



Produced by James McCormick




THE PAN-ANGLES

{ii}

{iii}

THE PAN-ANGLES

A CONSIDERATION OF THE FEDERATION OF THE SEVEN ENGLISH-SPEAKING
NATIONS

BY

SINCLAIR KENNEDY

_WITH A MAP_

SECOND IMPRESSION

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.

FOURTH AVENUE & 30TH STREET, NEW YORK

LONDON, BOMBAY. CALCUTTA AND MADRAS

1915

_All Rights Reserved_

{iv}

{v}

TO

THE PAN-ANGLES



{vi}

PREFATORY NOTE


THE Author is indebted to the following publishers and authors
for kind permission to make quotations from copyright matter: to
Mr. Edward Arnold for _Colonial Nationalism_, by Richard Jebb;
to Mr. B. H. Blackwell for _Imperial Architects_, by A. L. Burt;
to the Delegates of the Clarendon Press for _Federations and
Unions_, by H. E. Egerton; to Messrs. Constable & Co. for
_Alexander Hamilton_, by F. S. Oliver, and _The Nation and the
Empire_, edited by Lord Milner; to the publishers of the
_Encyclopedia Britannica_; to Messrs. Macmillan & Co. for
Seeley's _Expansion of England_, and G. L. Parkin's _Imperial
Federation_; to Admiral Mahan; to Mr. John Murray for _English
Colonization and Empire_, by A. Caldecott; to Sir Isaac Pitman &
Sons Ltd. for _The Union of South Africa_, by W. B. Worsfold; to
the Executors of the late W. T. Stead for the _Last Will and
Testament of C. J. Rhodes_; to Messrs. H. Stevens, Son, & Stiles
for _Thomas Pownall_, by C. A. W. Pownall; to Messrs. Houghton,
Mifflin Company for Thayer's _John Marshall_ and Woodrow
Wilson's _Mere Literature_; to Messrs. D. C. Heath & Co. for
Woodrow Wilson's _The State_; to Messrs. G. P. Putnam's Sons for
_The Works of Benjamin Franklin_, edited by John Bigelow; to the
Yale University Press for _Popular Government_, by W. H. Taft;
and also to _The Times_; _The Round Table_; _The Outlook_; and
_The Springfield Weekly Republican_.

{vii}

FOREWORD


THE English-speaking, self-governing white people of the world
in 1914 number upwards of one hundred and forty-one millions.
Since December 24, 1814, there has been unbroken peace between
the two independent groups of this race--a fact that contravenes
the usual historical experiences of peoples between whom there
has been uninterrupted communication during so long an epoch.
The last few decades have seen increasingly close understandings
between both the governments and the peoples of this
civilization.

In 1900 the British navy controlled the seas--all seas. From
1910 to 1914 the British navy has controlled the North Sea
only.[vii-1] Some doubt whether this control can long be
maintained. If it is lost, the British Empire is
finished.[vii-2] The adhesion of the dependencies to their
various governments and also the voluntary cohesion of the
self-governing units would be at an end. "The disorders which
followed the fall of Rome would be insignificant compared with
those which would {viii} ensue were the British Empire to break
in pieces."[viii-1] Such a splitting up would place each
English-speaking nation in an exposed position, and would
strengthen its rivals, Germany, Japan, Russia, and China. It
would compel America to protect with arms, or to abandon to its
enemies, not only the countries to which the Monroe Doctrine has
been considered as applicable, but those lands still more
important to the future of our race, New Zealand and Australia.
If this catastrophe is to be averted, the English-speaking
peoples must regain control of the seas.

These pages are concerned with the English-speaking people of
1914. Here will be found no jingoism, if this be defined as a
desire to flaunt power for its own sake; no altruism, if this
means placing the welfare of others before one's own; and no
sentiment except that which leads to self-preservation. No
technical discussion of military or naval power is here
attempted. The purpose of these pages is to indicate some of the
common heritages of these English-speaking peoples, their need
of land and their desire for the sole privilege of taxing
themselves for their own purposes and in their own way.

Federation is here recognized as the method by which
English-speaking people ensure the freedom of the individual. It
utilizes ideals and methods common to them all. Where it has
been applied, it fulfils its dual purpose of protecting the
group and leaving the individual unhampered.

This consideration may appear to the political {ix} economist to
be merely a few comments on one instance of the relationship of
the food supply to the excess of births over deaths; to the
international politician, as notes on the struggles of the
English-speaking race; and to the business man, as hints on
present and future markets and the maintenance of routes
thereto. Books could be written on each of these and kindred
topics. This is not any one of such treatises, but a statement
of only a few aspects of a huge question.

To Benjamin Franklin may be given the credit of initiating the
thesis of these pages, for he foresaw in 1754 the need of a
single government based on the representation of both the
American and British groups of self-governing English-speaking
people. Possibly there were others before him. Certainly there
have been many since. Some have been obscured by time. Others,
like Cecil John Rhodes, stand out brilliantly. These men
visioned the whole race without losing sight of their own local
fragment. They saw the need of blocking intra-race frictions in
order to maintain our inter-race supremacy. They spoke the
English language, and held by the ideals of English-speaking
men--proud of their race.

To such as these, wherever they are found, owing affection to
the British and American flags which they protect, and which
protect them from others, this discussion is addressed. It is a
family appeal in terms familiar to the family here called--the
Pan-Angles.

SINCLAIR KENNEDY.

BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS.

_January_ 17, 1914.



[vii-1] Cf. _Round Table_, London, May 1911, p. 247.

[vii-2] _Round Table_, London, November 1910, p. 27: "Directly
the British Empire is doubtful of its supremacy by sea its full
liberty will disappear, even if there has been no war."

[viii-1] _United Empire_, London, January 1914, J. G. Lockhart,
"The Meaning of British Imperialism," p. 53.




{x}

{xi}

CONTENTS


FOREWORD                   vii

I. THE CIVILIZATION          1

II. THE PEOPLE              21

III. INDIVIDUALISM          47

IV. THE SEVEN NATIONS       79

V. GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICES   94

VI. DANGERS                120

VII. TENDENCIES            160

VIII. A COMMON GOVERNMENT  184

IX. WORKING FOR FEDERATION 206

X. CONCLUSION              227

INDEX                      237

MAP     _At the end of the volume_

{x}



{1}



THE PAN-ANGLES

I

THE CIVILIZATION


A GREAT civilization has spread over the earth. Many millions of
people believe it the best that has yet appeared. In it the
faiths and strivings of a strong race are expressed. History
teaches that it will be assailed by rival civilizations. Must it
fall and its people be led into the bondage of alien ways?


The date at which a civilization begins must always be unknown,
so slowly and steadily do the contributing forces operate. The
birth of even so definite an organization as a nation is a
matter of opinion. The United States of America, for example,
may be regarded as having come into being on July 4, 1776, or at
the adoption of the Constitution in 1789, or at the end of the
French War in 1763, or on anyone of various other dates,
according to the historical bias of the chronicler. But before
records now legible to us were made, the Pan-Angles were long
past their beginning stages.

Thousands of years ago Europe emerged from the {2} glacial ice.
Off its western coast lay islands. The largest was close to the
continent, and whatever peoples made their way into Europe had
no great difficulty in crossing the narrow water. Migration must
have followed migration, as continental tribes, more progressive
than the islanders, came with superior weapons and skill
to conquer and colonize. Bronze drove out flint and iron
overcame bronze. Settlements of invaders assimilated with the
subject natives and themselves became natives to the next
foreign exploiter. The resulting people became known to the
Romans as Britons. Rome's traders saw that the land was worth
possessing.

In the middle of the first century A.D., Imperial Rome was in a
mood for further expansion. It became necessary to intervene in
the affairs of the northern island, touched already by Roman
influence, but as yet independent of that power. In the island
there were many princes and many governments adequate to the
local demands, but no organization for concerted action against
a powerful intruder. Within fifty years the task of pacification
was largely accomplished. The southern two-thirds of the land
then enjoyed the beneficent rule of Roman administrators. They
governed Britain for its own good--as they saw it. They made it
as much as possible like Rome. Baths and temples, roads and
bridges, and a firm law brought Roman enlightenment to
uncultured Britain. The Latin tongue was the official language.
Many Romans of the military and civil services married native
women. For more than two centuries Britain was thus a dependency
of Rome, and many Britons were proud to belong to the {3} great
empire. The rest of the island, to which this boon was never
extended, was inhabited by barbarous hill tribes, who, even when
Rome was strong, could protect themselves, and who at favourable
opportunities made raids against the loyal Britons. The Romans
had come to Britain to rule it, but had remained Romans, had
taken their orders from colonial secretaries in Rome, had left
their Roman wives and children at home--presumably because of
the severity of Britain's climate,--and after an honourable term
of service had retired on half-pay, or something as good. Just
how Rome profited by holding Britain is immaterial now, whether
by tribute levied and collected directly, whether through
extended opportunities for trade, or whether in the employment
("outdoor relief," a Canadian might put it [3-11]) of a large
military and civil force, paid, if Britain were self-supporting,
by Britain's taxes. Perhaps the knowledge of having discharged a
duty, shirking not the burden of the strong, was the reward Rome
really prized.

A change of rulers was, however, in store for them all--Briton
and Roman alike. By 350 A.D. a huge amorphous rival had begun to
overflow its Northern forest, a race of strong, eager men
seeking more land. That their first attacks were toward Rome
itself showed the empire's weakness. Rome's intentions toward
outlying dependencies may have been of the best, but it was
powerless to fulfil them. The navy, such as it was, was forced
to concentrate in home waters; and the army, called to protect
the heart of the empire, left empty the barracks of Britain.

{4}

Then, on the disorganized Britain, borne by the north-east wind,
fell the invaders. With them came many of our most cherished
virtues and a new epoch of governmental theory. The Jutes,
Angles, Saxons, Danes, and Norsemen came, not to superimpose
themselves as rulers, but to colonize. They brought their
families along. The climate suited them nicely. They wanted to
live there and make the country their country. The fact that it
was already inhabited formed only a temporary obstacle. As has
happened repeatedly in history, those who came were strong;
those they found were weak. The right of prior occupation was
matched against the right to take by force. In time the natives
had disappeared and the newcomers were settling and improving
the land. There was no looking back to a mother country for
orders or protection. Their fathers across the North Sea had
evolved certain governmental ideas. These the migrating
generations had carried with them and planted in the new soil.
They proved adequate; and if any tie bound the lusty offspring
to the ancestral home it could have been sentiment
only--unencouraged by written and electric communication. The
sentiment was short-lived.

Of these separate colonies there were as many as there were
tribes, and as many tribes as there were shiploads. They all
came from the great Teutonic stock that covered so much of
north-western Europe. Five hundred years they spent trying
conclusions among themselves, deciding what should be the
language, the law, the name, they were to hand down to us. The
people long remained without any name common to all; but in time
{5} their country became known as England. Here were established
the characteristics that have marked us ever since. The
framework of the language was set; the greed for land was
indulged; and the instinct for self-government, unable to evolve
for its own security any system of central control, proved
finally the undoing of all the jealous little autonomies. When a
single-minded force threatened their cherished liberties, they
were capable of no single-minded resistance. A neighbour across
the channel thought he could make good use of England, proved
his point one day when the wind blew favourably towards
Hastings, and became England's master.

Then began a new governmental era, one having no parallel in our
history since. The Saxon had been in most recent supremacy.
Wealth and power passed from Saxon to Norman hands. Had the
Duchy of Normandy been large enough to form the centre of its
ruler's activities, England, like the Britain of the past, would
have become a dependency of a foreign power. Two factors
prevented: England, because of its size and of its separation
from the continent was the more valued possession of the two;
and William and his followers, although considering themselves
greatly superior in culture and breeding, were really of the
same race as the men they conquered, and hence easily
assimilated with them. Had this been an invasion of people, that
is, of men with their wives and children--it must have meant
extermination of the Angles, Saxons, and Danes, either in war or
in economic strife. But no such colonizing force was at work.
The lords of England were reduced {6} to peasantry, and the
peasants of whatever origin kept on about their affairs. In time
the new nobility was no longer foreign. Neither a dependency,
nor a colony, England gradually absorbed the Normans and all the
importance of Normandy.

From this assimilation England rose independent and a unit. The
Normans, it has been said, crushed the Angles, Danes, and Saxons
into one people.[6-1] Just as inexorably were the Normans
themselves fused into the common mass--

    "Thus from a mixture of all kinds began,
    That heterogeneous thing, an Englishman: . . .
    The silent nations undistinguish'd fall,
    An Englishman's the common name for all.
    Fate jumbled them together, God knows how;
    Whate'er they were, they're true-born English now."[6-2]

Out of the vigour and strength that resulted have risen the
Pan-Angles; and no foreign power since then has conquered or
ruled them in England or elsewhere. With several governmental
units co-ordinated to no central authority, England had been
devastated and had been unable to repel invasions. These local
powers were now combined under a strong unitary government. So
efficient did it prove for many generations, that Pan-Angles as
a whole are only now realising its limitations. For five
centuries no change in circumstances warranted the consideration
of any other.

Suddenly, in a few years, everything changed except the minds of
men. The world began to {7} grow, and Europe was staggered by
the knowledge of areas immeasurable as compared to the lands
previously known. England then began to take its place as a
great nation. In 1497 a ship, financed by Bristol merchants,
discovered Newfoundland,[7-1] and the sea-divided control of the
Pan-Angles was foreshadowed. From this date, perhaps, Pan-Angle
history may most conveniently be reckoned. If so, four hundred
and seventeen years lie behind us. Of these the first hundred
are negligible. That was an age of fable, when the children of
Europe went out on lonely quests and staked their lives in
adventure for prizes whose value they could never know. Men left
England and circled the globe; they fished in distant
waters;[7-2] they bartered with strange peoples; but in the main
they returned again to England. No colonial policy was required
to meet their needs.

After 1600, however, they less often returned. They settled the
new lands, and grew great in wealth and population. They
organized governments and huge instruments of trade. Slowly the
fabric grew that was to dwarf England in size and resources, and
England, failing to understand that it was no loser thereby, but
richer as a part of a {8} strengthening Pan-Angle civilization,
found little light on the problems arising. In 1607 Virginia and
in 1620 Massachusetts were permanently settled.[8-1] During the
same years Englishmen were acquiring titles and trading rights
in India. Here, at the outset, we have all the elements that
long made for obscurity and discord.

In Virginia and Massachusetts the land was suitable for the
occupations and for the breeding of white men. These settlements
were typical of many in North America, South Africa, and
Australasia. The settler changed his latitude and longitude, but
little else. He pushed back the natives, from the land he
desired to use, gave the place an English name, and proceeded
about his affairs with his fundamental ideals, habits, and
institutions unaltered. He brought from England, besides
furniture and bricks for his house, his language, his religion,
and his notions of government. These he preserved and handed
down to his children, who in turn thought and behaved as though
Englanders, and in two localities, a hemisphere apart, named
their land New England. Self-government was one of their
inherited ideas; they believed that he who supports the
government with taxes should be represented therein. Settlements
such as these are here distinguished as colonies. The first
sprang from England, and in some cases have themselves been the
prolific parents of new colonies. But of whatever origin, all
are a product of the individualism of the Pan-Angle
civilization. In them self-government {9} has been a question of
time only. "Assemblies were not formally instituted, but grew of
themselves because it was the nature of Englishmen to assemble.
Thus the old historian of the colonies Hutchinson, writes under
the year 1619, 'This year a House of Burgesses broke out in
Virginia.'"[9-1] However strongly such colonies may be attached
by sentimental and political ties to some other governmental
group, they belong to themselves alone. On terms of equality
they are part of the Pan-Angle power that controls the world.

In India, and in the many other instances of the same sort, the
land was not suited for the occupations and for the breeding of
white men. It was filled with native inhabitants who neither
gave way before the European, nor assimilated with him. The
English language, law, and governmental forms might be
superimposed to some degree, but the great bulk of the people
continued to think, talk, and act in ways that were not our
ways. Their civilization, however high, was not our
civilization. Such lands, and only such lands, may be called
"possessions" of any Pan-Angle nation. Ceylon belongs to the
British Isles; the Cook Islands belong to New Zealand; Papua
belongs to Australia; and the Philippines belong to the United
States. Because they "belong to" another than themselves, these
lands are called dependencies.

The men who ruled England in 1600 could not anticipate this
distinction so as to make their phraseology, their thoughts and
their efforts at {10} government correspond. Nor, as years
passed, did they come to understand it. Often they knew little
about these settlements, except that all were distant very many
days sailing. In general, the tendency was to act as though all
were possessions belonging to England and subject to its will.
To the statesman in London it might seem at most a theoretical
difference; not so to the man on the spot. If he were a colonist
he felt his land a part of the Mother Country, or its equal in a
larger group of which both were parts. His land did not and
could not belong to England in any sense that gave him less
liberty than Englanders enjoyed.

Here, on the one side, was a stubborn fact; on the other, an
inability to recognize that fact. Friction resulted. In 1707
England united with Scotland to form Great Britain. But Great
Britain, like England, thought colonies possessions. It so
regarded the American colonies. Friction increased.

The colonists understood what it was to desire to be "part of"
and to find they were considered as "belonging to." In Taunton,
Massachusetts, they raised a liberty pole, October 21, 1774.
From it flew the flag of Great Britain bearing the words
"Liberty and Union." To the pole was affixed the following
lines:

    CRESCIT AMOR PATRIAE LIBERTATIS
    QUE CUPIDO
     "Be it known to the present,
    And to all future generations,
    That the Sons of Liberty in Taunton
    Fired with a zeal for the preservation of {11}
    Their rights as men, and as
    American Englishmen,
    And prompted by a just resentment of
    The wrongs and injuries offered to the
    English colonies in general, and to
    This Province in particular, . . ."[11-1]

Not enough of the Pan-Angle statesmen of those days had the
insight to read rightly that inscription. It was only by
severing the Pan-Angles that the American colonies demonstrated
that their citizens were the peers of the citizens of Great
Britain.

Yet there were men on both sides of the Atlantic who even in
those days appreciated that one group of English-speaking white
men cannot be controlled by another. They understood the
equality of citizenship in all Pan-Angles. Of these men it is
enough to mention five: Burke of Ireland, whose words "ring out
the authentic voice of the best political thought of the English
race,"[11-2] and who gave us the "Conciliation with America";
Otis of Massachusetts, whose speech against the Writs of
Assistance was only the beginning of his work; Galloway of
Pennsylvania, the Loyalist who refused re-election to the 1775
Continental Congress when he had to choose {12} between America
and Great Britain; Pownall of England, Governor of Massachusetts
1757-1760, and later Member of the British Parliament 1768-1780;
and Franklin of Pennsylvania, who with Pownall worked for
Pan-Angle unity on both sides of the Atlantic till he, like
Galloway, had to decide, and ended by choosing not Great Britain
but his own nation. The first was never in America; the second
was never in England; the third saw England in his exile only
after American nationhood was established; and the fourth and
fifth knew both England and America.

These men did not discover to Pan-Angles the doctrine of no
taxation without representation. That, like many other alleged
Americanisms, was a Pan-Angle tenet already old. "The
Principality of Wales, said Galloway, the Bishopric of Durham,
and the Palatinate of Chester, laboured, just as America, under
the grievance of being bound by the authority of Parliament
without sharing the direction of that authority. They petitioned
for a share, and their claim was recognized. When Henry VIII.,
he continued, conquered Calais, and settled it with English
merchants, it was so incompatible with English liberty to be
otherwise, that Calais representatives were incorporated in the
English Parliament."[12-1] But these five men may {13} be said
to be among those who rediscovered this tenet. As such they
shared in the formation of the nationhood not only of America,
but also of the five new nations of the Britannic world.

In 1801 Great Britain and Ireland were formed into one political
unit under the official title of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland, in these pages referred to as the British
Isles. And still the distinctions between "part of" and
"belonging to" were not understood in the British Isles.
Colonies and dependencies grew in importance and size, many of
the former having colonies and dependencies of their own; and
still their radical differences were not clearly recognized.
Repeatedly such colonies as Canada, New Zealand, or South Africa
have reasserted the Pan-Angle principle that one group of
self-governing white men cannot be the possession of another. So
strong has been the effect of this reiteration that now there is
some tendency in the British Isles to err on the other side, and
to consider India, the Malay States, and other dependencies as
though they hold, or should hold, the same status as colonies.

Failure to distinguish between areas that are self-governing and
those that are not leads to a loose application of terms which
contributes to further obscurity of thought. One recent instance
is striking in its subtle suggestiveness. Most of the Malay
Peninsula has been taken under the surveillance of the British
Isles. Gradually one native ruler after another has been induced
to desire the friendship of the men who came from the British
Isles.

Some of the areas so acquired are dubbed {14} "States."[14-1]
The collective government of this group of "States" has been
given the grandiloquent title "Federated Malay States," The
Pan-Angle student, familiar with federation in the
English-speaking nations which have already succeeded in their
autonomous efforts, cannot but be confused by hearing the word
"federated" applied to regions where self-government is not even
spoken of, and where the inhabitants take their political orders
from such officials as are appointed by their white conquerors.
The confusion is increased when a battleship guaranteed with
funds of the Federated Malay States is presented to the
government of the British Isles, and is made the occasion of
fulsome speeches about the "loyalty" of the "King's subjects" in
the Federated Malay States. The uninformed persons of the
British Isles and elsewhere may not realize that this gift of
the battleship _Malaya_ means simply the imposition of
additional taxes on the conquered subjects that "belong to" the
conquering race. This is equally true whether or not has been
obtained the approval of the figureheads that are known to the
outside world as the "native rulers."[14-2] Such an instance
{15} fogs our perception of the problems pressing for solution
by the Britannic self-governing peoples.

This confused thinking and failure to appreciate the difference
between "part of" and "belonging to" has delayed Pan-Angle
progress. It led to the disrupting American Revolution, to the
Canadian Rebellion of 1837, and to frictions less in importance
only because they were more promptly remedied. It has been an
unnecessary difficulty in the way of all schemes proposed for
closer Britannic union. Are the self-governing colonies to be
united to each other and to the Mother Country?--or to these and
to the dependencies besides? The word empire is variously used,
and the thought underlying it sometimes vague. To some Britannic
writers it refers inclusively to every spot over which the
British flag flies, classing all colours and conditions of men
in one category.[15-1] Others restrict its use to self-governing
areas and peoples.[15-2] To still other minds it connotes lack
of self-government, and is applicable only to the
dependencies.[15-3] The "imperial parliaments" conjured {16} up
by these three definitions are vastly dissimilar. And the New
Zealander, for instance, would like to know, before he becomes a
party to one, whether he is going to help rule India, or to sit
in joint deliberation with its representatives.[16-1]


The British Isles and the countries that have developed from
British colonies form numerous and interrelated political
groups. The largest, and now most important areas from a racial
point of view, are New Zealand, Australia, South Africa,
Newfoundland, Canada, the British Isles, and the United States
of America. In this discussion these seven nations are
considered as representing their race. Their peoples are known
respectively as New Zealanders, Australians, South Africans,
Newfoundlanders, Canadians, Britishers, and Americans. These
seven nations hold in actual or allied control lands amounting
to sixteen million square miles, with a population of five
hundred and thirty-five million people,[16-2] or thirty and
thirty-three per cent. respectively of the entire surface, and
the entire {17} population of the world. Rome at her greatest
dominated a population of one hundred and twenty millions.[17-1]
In these seven nations more than one hundred and forty-one
millions are white people,[17-2] nearly all speaking the same
language, and all enjoying individual liberty of substantial
equality. They govern themselves and they govern other peoples
of other languages, colours, and ideals, to a total of nearly
four times the entire Roman Empire. To the English-speaking
whites these subject-peoples owe their privileges, such as they
are. Success or failure in governing themselves and others
depends for these whites on their ability so to control
themselves that no foreign powers can interfere with this
world-wide domination.

The words "the English-speaking, self-governing white people of
New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, Newfoundland, Canada, the
British Isles, and the United States of America," make a long
expression. No suitable abbreviation seems to have been devised.
The word Pan-Angle as a noun and as an adjective is here
offered.

{18}

There are various reasons why other words are unsatisfactory.
None in existence exactly denotes the meaning which is here
desired. Anglo-Saxon may refer to the fusion of two stocks of
conquering immigrants who contributed men and vitality of ideas
to the present Pan-Angles. Sometimes, however, it has referred
to only one of these tribes, the Saxons, and designated them as
the Saxons colonizing Angle-land, as opposed to the parent
stock, the Saxons of the continent.[18-1] Some writers have
employed the word loosely as a collective name for all persons
and ideas whose ancestry can be traced to the British Isles.
Again, a literature, a law, an architecture, and a language is
each called Anglo-Saxon. Moreover, there is a people called
Saxons, and a land of Saxony, forming no part of the Pan-Angle
group. Anglican is one of our race names, with its roots deep in
the past, but it has already a restricted meaning as a name for
one of our religious creeds. English is equally unsatisfactory.
It is properly applied to our common language and to the people
inhabiting a part of the British Isles. Even this seemingly
simple meaning has not been faithfully preserved. Writers,
otherwise careful, speak of the English flag and the English
Parliament, when they mean the flag and Parliament of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Robert Louis Stevenson, by
a recent student and author, was called an Englishman![18-2]
This inexactness is equally distasteful to those to whom the
appellation rightfully belongs, and to those who have names of
their own of which they are proud.

{19}

To avoid confusion, the word English in this discussion is
restricted as far as possible to the language alone, or is used
in the sense of belonging to or originating in England. The term
England refers only to the geographic area bearing that
name.[19-1] The inhabitants of England are herein referred to as
Englanders.[19-2] It would be well to have a name for these
self-governing, English-speaking white people that would direct
the mind back to the European stocks, whose bloods have mingled
in the British Isles and in these six other nations, and that
would suggest the origin of the ideals and of the men that have
made possible the present world domination of these people.
Failing such an extensively composite and suggestive word,
resort is had to the name of one of these many tribes. They are
but one of many peoples that went to our making. The Angles
to-day exist nowhere as Angles. But they gave their name to our
tongue and to the country through which we have inherited much.
Every English-speaking schoolboy knows Gregory's exclamation at
the sight of the fair-skinned children brought from
Britain.[19-3] "Angels," they may have looked to the fervent
{20} priest, on their block in the Roman slave market; but, as
"inheritors of the earth, successors to Rome about to fall," he
might prophetically have saluted them. Their political
descendants have abolished slavery throughout a large part of
the world. They are the white people who speak English, citizens
of the autonomous nations: New Zealand, Australia, South Africa,
Newfoundland, Canada, the British Isles, and the United States
of America. Pan-Angles they are here called, and their nations,
Pan-Angle nations.



[3-1] _Round Table,_ London, September 1913, p. 639.

[6-1] C. H. Pearson, _History of England during the Early and
Middle Ages_, London, 1867, vol. i, p. 136.

[6-2] Daniel Defoe, "The True-born Englishman: A Satire," in
_Novels and Miscellaneous Works,_ London, 1855, vol. v. pp. 441,
442.

[7-1] Richard Hakluyt, _The Principal Navigations Voyages
Traffiques_ and _Discoveries of the English Nation,_ Hakluyt
Society reprint, Glasgow, 1904, vol. vii. p. 146: "IN the yere
of our Lord 1497 John Cabot a Venetian, and his sonne Sebastian
(with an English fleet set out from Bristoll) discovered that
land which no man before that time had attempted, on the 24 of
June, about five of the clocke early in the morning," _Cf._
Alfred Caldecott, _English Colonization and Empire,_ London,
1891, p. 28.

[7-2] D. W. Prowse, _History of Newfoundland,_ London, 1895, pp.
28, 58, 83.

[8-1] John Fiske, _Old Virginia and Her Neighbours,_ London,
1897, vol. i. pp. 93, 94; John Fiske, _The Beginnings of New
England,_ Boston, 1889, pp. 81-83.

[9-1] J.R. Seeley, _The Expansion of England,_ London, 1883,
p.69.

[11-1] P. D. Harrison, _The Stars and Stripes,_ Boston, 1906, p.
24; _ibid.,_ p. 23: "The Taunton flag was the regular English
[Great Britain's] flag, adopted by the union of the aforesaid
crosses upon a red field. Its significance lay in its motto,
signifying that there was at that time no thought of severance
from the mother country, their only thought being liberty of
action; and it has historic value because it was the first to
wave with that motto."

[11-2] Woodrow Wilson, _Mere Literature,_ Boston, 1900, p. 105.

[12-1] A. L. Burt, _Imperial Architects,_ Oxford, 1913, p. 60.
Henry VIII. above should read Edward III. After the battle of
Crecy he besieged Calais in 1346. _Cf._ C.A.W. Pownall, _Thomas
Pownall,_ London, 1908, p. 204, who refers to the same ideas as
above, quoted from the 4th edition (1768) of Thomas Pownall's
_The Administration of the Colonies._ For maps of these four
historical areas, see W. R. Shepherd, _Historical Atlas,_
Boston, 1911, pp. 74 and 84.

[14-1] For a definition of grades of government of dependencies
of Britannic nations, see _An Analysis of the System of
Government throughout the British Empire,_ London, 1912, pp.
59-61.

[14-2] _Round Table,_ London, September 1913, p. 697: "It is not
true that she [_Malaya_] was offered as the result of pressure
by the British Government. She owes her existence partly to the
imagination of the Colonial Secretary in the Malay States, who
would by general agreement have been well advised to keep his
visions to himself instead of communicating them even to
sympathetic chiefs, but the Government in the 'Malay States
certainly received no suggestion on the subject from the
Colonial Office.'"

[15-1] _Ency. Brit_., vol. iv. p. 606. "_Ency. Brit._" in this
and subsequent notes refers to _Encyclopedia Britannica_,
Eleventh Edition, Cambridge, England, 1910. Also _Empire
Movement (Non-Party, Non-Sectarian, Non-Aggressive, and
Non-Racial_), London, 1913; Leaflet 19, _Shorter Catechism_:
"The British Empire is that portion of the Earth's land surface
which is subject to the authority of King George."

[15-2] J. R. Seeley, _The Expansion of England,_ London, 1883,
p. 46: "The English Empire is on the whole free from that
weakness which has brought down most empires, the weakness of
being a mere mechanical forced union of alien nationalities. . .
. the English Empire in the main and broadly may be said to be
English throughout."

[15-3] _Cf._ G.R. Parkin, _Imperial Federation_, London, 1892,
p. 248: "Unquestionably confusion of thought is caused by the
careless use of the term Empire into which English people have
fallen. Applied to India and the crown colonies it is
admissible, . . . As a name for the 'slowly grown and crowned
Republic' of which the mother-land is the type and the great
self-governing colonies copies, the term Empire is a misnomer,
 . . ."

[16-1] Richard Jebb, _Studies in Colonial Nationalism,_ London,
1905, p. 276: "Indeed, the inclusion of India involves the
_reductio ad absurdum_ of the imperial-federation theory which
forms the logical complement of the expansion-of-England
theory."

[16-2] _Whitaker's Almanack_, London, 1913, pp.479, 646:
16,897,126 square miles and 535,753,952 persons.

[17-1] _An Analysis of the System of Government throughout the
British Empire_, London, 1912, p. v, gives the Roman Empire
population as eighty-five millions and the British Empire as
four hundred and ten millions. But see Edward Gibbon, _Decline
and Fall of the Roman Empire_, London, 1782, vol. i. pp. 51, 52:
"We are informed, that when the emperor Claudius exercised the
office of censor, he took an account of six millions nine
hundred and forty-five thousand Roman citizens, . . . it seems
probable, that there existed, in the time of Claudius, about
twice as many provincials as there were citizens, . . . and that
the slaves were at least equal in number to the free inhabitants
of the Roman world. The total amount of this imperfect
calculation would rise to about one hundred and twenty millions
of persons."

[17-2] _Cf_. _post_, p. 81, note 1.

[18-1] Cf. _Ency. Brit._, vol. ix. p. 588.

[18-2] Price Collier, _England and the English,_ London, 1911,
p. 341.

[19-1] As to quoted passages, the reader is cautioned to
distinguish in each instance the meanings of the terms England,
Britain, Great Britain, British, Britannic, etc. The usage in
one quotation may differ from that in another and from that in
the non-quoted passages. The terminology in the latter has been
adopted to accord with the most accurate and consistent present
usage. The only innovation in terms here employed is the word
Pan-Angles.

[19-2] Sir Walter Scott, _The Abbot_, iv.: "I marvel what blood
thou art--neither Englander nor Scot," quoted in _New English
Dictionary_, Oxford, 1891--"Englander."

[19-3] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xii. p. 566.




{21}

II

THE PEOPLE


If an intelligent traveller from Mars were to tour the earth
to-day he would jot down in his note-book that New Zealand,
Australia, South Africa, Newfoundland, Canada, the British
Isles, and the United States were all inhabited by the same sort
of people. Their language, their forms of government, their ways
of thinking and of conducting the various departments of life
would lead him to think so. And he would be right. The
English-speaking traveller, denied the point of view of an
outsider, is prone to take the likenesses for granted and to
dwell on the differences, using his own local group as a
yard-stick to measure the rest. Beneath his criticism, however,
he is conscious that in these countries he is at home in the
same sense that he is an alien in all others. Whichever of the
seven he may be from, he finds in each of the other six, men he
can hardly tell from himself, and realizes that in his own
political unit, whose oneness he never questions, there are
communities with natures more dissimilar than are the natures of
these seven nations. No knowledge of history is needed for
either him or the Martian to conclude that while they use
different names to designate this part or that, {22} they are
speaking always of one people and one civilization.


Of what stuffs the English-speaking people were fashioned has
already been explained. England, when colonization began, held
the germ of the future Pan-Angles. Within two centuries Scotland
and Ireland were united with England and Wales under one
government, and the English language and English ideals
penetrated further and further into those once Celtic
strongholds. Welsh, Scots, and Irish brought their contributions
to our development. They wrote English poems and English books.
They officered the army and built battleships. They made and
administered laws, and furnished prime ministers for the British
Isles. Like the Englanders they too migrated to the new
Pan-Angle lands, seeking religious or political liberty in some
cases, but oftenest seeking the means of a more satisfactory
life. These they have found. By this blending of all British
Isles stocks came new vitality to the Pan-Angles.

Three centuries ago this diffusion of Britishers began, and it
continues to-day in far greater numbers than then.[22-1] Nor
have they come less to the United States since it became
independent of Great Britain.[22-2] {23} A French student
divides the American people into two groups: those whose
ancestors were in the United States previous to 1830, and hence
almost totally British, and those descended from persons
immigrating since that time. The former, according to his
computation, comprises more than one-half of the present
population of the United States. And of the latter, one-third at
least are likewise of British stock. A total of two-thirds, or
perhaps even of three-fourths, of the American people to-day
are, he concludes, the descendants of Britishers.[23-1] The
Irish he considers an important element. Of the result of the
mingled immigrations of the Irish and other Celts with the
Scandinavians and Germans, an American student says: "When we
remember that it was the crossing of the Germanic and the Celtic
stocks that produced the English race itself, we are obliged to
assume that the future American people will be substantially the
same human stuff that created the English common law, founded
parliamentary institutions, established American
self-government, and framed the Constitution of the United
States."[23-2] Of all Pan-Angles a tremendous majority are of
British descent. Of all Pan-Angles outside the British Isles a
majority are still of British descent; and theirs has been the
influence that has made six new nations vastly alike, and like,
also, to the Mother Country.

In some instances, notably in Canada and in South Africa, the
Pan-Angles found on their {24} arrival other peoples, sprung
from European stocks, firmly rooted to the land. Descendants of
these first settlers still form communities apart, in which one
hears English less often than French or Taal, as the case may
be; much as one finds communities in the British Isles where
only a form of Celtic is spoken. In other places, too, as in New
York and London, are little foreign nuclei engaged in some
particular trade, where a man can live and earn his wage and
know no English. These are, however, the remarked exceptions.

British blood, moreover, has not in the meantime been stagnant.
Through these centuries, as from earliest history, it has been
constantly enriched and invigorated by admixtures from the
continent of Europe. To the British Isles, South Africa,
Newfoundland, Canada, and the United States, non-British peoples
have come. Even New Zealand and Australia, almost purely British
as they are, have their French and German settlements
respectively. In the British Isles the reception and absorption
of foreign stocks has been unspectacular. Individuals, or from
time to time groups, seeking the larger tolerance of England,
have taken up an abode there. One has but to observe and listen
in the streets to be convinced that foreign invaders, though
with no hostile intent, still land on British soil. Outside the
British Isles, this replenishing of the British stock by
"foreign" immigrants often presents features that are
spectacular--especially where the bulk of the foreigners now
arrive--in the United States and Canada.[24-1]

{25}

The immigrant often comes with no ability to speak English or to
understand the habits of mind and forms of government of those
who do. He may never have been proudly conscious of any
nationality. But in an amazingly brief length of time, we find
him taking his place among his Pan-Angle fellows and conducting
himself as one of them. In one generation he is transformed into
a Pan-Angle.

This process of assimilation was formerly unconscious on the
part of the receiving nations. Now, as the task has grown more
stupendous, special machineries in the way of day and night
schools and settlement clubs and classes have been devised in
the larger centres, and are maintained at the expense of the
public. The immigrant, safely arrived, finds himself still
outside the unyielding wall of the English language. He cannot
ask for food or work. Even those from his former country talk
English together, and jeer at his ignorance. By hard experience
and whatever help is offered, he qualifies himself in this first
requisite. With his English he acquires much else. He learns
words which express ideas peculiar to Pan-Angle psychology. From
the words he progresses to the ideas themselves. Thus he learns
somewhat of the theory of law and government, and of the
aspirations and ideals, and of the expected privileges that have
evolved with this language. The pride of the Pan-Angle comes
over him, and a faith in those precepts of individual freedom of
which he {26} had never dreamed, it may be, until he learned to
read and talk of them in English. "An Englishman's house is his
castle." Here is a promise of privacy perhaps unknown in the
land he has quitted. "Government derives its just powers from
the consent of the governed." This is a long step from the
doctrine of the Divine Right of kings. Thus with the language
goes an atmosphere of many things that are not to be translated,
historical heritages which the immigrant must substitute for
those of his birth. As he practises the new tongue amid
increased material and spiritual comforts, his perception
quickens and he is already fairly started to become one of us.
"I am an American," he cries; or "I am a Canadian": more
noisily, perhaps, because his liberties are newer, but speaking
none the less from the same fountains of pride that inspire--"I
am an Englishman."

On the second generation the same force operates; the
stubbornness of the English-speaking people for their language
acts firmly as the Inquisition and gently as a blessing. They
attend free schools, read only books written in English from the
point of view of English-speaking people and on subjects
interesting to such people. Non-Pan-Angle theories of government
are non-existent; alien moral standards unheard of. The wall
that once hedged the father out, hedges the children in. More
often than not they cannot speak the tongue their parents were
born to. With _Ivanhoe_ and _King Lear_ they are familiar; they
quote Burns and Wordsworth and Longfellow; after local history
they study that of England. The history and poets of their
fathers' native lands are foreign {27} and unknown. If oratory
be demanded, it is Burke or Lincoln who furnish the words and
sentiments to young Hans and Pietro.[27-1]

This is a consideration of English-speaking whites, and as such
is not concerned with the non-whites of various races and
various and inconsistent degrees of subjection or citizenship,
who dwell in Pan-Angle countries. The aborigines of the United
States and Canada, of New Zealand and Australia, are now
problems of the past, solved according to nature's rule of the
survival of the fittest. They could not live and increase in the
environment the white man was strong enough to throw about them.
The <DW64>, numbering almost four times the whites in South
Africa[27-2] and one-eighth of the whites in America,[27-3] is a
problem yet unsolved, for nature has not yet made it clear
which, all things considered, is the most fit. He not only
thrives in contact with whites, but with his low standard of
living multiplies more rapidly. The Asiatic races are the
problem of the future. In every quarter we see a determination
that it shall not grow beyond its present incipient stage. All
Pan-Angle nations may not be able to obtain, as Australia wishes
to, an exclusively white population. {28} But each nation,
whenever non-whites appear to endanger the success of white
local self-government, are able to exclude from the privilege of
the franchise any non-assimilable inhabitants. In each of these
seven nations white local autonomy is recognized as necessary.
The existence of these problems in no way modifies the
definition of Pan-Angles as English-speaking whites who are the
self-governing forces in the seven above-named nations.


The language Pan-Angles speak grew out of the Germanic tongues
of the Saxons, Angles, Danes, and Jutes. Our most common and
familiar words have been in uninterrupted use since the days of
those invaders.[28-1] To this Teutonic basis was added the
French of the Northmen called Normans. A proclamation of 1258 is
sometimes called the first specimen of English,[28-2] but its
resemblance to modern speech is not for the uninstructed to
discern. Through the thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen hundreds
English took on a form more intelligible to us of to-day. In the
latter part of the fifteen hundreds a great poet and playwright
employed it so effectively that his diction and style became a
standard.[28-3] From the same epoch dates the translation of the
Bible and its popular use. "The English version of the Bible
remains the noblest example of the English tongue, while its
perpetual use made it from the {29} instant of its appearance
the standard of our language."[29-1]

Thus it came about that in the _Mayflower_ and other early
emigrant ships was carried to the new countries an English of
authenticated stamp. The standards then recognized are still
recognized. This was, however, the English of books and
education. Each shire of England in its own speech bore witness
to its past. Kent and Yorkshire often could not understand each
other, and words used in one were unknown to the other. The
emigrating Englander carried with him accordingly, besides the
English as established for educated men, the common dialect of
his neighbourhood. In the colonies these differences tended to
vanish under the influence of the press, free schools, and easy
methods of travel; though occasionally in a word, or here and
there a pronunciation, the delighted etymologist sees the ghost
of some local English usage, as in the old Devon still spoken in
Newfoundland.[29-2] In England these local variations of speech
have persisted longer, and still puzzle the unaccustomed ear. In
America there still exist words and expressions which when they
left England were in good usage, but which have there since been
dropped. Though the dictionaries of to-day call it an
Americanism, Shakespeare wrote: "Better far, I guess, That we do
make our entrance several ways."[29-3]

{30}

The variety and interest of the English language does not lie
alone in these historical survivals. It has been, and still is,
constantly enriched from outside itself. In the colonies and
dependencies, and in foreign lands as well, the English language
has come in contact with practically all the tongues of the
earth. From these it has helped itself according to need or
fancy. The result gives locally a strong dash of colour which
inevitably tends to tinge the whole. Ranch, trek, amok, portage,
taboo, tomahawk, coolie,--have long since ceased to serve
limited communities, and stand acknowledged in our dictionaries
besides words of Saxon and Norman pedigrees. Spruit, kai,
bilabong,--if not lost altogether will come to the same dignity.
Whether the new word is taken from another language or coined
from English roots as local slang, the story of a growth in
usage is the same. The "tramp" and "sun-downer" may consort
together in any library with a "creeper," a "tenderfoot," and a
"new chum." In language usages we have no authority but our own
desires.

