
prove elements of weakness rather than strength.  After the invading
army had established their camps out of range of the fire from the city,
batteries were established, under cover of night, far to the front of
the line where the troops lay.  These batteries were intrenched and the
approaches sufficiently protected.  If a sortie had been made at any
time by the Mexicans, the men serving the batteries could have been
quickly reinforced without great exposure to the fire from the enemy's
main line.  No serious attempt was made to capture the batteries or to
drive our troops away.

The siege continued with brisk firing on our side till the 27th of
March, by which time a considerable breach had been made in the wall
surrounding the city.  Upon this General Morales, who was Governor of
both the city and of San Juan de Ulloa, commenced a correspondence with
General Scott looking to the surrender of the town, forts and garrison.
On the 29th Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulloa were occupied by Scott's
army.  About five thousand prisoners and four hundred pieces of
artillery, besides large amounts of small arms and ammunition, fell into
the hands of the victorious force.  The casualties on our side during
the siege amounted to sixty-four officers and men, killed and wounded.



CHAPTER X.

MARCH TO JALAPA--BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO--PEROTE--PUEBLA--SCOTT AND
TAYLOR.

General Scott had less than twelve thousand men at Vera Cruz. He had
been promised by the administration a very much larger force, or claimed
that he had, and he was a man of veracity. Twelve thousand was a very
small army with which to penetrate two hundred and sixty miles into an
enemy's country, and to besiege the capital; a city, at that time, of
largely over one hundred thousand inhabitants.  Then, too, any line of
march that could be selected led through mountain passes easily
defended. In fact, there were at that time but two roads from Vera Cruz
to the City of Mexico that could be taken by an army; one by Jalapa and
Perote, the other by Cordova and Orizaba, the two coming together on the
great plain which extends to the City of Mexico after the range of
mountains is passed.

It was very important to get the army away from Vera Cruz as soon as
possible, in order to avoid the yellow fever, or vomito, which usually
visits that city early in the year, and is very fatal to persons not
acclimated; but transportation, which was expected from the North, was
arriving very slowly.  It was absolutely necessary to have enough to
supply the army to Jalapa, sixty-five miles in the interior and above
the fevers of the coast.  At that point the country is fertile, and an
army of the size of General Scott's could subsist there for an
indefinite period.  Not counting the sick, the weak and the garrisons
for the captured city and fort, the moving column was now less than ten
thousand strong.  This force was composed of three divisions, under
Generals Twiggs, Patterson, and Worth. The importance of escaping the
vomito was so great that as soon as transportation enough could be got
together to move a division the advance was commenced.  On the 8th of
April, Twiggs's division started for Jalapa.  He was followed very soon
by Patterson, with his division.  General Worth was to bring up the rear
with his command as soon as transportation enough was assembled to carry
six days' rations for his troops with the necessary ammunition and camp
and garrison equipage.  It was the 13th of April before this division
left Vera Cruz.

The leading division ran against the enemy at Cerro Gordo, some fifty
miles west, on the road to Jalapa, and went into camp at Plan del Rio,
about three miles from the fortifications. General Patterson reached
Plan del Rio with his division soon after Twiggs arrived.  The two were
then secure against an attack from Santa Anna, who commanded the Mexican
forces.  At all events they confronted the enemy without reinforcements
and without molestation, until the 18th of April.  General Scott had
remained at Vera Cruz to hasten preparations for the field; but on the
12th, learning the situation at the front, he hastened on to take
personal supervision.  He at once commenced his preparations for the
capture of the position held by Santa Anna and of the troops holding it.

Cerro Gordo is one of the higher spurs of the mountains some twelve to
fifteen miles east of Jalapa, and Santa Anna had selected this point as
the easiest to defend against an invading army.  The road, said to have
been built by Cortez, zigzags around the mountain-side and was defended
at every turn by artillery.  On either side were deep chasms or mountain
walls. A direct attack along the road was an impossibility.  A flank
movement seemed equally impossible.  After the arrival of the
commanding-general upon the scene, reconnoissances were sent out to
find, or to make, a road by which the rear of the enemy's works might be
reached without a front attack.  These reconnoissances were made under
the supervision of Captain Robert E. Lee, assisted by Lieutenants P. G.
T. Beauregard, Isaac I. Stevens, Z. B. Tower, G. W. Smith, George B.
McClellan, and J. G. Foster, of the corps of engineers, all officers who
attained rank and fame, on one side or the other, in the great conflict
for the preservation of the unity of the nation.  The reconnoissance was
completed, and the labor of cutting out and making roads by the flank of
the enemy was effected by the 17th of the month.  This was accomplished
without the knowledge of Santa Anna or his army, and over ground where
he supposed it impossible.  On the same day General Scott issued his
order for the attack on the 18th.

The attack was made as ordered, and perhaps there was not a battle of
the Mexican war, or of any other, where orders issued before an
engagement were nearer being a correct report of what afterwards took
place.  Under the supervision of the engineers, roadways had been opened
over chasms to the right where the walls were so steep that men could
barely climb them.  Animals could not.  These had been opened under
cover of night, without attracting the notice of the enemy.  The
engineers, who had directed the opening, led the way and the troops
followed. Artillery was let down the steep <DW72>s by hand, the men
engaged attaching a strong rope to the rear axle and letting the guns
down, a piece at a time, while the men at the ropes kept their ground on
top, paying out gradually, while a few at the front directed the course
of the piece.  In like manner the guns were drawn by hand up the
opposite <DW72>s.  In this way Scott's troops reached their assigned
position in rear of most of the intrenchments of the enemy, unobserved.
The attack was made, the Mexican reserves behind the works beat a hasty
retreat, and those occupying them surrendered.  On the left General
Pillow's command made a formidable demonstration, which doubtless held a
part of the enemy in his front and contributed to the victory. I am not
pretending to give full details of all the battles fought, but of the
portion that I saw.  There were troops engaged on both sides at other
points in which both sustained losses; but the battle was won as here
narrated.

The surprise of the enemy was complete, the victory overwhelming; some
three thousand prisoners fell into Scott's hands, also a large amount of
ordnance and ordnance stores.  The prisoners were paroled, the artillery
parked and the small arms and ammunition destroyed.  The battle of Buena
Vista was probably very important to the success of General Scott at
Cerro Gordo and in his entire campaign from Vera Cruz to the great
plains reaching to the City of Mexico.  The only army Santa Anna had to
protect his capital and the mountain passes west of Vera Cruz, was the
one he had with him confronting General Taylor. It is not likely that he
would have gone as far north as Monterey to attack the United States
troops when he knew his country was threatened with invasion further
south.  When Taylor moved to Saltillo and then advanced on to Buena
Vista, Santa Anna crossed the desert confronting the invading army,
hoping no doubt to crush it and get back in time to meet General Scott
in the mountain passes west of Vera Cruz.  His attack on Taylor was
disastrous to the Mexican army, but, notwithstanding this, he marched
his army to Cerro Gordo, a distance not much short of one thousand miles
by the line he had to travel, in time to intrench himself well before
Scott got there.  If he had been successful at Buena Vista his troops
would no doubt have made a more stubborn resistance at Cerro Gordo.  Had
the battle of Buena Vista not been fought Santa Anna would have had time
to move leisurely to meet the invader further south and with an army not
demoralized nor depleted by defeat.

After the battle the victorious army moved on to Jalapa, where it was in
a beautiful, productive and healthy country, far above the fevers of the
coast.  Jalapa, however, is still in the mountains, and between there
and the great plain the whole line of the road is easy of defence.  It
was important, therefore, to get possession of the great highway between
the sea-coast and the capital up to the point where it leaves the
mountains, before the enemy could have time to re-organize and fortify
in our front. Worth's division was selected to go forward to secure this
result.  The division marched to Perote on the great plain, not far from
where the road debouches from the mountains.  There is a low, strong
fort on the plain in front of the town, known as the Castle of Perote.
This, however, offered no resistance and fell into our hands, with its
armament.

General Scott having now only nine or ten thousand men west of Vera
Cruz, and the time of some four thousand of them being about to expire,
a long delay was the consequence.  The troops were in a healthy climate,
and where they could subsist for an indefinite period even if their line
back to Vera Cruz should be cut off.  It being ascertained that the men
whose time would expire before the City of Mexico could possibly fall
into the hands of the American army, would not remain beyond the term
for which they had volunteered, the commanding-general determined to
discharge them at once, for a delay until the expiration of their time
would have compelled them to pass through Vera Cruz during the season of
the vomito.  This reduced Scott's force in the field to about five
thousand men.

Early in May, Worth, with his division, left Perote and marched on to
Puebla.  The roads were wide and the country open except through one
pass in a spur of mountains coming up from the south, through which the
road runs.  Notwithstanding this the small column was divided into two
bodies, moving a day apart. Nothing occurred on the march of special
note, except that while lying at the town of Amozoque--an easy day's
march east of Puebla--a body of the enemy's cavalry, two or three
thousand strong, was seen to our right, not more than a mile away.  A
battery or two, with two or three infantry regiments, was sent against
them and they soon disappeared.  On the 15th of May we entered the city
of Puebla.

General Worth was in command at Puebla until the latter end of May, when
General Scott arrived.  Here, as well as on the march up, his
restlessness, particularly under responsibilities, showed itself.
During his brief command he had the enemy hovering around near the city,
in vastly superior numbers to his own.  The brigade to which I was
attached changed quarters three different times in about a week,
occupying at first quarters near the plaza, in the heart of the city;
then at the western entrance; then at the extreme east.  On one occasion
General Worth had the troops in line, under arms, all day, with three
days' cooked rations in their haversacks.  He galloped from one command
to another proclaiming the near proximity of Santa Anna with an army
vastly superior to his own.  General Scott arrived upon the scene the
latter part of the month, and nothing more was heard of Santa Anna and
his myriads.  There were, of course, bodies of mounted Mexicans hovering
around to watch our movements and to pick up stragglers, or small bodies
of troops, if they ventured too far out.  These always withdrew on the
approach of any considerable number of our soldiers.  After the arrival
of General Scott I was sent, as quartermaster, with a large train of
wagons, back two days' march at least, to procure forage.  We had less
than a thousand men as escort, and never thought of danger.  We procured
full loads for our entire train at two plantations, which could easily
have furnished as much more.

There had been great delay in obtaining the authority of Congress for
the raising of the troops asked for by the administration.  A bill was
before the National Legislature from early in the session of 1846-7,
authorizing the creation of ten additional regiments for the war to be
attached to the regular army, but it was the middle of February before
it became a law.  Appointments of commissioned officers had then to be
made; men had to be enlisted, the regiments equipped and the whole
transported to Mexico.  It was August before General Scott received
reinforcement sufficient to warrant an advance.  His moving column, not
even now more than ten thousand strong, was in four divisions, commanded
by Generals Twiggs, Worth, Pillow and Quitman.  There was also a cavalry
corps under General Harney, composed of detachments of the 1st, 2d, and
3d dragoons.  The advance commenced on the 7th of August with Twiggs's
division in front.  The remaining three divisions followed, with an
interval of a day between.  The marches were short, to make
concentration easier in case of attack.

I had now been in battle with the two leading commanders conducting
armies in a foreign land.  The contrast between the two was very marked.
General Taylor never wore uniform, but dressed himself entirely for
comfort.  He moved about the field in which he was operating to see
through his own eyes the situation.  Often he would be without staff
officers, and when he was accompanied by them there was no prescribed
order in which they followed.  He was very much given to sit his horse
side-ways--with both feet on one side--particularly on the battlefield.
General Scott was the reverse in all these particulars.  He always wore
all the uniform prescribed or allowed by law when he inspected his
lines; word would be sent to all division and brigade commanders in
advance, notifying them of the hour when the commanding general might be
expected.  This was done so that all the army might be under arms to
salute their chief as he passed.  On these occasions he wore his dress
uniform, cocked hat, aiguillettes, sabre and spurs.  His staff proper,
besides all officers constructively on his staff--engineers, inspectors,
quartermasters, etc., that could be spared--followed, also in uniform
and in prescribed order.  Orders were prepared with great care and
evidently with the view that they should be a history of what followed.

In their modes of expressing thought, these two generals contrasted
quite as strongly as in their other characteristics.  General Scott was
precise in language, cultivated a style peculiarly his own; was proud of
his rhetoric; not averse to speaking of himself, often in the third
person, and he could bestow praise upon the person he was talking about
without the least embarrassment.  Taylor was not a conversationalist,
but on paper he could put his meaning so plainly that there could be no
mistaking it.  He knew how to express what he wanted to say in the
fewest well-chosen words, but would not sacrifice meaning to the
construction of high-sounding sentences.  But with their opposite
characteristics both were great and successful soldiers; both were true,
patriotic and upright in all their dealings.  Both were pleasant to
serve under--Taylor was pleasant to serve with.  Scott saw more through
the eyes of his staff officers than through his own.  His plans were
deliberately prepared, and fully expressed in orders.  Taylor saw for
himself, and gave orders to meet the emergency without reference to how
they would read in history.



CHAPTER XI.

ADVANCE ON THE CITY OF MEXICO--BATTLE OF CONTRERAS--ASSAULT AT
CHURUBUSCO--NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE--BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY--STORMING
OF CHAPULTEPEC--SAN COSME--EVACUATION OF THE CITY--HALLS OF THE
MONTEZUMAS.

The route followed by the army from Puebla to the City of Mexico was
over Rio Frio mountain, the road leading over which, at the highest
point, is about eleven thousand feet above tide water. The pass through
this mountain might have been easily defended, but it was not; and the
advanced division reached the summit in three days after leaving Puebla.
The City of Mexico lies west of Rio Frio mountain, on a plain backed by
another mountain six miles farther west, with others still nearer on the
north and south.  Between the western base of Rio Frio and the City of
Mexico there are three lakes, Chalco and Xochimilco on the left and
Texcoco on the right, extending to the east end of the City of Mexico.
Chalco and Texcoco are divided by a narrow strip of land over which the
direct road to the city runs.  Xochimilco is also to the left of the
road, but at a considerable distance south of it, and is connected with
Lake Chalco by a narrow channel.  There is a high rocky mound, called El
Penon, on the right of the road, springing up from the low flat ground
dividing the lakes.  This mound was strengthened by intrenchments at its
base and summit, and rendered a direct attack impracticable.

Scott's army was rapidly concentrated about Ayotla and other points near
the eastern end of Lake Chalco.  Reconnoissances were made up to within
gun-shot of El Penon, while engineers were seeking a route by the south
side of Lake Chalco to flank the city, and come upon it from the south
and south-west.  A way was found around the lake, and by the 18th of
August troops were in St. Augustin Tlalpam, a town about eleven miles
due south from the plaza of the capital.  Between St. Augustin Tlalpam
and the city lie the hacienda of San Antonio and the village of
Churubusco, and south-west of them is Contreras.  All these points,
except St. Augustin Tlalpam, were intrenched and strongly garrisoned.
Contreras is situated on the side of a mountain, near its base, where
volcanic rocks are piled in great confusion, reaching nearly to San
Antonio.  This made the approach to the city from the south very
difficult.

The brigade to which I was attached--Garland's, of Worth's division--was
sent to confront San Antonio, two or three miles from St. Augustin
Tlalpam, on the road to Churubusco and the City of Mexico.  The ground
on which San Antonio stands is completely in the valley, and the surface
of the land is only a little above the level of the lakes, and, except
to the south-west, it was cut up by deep ditches filled with water.  To
the south-west is the Pedregal--the volcanic rock before spoken of--over
which cavalry or artillery could not be passed, and infantry would make
but poor progress if confronted by an enemy.  From the position occupied
by Garland's brigade, therefore, no movement could be made against the
defences of San Antonio except to the front, and by a narrow causeway,
over perfectly level ground, every inch of which was commanded by the
enemy's artillery and infantry.  If Contreras, some three miles west and
south, should fall into our hands, troops from there could move to the
right flank of all the positions held by the enemy between us and the
city.  Under these circumstances General Scott directed the holding of
the front of the enemy without making an attack until further orders.

On the 18th of August, the day of reaching San Augustin Tlalpam,
Garland's brigade secured a position within easy range of the advanced
intrenchments of San Antonio, but where his troops were protected by an
artificial embankment that had been thrown up for some other purpose
than defense.  General Scott at once set his engineers reconnoitring the
works about Contreras, and on the 19th movements were commenced to get
troops into positions from which an assault could be made upon the force
occupying that place.  The Pedregal on the north and north-east, and the
mountain on the south, made the passage by either flank of the enemy's
defences difficult, for their work stood exactly between those natural
bulwarks; but a road was completed during the day and night of the 19th,
and troops were got to the north and west of the enemy.

This affair, like that of Cerro Gordo, was an engagement in which the
officers of the engineer corps won special distinction.  In fact, in
both cases, tasks which seemed difficult at first sight were made easier
for the troops that had to execute them than they would have been on an
ordinary field.  The very strength of each of these positions was, by
the skill of the engineers, converted into a defence for the assaulting
parties while securing their positions for final attack.  All the troops
with General Scott in the valley of Mexico, except a part of the
division of General Quitman at San Augustin Tlalpam and the brigade of
Garland (Worth's division) at San Antonio, were engaged at the battle of
Contreras, or were on their way, in obedience to the orders of their
chief, to reinforce those who were engaged.  The assault was made on the
morning of the 20th, and in less than half an hour from the sound of the
advance the position was in our hands, with many prisoners and large
quantities of ordnance and other stores. The brigade commanded by
General Riley was from its position the most conspicuous in the final
assault, but all did well, volunteers and regulars.

From the point occupied by Garland's brigade we could see the progress
made at Contreras and the movement of troops toward the flank and rear
of the enemy opposing us.  The Mexicans all the way back to the city
could see the same thing, and their conduct showed plainly that they did
not enjoy the sight.  We moved out at once, and found them gone from our
immediate front.  Clarke's brigade of Worth's division now moved west
over the point of the Pedregal, and after having passed to the north
sufficiently to clear San Antonio, turned east and got on the causeway
leading to Churubusco and the City of Mexico.  When he approached
Churubusco his left, under Colonel Hoffman, attacked a tete-de-pont at
that place and brought on an engagement.  About an hour after, Garland
was ordered to advance directly along the causeway, and got up in time
to take part in the engagement.  San Antonio was found evacuated, the
evacuation having probably taken place immediately upon the enemy seeing
the stars and stripes waving over Contreras.

The troops that had been engaged at Contreras, and even then on their
way to that battle-field, were moved by a causeway west of, and parallel
to the one by way of San Antonio and Churubusco.  It was expected by the
commanding general that these troops would move north sufficiently far
to flank the enemy out of his position at Churubusco, before turning
east to reach the San Antonio road, but they did not succeed in this,
and Churubusco proved to be about the severest battle fought in the
valley of Mexico.  General Scott coming upon the battle-field about this
juncture, ordered two brigades, under Shields, to move north and turn
the right of the enemy.  This Shields did, but not without hard fighting
and heavy loss.  The enemy finally gave way, leaving in our hands
prisoners, artillery and small arms.  The balance of the causeway held
by the enemy, up to the very gates of the city, fell in like manner.  I
recollect at this place that some of the gunners who had stood their
ground, were deserters from General Taylor's army on the Rio Grande.

Both the strategy and tactics displayed by General Scott in these
various engagements of the 20th of August, 1847, were faultless as I
look upon them now, after the lapse of so many years.  As before stated,
the work of the engineer officers who made the reconnoissances and led
the different commands to their destinations, was so perfect that the
chief was able to give his orders to his various subordinates with all
the precision he could use on an ordinary march.  I mean, up to the
points from which the attack was to commence.  After that point is
reached the enemy often induces a change of orders not before
contemplated.  The enemy outside the city outnumbered our soldiery quite
three to one, but they had become so demoralized by the succession of
defeats this day, that the City of Mexico could have been entered
without much further bloodshed.  In fact, Captain Philip Kearney
--afterwards a general in the war of the rebellion--rode with a squadron
of cavalry to the very gates of the city, and would no doubt have
entered with his little force, only at that point he was badly wounded,
as were several of his officers.  He had not heard the call for a halt.

General Franklin Pierce had joined the army in Mexico, at Puebla, a
short time before the advance upon the capital commenced.  He had
consequently not been in any of the engagements of the war up to the
battle of Contreras.  By an unfortunate fall of his horse on the
afternoon of the 19th he was painfully injured.  The next day, when his
brigade, with the other troops engaged on the same field, was ordered
against the flank and rear of the enemy guarding the different points of
the road from San Augustin Tlalpam to the city, General Pierce attempted
to accompany them.  He was not sufficiently recovered to do so, and
fainted.  This circumstance gave rise to exceedingly unfair and unjust
criticisms of him when he became a candidate for the Presidency.
Whatever General Pierce's qualifications may have been for the
Presidency, he was a gentleman and a man of courage.  I was not a
supporter of him politically, but I knew him more intimately than I did
any other of the volunteer generals.

General Scott abstained from entering the city at this time, because Mr.
Nicholas P. Trist, the commissioner on the part of the United States to
negotiate a treaty of peace with Mexico, was with the army, and either
he or General Scott thought--probably both of them--that a treaty would
be more possible while the Mexican government was in possession of the
capital than if it was scattered and the capital in the hands of an
invader.  Be this as it may, we did not enter at that time. The army
took up positions along the <DW72>s of the mountains south of the city,
as far west as Tacubaya.  Negotiations were at once entered into with
Santa Anna, who was then practically THE GOVERNMENT and the immediate
commander of all the troops engaged in defence of the country.  A truce
was signed which denied to either party the right to strengthen its
position, or to receive reinforcements during the continuance of the
armistices, but authorized General Scott to draw supplies for his army
from the city in the meantime.

Negotiations were commenced at once and were kept up vigorously between
Mr. Trist and the commissioners appointed on the part of Mexico, until
the 2d of September.  At that time Mr. Trist handed in his ultimatum.
Texas was to be given up absolutely by Mexico, and New Mexico and
California ceded to the United States for a stipulated sum to be
afterwards determined.  I do not suppose Mr. Trist had any discretion
whatever in regard to boundaries. The war was one of conquest, in the
interest of an institution, and the probabilities are that private
instructions were for the acquisition of territory out of which new
States might be carved.  At all events the Mexicans felt so outraged at
the terms proposed that they commenced preparations for defence, without
giving notice of the termination of the armistice.  The terms of the
truce had been violated before, when teams had been sent into the city
to bring out supplies for the army.  The first train entering the city
was very severely threatened by a mob. This, however, was apologized for
by the authorities and all responsibility for it denied; and thereafter,
to avoid exciting the Mexican people and soldiery, our teams with their
escorts were sent in at night, when the troops were in barracks and the
citizens in bed.  The circumstance was overlooked and negotiations
continued.  As soon as the news reached General Scott of the second
violation of the armistice, about the 4th of September, he wrote a
vigorous note to President Santa Anna, calling his attention to it, and,
receiving an unsatisfactory reply, declared the armistice at an end.

General Scott, with Worth's division, was now occupying Tacubaya, a
village some four miles south-west of the City of Mexico, and extending
from the base up the mountain-side for the distance of half a mile.
More than a mile west, and also a little above the plain, stands Molino
del Rey.  The mill is a long stone structure, one story high and several
hundred feet in length.  At the period of which I speak General Scott
supposed a portion of the mill to be used as a foundry for the casting
of guns.  This, however, proved to be a mistake.  It was valuable to the
Mexicans because of the quantity of grain it contained. The building is
flat roofed, and a line of sand-bags over the outer walls rendered the
top quite a formidable defence for infantry.  Chapultepec is a mound
springing up from the plain to the height of probably three hundred
feet, and almost in a direct line between Molino del Rey and the western
part of the city.  It was fortified both on the top and on the rocky and
precipitous sides.

The City of Mexico is supplied with water by two aqueducts, resting on
strong stone arches.  One of these aqueducts draws its supply of water
from a mountain stream coming into it at or near Molino del Rey, and
runs north close to the west base of Chapultepec; thence along the
centre of a wide road, until it reaches the road running east into the
city by the Garita San Cosme; from which point the aqueduct and road
both run east to the city.  The second aqueduct starts from the east
base of Chapultepec, where it is fed by a spring, and runs north-east to
the city.  This aqueduct, like the other, runs in the middle of a broad
road-way, thus leaving a space on each side.  The arches supporting the
aqueduct afforded protection for advancing troops as well as to those
engaged defensively.  At points on the San Cosme road parapets were
thrown across, with an embrasure for a single piece of artillery in
each.  At the point where both road and aqueduct turn at right angles
from north to east, there was not only one of these parapets supplied by
one gun and infantry supports, but the houses to the north of the San
Cosme road, facing south and commanding a view of the road back to
Chapultepec, were covered with infantry, protected by parapets made of
sandbags.  The roads leading to garitas (the gates) San Cosme and Belen,
by which these aqueducts enter the city, were strongly intrenched.
Deep, wide ditches, filled with water, lined the sides of both roads.
Such were the defences of the City of Mexico in September, 1847, on the
routes over which General Scott entered.

Prior to the Mexican war General Scott had been very partial to General
Worth--indeed he continued so up to the close of hostilities--but, for
some reason, Worth had become estranged from his chief.  Scott evidently
took this coldness somewhat to heart.  He did not retaliate, however,
but on the contrary showed every disposition to appease his subordinate.
It was understood at the time that he gave Worth authority to plan and
execute the battle of Molino del Rey without dictation or interference
from any one, for the very purpose of restoring their former relations.
The effort failed, and the two generals remained ever after cold and
indifferent towards each other, if not actually hostile.

The battle of Molino del Rey was fought on the 8th of September.  The
night of the 7th, Worth sent for his brigade and regimental commanders,
with their staffs, to come to his quarters to receive instructions for
the morrow.  These orders contemplated a movement up to within striking
distance of the Mills before daylight.  The engineers had reconnoitred
the ground as well as possible, and had acquired all the information
necessary to base proper orders both for approach and attack.

By daylight on the morning of the 8th, the troops to be engaged at
Molino were all at the places designated.  The ground in front of the
Mills, to the south, was commanded by the artillery from the summit of
Chapultepec as well as by the lighter batteries at hand; but a charge
was made, and soon all was over.  Worth's troops entered the Mills by
every door, and the enemy beat a hasty retreat back to Chapultepec.  Had
this victory been followed up promptly, no doubt Americans and Mexicans
would have gone over the defences of Chapultepec so near together that
the place would have fallen into our hands without further loss.  The
defenders of the works could not have fired upon us without endangering
their own men.  This was not done, and five days later more valuable
lives were sacrificed to carry works which had been so nearly in our
possession on the 8th.  I do not criticise the failure to capture
Chapultepec at this time.  The result that followed the first assault
could not possibly have been foreseen, and to profit by the unexpected
advantage, the commanding general must have been on the spot and given
the necessary instructions at the moment, or the troops must have kept
on without orders.  It is always, however, in order to follow a
retreating foe, unless stopped or otherwise directed.  The loss on our
side at Molino del Rey was severe for the numbers engaged.  It was
especially so among commissioned officers.

I was with the earliest of the troops to enter the Mills.  In passing
through to the north side, looking towards Chapultepec, I happened to
notice that there were armed Mexicans still on top of the building, only
a few feet from many of our men.  Not seeing any stairway or ladder
reaching to the top of the building, I took a few soldiers, and had a
cart that happened to be standing near brought up, and, placing the
shafts against the wall and chocking the wheels so that the cart could
not back, used the shafts as a sort of ladder extending to within three
or four feet of the top.  By this I climbed to the roof of the building,
followed by a few men, but found a private soldier had preceded me by
some other way.  There were still quite a number of Mexicans on the
roof, among them a major and five or six officers of lower grades, who
had not succeeded in getting away before our troops occupied the
building.  They still had their arms, while the soldier before mentioned
was walking as sentry, guarding the prisoners he had SURROUNDED, all by
himself.  I halted the sentinel, received the swords from the
commissioned officers, and proceeded, with the assistance of the
soldiers now with me, to disable the muskets by striking them against
the edge of the wall, and throw them to the ground below.

Molino del Rey was now captured, and the troops engaged, with the
exception of an appropriate guard over the captured position and
property, were marched back to their quarters in Tacubaya. The
engagement did not last many minutes, but the killed and wounded were
numerous for the number of troops engaged.

During the night of the 11th batteries were established which could play
upon the fortifications of Chapultepec.  The bombardment commenced early
on the morning of the 12th, but there was no further engagement during
this day than that of the artillery.  General Scott assigned the capture
of Chapultepec to General Pillow, but did not leave the details to his
judgment. Two assaulting columns, two hundred and fifty men each,
composed of volunteers for the occasion, were formed.  They were
commanded by Captains McKinzie and Casey respectively.  The assault was
successful, but bloody.

In later years, if not at the time, the battles of Molino del Rey and
Chapultepec have seemed to me to have been wholly unnecessary.  When the
assaults upon the garitas of San Cosme and Belen were determined upon,
the road running east to the former gate could have been reached easily,
without an engagement, by moving along south of the Mills until west of
them sufficiently far to be out of range, thence north to the road above
mentioned; or, if desirable to keep the two attacking columns nearer
together, the troops could have been turned east so as to come on the
aqueduct road out of range of the guns from Chapultepec.  In like
manner, the troops designated to act against Belen could have kept east
of Chapultepec, out of range, and come on to the aqueduct, also out of
range of Chapultepec. Molino del Rey and Chapultepec would both have
been necessarily evacuated if this course had been pursued, for they
would have been turned.

General Quitman, a volunteer from the State of Mississippi, who stood
well with the army both as a soldier and as a man, commanded the column
acting against Belen.  General Worth commanded the column against San
Cosme.  When Chapultepec fell the advance commenced along the two
aqueduct roads.  I was on the road to San Cosme, and witnessed most that
took place on that route.  When opposition was encountered our troops
sheltered themselves by keeping under the arches supporting the
aqueduct, advancing an arch at a time.  We encountered no serious
obstruction until within gun-shot of the point where the road we were on
intersects that running east to the city, the point where the aqueduct
turns at a right angle.  I have described the defences of this position
before.  There were but three commissioned officers besides myself, that
I can now call to mind, with the advance when the above position was
reached. One of these officers was a Lieutenant Semmes, of the Marine
Corps.  I think Captain Gore, and Lieutenant Judah, of the 4th infantry,
were the others.  Our progress was stopped for the time by the single
piece of artillery at the angle of the roads and the infantry occupying
the house-tops back from it.

West of the road from where we were, stood a house occupying the
south-west angle made by the San Cosme road and the road we were moving
upon. A stone wall ran from the house along each of these roads for a
considerable distance and thence back until it joined, enclosing quite a
yard about the house.  I watched my opportunity and skipped across the
road and behind the south wall.  Proceeding cautiously to the west
corner of the enclosure, I peeped around and seeing nobody, continued,
still cautiously, until the road running east and west was reached.  I
then returned to the troops, and called for volunteers.  All that were
close to me, or that heard me, about a dozen, offered their services.
Commanding them to carry their arms at a trail, I watched our
opportunity and got them across the road and under cover of the wall
beyond, before the enemy had a shot at us. Our men under cover of the
arches kept a close watch on the intrenchments that crossed our path and
the house-tops beyond, and whenever a head showed itself above the
parapets they would fire at it.  Our crossing was thus made practicable
without loss.

When we reached a safe position I instructed my little command again to
carry their arms at a trail, not to fire at the enemy until they were
ordered, and to move very cautiously following me until the San Cosme
road was reached; we would then be on the flank of the men serving the
gun on the road, and with no obstruction between us and them.  When we
reached the south-west corner of the enclosure before described, I saw
some United States troops pushing north through a shallow ditch near by,
who had come up since my reconnaissance.  This was the company of
Captain Horace Brooks, of the artillery, acting as infantry.  I
explained to Brooks briefly what I had discovered and what I was about
to do.  He said, as I knew the ground and he did not, I might go on and
he would follow.  As soon as we got on the road leading to the city the
troops serving the gun on the parapet retreated, and those on the
house-tops near by followed; our men went after them in such close
pursuit--the troops we had left under the arches joining--that a second
line across the road, about half-way between the first and the garita,
was carried. No reinforcements had yet come up except Brooks's company,
and the position we had taken was too advanced to be held by so small a
force.  It was given up, but retaken later in the day, with some loss.

Worth's command gradually advanced to the front now open to it.  Later
in the day in reconnoitring I found a church off to the south of the
road, which looked to me as if the belfry would command the ground back
of the garita San Cosme.  I got an officer of the voltigeurs, with a
mountain howitzer and men to work it, to go with me.  The road being in
possession of the enemy, we had to take the field to the south to reach
the church.  This took us over several ditches breast deep in water and
grown up with water plants.  These ditches, however, were not over eight
or ten feet in width.  The howitzer was taken to pieces and carried by
the men to its destination.  When I knocked for admission a priest came
to the door who, while extremely polite, declined to admit us.  With the
little Spanish then at my command, I explained to him that he might save
property by opening the door, and he certainly would save himself from
becoming a prisoner, for a time at least; and besides, I intended to go
in whether he consented or not.  He began to see his duty in the same
light that I did, and opened the door, though he did not look as if it
gave him special pleasure to do so.  The gun was carried to the belfry
and put together.  We were not more than two or three hundred yards from
San Cosme.  The shots from our little gun dropped in upon the enemy and
created great confusion.  Why they did not send out a small party and
capture us, I do not know.  We had no infantry or other defences besides
our one gun.

The effect of this gun upon the troops about the gate of the city was so
marked that General Worth saw it from his position. (*3) He was so
pleased that he sent a staff officer, Lieutenant Pemberton--later
Lieutenant-General commanding the defences of Vicksburg--to bring me to
him.  He expressed his gratification at the services the howitzer in the
church steeple was doing, saying that every shot was effective, and
ordered a captain of voltigeurs to report to me with another howitzer to
be placed along with the one already rendering so much service.  I could
not tell the General that there was not room enough in the steeple for
another gun, because he probably would have looked upon such a statement
as a contradiction from a second lieutenant.  I took the captain with
me, but did not use his gun.

The night of the 13th of September was spent by the troops under General
Worth in the houses near San Cosme, and in line confronting the general
line of the enemy across to Belen.  The troops that I was with were in
the houses north of the road leading into the city, and were engaged
during the night in cutting passage-ways from one house to another
towards the town.  During the night Santa Anna, with his army--except
the deserters--left the city.  He liberated all the convicts confined in
the town, hoping, no doubt, that they would inflict upon us some injury
before daylight; but several hours after Santa Anna was out of the way,
the city authorities sent a delegation to General Scott to ask--if not
demand--an armistice, respecting church property, the rights of citizens
and the supremacy of the city government in the management of municipal
affairs.  General Scott declined to trammel himself with conditions, but
gave assurances that those who chose to remain within our lines would be
protected so long as they behaved themselves properly.

General Quitman had advanced along his line very successfully on the
13th, so that at night his command occupied nearly the same position at
Belen that Worth's troops did about San Cosme. After the interview above
related between General Scott and the city council, orders were issued
for the cautious entry of both columns in the morning.  The troops under
Worth were to stop at the Alameda, a park near the west end of the city.
Quitman was to go directly to the Plaza, and take possession of the
Palace--a mass of buildings on the east side in which Congress has its
sessions, the national courts are held, the public offices are all
located, the President resides, and much room is left for museums,
receptions, etc.  This is the building generally designated as the
"Halls of the Montezumas."



CHAPTER XII.

PROMOTION TO FIRST LIEUTENANT--CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF MEXICO--THE ARMY
--MEXICAN SOLDIERS--PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

On entering the city the troops were fired upon by the released
convicts, and possibly by deserters and hostile citizens.  The streets
were deserted, and the place presented the appearance of a "city of the
dead," except for this firing by unseen persons from house-tops,
windows, and around corners.  In this firing the lieutenant-colonel of
my regiment, Garland, was badly wounded, Lieutenant Sidney Smith, of the
4th infantry, was also wounded mortally.  He died a few days after, and
by his death I was promoted to the grade of first lieutenant.(*4)  I had
gone into the battle of Palo Alto in May, 1846, a second lieutenant, and
I entered the city of Mexico sixteen months later with the same rank,
after having been in all the engagements possible for any one man and in
a regiment that lost more officers during the war than it ever had
present at any one engagement.  My regiment lost four commissioned
officers, all senior to me, by steamboat explosions during the Mexican
war.  The Mexicans were not so discriminating.  They sometimes picked
off my juniors.

General Scott soon followed the troops into the city, in state.  I
wonder that he was not fired upon, but I believe he was not; at all
events he was not hurt.  He took quarters at first in the "Halls of the
Montezumas," and from there issued his wise and discreet orders for the
government of a conquered city, and for suppressing the hostile acts of
liberated convicts already spoken of--orders which challenge the respect
of all who study them.  Lawlessness was soon suppressed, and the City of
Mexico settled down into a quiet, law-abiding place.  The people began
to make their appearance upon the streets without fear of the invaders.
Shortly afterwards the bulk of the troops were sent from the city to the
villages at the foot of the mountains, four or five miles to the south
and south-west.

Whether General Scott approved of the Mexican war and the manner in
which it was brought about, I have no means of knowing.  His orders to
troops indicate only a soldierly spirit, with probably a little regard
for the perpetuation of his own fame.  On the other hand, General
Taylor's, I think, indicate that he considered the administration
accountable for the war, and felt no responsibility resting on himself
further than for the faithful performance of his duties.  Both generals
deserve the commendations of their countrymen and to live in the
grateful memory of this people to the latest generation.

Earlier in this narrative I have stated that the plain, reached after
passing the mountains east of Perote, extends to the cities of Puebla
and Mexico.  The route travelled by the army before reaching Puebla,
goes over a pass in a spur of mountain coming up from the south.  This
pass is very susceptible of defence by a smaller against a larger force.
Again, the highest point of the road-bed between Vera Cruz and the City
of Mexico is over Rio Frio mountain, which also might have been
successfully defended by an inferior against a superior force.  But by
moving north of the mountains, and about thirty miles north of Puebla,
both of these passes would have been avoided.  The road from Perote to
the City of Mexico, by this latter route, is as level as the prairies in
our West.  Arriving due north from Puebla, troops could have been
detached to take possession of that place, and then proceeding west with
the rest of the army no mountain would have been encountered before
reaching the City of Mexico.  It is true this road would have brought
troops in by Guadalupe--a town, church and detached spur of mountain
about two miles north of the capital, all bearing the same general name
--and at this point Lake Texcoco comes near to the mountain, which was
fortified both at the base and on the sides:  but troops could have
passed north of the mountain and come in only a few miles to the
north-west, and so flanked the position, as they actually did on the
south.

It has always seemed to me that this northern route to the City of
Mexico, would have been the better one to have taken.  But my later
experience has taught me two lessons:  first, that things are seen
plainer after the events have occurred; second, that the most confident
critics are generally those who know the least about the matter
criticised.  I know just enough about the Mexican war to approve
heartily of most of the generalship, but to differ with a little of it.
It is natural that an important city like Puebla should not have been
passed with contempt; it may be natural that the direct road to it
should have been taken; but it could have been passed, its evacuation
insured and possession acquired without danger of encountering the enemy
in intricate mountain defiles.  In this same way the City of Mexico
could have been approached without any danger of opposition, except in
the open field.

But General Scott's successes are an answer to all criticism. He invaded
a populous country, penetrating two hundred and sixty miles into the
interior, with a force at no time equal to one-half of that opposed to
him; he was without a base; the enemy was always intrenched, always on
the defensive; yet he won every battle, he captured the capital, and
conquered the government.  Credit is due to the troops engaged, it is
true, but the plans and the strategy were the general's.

I had now made marches and been in battle under both General Scott and
General Taylor.  The former divided his force of 10,500 men into four
columns, starting a day apart, in moving from Puebla to the capital of
the nation, when it was known that an army more than twice as large as
his own stood ready to resist his coming.  The road was broad and the
country open except in crossing the Rio Frio mountain.  General Taylor
pursued the same course in marching toward an enemy.  He moved even in
smaller bodies.  I never thought at the time to doubt the infallibility
of these two generals in all matters pertaining to their profession.  I
supposed they moved in small bodies because more men could not be passed
over a single road on the same day with their artillery and necessary
trains.  Later I found the fallacy of this belief.  The rebellion, which
followed as a sequence to the Mexican war, never could have been
suppressed if larger bodies of men could not have been moved at the same
time than was the custom under Scott and Taylor.

The victories in Mexico were, in every instance, over vastly superior
numbers.  There were two reasons for this.  Both General Scott and
General Taylor had such armies as are not often got together.  At the
battles of Palo Alto and Resaca-de-la-Palma, General Taylor had a small
army, but it was composed exclusively of regular troops, under the best
of drill and discipline.  Every officer, from the highest to the lowest,
was educated in his profession, not at West Point necessarily, but in
the camp, in garrison, and many of them in Indian wars. The rank and
file were probably inferior, as material out of which to make an army,
to the volunteers that participated in all the later battles of the war;
but they were brave men, and then drill and discipline brought out all
there was in them.  A better army, man for man, probably never faced an
enemy than the one commanded by General Taylor in the earliest two
engagements of the Mexican war.  The volunteers who followed were of
better material, but without drill or discipline at the start.  They
were associated with so many disciplined men and professionally educated
officers, that when they went into engagements it was with a confidence
they would not have felt otherwise.  They became soldiers themselves
almost at once.  All these conditions we would enjoy again in case of
war.

The Mexican army of that day was hardly an organization.  The private
soldier was picked up from the lower class of the inhabitants when
wanted; his consent was not asked; he was poorly clothed, worse fed, and
seldom paid.  He was turned adrift when no longer wanted.  The officers
of the lower grades were but little superior to the men.  With all this
I have seen as brave stands made by some of these men as I have ever
seen made by soldiers.  Now Mexico has a standing army larger than that
of the United States.  They have a military school modelled after West
Point.  Their officers are educated and, no doubt, generally brave.  The
Mexican war of 1846-8 would be an impossibility in this generation.

The Mexicans have shown a patriotism which it would be well if we would
imitate in part, but with more regard to truth.  They celebrate the
anniversaries of Chapultepec and Molino del Rey as of very great
victories.  The anniversaries are recognized as national holidays.  At
these two battles, while the United States troops were victorious, it
was at very great sacrifice of life compared with what the Mexicans
suffered.  The Mexicans, as on many other occasions, stood up as well as
any troops ever did.  The trouble seemed to be the lack of experience
among the officers, which led them after a certain time to simply quit,
without being particularly whipped, but because they had fought enough.
Their authorities of the present day grow enthusiastic over their theme
when telling of these victories, and speak with pride of the large sum
of money they forced us to pay in the end.  With us, now twenty years
after the close of the most stupendous war ever known, we have writers
--who profess devotion to the nation--engaged in trying to prove that the
Union forces were not victorious; practically, they say, we were slashed
around from Donelson to Vicksburg and to Chattanooga; and in the East
from Gettysburg to Appomattox, when the physical rebellion gave out from
sheer exhaustion.  There is no difference in the amount of romance in
the two stories.

I would not have the anniversaries of our victories celebrated, nor
those of our defeats made fast days and spent in humiliation and prayer;
but I would like to see truthful history written. Such history will do
full credit to the courage, endurance and soldierly ability of the
American citizen, no matter what section of the country he hailed from,
or in what ranks he fought.  The justice of the cause which in the end
prevailed, will, I doubt not, come to be acknowledged by every citizen
of the land, in time.  For the present, and so long as there are living
witnesses of the great war of sections, there will be people who will
not be consoled for the loss of a cause which they believed to be holy.
As time passes, people, even of the South, will begin to wonder how it
was possible that their ancestors ever fought for or justified
institutions which acknowledged the right of property in man.

After the fall of the capital and the dispersal of the government of
Mexico, it looked very much as if military occupation of the country for
a long time might be necessary. General Scott at once began the
preparation of orders, regulations and laws in view of this contingency.
He contemplated making the country pay all the expenses of the
occupation, without the army becoming a perceptible burden upon the
people.  His plan was to levy a direct tax upon the separate states, and
collect, at the ports left open to trade, a duty on all imports.  From
the beginning of the war private property had not been taken, either for
the use of the army or of individuals, without full compensation.  This
policy was to be pursued.  There were not troops enough in the valley of
Mexico to occupy many points, but now that there was no organized army
of the enemy of any size, reinforcements could be got from the Rio
Grande, and there were also new volunteers arriving from time to time,
all by way of Vera Cruz.  Military possession was taken of Cuernavaca,
fifty miles south of the City of Mexico; of Toluca, nearly as far west,
and of Pachuca, a mining town of great importance, some sixty miles to
the north-east.  Vera Cruz, Jalapa, Orizaba, and Puebla were already in
our possession.

Meanwhile the Mexican government had departed in the person of Santa
Anna, and it looked doubtful for a time whether the United States
commissioner, Mr. Trist, would find anybody to negotiate with.  A
temporary government, however, was soon established at Queretaro, and
Trist began negotiations for a conclusion of the war.  Before terms were
finally agreed upon he was ordered back to Washington, but General Scott
prevailed upon him to remain, as an arrangement had been so nearly
reached, and the administration must approve his acts if he succeeded in
making such a treaty as had been contemplated in his instructions.  The
treaty was finally signed the 2d of February, 1848, and accepted by the
government at Washington.  It is that known as the "Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo," and secured to the United States the Rio Grande as the
boundary of Texas, and the whole territory then included in New Mexico
and Upper California, for the sum of $15,000,000.

Soon after entering the city of Mexico, the opposition of Generals
Pillow, Worth and Colonel Duncan to General Scott became very marked.
Scott claimed that they had demanded of the President his removal.  I do
not know whether this is so or not, but I do know of their unconcealed
hostility to their chief.  At last he placed them in arrest, and
preferred charges against them of insubordination and disrespect.  This
act brought on a crisis in the career of the general commanding.  He had
asserted from the beginning that the administration was hostile to him;
that it had failed in its promises of men and war material; that the
President himself had shown duplicity if not treachery in the endeavor
to procure the appointment of Benton:  and the administration now gave
open evidence of its enmity.  About the middle of February orders came
convening a court of inquiry, composed of Brevet Brigadier-General
Towson, the paymaster-general of the army, Brigadier-General Cushing and
Colonel Belknap, to inquire into the conduct of the accused and the
accuser, and shortly afterwards orders were received from Washington,
relieving Scott of the command of the army in the field and assigning
Major-General William O. Butler of Kentucky to the place.  This order
also released Pillow, Worth and Duncan from arrest.

If a change was to be made the selection of General Butler was agreeable
to every one concerned, so far as I remember to have heard expressions
on the subject.  There were many who regarded the treatment of General
Scott as harsh and unjust.  It is quite possible that the vanity of the
General had led him to say and do things that afforded a plausible
pretext to the administration for doing just what it did and what it had
wanted to do from the start.  The court tried the accuser quite as much
as the accused.  It was adjourned before completing its labors, to meet
in Frederick, Maryland.  General Scott left the country, and never after
had more than the nominal command of the army until early in 1861.  He
certainly was not sustained in his efforts to maintain discipline in
high places.

The efforts to kill off politically the two successful generals, made
them both candidates for the Presidency.  General Taylor was nominated
in 1848, and was elected.  Four years later General Scott received the
nomination but was badly beaten, and the party nominating him died with
his defeat.(*5)



CHAPTER XIII.

TREATY OF PEACE--MEXICAN BULL FIGHTS--REGIMENTAL QUARTERMASTER--TRIP TO
POPOCATAPETL--TRIP TO THE CAVES OF MEXICO.

The treaty of peace between the two countries was signed by the
commissioners of each side early in February, 1848.  It took a
considerable time for it to reach Washington, receive the approval of
the administration, and be finally ratified by the Senate.  It was
naturally supposed by the army that there would be no more fighting, and
officers and men were of course anxious to get home, but knowing there
must be delay they contented themselves as best they could.  Every
Sunday there was a bull fight for the amusement of those who would pay
their fifty cents.  I attended one of them--just one--not wishing to
leave the country without having witnessed the national sport.  The
sight to me was sickening.  I could not see how human beings could enjoy
the sufferings of beasts, and often of men, as they seemed to do on
these occasions.

At these sports there are usually from four to six bulls sacrificed.
The audience occupies seats around the ring in which the exhibition is
given, each seat but the foremost rising higher than the one in front,
so that every one can get a full view of the sport.  When all is ready a
bull is turned into the ring.  Three or four men come in, mounted on the
merest skeletons of horses blind or blind-folded and so weak that they
could not make a sudden turn with their riders without danger of falling
down.  The men are armed with spears having a point as sharp as a
needle.  Other men enter the arena on foot, armed with red flags and
explosives about the size of a musket cartridge.  To each of these
explosives is fastened a barbed needle which serves the purpose of
attaching them to the bull by running the needle into the skin.  Before
the animal is turned loose a lot of these explosives are attached to
him.  The pain from the pricking of the skin by the needles is
exasperating; but when the explosions of the cartridges commence the
animal becomes frantic.  As he makes a lunge towards one horseman,
another runs a spear into him.  He turns towards his last tormentor when
a man on foot holds out a red flag; the bull rushes for this and is
allowed to take it on his horns.  The flag drops and covers the eyes of
the animal so that he is at a loss what to do; it is jerked from him and
the torment is renewed.  When the animal is worked into an
uncontrollable frenzy, the horsemen withdraw, and the matadores
--literally murderers--enter, armed with knives having blades twelve or
eighteen inches long, and sharp.  The trick is to dodge an attack from
the animal and stab him to the heart as he passes. If these efforts fail
the bull is finally lassoed, held fast and killed by driving a knife
blade into the spinal column just back of the horns.  He is then dragged
out by horses or mules, another is let into the ring, and the same
performance is renewed.

On the occasion when I was present one of the bulls was not turned aside
by the attacks in the rear, the presentations of the red flag, etc.,
etc., but kept right on, and placing his horns under the flanks of a
horse threw him and his rider to the ground with great force.  The horse
was killed and the rider lay prostrate as if dead.  The bull was then
lassoed and killed in the manner above described.  Men came in and
carried the dead man off in a litter.  When the slaughtered bull and
horse were dragged out, a fresh bull was turned into the ring.
Conspicuous among the spectators was the man who had been carried out on
a litter but a few minutes before.  He was only dead so far as that
performance went; but the corpse was so lively that it could not forego
the chance of witnessing the discomfiture of some of his brethren who
might not be so fortunate.  There was a feeling of disgust manifested by
the audience to find that he had come to life again.  I confess that I
felt sorry to see the cruelty to the bull and the horse.  I did not stay
for the conclusion of the performance; but while I did stay, there was
not a bull killed in the prescribed way.

Bull fights are now prohibited in the Federal District--embracing a
territory around the City of Mexico, somewhat larger than the District
of Columbia--and they are not an institution in any part of the country.
During one of my recent visits to Mexico, bull fights were got up in my
honor at Puebla and at Pachuca.  I was not notified in advance so as to
be able to decline and thus prevent the performance; but in both cases I
civilly declined to attend.

Another amusement of the people of Mexico of that day, and one which
nearly all indulged in, male and female, old and young, priest and
layman, was Monte playing.  Regular feast weeks were held every year at
what was then known as St. Augustin Tlalpam, eleven miles out of town.
There were dealers to suit every class and condition of people.  In many
of the booths tlackos--the copper coin of the country, four of them
making six and a quarter cents of our money--were piled up in great
quantities, with some silver, to accommodate the people who could not
bet more than a few pennies at a time.  In other booths silver formed
the bulk of the capital of the bank, with a few doubloons to be changed
if there should be a run of luck against the bank.  In some there was no
coin except gold.  Here the rich were said to bet away their entire
estates in a single day.  All this is stopped now.

For myself, I was kept somewhat busy during the winter of 1847-8.  My
regiment was stationed in Tacubaya.  I was regimental quartermaster and
commissary.  General Scott had been unable to get clothing for the
troops from the North.  The men were becoming--well, they needed
clothing.  Material had to be purchased, such as could be obtained, and
people employed to make it up into "Yankee uniforms."  A quartermaster
in the city was designated to attend to this special duty; but clothing
was so much needed that it was seized as fast as made up.  A regiment
was glad to get a dozen suits at a time.  I had to look after this
matter for the 4th infantry.  Then our regimental fund had run down and
some of the musicians in the band had been without their extra pay for a
number of months.

The regimental bands at that day were kept up partly by pay from the
government, and partly by pay from the regimental fund. There was
authority of law for enlisting a certain number of men as musicians.  So
many could receive the pay of non-commissioned officers of the various
grades, and the remainder the pay of privates.  This would not secure a
band leader, nor good players on certain instruments.  In garrison there
are various ways of keeping up a regimental fund sufficient to give
extra pay to musicians, establish libraries and ten-pin alleys,
subscribe to magazines and furnish many extra comforts to the men.  The
best device for supplying the fund is to issue bread to the soldiers
instead of flour.  The ration used to be eighteen ounces per day of
either flour or bread; and one hundred pounds of flour will make one
hundred and forty pounds of bread.  This saving was purchased by the
commissary for the benefit of the fund.  In the emergency the 4th
infantry was laboring under, I rented a bakery in the city, hired
bakers--Mexicans--bought fuel and whatever was necessary, and I also got
a contract from the chief commissary of the army for baking a large
amount of hard bread.  In two months I made more money for the fund than
my pay amounted to during the entire war.  While stationed at Monterey I
had relieved the post fund in the same way.  There, however, was no
profit except in the saving of flour by converting it into bread.

In the spring of 1848 a party of officers obtained leave to visit
Popocatapetl, the highest volcano in America, and to take an escort.  I
went with the party, many of whom afterwards occupied conspicuous
positions before the country.  Of those who "went south," and attained
high rank, there was Lieutenant Richard Anderson, who commanded a corps
at Spottsylvania; Captain Sibley, a major-general, and, after the war,
for a number of years in the employ of the Khedive of Egypt; Captain
George Crittenden, a rebel general; S. B. Buckner, who surrendered Fort
Donelson; and Mansfield Lovell, who commanded at New Orleans before that
city fell into the hands of the National troops.  Of those who remained
on our side there were Captain Andrew Porter, Lieutenant C. P. Stone and
Lieutenant Z. B. Tower.  There were quite a number of other officers,
whose names I cannot recollect.

At a little village (Ozumba) near the base of Popocatapetl, where we
purposed to commence the ascent, we procured guides and two pack mules
with forage for our horses.  High up on the mountain there was a
deserted house of one room, called the Vaqueria, which had been occupied
years before by men in charge of cattle ranging on the mountain.  The
pasturage up there was very fine when we saw it, and there were still
some cattle, descendants of the former domestic herd, which had now
become wild.  It was possible to go on horseback as far as the Vaqueria,
though the road was somewhat hazardous in places. Sometimes it was very
narrow with a yawning precipice on one side, hundreds of feet down to a
roaring mountain torrent below, and almost perpendicular walls on the
other side.  At one of these places one of our mules loaded with two
sacks of barley, one on each side, the two about as big as he was,
struck his load against the mountain-side and was precipitated to the
bottom.  The descent was steep but not perpendicular.  The mule rolled
over and over until the bottom was reached, and we supposed of course
the poor animal was dashed to pieces.  What was our surprise, not long
after we had gone into bivouac, to see the lost mule, cargo and owner
coming up the ascent.  The load had protected the animal from serious
injury; and his owner had gone after him and found a way back to the
path leading up to the hut where we were to stay.

The night at the Vaqueria was one of the most unpleasant I ever knew.
It was very cold and the rain fell in torrents.  A little higher up the
rain ceased and snow began.  The wind blew with great velocity.  The
log-cabin we were in had lost the roof entirely on one side, and on the
other it was hardly better then a sieve.  There was little or no sleep
that night.  As soon as it was light the next morning, we started to
make the ascent to the summit.  The wind continued to blow with violence
and the weather was still cloudy, but there was neither rain nor snow.
The clouds, however, concealed from our view the country below us,
except at times a momentary glimpse could be got through a clear space
between them.  The wind carried the loose snow around the mountain-sides
in such volumes as to make it almost impossible to stand up against it.
We labored on and on, until it became evident that the top could not be
reached before night, if at all in such a storm, and we concluded to
return. The descent was easy and rapid, though dangerous, until we got
below the snow line.  At the cabin we mounted our horses, and by night
were at Ozumba.

The fatigues of the day and the loss of sleep the night before drove us
to bed early.  Our beds consisted of a place on the dirt-floor with a
blanket under us.  Soon all were asleep; but long before morning first
one and then another of our party began to cry out with excruciating
pain in the eyes.  Not one escaped it.  By morning the eyes of half the
party were so swollen that they were entirely closed.  The others
suffered pain equally.  The feeling was about what might be expected
from the prick of a sharp needle at a white heat.  We remained in
quarters until the afternoon bathing our eyes in cold water. This
relieved us very much, and before night the pain had entirely left.  The
swelling, however, continued, and about half the party still had their
eyes entirely closed; but we concluded to make a start back, those who
could see a little leading the horses of those who could not see at all.
We moved back to the village of Ameca Ameca, some six miles, and stopped
again for the night.  The next morning all were entirely well and free
from pain.  The weather was clear and Popocatapetl stood out in all its
beauty, the top looking as if not a mile away, and inviting us to
return.  About half the party were anxious to try the ascent again, and
concluded to do so.  The remainder--I was with the remainder--concluded
that we had got all the pleasure there was to be had out of mountain
climbing, and that we would visit the great caves of Mexico, some ninety
miles from where we then were, on the road to Acapulco.

The party that ascended the mountain the second time succeeded in
reaching the crater at the top, with but little of the labor they
encountered in their first attempt.  Three of them--Anderson, Stone and
Buckner--wrote accounts of their journey, which were published at the
time.  I made no notes of this excursion, and have read nothing about it
since, but it seems to me that I can see the whole of it as vividly as
if it were but yesterday.  I have been back at Ameca Ameca, and the
village beyond, twice in the last five years.  The scene had not changed
materially from my recollection of it.

The party which I was with moved south down the valley to the town of
Cuantla, some forty miles from Ameca Ameca.  The latter stands on the
plain at the foot of Popocatapetl, at an elevation of about eight
thousand feet above tide water.  The <DW72> down is gradual as the
traveller moves south, but one would not judge that, in going to
Cuantla, descent enough had been made to occasion a material change in
the climate and productions of the soil; but such is the case.  In the
morning we left a temperate climate where the cereals and fruits are
those common to the United States, we halted in the evening in a
tropical climate where the orange and banana, the coffee and the
sugar-cane were flourishing.  We had been travelling, apparently,
on a plain all day, but in the direction of the flow of water.

Soon after the capture of the City of Mexico an armistice had been
agreed to, designating the limits beyond which troops of the respective
armies were not to go during its continuance. Our party knew nothing
about these limits.  As we approached Cuantla bugles sounded the
assembly, and soldiers rushed from the guard-house in the edge of the
town towards us.  Our party halted, and I tied a white pocket
handkerchief to a stick and, using it as a flag of truce, proceeded on
to the town.  Captains Sibley and Porter followed a few hundred yards
behind.  I was detained at the guard-house until a messenger could be
dispatched to the quarters of the commanding general, who authorized
that I should be conducted to him.  I had been with the general but a
few minutes when the two officers following announced themselves.  The
Mexican general reminded us that it was a violation of the truce for us
to be there.  However, as we had no special authority from our own
commanding general, and as we knew nothing about the terms of the truce,
we were permitted to occupy a vacant house outside the guard for the
night, with the promise of a guide to put us on the road to Cuernavaca
the next morning.

Cuernavaca is a town west of Guantla.  The country through which we
passed, between these two towns, is tropical in climate and productions
and rich in scenery.  At one point, about half-way between the two
places, the road goes over a low pass in the mountains in which there is
a very quaint old town, the inhabitants of which at that day were nearly
all full-blooded Indians.  Very few of them even spoke Spanish.  The
houses were built of stone and generally only one story high.  The
streets were narrow, and had probably been paved before Cortez visited
the country.  They had not been graded, but the paving had been done on
the natural surface.  We had with us one vehicle, a cart, which was
probably the first wheeled vehicle that had ever passed through that
town.

On a hill overlooking this town stands the tomb of an ancient king; and
it was understood that the inhabitants venerated this tomb very highly,
as well as the memory of the ruler who was supposed to be buried in it.
We ascended the mountain and surveyed the tomb; but it showed no
particular marks of architectural taste, mechanical skill or advanced
civilization.  The next day we went into Cuernavaca.

After a day's rest at Cuernavaca our party set out again on the journey
to the great caves of Mexico.  We had proceeded but a few miles when we
were stopped, as before, by a guard and notified that the terms of the
existing armistice did not permit us to go further in that direction.
Upon convincing the guard that we were a mere party of pleasure seekers
desirous of visiting the great natural curiosities of the country which
we expected soon to leave, we were conducted to a large hacienda near
by, and directed to remain there until the commanding general of that
department could be communicated with and his decision obtained as to
whether we should be permitted to pursue our journey.  The guard
promised to send a messenger at once, and expected a reply by night.  At
night there was no response from the commanding general, but the captain
of the guard was sure he would have a reply by morning.  Again in the
morning there was no reply.  The second evening the same thing happened,
and finally we learned that the guard had sent no message or messenger
to the department commander.  We determined therefore to go on unless
stopped by a force sufficient to compel obedience.

After a few hours' travel we came to a town where a scene similar to the
one at Cuantia occurred.  The commanding officer sent a guide to conduct
our party around the village and to put us upon our road again.  This
was the last interruption:  that night we rested at a large coffee
plantation, some eight miles from the cave we were on the way to visit.
It must have been a Saturday night; the peons had been paid off, and
spent part of the night in gambling away their scanty week's earnings.
Their coin was principally copper, and I do not believe there was a man
among them who had received as much as twenty-five cents in money.  They
were as much excited, however, as if they had been staking thousands.  I
recollect one poor fellow, who had lost his last tlacko, pulled off his
shirt and, in the most excited manner, put that up on the turn of a
card.  Monte was the game played, the place out of doors, near the
window of the room occupied by the officers of our party.

The next morning we were at the mouth of the cave at an early hour,
provided with guides, candles and rockets.  We explored to a distance of
about three miles from the entrance, and found a succession of chambers
of great dimensions and of great beauty when lit up with our rockets.
Stalactites and stalagmites of all sizes were discovered.  Some of the
former were many feet in diameter and extended from ceiling to floor;
some of the latter were but a few feet high from the floor; but the
formation is going on constantly, and many centuries hence these
stalagmites will extend to the ceiling and become complete columns.  The
stalagmites were all a little concave, and the cavities were filled with
water.  The water percolates through the roof, a drop at a time--often
the drops several minutes apart--and more or less charged with mineral
matter.  Evaporation goes on slowly, leaving the mineral behind.  This
in time makes the immense columns, many of them thousands of tons in
weight, which serve to support the roofs over the vast chambers.  I
recollect that at one point in the cave one of these columns is of such
huge proportions that there is only a narrow passage left on either side
of it.  Some of our party became satisfied with their explorations
before we had reached the point to which the guides were accustomed to
take explorers, and started back without guides.  Coming to the large
column spoken of, they followed it entirely around, and commenced
retracing their steps into the bowels of the mountain, without being
aware of the fact.  When the rest of us had completed our explorations,
we started out with our guides, but had not gone far before we saw the
torches of an approaching party.  We could not conceive who these could
be, for all of us had come in together, and there were none but
ourselves at the entrance when we started in. Very soon we found it was
our friends.  It took them some time to conceive how they had got where
they were.  They were sure they had kept straight on for the mouth of
the cave, and had gone about far enough to have reached it.



CHAPTER XIV.

RETURN OF THE ARMY--MARRIAGE--ORDERED TO THE PACIFIC COAST--CROSSING THE
ISTHMUS--ARRIVAL AT SAN FRANCISCO.

My experience in the Mexican war was of great advantage to me
afterwards.  Besides the many practical lessons it taught, the war
brought nearly all the officers of the regular army together so as to
make them personally acquainted.  It also brought them in contact with
volunteers, many of whom served in the war of the rebellion afterwards.
Then, in my particular case, I had been at West Point at about the right
time to meet most of the graduates who were of a suitable age at the
breaking out of the rebellion to be trusted with large commands.
Graduating in 1843, I was at the military academy from one to four years
with all cadets who graduated between 1840 and 1846--seven classes.
These classes embraced more than fifty officers who afterwards became
generals on one side or the other in the rebellion, many of them holding
high commands.  All the older officers, who became conspicuous in the
rebellion, I had also served with and known in Mexico:  Lee, J. E.
Johnston, A. S. Johnston, Holmes, Hebert and a number of others on the
Confederate side; McCall, Mansfield, Phil. Kearney and others on the
National side.  The acquaintance thus formed was of immense service to
me in the war of the rebellion--I mean what I learned of the characters
of those to whom I was afterwards opposed.  I do not pretend to say that
all movements, or even many of them, were made with special reference to
the characteristics of the commander against whom they were directed.
But my appreciation of my enemies was certainly affected by this
knowledge.  The natural disposition of most people is to clothe a
commander of a large army whom they do not know, with almost superhuman
abilities.  A large part of the National army, for instance, and most of
the press of the country, clothed General Lee with just such qualities,
but I had known him personally, and knew that he was mortal; and it was
just as well that I felt this.

The treaty of peace was at last ratified, and the evacuation of Mexico
by United States troops was ordered.  Early in June the troops in the
City of Mexico began to move out.  Many of them, including the brigade
to which I belonged, were assembled at Jalapa, above the vomito, to
await the arrival of transports at Vera Cruz:  but with all this
precaution my regiment and others were in camp on the sand beach in a
July sun, for about a week before embarking, while the fever raged with
great virulence in Vera Cruz, not two miles away.  I can call to mind
only one person, an officer, who died of the disease.  My regiment was
sent to Pascagoula, Mississippi, to spend the summer.  As soon as it was
settled in camp I obtained a leave of absence for four months and
proceeded to St. Louis.  On the 22d of August, 1848, I was married to
Miss Julia Dent, the lady of whom I have before spoken.  We visited my
parents and relations in Ohio, and, at the end of my leave, proceeded to
my post at Sackett's Harbor, New York.  In April following I was ordered
to Detroit, Michigan, where two years were spent with but few important
incidents.

The present constitution of the State of Michigan was ratified during
this time.  By the terms of one of its provisions, all citizens of the
United States residing within the State at the time of the ratification
became citizens of Michigan also. During my stay in Detroit there was an
election for city officers.  Mr. Zachariah Chandler was the candidate of
the Whigs for the office of Mayor, and was elected, although the city
was then reckoned democratic.  All the officers stationed there at the
time who offered their votes were permitted to cast them.  I did not
offer mine, however, as I did not wish to consider myself a citizen of
Michigan.  This was Mr. Chandler's first entry into politics, a career
he followed ever after with great success, and in which he died enjoying
the friendship, esteem and love of his countrymen.

In the spring of 1851 the garrison at Detroit was transferred to
Sackett's Harbor, and in the following spring the entire 4th infantry
was ordered to the Pacific Coast.  It was decided that Mrs. Grant should
visit my parents at first for a few months, and then remain with her own
family at their St. Louis home until an opportunity offered of sending
for her.  In the month of April the regiment was assembled at Governor's
Island, New York Harbor, and on the 5th of July eight companies sailed
for Aspinwall.  We numbered a little over seven hundred persons,
including the families of officers and soldiers.  Passage was secured
for us on the old steamer Ohio, commanded at the time by Captain
Schenck, of the navy.  It had not been determined, until a day or two
before starting, that the 4th infantry should go by the Ohio;
consequently, a complement of passengers had already been secured.  The
addition of over seven hundred to this list crowded the steamer most
uncomfortably, especially for the tropics in July.

In eight days Aspinwall was reached.  At that time the streets of the
town were eight or ten inches under water, and foot passengers passed
from place to place on raised foot-walks. July is at the height of the
wet season, on the Isthmus.  At intervals the rain would pour down in
streams, followed in not many minutes by a blazing, tropical summer's
sun.  These alternate changes, from rain to sunshine, were continuous in
the afternoons.  I wondered how any person could live many months in
Aspinwall, and wondered still more why any one tried.

In the summer of 1852 the Panama railroad was completed only to the
point where it now crosses the Chagres River.  From there passengers
were carried by boats to Gorgona, at which place they took mules for
Panama, some twenty-five miles further.  Those who travelled over the
Isthmus in those days will remember that boats on the Chagres River were
propelled by natives not inconveniently burdened with clothing.  These
boats carried thirty to forty passengers each.  The crews consisted of
six men to a boat, armed with long poles.  There were planks wide enough
for a man to walk on conveniently, running along the sides of each boat
from end to end.  The men would start from the bow, place one end of
their poles against the river bottom, brace their shoulders against the
other end, and then walk to the stern as rapidly as they could.  In this
way from a mile to a mile and a half an hour could be made, against the
current of the river.

I, as regimental quartermaster, had charge of the public property and
had also to look after the transportation.  A contract had been entered
into with the steamship company in New York for the transportation of
the regiment to California, including the Isthmus transit.  A certain
amount of baggage was allowed per man, and saddle animals were to be
furnished to commissioned officers and to all disabled persons.  The
regiment, with the exception of one company left as guards to the public
property--camp and garrison equipage principally--and the soldiers with
families, took boats, propelled as above described, for Gorgona.  From
this place they marched to Panama, and were soon comfortably on the
steamer anchored in the bay, some three or four miles from the town.  I,
with one company of troops and all the soldiers with families, all the
tents, mess chests and camp kettles, was sent to Cruces, a town a few
miles higher up the Chagres River than Gorgona.  There I found an
impecunious American who had taken the contract to furnish
transportation for the regiment at a stipulated price per hundred pounds
for the freight and so much for each saddle animal.  But when we reached
Cruces there was not a mule, either for pack or saddle, in the place.
The contractor promised that the animals should be on hand in the
morning.  In the morning he said that they were on the way from some
imaginary place, and would arrive in the course of the day.  This went
on until I saw that he could not procure the animals at all at the price
he had promised to furnish them for.  The unusual number of passengers
that had come over on the steamer, and the large amount of freight to
pack, had created an unprecedented demand for mules.  Some of the
passengers paid as high as forty dollars for the use of a mule to ride
twenty-five miles, when the mule would not have sold for ten dollars in
that market at other times. Meanwhile the cholera had broken out, and
men were dying every hour.  To diminish the food for the disease, I
permitted the company detailed with me to proceed to Panama.  The
captain and the doctors accompanied the men, and I was left alone with
the sick and the soldiers who had families.  The regiment at Panama was
also affected with the disease; but there were better accommodations for
the well on the steamer, and a hospital, for those taken with the
disease, on an old hulk anchored a mile off.  There were also hospital
tents on shore on the island of Flamingo, which stands in the bay.

I was about a week at Cruces before transportation began to come in.
About one-third of the people with me died, either at Cruces or on the
way to Panama.  There was no agent of the transportation company at
Cruces to consult, or to take the responsibility of procuring
transportation at a price which would secure it.  I therefore myself
dismissed the contractor and made a new contract with a native, at more
than double the original price.  Thus we finally reached Panama.  The
steamer, however, could not proceed until the cholera abated, and the
regiment was detained still longer.  Altogether, on the Isthmus and on
the Pacific side, we were delayed six weeks.  About one-seventh of those
who left New York harbor with the 4th infantry on the 5th of July, now
lie buried on the Isthmus of Panama or on Flamingo island in Panama Bay.

One amusing circumstance occurred while we were lying at anchor in
Panama Bay.  In the regiment there was a Lieutenant Slaughter who was
very liable to sea-sickness.  It almost made him sick to see the wave of
a table-cloth when the servants were spreading it.  Soon after his
graduation, Slaughter was ordered to California and took passage by a
sailing vessel going around Cape Horn.  The vessel was seven months
making the voyage, and Slaughter was sick every moment of the time,
never more so than while lying at anchor after reaching his place of
destination. On landing in California he found orders which had come by
the Isthmus, notifying him of a mistake in his assignment; he should
have been ordered to the northern lakes.  He started back by the Isthmus
route and was sick all the way.  But when he arrived at the East he was
again ordered to California, this time definitely, and at this date was
making his third trip.  He was as sick as ever, and had been so for more
than a month while lying at anchor in the bay.  I remember him well,
seated with his elbows on the table in front of him, his chin between
his hands, and looking the picture of despair.  At last he broke out, "I
wish I had taken my father's advice; he wanted me to go into the navy;
if I had done so, I should not have had to go to sea so much."  Poor
Slaughter! it was his last sea voyage.  He was killed by Indians in
Oregon.

By the last of August the cholera had so abated that it was deemed safe
to start.  The disease did not break out again on the way to California,
and we reached San Francisco early in September.



CHAPTER XV.

SAN FRANCISCO--EARLY CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCES--LIFE ON THE PACIFIC COAST
--PROMOTED CAPTAIN--FLUSH TIMES IN CALIFORNIA.

San Francisco at that day was a lively place.  Gold, or placer digging
as it was called, was at its height.  Steamers plied daily between San
Francisco and both Stockton and Sacramento. Passengers and gold from the
southern mines came by the Stockton boat; from the northern mines by
Sacramento.  In the evening when these boats arrived, Long Wharf--there
was but one wharf in San Francisco in 1852--was alive with people
crowding to meet the miners as they came down to sell their "dust" and
to "have a time."  Of these some were runners for hotels, boarding
houses or restaurants; others belonged to a class of impecunious
adventurers, of good manners and good presence, who were ever on the
alert to make the acquaintance of people with some ready means, in the
hope of being asked to take a meal at a restaurant.  Many were young men
of good family, good education and gentlemanly instincts.  Their parents
had been able to support them during their minority, and to give them
good educations, but not to maintain them afterwards.  From 1849 to 1853
there was a rush of people to the Pacific coast, of the class described.
All thought that fortunes were to be picked up, without effort, in the
gold fields on the Pacific.  Some realized more than their most sanguine
expectations; but for one such there were hundreds disappointed, many of
whom now fill unknown graves; others died wrecks of their former selves,
and many, without a vicious instinct, became criminals and outcasts.
Many of the real scenes in early California life exceed in strangeness
and interest any of the mere products of the brain of the novelist.

Those early days in California brought out character.  It was a long way
off then, and the journey was expensive.  The fortunate could go by Cape
Horn or by the Isthmus of Panama; but the mass of pioneers crossed the
plains with their ox-teams.  This took an entire summer.  They were very
lucky when they got through with a yoke of worn-out cattle.  All other
means were exhausted in procuring the outfit on the Missouri River.  The
immigrant, on arriving, found himself a stranger, in a strange land, far
from friends.  Time pressed, for the little means that could be realized
from the sale of what was left of the outfit would not support a man
long at California prices.  Many became discouraged.  Others would take
off their coats and look for a job, no matter what it might be.  These
succeeded as a rule. There were many young men who had studied
professions before they went to California, and who had never done a
day's manual labor in their lives, who took in the situation at once and
went to work to make a start at anything they could get to do.  Some
supplied carpenters and masons with material--carrying plank, brick, or
mortar, as the case might be; others drove stages, drays, or baggage
wagons, until they could do better.  More became discouraged early and
spent their time looking up people who would "treat," or lounging about
restaurants and gambling houses where free lunches were furnished daily.
They were welcomed at these places because they often brought in miners
who proved good customers.

My regiment spent a few weeks at Benicia barracks, and then was ordered
to Fort Vancouver, on the Columbia River, then in Oregon Territory.
During the winter of 1852-3 the territory was divided, all north of the
Columbia River being taken from Oregon to make Washington Territory.

Prices for all kinds of supplies were so high on the Pacific coast from
1849 until at least 1853--that it would have been impossible for
officers of the army to exist upon their pay, if it had not been that
authority was given them to purchase from the commissary such supplies
as he kept, at New Orleans wholesale prices.  A cook could not be hired
for the pay of a captain.  The cook could do better.  At Benicia, in
1852, flour was 25 cents per pound; potatoes were 16 cents; beets,
turnips and cabbage, 6 cents; onions, 37 1/2 cents; meat and other
articles in proportion.  In 1853 at Vancouver vegetables were a little
lower.  I with three other officers concluded that we would raise a crop
for ourselves, and by selling the surplus realize something handsome.  I
bought a pair of horses that had crossed the plains that summer and were
very poor.  They recuperated rapidly, however, and proved a good team to
break up the ground with.  I performed all the labor of breaking up the
ground while the other officers planted the potatoes.  Our crop was
enormous.  Luckily for us the Columbia River rose to a great height from
the melting of the snow in the mountains in June, and overflowed and
killed most of our crop.  This saved digging it up, for everybody on the
Pacific coast seemed to have come to the conclusion at the same time
that agriculture would be profitable.  In 1853 more than three-quarters
of the potatoes raised were permitted to rot in the ground, or had to be
thrown away.  The only potatoes we sold were to our own mess.

While I was stationed on the Pacific coast we were free from Indian
wars.  There were quite a number of remnants of tribes in the vicinity
of Portland in Oregon, and of Fort Vancouver in Washington Territory.
They had generally acquired some of the vices of civilization, but none
of the virtues, except in individual cases.  The Hudson's Bay Company
had held the North-west with their trading posts for many years before
the United States was represented on the Pacific coast.  They still
retained posts along the Columbia River and one at Fort Vancouver, when
I was there.  Their treatment of the Indians had brought out the better
qualities of the savages.  Farming had been undertaken by the company to
supply the Indians with bread and vegetables; they raised some cattle
and horses; and they had now taught the Indians to do the labor of the
farm and herd. They always compensated them for their labor, and always
gave them goods of uniform quality and at uniform price.

Before the advent of the American, the medium of exchange between the
Indian and the white man was pelts.  Afterward it was silver coin.  If
an Indian received in the sale of a horse a fifty dollar gold piece, not
an infrequent occurrence, the first thing he did was to exchange it for
American half dollars. These he could count.  He would then commence his
purchases, paying for each article separately, as he got it.  He would
not trust any one to add up the bill and pay it all at once.  At that
day fifty dollar gold pieces, not the issue of the government, were
common on the Pacific coast.  They were called slugs.

The Indians, along the lower Columbia as far as the Cascades and on the
lower Willamette, died off very fast during the year I spent in that
section; for besides acquiring the vices of the white people they had
acquired also their diseases.  The measles and the small-pox were both
amazingly fatal.  In their wild state, before the appearance of the
white man among them, the principal complaints they were subject to were
those produced by long involuntary fasting, violent exercise in pursuit
of game, and over-eating.  Instinct more than reason had taught them a
remedy for these ills.  It was the steam bath.  Something like a
bake-oven was built, large enough to admit a man lying down. Bushes were
stuck in the ground in two rows, about six feet long and some two or
three feet apart; other bushes connected the rows at one end.  The tops
of the bushes were drawn together to interlace, and confined in that
position; the whole was then plastered over with wet clay until every
opening was filled. Just inside the open end of the oven the floor was
scooped out so as to make a hole that would hold a bucket or two of
water. These ovens were always built on the banks of a stream, a big
spring, or pool of water.  When a patient required a bath, a fire was
built near the oven and a pile of stones put upon it. The cavity at the
front was then filled with water.  When the stones were sufficiently
heated, the patient would draw himself into the oven; a blanket would be
thrown over the open end, and hot stones put into the water until the
patient could stand it no longer.  He was then withdrawn from his steam
bath and doused into the cold stream near by.  This treatment may have
answered with the early ailments of the Indians.  With the measles or
small-pox it would kill every time.

During my year on the Columbia River, the small-pox exterminated one
small remnant of a band of Indians entirely, and reduced others
materially.  I do not think there was a case of recovery among them,
until the doctor with the Hudson Bay Company took the matter in hand and
established a hospital.  Nearly every case he treated recovered.  I
never, myself, saw the treatment described in the preceding paragraph,
but have heard it described by persons who have witnessed it.  The
decimation among the Indians I knew of personally, and the hospital,
established for their benefit, was a Hudson's Bay building not a stone's
throw from my own quarters.

The death of Colonel Bliss, of the Adjutant General's department, which
occurred July 5th, 1853, promoted me to the captaincy of a company then
stationed at Humboldt Bay, California.  The notice reached me in
September of the same year, and I very soon started to join my new
command.  There was no way of reaching Humboldt at that time except to
take passage on a San Francisco sailing vessel going after lumber.  Red
wood, a species of cedar, which on the Pacific coast takes the place
filled by white pine in the East, then abounded on the banks of Humboldt
Bay.  There were extensive saw-mills engaged in preparing this lumber
for the San Francisco market, and sailing vessels, used in getting it to
market, furnished the only means of communication between Humboldt and
the balance of the world.

I was obliged to remain in San Francisco for several days before I found
a vessel.  This gave me a good opportunity of comparing the San
Francisco of 1852 with that of 1853.  As before stated, there had been
but one wharf in front of the city in 1852--Long Wharf.  In 1853 the
town had grown out into the bay beyond what was the end of this wharf
when I first saw it.  Streets and houses had been built out on piles
where the year before the largest vessels visiting the port lay at
anchor or tied to the wharf.  There was no filling under the streets or
houses.  San Francisco presented the same general appearance as the year
before; that is, eating, drinking and gambling houses were conspicuous
for their number and publicity.  They were on the first floor, with
doors wide open.  At all hours of the day and night in walking the
streets, the eye was regaled, on every block near the water front, by
the sight of players at faro. Often broken places were found in the
street, large enough to let a man down into the water below.  I have but
little doubt that many of the people who went to the Pacific coast in
the early days of the gold excitement, and have never been heard from
since, or who were heard from for a time and then ceased to write, found
watery graves beneath the houses or streets built over San Francisco
Bay.

Besides the gambling in cards there was gambling on a larger scale in
city lots.  These were sold "On Change," much as stocks are now sold on
Wall Street.  Cash, at time of purchase, was always paid by the broker;
but the purchaser had only to put up his margin.  He was charged at the
rate of two or three per cent. a month on the difference, besides
commissions.  The sand hills, some of them almost inaccessible to
foot-passengers, were surveyed off and mapped into fifty vara lots--a
vara being a Spanish yard.  These were sold at first at very low prices,
but were sold and resold for higher prices until they went up to many
thousands of dollars.  The brokers did a fine business, and so did many
such purchasers as were sharp enough to quit purchasing before the final
crash came.  As the city grew, the sand hills back of the town furnished
material for filling up the bay under the houses and streets, and still
further out. The temporary houses, first built over the water in the
harbor, soon gave way to more solid structures.  The main business part
of the city now is on solid ground, made where vessels of the largest
class lay at anchor in the early days.  I was in San Francisco again in
1854.  Gambling houses had disappeared from public view.  The city had
become staid and orderly.



CHAPTER XVI.

RESIGNATION--PRIVATE LIFE--LIFE AT GALENA--THE COMING CRISIS.

My family, all this while, was at the East.  It consisted now of a wife
and two children.  I saw no chance of supporting them on the Pacific
coast out of my pay as an army officer.  I concluded, therefore, to
resign, and in March applied for a leave of absence until the end of the
July following, tendering my resignation to take effect at the end of
that time.  I left the Pacific coast very much attached to it, and with
the full expectation of making it my future home.  That expectation and
that hope remained uppermost in my mind until the Lieutenant-Generalcy
bill was introduced into Congress in the winter of 1863-4.  The passage
of that bill, and my promotion, blasted my last hope of ever becoming a
citizen of the further West.

In the late summer of 1854 I rejoined my family, to find in it a son
whom I had never seen, born while I was on the Isthmus of Panama.  I was
now to commence, at the age of thirty-two, a new struggle for our
support.  My wife had a farm near St. Louis, to which we went, but I had
no means to stock it.  A house had to be built also.  I worked very
hard, never losing a day because of bad weather, and accomplished the
object in a moderate way.  If nothing else could be done I would load a
cord of wood on a wagon and take it to the city for sale.  I managed to
keep along very well until 1858, when I was attacked by fever and ague.
I had suffered very severely and for a long time from this disease,
while a boy in Ohio.  It lasted now over a year, and, while it did not
keep me in the house, it did interfere greatly with the amount of work I
was able to perform.  In the fall of 1858 I sold out my stock, crops and
farming utensils at auction, and gave up farming.

In the winter I established a partnership with Harry Boggs, a cousin of
Mrs.  Grant, in the real estate agency business.  I spent that winter at
St. Louis myself, but did not take my family into town until the spring.
Our business might have become prosperous if I had been able to wait for
it to grow.  As it was, there was no more than one person could attend
to, and not enough to support two families.  While a citizen of St.
Louis and engaged in the real estate agency business, I was a candidate
for the office of county engineer, an office of respectability and
emolument which would have been very acceptable to me at that time.  The
incumbent was appointed by the county court, which consisted of five
members.  My opponent had the advantage of birth over me (he was a
citizen by adoption) and carried off the prize.  I now withdrew from the
co-partnership with Boggs, and, in May, 1860, removed to Galena,
Illinois, and took a clerkship in my father's store.

While a citizen of Missouri, my first opportunity for casting a vote at
a Presidential election occurred.  I had been in the army from before
attaining my majority and had thought but little about politics,
although I was a Whig by education and a great admirer of Mr. Clay.  But
the Whig party had ceased to exist before I had an opportunity of
exercising the privilege of casting a ballot; the Know-Nothing party had
taken its place, but was on the wane; and the Republican party was in a
chaotic state and had not yet received a name.  It had no existence in
the Slave States except at points on the borders next to Free States.
In St. Louis City and County, what afterwards became the Republican
party was known as the Free-Soil Democracy, led by the Honorable Frank
P. Blair.  Most of my neighbors had known me as an officer of the army
with Whig proclivities.  They had been on the same side, and, on the
death of their party, many had become Know-Nothings, or members of the
American party. There was a lodge near my new home, and I was invited to
join it.  I accepted the invitation; was initiated; attended a meeting
just one week later, and never went to another afterwards.

I have no apologies to make for having been one week a member of the
American party; for I still think native-born citizens of the United
States should have as much protection, as many privileges in their
native country, as those who voluntarily select it for a home.  But all
secret, oath-bound political parties are dangerous to any nation, no
matter how pure or how patriotic the motives and principles which first
bring them together.  No political party can or ought to exist when one
of its corner-stones is opposition to freedom of thought and to the
right to worship God "according to the dictate of one's own conscience,"
or according to the creed of any religious denomination whatever.
Nevertheless, if a sect sets up its laws as binding above the State
laws, wherever the two come in conflict this claim must be resisted and
suppressed at whatever cost.

Up to the Mexican war there were a few out and out abolitionists, men
who carried their hostility to slavery into all elections, from those
for a justice of the peace up to the Presidency of the United States.
They were noisy but not numerous.  But the great majority of people at
the North, where slavery did not exist, were opposed to the institution,
and looked upon its existence in any part of the country as unfortunate.
They did not hold the States where slavery existed responsible for it;
and believed that protection should be given to the right of property in
slaves until some satisfactory way could be reached to be rid of the
institution.  Opposition to slavery was not a creed of either political
party.  In some sections more anti-slavery men belonged to the
Democratic party, and in others to the Whigs.  But with the inauguration
of the Mexican war, in fact with the annexation of Texas, "the
inevitable conflict" commenced.

As the time for the Presidential election of 1856--the first at which I
had the opportunity of voting--approached, party feeling began to run
high.  The Republican party was regarded in the South and the border
States not only as opposed to the extension of slavery, but as favoring
the compulsory abolition of the institution without compensation to the
owners.  The most horrible visions seemed to present themselves to the
minds of people who, one would suppose, ought to have known better.
Many educated and, otherwise, sensible persons appeared to believe that
emancipation meant social equality.  Treason to the Government was
openly advocated and was not rebuked.  It was evident to my mind that
the election of a Republican President in 1856 meant the secession of
all the Slave States, and rebellion.  Under these circumstances I
preferred the success of a candidate whose election would prevent or
postpone secession, to seeing the country plunged into a war the end of
which no man could foretell.  With a Democrat elected by the unanimous
vote of the Slave States, there could be no pretext for secession for
four years.  I very much hoped that the passions of the people would
subside in that time, and the catastrophe be averted altogether; if it
was not, I believed the country would be better prepared to receive the
shock and to resist it.  I therefore voted for James Buchanan for
President.  Four years later the Republican party was successful in
electing its candidate to the Presidency.  The civilized world has
learned the consequence.  Four millions of human beings held as chattels
have been liberated; the ballot has been given to them; the free schools
of the country have been opened to their children.  The nation still
lives, and the people are just as free to avoid social intimacy with the
blacks as ever they were, or as they are with white people.

While living in Galena I was nominally only a clerk supporting myself
and family on a stipulated salary.  In reality my position was
different.  My father had never lived in Galena himself, but had
established my two brothers there, the one next younger than myself in
charge of the business, assisted by the youngest.  When I went there it
was my father's intention to give up all connection with the business
himself, and to establish his three sons in it:  but the brother who had
really built up the business was sinking with consumption, and it was
not thought best to make any change while he was in this condition.  He
lived until September, 1861, when he succumbed to that insidious disease
which always flatters its victims into the belief that they are growing
better up to the close of life.  A more honorable man never transacted
business.  In September, 1861, I was engaged in an employment which
required all my attention elsewhere.

During the eleven months that I lived in Galena prior to the first call
for volunteers, I had been strictly attentive to my business, and had
made but few acquaintances other than customers and people engaged in
the same line with myself.  When the election took place in November,
1860, I had not been a resident of Illinois long enough to gain
citizenship and could not, therefore, vote.  I was really glad of this
at the time, for my pledges would have compelled me to vote for Stephen
A. Douglas, who had no possible chance of election.  The contest was
really between Mr. Breckinridge and Mr. Lincoln; between minority rule
and rule by the majority.  I wanted, as between these candidates, to see
Mr. Lincoln elected.  Excitement ran high during the canvass, and
torch-light processions enlivened the scene in the generally quiet
streets of Galena many nights during the campaign.  I did not parade
with either party, but occasionally met with the "wide awakes"
--Republicans--in their rooms, and superintended their drill.  It was
evident, from the time of the Chicago nomination to the close of the
canvass, that the election of the Republican candidate would be the
signal for some of the Southern States to secede.  I still had hopes
that the four years which had elapsed since the first nomination of a
Presidential candidate by a party distinctly opposed to slavery
extension, had given time for the extreme pro-slavery sentiment to cool
down; for the Southerners to think well before they took the awful leap
which they had so vehemently threatened.  But I was mistaken.

The Republican candidate was elected, and solid substantial people of
the North-west, and I presume the same order of people throughout the
entire North, felt very serious, but determined, after this event.  It
was very much discussed whether the South would carry out its threat to
secede and set up a separate government, the corner-stone of which
should be, protection to the "Divine" institution of slavery.  For there
were people who believed in the "divinity" of human slavery, as there
are now people who believe Mormonism and Polygamy to be ordained by the
Most High.  We forgive them for entertaining such notions, but forbid
their practice.  It was generally believed that there would be a flurry;
that some of the extreme Southern States would go so far as to pass
ordinances of secession.  But the common impression was that this step
was so plainly suicidal for the South, that the movement would not
spread over much of the territory and would not last long.

Doubtless the founders of our government, the majority of them at least,
regarded the confederation of the colonies as an experiment.  Each
colony considered itself a separate government; that the confederation
was for mutual protection against a foreign foe, and the prevention of
strife and war among themselves.  If there had been a desire on the part
of any single State to withdraw from the compact at any time while the
number of States was limited to the original thirteen, I do not suppose
there would have been any to contest the right, no matter how much the
determination might have been regretted. The problem changed on the
ratification of the Constitution by all the colonies; it changed still
more when amendments were added; and if the right of any one State to
withdraw continued to exist at all after the ratification of the
Constitution, it certainly ceased on the formation of new States, at
least so far as the new States themselves were concerned.  It was never
possessed at all by Florida or the States west of the Mississippi, all
of which were purchased by the treasury of the entire nation. Texas and
the territory brought into the Union in consequence of annexation, were
purchased with both blood and treasure; and Texas, with a domain greater
than that of any European state except Russia, was permitted to retain
as state property all the public lands within its borders.  It would
have been ingratitude and injustice of the most flagrant sort for this
State to withdraw from the Union after all that had been spent and done
to introduce her; yet, if separation had actually occurred, Texas must
necessarily have gone with the South, both on account of her
institutions and her geographical position. Secession was illogical as
well as impracticable; it was revolution.

Now, the right of revolution is an inherent one.  When people are
oppressed by their government, it is a natural right they enjoy to
relieve themselves of the oppression, if they are strong enough, either
by withdrawal from it, or by overthrowing it and substituting a
government more acceptable.  But any people or part of a people who
resort to this remedy, stake their lives, their property, and every
claim for protection given by citizenship--on the issue.  Victory, or
the conditions imposed by the conqueror--must be the result.

In the case of the war between the States it would have been the exact
truth if the South had said,--"We do not want to live with you Northern
people any longer; we know our institution of slavery is obnoxious to
you, and, as you are growing numerically stronger than we, it may at
some time in the future be endangered.  So long as you permitted us to
control the government, and with the aid of a few friends at the North
to enact laws constituting your section a guard against the escape of
our property, we were willing to live with you.  You have been
submissive to our rule heretofore; but it looks now as if you did not
intend to continue so, and we will remain in the Union no longer."
Instead of this the seceding States cried lustily,--"Let us alone; you
have no constitutional power to interfere with us."  Newspapers and
people at the North reiterated the cry.  Individuals might ignore the
constitution; but the Nation itself must not only obey it, but must
enforce the strictest construction of that instrument; the construction
put upon it by the Southerners themselves.  The fact is the constitution
did not apply to any such contingency as the one existing from 1861 to
1865.  Its framers never dreamed of such a contingency occurring.  If
they had foreseen it, the probabilities are they would have sanctioned
the right of a State or States to withdraw rather than that there should
be war between brothers.

The framers were wise in their generation and wanted to do the very best
possible to secure their own liberty and independence, and that also of
their descendants to the latest days.  It is preposterous to suppose
that the people of one generation can lay down the best and only rules
of government for all who are to come after them, and under unforeseen
contingencies.  At the time of the framing of our constitution the only
physical forces that had been subdued and made to serve man and do his
labor, were the currents in the streams and in the air we breathe. Rude
machinery, propelled by water power, had been invented; sails to propel
ships upon the waters had been set to catch the passing breeze--but the
application of stream to propel vessels against both wind and current,
and machinery to do all manner of work had not been thought of.  The
instantaneous transmission of messages around the world by means of
electricity would probably at that day have been attributed to
witchcraft or a league with the Devil.  Immaterial circumstances had
changed as greatly as material ones.  We could not and ought not to be
rigidly bound by the rules laid down under circumstances so different
for emergencies so utterly unanticipated.  The fathers themselves would
have been the first to declare that their prerogatives were not
irrevocable.  They would surely have resisted secession could they have
lived to see the shape it assumed.

I travelled through the Northwest considerably during the winter of
1860-1.  We had customers in all the little towns in south-west
Wisconsin, south-east Minnesota and north-east Iowa.  These generally
knew I had been a captain in the regular army and had served through the
Mexican war.  Consequently wherever I stopped at night, some of the
people would come to the public-house where I was, and sit till a late
hour discussing the probabilities of the future.  My own views at that
time were like those officially expressed by Mr. Seward at a later day,
that "the war would be over in ninety days."  I continued to entertain
these views until after the battle of Shiloh.  I believe now that there
would have been no more battles at the West after the capture of Fort
Donelson if all the troops in that region had been under a single
commander who would have followed up that victory.

There is little doubt in my mind now that the prevailing sentiment of
the South would have been opposed to secession in 1860 and 1861, if
there had been a fair and calm expression of opinion, unbiased by
threats, and if the ballot of one legal voter had counted for as much as
that of any other.  But there was no calm discussion of the question.
Demagogues who were too old to enter the army if there should be a war,
others who entertained so high an opinion of their own ability that they
did not believe they could be spared from the direction of the affairs
of state in such an event, declaimed vehemently and unceasingly against
the North; against its aggressions upon the South; its interference with
Southern rights, etc., etc.  They denounced the Northerners as cowards,
poltroons, <DW64>-worshippers; claimed that one Southern man was equal to
five Northern men in battle; that if the South would stand up for its
rights the North would back down.  Mr. Jefferson Davis said in a speech,
delivered at La Grange, Mississippi, before the secession of that State,
that he would agree to drink all the blood spilled south of Mason and
Dixon's line if there should be a war.  The young men who would have the
fighting to do in case of war, believed all these statements, both in
regard to the aggressiveness of the North and its cowardice.  They, too,
cried out for a separation from such people.  The great bulk of the
legal voters of the South were men who owned no slaves; their homes were
generally in the hills and poor country; their facilities for educating
their children, even up to the point of reading and writing, were very
limited; their interest in the contest was very meagre--what there was,
if they had been capable of seeing it, was with the North; they too
needed emancipation.  Under the old regime they were looked down upon by
those who controlled all the affairs in the interest of slave-owners, as
poor white trash who were allowed the ballot so long as they cast it
according to direction.

I am aware that this last statement may be disputed and individual
testimony perhaps adduced to show that in ante-bellum days the ballot
was as untrammelled in the south as in any section of the country; but
in the face of any such contradiction I reassert the statement.  The
shot-gun was not resorted to.  Masked men did not ride over the country
at night intimidating voters; but there was a firm feeling that a class
existed in every State with a sort of divine right to control public
affairs.  If they could not get this control by one means they must by
another.  The end justified the means.  The coercion, if mild, was
complete.

There were two political parties, it is true, in all the States, both
strong in numbers and respectability, but both equally loyal to the
institution which stood paramount in Southern eyes to all other
institutions in state or nation.  The slave-owners were the minority,
but governed both parties.  Had politics ever divided the slave-holders
and the non-slave-holders, the majority would have been obliged to
yield, or internecine war would have been the consequence.  I do not
know that the Southern people were to blame for this condition of
affairs. There was a time when slavery was not profitable, and the
discussion of the merits of the institution was confined almost
exclusively to the territory where it existed.  The States of Virginia
and Kentucky came near abolishing slavery by their own acts, one State
defeating the measure by a tie vote and the other only lacking one.  But
when the institution became profitable, all talk of its abolition ceased
where it existed; and naturally, as human nature is constituted,
arguments were adduced in its support.  The cotton-gin probably had much
to do with the justification of slavery.

The winter of 1860-1 will be remembered by middle-aged people of to-day
as one of great excitement.  South Carolina promptly seceded after the
result of the Presidential election was known.  Other Southern States
proposed to follow.  In some of them the Union sentiment was so strong
that it had to be suppressed by force.  Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky and
Missouri, all Slave States, failed to pass ordinances of secession; but
they were all represented in the so-called congress of the so-called
Confederate States.  The Governor and Lieutenant-Governor of Missouri,
in 1861, Jackson and Reynolds, were both supporters of the rebellion and
took refuge with the enemy.  The governor soon died, and the
lieutenant-governor assumed his office; issued proclamations as governor
of the State; was recognized as such by the Confederate Government, and
continued his pretensions until the collapse of the rebellion. The South
claimed the sovereignty of States, but claimed the right to coerce into
their confederation such States as they wanted, that is, all the States
where slavery existed.  They did not seem to think this course
inconsistent.  The fact is, the Southern slave-owners believed that, in
some way, the ownership of slaves conferred a sort of patent of
nobility--a right to govern independent of the interest or wishes of
those who did not hold such property.  They convinced themselves, first,
of the divine origin of the institution and, next, that that particular
institution was not safe in the hands of any body of legislators but
themselves.

Meanwhile the Administration of President Buchanan looked helplessly on
and proclaimed that the general government had no power to interfere;
that the Nation had no power to save its own life.  Mr. Buchanan had in
his cabinet two members at least, who were as earnest--to use a mild
term--in the cause of secession as Mr. Davis or any Southern statesman.
One of them, Floyd, the Secretary of War, scattered the army so that
much of it could be captured when hostilities should commence, and
distributed the cannon and small arms from Northern arsenals throughout
the South so as to be on hand when treason wanted them.  The navy was
scattered in like manner.  The President did not prevent his cabinet
preparing for war upon their government, either by destroying its
resources or storing them in the South until a de facto government was
established with Jefferson Davis as its President, and Montgomery,
Alabama, as the Capital.  The secessionists had then to leave the
cabinet.  In their own estimation they were aliens in the country which
had given them birth.  Loyal men were put into their places.  Treason in
the executive branch of the government was estopped.  But the harm had
already been done.  The stable door was locked after the horse had been
stolen.

During all of the trying winter of 1860-1, when the Southerners were so
defiant that they would not allow within their borders the expression of
a sentiment hostile to their views, it was a brave man indeed who could
stand up and proclaim his loyalty to the Union.  On the other hand men
at the North--prominent men--proclaimed that the government had no power
to coerce the South into submission to the laws of the land; that if the
North undertook to raise armies to go south, these armies would have to
march over the dead bodies of the speakers.  A portion of the press of
the North was constantly proclaiming similar views. When the time
arrived for the President-elect to go to the capital of the Nation to be
sworn into office, it was deemed unsafe for him to travel, not only as a
President-elect, but as any private citizen should be allowed to do.
Instead of going in a special car, receiving the good wishes of his
constituents at all the stations along the road, he was obliged to stop
on the way and to be smuggled into the capital.  He disappeared from
public view on his journey, and the next the country knew, his arrival
was announced at the capital.  There is little doubt that he would have
been assassinated if he had attempted to travel openly throughout his
journey.



CHAPTER XVII.

OUTBREAK OF THE REBELLION--PRESIDING AT A UNION MEETING--MUSTERING
OFFICER OF STATE TROOPS--LYON AT CAMP JACKSON--SERVICES TENDERED TO THE
GOVERNMENT.

The 4th of March, 1861, came, and Abraham Lincoln was sworn to maintain
the Union against all its enemies.  The secession of one State after
another followed, until eleven had gone out.  On the 11th of April Fort
Sumter, a National fort in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina, was
fired upon by the Southerners and a few days after was captured.  The
Confederates proclaimed themselves aliens, and thereby debarred
themselves of all right to claim protection under the Constitution of
the United States.  We did not admit the fact that they were aliens, but
all the same, they debarred themselves of the right to expect better
treatment than people of any other foreign state who make war upon an
independent nation.  Upon the firing on Sumter President Lincoln issued
his first call for troops and soon after a proclamation convening
Congress in extra session.  The call was for 75,000 volunteers for
ninety days' service.  If the shot fired at Fort Sumter "was heard
around the world," the call of the President for 75,000 men was heard
throughout the Northern States.  There was not a state in the North of a
million of inhabitants that would not have furnished the entire number
faster than arms could have been supplied to them, if it had been
necessary.

As soon as the news of the call for volunteers reached Galena, posters
were stuck up calling for a meeting of the citizens at the court-house
in the evening.  Business ceased entirely; all was excitement; for a
time there were no party distinctions; all were Union men, determined to
avenge the insult to the national flag.  In the evening the court-house
was packed.  Although a comparative stranger I was called upon to
preside; the sole reason, possibly, was that I had been in the army and
had seen service.  With much embarrassment and some prompting I made out
to announce the object of the meeting.  Speeches were in order, but it
is doubtful whether it would have been safe just then to make other than
patriotic ones.  There was probably no one in the house, however, who
felt like making any other.  The two principal speeches were by B. B.
Howard, the post-master and a Breckinridge Democrat at the November
election the fall before, and John A. Rawlins, an elector on the Douglas
ticket.  E. B. Washburne, with whom I was not acquainted at that time,
came in after the meeting had been organized, and expressed, I
understood afterwards, a little surprise that Galena could not furnish a
presiding officer for such an occasion without taking a stranger.  He
came forward and was introduced, and made a speech appealing to the
patriotism of the meeting.

After the speaking was over volunteers were called for to form a
company.  The quota of Illinois had been fixed at six regiments; and it
was supposed that one company would be as much as would be accepted from
Galena.  The company was raised and the officers and non-commissioned
officers elected before the meeting adjourned.  I declined the captaincy
before the balloting, but announced that I would aid the company in
every way I could and would be found in the service in some position if
there should be a war.  I never went into our leather store after that
meeting, to put up a package or do other business.

The ladies of Galena were quite as patriotic as the men.  They could not
enlist, but they conceived the idea of sending their first company to
the field uniformed.  They came to me to get a description of the United
States uniform for infantry; subscribed and bought the material;
procured tailors to cut out the garments, and the ladies made them up.
In a few days the company was in uniform and ready to report at the
State capital for assignment.  The men all turned out the morning after
their enlistment, and I took charge, divided them into squads and
superintended their drill.  When they were ready to go to Springfield I
went with them and remained there until they were assigned to a
regiment.

There were so many more volunteers than had been called for that the
question whom to accept was quite embarrassing to the governor, Richard
Yates.  The legislature was in session at the time, however, and came to
his relief.  A law was enacted authorizing the governor to accept the
services of ten additional regiments, one from each congressional
district, for one month, to be paid by the State, but pledged to go into
the service of the United States if there should be a further call
during their term.  Even with this relief the governor was still very
much embarrassed.  Before the war was over he was like the President
when he was taken with the varioloid:  "at last he had something he
could give to all who wanted it."

In time the Galena company was mustered into the United States service,
forming a part of the 11th Illinois volunteer infantry.  My duties, I
thought, had ended at Springfield, and I was prepared to start home by
the evening train, leaving at nine o'clock.  Up to that time I do not
think I had been introduced to Governor Yates, or had ever spoken to
him.  I knew him by sight, however, because he was living at the same
hotel and I often saw him at table.  The evening I was to quit the
capital I left the supper room before the governor and was standing at
the front door when he came out.  He spoke to me, calling me by my old
army title "Captain," and said he understood that I was about leaving
the city.  I answered that I was.  He said he would be glad if I would
remain over-night and call at the Executive office the next morning.
I complied with his request, and was asked to go into the
Adjutant-General's office and render such assistance as I could, the
governor saying that my army experience would be of great service there.
I accepted the proposition.

My old army experience I found indeed of very great service.  I was no
clerk, nor had I any capacity to become one.  The only place I ever
found in my life to put a paper so as to find it again was either a side
coat-pocket or the hands of a clerk or secretary more careful than
myself.  But I had been quartermaster, commissary and adjutant in the
field.  The army forms were familiar to me and I could direct how they
should be made out.  There was a clerk in the office of the
Adjutant-General who supplied my deficiencies.  The ease with which the
State of Illinois settled its accounts with the government at the close
of the war is evidence of the efficiency of Mr. Loomis as an accountant
on a large scale.  He remained in the office until that time.

As I have stated, the legislature authorized the governor to accept the
services of ten additional regiments.  I had charge of mustering these
regiments into the State service.  They were assembled at the most
convenient railroad centres in their respective congressional districts.
I detailed officers to muster in a portion of them, but mustered three
in the southern part of the State myself.  One of these was to assemble
at Belleville, some eighteen miles south-east of St. Louis.  When I got
there I found that only one or two companies had arrived. There was no
probability of the regiment coming together under five days.  This gave
me a few idle days which I concluded to spend in St. Louis.

There was a considerable force of State militia at Camp Jackson, on the
outskirts of St. Louis, at the time.  There is but little doubt that it
was the design of Governor Claiborn Jackson to have these troops ready
to seize the United States arsenal and the city of St. Louis.  Why they
did not do so I do not know. There was but a small garrison, two
companies I think, under Captain N. Lyon at the arsenal, and but for the
timely services of the Hon. F. P. Blair, I have little doubt that St.
Louis would have gone into rebel hands, and with it the arsenal with all
its arms and ammunition.

Blair was a leader among the Union men of St. Louis in 1861. There was
no State government in Missouri at the time that would sanction the
raising of troops or commissioned officers to protect United States
property, but Blair had probably procured some form of authority from
the President to raise troops in Missouri and to muster them into the
service of the United States.  At all events, he did raise a regiment
and took command himself as Colonel.  With this force he reported to
Captain Lyon and placed himself and regiment under his orders.  It was
whispered that Lyon thus reinforced intended to break up Camp Jackson
and capture the militia.  I went down to the arsenal in the morning to
see the troops start out.  I had known Lyon for two years at West Point
and in the old army afterwards.  Blair I knew very well by sight.  I had
heard him speak in the canvass of 1858, possibly several times, but I
had never spoken to him.  As the troops marched out of the enclosure
around the arsenal, Blair was on his horse outside forming them into
line preparatory to their march.  I introduced myself to him and had a
few moments' conversation and expressed my sympathy with his purpose.
This was my first personal acquaintance with the Honorable--afterwards
Major-General F. P. Blair.  Camp Jackson surrendered without a fight and
the garrison was marched down to the arsenal as prisoners of war.

Up to this time the enemies of the government in St. Louis had been bold
and defiant, while Union men were quiet but determined.  The enemies had
their head-quarters in a central and public position on Pine Street,
near Fifth--from which the rebel flag was flaunted boldly.  The Union
men had a place of meeting somewhere in the city, I did not know where,
and I doubt whether they dared to enrage the enemies of the government
by placing the national flag outside their head-quarters.  As soon as
the news of the capture of Camp Jackson reached the city the condition
of affairs was changed.  Union men became rampant, aggressive, and, if
you will, intolerant.  They proclaimed their sentiments boldly, and were
impatient at anything like disrespect for the Union.  The secessionists
became quiet but were filled with suppressed rage.  They had been
playing the bully.  The Union men ordered the rebel flag taken down from
the building on Pine Street.  The command was given in tones of
authority and it was taken down, never to be raised again in St. Louis.

I witnessed the scene.  I had heard of the surrender of the camp and
that the garrison was on its way to the arsenal.  I had seen the troops
start out in the morning and had wished them success.  I now determined
to go to the arsenal and await their arrival and congratulate them.  I
stepped on a car standing at the corner of 4th and Pine streets, and saw
a crowd of people standing quietly in front of the head-quarters, who
were there for the purpose of hauling down the flag.  There were squads
of other people at intervals down the street.  They too were quiet but
filled with suppressed rage, and muttered their resentment at the insult
to, what they called, "their" flag.  Before the car I was in had
started, a dapper little fellow--he would be called a dude at this day
--stepped in.  He was in a great state of excitement and used adjectives
freely to express his contempt for the Union and for those who had just
perpetrated such an outrage upon the rights of a free people.  There was
only one other passenger in the car besides myself when this young man
entered.  He evidently expected to find nothing but sympathy when he got
away from the "mud sills" engaged in compelling a "free people" to pull
down a flag they adored.  He turned to me saying:  "Things have come to
a ---- pretty pass when a free people can't choose their own flag.
Where I came from if a man dares to say a word in favor of the Union we
hang him to a limb of the first tree we come to."  I replied that "after
all we were not so intolerant in St. Louis as we might be; I had not
seen a single rebel hung yet, nor heard of one; there were plenty of
them who ought to be, however."  The young man subsided.  He was so
crestfallen that I believe if I had ordered him to leave the car he
would have gone quietly out, saying to himself:  "More Yankee
oppression."

By nightfall the late defenders of Camp Jackson were all within the
walls of the St. Louis arsenal, prisoners of war.  The next day I left
St. Louis for Mattoon, Illinois, where I was to muster in the regiment
from that congressional district.  This was the 21st Illinois infantry,
the regiment of which I subsequently became colonel.  I mustered one
regiment afterwards, when my services for the State were about closed.

Brigadier-General John Pope was stationed at Springfield, as United
States mustering officer, all the time I was in the State service.  He
was a native of Illinois and well acquainted with most of the prominent
men in the State.  I was a carpet-bagger and knew but few of them.
While I was on duty at Springfield the senators, representatives in
Congress, ax-governors and the State legislators were nearly all at the
State capital.  The only acquaintance I made among them was with the
governor, whom I was serving, and, by chance, with Senator S. A.
Douglas.  The only members of Congress I knew were Washburne and Philip
Foulk.  With the former, though he represented my district and we were
citizens of the same town, I only became acquainted at the meeting when
the first company of Galena volunteers was raised.  Foulk I had known in
St. Louis when I was a citizen of that city.  I had been three years at
West Point with Pope and had served with him a short time during the
Mexican war, under General Taylor.  I saw a good deal of him during my
service with the State.  On one occasion he said to me that I ought to
go into the United States service.  I told him I intended to do so if
there was a war.  He spoke of his acquaintance with the public men of
the State, and said he could get them to recommend me for a position and
that he would do all he could for me.  I declined to receive endorsement
for permission to fight for my country.

Going home for a day or two soon after this conversation with General
Pope, I wrote from Galena the following letter to the Adjutant-General
of the Army.


GALENA, ILLINOIS, May 24, 1861.

COL. L. THOMAS Adjt.  Gen.  U. S. A., Washington, D. C.

SIR:--Having served for fifteen years in the regular army, including
four years at West Point, and feeling it the duty of every one who has
been educated at the Government expense to offer their services for the
support of that Government, I have the honor, very respectfully, to
tender my services, until the close of the war, in such capacity as may
be offered.  I would say, in view of my present age and length of
service, I feel myself competent to command a regiment, if the
President, in his judgment, should see fit to intrust one to me.

Since the first call of the President I have been serving on the staff
of the Governor of this State, rendering such aid as I could in the
organization of our State militia, and am still engaged in that
capacity.  A letter addressed to me at Springfield, Illinois, will reach
me.

I am very respectfully, Your obt. svt., U. S. GRANT.


This letter failed to elicit an answer from the Adjutant-General of the
Army.  I presume it was hardly read by him, and certainly it could not
have been submitted to higher authority. Subsequent to the war General
Badeau having heard of this letter applied to the War Department for a
copy of it.  The letter could not be found and no one recollected ever
having seen it.  I took no copy when it was written.  Long after the
application of General Badeau, General Townsend, who had become
Adjutant-General of the Army, while packing up papers preparatory to the
removal of his office, found this letter in some out-of-the-way place.
It had not been destroyed, but it had not been regularly filed away.

I felt some hesitation in suggesting rank as high as the colonelcy of a
regiment, feeling somewhat doubtful whether I would be equal to the
position.  But I had seen nearly every colonel who had been mustered in
from the State of Illinois, and some from Indiana, and felt that if they
could command a regiment properly, and with credit, I could also.

Having but little to do after the muster of the last of the regiments
authorized by the State legislature, I asked and obtained of the
governor leave of absence for a week to visit my parents in Covington,
Kentucky, immediately opposite Cincinnati.  General McClellan had been
made a major-general and had his headquarters at Cincinnati.  In reality
I wanted to see him.  I had known him slightly at West Point, where we
served one year together, and in the Mexican war.  I was in hopes that
when he saw me he would offer me a position on his staff.  I called on
two successive days at his office but failed to see him on either
occasion, and returned to Springfield.



CHAPTER XVIII.

APPOINTED COLONEL OF THE 21ST ILLINOIS--PERSONNEL OF THE REGIMENT
--GENERAL LOGAN--MARCH TO MISSOURI--MOVEMENT AGAINST HARRIS AT FLORIDA,
MO.--GENERAL POPE IN COMMAND--STATIONED AT MEXICO, MO.

While I was absent from the State capital on this occasion the
President's second call for troops was issued.  This time it was for
300,000 men, for three years or the war.  This brought into the United
States service all the regiments then in the State service.  These had
elected their officers from highest to lowest and were accepted with
their organizations as they were, except in two instances.  A Chicago
regiment, the 19th infantry, had elected a very young man to the
colonelcy.  When it came to taking the field the regiment asked to have
another appointed colonel and the one they had previously chosen made
lieutenant-colonel.  The 21st regiment of infantry, mustered in by me at
Mattoon, refused to go into the service with the colonel of their
selection in any position.  While I was still absent Governor Yates
appointed me colonel of this latter regiment.  A few days after I was in
charge of it and in camp on the fair grounds near Springfield.

My regiment was composed in large part of young men of as good social
position as any in their section of the State.  It embraced the sons of
farmers, lawyers, physicians, politicians, merchants, bankers and
ministers, and some men of maturer years who had filled such positions
themselves.  There were also men in it who could be led astray; and the
colonel, elected by the votes of the regiment, had proved to be fully
capable of developing all there was in his men of recklessness.  It was
said that he even went so far at times as to take the guard from their
posts and go with them to the village near by and make a night of it.
When there came a prospect of battle the regiment wanted to have some
one else to lead them.  I found it very hard work for a few days to
bring all the men into anything like subordination; but the great
majority favored discipline, and by the application of a little regular
army punishment all were reduced to as good discipline as one could ask.

The ten regiments which had volunteered in the State service for thirty
days, it will be remembered, had done so with a pledge to go into the
National service if called upon within that time. When they volunteered
the government had only called for ninety days' enlistments.  Men were
called now for three years or the war.  They felt that this change of
period released them from the obligation of re-volunteering.  When I was
appointed colonel, the 21st regiment was still in the State service.
About the time they were to be mustered into the United States service,
such of them as would go, two members of Congress from the State,
McClernand and Logan, appeared at the capital and I was introduced to
them.  I had never seen either of them before, but I had read a great
deal about them, and particularly about Logan, in the newspapers.  Both
were democratic members of Congress, and Logan had been elected from the
southern district of the State, where he had a majority of eighteen
thousand over his Republican competitor.  His district had been settled
originally by people from the Southern States, and at the breaking out
of secession they sympathized with the South.  At the first outbreak of
war some of them joined the Southern army; many others were preparing to
do so; others rode over the country at night denouncing the Union, and
made it as necessary to guard railroad bridges over which National
troops had to pass in southern Illinois, as it was in Kentucky or any of
the border slave states.  Logan's popularity in this district was
unbounded.  He knew almost enough of the people in it by their Christian
names, to form an ordinary congressional district.  As he went in
politics, so his district was sure to go.  The Republican papers had
been demanding that he should announce where he stood on the questions
which at that time engrossed the whole of public thought.  Some were
very bitter in their denunciations of his silence.  Logan was not a man
to be coerced into an utterance by threats.  He did, however, come out
in a speech before the adjournment of the special session of Congress
which was convened by the President soon after his inauguration, and
announced his undying loyalty and devotion to the Union. But I had not
happened to see that speech, so that when I first met Logan my
impressions were those formed from reading denunciations of him.
McClernand, on the other hand, had early taken strong grounds for the
maintenance of the Union and had been praised accordingly by the
Republican papers.  The gentlemen who presented these two members of
Congress asked me if I would have any objections to their addressing my
regiment.  I hesitated a little before answering.  It was but a few days
before the time set for mustering into the United States service such of
the men as were willing to volunteer for three years or the war.  I had
some doubt as to the effect a speech from Logan might have; but as he
was with McClernand, whose sentiments on the all-absorbing questions of
the day were well known, I gave my consent.  McClernand spoke first; and
Logan followed in a speech which he has hardly equalled since for force
and eloquence.  It breathed a loyalty and devotion to the Union which
inspired my men to such a point that they would have volunteered to
remain in the army as long as an enemy of the country continued to bear
arms against it.  They entered the United States service almost to a
man.

General Logan went to his part of the State and gave his attention to
raising troops.  The very men who at first made it necessary to guard
the roads in southern Illinois became the defenders of the Union.  Logan
entered the service himself as colonel of a regiment and rapidly rose to
the rank of major-general.  His district, which had promised at first to
give much trouble to the government, filled every call made upon it for
troops, without resorting to the draft.  There was no call made when
there were not more volunteers than were asked for. That congressional
district stands credited at the War Department to-day with furnishing
more men for the army than it was called on to supply.

I remained in Springfield with my regiment until the 3d of July, when I
was ordered to Quincy, Illinois.  By that time the regiment was in a
good state of discipline and the officers and men were well up in the
company drill.  There was direct railroad communication between
Springfield and Quincy, but I thought it would be good preparation for
the troops to march there.  We had no transportation for our camp and
garrison equipage, so wagons were hired for the occasion and on the 3d
of July we started.  There was no hurry, but fair marches were made
every day until the Illinois River was crossed.  There I was overtaken
by a dispatch saying that the destination of the regiment had been
changed to Ironton, Missouri, and ordering me to halt where I was and
await the arrival of a steamer which had been dispatched up the Illinois
River to take the regiment to St. Louis.  The boat, when it did come,
grounded on a sand-bar a few miles below where we were in camp.  We
remained there several days waiting to have the boat get off the bar,
but before this occurred news came that an Illinois regiment was
surrounded by rebels at a point on the Hannibal and St. Joe Railroad
some miles west of Palmyra, in Missouri, and I was ordered to proceed
with all dispatch to their relief.  We took the cars and reached Quincy
in a few hours.

When I left Galena for the last time to take command of the 21st
regiment I took with me my oldest son, Frederick D. Grant, then a lad of
eleven years of age.  On receiving the order to take rail for Quincy I
wrote to Mrs. Grant, to relieve what I supposed would be her great
anxiety for one so young going into danger, that I would send Fred home
from Quincy by river.  I received a prompt letter in reply decidedly
disapproving my proposition, and urging that the lad should be allowed
to accompany me.  It came too late.  Fred was already on his way up the
Mississippi bound for Dubuque, Iowa, from which place there was a
railroad to Galena.

My sensations as we approached what I supposed might be "a field of
battle" were anything but agreeable.  I had been in all the engagements
in Mexico that it was possible for one person to be in; but not in
command.  If some one else had been colonel and I had been
lieutenant-colonel I do not think I would have felt any trepidation.
Before we were prepared to cross the Mississippi River at Quincy my
anxiety was relieved; for the men of the besieged regiment came
straggling into town.  I am inclined to think both sides got frightened
and ran away.

I took my regiment to Palmyra and remained there for a few days, until
relieved by the 19th Illinois infantry.  From Palmyra I proceeded to
Salt River, the railroad bridge over which had been destroyed by the
enemy.  Colonel John M. Palmer at that time commanded the 13th Illinois,
which was acting as a guard to workmen who were engaged in rebuilding
this bridge.  Palmer was my senior and commanded the two regiments as
long as we remained together.  The bridge was finished in about two
weeks, and I received orders to move against Colonel Thomas Harris, who
was said to be encamped at the little town of Florida, some twenty-five
miles south of where we then were.

At the time of which I now write we had no transportation and the
country about Salt River was sparsely settled, so that it took some days
to collect teams and drivers enough to move the camp and garrison
equipage of a regiment nearly a thousand strong, together with a week's
supply of provision and some ammunition.  While preparations for the
move were going on I felt quite comfortable; but when we got on the road
and found every house deserted I was anything but easy.  In the
twenty-five miles we had to march we did not see a person, old or young,
male or female, except two horsemen who were on a road that crossed
ours.  As soon as they saw us they decamped as fast as their horses
could carry them.  I kept my men in the ranks and forbade their entering
any of the deserted houses or taking anything from them.  We halted at
night on the road and proceeded the next morning at an early hour.
Harris had been encamped in a creek bottom for the sake of being near
water. The hills on either side of the creek extend to a considerable
height, possibly more than a hundred feet.  As we approached the brow of
the hill from which it was expected we could see Harris' camp, and
possibly find his men ready formed to meet us, my heart kept getting
higher and higher until it felt to me as though it was in my throat.  I
would have given anything then to have been back in Illinois, but I had
not the moral courage to halt and consider what to do; I kept right on.
When we reached a point from which the valley below was in full view I
halted. The place where Harris had been encamped a few days before was
still there and the marks of a recent encampment were plainly visible,
but the troops were gone.  My heart resumed its place.  It occurred to
me at once that Harris had been as much afraid of me as I had been of
him. This was a view of the question I had never taken before; but it
was one I never forgot afterwards.  From that event to the close of the
war, I never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy, though I
always felt more or less anxiety.  I never forgot that he had as much
reason to fear my forces as I had his.  The lesson was valuable.

Inquiries at the village of Florida divulged the fact that Colonel
Harris, learning of my intended movement, while my transportation was
being collected took time by the forelock and left Florida before I had
started from Salt River.  He had increased the distance between us by
forty miles.  The next day I started back to my old camp at Salt River
bridge.  The citizens living on the line of our march had returned to
their houses after we passed, and finding everything in good order,
nothing carried away, they were at their front doors ready to greet us
now.  They had evidently been led to believe that the National troops
carried death and devastation with them wherever they went.

In a short time after our return to Salt River bridge I was ordered with
my regiment to the town of Mexico.  General Pope was then commanding the
district embracing all of the State of Missouri between the Mississippi
and Missouri rivers, with his headquarters in the village of Mexico.  I
was assigned to the command of a sub-district embracing the troops in
the immediate neighborhood, some three regiments of infantry and a
section of artillery.  There was one regiment encamped by the side of
mine.  I assumed command of the whole and the first night sent the
commander of the other regiment the parole and countersign.  Not wishing
to be outdone in courtesy, he immediately sent me the countersign for
his regiment for the night.  When he was informed that the countersign
sent to him was for use with his regiment as well as mine, it was
difficult to make him understand that this was not an unwarranted
interference of one colonel over another.  No doubt he attributed it for
the time to the presumption of a graduate of West Point over a volunteer
pure and simple.  But the question was soon settled and we had no
further trouble.

My arrival in Mexico had been preceded by that of two or three regiments
in which proper discipline had not been maintained, and the men had been
in the habit of visiting houses without invitation and helping
themselves to food and drink, or demanding them from the occupants.
They carried their muskets while out of camp and made every man they
found take the oath of allegiance to the government.  I at once
published orders prohibiting the soldiers from going into private houses
unless invited by the inhabitants, and from appropriating private
property to their own or to government uses.  The people were no longer
molested or made afraid.  I received the most marked courtesy from the
citizens of Mexico as long as I remained there.

Up to this time my regiment had not been carried in the school of the
soldier beyond the company drill, except that it had received some
training on the march from Springfield to the Illinois River.  There was
now a good opportunity of exercising it in the battalion drill.  While I
was at West Point the tactics used in the army had been Scott's and the
musket the flint lock.  I had never looked at a copy of tactics from the
time of my graduation.  My standing in that branch of studies had been
near the foot of the class.  In the Mexican war in the summer of 1846, I
had been appointed regimental quartermaster and commissary and had not
been at a battalion drill since.  The arms had been changed since then
and Hardee's tactics had been adopted.  I got a copy of tactics and
studied one lesson, intending to confine the exercise of the first day
to the commands I had thus learned.  By pursuing this course from day to
day I thought I would soon get through the volume.

We were encamped just outside of town on the common, among scattering
suburban houses with enclosed gardens, and when I got my regiment in
line and rode to the front I soon saw that if I attempted to follow the
lesson I had studied I would have to clear away some of the houses and
garden fences to make room.  I perceived at once, however, that Hardee's
tactics--a mere translation from the French with Hardee's name attached
--was nothing more than common sense and the progress of the age applied
to Scott's system.  The commands were abbreviated and the movement
expedited.  Under the old tactics almost every change in the order of
march was preceded by a "halt," then came the change, and then the
"forward march."  With the new tactics all these changes could be made
while in motion.  I found no trouble in giving commands that would take
my regiment where I wanted it to go and carry it around all obstacles.
I do not believe that the officers of the regiment ever discovered that
I had never studied the tactics that I used.



CHAPTER XIX.

COMMISSIONED BRIGADIER-GENERAL--COMMAND AT IRONTON, MO.--JEFFERSON CITY
--CAPE GIRARDEAU--GENERAL PRENTISS--SEIZURE OF PADUCAH--HEADQUARTERS AT
CAIRO.

I had not been in Mexico many weeks when, reading a St. Louis paper,
I found the President had asked the Illinois delegation in Congress
to recommend some citizens of the State for the position of
brigadier-general, and that they had unanimously recommended me as first
on a list of seven.  I was very much surprised because, as I have said,
my acquaintance with the Congressmen was very limited and I did not know
of anything I had done to inspire such confidence.  The papers of the
next day announced that my name, with three others, had been sent to the
Senate, and a few days after our confirmation was announced.

When appointed brigadier-general I at once thought it proper that one of
my aides should come from the regiment I had been commanding, and so
selected Lieutenant C. B. Lagow.  While living in St. Louis, I had had a
desk in the law office of McClellan, Moody and Hillyer.  Difference in
views between the members of the firm on the questions of the day, and
general hard times in the border cities, had broken up this firm.
Hillyer was quite a young man, then in his twenties, and very brilliant.
I asked him to accept a place on my staff.  I also wanted to take one
man from my new home, Galena.  The canvass in the Presidential campaign
the fall before had brought out a young lawyer by the name of John A.
Rawlins, who proved himself one of the ablest speakers in the State.  He
was also a candidate for elector on the Douglas ticket.  When Sumter was
fired upon and the integrity of the Union threatened, there was no man
more ready to serve his country than he.  I wrote at once asking him to
accept the position of assistant adjutant-general with the rank of
captain, on my staff.  He was about entering the service as major of a
new regiment then organizing in the north-western part of the State; but
he threw this up and accepted my offer.

Neither Hillyer nor Lagow proved to have any particular taste or special
qualifications for the duties of the soldier, and the former resigned
during the Vicksburg campaign; the latter I relieved after the battle of
Chattanooga.  Rawlins remained with me as long as he lived, and rose to
the rank of brigadier general and chief-of-staff to the General of the
Army--an office created for him--before the war closed.  He was an able
man, possessed of great firmness, and could say "no" so emphatically to
a request which he thought should not be granted that the person he was
addressing would understand at once that there was no use of pressing
the matter.  General Rawlins was a very useful officer in other ways
than this.  I became very much attached to him.

Shortly after my promotion I was ordered to Ironton, Missouri, to
command a district in that part of the State, and took the 21st
Illinois, my old regiment, with me.  Several other regiments were
ordered to the same destination about the same time.  Ironton is on the
Iron Mountain railroad, about seventy miles south of St. Louis, and
situated among hills rising almost to the dignity of mountains.  When I
reached there, about the 8th of August, Colonel B. Gratz Brown
--afterwards Governor of Missouri and in 1872 Vice-Presidential candidate
--was in command.  Some of his troops were ninety days' men and their
time had expired some time before.  The men had no clothing but what
they had volunteered in, and much of this was so worn that it would
hardly stay on.  General Hardee--the author of the tactics I did not
study--was at Greenville some twenty-five miles further south, it was
said, with five thousand Confederate troops.  Under these circumstances
Colonel Brown's command was very much demoralized.  A squadron of
cavalry could have ridden into the valley and captured the entire force.
Brown himself was gladder to see me on that occasion than he ever has
been since.  I relieved him and sent all his men home within a day or
two, to be mustered out of service.

Within ten days after reaching Ironton I was prepared to take the
offensive against the enemy at Greenville.  I sent a column east out of
the valley we were in, with orders to swing around to the south and west
and come into the Greenville road ten miles south of Ironton.  Another
column marched on the direct road and went into camp at the point
designated for the two columns to meet. I was to ride out the next
morning and take personal command of the movement.  My experience
against Harris, in northern Missouri, had inspired me with confidence.
But when the evening train came in, it brought General B. M. Prentiss
with orders to take command of the district.  His orders did not relieve
me, but I knew that by law I was senior, and at that time even the
President did not have the authority to assign a junior to command a
senior of the same grade.  I therefore gave General Prentiss the
situation of the troops and the general condition of affairs, and
started for St. Louis the same day.  The movement against the rebels at
Greenville went no further.

From St. Louis I was ordered to Jefferson City, the capital of the
State, to take command.  General Sterling Price, of the Confederate
army, was thought to be threatening the capital, Lexington, Chillicothe
and other comparatively large towns in the central part of Missouri.  I
found a good many troops in Jefferson City, but in the greatest
confusion, and no one person knew where they all were.  Colonel
Mulligan, a gallant man, was in command, but he had not been educated as
yet to his new profession and did not know how to maintain discipline.
I found that volunteers had obtained permission from the department
commander, or claimed they had, to raise, some of them, regiments; some
battalions; some companies--the officers to be commissioned according to
the number of men they brought into the service.  There were recruiting
stations all over town, with notices, rudely lettered on boards over the
doors, announcing the arm of service and length of time for which
recruits at that station would be received.  The law required all
volunteers to serve for three years or the war.  But in Jefferson City
in August, 1861, they were recruited for different periods and on
different conditions; some were enlisted for six months, some for a
year, some without any condition as to where they were to serve, others
were not to be sent out of the State.  The recruits were principally men
from regiments stationed there and already in the service, bound for
three years if the war lasted that long.

The city was filled with Union fugitives who had been driven by guerilla
bands to take refuge with the National troops.  They were in a
deplorable condition and must have starved but for the support the
government gave them.  They had generally made their escape with a team
or two, sometimes a yoke of oxen with a mule or a horse in the lead.  A
little bedding besides their clothing and some food had been thrown into
the wagon.  All else of their worldly goods were abandoned and
appropriated by their former neighbors; for the Union man in Missouri
who staid at home during the rebellion, if he was not immediately under
the protection of the National troops, was at perpetual war with his
neighbors.  I stopped the recruiting service, and disposed the troops
about the outskirts of the city so as to guard all approaches.  Order
was soon restored.

I had been at Jefferson City but a few days when I was directed from
department headquarters to fit out an expedition to Lexington,
Booneville and Chillicothe, in order to take from the banks in those
cities all the funds they had and send them to St. Louis.  The western
army had not yet been supplied with transportation.  It became necessary
therefore to press into the service teams belonging to sympathizers with
the rebellion or to hire those of Union men.  This afforded an
opportunity of giving employment to such of the refugees within our
lines as had teams suitable for our purposes.  They accepted the service
with alacrity.  As fast as troops could be got off they were moved west
some twenty miles or more.  In seven or eight days from my assuming
command at Jefferson City, I had all the troops, except a small
garrison, at an advanced position and expected to join them myself the
next day.

But my campaigns had not yet begun, for while seated at my office door,
with nothing further to do until it was time to start for the front, I
saw an officer of rank approaching, who proved to be Colonel Jefferson
C. Davis.  I had never met him before, but he introduced himself by
handing me an order for him to proceed to Jefferson City and relieve me
of the command.  The orders directed that I should report at department
headquarters at St. Louis without delay, to receive important special
instructions.  It was about an hour before the only regular train of the
day would start.  I therefore turned over to Colonel Davis my orders,
and hurriedly stated to him the progress that had been made to carry out
the department instructions already described.  I had at that time but
one staff officer, doing myself all the detail work usually performed by
an adjutant-general.  In an hour after being relieved from the command I
was on my way to St. Louis, leaving my single staff officer(*6) to
follow the next day with our horses and baggage.

The "important special instructions" which I received the next day,
assigned me to the command of the district of south-east Missouri,
embracing all the territory south of St. Louis, in Missouri, as well as
all southern Illinois.  At first I was to take personal command of a
combined expedition that had been ordered for the capture of Colonel
Jeff. Thompson, a sort of independent or partisan commander who was
disputing with us the possession of south-east Missouri.  Troops had
been ordered to move from Ironton to Cape Girardeau, sixty or seventy
miles to the south-east, on the Mississippi River; while the forces at
Cape Girardeau had been ordered to move to Jacksonville, ten miles out
towards Ironton; and troops at Cairo and Bird's Point, at the junction
of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, were to hold themselves in readiness
to go down the Mississippi to Belmont, eighteen miles below, to be moved
west from there when an officer should come to command them.  I was the
officer who had been selected for this purpose.  Cairo was to become my
headquarters when the expedition terminated.

In pursuance of my orders I established my temporary headquarters at
Cape Girardeau and sent instructions to the commanding officer at
Jackson, to inform me of the approach of General Prentiss from Ironton.
Hired wagons were kept moving night and day to take additional rations
to Jackson, to supply the troops when they started from there.  Neither
General Prentiss nor Colonel Marsh, who commanded at Jackson, knew their
destination.  I drew up all the instructions for the contemplated move,
and kept them in my pocket until I should hear of the junction of our
troops at Jackson.  Two or three days after my arrival at Cape
Girardeau, word came that General Prentiss was approaching that place
(Jackson).  I started at once to meet him there and to give him his
orders.  As I turned the first corner of a street after starting, I saw
a column of cavalry passing the next street in front of me.  I turned
and rode around the block the other way, so as to meet the head of the
column.  I found there General Prentiss himself, with a large escort.
He had halted his troops at Jackson for the night, and had come on
himself to Cape Girardeau, leaving orders for his command to follow him
in the morning.  I gave the General his orders--which stopped him at
Jackson--but he was very much aggrieved at being placed under another
brigadier-general, particularly as he believed himself to be the senior.
He had been a brigadier, in command at Cairo, while I was mustering
officer at Springfield without any rank.  But we were nominated at the
same time for the United States service, and both our commissions bore
date May 17th, 1861.  By virtue of my former army rank I was, by law,
the senior.  General Prentiss failed to get orders to his troops to
remain at Jackson, and the next morning early they were reported as
approaching Cape Girardeau.  I then ordered the General very
peremptorily to countermarch his command and take it back to Jackson.
He obeyed the order, but bade his command adieu when he got them to
Jackson, and went to St. Louis and reported himself.  This broke up the
expedition.  But little harm was done, as Jeff. Thompson moved light and
had no fixed place for even nominal headquarters.  He was as much at
home in Arkansas as he was in Missouri and would keep out of the way of
a superior force.  Prentiss was sent to another part of the State.

General Prentiss made a great mistake on the above occasion, one that he
would not have committed later in the war.  When I came to know him
better, I regretted it much.  In consequence of this occurrence he was
off duty in the field when the principal campaign at the West was going
on, and his juniors received promotion while he was where none could be
obtained.  He would have been next to myself in rank in the district of
south-east Missouri, by virtue of his services in the Mexican war.  He
was a brave and very earnest soldier.  No man in the service was more
sincere in his devotion to the cause for which we were battling; none
more ready to make sacrifices or risk life in it.

On the 4th of September I removed my headquarters to Cairo and found
Colonel Richard Oglesby in command of the post.  We had never met, at
least not to my knowledge.  After my promotion I had ordered my
brigadier-general's uniform from New York, but it had not yet arrived,
so that I was in citizen's dress.  The Colonel had his office full of
people, mostly from the neighboring States of Missouri and Kentucky,
making complaints or asking favors.  He evidently did not catch my name
when I was presented, for on my taking a piece of paper from the table
where he was seated and writing the order assuming command of the
district of south-east Missouri, Colonel Richard J. Oglesby to command
the post at Bird's Point, and handing it to him, he put on an expression
of surprise that looked a little as if he would like to have some one
identify me.  But he surrendered the office without question.

The day after I assumed command at Cairo a man came to me who said he
was a scout of General Fremont.  He reported that he had just come from
Columbus, a point on the Mississippi twenty miles below on the Kentucky
side, and that troops had started from there, or were about to start, to
seize Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee.  There was no time for
delay; I reported by telegraph to the department commander the
information I had received, and added that I was taking steps to get off
that night to be in advance of the enemy in securing that important
point.  There was a large number of steamers lying at Cairo and a good
many boatmen were staying in the town.  It was the work of only a few
hours to get the boats manned, with coal aboard and steam up.  Troops
were also designated to go aboard.  The distance from Cairo to Paducah
is about forty-five miles.  I did not wish to get there before daylight
of the 6th, and directed therefore that the boats should lie at anchor
out in the stream until the time to start.  Not having received an
answer to my first dispatch, I again telegraphed to department
headquarters that I should start for Paducah that night unless I
received further orders.  Hearing nothing, we started before midnight
and arrived early the following morning, anticipating the enemy by
probably not over six or eight hours.  It proved very fortunate that the
expedition against Jeff. Thompson had been broken up. Had it not been,
the enemy would have seized Paducah and fortified it, to our very great
annoyance.

