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THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

[Illustration]


   THE

   HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

   TRANSLATED FROM THE TEXT OF F. HULTSCH

   BY

   EVELYN S. SHUCKBURGH, M.A.

   LATE FELLOW OF EMMANUEL COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

   IN TWO VOLUMES

   VOL. I

   LONDON

   MACMILLAN AND CO.

   AND NEW YORK

   1889

   _All rights reserved_



   TO

   F. M. S.

   IN GRATITUDE FOR MUCH PATIENT HELP




PREFACE


This is the first English translation of the complete works of Polybius
as far as they are now known. In attempting such a task I feel that I
ought to state distinctly the limits which I have proposed to myself
in carrying it out. I have desired to present to English readers a
faithful copy of what Polybius wrote, which should at the same time
be a readable English book. I have not been careful to follow the
Greek idiom; and have not hesitated to break up and curtail or enlarge
his sentences, when I thought that, by doing so, I could present his
meaning in more idiomatic English. Polybius is not an author likely
to be studied for the sake of his Greek, except by a few technical
scholars; and the modern complexion of much of his thought makes
such a plan of translation both possible and desirable. How far I
have succeeded I must leave my readers to decide. Again, I have not
undertaken to write a commentary on Polybius, nor to discuss at length
the many questions of interest which arise from his text. Such an
undertaking would have required much more space than I was able to
give: and happily, while my translation was passing through the press,
two books have appeared, which will supply English students with much
that I might have felt bound to endeavour to give—the Achaean league
by Mr. Capes, and the sumptuous Oxford edition of extracts by Mr.
Strachan-Davidson.

The translation is made from the text of Hultsch and follows his
arrangement of the fragments. If this causes some inconvenience to
those who use the older texts, I hope that such inconvenience will
be minimised by the full index which I have placed at the end of the
second volume.

I have not, I repeat, undertaken to write a commentary. I propose
rather to give the materials for commentary to those who, for various
reasons, do not care to use the Greek of Polybius. I have therefore in
the first five complete books left him to speak for himself, with the
minimum of notes which seemed necessary for the understanding of his
text. The case of the fragments was different. In giving a translation
of them I have tried, when possible, to indicate the part of the
history to which they belong, and to connect them by brief sketches of
intermediate events, with full references to those authors who supply
the missing links.

Imperfect as the performance of such a task must, I fear, be, it has
been one of no ordinary labour, and has occupied every hour that
could be spared during several years of a not unlaborious life. And
though I cannot hope to have escaped errors, either of ignorance or
human infirmity, I trust that I may have produced what will be found
of use to some historical students, in giving them a fairly faithful
representation of the works of an historian who is, in fact, our sole
authority for some most interesting portions of the world’s history.

It remains to give a brief account of the gradual formation of the text
of Polybius, as we now have it.

The revival of interest in the study of Polybius was due to Pope
Nicholas V (1447-1455), the founder of the Vatican Library. Soon after
his election he seems to have urged Cardinal Perotti to undertake a
Latin translation of the five books then known to exist. When Perotti
sent him his translation of the first book, the Pope thus acknowledges
it in a letter dated 28th August 1452:—[1]

   “_Primus Polybii liber, quem ad nos misisti, nuper a te de Graeca
   in Latinam translatus, gratissimus etiam fuit et jucundissimus:
   quippe in ea translatione nobis cumulatissime satisfacis. Tanta
   enim facilitate et eloquentia transfers, ut Historia ipsa nunquam
   Graeca, sed prorsus Latina semper fuisse videatur. Optimum igitur
   ingenium tuum valde commendamus atque probamus, teque hortamur ut
   velis pro laude et gloria tua, et pro voluptate nimia singulare
   opus inchoatum perficere, nec labori parcas. Nam et rem ingenio
   et doctrina tua dignam, et nobis omnium gratissimam efficies; qui
   laborum et studiorum tuorum aliquando memores erimus.... Tu vero,
   si nobis rem gratam efficere cupis, nihil negligentiae committas
   in hoc opere traducendo. Nihil enim nobis gratius efficere
   poteris. Librum primum a vertice ad calcem legimus, in cujus
   translatione voluntati nostrae amplissime satisfactum est._”

On the 3d of January 1454 the Pope writes again to Perotti thanking him
for the third book; and in a letter to Torelli, dated 13th November
1453, Perotti says that he had finished his translation of Polybius in
the preceding September. This translation was first printed in 1473.
The Greek text was not printed till 1530, when an edition of the first
five books in Greek, along with Perotti’s translation, was published at
the Hague, _opera Vincentii Obsopaei_, dedicated to George, Marquess of
Brandenburg. Perotti’s translation was again printed at Basle in 1549,
accompanied by a Latin translation of the fragments of books 6 to 17 by
Wolfgan Musculus, and reprinted at the Hague in 1598.

The chief fragments of Polybius fall into two classes; (1) those
made by some unknown epitomator, who Casaubon even supposed might be
Marcus Brutus, who, according to Plutarch, was engaged in this work
in his tent the night before the battle of Pharsalus. The printing of
these began with two insignificant fragments on the battle between
the Rhodians and Attalus against Philip, Paris, 1536; and another _de
re navali_, Basle, 1537. These fragments have continually accumulated
by fresh discoveries. (2) The other class of fragments are those
made by the order of Constantinus Porphyrogenitus (911-959), among
similar ones from other historians, which were to be digested under
fifty-three heads or tituli; one of which (the 27th) has come down
to us, discovered in the sixteenth century, containing the _selecta
de legationibus_; and another (the 50th) _de virtute et vitio_. The
printing of the first of these begins with the edition of Fulvius
Ursinus, published at Antwerp in 1582. This was supplemented in
1634 (Paris) by an edition by Valesius of _excerpta ex collectaneis
Constantini Augusti Porphyrogeneti_. The first edition of something
like a complete text of Polybius, containing the five entire books,
the _excerptae legationes_, and fragments of the other books, was
that of Isaac Casaubon, Paris, 1609, fo. It was accompanied by a new
and very brilliant Latin translation, and a preface which has been
famous among such works. It contains also a Latin translation of
Aeneas Tacticus. Altogether it is a splendid book. Some additional
_annotationes_ of Casaubon’s were published after his death in 1617,
Paris.[2] Other editions followed; that of Gronovius, Amsterdam, 1670:
of Ernesti, Leipsic, 1764, containing Casaubon’s translation more or
less emended, and additional fragments. But the next important step
in the bibliography of Polybius was the publication of the great
edition of Schweighaeuser, Leipsic, 1789-1795, in nine volumes, with
a new Latin translation,—founded, however, to a great extent on
Casaubon,—a new recension of the text, and still farther additions
to the fragments; accompanied also by an excellent Lexicon and
Onomasticon. This great work has been the foundation from which all
modern commentaries on Polybius must spring. Considerable additions
to the fragments, collected from MSS. in the Vatican by Cardinal Mai,
were published in 1827 at Rome. The chief modern texts are those of
Bekker, 1844; Duebner (with Latin translation), 1839 and 1865; Dindorf,
1866-1868, 1882 (Teubner). A new recension of the five books and all
the known fragments—founded on a collation of some twelve MSS. and all
previous editions, as well as all the numerous works of importance on
our Author that have appeared in Germany and elsewhere—was published
by F. Hultsch, Berlin, 1867-1872, in four volumes. This must now be
considered the standard text. A second edition of the first volume
appeared in 1888, but after that part of my translation had passed
through the press.

Of English translations the earliest was by Ch. Watson, 1568, of the
first five books. It is entitled _The Hystories of the most famous
Cronographer Polybios; Discoursing of the warres betwixt the Romanes
and Carthaginenses, a rich and goodly work, conteining holsome counsels
and wonderful devices against the inconstances of fickle Fortune.
Englished by C[hristopher] W[atson] whereunto is annexed an Abstract,
compendiously coarcted out of the life and worthy Acts perpetrate
by oure puissant Prince King Henry the fift. London, Imprinted by
Henry Byneman for Tho. Hacket, 1568_, 8vo. See Herbert’s _Ames_, p.
895. Another translation of the five books was published by Edward
Grimestone, London, 1634, of which a second and third edition appeared
in 1648 and 1673. A translation of the Mercenary War from the first
book was made by Sir Walter Raleigh, and published after his death
in 1647 (London, 4to). Next, a new translation of the five books was
published in London, 1693 (2 vols. 8vo), by Sir H[enry] S[hears],
with a preface by Dryden. In 1741 (London, 4to) appeared “A fragment
of the 6th book containing a dissertation on government, translated
from the Greek of Polybius, with notes, etc., by A Gentleman.” This
was followed by the first English translation, which contained any
part of the fragments, as well as the five books, by the Rev. James
Hampton, London, 4to, 1756-1761, which between that date and 1823
(2 vols., Oxford) went through at least seven editions. Lastly, a
translation of Polybius’s account of Hannibal’s passage of the Alps is
appended by Messrs. Church and Brodribb to their translation of Livy,
21-22. There is a German translation by A. Haakh and Kraz, Stuttgart,
1858-1875. And a French translation by J. A. C. Buchon, Paris, 1842,
Orléans, 1875. For the numerous German essays and dissertations on
the text, and particular questions arising from the history, I must
refer my readers to Engelmann’s _Bibliotheca_. In England such studies
are rare. Mr. Strachan-Davidson published an essay on Polybius in
Hellenica; and his edition of extracts of the text (Oxford, 1888)
contains several dissertations of value. Mr. Capes (London, 1888) has
published an edition of extracts referring to the Achaean league,
with an introductory essay on the author and his work. And a very
admirable article on Polybius appears in the recent edition of the
_Encyclopædia Britannica_ by Mr. H. F. Pelham. There is also a good
paper on Polybius in the _Quarterly Review_ for 1879, No. 296.
Criticisms on Polybius, and estimates of his value as an historian,
will be found in Thirlwall’s _History of Greece_, vol. viii.; Arnold’s
_History of Rome_; Mommsen’s _History of Rome_, book iv. c. xiii.;
Freeman’s _History of Federal Government_ and _Essays_; Bunbury’s
_Ancient Geography_, vol. ii. p. 16; Law’s _Alps of Hannibal_. For
the Roman side of his history, besides the works mentioned by Mr.
Strachan-Davidson, a good list of the literature on the 2d Punic war
is given by Mr. W. T. Arnold in his edition of Dr. Arnold’s history of
that period [London, Macmillan, 1886].

Finally, I have to express my warm thanks to Dr. Warre, Head Master of
Eton, for aiding me with his unique knowledge of ancient and modern
tactics in clearing up many points very puzzling to a civilian. To
Mr. W. Chawner, Fellow and Tutor of Emmanuel College, for reading
part of the translation in proof, and making valuable corrections and
suggestions. And to Professor Ridgway, of Queen’s College, Cork, for
corrections in the geographical fragments of book 34.




CONTENTS


                                       PAGES

   INTRODUCTION                      xvii-lx

   BOOKS I TO IX                       1-602




INTRODUCTION

I. POLYBIUS


Fortune cast the life of Polybius in stirring times. His special claim
to our admiration is that he understood the importance in the history
of the world of the changes which were passing under his eyes, and
exerted himself to trace the events which immediately preceded them,
and from which they sprang, while it was yet possible to see and
question surviving participators in them; to examine places, before
they had lost all marks of the great events of which they had been
the scene; and records or monuments before time had cast a doubt upon
their meaning or authenticity. Nor is this ordinary praise. Men are
apt to turn their eyes upon the past, as holding all that is worthy of
contemplation, while they fail to take note of history “in the making,”
or to grasp the importance of the transactions of their own day. But
as every year has its decisive influence on the years which succeed
it, the greatest benefactor of posterity is the man who understands
and records events as they pass with care and sincerity. Laborious
compilation, from the study and comparison of ancient records and
monuments, has its value: it may often be all that it is possible to
obtain; it may not unfrequently even serve to correct statements of
contemporaries which have been deformed by carelessness or  by
prejudice. But the best compilation is infinitely inferior in interest
and instructiveness to the barest report of a contemporary. And when
such a man is also an eye-witness of much that he relates; when he knew
and conversed with many of the chief actors in the great events which
he records; when again he tells us of transactions so remote in time,
that all written documents have necessarily perished, and those in more
durable bronze and stone all but followed in their train, then indeed
the interest rises to the highest pitch. Like Herodotus and Thucydides,
then, Polybius tells us of his own times, and of the generations
immediately preceding them. It is true that the part of his work which
has survived in a complete form deals with a period before his own
day, just as the greater part of the history of Herodotus does, but in
the larger part of the fragments he is writing with even more complete
personal knowledge than Thucydides. He had, again, neither the faculty
for story-telling possessed by Herodotus nor the literary and dramatic
force of Thucydides. The language which he spoke and wrote had lost
the magic of style; had lost the lucidity and grace of Sophocles, and
the rugged vigour and terseness of Thucydides. Nor had he apparently
acquired any of those artifices which, while they sometimes weary us
in the later rhetoricians, yet generally serve to make their writings
the easiest and pleasantest of reading. Equally remote again is his
style from the elaborate and involved manner of Plutarch, with its huge
compound words built up of intricate sentences, more like difficult
German than Greek. Polybius had no tricks of this sort;[3] but his
style lacks logical order and clearness. It seems rather the language
of a man of affairs, who had had neither leisure to study style, nor
taste to read widely with a view to literature as such. But after all
it is Greek, and Greek that still retained its marvellous adaptability
to every purpose, to every shade of thought, and every form of
literature. Nor is his style in the purely narrative parts of his work
wanting in a certain force, derived from singleness and directness of
purpose. He “speaks right on,” and turns neither to the right hand nor
the left. It is when he reflects and argues and moralises, that his
want of literary skill sometimes makes him difficult and involved;
and though the thought is essentially just, and his point of view
wonderfully modern, we continually feel the want of that nameless charm
which the Greeks called χάρις.

His bent for historical composition was fortunately encouraged by the
circumstances of his life, which gave Polybius special opportunities
of satisfying his curiosity and completing his knowledge. Not only was
he the son of a man who had held the highest office in the league, and
so must have heard the politics and history of Achaia discussed from
his earliest youth; not only from early manhood was he himself in the
thick of political business; but he knew the sovereigns of Egypt and
Pergamus, of Macedonia and Syria, and the Roman generals who conquered
the latter. He had visited a Roman camp and witnessed its practical
arrangements and discipline. And his enforced residence of sixteen
years in Italy and Rome was, by the good fortune of his introduction to
Aemilius Paullus and his sons, turned into an opportunity of unrivalled
advantage for studying the laws, military discipline, and character
of the imperial people whose world conquest he chronicles. Unlike his
fellow-exiles, he did not allow his depressing circumstances to numb
his faculties, exasperate his temper, or deaden his curiosity. He won
the confidence of the leading men at Rome; and seems, while pushing on
his inquiries with untiring vigour, to have used his influence for the
benefit of his countrymen, and of all Greek subjects of Rome.