Such is our language, a living thing growing in parts, dying in
parts, and ever ready to adapt itself to local needs. It is,
moreover, uniform, as nearly as any living tongue can be
uniform. The peculiarities of speech observed in different
localities are enough to furnish picturesque touches for a novel
and humour to the stage, but never [30-1] {31} enough to make
even the slightest barrier between any two regions.
Even so it is a matter largely of pronunciation and
inflection. The writer who would suggest the twangs and drawls,
and indicate the r's that are rolled or ignored, and the h's
insecure in position, has hard work with tortured spelling to
accomplish his end. To the art of printing and all the
publishing, useful and otherwise, it has made possible; to
popular education and the reading it stimulates, we owe a
uniform written language. Had the colonists gone forth and
builded their nations prior to the days of type and presses and
cheap books, the Kansan and Tasmanian might have been to-day as
linguistically remote from each other as both are now from the
Anglo-Saxons of Bede's days. Instead, though they may "labor" or
"labour" according to fancy, and each have his preference about
going to "jail" or to "gaol," they are able to pool their
literatures and draw from a common fund. To increasingly
comfortable and rapid means of transportation, whether of the
tourist, the British bagman or American drummer or the job
hunter, we are indebted for our homogeneous speech. And in that
common speech lies possibly the strongest tie between Pan-Angles
and the one that makes all others potent.

Every Pan-Angle is in instant communication with every other
Pan-Angle wherever he may meet him. Through books, newspapers,
and magazines written in his mother tongue, he may be in
constant touch with the doings of the whole Pan-Angle world.
American youths study Geikie's _Geology_ in their schools; New
Zealanders buy {32} and read the _Atlantic Monthly_; and the
_Century Dictionary_ is in use at Oxford. Men like Lord Bryce
and Admiral Mahan write on matters vital to the existence of
Pan-Angle civilization; and attention and esteem are theirs from
every thoughtful English-speaking man. Through the pulpit, the
lecture platform, and the stage, the people of each nation daily
form first-hand acquaintance with the representatives of each of
the other six--no bar of translation or interpretation standing
between. Of the popular authors and novelists, one-half of their
readers probably hardly know which are American, which
Britannic. Thus our common language produces a continuous
interchange of thought which makes for mental unity and keeps us
one people.

Through this world-wide interchange of thought we see not only
each other, but ourselves, from the point of view of each other.
Family criticism is often harsh when most friendly; and among
ourselves we speak our minds freely, whether it be tolls,
boundaries, or table manners under discussion. Frank opinions
are sometimes resented. "I do not talk through my nose," says
the American. "Nor do I use my a's like a cockney," retorts the
Australian. "I have no accent," rejoins the Englander with an
unmistakable drawl. "Look at your police and your yellow press,"
say six of us, and the American stands ashamed. "Look at the
abject misery of your poor and the waste of your fertile lands,"
and the Englander winces. "Look at your defenceless condition,"
and Newfoundlanders, Canadians, New Zealanders, Australians, and
South Africans all admit the indictment. {33} Mutual criticism
is accordingly not without profit. In each other's virtues and
failings we find models and warnings, for our ideals are in the
main the same, and to no foreign opinion are we so sensitive as
to the opinion of other members of our own family.

In Pan-Angle nations there are to-day more people speaking
English than have ever before in the world's history spoken one
tongue.[33-1] But even outside of those seven nations, English
ranks as the world language, the one most useful for commerce,
travel, or education. Some maintain that it is the richest
language known. On a computation of words that may perhaps be
so.[33-2] Others claim it is easy to learn. No one calls it easy
to spell. Some say English-speaking people cannot learn other
languages; others say they will not. The story is {34} told of a
man for many years the only British resident on 1500 miles of
Arabian coast. He knew less than a dozen words of Arabic. "How
do you carry on your trade?" someone asked. "Oh," he replied,
"the beggars have got to learn English."[34-1] Similar is Mr.
Dooley's promise to the Filipinos: "An' we'll larn ye our
language, because 'tis aisier to larn ye ours than to larn
oursilves yours."

That the wide knowledge of its language is a source of advantage
to a nation, Benjamin Franklin pointed out in a letter to Noah
Webster in 1789: "The Latin language, long the vehicle used in
distributing knowledge among the different nations of Europe, is
daily more and more neglected; and one of the modern tongues,
viz. the French, seems in point of universality to have supplied
its place. It is spoken in all the courts of Europe; and most of
the literati, those even who do not speak it, have acquired
knowledge enough of it to enable them easily to read the books
that are written in it. This gives a considerable advantage to
that nation; it enables its authors to inculcate and spread
throughout other nations such sentiments and opinions on
important points as are most conducive to its interests, or
which may contribute to its reputation by promoting the common
interests of mankind. It is perhaps owing to its being written
in French, that Voltaire's treatise on 'Toleration' has had so
sudden and so great an effect on the bigotry of Europe, as
almost entirely to disarm it. The general use of the French
language has likewise a very advantageous effect on the profits
of {35} the bookselling branch of commerce, . . . And at present
there is no capital town in Europe without a French bookseller's
shop corresponding with Paris.

"Our English bids fair to obtain the second place. The great
body of excellent printed sermons in our language, and the
freedom of our writings on political subjects, have induced a
number of divines of differents sects and nations, as well as
gentlemen concerned in public affairs, to study it; so far at
least as to read it. And if we were to endeavor the facilitating
its progress, the study of our tongue might become much more
general."[35-1]

By 1856 the use of our language had progressed so that Emerson
thought it "destined to be the universal language of men."[35-2]

That we who talk English go about with an assumption of
superiority, there is abundant testimony. In 1676 an English
ship visited Mauritius, then a possession of Holland. A modern
historian quotes from the records of the Dutch Governor: "This
breed imagine the Hollanders are of a lower stock, naturally
inferior, who ought always to be humbly and servilely at their
disposal."[35-3] A Bostonian, who sailed from his home port for
Liverpool on news of the ratification of the treaty of Ghent,
mentions a British army officer with whom he chatted in London
in 1815: "The colonel complimented the American troops in a
curious manner by observing that they were brave {36} and it was
not to be wondered at since they were 'descendants of
Englishmen.' It required all my gravity to make an acknowledging
bow for this compliment I frequently found that the bravery
displayed by the Americans in the last war was accounted for
from this source."[36-1] "They [the Scots] _are_ bumptious, very
bumptious," says Goldwin Smith. "They try to force their Burns
down our throats."[36-2] "Do not, above all things," counsels an
official circular addressed to British emigrants to Canada, "try
to impress on your Canadian employer how much better we do
things in England, for it will only make him dislike you and
perhaps not care to keep you in his employ. Canadians, too,
often resent criticism of their country or its methods, but you
should remember that they have been working in Canada long
before you were born, and that they are more likely than a
stranger like yourself to know what suits that country
best."[36-3] The American Ambassador, speaking in London in
1913, said "he was asked almost every day by the kindly people
whom he met--and he could not too strongly emphasize the word
'kindly' since he had come to England--how they were getting on
in the United States assimilating the endless hordes of people
from all lands who came to their shores. He did not wish {37} to
boast. He was a humble man from the humblest of countries.
(Laughter.) But he was delighted to assure them that the
Anglo-Saxon, or British, race, who settled the United States
first, shaped its destinies, directed its energies, according to
their conscience, against their own Motherland, and developed
themselves and the great territory which they subdued, to this
day, no matter how many men came from how many lands, still
ruled it and led it. (Cheers.) And there was no time in sight
when that would have changed. Every President of the United
States had been of English or Scottish blood dominantly. Out of
121 mayors of cities only 11 per cent. had names which showed
that they or their predecessors came from countries other than
the United Kingdom. Only 14 per cent. of the representative men
who took part in the government of the United States in the
House of Representatives or the Senate bore foreign names, which
left 86 per cent. who came from the United Kingdom. The
Anglo-Saxon was quite as much the leader of men in the great
Republic as he was in the great United Kingdom. That was not a
boast; it was a natural phenomenon. It was destiny, and they
could not help it if they would. Americans deserved no
particular praise for it. They believed, just as Englishmen
believed, that they were born to rule the world."[37-1] "That
complacency which never deserts a true-born Englishman"[37-2]
speaks wherever a Pan-Angle voice is raised. {38} Foreign
testimony on this point in our character is unanimous, but no
foreigner can demonstrate so vividly the arrogance of our
self-satisfaction as do we in our every act and attitude.
Moreover, what do most of us care about what foreigners think?
Was it not Dr. Johnson who said, "All foreigners are mostly
fools"?[38-1]

As Pan-Angles we are, in short, the cream of the earth. As
Britishers, Americans or Australians we are the cream of the
cream. As Englanders, Missourians, or Queenslanders we are
something even more superlative. As Londoners, St. Louisans, or
Brisbanians,--words fail to express the height of our
self-approval. The Englander says little on the subject but,
like the calm ungainsayable fog of his habitat, simply is. If
called from his high estate to pass judgment, he characterizes
the rest of the world as "beastly peculiar." "Colonials," in
this term he lumps also the inhabitants of the United States,
are to him unfortunates, having "jolly rotten luck to live way
off out there." The American, more nervously pitched, raises his
voice and talks long about his bigness. "You call that a river?"
he indicates the Thames. "Why, if we had a damp streak like that
in one of our fields in Iowa, we'd tile it just to keep from
getting our feet wet crossing." The Australian, conscious that
little attention has been paid him as yet, and conscious too
that his "potentialities" are really great, {39} aggressively
balances a chip for the inspection of critics. His sheep, his
harbour, his apples, his stars--woe to anyone who fails to
acquiesce in their paramount excellence! "And after all," he
sighs, returned from the other fair places of the earth, "after
all, there is only one Sydney."

Such are our local prides, or such at least do they appear in
their most blatant types. "The habit of brag runs through all
classes"[39-1] wherever we live. Those of us who observe the
good form of appearing tolerably meek-minded, are perhaps at
heart no more so. Why, then, do we smile tolerantly at all the
world and take no offence at each other. Because each is
confident of his own place in the sun, and confident too that
the Pan-Angles, although he may not use that term, by virtue of
these very local prides, are one in their desire and
determination to maintain their civilization against all others
who are not of our language and our ways.

An American was one day asked by a cutlery salesman from
Birmingham (England), "Are you not humiliated by having no
national language?" "We have one," was the prompt reply; "it is
English." So would have spoken a Canadian or a Newfoundlander, a
South African, a New Zealander, or an Australian. That is one of
our prides. Our language is ours. It reflects our many-rooted
origins, our varied and severally branched histories, our
constantly converging growths. It binds us to the ideals of our
kind. Its very name takes us in imagination to the infancy of
our race, where {40} from subservience to the wills of others
the individual emerged. "The English have given importance to
individuals, a principal end and fruit of every society. Every
man is allowed and encouraged to be what he is, and is guarded
in the indulgence of his whim. 'Magna Charta,' said Rushworth,
'is such a fellow that he will have no sovereign.' By this
general activity and by this sacredness of individuals, they
have in seven hundred years evolved the principles of freedom.
It is the land of patriots, martyrs, sages and bards, and if the
ocean out of which it emerged should wash it away, it will be
remembered as an island famous for immortal laws, for the
announcement of original right which make the stone tables of
liberty."[40-1] To acknowledge the relation of America to the
land of these struggles and their earliest successes can never
be humiliating. England's past belongs to us all, and to-day
England is one of us. There, was cradled the individualism of
our Teuton forbears that has grown into a civilizing world-wide
domination. We all have helped to nurture and shield it. We are
as seven guardians whose harmony is secured not only because
they are one in aim and method but because being one in language
they are bound into understanding.


The Pan-Angle enjoys the highest standard of living known to any
comparable number of people in the world, either formerly or
to-day. If civilization depends on the margin of wealth above
mere {41} means of existence, Pan-Angles are the most civilized
of the races.

Given a hypothetical community possessed only of such material
resources that all the energies of every member must be used to
provide food and protection from the elements, and there is
presented the lowest possible standard of living. Anything lower
would mean starvation, exposure, and death. Add but ever so
little to those resources, so that some few, still fed and
sheltered, may employ their energies in other ways, and they may
become scientists and prolong the lives of their fellows and
teach them more productive methods of food getting; they may
become artists and poets for the delight and recreation of the
rest; they may devise laws and systems of government to regulate
labour and control wealth; and may develop certain instinctive
cravings into hopeful religions. The community has now taken its
first steps toward what we call civilization. Add further to the
resources, increase the amount of energy that can be spent in
channels other than the maintenance of life, and there is
developed a complex organism, with churches and schools, music
and literature, steam transportation, electric machinery, and
contrivances of many other sorts to make life comfortable,
enjoyable, and inspiring. Between this hypothetical primitive
community and civilization as the Pan-Angles understand it are
many stages, some of them occupied to-day by our neighbours
whose material resources have not increased to the extent of
ours. Now, of all the world, the people having most time and
strength {42} after their physical necessities are secured are
the Pan-Angles.

The per capita wealth and the per capita land holdings of the
Pan-Angles are greater than those of any other comparable number
of people. Their diet is more generous, more costly, and more
varied. Their apparel is more expensive, and their housing more
capacious and more comfortable. They are able to support a
greater number of instructors and entertainers in their writers,
artists, and musicians. Hardly an act of their lives, hardly an
article they use, but has some embellishment not strictly
necessary to life and utility. With all this the Pan-Angles, so
much have they beyond the mere means of existence, furnish
lavishly the pleasures of the so-called "higher life" to their
own souls. They study philosophies and ponder the rights of man;
they support the weak and economically useless with the proceeds
of their own labour. They send of their wealth to other
civilizations, as missionary reports testify, trying to
contribute to their welfare. And with all this spending, they
still have at their disposal such resources that they increase
in numbers from generation to generation, and each generation
has more than the generation before.

The reason for this high standard of living is not far to seek.
We have all this because we have been strong enough to take
land, the source of food and shelter, the basis of all life and
wealth. The Teutons came and took England; the Normans came and
took England; and Pan-Angles since have taken land in every
continent and throughout the seas: from the bleak coast {43} and
rich shore-fisheries of the Labrador to the fertile plains of
the Missouri and the grassy ranges of Otago. In Canada and the
United States for years land was the prize that the country
offered to pioneers, giving thousands of acres in parcels of one
hundred and sixty as long as they lasted. From their land and
sea-coast holdings, the Pan-Angles have taken the yield of fish
and grain and meat; and those who laboured in getting food
produced enough for themselves and for their fellows who were
working in other ways. Besides food, these lands provided many
other of the essentials of the standard of living we desire.

Other lands rich in promise came under the Pan-Angle gaze. Often
there seemed the best of reasons why we should not go and live
there. We thereupon set up additional factories at home and made
cloth and knives above our own demands to send out to those
countries in trade. By working at home in smoky cities we were
able to gather the food and the luxuries we wanted from all
parts of the world. These lands we have taken into our custody
in order to guarantee our trade supremacy. Unproductive spots
here and there, such as Gibraltar, Aden, Singapore, and Hong
Kong, we have been forced to hold to facilitate and protect our
trade. In the main we acquired some very valuable pieces--the
most valuable in sight some of our rivals have thought. We never
know how valuable a place may be, and, conversely, we never
appreciate what a nuisance a place may be until after we have
taken it. Yet, the nuisances we try to turn to useful account.

{44}

Land to occupy or to trade with, the Pan-Angles have been able
to acquire because they were strong. France, Spain, and Holland
wanted North America; the Pan-Angles took it. France wanted New
Zealand and Australia; the Pan-Angles took them. Portugal and
Holland both had ports at Cape Town before the British flag flew
there. And as to dependencies or trade lands, India, Mauritius,
Malacca, Ceylon, the Philippines, were all wrested from other
nations, while hosts of islands in every sea fell undisputedly
to us, only because no other powers felt strong enough to
contest the point. If at any time we had been unable to take
these, we should have been unable to grow and increase our
standard of living to its present degree of comfort. There is
among us to-day a great abhorrence of war. We should like to
abolish it together with pain, death, and all other evils. The
human race has already learned and accomplished much toward that
end. Doubtless more will be revealed. That our presence here,
however, and that of our children to come, is due to the efforts
our fathers displayed, seems evident. Perhaps we ought not to
risk that heritage too lightly.

Not a single Pan-Angle is willing to reduce his race numbers. He
wishes his children to live and to have children in turn. Not a
single Pan-Angle is willing to reduce his standard of living. He
wishes for himself more leisure, more nourishing and cleaner
food, greater safety in all his employments. He wishes to see no
poverty and no discomfort. He is busy passing laws in all his
legislatures to-day in his efforts to attain all this.

What the Pan-Angle has, he got by taking land {45} and making
the best use he knew of it. For years the British Isles alone of
the Pan-Angle nations sent out migrants. For years the British
Isles alone was the manufacturing country, the others growing
food for themselves and for export. The United States is now
sending out migrants; it is likewise sending out less and less
food. Pownall foresaw that "when the field of agriculture shall
be filled up . . . the moment that the progress of civilisation,
carried thus on its natural course, is ripe for it, the branch
of manufactures will take its shoot and will grow and increase
with an astonishing exuberancy."[45-1] The same future doubtless
faces the other five of us. New lands are less easy of
acquisition in these days. We have recently enlarged our
holdings in the neighbourhood of the two poles, but the
opportunities even there grow fewer. Lands are becoming more
thickly populated and better defended. But beyond that, we have
developed certain scruples that our forefathers in their takings
did not know. Only a need equal to theirs will perhaps impel us
to similar exercise of force. That need will not come until our
standard of living is threatened. Colonizing apart, there is
left to us trade; and trade apart, we still have our present
lands to develop to their highest point. This problem of
development is now receiving our best attention. We support
costly bureaus and experiment stations to discover and teach us
the means of so intensively cultivating that we may get the
highest possible yield from our land. We shall not relax these
efforts.

But as we utilize our lands and increase our {46} trade, other
civilizations will be desiring to raise the standards of living
among their increasing populations. They will need more land.
They will covet some of our little-used pieces, Northern Canada
or Northern Australia, lands we mean to develop ourselves. No
Pan-Angle is minded to part with them. Our rivals, as they grow,
will need more trade in order to keep more factories busy to buy
more food. They may covet our markets, so that rice and tea and
rubber from our present possessions may come to them. If at any
time we lose land or trade, by so much must part of our numbers
suffer, must be less well housed, and less well nourished, less
well cared for if sick. No Pan-Angle sees his way to closing up
his factories or to putting himself in a position where he and
his children can build no more. More babies mean a demand for
more food, and we hope to give them more advantages of every
sort. The only way to retain our lands and our trade is to be
strong enough to protect them. There is no cheaper nor more
effective strength than in co-operation.



[22-1] _Whitaker's Almanack_, London, 1913, p. 484: 454,527
British and Irish emigrants left the British Isles in 1911. Of
these 80,770 went to Australasia; 30,767 to South Africa;
184,860 to Britannic North America; and 121,814 to the United
States.

[22-2] A. L. Burt, _Imperial Architects_, Oxford, 1913, pp.
123-124: "In sixty years (1815-1876) eight and a half million
people had emigrated from Great Britain. Of these only three
million settled in the Colonies. The rest went to the United
States. . . ."

[23-1] Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, _Les Etats-Unis au Vingtieme
Siecle,_ Paris, 1904, pp. 25-26.

[23-2] F. H. Giddings, _Democracy and Empire,_ New York, 1900,
pp. 296-297.

[24-1] _Round Table_, London, September 1913, p. 723: "Last year
the United States received immigrants from other countries equal
to three-quarters of one per cent. of the total population. The
influx to Canada was between six and seven per cent. of the
total population."

[27-1] _Boston_ (Massachusetts) _Transcript,_ November 19, 1913:
"Chicago, Nov. 19--Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg address, which
was delivered fifty years ago to-day, was read to-day to the one
million pupils in the public schools of Illinois. Pupils above
the sixth grade had memorized the address and recited it at the
hour at which President Lincoln began his speech. To-night the
speech will be repeated in nearly every night school and social
centre in the State."

[27-2] _Britannica Year Book_, London, 1913, p. 703.

[27-3] _Cf. post,_ p. 81, note 1.

[28-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. ix. p. 597.

[28-2] _Ibid._, vol. ix. p. 594.

[28-3] _Ibid._, vol. ix. p. 596.

[29-1] J. R. Green, _A Short History of the English People_,
London, 1898, vol. ii. p. 934.

[29-2] J. G. Millais, _Newfoundland and its Untrodden Ways_,
London, 1907, p. 339.

[29-3] _Henry VI.,_ Pt. I., Act II., Scene i., line 29. _Cf._
John Bartlett, _Concordance of Shakespeare_, London, 1894--"
Guess."

[30-1] Also Geoffrey Chaucer, "The Canterbury Tales, _(A) _The
Prologue," in _The Complete Works of Geoffrey Chaucer_, W. W.
Skeat ed., Oxford, 1894, vol. iv., line 82: "Of twenty yeer of
age he was, I gesse." _Ibid._, line 117: "A forster was he,
soothly, as I gesse."

[33-1] The world contains one hundred and sixty million
English-speaking people, according to _Whitaker's Almanack_,
London, 1913, p. 99. Of the one hundred and twenty millions
computed to have been under the control of the Roman Empire only
a portion spoke Latin.

[33-2] _The Outlook_, New York, August 9, 1913: "Four new words
are added to the English language every day, if we may accept
the dictionaries as a standard of measurement. During the last
three centuries the rate of growth of the dictionaries has been
1500 words a year. In 1616 John Bullokar . . . published his
_Compleat English Dictionary_, with 5080 words. . . . There are
now in fact 600,000 English words, but about one-quarter of this
number are rare scientific terms or words that are obsolete or
obsolescent." Cf. _Boston_ (Massachusetts) _Transcript_, May 28,
1913, Franklin Clarklin, "A Supreme Court of the Language ":
"This year will see the issue of an English language dictionary
containing 450,000 words. It is said that the largest German
dictionary including personal words has 300,000 words, a French
one 210,000 words, a Russian and an Italian 140,000 words each,
and a Spanish 120,000 words."

[34-1] _Manchester_ (England) _Guardian_, March 24, 1913.

[35-1] John Bigelow, _The Complete Works of Benjamin Franklin_,
New York, 1888, vol. x, pp. 177-178.

[35-2] R. W. Emerson, _English Traits_, 1856, Boston reprint,
1894, p.287.

[35-3] Albert Pitot, _T' Eylandt Mauritius_, 1598-1710,
Port-Louis, Ile Maurice, 1905, p. 178.

[36-1] J. B. Crocker, ed., _England in 1815, as Seen by a Young
Boston Merchant_: Being the Reflections and Comments of Joseph
Ballard on a Trip through Great Britain in the year of Waterloo,
Boston, 1913, p. 22.

[36-2] Arnold Haultain, _Goldwin Smith His Life and Opinions_,
London, p. 162.

[36-3] Quoted, _The Times_ Weekly Edition, London, October 17,
1913.

[37-1] _The Times_ Weekly Edition, London, July 25, 1913.
Account of Anglo-Saxon Club Dinner, July 18, 1913.

[37-2] R. W. Emerson, _English Traits_, 1856, Boston reprint,
1894, p. 280. Cf. _ibid._, p. 145: "An English lady on the Rhine
hearing a German speaking of her party as foreigners, exclaimed,
'No, we are not foreigners; we are English; it is you that are
foreigners.'

[38-1] _Cf._ Price Collier, _England and the English_, London,
1911, p.359.

[39-1] R.W. Emerson, _English Traits_, 1856, Boston reprint,
1894, p.145.

[40-1] R. W. Emerson, _English Traits_, 1856, Boston reprint,
1894, p.291.

[45-1] C. A. W. Pownall, _Thomas Pownall_, London, 1908, p. 401.




{47}

III

INDIVIDUALISM


The individualism of the Pan-Angles is rooted in our earliest
struggles for personal liberty, and its first successes were won
far beyond the confines of known history. The institutions in
which it is expressed we trace back through English to Teuton
practices, where they are lost from sight. How they have been
modified and enlarged since, and what we have wrought under the
impulse of this dominant characteristic is abundantly recorded.
It is the mainspring of all our achievement.

The Pan-Angles collectively are conservative and slow to move.
They respect tradition and law, and break with the past less
easily than more volatile peoples. The individual Pan-Angle, on
the other hand, makes often his own law, disregarding and
outrunning the law of his group. It is a trait we approve; the
Robin Hoods ashore and the Drakes afloat have our sympathy, as
well as often our gratitude for the substantial gifts their
individual enterprise has left us. No theory, no agreed-upon
plan has led us in our various endeavours, but always the
success of some man who went that way on his own. Adventurers
have gone out across trackless land or water wastes, and we have
followed with our commerce and settlers. {48} Idealists have
gone questing for religious or civil liberty, and we, guided by
their footprints, draw bills of rights, reform our property
laws, and our suffrage, and remove religious disabilities.

From less than sixty thousand our holdings have increased to
more than sixteen million square miles,[48-1] through the spirit
of individual men. Each acquisition presents similar features. A
Pan-Angle wanders off and finds something he wishes. He takes
it. Sometimes he calls on the homestayers for aid. Sometimes
they give it; often not. Seven times the British Isles refused
to acknowledge that the British flag flew over New
Zealand;[48-2] and the Queenslanders, who in 1883 raised the
Britannic colours in New Guinea, were ordered from London to
lower them again.[48-3] The pioneer puts the best he has into
the struggle, for far from being an altruist with one eye on a
grateful posterity, he is fighting for his own valued
possession, whether it be land, the right to trade, or to
collect copra in comfort. If there is room for more than one,
and the chance of success promising, other adventurous
individuals join him. Together they at last attract the ear of
the home government which, if induced to interfere, does so to
protect the interests of its citizens--or subjects, as the case
may be--from outside encroachment. The sway of the Pan-Angles
has thus been {49} extended-a little.[49-1] The next little will
be added in a similar manner. No one plans for it, but in some
opportune moment the leader arises.

In some cases elaborately organized companies with directors and
stockholders seem to take the place of the individual. That is
only seeming. Whether it be the East India Company, or the
Hudson's Bay Company, or the British South Africa Company, there
is always a Rhodes at the heart of it. And half of its success
in the end depends on agents who take their own counsel and work
by themselves, thereby extending their company's power, as the
company extends the nation's. That this character was recognized
from the beginning witnesses the Royal Charter granted "the
Governor and Company of Adventurers of England trading into
Hudson's Bay."[49-2]

Of the men who failed to make good, who could not take what they
wanted, we hear little. Their dreaming and daring, their
judgment and fortitude, are their own affair; they are part of
the unenlisted legion our individualism has produced. A
sympathetic editor in America writes as follows of a young
English individualist in Somaliland: "Richard Conyngham Corfield
. . . was stationed in one of the most inaccessible and
undesirable of Britain's many wild lands. He hoped to make a
name for himself, to conquer a little empire of his own and
restore it to his country, to humiliate the Mad Mullah who had
humiliated England, and to earn promotion. So, on his own
responsibility, he {50} led his little army against the fanatic
horde of the Mullah. The spirit of adventure moved him as it
moved the heroes of the early days of British empire building.
He lost, as many another adventurer has lost; had he won he
would have been remembered for some time. But, having lost all,
even his name will be forgotten within a twelvemonth."[50-1]

Extended holdings in personal liberty have been won for us by
this same individualism. A cargo of tea was stolen and
maliciously destroyed, and now Pan-Angles feel certain they have
the right to vote their own taxes. The city of Birmingham,
England, in 1819, elected a representative to the Parliament of
the British Isles, in which it was allowed no
representation.[50-2] In 1832 a Reform Bill gave them and all
their neighbours a share in parliamentary legislation. John
Brown was hanged for "treason, and conspiring and advising with
slaves and other rebels, and murder in the first degree."[50-3]
But within four years slavery had been abolished in the United
States, and every school child in America for years gave vocal
testimony that, while their hero's body lay "a-mouldering in the
grave," his soul went "marching on."

With individualism goes self-reliance--having these we are also
self-sufficient. We want our ways of doing things, and are ready
to sacrifice a great deal to get them, for we know our ways are
right. We want room in which to express ourselves. Daniel Boone
left his Kentucky home {51} when a neighbour moved to within
twenty miles of him, because the country was becoming too
thickly settled. Others like him trudged mile by mile across the
whole North American continent.[51-1] With them went Pan-Angle
women.[51-2] In the conflict for the possession of North
America, the Pan-Angles won. They were still of true British
blood, while the French were largely Indian.[51-3] The French
had adapted themselves to the country, while the Pan-Angles had
adapted the country to themselves. Arrived after successive
generations at the Pacific Coast they were still Pan-Angles with
their essential characteristics unchanged. In the back-blocks of
New Zealand and Australia, and the table-lands of Rhodesia, men
of the same type are living to-day. If their individualism is
intensified and in their own opinion improved, it is because
they have plenty of room. The pushing American is but the
individual Britisher let loose in a larger field. These men may
be described in the words Pownall used of the Americans: "An
unabated application of the powers of individuals and a
perpetual struggle of their spirits sharpens their wits and
gives constant training to the mind. . . . This turn of
character, which in the ordinary {52} occurrences of life is
called _inquisitiveness_, and which, when exerted about trifles
goes even to a degree of ridicule in many instances, is yet, in
matters of business and commerce, a most useful and efficient
talent."[52-1] An Australian, as he describes himself, in his
roomiest of our nations, "is little other than a transplanted
Briton, with the essential characteristics of his British
forbears, the desire for freedom from restraint, however, being
perhaps more strongly accentuated."[52-2]

With all his individualism the Pan-Angle has a gift for
combining. He would rather act alone. But when desirous of
results he cannot obtain by himself, he is not afraid of uniting
with his fellows. In order to combine effectively, mutual
confidence is necessary. We have that trust ability. Indeed, we
use the very word "trust" to designate in popular parlance
certain combinations: "the money trust," "the labour trust," and
the multitudinous other smaller and lesser combinations, down to
the facetiously referred to "plumbers' trust," which all appear
huge in direct proportion to the distance of the spectator.
Viewed with the eye of the insider, such aggregations of capital
and power are merely the co-operations of many individuals to
produce results--it may be the building of a railroad or the
distribution of a food--that no one could accomplish alone. It
has been the outsider who objected to their power. To our
combinations in the matter of government few of us object, {53}
because we all are insiders. Much of our progress in the path of
individual freedom has come through combining.

The barons combined to secure Magna Carta. New Zealanders use
their government (the combination at their disposal) to remedy
injustices against their individual members.[53-1] The thirteen
American states, each bristling with a sense of individualism,
recognized that they could secure this precious possession only
through joining together. Benjamin Franklin had voiced their
situation earlier, when he said: "If we do not hang together, we
shall hang separate." Their first attempt at combination had to
be discarded because they were not hanging together firmly
enough. But from 1789 to 1914, their second effort has exhibited
to the world the largest voluntary political association as yet
seen, proving a new method of adjusting local needs and
differences. It has succeeded in so much that it has bound
together a nation, or an assemblage of nations {54} now
numbering forty-eight, in security and prosperity, while
retaining to each individual locality and to each citizen a fair
share of the liberties for which the race has long been
striving.

While these political combinations are guarding our
individualism they are at the same time dependent upon it.
"England expects her navy will do its duty," was not the signal
Nelson hoisted on the _Victory_. His appeal was to "every man."
"Keep cool and obey orders," admonished Dewey at Manila,
recognizing that in the intelligent self-subordination of each
member of each crew lay the strength of his fleet.


The individualism of the Pan-Angle forms the keynote of all his
theories and practices as to government. He wants to attend to
his own affairs. He prefers to give personal attention to the
making and administering of laws. In so far as it seems
impossible or impracticable to do this, he has recourse to the
best alternative, and wishes someone representing him to attend
in his stead to those matters. This representative is often
limited in power by written instructions from his principal, and
provision is made in some cases for the revision of the agent's
acts by the same ultimate power. And to whatever extent changing
circumstances make again feasible the personal participation of
the individual, to that extent he dispenses with the services of
his deputy. Here is the whole story of government among the
Pan-Angles.

Early accounts of the Germanic tribes tell us {55} that the
freemen assembled to determine matters of public concern, and
there each in person gave his opinion and assented or dissented
to the opinions of others. This was a simple presentative
government: each man presenting himself at the meeting or moot,
and speaking in his own interests. Laws were made, and leaders
or kings chosen and deposed. Only lesser questions were for the
chiefs, the important questions were for the community.[55-1]

As the areas having common interests widened, not all the men
who had the right found it convenient to attend the assembly.
They might still present themselves at some local gathering, a
town meeting, or a burgh meeting, within range of their
travelling powers, but to the more general assembly only the
great and strong were able to go. There grew up the practice,
too, that summons should be sent out, inviting to the assembly.
This worked to discourage the full attendance of all who
formerly had the right to come. The Witenagamot or Witan,
gathering of wise men, is the name by which this early
legislative body was known.

In 1068 all the landowners of England repaired to a great
assembly at Salisbury to swear fealty to William the Conqueror.
Part of them were summoned personally, and in time came to claim
a right to a summons to succeeding assemblies. In these they
were more or less powerful according to the nature of the king,
and more than once extorted from him charters of rights,
re-establishing or enlarging their ancient privileges. For two
centuries {56} they participated in the form of electing kings.
The vast multitude, however, the "land-sitting men," were
summoned to Salisbury in a body, and for that occasion only, and
gradually lost all right of personal attendance at later
assemblies.[56-1]

Meanwhile the Angles and Saxons and their Teutonic kindred had
long--even before leaving the continent--been familiar with the
idea of representation.[56-2] Free men might be appointed or
selected, not necessarily by vote, to attend a moot, including
several towns or burghs, with authority to act there in the name
of their fellows. And when, after the Norman Conquest, the
people had sufficiently recovered themselves to be able to
refuse taxes levied without their consent, the natural method of
giving or withholding that consent was through representatives.

If the king wanted money, he might ask the lords and bishops who
were present and could speak for themselves in his councils, but
he must ask also the people who, unable to present themselves in
a vast body, were represented by some one who spoke for them.

King John in 1213 bids "discreet men" from each shire come to
Oxford,[56-3] and his son Henry III. in 1254 issues a writ
requiring "to cause to come before the King's Council two good
and discreet Knights of the Shire, whom the men of the county
{57} shall have chosen for this purpose in the stead of all and
of each of them, to consider along with the knights of other
shires what aid they will grant the king."[57-1] In a similar
writ of 1295 the term "to be elected" is first used instead of
the less specific instruction "chosen."[57-2] The word
representative, to describe such a person "chosen" or "elected"
"with full and sufficient power _for themselves and for the
community_"[57-3] was not yet in use. It appears in print in
Cromwell's time,[57-4] and was then possibly new political
jargon.

The council so composed developed into the British Parliament,
that name coming into use for it in 1275.[57-5] With the king it
was for years the law-making power of the British Isles. The
peers held their seats in the House of Lords by personal right,
as did the wise men of the Witenagamot.[57-6] They acted on
their own account, and were responsible to no one. The members
of the House of Commons held their seats by no personal right,
but as representatives of a large body of commoners {58} who
could not all attend. They were chosen for this purpose, and
derived authority from the people who employed them. The king in
his own right gave or withheld his sanction to the measures
agreed upon by the two houses. It followed that the king and
peers had no vote for representatives in Parliament, as, being
present to act for themselves, they needed none.

The character of the law-making power has gradually altered.
Since the days of Queen Anne no sovereign has attempted to veto
a bill passed by Parliament.[58-1] Since 1834 no sovereign has
dismissed a ministry,[58-2] nor has he formed one,[58-3] and the
ministry has come to be responsible to the representative branch
of Parliament alone. From 1835 to 1911 the presentative branch
was purely a revising chamber.[58-4] Since 1911 it has been
permitted to delay only, but not to prevent, the passing of a
law desired by the representative branch, Parliament becoming
thus in essence unicameral. The king and the lords hold
positions of great historical and sentimental value; their
personal influence may be as great as they can make it. The
House of Commons, however, is now the sole power of legislation
in the British Isles. It is hence fair to say that the
presentative element is negligible in the national government of
the British Isles.

Across the Atlantic went the developing political structures of
the Pan-Angles. The colonists, in the simplicity of their social
organization, approached early Teuton conditions. They {59} had
the benefit, however, of all the experience the race had
accumulated since that time. In New England from the earliest
settlement till to-day the town meeting has been at the basis of
government. It is the folk moot flourishing in new soil, and
with the House of Lords (as it existed till 1911) could claim
descent from the presentative government of our political
forbears in the German forests. Of Virginia it is written that
in "1619 a House of Assembly 'broke out' in the colony . . .
then just twelve years old. In that Assembly we see the
_first-born child of the British Parliament_, the eldest
brother, so to speak, of the legislatures of the United States
and of the English colonies of to-day. This Assembly was
composed of a council and a body of twenty-two representatives
from the eleven plantations, elected by the freeholders,
imposing taxes and passing laws, meeting either annually or at
frequent intervals."[59-1] In this manner were our notions of
representative government transplanted.

A representative is not necessarily chosen by the people he
represents.[59-2] In the early parliamentary days he often was
not, but was arbitrarily appointed by the king. Since then the
people have taken upon themselves the right of designating who
is to represent them, and an increasingly large number of any
given community has gained participation in that right. In some
cases the people have arranged to make their choice indirectly.
An example is the election prior to 1913 of United States
senators by the people of the {60} state, but through the state
legislature; another, is the appointment of the upper house, as
in New Zealand, by the elected members of the lower house. But
as evidence of the people's wish to keep control over their
representatives, one may note the agitation for direct election
in both these cases, and the virtual direct election of senators
in some states of the United States, even before the Seventeenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States came into
force in 1913.[60-1]

There are certain difficulties attendant upon representation.
The agent may fail truly to represent, and the Pan-Angle people
are constantly seeking to devise and perfect methods of
minimizing this difficulty. One means toward that end has been
sets of written instructions called constitutions,[60-2] adopted
by the people and set over their representatives. The written
Constitution of the United States and those of its original
thirteen states were early edicts of the people restricting the
power of the people's representatives. In the political talk of
our times we find persistently recurring the words initiative,
referendum, and recall.[60-3] What success will attend the
movements for which they stand, movements which merely extend or
return to ancient practices, it is too early to say. But the
thing that is plain is that these are all efforts of the people
to exercise their right to govern themselves presentatively,
because they {61} think representation in present practice not
entirely satisfactory.

Once presentative government over even a comparatively small
area was impracticable because of the time necessary to cover
distances. Now the results of an election involving millions of
voters and extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific can be
known a few hours after the closing of the polls. Burke thought
the two months' sailing between Great Britain and America an
insuperable obstacle to joint representation, although Franklin
and Pownall disagreed with him.[61-1] Such is our speed of
travel to-day that representatives from every Pan-Angle nation
could reach North America in less than a month. Not only that,
but thanks to electricity, a referendum could be held all over
the Pan-Angle countries to-day as successfully as the town
meeting was held a hundred years ago. And the decisions it
reached would be known throughout the world in a fraction of the
time that was needed for the deliberations of the Witan to reach
the outskirts of the kingdom.

In what proportion the governments of the seven nations are
presentative and in what proportion representative, it would be
difficult to tell. Easy it is, however, to recognize these forms
everywhere. Whether it is the adult population of New Zealand
balloting on national prohibition; the men of a New England town
meeting voting its school appropriation; or the members of the
House of Lords discussing federation within the British
Isles--we have a purely presentative bit of {62} governing. If
it is the representatives of an Australian state voting on a
minimum wage bill; the members of the British House of Commons
passing a compulsory insurance act; or those of a Canadian
provincial legislative assembly voting to exclude Asiatics, the
principle is identical. Government in these cases is
representative.

The tendency is towards an increase in the presentative element,
as is evidenced by growing popular control. Not only our laws
but our forms of government show this. The Pan-Angle notion of
an executive at the time the first colonies were forming was
drawn from a kingship which then meant a permanent tenure of
office. The president of the United States who holds office for
a fixed length of time was created after that model. He
represents, but once elected cannot be recalled.[62-1] In the
British Isles changes have come about, and the prime minister
who now wields executive power can be recalled any day by the
people speaking indirectly through their representatives,
popular opinion swaying his party adherents to relinquish their
efforts in his support.[62-1] In this respect the British Isles
organization has proved more sensitive than the American to the
spirit of the times.[62-2]

In our governments various individuals and classes, or what
would in modern days be called "interests," struggle for
supremacy. When a minority is successful we dub it aristocracy
or privilege. At one time the king was the privileged minority.
In 1215 the barons attacked the {63} privilege of this minority;
the king asked to have the matter arbitrated by a third party.
The barons, who apparently understood something about
arbitration, refused. They also refused to give any assurance of
their own good behaviour; Magna Carta was a check on the king
only. Moreover "Magna Carta can hardly be said to have
introduced any new ideas. As Pollock and Maitland (_History of
English Law_) say 'on the whole the charter contains little that
is absolutely new. It is restorative.'" [63-1] Since then many
aristocrats have enjoyed special privileges: certain churches,
certain forms of industry, holders of certain kinds of property.
Against all these in turn the levelling force of democracy has
been hurled. It can be said in general that we are travelling,
though with a wise conservatism, away from the aristocratic to
the democratic, by which is meant that privileges are becoming
more seldom to the few and power more usual to the many.
Democracy, it seems likely, is to be our common future. But, in
the meanwhile, the present stage of all our governments may
truly be said to be representative action with presentative
sanction.