When the National troops entered the town the citizens were taken by
surprise.  I never after saw such consternation depicted on the faces of
the people.  Men, women and children came out of their doors looking
pale and frightened at the presence of the invader.  They were expecting
rebel troops that day.  In fact, nearly four thousand men from Columbus
were at that time within ten or fifteen miles of Paducah on their way to
occupy the place.  I had but two regiments and one battery with me, but
the enemy did not know this and returned to Columbus.  I stationed my
troops at the best points to guard the roads leading into the city, left
gunboats to guard the river fronts and by noon was ready to start on my
return to Cairo.  Before leaving, however, I addressed a short printed
proclamation to the citizens of Paducah assuring them of our peaceful
intentions, that we had come among them to protect them against the
enemies of our country, and that all who chose could continue their
usual avocations with assurance of the protection of the government.
This was evidently a relief to them; but the majority would have much
preferred the presence of the other army.  I reinforced Paducah rapidly
from the troops at Cape Girardeau; and a day or two later General C. F.
Smith, a most accomplished soldier, reported at Cairo and was assigned
to the command of the post at the mouth of the Tennessee.  In a short
time it was well fortified and a detachment was sent to occupy
Smithland, at the mouth of the Cumberland.

The State government of Kentucky at that time was rebel in sentiment,
but wanted to preserve an armed neutrality between the North and the
South, and the governor really seemed to think the State had a perfect
right to maintain a neutral position. The rebels already occupied two
towns in the State, Columbus and Hickman, on the Mississippi; and at the
very moment the National troops were entering Paducah from the Ohio
front, General Lloyd Tilghman--a Confederate--with his staff and a small
detachment of men, were getting out in the other direction, while, as I
have already said, nearly four thousand Confederate troops were on
Kentucky soil on their way to take possession of the town. But, in the
estimation of the governor and of those who thought with him, this did
not justify the National authorities in invading the soil of Kentucky.
I informed the legislature of the State of what I was doing, and my
action was approved by the majority of that body.  On my return to Cairo
I found authority from department headquarters for me to take Paducah
"if I felt strong enough," but very soon after I was reprimanded from
the same quarters for my correspondence with the legislature and warned
against a repetition of the offence.

Soon after I took command at Cairo, General Fremont entered into
arrangements for the exchange of the prisoners captured at Camp Jackson
in the month of May.  I received orders to pass them through my lines to
Columbus as they presented themselves with proper credentials.  Quite a
number of these prisoners I had been personally acquainted with before
the war.  Such of them as I had so known were received at my
headquarters as old acquaintances, and ordinary routine business was not
disturbed by their presence.  On one occasion when several were present
in my office my intention to visit Cape Girardeau the next day, to
inspect the troops at that point, was mentioned.  Something transpired
which postponed my trip; but a steamer employed by the government was
passing a point some twenty or more miles above Cairo, the next day,
when a section of rebel artillery with proper escort brought her to.  A
major, one of those who had been at my headquarters the day before, came
at once aboard and after some search made a direct demand for my
delivery.  It was hard to persuade him that I was not there.  This
officer was Major Barrett, of St. Louis.  I had been acquainted with his
family before the war.



CHAPTER XX.

GENERAL FREMONT IN COMMAND--MOVEMENT AGAINST BELMONT--BATTLE OF BELMONT
--A NARROW ESCAPE--AFTER THE BATTLE.

From the occupation of Paducah up to the early part of November nothing
important occurred with the troops under my command.  I was reinforced
from time to time and the men were drilled and disciplined preparatory
for the service which was sure to come.  By the 1st of November I had
not fewer than 20,000 men, most of them under good drill and ready to
meet any equal body of men who, like themselves, had not yet been in an
engagement.  They were growing impatient at lying idle so long, almost
in hearing of the guns of the enemy they had volunteered to fight
against.  I asked on one or two occasions to be allowed to move against
Columbus.  It could have been taken soon after the occupation of
Paducah; but before November it was so strongly fortified that it would
have required a large force and a long siege to capture it.

In the latter part of October General Fremont took the field in person
and moved from Jefferson City against General Sterling Price, who was
then in the State of Missouri with a considerable command.  About the
first of November I was directed from department headquarters to make a
demonstration on both sides of the Mississippi River with the view of
detaining the rebels at Columbus within their lines.  Before my troops
could be got off, I was notified from the same quarter that there were
some 3,000 of the enemy on the St. Francis River about fifty miles west,
or south-west, from Cairo, and was ordered to send another force against
them.  I dispatched Colonel Oglesby at once with troops sufficient to
compete with the reported number of the enemy.  On the 5th word came
from the same source that the rebels were about to detach a large force
from Columbus to be moved by boats down the Mississippi and up the White
River, in Arkansas, in order to reinforce Price, and I was directed to
prevent this movement if possible.  I accordingly sent a regiment from
Bird's Point under Colonel W. H. L. Wallace to overtake and reinforce
Oglesby, with orders to march to New Madrid, a point some distance below
Columbus, on the Missouri side.  At the same time I directed General C.
F. Smith to move all the troops he could spare from Paducah directly
against Columbus, halting them, however, a few miles from the town to
await further orders from me.  Then I gathered up all the troops at
Cairo and Fort Holt, except suitable guards, and moved them down the
river on steamers convoyed by two gunboats, accompanying them myself.
My force consisted of a little over 3,000 men and embraced five
regiments of infantry, two guns and two companies of cavalry.  We
dropped down the river on the 6th to within about six miles of Columbus,
debarked a few men on the Kentucky side and established pickets to
connect with the troops from Paducah.

I had no orders which contemplated an attack by the National troops, nor
did I intend anything of the kind when I started out from Cairo; but
after we started I saw that the officers and men were elated at the
prospect of at last having the opportunity of doing what they had
volunteered to do--fight the enemies of their country.  I did not see
how I could maintain discipline, or retain the confidence of my command,
if we should return to Cairo without an effort to do something.
Columbus, besides being strongly fortified, contained a garrison much
more numerous than the force I had with me.  It would not do, therefore,
to attack that point.  About two o'clock on the morning of the 7th, I
learned that the enemy was crossing troops from Columbus to the west
bank to be dispatched, presumably, after Oglesby.  I knew there was a
small camp of Confederates at Belmont, immediately opposite Columbus,
and I speedily resolved to push down the river, land on the Missouri
side, capture Belmont, break up the camp and return.  Accordingly, the
pickets above Columbus were drawn in at once, and about daylight the
boats moved out from shore.  In an hour we were debarking on the west
bank of the Mississippi, just out of range of the batteries at Columbus.

The ground on the west shore of the river, opposite Columbus, is low and
in places marshy and cut up with sloughs.  The soil is rich and the
timber large and heavy.  There were some small clearings between Belmont
and the point where we landed, but most of the country was covered with
the native forests.  We landed in front of a cornfield.  When the
debarkation commenced, I took a regiment down the river to post it as a
guard against surprise.  At that time I had no staff officer who could
be trusted with that duty.  In the woods, at a short distance below the
clearing, I found a depression, dry at the time, but which at high water
became a slough or bayou.  I placed the men in the hollow, gave them
their instructions and ordered them to remain there until they were
properly relieved.  These troops, with the gunboats, were to protect our
transports.

Up to this time the enemy had evidently failed to divine our intentions.
From Columbus they could, of course, see our gunboats and transports
loaded with troops.  But the force from Paducah was threatening them
from the land side, and it was hardly to be expected that if Columbus
was our object we would separate our troops by a wide river.  They
doubtless thought we meant to draw a large force from the east bank,
then embark ourselves, land on the east bank and make a sudden assault
on Columbus before their divided command could be united.

About eight o'clock we started from the point of debarkation, marching
by the flank.  After moving in this way for a mile or a mile and a half,
I halted where there was marshy ground covered with a heavy growth of
timber in our front, and deployed a large part of my force as
skirmishers.  By this time the enemy discovered that we were moving upon
Belmont and sent out troops to meet us.  Soon after we had started in
line, his skirmishers were encountered and fighting commenced.  This
continued, growing fiercer and fiercer, for about four hours, the enemy
being forced back gradually until he was driven into his camp. Early in
this engagement my horse was shot under me, but I got another from one
of my staff and kept well up with the advance until the river was
reached.

The officers and men engaged at Belmont were then under fire for the
first time.  Veterans could not have behaved better than they did up to
the moment of reaching the rebel camp.  At this point they became
demoralized from their victory and failed to reap its full reward.  The
enemy had been followed so closely that when he reached the clear ground
on which his camp was pitched he beat a hasty retreat over the river
bank, which protected him from our shots and from view.  This
precipitate retreat at the last moment enabled the National forces to
pick their way without hinderance through the _abatis_--the only
artificial defence the enemy had.  The moment the camp was reached our
men laid down their arms and commenced rummaging the tents to pick up
trophies.  Some of the higher officers were little better than the
privates.  They galloped about from one cluster of men to another and at
every halt delivered a short eulogy upon the Union cause and the
achievements of the command.

All this time the troops we had been engaged with for four hours, lay
crouched under cover of the river bank, ready to come up and surrender
if summoned to do so; but finding that they were not pursued, they
worked their way up the river and came up on the bank between us and our
transports.  I saw at the same time two steamers coming from the
Columbus side towards the west shore, above us, black--or gray--with
soldiers from boiler-deck to roof.  Some of my men were engaged in
firing from captured guns at empty steamers down the river, out of
range, cheering at every shot.  I tried to get them to turn their guns
upon the loaded steamers above and not so far away.  My efforts were in
vain.  At last I directed my staff officers to set fire to the camps.
This drew the fire of the enemy's guns located on the heights of
Columbus.  They had abstained from firing before, probably because they
were afraid of hitting their own men; or they may have supposed, until
the camp was on fire, that it was still in the possession of their
friends.  About this time, too, the men we had driven over the bank were
seen in line up the river between us and our transports.  The alarm
"surrounded" was given.  The guns of the enemy and the report of being
surrounded, brought officers and men completely under control.  At first
some of the officers seemed to think that to be surrounded was to be
placed in a hopeless position, where there was nothing to do but
surrender.  But when I announced that we had cut our way in and could
cut our way out just as well, it seemed a new revelation to officers and
soldiers.  They formed line rapidly and we started back to our boats,
with the men deployed as skirmishers as they had been on entering camp.
The enemy was soon encountered, but his resistance this time was feeble.
Again the Confederates sought shelter under the river banks.  We could
not stop, however, to pick them up, because the troops we had seen
crossing the river had debarked by this time and were nearer our
transports than we were.  It would be prudent to get them behind us; but
we were not again molested on our way to the boats.

From the beginning of the fighting our wounded had been carried to the
houses at the rear, near the place of debarkation.  I now set the troops
to bringing their wounded to the boats.  After this had gone on for some
little time I rode down the road, without even a staff officer, to visit
the guard I had stationed over the approach to our transports.  I knew
the enemy had crossed over from Columbus in considerable numbers and
might be expected to attack us as we were embarking.  This guard would
be encountered first and, as they were in a natural intrenchment, would
be able to hold the enemy for a considerable time.  My surprise was
great to find there was not a single man in the trench.  Riding back to
the boat I found the officer who had commanded the guard and learned
that he had withdrawn his force when the main body fell back.  At first
I ordered the guard to return, but finding that it would take some time
to get the men together and march them back to their position, I
countermanded the order.  Then fearing that the enemy we had seen
crossing the river below might be coming upon us unawares, I rode out in
the field to our front, still entirely alone, to observe whether the
enemy was passing.  The field was grown up with corn so tall and thick
as to cut off the view of even a person on horseback, except directly
along the rows.  Even in that direction, owing to the overhanging blades
of corn, the view was not extensive. I had not gone more than a few
hundred yards when I saw a body of troops marching past me not fifty
yards away.  I looked at them for a moment and then turned my horse
towards the river and started back, first in a walk, and when I thought
myself concealed from the view of the enemy, as fast as my horse could
carry me.  When at the river bank I still had to ride a few hundred
yards to the point where the nearest transport lay.

The cornfield in front of our transports terminated at the edge of a
dense forest.  Before I got back the enemy had entered this forest and
had opened a brisk fire upon the boats.  Our men, with the exception of
details that had gone to the front after the wounded, were now either
aboard the transports or very near them.  Those who were not aboard soon
got there, and the boats pushed off.  I was the only man of the National
army between the rebels and our transports.  The captain of a boat that
had just pushed out but had not started, recognized me and ordered the
engineer not to start the engine; he then had a plank run out for me.
My horse seemed to take in the situation.  There was no path down the
bank and every one acquainted with the Mississippi River knows that its
banks, in a natural state, do not vary at any great angle from the
perpendicular.  My horse put his fore feet over the bank without
hesitation or urging, and with his hind feet well under him, slid down
the bank and trotted aboard the boat, twelve or fifteen feet away, over
a single gang plank.  I dismounted and went at once to the upper deck.

The Mississippi River was low on the 7th of November, 1861, so that the
banks were higher than the heads of men standing on the upper decks of
the steamers.  The rebels were some distance back from the river, so
that their fire was high and did us but little harm.  Our smoke-stack
was riddled with bullets, but there were only three men wounded on the
boats, two of whom were soldiers.  When I first went on deck I entered
the captain's room adjoining the pilot-house, and threw myself on a
sofa.  I did not keep that position a moment, but rose to go out on the
deck to observe what was going on.  I had scarcely left when a musket
ball entered the room, struck the head of the sofa, passed through it
and lodged in the foot.

When the enemy opened fire on the transports our gunboats returned it
with vigor.  They were well out in the stream and some distance down, so
that they had to give but very little elevation to their guns to clear
the banks of the river.  Their position very nearly enfiladed the line
of the enemy while he was marching through the cornfield.  The execution
was very great, as we could see at the time and as I afterwards learned
more positively.  We were very soon out of range and went peacefully on
our way to Cairo, every man feeling that Belmont was a great victory and
that he had contributed his share to it.

Our loss at Belmont was 485 in killed, wounded and missing. About 125 of
our wounded fell into the hands of the enemy.  We returned with 175
prisoners and two guns, and spiked four other pieces.  The loss of the
enemy, as officially reported, was 642 men, killed, wounded and missing.
We had engaged about 2,500 men, exclusive of the guard left with the
transports.  The enemy had about 7,000; but this includes the troops
brought over from Columbus who were not engaged in the first defence of
Belmont.

The two objects for which the battle of Belmont was fought were fully
accomplished.  The enemy gave up all idea of detaching troops from
Columbus.  His losses were very heavy for that period of the war.
Columbus was beset by people looking for their wounded or dead kin, to
take them home for medical treatment or burial.  I learned later, when I
had moved further south, that Belmont had caused more mourning than
almost any other battle up to that time.  The National troops acquired a
confidence in themselves at Belmont that did not desert them through the
war.

The day after the battle I met some officers from General Polk's
command, arranged for permission to bury our dead at Belmont and also
commenced negotiations for the exchange of prisoners.  When our men went
to bury their dead, before they were allowed to land they were conducted
below the point where the enemy had engaged our transports.  Some of the
officers expressed a desire to see the field; but the request was
refused with the statement that we had no dead there.

While on the truce-boat I mentioned to an officer, whom I had known both
at West Point and in the Mexican war, that I was in the cornfield near
their troops when they passed; that I had been on horseback and had worn
a soldier's overcoat at the time.  This officer was on General Polk's
staff.  He said both he and the general had seen me and that Polk had
said to his men, "There is a Yankee; you may try your marksmanship on
him if you wish," but nobody fired at me.

Belmont was severely criticised in the North as a wholly unnecessary
battle, barren of results, or the possibility of them from the
beginning.  If it had not been fought, Colonel Oglesby would probably
have been captured or destroyed with his three thousand men.  Then I
should have been culpable indeed.



CHAPTER XXI.

GENERAL HALLECK IN COMMAND--COMMANDING THE DISTRICT OF CAIRO--MOVEMENT
ON FORT HENRY--CAPTURE OF FORT HENRY.

While at Cairo I had frequent opportunities of meeting the rebel
officers of the Columbus garrison.  They seemed to be very fond of
coming up on steamers under flags of truce.  On two or three occasions I
went down in like manner.  When one of their boats was seen coming up
carrying a white flag, a gun would be fired from the lower battery at
Fort Holt, throwing a shot across the bow as a signal to come no
farther.  I would then take a steamer and, with my staff and
occasionally a few other officers, go down to receive the party.  There
were several officers among them whom I had known before, both at West
Point and in Mexico. Seeing these officers who had been educated for the
profession of arms, both at school and in actual war, which is a far
more efficient training, impressed me with the great advantage the South
possessed over the North at the beginning of the rebellion.  They had
from thirty to forty per cent. of the educated soldiers of the Nation.
They had no standing army and, consequently, these trained soldiers had
to find employment with the troops from their own States.  In this way
what there was of military education and training was distributed
throughout their whole army.  The whole loaf was leavened.

The North had a great number of educated and trained soldiers, but the
bulk of them were still in the army and were retained, generally with
their old commands and rank, until the war had lasted many months.  In
the Army of the Potomac there was what was known as the "regular
brigade," in which, from the commanding officer down to the youngest
second lieutenant, every one was educated to his profession.  So, too,
with many of the batteries; all the officers, generally four in number
to each, were men educated for their profession.  Some of these went
into battle at the beginning under division commanders who were entirely
without military training.  This state of affairs gave me an idea which
I expressed while at Cairo; that the government ought to disband the
regular army, with the exception of the staff corps, and notify the
disbanded officers that they would receive no compensation while the war
lasted except as volunteers.  The register should be kept up, but the
names of all officers who were not in the volunteer service at the
close, should be stricken from it.

On the 9th of November, two days after the battle of Belmont,
Major-General H. W. Halleck superseded General Fremont in command of the
Department of the Missouri.  The limits of his command took in Arkansas
and west Kentucky east to the Cumberland River.  From the battle of
Belmont until early in February, 1862, the troops under my command did
little except prepare for the long struggle which proved to be before
them.

The enemy at this time occupied a line running from the Mississippi
River at Columbus to Bowling Green and Mill Springs, Kentucky.  Each of
these positions was strongly fortified, as were also points on the
Tennessee and Cumberland rivers near the Tennessee state line.  The
works on the Tennessee were called Fort Heiman and Fort Henry, and that
on the Cumberland was Fort Donelson.  At these points the two rivers
approached within eleven miles of each other.  The lines of rifle pits
at each place extended back from the water at least two miles, so that
the garrisons were in reality only seven miles apart.  These positions
were of immense importance to the enemy; and of course correspondingly
important for us to possess ourselves of.  With Fort Henry in our hands
we had a navigable stream open to us up to Muscle Shoals, in Alabama.
The Memphis and Charleston Railroad strikes the Tennessee at Eastport,
Mississippi, and follows close to the banks of the river up to the
shoals.  This road, of vast importance to the enemy, would cease to be
of use to them for through traffic the moment Fort Henry became ours.
Fort Donelson was the gate to Nashville--a place of great military and
political importance--and to a rich country extending far east in
Kentucky.  These two points in our possession the enemy would
necessarily be thrown back to the Memphis and Charleston road, or to the
boundary of the cotton states, and, as before stated, that road would be
lost to them for through communication.

The designation of my command had been changed after Halleck's arrival,
from the District of South-east Missouri to the District of Cairo, and
the small district commanded by General C. F. Smith, embracing the
mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, had been added to my
jurisdiction.  Early in January, 1862, I was directed by General
McClellan, through my department commander, to make a reconnoissance in
favor of Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell, who commanded the
Department of the Ohio, with headquarters at Louisville, and who was
confronting General S. B. Buckner with a larger Confederate force at
Bowling Green.  It was supposed that Buell was about to make some move
against the enemy, and my demonstration was intended to prevent the
sending of troops from Columbus, Fort Henry or Donelson to Buckner.  I
at once ordered General Smith to send a force up the west bank of the
Tennessee to threaten forts Heiman and Henry; McClernand at the same
time with a force of 6,000 men was sent out into west Kentucky,
threatening Columbus with one column and the Tennessee River with
another. I went with McClernand's command.  The weather was very bad;
snow and rain fell; the roads, never good in that section, were
intolerable.  We were out more than a week splashing through the mud,
snow and rain, the men suffering very much.  The object of the
expedition was accomplished.  The enemy did not send reinforcements to
Bowling Green, and General George H. Thomas fought and won the battle of
Mill Springs before we returned.

As a result of this expedition General Smith reported that he thought it
practicable to capture Fort Heiman.  This fort stood on high ground,
completely commanding Fort Henry on the opposite side of the river, and
its possession by us, with the aid of our gunboats, would insure the
capture of Fort Henry.  This report of Smith's confirmed views I had
previously held, that the true line of operations for us was up the
Tennessee and Cumberland rivers.  With us there, the enemy would be
compelled to fall back on the east and west entirely out of the State of
Kentucky.  On the 6th of January, before receiving orders for this
expedition, I had asked permission of the general commanding the
department to go to see him at St. Louis.  My object was to lay this
plan of campaign before him.  Now that my views had been confirmed by so
able a general as Smith, I renewed my request to go to St. Louis on what
I deemed important military business.  The leave was granted, but not
graciously.  I had known General Halleck but very slightly in the old
army, not having met him either at West Point or during the Mexican war.
I was received with so little cordiality that I perhaps stated the
object of my visit with less clearness than I might have done, and I had
not uttered many sentences before I was cut short as if my plan was
preposterous.  I returned to Cairo very much crestfallen.

Flag-officer Foote commanded the little fleet of gunboats then in the
neighborhood of Cairo and, though in another branch of the service, was
subject to the command of General Halleck.  He and I consulted freely
upon military matters and he agreed with me perfectly as to the
feasibility of the campaign up the Tennessee.  Notwithstanding the
rebuff I had received from my immediate chief, I therefore, on the 28th
of January, renewed the suggestion by telegraph that "if permitted, I
could take and hold Fort Henry on the Tennessee."  This time I was
backed by Flag-officer Foote, who sent a similar dispatch.  On the 29th
I wrote fully in support of the proposition.  On the 1st of February I
received full instructions from department headquarters to move upon
Fort Henry.  On the 2d the expedition started.

In February, 1862, there were quite a good many steamers laid up at
Cairo for want of employment, the Mississippi River being closed against
navigation below that point.  There were also many men in the town whose
occupation had been following the river in various capacities, from
captain down to deck hand But there were not enough of either boats or
men to move at one time the 17,000 men I proposed to take with me up the
Tennessee.  I loaded the boats with more than half the force, however,
and sent General McClernand in command.  I followed with one of the
later boats and found McClernand had stopped, very properly, nine miles
below Fort Henry.  Seven gunboats under Flag-officer Foote had
accompanied the advance.  The transports we had with us had to return to
Paducah to bring up a division from there, with General C. F. Smith in
command.

Before sending the boats back I wanted to get the troops as near to the
enemy as I could without coming within range of their guns.  There was a
stream emptying into the Tennessee on the east side, apparently at about
long range distance below the fort.  On account of the narrow water-shed
separating the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers at that point, the stream
must be insignificant at ordinary stages, but when we were there, in
February, it was a torrent.  It would facilitate the investment of Fort
Henry materially if the troops could be landed south of that stream.  To
test whether this could be done I boarded the gunboat Essex and
requested Captain Wm. Porter commanding it, to approach the fort to draw
its fire.  After we had gone some distance past the mouth of the stream
we drew the fire of the fort, which fell much short of us.  In
consequence I had made up my mind to return and bring the troops to the
upper side of the creek, when the enemy opened upon us with a rifled gun
that sent shot far beyond us and beyond the stream.  One shot passed
very near where Captain Porter and I were standing, struck the deck near
the stern, penetrated and passed through the cabin and so out into the
river.  We immediately turned back, and the troops were debarked below
the mouth of the creek.

When the landing was completed I returned with the transports to Paducah
to hasten up the balance of the troops.  I got back on the 5th with the
advance, the remainder following as rapidly as the steamers could carry
them.  At ten o'clock at night, on the 5th, the whole command was not
yet up.  Being anxious to commence operations as soon as possible before
the enemy could reinforce heavily, I issued my orders for an advance at
11 A.M. on the 6th.  I felt sure that all the troops would be up by that
time.

Fort Henry occupies a bend in the river which gave the guns in the water
battery a direct fire down the stream.  The camp outside the fort was
intrenched, with rifle pits and outworks two miles back on the road to
Donelson and Dover.  The garrison of the fort and camp was about 2,800,
with strong reinforcements from Donelson halted some miles out.  There
were seventeen heavy guns in the fort.  The river was very high, the
banks being overflowed except where the bluffs come to the water's edge.
A portion of the ground on which Fort Henry stood was two feet deep in
water.  Below, the water extended into the woods several hundred yards
back from the bank on the east side.  On the west bank Fort Heiman stood
on high ground, completely commanding Fort Henry.  The distance from
Fort Henry to Donelson is but eleven miles.  The two positions were so
important to the enemy, AS HE SAW HIS INTEREST, that it was natural to
suppose that reinforcements would come from every quarter from which
they could be got.  Prompt action on our part was imperative.

The plan was for the troops and gunboats to start at the same moment.
The troops were to invest the garrison and the gunboats to attack the
fort at close quarters.  General Smith was to land a brigade of his
division on the west bank during the night of the 5th and get it in rear
of Heiman.

At the hour designated the troops and gunboats started.  General Smith
found Fort Heiman had been evacuated before his men arrived.  The
gunboats soon engaged the water batteries at very close quarters, but
the troops which were to invest Fort Henry were delayed for want of
roads, as well as by the dense forest and the high water in what would
in dry weather have been unimportant beds of streams.  This delay made
no difference in the result.  On our first appearance Tilghman had sent
his entire command, with the exception of about one hundred men left to
man the guns in the fort, to the outworks on the road to Dover and
Donelson, so as to have them out of range of the guns of our navy; and
before any attack on the 6th he had ordered them to retreat on Donelson.
He stated in his subsequent report that the defence was intended solely
to give his troops time to make their escape.

Tilghman was captured with his staff and ninety men, as well as the
armament of the fort, the ammunition and whatever stores were there.
Our cavalry pursued the retreating column towards Donelson and picked up
two guns and a few stragglers; but the enemy had so much the start, that
the pursuing force did not get in sight of any except the stragglers.

All the gunboats engaged were hit many times.  The damage, however,
beyond what could be repaired by a small expenditure of money, was
slight, except to the Essex.  A shell penetrated the boiler of that
vessel and exploded it, killing and wounding forty-eight men, nineteen
of whom were soldiers who had been detailed to act with the navy.  On
several occasions during the war such details were made when the
complement of men with the navy was insufficient for the duty before
them.  After the fall of Fort Henry Captain Phelps, commanding the
iron-clad Carondelet, at my request ascended the Tennessee River and
thoroughly destroyed the bridge of the Memphis and Ohio Railroad.



CHAPTER XXII.

INVESTMENT OF FORT DONELSON--THE NAVAL OPERATIONS--ATTACK OF THE ENEMY
--ASSAULTING THE WORKS--SURRENDER OF THE FORT.

I informed the department commander of our success at Fort Henry and
that on the 8th I would take Fort Donelson.  But the rain continued to
fall so heavily that the roads became impassable for artillery and wagon
trains.  Then, too, it would not have been prudent to proceed without
the gunboats.  At least it would have been leaving behind a valuable
part of our available force.

On the 7th, the day after the fall of Fort Henry, I took my staff and
the cavalry--a part of one regiment--and made a reconnoissance to within
about a mile of the outer line of works at Donelson.  I had known
General Pillow in Mexico, and judged that with any force, no matter how
small, I could march up to within gunshot of any intrenchments he was
given to hold.  I said this to the officers of my staff at the time.  I
knew that Floyd was in command, but he was no soldier, and I judged that
he would yield to Pillow's pretensions.  I met, as I expected, no
opposition in making the reconnoissance and, besides learning the
topography of the country on the way and around Fort Donelson, found
that there were two roads available for marching; one leading to the
village of Dover, the other to Donelson.

Fort Donelson is two miles north, or down the river, from Dover.  The
fort, as it stood in 1861, embraced about one hundred acres of land.  On
the east it fronted the Cumberland; to the north it faced Hickman's
creek, a small stream which at that time was deep and wide because of
the back-water from the river; on the south was another small stream, or
rather a ravine, opening into the Cumberland.  This also was filled with
back-water from the river.  The fort stood on high ground, some of it as
much as a hundred feet above the Cumberland.  Strong protection to the
heavy guns in the water batteries had been obtained by cutting away
places for them in the bluff.  To the west there was a line of rifle
pits some two miles back from the river at the farthest point.  This
line ran generally along the crest of high ground, but in one place
crossed a ravine which opens into the river between the village and the
fort.  The ground inside and outside of this intrenched line was very
broken and generally wooded.  The trees outside of the rifle-pits had
been cut down for a considerable way out, and had been felled so that
their tops lay outwards from the intrenchments.  The limbs had been
trimmed and pointed, and thus formed an _abatis_ in front of the greater
part of the line. Outside of this intrenched line, and extending about
half the entire length of it, is a ravine running north and south and
opening into Hickman creek at a point north of the fort.  The entire
side of this ravine next to the works was one long _abatis_.

General Halleck commenced his efforts in all quarters to get
reinforcements to forward to me immediately on my departure from Cairo.
General Hunter sent men freely from Kansas, and a large division under
General Nelson, from Buell's army, was also dispatched.  Orders went out
from the War Department to consolidate fragments of companies that were
being recruited in the Western States so as to make full companies, and
to consolidate companies into regiments.  General Halleck did not
approve or disapprove of my going to Fort Donelson.  He said nothing
whatever to me on the subject.  He informed Buell on the 7th that I
would march against Fort Donelson the next day; but on the 10th he
directed me to fortify Fort Henry strongly, particularly to the land
side, saying that he forwarded me intrenching tools for that purpose.  I
received this dispatch in front of Fort Donelson.

I was very impatient to get to Fort Donelson because I knew the
importance of the place to the enemy and supposed he would reinforce it
rapidly.  I felt that 15,000 men on the 8th would be more effective than
50,000 a month later.  I asked Flag-officer Foote, therefore, to order
his gunboats still about Cairo to proceed up the Cumberland River and
not to wait for those gone to Eastport and  Florence; but the others got
back in time and we started on the 12th.  I had moved McClernand out a
few miles the night before so as to leave the road as free as possible.

Just as we were about to start the first reinforcement reached me on
transports.  It was a brigade composed of six full regiments commanded
by Colonel Thayer, of Nebraska.  As the gunboats were going around to
Donelson by the Tennessee, Ohio and Cumberland rivers, I directed Thayer
to turn about and go under their convoy.

I started from Fort Henry with 15,000 men, including eight batteries and
part of a regiment of cavalry, and, meeting with no obstruction to
detain us, the advance arrived in front of the enemy by noon.  That
afternoon and the next day were spent in taking up ground to make the
investment as complete as possible.  General Smith had been directed to
leave a portion of his division behind to guard forts Henry and Heiman.
He left General Lew. Wallace with 2,500 men.  With the remainder of his
division he occupied our left, extending to Hickman creek. McClernand
was on the right and covered the roads running south and south-west from
Dover.  His right extended to the back-water up the ravine opening into
the Cumberland south of the village. The troops were not intrenched, but
the nature of the ground was such that they were just as well protected
from the fire of the enemy as if rifle-pits had been thrown up.  Our
line was generally along the crest of ridges.  The artillery was
protected by being sunk in the ground.  The men who were not serving the
guns were perfectly covered from fire on taking position a little back
from the crest.  The greatest suffering was from want of shelter.  It
was midwinter and during the siege we had rain and snow, thawing and
freezing alternately.  It would not do to allow camp-fires except far
down the hill out of sight of the enemy, and it would not do to allow
many of the troops to remain there at the same time.  In the march over
from Fort Henry numbers of the men had thrown away their blankets and
overcoats.  There was therefore much discomfort and absolute suffering.

During the 12th and 13th, and until the arrival of Wallace and Thayer on
the 14th, the National forces, composed of but 15,000 men, without
intrenchments, confronted an intrenched army of 21,000, without conflict
further than what was brought on by ourselves.  Only one gunboat had
arrived.  There was a little skirmishing each day, brought on by the
movement of our troops in securing commanding positions; but there was
no actual fighting during this time except once, on the 13th, in front
of McClernand's command.  That general had undertaken to capture a
battery of the enemy which was annoying his men.  Without orders or
authority he sent three regiments to make the assault.  The battery was
in the main line of the enemy, which was defended by his whole army
present.  Of course the assault was a failure, and of course the loss on
our side was great for the number of men engaged.  In this assault
Colonel William Morrison fell badly wounded.  Up to this time the
surgeons with the army had no difficulty in finding room in the houses
near our line for all the sick and wounded; but now hospitals were
overcrowded. Owing, however, to the energy and skill of the surgeons the
suffering was not so great as it might have been.  The hospital
arrangements at Fort Donelson were as complete as it was possible to
make them, considering the inclemency of the weather and the lack of
tents, in a sparsely settled country where the houses were generally of
but one or two rooms.

On the return of Captain Walke to Fort Henry on the 10th, I had
requested him to take the vessels that had accompanied him on his
expedition up the Tennessee, and get possession of the Cumberland as far
up towards Donelson as possible.  He started without delay, taking,
however, only his own gunboat, the Carondelet, towed by the steamer
Alps.  Captain Walke arrived a few miles below Donelson on the 12th, a
little after noon. About the time the advance of troops reached a point
within gunshot of the fort on the land side, he engaged the water
batteries at long range.  On the 13th I informed him of my arrival the
day before and of the establishment of most of our batteries, requesting
him at the same time to attack again that day so that I might take
advantage of any diversion.  The attack was made and many shots fell
within the fort, creating some consternation, as we now know.  The
investment on the land side was made as complete as the number of troops
engaged would admit of.

During the night of the 13th Flag-officer Foote arrived with the
iron-clads St. Louis, Louisville and Pittsburg and the wooden gunboats
Tyler and Conestoga, convoying Thayer's brigade.  On the morning of the
14th Thayer was landed.  Wallace, whom I had ordered over from Fort
Henry, also arrived about the same time.  Up to this time he had been
commanding a brigade belonging to the division of General C. F. Smith.
These troops were now restored to the division they belonged to, and
General Lew. Wallace was assigned to the command of a division composed
of the brigade of Colonel Thayer and other reinforcements that arrived
the same day.  This new division was assigned to the centre, giving the
two flanking divisions an opportunity to close up and form a stronger
line.

The plan was for the troops to hold the enemy within his lines, while
the gunboats should attack the water batteries at close quarters and
silence his guns if possible.  Some of the gunboats were to run the
batteries, get above the fort and above the village of Dover.  I had
ordered a reconnoissance made with the view of getting troops to the
river above Dover in case they should be needed there.  That position
attained by the gunboats it would have been but a question of time--and
a very short time, too--when the garrison would have been compelled to
surrender.

By three in the afternoon of the 14th Flag-officer Foote was ready, and
advanced upon the water batteries with his entire fleet.  After coming
in range of the batteries of the enemy the advance was slow, but a
constant fire was delivered from every gun that could be brought to bear
upon the fort.  I occupied a position on shore from which I could see
the advancing navy. The leading boat got within a very short distance of
the water battery, not further off I think than two hundred yards, and I
soon saw one and then another of them dropping down the river, visibly
disabled.  Then the whole fleet followed and the engagement closed for
the day.  The gunboat which Flag-officer Foote was on, besides having
been hit about sixty times, several of the shots passing through near
the waterline, had a shot enter the pilot-house which killed the pilot,
carried away the wheel and wounded the flag-officer himself.  The
tiller-ropes of another vessel were carried away and she, too, dropped
helplessly back.  Two others had their pilot-houses so injured that they
scarcely formed a protection to the men at the wheel.

The enemy had evidently been much demoralized by the assault, but they
were jubilant when they saw the disabled vessels dropping down the river
entirely out of the control of the men on board.  Of course I only
witnessed the falling back of our gunboats and felt sad enough at the
time over the repulse. Subsequent reports, now published, show that the
enemy telegraphed a great victory to Richmond.  The sun went down on the
night of the 14th of February, 1862, leaving the army confronting Fort
Donelson anything but comforted over the prospects.  The weather had
turned intensely cold; the men were without tents and could not keep up
fires where most of them had to stay, and, as previously stated, many
had thrown away their overcoats and blankets.  Two of the strongest of
our gunboats had been disabled, presumably beyond the possibility of
rendering any present assistance.  I retired this night not knowing but
that I would have to intrench my position, and bring up tents for the
men or build huts under the cover of the hills.

On the morning of the 15th, before it was yet broad day, a messenger
from Flag-officer Foote handed me a note, expressing a desire to see me
on the flag-ship and saying that he had been injured the day before so
much that he could not come himself to me.  I at once made my
preparations for starting.  I directed my adjutant-general to notify
each of the division commanders of my absence and instruct them to do
nothing to bring on an engagement until they received further orders,
but to hold their positions.  From the heavy rains that had fallen for
days and weeks preceding and from the constant use of the roads between
the troops and the landing four to seven miles below, these roads had
become cut up so as to be hardly passable.  The intense cold of the
night of the 14th-15th had frozen the ground solid.  This made travel on
horseback even slower than through the mud; but I went as fast as the
roads would allow.

When I reached the fleet I found the flag-ship was anchored out in the
stream.  A small boat, however, awaited my arrival and I was soon on
board with the flag-officer.  He explained to me in short the condition
in which he was left by the engagement of the evening before, and
suggested that I should intrench while he returned to Mound City with
his disabled boats, expressing at the time the belief that he could have
the necessary repairs made and be back in ten days.  I saw the absolute
necessity of his gunboats going into hospital and did not know but I
should be forced to the alternative of going through a siege.  But the
enemy relieved me from this necessity.

When I left the National line to visit Flag-officer Foote I had no idea
that there would be any engagement on land unless I brought it on
myself.  The conditions for battle were much more favorable to us than
they had been for the first two days of the investment.  From the 12th
to the 14th we had but 15,000 men of all arms and no gunboats.  Now we
had been reinforced by a fleet of six naval vessels, a large division of
troops under General L. Wallace and 2,500 men brought over from Fort
Henry belonging to the division of C. F. Smith.  The enemy, however, had
taken the initiative.  Just as I landed I met Captain Hillyer of my
staff, white with fear, not for his personal safety, but for the safety
of the National troops.  He said the enemy had come out of his lines in
full force and attacked and scattered McClernand's division, which was
in full retreat.  The roads, as I have said, were unfit for making fast
time, but I got to my command as soon as possible.  The attack had been
made on the National right.  I was some four or five miles north of our
left.  The line was about three miles long.  In reaching the point where
the disaster had occurred I had to pass the divisions of Smith and
Wallace.  I saw no sign of excitement on the portion of the line held by
Smith; Wallace was nearer the scene of conflict and had taken part in
it.  He had, at an opportune time, sent Thayer's brigade to the support
of McClernand and thereby contributed to hold the enemy within his
lines.

I saw everything favorable for us along the line of our left and centre.
When I came to the right appearances were different. The enemy had come
out in full force to cut his way out and make his escape.  McClernand's
division had to bear the brunt of the attack from this combined force.
His men had stood up gallantly until the ammunition in their
cartridge-boxes gave out.  There was abundance of ammunition near by
lying on the ground in boxes, but at that stage of the war it was not
all of our commanders of regiments, brigades, or even divisions, who had
been educated up to the point of seeing that their men were constantly
supplied with ammunition during an engagement.  When the men found
themselves without ammunition they could not stand up against troops who
seemed to have plenty of it.  The division broke and a portion fled, but
most of the men, as they were not pursued, only fell back out of range
of the fire of the enemy. It must have been about this time that Thayer
pushed his brigade in between the enemy and those of our troops that
were without ammunition.  At all events the enemy fell back within his
intrenchments and was there when I got on the field.

I saw the men standing in knots talking in the most excited manner.  No
officer seemed to be giving any directions.  The soldiers had their
muskets, but no ammunition, while there were tons of it close at hand.
I heard some of the men say that the enemy had come out with knapsacks,
and haversacks filled with rations.  They seemed to think this indicated
a determination on his part to stay out and fight just as long as the
provisions held out.  I turned to Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff,
who was with me, and said:  "Some of our men are pretty badly
demoralized, but the enemy must be more so, for he has attempted to
force his way out, but has fallen back:  the one who attacks first now
will be victorious and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets
ahead of me."  I determined to make the assault at once on our left.  It
was clear to my mind that the enemy had started to march out with his
entire force, except a few pickets, and if our attack could be made on
the left before the enemy could redistribute his forces along the line,
we would find but little opposition except from the intervening _abatis_.
I directed Colonel Webster to ride with me and call out to the men as we
passed:  "Fill your cartridge-boxes, quick, and get into line; the enemy
is trying to escape and he must not be permitted to do so."  This acted
like a charm.  The men only wanted some one to give them a command.  We
rode rapidly to Smith's quarters, when I explained the situation to him
and directed him to charge the enemy's works in his front with his whole
division, saying at the same time that he would find nothing but a very
thin line to contend with.  The general was off in an incredibly short
time, going in advance himself to keep his men from firing while they
were working their way through the _abatis_ intervening between them and
the enemy.  The outer line of rifle-pits was passed, and the night of
the 15th General Smith, with much of his division, bivouacked within the
lines of the enemy.  There was now no doubt but that the Confederates
must surrender or be captured the next day.

There seems from subsequent accounts to have been much consternation,
particularly among the officers of high rank, in Dover during the night
of the 15th.  General Floyd, the commanding officer, who was a man of
talent enough for any civil position, was no soldier and, possibly, did
not possess the elements of one.  He was further unfitted for command,
for the reason that his conscience must have troubled him and made him
afraid.  As Secretary of War he had taken a solemn oath to maintain the
Constitution of the United States and to uphold the same against all its
enemies.  He had betrayed that trust.  As Secretary of War he was
reported through the northern press to have scattered the little army
the country had so that the most of it could be picked up in detail when
secession occurred. About a year before leaving the Cabinet he had
removed arms from northern to southern arsenals.  He continued in the
Cabinet of President Buchanan until about the 1st of January, 1861,
while he was working vigilantly for the establishment of a confederacy
made out of United States territory.  Well may he have been afraid to
fall into the hands of National troops.  He would no doubt have been
tried for misappropriating public property, if not for treason, had he
been captured.  General Pillow, next in command, was conceited, and
prided himself much on his services in the Mexican war.  He telegraphed
to General Johnston, at Nashville, after our men were within the rebel
rifle-pits, and almost on the eve of his making his escape, that the
Southern troops had had great success all day.  Johnston forwarded the
dispatch to Richmond.  While the authorities at the capital were reading
it Floyd and Pillow were fugitives.

A council of war was held by the enemy at which all agreed that it would
be impossible to hold out longer.  General Buckner, who was third in
rank in the garrison but much the most capable soldier, seems to have
regarded it a duty to hold the fort until the general commanding the
department, A. S. Johnston, should get back to his headquarters at
Nashville.  Buckner's report shows, however, that he considered Donelson
lost and that any attempt to hold the place longer would be at the
sacrifice of the command.  Being assured that Johnston was already in
Nashville, Buckner too agreed that surrender was the proper thing.
Floyd turned over the command to Pillow, who declined it.  It then
devolved upon Buckner, who accepted the responsibility of the position.
Floyd and Pillow took possession of all the river transports at Dover
and before morning both were on their way to Nashville, with the brigade
formerly commanded by Floyd and some other troops, in all about 3,000.
Some marched up the east bank of the Cumberland; others went on the
steamers.  During the night Forrest also, with his cavalry and some
other troops about a thousand in all, made their way out, passing
between our right and the river.  They had to ford or swim over the
back-water in the little creek just south of Dover.

Before daylight General Smith brought to me the following letter from
General Buckner:


HEADQUARTERS, FORT DONELSON, February 16, 1862.

SIR:--In consideration of all the circumstances governing the present
situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the Commanding
Officer of the Federal forces the appointment of Commissioners to agree
upon terms of capitulation of the forces and fort under my command, and
in that view suggest an armistice until 12 o'clock to-day.

I am, sir, very respectfully, Your ob't se'v't, S. B. BUCKNER, Brig.
Gen. C. S. A.

To Brigadier-General U. S. Grant, Com'ding U. S. Forces, Near Fort
Donelson.


To this I responded as follows:


HEADQUARTERS ARMY IN THE FIELD, Camp near Donelson, February 16, 1862.

General S. B. BUCKNER, Confederate Army.

SIR:--Yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of
Commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received.  No
terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted.
I propose to move immediately upon your works.

I am, sir, very respectfully, Your ob't se'v't, U. S. GRANT, Brig. Gen.


To this I received the following reply:


HEADQUARTERS, DOVER, TENNESSEE, February 16, 1862.

To Brig. Gen'l U. S. GRANT, U. S. Army.

SIR:--The distribution of the forces under my command, incident to an
unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under your
command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the
Confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous
terms which you propose.

I am, sir, Your very ob't se'v't, S. B. BUCKNER, Brig. Gen. C. S. A.


General Buckner, as soon as he had dispatched the first of the above
letters, sent word to his different commanders on the line of
rifle-pits, notifying them that he had made a proposition looking to the
surrender of the garrison, and directing them to notify National troops
in their front so that all fighting might be prevented.  White flags
were stuck at intervals along the line of rifle-pits, but none over the
fort.  As soon as the last letter from Buckner was received I mounted my
horse and rode to Dover.  General Wallace, I found, had preceded me an
hour or more.  I presume that, seeing white flags exposed in his front,
he rode up to see what they meant and, not being fired upon or halted,
he kept on until he found himself at the headquarters of General
Buckner.

I had been at West Point three years with Buckner and afterwards served
with him in the army, so that we were quite well acquainted.  In the
course of our conversation, which was very friendly, he said to me that
if he had been in command I would not have got up to Donelson as easily
as I did.  I told him that if he had been in command I should not have
tried in the way I did:  I had invested their lines with a smaller force
than they had to defend them, and at the same time had sent a brigade
full 5,000 strong, around by water; I had relied very much upon their
commander to allow me to come safely up to the outside of their works.
I asked General Buckner about what force he had to surrender.  He
replied that he could not tell with any degree of accuracy; that all the
sick and weak had been sent to Nashville while we were about Fort Henry;
that Floyd and Pillow had left during the night, taking many men with
them; and that Forrest, and probably others, had also escaped during the
preceding night:  the number of casualties he could not tell; but he
said I would not find fewer than 12,000, nor more than 15,000.

He asked permission to send parties outside of the lines to bury his
dead, who had fallen on the 15th when they tried to get out.  I gave
directions that his permit to pass our limits should be recognized.  I
have no reason to believe that this privilege was abused, but it
familiarized our guards so much with the sight of Confederates passing
to and fro that I have no doubt many got beyond our pickets unobserved
and went on.  The most of the men who went in that way no doubt thought
they had had war enough, and left with the intention of remaining out of
the army.  Some came to me and asked permission to go, saying that they
were tired of the war and would not be caught in the ranks again, and I
bade them go.

The actual number of Confederates at Fort Donelson can never be given
with entire accuracy.  The largest number admitted by any writer on the
Southern side, is by Colonel Preston Johnston.  He gives the number at
17,000.  But this must be an underestimate. The commissary general of
prisoners reported having issued rations to 14,623 Fort Donelson
prisoners at Cairo, as they passed that point.  General Pillow reported
the killed and wounded at 2,000; but he had less opportunity of knowing
the actual numbers than the officers of McClernand's division, for most
of the killed and wounded fell outside their works, in front of that
division, and were buried or cared for by Buckner after the surrender
and when Pillow was a fugitive.  It is known that Floyd and Pillow
escaped during the night of the 15th, taking with them not less than
3,000 men.  Forrest escaped with about 1,000 and others were leaving
singly and in squads all night.  It is probable that the Confederate
force at Donelson, on the 15th of February, 1862, was 21,000 in round
numbers.

On the day Fort Donelson fell I had 27,000 men to confront the
Confederate lines and guard the road four or five miles to the left,
over which all our supplies had to be drawn on wagons. During the 16th,
after the surrender, additional reinforcements arrived.

During the siege General Sherman had been sent to Smithland, at the
mouth of the Cumberland River, to forward reinforcements and supplies to
me.  At that time he was my senior in rank and there was no authority of
law to assign a junior to command a senior of the same grade.  But every
boat that came up with supplies or reinforcements brought a note of
encouragement from Sherman, asking me to call upon him for any
assistance he could render and saying that if he could be of service at
the front I might send for him and he would waive rank.



CHAPTER XXIII.

PROMOTED MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS--UNOCCUPIED TERRITORY--ADVANCE UPON
NASHVILLE--SITUATION OF THE TROOPS--CONFEDERATE RETREAT--RELIEVED OF THE
COMMAND--RESTORED TO THE COMMAND--GENERAL SMITH.

The news of the fall of Fort Donelson caused great delight all over the
North.  At the South, particularly in Richmond, the effect was
correspondingly depressing.  I was promptly promoted to the grade of
Major-General of Volunteers, and confirmed by the Senate.  All three of
my division commanders were promoted to the same grade and the colonels
who commanded brigades were made brigadier-generals in the volunteer
service.  My chief, who was in St. Louis, telegraphed his
congratulations to General Hunter in Kansas for the services he had
rendered in securing the fall of Fort Donelson by sending reinforcements
so rapidly.  To Washington he telegraphed that the victory was due to
General C. F. Smith; "promote him," he said, "and the whole country will
applaud."  On the 19th there was published at St. Louis a formal order
thanking Flag-officer Foote and myself, and the forces under our
command, for the victories on the Tennessee and the Cumberland.  I
received no other recognition whatever from General Halleck.  But
General Cullum, his chief of staff, who was at Cairo, wrote me a warm
congratulatory letter on his own behalf.  I approved of General Smith's
promotion highly, as I did all the promotions that were made.

My opinion was and still is that immediately after the fall of Fort
Donelson the way was opened to the National forces all over the
South-west without much resistance.  If one general who would have taken
the responsibility had been in command of all the troops west of the
Alleghanies, he could have marched to Chattanooga, Corinth, Memphis and
Vicksburg with the troops we then had, and as volunteering was going on
rapidly over the North there would soon have been force enough at all
these centres to operate offensively against any body of the enemy that
might be found near them.  Rapid movements and the acquisition of
rebellious territory would have promoted volunteering, so that
reinforcements could have been had as fast as transportation could have
been obtained to carry them to their destination.  On the other hand
there were tens of thousands of strong able-bodied young men still at
their homes in the South-western States, who had not gone into the
Confederate army in February, 1862, and who had no particular desire to
go.  If our lines had been extended to protect their homes, many of them
never would have gone.  Providence ruled differently.  Time was given
the enemy to collect armies and fortify his new positions; and twice
afterwards he came near forcing his north-western front up to the Ohio
River.

I promptly informed the department commander of our success at Fort
Donelson and that the way was open now to Clarksville and Nashville; and
that unless I received orders to the contrary I should take Clarksville
on the 21st and Nashville about the 1st of March.  Both these places are
on the Cumberland River above Fort Donelson.  As I heard nothing from
headquarters on the subject, General C. F. Smith was sent to Clarksville
at the time designated and found the place evacuated.  The capture of
forts Henry and Donelson had broken the line the enemy had taken from
Columbus to Bowling Green, and it was known that he was falling back
from the eastern point of this line and that Buell was following, or at
least advancing.  I should have sent troops to Nashville at the time I
sent to Clarksville, but my transportation was limited and there were
many prisoners to be forwarded north.

None of the reinforcements from Buell's army arrived until the 24th of
February.  Then General Nelson came up, with orders to report to me with
two brigades, he having sent one brigade to Cairo.  I knew General Buell
was advancing on Nashville from the north, and I was advised by scouts
that the rebels were leaving that place, and trying to get out all the
supplies they could. Nashville was, at that time, one of the best
provisioned posts in the South.  I had no use for reinforcements now,
and thinking Buell would like to have his troops again, I ordered Nelson
to proceed to Nashville without debarking at Fort Donelson.  I sent a
gunboat also as a convoy.  The Cumberland River was very high at the
time; the railroad bridge at Nashville had been burned, and all river
craft had been destroyed, or would be before the enemy left.  Nashville
is on the west bank of the Cumberland, and Buell was approaching from
the east.  I thought the steamers carrying Nelson's division would be
useful in ferrying the balance of Buell's forces across.  I ordered
Nelson to put himself in communication with Buell as soon as possible,
and if he found him more than two days off from Nashville to return
below the city and await orders.  Buell, however, had already arrived in
person at Edgefield, opposite Nashville, and Mitchell's division of his
command reached there the same day. Nelson immediately took possession
of the city.

After Nelson had gone and before I had learned of Buell's arrival, I
sent word to department headquarters that I should go to Nashville
myself on the 28th if I received no orders to the contrary.  Hearing
nothing, I went as I had informed my superior officer I would do.  On
arriving at Clarksville I saw a fleet of steamers at the shore--the same
that had taken Nelson's division--and troops going aboard.  I landed and
called on the commanding officer, General C. F. Smith.  As soon as he
saw me he showed an order he had just received from Buell in these
words:


NASHVILLE, February 25, 1862.

GENERAL C. F. SMITH, Commanding U. S. Forces, Clarksville.

GENERAL:--The landing of a portion of our troops, contrary to my
intentions, on the south side of the river has compelled me to hold this
side at every hazard.  If the enemy should assume the offensive, and I
am assured by reliable persons that in view of my position such is his
intention, my force present is altogether inadequate, consisting of only
15,000 men.  I have to request you, therefore, to come forward with all
the available force under your command.  So important do I consider the
occasion that I think it necessary to give this communication all the
force of orders, and I send four boats, the Diana, Woodford, John Rain,
and Autocrat, to bring you up.  In five or six days my force will
probably be sufficient to relieve you.

Very respectfully, your ob't srv't, D. C. BUELL, Brigadier-General
Comd'g.

P. S.--The steamers will leave here at 12 o'clock to-night.


General Smith said this order was nonsense.  But I told him it was
better to obey it.  The General replied, "of course I must obey," and
said his men were embarking as fast as they could.  I went on up to
Nashville and inspected the position taken by Nelson's troops.  I did
not see Buell during the day, and wrote him a note saying that I had
been in Nashville since early morning and had hoped to meet him.  On my
return to the boat we met.  His troops were still east of the river, and
the steamers that had carried Nelson's division up were mostly at
Clarksville to bring Smith's division.  I said to General Buell my
information was that the enemy was retreating as fast as possible.
General Buell said there was fighting going on then only ten or twelve
miles away.  I said:  "Quite probably; Nashville contained valuable
stores of arms, ammunition and provisions, and the enemy is probably
trying to carry away all he can.  The fighting is doubtless with the
rear-guard who are trying to protect the trains they are getting away
with."  Buell spoke very positively of the danger Nashville was in of an
attack from the enemy.  I said, in the absence of positive information,
I believed my information was correct.  He responded that he "knew."
"Well," I said, "I do not know; but as I came by Clarksville General
Smith's troops were embarking to join you."

Smith's troops were returned the same day.  The enemy were trying to get
away from Nashville and not to return to it.

At this time General Albert Sidney Johnston commanded all the
Confederate troops west of the Alleghany Mountains, with the exception
of those in the extreme south.  On the National side the forces
confronting him were divided into, at first three, then four separate
departments.  Johnston had greatly the advantage in having supreme
command over all troops that could possibly be brought to bear upon one
point, while the forces similarly situated on the National side, divided
into independent commands, could not be brought into harmonious action
except by orders from Washington.

At the beginning of 1862 Johnston's troops east of the Mississippi
occupied a line extending from Columbus, on his left, to Mill Springs,
on his right.  As we have seen, Columbus, both banks of the Tennessee
River, the west bank of the Cumberland and Bowling Green, all were
strongly fortified.  Mill Springs was intrenched.  The National troops
occupied no territory south of the Ohio, except three small garrisons
along its bank and a force thrown out from Louisville to confront that
at Bowling Green.  Johnston's strength was no doubt numerically inferior
to that of the National troops; but this was compensated for by the
advantage of being sole commander of all the Confederate forces at the
West, and of operating in a country where his friends would take care of
his rear without any detail of soldiers.  But when General George H.
Thomas moved upon the enemy at Mill Springs and totally routed him,
inflicting a loss of some 300 killed and wounded, and forts Henry and
Heiman fell into the hands of the National forces, with their armaments
and about 100 prisoners, those losses seemed to dishearten the
Confederate commander so much that he immediately commenced a retreat
from Bowling Green on Nashville.  He reached this latter place on the
14th of February, while Donelson was still besieged.  Buell followed
with a portion of the Army of the Ohio, but he had to march and did not
reach the east bank of the Cumberland opposite Nashville until the 24th
of the month, and then with only one division of his army.

The bridge at Nashville had been destroyed and all boats removed or
disabled, so that a small garrison could have held the place against any
National troops that could have been brought against it within ten days
after the arrival of the force from Bowling Green.  Johnston seemed to
lie quietly at Nashville to await the result at Fort Donelson, on which
he had staked the possession of most of the territory embraced in the
States of Kentucky and Tennessee.  It is true, the two generals senior
in rank at Fort Donelson were sending him encouraging dispatches, even
claiming great Confederate victories up to the night of the 16th when
they must have been preparing for their individual escape. Johnston made
a fatal mistake in intrusting so important a command to Floyd, who he
must have known was no soldier even if he possessed the elements of one.
Pillow's presence as second was also a mistake.  If these officers had
been forced upon him and designated for that particular command, then he
should have left Nashville with a small garrison under a trusty officer,
and with the remainder of his force gone to Donelson himself.  If he had
been captured the result could not have been worse than it was.

Johnston's heart failed him upon the first advance of National troops.
He wrote to Richmond on the 8th of February, "I think the gunboats of
the enemy will probably take Fort Donelson without the necessity of
employing their land force in cooperation."  After the fall of that
place he abandoned Nashville and Chattanooga without an effort to save
either, and fell back into northern Mississippi, where, six weeks later,
he was destined to end his career.

From the time of leaving Cairo I was singularly unfortunate in not
receiving dispatches from General Halleck.  The order of the 10th of
February directing me to fortify Fort Henry strongly, particularly to
the land side, and saying that intrenching tools had been sent for that
purpose, reached me after Donelson was invested.  I received nothing
direct which indicated that the department commander knew we were in
possession of Donelson.  I was reporting regularly to the chief of
staff, who had been sent to Cairo, soon after the troops left there, to
receive all reports from the front and to telegraph the substance to the
St. Louis headquarters.  Cairo was at the southern end of the telegraph
wire.  Another line was started at once from Cairo to Paducah and
Smithland, at the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland respectively.
My dispatches were all sent to Cairo by boat, but many of those
addressed to me were sent to the operator at the end of the advancing
wire and he failed to forward them.  This operator afterwards proved to
be a rebel; he deserted his post after a short time and went south
taking his dispatches with him.  A telegram from General McClellan to me
of February 16th, the day of the surrender, directing me to report in
full the situation, was not received at my headquarters until the 3d of
March.

On the 2d of March I received orders dated March 1st to move my command
back to Fort Henry, leaving only a small garrison at Donelson.  From
Fort Henry expeditions were to be sent against Eastport, Mississippi,
and Paris, Tennessee.  We started from Donelson on the 4th, and the same
day I was back on the Tennessee River.  On March 4th I also received the
following dispatch from General Halleck:


MAJ.-GEN. U. S. GRANT, Fort Henry:

You will place Maj.-Gen. C. F. Smith in command of expedition, and
remain yourself at Fort Henry.  Why do you not obey my orders to report
strength and positions of your command?

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.


I was surprised.  This was the first intimation I had received that
General Halleck had called for information as to the strength of my
command.  On the 6th he wrote to me again.  "Your going to Nashville
without authority, and when your presence with your troops was of the
utmost importance, was a matter of very serious complaint at Washington,
so much so that I was advised to arrest you on your return."  This was
the first I knew of his objecting to my going to Nashville.  That place
was not beyond the limits of my command, which, it had been expressly
declared in orders, were "not defined."  Nashville is west of the
Cumberland River, and I had sent troops that had reported to me for duty
to occupy the place.  I turned over the command as directed and then
replied to General Halleck courteously, but asked to be relieved from
further duty under him.

Later I learned that General Halleck had been calling lustily for more
troops, promising that he would do something important if he could only
be sufficiently reinforced.  McClellan asked him what force he then had.
Halleck telegraphed me to supply the information so far as my command
was concerned, but I received none of his dispatches.  At last Halleck
reported to Washington that he had repeatedly ordered me to give the
strength of my force, but could get nothing out of me; that I had gone
to Nashville, beyond the limits of my command, without his authority,
and that my army was more demoralized by victory than the army at Bull
Run had been by defeat.  General McClellan, on this information, ordered
that I should be relieved from duty and that an investigation should be
made into any charges against me.  He even authorized my arrest.  Thus
in less than two weeks after the victory at Donelson, the two leading
generals in the army were in correspondence as to what disposition
should be made of me, and in less than three weeks I was virtually in
arrest and without a command.

On the 13th of March I was restored to command, and on the 17th Halleck
sent me a copy of an order from the War Department which stated that
accounts of my misbehavior had reached Washington and directed him to
investigate and report the facts.  He forwarded also a copy of a
detailed dispatch from himself to Washington entirely exonerating me;
but he did not inform me that it was his own reports that had created
all the trouble.  On the contrary, he wrote to me, "Instead of relieving
you, I wish you, as soon as your new army is in the field, to assume
immediate command, and lead it to new victories."  In consequence I felt
very grateful to him, and supposed it was his interposition that had set
me right with the government.  I never knew the truth until General
Badeau unearthed the facts in his researches for his history of my
campaigns.

General Halleck unquestionably deemed General C. F. Smith a much fitter
officer for the command of all the forces in the military district than
I was, and, to render him available for such command, desired his
promotion to antedate mine and those of the other division commanders.
It is probable that the general opinion was that Smith's long services
in the army and distinguished deeds rendered him the more proper person
for such command.  Indeed I was rather inclined to this opinion myself
at that time, and would have served as faithfully under Smith as he had
done under me.  But this did not justify the dispatches which General
Halleck sent to Washington, or his subsequent concealment of them from
me when pretending to explain the action of my superiors.

On receipt of the order restoring me to command I proceeded to Savannah
on the Tennessee, to which point my troops had advanced.  General Smith
was delighted to see me and was unhesitating in his denunciation of the
treatment I had received.  He was on a sick bed at the time, from which
he never came away alive.  His death was a severe loss to our western
army.  His personal courage was unquestioned, his judgment and
professional acquirements were unsurpassed, and he had the confidence
of those he commanded as well as of those over him.



CHAPTER XXIV.

THE ARMY AT PITTSBURG LANDING--INJURED BY A FALL--THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK
AT SHILOH--THE FIRST DAY'S FIGHT AT SHILOH--GENERAL SHERMAN--CONDITION
OF THE ARMY--CLOSE OF THE FIRST DAY'S FIGHT--THE SECOND DAY'S FIGHT
--RETREAT AND DEFEAT OF THE CONFEDERATES.

When I reassumed command on the 17th of March I found the army divided,
about half being on the east bank of the Tennessee at Savannah, while
one division was at Crump's landing on the west bank about four miles
higher up, and the remainder at Pittsburg landing, five miles above
Crump's.  The enemy was in force at Corinth, the junction of the two
most important railroads in the Mississippi valley--one connecting
Memphis and the Mississippi River with the East, and the other leading
south to all the cotton states.  Still another railroad connects Corinth
with Jackson, in west Tennessee.  If we obtained possession of Corinth
the enemy would have no railroad for the transportation of armies or
supplies until that running east from Vicksburg was reached.  It was the
great strategic position at the West between the Tennessee and the
Mississippi rivers and between Nashville and Vicksburg.

I at once put all the troops at Savannah in motion for Pittsburg
landing, knowing that the enemy was fortifying at Corinth and collecting
an army there under Johnston.  It was my expectation to march against
that army as soon as Buell, who had been ordered to reinforce me with
the Army of the Ohio, should arrive; and the west bank of the river was
the place to start from.  Pittsburg is only about twenty miles from
Corinth, and Hamburg landing, four miles further up the river, is a mile
or two nearer.  I had not been in command long before I selected Hamburg
as the place to put the Army of the Ohio when it arrived.  The roads
from Pittsburg and Hamburg to Corinth converge some eight miles out.
This disposition of the troops would have given additional roads to
march over when the advance commenced, within supporting distance of
each other.

Before I arrived at Savannah, Sherman, who had joined the Army of the
Tennessee and been placed in command of a division, had made an
expedition on steamers convoyed by gunboats to the neighborhood of
Eastport, thirty miles south, for the purpose of destroying the railroad
east of Corinth.  The rains had been so heavy for some time before that
the low-lands had become impassable swamps.  Sherman debarked his troops
and started out to accomplish the object of the expedition; but the
river was rising so rapidly that the back-water up the small tributaries
threatened to cut off the possibility of getting back to the boats, and
the expedition had to return without reaching the railroad.  The guns
had to be hauled by hand through the water to get back to the boats.

On the 17th of March the army on the Tennessee River consisted of five
divisions, commanded respectively by Generals C. F. Smith, McClernand,
L. Wallace, Hurlbut and Sherman.  General W. H. L. Wallace was
temporarily in command of Smith's division, General Smith, as I have
said, being confined to his bed. Reinforcements were arriving daily and
as they came up they were organized, first into brigades, then into a
division, and the command given to General Prentiss, who had been
ordered to report to me.  General Buell was on his way from Nashville
with 40,000 veterans.  On the 19th of March he was at Columbia,
Tennessee, eighty-five miles from Pittsburg.  When all reinforcements
should have arrived I expected to take the initiative by marching on
Corinth, and had no expectation of needing fortifications, though this
subject was taken into consideration.  McPherson, my only military
engineer, was directed to lay out a line to intrench.  He did so, but
reported that it would have to be made in rear of the line of encampment
as it then ran.  The new line, while it would be nearer the river, was
yet too far away from the Tennessee, or even from the creeks, to be
easily supplied with water, and in case of attack these creeks would be
in the hands of the enemy.  The fact is, I regarded the campaign we were
engaged in as an offensive one and had no idea that the enemy would
leave strong intrenchments to take the initiative when he knew he would
be attacked where he was if he remained.  This view, however, did not
prevent every precaution being taken and every effort made to keep
advised of all movements of the enemy.

Johnston's cavalry meanwhile had been well out towards our front, and
occasional encounters occurred between it and our outposts.  On the 1st
of April this cavalry became bold and approached our lines, showing that
an advance of some kind was contemplated.  On the 2d Johnston left
Corinth in force to attack my army.  On the 4th his cavalry dashed down
and captured a small picket guard of six or seven men, stationed some
five miles out from Pittsburg on the Corinth road.  Colonel Buckland
sent relief to the guard at once and soon followed in person with an
entire regiment, and General Sherman followed Buckland taking the
remainder of a brigade.  The pursuit was kept up for some three miles
beyond the point where the picket guard had been captured, and after
nightfall Sherman returned to camp and reported to me by letter what had
occurred.

At this time a large body of the enemy was hovering to the west of us,
along the line of the Mobile and Ohio railroad.  My apprehension was
much greater for the safety of Crump's landing than it was for
Pittsburg.  I had no apprehension that the enemy could really capture
either place.  But I feared it was possible that he might make a rapid
dash upon Crump's and destroy our transports and stores, most of which
were kept at that point, and then retreat before Wallace could be
reinforced.  Lew. Wallace's position I regarded as so well chosen that
he was not removed.

At this time I generally spent the day at Pittsburg and returned to
Savannah in the evening.  I was intending to remove my headquarters to
Pittsburg, but Buell was expected daily and would come in at Savannah.
I remained at this point, therefore, a few days longer than I otherwise
should have done, in order to meet him on his arrival.  The skirmishing
in our front, however, had been so continuous from about the 3d of April
that I did not leave Pittsburg each night until an hour when I felt
there would be no further danger before the morning.

On Friday the 4th, the day of Buckland's advance, I was very much
injured by my horse falling with me, and on me, while I was trying to
get to the front where firing had been heard.  The night was one of
impenetrable darkness, with rain pouring down in torrents; nothing was
visible to the eye except as revealed by the frequent flashes of
lightning.  Under these circumstances I had to trust to the horse,
without guidance, to keep the road.  I had not gone far, however, when I
met General W. H. L. Wallace and Colonel (afterwards General) McPherson
coming from the direction of the front.  They said all was quiet so far
as the enemy was concerned.  On the way back to the boat my horse's feet
slipped from under him, and he fell with my leg under his body.  The
extreme softness of the ground, from the excessive rains of the few
preceding days, no doubt saved me from a severe injury and protracted
lameness.  As it was, my ankle was very much injured, so much so that my
boot had to be cut off.  For two or three days after I was unable to
walk except with crutches.

On the 5th General Nelson, with a division of Buell's army, arrived at
Savannah and I ordered him to move up the east bank of the river, to be
in a position where he could be ferried over to Crump's landing or
Pittsburg as occasion required.  I had learned that General Buell
himself would be at Savannah the next day, and desired to meet me on his
arrival.  Affairs at Pittsburg landing had been such for several days
that I did not want to be away during the day.  I determined, therefore,
to take a very early breakfast and ride out to meet Buell, and thus save
time.  He had arrived on the evening of the 5th, but had not advised me
of the fact and I was not aware of it until some time after.  While I
was at breakfast, however, heavy firing was heard in the direction of
Pittsburg landing, and I hastened there, sending a hurried note to Buell
informing him of the reason why I could not meet him at Savannah.  On
the way up the river I directed the dispatch-boat to run in close to
Crump's landing, so that I could communicate with General Lew. Wallace.
I found him waiting on a boat apparently expecting to see me, and I
directed him to get his troops in line ready to execute any orders he
might receive.  He replied that his troops were already under arms and
prepared to move.

Up to that time I had felt by no means certain that Crump's landing
might not be the point of attack.  On reaching the front, however, about
eight A.M., I found that the attack on Pittsburg was unmistakable, and
that nothing more than a small guard, to protect our transports and
stores, was needed at Crump's.  Captain Baxter, a quartermaster on my
staff, was accordingly directed to go back and order General Wallace to
march immediately to Pittsburg by the road nearest the river. Captain
Baxter made a memorandum of this order.  About one P.M., not hearing
from Wallace and being much in need of reinforcements, I sent two more
of my staff, Colonel McPherson and Captain Rowley, to bring him up with
his division.  They reported finding him marching towards Purdy, Bethel,
or some point west from the river, and farther from Pittsburg by several
miles than when he started.  The road from his first position to
Pittsburg landing was direct and near the river.  Between the two points
a bridge had been built across Snake Creek by our troops, at which
Wallace's command had assisted, expressly to enable the troops at the
two places to support each other in case of need.  Wallace did not
arrive in time to take part in the first day's fight.  General Wallace
has since claimed that the order delivered to him by Captain Baxter was
simply to join the right of the army, and that the road over which he
marched would have taken him to the road from Pittsburg to Purdy where
it crosses Owl Creek on the right of Sherman; but this is not where I
had ordered him nor where I wanted him to go.

I never could see and do not now see why any order was necessary further
than to direct him to come to Pittsburg landing, without specifying by
what route.  His was one of three veteran divisions that had been in
battle, and its absence was severely felt.  Later in the war General
Wallace would not have made the mistake that he committed on the 6th of
April, 1862.  I presume his idea was that by taking the route he did he
would be able to come around on the flank or rear of the enemy, and thus
perform an act of heroism that would redound to the credit of his
command, as well as to the benefit of his country.

Some two or three miles from Pittsburg landing was a log meeting-house
called Shiloh.  It stood on the ridge which divides the waters of Snake
and Lick creeks, the former emptying into the Tennessee just north of
Pittsburg landing, and the latter south.  This point was the key to our
position and was held by Sherman.  His division was at that time wholly
raw, no part of it ever having been in an engagement; but I thought this
deficiency was more than made up by the superiority of the commander.
McClernand was on Sherman's left, with troops that had been engaged at
forts Henry and Donelson and were therefore veterans so far as western
troops had become such at that stage of the war.  Next to McClernand
came Prentiss with a raw division, and on the extreme left, Stuart with
one brigade of Sherman's division.  Hurlbut was in rear of Prentiss,
massed, and in reserve at the time of the onset.  The division of
General C. F. Smith was on the right, also in reserve.  General Smith
was still sick in bed at Savannah, but within hearing of our guns.  His
services would no doubt have been of inestimable value had his health
permitted his presence.  The command of his division devolved upon
Brigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace, a most estimable and able officer; a
veteran too, for he had served a year in the Mexican war and had been
with his command at Henry and Donelson.  Wallace was mortally wounded in
the first day's engagement, and with the change of commanders thus
necessarily effected in the heat of battle the efficiency of his
division was much weakened.

The position of our troops made a continuous line from Lick Creek on the
left to Owl Creek, a branch of Snake Creek, on the right, facing nearly
south and possibly a little west.  The water in all these streams was
very high at the time and contributed to protect our flanks.  The enemy
was compelled, therefore, to attack directly in front.  This he did with
great vigor, inflicting heavy losses on the National side, but suffering
much heavier on his own.

The Confederate assaults were made with such a disregard of losses on
their own side that our line of tents soon fell into their hands.  The
ground on which the battle was fought was undulating, heavily timbered
with scattered clearings, the woods giving some protection to the troops
on both sides.  There was also considerable underbrush.  A number of
attempts were made by the enemy to turn our right flank, where Sherman
was posted, but every effort was repulsed with heavy loss.  But the
front attack was kept up so vigorously that, to prevent the success of
these attempts to get on our flanks, the National troops were compelled,
several times, to take positions to the rear nearer Pittsburg landing.
When the firing ceased at night the National line was all of a mile in
rear of the position it had occupied in the morning.

In one of the backward moves, on the 6th, the division commanded by
General Prentiss did not fall back with the others.  This left his
flanks exposed and enabled the enemy to capture him with about 2,200 of
his officers and men.  General Badeau gives four o'clock of the 6th as
about the time this capture took place. He may be right as to the time,
but my recollection is that the hour was later.  General Prentiss
himself gave the hour as half-past five.  I was with him, as I was with
each of the division commanders that day, several times, and my
recollection is that the last time I was with him was about half-past
four, when his division was standing up firmly and the General was as
cool as if expecting victory.  But no matter whether it was four or
later, the story that he and his command were surprised and captured in
their camps is without any foundation whatever.  If it had been true, as
currently reported at the time and yet believed by thousands of people,
that Prentiss and his division had been captured in their beds, there
would not have been an all-day struggle, with the loss of thousands
killed and wounded on the Confederate side.

With the single exception of a few minutes after the capture of
Prentiss, a continuous and unbroken line was maintained all day from
Snake Creek or its tributaries on the right to Lick Creek or the
Tennessee on the left above Pittsburg.

There was no hour during the day when there was not heavy firing and
generally hard fighting at some point on the line, but seldom at all
points at the same time.  It was a case of Southern dash against
Northern pluck and endurance.  Three of the five divisions engaged on
Sunday were entirely raw, and many of the men had only received their
arms on the way from their States to the field.  Many of them had
arrived but a day or two before and were hardly able to load their
muskets according to the manual.  Their officers were equally ignorant
of their duties. Under these circumstances it is not astonishing that
many of the regiments broke at the first fire.  In two cases, as I now
remember, colonels led their regiments from the field on first hearing
the whistle of the enemy's bullets.  In these cases the colonels were
constitutional cowards, unfit for any military position; but not so the
officers and men led out of danger by them.  Better troops never went
upon a battle-field than many of these, officers and men, afterwards
proved themselves to be, who fled panic stricken at the first whistle of
bullets and shell at Shiloh.

During the whole of Sunday I was continuously engaged in passing from
one part of the field to another, giving directions to division
commanders.  In thus moving along the line, however, I never deemed it
important to stay long with Sherman.  Although his troops were then
under fire for the first time, their commander, by his constant presence
with them, inspired a confidence in officers and men that enabled them
to render services on that bloody battle-field worthy of the best of
veterans.  McClernand was next to Sherman, and the hardest fighting was
in front of these two divisions.  McClernand told me on that day, the
6th, that he profited much by having so able a commander supporting him.
A casualty to Sherman that would have taken him from the field that day
would have been a sad one for the troops engaged at Shiloh.  And how
near we came to this! On the 6th Sherman was shot twice, once in the
hand, once in the shoulder, the ball cutting his coat and making a
slight wound, and a third ball passed through his hat.  In addition to
this he had several horses shot during the day.

The nature of this battle was such that cavalry could not be used in
front; I therefore formed ours into line in rear, to stop stragglers--of
whom there were many.  When there would be enough of them to make a
show, and after they had recovered from their fright, they would be sent
to reinforce some part of the line which needed support, without regard
to their companies, regiments or brigades.

On one occasion during the day I rode back as far as the river and met
General Buell, who had just arrived; I do not remember the hour, but at
that time there probably were as many as four or five thousand
stragglers lying under cover of the river bluff, panic-stricken, most of
whom would have been shot where they lay, without resistance, before
they would have taken muskets and marched to the front to protect
themselves.  This meeting between General Buell and myself was on the
dispatch-boat used to run between the landing and Savannah.  It was
brief, and related specially to his getting his troops over the river.
As we left the boat together, Buell's attention was attracted by the men
lying under cover of the river bank.  I saw him berating them and trying
to shame them into joining their regiments.  He even threatened them
with shells from the gunboats near by.  But it was all to no effect.
Most of these men afterward proved themselves as gallant as any of those
who saved the battle from which they had deserted.  I have no doubt that
this sight impressed General Buell with the idea that a line of retreat
would be a good thing just then.  If he had come in by the front instead
of through the stragglers in the rear, he would have thought and felt
differently.  Could he have come through the Confederate rear, he would
have witnessed there a scene similar to that at our own.  The distant
rear of an army engaged in battle is not the best place from which to
judge correctly what is going on in front.  Later in the war, while
occupying the country between the Tennessee and the Mississippi, I
learned that the panic in the Confederate lines had not differed much
from that within our own.  Some of the country people estimated the
stragglers from Johnston's army as high as 20,000.  Of course this was
an exaggeration.

The situation at the close of Sunday was as follows:  along the top of
the bluff just south of the log-house which stood at Pittsburg landing,
Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff, had arranged twenty or more pieces
of artillery facing south or up the river.  This line of artillery was
on the crest of a hill overlooking a deep ravine opening into the
Tennessee.  Hurlbut with his division intact was on the right of this
artillery, extending west and possibly a little north.  McClernand came
next in the general line, looking more to the west.  His division was
complete in its organization and ready for any duty.  Sherman came next,
his right extending to Snake Creek. His command, like the other two, was
complete in its organization and ready, like its chief, for any service
it might be called upon to render.  All three divisions were, as a
matter of course, more or less shattered and depleted in numbers from
the terrible battle of the day.  The division of W. H. L. Wallace, as
much from the disorder arising from changes of division and brigade
commanders, under heavy fire, as from any other cause, had lost its
organization and did not occupy a place in the line as a division.
Prentiss' command was gone as a division, many of its members having
been killed, wounded or captured, but it had rendered valiant services
before its final dispersal, and had contributed a good share to the
defence of Shiloh.

The right of my line rested near the bank of Snake Creek, a short
distance above the bridge which had been built by the troops for the
purpose of connecting Crump's landing and Pittsburg landing.  Sherman
had posted some troops in a log-house and out-buildings which overlooked
both the bridge over which Wallace was expected and the creek above that
point.  In this last position Sherman was frequently attacked before
night, but held the point until he voluntarily abandoned it to advance
in order to make room for Lew. Wallace, who came up after dark.

There was, as I have said, a deep ravine in front of our left. The
Tennessee River was very high and there was water to a considerable
depth in the ravine.  Here the enemy made a last desperate effort to
turn our flank, but was repelled.  The gunboats Tyler and Lexington,
Gwin and Shirk commanding, with the artillery under Webster, aided the
army and effectually checked their further progress.  Before any of
Buell's troops had reached the west bank of the Tennessee, firing had
almost entirely ceased; anything like an attempt on the part of the
enemy to advance had absolutely ceased.  There was some artillery firing
from an unseen enemy, some of his shells passing beyond us; but I do not
remember that there was the whistle of a single musket-ball heard.  As
his troops arrived in the dusk General Buell marched several of his
regiments part way down the face of the hill where they fired briskly
for some minutes, but I do not think a single man engaged in this firing
received an injury.  The attack had spent its force.

General Lew. Wallace, with 5,000 effective men, arrived after firing had
ceased for the day, and was placed on the right. Thus night came,
Wallace came, and the advance of Nelson's division came; but none
--unless night--in time to be of material service to the gallant men who
saved Shiloh on that first day against large odds.  Buell's loss on the
6th of April was two men killed and one wounded, all members of the 36th
Indiana infantry.  The Army of the Tennessee lost on that day at least
7,000 men.  The presence of two or three regiments of Buell's army on
the west bank before firing ceased had not the slightest effect in
preventing the capture of Pittsburg landing.

So confident was I before firing had ceased on the 6th that the next day
would bring victory to our arms if we could only take the initiative,
that I visited each division commander in person before any
reinforcements had reached the field.  I directed them to throw out
heavy lines of skirmishers in the morning as soon as they could see, and
push them forward until they found the enemy, following with their
entire divisions in supporting distance, and to engage the enemy as soon
as found.  To Sherman I told the story of the assault at Fort Donelson,
and said that the same tactics would win at Shiloh.  Victory was assured
when Wallace arrived, even if there had been no other support.  I was
glad, however, to see the reinforcements of Buell and credit them with
doing all there was for them to do.

During the night of the 6th the remainder of Nelson's division, Buell's
army crossed the river and were ready to advance in the morning, forming
the left wing.  Two other divisions, Crittenden's and McCook's, came up
the river from Savannah in the transports and were on the west bank
early on the 7th. Buell commanded them in person.  My command was thus
nearly doubled in numbers and efficiency.

During the night rain fell in torrents and our troops were exposed to
the storm without shelter.  I made my headquarters under a tree a few
hundred yards back from the river bank.  My ankle was so much swollen
from the fall of my horse the Friday night preceding, and the bruise was
so painful, that I could get no rest.

The drenching rain would have precluded the possibility of sleep without
this additional cause.  Some time after midnight, growing restive under
the storm and the continuous pain, I moved back to the log-house under
the bank.  This had been taken as a hospital, and all night wounded men
were being brought in, their wounds dressed, a leg or an arm amputated
as the case might require, and everything being done to save life or
alleviate suffering.  The sight was more unendurable than encountering
the enemy's fire, and I returned to my tree in the rain.

The advance on the morning of the 7th developed the enemy in the camps
occupied by our troops before the battle began, more than a mile back
from the most advanced position of the Confederates on the day before.
It is known now that they had not yet learned of the arrival of Buell's
command.  Possibly they fell back so far to get the shelter of our tents
during the rain, and also to get away from the shells that were dropped
upon them by the gunboats every fifteen minutes during the night.

The position of the Union troops on the morning of the 7th was as
follows:  General Lew. Wallace on the right; Sherman on his left; then
McClernand and then Hurlbut.  Nelson, of Buell's army, was on our
extreme left, next to the river.

Crittenden was next in line after Nelson and on his right, McCook
followed and formed the extreme right of Buell's command.  My old
command thus formed the right wing, while the troops directly under
Buell constituted the left wing of the army.  These relative positions
were retained during the entire day, or until the enemy was driven from
the field.

In a very short time the battle became general all along the line.  This
day everything was favorable to the Union side.  We had now become the
attacking party.  The enemy was driven back all day, as we had been the
day before, until finally he beat a precipitate retreat.  The last point
held by him was near the road leading from the landing to Corinth, on
the left of Sherman and right of McClernand.  About three o'clock, being
near that point and seeing that the enemy was giving way everywhere
else, I gathered up a couple of regiments, or parts of regiments, from
troops near by, formed them in line of battle and marched them forward,
going in front myself to prevent premature or long-range firing.  At
this point there was a clearing between us and the enemy favorable for
charging, although exposed.  I knew the enemy were ready to break and
only wanted a little encouragement from us to go quickly and join their
friends who had started earlier.  After marching to within musket-range
I stopped and let the troops pass.  The command, CHARGE, was given, and
was executed with loud cheers and with a run; when the last of the enemy
broke. (*7)



CHAPTER XXV.

STRUCK BY A BULLET--PRECIPITATE RETREAT OF THE CONFEDERATES
--INTRENCHMENTS AT SHILOH--GENERAL BUELL--GENERAL JOHNSTON--REMARKS ON
SHILOH.

During this second day of the battle I had been moving from right to
left and back, to see for myself the progress made.  In the early part
of the afternoon, while riding with Colonel McPherson and Major Hawkins,
then my chief commissary, we got beyond the left of our troops.  We were
moving along the northern edge of a clearing, very leisurely, toward the
river above the landing.  There did not appear to be an enemy to our
right, until suddenly a battery with musketry opened upon us from the
edge of the woods on the other side of the clearing. The shells and
balls whistled about our ears very fast for about a minute.  I do not
think it took us longer than that to get out of range and out of sight.
In the sudden start we made, Major Hawkins lost his hat.  He did not
stop to pick it up.  When we arrived at a perfectly safe position we
halted to take an account of damages.  McPherson's horse was panting as
if ready to drop.  On examination it was found that a ball had struck
him forward of the flank just back of the saddle, and had gone entirely
through.  In a few minutes the poor beast dropped dead; he had given no
sign of injury until we came to a stop.  A ball had struck the metal
scabbard of my sword, just below the hilt, and broken it nearly off;
before the battle was over it had broken off entirely.  There were
three of us:  one had lost a horse, killed; one a hat and one a
sword-scabbard.  All were thankful that it was no worse.

After the rain of the night before and the frequent and heavy rains for
some days previous, the roads were almost impassable.  The enemy
carrying his artillery and supply trains over them in his retreat, made
them still worse for troops following.  I wanted to pursue, but had not
the heart to order the men who had fought desperately for two days,
lying in the mud and rain whenever not fighting, and I did (*8) not feel
disposed to positively order Buell, or any part of his command, to
pursue.  Although the senior in rank at the time I had been so only a
few weeks.  Buell was, and had been for some time past, a department
commander, while I commanded only a district.  I did not meet Buell in
person until too late to get troops ready and pursue with effect; but
had I seen him at the moment of the last charge I should have at least
requested him to follow.

I rode forward several miles the day after the battle, and found that
the enemy had dropped much, if not all, of their provisions, some
ammunition and the extra wheels of their caissons, lightening their
loads to enable them to get off their guns. About five miles out we
found their field hospital abandoned. An immediate pursuit must have
resulted in the capture of a considerable number of prisoners and
probably some guns.

Shiloh was the severest battle fought at the West during the war, and
but few in the East equalled it for hard, determined fighting.  I saw an
open field, in our possession on the second day, over which the
Confederates had made repeated charges the day before, so covered with
dead that it would have been possible to walk across the clearing, in
any direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching the
ground.  On our side National and Confederate troops were mingled
together in about equal proportions; but on the remainder of the field
nearly all were Confederates.  On one part, which had evidently not been
ploughed for several years, probably because the land was poor, bushes
had grown up, some to the height of eight or ten feet. There was not one
of these left standing unpierced by bullets. The smaller ones were all
cut down.

Contrary to all my experience up to that time, and to the experience of
the army I was then commanding, we were on the defensive.  We were
without intrenchments or defensive advantages of any sort, and more than
half the army engaged the first day was without experience or even drill
as soldiers.  The officers with them, except the division commanders and
possibly two or three of the brigade commanders, were equally
inexperienced in war.  The result was a Union victory that gave the men
who achieved it great confidence in themselves ever after.

The enemy fought bravely, but they had started out to defeat and destroy
an army and capture a position.  They failed in both, with very heavy
loss in killed and wounded, and must have gone back discouraged and
convinced that the "Yankee" was not an enemy to be despised.

After the battle I gave verbal instructions to division commanders to
let the regiments send out parties to bury their own dead, and to detail
parties, under commissioned officers from each division, to bury the
Confederate dead in their respective fronts and to report the numbers so
buried.  The latter part of these instructions was not carried out by
all; but they were by those sent from Sherman's division, and by some of
the parties sent out by McClernand.  The heaviest loss sustained by the
enemy was in front of these two divisions.

The criticism has often been made that the Union troops should have been
intrenched at Shiloh.  Up to that time the pick and spade had been but
little resorted to at the West.  I had, however, taken this subject
under consideration soon after re-assuming command in the field, and, as
already stated, my only military engineer reported unfavorably.  Besides
this, the troops with me, officers and men, needed discipline and drill
more than they did experience with the pick, shovel and axe.
Reinforcements were arriving almost daily, composed of troops that had
been hastily thrown together into companies and regiments--fragments of
incomplete organizations, the men and officers strangers to each other.
Under all these circumstances I concluded that drill and discipline were
worth more to our men than fortifications.

General Buell was a brave, intelligent officer, with as much
professional pride and ambition of a commendable sort as I ever knew.  I
had been two years at West Point with him, and had served with him
afterwards, in garrison and in the Mexican war, several years more.  He
was not given in early life or in mature years to forming intimate
acquaintances.  He was studious by habit, and commanded the confidence
and respect of all who knew him.  He was a strict disciplinarian, and
perhaps did not distinguish sufficiently between the volunteer who
"enlisted for the war" and the soldier who serves in time of peace.  One
system embraced men who risked life for a principle, and often men of
social standing, competence, or wealth and independence of character.
The other includes, as a rule, only men who could not do as well in any
other occupation.  General Buell became an object of harsh criticism
later, some going so far as to challenge his loyalty.  No one who knew
him ever believed him capable of a dishonorable act, and nothing could
be more dishonorable than to accept high rank and command in war and
then betray the trust.  When I came into command of the army in 1864, I
requested the Secretary of War to restore General Buell to duty.

After the war, during the summer of 1865, I travelled considerably
through the North, and was everywhere met by large numbers of people.
Every one had his opinion about the manner in which the war had been
conducted:  who among the generals had failed, how, and why.
Correspondents of the press were ever on hand to hear every word
dropped, and were not always disposed to report correctly what did not
confirm their preconceived notions, either about the conduct of the war
or the individuals concerned in it.  The opportunity frequently occurred
for me to defend General Buell against what I believed to be most unjust
charges.  On one occasion a correspondent put in my mouth the very
charge I had so often refuted--of disloyalty.  This brought from General
Buell a very severe retort, which I saw in the New York World some time
before I received the letter itself.  I could very well understand his
grievance at seeing untrue and disgraceful charges apparently sustained
by an officer who, at the time, was at the head of the army.  I replied
to him, but not through the press.  I kept no copy of my letter, nor did
I ever see it in print; neither did I receive an answer.

General Albert Sidney Johnston, who commanded the Confederate forces at
the beginning of the battle, was disabled by a wound on the afternoon of
the first day.  This wound, as I understood afterwards, was not
necessarily fatal, or even dangerous.  But he was a man who would not
abandon what he deemed an important trust in the face of danger and
consequently continued in the saddle, commanding, until so exhausted by
the loss of blood that he had to be taken from his horse, and soon after
died.  The news was not long in reaching our side and I suppose was
quite an encouragement to the National soldiers.

I had known Johnston slightly in the Mexican war and later as an officer
in the regular army.  He was a man of high character and ability.  His
contemporaries at West Point, and officers generally who came to know
him personally later and who remained on our side, expected him to prove
the most formidable man to meet that the Confederacy would produce.

I once wrote that nothing occurred in his brief command of an army to
prove or disprove the high estimate that had been placed upon his
military ability; but after studying the orders and dispatches of
Johnston I am compelled to materially modify my views of that officer's
qualifications as a soldier.  My judgment now is that he was vacillating
and undecided in his actions.

All the disasters in Kentucky and Tennessee were so discouraging to the
authorities in Richmond that Jefferson Davis wrote an unofficial letter
to Johnston expressing his own anxiety and that of the public, and
saying that he had made such defence as was dictated by long friendship,
but that in the absence of a report he needed facts.  The letter was not
a reprimand in direct terms, but it was evidently as much felt as though
it had been one.  General Johnston raised another army as rapidly as he
could, and fortified or strongly intrenched at Corinth.  He knew the
National troops were preparing to attack him in his chosen position.
But he had evidently become so disturbed at the results of his
operations that he resolved to strike out in an offensive campaign which
would restore all that was lost, and if successful accomplish still
more.  We have the authority of his son and biographer for saying that
his plan was to attack the forces at Shiloh and crush them; then to
cross the Tennessee and destroy the army of Buell, and push the war
across the Ohio River.  The design was a bold one; but we have the same
authority for saying that in the execution Johnston showed vacillation
and indecision.  He left Corinth on the 2d of April and was not ready to
attack until the 6th.  The distance his army had to march was less than
twenty miles.  Beauregard, his second in command, was opposed to the
attack for two reasons: first, he thought, if let alone the National
troops would attack the Confederates in their intrenchments; second, we
were in ground of our own choosing and would necessarily be intrenched.
Johnston not only listened to the objection of Beauregard to an attack,
but held a council of war on the subject on the morning of the 5th.  On
the evening of the same day he was in consultation with some of his
generals on the same subject, and still again on the morning of the 6th.
During this last consultation, and before a decision had been reached,
the battle began by the National troops opening fire on the enemy. This
seemed to settle the question as to whether there was to be any battle
of Shiloh.  It also seems to me to settle the question as to whether
there was a surprise.

I do not question the personal courage of General Johnston, or his
ability.  But he did not win the distinction predicted for him by many
of his friends.  He did prove that as a general he was over-estimated.

General Beauregard was next in rank to Johnston and succeeded to the
command, which he retained to the close of the battle and during the
subsequent retreat on Corinth, as well as in the siege of that place.
His tactics have been severely criticised by Confederate writers, but I
do not believe his fallen chief could have done any better under the
circumstances.  Some of these critics claim that Shiloh was won when
Johnston fell, and that if he had not fallen the army under me would
have been annihilated or captured.  IFS defeated the Confederates at
Shiloh.  There is little doubt that we would have been disgracefully
beaten IF all the shells and bullets fired by us had passed harmlessly
over the enemy and IF all of theirs had taken effect.  Commanding
generals are liable to be killed during engagements; and the fact that
when he was shot Johnston was leading a brigade to induce it to make a
charge which had been repeatedly ordered, is evidence that there was
neither the universal demoralization on our side nor the unbounded
confidence on theirs which has been claimed.  There was, in fact, no
hour during the day when I doubted the eventual defeat of the enemy,
although I was disappointed that reinforcements so near at hand did not
arrive at an earlier hour.

The description of the battle of Shiloh given by Colonel Wm. Preston
Johnston is very graphic and well told.  The reader will imagine that he
can see each blow struck, a demoralized and broken mob of Union
soldiers, each blow sending the enemy more demoralized than ever towards
the Tennessee River, which was a little more than two miles away at the
beginning of the onset. If the reader does not stop to inquire why, with
such Confederate success for more than twelve hours of hard fighting,
the National troops were not all killed, captured or driven into the
river, he will regard the pen picture as perfect.  But I witnessed the
fight from the National side from eight o'clock in the morning until
night closed the contest.  I see but little in the description that I
can recognize.  The Confederate troops fought well and deserve
commendation enough for their bravery and endurance on the 6th of April,
without detracting from their antagonists or claiming anything more than
their just dues.

The reports of the enemy show that their condition at the end of the
first day was deplorable; their losses in killed and wounded had been
very heavy, and their stragglers had been quite as numerous as on the
National side, with the difference that those of the enemy left the
field entirely and were not brought back to their respective commands
for many days.  On the Union side but few of the stragglers fell back
further than the landing on the river, and many of these were in line
for duty on the second day.  The admissions of the highest Confederate
officers engaged at Shiloh make the claim of a victory for them absurd.
The victory was not to either party until the battle was over.  It was
then a Union victory, in which the Armies of the Tennessee and the Ohio
both participated.  But the Army of the Tennessee fought the entire
rebel army on the 6th and held it at bay until near night; and night
alone closed the conflict and not the three regiments of Nelson's
division.

The Confederates fought with courage at Shiloh, but the particular skill
claimed I could not and still cannot see; though there is nothing to
criticise except the claims put forward for it since.  But the
Confederate claimants for superiority in strategy, superiority in
generalship and superiority in dash and prowess are not so unjust to the
Union troops engaged at Shiloh as are many Northern writers.  The troops
on both sides were American, and united they need not fear any foreign
foe.  It is possible that the Southern man started in with a little more
dash than his Northern brother; but he was correspondingly less
enduring.

The endeavor of the enemy on the first day was simply to hurl their men
against ours--first at one point, then at another, sometimes at several
points at once.  This they did with daring and energy, until at night
the rebel troops were worn out.  Our effort during the same time was to
be prepared to resist assaults wherever made.  The object of the
Confederates on the second day was to get away with as much of their
army and material as possible.  Ours then was to drive them from our
front, and to capture or destroy as great a part as possible of their
men and material.  We were successful in driving them back, but not so
successful in captures as if farther pursuit could have been made.  As
it was, we captured or recaptured on the second day about as much
artillery as we lost on the first; and, leaving out the one great
capture of Prentiss, we took more prisoners on Monday than the enemy
gained from us on Sunday.  On the 6th Sherman lost seven pieces of
artillery, McClernand six, Prentiss eight, and Hurlbut two batteries.
On the 7th Sherman captured seven guns, McClernand three and the Army of
the Ohio twenty.

At Shiloh the effective strength of the Union forces on the morning of
the 6th was 33,000 men.  Lew. Wallace brought 5,000 more after
nightfall.  Beauregard reported the enemy's strength at 40,955.
According to the custom of enumeration in the South, this number
probably excluded every man enlisted as musician or detailed as guard or
nurse, and all commissioned officers--everybody who did not carry a
musket or serve a cannon. With us everybody in the field receiving pay
from the government is counted.  Excluding the troops who fled,
panic-stricken, before they had fired a shot, there was not a time
during the 6th when we had more than 25,000 men in line. On the 7th
Buell brought 20,000 more.  Of his remaining two divisions, Thomas's did
not reach the field during the engagement; Wood's arrived before firing
had ceased, but not in time to be of much service.

Our loss in the two days' fight was 1,754 killed, 8,408 wounded and
2,885 missing.  Of these, 2,103 were in the Army of the Ohio.
Beauregard reported a total loss of 10,699, of whom 1,728 were killed,
8,012 wounded and 957 missing.  This estimate must be incorrect.  We
buried, by actual count, more of the enemy's dead in front of the
divisions of McClernand and Sherman alone than here reported, and 4,000
was the estimate of the burial parties of the whole field.  Beauregard
reports the Confederate force on the 6th at over 40,000, and their total
loss during the two days at 10,699; and at the same time declares that
he could put only 20,000 men in battle on the morning of the 7th.

The navy gave a hearty support to the army at Shiloh, as indeed it
always did both before and subsequently when I was in command.  The
nature of the ground was such, however, that on this occasion it could
do nothing in aid of the troops until sundown on the first day.  The
country was broken and heavily timbered, cutting off all view of the
battle from the river, so that friends would be as much in danger from
fire from the gunboats as the foe.  But about sundown, when the National
troops were back in their last position, the right of the enemy was near
the river and exposed to the fire of the two gun-boats, which was
delivered with vigor and effect.  After nightfall, when firing had
entirely ceased on land, the commander of the fleet informed himself,
approximately, of the position of our troops and suggested the idea of
dropping a shell within the lines of the enemy every fifteen minutes
during the night.  This was done with effect, as is proved by the
Confederate reports.

Up to the battle of Shiloh I, as well as thousands of other citizens,
believed that the rebellion against the Government would collapse
suddenly and soon, if a decisive victory could be gained over any of its
armies.  Donelson and Henry were such victories.  An army of more than
21,000 men was captured or destroyed.  Bowling Green, Columbus and
Hickman, Kentucky, fell in consequence, and Clarksville and Nashville,
Tennessee, the last two with an immense amount of stores, also fell into
our hands.  The Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, from their mouths to
the head of navigation, were secured.  But when Confederate armies were
collected which not only attempted to hold a line farther south, from
Memphis to Chattanooga, Knoxville and on to the Atlantic, but assumed
the offensive and made such a gallant effort to regain what had been
lost, then, indeed, I gave up all idea of saving the Union except by
complete conquest.  Up to that time it had been the policy of our army,
certainly of that portion commanded by me, to protect the property of
the citizens whose territory was invaded, without regard to their
sentiments, whether Union or Secession.  After this, however, I regarded
it as humane to both sides to protect the persons of those found at
their homes, but to consume everything that could be used to support or
supply armies.  Protection was still continued over such supplies as
were within lines held by us and which we expected to continue to hold;
but such supplies within the reach of Confederate armies I regarded as
much contraband as arms or ordnance stores.  Their destruction was
accomplished without bloodshed and tended to the same result as the
destruction of armies.  I continued this policy to the close of the war.
Promiscuous pillaging, however, was discouraged and punished.
Instructions were always given to take provisions and forage under the
direction of commissioned officers who should give receipts to owners,
if at home, and turn the property over to officers of the quartermaster
or commissary departments to be issued as if furnished from our Northern
depots.  But much was destroyed without receipts to owners, when it
could not be brought within our lines and would otherwise have gone to
the support of secession and rebellion.

This policy I believe exercised a material influence in hastening the
end.

The battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg landing, has been perhaps less
understood, or, to state the case more accurately, more persistently
misunderstood, than any other engagement between National and
Confederate troops during the entire rebellion. Correct reports of the
battle have been published, notably by Sherman, Badeau and, in a speech
before a meeting of veterans, by General Prentiss; but all of these
appeared long subsequent to the close of the rebellion and after public
opinion had been most erroneously formed.

I myself made no report to General Halleck, further than was contained
in a letter, written immediately after the battle informing him that an
engagement had been fought and announcing the result.  A few days
afterwards General Halleck moved his headquarters to Pittsburg landing
and assumed command of the troops in the field.  Although next to him in
rank, and nominally in command of my old district and army, I was
ignored as much as if I had been at the most distant point of territory
within my jurisdiction; and although I was in command of all the troops
engaged at Shiloh I was not permitted to see one of the reports of
General Buell or his subordinates in that battle, until they were
published by the War Department long after the event.  For this reason I
never made a full official report of this engagement.



CHAPTER XXVI.

HALLECK ASSUMES COMMAND IN THE FIELD--THE ADVANCE UPON CORINTH
--OCCUPATION OF CORINTH--THE ARMY SEPARATED.

General Halleck arrived at Pittsburg landing on the 11th of April and
immediately assumed command in the field.  On the 21st General Pope
arrived with an army 30,000 strong, fresh from the capture of Island
Number Ten in the Mississippi River.  He went into camp at Hamburg
landing five miles above Pittsburg. Halleck had now three armies:  the
Army of the Ohio, Buell commanding; the Army of the Mississippi, Pope
commanding; and the Army of the Tennessee.  His orders divided the
combined force into the right wing, reserve, centre and left wing.
Major-General George H. Thomas, who had been in Buell's army, was
transferred with his division to the Army of the Tennessee and given
command of the right wing, composed of all of that army except
McClernand's and Lew. Wallace's divisions. McClernand was assigned to
the command of the reserve, composed of his own and Lew. Wallace's
divisions.  Buell commanded the centre, the Army of the Ohio; and Pope
the left wing, the Army of the Mississippi.  I was named second in
command of the whole, and was also supposed to be in command of the
right wing and reserve.

Orders were given to all the commanders engaged at Shiloh to send in
their reports without delay to department headquarters.  Those from
officers of the Army of the Tennessee were sent through me; but from the
Army of the Ohio they were sent by General Buell without passing through
my hands.  General Halleck ordered me, verbally, to send in my report,
but I positively declined on the ground that he had received the reports
of a part of the army engaged at Shiloh without their coming through me.
He admitted that my refusal was justifiable under the circumstances, but
explained that he had wanted to get the reports off before moving the
command, and as fast as a report had come to him he had forwarded it to
Washington.

Preparations were at once made upon the arrival of the new commander for
an advance on Corinth.  Owl Creek, on our right, was bridged, and
expeditions were sent to the north-west and west to ascertain if our
position was being threatened from those quarters; the roads towards
Corinth were corduroyed and new ones made; lateral roads were also
constructed, so that in case of necessity troops marching by different
routes could reinforce each other.  All commanders were cautioned
against bringing on an engagement and informed in so many words that it
would be better to retreat than to fight.  By the 30th of April all
preparations were complete; the country west to the Mobile and Ohio
railroad had been reconnoitred, as well as the road to Corinth as far as
Monterey twelve miles from Pittsburg. Everywhere small bodies of the
enemy had been encountered, but they were observers and not in force to
fight battles.

Corinth, Mississippi, lies in a south-westerly direction from Pittsburg
landing and about nineteen miles away as the bird would fly, but
probably twenty-two by the nearest wagon-road. It is about four miles
south of the line dividing the States of Tennessee and Mississippi, and
at the junction of the Mississippi and Chattanooga railroad with the
Mobile and Ohio road which runs from Columbus to Mobile.  From Pittsburg
to Corinth the land is rolling, but at no point reaching an elevation
that makes high hills to pass over.  In 1862 the greater part of the
country was covered with forest with intervening clearings and houses.
Underbrush was dense in the low grounds along the creeks and ravines,
but generally not so thick on the high land as to prevent men passing
through with ease.  There are two small creeks running from north of the
town and connecting some four miles south, where they form Bridge Creek
which empties into the Tuscumbia River.  Corinth is on the ridge between
these streams and is a naturally strong defensive position.  The creeks
are insignificant in volume of water, but the stream to the east widens
out in front of the town into a swamp impassable in the presence of an
enemy.  On the crest of the west bank of this stream the enemy was
strongly intrenched.

Corinth was a valuable strategic point for the enemy to hold, and
consequently a valuable one for us to possess ourselves of.  We ought to
have seized it immediately after the fall of Donelson and Nashville,
when it could have been taken without a battle, but failing then it
should have been taken, without delay on the concentration of troops at
Pittsburg landing after the battle of Shiloh.  In fact the arrival of
Pope should not have been awaited.  There was no time from the battle of
Shiloh up to the evacuation of Corinth when the enemy would not have
left if pushed.  The demoralization among the Confederates from their
defeats at Henry and Donelson; their long marches from Bowling Green,
Columbus, and Nashville, and their failure at Shiloh; in fact from
having been driven out of Kentucky and Tennessee, was so great that a
stand for the time would have been impossible.  Beauregard made
strenuous efforts to reinforce himself and partially succeeded.  He
appealed to the people of the South-west for new regiments, and received
a few.  A. S. Johnston had made efforts to reinforce in the same
quarter, before the battle of Shiloh, but in a different way.  He had
<DW64>s sent out to him to take the place of teamsters, company cooks
and laborers in every capacity, so as to put all his white men into the
ranks.  The people, while willing to send their sons to the field, were
not willing to part with their <DW64>s.  It is only fair to state that
they probably wanted their blacks to raise supplies for the army and for
the families left at home.

Beauregard, however, was reinforced by Van Dorn immediately after Shiloh
with 17,000 men.  Interior points, less exposed, were also depleted to
add to the strength at Corinth.  With these reinforcements and the new
regiments, Beauregard had, during the month of May, 1862, a large force
on paper, but probably not much over 50,000 effective men.  We estimated
his strength at 70,000.  Our own was, in round numbers, 120,000. The
defensible nature of the ground at Corinth, and the fortifications, made
50,000 then enough to maintain their position against double that number
for an indefinite time but for the demoralization spoken of.

On the 30th of April the grand army commenced its advance from Shiloh
upon Corinth.  The movement was a siege from the start to the close.
The National troops were always behind intrenchments, except of course
the small reconnoitring parties sent to the front to clear the way for
an advance.  Even the commanders of these parties were cautioned, "not
to bring on an engagement." "It is better to retreat than to fight."
The enemy were constantly watching our advance, but as they were simply
observers there were but few engagements that even threatened to become
battles.  All the engagements fought ought to have served to encourage
the enemy.  Roads were again made in our front, and again corduroyed; a
line was intrenched, and the troops were advanced to the new position.
Cross roads were constructed to these new positions to enable the troops
to concentrate in case of attack.  The National armies were thoroughly
intrenched all the way from the Tennessee River to Corinth.

For myself I was little more than an observer.  Orders were sent direct
to the right wing or reserve, ignoring me, and advances were made from
one line of intrenchments to another without notifying me.  My position
was so embarrassing in fact that I made several applications during the
siege to be relieved.

General Halleck kept his headquarters generally, if not all the time,
with the right wing.  Pope being on the extreme left did not see so much
of his chief, and consequently got loose as it were at times.  On the 3d
of May he was at Seven Mile Creek with the main body of his command, but
threw forward a division to Farmington, within four miles of Corinth.
His troops had quite a little engagement at Farmington on that day, but
carried the place with considerable loss to the enemy.  There would then
have been no difficulty in advancing the centre and right so as to form
a new line well up to the enemy, but Pope was ordered back to conform
with the general line.  On the 8th of May he moved again, taking his
whole force to Farmington, and pushed out two divisions close to the
rebel line.  Again he was ordered back.  By the 4th of May the centre
and right wing reached Monterey, twelve miles out.  Their advance was
slow from there, for they intrenched with every forward movement.  The
left wing moved up again on the 25th of May and intrenched itself close
to the enemy.  The creek with the marsh before described, separated the
two lines.  Skirmishers thirty feet apart could have maintained either
line at this point.

Our centre and right were, at this time, extended so that the right of
the right wing was probably five miles from Corinth and four from the
works in their front.  The creek, which was a formidable obstacle for
either side to pass on our left, became a very slight obstacle on our
right.  Here the enemy occupied two positions.  One of them, as much as
two miles out from his main line, was on a commanding elevation and
defended by an intrenched battery with infantry supports.  A heavy wood
intervened between this work and the National forces.  In rear to the
south there was a clearing extending a mile or more, and south of this
clearing a log-house which had been loop-holed and was occupied by
infantry.  Sherman's division carried these two positions with some loss
to himself, but with probably greater to the enemy, on the 28th of May,
and on that day the investment of Corinth was complete, or as complete
as it was ever made. Thomas' right now rested west of the Mobile and
Ohio railroad. Pope's left commanded the Memphis and Charleston railroad
east of Corinth.

Some days before I had suggested to the commanding general that I
thought if he would move the Army of the Mississippi at night, by the
rear of the centre and right, ready to advance at daylight, Pope would
find no natural obstacle in his front and, I believed, no serious
artificial one.  The ground, or works, occupied by our left could be
held by a thin picket line, owing to the stream and swamp in front.  To
the right the troops would have a dry ridge to march over.  I was
silenced so quickly that I felt that possibly I had suggested an
unmilitary movement.

Later, probably on the 28th of May, General Logan, whose command was
then on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, said to me that the enemy had been
evacuating for several days and that if allowed he could go into Corinth
with his brigade.  Trains of cars were heard coming in and going out of
Corinth constantly.  Some of the men who had been engaged in various
capacities on railroads before the war claimed that they could tell, by
putting their ears to the rail, not only which way the trains were
moving but which trains were loaded and which were empty.  They said
loaded trains had been going out for several days and empty ones coming
in.  Subsequent events proved the correctness of their judgment.
Beauregard published his orders for the evacuation of Corinth on the
26th of May and fixed the 29th for the departure of his troops, and on
the 30th of May General Halleck had his whole army drawn up prepared for
battle and announced in orders that there was every indication that our
left was to be attacked that morning.  Corinth had already been
evacuated and the National troops marched on and took possession without
opposition.  Everything had been destroyed or carried away.  The
Confederate commander had instructed his soldiers to cheer on the
arrival of every train to create the impression among the Yankees that
reinforcements were arriving.  There was not a sick or wounded man left
by the Confederates, nor stores of any kind. Some ammunition had been
blown up--not removed--but the trophies of war were a few Quaker guns,
logs of about the diameter of ordinary cannon, mounted on wheels of
wagons and pointed in the most threatening manner towards us.

The possession of Corinth by the National troops was of strategic
importance, but the victory was barren in every other particular.  It
was nearly bloodless.  It is a question whether the MORALE of the
Confederate troops engaged at Corinth was not improved by the immunity
with which they were permitted to remove all public property and then
withdraw themselves.  On our side I know officers and men of the Army of
the Tennessee--and I presume the same is true of those of the other
commands--were disappointed at the result.  They could not see how the
mere occupation of places was to close the war while large and effective
rebel armies existed.  They believed that a well-directed attack would
at least have partially destroyed the army defending Corinth.  For
myself I am satisfied that Corinth could have been captured in a two
days' campaign commenced promptly on the arrival of reinforcements after
the battle of Shiloh.

General Halleck at once commenced erecting fortifications around Corinth
on a scale to indicate that this one point must be held if it took the
whole National army to do it.  All commanding points two or three miles
to the south, south-east and south-west were strongly fortified.  It was
expected in case of necessity to connect these forts by rifle-pits.
They were laid out on a scale that would have required 100,000 men to
fully man them.  It was probably thought that a final battle of the war
would be fought at that point.  These fortifications were never used.
Immediately after the occupation of Corinth by the National troops,
General Pope was sent in pursuit of the retreating garrison and General
Buell soon followed.  Buell was the senior of the two generals and
commanded the entire column.  The pursuit was kept up for some thirty
miles, but did not result in the capture of any material of war or
prisoners, unless a few stragglers who had fallen behind and were
willing captives.  On the 10th of June the pursuing column was all back
at Corinth.  The Army of the Tennessee was not engaged in any of these
movements.

The Confederates were now driven out of West Tennessee, and on the 6th
of June, after a well-contested naval battle, the National forces took
possession of Memphis and held the Mississippi river from its source to
that point.  The railroad from Columbus to Corinth was at once put in
good condition and held by us.  We had garrisons at Donelson,
Clarksville and Nashville, on the Cumberland River, and held the
Tennessee River from its mouth to Eastport.  New Orleans and Baton Rouge
had fallen into the possession of the National forces, so that now the
Confederates at the west were narrowed down for all communication with
Richmond to the single line of road running east from Vicksburg.  To
dispossess them of this, therefore, became a matter of the first
importance.  The possession of the Mississippi by us from Memphis to
Baton Rouge was also a most important object.  It would be equal to the
amputation of a limb in its weakening effects upon the enemy.

After the capture of Corinth a movable force of 80,000 men, besides
enough to hold all the territory acquired, could have been set in motion
for the accomplishment of any great campaign for the suppression of the
rebellion.  In addition to this fresh troops were being raised to swell
the effective force.  But the work of depletion commenced.  Buell with
the Army of the Ohio was sent east, following the line of the Memphis
and Charleston railroad.  This he was ordered to repair as he advanced
--only to have it destroyed by small guerilla bands or other troops as
soon as he was out of the way.  If he had been sent directly to
Chattanooga as rapidly as he could march, leaving two or three divisions
along the line of the railroad from Nashville forward, he could have
arrived with but little fighting, and would have saved much of the loss
of life which was afterwards incurred in gaining Chattanooga.  Bragg
would then not have had time to raise an army to contest the possession
of middle and east Tennessee and Kentucky; the battles of Stone River
and Chickamauga would not necessarily have been fought; Burnside would
not have been besieged in Knoxville without the power of helping himself
or escaping; the battle of Chattanooga would not have been fought.
These are the negative advantages, if the term negative is applicable,
which would probably have resulted from prompt movements after Corinth
fell into the possession of the National forces.  The positive results
might have been:  a bloodless advance to Atlanta, to Vicksburg, or to
any other desired point south of Corinth in the interior of Mississippi.



CHAPTER XXVII.

HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO MEMPHIS--ON THE ROAD TO MEMPHIS--ESCAPING JACKSON
--COMPLAINTS AND REQUESTS--HALLECK APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF--RETURN
TO CORINTH--MOVEMENTS OF BRAGG--SURRENDER OF CLARKSVILLE--THE ADVANCE
UPON CHATTANOOGA--SHERIDAN COLONEL OF A MICHIGAN REGIMENT.

My position at Corinth, with a nominal command and yet no command,
became so unbearable that I asked permission of Halleck to remove my
headquarters to Memphis.  I had repeatedly asked, between the fall of
Donelson and the evacuation of Corinth, to be relieved from duty under
Halleck; but all my applications were refused until the occupation of
the town.  I then obtained permission to leave the department, but
General Sherman happened to call on me as I was about starting and urged
me so strongly not to think of going, that I concluded to remain.  My
application to be permitted to remove my headquarters to Memphis was,
however, approved, and on the 21st of June I started for that point with
my staff and a cavalry escort of only a part of one company.  There was
a detachment of two or three companies going some twenty-five miles west
to be stationed as a guard to the railroad.  I went under cover of this
escort to the end of their march, and the next morning proceeded to La
Grange with no convoy but the few cavalry men I had with me.

From La Grange to Memphis the distance is forty-seven miles. There were
no troops stationed between these two points, except a small force
guarding a working party which was engaged in repairing the railroad.
Not knowing where this party would be found I halted at La Grange.
General Hurlbut was in command there at the time and had his
headquarters tents pitched on the lawn of a very commodious country
house.  The proprietor was at home and, learning of my arrival, he
invited General Hurlbut and me to dine with him.  I accepted the
invitation and spent a very pleasant afternoon with my host, who was a
thorough Southern gentleman fully convinced of the justice of secession.
After dinner, seated in the capacious porch, he entertained me with a
recital of the services he was rendering the cause.  He was too old to
be in the ranks himself--he must have been quite seventy then--but his
means enabled him to be useful in other ways.  In ordinary times the
homestead where he was now living produced the bread and meat to supply
the slaves on his main plantation, in the low-lands of Mississippi.  Now
he raised food and forage on both places, and thought he would have that
year a surplus sufficient to feed three hundred families of poor men who
had gone into the war and left their families dependent upon the
"patriotism" of those better off.  The crops around me looked fine, and
I had at the moment an idea that about the time they were ready to be
gathered the "Yankee" troops would be in the neighborhood and harvest
them for the benefit of those engaged in the suppression of the
rebellion instead of its support.  I felt, however, the greatest respect
for the candor of my host and for his zeal in a cause he thoroughly
believed in, though our views were as wide apart as it is possible to
conceive.

The 23d of June, 1862, on the road from La Grange to Memphis was very
warm, even for that latitude and season.  With my staff and small escort
I started at an early hour, and before noon we arrived within twenty
miles of Memphis.  At this point I saw a very comfortable-looking
white-haired gentleman seated at the front of his house, a little
distance from the road.  I let my staff and escort ride ahead while I
halted and, for an excuse, asked for a glass of water.  I was invited at
once to dismount and come in.  I found my host very genial and
communicative, and staid longer than I had intended, until the lady of
the house announced dinner and asked me to join them.  The host,
however, was not pressing, so that I declined the invitation and,
mounting my horse, rode on.

About a mile west from where I had been stopping a road comes up from
the southeast, joining that from La Grange to Memphis.  A mile west of
this junction I found my staff and escort halted and enjoying the shade
of forest trees on the lawn of a house located several hundred feet back
from the road, their horses hitched to the fence along the line of the
road.  I, too, stopped and we remained there until the cool of the
afternoon, and then rode into Memphis.

The gentleman with whom I had stopped twenty miles from Memphis was a
Mr. De Loche, a man loyal to the Union.  He had not pressed me to tarry
longer with him because in the early part of my visit a neighbor, a Dr.
Smith, had called and, on being presented to me, backed off the porch as
if something had hit him.  Mr. De Loche knew that the rebel General
Jackson was in that neighborhood with a detachment of cavalry.  His
neighbor was as earnest in the southern cause as was Mr. De Loche in
that of the Union.  The exact location of Jackson was entirely unknown
to Mr. De Loche; but he was sure that his neighbor would know it and
would give information of my presence, and this made my stay unpleasant
to him after the call of Dr. Smith.

I have stated that a detachment of troops was engaged in guarding
workmen who were repairing the railroad east of Memphis.  On the day I
entered Memphis, Jackson captured a small herd of beef cattle which had
been sent east for the troops so engaged.  The drovers were not enlisted
men and he released them.  A day or two after one of these drovers came
to my headquarters and, relating the circumstances of his capture, said
Jackson was very much disappointed that he had not captured me; that he
was six or seven miles south of the Memphis and Charleston railroad when
he learned that I was stopping at the house of Mr. De Loche, and had
ridden with his command to the junction of the road he was on with that
from La Grange and Memphis, where he learned that I had passed
three-quarters of an hour before.  He thought it would be useless to
pursue with jaded horses a well-mounted party with so much of a start.
Had he gone three-quarters of a mile farther he would have found me with
my party quietly resting under the shade of trees and without even arms
in our hands with which to defend ourselves.

General Jackson of course did not communicate his disappointment at not
capturing me to a prisoner, a young drover; but from the talk among the
soldiers the facts related were learned.  A day or two later Mr. De
Loche called on me in Memphis to apologize for his apparent incivility
in not insisting on my staying for dinner.  He said that his wife
accused him of marked discourtesy, but that, after the call of his
neighbor, he had felt restless until I got away.  I never met General
Jackson before the war, nor during it, but have met him since at his
very comfortable summer home at Manitou Springs, Colorado.  I reminded
him of the above incident, and this drew from him the response that he
was thankful now he had not captured me.  I certainly was very thankful
too.

My occupation of Memphis as district headquarters did not last long.
The period, however, was marked by a few incidents which were novel to
me.  Up to that time I had not occupied any place in the South where the
citizens were at home in any great numbers.  Dover was within the
fortifications at Fort Donelson, and, as far as I remember, every
citizen was gone.  There were no people living at Pittsburg landing, and
but very few at Corinth.  Memphis, however, was a populous city, and
there were many of the citizens remaining there who were not only
thoroughly impressed with the justice of their cause, but who thought
that even the "Yankee soldiery" must entertain the same views if they
could only be induced to make an honest confession.  It took hours of my
time every day to listen to complaints and requests.  The latter were
generally reasonable, and if so they were granted; but the complaints
were not always, or even often, well founded.  Two instances will mark
the general character.  First:  the officer who commanded at Memphis
immediately after the city fell into the hands of the National troops
had ordered one of the churches of the city to be opened to the
soldiers.  Army chaplains were authorized to occupy the pulpit.  Second:
at the beginning of the war the Confederate Congress had passed a law
confiscating all property of "alien enemies" at the South, including the
debts of Southerners to Northern men.  In consequence of this law, when
Memphis was occupied the provost-marshal had forcibly collected all the
evidences he could obtain of such debts.

Almost the first complaints made to me were these two outrages.  The
gentleman who made the complaints informed me first of his own high
standing as a lawyer, a citizen and a Christian.  He was a deacon in the
church which had been defiled by the occupation of Union troops, and by
a Union chaplain filling the pulpit.  He did not use the word "defile,"
but he expressed the idea very clearly.  He asked that the church be
restored to the former congregation.  I told him that no order had been
issued prohibiting the congregation attending the church.  He said of
course the congregation could not hear a Northern clergyman who differed
so radically with them on questions of government.  I told him the
troops would continue to occupy that church for the present, and that
they would not be called upon to hear disloyal sentiments proclaimed
from the pulpit.  This closed the argument on the first point.

Then came the second.  The complainant said that he wanted the papers
restored to him which had been surrendered to the provost-marshal under
protest; he was a lawyer, and before the establishment of the
"Confederate States Government" had been the attorney for a number of
large business houses at the North; that "his government" had
confiscated all debts due "alien enemies," and appointed commissioners,
or officers, to collect such debts and pay them over to the
"government":  but in his case, owing to his high standing, he had been
permitted to hold these claims for collection, the responsible officials
knowing that he would account to the "government" for every dollar
received. He said that his "government," when it came in possession of
all its territory, would hold him personally responsible for the claims
he had surrendered to the provost-marshal.  His impudence was so sublime
that I was rather amused than indignant.  I told him, however, that if
he would remain in Memphis I did not believe the Confederate government
would ever molest him.  He left, no doubt, as much amazed at my
assurance as I was at the brazenness of his request.

On the 11th of July General Halleck received telegraphic orders
appointing him to the command of all the armies, with headquarters in
Washington.  His instructions pressed him to proceed to his new field of
duty with as little delay as was consistent with the safety and
interests of his previous command.  I was next in rank, and he
telegraphed me the same day to report at department headquarters at
Corinth.  I was not informed by the dispatch that my chief had been
ordered to a different field and did not know whether to move my
headquarters or not.  I telegraphed asking if I was to take my staff
with me, and received word in reply:  "This place will be your
headquarters.  You can judge for yourself."  I left Memphis for my new
field without delay, and reached Corinth on the 15th of the month.
General Halleck remained until the 17th of July; but he was very
uncommunicative, and gave me no information as to what I had been called
to Corinth for.

When General Halleck left to assume the duties of general-in-chief I
remained in command of the district of West Tennessee.  Practically I
became a department commander, because no one was assigned to that
position over me and I made my reports direct to the general-in-chief;
but I was not assigned to the position of department commander until the
25th of October.  General Halleck while commanding the Department of the
Mississippi had had control as far east as a line drawn from Chattanooga
north.  My district only embraced West Tennessee and Kentucky west of
the Cumberland River.  Buell, with the Army of the Ohio, had, as
previously stated, been ordered east towards Chattanooga, with
instructions to repair the Memphis and Charleston railroad as he
advanced.  Troops had been sent north by Halleck along the line of the
Mobile and Ohio railroad to put it in repair as far as Columbus.  Other
troops were stationed on the railroad from Jackson, Tennessee, to Grand
Junction, and still others on the road west to Memphis.

The remainder of the magnificent army of 120,000 men which entered
Corinth on the 30th of May had now become so scattered that I was put
entirely on the defensive in a territory whose population was hostile to
the Union.  One of the first things I had to do was to construct
fortifications at Corinth better suited to the garrison that could be
spared to man them.  The structures that had been built during the
months of May and June were left as monuments to the skill of the
engineer, and others were constructed in a few days, plainer in design
but suited to the command available to defend them.

I disposed the troops belonging to the district in conformity with the
situation as rapidly as possible.  The forces at Donelson, Clarksville
and Nashville, with those at Corinth and along the railroad eastward, I
regarded as sufficient for protection against any attack from the west.
The Mobile and Ohio railroad was guarded from Rienzi, south of Corinth,
to Columbus; and the Mississippi Central railroad from Jackson,
Tennessee, to Bolivar.  Grand Junction and La Grange on the Memphis
railroad were abandoned.

South of the Army of the Tennessee, and confronting it, was Van Dorn,
with a sufficient force to organize a movable army of thirty-five to
forty thousand men, after being reinforced by Price from Missouri.  This
movable force could be thrown against either Corinth, Bolivar or
Memphis; and the best that could be done in such event would be to
weaken the points not threatened in order to reinforce the one that was.
Nothing could be gained on the National side by attacking elsewhere,
because the territory already occupied was as much as the force present
could guard.  The most anxious period of the war, to me, was during the
time the Army of the Tennessee was guarding the territory acquired by
the fall of Corinth and Memphis and before I was sufficiently reinforced
to take the offensive.  The enemy also had cavalry operating in our
rear, making it necessary to guard every point of the railroad back to
Columbus, on the security of which we were dependent for all our
supplies. Headquarters were connected by telegraph with all points of
the command except Memphis and the Mississippi below Columbus.  With
these points communication was had by the railroad to Columbus, then
down the river by boat.  To reinforce Memphis would take three or four
days, and to get an order there for troops to move elsewhere would have
taken at least two days.  Memphis therefore was practically isolated
from the balance of the command.  But it was in Sherman's hands.  Then
too the troops were well intrenched and the gunboats made a valuable
auxiliary.

During the two months after the departure of General Halleck there was
much fighting between small bodies of the contending armies, but these
encounters were dwarfed by the magnitude of the main battles so as to be
now almost forgotten except by those engaged in them.  Some of them,
however, estimated by the losses on both sides in killed and wounded,
were equal in hard fighting to most of the battles of the Mexican war
which attracted so much of the attention of the public when they
occurred.  About the 23d of July Colonel Ross, commanding at Bolivar,
was threatened by a large force of the enemy so that he had to be
reinforced from Jackson and Corinth.  On the 27th there was skirmishing
on the Hatchie River, eight miles from Bolivar. On the 30th I learned
from Colonel P. H. Sheridan, who had been far to the south, that Bragg
in person was at Rome, Georgia, with his troops moving by rail (by way
of Mobile) to Chattanooga and his wagon train marching overland to join
him at Rome.  Price was at this time at Holly Springs, Mississippi, with
a large force, and occupied Grand Junction as an outpost.  I proposed to
the general-in-chief to be permitted to drive him away, but was informed
that, while I had to judge for myself, the best use to make of my troops
WAS NOT TO SCATTER THEM, but hold them ready to reinforce Buell.

The movement of Bragg himself with his wagon trains to Chattanooga
across country, while his troops were transported over a long
round-about road to the same destination, without need of guards except
when in my immediate front, demonstrates the advantage which troops
enjoy while acting in a country where the people are friendly.  Buell
was marching through a hostile region and had to have his communications
thoroughly guarded back to a base of supplies.  More men were required
the farther the National troops penetrated into the enemy's country.  I,
with an army sufficiently powerful to have destroyed Bragg, was purely
on the defensive and accomplishing no more than to hold a force far
inferior to my own.

On the 2d of August I was ordered from Washington to live upon the
country, on the resources of citizens hostile to the government, so far
as practicable.  I was also directed to "handle rebels within our lines
without gloves," to imprison them, or to expel them from their homes and
from our lines.  I do not recollect having arrested and confined a
citizen (not a soldier) during the entire rebellion.  I am aware that a
great many were sent to northern prisons, particularly to Joliet,
Illinois, by some of my subordinates with the statement that it was my
order.  I had all such released the moment I learned of their arrest;
and finally sent a staff officer north to release every prisoner who was
said to be confined by my order.  There were many citizens at home who
deserved punishment because they were soldiers when an opportunity was
afforded to inflict an injury to the National cause.  This class was not
of the kind that were apt to get arrested, and I deemed it better that a
few guilty men should escape than that a great many innocent ones should
suffer.

On the 14th of August I was ordered to send two more divisions to Buell.
They were sent the same day by way of Decatur.  On the 22d Colonel
Rodney Mason surrendered Clarksville with six companies of his regiment.

Colonel Mason was one of the officers who had led their regiments off
the field at almost the first fire of the rebels at Shiloh.  He was by
nature and education a gentleman, and was terribly mortified at his
action when the battle was over.  He came to me with tears in his eyes
and begged to be allowed to have another trial.  I felt great sympathy
for him and sent him, with his regiment, to garrison Clarksville and
Donelson.  He selected Clarksville for his headquarters, no doubt
because he regarded it as the post of danger, it being nearer the enemy.
But when he was summoned to surrender by a band of guerillas, his
constitutional weakness overcame him.  He inquired the number of men the
enemy had, and receiving a response indicating a force greater than his
own he said if he could be satisfied of that fact he would surrender.
Arrangements were made for him to count the guerillas, and having
satisfied himself that the enemy had the greater force he surrendered
and informed his subordinate at Donelson of the fact, advising him to do
the same.  The guerillas paroled their prisoners and moved upon
Donelson, but the officer in command at that point marched out to meet
them and drove them away.

Among other embarrassments, at the time of which I now write, was the
fact that the government wanted to get out all the cotton possible from
the South and directed me to give every facility toward that end.  Pay
in gold was authorized, and stations on the Mississippi River and on the
railroad in our possession had to be designated where cotton would be
received.  This opened to the enemy not only the means of converting
cotton into money, which had a value all over the world and which they
so much needed, but it afforded them means of obtaining accurate and
intelligent information in regard to our position and strength.  It was
also demoralizing to the troops.  Citizens obtaining permits from the
treasury department had to be protected within our lines and given
facilities to get out cotton by which they realized enormous profits.
Men who had enlisted to fight the battles of their country did not like
to be engaged in protecting a traffic which went to the support of an
enemy they had to fight, and the profits of which went to men who shared
none of their dangers.

On the 30th of August Colonel M. D. Leggett, near Bolivar, with the 20th
and 29th Ohio volunteer infantry, was attacked by a force supposed to be
about 4,000 strong.  The enemy was driven away with a loss of more than
one hundred men.  On the 1st of September the bridge guard at Medon was
attacked by guerillas. The guard held the position until reinforced,
when the enemy were routed leaving about fifty of their number on the
field dead or wounded, our loss being only two killed and fifteen
wounded.  On the same day Colonel Dennis, with a force of less than 500
infantry and two pieces of artillery, met the cavalry of the enemy in
strong force, a few miles west of Medon, and drove them away with great
loss.  Our troops buried 179 of the enemy's dead, left upon the field.
Afterwards it was found that all the houses in the vicinity of the
battlefield were turned into hospitals for the wounded.  Our loss, as
reported at the time, was forty-five killed and wounded.  On the 2d of
September I was ordered to send more reinforcements to Buell.  Jackson
and Bolivar were yet threatened, but I sent the reinforcements.  On the
4th I received direct orders to send Granger's division also to
Louisville, Kentucky.

General Buell had left Corinth about the 10th of June to march upon
Chattanooga; Bragg, who had superseded Beauregard in command, sent one
division from Tupelo on the 27th of June for the same place.  This gave
Buell about seventeen days' start. If he had not been required to repair
the railroad as he advanced, the march could have been made in eighteen
days at the outside, and Chattanooga must have been reached by the
National forces before the rebels could have possibly got there.  The
road between Nashville and Chattanooga could easily have been put in
repair by other troops, so that communication with the North would have
been opened in a short time after the occupation of the place by the
National troops.  If Buell had been permitted to move in the first
instance, with the whole of the Army of the Ohio and that portion of the
Army of the Mississippi afterwards sent to him, he could have thrown
four divisions from his own command along the line of road to repair and
guard it.

Granger's division was promptly sent on the 4th of September.  I was at
the station at Corinth when the troops reached that point, and found
General P. H. Sheridan with them.  I expressed surprise at seeing him
and said that I had not expected him to go.  He showed decided
disappointment at the prospect of being detained.  I felt a little
nettled at his desire to get away and did not detain him.

Sheridan was a first lieutenant in the regiment in which I had served
eleven years, the 4th infantry, and stationed on the Pacific coast when
the war broke out.  He was promoted to a captaincy in May, 1861, and
before the close of the year managed in some way, I do not know how, to
get East.  He went to Missouri.  Halleck had known him as a very
successful young officer in managing campaigns against the Indians on
the Pacific coast, and appointed him acting-quartermaster in south-west
Missouri.  There was no difficulty in getting supplies forward while
Sheridan served in that capacity; but he got into difficulty with his
immediate superiors because of his stringent rules for preventing the
use of public transportation for private purposes.  He asked to be
relieved from further duty in the capacity in which he was engaged and
his request was granted. When General Halleck took the field in April,
1862, Sheridan was assigned to duty on his staff.  During the advance on
Corinth a vacancy occurred in the colonelcy of the 2d Michigan cavalry.
Governor Blair, of Michigan, telegraphed General Halleck asking him to
suggest the name of a professional soldier for the vacancy, saying he
would appoint a good man without reference to his State.  Sheridan was
named; and was so conspicuously efficient that when Corinth was reached
he was assigned to command a cavalry brigade in the Army of the
Mississippi.  He was in command at Booneville on the 1st of July with
two small regiments, when he was attacked by a force full three times
as numerous as his own.  By very skilful manoeuvres and boldness of
attack he completely routed the enemy.  For this he was made a
brigadier-general and became a conspicuous figure in the army about
Corinth.  On this account I was sorry to see him leaving me.  His
departure was probably fortunate, for he rendered distinguished services
in his new field.

Granger and Sheridan reached Louisville before Buell got there, and on
the night of their arrival Sheridan with his command threw up works
around the railroad station for the defence of troops as they came from
the front.



CHAPTER XXVIII.

ADVANCE OF VAN DORN AND PRICE--PRICE ENTERS IUKA--BATTLE OF IUKA.

At this time, September 4th, I had two divisions of the Army of the
Mississippi stationed at Corinth, Rienzi, Jacinto and Danville.  There
were at Corinth also Davies' division and two brigades of McArthur's,
besides cavalry and artillery.  This force constituted my left wing, of
which Rosecrans was in command.  General Ord commanded the centre, from
Bethel to Humboldt on the Mobile and Ohio railroad and from Jackson to
Bolivar where the Mississippi Central is crossed by the Hatchie River.
General Sherman commanded on the right at Memphis with two of his
brigades back at Brownsville, at the crossing of the Hatchie River by
the Memphis and Ohio railroad.  This made the most convenient
arrangement I could devise for concentrating all my spare forces upon
any threatened point.  All the troops of the command were within
telegraphic communication of each other, except those under Sherman.  By
bringing a portion of his command to Brownsville, from which point there
was a railroad and telegraph back to Memphis, communication could be had
with that part of my command within a few hours by the use of couriers.
In case it became necessary to reinforce Corinth, by this arrangement
all the troops at Bolivar, except a small guard, could be sent by rail
by the way of Jackson in less than twenty-four hours; while the troops
from Brownsville could march up to Bolivar to take their place.

On the 7th of September I learned of the advance of Van Dorn and Price,
apparently upon Corinth.  One division was brought from Memphis to
Bolivar to meet any emergency that might arise from this move of the
enemy.  I was much concerned because my first duty, after holding the
territory acquired within my command, was to prevent further reinforcing
of Bragg in Middle Tennessee.  Already the Army of Northern Virginia had
defeated the army under General Pope and was invading Maryland.  In the
Centre General Buell was on his way to Louisville and Bragg marching
parallel to him with a large Confederate force for the Ohio River.

I had been constantly called upon to reinforce Buell until at this time
my entire force numbered less than 50,000 men, of all arms.  This
included everything from Cairo south within my jurisdiction.  If I too
should be driven back, the Ohio River would become the line dividing the
belligerents west of the Alleghanies, while at the East the line was
already farther north than when hostilities commenced at the opening of
the war.  It is true Nashville was never given up after its first
capture, but it would have been isolated and the garrison there would
have been obliged to beat a hasty retreat if the troops in West
Tennessee had been compelled to fall back.  To say at the end of the
second year of the war the line dividing the contestants at the East was
pushed north of Maryland, a State that had not seceded, and at the West
beyond Kentucky, another State which had been always loyal, would have
been discouraging indeed.  As it was, many loyal people despaired in the
fall of 1862 of ever saving the Union.  The administration at Washington
was much concerned for the safety of the cause it held so dear. But I
believe there was never a day when the President did not think that, in
some way or other, a cause so just as ours would come out triumphant.

Up to the 11th of September Rosecrans still had troops on the railroad
east of Corinth, but they had all been ordered in.  By the 12th all were
in except a small force under Colonel Murphy of the 8th Wisconsin.  He
had been detained to guard the remainder of the stores which had not yet
been brought in to Corinth.

On the 13th of September General Sterling Price entered Iuka, a town
about twenty miles east of Corinth on the Memphis and Charleston
railroad.  Colonel Murphy with a few men was guarding the place.  He
made no resistance, but evacuated the town on the approach of the enemy.
I was apprehensive lest the object of the rebels might be to get troops
into Tennessee to reinforce Bragg, as it was afterwards ascertained to
be.  The authorities at Washington, including the general-in-chief of
the army, were very anxious, as I have said, about affairs both in East
and Middle Tennessee; and my anxiety was quite as great on their account
as for any danger threatening my command.  I had not force enough at
Corinth to attack Price even by stripping everything; and there was
danger that before troops could be got from other points he might be far
on his way across the Tennessee.  To prevent this all spare forces at
Bolivar and Jackson were ordered to Corinth, and cars were concentrated
at Jackson for their transportation.  Within twenty-four hours from the
transmission of the order the troops were at their destination, although
there had been a delay of four hours resulting from the forward train
getting off the track and stopping all the others.  This gave a
reinforcement of near 8,000 men, General Ord in command.  General
Rosecrans commanded the district of Corinth with a movable force of
about 9,000 independent of the garrison deemed necessary to be left
behind.  It was known that General Van Dorn was about a four days' march
south of us, with a large force.  It might have been part of his plan to
attack at Corinth, Price coming from the east while he came up from the
south.  My desire was to attack Price before Van Dorn could reach
Corinth or go to his relief.