But, like so many of the writers of antiquity, he has had no one to
perform for him the service he had done for others in rescuing their
achievements and the particulars of their career from oblivion. Of the
many _testimonia_ collected by Schweighaeuser and others from ancient
writers, scarcely one gives us any details or anecdotes of the writer,
whose work they briefly describe or praise. We are reduced as usual to
pick out from his own writings the scattered allusions or statements
which help us to picture his character and career.

[Sidenote: Birth of Polybius.]

Polybius of Megalopolis was the son of Lycortas, the friend and
partisan of Philopoemen, who had served the Achaean league in several
capacities: as ambassador to Rome in B.C. 189, along with Diophanes,
on the question of the war with Sparta,[4] and to Ptolemy Epiphanes
in B.C. 186,[5] and finally as Strategus in B.C. 184-183. Of the year
of his birth we cannot be certain. He tells us that he was elected
to go on embassy from the league to Ptolemy Epiphanes in the year of
the death of that monarch (B.C. 181), although he was below the legal
age.[6] But we do not know for certain what that age was; although
it seems likely that it was thirty, that apparently being the age at
which a member of the league exercised his full privileges.[7] But
assuming this, we do not know how much under that age he was. Two years
previously (B.C. 183) he had carried the urn at Philopoemen’s funeral.
This was an office usually performed by quite young men (νεανίσκοι)[8],
probably not much over twenty years old. As we know that he lived to
write a history of the Numantine war, which ended B.C. 133[9], and that
he was eighty-two at the time of his death[10], we shall not, I think,
be probably far wrong if we place his birth in B.C. 203 and his death
in B.C. 121 as Casaubon does, who notes that the latter is just sixteen
years before the birth of Cicero. But though this is a good working
hypothesis, it is very far from being a demonstrated fact.

Between B.C. 181-168 he was closely allied with his father in politics;
and if we wish to have any conception of what he was doing, it is
necessary to form some idea of the state of parties in the Peloponnese
at the time.

The crowning achievement of Philopoemen’s career had been the uniting
of Sparta to the Achaean league, after the murder of the tyrant Nabis
by the Aetolians who had come to Sparta as his allies (B.C. 192). In
B.C. 191 the Achaeans were allowed to add Messene and Elis to their
league, as a reward for their services to Rome in the war against
Antiochus. The Aetolian league, the chief enemy and opponent of Achaia,
was reduced to a state of humble dependence on Rome in B.C. 189, after
the defeat of Antiochus at Thermopylae (B.C. 191) and the Aetolian
war (B.C. 191-189). From B.C. 190 then begins the time during which
Polybius says that the “name of the Achaeans became the universal one
for all the inhabitants of the Peloponnese” (2, 42). But though Sparta
was included in the league she was always a restive and dissatisfied
member; and the people of Elis and Messene, who were not very willing
members either, were told by Flamininus that if they had any reason to
complain of the federal government they were to appeal to him.[11] Now,
by a treaty of alliance with Rome, decreed at Sikyon in B.C. 198, it
was provided that Rome should receive no envoys from separate states of
the league, but only from the league itself.[12] Flamininus, therefore,
if he said what Livy reports him to have said, was violating this
treaty. And this will be a good instance to illustrate the divisions
of parties existing during the period of Polybius’s active political
life (B.C. 181-169). We have seen that in B.C. 198 the Achaean league
became an ally of Rome as a complete and independent state; that this
state was consolidated by the addition of Sparta (192) and Elis and
Messene (191) so as to embrace the whole of the Peloponnese; that its
chief enemy in Greece, the Aetolian league, was rendered powerless
in B.C. 189. The Macedonian influence in the Peloponnese had been
abolished after the battle of Cynoscephalae (197) by the proclamation
of Greek freedom by Flamininus (196). But all this seeming liberty
and growth in power really depended upon the favour of Rome, and was
continually endangered not only by the appeals to the Senate from
separate states in the league, who conceived themselves wronged, but by
treasonable representations of her own envoys, who preferred a party
triumph to the welfare and independence of their country[13]. In these
circumstances, there were naturally differences of opinion as to the
proper attitude for the league government to assume towards a state,
which was nominally an equal ally, but really an absolute master. There
was one party who were for submissively carrying out the will of the
Roman officers who from time to time visited the Peloponnese; and for
conciliating the Senate by displaying a perpetual readiness to carry
out its wishes, without putting forward in any way the rights which
the treaty of 198 had secured to them. The leaders of this party, in
the time of Philopoemen, were Aristaenos and Diophanes. The other
party, headed till his death by Philopoemen, equally admitting that the
Roman government could not be safely defied, were yet for aiming at
preserving their country’s independence by strictly carrying out the
terms of the Roman alliance, and respectfully but firmly resisting any
encroachment upon those terms by the officers representing the Roman
government. On Philopoemen’s death (B.C. 183) Lycortas, who had been
his most devoted follower, took, along with Archon, the lead of the
party which were for carrying out his policy; while Callicrates became
the most prominent of the Romanising party. Lycortas was supported
by his son Polybius when about B.C. 181 he began to take part in
politics. Polybius seems always to have consistently maintained this
policy. His view seems to have been that Rome, having crushed Philip
and Antiochus, was necessarily the supreme power. The Greeks must
recognise facts; must avoid offending Rome; but must do so by keeping
to a position of strict legality, maintaining their rights, and neither
flattering nor defying the victorious Commonwealth. He believed that
the Romans meant fairly by Greece, and that Greek freedom was safe
in their hands[14]. But the straightforward policy of the Senate, if
it was ever sincere, was altered by the traitor Callicrates in B.C.
179; who, being sent to Rome to oppose what the league thought the
unconstitutional restitution of certain Spartan exiles, advised the
Senate to use the Romanising party in each state to secure a direct
control in Achaia[15]. Acting on this insidious advice, the Roman
government began to view with suspicion the legal and independent
attitude of the other party, and to believe or affect to believe
that they were enemies of the Roman supremacy. Lycortas, Archon,
and Polybius, finding themselves the objects of suspicion, not less
dangerous because undeserved, to the Roman government, appear to have
adopted an attitude of reserve, abstaining from taking an active or
prominent part in the business of the assemblies. This, however, did
not succeed in averting Roman jealousy; and the commissioners, Gaius
Popilius and Gnaeus Octavius, who visited the Peloponnese in B.C. 169,
gave out that those who held aloof were as displeasing to the Senate
as those who openly opposed it. They were said to have resolved on
formally impeaching the three statesmen before the Achaean assembly
as being enemies of Rome; but when the assembly met at Aegium, they
had failed to obtain any reasonable handle against them, and contented
themselves with a speech of general exhortation.[16] This was during
the war with Perseus, when the Romans kept a vigilant eye on all parts
of Greece, and closely inquired which politicians in the several
states ventured to display the least sympathy with the Macedonian
king, or were believed to secretly nourish any wish for his success.
It speaks strongly both for the independent spirit still surviving in
the league, as well as for the character of Archon and Polybius, that
they were elected, apparently in the same assembly, the one Strategus
and the other Hipparch for the year B.C. 169-168.[17] In this office
Polybius doubtless hoped to carry out the principles and discipline
of Philopoemen, under whom he had probably served in the cavalry, and
whose management of this branch of the service he had at any rate
minutely studied.[18] But there was little occasion for the use of the
Achaean cavalry in his year. Being sent on a mission to Q. Marcius
Philippus at Heracleia to offer the league’s assistance in the war
with Perseus, when their help was declined, he remained behind after
the other ambassadors had returned, to witness the campaign.[19] After
spending some time in the Roman camp, he was sent by Q. Marcius to
prevent the Achaeans from consenting to supply five thousand men to
Appius Claudius Cento in Epirus. This was a matter of considerable
delicacy. He had to choose between offending one or the other powerful
Roman. But he conducted the affair with prudence, and on the lines
he had always laid down, those, namely, of strict legality. He found
the Achaean assembly in session at Sicyon; and he carried his point
by representing that the demand of Appius Claudius did not bear on
the face of it the order of the Senate, without which they were
prohibited from supplying the requisitions of Roman commanders.[20] He
thus did not betray that he was acting on the instigation of Quintus
Marcius, and put himself and the league in an attitude of loyalty
toward the Senate.[21] In the same cautious spirit he avoided another
complication. Certain complimentary statues or inscriptions had been
put up in various cities of the league in honour of Eumenes, king of
Pergamus, and on some offence arising had been taken down. This seems
to have annoyed Eumenes exceedingly; and Polybius persuaded the people
that it had been ordered by Sosigenes and Diopeithes, as judges, from
feelings of personal spite, and without any act of Eumenes unfriendly
to the league. He carried his point, and thus avoided offending a
king who at that time was on very friendly terms with Rome.[22] But
while thus minded to avoid unnecessary offence, Polybius and his party
were in favour of strengthening the league by alliances which could
be entered upon with safety. Egypt at this time was under the joint
government of two Ptolemies, Philometor and Physcon, who were being
threatened with an invasion by Antiochus Epiphanes. The friendship
of the league with the kings of Egypt had been of long standing, as
far back as the time of Aratus; and though that friendship had been
afterwards interrupted by the Macedonian policy of Aratus, just before
his death the father of these kings had presented the league with ten
ships and a sum of money. The two kings now sent to beg for aid; and
asked that Lycortas should come as commander-in-chief, and Polybius
as hipparch. Lycortas and Polybius were in favour of supplying the
assistance asked.[23] But the measure was opposed by Callicrates and
his partisans, on the specious ground that their whole efforts should
be directed to aid the Romans against Perseus. Lycortas and Polybius
replied that the Romans did not require their help; and that they were
bound, by gratitude, as well as by treaty, to help the Ptolemies. They
carried with them the popular feeling: but Callicrates outwitted them
by obtaining a dispatch from Q. Marcius, urging the league to join the
senate in effecting a reconciliation between Antiochus and the kings
of Egypt. Polybius gave in, and advised compliance. Ambassadors were
appointed to aid in the pacification; and the envoys from Alexandria
were obliged to depart without effecting their object. They contented
themselves with handing in to the magistrates the Royal letters,
in which Lycortas and Polybius were invited by name to come to
Alexandria.[24]

[Sidenote: B.C. 167.]

Careful, however, as he had ever been to avoid giving just offence to
Rome, he and his party had long been marked by the Senate as opponents
of that more complete interference in the details of Achaean politics
which it wished to exercise. This was partly owing to the machinations
of Callicrates; but it was also the result of the deliberate policy of
the Senate: and it was doubtless helped by the report of every Roman
officer who had found himself thwarted by the appeal to legality,
under the influence of the party in the league with which Polybius was
connected.[25] Accordingly, soon after the final defeat of Perseus
by Aemilius Paulus in B.C. 168, and the consequent dismemberment of
Macedonia, the Senate proceeded to execute its vengeance upon those
citizens in every state in Greece who were believed to have been
opposed to the Roman interests. The commissioners entrusted with
the settlement and division of Macedonia were directed to hold an
inquiry into this matter also. From every city the extreme partisans
of Rome were summoned to assist them, men who were only too ready to
sacrifice their political opponents to the vengeance of the power to
which they had long been paying a servile and treacherous court. From
Boeotia came Mnasippus; from Acarnania, Chremes; from Epirus, Charops
and Nicias; from Aetolia, Lyciscus and Tisippus; and from Achaia,
Callicrates, Agesias, and Philippus.[26] Instigated by these advisers,
the commissioners ordered the supposed covert enemies of Rome in the
several states to proceed to Italy to take their trial. To Achaia
two commissioners, Gaius Claudius and Gnaeus Domitius, were sent. An
Achaean assembly being summoned to meet them, they announced that there
were certain men of influence in the league who had helped Perseus by
money and other support. They required that a vote should be passed
condemning them all to death; and said that, when that was done, they
would publish the names. Such a monstrous perversion of justice was
too much for the assembly, who refused to vote until they knew the
names. The commissioners then said that all the Strategi who had been
in office since the beginning of the war were involved. One of them,
Xeno, came forward, declared his innocence, and asserted that he was
ready to plead his cause before any tribunal, Achaean or Roman. Upon
this the commissioners required that all the accused persons should go
to Rome. A list of one thousand names was drawn up, under the guidance
of Callicrates, of those who were at once to proceed to Italy[27] (B.C.
167). The court of inquiry, before which they were to appear, was never
held. They were not allowed even to stay in Rome, but were quartered
in various cities of Italy, which were made responsible for their safe
custody: and there they remained until B.C. 151, when such of them as
were still alive, numbering then somewhat less than three hundred, were
contemptuously allowed to return.[28] Among these detenus was Polybius.
We do not hear that Lycortas was also one, from which it has been with
some probability supposed that he was dead. More fortunate than the
rest, Polybius was allowed to remain at Rome. He had made, it seems,
the acquaintance of Aemilius Paulus and his two sons in Macedonia, and
during the tour of Amelius through Greece after the Macedonian war.[29]
And on their return to Italy he was allowed by their influence to
remain in Rome; and, acting as tutor to the two boys,[30] became well
acquainted with all the best society in the city. The charming account
which he gives[31] of the mutual affection existing between him and
the younger son of Aemilius (by adoption now called Publius Scipio
Africanus Aemilianus) bears all the marks of sincerity, and is highly
to the credit of both. To it we may add the anecdote of Plutarch, that
“Scipio, in observance of the precept of Polybius, endeavoured never to
leave the forum without having made a close friend of some one he met
there.”

But much as he owed to the friendship of the sons of Aemilius, he
owed it also to his own energy and cheerful vigour that these sixteen
years of exile were not lost time in his life. He employed them, not
in fruitless indulgence in homesickness, or in gloomy brooding over
his wrongs, but in a careful and industrious study of the history and
institutions of the people among whom he was compelled to reside[32];
in ingratiating himself with those members of the Senate who he thought
might be useful to his countrymen; and in forming and maturing his
judgment as to the course of policy they ought to pursue. Nor was he
without means of gratifying lighter tastes. He was an active sportsman:
and the boar-hunting in the district of Laurentum not only diverted his
attention from the distressing circumstances of his exile, and kept
his body in vigorous health, but obtained for him the acquaintance of
many men of rank and influence. Thus for instance his intimacy with
the Syrian prince Demetrius, afterwards king Demetrius Soter, was made
in the hunting-field[33]: and the value which this young man attached
to his advice and support is some measure of the opinion entertained
generally of his wisdom, moderation, and good judgment. We have no
further details of his life in Rome; but we have what is better,—its
fruits, in the luminous account of its polity, the constitution of its
army, and the aims of its statesmen.