Allied to the question of government is that of suffrage. While
all are subject to the government {64} of the land, only some
take active part in determining what it shall be. And here,
again, the individualism of the Pan-Angles is an insistent
factor. Voters, whether so presentatively or representatively,
have been in our past one of the privileged minorities--all
individuals reckoned. They are so still. But by constantly
receiving into their ranks bodies of newly enfranchised persons,
they bid fair to become the majority. Social, religious,
property, and educational disqualifications long kept many men
from the suffrage. Many of these disabilities have been
abandoned, some in all places, others in some places only. Sex
alone has kept many from voting. This disqualification has been
in places and in some respects removed. Whatever one may believe
as to the wisdom of entrusting the ballot to the few or to the
many, it has long seemed evident that the race was advancing
toward universal adult male suffrage. Now many would say instead
that the goal is universal adult suffrage.

On our respective paths toward this goal our various electoral
units mark various stages of progress. Identical voting
qualifications may be found half a world apart, while
neighbouring groups differ. No two probably agree in every
slight detail, though the range of dissimilarity is narrow.
Certain property and educational tests are not infrequent,
especially in the older Pan-Angle organizations. The newer ones,
as a rule, are the more democratic. Women hold suffrage
privileges in at least some respects very extensively, the newer
communities again being more liberal in this. Plural voting
obtains in the British Isles. {65} These local differences
produce no confusion, but keep our progress orderly.

Of the United States it has been said, "There is a great
advantage in having different State governments try different
experiments in the enactment of laws and in governmental
policies, so that a State less prone to accept novel and untried
remedies may await their development by States more enterprising
and more courageous. The end is that the diversity of opinion in
State governments enforces a wise deliberation and creates a
_locus poenitentiae_ which may constitute the salvation of the
Republic."[65-1] Equally might this have been stated of the
effect of the diversity of opinion in the Pan-Angle units on the
progress of the whole civilization.

In no regard more than in the question of suffrage, is seen the
value and need of local option. It permits progress in whatever
respect progress is possible, and prevents the misfortunes that
accompany attempts to force progress where the time and
conditions are not ripe for it. Through the exercise of local
option the suffrage has been constantly extended, a bit here and
a bit there, throughout Pan-Angle countries without seriously
affecting our political stability. Any attendant shock is
confined within narrow boundaries.[65-2] If Texas and Vermont,
Tasmania and South Australia, Transvaal and Cape Province have
different suffrage {66} requirements, it is because they differ
in history and composition and hence in needs. The desires of
their inhabitants could not be satisfied by a single law. To
seek to establish one would be to estrange all and satisfy none.

The question of <DW64> suffrage is in point. The northern states
of America, where the <DW64>s were comparatively few and were to
some degree at least educated, felt favourably toward <DW64>
suffrage. After the Civil War the northern voters, acting
through the central government, were able to give the vote to
the <DW64>, not only within their own borders but throughout the
country. The results were most unfortunate. The Pan-Angle
population of the southern states thereby lost their local
autonomy. The men most fit to govern in these states were forced
in self-defence to become law-breakers. It took many years to
undo the mistake and re-establish there the will of the
Pan-Angle community. Through the intelligence of the South in
framing legislation, and the forbearance of the North in not
overriding this legislation, it is now adequately accomplished.
"Hitherto, no amount of legal ingenuity has sufficed to extract
from the United States supreme court a direct, straightforward
decision on the constitutionality of the 'grandfather' clauses
in the election laws of many states, whereby the <DW64> voters
have been disfranchised. The court has invariably disposed of
cases designed to test the constitutionality of such laws on
technical grounds."[66-1] South Africa, when the subject arose
in Constitutional Convention, {67} was wiser. No part overruled
another part. "In respect of the admission, of natives to the
parliamentary franchise the practice of the Cape Colony was in
direct conflict with that of the remaining colonies. As no
agreement on the question of the admission or non-admission of
natives to the Union franchise could be reached, the Convention
decided that the franchise qualifications existing in the
several colonies should stand as the franchise qualifications
for the Union Parliament in the respective provinces of the
Union. As the result of this compromise, while the native voters
in the Cape Province obtained the Union franchise, practically
no natives were admitted to this privilege in the remaining
three provinces."[67-1] With certain temporary limitations,
provision is made for the elimination of the vote of the
 inhabitants of Cape Province.[67-2] It is now generally
acknowledged that no community of Pan-Angles is to be forced to
accept as voters those whom it considers non-assimilable.


Our law, like our language, has flowed from many sources and has
been subjected to foreign influence. The colonists carried out
with them the English common law, the sources of which "have
been stated to be 'as undiscoverable as those of the
Nile.'"[67-3] Quite different from this is the common law of
Scotland, "based on the principles {68} of the Roman Civil and
Canon law as applied and modified by a long series of statutes
of the Scots Parliament and decisions of the Scottish courts.
. . . A detailed comparison of the differences between the
private law of England and Scotland would involve a survey of
the whole domain of jurisprudence and would be the work of a
lifetime;"[68-1] From 1642 to 1652 occurred the English Civil
War, followed by the Commonwealth. In those stormy years which
seem, as writes an Australian jurist, "to have anticipated
almost every effort of modern political thought, scarcely any
cry was more persistently raised by the reform party than the
cry for reform of the law. It was the first great period of
conscious law reform."[68-2] All the Pan-Angle nations, save
only the British Isles and Newfoundland, had the stress of that
period reflected in the history of their settlements, or were
founded after the results of that war had been produced.

In the new countries the legal influence was predominantly
British, but in some parts the colonists encountered communities
of Europeans of other civilizations and of other legal theories.
In Quebec and Louisiana they met French law; in western United
States, Spanish; and in South Africa, a form of Roman-Dutch.
Being elements in civilizations which only gradually have
blended into that of the Pan-Angles, these laws have in greater
or less measure survived. But in such {69} localities slowly the
foreign law merges into that of the local Pan-Angles. As an
example we have South Africa: "The local Dutch statute law was
abandoned perforce as obsolescent, and replaced almost entirely
by local enactments based upon the existing circumstances of the
colony or founded upon English statutes, and the Roman-Dutch
common law, broadly speaking, came to be administered
concurrently with English common law. Nor was it surprising
that, with judges and advocates alike versed in the decisions
and practice of the English Courts, English principles were more
and more closely woven into the fabric of the Colonial law. And
apart from the influence of the 'case-law,' thus built up
through the Colonial Reports, circumstances--or rather its
greater capacity to satisfy the conditions of modern life--gave
the regulation of the field of commercial intercourse almost
exclusively to English law."[69-1] A like story might be told of
French law in Louisiana. In other instances, where perhaps it
receives no official recognition, non-English law has doubtless
had its effect on what may be loosely called Pan-Angle law. As
long as it suits the people and their needs better, so long a
law exists regardless of its origin. But experience shows that
the law of any Pan-Angle nation tends to conform to the
practices of our whole civilization.

Because the English common law forms so large an element, and
because it has among us been modified only by English-speaking
people, the Pan-Angle law, though drawn from many sources, {70}
still presents a certain homogeneity. "An English barrister
 . . . when once he enters an American court, or begins debating
legal questions with American lawyers, . . . knows that he is
not abroad, but at home; he breathes again the legal atmosphere
to which he is accustomed. The law of America, he finds, is the
law of England carried across the Atlantic, and little changed
even in form. In all legal matters it is the conservatism, not
the changeableness, of Americans which astonishes an English
observer. Old names and old formulas meet us in every law court.
Some twenty-six years ago there were to be found in Chicago in
daily use forms of pleading which had long become obsolete in
England."[70-1]

It is in our common tendencies, however, that the legal
attitudes of the seven nations show most striking accord. Jenks,
quoted earlier, concludes that we are in favour of uniformity,
simplicity, greater freedom of the individual, and more fluidity
of capital and labour, so much so, that "The courts will not
even enforce effectively a contract of service. To do that, it
is said, would be to legalize slavery, and the fact that the
slave has become such by his own act makes no difference. It is
considered that the perfect spontaneity of labour is of more
value than the sacredness of contract."[70-2] Further than this,
actual legislation repeats itself in the many Pan-Angle
law-making bodies. The British Isles, {71} Massachusetts, New
Zealand, and Australia test the merits or demerits of a minimum
wage law. Compulsory insurance, old age pensions, maternity
benefits, and arbitration statutes spring up everywhere. In
efforts to solve some problems one part of the Pan-Angles leads;
in others another part. Whether this is regarded as reform or
experimentation is not under present discussion. The whole
Pan-Angle civilization appears headed towards what is called by
some social amelioration and by others paternalism. Whatever its
true name, this race progress starts from a greater recognition
of the individual and hopes for his greater comfort and welfare.

Of law among the Pan-Angles it may be said that it shows plainly
its relation to English common law; that it is affected by local
conditions resulting from historical causes; that it exhibits
certain common tendencies, and among those is a regard for the
individual and a passing from the viewpoint of status to that of
contract.


All this can be seen in the laws regarding marriage and divorce.
These, as well as our prejudices in such matters, are still
largely determined by the dead hand of the Middle Ages. But the
Teutonic ideal of the equality of the marriage partnership has
survived the accumulation of dogma. Our release from its grip
has not depended on the divorce of an English king, nor the
accompanying religious schism. There is in us that which was
destined to carry us up through the pains of changing social
conditions to more satisfactory relations between the husband
and the wife and society.

{72}

In our efforts to attain our ideals we are using many local
laws. The British Isles have three: English, Scottish, and
Irish. If the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man were
considered, there would be six. Besides this, members of the
royal family are subject to special restrictions. Newfoundland
and New Zealand have marriage laws of their own. Canada has
eleven, the Union of South Africa has four, and Australia
six.[72-1] In the United States there are forty-eight. This
makes a total of seventy-four sets of laws in the seven
self-governing nations regarding who may marry and divorce and
how.

These seventy-four different sets are not, however, strange and
dissimilar. As in the case of suffrage, each one has many points
identical with many others, and the range of variation is small.
All are monogamous; all allow freedom of choice to the marrying
parties; all hold marriage and divorce to be civil matters, and
consider ministers and priests of religious denominations as
civil officials for the legalizing of marriages. All prohibit
marriage within certain degrees of relationship, the tendency
being not to include among them the relationship-by-marriage
impediments surviving from medieval practice, such as the
various deceased spouse's brother or sister laws. The majority
allow divorce, although in some, like Newfoundland and South
Carolina, marriage is by law indissoluble. The trend at present
seems to be towards safe-guarding marriage, but to make easier
the means of divorce. Men and women are coming more {73} nearly
to an equality before the law. Such enactments as that of New
South Wales permitting a husband and wife to contract
financially with each other shows the trend of our beliefs in
the rights of any individual to be a distinct personality.

The sacred beauty of the marriage tie no people hold higher than
do the Pan-Angles. With them it is not a status imposed from
without, but the voluntary union of two individuals. John Stuart
Mill voiced an aspiration of the entire Pan-Angle civilization
when he wrote: "What marriage may be in the case of two persons
of cultivated faculties, identical in opinions and purposes,
between whom there exists that best kind of equality, similarity
of powers and capacities with reciprocal superiority in them--so
that each can enjoy the luxury of looking up to the other, and
can have alternately the pleasure of leading and of being led in
the path of development--I will not attempt to describe. To
those who can conceive it, there is no need; to those who
cannot, it would appear the dream of an enthusiast. But I
maintain, with the profoundest conviction, that this, and this
only, is the ideal of marriage; . . . "[73-1]


In no sphere is the individualism of the Pan-Angle more rampant
than in matters of religion. Liberty of conscience to him is as
necessary as liberty of body, and he has struggled to obtain it
with the same persistency.

Once the status of nationality carried with it {74} automatic
inclusion in the national church. A diversity of faiths in one
nation was unthinkable. Any who refused to conform, in semblance
at least, were considered by the group as outsiders and enemies,
to be harried and pillaged, perhaps slaughtered. Later, though
leave to live was granted to those of minority creeds, they were
debarred from the exercise of certain civil privileges. In the
British Isles, not until 1858 were Jews able to take oaths as
members of the Houses of Parliament. Still later, though all
might share equally in the duties and rights of citizenship, all
were compelled to contribute directly or, indirectly to the
support of the state church, and, unless openly avowing
otherwise, were presumed to belong to it. Some Pan-Angles still
linger in this stage--those, for example, who reside in Quebec
or England. This is the significance of the state church to-day.

To the majority of the Pan-Angles, however, religion is a
private matter--not a public matter. In short, it is a concern
in which the majority are not to interfere with the minority and
in which the minority are not asked to acquiesce in the feelings
of the majority. This is a condition not easily achieved.
Migration from the British Isles by no means ended all
contention. "Everywhere, indeed, that British settlers went this
strife of sects went with them."[74-1] Six out of the seven
nations were founded after our British predecessors had begun
the battle for religious freedom. All six have known state
churches in one form or {75} another, sometimes with attendant
persecutions. To-day five thrive without state churches. Even in
Quebec and England taxation for the benefit of one's neighbour's
church is the only penalty against free worshipping. Elsewhere,
throughout the Pan-Angle world, one may hold any creed he will,
and the state does not ask him to contribute to any church, nor
does the state assist, or recognize one creed above another.

In certain places, notably portions of the United States,
individualism in religion goes to extremes. In 1906 there were
estimated to be in that country one hundred and eighty-six
different kinds of Protestant churches,[75-1] some of them
approaching the bizarre in character, others so like one another
that the differences which divided them were scarcely
discernible. Certain denominations were known only in very
circumscribed areas.[75-2] There may be a certain extravagance
in maintaining the large amount of equipment necessary for so
many establishments. Apart from that, however, there seems to be
no objection to the multitudinousness of American faiths that is
not more than balanced by the benefits to the individual from
free self-expression.


"After God had carried us safe to _New England_, and wee had
builded our houses, provided necessaries for our livelihood,
rear'd convenient places for {76} Gods worship, and setled the
Civill Government: One of the next things we longed for, and
looked after was to advance _Learning_ and perpetuate it to
Posterity; dreading to leave an illiterate Ministery to the
Churches, when our present Ministers shall lie in the
Dust."[76-1] So runs an account of the founding of one of the
Pan-Angle universities as it was written in 1643. In a near-by
city a public library was later established. On the building
that shelters it to-day are inscribed these sentences: "The
Commonwealth requires the education of the people as the
safeguard of order and liberty," and "Built by the people and
dedicated to the advancement of learning." Over the door are the
words: "Free to all."

Here is evidenced the attitude of one early colony toward
education, and it is typical of all. Education, education free
to all, education compulsory on all, is the ideal in each of the
six new nations. Free instruction is in some places offered to a
child from the age of three, when he enters kindergarten, to any
age at which he wishes to attend the university. For certain
years, very generally six to fourteen, attendance at school is
compulsory. There is no discrimination in regard to sex, and the
classes are frequently co-educational. Parents are in the main
allowed to send children to private and church schools when
these are of satisfactory excellence; though in many places no
such exist, and no stigma is in any way attached to the
acceptance of free education. In many places no other sort has
ever been dreamed of.

The British Isles meanwhile have not been {77} insensible to the
same impulses. If popular education there has seemed to lag
behind that of the younger nations, it is because the British
Isles had not so free a field for change. There, a more complex
social structure, and a tradition that envelops every department
of life, interfere with the movement that would cast aside the
old and adopt the new. Reforms must go slowly under such
conditions, but the opportunity for education for all is there
now an accomplished fact. In 1832 began the history of state
education in the British Isles.[77-1] To-day elementary
education is compulsory between the ages of five and
fourteen,[77-2] and free, if one desires to take it so. Since
1902 public grants to secondary schools have opened their doors
to certain numbers of non-paying pupils. The differences between
the educational systems of the British Isles and those of the
other English-speaking nations can now be said to be differences
of method or degree only, but not of spirit.

Throughout our civilization, education opens the way to
achievement, "the only real patent of nobility in the modern
world."[77-3] The success or failure of the group is known to
depend on the individual. He holds the ballot, makes the laws,
enforces them; his religion is part of the faith of the land and
determines the character of its composite; his ideals of
marriage are expressed in the practice of the race. Organization
and a few picked men do not control our destinies. To {78}
ensure the future of the group we educate our citizens. We
"advance _Learning_ and perpetuate it to Posterity" so that
wisdom may be heard in our councils, and that ballots may
register considered judgments.


As individualists the Pan-Angles have come to their present
state. As individualists they must continue to work out their
destiny. The right they prize most is the right to develop
further in individualism. That right will be secured to
Pan-Angles only when they have cause to fear no human power.



[48-1] Modern England, 50,916 square miles, and all Pan Angle
nations and their dependencies, 16,897,126. See _post_, p. 81,
note 1.

[48-2] _Round Table_, London, February 1911, p. 207: "1817,
1823, 1825, 1828, 1832, 1835, 1836."

[48-3] A. W. Jose, _History of Australasia_, Sydney, 1911, p.
187.

[49-1] Cf. _Ency. Brit._, vol. xxvi. pp. 692-693, on the story
of Texas.

[49-2] For an account of which, see Beckles Willson, _The Great
Company_ (1667-1871), London, 1900.

[50-1] _The Cleveland Plain Dealer_, Cleveland, Ohio, September
2, 1913; but cf. _United Empire_, London, December 1913, p. 934
concerning a statue to his memory at Berbera.

[50-2] _Ency. Brit._, vol. ix. p. 556.

[50-3] _Ibid._, vol. iv. p. 660.

[51-1] Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, _Les Etats-Unis au Vingtieme
Siecle_, Paris, 1904, pp. 37, 38, claims that the country to the
south of the long Canadian frontier was opened up by successive
waves of people of the same blood, the pioneers being almost
entirely sons of pioneers.

[51-2] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xxvii. p. 691: "The new life bore
most hardly upon women; and, if the record of woman's share in
the work of American colonization could be fully made up, the
price paid for the final success would seem enormous."

[51-3] W. M. West, _Modern History_, Boston, rev. ed., 1907, p.
300.

[52-1] C.A.W. Pownall, _Thomas Pownall_, London, 1908, pp.
400-401. _Cf._ Edmund Burke in _Conciliation with America_, par.
37.

[52-2] _Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia_, Melbourne,
No. 4, 1911, p.122.

[53-1] J. E. Le Rossignol and W. D. Stewart, _State Socialism in
New Zealand_, London [1911], p. 17: "The people of New Zealand
are not doctrinaires, and the academic question as to the proper
spheres of governmental and individual activity is seldom
discussed. The State has taken up one thing after another as the
result of concrete discussion of concrete cases. Usually, if not
invariably, abuses have been thought to exist, which the State
has been called upon to remedy: the great landowners have stood
in the way of closer settlement: wages have been low and
conditions of labour bad: rates of interest, insurance premiums,
prices of coal, and rents of dwellings have been thought to be
high: the oyster beds have been depleted by private
exploitation: taxation has fallen too heavily upon the poor: for
one cause or another there has been complaint, complaint has
grown into agitation, and agitation into legislation."

[55-1] Arthur Murphy, _The Works of Cornelius Tacitus_, London,
1793, vol. iv. p. 16.

[56-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xxiii. p. 110.

[56-2] _Ibid._, vol. xx. p. 837: "The Angles, Saxons and other
Teutonic races who conquered Britain brought to their new homes
their own laws and customs, . . . and a certain rude
representation in local affairs:' _Cf._ also Woodrow Wilson,
_The State_, 1898, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, pp. 560, 561.

[56-3] _Ency. Brit._, vol. ix. p. 491.

[57-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xxiii. p. 109.

[57-2] _Ibid._, vol. xxiii. pp. 109-110.

[57-3] _Ibid._, vol. xxiii. p. 110.

[57-4] _Ibid._, vol. xxiii. p. 109: "In 1651 Isaac Penington the
younger published a pamphlet entitled 'The fundamental right,
safety and liberty of the People; which is radically in
themselves, derivatively in the Parliament, their substitutes or
representatives.'" Cf. _New English Dictionary_, Oxford, 1891,
"Representative," where 1658 is mentioned as its first use.

[57-5] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xx. p. 835, and vol. ix. p. 491.

[57-6] The House of Lords contains a certain representative
element in the Irish and Scottish members. These are some only
of the peers of their respective countries, and are elected by
their fellow peers to seats in the House of Lords--those from
Ireland for life, and from Scotland for a session.

[58-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xii. p. 295.

[58-2] _Ibid._, p. 295.

[58-3] _Ibid._, vol. xxiii. p. 112.

[58-4] _Ibid._, vol. xxiii. p. 112.

[59-1] Alfred Caldecott, _English Colonization and Empire_,
London, 1891, p. 129.

[59-2] Cf. _ante_, p. 56.

[60-1] Cf. _post_, p. 109, note 1.

[60-2] The variety of uses of the word "constitution" is
referred to, _post_, pp. 95-108.

[60-3] _Cf._ W.H. Taft, _Popular Government_, New Haven,
Connecticut, 1913, pp. 42-95, for a discussion of these three
terms.

[61-1] C.A.W. Pownall, _Thomas Pownall_, London, 1908, pp.
207-208.

[62-1] Recourse to the grave process of impeachment lies outside
normal procedure and is here disregarded.

[62-2] Cf. _post_, p. 113 _et seq._

[63-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xvii. pp. 315, 317; but also cf.
_ibid._, vol. ix. p. 488: "It was the first of the many
occasions in English history when the demand for reform took the
shape of a reference back to old precedents, and now (as on all
subsequent occasions) the party which opposed the crown read
back into the ancient grants which they quoted a good deal more
than had been actually conceded in them."

[65-1] W.H. Taft, _Popular Government_, New Haven, Connecticut,
1913, p. 155.

[65-2] The exception to this statement is apparent in the
British Isles, where suffrage is a national affair, and no
federal framework affords a basis for local option on this
privilege.

[66-1] _Springfield_ (Massachusetts) _Weekly Republican_,
November 20, 1913.

[67-1] W. B. Worsfold, _The Union of South Africa_, London,
1912, p. 126.

[67-2] _Ibid._, pp. 139-140.

[67-3] _An Analysis of the System of Government throughout the
British Empire_, London, 1912, p. 44.

[68-1] _An Analysis of the System of Government throughout the
British Empire_, London, 1912, pp. 44-45.

[68-2] Edward Jenks, _The Future of British Law: An Inaugural
Lecture delivered before the University of Melbourne_,
Melbourne, 1889, pp. 6-7.

[69-1] W.B. Worsfold, _The Union of South Africa_, London, 1912,
p.438.

[70-1] A. V. Dicey, "A Common Citizenship for the English Race,"
in _Contemporary Review_, vol. lxxi., April 1897, p. 469.

[70-2] Edward Jenks, _The Future of British Law: An Inaugural
Lecture delivered before the University of Melbourne_,
Melbourne, 1889, p. 11.

[72-1] Eversley and Craies, _Marriage Laws of the British
Empire_, London, 1910, pp. 61, 173, 192, 70, 239-392.

[73-1] John Stuart Mill, _The Subjection of Women_, London,
1906, p. 123.

[74-1] _United Empire_, London, January 1914, A. W. Tilby,
"Christianity and the Empire," p. 57.

[75-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xxvii. p. 638.

[75-2] U.S. Bureau of the Census, _Special Reports of the
Census: Religious Bodies: 1906_, Washington, D.C., 1910, pt.
ii., pp. 225, 508, 626, 635, 659.

[76-1] _New England's First Fruits_, London, 1643, p.12.

[77-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. viii. p. 971.

[77-2] _Whitaker's Almanack_, London, 1913, p. 489.

[77-3] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1898, Boston, rev. ed.,
1911, p.18.




{79}

IV

THE SEVEN NATIONS


"THE representatives of the great nations across the seas."

A British Colonial Secretary used these words[79-1] in a speech
welcoming to the Imperial Conference of 1902 the Prime Ministers
of the other Britannic governments. This should be enough to
permit the terminology to any Pan-Angle, when he refers to New
Zealand, Australia, South Africa, Newfoundland or Canada, and
the men who govern them. These "great nations across the seas"
are themselves conscious of nationhood on a parity with that of
the British Isles. A representative of one of them in the same
year thus spoke of his country and its fellow nations: "The
British Empire . . . a galaxy of independent nations . . . There
is not in Canada at the present moment a single British soldier
to maintain British supremacy--moreover it is Canadian soldiers
who are today garrisoning Halifax . . . The whole Australian
continent {80} has now been moulded into another nation under
the flag . . . and I can see dawning in South Africa the day
when there will be another Confederation . . . "[80-1] Eleven
years later in that South Africa another national Prime Minister
spoke of _his_ country and _his_ countrymen. "Their country was
part of the British Empire. They could not get away from it; it
was their Constitution; and yet they were as free as if they
were their own State, and they took up the position--he had said
so in England--that they were not a subject State, but part of
the British Empire, and were on an equality. They were a sister
State of England."[80-2]

When throughout these lands writers similarly use the word
"nation," the student of Pan-Angle affairs need proceed to no
further investigation, though he may be unable to justify the
word by current dictionary definition. Enough if he notes its
political significance. In the same class are such words as
"independent," "self-governing," and "autonomous": subject to
the same theoretical queries but established by the same
practical usage. Anyone who would question such usage is
silenced by the recognition that it only conforms to facts. On
such facts is based the thesis of these pages.

The seven units of the Pan-Angle world differ {81} both in size
and density of population,[81-1] Hence it might be objected that
to classify according to these divisions is to neglect the
relative strength and importance of the various political
groups, Newfoundland is not as important in population or wealth
as the British Isles; while near Canada, it cannot be considered
a part of Canada, New Zealand is two-thirds as far from
Australia as Newfoundland is from Scotland, and emphatically is
no part of its huge neighbour,[81-2] One of its citizens writes:
"Although one thousand miles distant from Australia at the
nearest point, although situated in a different climate and
inevitably destined to display a different national temperament,
although already possessed of a national {82} character,
national aspirations and national peculiarities, although
already served by Imperial affiliation much better than it could
be served by any mere local federation, the Australian Prime
Minister has no deeper insight than to predict the sinking of
New Zealand into the _status_ of a petty and subordinate
Australian State. . . . before New Zealand denies its
independence under the Empire, and seeks shelter under the
mantle of the [Australian] Federal Parliament, there will be a
new political heaven and a new political earth. At the present
time the proposal is simply absurd." [82-1]

Some might prefer to treat the Pan-Angle world as made up of two
groups, those under the British and American flags respectively.
This, however, fails to give the true character of the five
younger Britannic nations, and might suggest erroneously that
they bear a position to the British Parliament similar to the
position of the American states to the Congress of the United
States. Some American may resent the implied insignificance of
the forty-eight states, some of which are larger in size or
population, or both, than certain of the Britannic nations.
Texas is over twice as large as either the British Isles or New
Zealand, and has a population about four times that of New
Zealand, or somewhat less than that of Australia. Similarly, it
may occur to an Australian, or a Canadian, or a South African,
that the states of the first, or the provinces of the two latter
nations should receive more prominence. Others again might
consider that the yet undivided areas of the British Isles,
which may some time be {83} organized under a federal system, or
else the ancient historical parts as they were before the days
of union, should be among the basic units of this discussion.

To all these questionings the same answer applies. It is not
easy to generalize in a system which, like ours, is the result
of growth and adaptation. There are many local peculiarities of
governments and grades of autonomy which, significant in
themselves, are immaterial to the question of Pan-Angle
federation, and which for simplicity's sake are here ignored.
The classification here used does not forbid others. Each reader
may consider these people according to any scheme of which he
approves. The seven nations here designated are entities. Their
pride of personality is in most cases very great. This is reason
enough, in spite of huge discrepancies in size and population,
for utilizing a classification based on existing national
feelings.

The British Isles[83-1] and the United States[83-2] are {84}
entirely independent of each other and of all other powers.
Neither recognizes the right of anyone to dictate to it in any
matter, except by war or its threat. The other five of the
Pan-Angle nations do not yet perhaps go so far.

In the past certainly the British government legislated for them
as it saw fit. The abolition of slavery under the British flag
early in the nineteenth century serves as an example. This
outside interference while humane was even then considered
arbitrary.

In South Africa "what mainly angered the Cape colonists was the
inadequacy of the compensation which was awarded in their case.
The value of the slaves on Dec. 1, 1834, when the Emancipation
Act came into effect, was estimated by the commissioners
specially appointed for the purpose at three million sterling.
The sum allotted by the Imperial Government was no more than one
and a quarter million, payable, not in South Africa, but in
London, and with a deduction of any expenses incurred in
carrying out the work of emancipation. The result was to
impoverish the former slave owners, and to awaken in them a
bitter feeling of resentment against the government which had
deprived them of their property, and against the philanthropists
by whom the policy of emancipation had been inspired."[84-1]
This step had been taken without the consent of the governed,
{85} the slave-holding communities having no representation in
the Parliament that enacted the law.

Theoretically the same right exists to-day.[85-1] "In granting
self-government to the British Dominions Britain did not change
her constitution. Conscious that the British Government could
not rule great communities in America, Australasia, and Africa,
. . . Britain has agreed that they shall manage their own
affairs. But she has never undertaken, and could not undertake,
a clear division of functions, nor could she in theory
explicitly divest herself of final responsibility in any sphere
of government. The British North America Act is a constitution
by which the relations of the Federal Government of Canada with
the Provincial Governments are fully regulated and defined; but
it is not a constitution by which the relations of that Federal
Government with the Imperial Government are fully regulated or
defined. . . . Any constitutional powers vested in the English
Government before the grant of self-government to the Dominions
are in theory still vested in that Government today."[85-2]

In practice this theoretical right has yielded to the stronger
claim of self-government. "My vindication of the preference
policy was given not at Ottawa or on Canadian soil, but in the
heart of the Empire at London, at the Colonial Conference, when
I declared to the Empire that {86} I and my colleagues of the
Government were ready to make a trade treaty. We said, 'we are
ready to discuss with you articles on which we can give you a
preference, and articles on which you can give us a preference.
We are ready to make with you a treaty of trade.' Mark those
words coming from a colony to the mother country without offence
being given or taken."[86-1] "What has never been questioned
since the War of Independence is that a democracy pretending to
a sovereignty over other democracies is either a phantom or the
most intolerable of all oppressions."[86-2] "Nobody dreams in
these days of the British Parliament making laws for Canada or
Australia. Such an idea is alien to all thinking men, . . .
[86-3]

In sum, the government of the British Isles no longer dictates
to the "great nations across the seas." All that is now apparent
of its former right of interference consists of appeals from the
courts of these younger nations to the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council of the British Isles, and the seldom used veto
power of the governors sent out from the British Isles to these
younger nations. The appeal power, though of great theoretical
importance, is of such limited practical use that a British
writer has overlooked its existence in the following
description: The {87} Governor is the only link between the Home
Government and the Colonial, and in all of them his powers are
limited to the exercise of the veto. Even this is circumscribed.
It is tacitly understood that the _veto_ will be resorted to
only when the _foreign relations_ of the empire are affected, or
when some Act is passed which the Secretary of State decides to
be incompatible with existent Imperial legislation."[87-1]

In place of the former parental-filial attitude between the
British Isles and the five younger nations there is growing up a
sympathetic and sentimental friendship. The younger nations as
yet have no representatives chosen by their voters to sit in a
common legislature with Britishers, but claim, nevertheless, to
act with the British Isles as equal partners in the Britannic
world. This claim is acknowledged by the British Isles
government. In the words of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain at Glasgow,
October 6, 1903: "And when I speak of _our_ colonies, it is an
expression; they are not ours--they are not ours in a possessory
sense. They are sister States, able to treat with us from an
equal position, able to hold to us, willing to hold to us, but
also able to break with us."[87-2]

In the light of the foregoing testimony, the exact political
status of New Zealand, Australia, Newfoundland, Canada, and
South Africa becomes increasingly difficult to define. It seems,
on the whole, more nearly accurate to regard them as {88}
independent and autonomous with certain limitations, than to
consider them as dependent with excessive liberties.
Accordingly, each of the seven Pan-Angle nations is here
considered to be the equal of each of the other six.

The collective Britannic nations have often been styled Greater
Britain, or the Britannic Empire. The word empire, though
constantly used for lack of a better term, is a misnomer. As
Seeley says: "Greater Britain is not in the ordinary sense an
Empire at all."[88-1] Another authority says: "The British
Empire is not an Empire in the ordinary meaning of the word. It
is a system of government."[88-2] "There is no Imperial
Government."[88-3]

Men speak of an Imperial Parliament, but in reality no such
thing exists. It is an ambitious name applied sometimes to the
Parliament of the British Isles which has no members from the
other nations, and whose power to enforce its legislation in the
other Britannic nations is denied. "By a fine tradition it has
the full dignity of sovereignty; but in reality it is as
impotent as the Continental Congress, and only less ridiculous
because it has learned from experience the timid wisdom not to
court rebuffs."[88-4]

Downing Street is often referred to. Downing Street is a term
used to sum up the six administrative departments of the British
Isles government: the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, the
India Office, {89} the Admiralty, the War Office, and the Board
of Trade. Of these the India Office, does not enter into the
matters here discussed, and the Colonial Office "in its present
relations with the Dominions, . . . is in reality little more
than a clearing house of information and correspondence."[89-1]
The remaining four, _i.e._ the Foreign Office, the Admiralty,
the War Office, and the Board of Trade have their normal
administrative functions in the government of the British Isles.
They are filled by the ministry of the day, and hence are
responsible to the majority of the House of Commons and
ultimately to the British people. They are in no way
representative of, nor responsible to, the other five
self-governing nations. Through the theoretical veto of the
governors sent out from the British Isles, Downing Street is
supposed to wield its power and to prevent legislation in the
five younger nations that in matters touching foreign affairs is
contrary to the will of the British Parliament. As a matter of
fact, this veto is rarely exercised. Its exercise would be, "in
plain words, the tyranny of one Parliament over another--of one
democracy over another."[89-2] "The theory of the British
Constitution is, as it stands, clearly intolerable except in
disuse. The powers which are imagined to exist in it would never
stand the strain of being put in force."[89-2] What does happen
when a veto appears called for by Britannic safety is that the
Parliament of the younger nation is induced to reconsider
matters in the light of whatever {90} argument Downing Street
has at hand. Here, obviously, are not officials who as
executives and legislators are part of any common government.
They are part of only one government, viz. that of the British
Isles. Certain matters in government must proceed from a single
source. In the United States the federal government, which
represents all the people and each state, has this in its charge
and has machinery by which to enforce its power. Among the
Britannic nations, the government of one of them controls these
matters with no other machinery than persuasion to enforce its
often debated authority.

A member of the British Ministry of 1913 is quoted as saying
that "the only political organisations common to the whole
Empire, . . . are the Crown, the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council, and the Committee of Imperial Defence, but not one of
them has any executive or legislative power."[90-1] By "the
Crown" is meant the power of Downing Street just discussed. The
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the British Isles is
the supreme appellate court for courts under the British flag
outside the British Isles. A like function is performed for
British Isles courts by the House of Lords. There is no single
court of appeal for the six Britannic nations.[90-2]
Consequently, the Judicial {91} Committee of the Privy Council
can hardly be called an institution common to all these nations,
even were its activity not so limited as to be negligible. As to
the Committee of Imperial Defence, in it "the Dominion
representatives are guests and not constituents."[91-1]

All this is to say that through certain makeshifts and
survivals, whose forms and functions are nowhere clearly
defined, the governments of the six Britannic nations come in
occasional contact with each other.

Such is the complexity of the English-speaking world control,
and such is its lack of uniformity of classification and naming,
that it is not safe to say the five new nations and the British
Isles and the United States are the only English-speaking
autonomous groups. "The British Empire exhibits forms and
methods of Government in almost exuberant _variety_." [91-2] For
example, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands and such
outposts of Pan-Angle civilization as Pitcairn and Tristan da
Cunha might well be considered self-governing. These areas are
omitted from enumeration in this discussion, not by reason of
any lack of appreciation of their worth, but because the
inclusion of these many assets and liabilities of the Pan-Angle
concern would unduly expand this discussion. These groups have
their respective positions with the several Pan-Angle nations to
which they are to a greater or less degree connected. On the
continued career of the seven Pan-Angle nations {92} depend the
political existences of a multitude of these smaller Pan-Angle
localities.

Moreover, no direct discussion of the politics of any of the
many dependencies is here made. Their needs are not for their
own solving. Our control we try to make materially beneficial to
their inhabitants by "giving them only what is good for them,
not always what they want."[92-1] Our control of ourselves is
based on the entirely opposite theorem of taking what we want,
not necessarily what someone else thinks is good for us. In
short, we govern our dependencies in one way, ourselves in quite
another. The dependent countries which "belong to" the several
nations may present many problems to the Pan-Angles, but these
form no "part of" the Pan-Angle problem. This is no place to
question whether Seeley was justified in his doubt as to the
value of India to the British Isles.[92-2] Enough here to
acknowledge that our present economic policy leads many of our
seven nations to believe that the holding of dependencies,
especially in the tropics, is of value. To enumerate all these
dependencies would be tedious and needless. It is only to
distinguish the dependent from the independent that space is
here given to the subject.

A united government over and between these seven Pan-Angle
nations would be unaffected by the existence of these
possessions. At the present {93} time New Zealand and Australia
hold dependencies. This in no way interferes with their being
somehow, as they believe, parts of a political entity with the
British Isles. Similarly, in case of the uniting of the seven
Pan-Angle nations, New Zealand and Australia could each retain
its dependencies, and the United States could retain its
dependencies, without impairing the success of a Pan-Angle
government. The history of our civilization shows that such a
complicated procedure is the way of natural growth among
Pan-Angle peoples.

"Empire," from its long association with states builded of
conquered peoples, is no fit word to use for a voluntary
combination of Pan-Angles. Nor would any form of government be
acceptable that blotted out the individuality that each of the
seven nations has established. They are members of a great
civilization, each to-day practically self-supreme. Whatever
arrangement they may choose to enter upon to protect themselves
and their civilization, they will wish to continue always
nations.



[79-1] Richard Jebb, _Studies in Colonial Nationalism_, London,
1905, p. 187.

[80-1] Sir Wilfrid Laurier at the Dominion Day Banquet, 1902;
quoted Richard Jebb, _Studies in Colonial Nationalism_, London,
1905, p. 1.

[80-2] General Botha at South African Nationalist Congress,
November 24, 1913; quoted in _The Times_ Weekly Edition, London,
November 28, 1913.

[81-1]         Area in     Per cent  White       Per cent
               sq. miles   of total  population  of total
                            area      1911      population
New Zealand     103,658     .92     1,008,468       .71
Australia     2,974,581   26.59     4,455,005      3.15
South Africa    473,954    4.23     1,276,242       .81
Newfoundland    162,750    1.45       242,966       .17
Canada        3,729,665   33.34     7,204,838      5.10
British Isles   121,089    1.08    45,211,888     32.03
United States 3,617,949   32.35    81,735,623     57.91
Total        11,183,646           141,135,030

In comparison with the above figures, England contains 50,890
square miles and 34,045,290 population. United States and South
Africa contain 9,828,294 and 4,697,152 respectively of <DW64>s,
which together with other non-whites are excluded from the
figures in the above table, These figures are based on
_Whitaker's Almanack_, London, 1913, pp. 584, 603, 660-667; and
_Britannica Year Book_, London, 1913, pp. 680, 682,663, 678,699,
703, 714, 557.

[81-2] Auckland to Sydney, 1264; Wellington to Sydney, 1233;
Bluff to Hobart, 940; and St. John's to Glasgow, 1859 miles.

[82-1] _Round Table_, London, September 1912, p. 753, quoting
_New Zealand Herald_, Auckland.

[83-1] The British Isles is here used in preference to United
Kingdom. None of the other Pan-Angle nations are "kingdoms ";
and the term is applicable only historically to that democratic
group of people of which England contains the largest portion.
For a modern Pan-Angle attitude, see W. H. Moore, _The
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia_, 2nd ed.,
Melbourne, 1910, p. 66, where he says concerning the naming of a
nation: '"Kingdom of Australia' would be acceptable to none."

[83-2] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xxvii. p. 612: "The United States,
the short title usually given to the great federal republic
which had its origin in the revolt of the British colonies in
North America, when, in the Declaration of Independence, they
described themselves as 'The Thirteen United States of America.'
Officially the name is 'The United States of America,' but 'The
United States' (used as a singular and not as a plural) has
become accepted as the name of the country; and pre-eminent
usage has now made its citizens 'Americans,' in distinction from
the other inhabitants of North and South America."

[84-1] C.P. Lucas, _Historical Geography of the British
Colonies_, vol. iv., _South Africa_, Oxford, 1913, pt. i., pp.
146-147.

[85-1] _An Analysis of the System of Government throughout the
British Empire_, London, 1912, p. 58: "It should be remembered
that in theory there is nothing to prevent the Parliament of the
United Kingdom legislating for the internal affairs of a
self-governing colony or even imposing taxation on such a
colony."

[85-2] _Round Table_, London, September 1913, pp. 588-589.

[86-1] Sir Wilfrid Laurier at Sorel, September 28, 1904, quoted
in Richard Jebb, _Studies in Colonial Nationalism_, London,
1905, p.151.

[86-2] F. S. Oliver, _Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on American
Union_, London, 1906, p. 448.

[86-3] Lord Milner, November 3, 1908, at Canadian Club,
Montreal, in Lord Milner, _The Nation and the Empire_, London,
1913, p. 362.

[87-1] Alfred Caldecott, _English Colonization and Empire_,
London, 1891, p. 134.

[87-2] Richard Jebb, _Studies in Colonial Nationalism_, London,
1905, p.272.