General Rosecrans had previously had his headquarters at Iuka, where his
command was spread out along the Memphis and Charleston railroad
eastward.  While there he had a most excellent map prepared showing all
the roads and streams in the surrounding country.  He was also
personally familiar with the ground, so that I deferred very much to him
in my plans for the approach.  We had cars enough to transport all of
General Ord's command, which was to go by rail to Burnsville, a point on
the road about seven miles west of Iuka.  From there his troops were to
march by the north side of the railroad and attack Price from the
north-west, while Rosecrans was to move eastward from his position south
of Corinth by way of the Jacinto road.  A small force was to hold the
Jacinto road where it turns to the north-east, while the main force
moved on the Fulton road which comes into Iuka further east.  This plan
was suggested by Rosecrans.

Bear Creek, a few miles to the east of the Fulton road, is a formidable
obstacle to the movement of troops in the absence of bridges, all of
which, in September, 1862, had been destroyed in that vicinity.  The
Tennessee, to the north-east, not many miles away, was also a formidable
obstacle for an army followed by a pursuing force.  Ord was on the
north-west, and even if a rebel movement had been possible in that
direction it could have brought only temporary relief, for it would have
carried Price's army to the rear of the National forces and isolated it
from all support.  It looked to me that, if Price would remain in Iuka
until we could get there, his annihilation was inevitable.

On the morning of the 18th of September General Ord moved by rail to
Burnsville, and there left the cars and moved out to perform his part of
the programme.  He was to get as near the enemy as possible during the
day and intrench himself so as to hold his position until the next
morning.  Rosecrans was to be up by the morning of the 19th on the two
roads before described, and the attack was to be from all three quarters
simultaneously.  Troops enough were left at Jacinto and Rienzi to detain
any cavalry that Van Dorn might send out to make a sudden dash into
Corinth until I could be notified.  There was a telegraph wire along the
railroad, so there would be no delay in communication.  I detained cars
and locomotives enough at Burnsville to transport the whole of Ord's
command at once, and if Van Dorn had moved against Corinth instead of
Iuka I could have thrown in reinforcements to the number of 7,000 or
8,000 before he could have arrived.  I remained at Burnsville with a
detachment of about 900 men from Ord's command and communicated with my
two wings by courier.  Ord met the advance of the enemy soon after
leaving Burnsville.  Quite a sharp engagement ensued, but he drove the
rebels back with considerable loss, including one general officer
killed.  He maintained his position and was ready to attack by daylight
the next morning.  I was very much disappointed at receiving a dispatch
from Rosecrans after midnight from Jacinto, twenty-two miles from Iuka,
saying that some of his command had been delayed, and that the rear of
his column was not yet up as far as Jacinto.  He said, however, that he
would still be at Iuka by two o'clock the next day.  I did not believe
this possible because of the distance and the condition of the roads,
which was bad; besides, troops after a forced march of twenty miles are
not in a good condition for fighting the moment they get through.  It
might do in marching to relieve a beleaguered garrison, but not to make
an assault.  I immediately sent Ord a copy of Rosecrans' dispatch and
ordered him to be in readiness to attack the moment he heard the sound
of guns to the south or south-east.  He was instructed to notify his
officers to be on the alert for any indications of battle. During the
19th the wind blew in the wrong direction to transmit sound either
towards the point where Ord was, or to Burnsville where I had remained.

A couple of hours before dark on the 19th Rosecrans arrived with the
head of his column at Barnets, the point where the Jacinto road to Iuka
leaves the road going east.  He here turned north without sending any
troops to the Fulton road.  While still moving in column up the Jacinto
road he met a force of the enemy and had his advance badly beaten and
driven back upon the main road.  In this short engagement his loss was
considerable for the number engaged, and one battery was taken from him.
The wind was still blowing hard and in the wrong direction to transmit
sounds towards either Ord or me.  Neither he nor I nor any one in either
command heard a gun that was fired upon the battle-field.  After the
engagement Rosecrans sent me a dispatch announcing the result.  This was
brought by a courier.  There was no road between Burnsville and the
position then occupied by Rosecrans and the country was impassable for a
man on horseback.  The courier bearing the message was compelled to move
west nearly to Jacinto before he found a road leading to Burnsville.
This made it a late hour of the night before I learned of the battle
that had taken place during the afternoon.  I at once notified Ord of
the fact and ordered him to attack early in the morning.  The next
morning Rosecrans himself renewed the attack and went into Iuka with but
little resistance.  Ord also went in according to orders, without
hearing a gun from the south of town but supposing the troops coming
from the south-west must be up by that time.  Rosecrans, however, had
put no troops upon the Fulton road, and the enemy had taken advantage of
this neglect and retreated by that road during the night.  Word was soon
brought to me that our troops were in Iuka.  I immediately rode into
town and found that the enemy was not being pursued even by the cavalry.
I ordered pursuit by the whole of Rosecrans' command and went on with
him a few miles in person.  He followed only a few miles after I left
him and then went into camp, and the pursuit was continued no further.
I was disappointed at the result of the battle of Iuka--but I had so
high an opinion of General Rosecrans that I found no fault at the time.



CHAPTER XXIX.

VAN DORN'S MOVEMENTS--BATTLE OF CORINTH--COMMAND OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
THE TENNESSEE.

On the 19th of September General Geo. H. Thomas was ordered east to
reinforce Buell.  This threw the army at my command still more on the
defensive.  The Memphis and Charleston railroad was abandoned, except at
Corinth, and small forces were left at Chewalla and Grand Junction.
Soon afterwards the latter of these two places was given up and Bolivar
became our most advanced position on the Mississippi Central railroad.
Our cavalry was kept well to the front and frequent expeditions were
sent out to watch the movements of the enemy.  We were in a country
where nearly all the people, except the <DW64>s, were hostile to us and
friendly to the cause we were trying to suppress.  It was easy,
therefore, for the enemy to get early information of our every move.
We, on the contrary, had to go after our information in force, and then
often returned without it.

On the 22d Bolivar was threatened by a large force from south of Grand
Junction, supposed to be twenty regiments of infantry with cavalry and
artillery.  I reinforced Bolivar, and went to Jackson in person to
superintend the movement of troops to whatever point the attack might be
made upon.  The troops from Corinth were brought up in time to repel the
threatened movement without a battle.  Our cavalry followed the enemy
south of Davis' mills in Mississippi.

On the 30th I found that Van Dorn was apparently endeavoring to strike
the Mississippi River above Memphis.  At the same time other points
within my command were so threatened that it was impossible to
concentrate a force to drive him away.  There was at this juncture a
large Union force at Helena, Arkansas, which, had it been within my
command, I could have ordered across the river to attack and break up
the Mississippi Central railroad far to the south.  This would not only
have called Van Dorn back, but would have compelled the retention of a
large rebel force far to the south to prevent a repetition of such raids
on the enemy's line of supplies.  Geographical lines between the
commands during the rebellion were not always well chosen, or they were
too rigidly adhered to.

Van Dorn did not attempt to get upon the line above Memphis, as had
apparently been his intention.  He was simply covering a deeper design;
one much more important to his cause.  By the 1st of October it was
fully apparent that Corinth was to be attacked with great force and
determination, and that Van Dorn, Lovell, Price, Villepigue and Rust had
joined their strength for this purpose.  There was some skirmishing
outside of Corinth with the advance of the enemy on the 3d.  The rebels
massed in the north-west angle of the Memphis and Charleston and the
Mobile and Ohio railroads, and were thus between the troops at Corinth
and all possible reinforcements.  Any fresh troops for us must come by a
circuitous route.

On the night of the 3d, accordingly, I ordered General McPherson, who
was at Jackson, to join Rosecrans at Corinth with reinforcements picked
up along the line of the railroad equal to a brigade.  Hurlbut had been
ordered from Bolivar to march for the same destination; and as Van Dorn
was coming upon Corinth from the north-west some of his men fell in with
the advance of Hurlbut's and some skirmishing ensued on the evening of
the 3d.  On the 4th Van Dorn made a dashing attack, hoping, no doubt, to
capture Rosecrans before his reinforcements could come up.  In that case
the enemy himself could have occupied the defences of Corinth and held
at bay all the Union troops that arrived.  In fact he could have taken
the offensive against the reinforcements with three or four times their
number and still left a sufficient garrison in the works about Corinth
to hold them.  He came near success, some of his troops penetrating the
National lines at least once, but the works that were built after
Halleck's departure enabled Rosecrans to hold his position until the
troops of both McPherson and Hurlbut approached towards the rebel front
and rear.  The enemy was finally driven back with great slaughter:  all
their charges, made with great gallantry, were repulsed.  The loss on
our side was heavy, but nothing to compare with Van Dorn's.  McPherson
came up with the train of cars bearing his command as close to the enemy
as was prudent, debarked on the rebel flank and got in to the support of
Rosecrans just after the repulse.  His approach, as well as that of
Hurlbut, was known to the enemy and had a moral effect. General
Rosecrans, however, failed to follow up the victory, although I had
given specific orders in advance of the battle for him to pursue the
moment the enemy was repelled.  He did not do so, and I repeated the
order after the battle.  In the first order he was notified that the
force of 4,000 men which was going to his assistance would be in great
peril if the enemy was not pursued.

General Ord had joined Hurlbut on the 4th and being senior took command
of his troops.  This force encountered the head of Van Dorn's retreating
column just as it was crossing the Hatchie by a bridge some ten miles
out from Corinth.  The bottom land here was swampy and bad for the
operations of troops, making a good place to get an enemy into.  Ord
attacked the troops that had crossed the bridge and drove them back in a
panic.  Many were killed, and others were drowned by being pushed off
the bridge in their hurried retreat.  Ord followed and met the main
force.  He was too weak in numbers to assault, but he held the bridge
and compelled the enemy to resume his retreat by another bridge higher
up the stream.  Ord was wounded in this engagement and the command
devolved on Hurlbut.

Rosecrans did not start in pursuit till the morning of the 5th and then
took the wrong road.  Moving in the enemy's country he travelled with a
wagon train to carry his provisions and munitions of war.  His march was
therefore slower than that of the enemy, who was moving towards his
supplies.  Two or three hours of pursuit on the day of battle, without
anything except what the men carried on their persons, would have been
worth more than any pursuit commenced the next day could have possibly
been.  Even when he did start, if Rosecrans had followed the route taken
by the enemy, he would have come upon Van Dorn in a swamp with a stream
in front and Ord holding the only bridge; but he took the road leading
north and towards Chewalla instead of west, and, after having marched as
far as the enemy had moved to get to the Hatchie, he was as far from
battle as when he started.  Hurlbut had not the numbers to meet any such
force as Van Dorn's if they had been in any mood for fighting, and he
might have been in great peril.

I now regarded the time to accomplish anything by pursuit as past and,
after Rosecrans reached Jonesboro, I ordered him to return.  He kept on
to Ripley, however, and was persistent in wanting to go farther.  I
thereupon ordered him to halt and submitted the matter to the
general-in-chief, who allowed me to exercise my judgment in the matter,
but inquired "why not pursue?"  Upon this I ordered Rosecrans back.  Had
he gone much farther he would have met a greater force than Van Dorn had
at Corinth and behind intrenchments or on chosen ground, and the
probabilities are he would have lost his army.

The battle of Corinth was bloody, our loss being 315 killed, 1,812
wounded and 232 missing.  The enemy lost many more. Rosecrans reported
1,423 dead and 2,225 prisoners.  We fought behind breastworks, which
accounts in some degree for the disparity.  Among the killed on our side
was General Hackelman.  General Oglesby was badly, it was for some time
supposed mortally, wounded.  I received a congratulatory letter from the
President, which expressed also his sorrow for the losses.

This battle was recognized by me as being a decided victory, though not
so complete as I had hoped for, nor nearly so complete as I now think
was within the easy grasp of the commanding officer at Corinth.  Since
the war it is known that the result, as it was, was a crushing blow to
the enemy, and felt by him much more than it was appreciated at the
North.  The battle relieved me from any further anxiety for the safety
of the territory within my jurisdiction, and soon after receiving
reinforcements I suggested to the general-in-chief a forward movement
against Vicksburg.

On the 23d of October I learned of Pemberton's being in command at Holly
Springs and much reinforced by conscripts and troops from Alabama and
Texas.  The same day General Rosecrans was relieved from duty with my
command, and shortly after he succeeded Buell in the command of the army
in Middle Tennessee.  I was delighted at the promotion of General
Rosecrans to a separate command, because I still believed that when
independent of an immediate superior the qualities which I, at that
time, credited him with possessing, would show themselves.  As a
subordinate I found that I could not make him do as I wished, and had
determined to relieve him from duty that very day.

At the close of the operations just described my force, in round
numbers, was 48,500.  Of these 4,800 were in Kentucky and Illinois,
7,000 in Memphis, 19,200 from Mound City south, and 17,500 at Corinth.
General McClernand had been authorized from Washington to go north and
organize troops to be used in opening the Mississippi.  These new levies
with other reinforcements now began to come in.

On the 25th of October I was placed in command of the Department of the
Tennessee.  Reinforcements continued to come from the north and by the
2d of November I was prepared to take the initiative.  This was a great
relief after the two and a half months of continued defence over a large
district of country, and where nearly every citizen was an enemy ready
to give information of our every move.  I have described very
imperfectly a few of the battles and skirmishes that took place during
this time.  To describe all would take more space than I can allot to
the purpose; to make special mention of all the officers and troops who
distinguished themselves, would take a volume. (*9)



CHAPTER XXX.

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST VICKSBURG--EMPLOYING THE FREEDMEN--OCCUPATION OF
HOLLY SPRINGS--SHERMAN ORDERED TO MEMPHIS--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS DOWN THE
MISSISSIPPI--VAN DORN CAPTURES HOLLY SPRINGS--COLLECTING FORAGE AND
FOOD.

Vicksburg was important to the enemy because it occupied the first high
ground coming close to the river below Memphis.  From there a railroad
runs east, connecting with other roads leading to all points of the
Southern States.  A railroad also starts from the opposite side of the
river, extending west as far as Shreveport, Louisiana.  Vicksburg was
the only channel, at the time of the events of which this chapter
treats, connecting the parts of the Confederacy divided by the
Mississippi.  So long as it was held by the enemy, the free navigation
of the river was prevented.  Hence its importance.  Points on the river
between Vicksburg and Port Hudson were held as dependencies; but their
fall was sure to follow the capture of the former place.

The campaign against Vicksburg commenced on the 2d of November as
indicated in a dispatch to the general-in-chief in the following words:
"I have commenced a movement on Grand Junction, with three divisions
from Corinth and two from Bolivar.  Will leave here [Jackson, Tennessee]
to-morrow, and take command in person.  If found practicable, I will go
to Holly Springs, and, may be, Grenada, completing railroad and
telegraph as I go."

At this time my command was holding the Mobile and Ohio railroad from
about twenty-five miles south of Corinth, north to Columbus, Kentucky;
the Mississippi Central from Bolivar north to its junction with the
Mobile and Ohio; the Memphis and Charleston from Corinth east to Bear
Creek, and the Mississippi River from Cairo to Memphis.  My entire
command was no more than was necessary to hold these lines, and hardly
that if kept on the defensive.  By moving against the enemy and into his
unsubdued, or not yet captured, territory, driving their army before us,
these lines would nearly hold themselves; thus affording a large force
for field operations.  My moving force at that time was about 30,000
men, and I estimated the enemy confronting me, under Pemberton, at about
the same number.  General McPherson commanded my left wing and General
C. S. Hamilton the centre, while Sherman was at Memphis with the right
wing.  Pemberton was fortified at the Tallahatchie, but occupied Holly
Springs and Grand Junction on the Mississippi Central railroad.  On the
8th we occupied Grand Junction and La Grange, throwing a considerable
force seven or eight miles south, along the line of the railroad.  The
road from Bolivar forward was repaired and put in running order as the
troops advanced.

Up to this time it had been regarded as an axiom in war that large
bodies of troops must operate from a base of supplies which they always
covered and guarded in all forward movements.  There was delay therefore
in repairing the road back, and in gathering and forwarding supplies to
the front.

By my orders, and in accordance with previous instructions from
Washington, all the forage within reach was collected under the
supervision of the chief quartermaster and the provisions under the
chief commissary, receipts being given when there was any one to take
them; the supplies in any event to be accounted for as government
stores.  The stock was bountiful, but still it gave me no idea of the
possibility of supplying a moving column in an enemy's country from the
country itself.

It was at this point, probably, where the first idea of a "Freedman's
Bureau" took its origin.  Orders of the government prohibited the
expulsion of the <DW64>s from the protection of the army, when they came
in voluntarily.  Humanity forbade allowing them to starve.  With such an
army of them, of all ages and both sexes, as had congregated about Grand
Junction, amounting to many thousands, it was impossible to advance.
There was no special authority for feeding them unless they were
employed as teamsters, cooks and pioneers with the army; but only
able-bodied young men were suitable for such work.  This labor would
support but a very limited percentage of them.  The plantations were all
deserted; the cotton and corn were ripe: men, women and children above
ten years of age could be employed in saving these crops.  To do this
work with contrabands, or to have it done, organization under a
competent chief was necessary.  On inquiring for such a man Chaplain
Eaton, now and for many years the very able United States Commissioner
of Education, was suggested.  He proved as efficient in that field as he
has since done in his present one.  I gave him all the assistants and
guards he called for.  We together fixed the prices to be paid for the
<DW64> labor, whether rendered to the government or to individuals.  The
cotton was to be picked from abandoned plantations, the laborers to
receive the stipulated price (my recollection is twelve and a half cents
per pound for picking and ginning) from the quartermaster, he shipping
the cotton north to be sold for the benefit of the government. Citizens
remaining on their plantations were allowed the privilege of having
their crops saved by freedmen on the same terms.

At once the freedmen became self-sustaining.  The money was not paid to
them directly, but was expended judiciously and for their benefit.  They
gave me no trouble afterwards.

Later the freedmen were engaged in cutting wood along the Mississippi
River to supply the large number of steamers on that stream.  A good
price was paid for chopping wood used for the supply of government
steamers (steamers chartered and which the government had to supply with
fuel).  Those supplying their own fuel paid a much higher price.  In
this way a fund was created not only sufficient to feed and clothe all,
old and young, male and female, but to build them comfortable cabins,
hospitals for the sick, and to supply them with many comforts they had
never known before.

At this stage of the campaign against Vicksburg I was very much
disturbed by newspaper rumors that General McClernand was to have a
separate and independent command within mine, to operate against
Vicksburg by way of the Mississippi River.  Two commanders on the same
field are always one too many, and in this case I did not think the
general selected had either the experience or the qualifications to fit
him for so important a position.  I feared for the safety of the troops
intrusted to him, especially as he was to raise new levies, raw troops,
to execute so important a trust.  But on the 12th I received a dispatch
from General Halleck saying that I had command of all the troops sent to
my department and authorizing me to fight the enemy where I pleased.
The next day my cavalry was in Holly Springs, and the enemy fell back
south of the Tallahatchie.

Holly Springs I selected for my depot of supplies and munitions of war,
all of which at that time came by rail from Columbus, Kentucky, except
the few stores collected about La Grange and Grand Junction.  This was a
long line (increasing in length as we moved south) to maintain in an
enemy's country.  On the 15th of November, while I was still at Holly
Springs, I sent word to Sherman to meet me at Columbus.  We were but
forty-seven miles apart, yet the most expeditious way for us to meet was
for me to take the rail to Columbus and Sherman a steamer for the same
place.  At that meeting, besides talking over my general plans I gave
him his orders to join me with two divisions and to march them down the
Mississippi Central railroad if he could. Sherman, who was always
prompt, was up by the 29th to Cottage Hill, ten miles north of Oxford.
He brought three divisions with him, leaving a garrison of only four
regiments of infantry, a couple of pieces of artillery and a small
detachment of cavalry. Further reinforcements he knew were on their way
from the north to Memphis.  About this time General Halleck ordered
troops from Helena, Arkansas (territory west of the Mississippi was not
under my command then) to cut the road in Pemberton's rear.  The
expedition was under Generals Hovey and C. C. Washburn and was
successful so far as reaching the railroad was concerned, but the damage
done was very slight and was soon repaired.

The Tallahatchie, which confronted me, was very high, the railroad
bridge destroyed and Pemberton strongly fortified on the south side.  A
crossing would have been impossible in the presence of an enemy.  I sent
the cavalry higher up the stream and they secured a crossing.  This
caused the enemy to evacuate their position, which was possibly
accelerated by the expedition of Hovey and Washburn.  The enemy was
followed as far south as Oxford by the main body of troops, and some
seventeen miles farther by McPherson's command.  Here the pursuit was
halted to repair the railroad from the Tallahatchie northward, in order
to bring up supplies.  The piles on which the railroad bridge rested had
been left standing.  The work of constructing a roadway for the troops
was but a short matter, and, later, rails were laid for cars.

During the delay at Oxford in repairing railroads I learned that an
expedition down the Mississippi now was inevitable and, desiring to have
a competent commander in charge, I ordered Sherman on the 8th of
December back to Memphis to take charge. The following were his orders:

Headquarters 13th Army Corps, Department of the Tennessee. OXFORD,
MISSISSIPPI, December 8,1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Right Wing:

You will proceed, with as little delay as possible, to Memphis,
Tennessee, taking with you one division of your present command.  On
your arrival at Memphis you will assume command of all the troops there,
and that portion of General Curtis's forces at present east of the
Mississippi River, and organize them into brigades and divisions in your
own army.  As soon as possible move with them down the river to the
vicinity of Vicksburg, and with the co-operation of the gunboat fleet
under command of Flag-officer Porter proceed to the reduction of that
place in such a manner as circumstances, and your own judgment, may
dictate.

The amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc., necessary to
take, will be left entirely with yourself.  The Quartermaster at St.
Louis will be instructed to send you transportation for 30,000 men;
should you still find yourself deficient, your quartermaster will be
authorized to make up the deficiency from such transports as may come
into the port of Memphis.

On arriving in Memphis, put yourself in communication with Admiral
Porter, and arrange with him for his co-operation.

Inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you will
embark, and such plans as may then be matured.  I will hold the forces
here in readiness to co-operate with you in such manner as the movements
of the enemy may make necessary.

Leave the District of Memphis in the command of an efficient officer,
and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the siege guns, and
whatever cavalry may be there.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.


This idea had presented itself to my mind earlier, for on the 3d of
December I asked Halleck if it would not be well to hold the enemy south
of the Yallabusha and move a force from Helena and Memphis on Vicksburg.
On the 5th again I suggested, from Oxford, to Halleck that if the Helena
troops were at my command I though it would be possible to take them and
the Memphis forces south of the mouth of the Yazoo River, and thus
secure Vicksburg and the State of Mississippi.  Halleck on the same day,
the 5th of December, directed me not to attempt to hold the country
south of the Tallahatchie, but to collect 25,000 troops at Memphis by
the 20th for the Vicksburg expedition.  I sent Sherman with two
divisions at once, informed the general-in-chief of the fact, and asked
whether I should command the expedition down the river myself or send
Sherman.  I was authorized to do as I though best for the accomplishment
of the great object in view.  I sent Sherman and so informed General
Halleck.

As stated, my action in sending Sherman back was expedited by a desire
to get him in command of the forces separated from my direct
supervision.  I feared that delay might bring McClernand, who was his
senior and who had authority from the President and Secretary of War to
exercise that particular command,--and independently.  I doubted
McClernand's fitness; and I had good reason to believe that in
forestalling him I was by no means giving offence to those whose
authority to command was above both him and me.

Neither my orders to General Sherman, nor the correspondence between us
or between General Halleck and myself, contemplated at the time my going
further south than the Yallabusha. Pemberton's force in my front was the
main part of the garrison of Vicksburg, as the force with me was the
defence of the territory held by us in West Tennessee and Kentucky.  I
hoped to hold Pemberton in my front while Sherman should get in his rear
and into Vicksburg.  The further north the enemy could be held the
better.

It was understood, however, between General Sherman and myself that our
movements were to be co-operative; if Pemberton could not be held away
from Vicksburg I was to follow him; but at that time it was not expected
to abandon the railroad north of the Yallabusha.  With that point as a
secondary base of supplies, the possibility of moving down the Yazoo
until communications could be opened with the Mississippi was
contemplated.

It was my intention, and so understood by Sherman and his command, that
if the enemy should fall back I would follow him even to the gates of
Vicksburg.  I intended in such an event to hold the road to Grenada on
the Yallabusha and cut loose from there, expecting to establish a new
base of supplies on the Yazoo, or at Vicksburg itself, with Grenada to
fall back upon in case of failure.  It should be remembered that at the
time I speak of it had not been demonstrated that an army could operate
in an enemy's territory depending upon the country for supplies.  A halt
was called at Oxford with the advance seventeen miles south of there, to
bring up the road to the latter point and to bring supplies of food,
forage and munitions to the front.

On the 18th of December I received orders from Washington to divide my
command into four army corps, with General McClernand to command one of
them and to be assigned to that part of the army which was to operate
down the Mississippi.  This interfered with my plans, but probably
resulted in my ultimately taking the command in person.  McClernand was
at that time in Springfield, Illinois.  The order was obeyed without any
delay.  Dispatches were sent to him the same day in conformity.

On the 20th General Van Dorn appeared at Holly Springs, my secondary
base of supplies, captured the garrison of 1,500 men commanded by
Colonel Murphy, of the 8th Wisconsin regiment, and destroyed all our
munitions of war, food and forage.  The capture was a disgraceful one to
the officer commanding but not to the troops under him.  At the same
time Forrest got on our line of railroad between Jackson, Tennessee, and
Columbus, Kentucky, doing much damage to it.  This cut me off from all
communication with the north for more than a week, and it was more than
two weeks before rations or forage could be issued from stores obtained
in the regular way.  This demonstrated the impossibility of maintaining
so long a line of road over which to draw supplies for an army moving in
an enemy's country.  I determined, therefore, to abandon my campaign
into the interior with Columbus as a base, and returned to La Grange and
Grand Junction destroying the road to my front and repairing the road to
Memphis, making the Mississippi river the line over which to draw
supplies.  Pemberton was falling back at the same time.

The moment I received the news of Van Dorn's success I sent the cavalry
at the front back to drive him from the country.  He had start enough to
move north destroying the railroad in many places, and to attack several
small garrisons intrenched as guards to the railroad.  All these he
found warned of his coming and prepared to receive him.  Van Dorn did
not succeed in capturing a single garrison except the one at Holly
Springs, which was larger than all the others attacked by him put
together.  Murphy was also warned of Van Dorn's approach, but made no
preparations to meet him.  He did not even notify his command.

Colonel Murphy was the officer who, two months before, had evacuated
Iuka on the approach of the enemy.  General Rosecrans denounced him for
the act and desired to have him tried and punished.  I sustained the
colonel at the time because his command was a small one compared with
that of the enemy--not one-tenth as large--and I thought he had done
well to get away without falling into their hands.  His leaving large
stores to fall into Price's possession I looked upon as an oversight and
excused it on the ground of inexperience in military matters. He should,
however, have destroyed them.  This last surrender demonstrated to my
mind that Rosecrans' judgment of Murphy's conduct at Iuka was correct.
The surrender of Holly Springs was most reprehensible and showed either
the disloyalty of Colonel Murphy to the cause which he professed to
serve, or gross cowardice.

After the war was over I read from the diary of a lady who accompanied
General Pemberton in his retreat from the Tallahatchie, that the retreat
was almost a panic.  The roads were bad and it was difficult to move the
artillery and trains.  Why there should have been a panic I do not see.
No expedition had yet started down the Mississippi River.  Had I known
the demoralized condition of the enemy, or the fact that central
Mississippi abounded so in all army supplies, I would have been in
pursuit of Pemberton while his cavalry was destroying the roads in my
rear.

After sending cavalry to drive Van Dorn away, my next order was to
dispatch all the wagons we had, under proper escort, to collect and
bring in all supplies of forage and food from a region of fifteen miles
east and west of the road from our front back to Grand Junction, leaving
two months' supplies for the families of those whose stores were taken.
I was amazed at the quantity of supplies the country afforded.  It
showed that we could have subsisted off the country for two months
instead of two weeks without going beyond the limits designated.  This
taught me a lesson which was taken advantage of later in the campaign
when our army lived twenty days with the issue of only five days'
rations by the commissary.  Our loss of supplies was great at Holly
Springs, but it was more than compensated for by those taken from the
country and by the lesson taught.

The news of the capture of Holly Springs and the destruction of our
supplies caused much rejoicing among the people remaining in Oxford.
They came with broad smiles on their faces, indicating intense joy, to
ask what I was going to do now without anything for my soldiers to eat.
I told them that I was not disturbed; that I had already sent troops and
wagons to collect all the food and forage they could find for fifteen
miles on each side of the road.  Countenances soon changed, and so did
the inquiry.  The next was, "What are WE to do?"  My response was that
we had endeavored to feed ourselves from our own northern resources
while visiting them; but their friends in gray had been uncivil enough
to destroy what we had brought along, and it could not be expected that
men, with arms in their hands, would starve in the midst of plenty.  I
advised them to emigrate east, or west, fifteen miles and assist in
eating up what we left.



CHAPTER XXXI.

HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO HOLLY SPRINGS--GENERAL M'CLERNAND IN COMMAND
--ASSUMING COMMAND AT YOUNG'S POINT--OPERATIONS ABOVE VICKSBURG
--FORTIFICATIONS ABOUT VICKSBURG--THE CANAL--LAKE PROVIDENCE
--OPERATIONS AT YAZOO PASS.

This interruption in my communications north--I was really cut off from
communication with a great part of my own command during this time
--resulted in Sherman's moving from Memphis before McClernand could
arrive, for my dispatch of the 18th did not reach McClernand.  Pemberton
got back to Vicksburg before Sherman got there.  The rebel positions
were on a bluff on the Yazoo River, some miles above its mouth.  The
waters were high so that the bottoms were generally overflowed, leaving
only narrow causeways of dry land between points of debarkation and the
high bluffs.  These were fortified and defended at all points.  The
rebel position was impregnable against any force that could be brought
against its front.  Sherman could not use one-fourth of his force.  His
efforts to capture the city, or the high ground north of it, were
necessarily unavailing.

Sherman's attack was very unfortunate, but I had no opportunity of
communicating with him after the destruction of the road and telegraph
to my rear on the 20th.  He did not know but what I was in the rear of
the enemy and depending on him to open a new base of supplies for the
troops with me.  I had, before he started from Memphis, directed him to
take with him a few small steamers suitable for the navigation of the
Yazoo, not knowing but that I might want them to supply me after cutting
loose from my base at Grenada.

On the 23d I removed my headquarters back to Holly Springs.  The troops
were drawn back gradually, but without haste or confusion, finding
supplies abundant and no enemy following.  The road was not damaged
south of Holly Springs by Van Dorn, at least not to an extent to cause
any delay.  As I had resolved to move headquarters to Memphis, and to
repair the road to that point, I remained at Holly Springs until this
work was completed.

On the 10th of January, the work on the road from Holly Springs to Grand
Junction and thence to Memphis being completed, I moved my headquarters
to the latter place.  During the campaign here described, the losses
(mostly captures) were about equal, crediting the rebels with their
Holly Springs capture, which they could not hold.

When Sherman started on his expedition down the river he had 20,000 men,
taken from Memphis, and was reinforced by 12,000 more at Helena,
Arkansas.  The troops on the west bank of the river had previously been
assigned to my command.  McClernand having received the orders for his
assignment reached the mouth of the Yazoo on the 2d of January, and
immediately assumed command of all the troops with Sherman, being a part
of his own corps, the 13th, and all of Sherman's, the 15th.  Sherman,
and Admiral Porter with the fleet, had withdrawn from the Yazoo. After
consultation they decided that neither the army nor navy could render
service to the cause where they were, and learning that I had withdrawn
from the interior of Mississippi, they determined to return to the
Arkansas River and to attack Arkansas Post, about fifty miles up that
stream and garrisoned by about five or six thousand men.  Sherman had
learned of the existence of this force through a man who had been
captured by the enemy with a steamer loaded with ammunition and other
supplies intended for his command.  The man had made his escape.
McClernand approved this move reluctantly, as Sherman says.  No obstacle
was encountered until the gunboats and transports were within range of
the fort.  After three days' bombardment by the navy an assault was made
by the troops and marines, resulting in the capture of the place, and in
taking 5,000 prisoners and 17 guns.  I was at first disposed to
disapprove of this move as an unnecessary side movement having no
especial bearing upon the work before us; but when the result was
understood I regarded it as very important.  Five thousand Confederate
troops left in the rear might have caused us much trouble and loss of
property while navigating the Mississippi.

Immediately after the reduction of Arkansas Post and the capture of the
garrison, McClernand returned with his entire force to Napoleon, at the
mouth of the Arkansas River.  From here I received messages from both
Sherman and Admiral Porter, urging me to come and take command in
person, and expressing their distrust of McClernand's ability and
fitness for so important and intricate an expedition.

On the 17th I visited McClernand and his command at Napoleon. It was
here made evident to me that both the army and navy were so distrustful
of McClernand's fitness to command that, while they would do all they
could to insure success, this distrust was an element of weakness.  It
would have been criminal to send troops under these circumstances into
such danger.  By this time I had received authority to relieve
McClernand, or to assign any person else to the command of the river
expedition, or to assume command in person.  I felt great embarrassment
about McClernand.  He was the senior major-general after myself within
the department.  It would not do, with his rank and ambition, to assign
a junior over him.  Nothing was left, therefore, but to assume the
command myself.  I would have been glad to put Sherman in command, to
give him an opportunity to accomplish what he had failed in the December
before; but there seemed no other way out of the difficulty, for he was
junior to McClernand.  Sherman's failure needs no apology.

On the 20th I ordered General McClernand with the entire command, to
Young's Point and Milliken's Bend, while I returned to Memphis to make
all the necessary preparation for leaving the territory behind me
secure.  General Hurlbut with the 16th corps was left in command.  The
Memphis and Charleston railroad was held, while the Mississippi Central
was given up.  Columbus was the only point between Cairo and Memphis, on
the river, left with a garrison.  All the troops and guns from the posts
on the abandoned railroad and river were sent to the front.

On the 29th of January I arrived at Young's Point and assumed command
the following day.  General McClernand took exception in a most
characteristic way--for him.  His correspondence with me on the subject
was more in the nature of a reprimand than a protest. It was highly
insubordinate, but I overlooked it, as I believed, for the good of the
service.  General McClernand was a politician of very considerable
prominence in his State; he was a member of Congress when the secession
war broke out; he belonged to that political party which furnished all
the opposition there was to a vigorous prosecution of the war for saving
the Union; there was no delay in his declaring himself for the Union at
all hazards, and there was no uncertain sound in his declaration of
where he stood in the contest before the country.  He also gave up his
seat in Congress to take the field in defence of the principles he had
proclaimed.

The real work of the campaign and siege of Vicksburg now began.  The
problem was to secure a footing upon dry ground on the east side of the
river from which the troops could operate against Vicksburg.  The
Mississippi River, from Cairo south, runs through a rich alluvial valley
of many miles in width, bound on the east by land running from eighty up
to two or more hundred feet above the river.  On the west side the
highest land, except in a few places, is but little above the highest
water.  Through this valley the river meanders in the most tortuous way,
varying in direction to all points of the compass.  At places it runs to
the very foot of the bluffs. After leaving Memphis, there are no such
highlands coming to the water's edge on the east shore until Vicksburg
is reached.

The intervening land is cut up by bayous filled from the river in high
water--many of them navigable for steamers.  All of them would be,
except for overhanging trees, narrowness and tortuous course, making it
impossible to turn the bends with vessels of any considerable length.
Marching across this country in the face of an enemy was impossible;
navigating it proved equally impracticable.  The strategical way
according to the rule, therefore, would have been to go back to Memphis;
establish that as a base of supplies; fortify it so that the storehouses
could be held by a small garrison, and move from there along the line of
railroad, repairing as we advanced, to the Yallabusha, or to Jackson,
Mississippi.  At this time the North had become very much discouraged.
Many strong Union men believed that the war must prove a failure.  The
elections of 1862 had gone against the party which was for the
prosecution of the war to save the Union if it took the last man and the
last dollar.  Voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout the greater
part of the North, and the draft had been resorted to to fill up our
ranks.  It was my judgment at the time that to make a backward movement
as long as that from Vicksburg to Memphis, would be interpreted, by many
of those yet full of hope for the preservation of the Union, as a
defeat, and that the draft would be resisted, desertions ensue and the
power to capture and punish deserters lost. There was nothing left to be
done but to go FORWARD TO A DECISIVE VICTORY.  This was in my mind from
the moment I took command in person at Young's Point.

The winter of 1862-3 was a noted one for continuous high water in the
Mississippi and for heavy rains along the lower river. To get dry land,
or rather land above the water, to encamp the troops upon, took many
miles of river front.  We had to occupy the levees and the ground
immediately behind.  This was so limited that one corps, the 17th, under
General McPherson, was at Lake Providence, seventy miles above
Vicksburg.

It was in January the troops took their position opposite Vicksburg.
The water was very high and the rains were incessant.  There seemed no
possibility of a land movement before the end of March or later, and it
would not do to lie idle all this time.  The effect would be
demoralizing to the troops and injurious to their health.  Friends in
the North would have grown more and more discouraged, and enemies in the
same section more and more insolent in their gibes and denunciation of
the cause and those engaged in it.

I always admired the South, as bad as I thought their cause, for the
boldness with which they silenced all opposition and all croaking, by
press or by individuals, within their control.  War at all times,
whether a civil war between sections of a common country or between
nations, ought to be avoided, if possible with honor.  But, once entered
into, it is too much for human nature to tolerate an enemy within their
ranks to give aid and comfort to the armies of the opposing section or
nation.

Vicksburg, as stated before, is on the first high land coming to the
river's edge, below that on which Memphis stands.  The bluff, or high
land, follows the left bank of the Yazoo for some distance and continues
in a southerly direction to the Mississippi River, thence it runs along
the Mississippi to Warrenton, six miles below.  The Yazoo River leaves
the high land a short distance below Haines' Bluff and empties into the
Mississippi nine miles above Vicksburg.  Vicksburg is built on this high
land where the Mississippi washes the base of the hill.  Haines' Bluff,
eleven miles from Vicksburg, on the Yazoo River, was strongly fortified.
The whole distance from there to Vicksburg and thence to Warrenton was
also intrenched, with batteries at suitable distances and rifle-pits
connecting them.

From Young's Point the Mississippi turns in a north-easterly direction
to a point just above the city, when it again turns and runs
south-westerly, leaving vessels, which might attempt to run the blockade,
exposed to the fire of batteries six miles below the city before they
were in range of the upper batteries.  Since then the river has made a
cut-off, leaving what was the peninsula in front of the city, an island.
North of the Yazoo was all a marsh, heavily timbered, cut up with
bayous, and much overflowed.  A front attack was therefore impossible,
and was never contemplated; certainly not by me. The problem then
became, how to secure a landing on high ground east of the Mississippi
without an apparent retreat.  Then commenced a series of experiments to
consume time, and to divert the attention of the enemy, of my troops and
of the public generally.  I, myself, never felt great confidence that
any of the experiments resorted to would prove successful. Nevertheless
I was always prepared to take advantage of them in case they did.

In 1862 General Thomas Williams had come up from New Orleans and cut a
ditch ten or twelve feet wide and about as deep, straight across from
Young's Point to the river below.  The distance across was a little over
a mile.  It was Williams' expectation that when the river rose it would
cut a navigable channel through; but the canal started in an eddy from
both ends, and, of course, it only filled up with water on the rise
without doing any execution in the way of cutting.  Mr. Lincoln had
navigated the Mississippi in his younger days and understood well its
tendency to change its channel, in places, from time to time.  He set
much store accordingly by this canal.  General McClernand had been,
therefore, directed before I went to Young's Point to push the work of
widening and deepening this canal.  After my arrival the work was
diligently pushed with about 4,000 men--as many as could be used to
advantage--until interrupted by a sudden rise in the river that broke a
dam at the upper end, which had been put there to keep the water out
until the excavation was completed.  This was on the 8th of March.

Even if the canal had proven a success, so far as to be navigable for
steamers, it could not have been of much advantage to us.  It runs in a
direction almost perpendicular to the line of bluffs on the opposite
side, or east bank, of the river.  As soon as the enemy discovered what
we were doing he established a battery commanding the canal throughout
its length.  This battery soon drove out our dredges, two in number,
which were doing the work of thousands of men.  Had the canal been
completed it might have proven of some use in running transports
through, under the cover of night, to use below; but they would yet have
to run batteries, though for a much shorter distance.

While this work was progressing we were busy in other directions, trying
to find an available landing on high ground on the east bank of the
river, or to make water-ways to get below the city, avoiding the
batteries.

On the 30th of January, the day after my arrival at the front, I ordered
General McPherson, stationed with his corps at Lake Providence, to cut
the levee at that point.  If successful in opening a channel for
navigation by this route, it would carry us to the Mississippi River
through the mouth of the Red River, just above Port Hudson and four
hundred miles below Vicksburg by the river.

Lake Providence is a part of the old bed of the Mississippi, about a
mile from the present channel.  It is six miles long and has its outlet
through Bayou Baxter, Bayou Macon, and the Tensas, Washita and Red
Rivers.  The last three are navigable streams at all seasons.  Bayous
Baxter and Macon are narrow and tortuous, and the banks are covered with
dense forests overhanging the channel.  They were also filled with
fallen timber, the accumulation of years.  The land along the
Mississippi River, from Memphis down, is in all instances highest next
to the river, except where the river washes the bluffs which form the
boundary of the valley through which it winds.  Bayou Baxter, as it
reaches lower land, begins to spread out and disappears entirely in a
cypress swamp before it reaches the Macon.  There was about two feet of
water in this swamp at the time.  To get through it, even with vessels
of the lightest draft, it was necessary to clear off a belt of heavy
timber wide enough to make a passage way.  As the trees would have to be
cut close to the bottom--under water--it was an undertaking of great
magnitude.

On the 4th of February I visited General McPherson, and remained with
him several days.  The work had not progressed so far as to admit the
water from the river into the lake, but the troops had succeeded in
drawing a small steamer, of probably not over thirty tons' capacity,
from the river into the lake.  With this we were able to explore the
lake and bayou as far as cleared.  I saw then that there was scarcely a
chance of this ever becoming a practicable route for moving troops
through an enemy's country.  The distance from Lake Providence to the
point where vessels going by that route would enter the Mississippi
again, is about four hundred and seventy miles by the main river.  The
distance would probably be greater by the tortuous bayous through which
this new route would carry us.  The enemy held Port Hudson, below where
the Red River debouches, and all the Mississippi above to Vicksburg.
The Red River, Washita and Tensas were, as has been said, all navigable
streams, on which the enemy could throw small bodies of men to obstruct
our passage and pick off our troops with their sharpshooters.  I let the
work go on, believing employment was better than idleness for the men.
Then, too, it served as a cover for other efforts which gave a better
prospect of success.  This work was abandoned after the canal proved a
failure.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson of my staff was sent to Helena, Arkansas, to
examine and open a way through Moon Lake and the Yazoo Pass if possible.
Formerly there was a route by way of an inlet from the Mississippi River
into Moon Lake, a mile east of the river, thence east through Yazoo Pass
to Coldwater, along the latter to the Tallahatchie, which joins the
Yallabusha about two hundred and fifty miles below Moon Lake and forms
the Yazoo River.  These were formerly navigated by steamers trading with
the rich plantations along their banks; but the State of Mississippi had
built a strong levee across the inlet some years before, leaving the
only entrance for vessels into this rich region the one by way of the
mouth of the Yazoo several hundreds of miles below.

On the 2d of February this dam, or levee, was cut.  The river being high
the rush of water through the cut was so great that in a very short time
the entire obstruction was washed away. The bayous were soon filled and
much of the country was overflowed. This pass leaves the Mississippi
River but a few miles below Helena. On the 24th General Ross, with his
brigade of about 4,500 men on transports, moved into this new water-way.
The rebels had obstructed the navigation of Yazoo Pass and the Coldwater
by felling trees into them.  Much of the timber in this region being of
greater specific gravity than water, and being of great size, their
removal was a matter of great labor; but it was finally accomplished,
and on the 11th of March Ross found himself, accompanied by two gunboats
under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Watson Smith, confronting a
fortification at Greenwood, where the Tallahatchie and Yallabusha unite
and the Yazoo begins.  The bends of the rivers are such at this point as
to almost form an island, scarcely above water at that stage of the
river.  This island was fortified and manned.  It was named Fort
Pemberton after the commander at Vicksburg.  No land approach was
accessible.  The troops, therefore, could render no assistance towards
an assault further than to establish a battery on a little piece of
ground which was discovered above water.  The gunboats, however,
attacked on the 11th and again on the 13th of March.  Both efforts were
failures and were not renewed.  One gunboat was disabled and we lost six
men killed and twenty-five wounded. The loss of the enemy was less.

Fort Pemberton was so little above the water that it was thought that a
rise of two feet would drive the enemy out.  In hope of enlisting the
elements on our side, which had been so much against us up to this time,
a second cut was made in the Mississippi levee, this time directly
opposite Helena, or six miles above the former cut.  It did not
accomplish the desired result, and Ross, with his fleet, started back.
On the 22d he met Quinby with a brigade at Yazoo Pass.  Quinby was the
senior of Ross, and assumed command.  He was not satisfied with
returning to his former position without seeing for himself whether
anything could be accomplished.  Accordingly Fort Pemberton was
revisited by our troops; but an inspection was sufficient this time
without an attack.  Quinby, with his command, returned with but little
delay.  In the meantime I was much exercised for the safety of Ross, not
knowing that Quinby had been able to join him.  Reinforcements were of
no use in a country covered with water, as they would have to remain on
board of their transports.  Relief had to come from another quarter.  So
I determined to get into the Yazoo below Fort Pemberton.

Steel's Bayou empties into the Yazoo River between Haines' Bluff and its
mouth.  It is narrow, very tortuous, and fringed with a very heavy
growth of timber, but it is deep.  It approaches to within one mile of
the Mississippi at Eagle Bend, thirty miles above Young's Point.
Steel's Bayou connects with Black Bayou, Black Bayou with Deer Creek,
Deer Creek with Rolling Fork, Rolling Fork with the Big Sunflower River,
and the Big Sunflower with the Yazoo River about ten miles above Haines'
Bluff in a right line but probably twenty or twenty-five miles by the
winding of the river.  All these waterways are of about the same nature
so far as navigation is concerned, until the Sunflower is reached; this
affords free navigation.

Admiral Porter explored this waterway as far as Deer Creek on the 14th
of March, and reported it navigable.  On the next day he started with
five gunboats and four mortar-boats.  I went with him for some distance.
The heavy overhanging timber retarded progress very much, as did also
the short turns in so narrow a stream.  The gunboats, however, ploughed
their way through without other damage than to their appearance.  The
transports did not fare so well although they followed behind. The road
was somewhat cleared for them by the gunboats.  In the evening I
returned to headquarters to hurry up reinforcements. Sherman went in
person on the 16th, taking with him Stuart's division of the 15th corps.
They took large river transports to Eagle Bend on the Mississippi, where
they debarked and marched across to Steel's Bayou, where they
re-embarked on the transports.  The river steamers, with their tall
smokestacks and light guards extending out, were so much impeded that
the gunboats got far ahead.  Porter, with his fleet, got within a few
hundred yards of where the sailing would have been clear and free from
the obstructions caused by felling trees into the water, when he
encountered rebel sharp-shooters, and his progress was delayed by
obstructions in his front.  He could do nothing with gunboats against
sharpshooters.  The rebels, learning his route, had sent in about 4,000
men--many more than there were sailors in the fleet.

Sherman went back, at the request of the admiral, to clear out Black
Bayou and to hurry up reinforcements, which were far behind.  On the
night of the 19th he received notice from the admiral that he had been
attacked by sharp-shooters and was in imminent peril.  Sherman at once
returned through Black Bayou in a canoe, and passed on until he met a
steamer, with the last of the reinforcements he had, coming up.  They
tried to force their way through Black Bayou with their steamer, but,
finding it slow and tedious work, debarked and pushed forward on foot.
It was night when they landed, and intensely dark.  There was but a
narrow strip of land above water, and that was grown up with underbrush
or cane.  The troops lighted their way through this with candles carried
in their hands for a mile and a half, when they came to an open
plantation.  Here the troops rested until morning.  They made twenty-one
miles from this resting-place by noon the next day, and were in time to
rescue the fleet.  Porter had fully made up his mind to blow up the
gunboats rather than have them fall into the hands of the enemy.  More
welcome visitors he probably never met than the "boys in blue" on this
occasion.  The vessels were backed out and returned to their rendezvous
on the Mississippi; and thus ended in failure the fourth attempt to get
in rear of Vicksburg.



CHAPTER XXXII.

THE BAYOUS WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI--CRITICISMS OF THE  NORTHERN PRESS
--RUNNING THE BATTERIES--LOSS OF THE INDIANOLA--DISPOSITION OF THE
TROOPS.

The original canal scheme was also abandoned on the 27th of March.  The
effort to make a waterway through Lake Providence and the connecting
bayous was abandoned as wholly impracticable about the same time.

At Milliken's Bend, and also at Young's Point, bayous or channels start,
which connecting with other bayous passing Richmond, Louisiana, enter
the Mississippi at Carthage twenty-five or thirty miles above Grand
Gulf.  The Mississippi levee cuts the supply of water off from these
bayous or channels, but all the rainfall behind the levee, at these
points, is carried through these same channels to the river below.  In
case of a crevasse in this vicinity, the water escaping would find its
outlet through the same channels.  The dredges and laborers from the
canal having been driven out by overflow and the enemy's batteries, I
determined to open these other channels, if possible.  If successful the
effort would afford a route, away from the enemy's batteries, for our
transports.  There was a good road back of the levees, along these
bayous, to carry the troops, artillery and wagon trains over whenever
the water receded a little, and after a few days of dry weather.
Accordingly, with the abandonment of all the other plans for reaching a
base heretofore described, this new one was undertaken.

As early as the 4th of February I had written to Halleck about this
route, stating that I thought it much more practicable than the other
undertaking (the Lake Providence route), and that it would have been
accomplished with much less labor if commenced before the water had got
all over the country.

The upper end of these bayous being cut off from a water supply, further
than the rainfall back of the levees, was grown up with dense timber for
a distance of several miles from their source.  It was necessary,
therefore, to clear this out before letting in the water from the river.
This work was continued until the waters of the river began to recede
and the road to Richmond, Louisiana, emerged from the water.  One small
steamer and some barges were got through this channel, but no further
use could be made of it because of the fall in the river. Beyond this it
was no more successful than the other experiments with which the winter
was whiled away.  All these failures would have been very discouraging
if I had expected much from the efforts; but I had not.  From the first
the most I hoped to accomplish was the passage of transports, to be used
below Vicksburg, without exposure to the long line of batteries
defending that city.

This long, dreary and, for heavy and continuous rains and high water,
unprecedented winter was one of great hardship to all engaged about
Vicksburg.  The river was higher than its natural banks from December,
1862, to the following April.  The war had suspended peaceful pursuits
in the South, further than the production of army supplies, and in
consequence the levees were neglected and broken in many places and the
whole country was covered with water.  Troops could scarcely find dry
ground on which to pitch their tents.  Malarial fevers broke out among
the men.  Measles and small-pox also attacked them.  The hospital
arrangements and medical attendance were so perfect, however, that the
loss of life was much less than might have been expected.  Visitors to
the camps went home with dismal stories to relate; Northern papers came
back to the soldiers with these stories exaggerated.  Because I would
not divulge my ultimate plans to visitors, they pronounced me idle,
incompetent and unfit to command men in an emergency, and clamored for
my removal.  They were not to be satisfied, many of them, with my simple
removal, but named who my successor should be. McClernand, Fremont,
Hunter and McClellan were all mentioned in this connection.  I took no
steps to answer these complaints, but continued to do my duty, as I
understood it, to the best of my ability.  Every one has his
superstitions.  One of mine is that in positions of great responsibility
every one should do his duty to the best of his ability where assigned
by competent authority, without application or the use of influence to
change his position.  While at Cairo I had watched with very great
interest the operations of the Army of the Potomac, looking upon that as
the main field of the war.  I had no idea, myself, of ever having any
large command, nor did I suppose that I was equal to one; but I had the
vanity to think that as a cavalry officer I might succeed very well in
the command of a brigade. On one occasion, in talking about this to my
staff officers, all of whom were civilians without any military
education whatever, I said that I would give anything if I were
commanding a brigade of cavalry in the Army of the Potomac and I
believed I could do some good.  Captain Hillyer spoke up and suggested
that I make application to be transferred there to command the cavalry.
I then told him that I would cut my right arm off first, and mentioned
this superstition.

In time of war the President, being by the Constitution
Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, is responsible for the
selection of commanders.  He should not be embarrassed in making his
selections.  I having been selected, my responsibility ended with my
doing the best I knew how.  If I had sought the place, or obtained it
through personal or political influence, my belief is that I would have
feared to undertake any plan of my own conception, and would probably
have awaited direct orders from my distant superiors.  Persons obtaining
important commands by application or political influence are apt to keep
a written record of complaints and predictions of defeat, which are
shown in case of disaster.  Somebody must be responsible for their
failures.

With all the pressure brought to bear upon them, both President Lincoln
and General Halleck stood by me to the end of the campaign.  I had never
met Mr.  Lincoln, but his support was constant.

At last the waters began to recede; the roads crossing the peninsula
behind the levees of the bayous, were emerging from the waters; the
troops were all concentrated from distant points at Milliken's Bend
preparatory to a final move which was to crown the long, tedious and
discouraging labors with success.

I had had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land to a
point below Vicksburg from which to operate, subject only to the
possible but not expected success of some one of the expedients resorted
to for the purpose of giving us a different base.  This could not be
undertaken until the waters receded.  I did not therefore communicate
this plan, even to an officer of my staff, until it was necessary to
make preparations for the start.  My recollection is that Admiral Porter
was the first one to whom I mentioned it.  The co-operation of the navy
was absolutely essential to the success (even to the contemplation) of
such an enterprise.  I had no more authority to command Porter than he
had to command me.  It was necessary to have part of his fleet below
Vicksburg if the troops went there.  Steamers to use as ferries were
also essential.  The navy was the only escort and protection for these
steamers, all of which in getting below had to run about fourteen miles
of batteries. Porter fell into the plan at once, and suggested that he
had better superintend the preparation of the steamers selected to run
the batteries, as sailors would probably understand the work better than
soldiers.  I was glad to accept his proposition, not only because I
admitted his argument, but because it would enable me to keep from the
enemy a little longer our designs. Porter's fleet was on the east side
of the river above the mouth of the Yazoo, entirely concealed from the
enemy by the dense forests that intervened.  Even spies could not get
near him, on account of the undergrowth and overflowed lands.
Suspicions of some mysterious movements were aroused.  Our river guards
discovered one day a small skiff moving quietly and mysteriously up the
river near the east shore, from the direction of Vicksburg, towards the
fleet.  On overhauling the boat they found a small white flag, not much
larger than a handkerchief, set up in the stern, no doubt intended as a
flag of truce in case of discovery.  The boat, crew and passengers were
brought ashore to me.  The chief personage aboard proved to be Jacob
Thompson, Secretary of the Interior under the administration of
President Buchanan.  After a pleasant conversation of half an hour or
more I allowed the boat and crew, passengers and all, to return to
Vicksburg, without creating a suspicion that there was a doubt in my
mind as to the good faith of Mr. Thompson and his flag.

Admiral Porter proceeded with the preparation of the steamers for their
hazardous passage of the enemy's batteries.  The great essential was to
protect the boilers from the enemy's shot, and to conceal the fires
under the boilers from view.  This he accomplished by loading the
steamers, between the guards and boilers on the boiler deck up to the
deck above, with bales of hay and cotton, and the deck in front of the
boilers in the same way, adding sacks of grain.  The hay and grain would
be wanted below, and could not be transported in sufficient quantity by
the muddy roads over which we expected to march.

Before this I had been collecting, from St. Louis and Chicago, yawls and
barges to be used as ferries when we got below.  By the 16th of April
Porter was ready to start on his perilous trip.  The advance, flagship
Benton, Porter commanding, started at ten o'clock at night, followed at
intervals of a few minutes by the Lafayette with a captured steamer, the
Price, lashed to her side, the Louisville, Mound City, Pittsburgh and
Carondelet--all of these being naval vessels.  Next came the transports
--Forest Queen, Silver Wave and Henry Clay, each towing barges loaded
with coal to be used as fuel by the naval and transport steamers when
below the batteries.  The gunboat Tuscumbia brought up the rear.  Soon
after the start a battery between Vicksburg and Warrenton opened fire
across the intervening peninsula, followed by the upper batteries, and
then by batteries all along the line.  The gunboats ran up close under
the bluffs, delivering their fire in return at short distances, probably
without much effect.  They were under fire for more than two hours and
every vessel was struck many times, but with little damage to the
gunboats.  The transports did not fare so well.  The Henry Clay was
disabled and deserted by her crew. Soon after a shell burst in the
cotton packed about the boilers, set the vessel on fire and burned her
to the water's edge.  The burning mass, however, floated down to
Carthage before grounding, as did also one of the barges in tow.

The enemy were evidently expecting our fleet, for they were ready to
light up the river by means of bonfires on the east side and by firing
houses on the point of land opposite the city on the Louisiana side.
The sight was magnificent, but terrible.  I witnessed it from the deck
of a river transport, run out into the middle of the river and as low
down as it was prudent to go.  My mind was much relieved when I learned
that no one on the transports had been killed and but few, if any,
wounded.  During the running of the batteries men were stationed in the
holds of the transports to partially stop with cotton shot-holes that
might be made in the hulls.  All damage was afterwards soon repaired
under the direction of Admiral Porter.

The experiment of passing batteries had been tried before this, however,
during the war.  Admiral Farragut had run the batteries at Port Hudson
with the flagship Hartford and one iron-clad and visited me from below
Vicksburg.  The 13th of February Admiral Porter had sent the gunboat
Indianola, Lieutenant-Commander George Brown commanding, below.  She met
Colonel Ellet of the Marine brigade below Natchez on a captured steamer.
Two of the Colonel's fleet had previously run the batteries, producing
the greatest consternation among the people along the Mississippi from
Vicksburg (*10) to the Red River.

The Indianola remained about the mouth of the Red River some days, and
then started up the Mississippi.  The Confederates soon raised the Queen
of the West, (*11) and repaired her.  With this vessel and the ram Webb,
which they had had for some time in the Red River, and two other
steamers, they followed the Indianola. The latter was encumbered with
barges of coal in tow, and consequently could make but little speed
against the rapid current of the Mississippi.  The Confederate fleet
overtook her just above Grand Gulf, and attacked her after dark on the
24th of February.  The Indianola was superior to all the others in
armament, and probably would have destroyed them or driven them away,
but for her encumbrance.  As it was she fought them for an hour and a
half, but, in the dark, was struck seven or eight times by the ram and
other vessels, and was finally disabled and reduced to a sinking
condition.  The armament was thrown overboard and the vessel run ashore.
Officers and crew then surrendered.

I had started McClernand with his corps of four divisions on the 29th of
March, by way of Richmond, Louisiana, to New Carthage, hoping that he
might capture Grand Gulf before the balance of the troops could get
there; but the roads were very bad, scarcely above water yet.  Some
miles from New Carthage the levee to Bayou Vidal was broken in several
places, overflowing the roads for the distance of two miles.  Boats were
collected from the surrounding bayous, and some constructed on the spot
from such material as could be collected, to transport the troops across
the overflowed interval.  By the 6th of April McClernand had reached New
Carthage with one division and its artillery, the latter ferried through
the woods by these boats.  On the 17th I visited New Carthage in person,
and saw that the process of getting troops through in the way we were
doing was so tedious that a better method must be devised.  The water
was falling, and in a few days there would not be depth enough to use
boats; nor would the land be dry enough to march over.  McClernand had
already found a new route from Smith's plantation where the crevasse
occurred, to Perkins' plantation, eight to twelve miles below New
Carthage.  This increased the march from Milliken's Bend from
twenty-seven to nearly forty miles.  Four bridges had to be built across
bayous, two of them each over six hundred feet long, making about two
thousand feet of bridging in all.  The river falling made the current in
these bayous very rapid, increasing the difficulty of building and
permanently fastening these bridges; but the ingenuity of the "Yankee
soldier" was equal to any emergency.  The bridges were soon built of
such material as could be found near by, and so substantial were they
that not a single mishap occurred in crossing all the army with
artillery, cavalry and wagon trains, except the loss of one siege gun
(a thirty-two pounder).  This, if my memory serves me correctly, broke
through the only pontoon bridge we had in all our march across the
peninsula. These bridges were all built by McClernand's command, under
the supervision of Lieutenant Hains of the Engineer Corps.

I returned to Milliken's Bend on the 18th or 19th, and on the 20th
issued the following final order for the movement of troops:


HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, MILLIKEN'S BEND, LOUISIANA,
April 20, 1863.

Special Orders, No. 110. *         *         *         *         * *
* VIII.  The following orders are published for the information and
guidance of the "Army in the Field," in its present movement to obtain a
foothold on the east bank of the Mississippi River, from which Vicksburg
can be approached by practicable roads.

First.--The Thirteenth army corps, Major-General John A. McClernand
commanding, will constitute the right wing.

Second.--The Fifteenth army corps, Major-General W. T. Sherman
commanding, will constitute the left wing.

Third.--The Seventeenth army corps, Major-General James B. McPherson
commanding, will constitute the centre.

Fourth.--The order of march to New Carthage will be from right to left.

Fifth.--Reserves will be formed by divisions from each army corps; or,
an entire army corps will be held as a reserve, as necessity may
require.  When the reserve is formed by divisions, each division will
remain under the immediate command of its respective corps commander,
unless otherwise specially ordered for a particular emergency.

Sixth.--Troops will be required to bivouac, until proper facilities can
be afforded for the transportation of camp equipage.

Seventh.--In the present movement, one tent will be allowed to each
company for the protection of rations from rain; one wall tent for each
regimental headquarters; one wall tent for each brigade headquarters;
and one wall tent for each division headquarters; corps commanders
having the books and blanks of their respective commands to provide for,
are authorized to take such tents as are absolutely necessary, but not
to exceed the number allowed by General Orders No. 160, A. G. O., series
of 1862.

Eighth.--All the teams of the three army corps, under the immediate
charge of the quartermasters bearing them on their returns, will
constitute a train for carrying supplies and ordnance and the authorized
camp equipage of the army.

Ninth.--As fast as the Thirteenth army corps advances, the Seventeenth
army corps will take its place; and it, in turn, will be followed in
like manner by the Fifteenth army corps.

Tenth.--Two regiments from each army corps will be detailed by corps
commanders, to guard the lines from Richmond to New Carthage.

Eleventh.--General hospitals will be established by the medical director
between Duckport and Milliken's Bend.  All sick and disabled soldiers
will be left in these hospitals.  Surgeons in charge of hospitals will
report convalescents as fast as they become fit for duty.  Each corps
commander will detail an intelligent and good drill officer, to remain
behind and take charge of the convalescents of their respective corps;
officers so detailed will organize the men under their charge into
squads and companies, without regard to the regiments they belong to;
and in the absence of convalescent commissioned officers to command
them, will appoint non-commissioned officers or privates.  The force so
organized will constitute the guard of the line from Duckport to
Milliken's Bend.  They will furnish all the guards and details required
for general hospitals, and with the contrabands that may be about the
camps, will furnish all the details for loading and unloading boats.

Twelfth.--The movement of troops from Milliken's Bend to New Carthage
will be so conducted as to allow the transportation of ten days' supply
of rations, and one-half the allowance of ordnance, required by previous
orders.

Thirteenth.--Commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect all the
beef cattle, corn and other necessary supplies on the line of march; but
wanton destruction of property, taking of articles useless for military
purposes, insulting citizens, going into and searching houses without
proper orders from division commanders, are positively prohibited.  All
such irregularities must be summarily punished.

Fourteenth.--Brigadier-General J. C.  Sullivan is appointed to the
command of all the forces detailed for the protection of the line from
here to New Carthage.  His particular attention is called to General
Orders, No. 69, from Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, of date
March 20, 1863.

By order of MAJOR-GENERAL U. S.  GRANT.


McClernand was already below on the Mississippi.  Two of McPherson's
divisions were put upon the march immediately.  The third had not yet
arrived from Lake Providence; it was on its way to Milliken's Bend and
was to follow on arrival.

Sherman was to follow McPherson.  Two of his divisions were at Duckport
and Young's Point, and the third under Steele was under orders to return
from Greenville, Mississippi, where it had been sent to expel a rebel
battery that had been annoying our transports.

It had now become evident that the army could not be rationed by a wagon
train over the single narrow and almost impassable road between
Milliken's Bend and Perkins' plantation.  Accordingly six more steamers
were protected as before, to run the batteries, and were loaded with
supplies.  They took twelve barges in tow, loaded also with rations.  On
the night of the 22d of April they ran the batteries, five getting
through more or less disabled while one was sunk.  About half the barges
got through with their needed freight.

When it was first proposed to run the blockade at Vicksburg with river
steamers there were but two captains or masters who were willing to
accompany their vessels, and but one crew. Volunteers were called for
from the army, men who had had experience in any capacity in navigating
the western rivers. Captains, pilots, mates, engineers and deck-hands
enough presented themselves to take five times the number of vessels we
were moving through this dangerous ordeal.  Most of them were from
Logan's division, composed generally of men from the southern part of
Illinois and from Missouri.  All but two of the steamers were commanded
by volunteers from the army, and all but one so manned.  In this
instance, as in all others during the war, I found that volunteers could
be found in the ranks and among the commissioned officers to meet every
call for aid whether mechanical or professional.  Colonel W. S. Oliver
was master of transportation on this occasion by special detail.



CHAPTER XXXIII.

ATTACK ON GRAND GULF--OPERATIONS BELOW VICKSBURG.

On the 24th my headquarters were with the advance at Perkins'
plantation.  Reconnoissances were made in boats to ascertain whether
there was high land on the east shore of the river where we might land
above Grand Gulf.  There was none practicable. Accordingly the troops
were set in motion for Hard Times, twenty-two miles farther down the
river and nearly opposite Grand Gulf.  The loss of two steamers and six
barges reduced our transportation so that only 10,000 men could be moved
by water. Some of the steamers that had got below were injured in their
machinery, so that they were only useful as barges towed by those less
severely injured.  All the troops, therefore, except what could be
transported in one trip, had to march.  The road lay west of Lake St.
Joseph.  Three large bayous had to be crossed.  They were rapidly
bridged in the same manner as those previously encountered. (*12)

On the 27th McClernand's corps was all at Hard Times, and McPherson's
was following closely.  I had determined to make the attempt to effect a
landing on the east side of the river as soon as possible.  Accordingly,
on the morning of the 29th, McClernand was directed to embark all the
troops from his corps that our transports and barges could carry.  About
10,000 men were so embarked.  The plan was to have the navy silence the
guns at Grand Gulf, and to have as many men as possible ready to debark
in the shortest possible time under cover of the fire of the navy and
carry the works by storm.  The following order was issued:

PERKINS PLANTATION, LA., April 27,1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL J. A. MCCLERNAND, Commanding 13th A. C.

Commence immediately the embarkation of your corps, or so much of it as
there is transportation for.  Have put aboard the artillery and every
article authorized in orders limiting baggage, except the men, and hold
them in readiness, with their places assigned, to be moved at a moment's
warning.

All the troops you may have, except those ordered to remain behind, send
to a point nearly opposite Grand Gulf, where you see, by special orders
of this date, General McPherson is ordered to send one division.

The plan of the attack will be for the navy to attack and silence all
the batteries commanding the river.  Your corps will be on the river,
ready to run to and debark on the nearest eligible land below the
promontory first brought to view passing down the river.  Once on shore,
have each commander instructed beforehand to form his men the best the
ground will admit of, and take possession of the most commanding points,
but avoid separating your command so that it cannot support itself.  The
first object is to get a foothold where our troops can maintain
themselves until such time as preparations can be made and troops
collected for a forward movement.

Admiral Porter has proposed to place his boats in the position indicated
to you a few days ago, and to bring over with them such troops as may be
below the city after the guns of the enemy are silenced.

It may be that the enemy will occupy positions back from the city, out
of range of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable to run past Grand
Gulf and land at Rodney.  In case this should prove the plan, a signal
will be arranged and you duly informed, when the transports are to start
with this view.  Or, it may be expedient for the boats to run past, but
not the men.  In this case, then, the transports would have to be
brought back to where the men could land and move by forced marches to
below Grand Gulf, re-embark rapidly and proceed to the latter place.
There will be required, then, three signals; one, to indicate that the
transports can run down and debark the troops at Grand Gulf; one, that
the transports can run by without the troops; and the last, that the
transports can run by with the troops on board.

Should the men have to march, all baggage and artillery will be left to
run the blockade.

If not already directed, require your men to keep three days' rations in
their haversacks, not to be touched until a movement commences.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.


At 8 o'clock A.M., 29th, Porter made the attack with his entire strength
present, eight gunboats.  For nearly five and a half hours the attack
was kept up without silencing a single gun of the enemy.  All this time
McClernand's 10,000 men were huddled together on the transports in the
stream ready to attempt a landing if signalled.  I occupied a tug from
which I could see the effect of the battle on both sides, within range
of the enemy's guns; but a small tug, without armament, was not
calculated to attract the fire of batteries while they were being
assailed themselves.  About half-past one the fleet withdrew, seeing
their efforts were entirely unavailing.  The enemy ceased firing as soon
as we withdrew.  I immediately signalled the Admiral and went aboard his
ship.  The navy lost in this engagement eighteen killed and fifty-six
wounded.  A large proportion of these were of the crew of the flagship,
and most of those from a single shell which penetrated the ship's side
and exploded between decks where the men were working their guns.  The
sight of the mangled and dying men which met my eye as I boarded the
ship was sickening.

Grand Gulf is on a high bluff where the river runs at the very foot of
it.  It is as defensible upon its front as Vicksburg and, at that time,
would have been just as impossible to capture by a front attack.  I
therefore requested Porter to run the batteries with his fleet that
night, and to take charge of the transports, all of which would be
wanted below.

There is a long tongue of land from the Louisiana side extending towards
Grand Gulf, made by the river running nearly east from about three miles
above and nearly in the opposite direction from that point for about the
same distance below.  The land was so low and wet that it would not have
been practicable to march an army across but for a levee.  I had had
this explored before, as well as the east bank below to ascertain if
there was a possible point of debarkation north of Rodney.  It was found
that the top of the levee afforded a good road to march upon.

Porter, as was always the case with him, not only acquiesced in the
plan, but volunteered to use his entire fleet as transports.  I had
intended to make this request, but he anticipated me.  At dusk, when
concealed from the view of the enemy at Grand Gulf, McClernand landed
his command on the west bank.  The navy and transports ran the batteries
successfully. The troops marched across the point of land under cover of
night, unobserved.  By the time it was light the enemy saw our whole
fleet, ironclads, gunboats, river steamers and barges, quietly moving
down the river three miles below them, black, or rather blue, with
National troops.

When the troops debarked, the evening of the 29th, it was expected that
we would have to go to Rodney, about nine miles below, to find a
landing; but that night a <DW52> man came in who informed me that a
good landing would be found at Bruinsburg, a few miles above Rodney,
from which point there was a good road leading to Port Gibson some
twelve miles in the interior.  The information was found correct, and
our landing was effected without opposition.

Sherman had not left his position above Vicksburg yet.  On the morning
of the 27th I ordered him to create a diversion by moving his corps up
the Yazoo and threatening an attack on Haines' Bluff.

My object was to compel Pemberton to keep as much force about Vicksburg
as I could, until I could secure a good footing on high land east of the
river.  The move was eminently successful and, as we afterwards learned,
created great confusion about Vicksburg and doubts about our real
design.  Sherman moved the day of our attack on Grand Gulf, the 29th,
with ten regiments of his command and eight gunboats which Porter had
left above Vicksburg.

He debarked his troops and apparently made every preparation to attack
the enemy while the navy bombarded the main forts at Haines' Bluff.
This move was made without a single casualty in either branch of the
service.  On the first of May Sherman received orders from me (sent from
Hard Times the evening of the 29th of April) to withdraw from the front
of Haines' Bluff and follow McPherson with two divisions as fast as he
could.

I had established a depot of supplies at Perkins' plantation. Now that
all our gunboats were below Grand Gulf it was possible that the enemy
might fit out boats in the Big Black with improvised armament and
attempt to destroy these supplies. McPherson was at Hard Times with a
portion of his corps, and the depot was protected by a part of his
command.  The night of the 29th I directed him to arm one of the
transports with artillery and send it up to Perkins' plantation as a
guard; and also to have the siege guns we had brought along moved there
and put in position.

The embarkation below Grand Gulf took place at De Shroon's, Louisiana,
six miles above Bruinsburg, Mississippi.  Early on the morning of 30th
of April McClernand's corps and one division of McPherson's corps were
speedily landed.

When this was effected I felt a degree of relief scarcely ever equalled
since.  Vicksburg was not yet taken it is true, nor were its defenders
demoralized by any of our previous moves.  I was now in the enemy's
country, with a vast river and the stronghold of Vicksburg between me
and my base of supplies.  But I was on dry ground on the same side of
the river with the enemy.  All the campaigns, labors, hardships and
exposures from the month of December previous to this time that had been
made and endured, were for the accomplishment of this one object.

I had with me the 13th corps, General McClernand commanding, and two
brigades of Logan's division of the 17th corps, General McPherson
commanding--in all not more than twenty thousand men to commence the
campaign with.  These were soon reinforced by the remaining brigade of
Logan's division and Crocker's division of the 17th corps.  On the 7th
of May I was further reinforced by Sherman with two divisions of his,
the 15th corps.  My total force was then about thirty-three thousand
men.

The enemy occupied Grand Gulf, Haines' Bluff and Jackson with a force of
nearly sixty thousand men.  Jackson is fifty miles east of Vicksburg and
is connected with it by a railroad.  My first problem was to capture
Grand Gulf to use as a base.

Bruinsburg is two miles from high ground.  The bottom at that point is
higher than most of the low land in the valley of the Mississippi, and a
good road leads to the bluff.  It was natural to expect the garrison
from Grand Gulf to come out to meet us and prevent, if they could, our
reaching this solid base.  Bayou Pierre enters the Mississippi just
above Bruinsburg and, as it is a navigable stream and was high at the
time, in order to intercept us they had to go by Port Gibson, the
nearest point where there was a bridge to cross upon.  This more than
doubled the distance from Grand Gulf to the high land back of
Bruinsburg.  No time was to be lost in securing this foothold. Our
transportation was not sufficient to move all the army across the river
at one trip, or even two; but the landing of the 13th corps and one
division of the 17th was effected during the day, April 30th, and early
evening.  McClernand was advanced as soon as ammunition and two days'
rations (to last five) could be issued to his men.  The bluffs were
reached an hour before sunset and McClernand was pushed on, hoping to
reach Port Gibson and save the bridge spanning the Bayou Pierre before
the enemy could get there; for crossing a stream in the presence of an
enemy is always difficult.  Port Gibson, too, is the starting point of
roads to Grand Gulf, Vicksburg and Jackson.

McClernand's advance met the enemy about five miles west of Port Gibson
at Thompson's plantation.  There was some firing during the night, but
nothing rising to the dignity of a battle until daylight.  The enemy had
taken a strong natural position with most of the Grand Gulf garrison,
numbering about seven or eight thousand men, under General Bowen.  His
hope was to hold me in check until reinforcements under Loring could
reach him from Vicksburg; but Loring did not come in time to render much
assistance south of Port Gibson.  Two brigades of McPherson's corps
followed McClernand as fast as rations and ammunition could be issued,
and were ready to take position upon the battlefield whenever the 13th
corps could be got out of the way.

The country in this part of Mississippi stands on edge, as it were, the
roads running along the ridges except when they occasionally pass from
one ridge to another.  Where there are no clearings the sides of the
hills are covered with a very heavy growth of timber and with
undergrowth, and the ravines are filled with vines and canebrakes,
almost impenetrable.  This makes it easy for an inferior force to delay,
if not defeat, a far superior one.

Near the point selected by Bowen to defend, the road to Port Gibson
divides, taking two ridges which do not diverge more than a mile or two
at the widest point.  These roads unite just outside the town.  This
made it necessary for McClernand to divide his force.  It was not only
divided, but it was separated by a deep ravine of the character above
described.  One flank could not reinforce the other except by marching
back to the junction of the roads.  McClernand put the divisions of
Hovey, Carr and A. J. Smith upon the right-hand branch and Osterhaus on
the left.  I was on the field by ten A.M., and inspected both flanks in
person.  On the right the enemy, if not being pressed back, was at least
not repulsing our advance.  On the left, however, Osterhaus was not
faring so well.  He had been repulsed with some loss.  As soon as the
road could be cleared of McClernand's troops I ordered up McPherson, who
was close upon the rear of the 13th corps, with two brigades of Logan's
division.  This was about noon.  I ordered him to send one brigade
(General John E. Smith's was selected) to support Osterhaus, and to move
to the left and flank the enemy out of his position.  This movement
carried the brigade over a deep ravine to a third ridge and, when
Smith's troops were seen well through the ravine, Osterhaus was directed
to renew his front attack.  It was successful and unattended by heavy
loss.  The enemy was sent in full retreat on their right, and their left
followed before sunset.  While the movement to our left was going on,
McClernand, who was with his right flank, sent me frequent requests for
reinforcements, although the force with him was not being pressed.  I
had been upon the ground and knew it did not admit of his engaging all
the men he had.  We followed up our victory until night overtook us
about two miles from Port Gibson; then the troops went into bivouac for
the night.



CHAPTER XXXIV.

CAPTURE OF PORT GIBSON--GRIERSON'S RAID--OCCUPATION OF GRAND GULF
--MOVEMENT UP THE BIG BLACK--BATTLE OF RAYMOND.

We started next morning for Port Gibson as soon as it was light enough
to see the road.  We were soon in the town, and I was delighted to find
that the enemy had not stopped to contest our crossing further at the
bridge, which he had burned.  The troops were set to work at once to
construct a bridge across the South Fork of the Bayou Pierre.  At this
time the water was high and the current rapid.  What might be called a
raft-bridge was soon constructed from material obtained from wooden
buildings, stables, fences, etc., which sufficed for carrying the whole
army over safely.  Colonel J. H. Wilson, a member of my staff, planned
and superintended the construction of this bridge, going into the water
and working as hard as any one engaged.  Officers and men generally
joined in this work.  When it was finished the army crossed and marched
eight miles beyond to the North Fork that day.  One brigade of Logan's
division was sent down the stream to occupy the attention of a rebel
battery, which had been left behind with infantry supports to prevent
our repairing the burnt railroad bridge.  Two of his brigades were sent
up the bayou to find a crossing and reach the North Fork to repair the
bridge there.  The enemy soon left when he found we were building a
bridge elsewhere.  Before leaving Port Gibson we were reinforced by
Crocker's division, McPherson's corps, which had crossed the Mississippi
at Bruinsburg and come up without stopping except to get two days'
rations.  McPherson still had one division west of the Mississippi
River, guarding the road from Milliken's Bend to the river below until
Sherman's command should relieve it.

On leaving Bruinsburg for the front I left my son Frederick, who had
joined me a few weeks before, on board one of the gunboats asleep, and
hoped to get away without him until after Grand Gulf should fall into
our hands; but on waking up he learned that I had gone, and being guided
by the sound of the battle raging at Thompson's Hill--called the Battle
of Port Gibson--found his way to where I was.  He had no horse to ride
at the time, and I had no facilities for even preparing a meal.  He,
therefore, foraged around the best he could until we reached Grand Gulf.
Mr. C. A. Dana, then an officer of the War Department, accompanied me on
the Vicksburg campaign and through a portion of the siege.  He was in
the same situation as Fred so far as transportation and mess
arrangements were concerned.  The first time I call to mind seeing
either of them, after the battle, they were mounted on two enormous
horses, grown white from age, each equipped with dilapidated saddles and
bridles.

Our trains arrived a few days later, after which we were all perfectly
equipped.

My son accompanied me throughout the campaign and siege, and caused no
anxiety either to me or to his mother, who was at home.  He looked out
for himself and was in every battle of the campaign.  His age, then not
quite thirteen, enabled him to take in all he saw, and to retain a
recollection of it that would not be possible in more mature years.

When the movement from Bruinsburg commenced we were without a wagon
train.  The train still west of the Mississippi was carried around with
proper escort, by a circuitous route from Milliken's Bend to Hard Times
seventy or more miles below, and did not get up for some days after the
battle of Port Gibson. My own horses, headquarters' transportation,
servants, mess chest, and everything except what I had on, was with this
train. General A. J. Smith happened to have an extra horse at Bruinsburg
which I borrowed, with a saddle-tree without upholstering further than
stirrups.  I had no other for nearly a week.

It was necessary to have transportation for ammunition. Provisions could
be taken from the country; but all the ammunition that can be carried on
the person is soon exhausted when there is much fighting.  I directed,
therefore, immediately on landing that all the vehicles and draft
animals, whether horses, mules, or oxen, in the vicinity should be
collected and loaded to their capacity with ammunition.  Quite a train
was collected during the 30th, and a motley train it was.  In it could
be found fine carriages, loaded nearly to the top with boxes of
cartridges that had been pitched in promiscuously, drawn by mules with
plough, harness, straw collars, rope-lines, etc.; long-coupled wagons,
with racks for carrying cotton bales, drawn by oxen, and everything that
could be found in the way of transportation on a plantation, either for
use or pleasure.  The making out of provision returns was stopped for
the time.  No formalities were to <DW44> our progress until a position
was secured when the time could be spared to observe them.

It was at Port Gibson I first heard through a Southern paper of the
complete success of Colonel Grierson, who was making a raid through
central Mississippi.  He had started from La Grange April 17th with
three regiments of about 1,700 men.  On the 21st he had detached Colonel
Hatch with one regiment to destroy the railroad between Columbus and
Macon and then return to La Grange.  Hatch had a sharp fight with the
enemy at Columbus and retreated along the railroad, destroying it at
Okalona and Tupelo, and arriving in La Grange April 26.  Grierson
continued his movement with about 1,000 men, breaking the Vicksburg and
Meridian railroad and the New Orleans and Jackson railroad, arriving at
Baton Rouge May 2d.  This raid was of great importance, for Grierson had
attracted the attention of the enemy from the main movement against
Vicksburg.

During the night of the 2d of May the bridge over the North Fork was
repaired, and the troops commenced crossing at five the next morning.
Before the leading brigade was over it was fired upon by the enemy from
a commanding position; but they were soon driven off.  It was evident
that the enemy was covering a retreat from Grand Gulf to Vicksburg.
Every commanding position from this (Grindstone) crossing to Hankinson's
ferry over the Big Black was occupied by the retreating foe to delay our
progress. McPherson, however, reached Hankinson's ferry before night,
seized the ferry boat, and sent a detachment of his command across and
several miles north on the road to Vicksburg.  When the junction of the
road going to Vicksburg with the road from Grand Gulf to Raymond and
Jackson was reached, Logan with his division was turned to the left
towards Grand Gulf.  I went with him a short distance from this
junction.  McPherson had encountered the largest force yet met since the
battle of Port Gibson and had a skirmish nearly approaching a battle;
but the road Logan had taken enabled him to come up on the enemy's right
flank, and they soon gave way.  McPherson was ordered to hold
Hankinson's ferry and the road back to Willow Springs with one division;
McClernand, who was now in the rear, was to join in this as well as to
guard the line back down the bayou.  I did not want to take the chances
of having an enemy lurking in our rear.

On the way from the junction to Grand Gulf, where the road comes into
the one from Vicksburg to the same place six or seven miles out, I
learned that the last of the enemy had retreated past that place on
their way to Vicksburg.  I left Logan to make the proper disposition of
his troops for the night, while I rode into the town with an escort of
about twenty cavalry.  Admiral Porter had already arrived with his
fleet.  The enemy had abandoned his heavy guns and evacuated the place.

When I reached Grand Gulf May 3d I had not been with my baggage since
the 27th of April and consequently had had no change of underclothing,
no meal except such as I could pick up sometimes at other headquarters,
and no tent to cover me.  The first thing I did was to get a bath,
borrow some fresh underclothing from one of the naval officers and
get a good meal on the flag-ship.  Then I wrote letters to the
general-in-chief informing him of our present position, dispatches to be
telegraphed from Cairo, orders to General Sullivan commanding above
Vicksburg, and gave orders to all my corps commanders.  About twelve
o'clock at night I was through my work and started for Hankinson's
ferry, arriving there before daylight.  While at Grand Gulf I heard from
Banks, who was on the Red River, and who said that he could not be at
Port Hudson before the 10th of May and then with only 15,000 men.  Up to
this time my intention had been to secure Grand Gulf, as a base of
supplies, detach McClernand's corps to Banks and co-operate with him in
the reduction of Port Hudson.

The news from Banks forced upon me a different plan of campaign from the
one intended.  To wait for his co-operation would have detained me at
least a month.  The reinforcements would not have reached ten thousand
men after deducting casualties and necessary river guards at all high
points close to the river for over three hundred miles.  The enemy would
have strengthened his position and been reinforced by more men than
Banks could have brought. I therefore determined to move independently
of Banks, cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in rear of
Vicksburg and invest or capture the city.

Grand Gulf was accordingly given up as a base and the authorities at
Washington were notified.  I knew well that Halleck's caution would lead
him to disapprove of this course; but it was the only one that gave any
chance of success.  The time it would take to communicate with
Washington and get a reply would be so great that I could not be
interfered with until it was demonstrated whether my plan was
practicable.  Even Sherman, who afterwards ignored bases of supplies
other than what were afforded by the country while marching through four
States of the Confederacy with an army more than twice as large as mine
at this time, wrote me from Hankinson's ferry, advising me of the
impossibility of supplying our army over a single road.  He urged me to
"stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, and
then act as quick as possible; for this road will be jammed, as sure as
life."  To this I replied:  "I do not calculate upon the possibility of
supplying the army with full rations from Grand Gulf.  I know it will be
impossible without constructing additional roads.  What I do expect is
to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee and salt we can, and make
the country furnish the balance."  We started from Bruinsburg with an
average of about two days' rations, and received no more from our own
supplies for some days; abundance was found in the mean time.  A delay
would give the enemy time to reinforce and fortify.

McClernand's and McPherson's commands were kept substantially as they
were on the night of the 2d, awaiting supplies sufficient to give them
three days' rations in haversacks.  Beef, mutton, poultry and forage
were found in abundance.  Quite a quantity of bacon and molasses was
also secured from the country, but bread and coffee could not be
obtained in quantity sufficient for all the men.  Every plantation,
however, had a run of stone, propelled by mule power, to grind corn for
the owners and their slaves.  All these were kept running while we were
stopping, day and night, and when we were marching, during the night, at
all plantations covered by the troops.  But the product was taken by the
troops nearest by, so that the majority of the command was destined to
go without bread until a new base was established on the Yazoo above
Vicksburg.

While the troops were awaiting the arrival of rations I ordered
reconnoissances made by McClernand and McPherson, with the view of
leading the enemy to believe that we intended to cross the Big Black and
attack the city at once.

On the 6th Sherman arrived at Grand Gulf and crossed his command that
night and the next day.  Three days' rations had been brought up from
Grand Gulf for the advanced troops and were issued.  Orders were given
for a forward movement the next day.  Sherman was directed to order up
Blair, who had been left behind to guard the road from Milliken's Bend
to Hard Times with two brigades.

The quartermaster at Young's Point was ordered to send two hundred
wagons with Blair, and the commissary was to load them with hard bread,
coffee, sugar, salt and one hundred thousand pounds of salt meat.

On the 3d Hurlbut, who had been left at Memphis, was ordered to send
four regiments from his command to Milliken's Bend to relieve Blair's
division, and on the 5th he was ordered to send Lauman's division in
addition, the latter to join the army in the field.  The four regiments
were to be taken from troops near the river so that there would be no
delay.

During the night of the 6th McPherson drew in his troops north of the
Big Black and was off at an early hour on the road to Jackson, via Rocky
Springs, Utica and Raymond.  That night he and McClernand were both at
Rocky Springs ten miles from Hankinson's ferry.  McPherson remained
there during the 8th, while McClernand moved to Big Sandy and Sherman
marched from Grand Gulf to Hankinson's ferry.  The 9th, McPherson moved
to a point within a few miles west of Utica; McClernand and Sherman
remained where they were.  On the 10th McPherson moved to Utica, Sherman
to Big Sandy; McClernand was still at Big Sandy.  The 11th, McClernand
was at Five Mile Creek; Sherman at Auburn; McPherson five miles advanced
from Utica. May 12th, McClernand was at Fourteen Mile Creek; Sherman at
Fourteen Mile Creek; McPherson at Raymond after a battle.

After McPherson crossed the Big Black at Hankinson's ferry Vicksburg
could have been approached and besieged by the south side.  It is not
probable, however, that Pemberton would have permitted a close
besiegement.  The broken nature of the ground would have enabled him to
hold a strong defensible line from the river south of the city to the
Big Black, retaining possession of the railroad back to that point.  It
was my plan, therefore, to get to the railroad east of Vicksburg, and
approach from that direction.  Accordingly, McPherson's troops that had
crossed the Big Black were withdrawn and the movement east to Jackson
commenced.

As has been stated before, the country is very much broken and the roads
generally confined to the tops of the hills.  The troops were moved one
(sometimes two) corps at a time to reach designated points out parallel
to the railroad and only from six to ten miles from it.  McClernand's
corps was kept with its left flank on the Big Black guarding all the
crossings.  Fourteen Mile Creek, a stream substantially parallel with
the railroad, was reached and crossings effected by McClernand and
Sherman with slight loss.  McPherson was to the right of Sherman,
extending to Raymond.  The cavalry was used in this advance in
reconnoitring to find the roads:  to cover our advances and to find the
most practicable routes from one command to another so they could
support each other in case of an attack.  In making this move I
estimated Pemberton's movable force at Vicksburg at about eighteen
thousand men, with smaller forces at Haines' Bluff and Jackson.  It
would not be possible for Pemberton to attack me with all his troops at
one place, and I determined to throw my army between his and fight him
in detail.  This was done with success, but I found afterwards that I
had entirely under-estimated Pemberton's strength.

Up to this point our movements had been made without serious opposition.
My line was now nearly parallel with the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad
and about seven miles south of it.  The right was at Raymond eighteen
miles from Jackson, McPherson commanding; Sherman in the centre on
Fourteen Mile Creek, his advance thrown across; McClernand to the left,
also on Fourteen Mile Creek, advance across, and his pickets within two
miles of Edward's station, where the enemy had concentrated a
considerable force and where they undoubtedly expected us to attack.
McClernand's left was on the Big Black.  In all our moves, up to this
time, the left had hugged the Big Black closely, and all the ferries had
been guarded to prevent the enemy throwing a force on our rear.

McPherson encountered the enemy, five thousand strong with two batteries
under General Gregg, about two miles out of Raymond. This was about two
P.M.  Logan was in advance with one of his brigades.  He deployed and
moved up to engage the enemy. McPherson ordered the road in rear to be
cleared of wagons, and the balance of Logan's division, and Crocker's,
which was still farther in rear, to come forward with all dispatch.  The
order was obeyed with alacrity.  Logan got his division in position for
assault before Crocker could get up, and attacked with vigor, carrying
the enemy's position easily, sending Gregg flying from the field not to
appear against our front again until we met at Jackson.

In this battle McPherson lost 66 killed, 339 wounded, and 37 missing
--nearly or quite all from Logan's division.  The enemy's loss was 100
killed, 305 wounded, besides 415 taken prisoners.

I regarded Logan and Crocker as being as competent division commanders
as could be found in or out of the army and both equal to a much higher
command.  Crocker, however, was dying of consumption when he
volunteered.  His weak condition never put him on the sick report when
there was a battle in prospect, as long as he could keep on his feet.
He died not long after the close of the rebellion.



CHAPTER XXXV.

MOVEMENT AGAINST JACKSON--FALL OF JACKSON--INTERCEPTING THE ENEMY
--BATTLE OF CHAMPION'S HILL.

When the news reached me of McPherson's victory at Raymond about sundown
my position was with Sherman.  I decided at once to turn the whole
column towards Jackson and capture that place without delay.

Pemberton was now on my left, with, as I supposed, about 18,000 men; in
fact, as I learned afterwards, with nearly 50,000.  A force was also
collecting on my right, at Jackson, the point where all the railroads
communicating with Vicksburg connect. All the enemy's supplies of men
and stores would come by that point.  As I hoped in the end to besiege
Vicksburg I must first destroy all possibility of aid.  I therefore
determined to move swiftly towards Jackson, destroy or drive any force
in that direction and then turn upon Pemberton.  But by moving against
Jackson, I uncovered my own communication.  So I finally decided to have
none--to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole force
eastward.  I then had no fears for my communications, and if I moved
quickly enough could turn upon Pemberton before he could attack me in
the rear.

Accordingly, all previous orders given during the day for movements on
the 13th were annulled by new ones.  McPherson was ordered at daylight
to move on Clinton, ten miles from Jackson; Sherman was notified of my
determination to capture Jackson and work from there westward.  He was
ordered to start at four in the morning and march to Raymond.
McClernand was ordered to march with three divisions by Dillon's to
Raymond.  One was left to guard the crossing of the Big Black.

On the 10th I had received a letter from Banks, on the Red River, asking
reinforcements.  Porter had gone to his assistance with a part of his
fleet on the 3d, and I now wrote to him describing my position and
declining to send any troops.  I looked upon side movements as long as
the enemy held Port Hudson and Vicksburg as a waste of time and
material.

General Joseph E. Johnston arrived at Jackson in the night of the 13th
from Tennessee, and immediately assumed command of all the Confederate
troops in Mississippi.  I knew he was expecting reinforcements from the
south and east. On the 6th I had written to General Halleck:
"Information from the other side leaves me to believe the enemy are
bringing forces from Tullahoma."

Up to this time my troops had been kept in supporting distances of each
other, as far as the nature of the country would admit.  Reconnoissances
were constantly made from each corps to enable them to acquaint
themselves with the most practicable routes from one to another in case
a union became necessary.

McPherson reached Clinton with the advance early on the 13th and
immediately set to work destroying the railroad.  Sherman's advance
reached Raymond before the last of McPherson's command had got out of
the town.  McClernand withdrew from the front of the enemy, at Edward's
station, with much skill and without loss, and reached his position for
the night in good order.  On the night of the 13th, McPherson was
ordered to march at early dawn upon Jackson, only fifteen miles away.
Sherman was given the same order; but he was to move by the direct road
from Raymond to Jackson, which is south of the road McPherson was on and
does not approach within two miles of it at the point where it crossed
the line of intrenchments which, at that time, defended the city.
McClernand was ordered to move one division of his command to Clinton,
one division a few miles beyond Mississippi Springs following Sherman's
line, and a third to Raymond.  He was also directed to send his siege
guns, four in number with the troops going by Mississippi Springs.
McClernand's position was an advantageous one in any event. With one
division at Clinton he was in position to reinforce McPherson, at
Jackson, rapidly if it became necessary; the division beyond Mississippi
Springs was equally available to reinforce Sherman; the one at Raymond
could take either road. He still had two other divisions farther back
now that Blair had come up, available within a day at Jackson.  If this
last command should not be wanted at Jackson, they were already one
day's march from there on their way to Vicksburg and on three different
roads leading to the latter city.  But the most important consideration
in my mind was to have a force confronting Pemberton if he should come
out to attack my rear. This I expected him to do; as shown further on,
he was directed by Johnston to make this very move.

I notified General Halleck that I should attack the State capital on the
14th.  A courier carried the dispatch to Grand Gulf through an
unprotected country.

Sherman and McPherson communicated with each other during the night and
arranged to reach Jackson at about the same hour.  It rained in torrents
during the night of the 13th and the fore part of the day of the 14th.
The roads were intolerable, and in some places on Sherman's line, where
the land was low, they were covered more than a foot deep with water.
But the troops never murmured.  By nine o'clock Crocker, of McPherson's
corps, who was now in advance, came upon the enemy's pickets and
speedily drove them in upon the main body.  They were outside of the
intrenchments in a strong position, and proved to be the troops that had
been driven out of Raymond.  Johnston had been reinforced; during the
night by Georgia and South Carolina regiments, so that his force
amounted to eleven thousand men, and he was expecting still more.

Sherman also came upon the rebel pickets some distance out from the
town, but speedily drove them in.  He was now on the south and
south-west of Jackson confronting the Confederates behind their
breastworks, while McPherson's right was nearly two miles north,
occupying a line running north and south across the Vicksburg railroad.
Artillery was brought up and reconnoissances made preparatory to an
assault. McPherson brought up Logan's division while he deployed
Crocker's for the assault.  Sherman made similar dispositions on the
right.  By eleven A.M. both were ready to attack.  Crocker moved his
division forward, preceded by a strong skirmish line.  These troops at
once encountered the enemy's advance and drove it back on the main body,
when they returned to their proper regiment and the whole division
charged, routing the enemy completely and driving him into this main
line.  This stand by the enemy was made more than two miles outside of
his main fortifications. McPherson followed up with his command until
within range of the guns of the enemy from their intrenchments, when he
halted to bring his troops into line and reconnoitre to determine the
next move.  It was now about noon.

While this was going on Sherman was confronting a rebel battery which
enfiladed the road on which he was marching--the Mississippi Springs
road--and commanded a bridge spanning a stream over which he had to
pass.  By detaching right and left the stream was forced and the enemy
flanked and speedily driven within the main line.  This brought our
whole line in front of the enemy's line of works, which was continuous
on the north, west and south sides from the Pearl River north of the
city to the same river south.  I was with Sherman.  He was confronted by
a force sufficient to hold us back.  Appearances did not justify an
assault where we were.  I had directed Sherman to send a force to the
right, and to reconnoitre as far as to the Pearl River.  This force,
Tuttle's division, not returning I rode to the right with my staff, and
soon found that the enemy had left that part of the line.  Tuttle's
movement or McPherson's pressure had no doubt led Johnston to order a
retreat, leaving only the men at the guns to <DW44> us while he was
getting away.  Tuttle had seen this and, passing through the lines
without resistance, came up in the rear of the artillerists confronting
Sherman and captured them with ten pieces of artillery.  I rode
immediately to the State House, where I was soon followed by Sherman.
About the same time McPherson discovered that the enemy was leaving his
front, and advanced Crocker, who was so close upon the enemy that they
could not move their guns or destroy them.  He captured seven guns and,
moving on, hoisted the National flag over the rebel capital of
Mississippi.  Stevenson's brigade was sent to cut off the rebel retreat,
but was too late or not expeditious enough.

Our loss in this engagement was:  McPherson, 37 killed, 228 wounded;
Sherman, 4 killed and 21 wounded and missing.  The enemy lost 845
killed, wounded and captured.  Seventeen guns fell into our hands, and
the enemy destroyed by fire their store-houses, containing a large
amount of commissary stores.

On this day Blair reached New Auburn and joined McClernand's 4th
division.  He had with him two hundred wagons loaded with rations, the
only commissary supplies received during the entire campaign.

I slept that night in the room that Johnston was said to have occupied
the night before.

About four in the afternoon I sent for the corps commanders and directed
the dispositions to be made of their troops.  Sherman was to remain in
Jackson until he destroyed that place as a railroad centre, and
manufacturing city of military supplies. He did the work most
effectually.  Sherman and I went together into a manufactory which had
not ceased work on account of the battle nor for the entrance of Yankee
troops.  Our presence did not seem to attract the attention of either
the manager or the operatives, most of whom were girls.  We looked on
for a while to see the tent cloth which they were making roll out of the
looms, with "C. S. A."  woven in each bolt.  There was an immense amount
of cotton, in bales, stacked outside.  Finally I told Sherman I thought
they had done work enough.  The operatives were told they could leave
and take with them what cloth they could carry.  In a few minutes cotton
and factory were in a blaze. The proprietor visited Washington while I
was President to get his pay for this property, claiming that it was
private.  He asked me to give him a statement of the fact that his
property had been destroyed by National troops, so that he might use it
with Congress where he was pressing, or proposed to press, his claim.  I
declined.

On the night of the 13th Johnston sent the following dispatch to
Pemberton at Edward's station:  "I have lately arrived, and learn that
Major-General Sherman is between us with four divisions at Clinton.  It
is important to establish communication, that you may be reinforced.  If
practicable, come up in his rear at once.  To beat such a detachment
would be of immense value.  All the troops you can quickly assemble
should be brought.  Time is all-important."  This dispatch was sent in
triplicate, by different messengers.  One of the messengers happened to
be a loyal man who had been expelled from Memphis some months before by
Hurlbut for uttering disloyal and threatening sentiments. There was a
good deal of parade about his expulsion, ostensibly as a warning to
those who entertained the sentiments he expressed; but Hurlbut and the
expelled man understood each other.  He delivered his copy of Johnston's
dispatch to McPherson who forwarded it to me.

Receiving this dispatch on the 14th I ordered McPherson to move promptly
in the morning back to Bolton, the nearest point where Johnston could
reach the road.  Bolton is about twenty miles west of Jackson.  I also
informed McClernand of the capture of Jackson and sent him the following
order:  "It is evidently the design of the enemy to get north of us and
cross the Big Black, and beat us into Vicksburg.  We must not allow them
to do this.  Turn all your forces towards Bolton station, and make all
dispatch in getting there.  Move troops by the most direct road from
wherever they may be on the receipt of this order."

And to Blair I wrote:  "Their design is evidently to cross the Big Black
and pass down the peninsula between the Big Black and Yazoo rivers.  We
must beat them.  Turn your troops immediately to Bolton; take all the
trains with you.  Smith's division, and any other troops now with you,
will go to the same place.  If practicable, take parallel roads, so as
to divide your troops and train."

Johnston stopped on the Canton road only six miles north of Jackson, the
night of the 14th.  He sent from there to Pemberton dispatches
announcing the loss of Jackson, and the following order:

"As soon as the reinforcements are all up, they must be united to the
rest of the army.  I am anxious to see a force assembled that may be
able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy.  Can Grant supply himself
from the Mississippi?  Can you not cut him off from it, and above all,
should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him."

The concentration of my troops was easy, considering the character of
the country.  McPherson moved along the road parallel with and near the
railroad.  McClernand's command was, one division (Hovey's) on the road
McPherson had to take, but with a start of four miles.  One (Osterhaus)
was at Raymond, on a converging road that intersected the other near
Champion's Hill; one (Carr's) had to pass over the same road with
Osterhaus, but being back at Mississippi Springs, would not be detained
by it; the fourth (Smith's) with Blair's division, was near Auburn with
a different road to pass over.  McClernand faced about and moved
promptly.  His cavalry from Raymond seized Bolton by half-past nine in
the morning, driving out the enemy's pickets and capturing several men.

The night of the 15th Hovey was at Bolton; Carr and Osterhaus were about
three miles south, but abreast, facing west; Smith was north of Raymond
with Blair in his rear.

McPherson's command, with Logan in front, had marched at seven o'clock,
and by four reached Hovey and went into camp; Crocker bivouacked just in
Hovey's rear on the Clinton road.  Sherman with two divisions, was in
Jackson, completing the destruction of roads, bridges and military
factories.  I rode in person out to Clinton.  On my arrival I ordered
McClernand to move early in the morning on Edward's station, cautioning
him to watch for the enemy and not bring on an engagement unless he felt
very certain of success.

I naturally expected that Pemberton would endeavor to obey the orders of
his superior, which I have shown were to attack us at Clinton.  This,
indeed, I knew he could not do; but I felt sure he would make the
attempt to reach that point.  It turned out, however, that he had
decided his superior's plans were impracticable, and consequently
determined to move south from Edward's station and get between me and my
base.  I, however, had no base, having abandoned it more than a week
before.  On the 15th Pemberton had actually marched south from Edward's
station, but the rains had swollen Baker's Creek, which he had to cross
so much that he could not ford it, and the bridges were washed away.
This brought him back to the Jackson road, on which there was a good
bridge over Baker's Creek.  Some of his troops were marching until
midnight to get there.  Receiving here early on the 16th a repetition of
his order to join Johnston at Clinton, he concluded to obey, and sent a
dispatch to his chief, informing him of the route by which he might be
expected.

About five o'clock in the morning (16th) two men, who had been employed
on the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad, were brought to me.  They
reported that they had passed through Pemberton's army in the night, and
that it was still marching east. They reported him to have eighty
regiments of infantry and ten batteries; in all, about twenty-five
thousand men.

I had expected to leave Sherman at Jackson another day in order to
complete his work; but getting the above information I sent him orders
to move with all dispatch to Bolton, and to put one division with an
ammunition train on the road at once, with directions to its commander
to march with all possible speed until he came up to our rear.  Within
an hour after receiving this order Steele's division was on the road.
At the same time I dispatched to Blair, who was near Auburn, to move
with all speed to Edward's station.  McClernand was directed to embrace
Blair in his command for the present.  Blair's division was a part of
the 15th army corps (Sherman's); but as it was on its way to join its
corps, it naturally struck our left first, now that we had faced about
and were moving west. The 15th corps, when it got up, would be on our
extreme right.  McPherson was directed to get his trains out of the way
of the troops, and to follow Hovey's division as closely as possible.
McClernand had two roads about three miles apart, converging at Edward's
station, over which to march his troops.  Hovey's division of his corps
had the advance on a third road (the Clinton) still farther north.
McClernand was directed to move Blair's and A. J. Smith's divisions by
the southernmost of these roads, and Osterhaus and Carr by the middle
road.  Orders were to move cautiously with skirmishers to the front to
feel for the enemy.

Smith's division on the most southern road was the first to encounter
the enemy's pickets, who were speedily driven in. Osterhaus, on the
middle road, hearing the firing, pushed his skirmishers forward, found
the enemy's pickets and forced them back to the main line.  About the
same time Hovey encountered the enemy on the northern or direct wagon
road from Jackson to Vicksburg.  McPherson was hastening up to join
Hovey, but was embarrassed by Hovey's trains occupying the roads.  I was
still back at Clinton.  McPherson sent me word of the situation, and
expressed the wish that I was up.  By half-past seven I was on the road
and proceeded rapidly to the front, ordering all trains that were in
front of troops off the road.  When I arrived Hovey's skirmishing
amounted almost to a battle.

McClernand was in person on the middle road and had a shorter distance
to march to reach the enemy's position than McPherson.  I sent him word
by a staff officer to push forward and attack.  These orders were
repeated several times without apparently expediting McClernand's
advance.

Champion's Hill, where Pemberton had chosen his position to receive us,
whether taken by accident or design, was well selected.  It is one of
the highest points in that section, and commanded all the ground in
range.  On the east side of the ridge, which is quite precipitous, is a
ravine running first north, then westerly, terminating at Baker's Creek.
It was grown up thickly with large trees and undergrowth, making it
difficult to penetrate with troops, even when not defended.  The ridge
occupied by the enemy terminated abruptly where the ravine turns
westerly.  The left of the enemy occupied the north end of this ridge.
The Bolton and Edward's station wagon-road turns almost due south at
this point and ascends the ridge, which it follows for about a mile;
then turning west, descends by a gentle declivity to Baker's Creek,
nearly a mile away.  On the west side the <DW72> of the ridge is gradual
and is cultivated from near the summit to the creek.  There was, when we
were there, a narrow belt of timber near the summit west of the road.

From Raymond there is a direct road to Edward's station, some three
miles west of Champion's Hill.  There is one also to Bolton.  From this
latter road there is still another, leaving it about three and a half
miles before reaching Bolton and leads direct to the same station.  It
was along these two roads that three divisions of McClernand's corps,
and Blair of Sherman's, temporarily under McClernand, were moving.
Hovey of McClernand's command was with McPherson, farther north on the
road from Bolton direct to Edward's station.  The middle road comes into
the northern road at the point where the latter turns to the west and
descends to Baker's Creek; the southern road is still several miles
south and does not intersect the others until it reaches Edward's
station.  Pemberton's lines covered all these roads, and faced east.
Hovey's line, when it first drove in the enemy's pickets, was formed
parallel to that of the enemy and confronted his left.

By eleven o'clock the skirmishing had grown into a hard-contested
battle.  Hovey alone, before other troops could be got to assist him,
had captured a battery of the enemy.  But he was not able to hold his
position and had to abandon the artillery.  McPherson brought up his
troops as fast as possible, Logan in front, and posted them on the right
of Hovey and across the flank of the enemy.  Logan reinforced Hovey with
one brigade from his division; with his other two he moved farther west
to make room for Crocker, who was coming up as rapidly as the roads
would admit.  Hovey was still being heavily pressed, and was calling on
me for more reinforcements.  I ordered Crocker, who was now coming up,
to send one brigade from his division. McPherson ordered two batteries
to be stationed where they nearly enfiladed the enemy's line, and they
did good execution.

From Logan's position now a direct forward movement carried him over
open fields, in rear of the enemy and in a line parallel with them.  He
did make exactly this move, attacking, however, the enemy through the
belt of woods covering the west <DW72> of the hill for a short distance.
Up to this time I had kept my position near Hovey where we were the most
heavily pressed; but about noon I moved with a part of my staff by our
right around, until I came up with Logan himself.  I found him near the
road leading down to Baker's Creek.  He was actually in command of the
only road over which the enemy could retreat; Hovey, reinforced by two
brigades from McPherson's command, confronted the enemy's left; Crocker,
with two brigades, covered their left flank; McClernand two hours
before, had been within two miles and a half of their centre with two
divisions, and the two divisions, Blair's and A. J. Smith's, were
confronting the rebel right; Ransom, with a brigade of McArthur's
division of the 17th corps (McPherson's), had crossed the river at Grand
Gulf a few days before, and was coming up on their right flank.  Neither
Logan nor I knew that we had cut off the retreat of the enemy.  Just at
this juncture a messenger came from Hovey, asking for more
reinforcements.  There were none to spare.  I then gave an order to move
McPherson's command by the left flank around to Hovey. This uncovered
the rebel line of retreat, which was soon taken advantage of by the
enemy.

During all this time, Hovey, reinforced as he was by a brigade from
Logan and another from Crocker, and by Crocker gallantly coming up with
two other brigades on his right, had made several assaults, the last one
about the time the road was opened to the rear.  The enemy fled
precipitately.  This was between three and four o'clock.  I rode
forward, or rather back, to where the middle road intersects the north
road, and found the skirmishers of Carr's division just coming in.
Osterhaus was farther south and soon after came up with skirmishers
advanced in like manner.  Hovey's division, and McPherson's two
divisions with him, had marched and fought from early dawn, and were not
in the best condition to follow the retreating foe.  I sent orders to
Osterhaus to pursue the enemy, and to Carr, whom I saw personally, I
explained the situation and directed him to pursue vigorously as far as
the Big Black, and to cross it if he could; Osterhaus to follow him.
The pursuit was continued until after dark.

The battle of Champion's Hill lasted about four hours, hard fighting,
preceded by two or three hours of skirmishing, some of which almost rose
to the dignity of battle.  Every man of Hovey's division and of
McPherson's two divisions was engaged during the battle.  No other part
of my command was engaged at all, except that as described before.
Osterhaus's and A. J. Smith's divisions had encountered the rebel
advanced pickets as early as half-past seven.  Their positions were
admirable for advancing upon the enemy's line.  McClernand, with two
divisions, was within a few miles of the battle-field long before noon
and in easy hearing.  I sent him repeated orders by staff officers fully
competent to explain to him the situation.  These traversed the wood
separating us, without escort, and directed him to push forward; but he
did not come.  It is true, in front of McClernand there was a small
force of the enemy and posted in a good position behind a ravine
obstructing his advance; but if he had moved to the right by the road my
staff officers had followed the enemy must either have fallen back or
been cut off.  Instead of this he sent orders to Hovey, who belonged to
his corps, to join on to his right flank.  Hovey was bearing the brunt
of the battle at the time.  To obey the order he would have had to pull
out from the front of the enemy and march back as far as McClernand had
to advance to get into battle and substantially over the same ground.
Of course I did not permit Hovey to obey the order of his intermediate
superior.

We had in this battle about 15,000 men absolutely engaged.  This
excludes those that did not get up, all of McClernand's command except
Hovey.  Our loss was 410 killed, 1,844 wounded and 187 missing.  Hovey
alone lost 1,200 killed, wounded and missing--more than one-third of his
division.

Had McClernand come up with reasonable promptness, or had I known the
ground as I did afterwards, I cannot see how Pemberton could have
escaped with any organized force.  As it was he lost over three thousand
killed and wounded and about three thousand captured in battle and in
pursuit.  Loring's division, which was the right of Pemberton's line,
was cut off from the retreating army and never got back into Vicksburg.
Pemberton himself fell back that night to the Big Black River.  His
troops did not stop before midnight and many of them left before the
general retreat commenced, and no doubt a good part of them returned to
their homes.  Logan alone captured 1,300 prisoners and eleven guns.
Hovey captured 300 under fire and about 700 in all, exclusive of 500
sick and wounded whom he paroled, thus making 1,200.

McPherson joined in the advance as soon as his men could fill their
cartridge-boxes, leaving one brigade to guard our wounded.  The pursuit
was continued as long as it was light enough to see the road.  The night
of the 16th of May found McPherson's command bivouacked from two to six
miles west of the battlefield, along the line of the road to Vicksburg.
Carr and Osterhaus were at Edward's station, and Blair was about three
miles south-east; Hovey remained on the field where his troops had
fought so bravely and bled so freely.  Much war material abandoned by
the enemy was picked up on the battle-field, among it thirty pieces of
artillery.  I pushed through the advancing column with my staff and kept
in advance until after night. Finding ourselves alone we stopped and
took possession of a vacant house.  As no troops came up we moved back a
mile or more until we met the head of the column just going into bivouac
on the road.  We had no tents, so we occupied the porch of a house which
had been taken for a rebel hospital and which was filled with wounded
and dying who had been brought from the battle-field we had just left.

While a battle is raging one can see his enemy mowed down by the
thousand, or the ten thousand, with great composure; but after the
battle these scenes are distressing, and one is naturally disposed to do
as much to alleviate the suffering of an enemy as a friend.



CHAPTER XXXVI.

BATTLE OF BLACK RIVER BRIDGE--CROSSING THE BIG BLACK--INVESTMENT OF
VICKSBURG--ASSAULTING THE WORKS.

We were now assured of our position between Johnston and Pemberton,
without a possibility of a junction of their forces.  Pemberton might
have made a night march to the Big Black, crossed the bridge there and,
by moving north on the west side, have eluded us and finally returned to
Johnston.  But this would have given us Vicksburg.  It would have been
his proper move, however, and the one Johnston would have made had he
been in Pemberton's place.  In fact it would have been in conformity
with Johnston's orders to Pemberton.

Sherman left Jackson with the last of his troops about noon on the 16th
and reached Bolton, twenty miles west, before halting.  His rear guard
did not get in until two A.M. the 17th, but renewed their march by
daylight.  He paroled his prisoners at Jackson, and was forced to leave
his own wounded in care of surgeons and attendants.  At Bolton he was
informed of our victory.  He was directed to commence the march early
next day, and to diverge from the road he was on to Bridgeport on the
Big Black River, some eleven miles above the point where we expected to
find the enemy.  Blair was ordered to join him there with the pontoon
train as early as possible.

This movement brought Sherman's corps together, and at a point where I
hoped a crossing of the Big Black might be effected and Sherman's corps
used to flank the enemy out of his position in our front, thus opening a
crossing for the remainder of the army.  I informed him that I would
endeavor to hold the enemy in my front while he crossed the river.

The advance division, Carr's (McClernand's corps), resumed the pursuit
at half-past three A.M. on the 17th, followed closely by Osterhaus,
McPherson bringing up the rear with his corps.  As I expected, the enemy
was found in position on the Big Black.  The point was only six miles
from that where my advance had rested for the night, and was reached at
an early hour.  Here the river makes a turn to the west, and has washed
close up to the high land; the east side is a low bottom, sometimes
overflowed at very high water, but was cleared and in cultivation.  A
bayou runs irregularly across this low land, the bottom of which,
however, is above the surface of the Big Black at ordinary stages.  When
the river is full water runs through it, converting the point of land
into an island.  The bayou was grown up with timber, which the enemy had
felled into the ditch.  At this time there was a foot or two of water in
it. The rebels had constructed a parapet along the inner bank of this
bayou by using cotton bales from the plantation close by and throwing
dirt over them.  The whole was thoroughly commanded from the height west
of the river.  At the upper end of the bayou there was a strip of
uncleared land which afforded a cover for a portion of our men.  Carr's
division was deployed on our right, Lawler's brigade forming his extreme
right and reaching through these woods to the river above.  Osterhaus'
division was deployed to the left of Carr and covered the enemy's entire
front.  McPherson was in column on the road, the head close by, ready to
come in wherever he could be of assistance.

While the troops were standing as here described an officer from Banks'
staff came up and presented me with a letter from General Halleck, dated
the 11th of May.  It had been sent by the way of New Orleans to Banks to
be forwarded to me.  It ordered me to return to Grand Gulf and to
co-operate from there with Banks against Port Hudson, and then to return
with our combined forces to besiege Vicksburg.  I told the officer that
the order came too late, and that Halleck would not give it now if he
knew our position.  The bearer of the dispatch insisted that I ought to
obey the order, and was giving arguments to support his position when I
heard great cheering to the right of our line and, looking in that
direction, saw Lawler in his shirt sleeves leading a charge upon the
enemy.  I immediately mounted my horse and rode in the direction of the
charge, and saw no more of the officer who delivered the dispatch; I
think not even to this day.

The assault was successful.  But little resistance was made. The enemy
fled from the west bank of the river, burning the bridge behind him and
leaving the men and guns on the east side to fall into our hands.  Many
tried to escape by swimming the river. Some succeeded and some were
drowned in the attempt. Eighteen guns were captured and 1,751 prisoners.
Our loss was 39 killed, 237 wounded and 3 missing.  The enemy probably
lost but few men except those captured and drowned.  But for the
successful and complete destruction of the bridge, I have but little
doubt that we should have followed the enemy so closely as to prevent
his occupying his defences around Vicksburg.

As the bridge was destroyed and the river was high, new bridges had to
be built.  It was but little after nine o'clock A.M. when the capture
took place.  As soon as work could be commenced, orders were given for
the construction of three bridges.  One was taken charge of by
Lieutenant Hains, of the Engineer Corps, one by General McPherson
himself and one by General Ransom, a most gallant and intelligent
volunteer officer.  My recollection is that Hains built a raft bridge;
McPherson a pontoon, using cotton bales in large numbers, for pontoons;
and that Ransom felled trees on opposite banks of the river, cutting
only on one side of the tree, so that they would fall with their tops
interlacing in the river, without the trees being entirely severed from
their stumps.  A bridge was then made with these trees to support the
roadway.  Lumber was taken from buildings, cotton gins and wherever
found, for this purpose.  By eight o'clock in the morning of the 18th
all three bridges were complete and the troops were crossing.

Sherman reached Bridgeport about noon of the 17th and found Blair with
the pontoon train already there.  A few of the enemy were intrenched on
the west bank, but they made little resistance and soon surrendered.
Two divisions were crossed that night and the third the following
morning.

On the 18th I moved along the Vicksburg road in advance of the troops
and as soon as possible joined Sherman.  My first anxiety was to secure
a base of supplies on the Yazoo River above Vicksburg.  Sherman's line
of march led him to the very point on Walnut Hills occupied by the enemy
the December before when he was repulsed.  Sherman was equally anxious
with myself.  Our impatience led us to move in advance of the column and
well up with the advanced skirmishers.  There were some detached works
along the crest of the hill.  These were still occupied by the enemy, or
else the garrison from Haines' Bluff had not all got past on their way
to Vicksburg.  At all events the bullets of the enemy whistled by thick
and fast for a short time.  In a few minutes Sherman had the pleasure of
looking down from the spot coveted so much by him the December before on
the ground where his command had lain so helpless for offensive action.
He turned to me, saying that up to this minute he had felt no positive
assurance of success.  This, however, he said was the end of one of the
greatest campaigns in history and I ought to make a report of it at
once.  Vicksburg was not yet captured, and there was no telling what
might happen before it was taken; but whether captured or not, this was
a complete and successful campaign.  I do not claim to quote Sherman's
language; but the substance only.  My reason for mentioning this
incident will appear further on.

McPherson, after crossing the Big Black, came into the Jackson and
Vicksburg road which Sherman was on, but to his rear.  He arrived at
night near the lines of the enemy, and went into camp.  McClernand moved
by the direct road near the railroad to Mount Albans, and then turned to
the left and put his troops on the road from Baldwin's ferry to
Vicksburg.  This brought him south of McPherson.  I now had my three
corps up the works built for the defence of Vicksburg, on three roads
--one to the north, one to the east and one to the south-east of the city.
By the morning of the 19th the investment was as complete as my limited
number of troops would allow.  Sherman was on the right, and covered the
high ground from where it overlooked the Yazoo as far south-east as his
troops would extend.  McPherson joined on to his left, and occupied
ground on both sides of the Jackson road.  McClernand took up the ground
to his left and extended as far towards Warrenton as he could, keeping a
continuous line.

On the 19th there was constant skirmishing with the enemy while we were
getting into better position.  The enemy had been much demoralized by
his defeats at Champion's Hill and the Big Black, and I believed he
would not make much effort to hold Vicksburg. Accordingly, at two
o'clock I ordered an assault.  It resulted in securing more advanced
positions for all our troops where they were fully covered from the fire
of the enemy.

The 20th and 21st were spent in strengthening our position and in making
roads in rear of the army, from Yazoo River or Chickasaw Bayou.  Most of
the army had now been for three weeks with only five days' rations
issued by the commissary.  They had an abundance of food, however, but
began to feel the want of bread.  I remember that in passing around to
the left of the line on the 21st, a soldier, recognizing me, said in
rather a low voice, but yet so that I heard him, "Hard tack."  In a
moment the cry was taken up all along the line, "Hard tack! Hard tack!"
I told the men nearest to me that we had been engaged ever since the
arrival of the troops in building a road over which to supply them with
everything they needed.  The cry was instantly changed to cheers.  By
the night of the 21st all the troops had full rations issued to them.
The bread and coffee were highly appreciated.

I now determined on a second assault.  Johnston was in my rear, only
fifty miles away, with an army not much inferior in numbers to the one I
had with me, and I knew he was being reinforced. There was danger of his
coming to the assistance of Pemberton, and after all he might defeat my
anticipations of capturing the garrison if, indeed, he did not prevent
the capture of the city.  The immediate capture of Vicksburg would save
sending me the reinforcements which were so much wanted elsewhere, and
would set free the army under me to drive Johnston from the State.  But
the first consideration of all was--the troops believed they could carry
the works in their front, and would not have worked so patiently in the
trenches if they had not been allowed to try.

The attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at ten
o'clock A.M. on the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery in
position.  All the corps commanders set their time by mine so that all
might open the engagement at the same minute. The attack was gallant,
and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to the
very parapets of the enemy and in planting their battle flags upon them;
but at no place were we able to enter.  General McClernand reported that
he had gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, and wanted
reinforcements.  I occupied a position from which I believed I could see
as well as he what took place in his front, and I did not see the
success he reported.  But his request for reinforcements being repeated
I could not ignore it, and sent him Quinby's division of the 17th corps.
Sherman and McPherson were both ordered to renew their assaults as a
diversion in favor of McClernand.  This last attack only served to
increase our casualties without giving any benefit whatever.  As soon as
it was dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and been
obliged to remain there for security all day, were withdrawn; and thus
ended the last assault upon Vicksburg.



CHAPTER XXXVII

SIEGE OF VICKSBURG.

I now determined upon a regular siege--to "out-camp the enemy," as it
were, and to incur no more losses.  The experience of the 22d convinced
officers and men that this was best, and they went to work on the
defences and approaches with a will.  With the navy holding the river,
the investment of Vicksburg was complete.  As long as we could hold our
position the enemy was limited in supplies of food, men and munitions of
war to what they had on hand.  These could not last always.

The crossing of troops at Bruinsburg commenced April 30th.  On the 18th
of May the army was in rear of Vicksburg.  On the 19th, just twenty days
after the crossing, the city was completely invested and an assault had
been made:  five distinct battles (besides continuous skirmishing) had
been fought and won by the Union forces; the capital of the State had
fallen and its arsenals, military manufactories and everything useful
for military purposes had been destroyed; an average of about one
hundred and eighty miles had been marched by the troops engaged; but
five days' rations had been issued, and no forage; over six thousand
prisoners had been captured, and as many more of the enemy had been
killed or wounded; twenty-seven heavy cannon and sixty-one field-pieces
had fallen into our hands; and four hundred miles of the river, from
Vicksburg to Port Hudson, had become ours.  The Union force that had
crossed the Mississippi River up to this time was less than forty-three
thousand men. One division of these, Blair's, only arrived in time to
take part in the battle of Champion's Hill, but was not engaged there;
and one brigade, Ransom's of McPherson's corps, reached the field after
the battle.  The enemy had at Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Jackson, and on the
roads between these places, over sixty thousand men.  They were in their
own country, where no rear guards were necessary.  The country is
admirable for defence, but difficult for the conduct of an offensive
campaign.  All their troops had to be met.  We were fortunate, to say
the least, in meeting them in detail:  at Port Gibson seven or eight
thousand; at Raymond, five thousand; at Jackson, from eight to eleven
thousand; at Champion's Hill, twenty-five thousand; at the Big Black,
four thousand.  A part of those met at Jackson were all that was left of
those encountered at Raymond.  They were beaten in detail by a force
smaller than their own, upon their own ground.  Our loss up to this time
was:

                             KILLED  WOUNDED  MISSING

 Port Gibson.....              131     719      25
 South Fork Bayou Pierre.....   ..       1      ..
 Skirmishes, May 3 .....         1       9      ..
 Fourteen Mile Creek.....        6      24      ..
 Raymond...............         66     339      39
 Jackson.....                   42     251       7
 Champion's Hill.....          410   1,844     187
 Big Black.....                 39     237       3
 Bridgeport.....                ..       1      ..
 Total.....                    695   3,425     259


Of the wounded many were but slightly so, and continued on duty.  Not
half of them were disabled for any length of time.

After the unsuccessful assault of the 22d the work of the regular siege
began.  Sherman occupied the right starting from the river above
Vicksburg, McPherson the centre (McArthur's division now with him) and
McClernand the left, holding the road south to Warrenton.  Lauman's
division arrived at this time and was placed on the extreme left of the
line.

In the interval between the assaults of the 19th and 22d, roads had been
completed from the Yazoo River and Chickasaw Bayou, around the rear of
the army, to enable us to bring up supplies of food and ammunition;
ground had been selected and cleared on which the troops were to be
encamped, and tents and cooking utensils were brought up.  The troops
had been without these from the time of crossing the Mississippi up to
this time.  All was now ready for the pick and spade.  Prentiss and
Hurlbut were ordered to send forward every man that could be spared.
Cavalry especially was wanted to watch the fords along the Big Black,
and to observe Johnston.  I knew that Johnston was receiving
reinforcements from Bragg, who was confronting Rosecrans in Tennessee.
Vicksburg was so important to the enemy that I believed he would make
the most strenuous efforts to raise the siege, even at the risk of
losing ground elsewhere.

My line was more than fifteen miles long, extending from Haines' Bluff
to Vicksburg, thence to Warrenton.  The line of the enemy was about
seven.  In addition to this, having an enemy at Canton and Jackson, in
our rear, who was being constantly reinforced, we required a second line
of defence facing the other way.  I had not troops enough under my
command to man these.  General Halleck appreciated the situation and,
without being asked, forwarded reinforcements with all possible
dispatch.

The ground about Vicksburg is admirable for defence.  On the north it is
about two hundred feet above the Mississippi River at the highest point
and very much cut up by the washing rains; the ravines were grown up
with cane and underbrush, while the sides and tops were covered with a
dense forest.  Farther south the ground flattens out somewhat, and was
in cultivation.  But here, too, it was cut up by ravines and small
streams.  The enemy's line of defence followed the crest of a ridge from
the river north of the city eastward, then southerly around to the
Jackson road, full three miles back of the city; thence in a
southwesterly direction to the river.  Deep ravines of the description
given lay in front of these defences.  As there is a succession of
gullies, cut out by rains along the side of the ridge, the line was
necessarily very irregular.  To follow each of these spurs with
intrenchments, so as to command the <DW72>s on either side, would have
lengthened their line very much. Generally therefore, or in many places,
their line would run from near the head of one gully nearly straight to
the head of another, and an outer work triangular in shape, generally
open in the rear, was thrown up on the point; with a few men in this
outer work they commanded the approaches to the main line completely.

The work to be done, to make our position as strong against the enemy as
his was against us, was very great.  The problem was also complicated by
our wanting our line as near that of the enemy as possible.  We had but
four engineer officers with us. Captain Prime, of the Engineer Corps,
was the chief, and the work at the beginning was mainly directed by him.
His health soon gave out, when he was succeeded by Captain Comstock,
also of the Engineer Corps.  To provide assistants on such a long line I
directed that all officers who had graduated at West Point, where they
had necessarily to study military engineering, should in addition to
their other duties assist in the work.

The chief quartermaster and the chief commissary were graduates.  The
chief commissary, now the Commissary-General of the Army, begged off,
however, saying that there was nothing in engineering that he was good
for unless he would do for a sap-roller.  As soldiers require rations
while working in the ditches as well as when marching and fighting, and
as we would be sure to lose him if he was used as a sap-roller, I let
him off.  The general is a large man; weighs two hundred and twenty
pounds, and is not tall.

We had no siege guns except six thirty-two pounders, and there were none
at the West to draw from.  Admiral Porter, however, supplied us with a
battery of navy-guns of large calibre, and with these, and the field
artillery used in the campaign, the siege began.  The first thing to do
was to get the artillery in batteries where they would occupy commanding
positions; then establish the camps, under cover from the fire of the
enemy but as near up as possible; and then construct rifle-pits and
covered ways, to connect the entire command by the shortest route.  The
enemy did not harass us much while we were constructing our batteries.
Probably their artillery ammunition was short; and their infantry was
kept down by our sharpshooters, who were always on the alert and ready
to fire at a head whenever it showed itself above the rebel works.

In no place were our lines more than six hundred yards from the enemy.
It was necessary, therefore, to cover our men by something more than
the ordinary parapet.  To give additional protection sand bags,
bullet-proof, were placed along the tops of the parapets far enough
apart to make loop-holes for musketry.  On top of these, logs were put.
By these means the men were enabled to walk about erect when off duty,
without fear of annoyance from sharpshooters.  The enemy used in their
defence explosive musket-balls, no doubt thinking that, bursting over
our men in the trenches, they would do some execution; but I do not
remember a single case where a man was injured by a piece of one of
these shells. When they were hit and the ball exploded, the wound was
terrible.  In these cases a solid ball would have hit as well.  Their
use is barbarous, because they produce increased suffering without any
corresponding advantage to those using them.

The enemy could not resort to our method to protect their men, because
we had an inexhaustible supply of ammunition to draw upon and used it
freely.  Splinters from the timber would have made havoc among the men
behind.

There were no mortars with the besiegers, except what the navy had in
front of the city; but wooden ones were made by taking logs of the
toughest wood that could be found, boring them out for six or twelve
pound shells and binding them with strong iron bands.  These answered as
coehorns, and shells were successfully thrown from them into the
trenches of the enemy.

The labor of building the batteries and intrenching was largely done by
the pioneers, assisted by <DW64>s who came within our lines and who were
paid for their work; but details from the troops had often to be made.
The work was pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and when an advanced
position was secured and covered from the fire of the enemy the
batteries were advanced.  By the 30th of June there were two hundred and
twenty guns in position, mostly light field-pieces, besides a battery of
heavy guns belonging to, manned and commanded by the navy.  We were now
as strong for defence against the garrison of Vicksburg as they were
against us; but I knew that Johnston was in our rear, and was receiving
constant reinforcements from the east. He had at this time a larger
force than I had had at any time prior to the battle of Champion's Hill.

As soon as the news of the arrival of the Union army behind Vicksburg
reached the North, floods of visitors began to pour in.  Some came to
gratify curiosity; some to see sons or brothers who had passed through
the terrible ordeal; members of the Christian and Sanitary Associations
came to minister to the wants of the sick and the wounded.  Often those
coming to see a son or brother would bring a dozen or two of poultry.
They did not know how little the gift would be appreciated.  Many of the
soldiers had lived so much on chickens, ducks and turkeys without bread
during the march, that the sight of poultry, if they could get bacon,
almost took away their appetite.  But the intention was good.

Among the earliest arrivals was the Governor of Illinois, with most of
the State officers.  I naturally wanted to show them what there was of
most interest.  In Sherman's front the ground was the most broken and
most wooded, and more was to be seen without exposure.  I therefore took
them to Sherman's headquarters and presented them.  Before starting out
to look at the lines--possibly while Sherman's horse was being saddled
--there were many questions asked about the late campaign, about which
the North had been so imperfectly informed.  There was a little knot
around Sherman and another around me, and I heard Sherman repeating, in
the most animated manner, what he had said to me when we first looked
down from Walnut Hills upon the land below on the 18th of May, adding:
"Grant is entitled to every bit of the credit for the campaign; I
opposed it. I wrote him a letter about it."  But for this speech it is
not likely that Sherman's opposition would have ever been heard of.  His
untiring energy and great efficiency during the campaign entitle him to
a full share of all the credit due for its success.  He could not have
done more if the plan had been his own. (*13)

On the 26th of May I sent Blair's division up the Yazoo to drive out a
force of the enemy supposed to be between the Big Black and the Yazoo.
The country was rich and full of supplies of both food and forage.
Blair was instructed to take all of it.  The cattle were to be driven in
for the use of our army, and the food and forage to be consumed by our
troops or destroyed by fire; all bridges were to be destroyed, and the
roads rendered as nearly impassable as possible.  Blair went forty-five
miles and was gone almost a week.  His work was effectually done.  I
requested Porter at this time to send the marine brigade, a floating
nondescript force which had been assigned to his command and which
proved very useful, up to Haines' Bluff to hold it until reinforcements
could be sent.

On the 26th I also received a letter from Banks, asking me to reinforce
him with ten thousand men at Port Hudson.  Of course I could not comply
with his request, nor did I think he needed them.  He was in no danger
of an attack by the garrison in his front, and there was no army
organizing in his rear to raise the siege.

On the 3d of June a brigade from Hurlbut's command arrived, General
Kimball commanding.  It was sent to Mechanicsburg, some miles north-east
of Haines' Bluff and about midway between the Big Black and the Yazoo.
A brigade of Blair's division and twelve hundred cavalry had already, on
Blair's return from the Yazoo, been sent to the same place with
instructions to watch the crossings of the Big Black River, to destroy
the roads in his (Blair's) front, and to gather or destroy all supplies.

On the 7th of June our little force of  and white troops across
the Mississippi, at Milliken's Bend, were attacked by about 3,000 men
from Richard Taylor's trans-Mississippi command.  With the aid of the
gunboats they were speedily repelled.  I sent Mower's brigade over with
instructions to drive the enemy beyond the Tensas Bayou; and we had no
further trouble in that quarter during the siege.  This was the first
important engagement of the war in which <DW52> troops were under fire.
These men were very raw, having all been enlisted since the beginning of
the siege, but they behaved well.

On the 8th of June a full division arrived from Hurlbut's command, under
General Sooy Smith.  It was sent immediately to Haines' Bluff, and
General C. C. Washburn was assigned to the general command at that
point.

On the 11th a strong division arrived from the Department of the
Missouri under General Herron, which was placed on our left. This cut
off the last possible chance of communication between Pemberton and
Johnston, as it enabled Lauman to close up on McClernand's left while
Herron intrenched from Lauman to the water's edge.  At this point the
water recedes a few hundred yards from the high land.  Through this
opening no doubt the Confederate commanders had been able to get
messengers under cover of night.

On the 14th General Parke arrived with two divisions of Burnside's
corps, and was immediately dispatched to Haines' Bluff.  These latter
troops--Herron's and Parke's--were the reinforcements already spoken of
sent by Halleck in anticipation of their being needed.  They arrived
none too soon.

I now had about seventy-one thousand men.  More than half were disposed
across the peninsula, between the Yazoo at Haines' Bluff and the Big
Black, with the division of Osterhaus watching the crossings of the
latter river farther south and west from the crossing of the Jackson
road to Baldwin's ferry and below.

There were eight roads leading into Vicksburg, along which and their
immediate sides, our work was specially pushed and batteries advanced;
but no commanding point within range of the enemy was neglected.

On the 17th I received a letter from General Sherman and one on the 18th
from General McPherson, saying that their respective commands had
complained to them of a fulsome, congratulatory order published by
General McClernand to the 13th corps, which did great injustice to the
other troops engaged in the campaign.  This order had been sent North
and published, and now papers containing it had reached our camps.  The
order had not been heard of by me, and certainly not by troops outside
of McClernand's command until brought in this way.  I at once wrote to
McClernand, directing him to send me a copy of this order.  He did so,
and I at once relieved him from the command of the 13th army corps and
ordered him back to Springfield, Illinois.  The publication of his order
in the press was in violation of War Department orders and also of mine.



CHAPTER XXXVIII.

JOHNSTON'S MOVEMENTS--FORTIFICATIONS AT HAINES' BLUFF--EXPLOSION OF THE
MINE--EXPLOSION OF THE SECOND MINE--PREPARING FOR THE ASSAULT--THE FLAG
OF TRUCE--MEETING WITH PEMBERTON--NEGOTIATIONS FOR SURRENDER--ACCEPTING
THE TERMS--SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG.

On the 22d of June positive information was received that Johnston had
crossed the Big Black River for the purpose of attacking our rear, to
raise the siege and release Pemberton. The correspondence between
Johnston and Pemberton shows that all expectation of holding Vicksburg
had by this time passed from Johnston's mind.  I immediately ordered
Sherman to the command of all the forces from Haines' Bluff to the Big
Black River. This amounted now to quite half the troops about Vicksburg.
Besides these, Herron and A. J. Smith's divisions were ordered to hold
themselves in readiness to reinforce Sherman.  Haines' Bluff had been
strongly fortified on the land side, and on all commanding points from
there to the Big Black at the railroad crossing batteries had been
constructed.  The work of connecting by rifle-pits where this was not
already done, was an easy task for the troops that were to defend them.

We were now looking west, besieging Pemberton, while we were also
looking east to defend ourselves against an expected siege by Johnston.
But as against the garrison of Vicksburg we were as substantially
protected as they were against us.  Where we were looking east and north
we were strongly fortified, and on the defensive.  Johnston evidently
took in the situation and wisely, I think, abstained from making an
assault on us because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides
without accomplishing any result.  We were strong enough to have taken
the offensive against him; but I did not feel disposed to take any risk
of losing our hold upon Pemberton's army, while I would have rejoiced at
the opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by Johnston.