[Sidenote: B.C. 151. Release of the detenus.]

At last the time came when he was once more free to visit his own
country, or to extend his knowledge by visiting the countries which
he wished to describe. After repeated applications to the Senate
by embassies from Achaia, made without avail, in B.C. 151 Polybius
appeared in person to plead the cause before the Fathers. There was
now, it was thought, no reason for retaining these unfortunate men. The
original thousand had shrunk to less than three hundred; middle-aged
men had become in sixteen years old and decrepit; they had lost
connexions and influence in the Peloponnese; they had learnt by bitter
experience the impossibility of resisting the power of Rome, and were
no longer likely to venture on organising any opposition. Their longer
detention could only be a measure of vengeance, and useless vengeance.
Still the debate in the Senate was long and doubtful, until it was
brought to a conclusion by the contemptuous exclamation of Cato: “Are
we to sit here all day discussing whether some old Greek dotards are
to be buried by Italian or Achaean undertakers?” Polybius, elated by
a concession thus ungraciously accorded, wished to enter the Senate
once more with a further request for a restitution of their property in
Achaia. But Cato bluntly bade him “remember Ulysses, who wanted to go
back into the cave of the Cyclops to fetch his cap and belt.”[34]

[Sidenote: Coss. L. Marcius Censornius, Manius Manilius, B.C. 149.
Polybius sent for to Lilybaeum.]

Polybius seems to have returned to the Peloponnese at once, and to have
remained there until B.C. 149, when he was suddenly summoned to serve
the government whose enforced guest he had been so long. It was the
year in which the Senate had determined to commence their proceedings
against Carthage, which were not to be stayed until she was levelled
with the ground. In B.C. 150 the victory of Massanissa had restored the
oligarchs, who had been superseded by the popular anti-Roman party in
Carthage. These men hastened to make every possible offer of submission
to Rome. The Senate had made up its mind for war; and yet did not at
once say so. After demanding that full satisfaction should be made to
Massanissa, it next decreed that the Carthaginians must at once give
three hundred of their noblest youths as hostages to the Roman consuls
Manilius and Censorinus, who had sailed to Lilybaeum with secret orders
to let no concession induce them to stop the war until Carthage was
destroyed.[35] There was naturally some hesitation in obeying this
demand at Carthage; for the hostages were to be given to the Romans
absolutely without any terms, and without any security. They felt
that it was practically a surrender of their city. To overcome this
hesitation Manilius sent for Polybius, perhaps because he had known and
respected him at Rome, and believed that he could trust him; perhaps
because his well-known opinion, as to the safety in trusting the Roman
_fides_, might make him a useful agent. But also probably because he
was known to many influential Carthaginians, and perhaps spoke their
language.[36] He started for Lilybaeum at once. But when he reached
Corcyra he was met with the news that the hostages had been given up
to the consul: he thought, therefore, that the chance of war was at an
end, and he returned to the Peloponnese.[37]

He must soon have learnt his mistake. The Consul, in accordance with
his secret instructions,—first to secure the arms in Carthage, and
then to insist on the destruction of the town,—gradually let the
wretched people know the extent of the submission required of them.
These outrageous demands resulted in the Carthaginians taking the
desperate resolution of standing a siege. Censorinus and his colleague
accordingly began operations; but they were not capable of so great
an undertaking. The eyes of the whole army were turned upon Scipio
Aemilianus, who was serving as a military tribune. The siege lingered
through the summer of B.C. 148 without any result; and when in the
autumn Scipio left for Rome, to stand for the Aedileship, he started
amidst loud expressions of hope that he might return as Consul, though
below the legal age.[38]

The loss of so much of Polybius’s narrative at this point leaves us
uncertain when he arrived in Africa: but as he met and conversed with
Massanissa,[39] who died in B.C. 148, it seems likely that he did join
the army after all in B.C. 149. At any rate he was in Scipio’s train
in B.C. 147-146, when he was in chief command of the army, first as
consul, and then as proconsul; advised him on sundry points in the
formation of his siege works; stood by his side when Carthage was
burning; and heard him, as he watched the dreadful sight, utter with
tearful eyes the foreboding of what might one day befall Rome.[40]
Scipio is also said to have supplied him with ships for an exploring
expedition round the coast of Africa;[41] and it seems most likely that
this was in his year of consulship (147), as after the fall of Carthage
Polybius went home.

The destruction of Carthage took place in the spring of B.C. 146. When
Scipio went back to celebrate his triumph, Polybius seems to have
returned to the Peloponnese, there to witness another act of vengeance
on the part of Rome, and to do what he could to lighten the blow to his
countrymen, and to preserve the fragments of their shattered liberties.

[Sidenote: B.C. 148.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 147.]

Among the restored Achaean exiles were Diaeus, Damocritus, Alcamenes,
Theodectes, and Archicrates. They had returned with feelings embittered
by their exile; and without any of the experience of active life, which
might have taught them to subordinate their private thirst for revenge
to the safety of their country. Callicrates died in B.C. 148, and
Diaeus was Strategus in B.C. 149-148, 147-146. The appearance of the
pseudo-Philip (Andriscus) in Macedonia, and the continued resistance
of Carthage during his first year of office (148), encouraged him
perhaps to venture on a course, and to recommend the people to adopt
a policy, on which he would otherwise not have ventured. Troubles
arising out of a disgraceful money transaction between the Spartan
Menalchidas, Achaean Strategus, and the Oropians, who had bribed him
to aid them against the Athenians, had led to a violent quarrel with
Callicrates, who threatened to impeach him for treason to the league
in the course of an embassy to Rome. To save himself he gave half the
Oropian money to Diaeus, his successor as Strategus (B.C. 149-148).
This led to a popular clamour against Diaeus: who, to save himself,
falsely reported that the Senate had granted the Achaeans leave to try
and condemn certain Spartans for the offence of occupying a disputed
territory. Sparta was prepared to resist in arms, and a war seemed to
be on the point of breaking out. Callicrates and Diaeus, however, were
sent early in B.C. 148 to place the Achaean case before the Senate,
while the Spartans sent Menalchidas. Callicrates died on the road. The
Senate heard, therefore, the two sides from Diaeus and Menalchidas, and
answered that they would send commissioners to inquire into the case.
The commissioners, however, were slow in coming; so that both Diaeus
and Menalchidas had time to misrepresent the Senate’s answer to their
respective peoples. The Achaeans believed that they had full leave to
proceed according to the league law against the Spartans; the Spartans
believed that they had permission to break off from the league. Once
more, therefore, war was on the point of breaking out.[42] Just at
this time Q. Caecilius Metellus was in Macedonia with an army to crush
Andriscus. He was sending some commissioners to Asia, and ordered them
to visit the Peloponnese on their way and give a friendly warning. It
was neglected, and the Spartans sustained a defeat, which irritated
them without crushing their revolt. When Diaeus succeeded Damocritus as
Strategus in B.C. 147, he answered a second embassy from Metellus by
a promise not to take any hostile steps until the Roman commissioners
arrived. But he irritated the Spartans by putting garrisons into some
forts which commanded Laconia; and they actually elected Menalchidas as
a Strategus in opposition to Diaeus. But finding that he had no chance
of success Menalchidas poisoned himself.[43]

Then followed the riot at Corinth.[44] Marcus Aurelius Orestes at the
head of a commission arrived at last at Corinth, and there informed the
magistrates in council that the league must give up Argos, Corinth,
and Sparta. The magistrates hastily summoned an assembly and announced
the message from the Senate; a furious riot followed, every man in
Corinth suspected of being a Spartan was seized and thrown into prison;
the very residence of the Roman commissioners was not able to afford
such persons any protection, and even the persons of Orestes and his
colleagues were in imminent danger.

Some months afterwards a second commission arrived headed by Sextus
Julius Caesar, and demanded, without any express menace, that the
authors of the riot should be given up. The demand was evaded; and when
Caesar returned to Rome with his report, war was at once declared.

[Sidenote: B.C. 147-146.]

The new Strategus, elected in the autumn of B.C. 147, was Critolaus.
He was a bitter anti-Romanist like Diaeus: and these statesmen and
their party fancied that the Romans, having already two wars on hand,
at Carthage and in Spain, would make any sacrifice to keep peace with
Achaia. They had not indeed openly declined the demands of Sextus,
but, to use Polybius’s expressive phrase, “they accepted with the left
hand what the Romans offered with the right.”[45] While pretending to
be preparing to submit their case to the Senate, they were collecting
an army from the cities of the league. Inspired with an inexplicable
infatuation, which does not deserve the name of courage, Critolaus even
advanced northwards towards Thermopylae, as if he could with his petty
force bar the road to the Romans and free Greece. He was encouraged,
it was said, by a party at Thebes which had suffered from Rome for its
Macedonising policy. But, rash as the march was, it was managed with at
least equal imprudence. Instead of occupying Thermopylae, they stopped
short of it to besiege Trachinian Heracleia, an old Spartan colony,[46]
which refused to join the league. While engaged in this, Critolaus
heard that Metellus (who wished to anticipate his successor Mummius)
was on the march from Macedonia. He beat a hasty retreat to Scarpheia
in Locris,[47] which was on the road leading to Elateia and the south;
here he was overtaken and defeated with considerable slaughter.
Critolaus appears not to have fallen on the field; but he was never
seen again. He was either lost in some marshes over which he attempted
to escape, as Pausanias suggests, or poisoned himself, as Livy says.
Diaeus, as his predecessor, became Strategus, and was elected for the
following year also. Diaeus exerted himself to collect troops for
the defence of Corinth, nominally as being at war with Sparta. He
succeeded in getting as many as fourteen thousand infantry and six
hundred cavalry, consisting partly of citizens and partly of slaves;
and sent four thousand picked men under Alcamenes to hold Megara, while
he himself occupied Corinth. When Metellus approached, however, this
outpost at Megara hastily retreated into Corinth. Metellus took up his
position in the Isthmus, and offered the Achaeans the fairest terms.
Diaeus, however, induced them to reject all offers; and Metellus was
kept some time encamped before Corinth.

[Sidenote: B.C. 146. Arrival of Mummius.]

It was now late in the spring of B.C. 146, and the new Consul, Lucius
Mummius, arrived at the Roman camp. He at once sent Metellus back to
Macedonia, and quietly awaited the arrival of fresh troops, which he
had sent for from Crete and Pergamum, as well as from Italy.[48] He
eventually had an army of about thirty thousand men, nearly double
of the Greek army in Corinth. Nothing apparently was done till the
late summer, or autumn. But then the final catastrophe was rapid and
complete. The Roman officers regarded the Achaean force with such
contempt, that they did not take proper precautions, so that Diaeus
won a slight advantage against one of the Roman outposts. Flushed with
this success, he drew out for a pitched battle, in which he was totally
defeated. He made his way to Megalopolis, where, after killing his
wife, he poisoned himself.

[Sidenote: Polybius saves some statues of national interest.]

Thus by a series of imprudent measures, which Polybius denounces,
but was not at home to oppose, the Achaean league had drifted into
downright war with Rome; and, almost without a struggle, had fallen
helplessly at her feet, forced to accept whatever her mercy or contempt
might grant. Mercy, however, was to be preceded by stern punishment.
Corinth was given up to plunder and to fire, and Polybius returned
from Africa in time to witness it.[49] The destruction or deportation
of works of art, of pictures, statues, and costly furniture, he could
not prevent; but he spoke a successful word to preserve the statues of
Philopoemen in the various cities from destruction; and also begged
successfully for the restoration of some of the Eponymous hero Achaeus,
and of Philopoemen and Aratus, which had already been transported as
far as Acarnania on their way to Italy.[50] He also dissuaded his
friends from rushing to take their share in the plunder by purchasing
the confiscated goods of Diaeus, which were put to auction and could be
bought at low rates; and he refused to accept any of them himself.[51]

[Sidenote: The new settlement of the Peloponnese, B.C. 146-145.]

The settlement of the territories of the league was put into the hands
of a commission of ten men who were sent out after the sack of Corinth;
while Mummius, after seeing that such towns in the Peloponnese as had
joined in the war were deprived of their fortifications and arms, and
after inflicting punishment upon other towns in Greece which had shown
active sympathy with Perseus, especially Thebes and Chalcis, returned
home to celebrate his triumph, which was adorned with marble and bronze
statues and pictures from Corinth.[52] The commissioners who had been
sent out to make a final settlement of Greece, or Achaia, as it was
henceforth to be called in official language, settled the general
plan in conjunction with Mummius; but the commissioners continued
their labours for six months, at the end of which time they departed,
leaving Polybius to settle with each town the details of their local
legislation. The general principles which the commissioners laid down
were first, the entire abolition of all the leagues, and consequently
of the league assemblies; each town, with its surrounding district,
which had once formed a canton in the league, was to be separate and
independent: its magistrates, secondly, were to be selected according
to a fixed assessment of property, the old equality or democracy
being abolished: thirdly, no member of one canton might own property
in another: fourthly, the Boeotians were ordered to pay a heavy
compensation to the Heracleots and Euboeans, and the Achaeans to the
Spartans: lastly, a fixed tribute to Rome was imposed on all states
in Greece.[53] Some of these measures were in a few years’ time
relaxed, the fines were mitigated, the rule against inter-possession of
property was abolished, and the league assemblies were again allowed
for certain local purposes. But this was the end of the league as a
free federation. It is often said that “Greece was now reduced to the
form of a Roman province under the name of Achaia.” This is true in a
sense, and yet is misleading. Achaia did not become a province like
the other provinces, yearly allotted to a proconsul or propraetor or
legatus, until the time of Augustus. Such direct interference from a
Roman magistrate as was thought necessary was left to the governor of
Macedonia.[54] Yet in a certain sense Achaia was treated as a separate
entity, and had a “formula,” or constitution, founded on the separate
local laws which the commissioners found existing, or imposed, with the
help of Polybius, on the several states; it paid tribute like other
provinces, and was in fact, though called free, subject to Rome.