[88-1] J.R. Seeley, _The Expansion of England_, London, 1883,
p.296.

[88-2] _Round Table_, London, May 1911, p. 232.

[88-3] _Ibid._, February 1911, p. 167.

[88-4] F. S. Oliver, _Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on American
Union_, London, 1906, p. 449.

[89-1] _Round Table_, London, September 1913, p. 590.

[89-2] F. S. Oliver, _Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on American
Union_, London, 1906, p. 449.

[90-1] _United Empire_, London, January 1914, p. 1.

[90-2] _United Empire_, London, October 1913, p.767: ". . .
there is no ultimate court of appeal for the Empire as a whole.
A proposal to create one, by fusing the judicial functions of
the House of Lords, which hears United Kingdom appeals, and the
Privy Council, which hears appeals from oversea, has long been
favoured by Australian statesmen." Cf. _The Times_ Weekly
Edition, London, August 22, 1913, "An Imperial Court of
Appeals."

[91-1] _United Empire_, London, January 1914, p. 1.

[91-2] Alfred Caldecott, _English Colonization and Empire_,
London, 1891, p. 121.

[92-1] W. C. Forbes, lately Civil Governor of the Philippine
Islands, Address concerning the Philippines, before Boston City
Club, November 20, 1913, quoted in _Boston City Club Bulletin_,
Boston, January 1, 1914, p. 40.

[92-2] J.R. Seeley, _The Expansion of England_, London, 1883, p.
11.




{94}

V

GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICES


THE seven Pan-Angle nations are similar in their forms of
government. This similarity is often obvious, but even where
differences of procedure seem to exist the foundations of
government are still the same.

In each of the nations the people rule. In each they follow in
governing three practices: ultimate control on all questions is
in the voters; immediate legislative control is in legislatures
composed of representatives who act on behalf of the voters, and
subject to restrictions, if any, by the voters only; and
executive or administrative control is in charge of elected
persons. If "a country where a large portion of the people has
some considerable share in the supreme power would be a
constitutional country,"[94-1] then these seven nations are more
than constitutional countries, for in them the people not only
have "some considerable share," but are the final judges on any
matters which they desire to adjudicate. As such these nations
meet Burke's definition of a free government: "If any man asks
me what a free government is, I answer, that, for any practical
purpose, it is what the people think {95} so,--and that they,
and not I, are the natural, lawful, and competent judges of the
matter."[95-1]


Ultimate control in all these nations is secured to the voters
by elections and referenda. By these two means the voters choose
their representatives and sometimes actively participate in
legislation. Often, too, they state the forms under which their
representatives shall work and limit the work they shall be
allowed to perform. In the British Isles there is no formal
limitation on the power of the representatives elected to the
House of Commons. In the other six nations the elected
representatives are empowered to act only in certain fields.
Their power is conveyed to them through written instruments or
constitutions which are beyond their control. All power in
either case lies ultimately in the voters, whether through the
ballot and their ability to defeat at the polls alone, or
through this plus a written constitution. Accordingly, as
already stated, all seven of our nations have constitutional
governments. Outside the British Isles they are, in a sense,
doubly constitutional, because not only is this power of
election in the voters, but the framework, or written
constitution, of each government under which the representatives
must act is likewise in the control of the voters.

The word constitution[95-2] is variously used in Pan-Angle {96}
parlance, and it may be well here to discuss some of its
meanings.

The Constitution of the British Isles consists partly of laws,
determining the form of government, which have been passed at
various times and are still in force. To this extent it is
written. The bulk of the Constitution, however, lies in a mass
of tradition, and depends for its force upon the respect in
which Parliament holds that tradition. For this reason the
British Constitution is frequently called "unwritten." "In one
important respect England differs conspicuously from most other
countries. Her constitution is to a large extent _unwritten_,
using the word in much the same sense as when we speak of
unwritten law. Its rules can be found in no written document,
but depend, as so much of English law does, on precedent
modified by a constant process of interpretation {97}. Many
rules of the constitution have in fact a purely legal history,
that is to say, they have been developed by the law courts, as
part of the general body of the common law. Others have in a
similar way been developed by the practice of parliament. Both
Houses, in fact, have exhibited the same spirit of adherence to
precedent, coupled with a power of modifying precedent to suit
circumstances, which distinguishes the judicial tribunals. In a
constitutional crisis the House of Commons appoints a committee
to 'search its journals for precedents,' just as the court of
king's bench would examine the records of its own decisions. And
just as the law, while professing to remain the same, is in
process of constant change, so, too, the unwritten constitution
is, without any acknowledgment of the fact, constantly taking up
new ground."[97-1] "'Constitutional law,' as the expression is
used in England, both by the public and by authoritative
writers, consists of two elements. The one element, which I have
called the 'law of the constitution' is a body of undoubted law;
the other element, which I have called the 'conventions of the
constitution,' consists of maxims and practices which, though
they regulate the ordinary conduct of the Crown and of Ministers
and of others under the constitution, are not in strictness laws
at all."[97-2] It must be borne in mind that Parliament, and
Parliament alone, can change these laws of the Constitution, and
that the change can occur whenever a majority of Parliament so
decides. {98} What these traditions are changes from year to
year and even from day to day--in fact, it is difficult to find
two Britishers who will agree on what is the Constitution at a
given date, so greatly are these traditions a matter of
personal, not national, conviction.

In each of the other Pan-Angle countries the Constitution
consists of laws and traditions similar to those in the British
Isles, plus a written document (or documents) which is a power
of attorney limiting in certain ways the power of the national
representatives-be they executive, judicial, or legislative.
These written documents are either enactments of the Parliament
of the British Isles, or successors to such enactments. The
Canadian Constitution was drafted in London by delegates from
the Canadian colonies and various British officials,[98-1] and
was passed by the British Isles Parliament, March 29, 1867, to
take effect July 1. It was never submitted to the people,[98-2]
although it was pleaded that the general election which ensued
was "virtual ratification." The Australian Constitution, drafted
by Australians in a national constitutional convention, ratified
by referenda in each colony,[98-3] now to become a "state," was
altered by the British Isles Parliament only in reference to the
clause which prohibited appeals to the King in Council, and was
passed by that Parliament July 9, 1900, to take effect January
1, 1901. The South {99} African Constitution was drafted in
South Africa by South Africans in a national constitutional
convention, ratified by the legislatures in three of the South
African provinces, and in Natal by a referendum of the voters,
was altered by the British Isles Parliament only in reference to
matters affecting "natives" and "Asiatics," and was passed by
that Parliament September 20, 1909, to take effect May
31,1910.[99-1] The Constitutions of New Zealand and Newfoundland
are to be found in the charters and enactments framed in London
for their government, and are historically similar in
composition to the constitutions of the thirteen American
colonies. The American Constitution was based on the previous
experience of the race, especially as acquired under various
colonial charters. It was drafted at a national convention, and
was subsequently ratified by state representative conventions
successively. The work of the National Convention "was a work of
selection, not a work of creation, . . . the success of their
work was not a success of invention, always most dangerous in
government, but a success of judgment, of selective wisdom, of
practical sagacity,--the only sort of success in politics which
can ever be made permanent."[99-2] The American people changed
governmental responsibility from the British Isles to
themselves, but did not and could not change the source of their
ideas.

Such written documents are so often referred to as "The
Constitution" that citizens of some of the {100} six younger
nations often assume that "The Constitution" is the whole
Constitution of their respective governments. The first such
written power of attorney to the legislators, and as such an
expression of the views then held by a certain body politic, was
signed aboard the _Mayflower_ in 1620.[100-1] This Constitution
by which the forty-one signers "solemnly and mutually . . .
covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil body
politic, for our better ordering and preservation and
furtherance of the ends aforesaid; and by virtue hereof to
enact, constitute and frame-[laws]--unto which we promise all
due submission and obedience,"[100-2] did not, however,
supersede all other, including unwritten, governmental
traditions of that body politic. Constitutions written later
have similarly left for their respective groups much continuing
tradition, that has been respected and has been enlarged upon.
We have written down that which we felt strongly about, but we
have also continued other customs. Written "constitutions" have
been expressions of public belief as to the form of framework of
any given body politic, but for interpretation they have had to
rely on unwritten or previously written tradition, as developed
to meet arising needs. The mere writing has not arrested our
constitutional growth nor rendered inflexible our governmental
forms.

The American Constitution consists really of {101} two portions,
the written and the unwritten. The tenacity with which the
nation clings to certain traditions never put in writing or even
at variance with the spirit of the writing, makes it advisable,
if not absolutely necessary, so to consider it. Lord Bryce,
familiar with the nature of the British Constitution, calls the
usages that have grown up apart from the written Constitution
"parts of the actual or (so to speak) 'working'
Constitution"[101-1] of America. As illustrative of the latter
he mentions certain American customs: "The president practically
is limited to two continuous terms of office. The presidential
electors are expected to vote for the candidate of the party
which has chosen them, exercising no free will of their own. The
Senate always confirms the nominations to a cabinet office made
by the President."[101-2] These instances, of what he calls the
American working Constitution, are supported by the same force
that maintains the entire British Constitution--public opinion.

To the Britisher, this point of view is thoroughly natural. He
has at home a Constitution which is also compounded of written
and unwritten parts. To the American this phraseology may sound
strange, for he has long been accustomed to think the
"Constitution" refers to a particular written document and the
judicial decisions thereunder. For the unwritten or working
basis of his government he has had no word.

The real difference in the two Constitutions must be sought in
the amending power. To the amending of the unwritten portions of
either there is no check on Parliament or on Congress, other
than public {102} opinion. To the amending of the written
portion of the British Constitution, there is likewise no check
other than public opinion. Parliament amends the written and
unwritten portions of the Constitution,--at the will of a
majority of the House of Commons. Congress cannot so amend the
written portions of the American Constitution; that is a
prerogative of the voters alone. Therein lies the mystery of the
alleged respective "flexity" and "rigidity" of the two. But the
mystery is less, and the distinctions of flexity and rigidity
grow of uncertain value when it is realized that both
Constitutions are being constantly changed by the genius of our
race. As in the case of our laws, our Constitutions are being
steadily interpreted in accord with the will of the voters. That
we do not change more suddenly is due to the conservative, yet
discreet, action of our representatives, sanctioned by the
voters.

An enactment of Parliament at variance with the British
Constitution changes that Constitution. An enactment of Congress
at variance with the written portion of the American
Constitution does not change the Constitution but remains at
variance with it. To uphold the written Constitution in such a
case and to insist on the priority of its terms over the acts
performed by representatives acting under it, early became the
self-imposed duty of the American courts. "But this, although,
as we may well think, a sound conclusion, was not a necessary
one; and it was long denied by able statesmen, judges, and
lawyers."[102-1] This function of the courts was for years a
unique feature of the United {103} States government. "The right
to deal thus with their legislatures had already been asserted
in the States, and once or twice it had really been exercised.
Had the question related to a conflict, between that [federal
written] Constitution and the enactment of a State, it would
have been a simpler matter. These two questions, under European
written constitutions, are regarded as different ones. It is
almost necessary to the working of a federal system that the
general government, and each of its departments, should be free
to disregard acts of any departments of the local states which
may be inconsistent with the federal constitution. And so in
Switzerland and Germany the federal courts thus treat local
enactments. But there is not under any written constitution in
Europe a country where a court deals in this way with the acts
of its coordinate legislature."[103-1]

Because the power to amend the written Constitution is not in
Congress, it has come about that courts see to it that the will
of the popular power so expressed shall not be ignored or
vitiated by those who are the servants of that popular power.
Because the power to amend the written portions of the British
Constitution is in Parliament, there can be no clash between the
wishes of Parliament and its Constitution. What Parliament
_does_ is the final test of what the Constitution _is_.

From the different powers of Parliament and Congress in regard
to their respective national Constitutions comes the ambiguity
of Pan-Angle usage of the word "unconstitutional."

In the British Isles "unconstitutional" referring {104} to
parliamentary action means that someone considers it not
consistent with established British political customs. Yet, if
the British Parliament enacts any legislation it must be
constitutional, because the legislation by its mere enactment is
proved not inconsistent with the views of the temporary majority
in Parliament. Various British kings have been elected by the
Witan and by Parliament; one king was beheaded by the same
popular authority; at various dates the duties of kingship have
been altered. All these acts were constitutional the day they
were voted. It was therefore correct to say in 1910 that the
British Constitution "can be torn up by the mere vote of a
temporary majority in the two houses of Parliament."[104-1]
Since 1911 it would be equally correct to say that such power is
now in one House--the House of Commons. It is evident that,
"This arrangement, while it makes for flexibility, may be a
source of grave danger in the hands of an unscrupulous
majority."[104-2]

That forces other than parliamentary majorities may come to
exercise more direct control over the British Constitution is
not impossible. In the excitement of discussing the place of the
House of Lords in the government of the British Isles, the party
leaders in 1910, after the death of Edward VII., held a
conference. Although they failed to find a consensus of opinion
on the best framework for the British Isles government, "The
significance of the Conference lies in the precedent it creates
for the alteration of the national {105} constitution by the
expedient of conference and compromise, instead of by the
steam-rolling of a party machine."[105-1] Concerning this same
conference another writer observes, "whether in itself it be a
development of our Constitution, as some people affirm, or an
encroachment on our Constitution, which is the complaint of
others, it has at any rate affected our Constitution very
materially, simply by its existence."[105-2] If such a
conference after deliberating were to lay its conclusions before
the people for ratification, it would be analogous to the
national constitutional conventions which since the early
American experiments have been familiar to the Pan-Angle world.
From this the British Isles might come to have a "written
constitution" in the same sense that the Constitutions of the
United States, Canada, and Australia are written.

For the present, the plan of parliamentary government control
which is the British Constitution while successful is, as the
above quotations evidence, hazy. And in the British Isles it is
fair to consider that "unconstitutional" means "unusual."[105-3]

With Americans the word "unconstitutional" never in popular
practice has the comprehensive and indefinite British meaning.
As Americans have no term in common use to denote the unwritten
part of their Constitution, so they have none at all with which
to refer to an infraction of it. The {106} expression has yet to
be coined for the American public to employ should the Electoral
College act as it did in Washington's day, viz. each elector
exercise his individual discretion in voting for a president, or
should a president be elected for a third term, whether or not
consecutive. In either of these instances the change could not
be unconstitutional in the American sense, though it would be
unconstitutional in the British sense. In the former case, the
procedure would be a return to what was once entirely usual in
the American practice, and called for by the one-time working
interpretation of the written Constitution. In the latter case,
it would be a change to what has never been forbidden by the
American written Constitution, but to what is now forbidden by
the un-written Constitution. In either of these cases, what
would the American courts decide? They would find no violation
of the written Constitution, but only of the present unwritten
or working Constitution. The American can console himself in his
ignorance by the oft-quoted remark: "The Supreme Court has the
last guess." The word "unconstitutional" refers to an enactment
in such conflict with the written Constitution and decisions
thereunder, that American courts will not consider it legal.
When legislation beyond the powers conferred by the written
Constitution is attempted and a case, for whose decision it is
necessary to decide the power of Congress so to enact, is
brought to the courts, they will declare the attempted
legislation void. The courts, and they alone, have this power.
Hence the word "unconstitutional" in America means _illegal_.

{107}

In 1913 occurred a modification of the American unwritten or
working Constitution which may or may not pass into a permanent
change. George Washington and John Adams addressed Congress
orally on public affairs. Thomas Jefferson, the third president,
being a poor speaker, changed this part of the working
Constitution by addressing Congress through written messages.
This custom remained as a revision of the working Constitution
until 1913. Of this tradition Wilson wrote in 1898: "Hence a
sacred rule of constitutional action!"[107-1] In 1913 he, as
president, reverted from this "sacred rule" to the oral custom
of Washington, and the country's comment was largely
commendatory. In this instance it is likely that the Supreme
Court may not guess at all!

Illustrative of the British significance of "unconstitutional"
is quoted the following, written in 1910: "It is an undoubted
rule of the English constitution that the king shall not refuse
his assent to a bill which has passed both Houses of Parliament,
but it is certainly not a law. Should the king veto such a bill
his action would be unconstitutional, but not illegal."[107-2] A
corresponding American example might be furnished by the action
of an American president in issuing an order, without being
authorized thereto by Congress, temporarily repealing part of a
tariff bill. Such an act being outside of the scope of a
president's authority would, if reviewed by a court as part of
the _ratio decidendi_ of a case, be held unconstitutional and
therefore illegal.

{108}

These British and American usages of "constitution" and
"unconstitutional" are reflected in the five other Pan-Angle
nations. It consequently behoves one to use either of these
words with careful attention to the meaning desired. But of each
of the seven nations it may be said: that it is governed under a
constitution; that some part of its constitution is written; and
that through its constitution, however amendable, ultimate
control of all questions is in the voters.


Immediate legislative control of these seven nations is in
legislatures composed of representatives who act on behalf of
the voters, and subject to restrictions, if any, by the voters
only. Until 1911, one nation, the British Isles afforded an
exception to this as its legislative power was shared by persons
who owed their position to their birth. This instance of
presentation in a national legislature which was composed
otherwise of elected representatives expired before 1911. Since
that date the House of Lords exists not as a part of the
legislature but as a consultative body subservient to the will
of the House of Commons. To-day the legislatures of the
Pan-Angle nations are in all cases representative and the
representatives, however elected or appointed act on behalf of
the voters.[108-1] Those that are considered appointed are {109}
in reality chosen by a method of indirect election. For example,
in Canada and in New Zealand the representatives who form the
upper houses are chosen by the majority in the lower houses at
the time of their election. The fact that these "legislators
may, in the Canadian case, hold office for life does not affect
the fact that they are elected, but concerns only their terms of
office. In New Zealand the terms of office of some members of
the upper house is for life, whereas more recent members have
been chosen for a period of years. In the United States,
according to the provisions of the Federal Constitution, the
members of the upper house were formerly chosen by the state
legislatures. They are now, by the provisions of the
Constitution, elected directly.[109-1] In Australia the upper
house members are chosen by the voters organized in voting
districts larger than those electing representatives. This last
is the method toward which the choice of upper house members
seems in Pan-Angle nations to be approaching. The discontent in
New Zealand and {110} Canada at their present methods and the
recent change in America indicate this trend. This tendency
emphasizes the insistence of the voters that representatives are
responsible only to the voters.

That such representatives are subject to restrictions, if any,
by the voters only, is a statement qualified solely by the
technical exception that some of the Britannic nations act under
Constitutions enacted for them by another nation, viz. the
British Isles. This exception is more true in theory than in
reality. If in some of the Britannic nations, such as New
Zealand and Newfoundland, there have been no ratifications of
their respective frameworks of government, nevertheless the
whole spirit of the people in these countries, as well as in
Canada, where a like state of affairs exists, and in Australia
and South Africa where ratifications have occurred on what is in
each case substantially their present Constitution, makes
evident the tendency of each one of these nations to regard its
Constitution as its own act.[110-1] Consequently, it is fair to
say that acting under authority of the voters, representatives
carry out the national will in each of the seven Pan-Angle
nations.


That executive or administrative control is in charge of elected
persons is true without exception {111} in these seven nations.
The methods of choosing who shall so administer, may be
designated respectively as the British and the American. Under
both plans the executive is chosen by indirect popular election.
The British system produces a prime minister elected by a
majority of the more popular (in the British Isles the sole)
chamber of the legislature. This prime minister associates about
himself certain other men from the same chamber to carry on the
government for a certain time, which may be a shorter and
therefore an uncertain time. In the American system the people
elect representatives, called the electors, to carry out the
election of a president. This forlorn novelty, the Electoral
College, shows the futility among Pan-Angles of new-fangled
institutions. In all other ideas, the framers of the American
Constitution of 1787 followed the evolved and known usages of
the race. "It was only when they came to construct the machinery
for the election of the President that they left the field of
American experience and English example and devised an
arrangement which was so original that it was destined to break
down almost as soon as it was put in operation."[111-1] The true
election is no longer by the electors, but by the people of each
state using their allotted number of electors as so many counts
in favour of one candidate.[111-2] The president associates
about himself a group of men chosen from the nation at large.
These men act as {112} secretaries to administer departments in
behalf of the president, and have no seat in the legislative
branch of the government. These two systems are the types used
as models throughout the Pan-Angle self-governing areas.

In the two plans we have popular election with virtual
similarity. This is remarked in the following comment on the
choice, in 1841, of a British national executive: "But the
Reform Act of 1832 introduced a new order of things. In 1835 the
result of a general election was for the first time the direct
cause of a change of ministry, and in 1841 a House of Commons
was elected, for the express purpose of bringing a particular
statesman into power. The electorate voted for Sir Robert Peel,
and it would have been as impossible for the house then elected
to deny him their support as it would be for the college of
electors in the United States to exercise their private judgment
in the selection of a president."[112-1] The results of
parliamentary general elections in the British Isles are
announced on newspaper bulletin boards in terms of votes for the
leaders of the opposing parties, just as in America the state
vote is credited directly to the presidential candidates.

Adherence to either the American or British type of executive
does not connote a corresponding similarity in other
governmental respects. Australia has a British style executive
in connection with an American style legislature. Moreover,
Australia's written Constitution has been left unfixed in
certain matters, so that, if after trial the British system of
executive is found wanting, and some modification {113} shall
seem better, a change may be made without the need of
constitutional amendment.[113-1]

While representatives are elected to carry out the executive
will of the voters under both the British and the American
systems, the methods of discharging that duty present
differences. These may be summed up in the statement that the
British executives take the form of a responsible cabinet; and
the American executives, both federal and state, take the form
of a cabinet which is not in the same sense responsible. An
explanation lies in the race's experience with executives.

The Teuton executive was in the form of an elected king who
carried out the wishes of the majority which elected him. He
could be and was deposed at the will of his constituents. In
short, he was a spokesman. As the nationality of the British
Isles crystallized, this spokesman assumed his powers were not
subject to recall by his {114} fellow-citizens; considered his
office hereditary; and undertook to extend his functions in his
own right, not by right of being the spokesman of a majority to
whom he was responsible.

At the time of the American Revolution the executive office in
the British Isles was held in a way quite unlike the Teuton
ideal, and local self-government had, owing to economic changes,
sunk to a low level. The king and a few of the landed gentry
controlled Parliament and the election of a large proportion of
its members.[114-1] When, therefore, the Americans framed their
system of government, they had before them an executive example
on which they wished to improve. They accordingly created a king
who could not initiate or prevent legislation; who was
automatically recalled every four years; and who, in common with
all other citizens, held no title that could be inherited. Most
of the state governments, affected by the same ideas, have gone
further. They have even taken from the executive the appointment
of judges, making them also elective, though a few states and
the national government continue the system of appointing the
judiciary through the executive. Further checks to the
president's power were devised in making his appointments to the
executive and judicial services as well as his negotiations of
treaties subject to confirmation by the Senate. Thus the
American president is a modified eighteenth-century British
king.

After America had become independent and had {115} framed its
federal government, the British Isles electorate gradually
reasserted its power, and took back into the keeping of its
elected representatives the control of executive affairs.[115-1]
That return to earlier ideas has produced a spokesman who is
elected for five years but may be, and usually is, recalled
before the expiration of this term,--by the shifting opinion of
the voters manifested in the votes of their representatives in
Parliament. This spokesman is no longer called a king but a
prime minister. "The imperial sovereignty which is exercised in
the name of the King actually resides in the British Prime
Minister, a gentleman who holds his office at the pleasure of
the majority of the British House of Commons."[115-2] He and his
associates, chosen from the members of Parliament, constitute a
ministry, of which a portion is called the cabinet. It is this
cabinet, this managing committee, that both executes the laws of
the British Isles and takes charge of the legislation desired,
supposedly, by a majority of the British voters. As the voters
elect the members of Parliament and the latter elect the
ministry, and as the ministry cannot continue in office in the
face of an opposing majority in Parliament, this cabinet
executive control is called a "responsible government," _i.e._
responsible directly to the people.

{116}

In re-attaining the ideal of the Teuton spokesman, America has
made slight progress in theory, however much the American
president has stood ready to take such position and however much
he may have tried, despite the conservative form of constitution
he works under, to perform the duties of such an office.
Consequently, the American executive stands apart from the
legislative power as the British executive stands near, and is
part of, the legislative power. To the American executive and
his cabinet, chosen not from Congress but from the country at
large, is the explicit duty of administering, not of making,
laws, except in so far as the veto power gives the president
some share in checking legislation. But the instinct of the race
still calls on the president, as though he were the spokesman of
his nation, to assist the other representatives in making as
well as executing the laws. Signs are not wanting that this same
insistence of the voters may bring the American executive back
to the executive-legislative functions of the race's early
spokesmen. At present the president can interpret the manner in
which laws shall be administered, but if his interpretation
conflicts with the wishes of Congress, it can pass new
enactments not susceptible to such interpretation. Hence,
practically the president can influence legislation only by his
personal force working on Congress, or by his use of the
patronage to induce congressmen to take action in accord with
his opinion of the national will. There results a possibility of
the use of patronage disastrous to the administrative efficiency
of the nation. To meet this disastrous use of the patronage,
American {117} public opinion has demanded the "merit system" of
appointment of all administrative officials of less station than
those political agents who must be in sympathy with the
political ideas from time to time in the ascendant, as expressed
by political parties. Recognizing this need for efficiency in
administrative subordinates, American presidents find it
difficult to utilize the merit system of appointment and at the
same time forward desired legislation. The personal power of the
president backed by popular opinion is, however, still a force
to be reckoned with by Congress. Through this power he is able
to carry out in part at least the demand made by these political
descendants of the Teutons that their spokesman, and all other
representatives, shall carry out the legislation the voters
require.

Although Alexander Hamilton was unable to obtain a realization
of his desires to see the cabinet officers entitled to seats in
Congress, the president is called on by the written Constitution
to report to Congress on "the state of the Union, and recommend
to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary
and expedient."[117-1] In reality he does more, and in
accordance with the working Constitution actually furthers the
legislative programme called for by his party's majority. He
may, if the instincts of American public opinion demand it,
easily evolve into a responsible spokesman with other
administrative officers about him, much after the similitude of
a British responsible cabinet ministry. How this may occur by
change in either the working or the written Constitution, {118}
or both, it is unnecessary here to elaborate. Enough to show
that this present difference in the American and British
executives is a result of historical conditions working in both
branches of the race.

The representatives who carry out the political will of a
Pan-Angle nation are called in America the Administration and in
the other six nations the Government. This diversity of
terminology may produce misunderstanding, as in the case of
"constitution"--the more so as "government" has another meaning
common to all Pan-Angles, viz. control of peoples.[118-1] A
proverbial Irishman landed in America is asked with which party
he sympathizes, and retorts that he is "against the Government."
He means probably that he is opposed to the ministry of the day
in the British Isles--in short, sympathizes with some Opposition
ideas. The American hearer, unaccustomed to the word in this
specialized sense, may be astonished at what seems an outburst
of anarchy. Later our Irishman, become an American, would reply
to the same question about his politics, that he was, or was
not, in favour of the Administration. But whichever term is
used, Administration or Government, it refers alike to those
elected representatives who, by the use of their own discretion,
or following the instruction of their voters, or by a
combination {119} of both methods, conduct the executive
business of their nation.


Because the seven Pan-Angle nations are similar in their forms
of government they are in a position to establish a common
government. All take for granted the same theories and
practically the same procedures. Because these theories and
procedures work successfully as they are applied to the
government of each nation, Pan-Angles will be predisposed to
believe that they will work when applied to a government of the
whole race.



[94-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. vii. p. 15.

[95-1] Quoted in Woodrow Wilson, _Mere Literature_, Boston,
1900, p. 105.

[95-2] _Ency. Brit._, vol. vii. p. 15: "The ideas associated
with constitution and constitutionalism are thus, it will be
seen, mainly of modern and European origin. They are wholly
inapplicable to the primitive and simple societies of the
present or of the former times. The discussion of forms of
government occupies a large space in the writings of the Greek
philosophers,--a fact which is to be explained by the existence
among the Greeks of many independent political communities,
variously organized, and more or less democratic in character.
Between the political problems of the smaller societies and
those of the great European nations there is no useful parallel
to be drawn, although the predominance of classical learning
made it the fashion for a long time to apply Greek speculations
on the nature of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy to public
questions in modern Europe. Representation . . . the
characteristic principle of European constitutions, has, of
course, no place in societies which were not too large to admit
of every free citizen participating personally in the business
of government. Nor is there much in the politics or the
political literature of the Romans to compare with the
constitutions of modern states. Their political system, almost
from the beginning of the empire, was ruled absolutely by a
small assembly or by one man."

[97-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. vii. p. 15.

[97-2] A. V. Dicey, _The Law of the Constitution_, London, 1885,
p.25.

[98-1] H. E. Egerton, _Federations and Unions within the British
Empire_, Oxford, 1911, p. 33.

[98-2] Goldwin Smith, "Canada, England, and the States," in
_Contemporary Review_, London, March 1907, p. 851.

[98-3] _Ency. Brit._, vol. ii. p. 966.

[99-1] W.B. Worsfold, _The Union of South Africa_, London, 1912,
p. 128.

[99-2] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1897, Boston, rev. ed.,
1911, p.462.

[100-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xvii. p. 858: "Finding themselves
without warrant in a region beyond their patent, . . . they drew
up and signed before landing a democratic compact of government
which is accounted the earliest written constitution in
history."

[100-2] _Ibid._, vol. xvii. p. 858.

[101-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xxvii. p. 658.

[101-2] _Ibid._

[102-1] J.B. Thayer, _John Marshall_, Boston, 1901, p. 63

[103-1] J.B. Thayer, _John Marshall_, Boston, 1901, p. 61.

[104-1] _Round Table_, London, November 1910, p. 62.

[104-2] _Ibid._, p. 62.

[105-1] _Round Table_, London, November 1910, p. 62.

[105-2] "Pacificus," _Federalism and Home Rule_, London, 1910,
p. 2.

[105-3] _Ency. Brit._, vol. vii. p. 15: "Again, as a term of
party politics, constitutional has come to mean, in England, not
obedience to constitutional rules . . . but adherence to the
existing type of the constitution or to some conspicuous
portions thereof,--in other words, conservative."

[107-1] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1898, Boston, rev. ed.,
1911, p. 378.

[107-2] _Ency. Brit._, vol. vii. p. 14.

[108-1] The fact that so-called "governors" are sent out from
the British Isles to the five newer Britannic nations does not
affect the statements in this paragraph. Such "governors" do not
share in legislation, but acquiesce in legislation formulated by
others. Such "governors" are best considered as ambassadors with
peculiar local recognition, who act under orders from and in
behalf of the government of the British Isles, and act also
wherever possible in behalf of all six of the Britannic nations
and their dependencies. _Cf. ante_, p. 89.

[109-1] The Seventeenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution,
initiated by Congress in 1912, requiring the direct election of
senators by the voters of each state, came into force May 31,
1913. The practical effects of direct election were, however,
previously obtained in some states, the legislatures electing as
senators candidates already designated by the voters. This
instance, in which the working Constitution violated the spirit
of the written Constitution, is interesting as evidence of the
flexity of the American Constitution and of the strength of the
spirit of local self-government. Cf. _Britannica Year Book_,
London, 1913, pp. 744-745.

[110-1] That Australia may change its Constitution regardless of
the wishes of the British Isles, _cf._ Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act, chapter viii. paragraph 128, and comments
thereon in C.P. Lucas, _A Historical Geography of the British
Colonies,_ vol. vi., _Australasia_, by A. D. Rogers, Oxford,
1907, pt. i., p. 289.

[111-1] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1898, Boston, rev. ed.,
1911, p.462.

[111-2] Concerning the alteration in procedure of the American
Electoral College whereby presidential electors are pledged
before their election, cf. _Ency. Brit._, vol. xxvii. p. 655.

[112-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xx. p. 845.

[113-1] _Cf._ W.H. Moore, _The Constitution of the Commonwealth
of Australia_, 2nd ed., Melbourne, 1910, p. 297: "Further, the
Constitution recognizes, if it does not establish, the Cabinet
system in the Commonwealth, and the responsibilities of the
Executive extend to the consideration of the subjects committed
to Parliament, and, if need be, to the initiation of legislation
upon them," Also B, R. Wise, _The Commonwealth of Australia_,
London, 1909, pp. 193-194: "At the same time, the provisions
which enable its [responsible government] continuance are
sufficiently wide to allow of other systems, should this one
prove unsuited to a Federation. Except that Ministers must sit
in Parliament, there seems no limit to the changes which might
be made with the acquiescence of the Governor-General, in the
method of appointment, tenure of office, or function," _Cf._
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, chapter i., part i.,
paragraph 5.

[114-1] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1898, Boston, rev. ed.,
1911, p. 889, gives this lack of local self-government as one of
the causes of the American Revolution.

[115-1] Cf. _Ency. Brit._, vol. xx. pp. 845-849; and _Britannica
Year Book_, London, 1913, pp. 491-497 and 480-482.

[115-2] F. S. Oliver, _Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on American
Union_, London, 1906, p. 447. Students who are mystified by
allusions to the "Crown," the "King in Council," and the "King
has graciously consented," etc., should find the sentence above
quoted a valuable explanation.

[117-1] Constitution of the United States, art. ii. sec. 3.

[118-1] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1898, Boston, rev. ed.,
1911, p. 572: "Government, in its last analysis, is organized
force. . . . The machinery of government necessary to such an
organization consists of instrumentalities fitted to enforce in
the conduct of the common affairs of the community the will of
the sovereign men: the sovereign minority, or the sovereign
majority."




{120}

VI

DANGERS


DANGER may arise to menace the Pan-Angle civilization from three
sources: from within any of the seven groups; from between any
of the groups; or from outside civilizations.


The first of these sources exists in every body politic. Civil
discord whenever it becomes active must be cured as it
develops--from within. The soundness of a nation lies in its
ability to cope with internal disorder and still maintain its
integrity before the world. Any interference, however kindly
meant, only exasperates those on the spot. No Britisher, for
example, can improve the situation in South Africa by
sympathizing with "Hindus" that South Africa does not
want.[120-1] And especially is it true among Pan-Angles to whom
local self-government is instinctive, that {121} each political
entity must look to the order of its own household.


The second source of danger is more grave. As long as the seven
nations remain in real or hazily defined independence of each
other frictions are bound to arise. These frictions may grow
from the competitions of commerce. They may cause reprisals of
commerce. Commerce affords the quickest attack on a nation's
standard of living. Those who abhor war often overlook the fact
that trade reprisal may also produce similar inexpressible
suffering. The frictions of commerce in the thirteen American
nations in the eighteenth century, the similar discords in
Australia before 1900, and in South Africa before 1910, point
the same lesson--an adequate central government to adjust such
differences. While lacking such an adequate central government
for the seven Pan-Angle nations, our only recourse when
interests conflict is to our mutual forbearance.

Within a nation a government hales offenders before a court
empowered to enforce its decisions. Between nations there is no
such tribunal. A court is "a body in the government to which the
public administration of justice is delegated."[121-1] This
presupposes in the court power to bring parties before it; a law
governing the case; and power to enforce a decision. The Hague
Tribunal or any other existing so-called "international {122}
arbitration court" has no one of these three attributes. It is
no court at all. Any body of presumably well-intentioned persons
anywhere can listen to a dispute and give advice. This is all
the Hague Tribunal, for all its name, can do. The contending
parties can take the advice or not as they like. No parties can
be compelled to appear before this non-governmental body; no one
can know beforehand, except by frangible mutual agreement with
his opponents and with the "court," what rules are to govern the
decision; and on no party can a decision be enforced. "In
international affairs the primitive rule, that 'might is right'
still holds good, for either side to a quarrel can insist on a
resort to force. In the outer void of world politics there is no
reign of law, for there is no law-maker; there is no assured
justice, for there is no judge; there is no safety for the weak,
for there are no police to whom they can appeal.

"Why is this? It is because no nation is willing to submit its
destinies to a tribunal over which it has no control, or to
surrender its armaments to a world authority which will use them
to enforce some international code of its own creation."[122-1]

Inter-Pan-Angle frictions in the past have been numerous, the
American Revolution being merely the most disastrous. Troubles
that have arisen {123} between the British Isles and Canada and
between the British Isles and the United States since the peace
of 1814 may be passed over because more happily
terminated.[123-1] Other of the nations have likewise had their
family quarrels with the British Isles. Three years before the
Boer War, a South African wrote: "The most powerful factor which
makes for disunion at present is the interference of the British
Government in the internal affairs of South Africa. . . .
England's periods of active interference in South Africa have
always been disastrous to herself and to South Africa--indeed
the present troubles may all be traced directly to Lord
Carnarvon's attempt to force his policy on South Africa."[123-2]
Twelve years later, the Boer War being over, and the union of
the four South African provinces being not yet accomplished,
another South African wrote: "Directly after [after the Chinese
indentured labourers in the Transvaal were 'freed' by the
British Isles Government][123-3] came the Zulu rebellion in
Natal, and so enraged were the South African colonies, so bitter
and so angry with the Home Government, that, had it been
possible, they would have broken away. Given another crisis of
the kind in more prosperous times, and the British will go solid
with the Dutch for independence and a Republic."[123-4] The same
dangers lurked in the recent suggestion that the British {124}
Isles should interfere in South Africa in reference to Asiatic
Indians in Natal.

Nor is it alone in the realms of legislation and administration
where partisan politics may be factors that such frictions
arise. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the
British Isles is still, however rarely used, the supreme
appellate court for the five over-seas Britannic nations.
Against its fitness for the position, the Court of Appeal of New
Zealand in 1903 passed formal and deliberate
resolutions--reading, in part, as follows: "That the decisions
of this Court should continue to be subject to review by a
higher Court is of the utmost importance. The knowledge that a
decision can be reviewed is good alike for Judges and litigants.
Whether, however, they should be reviewed by the Judicial
Committee, as at present constituted is a question worthy of
consideration. That Court, by its imputations in the present
case, by the ignorance it has shown in this and other cases of
our history, of our legislation and of our practice, and by its
long-delayed judgments, has displayed every characteristic of an
alien tribunal. If we have spoken strongly it is because we feel
deeply. And we speak under grievous and unexampled
provocation."[124-1] It is inevitable that different political
groups without {125} more adequate cohesion than sentiment and
shifting political desires should have had such family quarrels.
It is unnecessary here to quote other instances from the past.

To-day's inter-Pan-Angle frictions are the inevitable results of
the international conflicts of local national policies. Some of
them are trivial; others, vital. And from even trivial questions
improperly handled grow wars. "A White Australia," "No Indians
for the Transvaal," "No Hindus for British Columbia,"[125-1] are
familiar slogans suggesting all sorts of possible disagreements
for the settlement of which there is no court in existence. The
questions of Asiatic migrations are not trivial to the six
nations exasperated thereby. Yet even if all these questions
were removed, there would remain many opportunities for discord
still unadjusted. For the six Britannic nations Downing Street
is the only medium for adjusting such discords. And the lack of
power behind the decrees of Downing Street results in an
accumulation of makeshifts that is provocative of future
troubles.

Between the United States and the British Isles the Monroe
Doctrine has at times bulked large as a possible source of
disagreement. The question of Panama Canal tolls has recently
rasped these nations' amiability. It is worth while to examine
into these trouble breeders and to see how the situations would
be altered if the two countries were {126} treating not as
independent units but as parties to a huge federation.

The Monroe Doctrine was dictated to American statesmen by the
fear of Europe. To the people of the United States its
maintenance has meant safety from aggression. It has lived by
their sanction alone. "It would have been forgotten within 60
days after President Monroe first formulated it in a
presidential message if it had not met with a response in
popular feeling. . . . the popular feeling existed long before
Monroe was president, for Jefferson stated principles of foreign
policy which embodied the ideas associated now for 90 years with
Monroe's name. . . . And thus America has always, down to the
present crisis with Mexico, followed the national instinct
concerning entanglements on its own part in Europe's affairs,
and interferences on Europe's part in the affairs of this
hemisphere." ". . . Whenever a specific issue arises in our
relations with Latin-America, a practical test of what the
public feeling in this country amounts to is offered. Our
history for the past dozen years abounds in 'incidents' that
revealed the public temper. It is certain that whenever such a
test has been made in the Latin-American states around the
Caribbean Sea, the fear of the jealousy of European encroachment
manifests itself instantly and warns the administration of the
day what the people expect the government to do. The Monroe
doctrine, or the idea, feeling or instinct upon which it is
based, thus is repeatedly referred to the people for a fresh
expression of their sentiment, and there is no prospect that it
will become an obsolete feature of our foreign policy so long as
these re current {127} tests find the people vitally interested
in its preservation."[127-1]

The maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, whatever it may mean, is
to the American voter what the maintenance of a Big Fleet,
whatever the size may be, is to the British voter. A Britannic
authority thus expresses the feelings of the average Britisher:
"Our 'man on the omnibus' has never failed as yet to respond to
an agitation on behalf of the Fleet. He did so instantly in
1909, and he will always do so again. Given a serious division
between the parties on the naval question, there can be no doubt
which will win. . . . Whenever the controversy is taken to the
country, the country decides for the larger Fleet."[127-2] The
American Monroe Doctrine and the British Big Fleet are the
outcome of the instinctive fears Pan-Angles hold towards Europe.

The Monroe Doctrine was not designed as a weapon against the
British Isles any more than the Big Fleet is built to fight
American ships. The older country was in hearty agreement with
President Monroe's original pronouncement. "Indeed it was
Canning's policy, summed up three years later by his famous
reference to the necessity of calling the New World into
existence to restore the balance of the Old."[127-3] As long,
however, as the British Isles remains an outsider it falls
within the definition of "any European power" of the message,
just as there is nothing to prevent the {128} United States, as
long as it remains an outsider, from suffering from the strength
of the Big Fleet.

The two countries are independent now and must in the last
resort each protect itself from the other, however much they may
prefer friendship. As members of a federation each would be
spared the necessity of self-protection against the other. In
such event the Monroe Doctrine would apply to non-Pan-Angles
only and the Fleet would be the instrument by which it was
enforced.