From the 23d of May the work of fortifying and pushing forward our
position nearer to the enemy had been steadily progressing.  At three
points on the Jackson road, in front of Leggett's brigade, a sap was run
up to the enemy's parapet, and by the 25th of June we had it undermined
and the mine charged. The enemy had countermined, but did not succeed in
reaching our mine.  At this particular point the hill on which the rebel
work stands rises abruptly.  Our sap ran close up to the outside of the
enemy's parapet.  In fact this parapet was also our protection.  The
soldiers of the two sides occasionally conversed pleasantly across this
barrier; sometimes they exchanged the hard bread of the Union soldiers
for the tobacco of the Confederates; at other times the enemy threw over
hand-grenades, and often our men, catching them in their hands, returned
them.

Our mine had been started some distance back down the hill; consequently
when it had extended as far as the parapet it was many feet below it.
This caused the failure of the enemy in his search to find and destroy
it.  On the 25th of June at three o'clock, all being ready, the mine was
exploded.  A heavy artillery fire all along the line had been ordered to
open with the explosion.  The effect was to blow the top of the hill off
and make a crater where it stood.  The breach was not sufficient to
enable us to pass a column of attack through.  In fact, the enemy having
failed to reach our mine had thrown up a line farther back, where most
of the men guarding that point were placed.  There were a few men,
however, left at the advance line, and others working in the
countermine, which was still being pushed to find ours.  All that were
there were thrown into the air, some of them coming down on our side,
still alive.  I remember one <DW52> man, who had been under ground at
work when the explosion took place, who was thrown to our side.  He was
not much hurt, but terribly frightened.  Some one asked him how high he
had gone up.  "Dun no, massa, but t'ink 'bout t'ree mile," was his
reply.  General Logan commanded at this point and took this <DW52> man
to his quarters, where he did service to the end of the siege.

As soon as the explosion took place the crater was seized by two
regiments of our troops who were near by, under cover, where they had
been placed for the express purpose.  The enemy made a desperate effort
to expel them, but failed, and soon retired behind the new line.  From
here, however, they threw hand-grenades, which did some execution.  The
compliment was returned by our men, but not with so much effect.  The
enemy could lay their grenades on the parapet, which alone divided the
contestants, and roll them down upon us; while from our side they had to
be thrown over the parapet, which was at considerable elevation.  During
the night we made efforts to secure our position in the crater against
the missiles of the enemy, so as to run trenches along the outer base of
their parapet, right and left; but the enemy continued throwing their
grenades, and brought boxes of field ammunition (shells), the fuses of
which they would light with portfires, and throw them by hand into our
ranks.  We found it impossible to continue this work.  Another mine was
consequently started which was exploded on the 1st of July, destroying
an entire rebel redan, killing and wounding a considerable number of its
occupants and leaving an immense chasm where it stood.  No attempt to
charge was made this time, the experience of the 25th admonishing us.
Our loss in the first affair was about thirty killed and wounded.  The
enemy must have lost more in the two explosions than we did in the
first.  We lost none in the second.

From this time forward the work of mining and pushing our position
nearer to the enemy was prosecuted with vigor, and I determined to
explode no more mines until we were ready to explode a number at
different points and assault immediately after.  We were up now at three
different points, one in front of each corps, to where only the parapet
of the enemy divided us.

At this time an intercepted dispatch from Johnston to Pemberton informed
me that Johnston intended to make a determined attack upon us in order
to relieve the garrison at Vicksburg.  I knew the garrison would make no
formidable effort to relieve itself.  The picket lines were so close to
each other--where there was space enough between the lines to post
pickets--that the men could converse.  On the 21st of June I was
informed, through this means, that Pemberton was preparing to escape, by
crossing to the Louisiana side under cover of night; that he had
employed workmen in making boats for that purpose; that the men had been
canvassed to ascertain if they would make an assault on the "Yankees" to
cut their way out; that they had refused, and almost mutinied, because
their commander would not surrender and relieve their sufferings, and
had only been pacified by the assurance that boats enough would be
finished in a week to carry them all over.  The rebel pickets also said
that houses in the city had been pulled down to get material to build
these boats with.  Afterwards this story was verified:  on entering the
city we found a large number of very rudely constructed boats.

All necessary steps were at once taken to render such an attempt
abortive.  Our pickets were doubled; Admiral Porter was notified, so
that the river might be more closely watched; material was collected on
the west bank of the river to be set on fire and light up the river if
the attempt was made; and batteries were established along the levee
crossing the peninsula on the Louisiana side.  Had the attempt been made
the garrison of Vicksburg would have been drowned, or made prisoners on
the Louisiana side.  General Richard Taylor was expected on the west
bank to co-operate in this movement, I believe, but he did not come, nor
could he have done so with a force sufficient to be of service.  The
Mississippi was now in our possession from its source to its mouth,
except in the immediate front of Vicksburg and of Port Hudson.  We had
nearly exhausted the country, along a line drawn from Lake Providence to
opposite Bruinsburg.  The roads west were not of a character to draw
supplies over for any considerable force.

By the 1st of July our approaches had reached the enemy's ditch at a
number of places.  At ten points we could move under cover to within
from five to one hundred yards of the enemy.  Orders were given to make
all preparations for assault on the 6th of July.  The debouches were
ordered widened to afford easy egress, while the approaches were also to
be widened to admit the troops to pass through four abreast.  Plank, and
bags filled with cotton packed in tightly, were ordered prepared, to
enable the troops to cross the ditches.

On the night of the 1st of July Johnston was between Brownsville and the
Big Black, and wrote Pemberton from there that about the 7th of the
month an attempt would be made to create a diversion to enable him to
cut his way out.  Pemberton was a prisoner before this message reached
him.

On July 1st Pemberton, seeing no hope of outside relief, addressed the
following letter to each of his four division commanders:

"Unless the siege of Vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown in, it
will become necessary very shortly to evacuate the place.  I see no
prospect of the former, and there are many great, if not insuperable
obstacles in the way of the latter. You are, therefore, requested to
inform me with as little delay as possible, as to the condition of your
troops and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigues
necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation."

Two of his generals suggested surrender, and the other two practically
did the same.  They expressed the opinion that an attempt to evacuate
would fail.  Pemberton had previously got a message to Johnston
suggesting that he should try to negotiate with me for a release of the
garrison with their arms.  Johnston replied that it would be a
confession of weakness for him to do so; but he authorized Pemberton to
use his name in making such an arrangement.

On the 3d about ten o'clock A.M. white flags appeared on a portion of
the rebel works.  Hostilities along that part of the line ceased at
once.  Soon two persons were seen coming towards our lines bearing a
white flag.  They proved to be General Bowen, a division commander, and
Colonel Montgomery, aide-de-camp to Pemberton, bearing the following
letter to me:

"I have the honor to propose an armistice for--hours, with the view to
arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg.  To this end, if
agreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners, to meet a like
number to be named by yourself at such place and hour to-day as you may
find convenient.  I make this proposition to save the further effusion
of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling
myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period.
This communication will be handed you under a flag of truce, by
Major-General John S. Bowen."

It was a glorious sight to officers and soldiers on the line where these
white flags were visible, and the news soon spread to all parts of the
command.  The troops felt that their long and weary marches, hard
fighting, ceaseless watching by night and day, in a hot climate,
exposure to all sorts of weather, to diseases and, worst of all, to the
gibes of many Northern papers that came to them saying all their
suffering was in vain, that Vicksburg would never be taken, were at last
at an end and the Union sure to be saved.

Bowen was received by General A. J. Smith, and asked to see me.  I had
been a neighbor of Bowen's in Missouri, and knew him well and favorably
before the war; but his request was refused.  He then suggested that I
should meet Pemberton.  To this I sent a verbal message saying that, if
Pemberton desired it, I would meet him in front of McPherson's corps at
three o'clock that afternoon.  I also sent the following written reply
to Pemberton's letter:

"Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice for
several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation
through commissioners, to be appointed, etc.  The useless effusion of
blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time you
may choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison.
Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in
Vicksburg, will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and I can
assure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war.
I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange
the terms of capitulation, because I have no terms other than those
indicated above."

At three o'clock Pemberton appeared at the point suggested in my verbal
message, accompanied by the same officers who had borne his letter of
the morning.  Generals Ord, McPherson, Logan and A. J. Smith, and
several officers of my staff, accompanied me. Our place of meeting was
on a hillside within a few hundred feet of the rebel lines.  Near by
stood a stunted oak-tree, which was made historical by the event.  It
was but a short time before the last vestige of its body, root and limb
had disappeared, the fragments taken as trophies.  Since then the same
tree has furnished as many cords of wood, in the shape of trophies, as
"The True Cross."

Pemberton and I had served in the same division during part of the
Mexican War.  I knew him very well therefore, and greeted him as an old
acquaintance.  He soon asked what terms I proposed to give his army if
it surrendered.  My answer was the same as proposed in my reply to his
letter.  Pemberton then said, rather snappishly, "The conference might
as well end," and turned abruptly as if to leave.  I said, "Very well."
General Bowen, I saw, was very anxious that the surrender should be
consummated. His manner and remarks while Pemberton and I were talking,
showed this.  He now proposed that he and one of our generals should
have a conference.  I had no objection to this, as nothing could be made
binding upon me that they might propose. Smith and Bowen accordingly had
a conference, during which Pemberton and I, moving a short distance away
towards the enemy's lines were in conversation.  After a while Bowen
suggested that the Confederate army should be allowed to march out with
the honors of war, carrying their small arms and field artillery.  This
was promptly and unceremoniously rejected.  The interview here ended, I
agreeing, however, to send a letter giving final terms by ten o'clock
that night.

Word was sent to Admiral Porter soon after the correspondence with
Pemberton commenced, so that hostilities might be stopped on the part of
both army and navy.  It was agreed on my paging with Pemberton that they
should not be renewed until our correspondence ceased.

When I returned to my headquarters I sent for all the corps and division
commanders with the army immediately confronting Vicksburg.  Half the
army was from eight to twelve miles off, waiting for Johnston.  I
informed them of the contents of Pemberton's letters, of my reply and
the substance of the interview, and that I was ready to hear any
suggestion; but would hold the power of deciding entirely in my own
hands.  This was the nearest approach to a "council of war" I ever held.
Against the general, and almost unanimous judgment of the council I sent
the following letter:

"In conformity with agreement of this afternoon, I will submit the
following proposition for the surrender of the City of Vicksburg, public
stores, etc.  On your accepting the terms proposed, I will march in one
division as a guard, and take possession at eight A.M. to-morrow.  As
soon as rolls can be made out, and paroles be signed by officers and
men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking
with them their side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff and cavalry
officers one horse each.  The rank and file will be allowed all their
clothing, but no other property.  If these conditions are accepted, any
amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores
you now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing
them.  Thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as one,
will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along.
The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and
soldiers as fast as they become able to travel.  The paroles for these
latter must be signed, however, whilst officers present are authorized
to sign the roll of prisoners."

By the terms of the cartel then in force, prisoners captured by either
army were required to be forwarded as soon as possible to either Aiken's
landing below Dutch Gap on the James River, or to Vicksburg, there to be
exchanged, or paroled until they could be exchanged.  There was a
Confederate commissioner at Vicksburg, authorized to make the exchange.
I did not propose to take him a prisoner, but to leave him free to
perform the functions of his office.  Had I insisted upon an
unconditional surrender there would have been over thirty thousand men
to transport to Cairo, very much to the inconvenience of the army on the
Mississippi.  Thence the prisoners would have had to be transported by
rail to Washington or Baltimore; thence again by steamer to Aiken's--all
at very great expense.  At Aiken's they would have had to be paroled,
because the Confederates did not have Union prisoners to give in
exchange.  Then again Pemberton's army was largely composed of men whose
homes were in the South-west; I knew many of them were tired of the war
and would get home just as soon as they could.  A large number of them
had voluntarily come into our lines during the siege, and requested to
be sent north where they could get employment until the war was over and
they could go to their homes.

Late at night I received the following reply to my last letter:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of
this date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post.
In the main your terms are accepted; but, in justice both to the honor
and spirit of my troops manifested in the defence of Vicksburg, I have
to submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will
perfect the agreement between us.  At ten o'clock A.M. to-morrow, I
propose to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg, and to surrender
the city and garrison under my command, by marching out with my colors
and arms, stacking them in front of my present lines.  After which you
will take possession.  Officers to retain their side-arms and personal
property, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected."

This was received after midnight.  My reply was as follows:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of 3d
July.  The amendment proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full.  It
will be necessary to furnish every officer and man with a parole signed
by himself, which, with the completion of the roll of prisoners, will
necessarily take some time.  Again, I can make no stipulations with
regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property.  While I
do not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannot
consent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. The
property which officers will be allowed to take with them will be as
stated in my proposition of last evening; that is, officers will be
allowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers one
horse each.  If you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march
to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at ten
o'clock A.M., and then return to the inside and there remain as
prisoners until properly paroled, I will make no objection to it.
Should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms by
nine o'clock A.M. I shall regard them as having been rejected, and shall
act accordingly.  Should these terms be accepted, white flags should be
displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have
been notified, from firing upon your men."

Pemberton promptly accepted these terms.

During the siege there had been a good deal of friendly sparring between
the soldiers of the two armies, on picket and where the lines were close
together.  All rebels were known as "Johnnies," all Union troops as
"Yanks."  Often "Johnny" would call:  "Well, Yank, when are you coming
into town?"  The reply was sometimes: "We propose to celebrate the 4th
of July there."  Sometimes it would be:  "We always treat our prisoners
with kindness and do not want to hurt them;" or, "We are holding you as
prisoners of war while you are feeding yourselves."  The garrison, from
the commanding general down, undoubtedly expected an assault on the
fourth.  They knew from the temper of their men it would be successful
when made; and that would be a greater humiliation than to surrender.
Besides it would be attended with severe loss to them.

The Vicksburg paper, which we received regularly through the courtesy of
the rebel pickets, said prior to the fourth, in speaking of the "Yankee"
boast that they would take dinner in Vicksburg that day, that the best
receipt for cooking a rabbit was "First ketch your rabbit."  The paper
at this time and for some time previous was printed on the plain side of
wall paper.  The last number was issued on the fourth and announced that
we had "caught our rabbit."

I have no doubt that Pemberton commenced his correspondence on the third
with a two-fold purpose:  first, to avoid an assault, which he knew
would be successful, and second, to prevent the capture taking place on
the great national holiday, the anniversary of the Declaration of
American Independence. Holding out for better terms as he did he
defeated his aim in the latter particular.

At the appointed hour the garrison of Vicksburg marched out of their
works and formed line in front, stacked arms and marched back in good
order.  Our whole army present witnessed this scene without cheering.
Logan's division, which had approached nearest the rebel works, was the
first to march in; and the flag of one of the regiments of his division
was soon floating over the court-house.  Our soldiers were no sooner
inside the lines than the two armies began to fraternize.  Our men had
had full rations from the time the siege commenced, to the close.  The
enemy had been suffering, particularly towards the last.  I myself saw
our men taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to the enemy
they had so recently been engaged in starving out.  It was accepted with
avidity and with thanks.

Pemberton says in his report:

"If it should be asked why the 4th of July was selected as the day for
surrender, the answer is obvious.  I believed that upon that day I
should obtain better terms.  Well aware of the vanity of our foe, I knew
they would attach vast importance to the entrance on the 4th of July
into the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify their
national vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted from
them at any other time."

This does not support my view of his reasons for selecting the day he
did for surrendering.  But it must be recollected that his first letter
asking terms was received about 10 o'clock A.M., July 3d.  It then could
hardly be expected that it would take twenty-four hours to effect a
surrender.  He knew that Johnston was in our rear for the purpose of
raising the siege, and he naturally would want to hold out as long as he
could.  He knew his men would not resist an assault, and one was
expected on the fourth.  In our interview he told me he had rations
enough to hold out for some time--my recollection is two weeks.  It was
this statement that induced me to insert in the terms that he was to
draw rations for his men from his own supplies.

On the 4th of July General Holmes, with an army of eight or nine
thousand men belonging to the trans-Mississippi department, made an
attack upon Helena, Arkansas.  He was totally defeated by General
Prentiss, who was holding Helena with less than forty-two hundred
soldiers.  Holmes reported his loss at 1,636, of which 173 were killed;
but as Prentiss buried 400, Holmes evidently understated his losses.
The Union loss was 57 killed, 127 wounded, and between 30 and 40
missing.  This was the last effort on the part of the Confederacy to
raise the siege of Vicksburg.

On the third, as soon as negotiations were commenced, I notified Sherman
and directed him to be ready to take the offensive against Johnston,
drive him out of the State and destroy his army if he could.  Steele and
Ord were directed at the same time to be in readiness to join Sherman as
soon as the surrender took place.  Of this Sherman was notified.

I rode into Vicksburg with the troops, and went to the river to exchange
congratulations with the navy upon our joint victory. At that time I
found that many of the citizens had been living under ground.  The
ridges upon which Vicksburg is built, and those back to the Big Black,
are composed of a deep yellow clay of great tenacity.  Where roads and
streets are cut through, perpendicular banks are left and stand as well
as if composed of stone.  The magazines of the enemy were made by
running passage-ways into this clay at places where there were deep
cuts.  Many citizens secured places of safety for their families by
carving out rooms in these embankments.  A door-way in these cases would
be cut in a high bank, starting from the level of the road or street,
and after running in a few feet a room of the size required was carved
out of the clay, the dirt being removed by the door-way.  In some
instances I saw where two rooms were cut out, for a single family, with
a door-way in the clay wall separating them.  Some of these were
carpeted and furnished with considerable elaboration.  In these the
occupants were fully secure from the shells of the navy, which were
dropped into the city night and dav without intermission.

I returned to my old headquarters outside in the afternoon, and did not
move into the town until the sixth.  On the afternoon of the fourth I
sent Captain Wm. M. Dunn of my staff to Cairo, the nearest point where
the telegraph could be reached, with a dispatch to the general-in-chief.
It was as follows:

"The enemy surrendered this morning.  The only terms allowed is their
parole as prisoners of war.  This I regard as a great advantage to us at
this moment.  It saves, probably, several days in the capture, and
leaves troops and transports ready for immediate service.  Sherman, with
a large force, moves immediately on Johnston, to drive him from the
State.  I will send troops to the relief of Banks, and return the 9th
army corps to Burnside."

This news, with the victory at Gettysburg won the same day, lifted a
great load of anxiety from the minds of the President, his Cabinet and
the loyal people all over the North.  The fate of the Confederacy was
sealed when Vicksburg fell.  Much hard fighting was to be done
afterwards and many precious lives were to be sacrificed; but the MORALE
was with the supporters of the Union ever after.

I at the same time wrote to General Banks informing him of the fall and
sending him a copy of the terms; also saying I would send him all the
troops he wanted to insure the capture of the only foothold the enemy
now had on the Mississippi River. General Banks had a number of copies
of this letter printed, or at least a synopsis of it, and very soon a
copy fell into the hands of General Gardner, who was then in command of
Port Hudson.  Gardner at once sent a letter to the commander of the
National forces saying that he had been informed of the surrender of
Vicksburg and telling how the information reached him.  He added that if
this was true, it was useless for him to hold out longer.  General Banks
gave him assurances that Vicksburg had been surrendered, and General
Gardner surrendered unconditionally on the 9th of July.  Port Hudson
with nearly 6,000 prisoners, 51 guns, 5,000 small-arms and other stores
fell into the hands of the Union forces:  from that day to the close of
the rebellion the Mississippi River, from its source to its mouth,
remained in the control of the National troops.

Pemberton and his army were kept in Vicksburg until the whole could be
paroled.  The paroles were in duplicate, by organization (one copy for
each, Federals and Confederates), and signed by the commanding officers
of the companies or regiments.  Duplicates were also made for each
soldier and signed by each individually, one to be retained by the
soldier signing and one to be retained by us.  Several hundred refused
to sign their paroles, preferring to be sent to the North as prisoners
to being sent back to fight again.  Others again kept out of the way,
hoping to escape either alternative.

Pemberton appealed to me in person to compel these men to sign their
paroles, but I declined.  It also leaked out that many of the men who
had signed their paroles, intended to desert and go to their homes as
soon as they got out of our lines.  Pemberton hearing this, again
appealed to me to assist him.  He wanted arms for a battalion, to act as
guards in keeping his men together while being marched to a camp of
instruction, where he expected to keep them until exchanged.  This
request was also declined.  It was precisely what I expected and hoped
that they would do.  I told him, however, that I would see that they
marched beyond our lines in good order.  By the eleventh, just one week
after the surrender, the paroles were completed and the Confederate
garrison marched out.  Many deserted, and fewer of them were ever
returned to the ranks to fight again than would have been the case had
the surrender been unconditional and the prisoners sent to the James
River to be paroled.

As soon as our troops took possession of the city guards were
established along the whole line of parapet, from the river above to the
river below.  The prisoners were allowed to occupy their old camps
behind the intrenchments.  No restraint was put upon them, except by
their own commanders.  They were rationed about as our own men, and from
our supplies.  The men of the two armies fraternized as if they had been
fighting for the same cause.  When they passed out of the works they had
so long and so gallantly defended, between lines of their late
antagonists, not a cheer went up, not a remark was made that would give
pain.  Really, I believe there was a feeling of sadness just then in the
breasts of most of the Union soldiers at seeing the dejection of their
late antagonists.

The day before the departure the following order was issued:

"Paroled prisoners will be sent out of here to-morrow.  They will be
authorized to cross at the railroad bridge, and move from there to
Edward's Ferry, (*14) and on by way of Raymond. Instruct the commands to
be orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass, to make no offensive
remarks, and not to harbor any who fall out of ranks after they have
passed."



CHAPTER XXXIX.

RETROSPECT OF THE CAMPAIGN--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS--PROPOSED MOVEMENT UPON
MOBILE--A PAINFUL ACCIDENT--ORDERED TO REPORT AT CAIRO.

The capture of Vicksburg, with its garrison, ordnance and ordnance
stores, and the successful battles fought in reaching them, gave new
spirit to the loyal people of the North.  New hopes for the final
success of the cause of the Union were inspired.  The victory gained at
Gettysburg, upon the same day, added to their hopes.  Now the
Mississippi River was entirely in the possession of the National troops;
for the fall of Vicksburg gave us Port Hudson at once.  The army of
northern Virginia was driven out of Pennsylvania and forced back to
about the same ground it occupied in 1861.  The Army of the Tennessee
united with the Army of the Gulf, dividing the Confederate States
completely.

The first dispatch I received from the government after the fall of
Vicksburg was in these words:

"I fear your paroling the prisoners at Vicksburg, without actual
delivery to a proper agent as required by the seventh article of the
cartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and that the men will
immediately be placed in the ranks of the enemy. Such has been the case
elsewhere.  If these prisoners have not been allowed to depart, you will
detain them until further orders."

Halleck did not know that they had already been delivered into the hands
of Major Watts, Confederate commissioner for the exchange of prisoners.

At Vicksburg 31,600 prisoners were surrendered, together with 172 cannon
about 60,000 muskets and a large amount of ammunition.  The small-arms
of the enemy were far superior to the bulk of ours.  Up to this time our
troops at the West had been limited to the old United States flint-lock
muskets changed into percussion, or the Belgian musket imported early in
the war--almost as dangerous to the person firing it as to the one aimed
at--and a few new and improved arms.  These were of many different
calibers, a fact that caused much trouble in distributing ammunition
during an engagement.  The enemy had generally new arms which had run
the blockade and were of uniform caliber.  After the surrender I
authorized all colonels whose regiments were armed with inferior
muskets, to place them in the stack of captured arms and replace them
with the latter.  A large number of arms turned in to the Ordnance
Department as captured, were thus arms that had really been used by the
Union army in the capture of Vicksburg.

In this narrative I have not made the mention I should like of officers,
dead and alive, whose services entitle them to special mention.  Neither
have I made that mention of the navy which its services deserve.
Suffice it to say, the close of the siege of Vicksburg found us with an
army unsurpassed, in proportion to its numbers, taken as a whole of
officers and men.  A military education was acquired which no other
school could have given. Men who thought a company was quite enough for
them to command properly at the beginning, would have made good
regimental or brigade commanders; most of the brigade commanders were
equal to the command of a division, and one, Ransom, would have been
equal to the command of a corps at least. Logan and Crocker ended the
campaign fitted to command independent armies.

General F. P. Blair joined me at Milliken's Bend a full-fledged general,
without having served in a lower grade.  He commanded a division in the
campaign.  I had known Blair in Missouri, where I had voted against him
in 1858 when he ran for Congress.  I knew him as a frank, positive and
generous man, true to his friends even to a fault, but always a leader.
I dreaded his coming; I knew from experience that it was more difficult
to command two generals desiring to be leaders than it was to command
one army officered intelligently and with subordination.  It affords me
the greatest pleasure to record now my agreeable disappointment in
respect to his character.  There was no man braver than he, nor was
there any who obeyed all orders of his superior in rank with more
unquestioning alacrity.  He was one man as a soldier, another as a
politician.

The navy under Porter was all it could be, during the entire campaign.
Without its assistance the campaign could not have been successfully
made with twice the number of men engaged.  It could not have been made
at all, in the way it was, with any number of men without such
assistance.  The most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms of
the service.  There never was a request made, that I am aware of, either
of the flag-officer or any of his subordinates, that was not promptly
complied with.

The campaign of Vicksburg was suggested and developed by circumstances.
The elections of 1862 had gone against the prosecution of the war.
Voluntary enlistments had nearly ceased and the draft had been resorted
to; this was resisted, and a defeat or backward movement would have made
its execution impossible.  A forward movement to a decisive victory was
necessary.  Accordingly I resolved to get below Vicksburg, unite with
Banks against Port Hudson, make New Orleans a base and, with that base
and Grand Gulf as a starting point, move our combined forces against
Vicksburg.  Upon reaching Grand Gulf, after running its batteries and
fighting a battle, I received a letter from Banks informing me that he
could not be at Port Hudson under ten days, and then with only fifteen
thousand men.  The time was worth more than the reinforcements; I
therefore determined to push into the interior of the enemy's country.

With a large river behind us, held above and below by the enemy, rapid
movements were essential to success.  Jackson was captured the day after
a new commander had arrived, and only a few days before large
reinforcements were expected.  A rapid movement west was made; the
garrison of Vicksburg was met in two engagements and badly defeated, and
driven back into its stronghold and there successfully besieged.  It
looks now as though Providence had directed the course of the campaign
while the Army of the Tennessee executed the decree.

Upon the surrender of the garrison of Vicksburg there were three things
that required immediate attention.  The first was to send a force to
drive the enemy from our rear, and out of the State.  The second was to
send reinforcements to Banks near Port Hudson, if necessary, to complete
the triumph of opening the Mississippi from its source to its mouth to
the free navigation of vessels bearing the Stars and Stripes.  The third
was to inform the authorities at Washington and the North of the good
news, to relieve their long suspense and strengthen their confidence in
the ultimate success of the cause they had so much at heart.

Soon after negotiations were opened with General Pemberton for the
surrender of the city, I notified Sherman, whose troops extended from
Haines' Bluff on the left to the crossing of the Vicksburg and Jackson
road over the Big Black on the right, and directed him to hold his
command in readiness to advance and drive the enemy from the State as
soon as Vicksburg surrendered.  Steele and Ord were directed to be in
readiness to join Sherman in his move against General Johnston, and
Sherman was advised of this also.  Sherman moved promptly, crossing the
Big Black at three different points with as many columns, all
concentrating at Bolton, twenty miles west of Jackson.

Johnston heard of the surrender of Vicksburg almost as soon as it
occurred, and immediately fell back on Jackson.  On the 8th of July
Sherman was within ten miles of Jackson and on the 11th was close up to
the defences of the city and shelling the town.  The siege was kept up
until the morning of the 17th, when it was found that the enemy had
evacuated during the night.  The weather was very hot, the roads dusty
and the water bad. Johnston destroyed the roads as he passed and had so
much the start that pursuit was useless; but Sherman sent one division,
Steele's, to Brandon, fourteen miles east of Jackson.

The National loss in the second capture of Jackson was less than one
thousand men, killed, wounded and missing.  The Confederate loss was
probably less, except in captured.  More than this number fell into our
hands as prisoners.

Medicines and food were left for the Confederate wounded and sick who
had to be left behind.  A large amount of rations was issued to the
families that remained in Jackson.  Medicine and food were also sent to
Raymond for the destitute families as well as the sick and wounded, as I
thought it only fair that we should return to these people some of the
articles we had taken while marching through the country.  I wrote to
Sherman: "Impress upon the men the importance of going through the State
in an orderly manner, abstaining from taking anything not absolutely
necessary for their subsistence while travelling. They should try to
create as favorable an impression as possible upon the people."
Provisions and forage, when called for by them, were issued to all the
people, from Bruinsburg to Jackson and back to Vicksburg, whose
resources had been taken for the supply of our army.  Very large
quantities of groceries and provisions were so issued.

Sherman was ordered back to Vicksburg, and his troops took much the same
position they had occupied before--from the Big Black to Haines' Bluff.
Having cleaned up about Vicksburg and captured or routed all regular
Confederate forces for more than a hundred miles in all directions, I
felt that the troops that had done so much should be allowed to do more
before the enemy could recover from the blow he had received, and while
important points might be captured without bloodshed.  I suggested to
the General-in-chief the idea of a campaign against Mobile, starting
from Lake Pontchartrain.  Halleck preferred another course.  The
possession of the trans-Mississippi by the Union forces seemed to
possess more importance in his mind than almost any campaign east of the
Mississippi.  I am well aware that the President was very anxious to
have a foothold in Texas, to stop the clamor of some of the foreign
governments which seemed to be seeking a pretext to interfere in the
war, at least so far as to recognize belligerent rights to the
Confederate States.  This, however, could have been easily done without
wasting troops in western Louisiana and eastern Texas, by sending a
garrison at once to Brownsville on the Rio Grande.

Halleck disapproved of my proposition to go against Mobile, so that I
was obliged to settle down and see myself put again on the defensive as
I had been a year before in west Tennessee.  It would have been an easy
thing to capture Mobile at the time I proposed to go there.  Having that
as a base of operations, troops could have been thrown into the interior
to operate against General Bragg's army.  This would necessarily have
compelled Bragg to detach in order to meet this fire in his rear.  If he
had not done this the troops from Mobile could have inflicted
inestimable damage upon much of the country from which his army and
Lee's were yet receiving their supplies.  I was so much impressed with
this idea that I renewed my request later in July and again about the
1st of August, and proposed sending all the troops necessary, asking
only the assistance of the navy to protect the debarkation of troops at
or near Mobile.  I also asked for a leave of absence to visit New
Orleans, particularly if my suggestion to move against Mobile should be
approved. Both requests were refused.  So far as my experience with
General Halleck went it was very much easier for him to refuse a favor
than to grant one.  But I did not regard this as a favor. It was simply
in line of duty, though out of my department.

The General-in-chief having decided against me, the depletion of an
army, which had won a succession of great victories, commenced, as had
been the case the year before after the fall of Corinth when the army
was sent where it would do the least good.  By orders, I sent to Banks a
force of 4,000 men; returned the 9th corps to Kentucky and, when
transportation had been collected, started a division of 5,000 men to
Schofield in Missouri where Price was raiding the State.  I also
detached a brigade under Ransom to Natchez, to garrison that place
permanently.  This latter move was quite fortunate as to the time when
Ransom arrived there.  The enemy happened to have a large number, about
5,000 head, of beef cattle there on the way from Texas to feed the
Eastern armies, and also a large amount of munitions of war which had
probably come through Texas from the Rio Grande and which were on the
way to Lee's and other armies in the East.

The troops that were left with me around Vicksburg were very busily and
unpleasantly employed in making expeditions against guerilla bands and
small detachments of cavalry which infested the interior, and in
destroying mills, bridges and rolling stock on the railroads.  The
guerillas and cavalry were not there to fight but to annoy, and
therefore disappeared on the first approach of our troops.

The country back of Vicksburg was filled with deserters from Pemberton's
army and, it was reported, many from Johnston's also.  The men
determined not to fight again while the war lasted.  Those who lived
beyond the reach of the Confederate army wanted to get to their homes.
Those who did not, wanted to get North where they could work for their
support till the war was over.  Besides all this there was quite a peace
feeling, for the time being, among the citizens of that part of
Mississippi, but this feeling soon subsided.  It is not probable that
Pemberton got off with over 4,000 of his army to the camp where he
proposed taking them, and these were in a demoralized condition.

On the 7th of August I further depleted my army by sending the 13th
corps, General Ord commanding, to Banks.  Besides this I received orders
to co-operate with the latter general in movements west of the
Mississippi.  Having received this order I went to New Orleans to confer
with Banks about the proposed movement.  All these movements came to
naught.

During this visit I reviewed Banks' army a short distance above
Carrollton.  The horse I rode was vicious and but little used, and on my
return to New Orleans ran away and, shying at a locomotive in the
street, fell, probably on me.  I was rendered insensible, and when I
regained consciousness I found myself in a hotel near by with several
doctors attending me.  My leg was swollen from the knee to the thigh,
and the swelling, almost to the point of bursting, extended along the
body up to the arm-pit.  The pain was almost beyond endurance.  I lay at
the hotel something over a week without being able to turn myself in
bed.  I had a steamer stop at the nearest point possible, and was
carried to it on a litter.  I was then taken to Vicksburg, where I
remained unable to move for some time afterwards.

While I was absent General Sherman declined to assume command because,
he said, it would confuse the records; but he let all the orders be made
in my name, and was glad to render any assistance he could.  No orders
were issued by my staff, certainly no important orders, except upon
consultation with and approval of Sherman.

On the 13th of September, while I was still in New Orleans, Halleck
telegraphed to me to send all available forces to Memphis and thence to
Tuscumbia, to co-operate with Rosecrans for the relief of Chattanooga.
On the 15th he telegraphed again for all available forces to go to
Rosecrans.  This was received on the 27th.  I was still confined to my
bed, unable to rise from it without assistance; but I at once ordered
Sherman to send one division to Memphis as fast as transports could be
provided.  The division of McPherson's corps, which had got off and was
on the way to join Steele in Arkansas, was recalled and sent, likewise,
to report to Hurlbut at Memphis.  Hurlbut was directed to forward these
two divisions with two others from his own corps at once, and also to
send any other troops that might be returning there.  Halleck suggested
that some good man, like Sherman or McPherson, should be sent to Memphis
to take charge of the troops going east. On this I sent Sherman, as
being, I thought, the most suitable person for an independent command,
and besides he was entitled to it if it had to be given to any one.  He
was directed to take with him another division of his corps.  This left
one back, but having one of McPherson's divisions he had still the
equivalent.

Before the receipt by me of these orders the battle of Chickamauga had
been fought and Rosecrans forced back into Chattanooga. The
administration as well as the General-in-chief was nearly frantic at the
situation of affairs there.  Mr. Charles A. Dana, an officer of the War
Department, was sent to Rosecrans' headquarters.  I do not know what his
instructions were, but he was still in Chattanooga when I arrived there
at a later period.

It seems that Halleck suggested that I should go to Nashville as soon as
able to move and take general direction of the troops moving from the
west. I received the following dispatch dated October 3d:  "It is the
wish of the Secretary of War that as soon as General Grant is able he
will come to Cairo and report by telegraph."  I was still very lame, but
started without delay.  Arriving at Columbus on the 16th I reported by
telegraph:  "Your dispatch from Cairo of the 3d directing me to report
from Cairo was received at 11.30 on the 10th.  Left the same day with
staff and headquarters and am here en route for Cairo."

END OF VOLUME I.





PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT

VOLUME II.

CONTENTS.


CHAPTER XL. FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON--GENERAL ROSECRANS
--COMMANDING MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI--ANDREW JOHNSON'S ADDRESS
--ARRIVAL AT CHATTANOOGA.

CHAPTER XLI. ASSUMING THE COMMAND AT CHATTANOOGA--OPENING A LINE OF
SUPPLIES--BATTLE OF WAUHATCHIE--ON THE PICKET LINE.

CHAPTER XLII. CONDITION OF THE ARMY--REBUILDING THE RAILROAD--GENERAL
BURNSIDE'S SITUATION--ORDERS FOR BATTLE--PLANS FOR THE ATTACK--HOOKER'S
POSITION--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS.

CHAPTER XLIII. PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE--THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE OF
THE ENEMY--SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE--BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN
--GENERAL HOOKER'S FIGHT.

CHAPTER XLIV. BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA--A GALLANT CHARGE--COMPLETE ROUT OF
THE ENEMY--PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES--GENERAL BRAGG--REMARKS ON
CHATTANOOGA.

CHAPTER XLV. THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE--HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE
--VISITING KNOXVILLE--CIPHER DISPATCHES--WITHHOLDING ORDERS.

CHAPTER XLVI. OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI--LONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEE
--COMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT-GENERAL--COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED
STATES--FIRST INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

CHAPTER XLVII. THE MILITARY SITUATION--PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN--SHERIDAN
ASSIGNED TO COMMAND OF THE CAVALRY--FLANK MOVEMENTS--FORREST AT FORT
PILLOW--GENERAL BANKS'S EXPEDITION--COLONEL MOSBY--AN INCIDENT OF THE
WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN.

CHAPTER XLVIII. COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN--GENERAL BUTLER'S
POSITION--SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID.

CHAPTER XLIX. SHERMAN S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SIEGE OF ATLANTA--DEATH OF
GENERAL MCPHERSON--ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE ANDERSONVILLE--CAPTURE OF ATLANTA.

CHAPTER L. GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC--CROSSING THE
RAPIDAN--ENTERING THE WILDERNESS--BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.

CHAPTER LI. AFTER THE BATTLE--TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SERVICE--MOVEMENT BY
THE LEFT FLANK.

CHAPTER LII. BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA--HANCOCK'S POSITION--ASSAULT OF
WARREN'S AND WRIGHT'S CORPS--UPTON PROMOTED ON THE FIELD--GOOD NEWS FROM
BUTLER AND SHERIDAN.

CHAPTER LIII. HANCOCK'S ASSAULT--LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATES--PROMOTIONS
RECOMMENDED--DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY--EWELL'S ATTACK--REDUCING THE
ARTILLERY.

CHAPTER LIV. MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK--BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA--AN
INCIDENT OF THE MARCH--MOVING ON RICHMOND--SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY
--POSITION OF THE NATIONAL ARMY.

CHAPTER LV. ADVANCE ON COLD HARBOR--AN ANECDOTE OF THE WAR--BATTLE OF
COLD HARBOR--CORRESPONDENCE WITH LEE RETROSPECTIVE.

CHAPTER LVI. LEFT FLANK MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES
--GENERAL LEE--VISIT TO BUTLER--THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG
--THE INVESTMENT OF PETERSBURG.

CHAPTER LVII. RAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD--RAID ON THE WELDON
RAILROAD--EARLY'S MOVEMENT UPON WASHINGTON--MINING THE WORKS BEFORE
PETERSBURG--EXPLOSION OF THE MINE BEFORE PETERSBURG--CAMPAIGN IN THE
SHENANDOAH VALLEY--CAPTURE OF THE WELDON RAILROAD.

CHAPTER LVIII. SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE--VISIT TO SHERIDAN--SHERIDAN'S VICTORY
IN THE SHENANDOAH--SHERIDAN'S RIDE TO WINCHESTER--CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN
FOR THE WINTER.

CHAPTER LIX. THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA--WAR
ANECDOTES--THE MARCH ON SAVANNAH--INVESTMENT OF SAVANNAH--CAPTURE OF
SAVANNAH.

CHAPTER LX. THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN--THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE

CHAPTER LXI. EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER--ATTACK ON THE FORT--FAILURE
OF THE EXPEDITION--SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FORT--CAPTURE OF FORT
FISHER.

CHAPTER LXII. SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH--SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG
--CANBY ORDERED TO MOVE AGAINST MOBILE--MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND THOMAS
--CAPTURE OF COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA--SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS.

CHAPTER LXIII. ARRIVAL OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS--LINCOLN AND THE PEACE
COMMISSIONERS--AN ANECDOTE OF LINCOLN--THE WINTER BEFORE PETERSBURG
--SHERIDAN DESTROYS THE RAILROAD--GORDON CARRIES THE PICKET LINE--PARKE
RECAPTURES THE LINE--THE BATTLE OF WHITE OAK ROAD.

CHAPTER LXIV. INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN--GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE
POTOMAC--SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE ON FIVE FORKS--BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS--PARKE
AND WRIGHT STORM THE ENEMY'S LINE--BATTLES BEFORE PETERSBURG.

CHAPTER LXV. THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG--MEETING PRESIDENT LINCOLN IN
PETERSBURG--THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND--PURSUING THE ENEMY--VISIT TO
SHERIDAN AND MEADE.

CHAPTER LXVI. BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK--ENGAGEMENT AT FARMVILLE
--CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL LEE--SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY.

CHAPTER LXVII. NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX--INTERVIEW WITH LEE AT
MCLEAN'S HOUSE--THE TERMS OF SURRENDER--LEE'S SURRENDER--INTERVIEW WITH
LEE AFTER THE SURRENDER.

CHAPTER LXVIII. MORALE OF THE TWO ARMIES--RELATIVE CONDITIONS OF THE
NORTH AND SOUTH--PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITS RICHMOND--ARRIVAL AT
WASHINGTON--PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ASSASSINATION--PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S
POLICY.

CHAPTER LXIX. SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON--JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER TO SHERMAN
--CAPTURE OF MOBILE--WILSON'S EXPEDITION--CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
--GENERAL THOMAS'S QUALITIES--ESTIMATE OF GENERAL CANBY.

CHAPTER LXX. THE END OF THE WAR--THE MARCH TO WASHINGTON--ONE OF
LINCOLN'S ANECDOTES--GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON--CHARACTERISTICS OF
LINCOLN AND STANTON--ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS.

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX




CHAPTER XL.

FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON--GENERAL ROSECRANS--COMMANDING
MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI--ANDREW JOHNSON'S ADDRESS--ARRIVAL AT
CHATTANOOGA.

The reply (to my telegram of October 16, 1863, from Cairo, announcing my
arrival at that point) came on the morning of the 17th, directing me to
proceed immediately to the Galt House, Louisville, where I would meet an
officer of the War Department with my instructions.  I left Cairo within
an hour or two after the receipt of this dispatch, going by rail via
Indianapolis. Just as the train I was on was starting out of the depot
at Indianapolis a messenger came running up to stop it, saying the
Secretary of War was coming into the station and wanted to see me.

I had never met Mr. Stanton up to that time, though we had held frequent
conversations over the wires the year before, when I was in Tennessee.
Occasionally at night he would order the wires between the War
Department and my headquarters to be connected, and we would hold a
conversation for an hour or two.  On this occasion the Secretary was
accompanied by Governor Brough of Ohio, whom I had never met, though he
and my father had been old acquaintances.  Mr. Stanton dismissed the
special train that had brought him to Indianapolis, and accompanied me
to Louisville.

Up to this time no hint had been given me of what was wanted after I
left Vicksburg, except the suggestion in one of Halleck's dispatches
that I had better go to Nashville and superintend the operation of
troops sent to relieve Rosecrans. Soon after we started the Secretary
handed me two orders, saying that I might take my choice of them.  The
two were identical in all but one particular.  Both created the
"Military Division of Mississippi," (giving me the command) composed of
the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and all
the territory from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi River north of
Banks's command in the south-west.  One order left the department
commanders as they were, while the other relieved Rosecrans and assigned
Thomas to his place.  I accepted the latter.  We reached Louisville
after night and, if I remember rightly, in a cold, drizzling rain.  The
Secretary of War told me afterwards that he caught a cold on that
occasion from which he never expected to recover.  He never did.

A day was spent in Louisville, the Secretary giving me the military news
at the capital and talking about the disappointment at the results of
some of the campaigns.  By the evening of the day after our arrival all
matters of discussion seemed exhausted, and I left the hotel to spend
the evening away, both Mrs. Grant (who was with me) and myself having
relatives living in Louisville.  In the course of the evening Mr.
Stanton received a dispatch from Mr. C. A. Dana, then in Chattanooga,
informing him that unless prevented Rosecrans would retreat, and
advising peremptory orders against his doing so.

As stated before, after the fall of Vicksburg I urged strongly upon the
government the propriety of a movement against Mobile.  General
Rosecrans had been at Murfreesboro', Tennessee, with a large and
well-equipped army from early in the year 1863, with Bragg confronting
him with a force quite equal to his own at first, considering it was on
the defensive.  But after the investment of Vicksburg Bragg's army was
largely depleted to strengthen Johnston, in Mississippi, who was being
reinforced to raise the siege.  I frequently wrote General Halleck
suggesting that Rosecrans should move against Bragg.  By so doing he
would either detain the latter's troops where they were or lay
Chattanooga open to capture.  General Halleck strongly approved the
suggestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly ordered
Rosecrans to advance, but that the latter had constantly failed to
comply with the order, and at last, after having held a council of war,
had replied in effect that it was a military maxim "not to fight two
decisive battles at the same time."  If true, the maxim was not
applicable in this case.  It would be bad to be defeated in two decisive
battles fought the same day, but it would not be bad to win them.  I,
however, was fighting no battle, and the siege of Vicksburg had drawn
from Rosecrans' front so many of the enemy that his chances of victory
were much greater than they would be if he waited until the siege was
over, when these troops could be returned.  Rosecrans was ordered to
move against the army that was detaching troops to raise the siege.
Finally he did move, on the 24th of June, but ten days afterwards
Vicksburg surrendered, and the troops sent from Bragg were free to
return.

It was at this time that I recommended to the general-in-chief the
movement against Mobile.  I knew the peril the Army of the Cumberland
was in, being depleted continually, not only by ordinary casualties, but
also by having to detach troops to hold its constantly extending line
over which to draw supplies, while the enemy in front was as constantly
being strengthened.  Mobile was important to the enemy, and in the
absence of a threatening force was guarded by little else than
artillery.  If threatened by land and from the water at the same time
the prize would fall easily, or troops would have to be sent to its
defence.  Those troops would necessarily come from Bragg.  My judgment
was overruled, and the troops under my command were dissipated over
other parts of the country where it was thought they could render the
most service.

Soon it was discovered in Washington that Rosecrans was in trouble and
required assistance.  The emergency was now too immediate to allow us to
give this assistance by making an attack in rear of Bragg upon Mobile.
It was therefore necessary to reinforce directly, and troops were sent
from every available point.

Rosecrans had very skilfully manoeuvred Bragg south of the Tennessee
River, and through and beyond Chattanooga. If he had stopped and
intrenched, and made himself strong there, all would have been right and
the mistake of not moving earlier partially compensated.  But he pushed
on, with his forces very much scattered, until Bragg's troops from
Mississippi began to join him.  Then Bragg took the initiative.
Rosecrans had to fall back in turn, and was able to get his army
together at Chickamauga, some miles south-east of Chattanooga, before
the main battle was brought on.  The battle was fought on the 19th and
20th of September, and Rosecrans was badly defeated, with a heavy loss
in artillery and some sixteen thousand men killed, wounded and captured.
The corps under Major-General George H. Thomas stood its ground, while
Rosecrans, with Crittenden and McCook, returned to Chattanooga. Thomas
returned also, but later, and with his troops in good order.  Bragg
followed and took possession of Missionary Ridge, overlooking
Chattanooga. He also occupied Lookout Mountain, west of the town, which
Rosecrans had abandoned, and with it his control of the river and the
river road as far back as Bridgeport.  The National troops were now
strongly intrenched in Chattanooga Valley, with the Tennessee River
behind them and the enemy occupying commanding heights to the east and
west, with a strong line across the valley from mountain to mountain,
and with Chattanooga Creek, for a large part of the way, in front of
their line.

On the 29th Halleck telegraphed me the above results, and directed all
the forces that could be spared from my department to be sent to
Rosecrans.  Long before this dispatch was received Sherman was on his
way, and McPherson was moving east with most of the garrison of
Vicksburg.

A retreat at that time would have been a terrible disaster.  It would
not only have been the loss of a most important strategic position to
us, but it would have been attended with the loss of all the artillery
still left with the Army of the Cumberland and the annihilation of that
army itself, either by capture or demoralization.

All supplies for Rosecrans had to be brought from Nashville. The
railroad between this base and the army was in possession of the
government up to Bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses to the
south side of the Tennessee River; but Bragg, holding Lookout and
Raccoon mountains west of Chattanooga, commanded the railroad, the river
and the shortest and best wagon-roads, both south and north of the
Tennessee, between Chattanooga and Bridgeport.  The distance between
these two places is but twenty-six miles by rail, but owing to the
position of Bragg, all supplies for Rosecrans had to be hauled by a
circuitous route north of the river and over a mountainous country,
increasing the distance to over sixty miles.

This country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly ten
thousand of which had already starved, and not enough were left to draw
a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances to convey the sick.
The men had been on half rations of hard bread for a considerable time,
with but few other supplies except beef driven from Nashville across the
country.  The region along the road became so exhausted of food for the
cattle that by the time they reached Chattanooga they were much in the
condition of the few animals left alive there--"on the lift." Indeed,
the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying, with
a faint facetiousness, that they were living on "half rations of hard
bread and BEEF DRIED ON THE HOOF."

Nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were without
sufficient shoes or other clothing suitable for the advancing season.
What they had was well worn.  The fuel within the Federal lines was
exhausted, even to the stumps of trees. There were no teams to draw it
from the opposite bank, where it was abundant.  The only way of
supplying fuel, for some time before my arrival, had been to cut trees
on the north bank of the river at a considerable distance up the stream,
form rafts of it and float it down with the current, effecting a landing
on the south side within our lines by the use of paddles or poles. It
would then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their camps.

If a retreat had occurred at this time it is not probable that any of
the army would have reached the railroad as an organized body, if
followed by the enemy.

On the receipt of Mr. Dana's dispatch Mr. Stanton sent for me. Finding
that I was out he became nervous and excited, inquiring of every person
he met, including guests of the house, whether they knew where I was,
and bidding them find me and send me to him at once.  About eleven
o'clock I returned to the hotel, and on my way, when near the house,
every person met was a messenger from the Secretary, apparently
partaking of his impatience to see me.  I hastened to the room of the
Secretary and found him pacing the floor rapidly in his dressing-gown.
Saying that the retreat must be prevented, he showed me the dispatch.  I
immediately wrote an order assuming command of the Military Division of
the Mississippi, and telegraphed it to General Rosecrans.  I then
telegraphed to him the order from Washington assigning Thomas to the
command of the Army of the Cumberland; and to Thomas that he must hold
Chattanooga at all hazards, informing him at the same time that I would
be at the front as soon as possible.  A prompt reply was received from
Thomas, saying, "We will hold the town till we starve."  I appreciated
the force of this dispatch later when I witnessed the condition of
affairs which prompted it.  It looked, indeed, as if but two courses
were open:  one to starve, the other to surrender or be captured.

On the morning of the 20th of October I started, with my staff, and
proceeded as far as Nashville.  At that time it was not prudent to
travel beyond that point by night, so I remained in Nashville until the
next morning.  Here I met for the first time Andrew Johnson, Military
Governor of Tennessee.  He delivered a speech of welcome.  His composure
showed that it was by no means his maiden effort.  It was long, and I
was in torture while he was delivering it, fearing something would be
expected from me in response.  I was relieved, however, the people
assembled having apparently heard enough.  At all events they commenced
a general hand-shaking, which, although trying where there is so much of
it, was a great relief to me in this emergency.

From Nashville I telegraphed to Burnside, who was then at Knoxville,
that important points in his department ought to be fortified, so that
they could be held with the least number of men; to Admiral Porter at
Cairo, that Sherman's advance had passed Eastport, Mississippi, that
rations were probably on their way from St. Louis by boat for supplying
his army, and requesting him to send a gunboat to convoy them; and to
Thomas, suggesting that large parties should be put at work on the
wagon-road then in use back to Bridgeport.

On the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front, reaching
Stevenson Alabama, after dark.  Rosecrans was there on his way north.
He came into my car and we held a brief interview, in which he described
very clearly the situation at Chattanooga, and made some excellent
suggestions as to what should be done.  My only wonder was that he had
not carried them out.  We then proceeded to Bridgeport, where we stopped
for the night.  From here we took horses and made our way by Jasper and
over Waldron's Ridge to Chattanooga. There had been much rain, and the
roads were almost impassable from mud, knee-deep in places, and from
wash-outs on the mountain sides.  I had been on crutches since the time
of my fall in New Orleans, and had to be carried over places where it
was not safe to cross on horseback.  The roads were strewn with the
debris of broken wagons and the carcasses of thousands of starved mules
and horses.  At Jasper, some ten or twelve miles from Bridgeport, there
was a halt.  General O. O. Howard had his headquarters there.  From this
point I telegraphed Burnside to make every effort to secure five hundred
rounds of ammunition for his artillery and small-arms.  We stopped for
the night at a little hamlet some ten or twelve miles farther on.  The
next day we reached Chattanooga a little before dark.  I went directly
to General Thomas's headquarters, and remaining there a few days, until
I could establish my own.

During the evening most of the general officers called in to pay their
respects and to talk about the condition of affairs.  They pointed out
on the map the line, marked with a red or blue pencil, which Rosecrans
had contemplated falling back upon.  If any of them had approved the
move they did not say so to me.  I found General W. F. Smith occupying
the position of chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland.  I had
known Smith as a cadet at West Point, but had no recollection of having
met him after my graduation, in 1843, up to this time.  He explained the
situation of the two armies and the topography of the country so plainly
that I could see it without an inspection.  I found that he had
established a saw-mill on the banks of the river, by utilizing an old
engine found in the neighborhood; and, by rafting logs from the north
side of the river above, had got out the lumber and completed pontoons
and roadway plank for a second bridge, one flying bridge being there
already.  He was also rapidly getting out the materials and constructing
the boats for a third bridge.  In addition to this he had far under way
a steamer for plying between Chattanooga and Bridgeport whenever we
might get possession of the river.  This boat consisted of a scow, made
of the plank sawed out at the mill, housed in, and a stern wheel
attached which was propelled by a second engine taken from some shop or
factory.

I telegraphed to Washington this night, notifying General Halleck of my
arrival, and asking to have General Sherman assigned to the command of
the Army of the Tennessee, headquarters in the field.  The request was
at once complied with.



CHAPTER XLI.

ASSUMING THE COMMAND AT CHATTANOOGA--OPENING A LINE OF SUPPLIES--BATTLE
OF WAUHATCHIE--ON THE PICKET LINE.

The next day, the 24th, I started out to make a personal inspection,
taking Thomas and Smith with me, besides most of the members of my
personal staff.  We crossed to the north side of the river, and, moving
to the north of detached spurs of hills, reached the Tennessee at
Brown's Ferry, some three miles below Lookout Mountain, unobserved by
the enemy.  Here we left our horses back from the river and approached
the water on foot. There was a picket station of the enemy on the
opposite side, of about twenty men, in full view, and we were within
easy range. They did not fire upon us nor seem to be disturbed by our
presence.  They must have seen that we were all commissioned officers.
But, I suppose, they looked upon the garrison of Chattanooga as
prisoners of war, feeding or starving themselves, and thought it would
be inhuman to kill any of them except in self-defence.

That night I issued orders for opening the route to Bridgeport--a
cracker line, as the soldiers appropriately termed it.  They had been so
long on short rations that my first thought was the establishment of a
line over which food might reach them.

Chattanooga is on the south bank of the Tennessee, where that river runs
nearly due west.  It is at the northern end of a valley five or six
miles in width, through which Chattanooga Creek runs.  To the east of
the valley is Missionary Ridge, rising from five to eight hundred feet
above the creek and terminating somewhat abruptly a half mile or more
before reaching the Tennessee.  On the west of the valley is Lookout
Mountain, twenty-two hundred feet above-tide water.  Just below the town
the Tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to the base of Lookout
Mountain, leaving no level ground between the mountain and river.  The
Memphis and Charleston Railroad passes this point, where the mountain
stands nearly perpendicular. East of Missionary Ridge flows the South
Chickamauga River; west of Lookout Mountain is Lookout Creek; and west
of that, Raccoon Mountains.  Lookout Mountain, at its northern end,
rises almost perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in a
gentle <DW72> of cultivated fields to near the summit, where it ends in a
palisade thirty or more feet in height.  On the gently sloping ground,
between the upper and lower palisades, there is a single farmhouse,
which is reached by a wagon-road from the valley east.

The intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end of
Missionary Ridge and extended along the crest for some distance south,
thence across Chattanooga valley to Lookout Mountain. Lookout Mountain
was also fortified and held by the enemy, who also kept troops in
Lookout valley west, and on Raccoon Mountain, with pickets extending
down the river so as to command the road on the north bank and render it
useless to us.  In addition to this there was an intrenched line in
Chattanooga valley extending from the river east of the town to Lookout
Mountain, to make the investment complete.  Besides the fortifications
on Mission Ridge, there was a line at the base of the hill, with
occasional spurs of rifle-pits half-way up the front.  The enemy's
pickets extended out into the valley towards the town, so far that the
pickets of the two armies could converse.  At one point they were
separated only by the narrow creek which gives its name to the valley
and town, and from which both sides drew water.  The Union lines were
shorter than those of the enemy.

Thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly fortified to
the east, south, and west, and commanded the river below.  Practically,
the Army of the Cumberland was besieged. The enemy had stopped with his
cavalry north of the river the passing of a train loaded with ammunition
and medical supplies.  The Union army was short of both, not having
ammunition enough for a day's fighting.

General Halleck had, long before my coming into this new field, ordered
parts of the 11th and 12th corps, commanded respectively by Generals
Howard and Slocum, Hooker in command of the whole, from the Army of the
Potomac to reinforce Rosecrans.  It would have been folly to send them
to Chattanooga to help eat up the few rations left there.  They were
consequently left on the railroad, where supplies could be brought to
them.  Before my arrival, Thomas ordered their concentration at
Bridgeport.

General W. F. Smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the move
which I was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about the
manner of making it, that I deemed it but just to him that he should
have command of the troops detailed to execute the design, although he
was then acting as a staff officer and was not in command of troops.

On the 24th of October, after my return to Chattanooga, the following
details were made:  General Hooker, who was now at Bridgeport, was
ordered to cross to the south side of the Tennessee and march up by
Whitesides and Wauhatchie to Brown's Ferry.  General Palmer, with a
division of the 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland, was ordered to move
down the river on the north side, by a back road, until opposite
Whitesides, then cross and hold the road in Hooker's rear after he had
passed. Four thousand men were at the same time detailed to act under
General Smith directly from Chattanooga. Eighteen hundred of them, under
General Hazen, were to take sixty pontoon boats, and under cover of
night float by the pickets of the enemy at the north base of Lookout,
down to Brown's Ferry, then land on the south side and capture or drive
away the pickets at that point.  Smith was to march with the remainder
of the detail, also under cover of night, by the north bank of the river
to Brown's Ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the bridge
as soon as the crossing was secured.

On the 26th, Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport and commenced his
eastward march.  At three o'clock on the morning of the 27th, Hazen
moved into the stream with his sixty pontoons and eighteen hundred brave
and well-equipped men.  Smith started enough in advance to be near the
river when Hazen should arrive.  There are a number of detached spurs of
hills north of the river at Chattanooga, back of which is a good road
parallel to the stream, sheltered from the view from the top of Lookout.
It was over this road Smith marched.  At five o'clock Hazen landed at
Brown's Ferry, surprised the picket guard, and captured most of it.  By
seven o'clock the whole of Smith's force was ferried over and in
possession of a height commanding the ferry.  This was speedily
fortified, while a detail was laying the pontoon bridge.  By ten o'clock
the bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in Lookout valley, was
fortified and connected with the rest of the army.  The two bridges over
the Tennessee River--a flying one at Chattanooga and the new one at
Brown's Ferry--with the road north of the river, covered from both the
fire and the view of the enemy, made the connection complete.  Hooker
found but slight obstacles in his way, and on the afternoon of the 28th
emerged into Lookout valley at Wauhatchie.  Howard marched on to Brown's
Ferry, while Geary, who commanded a division in the 12th corps, stopped
three miles south.  The pickets of the enemy on the river below were now
cut off, and soon came in and surrendered.

The river was now opened to us from Lookout valley to Bridgeport.
Between Brown's Ferry and Kelly's Ferry the Tennessee runs through a
narrow gorge in the mountains, which contracts the stream so much as to
increase the current beyond the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stem
it.  To get up these rapids, steamers must be cordelled; that is, pulled
up by ropes from the shore.  But there is no difficulty in navigating
the stream from Bridgeport to Kelly's Ferry.  The latter point is only
eight miles from Chattanooga and connected with it by a good wagon-road,
which runs through a low pass in the Raccoon Mountains on the south side
of the river to Brown's Ferry, thence on the north side to the river
opposite Chattanooga. There were several steamers at Bridgeport, and
abundance of forage, clothing and provisions.

On the way to Chattanooga I had telegraphed back to Nashville for a good
supply of vegetables and small rations, which the troops had been so
long deprived of.  Hooker had brought with him from the east a full
supply of land transportation.  His animals had not been subjected to
hard work on bad roads without forage, but were in good condition.  In
five days from my arrival in Chattanooga the way was open to Bridgeport
and, with the aid of steamers and Hooker's teams, in a week the troops
were receiving full rations.  It is hard for any one not an eye-witness
to realize the relief this brought.  The men were soon reclothed and
also well fed, an abundance of ammunition was brought up, and a
cheerfulness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks.  Neither
officers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed.  The weak
and languid appearance of the troops, so visible before, disappeared at
once.  I do not know what the effect was on the other side, but assume
it must have been correspondingly depressing.  Mr. Davis had visited
Bragg but a short time before, and must have perceived our condition to
be about as Bragg described it in his subsequent report.  "These
dispositions," he said, "faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's
speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage.  Possessed
of the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reinforcements
must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only a
question of time."  But the dispositions were not "faithfully
sustained," and I doubt not but thousands of men engaged in trying to
"sustain" them now rejoice that they were not.  There was no time during
the rebellion when I did not think, and often say, that the South was
more to be benefited by its defeat than the North.  The latter had the
people, the institutions, and the territory to make a great and
prosperous nation.  The former was burdened with an institution
abhorrent to all civilized people not brought up under it, and one which
degraded labor, kept it in ignorance, and enervated the governing class.
With the outside world at war with this institution, they could not have
extended their territory.  The labor of the country was not skilled, nor
allowed to become so.  The whites could not toil without becoming
degraded, and those who did were denominated "poor white trash."  The
system of labor would have soon exhausted the soil and left the people
poor.  The non-slaveholders would have left the country, and the small
slaveholder must have sold out to his more fortunate neighbor.  Soon the
slaves would have outnumbered the masters, and, not being in sympathy
with them, would have risen in their might and exterminated them.  The
war was expensive to the South as well as to the North, both in blood
and treasure, but it was worth all it cost.

The enemy was surprised by the movements which secured to us a line of
supplies.  He appreciated its importance, and hastened to try to recover
the line from us.  His strength on Lookout Mountain was not equal to
Hooker's command in the valley below.  From Missionary Ridge he had to
march twice the distance we had from Chattanooga, in order to reach
Lookout Valley; but on the night of the 28th and 29th an attack was made
on Geary at Wauhatchie by Longstreet's corps.  When the battle
commenced, Hooker ordered Howard up from Brown's Ferry.  He had three
miles to march to reach Geary.  On his way he was fired upon by rebel
troops from a foot-hill to the left of the road and from which the road
was commanded.  Howard turned to the left, charged up the hill and
captured it before the enemy had time to intrench, taking many
prisoners.  Leaving sufficient men to hold this height, he pushed on to
reinforce Geary.  Before he got up, Geary had been engaged for about
three hours against a vastly superior force.  The night was so dark that
the men could not distinguish one from another except by the light of
the flashes of their muskets.  In the darkness and uproar Hooker's
teamsters became frightened and deserted their teams.  The mules also
became frightened, and breaking loose from their fastenings stampeded
directly towards the enemy.  The latter, no doubt, took this for a
charge, and stampeded in turn.  By four o'clock in the morning the
battle had entirely ceased, and our "cracker line" was never afterward
disturbed.

In securing possession of Lookout Valley, Smith lost one man killed and
four or five wounded.  The enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry,
captured.  In the night engagement of the 28th-9th Hooker lost 416
killed and wounded.  I never knew the loss of the enemy, but our troops
buried over one hundred and fifty of his dead and captured more than a
hundred.

After we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring our
supplies to the army, I made a personal inspection to see the situation
of the pickets of the two armies.  As I have stated, Chattanooga Creek
comes down the centre of the valley to within a mile or such a matter of
the town of Chattanooga, then bears off westerly, then north-westerly,
and enters the Tennessee River at the foot of Lookout Mountain.  This
creek, from its mouth up to where it bears off west, lay between the two
lines of pickets, and the guards of both armies drew their water from
the same stream.  As I would be under short-range fire and in an open
country, I took nobody with me, except, I believe, a bugler, who stayed
some distance to the rear.  I rode from our right around to our left.
When I came to the camp of the picket guard of our side, I heard the
call, "Turn out the guard for the commanding general."  I replied,
"Never mind the guard," and they were dismissed and went back to their
tents. Just back of these, and about equally distant from the creek,
were the guards of the Confederate pickets.  The sentinel on their post
called out in like manner, "Turn out the guard for the commanding
general," and, I believe, added, "General Grant."  Their line in a
moment front-faced to the north, facing me, and gave a salute, which I
returned.

The most friendly relations seemed to exist between the pickets of the
two armies.  At one place there was a tree which had fallen across the
stream, and which was used by the soldiers of both armies in drawing
water for their camps.  General Longstreet's corps was stationed there
at the time, and wore blue of a little different shade from our uniform.
Seeing a soldier in blue on this log, I rode up to him, commenced
conversing with him, and asked whose corps he belonged to.  He was very
polite, and, touching his hat to me, said he belonged to General
Longstreet's corps.  I asked him a few questions--but not with a view of
gaining any particular information--all of which he answered, and I rode
off.



CHAPTER XLII.

CONDITION OF THE ARMY--REBUILDING THE RAILROAD--GENERAL BURNSIDE'S
SITUATION--ORDERS FOR BATTLE--PLANS FOR THE ATTACK--HOOKER'S POSITION
--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS.

Having got the Army of the Cumberland in a comfortable position, I now
began to look after the remainder of my new command. Burnside was in
about as desperate a condition as the Army of the Cumberland had been,
only he was not yet besieged.  He was a hundred miles from the nearest
possible base, Big South Fork of the Cumberland River, and much farther
from any railroad we had possession of.  The roads back were over
mountains, and all supplies along the line had long since been
exhausted.  His animals, too, had been starved, and their carcasses
lined the road from Cumberland Gap, and far back towards Lexington, Ky.
East Tennessee still furnished supplies of beef, bread and forage, but
it did not supply ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, or small
rations, such as coffee, sugar, salt and rice.

Sherman had started from Memphis for Corinth on the 11th of October.
His instructions required him to repair the road in his rear in order to
bring up supplies.  The distance was about three hundred and thirty
miles through a hostile country.  His entire command could not have
maintained the road if it had been completed.  The bridges had all been
destroyed by the enemy, and much other damage done.  A hostile community
lived along the road; guerilla bands infested the country, and more or
less of the cavalry of the enemy was still in the West.  Often Sherman's
work was destroyed as soon as completed, and he only a short distance
away.

The Memphis and Charleston Railroad strikes the Tennessee River at
Eastport, Mississippi.  Knowing the difficulty Sherman would have to
supply himself from Memphis, I had previously ordered supplies sent from
St. Louis on small steamers, to be convoyed by the navy, to meet him at
Eastport.  These he got.  I now ordered him to discontinue his work of
repairing roads and to move on with his whole force to Stevenson,
Alabama, without delay.  This order was borne to Sherman by a messenger,
who paddled down the Tennessee in a canoe and floated over Muscle
Shoals; it was delivered at Iuka on the 27th.  In this Sherman was
notified that the rebels were moving a force towards Cleveland, East
Tennessee, and might be going to Nashville, in which event his troops
were in the best position to beat them there.  Sherman, with his
characteristic promptness, abandoned the work he was engaged upon and
pushed on at once.  On the 1st of November he crossed the Tennessee at
Eastport, and that day was in Florence, Alabama, with the head of
column, while his troops were still crossing at Eastport, with Blair
bringing up the rear.

Sherman's force made an additional army, with cavalry, artillery, and
trains, all to be supplied by the single track road from Nashville.  All
indications pointed also to the probable necessity of supplying
Burnside's command in East Tennessee, twenty-five thousand more, by the
same route.  A single track could not do this.  I gave, therefore, an
order to Sherman to halt General G. M. Dodge's command, of about eight
thousand men, at Athens, and subsequently directed the latter to arrange
his troops along the railroad from Decatur north towards Nashville, and
to rebuild that road.  The road from Nashville to Decatur passes over a
broken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of
considerable width, and with valleys far below the road-bed.  All the
bridges over these had been destroyed, and the rails taken up and
twisted by the enemy.  All the cars and locomotives not carried off had
been destroyed as effectually as they knew how to destroy them.  All
bridges and culverts had been destroyed between Nashville and Decatur,
and thence to Stevenson, where the Memphis and Charleston and the
Nashville and Chattanooga roads unite.  The rebuilding of this road
would give us two roads as far as Stevenson over which to supply the
army.  From Bridgeport, a short distance farther east, the river
supplements the road.

General Dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experienced
railroad builder.  He had no tools to work with except those of the
pioneers--axes, picks, and spades.  With these he was able to intrench
his men and protect them against surprises by small parties of the
enemy.  As he had no base of supplies until the road could be completed
back to Nashville, the first matter to consider after protecting his men
was the getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country.  He
had his men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or all
they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as could
be found.  Millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along
the line of the army.  When these were not near enough to the troops for
protection they were taken down and moved up to the line of the road.
Blacksmith shops, with all the iron and steel found in them, were moved
up in like manner.  Blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the
tools necessary in railroad and bridge building.  Axemen were put to
work getting out timber for bridges and cutting fuel for locomotives
when the road should be completed.  Car-builders were set to work
repairing the locomotives and cars.  Thus every branch of railroad
building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen with
food, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or
laborer except what the command itself furnished.  But rails and cars
the men could not make without material, and there was not enough
rolling stock to keep the road we already had worked to its full
capacity.  There were no rails except those in use.  To supply these
deficiencies I ordered eight of the ten engines General McPherson had at
Vicksburg to be sent to Nashville, and all the cars he had except ten.
I also ordered the troops in West Tennessee to points on the river and
on the Memphis and Charleston road, and ordered the cars, locomotives
and rails from all the railroads except the Memphis and Charleston to
Nashville.  The military manager of railroads also was directed to
furnish more rolling stock and, as far as he could, bridge material.
General Dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days after
receiving his orders.  The number of bridges to rebuild was one hundred
and eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms; the length of
road repaired was one hundred and two miles.

The enemy's troops, which it was thought were either moving against
Burnside or were going to Nashville, went no farther than Cleveland.
Their presence there, however, alarmed the authorities at Washington,
and, on account of our helpless condition at Chattanooga, caused me much
uneasiness.  Dispatches were constantly coming, urging me to do
something for Burnside's relief; calling attention to the importance of
holding East Tennessee; saying the President was much concerned for the
protection of the loyal people in that section, etc.  We had not at
Chattanooga animals to pull a single piece of artillery, much less a
supply train.  Reinforcements could not help Burnside, because he had
neither supplies nor ammunition sufficient for them; hardly, indeed,
bread and meat for the men he had.  There was no relief possible for him
except by expelling the enemy from Missionary Ridge and about
Chattanooga.

On the 4th of November Longstreet left our front with about fifteen
thousand troops, besides Wheeler's cavalry, five thousand more, to go
against Burnside.  The situation seemed desperate, and was more
aggravating because nothing could be done until Sherman should get up.
The authorities at Washington were now more than ever anxious for the
safety of Burnside's army, and plied me with dispatches faster than
ever, urging that something should be done for his relief.  On the 7th,
before Longstreet could possibly have reached Knoxville, I ordered
Thomas peremptorily to attack the enemy's right, so as to force the
return of the troops that had gone up the valley.  I directed him to
take mules, officers' horses, or animals wherever he could get them to
move the necessary artillery.  But he persisted in the declaration that
he could not move a single piece of artillery, and could not see how he
could possibly comply with the order.  Nothing was left to be done but
to answer Washington dispatches as best I could; urge Sherman forward,
although he was making every effort to get forward, and encourage
Burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time he should be
relieved.  All of Burnside's dispatches showed the greatest confidence
in his ability to hold his position as long as his ammunition held out.
He even suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory he held
south and west of Knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from his
base and make it more difficult for him to get back to Chattanooga when
the battle should begin.  Longstreet had a railroad as far as Loudon;
but from there to Knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains. Burnside's
suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was adopted.  On the 14th
I telegraphed him:

"Sherman's advance has reached Bridgeport.  His whole force will be
ready to move from there by Tuesday at farthest.  If you can hold
Longstreet in check until he gets up, or by skirmishing and falling back
can avoid serious loss to yourself and gain time, I will be able to
force the enemy back from here and place a force between Longstreet and
Bragg that must inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passes
by every available road, to get to his supplies.  Sherman would have
been here before this but for high water in Elk River driving him some
thirty miles up that river to cross."

And again later in the day, indicating my plans for his relief, as
follows:

"Your dispatch and Dana's just received.  Being there, you can tell
better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct.  With your
showing you had better give up Kingston at the last moment and save the
most productive part of your possessions.  Every arrangement is now made
to throw Sherman's force across the river, just at and below the mouth
of Chickamauga Creek, as soon as it arrives.  Thomas will attack on his
left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry Missionary
Ridge, and from there push a force on to the railroad between Cleveland
and Dalton.  Hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carry
Lookout Mountain.  The enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on
his left flank.  This favors us.  To further confirm this, Sherman's
advance division will march direct from Whiteside to Trenton.  The
remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from
Whiteside to Kelly's Ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and
leave him to suppose the whole force is going up Lookout Valley.
Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport.  The rear will only
reach there on the 16th.  This will bring it to the 19th as the earliest
day for making the combined movement as desired.  Inform me if you think
you can sustain yourself until this time.  I can hardly conceive of the
enemy breaking through at Kingston and pushing for Kentucky.  If they
should, however, a new problem would be left for solution.  Thomas has
ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta. I will
ascertain if they have started, and inform you.  It will be entirely out
of the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they cannot be
spared, but how would they be fed after they got even one day east from
here?"

Longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at Loudon until the 13th.
That being the terminus of his railroad communications, it is probable
he was directed to remain there awaiting orders.  He was in a position
threatening Knoxville, and at the same time where he could be brought
back speedily to Chattanooga. The day after Longstreet left Loudon,
Sherman reached Bridgeport in person and proceeded on to see me that
evening, the 14th, and reached Chattanooga the next day.

My orders for battle were all prepared in advance of Sherman's arrival
(*15), except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to be
engaged were so far away.  The possession of Lookout Mountain was of no
special advantage to us now.  Hooker was instructed to send Howard's
corps to the north side of the Tennessee, thence up behind the hills on
the north side, and to go into camp opposite Chattanooga; with the
remainder of the command, Hooker was, at a time to be afterwards
appointed, to ascend the western <DW72> between the upper and lower
palisades, and so get into Chattanooga valley.

The plan of battle was for Sherman to attack the enemy's right flank,
form a line across it, extend our left over South Chickamauga River so
as to threaten or hold the railroad in Bragg's rear, and thus force him
either to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his
base at Chickamauga Station.  Hooker was to perform like service on our
right.  His problem was to get from Lookout Valley to Chattanooga Valley
in the most expeditious way possible; cross the latter valley rapidly to
Rossville, south of Bragg's line on Missionary Ridge, form line there
across the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended to
Chickamauga Valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy's rear
on that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also.  Thomas, with
the Army of the Cumberland, occupied the centre, and was to assault
while the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks.

To carry out this plan, Sherman was to cross the Tennessee at Brown's
Ferry and move east of Chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of
Mission Ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out of
sight of the enemy on the ridge.  There are two streams called
Chickamauga emptying into the Tennessee River east of Chattanooga--North
Chickamauga, taking its rise in Tennessee, flowing south, and emptying
into the river some seven or eight miles east; while the South
Chickamauga, which takes its rise in Georgia, flows northward, and
empties into the Tennessee some three or four miles above the town.
There were now one hundred and sixteen pontoons in the North Chickamauga
River, their presence there being unknown to the enemy.

At night a division was to be marched up to that point, and at two
o'clock in the morning moved down with the current, thirty men in each
boat.  A few were to land east of the mouth of the South Chickamauga,
capture the pickets there, and then lay a bridge connecting the two
banks of the river.  The rest were to land on the south side of the
Tennessee, where Missionary Ridge would strike it if prolonged, and a
sufficient number of men to man the boats were to push to the north side
to ferry over the main body of Sherman's command while those left on the
south side intrenched themselves.  Thomas was to move out from his lines
facing the ridge, leaving enough of Palmer's corps to guard against an
attack down the valley.  Lookout Valley being of no present value to us,
and being untenable by the enemy if we should secure Missionary Ridge,
Hooker's orders were changed.  His revised orders brought him to
Chattanooga by the established route north of the Tennessee.  He was
then to move out to the right to Rossville.

Hooker's position in Lookout Valley was absolutely essential to us so
long as Chattanooga was besieged.  It was the key to our line for
supplying the army.  But it was not essential after the enemy was
dispersed from our front, or even after the battle for this purpose was
begun.  Hooker's orders, therefore, were designed to get his force past
Lookout Mountain and Chattanooga Valley, and up to Missionary Ridge.  By
crossing the north face of Lookout the troops would come into
Chattanooga Valley in rear of the line held by the enemy across the
valley, and would necessarily force its evacuation.  Orders were
accordingly given to march by this route.  But days before the battle
began the advantages as well as the disadvantages of this plan of action
were all considered.  The passage over the mountain was a difficult one
to make in the face of an enemy.  It might consume so much time as to
lose us the use of the troops engaged in it at other points where they
were more wanted.  After reaching Chattanooga Valley, the creek of the
same name, quite a formidable stream to get an army over, had to be
crossed.  I was perfectly willing that the enemy should keep Lookout
Mountain until we got through with the troops on Missionary Ridge.  By
marching Hooker to the north side of the river, thence up the stream,
and recrossing at the town, he could be got in position at any named
time; when in this new position, he would have Chattanooga Creek behind
him, and the attack on Missionary Ridge would unquestionably cause the
evacuation by the enemy of his line across the valley and on Lookout
Mountain.  Hooker's order was changed accordingly.  As explained
elsewhere, the original order had to be reverted to, because of a flood
in the river rendering the bridge at Brown's Ferry unsafe for the
passage of troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted to bring all
the troops together against Missionary Ridge.

The next day after Sherman's arrival I took him, with Generals Thomas
and Smith and other officers, to the north side of the river, and showed
them the ground over which Sherman had to march, and pointed out
generally what he was expected to do.  I, as well as the authorities in
Washington, was still in a great state of anxiety for Burnside's safety.
Burnside himself, I believe, was the only one who did not share in this
anxiety. Nothing could be done for him, however, until Sherman's troops
were up.  As soon, therefore, as the inspection was over, Sherman
started for Bridgeport to hasten matters, rowing a boat himself, I
believe, from Kelly's Ferry.  Sherman had left Bridgeport the night
of the 14th, reached Chattanooga the evening of the 15th, made the
above-described inspection on the morning of the 16th, and started back
the same evening to hurry up his command, fully appreciating the
importance of time.

His march was conducted with as much expedition as the roads and season
would admit of.  By the 20th he was himself at Brown's Ferry with the
head of column, but many of his troops were far behind, and one division
(Ewing's) was at Trenton, sent that way to create the impression that
Lookout was to be taken from the south.  Sherman received his orders at
the ferry, and was asked if he could not be ready for the assault the
following morning.  News had been received that the battle had been
commenced at Knoxville.  Burnside had been cut off from telegraphic
communications.  The President, the Secretary of War, and General
Halleck, were in an agony of suspense.  My suspense was also great, but
more endurable, because I was where I could soon do something to relieve
the situation.  It was impossible to get Sherman's troops up for the
next day.  I then asked him if they could not be got up to make the
assault on the morning of the 22d, and ordered Thomas to move on that
date.  But the elements were against us.  It rained all the 20th and
21st. The river rose so rapidly that it was difficult to keep the
pontoons in place.

General Orlando B. Willcox, a division commander under Burnside, was at
this time occupying a position farther up the valley than Knoxville
--about Maynardville--and was still in telegraphic communication with the
North.  A dispatch was received from him saying that he was threatened
from the east.  The following was sent in reply:

"If you can communicate with General Burnside, say to him that our
attack on Bragg will commence in the morning.  If successful, such a
move will be made as I think will relieve East Tennessee, if he can hold
out.  Longstreet passing through our lines to Kentucky need not cause
alarm.  He would find the country so bare that he would lose his
transportation and artillery before reaching Kentucky, and would meet
such a force before he got through, that he could not return."

Meantime, Sherman continued his crossing without intermission as fast as
his troops could be got up.  The crossing had to be effected in full
view of the enemy on the top of Lookout Mountain.  Once over, however,
the troops soon disappeared behind the detached hill on the north side,
and would not come to view again, either to watchmen on Lookout Mountain
or Missionary Ridge, until they emerged between the hills to strike the
bank of the river.  But when Sherman's advance reached a point opposite
the town of Chattanooga, Howard, who, it will be remembered, had been
concealed behind the hills on the north side, took up his line of march
to join the troops on the south side.  His crossing was in full view
both from Missionary Ridge and the top of Lookout, and the enemy of
course supposed these troops to be Sherman's.  This enabled Sherman to
get to his assigned position without discovery.



CHAPTER XLIII.

PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE--THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE OF THE ENEMY
--SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE--BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN
--GENERAL HOOKER'S FIGHT.

On the 20th, when so much was occurring to discourage--rains falling so
heavily as to delay the passage of troops over the river at Brown's
Ferry and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge; news coming of
a battle raging at Knoxville; of Willcox being threatened by a force
from the east--a letter was received from Bragg which contained these
words:  "As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I
deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early
withdrawal." Of course, I understood that this was a device intended to
deceive; but I did not know what the intended deception was.  On the
22d, however, a deserter came in who informed me that Bragg was leaving
our front, and on that day Buckner's division was sent to reinforce
Longstreet at Knoxville, and another division started to follow but was
recalled.  The object of Bragg's letter, no doubt, was in some way to
detain me until Knoxville could be captured, and his troops there be
returned to Chattanooga.

During the night of the 21st the rest of the pontoon boats, completed,
one hundred and sixteen in all, were carried up to and placed in North
Chickamauga. The material for the roadway over these was deposited out
of view of the enemy within a few hundred yards of the bank of the
Tennessee, where the north end of the bridge was to rest.

Hearing nothing from Burnside, and hearing much of the distress in
Washington on his account, I could no longer defer operations for his
relief.  I determined, therefore, to do on the 23d, with the Army of the
Cumberland, what had been intended to be done on the 24th.

The position occupied by the Army of the Cumberland had been made very
strong for defence during the months it had been besieged.  The line was
about a mile from the town, and extended from Citico Creek, a small
stream running near the base of Missionary Ridge and emptying into the
Tennessee about two miles below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, on
the left, to Chattanooga Creek on the right.  All commanding points on
the line were well fortified and well equipped with artillery.  The
important elevations within the line had all been carefully fortified
and supplied with a proper armament.  Among the elevations so fortified
was one to the east of the town, named Fort Wood.  It owed its
importance chiefly to the fact that it lay between the town and
Missionary Ridge, where most of the strength of the enemy was.  Fort
Wood had in it twenty-two pieces of artillery, most of which would reach
the nearer points of the enemy's line.  On the morning of the 23d
Thomas, according to instructions, moved Granger's corps of two
divisions, Sheridan and T. J. Wood commanding, to the foot of Fort Wood,
and formed them into line as if going on parade, Sheridan on the right,
Wood to the left, extending to or near Citico Creek.  Palmer, commanding
the 14th corps, held that part of our line facing south and southwest.
He supported Sheridan with one division (Baird's), while his other
division under Johnson remained in the trenches, under arms, ready to be
moved to any point. Howard's corps was moved in rear of the centre.  The
picket lines were within a few hundred yards of each other.  At two
o'clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance.  By this time the
clouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his elevated position
all that was going on.  The signal for advance was given by a booming of
cannon from Fort Wood and other points on the line.  The rebel pickets
were soon driven back upon the main guards, which occupied minor and
detached heights between the main ridge and our lines.  These too were
carried before halting, and before the enemy had time to reinforce their
advance guards.  But it was not without loss on both sides. This
movement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we
occupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied up to
this time.  The fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other
way.  During the following night they were made strong.  We lost in this
preliminary action about eleven hundred killed and wounded, while the
enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were
captured. With the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up from
Missionary Ridge and Fort Wood until night closed in, this ended the
fighting for the first day.

The advantage was greatly on our side now, and if I could only have been
assured that Burnside could hold out ten days longer I should have
rested more easily.  But we were doing the best we could for him and the
cause.

By the night of the 23d Sherman's command was in a position to move,
though one division (Osterhaus's) had not yet crossed the river at
Brown's Ferry.  The continuous rise in the Tennessee had rendered it
impossible to keep the bridge at that point in condition for troops to
cross; but I was determined to move that night even without this
division.  Orders were sent to Osterhaus accordingly to report to
Hooker, if he could not cross by eight o'clock on the morning of the
24th.  Because of the break in the bridge, Hooker's orders were again
changed, but this time only back to those first given to him.

General W. F. Smith had been assigned to duty as Chief Engineer of the
Military Division.  To him were given the general direction of moving
troops by the boats from North Chickamauga, laying the bridge after they
reached their position, and generally all the duties pertaining to his
office of chief engineer.  During the night General Morgan L. Smith's
division was marched to the point where the pontoons were, and the
brigade of Giles A. Smith was selected for the delicate duty of manning
the boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the south bank of the
river.  During this night also General J. M. Brannan, chief of
artillery, moved forty pieces of artillery, belonging to the Army of the
Cumberland, and placed them on the north side of the river so as to
command the ground opposite, to aid in protecting the approach to the
point where the south end of the bridge was to rest.  He had to use
Sherman's artillery horses for this purpose, Thomas having none.

At two o'clock in the morning, November 24th, Giles A. Smith pushed out
from the North Chickamauga with his one hundred and sixteen boats, each
loaded with thirty brave and well-armed men.  The boats with their
precious freight dropped down quietly with the current to avoid
attracting the attention of any one who could convey information to the
enemy, until arriving near the mouth of South Chickamauga. Here a few
boats were landed, the troops debarked, and a rush was made upon the
picket guard known to be at that point.  The guard were surprised, and
twenty of their number captured.  The remainder of the troops effected a
landing at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally good
results.  The work of ferrying over Sherman's command from the north
side of the Tennessee was at once commenced, using the pontoons for the
purpose.  A steamer was also brought up from the town to assist.  The
rest of M. L. Smith's division came first, then the division of John E.
Smith.  The troops as they landed were put to work intrenching their
position.  By daylight the two entire divisions were over, and well
covered by the works they had built.

The work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery and
cavalry, was now begun.  The ferrying over the infantry was continued
with the steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons, however, as fast
as they were wanted to put in their place in the bridge.  By a little
past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the South
Chickamauga connecting the troops left on that side with their comrades
below, and all the infantry and artillery were on the south bank of the
Tennessee.

Sherman at once formed his troops for assault on Missionary Ridge.  By
one o'clock he started with M. L. Smith on his left, keeping nearly the
course of Chickamauga River; J. E. Smith next to the right and a little
to the rear; and Ewing still farther to the right and also a little to
the rear of J. E. Smith's command, in column, ready to deploy to the
right if an enemy should come from that direction.  A good skirmish line
preceded each of these columns.  Soon the foot of the hill was reached;
the skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by their supports.
By half-past three Sherman was in possession of the height without
having sustained much loss.  A brigade from each division was now
brought up, and artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand.
The enemy did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of the
hill was gained.  There had been a drizzling rain during the day, and
the clouds were so low that Lookout Mountain and the top of Missionary
Ridge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley.  But now the
enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts with
their skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail.  Later in the
day a more determined attack was made, but this, too, failed, and
Sherman was left to fortify what he had gained.

Sherman's cavalry took up its line of march soon after the bridge was
completed, and by half-past three the whole of it was over both bridges
and on its way to strike the enemy's communications at Chickamauga
Station.  All of Sherman's command was now south of the Tennessee.
During the afternoon General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded and
carried from the field.

Thomas having done on the 23d what was expected of him on the 24th,
there was nothing for him to do this day except to strengthen his
position.  Howard, however, effected a crossing of Citico Creek and a
junction with Sherman, and was directed to report to him.  With two or
three regiments of his command he moved in the morning along the banks
of the Tennessee, and reached the point where the bridge was being laid.
He went out on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end,
and saw Sherman superintending the work from the north side and moving
himself south as fast as an additional boat was put in and the roadway
put upon it.  Howard reported to his new chief across the chasm between
them, which was now narrow and in a few minutes closed.

While these operations were going on to the east of Chattanooga, Hooker
was engaged on the west.  He had three divisions: Osterhaus's, of the
15th corps, Army of the Tennessee; Geary's, 12th corps, Army of the
Potomac; and Cruft's, 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland.  Geary was on
the right at Wauhatchie, Cruft at the centre, and Osterhaus near Brown's
Ferry.  These troops were all west of Lookout Creek.  The enemy had the
east bank of the creek strongly picketed and intrenched, and three
brigades of troops in the rear to reinforce them if attacked.  These
brigades occupied the summit of the mountain.  General Carter L.
Stevenson was in command of the whole.  Why any troops, except artillery
with a small infantry guard, were kept on the mountain-top, I do not
see.  A hundred men could have held the summit--which is a palisade for
more than thirty feet down--against the assault of any number of men
from the position Hooker occupied.

The side of Lookout Mountain confronting Hooker's command was rugged,
heavily timbered, and full of chasms, making it difficult to advance
with troops, even in the absence of an opposing force.  Farther up, the
ground becomes more even and level, and was in cultivation.  On the east
side the <DW72> is much more gradual, and a good wagon road, zigzagging
up it, connects the town of Chattanooga with the summit.

Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved Geary's division,
supported by a brigade of Cruft's, up Lookout Creek, to effect a
crossing.  The remainder of Cruft's division was to seize the bridge
over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad. Osterhaus was to move
up to the bridge and cross it.  The bridge was seized by Gross's brigade
after a slight skirmish with the pickets guarding it.  This attracted
the enemy so that Geary's movement farther up was not observed.  A heavy
mist obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of the
mountain.  He crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured the
picket of over forty men on guard near by.  He then commenced ascending
the mountain directly in his front.  By this time the enemy was seen
coming down from their camps on the mountain <DW72>, and filing into
their rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the bridge.  By eleven
o'clock the bridge was complete.  Osterhaus was up, and after some sharp
skirmishing the enemy was driven away with considerable loss in killed
and captured.

While the operations at the bridge were progressing, Geary was pushing
up the hill over great obstacles, resisted by the enemy directly in his
front, and in face of the guns on top of the mountain.  The enemy,
seeing their left flank and rear menaced, gave way, and were followed by
Cruft and Osterhaus.  Soon these were up abreast of Geary, and the whole
command pushed up the hill, driving the enemy in advance.  By noon Geary
had gained the open ground on the north <DW72> of the mountain, with his
right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were strong
fortifications in his front.  The rest of the command coming up, a line
was formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth of
Chattanooga Creek.

Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Knob.  Hooker's advance now made
our line a continuous one.  It was in full view, extending from the
Tennessee River, where Sherman had crossed, up Chickamauga River to the
base of Mission Ridge, over the top of the north end of the ridge to
Chattanooga Valley, then along parallel to the ridge a mile or more,
across the valley to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek, thence up the <DW72>
of Lookout Mountain to the foot of the upper palisade.  The day was
hazy, so that Hooker's operations were not visible to us except at
moments when the clouds would rise.  But the sound of his artillery and
musketry was heard incessantly.  The enemy on his front was partially
fortified, but was soon driven out of his works.  During the afternoon
the clouds, which had so obscured the top of Lookout all day as to hide
whatever was going on from the view of those below, settled down and
made it so dark where Hooker was as to stop operations for the time.  At
four o'clock Hooker reported his position as impregnable.  By a little
after five direct communication was established, and a brigade of troops
was sent from Chattanooga to reinforce him.  These troops had to cross
Chattanooga Creek and met with some opposition, but soon overcame it,
and by night the commander, General Carlin, reported to Hooker and was
assigned to his left.  I now telegraphed to Washington:  "The fight
to-day progressed favorably.  Sherman carried the end of Missionary
Ridge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and his left at Chickamauga
Creek. Troops from Lookout Valley carried the point of the mountain, and
now hold the eastern <DW72> and a point high up.  Hooker reports two
thousand prisoners taken, besides which a small number have fallen into
our hands from Missionary Ridge."  The next day the President replied:
"Your dispatches as to fighting on Monday and Tuesday are here.  Well
done. Many thanks to all.  Remember Burnside."  And Halleck also
telegraphed: "I congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans.
I fear that Burnside is hard pushed, and that any further delay may
prove fatal.  I know you will do all in your power to relieve him."

The division of Jefferson C. Davis, Army of the Cumberland, had been
sent to the North Chickamauga to guard the pontoons as they were
deposited in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress of
citizens.  On the night of the 24th his division, having crossed with
Sherman, occupied our extreme left from the upper bridge over the plain
to the north base of Missionary Ridge. Firing continued to a late hour
in the night, but it was not connected with an assault at any point.



CHAPTER XLIV.

BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA--A GALLANT CHARGE--COMPLETE ROUT OF THE ENEMY
--PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES--GENERAL BRAGG--REMARKS ON CHATTANOOGA.

At twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, I began to give orders
for the next day, and sent a dispatch to Willcox to encourage Burnside.
Sherman was directed to attack at daylight.  Hooker was ordered to move
at the same hour, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if he
still remained; if he had gone, then to move directly to Rossville and
operate against the left and rear of the force on Missionary Ridge.
Thomas was not to move until Hooker had reached Missionary Ridge.  As I
was with him on Orchard Knob, he would not move without further orders
from me.

The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field was
in full view from the top of Orchard Knob.  It remained so all day.
Bragg's headquarters were in full view, and officers--presumably staff
officers--could be seen coming and going constantly.

The point of ground which Sherman had carried on the 24th was almost
disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. A low pass, over
which there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and near which there is a
railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two hills.  The problem now was
to get to the main ridge. The enemy was fortified on the point; and back
farther, where the ground was still higher, was a second fortification
commanding the first.  Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to
see, and by sunrise his command was in motion.  Three brigades held the
hill already gained.  Morgan L. Smith moved along the east base of
Missionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base, supported by two brigades
of John E. Smith's division; and Corse with his brigade was between the
two, moving directly towards the hill to be captured.  The ridge is
steep and heavily wooded on the east side, where M. L. Smith's troops
were advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle <DW72> on the west
side.  The troops advanced rapidly and carried the extreme end of the
rebel works.  Morgan L. Smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy
off from the railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by
rail from Chickamauga Station, where the main depot was located.  The
enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from the
position we had gained, but without success.  The contest lasted for two
hours.  Corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly wounded in
this assault.  Sherman now threatened both Bragg's flank and his stores,
and made it necessary for him to weaken other points of his line to
strengthen his right.  From the position I occupied I could see column
after column of Bragg's forces moving against Sherman.  Every
Confederate gun that could be brought to bear upon the Union forces was
concentrated upon him.  J. E. Smith, with two brigades, charged up the
west side of the ridge to the support of Corse's command, over open
ground and in the face of a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry,
and reached the very parapet of the enemy.  He lay here for a time, but
the enemy coming with a heavy force upon his right flank, he was
compelled to fall back, followed by the foe.  A few hundred yards
brought Smith's troops into a wood, where they were speedily reformed,
when they charged and drove the attacking party back to his
intrenchments.

Seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of J. E. Smith from the
position I occupied, I directed Thomas to send a division to reinforce
him.  Baird's division was accordingly sent from the right of Orchard
Knob.  It had to march a considerable distance directly under the eye of
the enemy to reach its position.  Bragg at once commenced massing in the
same direction.  This was what I wanted.  But it had now got to be late
in the afternoon, and I had expected before this to see Hooker crossing
the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville and compelling Bragg to mass
in that direction also.

The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain during the night, as I expected
he would.  In crossing the valley he burned the bridge over Chattanooga
Creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him.  Hooker
was off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distance
and the destruction above named.  He was detained four hours crossing
Chattanooga Creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expected
from his forces.  His reaching Bragg's flank and extending across it was
to be the signal for Thomas's assault of the ridge.  But Sherman's
condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could
not be delayed any longer.

Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early
morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. I now directed
Thomas to order the charge at once (*16). I watched eagerly to see the
effect, and became impatient at last that there was no indication of any
charge being made.  The centre of the line which was to make the charge
was near where Thomas and I stood, but concealed from view by an
intervening forest.  Turning to Thomas to inquire what caused the delay,
I was surprised to see Thomas J. Wood, one of the division commanders
who was to make the charge, standing talking to him.  I spoke to General
Wood, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour before.  He
replied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, but
that he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice.  I told him
to make the charge at once.  He was off in a moment, and in an
incredibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and Sheridan were
driving the enemy's advance before them towards Missionary Ridge.  The
Confederates were strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in front
of us, and had a second line half-way down and another at the base. Our
men drove the troops in front of the lower line of rifle-pits so
rapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel and Union troops went
over the first line of works almost at the same time.  Many rebels were
captured and sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends higher
up the hill.  Those that were not captured retreated, and were pursued.
The retreating hordes being between friends and pursuers caused the
enemy to fire high to avoid killing their own men.  In fact, on that
occasion the Union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position.
Without awaiting further orders or stopping to reform, on our troops
went to the second line of works; over that and on for the crest--thus
effectually carrying out my orders of the 18th for the battle and of the
24th (*17) for this charge.

I watched their progress with intense interest.  The fire along the
rebel line was terrific.  Cannon and musket balls filled the air:  but
the damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition expended.  The
pursuit continued until the crest was reached, and soon our men were
seen climbing over the Confederate barriers at different points in front
of both Sheridan's and Wood's divisions.  The retreat of the enemy along
most of his line was precipitate and the panic so great that Bragg and
his officers lost all control over their men.  Many were captured, and
thousands threw away their arms in their flight.

Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River at a
point above where the enemy crossed.  He met some resistance from troops
occupying a second hill in rear of Missionary Ridge, probably to cover
the retreat of the main body and of the artillery and trains.  It was
now getting dark, but Sheridan, without halting on that account pushed
his men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting the
attention of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the right
and left to surround the position.  The enemy discovered the movement
before these dispositions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat,
leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many prisoners in our hands.  To
Sheridan's prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland, and the nation,
are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and
small-arms that day. Except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this way
would not have been accomplished.

While the advance up Mission Ridge was going forward, General Thomas
with staff, General Gordon Granger, commander of the corps making the
assault, and myself and staff occupied Orchard Knob, from which the
entire field could be observed.  The moment the troops were seen going
over the last line of rebel defences, I ordered Granger to join his
command, and mounting my horse I rode to the front.  General Thomas left
about the same time. Sheridan on the extreme right was already in
pursuit of the enemy east of the ridge.  Wood, who commanded the
division to the left of Sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback in
the charge, but did not join Sheridan in the pursuit.  To the left, in
Baird's front where Bragg's troops had massed against Sherman, the
resistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted longer.  I ordered
Granger to follow the enemy with Wood's division, but he was so much
excited, and kept up such a roar of musketry in the direction the enemy
had taken, that by the time I could stop the firing the enemy had got
well out of the way.  The enemy confronting Sherman, now seeing
everything to their left giving way, fled also.  Sherman, however, was
not aware of the extent of our success until after nightfall, when he
received orders to pursue at daylight in the morning.

As soon as Sherman discovered that the enemy had left his front he
directed his reserves, Davis's division of the Army of the Cumberland,
to push over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the Chickamauga, and to
move forward to Chickamauga Station.  He ordered Howard to move up the
stream some two miles to where there was an old bridge, repair it during
the night, and follow Davis at four o'clock in the morning.  Morgan L.
Smith was ordered to reconnoitre the tunnel to see if that was still
held.  Nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both armies.
The rest of Sherman's command was directed to follow Howard at daylight
in the morning to get on to the railroad towards Graysville.

Hooker, as stated, was detained at Chattanooga Creek by the destruction
of the bridge at that point.  He got his troops over, with the exception
of the artillery, by fording the stream at a little after three o'clock.
Leaving his artillery to follow when the bridge should be reconstructed,
he pushed on with the remainder of his command.  At Rossville he came
upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a
retreat along the ridge.  This threw them on Palmer.  They could make
but little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as many
of them as could do so escaped.  Many, however, were captured.  Hooker's
position during the night of the 25th was near Rossville, extending east
of the ridge.  Palmer was on his left, on the road to Graysville.

During the night I telegraphed to Willcox that Bragg had been defeated,
and that immediate relief would be sent to Burnside if he could hold
out; to Halleck I sent an announcement of our victory, and informed him
that forces would be sent up the valley to relieve Burnside.

Before the battle of Chattanooga opened I had taken measures for the
relief of Burnside the moment the way should be clear. Thomas was
directed to have the little steamer that had been built at Chattanooga
loaded to its capacity with rations and ammunition.  Granger's corps was
to move by the south bank of the Tennessee River to the mouth of the
Holston, and up that to Knoxville accompanied by the boat.  In addition
to the supplies transported by boat, the men were to carry forty rounds
of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days' rations in
haversacks.

In the battle of Chattanooga, troops from the Army of the Potomac, from
the Army of the Tennessee, and from the Army of the Cumberland
participated.  In fact, the accidents growing out of the heavy rains and
the sudden rise in the Tennessee River so mingled the troops that the
organizations were not kept together, under their respective commanders,
during the battle.  Hooker, on the right, had Geary's division of the
12th corps, Army of the Potomac; Osterhaus's division of the 15th corps,
Army of the Tennessee; and Cruft's division of the Army of the
Cumberland.  Sherman had three divisions of his own army, Howard's corps
from the Army of the Potomac, and Jefferson C. Davis's division of the
Army of the Cumberland.  There was no jealousy--hardly rivalry.  Indeed,
I doubt whether officers or men took any note at the time of the fact of
this intermingling of commands.  All saw a defiant foe surrounding them,
and took it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him,
and it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end was
accomplished.

The victory at Chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the
advantage the enemy had of position, and was accomplished more easily
than was expected by reason of Bragg's making several grave mistakes:
first, in sending away his ablest corps commander with over twenty
thousand troops; second, in sending away a division of troops on the eve
of battle; third, in placing so much of a force on the plain in front of
his impregnable position.

It was known that Mr. Jefferson Davis had visited Bragg on Missionary
Ridge a short time before my reaching Chattanooga. It was reported and
believed that he had come out to reconcile a serious difference between
Bragg and Longstreet, and finding this difficult to do, planned the
campaign against Knoxville, to be conducted by the latter general.  I
had known both Bragg and Longstreet before the war, the latter very
well.  We had been three years at West Point together, and, after my
graduation, for a time in the same regiment.  Then we served together in
the Mexican War.  I had known Bragg in Mexico, and met him occasionally
subsequently.  I could well understand how there might be an
irreconcilable difference between them.

Bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man, professionally
and otherwise.  He was also thoroughly upright. But he was possessed of
an irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious.  A man of the
highest moral character and the most correct habits, yet in the old army
he was in frequent trouble. As a subordinate he was always on the
lookout to catch his commanding officer infringing his prerogatives; as
a post commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest
neglect, even of the most trivial order.

I have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of Bragg.
On one occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies commanded
by a field officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies and
at the same time acting as post quartermaster and commissary.  He was
first lieutenant at the time, but his captain was detached on other
duty.  As commander of the company he made a requisition upon the
quartermaster--himself--for something he wanted.  As quartermaster he
declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed on the back of it his
reasons for so doing.  As company commander he responded to this, urging
that his requisition called for nothing but what he was entitled to, and
that it was the duty of the quartermaster to fill it.  As quartermaster
he still persisted that he was right.  In this condition of affairs
Bragg referred the whole matter to the commanding officer of the post.
The latter, when he saw the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed:
"My God, Mr. Bragg, you have quarrelled with every officer in the army,
and now you are quarrelling with yourself!"

Longstreet was an entirely different man.  He was brave, honest,
intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his superiors, just
and kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which he
had the courage to maintain.  He was never on the lookout to detect a
slight, but saw one as soon as anybody when intentionally given.

It may be that Longstreet was not sent to Knoxville for the reason
stated, but because Mr. Davis had an exalted opinion of his own military
genius, and thought he saw a chance of "killing two birds with one
stone."  On several occasions during the war he came to the relief of
the Union army by means of his SUPERIOR MILITARY GENIUS.

I speak advisedly when I saw Mr. Davis prided himself on his military
capacity.  He says so himself, virtually, in his answer to the notice of
his nomination to the Confederate presidency. Some of his generals have
said so in their writings since the downfall of the Confederacy.

My recollection is that my first orders for the battle of Chattanooga
were as fought.  Sherman was to get on Missionary Ridge, as he did;
Hooker to cross the north end of Lookout Mountain, as he did, sweep
across Chattanooga Valley and get across the south end of the ridge near
Rossville.  When Hooker had secured that position the Army of the
Cumberland was to assault in the centre.  Before Sherman arrived,
however, the order was so changed as that Hooker was directed to come to
Chattanooga by the north bank of the Tennessee River.  The waters in the
river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at Brown's
Ferry could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossing
troops upon it.  For this reason Hooker's orders were changed by
telegraph back to what they were originally.------

NOTE.--From this point on this volume was written (with the exception of
the campaign in the Wilderness, which had been previously written) by
General Grant, after his great illness in April, and the present
arrangement of the subject-matter was made by him between the 10th and
18th of July, 1885.



CHAPTER XLV.

THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE--HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE--VISITING
KNOXVILLE-CIPHER DISPATCHES--WITHHOLDING ORDERS.

Chattanooga now being secure to the National troops beyond any doubt, I
immediately turned my attention to relieving Knoxville, about the
situation of which the President, in particular, was very anxious.
Prior to the battles, I had made preparations for sending troops to the
relief of Burnside at the very earliest moment after securing
Chattanooga. We had there two little steamers which had been built and
fitted up from the remains of old boats and put in condition to run.
General Thomas was directed to have one of these boats loaded with
rations and ammunition and move up the Tennessee River to the mouth of
the Holston, keeping the boat all the time abreast of the troops.
General Granger, with the 4th corps reinforced to make twenty thousand
men, was to start the moment Missionary Ridge was carried, and under no
circumstances were the troops to return to their old camps.  With the
provisions carried, and the little that could be got in the country, it
was supposed he could hold out until Longstreet was driven away, after
which event East Tennessee would furnish abundance of food for
Burnside's army and his own also.

While following the enemy on the 26th, and again on the morning of the
27th, part of the time by the road to Ringgold, I directed Thomas,
verbally, not to start Granger until he received further orders from me;
advising him that I was going to the front to more fully see the
situation.  I was not right sure but that Bragg's troops might be over
their stampede by the time they reached Dalton.  In that case Bragg
might think it well to take the road back to Cleveland, move thence
towards Knoxville, and, uniting with Longstreet, make a sudden dash upon
Burnside.

When I arrived at Ringgold, however, on the 27th, I saw that the retreat
was most earnest.  The enemy had been throwing away guns, caissons and
small-arms, abandoning provisions, and, altogether, seemed to be moving
like a disorganized mob, with the exception of Cleburne's division,
which was acting as rear-guard to cover the retreat.

When Hooker moved from Rossville toward Ringgold Palmer's division took
the road to Graysville, and Sherman moved by the way of Chickamauga
Station toward the same point.  As soon as I saw the situation at
Ringgold I sent a staff officer back to Chattanooga to advise Thomas of
the condition of affairs, and direct him by my orders to start Granger
at once.  Feeling now that the troops were already on the march for the
relief of Burnside I was in no hurry to get back, but stayed at Ringgold
through the day to prepare for the return of our troops.

Ringgold is in a valley in the mountains, situated between East
Chickamauga Creek and Taylor's Ridge, and about twenty miles south-east
from Chattanooga. I arrived just as the artillery that Hooker had left
behind at Chattanooga Creek got up.  His men were attacking Cleburne's
division, which had taken a strong position in the adjacent hills so as
to cover the retreat of the Confederate army through a narrow gorge
which presents itself at that point.  Just beyond the gorge the valley
is narrow, and the creek so tortuous that it has to be crossed a great
many times in the course of the first mile.  This attack was
unfortunate, and cost us some men unnecessarily.  Hooker captured,
however, 3 pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners, and 130 rebel dead
were left upon the field.

I directed General Hooker to collect the flour and wheat in the
neighboring mills for the use of the troops, and then to destroy the
mills and all other property that could be of use to the enemy, but not
to make any wanton destruction.

At this point Sherman came up, having reached Graysville with his
troops, where he found Palmer had preceded him.  Palmer had picked up
many prisoners and much abandoned property on the route.  I went back in
the evening to Graysville with Sherman, remained there over night and
did not return to Chattanooga until the following night, the 29th.  I
then found that Thomas had not yet started Granger, thus having lost a
full day which I deemed of so much importance in determining the fate of
Knoxville.  Thomas and Granger were aware that on the 23d of the month
Burnside had telegraphed that his supplies would last for ten or twelve
days and during that time he could hold out against Longstreet, but if
not relieved within the time indicated he would be obliged to surrender
or attempt to retreat.  To effect a retreat would have been an
impossibility.  He was already very low in ammunition, and with an army
pursuing he would not have been able to gather supplies.

Finding that Granger had not only not started but was very reluctant to
go, he having decided for himself that it was a very bad move to make, I
sent word to General Sherman of the situation and directed him to march
to the relief of Knoxville.  I also gave him the problem that we had to
solve--that Burnside had now but four to six days supplies left, and
that he must be relieved within that time.

Sherman, fortunately, had not started on his return from Graysville,
having sent out detachments on the railroad which runs from Dalton to
Cleveland and Knoxville to thoroughly destroy that road, and these
troops had not yet returned to camp.  I was very loath to send Sherman,
because his men needed rest after their long march from Memphis and hard
fighting at Chattanooga. But I had become satisfied that Burnside would
not be rescued if his relief depended upon General Granger's movements.

Sherman had left his camp on the north side of the Tennessee River, near
Chattanooga, on the night of the 23d, the men having two days' cooked
rations in their haversacks.  Expecting to be back in their tents by
that time and to be engaged in battle while out, they took with them
neither overcoats nor blankets. The weather was already cold, and at
night they must have suffered more or less.  The two days' rations had
already lasted them five days; and they were now to go through a country
which had been run over so much by Confederate troops that there was but
little probability of finding much food.  They did, however, succeed in
capturing some flour.  They also found a good deal of bran in some of
the mills, which the men made up into bread; and in this and other ways
they eked out an existence until they could reach Knoxville.

I was so very anxious that Burnside should get news of the steps being
taken for his relief, and thus induce him to hold out a little longer if
it became necessary, that I determined to send a message to him.  I
therefore sent a member of my staff, Colonel J. H. Wilson, to get into
Knoxville if he could report to Burnside the situation fully, and give
him all the encouragement possible.  Mr. Charles A. Dana was at
Chattanooga during the battle, and had been there even before I assumed
command.  Mr. Dana volunteered to accompany Colonel Wilson, and did
accompany him.  I put the information of what was being done for the
relief of Knoxville into writing, and directed that in some way or other
it must be secretly managed so as to have a copy of this fall into the
hands of General Longstreet.  They made the trip safely; General
Longstreet did learn of Sherman's coming in advance of his reaching
there, and Burnside was prepared to hold out even for a longer time if
it had been necessary.

Burnside had stretched a boom across the Holston River to catch scows
and flats as they floated down.  On these, by previous arrangements with
the loyal people of East Tennessee, were placed flour and corn, with
forage and provisions generally, and were thus secured for the use of
the Union troops.  They also drove cattle into Knoxville by the east
side, which was not covered by the enemy; so that when relief arrived
Burnside had more provisions on hand than when he had last reported.

Our total loss (not including Burnside's) in all these engagements
amounted to 757 killed, 4,529 wounded and 330 missing.  We captured
6,142 prisoners--about 50 per cent. more than the enemy reported for
their total loss--40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and
caissons and over 7,000 stands of small-arms.  The enemy's loss in arms
was probably much greater than here reported, because we picked up a
great many that were found abandoned.

I had at Chattanooga, in round numbers, about 60,000 men.  Bragg had
about half this number, but his position was supposed to be impregnable.
It was his own fault that he did not have more men present.  He had sent
Longstreet away with his corps swelled by reinforcements up to over
twenty thousand men, thus reducing his own force more than one-third and
depriving himself of the presence of the ablest general of his command.
He did this, too, after our troops had opened a line of communication by
way of Brown's and Kelly's ferries with Bridgeport, thus securing full
rations and supplies of every kind; and also when he knew reinforcements
were coming to me.  Knoxville was of no earthly use to him while
Chattanooga was in our hands.  If he should capture Chattanooga,
Knoxville with its garrison would have fallen into his hands without a
struggle.  I have never been able to see the wisdom of this move.

Then, too, after Sherman had arrived, and when Bragg knew that he was on
the north side of the Tennessee River, he sent Buckner's division to
reinforce Longstreet.  He also started another division a day later, but
our attack having commenced before it reached Knoxville Bragg ordered it
back.  It had got so far, however, that it could not return to
Chattanooga in time to be of service there.  It is possible this latter
blunder may have been made by Bragg having become confused as to what
was going on on our side.  Sherman had, as already stated, crossed to
the north side of the Tennessee River at Brown's Ferry, in full view of
Bragg's troops from Lookout Mountain, a few days before the attack.
They then disappeared behind foot hills, and did not come to the view of
the troops on Missionary Ridge until they met their assault.  Bragg knew
it was Sherman's troops that had crossed, and, they being so long out of
view, may have supposed that they had gone up the north bank of the
Tennessee River to the relief of Knoxville and that Longstreet was
therefore in danger.  But the first great blunder, detaching Longstreet,
cannot be accounted for in any way I know of.  If he had captured
Chattanooga, East Tennessee would have fallen without a struggle.  It
would have been a victory for us to have got our army away from
Chattanooga safely.  It was a manifold greater victory to drive away the
besieging army; a still greater one to defeat that army in his chosen
ground and nearly annihilate it.

The probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as we
were the attacking party.  The enemy reported his loss in killed at 361:
but as he reported his missing at 4,146, while we held over 6,000 of
them as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds if not thousands
who deserted, but little reliance can be placed on this report.  There
was certainly great dissatisfaction with Bragg on the part of the
soldiers for his harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get away
if they could.  Then, too, Chattanooga, following in the same half year
with Gettysburg in the East and Vicksburg in the West, there was much
the same feeling in the South at this time that there had been in the
North the fall and winter before.  If the same license had been allowed
the people and press in the South that was allowed in the North,
Chattanooga would probably have been the last battle fought for the
preservation of the Union.

General William F. Smith's services in these battles had been such that
I thought him eminently entitled to promotion.  I was aware that he had
previously been named by the President for promotion to the grade of
major-general, but that the Senate had rejected the nomination.  I was
not aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore strongly
recommended him for a major-generalcy.  My recommendation was heeded and
the appointment made.

Upon the raising of the siege of Knoxville I, of course, informed the
authorities at Washington--the President and Secretary of War--of the
fact, which caused great rejoicing there.  The President especially was
rejoiced that Knoxville had been relieved (*18) without further
bloodshed.  The safety of Burnside's army and the loyal people of East
Tennessee had been the subject of much anxiety to the President for
several months, during which time he was doing all he could to relieve
the situation; sending a new commander (*19) with a few thousand troops
by the way of Cumberland Gap, and telegraphing me daily, almost hourly,
to "remember Burnside," "do something for Burnside," and other appeals
of like tenor.  He saw no escape for East Tennessee until after our
victory at Chattanooga. Even then he was afraid that Burnside might be
out of ammunition, in a starving condition, or overpowered:  and his
anxiety was still intense until he heard that Longstreet had been driven
from the field.

Burnside followed Longstreet only to Strawberry Plains, some twenty
miles or more east, and then stopped, believing that Longstreet would
leave the State.  The latter did not do so, however, but stopped only a
short distance farther on and subsisted his army for the entire winter
off East Tennessee. Foster now relieved Burnside.  Sherman made
disposition of his troops along the Tennessee River in accordance with
instructions.  I left Thomas in command at Chattanooga, and, about the
20th of December, moved my headquarters to Nashville, Tennessee.

Nashville was the most central point from which to communicate with my
entire military division, and also with the authorities at Washington.
While remaining at Chattanooga I was liable to have my telegraphic
communications cut so as to throw me out of communication with both my
command and Washington.

Nothing occurred at Nashville worthy of mention during the winter, (*20)
so I set myself to the task of having troops in positions from which
they could move to advantage, and in collecting all necessary supplies
so as to be ready to claim a due share of the enemy's attention upon the
appearance of the first good weather in the spring.  I expected to
retain the command I then had, and prepared myself for the campaign
against Atlanta. I also had great hopes of having a campaign made
against Mobile from the Gulf.  I expected after Atlanta fell to occupy
that place permanently, and to cut off Lee's army from the West by way
of the road running through Augusta to Atlanta and thence south-west.  I
was preparing to hold Atlanta with a small garrison, and it was my
expectation to push through to Mobile if that city was in our
possession:  if not, to Savannah; and in this manner to get possession
of the only east and west railroad that would then be left to the enemy.
But the spring campaign against Mobile was not made.

The Army of the Ohio had been getting supplies over Cumberland Gap until
their animals had nearly all starved.  I now determined to go myself to
see if there was any possible chance of using that route in the spring,
and if not to abandon it. Accordingly I left Nashville in the latter
part of December by rail for Chattanooga. From Chattanooga I took one of
the little steamers previously spoken of as having been built there,
and, putting my horses aboard, went up to the junction of the Clinch
with the Tennessee.  From that point the railroad had been repaired up
to Knoxville and out east to Strawberry Plains.  I went by rail
therefore to Knoxville, where I remained for several days.  General John
G. Foster was then commanding the Department of the Ohio.  It was an
intensely cold winter, the thermometer being down as low as zero every
morning for more than a week while I was at Knoxville and on my way from
there on horseback to Lexington, Kentucky, the first point where I could
reach rail to carry me back to my headquarters at Nashville.

The road over Cumberland Gap, and back of it, was strewn with debris of
broken wagons and dead animals, much as I had found it on my first trip
to Chattanooga over Waldron's Ridge.  The road had been cut up to as
great a depth as clay could be by mules and wagons, and in that
condition frozen; so that the ride of six days from Strawberry Plains to
Lexington over these holes and knobs in the road was a very cheerless
one, and very disagreeable.

I found a great many people at home along that route, both in Tennessee
and Kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely loyal.  They would
collect in little places where we would stop of evenings, to see me,
generally hearing of my approach before we arrived.  The people
naturally expected to see the commanding general the oldest person in
the party.  I was then forty-one years of age, while my medical director
was gray-haired and probably twelve or more years my senior.  The crowds
would generally swarm around him, and thus give me an opportunity of
quietly dismounting and getting into the house.  It also gave me an
opportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to another
about their general.  Those remarks were apt to be more complimentary to
the cause than to the appearance of the supposed general, owing to his
being muffled up, and also owing to the travel-worn condition we were
all in after a hard day's ride.  I was back in Nashville by the 13th of
January, 1864.

When I started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some person
along who could turn dispatches into cipher, and who could also read the
cipher dispatches which I was liable to receive daily and almost hourly.
Under the rules of the War Department at that time, Mr. Stanton had
taken entire control of the matter of regulating the telegraph and
determining how it should be used, and of saying who, and who alone,
should have the ciphers.  The operators possessed of the ciphers, as
well as the ciphers used, were practically independent of the commanders
whom they were serving immediately under, and had to report to the War
Department through General Stager all the dispatches which they received
or forwarded.

I was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator back at Nashville,
because that was the point at which all dispatches to me would come, to
be forwarded from there.  As I have said, it was necessary for me also
to have an operator during this inspection who had possession of this
cipher to enable me to telegraph to my division and to the War
Department without my dispatches being read by all the operators along
the line of wires over which they were transmitted.  Accordingly I
ordered the cipher operator to turn over the key to Captain Cyrus B.
Comstock, of the Corps of Engineers, whom I had selected as a wise and
discreet man who certainly could be trusted with the cipher if the
operator at my headquarters could.

The operator refused point blank to turn over the key to Captain
Comstock as directed by me, stating that his orders from the War
Department were not to give it to anybody--the commanding general or any
one else.  I told him I would see whether he would or not.  He said that
if he did he would be punished.  I told him if he did not he most
certainly would be punished. Finally, seeing that punishment was certain
if he refused longer to obey my order, and being somewhat remote (even
if he was not protected altogether from the consequences of his
disobedience to his orders) from the War Department, he yielded.  When I
returned from Knoxville I found quite a commotion.  The operator had
been reprimanded very severely and ordered to be relieved.  I informed
the Secretary of War, or his assistant secretary in charge of the
telegraph, Stager, that the man could not be relieved, for he had only
obeyed my orders.  It was absolutely necessary for me to have the
cipher, and the man would most certainly have been punished if he had
not delivered it; that they would have to punish me if they punished
anybody, or words to that effect.

This was about the only thing approaching a disagreeable difference
between the Secretary of War and myself that occurred until the war was
over, when we had another little spat.  Owing to his natural disposition
to assume all power and control in all matters that he had anything
whatever to do with, he boldly took command of the armies, and, while
issuing no orders on the subject, prohibited any order from me going out
of the adjutant-general's office until he had approved it.  This was
done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any orders that came from
me to be issued from the adjutant-general's office until he had examined
them and given his approval.  He never disturbed himself, either, in
examining my orders until it was entirely convenient for him; so that
orders which I had prepared would often lie there three or four days
before he would sanction them.  I remonstrated against this in writing,
and the Secretary apologetically restored me to my rightful position of
General-in-Chief of the Army.  But he soon lapsed again and took control
much as before.

After the relief of Knoxville Sherman had proposed to Burnside that he
should go with him to drive Longstreet out of Tennessee; but Burnside
assured him that with the troops which had been brought by Granger, and
which were to be left, he would be amply prepared to dispose of
Longstreet without availing himself of this offer.  As before stated
Sherman's command had left their camps north of the Tennessee, near
Chattanooga, with two days' rations in their haversacks, without coats
or blankets, and without many wagons, expecting to return to their camps
by the end of that time.  The weather was now cold and they were
suffering, but still they were ready to make the further sacrifice, had
it been required, for the good of the cause which had brought them into
service.  Sherman, having accomplished the object for which he was sent,
marched back leisurely to his old camp on the Tennessee River.



CHAPTER XLVI.

OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI--LONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEE--COMMISSIONED
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL--COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES--FIRST
INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

Soon after his return from Knoxville I ordered Sherman to distribute his
forces from Stevenson to Decatur and thence north to Nashville; Sherman
suggested that he be permitted to go back to Mississippi, to the limits
of his own department and where most of his army still remained, for the
purpose of clearing out what Confederates might still be left on the
east bank of the Mississippi River to impede its navigation by our
boats.  He expected also to have the co-operation of Banks to do the
same thing on the west shore.  Of course I approved heartily.

About the 10th of January Sherman was back in Memphis, where Hurlbut
commanded, and got together his Memphis men, or ordered them collected
and sent to Vicksburg.  He then went to Vicksburg and out to where
McPherson was in command, and had him organize his surplus troops so as
to give him about 20,000 men in all.

Sherman knew that General (Bishop) Polk was occupying Meridian with his
headquarters, and had two divisions of infantry with a considerable
force of cavalry scattered west of him.  He determined, therefore, to
move directly upon Meridian.

I had sent some 2,500 cavalry under General Sooy Smith to Sherman's
department, and they had mostly arrived before Sherman got to Memphis.
Hurlbut had 7,000 cavalry, and Sherman ordered him to reinforce Smith so
as to give the latter a force of about 7,000 with which to go against
Forrest, who was then known to be south-east from Memphis.  Smith was
ordered to move about the 1st of February.

While Sherman was waiting at Vicksburg for the arrival of Hurlbut with
his surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain the position and
strength of the enemy and to bring back all the information they could
gather.  When these scouts returned it was through them that he got the
information of General Polk's being at Meridian, and of the strength and
disposition of his command.

Forrest had about 4,000 cavalry with him, composed of thoroughly
well-disciplined men, who under so able a leader were very effective.
Smith's command was nearly double that of Forrest, but not equal, man to
man, for the lack of a successful experience such as Forrest's men had
had.  The fact is, troops who have fought a few battles and won, and
followed up their victories, improve upon what they were before to an
extent that can hardly be counted by percentage.  The difference in
result is often decisive victory instead of inglorious defeat.  This
same difference, too, is often due to the way troops are officered, and
for the particular kind of warfare which Forrest had carried on neither
army could present a more effective officer than he was.

Sherman got off on the 3d of February and moved out on his expedition,
meeting with no opposition whatever until he crossed the Big Black, and
with no great deal of opposition after that until he reached Jackson,
Mississippi.  This latter place he reached on the 6th or 7th, Brandon on
the 8th, and Morton on the 9th.  Up to this time he moved in two columns
to enable him to get a good supply of forage, etc., and expedite the
march. Here, however, there were indications of the concentration of
Confederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep his army close
together.  He had no serious engagement; but he met some of the enemy
who destroyed a few of his wagons about Decatur, Mississippi, where, by
the way, Sherman himself came near being picked up.

He entered Meridian on the 14th of the month, the enemy having retreated
toward Demopolis, Alabama. He spent several days in Meridian in
thoroughly destroying the railroad to the north and south, and also for
the purpose of hearing from Sooy Smith, who he supposed had met Forrest
before this time and he hoped had gained a decisive victory because of a
superiority of numbers. Hearing nothing of him, however, he started on
his return trip to Vicksburg.  There he learned that Smith, while
waiting for a few of his men who had been ice-bound in the Ohio River,
instead of getting off on the 1st as expected, had not left until the
11th.  Smith did meet Forrest, but the result was decidedly in Forrest's
favor.

Sherman had written a letter to Banks, proposing a co-operative movement
with him against Shreveport, subject to my approval.  I disapproved of
Sherman's going himself, because I had other important work for him to
do, but consented that he might send a few troops to the aid of Banks,
though their time to remain absent must be limited.  We must have them
for the spring campaign.  The trans-Mississippi movement proved
abortive.

My eldest son, who had accompanied me on the Vicksburg campaign and
siege, had while there contracted disease, which grew worse, until he
had grown so dangerously ill that on the 24th of January I obtained
permission to go to St. Louis, where he was staying at the time, to see
him, hardly expecting to find him alive on my arrival.  While I was
permitted to go, I was not permitted to turn over my command to any one
else, but was directed to keep the headquarters with me and to
communicate regularly with all parts of my division and with Washington,
just as though I had remained at Nashville.

When I obtained this leave I was at Chattanooga, having gone there again
to make preparations to have the troops of Thomas in the southern part
of Tennessee co-operate with Sherman's movement in Mississippi.  I
directed Thomas, and Logan who was at Scottsboro, Alabama, to keep up a
threatening movement to the south against J. E. Johnston, who had again
relieved Bragg, for the purpose of making him keep as many troops as
possible there.

I learned through Confederate sources that Johnston had already sent two
divisions in the direction of Mobile, presumably to operate against
Sherman, and two more divisions to Longstreet in East Tennessee.  Seeing
that Johnston had depleted in this way, I directed Thomas to send at
least ten thousand men, besides Stanley's division which was already to
the east, into East Tennessee, and notified Schofield, who was now in
command in East Tennessee, of this movement of troops into his
department and also of the reinforcements Longstreet had received.  My
object was to drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee as a part of the
preparations for my spring campaign.

About this time General Foster, who had been in command of the
Department of the Ohio after Burnside until Schofield relieved him
(*21), advised me that he thought it would be a good thing to keep
Longstreet just where he was; that he was perfectly quiet in East
Tennessee, and if he was forced to leave there, his whole well-equipped
army would be free to go to any place where it could effect the most for
their cause.  I thought the advice was good, and, adopting that view,
countermanded the orders for pursuit of Longstreet.

On the 12th of February I ordered Thomas to take Dalton and hold it, if
possible; and I directed him to move without delay. Finding that he had
not moved, on the 17th I urged him again to start, telling him how
important it was, that the object of the movement was to co-operate with
Sherman, who was moving eastward and might be in danger.  Then again on
the 21st, he not yet having started, I asked him if he could not start
the next day.  He finally got off on the 22d or 23d.  The enemy fell
back from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite as
strong and farther to the rear.  Thomas reported that he could not go
any farther, because it was impossible with his poor teams, nearly
starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were repaired.  He soon
fell back.

Schofield also had to return for the same reason.  He could not carry
supplies with him, and Longstreet was between him and the supplies still
left in the country.  Longstreet, in his retreat, would be moving
towards his supplies, while our forces, following, would be receding
from theirs.  On the 2d of March, however, I learned of Sherman's
success, which eased my mind very much.  The next day, the 3d, I was
ordered to Washington.

The bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general of the army had
passed through Congress and became a law on the 26th of February.  My
nomination had been sent to the Senate on the 1st of March and confirmed
the next day (the 2d).  I was ordered to Washington on the 3d to receive
my commission, and started the day following that.  The commission was
handed to me on the 9th.  It was delivered to me at the Executive
Mansion by President Lincoln in the presence of his Cabinet, my eldest
son, those of my staff who were with me and and a few other visitors.

The President in presenting my commission read from a paper--stating,
however, as a preliminary, and prior to the delivery of it, that he had
drawn that up on paper, knowing my disinclination to speak in public,
and handed me a copy in advance so that I might prepare a few lines of
reply.  The President said:

"General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its
reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great
struggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting you
lieutenant-general in the Army of the United States.  With this high
honor, devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility.  As the
country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you.  I
scarcely need to add, that, with what I here speak for the nation, goes
my own hearty personal concurrence."

To this I replied:  "Mr. President, I accept the commission, with
gratitude for the high honor conferred.  With the aid of the noble
armies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, it
will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations.  I feel
the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and I know
that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, to
the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men."

On the 10th I visited the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac at
Brandy Station; then returned to Washington, and pushed west at once to
make my arrangements for turning over the commands there and giving
general directions for the preparations to be made for the spring
campaign.

It had been my intention before this to remain in the West, even if I
was made lieutenant-general; but when I got to Washington and saw the
situation it was plain that here was the point for the commanding
general to be.  No one else could, probably, resist the pressure that
would be brought to bear upon him to desist from his own plans and
pursue others.  I determined, therefore, before I started back to have
Sherman advanced to my late position, McPherson to Sherman's in command
of the department, and Logan to the command of McPherson's corps. These
changes were all made on my recommendation and without hesitation.  My
commission as lieutenant-general was given to me on the 9th of March,
1864.  On the following day, as already stated, I visited General Meade,
commanding the Army of the Potomac, at his headquarters at Brandy
Station, north of the Rapidan.  I had known General Meade slightly in
the Mexican war, but had not met him since until this visit.  I was a
stranger to most of the Army of the Potomac, I might say to all except
the officers of the regular army who had served in the Mexican war.
There had been some changes ordered in the organization of that army
before my promotion.  One was the consolidation of five corps into
three, thus throwing some officers of rank out of important commands.
Meade evidently thought that I might want to make still one more change
not yet ordered.  He said to me that I might want an officer who had
served with me in the West, mentioning Sherman specially, to take his
place.  If so, he begged me not to hesitate about making the change.  He
urged that the work before us was of such vast importance to the whole
nation that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand in the
way of selecting the right men for all positions.  For himself, he would
serve to the best of his ability wherever placed.  I assured him that I
had no thought of substituting any one for him.  As to Sherman, he could
not be spared from the West.

This incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of Meade than did
his great victory at Gettysburg the July before.  It is men who wait to
be selected, and not those who seek, from whom we may always expect the
most efficient service.

Meade's position afterwards proved embarrassing to me if not to him.  He
was commanding an army and, for nearly a year previous to my taking
command of all the armies, was in supreme command of the Army of the
Potomac--except from the authorities at Washington.  All other general
officers occupying similar positions were independent in their commands
so far as any one present with them was concerned.  I tried to make
General Meade's position as nearly as possible what it would have been
if I had been in Washington or any other place away from his command.  I
therefore gave all orders for the movements of the Army of the Potomac
to Meade to have them executed.  To avoid the necessity of having to
give orders direct, I established my headquarters near his, unless there
were reasons for locating them elsewhere.  This sometimes happened, and
I had on occasions to give orders direct to the troops affected.  On the
11th I returned to Washington and, on the day after, orders were
published by the War Department placing me in command of all the armies.
I had left Washington the night before to return to my old command in
the West and to meet Sherman whom I had telegraphed to join me in
Nashville.

Sherman assumed command of the military division of the Mississippi on
the 18th of March, and we left Nashville together for Cincinnati.  I had
Sherman accompany me that far on my way back to Washington so that we
could talk over the matters about which I wanted to see him, without
losing any more time from my new command than was necessary.  The first
point which I wished to discuss was particularly about the co-operation
of his command with mine when the spring campaign should commence. There
were also other and minor points, minor as compared with the great
importance of the question to be decided by sanguinary war--the
restoration to duty of officers who had been relieved from important
commands, namely McClellan, Burnside and Fremont in the East, and Buell,
McCook, Negley and Crittenden in the West.

Some time in the winter of 1863-64 I had been invited by the
general-in-chief to give my views of the campaign I thought advisable
for the command under me--now Sherman's.  General J. E. Johnston was
defending Atlanta and the interior of Georgia with an army, the largest
part of which was stationed at Dalton, about 38 miles south of
Chattanooga. Dalton is at the junction of the railroad from Cleveland
with the one from Chattanooga to Atlanta.

There could have been no difference of opinion as to the first duty of
the armies of the military division of the Mississippi.  Johnston's army
was the first objective, and that important railroad centre, Atlanta,
the second.  At the time I wrote General Halleck giving my views of the
approaching campaign, and at the time I met General Sherman, it was
expected that General Banks would be through with the campaign which he
had been ordered upon before my appointment to the command of all the
armies, and would be ready to co-operate with the armies east of the
Mississippi, his part in the programme being to move upon Mobile by land
while the navy would close the harbor and assist to the best of its
ability. (*22) The plan therefore was for Sherman to attack Johnston and
destroy his army if possible, to capture Atlanta and hold it, and with
his troops and those of Banks to hold a line through to Mobile, or at
least to hold Atlanta and command the railroad running east and west,
and the troops from one or other of the armies to hold important points
on the southern road, the only east and west road that would be left in
the possession of the enemy.  This would cut the Confederacy in two
again, as our gaining possession of the Mississippi River had done
before.  Banks was not ready in time for the part assigned to him, and
circumstances that could not be foreseen determined the campaign which
was afterwards made, the success and grandeur of which has resounded
throughout all lands.

In regard to restoring officers who had been relieved from important
commands to duty again, I left Sherman to look after those who had been
removed in the West while I looked out for the rest.  I directed,
however, that he should make no assignment until I could speak to the
Secretary of War about the matter.  I shortly after recommended to the
Secretary the assignment of General Buell to duty.  I received the
assurance that duty would be offered to him; and afterwards the
Secretary told me that he had offered Buell an assignment and that the
latter had declined it, saying that it would be degradation to accept
the assignment offered.  I understood afterwards that he refused to
serve under either Sherman or Canby because he had ranked them both.
Both graduated before him and ranked him in the old army.  Sherman
ranked him as a brigadier-general.  All of them ranked me in the old
army, and Sherman and Buell did as brigadiers.  The worst excuse a
soldier can make for declining service is that he once ranked the
commander he is ordered to report to.

On the 23d of March I was back in Washington, and on the 26th took up my
headquarters at Culpeper Court-House, a few miles south of the
headquarters of the Army of the Potomac.

Although hailing from Illinois myself, the State of the President, I
never met Mr. Lincoln until called to the capital to receive my
commission as lieutenant-general.  I knew him, however, very well and
favorably from the accounts given by officers under me at the West who
had known him all their lives.  I had also read the remarkable series of
debates between Lincoln and Douglas a few years before, when they were
rival candidates for the United States Senate.  I was then a resident of
Missouri, and by no means a "Lincoln man" in that contest; but I
recognized then his great ability.

In my first interview with Mr. Lincoln alone he stated to me that he had
never professed to be a military man or to know how campaigns should be
conducted, and never wanted to interfere in them:  but that
procrastination on the part of commanders, and the pressure from the
people at the North and Congress, WHICH WAS ALWAYS WITH HIM, forced him
into issuing his series of "Military Orders"--one, two, three, etc.  He
did not know but they were all wrong, and did know that some of them
were.  All he wanted or had ever wanted was some one who would take the
responsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance needed,
pledging himself to use all the power of the government in rendering
such assistance.  Assuring him that I would do the best I could with the
means at hand, and avoid as far as possible annoying him or the War
Department, our first interview ended.

The Secretary of War I had met once before only, but felt that I knew
him better.

While commanding in West Tennessee we had occasionally held
conversations over the wires, at night, when they were not being
otherwise used.  He and General Halleck both cautioned me against giving
the President my plans of campaign, saying that he was so kind-hearted,
so averse to refusing anything asked of him, that some friend would be
sure to get from him all he knew.  I should have said that in our
interview the President told me he did not want to know what I proposed
to do.  But he submitted a plan of campaign of his own which he wanted
me to hear and then do as I pleased about.  He brought out a map of
Virginia on which he had evidently marked every position occupied by the
Federal and Confederate armies up to that time.  He pointed out on the
map two streams which empty into the Potomac, and suggested that the
army might be moved on boats and landed between the mouths of these
streams.  We would then have the Potomac to bring our supplies, and the
tributaries would protect our flanks while we moved out.  I listened
respectfully, but did not suggest that the same streams would protect
Lee's flanks while he was shutting us up.

I did not communicate my plans to the President, nor did I to the
Secretary of War or to General Halleck.

March the 26th my headquarters were, as stated, at Culpeper, and the
work of preparing for an early campaign commenced.



CHAPTER XLVII.

THE MILITARY SITUATION--PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN--SHERIDAN ASSIGNED TO
COMMAND OF THE CAVALRY--FLANK MOVEMENTS--FORREST AT FORT PILLOW--GENERAL
BANKS'S EXPEDITION--COLONEL MOSBY--AN INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESS
CAMPAIGN.