Polybius performed his task of visiting the various towns in the
Peloponnese, explaining when necessary the meaning of the new
arrangements, and advising them, when they had to make others for
themselves, so much to the satisfaction of every one, that there was
a universal feeling that he had been a benefactor to his country, and
had made the best of their situation that could be made. Statues of him
are mentioned by Pausanias in several places in the Peloponnese: in
Mantinea[55] and at Megalopolis,[56] with an inscription in elegiacs
to the effect that “he had travelled over every land and sea; was an
ally of the Romans, and mitigated their wrath against Greece.” Another
in the temple of Persephone, near Acacesium,[57] under which was a
legend stating that “Greece would not have erred at all if she had
obeyed Polybius; and that when she did err, he alone proved of any
help to her.” There were others also at Pallantium,[58] Tegea,[59] and
Olympia.[60]

In these services to his country Polybius was occupied in B.C. 145.
Of his life after that we have no detailed record. He is believed
to have visited Scipio while engaged on the siege of Numantia (B.C.
134-132), on which he wrote a separate treatise.[61] We know also
that he visited Alexandria in the reign of Ptolemy Physcon (B.C.
146-117), and expressed his contempt for the state of the people and
their rulers.[62] These years must have been also much occupied with
the extension of his history, which he originally intended should
end with the fall of the Macedonian kingdom (B.C. 168),[63] but
which was afterwards continued to the fall of Carthage and Greece
(B.C. 146);[64] for even if the history had been completed up to its
originally intended limit, and the notice of extension afterwards
inserted, there still was enough to do to occupy some years of a busy
life; especially as he seems to have carried out his principle that an
historian ought to be a traveller, visiting the localities of which
he speaks, and testing by personal inspection the possibility of the
military evolutions which he undertakes to describe. His travels appear
certainly to have embraced the greater part of Gaul, and it even seems
possible from one passage that he visited Britain.[65] His explorations
on the African coast were doubtless extensive, and he appears to have
visited Phoenicia, Cilicia, and Asia Minor. We hear of him at Sardis,
though we cannot fix the date of the visit.[66] Lastly, Lucian tells us
that, “returning from the country, he had a fall from his horse, the
effects of which he died at the age of eighty-two.” No place is given,
and no clue which may help us to be certain of the date.[67] Polybius,
besides the general history, had written a treatise on Tactics,[68] a
panegyric on Philopoemen,[69] a history of the Numantine war,[70] and
perhaps a treatise on public speaking (δημηγορία).[71]


§ 2.—THE SOURCES OF POLYBIUS’S HISTORY

Polybius always maintains that the study of documents is only one, and
not the most important, element in the equipment of an historian. The
best is personal experience and personal inquiry.

[Sidenote: Personal knowledge.]

Of the sources of his own history, then, the first and best may be set
down as knowledge acquired by being actually present at great events,
such as the destruction of Carthage and the sack of Corinth; visits to
the Roman army in camp; assisting at actual debates in his own country;
personal knowledge of and service under men of the first position
in Achaia; personal visits to famous localities; voyages and tours
undertaken for the definite object of inspection and inquiry; and,
lastly, seeing and questioning the survivors of great battles, or the
men who had played a leading part in conspicuous political transactions.

From his earliest youth Polybius had enjoyed some special advantages
in these respects. As he himself says, “the events in Greece fell
within his own generation, or that immediately preceding his own,—and
he therefore could relate what he had seen, or what he had heard from
eye-witnesses” (4, 2). And of the later period he “was not only an eye
witness, but in some cases an actor, and in others the chief actor”
(3, 4). When he was probably under twenty we hear of his being present
at an important interview between Philopoemen and Archon;[72] and his
election as hipparch in B.C. 169, soon after he reached the legal age,
was in consequence of his having thrown himself with vigour into the
practical working of the cavalry under Philopoemen. In regard to Roman
history and polity, we have Cicero’s testimony that he was _bonus
auctor in primis_,[73] and more particularly in regard to chronology,
_quo nemo fuit in exquirendis temporibus diligentius_.[74] Nor is
this praise undeserved, as is shown by his energy in pushing minute
and personal inquiries. Thus he learnt the details of the Hannibalic
war from some of the survivors of those actually engaged; visited the
localities, and made the pass of the Alps used by Hannibal;[75] studied
and transcribed the stele or bronze tablet placed by Hannibal on the
Lacinian promontory;[76] travelled through Libya, Spain, Gaul, and the
seas which washed their shores (perhaps even as far as Britain), in
order to give a true account of them.[77] Conversed with Massanissa
on the character of the Carthaginians, as well as with many of the
Carthaginians themselves.[78] Carefully observed Carthagena.[79]
Inspected the records at Rhodes,[80] and the Archives at Rome;[81]
and studied and transcribed the treaties preserved there.[82] Visited
Sardis,[83] Alexandria,[84] and Locri Epizephyrii.[85] To this, which
is by no means an exhaustive account of his travels and inquiries,
may be added the fact that his intimacy with the younger Africanus,
grandson by adoption and nephew by marriage of the elder Scipio,
must have placed at his disposal a considerable mass of information
contained in the family archives of the Scipios, as to the Hannibalian
war, and especially as to the campaigns in Spain.[86]

Such were some of the means by which Polybius was enabled to obtain
accurate and trustworthy information.

[Sidenote: Use of previous writers by Polybius.]

It remains to inquire how far Polybius availed himself of the writings
of others. He looks upon the study of books as an important part of
an historian’s work, but, as we have seen, not the most important.
His practice appears to have been conformable to his theory. The
greater part of his information he gained from personal observation
and personal inquiry. Nevertheless, some of his history must have been
learnt from books, and very little of it could have been entirely
independent of them. Still, as far as we have the means of judging from
the fragments of his work that have come down to us, his obligations
to his predecessors are not as extensive as that of most of those who
wrote after him; nor is the number of those to whom he refers great.[87]

[Sidenote: The Punic wars.]

Of his preliminary sketch contained in books 1 and 2, the first book,
containing the account of the first Punic war and the Mercenary war,
appears to have been derived mainly from the writings of Fabius Pictor
(b. circ. B.C. 260), and Philinus of Agrigentum (contemporary and
secretary of Hannibal). He complains that they were violent partisans,
the one of Rome, the other of Carthage.[88] But by comparing the two,
and checking both by documents and inscriptions at Rome, he, no doubt,
found sufficient material for his purpose.

[Sidenote: Illyrians and Gauls.]

[Sidenote: Achaia.]

The second book contains an account of the origin of the war between
Rome and Illyricum; of the Gallic or Celtic wars from the earliest
times; and a sketch of Achaean history to the end of the Cleomenic
war. The first two of these must have been compiled with great labour
from various public documents and family records, as well as in part
from Pictor. The sketch of Achaean history rested mainly, as far as
it depends on books, on the Memoirs of Aratus; while he studied only
to refute the writings of Phylarchus the panegyrist of Cleomenes. He
complains of the partiality of Phylarchus: but in this part of the
history it was perhaps inevitable that his own views should have been
 by the prejudices and prepossessions of a politician, and one
who had been closely connected from boyhood with the patriotic Achaean
party, led by Philopoemen, which was ever at enmity with all that
Cleomenes did his utmost to establish.

[Sidenote: Sicilian history.]

For his account of Sicilian affairs he had studied the works of Timaeus
of Tauromeniun. Although he accuses him bitterly, and at excessive
length,[89] of all the faults of which an historian can be guilty, he
yet confesses that he found in his books much that was of assistance to
him[90] in regard both to Magna Graecia and Sicily; for which he also
consulted the writings of Aristotle, especially it appears the now lost
works on Polities (πολιτείαι), and Founding of Cities (κτίσεις). The
severity of his criticism of Timaeus is supported by later authors.
He was nicknamed ἐπιτίμαιος, in allusion to the petulance of his
criticism of others;[91] and Plutarch attacks him for his perversion
of truth and his foolish and self-satisfied attempts to rival the best
of the ancient writers, and to diminish the credit of the most famous
philosophers.[92]

[Sidenote: Greek history.]

As far as we possess his writings, we find little trace in Polybius of
a reference to the earliest historians. Herodotus is not mentioned,
though there may be some indications of acquaintance with his work;[93]
nor the Sicilian Philistus who flourished about B.C. 430. Thucydides
is mentioned once, and Xenophon three times. Polybius was engaged in
the history of a definite period, and had not much occasion to refer to
earlier times; and perhaps the epitomator, in extracting what seemed
of value, chose those parts especially where he was the sole or best
authority.

[Sidenote: Macedonia.]

For the early history of Macedonia, he seems to have relied mostly on
two pupils of Isocrates, Ephorus of Cumae and Theopompus of Chios;
though the malignity of the latter deprived his authority of much
weight.[94] He also studied the work of Alexander’s friend and victim,
Callisthenes; and vehemently assailed his veracity, as others have
done. More important to him perhaps were the writings of his own
contemporaries, the Rhodians Antisthenes and Zeno; though he detects
them in some inaccuracies, which in the case of Zeno he took the
trouble to correct: and of Demetrius of Phalerum, whose writings he
seems to have greatly admired.

[Sidenote: Egypt and Syria.]

For the contemporary history of Egypt and Syria he seems to have
trusted principally to personal inquiry. He expressly (2, 37) declines
entering on the early history of Egypt on the ground of its having been
fully done by others (referring, perhaps, to Herodotus, Manetho, and
Ptolemy of Megalopolis). For the Seleucid dynasty of Syria he quotes no
authorities.

[Sidenote: Geography.]

On no subject does Polybius seem to have read so widely as on
geography: doubtless as preparing himself not only for writing, but for
being able to travel with the knowledge and intelligence necessary to
enable him to observe rightly. He had studied minutely and criticised
freely the writings of Dicaearchus, Pytheas, Eudoxus, and Eratosthenes.
He was quick to detect fallacies in these writers, and to reject their
dogmatising on the possibilities of nature; yet he does not seem to
have had in an eminent degree the topographical faculty, or the power
of giving a graphic picture of a locality. Modern research has tended
rather to strengthen than weaken our belief in the accuracy of his
descriptions, as in the case of Carthagena and the site of the battle
of Cannae; still it cannot be asserted that he is to be classed high in
the list of topographers, whether scientific or picturesque.

[Sidenote: General Literature.]

He appears to have been fairly well acquainted with the poets; but
his occasions for quoting them, as far as we have his work, are not
very frequent. He seems to have known his Homer, as every Greek was
bound to do. He quotes the Cypria of Stasinus, who, according to
tradition, was son-in-law of Homer; Hesiod, Simonides of Ceos, Pindar,
Euripides, and Epicharmus of Cos. He quotes or refers to Plato, whom
he appears chiefly to have studied for his political theories; and
certain technical writers, such as Aeneas Tacticus, and Cleoxenos and
Democlitus, inventors of a new system of telegraphy, if they wrote it
rather than taught it practically.

Even allowing for the loss of so great a part of his work, the list
of authors is not a long one: and it suggests the remark, which his
style as well as his own professions tend to confirm, that he was
not primarily a man of letters, but a man of affairs and action, who
loved the stir of political agitation, and unbent his mind by the
excitement of travel and the chase. Nothing moves his contempt more
than the idea of Timaeus living peaceably for fifty years at Athens,
holding aloof from all active life, and poring over the books in
the Athenian libraries as a preparation for writing history; which,
according to him, can only be worth reading when it springs, not from
rummaging Record offices, but from taking a personal share in the
political strife of the day; studying military tactics in the camp and
field; witnessing battles; questioning the actors in great events; and
visiting the sites of battles, the cities and lands which are to be
described.


§ 3. THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE[95]

To the student of politics the history of Greece is chiefly interesting
as offering examples of numerous small states enjoying complete local
autonomy, yet retaining a feeling of a larger nationality founded in a
community of blood, language, and religion; a community, that is, in
the sense that, fundamentally united in these three particulars, they
yet acknowledged variations even in them, which distinguished without
entirely separating them. From some points of view the experiment may
be regarded as having been successful. From others it was a signal
failure. Local jealousies and mutual provocations not only continually
set city against city, clan against clan, but perpetually suggested
invitations sent by one city, or even one party in a city, to foreign
potentates or peoples to interfere in their behalf against another city
or party, which they hated or feared, but were too weak to resist. Thus
we find the Persians, Macedonians, Syrians, and Romans successively
induced to interfere in Greek politics with the assurance that there
were always some states, or some party in each state, who would welcome
them. From time to time men of larger views had conceived the idea of
creating a united Empire of Hellas, which might present an unbroken
front to the foreigner. From time to time philosophers had preached the
impossibility of combining complete local independence with the idea of
a strong and vigorous nationality. But the true solution of the problem
had never been successfully hit upon: and after various abortive
attempts at combination, Greece was left, a helpless collection of
disjointed fragments, to fall under the intrigues of Macedonia and Rome.

The Achaean league was not the first attempt at such a formation;
though it was the first that ever arrived at anything like a complete
scheme of federalism (unless the Aetolian preceded it); and was in
many respects a fresh departure in Hellenic policy, and the first
experiment in federation which seemed to contain the elements of
success. From the earliest times certain Greek states had combined more
or less closely, or loosely, for certain specific purposes. Such were
the various Amphictyonies, and especially the Amphictyonic league of
Thermopylae and Delphi. The object of these was primarily religious:
the worship of a particular deity, the care of a particular temple; the
first condition of membership being therefore community of blood. But
though this was the origin of their being, there were elements in their
constitution which might have developed into some form of federalism,
had it not been for the centrifugal forces that always tended to keep
Greek states apart. Thus we can conceive the idea of the Pylagorae from
the various states gradually giving rise to the notion of a central
parliament of elected representatives; and the sphere of its activity
gradually extending to matters purely political, beginning with those
which were on the borderland of religion and politics. And, indeed,
the action of the great Amphictyonic league at times seemed to be
approaching this.[96]

But the forces tending to decentralisation were always the stronger:
and though the league continued to exist for many centuries, it became
less and less political, and less and less influential in Greece. So
too with other combinations in Greece. The community (τὸ κοινὸν) of the
Ionians, beginning with a common meeting for worship at the Panionium,
on one memorable occasion at least seemed for a brief space to promise
to develop into a federation for mutual succour and defence. In the
Ionian revolt in B.C. 500, the deputies (πρόβουλοι) of the Ionian
states met and determined to combine against the enemy; they even went
so far as to appoint a common general or admiral. But the instinct
of separation was too strong; at the first touch of difficulty and
hardship the union was resolved into its elements.[97]

The constitution of the Boeotian league was somewhat more regular and
permanent. The Boeotarchs appear to have met at regular intervals, and
now and again to have succeeded in mustering a national levy. There
were also four regularly constituted “Senates” to control them, though
we know nothing of their constitution.[98] But the league had come to
nothing; partly from the resistance of the towns to the overweening
pretensions of Thebes, and later from the severity of the treatment
experienced by it at the hands of Alexander and his successors.