The question of Canal tolls to many Americans to-day is a matter
of only national, not international, politics. They believe
tolls should be paid for Canal privileges. They also, however,
seek a means of lowering transcontinental freight rates. As only
American ships are allowed by law to engage in American
coastwise trade, these are the only competitors of the
railroads. To free such ships from Canal tolls might be a means
toward lowering transcontinental freight rates. Those Americans
who so believe are pleased if the Hay-Pauncefoote treaty seems
to allow an interpretation favourable to their purpose. Other
Americans believe no such interpretation possible, whatever the
problems of national economics. To both, however, outside
criticism of "violation of treaty" may induce merely the
exasperation that leads to refusal to discuss the question.

The difficulty, as our nations are now organized, is that a
question of mutual interest is decided by the majority in power
in one of the nations. In the present instance it was the United
States that {129} controlled the situation. The United States
decided. Afterwards the British Isles might, if it wished,
protest in terms of whatever mildness or vigour its public
policy dictated. The British Government has shown itself
forbearing. It protested but did not press its claims in terms
incompatible with peaceful relations. The American government,
unantagonized, was left in a mood to review the matter and, as
seems probable, to alter its previous decision. In some other
matter the tables may be reversed. The British Isles may hold in
its power the solution of some question of interest to the
United States. And the United States may have only the
opportunity to remonstrate in its turn against what it considers
an "unfair" interpretation of a treaty. Such remonstrance is apt
to be tinged with hostility, the thing we wish most of all to
avoid. Having no common government, the two nations have no
court to decide the case. Were they members of a federation,
such machinery would be established and in constant working
order.

Separate political existences of seven Pan-Angle nations do not
make for peace. If for us is coming the great millennium, so
sweetly dreamed of by so many, it will not come the sooner by
perpetuating opportunities for discord. A common government over
Pan-Angles would be copying what we have already done
successfully in smaller "closer unions." Before the formation of
one of these, it was stated: "Three choices therefore lie before
the people of South Africa. The make-shift regime of the High
Commissioner, the jarring separation of the States of South
America, the noble union of the States of {130} North
America."[130-1] This might be paraphrased. Three choices lie
before the Pan-Angles: the make-shift regime of Downing Street
and the gambling uncertainties of arbitration boards, the
jarring separation we have known in our past, the noble method
of union which our race has evolved, tested, and in four
separate nations adopted. By solving our international
differences of opinion in a federal government we can husband
our strength for self-defence as a united power against other
civilizations.


Despite our self-esteem we are not the only civilization in the
world. There are others who need land for their children, as
much or more than we do. These others wish to see the world
"bettered" by their ideas. If we are wise we shall recognize
these foreign aspirations to be as normal as our own. As we have
progressed other civilizations have progressed, even though
differently. And difference does not mean inferiority. Once we
could believe that our rivals, personal, national, or racial,
were bad because different; but nowadays we cannot call it wrong
when others, less favourably situated than we in the sunshine of
this world, strive like ourselves for comfort. "The tragedy of
history is not the conflict between right and wrong, but the
conflict between right and right." Each civilization knows it is
right. Each is right {131} till another civilization is proved
to be not only right, but better. A civilization is better than
ours if it shall prove its people able to conquer our
people--through cutting off our food by more resourceful
trading, thriftier living, or war. As it has always been since
the Pan-Angles were a people, the world is now an
inter-civilization competition selecting the fittest to survive.

Four nations of men, white like ourselves and holding some of
the same ideals, have been in the past our life and death
rivals. Spain, Portugal, Holland, and France all were great
before we were. They discovered and pre-empted a large part of
the world. To the shores of almost everyone of the seven
Pan-Angle nations their keels have come with intent to seize
land. Our rivals often succeeded and held the land for a time
until we grew strong enough to take it from them. Our struggles
against these out-run powers make thrilling stories, for they
tested the courage, the resources, and the tenacity of the
Pan-Angle victors.

Portugal and Spain once shared between them the seas of the
world--according to a Pope's decree. They raced in opposite
directions to see which first should reach the Antipodes. Macao
and Manila, lying opposite each other, show where the two routes
terminated. To-day Spain holds no land outside of Europe except
the Canaries and odd inconsequential bits of Africa. From before
the days of the Armada to the conclusion of the Spanish-American
War, Pan-Angles have been plundering Spain. Some of the spoils
they kept for themselves, some they gave away. The Ladrones in a
recent division were allotted to {132} Germany. Portugal holds
more extensive reminders of its former empire. The Azores, the
Cape Verdes, Timor and Goa, and strips of East and West Africa
show where that nation was once supreme. Both the African areas
are bordered by Pan-Angle and German holdings, and it requires
no shrewd forecasting to predict their future.[132-1]

Holland holds the Dutch East Indies--a dependency huge in extent
and population as compared to the tiny European state,[132-2]
but small "compared to the lands adapted for true colonization,
long ago relinquished. Holland holds also certain remnants in
the Western Hemisphere, as Spain and Portugal do not. But like
Spain and Portugal, Holland holds these dependencies not by
virtue of its own strength, but by virtue of the matched
strength of others, the balance of power leaving Holland for the
present undisturbed.

France, the most recent of these four rivals of the Pan-Angles,
to-day holds dependencies of {133} greater area than those of
the three other rivals combined.[133-1] Over lands on, or
islands near, every continent, the French flag flies. Only the
flags of the British Isles and of Russia are to-day further
flung. No one feels confident of despoiling France at will, and
the British Isles regards its late rival as an effective ally.
Yet the French hold no true colonies, lands in which France
grows again in a new life. Canada and Louisiana are now the
nurseries of a vigorous Pan-Angle stock.

Towards these four out-run powers we harbour no unfriendly
sentiments. They, alone or combined, can no longer hurt us. We
have grown so large and control so vast an area and population
that we forget that these rivals once threatened our existence.
The place-names they gave and many of their words, now part of
the English language, hardly recall the old struggles. So
thoroughly have we taken the lands they claimed, that with our
own history we associate such names as Columbus, Da Gama,
Magellan, Van Diemen, Tasman, Champlain, and La Salle. With our
former competitors we can make alliances, if we wish, for the
sake of guarding them and ourselves from the powers that loom
out of the future.

But because of such friendly alliances we must not lose sight of
the truth. Our present supremacy we hold not by the courtesy of
these our former rivals, but by the might of our forefathers,
who by their strength procured lands for us. The past secured to
us the present. The visible method was war. "Between the
[English] Revolution and {134} the Battle of Waterloo, it may be
reckoned that we waged seven great wars, of which the shortest
lasted seven years and the longest about twelve. Out of a
hundred and twenty-six years, sixty-four years, or more than
half, were spent in war."[134-1] At the end of these wars the
Pan-Angles had outrun their rivals.[134-2] That century and a
quarter witnessed the steady extension of the Pan-Angle control
in North America."The struggle was literally worldwide. Red men
scalped each other by the Great Lakes of North America, and
black men fought in Senegal in Africa; while Frenchmen and
Englishmen grappled in India as well as in Germany, and their
fleets engaged on every sea. The most tremendous and showy
battles took place in Germany; and, though the real importance
of the struggle lay outside Europe, still the European conflict
in the main decided the wider results. _William Pitt_, the
English minister, who was working to build up the great British
empire, declared that in Germany he would conquer America from
France. He did so."[134-3] Taxation in Massachusetts during one
of the years of this war was equivalent to an income tax of 66
per cent.[134-4] After Waterloo for over half a century this
extension continued. In this struggle for our world domination,
in which American and Britannic Pan-Angles each did their share,
we showed we were fighters. We fought to win. We won.

{135}

During and after our struggles with these four white nations, we
have had lesser struggles with peoples of other colours. Our
successes in these struggles have added to our
self-satisfaction. Thus far our efforts against the red, brown,
and black have not been too great for us. In America the red man
had land we needed; we drove him out. In New Zealand the brown
man's country was one we could thrive in; we installed ourselves
there. In India and through the East the brown man had rich
territories; we subdued him, we helped him to increase in
numbers, we sold him more of our goods. The same can be said of
the blacks in various tropical regions. In Australia the black
man had lands suitable for whites, and we occupied them. In
South Africa we have done the same, and, though the possession
of the whites is hardly as yet undisputed, we bear there as
elsewhere a mien of self-reliant superiority.

Our successes have brought us the material benefits we see in
the well-fed prosperity of our peoples. The non-material
benefits it is difficult to estimate. So naturally do we accept
both, that the thoughtless among us assume such comfort to be
the normal lot of good people such as we are. We are content
with our present portion--the best the world provides--and would
counsel others to be content with theirs. We think we are a
peaceful people, and deprecate as bad form the huge expenditures
made by European nations for military and naval preparations.
Some Americans contemplate their small army as though their
nation were by that proved virtuous, much as though the learned
Babu, contemplating the fur-clad {136} Eskimo, should pride
himself on his own tropical attire. Like the sons of wealthy
shopkeepers who disdain to demean themselves by trading, we
Pan-Angles forget sometimes on what harsh foundations was laid
our present exemption from harshness.

Apart from its short-visioned inconsistency, this attitude may
betray us into dangers. The English-speaking peoples have fallen
into a sense of security, assuming the continuance of our
present peace as the normal condition of affairs. We pride
ourselves that we mind our own business with success. And from
minding it for so long, and with so slight a chance of having it
disarranged by outsiders, we have grown accustomed to pursue
without doubts our way to greater individual freedom. We are
oblivious sometimes of the fact that all our efforts for greater
individual freedom are of no avail if some other nation may
deprive us of the wherewithal to individualize:--Our land, our
trade, and our political system. "To live well a people must
first live; and an ideal that ignores the primary conditions of
national existence is a castle in the air."[136-1]

Since the throes of the eighteenth century, North America has
been developed and Australia and New Zealand have prepared
themselves for large populations--all undisturbed by fear of
invasions. In these newer countries have been nurtured many of
the ideals of the race. There, have been tested not only the
federal idea, but also many political and social reforms, such
as those whose names are associated with Australasia, but which
find a congenial {137} habitat in other branches of the race. In
peace we have thus been aiding each other, as we have so often
in war. And it is well for us that this reign of peace has
continued so long, not merely because peace is to be desired,
but because of the strength it allows to accumulate for
struggles to come. That this long peace is unusual, that
struggles will come, history teaches.

Tacitus tells us of a Teuton tribe, "just and upright."
"Unmolested by their neighbors, they enjoyed the sweets of
peace, forgetting that amidst powerful and ambitious neighbors
the repose, which you enjoy, serves only to lull you into a
calm, always pleasing, but deceitful in the end. When the sword
is drawn, and the power of the strongest is to decide, you talk
in vain of equity and moderation: those virtues always belong to
the conqueror. Thus it happened to the Cheruscans: they were
formerly just and upright; at present they are called fools and
cowards." [137-1]

We, unmolested by our neighbours, are now enjoying "the sweets
of peace." Is there anything we are forgetting? Are we backing
the Pax Britannica and the Pax Americana with sufficient power
to ensure their maintenance? Shall we continue to be called
"just and upright"?

We still have land to which to extend our population. Our
prosperity is still undimmed. No one is our proved superior in
civilization. Recent wars have not contributed to our military
reputation, but our faith in our naval superiority has not been
shaken and our pride of race intensifies.

{138}

Yet slowly a consciousness is creeping over us by way now of
London, now of Brisbane, now of Durban, or again of Vancouver or
San Francisco, that all is not as safe for us as it once was.
Once we could afford to squabble a bit in the family; now we
feel we must stop such silly behaviour. To all of us has come
this feeling. It is not merely the appearance of Germany in the
North Sea or the South Pacific, nor the desire of Asiatic Indian
coolies for entrance to the Transvaal, nor the willingness of
these and other Asiatics to share with us the wealth of North
America. These are but signs. They forebode coming dangers whose
extent we cannot foresee.

Out of the future loom menacing forms, hardly more tangible and
comprehensible to us than were the Teutonic hordes to the
Romans. What latent energies lie hidden in the north and east we
can only fearfully surmise. There, perhaps, are peoples
multitudinous in numbers and unmeasured in resources. Their
faiths and ideals are not ours. To be subject to them would be
no illusion.

Across the north of Europe and Asia stretches Russia--a land of
eight and one-half million square miles,[138-1] larger than all
the Pan-Angle area were either Australia, Canada or the United
States omitted from the total.[138-2] Its population of
168,000,000[138-3] outnumbers the Pan-Angle whites {139} by
22,000,000.[139-1] Russia is self-supporting in that within its
borders are food and fuel for years to come. In Siberia are
ample coal and iron fields. Petroleum, of such growing
importance in these days of aerial navigation, Russia has in
plenty. The growth of the Russian power has been practically
simultaneous with that of the Pan-Angles, for in 1913 was
celebrated the third centenary of Romanoff rule. What was once
the small state of Muscovy has extended its borders and pushed
back its frontier, until now it presents by far the largest
stretch of contiguous territory under one rule in the world. It
has, moreover, room for internal development. Only the fighting
edges of Siberia are filled with settlers, most of them
ex-soldiers and their families. The interior is scantily
populated against the time when the advance of the frontier
shall be checked.

The significance of this growth has not been ignored in Europe.
Statesmen have acted or have feared to act according to their
conjectures of Russian desires and powers. For years Russia has
been, and indeed still is, the bugbear of the British on the
Indian and Persian frontiers. Urged by the British Isles, Japan,
fighting for its very existence, checked Russia. The resulting
loss to that country was insignificant. It could receive many
such checks and still be a formidable rival. Russia's success
against Pan-Angles would mean not only to them the material loss
of lands and food, but to the whole world the loss of some
measure of individual liberty, for the unity and strength of
that great country are founded on {140} characteristics the
antitheses of those which make the Pan-Angles great.

But a danger greater than Russia has thrown its shadow in our
path. The white race once felt assured that it was the chosen
race among mankind. It met the red, brown, and black races never
to its own ultimate disadvantage, and often, it was convinced,
for their good. It felt a similar destiny toward the yellow
races. It insisted that they open their doors to the white man's
trade and took them to school in the white man's ways. Now the
white race apprehensively wonders if it has made a mistake, if
destiny is at last on the other side.

China is the wonder of history, both ancient and modern.
Civilization after civilization has battered at its gates, taken
some trifle only to lose it, and has departed. Chinese
civilization has continued unharmed by its transient rivals.
Each of these rivals has pondered over China's strangeness, and
has failed to impress foreign ideals on its people. The Arab,
Malay, Portuguese, Dutch, French, English, American, German, and
now the Japanese and the Russian people, have taken trifles. Of
these Macao, French Cochin-China, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Kiaochow,
Wei-Hai-Wei, Formosa, and Tibet are modern examples. How long it
will be before these land-takings revert to the Celestial Empire
remains to be seen. "The old negative, anti-foreign prejudice is
giving way to a positive sentiment of national ambition. With a
population--according to the last census--of over 430,000,000 of
the cheapest and most industrious workers in the world, China is
bound sooner or later to dominate the East, unless she becomes
divided {141} against herself. And this the pressure from the
greedy competition of foreign powers seems certain to
prevent."[141-1]

To-day China is perhaps to become definitely a republic. No one
knows what China can or will do. The white race realizes that
its problem now is no longer how to distribute among its nations
the lands of the yellow races, but how to prevent the yellow
races from distributing its lands among themselves. Men who can
endure arctic cold and tropical heat with like fortitude and
profit, may soon become a factor in the defensive problem of the
Pan-Angles.

"The history of China, ancient and modern, is an eternal series
of paroxysms; its keynote is bloodshed and famine, with periods
of peace and prosperity purchased by the slaughter of countless
innocents. Its splendid civilization, based on an unassailable
moral philosophy and the canons of the Sages, has ever proved
powerless against the inexorable laws of nature, the pitiless
cruelty of the struggle for life. . . ."[141-2] It seems not
impossible that the Chinese may seek to ameliorate their
condition, to lessen "the pitiless cruelty of the struggle for
life" by overflowing into the lands now held by the Pan-Angles.
By what means could we save ourselves from being crushed before
the advance of a people our superiors in thrift and industry and
in ability to render the soil productive, and who are three
times our number?

{142}

Russia and China may be the active foes of our children. We can
bequeath them only such aid in their struggle as our foresight
dictates. Meanwhile we have problems of our own demanding more
immediate solution.

Russia and China are the rivals of to-morrow.

Japan and Germany are the rivals of to-day.

To Japan the Pan-Angles should doff their hats as to their
peers. Radically different, they are not our inferiors. Japan
has forged ahead materially at a rate that Pan-Angles have never
in their history approached. In 1853, when the American
Pan-Angle Admiral Perry forced foreign commerce on Japan, the
land was a feudal area given over to devastating civil wars. The
privileges that the white races after 1853 exacted have been
gradually and entirely taken back. Japan now stands as a world
power. Its people are increasing rapidly. It builds its own
ships. The three fastest merchant steamers on the Pacific to-day
are Japanese.[142-1] No one forgets, and it is hoped that no
Pan-Angle underestimates, the medical ability and the discipline
that backed the bravery and the patriotic spirit of the Japanese
in their life-and-death struggle against Russia. The Japanese
have taken Formosa and Korea from China, and have held the
last-named acquisition against Russia, taking also from Russia
the southern half of Sakhalin. As Scotland, Wales, and England
have been called Great Britain, so the Japanese have called
their home group "Dai Nippon," Great Japan.

Japan, the Dai Nippon group of islands, has a {143} geographical
area of about 150,000 square miles, or three-quarters the size
of Germany, or slightly greater than the area of the British
Isles. Its population of forty-nine millions is three-quarters
that of Germany, or about one-ninth more than that of the
British Isles, or five-sixths that of the whites of the
Britannic nations, or over one-third the white population of the
Pan-Angle world. Although Formosa and Korea, and possible
portions of Manchuria, are to be considered to-day as
dependencies of Japan, the fact remains that Great Japan as a
power, despite slight differences of dialect, contains a
homogeneous people actuated by the same spirit. The population
is now overburdening the land of Japan. Japan must have either
more land or more trade in order to feed its people, or it must
reduce its standard of living--or lessen the population by
emigration.

In Japan's search for more land, Asia offers few
inducements.[143-1] From Japan to the west lies China, full to
overflowing with people. From Japan to the north and north-west
lies Russia-in-Asia under various names. Outside of Asia the
allurements increase. From Japan to the southward lie the
Philippines, now a Pan-Angle dependency, and the islands of the
East Indies,--mostly Dutch, some German, one Portuguese, some
French, and some Pan-Angle. This network of islands paves the
route from Japan to almost empty Australia and fertile New
Zealand. To the eastward, across the Pacific, lie the Hawaiian
Islands, the key of the Pacific, containing 80,000 Japanese,
which is 45 per cent. of a population {144} of which only a
small per cent. are white.[144-1] Further to the eastward lie
Alaska, British Columbia, and the Pacific <DW72> of America--all
comparatively empty. Mexico contains Japanese to await there the
tide of international events. South of the Panama Canal is a
whole continent with its many open places. The Japanese are not
a tropical people. They want temperate, arable lands. The best
lands for Japan to annex are controlled by Pan-Angles.

Preliminary to annexation in past histories has often gone
occupation. But even if annexation by a foreign power is not to
follow the occupation of our lands by any considerable number of
aliens, who remain aliens loyal to a foreign power, our
integrity and welfare are thereby seriously disturbed. Several
of our groups are awakening to this fact. Alaska, British
Columbia, and the Pacific <DW72> states on one side of the ocean,
New Zealand and Australia on the other, and the Hawaiian Islands
between, all find the problem of Japanese migration a live topic
of practical politics. In every one of these places legislation
has been enacted to discriminate against the Japanese. To both
New Zealand and Australia, the nearness of Japan has been a
stimulus toward undertaking means of self-protection, naval and
military, since these countries have come to feel that the
British navy does not furnish adequate protection to their
exposed shores. He who looks into the conditions of exclusion of
the Japanese from these Britannic and American shores will note
the fact that the {145} action of British Columbia, California,
New Zealand, and Australia has at one time or another been in
conflict with the treaties made by the larger political entity
of which each respectively is a part. He will see how Australia
and New Zealand have changed their legislation to accord with
the letter, but not the spirit, of the Anglo-Japanese treaty,
and how British Columbia and California have insisted on
protecting themselves.[145-1]

As new areas of the Pan-Angle world are affected by the problem,
such comment as the following appears: "A brisk controversy is
going on in the South over the proposed colonization of Japanese
in Florida. The newspapers of that state ridicule the alarm
shown by Representative Clark; the three or four Japanese seen
in Jacksonville, says the _Times-Union_ of that city, appear to
be perfectly tame, and the editor concludes: 'It is not at all
probable that many Japanese will ever wish to come to Florida,
and we are willing that all who wish to come should come. 'The
_New Orleans Times-Democrat_ is more pessimistic, and remarks:
'That, it will be remembered, was California's attitude not many
years ago.'" [145-2]

In the solution of this problem, which relates not only to the
Pacific but which is a problem of a civilization, we are aided
by the Pan-Angle individualistic habit of each locality
controlling its own local questions. "'No one,' said the Premier
of British Columbia the other day . . . 'no one {146} can
question the supreme authority of the Legislature of British
Columbia to deal with oriental immigration.'"[146-1] In cases
where no one does question such authority, the matter is
promptly settled according to the wishes of the locality
affected. If, on the other hand, anyone does question such
authority, the locality has, at least, by its insistence warned
the whole race of its perils. Each such insistence offends the
Asiatics. To those Pan-Angles concerned, it is becoming
increasingly understood that the struggle has only just begun.

The anti-Asiatic feeling has been expressed from Vancouver to
Hobart, and from Auckland to Durban. Its utterance has been
earnest and measured, bitter and extravagant, loud and long. A
whole race would not in various corners of the earth so talk and
act for no reason. It would be tedious here to catalogue the
phrases ranging from mild to execrative. Nor can the credit be
given to any special one of the Pan-Angle nations involved for
moderation of statement or care in analysis of the problem.

Enough here to quote a statement of one[146-2] who is known
throughout the Pan-Angle world: "The question discussed . . . is
based . . . upon the Alien Land Bill recently passed by the
California Legislature. Upon that particular measure I have no
comment to make; it is in fitter hands than mine. It is to 'the
ultimate issue involved,' . . . {147} that I direct my remarks.
'The ultimate issue involved'. ..'is whether Japan, who has made
good her title to be treated on a footing of complete equality
as one of the Great Powers of the world, is not also entitled to
rank among the civilized nations whose citizens the American
Republic is ready to welcome, subject to a few well-defined
exceptions, within its fold whenever they are prepared to
transfer their allegiance to it.' In brief, this means, I
apprehend, whether the attainment by Japan of the position of a
Great Power entitles her to claim for her citizens free
immigration into the territories of any other Great Power, with
accompanying naturalization.

". . . In my own appreciation there is no necessary connexion
between a nation's status as a Great Power and her right to
receive for her people the privileges of immigration and
naturalization in the territory of another State; and the
reasonings adduced in support of the proposition seem to me
defective, both in some of their assertions and still more so in
ignoring certain conspicuous facts.

"Primary among these facts is that of the popular will, upon
which, in the fundamental conceptions of both British and
American government, the policy of a nation must rest. Be the
causes what they may--economical, industrial, social, racial, or
all four; and if there be any other motives--the will of the
people is the law of the Government. So far as that will has
been expressed in America and in Canada it is distinctly
contrary to the concession of such immigration. With the
question of immigration that of naturalization {148} is
inextricably involved. There cannot be naturalization without
immigration; while immigration without concession of
naturalization, though conceivable and possible, is contrary to
the genius of American institutions, which, as a general
proposition, do not favour inhabitancy without right to
citizenship.

"Another tacit assumption is that changes of governmental
methods change also natural characteristics, to such an extent
as to affect radically those qualities which make for beneficial
citizenship in a foreign country. Stated concretely, this means
that the adoption of Western methods by Japan has in two
generations so changed the Japanese racial characteristics as to
make them readily assimilable with Europeans, so as to be easily
absorbed. This the Japanese in their just pride of race would be
the first to deny. It ignores also the whole background of
European history, and the fact that European civilization (which
includes America) grew up for untold centuries under influences
of which Eastern Asia--including therein Japan--experienced
nothing. The 'Foundations of the Twentieth Century,' are not
only a succession of facts, or combination of factors. They are
to be _found_ chiefly in the moulding of character, national and
individual, through sixty-odd generations.

"It is, I conceive, this deep impress of prolonged common
experience which constitutes the possibility of assimilation,
even among the unhappy, poverty-stricken mass often coming to
us, . . . Undoubtedly they constitute a problem, but one with
which the immense assimilative force of {149} English
institutions, especially when Americanized, has been able so far
to deal successfully, and I believe will continue able. But
there are those who greatly doubt whether, in view of the very
different foundations of the Japanese 20th century, and of the
recognized strength and tenacity of character of the Japanese
people emphasized by strong racial marks, they could be so
assimilated. We who so think--I am one--cordially recognize the
great progresses of Japan and admire her achievements of the
past half century, both civil and military; but we do not
perceive in them the promise of ready adaptability to the spirit
of our own institutions which would render naturalization
expedient; and immigration, as I have said, with us implies
naturalization. Whatever our doubts as to the effect upon
national welfare of the presence of an unassimilable multitude
of naturalized aliens, the presence of a like number of
unnaturalized foreigners of the same type would be even worse.

"The question is fundamentally that of assimilation, though it
is idle to ignore that clear superficial evidences of
difference, which inevitably _sautent aux yeux_, due to marked
racial types, do exasperate the difficulty. Personally, I
entirely reject any assumption or belief that my race is
superior to the Chinese, or to the Japanese. My own suits me
better, probably because I am used to it; but I wholly disclaim,
as unworthy of myself and of them, any thought of superiority.
But with equal clearness I see and avow the difficulties of
assimilation due to formative influences of divergent pasts and
to race. . . .

"Let me say here that . . . is mistaken in the {150} statement
that the United States' within living memory waged the greatest
civil war of modern times in order to establish the claim of
American <DW64>s to equal right of citizenship with the white
population.' With the statement falls necessarily his inference
from it, that 'a colour bar cannot be logically pleaded as
prohibitive.' The United States did not wage the War of
Secession even for the abolition of slavery, still less for
equal rights of citizenship. Goldwin Smith, as a contemporary,
held against us that the war, not being for abolition, was one
of conquest. Lincoln said distinctly:--'I will restore the union
with slavery or without slavery, as best can be.' Myself a
contemporary and partaker, I can affirm this as a general tone,
though there was a strong minority of abolition sentiment. The
abolition proclamation came 18 months after the war began, and
purely as a measure of policy. The full rights of citizenship
came after the war ended, as a party political measure, though
doubtless with this mingled much humanitarian feeling.
Concerning this legislation a very acute American thinker,
himself in the war, said to me within the past two years, 'The
great mistake of the men of that day was the unconscious
assumption that the <DW64> was a white man, with the accident of
a black skin.' That is, the question was not one of colour, but
of assimilation as involved in race character. Now, while
recognizing what I clearly see to be the great superiority of
the Japanese, as of the white over the <DW64>, it appears to me
reasonable that a great number of my fellow-citizens, knowing
the problem we have in the <DW52> race among us, should dread
the introduction {151} of what they believe will constitute
another race problem; and one much more difficult, because the
virile qualities of the Japanese will still more successfully
withstand assimilation, constituting a homogeneous foreign mass,
naturally acting together irrespective of the national welfare,
and so will be a perennial cause of friction with Japan, even
more dangerous than at present. . . .

[Here follows a personal appreciation of the Japanese as Admiral
Mahan had known them for forty years, and to which most
thoughtful Pan-Angles would gladly subscribe. He then
concludes:]

". . . Despite gigantic success up to the present in
assimilative processes--due to English institutions inherited
and Americanized, and to the prevalence among the children of
our community of the common English tongue over all other
idioms--America doubts her power to digest and assimilate the
strong national and racial characteristics which distinguish the
Japanese, which are the secret of much of their success, and
which, if I am not mistaken, would constitute them continually a
solid homogeneous body, essentially and unchangingly foreign."

If there are, as Admiral Mahan suggests, good reasons why the
Japanese should not be allowed to settle in Pan-Angle countries,
those certainly form the best of reasons why the Pan-Angles
should not allow themselves to occupy a position where Japan
could demand of them this privilege for its subjects.

But while Japanese immigration, for the present peaceful except
in the field of economics, has been {152} agitating the nations
that border the Pacific, half way round the world other
Pan-Angles have had nightmares of a military invasion. "Within
twelve hours' steam of Essex and Lincolnshire is the port of
Emden, recently adapted for the embarkation of large bodies of
troops."[152-1] "The past need not concern us here. However
serious the old scares may have been, at least they came and
went, leaving a clear sky behind them when they had gone. But
now the sky refuses to clear. The 'scare' of 1909, launched on
that March afternoon when Sir Edward Grey told the House of
Commons that, in view of German competition, the whole British
Fleet would have to be rebuilt in Dreadnought form, has left a
permanent mark upon the public mind."[152-2]

There, at England's door, has been growing a nation small in
geographical area but with a population of 65,000,000
whites,[152-3] which, though less than the number of whites of
the United States, is more than the number of whites of the six
Britannic nations. Roughly stated, Germany has about one-half as
many whites as have all the Pan-Angle nations combined.[152-4]
In many respects Germany's position is not unlike Japan's. Both
nations have had a victorious rise based on military efficiency,
and there is no proof that their naval efficiency is not
similarly high. Both nations {153} have, relatively speaking,
but a small subject population to control. Both nations must
necessarily be warlike on account of the pressure of population
about them, and both have birth-rates which are already crowding
their lands more than the Pan-Angles are crowding theirs.

Practically all the non-European areas of the world which the
white race can occupy are held by the seven Pan-Angle nations,
or protected by one of them, or are in the hands of their
out-run rivals, or in the control of Japan, Russia, or China.
The same is true of lands unsuited for white occupation, but
desirable as dependencies. Germany arrived on the scene so
recently that it shared practically only the last divisions of
the lands of the blacks. Consequently, the only lands available
for Germany are those now held by the white and yellow races.

Under such circumstances, if Germany is to take land from
whites, Pan-Angle common-sense suggests that such land should
not be ours. In accord with such policy is Sir Harry H.
Johnston's suggestion that Portugal's African dependencies be
divided between the British Isles and Germany.[153-1] If Germany
should, however, show a preference for Pan-Angle lands and
should ask for those lands on which we now depend for our life
and comfort, common-sense equally suggests that we be in a
position to refuse. We could not expect the Germans to starve
themselves and their children, or even to reduce their standard
of living out of respect for claims we could no longer uphold.
We did not so respect the claims {154} of Portugal or Spain,
Holland or France. Episodes in our own history ought to point
plain the only road to security of possession.

The rise of the German Empire might by Pan-Angles be regarded
with antagonism, if Japan, Russia, and China offered no dangers.
The old and lasting fear that Pan-Angles have for centuries held
toward Europe was the fear that called for the naval supremacy
of the British Isles and for the Monroe Doctrine of America.
Antagonism toward Germany might seem justified were it not that
the fear of these other three powers, so different in
civilization from us, makes Germany our natural and civilization
ally. The victory of Germany over any portion of the Britannic
world would be a Pan-Angle calamity. The fall of modern Germany
would be hardly less of a Pan-Angle calamity. Any thought of the
whites weakening each other, and especially of weakening their
chance for developing their individualism, should be abhorrent
to every Pan-Angle or German who can see further than the mass
of his fellows.

International politenesses often verge towards the extravagant.
But certainly, if human relationships can be ascribed to
nations, Germany is our near of kin. German blood has enriched
ours for fifteen hundred years. Pan-Angle ideals of religious
and political freedom came originally from Germany. Pan-Angle
language, Pan-Angle law, and many of the qualities of which we
are most proud had the same source. Individualism has developed
more highly among the Pan-Angles--at least in matters of
government. This is {155} demonstrated by Pan-Angle and German
ideas regarding civil officers. "Of course, in every nation its
affairs are, and must be, conducted by officials. That is as
true of America as of Germany. The fundamental difference is
that with us these official persons are executive officers only,
the real captain is the people; while in Germany these official
persons are the real governors of the people, subject to the
commands of one who repeatedly and publicly asserts that his
commission is from God and not from the people."[155-1] Contrast
with this the utterance of an American "official": "the people
have not transferred their government to us. They still retain
ownership and all the rights and powers of ownership. We are
merely their temporary agents in performing duties which they
have delegated to us."[155-2] The German point of view would be
intolerable to a Pan-Angle, but there is no reason for assuming
that this bureaucratic country may not develop a truly
representative form of government.[155-3]

To prevent a conflict with Germany should be not merely a matter
of Pan-Angle sentiment, but of Pan-Angle business. If the
Pan-Angles were so strong that Germany was no longer a source of
danger to anyone of their nations, Germany would be changed from
a dangerous rival to a political ally. It would be the buffer
state for the Pan-Angles {156} against Russia, indeed against
all Europe, providing thus greater security for itself as well
as for us. We now realize the world has already been staked off
by the white and yellow races. While the British Isles and
Germany are making extraordinary efforts to build navies, Japan,
Russia, and China are growing unmolested. Germany should be the
nation with which all Europe and all Pan-Angles should unite to
neutralize Japanese and other Asiatic questions that press for
solution, and the nation with which all other whites should
rally if this test of strength ever has to come. Properly
understood in reference to the economic and political struggle
between the white and yellow races, a Pan-Angle federation
should be welcomed by every German.


The Pan-Angles are responsible for large subject populations,
which they both control and protect. This requires a greater or
less military effort according to local circumstance and the
fluctuating make-up of the international situation. Fortunately,
from a military point of view, these Pan-Angle dependencies are
widely scattered over the earth, and of such diverse languages
that no combination among them has thus far appeared probable.
But in case of any conflict with a foreign power they must
always be regarded as an element of weakness to us. The
Pan-Angles are not a military people. In each of our recent wars
we have had to make ready an army after hostilities began--even
though we were not taken unawares. In this regard we are at a
disadvantage with those powers who keep {157} their military
force in constant readiness. In the past we have been willing to
forego a fighting efficiency, if thereby we could be free of a
possibly tyrannical system and obtain greater play for our
individualism. We may continue of this mind for the future. But
if we choose to disregard the usual national precaution of
military safety, we must make doubly sure of other strength as
its equivalent.

The Pan-Angles do not occupy a contiguous land area. They are
scattered over the globe, and are exposed not only on their many
shores but throughout the length of their lines of sea
communication. The oceans sever them from each other and sever
some of them from their food. One answer to the problems which
arise from this wide separation is sea power. On this depends
the very daily existence of some of our groups.

Until recently six of our nations have relied almost entirely
upon the taxing power and efforts of the British Isles to
maintain a navy for them.

The burden on the British Isles has been heavy, and is growing
steadily heavier. To defend the British Isles from Germany the
British navy was withdrawn to European waters. Since 1910 this
concentration has been practically a defence of the North Sea
shores of the British Isles. How long can the British Isles
alone bear the strain of its own naval defence? And who is to
defend the other five Britannic nations? "We have made great
efforts, as in the past, but we are realizing that even so our
efforts, in Great Britain alone, may before long fall short of
what Imperial security requires. And this increasing anxiety is
not due solely to a narrow {158} apprehension of German aims. It
is due to the rate of naval expansion everywhere."[158-1] "It is
quite clear that external pressure is already more severe than
it has been for nearly a hundred years, and that it will
probably become even greater in the future."[158-2]

Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have now taken steps towards
maintaining their own navies to co-operate with the British
navy, but it is still true that, "Once the command of the sea is
lost by the [British] Empire no local system of defence, naval
or military, could secure Australia's autonomy, and she would
become the prey of the strongest maritime power."[158-3] A like
statement could be made of the other younger Britannic nations.
And while the American navy is not to be disregarded as a
possible aid, it is not wise for either the Britannic or
American people to assume that navies under separate governments
will act with that promptness possible under a single control.

In comparison with some of their competitors now rising to the
stage of active rivalry, all the seven Pan-Angle nations are
collectively only one first-class world-power. Each Pan-Angle
nation is naturally more solicitous for its own welfare than for
that of its fellow nations. The Englander is exasperated that
the other Britannic nations take so little interest in the
German peril. Australia and South Africa block the immigration
of Asiatics from British dependencies. Canada dallies over {159}
the merits or demerits of a naval appropriation bill. The United
States fortifies its Canal. Our co-operation is still uncertain,
for we are still divided into seven different nations. Neither
New Zealand, nor Australia, nor Newfoundland, nor Canada, nor
South Africa, nor the British Isles, nor the United States would
care to try to stand alone against the possible combinations
that might be brought against it; sentiments of warmest
friendship, or even treaties, are a poor substitute for a
machinery of government tried and tested before the crash comes.
As they now are, the seven Pan-Angle nations offer the maximum
of inducements for inter-Pan-Angle friction and extra-Pan-Angle
aggressions. Together the Pan-Angles could ensure the peace of
the world.



[120-1] _The Times_, London, November 28, 1913, Cape Town
despatch concerning Lord Hardinge's speech at Madras, November
26, in reference to treatment of Indians in South Africa states:
"After criticizing severely several passages in the speech, the
_Cape Times_, referring to the suggestion that the Imperial
Government should intervene in South Africa, utters the warning
that this way madness lies."

[121-1] _Bouvier's Law Dictionary_, Rawle's revision, Boston,
1897, "Court."

[122-1] _Round Table_, London, February 1911, pp. 107-108; _cf._
also _Round Table_, December 1912, p. 29: "Arbitration is no
cure for war so long as there is no agreement between nations to
substitute arbitration for war, and no power strong enough to
enforce such an agreement if made."

[123-1] For an account of some of these discords, _cf._ H. C.
Lodge, _One Hundred Years of Peace_, New York, 1913; also _Round
Table_, London, December 1913, pp. 106-122.

[123-2] P. A. Molteno, _A Federal South Africa_, London, 1896,
p. viii.

[123-3] Concerning these Chinese coolies, cf. _Ency. Brit._,
vol. xxv. p.481.

[123-4] M. C. Bruce, _The New Transvaal_, London, 1908, p. Ill.

[124-1] "Proceedings in the Court of Appeal of New Zealand with
reference to comments made upon that Court by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Wallis and Others,
Appellants, and His Majesty's Solicitor-General for the Colony
of New Zealand, Respondent. Together with the Judgments of the
Court of Appeal and the Privy Council in the same Case," Dunedin
[New Zealand], 1903, p. 28.

[125-1] "Hindus" (an unfortunate application of a religious
creed-name to a people) who had been admitted to the Philippines
and who sailed from Manila to San Francisco were debarred
entrance to United States, according to _Springfield_
(Massachusetts) _Weekly Republican_, December 11, 1913.

[127-1] _Springfield_ (Massachusetts) _Weekly Republican_,
November 27, 1913: "The Monroe Doctrine Today."

[127-2] _Round Table_, London, September 1913, p. 680.

[127-3] Cf. _Ency. Brit._, vol. xviii. p. 789.

[130-1] _A Review of the Present Mutual Relations of the British
South African Colonies, to which is appended a Memorandum on
South African Railway Unification_, "Printed by Authority"
[Johannesburg, 1907]; Lord Selborne's letter of January 7, 1907,
p. viii.

[132-1] Sir Harry H. Johnston in _Nineteenth Century_, London,
March 1912, questions the appropriateness of leaving these
dependencies in the care of Portugal. _Cf._ thirteen months
later, _Springfield_ (Massachusetts) _Weekly Republican_, June
12,1913: "That something is brewing in the way of a partition of
Portuguese Africa seems likely despite official disclaimers, and
the London _Spectator_ now sketches a hypothetical division.
. . . " Cf. _Transvaal Leader_, Johannesburg, December 5, 1912,
for an account of Lourenco Marques' "warning against the
neglectful attitude of the Home [Lisbon] Government toward this
Colony."

[132-2] The ratio of the population of British India to the
British Isles is approximately 7 to 1. A like ratio exists
between the populations of the Dutch Indies and Holland. _Cf._
A. Cabaton, _Java, Sumatra, and the other Islands of the Dutch
East Indies_, trans. Bernard Miall, London, 1911, p. 26.

[133-1] George Philip & Son Ltd., _Chamber of Commerce Atlas_,
London, 1912, p. 32.

[134-1] J.R. Seeley, _The Expansion of England_, London, 1883,
p. 20.

[134-2] _Cf._ W.M. West, _Modern History_, Boston, rev. ed.,
1907, pp.300-301.

[134-3] _Ibid._, pp. 294, 295.

[134-4] C.A.W. Pownall, _Thomas Pownall_, London, 1908, p. 95.
This was as of 1758.

[136-1] _Round Table_, London, June 1913, p. 485.

[137-1] Arthur Murphy, _The Works of Cornelius Tacitus_, London,
1798, vol. iv. p. 35.

[138-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xxiii. p. 870: "The Russian empire
stretches over a vast territory in E. Europe and N. Asia, with
an area exceeding 8,660,000 sq. m., or one-sixth of the land
surface of the globe. . . ."

[138-2] Cf. _ante_, p. 81, note 1.

[138-3] H. P. Kennard, comp. and ed., _The Russian Yearbook for
1912_, London, 1912, p. 46. This is as of 1910 census.

[139-1] Cf. _ante_, p. 81, note 1.

[141-1] _Round Table_, London, February 1911, p. 140.

[141-2] E. Backhouse and J.O.P. Bland, "Secret Annals of the
Manchu Court," in _Atlantic Monthly_, Boston, December 1913,
p.767.

[142-1] Toyo Kisen Kaisha (Oriental Steamship Company) boats
_Shinyo Maru, Chiyo Maru,_ and _Tenyo Maru_.

[143-1] Cf. _Round Table_, London, May 1911, pp. 263-269.

[144-1] Cf. _Springfield_ (Massachusetts) _Weekly Republican_,
June 26, 1913; and _Britannica Year Book_, London, 1913, p. 941.