When I assumed command of all the armies the situation was about this:
the Mississippi River was guarded from St. Louis to its mouth; the line
of the Arkansas was held, thus giving us all the North-west north of
that river.  A few points in Louisiana not remote from the river were
held by the Federal troops, as was also the mouth of the Rio Grande.
East of the Mississippi we held substantially all north of the Memphis
and Charleston Railroad as far east as Chattanooga, thence along the
line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, taking in nearly all of the
State of Tennessee.  West Virginia was in our hands; and that part of
old Virginia north of the Rapidan and east of the Blue Ridge we also
held.  On the sea-coast we had Fortress Monroe and Norfolk in Virginia;
Plymouth, Washington and New Berne in North Carolina; Beaufort, Folly
and Morris islands, Hilton Head, Port Royal and Fort Pulaski in South
Carolina and Georgia; Fernandina, St. Augustine, Key West and Pensacola
in Florida. The balance of the Southern territory, an empire in extent,
was still in the hands of the enemy.

Sherman, who had succeeded me in the command of the military division of
the Mississippi, commanded all the troops in the territory west of the
Alleghanies and north of Natchez, with a large movable force about
Chattanooga. His command was subdivided into four departments, but the
commanders all reported to Sherman and were subject to his orders.  This
arrangement, however, insured the better protection of all lines of
communication through the acquired territory, for the reason that these
different department commanders could act promptly in case of a sudden
or unexpected raid within their respective jurisdictions without
awaiting the orders of the division commander.

In the East the opposing forces stood in substantially the same
relations towards each other as three years before, or when the war
began; they were both between the Federal and Confederate capitals.  It
is true, footholds had been secured by us on the sea-coast, in Virginia
and North Carolina, but, beyond that, no substantial advantage had been
gained by either side.  Battles had been fought of as great severity as
had ever been known in war, over ground from the James River and
Chickahominy, near Richmond, to Gettysburg and Chambersburg, in
Pennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to the
National army, sometimes to the Confederate army; but in every instance,
I believe, claimed as victories for the South by the Southern press if
not by the Southern generals.  The Northern press, as a whole, did not
discourage these claims; a portion of it always magnified rebel success
and belittled ours, while another portion, most sincerely earnest in
their desire for the preservation of the Union and the overwhelming
success of the Federal armies, would nevertheless generally express
dissatisfaction with whatever victories were gained because they were
not more complete.

That portion of the Army of the Potomac not engaged in guarding lines of
communication was on the northern bank of the Rapidan.  The Army of
Northern Virginia confronting it on the opposite bank of the same river,
was strongly intrenched and commanded by the acknowledged ablest general
in the Confederate army.  The country back to the James River is cut up
with many streams, generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross except
where bridged.  The region is heavily timbered, and the roads narrow,
and very bad after the least rain.  Such an enemy was not, of course,
unprepared with adequate fortifications at convenient intervals all the
way back to Richmond, so that when driven from one fortified position
they would always have another farther to the rear to fall back into.

To provision an army, campaigning against so formidable a foe through
such a country, from wagons alone seemed almost impossible.  System and
discipline were both essential to its accomplishment.

The Union armies were now divided into nineteen departments, though four
of them in the West had been concentrated into a single military
division.  The Army of the Potomac was a separate command and had no
territorial limits.  There were thus seventeen distinct commanders.
Before this time these various armies had acted separately and
independently of each other, giving the enemy an opportunity often of
depleting one command, not pressed, to reinforce another more actively
engaged.  I determined to stop this.  To this end I regarded the Army of
the Potomac as the centre, and all west to Memphis along the line
described as our position at the time, and north of it, the right wing;
the Army of the James, under General Butler, as the left wing, and all
the troops south, as a force in rear of the enemy.  Some of these latter
were occupying positions from which they could not render service
proportionate to their numerical strength.  All such were depleted to
the minimum necessary to hold their positions as a guard against
blockade runners; where they could not do this their positions were
abandoned altogether.  In this way ten thousand men were added to the
Army of the James from South Carolina alone, with General Gillmore in
command.  It was not contemplated that General Gillmore should leave his
department; but as most of his troops were taken, presumably for active
service, he asked to accompany them and was permitted to do so.
Officers and soldiers on furlough, of whom there were many thousands,
were ordered to their proper commands; concentration was the order of
the day, and to have it accomplished in time to advance at the earliest
moment the roads would permit was the problem.

As a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or to act in support of
it, the 9th army corps, over twenty thousand strong, under General
Burnside, had been rendezvoused at Annapolis, Maryland.  This was an
admirable position for such a reinforcement.  The corps could be brought
at the last moment as a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or it
could be thrown on the sea-coast, south of Norfolk, in Virginia or North
Carolina, to operate against Richmond from that direction.  In fact
Burnside and the War Department both thought the 9th corps was intended
for such an expedition up to the last moment.

My general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible against
the Confederate armies in the field.  There were but two such, as we
have seen, east of the Mississippi River and facing north.  The Army of
Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee commanding, was on the south
bank of the Rapidan, confronting the Army of the Potomac; the second,
under General Joseph E. Johnston, was at Dalton, Georgia, opposed to
Sherman who was still at Chattanooga. Beside these main armies the
Confederates had to guard the Shenandoah Valley, a great storehouse to
feed their armies from, and their line of communications from Richmond
to Tennessee.  Forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in the
West with a large force; making a larger command necessary to hold what
we had gained in Middle and West Tennessee.  We could not abandon any
territory north of the line held by the enemy because it would lay the
Northern States open to invasion.  But as the Army of the Potomac was
the principal garrison for the protection of Washington even while it
was moving on Lee, so all the forces to the west, and the Army of the
James, guarded their special trusts when advancing from them as well as
when remaining at them.  Better indeed, for they forced the enemy to
guard his own lines and resources at a greater distance from ours, and
with a greater force.  Little expeditions could not so well be sent out
to destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn a
storehouse, or inflict other little annoyances.  Accordingly I arranged
for a simultaneous movement all along the line.  Sherman was to move
from Chattanooga, Johnston's army and Atlanta being his objective
points. (*23)  Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was to move from the
mouth of the Gauley River with a cavalry force and some artillery, the
Virginia and Tennessee Railroad to be his objective.  Either the enemy
would have to keep a large force to protect their communications, or see
them destroyed and a large amount of forage and provision, which they so
much needed, fall into our hands.  Sigel was in command in the Valley of
Virginia. He was to advance up the valley, covering the North from an
invasion through that channel as well while advancing as by remaining
near Harper's Ferry.  Every mile he advanced also gave us possession of
stores on which Lee relied.  Butler was to advance by the James River,
having Richmond and Petersburg as his objective.

Before the advance commenced I visited Butler at Fort Monroe. This was
the first time I had ever met him.  Before giving him any order as to
the part he was to play in the approaching campaign I invited his views.
They were very much such as I intended to direct, and as I did direct
(*24), in writing, before leaving.

General W. F. Smith, who had been promoted to the rank of major-general
shortly after the battle of Chattanooga on my recommendation, had not
yet been confirmed.  I found a decided prejudice against his
confirmation by a majority of the Senate, but I insisted that his
services had been such that he should be rewarded.  My wishes were now
reluctantly complied with, and I assigned him to the command of one of
the corps under General Butler.  I was not long in finding out that the
objections to Smith's promotion were well founded.

In one of my early interviews with the President I expressed my
dissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by the
cavalry so far in the war, and the belief that it was capable of
accomplishing much more than it had done if under a thorough leader.  I
said I wanted the very best man in the army for that command.  Halleck
was present and spoke up, saying: "How would Sheridan do?"  I replied:
"The very man I want." The President said I could have anybody I wanted.
Sheridan was telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was assigned
to the command of the cavalry corps with the Army of the Potomac.  This
relieved General Alfred Pleasonton.  It was not a reflection on that
officer, however, for I did not know but that he had been as efficient
as any other cavalry commander.

Banks in the Department of the Gulf was ordered to assemble all the
troops he had at New Orleans in time to join in the general move, Mobile
to be his objective.

At this time I was not entirely decided as to whether I should move the
Army of the Potomac by the right flank of the enemy, or by his left.
Each plan presented advantages. (*25)  If by his right--my left--the
Potomac, Chesapeake Bay and tributaries would furnish us an easy hauling
distance of every position the army could occupy from the Rapidan to the
James River.  But Lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army
north on a line rather interior to the one I would have to take in
following.  A movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but
all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition
we started with.  All idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned
when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was
considered.  The country over which we would have to pass was so
exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry
everything with us.

While these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle.
In the West Forrest made a raid in West Tennessee up to the northern
border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at Union
City, and followed it up by an attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks
of the Ohio.  While he was able to enter the city he failed to capture
the forts or any part of the garrison.  On the first intelligence of
Forrest's raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against
him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into.
Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got
my order.

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at Fort
Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the
Mississippi River.  The garrison consisted of a regiment of <DW52>
troops, infantry, and a detachment of Tennessee cavalry.  These troops
fought bravely, but were overpowered.  I will leave Forrest in his
dispatches to tell what he did with them.

"The river was dyed," he says, "with the blood of the slaughtered for
two hundred yards.  The approximate loss was upward of five hundred
killed, but few of the officers escaping.  My loss was about twenty
killed.  It is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the Northern
people that <DW64> soldiers cannot cope with Southerners."  Subsequently
Forrest made a report in which he left out the part which shocks
humanity to read.

At the East, also, the rebels were busy.  I had said to Halleck that
Plymouth and Washington, North Carolina, were unnecessary to hold.  It
would be better to have the garrisons engaged there added to Butler's
command.  If success attended our arms both places, and others too,
would fall into our hands naturally. These places had been occupied by
Federal troops before I took command of the armies, and I knew that the
Executive would be reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained my
views; but before my views were carried out the rebels captured the
garrison at Plymouth.  I then ordered the abandonment of Washington, but
directed the holding of New Berne at all hazards.  This was essential
because New Berne was a port into which blockade runners could enter.

General Banks had gone on an expedition up the Red River long before my
promotion to general command.  I had opposed the movement strenuously,
but acquiesced because it was the order of my superior at the time.  By
direction of Halleck I had reinforced Banks with a corps of about ten
thousand men from Sherman's command.  This reinforcement was wanted back
badly before the forward movement commenced.  But Banks had got so far
that it seemed best that he should take Shreveport on the Red River, and
turn over the line of that river to Steele, who commanded in Arkansas,
to hold instead of the line of the Arkansas.  Orders were given
accordingly, and with the expectation that the campaign would be ended
in time for Banks to return A. J. Smith's command to where it belonged
and get back to New Orleans himself in time to execute his part in the
general plan.  But the expedition was a failure.  Banks did not get back
in time to take part in the programme as laid down. Nor was Smith
returned until long after the movements of May, 1864, had been begun.
The services of forty thousand veteran troops, over and above the number
required to hold all that was necessary in the Department of the Gulf,
were thus paralyzed. It is but just to Banks, however, to say that his
expedition was ordered from Washington and he was in no way responsible
except for the conduct of it.  I make no criticism on this point.  He
opposed the expedition.

By the 27th of April spring had so far advanced as to justify me in
fixing a day for the great move.  On that day Burnside left Annapolis to
occupy Meade's position between Bull Run and the Rappahannock.  Meade
was notified and directed to bring his troops forward to his advance.
On the following day Butler was notified of my intended advance on the
4th of May, and he was directed to move the night of the same day and
get as far up the James River as possible by daylight, and push on from
there to accomplish the task given him.  He was also notified that
reinforcements were being collected in Washington City, which would be
forwarded to him should the enemy fall back into the trenches at
Richmond.  The same day Sherman was directed to get his forces up ready
to advance on the 5th.  Sigel was in Winchester and was notified to move
in conjunction with the others.

The criticism has been made by writers on the campaign from the Rapidan
to the James River that all the loss of life could have been obviated by
moving the army there on transports.  Richmond was fortified and
intrenched so perfectly that one man inside to defend was more than
equal to five outside besieging or assaulting.  To get possession of
Lee's army was the first great object.  With the capture of his army
Richmond would necessarily follow.  It was better to fight him outside
of his stronghold than in it.  If the Army of the Potomac had been moved
bodily to the James River by water Lee could have moved a part of his
forces back to Richmond, called Beauregard from the south to reinforce
it, and with the balance moved on to Washington. Then, too, I ordered a
move, simultaneous with that of the Army of the Potomac, up the James
River by a formidable army already collected at the mouth of the river.

While my headquarters were at Culpeper, from the 26th of March to the
4th of May, I generally visited Washington once a week to confer with
the Secretary of War and President.  On the last occasion, a few days
before moving, a circumstance occurred which came near postponing my
part in the campaign altogether. Colonel John S. Mosby had for a long
time been commanding a partisan corps, or regiment, which operated in
the rear of the Army of the Potomac.  On my return to the field on this
occasion, as the train approached Warrenton Junction, a heavy cloud of
dust was seen to the east of the road as if made by a body of cavalry on
a charge.  Arriving at the junction the train was stopped and inquiries
made as to the cause of the dust. There was but one man at the station,
and he informed us that Mosby had crossed a few minutes before at full
speed in pursuit of Federal cavalry.  Had he seen our train coming, no
doubt he would have let his prisoners escape to capture the train.  I
was on a special train, if I remember correctly, without any guard.

Since the close of the war I have come to know Colonel Mosby personally,
and somewhat intimately.  He is a different man entirely from what I had
supposed.  He is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as if he could
endure any amount of physical exercise.  He is able, and thoroughly
honest and truthful. There were probably but few men in the South who
could have commanded successfully a separate detachment in the rear of
an opposing army, and so near the border of hostilities, as long as he
did without losing his entire command.

On this same visit to Washington I had my last interview with the
President before reaching the James River.  He had of course become
acquainted with the fact that a general movement had been ordered all
along the line, and seemed to think it a new feature in war.  I
explained to him that it was necessary to have a great number of troops
to guard and hold the territory we had captured, and to prevent
incursions into the Northern States.  These troops could perform this
service just as well by advancing as by remaining still; and by
advancing they would compel the enemy to keep detachments to hold them
back, or else lay his own territory open to invasion.  His answer was:
"Oh, yes!  I see that.  As we say out West, if a man can't skin he must
hold a leg while somebody else does."

There was a certain incident connected with the Wilderness campaign of
which it may not be out of place to speak; and to avoid a digression
further on I will mention it here.

A few days before my departure from Culpeper the Honorable E. B.
Washburne visited me there, and remained with my headquarters for some
distance south, through the battle in the Wilderness and, I think, to
Spottsylvania. He was accompanied by a Mr. Swinton, whom he presented as
a literary gentleman who wished to accompany the army with a view of
writing a history of the war when it was over.  He assured me--and I
have no doubt Swinton gave him the assurance--that he was not present as
a correspondent of the press.  I expressed an entire willingness to have
him (Swinton) accompany the army, and would have allowed him to do so as
a correspondent, restricted, however, in the character of the
information he could give.  We received Richmond papers with about as
much regularity as if there had been no war, and knew that our papers
were received with equal regularity by the Confederates.  It was
desirable, therefore, that correspondents should not be privileged spies
of the enemy within our lines.

Probably Mr. Swinton expected to be an invited guest at my headquarters,
and was disappointed that he was not asked to become so.  At all events
he was not invited, and soon I found that he was corresponding with some
paper (I have now forgotten which one), thus violating his word either
expressed or implied.  He knew of the assurance Washburne had given as
to the character of his mission.  I never saw the man from the day of
our introduction to the present that I recollect.  He accompanied us,
however, for a time at least.

The second night after crossing the Rapidan (the night of the 5th of
May) Colonel W. R. Rowley, of my staff, was acting as night officer at
my headquarters.  A short time before midnight I gave him verbal
instructions for the night.  Three days later I read in a Richmond paper
a verbatim report of these instructions.

A few nights still later (after the first, and possibly after the
second, day's fighting in the Wilderness) General Meade came to my tent
for consultation, bringing with him some of his staff officers.  Both
his staff and mine retired to the camp-fire some yards in front of the
tent, thinking our conversation should be private.  There was a stump a
little to one side, and between the front of the tent and camp-fire.
One of my staff, Colonel T. S. Bowers, saw what he took to be a man
seated on the ground and leaning against the stump, listening to the
conversation between Meade and myself.  He called the attention of
Colonel Rowley to it.  The latter immediately took the man by the
shoulder and asked him, in language more forcible than polite, what he
was doing there.  The man proved to be Swinton, the "historian," and his
replies to the question were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he was
warned against further eaves-dropping.

The next I heard of Mr. Swinton was at Cold Harbor.  General Meade came
to my headquarters saying that General Burnside had arrested Swinton,
who at some previous time had given great offence, and had ordered him
to be shot that afternoon.  I promptly ordered the prisoner to be
released, but that he must be expelled from the lines of the army not to
return again on pain of punishment.



CHAPTER XLVIII.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN--GENERAL BUTLER'S POSITION
--SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID.

The armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment of a single
object.  They were acting as a unit so far as such a thing was possible
over such a vast field.  Lee, with the capital of the Confederacy, was
the main end to which all were working.  Johnston, with Atlanta, was an
important obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at,
and was therefore almost an independent objective.  It was of less
importance only because the capture of Johnston and his army would not
produce so immediate and decisive a result in closing the rebellion as
would the possession of Richmond, Lee and his army.  All other troops
were employed exclusively in support of these two movements.  This was
the plan; and I will now endeavor to give, as concisely as I can, the
method of its execution, outlining first the operations of minor
detached but co-operative columns.

As stated before, Banks failed to accomplish what he had been sent to do
on the Red River, and eliminated the use of forty thousand veterans
whose cooperation in the grand campaign had been expected--ten thousand
with Sherman and thirty thousand against Mobile.

Sigel's record is almost equally brief.  He moved out, it is true,
according to programme; but just when I was hoping to hear of good work
being done in the valley I received instead the following announcement
from Halleck:  "Sigel is in full retreat on Strasburg.  He will do
nothing but run; never did anything else."  The enemy had intercepted
him about New Market and handled him roughly, leaving him short six
guns, and some nine hundred men out of his six thousand.

The plan had been for an advance of Sigel's forces in two columns.
Though the one under his immediate command failed ingloriously the other
proved more fortunate.  Under Crook and Averell his western column
advanced from the Gauley in West Virginia at the appointed time, and
with more happy results. They reached the Virginia and Tennessee
Railroad at Dublin and destroyed a depot of supplies, besides tearing up
several miles of road and burning the bridge over New River.  Having
accomplished this they recrossed the Alleghanies to Meadow Bluffs and
there awaited further orders.

Butler embarked at Fort Monroe with all his command, except the cavalry
and some artillery which moved up the south bank of the James River.
His steamers moved first up Chesapeake Bay and York River as if
threatening the rear of Lee's army.  At midnight they turned back, and
Butler by daylight was far up the James River.  He seized City Point and
Bermuda Hundred early in the day, without loss and, no doubt, very much
to the surprise of the enemy.

This was the accomplishment of the first step contemplated in my
instructions to Butler.  He was to act from here, looking to Richmond as
his objective point.  I had given him to understand that I should aim to
fight Lee between the Rapidan and Richmond if he would stand; but should
Lee fall back into Richmond I would follow up and make a junction of the
armies of the Potomac and the James on the James River.  He was directed
to secure a footing as far up the south side of the river as he could at
as early a date as possible.

Butler was in position by the 6th of May and had begun intrenching, and
on the 7th he sent out his cavalry from Suffolk to cut the Weldon
Railroad.  He also sent out detachments to destroy the railroad between
Petersburg and Richmond, but no great success attended these latter
efforts.  He made no great effort to establish himself on that road and
neglected to attack Petersburg, which was almost defenceless.  About the
11th he advanced slowly until he reached the works at Drury's Bluff,
about half way between Bermuda Hundred and Richmond.  In the mean time
Beauregard had been gathering reinforcements.  On the 16th he attacked
Butler with great vigor, and with such success as to limit very
materially the further usefulness of the Army of the James as a distinct
factor in the campaign.  I afterward ordered a portion of it to join the
Army of the Potomac, leaving a sufficient force with Butler to man his
works, hold securely the footing he had already gained and maintain a
threatening front toward the rear of the Confederate capital.

The position which General Butler had chosen between the two rivers, the
James and Appomattox, was one of great natural strength, one where a
large area of ground might be thoroughly inclosed by means of a single
intrenched line, and that a very short one in comparison with the extent
of territory which it thoroughly protected.  His right was protected by
the James River, his left by the Appomattox, and his rear by their
junction--the two streams uniting near by.  The bends of the two streams
shortened the line that had been chosen for intrenchments, while it
increased the area which the line inclosed.

Previous to ordering any troops from Butler I sent my chief engineer,
General Barnard, from the Army of the Potomac to that of the James to
inspect Butler's position and ascertain whether I could again safely
make an order for General Butler's movement in co-operation with mine,
now that I was getting so near Richmond; or, if I could not, whether his
position was strong enough to justify me in withdrawing some of his
troops and having them brought round by water to White House to join me
and reinforce the Army of the Potomac.  General Barnard reported the
position very strong for defensive purposes, and that I could do the
latter with great security; but that General Butler could not move from
where he was, in co-operation, to produce any effect. He said that the
general occupied a place between the James and Appomattox rivers which
was of great strength, and where with an inferior force he could hold it
for an indefinite length of time against a superior; but that he could
do nothing offensively.  I then asked him why Butler could not move out
from his lines and push across the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad to
the rear and on the south side of Richmond.  He replied that it was
impracticable, because the enemy had substantially the same line across
the neck of land that General Butler had.  He then took out his pencil
and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was like
a bottle and that Butler's line of intrenchments across the neck
represented the cork; that the enemy had built an equally strong line
immediately in front of him across the neck; and it was therefore as if
Butler was in a bottle.  He was perfectly safe against an attack; but,
as Barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with a
small force could hold the cork in its place.  This struck me as being
very expressive of his position, particularly when I saw the hasty
sketch which General Barnard had drawn; and in making my subsequent
report I used that expression without adding quotation marks, never
thinking that anything had been said that would attract attention--as
this did, very much to the annoyance, no doubt, of General Butler and, I
know, very much to my own.  I found afterwards that this was mentioned
in the notes of General Badeau's book, which, when they were shown to
me, I asked to have stricken out; yet it was retained there, though
against my wishes.

I make this statement here because, although I have often made it
before, it has never been in my power until now to place it where it
will correct history; and I desire to rectify all injustice that I may
have done to individuals, particularly to officers who were gallantly
serving their country during the trying period of the war for the
preservation of the Union. General Butler certainly gave his very
earnest support to the war; and he gave his own best efforts personally
to the suppression of the rebellion.

The further operations of the Army of the James can best be treated of
in connection with those of the Army of the Potomac, the two being so
intimately associated and connected as to be substantially one body in
which the individuality of the supporting wing is merged.

Before giving the reader a summary of Sherman's great Atlanta campaign,
which must conclude my description of the various co-operative movements
preparatory to proceeding with that of the operations of the centre, I
will briefly mention Sheridan's first raid upon Lee's communications
which, though an incident of the operations on the main line and not
specifically marked out in the original plan, attained in its brilliant
execution and results all the proportions of an independent campaign.
By thus anticipating, in point of time, I will be able to more perfectly
observe the continuity of events occurring in my immediate front when I
shall have undertaken to describe our advance from the Rapidan.

On the 8th of May, just after the battle of the Wilderness and when we
were moving on Spottsylvania I directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose
from the Army of the Potomac, pass around the left of Lee's army and
attack his cavalry:  to cut the two roads--one running west through
Gordonsville, Charlottesville and Lynchburg, the other to Richmond, and,
when compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, to move on to
the James River and draw these from Butler's supplies.  This move took
him past the entire rear of Lee's army.  These orders were also given in
writing through Meade.

The object of this move was three-fold.  First, if successfully
executed, and it was, he would annoy the enemy by cutting his line of
supplies and telegraphic communications, and destroy or get for his own
use supplies in store in the rear and coming up.  Second, he would draw
the enemy's cavalry after him, and thus better protect our flanks, rear
and trains than by remaining with the army.  Third, his absence would
save the trains drawing his forage and other supplies from
Fredericksburg, which had now become our base.  He started at daylight
the next morning, and accomplished more than was expected.  It was
sixteen days before he got back to the Army of the Potomac.

The course Sheridan took was directly to Richmond.  Before night Stuart,
commanding the Confederate cavalry, came on to the rear of his command.
But the advance kept on, crossed the North Anna, and at Beaver Dam, a
station on the Virginia Central Railroad, recaptured four hundred Union
prisoners on their way to Richmond, destroyed the road and used and
destroyed a large amount of subsistence and medical stores.

Stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing towards Richmond, abandoned
the pursuit on the morning of the 10th and, by a detour and an
exhausting march, interposed between Sheridan and Richmond at Yellow
Tavern, only about six miles north of the city.  Sheridan destroyed the
railroad and more supplies at Ashland, and on the 11th arrived in
Stuart's front.  A severe engagement ensued in which the losses were
heavy on both sides, but the rebels were beaten, their leader mortally
wounded, and some guns and many prisoners were captured.

Sheridan passed through the outer defences of Richmond, and could, no
doubt, have passed through the inner ones.  But having no supports near
he could not have remained.  After caring for his wounded he struck for
the James River below the city, to communicate with Butler and to rest
his men and horses as well as to get food and forage for them.

He moved first between the Chickahominy and the James, but in the
morning (the 12th) he was stopped by batteries at Mechanicsville.  He
then turned to cross to the north side of the Chickahominy by Meadow
Bridge.  He found this barred, and the defeated Confederate cavalry,
reorganized, occupying the opposite side.  The panic created by his
first entrance within the outer works of Richmond having subsided troops
were sent out to attack his rear.

He was now in a perilous position, one from which but few generals could
have extricated themselves.  The defences of Richmond, manned, were to
the right, the Chickahominy was to the left with no bridge remaining and
the opposite bank guarded, to the rear was a force from Richmond.  This
force was attacked and beaten by Wilson's and Gregg's divisions, while
Sheridan turned to the left with the remaining division and hastily
built a bridge over the Chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forced
a crossing and soon dispersed the Confederates he found there. The enemy
was held back from the stream by the fire of the troops not engaged in
bridge building.

On the 13th Sheridan was at Bottom's Bridge, over the Chickahominy.  On
the 14th he crossed this stream and on that day went into camp on the
James River at Haxall's Landing.  He at once put himself into
communication with General Butler, who directed all the supplies he
wanted to be furnished.

Sheridan had left the Army of the Potomac at Spottsylvania, but did not
know where either this or Lee's army was now.  Great caution therefore
had to be exercised in getting back.  On the 17th, after resting his
command for three days, he started on his return.  He moved by the way
of White House.  The bridge over the Pamunkey had been burned by the
enemy, but a new one was speedily improvised and the cavalry crossed
over it.  On the 22d he was at Aylett's on the Matapony, where he
learned the position of the two armies.  On the 24th he joined us on the
march from North Anna to Cold Harbor, in the vicinity of Chesterfield.

Sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely around Lee's army:
encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated them in all;
recaptured four hundred Union prisoners and killed and captured many of
the enemy; destroyed and used many supplies and munitions of war;
destroyed miles of railroad and telegraph, and freed us from annoyance
by the cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks.



CHAPTER XLIX.

SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SIEGE OF ATLANTA--DEATH OF GENERAL
MCPHERSON--ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE ANDERSONVILLE--CAPTURE OF ATLANTA.

After separating from Sherman in Cincinnati I went on to Washington, as
already stated, while he returned to Nashville to assume the duties of
his new command.  His military division was now composed of four
departments and embraced all the territory west of the Alleghany
Mountains and east of the Mississippi River, together with the State of
Arkansas in the trans-Mississippi.  The most easterly of these was the
Department of the Ohio, General Schofield commanding; the next was the
Department of the Cumberland, General Thomas commanding; the third the
Department of the Tennessee, General McPherson commanding; and General
Steele still commanded the trans-Mississippi, or Department of Arkansas.
The last-named department was so far away that Sherman could not
communicate with it very readily after starting on his spring campaign,
and it was therefore soon transferred from his military division to that
of the Gulf, where General Canby, who had relieved General Banks, was in
command.

The movements of the armies, as I have stated in a former chapter, were
to be simultaneous, I fixing the day to start when the season should be
far enough advanced, it was hoped, for the roads to be in a condition
for the troops to march.

General Sherman at once set himself to work preparing for the task which
was assigned him to accomplish in the spring campaign.  McPherson lay at
Huntsville with about twenty-four thousand men, guarding those points of
Tennessee which were regarded as most worth holding; Thomas, with over
sixty thousand men of the Army of the Cumberland, was at Chattanooga;
and Schofield, with about fourteen thousand men, was at Knoxville. With
these three armies, numbering about one hundred thousand men in all,
Sherman was to move on the day fixed for the general advance, with a
view of destroying Johnston's army and capturing Atlanta. He visited
each of these commands to inform himself as to their condition, and it
was found to be, speaking generally, good.

One of the first matters to turn his attention to was that of getting,
before the time arrived for starting, an accumulation of supplies
forward to Chattanooga, sufficiently large to warrant a movement.  He
found, when he got to that place, that the trains over the single-track
railroad, which was frequently interrupted for a day or two at a time,
were only sufficient to meet the daily wants of the troops without
bringing forward any surplus of any kind.  He found, however, that
trains were being used to transport all the beef cattle, horses for the
cavalry, and even teams that were being brought to the front.  He at
once changed all this, and required beef cattle, teams, cavalry horses,
and everything that could travel, even the troops, to be marched, and
used the road exclusively for transporting supplies.  In this way he was
able to accumulate an abundance before the time finally fixed upon for
the move, the 4th of May.

As I have said already, Johnston was at Dalton, which was nearly
one-fourth of the way between Chattanooga and Atlanta. The country is
mountainous all the way to Atlanta, abounding in mountain streams, some
of them of considerable volume.  Dalton is on ground where water drains
towards Atlanta and into one of the main streams rising north-east from
there and flowing south-west--this being the general direction which all
the main streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries entering
into them.  Johnston had been preparing himself for this campaign during
the entire winter.  The best positions for defence had been selected all
the way from Dalton back to Atlanta, and very strongly intrenched; so
that, as he might be forced to fall back from one position, he would
have another to fall into in his rear.  His position at Dalton was so
very strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least hoped,
to hold Sherman there and prevent him from getting any further.  With a
less skilful general, and one disposed to take no risks, I have no doubt
that he would have succeeded.

Sherman's plan was to start Schofield, who was farthest back, a few days
in advance from Knoxville, having him move on the direct road to Dalton.
Thomas was to move out to Ringgold.  It had been Sherman's intention to
cross McPherson over the Tennessee River at Huntsville or Decatur, and
move him south from there so as to have him come into the road running
from Chattanooga to Atlanta a good distance to the rear of the point
Johnston was occupying; but when that was contemplated it was hoped that
McPherson alone would have troops enough to cope with Johnston, if the
latter should move against him while unsupported by the balance of the
army.  In this he was disappointed.  Two of McPherson's veteran
divisions had re-enlisted on the express provision that they were to
have a furlough.  This furlough had not yet expired, and they were not
back.

Then, again, Sherman had lent Banks two divisions under A. J. Smith, the
winter before, to co-operate with the trans-Mississippi forces, and this
with the express pledge that they should be back by a time specified, so
as to be prepared for this very campaign.  It is hardly necessary to say
they were not returned.  That department continued to absorb troops to
no purpose to the end of the war.  This left McPherson so weak that the
part of the plan above indicated had to be changed.  He was therefore
brought up to Chattanooga and moved from there on a road to the right of
Thomas--the two coming together about Dalton.  The three armies were
abreast, all ready to start promptly on time.

Sherman soon found that Dalton was so strongly fortified that it was
useless to make any attempt to carry it by assault; and even to carry it
by regular approaches was impracticable.  There was a narrowing up in
the mountain, between the National and Confederate armies, through which
a stream, a wagon road and a railroad ran.  Besides, the stream had been
dammed so that the valley was a lake.  Through this gorge the troops
would have to pass.  McPherson was therefore sent around by the right,
to come out by the way of Snake Creek Gap into the rear of the enemy.
This was a surprise to Johnston, and about the 13th he decided to
abandon his position at Dalton.

On the 15th there was very hard fighting about Resaca; but our cavalry
having been sent around to the right got near the road in the enemy's
rear.  Again Johnston fell back, our army pursuing.  The pursuit was
continued to Kingston, which was reached on the 19th with very little
fighting, except that Newton's division overtook the rear of Johnston's
army and engaged it.  Sherman was now obliged to halt for the purpose of
bringing up his railroad trains.  He was depending upon the railroad for
all of his supplies, and as of course the railroad was wholly destroyed
as Johnston fell back, it had to be rebuilt.  This work was pushed
forward night and day, and caused much less delay than most persons
would naturally expect in a mountainous country where there were so many
bridges to be rebuilt.

The campaign to Atlanta was managed with the most consummate skill, the
enemy being flanked out of one position after another all the way there.
It is true this was not accomplished without a good deal of fighting
--some of it very hard fighting, rising to the dignity of very important
battles--neither were single positions gained in a day.  On the
contrary, weeks were spent at some; and about Atlanta more than a month
was consumed.

It was the 23d of May before the road was finished up to the rear of
Sherman's army and the pursuit renewed.  This pursuit brought him up to
the vicinity of Allatoona. This place was very strongly intrenched, and
naturally a very defensible position. An assault upon it was not thought
of, but preparations were made to flank the enemy out of it.  This was
done by sending a large force around our right, by the way of Dallas, to
reach the rear of the enemy.  Before reaching there, however, they found
the enemy fortified in their way, and there resulted hard fighting for
about a week at a place called New Hope Church.  On the left our troops
also were fortified, and as close up to the enemy as they could get.
They kept working still farther around to the left toward the railroad.
This was the case more particularly with the cavalry.  By the 4th of
June Johnston found that he was being hemmed in so rapidly that he drew
off and Allatoona was left in our possession.

Allatoona, being an important place, was strongly intrenched for
occupation by our troops before advancing farther, and made a secondary
base of supplies.  The railroad was finished up to that point, the
intrenchments completed, storehouses provided for food, and the army got
in readiness for a further advance. The rains, however, were falling in
such torrents that it was impossible to move the army by the side roads
which they would have to move upon in order to turn Johnston out of his
new position.

While Sherman's army lay here, General F. P. Blair returned to it,
bringing with him the two divisions of veterans who had been on
furlough.

Johnston had fallen back to Marietta and Kenesaw Mountain, where strong
intrenchments awaited him.  At this latter place our troops made an
assault upon the enemy's lines after having got their own lines up close
to him, and failed, sustaining considerable loss.  But during the
progress of the battle Schofield was gaining ground to the left; and the
cavalry on his left were gaining still more toward the enemy's rear.
These operations were completed by the 3d of July, when it was found
that Johnston had evacuated the place.  He was pursued at once.  Sherman
had made every preparation to abandon the railroad, leaving a strong
guard in his intrenchments.  He had intended, moving out with twenty
days' rations and plenty of ammunition, to come in on the railroad again
at the Chattahoochee River.  Johnston frustrated this plan by himself
starting back as above stated.  This time he fell back to the
Chattahoochee.

About the 5th of July he was besieged again, Sherman getting easy
possession of the Chattahoochee River both above and below him.  The
enemy was again flanked out of his position, or so frightened by
flanking movements that on the night of the 9th he fell back across the
river.

Here Johnston made a stand until the 17th, when Sherman's old tactics
prevailed again and the final movement toward Atlanta began.  Johnston
was now relieved of the command, and Hood superseded him.

Johnston's tactics in this campaign do not seem to have met with much
favor, either in the eyes of the administration at Richmond, or of the
people of that section of the South in which he was commanding.  The
very fact of a change of commanders being ordered under such
circumstances was an indication of a change of policy, and that now they
would become the aggressors--the very thing our troops wanted.

For my own part, I think that Johnston's tactics were right. Anything
that could have prolonged the war a year beyond the time that it did
finally close, would probably have exhausted the North to such an extent
that they might then have abandoned the contest and agreed to a
separation.

Atlanta was very strongly intrenched all the way around in a circle
about a mile and a half outside of the city.  In addition to this, there
were advanced intrenchments which had to be taken before a close siege
could be commenced.

Sure enough, as indicated by the change of commanders, the enemy was
about to assume the offensive.  On the 20th he came out and attacked the
Army of the Cumberland most furiously.  Hooker's corps, and Newton's and
Johnson's divisions were the principal ones engaged in this contest,
which lasted more than an hour; but the Confederates were then forced to
fall back inside their main lines.  The losses were quite heavy on both
sides.  On this day General Gresham, since our Postmaster-General, was
very badly wounded.  During the night Hood abandoned his outer lines,
and our troops were advanced.  The investment had not been relinquished
for a moment during the day.

During the night of the 21st Hood moved out again, passing by our left
flank, which was then in motion to get a position farther in rear of
him, and a desperate battle ensued, which lasted most of the day of the
22d.  At first the battle went very much in favor of the Confederates,
our troops being somewhat surprised.  While our troops were advancing
they were struck in flank, and their flank was enveloped.  But they had
become too thorough veterans to be thrown into irreparable confusion by
an unexpected attack when off their guard, and soon they were in order
and engaging the enemy, with the advantage now of knowing where their
antagonist was.  The field of battle continued to expand until it
embraced about seven miles of ground.  Finally, however, and before
night, the enemy was driven back into the city (*26).

It was during this battle that McPherson, while passing from one column
to another, was instantly killed.  In his death the army lost one of its
ablest, purest and best generals.

Garrard had been sent out with his cavalry to get upon the railroad east
of Atlanta and to cut it in the direction of Augusta. He was successful
in this, and returned about the time of the battle.  Rousseau had also
come up from Tennessee with a small division of cavalry, having crossed
the Tennessee River about Decatur and made a raid into Alabama. Finally,
when hard pressed, he had come in, striking the railroad in rear of
Sherman, and reported to him about this time.

The battle of the 22d is usually known as the Battle of Atlanta,
although the city did not fall into our hands until the 2d of September.
Preparations went on, as before, to flank the enemy out of his position.
The work was tedious, and the lines that had to be maintained were very
long.  Our troops were gradually worked around to the east until they
struck the road between Decatur and Atlanta. These lines were strongly
fortified, as were those to the north and west of the city--all as close
up to the enemy's lines as practicable--in order to hold them with the
smallest possible number of men, the design being to detach an army to
move by our right and try to get upon the railroad down south of
Atlanta.

On the 27th the movement by the right flank commenced.  On the 28th the
enemy struck our right flank, General Logan commanding, with great
vigor.  Logan intrenched himself hastily, and by that means was enabled
to resist all assaults and inflict a great deal of damage upon the
enemy.  These assaults were continued to the middle of the afternoon,
and resumed once or twice still later in the day.  The enemy's losses in
these unsuccessful assaults were fearful.

During that evening the enemy in Logan's front withdrew into the town.
This now left Sherman's army close up to the Confederate lines,
extending from a point directly east of the city around by the north and
west of it for a distance of fully ten miles; the whole of this line
being intrenched, and made stronger every day they remained there.

In the latter part of July Sherman sent Stoneman to destroy the
railroads to the south, about Macon.  He was then to go east and, if
possible, release our prisoners about Andersonville. There were painful
stories current at the time about the great hardships these prisoners
had to endure in the way of general bad treatment, in the way in which
they were housed, and in the way in which they were fed.  Great sympathy
was felt for them; and it was thought that even if they could be turned
loose upon the country it would be a great relief to them.  But the
attempt proved a failure.  McCook, who commanded a small brigade, was
first reported to have been captured; but he got back, having inflicted
a good deal of damage upon the enemy.  He had also taken some prisoners;
but encountering afterwards a largely superior force of the enemy he was
obliged to drop his prisoners and get back as best he could with what
men he had left.  He had lost several hundred men out of his small
command.  On the 4th of August Colonel Adams, commanding a little
brigade of about a thousand men, returned reporting Stoneman and all but
himself as lost.  I myself had heard around Richmond of the capture of
Stoneman, and had sent Sherman word, which he received.  The rumor was
confirmed there, also, from other sources.  A few days after Colonel
Adams's return Colonel Capron also got in with a small detachment and
confirmed the report of the capture of Stoneman with something less than
a thousand men.

It seems that Stoneman, finding the escape of all his force was
impossible, had made arrangements for the escape of two divisions.  He
covered the movement of these divisions to the rear with a force of
about seven hundred men, and at length surrendered himself and this
detachment to the commanding Confederate.  In this raid, however, much
damage was inflicted upon the enemy by the destruction of cars,
locomotives, army wagons, manufactories of military supplies, etc.

On the 4th and 5th Sherman endeavored to get upon the railroad to our
right, where Schofield was in command, but these attempts failed
utterly.  General Palmer was charged with being the cause of this
failure, to a great extent, by both General Sherman and General
Schofield; but I am not prepared to say this, although a question seems
to have arisen with Palmer as to whether Schofield had any right to
command him.  If he did raise this question while an action was going
on, that act alone was exceedingly reprehensible.

About the same time Wheeler got upon our railroad north of Resaca and
destroyed it nearly up to Dalton.  This cut Sherman off from
communication with the North for several days.  Sherman responded to
this attack on his lines of communication by directing one upon theirs.

Kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of August to reach the Macon
road about Jonesboro.  He succeeded in doing so, passed entirely around
the Confederate lines of Atlanta, and was back again in his former
position on our left by the 22d.  These little affairs, however,
contributed but very little to the grand result.  They annoyed, it is
true, but any damage thus done to a railroad by any cavalry expedition
is soon repaired.

Sherman made preparations for a repetition of his tactics; that is, for
a flank movement with as large a force as could be got together to some
point in the enemy's rear.  Sherman commenced this last movement on the
25th of August, and on the 1st of September was well up towards the
railroad twenty miles south of Atlanta.  Here he found Hardee
intrenched, ready to meet him.  A battle ensued, but he was unable to
drive Hardee away before night set in.  Under cover of the night,
however, Hardee left of his own accord.  That night Hood blew up his
military works, such as he thought would be valuable in our hands, and
decamped.

The next morning at daylight General H. W. Slocum, who was commanding
north of the city, moved in and took possession of Atlanta, and notified
Sherman.  Sherman then moved deliberately back, taking three days to
reach the city, and occupied a line extending from Decatur on the left
to Atlanta in the centre, with his troops extending out of the city for
some distance to the right.

The campaign had lasted about four months, and was one of the most
memorable in history.  There was but little if anything in the whole
campaign, now that it is over, to criticise at all, and nothing to
criticise severely.  It was creditable alike to the general who
commanded and the army which had executed it. Sherman had on this
campaign some bright, wide-awake division and brigade commanders whose
alertness added a host to the efficiency of his command.

The troops now went to work to make themselves comfortable, and to enjoy
a little rest after their arduous campaign.  The city of Atlanta was
turned into a military base.  The citizens were all compelled to leave.
Sherman also very wisely prohibited the assembling of the army of
sutlers and traders who always follow in the wake of an army in the
field, if permitted to do so, from trading with the citizens and getting
the money of the soldiers for articles of but little use to them, and
for which they are made to pay most exorbitant prices.  He limited the
number of these traders to one for each of his three armies.

The news of Sherman's success reached the North instantaneously, and set
the country all aglow.  This was the first great political campaign for
the Republicans in their canvass of 1864.  It was followed later by
Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley; and these two campaigns
probably had more effect in settling the election of the following
November than all the speeches, all the bonfires, and all the parading
with banners and bands of music in the North.




CHAPTER L.

GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC--CROSSING THE RAPIDAN
--ENTERING THE WILDERNESS--BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.

Soon after midnight, May 3d-4th, the Army of the Potomac moved out from
its position north Rapidan, to start upon that memorable campaign,
destined to result in the capture of the Confederate capital and the
army defending it.  This was not to be accomplished, however, without as
desperate fighting as the world has ever witnessed; not to be
consummated in a day, a week, a month, single season.  The losses
inflicted, and endured, were destined to be severe; but the armies now
confronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for a period
of three years, with immense losses in killed, by death from sickness,
captured and wounded; and neither had made any real progress
accomplishing the final end.  It is true the Confederates had, so far,
held their capital, and they claimed this to be their sole object.  But
previously they had boldly proclaimed their intention to capture
Philadelphia, New York, and the National Capital, and had made several
attempts to do so, and once or twice had come fearfully near making
their boast good--too near for complacent contemplation by the loyal
North. They had also come near losing their own capital on at least one
occasion.  So here was a stand-off.  The campaign now begun was destined
to result in heavier losses, to both armies, in a given time, than any
previously suffered; but the carnage was to be limited to a single year,
and to accomplish all that had been anticipated or desired at the
beginning in that time.  We had to have hard fighting to achieve this.
The two armies had been confronting each other so long, without any
decisive result, that they hardly knew which could whip.

Ten days' rations, with a supply of forage and ammunition were taken in
wagons.  Beef cattle were driven with the trains, and butchered as
wanted.  Three days rations in addition, in haversacks, and fifty rounds
of cartridges, were carried on the person of each soldier.

The country over which the army had to operate, from the Rapidan to the
crossing of the James River, is rather flat, and is cut by numerous
streams which make their way to the Chesapeake Bay.  The crossings of
these streams by the army were generally made not far above tide-water,
and where they formed a considerable obstacle to the rapid advance of
troops even when the enemy did not appear in opposition.  The country
roads were narrow and poor. Most of the country is covered with a dense
forest, in places, like the Wilderness and along the Chickahominy,
almost impenetrable even for infantry except along the roads.  All
bridges were naturally destroyed before the National troops came to
them.

The Army of the Potomac was composed of three infantry and one cavalry
corps, commanded respectively by Generals W. S. Hancock, G. K. Warren,
(*27) John Sedgwick and P. H. Sheridan.  The artillery was commanded by
General Henry J. Hunt.  This arm was in such abundance that the fourth
of it could not be used to advantage in such a country as we were
destined to pass through.  The surplus was much in the way, taking up as
it did so much of the narrow and bad roads, and consuming so much of the
forage and other stores brought up by the trains.

The 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was in advance on the right,
and marched directly for Germania Ford, preceded by one division of
cavalry, under General J. H. Wilson.  General Sedgwick followed Warren
with the 6th corps.  Germania Ford was nine or ten miles below the right
of Lee's line.  Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved by another road,
farther east, directly upon Ely's Ford, six miles below Germania,
preceded by Gregg's division of cavalry, and followed by the artillery.
Torbert's division of cavalry was left north of the Rapidan, for the
time, to picket the river and prevent the enemy from crossing and
getting into our rear.  The cavalry seized the two crossings before
daylight, drove the enemy's pickets guarding them away, and by six
o'clock A.M. had the pontoons laid ready for the crossing of the
infantry and artillery.  This was undoubtedly a surprise to Lee.  The
fact that the movement was unopposed proves this.

Burnside, with the 9th corps, was left back at Warrenton, guarding the
railroad from Bull Run forward to preserve control of it in case our
crossing the Rapidan should be long delayed. He was instructed, however,
to advance at once on receiving notice that the army had crossed; and a
dispatch was sent to him a little after one P.M. giving the information
that our crossing had been successful.

The country was heavily wooded at all the points of crossing,
particularly on the south side of the river.  The battle-field from the
crossing of the Rapidan until the final movement from the Wilderness
toward Spottsylvania was of the same character. There were some
clearings and small farms within what might be termed the battle-field;
but generally the country was covered with a dense forest.  The roads
were narrow and bad.  All the conditions were favorable for defensive
operations.

There are two roads, good for that part of Virginia, running from Orange
Court House to the battle-field.  The most southerly of these roads is
known as the Orange Court House Plank Road, the northern one as the
Orange Turnpike.  There are also roads from east of the battle-field
running to Spottsylvania Court House, one from Chancellorsville,
branching at Aldrich's; the western branch going by Piney Branch Church,
Alsop's, thence by the Brock Road to Spottsylvania; the east branch goes
by Gates's, thence to Spottsylvania.  The Brock Road runs from Germania
Ford through the battle-field and on to the Court House.  As
Spottsylvania is approached the country is cut up with numerous roads,
some going to the town direct, and others crossing so as to connect the
farms with roads going there.

Lee's headquarters were at Orange Court House.  From there to
Fredericksburg he had the use of the two roads above described running
nearly parallel to the Wilderness.  This gave him unusual facilities,
for that country, for concentrating his forces to his right.  These
roads strike the road from Germania Ford in the Wilderness.

As soon as the crossing of the infantry was assured, the cavalry pushed
forward, Wilson's division by Wilderness Tavern to Parker's store, on
the Orange Plank Road; Gregg to the left towards Chancellorsville.
Warren followed Wilson and reached the Wilderness Tavern by noon, took
position there and intrenched.  Sedgwick followed Warren.  He was across
the river and in camp on the south bank, on the right of Warren, by
sundown.  Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved parallel with Warren and
camped about six miles east of him.  Before night all the troops, and by
the evening of the 5th the trains of more than four thousand wagons,
were safely on the south side of the river.

There never was a corps better organized than was the quartermaster's
corps with the Army of the Potomac in 1864. With a wagon-train that
would have extended from the Rapidan to Richmond, stretched along in
single file and separated as the teams necessarily would be when moving,
we could still carry only three days' forage and about ten to twelve
days' rations, besides a supply of ammunition.  To overcome all
difficulties, the chief quartermaster, General Rufus Ingalls, had marked
on each wagon the corps badge with the division color and the number of
the brigade.  At a glance, the particular brigade to which any wagon
belonged could be told.  The wagons were also marked to note the
contents:  if ammunition, whether for artillery or infantry; if forage,
whether grain or hay; if rations, whether, bread, pork, beans, rice,
sugar, coffee or whatever it might be.  Empty wagons were never allowed
to follow the army or stay in camp.  As soon as a wagon was empty it
would return to the base of supply for a load of precisely the same
article that had been taken from it.  Empty trains were obliged to leave
the road free for loaded ones.  Arriving near the army they would be
parked in fields nearest to the brigades they belonged to.  Issues,
except of ammunition, were made at night in all cases.  By this system
the hauling of forage for the supply train was almost wholly dispensed
with.  They consumed theirs at the depots.

I left Culpeper Court House after all the troops had been put in motion,
and passing rapidly to the front, crossed the Rapidan in advance of
Sedgwick's corps; and established headquarters for the afternoon and
night in a deserted house near the river.

Orders had been given, long before this movement began, to cut down the
baggage of officers and men to the lowest point possible.
Notwithstanding this I saw scattered along the road from Culpeper to
Germania Ford wagon-loads of new blankets and overcoats, thrown away by
the troops to lighten their knapsacks; an improvidence I had never
witnessed before.

Lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have discovered at a very
early hour on the morning of the 4th of May, that the Army of the
Potomac was moving, evidently did not learn until about one o'clock in
the afternoon by what route we would confront his army.  This I judge
from the fact that at 1.15 P.M., an hour and a quarter after Warren had
reached Old Wilderness Tavern, our officers took off rebel signals
which, when translated, were seen to be an order to his troops to occupy
their intrenchments at Mine Run.

Here at night dispatches were received announcing that Sherman, Butler
and Crook had moved according to programme.

On discovering the advance of the Army of the Potomac, Lee ordered Hill,
Ewell and Longstreet, each commanding corps, to move to the right to
attack us, Hill on the Orange Plank Road, Longstreet to follow on the
same road.  Longstreet was at this time--middle of the afternoon--at
Gordonsville, twenty or more miles away.  Ewell was ordered by the
Orange Pike.  He was near by and arrived some four miles east of Mine
Run before bivouacking for the night.

My orders were given through General Meade for an early advance on the
morning of the 5th.  Warren was to move to Parker's store, and Wilson's
cavalry--then at Parker's store--to move on to Craig's meeting-house.
Sedgwick followed Warren, closing in on his right.  The Army of the
Potomac was facing to the west, though our advance was made to the
south, except when facing the enemy.  Hancock was to move south-westward
to join on the left of Warren, his left to reach to Shady Grove Church.

At six o'clock, before reaching Parker's store, Warren discovered the
enemy.  He sent word back to this effect, and was ordered to halt and
prepare to meet and attack him.  Wright, with his division of Sedgwick's
corps, was ordered, by any road he could find, to join on to Warren's
right, and Getty with his division, also of Sedgwick's corps, was
ordered to move rapidly by Warren's rear and get on his left.  This was
the speediest way to reinforce Warren who was confronting the enemy on
both the Orange plank and turnpike roads.

Burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on receiving word that the Army
of the Potomac had safely crossed the Rapidan.  By making a night march,
although some of his troops had to march forty miles to reach the river,
he was crossing with the head of his column early on the morning of the
5th.  Meade moved his headquarters on to Old Wilderness Tavern, four
miles south of the river, as soon as it was light enough to see the
road.  I remained to hasten Burnside's crossing and to put him in
position.  Burnside at this time was not under Meade's command, and was
his senior in rank.  Getting information of the proximity of the enemy,
I informed Meade, and without waiting to see Burnside, at once moved
forward my headquarters to where Meade was.

It was my plan then, as it was on all other occasions, to take the
initiative whenever the enemy could be drawn from his intrenchments if
we were not intrenched ourselves.  Warren had not yet reached the point
where he was to halt, when he discovered the enemy near by.  Neither
party had any advantage of position.  Warren was, therefore, ordered to
attack as soon as he could prepare for it.  At nine o'clock Hancock was
ordered to come up to the support of Getty.  He himself arrived at
Getty's front about noon, but his troops were yet far in the rear.
Getty was directed to hold his position at all hazards until relieved.
About this hour Warren was ready, and attacked with favorable though not
decisive results.  Getty was somewhat isolated from Warren and was in a
precarious condition for a time.  Wilson, with his division of cavalry,
was farther south, and was cut off from the rest of the army.  At two
o'clock Hancock's troops began to arrive, and immediately he was ordered
to join Getty and attack the enemy.  But the heavy timber and narrow
roads prevented him from getting into position for attack as promptly as
he generally did when receiving such orders.  At four o'clock he again
received his orders to attack, and General Getty received orders from
Meade a few minutes later to attack whether Hancock was ready or not.
He met the enemy under Heth within a few hundred yards.

Hancock immediately sent two divisions, commanded by Birney and Mott,
and later two brigades, Carroll's and Owen's, to the support of Getty.
This was timely and saved Getty.  During the battle Getty and Carroll
were wounded, but remained on the field.  One of Birney's most gallant
brigade commanders--Alexander Hays--was killed.

I had been at West Point with Hays for three years, and had served with
him through the Mexican war, a portion of the time in the same regiment.
He was a most gallant officer, ready to lead his command wherever
ordered.  With him it was "Come, boys," not "Go."

Wadsworth's division and Baxter's brigade of the 2d division were sent
to reinforce Hancock and Getty; but the density of the intervening
forest was such that, there being no road to march upon, they did not
get up with the head of column until night, and bivouacked where they
were without getting into position.

During the afternoon Sheridan sent Gregg's division of cavalry to Todd's
Tavern in search of Wilson.  This was fortunate.  He found Wilson
engaged with a superior force under General Rosser, supported by
infantry, and falling back before it.  Together they were strong enough
to turn the tables upon the enemy and themselves become aggressive.
They soon drove the rebel cavalry back beyond Corbin's Bridge.

Fighting between Hancock and Hill continued until night put a close to
it.  Neither side made any special progress.

After the close of the battle of the 5th of May my orders were given for
the following morning.  We knew Longstreet with 12,000 men was on his
way to join Hill's right, near the Brock Road, and might arrive during
the night.  I was anxious that the rebels should not take the initiative
in the morning, and therefore ordered Hancock to make an assault at 4.30
o'clock.  Meade asked to have the hour changed to six.  Deferring to his
wishes as far as I was willing, the order was modified and five was
fixed as the hour to move.

Hancock had now fully one-half of the Army of the Potomac. Wadsworth
with his division, which had arrived the night before, lay in a line
perpendicular to that held by Hill, and to the right of Hancock.  He was
directed to move at the same time, and to attack Hill's left.

Burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, was directed to get in
between Warren and Wadsworth, and attack as soon as he could get in
position to do so.  Sedgwick and Warren were to make attacks in their
front, to detain as many of the enemy as they could and to take
advantage of any attempt to reinforce Hill from that quarter.  Burnside
was ordered if he should succeed in breaking the enemy's centre, to
swing around to the left and envelop the right of Lee's army.  Hancock
was informed of all the movements ordered.

Burnside had three divisions, but one of them--a  division--was
sent to guard the wagon train, and he did not see it again until July.

Lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on his
right until Longstreet got up.  This is evident from the fact that
notwithstanding the early hour at which I had ordered the assault, both
for the purpose of being the attacking party and to strike before
Longstreet got up, Lee was ahead in his assault on our right.  His
purpose was evident, but he failed.

Hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, but learning in time
that Longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the Catharpin Road,
thus threatening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, commanded
by General Barlow, with all his artillery, to cover the approaches by
which Longstreet was expected.  This disposition was made in time to
attack as ordered.  Hancock moved by the left of the Orange Plank Road,
and Wadsworth by the right of it. The fighting was desperate for about
an hour, when the enemy began to break up in great confusion.

I believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now, that if
the country had been such that Hancock and his command could have seen
the confusion and panic in the lines of the enemy, it would have been
taken advantage of so effectually that Lee would not have made another
stand outside of his Richmond defences.

Gibbon commanded Hancock's left, and was ordered to attack, but was not
able to accomplish much.

On the morning of the 6th Sheridan was sent to connect with Hancock's
left and attack the enemy's cavalry who were trying to get on our left
and rear.  He met them at the intersection of the Furnace and Brock
roads and at Todd's Tavern, and defeated them at both places.  Later he
was attacked, and again the enemy was repulsed.

Hancock heard the firing between Sheridan and Stuart, and thinking the
enemy coming by that road, still further reinforced his position
guarding the entrance to the Brock Road.  Another incident happened
during the day to further induce Hancock to weaken his attacking column.
Word reached him that troops were seen moving towards him from the
direction of Todd's Tavern, and Brooke's brigade was detached to meet
this new enemy; but the troops approaching proved to be several hundred
convalescents coming from Chancellorsville, by the road Hancock had
advanced upon, to join their respective commands.  At 6.50 o'clock A.M.,
Burnside, who had passed Wilderness Tavern at six o'clock, was ordered
to send a division to the support of Hancock, but to continue with the
remainder of his command in the execution of his previous order.  The
difficulty of making a way through the dense forests prevented Burnside
from getting up in time to be of any service on the forenoon of the
sixth.

Hancock followed Hill's retreating forces, in the morning, a mile or
more.  He maintained this position until, along in the afternoon,
Longstreet came upon him.  The retreating column of Hill meeting
reinforcements that had not yet been engaged, became encouraged and
returned with them.  They were enabled, from the density of the forest,
to approach within a few hundred yards of our advance before being
discovered.  Falling upon a brigade of Hancock's corps thrown to the
advance, they swept it away almost instantly.  The enemy followed up his
advantage and soon came upon Mott's division, which fell back in great
confusion.  Hancock made dispositions to hold his advanced position, but
after holding it for a time, fell back into the position that he had
held in the morning, which was strongly intrenched.  In this engagement
the intrepid Wadsworth while trying to rally his men was mortally
wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy.  The enemy followed up,
but made no immediate attack.

The Confederate General Jenkins was killed and Longstreet seriously
wounded in this engagement.  Longstreet had to leave the field, not to
resume command for many weeks.  His loss was a severe one to Lee, and
compensated in a great measure for the mishap, or misapprehensions,
which had fallen to our lot during the day.

After Longstreet's removal from the field Lee took command of his right
in person.  He was not able, however, to rally his men to attack
Hancock's position, and withdrew from our front for the purpose of
reforming.  Hancock sent a brigade to clear his front of all remnants
that might be left of Longstreet's or Hill's commands.  This brigade
having been formed at right angles to the intrenchments held by
Hancock's command, swept down the whole length of them from left to
right.  A brigade of the enemy was encountered in this move; but it
broke and disappeared without a contest.

Firing was continued after this, but with less fury.  Burnside had not
yet been able to get up to render any assistance.  But it was now only
about nine in the morning, and he was getting into position on Hancock's
right.

At 4.15 in the afternoon Lee attacked our left.  His line moved up to
within a hundred yards of ours and opened a heavy fire. This status was
maintained for about half an hour.  Then a part of Mott's division and
Ward's brigade of Birney's division gave way and retired in disorder.
The enemy under R. H. Anderson took advantage of this and pushed through
our line, planting their flags on a part of the intrenchments not on
fire.  But owing to the efforts of Hancock, their success was but
temporary.  Carroll, of Gibbon's division, moved at a double quick with
his brigade and drove back the enemy, inflicting great loss.  Fighting
had continued from five in the morning sometimes along the whole line,
at other times only in places. The ground fought over had varied in
width, but averaged three-quarters of a mile.  The killed, and many of
the severely wounded, of both armies, lay within this belt where it was
impossible to reach them.  The woods were set on fire by the bursting
shells, and the conflagration raged.  The wounded who had not strength
to move themselves were either suffocated or burned to death.  Finally
the fire communicated with our breastworks, in places.  Being
constructed of wood, they burned with great fury.  But the battle still
raged, our men firing through the flames until it became too hot to
remain longer.

Lee was now in distress.  His men were in confusion, and his personal
efforts failed to restore order.  These facts, however, were learned
subsequently, or we would have taken advantage of his condition and no
doubt gained a decisive success.  His troops were withdrawn now, but I
revoked the order, which I had given previously to this assault, for
Hancock to attack, because his troops had exhausted their ammunition and
did not have time to replenish from the train, which was at some
distance.

Burnside, Sedgwick, and Warren had all kept up an assault during all
this time; but their efforts had no other effect than to prevent the
enemy from reinforcing his right from the troops in their front.

I had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the Rapidan to be taken
up except one at Germania Ford.

The troops on Sedgwick's right had been sent to enforce our left.  This
left our right in danger of being turned, and us of being cut off from
all present base of supplies.  Sedgwick had refused his right and
intrenched it for protection against attack.  But late in the afternoon
of the 6th Early came out from his lines in considerable force and got
in upon Sedgwick's right, notwithstanding the precautions taken, and
created considerable confusion.  Early captured several hundred
prisoners, among them two general officers.  The defence, however, was
vigorous; and night coming on, the enemy was thrown into as much
confusion as our troops, engaged, were.  Early says in his Memoirs that
if we had discovered the confusion in his lines we might have brought
fresh troops to his great discomfort.  Many officers, who had not been
attacked by Early, continued coming to my headquarters even after
Sedgwick had rectified his lines a little farther to the rear, with news
of the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy was
pushing on and would soon be upon me.

During the night all of Lee's army withdrew within their intrenchments.
On the morning of the 7th General Custer drove the enemy's cavalry from
Catharpin Furnace to Todd's Tavern. Pickets and skirmishers were sent
along our entire front to find the position of the enemy.  Some went as
far as a mile and a half before finding him. But Lee showed no
disposition to come out of his Works.  There was no battle during the
day, and but little firing except in Warren's front; he being directed
about noon to make a reconnoissance in force.  This drew some sharp
firing, but there was no attempt on the part of Lee to drive him back.
This ended the Battle of the Wilderness.



CHAPTER LI.

AFTER THE BATTLE--TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SERVICE--MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT
FLANK.

More desperate fighting has not been witnessed on this continent than
that of the 5th and 6th of May.  Our victory consisted in having
successfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the face of an
enemy, and in getting the army together as a unit. We gained an
advantage on the morning of the 6th, which, if it had been followed up,
must have proven very decisive.  In the evening the enemy gained an
advantage; but was speedily repulsed.  As we stood at the close, the two
armies were relatively in about the same condition to meet each other as
when the river divided them.  But the fact of having safely crossed was
a victory.

Our losses in the Wilderness were very severe.  Those of the
Confederates must have been even more so; but I have no means of
speaking with accuracy upon this point.  The Germania Ford bridge was
transferred to Ely's Ford to facilitate the transportation of the
wounded to Washington.

It may be as well here as elsewhere to state two things connected with
all movements of the Army of the Potomac:  first, in every change of
position or halt for the night, whether confronting the enemy or not,
the moment arms were stacked the men intrenched themselves.  For this
purpose they would build up piles of logs or rails if they could be
found in their front, and dig a ditch, throwing the dirt forward on the
timber.  Thus the digging they did counted in making a depression to
stand in, and increased the elevation in front of them.  It was
wonderful how quickly they could in this way construct defences of
considerable strength.  When a halt was made with the view of assaulting
the enemy, or in his presence, these would be strengthened or their
positions changed under the direction of engineer officers.  The second
was, the use made of the telegraph and signal corps.  Nothing could be
more complete than the organization and discipline of this body of brave
and intelligent men.  Insulated wires--insulated so that they would
transmit messages in a storm, on the ground or under water--were wound
upon reels, making about two hundred pounds weight of wire to each reel.
Two men and one mule were detailed to each reel.  The pack-saddle on
which this was carried was provided with a rack like a sawbuck placed
crosswise of the saddle, and raised above it so that the reel, with its
wire, would revolve freely.  There was a wagon, supplied with a
telegraph operator, battery and telegraph instruments for each division,
each corps, each army, and one for my headquarters.  There were wagons
also loaded with light poles, about the size and length of a wall tent
pole, supplied with an iron spike in one end, used to hold the wires up
when laid, so that wagons and artillery would not run over them.  The
mules thus loaded were assigned to brigades, and always kept with the
command they were assigned to.  The operators were also assigned to
particular headquarters, and never changed except by special orders.

The moment the troops were put in position to go into camp all the men
connected with this branch of service would proceed to put up their
wires.  A mule loaded with a coil of wire would be led to the rear of
the nearest flank of the brigade he belonged to, and would be led in a
line parallel thereto, while one man would hold an end of the wire and
uncoil it as the mule was led off.  When he had walked the length of the
wire the whole of it would be on the ground.  This would be done in rear
of every brigade at the same time.  The ends of all the wires would then
be joined, making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole army.  The
men, attached to brigades or divisions, would all commence at once
raising the wires with their telegraph poles. This was done by making a
loop in the wire and putting it over the spike and raising the pole to a
perpendicular position.  At intervals the wire would be attached to
trees, or some other permanent object, so that one pole was sufficient
at a place. In the absence of such a support two poles would have to be
used, at intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold the wire firm in
its place.  While this was being done the telegraph wagons would take
their positions near where the headquarters they belonged to were to be
established, and would connect with the wire. Thus, in a few minutes
longer time than it took a mule to walk the length of its coil,
telegraphic communication would be effected between all the headquarters
of the army.  No orders ever had to be given to establish the telegraph.

The signal service was used on the march.  The men composing this corps
were assigned to specified commands.  When movements were made, they
would go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize upon high points of
ground giving a commanding view of the country, if cleared, or would
climb tall trees on the highest points if not cleared, and would denote,
by signals, the positions of different parts of our own army, and often
the movements of the enemy.  They would also take off the signals of the
enemy and transmit them.  It would sometimes take too long a time to
make translations of intercepted dispatches for us to receive any
benefit from them.  But sometimes they gave useful information.

On the afternoon of the 7th I received news from Washington announcing
that Sherman had probably attacked Johnston that day, and that Butler
had reached City Point safely and taken it by surprise on the 5th.  I
had given orders for a movement by the left flank, fearing that Lee
might move rapidly to Richmond to crush Butler before I could get there.

My order for this movement was as follows:


HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S., May 7, 1864, 6.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P.

Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take position
at Spottsylvania C. H. with one army corps, at Todd's Tavern with one,
and another near the intersection of the Piney Branch and Spottsylvania
road with the road from Alsop's to Old Court House.  If this move is
made the trains should be thrown forward early in the morning to the Ny
River.

I think it would be advisable in making the change to leave Hancock
where he is until Warren passes him.  He could then follow and become
the right of the new line.  Burnside will move to Piney Branch Church.
Sedgwick can move along the pike to Chancellorsville and on to his
destination.  Burnside will move on the plank road to the intersection
of it with the Orange and Fredericksburg plank road, then follow
Sedgwick to his place of destination.

All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before the troops
move, and then move off quietly.

It is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy attack
on Hancock this afternoon.  In case they do we must be prepared to
resist them, and follow up any success we may gain, with our whole
force.  Such a result would necessarily modify these instructions.

All the hospitals should be moved to-day to Chancellorsville.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


During the 7th Sheridan had a fight with the rebel cavalry at Todd's
Tavern, but routed them, thus opening the way for the troops that were
to go by that route at night.  Soon after dark Warren withdrew from the
front of the enemy, and was soon followed by Sedgwick.  Warren's march
carried him immediately behind the works where Hancock's command lay on
the Brock Road.  With my staff and a small escort of cavalry I preceded
the troops.  Meade with his staff accompanied me.  The greatest
enthusiasm was manifested by Hancock's men as we passed by.  No doubt it
was inspired by the fact that the movement was south. It indicated to
them that they had passed through the "beginning of the end" in the
battle just fought.  The cheering was so lusty that the enemy must have
taken it for a night attack.  At all events it drew from him a furious
fusillade of artillery and musketry, plainly heard but not felt by us.

Meade and I rode in advance.  We had passed but a little way beyond our
left when the road forked.  We looked to see, if we could, which road
Sheridan had taken with his cavalry during the day.  It seemed to be the
right-hand one, and accordingly we took it.  We had not gone far,
however, when Colonel C. B. Comstock, of my staff, with the instinct of
the engineer, suspecting that we were on a road that would lead us into
the lines of the enemy, if he, too, should be moving, dashed by at a
rapid gallop and all alone.  In a few minutes he returned and reported
that Lee was moving, and that the road we were on would bring us into
his lines in a short distance.  We returned to the forks of the road,
left a man to indicate the right road to the head of Warren's column
when it should come up, and continued our journey to Todd's Tavern,
where we arrived after midnight.

My object in moving to Spottsylvania was two-fold:  first, I did not
want Lee to get back to Richmond in time to attempt to crush Butler
before I could get there; second, I wanted to get between his army and
Richmond if possible; and, if not, to draw him into the open field.  But
Lee, by accident, beat us to Spottsylvania.  Our wagon trains had been
ordered easterly of the roads the troops were to march upon before the
movement commenced.  Lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the Army
of the Potomac to Fredericksburg, and so informed his government.
Accordingly he ordered Longstreet's corps--now commanded by Anderson--to
move in the morning (the 8th) to Spottsylvania.  But the woods being
still on fire, Anderson could not go into bivouac, and marched directly
on to his destination that night.  By this accident Lee got possession
of Spottsylvania.  It is impossible to say now what would have been the
result if Lee's orders had been obeyed as given; but it is certain that
we would have been in Spottsylvania, and between him and his capital.
My belief is that there would have been a race between the two armies to
see which could reach Richmond first, and the Army of the Potomac would
have had the shorter line.  Thus, twice since crossing the Rapidan we
came near closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, from
the Rapidan to the James River or Richmond.  The first failure was
caused by our not following up the success gained over Hill's corps on
the morning of the 6th, as before described:  the second, when fires
caused by that battle drove Anderson to make a march during the night of
the 7th-8th which he was ordered to commence on the morning of the 8th.
But accident often decides the fate of battle.

Sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fighting during the afternoon of
the 7th, lasting at Todd's Tavern until after night, with the field his
at the close.  He issued the necessary orders for seizing Spottsylvania
and holding the bridge over the Po River, which Lee's troops would have
to cross to get to Spottsylvania.  But Meade changed Sheridan's orders
to Merritt--who was holding the bridge--on his arrival at Todd's Tavern,
and thereby left the road free for Anderson when he came up.  Wilson,
who was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his division of cavalry;
but he could not hold it against the Confederate corps which had not
been detained at the crossing of the Po, as it would have been but for
the unfortunate change in Merritt's orders.  Had he been permitted to
execute the orders Sheridan gave him, he would have been guarding with
two brigades of cavalry the bridge over the Po River which Anderson had
to cross, and must have detained him long enough to enable Warren to
reinforce Wilson and hold the town.

Anderson soon intrenched himself--if indeed the intrenchments were not
already made--immediately across Warren's front. Warren was not aware of
his presence, but probably supposed it was the cavalry which Merritt had
engaged earlier in the day. He assaulted at once, but was repulsed.  He
soon organized his men, as they were not pursued by the enemy, and made
a second attack, this time with his whole corps.  This time he succeeded
in gaining a position immediately in the enemy's front, where he
intrenched.  His right and left divisions--the former Crawford's, the
latter Wadsworth's, now commanded by Cutler--drove the enemy back some
distance.

At this time my headquarters had been advanced to Piney Branch Church.
I was anxious to crush Anderson before Lee could get a force to his
support.  To this end Sedgwick who was at Piney Branch Church, was
ordered to Warren's support.  Hancock, who was at Todd's Tavern, was
notified of Warren's engagement, and was directed to be in readiness to
come up.  Burnside, who was with the wagon trains at Aldrich's on our
extreme left, received the same instructions.  Sedgwick was slow in
getting up for some reason--probably unavoidable, because he was never
at fault when serious work was to be done--so that it was near night
before the combined forces were ready to attack.  Even then all of
Sedgwick's command did not get into the engagement.  Warren led the last
assault, one division at a time, and of course it failed.

Warren's difficulty was twofold:  when he received an order to do
anything, it would at once occur to his mind how all the balance of the
army should be engaged so as properly to co-operate with him.  His ideas
were generally good, but he would forget that the person giving him
orders had thought of others at the time he had of him.  In like manner,
when he did get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligent
instructions to division commanders, he would go in with one division,
holding the others in reserve until he could superintend their movements
in person also, forgetting that division commanders could execute an
order without his presence.  His difficulty was constitutional and
beyond his control.  He was an officer of superior ability, quick
perceptions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that could be
done with a small command.

Lee had ordered Hill's corps--now commanded by Early--to move by the
very road we had marched upon.  This shows that even early in the
morning of the 8th Lee had not yet become acquainted with my move, but
still thought that the Army of the Potomac had gone to Fredericksburg.
Indeed, he informed the authorities at Richmond he had possession of
Spottsylvania and was on my flank. Anderson was in possession of
Spottsylvania, through no foresight of Lee, however.  Early only found
that he had been following us when he ran against Hancock at Todd's
Tavern.  His coming detained Hancock from the battle-field of
Spottsylvania for that day; but he, in like manner, kept Early back and
forced him to move by another route.

Had I ordered the movement for the night of the 7th by my left flank, it
would have put Hancock in the lead.  It would also have given us an hour
or earlier start.  It took all that time for Warren to get the head of
his column to the left of Hancock after he had got his troops out of
their line confronting the enemy.  This hour, and Hancock's capacity to
use his whole force when necessary, would, no doubt, have enabled him to
crush Anderson before he could be reinforced.  But the movement made was
tactical.  It kept the troops in mass against a possible assault by the
enemy.  Our left occupied its intrenchments while the two corps to the
right passed.  If an attack had been made by the enemy he would have
found the 2d corps in position, fortified, and, practically, the 5th and
6th corps in position as reserves, until his entire front was passed.
By a left flank movement the army would have been scattered while still
passing the front of the enemy, and before the extreme right had got by
it would have been very much exposed.  Then, too, I had not yet learned
the special qualifications of the different corps commanders.  At that
time my judgment was that Warren was the man I would suggest to succeed
Meade should anything happen to that gallant soldier to take him from
the field.  As I have before said, Warren was a gallant soldier, an able
man; and he was beside thoroughly imbued with the solemnity and
importance of the duty he had to perform.



CHAPTER LII.

BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA--HANCOCK'S POSITION--ASSAULT OF WARREN'S AND
WRIGHT'S CORPS--UPTON PROMOTED ON THE FIELD--GOOD NEWS FROM BUTLER AND
SHERIDAN.

The Mattapony River is formed by the junction of the Mat, the Ta, the Po
and the Ny rivers, the last being the northernmost of the four.  It
takes its rise about a mile south and a little east of the Wilderness
Tavern.  The Po rises south-west of the place, but farther away.
Spottsylvania is on the ridge dividing these two streams, and where they
are but a few miles apart.  The Brock Road reaches Spottsylvania without
crossing either of these streams. Lee's army coming up by the Catharpin
Road, had to cross the Po at Wooden Bridge.  Warren and Hancock came by
the Brock Road.  Sedgwick crossed the Ny at Catharpin Furnace. Burnside
coming by Aldrich's to Gates's house, had to cross the Ny near the
enemy.  He found pickets at the bridge, but they were soon driven off by
a brigade of Willcox's division, and the stream was crossed.  This
brigade was furiously attacked; but the remainder of the division coming
up, they were enabled to hold their position, and soon fortified it.

About the time I received the news of this attack, word came from
Hancock that Early had left his front.  He had been forced over to the
Catharpin Road, crossing the Po at Corbin's and again at Wooden Bridge.
These are the bridges Sheridan had given orders to his cavalry to occupy
on the 8th, while one division should occupy Spottsylvania.  These
movements of the enemy gave me the idea that Lee was about to make the
attempt to get to, or towards, Fredericksburg to cut off my supplies.  I
made arrangements to attack his right and get between him and Richmond
if he should try to execute this design.  If he had any such intention
it was abandoned as soon as Burnside was established south of the Ny.

The Po and the Ny are narrow little streams, but deep, with abrupt
banks, and bordered by heavily wooded and marshy bottoms--at the time we
were there--and difficult to cross except where bridged.  The country
about was generally heavily timbered, but with occasional clearings.  It
was a much better country to conduct a defensive campaign in than an
offensive one.

By noon of the 9th the position of the two armies was as follows:  Lee
occupied a semicircle facing north, north-west and north-east, inclosing
the town.  Anderson was on his left extending to the Po, Ewell came
next, then Early.  Warren occupied our right, covering the Brock and
other roads converging at Spottsylvania; Sedgwick was to his left and
Burnside on our extreme left.  Hancock was yet back at Todd's Tavern,
but as soon as it was known that Early had left Hancock's front the
latter was ordered up to Warren's right.  He formed a line with three
divisions on the hill overlooking the Po early in the afternoon, and was
ordered to cross the Po and get on the enemy's flank.  The fourth
division of Hancock's corps, Mott commanding, was left at Todd's when
the corps first came up; but in the afternoon it was brought up and
placed to the left of Sedgwick's--now Wright's--6th corps.  In the
morning General Sedgwick had been killed near the right of his
intrenchments by rebel sharpshooters.  His loss was a severe one to the
Army of the Potomac and to the Nation.  General H. G. Wright succeeded
him in the command of his corps.

Hancock was now, nine P.M. of the 9th of May, across the left flank of
Lee's army, but separated from it, and also from the remainder of
Meade's army, by the Po River.  But for the lateness of the hour and the
darkness of the night he would have attempted to cross the river again
at Wooden Bridge, thus bringing himself on the same side with both
friend and foe.

The Po at the points where Hancock's corps crossed runs nearly due east.
Just below his lower crossing--the troops crossed at three points--it
turns due south, and after passing under Wooden Bridge soon resumes a
more easterly direction.  During the night this corps built three
bridges over the Po; but these were in rear.

The position assumed by Hancock's corps forced Lee to reinforce his left
during the night.  Accordingly on the morning of the 10th, when Hancock
renewed his effort to get over the Po to his front, he found himself
confronted by some of Early's command, which had been brought from the
extreme right of the enemy during the night.  He succeeded in effecting
a crossing with one brigade, however, but finding the enemy intrenched
in his front, no more were crossed.

Hancock reconnoitred his front on the morning of the 10th, with the view
of forcing a crossing, if it was found that an advantage could be
gained.  The enemy was found strongly intrenched on the high ground
overlooking the river, and commanding the Wooden Bridge with artillery.
Anderson's left rested on the Po, where it turns south; therefore, for
Hancock to cross over--although it would bring him to the same side of
the stream with the rest of the army--would still farther isolate him
from it.  The stream would have to be crossed twice in the face of the
enemy to unite with the main body.  The idea of crossing was therefore
abandoned.

Lee had weakened the other parts of his line to meet this movement of
Hancock's, and I determined to take advantage of it.  Accordingly in the
morning, orders were issued for an attack in the afternoon on the centre
by Warren's and Wright's corps, Hancock to command all the attacking
force.  Two of his divisions were brought to the north side of the Po.
Gibbon was placed to the right of Warren, and Birney in his rear as a
reserve.  Barlow's division was left south of the stream, and Mott of
the same corps was still to the left of Wright's corps.  Burnside was
ordered to reconnoitre his front in force, and, if an opportunity
presented, to attack with vigor.  The enemy seeing Barlow's division
isolated from the rest of the army, came out and attacked with fury.
Barlow repulsed the assault with great slaughter, and with considerable
loss to himself.  But the enemy reorganized and renewed the assault.
Birney was now moved to the high ground overlooking the river crossings
built by our troops, and covered the crossings.  The second assault was
repulsed, again with severe loss to the enemy, and Barlow was withdrawn
without further molestation. General T. G. Stevenson was killed in this
move.

Between the lines, where Warren's assault was to take place, there was a
ravine grown up with large trees and underbrush, making it almost
impenetrable by man.  The <DW72>s on both sides were also covered with a
heavy growth of timber.  Warren, before noon, reconnoitred his front
twice, the first time with one and the second with two divisions.  He
was repulsed on both occasions, but gained such information of the
ground as to induce him to report recommending the assault.

Wright also reconnoitred his front and gained a considerably advanced
position from the one he started from.  He then organized a storming
party, consisting of twelve regiments, and assigned Colonel Emory Upton,
of the 121st New York Volunteers, to the command of it.  About four
o'clock in the afternoon the assault was ordered, Warren's and Wright's
corps, with Mott's division of Hancock's corps, to move simultaneously.
The movement was prompt, and in a few minutes the fiercest of struggles
began.  The battle-field was so densely covered with forest that but
little could be seen, by any one person, as to the progress made.  Meade
and I occupied the best position we could get, in rear of Warren.

Warren was repulsed with heavy loss, General J. C. Rice being among the
killed.  He was not followed, however, by the enemy, and was thereby
enabled to reorganize his command as soon as covered from the guns of
the enemy.  To the left our success was decided, but the advantage was
lost by the feeble action of Mott.  Upton with his assaulting party
pushed forward and crossed the enemy's intrenchments.  Turning to the
right and left he captured several guns and some hundreds of prisoners.
Mott was ordered to his assistance but failed utterly.  So much time was
lost in trying to get up the troops which were in the right position to
reinforce, that I ordered Upton to withdraw; but the officers and men of
his command were so averse to giving up the advantage they had gained
that I withdrew the order.  To relieve them, I ordered a renewal of the
assault.  By this time Hancock, who had gone with Birney's division to
relieve Barlow, had returned, bringing the division with him.  His corps
was now joined with Warren's and Wright's in this last assault.  It was
gallantly made, many men getting up to, and over, the works of the
enemy; but they were not able to hold them.  At night they were
withdrawn.  Upton brought his prisoners with him, but the guns he had
captured he was obliged to abandon.  Upton had gained an important
advantage, but a lack in others of the spirit and dash possessed by him
lost it to us.  Before leaving Washington I had been authorized to
promote officers on the field for special acts of gallantry.  By this
authority I conferred the rank of brigadier-general upon Upton on the
spot, and this act was confirmed by the President.  Upton had been badly
wounded in this fight.

Burnside on the left had got up to within a few hundred yards of
Spottsylvania Court House, completely turning Lee's right.  He was not
aware of the importance of the advantage he had gained, and I, being
with the troops where the heavy fighting was, did not know of it at the
time.  He had gained his position with but little fighting, and almost
without loss.  Burnside's position now separated him widely from
Wright's corps, the corps nearest to him.  At night he was ordered to
join on to this.  This brought him back about a mile, and lost to us an
important advantage.  I attach no blame to Burnside for this, but I do
to myself for not having had a staff officer with him to report to me
his position.

The enemy had not dared to come out of his line at any point to follow
up his advantage, except in the single instance of his attack on Barlow.
Then he was twice repulsed with heavy loss, though he had an entire
corps against two brigades.  Barlow took up his bridges in the presence
of this force.

On the 11th there was no battle and but little firing; none except by
Mott who made a reconnoissance to ascertain if there was a weak point in
the enemy's line.

I wrote the following letter to General Halleck:


NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 11, 1864--8.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C.

We have now ended the 6th day of very hard fighting.  The result up to
this time is much in our favor.  But our losses have been heavy as well
as those of the enemy.  We have lost to this time eleven general
officers killed, wounded and missing, and probably twenty thousand men.
I think the loss of the enemy must be greater--we having taken over four
thousand prisoners in battle, whilst he has taken from us but few except
a few stragglers.  I am now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons
for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight it
out on this line if it takes all summer.

The arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouraging to the men,
and I hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and in as great
numbers.  My object in having them sent to Belle Plain was to use them
as an escort to our supply trains.  If it is more convenient to send
them out by train to march from the railroad to Belle Plain or
Fredericksburg, send them so.

I am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to the
mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers, and by
keeping them intrenched in every position they take.

Up to this time there is no indication of any portion of Lee's army
being detached for the defence of Richmond.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


And also, I received information, through the War Department, from
General Butler that his cavalry under Kautz had cut the railroad south
of Petersburg, separating Beauregard from Richmond, and had whipped
Hill, killing, wounding and capturing many.  Also that he was
intrenched, and could maintain himself.  On this same day came news from
Sheridan to the effect that he had destroyed ten miles of the railroad
and telegraph between Lee and Richmond, one and a half million rations,
and most of the medical stores for his army.

On the 8th I had directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose from the Army
of the Potomac and pass around the left of Lee's army and attack his
cavalry and communications, which was successfully executed in the
manner I have already described.



CHAPTER LIII.

HANCOCK'S ASSAULT-LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATES--PROMOTIONS RECOMMENDED
--DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY--EWELL'S ATTACK-REDUCING THE ARTILLERY.

In the reconnoissance made by Mott on the 11th, a salient was discovered
at the right centre. I determined that an assault should be made at that
point. (*28) Accordingly in the afternoon Hancock was ordered to move
his command by the rear of Warren and Wright, under cover of night, to
Wright's left, and there form it for an assault at four o'clock the next
morning.  The night was dark, it rained heavily, and the road was
difficult, so that it was midnight when he reached the point where he
was to halt.  It took most of the night to get the men in position for
their advance in the morning.  The men got but little rest.  Burnside
was ordered to attack (*29) on the left of the salient at the same hour.
I sent two of my staff officers to impress upon him the importance of
pushing forward vigorously.  Hancock was notified of this.  Warren and
Wright were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to join in the
assault if circumstances made it advisable.  I occupied a central
position most convenient for receiving information from all points.
Hancock put Barlow on his left, in double column, and Birney to his
right.  Mott followed Birney, and Gibbon was held in reserve.

The morning of the 12th opened foggy, delaying the start more than half
an hour.

The ground over which Hancock had to pass to reach the enemy, was
ascending and heavily wooded to within two or three hundred yards of the
enemy's intrenchments.  In front of Birney there was also a marsh to
cross.  But, notwithstanding all these difficulties, the troops pushed
on in quick time without firing a gun, and when within four or five
hundred yards of the enemy's line broke out in loud cheers, and with a
rush went up to and over the breastworks.  Barlow and Birney entered
almost simultaneously.  Here a desperate hand-to-hand conflict took
place.  The men of the two sides were too close together to fire, but
used their guns as clubs.  The hand conflict was soon over.  Hancock's
corps captured some four thousand prisoners among them a division and a
brigade commander twenty or more guns with their horses, caissons, and
ammunition, several thousand stand of arms, and many colors.  Hancock,
as soon as the hand-to-hand conflict was over, turned the guns of the
enemy against him and advanced inside the rebel lines.  About six
o'clock I ordered Warren's corps to the support of Hancock's. Burnside,
on the left, had advanced up east of the salient to the very parapet of
the enemy.  Potter, commanding one of his divisions, got over but was
not able to remain there.  However, he inflicted a heavy loss upon the
enemy; but not without loss in return.

This victory was important, and one that Lee could not afford to leave
us in full possession of.  He made the most strenuous efforts to regain
the position he had lost.  Troops were brought up from his left and
attacked Hancock furiously.  Hancock was forced to fall back:  but he
did so slowly, with his face to the enemy, inflicting on him heavy loss,
until behind the breastworks he had captured.  These he turned, facing
them the other way, and continued to hold.  Wright was ordered up to
reinforce Hancock, and arrived by six o'clock.  He was wounded soon
after coming up but did not relinquish the command of his corps,
although the fighting lasted until one o'clock the next morning.  At
eight o'clock Warren was ordered up again, but was so slow in making his
dispositions that his orders were frequently repeated, and with
emphasis.  At eleven o'clock I gave Meade written orders to relieve
Warren from his command if he failed to move promptly. Hancock placed
batteries on high ground in his rear, which he used against the enemy,
firing over the heads of his own troops.

Burnside accomplished but little on our left of a positive nature, but
negatively a great deal.  He kept Lee from reinforcing his centre from
that quarter.  If the 5th corps, or rather if Warren, had been as prompt
as Wright was with the 6th corps, better results might have been
obtained.

Lee massed heavily from his left flank on the broken point of his line.
Five times during the day he assaulted furiously, but without dislodging
our troops from their new position.  His losses must have been fearful.
Sometimes the belligerents would be separated by but a few feet.  In one
place a tree, eighteen inches in diameter, was cut entirely down by
musket balls.  All the trees between the lines were very much cut to
pieces by artillery and musketry.  It was three o'clock next morning
before the fighting ceased.  Some of our troops had then been twenty
hours under fire.  In this engagement we did not lose a single
organization, not even a company.  The enemy lost one division with its
commander, one brigade and one regiment, with heavy losses
elsewhere.(*30)  Our losses were heavy, but, as stated, no whole company
was captured.  At night Lee took a position in rear of his former one,
and by the following morning he was strongly intrenched in it.

Warren's corps was now temporarily broken up, Cutler's division sent to
Wright, and Griffin's to Hancock.  Meade ordered his chief of staff,
General Humphreys, to remain with Warren and the remaining division, and
authorized him to give it orders in his name.

During the day I was passing along the line from wing to wing
continuously.  About the centre stood a house which proved to be
occupied by an old lady and her daughter.  She showed such unmistakable
signs of being strongly Union that I stopped.  She said she had not seen
a Union flag for so long a time that it did her heart good to look upon
it again.  She said her husband and son, being, Union men, had had to
leave early in the war, and were now somewhere in the Union army, if
alive.  She was without food or nearly so, so I ordered rations issued
to her, and promised to find out if I could where the husband and son
were.

There was no fighting on the 13th, further than a little skirmishing
between Mott's division and the enemy.  I was afraid that Lee might be
moving out, and I did not want him to go without my knowing it. The
indications were that he was moving, but it was found that he was only
taking his new position back from the salient that had been captured.
Our dead were buried this day.  Mott's division was reduced to a
brigade, and assigned to Birney's division.

During this day I wrote to Washington recommending Sherman and Meade
(*31) for promotion to the grade of Major-General in the regular army;
Hancock for Brigadier-General; Wright, Gibbon and Humphreys to be
Major-Generals of Volunteers; and Upton and Carroll to be Brigadiers.
Upton had already been named as such, but the appointment had to be
confirmed by the Senate on the nomination of the President.

The night of the 13th Warren and Wright were moved by the rear to the
left of Burnside.  The night was very dark and it rained heavily, the
roads were so bad that the troops had to cut trees and corduroy the road
a part of the way, to get through.  It was midnight before they got to
the point where they were to halt, and daylight before the troops could
be organized to advance to their position in line.  They gained their
position in line, however, without any fighting, except a little in
Wright's front.  Here Upton had to contend for an elevation which we
wanted and which the enemy was not disposed to yield.  Upton first drove
the enemy, and was then repulsed in turn.  Ayres coming to his support
with his brigade (of Griffin's division, Warren's corps), the position
was secured and fortified.  There was no more battle during the 14th.
This brought our line east of the Court House and running north and
south and facing west.

During the night of the 14th-15th Lee moved to cover this new front.
This left Hancock without an enemy confronting him.  He was brought to
the rear of our new centre, ready to be moved in any direction he might
be wanted.

On the 15th news came from Butler and Averill.  The former reported the
capture of the outer works at Drury's Bluff, on the James River, and
that his cavalry had cut the railroad and telegraph south of Richmond on
the Danville road:  and the latter, the destruction of a depot of
supplies at Dublin, West Virginia, and the breaking of New River Bridge
on the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.  The next day news came from
Sherman and Sheridan.  Sherman had forced Johnston out of Dalton,
Georgia, and was following him south.  The report from Sheridan embraced
his operations up to his passing the outer defences of Richmond.  The
prospect must now have been dismal in Richmond. The road and telegraph
were cut between the capital and Lee. The roads and wires were cut in
every direction from the rebel capital.  Temporarily that city was cut
off from all communication with the outside except by courier.  This
condition of affairs, however, was of but short duration.

I wrote Halleck:


NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 16, 1864, 8 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:

We have had five days almost constant rain without any prospect yet of
it clearing up.  The roads have now become so impassable that ambulances
with wounded men can no longer run between here and Fredericksburg.  All
offensive operations necessarily cease until we can have twenty-four
hours of dry weather.  The army is in the best of spirits, and feel the
greatest confidence of ultimate success. *        *        *        *
*        * You can assure the President and Secretary of War that the
elements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no manner
due to weakness or exhaustion on our part.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


The condition of the roads was such that nothing was done on the 17th.
But that night Hancock and Wright were to make a night march back to
their old positions, and to make an assault at four o'clock in the
morning.  Lee got troops back in time to protect his old line, so the
assault was unsuccessful.  On this day (18th) the news was almost as
discouraging to us as it had been two days before in the rebel capital.
As stated above, Hancock's and Wright's corps had made an unsuccessful
assault. News came that Sigel had been defeated at New Market, badly,
and was retreating down the valley.  Not two hours before, I had sent
the inquiry to Halleck whether Sigel could not get to Staunton to stop
supplies coming from there to Lee.  I asked at once that Sigel might be
relieved, and some one else put in his place. Hunter's name was
suggested, and I heartily approved.  Further news from Butler reported
him driven from Drury's Bluff, but still in possession of the Petersburg
road.  Banks had been defeated in Louisiana, relieved, and Canby put in
his place. This change of commander was not on my suggestion.  All this
news was very discouraging.  All of it must have been known by the enemy
before it was by me.  In fact, the good news (for the enemy) must have
been known to him at the moment I thought he was in despair, and his
anguish had been already relieved when we were enjoying his supposed
discomfiture, But this was no time for repining.  I immediately gave
orders for a movement by the left flank, on towards Richmond, to
commence on the night of the 19th.  I also asked Halleck to secure the
cooperation of the navy in changing our base of supplies from
Fredericksburg to Port Royal, on the Rappahannock.

Up to this time I had received no reinforcements, except six thousand
raw troops under Brigadier General Robert O. Tyler, just arrived.  They
had not yet joined their command, Hancock's corps, but were on our
right.  This corps had been brought to the rear of the centre, ready to
move in any direction.  Lee, probably suspecting some move on my part,
and seeing our right entirely abandoned, moved Ewell's corps about five
o'clock in the afternoon, with Early's as a reserve, to attack us in
that quarter.  Tyler had come up from Fredericksburg, and had been
halted on the road to the right of our line, near Kitching's brigade of
Warren's corps.  Tyler received the attack with his raw troops, and they
maintained their position, until reinforced, in a manner worthy of
veterans.

Hancock was in a position to reinforce speedily, and was the soldier to
do it without waiting to make dispositions.  Birney was thrown to
Tyler's right and Crawford to his left, with Gibbon as a reserve; and
Ewell was whirled back speedily and with heavy loss.

Warren had been ordered to get on Ewell's flank and in his rear, to cut
him off from his intrenchments.  But his efforts were so feeble that
under the cover of night Ewell got back with only the loss of a few
hundred prisoners, besides his killed and wounded.  The army being
engaged until after dark, I rescinded the order for the march by our
left flank that night.

As soon as it was discovered that the enemy were coming out to attack, I
naturally supposed they would detach a force to destroy our trains.  The
withdrawal of Hancock from the right uncovered one road from
Spottsylvania to Fredericksburg over which trains drew our supplies.
This was guarded by a division of <DW52> troops, commanded by General
Ferrero, belonging to Burnside's corps.  Ferrero was therefore promptly
notified, and ordered to throw his cavalry pickets out to the south and
be prepared to meet the enemy if he should come; if he had to retreat to
do so towards Fredericksburg.  The enemy did detach as expected, and
captured twenty-five or thirty wagons which, however, were soon retaken.

In consequence of the disasters that had befallen us in the past few
days, Lee could be reinforced largely, and I had no doubt he would be.
Beauregard had come up from the south with troops to guard the
Confederate capital when it was in danger.  Butler being driven back,
most of the troops could be sent to Lee. Hoke was no longer needed in
North Carolina; and Sigel's troops having gone back to Cedar Creek,
whipped, many troops could be spared from the valley.

The Wilderness and Spottsylvania battles convinced me that we had more
artillery than could ever be brought into action at any one time.  It
occupied much of the road in marching, and taxed the trains in bringing
up forage.  Artillery is very useful when it can be brought into action,
but it is a very burdensome luxury where it cannot be used.  Before
leaving Spottsylvania, therefore, I sent back to the defences of
Washington over one hundred pieces of artillery, with the horses and
caissons.  This relieved the roads over which we were to march of more
than two hundred six-horse teams, and still left us more artillery than
could be advantageously used.  In fact, before reaching the James River
I again reduced the artillery with the army largely.

I believed that, if one corps of the army was exposed on the road to
Richmond, and at a distance from the main army, Lee would endeavor to
attack the exposed corps before reinforcements could come up; in which
case the main army could follow Lee up and attack him before he had time
to intrench.  So I issued the following orders:


NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., VA., May 18, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Before daylight to-morrow morning I propose to draw Hancock and Burnside
from the position they now hold, and put Burnside to the left of Wright.
Wright and Burnside should then force their way up as close to the enemy
as they can get without a general engagement, or with a general
engagement if the enemy will come out of their works to fight, and
intrench.  Hancock should march and take up a position as if in support
of the two left corps. To-morrow night, at twelve or one o'clock, he
will be moved south-east with all his force and as much cavalry as can
be given to him, to get as far towards Richmond on the line of the
Fredericksburg Railroad as he can make, fighting the enemy in whatever
force he can find him.  If the enemy make a general move to meet this,
they will be followed by the other three corps of the army, and
attacked, if possible, before time is given to intrench.

Suitable directions will at once be given for all trains and surplus
artillery to conform to this movement.

U. S. GRANT.


On the 20th, Lee showing no signs of coming out of his lines, orders
were renewed for a left-flank movement, to commence after night.



CHAPTER LIV.

MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK--BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA--AN INCIDENT OF THE
MARCH--MOVING ON RICHMOND--SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY--POSITION OF THE
NATIONAL ARMY.

We were now to operate in a different country from any we had before
seen in Virginia.  The roads were wide and good, and the country well
cultivated.  No men were seen except those bearing arms, even the black
man having been sent away.  The country, however, was new to us, and we
had neither guides nor maps to tell us where the roads were, or where
they led to.  Engineer and staff officers were put to the dangerous duty
of supplying the place of both maps and guides.  By reconnoitring they
were enabled to locate the roads in the vicinity of each army corps.
Our course was south, and we took all roads leading in that direction
which would not separate the army too widely.

Hancock who had the lead had marched easterly to Guiney's Station, on
the Fredericksburg Railroad, thence southerly to Bowling Green and
Milford.  He was at Milford by the night of the 21st.  Here he met a
detachment of Pickett's division coming from Richmond to reinforce Lee.
They were speedily driven away, and several hundred captured.  Warren
followed on the morning of the 21st, and reached Guiney's Station that
night without molestation.  Burnside and Wright were retained at
Spottsylvania to keep up the appearance of an intended assault, and to
hold Lee, if possible, while Hancock and Warren should get start enough
to interpose between him and Richmond.

Lee had now a superb opportunity to take the initiative either by
attacking Wright and Burnside alone, or by following by the Telegraph
Road and striking Hancock's and Warren's corps, or even Hancock's alone,
before reinforcements could come up.  But he did not avail himself of
either opportunity.  He seemed really to be misled as to my designs; but
moved by his interior line--the Telegraph Road--to make sure of keeping
between his capital and the Army of the Potomac.  He never again had
such an opportunity of dealing a heavy blow.

The evening of the 21st Burnside, 9th corps, moved out followed by
Wright, 6th corps.  Burnside was to take the Telegraph Road; but finding
Stanard's Ford, over the Po, fortified and guarded, he turned east to
the road taken by Hancock and Warren without an attempt to dislodge the
enemy.  The night of the 21st I had my headquarters near the 6th corps,
at Guiney's Station, and the enemy's cavalry was between us and Hancock.
There was a slight attack on Burnside's and Wright's corps as they moved
out of their lines; but it was easily repulsed.  The object probably was
only to make sure that we were not leaving a force to follow upon the
rear of the Confederates.

By the morning of the 22d Burnside and Wright were at Guiney's Station.
Hancock's corps had now been marching and fighting continuously for
several days, not having had rest even at night much of the time.  They
were, therefore, permitted to rest during the 22d.  But Warren was
pushed to Harris's Store, directly west of Milford, and connected with
it by a good road, and Burnside was sent to New Bethel Church.  Wright's
corps was still back at Guiney's Station.

I issued the following order for the movement of the troops the next
day:


NEW BETHEL, VA., May 22, 1864

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Direct corps commanders to hold their troops in readiness to march at
five A.M. to-morrow.  At that hour each command will send out cavalry
and infantry on all roads to their front leading south, and ascertain,
if possible, where the enemy is. If beyond the South Anna, the 5th and
6th corps will march to the forks of the road, where one branch leads to
Beaver Dam Station, the other to Jericho Bridge, then south by roads
reaching the Anna, as near to and east of Hawkins Creek as they can be
found.

The 2d corps will move to Chesterfield Ford.  The 9th corps will be
directed to move at the same time to Jericho Bridge.  The map only shows
two roads for the four corps to march upon, but, no doubt, by the use of
plantation roads, and pressing in guides, others can be found, to give
one for each corps.

The troops will follow their respective reconnoitring parties. The
trains will be moved at the same time to Milford Station.

Headquarters will follow the 9th corps.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


Warren's corps was moved from Harris's Store to Jericho Ford, Wright's
following.  Warren arrived at the ford early in the afternoon, and by
five o'clock effected a crossing under the protection of sharpshooters.
The men had to wade in water up to their waists.  As soon as enough
troops were over to guard the ford, pontoons were laid and the artillery
and the rest of the troops crossed.  The line formed was almost
perpendicular to the course of the river--Crawford on the left, next to
the river, Griffin in the centre, and Cutler on the right.  Lee was
found intrenched along the front of their line.  The whole of Hill's
corps was sent against Warren's right before it had got in position.  A
brigade of Cutler's division was driven back, the enemy following, but
assistance coming up the enemy was in turn driven back into his trenches
with heavy loss in killed and wounded, with about five hundred prisoners
left in our hands. By night Wright's corps was up ready to reinforce
Warren.

On the 23d Hancock's corps was moved to the wooden bridge which spans
the North Anna River just west of where the Fredericksburg Railroad
crosses.  It was near night when the troops arrived. They found the
bridge guarded, with troops intrenched, on the north side.  Hancock sent
two brigades, Egan's and Pierce's, to the right and left, and when
properly disposed they charged simultaneously.  The bridge was carried
quickly, the enemy retreating over it so hastily that many were shoved
into the river, and some of them were drowned.  Several hundred
prisoners were captured.  The hour was so late that Hancock did not
cross until next morning.

Burnside's corps was moved by a middle road running between those
described above, and which strikes the North Anna at Ox Ford, midway
between Telegraph Road and Jericho Ford.  The hour of its arrival was
too late to cross that night.

On the 24th Hancock's corps crossed to the south side of the river
without opposition, and formed line facing nearly west. The railroad in
rear was taken possession of and destroyed as far as possible.  Wright's
corps crossed at Jericho early the same day, and took position to the
right of Warren's corps, extending south of the Virginia Central
Railroad.  This road was torn up for a considerable distance to the rear
(west), the ties burned, and the rails bent and twisted by heating them
over the burning ties.  It was found, however, that Burnside's corps
could not cross at Ox Ford.  Lee had taken a position with his centre on
the river at this point, with the two wings thrown back, his line making
an acute angle where it overlooked the river.

Before the exact position of the whole of Lee's line was accurately
known, I directed Hancock and Warren each to send a brigade to Ox Ford
by the south side of the river.  They found the enemy too strong to
justify a serious attack.  A third ford was found between Ox Ford and
Jericho.  Burnside was directed to cross a division over this ford, and
to send one division to Hancock.  Crittenden was crossed by this
newly-discovered ford, and formed up the river to connect with
Crawford's left.  Potter joined Hancock by way of the wooden bridge.
Crittenden had a severe engagement with some of Hill's corps on his
crossing the river, and lost heavily.  When joined to Warren's corps he
was no further molested.  Burnside still guarded Ox Ford from the north
side.

Lee now had his entire army south of the North Anna.  Our lines covered
his front, with the six miles separating the two wings guarded by but a
single division.  To get from one wing to the other the river would have
to be crossed twice.  Lee could reinforce any part of his line from all
points of it in a very short march; or could concentrate the whole of it
wherever he might choose to assault.  We were, for the time, practically
two armies besieging.

Lee had been reinforced, and was being reinforced, largely. About this
time the very troops whose coming I had predicted, had arrived or were
coming in.  Pickett with a full division from Richmond was up; Hoke from
North Carolina had come with a brigade; and Breckinridge was there:  in
all probably not less than fifteen thousand men.  But he did not attempt
to drive us from the field.

On the 22d or 23d I received dispatches from Washington saying that
Sherman had taken Kingston, crossed the Etowah River and was advancing
into Georgia.

I was seated at the time on the porch of a fine plantation house waiting
for Burnside's corps to pass.  Meade and his staff, besides my own
staff, were with me.  The lady of the house, a Mrs. Tyler, and an
elderly lady, were present.  Burnside seeing us, came up on the porch,
his big spurs and saber rattling as he walked.  He touched his hat
politely to the ladies, and remarked that he supposed they had never
seen so many "live Yankees" before in their lives.  The elderly lady
spoke up promptly saying, "Oh yes, I have; many more."  "Where?" said
Burnside. "In Richmond."  Prisoners, of course, was understood.

I read my dispatch aloud, when it was received.  This threw the younger
lady into tears. I found the information she had received (and I suppose
it was the information generally in circulation through the South) was
that Lee was driving us from the State in the most demoralized condition
and that in the South-west our troops were but little better than
prisoners of war.  Seeing our troops moving south was ocular proof that
a part of her information was incorrect, and she asked me if my news
from Sherman was true.  I assured her that there was no doubt about it.
I left a guard to protect the house from intrusion until the troops
should have all passed, and assured her that if her husband was in
hiding she could bring him in and he should be protected also.  But I
presume he was in the Confederate army.

On the 25th I gave orders, through Halleck, to Hunter, who had relieved
Sigel, to move up the Valley of Virginia, cross over the Blue Ridge to
Charlottesville and go as far as Lynchburg if possible, living upon the
country and cutting the railroads and canal as he went.  After doing
this he could find his way back to his base, or join me.

On the same day news was received that Lee was falling back on Richmond.
This proved not to be true.  But we could do nothing where we were
unless Lee would assume the offensive. I determined, therefore, to draw
out of our present position and make one more effort to get between him
and Richmond.  I had no expectation now, however, of succeeding in this;
but I did expect to hold him far enough west to enable me to reach the
James River high up.  Sheridan was now again with the Army of the
Potomac.

On the 26th I informed the government at Washington of the position of
the two armies; of the reinforcements the enemy had received; of the
move I proposed to make (*32); and directed that our base of supplies
should be shifted to White House, on the Pamunkey.  The wagon train and
guards moved directly from Port Royal to White House.  Supplies moved
around by water, guarded by the navy.  Orders had previously been sent,
through Halleck, for Butler to send Smith's corps to White House.  This
order was repeated on the 25th, with directions that they should be
landed on the north side of the Pamunkey, and marched until they joined
the Army of the Potomac.

It was a delicate move to get the right wing of the Army of the Potomac
from its position south of the North Anna in the presence of the enemy.
To accomplish it, I issued the following order:


QUARLES' MILLS, VA., May 25, 1864.

MAJOR GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P.

Direct Generals Warren and Wright to withdraw all their teams and
artillery, not in position, to the north side of the river to-morrow.
Send that belonging to General Wright's corps as far on the road to
Hanover Town as it can go, without attracting attention to the fact.
Send with it Wright's best division or division under his ablest
commander.  Have their places filled up in the line so if possible the
enemy will not notice their withdrawal.  Send the cavalry to-morrow
afternoon, or as much of it as you may deem necessary, to watch and
seize, if they can, Littlepage's Bridge and Taylor's Ford, and to remain
on one or other side of the river at these points until the infantry and
artillery all pass.  As soon as it is dark to-morrow night start the
division which you withdraw first from Wright's corps to make a forced
march to Hanover Town, taking with them no teams to impede their march.
At the same time this division starts commence withdrawing all of the
5th and 6th corps from the south side of the river, and march them for
the same place.  The two divisions of the 9th corps not now with
Hancock, may be moved down the north bank of the river where they will
be handy to support Hancock if necessary, or will be that much on their
road to follow the 5th and 6th corps.  Hancock should hold his command
in readiness to follow as soon as the way is clear for him. To-morrow it
will leave nothing for him to do, but as soon as he can he should get
all his teams and spare artillery on the road or roads which he will
have to take.  As soon as the troops reach Hanover Town they should get
possession of all the crossings they can in that neighborhood.  I think
it would be well to make a heavy cavalry demonstration on the enemy's
left, to-morrow afternoon, also.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


Wilson's division of cavalry was brought up from the left and moved by
our right south to Little River.  Here he manoeuvred to give the
impression that we were going to attack the left flank of Lee's army.

Under cover of night our right wing was withdrawn to the north side of
the river, Lee being completely deceived by Wilson's feint.  On the
afternoon of the 26th Sheridan moved, sending Gregg's and Torbert's
cavalry to Taylor's and Littlepage's fords towards Hanover.  As soon as
it was dark both divisions moved quietly to Hanover Ferry, leaving small
guards behind to keep up the impression that crossings were to be
attempted in the morning.  Sheridan was followed by a division of
infantry under General Russell.  On the morning of the 27th the crossing
was effected with but little loss, the enemy losing thirty or forty,
taken prisoners.  Thus a position was secured south of the Pamunkey.

Russell stopped at the crossing while the cavalry pushed on to Hanover
Town.  Here Barringer's, formerly Gordon's, brigade of rebel cavalry was
encountered, but it was speedily driven away.

Warren's and Wright's corps were moved by the rear of Burnside's and
Hancock's corps.  When out of the way these latter corps followed,
leaving pickets confronting the enemy.  Wilson's cavalry followed last,
watching all the fords until everything had recrossed; then taking up
the pontoons and destroying other bridges, became the rear-guard.

Two roads were traversed by the troops in this move.  The one nearest to
and north of the North Anna and Pamunkey was taken by Wright, followed
by Hancock.  Warren, followed by Burnside, moved by a road farther
north, and longer.  The trains moved by a road still farther north, and
had to travel a still greater distance.  All the troops that had crossed
the Pamunkey on the morning of the 27th remained quiet during the rest
of the day, while the troops north of that stream marched to reach the
crossing that had been secured for them.

Lee had evidently been deceived by our movement from North Anna; for on
the morning of the 27th he telegraphed to Richmond: "Enemy crossed to
north side, and cavalry and infantry crossed at Hanover Town."  The
troops that had then crossed left his front the night of the 25th.

The country we were now in was a difficult one to move troops over.  The
streams were numerous, deep and sluggish, sometimes spreading out into
swamps grown up with impenetrable growths of trees and underbrush.  The
banks were generally low and marshy, making the streams difficult to
approach except where there were roads and bridges.

Hanover Town is about twenty miles from Richmond.  There are two roads
leading there; the most direct and shortest one crossing the
Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge, near the Virginia Central Railroad, the
second going by New and Old Cold Harbor.  A few miles out from Hanover
Town there is a third road by way of Mechanicsville to Richmond.  New
Cold Harbor was important to us because while there we both covered the
roads back to White House (where our supplies came from), and the roads
south-east over which we would have to pass to get to the James River
below the Richmond defences.

On the morning of the 28th the army made an early start, and by noon all
had crossed except Burnside's corps.  This was left on the north side
temporarily to guard the large wagon train.  A line was at once formed
extending south from the river, Wright's corps on the right, Hancock's
in the centre, and Warren's on the left, ready to meet the enemy if he
should come.

At the same time Sheridan was directed to reconnoitre towards
Mechanicsville to find Lee's position.  At Hawes' Shop, just where the
middle road leaves the direct road to Richmond, he encountered the
Confederate cavalry dismounted and partially intrenched.  Gregg attacked
with his division, but was unable to move the enemy.  In the evening
Custer came up with a brigade. The attack was now renewed, the cavalry
dismounting and charging as infantry.  This time the assault was
successful, both sides losing a considerable number of men.  But our
troops had to bury the dead, and found that more Confederate than Union
soldiers had been killed.  The position was easily held, because our
infantry was near.

On the 29th a reconnoissance was made in force, to find the position of
Lee.  Wright's corps pushed to Hanover Court House.  Hancock's corps
pushed toward Totopotomoy Creek; Warren's corps to the left on the Shady
Grove Church Road, while Burnside was held in reserve. Our advance was
pushed forward three miles on the left with but little fighting.  There
was now an appearance of a movement past our left flank, and Sheridan
was sent to meet it.

On the 30th Hancock moved to the Totopotomoy, where he found the enemy
strongly fortified.  Wright was moved to the right of Hancock's corps,
and Burnside was brought forward and crossed, taking position to the
left of Hancock.  Warren moved up near Huntley Corners on the Shady
Grove Church Road.  There was some skirmishing along the centre, and in
the evening Early attacked Warren with some vigor, driving him back at
first, and threatening to turn our left flank.  As the best means of
reinforcing the left, Hancock was ordered to attack in his front.  He
carried and held the rifle-pits.  While this was going on Warren got his
men up, repulsed Early, and drove him more than a mile.

On this day I wrote to Halleck ordering all the pontoons in Washington
to be sent to City Point.

In the evening news was received of the arrival of Smith with his corps
at White House.  I notified Meade, in writing, as follows:


NEAR HAWES' SHOP, VA., 6.40 P.M., May 30, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P.

General Smith will debark his force at the White House tonight and start
up the south bank of the Pamunkey at an early hour, probably at 3 A.M.
in the morning.  It is not improbable that the enemy, being aware of
Smith's movement, will be feeling to get on our left flank for the
purpose of cutting him off, or by a dash to crush him and get back
before we are aware of it. Sheridan ought to be notified to watch the
enemy's movements well out towards Cold Harbor, and also on the
Mechanicsville road.  Wright should be got well massed on Hancock's
right, so that, if it becomes necessary, he can take the place of the
latter readily whilst troops are being thrown east of the Totopotomoy if
necessary.

I want Sheridan to send a cavalry force of at least half a brigade, if
not a whole brigade, at 5 A.M. in the morning, to communicate with Smith
and to return with him.  I will send orders for Smith by the messenger
you send to Sheridan with his orders.

U. S. GRANT.


I also notified Smith of his danger, and the precautions that would be
taken to protect him.

The night of the 30th Lee's position was substantially from Atlee's
Station on the Virginia Central Railroad south and east to the vicinity
of Cold Harbor.  Ours was:  The left of Warren's corps was on the Shady
Grove Road, extending to the Mechanicsville Road and about three miles
south of the Totopotomoy.  Burnside to his right, then Hancock, and
Wright on the extreme right, extending towards Hanover Court House, six
miles south-east of it.  Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry was
watching our left front towards Cold Harbor.  Wilson with his division
on our right was sent to get on the Virginia Central Railroad and
destroy it as far back as possible.  He got possession of Hanover Court
House the next day after a skirmish with Young's cavalry brigade.  The
enemy attacked Sheridan's pickets, but reinforcements were sent up and
the attack was speedily repulsed and the enemy followed some distance
towards Cold Harbor.



CHAPTER LV.

ADVANCE ON COLD HARBOR--AN ANECDOTE OF THE WAR--BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR
--CORRESPONDENCE WITH LEE--RETROSPECTIVE.

On the 31st Sheridan advanced to near Old Cold Harbor.  He found it
intrenched and occupied by cavalry and infantry.  A hard fight ensued
but the place was carried.  The enemy well knew the importance of Cold
Harbor to us, and seemed determined that we should not hold it.  He
returned with such a large force that Sheridan was about withdrawing
without making any effort to hold it against such odds; but about the
time he commenced the evacuation he received orders to hold the place at
all hazards, until reinforcements could be sent to him.  He speedily
turned the rebel works to face against them and placed his men in
position for defence.  Night came on before the enemy was ready for
assault.

Wright's corps was ordered early in the evening to march directly to
Cold Harbor passing by the rear of the army.  It was expected to arrive
by daylight or before; but the night was dark and the distance great, so
that it was nine o'clock the 1st of June before it reached its
destination.  Before the arrival of Wright the enemy had made two
assaults on Sheridan, both of which were repulsed with heavy loss to the
enemy.  Wright's corps coming up, there was no further assault on Cold
Harbor.

Smith, who was coming up from White House, was also directed to march
directly to Cold Harbor, and was expected early on the morning of the
1st of June; but by some blunder the order which reached Smith directed
him to Newcastle instead of Cold Harbor.  Through this blunder Smith did
not reach his destination until three o'clock in the afternoon, and then
with tired and worn-out men from their long and dusty march.  He landed
twelve thousand five hundred men from Butler's command, but a division
was left at White House temporarily and many men had fallen out of ranks
in their long march.

Before the removal of Wright's corps from our right, after dark on the
31st, the two lines, Federal and Confederate, were so close together at
that point that either side could detect directly any movement made by
the other.  Finding at daylight that Wright had left his front, Lee
evidently divined that he had gone to our left.  At all events, soon
after light on the 1st of June Anderson, who commanded the corps on
Lee's left, was seen moving along Warren's front.  Warren was ordered to
attack him vigorously in flank, while Wright was directed to move out
and get on his front.  Warren fired his artillery at the enemy; but lost
so much time in making ready that the enemy got by, and at three o'clock
he reported the enemy was strongly intrenched in his front, and besides
his lines were so long that he had no mass of troops to move with.  He
seemed to have forgotten that lines in rear of an army hold themselves
while their defenders are fighting in their front.  Wright reconnoitred
some distance to his front:  but the enemy finding Old Cold Harbor
already taken had halted and fortified some distance west.

By six o'clock in the afternoon Wright and Smith were ready to make an
assault.  In front of both the ground was clear for several hundred
yards and then became wooded.  Both charged across this open space and
into the wood, capturing and holding the first line of rifle-pits of the
enemy, and also capturing seven or eight hundred prisoners.

While this was going on, the enemy charged Warren three separate times
with vigor, but were repulsed each time with loss.  There was no officer
more capable, nor one more prompt in acting, than Warren when the enemy
forced him to it.  There was also an attack upon Hancock's and
Burnside's corps at the same time; but it was feeble and probably only
intended to relieve Anderson who was being pressed by Wright and Smith.

During the night the enemy made frequent attacks with the view of
dispossessing us of the important position we had gained, but without
effecting their object.

Hancock was moved from his place in line during the night and ordered to
the left of Wright.  I expected to take the offensive on the morning of
the 2d, but the night was so dark, the heat and dust so excessive and
the roads so intricate and hard to keep, that the head of column only
reached Old Cold Harbor at six o'clock, but was in position at 7.30 A.M.
Preparations were made for an attack in the afternoon, but did not take
place until the next morning.  Warren's corps was moved to the left to
connect with Smith:  Hancock's corps was got into position to the left
of Wright's, and Burnside was moved to Bethesda Church in reserve. While
Warren and Burnside were making these changes the enemy came out several
times and attacked them, capturing several hundred prisoners.  The
attacks were repulsed, but not followed up as they should have been.  I
was so annoyed at this that I directed Meade to instruct his corps
commanders that they should seize all such opportunities when they
occurred, and not wait for orders, all of our manoeuvres being made for
the very purpose of getting the enemy out of his cover.

On this day Wilson returned from his raid upon the Virginia Central
Railroad, having damaged it considerably.  But, like ourselves, the
rebels had become experts in repairing such damage.  Sherman, in his
memoirs, relates an anecdote of his campaign to Atlanta that well
illustrates this point.  The rebel cavalry lurking in his rear to burn
bridges and obstruct his communications had become so disgusted at
hearing trains go whistling by within a few hours after a bridge had
been burned, that they proposed to try blowing up some of the tunnels.
One of them said, "No use, boys, Old Sherman carries duplicate tunnels
with him, and will replace them as fast as you can blow them up; better
save your powder."

Sheridan was engaged reconnoitring the banks of the Chickahominy, to
find crossings and the condition of the roads.  He reported favorably.

During the night Lee moved his left up to make his line correspond to
ours.  His lines extended now from the Totopotomoy to New Cold Harbor.
Mine from Bethesda Church by Old Cold Harbor to the Chickahominy, with a
division of cavalry guarding our right.  An assault was ordered for the
3d, to be made mainly by the corps of Hancock, Wright and Smith; but
Warren and Burnside were to support it by threatening Lee's left, and to
attack with great earnestness if he should either reinforce more
threatened points by drawing from that quarter or if a favorable
opportunity should present itself.

The corps commanders were to select the points in their respective
fronts where they would make their assaults.  The move was to commence
at half-past four in the morning.  Hancock sent Barlow and Gibbon
forward at the appointed hour, with Birney as a reserve.  Barlow pushed
forward with great vigor, under a heavy fire of both artillery and
musketry, through thickets and swamps.  Notwithstanding all the
resistance of the enemy and the natural obstructions to overcome, he
carried a position occupied by the enemy outside their main line where
the road makes a deep cut through a bank affording as good a shelter for
troops as if it had been made for that purpose.  Three pieces of
artillery had been captured here, and several hundred prisoners.  The
guns were immediately turned against the men who had just been using
them.  No (*33) assistance coming to him, he (Barlow) intrenched under
fire and continued to hold his place.  Gibbon was not so fortunate in
his front.  He found the ground over which he had to pass cut up with
deep ravines, and a morass difficult to cross.  But his men struggled on
until some of them got up to the very parapet covering the enemy.
Gibbon gained ground much nearer the enemy than that which he left, and
here he intrenched and held fast.

Wright's corps moving in two lines captured the outer rifle-pits in
their front, but accomplished nothing more.  Smith's corps also gained
the outer rifle-pits in its front.  The ground over which this corps
(18th) had to move was the most exposed of any over which charges were
made.  An open plain intervened between the contending forces at this
point, which was exposed both to a direct and a cross fire.  Smith,
however, finding a ravine running towards his front, sufficiently deep
to protect men in it from cross fire, and somewhat from a direct fire,
put Martindale's division in it, and with Brooks supporting him on the
left and Devens on the right succeeded in gaining the outer--probably
picket--rifle-pits.  Warren and Burnside also advanced and gained
ground--which brought the whole army on one line.

This assault cost us heavily and probably without benefit to compensate:
but the enemy was not cheered by the occurrence sufficiently to induce
him to take the offensive.  In fact, nowhere after the battle of the
Wilderness did Lee show any disposition to leave his defences far behind
him.

Fighting was substantially over by half-past seven in the morning.  At
eleven o'clock I started to visit all the corps commanders to see for
myself the different positions gained and to get their opinion of the
practicability of doing anything more in their respective fronts.

Hancock gave the opinion that in his front the enemy was too strong to
make any further assault promise success.  Wright thought he could gain
the lines of the enemy, but it would require the cooperation of
Hancock's and Smith's corps.  Smith thought a lodgment possible, but was
not sanguine:  Burnside thought something could be done in his front,
but Warren differed.  I concluded, therefore to make no more assaults,
and a little after twelve directed in the following letter that all
offensive action should cease.


COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864.-12.30 P.M. MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,

Commanding A. P.

The opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an
assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of farther advance for
the present.  Hold our most advanced positions and strengthen them.
Whilst on the defensive our line may be contracted from the right if
practicable.

Reconnoissances should be made in front of every corps and advances made
to advantageous positions by regular approaches. To aid the expedition
under General Hunter it is necessary that we should detain all the army
now with Lee until the former gets well on his way to Lynchburg.  To do
this effectually it will be better to keep the enemy out of the
intrenchments of Richmond than to have them go back there.

Wright and Hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy should
break through General Smith's lines, and all should be ready to resist
an assault.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


The remainder of the day was spent in strengthening the line we now
held.  By night we were as strong against Lee as he was against us.

During the night the enemy quitted our right front, abandoning some of
their wounded, and without burying their dead.  These we were able to
care for.  But there were many dead and wounded men between the lines of
the contending forces, which were now close together, who could not be
cared for without a cessation of hostilities.

So I wrote the following:


COLD HARBOR, VA., June 5, 1864.

GENERAL R.  E. LEE, Commanding Confederate Army.

It is reported to me that there are wounded men, probably of both
armies, now lying exposed and suffering between the lines occupied
respectively by the two armies.  Humanity would dictate that some
provision should be made to provide against such hardships.  I would
propose, therefore, that hereafter, when no battle is raging, either
party be authorized to send to any point between the pickets or skirmish
lines, unarmed men bearing litters to pick up their dead or wounded,
without being fired upon by the other party.  Any other method, equally
fair to both parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired will
be accepted by me.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


Lee replied that he feared such an arrangement would lead to
misunderstanding, and proposed that in future, when either party wished
to remove their dead and wounded, a flag of truce be sent.  I answered
this immediately by saying:


COLD HARBOR, VA., June 6, 1864.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding Army of N. Va.

Your communication of yesterday's date is received.  I will send
immediately, as you propose, to collect the dead and wounded between the
lines of the two armies, and will also instruct that you be allowed to
do the same.  I propose that the time for doing this be between the
hours of 12 M. and 3 P.M. to-day.  I will direct all parties going out
to bear a white flag, and not to attempt to go beyond where we have dead
or wounded, and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


Lee's response was that he could not consent to the burial of the dead
and removal of the wounded in the way I proposed, but when either party
desired such permission it should be asked for by flag of truce and he
had directed that any parties I may have sent out, as mentioned in my
letter, to be turned back.  I answered:


COLD HARBOR, VA, June 6, 1864.

GENERAL R. E. LEE. Commanding Army, N. Va.

The knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of attention,
between the two armies, compels me to ask a suspension of hostilities
for sufficient time to collect them in, say two hours.  Permit me to say
that the hours you may fix upon for this will be agreeable to me, and
the same privilege will be extended to such parties as you may wish to
send out on the same duty without further application.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


Lee acceded to this; but delays in transmitting the correspondence
brought it to the 7th of June--forty-eight hours after it commenced
--before parties were got out to collect the men left upon the field.
In the meantime all but two of the wounded had died.  And I wrote to
Lee:


COLD HARBOR, VA., June 7, 1864. 10.30 A.M.

GEN. R. E. LEE, Commanding Army of N. Va.

I regret that your note of seven P.M. yesterday should have been
received at the nearest corps headquarters, to where it was delivered,
after the hour which had been given for the removal of the dead and
wounded had expired; 10.45 P.M. was the hour at which it was received at
corps headquarters, and between eleven and twelve it reached my
headquarters.  As a consequence, it was not understood by the troops of
this army that there was a cessation of hostilities for the purpose of
collecting the dead and wounded, and none were collected.  Two officers
and six men of the 8th and 25th North Carolina Regts., who were out in
search of the bodies of officers of their respective regiments, were
captured and brought into our lines, owing to this want of
understanding.  I regret this, but will state that as soon as I learned
the fact, I directed that they should not be held as prisoners, but must
be returned to their commands.  These officers and men having been
carelessly brought through our lines to the rear have not determined
whether they will be sent back the way they came, or whether they will
be sent by some other route.

Regretting that all my efforts for alleviating the sufferings of wounded
men left upon the battle-field have been rendered nugatory, I remain,
&c.,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever
made.  I might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of May,
1863, at Vicksburg.  At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to
compensate for the heavy loss we sustained.  Indeed, the advantages
other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side.
Before that, the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to have acquired a
wholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities
generally of the Army of the Potomac.  They no longer wanted to fight
them "one Confederate to five Yanks."  Indeed, they seemed to have given
up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the open
field.  They had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to the
Army of the Potomac.  This charge seemed to revive their hopes
temporarily; but it was of short duration.  The effect upon the Army of
the Potomac was the reverse.  When we reached the James River, however,
all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared.

There was more justification for the assault at Vicksburg.  We were in a
Southern climate, at the beginning of the hot season.  The Army of the
Tennessee had won five successive victories over the garrison of
Vicksburg in the three preceding weeks.  They had driven a portion of
that army from Port Gibson with considerable loss, after having flanked
them out of their stronghold at Grand Gulf.  They had attacked another
portion of the same army at Raymond, more than fifty miles farther in
the interior of the State, and driven them back into Jackson with great
loss in killed, wounded, captured and missing, besides loss of large and
small arms:  they had captured the capital of the State of Mississippi,
with a large amount of materials of war and manufactures.  Only a few
days before, they had beaten the enemy then penned up in the town first
at Champion's Hill, next at Big Black River Bridge, inflicting upon him
a loss of fifteen thousand or more men (including those cut off from
returning) besides large losses in arms and ammunition.  The Army of the
Tennessee had come to believe that they could beat their antagonist
under any circumstances.  There was no telling how long a regular siege
might last.  As I have stated, it was the beginning of the hot season in
a Southern climate.  There was no telling what the casualties might be
among Northern troops working and living in trenches, drinking surface
water filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropical sun.  If
Vicksburg could have been carried in May, it would not only have saved
the army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets of
the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid army, well equipped and
officered, to operate elsewhere with. These are reasons justifying the
assault.  The only benefit we gained--and it was a slight one for so
great a sacrifice--was that the men worked cheerfully in the trenches
after that, being satisfied with digging the enemy out.  Had the assault
not been made, I have no doubt that the majority of those engaged in the
siege of Vicksburg would have believed that had we assaulted it would
have proven successful, and would have saved life, health and comfort.



CHAPTER LVI.

LEFT FLANK MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES--GENERAL LEE
--VISIT TO BUTLER--THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG--THE INVESTMENT OF
PETERSBURG.

Lee's position was now so near Richmond, and the intervening swamps of
the Chickahominy so great an obstacle to the movement of troops in the
face of an enemy, that I determined to make my next left flank move
carry the Army of the Potomac south of the James River. (*34)
Preparations for this were promptly commenced. The move was a hazardous
one to make:  the Chickahominy River, with its marshy and heavily
timbered approaches, had to be crossed; all the bridges over it east of
Lee were destroyed; the enemy had a shorter line and better roads to
travel on to confront me in crossing; more than fifty miles intervened
between me and Butler, by the roads I should have to travel, with both
the James and the Chickahominy unbridged to cross; and last, the Army of
the Potomac had to be got out of a position but a few hundred yards from
the enemy at the widest place.  Lee, if he did not choose to follow me,
might, with his shorter distance to travel and his bridges over the
Chickahominy and the James, move rapidly on Butler and crush him before
the army with me could come to his relief.  Then too he might spare
troops enough to send against Hunter who was approaching Lynchburg,
living upon the country he passed through, and without ammunition
further than what he carried with him.

But the move had to be made, and I relied upon Lee's not seeing my
danger as I saw it.  Besides we had armies on both sides of the James
River and not far from the Confederate capital.  I knew that its safety
would be a matter of the first consideration with the executive,
legislative and judicial branches of the so-called Confederate
government, if it was not with the military commanders.  But I took all
the precaution I knew of to guard against all dangers.

Sheridan was sent with two divisions, to communicate with Hunter and to
break up the Virginia Central Railroad and the James River Canal, on the
7th of June, taking instructions to Hunter to come back with him (*35).
Hunter was also informed by way of Washington and the Valley that
Sheridan was on the way to meet him.  The canal and Central Road, and
the regions penetrated by them, were of vast importance to the enemy,
furnishing and carrying a large per cent. of all the supplies for the
Army of Northern Virginia and the people of Richmond.  Before Sheridan
got off on the 7th news was received from Hunter reporting his advance
to Staunton and successful engagement with the enemy near that place on
the 5th, in which the Confederate commander, W. S. Jones, was killed.
On the 4th of June the enemy having withdrawn his left corps, Burnside
on our right was moved up between Warren and Smith.  On the 5th Birney
returned to Hancock, which extended his left now to the Chickahominy,
and Warren was withdrawn to Cold Harbor.  Wright was directed to send
two divisions to the left to extend down the banks of that stream to
Bottom's Bridge.  The cavalry extended still farther east to Jones's
Bridge.

On the 7th Abercrombie--who was in command at White House, and who had
been in command at our base of supplies in all the changes made from the
start--was ordered to take up the iron from the York River Railroad and
put it on boats, and to be in readiness to move by water to City Point.

On the 8th Meade was directed to fortify a line down the bank
overlooking the Chickahominy, under cover of which the army could move.

On the 9th Abercrombie was directed to send all organized troops
arriving at White House, without debarking from their transports, to
report to Butler.  Halleck was at this time instructed to send all
reinforcements to City Point.

On the 11th I wrote:


COLD HARBOR, VA., June 11, 1864.

MAJOR-GEN. B. F. BUTLER, Commanding Department of Va. and N. C.

The movement to transfer this army to the south side of the James River
will commence after dark to-morrow night.  Col. Comstock, of my staff,
was sent specially to ascertain what was necessary to make your position
secure in the interval during which the enemy might use most of his
force against you, and also, to ascertain what point on the river we
should reach to effect a crossing if it should not be practicable to
reach this side of the river at Bermuda Hundred.  Colonel Comstock has
not yet returned, so that I cannot make instructions as definite as I
would wish, but the time between this and Sunday night being so short in
which to get word to you, I must do the best I can.  Colonel Dent goes
to the Chickahominy to take to you the 18th corps.  The corps will leave
its position in the trenches as early in the evening, tomorrow, as
possible, and make a forced march to Cole's Landing or Ferry, where it
should reach by ten A.M. the following morning.  This corps numbers now
15,300 men.  They take with them neither wagons nor artillery; these
latter marching with the balance of the army to the James River.  The
remainder of the army will cross the Chickahominy at Long Bridge and at
Jones's, and strike the river at the most practicable crossing below
City Point.

I directed several days ago that all reinforcements for the army should
be sent to you.  I am not advised of the number that may have gone, but
suppose you have received from six to ten thousand.  General Smith will
also reach you as soon as the enemy could, going by the way of Richmond.

The balance of the force will not be more than one day behind, unless
detained by the whole of Lee's army, in which case you will be strong
enough.

I wish you would direct the proper staff officers, your chief-engineer
and your chief-quartermaster, to commence at once the collection of all
the means in their reach for crossing the army on its arrival.  If there
is a point below City Point where a pontoon bridge can be thrown, have
it laid.

Expecting the arrival of the 18th corps by Monday night, if you deem it
practicable from the force you have to seize and hold Petersburg, you
may prepare to start, on the arrival of troops to hold your present
lines.  I do not want Petersburg visited, however, unless it is held,
nor an attempt to take it, unless you feel a reasonable degree of
confidence of success.  If you should go there, I think troops should
take nothing with them except what they can carry, depending upon
supplies being sent after the place is secured.  If Colonel Dent should
not succeed in securing the requisite amount of transportation for the
18th corps before reaching you, please have the balance supplied.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

P. S.--On reflection I will send the 18th corps by way of White House.
The distance which they will have to march will be enough shorter to
enable them to reach you about the same time, and the uncertainty of
navigation on the Chickahominy will be avoided.

U. S. GRANT.


COLD HARBOR, VA., June 11,1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL G. G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Colonel Comstock, who visited the James River for the purpose of
ascertaining the best point below Bermuda Hundred to which to march the
army has not yet returned.  It is now getting so late, however, that all
preparations may be made for the move to-morrow night without waiting
longer.

The movement will be made as heretofore agreed upon, that is, the 18th
corps make a rapid march with the infantry alone, their wagons and
artillery accompanying the balance of the army to Cole's Landing or
Ferry, and there embark for City Point, losing no time for rest until
they reach the latter point.

The 5th corps will seize Long Bridge and move out on the Long Bridge
Road to its junction with Quaker Road, or until stopped by the enemy.

The other three corps will follow in such order as you may direct, one
of them crossing at Long Bridge, and two at Jones's Bridge.  After the
crossing is effected, the most practicable roads will be taken to reach
about Fort Powhattan.  Of course, this is supposing the enemy makes no
opposition to our advance.  The 5th corps, after securing the passage of
the balance of the army, will join or follow in rear of the corps which
crosses the same bridge with themselves.  The wagon trains should be
kept well east of the troops, and if a crossing can be found, or made
lower down than Jones's they should take it.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

P. S.--In view of the long march to reach Cole's Landing, and the
uncertainty of being able to embark a large number of men there, the
direction of the 18th corps may be changed to White House.  They should
be directed to load up transports, and start them as fast as loaded
without waiting for the whole corps or even whole divisions to go
together.

U. S. GRANT.


About this time word was received (through the Richmond papers of the
11th) that Crook and Averell had united and were moving east.  This,
with the news of Hunter's successful engagement near Staunton, was no
doubt known to Lee before it was to me. Then Sheridan leaving with two
divisions of cavalry, looked indeed threatening, both to Lee's
communications and supplies. Much of his cavalry was sent after
Sheridan, and Early with Ewell's entire corps was sent to the Valley.
Supplies were growing scarce in Richmond, and the sources from which to
draw them were in our hands.  People from outside began to pour into
Richmond to help eat up the little on hand.  Consternation reigned
there.

On the 12th Smith was ordered to move at night to White House, not to
stop until he reached there, and to take boats at once for City Point,
leaving his trains and artillery to move by land.

Soon after dark some of the cavalry at Long Bridge effected a crossing
by wading and floundering through the water and mud, leaving their
horses behind, and drove away the cavalry pickets.  A pontoon bridge was
speedily thrown across, over which the remainder of the army soon passed
and pushed out for a mile or two to watch and detain any advance that
might be made from the other side.  Warren followed the cavalry, and by
the morning of the 13th had his whole corps over.  Hancock followed
Warren.  Burnside took the road to Jones's Bridge, followed by Wright.
Ferrero's division, with the wagon train, moved farther east, by Window
Shades and Cole's Ferry, our rear being covered by cavalry.

It was known that the enemy had some gunboats at Richmond. These might
run down at night and inflict great damage upon us before they could be
sunk or captured by our navy.  General Butler had, in advance, loaded
some vessels with stone ready to be sunk so as to obstruct the channel
in an emergency.  On the 13th I sent orders to have these sunk as high
up the river as we could guard them, and prevent their removal by the
enemy.

As soon as Warren's corps was over the Chickahominy it marched out and
joined the cavalry in holding the roads from Richmond while the army
passed.  No attempt was made by the enemy to impede our march, however,
but Warren and Wilson reported the enemy strongly fortified in their
front.  By the evening of the 13th Hancock's corps was at Charles City
Court House on the James River.  Burnside's and Wright's corps were on
the Chickahominy, and crossed during the night, Warren's corps and the
cavalry still covering the army.  The material for a pontoon bridge was
already at hand and the work of laying it was commenced immediately,
under the superintendence of Brigadier-General Benham, commanding the
engineer brigade.  On the evening of the 14th the crossing commenced,
Hancock in advance, using both the bridge and boats.