Thessaly, again, was a loose confederacy of towns or cantons, in which
certain great families, such as the Aleuadae and Scopadae, held the
direction of their local affairs; or some tyrannus, as Alexander of
Pherae, obtained sovereign powers. Still, for certain purposes, a
connexion was acknowledged, and a Tagus of Thessaly was appointed, with
the power of summoning a general levy of men. For a short time prior
to the Roman conquest these officers appear to have gained additional
importance; but Thessaly never was united enough to be of importance,
in spite of its famous cavalry, even among Greek nations, far less to
be capable of presenting a firm front to the foreigner.

One other early attempt at forming something like a Panhellenic
union ought to be noticed. When the Persian invasion of B.C. 480 was
threatening, deputies (πρόβουλοι) met at the Isthmus, sat there in
council for some months, and endeavoured to unite Greece against the
foreigner.[99] But the one expedition which was sent solely by their
instigation proved a failure.[100] And when the danger was over,
principally by the combined exertion of Athens and Sparta, this council
seems to have died a natural death. Still for a time it acted as a
supreme parliament of Greece, and assumed the power to punish with fine
or death those Greeks who had medised.[101]

Besides these rudimentary leagues, which might, but did not, issue
in some form of Panhellenic government, there were periods in Greek
history in which the Hegemone of one state did something towards
presenting the appearance of union. Thus Polycrates of Samos seemed
at one time to be likely to succeed in forming a great Ionian Empire.
And in continental Greece, before the Persian wars, we find Sparta
occupying the position of an acknowledged court of reference in
international questions,[102]—a position in which she probably had been
preceded by Argos. And after those wars, by means of the confederacy
of Delos, formed at first for one specific purpose—that of keeping the
Aegean free of the Persians—Athens gradually rose to the position of
an imperial city, claiming active control over the external politics
of a considerable portion of Greece and nearly all the islands (B.C.
478-404). But this proved after all but a passing episode in Greek
history. Athens perhaps misused her power; and Sparta took up the
task with great professions, but in a spirit even less acceptable to
the Greek world than that of Athens; and by the peace of Antalcidas
(B.C. 387) the issue of the hundred years’ struggle with Persia left
one of the fairest portions of Hellas permanently separated from the
main body. Asiatic Greece never became Hellenic again. The fall of the
Persian empire before the invasion of Alexander for a while reunited it
to a semi-Greek power; but Alexander’s death left it a prey to warring
tyrants. It lost its prosperity and its commerce; and whatever else it
became, it was never independent, or really Hellenic again.

For a few years more Sparta and then Thebes assumed to be head of
Greece, but the Macedonian supremacy secured at Chaeronea (B.C.
338), still more fully after the abortive Lamian war (B.C. 323),
left Greece only a nominal freedom, again and again assured to it by
various Macedonian monarchs, but really held only on sufferance. The
country seemed to settle down without farther struggle into political
insignificance. The games and festivals went on, and there was still
some high talk of Hellenic glories. But one after another of the
towns submitted to receive Macedonian garrisons and governors; and
Athens, once the brilliant leader in national aspirations, practically
abandoned politics, and was content to enjoy a reputation partly
founded on her past, and partly on the fame of the philosophers who
still taught in her gardens and porches, and attracted young men from
all parts of the world to listen to their discourses, and to sharpen
their wits by the acute if not very useful discussions which they
promoted.[103] Sparta, far from retaining her old ascendency, had been
losing with it her ancient constitution, which had been the foundation
of her glory, as well perhaps as in some respects the source of her
weakness; and for good or evil had ceased to count for much in Hellenic
politics.

In the midst of this general collapse two portions of the Hellenic race
gradually formed or recovered some sort of united government, which
enabled them to play a conspicuous part in the later history of Greece,
and which was essentially different from any of the combinations of
earlier times of which I have been speaking. These were the Aetolians
and Achaeans.

[Sidenote: Aetolian league.]

With regard to the former our information is exceedingly scanty.
They were said to have been an emigration from Elis originally;[104]
but they were little known to the rest of Greece. Strange stories
were told of them, of their savage mode of life, their scarcely
intelligible language, their feeding on raw flesh, and their fierceness
as soldiers. They were said to live in open villages, widely removed
from each other, and without effective means of combination for
mutual protection. Their piracies, which were chiefly directed to the
coasts of Messenia, caused the Messenians to seize the opportunity
of Demosthenes being in their neighbourhood in B.C. 426, with a
considerable Athenian army, to persuade him to invade the Aetolians,
who were always on the look-out to attack Naupactus, a town which the
Athenians had held since B.C. 455,[105] and which was naturally an
object of envy to them as commanding the entrance to the Corinthian
gulf. But when Demosthenes attempted the invasion, he found to his
cost that the Aetolians knew how to combine, and he had to retire
beaten with severe loss.[106] The separate tribes in Aetolia seem soon
afterwards to have had, if they had not already, some form of central
government; for we find them negotiating with Agesilaus in B.C. 390,
with the same object of obtaining Naupactus,[107] when the Athenians
had lost it, and it had fallen into the hands of the Locrians.[108] The
Aetolians appear to have gradually increased in importance: for we find
Philip making terms with them and giving them the coveted Naupactus in
B.C. 341, which had at some time previous come into the possession of
the Achaeans.[109] But their most conspicuous achievement, which caused
them to take a position of importance in Greece, was their brilliant
defeat of the invading Gauls at Delphi in B.C. 279.[110] By this
time their federal constitution must in some shape have been formed.
The people elected a Strategus in a general meeting, usually held at
Thermus, at the autumn equinox, to which apparently all Aetolians
were at liberty to come, and at which questions of peace and war and
external politics generally were brought forward; though meanwhile the
Strategus appears to have had the right of declaring and carrying on
war as he chose. There was also a hipparch and a secretary (21, 32);
and a senate called Apocleti (20, 1); and a body called _Synedri_
(_C. I. G._ 2350), which seem to have been judicial, and another
called _Nomographi_ (13, 1, _C. I. G._ 3046), who were apparently an
occasional board for legislation. They produced some writers, but their
works are lost. Accordingly, as Professor Mahaffy observes, “we know
them entirely from their enemies.” Still the acknowledged principle on
which they acted, ἄγειν λάφυρον ἀπὸ λαφύρου[111]—that is, that where
spoils were going, whether from friend or foe, they were justified in
taking a part, speaks for itself, and is enough to stamp them as at
least dangerous and unpleasant neighbours.

[Sidenote: Achaean league.]

The Achaeans have a different and more interesting history.

The original Achaean league consisted of a federation of twelve
cities and their respective territory (μέρος): Pellene, Aegira,
Aegae, Bura, Helice, Aegium, Rhypes, Patrae, Pharae, Olenus, Dyme,
Tritaea.[112] This league was of great antiquity, but we know nothing
of its history, or how it differed from other leagues, such as I have
already mentioned, in adding political to religious unity. In B.C.
454 it submitted to Athens; but was restored to its original position
in the same year on the signing of the thirty years’ truce between
Sparta and Athens;[113] and though the Athenians demanded that their
authority over it should be restored to them in B.C. 425, when they
had caught the Spartan army at Sphacteria, no change appears to have
been made.[114] Thucydides certainly seems to speak of it, not as
entirely free, but as in some special manner subject to the supremacy
of Sparta. Polybius, however, claims for them, at an early period, a
peculiar and honourable place in Greek politics, as being distinguished
for probity and honour. Thus they were chosen as arbitrators in the
intestine of Magna Graecia (about B.C. 400-390); and again, after the
battle of Leuctra (B.C. 371) to mediate between Sparta and Thebes.[115]
They must therefore, between B.C. 425-390, have obtained a virtual
independence. They shared, however, in the universal decline of
Hellenic activity during the Macedonian period (B.C. 359 to about B.C.
285), and Polybius complains that they were systematically depressed
by the intrigues of Sparta and Macedonia; both which powers took care
to prevent any Achaean of promising ability from attaining influence
in the Peloponnese.[116] The same influence was exerted to estrange
the Achaean cities from each other. They were garrisoned by Macedonian
troops, or fell under the power of tyrants; and to all appearance the
league had fared as other such combinations had fared before, and had
been resolved into its original elements.

[Sidenote: Revival of the league, B.C. 284-280.]

But the tradition of the old union did not die out entirely. Eight
of the old cities still existed in a state of more or less vigour.
Olenus and Helice had long ago disappeared by encroachments of the sea
(before B.C. 371), and their places had not been filled up by others.
Two other towns, Rhypes and Aegae, had from various causes ceased to be
inhabited, and their places had been taken in the league (before the
dissolution) by Leontium and Caryneia. There were therefore ten cities
which had once known the advantages and disadvantages of some sort of
federal union; as well as the misfortunes which attached to disunion,
aggravated by constant interference from without.

[Sidenote: B.C. 284. First union of Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, Pharae.]

[Sidenote: Adherence of Aegium, B.C. 279.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 279-255.]

[Sidenote: Margos of Caryneia first sole Strategus, B.C. 255.]

The first step in an attempt to resuscitate the league was taken in
the 124th Olympiad (B.C. 284-280). Macedonia was at the time weakened
by the troubles of a disputed succession: Pyrrhus was absorbed in
his futile Italian expedition: a change in the sovereign of Egypt
opened a way to a possible change of policy at Alexandria: and the
death of Lysimachus gave the monarchs something else to do than to
trouble themselves about the Peloponnese. At this period four of the
Achaean towns, Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, and Pharae, formed a league
for mutual help. This proving, after a trial of five years, to have
some stability, it was joined by Aegium, from which the Macedonian
garrison was expelled. At intervals, of which we are not informed, this
was again joined by Bura and Caryneia. These seven cities continued
to constitute the entire league for twenty-five years; the federal
magistrates consisting of two Strategi, elected by each city in turns,
and a secretary. As to the doings of the league during this period
we are entirely in the dark. The next step that we hear of is the
abolition of the dual presidency and the election of Margos of Caryneia
as sole Strategus. We are not told the reasons of the change; but it
is clear that a divided command might often give room for delay, when
delay was fatal; and for the conflict of local interests, where the
interests of the community should be the paramount consideration. At
any rate the change was made: and Margos, who had been a loyal servant
of the league, was the first sole Strategus. His immediate successors
we do not know. The next fact in the history of the league was the
adherence of Sicyon, a powerful town and the first of any, not in the
number of the old Achaean federation, to join. This therefore was
a great step in the direction of extending the federation over the
Peloponnese; and it was the work of the man destined to do much in
moulding the league into the shape in which it attained its greatest
effectiveness, Aratus of Sicyon. He found it weak; its cities poor
and insignificant; with no aid from rich soil or good harbourage to
increase its wealth or property;[117] he left it, not indeed free
from serious dangers and difficulties,—in part the result of his own
policy in calling in the aid of the Macedonians, in part created by
the persistent hostility of Aetolia and Sparta,—but yet possessed of
great vitality, and fast becoming the most powerful and influential of
all the Greek governments; although at no time can it be spoken of as
Panhellenic without very considerable exaggeration. Aratus had been
brought up in exile at Argos, after the murder of his father Cleinias
(B.C. 271); and, when twenty years of age, by a gallant and romantic
adventure, had driven out the tyrant Nicocles from Sicyon (B.C. 251).
He became the chief magistrate of his native town, which he induced to
join the Achaean league, thus causing, as I have said, the league to
take its first step towards embracing all the Peloponnese. It seems
that for five years Aratus remained chief magistrate of Sicyon, but
a private citizen of the league. In B.C. 245 (though of the exact
year we have no positive information), he appears to have been first
elected Strategus of the league. But it was not until his second year
of office, B.C. 243-242, that he began putting in practice the policy
which he proposed to himself,—the expulsion of the Macedonian garrisons
and the despots from the cities of the Peloponnese, with the view of
their joining the league. He began with the Acrocorinthus. Corinth,
freed from the foreign garrison, joined the league, and was followed
soon after by Megara[118] (B.C. 240). From this time Aratus was
Strategus of the league in alternate years to the time of his death,
the federal law not allowing two consecutive years of office.[119]

[Sidenote: Cleomenic war, B.C. 227-221.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 226-221.]