[145-1] Cf. _Round Table_, London, February 1911, pp. 123-153.

[145-2] _Springfield_ (Massachusetts) _Weekly Republican_,
November 27, 1913.

[146-1] _Round Table_, London, September 1913, p. 602.

[146-2] A. T. Mahan, "Japan among the Nations," a letter to the
editor of _The Times_, in _The Times_ Weekly Edition, London,
June 27, 1913.

[152-1] C.A.W. Pownall, _Thomas Pownall_, London, 1908,
Supplement, p. 51.

[152-2] _Round Table_, London, September 1913, p. 675.

[152-3] _Statesman's Yearbook_, London, 1913, p. 857: 1910
population of Germany 64,925,993, which is 310.4 per square
mile.

[152-4] Germany 65,000,000; Japan 49,000,000; America
81,000,000; and all the seven Pan-Angle nations 141,000,000.

[153-1] Cf. _ante_, p. 132, note 1.

[155-1] Price Collier, _Germany and the Germans_, New York,
1913, p.190.

[155-2] Inaugural message of Governor David I. Walsh of
Massachusetts to the State Legislature, January 8, 1914.

[155-3] Note the effort, December 1913, of the lower house of
the German Parliament to make the Chancellor responsible not to
the Emperor but to the lower house.

[158-1] _Round Table_, London, September 1913, p. 675.

[158-2] _Ibid._, May 1911, p. 244.

[158-3] Admiral Henderson in "Report to Australian Government,"
quoted in _Round Table_, London, May 1911, p. 258.




{160}

VII

TENDENCIES


THE future of the Pan-Angles must flow out of their past. The
course it will take is indicated by our history if, following
Seeley's admonition, the investigator turns "narrative into
problems." "For in history everything depends upon turning
narrative into problems. So long as you think of history as a
mere chronological narrative, so long you are in the old
literary groove which leads to no trustworthy knowledge, but
only to that pompous conventional romancing of which all serious
men are tired. Break the drowsy spell of narrative; ask yourself
questions; set yourself problems; your mind will at once take up
a new attitude; you will become an investigator; you will cease
to be solemn and begin to be serious."[160-1]

The events of Pan-Angle history reveal three tendencies. These
may be designated as: spreading, separating, and converging.
They are to be noted both in the various national growths and in
the collective growth of the entire civilization. Without
discussing seriatim these three tendencies in each one of the
seven nations, or the singular {161} similarities exemplified in
the histories of the United States, Canada, Australia, and South
Africa, consideration is here given only to the aggregate swing
or movement in the whole civilization.

The spreading, starting with the days that saw the discovery of
Newfoundland, continued and made the whole of North America
Pan-Angle land. If the impulse had produced nothing more than
this, its work would have been stupendous. Yet the spreading was
so effective in other parts of the world that a large proportion
of the Southern Hemisphere also became Pan-Angle land. To-day we
control thirty per cent. of the world's land surface.[161-1]

The tendency to separate is stimulated whenever the imperative
Pan-Angle need of exercising self-government is improperly
checked. If this need is satisfied, separation is prevented. If
the need is denied satisfaction, it grows more and more acute to
the point of rupture.

The story of separations among us began with the failure to
recognize this principle of local autonomy, and the many
interferences which slowly exasperated the "American Englishmen"
to rebel. Thus was destroyed the first Britannic Empire. Thus
were embittered against each other the Americans and the British
of three generations.

The American Revolution, aptly called the Imperial Civil War,
started migrations. Loyalists from the thirteen new nations took
Pan-Angle ideals into Canada. "It has been estimated, apparently
on good authority, that in the two provinces of Nova Scotia and
New Brunswick {162} alone, the Loyalist emigrants and their
families amounted to not less than 35,000 persons, and the total
number of refugees cannot have been much less than
100,000."[162-1] This is the principal reason why Canada to-day
is Pan-Angle rather than French.[162-2] It is the reason, too,
why in some parts of Canada there is a feeling grounded on
inherited prejudice against the United States.

So little were the causes of the phenomenon of separating
understood by the rulers of the British Isles, that Canada, in
turn, came to the verge of a revolt which "was in fact a war of
nationality in the British Empire, though it wore the disguise
of a war of liberty."[162-3] "The settlement of the difficulty
was effected by means not very commonly in high favour. For
once_ systematic thought was brought to bear upon politics_.
. . . a young peer of considerable promise, Lord Durham, was
sent out as Governor in 1838; he issued a famous report, due to
the pen of Charles Buller, in which the Radical philosophers'
principles were vigorously applied . . . and in 1840 Parliament
was persuaded to give effect to the proposals made in the
report; . . . the main point was that _the Executive branch of
government was brought under the control of the colonists. . . .
The year 1841 is therefore the year of the inauguration of
modern Colonial government._"[162-4] The year 1841, therefore,
inaugurated the {163} policies that were in time to check the
separating tendency.

Not only was separation the desire of certain of the younger
groups, but it was to some extent the desire and foregone
conclusion of one group from which separation might take place.
The attitude of the British public concerning those portions of
the British world where English-speaking white men were claiming
increasingly the right to govern themselves was in itself more
than an invitation to these "colonies" to separate themselves
from the Mother Country. Comparison was made to a tree whose
ripened fruit in due season detaches itself from the parent
stem. The loss of the richest area in whose conquest the British
government ever shared had so impressed statesmen that such men
as Gladstone could desire the separation from the British Isles
of various Pan-Angle nations.

"During the years which preceded the repeal of the Corn Laws in
1846 there was in this country [British Isles] a general
indifference to the colonial question which did not cease till
long afterwards. . . . After the Cobden era came that of Mr.
Gladstone, who was in his zenith in the sixties and as purely
insular and deficient in the power of Imperial thought as Cobden
had been in the forties."[163-1] "A governor, leaving to take
charge of an Australian colony, was told even from the Colonial
Office that he would probably be the last representative of the
Crown sent out from Britain. This tendency of official thought
found its culmination when, in 1866, a great journal frankly
warned Canada, the {164} greatest of all the colonies, that it
was time to prepare for the separation from the mother-land that
must needs come."[164-1] "Mr. Goldwin Smith . . . in his . . .
_Canada and the Canadian Question_, which may fairly be supposed
to condense all that can be said in favor of the separation of
Canada from the Empire, and generally in support of that form of
national disintegration which is involved in the great colonies
becoming separate states or annexing themselves to other nations
. . . is almost the last conspicuous representative of a school
of thinkers which twenty-five or thirty years ago appeared
likely to dominate English opinion on colonial affairs."[164-2]
Only slowly were learned the lessons of the American Revolution,
which a British historian in 1883 could truthfully say, "We have
tacitly agreed to mention as seldom as we can."[164-3]

The tendency to separation is latent in every Pan-Angle
community. It is only when local and central authority are
properly balanced that it is quieted. In one it has never been
quieted. The story of Ireland it is unnecessary and inexpedient
here to narrate.[164-4] An Englander calls it "the greatest and
most lamentable failure of the Pax Britannica."[164-5] It is
merely the proof, again and again repeated, of the inability of
Pan-Angles {165} successfully to control the local affairs of
other Pan-Angles. There is something in us, in our
individualism, that forbids such success, and calls for
separation, which leads to rebellion if opposed, or revolution
if permitted.

The Irish for generations have been leaving Ireland. They leave
embittered against England. That bitterness they spread
broadcast in the six younger Pan-Angle nations. Everywhere in
these six nations the Irish find home rule.[165-1] The
bitterness against government, as government, wears off. The
Irishman becomes a citizen of a new and proud nation--he becomes
a self-conscious Pan-Angle. But the Irish Question is no nearer
solution than before.

Contemporaneous with the separation sentiments among the
Britannic peoples were the agitations in the United States that
were to culminate in the secession movement. The dread of a
strong central government had left in the southern portion of
America a belief in state separateness that worked against the
existence of a common government which, within the scope of its
authority could make decisions binding on all its component
lands and people. From the end of the French-Pan-Angle struggle
to the beginning of the American Civil War, the century of
1763-1861, the course of separation ran almost unchecked.

As this separation tendency strengthened, the unity of the race
and that of one of its component nations were exposed to
disintegration. The outcome {166} appeared to forebode the end
of Pan-Angle world control. A house divided against itself
cannot stand. If this family was to split into national factions
of increasingly smaller size, its end was apparent. Some other
civilization would absorb the scattered bits of the once
powerful race and another chapter of the struggles of successive
civilizations would be concluded.

Certain American states, desiring to loosen the tie by which
they were bound, seceded from the Union. Other states declared
their faith in the federal principle and took their stand
against separation. The issue was befogged in many minds by
other points of contention. But "the question submitted to the
arbitrament of war was the right of secession."[166-1] Those who
looked on could see that if success attended the secession
movement, Pan-Angles would have to begin again their search for
the means of preserving the balance between local and central
government. "My paramount object is to save the Union and not
either to save or destroy slavery," wrote Lincoln in
1862.[166-2]

Wilson characterizes the three great men of that struggle in
terms of the question at stake. Of Lincoln he says: "The whole
country is summed up in him: the rude Western strength, tempered
with shrewdness and a broad and humane wit; the Eastern
conservatism, regardful of law and devoted to fixed standards of
duty. He even understood {167} the South, as no other Northern
man of his generation did. He respected, because he
comprehended, though he could not hold, its view of the
Constitution; he appreciated the inexorable compulsions of its
past in respect of slavery; he would have secured it once more,
and speedily if possible, in its right to self-government when
the fight was fought out . . .

"Grant was Lincoln's suitable instrument, . . . A Western man,
he had no thought of commonwealths politically separate, and was
instinctively for the Union; a man of the common people, he
deemed himself always an instrument, never a master, and did his
work, though ruthlessly, without malice; a sturdy, hard-willed,
taciturn man, a sort of Lincoln the Silent in thought and
spirit."

On the opposite side Robert E. Lee fought "for a principle which
is in a sense scarcely less American than the principle of
Union. He represented the idea of the inherent--the
essential--separateness of self-government. . . . Lee did not
believe in secession, but he did believe in the local rootage of
all government. This is at the bottom, no doubt, an English
idea; but it has had a characteristic American development. It
is the reverse side of the shield which bears upon its obverse
the devices of the Union,[167-1] . . . Lee . . . could not
conceive of the nation apart from the State: above {168} all, he
could not live in the nation divorced from his neighbors. His
own community should decide his political destiny and
duty."[168-1]

The outcome of the American Civil War, to those in the Pan-Angle
world who were looking forward to an end of separatings--and
this included many in the British Isles,--gave hope and
inspiration. It demonstrated the reality of American nationhood
and, more important still, it encouraged the race on its path
towards convergence. It made natural the Canadian Constitution,
otherwise known as the British North America Act of 1867. It
made reasonable the foundation in London of the Royal Colonial
Institute in 1868, whose motto is "United Empire."[168-2] It
made comprehensible the theses of such books as Dilke's _Greater
Britain_, 1868, and Seeley's _Expansion of England_,
1883.[168-3] Later were to come the convergences of the
Australian states in 1900 and the South African provinces in
1909. "For the idea of national unity the people of the United
States twenty-five years ago made sacrifices of life and money
without a parallel in modern history. No one now doubts that the
end justified the enormous expenditure of national force. 'The
Union must be preserved' was the pregnant sentence into which
Lincoln condensed the national duty of the moment, and to
maintain this principle he was able to concentrate the national
energy for a supreme effort. The strong man who {169} saved the
great republic from disruption takes his place, without a
question, among the benefactors of mankind."[169-1]

Moreover, the outcome of the American Civil War tended to revise
the attitudes of the British Isles and America toward each
other. Up to this time, their attention had been fixed on the
conditions of their separation. Hostility seized on various acts
performed or permitted by the British government which, rightly
or wrongly, the American people considered acts of
unfriendliness. These, as the Americans realized, they were
hardly in a position to resent while the Civil War was in
progress, although at one time war was very nearly declared
against the British Isles.[169-2] When the Civil War was over,
retaliation might have been undertaken. The American government
had at its disposal a navy of over seven hundred vessels, of
which over seventy were ironclads. It had an army of over one
million seasoned men. The opportunity suggested itself as a
proper time to payoff American grudges against the British Isles
by annexing Canada. This would have been holding Canada blamable
for the doings of another nation. To the credit of the
Pan-Angles, President Grant successfully opposed the
scheme.[169-3] Not only did the decade 1860-1870 mark the rise
of the converging movement in the United States and in Canada,
but the same decade saw the culmination and abatement of
separating tendencies between {170} the two great powers of the
Pan-Angle group, the British Isles and America.

Since those days Pan-Angles have made progress in understanding
the balance necessary between the separating and the converging
impulses. Men have erred by emphasizing too strongly one side or
the other. In America they cried out blindly for
"centralization," or "states rights "--in ignorance that only by
the complementary strengths of both central and local
governments can our sort of people be governed in great masses.
Among the Britannic peoples men favoured either British Isles
ascendency, or colonial independence--ignorant that the first
would as quickly destroy them as would the second. Either course
would produce the independence of the younger nations and,
through lack of strength to maintain that independence, the loss
of it, possibly to some nation outside the Pan-Angle group.
These American and Britannic extremists are now a diminishing
minority.

The growth of the idea of complementary functions in co-ordinate
(not superior and inferior) governments has been instanced by
many developments in America. There was a time, many now alive
can remember the days, when "centralization" and "states rights"
were championed by opposing political parties. To-day it is
recognized that the successful government of America rests on
the proper use of both of these extremes. This is true, whether
it refers to national versus state authorities, or state versus
municipal authorities. With a strong central authority in
America goes to-day greater recognition of the need of a
concurrent local control. This local spirit has gone so far in
{171} some of the American states that state legislatures have
authorized cities to draw up their own charters.[171-1]
Moreover, American political experience within the states has
adhered in many cases to the theorem that, on such questions as
local taxation and the sale of liquor, the smaller subdivisions
of the state should decide their own usages.

Once it was assumed that the officers of the federal government
in America should enlarge as much as possible their spheres of
activity, even if they appeared to encroach upon state
functions. It is now realized that the states should be
encouraged to attend to their own affairs, and thus avoid
increasing the burdens of the federal government. President
Roosevelt in 1908 unofficially called together the American
state governors to discuss "conservation," and since then yearly
these state executives have met to discuss questions of state
policy. These conferences not only tend to produce greater
uniformity of Pan-Angle political action, but tend also to make
that action the product of large experience. This Conference of
the Governors[171-2] and other non-official bodies, the {172}
American Bar Association among them, are now encouraged by
public opinion to remedy, in whatever ways seem wise,
undesirable discrepancies in the laws of the various states, not
by seeking greater authority in the central government, but by
agitating in the states themselves.

The extent of our progress is shown strikingly by the change in
Pan-Angle sentiment between the wars of 1861-1865 and 1899-1902.
In South Africa the race was spared any repetition of the
humiliating political corruption of the "carpet-bag" era of the
American "reconstruction."[172-1] We have learned that whether
it is in the United States or South Africa, in Canada[172-2] or
in Ireland, white men must be made into self-governing
Pan-Angles. Rhodes recognized this when he said even while the
war was in progress, ". . . you cannot govern South Africa by
trampling on the Dutch."[172-3] The impulses toward local
autonomy and those toward a common group unity must be
correlated. To favour either at the expense of the other is to
court disaster.

The spreading of the Pan-Angles is still going on, though in the
multiplicity of affairs arising in {173} the places we already
occupy we often overlook the pioneer work of the present. The
causes for separating have been understood and extensively
removed. The converging tendency is now in the ascendant. The
political evolution that accompanies this convergence, though it
seems slow to the impatient reformer, may, if understood and
assisted by those who shape popular opinion, give Pan-Angles in
the fulness of time an entity government.

This converging tendency of the race, Americans have seen with
satisfaction in their own land. As far as they have been
conversant with it, they have approved of it in Britannic lands.
A Canadian wrote in 1892: "Among thinking native Americans I
have found, as a rule, a genuine sympathy with the advocates of
unity for British people, a sympathy perfectly natural in a
nation which has suffered and sacrificed so much as the people
of the United States have for a similar object."[173-1] Since
our knowledge of each other has grown in twenty odd years this
might to-day be expressed even more strongly. Moreover, "English
people," the same writer testifies, "now understand and respect
the motives which actuated the resolute and successful struggle
of the people of the United States against disruption."[173-2]


There is to-day a great drawing together of the whole Pan-Angle
race. The desires of Franklin and his supporters are nearing
realization. The {174} errors which led to our separations have
passed into the race experience. We can all profit by them. We
have all profited by them. The tendency to convergence was never
wholly in operative. It survived the wrench of the American
Revolution. Lord Shelburne, in conducting the British side of
the peace negotiations of 1783, held to the ideal of restoring
Pan-Angle unity, and thereafter worked for it in Parliament,
hoping "that this would have been the beginning of the great
Anglo-Saxon federation of which Chatham had dreamed;
. . ."[174-1]

The power of this impulse drawing us together is evidenced in
the peace that has endured among us. The century closing
December 24, 1914, stands as witness. Within our whole
civilization, this period has chronicled only two wars of white
men on Pan-Angle soil--1861-1865 and 1899-1902. These were
devastating and deeply to be regretted. They remind us that
peace is not to be taken for granted. Between the two entirely
independent sections of the Pan-Angles, and these are at the
same time the most populous, no conflict of interests has been
allowed to develop into war. Differences of opinion have arisen,
as was inevitable. They have been settled through the exercise
of forbearance, self-control, and concession, without recourse
to arms.

Needless to try to apportion the credit between the two nations.
Canadians have sometimes felt {175} that their interests were
being sacrificed on the altar of British-American friendship.
"Those who study the history of the questions which have arisen
from time to time since the Peace of 1813 between this country
[British Isles] and the United States, can hardly fail to be
struck by a difference in the habitual attitude of the two
Powers. Great Britain has always been pliable as to such
questions; having indeed every motive, both of sentiment and of
interest, for being and remaining on the best terms possible
with the United States."[175-1] Another Britannic critic not
only denies that the British negotiators have been pliable, but
claims that as envoys on Canada-America disputes they have been
of a cleverness at least equal to that of the Americans.[175-2]

Whoever may have appreciated it more keenly, the fact is now
evident that the community of interests which embraces all
Pan-Angles is an affair of transcending importance. Our great
men have understood this and given it repeated expression. Mr.
Joseph Chamberlain said at Toronto in 1897: "But I should think
our patriotism was dwarfed and stunted indeed if it did not
embrace the Greater Britain beyond the seas; if it did not
include the young and vigorous nations carrying throughout the
globe the knowledge of the English tongue and the English love
of liberty and law; and, gentlemen, with {176} those feelings I
refuse to think or speak of the United States of America as a
foreign nation. We are all of the same race and blood. I refuse
to make any distinction between the interests of Englishmen in
England, in Canada, and in the United States."[176-1] An
Australian in 1912 wrote: "British interests in India or the
East Indies would not be attacked; if there were a large
Australian fleet. The problems of defence in Canada, South
Africa, Egypt, and United States [_sic_] would be distinctly
easier with such a fleet."[176-2] Note that he makes no
distinction which sets the United States aside from other
Pan-Angles. Lord Bryce--and no American is more highly esteemed
in the United States than he,--[176-3] speaking in London in
1913, said: "Returning hither from America, I have two things to
say to the British Pilgrims gathered here as friends of the
American people. One is that you must not take too seriously the
lurid pictures of American life drawn in some organs of the
European press. In Washington I used to be struck by the dark
view which the press news from England conveyed of British
events and conditions, a view which I knew to be misleading.
Here the same thing happens. Cable messages and {177} the vivid
pens of correspondents inevitably heighten the colour. My other
message is to assure you that the friendship you entertain for
the people of the United States is reciprocated by them far more
universally and heartily than ever before. There is a friendship
of governments and a friendship of nations. The former may shift
with the shifting of material interests or be affected by the
relations of each power with other powers. But the latter rests
on solid and permanent foundations. With our two peoples it is
based on a community of speech, of literature, of institutions,
of beliefs, of traditions from the past, of ideals for the
future. In all these things the British and American peoples are
closer than any two other peoples can be. Nature and history
have meant them to be friends."[177-1]

Against this spirit of amity not a dissenting voice is raised.
We rejoice in the peace of the years behind us and in the good
feeling of the era at hand. We seek some means to perpetuate
them.


Political good feeling in its different degrees takes, according
to Pan-Angle experience, three forms. These so merge, that it is
difficult at times to define in terms of them. They may be known
for purpose of study as: friendship, alliance, and common
government.

The relations between England and its American colonies started
in the friendship stage. Later developed a co-operation that can
be fairly called {178} alliance. In the French-Pan-Angle
struggle for North America, the colonies contributed men and
money, as did Great Britain. Together they won much of the
territory now the United States and all that is now Canada.
Together they did more than this. "The Seven Years War made
England what she is. It crippled the commerce of her rival,
ruined France in two continents, and blighted her as a colonial
power. It gave England the control of the seas and the mastery
of North America and India, made her the first of commercial
nations, and prepared that vast colonial system that has planted
new Englands in every part of the globe."[178-1] Pownall, during
his term as governor, saw Massachusetts raise at the requisition
of the Crown not the 2300 men asked for, but 7000.[178-2]
"Owners of property were paying in taxes two-thirds of their
incomes."[178-3] Yet their legislature in 1759 voted funds for a
monument to Lord Howe, who had fallen the previous summer at
Ticonderoga. It stands in Westminster Abbey[178-4] to-day, a
memorial as well of the men whose "affection to the mother
country . . . zeal for the service," Pownall knew from
experience.[178-5] Speaking in the British House of Commons, of
which he was a member 1768-1780, {179} he describes their
attitude during the Seven Years War. In case of a French
invasion of England at that time, he testifies: "Those New
England men would have been ready to come over at their own
expense to the assistance of their native country--as they
always hold England to be."[179-1]

After the pressure of war was removed, the alliance, instead of
being carried to the stage of common government, was neglected.
Friendship and co-operation became things of the past, and
separation took place. Many then thought that this might have
been avoided. Governor Pownall, for one, knew that there was "a
certain good temper and right spirit which, if observed on both
sides, might bring these matters of dispute to such a settlement
as political truth and liberty are best established
upon."[179-2] The "certain good temper" did not then prevail.
To-day, in 1914, we see the advantage of acting in the "right
spirit" which may bring all our affairs to such a settlement as
is conducive to the welfare of all Pan-Angles.

The United States in itself shows, perhaps most completely, the
detailed history of the political growth of groups of Pan-Angles
through the three stages. The defensive alliance of the American
colonies fell apart after the successful outcome of the French
War. The friendship between the thirteen nations survived, and
common necessity with a common cause[179-3] produced the
alliance {180} which made successful the American Revolution.
Thereafter came the critical period of American history.[180-1]
The first attempt at common government in 1781 took the form of
a strengthened alliance and failed, because alliance was at this
juncture inadequate. Undaunted, the Americans framed another
constitution for the potential nation. Here at last was a common
government.

It has survived so long that to-day the United States is the
oldest republic in the world. It has endured the strain of both
foreign and civil wars. It has permitted the assimilation of
vast hordes of white people, who now cherish this government as
their own. This government expresses the will of eighty-one
millions of whites--a majority of the English-speaking people of
the world.[180-2]

Of the six Britannic nations, Canada, Australia, and South
Africa have travelled through friendship and alliance to common
government. Canada, apparently divided by two languages, was the
first thus to establish its nationhood. Australia was the
second. More recently still, South Africa, in spite of a
diversity of tongues, achieved the same result.[180-3]

{181}

There are those who maintain that the six Britannic nations have
not yet arrived at the alliance stage. "Everything hangs on
sentiment, influence, and management."[181-1] Some recommend
that an alliance should be definitely entered into.[181-2] Yet
while it is true that the five younger Britannic entities are
"nations, with a life, a pride, a consciousness of their own,
with separate, divergent, and in some cases indeed conflicting
interests,"[181-3] it seems also true that a friendly alliance
does exist among them and between them and the British Isles.

It is an alliance _de facto_ if not _de jure_, its terms being
unwritten, unstated, and unknown. In the Colonial Conference of
1902, "To Sir Wilfrid Laurier's famous challenge, 'If you want
our aid, call us to your councils,' the Colonial Secretary
[Chamberlain] made an emphatic response. 'Gentlemen, we do want
your aid. We do want your assistance in the administration of
the vast Empire which is yours as well as ours. The weary Titan
staggers under the too vast orb of his fate. We have borne the
burden for many years. We think it time that our children should
assist us to support it, and whenever you make the request to
us, be very sure that we shall hasten gladly to call you to our
councils.'"[181-4] In the South African {182} War, and more
recently in their efforts in behalf of greater naval strength,
the six nations behaved as allies affording inspiring examples
of what they can and may again do. Certainly the political good
feeling between the Britannic nations cannot be said to have
progressed further than to the alliance stage, since "any
political arrangement in which powers are withheld, or granted
upon terms, or are subject to revision at the will of any member
of the confederacy, is not a real union, but only an
alliance."[182-1]

Between the United States and the British Isles are treaties
that bind them into an extraordinarily close alliance--treaties
which are the strongest written expressions of international
goodwill.[182-2] On the even closer "understanding" between the
two nations, so that they are found acting in concert in every
part of the globe, it is unnecessary to dwell.

But between the United States and the younger Britannic nations,
what is the relation? They are undoubtedly friendly, but where
is the formal evidence of such friendliness? The five younger
nations can hardly be considered partners to the alliance
between the United States and the British Isles, as in making
this alliance these five had no share. To form an alliance
between the United States and the Britannic power, inclusive of
the six Britannic nations, is now impossible, because such {183}
a Britannic political entity able to ratify treaties is
non-existent. Postulating an alliance among all the Britannic
nations, the United States through its alliance with the British
Isles may perhaps be considered as allied to the allies of its
ally. As we are now organized, this is as far as we have been
able to progress. It is just beyond the friendship stage.

The seven Pan-Angle nations are to-day bound together by
friendship and, in some cases, alliance. They are united by
sentiment only, whether it be unwritten or written. At this
stage many of our groups have found themselves in the past. It
has held for them two possibilities. Sentiment was the bond
between Pan-Angles after the French War which ended in 1763. The
bond failed to hold and separation followed. Sentiment in
alliance form was tried in the Articles of Confederation in
1781. It failed; and on its ruins was built a common government.
It is of no moment that sentiment in the first case was
unwritten, and in the second case, written. Sentiment is not
government. Need other cases of failure be mentioned? It is for
us to determine whether, when our present relationships change,
they give way to separation and weakness, or develop by
convergence into the strength of a common government. The motto
of our youngest nation points out the hope of our future, "Ex
unitate vires."



[160-1] J.R. Seeley, _The Expansion of England_, London, 1883,
pp.174-175.

[161-1] Cf. _ante_, p. 16.

[162-1] Jones, _History of New York_, ii. pp. 259,268,500,509,
quoted by G. F. Parkin, _Imperial Federation_, London, 1892,
note, p. 124.

[162-2] _Cf._ G. R. Parkin, _Imperial Federation_, London, 1892,
pp. 127, 153.

[162-3] J. R. Seeley, _The Expansion of England_, London, 1883,
p. 48.

[162-4] Alfred Caldecott, _English Colonization and Empire_,
London, 1891, pp. 131-133.

[163-1] C.A.W. Pownall, _Thomas Pownall_, London, 1908,
Supplement, pp. 9, 10.

[164-1] G.R. Parkin, _Imperial Federation_, London, 1892, p. 8.

[164-2] _Ibid._, p. 163.

[164-3] J.R. Seeley, _The Expansion of England_, London, 1883,
p. 22.

[164-4] For a general account of Ireland in this connection, see
Price Collier, _England and the English_, London, 1911, pp.
230-262; and for a constitutional discussion, Cf. _Round Table_,
London, December 1913, pp. 1-67.

[164-5] H.S. Perris, _Pax Britannica_, London, 1913, p. 139.

[165-1] As Home Rule, like other political terms, has been used
to denote many theorems, its meaning in any statement depends
somewhat on the particular instance.

[166-1] W.H. Taft, _Popular Government_, New Haven, Connecticut,
1913, p. 137.

[166-2] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xxiii. p. 178, Letter of Abraham
Lincoln to Horace Greeley, August 1862.

[167-1] _Cf._ W.H. Taft, _Popular Government_, New Haven,
Connecticut, 1913, p.151: "It is essential . . . in the life of
our dual government that the power and functions of the State
governments be maintained in all the fulness that they were
intended to have by the framers of the Constitution."

[168-1] Woodrow Wilson, _Mere Literature_, Boston, 1900, pp.
208-210.

[168-2] _United Empire_ is also the title of the magazine
published monthly by the Royal Colonial Institute, London.

[168-3] C. W. Dilke, _Greater Britain_, London, 1868; J. R.
Seeley, _The Expansion of England_, London, 1883.

[169-1] G. R. Parkin, _Imperial Federation_, London, 1892, p.
25.

[169-2] According to H.C. Lodge--_One Hundred Years of Peace_,
New York, 1913, p.108--September 3, 1863, was the crucial day.

[169-3] _Ibid._, pp. 118-119.

[171-1] Cf. _Ency. Brit._, vol. xxvii. p. 651.

[171-2] _The Outlook_, New York, December 21, 1912, p. 843: "The
first Governors' Conference was called by President Roosevelt in
1908. It met at the White House to consider the subject of
Conservation. So immediately evident was the desirability of
co-operation that Governor Willson, of Kentucky, sprang to his
feet at the close of one of the sessions and said, 'Gentlemen,
let me detain you a moment.' He went to the platform and there
unfolded a plan for a Conference of the Governors, to be called
by themselves. This was held at Washington in 1909. The third
meeting of the Governors occurred at Frankfort, Kentucky,
Governor Willson's own capital, in 1911, . . . The Governors'
Conference is apparently becoming something of a fixture in our
political life."

[172-1] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xxv. pp. 480-481: Peace signed at
Pretoria, May 31, 1902; self-government decreed, December 12,
1906; elections held in Transvaal, February 1907.

[172-2] _Cf._ Alfred Caldecott, _English Colonization and
Empire_, London, 1891, p. 130: "Canada was a conquered
possession, not a settlement, it is true; but the attempt to
treat it as a conquest nearly ended in another catastrophe."

[172-3] W.T. Stead, _The Last Will and Testament of Cecil John
Rhodes_, London, 1902, p. 113.

[173-1] G. R. Parkin, _Imperial Federation_, London, 1892, p.
253.

[173-2] _Ibid._, p. 254.

[174-1] _Round Table_, London, December 1913, p. 112. As to
Chatham's plans for both Irish and American co-operation in
Pan-Angle government, see A. L. Burt, _Imperial Architects_,
Oxford, 1913, pp. 28-32.

[175-1] Roundell Palmer, Earl of Selborne, _Memorials: Part II.,
Personal and Political_, London, 1898, vol. i. p. 202.

[175-2] _Round Table_, London, December 1913, pp. 106-122. This
article should amuse all Pan-Angles by its fraternal frankness
in describing the diplomacy of both British and American actors
in these dramas. It also throws light on the usages of so-called
"international arbitration."

[176-1] Mr. Chamberlain at Toronto, December 30, 1897, quoted by
M. Victor Berard, _British Imperialism and Commercial
Supremacy_, trans. H. W. Foskett, London, 1906, p. 200.

[176-2] _Round Table_, London, September 1912, p. 722.

[176-3] At a farewell dinner given to Mr. Bryce in New York
City, former American Ambassador to the British Isles Joseph H.
Choate turned to the guest of honour and stated: "England has
sent, will send, many Ambassadors, but there's only one Bryce in
the whole list. The American people from the Atlantic to the
Pacific love and honour you, sir." See _The Outlook_, New York,
May 10, 1913, p. 80.

[177-1] Mr. Bryce before the Pilgrims Club in London, November
6, 1913, quoted by _Springfield_ (Massachusetts) _Weekly
Republican_, November 7, 1913.

[178-1] Francis Parkman, _Montcalm and Wolfe_, London, 1884,
vol. i. p.3.

[178-2] C.A.W. Pownall, _Thomas Pownall_, London, 1908, p. 157.

[178-3] _Ibid._, p. 95. This is as of 1758.

[178-4] Cf. _ibid._, p. 125. The monument is in the Belfry
Tower, the north aisle of nave. _Cf._ Baedeker's _London_, 1911,
p. 217. It was Lord Howe's brother, Sir William Howe, who on
March 17, 1776, evacuated Boston to abandon the city to these
same American Englishmen--now rebels.

[178-5] C.A.W. Pownall, _Thomas Pownall_, London, 1908, p. 157.

[179-1] C.A.W. Pownall, _Thomas Pownall_, London, 1908, p. 232.

[179-2] _Ibid._, p. 202.

[179-3] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1897, rev. ed., Boston,
1911, p. 453: "Despite very considerable outward differences of
social condition and many apparent divergencies of interest as
between colony and colony, they one and all _wanted the same
revolution_. . . . They did not so much _make_ a common cause as
_have_ a common cause from the first."

[180-1] See John Fiske, _The Critical Period of American
History_, 1788-1789, Boston, 1898.

[180-2] Cf. _ante_, p. 81, note 1.

[180-3] P. A. Molteno's _A Federal South Africa_, London, 1896,
written more than three years before the Boer War, compares the
then condition of South Africa with the condition of the
American thirteen nations in the days covered by Fiske's _The
Critical Period of American History_, contains a prophecy now
fulfilled, and is a valuable comment on many of the needs of the
Pan-Angle world of to-day.

[181-1] F. S. Oliver, _Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on American
Union_, London, 1906, p. 447.

[181-2] Richard Jebb, _The Britannic Question_, London, 1913.

[181-3] Lord Milner, December 14, 1906, at Conservative Club,
Manchester, England, in Lord Milner, _The Nation and the
Empire_, London, 1913, p. 142.

[181-4] Richard Jebb, _Studies in Colonial Nationalism_, London,
1905, p.138.

[182-1] F. S. Oliver, _Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on American
Union_, London, 1906, p. 452.

[182-2] For a history of the General Arbitration Treaty of 1911
between America and the British Isles and its full text as
proposed and as ratified, see H.S. Perris, _Pax Britannica_,
London, 1913, pp. 285-298, 801-807.




{184}

VIII

A COMMON GOVERNMENT


WHO, first of all, dreamed of closer union between England (or
Great Britain) and its colonies we do not know. As early as 1652
there came from Barbados a suggestion. It was in no way followed
up. Colonel Thomas Modyford "desires, although it may seem
immodest, that two representatives should be chosen by the
island to sit and vote in the English parliament."[184-1]

In the following century Benjamin Franklin devised a scheme of
union and laboured to commend it to the makers of Pan-Angle
history. In June 1754 he attended a conference of eleven of the
colonies met at Albany to consider defence against the Indians.
That matter disposed of, Franklin submitted a plan for the union
of the {185} colonies.[185-1] Later in the year he wrote as
follows to Shirley, Royal Governor of Massachusetts: "Since the
conversation your Excellency was pleased to honor me with, on
the subject of _uniting the colonies_ more intimately with Great
Britain, by allowing them _representatives_ in Parliament, I
have something further considered that matter, and am of opinion
that such a union would be very acceptable to the colonies,
provided they had a reasonable number of representatives allowed
them; . . .

"I should hope, too, that by such a union the people of Great
Britain and the people of the colonies would learn to consider
themselves as not belonging to different communities with
different interests, but to one community with one interest;
which I imagine would contribute to strengthen the whole, and
greatly lessen the danger of future separations. . . .

"Now, I look on the colonies as so many countries gained to
Great Britain, and more advantageous to it than if they had been
gained out of the seas around its coasts and joined to its
lands; . . . and since they are all included in the British
empire, which has only extended itself by their means, and the
strength and wealth of the parts are the strength and wealth of
the whole, what imports it to the general state whether a
merchant, a smith, or a hatter grows rich in Old or New England?
. . . And if there be any difference, those who have most
contributed to enlarge Britain's empire and commerce, increase
her strength, her wealth, and {186} the numbers of her people,
at the risk of their own lives and private fortunes in new and
strange countries, methinks ought rather to expect some
preference."[186-1]

The Albany scheme failed of adoption. The race was not ripe for
Franklin's foresight.[186-2] Years afterwards he wrote: "The
different and contrary reasons of dislike to my plan make me
suspect that it was really the true medium; and I am still of
opinion that it would have been happy for both sides if it had
been adopted. The Colonies so united would have been
sufficiently strong to have defended themselves. There would
then have been no need of troops from England. Of course, the
consequent pretext for taxing America and the bloody contest it
occasioned would have been avoided. But such mistakes are not
new; history is full of the errors of states and princes. Those
who govern, having much business on their hands, do not
generally like to take the trouble of considering and carrying
into execution new projects. The best public measures are
therefore seldom adopted from previous wisdom but forced by the
occasion."[186-3]

{187}

But Franklin's idea did not die. Thomas Pownall, just out from
England, a man later appointed Downing Street's Governor of
Massachusetts, attended the Albany Colonial Conference. He heard
the deliberations and talked with the commissioners and, as he
himself wrote later, then "first conceived the idea and saw the
necessity of a general British union."[187-1] The acquaintance
he made there with Franklin grew into closest friendship. Both
men wrote in favour of colonial representation;[187-2] and
present in many ways an adequate epitome of the best thought of
each branch of their civilization.

Pownall recognized that the race would outgrow its London
capital. In 1766 he wrote that representatives of the colonies,
if apportioned according to population, would in time outnumber
those of Great Britain, and "the centre of power instead of
remaining fixed as it is now in Great Britain will, as the
magnitude and interest of the colonies increases, be drawn out
from these islands by the same laws of nature, analogous in all
cases, by which the centre of gravity, now near the face of the
sun, would, by an increase of the quantity of {188} matter in
the planets, be drawn out beyond that surface."[188-1] This
result, he thought, might be guarded against by stipulating that
the colonial members were always to come to England.[188-2] A
present-day Englander makes no such stipulation. Lord Milner in
Johannesburg in 1904 stated: "I am an Imperialist
out-and-out--and by an Imperialist I don't mean that which is
commonly supposed to be indicated by the word. It is not the
domination of Great Britain over the other parts of the Empire
that is in my mind when I call myself an Imperialist
out-and-out. I am an Englishman, but I am an Imperialist more
than an Englishman, and I am prepared to see the Federal Council
of the Empire sitting in Ottawa, in Sydney, in South
Africa--sitting anywhere within the Empire--if in the great
future we can only all hold together."[188-3]

About another objection Pownall consulted Franklin. "He had been
told that if the colonists were to pay the same taxes as people
in England and, like them, to send members to Parliament, equal
powers of trade must be conceded. When that was done the
Atlantic commerce might afterwards centre in New York or Boston,
and power be transferred there from England. 'Which consequence,
however it may suit a citizen of the world, must be folly and
madness to a Briton.' {189} So exclaimed the Englishman who
wrote to his colonial friend for a solution of the difficulty.
The American-born Franklin took quite another view. He saw no
difficulty at all; he replied that the fallacy lay in supposing
that gain to a British Colony was loss to Britain. He maintained
that the whole Empire gained if any part of it developed a
particular trade, and he predicted that without a complete
union, by which full and equal rights were given, the existing
system of government could not long be retained. Assuming
Pownall's premises to be correct he inquired, 'which is best--to
have a total separation or a change of the seat of
government?'"[189-1]

Soon it was too late to answer Franklin's question. A separation
took place, and two supreme governments divided the
responsibility of safe-guarding the English-speaking whites. As
time passed, each portion of the Pan-Angles founded colonies.
The American colonies were held to the American "home" states by
means of a federal government The British Isles colonies have,
in some instances, federated among themselves, so that to-day
the Britannic power consists of six nations. And now all seven
nations are appreciating how superficial are these political
separations. To-day we have seven central seats of government,
and after a century of peace, a new question arises--whether we
should re-form our relations.

One hundred and twenty-three years after Franklin and Pownall so
discussed the migration of the seat of government of the
English-speaking {190} peoples, another Colonial and another
Englander corresponded on the same subject. Cecil John Rhodes
wrote to William T. Stead: "What an awful thought it is that if
we had not lost America, or if even now we could arrange with
the present members of the United States Assembly and our House
of Commons, the peace of the world is secured for all eternity!
We could hold your federal parliament five years at Washington
and five at London."[190-1] Stead has recorded a conversation of
the same year in which Rhodes "expressed his readiness to adopt
the course from which he had at first recoiled--viz. that of
securing the unity of the English-speaking race by consenting to
the absorption of the British Empire in the American Union if it
could not be secured in any other way. In his first dream he
clung passionately to the idea of British ascendancy--this was
in 1877--in the English-speaking union of which he then thought
John Bull was to be the predominant partner. But in 1891,
abandoning in no whit his devotion to his own country, he
expressed his deliberate conviction that English-speaking
reunion was so great an end in itself as to justify even the
sacrifice of the monarchical features and isolated existence of
the British Empire . . . and from that moment the ideal of
English-speaking reunion assumed its natural and final place as
the centre of his political aspirations."[190-2]

As Franklin and Pownall foresaw, the race {191} centre moved out
of England. Emerson in 1856 realized that in America "is the
seat and centre of the British race,"[191-1] a statement
strengthened since by the growth of Canada. North America is now
the centre of Pan-Angle civilization, and Canada is the key of
the Britannic world.