When the Wilderness campaign commenced the Army of the Potomac,
including Burnside's--which was a separate command until the 24th of May
when it was incorporated with the main army--numbered about 116,000 men.
During the progress of the campaign about 40,000 reinforcements were
received.  At the crossing of the James River June 14th-15th the army
numbered about 115,000.  Besides the ordinary losses incident to a
campaign of six weeks' nearly constant fighting or skirmishing, about
one-half of the artillery was sent back to Washington, and many men were
discharged by reason of the expiration of their term of service.* In
estimating our strength every enlisted man and every commissioned
officer present is included, no matter how employed; in bands, sick in
field hospitals, hospital attendants, company cooks and all.  Operating
in an enemy's country, and being supplied always from a distant base,
large detachments had at all times to be sent from the front, not only
to guard the base of supplies and the roads to it, but all the roads
leading to our flanks and rear.  We were also operating in a country
unknown to us, and without competent guides or maps showing the roads
accurately.

The manner of estimating numbers in the two armies differs materially.
In the Confederate army often only bayonets are taken into account,
never, I believe, do they estimate more than are handling the guns of
the artillery and armed with muskets (*36) or carbines.  Generally the
latter are far enough away to be excluded from the count in any one
field.  Officers and details of enlisted men are not included.  In the
Northern armies the estimate is most liberal, taking in all connected
with the army and drawing pay.

Estimated in the same manner as ours, Lee had not less than 80,000 men
at the start.  His reinforcements were about equal to ours during the
campaign, deducting the discharged men and those sent back.  He was on
the defensive, and in a country in which every stream, every road, every
obstacle to the movement of troops and every natural defence was
familiar to him and his army.  The citizens were all friendly to him and
his cause, and could and did furnish him with accurate reports of our
every move.  Rear guards were not necessary for him, and having always a
railroad at his back, large wagon trains were not required. All
circumstances considered we did not have any advantage in numbers.

General Lee, who had led the Army of Northern Virginia in all these
contests, was a very highly estimated man in the Confederate army and
States, and filled also a very high place in the estimation of the
people and press of the Northern States.  His praise was sounded
throughout the entire North after every action he was engaged in:  the
number of his forces was always lowered and that of the National forces
exaggerated.  He was a large, austere man, and I judge difficult of
approach to his subordinates.  To be extolled by the entire press of the
South after every engagement, and by a portion of the press North with
equal vehemence, was calculated to give him the entire confidence of his
troops and to make him feared by his antagonists.  It was not an
uncommon thing for my staff-officers to hear from Eastern officers,
"Well, Grant has never met Bobby Lee yet."  There were good and true
officers who believe now that the Army of Northern Virginia was superior
to the Army of the Potomac man to man.  I do not believe so, except as
the advantages spoken of above made them so.  Before the end I believe
the difference was the other way.  The Army of Northern Virginia became
despondent and saw the end.  It did not please them.  The National army
saw the same thing, and were encouraged by it.

The advance of the Army of the Potomac reached the James on the 14th of
June.  Preparations were at once commenced for laying the pontoon
bridges and crossing the river.  As already stated, I had previously
ordered General Butler to have two vessels loaded with stone and carried
up the river to a point above that occupied by our gunboats, where the
channel was narrow, and sunk there so as to obstruct the passage and
prevent Confederate gunboats from coming down the river.  Butler had had
these boats filled and put in position, but had not had them sunk before
my arrival.  I ordered this done, and also directed that he should turn
over all material and boats not then in use in the river to be used in
ferrying the troops across.

I then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran up to Bermuda Hundred to see
General Butler for the purpose of directing a movement against
Petersburg, while our troops of the Army of the Potomac were crossing.

I had sent General W. F. Smith back from Cold Harbor by the way of White
House, thence on steamers to City Point for the purpose of giving
General Butler more troops with which to accomplish this result.
General Butler was ordered to send Smith with his troops reinforced, as
far as that could be conveniently done, from other parts of the Army of
the James.  He gave Smith about six thousand reinforcements, including
some twenty-five hundred cavalry under Kautz, and about thirty-five
hundred  infantry under Hinks.

The distance which Smith had to move to reach the enemy's lines was
about six miles, and the Confederate advance line of works was but two
miles outside of Petersburg.  Smith was to move under cover of night, up
close to the enemy's works, and assault as soon as he could after
daylight.  I believed then, and still believe, that Petersburg could
have been easily captured at that time.  It only had about 2,500 men in
the defences besides some irregular troops, consisting of citizens and
employees in the city who took up arms in case of emergency.  Smith
started as proposed, but his advance encountered a rebel force
intrenched between City Point and their lines outside of Petersburg.
This position he carried, with some loss to the enemy; but there was so
much delay that it was daylight before his troops really got off from
there.  While there I informed General Butler that Hancock's corps would
cross the river and move to Petersburg to support Smith in case the
latter was successful, and that I could reinforce there more rapidly
than Lee could reinforce from his position.

I returned down the river to where the troops of the Army of the Potomac
now were, communicated to General Meade, in writing, the directions I
had given to General Butler and directed him (Meade) to cross Hancock's
corps over under cover of night, and push them forward in the morning to
Petersburg; halting them, however, at a designated point until they
could hear from Smith.  I also informed General Meade that I had ordered
rations from Bermuda Hundred for Hancock's corps, and desired him to
issue them speedily, and to lose no more time than was absolutely
necessary.  The rations did not reach him, however, and Hancock, while
he got all his corps over during the night, remained until half-past ten
in the hope of receiving them.  He then moved without them, and on the
road received a note from General W. F. Smith, asking him to come on.
This seems to be the first information that General Hancock had received
of the fact that he was to go to Petersburg, or that anything particular
was expected of him.  Otherwise he would have been there by four o'clock
in the afternoon.

Smith arrived in front of the enemy's lines early in the forenoon of the
15th, and spent the day until after seven o'clock in the evening in
reconnoitering what appeared to be empty works.  The enemy's line
consisted of redans occupying commanding positions, with rifle-pits
connecting them.  To the east side of Petersburg, from the Appomattox
back, there were thirteen of these redans extending a distance of
several miles, probably three.  If they had been properly manned they
could have held out against any force that could have attacked them, at
least until reinforcements could have got up from the north of Richmond.

Smith assaulted with the <DW52> troops, and with success.  By nine
o'clock at night he was in possession of five of these redans and, of
course, of the connecting lines of rifle-pits. All of them contained
artillery, which fell into our hands. Hancock came up and proposed to
take any part assigned to him; and Smith asked him to relieve his men
who were in the trenches.

Next morning, the 16th, Hancock himself was in command, and captured
another redan.  Meade came up in the afternoon and succeeded Hancock,
who had to be relieved, temporarily, from the command of his corps on
account of the breaking out afresh of the wound he had received at
Gettysburg.  During the day Meade assaulted and carried one more redan
to his right and two to his left.  In all this we lost very heavily.
The works were not strongly manned, but they all had guns in them which
fell into our hands, together with the men who were handling them in the
effort to repel these assaults.

Up to this time Beauregard, who had commanded south of Richmond, had
received no reinforcements, except Hoke's division from Drury's
Bluff,(*37) which had arrived on the morning of the 16th; though he had
urged the authorities very strongly to send them, believing, as he did,
that Petersburg would be a valuable prize which we might seek.

During the 17th the fighting was very severe and the losses heavy; and
at night our troops occupied about the same position they had occupied
in the morning, except that they held a redan which had been captured by
Potter during the day.  During the night, however, Beauregard fell back
to the line which had been already selected, and commenced fortifying
it.  Our troops advanced on the 18th to the line which he had abandoned,
and found that the Confederate loss had been very severe, many of the
enemy's dead still remaining in the ditches and in front of them.

Colonel J. L. Chamberlain, of the 20th Maine, was wounded on the 18th.
He was gallantly leading his brigade at the time, as he had been in
the habit of doing in all the engagements in which he had previously
been engaged.  He had several times been recommended for a
brigadier-generalcy for gallant and meritorious conduct.  On this
occasion, however, I promoted him on the spot, and forwarded a copy of
my order to the War Department, asking that my act might be confirmed
and Chamberlain's name sent to the Senate for confirmation without any
delay.  This was done, and at last a gallant and meritorious officer
received partial justice at the hands of his government, which he had
served so faithfully and so well.

If General Hancock's orders of the 15th had been communicated to him,
that officer, with his usual promptness, would undoubtedly have been
upon the ground around Petersburg as early as four o'clock in the
afternoon of the 15th.  The days were long and it would have given him
considerable time before night.  I do not think there is any doubt that
Petersburg itself could have been carried without much loss; or, at
least, if protected by inner detached works, that a line could have been
established very much in rear of the one then occupied by the enemy.
This would have given us control of both the Weldon and South Side
railroads.  This would also have saved an immense amount of hard
fighting which had to be done from the 15th to the 18th, and would have
given us greatly the advantage in the long siege which ensued.

I now ordered the troops to be put under cover and allowed some of the
rest which they had so long needed.  They remained quiet, except that
there was more or less firing every day, until the 22d, when General
Meade ordered an advance towards the Weldon Railroad.  We were very
anxious to get to that road, and even round to the South Side Railroad
if possible.

Meade moved Hancock's corps, now commanded by Birney, to the left, with
a view to at least force the enemy to stay within the limits of his own
line.  General Wright, with the 6th corps, was ordered by a road farther
south, to march directly for the Weldon road.  The enemy passed in
between these two corps and attacked vigorously, and with very serious
results to the National troops, who were then withdrawn from their
advanced position.

The Army of the Potomac was given the investment of Petersburg, while
the Army of the James held Bermuda Hundred and all the ground we
possessed north of the James River.  The 9th corps, Burnside's, was
placed upon the right at Petersburg; the 5th, Warren's, next; the 2d,
Birney's, next; then the 6th, Wright's, broken off to the left and
south.  Thus began the siege of Petersburg.



CHAPTER LVII.

RAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD--RAID ON THE WELDON RAILROAD
--EARLY 'S MOVEMENT UPON WASHINGTON--MINING THE WORKS BEFORE PETERSBURG
--EXPLOSION OF THE MINE BEFORE PETERSBURG--CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH
VALLEY--CAPTURE OF THE WELDON RAILROAD.

On the 7th of June, while at Cold Harbor, I had as already indicated
sent Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry to destroy as much as he
could of the Virginia Central Railroad.  General Hunter had been
operating up the Shenandoah Valley with some success, having fought a
battle near Staunton where he captured a great many prisoners, besides
killing and wounding a good many men.  After the battle he formed a
junction at Staunton with Averell and Crook, who had come up from the
Kanawha, or Gauley River.  It was supposed, therefore, that General
Hunter would be about Charlottesville, Virginia, by the time Sheridan
could get there, doing on the way the damage that he was sent to do.

I gave Sheridan instructions to have Hunter, in case he should meet him
about Charlottesville, join and return with him to the Army of the
Potomac.  Lee, hearing of Hunter's success in the valley, started
Breckinridge out for its defence at once. Learning later of Sheridan's
going with two divisions, he also sent Hampton with two divisions of
cavalry, his own and Fitz-Hugh Lee's.

Sheridan moved to the north side of the North Anna to get out west, and
learned of the movement of these troops to the south side of the same
stream almost as soon as they had started. He pushed on to get to
Trevilian Station to commence his destruction at that point.  On the
night of the 10th he bivouacked some six or seven miles east of
Trevilian, while Fitz-Hugh Lee was the same night at Trevilian Station
and Hampton but a few miles away.

During the night Hampton ordered an advance on Sheridan, hoping, no
doubt, to surprise and very badly <DW36> him.  Sheridan, however, by a
counter move sent Custer on a rapid march to get between the two
divisions of the enemy and into their rear. This he did successfully, so
that at daylight, when the assault was made, the enemy found himself at
the same time resisted in front and attacked in rear, and broke in some
confusion.  The losses were probably very light on both sides in killed
and wounded, but Sheridan got away with some five hundred prisoners and
sent them to City Point.

During that day, the 11th, Sheridan moved into Trevilian Station, and
the following day proceeded to tear up the road east and west.  There
was considerable fighting during the whole of the day, but the work of
destruction went on.  In the meantime, at night, the enemy had taken
possession of the crossing which Sheridan had proposed to take to go
north when he left Trevilian.  Sheridan learned, however, from some of
the prisoners he had captured here, that General Hunter was about
Lynchburg, and therefore that there was no use of his going on to
Charlottesville with a view to meet him.

Sheridan started back during the night of the 12th, and made his way
north and farther east, coming around by the north side of White House,
and arriving there on the 21st.  Here he found an abundance of forage
for his animals, food for his men, and security while resting.  He had
been obliged to leave about ninety of his own men in the field-hospital
which he had established near Trevilian, and these necessarily fell into
the hands of the enemy.

White House up to this time had been a depot; but now that our troops
were all on the James River, it was no longer wanted as a store of
supplies.  Sheridan was, therefore, directed to break it up; which he
did on the 22d of June, bringing the garrison and an immense wagon train
with him.  All these were over the James River by the 26th of the month,
and Sheridan ready to follow.

In the meantime Meade had sent Wilson's division on a raid to destroy
the Weldon and South Side roads.  Now that Sheridan was safe and Hampton
free to return to Richmond with his cavalry, Wilson's position became
precarious.  Meade therefore, on the 27th, ordered Sheridan over the
river to make a demonstration in favor of Wilson.  Wilson got back,
though not without severe loss, having struck both roads, but the damage
done was soon repaired.

After these events comparative quiet reigned about Petersburg until late
in July.  The time, however, was spent in strengthening the
intrenchments and making our position generally more secure against a
sudden attack.  In the meantime I had to look after other portions of my
command, where things had not been going on so favorably, always, as I
could have wished.

General Hunter who had been appointed to succeed Sigel in the Shenandoah
Valley immediately took up the offensive.  He met the enemy on the 5th
of June at Piedmont, and defeated him.  On the 8th he formed a junction
with Crook and Averell at Staunton, from which place he moved direct on
Lynchburg, via Lexington, which he reached and invested on the 16th.  Up
to this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty of
taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through
a hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured Lynchburg. The
destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories had been very
great.  To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee sent
Early with his corps, a part of which reached Lynchburg before Hunter.
After some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a
want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place.
Unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for
his return but by the way of the Gauley and Kanawha rivers, thence up
the Ohio River, returning to Harper's Ferry by way of the Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad.  A long time was consumed in making this movement.
Meantime the valley was left open to Early's troops, and others in that
quarter; and Washington also was uncovered. Early took advantage of this
condition of affairs and moved on Washington.

In the absence of Hunter, General Lew Wallace, with headquarters at
Baltimore, commanded the department in which the Shenandoah lay.  His
surplus of troops with which to move against the enemy was small in
number.  Most of these were raw and, consequently, very much inferior to
our veterans and to the veterans which Early had with him; but the
situation of Washington was precarious, and Wallace moved with
commendable promptitude to meet the enemy at the Monocacy.  He could
hardly have expected to defeat him badly, but he hoped to <DW36> and
delay him until Washington could be put into a state of preparation for
his reception.  I had previously ordered General Meade to send a
division to Baltimore for the purpose of adding to the defences of
Washington, and he had sent Ricketts's division of the 6th corps
(Wright's), which arrived in Baltimore on the 8th of July.  Finding that
Wallace had gone to the front with his command, Ricketts immediately
took the cars and followed him to the Monocacy with his entire division.
They met the enemy and, as might have been expected, were defeated; but
they succeeded in stopping him for the day on which the battle took
place.  The next morning Early started on his march to the capital of
the Nation, arriving before it on the 11th.

Learning of the gravity of the situation I had directed General Meade to
also order Wright with the rest of his corps directly to Washington for
the relief of that place, and the latter reached there the very day that
Early arrived before it.  The 19th corps, which had been stationed in
Louisiana, having been ordered up to reinforce the armies about
Richmond, had about this time arrived at Fortress Monroe, on their way
to join us. I diverted them from that point to Washington, which place
they reached, almost simultaneously with Wright, on the 11th.  The 19th
corps was commanded by Major-General Emory.

Early made his reconnoissance with a view of attacking on the following
morning, the 12th; but the next morning he found our intrenchments,
which were very strong, fully manned.  He at once commenced to retreat,
Wright following.  There is no telling how much this result was
contributed to by General Lew Wallace's leading what might well be
considered almost a forlorn hope.  If Early had been but one day earlier
he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the
reinforcements I had sent. Whether the delay caused by the battle
amounted to a day or not, General Wallace contributed on this occasion,
by the defeat of the troops under him a greater benefit to the cause
than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render
by means of a victory.

Farther west also the troubles were threatening.  Some time before,
Forrest had met Sturgis in command of some of our cavalry in Mississippi
and handled him very roughly, gaining a very great victory over him.
This left Forrest free to go almost where he pleased, and to cut the
roads in rear of Sherman who was then advancing.  Sherman was abundantly
able to look after the army that he was immediately with, and all of his
military division so long as he could communicate with it; but it was my
place to see that he had the means with which to hold his rear.  Two
divisions under A. J. Smith had been sent to Banks in Louisiana some
months before.  Sherman ordered these back, with directions to attack
Forrest.  Smith met and defeated him very badly.  I then directed that
Smith should hang to Forrest and not let him go; and to prevent by all
means his getting upon the Memphis and Nashville Railroad.  Sherman had
anticipated me in this matter, and given the same orders in substance;
but receiving my directions for this order to Smith, he repeated it.

On the 25th of June General Burnside had commenced running a mine from
about the centre of his front under the Confederate works confronting
him.  He was induced to do this by Colonel Pleasants, of the
Pennsylvania Volunteers, whose regiment was mostly composed of miners,
and who was himself a practical miner.  Burnside had submitted the
scheme to Meade and myself, and we both approved of it, as a means of
keeping the men occupied.  His position was very favorable for carrying
on this work, but not so favorable for the operations to follow its
completion.  The position of the two lines at that point were only about
a hundred yards apart with a comparatively deep ravine intervening.  In
the bottom of this ravine the work commenced.  The position was
unfavorable in this particular: that the enemy's line at that point was
re-entering, so that its front was commanded by their own lines both to
the right and left.  Then, too, the ground was sloping upward back of
the Confederate line for a considerable distance, and it was presumable
that the enemy had, at least, a detached work on this highest point.
The work progressed, and on the 23d of July the mine was finished ready
for charging; but I had this work of charging deferred until we were
ready for it.

On the 17th of July several deserters came in and said that there was
great consternation in Richmond, and that Lee was coming out to make an
attack upon us the object being to put us on the defensive so that he
might detach troops to go to Georgia where the army Sherman was
operating against was said to be in great trouble.  I put the army
commanders, Meade and Butler, on the lookout, but the attack was not
made.

I concluded, then, a few days later, to do something in the way of
offensive movement myself, having in view something of the same object
that Lee had had.  Wright's and Emory's corps were in Washington, and
with this reduction of my force Lee might very readily have spared some
troops from the defences to send West.  I had other objects in view,
however, besides keeping Lee where he was.  The mine was constructed and
ready to be exploded, and I wanted to take that occasion to carry
Petersburg if I could.  It was the object, therefore, to get as many of
Lee's troops away from the south side of the James River as possible.
Accordingly, on the 26th, we commenced a movement with Hancock's corps
and Sheridan's cavalry to the north side by the way of Deep Bottom,
where Butler had a pontoon bridge laid. The plan, in the main, was to
let the cavalry cut loose and, joining with Kautz's cavalry of the Army
of the James, get by Lee's lines and destroy as much as they could of
the Virginia Central Railroad, while, in the mean time, the infantry was
to move out so as to protect their rear and cover their retreat back
when they should have got through with their work.  We were successful
in drawing the enemy's troops to the north side of the James as I
expected.  The mine was ordered to be charged, and the morning of the
30th of July was the time fixed for its explosion.  I gave Meade minute
orders (*38) on the 24th directing how I wanted the assault conducted,
which orders he amplified into general instructions for the guidance of
the troops that were to be engaged.

Meade's instructions, which I, of course, approved most heartily, were
all that I can see now was necessary.  The only further precaution which
he could have taken, and which he could not foresee, would have been to
have different men to execute them.

The gallery to the mine was over five hundred feet long from where it
entered the ground to the point where it was under the enemy's works,
and with a cross gallery of something over eighty feet running under
their lines.  Eight chambers had been left, requiring a ton of powder
each to charge them.  All was ready by the time I had prescribed; and on
the 29th Hancock and Sheridan were brought back near the James River
with their troops.  Under cover of night they started to recross the
bridge at Deep Bottom, and to march directly for that part of our lines
in front of the mine.

Warren was to hold his line of intrenchments with a sufficient number of
men and concentrate the balance on the right next to Burnside's corps,
while Ord, now commanding the 18th corps, temporarily under Meade, was
to form in the rear of Burnside to support him when he went in.  All
were to clear off the parapets and the _abatis_ in their front so as to
leave the space as open as possible, and be able to charge the moment
the mine had been sprung and Burnside had taken possession.  Burnside's
corps was not to stop in the crater at all but push on to the top of the
hill, supported on the right and left by Ord's and Warren's corps.

Warren and Ord fulfilled their instructions perfectly so far as making
ready was concerned.  Burnside seemed to have paid no attention whatever
to the instructions, and left all the obstruction in his own front for
his troops to get over in the best way they could.  The four divisions
of his corps were commanded by Generals Potter, Willcox, Ledlie and
Ferrero.  The last was a  division; and Burnside selected it to
make the assault.  Meade interfered with this.  Burnside then took
Ledlie's division--a worse selection than the first could have been.  In
fact, Potter and Willcox were the only division commanders Burnside had
who were equal to the occasion.  Ledlie besides being otherwise
inefficient, proved also to possess disqualification less common among
soldiers.

There was some delay about the explosion of the mine so that it did not
go off until about five o'clock in the morning.  When it did explode it
was very successful, making a crater twenty feet deep and something like
a hundred feet in length.  Instantly one hundred and ten cannon and
fifty mortars, which had been placed in the most commanding positions
covering the ground to the right and left of where the troops were to
enter the enemy's lines, commenced playing.  Ledlie's division marched
into the crater immediately on the explosion, but most of the men
stopped there in the absence of any one to give directions; their
commander having found some safe retreat to get into before they
started.  There was some delay on the left and right in advancing, but
some of the troops did get in and turn to the right and left, carrying
the rifle-pits as I expected they would do.

There had been great consternation in Petersburg, as we were well aware,
about a rumored mine that we were going to explode.  They knew we were
mining, and they had failed to cut our mine off by countermining, though
Beauregard had taken the precaution to run up a line of intrenchments to
the rear of that part of their line fronting where they could see that
our men were at work.  We had learned through deserters who had come in
that the people had very wild rumors about what was going on on our
side.  They said that we had undermined the whole of Petersburg; that
they were resting upon a slumbering volcano and did not know at what
moment they might expect an eruption.  I somewhat based my calculations
upon this state of feeling, and expected that when the mine was exploded
the troops to the right and left would flee in all directions, and that
our troops, if they moved promptly, could get in and strengthen
themselves before the enemy had come to a realization of the true
situation.  It was just as I expected it would be.  We could see the men
running without any apparent object except to get away. It was half an
hour before musketry firing, to amount to anything, was opened upon our
men in the crater.  It was an hour before the enemy got artillery up to
play upon them; and it was nine o'clock before Lee got up reinforcements
from his right to join in expelling our troops.

The effort was a stupendous failure.  It cost us about four thousand
men, mostly, however, captured; and all due to inefficiency on the part
of the corps commander and the incompetency of the division commander
who was sent to lead the assault.

After being fully assured of the failure of the mine, and finding that
most of that part of Lee's army which had been drawn north of the James
River were still there, I gave Meade directions to send a corps of
infantry and the cavalry next morning, before Lee could get his forces
back, to destroy fifteen or twenty miles of the Weldon Railroad.  But
misfortunes never come singly.  I learned during that same afternoon
that Wright's pursuit of Early was feeble because of the constant and
contrary orders he had been receiving from Washington, while I was cut
off from immediate communication by reason of our cable across
Chesapeake Bay being broken.  Early, however, was not aware of the fact
that Wright was not pursuing until he had reached Strasburg.  Finding
that he was not pursued he turned back to Winchester, where Crook was
stationed with a small force, and drove him out.  He then pushed north
until he had reached the Potomac, then he sent McCausland across to
Chambersburg, Pa., to destroy that town.  Chambersburg was a purely
defenceless town with no garrison whatever, and no fortifications; yet
McCausland, under Early's orders, burned the place and left about three
hundred families houseless.  This occurred on the 30th of July.  I
rescinded my orders for the troops to go out to destroy the Weldon
Railroad, and directed them to embark for Washington City.  After
burning Chambersburg McCausland retreated, pursued by our cavalry,
towards Cumberland.  They were met and defeated by General Kelley and
driven into Virginia.

The Shenandoah Valley was very important to the Confederates, because it
was the principal storehouse they now had for feeding their armies about
Richmond.  It was well known that they would make a desperate struggle
to maintain it.  It had been the source of a great deal of trouble to us
heretofore to guard that outlet to the north, partly because of the
incompetency of some of the commanders, but chiefly because of
interference from Washington.

It seemed to be the policy of General Halleck and Secretary Stanton to
keep any force sent there, in pursuit of the invading army, moving right
and left so as to keep between the enemy and our capital; and, generally
speaking, they pursued this policy until all knowledge of the
whereabouts of the enemy was lost. They were left, therefore, free to
supply themselves with horses, beef cattle, and such provisions as they
could carry away from Western Maryland and Pennsylvania.  I determined
to put a stop to this.  I started Sheridan at once for that field of
operation, and on the following day sent another division of his
cavalry.

I had previously asked to have Sheridan assigned to that command, but
Mr. Stanton objected, on the ground that he was too young for so
important a command.  On the 1st of August when I sent reinforcements
for the protection of Washington, I sent the following orders:


CITY POINT, VA.,

August 1, 1864, 11.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington D. C.

I am sending General Sheridan for temporary duty whilst the enemy is
being expelled from the border.  Unless General Hunter is in the field
in person, I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the
field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow
him to the death.  Wherever the enemy goes let our troops go also.  Once
started up the valley they ought to be followed until we get possession
of the Virginia Central Railroad.  If General Hunter is in the field,
give Sheridan direct command of the 6th corps and cavalry division. All
the cavalry, I presume, will reach Washington in the course of
to-morrow.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


The President in some way or other got to see this dispatch of mine
directing certain instructions to be given to the commanders in the
field, operating against Early, and sent me the following very
characteristic dispatch:


OFFICE U. S. MILITARY TELEGRAPH, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
August 3, 1864.

Cypher. 6 P.M.,

LT. GENERAL GRANT, City Point, Va.

I have seen your despatch in which you say, "I want Sheridan put in
command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself
south of the enemy, and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy
goes, let our troops go also."  This, I think, is exactly right, as to
how our forces should move.  But please look over the despatches you may
have received from here, even since you made that order, and discover,
if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here, of
"putting our army south of the enemy," or of "following him to the
death" in any direction.  I repeat to you it will neither be done nor
attempted unless you watch it every day, and hour, and force it.

A. LINCOLN.


I replied to this that "I would start in two hours for Washington," and
soon got off, going directly to the Monocacy without stopping at
Washington on my way.  I found General Hunter's army encamped there,
scattered over the fields along the banks of the Monocacy, with many
hundreds of cars and locomotives, belonging to the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad, which he had taken the precaution to bring back and collect at
that point.  I asked the general where the enemy was.  He replied that
he did not know.  He said the fact was, that he was so embarrassed with
orders from Washington moving him first to the right and then to the
left that he had lost all trace of the enemy.

I then told the general that I would find out where the enemy was, and
at once ordered steam got up and trains made up, giving directions to
push for Halltown, some four miles above Harper's Ferry, in the
Shenandoah Valley.  The cavalry and the wagon trains were to march, but
all the troops that could be transported by the cars were to go in that
way.  I knew that the valley was of such importance to the enemy that,
no matter how much he was scattered at that time, he would in a very
short time be found in front of our troops moving south.

I then wrote out General Hunter's instructions. (*39)  I told him that
Sheridan was in Washington, and still another division was on its way;
and suggested that he establish the headquarters of the department at
any point that would suit him best, Cumberland, Baltimore, or elsewhere,
and give Sheridan command of the troops in the field.  The general
replied to this, that he thought he had better be relieved entirely.  He
said that General Halleck seemed so much to distrust his fitness for the
position he was in that he thought somebody else ought to be there.  He
did not want, in any way, to embarrass the cause; thus showing a
patriotism that was none too common in the army.  There were not many
major-generals who would voluntarily have asked to have the command of a
department taken from them on the supposition that for some particular
reason, or for any reason, the service would be better performed.  I
told him, "very well then," and telegraphed at once for Sheridan to come
to the Monocacy, and suggested that I would wait and meet him there.

Sheridan came at once by special train, but reached there after the
troops were all off.  I went to the station and remained there until he
arrived.  Myself and one or two of my staff were about all the Union
people, except General Hunter and his staff, who were left at the
Monocacy when Sheridan arrived.  I hastily told Sheridan what had been
done and what I wanted him to do, giving him, at the same time, the
written instructions which had been prepared for General Hunter and
directed to that officer.

Sheridan now had about 30,000 men to move with, 8,000 of them being
cavalry.  Early had about the same number, but the superior ability of
the National commander over the Confederate commander was so great that
all the latter's advantage of being on the defensive was more than
counterbalanced by this circumstance.  As I had predicted, Early was
soon found in front of Sheridan in the valley, and Pennsylvania and
Maryland were speedily freed from the invaders.  The importance of the
valley was so great to the Confederates that Lee reinforced Early, but
not to the extent that we thought and feared he would.

To prevent as much as possible these reinforcements from being sent out
from Richmond, I had to do something to compel Lee to retain his forces
about his capital.  I therefore gave orders for another move to the
north side of the James River, to threaten Richmond.  Hancock's corps,
part of the 10th corps under Birney, and Gregg's division of cavalry
were crossed to the north side of the James during the night of the
13th-14th of August.  A threatening position was maintained for a number
of days, with more or less skirmishing, and some tolerably hard
fighting; although it was my object and my instructions that anything
like a battle should be avoided, unless opportunities should present
themselves which would insure great success. General Meade was left in
command of the few troops around Petersburg, strongly intrenched; and
was instructed to keep a close watch upon the enemy in that quarter, and
himself to take advantage of any weakening that might occur through an
effort on the part of the enemy to reinforce the north side.  There was
no particular victory gained on either side; but during that time no
more reinforcements were sent to the valley.

I informed Sheridan of what had been done to prevent reinforcements
being sent from Richmond against him, and also that the efforts we had
made had proven that one of the divisions which we supposed had gone to
the valley was still at Richmond, because we had captured six or seven
hundred prisoners from that division, each of its four brigades having
contributed to our list of captures.  I also informed him that but one
division had gone, and it was possible that I should be able to prevent
the going of any more.

To add to my embarrassment at this time Sherman, who was now near
Atlanta, wanted reinforcements.  He was perfectly willing to take the
raw troops then being raised in the North-west, saying that he could
teach them more soldiering in one day among his troops than they would
learn in a week in a camp of instruction.  I therefore asked that all
troops in camps of instruction in the North-west be sent to him.
Sherman also wanted to be assured that no Eastern troops were moving out
against him.  I informed him of what I had done and assured him that I
would hold all the troops there that it was possible for me to hold, and
that up to that time none had gone.  I also informed him that his real
danger was from Kirby Smith, who commanded the trans-Mississippi
Department.  If Smith should escape Steele, and get across the
Mississippi River, he might move against him.  I had, therefore, asked
to have an expedition ready to move from New Orleans against Mobile in
case Kirby Smith should get across.  This would have a tendency to draw
him to the defence of that place, instead of going against Sherman.

Right in the midst of all these embarrassments Halleck informed me that
there was an organized scheme on foot in the North to resist the draft,
and suggested that it might become necessary to draw troops from the
field to put it down.  He also advised taking in sail, and not going too
fast.

The troops were withdrawn from the north side of the James River on the
night of the 20th.  Before they were withdrawn, however, and while most
of Lee's force was on that side of the river, Warren had been sent with
most of the 5th corps to capture the Weldon Railroad.  He took up his
line of march well back to the rear, south of the enemy, while the
troops remaining in the trenches extended so as to cover that part of
the line which he had vacated by moving out.  From our left, near the
old line, it was about three miles to the Weldon Railroad.  A division
was ordered from the right of the Petersburg line to reinforce Warren,
while a division was brought back from the north side of the James River
to take its place.

This road was very important to the enemy.  The limits from which his
supplies had been drawn were already very much contracted, and I knew
that he must fight desperately to protect it.  Warren carried the road,
though with heavy loss on both sides.  He fortified his new position,
and our trenches were then extended from the left of our main line to
connect with his new one.  Lee made repeated attempts to dislodge
Warren's corps, but without success, and with heavy loss.

As soon as Warren was fortified and reinforcements reached him, troops
were sent south to destroy the bridges on the Weldon Railroad; and with
such success that the enemy had to draw in wagons, for a distance of
about thirty miles, all the supplies they got thereafter from that
source.  It was on the 21st that Lee seemed to have given up the Weldon
Railroad as having been lost to him; but along about the 24th or 25th he
made renewed attempts to recapture it; again he failed and with very
heavy losses to him as compared with ours.

On the night of the 20th our troops on the north side of the James were
withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg were sent south to destroy the Weldon
Railroad.  They were attacked on the 25th at Reams's Station, and after
desperate fighting a part of our line gave way, losing five pieces of
artillery.  But the Weldon Railroad never went out of our possession
from the 18th of August to the close of the war.



CHAPTER LVIII.

SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE--VISIT TO SHERIDAN--SHERIDAN'S VICTORY IN THE
SHENANDOAH--SHERIDAN'S RIDE TO WINCHESTER--CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE
WINTER.

We had our troops on the Weldon Railroad contending against a large
force that regarded this road of so much importance that they could
afford to expend many lives in retaking it; Sherman just getting through
to Atlanta with great losses of men from casualties, discharges and
detachments left along as guards to occupy and hold the road in rear of
him; Washington threatened but a short time before, and now Early being
strengthened in the valley so as, probably, to renew that attempt.  It
kept me pretty active in looking after all these points.

On the 10th of August Sheridan had advanced on Early up the Shenandoah
Valley, Early falling back to Strasburg.  On the 12th I learned that Lee
had sent twenty pieces of artillery, two divisions of infantry and a
considerable cavalry force to strengthen Early.  It was important that
Sheridan should be informed of this, so I sent the information to
Washington by telegraph, and directed a courier to be sent from there to
get the message to Sheridan at all hazards, giving him the information.
The messenger, an officer of the army, pushed through with great energy
and reached Sheridan just in time. The officer went through by way of
Snicker's Gap, escorted by some cavalry.  He found Sheridan just making
his preparations to attack Early in his chosen position.  Now, however,
he was thrown back on the defensive.

On the 15th of September I started to visit General Sheridan in the
Shenandoah Valley.  My purpose was to have him attack Early, or drive
him out of the valley and destroy that source of supplies for Lee's
army.  I knew it was impossible for me to get orders through Washington
to Sheridan to make a move, because they would be stopped there and such
orders as Halleck's caution (and that of the Secretary of War) would
suggest would be given instead, and would, no doubt, be contradictory to
mine.  I therefore, without stopping at Washington, went directly
through to Charlestown, some ten miles above Harper's Ferry, and waited
there to see General Sheridan, having sent a courier in advance to
inform him where to meet me.

When Sheridan arrived I asked him if he had a map showing the positions
of his army and that of the enemy.  He at once drew one out of his side
pocket, showing all roads and streams, and the camps of the two armies.
He said that if he had permission he would move so and so (pointing out
how) against the Confederates, and that he could "whip them."  Before
starting I had drawn up a plan of campaign for Sheridan, which I had
brought with me; but, seeing that he was so clear and so positive in his
views and so confident of success, I said nothing about this and did not
take it out of my pocket.

Sheridan's wagon trains were kept at Harper's Ferry, where all of his
stores were.  By keeping the teams at that place, their forage did not
have to be hauled to them.  As supplies of ammunition, provisions and
rations for the men were wanted, trains would be made up to deliver the
stores to the commissaries and quartermasters encamped at Winchester.
Knowing that he, in making preparations to move at a given day, would
have to bring up wagons trains from Harper's Ferry, I asked him if he
could be ready to get off by the following Tuesday.  This was on Friday.
"O Yes," he said, he "could be off before daylight on Monday."  I told
him then to make the attack at that time and according to his own plan;
and I immediately started to return to the army about Richmond.  After
visiting Baltimore and Burlington, New Jersey, I arrived at City Point
on the 19th.

On the way out to Harper's Ferry I had met Mr. Robert Garrett, President
of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.  He seemed very anxious to know when
workmen might be put upon the road again so as to make repairs and put
it in shape for running.  It was a large piece of property to have
standing idle.  I told him I could not answer then positively but would
try and inform him before a great while.  On my return Mr. Garrett met
me again with the same and I told him I thought that by the Wednesday he
might send his workmen out on his road.  I gave him no further
information however, and he had no suspicion of how I expected to have
the road cleared for his workmen.

Sheridan moved at the time he had fixed upon.  He met Early at the
crossing of Opequon Creek, and won a most decisive victory--one which
electrified the country.  Early had invited this attack himself by his
bad generalship and made the victory easy.  He had sent G. T. Anderson's
division east of the Blue Ridge before I went to Harper's Ferry; and
about the time I arrived there he started other divisions (leaving but
two in their camps) to march to Martinsburg for the purpose destroying
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at that point.  Early here learned that
I had been with Sheridan and, supposing there was some movement on foot,
started back as soon as he got the information.  But his forces were
separated and, as I have said, he was very badly defeated.  He fell back
to Fisher's Hill, Sheridan following.

The valley is narrow at that point, and Early made another stand there,
behind works which extended across.  But Sheridan turned both his flanks
and again sent him speeding up the valley, following in hot pursuit.
The pursuit was continued up the valley to Mount Jackson and New Market.
Sheridan captured about eleven hundred prisoners and sixteen guns.  The
houses which he passed all along the route were found to be filled with
Early's wounded, and the country swarmed with his deserters.  Finally,
on the 25th, Early turned from the valley eastward, leaving Sheridan at
Harrisonburg in undisputed possession.

Now one of the main objects of the expedition began to be accomplished.
Sheridan went to work with his command, gathering in the crops, cattle,
and everything in the upper part of the valley required by our troops;
and especially taking what might be of use to the enemy.  What he could
not take away he destroyed, so that the enemy would not be invited to
come back there.  I congratulated Sheridan upon his recent great victory
and had a salute of a hundred guns fired in honor of it, the guns being
aimed at the enemy around Petersburg.  I also notified the other
commanders throughout the country, who also fired salutes in honor of
his victory.

I had reason to believe that the administration was a little afraid to
have a decisive battle at that time, for fear it might go against us and
have a bad effect on the November elections. The convention which had
met and made its nomination of the Democratic candidate for the
presidency had declared the war a failure.  Treason was talked as boldly
in Chicago at that convention as ever been in Charleston.  It was a
question whether the government would then have had the power to make
arrests and punish those who talked treason.  But this decisive victory
was the most effective campaign argument made in the canvass.

Sheridan, in his pursuit, got beyond where they could hear from him in
Washington, and the President became very much frightened about him.  He
was afraid that the hot pursuit had been a little like that of General
Cass was said to have been, in one of our Indian wars, when he was an
officer of army.  Cass was pursuing the Indians so closely that the
first thing he knew he found himself in front, and the Indians pursuing
him.  The President was afraid that Sheridan had got on the other side
of Early and that Early was in behind him.  He was afraid that Sheridan
was getting so far away that reinforcements would be sent out from
Richmond to enable Early to beat him.  I replied to the President that I
had taken steps to prevent Lee from sending reinforcements to Early, by
attacking the former where he was.

On the 28th of September, to retain Lee in his position, I sent Ord with
the 18th corps and Birney with the 10th corps to make an advance on
Richmond, to threaten it.  Ord moved with the left wing up to Chaffin's
Bluff; Birney with the 10th corps took a road farther north; while Kautz
with the cavalry took the Darby road, still farther to the north.  They
got across the river by the next morning, and made an effort to surprise
the enemy.  In that, however, they were unsuccessful.

The enemy's lines were very strong and very intricate. Stannard's
division of the 18th corps with General Burnham's brigade leading, tried
an assault against Fort Harrison and captured it with sixteen guns and a
good many prisoners. Burnham was killed in the assault.  Colonel Stevens
who succeeded him was badly wounded; and his successor also fell in the
same way.  Some works to the right and left were also carried with the
guns in them--six in number--and a few more prisoners.  Birney's troops
to the right captured the enemy's intrenched picket-lines, but were
unsuccessful in their efforts upon the main line.

Our troops fortified their new position, bringing Fort Harrison into the
new line and extending it to the river.  This brought us pretty close to
the enemy on the north side of the James, and the two opposing lines
maintained their relative positions to the close of the siege.

In the afternoon a further attempt was made to advance, but it failed.
Ord fell badly wounded, and had to be relieved; the command devolved
upon General Heckman, and later General Weitzel was assigned to the
command of the 18th corps.  During the night Lee reinforced his troops
about Fort Gilmer, which was at the right of Fort Harrison, by eight
additional brigades from Petersburg, and attempted to retake the works
which we had captured by concentrating ten brigades against them.  All
their efforts failed, their attacks being all repulsed with very heavy
loss.  In one of these assaults upon us General Stannard, a gallant
officer who was defending Fort Harrison, lost an arm. Our casualties
during these operations amounted to 394 killed, I,554 wounded and 324
missing.

Whilst this was going on General Meade was instructed to keep up an
appearance of moving troops to our extreme left.  Parke and Warren were
kept with two divisions, each under arms, ready to move leaving their
enclosed batteries manned, with a scattering line on the other
intrenchments.  The object of this was to prevent reinforcements from
going to the north side of the river.  Meade was instructed to watch the
enemy closely and, if Lee weakened his lines, to make an attack.

On the 30th these troops moved out, under Warren, and captured an
advanced intrenched camp at Peeble's farm, driving the enemy back to the
main line.  Our troops followed and made an attack in the hope of
carrying the enemy's main line; but in this they were unsuccessful and
lost a large number of men, mostly captured.  The number of killed and
wounded was not large.  The next day our troops advanced again and
established themselves, intrenching a new line about a mile in front of
the enemy.  This advanced Warren's position on the Weldon Railroad very
considerably.

Sheridan having driven the enemy out of the valley, and taken the
productions of the valley so that instead of going there for supplies
the enemy would have to bring his provisions with him if he again
entered it, recommended a reduction of his own force, the surplus to be
sent where it could be of more use.  I approved of his suggestion, and
ordered him to send Wright's corps back to the James River.  I further
directed him to repair the railroad up the Shenandoah Valley towards the
advanced position which we would hold with a small force.  The troops
were to be sent to Washington by the way of Culpeper, in order to watch
the east side of the Blue Ridge, and prevent the enemy from getting into
the rear of Sheridan while he was still doing his work of destruction.

The valley was so very important, however, to the Confederate army that,
contrary to our expectations, they determined to make one more strike,
and save it if possible before the supplies should be all destroyed.
Reinforcements were sent therefore to Early, and this before any of our
troops had been withdrawn. Early prepared to strike Sheridan at
Harrisonburg; but the latter had not remained there.

On the 6th of October Sheridan commenced retiring down the valley,
taking or destroying all the food and forage and driving the cattle
before him, Early following.  At Fisher's Hill Sheridan turned his
cavalry back on that of Early, which, under the lead of Rosser, was
pursuing closely, and routed it most completely, capturing eleven guns
and a large number of prisoners.  Sheridan lost only about sixty men.
His cavalry pursued the enemy back some twenty-five miles.  On the 10th
of October the march down the valley was again resumed, Early again
following.

I now ordered Sheridan to halt, and to improve the opportunity if
afforded by the enemy's having been sufficiently weakened, to move back
again and cut the James River Canal and Virginia Central Railroad.  But
this order had to go through Washington where it was intercepted; and
when Sheridan received what purported to be a statement of what I wanted
him to do it was something entirely different.  Halleck informed
Sheridan that it was my wish for him to hold a forward position as a
base from which to act against Charlottesville and Gordonsville; that he
should fortify this position and provision it.

Sheridan objected to this most decidedly; and I was impelled to
telegraph him, on the 14th, as follows:


CITY POINT, VA., October 14, 1864.--12.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Cedar Creek, Va.

What I want is for you to threaten the Virginia Central Railroad and
canal in the manner your judgment tells you is best, holding yourself
ready to advance, if the enemy draw off their forces. If you make the
enemy hold a force equal to your own for the protection of those
thoroughfares, it will accomplish nearly as much as their destruction.
If you cannot do this, then the next best thing to do is to send here
all the force you can.  I deem a good cavalry force necessary for your
offensive, as well as defensive operations.  You need not therefore send
here more than one division of cavalry.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


Sheridan having been summoned to Washington City, started on the 15th
leaving Wright in command.  His army was then at Cedar Creek, some
twenty miles south of Winchester.  The next morning while at Front
Royal, Sheridan received a dispatch from Wright, saying that a dispatch
from Longstreet to Early had been intercepted.  It directed the latter
to be ready to move and to crush Sheridan as soon as he, Longstreet,
arrived.  On the receipt of this news Sheridan ordered the cavalry up
the valley to join Wright.

On the 18th of October Early was ready to move, and during the night
succeeded in getting his troops in the rear of our left flank, which
fled precipitately and in great confusion down the valley, losing
eighteen pieces of artillery and a thousand or more prisoners.  The
right under General Getty maintained a firm and steady front, falling
back to Middletown where it took a position and made a stand.  The
cavalry went to the rear, seized the roads leading to Winchester and
held them for the use of our troops in falling back, General Wright
having ordered a retreat back to that place.

Sheridan having left Washington on the 18th, reached Winchester that
night.  The following morning he started to join his command.  He had
scarcely got out of town, when he met his men returning in panic from
the front and also heard heavy firing to the south.  He immediately
ordered the cavalry at Winchester to be deployed across the valley to
stop the stragglers.  Leaving members of his staff to take care of
Winchester and the public property there, he set out with a small escort
directly for the scene of battle.  As he met the fugitives he ordered
them to turn back, reminding them that they were going the wrong way.
His presence soon restored confidence.  Finding themselves worse
frightened than hurt the men did halt and turn back.  Many of those who
had run ten miles got back in time to redeem their reputation as gallant
soldiers before night.

When Sheridan got to the front he found Getty and Custer still holding
their ground firmly between the Confederates and our retreating troops.
Everything in the rear was now ordered up. Sheridan at once proceeded to
intrench his position; and he awaited an assault from the enemy.  This
was made with vigor, and was directed principally against Emory's corps,
which had sustained the principal loss in the first attack.  By one
o'clock the attack was repulsed.  Early was so badly damaged that he
seemed disinclined to make another attack, but went to work to intrench
himself with a view to holding the position he had already gained.  He
thought, no doubt, that Sheridan would be glad enough to leave him
unmolested; but in this he was mistaken.

About the middle of the afternoon Sheridan advanced.  He sent his
cavalry by both flanks, and they penetrated to the enemy's rear.  The
contest was close for a time, but at length the left of the enemy broke,
and disintegration along the whole line soon followed.  Early tried to
rally his men, but they were followed so closely that they had to give
way very quickly every time they attempted to make a stand.  Our
cavalry, having pushed on and got in the rear of the Confederates,
captured twenty-four pieces of artillery, besides retaking what had been
lost in the morning.  This victory pretty much closed the campaigning in
the Valley of Virginia.  All the Confederate troops were sent back to
Richmond with the exception of one division of infantry and a little
cavalry.  Wright's corps was ordered back to the Army of the Potomac,
and two other divisions were withdrawn from the valley.  Early had lost
more men in killed, wounded and captured in the valley than Sheridan had
commanded from first to last.

On more than one occasion in these engagements General R. B. Hayes, who
succeeded me as President of the United States, bore a very honorable
part.  His conduct on the field was marked by conspicuous gallantry as
well as the display of qualities of a higher order than that of mere
personal daring.  This might well have been expected of one who could
write at the time he is said to have done so:  "Any officer fit for duty
who at this crisis would abandon his post to electioneer for a seat in
Congress, ought to be scalped."  Having entered the army as a Major of
Volunteers at the beginning of the war, General Hayes attained by
meritorious service the rank of Brevet Major-General before its close.

On the north side of the James River the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry
on the 7th of October, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed,
wounded and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery.  This was
followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was
repulsed with severe slaughter.  On the 13th a reconnoissance was sent
out by General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new
works he was constructing, which resulted in heavy loss to us.

On the 24th I ordered General Meade to attempt to get possession of the
South Side Railroad, and for that purpose to advance on the 27th.  The
attempt proved a failure, however, the most advanced of our troops not
getting nearer than within six miles of the point aimed for.  Seeing the
impossibility of its accomplishment I ordered the troops to withdraw,
and they were all back in their former positions the next day.

Butler, by my directions, also made a demonstration on the north side of
the James River in order to support this move, by detaining there the
Confederate troops who were on that side. He succeeded in this, but
failed of further results by not marching past the enemy's left before
turning in on the Darby road and by reason of simply coming up against
their lines in place.

This closed active operations around Richmond for the winter. Of course
there was frequent skirmishing between pickets, but no serious battle
was fought near either Petersburg or Richmond. It would prolong this
work to give a detailed account of all that took place from day to day
around Petersburg and at other parts of my command, and it would not
interest the general reader if given.  All these details can be found by
the military student in a series of books published by the Scribners,
Badeau's history of my campaigns, and also in the publications of the
War Department, including both the National and Confederate reports.

In the latter part of November General Hancock was relieved from the
command of the 2d corps by the Secretary of War and ordered to
Washington, to organize and command a corps of veteran troops to be
designated the 1st corps.  It was expected that this would give him a
large command to co-operate with in the spring.  It was my expectation,
at the time, that in the final operations Hancock should move either up
the valley, or else east of the Blue Ridge to Lynchburg; the idea being
to make the spring campaign the close of the war.  I expected, with
Sherman coming up from the South, Meade south of Petersburg and around
Richmond, and Thomas's command in Tennessee with depots of supplies
established in the eastern part of that State, to move from the
direction of Washington or the valley towards Lynchburg.  We would then
have Lee so surrounded that his supplies would be cut off entirely,
making it impossible for him to support his army.

General Humphreys, chief-of-staff of the Army of the Potomac, was
assigned to the command of the 2d corps, to succeed Hancock.



CHAPTER LIX.

THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA--WAR ANECDOTES--THE
MARCH ON SAVANNAH--INVESTMENT OF SAVANNAH--CAPTURE OF SAVANNAH.

Let us now return to the operations in the military division of the
Mississippi, and accompany Sherman in his march to the sea.

The possession of Atlanta by us narrowed the territory of the enemy very
materially and cut off one of his two remaining lines of roads from east
to west.

A short time after the fall of Atlanta Mr. Davis visited Palmetto and
Macon and made speeches at each place.  He spoke at Palmetto on the 20th
of September, and at Macon on the 22d. Inasmuch as he had relieved
Johnston and appointed Hood, and Hood had immediately taken the
initiative, it is natural to suppose that Mr. Davis was disappointed
with General Johnston's policy.  My own judgment is that Johnston acted
very wisely:  he husbanded his men and saved as much of his territory as
he could, without fighting decisive battles in which all might be lost.
As Sherman advanced, as I have show, his army became spread out, until,
if this had been continued, it would have been easy to destroy it in
detail.  I know that both Sherman and I were rejoiced when we heard of
the change.  Hood was unquestionably a brave, gallant soldier and not
destitute of ability; but unfortunately his policy was to fight the
enemy wherever he saw him, without thinking much of the consequences of
defeat.

In his speeches Mr. Davis denounced Governor Brown, of Georgia, and
General Johnston in unmeasured terms, even insinuating that their
loyalty to the Southern cause was doubtful.  So far as General Johnston
is concerned, I think Davis did him a great injustice in this
particular.  I had know the general before the war and strongly believed
it would be impossible for him to accept a high commission for the
purpose of betraying the cause he had espoused.  There, as I have said,
I think that his policy was the best one that could have been pursued by
the whole South--protract the war, which was all that was necessary to
enable them to gain recognition in the end.  The North was already
growing weary, as the South evidently was also, but with this
difference.  In the North the people governed, and could stop
hostilities whenever they chose to stop supplies.  The South was a
military camp, controlled absolutely by the government with soldiers to
back it, and the war could have been protracted, no matter to what
extent the discontent reached, up to the point of open mutiny of the
soldiers themselves.  Mr. Davis's speeches were frank appeals to the
people of Georgia and that portion of the South to come to their relief.
He tried to assure his frightened hearers that the Yankees were rapidly
digging their own graves; that measures were already being taken to cut
them off from supplies from the North; and that with a force in front,
and cut off from the rear, they must soon starve in the midst of a
hostile people.  Papers containing reports of these speeches immediately
reached the Northern States, and they were republished.  Of course, that
caused no alarm so long as telegraphic communication was kept up with
Sherman.

When Hood was forced to retreat from Atlanta he moved to the south-west
and was followed by a portion of Sherman's army.  He soon appeared upon
the railroad in Sherman's rear, and with his whole army began destroying
the road.  At the same time also the work was begun in Tennessee and
Kentucky which Mr. Davis had assured his hearers at Palmetto and Macon
would take place.  He ordered Forrest (about the ablest cavalry general
in the South) north for this purpose; and Forrest and Wheeler carried
out their orders with more or less destruction, occasionally picking up
a garrison.  Forrest indeed performed the very remarkable feat of
capturing, with cavalry, two gunboats and a number of transports,
something the accomplishment of which is very hard to account for.
Hood's army had been weakened by Governor Brown's withdrawing the
Georgia State troops for the purpose of gathering in the season's crops
for the use of the people and for the use of the army.  This not only
depleted Hood's forces but it served a most excellent purpose in
gathering in supplies of food and forage for the use of our army in its
subsequent march.  Sherman was obliged to push on with his force and go
himself with portions of it hither and thither, until it was clearly
demonstrated to him that with the army he then had it would be
impossible to hold the line from Atlanta back and leave him any force
whatever with which to take the offensive.  Had that plan been adhered
to, very large reinforcements would have been necessary; and Mr. Davis's
prediction of the destruction of the army would have been realized, or
else Sherman would have been obliged to make a successful retreat, which
Mr. Davis said in his speeches would prove more disastrous than
Napoleon's retreat from Moscow.

These speeches of Mr. Davis were not long in reaching Sherman. He took
advantage of the information they gave, and made all the preparation
possible for him to make to meet what now became expected, attempts to
break his communications.  Something else had to be done:  and to
Sherman's sensible and soldierly mind the idea was not long in dawning
upon him, not only that something else had to be done, but what that
something else should be.

On September 10th I telegraphed Sherman as follows:


CITY POINT, VA., Sept. 10, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN, Atlanta, Georgia.

So soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations can be
made, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced.  We
want to keep the enemy constantly pressed to the end of the war.  If we
give him no peace whilst the war lasts, the end cannot be distant.  Now
that we have all of Mobile Bay that is valuable, I do not know but it
will be the best move to transfer Canby's troops to act upon Savannah,
whilst you move on Augusta. I should like to hear from you, however, in
this matter.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


Sherman replied promptly:

"If I could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at Augusta, or
Columbus, Georgia, I can march to Milledgeville, and compel Hood to give
up Augusta or Macon, and then turn on the other.  * * * If you can
manage to take the Savannah River as high up as Augusta, or the
Chattahoochee as far up as Columbus, I can sweep the whole State of
Georgia."

On the 12th I sent a special messenger, one of my own staff, with a
letter inviting Sherman's views about the next campaign.

CITY POINT, VA., Sept. 12, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T.  SHERMAN, Commanding Mill Division of the
Mississippi.

I send Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, of my staff, with this. Colonel Porter
will explain to you the exact condition of affairs here better than I
can do in the limits of a letter. Although I feel myself strong enough
for offensive operations, I am holding on quietly to get advantage of
recruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly.  My
lines are necessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom north of the
James across the peninsula formed by the Appomattox and the James, and
south of the Appomattox to the Weldon Road.  This line is very strongly
fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men, but from its
great length takes many in the aggregate.  I propose, when I do move, to
extend my left so as to control what is known as the South Side, or
Lynchburg and Petersburg Road, then if possible to keep the Danville
Road cut.  At the same time this move is made, I want to send a force of
from six to ten thousand men against Wilmington.

The way I propose to do this is to land the men north of Fort Fisher,
and hold that point.  At the same time a large naval fleet will be
assembled there, and the iron-clads will run the batteries as they did
at Mobile.  This will give us the same control of the harbor of
Wilmington that we now have of the harbor of Mobile. What you are to do
with the forces at your command, I do not see. The difficulties of
supplying your army, except when you are constantly moving, beyond where
you are, I plainly see.  If it had not been for Price's movements Canby
would have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile.  From your command
on the Mississippi an equal number could have been taken.  With these
forces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one half to
Mobile and the other half to Savannah.  You could then move as proposed
in your telegram, so as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally.
Whichever was abandoned by the enemy you could take and open up a new
base of supplies.  My object now in sending a staff officer is not so
much to suggest operations for you, as to get your views and have plans
matured by the time everything can be got ready.  It will probably be
the 5th of October before any of the plans herein indicated will be
executed.

If you have any promotions to recommend, send the names forward and I
will approve them. * * *

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


This reached Sherman on September 20th.

On the 25th of September Sherman reported to Washington that Hood's
troops were in his rear.  He had provided against this by sending a
division to Chattanooga and a division to Rome, Georgia, which was in
the rear of Hood, supposing that Hood would fall back in the direction
from which he had come to reach the railroad.  At the same time Sherman
and Hood kept up a correspondence relative to the exchange of prisoners,
the treatment of citizens, and other matters suitable to be arranged
between hostile commanders in the field.  On the 27th of September I
telegraphed Sherman as follows:


CITY POINT, VA., September 27, 1864--10.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN:

I have directed all recruits and new troops from the Western States to
be sent to Nashville, to receive their further orders from you.  * * *

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


On the 29th Sherman sent Thomas back to Chattanooga, and afterwards to
Nashville, with another division (Morgan's) of the advanced army.
Sherman then suggested that, when he was prepared, his movements should
take place against Milledgeville and then to Savannah.  His expectation
at that time was, to make this movement as soon as he could get up his
supplies.  Hood was moving in his own country, and was moving light so
that he could make two miles to Sherman's one.  He depended upon the
country to gather his supplies, and so was not affected by delays.

As I have said, until this unexpected state of affairs happened, Mobile
had been looked upon as the objective point of Sherman's army.  It had
been a favorite move of mine from 1862, when I first suggested to the
then commander-in-chief that the troops in Louisiana, instead of
frittering away their time in the trans-Mississippi, should move
against Mobile.  I recommended this from time to time until I came into
command of the army, the last of March 1864.  Having the power in my own
hands, I now ordered the concentration of supplies, stores and troops,
in the department of the Gulf about New Orleans, with a view to a move
against Mobile, in support of, and in conjunction with, the other armies
operating in the field.  Before I came into command, these troops had
been scattered over the trans-Mississippi department in such a way that
they could not be, or were not, gotten back in time to take any part in
the original movement; hence the consideration, which had caused Mobile
to be selected as the objective point for Sherman's army to find his
next base of supplies after having cut loose from Atlanta, no longer
existed.

General G. M. Dodge, an exceedingly efficient officer, having been badly
wounded, had to leave the army about the first of October. He was in
command of two divisions of the 16th corps, consolidated into one.
Sherman then divided his army into the right and left wings the right
commanded by General O. O. Howard and the left by General Slocum.
General Dodge's two divisions were assigned, one to each of these wings.
Howard's command embraced the 15th and 17th corps, and Slocum's the 14th
and 20th corps, commanded by Generals Jeff. C. Davis and A. S. Williams.
Generals Logan and Blair commanded the two corps composing the right
wing.  About this time they left to take part in the presidential
election, which took place that year, leaving their corps to Osterhaus
and Ransom.  I have no doubt that their leaving was at the earnest
solicitation of the War Department. General Blair got back in time to
resume his command and to proceed with it throughout the march to the
sea and back to the grand review at Washington.  General Logan did not
return to his command until after it reached Savannah.

Logan felt very much aggrieved at the transfer of General Howard from
that portion of the Army of the Potomac which was then with the Western
Army, to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, with which army
General Logan had served from the battle of Belmont to the fall of
Atlanta--having passed successively through all grades from colonel
commanding a regiment to general commanding a brigade, division and army
corps, until upon the death of McPherson the command of the entire Army
of the Tennessee devolved upon him in the midst of a hotly contested
battle.  He conceived that he had done his full duty as commander in
that engagement; and I can bear testimony, from personal observation,
that he had proved himself fully equal to all the lower positions which
he had occupied as a soldier.  I will not pretend to question the motive
which actuated Sherman in taking an officer from another army to
supersede General Logan.  I have no doubt, whatever, that he did this
for what he considered would be to the good of the service, which was
more important than that the personal feelings of any individual should
not be aggrieved; though I doubt whether he had an officer with him who
could have filled the place as Logan would have done.  Differences of
opinion must exist between the best of friends as to policies in war,
and of judgment as to men's fitness.  The officer who has the command,
however, should be allowed to judge of the fitness of the officers under
him, unless he is very manifestly wrong.

Sherman's army, after all the depletions, numbered about sixty thousand
effective men.  All weak men had been left to hold the rear, and those
remaining were not only well men, but strong and hardy, so that he had
sixty thousand as good soldiers as ever trod the earth; better than any
European soldiers, because they not only worked like a machine but the
machine thought. European armies know very little what they are fighting
for, and care less. Included in these sixty thousand troops, there were
two small divisions of cavalry, numbering altogether about four thousand
men.  Hood had about thirty-five to forty thousand men, independent of
Forrest, whose forces were operating in Tennessee and Kentucky, as Mr.
Davis had promised they should.  This part of Mr. Davis's military plan
was admirable, and promised the best results of anything he could have
done, according to my judgment. I say this because I have criticised his
military judgment in the removal of Johnston, and also in the
appointment of Hood.  I am aware, however, that there was high feeling
existing at that time between Davis and his subordinate, whom I regarded
as one of his ablest lieutenants.

On the 5th of October the railroad back from Atlanta was again very
badly broken, Hood having got on the track with his army. Sherman saw
after night, from a high point, the road burning for miles.  The defence
of the railroad by our troops was very gallant, but they could not hold
points between their intrenched positions against Hood's whole army; in
fact they made no attempt to do so; but generally the intrenched
positions were held, as well as important bridges, and store located at
them. Allatoona, for instance, was defended by a small force of men
under the command of General Corse, one of the very able and efficient
volunteer officers produced by the war.  He, with a small force, was cut
off from the remainder of the National army and was attacked with great
vigor by many times his own number. Sherman from his high position could
see the battle raging, with the Confederate troops between him and his
subordinate.  He sent men, of course, to raise the temporary siege, but
the time that would be necessarily consumed in reaching Corse, would be
so great that all occupying the intrenchments might be dead.  Corse was
a man who would never surrender.  From a high position some of Sherman's
signal corps discovered a signal flag waving from a hole in the block
house at Allatoona.  It was from Corse.  He had been shot through the
face, but he signalled to his chief a message which left no doubt of his
determination to hold his post at all hazards.  It was at this point
probably, that Sherman first realized that with the forces at his
disposal, the keeping open of his line of communication with the North
would be impossible if he expected to retain any force with which to
operate offensively beyond Atlanta.  He proposed, therefore, to destroy
the roads back to Chattanooga, when all ready to move, and leave the
latter place garrisoned.  Yet, before abandoning the railroad, it was
necessary that he should repair damages already done, and hold the road
until he could get forward such supplies, ordnance stores and small
rations, as he wanted to carry with him on his proposed march, and to
return to the north his surplus artillery; his object being to move
light and to have no more artillery than could be used to advantage on
the field.

Sherman thought Hood would follow him, though he proposed to prepare for
the contingency of the latter moving the other way while he was moving
south, by making Thomas strong enough to hold Tennessee and Kentucky.
I, myself, was thoroughly satisfied that Hood would go north, as he did.
On the 2d of November I telegraphed Sherman authorizing him definitely
to move according to the plan he had proposed:  that is, cutting loose
from his base, giving up Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga.
To strengthen Thomas he sent Stanley (4th corps) back, and also ordered
Schofield, commanding the Army of the Ohio, twelve thousand strong, to
report to him.  In addition to this, A. J. Smith, who, with two
divisions of Sherman's army, was in Missouri aiding Rosecrans in driving
the enemy from that State, was under orders to return to Thomas and,
under the most unfavorable circumstances, might be expected to arrive
there long before Hood could reach Nashville.

In addition to this, the new levies of troops that were being raised in
the  North-west went to Thomas as rapidly as enrolled and equipped.
Thomas, without any of these additions spoken of, had a garrison at
Chattanooga which had been strengthened by one division and garrisons at
Bridgeport, Stevenson, Decatur, Murfreesboro, and Florence.  There were
already with him in Nashville ten thousand soldiers in round numbers,
and many thousands of employees in the quartermaster's and other
departments who could be put in the intrenchments in front of Nashville,
for its defence.  Also, Wilson was there with ten thousand dismounted
cavalrymen, who were being equipped for the field.  Thomas had at this
time about forty-five thousand men without any of the reinforcements
here above enumerated.  These reinforcements gave him  altogether about
seventy thousand men, without counting what might be added by the new
levies already spoken of.

About this time Beauregard arrived upon the field, not to supersede Hood
in command, but to take general charge over the entire district in which
Hood and Sherman were, or might be, operating.  He made the most frantic
appeals to the citizens for assistance to be rendered in every way:  by
sending reinforcements, by destroying supplies on the line of march of
the invaders, by destroying the bridges over which they would have to
cross, and by, in every way, obstructing the roads to their front. But
it was hard to convince the people of the propriety of destroying
supplies which were so much needed by themselves, and each one hoped
that his own possessions might escape.

Hood soon started north, and went into camp near Decatur, Alabama, where
he remained until the 29th of October, but without making an attack on
the garrison of that place.

The Tennessee River was patrolled by gunboats, from Muscle Shoals east;
and, also, below the second shoals out to the Ohio River.  These, with
the troops that might be concentrated from the garrisons along the river
at any point where Hood might choose to attempt to cross, made it
impossible for him to cross the Tennessee at any place where it was
navigable.  But Muscle Shoals is not navigable, and below them again is
another shoal which also obstructs navigation.  Hood therefore moved
down to a point nearly opposite Florence, Alabama, crossed over and
remained there for some time, collecting supplies of food, forage and
ammunition. All of these had to come from a considerable distance south,
because the region in which he was then situated was mountainous, with
small valleys which produced but little, and what they had produced had
long since been exhausted.  On the 1st of November I suggested to
Sherman, and also asked his views thereon, the propriety of destroying
Hood before he started on his campaign.

On the 2d of November, as stated, I approved definitely his making his
proposed campaign through Georgia, leaving Hood behind to the tender
mercy of Thomas and the troops in his command.  Sherman fixed the 10th
of November as the day of starting.

Sherman started on that day to get back to Atlanta, and on the 15th the
real march to the sea commenced.  The right wing, under Howard, and the
cavalry went to Jonesboro, Milledgeville, then the capital of Georgia,
being Sherman's objective or stopping place on the way to Savannah.  The
left wing moved to Stone Mountain, along roads much farther east than
those taken by the right wing. Slocum was in command, and threatened
Augusta as the point to which he was moving, but he was to turn off and
meet the right wing at Milledgeville.

Atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it worthless for military
purposes before starting, Sherman himself remaining over a day to
superintend the work, and see that it was well done. Sherman's orders
for this campaign were perfect.  Before starting, he had sent back all
sick, disabled and weak men, retaining nothing but the hardy,
well-inured soldiers to accompany him on his long march in prospect.
His artillery was reduced to sixty-five guns. The ammunition carried
with them was two hundred rounds for musket and gun.  Small rations were
taken in a small wagon train, which was loaded to its capacity for rapid
movement.  The army was expected to live on the country, and to always
keep the wagons full of forage and provisions against a possible delay
of a few days.

The troops, both of the right and left wings, made most of their advance
along the line of railroads, which they destroyed.  The method adopted
to perform this work, was to burn and destroy all the bridges and
culverts, and for a long distance, at places, to tear up the track and
bend the rails.  Soldiers to do this rapidly would form a line along one
side of the road with crowbars and poles, place these under the rails
and, hoisting all at once, turn over many rods of road at one time.  The
ties would then be placed in piles, and the rails, as they were
loosened, would be carried and put across these log heaps.  When a
sufficient number of rails were placed upon a pile of ties it would be
set on fire.  This would heat the rails very much more in the middle,
that being over the main part of the fire, than at the ends, so that
they would naturally bend of their own weight; but the soldiers, to
increase the damage, would take tongs and, one or two men at each end of
the rail, carry it with force against the nearest tree and twist it
around, thus leaving rails forming bands to ornament the forest trees of
Georgia. All this work was going on at the same time, there being a
sufficient number of men detailed for that purpose. Some piled the logs
and built the fire; some put the rails upon the fire; while others would
bend those that were sufficiently heated: so that, by the time the last
bit of road was torn up, that it was designed to destroy at a certain
place, the rails previously taken up were already destroyed.

The organization for supplying the army was very complete.  Each brigade
furnished a company to gather supplies of forage and provisions for the
command to which they belonged.  Strict injunctions were issued against
pillaging, or otherwise unnecessarily annoying the people; but
everything in shape of food for man and forage for beast was taken.  The
supplies were turned over to the brigade commissary and quartermaster,
and were issued by them to their respective commands precisely the same
as if they had been purchased.  The captures consisted largely of
cattle, sheep, poultry, some bacon, cornmeal, often molasses, and
occasionally coffee or other small rations.

The skill of these men, called by themselves and the army "<DW15>s," in
collecting their loads and getting back to their respective commands,
was marvellous.  When they started out in the morning, they were always
on foot; but scarcely one of them returned in the evening without being
mounted on a horse or mule. These would be turned in for the general use
of the army, and the next day these men would start out afoot and return
again in the evening mounted.

Many of the exploits of these men would fall under the head of romance;
indeed, I am afraid that in telling some of their experiences, the
romance got the better of the truth upon which the story was founded,
and that, in the way many of these anecdotes are told, very little of
the foundation is left.  I suspect that most of them consist chiefly of
the fiction added to make the stories better.  In one instance it was
reported that a few men of Sherman's army passed a house where they
discovered some chickens under the dwelling.  They immediately proceeded
to capture them, to add to the army's supplies.  The lady of the house,
who happened to be at home, made piteous appeals to have these spared,
saying they were a few she had put away to save by permission of other
parties who had preceded and who had taken all the others that she had.
The soldiers seemed moved at her appeal; but looking at the chickens
again they were tempted and one of them replied:  "The rebellion must be
suppressed if it takes the last chicken in the Confederacy," and
proceeded to appropriate the last one.

Another anecdote characteristic of these times has been told. The South,
prior to the rebellion, kept bloodhounds to pursue runaway slaves who
took refuge in the neighboring swamps, and also to hunt convicts.
Orders were issued to kill all these animals as they were met with.  On
one occasion a soldier picked up a poodle, the favorite pet of its
mistress, and was carrying it off to execution when the lady made a
strong appeal to him to spare it. The soldier replied, "Madam, our
orders are to kill every bloodhound."  "But this is not a bloodhound,"
said the lady.  "Well, madam, we cannot tell what it will grow into if
we leave it behind," said the soldier as he went off with it.

Notwithstanding these anecdotes, and the necessary hardship they would
seem to imply, I do not believe there was much unwarrantable pillaging
considering that we were in the enemy's territory and without any
supplies except such as the country afforded.

On the 23d Sherman, with the left wing, reached Milledgeville. The right
wing was not far off:  but proceeded on its way towards Savannah
destroying the road as it went.  The troops at Milledgeville remained
over a day to destroy factories, buildings used for military purposes,
etc., before resuming its march.

The governor, who had been almost defying Mr. Davis before this, now
fled precipitately, as did the legislature of the State and all the
State officers.  The governor, Sherman says, was careful to carry away
even his garden vegetables, while he left the archives of the State to
fall into our hands.  The only military force that was opposed to
Sherman's forward march was the Georgia militia, a division under the
command of General G. W. Smith, and a battalion under Harry Wayne.
Neither the quality of the forces nor their numbers was sufficient to
even <DW44> the progress of Sherman's army.

The people at the South became so frantic at this time at the successful
invasion of Georgia that they took the cadets from the military college
and added them to the ranks of the militia.  They even liberated the
State convicts under promise from them that they would serve in the
army.  I have but little doubt that the worst acts that were attributed
to Sherman's army were committed by these convicts, and by other
Southern people who ought to have been under sentence--such people as
could be found in every community, North and South--who took advantage
of their country being invaded to commit crime.  They were in but little
danger of detection, or of arrest even if detected.

The Southern papers in commenting upon Sherman's movements pictured him
as in the most deplorable condition:  stating that his men were
starving, that they were demoralized and wandering about almost without
object, aiming only to reach the sea coast and get under the protection
of our navy.  These papers got to the North and had more or less effect
upon the minds of the people, causing much distress to all loyal persons
particularly to those who had husbands, sons or brothers with Sherman.
Mr. Lincoln seeing these accounts, had a letter written asking me if I
could give him anything that he could say to the loyal people that would
comfort them.  I told him there was not the slightest occasion for
alarm; that with 60,000 such men as Sherman had with him, such a
commanding officer as he was could not be cut off in the open country.
He might possibly be prevented from reaching the point he had started
out to reach, but he would get through somewhere and would finally get
to his chosen destination:  and even if worst came to worst he could
return North.  I heard afterwards of Mr. Lincoln's saying, to those who
would inquire of him as to what he thought about the safety of Sherman's
army, that Sherman was all right:  "Grant says they are safe with such a
general, and that if they cannot get out where they want to, they can
crawl back by the hole they went in at."

While at Milledgeville the soldiers met at the State House, organized a
legislature, and proceeded to business precisely as if they were the
legislative body belonging to the State of Georgia. The debates were
exciting, and were upon the subject of the situation the South was in at
that time, particularly the State of Georgia.  They went so far as to
repeal, after a spirited and acrimonious debate, the ordinance of
secession.

The next day (24th) Sherman continued his march, going by the way of
Waynesboro and Louisville, Millen being the next objective and where the
two columns (the right and left wings) were to meet.  The left wing
moved to the left of the direct road, and the cavalry still farther off
so as to make it look as though Augusta was the point they were aiming
for.  They moved on all the roads they could find leading in that
direction.  The cavalry was sent to make a rapid march in hope of
surprising Millen before the Union prisoners could be carried away; but
they failed in this.

The distance from Milledgeville to Millen was about one hundred miles.
At this point Wheeler, who had been ordered from Tennessee, arrived and
swelled the numbers and efficiency of the troops confronting Sherman.
Hardee, a native of Georgia, also came, but brought no troops with him.
It was intended that he should raise as large an army as possible with
which to intercept Sherman's march.  He did succeed in raising some
troops, and with these and those under the command of Wheeler and Wayne,
had an army sufficient to cause some annoyance but no great detention.
Our cavalry and Wheeler's had a pretty severe engagement, in which
Wheeler was driven towards Augusta, thus giving the idea that Sherman
was probably making for that point.

Millen was reached on the 3d of December, and the march was resumed the
following day for Savannah, the final objective. Bragg had now been sent
to Augusta with some troops.  Wade Hampton was there also trying to
raise cavalry sufficient to destroy Sherman's army.  If he ever raised a
force it was too late to do the work expected of it.  Hardee's whole
force probably numbered less than ten thousand men.

From Millen to Savannah the country is sandy and poor, and affords but
very little forage other than rice straw, which was then growing.  This
answered a very good purpose as forage, and the rice grain was an
addition to the soldier's rations.  No further resistance worthy of note
was met with, until within a few miles of Savannah.  This place was
found to be intrenched and garrisoned.  Sherman proceeded at once on his
arrival to invest the place, and found that the enemy had placed
torpedoes in the ground, which were to explode when stepped on by man or
beast. One of these exploded under an officer's horse, blowing the
animal to pieces and tearing one of the legs of the officer so badly
that it had to be amputated.  Sherman at once ordered his prisoners to
the front, moving them in a compact body in advance, to either explode
the torpedoes or dig them up.  No further explosion took place.

On the 10th of December the siege of Savannah commenced. Sherman then,
before proceeding any further with operations for the capture of the
place, started with some troops to open communication with our fleet,
which he expected to find in the lower harbor or as near by as the forts
of the enemy would permit. In marching to the coast he encountered Fort
McAllister, which it was necessary to reduce before the supplies he
might find on shipboard could be made available.  Fort McAllister was
soon captured by an assault made by General Hazen's division.
Communication was then established with the fleet.  The capture of
Savannah then only occupied a few days, and involved no great loss of
life.  The garrison, however, as we shall see, was enabled to escape by
crossing the river and moving eastward.

When Sherman had opened communication with the fleet he found there a
steamer, which I had forwarded to him, carrying the accumulated mails
for his army, also supplies which I supposed he would be in need of.
General J. G. Foster, who commanded all the troops south of North
Carolina on the Atlantic sea-board, visited General Sherman before he
had opened communication with the fleet, with the view of ascertaining
what assistance he could be to him.  Foster returned immediately to his
own headquarters at Hilton Head, for the purpose of sending Sherman
siege guns, and also if he should find he had them to spare, supplies of
clothing, hard bread, etc., thinking that these articles might not be
found outside.  The mail on the steamer which I sent down, had been
collected by Colonel A. H. Markland of the Post Office Department, who
went in charge of it.  On this same vessel I sent an officer of my staff
(Lieutenant Dunn) with the following letter to General Sherman:


CITY POINT, VA., Dec. 3, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T.  SHERMAN, Commanding Armies near Savannah, Ga.

The little information gleaned from the Southern press, indicating no
great obstacle to your progress, I have directed your mails (which had
been previously collected at Baltimore by Colonel Markland, Special
Agent of the Post Office Department) to be sent as far as the blockading
squadron off Savannah, to be forwarded to you as soon as heard from on
the coast.

Not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abstain from
congratulating you and those under your command, until bottom has been
struck.  I have never had a fear, however, for the result.

Since you left Atlanta, no very great progress has been made here. The
enemy has been closely watched though, and prevented from detaching
against you.  I think not one man has gone from here, except some twelve
or fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry.  Bragg has gone from Wilmington.
I am trying to take advantage of his absence to get possession of that
place.  Owing to some preparations Admiral Porter and General Butler are
making to blow up Fort Fisher (which, while hoping for the best, I do
not believe a particle in), there is a delay in getting this expedition
off.  I hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that Bragg will
not have started back by that time.

In this letter I do not intend to give you anything like directions for
future action, but will state a general idea I have, and will get your
views after you have established yourself on the sea-coast. With your
veteran army I hope to get control of the only two through routes from
east to west possessed by the enemy before the fall of Atlanta.  The
condition will be filled by holding Savannah and Augusta, or by holding
any other port to the east of Savannah and Branchville.  If Wilmington
falls, a force from there can co-operate with you.

Thomas has got back into the defences of Nashville, with Hood close upon
him.  Decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads except the
main one leading to Chattanooga.  Part of this falling back was
undoubtedly necessary and all of it may have been.  It did not look so,
however, to me.  In my opinion, Thomas far outnumbers Hood in infantry.
In cavalry, Hood has the advantage in morale and numbers.  I hope yet
that Hood will be badly crippled if not destroyed.  The general news you
will learn from the papers better than I could give it.

After all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that there is
likely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, I will run down the
coast to see you.  If you desire it, I will ask Mrs. Sherman to go with
me.

Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General


I quote this letter because it gives the reader a full knowledge of the
events of that period.

Sherman now (the 15th) returned to Savannah to complete its investment
and insure the surrender of the garrison.  The country about Savannah is
low and marshy, and the city was well intrenched from the river above to
the river below; and assaults could not be made except along a
comparatively narrow causeway. For this reason assaults must have
resulted in serious destruction of life to the Union troops, with the
chance of failing altogether. Sherman therefore decided upon a complete
investment of the place.  When he believed this investment completed, he
summoned the garrison to surrender.  General Hardee, who was in command,
replied in substance that the condition of affairs was not such as
Sherman had described.  He said he was in full communication with his
department and was receiving supplies constantly.

Hardee, however, was cut off entirely from all communication with the
west side of the river, and by the river itself to the north and south.
On the South Carolina side the country was all rice fields, through
which it would have been impossible to bring supplies so that Hardee had
no possible communication with the outside world except by a dilapidated
plank road starting from the west bank of the river.  Sherman, receiving
this reply, proceeded in person to a point on the coast, where General
Foster had troops stationed under General Hatch, for the purpose of
making arrangements with the latter officer to go through by one of the
numerous channels running inland along that part of the coast of South
Carolina, to the plank road which General Hardee still possessed, and
thus to cut him off from the last means he had of getting supplies, if
not of communication.

While arranging for this movement, and before the attempt to execute the
plan had been commenced, Sherman received information through one of his
staff officers that the enemy had evacuated Savannah the night before.
This was the night of the 21st of December.  Before evacuating the place
Hardee had blown up the navy yard.  Some iron-clads had been destroyed,
as well as other property that might have been valuable to us; but he
left an immense amount of stores untouched, consisting of cotton,
railroad cars, workshops, numerous pieces of artillery, and several
thousand stands of small arms.

A little incident occurred, soon after the fall of Savannah, which
Sherman relates in his Memoirs, and which is worthy of repetition.
Savannah was one of the points where blockade runners entered. Shortly
after the city fell into our possession, a blockade runner came sailing
up serenely, not doubting but the Confederates were still in possession.
It was not molested, and the captain did not find out his mistake until
he had tied up and gone to the Custom House, where he found a new
occupant of the building, and made a less profitable disposition of his
vessel and cargo than he had expected.

As there was some discussion as to the authorship of Sherman's march to
the sea, by critics of his book when it appeared before the public, I
want to state here that no question upon that subject was ever raised
between General Sherman and myself. Circumstances made the plan on which
Sherman expected to act impracticable, as as commander of the forces he
necessarily had to devise a new on which would give more promise of
success: consequently he recommended the destruction of the railroad
back to Chattanooga, and that he should be authorized then to move, as
he did, from Atlanta forward.  His suggestions were finally approved,
although they did not immediately find favor in Washington.  Even when
it came to the time of starting, the greatest apprehension, as to the
propriety of the campaign he was about commence, filled the mind of the
President, induced no doubt by his advisers.  This went so far as to
move the President to ask me to suspend Sherman's march for a day or two
until I could think the matter over.  My recollection is, though I find
no record to show it, that out of deference to the President's wish I
did send a dispatch to Sherman asking him to wait a day or two, or else
the connections between us were already cut so that I could not do so.
However this may be, the question of who devised the plan of march from
Atlanta to Savannah is easily answered:  it was clearly Sherman, and to
him also belongs the credit of its brilliant execution.  It was hardly
possible that any one else than those on the spot could have devised a
new plan of campaign to supersede one that did not promise success.
(*40)

I was in favor of Sherman's plan from the time it was first submitted to
me.  My chief of staff, however, was very bitterly opposed to it and, as
I learned subsequently, finding that he could not move me, he appealed
to the authorities at Washington to stop it.



CHAPTER LX.

THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN--THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.

As we have seen, Hood succeeded in crossing the Tennessee River between
Muscle Shoals and the lower shoals at the end of October, 1864.  Thomas
sent Schofield with the 4th and 23d corps, together with three brigades
of Wilson's cavalry to Pulaski to watch him.  On the 17th of November
Hood started and moved in such a manner as to avoid Schofield, thereby
turning his position.  Hood had with him three infantry corps, commanded
respectively by Stephen D. Lee, Stewart and Cheatham.  These, with his
cavalry, numbered about forty-five thousand men. Schofield had, of all
arms, about thirty thousand.  Thomas's orders were, therefore, for
Schofield to watch the movements of the enemy, but not to fight a battle
if he could avoid it; but to fall back in case of an advance on
Nashville, and to fight the enemy, as he fell back, so as to <DW44> the
enemy's movements until he could be reinforced by Thomas himself.  As
soon as Schofield saw this movement of Hood's, he sent his trains to the
rear, but did not fall back himself until the 21st, and then only to
Columbia.  At Columbia there was a slight skirmish but no battle.  From
this place Schofield then retreated to Franklin.  He had sent his wagons
in advance, and Stanley had gone with them with two divisions to protect
them.  Cheatham's corps of Hood's army pursued the wagon train and went
into camp at Spring Hill, for the night of the 29th.

Schofield retreating from Columbia on the 29th, passed Spring Hill,
where Cheatham was bivouacked, during the night without molestation,
though within half a mile of where the Confederates were encamped.  On
the morning of the 30th he had arrived at Franklin.

Hood followed closely and reached Franklin in time to make an attack the
same day.  The fight was very desperate and sanguinary.  The Confederate
generals led their men in the repeated charges, and the loss among them
was of unusual proportions.  This fighting continued with great severity
until long after the night closed in, when the Confederates drew off.
General Stanley, who commanded two divisions of the Union troops, and
whose troops bore the brunt of the battle, was wounded in the fight, but
maintained his position.

The enemy's loss at Franklin, according to Thomas's report, was 1,750
buried upon the field by our troops, 3,800 in the hospital, and 702
prisoners besides.  Schofield's loss, as officially reported, was 189
killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104 captured and missing.

Thomas made no effort to reinforce Schofield at Franklin, as it seemed
to me at the time he should have done, and fight out the battle there.
He simply ordered Schofield to continue his retreat to Nashville, which
the latter did during that night and the next day.

Thomas, in the meantime, was making his preparations to receive Hood.
The road to Chattanooga was still well guarded with strong garrisons at
Murfreesboro, Stevenson, Bridgeport and Chattanooga.  Thomas had
previously given up Decatur and had been reinforced by A. J. Smith's two
divisions just returned from Missouri.  He also had Steedman's division
and R. S. Granger's, which he had drawn from the front.  His
quartermaster's men, about ten thousand in number, had been organized
and armed under the command of the chief quartermaster, General J. L.
Donaldson, and placed in the fortifications under the general
supervision of General Z. B. Tower, of the United States Engineers.

Hood was allowed to move upon Nashville, and to invest that place almost
without interference.  Thomas was strongly fortified in his position, so
that he would have been safe against the attack of Hood.  He had troops
enough even to annihilate him in the open field.  To me his delay was
unaccountable--sitting there and permitting himself to be invested, so
that, in the end, to raise the siege he would have to fight the enemy
strongly posted behind fortifications.  It is true the weather was very
bad.  The rain was falling and freezing as it fell, so that the ground
was covered with a sheet of ice, that made it very difficult to move.
But I was afraid that the enemy would find means of moving, elude Thomas
and manage to get north of the Cumberland River.  If he did this, I
apprehended most serious results from the campaign in the North, and was
afraid we might even have to send troops from the East to head him off
if he got there, General Thomas's movements being always so deliberate
and so slow, though effective in defence.

I consequently urged Thomas in frequent dispatches sent from City
Point(*41) to make the attack at once.  The country was alarmed, the
administration was alarmed, and I was alarmed lest the very thing would
take place which I have just described that is, Hood would get north.
It was all without avail further than to elicit dispatches from Thomas
saying that he was getting ready to move as soon as he could, that he
was making preparations, etc.  At last I had to say to General Thomas
that I should be obliged to remove him unless he acted promptly.  He
replied that he was very sorry, but he would move as soon as he could.

General Logan happening to visit City Point about that time, and knowing
him as a prompt, gallant and efficient officer, I gave him an order to
proceed to Nashville to relieve Thomas.  I directed him, however, not to
deliver the order or publish it until he reached there, and if Thomas
had moved, then not to deliver it at all, but communicate with me by
telegraph.  After Logan started, in thinking over the situation, I
became restless, and concluded to go myself.  I went as far as
Washington City, when a dispatch was received from General Thomas
announcing his readiness at last to move, and designating the time of
his movement.  I concluded to wait until that time. He did move, and was
successful from the start.  This was on the 15th of December.  General
Logan was at Louisville at the time this movement was made, and
telegraphed the fact to Washington, and proceeded no farther himself.

The battle during the 15th was severe, but favorable to the Union
troops, and continued until night closed in upon the combat.  The next
day the battle was renewed.  After a successful assault upon Hood's men
in their intrenchments the enemy fled in disorder, routed and broken,
leaving their dead, their artillery and small arms in great numbers on
the field, besides the wounded that were captured.  Our cavalry had
fought on foot as infantry, and had not their horses with them; so that
they were not ready to join in the pursuit the moment the enemy
retreated.  They sent back, however, for their horses, and endeavored to
get to Franklin ahead of Hood's broken army by the Granny White Road,
but too much time was consumed in getting started.  They had got but a
few miles beyond the scene of the battle when they found the enemy's
cavalry dismounted and behind intrenchments covering the road on which
they were advancing. Here another battle ensued, our men dismounting and
fighting on foot, in which the Confederates were again routed and driven
in great disorder.  Our cavalry then went into bivouac, and renewed the
pursuit on the following morning.  They were too late.  The enemy
already had possession of Franklin, and was beyond them. It now became a
chase in which the Confederates had the lead.

Our troops continued the pursuit to within a few miles of Columbia,
where they found the rebels had destroyed the railroad bridge as well as
all other bridges over Duck River.  The heavy rains of a few days before
had swelled the stream into a mad torrent, impassable except on bridges.
Unfortunately, either through a mistake in the wording of the order or
otherwise, the pontoon bridge which was to have been sent by rail out to
Franklin, to be taken thence with the pursuing column, had gone toward
Chattanooga.  There was, consequently, a delay of some four days in
building bridges out of the remains of the old railroad bridge.  Of
course Hood got such a start in this time that farther pursuit was
useless, although it was continued for some distance, but without coming
upon him again.



CHAPTER LXI.

EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER--ATTACK ON THE FORT--FAILURE OF THE
EXPEDITION--SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FORT--CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER.

Up to January, 1865, the enemy occupied Fort Fisher, at the mouth of
Cape Fear River and below the City of Wilmington.  This port was of
immense importance to the Confederates, because it formed their
principal inlet for blockade runners by means of which they brought in
from abroad such supplies and munitions of war as they could not produce
at home.  It was equally important to us to get possession of it, not
only because it was desirable to cut off their supplies so as to insure
a speedy termination of the war, but also because foreign governments,
particularly the British Government, were constantly threatening that
unless ours could maintain the blockade of that coast they should cease
to recognize any blockade.  For these reasons I determined, with the
concurrence of the Navy Department, in December, to send an expedition
against Fort Fisher for the purpose of capturing it.

To show the difficulty experienced in maintaining the blockade, I will
mention a circumstance that took place at Fort Fisher after its fall.
Two English blockade runners came in at night.  Their commanders, not
supposing the fort had fallen, worked their way through all our fleet
and got into the river unobserved.  They then signalled the fort,
announcing their arrival.  There was a <DW52> man in the fort who had
been there before and who understood these signals.  He informed General
Terry what reply he should make to have them come in, and Terry did as
he advised.  The vessels came in, their officers entirely unconscious
that they were falling into the hands of the Union forces.  Even after
they were brought in to the fort they were entertained in conversation
for some little time before suspecting that the Union troops were
occupying the fort.  They were finally informed that their vessels and
cargoes were prizes.

I selected General Weitzel, of the Army of the James, to go with the
expedition, but gave instructions through General Butler.  He commanded
the department within whose geographical limits Fort Fisher was
situated, as well as Beaufort and other points on that coast held by our
troops; he was, therefore, entitled to the right of fitting out the
expedition against Fort Fisher.

General Butler conceived the idea that if a steamer loaded heavily with
powder could be run up to near the shore under the fort and exploded, it
would create great havoc and make the capture an easy matter.  Admiral
Porter, who was to command the naval squadron, seemed to fall in with
the idea, and it was not disapproved of in Washington; the navy was
therefore given the task of preparing the steamer for this purpose.  I
had no confidence in the success of the scheme, and so expressed myself;
but as no serious harm could come of the experiment, and the authorities
at Washington seemed desirous to have it tried, I permitted it.  The
steamer was sent to Beaufort, North Carolina, and was there loaded with
powder and prepared for the part she was to play in the reduction of
Fort Fisher.

General Butler chose to go in command of the expedition himself, and was
all ready to sail by the 9th of December (1864).  Very heavy storms
prevailed, however, at that time along that part of the sea-coast, and
prevented him from getting off until the 13th or 14th.  His advance
arrived off Fort Fisher on the 15th.  The naval force had been already
assembled, or was assembling, but they were obliged to run into Beaufort
for munitions, coal, etc.; then, too, the powder-boat was not yet fully
prepared. The fleet was ready to proceed on the 18th; but Butler, who
had remained outside from the 15th up to that time, now found himself
out of coal, fresh water, etc., and had to put into Beaufort to
replenish.  Another storm overtook him, and several days more were lost
before the army and navy were both ready at the same time to co-operate.

On the night of the 23d the powder-boat was towed in by a gunboat as
near to the fort as it was safe to run.  She was then propelled by her
own machinery to within about five hundred yards of the shore.  There
the clockwork, which was to explode her within a certain length of time,
was set and she was abandoned.  Everybody left, and even the vessels put
out to sea to prevent the effect of the explosion upon them.  At two
o'clock in the morning the explosion took place--and produced no more
effect on the fort, or anything else on land, than the bursting of a
boiler anywhere on the Atlantic Ocean would have done.  Indeed when the
troops in Fort Fisher heard the explosion they supposed it was the
bursting of a boiler in one of the Yankee gunboats.

Fort Fisher was situated upon a low, flat peninsula north of Cape Fear
River.  The soil is sandy.  Back a little the peninsula is very heavily
wooded, and covered with fresh-water swamps.  The fort ran across this
peninsula, about five hundred yards in width, and extended along the sea
coast about thirteen hundred yards.  The fort had an armament of 21 guns
and 3 mortars on the land side, and 24 guns on the sea front.  At that
time it was only garrisoned by four companies of infantry, one light
battery and the gunners at the heavy guns less than seven hundred men
with a reserve of less than a thousand men five miles up the peninsula.
General Whiting of the Confederate army was in command, and General
Bragg was in command of the force at Wilmington.  Both commenced calling
for reinforcements the moment they saw our troops landing.  The Governor
of North Carolina called for everybody who could stand behind a parapet
and shoot a gun, to join them.  In this way they got two or three
hundred additional men into Fort Fisher; and Hoke's division, five or
six thousand strong, was sent down from Richmond.  A few of these troops
arrived the very day that Butler was ready to advance.

On the 24th the fleet formed for an attack in arcs of concentric
circles, their heavy iron-clads going in very close range, being nearest
the shore, and leaving intervals or spaces so that the outer vessels
could fire between them.  Porter was thus enabled to throw one hundred
and fifteen shells per minute.  The damage done to the fort by these
shells was very slight, only two or three cannon being disabled in the
fort.  But the firing silenced all the guns by making it too hot for the
men to maintain their positions about them and compelling them to seek
shelter in the bomb-proofs.

On the next day part of Butler's troops under General Adelbert Ames
effected a landing out of range of the fort without difficulty.  This
was accomplished under the protection of gunboats sent for the purpose,
and under cover of a renewed attack upon the fort by the fleet.  They
formed a line across the peninsula and advanced, part going north and
part toward the fort, covering themselves as they did so.  Curtis pushed
forward and came near to Fort Fisher, capturing the small garrison at
what was called the Flag Pond Battery.  Weitzel accompanied him to
within a half a mile of the works.  Here he saw that the fort had not
been injured, and so reported to Butler, advising against an assault.
Ames, who had gone north in his advance, captured 228 of the reserves.
These prisoners reported to Butler that sixteen hundred of Hoke's
division of six thousand from Richmond had already arrived and the rest
would soon be in his rear.

Upon these reports Butler determined to withdraw his troops from the
peninsula and return to the fleet.  At that time there had not been a
man on our side injured except by one of the shells from the fleet.
Curtis had got within a few yards of the works.  Some of his men had
snatched a flag from the parapet of the fort, and others had taken a
horse from the inside of the stockade.  At night Butler informed Porter
of his withdrawal, giving the reasons above stated, and announced his
purpose as soon as his men could embark to start for Hampton Roads.
Porter represented to him that he had sent to Beaufort for more
ammunition.  He could fire much faster than he had been doing, and would
keep the enemy from showing himself until our men were within twenty
yards of the fort, and he begged that Butler would leave some brave
fellows like those who had snatched the flag from the parapet and taken
the horse from the fort.

Butler was unchangeable.  He got all his troops aboard, except Curtis's
brigade, and started back.  In doing this, Butler made a fearful
mistake.  My instructions to him, or to the officer who went in command
of the expedition, were explicit in the statement that to effect a
landing would be of itself a great victory, and if one should be
effected, the foothold must not be relinquished; on the contrary, a
regular siege of the fort must be commenced and, to guard against
interference by reason of storms, supplies of provisions must be laid in
as soon as they could be got on shore.  But General Butler seems to have
lost sight of this part of his instructions, and was back at Fort Monroe
on the 28th.

I telegraphed to the President as follows:


CITY POINT, VA., Dec. 28, 1864.--8.30 P.M.

The Wilmington expedition has proven a gross and culpable failure.  Many
of the troops are back here.  Delays and free talk of the object of the
expedition enabled the enemy to move troops to Wilmington to defeat it.
After the expedition sailed from Fort Monroe, three days of fine weather
were squandered, during which the enemy was without a force to protect
himself. Who is to blame will, I hope, be known.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


Porter sent dispatches to the Navy Department in which he complained
bitterly of having been abandoned by the army just when the fort was
nearly in our possession, and begged that our troops might be sent back
again to cooperate, but with a different commander.  As soon as I heard
this I sent a messenger to Porter with a letter asking him to hold on.
I assured him that I fully sympathized with him in his disappointment,
and that I would send the same troops back with a different commander,
with some reinforcements to offset those which the enemy had received.
I told him it would take some little time to get transportation for the
additional troops; but as soon as it could be had the men should be on
their way to him, and there would be no delay on my part.  I selected A.
H. Terry to command.

It was the 6th of January before the transports could be got ready and
the troops aboard.  They sailed from Fortress Monroe on that day.  The
object and destination of the second expedition were at the time kept a
secret to all except a few in the Navy Department and in the army to
whom it was necessary to impart the information.  General Terry had not
the slightest idea of where he was going or what he was to do.  He
simply knew that he was going to sea and that he had his orders with
him, which were to be opened when out at sea.

He was instructed to communicate freely with Porter and have entire
harmony between army and navy, because the work before them would
require the best efforts of both arms of service. They arrived off
Beaufort on the 8th. A heavy storm, however, prevented a landing at
Fort Fisher until the 13th.  The navy prepared itself for attack about
as before, and the same time assisted the army in landing, this time
five miles away.  Only iron-clads fired at first; the object being to
draw the fire of the enemy's guns so as to ascertain their positions.
This object being accomplished, they then let in their shots thick and
fast.  Very soon the guns were all silenced, and the fort showed evident
signs of being much injured.

Terry deployed his men across the peninsula as had been done before, and
at two o'clock on the following morning was up within two miles of the
fort with a respectable _abatis_ in front of his line. His artillery was
all landed on that day, the 14th.  Again Curtis's brigade of Ame's
division had the lead. By noon they had carried an unfinished work less
than a half mile from the fort, and turned it so as to face the other
way.

Terry now saw Porter and arranged for an assault on the following day.
The two commanders arranged their signals so that they could communicate
with each other from time to time as they might have occasion.  At day
light the fleet commenced its firing.  The time agreed upon for the
assault was the middle of the afternoon, and Ames who commanded the
assaulting column moved at 3.30.  Porter landed a force of sailors and
marines to move against the sea-front in co-operation with Ames's
assault.  They were under Commander Breese of the navy.  These sailors
and marines had worked their way up to within a couple of hundred yards
of the fort before the assault.  The signal was given and the assault
was made; but the poor sailors and marines were repulsed and very badly
handled by the enemy, losing 280 killed and wounded out of their number.

Curtis's brigade charged successfully though met by a heavy fire, some
of the men having to wade through the swamp up to their waists to reach
the fort.  Many were wounded, of course, and some killed; but they soon
reached the palisades.  These they cut away, and pushed on through.  The
other troops then came up, Pennypacker's following Curtis, and Bell, who
commanded the 3d brigade of Ames's division, following Pennypacker.  But
the fort was not yet captured though the parapet was gained.

The works were very extensive.  The large parapet around the work would
have been but very little protection to those inside except when they
were close up under it.  Traverses had, therefore, been run until really
the work was a succession of small forts enclosed by a large one.  The
rebels made a desperate effort to hold the fort, and had to be driven
from these traverses one by one.  The fight continued till long after
night.  Our troops gained first one traverse and then another, and by 10
o'clock at night the place was carried.  During this engagement the
sailors, who had been repulsed in their assault on the bastion, rendered
the best service they could by reinforcing Terry's northern line--thus
enabling him to send a detachment to the assistance of Ames.  The fleet
kept up a continuous fire upon that part of the fort which was still
occupied by the enemy.  By means of signals they could be informed where
to direct their shots.

During the succeeding nights the enemy blew up Fort Caswell on the
opposite side of Cape Fear River, and abandoned two extensive works on
Smith's Island in the river.

Our captures in all amounted to 169 guns, besides small-arms, with full
supplies of ammunition, and 2,083 prisoners.  In addition to these,
there were about 700 dead and wounded left there.  We had lost 110
killed and 536 wounded.

In this assault on Fort Fisher, Bell, one of the brigade commanders, was
killed, and two, Curtis and Pennypacker, were badly wounded.

Secretary Stanton, who was on his way back from Savannah, arrived off
Fort Fisher soon after it fell.  When he heard the good news he promoted
all the officers of any considerable rank for their conspicuous
gallantry.  Terry had been nominated for major-general, but had not been
confirmed.  This confirmed him; and soon after I recommended him for a
brigadier-generalcy in the regular army, and it was given to him for
this victory.



CHAPTER LXII.

SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH--SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG--CANBY ORDERED TO
MOVE AGAINST MOBILE--MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND THOMAS--CAPTURE OF
COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA--SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS.

When news of Sherman being in possession of Savannah reached the North,
distinguished statesmen and visitors began to pour in to see him.  Among
others who went was the Secretary of War, who seemed much pleased at the
result of his campaign.  Mr. Draper, the collector of customs of New
York, who was with Mr. Stanton's party, was put in charge of the public
property that had been abandoned and captured.  Savannah was then turned
over to General Foster's command to hold, so that Sherman might have his
own entire army free to operate as might be decided upon in the future.
I sent the chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac (General Barnard)
with letters to General Sherman.  He remained some time with the
general, and when he returned brought back letters, one of which
contained suggestions from Sherman as to what ought to be done in
co-operation with him, when he should have started upon his march
northward.

I must not neglect to state here the fact that I had no idea originally
of having Sherman march from Savannah to Richmond, or even to North
Carolina.  The season was bad, the roads impassable for anything except
such an army as he had, and I should not have thought of ordering such a
move.  I had, therefore, made preparations to collect transports to
carry Sherman and his army around to the James River by water, and so
informed him.  On receiving this letter he went to work immediately to
prepare for the move, but seeing that it would require a long time to
collect the transports, he suggested the idea then of marching up north
through the Carolinas.  I was only too happy to approve this; for if
successful, it promised every advantage.  His march through Georgia had
thoroughly destroyed all lines of transportation in that State, and had
completely cut the enemy off from all sources of supply to the west of
it.  If North and South Carolina were rendered helpless so far as
capacity for feeding Lee's army was concerned, the Confederate garrison
at Richmond would be reduced in territory, from which to draw supplies,
to very narrow limits in the State of Virginia; and, although that
section of the country was fertile, it was already well exhausted of
both forage and food.  I approved Sherman's suggestion therefore at
once.

The work of preparation was tedious, because supplies, to load the
wagons for the march, had to be brought from a long distance.  Sherman
would now have to march through a country furnishing fewer provisions
than that he had previously been operating in during his march to the
sea.  Besides, he was confronting, or marching toward, a force of the
enemy vastly superior to any his troops had encountered on their
previous march; and the territory through which he had to pass had now
become of such vast importance to the very existence of the Confederate
army, that the most desperate efforts were to be expected in order to
save it.

Sherman, therefore, while collecting the necessary supplies to start
with, made arrangements with Admiral Dahlgren, who commanded that part
of the navy on the South Carolina and Georgia coast, and General Foster,
commanding the troops, to take positions, and hold a few points on the
sea coast, which he (Sherman) designated, in the neighborhood of
Charleston.

This provision was made to enable him to fall back upon the sea coast,
in case he should encounter a force sufficient to stop his onward
progress.  He also wrote me a letter, making suggestions as to what he
would like to have done in support of his movement farther north.  This
letter was brought to City Point by General Barnard at a time when I
happened to be going to Washington City, where I arrived on the 21st of
January.  I cannot tell the provision I had already made to co-operate
with Sherman, in anticipation of his expected movement, better than by
giving my reply to this letter.


HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C., Jan. 21,
1865.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Mill <DW37>. of the Mississippi.

GENERAL:--Your letters brought by General Barnard were received at City
Point, and read with interest.  Not having them with me, however, I
cannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you on all points of
recommendation.  As I arrived here at one P.M., and must leave at six
P.M., having in the meantime spent over three hours with the Secretary
and General Halleck, I must be brief.  Before your last request to have
Thomas make a campaign into the heart of Alabama, I had ordered
Schofield to Annapolis, Md., with his corps.  The advance (six thousand)
will reach the seaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly
as railroad transportation can be procured from Cincinnati.  The corps
numbers over twenty-one thousand men.  I was induced to do this because
I did not believe Thomas could possibly be got off before spring.  His
pursuit of Hood indicated a sluggishness that satisfied me that he would
never do to conduct one of your campaigns.  The command of the advance
of the pursuit was left to subordinates, whilst Thomas followed far
behind.  When Hood had crossed the Tennessee, and those in pursuit had
reached it, Thomas had not much more than half crossed the State, from
whence he returned to Nashville to take steamer for Eastport. He is
possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness and honesty, but he is
not good on a pursuit.  He also reported his troops fagged, and that it
was necessary to equip up.  This report and a determination to give the
enemy no rest determined me to use his surplus troops elsewhere.

Thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to Selma
under an energetic leader.  He has been telegraphed to, to know whether
he could go, and, if so, which of the several routes he would select.
No reply is yet received.  Canby has been ordered to act offensively
from the sea-coast to the interior, towards Montgomery and Selma.
Thomas's forces will move from the north at an early day, or some of his
troops will be sent to Canby.  Without further reinforcements Canby will
have a moving column of twenty thousand men.

Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured.  We have a force there of
eight thousand effective.  At New Bern about half the number.  It is
rumored, through deserters, that Wilmington also has fallen.  I am
inclined to believe the rumor, because on the 17th we knew the enemy
were blowing up their works about Fort Caswell, and that on the 18th
Terry moved on Wilmington.

If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there.  If not, he will be
sent to New Bern.  In either event, all the surplus forces at the two
points will move to the interior toward Goldsboro' in co-operation with
your movements.  From either point, railroad communications can be run
out, there being here abundance of rolling-stock suited to the gauge of
those roads.

There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee's army south.
Of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, if Wilmington is
not held by the enemy, casualties at Fort Fisher having overtaken about
two thousand.

All these troops are subject to your orders as you come in communication
with them.  They will be so instructed.  From about Richmond I will
watch Lee closely, and if he detaches much more, or attempts to
evacuate, will pitch in.  In the meantime, should you be brought to a
halt anywhere, I can send two corps of thirty thousand effective men to
your support, from the troops about Richmond.

To resume:  Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the Gulf.
A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it doubtful.  A force of
twenty-eight or thirty thousand will co-operate with you from New Bern
or Wilmington, or both.  You can call for reinforcements.

This will be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who will return
with any message you may have for me.  If there is anything I can do for
you in the way of having supplies on ship-board, at any point on the
sea-coast, ready for you, let me know it.

Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


I had written on the 18th of January to General Sherman, giving him the
news of the battle of Nashville.  He was much pleased at the result,
although, like myself, he had been very much disappointed at Thomas for
permitting Hood to cross the Tennessee River and nearly the whole State
of Tennessee, and come to Nashville to be attacked there.  He, however,
as I had done, sent Thomas a warm congratulatory letter.

On the 10th of January, 1865, the resolutions of thanks to Sherman and
his army passed by Congress were approved.

Sherman, after the capture, at once had the debris cleared up,
commencing the work by removing the piling and torpedoes from the river,
and taking up all obstructions.  He had then intrenched the city, so
that it could be held by a small garrison.  By the middle of January all
his work was done, except the accumulation of supplies to commence his
movement with.

He proposed to move in two columns, one from Savannah, going along by
the river of the same name, and the other by roads farther east,
threatening Charleston.  He commenced the advance by moving his right
wing to Beaufort, South Carolina, then to Pocotaligo by water.  This
column, in moving north, threatened Charleston, and, indeed, it was not
determined at first that they would have a force visit Charleston.
South Carolina had done so much to prepare the public mind of the South
for secession, and had been so active in precipitating the decision of
the question before the South was fully prepared to meet it, that there
was, at that time, a feeling throughout the North and also largely
entertained by people of the South, that the State of South Carolina,
and Charleston, the hot-bed of secession in particular, ought to have a
heavy hand laid upon them.  In fact, nothing but the decisive results
that followed, deterred the radical portion of the people from
condemning the movement, because Charleston had been left out.  To pass
into the interior would, however, be to insure the evacuation of the
city, and its possession by the navy and Foster's troops.  It is so
situated between two formidable rivers that a small garrison could have
held it against all odds as long as their supplies would hold out.
Sherman therefore passed it by.

By the first of February all preparations were completed for the final
march, Columbia, South Carolina, being the first objective;
Fayetteville, North Carolina, the second; and Goldsboro, or
neighborhood, the final one, unless something further should be
determined upon.  The right wing went from Pocotaligo, and the left from
about Hardeeville on the Savannah River, both columns taking a pretty
direct route for Columbia.  The cavalry, however, were to threaten
Charleston on the right, and Augusta on the left.

On the 15th of January Fort Fisher had fallen, news of which Sherman had
received before starting out on his march.  We already had New Bern and
had soon Wilmington, whose fall followed that of Fort Fisher; as did
other points on the sea coast, where the National troops were now in
readiness to co-operate with Sherman's advance when he had passed
Fayetteville.

On the 18th of January I ordered Canby, in command at New Orleans, to
move against Mobile, Montgomery and Selma, Alabama, for the purpose of
destroying roads, machine shops, etc.  On the 8th of February I ordered
Sheridan, who was in the Valley of Virginia, to push forward as soon as
the weather would permit and strike the canal west of Richmond at or
about Lynchburg; and on the 20th I made the order to go to Lynchburg as
soon as the roads would permit, saying:  "As soon as it is possible to
travel, I think you will have no difficulty about reaching Lynchburg
with a cavalry force alone.  From there you could destroy the railroad
and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the
rebellion. * * * This additional raid, with one starting from East
Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering about four or five thousand cavalry;
one from Eastport, Mississippi, ten thousand cavalry; Canby, from Mobile
Bay, with about eighteen thousand mixed troops--these three latter
pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma and Montgomery; and Sherman with a large
army eating out the vitals of South Carolina--is all that will be wanted
to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon.  I would advise you to
overcome great obstacles to accomplish this.  Charleston was evacuated
on Tuesday last."

On the 27th of February, more than a month after Canby had received his
orders, I again wrote to him, saying that I was extremely anxious to
hear of his being in Alabama.  I notified him, also, that I had sent
Grierson to take command of his cavalry, he being a very efficient
officer.  I further suggested that Forrest was probably in Mississippi,
and if he was there, he would find him an officer of great courage and
capacity whom it would be difficult to get by.  I still further informed
him that Thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force into
Mississippi on the 20th of February, or as soon as possible thereafter.
This force did not get off however.

All these movements were designed to be in support of Sherman's march,
the object being to keep the Confederate troops in the West from leaving
there.  But neither Canby nor Thomas could be got off in time.  I had
some time before depleted Thomas's army to reinforce Canby, for the
reason that Thomas had failed to start an expedition which he had been
ordered to send out, and to have the troops where they might do
something.  Canby seemed to be equally deliberate in all of his
movements.  I ordered him to go in person; but he prepared to send a
detachment under another officer.  General Granger had got down to New
Orleans, in some way or other, and I wrote Canby that he must not put
him in command of troops.  In spite of this he asked the War Department
to assign Granger to the command of a corps.

Almost in despair of having adequate service rendered to the cause in
that quarter, I said to Canby:  "I am in receipt of a dispatch * * *
informing me that you have made requisitions for a construction corps
and material to build seventy miles of railroad.  I have directed that
none be sent.  Thomas's army has been depleted to send a force to you
that they might be where they could act in winter, and at least detain
the force the enemy had in the West.  If there had been any idea of
repairing railroads, it could have been done much better from the North,
where we already had the troops.  I expected your movements to be
co-operative with Sherman's last.  This has now entirely failed.  I
wrote to you long ago, urging you to push promptly and to live upon the
country, and destroy railroads, machine shops, etc., not to build them.
Take Mobile and hold it, and push your forces to the interior--to
Montgomery and to Selma. Destroy railroads, rolling stock, and
everything useful for carrying on war, and, when you have done this,
take such positions as can be supplied by water.  By this means alone
you can occupy positions from which the enemy's roads in the interior
can be kept broken."

Most of these expeditions got off finally, but too late to render any
service in the direction for which they were designed.

The enemy, ready to intercept his advance, consisted of Hardee's troops
and Wheeler's cavalry, perhaps less than fifteen thousand men in all;
but frantic efforts were being made in Richmond, as I was sure would be
the case, to <DW44> Sherman's movements. Everything possible was being
done to raise troops in the South.  Lee dispatched against Sherman the
troops which had been sent to relieve Fort Fisher, which, including
those of the other defences of the harbor and its neighborhood,
amounted, after deducting the two thousand killed, wounded and captured,
to fourteen thousand men.  After Thomas's victory at Nashville what
remained, of Hood's army were gathered together and forwarded as rapidly
as possible to the east to co-operate with these forces; and, finally,
General Joseph E. Johnston, one of the ablest commanders of the South
though not in favor with the administration (or at least with Mr.
Davis), was put in command of all the troops in North and South
Carolina.

Schofield arrived at Annapolis in the latter part of January, but before
sending his troops to North Carolina I went with him down the coast to
see the situation of affairs, as I could give fuller directions after
being on the ground than I could very well have given without.  We soon
returned, and the troops were sent by sea to Cape Fear River.  Both New
Bern and Wilmington are connected with Raleigh by railroads which unite
at Goldsboro.  Schofield was to land troops at Smithville, near the
mouth of the Cape Fear River on the west side, and move up to secure the
Wilmington and Charlotteville Railroad.  This column took their pontoon
bridges with them, to enable them to cross over to the island south of
the city of Wilmington.  A large body was sent by the north side to
co-operate with them.  They succeeded in taking the city on the 22d of
February.  I took the precaution to provide for Sherman's army, in case
he should be forced to turn in toward the sea coast before reaching
North Carolina, by forwarding supplies to every place where he was
liable to have to make such a deflection from his projected march.  I
also sent railroad rolling stock, of which we had a great abundance, now
that we were not operating the roads in Virginia.  The gauge of the
North Carolina railroads being the same as the Virginia railroads had
been altered too; these cars and locomotives were ready for use there
without any change.

On the 31st of January I countermanded the orders given to Thomas to
move south to Alabama and Georgia.  (I had previously reduced his force
by sending a portion of it to Terry.)  I directed in lieu of this
movement, that he should send Stoneman through East Tennessee, and push
him well down toward Columbia, South Carolina, in support of Sherman.
Thomas did not get Stoneman off in time, but, on the contrary, when I
had supposed he was on his march in support of Sherman I heard of his
being in Louisville, Kentucky.  I immediately changed the order, and
directed Thomas to send him toward Lynchburg.  Finally, however, on the
12th of March, he did push down through the north-western end of South
Carolina, creating some consternation.  I also ordered Thomas to send
the 4th corps (Stanley's) to Bull Gap and to destroy no more roads east
of that.  I also directed him to concentrate supplies at Knoxville, with
a view to a probable movement of his army through that way toward
Lynchburg.

Goldsboro is four hundred and twenty-five miles from Savannah. Sherman's
march was without much incident until he entered Columbia, on the 17th
of February.  He was detained in his progress by having to repair and
corduroy the roads, and rebuild the bridges.  There was constant
skirmishing and fighting between the cavalry of the two armies, but this
did not <DW44> the advance of the infantry.  Four days, also, were lost
in making complete the destruction of the most important railroads south
of Columbia; there was also some delay caused by the high water, and the
destruction of the bridges on the line of the road.  A formidable river
had to be crossed near Columbia, and that in the face of a small
garrison under General Wade Hampton.  There was but little delay,
however, further than that caused by high water in the stream.  Hampton
left as Sherman approached, and the city was found to be on fire.

There has since been a great deal of acrimony displayed in discussions
of the question as to who set Columbia on fire. Sherman denies it on the
part of his troops, and Hampton denies it on the part of the
Confederates.  One thing is certain:  as soon as our troops took
possession, they at once proceeded to extinguish the flames to the best
of their ability with the limited means at hand.  In any case, the
example set by the Confederates in burning the village of Chambersburg,
Pa., a town which was not garrisoned, would seem to make a defence of
the act of firing the seat of government of the State most responsible
for the conflict then raging, not imperative.

The Confederate troops having vacated the city, the mayor took
possession, and sallied forth to meet the commander of the National
forces for the purpose of surrendering the town, making terms for the
protection of property, etc.  Sherman paid no attention at all to the
overture, but pushed forward and took the town without making any
conditions whatever with its citizens.  He then, however, co-operated
with the mayor in extinguishing the flames and providing for the people
who were rendered destitute by this destruction of their homes.  When he
left there he even gave the mayor five hundred head of cattle to be
distributed among the citizens, to tide them over until some arrangement
could be made for their future supplies.  He remained in Columbia until
the roads, public buildings, workshops and everything that could be
useful to the enemy were destroyed.  While at Columbia, Sherman learned
for the first time that what remained of Hood's army was confronting
him, under the command of General Beauregard.

Charleston was evacuated on the 18th of February, and Foster garrisoned
the place.  Wilmington was captured on the 22d. Columbia and Cheraw
farther north, were regarded as so secure from invasion that the wealthy
people of Charleston and Augusta had sent much of their valuable
property to these two points to be stored.  Among the goods sent there
were valuable carpets, tons of old Madeira, silverware, and furniture.
I am afraid much of these goods fell into the hands of our troops.
There was found at Columbia a large amount of powder, some artillery,
small-arms and fixed ammunition.  These, of course were among the
articles destroyed.  While here, Sherman also learned of Johnston's
restoration to command.  The latter was given, as already stated, all
troops in North and South Carolina.  After the completion of the
destruction of public property about Columbia, Sherman proceeded on his
march and reached Cheraw without any special opposition and without
incident to relate. The railroads, of course, were thoroughly destroyed
on the way.  Sherman remained a day or two at Cheraw; and, finally, on
the 6th of March crossed his troops over the Pedee and advanced straight
for Fayetteville.  Hardee and Hampton were there, and barely escaped.
Sherman reached Fayetteville on the 11th of March.  He had dispatched
scouts from Cheraw with letters to General Terry, at Wilmington, asking
him to send a steamer with some supplies of bread, clothing and other
articles which he enumerated.  The scouts got through successfully, and
a boat was sent with the mail and such articles for which Sherman had
asked as were in store at Wilmington; unfortunately, however, those
stores did not contain clothing.

Four days later, on the 15th, Sherman left Fayetteville for Goldsboro.
The march, now, had to be made with great caution, for he was
approaching Lee's army and nearing the country that still remained open
to the enemy.  Besides, he was confronting all that he had had to
confront in his previous march up to that point, reinforced by the
garrisons along the road and by what remained of Hood's army.  Frantic
appeals were made to the people to come in voluntarily and swell the
ranks of our foe.  I presume, however, that Johnston did not have in all
over 35,000 or 40,000 men.  The people had grown tired of the war, and
desertions from the Confederate army were much more numerous than the
voluntary accessions.

There was some fighting at Averysboro on the 16th between Johnston's
troops and Sherman's, with some loss; and at Bentonville on the 19th and
21st of March, but Johnston withdrew from the contest before the morning
of the 22d.  Sherman's loss in these last engagements in killed,
wounded, and missing, was about sixteen hundred.  Sherman's troops at
last reached Goldsboro on the 23d of the month and went into bivouac;
and there his men were destined to have a long rest.  Schofield was
there to meet him with the troops which had been sent to Wilmington.

Sherman was no longer in danger.  He had Johnston confronting him; but
with an army much inferior to his own, both in numbers and morale.  He
had Lee to the north of him with a force largely superior; but I was
holding Lee with a still greater force, and had he made his escape and
gotten down to reinforce Johnston, Sherman, with the reinforcements he
now had from Schofield and Terry, would have been able to hold the
Confederates at bay for an indefinite period.  He was near the sea-shore
with his back to it, and our navy occupied the harbors.  He had a
railroad to both Wilmington and New Bern, and his flanks were thoroughly
protected by streams, which intersect that part of the country and
deepen as they approach the sea.  Then, too, Sherman knew that if Lee
should escape me I would be on his heels, and he and Johnson together
would be crushed in one blow if they attempted to make a stand.  With
the loss of their capital, it is doubtful whether Lee's army would have
amounted to much as an army when it reached North Carolina.  Johnston's
army was demoralized by constant defeat and would hardly have made an
offensive movement, even if they could have been induced to remain on
duty.  The men of both Lee's and Johnston's armies were, like their
brethren of the North, as brave as men can be; but no man is so brave
that he may not meet such defeats and disasters as to discourage him and
dampen his ardor for any cause, no matter how just he deems it.



CHAPTER LXIII.

ARRIVAL OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS--LINCOLN AND THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS
--AN ANECDOTE OF LINCOLN--THE WINTER BEFORE PETERSBURG--SHERIDAN DESTROYS
THE RAILROAD--GORDON CARRIES THE PICKET LINE--PARKE RECAPTURES THE LINE
--THE LINE OF BATTLE OF WHITE OAK ROAD.

On the last of January, 1865, peace commissioners from the so-called
Confederate States presented themselves on our lines around Petersburg,
and were immediately conducted to my headquarters at City Point.  They
proved to be Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy,
Judge Campbell, Assistant-Secretary of War, and R. M. T. Hunt, formerly
United States Senator and then a member of the Confederate Senate.

It was about dark when they reached my headquarters, and I at once
conducted them to the steam Mary Martin, a Hudson River boat which was
very comfortably fitted up for the use of passengers.  I at once
communicated by telegraph with Washington and informed the Secretary of
War and the President of the arrival of these commissioners and that
their object was to negotiate terms of peace between the United States
and, as they termed it, the Confederate Government.  I was instructed to
retain them at City Point, until the President, or some one whom he
would designate, should come to meet them.  They remained several days
as guests on board the boat.  I saw them quite frequently, though I have
no recollection of having had any conversation whatever with them on the
subject of their mission.  It was something I had nothing to do with,
and I therefore did not wish to express any views on the subject.  For
my own part I never had admitted, and never was ready to admit, that
they were the representatives of a GOVERNMENT.  There had been too great
a waste of blood and treasure to concede anything of the kind.  As long
as they remained there, however, our relations were pleasant and I found
them all very agreeable gentlemen.  I directed the captain to furnish
them with the best the boat afforded, and to administer to their comfort
in every way possible.  No guard was placed over them and no restriction
was put upon their movements; nor was there any pledge asked that they
would not abuse the privileges extended to them.  They were permitted to
leave the boat when they felt like it, and did so, coming up on the bank
and visiting me at my headquarters.

I had never met either of these gentlemen before the war, but knew them
well by reputation and through their public services, and I had been a
particular admirer of Mr. Stephens.  I had always supposed that he was a
very small man, but when I saw him in the dusk of the evening I was very
much surprised to find so large a man as he seemed to be.  When he got
down on to the boat I found that he was wearing a coarse gray woollen
overcoat, a manufacture that had been introduced into the South during
the rebellion.  The cloth was thicker than anything of the kind I had
ever seen, even in Canada.  The overcoat extended nearly to his feet,
and was so large that it gave him the appearance of being an
average-sized man.  He took this off when he reached the cabin of the
boat, and I was struck with the apparent change in size, in the coat and
out of it.

After a few days, about the 2d of February, I received a dispatch from
Washington, directing me to send the commissioners to Hampton Roads to
meet the President and a member of the cabinet.  Mr. Lincoln met them
there and had an interview of short duration.  It was not a great while
after they met that the President visited me at City Point.  He spoke of
his having met the commissioners, and said he had told them that there
would be no use in entering into any negotiations unless they would
recognize, first:  that the Union as a whole must be forever preserved,
and second:  that slavery must be abolished. If they were willing to
concede these two points, then he was ready to enter into negotiations
and was almost willing to hand them a blank sheet of paper with his
signature attached for them to fill in the terms upon which they were
willing to live with us in the Union and be one people.  He always
showed a generous and kindly spirit toward the Southern people, and I
never heard him abuse an enemy.  Some of the cruel things said about
President Lincoln, particularly in the North, used to pierce him to the
heart; but never in my presence did he evince a revengeful disposition
and I saw a great deal of him at City Point, for he seemed glad to get
away from the cares and anxieties of the capital.

Right here I might relate an anecdote of Mr. Lincoln.  It was on the
occasion of his visit to me just after he had talked with the peace
commissioners at Hampton Roads.  After a little conversation, he asked
me if I had seen that overcoat of Stephens's.  I replied that I had.
"Well," said he, "did you see him take it off?"  I said yes.  "Well,"
said he, "didn't you think it was the biggest shuck and the littlest ear
that ever you did see?"  Long afterwards I told this story to the
Confederate General J. B. Gordon, at the time a member of the Senate.
He repeated it to Stephens, and, as I heard afterwards, Stephens laughed
immoderately at the simile of Mr. Lincoln.

The rest of the winter, after the departure of the peace commissioners,
passed off quietly and uneventfully, except for two or three little
incidents.  On one occasion during this period, while I was visiting
Washington City for the purpose of conferring with the administration,
the enemy's cavalry under General Wade Hampton, passing our extreme left
and then going to the south, got in east of us.  Before their presence
was known, they had driven off a large number of beef cattle that were
grazing in that section.  It was a fair capture, and they were
sufficiently needed by the Confederates.  It was only retaliating for
what we had done, sometimes for many weeks at a time, when out of
supplies taking what the Confederate army otherwise would have gotten.
As appears in this book, on one single occasion we captured five
thousand head of cattle which were crossing the Mississippi River near
Port Hudson on their way from Texas to supply the Confederate army in
the East.

One of the most anxious periods of my experience during the rebellion
was the last few weeks before Petersburg.  I felt that the situation of
the Confederate army was such that they would try to make an escape at
the earliest practicable moment, and I was afraid, every morning, that I
would awake from my sleep to hear that Lee had gone, and that nothing
was left but a picket line.  He had his railroad by the way of Danville
south, and I was afraid that he was running off his men and all stores
and ordnance except such as it would be necessary to carry with him for
his immediate defence.  I knew he could move much more lightly and more
rapidly than I, and that, if he got the start, he would leave me behind
so that we would have the same army to fight again farther south and the
war might be prolonged another year.

I was led to this fear by the fact that I could not see how it was
possible for the Confederates to hold out much longer where they were.
There is no doubt that Richmond would have been evacuated much sooner
than it was, if it had not been that it was the capital of the so-called
Confederacy, and the fact of evacuating the capital would, of course,
have had a very demoralizing effect upon the Confederate army.  When it
was evacuated (as we shall see further on), the Confederacy at once
began to crumble and fade away.  Then, too, desertions were taking
place, not only among those who were with General Lee in the
neighborhood of their capital, but throughout the whole Confederacy.  I
remember that in a conversation with me on one occasion long prior to
this, General Butler remarked that the Confederates would find great
difficulty in getting more men for their army; possibly adding, though I
am not certain as to this, "unless they should arm the slave."

The South, as we all knew, were conscripting every able-bodied man
between the ages of eighteen and forty-five; and now they had passed a
law for the further conscription of boys from fourteen to eighteen,
calling them the junior reserves, and men from forty-five to sixty to be
called the senior reserves.  The latter were to hold the necessary
points not in immediate danger, and especially those in the rear.
General Butler, in alluding to this conscription, remarked that they
were thus "robbing both the cradle and the grave," an expression which I
afterwards used in writing a letter to Mr. Washburn.

It was my belief that while the enemy could get no more recruits they
were losing at least a regiment a day, taking it throughout the entire
army, by desertions alone.  Then by casualties of war, sickness, and
other natural causes, their losses were much heavier.  It was a mere
question of arithmetic to calculate how long they could hold out while
that rate of depletion was going on.  Of course long before their army
would be thus reduced to nothing the army which we had in the field
would have been able to capture theirs.  Then too I knew from the great
number of desertions, that the men who had fought so bravely, so
gallantly and so long for the cause which they believed in--and as
earnestly, I take it, as our men believed in the cause for which they
were fighting--had lost hope and become despondent.  Many of them were
making application to be sent North where they might get employment
until the war was over, when they could return to their Southern homes.

For these and other reasons I was naturally very impatient for the time
to come when I could commence the spring campaign, which I thoroughly
believed would close the war.

There were two considerations I had to observe, however, and which
detained me.  One was the fact that the winter had been one of heavy
rains, and the roads were impassable for artillery and teams.  It was
necessary to wait until they had dried sufficiently to enable us to move
the wagon trains and artillery necessary to the efficiency of an army
operating in the enemy's country.  The other consideration was that
General Sheridan with the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac was
operating on the north side of the James River, having come down from
the Shenandoah. It was necessary that I should have his cavalry with me,
and I was therefore obliged to wait until he could join me south of the
James River.

Let us now take account of what he was doing.

On the 5th of March I had heard from Sheridan.  He had met Early between
Staunton and Charlottesville and defeated him, capturing nearly his
entire command.  Early and some of his officers escaped by finding
refuge in the neighboring houses or in the woods.

On the 12th I heard from him again.  He had turned east, to come to
White House.  He could not go to Lynchburg as ordered, because the rains
had been so very heavy and the streams were so very much swollen.  He
had a pontoon train with him, but it would not reach half way across
some of the streams, at their then stage of water, which he would have
to get over in going south as first ordered.

I had supplies sent around to White House for him, and kept the depot
there open until he arrived.  We had intended to abandon it because the
James River had now become our base of supplies.

Sheridan had about ten thousand cavalry with him, divided into two
divisions commanded respectively by Custer and Devin. General Merritt
was acting as chief of cavalry.  Sheridan moved very light, carrying
only four days' provisions with him, with a larger supply of coffee,
salt and other small rations, and a very little else besides ammunition.
They stopped at Charlottesville and commenced tearing up the railroad
back toward Lynchburg.  He also sent a division along the James River
Canal to destroy locks, culverts etc.  All mills and factories along the
lines of march of his troops were destroyed also.

Sheridan had in this way consumed so much time that his making a march
to White House was now somewhat hazardous.  He determined therefore to
fight his way along the railroad and canal till he was as near to
Richmond as it was possible to get, or until attacked.  He did this,
destroying the canal as far as Goochland, and the railroad to a point as
near Richmond as he could get.  On the 10th he was at Columbia.  <DW64>s
had joined his column to the number of two thousand or more, and they
assisted considerably in the work of destroying the railroads and the
canal.  His cavalry was in as fine a condition as when he started,
because he had been able to find plenty of forage. He had captured most
of Early's horses and picked up a good many others on the road.  When he
reached Ashland he was assailed by the enemy in force.  He resisted
their assault with part of his command, moved quickly across the South
and North Anna, going north, and reached White House safely on the 19th.

The time for Sherman to move had to be fixed with reference to the time
he could get away from Goldsboro where he then was. Supplies had to be
got up to him which would last him through a long march, as there would
probably not be much to be obtained in the country through which he
would pass.  I had to arrange, therefore, that he should start from
where he was, in the neighborhood of Goldsboro on the 18th of April, the
earliest day at which he supposed he could be ready.

Sherman was anxious that I should wait where I was until he could come
up, and make a sure thing of it; but I had determined to move as soon as
the roads and weather would admit of my doing so.  I had been tied down
somewhat in the matter of fixing any time at my pleasure for starting,
until Sheridan, who was on his way from the Shenandoah Valley to join
me, should arrive, as both his presence and that of his cavalry were
necessary to the execution of the plans which I had in mind.  However,
having arrived at White House on the 19th of March, I was enabled to
make my plans.

Prompted by my anxiety lest Lee should get away some night before I was
aware of it, and having the lead of me, push into North Carolina to join
with Johnston in attempting to crush out Sherman, I had, as early as the
1st of the month of March, given instructions to the troops around
Petersburg to keep a sharp lookout to see that such a movement should
not escape their notice, and to be ready strike at once if it was
undertaken.

It is now known that early in the month of March Mr. Davis and General
Lee had a consultation about the situation of affairs in and about and
Petersburg, and they both agreed places were no longer tenable for them,
and that they must get away as soon as possible.  They, too, were
waiting for dry roads, or a condition of the roads which would make it
possible to move.

General Lee, in aid of his plan of escape, and to secure a wider opening
to enable them to reach the Danville Road with greater security than he
would have in the way the two armies were situated, determined upon an
assault upon the right of our lines around Petersburg.  The night of the
24th of March was fixed upon for this assault, and General Gordon was
assigned to the execution of the plan.  The point between Fort Stedman
and Battery No. 10, where our lines were closest together, was selected
as the point of his attack.  The attack was to be made at night, and the
troops were to get possession of the higher ground in the rear where
they supposed we had intrenchments, then sweep to the right and left,
create a panic in the lines of our army, and force me to contract my
lines.  Lee hoped this would detain me a few days longer and give him an
opportunity of escape.  The plan was well conceived and the execution of
it very well done indeed, up to the point of carrying a portion of our
line.

Gordon assembled his troops under the cover of night, at the point at
which they were to make their charge, and got possession of our
picket-line, entirely without the knowledge of the troops inside of our
main line of intrenchments; this reduced the distance he would have to
charge over to not much more than fifty yards.  For some time before the
deserters had been coming in with great frequency, often bringing their
arms with them, and this the Confederate general knew.  Taking advantage
of this knowledge he sent his pickets, with their arms, creeping through
to ours as if to desert.  When they got to our lines they at once took
possession and sent our pickets to the rear as prisoners. In the main
line our men were sleeping serenely, as if in great security.  This plan
was to have been executed and much damage done before daylight; but the
troops that were to reinforce Gordon had to be brought from the north
side of the James River and, by some accident on the railroad on their
way over, they were detained for a considerable time; so that it got to
be nearly daylight before they were ready to make the charge.

The charge, however, was successful and almost without loss, the enemy
passing through our lines between Fort Stedman and Battery No. 10.  Then
turning to the right and left they captured the fort and the battery,
with all the arms and troops in them. Continuing the charge, they also
carried batteries Eleven and Twelve to our left, which they turned
toward City Point.

Meade happened to be at City Point that night, and this break in his
line cut him off from all communication with his headquarters.  Parke,
however, commanding the 9th corps when this breach took place,
telegraphed the facts to Meade's headquarters, and learning that the
general was away, assumed command himself and with commendable
promptitude made all preparations to drive the enemy back.  General
Tidball gathered a large number of pieces of artillery and planted them
in rear of the captured works so as to sweep the narrow space of ground
between the lines very thoroughly.  Hartranft was soon out with his
division, as also was Willcox.  Hartranft to the right of the breach
headed the rebels off in that direction and rapidly drove them back into
Fort Stedman.  On the other side they were driven back into the
intrenchments which they had captured, and batteries eleven and twelve
were retaken by Willcox early in the morning.

Parke then threw a line around outside of the captured fort and
batteries, and communication was once more established.  The artillery
fire was kept up so continuously that it was impossible for the
Confederates to retreat, and equally impossible for reinforcements to
join them.  They all, therefore, fell captives into our hands.  This
effort of Lee's cost him about four thousand men, and resulted in their
killing, wounding and capturing about two thousand of ours.

After the recapture of the batteries taken by the Confederates, our
troops made a charge and carried the enemy's intrenched picket line,
which they strengthened and held.  This, in turn, gave us but a short
distance to charge over when our attack came to be made a few days
later.

The day that Gordon was making dispositions for this attack (24th of
March) I issued my orders for the movement to commence on the 29th.
Ord, with three divisions of infantry and Mackenzie's cavalry, was to
move in advance on the night of the 27th, from the north side of the
James River and take his place on our extreme left, thirty miles away.
He left Weitzel with the rest of the Army of the James to hold Bermuda
Hundred and the north of the James River.  The engineer brigade was to
be left at City Point, and Parke's corps in the lines about Petersburg.
(*42)

Ord was at his place promptly.  Humphreys and Warren were then on our
extreme left with the 2d and 5th corps.  They were directed on the
arrival of Ord, and on his getting into position in their places, to
cross Hatcher's Run and extend out west toward Five Forks, the object
being to get into a position from which we could strike the South Side
Railroad and ultimately the Danville Railroad.  There was considerable
fighting in taking up these new positions for the 2d and 5th corps, in
which the Army of the James had also to participate somewhat, and the
losses were quite severe.

This was what was known as the Battle of White Oak Road.



CHAPTER LXIV.

INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN--GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC
--SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE ON FIVE FORKS--BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS--PARKE AND
WRIGHT STORM THE ENEMY'S LINE--BATTLES BEFORE PETERSBURG.

Sheridan reached City Point on the 26th day of March.  His horses, of
course, were jaded and many of them had lost their shoes.  A few days of
rest were necessary to recuperate the animals and also to have them shod
and put in condition for moving.  Immediately on General Sheridan's
arrival at City Point I prepared his instructions for the move which I
had decided upon.  The movement was to commence on the 29th of the
month.

After reading the instructions I had given him, Sheridan walked out of
my tent, and I followed to have some conversation with him by himself
--not in the presence of anybody else, even of a member of my staff.  In
preparing his instructions I contemplated just what took place; that is
to say, capturing Five Forks, driving the enemy from Petersburg and
Richmond and terminating the contest before separating from the enemy.
But the Nation had already become restless and discouraged at the
prolongation of the war, and many believed that it would never terminate
except by compromise.  Knowing that unless my plan proved an entire
success it would be interpreted as a disastrous defeat, I provided in
these instructions that in a certain event he was to cut loose from the
Army of the Potomac and his base of supplies, and living upon the
country proceed south by the way of the Danville Railroad, or near it,
across the Roanoke, get in the rear of Johnston, who was guarding that
road, and cooperate with Sherman in destroying Johnston; then with these
combined forces to help carry out the instructions which Sherman already
had received, to act in cooperation with the armies around Petersburg
and Richmond.

I saw that after Sheridan had read his instructions he seemed somewhat
disappointed at the idea, possibly, of having to cut loose again from
the Army of the Potomac, and place himself between the two main armies
of the enemy.  I said to him: "General, this portion of your
instructions I have put in merely as a blind;" and gave him the reason
for doing so, heretofore described.  I told him that, as a matter of
fact, I intended to close the war right here, with this movement, and
that he should go no farther.  His face at once brightened up, and
slapping his hand on his leg he said:  "I am glad to hear it, and we can
do it."