The death of Antigonus Gonatas (B.C. 239) led to a new departure.
Hitherto the Aetolians had been in league with the Macedonians to
vex and harry the Achaeans. The two leagues now made peace, and
the Aetolians aided the Achaeans in their resistance to Gonatas’s
successor, Demetrius (B.C. 239-229). Still the despots in many of the
Peloponnesian towns held out, trusting to the support of Demetrius.
When he died (B.C. 229) there was a general movement among them to
abdicate and join their cities to the league. Lydiades of Megalopolis
had done so during Demetrius’s lifetime; and now Aristomachus of Argos,
Xeno of Hermione, and Cleonymus of Phlius did the same. The rapid
extension of the Achaean league, however, could not fail to excite the
jealousy of the Aetolians, to whose league belonged certain Arcadian
cities such as Mantinea, Tegea, and Orchomenus. These they imagined to
be threatened by the policy of Aratus, which was apt to proceed on the
line that even a forcible attachment of a Peloponnesian town to the
league was in reality a liberation of its people from a constraining
power. The Spartan jealousy was aroused by the same fear. And then, as
Polybius puts it, the Aetolians connived at the extension of Spartan
power, even at the expense of cities in league with themselves, in
order to strengthen Cleomenes in his attitude of opposition to the
Achaeans.[120] Aratus, however, resolved to wait for some definite act
of hostility before moving. This was supplied by Cleomenes building
a fort (the Athenaeum) at Belbina, in the territory of Megalopolis,
a league city. Upon this the league necessarily proclaimed war with
Sparta. Thus does Polybius, a warm friend of the league, state the case
in its behalf. The league, he argues, had been growing by the voluntary
adherence of independent towns: it had shown no sign of an intention
to attack Laconian territory, or towns in league with Aetolia: while
Cleomenes had committed an act of wanton aggression and provocation
by building a hostile fort in its territory. But what the other side
had to say may be gathered from Plutarch’s life of Cleomenes, founded
principally on the work of Phylarchus the panegyrist of Cleomenes.[121]
Here the case is put very differently. Aratus, according to him, had
made up his mind that a union of the Peloponnesus was the one thing
necessary for the safety of the league. In a great measure he had been
already successful; but the parts which still stood aloof were Elis,
Laconia, and the cities of Arcadia which were under the influence of
Sparta.[122] He therefore harassed these last by every means in his
power; and the erection or fortification of the Athenaeum at Belbina
by Cleomenes was in truth only a measure of necessary defence. Aratus,
indeed, held that some of these Arcadian cities had been unfairly
seized by Cleomenes, with the connivance of the Aetolians;[123] but to
this Cleomenes might reply that, if the league claimed the right of
extending its connexion with the assent, often extorted, of the various
cities annexed, the same right could not justly be denied to himself.
A series of military operations took place during the next five years,
in which Cleomenes nearly always got the better of Aratus; who, able
and courageous in plots and surprises, was timid and ineffective in
the field. The one important blow struck by Aratus, that of seizing
Mantinea, was afterwards nullified by a counter-occupation of it by
the Lacedaemonians; and in spite of troubles at home, caused by his
great scheme of reform, Cleomenes was by B.C. 224 in so superior a
position that he could with dignity propose terms to the league. He
asked to be elected Strategus, therefore.[124] At first sight this
seemed a means of effecting the desired union of the Peloponnese; and
as such the Achaeans were inclined to accept the proposal. Aratus,
however, exerted all his influence to defeat the measure: and, in
spite of all his failures, his services to the league enabled him to
convince his countrymen that they should reject the offer; and he was
himself elected Strategus for the twelfth time in the spring of B.C.
223. Aratus has been loudly condemned for allowing a selfish jealousy
to override his care for the true interests of his country, in thus
refusing a prospect of a united Achaia, in which some one besides
himself should be the leading man.[125] But I think there is something
to be said on the other side. What Aratus had been working for with a
passionate eagerness was a union of free democratic states. Cleomenes,
in spite of his liberal reforms at home, was a Spartan to the back
bone. Aratus would have no manner of doubt that a league, with Sparta
supreme in it, would inevitably become a Spartan kingdom. The forces
of Sparta would be used to crush dissenting cities; and soon to put
down the free institution which would always be disliked and feared
by the Spartan government. Security from Macedonian influence, if it
were really obtained,—and that was far from certain,—would be dearly
purchased at the price of submission to Spartan tyranny, which would
be more galling and oppressive in proportion as it was nearer and
more unremitting. With these views Aratus began to turn his eyes to
the Macedonian court, as the only possible means of resisting the
encroaching policy of Cleomenes. The character of Antigonus Doson, who
was then administering Macedonia, gave some encouragement to hope for
honest and honourable conduct on his part; and after some hesitation
Aratus took the final step of asking for his aid.[126] I do not expect
to carry the assent of many readers when I express the opinion that
he was right; and that the Greek policy towards Macedonia had been
from the first a grievous error,—fostered originally by the patriotic
eloquence of Demosthenes, and continued ever since by that ineradicable
sentiment for local autonomy which makes Greek history so interesting,
but inevitably tended to the political annihilation of Greece. Had some
_modus vivendi_ been found with the series of very able sovereigns who
ruled Macedonia, a strong Greek nation might have been the result,
with a central government able to hold its own even in the face of
the great “cloud in the West,” which was surely overshadowing Greek
freedom. But this was not to be. The taste for local freedom was too
strong; and showed itself by constant appeals to an outside power
against neighbours, which yet the very men who appealed to it would not
recognise or obey. The Greeks had to learn that nations cannot, any
more than individuals, eat their cake and have it too. Local autonomy,
and the complete liberty of every state to war with its neighbours as
it chooses, and of every one to speak and act as he pleases, have their
charms; but they are not compatible with a united resistance to a great
centralised and law-abiding power. And all the eloquence of all the
Greek orators rolled into one could not make up for the lack of unity,
or enable the distracted Greeks to raise an army which might stand
before a volley of Roman pila or a charge of Roman legionaries.

The help asked of Antigonus Doson was given with fatal readiness; but
it had to be purchased by the admission of a Macedonian garrison into
the Acrocorinthus, one of those “fetters of Greece,” the recovery of
which had been among Aratus’s earliest and most glorious triumphs.
The battle of Sellasia (B.C. 221) settled the question of Spartan
influence. Cleomenes fled to Alexandria and never returned. Sparta was
not enslaved by Antigonus; who on the contrary professed to restore her
ancient constitution,—probably meaning that the Ephoralty destroyed
by Cleomenes was to be reconstituted, and the exiles banished by him
recalled. Practically she was left a prey to a series of unscrupulous
tyrants who one after the other managed to obtain absolute power,
Lycurgus (B.C. 220-210), Machanidas, B.C. 210-207; Nabis, B.C. 207-192;
who, though differing in their home administrations, all agreed in
using the enmity of the Aetolians in order to harass and oppress the
Achaeans in every possible way.

[Sidenote: B.C. 213. Death of Aratus.]

Aratus died in B.C. 213. The last seven years of his life were
embittered by much ill success in his struggles with the Aetolians;
and by seeing Philip V., of whose presence in the Peloponnese he was
the main cause, after rendering some brilliant services to the league,
both in the Peloponnese and the invasion of Aetolia, develop some of
the worst vices of the tyrant; and he believed himself, whether rightly
or wrongly, to be poisoned by Philip’s order: “This is the reward,” he
said to an attendant when he felt himself dying, “of my friendship for
Philip.”[127]

The history of the league after his death followed the same course for
some years. The war with the Aetolians went on, sometimes slackly,
sometimes vigorously, as Philip V. was or was not diverted by
contests with his barbarian neighbours, or by schemes for joining the
Carthaginian assaults upon the Roman power.

[Sidenote: B.C. 208-183, Philopoemen.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 193.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 195-194.]

The next phase of vigorous action on the part of the league is that
which corresponds with the career of Philopoemen, who had already
shown his energy and skill at the battle of Sellasia. He was elected
Hipparch in B.C. 210, and Strategus in B.C. 209. In his first office
he did much to reorganise the Achaean cavalry and restore them to
some discipline,[128] and he extended this as Strategus to the whole
army.[129] His life’s work, however, was the defeating and either
killing or confining to their frontier the tyrants of Sparta. But while
he was absent from the country after B.C. 200 a new element appeared in
the Peloponnese. In 197 the battle of Cynoscephalae put an end for ever
to Macedonian influence, and Flamininus proclaimed the liberty of all
Greece in B.C. 195 at the Nemean festival. But Nabis was not deposed;
he was secured in his power by a treaty with Rome; and when Philopoemen
returned from Crete (B.C. 193), he found a fresh war on the point of
breaking out owing to intrigues between that tyrant and the Aetolians.
They suggested, and he eagerly undertook to make, an attempt to
recover the maritime towns of which he had been deprived by the Roman
settlement.[130][Sidenote: 193-192.] Nabis at once attacked Gythium:
and seemed on the point of taking it and the whole of the coast towns,
which would thus have been lost to the league. Philopoemen, now again
Strategus (B.C. 192), failed to relieve Gythium; but by a skilful
piece of generalship inflicted so severe a defeat on Nabis, as he was
returning to Sparta, that he did not venture on further movements
beyond Laconia; and shortly afterwards was assassinated by some
Aetolians whom he had summoned to his aid.

[Sidenote: 189-187.]

But the comparative peace in the Peloponnese was again broken in
B.C. 189 by the Spartans seizing a maritime town called Las; the
object being to relieve themselves of the restraint which shut them
from the sea, and the possible attacks of the exiles who had been
banished by Nabis, and who were always watching an opportunity to
effect their return. Philopoemen (Strategus both 189 and 188 B.C.)
led an army to the Laconian frontier in the spring of B.C. 188, and
after the execution of eighty Spartans, who had been surrendered on
account of the seizure of Las, and of the murder of thirty citizens
who were supposed to have Achaean proclivities—Sparta submitted to his
demand to raze the fortifications, dismiss the mercenaries, send away
the new citizens enrolled by the tyrants, and abolish the Lycurgean
laws, accepting the Achaean institutions instead. This was afterwards
supplemented by a demand for the restoration of the exiles banished by
the tyrants. Such of the new citizens (three thousand) as did not leave
the country by the day named were seized and sold as slaves.[131]

[Sidenote: B.C. 188.]

[Sidenote: 188-183.]

Sparta was now part of the Achaean league, which at this time reached
its highest point of power; and its alliance was solicited by the most
powerful princes of the east. It is this period which Polybius seems to
have in mind in his description of the league at its best, as embracing
the whole of the Peloponnese.[132][Sidenote: Lycortas Strategus, B.C.
184-182.] And it was in this third period of the existence of the
renewed league that his father Lycortas came to the front, and he
himself at an early age began taking part in politics.

[Sidenote: B.C. 179.]

But the terms imposed on Sparta were essentially violent and unjust,
and, as it turned out, impolitic. Cowed into submission, she proved
a thorn in the side of the league. The exiles continually appealed
to Rome; and after Philopoemen’s death (B.C. 183) the affairs of the
league began more and more to come before the Roman Senate. As usual,
traitors were at hand ready to sell their country for the sake of
the triumph of their party; and Callicrates, sent to Rome to plead
the cause of the league,[133] employed the opportunity to support
himself and his party by advising the Senate to give support to “the
Romanisers” in every state. This Polybius regards as the beginning of
the decline of the league. And the party of moderation, to which he and
his father Lycortas belonged, and which wished to assert the dignity
and legal rights of their country while offering no provocation to the
Romans, were eventually included under the sweeping decree which caused
them, to the number of a thousand, to be deported to Italy. We have
already seen, in tracing the life of Polybius, how the poor remnants of
these exiles returned in B.C. 151, embittered against Rome, and having
learnt nothing and forgotten nothing. And how the old quarrels were
renewed, until an armed interference of Rome was brought upon them; and
how the victory of Mummius at Corinth (B.C. 146), and the consequent
settlement of the commissioners, finally dissolved the league into
separate cantons, nominally autonomous, but really entirely subject to
Rome.[134]

The constitution of the league presents many points of interest to the
student of politics, and has been elaborately discussed by more than
one English scholar. I shall content myself here with pointing out some
of the main features as they are mentioned by Polybius.[135]

The league was a federation of free towns, all retaining full local
autonomy of some form or other of democracy, which for certain purposes
were under federal laws and federal magistrates, elected in a federal
assembly which all citizens of the league towns might if they chose
attend. All towns of the league also used the same standards in coinage
and weights and measures (2, 37). The assembly of the league (σύνοδος)
met for election of the chief magistrate in May of each year, at first
always at Aegium, but later at the other towns of the league in turn
(29, 23); and a second time in the autumn.[136] And besides these
annual meetings, the Strategus, acting with his council of magistrates,
could summon a meeting at any time for three days (_e.g._ at Sicyon,
23, 17); and on one occasion we find the assembly delegating its powers
to the armed levy of league troops, who for the nonce were to act as an
assembly (4, 7). Side by side with this general assembly was a council
(βουλή), the functions and powers of which we cannot clearly ascertain.
It seems to have acted as representing the general assembly in foreign
affairs (4, 26; 22, 12); and, being a working committee of the whole
assembly, it sometimes happened that when an assembly was summoned on
some subject which did not rouse popular interest, it practically was
the assembly (29, 24). Its numbers have been assumed to be one hundred
and twenty, from the fact that Eumenes offered them a present of one
hundred and twenty talents, the interest of which was to pay their
expenses. But this, after all, is not a certain deduction (22, 10).

The officers of the league were: First, a President or Strategus who
kept the seal of the league (4, 7), ordered the levy of federal troops,
and commanded it in the field. He also summoned the assemblies, and
brought the business to be done before them, which was in the form
of a proposal to be accepted or rejected, not amended. He was not
chairman of the assembly, but like an English minister or a Roman
consul brought on the proposals. He was assisted by a kind of cabinet
of ten magistrates from the several towns, who were called Demiurgi
(δημιουργοὶ 23, 5).[137] This was their technical name: but Polybius
also speaks of them under the more general appellation of οἱ ἄρχοντες
(5, 1), οἱ συνάρχοντες (23, 16), αἱ ἀρχαὶ (22, 13), αἱ συναρχίαι (27,
2). Whether the number ten had reference to the ten old towns of the
league or not, it was not increased with the number of the towns; and,
though we are not informed how they were elected, it seems reasonable
to suppose that they were freely selected without reference to the
towns from which they came, as the Strategus himself was. There was
also a vice-president, or hypo-strategus, whose position was, I think,
wholly military. He did not rule in absence of the Strategus, or
succeed him in case of death, that being reserved for the Strategus
of the previous year; but he took a certain command in war next the
Strategus (5, 94; 4, 59). Besides these we hear of a Hipparch to
command the league cavalry (5, 95; 7, 22), an office which seems to
have been regarded as stepping-stone to that of Strategus. This proved
a bad arrangement, as its holder was tempted to seek popularity by
winking at derelictions of duty among the cavalry who were voters.[138]
There was also a Navarch to command the regular squadron of federal
ships (5, 94), who does not seem to have been so important a person.
There are also mentioned certain judges (δίκασται) to administer the
federal law. We hear of them, however, performing duties closely
bordering on politics; for they decided whether certain honorary
inscriptions, statues, or other marks of respect to king Eumenes should
be allowed to remain in the Achaean cities (28, 7).

The Strategus, on the order of the assembly, raised the federal army
(4, 7). The number of men raised differed according to circumstances.
A fairly full levy seems to have been five thousand infantry and five
hundred cavalry (4, 15). But the league also used mercenaries to a
great extent. And we hear of one army which was to consist of eight
thousand mercenary infantry, with five hundred mercenary cavalry; and
in this case the Achaean levy was only to be three thousand infantry,
with three hundred cavalry (5, 91).

The pay of the mercenaries and other league expenses were provided for
by an εἰσφορά or contribution from all the states (5, 31, 91). The
contributing towns appear to have been able to recover their payments
as an indemnification for damage which the federal forces had failed to
avert (4, 60).

The regular federal squadron of ships for guarding the sea-coasts
appears to have consisted of ten triremes (2, 9; δεκαναία μακρῶν πλοίων
22, 10).

Such was the organisation of the Federal Government. It was in form
purely democratic, all members of thirty years old being eligible for
office, as well as possessing a vote in the assemblies. But a mass
assembly where the members are widely scattered inevitably becomes
oligarchic. Only the well-to-do and the energetic will be able or will
care to come a long journey to attend. And as the votes in the assembly
were given by towns, it must often have happened that the votes of many
towns were decided by a very small number of their citizens who were
there. No doubt, in times of great excitement, the attendance would be
large and the vote a popular one. But the general policy of the league
must have been directed by a small number of energetic men, who made
politics their profession and could afford to do so.