The impulse to closer union has never been long quiescent. It
has been active again and again in the minds of men. A century
after Franklin presented his Albany plan for the race, Joseph
Howe "looked upon the attainment of complete independence of
local government in the colonies as but a stepping-stone to the
assertion of still higher national rights, to the acceptance of
still higher responsibilities; to some form of substantial union
among British people, based on considerations of equal
citizenship and the defence of common interests. As far back as
1854 he delivered in the Nova Scotia Legislature an address,
since published . . . under the name of the 'Organization of the
Empire' which ... embodies most of what has since been said by the
advocates of national unity. Twelve years later, when on a visit
to England, he published in pamphlet form an essay bearing the
same title, and giving his more fully matured views upon the
question. If the genesis and enunciation of the Imperial
Federation idea in its modern form is to be credited to anyone,
it must be assigned to Joseph Howe for this early and
comprehensive statement of the main issues involved. The study
of the utterances of this great colonist, this champion of
colonial rights, may be {192} commended to those shallow critics
who profess to believe that the proposal for national unity is
an outcome of Imperial selfishness, and that its operation would
tend to cramp colonial development."[192-1]


Franklin and Pownall wrote in the days when the race knew only
the English method of integration--"absorptive,
incorporative."[192-2] The various American colonies had been
experimenting in effecting combinations on another principle,
but their successes had hardly yet proved that the same
principle in extended form could be applied to the desired union
between all the governments of the English-speaking race. In
1787 was drawn up the Constitution of the United States of
America, and the federal method of integration was put
definitely to trial. In 1801 Ireland was united to Great
Britain, but not by federation. Irish members were admitted to
the Parliament of the United Kingdom much after the manner in
which Franklin had suggested that American members should be
admitted. In the century or more since has been proved the value
of federation which means neither confederation[192-3] of groups
bound by treaties whereby no adequate affirmative policy or
common government would be possible, nor absorption whereby
local self-government would be obscured or blotted out, but an
expedient combining both local freedom and central strength. The
South African Colonial writing to the {193} Englander who shared
his vision takes for granted a "federal parliament."

The forms Pan-Angle governments take are now two. One is the
simple unitary form in which the central government is supreme
within the sanction of the will of the voters expressed at the
polls, any other government being a subordinate, i.e. a
municipal government. The other form is not unitary, and the
central government is supreme in the exercise of certain
authority only, other governments being in all else supreme and
autonomous partners.

The states of America, for example, and those of Australia are
unitary in government. Of the seven Pan-Angle nations, three,
Newfoundland, New Zealand, and the British Isles, are unitary,
the central government in each being supreme over every part and
in every respect.

Of the non-unitary governments there are four: the United
States, Canada, Australia, and South Africa. By an accident of
time and place America was the first to grapple with the
problems which called for such a government. Thirteen states
independent of each other and of any outside power found
themselves in danger from inter-state contentions and external
aggressions. Building for their very lives, they devised a form
of government which has been called federal. In it each state
kept most of its sovereign powers, but delegated certain others
of them to a central legislature. The federation of the six
Australian states followed much the same lines. In Canada and
South Africa the states (in both cases called provinces) have
retained less of their local autonomy. {194} The central
government in the former may with some legislative difficulty
and delay assume any power it desires, while in the latter
unrestricted power has been lodged from the beginning in the
central government. In neither of these two nations, however,
has the central government assumed the exercise of its full
possible power. In both it co-exists at present with the
provincial governments after a federal manner, obtaining thus
the advantages of federation.

For comparatively restricted areas within which problems and
opinions are tolerably uniform, a unitary government satisfies
Pan-Angles. States and provinces are such areas. Newfoundland
and New Zealand are at present such areas. In Newfoundland the
population is very sparse and the local variations are slight.
It will be many years probably before there arises a need and a
desire for devolution[194-1] of power from the present
legislature. In New Zealand conditions are not so uniform, and
although a unitary government seems satisfactory to-day, the
time may readily be imagined when a denser population and
conflicting interests of different sections of the country may
make feasible local legislatures, each, for its allotted tasks,
supreme. The only attempt so far towards that end originated
outside of New Zealand and was abandoned before being put into
practice.[194-2]

{195}

The unitary method of government has never proved itself able
successfully to integrate areas divided from each other by
distance or interests. It failed to hold together the first
Britannic growth; it has been unable to bring into unity the
second Britannic growth; it is acknowledged to be inadequate for
such a task. Its weaknesses are evident in the British Isles.
The British Isles, although no larger than many states and
provinces, is composed of several sections divided by history,
prejudice, and interest. These are now united into one
government, in which one central legislature is supreme.
Questions which may affect some one section alone are decided by
the representatives of the country at large who are possibly
both uninterested and uninformed. Scottish education, Welsh
Church, and Irish land bills are dependent on the will of the
whole British Isles,[195-1] and a multitude of strictly local
affairs must wait for the attention of Parliament, since no
other body has power to deal with them.

The results of this condition are two: first, a congestion of
business in Parliament incompatible {196} with efficient and
intelligent action; and, second, the violation of the principles
of self-government producing discord between the several
sections of the country. No one questions that Parliament to-day
labours under the terrible disadvantage of having more to do
than it possibly can accomplish. Needed and uncontended
legislation is delayed for years, and such bills as are passed
receive often inadequate consideration.[196-1] Though unity has
up to now been preserved, the lack of local self-government has
produced discords always more or less active. At times these
have threatened to break out into violent disruption.

To overcome these weaknesses--to relieve the burdens of
Parliament and to check the tendency to separation--many
thinkers and patriots in the British Isles are convinced that
some devolution of power to local legislatures cannot be long
delayed.[196-2] There is talk of Irish, Scottish, and Welsh home
rule. The present control of British Isles affairs by the Irish
members of the House of Commons is teaching the desirability of
home rule for England. Some would re-form the country into still
smaller governmental sections. In the operation of any such plan
a central Parliament is to be in control of certain nation-wide
interests, among which would be foreign affairs and the army and
navy.

{197}

"Now, what the Federalist is anxious to set up in the United
Kingdom is an arrangement upon the Canadian model, in which
there will be a supreme and sovereign Parliament, as at present,
for the United Kingdom, and under it a certain number of
subordinate parliaments, to attend to local and domestic
legislation and administration. . . . No Federalist has ever
suggested that Ireland should be turned into a Canada, although
this accusation has occasionally been made against him by
persons who have read his proposals carelessly, and have,
accordingly, misunderstood their nature."[197-1]

A British Cabinet Minister, speaking in Dundee on October 9,
1913, stated: "I am perhaps at an unfortunate age for making a
prophecy. I am ceasing to belong to the young men who dream
dreams, and I have not yet joined the ranks of the old men who
see visions; still I will run the risk of prophecy and tell you
that the day will most certainly come--many of you will live to
see it--when a federal system will be established in these
Islands which will give Wales and Scotland the control within
proper limits of their own Welsh and Scottish affairs, which
will free the Imperial Parliament from the great congestion of
business by which it is now pressed, and which will redound and
conduce to the contentment and well-being of all our
people."[197-2]

When some such re-formation of government is adopted by the
British Isles, it will only be utilizing {198} the fruits of the
race's experience in other parts of our civilization.

If the first steps to this "home rule all round" aimed at in the
present (1914) legislation regarding Ireland prove defective, in
that it concedes what is _not_ needed, and denies what _is_
needed, it is because the British Isles has not taken to heart
the inwardness of the federal idea. Lord Dunraven pointed this
out when he said that "there were only two principles on which
Home Rule could be founded--the Federal system or absolute
independence. The present Bill applied to neither and he could
recognize in it no basis of settlement."[198-1] In the following
resolution, he indicated how the question of "home rule all
round" should be attacked: ". . .'The best means of arriving at
a settlement by consent of the Irish political question and of
the constitutional difficulties connected with it, and of
securing the harmonious working of any system of self-government
in Ireland and the permanency of friendly relations between the
two islands is to be found in a convention, or conference,
representative of all nationalities and parties in the United
Kingdom, and . . . it is the duty of his Majesty's Government to
take the initiative in inviting such convention or
conference.'"[198-2] But the fact that a majority of the British
Parliament has gone so far as to advocate any form of Home Rule
is evidence of a sincere effort to meet the conditions of
Pan-Angle individualism where longest suppressed, {199} and thus
hasten the harmonious self-government of the British Isles.

Franklin, when he wrote to Shirley[199-1] in 1754 about the need
of colonial representation to the British Parliament in London,
may or may not have realized how far the gaining of that desire
would fail to satisfy. His plan would not have produced a
federal government for Pan-Angles. It would have created a
larger unitary government than then existed. There would not
have been co-ordinated spheres of governmental control. The
local affairs of Pennsylvania and England, of Scotland and New
York, would together have been in the hands of a Parliament
composed of representatives elected from the nation at large.
This would have been unacceptable to the people of England,
Pennsylvania, Scotland, and New York. They would have asked for
something more. A lesson can be drawn from this by those who
to-day urge Australian or Canadian representation in the present
British Isles Parliament. Such representation would subject
Britishers to outside control of their local problems, just as
to-day Englanders are affected by Irish representatives voting
on local problems of England. Conversely, it would mean a
continued interference in Australian and Canadian local problems
by the local representatives of the British Isles--the very
thing the peoples of the five new nations have already taken
appropriate steps to obviate. The Irish question demonstrates
that representation alone is not enough for Pan-Angles. The
Irish are more than {200} fairly represented in Parliament.
Still they clamour for more. That something more desired by all
Pan-Angles is local autonomy.

To representation in a central legislature must be added the
local control of local questions so dear to Pan-Angle
individualism. This is what federalism accomplishes.[200-1] "Our
Federal system is the only form of popular government that would
be possible in a country like ours, with an enormous territory
and 100,000,000 population. . . . But for this safety valve by
which people of one State can have such State government as they
choose, we would never be able to keep the union of all the
people so harmonious as we now have."[200-2] "The growth of the
United States has widened political horizons. It has proved that
immense territorial extent is not incompatible, under modern
conditions, with that representative system of popular
government which had its birth and development in England, and
its most notable adaptation in America. It has shown that the
spread of a nation over vast areas, including widely-separated
states with diverse interests, need not prevent it from becoming
strongly bound together in a political organism which combines
{201} the advantages of national greatness and unity of purpose
with jealously guarded freedom of local self-government."[201-1]

The indefinite governmental relationships between the Britannic
nations are to-day satisfactory to no one. Britannic closer
union forms the thesis of much writing and speech making and the
subject of much earnest study.[201-2] That the demands of the
situation can be met adequately only by federation seems evident
to many. This thought is thus expressed by Milner: "If, as I
fervently hope, the present loose association of the
self-governing states of the Empire grows in time into a regular
partnership, it can only be, as it seems to me, by the
development of a new organ of government representative of them
all, and dealing exclusively with matters of common interest. It
would only heighten confusion to bring representatives of the
Dominions into the House of Commons. And if, as I think everyone
would admit, it is impracticable to bring them into the House of
Commons, they would certainly say, 'Thank you for nothing' if we
were to offer them a few seats in the House of Lords."[201-3]

Mr. Winston Churchill continued in his speech at Dundee: "I tell
you further that that system when erected and established will
in itself be only the forerunner and nucleus of a general scheme
of Imperial federation which will gather together in {202} one
indissoluble circle the British people here and beyond the
seas."[202-1] Rhodes wrote over twenty years ago: "I will
frankly add that my interest in the Irish question has been
heightened by the fact that in it I see the possibility of the
commencement of changes which will eventually mould and weld
together all parts of the British Empire.

"The English are a conservative people, and like to move slowly,
and, as it were, experimentally. At present there can be no
doubt that the time of Parliament is overcrowded with the
discussion of trivial and local affairs. Imperial matters have
to stand their chance of a hearing alongside of railway and tram
bills. Evidently it must be a function of modern legislation to
delegate an enormous number of questions which now occupy the
time of Parliament, . . .

"But side by side with the tendency of decentralisation for
local affairs, there is growing up a feeling for the necessity
of greater union in Imperial matters. . . ."[202-2]


Not alone the federation of the Britannic nations, but the
federation of the whole Pan-Angle people, {203} is the end to be
sought. Behind Rhodes' "greater union in Imperial matters" lay
his vision of a common government over all English-speaking
people.[203-1] If we are to preserve our civilization and its
benefits to our individual citizens, we must avoid frictions
among ourselves and take a united stand before the world. Only a
common government will ensure this.

The four federations have been the results of similar practical
impulses. The separate states and provinces realized their
mutual need of co-operation to avoid conflict among themselves
and to withstand enemies, actual or possible, from without. In
some cases one, in some cases the other, of these arguments was
most pressing at the time of federation. American states were
vexed by many custom houses and were endangered by European
civilization and the savagery of the American Indians. Canada
was split by two languages and feared the waxing strength of
America. The Australian and South African internal contentions
arising over customs and railway rivalries were overshadowed by
ominous additions to German holdings in the South Pacific and in
East and West Africa respectively. Similar reasons are adduced
to-day in favour of the federation of the six Britannic nations.

The union of the "United Collonyes of New England" in 1643
appears inadequate and impotent in the light of our subsequent
"closer unions." But it was the first voluntary common
government instituted by separate governments of
English-speaking {204} people.[204-1] The reasons for this
co-operation are stated in terms worthy the attention and study
of present-day Pan-Angles: ". . . and whereas in our settling
(by a wise providence of God) we are further dispersed upon the
sea-coasts and rivers then was at first intended, so thatt wee
cannott (according to our desire) with conveniencie communicate
in one government and jurisdiction; and whereas we live in
compassed with people of severall nations and strange languages
which hereafter may prove injurious to us and our posterity: and
forasmuch as the natives have formerly committed sundry
insolencies and outrages upon severall plantations of the
English and have of late combined against us and seeing, by
reason of the sad distractions in England, which they have heard
of, and by which they know we are hindered both from thatt
humble way of seeking advice, and reaping those comfortable
frutes of protection, {205} which att other times we might well
expect, we therefore doe conceive itt our bounden dutye without
delay to enter into a present consociation amongst ourselves for
mutuall help and strength in all our future concernments, thatt
. . . we bee and continue one, according to the tennure and true
meaning of the ensueing articles."[205-1]

Federation was evolved by our race. Though its use was only
dimly understood in the years that followed 1643, its powers are
now known to us. It has proved the means of welding many of our
once jealous and discordant units into concentrated and
self-protective powers. Applied to all our nations, federation
would produce that co-operation necessary for the survival of
our civilization, yielding both the freedom we demand and the
strength that is indispensable--that Pan-Angle paradox of
flexity and firmness.



[184-1] A. L. Burt, _Imperial Architects_, Oxford, 1913, p. 14;
cf. pp. 14-16: "In all likelihood it was but a chance suggestion
without any serious purpose behind it, for, in his subsequent
career as Governor, though he erected an assembly which was not
ratified by the King, he did not, as far as can be ascertained,
once recur to this idea.

"It is doubtful when, or by whom, in the eighteenth century, the
first suggestion of American representatives in the British
Parliament was made. Though Franklin was perhaps not the first,
yet his proposal is the earliest extant."

[185-1] John Bigelow, _The Complete Works of Benjamin Franklin_,
New York, 1887, vol. ii. pp. 343-375, gives the plan in full.

[186-1] John Bigelow, _The Complete Works of Benjamin Franklin_,
New York, 1887; "Letter of Franklin to Shirley, December 22,
1754," vol. ii. p. 384.

[186-2] _Ency. Brit_., vol. i. p. 832; "In him [Franklin] was
the focus of the federating impulses of the time. . . . He was,
first of men, broadly interested in all the colonies, and in his
mind the future began to be comprehended in its true perspective
and scale; and for these reasons to him properly belongs the
title of 'the first American.'"

[186-3] H.E. Egerton, _Federations and Unions within the British
Empire_, Oxford, 1911, p. 16.

[187-1] C.A.W. Pownall, _Thomas Pownall_, London, 1908, pp.
50-51.

[187-2] _Ibid.,_ p. 204, and _ante_, p. 186, note 1. One of
Franklin's cleverest hoaxes was, "An Edict of the King of
Prussia," 1773, proclaiming that the island of Britain was a
colony of Prussia, having been settled by Angles and Saxons,
having been protected by Prussia, having been defended by
Prussia against France in the war just passed, and never having
been definitely freed from Prussia's rule; and that, therefore,
Great Britain should now submit to certain taxes laid by
Prussia--the taxes being identical with those laid upon American
colonies by Great Britain. Cf. _Ency. Brit._, vol. xi. p. 26.

[188-1] Thomas Pownall, _The Administration of the Colonies_,
3rd ed. (1766), quoted by C.A.W. Pownall, _Thomas Pownall_,
London, 1908, p. 187.

[188-2] C.A.W. Pownall, _Thomas Pownall_, London, 1908, p. 187.

[188-3] Lord Milner, May 28, 1904, at Navy League Meeting,
Johannesburg, in Lord Milner, _The Nation and the Empire_,
London, 1913, p. 67.

[189-1] C.A.W. Pownall, _Thomas Pownall_, London, 1908, pp.
199-200.

[190-1] W. T. Stead, _The Last Will and Testament of Cecil John
Rhodes_, London, 1902, p. 78: "Letter of Cecil J. Rhodes dated
August 19 and September 8, 1891, to William T, Stead."

[190-2] _Ibid._, p, 102.

[191-1] R. W. Emerson, _English Traits_, 1856, Boston reprint,
1894, p.261.

[192-1] G. R. Parkin, _Imperial Federation_, London, 1892, pp.
71-72.

[192-2] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1898, Boston, rev. ed.,
1911, p. 454.

[192-3] _Ibid._, p. 565.

[194-1] When a federation is built from component parts, certain
powers are _delegated_ by the parts to the central government.
When a federation is made by dividing a unitary government,
certain powers are _devoluted_ by the existing government to the
parts.

[194-2] P. A. Silburn, _Governance of Empire_, London, 1910, p.
210.

[195-1] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1898, Boston, rev. ed.,
1911, p. 473, points out that of the twelve greatest subjects of
legislation occupying the attention of the British Parliament
during the last century--Catholic emancipation, parliamentary
reform, the abolition of slavery, the amendment of the poor
laws, the reform of municipal corporations, the repeal of the
corn laws, the admission of the Jews to Parliament, the
disestablishment of the Irish Church, the alteration of the
Irish land laws, the establishment of national education, the
introduction of the ballot, and the reform of the criminal
law--only two (corn laws and slavery) would in America have been
subjects for central (federal) government regulation. Prior to
the American Civil War only one of these two, the former, would
have been a subject for central (federal) government regulation.

[196-1] For a detailed account of the difficulties of the
British Isles Parliament in this connection, cf. _An Analysis of
the System of Government throughout the British Empire_, London,
1912, Introduction, pp. xii-li.

[196-2] Cf. "Pacificus," _Federalism and Home Rule_, London,
1910; also Arthur Ponsonby, "The Future Government of the United
Kingdom," in _Contemporary Review_, London, November 1913.

[197-1] "Pacificus," _Federalism and Home Rule_, London, 1910,
pp. xlviii-xlix.

[197-2] _The Times_, London, October 10, 1913.

[198-1] _The Times_, London, March 3, 1913. Account of meeting
of delegates of All for Ireland League, Cork, March 1, 1913.

[198-2] _Ibid._

[199-1] John Bigelow, _The Complete Works of Benjamin Franklin_,
New York, 1887, vol. ii. pp. 376-387.

[200-1] As federation is used in these pages for combinations of
self-governing groups, no allusion is here made to any plans for
uniting dependencies for administrative purposes such as that
contained in C. S. Salmon's _The Caribbean Confederation_,
London, 1888, or in the established grouping of dependent areas
now styled "Federated Malay States "--concerning which latter,
see Frank Swettenham, _British Malaya_, London, 1907. Such bear
no comparison with self-governing federations.

[200-2] W.H. Taft, _Popular Government_, New Haven, Connecticut,
1913, p. 145.

[201-1] G. R. Parkin, _Imperial Federation_, London, 1892, p.
33.

[201-2] As an example, cf. _Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on
American Union_, by F. S. Oliver, London, 1906.

[201-3] Lord Milner, April 28, 1910, at Compatriots' Club,
London, in Lord Milner, _The Nation and the Empire_, London,
1913, p.454.

[202-1] _The Times_, London, October 10, 1913. Cf. _ante_, p.
197.

[202-2] Letter of Rhodes to Parnell, June 19, 1888, quoted in W.
T. Stead, _The Last Will and Testament of Cecil John Rhodes_,
London, 1902, pp. 122-124. On p. 120, Stead states as to Rhodes'
contribution to the Irish party: "The contract between the
African and the Irishman was strictly limited to the conversion
of Home Rule from a disruptive to a federative measure. It had
no relation directly or indirectly to any of Mr Rhodes'
Irish-African schemes. The whole story is told at length by
'Vindex' in an appendix to _The Political Life and Speeches of
Mr. Cecil Rhodes_, from which I quote these letters."

[203-1] W. T. Stead, _The Last Will and Testament of Cecil John
Rhodes_, London, 1902, p. 102, pp. 51-77 and other pages.

[204-1] P. A. Silburn, _The Governance of Empire_, London, 1910,
p. 191: "Half a century before the union of England and Scotland
was brought about, a union of British colonies had been
successfully achieved. It was in May 1643 that a convention of
colonial representatives confederated the British colonies of
Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven as the
'United Colonies of New England.' The negotiations leading up to
this confederation had taken six years, but when once the union
was effected its advantages were felt immediately. At this time
England, engaged elsewhere, had neither the time nor the
inclination to interfere with her American colonies. The
newly-formed confederation enjoyed almost complete liberty. A
year after the union we find this confederation negotiating
treaties with the French and projecting defences against the
Dutch. But this, the first union of colonies in the Empire, was
not a legislative one, it was simply an agreement of 'offence
and defence, advice and assistance.'"

[205-1] H. E. Egerton, _Federations and Unions within the
British Empire_, Oxford, 1911, p. 103, "Articles of
Confoederation betwixt the Plantations under the Government of
the Massacusetts, the Plantations under the Government of New
Plymouth, the Plantations under the Government of Conecticutt,
and the Government of Newhaven, with the Plantations in
combination with Itt."




{206}

IX

WORKING FOR FEDERATION


To maintain the individual liberty of its citizens from alien
interference is the task before each of the seven Pan-Angle
nations. Whether a closer union of the six units of the
Britannic power is sufficient insurance of the safety of each,
and whether the United States standing alone has sufficient
margin of safety, are at least debatable questions. Some foreign
power arguing in the negative might win. But that a closer union
of the entire self-governing English-speaking race would be
strong enough to protect each of its component nations is here
assumed to be not a debatable question. It is here postulated
that upwards of one hundred and forty-one million
English-speaking whites are strong enough to hold their own
against the forces of the world for considerable time to come.
The problem resolves itself into a struggle for the supremacy,
and finally for the survival, of the Pan-Angle civilization.

We can federate. All our past history teaches this.

The Britannic nations and America all contain an individualistic
form of patriotism that lends itself to Pan-Angle federation.
Just as {207} American Pan-Angle gives allegiance to the ideals
behind the dull earth he calls his home, be it city, town,
township or parish; so he gives a larger allegiance to his
state; and a still more comprehensive loyalty to his nation of
forty-eight states. Just as the Britannic Pan-Angle holds in
affection his throbbing factory city, or sheep-trimmed shire, or
township lush with ripening wheat; so he holds in greater
affection "That blessed plot, that earth, that realm, that
England," or "that" New South Wales, or "that" Saskatchewan; and
in still greater affection the British Isles, or Australia, or
Canada. Among the Britannic Pan-Angles is now growing a further
patriotism for the ideal of a Britannic whole of which each of
the six nations would be a part. Throughout the Pan-Angle world
let us add to these patriotisms for our dreamed-of Britannic
whole and for our United States a still larger patriotism for
our English-speaking civilization, our Pan-Angle lands.

Patriotism cannot attach itself to treaties or alliances, "the
very nature of an arbitration board is negative."[207-1] Nor can
it profess "loyalty" to a nation not its own. A Massachusetts
man cannot be loyal to New York State, nor a Victorian to New
South Wales, nor an Englander to Scotland. Nor can an American
be loyal to New Zealand, an Australian to South Africa, nor a
Britisher to Canada. But a Massachusetts man can be loyal to
America, a Victorian to Australia, and an Englander to the
British Isles. And all three of these men, when their nations
are part of the {208} federation of the English-speaking people,
can be loyal Pan-Angles.

Expressive of multiple patriotisms fly a multiplicity of flags.
Into battle alongside of the Stars and Stripes go the American
state flags. They know no jealousy of the national banner. Its
thirteen stripes stand for the thirteen independent nations that
originally federated; its stars, now increased to forty-eight,
stand each for a state now bound into the Union. It is not
forgotten how the men of the flag of the Maple Leaf and those of
the Four-starred and Five-starred Southern Crosses fought in
South Africa alongside the men under the Union Jack. There is as
yet no Britannic flag. The Union Jack is the British flag. It is
not, as often called, "the English flag"; it never has been. It
was formed of crosses, the emblems of three nations now united
into one nation, the British Isles. As the Union Jack and the
Stars and Stripes were made, so we can make a Pan-Angle flag
which every English-speaking man will instinctively salute. Such
a flag will subtract no glory from the cherished symbols of our
local prides. Loyalty to our common race in no way forbids
loyalty to our present local groups. All these our flags, our
loyalties, our groups, are to protect and to be protected by all
Pan-Angles.

Federation can be accomplished by either of two procedures: the
combination of the seven Pan-Angle nations directly, as seven
independent units; or the combination of the United States and a
Britannic Federation, after this latter has been formed.
Arguments for Britannic federation are arguments for Pan-Angle
federation. The man {209} who has persuaded himself of the
soundness of the former will be in a position to appreciate the
soundness of the latter. These pages are intended to set forth
the necessity and inevitableness of Pan-Angle federation, by
whichever method attained, and as such are in thorough accord
with all efforts towards Britannic federation. Either course is
possible, if delay does not furnish opportunities for our
separate destruction in the meantime by some rival civilization.

All over the Britannic world are men working for "closer union."
"The wisest and most farseeing Imperialists have steadily
maintained that the ultimate end of the whole movement is
Federation."[209-1] They are working now with only the six
Britannic nations as their acknowledged field. Organized and
unorganized, they are seeking patiently and intelligently for
the safety of their respective nations, which they know is bound
up in the safety of the whole people. They know the political
ideals of their race. They know that though the unrepresented
may be spasmodically willing to waive their rights in times of
great common danger, they none the less believe that "taxation
without representation is tyranny." These men know also that
money gifts by any Pan-Angle nation to a navy controlled by
another Pan-Angle nation is contrary to the political instincts
of all involved. They know that "mutual funk," though it may
hold their nations together for a time, is no safeguard against
the future. They are working to create a political entity, able
by the determination of its representatives to swing the whole
of its strength {210} at once against any foe. These men have
undertaken to persuade the Britannic Pan-Angle nations to put
aside local prejudices and to support the whole of which each is
a part.

Plans for Britannic "closer union" range from a scheme for
Britannic representation in the British Parliament at London,
such as Franklin advocated before the race had evolved
federalism, through schemes for an alliance of the six nations
with a capital outside the British Isles[210-1] to a plan for
definite federation, including a new Britannic Parliament to be
constituted of the representatives from each of the six
nations.[210-2]

Being now in the stage of vague alliance, it may be that the
Britannic Pan-Angles must accomplish definitely the alliance
stage as a step on the road to federation. If so, those who
favour a Britannic alliance[210-3] have the wisdom of the race
on their side. But the same wisdom prophesies that the negative
advantages of alliance will have to be changed later to the
affirmative strength of a common government. Federation has been
"the great ideal of the nineteenth century,"[210-4] and
apparently continues to {211} gain advocates. Britannic "present
'imperial architects' are building more carefully and
laboriously than did their predecessors."[211-1]


The greater part of the work for federation, either Britannic or
Pan-Angle, has already been done for us. The explorer, the
trader, the missionary, and the soldier have won for us the
eminence from which we are now able to survey the world and form
our plans. The statesmen who in our many legislative halls have
laboured to fit forms of government to the needs of the governed
have tested for us the material for our building and have
discarded what was ill-suited to our purposes. The millions of
individuals who have held true to their Pan-Angle ideals have
bequeathed them to us for inspiration. It is for us to continue
the work begun three centuries and more ago.

What remains to be done is to follow the path of our previous
successes and avoid a repetition of our failures. These failures
each nation can find often in the events of its own history
without turning to the histories of other Pan-Angles; and these
successes each nation can find in the histories of others, quite
as well as in that of its own. Such seeking will make for a
becoming modesty towards each other, and by it we shall lose
nothing. We are not dealing in this matter with our inferiors or
our betters. We are dealing with each other, to whom we cannot
give, and with whom we cannot curry, favour. Conciliation among
us is not less {212} necessary than compromise; without
conciliation in the past we should not have framed successful
constitutions. To-day, as in the folk-moots of our political
ancestors,--" No man dictates to the assembly: he may persuade,
but cannot command."[212-1] There is no room for hypocrisy among
free whites who talk English. In our dealings with each other
neither force nor intrigue should have place. Our history shows
that if we adhere to these ideals we can succeed in
co-operation.

We must avoid interfering with each other. Interference even
when actuated by the best of motives leads, as Pan-Angles have
repeatedly experienced, to disastrous frictions and ruptures.
This knowledge we have repeatedly bought at great cost. So well
has the lesson been learned, that even in cases where
interference is constitutional and where circumstances seem to
justify it, a Pan-Angle government first tries persuasion. The
United States Federal Government may consider a Californian
alien land act contrary to a United States treaty; the British
Parliament may consider the Ulster agitation serious enough to
justify coercion: both know that conciliation and persuasion are
the safe and permanent means to employ to right whatever the
wrong may be. Interference augments stubbornness; persuasion
hastens co-operation.

More than this, interference leads to failure. In 1849, the
British Privy Council drafted a bill for the federation of the
Australian colonies. It was not made by those for whose use it
was intended. {213} Its clauses did "not show any close grip of
the subject, or sign that their authors realized how they could
be worked in practice."[213-1] Nothing came of the plan. The
only purpose it served was to illustrate the futility of one
Pan-Angle nation acting for another. In 1819-1820 began the
Britannic immigrant occupation of South Africa.[213-2] In 1875
the British Isles government suggested that the various colonies
in South Africa should be combined.[213-3] Viewed in the
knowledge of to-day it almost appears such a step would have
been advisable. The best intentions must be imputed to the
outside government. Had this action been advocated by the South
Africans, some kind of joint government might have resulted.
Since it was not, the plan was merely a source of increased hard
feeling between colonists of Dutch and British descent, and is
to be included with other instances of British interference
which were the major causes of the long and bitter Great Boer
War. Each of these nations, Australia and South Africa, when it
was ready and in its own way, produced for itself a plan of
common government. A Britisher in the highest administrative
office in South Africa wrote in 1907: "It is a modern axiom of
British policy that any attempt to manage the domestic affairs
of a white population by a continuous exercise of the direct
authority of the Imperial Parliament, in which the people
concerned are not represented, is, save under very special
circumstances, a certain {214} path to failure."[214-1] American
experience goes still further. There, every community is
represented in every government having legislative jurisdiction
over it. Yet it has been proved advisable to leave certain
spheres of legislation solely to the wishes of the community
affected.

For many years the British Isles has been the Pan-Angle nation
which, from its position, was most tempted to interfere with the
affairs of the others. The lessons its failures set forth may be
taken to heart by the younger nations as they grow in strength.
Neither America, nor Canada, nor Australia, nor South Africa,
nor New Zealand, nor Newfoundland can at any time in their
future afford to make the mistake of trying to compel one of the
six other nations. An advantage of numbers, or position, or
wealth, may lie at some time with anyone of them. On that one,
then, will rest the obligation of keeping its hands off the
others. Particularly does this apply to that one of us whose
very existence is due to its revolt against interference, but
hardly less to those others of us whose more peaceful origins
were made possible by an already won revolution.

Federation should be attained through familiar governmental
forms, not through innovations. Burke knew his civilization's
aversion to _change_ which "alters the substance of the objects
themselves, and gets rid of all their essential good as well as
of all the accidental evil annexed to them," {215} whose results
"cannot certainly be known beforehand." He knew his
civilization's belief in _reform_--" a direct application of a
remedy to the grievance complained of. So far as that is
removed, all is sure. It stops there; and if it fails, the
substance which underwent the operation, at the very worst, is
but where it was."[215-1] In this _re-form_, the essence of our
civilization--our language, our individualism, our standards of
living based on land plenty--should be left unchanged. The new
growth, federation, will "remedy the grievance complained
of"--the danger of the extinction of our civilization.


Pending federation, the Pan-Angle nations must on no account
weaken each other, and so the entire race, with war. Much faith
is put, in these days, in arbitration, but on false
presumptions. No so-called "international arbitration court" in
existence has any authority whatsoever.[215-2] Such a body is of
value only when it is giving advice to contestants who greatly
desire to come to a friendly agreement, and who, for the sake of
peace, are predisposed to take the "court's" advice. Even then
its value is not great, for such contestants might very
probably, without its aid, have come to a peaceable
understanding. The Pan-Angle nations do most heartily desire
peace among themselves. They are then the best calculated to
find arbitration useful. The question thus arises whether some
tribunal can be established on Pan-Angle soil, for the
settlement of Pan-Angle inter-national {216} disputes. It would
be a makeshift and powerless, until by the establishment of a
common government it ceased to be inter-national, and became a
potent source of justice under the Pan-Angle federation.[216-1]
It is, however, a straw we well might grasp until we reach a
firmer footing. The greatest advantage of an organized body for
Pan-Angle arbitration is that from it might develop something
more practicable, as from the Maryland-Virginia Conference at
Alexandria in 1785[216-2] and as from the South African Railway
Rates Conference in 1908[216-3] developed respectively the
federations of the United States and South Africa.

Other stepping-stones ready for our use are to be found in
Britannic-American conferences on matters of mutual interest. In
February 1908 a conference on the conservation of the natural
resources of North America was held at Washington, at which
three Pan-Angle nations were represented by delegates.[216-4]
Some of the subjects suitable for such discussion are forests,
river flowage for power or irrigation purposes, and migrating
birds. If a conference were held for mutual information on
sea-fisheries, all our nations might well send delegates. A
similar opportunity is afforded in the urgent need of making
uniform and sensible the spelling of our language. At a meeting
in connection with the Conference of Education {217}
Associations in London, January 5, 1914, it was stated "that an
international conference should be summoned at which all parts
of the British Empire and the United States should be
represented."[217-1]

However great the good resulting from such conferences in
relation to their stated objects, it may some day appear
insignificant compared to the assistance rendered towards
producing federation.

Quicker and cheaper communication is working steadily towards
better Pan-Angle understanding. International postal
arrangements date only from 1874, but two-cent (penny in the
British Isles, New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa) postage
is now so general from points within to other points within the
Pan-Angle world, that by far the majority of inter-Pan-Angle
letters have the advantage of that rate. Land and water
telegraphs by wire and wireless are steadily linking up points
further and further apart, and rates are becoming cheaper. The
telephone is now a common household necessity over much of the
Pan-Angle world, and bids fair in time to conquer distances as
effectively as do telegraph lines. Every such agency, producing
a very real "closer union," is a factor in promoting Pan-Angle
federation.

The cheapness and speed of travel are increasing at rates to
which no bounds can reasonably be set. Steamers, on which we so
largely depend as inter-Pan-Angle carriers, yearly serve more
routes, are more numerous and faster. We shift easily from one
country to another as business or inclination takes us.
Ambassador Page has proposed that newspaper men from the British
Isles and America serve an {218} apprenticeship on journalistic
staffs in each other's countries.[218-1] The imperial "grand
tour" of the British Isles parliamentary party, recently
completed,[218-2] gave British politicians, better than would
any number of voluminous reports, an opportunity to appreciate
the needs and aspirations of the five other Britannic nations.
The celebration of the Centenary of Peace will this year furnish
innumerable similar opportunities. Every personal acquaintance
of one Pan-Angle with the country of other Pan-Angles makes for
the understanding that must precede federation.

The formation of a Pan-Angle federation must depend in the end
on our voters who are the source of first and final appeal in
our political problems. It will be achieved when they are
self-persuaded that it is desirable, that is, when they have
been educated to see its necessity. Only such means of education
may properly be used as will open the path to self-persuasion.
Among these, two readily suggest themselves. The first is the
educative work that can be done by associations of those aroused
to interest in the matter. The second is the educative influence
of travel and sojourn of Pan-Angles in each other's countries.

Voluntary associations established by private initiative are
among us recognized means of furthering reform. Through public
discussion, whether printed or spoken, they have fostered many
of the great movements for which we all {219} are now grateful.
"Discussion is the greatest of all reformers. It rationalizes
everything it touches. It robs principles of all false sanctity
and throws them back upon their reasonableness. If they have no
reasonableness, it ruthlessly crushes them out of existence and
sets up its own conclusions in their stead."[219-1] These
associations and their beliefs, if not supplying a public need,
wither and die. But if the times call for them, movements are
started which pass through a regular growth from insignificance
and obscurity to contempt and ridicule, followed by public
opposition and finally by success. Such have been the histories
of the freedom of conscience, the abolition of slavery, and a
host of similar triumphs. Men of like ideals associate
themselves together, take a name that proclaims their tenets,
and spend their time and energy and money to set forth the truth
as they see it. Everyone is given a chance to learn, but no one
is compelled to believe. No purpose can be so lofty, no course
of action so advantageous, that it does not need expounding. The
countless peace societies and the millions spent in that cause
bear witness. Meeting places must be hired, literature must be
printed and posted, advertising in its many forms must not be
neglected. All this means sacrifice of some sort from
somebody--obviously from those who have the success of the work
at heart. In every Pan-Angle nation can be found plenty of
organizations which are doing on a small scale in reference to
some local interest just what some non-local, inter-national
organization could {220} well do on a large scale for such an
ideal as Pan-Angle federation. The organization should be on an
inter-Pan-Angle basis, if for no other reason than to make for
uniformity in its efforts and to prevent it from slipping into
local points of view. As the demand for Pan-Angle federation
grows, practical politics will not remain insensible to it. Then
will be the time to marshal to its aid forces such as have
finally established by law the present nationhood of each of us.

In this labour of education we must work openly in the presence
of each other and under the scrutiny of the nations of the
world. If we were Germans or Japanese, an international _coup_
might be accomplished by diplomatic work unknown to the voters,
and the affair put through with secrecy and despatch. It is vain
to wish for such a style of procedure, and we have no desire, in
this case, to change from the more laborious and tedious method
of popular education and individual action. So to change would
demonstrate that we had lost the very essence of our
civilization--the initial as well as the final control of our
own destinies. We must work openly, because it is one of our
inestimable privileges to make up our own minds.

Not only can individual initiative accomplish this work, it can
do it better than can any other method. Ideas of state
interference under the guise of public ownership are making
headway all over the Pan-Angle world. One industry after
another, for one reason or another, is removed from the field of
private endeavour, and is run for good or ill by governments. It
has never been thus with our political undertakings. The
spectacle of {221} a Pan-Angle government calling on all good
citizens to aid in celebrating a Twenty-first of November, or a
Twenty-fourth of May, or a Fourth of July is so unheard of as to
be laughable,[221-1] and it is to be hoped that in the matter of
Pan-Angle federation the people will be the compelling power
forcing their respective governments to action.

Of the promotion of travel and sojourn of Pan-Angles in each
other's countries we have one notable example. Cecil John
Rhodes, wishing to instil in the minds of Britannic Pan-Angles
"the advantage to the Colonies as well as to the United Kingdom
of the retention of the unity of the Empire,"[221-2] and
desiring "to encourage and foster an appreciation of the
advantages which I implicitly believe will result from the union
of the English-speaking peoples throughout the world and to
encourage in the students from the United States of North
America . . . an attachment to the country from which they have
sprung but without I hope withdrawing them or their sympathies
from the land of their adoption or birth,"[221-3] directed the
trustees of his estate to establish scholarships at the
University of Oxford. Each year picked men from English-speaking
lands travel to England, enrol themselves in this Pan-Angle
university, and there measure themselves against representatives
of all their race. At the end of three years they return to
their respective countries. The book {222} knowledge they have
acquired could have been furnished by any one of many
universities. But Rhodes' sagacity has given them infinitely
more. They have lived and studied and travelled in what is truly
the Mother Country of us all. They have become conscious of
their fellow Pan-Angles and have made their fellow Pan-Angles
conscious of them. Their understanding and sympathy is freed for
all time from narrow prejudices.

The work so generously begun should be extended. Not only in the
British Isles but in North America, in South Africa, and in
Australasia young Pan-Angles should be brought in touch with the
other portions of our race, and should see at first hand what
problems require solving by us throughout the world. Not a
Pan-Angle university from McGill to Dunedin, from Ann Arbor to
Stellenbosch, but would welcome some exchange of students
similar to the growing system of exchange professors. Not one,
if it could offer scholarships to the youth of the other
nations, but would have enlarged the scope of its usefulness and
have grown from local to inter-national importance. Patriotic
Pan-Angles by endowing such scholarships could hasten the
accomplishment of the Pan-Angle federation, and thus share in
ensuring the safety of every Pan-Angle nation, and in securing
our civilization for the benefit of ourselves and for the peace
of the world.

Meanwhile no vision of future Pan-Angle safety should blind
anyone of us to his country's present needs. In the interim
before federation, we must so strengthen each of our respective
nations as best to weather the storm of adversity should it
{223} burst upon us before co-operation is secured.
Simultaneously with the recession to home waters of the British
Isles fleet, the younger Britannic nations are taking
appropriate steps to ensure their separate interests. This is an
evidence that each recognizes danger. Each assumes that these
defensive efforts are not induced by the fear of other
Pan-Angles. This is no place to discuss the compulsory military
service already established in New Zealand, Australia, and South
Africa, nor to suggest that it would not be needed were
Pan-Angle federation already an accomplished fact. Nor is this a
suitable occasion to discuss the policies, strengths, or
weaknesses of separate Britannic or Pan-Angle navies. America
must be equal to the emergency of defending all Pan-Angles who
would seek its protection if the British Isles fleet were to
suffer a serious setback. Wisely, America and Canada waste no
Pan-Angle funds in fortifications on their long boundary or in
war vessels on the Great Lakes. But they should both maintain on
salt water navies, which they can use for the joint interests of
Pan-Angles. Canada and America may soon need to co-operate with
Australasia in solving the problems of the Pacific.[223-1]
Pan-Angle nations may severally make alliances with foreign
powers for the purpose of protecting us all. One of them has
already done so.[223-2] But peoples who are strong enough make
no foreign alliances.