Sheridan was not however to make his movement against Five Forks until
he got further instructions from me.

One day, after the movement I am about to describe had commenced, and
when his cavalry was on our extreme left and far to the rear, south,
Sheridan rode up to where my headquarters were then established, at
Dabney's Mills.  He met some of my staff officers outside, and was
highly jubilant over the prospects of success, giving reasons why he
believed this would prove the final and successful effort.  Although my
chief-of-staff had urged very strongly that we return to our position
about City Point and in the lines around Petersburg, he asked Sheridan
to come in to see me and say to me what he had been saying to them.
Sheridan felt a little modest about giving his advice where it had not
been asked; so one of my staff came in and told me that Sheridan had
what they considered important news, and suggested that I send for him.
I did so, and was glad to see the spirit of confidence with which he was
imbued. Knowing as I did from experience, of what great value that
feeling of confidence by a commander was, I determined to make a
movement at once, although on account of the rains which had fallen
after I had started out the roads were still very heavy.  Orders were
given accordingly.

Finally the 29th of March came, and fortunately there having been a few
days free from rain, the surface of the ground was dry, giving
indications that the time had come when we could move.  On that date I
moved out with all the army available after leaving sufficient force to
hold the line about Petersburg.  It soon set in raining again however,
and in a very short time the roads became practically impassable for
teams, and almost so for cavalry.  Sometimes a horse or mule would be
standing apparently on firm ground, when all at once one foot would
sink, and as he commenced scrambling to catch himself all his feet would
sink and he would have to be drawn by hand out of the quicksands so
common in that part of Virginia and other southern States.  It became
necessary therefore to build corduroy roads every foot of the way as we
advanced, to move our artillery upon.  The army had become so accustomed
to this kind of work, and were so well prepared for it, that it was done
very rapidly.  The next day, March 30th, we had made sufficient progress
to the south-west to warrant me in starting Sheridan with his cavalry
over by Dinwiddie with instructions to then come up by the road leading
north-west to Five Forks, thus menacing the right of Lee's line.

This movement was made for the purpose of extending our lines to the
west as far as practicable towards the enemy's extreme right, or Five
Forks.  The column moving detached from the army still in the trenches
was, excluding the cavalry, very small.  The forces in the trenches were
themselves extending to the left flank. Warren was on the extreme left
when the extension began, but Humphreys was marched around later and
thrown into line between him and Five Forks.

My hope was that Sheridan would be able to carry Five Forks, get on the
enemy's right flank and rear, and force them to weaken their centre to
protect their right so that an assault in the centre might be
successfully made.  General Wright's corps had been designated to make
this assault, which I intended to order as soon as information reached
me of Sheridan's success.  He was to move under cover as close to the
enemy as he could get.

It is natural to suppose that Lee would understand my design to be to
get up to the South Side and ultimately to the Danville Railroad, as
soon as he had heard of the movement commenced on the 29th.  These roads
were so important to his very existence while he remained in Richmond
and Petersburg, and of such vital importance to him even in case of
retreat, that naturally he would make most strenuous efforts to defend
them.  He did on the 30th send Pickett with five brigades to reinforce
Five Forks.  He also sent around to the right of his army some two or
three other divisions, besides directing that other troops be held in
readiness on the north side of the James River to come over on call.  He
came over himself to superintend in person the defence of his right
flank.

Sheridan moved back to Dinwiddie Court-House on the night of the 30th,
and then took a road leading north-west to Five Forks.  He had only his
cavalry with him.  Soon encountering the rebel cavalry he met with a
very stout resistance.  He gradually drove them back however until in
the neighborhood of Five Forks.  Here he had to encounter other troops
besides those he had been contending with, and was forced to give way.

In this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken place and
stated that he was falling back toward Dinwiddie gradually and slowly,
and asked me to send Wright's corps to his assistance.  I replied to him
that it was impossible to send Wright's corps because that corps was
already in line close up to the enemy, where we should want to assault
when the proper time came, and was besides a long distance from him; but
the 2d (Humphreys's) and 5th (Warren's) corps were on our extreme left
and a little to the rear of it in a position to threaten the left flank
of the enemy at Five Forks, and that I would send Warren.

Accordingly orders were sent to Warren to move at once that night (the
31st) to Dinwiddie Court House and put himself in communication with
Sheridan as soon as possible, and report to him.  He was very slow in
moving, some of his troops not starting until after 5 o'clock next
morning.  When he did move it was done very deliberately, and on
arriving at Gravelly Run he found the stream swollen from the recent
rains so that he regarded it as not fordable.  Sheridan of course knew
of his coming, and being impatient to get the troops up as soon as
possible, sent orders to him to hasten.  He was also hastened or at
least ordered to move up rapidly by General Meade.  He now felt that he
could not cross that creek without bridges, and his orders were changed
to move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in flank or get in their
rear; but he was so late in getting up that Sheridan determined to move
forward without him.  However, Ayres's division of Warren's corps
reached him in time to be in the fight all day, most of the time
separated from the remainder of the 5th corps and fighting directly
under Sheridan.

Warren reported to Sheridan about 11 o'clock on the 1st, but the whole
of his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until late in the
afternoon.  Griffin's division in backing to get out of the way of a
severe cross fire of the enemy was found marching away from the
fighting.  This did not continue long, however; the division was brought
back and with Ayres's division did most excellent service during the
day.  Crawford's division of the same corps had backed still farther
off, and although orders were sent repeatedly to bring it up, it was
late before it finally got to where it could be of material assistance.
Once there it did very excellent service.

Sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon or a little later, in
advancing up to the point from which to make his designed assault upon
Five Forks itself.  He was very impatient to make the assault and have
it all over before night, because the ground he occupied would be
untenable for him in bivouac during the night.  Unless the assault was
made and was successful, he would be obliged to return to Dinwiddie
Court-House, or even further than that for the night.

It was at this junction of affairs that Sheridan wanted to get
Crawford's division in hand, and he also wanted Warren.  He sent staff
officer after staff officer in search of Warren, directing that general
to report to him, but they were unable to find him.  At all events
Sheridan was unable to get that officer to him.  Finally he went
himself.  He issued an order relieving Warren and assigning Griffin to
the command of the 5th corps. The troops were then brought up and the
assault successfully made.

I was so much dissatisfied with Warren's dilatory movements in the
battle of White Oak Road and in his failure to reach Sheridan in time,
that I was very much afraid that at the last moment he would fail
Sheridan.  He was a man of fine intelligence, great earnestness, quick
perception, and could make his dispositions as quickly as any officer,
under difficulties where he was forced to act.  But I had before
discovered a defect which was beyond his control, that was very
prejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies like the one just before
us.  He could see every danger at a glance before he had encountered it.
He would not only make preparations to meet the danger which might
occur, but he would inform his commanding officer what others should do
while he was executing his move.

I had sent a staff officer to General Sheridan to call his attention to
these defects, and to say that as much as I liked General Warren, now
was not a time when we could let our personal feelings for any one stand
in the way of success; and if his removal was necessary to success, not
to hesitate.  It was upon that authorization that Sheridan removed
Warren.  I was very sorry that it had been done, and regretted still
more that I had not long before taken occasion to assign him to another
field of duty.

It was dusk when our troops under Sheridan went over the parapets of the
enemy.  The two armies were mingled together there for a time in such
manner that it was almost a question which one was going to demand the
surrender of the other.  Soon, however, the enemy broke and ran in every
direction; some six thousand prisoners, besides artillery and small-arms
in large quantities, falling into our hands.  The flying troops were
pursued in different directions, the cavalry and 5th corps under
Sheridan pursuing the larger body which moved north-west.

This pursuit continued until about nine o'clock at night, when Sheridan
halted his troops, and knowing the importance to him of the part of the
enemy's line which had been captured, returned, sending the 5th corps
across Hatcher's Run to just south-west of Petersburg, and facing them
toward it.  Merritt, with the cavalry, stopped and bivouacked west of
Five Forks.

This was the condition which affairs were in on the night of the 1st of
April.  I then issued orders for an assault by Wright and Parke at four
o'clock on the morning of the 2d.  I also ordered the 2d corps, General
Humphreys, and General Ord with the Army of the James, on the left, to
hold themselves in readiness to take any advantage that could be taken
from weakening in their front.

I notified Mr. Lincoln at City Point of the success of the day; in fact
I had reported to him during the day and evening as I got news, because
he was so much interested in the movements taking place that I wanted to
relieve his mind as much as I could.  I notified Weitzel on the north
side of the James River, directing him, also, to keep close up to the
enemy, and take advantage of the withdrawal of troops from there to
promptly enter the city of Richmond.

I was afraid that Lee would regard the possession of Five Forks as of so
much importance that he would make a last desperate effort to retake it,
risking everything upon the cast of a single die.  It was for this
reason that I had ordered the assault to take place at once, as soon as
I had received the news of the capture of Five Forks.  The corps
commanders, however, reported that it was so dark that the men could not
see to move, and it would be impossible to make the assault then. But we
kept up a continuous artillery fire upon the enemy around the whole line
including that north of the James River, until it was light enough to
move, which was about a quarter to five in the morning.

At that hour Parke's and Wright's corps moved out as directed, brushed
the _abatis_ from their front as they advanced under a heavy fire of
musketry and artillery, and went without flinching directly on till they
mounted the parapets and threw themselves inside of the enemy's line.
Parke, who was on the right, swept down to the right and captured a very
considerable length of line in that direction, but at that point the
outer was so near the inner line which closely enveloped the city of
Petersburg that he could make no advance forward and, in fact, had a
very serious task to turn the lines which he had captured to the defence
of his own troops and to hold them; but he succeeded in this.

Wright swung around to his left and moved to Hatcher's Run, sweeping
everything before him.  The enemy had traverses in rear of his captured
line, under cover of which he made something of a stand, from one to
another, as Wright moved on; but the latter met no serious obstacle.  As
you proceed to the left the outer line becomes gradually much farther
from the inner one, and along about Hatcher's Run they must be nearly
two miles apart. Both Parke and Wright captured a considerable amount of
artillery and some prisoners--Wright about three thousand of them.

In the meantime Ord and Humphreys, in obedience to the instructions they
had received, had succeeded by daylight, or very early in the morning,
in capturing the intrenched picket-lines in their front; and before
Wright got up to that point, Ord had also succeeded in getting inside of
the enemy's intrenchments.  The second corps soon followed; and the
outer works of Petersburg were in the hands of the National troops,
never to be wrenched from them again.  When Wright reached Hatcher's
Run, he sent a regiment to destroy the South Side Railroad just outside
of the city.

My headquarters were still at Dabney's saw-mills.  As soon as I received
the news of Wright's success, I sent dispatches announcing the fact to
all points around the line, including the troops at Bermuda Hundred and
those on the north side of the James, and to the President at City
Point.  Further dispatches kept coming in, and as they did I sent the
additional news to these points.  Finding at length that they were all
in, I mounted my horse to join the troops who were inside the works.
When I arrived there I rode my horse over the parapet just as Wright's
three thousand prisoners were coming out.  I was soon joined inside by
General Meade and his staff.

Lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part of the lost ground.
Parke on our right was repeatedly assaulted, but repulsed every effort.
Before noon Longstreet was ordered up from the north side of the James
River thus bringing the bulk of Lee's army around to the support of his
extreme right.  As soon as I learned this I notified Weitzel and
directed him to keep up close to the enemy and to have Hartsuff,
commanding the Bermuda Hundred front, to do the same thing, and if they
found any break to go in; Hartsuff especially should do so, for this
would separate Richmond and Petersburg.

Sheridan, after he had returned to Five Forks, swept down to Petersburg,
coming in on our left.  This gave us a continuous line from the
Appomattox River below the city to the same river above.  At eleven
o'clock, not having heard from Sheridan, I reinforced Parke with two
brigades from City Point.  With this additional force he completed his
captured works for better defence, and built back from his right, so as
to protect his flank.  He also carried in and made an _abatis_ between
himself and the enemy.  Lee brought additional troops and artillery
against Parke even after this was done, and made several assaults with
very heavy losses.

The enemy had in addition to their intrenched line close up to
Petersburg, two enclosed works outside of it, Fort Gregg and Fort
Whitworth.  We thought it had now become necessary to carry them by
assault.  About one o'clock in the day, Fort Gregg was assaulted by
Foster's division of the 24th corps (Gibbon's), supported by two
brigades from Ord's command.  The battle was desperate and the National
troops were repulsed several times; but it was finally carried, and
immediately the troops in Fort Whitworth evacuated the place.  The guns
of Fort Gregg were turned upon the retreating enemy, and the commanding
officer with some sixty of the men of Fort Whitworth surrendered.

I had ordered Miles in the morning to report to Sheridan.  In moving to
execute this order he came upon the enemy at the intersection of the
White Oak Road and the Claiborne Road.  The enemy fell back to
Sutherland Station on the South Side Road and were followed by Miles.
This position, naturally a strong and defensible one, was also strongly
intrenched.  Sheridan now came up and Miles asked permission from him to
make the assault, which Sheridan gave.  By this time Humphreys had got
through the outer works in his front, and came up also and assumed
command over Miles, who commanded a division in his corps.  I had sent
an order to Humphreys to turn to his right and move towards Petersburg.
This order he now got, and started off, thus leaving Miles alone.  The
latter made two assaults, both of which failed, and he had to fall back
a few hundred yards.

Hearing that Miles had been left in this position, I directed Humphreys
to send a division back to his relief.  He went himself.

Sheridan before starting to sweep down to Petersburg had sent Merritt
with his cavalry to the west to attack some Confederate cavalry that had
assembled there.  Merritt drove them north to the Appomattox River.
Sheridan then took the enemy at Sutherland Station on the reverse side
from where Miles was, and the two together captured the place, with a
large number of prisoners and some pieces of artillery, and put the
remainder, portions of three Confederate corps, to flight.  Sheridan
followed, and drove them until night, when further pursuit was stopped.
Miles bivouacked for the night on the ground which he with Sheridan had
carried so handsomely by assault.  I cannot explain the situation here
better than by giving my dispatch to City Point that evening:


BOYDTON ROAD, NEAR PETERSBURG, April 2, 1865.--4.40 P.M.

COLONEL T. S. BOWERS, City Point.

We are now up and have a continuous line of troops, and in a few hours
will be intrenched from the Appomattox below Petersburg to the river
above.  Heth's and Wilcox's divisions, such part of them as were not
captured, were cut off from town, either designedly on their part or
because they could not help it. Sheridan with the cavalry and 5th corps
is above them.  Miles's division, 2d corps, was sent from the White Oak
Road to Sutherland Station on the South Side Railroad, where he met
them, and at last accounts was engaged with them.  Not knowing whether
Sheridan would get up in time, General Humphreys was sent with another
division from here.  The whole captures since the army started out
gunning will amount to not less than twelve thousand men, and probably
fifty pieces of artillery.  I do not know the number of men and guns
accurately however.  * * *  I think the President might come out and pay
us a visit tomorrow.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


During the night of April 2d our line was intrenched from the river
above to the river below.  I ordered a bombardment to be commenced the
next morning at five A.M., to be followed by an assault at six o'clock;
but the enemy evacuated Petersburg early in the morning.



CHAPTER LXV.

THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG--MEETING PRESIDENT LINCOLN IN PETERSBURG--THE
CAPTURE OF RICHMOND--PURSUING THE ENEMY--VISIT TO SHERIDAN AND MEADE.

General Meade and I entered Petersburg on the morning of the 3d and took
a position under cover of a house which protected us from the enemy's
musketry which was flying thick and fast there.  As we would
occasionally look around the corner we could see the streets and the
Appomattox bottom, presumably near the bridge, packed with the
Confederate army.  I did not have artillery brought up, because I was
sure Lee was trying to make his escape, and I wanted to push immediately
in pursuit.  At all events I had not the heart to turn the artillery
upon such a mass of defeated and fleeing men, and I hoped to capture
them soon.

Soon after the enemy had entirely evacuated Petersburg, a man came in
who represented himself to be an engineer of the Army of Northern
Virginia.  He said that Lee had for some time been at work preparing a
strong enclosed intrenchment, into which he would throw himself when
forced out of Petersburg, and fight his final battle there; that he was
actually at that time drawing his troops from Richmond, and falling back
into this prepared work. This statement was made to General Meade and
myself when we were together.  I had already given orders for the
movement up the south side of the Appomattox for the purpose of heading
off Lee; but Meade was so much impressed by this man's story that he
thought we ought to cross the Appomattox there at once and move against
Lee in his new position.  I knew that Lee was no fool, as he would have
been to have put himself and his army between two formidable streams
like the James and Appomattox rivers, and between two such armies as
those of the Potomac and the James. Then these streams coming together
as they did to the east of him, it would be only necessary to close up
in the west to have him thoroughly cut off from all supplies or
possibility of reinforcement.  It would only have been a question of
days, and not many of them, if he had taken the position assigned to him
by the so-called engineer, when he would have been obliged to surrender
his army.  Such is one of the ruses resorted to in war to deceive your
antagonist.  My judgment was that Lee would necessarily have to evacuate
Richmond, and that the only course for him to pursue would be to follow
the Danville Road. Accordingly my object was to secure a point on that
road south of Lee, and I told Meade this.  He suggested that if Lee was
going that way we would follow him.  My reply was that we did not want
to follow him; we wanted to get ahead of him and cut him off, and if he
would only stay in the position he (Meade) believed him to be in at that
time, I wanted nothing better; that when we got in possession of the
Danville Railroad, at its crossing of the Appomattox River, if we still
found him between the two rivers, all we had to do was to move eastward
and close him up.  That we would then have all the advantage we could
possibly have by moving directly against him from Petersburg, even if he
remained in the position assigned him by the engineer officer.

I had held most of the command aloof from the intrenchments, so as to
start them out on the Danville Road early in the morning, supposing that
Lee would be gone during the night.  During the night I strengthened
Sheridan by sending him Humphreys's corps.

Lee, as we now know, had advised the authorities at Richmond, during the
day, of the condition of affairs, and told them it would be impossible
for him to hold out longer than night, if he could hold out that long.
Davis was at church when he received Lee's dispatch.  The congregation
was dismissed with the notice that there would be no evening service.
The rebel government left Richmond about two o'clock in the afternoon of
the 2d.

At night Lee ordered his troops to assemble at Amelia Court House, his
object being to get away, join Johnston if possible, and to try to crush
Sherman before I could get there.  As soon as I was sure of this I
notified Sheridan and directed him to move out on the Danville Railroad
to the south side of the Appomattox River as speedily as possible.  He
replied that he already had some of his command nine miles out.  I then
ordered the rest of the Army of the Potomac under Meade to follow the
same road in the morning.  Parke's corps followed by the same road, and
the Army of the James was directed to follow the road which ran
alongside of the South Side Railroad to Burke's Station, and to repair
the railroad and telegraph as they proceeded.  That road was a 5 feet
gauge, while our rolling stock was all of the 4 feet 8 1/2 inches gauge;
consequently the rail on one side of the track had to be taken up
throughout the whole length and relaid so as to conform to the gauge of
our cars and locomotives.

Mr. Lincoln was at City Point at the time, and had been for some days.
I would have let him know what I contemplated doing, only while I felt a
strong conviction that the move was going to be successful, yet it might
not prove so; and then I would have only added another to the many
disappointments he had been suffering for the past three years.  But
when we started out he saw that we were moving for a purpose, and
bidding us Godspeed, remained there to hear the result.

The next morning after the capture of Petersburg, I telegraphed Mr.
Lincoln asking him to ride out there and see me, while I would await his
arrival.  I had started all the troops out early in the morning, so that
after the National army left Petersburg there was not a soul to be seen,
not even an animal in the streets.  There was absolutely no one there,
except my staff officers and, possibly, a small escort of cavalry.  We
had selected the piazza of a deserted house, and occupied it until the
President arrived.

About the first thing that Mr. Lincoln said to me, after warm
congratulations for the victory, and thanks both to myself and to the
army which had accomplished it, was:  "Do you know, general, that I have
had a sort of a sneaking idea for some days that you intended to do
something like this."  Our movements having been successful up to this
point, I no longer had any object in concealing from the President all
my movements, and the objects I had in view.  He remained for some days
near City Point, and I communicated with him frequently and fully by
telegraph.

Mr. Lincoln knew that it had been arranged for Sherman to join me at a
fixed time, to co-operate in the destruction of Lee's army.  I told him
that I had been very anxious to have the Eastern armies vanquish their
old enemy who had so long resisted all their repeated and gallant
attempts to subdue them or drive them from their capital.  The Western
armies had been in the main successful until they had conquered all the
territory from the Mississippi River to the State of North Carolina, and
were now almost ready to knock at the back door of Richmond, asking
admittance.  I said to him that if the Western armies should be even
upon the field, operating against Richmond and Lee, the credit would be
given to them for the capture, by politicians and non-combatants from
the section of country which those troops hailed from.  It might lead to
disagreeable bickerings between members of Congress of the East and
those of the West in some of their debates.  Western members might be
throwing it up to the members of the East that in the suppression of the
rebellion they were not able to capture an army, or to accomplish much
in the way of contributing toward that end, but had to wait until the
Western armies had conquered all the territory south and west of them,
and then come on to help them capture the only army they had been
engaged with.

Mr. Lincoln said he saw that now, but had never thought of it before,
because his anxiety was so great that he did not care where the aid came
from so the work was done.

The Army of the Potomac has every reason to be proud of its four years'
record in the suppression of the rebellion.  The army it had to fight
was the protection to the capital of a people which was attempting to
found a nation upon the territory of the United States.  Its loss would
be the loss of the cause.  Every energy, therefore, was put forth by the
Confederacy to protect and maintain their capital.  Everything else
would go if it went. Lee's army had to be strengthened to enable it to
maintain its position, no matter what territory was wrested from the
South in another quarter.

I never expected any such bickering as I have indicated, between the
soldiers of the two sections; and, fortunately, there has been none
between the politicians.  Possibly I am the only one who thought of the
liability of such a state of things in advance.

When our conversation was at an end Mr. Lincoln mounted his horse and
started on his return to City Point, while I and my staff started to
join the army, now a good many miles in advance.  Up to this time I had
not received the report of the capture of Richmond.

Soon after I left President Lincoln I received a dispatch from General
Weitzel which notified me that he had taken possession of Richmond at
about 8.15 o'clock in the morning of that day, the 3d, and that he had
found the city on fire in two places. The city was in the most utter
confusion.  The authorities had taken the precaution to empty all the
liquor into the gutter, and to throw out the provisions which the
Confederate government had left, for the people to gather up.  The city
had been deserted by the authorities, civil and military, without any
notice whatever that they were about to leave.  In fact, up to the very
hour of the evacuation the people had been led to believe that Lee had
gained an important victory somewhere around Petersburg.

Weitzel's command found evidence of great demoralization in Lee's army,
there being still a great many men and even officers in the town.  The
city was on fire.  Our troops were directed to extinguish the flames,
which they finally succeeded in doing. The fire had been started by some
one connected with the retreating army.  All authorities deny that it
was authorized, and I presume it was the work of excited men who were
leaving what they regarded as their capital and may have felt that it
was better to destroy it than have it fall into the hands of their
enemy.  Be that as it may, the National troops found the city in flames,
and used every effort to extinguish them.

The troops that had formed Lee's right, a great many of them, were cut
off from getting back into Petersburg, and were pursued by our cavalry
so hotly and closely that they threw away caissons, ammunition,
clothing, and almost everything to lighten their loads, and pushed along
up the Appomattox River until finally they took water and crossed over.

I left Mr. Lincoln and started, as I have already said, to join the
command, which halted at Sutherland Station, about nine miles out.  We
had still time to march as much farther, and time was an object; but the
roads were bad and the trains belonging to the advance corps had blocked
up the road so that it was impossible to get on.  Then, again, our
cavalry had struck some of the enemy and were pursuing them; and the
orders were that the roads should be given up to the cavalry whenever
they appeared.  This caused further delay.

General Wright, who was in command of one of the corps which were left
back, thought to gain time by letting his men go into bivouac and trying
to get up some rations for them, and clearing out the road, so that when
they did start they would be uninterrupted.  Humphreys, who was far
ahead, was also out of rations.  They did not succeed in getting them up
through the night; but the Army of the Potomac, officers and men, were
so elated by the reflection that at last they were following up a
victory to its end, that they preferred marching without rations to
running a possible risk of letting the enemy elude them.  So the march
was resumed at three o'clock in the morning.

Merritt's cavalry had struck the enemy at Deep Creek, and driven them
north to the Appomattox, where, I presume, most of them were forced to
cross.

On the morning of the 4th I learned that Lee had ordered rations up from
Danville for his famishing army, and that they were to meet him at
Farmville.  This showed that Lee had already abandoned the idea of
following the railroad down to Danville, but had determined to go
farther west, by the way of Farmville.  I notified Sheridan of this and
directed him to get possession of the road before the supplies could
reach Lee.  He responded that he had already sent Crook's division to
get upon the road between Burkesville and Jetersville, then to face
north and march along the road upon the latter place; and he thought
Crook must be there now.  The bulk of the army moved directly for
Jetersville by two roads.

After I had received the dispatch from Sheridan saying that Crook was on
the Danville Road, I immediately ordered Meade to make a forced march
with the Army of the Potomac, and to send Parke's corps across from the
road they were on to the South Side Railroad, to fall in the rear of the
Army of the James and to protect the railroad which that army was
repairing as it went along.

Our troops took possession of Jetersville and in the telegraph office,
they found a dispatch from Lee, ordering two hundred thousand rations
from Danville.  The dispatch had not been sent, but Sheridan sent a
special messenger with it to Burkesville and had it forwarded from
there.  In the meantime, however, dispatches from other sources had
reached Danville, and they knew there that our army was on the line of
the road; so that they sent no further supplies from that quarter.

At this time Merritt and Mackenzie, with the cavalry, were off between
the road which the Army of the Potomac was marching on and the
Appomattox River, and were attacking the enemy in flank.  They picked up
a great many prisoners and forced the abandonment of some property.

Lee intrenched himself at Amelia Court House, and also his advance north
of Jetersville, and sent his troops out to collect forage.  The country
was very poor and afforded but very little.  His foragers scattered a
great deal; many of them were picked up by our men, and many others
never returned to the Army of Northern Virginia.

Griffin's corps was intrenched across the railroad south of Jetersville,
and Sheridan notified me of the situation.  I again ordered Meade up
with all dispatch, Sheridan having but the one corps of infantry with a
little cavalry confronting Lee's entire army.  Meade, always prompt in
obeying orders, now pushed forward with great energy, although he was
himself sick and hardly able to be out of bed.  Humphreys moved at two,
and Wright at three o'clock in the morning, without rations, as I have
said, the wagons being far in the rear.

I stayed that night at Wilson's Station on the South Side Railroad.  On
the morning of the 5th I sent word to Sheridan of the progress Meade was
making, and suggested that he might now attack Lee.  We had now no other
objective than the Confederate armies, and I was anxious to close the
thing up at once.

On the 5th I marched again with Ord's command until within about ten
miles of Burkesville, where I stopped to let his army pass. I then
received from Sheridan the following dispatch:

"The whole of Lee's army is at or near Amelia Court House, and on this
side of it.  General Davies, whom I sent out to Painesville on their
right flank, has just captured six pieces of artillery and some wagons.
We can capture the Army of Northern Virginia if force enough can be
thrown to this point, and then advance upon it.  My cavalry was at
Burkesville yesterday, and six miles beyond, on the Danville Road, last
night.  General Lee is at Amelia Court House in person.  They are out of
rations, or nearly so.  They were advancing up the railroad towards
Burkesville yesterday, when we intercepted them at this point."

It now became a life and death struggle with Lee to get south to his
provisions.

Sheridan, thinking the enemy might turn off immediately towards
Farmville, moved Davies's brigade of cavalry out to watch him. Davies
found the movement had already commenced.  He attacked and drove away
their cavalry which was escorting wagons to the west, capturing and
burning 180 wagons.  He also captured five pieces of artillery.  The
Confederate infantry then moved against him and probably would have
handled him very roughly, but Sheridan had sent two more brigades of
cavalry to follow Davies, and they came to his relief in time.  A sharp
engagement took place between these three brigades of cavalry and the
enemy's infantry, but the latter was repulsed.

Meade himself reached Jetersville about two o'clock in the afternoon,
but in advance of all his troops.  The head of Humphreys's corps
followed in about an hour afterwards. Sheridan stationed the troops as
they came up, at Meade's request, the latter still being very sick.  He
extended two divisions of this corps off to the west of the road to the
left of Griffin's corps, and one division to the right.  The cavalry by
this time had also come up, and they were put still farther off to the
left, Sheridan feeling certain that there lay the route by which the
enemy intended to escape.  He wanted to attack, feeling that if time was
given, the enemy would get away; but Meade prevented this, preferring to
wait till his troops were all up.

At this juncture Sheridan sent me a letter which had been handed to him
by a <DW52> man, with a note from himself saying that he wished I was
there myself.  The letter was dated Amelia Court House, April 5th, and
signed by Colonel Taylor.  It was to his mother, and showed the
demoralization of the Confederate army. Sheridan's note also gave me the
information as here related of the movements of that day.  I received a
second message from Sheridan on the 5th, in which he urged more
emphatically the importance of my presence.  This was brought to me by a
scout in gray uniform.  It was written on tissue paper, and wrapped up
in tin-foil such as chewing tobacco is folded in.  This was a precaution
taken so that if the scout should be captured he could take this
tin-foil out of his pocket and putting it into his mouth, chew it.  It
would cause no surprise at all to see a Confederate soldier chewing
tobacco. It was nearly night when this letter was received.  I gave Ord
directions to continue his march to Burkesville and there intrench
himself for the night, and in the morning to move west to cut off all
the roads between there and Farmville.

I then started with a few of my staff and a very small escort of
cavalry, going directly through the woods, to join Meade's army.  The
distance was about sixteen miles; but the night being dark our progress
was slow through the woods in the absence of direct roads.  However, we
got to the outposts about ten o'clock in the evening, and after some
little parley convinced the sentinels of our identity and were conducted
in to where Sheridan was bivouacked.  We talked over the situation for
some little time, Sheridan explaining to me what he thought Lee was
trying to do, and that Meade's orders, if carried out, moving to the
right flank, would give him the coveted opportunity of escaping us and
putting us in rear of him.

We then together visited Meade, reaching his headquarters about
midnight.  I explained to Meade that we did not want to follow the
enemy; we wanted to get ahead of him, and that his orders would allow
the enemy to escape, and besides that, I had no doubt that Lee was
moving right then.  Meade changed his orders at once.  They were now
given for an advance on Amelia Court House, at an early hour in the
morning, as the army then lay; that is, the infantry being across the
railroad, most of it to the west of the road, with the cavalry swung out
still farther to the left.



CHAPTER LXVI.

BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK--ENGAGEMENT AT FARMVILLE--CORRESPONDENCE WITH
GENERAL LEE--SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY.

The Appomattox, going westward, takes a long sweep to the south-west
from the neighborhood of the Richmond and Danville Railroad bridge, and
then trends north-westerly.  Sailor's Creek, an insignificant stream,
running northward, empties into the Appomattox between the High Bridge
and Jetersville.  Near the High Bridge the stage road from Petersburg to
Lynchburg crosses the Appomattox River, also on a bridge.  The railroad
runs on the north side of the river to Farmville, a few miles west, and
from there, recrossing, continues on the south side of it.  The roads
coming up from the south-east to Farmville cross the Appomattox River
there on a bridge and run on the north side, leaving the Lynchburg and
Petersburg Railroad well to the left.

Lee, in pushing out from Amelia Court House, availed himself of all the
roads between the Danville Road and Appomattox River to move upon, and
never permitted the head of his columns to stop because of any fighting
that might be going on in his rear.  In this way he came very near
succeeding in getting to his provision trains and eluding us with at
least part of his army.

As expected, Lee's troops had moved during the night before, and our
army in moving upon Amelia Court House soon encountered them.  There was
a good deal of fighting before Sailor's Creek was reached.  Our cavalry
charged in upon a body of theirs which was escorting a wagon train in
order to get it past our left.  A severe engagement ensued, in which we
captured many prisoners, and many men also were killed and wounded.
There was as much gallantry displayed by some of the Confederates in
these little engagements as was displayed at any time during the war,
notwithstanding the sad defeats of the past week.

The armies finally met on Sailor's Creek, when a heavy engagement took
place, in which infantry, artillery and cavalry were all brought into
action.  Our men on the right, as they were brought in against the
enemy, came in on higher ground, and upon his flank, giving us every
advantage to be derived from the lay of the country.  Our firing was
also very much more rapid, because the enemy commenced his retreat
westward and in firing as he retreated had to turn around every time he
fired.  The enemy's loss was very heavy, as well in killed and wounded
as in captures.  Some six general officers fell into our hands in this
engagement, and seven thousand men were made prisoners.  This engagement
was commenced in the middle of the afternoon of the 6th, and the retreat
and pursuit were continued until nightfall, when the armies bivouacked
upon the ground where the night had overtaken them.

When the move towards Amelia Court House had commenced that morning, I
ordered Wright's corps, which was on the extreme right, to be moved to
the left past the whole army, to take the place of Griffin's, and
ordered the latter at the same time to move by and place itself on the
right.  The object of this movement was to get the 6th corps, Wright's,
next to the cavalry, with which they had formerly served so harmoniously
and so efficiently in the valley of Virginia.

The 6th corps now remained with the cavalry and under Sheridan's direct
command until after the surrender.

Ord had been directed to take possession of all the roads southward
between Burkesville and the High Bridge.  On the morning of the 6th he
sent Colonel Washburn with two infantry regiments with instructions to
destroy High Bridge and to return rapidly to Burkesville Station; and he
prepared himself to resist the enemy there.  Soon after Washburn had
started Ord became a little alarmed as to his safety and sent Colonel
Read, of his staff, with about eighty cavalrymen, to overtake him and
bring him back.  Very shortly after this he heard that the head of Lee's
column had got up to the road between him and where Washburn now was,
and attempted to send reinforcements, but the reinforcements could not
get through.  Read, however, had got through ahead of the enemy.  He
rode on to Farmville and was on his way back again when he found his
return cut off, and Washburn confronting apparently the advance of Lee's
army.  Read drew his men up into line of battle, his force now
consisting of less than six hundred men, infantry and cavalry, and rode
along their front, making a speech to his men to inspire them with the
same enthusiasm that he himself felt.  He then gave the order to charge.
This little band made several charges, of course unsuccessful ones, but
inflicted a loss upon the enemy more than equal to their own entire
number.  Colonel Read fell mortally wounded, and then Washburn; and at
the close of the conflict nearly every officer of the command and most
of the rank and file had been either killed or wounded.  The remainder
then surrendered.  The Confederates took this to be only the advance of
a larger column which had headed them off, and so stopped to intrench;
so that this gallant band of six hundred had checked the progress of a
strong detachment of the Confederate army.

This stoppage of Lee's column no doubt saved to us the trains following.
Lee himself pushed on and crossed the wagon road bridge near the High
Bridge, and attempted to destroy it.  He did set fire to it, but the
flames had made but little headway when Humphreys came up with his corps
and drove away the rear-guard which had been left to protect it while it
was being burned up.  Humphreys forced his way across with some loss,
and followed Lee to the intersection of the road crossing at Farmville
with the one from Petersburg.  Here Lee held a position which was very
strong, naturally, besides being intrenched.  Humphreys was alone,
confronting him all through the day, and in a very hazardous position.
He put on a bold face, however, and assaulted with some loss, but was
not assaulted in return.

Our cavalry had gone farther south by the way of Prince Edward's Court
House, along with the 5th corps (Griffin's), Ord falling in between
Griffin and the Appomattox.  Crook's division of cavalry and Wright's
corps pushed on west of Farmville.  When the cavalry reached Farmville
they found that some of the Confederates were in ahead of them, and had
already got their trains of provisions back to that point; but our
troops were in time to prevent them from securing anything to eat,
although they succeeded in again running the trains off, so that we did
not get them for some time.  These troops retreated to the north side of
the Appomattox to join Lee, and succeeded in destroying the bridge after
them.  Considerable fighting ensued there between Wright's corps and a
portion of our cavalry and the Confederates, but finally the cavalry
forded the stream and drove them away.  Wright built a foot-bridge for
his men to march over on and then marched out to the junction of the
roads to relieve Humphreys, arriving there that night.  I had stopped
the night before at Burkesville Junction.  Our troops were then pretty
much all out of the place, but we had a field hospital there, and Ord's
command was extended from that point towards Farmville.

Here I met Dr. Smith, a Virginian and an officer of the regular army,
who told me that in a conversation with General Ewell, one of the
prisoners and a relative of his, Ewell had said that when we had got
across the James River he knew their cause was lost, and it was the duty
of their authorities to make the best terms they could while they still
had a right to claim concessions. The authorities thought differently,
however.  Now the cause was lost and they had no right to claim
anything.  He said further, that for every man that was killed after
this in the war somebody is responsible, and it would be but very little
better than murder.  He was not sure that Lee would consent to surrender
his army without being able to consult with the President, but he hoped
he would.

I rode in to Farmville on the 7th, arriving there early in the day.
Sheridan and Ord were pushing through, away to the south.  Meade was
back towards the High Bridge, and Humphreys confronting Lee as before
stated.  After having gone into bivouac at Prince Edward's Court House,
Sheridan learned that seven trains of provisions and forage were at
Appomattox, and determined to start at once and capture them; and a
forced march was necessary in order to get there before Lee's army could
secure them.  He wrote me a note telling me this.  This fact, together
with the incident related the night before by Dr. Smith, gave me the
idea of opening correspondence with General Lee on the subject of the
surrender of his army.  I therefore wrote to him on this day, as
follows:


HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S., 5 P.M., April 7, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE Commanding C. S. A.

The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of
further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this
struggle.  I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from
myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of
you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army known
as the Army of Northern Virginia.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


Lee replied on the evening of the same day as follows:


April 7, 1865.

GENERAL:  I have received your note of this day.  Though not
entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further
resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate
your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore before
considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition
of its surrender.

R. E. LEE, General.

LIEUT.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commanding Armies of the U. S.


This was not satisfactory, but I regarded it as deserving another letter
and wrote him as follows:


April 8, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding C. S. A.

Your note of last evening in reply to mine of same date, asking the
condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of Northern
Virginia is just received.  In reply I would say that, peace being my
great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely:
that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking
up arms again against the Government of the United States until properly
exchanged.  I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any
officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to
you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the
surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


Lee's army was rapidly crumbling.  Many of his soldiers had enlisted
from that part of the State where they now were, and were continually
dropping out of the ranks and going to their homes.  I know that I
occupied a hotel almost destitute of furniture at Farmville, which had
probably been used as a Confederate hospital.  The next morning when I
came out I found a Confederate colonel there, who reported to me and
said that he was the proprietor of that house, and that he was a colonel
of a regiment that had been raised in that neighborhood.  He said that
when he came along past home, he found that he was the only man of the
regiment remaining with Lee's army, so he just dropped out, and now
wanted to surrender himself.  I told him to stay there and he would not
be molested.  That was one regiment which had been eliminated from Lee's
force by this crumbling process.

Although Sheridan had been marching all day, his troops moved with
alacrity and without any straggling.  They began to see the end of what
they had been fighting four years for.  Nothing seemed to fatigue them.
They were ready to move without rations and travel without rest until
the end.  Straggling had entirely ceased, and every man was now a rival
for the front.  The infantry marched about as rapidly as the cavalry
could.

Sheridan sent Custer with his division to move south of Appomattox
Station, which is about five miles south-west of the Court House, to get
west of the trains and destroy the roads to the rear.  They got there
the night of the 8th, and succeeded partially; but some of the train men
had just discovered the movement of our troops and succeeded in running
off three of the trains.  The other four were held by Custer.

The head of Lee's column came marching up there on the morning of the
9th, not dreaming, I suppose, that there were any Union soldiers near.
The Confederates were surprised to find our cavalry had possession of
the trains.  However, they were desperate and at once assaulted, hoping
to recover them.  In the melee that ensued they succeeded in burning one
of the trains, but not in getting anything from it.  Custer then ordered
the other trains run back on the road towards Farmville, and the fight
continued.

So far, only our cavalry and the advance of Lee's army were engaged.
Soon, however, Lee's men were brought up from the rear, no doubt
expecting they had nothing to meet but our cavalry.  But our infantry
had pushed forward so rapidly that by the time the enemy got up they
found Griffin's corps and the Army of the James confronting them.  A
sharp engagement ensued, but Lee quickly set up a white flag.



CHAPTER LXVII.

NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX--INTERVIEW WITH LEE AT MCLEAN'S HOUSE--THE
TERMS OF SURRENDER--LEE'S SURRENDER--INTERVIEW WITH LEE AFTER THE
SURRENDER.

On the 8th I had followed the Army of the Potomac in rear of Lee.  I was
suffering very severely with a sick headache, and stopped at a farmhouse
on the road some distance in rear of the main body of the army.  I spent
the night in bathing my feet in hot water and mustard, and putting
mustard plasters on my wrists and the back part of my neck, hoping to be
cured by morning. During the night I received Lee's answer to my letter
of the 8th, inviting an interview between the lines on the following
morning. (*43)  But it was for a different purpose from that of
surrendering his army, and I answered him as follows:


HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S., April 9, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding C. S. A.

Your note of yesterday is received.  As I have no authority to treat on
the subject of peace, the meeting proposed for ten A.M. to-day could
lead to no good.  I will state, however, General, that I am equally
anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same
feeling.  The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood.  By
the South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable
event, save thousands of human lives and hundreds of millions of
property not yet destroyed.  Sincerely hoping that all our difficulties
may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself,
etc.,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


I proceeded at an early hour in the morning, still suffering with the
headache, to get to the head of the column.  I was not more than two or
three miles from Appomattox Court House at the time, but to go direct I
would have to pass through Lee's army, or a portion of it.  I had
therefore to move south in order to get upon a road coming up from
another direction.

When the white flag was put out by Lee, as already described, I was in
this way moving towards Appomattox Court House, and consequently could
not be communicated with immediately, and be informed of what Lee had
done.  Lee, therefore, sent a flag to the rear to advise Meade and one
to the front to Sheridan, saying that he had sent a message to me for
the purpose of having a meeting to consult about the surrender of his
army, and asked for a suspension of hostilities until I could be
communicated with.  As they had heard nothing of this until the fighting
had got to be severe and all going against Lee, both of these commanders
hesitated very considerably about suspending hostilities at all.  They
were afraid it was not in good faith, and we had the Army of Northern
Virginia where it could not escape except by some deception.  They,
however, finally consented to a suspension of hostilities for two hours
to give an opportunity of communicating with me in that time, if
possible.  It was found that, from the route I had taken, they would
probably not be able to communicate with me and get an answer back
within the time fixed unless the messenger should pass through the rebel
lines.

Lee, therefore, sent an escort with the officer bearing this message
through his lines to me.


April 9, 1865.

GENERAL:  I received your note of this morning on the picket-line
whither I had come to meet you and ascertain definitely what terms were
embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender
of this army.  I now request an interview in accordance with the offer
contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose.

R. E. LEE, General.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT Commanding U. S. Armies.


When the officer reached me I was still suffering with the sick
headache, but the instant I saw the contents of the note I was cured.  I
wrote the following note in reply and hastened on:


April 9, 1865.

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding C. S. Armies.

Your note of this date is but this moment (11.50 A.M.) received, in
consequence of my having passed from the Richmond and Lynchburg road to
the Farmville and Lynchburg road.  I am at this writing about four miles
west of Walker's Church and will push forward to the front for the
purpose of meeting you. Notice sent to me on this road where you wish
the interview to take place will meet me.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.


I was conducted at once to where Sheridan was located with his troops
drawn up in line of battle facing the Confederate army near by.  They
were very much excited, and expressed their view that this was all a
ruse employed to enable the Confederates to get away.  They said they
believed that Johnston was marching up from North Carolina now, and Lee
was moving to join him; and they would whip the rebels where they now
were in five minutes if I would only let them go in.  But I had no doubt
about the good faith of Lee, and pretty soon was conducted to where he
was.  I found him at the house of a Mr. McLean, at Appomattox Court
House, with Colonel Marshall, one of his staff officers, awaiting my
arrival.  The head of his column was occupying a hill, on a portion of
which was an apple orchard, beyond a little valley which separated it
from that on the crest of which Sheridan's forces were drawn up in line
of battle to the south.

Before stating what took place between General Lee and myself, I will
give all there is of the story of the famous apple tree.

Wars produce many stories of fiction, some of which are told until they
are believed to be true.  The war of the rebellion was no exception to
this rule, and the story of the apple tree is one of those fictions
based on a slight foundation of fact. As I have said, there was an apple
orchard on the side of the hill occupied by the Confederate forces.
Running diagonally up the hill was a wagon road, which, at one point,
ran very near one of the trees, so that the wheels of vehicles had, on
that side, cut off the roots of this tree, leaving a little embankment.
General Babcock, of my staff, reported to me that when he first met
General Lee he was sitting upon this embankment with his feet in the
road below and his back resting against the tree.  The story had no
other foundation than that.  Like many other stories, it would be very
good if it was only true.

I had known General Lee in the old army, and had served with him in the
Mexican War; but did not suppose, owing to the difference in our age and
rank, that he would remember me, while I would more naturally remember
him distinctly, because he was the chief of staff of General Scott in
the Mexican War.

When I had left camp that morning I had not expected so soon the result
that was then taking place, and consequently was in rough garb.  I was
without a sword, as I usually was when on horseback on the field, and
wore a soldier's blouse for a coat, with the shoulder straps of my rank
to indicate to the army who I was. When I went into the house I found
General Lee.  We greeted each other, and after shaking hands took our
seats.  I had my staff with me, a good portion of whom were in the room
during the whole of the interview.

What General Lee's feelings were I do not know.  As he was a man of much
dignity, with an impassible face, it was impossible to say whether he
felt inwardly glad that the end had finally come, or felt sad over the
result, and was too manly to show it. Whatever his feelings, they were
entirely concealed from my observation; but my own feelings, which had
been quite jubilant on the receipt of his letter, were sad and
depressed.  I felt like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall
of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much
for a cause, though that cause was, I believe, one of the worst for
which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the least
excuse.  I do not question, however, the sincerity of the great mass of
those who were opposed to us.

General Lee was dressed in a full uniform which was entirely new, and
was wearing a sword of considerable value, very likely the sword which
had been presented by the State of Virginia; at all events, it was an
entirely different sword from the one that would ordinarily be worn in
the field.  In my rough traveling suit, the uniform of a private with
the straps of a lieutenant-general, I must have contrasted very
strangely with a man so handsomely dressed, six feet high and of
faultless form. But this was not a matter that I thought of until
afterwards.

We soon fell into a conversation about old army times.  He remarked that
he remembered me very well in the old army; and I told him that as a
matter of course I remembered him perfectly, but from the difference in
our rank and years (there being about sixteen years' difference in our
ages), I had thought it very likely that I had not attracted his
attention sufficiently to be remembered by him after such a long
interval.  Our conversation grew so pleasant that I almost forgot the
object of our meeting.  After the conversation had run on in this style
for some time, General Lee called my attention to the object of our
meeting, and said that he had asked for this interview for the purpose
of getting from me the terms I proposed to give his army.  I said that I
meant merely that his army should lay down their arms, not to take them
up again during the continuance of the war unless duly and properly
exchanged.  He said that he had so understood my letter.

Then we gradually fell off again into conversation about matters foreign
to the subject which had brought us together.  This continued for some
little time, when General Lee again interrupted the course of the
conversation by suggesting that the terms I proposed to give his army
ought to be written out. I called to General Parker, secretary on my
staff, for writing materials, and commenced writing out the following
terms:


APPOMATTOX C. H., VA.,

Ap 19th, 1865.

GEN. R. E. LEE, Comd'g C. S. A.

GEN:  In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th
inst., I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of N. Va. on the
following terms, to wit:  Rolls of all the officers and men to be made
in duplicate.  One copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the
other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate.
The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms
against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged,
and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men
of their commands.  The arms, artillery and public property to be parked
and stacked, and turned over to the officer appointed by me to receive
them.  This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their
private horses or baggage.  This done, each officer and man will be
allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United States
authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force
where they may reside.

Very respectfully, U. S. GRANT, Lt. Gen.


When I put my pen to the paper I did not know the first word that I
should make use of in writing the terms.  I only knew what was in my
mind, and I wished to express it clearly, so that there could be no
mistaking it.  As I wrote on, the thought occurred to me that the
officers had their own private horses and effects, which were important
to them, but of no value to us; also that it would be an unnecessary
humiliation to call upon them to deliver their side arms.

No conversation, not one word, passed between General Lee and myself,
either about private property, side arms, or kindred subjects.  He
appeared to have no objections to the terms first proposed; or if he had
a point to make against them he wished to wait until they were in
writing to make it.  When he read over that part of the terms about side
arms, horses and private property of the officers, he remarked, with
some feeling, I thought, that this would have a happy effect upon his
army.

Then, after a little further conversation, General Lee remarked to me
again that their army was organized a little differently from the army
of the United States (still maintaining by implication that we were two
countries); that in their army the cavalrymen and artillerists owned
their own horses; and he asked if he was to understand that the men who
so owned their horses were to be permitted to retain them.  I told him
that as the terms were written they would not; that only the officers
were permitted to take their private property.  He then, after reading
over the terms a second time, remarked that that was clear.

I then said to him that I thought this would be about the last battle of
the war--I sincerely hoped so; and I said further I took it that most of
the men in the ranks were small farmers. The whole country had been so
raided by the two armies that it was doubtful whether they would be able
to put in a crop to carry themselves and their families through the next
winter without the aid of the horses they were then riding.  The United
States did not want them and I would, therefore, instruct the officers I
left behind to receive the paroles of his troops to let every man of the
Confederate army who claimed to own a horse or mule take the animal to
his home.  Lee remarked again that this would have a happy effect.

He then sat down and wrote out the following letter:


HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865.

GENERAL:--I received your letter of this date containing the terms of
the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you.  As
they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the
8th inst., they are accepted.  I will proceed to designate the proper
officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

R. E. LEE, General. LIEUT.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT.


While duplicates of the two letters were being made, the Union generals
present were severally presented to General Lee.

The much talked of surrendering of Lee's sword and my handing it back,
this and much more that has been said about it is the purest romance.
The word sword or side arms was not mentioned by either of us until I
wrote it in the terms.  There was no premeditation, and it did not occur
to me until the moment I wrote it down.  If I had happened to omit it,
and General Lee had called my attention to it, I should have put it in
the terms precisely as I acceded to the provision about the soldiers
retaining their horses.

General Lee, after all was completed and before taking his leave,
remarked that his army was in a very bad condition for want of food, and
that they were without forage; that his men had been living for some
days on parched corn exclusively, and that he would have to ask me for
rations and forage.  I told him "certainly," and asked for how many men
he wanted rations.  His answer was "about twenty-five thousand;" and I
authorized him to send his own commissary and quartermaster to
Appomattox Station, two or three miles away, where he could have, out of
the trains we had stopped, all the provisions wanted.  As for forage, we
had ourselves depended almost entirely upon the country for that.

Generals Gibbon, Griffin and Merritt were designated by me to carry into
effect the paroling of Lee's troops before they should start for their
homes--General Lee leaving Generals Longstreet, Gordon and Pendleton for
them to confer with in order to facilitate this work.  Lee and I then
separated as cordially as we had met, he returning to his own lines, and
all went into bivouac for the night at Appomattox.

Soon after Lee's departure I telegraphed to Washington as follows:


HEADQUARTERS APPOMATTOX C. H., VA., April 9th, 1865, 4.30 P.M.

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington.

General Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia this afternoon on
terms proposed by myself.  The accompanying additional correspondence
will show the conditions fully.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.


When news of the surrender first reached our lines our men commenced
firing a salute of a hundred guns in honor of the victory.  I at once
sent word, however, to have it stopped.  The Confederates were now our
prisoners, and we did not want to exult over their downfall.

I determined to return to Washington at once, with a view to putting a
stop to the purchase of supplies, and what I now deemed other useless
outlay of money.  Before leaving, however, I thought I (*44) would like
to see General Lee again; so next morning I rode out beyond our lines
towards his headquarters, preceded by a bugler and a staff-officer
carrying a white flag.

Lee soon mounted his horse, seeing who it was, and met me.  We had there
between the lines, sitting on horseback, a very pleasant conversation of
over half an hour, in the course of which Lee said to me that the South
was a big country and that we might have to march over it three or four
times before the war entirely ended, but that we would now be able to do
it as they could no longer resist us.  He expressed it as his earnest
hope, however, that we would not be called upon to cause more loss and
sacrifice of life; but he could not foretell the result.  I then
suggested to General Lee that there was not a man in the Confederacy
whose influence with the soldiery and the whole people was as great as
his, and that if he would now advise the surrender of all the armies I
had no doubt his advice would be followed with alacrity.  But Lee said,
that he could not do that without consulting the President first.  I
knew there was no use to urge him to do anything against his ideas of
what was right.

I was accompanied by my staff and other officers, some of whom seemed to
have a great desire to go inside the Confederate lines.  They finally
asked permission of Lee to do so for the purpose of seeing some of their
old army friends, and the permission was granted.  They went over, had a
very pleasant time with their old friends, and brought some of them back
with them when they returned.

When Lee and I separated he went back to his lines and I returned to the
house of Mr. McLean.  Here the officers of both armies came in great
numbers, and seemed to enjoy the meeting as much as though they had been
friends separated for a long time while fighting battles under the same
flag.  For the time being it looked very much as if all thought of the
war had escaped their minds.  After an hour pleasantly passed in this
way I set out on horseback, accompanied by my staff and a small escort,
for Burkesville Junction, up to which point the railroad had by this
time been repaired.



CHAPTER LXVIII.

MORALE OF THE TWO ARMIES--RELATIVE CONDITIONS OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH
--PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITS RICHMOND--ARRIVAL AT WASHINGTON--PRESIDENT
LINCOLN'S ASSASSINATION--PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S POLICY.

After the fall of Petersburg, and when the armies of the Potomac and the
James were in motion to head off Lee's army, the morale of the National
troops had greatly improved.  There was no more straggling, no more rear
guards.  The men who in former times had been falling back, were now, as
I have already stated, striving to get to the front.  For the first time
in four weary years they felt that they were now nearing the time when
they could return to their homes with their country saved.  On the other
hand, the Confederates were more than correspondingly depressed.  Their
despondency increased with each returning day, and especially after the
battle of Sailor's Creek.  They threw away their arms in constantly
increasing numbers, dropping out of the ranks and betaking themselves to
the woods in the hope of reaching their homes.  I have already instanced
the case of the entire disintegration of a regiment whose colonel I met
at Farmville.  As a result of these and other influences, when Lee
finally surrendered at Appomattox, there were only 28,356 officers and
men left to be paroled, and many of these were without arms.  It was
probably this latter fact which gave rise to the statement sometimes
made, North and South, that Lee surrendered a smaller number of men than
what the official figures show.  As a matter of official record, and in
addition to the number paroled as given above, we captured between March
29th and the date of surrender 19,132 Confederates, to say nothing of
Lee's other losses, killed, wounded and missing, during the series of
desperate conflicts which marked his headlong and determined flight.
The same record shows the number of cannon, including those at
Appomattox, to have been 689 between the dates named.

There has always been a great conflict of opinion as to the number of
troops engaged in every battle, or all important battles, fought between
the sections, the South magnifying the number of Union troops engaged
and belittling their own. Northern writers have fallen, in many
instances, into the same error.  I have often heard gentlemen, who were
thoroughly loyal to the Union, speak of what a splendid fight the South
had made and successfully continued for four years before yielding, with
their twelve million of people against our twenty, and of the twelve
four being  slaves, non-combatants.  I will add to their
argument.  We had many regiments of brave and loyal men who volunteered
under great difficulty from the twelve million belonging to the South.

But the South had rebelled against the National government.  It was not
bound by any constitutional restrictions.  The whole South was a
military camp.  The occupation of the <DW52> people was to furnish
supplies for the army.  Conscription was resorted to early, and embraced
every male from the age of eighteen to forty-five, excluding only those
physically unfit to serve in the field, and the necessary number of
civil officers of State and intended National government.  The old and
physically disabled furnished a good portion of these.  The slaves, the
non-combatants, one-third of the whole, were required to work in the
field without regard to sex, and almost without regard to age.  Children
from the age of eight years could and did handle the hoe; they were not
much older when they began to hold the plough.  The four million of
 non-combatants were equal to more than three times their number
in the North, age for age and sex for sex, in supplying food from the
soil to support armies.  Women did not work in the fields in the North,
and children attended school.

The arts of peace were carried on in the North.  Towns and cities grew
during the war.  Inventions were made in all kinds of machinery to
increase the products of a day's labor in the shop, and in the field.
In the South no opposition was allowed to the government which had been
set up and which would have become real and respected if the rebellion
had been successful.  No rear had to be protected.  All the troops in
service could be brought to the front to contest every inch of ground
threatened with invasion.  The press of the South, like the people who
remained at home, were loyal to the Southern cause.

In the North, the country, the towns and the cities presented about the
same appearance they do in time of peace.  The furnace was in blast, the
shops were filled with workmen, the fields were cultivated, not only to
supply the population of the North and the troops invading the South,
but to ship abroad to pay a part of the expense of the war.  In the
North the press was free up to the point of open treason.  The citizen
could entertain his views and express them.  Troops were necessary in
the Northern States to prevent prisoners from the Southern army being
released by outside force, armed and set at large to destroy by fire our
Northern cities.  Plans were formed by Northern and Southern citizens to
burn our cities, to poison the water supplying them, to spread infection
by importing clothing from infected regions, to blow up our river and
lake steamers--regardless of the destruction of innocent lives.  The
copperhead disreputable portion of the press magnified rebel successes,
and belittled those of the Union army.  It was, with a large following,
an auxiliary to the Confederate army.  The North would have been much
stronger with a hundred thousand of these men in the Confederate ranks
and the rest of their kind thoroughly subdued, as the Union sentiment
was in the South, than we were as the battle was fought.

As I have said, the whole South was a military camp.  The <DW52>
people, four million in number, were submissive, and worked in the field
and took care of the families while the able-bodied white men were at
the front fighting for a cause destined to defeat.  The cause was
popular, and was enthusiastically supported by the young men.  The
conscription took all of them.  Before the war was over, further
conscriptions took those between fourteen and eighteen years of age as
junior reserves, and those between forty-five and sixty as senior
reserves.  It would have been an offence, directly after the war, and
perhaps it would be now, to ask any able-bodied man in the South, who
was between the ages of fourteen and sixty at any time during the war,
whether he had been in the Confederate army.  He would assert that he
had, or account for his absence from the ranks.  Under such
circumstances it is hard to conceive how the North showed such a
superiority of force in every battle fought.  I know they did not.

During 1862 and '3, John H. Morgan, a partisan officer, of no military
education, but possessed of courage and endurance, operated in the rear
of the Army of the Ohio in Kentucky and Tennessee.  He had no base of
supplies to protect, but was at home wherever he went.  The army
operating against the South, on the contrary, had to protect its lines
of communication with the North, from which all supplies had to come to
the front.  Every foot of road had to be guarded by troops stationed at
convenient distances apart.  These guards could not render assistance
beyond the points where stationed.  Morgan was foot-loose and could
operate where, his information--always correct--led him to believe he
could do the greatest damage.  During the time he was operating in this
way he killed, wounded and captured several times the number he ever had
under his command at any one time.  He destroyed many millions of
property in addition. Places he did not attack had to be guarded as if
threatened by him.  Forrest, an abler soldier, operated farther west,
and held from the National front quite as many men as could be spared
for offensive operations.  It is safe to say that more than half the
National army was engaged in guarding lines of supplies, or were on
leave, sick in hospital or on detail which prevented their bearing arms.
Then, again, large forces were employed where no Confederate army
confronted them.  I deem it safe to say that there were no large
engagements where the National numbers compensated for the advantage of
position and intrenchment occupied by the enemy.

While I was in pursuit of General Lee, the President went to Richmond in
company with Admiral Porter, and on board his flagship.  He found the
people of that city in great consternation.  The leading citizens among
the people who had remained at home surrounded him, anxious that
something should be done to relieve them from suspense.  General Weitzel
was not then in the city, having taken offices in one of the neighboring
villages after his troops had succeeded in subduing the conflagration
which they had found in progress on entering the Confederate capital.
The President sent for him, and, on his arrival, a short interview was
had on board the vessel, Admiral Porter and a leading citizen of
Virginia being also present. After this interview the President wrote an
order in about these words, which I quote from memory:  "General Weitzel
is authorized to permit the body calling itself the Legislature of
Virginia to meet for the purpose of recalling the Virginia troops from
the Confederate armies."

Immediately some of the gentlemen composing that body wrote out a call
for a meeting and had it published in their papers.  This call, however,
went very much further than Mr. Lincoln had contemplated, as he did not
say the "Legislature of Virginia" but "the body which called itself the
Legislature of Virginia." Mr. Stanton saw the call as published in the
Northern papers the very next issue and took the liberty of
countermanding the order authorizing any meeting of the Legislature, or
any other body, and this notwithstanding the fact that the President was
nearer the spot than he was.

This was characteristic of Mr. Stanton.  He was a man who never
questioned his own authority, and who always did in war time what he
wanted to do.  He was an able constitutional lawyer and jurist; but the
Constitution was not an impediment to him while the war lasted.  In this
latter particular I entirely agree with the view he evidently held.  The
Constitution was not framed with a view to any such rebellion as that of
1861-5.  While it did not authorize rebellion it made no provision
against it.  Yet the right to resist or suppress rebellion is as
inherent as the right of self-defence, and as natural as the right of an
individual to preserve his life when in jeopardy.  The Constitution was
therefore in abeyance for the time being, so far as it in any way
affected the progress and termination of the war.

Those in rebellion against the government of the United States were not
restricted by constitutional provisions, or any other, except the acts
of their Congress, which was loyal and devoted to the cause for which
the South was then fighting.  It would be a hard case when one-third of
a nation, united in rebellion against the national authority, is
entirely untrammeled, that the other two-thirds, in their efforts to
maintain the Union intact, should be restrained by a Constitution
prepared by our ancestors for the express purpose of insuring the
permanency of the confederation of the States.

After I left General Lee at Appomattox Station, I went with my staff and
a few others directly to Burkesville Station on my way to Washington.
The road from Burkesville back having been newly repaired and the ground
being soft, the train got off the track frequently, and, as a result, it
was after midnight of the second day when I reached City Point.  As soon
as possible I took a dispatch-boat thence to Washington City.

While in Washington I was very busy for a time in preparing the
necessary orders for the new state of affairs; communicating with my
different commanders of separate departments, bodies of troops, etc.
But by the 14th I was pretty well through with this work, so as to be
able to visit my children, who were then in Burlington, New Jersey,
attending school.  Mrs. Grant was with me in Washington at the time, and
we were invited by President and Mrs. Lincoln to accompany them to the
theatre on the evening of that day.  I replied to the President's verbal
invitation to the effect, that if we were in the city we would take
great pleasure in accompanying them; but that I was very anxious to get
away and visit my children, and if I could get through my work during
the day I should do so.  I did get through and started by the evening
train on the 14th, sending Mr. Lincoln word, of course, that I would not
be at the theatre.

At that time the railroad to New York entered Philadelphia on Broad
Street; passengers were conveyed in ambulances to the Delaware River,
and then ferried to Camden, at which point they took the cars again.
When I reached the ferry, on the east side of the City of Philadelphia,
I found people awaiting my arrival there; and also dispatches informing
me of the assassination of the President and Mr. Seward, and of the
probable assassination of the Vice President, Mr. Johnson, and
requesting my immediate return.

It would be impossible for me to describe the feeling that overcame me
at the news of these assassinations, more especially the assassination
of the President.  I knew his goodness of heart, his generosity, his
yielding disposition, his desire to have everybody happy, and above all
his desire to see all the people of the United States enter again upon
the full privileges of citizenship with equality among all.  I knew also
the feeling that Mr. Johnson had expressed in speeches and conversation
against the Southern people, and I feared that his course towards them
would be such as to repel, and make them unwilling citizens; and if they
became such they would remain so for a long while.  I felt that
reconstruction had been set back, no telling how far.

I immediately arranged for getting a train to take me back to Washington
City; but Mrs. Grant was with me; it was after midnight and Burlington
was but an hour away.  Finding that I could accompany her to our house
and return about as soon as they would be ready to take me from the
Philadelphia station, I went up with her and returned immediately by the
same special train.  The joy that I had witnessed among the people in
the street and in public places in Washington when I left there, had
been turned to grief; the city was in reality a city of mourning.  I
have stated what I believed then the effect of this would be, and my
judgment now is that I was right.  I believe the South would have been
saved from very much of the hardness of feeling that was engendered by
Mr. Johnson's course towards them during the first few months of his
administration.  Be this as it may, Mr. Lincoln's assassination was
particularly unfortunate for the entire nation.

Mr. Johnson's course towards the South did engender bitterness of
feeling.  His denunciations of treason and his ever-ready remark,
"Treason is a crime and must be made odious," was repeated to all those
men of the South who came to him to get some assurances of safety so
that they might go to work at something with the feeling that what they
obtained would be secure to them.  He uttered his denunciations with
great vehemence, and as they were accompanied with no assurances of
safety, many Southerners were driven to a point almost beyond endurance.

The President of the United States is, in a large degree, or ought to
be, a representative of the feeling, wishes and judgment of those over
whom he presides; and the Southerners who read the denunciations of
themselves and their people must have come to the conclusion that he
uttered the sentiments of the Northern people; whereas, as a matter of
fact, but for the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, I believe the great
majority of the Northern people, and the soldiers unanimously, would
have been in favor of a speedy reconstruction on terms that would be the
least humiliating to the people who had rebelled against their
government.  They believed, I have no doubt, as I did, that besides
being the mildest, it was also the wisest, policy.

The people who had been in rebellion must necessarily come back into the
Union, and be incorporated as an integral part of the nation.  Naturally
the nearer they were placed to an equality with the people who had not
rebelled, the more reconciled they would feel with their old
antagonists, and the better citizens they would be from the beginning.
They surely would not make good citizens if they felt that they had a
yoke around their necks.

I do not believe that the majority of the Northern people at that time
were in favor of <DW64> suffrage.  They supposed that it would naturally
follow the freedom of the <DW64>, but that there would be a time of
probation, in which the ex-slaves could prepare themselves for the
privileges of citizenship before the full right would be conferred; but
Mr. Johnson, after a complete revolution of sentiment, seemed to regard
the South not only as an oppressed people, but as the people best
entitled to consideration of any of our citizens.  This was more than
the people who had secured to us the perpetuation of the Union were
prepared for, and they became more radical in their views.  The
Southerners had the most power in the executive branch, Mr. Johnson
having gone to their side; and with a compact South, and such sympathy
and support as they could get from the North, they felt that they would
be able to control the nation at once, and already many of them acted as
if they thought they were entitled to do so.

Thus Mr. Johnson, fighting Congress on the one hand, and receiving the
support of the South on the other, drove Congress, which was
overwhelmingly republican, to the passing of first one measure and then
another to restrict his power.  There being a solid South on one side
that was in accord with the political party in the North which had
sympathized with the rebellion, it finally, in the judgment of Congress
and of the majority of the legislatures of the States, became necessary
to enfranchise the <DW64>, in all his ignorance.  In this work, I shall
not discuss the question of how far the policy of Congress in this
particular proved a wise one.  It became an absolute necessity, however,
because of the foolhardiness of the President and the blindness of the
Southern people to their own interest.  As to myself, while strongly
favoring the course that would be the least humiliating to the people
who had been in rebellion, I gradually worked up to the point where,
with the majority of the people, I favored immediate enfranchisement.



CHAPTER LXIX.

SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON--JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER TO SHERMAN--CAPTURE OF
MOBILE--WILSON'S EXPEDITION--CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS--GENERAL
THOMAS'S QUALITIES--ESTIMATE OF GENERAL CANBY.

When I left Appomattox I ordered General Meade to proceed leisurely back
to Burkesville Station with the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the
James, and to go into camp there until further orders from me.  General
Johnston, as has been stated before, was in North Carolina confronting
General Sherman.  It could not be known positively, of course, whether
Johnston would surrender on the news of Lee's surrender, though I
supposed he would; and if he did not, Burkesville Station was the
natural point from which to move to attack him.  The army which I could
have sent against him was superior to his, and that with which Sherman
confronted him was also superior; and between the two he would
necessarily have been crushed, or driven away.  With the loss of their
capital and the Army of Northern Virginia it was doubtful whether
Johnston's men would have the spirit to stand.  My belief was that he
would make no such attempt; but I adopted this course as a precaution
against what might happen, however improbable.

Simultaneously with my starting from City Point, I sent a messenger to
North Carolina by boat with dispatches to General Sherman, informing him
of the surrender of Lee and his army; also of the terms which I had
given him; and I authorized Sherman to give the same terms to Johnston
if the latter chose to accept them.  The country is familiar with the
terms that Sherman agreed to CONDITIONALLY, because they embraced a
political question as well as a military one and he would therefore have
to confer with the government before agreeing to them definitely.

General Sherman had met Mr. Lincoln at City Point while visiting there
to confer with me about our final movement, and knew what Mr. Lincoln
had said to the peace commissioners when he met them at Hampton Roads,
viz.:  that before he could enter into negotiations with them they would
have to agree to two points: one being that the Union should be
preserved, and the other that slavery should be abolished; and if they
were ready to concede these two points he was almost ready to sign his
name to a blank piece of paper and permit them to fill out the balance
of the terms upon which we would live together.  He had also seen
notices in the newspapers of Mr. Lincoln's visit to Richmond, and had
read in the same papers that while there he had authorized the convening
of the Legislature of Virginia.

Sherman thought, no doubt, in adding to the terms that I had made with
general Lee, that he was but carrying out the wishes of the President of
the United States.  But seeing that he was going beyond his authority,
he made it a point that the terms were only conditional.  They signed
them with this understanding, and agreed to a truce until the terms
could be sent to Washington for approval; if approved by the proper
authorities there, they would then be final; if not approved, then he
would give due notice, before resuming hostilities.  As the world knows,
Sherman, from being one of the most popular generals of the land
(Congress having even gone so far as to propose a bill providing for a
second lieutenant-general for the purpose of advancing him to that
grade), was denounced by the President and Secretary of War in very
bitter terms.  Some people went so far as to denounce him as a traitor
--a most preposterous term to apply to a man who had rendered so much
service as he had, even supposing he had made a mistake in granting such
terms as he did to Johnston and his army.  If Sherman had taken
authority to send Johnston with his army home, with their arms to be put
in the arsenals of their own States, without submitting the question to
the authorities at Washington, the suspicions against him might have
some foundation.  But the feeling against Sherman died out very rapidly,
and it was not many weeks before he was restored to the fullest
confidence of the American people.

When, some days after my return to Washington, President Johnson and the
Secretary of war received the terms which General Sherman had forwarded
for approval, a cabinet meeting was immediately called and I was sent
for.  There seemed to be the greatest consternation, lest Sherman would
commit the government to terms which they were not willing to accede to
and which he had no right to grant.  A message went out directing the
troops in the South not to obey General Sherman.  I was ordered to
proceed at once to North Carolina and take charge of matter there
myself. Of course I started without delay, and reached there as soon as
possible.  I repaired to Raleigh, where Sherman was, as quietly as
possible, hoping to see him without even his army learning of my
presence.

When I arrived I went to Sherman's headquarters, and we were at once
closeted together.  I showed him the instruction and orders under which
I visited him.  I told him that I wanted him to notify General Johnston
that the terms which they had conditionally agreed upon had not been
approved in Washington, and that he was authorized to offer the same
terms I had given General Lee.  I sent Sherman to do this himself.  I
did not wish the knowledge of my presence to be known to the army
generally; so I left it to Sherman to negotiate the terms of the
surrender solely by himself, and without the enemy knowing that I was
anywhere near the field.  As soon as possible I started to get away, to
leave Sherman quite free and untrammelled.

At Goldsboro', on my way back, I met a mail, containing the last
newspapers, and I found in them indications of great excitement in the
North over the terms Sherman had given Johnston; and harsh orders that
had been promulgated by the President and Secretary of War.  I knew that
Sherman must see these papers, and I fully realized what great
indignation they would cause him, though I do not think his feelings
could have been more excited than were my own.  But like the true and
loyal soldier that he was, he carried out the instructions I had given
him, obtained the surrender of Johnston's army, and settled down in his
camp about Raleigh, to await final orders.

There were still a few expeditions out in the South that could not be
communicated with, and had to be left to act according to the judgment
of their respective commanders.  With these it was impossible to tell
how the news of the surrender of Lee and Johnston, of which they must
have heard, might affect their judgment as to what was best to do.

The three expeditions which I had tried so hard to get off from the
commands of Thomas and Canby did finally get off:  one under Canby
himself, against Mobile, late in March; that under Stoneman from East
Tennessee on the 20th; and the one under Wilson, starting from Eastport,
Mississippi, on the 22d of March.  They were all eminently successful,
but without any good result. Indeed much valuable property was destroyed
and many lives lost at a time when we would have liked to spare them.
The war was practically over before their victories were gained.  They
were so late in commencing operations, that they did not hold any troops
away that otherwise would have been operating against the armies which
were gradually forcing the Confederate armies to a surrender.  The only
possible good that we may have experienced from these raids was by
Stoneman's getting near Lynchburg about the time the armies of the
Potomac and the James were closing in on Lee at Appomattox.

Stoneman entered North Carolina and then pushed north to strike the
Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.  He got upon that road, destroyed its
bridges at different places and rendered the road useless to the enemy
up to within a few miles of Lynchburg.  His approach caused the
evacuation of that city about the time we were at Appomattox, and was
the cause of a commotion we heard of there.  He then pushed south, and
was operating in the rear of Johnston's army about the time the
negotiations were going on between Sherman and Johnston for the latter's
surrender.  In this raid Stoneman captured and destroyed a large amount
of stores, while fourteen guns and nearly two thousand prisoners were
the trophies of his success.

Canby appeared before Mobile on the 27th of March.  The city of Mobile
was protected by two forts, besides other intrenchments--Spanish Fort,
on the east side of the bay, and Fort Blakely, north of the city.  These
forts were invested.  On the night of the 8th of April, the National
troops having carried the enemy's works at one point, Spanish Fort was
evacuated; and on the 9th, the very day of Lee's surrender, Blakely was
carried by assault, with a considerable loss to us.  On the 11th the
city was evacuated.

I had tried for more than two years to have an expedition sent against
Mobile when its possession by us would have been of great advantage.  It
finally cost lives to take it when its possession was of no importance,
and when, if left alone, it would within a few days have fallen into our
hands without any bloodshed whatever.

Wilson moved out with full 12,000 men, well equipped and well armed.  He
was an energetic officer and accomplished his work rapidly.  Forrest was
in his front, but with neither his old-time army nor his old-time
prestige.  He now had principally conscripts.  His conscripts were
generally old men and boys.  He had a few thousand regular cavalry left,
but not enough to even <DW44> materially the progress of Wilson's
cavalry.  Selma fell on the 2d of April, with a large number of
prisoners and a large quantity of war material, machine shops, etc., to
be disposed of by the victors.  Tuscaloosa, Montgomery and West Point
fell in quick succession.  These were all important points to the enemy
by reason of their railroad connections, as depots of supplies, and
because of their manufactories of war material.  They were fortified or
intrenched, and there was considerable fighting before they were
captured.  Macon surrendered on the 21st of April.  Here news was
received of the negotiations for the surrender of Johnston's army.
Wilson belonged to the military division commanded by Sherman, and of
course was bound by his terms.  This stopped all fighting.

General Richard Taylor had now become the senior Confederate officer
still at liberty east of the Mississippi River, and on the 4th of May he
surrendered everything within the limits of this extensive command.
General E. Kirby Smith surrendered the trans-Mississippi department on
the 26th of May, leaving no other Confederate army at liberty to
continue the war.

Wilson's raid resulted in the capture of the fugitive president of the
defunct confederacy before he got out of the country. This occurred at
Irwinsville, Georgia, on the 11th of May.  For myself, and I believe Mr.
Lincoln shared the feeling, I would have been very glad to have seen Mr.
Davis succeed in escaping, but for one reason:  I feared that if not
captured, he might get into the trans-Mississippi region and there set
up a more contracted confederacy.  The young men now out of homes and
out of employment might have rallied under his standard and protracted
the war yet another year.  The Northern people were tired of the war,
they were tired of piling up a debt which would be a further mortgage
upon their homes.

Mr. Lincoln, I believe, wanted Mr. Davis to escape, because he did not
wish to deal with the matter of his punishment.  He knew there would be
people clamoring for the punishment of the ex-Confederate president, for
high treason.  He thought blood enough had already been spilled to atone
for our wickedness as a nation.  At all events he did not wish to be the
judge to decide whether more should be shed or not.  But his own life
was sacrificed at the hands of an assassin before the ex-president of
the Confederacy was a prisoner in the hands of the government which he
had lent all his talent and all his energies to destroy.

All things are said to be wisely directed, and for the best interest of
all concerned.  This reflection does not, however, abate in the
slightest our sense of bereavement in the untimely loss of so good and
great a man as Abraham Lincoln.

He would have proven the best friend the South could have had, and saved
much of the wrangling and bitterness of feeling brought out by
reconstruction under a President who at first wished to revenge himself
upon Southern men of better social standing than himself, but who still
sought their recognition, and in a short time conceived the idea and
advanced the proposition to become their Moses to lead them triumphantly
out of all their difficulties.

The story of the legislation enacted during the reconstruction period to
stay the hands of the President is too fresh in the minds of the people
to be told now.  Much of it, no doubt, was unconstitutional; but it was
hoped that the laws enacted would serve their purpose before the
question of constitutionality could be submitted to the judiciary and a
decision obtained. These laws did serve their purpose, and now remain "a
dead letter" upon the statute books of the United States, no one taking
interest enough in them to give them a passing thought.

Much was said at the time about the garb Mr. Davis was wearing when he
was captured.  I cannot settle this question from personal knowledge of
the facts; but I have been under the belief, from information given to
me by General Wilson shortly after the event, that when Mr. Davis
learned that he was surrounded by our cavalry he was in his tent dressed
in a gentleman's dressing gown.  Naturally enough, Mr. Davis wanted to
escape, and would not reflect much how this should be accomplished
provided it might be done successfully.  If captured, he would be no
ordinary prisoner.  He represented all there was of that hostility to
the government which had caused four years of the bloodiest war--and the
most costly in other respects of which history makes any record.  Every
one supposed he would be tried for treason if captured, and that he
would be executed.  Had he succeeded in making his escape in any
disguise it would have been adjudged a good thing afterwards by his
admirers.

As my official letters on file in the War Department, as well as my
remarks in this book, reflect upon General Thomas by dwelling somewhat
upon his tardiness, it is due to myself, as well as to him, that I give
my estimate of him as a soldier.  The same remark will apply also in the
case of General Canby.  I had been at West Point with Thomas one year,
and had known him later in the old army.  He was a man of commanding
appearance, slow and deliberate in speech and action; sensible, honest
and brave.  He possessed valuable soldierly qualities in an eminent
degree.  He gained the confidence of all who served under him, and
almost their love.  This implies a very valuable quality.  It is a
quality which calls out the most efficient services of the troops
serving under the commander possessing it.

Thomas's dispositions were deliberately made, and always good. He could
not be driven from a point he was given to hold.  He was not as good,
however, in pursuit as he was in action.  I do not believe that he could
ever have conducted Sherman's army from Chattanooga to Atlanta against
the defences and the commander guarding that line in 1864.  On the other
hand, if it had been given him to hold the line which Johnston tried to
hold, neither that general nor Sherman, nor any other officer could have
done it better.

Thomas was a valuable officer, who richly deserved, as he has received,
the plaudits of his countrymen for the part he played in the great
tragedy of 1861-5.

General Canby was an officer of great merit.  He was naturally studious,
and inclined to the law.  There have been in the army but very few, if
any, officers who took as much interest in reading and digesting every
act of Congress and every regulation for the government of the army as
he.  His knowledge gained in this way made him a most valuable staff
officer, a capacity in which almost all his army services were rendered
up to the time of his being assigned to the Military Division of the
Gulf.  He was an exceedingly modest officer, though of great talent and
learning.  I presume his feelings when first called upon to command a
large army against a fortified city, were somewhat like my own when
marching a regiment against General Thomas Harris in Missouri in 1861.
Neither of us would have felt the slightest trepidation in going into
battle with some one else commanding.  Had Canby been in other
engagements afterwards, he would, I have no doubt, have advanced without
any fear arising from a sense of the responsibility.  He was afterwards
killed in the lava beds of Southern Oregon, while in pursuit of the
hostile Modoc Indians.  His character was as pure as his talent and
learning were great.  His services were valuable during the war, but
principally as a bureau officer.  I have no idea that it was from choice
that his services were rendered in an office, but because of his
superior efficiency there.



CHAPTER LXX.

THE END OF THE WAR--THE MARCH TO WASHINGTON--ONE OF LINCOLN'S ANECDOTES
--GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON--CHARACTERISTICS OF LINCOLN AND STANTON
--ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS.

Things began to quiet down, and as the certainty that there would be no
more armed resistance became clearer, the troops in North Carolina and
Virginia were ordered to march immediately to the capital, and go into
camp there until mustered out.  Suitable garrisons were left at the
prominent places throughout the South to insure obedience to the laws
that might be enacted for the government of the several States, and to
insure security to the lives and property of all classes.  I do not know
how far this was necessary, but I deemed it necessary, at that time,
that such a course should be pursued.  I think now that these garrisons
were continued after they ceased to be absolutely required; but it is
not to be expected that such a rebellion as was fought between the
sections from 1861 to 1865 could terminate without leaving many serious
apprehensions in the mind of the people as to what should be done.

Sherman marched his troops from Goldsboro, up to Manchester, on the
south side of the James River, opposite Richmond, and there put them in
camp, while he went back to Savannah to see what the situation was
there.

It was during this trip that the last outrage was committed upon him.
Halleck had been sent to Richmond to command Virginia, and had issued
orders prohibiting even Sherman's own troops from obeying his,
Sherman's, orders.  Sherman met the papers on his return, containing
this order of Halleck, and very justly felt indignant at the outrage.
On his arrival at Fortress Monroe returning from Savannah, Sherman
received an invitation from Halleck to come to Richmond and be his
guest.  This he indignantly refused, and informed Halleck, furthermore,
that he had seen his order.  He also stated that he was coming up to
take command of his troops, and as he marched through it would probably
be as well for Halleck not to show himself, because he (Sherman) would
not be responsible for what some rash person might do through
indignation for the treatment he had received.  Very soon after that,
Sherman received orders from me to proceed to Washington City, and to go
into camp on the south side of the city pending the mustering-out of the
troops.

There was no incident worth noting in the march northward from
Goldsboro, to Richmond, or in that from Richmond to Washington City.
The army, however, commanded by Sherman, which had been engaged in all
the battles of the West and had marched from the Mississippi through the
Southern States to the sea, from there to Goldsboro, and thence to
Washington City, had passed over many of the battle-fields of the Army
of the Potomac, thus having seen, to a greater extent than any other
body of troops, the entire theatre of the four years' war for the
preservation of the Union.

The march of Sherman's army from Atlanta to the sea and north to
Goldsboro, while it was not accompanied with the danger that was
anticipated, yet was magnificent in its results, and equally magnificent
in the way it was conducted.  It had an important bearing, in various
ways, upon the great object we had in view, that of closing the war.
All the States east of the Mississippi River up to the State of Georgia,
had felt the hardships of the war.  Georgia, and South Carolina, and
almost all of North Carolina, up to this time, had been exempt from
invasion by the Northern armies, except upon their immediate sea coasts.
Their newspapers had given such an account of Confederate success, that
the people who remained at home had been convinced that the Yankees had
been whipped from first to last, and driven from pillar to post, and
that now they could hardly be holding out for any other purpose than to
find a way out of the war with honor to themselves.

Even during this march of Sherman's the newspapers in his front were
proclaiming daily that his army was nothing better than a mob of men who
were frightened out of their wits and hastening, panic-stricken, to try
to get under the cover of our navy for protection against the Southern
people.  As the army was seen marching on triumphantly, however, the
minds of the people became disabused and they saw the true state of
affairs.  In turn they became disheartened, and would have been glad to
submit without compromise.

Another great advantage resulting from this march, and which was
calculated to hasten the end, was the fact that the great storehouse of
Georgia was entirely cut off from the Confederate armies.  As the troops
advanced north from Savannah, the destruction of the railroads in South
Carolina and the southern part of North Carolina, further cut off their
resources and left the armies still in Virginia and North Carolina
dependent for supplies upon a very small area of country, already very
much exhausted of food and forage.

In due time the two armies, one from Burkesville Junction and the other
from the neighborhood of Raleigh, North Carolina, arrived and went into
camp near the Capital, as directed.  The troops were hardy, being inured
to fatigue, and they appeared in their respective camps as ready and fit
for duty as they had ever been in their lives.  I doubt whether an equal
body of men of any nation, take them man for man, officer for officer,
was ever gotten together that would have proved their equal in a great
battle.

The armies of Europe are machines; the men are brave and the officers
capable; but the majority of the soldiers in most of the nations of
Europe are taken from a class of people who are not very intelligent and
who have very little interest in the contest in which they are called
upon to take part.  Our armies were composed of men who were able to
read, men who knew what they were fighting for, and could not be induced
to serve as soldiers, except in an emergency when the safety of the
nation was involved, and so necessarily must have been more than equal
to men who fought merely because they were brave and because they were
thoroughly drilled and inured to hardships.

There was nothing of particular importance occurred during the time
these troops were in camp before starting North.

I remember one little incident which I will relate as an anecdote
characteristic of Mr. Lincoln.  It occurred a day after I reached
Washington, and about the time General Meade reached Burkesville with
the army.  Governor Smith of Virginia had left Richmond with the
Confederate States government, and had gone to Danville.  Supposing I
was necessarily with the army at Burkesville, he addressed a letter to
me there informing me that, as governor of the Commonwealth of the State
of Virginia, he had temporarily removed the State capital from Richmond
to Danville, and asking if he would be permitted to perform the
functions of his office there without molestation by the Federal
authorities.  I give this letter only in substance.  He also inquired of
me whether in case he was not allowed to perform the duties of his
office, he with a few others might not be permitted to leave the country
and go abroad without interference.  General Meade being informed that a
flag of truce was outside his pickets with a letter to me, at once sent
out and had the letter brought in without informing the officer who
brought it that I was not present.  He read the letter and telegraphed
me its contents. Meeting Mr. Lincoln shortly after receiving this
dispatch, I repeated its contents to him.  Mr. Lincoln, supposing I was
asking for instructions, said, in reply to that part of Governor Smith's
letter which inquired whether he with a few friends would be permitted
to leave the country unmolested, that his position was like that of a
certain Irishman (giving the name) he knew in Springfield who was very
popular with the people, a man of considerable promise, and very much
liked.  Unfortunately he had acquired the habit of drinking, and his
friends could see that the habit was growing on him.  These friends
determined to make an effort to save him, and to do this they drew up a
pledge to abstain from all alcoholic drinks.  They asked Pat to join
them in signing the pledge, and he consented.  He had been so long out
of the habit of using plain water as a beverage that he resorted to
soda-water as a substitute.  After a few days this began to grow
distasteful to him.  So holding the glass behind him, he said:  "Doctor,
couldn't you drop a bit of brandy in that unbeknownst to myself."

I do not remember what the instructions were the President gave me, but
I know that Governor Smith was not permitted to perform the duties of
his office.  I also know that if Mr. Lincoln had been spared, there
would have been no efforts made to prevent any one from leaving the
country who desired to do so.  He would have been equally willing to
permit the return of the same expatriated citizens after they had time
to repent of their choice.

On the 18th of May orders were issued by the adjutant-general for a
grand review by the President and his cabinet of Sherman's and Meade's
armies.  The review commenced on the 23d and lasted two days.  Meade's
army occupied over six hours of the first day in passing the grand stand
which had been erected in front of the President's house.  Sherman
witnessed this review from the grand stand which was occupied by the
President and his cabinet.  Here he showed his resentment for the cruel
and harsh treatment that had unnecessarily been inflicted upon him by
the Secretary of War, by refusing to take his extended hand.

Sherman's troops had been in camp on the south side of the Potomac.
During the night of the 23d he crossed over and bivouacked not far from
the Capitol.  Promptly at ten o'clock on the morning of the 24th, his
troops commenced to pass in review.  Sherman's army made a different
appearance from that of the Army of the Potomac.  The latter had been
operating where they received directly from the North full supplies of
food and clothing regularly:  the review of this army therefore was the
review of a body of 65,000 well-drilled, well-disciplined and orderly
soldiers inured to hardship and fit for any duty, but without the
experience of gathering their own food and supplies in an enemy's
country, and of being ever on the watch. Sherman's army was not so
well-dressed as the Army of the Potomac, but their marching could not
be excelled; they gave the appearance of men who had been thoroughly
drilled to endure hardships, either by long and continuous marches or
through exposure to any climate, without the ordinary shelter of a camp.
They exhibited also some of the order of march through Georgia where the
"sweet potatoes sprung up from the ground" as Sherman's army went
marching through.  In the rear of a company there would be a captured
horse or mule loaded with small cooking utensils, captured chickens and
other food picked up for the use of the men.  <DW64> families who had
followed the army would sometimes come along in the rear of a company,
with three or four children packed upon a single mule, and the mother
leading it.

The sight was varied and grand:  nearly all day for two successive days,
from the Capitol to the Treasury Building, could be seen a mass of
orderly soldiers marching in columns of companies.  The National flag
was flying from almost every house and store; the windows were filled
with spectators; the door-steps and side-walks were crowded with <DW52>
people and poor whites who did not succeed in securing better quarters
from which to get a view of the grand armies.  The city was about as
full of strangers who had come to see the sights as it usually is on
inauguration day when a new President takes his seat.

It may not be out of place to again allude to President Lincoln and the
Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, who were the great conspicuous figures in
the executive branch of the government. There is no great difference of
opinion now, in the public mind, as to the characteristics of the
President.  With Mr. Stanton the case is different.  They were the very
opposite of each other in almost every particular, except that each
possessed great ability.  Mr. Lincoln gained influence over men by
making them feel that it was a pleasure to serve him.  He preferred
yielding his own wish to gratify others, rather than to insist upon
having his own way.  It distressed him to disappoint others.  In matters
of public duty, however, he had what he wished, but in the least
offensive way.  Mr. Stanton never questioned his own authority to
command, unless resisted.  He cared nothing for the feeling of others.
In fact it seemed to be pleasanter to him to disappoint than to gratify.
He felt no hesitation in assuming the functions of the executive, or in
acting without advising with him.  If his act was not sustained, he
would change it--if he saw the matter would be followed up until he did
so.

It was generally supposed that these two officials formed the complement
of each other.  The Secretary was required to prevent the President's
being imposed upon.  The President was required in the more responsible
place of seeing that injustice was not done to others.  I do not know
that this view of these two men is still entertained by the majority of
the people.  It is not a correct view, however, in my estimation.  Mr.
Lincoln did not require a guardian to aid him in the fulfilment of a
public trust.

Mr. Lincoln was not timid, and he was willing to trust his generals in
making and executing their plans.  The Secretary was very timid, and it
was impossible for him to avoid interfering with the armies covering the
capital when it was sought to defend it by an offensive movement against
the army guarding the Confederate capital.  He could see our weakness,
but he could not see that the enemy was in danger.  The enemy would not
have been in danger if Mr. Stanton had been in the field.  These
characteristics of the two officials were clearly shown shortly after
Early came so near getting into the capital.

Among the army and corps commanders who served with me during the war
between the States, and who attracted much public attention, but of
whose ability as soldiers I have not yet given any estimate, are Meade,
Hancock, Sedgwick, Burnside, Terry and Hooker.  There were others of
great merit, such as Griffin, Humphreys, Wright and Mackenzie.  Of those
first named, Burnside at one time had command of the Army of the
Potomac, and later of the Army of the Ohio.  Hooker also commanded the
Army of the Potomac for a short time.

General Meade was an officer of great merit, with drawbacks to his
usefulness that were beyond his control.  He had been an officer of the
engineer corps before the war, and consequently had never served with
troops until he was over forty-six years of age.  He never had, I
believe, a command of less than a brigade.  He saw clearly and
distinctly the position of the enemy, and the topography of the country
in front of his own position.  His first idea was to take advantage of
the lay of the ground, sometimes without reference to the direction we
wanted to move afterwards.  He was subordinate to his superiors in rank
to the extent that he could execute an order which changed his own plans
with the same zeal he would have displayed if the plan had been his own.
He was brave and conscientious, and commanded the respect of all who
knew him.  He was unfortunately of a temper that would get beyond his
control, at times, and make him speak to officers of high rank in the
most offensive manner.  No one saw this fault more plainly than he
himself, and no one regretted it more.  This made it unpleasant at
times, even in battle, for those around him to approach him even with
information.  In spite of this defect he was a most valuable officer and
deserves a high place in the annals of his country.

General Burnside was an officer who was generally liked and respected.
He was not, however, fitted to command an army.  No one knew this better
than himself.  He always admitted his blunders, and extenuated those of
officers under him beyond what they were entitled to.  It was hardly his
fault that he was ever assigned to a separate command.

Of Hooker I saw but little during the war.  I had known him very well
before, however.  Where I did see him, at Chattanooga, his achievement
in bringing his command around the point of Lookout Mountain and into
Chattanooga Valley was brilliant.  I nevertheless regarded him as a
dangerous man.  He was not subordinate to his superiors.  He was
ambitious to the extent of caring nothing for the rights of others.  His
disposition was, when engaged in battle, to get detached from the main
body of the army and exercise a separate command, gathering to his
standard all he could of his juniors.

Hancock stands the most conspicuous figure of all the general officers
who did not exercise a separate command.  He commanded a corps longer
than any other one, and his name was never mentioned as having committed
in battle a blunder for which he was responsible.  He was a man of very
conspicuous personal appearance.  Tall, well-formed and, at the time of
which I now write, young and fresh-looking, he presented an appearance
that would attract the attention of an army as he passed.  His genial
disposition made him friends, and his personal courage and his presence
with his command in the thickest of the fight won for him the confidence
of troops serving under him.  No matter how hard the fight, the 2d corps
always felt that their commander was looking after them.

Sedgwick was killed at Spottsylvania before I had an opportunity of
forming an estimate of his qualifications as a soldier from personal
observation.  I had known him in Mexico when both of us were
lieutenants, and when our service gave no indication that either of us
would ever be equal to the command of a brigade. He stood very high in
the army, however, as an officer and a man. He was brave and
conscientious.  His ambition was not great, and he seemed to dread
responsibility.  He was willing to do any amount of battling, but always
wanted some one else to direct. He declined the command of the Army of
the Potomac once, if not oftener.

General Alfred H. Terry came into the army as a volunteer without a
military education.  His way was won without political influence up to
an important separate command--the expedition against Fort Fisher, in
January, 1865.  His success there was most brilliant, and won for him
the rank of brigadier-general in the regular army and of major-general
of volunteers.  He is a man who makes friends of those under him by his
consideration of their wants and their dues.  As a commander, he won
their confidence by his coolness in action and by his clearness of
perception in taking in the situation under which he was placed at any
given time.

Griffin, Humphreys, and Mackenzie were good corps commanders, but came
into that position so near to the close of the war as not to attract
public attention.  All three served as such, in the last campaign of the
armies of the Potomac and the James, which culminated at Appomattox
Court House, on the 9th of April, 1865.  The sudden collapse of the
rebellion monopolized attention to the exclusion of almost everything
else.  I regarded Mackenzie as the most promising young officer in the
army.  Graduating at West Point, as he did, during the second year of
the war, he had won his way up to the command of a corps before its
close.  This he did upon his own merit and without influence.



CONCLUSION.

The cause of the great War of the Rebellion against the United Status
will have to be attributed to slavery.  For some years before the war
began it was a trite saying among some politicians that "A state half
slave and half free cannot exist."  All must become slave or all free,
or the state will go down.  I took no part myself in any such view of
the case at the time, but since the war is over, reviewing the whole
question, I have come to the conclusion that the saying is quite true.

Slavery was an institution that required unusual guarantees for its
security wherever it existed; and in a country like ours where the
larger portion of it was free territory inhabited by an intelligent and
well-to-do population, the people would naturally have but little
sympathy with demands upon them for its protection.  Hence the people of
the South were dependent upon keeping control of the general government
to secure the perpetuation of their favorite institution.  They were
enabled to maintain this control long after the States where slavery
existed had ceased to have the controlling power, through the assistance
they received from odd men here and there throughout the Northern
States.  They saw their power waning, and this led them to encroach upon
the prerogatives and independence of the Northern States by enacting
such laws as the Fugitive Slave Law.  By this law every Northern man
was obliged, when properly summoned, to turn out and help apprehend
the runaway slave of a Southern man.  Northern marshals became
slave-catchers, and Northern courts had to contribute to the support
and protection of the institution.

This was a degradation which the North would not permit any longer than
until they could get the power to expunge such laws from the statute
books.  Prior to the time of these encroachments the great majority of
the people of the North had no particular quarrel with slavery, so long
as they were not forced to have it themselves.  But they were not
willing to play the role of police for the South in the protection of
this particular institution.

In the early days of the country, before we had railroads, telegraphs
and steamboats--in a word, rapid transit of any sort--the States were
each almost a separate nationality.  At that time the subject of slavery
caused but little or no disturbance to the public mind.  But the country
grew, rapid transit was established, and trade and commerce between the
States got to be so much greater than before, that the power of the
National government became more felt and recognized and, therefore, had
to be enlisted in the cause of this institution.

It is probably well that we had the war when we did.  We are better off
now than we would have been without it, and have made more rapid
progress than we otherwise should have made.  The civilized nations of
Europe have been stimulated into unusual activity, so that commerce,
trade, travel, and thorough acquaintance among people of different
nationalities, has become common; whereas, before, it was but the few
who had ever had the privilege of going beyond the limits of their own
country or who knew anything about other people.  Then, too, our
republican institutions were regarded as experiments up to the breaking
out of the rebellion, and monarchical Europe generally believed that our
republic was a rope of sand that would part the moment the slightest
strain was brought upon it.  Now it has shown itself capable of dealing
with one of the greatest wars that was ever made, and our people have
proven themselves to be the most formidable in war of any nationality.

But this war was a fearful lesson, and should teach us the necessity of
avoiding wars in the future.

The conduct of some of the European states during our troubles shows the
lack of conscience of communities where the responsibility does not come
upon a single individual.  Seeing a nation that extended from ocean to
ocean, embracing the better part of a continent, growing as we were
growing in population, wealth and intelligence, the European nations
thought it would be well to give us a check.  We might, possibly, after
a while threaten their peace, or, at least, the perpetuity of their
institutions.  Hence, England was constantly finding fault with the
administration at Washington because we were not able to keep up an
effective blockade.  She also joined, at first, with France and Spain in
setting up an Austrian prince upon the throne in Mexico, totally
disregarding any rights or claims that Mexico had of being treated as an
independent power.  It is true they trumped up grievances as a pretext,
but they were only pretexts which can always be found when wanted.

Mexico, in her various revolutions, had been unable to give that
protection to the subjects of foreign nations which she would have liked
to give, and some of her revolutionary leaders had forced loans from
them.  Under pretence of protecting their citizens, these nations seized
upon Mexico as a foothold for establishing a European monarchy upon our
continent, thus threatening our peace at home.  I, myself, regarded this
as a direct act of war against the United States by the powers engaged,
and supposed as a matter of course that the United States would treat it
as such when their hands were free to strike.  I often spoke of the
matter to Mr. Lincoln and the Secretary of War, but never heard any
special views from them to enable me to judge what they thought or felt
about it.  I inferred that they felt a good deal as I did, but were
unwilling to commit themselves while we had our own troubles upon our
hands.

All of the powers except France very soon withdrew from the armed
intervention for the establishment of an Austrian prince upon the throne
of Mexico; but the governing people of these countries continued to the
close of the war to throw obstacles in our way.  After the surrender of
Lee, therefore, entertaining the opinion here expressed, I sent Sheridan
with a corps to the Rio Grande to have him where he might aid Juarez in
expelling the French from Mexico.  These troops got off before they
could be stopped; and went to the Rio Grande, where Sheridan distributed
them up and down the river, much to the consternation of the troops in
the quarter of Mexico bordering on that stream.  This soon led to a
request from France that we should withdraw our troops from the Rio
Grande and to negotiations for the withdrawal of theirs.  Finally
Bazaine was withdrawn from Mexico by order of the French Government.
From that day the empire began to totter.  Mexico was then able to
maintain her independence without aid from us.

France is the traditional ally and friend of the United States.  I did
not blame France for her part in the scheme to erect a monarchy upon the
ruins of the Mexican Republic.  That was the scheme of one man, an
imitator without genius or merit.  He had succeeded in stealing the
government of his country, and made a change in its form against the
wishes and instincts of his people.  He tried to play the part of the
first Napoleon, without the ability to sustain that role.  He sought by
new conquests to add to his empire and his glory; but the signal failure
of his scheme of conquest was the precursor of his own overthrow.

Like our own war between the States, the Franco-Prussian war was an
expensive one; but it was worth to France all it cost her people.  It
was the completion of the downfall of Napoleon III.  The beginning was
when he landed troops on this continent.  Failing here, the prestige of
his name--all the prestige he ever had--was gone.  He must achieve a
success or fall.  He tried to strike down his neighbor, Prussia--and
fell.

I never admired the character of the first Napoleon; but I recognize his
great genius.  His work, too, has left its impress for good on the face
of Europe.  The third Napoleon could have no claim to having done a good
or just act.

To maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared for war.
There can scarcely be a possible chance of a conflict, such as the last
one, occurring among our own people again; but, growing as we are, in
population, wealth and military power, we may become the envy of nations
which led us in all these particulars only a few years ago; and unless
we are prepared for it we may be in danger of a combined movement being
some day made to crush us out.  Now, scarcely twenty years after the
war, we seem to have forgotten the lessons it taught, and are going on
as if in the greatest security, without the power to resist an invasion
by the fleets of fourth-rate European powers for a time until we could
prepare for them.

We should have a good navy, and our sea-coast defences should be put in
the finest possible condition.  Neither of these cost much when it is
considered where the money goes, and what we get in return.  Money
expended in a fine navy, not only adds to our security and tends to
prevent war in the future, but is very material aid to our commerce with
foreign nations in the meantime.  Money spent upon sea-coast defences is
spent among our own people, and all goes back again among the people.
The work accomplished, too, like that of the navy, gives us a feeling of
security.

England's course towards the United States during the rebellion
exasperated the people of this country very much against the mother
country.  I regretted it.  England and the United States are natural
allies, and should be the best of friends.  They speak one language, and
are related by blood and other ties.  We together, or even either
separately, are better qualified than any other people to establish
commerce between all the nationalities of the world.

England governs her own colonies, and particularly those embracing
the people of different races from her own, better than any other
nation.  She is just to the conquered, but rigid.  She makes them
self-supporting, but gives the benefit of labor to the laborer.  She
does not seem to look upon the colonies as outside possessions which she
is at liberty to work for the support and aggrandizement of the home
government.

The hostility of England to the United States during our rebellion was
not so much real as it was apparent.  It was the hostility of the
leaders of one political party.  I am told that there was no time during
the civil war when they were able to get up in England a demonstration
in favor of secession, while these were constantly being gotten up in
favor of the Union, or, as they called it, in favor of the North.  Even
in Manchester, which suffered so fearfully by having the cotton cut off
from her mills, they had a monster demonstration in favor of the North
at the very time when their workmen were almost famishing.

It is possible that the question of a conflict between races may come up
in the future, as did that between freedom and slavery before.  The
condition of the <DW52> man within our borders may become a source of
anxiety, to say the least.  But he was brought to our shores by
compulsion, and he now should be considered as having as good a right to
remain here as any other class of our citizens.  It was looking to a
settlement of this question that led me to urge the annexation of Santo
Domingo during the time I was President of the United States.

Santo Domingo was freely offered to us, not only by the administration,
but by all the people, almost without price. The island is upon our
shores, is very fertile, and is capable of supporting fifteen millions
of people.  The products of the soil are so valuable that labor in her
fields would be so compensated as to enable those who wished to go there
to quickly repay the cost of their passage.  I took it that the <DW52>
people would go there in great numbers, so as to have independent states
governed by their own race.  They would still be States of the Union,
and under the protection of the General Government; but the citizens
would be almost wholly .

By the war with Mexico, we had acquired, as we have seen, territory
almost equal in extent to that we already possessed. It was seen that
the volunteers of the Mexican war largely composed the pioneers to
settle up the Pacific coast country. Their numbers, however, were
scarcely sufficient to be a nucleus for the population of the important
points of the territory acquired by that war.  After our rebellion, when
so many young men were at liberty to return to their homes, they found
they were not satisfied with the farm, the store, or the work-shop of
the villages, but wanted larger fields.  The mines of the mountains
first attracted them; but afterwards they found that rich valleys and
productive grazing and farming lands were there.  This territory, the
geography of which was not known to us at the close of the rebellion, is
now as well mapped as any portion of our country.  Railroads traverse it
in every direction, north, south, east, and west.  The mines are worked.
The high lands are used for grazing purposes, and rich agricultural
lands are found in many of the valleys.  This is the work of the
volunteer.  It is probable that the Indians would have had control of
these lands for a century yet but for the war.  We must conclude,
therefore, that wars are not always evils unmixed with some good.

Prior to the rebellion the great mass of the people were satisfied to
remain near the scenes of their birth.  In fact an immense majority of
the whole people did not feel secure against coming to want should they
move among entire strangers.  So much was the country divided into small
communities that localized idioms had grown up, so that you could almost
tell what section a person was from by hearing him speak.  Before, new
territories were settled by a "class"; people who shunned contact with
others; people who, when the country began to settle up around them,
would push out farther from civilization.  Their guns furnished meat,
and the cultivation of a very limited amount of the soil, their bread
and vegetables.  All the streams abounded with fish.  Trapping would
furnish pelts to be brought into the States once a year, to pay for
necessary articles which they could not raise--powder, lead, whiskey,
tobacco and some store goods.  Occasionally some little articles of
luxury would enter into these purchases--a quarter of a pound of tea,
two or three pounds of coffee, more of sugar, some playing cards, and if
anything was left over of the proceeds of the sale, more whiskey.

Little was known of the topography of the country beyond the settlements
of these frontiersmen.  This is all changed now. The war begot a spirit
of independence and enterprise.  The feeling now is, that a youth must
cut loose from his old surroundings to enable him to get up in the
world.  There is now such a commingling of the people that particular
idioms and pronunciation are no longer localized to any great extent;
the country has filled up "from the centre all around to the sea";
railroads connect the two oceans and all parts of the interior; maps,
nearly perfect, of every part of the country are now furnished the
student of geography.

The war has made us a nation of great power and intelligence. We have
but little to do to preserve peace, happiness and prosperity at home,
and the respect of other nations.  Our experience ought to teach us the
necessity of the first; our power secures the latter.

I feel that we are on the eve of a new era, when there is to be great
harmony between the Federal and Confederate.  I cannot stay to be a
living witness to the correctness of this prophecy; but I feel it within
me that it is to be so.  The universally kind feeling expressed for me
at a time when it was supposed that each day would prove my last, seemed
to me the beginning of the answer to "Let us have peace."

The expression of these kindly feelings were not restricted to a section
of the country, nor to a division of the people.  They came from
individual citizens of all nationalities; from all denominations--the
Protestant, the Catholic, and the Jew; and from the various societies of
the land--scientific, educational, religious or otherwise.  Politics did
not enter into the matter at all.

I am not egotist enough to suppose all this significance should be given
because I was the object of it.  But the war between the States was a
very bloody and a very costly war.  One side or the other had to yield
principles they deemed dearer than life before it could be brought to an
end.  I commanded the whole of the mighty host engaged on the victorious
side.  I was, no matter whether deservedly so or not, a representative
of that side of the controversy.  It is a significant and gratifying
fact that Confederates should have joined heartily in this spontaneous
move.  I hope the good feeling inaugurated may continue to the end.



APPENDIX.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, OF THE UNITED STATES ARMIES
1864-65.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 22,
1865.

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

SIR:  I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations
of the Armies of the United States from the date of my appointment to
command the same.

From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with the idea
that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be
brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary
to a speedy termination of the war.  The resources of the enemy and his
numerical strength were far inferior to ours; but as an offset to this,
we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the government, to
garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to
protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.

The armies in the East and West acted independently and without concert,
like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to
use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for
transporting troops from East to West, reinforcing the army most
vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of
inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of
producing, for the support of their armies.  It was a question whether
our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by
these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position.

From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had
that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both
North and South, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely
broken.

I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops
practicable against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him from
using the same force at different seasons against first one and then
another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and
producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance.  Second, to
hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his
resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be
nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of
our common country to the constitution and laws of the land.

These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and
campaigns made to carry them out.  Whether they might have been better
in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of
friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say.  All I
can say is, that what I have done has been done conscientiously, to the
best of my ability, and in what I conceived to be for the best interests
of the whole country.

At the date when this report begins, the situation of the contending
forces was about as follows:  The Mississippi River was strongly
garrisoned by Federal troops, from St.  Louis, Missouri, to its mouth.
The line of the Arkansas was also held, thus giving us armed possession
of all west of the Mississippi, north of that stream.  A few points in
Southern Louisiana, not remote from the river, were held by us, together
with a small garrison at and near the mouth of the Rio Grande.  All the
balance of the vast territory of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas was in
the almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an army of probably
not less than eighty thousand effective men, that could have been
brought into the field had there been sufficient opposition to have
brought them out.  The let-alone policy had demoralized this force so
that probably but little more than one-half of it was ever present in
garrison at any one time.  But the one-half, or forty thousand men, with
the bands of guerillas scattered through Missouri, Arkansas, and along
the Mississippi River, and the disloyal character of much of the
population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to keep
navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal people to the
west of it.  To the east of the Mississippi we held substantially with
the line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, running eastward to
include nearly all of the State of Tennessee.  South of Chattanooga, a
small foothold had been obtained in Georgia, sufficient to protect East
Tennessee from incursions from the enemy's force at Dalton, Georgia.
West Virginia was substantially within our lines.  Virginia, with the
exception of the northern border, the Potomac River, a small area about
the mouth of James River, covered by the troops at Norfolk and Fort
Monroe, and the territory covered by the Army of the Potomac lying along
the Rapidan, was in the possession of the enemy.  Along the sea-coast
footholds had been obtained at Plymouth, Washington, and New Bern, in
North Carolina; Beaufort, Folly and Morris Islands, Hilton Head, Fort
Pulaski, and Port Royal, in South Carolina; Fernandina and St.
Augustine, in Florida. Key West and Pensacola were also in our
possession, while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy.
The accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to General Sherman and
other commanders in March, 1864, shows by red lines the territory
occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion, and at the opening of
the campaign of 1864, while those in blue are the lines which it was
proposed to occupy.

Behind the Union lines there were many bands of guerillas and a large
population disloyal to the government, making it necessary to guard
every foot of road or river used in supplying our armies.  In the South,
a reign of military despotism prevailed, which made every man and boy
capable of bearing arms a soldier; and those who could not bear arms in
the field acted as provosts for collecting deserters and returning them.
This enabled the enemy to bring almost his entire strength into the
field.

The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the
Mississippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and J. E.
Johnston, his ablest and best generals.  The army commanded by Lee
occupied the south bank of the Rapidan, extending from Mine Run
westward, strongly intrenched, covering and defending Richmond, the
rebel capital, against the Army of the Potomac. The army under Johnston
occupied a strongly intrenched position at Dalton, Georgia, covering and
defending Atlanta, Georgia, a place of great importance as a railroad
centre, against the armies under Major-General W. T. Sherman.  In
addition to these armies he had a large cavalry force under Forrest, in
North-east Mississippi; a considerable force, of all arms, in the
Shenandoah Valley, and in the western part of Virginia and extreme
eastern part of Tennessee; and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons,
and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land.

These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, were the
main objective points of the campaign.

Major-General W. T. Sherman, who was appointed to the command of the
Military Division of the Mississippi, embracing all the armies and
territory east of the Mississippi River to the Alleghanies and the
Department of Arkansas, west of the Mississippi, had the immediate
command of the armies operating against Johnston.

Major-General George G. Meade had the immediate command of the Army of
the Potomac, from where I exercised general supervision of the movements
of all our armies.

General Sherman was instructed to move against Johnston's army, to break
it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as far as he
could, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources.  If
the enemy in his front showed signs of joining Lee, to follow him up to
the full extent of his ability, while I would prevent the concentration
of Lee upon him, if it was in the power of the Army of the Potomac to do
so.  More specific written instructions were not given, for the reason
that I had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and was
satisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the fullest
extent possible.

Major-General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up Red River against
Shreveport, Louisiana (which had been organized previous to my
appointment to command), was notified by me on the 15th of March, of the
importance it was that Shreveport should be taken at the earliest
possible day, and that if he found that the taking of it would occupy
from ten to fifteen days' more time than General Sherman had given his
troops to be absent from their command, he would send them back at the
time specified by General Sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of
the main object of the Red River expedition, for this force was
necessary to movements east of the Mississippi; that should his
expedition prove successful, he would hold Shreveport and the Red River
with such force as he might deem necessary, and return the balance of
his troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans, commencing no move for
the further acquisition of territory, unless it was to make that then
held by him more easily held; that it might be a part of the spring
campaign to move against Mobile; that it certainly would be, if troops
enough could be obtained to make it without embarrassing other
movements; that New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an
expedition; also, that I had directed General Steele to make a real move
from Arkansas, as suggested by him (General Banks), instead of a
demonstration, as Steele thought advisable.

On the 31st of March, in addition to the foregoing notification and
directions, he was instructed as follows:


"1st.  If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that you
turn over the defence of the Red River to General Steele and the navy.

"2d.  That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of your hold
upon the Rio Grande.  This can be held with four thousand men, if they
will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions.  At
least one-half of the force required for this service might be taken
from the <DW52> troops.

"3d.  By properly fortifying on the Mississippi River, the force to
guard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousand
men, if not to a less number.  Six thousand more would then hold all the
rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can
again be resumed west of the river. According to your last return, this
would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with which
to move against Mobile.  To this I expect to add five thousand men from
Missouri.  If however, you think the force here stated too small to hold
the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, I would say
concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present command
for operations against Mobile.  With these and such additions as I can
give you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to be
followed by an attack upon Mobile.  Two or more iron-clads will be
ordered to report to Admiral Farragut.  This gives him a strong naval
fleet with which to co-operate.  You can make your own arrangements with
the admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of approach.
My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should be your base; but,
from your long service in the Gulf Department, you will know best about
the matter.  It is intended that your movements shall be co-operative
with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon.  All I
would now add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at
once.  Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start
at the earliest possible moment.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL N. P. BANKS."


Major-General Meade was instructed that Lee's army would be his
objective point; that wherever Lee went he would go also.  For his
movement two plans presented themselves:  One to cross the Rapidan below
Lee, moving by his right flank; the other above, moving by his left.
Each presented advantages over the other, with corresponding objections.
By crossing above, Lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoring
Richmond or going north on a raid.  But if we took this route, all we
did would have to be done whilst the rations we started with held out;
besides, it separated us from Butler, so that he could not be directed
how to cooperate.  If we took the other route, Brandy Station could be
used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the York or
James rivers.  Of these, however, it was decided to take the lower
route.

The following letter of instruction was addressed to Major-General B. F.
Butler:


"FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA, April 2, 1864.

"GENERAL:-In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence
at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative
action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be
accomplished.

"It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large
ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding
on to the territory already taken from the enemy.  But, generally
speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to
the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to
guard.  By such movement, they interpose themselves between the enemy
and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to
guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of
the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. Lee's army and
Richmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must be
directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we
can against them.  The necessity of covering Washington with the Army of
the Potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it
impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. I
propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems
practicable:  The Army of the Potomac will act from its present base,
Lee's army being the objective point.  You will collect all the forces
from your command that can be spared from garrison duty--I should say
not less than twenty thousand effective men--to operate on the south
side of James River, Richmond being your objective point.  To the force
you already have will be added about ten thousand men from South
Carolina, under Major-General Gillmore, who will command them in person.
Major-General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to command the
troops sent into the field from your own department.

"General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress Monroe,
with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soon
thereafter as practicable.  Should you not receive notice by that time
to move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces as
you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to
be made.

"When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much force as
possible.  Fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all
your troops for the field there as rapidly as you can.  From City Point
directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements.

"The fact that has already been stated--that is, that Richmond is to be
your objective point, and that there is to be co-operation between your
force and the Army of the Potomac--must be your guide.  This indicates
the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James River
as you advance.  Then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments
in Richmond, the Army of the Potomac would follow, and by means of
transports the two armies would become a unit.

"All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your
direction. If, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry
south of you, so as to cut the railroad about Hicksford, about the time
of the general advance, it would be of immense advantage.

"You will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicable
day, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the
execution of this order.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER."


On the 16th these instructions were substantially reiterated. On the
19th, in order to secure full co-operation between his army and that of
General Meade, he was informed that I expected him to move from Fort
Monroe the same day that General Meade moved from Culpeper.  The exact
time I was to telegraph him as soon as it was fixed, and that it would
not be earlier than the 27th of April; that it was my intention to fight
Lee between Culpeper and Richmond, if he would stand.  Should he,
however, fall back into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junction
with his (General Butler's) army on the James River; that, could I be
certain he would be able to invest Richmond on the south side, so as to
have his left resting on the James, above the city, I would form the
junction there; that circumstances might make this course advisable
anyhow; that he should use every exertion to secure footing as far up
the south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible after
the receipt of orders to move; that if he could not carry the city, he
should at least detain as large a force there as possible.

In co-operation with the main movements against Lee and Johnston, I was
desirous of using all other troops necessarily kept in departments
remote from the fields of immediate operations, and also those kept in
the background for the protection of our extended lines between the
loyal States and the armies operating against them.

A very considerable force, under command of Major-General Sigel, was so
held for the protection of West Virginia, and the frontiers of Maryland
and Pennsylvania.  Whilst these troops could not be withdrawn to distant
fields without exposing the North to invasion by comparatively small
bodies of the enemy, they could act directly to their front, and give
better protection than if lying idle in garrison.  By such a movement
they would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the protection
of his supplies and lines of communication, or he would lose them.
General Sigel was therefore directed to organize all his available force
into two expeditions, to move from Beverly and Charleston, under command
of Generals Ord and Crook, against the East Tennessee and Virginia
Railroad. Subsequently, General Ord having been relieved at his own
request, General Sigel was instructed at his own suggestion, to give up
the expedition by Beverly, and to form two columns, one under General
Crook, on the Kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the
Shenandoah, numbering about seven thousand men.  The one on the
Shenandoah to assemble between Cumberland and the Shenandoah, and the
infantry and artillery advanced to Cedar Creek with such cavalry as
could be made available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in the
Shenandoah Valley, and advance as far as possible; while General Crook
would take possession of Lewisburg with part of his force and move down
the Tennessee Railroad, doing as much damage as he could, destroying the
New River Bridge and the salt-works, at Saltville, Va.

Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations were
delayed until the 1st of May, when, everything being in readiness and
the roads favorable, orders were given for a general movement of all the
armies not later than the 4th of May.

My first object being to break the military power of the rebellion, and
capture the enemy's important strongholds, made me desirous that General
Butler should succeed in his movement against Richmond, as that would
tend more than anything else, unless it were the capture of Lee's army,
to accomplish this desired result in the East. If he failed, it was my
determination, by hard fighting, either to compel Lee to retreat, or to
so <DW36> him that he could not detach a large force to go north, and
still retain enough for the defence of Richmond.  It was well
understood, by both Generals Butler and Meade, before starting on the
campaign, that it was my intention to put both their armies south of the
James River, in case of failure to destroy Lee without it.

Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at Fort
Monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance of
getting possession of Petersburg, and destroying railroad communication
as far south as possible.  Believing, however, in the practicability of
capturing Richmond unless it was reinforced, I made that the objective
point of his operations.  As the Army of the Potomac was to move
simultaneously with him, Lee could not detach from his army with safety,
and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence of
the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of James River.

I may here state that, commanding all the armies as I did, I tried, as
far as possible, to leave General Meade in independent command of the
Army of the Potomac.  My instructions for that army were all through
him, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and the
execution to him.  The campaigns that followed proved him to be the
right man in the right place.  His commanding always in the presence of
an officer superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of that
public attention that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which he
would otherwise have received.

The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early on the morning
of the 4th of May, under the immediate direction and orders of
Major-General Meade, pursuant to instructions.  Before night, the whole
army was across the Rapidan (the fifth and sixth corps crossing at
Germania Ford, and the second corps at Ely's Ford, the cavalry, under
Major-General Sheridan, moving in advance,) with the greater part of its
trains, numbering about four thousand wagons, meeting with but slight
opposition.  The average distance travelled by the troops that day was
about twelve miles.  This I regarded as a great success, and it removed
from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained, that of
crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and
ably commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through
a hostile country, and protected.  Early on the 5th, the advance corps
(the fifth, Major-General G. K. Warren commanding) met and engaged the
enemy outside his intrenchments near Mine Run.  The battle raged
furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fast
as the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the density
of the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable
promptness.

General Burnside, with the ninth corps, was, at the time the Army of the
Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the
Rappahannock River and Alexandria Railroad, holding the road back to
Bull Run, with instructions not to move until he received notice that a
crossing of the Rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon as
such notice was received.  This crossing he was apprised of on the
afternoon of the 4th.  By six o'clock of the morning of the 6th he was
leading his corps into action near the Wilderness Tavern, some of his
troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both the
Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers.  Considering that a large proportion,
probably two-thirds of his command, was composed of new troops,
unaccustomed to marches, and carrying the accoutrements of a soldier,
this was a remarkable march.

The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock on the
morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set
in, each army holding substantially the same position that they had on
the evening of the 5th.  After dark, the enemy made a feeble attempt to
turn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners and creating
considerable confusion.  But the promptness of General Sedgwick, who was
personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon reformed it
and restored order.  On the morning of the 7th, reconnoissances showed
that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to
the front, covering a part of the battle-field.  From this it was
evident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of his
inability to further maintain the contest in the open field,
notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would wait an
attack behind his works. I therefore determined to push on and put my
whole force between him and Richmond; and orders were at once issued for
a movement by his right flank.  On the night of the 7th, the march was
commenced towards Spottsylvania Court House, the fifth corps moving on
the most direct road.  But the enemy having become apprised of our
movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first.
On the 8th, General Warren met a force of the enemy, which had been sent
out to oppose and delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line
taken up at Spottsylvania.  This force was steadily driven back on the
main force, within the recently constructed works, after considerable
fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides.  On the morning of the
9th, General Sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines of
communication with Richmond.  The 9th, 10th, and 11th were spent in
manoeuvring and fighting, without decisive results.  Among the killed on
the 9th was that able and distinguished soldier Major-General John
Sedgwick, commanding the sixth army corps.  Major-General H. G. Wright
succeeded him in command.  Early on the morning of the 12th a general
attack was made on the enemy in position.  The second corps,
Major-General Hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line,
capturing most of Johnson's division of Ewell's corps and twenty pieces
of artillery.  But the resistance was so obstinate that the advantage
gained did not prove decisive.  The 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and
18th, were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of
reinforcements from Washington.  Deeming it impracticable to make any
further attack upon the enemy at Spottsylvania Court House, orders were
issued on the 15th with a view to a movement to the North Anna, to
commence at twelve o'clock on the night of the 19th.  Late in the
afternoon of the 19th, Ewell's corps came out of its works on our
extreme right flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavy
loss. This delayed the movement to the North Anna until the night of the
21st, when it was commenced.  But the enemy again, having the shorter
line, and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach
the North Anna in advance of us, and took position behind it.  The fifth
corps reached the North Anna on the afternoon of the 23d, closely
followed by the sixth corps. The second and ninth corps got up about the
same time, the second holding the railroad bridge, and the ninth lying
between that and Jericho Ford.  General Warren effected a crossing the
same afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. Soon after
getting into position he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemy
with great slaughter.  On the 25th, General Sheridan rejoined the Army
of the Potomac from the raid on which he started from Spottsylvania,
having destroyed the depots at Beaver Dam and Ashland stations, four
trains of cars, large supplies of rations, and many miles of
railroad-track; recaptured about four hundred of our men on their way to
Richmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy's cavalry at
Yellow Tavern; carried the first line of works around Richmond (but
finding the second line too strong to be carried by assault), recrossed
to the north bank of the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge under heavy fire,
and moved by a detour to Haxall's Landing, on the James River, where he
communicated with General Butler.  This raid had the effect of drawing
off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively easy
to guard our trains.

General Butler moved his main force up the James River, in pursuance of
instructions, on the 4th of May, General Gillmore having joined him with
the tenth corps.  At the same time he sent a force of one thousand eight
hundred cavalry, by way of West Point, to form a junction with him
wherever he might get a foothold, and a force of three thousand cavalry,
under General Kautz, from Suffolk, to operate against the road south of
Petersburg and Richmond.  On the 5th, he occupied, without opposition,
both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement being a complete
surprise.  On the 6th, he was in position with his main army, and
commenced intrenching.  On the 7th he made a reconnoissance against the
Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, destroying a portion of it after some
fighting.  On the 9th he telegraphed as follows:


"HEADQUARTERS, NEAR BERMUDA LANDING, May 9, 1864.

"HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

"Our operations may be summed up in a few words.  With one thousand
seven hundred cavalry we have advanced up the Peninsula, forced the
Chickahominy, and have safely, brought them to their present position.
These were  cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets
towards Richmond.

"General Kautz, with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk, on the same
day with our movement up James River, forced the Black Water, burned the
railroad bridge at Stony Creek, below Petersburg, cutting into
Beauregard's force at that point.

"We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of
railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold
out against the whole of Lee's army.  I have ordered up the supplies.

"Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by the
cutting of the railroads by Kautz.  That portion which reached
Petersburg under Hill I have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many,
and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well-contested fight.

"General Grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements to
Lee from Beauregard's force.

"BENJ. F. BUTLER, Major-General."


On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion
of the enemy's first line of defences at Drury's Bluff, or Fort Darling,
with small loss.  The time thus consumed from the 6th lost to us the
benefit of the surprise and capture of Richmond and Petersburg,
enabling, as it did, Beauregard to collect his loose forces in North and
South Carolina, and bring them to the defence of those places.  On the
16th, the enemy attacked General Butler in his position in front of
Drury's Bluff.  He was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchments
between the forks of the James and Appomattox rivers, the enemy
intrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads, the
city, and all that was valuable to him.  His army, therefore, though in
a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further
operations directly against Richmond as if it had been in a bottle
strongly corked.  It required but a comparatively small force of the
enemy to hold it there.

On the 12th, General Kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a raid
against the Danville Railroad, which he struck at Coalfield, Powhatan,
and Chula Stations, destroying them, the railroad-track, two freight
trains, and one locomotive, together with large quantities of commissary
and other stores; thence, crossing to the South Side Road, struck it at
Wilson's, Wellsville, and Black's and White's Stations, destroying the
road and station-houses; thence he proceeded to City Point, which he
reached on the 18th.

On the 19th of April, and prior to the movement of General Butler, the
enemy, with a land force under General Hoke and an iron-clad ram,
attacked Plymouth, N. C., commanded by General H. W. Wessells, and our
gunboats there, and, after severe fighting, the place was carried by
assault, and the entire garrison and armament captured.  The gunboat
Smithfield was sunk, and the Miami disabled.

The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically sealed
itself up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most,
if not all, the reinforcements brought from the south by Beauregard
against the Army of the Potomac. In addition to this reinforcement, a
very considerable one, probably not less than fifteen thousand men, was
obtained by calling in the scattered troops under Breckinridge from the
western part of Virginia.

The position of Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it was
difficult to operate from against the enemy.  I determined, therefore,
to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to secure
what had been gained; and accordingly, on the 22d, I directed that they
be sent forward, under command of Major-General W. F. Smith, to join the
Army of the Potomac.

On the 24th of May, the 9th army corps, commanded by Major-General A. E.
Burnside, was assigned to the Army of the Potomac, and from this time
forward constituted a portion of Major-General Meade's command.

Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than either of
his previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 26th to the north bank
of the North Anna, and moved via Hanover Town to turn the enemy's
position by his right.

Generals Torbert's and Merritt's divisions of cavalry, under Sheridan,
and the 6th corps, led the advance, crossed the Pamunkey River at
Hanover Town, after considerable fighting, and on the 28th the two
divisions of cavalry had a severe, but successful engagement with the
enemy at Hawes's Shop.  On the 29th and 30th we advanced, with heavy
skirmishing, to the Hanover Court House and Cold Harbor Road, and
developed the enemy's position north of the Chickahominy.  Late on the
evening of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but
was repulsed with very considerable loss.  An attack was immediately
ordered by General Meade, along his whole line, which resulted in
driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line.

On the 31st, General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroad
bridges over the South Anna River, after defeating the enemy's cavalry.
General Sheridan, on the same day, reached Cold Harbor, and held it
until relieved by the 6th corps and General Smith's command, which had
just arrived, via White House, from General Butler's army.

On the 1st day of June an attack was made at five P.M. by the 6th corps
and the troops under General Smith, the other corps being held in
readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. This resulted in our
carrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front of the
right of the 6th corps, and in front of General Smith.  During the
attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged
in the main attack, but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance.
That night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the
day, but failed.  The 2d was spent in getting troops into position for
an attack on the 3d.  On the 3d of June we again assaulted the enemy's
works, in the hope of driving him from his position.  In this attempt
our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe,
was comparatively light.  It was the only general attack made from the
Rapidan to the James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to
compensate for our own losses.  I would not be understood as saying that
all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished
as much as I had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy
severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow of
the rebellion.

From the proximity of the enemy to his defences around Richmond, it was
impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between him and the
city.  I was still in a condition to either move by his left flank, and
invest Richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his right
flank to the south side of the James.  While the former might have been
better as a covering for Washington, yet a full survey of all the ground
satisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and
east of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad, a long,
vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, and
that would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave open
to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of the
James.  My idea, from the start, had been to beat Lee's army north of
Richmond, if possible.  Then, after destroying his lines of
communication north of the James River, to transfer the army to the
south side, and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he
should retreat.  After the battle of the Wilderness, it was evident that
the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the
army he then had.  He acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks,
or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in
case of repulse, he could easily retire behind them.  Without a greater
sacrifice of life than I was willing to make, all could not be
accomplished that I had designed north of Richmond.  I therefore
determined to continue to hold substantially the ground we then
occupied, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances that might
present themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to Charlottesville
and Gordonsville to effectually break up the railroad connection between
Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley and Lynchburg; and when the cavalry
got well off, to move the army to the south side of the James River, by
the enemy's right flank, where I felt I could cut off all his sources of
supply, except by the canal.

On the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan, got off on
the expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad, with instructions
to Hunter, whom I hoped he would meet near Charlottesville, to join his
forces to Sheridan's, and after the work laid out for them was
thoroughly done, to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid down
in Sheridan's instructions.

On the 10th of June, General Butler sent a force of infantry, under
General Gillmore, and of cavalry under General Kautz, to capture
Petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridges
across the Appomattox.  The cavalry carried the works on the south side,
and penetrated well in towards the town, but were forced to retire.
General Gillmore, finding the works which he approached very strong, and
deeming an assault impracticable, returned to Bermuda Hundred without
attempting one.

Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg, I sent back
to Bermuda Hundred and City Point, General Smith's command by water, via
the White House, to reach there in advance of the Army of the Potomac.
This was for the express purpose of securing Petersburg before the
enemy, becoming aware of our intention, could reinforce the place.

The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the
12th.  One division of cavalry, under General Wilson, and the 5th corps,
crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and moved out to White Oak
Swamp, to cover the crossings of the other corps.  The advance corps
reached James River, at Wilcox's Landing and Charles City Court House,
on the night of the 13th.

During three long years the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia
had been confronting each other.  In that time they had fought more
desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two
armies to fight, without materially changing the vantage ground of
either.  The Southern press and people, with more shrewdness than was
displayed in the North, finding that they had failed to capture
Washington and march on to New York, as they had boasted they would do,
assumed that they only defended their Capital and Southern territory.
Hence, Antietam, Gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been
fought, were by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for
them.  Their army believed this.  It produced a morale which could only
be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting.  The battles of
the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North Anna and Cold Harbor, bloody and
terrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy,
and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the
offensive.  His losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the
fact that we were, save in the Wilderness, almost invariably the
attacking party; and when he did attack, it was in the open field.  The
details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of
the soldiery, have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report of
Major-General Meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it.

During the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to the James
River, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base, by
wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded country, with a lack
of wharves at each new base from which to conveniently discharge
vessels.  Too much credit cannot, therefore, be awarded to the
quartermaster and commissary departments for the zeal and efficiency
displayed by them. Under the general supervision of the chief
quartermaster, Brigadier-General R. Ingalls, the trains were made to
occupy all the available roads between the army and our water-base, and
but little difficulty was experienced in protecting them.

The movement in the Kanawha and Shenandoah valleys, under General Sigel,
commenced on the 1st of May.  General Crook, who had the immediate
command of the Kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns,
giving one, composed of cavalry, to General Averell.  They crossed the
mountains by separate routes. Averell struck the Tennessee and Virginia
Railroad, near Wytheville, on the 10th, and proceeding to New River and
Christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges and
depots, including New River Bridge, forming a junction with Crook at
Union on the 15th.  General Sigel moved up the Shenandoah Valley, met
the enemy at New Market on the 15th, and, after a severe engagement, was
defeated with heavy loss, and retired behind Cedar Creek.  Not regarding
the operations of General Sigel as satisfactory, I asked his removal
from command, and Major-General Hunter appointed to supersede him.  His
instructions were embraced in the following dispatches to Major-General
H. W. Halleck, chief of staff of the army:


"NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, VA. "May 20, 1864.

*        *        *        *        *        *        * "The enemy are
evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over the
branch road running through Staunton.  On the whole, therefore, I think
it would be better for General Hunter to move in that direction; reach
Staunton and Gordonsville or Charlottesville, if he does not meet too
much opposition.  If he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he
will be doing good service.  * * *

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK."


"JERICHO FORD, VA., May 25, 1864.

"If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he should
do so, living on the country.  The railroads and canal should be
destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks. Completing this, he
could find his way back to his original base, or from about Gordonsville
join this army.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK."


General Hunter immediately took up the offensive, and, moving up the
Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy on the 5th of June at Piedmont, and,
after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated him, capturing on the
field of battle one thousand five hundred men, three pieces of
artillery, and three hundred stand of small arms.  On the 8th of the
same month he formed a junction with Crook and Averell at Staunton, from
which place he moved direct on Lynchburg, via Lexington, which place he
reached and invested on the 16th day of June.  Up to this time he was
very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with him
sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile
country, he would, no doubt, have captured that, to the enemy important,
point.  The destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories was
very great.  To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee
sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached
Lynchburg a short time before Hunter.  After some skirmishing on the
17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give
battle, retired from before the place.  Unfortunately, this want of
ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way of
Kanawha. This lost to us the use of his troops for several weeks from
the defence of the North.

Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville, instead of
Lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in a
position to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against the enemy, should
the force he met have seemed to endanger it.  If it did not, he would
have been within easy distance of the James River Canal, on the main
line of communication between Lynchburg and the force sent for its
defence.  I have never taken exception to the operations of General
Hunter, and am not now disposed to find fault with him, for I have no
doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of his
instructions and the interests of the service.  The promptitude of his
movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation of
his country.

To return to the Army of the Potomac:  The 2d corps commenced crossing
the James River on the morning of the 14th by ferry-boats at Wilcox's
Landing.  The laying of the pontoon-bridge was completed about midnight
of the 14th, and the crossing of the balance of the army was rapidly
pushed forward by both bridge and ferry.

After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by steamer to Bermuda
Hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate capture of
Petersburg.

The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him to send
General Smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could give
him without sacrificing the position he then held.  I told him that I
would return at once to the Army of the Potomac, hasten its crossing and
throw it forward to Petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be
done, that we could reinforce our armies more rapidly there than the
enemy could bring troops against us.  General Smith got off as directed,
and confronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg before daylight next
morning, but for some reason that I have never been able to
satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines
until near sundown.  Then, with a part of his command only, he made the
assault, and carried the lines north-east of Petersburg from the
Appomattox River, for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing
fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners.  This was about
seven P.M. Between the line thus captured and Petersburg there were no
other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had reinforced
Petersburg with a single brigade from any source. The night was clear
the moon shining brightly and favorable to further operations.  General
Hancock, with two divisions of the 2d corps, reached General Smith just
after dark, and offered the service of these troops as he (Smith) might
wish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he naturally supposed
knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops.  But
instead of taking these troops and pushing at once into Petersburg, he
requested General Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured
works, which was done before midnight.

By the time I arrived the next morning the enemy was in force. An attack
was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by the troops under
Smith and the 2d and 9th corps.  It required until that time for the 9th
corps to get up and into position. The attack was made as ordered, and
the fighting continued with but little intermission until six o'clock
the next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some of
the main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously
captured by General Smith, several pieces of artillery, and over four
hundred prisoners.

The 5th corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and persisted in
with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only resulted in forcing the
enemy into an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged.  The
advantages of position gained by us were very great.  The army then
proceeded to envelop Petersburg towards the South Side Railroad as far
as possible without attacking fortifications.

On the 16th the enemy, to reinforce Petersburg, withdrew from a part of
his intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expecting, no doubt, to
get troops from north of the James to take the place of those withdrawn
before we could discover it.  General Butler, taking advantage of this,
at once moved a force on the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond.
As soon as I was apprised of the advantage thus gained, to retain it I
ordered two divisions of the 6th corps, General Wright commanding, that
were embarking at Wilcox's Landing, under orders for City Point, to
report to General Butler at Bermuda Hundred, of which General Butler was
notified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of his
present line urged upon him.

About two o'clock in the afternoon General Butler was forced back to the
line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. General Wright, with
his two divisions, joined General Butler on the forenoon of the 17th,
the latter still holding with a strong picket-line the enemy's works.
But instead of putting these divisions into the enemy's works to hold
them, he permitted them to halt and rest some distance in the rear of
his own line. Between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy
attacked and drove in his pickets and re-occupied his old line.

On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was effected
by General Butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the north bank of
the James, at Deep Bottom, and connected by pontoon-bridge with Bermuda
Hundred.