  ROMAN CAMP FOR TWO LEGIONS

  CONTAINING 4,068,289 SQUARE FEET

                    REAR (ἡ ὄπισθεν ἐπιφάνεια).
  +----------------------------    -----------------------------+
  |            200         Porta Praetoria.       200           |
  |            ft.                                ft.           |
  |       +----+--------------+    +---------------+----+       |
  |       |    |      EP      |    |       EP'     |    |       |
  |       | V  +--------------+ 50 +---------------+ V' |       |
  |       |    |      EE      | ft.|       EE'     |    |       |
  |       +----+--------------+    +---------------+----+       |
  |                                                       50    |
  |       +---+--+           +------+           +---+---+ ft.   |
  |       |PE |PP|           |      |           |PP'|PE'|       |
  |       +---+--+     F     |  P*  |     Q     +---+---+       |
  |700    |PE |PP|           |      |           |PP'|PE'|       |
  |ft.    +---+--+           +------+           +---+---+       |
  |                 ......              ......                  |
  |      T-----------------------------------------------T'     |
   Porta                                                   Porta
   Principalis                          100 ft.      Principalis
   Dextra.             Principia.                      Sinistra.
  |        +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+       |
  |        |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'|       |
  |        +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+       |
  |        |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'|       |
  |        +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+       |
  |200 ft. |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'|200 ft.|
  |        +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+       |
  |        |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'|       |
  |        +PS +ES+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+       |
  |        |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'|       |
  |        +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+       |
  |                        Via Quintana.    50 ft.              |
  |        +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+       |
  |        |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'|       |
  |        +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+       |
  |        |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'|       |
  |        +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+       |
  |        |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'|       |
  |        +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+       |
  |        |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'|       |
  |        +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+       | 2017
  |        |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'|       | ft.
  |        +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+       |
  |              50ft. 50ft. 50ft.   50ft.   50ft.              |
  |       200                                                   |
  |       ft.             Porto Decumana.                       |
  +----------------------------    -----------------------------+
       2017 ft.        FRONT (τὸ πρόσωπον).


       P*. Praetorium.
     T T'. Tents of the Tribuni Militum of two legions.
     E E'. Equites of two legions.
     P P'. Principes   ”     ”
     H H'. Hastati     ”     ”
     T T'. Triarii     ”     ”
   ES ES'. Equites of Socii of two legions.
   PS PS'. Pedites      ”       ”     ”
   PE PE'. Equites of the Praetorian Cohort of two legions.
   PP PP'. Pedites     ”      ”       ”         ”      ”
   EP EP'. Pedites extraordinarii of two legions.
   EE EE'. Equites      ”             ”     ”
        Q. Quaestorium.
        F. Forum or market-place.
     V V'. Foreigners or volunteers.




THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS




BOOK I


[Sidenote: Introduction. The importance and magnitude of the subject.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 219-167.]

+1.+ Had the praise of History been passed over by former Chroniclers
it would perhaps have been incumbent upon me to urge the choice and
special study of records of this sort, as the readiest means men can
have of correcting their knowledge of the past. But my predecessors
have not been sparing in this respect. They have all begun and ended,
so to speak, by enlarging on this theme: asserting again and again
that the study of History is in the truest sense an education, and a
training for political life; and that the most instructive, or rather
the only, method of learning to bear with dignity the vicissitudes
of fortune is to recall the catastrophes of others. It is evident,
therefore, that no one need think it his duty to repeat what has been
said by many, and said well. Least of all myself: for the surprising
nature of the events which I have undertaken to relate is in itself
sufficient to challenge and stimulate the attention of every one,
old or young, to the study of my work. Can any one be so indifferent
or idle as not to care to know by what means, and under what kind of
polity, almost the whole inhabited world was conquered and brought
under the dominion of the single city of Rome, and that too within
a period of not quite fifty-three years? Or who again can be so
completely absorbed in other subjects of contemplation or study, as to
think any of them superior in importance to the accurate understanding
of an event for which the past affords no precedent.

[Sidenote: Immensity of the Roman Empire shown by comparison with
Persia, Sparta, Macedonia. 1. Persia.]

[Sidenote: 2. Sparta. B.C. 405-394.]

[Sidenote: 3. Macedonia.]

+2.+ We shall best show how marvellous and vast our subject is by
comparing the most famous Empires which preceded, and which have
been the favourite themes of historians, and measuring them with the
superior greatness of Rome. There are but three that deserve even to
be so compared and measured: and they are these. The Persians for a
certain length of time were possessed of a great empire and dominion.
But every time they ventured beyond the limits of Asia, they found
not only their empire, but their own existence also in danger. The
Lacedaemonians, after contending for supremacy in Greece for many
generations, when they did get it, held it without dispute for barely
twelve years. The Macedonians obtained dominion in Europe from the
lands bordering on the Adriatic to the Danube,—which after all is but
a small fraction of this continent,—and, by the destruction of the
Persian Empire, they afterwards added to that the dominion of Asia. And
yet, though they had the credit of having made themselves masters of a
larger number of countries and states than any people had ever done,
they still left the greater half of the inhabited world in the hands of
others. They never so much as thought of attempting Sicily, Sardinia,
or Libya: and as to Europe, to speak the plain truth, they never even
knew of the most warlike tribes of the West. The Roman conquest, on
the other hand, was not partial. Nearly the whole inhabited world was
reduced by them to obedience: and they left behind them an empire not
to be paralleled in the past or rivalled in the future. Students will
gain from my narrative a clearer view of the whole story, and of the
numerous and important advantages which such exact record of events
offers.

[Sidenote: B.C. 220-217. The History starts from the 140th Olympiad,
when the tendency towards unity first shows itself.]

+3.+ My History begins in the 140th Olympiad. The events from which it
starts are these. In Greece, what is called the Social war: the first
waged by Philip, son of Demetrius and father of Perseus, in league with
the Achaeans against the Aetolians. In Asia, the war for the possession
of Coele-Syria which Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator carried on
against each other. In Italy, Libya, and their neighbourhood, the
conflict between Rome and Carthage, generally called the Hannibalian
war. My work thus begins where that of Aratus of Sicyon leaves off. Now
up to this time the world’s history had been, so to speak, a series
of disconnected transactions, as widely separated in their origin
and results as in their localities. But from this time forth History
becomes a connected whole: the affairs of Italy and Libya are involved
with those of Asia and Greece, and the tendency of all is to unity.
This is why I have fixed upon this era as the starting-point of my
work. For it was their victory over the Carthaginians in this war, and
their conviction that thereby the most difficult and most essential
step towards universal empire had been taken, which encouraged the
Romans for the first time to stretch out their hands upon the rest, and
to cross with an army into Greece and Asia.

[Sidenote: A sketch of their previous history necessary to explain the
success of the Romans.]

Now, had the states that were rivals for universal empire been
familiarly known to us, no reference perhaps to their previous history
would have been necessary, to show the purpose and the forces with
which they approached an undertaking of this nature and magnitude.
But the fact is that the majority of the Greeks have no knowledge of
the previous constitution, power, or achievements either of Rome or
Carthage. I therefore concluded that it was necessary to prefix this
and the next book to my History. I was anxious that no one, when fairly
embarked upon my actual narrative, should feel at a loss, and have to
ask what were the designs entertained by the Romans, or the forces and
means at their disposal, that they entered upon those undertakings,
which did in fact lead to their becoming masters of land and sea
everywhere in our part of the world. I wished, on the contrary, that
these books of mine, and the prefatory sketch which they contained,
might make it clear that the resources they started with justified
their original idea, and sufficiently explained their final success in
grasping universal empire and dominion.

[Sidenote: The need of a comprehensive view of history as well as a
close study of an epoch.]

+4.+ There is this analogy between the plan of my History and the
marvellous spirit of the age with which I have to deal. Just as Fortune
made almost all the affairs of the world incline in one direction,
and forced them to converge upon one and the same point; so it is my
task as an historian to put before my readers a compendious view of
the part played by Fortune in bringing about the general catastrophe.
It was this peculiarity which originally challenged my attention, and
determined me on undertaking this work. And combined with this was the
fact that no writer of our time has undertaken a general history. Had
any one done so my ambition in this direction would have been much
diminished. But, in point of fact, I notice that by far the greater
number of historians concern themselves with isolated wars and the
incidents that accompany them: while as to a general and comprehensive
scheme of events, their date, origin, and catastrophe, no one as far
as I know has undertaken to examine it. I thought it, therefore,
distinctly my duty neither to pass by myself, nor allow any one else to
pass by, without full study, a characteristic specimen of the dealings
of Fortune at once brilliant and instructive in the highest degree. For
fruitful as Fortune is in change, and constantly as she is producing
dramas in the life of men, yet never assuredly before this did she work
such a marvel, or act such a drama, as that which we have witnessed.
And of this we cannot obtain a comprehensive view from writers of mere
episodes. It would be as absurd to expect to do so as for a man to
imagine that he has learnt the shape of the whole world, its entire
arrangement and order, because he has visited one after the other the
most famous cities in it; or perhaps merely examined them in separate
pictures. That would be indeed absurd: and it has always seemed to me
that men, who are persuaded that they get a competent view of universal
from episodical history, are very like persons who should see the limbs
of some body, which had once been living and beautiful, scattered
and remote; and should imagine that to be quite as good as actually
beholding the activity and beauty of the living creature itself. But
if some one could there and then reconstruct the animal once more, in
the perfection of its beauty and the charm of its vitality, and could
display it to the same people, they would beyond doubt confess that
they had been far from conceiving the truth, and had been little better
than dreamers. For indeed some idea of a whole may be got from a part,
but an accurate knowledge and clear comprehension cannot. Wherefore we
must conclude that episodical history contributes exceedingly little to
the familiar knowledge and secure grasp of universal history. While it
is only by the combination and comparison of the separate parts of the
whole,—by observing their likeness and their difference,—that a man can
attain his object: can obtain a view at once clear and complete; and
thus secure both the profit and the delight of History.

[Sidenote: B.C. 264-261. I begin my preliminary account in the 129th
Olympiad, and with the circumstances which took the Romans to Sicily.]

+5.+ I shall adopt as the starting-point of this book the first
occasion on which the Romans crossed the sea from Italy. This is just
where the History of Timaeus left off; and it falls in the 129th
Olympiad. I shall accordingly have to describe what the state of their
affairs in Italy was, how long that settlement had lasted, and on what
resources they reckoned, when they resolved to invade Sicily. For this
was the first place outside Italy in which they set foot. The precise
cause of their thus crossing I must state without comment; for if I let
one cause lead me back to another, my point of departure will always
elude my grasp, and I shall never arrive at the view of my subject
which I wish to present. As to dates, then, I must fix on some era
agreed upon and recognised by all: and as to events, one that admits
of distinctly separate treatment; even though I may be obliged to go
back some short way in point of time, and take a summary review of the
intermediate transactions. For if the facts with which one starts are
unknown, or even open to controversy, all that comes after will fail
of approval and belief. But opinion being once formed on that point,
and a general assent obtained, all the succeeding narrative becomes
intelligible.

[Sidenote: B.C. 387-386. The rise of the Roman dominion may be traced
from the retirement of the Gauls from the city. From that time one
nation after another in Italy fell into their hands.]

[Sidenote: The Latini.]

[Sidenote: The Etruscans, Gauls, and Samnites.]

[Sidenote: Pyrrhus, B.C. 280.]

[Sidenote: Southern Italy.]

[Sidenote: Pyrrhus finally quits Italy, B.C. 274.]

+6.+ It was in the nineteenth year after the sea-fight at Aegospotami,
and the sixteenth before the battle at Leuctra; the year in which the
Lacedaemonians made what is called the Peace of Antalcidas with the
King of Persia; the year in which the elder Dionysius was besieging
Rhegium after beating the Italian Greeks on the River Elleporus; and
in which the Gauls took Rome itself by storm and were occupying the
whole of it except the Capitol. With these Gauls the Romans made a
treaty and settlement which they were content to accept: and having
thus become beyond all expectation once more masters of their own
country, they made a start in their career of expansion; and in the
succeeding period engaged in various wars with their neighbours. First,
by dint of valour, and the good fortune which attended them in the
field, they mastered all the Latini; then they went to war with the
Etruscans; then with the Celts; and next with the Samnites, who lived
on the eastern and northern frontiers of Latium. Some time after this
the Tarentines insulted the ambassadors of Rome, and, in fear of the
consequences, invited and obtained the assistance of Pyrrhus. This
happened in the year before the Gauls invaded Greece, some of whom
perished near Delphi, while others crossed into Asia. Then it was that
the Romans—having reduced the Etruscans and Samnites to obedience,
and conquered the Italian Celts in many battles—attempted for the
first time the reduction of the rest of Italy. The nations for whose
possessions they were about to fight they affected to regard, not in
the light of foreigners, but as already for the most part belonging and
pertaining to themselves. The experience gained from their contests
with the Samnites and the Celts had served as a genuine training in the
art of war. Accordingly, they entered upon the war with spirit, drove
Pyrrhus from Italy, and then undertook to fight with and subdue those
who had taken part with him. They succeeded everywhere to a marvel, and
reduced to obedience all the tribes inhabiting Italy except the Celts;
after which they undertook to besiege some of their own citizens, who
at that time were occupying Rhegium.

[Sidenote: The story of the Mamertines at Messene, and the Roman
garrison at Rhegium, Dio. Cassius _fr._]

+7.+ For misfortunes befell Messene and Rhegium, the cities built on
either side of the Strait, peculiar in their nature and alike in their
circumstances.

[Sidenote: 1. Messene.]

[Sidenote: Agathocles died, B.C. 289]

Not long before the period we are now describing some Campanian
mercenaries of Agathocles, having for some time cast greedy eyes upon
Messene, owing to its beauty and wealth, no sooner got an opportunity
than they made a treacherous attempt upon that city. They entered the
town under guise of friendship, and, having once got possession of
it, they drove out some of the citizens and put others to the sword.
This done, they seized promiscuously the wives and children of the
dispossessed citizens, each keeping those which fortune had assigned
him at the very moment of the lawless deed. All other property and the
land they took possession of by a subsequent division and retained.

[Sidenote: 2. Rhegium, Livy Ep. 12.]

[Sidenote: Pyrrhus in Sicily, B.C. 278-275.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 271. C. Quintus Claudius, L. Genucius Clepsina, Coss.]