As we work towards federation we must not be {224} discouraged
at our slow rate of visible progress. For "slow thought is the
ballast of a self-governing state."[224-1] The growth of the
federal idea may be none the less vigorous because its fruitage
appears long delayed. These pages abound with examples of the
fact that we are slow to move politically. Were it otherwise,
the autonomous nations of the Britannic world would long since
have had representation in some common parliament, would have
established a single final court of appeal, and a common
citizenship; an overburdened British Parliament would no longer
legislate on English municipal drainage, affairs of the
dependencies, and questions of inter-Pan-Angle concern. As it
is, the five younger Britannic nations, realizing tardily that
the British navy no longer adequately protects them, have not as
yet bestirred themselves to effect more cohesive and coherent
political relations with each other, and between themselves and
the British Isles. America, astride the Western Hemisphere, in
her own estimation secure against invasion, is taken up with
internal development, and but seldom, even since the last
Pan-Angle war with Spain, looks out at the increasing pressure
beyond her borders.

We move slowly. Pan-Angle federation is still a dream. But no
one can foresee how rapidly external pressure may turn dreams
into practical politics. The federation of the Pan-Angles may be
forced upon us--ready or not. Or we may find some day that it is
too late to federate.

Our method of combining, the distribution of powers between the
existing governments and the {225} new government, it is not
here necessary or appropriate to discuss, other than to
acknowledge that our history confesses that federation is the
present ideal of government of this civilization. In other
instances of suggested closer union, "The advocates of national
consolidation have been constantly subjected, as everyone
familiar with current discussion knows, to two diametrically
opposite forms of criticism. They are vigorously reproached
. . . for not stating in detail the method by which their
purposes are to be accomplished; they are ridiculed . . . as
people who aim at binding together by means of a 'cut and dried
plan' an Empire which has hitherto depended upon slow processes
of growth for its constitutional development."[225-1] Enough
that in our previous separate histories we have had
constitutional conventions to draw up both national and state
constitutions. Many men who have taken part in such conventions
are now living. What we have acquired a habit of doing on a
large scale, we can do again on a larger scale. Such
representatives can construct, for submission to our voters, a
framework of federal Pan-Angle government.

With the voters of the seven Pan-Angle nations rest the
decisions of when and how our co-operation is to be
accomplished. That it is to be accomplished many now earnestly
believe. And of it many can now say, as did Washington in the
American Constitutional Convention: "Let us raise a standard to
which the wise and honest can repair." Before that future
constitutional convention can have been accomplished, men will
have {226} gathered together the wisdom of the race, and will
have drawn up a constitution better than any now in use. Voters
from the ends of the earth will discuss what our governmental
framework should be, and, although our statesmen will act the
major parts, we may agree with Burke: "I have never yet seen any
plan which has not been mended by the observations of those who
were much inferior in understanding to the person who took the
lead in the business."[226-1]

What is desirable in this federation to preserve ourselves from
the menace of other civilizations? How shall we balance our
powers to ensure freedom to the individual and freedom to local
groups to follow their individual yearnings with safety to them
and to us all? How shall we bind ourselves for that all-time,
the indefinite future, so that we shall be gladly bound, and yet
be freemen still? "If, . . . in the famous words of Lincoln, we
as a body in our minds and hearts 'highly resolve' to work for
the general recognition: by society of the binding character of
international duties and rights as they arise within the
Anglo-Saxon group, we shall not resolve in vain. A mere common
desire may seem an intangible instrument, and yet, intangible as
it is, it may be enough to form the beginning of what in the end
can make the whole difference."[226-2]



[207-1] A. L. Burt, _Imperial Architects_, Oxford, 1913, p. 86.

[209-1] A. L. Burt, _Imperial Architects_, Oxford, 1913, p. 125.

[210-1] Richard Jebb, _Colonial Nationalism_, London, 1905, p.
336: "The imperial city shall lose her pride of place. In
another seagirt isle, by the margin of the Pacific. . . . sleeps
a fair city." According to Mrs. Henshaw, F.R.G.S., in _United
Empire_, London, January 1914, p. 80, Vancouver Island was named
by Sir Francis Drake, 1579, New Albion.

[210-2] A _resume_ of projects for Britannic federation is given
in A. L. Burt, _Imperial Architects_, Oxford, 1913, pp. 152-195;
the necessity of, and possible transitional stages on the way
towards, federation are discussed, _ibid._, pp. 196-225.

[210-3] Richard Jebb, _Studies in Colonial Nationalism_, London,
1905; and _The Britannic Question_, London, 1913.

[210-4] A.L. Burt, _Imperial Architects_, Oxford, 1913, p. 147.

[211-1] _Ibid_., Introduction by H. E. Egerton, p. vi.

[212-1] Arthur Murphy, _The Works of Cornelius Tacitus_, London,
1793, vol. iv. p. 17.

[213-1] H. E. Egerton, _Federations and Union within the British
Empire_, Oxford, 1911, p. 183.

[213-2] W. B. Worsfold, _The Union of South Africa_, London,
1912, p. 104.

[213-3] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xxv. p. 475.

[214-1] _A Review of the Present Mutual Relations of the British
South African Colonies, to which is appended a Memorandum on
South African Railway Unification_, "Printed by Authority"
[Johannesburg, 1907], p. 5.

[215-1] Quoted in Woodrow Wilson, _Mere Literature_, Boston,
1900, p. 149.

[215-2] Cf. _ante_, p. 121.

[216-1] The growth of inter-cantonal arbitration in Switzerland,
leading to present federal court, is alluded to in Woodrow
Wilson, _The State_, 1898, rev. ed., Boston, 1911, p. 328.

[216-2] _Ency. Brit._, vol. xxvii. p. 685.

[216-3] _Ibid._, vol. xxv. p. 482.

[216-4] _Britannica Year Book_, London, 1913, p. 664.

[217-1] _The Times_ Weekly Edition, London, January 9, 1914.

[218-1] _The Times_ Weekly Edition, London, December 19, 1913.
Account of Speech of American Ambassador at dinner of the
Institute of Journalists, London, December 13, 1913.

[218-2] _United Empire_, London, January 1914, p. 13.

[219-1] Woodrow Wilson, _The State_, 1898, Boston, rev. ed.,
191, p. 139.

[221-1] The French Government Proclamations posted in Paris (in
1909) concerning the 14th of July called on all good citizens to
help the government celebrate the day.

[221-2] W.T. Stead, _The Last Will and Testament of Cecil John
Rhodes_, London, 1902, p. 28.

[221-3] _Ibid_., pp. 24-29.

[223-1] _Cf_. R.M. Johnston in the _New York Times_, November
16, 1913, p. 5; and _Round Table_, London, June 1913, pp.
572-583.

[223-2] British-Japanese treaty and French understanding.

[224-1] Woodrow Wilson, _Mere Literature_, Boston, 1900, p. 98.

[225-1] G.R. Parkin, _Imperial Federation_, London, 1892, p.
296.

[226-1] Quoted in Woodrow Wilson, _Mere Literature_, Boston,
1900, p. 152.

[226-2] Rt. Hon. Richard Burdon Haldane, Lord High Chancellor of
Great Britain, before the American Bar Association, Montreal,
September 1, 1913, _Report of Thirty-Sixth Meeting of the
Association_, Baltimore, 1913, p. 416.




{227}

X

CONCLUSION


THE English-speaking peoples who govern themselves are faced by
the not remote possibility of the destruction of one or more of
their seven nations, should these nations be unable to
co-operate. The destruction of anyone would be a loss to all the
others. The destruction of one or more of these nations might
carry in its turn the destruction of others--or all. If one of
the densely populated and wealthy nations were overpowered, the
others would be exposed to the greater risk of attack. If one of
the less densely populated and less wealthy nations were
destroyed, the race would be deprived of homes for its growing
numbers. The Britannic nations and America have identical
interests in the safety of each and everyone of these seven
nations. The belief is here expressed that no co-operation short
of unity of government will form an effective means of
safeguarding the Pan-Angle civilization.

The danger to the Britannic nations was expressed in May 1911:
"The truth is that the safety of the Imperial system cannot be
maintained much longer by the arrangements which exist at
present. No one, in the face of the facts brought {228} forward
in this article, can believe that the need for national strength
is disappearing. The British naval budget and the creation of
the Dominion navies alone disprove it. Yet it is quite clear
that Great Britain alone cannot indefinitely guarantee the
Empire from disruption by external attack. The further one looks
ahead the more obvious does this become. A nation of 45,000,000
souls, occupying a small territory and losing much of the
natural increase in its population by emigration, cannot hope to
compete in the long run even against single powers of the first
magnitude--with Russia, for instance, with its 150,000,000
inhabitants, with America with its 90,000,000, with Germany with
its 65,000,000, increasing by nearly a million a year, to say
nothing of China with its 430,000,000 souls. Far less can if
hope to maintain the dominant position it has hitherto occupied
in the world, with a dozen new powers entering upon the scene.
Each of these powers, of small account by itself, is already an
important factor in the scale which measures the balance of
power. And as they are steadily increasing in wealth and
population, it is only a question of time before some of them
will become first-class powers in their turn. What will be the
position of the Empire then, if it has to depend upon the navy
of England alone? Obviously the day must come when, if the
Empire is to continue, it must be defended by the joint efforts
of all its self-governing peoples."[228-1]

In March 1913 another Britannic writer states: "The urgency of
the situation does not diminish. {229} Already, without striking
a blow, Germany has practically detached the British navy from
every sea except the North Sea--a result which no Englishman a
few years ago would have believed to be possible in any
circumstances whatever."[229-1]

The Britannic nations are not united in any single foreign
policy. Hence they offer many opportunities for fatal discord.
"It is simply impossible for the Dominions to set up independent
foreign policies and independent defensive systems of their own
without destroying the Empire, even if foreign powers refrain
from attack. Suppose the present tendency carried to its logical
conclusion. Instead of there being one government responsible
for the safety of the Empire, there will be five. Each of these
governments will be free to pursue any policy it likes, and each
will have military or naval strength with which to back its
policy. Each of them, therefore, may involve itself in war. And
if the policy of one government, or the use it makes of its
navy, does lead to war, what is to be the position? Are the
other governments to be involved? The Dominions, not
unreasonably, do not admit their responsibility for the policy
of Great Britain, because they have no share in framing it. Is
Great Britain to be responsible for the policy of the Dominions?
Australia, for instance, is committed to the policy of Asiatic
exclusion--a policy which may lead to international
complications of the gravest kind."[229-2] Again, "Obviously,
the principle of complete local autonomy, admirably as it works
for the {230} internal politics of the Empire, cannot be applied
to foreign affairs. The Empire will infallibly disappear if
anyone of five governments can involve it in war."[230-1]

The _Round Table_ article does not even consider the chance of
war between Britannic nations. Doubtless the thought is so
abhorrent that the possibilities which the facts present are
often overlooked. Yet such possibilities do exist, and are added
reasons for Britannic unity of government.

Whatever dangers threaten the Britannic nations, threaten also
America. In some cases these dangers are indirect or seemingly
remote, in others, more immediately pressing. Injury to any part
of the race would be an injury to America. If the Britannic
nations receive any substantial damage, America must face the
world as the head naval power of the English-speaking
civilization. It would succeed to all the responsibilities and
difficulties of that position, and its ability to discharge that
duty would have been diminished by whatever damage the Britannic
nations had sustained.

War between any of the Britannic nations and America would be as
fratricidal as that between any of the six Britannic nations.
But the possibility of such a war, however abhorrent, is not to
be ignored. America's population among the Pan-Angle nations
soon will be approximated only by that of Canada. Rivalry
between America and Canada would weaken the civilization in its
population and wealth centre--its heart. If such rivalry should
involve the clash of the six Britannic nations against America,
the struggle {231} would be more stupendous than any the race
has yet experienced.

All that is written as argument for closer union among the
Britannic nations applies with equal force to a project intended
to check the intra-racial struggles and safeguard the
inter-racial security of our whole Pan-Angle civilization. The
Pan-Angles have had their civil wars, both in and out of
England: the English Civil War, the American Revolution, and the
American Civil War. The Pan-Angles have had their foreign wars.
They have outrun the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and French.
These struggles warn us to co-operate to avoid further civil
wars and to meet the foreign wars to come.

The race centre has moved, as Franklin foresaw, across the
Atlantic. Canada, reaching to the two oceans, is the keystone of
the Britannic arch. Its population will soon exceed that of the
British Isles, whether compared with the present or any future
British Isles population now imaginable. A proposal to establish
the Britannic capital in Canada commends itself to some who are
anxious for Britannic closer union. This, however, concerns the
political unity of only the smaller portion of the race. The
Pan-Angle house would still be divided. The future will be
better secured to the race if the seven nations, taking counsel
together, build a common capital on that unfortified boundary
between the two Atlantic-Pacific nations.

Bound into one federal body politic, the seven Pan-Angle nations
would ensure to each of their component groups as final a sense
of political security as any people have ever experienced {232}
within the knowledge of history. We should doubtless prefer to
enjoy such a security without entering into any political
combination. Each nation desires to go its own gait, yielding no
iota of its independence. Since we cannot do that in safety, it
is better to be bound into a co-operative unity with our fellow
Pan-Angles, than to run any risk of suffering the bondage of an
alien government. Most of us have already tried federation and
found it effective. The British Isles appears about to adopt it.
While it makes for strength, it permits and encourages
individual freedom and local self-government, essentials to
Pan-Angle existence.

The reasons for federation are many, and the obstacles are not
as great as those we have met and overcome in previous instances
of like nature in our local histories.

Only a few reasons for federation have been here given. They are
based on some of the reiterative similar facts which in our
various local histories emphasize the same Pan-Angle principles.
Many other reasons drawn from Pan-Angle experience will occur to
the reader. He who wishes to see these arguments supplemented in
the stories of the downfall of other civilizations can find much
in non-Pan-Angle history to verify the theme of this book. But
he will fail to find any case of the rule of one people over
areas so extensive and so populous; he will fail to find free
men so equal in freedom--religious, political, and personal.
There are to-day over one hundred and forty-one millions of
white, English-speaking, self-governing people, who are living
witnesses that government of the {233} people, by the people,
and for the people, shall not perish from the earth.

For the citizens, and subject to their presentative sanction,
the practice of representative government exists. The citizens
do not exist for the sake of the government. To enlarge the
sphere of the individual with due regard to the preservation of
the group, Pan-Angles have used and proved the federal idea of
government.

England gave us the tenets of presentative and representative
control manifested in unitary governments. New England,
beginning in the days of "The United Collonyes" of 1643, added
to our English heritage the tenet of the co-existence of a
federal common government and partner unitary governments.
England is now merged into the nationality of the British Isles,
and New England is merely a small corner of America. But the
ideas they gave to us live wherever Pan-Angles talk of the
safety of our civilization.

The success of our former attempts at lesser "closer unions," is
the best evidence of our co-operative ability in the face of
obstacles. American, Canadian, Australian, and South African
experiences show how difficulties are overcome when the need is
understood. Rhode Island held back--the last to enter the new
America; Nova Scotia held back--the last willingly to enter the
new Canada; Queensland held back--the last to enter the
constitutional convention for the new Australia; and Natal held
back--the last to support the new South Africa. Obstacles have
always been present. They will arise in any effort for similar
co-operations. But the common danger and common need is {234}
enough to dispel the obstacles in the path of Pan-Angle
federation.

Only by the force of public opinion do we accomplish our common
intentions. We are slow to act politically. The refusal seven
times repeated of the British Government to acknowledge New
Zealand as within the Britannic world, and the long delayed
start by America to build an Atlantic-Pacific canal are typical
of all of us. But when our public desires are once formed they
find a way to realization.

While we Pan-Angles wait, our rivals are growing stronger.

If anyone searches here for unfriendly criticism or
disparagement, or for an ulterior motive in advocating such a
federation, he will be disappointed or self-deceived. If he be
an American who thinks he sees here a suggestion that the United
States should assert the hidden might of her eighty odd millions
of resourceful people to compel by diplomacy or tariffs such
joint action; if he be a Britisher who thinks he sees here
another pushing American plan of wider world control; if he be
from one of the five new Britannic nations and guards jealously
his own worthy pride of nationhood from the numerical domination
of both the British Isles and America, and fears that his own
nation's autonomy is covertly attacked--in any such case the
reader, whoever he be, is wrong.

These pages are to tell Pan-Angles that their efforts will be
wasted in any work not based on mutual respect and--may the word
be used between men of a race who hesitate to show
it--affection; to tell the Pan-Angle who has not {235} before
realized it that we are all of the same race, hard fighters and
firm friends; and to tell the men of each Pan-Angle nation that
their system of individual representation, with primary and
final control in the voters of the nation, is the race system.
To the Pan-Angle reader, wherever he be, just around the corner
or at the other side of the globe (which ought to be the same in
this, our world), these pages are addressed in hopes of helping
each of us better to understand each other, and to remind us how
much we need each other's help.

This attempt to express ourselves in terms of ourselves may seem
a trite treatise to those familiar with our history. The reason
for saying trite things is lest we forget.

The federation of the Pan-Angles is, perhaps to many of us, the
vision that is to become a reality as a result of this "Era of
English-speaking Good Feeling." We have inherited not only lands
but ideals from the men who fought for them, regardless of
whether it was they or we, their children, who should inherit
and enjoy them. To defend these lands, these ideals of personal
freedom, and this language we speak, we once had unquestioned
supremacy over the seas of the world. By a federation of the
English-speaking white people of these seven nations, the
control of the world and the self-control of our own citizens
will again be in the certain care of the Pan-Angles.

    "We sailed wherever ship can sail,
      We founded many a noble state;
    Pray God our greatness may not fail
      Through craven fear of being great."



[228-1] _Round Table_, London, May 1911, pp. 251-252.

[229-1] Richard Jebb, _The Britannic Question_, London, 1913, p.
258.

[229-2] _Round Table_, London, May 1911, pp. 252-253.

[230-1] _Round Table_, London, May 1911, pp. 253-254.




{236}



{237}

INDEX



Aborigines, the, of Pan-Angle lands, 27, 135.

Adams, John, _cited_, 107.

Administration, the, 118.

Administrative control, 94, 111.

Africa. _See_ South Africa.

Albany Conference, 184, 186, 187, 191.

Aliens, assimilation of, 25, 26.

Alliance stage in Pan-Angle relations, 181.

America. _See_ United States.

American:

  Characteristics, 51.

  National language, 39, 40.

  Nationhood demonstrated in the issue of the Civil War, 168.

  People, the, 23.

  States, combination between, 53, 179, 180. _See also under_
    United States.

American Ambassador, the, _quoted_, 36-37.

American Bar Association, 172, 226 _n._ 2.

American Civil War, 150, 166-168, 173; effect of, on the
attitudes of the British Isles and the United States, 169-170.

American colonies, the, 8, 10, 11; commercial friction in, in
the eighteenth century, 121.

American colonization, 51 _n._ 1; women's share in, 51 _and n._ 2.

American Revolution, the, 15, 114 _and n._, 122, 161, 164, 174,
180; migrations incident to, 161-162.

Americanisms, 29.

Americans, defined, 84 _n._

Angles, the, 4, 5, 6.

Anglican, the term, 18.

Anglo-Japanese treaty, 145, 223.

Anglo-Saxon: the term considered, 18; element in United States
government, the, 37.

Appeal Court, 90.

Arbitration courts, 121, 122, 175 _n._ 2, 215.

Arbitration treaty between America and the British Isles, 182
_n._ 2.

Asiatic:

  Immigration, 125, 138.

  Indian, the, 138.

  Races, problem of, 27.

Australia, 16, 27, 79, 158.

  Asiatic immigration, 125, 143-146 _passim_, 158, 229.

  Constitution, the, 98, 110 _and n._, 112.

  Federation in, 121, 168, 180.

  Government, 112-113 _and n._, 193.

  Upper House, election to, 109.

Australian, characteristics of the, 52.



Barbados, suggestion from, for closer union between England and
colonies, 184.

Bible, English version of, 28.

Boer War, the, 123, 213.

Boone, Daniel, 50.

Botha, General, _quoted_, 80.

Britain, early history of, 2 _et seq._

Britannic nations, the, 88; an alliance existent among, 181-183,
210; federation of, 208, 209, 210, 224; attitude of, in foreign
policy, 229-230; and America, 230.

{238}

_Britannica Year Book_, 109.

British-American friendship, 174-175 _and n._ 2, 182-183.

British Columbia and Oriental immigration, 125, 144-146.

British Isles:

  Ascendency, 170.

  Colonies and federation, 189. attitude to Colonial question in
the Cobden era and during the era of Gladstone, 163.

  Constitution, 96 _et seq._

  Defined, 83 _n._

  Federal model for, the, 197.

  Government, 62, 95, 111-115 _passim_, 193; weakness of unitary
system in, 195, 224; executive office during the American
Revolution, 114.

  Naval defence, 157-159, 228; Big Fleet policy, 127, 128, 154.

  Parliament. _See below_.

  Privy Council, Judicial Committee, 90, 91, 124.

British-Japanese treaty, 145, 223.

British North America Act, 85, 168.

British Parliament, 95; and the constitution, 96-98, 102, 103;
development of, 57-58; now in essence unicameral, 58, 104.

  American representatives in, suggested, 184.

  Cabinet, the, 115.

  General Election, 112.

  Relations with the Colonial Governments, 85 _et seq._

British South African Company, 49.

Britons, the, 2; under Roman administration, 2-3.

Brown, John, and the abolition of slavery, 50.

Bryce, Lord, 176; on British-American friendship, _quoted_,
176-177; _cited_, 32; _quoted_, 101.

Buller, Charles, 162.

Burke, E., _cited_, 11, 61; _quoted_, 94, 214-216, 226.



Cabot, John and Sebastian, 7 _n._ 1.

Caldecott, H., _English Colonization and Empire_, quoted, 59,
87, 91, 172 _n._ 2.

Canada, 13, 16, 23, 79, 110, 133, 158, 169, 172 _and n._ 2, 180, 191,
230, 231.

  Government, 193, 194.

  Immigration, 24-25 _n._

  Loyalist migrations into, during the American Revolution,
161-162.

  Separation, the question of, 162, 163-164.

  Upper House, election to, 109, 110.

Canadian Constitution, the, 98, 168.

Canadian Rebellion (1837), 15.

Cape Colony, native franchise in, 67.

_Cape Times_, quoted; 120 _n._ 1.

Carnarvon, Lord, _cited_, 123.

Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Joseph, _quoted_, 87, 175; reply to Sir
Wilfrid Laurier at Colonial Conference (1902), 181.

Chatham, Lord, 134, 174 _and n._

China, 140-142, 143, 228; civilization of, as a danger for
Pan-Angles, 141.

Choate, Joseph H., _quoted,_ 176, _n._

Churchill, Mr Winston, _quoted,_ 197, 201-202.

Civil discord as a danger for Pan-Angles, 120.

Cobden, _cited_, 163.

Colonial Conference (1902), the, 79, 85, 181-182.

Colonial government, inauguration of modern, 162.

Colonial independence, 170.

Colonial Office, the, 89.

Colonial representation favoured by Pownall and Franklin, 184
_n._, 185, 187-189, 192, 199.

Colonies and possessions, distinction between, not appreciated
by the rulers of England, 9-10, 13.

Colonization, by the Pan-Angles, 8, 51.

Commerce, competitions of, between nations, 121.

Common law of England and of Scotland, 67-68, 96, 97.

Conference of Education Associations, 216-217.

{239}

Congress and the American Constitution, 102-103.

Constitutional:

  Government, 95.

  Law, 97-98.

Constitutions, 60; as restrictions on the power of the people's
representatives, 60.

  American, 99 _et seq._

  Ancient and modern compared, 95 _n._ 2.

  British, 96 _et seq._

  Written, 100, 105.

Converging tendency, 170, 173, 174.

Co-operation for protection of lands and trade, 46.

Corfield, Richard C., 49.

Court of Arbitration, 121, 122, 215.

Court of Appeal, 90.

Crown colonies, the, 16 _n._



Danes, the, 4, 5, 6.

Dangers to the Pan-Angle civilization, 120 _et seq._, 227.

  Civil discord, 120, 231.

  Frictions, 121 _et seq._

  Sense of security as a danger, 135-137.

  Subject populations as a source of, 156.

Defoe, Daniel, _quoted_, 6.

Delegation, 194 _n._ 1.

Democracy, 63.

Dependencies, distinguished from colonies, 9, 91-93.

Devolution, 194 _and n._ 1.

Dewey, Admiral, 54.

Dilke's _Greater Britain_, cited, 168.

Downing Street, 88, 89, 90, 125.

Dunraven, Lord, on the principles of Home Rule, 198.

Durham, Lord, Governor of Canada, 162.



East India Company, 162.

Education, 76-78.

Egerton, H. E., _Federation and Unions_, quoted, 205 _n._

Election of representatives, the right of, 59.

Emerson, _English Traits_, quoted, 35, 191.

Emigration from Great Britain and Ireland, 22 _and n._

Empire, the term, considered, 15-16 _and nn._, 88, 93.

England, the term, considered, 19.

England, 5; the Norman invasion, 5-6; in the Age of Discovery,
7; the union with Scotland, 10.

England and the American Colonies, 8, 10, 11, 177-179;
Franklin's plans for closer union between, 184 _et seq._

England, modern area of, 48 _and n._ 1

English Civil War and law reform, 68.

English common law, 67 _et seq._, 96, 97.

English, the term, considered, 18-19.

English language: the tie between Pan-Angles, 31-32, 39, 40;
characteristics of, 33; development of, 28, 30, 33; standards
in, 29; differences of dialect and colonization, 29; local
variations of speech, 29, 30, 31; the written language, 31;
place of, as a world language, 35; Americanisms, 29.

English-speaking peoples: the seven nations, 16 _et seq._, 79
_et seq._, 189; number of, 33 _and n._ 1 232; the assumption of
superiority in, 35 _et seq._

European migrations into Britain, 2.

Executive control, 94, 111.



Federal courts, 102-103.

Federalism, 200, 224.

Federated Malay States, the, 13, 14, 200 _n._ 1.

Federation, 200 _n._ 1, 232; evolution of, 205.

Federation of Pan-Angles, considered,93, 129-130, 203, 206 _et
seq._, 227 _et seq._; methods of, 208-209; plans for, 210 _et
seq._; arbitration as leading to, 216; conferences as
stepping-stones to, 216-217; educative influences as factors in,
218-220, 221-222; facilities for communication as a factor in
promoting, 217; voluntary {240} associations for promotion of,
218-220; defensive efforts previous to, 222-223.

Forbes, W. C., _quoted_, 92.

Foreign alliances, 223.

Foreign immigration and the Pan-Angle lands, 24, 25.

France, 131, effect of the Seven Years War on, 178; oversea
possessions of, 132-133; regarded by British Isles as an
effective ally, 133; holds no true colonies, 133.

Franklin, Benjamin, on colonial representation in the British
Parliament, 184, _n._, 185, 192, 199; scheme of, for Pan-Angle
union, 184-191 _passim_; a hoax by, 187 _n._ 2; _quoted_, 34,
53; _cited_, 12, 61, 173, 210, 231.

French and British in North America, characteristics of, 51.

French language, the, 34.



Galloway, Pennsylvanian loyalist, _cited_, 11; _quoted_, 12.

Germanic tribes, early system of government in, 54-55.

Germany, 131, 138, 142, 143, 229; as a rival of the Pan-Angles,
152-156, 158, 228; rise of, 154; bureaucracy in, 155.

Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W. E., _cited_, 163.

Government, different significations of the word in England and
United States, 118.

Government, ultimate control of, with the voters, 94, 95.

  Non-unitary, 6, 193.

  Unitary, 194. inadequacy of, 195.

Governmental practices, 94 _et seq._

Governments: complementary functions in, 170; presentative and
representative, 61, 62, 63.

Governors, the British, 86, 87, 108-109 _n._; the power of veto
of, 86, 87, 89.

Grant, President, 167, 169,

Grey, Sir Edward, 152.



Hague Tribunal, the, 121-122.

Haldane, Lord, _quoted_, 226 _and n._ 2.

Hamilton, Alexander, 117.

Hardinge, Lord, _cited_, 120 _n._ 1.

Hawaiian Islands, the, 143, 144.

Hay-Pauncefoote treaty, 128.

Hindus, 125 _n._ 1.

Holland, 131; oversea possessions of, 132 _and n._ 2.

Home Rule, 165 _and n._ 1, 198.

House of Commons, 57, 58, 95, 97, 104, 108.

House of Lords, 57 _and n._ 6, 58, 59, 90, 104, 108.

Howe, Joseph, 191.

Howe, Lord, 178 _and n._

Howe, Sir William, 178 _n._

Hudson's Bay Company, 49.

Hutchinson, _quoted_, 9.



Imperial Civil War, the. _See_ American Revolution.

Imperial Defence Committee, 90, 91.

Imperial Federation, 15-16.

  Joseph Howe's statement, 191.

Imperial Parliament, 88. India, 8, 9, 13, 16 _n._, 178.

Individualism of the Pan-Angles, 40, 47 _et seq._, 154; and the
gift for combining, 52; and territorial acquisition, 48; and
personal liberty, 50; in religion, 73-75.

Initiative, 60.

International arbitration, 121, 122, 175 _n._ 2, 215.

International postal arrangements, 217.

Ireland and the Irish question, 13, 164 _and n._ 4, 165, 197,
198; union with Great Britain, 192.



Japan, 139, 142-143; rise of, as a world power, 142, 147, 149,
152; the increasing population and the search for land, 143-144.

Japanese migration and Pan-Angle lands, 144-146, 151; Admiral
Mahan on, 147 _et seq._; the question of assimilation, 149-151.

Japanese treaty with Great Britain, 145, 223.

Jefferson, Thomas, 107, 126.

{241}

Jenks, E., _The Future Of British Law_, quoted, 68, 70,

Johnson, Dr., _quoted_, 38.

Johnston, Sir H, H., _cited_, 132 _n._ 1, 153.

Jutes, the, 4.



Land and the standard of living, 42 _et seq._; co-operation for
protection of, 46.

Language of the Pan-Angles, growth of, 28.

Laurier, Sir Wilfrid, _quoted_, 80, 86, 181.

Law in the Pan-Angle nations, 67 _et seq._

Lee, Robert E., 167.

Legislative control, 94, 108.

Le Rossignol and Stewart, _State Socialism In New Zealand_,
quoted, 53 _n._

Leroy-Beaulieu, P., _Les Etats-Unis au Vingtieme Siecle_, cited,
51 _n._

Lincoln, President, 27 _n._ 1, 150, 166-167, 168, 226.

Local autonomy, 161, 172, 200, 229.

Lodge, H. C., _One Hundred Years of Peace_, cited, 123.

Louisiana, 133.

Lourenco Marques, 132 _n._ 1.



Magna Carta, 53, 63.

Mahan, Admiral, 32; _quoted_ on Japan among the Nations, 146 _et
seq._

Malay Peninsula, Federated States, the, 13, 14, 200 _n._ 1.

Marriage and divorce laws, 71-73; local laws, 72.

Maryland-Virginia, Conference (1785), 26.

Massachusetts: settlement of, 8; the Taunton liberty pole, 10,
11; during the Seven Years War, 134, 178, 179.

_Mayflower_, the, 29, 100.

Mill, J.S., _The Subjection of Women_, quoted, 73.

Milner, Lord, _quoted_, 86; on the federation of the Empire,
_quoted_, 188, 201.

Modyford, Colonel Thomas, 184.

Monroe doctrine, the, 125-128, 154.

Monroe, President, 126, 127.

Moore, W. H., _The Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Australia_, cited, 83 _n._ 1.



Natal, 233

  Asiatic Indians in, 123-124.

  Zulu rebellion in, 123.

National Church, 74.

Native franchise question in South Africa, 66.

Naval co-operation between the Pan-Angle countries, 158-159,
223.

Naval expansion, effect on Great Britain, 157-158.

Naval strength, importance of, to the Pan-Angles, 157, 158;
Colonial efforts for, 158, 182.

<DW64> problem, 27.

  Slavery and the War of Secession, 150, 166.

  Suffrage, 66-67.

Nelson, 54.

New England, the town meeting in, 59-61; union of the Colonies
in, 203-205, 233.

Newfoundland, 7, 16, 81, 161. Constitution of, 99, 110.

New Guinea, 48.

New Zealand, 13, 16, 48, 61, 81-82, 143-146 _passim_, 158, 234.

  Constitution of, 99, 110.

  Government of, 193, 194.

  House of Representatives, method of election to the Upper
House, 60, 109, 110.

  Resolutions against Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,
124.

  State Socialism in, 53 _and n._

Norman Conquest, the, 5-6, 56.

Norsemen, the, 4.

North America: the struggle for, 178, 179; the centre of
Pan-Angle civilization, 191.

Nova Scotia, 233.



Oliver, F. S., _Alexander Hamilton_, quoted, 86, 88, 89, 115
_n._

Otis, of Massachusetts, _cited_, 11.



Page, Ambassador, _cited_, 217, 218 _n._

Panama Canal tolls, 125, 128.

{242}

Pan-Angle, Pan-Angles:

  Alliances of, with former competitors, 133.

  Characteristics of, 47.

    gift for combining, 52.

  Civilization, character of, 41.

  Clamour for local autonomy, 200.

  Communities, tendency to separation latent in, 164-165.

  Converging tendency among, 173 _et seq._

  Defined, 17-18, 28.

  Equality of citizenship in, 11, 13.

  Federation of, considered, 93, 129-130, 203, 206 _et seq._,
227 _et seq._

  Governments, 108, 193.

  History, commencement of, 7.

  Language of, 28.

  Law among the, 67 _et seq._

  Nations:

    area of, 81 _n._ 1.

    attitude to Japanese immigration, 144 _et seq._

    dependencies of, 91-93.

    friendship and alliance among, 183.

    mutual criticism between, 32-33.

    naval co-operation between, 158-159, 223.

    population of, 81 _n._ 1.

    similarity in forms of government, 94.

  Origin of, 1 _et seq._, 6.

  People, the, 22 _et seq._

  Pioneers, methods of, 48.

  Standard of living, 40, 41, 42, 44.

  Struggle for world domination, 133-135.

  Struggles with other civilizations, 43, 44, 130 _et seq._

  Territories:

    acquisition of by, 43, 44.

    area of, 48 _and n._ 1.

  Women, 51 _and n._ 2.

Papua, 9.

Parliament, British. _See under_ British.

Patriotism and federation, 206-208.

Peel, Sir Robert, 112.

Penington, Isaac, 57 _n._ 4.

People, the, similarity of, in the Pan-Angle nations, 21, 23.

Perry, Admiral, 142.

Philippines, the, 9, 143.

Pitt, William. _See_ Chatham.

Political combinations preservative of individualism, 54.

Political good feeling, 177.

Political status of the six nations, 84 _et seq._

Pollock and Maitland, _History of English Law_, cited, 63.

Popular election, 112.

Population of the Pan-Angle nations, 81 _n._ 1.

Portugal, 131, 153.

  Oversea possessions of, 132 _and n._1.

Possessions as distinguished from colonies, 9.

Pownall, C. A. W., _Thomas Pownall_, 134, 152,

Pownall, Governor Thomas, views of, on colonial representation,
187-188, 189; _cited_, 12, 61, 187, 190; _quoted_, 45, 51, 52,
178, 179.

Presentative element in British government, the, 58.

Presentative government in the Pan-Angle nations, 55, 56, 61;
tendency towards an increase in, 62,

Privy Council, Judicial Committee of, 90-91, 124.



Queensland, 233.

Quoted passages, meaning of terms in, 19 _n._ 1



Recall, 60, 62.

Referendum, 60, 61.

Reform Bill (1832), 50, 112.

Religion and individualism, 73-75.

Representation: difficulties attendant upon, 60; not in itself
enough for Pan-Angles, 200.

Representative government, development of, 54, 56-58;
transplantation of, to the colonies, 58, 59.

Representative, a, not necessarily chosen by the people he
represents, 59; chosen by elections and referenda, 95.

Rhode Island, 233.

{243}

Rhodes, Cecil J., 149,172; interest in the Irish question, 202
_and n._ 2; views of, as to federation, 202, 203; _quoted_, on
English-speaking reunion, 190; the Rhodes' Scholarships, 221,
222.

Roman administration of Britain, 2-3.

Roman Empire population, 17 _and n._

Roosevelt, President, 171 _and n._ 2.

Royal Colonial Institute, 168 _and n._

Rushworth, _quoted_, 40.

Russia, 138-139, 142; growth of, significance for Pan-Angle
civilization, 139, 142, 228; checked by Japan, 139.



Saxons, the, 4, 5, 6.

Scotland, union with England, 10.

Scots, the, Goldwin Smith _quoted_ on, 36.

Sea power, importance of, to the Pan-Angles, 157, 158.

Seeley, J. R., _Expansion of England_, cited and quoted, 88, 92,
134, 160, 168.

Self-government, 8, 9, 120, 172, 201; effect of failure to
distinguish between self-governing and non-self-governing areas,
13-16; and the right of the British Government, 85 _and n._, 89
_et seq._; effect of improper check to, 161; principles of,
violated in the British system, 196.

Sentiment and government, 183.

Separation, the tendency to, 160 _et seq._, 173.

Seven English-speaking nations, the, 16 _et seq._, 79 _et seq._,
189.

Seven Years War, 134, 178.

Shakespeare, _cited_, 28, 29.

Shelburne, Lord, 174.

Shirley, Governor, 185, 199.

Silburn, P. A., _The Governance of Empire_, quoted, 204, _n._

Slavery, the abolition of, 50, 84, 150, 166.

Smith, Goldwin, _quoted_, 36, 150; _cited_, 164.

South Africa, 13, 16, 23, 80, 121, 172, 180.

South Africa:

  Asiatic Indians in, 120 _and n._, 123-124, 158.

  British Government and the internal affairs of, 123, 213.

  Chinese indentured labour in, 123.

  Constitution of, 99, 110.

  Emancipation of slaves in, 84.

  Government, 193.

  Law in, 69.

  Natives and the franchise in, 66-67.

South African Provinces, convergences of, 168.

South African Railway Rates Conference (1908), 216.

South African War, 172, 174, 182.

Spain and her possessions, 131.

Spreading: the tendency to, in Pan-Angle history, 100-161, 172.

State Church, the, 74.

Stead, W. T., _cited_, 190.

Suffrage, the, 63, _et seq._

  Local differences in, 64-65.

  Local option, 65.

  <DW64>, 66-67.

  Sex disqualification, the, 64.

Switzerland, Inter-cantonal, arbitration in, 216.



Taft, W. H., _Popular Government_, cited, 60 _n._ 3; quoted, 65.

Taunton liberty pole, the, 10, 11.

Taxation and representation, 12, 13, 209.

Tendencies, 160 _et seq._

  Revealed in Pan-Angle history, 160.

Teutonic: invasion of Britain, 4; system of government,
113-114, 116, 117.

Texas, 49 _n._ 1, 82.

Thayer, J. B., _John Marshall_, quoted, 102, 103.

_Times, The_, quoted, 120 _n._ 1.

Transvaal, 138.

  Indian question, 125.

_Transvaal Leader_, cited, 132 _n._ 1.

Trusts or combinations, 52.



Unconstitutional: different meanings of the word in Great
Britain and in United States, 104-108.

{244}

_United Empire_, 168 _n._ 2.

United States, the, 1, 9, 16, 45, 83 _n._ 2, 178, 179, 180, 228.
_See also under_ American.

  Administration, the. _See_ Government.

  Centralization, the demand for, in, 170.

  Colonies, federal government of, 189.

  Conference of Governors in, 171 _and n._ 2, 172.

  Conservation in, 171.

  Electoral College, 106, 111 _and n._, 112.

  Executive, the, 116.

  Federal Constitution of, 99-103 _passim_, 106, 107, 109 _and
n._

  Federal Government of, 90, 111-118 _passim_, 170-172, 189,
193, 200-201.

  Immigration, 22, 23, 24 _n._ 1.

  Law in, similar to the law of England, 70; appointment of the
judiciary, 114.

  President, the, 62, 101,114, 116, 117; election of, 111; and
administrative subordinates, 117.

  Secession movement in, 165; sacrifices to preserve the Union,
168, 173; the War of Secession, 150, 166-168, 172, 174.

  Senators, indirect election of, 60.

  State governments in, 65, 114.

  States rights, the demand for, 170.

United States:
  Upper House, election to, 109, 110.

United States and British Isles, effect of federation on sources
of disagreement between, 125 _et seq_.; treaties between,
182-183.

United States and the Britannic nations, 182, 230-231.



Vancouver Island, 210 _n._

Virginia, settlement of, 8.

  The House of Assembly in, 9, 59.

Voltaire, treatise on Toleration, _cited_, 34.



Washington, George, _cited_, 107; _quoted_, 225.

Webster, Noah, 34.

William the Conqueror, 5, 55.

Willson, Beckles, _The Great Company_, cited, 49 _n._ 2.

Wilson, Governor (of Kentucky), 171 _n._ 2.

Wilson, Woodrow, _Mere Literature_, quoted, 95, 166-168; _The
State_, quoted, 107, 114 _n._, 118 _n._

Witenagamot, the, 55, 57, 61.

Women's share in American colonization, 51 _and n._ 2.

Worsfold, W. B., _The Union of South Africa_, quoted, 67, 69.



Yellow races, the, 140 _et seq._



[Illustration: Pan-Angles World Map]



[Transcriber's Notes:

All spellings have been preserved as printed. The appearance of
[_sic_] is as printed in the source book.

Footnotes have been numbered as "ppp-nn", where "ppp" is the
page number and "nn" is the footnote's number on that page.  This
matches the original Index entries.

Footnote 30-1 was not numbered in the source book, nor was there
a referring footnote number in the source text on page 30.
]






End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Pan-Angles, by Sinclair Kennedy

*** 