On the 19th, General Sheridan, on his return from his expedition against
the Virginia Central Railroad, arrived at the White House just as the
enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled it to retire.  The
result of this expedition was, that General Sheridan met the enemy's
cavalry near Trevilian Station, on the morning of the 11th of June, whom
he attacked, and after an obstinate contest drove from the field in
complete rout.  He left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our
hands, and about four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses.  On
the 12th he destroyed the railroad from Trevilian Station to Louisa
Court House.  This occupied until three o'clock P.M., when he advanced
in the direction of Gordonsville.  He found the enemy reinforced by
infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from the
latter place and too strong to successfully assault.  On the extreme
right, however, his reserve brigade carried the enemy's works twice, and
was twice driven therefrom by infantry.  Night closed the contest.  Not
having sufficient ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animals
being without forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing), and
hearing nothing from General Hunter, he withdrew his command to the
north side of the North Anna, and commenced his return march, reaching
White House at the time before stated.  After breaking up the depot at
that place, he moved to the James River, which he reached safely after
heavy fighting.  He commenced crossing on the 25th, near Fort Powhatan,
without further molestation, and rejoined the Army of the Potomac.

On the 22d, General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the Army
of the Potomac, and General Kautz's division of cavalry of the Army of
the James moved against the enemy's railroads south of Richmond.
Striking the Weldon Railroad at Reams's Station, destroying the depot
and several miles of the road, and the South Side road about fifteen
miles from Petersburg, to near Nottoway Station, where he met and
defeated a force of the enemy's cavalry.  He reached Burkesville Station
on the afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the Danville
Railroad to Roanoke Bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles, where he
found the enemy in force, and in a position from which he could not
dislodge him.  He then commenced his return march, and on the 28th met
the enemy's cavalry in force at the Weldon Railroad crossing of Stony
Creek, where he had a severe but not decisive engagement.  Thence he
made a detour from his left with a view of reaching Reams's Station
(supposing it to be in our possession).  At this place he was met by the
enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the
loss of his artillery and trains.  In this last encounter, General
Kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made his way
into our lines.  General Wilson, with the remainder of his force,
succeeded in crossing the Nottoway River and coming in safely on our
left and rear.  The damage to the enemy in this expedition more than
compensated for the losses we sustained.  It severed all connection by
railroad with Richmond for several weeks.

With a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near Richmond to the
Anna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his army in the
Shenandoah, and, in the event of failure in this, to take advantage of
his necessary withdrawal of troops from Petersburg, to explode a mine
that had been prepared in front of the 9th corps and assault the enemy's
lines at that place, on the night of the 26th of July the 2d corps and
two divisions of the cavalry corps and Kautz's cavalry were crossed to
the north bank of the James River and joined the force General Butler
had there.  On the 27th the enemy was driven from his intrenched
position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery.  On the 28th our
lines were extended from Deep Bottom to New Market Road, but in getting
this position were attacked by the enemy in heavy force.  The fighting
lasted for several hours, resulting in considerable loss to both sides.
The first object of this move having failed, by reason of the very large
force thrown there by the enemy, I determined to take advantage of the
diversion made, by assaulting Petersburg before he could get his force
back there.  One division of the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night of
the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the 18th corps, to
relieve that corps in the line, that it might be foot-loose in the
assault to be made.  The other two divisions of the 2d corps and
Sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night of the 29th and moved
in front of Petersburg.  On the morning of the 30th, between four and
five o'clock, the mine was sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a
regiment, and the advance of the assaulting column, formed of the 9th
corps, immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion,
and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and a
detached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to advance
promptly to the ridge beyond.  Had they done this, I have every reason
to believe that Petersburg would have fallen.  Other troops were
immediately pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting them up
enabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been complete),
and get forces to this point for its defence.  The captured line thus
held being untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops were
withdrawn, but not without heavy loss.  Thus terminated in disaster what
promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign.

Immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that General Hunter was
retreating from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha River, thus laying the
Shenandoah Valley open for raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania, he
returned northward and moved down that valley.  As soon as this movement
of the enemy was ascertained, General Hunter, who had reached the
Kanawha River, was directed to move his troops without delay, by river
and railroad, to Harper's Ferry; but owing to the difficulty of
navigation by reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great
delay was experienced in getting there.  It became necessary, therefore,
to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy.  For this
purpose the 6th corps was taken from the armies operating against
Richmond, to which was added the 19th corps, then fortunately beginning
to arrive in Hampton Roads from the Gulf Department, under orders issued
immediately after the ascertainment of the result of the Red River
expedition.  The garrisons of Baltimore and Washington were at this time
made up of heavy-artillery regiments, hundred days' men, and detachments
from the invalid corps.  One division under command of General Ricketts,
of the 6th corps, was sent to Baltimore, and the remaining two divisions
of the 6th corps, under General Wright, were subsequently sent to
Washington.  On the 3d of July the enemy approached Martinsburg.
General Sigel, who was in command of our forces there, retreated across
the Potomac at Shepherdtown; and General Weber, commanding at Harper's
Ferry, crossed the occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column towards
Frederick City.  General Wallace, with Rickett's division and his own
command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from
Baltimore with great promptness, and met the enemy in force on the
Monocacy, near the crossing of the railroad bridge.  His force was not
sufficient to insure success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and
although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy,
and thereby served to enable General Wright to reach Washington with two
division of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th corps, before
him.  From Monocacy the enemy moved on Washington, his cavalry advance
reaching Rockville on the evening of the 10th.  On the 12th a
reconnoissance was thrown out in front of Fort Stevens, to ascertain the
enemy's position and force.  A severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost
about two hundred and eighty in killed and wounded.  The enemy's loss
was probably greater.  He commenced retreating during the night.
Learning the exact condition of affairs at Washington, I requested by
telegraph, at forty-five minutes past eleven P.M., on the 12th, the
assignment of Major-General H. G. Wright to the command of all the
troops that could be made available to operate in the field against the
enemy, and directed that he should get outside of the trenches with all
the force he could, and push Early to the last moment.  General Wright
commenced the pursuit on the 13th; on the 18th the enemy was overtaken
at Snicker's Ferry, on the Shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred;
and on the 20th, General Averell encountered and defeated a portion of
the rebel army at Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and
several hundred prisoners.

Learning that Early was retreating south towards Lynchburg or Richmond,
I directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to the armies
operating against Richmond, so that they might be used in a movement
against Lee before the return of the troops sent by him into the valley;
and that Hunter should remain in the Shenandoah Valley, keeping between
any force of the enemy and Washington, acting on the defensive as much
as possible.  I felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, the
fact would be developed before the 6th and 19th corps could leave
Washington.  Subsequently, the 19th corps was excepted form the order to
return to the James.

About the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again advancing upon
Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the 6th corps, then at Washington, was
ordered back to the vicinity of Harper's Ferry.  The rebel force moved
down the valley, and sent a raiding party into Pennsylvania which on the
30th burned Chambersburg, and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry,
towards Cumberland.  They were met and defeated by General Kelley, and
with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of West Virginia.
From the time of the first raid the telegraph wires were frequently down
between Washington and City Point, making it necessary to transmit
messages a part of the way by boat.  It took from twenty-four to
thirty-six hours to get dispatches through and return answers would be
received showing a different state of facts from those on which they
were based, causing confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that
must have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and
rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they otherwise
would have been. To remedy this evil, it was evident to my mind that
some person should have the supreme command of all the forces in the
Department of West Virginia, Washington, Susquehanna, and the Middle
Department, and I so recommended.

On the 2d of August, I ordered General Sheridan to report in person to
Major-General Halleck, chief of staff, at Washington, with a view to his
assignment to the command of all the forces against Early.  At this time
the enemy was concentrated in the neighborhood of Winchester, while our
forces, under General Hunter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at the
crossing of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, leaving open to the enemy
Western Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania.  From where I was, I
hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces at
Monocacy, lest by so doing I should expose Washington. Therefore, on the
4th, I left City Point to visit Hunter's command, and determine for
myself what was best to be done.  On arrival there, and after
consultation with General Hunter, I issued to him the following
instructions:


"MONOCACY BRIDGE, MARYLAND, August 5, 1864--8 P.M.

"GENERAL:--Concentrate all your available force without delay in the
vicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and
garrisons for public property as may be necessary.  Use, in this
concentrating, the railroad, if by so doing time can be saved.  From
Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the
Potomac in large force, push north, following him and attacking him
wherever found; follow him, if driven south of the Potomac, as long as
it is safe to do so.  If it is ascertained that the enemy has but a
small force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force,
detaching under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look after
the raiders, and drive them to their homes.  In detaching such a force,
the brigade of the cavalry now en route from Washington via Rockville
may be taken into account.

"There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best
cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses.  These will be
instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the south
side of the Potomac.  One brigade will probably start to-morrow.  In
pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to
go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite
the enemy to return.  Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for
the use of your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy.  It is not
desirable that the buildings should be destroyed--they should rather be
protected; but the people should be informed that, so long as an army
can subsist among them, recurrence of theses raids must be expected, and
we are determined to stop them at all hazards.

"Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do this
you want to keep him always in sight.  Be guided in your course by the
course he takes.

"Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular
vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country
through which you march.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER."


The troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance reached
Halltown that night.

General Hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a willingness to
be relieved from command, I telegraphed to have General Sheridan, then
at Washington, sent to Harper's Ferry by the morning train, with orders
to take general command of all the troops in the field, and to call on
General Hunter at Monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of
instructions.  I remained at Monocacy until General Sheridan arrived, on
the morning of the 6th, and, after a conference with him in relation to
military affairs in that vicinity, I returned to City Point by way of
Washington.

On the 7th of August, the Middle Department, and the Departments of West
Virginia, Washington, and Susquehanna, were constituted into the "Middle
Military Division," and  Major-General Sheridan was assigned to
temporary command of the same.

Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and Wilson, were
sent to Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac. The first reached him at
Harper's Ferry about the 11th of August.

His operations during the month of August and the fore part of September
were both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in many
severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we were
generally successful, but no general engagement took place.  The two
armies lay in such a position--the enemy on the west bank of the Opequon
Creek covering Winchester, and our forces in front of Berryville--that
either could bring on a battle at any time.  Defeat to us would lay open
to the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distances
before another army could be interposed to check him.  Under these
circumstances I hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken.
Finally, the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the Chesapeake
and Ohio Canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became so
indispensably necessary to us, and the importance of relieving
Pennsylvania and Maryland from continuously threatened invasion so
great, that I determined the risk should be taken.  But fearing to
telegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than I did of
General Sheridan's feelings as to what would be the probable result, I
left City Point on the 15th of September to visit him at his
headquarters, to decide, after conference with him, what should be done.
I met him at Charlestown, and he pointed out so distinctly how each army
lay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such
confidence of success, that I saw there were but two words of
instructions necessary--Go in!  For the conveniences of forage, the
teams for supplying the army were kept at Harper's Ferry.  I asked him
if he could get out his teams and supplies in time to make an attack on
the ensuing Tuesday morning.  His reply was, that he could before
daylight on Monday.  He was off promptly to time, and I may here add,
that the result was such that I have never since deemed it necessary to
visit General Sheridan before giving him orders.

Early on the morning of the 19th, General Sheridan attacked General
Early at the crossing on the Opequon Creek, and after a most sanguinary
and bloody battle, lasting until five o'clock in the evening, defeated
him with heavy loss, carrying his entire position from Opequon Creek to
Winchester, capturing several thousand prisoners and five pieces of
artillery.  The enemy rallied, and made a stand in a strong position at
Fisher's Hill, where he was attacked, and again defeated with heavy loss
on the 20th [22d].  Sheridan pursued him with great energy through
Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge.  After stripping
the upper valley of most of the supplies and provisions for the rebel
army, he returned to Strasburg, and took position on the north side of
Cedar Creek.

Having received considerable reinforcements, General Early again
returned to the valley, and, on the 9th of October, his cavalry
encountered ours near Strasburg, where the rebels were defeated, with
the loss of eleven pieces of artillery and three hundred and fifty
prisoners.  On the night of the 18th, the enemy crossed the mountains
which separate the branches of the Shenandoah, forded the North Fork,
and early on the morning of the 19th, under cover of the darkness and
the fog, surprised and turned our left flank, and captured the batteries
which enfiladed our whole line.  Our troops fell back with heavy loss
and in much confusion, but were finally rallied between Middletown and
Newtown.  At this juncture, General Sheridan, who was at Winchester when
the battle commenced arrived on the field, arranged his lines just in
time to repulse a heavy attack of the enemy, and immediately assuming
the offensive, he attacked in turn with great vigor.  The enemy was
defeated with great slaughter, and the loss of most of his artillery and
trains, and the trophies he had captured in the morning.  The wreck of
his army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of Staunton
and Lynchburg.  Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson. Thus ended this, the
enemy's last attempt to invade the North via the Shenandoah Valley.  I
was now enabled to return the 6th corps to the Army of the Potomac, and
to send one division from Sheridan's army to the Army of the James, and
another to Savannah, Georgia, to hold Sherman's new acquisitions on the
sea-coast, and thus enable him to move without detaching from his force
for that purpose.

Reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy had
detached three divisions from Petersburg to reinforce Early in the
Shenandoah Valley.  I therefore sent the 2d corps and Gregg's division
of cavalry, of the Army of the Potomac, and a force of General Butler's
army, on the night of the 13th of August, to threaten Richmond from the
north side of the James, to prevent him from sending troops away, and,
if possible, to draw back those sent.  In this move we captured six
pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained troops that
were under marching orders, and ascertained that but one division
(Kershaw's), of the three reputed detached, had gone.

The enemy having withdrawn heavily from Petersburg to resist this
movement, the 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was moved out on the
18th, and took possession of the Weldon Railroad.  During the day he had
considerable fighting.  To regain possession of the road, the enemy made
repeated and desperate assaults, but was each time repulsed with great
loss.  On the night of the 20th, the troops on the north side of the
James were withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg returned to the front at
Petersburg.  On the 25th, the 2d corps and Gregg's division of cavalry,
while at Reams's Station destroying the railroad, were attacked, and
after desperate fighting, a part of our line gave way, and five pieces
of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy.

By the 12th of September, a branch railroad was completed from the City
Point and Petersburg Railroad to the Weldon Railroad, enabling us to
supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the army in front of
Petersburg.

The extension of our lines across the Weldon Railroad compelled the
enemy to so extend his, that it seemed he could have but few troops
north of the James for the defence of Richmond.  On the night of the
28th, the 10th corps, Major-General Birney, and the 18th corps,
Major-General Ord commanding, of General Butler's army, were crossed to
the north side of the James, and advanced on the morning of the 29th,
carrying the very strong fortifications and intrenchments below
Chaffin's Farm, known as Fort Harrison, capturing fifteen pieces of
artillery, and the New Market Road and intrenchments.  This success was
followed up by a gallant assault upon Fort Gilmer, immediately in front
of the Chaffin Farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with heavy
loss.  Kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to the right of
this, supported by infantry, and reached the enemy's inner line, but was
unable to get further.  The position captured from the enemy was so
threatening to Richmond, that I determined to hold it.  The enemy made
several desperate attempts to dislodge us, all of which were
unsuccessful, and for which he paid dearly.  On the morning of the 30th,
General Meade sent out a reconnoissance with a view to attacking the
enemy's line, if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of
troops to the north side.  In this reconnoissance we captured and held
the enemy's works near Poplar Spring Church.  In the afternoon, troops
moving to get to the left of the point gained were attacked by the enemy
in heavy force, and compelled to fall back until supported by the forces
holding the captured works. Our cavalry under Gregg was also attacked,
but repulsed the enemy with great loss.

On the 7th of October, the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry north of the
James, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and
prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery eight or nine pieces.  This
he followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was
repulsed with severe slaughter.  On the 13th, a reconnoissance was sent
out by General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new
works he was constructing, which resulted in very heavy loss to us.

On the 27th, the Army of the Potomac, leaving only sufficient men to
hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank.  The 2d
corps, followed by two divisions of the 5th corps, with the cavalry in
advance and covering our left flank, forced a passage of Hatcher's Run,
and moved up the south side of it towards the South Side Railroad, until
the 2d corps and part of the cavalry reached the Boydton Plank Road
where it crosses Hatcher's Run.  At this point we were six miles distant
from the South Side Railroad, which I had hoped by this movement to
reach and hold.  But finding that we had not reached the end of the
enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successful
assault by which he might be doubled up and shortened, I determined to
withdraw to within our fortified line.  Orders were given accordingly.
Immediately upon receiving a report that General Warren had connected
with General Hancock, I returned to my headquarters.  Soon after I left
the enemy moved out across Hatcher's Run, in the gap between Generals
Hancock and Warren, which was not closed as reported, and made a
desperate attack on General Hancock's right and rear.  General Hancock
immediately faced his corps to meet it, and after a bloody combat drove
the enemy within his works, and withdrew that night to his old position.

In support of this movement, General Butler made a demonstration on the
north side of the James, and attacked the enemy on the Williamsburg
Road, and also on the York River Railroad.  In the former he was
unsuccessful; in the latter he succeeded in carrying a work which was
afterwards abandoned, and his forces withdrawn to their former
positions.

From this time forward the operations in front of Petersburg and
Richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the
defence and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements for
crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to prevent his
detaching any considerable force to send south.  By the 7th of February,
our lines were extended to Hatcher's Run, and the Weldon Railroad had
been destroyed to Hicksford.

General Sherman moved from Chattanooga on the 6th of May, with the
Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, commanded, respectively,
by Generals Thomas McPherson, and Schofield, upon Johnston's army at
Dalton; but finding the enemy's position at Buzzard's Roost, covering
Dalton, too strong to be assaulted, General McPherson was sent through
Snake Gap to turn it, while Generals Thomas and Schofield threatened it
in front and on the north.  This movement was successful.  Johnston,
finding his retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortified
position at Resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of May 15th.
A heavy battle ensued.  During the night the enemy retreated south.
Late on the 17th, his rear-guard was overtaken near Adairsville, and
heavy skirmishing followed.  The next morning, however, he had again
disappeared.  He was vigorously pursued, and was overtaken at Cassville
on the 19th, but during the ensuing night retreated across the Etowah.
While these operations were going on, General Jefferson C. Davis's
division of Thomas's army was sent to Rome, capturing it with its forts
and artillery, and its valuable mills and foundries.  General Sherman,
having give his army a few days' rest at this point, again put it in
motion on the 23d, for Dallas, with a view of turning the difficult pass
at Allatoona.  On the afternoon of the 25th, the advance, under General
Hooker, had a severe battle with the enemy, driving him back to New Hope
Church, near Dallas.  Several sharp encounters occurred at this point.
The most important was on the 28th, when the enemy assaulted General
McPherson at Dallas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse.

On the 4th of June, Johnston abandoned his intrenched position at New
Hope Church, and retreated to the strong positions of Kenesaw, Pine, and
Lost mountains.  He was forced to yield the two last-named places, and
concentrate his army on Kenesaw, where, on the 27th, Generals Thomas and
McPherson made a determined but unsuccessful assault.  On the night of
the 2d of July, Sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank,
and on the morning of the 3d, found that the enemy, in consequence of
this movement, had abandoned Kenesaw and retreated across the
Chattahoochee.

General Sherman remained on the Chattahoochee to give his men rest and
get up stores until the 17th of July, when he resumed his operations,
crossed the Chattahoochee, destroyed a large portion of the railroad to
Augusta, and drove the enemy back to Atlanta. At this place General Hood
succeeded General Johnston in command of the rebel army, and assuming
the offensive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon Sherman
in the vicinity of Atlanta, the most desperate and determined of which
was on the 22d of July.  About one P.M. of this day the brave,
accomplished, and noble-hearted McPherson was killed.  General Logan
succeeded him, and commanded the Army of the Tennessee through this
desperate battle, and until he was superseded by Major-General Howard,
on the 26th, with the same success and ability that had characterized
him in the command of a corps or division.

In all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss. Finding it
impossible to entirely invest the place, General Sherman, after securing
his line of communications across the Chattahoochee, moved his main
force round by the enemy's left flank upon the Montgomery and Macon
roads, to draw the enemy from his fortifications.  In this he succeeded,
and after defeating the enemy near Rough-and-Ready, Jonesboro, and
Lovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of September
occupied Atlanta, the objective point of his campaign.

About the time of this move, the rebel cavalry, under Wheeler, attempted
to cut his communications in the rear, but was repulsed at Dalton, and
driven into East Tennessee, whence it proceeded west to McMinnville,
Murfreesboro, and Franklin, and was finally driven south of the
Tennessee.  The damage done by this raid was repaired in a few days.

During the partial investment of Atlanta, General Rousseau joined
General Sherman with a force of cavalry from Decatur, having made a
successful raid upon the Atlanta and Montgomery Railroad, and its
branches near Opelika. Cavalry raids were also made by Generals McCook,
Garrard, and Stoneman, to cut the remaining Railroad communication with
Atlanta.  The first two were successful the latter, disastrous.

General Sherman's movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta was prompt,
skilful, and brilliant.  The history of his flank movements and battles
during that memorable campaign will ever be read with an interest
unsurpassed by anything in history.

His own report, and those of his subordinate commanders, accompanying
it, give the details of that most successful campaign.

He was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-track
railroad from Nashville to the point where he was operating.  This
passed the entire distance through a hostile country, and every foot of
it had to be protected by troops. The cavalry force of the enemy under
Forrest, in Northern Mississippi, was evidently waiting for Sherman to
advance far enough into the mountains of Georgia, to make a retreat
disastrous, to get upon this line and destroy it beyond the possibility
of further use.  To guard against this danger, Sherman left what he
supposed to be a sufficient force to operate against Forrest in West
Tennessee.  He directed General Washburn, who commanded there, to send
Brigadier-General S. D. Sturgis in command of this force to attack him.
On the morning of the 10th of June, General Sturgis met the enemy near
Guntown, Mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout
and confusion to Memphis, a distance of about one hundred miles, hotly
pursued by the enemy.  By this, however, the enemy was defeated in his
designs upon Sherman's line of communications. The persistency with
which he followed up this success exhausted him, and made a season for
rest and repairs necessary.  In the meantime, Major-General A. J. Smith,
with the troops of the Army of the Tennessee that had been sent by
General Sherman to General Banks, arrived at Memphis on their return
from Red River, where they had done most excellent service.  He was
directed by General Sherman to immediately take the offensive against
Forrest.  This he did with the promptness and effect which has
characterized his whole military career.  On the 14th of July, he met
the enemy at Tupelo, Mississippi, and whipped him badly.  The fighting
continued through three days.  Our loss was small compared with that of
the enemy.  Having accomplished the object of his expedition, General
Smith returned to Memphis.

During the months of March and April this same force under Forrest
annoyed us considerably.  On the 24th of March it captured Union City,
Kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th attacked Paducah, commanded
by Colonel S. G. Hicks, 40th Illinois Volunteers.  Colonel H., having
but a small force, withdrew to the forts near the river, from where he
repulsed the enemy and drove him from the place.

On the 13th of April, part of this force, under the rebel General
Buford, summoned the garrison of Columbus, Kentucky, to surrender, but
received for reply from Colonel Lawrence, 34th New Jersey Volunteers,
that being placed there by his Government with adequate force to hold
his post and repel all enemies from it, surrender was out of the
question.

On the morning of the same day Forrest attacked Fort Pillow, Tennessee,
garrisoned by a detachment of Tennessee cavalry and the 1st Regiment
Alabama <DW52> troops, commanded by Major Booth.  The garrison fought
bravely until about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy
carried the works by assault; and, after our men threw down their arms,
proceeded to an inhuman and merciless massacre of the garrison.

On the 14th, General Buford, having failed at Columbus, appeared before
Paducah, but was again driven off.

Guerillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by Forrest's operations,
were also very active in Kentucky.  The most noted of these was Morgan.
With a force of from two to three thousand cavalry, he entered the State
through Pound Gap in the latter part of May.  On the 11th of June they
attacked and captured Cynthiana, with its entire garrison.  On the 12th
he was overtaken by General Burbridge, and completely routed with heavy
loss, and was finally driven out of the State.  This notorious guerilla
was afterwards surprised and killed near Greenville, Tennessee, and his
command captured and dispersed by General Gillem.

In the absence of official reports of the commencement of the Red River
expedition, except so far as relates to the movements of the troops sent
by General Sherman under General A. J. Smith, I am unable to give the
date of its starting.  The troops under General Smith, comprising two
divisions of the 16th and a detachment of the 17th army corps, left
Vicksburg on the 10th of March, and reached the designated point on Red
River one day earlier than that appointed by General Banks.  The rebel
forces at Fort de Russy, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the
14th to give him battle in the open field; but, while occupying the
enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, Smith pushed forward to Fort
de Russy, which had been left with a weak garrison, and captured it with
its garrison about three hundred and fifty men, eleven pieces of
artillery, and many small-arms.  Our loss was but slight.  On the 15th
he pushed forward to Alexandria, which place he reached on the 18th.  On
the 21st he had an engagement with the enemy at Henderson's Hill, in
which he defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten prisoners and four
pieces of artillery.

On the 28th, he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the rebel
General Taylor, at Cane River.  By the 26th, General Banks had assembled
his whole army at Alexandria, and pushed forward to Grand Ecore.  On the
morning of April 6th he moved from Grand Ecore.  On the afternoon of the
7th, he advanced and met the enemy near Pleasant Hill, and drove him
from the field.  On the same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight
miles beyond Pleasant Hill, but was again compelled to retreat.  On the
8th, at Sabine Cross Roads and Peach Hill, the enemy attacked and
defeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of artillery and an
immense amount of transportation and stores.  During the night, General
Banks fell back to Pleasant Hill, where another battle was fought on the
9th, and the enemy repulsed with great loss.  During the night, General
Banks continued his retrograde movement to Grand Ecore, and thence to
Alexandria, which he reached on the 27th of April.  Here a serious
difficulty arose in getting Admiral Porter's fleet which accompanied the
expedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much since they
passed up as to prevent their return.  At the suggestion of Colonel (now
Brigadier-General) Bailey, and under his superintendence, wing-dams were
constructed, by which the channel was contracted so that the fleet
passed down the rapids in safety.

The army evacuated Alexandria on the 14th of May, after considerable
skirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached Morganzia and Point
Coupee near the end of the month.  The disastrous termination of this
expedition, and the lateness of the season, rendered impracticable the
carrying out of my plans of a movement in force sufficient to insure the
capture of Mobile.

On the 23d of March, Major-General Steele left Little Rock with the 7th
army corps, to  cooperate with General Banks's expedition on the Red
River, and reached Arkadelphia on the 28th.  On the 16th of April, after
driving the enemy before him, he was joined, near Elkin's Ferry, in
Washita County, by General Thayer, who had marched from Fort Smith.
After several severe skirmishes, in which the enemy was defeated,
General Steele reached Camden, which he occupied about the middle of
April.

On learning the defeat and consequent retreat of General Banks on Red
River, and the loss of one of his own trains at Mark's Mill, in Dallas
County, General Steele determined to fall back to the Arkansas River.
He left Camden on the 26th of April, and reached Little Rock on the 2d
of May.  On the 30th of April, the enemy attacked him while crossing
Saline River at Jenkins's Ferry, but was repulsed with considerable
loss.  Our loss was about six hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners.

Major-General Canby, who had been assigned to the command of the
"Military Division of the West Mississippi," was therefore directed to
send the 19th army corps to join the armies operating against Richmond,
and to limit the remainder of his command to such operations as might be
necessary to hold the positions and lines of communications he then
occupied.

Before starting General A. J. Smith's troops back to Sherman, General
Canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy that was
collecting near the Mississippi River.  General Smith met and defeated
this force near Lake Chicot on the 5th of June.  Our loss was about
forty killed and seventy wounded.

In the latter part of July, General Canby sent Major-General Gordon
Granger, with such forces as he could collect, to co-operate with
Admiral Farragut against the defences of Mobile Bay.  On the 8th of
August, Fort Gaines surrendered to the combined naval and land forces.
Fort Powell was blown up and abandoned.

On the 9th, Fort Morgan was invested, and, after a severe bombardment,
surrendered on the 23d.  The total captures amounted to one thousand
four hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and one hundred and four pieces
of artillery.

About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel General
Price, with a force of about ten thousand men, had reached Jacksonport,
on his way to invade Missouri, General A. J. Smith's command, then en
route from Memphis to join Sherman, was ordered to Missouri.  A cavalry
force was also, at the same time, sent from Memphis, under command of
Colonel Winslow.  This made General Rosecrans's forces superior to those
of Price, and no doubt was entertained he would be able to check Price
and drive him back; while the forces under General Steele, in Arkansas,
would cut off his retreat.  On the 26th day of September, Price attacked
Pilot Knob and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved north to
the Missouri River, and continued up that river towards Kansas.  General
Curtis, commanding Department of Kansas, immediately collected such
forces as he could to repel the invasion of Kansas, while General
Rosecrans's cavalry was operating in his rear.

The enemy was brought to battle on the Big Blue and defeated, with the
loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large number of
prisoners.  He made a precipitate retreat to Northern Arkansas.  The
impunity with which Price was enabled to roam over the State of Missouri
for a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, show to how
little purpose a superior force may be used.  There is no reason why
General Rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces, and beaten
and driven Price before the latter reached Pilot Knob.

September 20th, the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the
Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the 23d attacked the garrison
at Athens, consisting of six hundred men, which capitulated on the 24th.
Soon after the surrender two regiments of reinforcements arrived, and
after a severe fight were compelled to surrender.  Forrest destroyed the
railroad westward, captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch trestle,
skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on the 27th, and on the same day
cut the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad near Tullahoma and Dechard.
On the morning of the 30th, one column of Forrest's command, under
Buford, appeared before Huntsville, and summoned the surrender of the
garrison.  Receiving an answer in the negative, he remained in the
vicinity of the place until next morning, when he again summoned its
surrender, and received the same reply as on the night before.  He
withdrew in the direction of Athens which place had been regarrisoned,
and attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of October, but without
success.  On the morning of the 2d he renewed his attack, but was
handsomely repulsed.

Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on the morning of
the 1st, but did not make an attack.  On the morning of the 3d he moved
towards Mount Pleasant.  While these operations were going on, every
exertion was made by General Thomas to destroy the forces under Forrest
before he could recross the Tennessee, but was unable to prevent his
escape to Corinth, Mississippi.

In September, an expedition under General Burbridge was sent to destroy
the saltworks at Saltville, Virginia. He met the enemy on the 2d of
October, about three miles and a half from Saltville, and drove him into
his strongly intrenched position around the salt-works, from which he
was unable to dislodge him.  During the night he withdrew his command
and returned to Kentucky.

General Sherman, immediately after the fall of Atlanta, put his armies
in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations for refitting
and supplying them for future service.  The great length of road from
Atlanta to the Cumberland River, however, which had to be guarded,
allowed the troops but little rest.

During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech in Macon, Georgia, which
was reported in the papers of the South, and soon became known to the
whole country, disclosing the plans of the enemy, thus enabling General
Sherman to fully meet them.  He exhibited the weakness of supposing that
an army that had been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt
at the defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against the
army that had so often defeated it.

In execution of this plan, Hood, with this army, was soon reported to
the south-west of Atlanta. Moving far to Sherman's right, he succeeded
in reaching the railroad about Big Shanty, and moved north on it.

General Sherman, leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the remainder of
his army fell upon him and drove him to Gadsden, Alabama. Seeing the
constant annoyance he would have with the roads to his rear if he
attempted to hold Atlanta, General Sherman proposed the abandonment and
destruction of that place, with all the railroads leading to it, and
telegraphed me as follows:


"CENTREVILLE, GEORGIA", October 10--noon.

"Dispatch about Wilson just received.  Hood is now crossing Coosa River,
twelve miles below Rome, bound west.  If he passes over the Mobile and
Ohio road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by
Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas with the troops now in
Tennessee to defend the State?  He will have an ample force when the
reinforcements ordered reach Nashville.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT."


For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this dispatch, I
quote from the letter sent by Colonel Porter:

"I will therefore give my opinion, that your army and Canby's should be
reinforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you strike for
Savannah and the river; that Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi
River, and send a force to get Columbus, Georgia, either by the way of
the Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed and put
my army in final order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston,
to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commerce and the city
of Savannah is in our possession."  This was in reply to a letter of
mine of date September 12th, in answer to a dispatch of his containing
substantially the same proposition, and in which I informed him of a
proposed movement against Wilmington, and of the situation in Virginia,
etc.


"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,

"October 11, 1864--11 A.M.

"Your dispatch of October 10th received.  Does it not look as if Hood
was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobile
and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply his base on the
Tennessee River, about Florence or Decatur?  If he does this, he ought
to be met and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee River.  If
you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood's army, but
would be bushwhacked by all the old men and little boys, and such
railroad guards as are still left at home.  Hood would probably strike
for Nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater
damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south.  If there
is any way of getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that, but I must
trust to your own judgment.  I find I shall not be able to send a force
from here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements, therefore, will
be independent of mine; at least until the fall of Richmond takes place.
I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could
not prevent Hood from going north.  With Wilson turned loose, with all
your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive
than heretofore.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."


"KINGSTON, GEORGIA, "October 11--11 A.M.

"Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and
Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rome.  He threw one
corps on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to follow.  I hold Atlanta
with the 20th corps, and have strong detachments along my line.  This
reduces my active force to a comparatively small army.  We cannot remain
here on the defensive.  With the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold
cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads.  I would infinitely
prefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the country from Chattanooga
to Atlanta including the latter city send back all my wounded and
worthless, and with my effective army, move through Georgia, smashing
things, to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I
believe he will be forced to follow me.  Instead of my being on the
defensive, I would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he
means to do, he would have to guess at my plans.  The difference in war
is full twenty-five per cent.  I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the
mouth of the Chattahoochee.

"Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long.

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT."


"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, "October 11,1864--11.30 P.M.

"Your dispatch of to-day received.  If you are satisfied the trip to the
sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee River firmly,
you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton or
Chattanooga, as you think best.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."


It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting through to
the coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads, leading east
and west, through Georgia, to effectually sever the east from the west.
In other words, cut the would-be Confederacy in two again, as it had
been cut once by our gaining possession of the Mississippi River.
General Sherman's plan virtually effected this object.

General Sherman commenced at once his preparations for his proposed
movement, keeping his army in position in the meantime to watch Hood.
Becoming satisfied that Hood had moved westward from Gadsden across Sand
Mountain, General Sherman sent the 4th corps,  Major-General Stanley
commanding, and the 23d corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, back
to Chattanooga to report to Major-General Thomas, at Nashville, whom he
had placed in command of all the troops of his military division, save
the four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move with
through Georgia. With the troops thus left at his disposal, there was
little doubt that General Thomas could hold the line of the Tennessee,
or, in the event Hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and
beat him in battle.  It was therefore readily consented to that Sherman
should start for the sea-coast.

Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the 14th of November, he
commenced his march, threatening both Augusta and Macon.  His coming-out
point could not be definitely fixed. Having to gather his subsistence as
he marched through the country, it was not impossible that a force
inferior to his own might compel him to head for such point as he could
reach, instead of such as he might prefer.  The blindness of the enemy,
however, in ignoring his movement, and sending Hood's army, the only
considerable force he had west of Richmond and east of the Mississippi
River, northward on an offensive campaign, left the whole country open,
and Sherman's route to his own choice.

How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met with, the
condition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture of
Fort McAllister, on the Savannah River, and the occupation of Savannah
on the 21st of December, are all clearly set forth in General Sherman's
admirable report.

Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlanta, two
expeditions, one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one from Vicksburg,
Mississippi, were started by General Canby to cut the enemy's lines of
communication with Mobile and detain troops in that field.  General
Foster, commanding Department of the South, also sent an expedition, via
Broad River, to destroy the railroad between Charleston and Savannah.
The expedition from Vicksburg, under command of Brevet Brigadier-General
E. D. Osband (colonel 3d United States  cavalry), captured, on
the 27th of November, and destroyed the Mississippi Central Railroad
bridge and trestle-work over Big Black River, near Canton, thirty miles
of the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of stores.  The
expedition from Baton Rouge was without favorable results.  The
expedition from the Department of the South, under the immediate command
of Brigadier-General John P. Hatch, consisting of about five thousand
men of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up Broad
River and debarked at Boyd's Neck on the 29th of November, from where it
moved to strike the railroad at Grahamsville.  At Honey Hill, about
three miles from Grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in a
strongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe fighting, in
our repulse with a loss of seven hundred and forty-six in killed,
wounded, and missing.  During the night General Hatch withdrew.  On the
6th of December General Foster obtained a position covering the
Charleston and Savannah Railroad, between the Coosawhatchie and
Tulifinny rivers.

Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move northward, which
seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom.  At all events, had I
had the power to command both armies, I should not have changed the
orders under which he seemed to be acting.  On the 26th of October, the
advance of Hood's army attacked the garrison at Decatur, Alabama, but
failing to carry the place, withdrew towards Courtland, and succeeded,
in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgment on the north side of
the Tennessee River, near Florence.  On the 28th, Forrest reached the
Tennessee, at Fort Heiman, and captured a gunboat and three transports.
On the 2d of November he planted batteries above and below Johnsonville,
on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gunboats and eight
transports.  On the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place,
and was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison.  The gunboats
becoming disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports, to
prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy.  About a million and
a half dollars' worth of store and property on the levee and in
storehouses was consumed by fire.  On the 5th the enemy disappeared and
crossed to the north side of the Tennessee River, above Johnsonville,
moving towards Clifton, and subsequently joined Hood.  On the night of
the 5th, General Schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps, reached
Johnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to Pulaski, and
was put in command of all the troopers there, with instruction to watch
the movements of Hood and <DW44> his advance, but not to risk a general
engagement until the arrival of General A. J. Smith's command from
Missouri, and until General Wilson could get his cavalry remounted.

On the 19th, General Hood continued his advance.  General Thomas,
retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards Nashville for the
purpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival of
reinforcements.  The enemy coming up with our main force, commanded by
General Schofield, at Franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our works
repeatedly during the afternoon until late at night, but were in every
instance repulsed.  His loss in this battle was one thousand seven
hundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two prisoners, and three
thousand eight hundred wounded.  Among his losses were six general
officers killed, six wounded, and one captured.  Our entire loss was two
thousand three hundred.  This was the first serious opposition the enemy
met with, and I am satisfied was the fatal blow to all his expectations.
During the night, General Schofield fell back towards Nashville.  This
left the field to the enemy--not lost by battle, but voluntarily
abandoned--so that General Thomas's whole force might be brought
together.  The enemy followed up and commenced the establishment of his
line in front of Nashville on the 2d of December.

As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was crossing the Tennessee
River, and that Price was going out of Missouri, General Rosecrans was
ordered to send to General Thomas the troops of General A. J. Smith's
command, and such other troops as he could spare.  The advance of this
reinforcement reached Nashville on the 30th of November.

On the morning of the 15th December, General Thomas attacked Hood in
position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and drove him from
the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hand most of his
artillery and many thousand prisoners, including four general officers.

Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it
appeared to me, the unnecessary delay.  This impatience was increased
upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the
Cumberland into Kentucky.  I feared Hood would cross his whole army and
give us great trouble there. After urging upon General Thomas the
necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, I started West to
superintend matters there in person.  Reaching Washington City, I
received General Thomas's dispatch announcing his attack upon the enemy,
and the result as far as the battle had progressed.  I was delighted.
All fears and apprehensions were dispelled.  I am not yet satisfied but
that General Thomas, immediately upon the appearance of Hood before
Nashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have moved out with
his whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his
cavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it
impracticable to attack earlier than he did.  But his final defeat of
Hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a vindication of that
distinguished officer's judgment.

After Hood's defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued by
cavalry and infantry, to the Tennessee River, being forced to abandon
many pieces of artillery and most of his transportation.  On the 28th of
December our advanced forces ascertained that he had made good his
escape to the south side of the river.

About this time, the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee and North
Alabama, making it difficult to move army transportation and artillery,
General Thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the Tennessee
River.  A small force of cavalry, under Colonel W. J. Palmer, 15th
Pennsylvania Volunteers, continued to follow Hood for some distance,
capturing considerable transportation and all the enemy's
pontoon-bridge.  The details of these operations will be found
clearly set forth in General Thomas's report.

A cavalry expedition, under Brevet Major-General Grierson, started from
Memphis on the 21st of December.  On the 25th he surprised and captured
Forrest's dismounted camp at Verona, Mississippi, on the Mobile and Ohio
Railroad, destroyed the railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and
pontoons for Hood's army, four thousand new English carbines, and large
amounts of public stores.  On the morning of the 28th he attacked and
captured a force of the enemy at Egypt, and destroyed a train of
fourteen cars; thence turning to the south-west, he struck the
Mississippi Central Railroad at Winona, destroyed the factories and
large amounts of stores at Bankston, and the machine-shops and public
property at Grenada, arriving at Vicksburg January 5th.

During the operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, with a force under
General Breckinridge, entered East Tennessee.  On the 13th of November
he attacked General Gillem, near Morristown, capturing his artillery and
several hundred prisoners.  Gillem, with what was left of his command,
retreated to Knoxville.  Following up his success, Breckinridge moved to
near Knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by General Ammen.
Under the directions of General Thomas, General Stoneman concentrated
the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem near Bean's Station to
operate against Breckinridge, and destroy or drive him into Virginia
--destroy the salt-works at Saltville, and the railroad into Virginia
as far as he could go without endangering his command.  On the 12th of
December he commenced his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy's
forces wherever he met them.  On the 16th he struck the enemy, under
Vaughn, at Marion, completely routing and pursuing him to Wytheville,
capturing all his artillery, trains, and one hundred and ninety-eight
prisoners; and destroyed Wytheville, with its stores and supplies, and
the extensive lead-works near there. Returning to Marion, he met a force
under Breckinridge, consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of
Saltville, that had started in pursuit.  He at once made arrangements to
attack it the next morning; but morning found Breckinridge gone.  He
then moved directly to Saltville, and destroyed the extensive salt-works
at that place, a large amount of stores, and captured eight pieces of
artillery.  Having thus successfully executed his instructions, he
returned General Burbridge to Lexington and General Gillem to Knoxville.

Wilmington, North Carolina, was the most important sea-coast port left
to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad, and send cotton
and other products out by blockade-runners, besides being a place of
great strategic value.  The navy had been making strenuous exertions to
seal the harbor of Wilmington, but with only partial effect.  The nature
of the outlet of Cape Fear River was such, that it required watching for
so great a distance that, without possession of the land north of New
Inlet, or Fort Fisher, it was impossible for the navy to entirely close
the harbor against the entrance of blockade-runners.

To secure the possession of this land required the co-operation of a
land force, which I agreed to furnish.  Immediately commenced the
assemblage in Hampton Roads, under Admiral D. D. Porter, of the most
formidable armada ever collected for concentration upon one given point.
This necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy, as well as that
of the loyal North; and through the imprudence of the public press, and
very likely of officers of both branches of service, the exact object of
the expedition became a subject of common discussion in the newspapers
both North and South.  The enemy, thus warned, prepared to meet it.
This caused a postponement of the expedition until the later part of
November, when, being again called upon by Hon. G. V. Fox, Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, I agreed to furnish the men required at once, and
went myself, in company with Major-General Butler, to Hampton Roads,
where we had a conference with Admiral Porter as to the force required
and the time of starting.  A force of six thousand five hundred men was
regarded as sufficient.  The time of starting was not definitely
arranged, but it was thought all would be ready by the 6th of December,
if not before.  Learning, on the 30th of November, that Bragg had gone
to Georgia, taking with him most of the forces about Wilmington, I
deemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach its
destination before the return of Bragg, and directed General Butler to
make all arrangements for the departure of Major-General Weitzel, who
had been designated to command the land forces, so that the navy might
not be detained one moment.

On the 6th of December, the following instructions were given:


"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 6, 1864.

"GENERAL:  The first object of the expedition under General Weitzel is
to close to the enemy the port of Wilmington.  If successful in this,
the second will be to capture Wilmington itself.  There are reasonable
grounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence of
the greater part of the enemy's forces now looking after Sherman in
Georgia.  The directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of
the expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matter of where
they embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be taken.  The object
of the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on the main land
between Cape Fear River and the Atlantic, north of the north entrance to
the river.  Should such landing be effected while the enemy still holds
Fort Fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then
the troops should intrench themselves, and, by co-operating with the
navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places.  These in our
hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of Wilmington would
be sealed.  Should Fort Fisher and the point of land on which it is
built fall into the hands of our troops immediately on landing, then it
will be worth the attempt to capture Wilmington by a forced march and
surprise.  If time is consumed in gaining the first object of the
expedition, the second will become a matter of after consideration.

"The details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer
immediately in command of the troops.

"Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a landing at or
near Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the armies operating against
Richmond without delay.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER."


General Butler commanding the army from which the troops were taken for
this enterprise, and the territory within which they were to operate,
military courtesy required that all orders and instructions should go
through him.  They were so sent, but General Weitzel has since
officially informed me that he never received the foregoing
instructions, nor was he aware of their existence, until he read General
Butler's published official report of the Fort Fisher failure, with my
indorsement and papers accompanying it.  I had no idea of General
Butler's accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off
from Bermuda Hundred, and then did not dream but that General Weitzel
had received all the instructions, and would be in command.  I rather
formed the idea that General Butler was actuated by a desire to witness
the effect of the explosion of the powder-boat.  The expedition was
detained several days at Hampton Roads, awaiting the loading of the
powder-boat.

The importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off without any
delay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon General
Butler, and he advised to so notify Admiral Porter.

The expedition finally got off on the 13th of December, and arrived at
the place of rendezvous, off New Inlet, near Fort Fisher, on the evening
of the 15th.  Admiral Porter arrived on the evening of the 18th, having
put in at Beaufort to get ammunition for the monitors.  The sea becoming
rough, making it difficult to land troops, and the supply of water and
coal being about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to Beaufort to
replenish; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the return to
the place of rendezvous until the 24th.  The powder-boat was exploded on
the morning of the 24th, before the return of General Butler from
Beaufort; but it would seem, from the notice taken of it in the Southern
newspapers, that the enemy were never enlightened as to the object of
the explosion until they were informed by the Northern press.

On the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a
reconnoissance, under Brevet Brigadier-General Curtis, pushed up towards
the fort.  But before receiving a full report of the result of this
reconnoissance, General Butler, in direct violation of the instructions
given, ordered the re-embarkation of the troops and the return of the
expedition.  The re-embarkation was accomplished by the morning of the
27th.

On the return of the expedition officers and men among them Brevet
Major-General (then Brevet Brigadier-General) N. M. Curtis,
First-Lieutenant G. W. Ross, 117th Regiment New York Volunteers,
First-Lieutenant William H. Walling, and Second-Lieutenant George
Simpson, 142d New York Volunteers voluntarily reported to me that when
recalled they were nearly into the fort, and, in their opinion, it could
have been taken without much loss.

Soon after the return of the expedition, I received a dispatch from the
Secretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral Porter, informing me
that the fleet was still off Fort Fisher, and expressing the conviction
that, under a proper leader, the place could be taken.  The natural
supposition with me was, that when the troops abandoned the expedition,
the navy would do so also.  Finding it had not, however, I answered on
the 30th of December, advising Admiral Porter to hold on, and that I
would send a force and make another attempt to take the place.  This
time I selected Brevet Major-General (now Major-General) A. H. Terry to
command the expedition.  The troops composing it consisted of the same
that composed the former, with the addition of a small brigade,
numbering about one thousand five hundred, and a small siege train.  The
latter it was never found necessary to land.  I communicated direct to
the commander of the expedition the following instructions:


"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 3, 1865.

"GENERAL:  The expedition intrusted to your command has been fitted out
to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, N. C., and Wilmington
ultimately, if the fort falls.  You will then proceed with as little
delay as possible to the naval fleet lying off Cape Fear River, and
report the arrival of yourself and command to Admiral D. D. Porter,
commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

"It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should
exist between yourself and the naval commander.  I suggest, therefore,
that you consult with Admiral Porter freely, and get from him the part
to be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there may
be unity of action.  It would be well to have the whole programme laid
down in writing.  I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that you
can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes.  I
would, therefore, defer to him as much as is consistent with your own
responsibilities.  The first object to be attained is to get a firm
position on the spit of land on which Fort Fisher is built, from which
you can operate against that fort.  You want to look to the
practicability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourself
against superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left open
to the enemy. If such a position can be obtained, the siege of Fort
Fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, or
another plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters.

"My own views are, that if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a
portion of their fleet into Cape Fear River, while the balance of it
operates on the outside.  Land forces cannot invest Fort Fisher, or cut
it off from supplies or reinforcements, while the river is in possession
of the enemy.

"A siege-train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort Monroe, in
readiness to be sent to you if required.  All other supplies can be
drawn from Beaufort as you need them.

"Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured.
When you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as
you can spare, to Fort Monroe, to report for orders.

"In case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back to
Beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions.
You will not debark at Beaufort until so directed.

"General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to
Baltimore and place them on sea-going vessels.  These troops will be
brought to Fort Monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are heard
from.  Should you require them, they will be sent to you.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL A. H. TERRY."


Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock, aide-de-camp (now brevet
brigadier-general), who accompanied the former expedition,
was assigned, in orders, as chief-engineer to this.

It will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially from
those given for the first expedition, and that in neither instance was
there an order to assault Fort Fisher. This was a matter left entirely
to the discretion of the commanding officer.

The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the 6th,
arriving at the rendezvous, off Beaufort, on the 8th, where, owing to
the difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of the 12th,
when it got under way and reached its destination that evening.  Under
cover of the fleet, the disembarkation of the troops commenced on the
morning of the 13th, and by three o'clock P.M. was completed without
loss.  On the 14th a reconnoissance was pushed to within five hundred
yards of Fort Fisher, and a small advance work taken possession of and
turned into a defensive line against any attempt that might be made from
the fort.  This reconnoissance disclosed the fact that the front of the
work had been seriously injured by the navy fire.  In the afternoon of
the 15th the fort was assaulted, and after most desperate fighting was
captured, with its entire garrison and armament.  Thus was secured, by
the combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the most important
successes of the war.  Our loss was:  killed, one hundred and ten;
wounded, five hundred and thirty-six.  On the 16th and the 17th the
enemy abandoned and blew up Fort Caswell and the works on Smith's
Island, which were immediately occupied by us.  This gave us entire
control of the mouth of the Cape Fear River.

At my request, Mayor-General B. F. Butler was relieved, and
Major-General E. O. C. Ord assigned to the Department of Virginia and
North Carolina.

The defence of the line of the Tennessee no longer requiring the force
which had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army now threatening it,
I determined to find other fields of operation for General Thomas's
surplus troops--fields from which they would co-operate with other
movements.  General Thomas was therefore directed to collect all troops,
not essential to hold his communications at Eastport, in readiness for
orders.  On the 7th of January, General Thomas was directed, if he was
assured of the departure of Hood south from Corinth, to send General
Schofield with his corps east with as little delay as possible.  This
direction was promptly complied with, and the advance of the corps
reached Washington on the 23d of the same month, whence it was sent to
Fort Fisher and New Bern.  On the 26th he was directed to send General
A. J. Smith's command and a division of cavalry to report to General
Canby.  By the 7th of February the whole force was en route for its
destination.

The State of North Carolina was constituted into a military department,
and General Schofield assigned to command, and placed under the orders
of Major-General Sherman.  The following instructions were given him:


"CITY POINT, VA., January 31, 1865.

"GENERAL:-- *    *    *    Your movements are intended as co-operative
with Sherman's through the States of South and North Carolina.  The
first point to be attained is to secure Wilmington.  Goldsboro' will
then be your objective point, moving either from Wilmington or New Bern,
or both, as you deem best.  Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro',
you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place
with the sea-coast--as near to it as you can, building the road behind
you.  The enterprise under you has two objects:  the first is to give
General Sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north; the second,
to open a base of supplies for him on his line of march.  As soon,
therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, Wilmington or
New Bern, you can best use for throwing supplies from, to the interior,
you will commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage
for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals.  You will get of
these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the interior
as you may be able to occupy.  I believe General Palmer has received
some instructions direct from General Sherman on the subject of securing
supplies for his army.  You will learn what steps he has taken, and be
governed in your requisitions accordingly.  A supply of ordnance stores
will also be necessary.

"Make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments
in the field with me at City Point.  Communicate with me by every
opportunity, and should you deem it necessary at any time, send a
special boat to Fortress Monroe, from which point you can communicate by
telegraph.

"The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those
required for your own command.

"The movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your imperative
duty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for the interior to aid
Sherman.  In such case you will act on your own judgment without waiting
for instructions.  You will report, however, what you purpose doing.
The details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to
you.  I would urge, however, if I did not know that you are already
fully alive to the importance of it, prompt action.  Sherman may be
looked for in the neighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to
the 28th of February; this limits your time very materially.

"If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it can be
supplied from Washington.  A large force of railroad men have already
been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to Fort Fisher in a
day or two.  On this point I have informed you by telegraph.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL J. M. SCHOFIELD."


Previous to giving these instructions I had visited Fort Fisher,
accompanied by General Schofield, for the purpose of seeing for myself
the condition of things, and personally conferring with General Terry
and Admiral Porter as to what was best to be done.

Anticipating the arrival of General Sherman at Savannah his army
entirely foot-loose, Hood being then before Nashville, Tennessee, the
Southern railroads destroyed, so that it would take several months to
re-establish a through line from west to east, and regarding the capture
of Lee's army as the most important operation towards closing the
rebellion--I sent orders to General Sherman on the 6th of December, that
after establishing a base on the sea-coast, with necessary garrison, to
include all his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to City Point
with the balance of his command.

On the 18th of December, having received information of the defeat and
utter rout of Hood's army by General Thomas, and that, owing to the
great difficulty of procuring ocean transportation, it would take over
two months to transport Sherman's army, and doubting whether he might
not contribute as much towards the desired result by operating from
where he was, I wrote to him to that effect, and asked him for his views
as to what would be best to do.  A few days after this I received a
communication from General Sherman, of date 16th December, acknowledging
the receipt of my order of the 6th, and informing me of his preparations
to carry it into effect as soon as he could get transportation.  Also
that he had expected, upon reducing Savannah, instantly to march to
Columbia, South Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to me;
but that this would consume about six weeks' time after the fall of
Savannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the middle of
January.  The confidence he manifested in this letter of being able to
march up and join me pleased me, and, without waiting for a reply to my
letter of the 18th, I directed him, on the 28th of December, to make
preparations to start as he proposed, without delay, to break up the
railroads in North and South Carolina, and join the armies operating
against Richmond as soon as he could.

On the 21st of January I informed General Sherman that I had ordered the
23d corps,  Major-General Schofield commanding, east; that it numbered
about twenty-one thousand men; that we had at Fort Fisher, about eight
thousand men; at New Bern, about four thousand; that if Wilmington was
captured, General Schofield would go there; if not, he would be sent to
New Bern; that, in either event, all the surplus force at both points
would move to the interior towards Goldsboro', in co-operation with his
movement; that from either point railroad communication could be run
out; and that all these troops would be subject to his orders as he came
into communication with them.

In obedience to his instructions, General Schofield proceeded to reduce
Wilmington, North Carolina, in co-operation with the navy under Admiral
Porter, moving his forces up both sides of the Cape Fear River.  Fort
Anderson, the enemy's main defence on the west bank of the river, was
occupied on the morning of the 19th, the enemy having evacuated it after
our appearance before it.

After fighting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered Wilmington on the
morning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated towards Goldsboro' during
the night.  Preparations were at once made for a movement on Goldsboro'
in two columns--one from Wilmington, and the other from New Bern--and to
repair the railroad leading there from each place, as well as to supply
General Sherman by Cape Fear River, towards Fayetteville, if it became
necessary.  The column from New Bern was attacked on the 8th of March,
at Wise's Forks, and driven back with the loss of several hundred
prisoners.  On the 11th the enemy renewed his attack upon our intrenched
position, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell back during the
night.  On the 14th the Neuse River was crossed and Kinston occupied,
and on the 21st Goldsboro' was entered. The column from Wilmington
reached Cox's Bridge, on the Neuse River, ten miles above Goldsboro', on
the 22d.

By the 1st of February, General Sherman's whole army was in motion from
Savannah.  He captured Columbia, South Carolina, on the 17th; thence
moved on Goldsboro', North Carolina, via Fayetteville, reaching the
latter place on the 12th of March, opening up communication with General
Schofield by way of Cape Fear River.  On the 15th he resumed his march
on Goldsboro'.  He met a force of the enemy at Averysboro', and after a
severe fight defeated and compelled it to retreat.  Our loss in this
engagement was about six hundred.  The enemy's loss was much greater.
On the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, under Joe Johnston,
attacked his advance at Bentonville, capturing three guns and driving it
back upon the main body.  General Slocum, who was in the advance
ascertaining that the whole of Johnston's army was in the front,
arranged his troops on the defensive, intrenched himself and awaited
reinforcements, which were pushed forward.  On the night of the 21st the
enemy retreated to Smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our
hands.  From there Sherman continued to Goldsboro', which place had been
occupied by General Schofield on the 21st (crossing the Neuse River ten
miles above there, at Cox's Bridge, where General Terry had got
possession and thrown a pontoon-bridge on the 22d), thus forming a
junction with the columns from New Bern and Wilmington.

Among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of Charleston,
South Carolina. It was evacuated by the enemy on the night of the 17th
of February, and occupied by our forces on the 18th.

On the morning of the 31st of January, General Thomas was directed to
send a cavalry expedition, under General Stoneman, from East Tennessee,
to penetrate South Carolina well down towards Columbia, to destroy the
railroads and military resources of the country, and return, if he was
able, to East Tennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, releasing
our prisoners there, if possible.  Of the feasibility of this latter,
however, General Stoneman was to judge.  Sherman's movements, I had no
doubt, would attract the attention of all the force the enemy could
collect, and facilitate the execution of this.  General Stoneman was so
late in making his start on this expedition (and Sherman having passed
out of the State of South Carolina), on the 27th of February I directed
General Thomas to change his course, and order him to repeat his raid of
last fall, destroying the railroad towards Lynchburg as far as he could.
This would keep him between our garrisons in East Tennessee and the
enemy.  I regarded it not impossible that in the event of the enemy
being driven from Richmond, he might fall back to Lynchburg and attempt
a raid north through East Tennessee.  On the 14th of February the
following communication was sent to General Thomas:


"CITY POINT, VA., February 14, 1865.

"General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile
and the interior of Alabama. His force will consist of about twenty
thousand men, besides A. J. Smith's command.  The cavalry you have sent
to Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg. It, with the available cavalry
already in that section, will move from there eastward, in co-operation.
Hood's army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave
it in Tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by
the withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sherman.  (I take it a large
portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn.  It is so asserted in the
Richmond papers, and a member of the rebel Congress said a few days
since in a speech, that one-half of it had been brought to South
Carolina to oppose Sherman.)  This being true, or even if it is not
true, Canby's movement will attract all the attention of the enemy, and
leave the advance from your standpoint easy.  I think it advisable,
therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare,
and hold it in readiness to go south.  The object would be threefold:
first, to attract as much of the enemy's force as possible, to insure
success to Canby; second, to destroy the enemy's line of communications
and military resources; third, to destroy or capture their forces
brought into the field. Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be the
points to direct the expedition against.  This, however, would not be so
important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama.  Discretion
should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where,
according to the information he may receive, he will best secure the
objects named above.

"Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know what
number of men you can put into the field.  If not more than five
thousand men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be sufficient.  It
is not desirable that you should start this expedition until the one
leaving Vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a week.  I do
not know when it will start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as
I learn.  If you should hear through other sources before hearing from
me, you can act on the information received.

"To insure success your cavalry should go with as little wagon-train as
possible, relying upon the country for supplies.  I would also reduce
the number of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put the
extra teams to the guns taken.  No guns or caissons should be taken with
less than eight horses.

"Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force you think
you will be able to send under these directions.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS."


On the 15th, he was directed to start the expedition as soon after the
20th as he could get it off.

I deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement of the
armies operating against Richmond, that all communications with the
city, north of James River, should be cut off.  The enemy having
withdrawn the bulk of his force from the Shenandoah Valley and sent it
south, or replaced troops sent from Richmond, and desiring to reinforce
Sherman, if practicable, whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers
to that of the enemy, I determined to make a move from the Shenandoah,
which, if successful, would accomplish the first at least, and possibly
the latter of the objects.  I therefore telegraphed General Sheridan as
follows:


"CITY POINT, VA., February 20, 1865--1 P.M.

"GENERAL:--As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will have no
difficulty about reaching Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone.  From
there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as
to be of no further use to the rebellion.  Sufficient cavalry should be
left behind to look after Mosby's gang.  From Lynchburg, if information
you might get there would justify it, you will strike south, heading the
streams in Virgina to the westward of Danville, and push on and join
General Sherman.  This additional raid, with one now about starting from
East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering four or give thousand cavalry,
one from Vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry, one from
Eastport, Mississippi, then thousand cavalry, Canby from Mobile Bay,
with about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops, these three latter
pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery, and Sherman with a large
army eating out the vitals of South Carolina, is all that will be wanted
to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon.  I would advise you to
overcome great obstacles to accomplish this.  Charleston was evacuated
on Tuesday 1st.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."


On the 25th I received a dispatch from General Sheridan, inquiring where
Sherman was aiming for, and if I could give him definite information as
to the points he might be expected to move on, this side of Charlotte,
North Carolina.  In answer, the following telegram was sent him:


"CITY POINT, VA., February 25, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Sherman's movements will depend on the amount of opposition
he meets with from the enemy.  If strongly opposed, he may possibly have
to fall back to Georgetown, S. C., and fit out for a new start.  I
think, however, all danger for the necessity of going to that point has
passed.  I believe he has passed Charlotte.  He may take Fayetteville on
his way to Goldsboro'.  If you reach Lynchburg, you will have to be
guided in your after movements by the information you obtain.  Before
you could possibly reach Sherman, I think you would find him moving from
Goldsboro' towards Raleigh, or engaging the enemy strongly posted at one
or the other of these places, with railroad communications opened from
his army to Wilmington or New Bern.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."


General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of February, with two
divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand each.  On the 1st of
March he secured the bridge, which the enemy attempted to destroy,
across the middle fork of the Shenandoah, at Mount Crawford, and entered
Staunton on the 2d, the enemy having retreated to Waynesboro'.  Thence
he pushed on to Waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in an
intrenched position, under General Early.  Without stopping to make a
reconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the position was carried,
and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven pieces of artillery, with horses
and caissons complete, two hundred wagons and teams loaded with
subsistence, and seventeen battle-flags, were captured.  The prisoners,
under an escort of fifteen hundred men, were sent back to Winchester.
Thence he marched on Charlottesville, destroying effectually the
railroad and bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d.  Here
he remained two days, destroying the railroad towards Richmond and
Lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north and south
forks of the Rivanna River and awaited the arrival of his trains.  This
necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing Lynchburg.
On the morning of the 6th, dividing his force into two columns, he sent
one to Scottsville, whence it marched up the James River Canal to New
Market, destroying every lock, and in many places the bank of the canal.
From here a force was pushed out from this column to Duiguidsville, to
obtain possession of the bridge across the James River at that place,
but failed.  The enemy burned it on our approach.  The enemy also burned
the bridge across the river at Hardwicksville.  The other column moved
down the railroad towards Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Amherst
Court House, sixteen miles from Lynchburg; thence across the country,
uniting with the column at New Market.  The river being very high, his
pontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy having destroyed the
bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river and get on the South
Side Railroad about Farmville, and destroy it to Appomattox Court House,
the only thing left for him was to return to Winchester or strike a base
at the White House. Fortunately, he chose the latter.  From New Market
he took up his line of march, following the canal towards Richmond,
destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks wherever
practicable, to a point eight miles east of Goochland, concentrating the
whole force at Columbia on the 10th.  Here he rested one day, and sent
through by scouts information of his whereabouts and purposes, and a
request for supplies to meet him at White House, which reached me on the
night of the 12th.  An infantry force was immediately sent to get
possession of White House, and supplies were forwarded.  Moving from
Columbia in a direction to threaten Richmond, to near Ashland Station,
he crossed the Annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges and
many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of the
Pamunkey to White House, which place he reached on the 19th.

Previous to this the following communication was sent to General Thomas:


"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 7, 1865--9.30 A.M.

"GENERAL:--I think it will be advisable now for you to repair the
railroad in East Tennessee, and throw a good force up to Bull's Gap and
fortify there.  Supplies at Knoxville could always be got forward as
required.  With Bull's Gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts about
all of East Tennessee, and be prepared, if it should be required of you
in the spring, to make a campaign towards Lynchburg, or into North
Carolina.  I do not think Stoneman should break the road until he gets
into Virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling-stock that may be
caught west of that.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS."


Thus it will be seen that in March, 1865, General Canby was moving an
adequate force against Mobile and the army defending it under General
Dick Taylor; Thomas was pushing out two large and well-appointed cavalry
expeditions--one from Middle Tennessee under Brevet Major-General Wilson
against the enemy's vital points in Alabama, the other from East
Tennessee, under Major-General Stoneman, towards Lynchburg--and
assembling the remainder of his available forces, preparatory to
commence offensive operations from East Tennessee; General Sheridan's
cavalry was at White House; the armies of the Potomac and James were
confronting the enemy, under Lee, in his defences of Richmond and
Petersburg; General Sherman with his armies, reinforced by that of
General Schofield, was at Goldsboro'; General Pope was making
preparations for a spring campaign against the enemy under Kirby Smith
and Price, west of the Mississippi; and General Hancock was
concentrating a force in the vicinity of Winchester, Virginia, to guard
against invasion or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary.

After the long march by General Sheridan's cavalry over winter roads, it
was necessary to rest and refit at White House.  At this time the
greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the enemy would
leave his strong lines about Petersburg and Richmond for the purpose of
uniting with Johnston, and before he was driven from them by battle, or
I was prepared to make an effectual pursuit.  On the 24th of March,
General Sheridan moved from White House, crossed the James River at
Jones's Landing, and formed a junction with the Army of the Potomac in
front of Petersburg on the 27th.  During this move, General Ord sent
forces to cover the crossings of the Chickahominy.

On the 24th of March the following instructions for a general movement
of the armies operating against Richmond were issued:


"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 24, 1865.

"GENERAL:  On the 29th instant the armies operating against Richmond
will be moved by our left, for the double purpose of turning the enemy
out of his present position around Petersburg, and to insure the success
of the cavalry under General Sheridan, which will start at the same
time, in its efforts to reach and destroy the South Side and Danville
railroads.  Two corps of the Army of the Potomac will be moved at first
in two columns, taking the two roads crossing Hatcher's Run, nearest
where the present line held by us strikes that stream, both moving
towards Dinwiddie Court House.

"The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now under
General Davies, will move at the same time by the Weldon Road and the
Jerusalem Plank Road, turning west from the latter before crossing the
Nottoway, and west with the whole column before reaching Stony Creek.
General Sheridan will then move independently, under other instructions
which will be given him.  All dismounted cavalry belonging to the Army
of the Potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the Middle Military
Division not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of
service, will report to Brigadier-General Benham, to be added to the
defences of City Point.  Major-General Parke will be left in command of
all the army left for holding the lines about Petersburg and City Point,
subject of course to orders from the commander of the Army of the
Potomac.  The 9th army corps will be left intact, to hold the present
line of works so long as the whole line now occupied by us is held.  If,
however, the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then the
left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the position held
by the army prior to the capture of the Weldon Road.  All troops to the
left of the 9th corps will be held in readiness to move at the shortest
notice by such route as may be designated when the order is given.

"General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and one , or
so much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for the
present left of the Army of the Potomac.  In the absence of further
orders, or until further orders are given, the white divisions will
follow the left column of the Army of the Potomac, and the 
division the right column.  During the movement Major-General Weitzel
will be left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the Army
of the James.

"The movement of troops from the Army of the James will commence on the
night of the 27th instant.  General Ord will leave behind the minimum
number of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the absence of the main
army.  A cavalry expedition, from General Ord's command, will also be
started from Suffolk, to leave there on Saturday, the 1st of April,
under Colonel Sumner, for the purpose of cutting the railroad about
Hicksford.  This, if accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and
therefore from three to five hundred men will be sufficient.  They
should, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared
from Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crosses
the Blackwater.  The crossing should probably be at Uniten.  Should
Colonel Sumner succeed in reaching the Weldon Road, he will be
instructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roads
between Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston.  The railroad bridge at Weldon
being fitted up for the passage of carriages, it might be practicable to
destroy any accumulation of supplies the enemy may have collected south
of the Roanoke. All the troops will move with four days' rations in
haversacks and eight days' in wagons.  To avoid as much hauling as
possible, and to give the Army of the James the same number of days'
supplies with the Army of the Potomac, General Ord will direct his
commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered at
the terminus of the road to fill up in passing.  Sixty rounds of
ammunition per man will be taken in wagons, and as much grain as the
transportation on hand will carry, after taking the specified amount of
other supplies.  The densely wooded country in which the army has to
operate making the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken
with the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, at
the option of the army commanders.

"All necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operation
may be commenced at once.  The reserves of the 9th corps should be
massed as much as possible.  While I would not now order an
unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them, they should be ready
and should make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their front,
without waiting for orders.  In case they carry the line, then the whole
of the 9th corps could follow up so as to join or co-operate with the
balance of the army.  To prepare for this, the 9th corps will have
rations issued to them, same as the balance of the army.  General
Weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all
practicable to break through at any point, he will do so.  A success
north of the James should be followed up with great promptness.  An
attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy has
detached largely.  In that case it may be regarded as evident that the
enemy are relying upon their local reserves principally for the defence
of Richmond.  Preparations may be made for abandoning all the line north
of the James, except inclosed works only to be abandoned, however, after
a break is made in the lines of the enemy.

"By these instructions a large part of the armies operating against
Richmond is left behind.  The enemy, knowing this, may, as an only
chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of
advantage not being taken of it, while they hurl everything against the
moving column, and return.  It cannot be impressed too strongly upon
commanders of troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occur
without taking advantage of it.  The very fact of the enemy coming out
to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as almost conclusive
evidence of such a weakening of his lines.  I would have it particularly
enjoined upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from the
enemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding
officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move
promptly, and notify the commander of their action.  I would also enjoin
the same action on the part of division commanders when other parts of
their corps are engaged.  In like manner, I would urge the importance of
following up a repulse of the enemy.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERALS MEADE, ORD, AND SHERIDAN."


Early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines in front
of the 9th corps (which held from the Appomattox River towards our
left), and carried Fort Stedman, and a part of the line to the right and
left of it, established themselves and turned the guns of the fort
against us, but our troops on either flank held their ground until the
reserves were brought up, when the enemy was driven back with a heavy
loss in killed and wounded, and one thousand nine hundred prisoners.
Our loss was sixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded,
and five hundred and six missing.  General Meade at once ordered the
other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective fronts.
Pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's strongly intrenched
picket-line in front of the 2d and 6th corps, and eight hundred and
thirty-four prisoners.  The enemy made desperate attempts to retake this
line, but without success.  Our loss in front of these was fifty-two
killed, eight hundred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and seven
missing.  The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater.

General Sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp about
Goldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them
perfected, visited me at City Point on the 27th of March, and stated
that he would be ready to move, as he had previously written me, by the
10th of April, fully equipped and rationed for twenty days, if it should
become necessary to bring his command to bear against Lee's army, in
co-operation with our forces in front of Richmond and Petersburg.
General Sherman proposed in this movement to threaten Raleigh, and then,
by turning suddenly to the right, reach the Roanoke at Gaston or
thereabouts, whence he could move on to the Richmond and Danville
Railroad, striking it in the vicinity of Burkesville, or join the armies
operating against Richmond, as might be deemed best.  This plan he was
directed to carry into execution, if he received no further directions
in the meantime.  I explained to him the movement I had ordered to
commence on the 29th of March.  That if it should not prove as entirely
successful as I hoped, I would cut the cavalry loose to destroy the
Danville and South Side railroads, and thus deprive the enemy of further
supplies, and also to prevent the rapid concentration of Lee's and
Johnston's armies.

I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the report
that the enemy had retreated the night before.  I was firmly convinced
that Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would be the signal for Lee to
leave.  With Johnston and him combined, a long, tedious, and expensive
campaign, consuming most of the summer, might become necessary.  By
moving out I would put the army in better condition for pursuit, and
would at least, by the destruction of the Danville Road, <DW44> the
concentration of the two armies of Lee and Johnston, and cause the enemy
to abandon much material that he might otherwise save.  I therefore
determined not to delay the movement ordered.

On the night of the 27th, Major-General Ord, with two divisions of the
24th corps, Major-General Gibbon commanding, and one division of the
25th corps, Brigadier-General Birney commanding, and MacKenzie's
cavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance of the foregoing
instructions, and reached the position assigned him near Hatcher's Run
on the morning of the 29th.  On the 28th the following instructions were
given to General Sheridan:


"CITY POINT, VA., March 28, 1865.

"GENERAL:--The 5th army corps will move by the Vaughn Road at three A.M.
to-morrow morning.  The 2d moves at about nine A.M., having but about
three miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on the
right of the 5th corps, after the latter reaching Dinwiddie Court House.
Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being
confined to any particular road or roads.  You may go out by the nearest
roads in rear of the 5th corps, pass by its left, and passing near to or
through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as you
can.  It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched
position, but to force him out, if possible. Should he come out and
attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your
entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army
will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate.  I shall be on the
field, and will probably be able to communicate with you.  Should I not
do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched
line, you may cut loose and push for the Danville Road.  If you find it
practicable, I would like you to cross the South Side Road, between
Petersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to some extent.  I would not
advise much detention, however, until you reach the Danville Road, which
I would like you to strike as near to the Appomattox as possible.  Make
your destruction on that road as complete as possible.  You can then
pass on to the South Side Road, west of Burkesville, and destroy that in
like manner.

"After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which
are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may return to this
army, selecting your road further south, or you may go on into North
Carolina and join General Sherman.  Should you select the latter course,
get the information to me as early as possible, so that I may send
orders to meet you at Goldsboro'.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."


On the morning of the 29th the movement commenced.  At night the cavalry
was at Dinwiddie Court House, and the left of our infantry line extended
to the Quaker Road, near its intersection with the Boydton Plank Road.
The position of the troops from left to right was as follows:  Sheridan,
Warren, Humphreys, Ord, Wright, Parke.

Everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the capture
of Petersburg and Richmond, if the proper effort was made.  I therefore
addressed the following communication to General Sheridan, having
previously informed him verbally not to cut loose for the raid
contemplated in his orders until he received notice from me to do so:


"GRAVELLY CREEK, March 29, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to Dinwiddie.
We are all ready, however, to give up all, from the Jerusalem Plank Road
to Hatcher's Run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously.  After
getting into line south of Hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the
enemy's position. General Griffin was attacked near where the Quaker
Road intersects the Boydton Road, but repulsed it easily, capturing
about one hundred men.  Humphreys reached Dabney's Mill, and was pushing
on when last heard from.

"I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before
going back.  I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the
enemy's roads at present.  In the morning push around the enemy, if you
can, and get on to his right rear.  The movements of the enemy's cavalry
may, of course, modify your action.  We will act all together as one
army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy.  The
signal-officer at Cobb's Hill reported, at half-past eleven A.M., that a
cavalry column had passed that point from Richmond towards Petersburg,
taking forty minutes to pass.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."


From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell in
such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except
as corduroy roads were laid in front of them. During the 30th, Sheridan
advanced from Dinwiddie Court House towards Five Forks, where he found
the enemy in full force. General Warren advanced and extended his line
across the Boydton Plank Road to near the White Oak Road, with a view of
getting across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his front
and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was, and
fortify.  General Humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his main
line on the Hatcher, near Burgess's Mills. Generals Ord, Wright, and
Parke made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility of
an assault on the enemy's lines.  The two latter reported favorably.
The enemy confronting us as he did, at every point from Richmond to our
extreme left, I conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be
penetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct.  I determined,
therefore, to extend our line no farther, but to reinforce General
Sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and
turn the enemy's right flank, and with the other corps assault the
enemy's lines.  The result of the offensive effort of the enemy the week
before, when he assaulted Fort Stedman, particularly favored this.  The
enemy's intrenched  picket-line captured by us at that time threw the
lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some points that
it was but a moment's run from one to the other. Preparations were at
once made to relieve General Humphreys's corps, to report to General
Sheridan; but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement.
On the morning of the 31st, General Warren reported favorably to getting
possession of the White Oak Road, and was directed to do so.  To
accomplish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps,
which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the
2d division before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced back
upon the 3d division, when the enemy was checked.  A division of the 2d
corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with
heavy loss, and possession of the White Oak Road gained.  Sheridan
advanced, and with a portion of his cavalry got possession of the Five
Forks; but the enemy, after the affair with the 5th corps, reinforced
the rebel cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and forced him
back towards Dinwiddie Court House.  Here General Sheridan displayed
great generalship.  Instead of retreating with his whole command on the
main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployed
his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of
the horses.  This compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of
wooded and broken country, and made his progress slow.  At this juncture
he dispatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back
slowly on Dinwiddie Court House.  General Mackenzie's cavalry and one
division of the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance.
Soon after receiving a report from General Meade that Humphreys could
hold our position on the Boydton Road, and that the other two divisions
of the 5th corps could go to Sheridan, they were so ordered at once.
Thus the operations of the day necessitated the sending of Warren,
because of his accessibility, instead of Humphreys, as was intended, and
precipitated intended movements.  On the morning of the 1st of April,
General Sheridan, reinforced by General Warren, drove the enemy back on
Five Forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried his
strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and between
five and six thousand prisoners.

About the close of this battle, Brevet Major-General Charles Griffin
relieved Major-General Warren in command of the 5th corps.  The report
of this reached me after nightfall.  Some apprehensions filled my mind
lest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by falling
upon General Sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive him from
his position and open the way for retreat.  To guard against this,
General Miles's division of Humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him,
and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock in the
morning (April 2), when an assault was ordered on the enemy's lines.
General Wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, sweeping
everything before him, and to his left towards Hatcher's Run, capturing
many guns and several thousand prisoners.  He was closely followed by
two divisions of General Ord's command, until he met the other division
of General Ord's that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines near
Hatcher's Run. Generals Wright and Ord immediately swung to the right,
and closed all of the enemy on that side of them in Petersburg, while
General Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and joined General
Wright on the left.  General Parke succeeded in carrying the enemy's
main line, capturing guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry his
inner line.  General Sheridan being advised of the condition of affairs,
returned General Miles to his proper command.  On reaching the enemy's
lines immediately surrounding Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbon's
corps, by a most gallant charge, captured two strong inclosed works--the
most salient and commanding south of Petersburg--thus materially
shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the city.  The
enemy south of Hatcher's Run retreated westward to Sutherland's Station,
where they were overtaken by Miles's division.  A severe engagement
ensued, and lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatened
by the approach of General Sheridan, who was moving from Ford's Station
towards Petersburg, and a division sent by General Meade from the front
of Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in our
hands his guns and many prisoners.  This force retreated by the main
road along the Appomattox River.  During the night of the 2d the enemy
evacuated Petersburg and Richmond, and retreated towards Danville.  On
the morning of the 3d pursuit was commenced.  General Sheridan pushed
for the Danville Road, keeping near the Appomattox, followed by General
Meade with the 2d and 6th corps, while General Ord moved for
Burkesville, along the South Side Road; the 9th corps stretched along
that road behind him.  On the 4th, General Sheridan struck the Danville
Road near Jetersville, where he learned that Lee was at Amelia Court
House.  He immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival of
General Meade, who reached there the next day. General Ord reached
Burkesville on the evening of the 5th.

On the morning of the 5th, I addressed Major-General Sherman the
following communication:


"WILSON'S STATION, April 5, 1865.

"GENERAL:  All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach
Danville with the remnant of his force.  Sheridan, who was up with him
last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot, and dragoons, at
twenty thousand, much demoralized.  We hope to reduce this number
one-half.  I shall push on to Burkesville, and if a stand is made at
Danville, will in a very few days go there.  If you can possibly do so,
push on from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the job
with Lee's and Johnston's armies.  Whether it will be better for you to
strike for Greensboro', or nearer to Danville, you will be better able
to judge when you receive this.  Rebel armies now are the only strategic
points to strike at.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."


On the morning of the 6th, it was found that General Lee was moving west
of Jetersville, towards Danville.  General Sheridan moved with his
cavalry (the 5th corps having been returned to General Meade on his
reaching Jetersville) to strike his flank, followed by the 6th corps,
while the 2d and 5th corps pressed hard after, forcing him to abandon
several hundred wagons and several pieces of artillery.  General Ord
advanced from Burkesville towards Farmville, sending two regiments of
infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under Brevet Brigadier-General
Theodore Read, to reach and destroy the bridges.  This advance met the
head of Lee's column near Farmville, which it heroically attacked and
detained until General Read was killed and his small force overpowered.
This caused a delay in the enemy's movements, and enabled General Ord to
get well up with the remainder of his force, on meeting which, the enemy
immediately intrenched himself.  In the afternoon, General Sheridan
struck the enemy south of Sailors' Creek, captured sixteen pieces of
artillery and about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the 6th
corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was made,
which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand prisoners, among
whom were many general officers.  The movements of the 2d corps and
General Ord's command contributed greatly to the day's success.

On the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, except
one division, and the 5th corps moving by Prince Edward's Court House;
the 6th corps, General Ord's command, and one division of cavalry, on
Farmville; and the 2d corps by the High Bridge Road.  It was soon found
that the enemy had crossed to the north side of the Appomattox; but so
close was the pursuit, that the 2d corps got possession of the common
bridge at High Bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately
crossed over.  The 6th corps and a division of cavalry crossed at
Farmville to its support.

Feeling now that General Lee's chance of escape was utterly hopeless, I
addressed him the following communication from Farmville:


"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL--The result of the last week must convince you of the
hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern
Virginia in this struggle.  I feel that it is so, and regard it as my
duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of
blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate
States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"GENERAL R. E. LEE."


Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, I received at Farmville
the following:


"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL:  I have received your note of this date.  Though not
entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further
resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate
your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before
considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition
of its surrender.

"R. E. LEE, General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."


To this I immediately replied:


"April 8, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date,
asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of
Northern Virginia, is just received.  In reply, I would say, that peace
being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon
--namely, That the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for
taking up arms again against the Government of the United States until
properly exchanged.  I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet
any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable
to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the
surrender of the Army of the Northern Virginia will be received.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"GENERAL R. E. LEE."


Early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed. General Meade
followed north of the Appomattox, and General Sheridan, with all the
cavalry, pushed straight ahead for Appomattox Station, followed by
General Ord's command and the 5th corps. During the day General Meade's
advance had considerable fighting with the enemy's rear-guard, but was
unable to bring on a general engagement.  Late in the evening General
Sheridan struck the railroad at Appomattox Station, drove the enemy from
there, and captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train,
and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee's army.  During
this day I accompanied General Meade's column, and about midnight
received the following communication from General Lee:


April 8, 1865.

"GENERAL:--I received, at a late hour, your note of to-day.  In mine of
yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of
Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition.  To be
frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender
of this army; but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object
of all, I desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end.
I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the Army
of Northern Virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the
Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration
of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten A.M. to-morrow on the
old stage-road to Richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies.

"R. E. LEE, General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."


Early on the morning of the 9th I returned him an answer as follows, and
immediately started to join the column south of the Appomattox:


"April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:--Your note of yesterday is received.  I have no authority to
treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for ten A.M. to-day
could lead to no good.  I will state, however, general, that I am
equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains
the same feeling.  The terms upon which peace can be had are well
understood.  By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that
most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of
millions of property not yet destroyed.  Seriously hoping that all our
difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I
subscribe myself, etc.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"GENERAL R. E. LEE."


On this morning of the 9th, General Ord's command and the 5th corps
reached Appomattox Station just as the enemy was making a desperate
effort to break through our cavalry.  The infantry was at once thrown
in.  Soon after a white flag was received, requesting a suspension of
hostilities pending negotiations for a surrender.

Before reaching General Sheridan's headquarters, I received the
following from General Lee:


"April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:--I received your note of this morning on the picket-line,
whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were
embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender
of this army.  I now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer
contained in your letter of yesterday, for that purpose.

"R. E. LEE, General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."


The interview was held at Appomattox Court-House, the result of which is
set forth in the following correspondence:


APPOMATTOX COURT-HOUSE, Virginia, April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:  In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the
8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern
Virginia on the following terms, to wit:  Rolls of all the officers and
men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be
designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers
as you may designate.  The officers to give their individual paroles not
to take up arms against the Government of the United States until
properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like
parole for the men of their commands.  The arms, artillery, and public
property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers
appointed by me to receive them.  This will not embrace the side-arms of
the officers, nor their private horses or baggage.  This done, each
officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be
disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their
paroles and the laws in force where they may reside.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"GENERAL R. E. LEE."


"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865.

"GENERAL:  I have received your letter of this date containing the terms
of surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you.  As
they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the
8th instant, they are accepted.  I will proceed to designate the proper
officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

"R. E. LEE, General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."


The command of Major-General Gibbon, the 5th army corps under Griffin,
and Mackenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain at Appomattox
Court-House until the paroling of the surrendered army was completed,
and to take charge of the public property. The remainder of the army
immediately returned to the vicinity of Burkesville.

General Lee's great influence throughout the whole South caused his
example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies lately
under his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, and
their arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers.

On the receipt of my letter of the 5th, General Sherman moved directly
against Joe Johnston, who retreated rapidly on and through Raleigh,
which place General Sherman occupied on the morning of the 13th.  The
day preceding, news of the surrender of General Lee reached him at
Smithfield.

On the 14th a correspondence was opened between General Sherman and
General Johnston, which resulted on the 18th in an agreement for a
suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for peace, subject
to the approval of the President.  This agreement was disapproved by the
President on the 21st, which disapproval, together with your
instructions, was communicated to General Sherman by me in person on the
morning of the 24th, at Raleigh, North Carolina, in obedience to your
orders.  Notice was at once given by him to General Johnston for the
termination of the truce that had been entered into.  On the 25th
another meeting between them was agreed upon, to take place on the 26th,
which terminated in the surrender and disbandment of Johnston's army
upon substantially the same terms as were given to General Lee.

The expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee got off on the
20th of March, moving by way of Boone, North Carolina, and struck the
railroad at Wytheville, Chambersburg, and Big Lick.  The force striking
it at Big Lick pushed on to within a few miles of Lynchburg, destroying
the important bridges, while with the main force he effectually
destroyed it between New River and Big Lick, and then turned for
Greensboro', on the North Carolina Railroad; struck that road and
destroyed the bridges between Danville and Greensboro', and between
Greensboro' and the Yadkin, together with the depots of supplies along
it, and captured four hundred prisoners.  At Salisbury he attacked and
defeated a force of the enemy under General Gardiner, capturing fourteen
pieces of artillery and one thousand three hundred and sixty-four
prisoners, and destroyed large amounts of army stores.  At this place he
destroyed fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges towards Charlotte.
Thence he moved to Slatersville.

General Canby, who had been directed in January to make preparations for
a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile and the interior of Alabama,
commenced his movement on the 20th of March.  The 16th corps,
Major-General A. J. Smith commanding, moved from Fort Gaines by water to
Fish River; the 13th corps, under Major-General Gordon Granger, moved
from Fort Morgan and joined the 16th corps on Fish River, both moving
thence on Spanish Fort and investing it on the 27th; while Major-General
Steele's command moved from Pensacola, cut the railroad leading from
Tensas to Montgomery, effected a junction with them, and partially
invested Fort Blakely.  After a severe bombardment of Spanish Fort, a
part of its line was carried on the 8th of April.  During the night the
enemy evacuated the fort.  Fort Blakely was carried by assault on the
9th, and many prisoners captured; our loss was considerable.  These
successes practically opened to us the Alabama River, and enabled us to
approach Mobile from the north.  On the night of the 11th the city was
evacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on the morning of
the 12th.

The expedition under command of Brevet Major-General Wilson, consisting
of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was delayed by rains until
March 22d, when it moved from Chickasaw, Alabama.  On the 1st of April,
General Wilson encountered the enemy in force under Forrest near
Ebenezer Church, drove him in confusion, captured three hundred
prisoners and three guns, and destroyed the central bridge over the
Cahawba River.  On the 2d he attacked and captured the fortified city of
Selma, defended by Forrest, with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns,
destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine-shops, vast
quantities of stores, and captured three thousand prisoners.  On the 4th
he captured and destroyed Tuscaloosa.  On the 10th he crossed the
Alabama River, and after sending information of his operations to
General Canby, marched on Montgomery, which place he occupied on the
14th, the enemy having abandoned it.  At this place many stores and five
steamboats fell into our hands.  Thence a force marched direct on
Columbus, and another on West Point, both of which places were assaulted
and captured on the 16th.  At the former place we got one thousand five
hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, destroyed two gunboats, the
navy yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and much other public
property.  At the latter place we got three hundred prisoners, four
guns, and destroyed nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars.  On the
20th he took possession of Macon, Georgia, with sixty field-guns, one
thousand two hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by General
Howell Cobb.  General Wilson, hearing that Jeff. Davis was trying to
make his escape, sent forces in pursuit and succeeded in capturing him
on the morning of May 11th.

On the 4th day of May, General Dick Taylor surrendered to General Canby
all the remaining rebel forces east of the Mississippi.

A force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy under Kirby
Smith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately put in motion for Texas,
and Major-General Sheridan designated for its immediate command; but on
the 26th day of May, and before they reached their destination, General
Kirby Smith surrendered his entire command to Major-General Canby.  This
surrender did not take place, however, until after the capture of the
rebel President and Vice-President; and the bad faith was exhibited of
first disbanding most of his army and permitting an indiscriminate
plunder of public property.

Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against the
government had taken refuge upon the soil of Mexico, carrying with them
arms rightfully belonging to the United States, which had been
surrendered to us by agreement among them some of the leaders who had
surrendered in person and the disturbed condition of affairs on the Rio
Grande, the orders for troops to proceed to Texas were not changed.

There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and movements to
defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of them reflecting
great credit on our arms, and which contributed greatly to our final
triumph, that I have not mentioned.  Many of these will be found clearly
set forth in the reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams and
brief dispatches announcing them, and others, I regret to say, have not
as yet been officially reported.

For information touching our Indian difficulties, I would respectfully
refer to the reports of the commanders of departments in which they have
occurred.

It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the West and the East
fight battles, and from what I have seen I know there is no difference
in their fighting qualities.  All that it was possible for men to do in
battle they have done.  The Western armies commenced their battles in
the Mississippi Valley, and received the final surrender of the remnant
of the principal army opposed to them in North Carolina.  The armies of
the East commenced their battles on the river from which the Army of the
Potomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of their old
antagonists at Appomattox Court House, Virginia.  The splendid
achievements of each have nationalized our victories removed all
sectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunately experienced too
much), and the cause of crimination and recrimination that might have
followed had either section failed in its duty.  All have a proud
record, and all sections can well congratulate themselves and each other
for having done their full share in restoring the supremacy of law over
every foot of territory belonging to the United States.  Let them hope
for perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood, however
mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of valor.

I have the honor to be, Very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S.
GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

THE END


     __________
     FOOTNOTES

     (*1) Afterwards General Gardner, C.S.A.


     (*2) General Garland expressed a wish to get a message back to
     General Twiggs, his division commander, or General Taylor, to
     the effect that he was nearly out of ammunition and must have
     more sent to him, or otherwise be reinforced.  Deeming the
     return dangerous he did not like to order any one to carry it,
     so he called for a volunteer.  Lieutenant Grant offered his
     services, which were accepted.--PUBLISHERS.


     (*3) Mentioned in the reports of Major Lee, Colonel Garland and
     General Worth.--PUBLISHERS.


     (*4) NOTE.--It had been a favorite idea with General Scott for a
     great many years before the Mexican war to have established in
     the United States a soldiers' home, patterned after something of
     the kind abroad, particularly, I believe, in France.  He
     recommended this uniformly, or at least frequently, in his
     annual reports to the Secretary of War, but never got any
     hearing.  Now, as he had conquered the state, he made
     assessments upon the different large towns and cities occupied
     by our troops, in proportion to their capacity to pay, and
     appointed officers to receive the money.  In addition to the sum
     thus realized he had derived, through capture at Cerro Gordo,
     sales of captured government tobacco, etc., sums which swelled
     the fund to a total of about $220,000.  Portions of this fund
     were distributed among the rank and file, given to the wounded
     in hospital, or applied in other ways, leaving a balance of some
     $118,000 remaining unapplied at the close of the war.  After the
     war was over and the troops all home, General Scott applied to
     have this money, which had never been turned into the Treasury
     of the United States, expended in establishing such homes as he
     had previously recommended.  This fund was the foundation of the
     Soldiers' Home at Washington City, and also one at Harrodsburgh,
     Kentucky.

     The latter went into disuse many years ago.  In fact it never
     had many soldiers in it, and was, I believe, finally sold.


     (*5) The Mexican war made three presidential candidates, Scott,
     Taylor and Pierce--and any number of aspirants for that high
     office.  It made also governors of States, members of the
     cabinet, foreign ministers and other officers of high rank both
     in state and nation.  The rebellion, which contained more war in
     a single day, at some critical periods, than the whole Mexican
     war in two years, has not been so fruitful of political results
     to those engaged on the Union side.  On the other side, the side
     of the South, nearly every man who holds office of any sort
     whatever, either in the state or in the nation, was a
     Confederate soldier, but this is easily accounted for from the
     fact that the South was a military camp, and there were very few
     people of a suitable age to be in the army who were not in it.


     (*6) C. B. Lagow, the others not yet having joined me.


     (*7) NOTE.--Since writing this chapter I have received from Mrs.
     W. H. L. Wallace, widow of the gallant general who was killed in
     the first day's fight on the field of Shiloh, a letter from
     General Lew. Wallace to him dated the morning of the 5th.  At
     the date of this letter it was well known that the Confederates
     had troops out along the Mobile & Ohio railroad west of Crump's
     landing and Pittsburg landing, and were also collecting near
     Shiloh.  This letter shows that at that time General Lew.
     Wallace was making preparations for the emergency that might
     happen for the passing of reinforcements between Shiloh and his
     position, extending from Crump's landing westward, and he sends
     it over the road running from Adamsville to the Pittsburg
     landing and Purdy road.  These two roads intersect nearly a mile
     west of the crossing of the latter over Owl Creek, where our
     right rested.  In this letter General Lew. Wallace advises
     General W. H. L. Wallace that he will send "to-morrow" (and his
     letter also says "April 5th," which is the same day the letter
     was dated and which, therefore, must have been written on the
     4th) some cavalry to report to him at his headquarters, and
     suggesting the propriety of General W. H. L. Wallace's sending a
     company back with them for the purpose of having the cavalry at
     the two landings familiarize themselves with the road so that
     they could "act promptly in case of emergency as guides to and
     from the different camps."

     This modifies very materially what I have said, and what has
     been said by others, of the conduct of General Lew. Wallace at
     the battle of Shiloh.  It shows that he naturally, with no more
     experience than he had at the time in the profession of arms,
     would take the particular road that he did start upon in the
     absence of orders to move by a different road.

     The mistake he made, and which probably caused his apparent
     dilatoriness, was that of advancing some distance after he found
     that the firing, which would be at first directly to his front
     and then off to the left, had fallen back until it had got very
     much in rear of the position of his advance.  This falling back
     had taken place before I sent General Wallace orders to move up
     to Pittsburg landing and, naturally, my order was to follow the
     road nearest the river.  But my order was verbal, and to a staff
     officer who was to deliver it to General Wallace, so that I am
     not competent to say just what order the General actually
     received.

     General Wallace's division was stationed, the First brigade at
     Crump's landing, the Second out two miles, and the Third two and
     a half miles out.  Hearing the sounds of battle General Wallace
     early ordered his First and Third brigades to concentrate on the
     Second.  If the position of our front had not changed, the road
     which Wallace took would have been somewhat shorter to our right
     than the River road.

     U. S. GRANT.

     MOUNT MACGREGOR, NEW YORK, June 21, 1885.


     (*8) NOTE:  In an article on the battle of Shiloh which I wrote
     for the Century Magazine, I stated that General A. McD. McCook,
     who commanded a division of Buell's army, expressed some
     unwillingness to pursue the enemy on Monday, April 7th, because
     of the condition of his troops.  General Badeau, in his history,
     also makes the same statement, on my authority.  Out of justice
     to General McCook and his command, I must say that they left a
     point twenty-two miles east of Savannah on the morning of the
     6th.  From the heavy rains of a few days previous and the
     passage of trains and artillery, the roads were necessarily deep
     in mud, which made marching slow.  The division had not only
     marched through this mud the day before, but it had been in the
     rain all night without rest.  It was engaged in the battle of
     the second day and did as good service as its position
     allowed.  In fact an opportunity occurred for it to perform a
     conspicuous act of gallantry which elicited the highest
     commendation from division commanders in the Army of the
     Tennessee.  General Sherman both in his memoirs and report makes
     mention of this fact.  General McCook himself belongs to a family
     which furnished many volunteers to the army.  I refer to these
     circumstances with minuteness because I did General McCook
     injustice in my article in the Century, though not to the extent
     one would suppose from the public press.  I am not willing to do
     any one an injustice, and if convinced that I have done one, I
     am always willing to make the fullest admission.


     (*9) NOTE.--For gallantry in the various engagements, from the
     time I was left in command down to 26th of October and on my
     recommendation, Generals McPherson and C. S. Hamilton were
     promoted to be Major-Generals, and Colonels C. C. Marsh, 20th
     Illinois, M. M. Crocker, 13th Iowa J. A. Mower, 11th Missouri,
     M. D. Leggett, 78th Ohio, J. D. Stevenson, 7th Missouri, and
     John E. Smith, 45th Illinois, to be Brigadiers.


     (*10) Colonel Ellet reported having attacked a Confederate
     battery on the Red River two days before with one of his boats,
     the De Soto.  Running aground, he was obliged to abandon his
     vessel.  However, he reported that he set fire to her and blew
     her up.  Twenty of his men fell into the hands of the enemy.
     With the balance he escaped on the small captured steamer, the
     New Era, and succeeded in passing the batteries at Grand Gulf
     and reaching the vicinity of Vicksburg.


     (*11) One of Colonel Ellet's vessels which had run the blockade
     on February the 2d and been sunk in the Red River.


     (*12) NOTE.--On this occasion Governor Richard Yates, of
     Illinois, happened to be on a visit to the army and accompanied
     me to Carthage.  I furnished an ambulance for his use and that
     of some of the State officers who accompanied him.


     (*13) NOTE.--When General Sherman first learned of the move I
     proposed to make, he called to see me about it.  I recollect
     that I had transferred my headquarters from a boat in the river
     to a house a short distance back from the levee.  I was seated
     on the piazza engaged in conversation with my staff when Sherman
     came up.  After a few moments' conversation he said that he would
     like to see me alone.  We passed into the house together and shut
     the door after us.  Sherman then expressed his alarm at the move
     I had ordered, saying that I was putting myself in a position
     voluntarily which an enemy would be glad to manoeuvre a year--or
     a long time--to get me in.  I was going into the enemy's country,
     with a large river behind me and the enemy holding points
     strongly fortified above and below.  He said that it was an
     axiom in war that when any great body of troops moved against an
     enemy they should do so from a base of supplies, which they would
     guard as they would the apple of the eye, etc.  He pointed out
     all the difficulties that might be encountered in the campaign
     proposed, and stated in turn what would be the true campaign to
     make.  This was, in substance, to go back until high ground
     could be reached on the east bank of the river; fortify there
     and establish a depot of supplies, and move from there, being
     always prepared to fall back upon it in case of disaster.  I
     said this would take us back to Memphis.  Sherman then said that
     was the very place he would go to, and would move by railroad
     from Memphis to Grenada, repairing the road as we advanced.  To
     this I replied, the country is already disheartened over the
     lack of success on the part of our armies; the last election
     went against the vigorous prosecution of the war, voluntary
     enlistments had ceased throughout most of the North and
     conscription was already resorted to, and if we went back so far
     as Memphis it would discourage the people so much that bases of
     supplies would be of no use:  neither men to hold them nor
     supplies to put in them would be furnished.  The problem for us
     was to move forward to a decisive victory, or our cause was
     lost.  No progress was being made in any other field, and we had
     to go on.

     Sherman wrote to my adjutant general, Colonel J. A. Rawlins,
     embodying his views of the campaign that should be made, and
     asking him to advise me to at least get the views of my generals
     upon the subject.  Colonel Rawlins showed me the letter, but I
     did not see any reason for changing my plans.  The letter was
     not answered and the subject was not subsequently mentioned
     between Sherman and myself to the end of the war, that I
     remember of.  I did not regard the letter as official, and
     consequently did not preserve it.  General Sherman furnished a
     copy himself to General Badeau, who printed it in his history of
     my campaigns.  I did not regard either the conversation between
     us or the letter to my adjutant-general as protests, but simply
     friendly advice which the relations between us fully
     justified.  Sherman gave the same energy to make the campaign a
     success that he would or could have done if it had been ordered
     by himself.  I make this statement here to correct an impression
     which was circulated at the close of the war to Sherman's
     prejudice, and for which there was no fair foundation.


     (*14) Meant Edward's Station.

     (*15) CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.

     MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN:

     Enclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions to
     Major-General Thomas.  You having been over the ground in
     person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further
     instructions will not be necessary for you.  It is particularly
     desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad
     between Cleveland and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from
     communication with the South, but being confronted by a large
     force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is
     to be effected until the result of our first effort is known.

     I will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions to
     Thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which,
     if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the Tennessee above
     Chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to Cleveland or
     thereabouts.

     U. S. GRANT
     Maj.-Gen'l.


     CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.

     MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS,
     Chattanooga:

     All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's
     position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday at daylight.  Not being
     provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the
     mountains, and other places, such definite instructions cannot
     be given as might be desirable.  However, the general plan, you
     understand, is for Sherman, with the force brought with him
     strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a
     crossing of the Tennessee River just below the mouth of
     Chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the
     heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your
     chief of artillery), and to secure the heights on the northern
     extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can
     concentrate against him.  You will co-operate with Sherman.  The
     troops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on your
     left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend
     fortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of
     one division in readiness to move wherever ordered.  This
     division should show itself as threateningly as possible on the
     most practicable line for making an attack up the valley.  Your
     effort then will be to form a junction with Sherman, making your
     advance well towards the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and
     moving as near simultaneously with him as possible.  The
     junction once formed and the ridge carried, communications will
     be at once established between the two armies by roads on the
     south bank of the river.  Further movements will then depend on
     those of the enemy.  Lookout Valley, I think, will be easily
     held by Geary's division and what troops you may still have
     there belonging to the old Army of the Cumberland.  Howard's
     corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at
     Chattanooga or with Sherman.  It should be marched on Friday
     night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower
     down than the first pontoon-bridge, and there held in readiness
     for such orders as may become necessary.  All these troops will
     be provided with two days' cooked rations in haversacks, and one
     hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry
     soldier.  Special care should be taken by all officers to see
     that ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away.  You
     will call on the engineer department for such preparations as
     you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery
     over the creek.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Major-General.


     (*16) In this order authority was given for the troops to reform
     after taking the first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carrying
     the ridge.

     (*17) CHATTANOOGA, November 24,1863.

     MAJOR-GENERAL. CEO. H. THOMAS,
     Chattanooga

     General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel
     with only slight skirmishing.  His right now rests at the tunnel
     and on top of the hill, his left at Chickamauga Creek.  I have
     instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in
     the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will
     be in cooperation.  Your command will either carry the
     rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the
     left, as the presence of the enemy may require.  If Hooker's
     position on the mountain [cannot be maintained] with a small
     force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where
     he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with
     all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable
     road.

     U. S. GRANT,

     Major-General.


     (*18) WASHINGTON, D. C.,
     December 8, 1863, 10.2 A.M.

     MAJ.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

     Understanding that your lodgment at Knoxville and at Chattanooga
     is now secure, I wish to tender you, and all under your command,
     my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the skill,
     courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great
     difficulties, have effected that important object.  God bless you
     all,

     A. LINCOLN,

     President U. S.


     (*19) General John G. Foster.


     (*20) During this winter the citizens of Jo Davies County, Ill.,
     subscribed for and had a diamond-hilled sword made for General
     Grant, which was always known as the Chattanooga sword.  The
     scabbard was of gold, and was ornamented with a scroll running
     nearly its entire length, displaying in engraved letters the
     names of the battles in which General Grant had participated.

     Congress also gave him a vote of thanks for the victories at
     Chattanooga, and voted him a gold medal for Vicksburg and
     Chattanooga. All such things are now in the possession of the
     government at Washington.


     (*21) WASHINGTON, D. C.
     December 29, 1863.

     MAJ.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

     General Foster has asked to be relieved from his command on
     account of disability from old wounds.  Should his request be
     granted, who would you like as his successor?  It is possible
     that Schofield will be sent to your command.

     H. W. HALLECK
     General-in-Chief.
     (OFFICIAL.)


     (*22) See letter to Banks, in General Grant's report, Appendix.


     (*23) [PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.]

     HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
     April 4, 1864.

     MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,
     Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

     GENERAL:--It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me
     to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts
     of the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre.  For
     your information I now write you my programme, as at present
     determined upon.

     I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up
     his present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; to
     turn over the defence of Red River to General Steele and the
     navy and to return your troops to you and his own to New
     Orleans; to abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to
     hold that with not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the
     number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest number
     necessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less
     than twenty-five thousand men.  To this I will add five thousand
     men from Missouri.  With this force he is to commence operations
     against Mobile as soon as he can.  It will be impossible for him
     to commence too early.

     Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate
     against Richmond from the south side of the James River.  This
     will give Butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, W.
     F. Smith commanding the right wing of his forces and Gillmore
     the left wing.  I will stay with the Army of the Potomac,
     increased by Burnside's corps of not less than twenty-five
     thousand effective men, and operate directly against Lee's army,
     wherever it may be found.

     Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one,
     under Ord and Averell, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and the
     other, under Crook, to start from Charleston on the Kanawha, to
     move against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.

     Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about
     Saltville, and move east from there to join Ord.  His force will
     be all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousand
     men of all arms.

     You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up
     and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as
     you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war
     resources.

     I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but
     simply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave
     you free to execute it in your own way.  Submit to me, however,
     as early as you can, your plan of operations.

     As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he
     can.  Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the
     18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable.  Sigel is
     concentrating now.  None will move from their places of
     rendezvous until I direct, except Banks.  I want to be ready to
     move by the 25th inst., if possible.  But all I can now direct
     is that you get ready as soon as possible.  I know you will have
     difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to
     where supplies are abundant, but I believe you will accomplish
     it.

     From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do
     not calculate on very great results; but it is the only way I
     can take troops from there.  With the long line of railroad
     Sigel has to protect, he can spare no troops except to move
     directly to his front.  In this way he must get through to
     inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from
     one of his armies a large force to prevent it.  In other words,
     if Sigel can't skin himself he can hold a leg while some one
     else skins.

     I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieutenant-General.


     (*24) See instructions to Butler, in General Grant's report,
     Appendix.


     (*25) IN FIELD, CULPEPER C. H., VA.,
     April 9, 1864.

     MAJ.-GENERAL GEO. G. MEADE
     Com'd'g Army of the Potomac.

     For information and as instruction to govern your preparations
     for the coming campaign, the following is communicated
     confidentially for your own perusal alone.

     So far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and
     towards one common centre.  Banks has been instructed to turn
     over the guarding of the Red River to General Steele and the
     navy, to abandon Texas with the exception of the Rio Grande, and
     to concentrate all the force he can, not less than 25,000 men, to
     move on Mobile.  This he is to do without reference to other
     movements.  From the scattered condition of his command,
     however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave New Orleans
     before the 1st of May, if so soon.  Sherman will move at the same
     time you do, or two or three days in advance, Jo. Johnston's army
     being his objective point, and the heart of Georgia his ultimate
     aim.  If successful he will secure the line from Chattanooga to
     Mobile with the aid of Banks.

     Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either of
     the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his
     front.  This he has been directed to do, and is now making
     preparations for it.  Two columns of his command will make south
     at the same time with the general move; one from Beverly, from
     ten to twelve thousand strong, under Major-General Ord; the
     other from Charleston, Va., principally cavalry, under
     Brig.-General Crook.  The former of these will endeavor to reach
     the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, about south of Covington,
     and if found practicable will work eastward to Lynchburg and
     return to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley, or join
     you.  The other will strike at Saltville, Va., and come eastward
     to join Ord.  The cavalry from Ord's command will try tributaries which
     would furnish us an easy line over which to bring all supplies to
     within easy hauling distance of every position the army could
     occupy from the Rapidan to the James River.  But Lee could, if
     he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather
     interior to the one I would have to take in following.  A
     movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but all
     that was done would have to be done with the supplies and
     ammunition we started with.  All idea of adopting this latter
     plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies
     possible to take with us was considered.  The country over which
     we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that
     we would be obliged to carry everything with us.

     While these preparations were going on the enemy was not
     entirely idle.  In the West Forrest made a raid in West
     Tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of
     four or five hundred men at Union City, and followed it up by an
     attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the Ohio.  While he
     was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any
     part of the garrison.  On the first intelligence of Forrest's
     raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against him,
     and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself
     into.  Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him
     before he got my order.

     Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at
     Fort Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of
     the Mississippi River.  The garrison to force a passage
     southward, if they are successful in reaching the Virginia and
     Tennessee Railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting
     Richmond with all the South and South-west.

     Gillmore will join Butler with about 10,000 men from South
     Carolina. Butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000
     men into the field directly to his front.  The force will be
     commanded by Maj.-General W. F. Smith.  With Smith and Gillmore,
     Butler will seize City Point, and operate against Richmond from
     the south side of the river.  His movement will be simultaneous
     with yours.

     Lee's army will be your objective point.  Wherever Lee goes,
     there you will go also.  The only point upon which I am now in
     doubt is, whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above
     or below him.  Each plan presents great advantages over the
     other with corresponding objections.  By crossing above, Lee is
     cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going north on
     a raid.  But if we take this route, all we do must be done
     whilst the rations we start with hold out.  We separate from
     Butler so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate.  By the
     other route Brandy Station can be used as a base of supplies
     until another is secured on the York or James rivers.

     These advantages and objections I will talk over with you more
     fully than I can write them.

     Burnside with a force of probably 25,000 men will reinforce
     you.  Immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after
     the 20th inst., I will give him the defence of the road from
     Bull Run as far south as we wish to hold it.  This will enable
     you to collect all your strength about Brandy Station and to the
     front.

     There will be naval co-operation on the James River, and
     transports and ferries will be provided so that should Lee fall
     back into his intrenchments at Richmond, Butler's force and
     yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such.
     What I would direct then, is that you commence at once reducing
     baggage to the very lowest possible standard.  Two wagons to a
     regiment of five hundred men is the greatest number that should
     be allowed, for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and
     ordnance stores.  One wagon to brigade and one to division
     headquarters is sufficient and about two to corps headquarters.

     Should by Lee's right flank be our route, you will want to make
     arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded
     to White House on the Pamunkey.  Your estimates for this
     contingency should be made at once.  If not wanted there, there
     is every probability they will be wanted on the James River or
     elsewhere.

     If Lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be made
     for ordnance stores.  I would say not much short of five hundred
     rounds of infantry ammunition would do.  By the other, half the
     amount would be sufficient.

     U. S. GRANT,

     Lieutenant-General.

     (*26) General John A. Logan, upon whom devolved the command of
     the Army of the Tennessee during this battle, in his report gave
     our total loss in killed, wounded and missing at 3,521; and
     estimated that of the enemy to be not less than 10,000:  and
     General G. M. Dodge, graphically describing to General Sherman
     the enemy's attack, the full weight of which fell first upon and
     was broken by his depleted command, remarks:  "The disparity of
     forces can be seen from the fact that in the charge made by my
     two brigades under Fuller and Mersy they took 351 prisoners,
     representing forty-nine different regiments, eight brigades and
     three divisions; and brought back eight battle flags from the
     enemy."


     (*27)
     UNION ARMY ON THE RAPIDAN, MAY 5, 1864.

     [COMPILED.]

     LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief.

     MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.


     MAJ.-GEN. W. S. HANCOCK, commanding Second Army Corps.

          First Division, Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow.
               First Brigade, Col. Nelson A. Miles.
               Second Brigade, Col. Thomas A. Smyth.
               Third Brigade, Col. Paul Frank.
               Fourth Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke.

          Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon.
               First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alex. S. Webb.
               Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joshua T. Owen.
               Third Brigade, Col. Samuel S. Carroll.

          Third Division, Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney.
               First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. H. H. Ward.
               Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Hays.

          Fourth Divisin, Brig.-Gen. Gershom Mott.
               First Brigade, Col. Robert McAllister.
               Second Brigade, Col. Wm. R. Brewster.

               Artillery Brigade, Col. John C. Tidball.


     MAJ.-GEN. G. K. WARREN, commanding Fifth Army Corps.

          First Division, Brig.-Gen. Charles Griffin.
               First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres.
               Second Brigade, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer.
               Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. J. Bartlett.

          Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John C. Robinson.
               First Brigade, Col. Samuel H. Leonard.
               Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry Baxter.
               Third Brigade, Col. Andrew W. Denison.

          Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford.
               First Brigade, Col. Wm McCandless.
               Third Brigade, Col. Joseph W. Fisher.

          Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth.
               First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Lysander Cutler.
               Second Brigade Brig.-Gen. James C. Rice.
               Third Brigade, Col. Roy Stone

               Artillery Brigade, Col. S. S. Wainwright.


     MAJ.-GEN. JOHN SEDGWICK, commanding Sixth Army Corps.

          First Division, Brig.-Gen. H. G. Wright.
               First Brigade, Col. Henry W. Brown.
               Second Brigade, Col. Emory Upton.
               Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. D. A. Russell.
               Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Shaler.

          Second Division, Brig.-Gen. George W. Getty.
               First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton.
               Second Brigade, Col. Lewis A. Grant.
               Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thos. H. Neill.
               Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry L. Eustis.

          Third Division, Brig.-Gen. James Ricketts.
               First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wm. H. Morris.
               Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. T. Seymour.

               Artillery Brigade, Col. C. H. Tompkins


     MAJ.-GEN. P. H. SHERIDAN, commanding Cavalry Corps.

          First Division, Brig.-Gen. A. T. A. Torbert.
               First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. G. A. Custer.
               Second Brigade, Col. Thos. C. Devin.
               Reserve Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wesley Merritt

          Second Division, Brig.-Gen. D. McM. Gregg.
               First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry E. Davies, Jr.
               Second Brigade, Col. J. Irvin Gregg.

          Third Division, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Wilson.
               First Brigade, Col. T. M. Bryan, Jr.
               Second Brigade, Col. Geo. H. Chapman.


     MAJ.-GEN. A. E. BURNSIDE, commanding Ninth Army Corps.

          First Division, Brig.-Gen. T. G. Stevenson.
               First Brigade, Col. Sumner Carruth.
               Second Brigade, Col. Daniel Leasure.

          Second Division, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Potter.
               First Brigade, Col. Zenas R. Bliss.
               Second Brigade, Col. Simon G. Griffin.

          Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Orlando Willcox.
               First Brigade, Col. John F. Hartranft.
               Second Brigade, Col. Benj. C. Christ.

          Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. Edward Ferrero.
               First Brigade, Col. Joshua K. Sigfried.
               Second Brigade, Col. Henry G. Thomas.

               Provisional Brigade, Col. Elisha G. Marshall.


     BRIG.-GEN. HENRY J. HUNT, commanding Artillery.

          Reserve, Col. H. S. Burton.
               First Brigade, Col. J. H. Kitching.
               Second Brigade, Maj. J. A. Tompkins.
               First Brig. Horse Art., Capt. J. M. Robertson.
               Second Brigade, Horse Art., Capt. D. R. Ransom.
               Third Brigade, Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh.


     GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.......
               Provost Guard, Brig.-Gen. M. R. Patrick.
               Volunteer Engineers, Brig.-Gen. H. W. Benham.



     CONFEDERATE ARMY.

     Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, Commanded by
     GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE, August 31st, 1834.

         First Army Corps:  LIEUT.-GEN. R. H. ANDERSON, Commanding.

     MAJ.-GEN. GEO. E. PICKETT'S Division.
          Brig.-Gen. Seth M. Barton's Brigade. (a)
          Brig.-Gen. M. D. Corse's      "
               "     Eppa Hunton's      "
               "     Wm. R. Terry's     "

     MAJ.-GEN. C. W. FIELD'S Division. (b)
          Brig.-Gen. G. T. Anderson's Brigade
                "    E. M. Law's (c)     "
                "    John Bratton's      "

     MAJ.-GEN. J. B. KERSHAW'S Division. (d)
          Brig.-Gen. W. T. Wofford's Brigade
                "    B. G. Humphreys'   "
                "    Goode Bryan's      "
                "    Kershaw's (Old)    "


         Second Army Corps:  MAJOR-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY, Commanding

     MAJ.-GEN. JOHN B. GORDON'S Division.
          Brig.-Gen. H. T. Hays' Brigade. (e)
              "      John Pegram 's   "   (f)
              "      Gordon's         "   (g)
          Brig.-Gen. R. F. Hoke's     "

     MAJ.-GEN. EDWARD JOHNSON'S Division.
          Stonewall Brig. (Brig.-Gen. J. A. Walker). (h)
          Brig.-Gen. J M Jones' Brigade. (h)
              "      Geo H. Stewart's "  (h)
              "      L. A. Stafford's "  (e)

     MAJ.-GEN. R. E. RODES' Division.
          Brig.-Gen. J. Daniel's Brigade. (i)
              "      Geo. Dole's      "   (k)
              "      S. D. Ramseur's Brigade.
              "      C. A. Battle's   "
              "      R. D. Johnston's " (f)


         Third Army Corps:  LIEUT.-GEN. A. P. HILL, Commanding.

     MAJ.-GEN. WM. MAHONE'S Division. (l)
          Brig.-Gen. J. C. C. Sanders' Brigade.
                     Mahone's             "
          Brig.-Gen. N. H. Harris's       "  (m)
             "       A. R. Wright's       "
             "       Joseph Finegan's     "

     MAJ.-GEN. C. M. WILCOX'S Division.
          Brig.-Gen. E. L. Thomas's Brigade (n)
             "       James H. Lane's   "
             "       Sam'l McCowan's   "
             "       Alfred M. Scale's "

     MAJ.-GEN. H. HETH'S Division. (o)
          Brig.-Gen. J. R. Davis's Brigade.
             "       John R. Cooke's  "
             "       D. McRae's       "
             "       J. J. Archer's   "
             "       H. H. Walker's   "

                _unattached_:  5th Alabama Battalion.


       Cavalry Corps:  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL WADE HAMPTON, Commanding.(p)

     MAJ.-GEN. FITZHUGH LEE'S Division
          Brig.-Gen. W. C. Wickham's Brigade
             "      L. L. Lomax's      "

     MAJ.-GEN. M. C. BUTLER'S Division.
          Brig.-Gen. John Dunovant's Brigade.
             "       P. M. B. Young's   "
             "       Thomas L. Rosser's "

     MAJ.-GEN. W. H. F. LEE'S Division.
          Brig.-Gen. Rufus Barringer's Brigade.
             "      J. R. Chambliss's    "


       Artillery Reserve:  BRIG.-GEN. W. N. PENDLETON, Commanding.

     BRIG.-GEN. E. P. ALEXANDER'S DIVISION.*
          Cabell's Battalion.
               Manly's Battery.
               1st Co. Richmond Howitzers.
               Carleton's Battery.
               Calloway's Battery.

          Haskell's Battalion.
               Branch's Battery.
               Nelson's    "
               Garden's    "
               Rowan       "

          Huger's Battalion.
               Smith's Battery.
               Moody      "
               Woolfolk   "
               Parker's   "
               Taylor's   "
               Fickling's "
               Martin's   "

          Gibb's Battalion.
               Davidson's Battery.
               Dickenson's   "
               Otey's        "


     BRIG.-GEN. A. L. LONG'S DIVISION.

          Braxton's Battalion.
               Lee Battery.
               1st Md. Artillery.
               Stafford    "
               Alleghany   "

          Cutshaw's Battalion.
               Charlotteville Artillery.
               Staunton           "
               Courtney           "

          Carter's Battalion.
               Morris Artillery.
               Orange      "
               King William Artillery.
               Jeff Davis        "

         Nelson's Battalion.
               Amherst Artillery.
               Milledge     "
               Fluvauna     "

          Brown's Battalion.
               Powhatan Artillery.
               2d Richmond Howitzers.
               3d    "         "
               Rockbridge Artillery.
               Salem Flying Artillery.


     COL R. L.WALKER'S DIVISION.

          Cutt's Battalion.
               Ross's Battery.
               Patterson's Battery.
               Irwin Artillery.

          Richardson's Battalion.
               Lewis Artillery.
               Donaldsonville Artillery.
               Norfolk Light       "
               Huger               "

          Mclntosh 's Battalion.
               Johnson's Battery.
               Hardaway Artillery.
               Danville      "
               2d Rockbridge Artillery.

          Pegram's Battalion.
               Peedee Artillery.
               Fredericksburg Artillery.
               Letcher             "
               Purcell Battery.
               Crenshaw's Battery.

          Poague's Battalion.
               Madison Artillery.
               Albemarle    "
               Brooke       "
               Charlotte    "


     NOTE.
     (a) COL. W. R. Aylett was in command Aug. 29th, and probably at
     above date.
     (b) Inspection report of this division shows that it also
     contained Benning's and Gregg's Brigades. (c) Commanded by
     Colonel P. D. Bowles.
     (d) Only two brigadier-generals reported for duty; names not
     indicated.

     Organization of the Army of the Valley District.
     (e) Constituting York's Brigade.
     (f) In Ramseur's Division.
     (g) Evan's Brigade, Colonel E. N. Atkinson commanding, and
     containing 12th Georgia Battalion.
     (h) The Virginia regiments constituted Terry's Brigade, Gordon's
     Division.
     (i) Grimes' Brigade.
     (k) Cook's    "

     (l) Returns report but one general officer present for duty;
     name not indicated.
     (m) Colonel Joseph M. Jayne, commanding.
     (n) Colonel Thomas J. Simmons, commanding. (o) Four
     brigadier-generals reported present for duty; names not
     indicated.
     (p) On face of returns appears to have consisted of Hampton's,
     Fitz-Lee's, and W. H. F. Lee's Division, and Dearing's Brigade.

     *But one general officer reported present for duty in the
     artillery, and Alexander's name not on the original.


     (*28) HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S.,
     May II, 1864.--3 P.M.

     MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
     Commanding Army of the Potomac.

     Move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear of the 5th and
     6th corps, under cover of night, so as to join the 9th corps in
     a vigorous assault on the enemy at four o'clock A.M. to-morrow.
     will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay with
     Burnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt and
     vigorous attack.  Warren and Wright should hold their corps as
     close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any
     diversion caused by this attack, and to push in if any
     opportunity presents itself.  There is but little doubt in my
     mind that the assault last evening would have proved entirely
     successful if it had commenced one hour earlier and had been
     heartily entered into by Mott's division and the 9th corps.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieut.-General.


     (*29) HEADQUARTERS, ARMIES U. S.,
     May 11, 1864.-4 P.M.

     MAJOR-GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE,
     Commanding 9th Army Corps.

     Major-General Hancock has been ordered to move his corps under
     cover of night to join you in a vigorous attack against the
     enemy at 4 o'clock A.M. to-morrow.  You will move against the
     enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possible
     vigor at precisely 4 o'clock A.M. to-morrow the 12th inst.  Let
     your preparations for this attack be conducted with the utmost
     secrecy and veiled entirely from the enemy.

     I send two of my staff officers, Colonels Comstock and Babcock,
     in whom I have great confidence and who are acquainted with the
     direction the attack is to be made from here, to remain with you
     and General Hancock with instructions to render you every
     assistance in their power.  Generals Warren and Wright will hold
     their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage
     of any diversion caused by yours and Hancock's attack, and will
     push in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieut.-General.


     (*30) HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S.,
     May 12, 1864, 6.30 P.M.

     MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,
     Washington, D. C.

     The eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between three and
     four thousand prisoners in our hands for the day's work,
     including two general officers, and over thirty pieces of
     artillery.  The enemy are obstinate, and seem to have found the
     last ditch.  We have lost no organizations, not even that of a
     company, whilst we have destroyed and captured one division
     (Johnson's), one brigade (Doles'), and one regiment entire from
     the enemy.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieut.-General.


     (*31) SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 13, 1864.

     HON E. M. STANTON, SECRETARY OF WAR,
     Washington, D. C.

     I beg leave to recommend the following promotions be made for
     gallant and distinguished services in the last eight days'
     battles, to wit:  Brigadier-General H. G. Wright and
     Brigadier-General John Gibbon to be Major-Generals; Colonel S.
     S. Carroll, 8th Ohio Volunteers Colonel E. Upton, 121st New York
     Volunteers; Colonel William McCandless, 2d Pennsylvania Reserves,
     to be Brigadier-Generals. I would also recommend Major-General W.
     S. Hancock for Brigadier-General in the regular army.  His
     services and qualifications are eminently deserving of this
     recognition.  In making these recommendations I do not wish the
     claims of General G. M. Dodge for promotion forgotten, but
     recommend his name to be sent in at the same time.  I would also
     ask to have General Wright assigned to the command of the Sixth
     Army Corps.  I would further ask the confirmation of General
     Humphreys to the rank of Major-General.

     General Meade has more than met my most sanguine expectations.
     He and Sherman are the fittest officers for large commands I
     have come in contact with.  If their services can be rewarded by
     promotion to the rank of Major-Generals in the regular army the
     honor would be worthily bestowed, and I would feel personally
     gratified.  I would not like to see one of these promotions at
     this time without seeing both.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieut.-General.


     (*32) QUARLES' MILLS, VA., May 26, 1864.

     MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,
     Washington, D. C.

     The relative position of the two armies is now as follows: Lee's
     right rests on a swamp east of the Richmond and Fredericksburg
     road and south of the North Anna, his centre on the river at Ox
     Ford, and his left at Little River with the crossings of Little
     River guarded as far up as we have gone. Hancock with his corps
     and one division of the 9th corps crossed at Chesterfield Ford
     and covers the right wing of Lee's army. One division of the 9th
     corps is on the north bank of the Anna at Ox Ford, with bridges
     above and below at points nearest to it where both banks are
     held by us, so that it could reinforce either wing of our army
     with equal facility.  The 5th and 6th corps with one division of
     the 9th corps run from the south bank of the Anna from a short
     distance above Ox Ford to Little River, and parallel with and
     near to the enemy.

     To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter
     of our men that even success would not justify.  To turn the
     enemy by his right, between the two Annas is impossible on
     account of the swamp upon which his right rests.  To turn him by
     the left leaves Little River, New Found River and South Anna
     River, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to
     the movement of our army, to be crossed.  I have determined
     therefore to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or near
     Hanover Town.  This crosses all three streams at once, and
     leaves us still where we can draw supplies.

     During the last night the teams and artillery not in position,
     belonging to the right wing of our army, and one division of
     that wing were quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the river
     and moved down to the rear of the left.  As soon as it is dark
     this division with most of the cavalry will commence a forced
     march for Hanover Town to seize and hold the crossings.  The
     balance of the right wing will withdraw at the same hour, and
     follow as rapidly as possible.  The left wing will also withdraw
     from the south bank of the river to-night and follow in rear of
     the right wing.  Lee's army is really whipped.  The prisoners we
     now take show it, and the action of his army shows it
     unmistakably.  A battle with them outside of intrenchments
     cannot be had.  Our men feel that they have gained the MORALE
     over the enemy, and attack him with confidence.  I may be
     mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's army is already
     assured.  The promptness and rapidity with which you have
     forwarded reinforcements has contributed largely to the feeling
     of confidence inspired in our men, and to break down that of the
     enemy.

     We are destroying all the rails we can on the Central and
     Fredericksburg roads.  I want to leave a gap on the roads north
     of Richmond so big that to get a single track they will have to
     import rail from elsewhere.  Even if a crossing is not effected
     at Hanover Town it will probably be necessary for us to move on
     down the Pamunkey until a crossing is effected.  I think it
     advisable therefore to change our base of supplies from Port
     Royal to the White House.  I wish you would direct this change
     at once, and also direct Smith to put the railroad bridge there
     in condition for crossing troops and artillery and leave men to
     hold it.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieut.-General.


     (*33) NEAR COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864, 7 A.M.

     MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
     Commanding A. P.

     The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed,
     suspend the offensive; but when one does succeed, push it
     vigorously and if necessary pile in troops at the successful
     point from wherever they can be taken.  I shall go to where you
     are in the course of an hour.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieut.-General.


     (*34) COLD HARBOR, June 5,1864.

     MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington,
     D. C.

     A full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would be
     impracticable to hold a line north-east of Richmond that would
     protect the Fredericksburg Railroad to enable us to use that
     road for supplying the army.  To do so would give us a long
     vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our
     strength to guard it, and would leave open to the enemy all of
     his lines of communication on the south side of the James.  My
     idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army if possible
     north of Richmond; then after destroying his lines of
     communication on the north side of the James River to transfer
     the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or
     follow him south if he should retreat.

     I now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it
     of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now
     have.  They act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or
     feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where
     in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them.
     Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to
     make all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside of
     the city.  I have therefore resolved upon the following plan:

     I will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied by
     the Army of the Potomac, taking advantage of any favorable
     circumstance that may present itself until the cavalry can be
     sent west to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad from about
     Beaver Dam for some twenty-five or thirty miles west.  When this
     is effected I will move the army to the south side of the James
     River, either by crossing the Chickahominy and marching near to
     City Point, or by going to the mouth of the Chickahominy on
     north side and crossing there.  To provide for this last and
     most possible contingency, several ferry-boats of the largest
     class ought to be immediately provided.

     Once on the south side of the James River, I can cut off all
     sources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by the
     canal.  If Hunter succeeds in reaching Lynchburg, that will be
     lost to him also.  Should Hunter not succeed, I will still make
     the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south
     side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they
     can.

     The feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels
     can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst our
     army is not only confident of protecting itself without
     intrenchments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever
     and whenever he can be found without this protection.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieutenant-General.


     (*35) COLD HARBOR, VA., June 6, 1864.

     MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER

     Commanding Dept. W. Va.

     General Sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning, with
     instructions to proceed to Charlottesville, Va., and to commence
     there the destruction of the Va. Cen. R. R., destroying this way
     as much as possible.  The complete destruction of this road and
     of the canal on James River is of great importance to us.
     According to the instructions I sent to General Halleck for your
     guidance, you were to proceed to Lynchburg and commence there. It
     would be of great value to us to get possession of Lynchburg for
     a single day.  But that point is of so much importance to the
     enemy, that in attempting to get it such resistance may be met
     as to defeat your getting onto the road or canal at all.  I see,
     in looking over the letter to General Halleck on the subject of
     your instructions, that it rather indicates that your route
     should be from Staunton via Charlottesville.  If you have so
     understood it, you will be doing just what I want.  The
     direction I would now give is, that if this letter reaches you
     in the valley between Staunton and Lynchburg, you immediately
     turn east by the most practicable road.  From thence move
     eastward along the line of the road, destroying it completely
     and thoroughly, until you join General Sheridan.  After the work
     laid out for General Sheridan and yourself is thoroughly done,
     proceed to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid out in
     General Sheridan's instructions.

     If any portion of your force, especially your cavalry, is needed
     back in your Department, you are authorized to send it back.

     If on receipt of this you should be near to Lynchburg and deem
     it practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroy the canal.
     Lose no opportunity to destroy the canal.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieut.-General.


     (*36) FROM A STATEMENT OF LOSSES COMPILED IN THE
     ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE.

     FIELD OF ACTION AND DATE.  | KILLED.  | WOUNDED.  | MISSING. |
     AGGREGATE.  |


     Wilderness, May 5th to 7th | 2,261 | 8,785 | 2,902 |13,948 |
     Spottsylvania, May 8th to 21st | 2,271 | 9,360 | 1,970 | 13,601|
     North Anna, May 23d to 27th | 186 | 792 | 165 | 1,143 |
     Totopotomoy, May 27th to 31st | 99 | 358 | 52 | 509 | Cold
     Harbor, May 31st to June 12th | 1,769 | 6,752 | 1,537 |10,058 |
     Total ................  | 6,586 | 26,047 | 6,626 | 39,259 |


     (*37) CITY POINT, VA., June 17, 1864.  11 A.M.

     MAJOR-GEN. HALLECK,
     Washington, D. C.

             *        *        *        *        *        *        *

     The enemy in their endeavor to reinforce Petersburg abandoned
     their intrenchments in front of Bermuda Hundred.  They no doubt
     expected troops from north of the James River to take their
     place before we discovered it.  General Butler took advantage of
     this and moved a force at once upon the railroad and plank road
     between Richmond and Petersburg, which I hope to retain
     possession of.

     Too much credit cannot be given to the troops and their
     commanders for the energy and fortitude displayed during the
     last five days.  Day and night has been all the same, no delays
     being allowed on any account.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieut.-General.


     (*38) CITY POINT, VA., July 24, 1864.

     MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
     Commanding, etc.

     The engineer officers who made a survey of the front from
     Bermuda Hundred report against the probability of success from
     an attack there.  The chances they think will be better on
     Burnside's front.  If this is attempted it will be necessary to
     concentrate all the force possible at the point in the enemy's
     line we expect to penetrate.  All officers should be fully
     impressed with the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond
     the enemy's present line, if they should succeed in penetrating
     it, and of getting back to their present line promptly if they
     should not succeed in breaking through.

     To the right and left of the point of assault all the artillery
     possible should be brought to play upon the enemy in front
     during the assault.  Their lines would be sufficient for the
     support of the artillery, and all the reserves could be brought
     on the flanks of their commands nearest to the point of assault,
     ready to follow in if successful.  The field artillery and
     infantry held in the lines during the first assault should be in
     readiness to move at a moment's notice either to their front or
     to follow the main assault, as they should receive orders.  One
     thing, however, should be impressed on corps commanders.  If
     they see the enemy giving away on their front or moving from it
     to reinforce a heavily assaulted portion of their line, they
     should take advantage of such knowledge and act promptly without
     waiting for orders from army commanders.  General Ord can
     co-operate with his corps in this movement, and about five
     thousand troops from Bermuda Hundred can be sent to reinforce
     you or can be used to threaten an assault between the Appomattox
     and James rivers, as may be deemed best.

     This should be done by Tuesday morning, if done at all.  If not
     attempted, we will then start at the date indicated to destroy
     the railroad as far as Hicksford at least, and to Weldon if
     possible.

             *        *        *        *        *        *        *

     Whether we send an expedition on the road or assault at
     Petersburg, Burnside's mine will be blown up....

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieutenant-General.


     (*39) See letter, August 5th, Appendix.


     (*40) See Appendix, letters of Oct. 11th.


     (*41) CITY POINT, VA., December 2,1864.

     MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
     Nashville Tenn.

     If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, you will
     lose all the road back to Chattanooga and possibly have to
     abandon the line of the Tennessee.  Should he attack you it is
     all well, but if he does not you should attack him before he
     fortifies.  Arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster
     employees, citizens, etc.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieutenant-General.


     CITY POINT, VA., December 2, 1864.--1.30 P.M.

     MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
     Nashville, Tenn.

     With your citizen employees armed, you can move out of Nashville
     with all your army and force the enemy to retire or fight upon
     ground of your own choosing.  After the repulse of Hood at
     Franklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back to
     Nashville we should have taken the offensive against the enemy
     where he was.  At this distance, however, I may err as to the
     best method of dealing with the enemy.  You will now suffer
     incalculable injury upon your railroads if Hood is not speedily
     disposed of.  Put forth therefore every possible exertion to
     attain this end.  Should you get him to retreating give him no
     peace.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieutenant-General.


     CITY POINT, VA., December 5, 1864.

     MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
     Nashville, Tenn.

     Is there not danger of Forrest moving down the Cumberland to
     where he can cross it?  It seems to me whilst you should be
     getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after
     Forrest, Hood should be attacked where he is.  Time strengthens
     him in all possibility as much as it does you.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieutenant-General.


     CITY POINT, VA., December 6, 1864--4 P.M.

     MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
     Nashville, Tenn.

     Attack Hood at once and wait no longer for a remnant of your
     cavalry.  There is great danger of delay resulting in a campaign
     back to the Ohio River.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieutenant-General.


     CITY POINT, VA., December 8, 1864.--8.30 P.M.

     MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
     Nashville, Tenn.

     Your dispatch of yesterday received.  It looks to me evident the
     enemy are trying to cross the Cumberland River, and are
     scattered.  Why not attack at once?  By all means avoid the
     contingency of a foot race to see which, you or Hood, can beat
     to the Ohio.  If you think necessary call on the governors of
     States to send a force into Louisville to meet the enemy if he
     should cross the river.  You clearly never should cross except
     in rear of the enemy.  Now is one of the finest opportunities
     ever presented of destroying one of the three armies of the
     enemy.  If destroyed he never can replace it.  Use the means at
     your command, and you can do this and cause a rejoicing that
     will resound from one end of the land to the other.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieutenant-General.


     CITY POINT, VA., December 11, 1864.--4 P.M.

     MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
     Nashville, Tenn.

     If you delay attack longer the mortifying spectacle will be
     witnessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio River, and you
     will be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find.  Let
     there be no further delay.  Hood cannot even stand a drawn
     battle so far from his supplies of ordnance stores.  If he
     retreats and you follow, he must lose his material and much of
     his army.  I am in hopes of receiving a dispatch from you to-day
     announcing that you have moved.  Delay no longer for weather or
     reinforcements.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieutenant-General.


     WASHINGTON, D. C., December 15, 1864.

     MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
     Nashville, Tenn.

     I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a dispatch from
     Van Duzer detailing your splendid success of to-day, I shall go
     no further.  Push the enemy now and give him no rest until he is
     entirely destroyed.  Your army will cheerfully suffer many
     privations to break up Hood's army and render it useless for
     future operations.  Do not stop for trains or supplies, but take
     them from the country as the enemy have done.  Much is now
     expected.

     U. S. GRANT,
     Lieutenant-General.


     (*42) See orders to Major-General Meade, Ord, and Sheridan,
     March 24th, Appendix.


     (*43) See Appendix.


     (*44) NOTE.--The fac-simile of the terms of Lee's surrender
     inserted at this place, was copied from the original document
     furnished the publishers through the courtesy of General Ely S.
     Parker, Military Secretary on General Grant's staff at the time
     of the surrender.

     Three pages of paper were prepared in General Grant's manifold
     order book on which he wrote the terms, and the interlineations
     and erasures were added by General Parker at the suggestion of
     General Grant.  After such alteration it was handed to General
     Lee, who put on his glasses, read it, and handed it back to
     General Grant.  The original was then transcribed by General
     Parker upon official headed paper and a copy furnished General
     Lee.

     The fac-simile herewith shows the color of the paper of the
     original document and all interlineations and erasures.

     There is a popular error to the effect that Generals Grant and
     Lee each signed the articles of surrender.  The document in the
     form of a letter was signed only by General Grant, in the parlor
     of McLean's house while General Lee was sitting in the room, and
     General Lee immediately wrote a letter accepting the terms and
     handed it to General Grant.





End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant,
Complete, by Ulysses S. Grant

*** 