The speed with which they became masters of a fair territory and
city found ready imitators of their conduct. The people of Rhegium,
when Pyrrhus was crossing to Italy, felt a double anxiety. They
were dismayed at the thought of his approach, and at the same time
were afraid of the Carthaginians as being masters of the sea. They
accordingly asked and obtained a force from Rome to guard and support
them. The garrison, four thousand in number, under the command of a
Campanian named Decius Jubellius, entered the city, and for a time
preserved it, as well as their own faith. But at last, conceiving the
idea of imitating the Mamertines, and having at the same time obtained
their co-operation, they broke faith with the people of Rhegium,
enamoured of the pleasant site of the town and the private wealth of
the citizens, and seized the city after having, in imitation of the
Mamertines, first driven out some of the people and put others to the
sword. Now, though the Romans were much annoyed at this transaction,
they could take no active steps, because they were deeply engaged
in the wars I have mentioned above. But having got free from them
they invested and besieged the troops. They presently took the place
and killed the greater number in the assault,—for the men resisted
desperately, knowing what must follow,—but took more than three hundred
alive. These were sent to Rome, and there the Consuls brought them into
the forum, where they were scourged and beheaded according to custom:
for they wished as far as they could to vindicate their good faith in
the eyes of the allies. The territory and town they at once handed over
to the people of Rhegium.

[Sidenote: Effect of the fall of the rebellious garrison of Rhegium on
the Mamertines.]

+8.+ But the Mamertines (for this was the name which the Campanians
gave themselves after they became masters of Messene), as long as
they enjoyed the alliance of the Roman captors of Rhegium, not
only exercised absolute control over their own town and district
undisturbed, but about the neighbouring territory also gave no little
trouble to the Carthaginians and Syracusans, and levied tribute from
many parts of Sicily. But when they were deprived of this support,
the captors of Rhegium being now invested and besieged, they were
themselves promptly forced back into the town again by the Syracusans,
under circumstances which I will now detail.

[Sidenote: The rise of Hiero. He is elected General by the army, B.C.
275-274.]

Not long before this the military forces of the Syracusans had
quarrelled with the citizens, and while stationed near Merganè elected
commanders from their own body. These were Artemidorus and Hiero, the
latter of whom afterwards became King of Syracuse. At this time he was
quite a young man, but had a certain natural aptitude for kingcraft
and the politic conduct of affairs. Having taken over the command,
and having by means of some of his connexions made his way into the
city, he got his political opponents into his hands; but conducted
the government with such mildness, and in so lofty a spirit, that the
Syracusans, though by no means usually acquiescing in the election of
officers by the soldiers, did on this occasion unanimously approve
of Hiero as their general. His first step made it evident to close
observers that his hopes soared above the position of a mere general.

[Sidenote: Secures support of Leptines by marrying his daughter.]

[Sidenote: His device for getting rid of mutinous mercenaries.]

[Sidenote: Fiume Salso.]

[Sidenote: Hiero next attacks the Mamertines and defeats them near
Mylae, B.C. 268.]

+9.+ He noticed that among the Syracusans the despatch of troops,
and of magistrates in command of them, was always the signal for
revolutionary movements of some sort or another. He knew, too, that
of all the citizens Leptines enjoyed the highest position and credit,
and that among the common people especially he was by far the most
influential man existing. He accordingly contracted a relationship by
marriage with him, that he might have a representative of his interests
left at home at such times as he should be himself bound to go abroad
with the troops for a campaign. After marrying the daughter of this
man, his next step was in regard to the old mercenaries. He observed
that they were disaffected and mutinous: and he accordingly led out an
expedition, with the ostensible purpose of attacking the foreigners
who were in occupation of Messene. He pitched a camp against the enemy
near Centuripa, and drew up his line resting on the River Cyamosorus.
But the cavalry and infantry, which consisted of citizens, he kept
together under his personal command at some distance, on pretence of
intending to attack the enemy on another quarter: the mercenaries he
thrust to the front and allowed them to be completely cut to pieces by
the foreigners; while he seized the moment of their rout to affect a
safe retreat for himself and the citizens into Syracuse. This stroke of
policy was skilful and successful. He had got rid of the mutinous and
seditious element in the army; and after enlisting on his own account a
sufficient body of mercenaries, he thenceforth carried on the business
of the government in security. But seeing that the Mamertines were
encouraged by their success to greater confidence and recklessness in
their excursions, he fully armed and energetically drilled the citizen
levies, led them out, and engaged the enemy on the Mylaean plain near
the River Longanus. He inflicted a severe defeat upon them: took their
leaders prisoners: put a complete end to their audacious proceedings:
and on his return to Syracuse was himself greeted by all the allies
with the title of King.

[Sidenote: Some of the conquered Mamertines appeal to Rome for help.]

[Sidenote: The motives of the Romans in acceding to this
prayer,—jealousy of the growing power of Carthage.]

+10.+ Thus were the Mamertines first deprived of support from
Rhegium, and then subjected, from causes which I have just stated,
to a complete defeat on their own account. Thereupon some of them
betook themselves to the protection of the Carthaginians, and were
for putting themselves and their citadel into their hands; while
others set about sending an embassy to Rome to offer a surrender of
their city, and to beg assistance on the ground of the ties of race
which united them. The Romans were long in doubt. The inconsistency
of sending such aid seemed manifest. A little while ago they had put
some of their own citizens to death, with the extreme penalties of
the law, for having broken faith with the people of Rhegium: and now
so soon afterwards to assist the Mamertines, who had done precisely
the same to Messene as well as Rhegium, involved a breach of equity
very hard to justify. But while fully alive to these points, they yet
saw that Carthaginian aggrandisement was not confined to Libya, but
had embraced many districts in Iberia as well; and that Carthage was,
besides, mistress of all the islands in the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian
seas: they were beginning, therefore, to be exceedingly anxious lest,
if the Carthaginians became masters of Sicily also, they should find
them very dangerous and formidable neighbours, surrounding them as
they would on every side, and occupying a position which commanded all
the coasts of Italy. Now it was clear that, if the Mamertines did not
obtain the assistance they asked for, the Carthaginians would very
soon reduce Sicily. For should they avail themselves of the voluntary
offer of Messene and become masters of it, they were certain before
long to crush Syracuse also, since they were already lords of nearly
the whole of the rest of Sicily. The Romans saw all this, and felt
that it was absolutely necessary not to let Messene slip, or allow the
Carthaginians to secure what would be like a bridge to enable them to
cross into Italy.

[Sidenote: The Senate shirk the responsibility of decision. The people
vote for helping the Mamertines.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 264. Appius Claudius Caudex. M. Fulvius Flaccus, Coss.]

[Sidenote: Hiero joins Carthage in laying siege to the Mamertines in
Messene. Appius comes to the relief of the besieged, B.C. 264.]

[Sidenote: After vain attempts at negotiation, Appius determines to
attack Hiero.]

[Sidenote: Hiero is defeated, and returns to Syracuse.]

+11.+ In spite of protracted deliberations, the conflict of motives
proved too strong, after all, to allow of the Senate coming to any
decision; for the inconsistency of aiding the Messenians appeared to
them to be evenly balanced by the advantages to be gained by doing so.
The people, however, had suffered much from the previous wars, and
wanted some means of repairing the losses which they had sustained
in every department. Besides these national advantages to be gained
by the war, the military commanders suggested that individually they
would get manifest and important benefits from it. They accordingly
voted in favour of giving the aid. The decree having thus been passed
by the people, they elected one of the consuls, Appius Claudius, to
the command, and sent him out with instructions to cross to Messene
and relieve the Mamertines. These latter managed, between threats and
false representations, to oust the Carthaginian commander who was
already in possession of the citadel, invited Appius in, and offered
to deliver the city into his hands. The Carthaginians crucified their
commander for what they considered to be his cowardice and folly in
thus losing the citadel; stationed their fleet near Pelorus; their land
forces at a place called Synes; and laid vigorous siege to Messene.
Now at this juncture Hiero, thinking it a favourable opportunity for
totally expelling from Sicily the foreigners who were in occupation of
Messene, made a treaty with the Carthaginians. Having done this, he
started from Syracuse upon an expedition against that city. He pitched
his camp on the opposite side to the Carthaginians, near what was
called the Chalcidian Mount, whereby the garrison were cut off from
that way out as well as from the other. The Roman Consul Appius, for
his part, gallantly crossed the strait by night and got into Messene.
But he found that the enemy had completely surrounded the town and were
vigorously pressing on the attack; and he concluded on reflection that
the siege could bring him neither credit nor security so long as the
enemy commanded land as well as sea. He accordingly first endeavoured
to relieve the Mamertines from the contest altogether by sending
embassies to both of the attacking forces. Neither of them received
his proposals, and at last, from sheer necessity, he made up his mind
to hazard an engagement, and that he would begin with the Syracusans.
So he led out his forces and drew them up for the fight: nor was
the Syracusan backward in accepting the challenge, but descended
simultaneously to give him battle. After a prolonged struggle, Appius
got the better of the enemy, and chased the opposing forces right up
to their entrenchments. The result of this was that Appius, after
stripping the dead, retired into Messene again, while Hiero, with a
foreboding of the final result, only waited for nightfall to beat a
hasty retreat to Syracuse.

[Sidenote: Encouraged by this success, he attacks and drives off the
Carthaginians.]

+12.+ Next morning, when Appius was assured of their flight, his
confidence was strengthened, and he made up his mind to attack the
Carthaginians without delay. Accordingly, he issued orders to the
soldiers to despatch their preparations early, and at daybreak
commenced his sally. Having succeeded in engaging the enemy, he killed
a large number of them, and forced the rest to fly precipitately to
the neighbouring towns. These successes sufficed to raise the siege
of Messene: and thenceforth he scoured the territory of Syracuse and
her allies with impunity, and laid it waste without finding any one to
dispute the possession of the open country with him; and finally he sat
down before Syracuse itself and laid siege to it.

[Sidenote: Such preliminary sketches are necessary for clearness, and
my readers must not be surprised if I follow the same system in the
case of other towns.]

Such was the nature and motive of the first warlike expedition of
the Romans beyond the shores of Italy; and this was the period at
which it took place. I thought this expedition the most suitable
starting-point for my whole narrative, and accordingly adopted it as
a basis; though I have made a rapid survey of some anterior events,
that in setting forth its causes no point should be left obscure. I
thought it necessary, if we were to get an adequate and comprehensive
view of their present supreme position, to trace clearly how and when
the Romans, after the disaster which they sustained in the loss of
their own city, began their upward career; and how and when, once
more, after possessing themselves of Italy, they conceived the idea of
attempting conquests external to it. This must account in future parts
of my work for my taking, when treating of the most important states,
a preliminary survey of their previous history. In doing so my object
will be to secure such a vantage-ground as will enable us to see with
clearness from what origin, at what period, and in what circumstances
they severally started and arrived at their present position. This is
exactly what I have just done with regard to the Romans.

[Sidenote: Subjects of the two first books of the Histories. 1. War
in Sicily or first Punic War, B.C. 264-241. 2. The Mercenary or
“inexpiable” war, B.C. 240-237. 3. Carthaginian movements in Spain,
B.C. 241-218. 4. Illyrian war, B.C. 229-228. 5. Gallic war, B.C.
225-221. 6. Cleomenic war, B.C. 227-221.]

+13.+ It is time to have done with these explanations, and to come to
my subject, after a brief and summary statement of the events of which
my introductory books are to treat. Of these the first in order of
time are those which befell the Romans and Carthaginians in their war
for the possession of Sicily. Next comes the Libyan or Mercenary war;
immediately following on which are the Carthaginian achievements in
Spain, first under Hamilcar, and then under Hasdrubal. In the course
of these events, again, occurred the first expedition of the Romans
into Illyria and the Greek side of Europe; and, besides that, their
struggles within Italy with the Celts. In Greece at the same time the
war called after Cleomenes was in full action. With this war I design
to conclude my prefatory sketch and my second book.

[Sidenote: The first Punic war deserves more detailed treatment,
as furnishing a better basis for comparing Rome and Carthage than
subsequent wars.]

To enter into minute details of these events is unnecessary, and would
be of no advantage to my readers. It is not part of my plan to write a
history of them: my sole object is to recapitulate them in a summary
manner by way of introduction to the narrative I have in hand. I will,
therefore, touch lightly upon the leading events of this period in a
comprehensive sketch, and will endeavour to make the end of it dovetail
with the commencement of my main history. In this way the narrative
will acquire a continuity; and I shall be shown to have had good reason
for touching on points already treated by others: while by such an
arrangement the studiously inclined will find the approach to the story
which has to be told made intelligible and easy for them. I shall,
however, endeavour to describe with somewhat more care the first war
which arose between the Romans and Carthaginians for the possession of
Sicily. For it would not be easy to mention any war that lasted longer
than this one; nor one in which the preparations made were on a larger
scale, or the efforts made more sustained, or the actual engagements
more numerous, or the reverses sustained on either side more signal.
Moreover, the two states themselves were at the precise period of
their history when their institutions were as yet in their original
integrity, their fortunes still at a moderate level, and their forces
on an equal footing. So that those who wish to gain a fair view of the
national characteristics and resources of the two had better base their
comparison upon this war rather than upon those which came after.

[Sidenote: This is rendered more necessary by the partisan
misrepresentations of Philinus and Fabius Pictor.]

+14.+ But it was not these considerations only which induced me to
undertake the history of this war. I was influenced quite as much
by the fact that Philinus and Fabius, who have the reputation of
writing with the most complete knowledge about it, have given us an
inadequate representation of the truth. Now, judging from their lives
and principles, I do not suppose that these writers have intentionally
stated what was false; but I think that they are much in the same
state of mind as men in love. Partisanship and complete prepossession
made Philinus think that all the actions of the Carthaginians were
characterised by wisdom, honour, and courage: those of the Romans by
the reverse. Fabius thought the exact opposite. Now in other relations
of life one would hesitate to exclude such warmth of sentiment: for a
good man ought to be loyal to his friends and patriotic to his country;
ought to be at one with his friends in their hatreds and likings. But
directly a man assumes the moral attitude of an historian he ought to
forget all considerations of that kind. There will be many occasions on
which he will be bound to speak well of his enemies, and even to praise
them in the highest terms if the facts demand it: and on the other hand
many occasions on which it will be his duty to criticise and denounce
his own side, however dear to him, if their errors of conduct suggest
that course. For as a living creature is rendered wholly useless if
deprived of its eyes, so if you take truth from History what is left is
but an idle unprofitable tale. Therefore, one must not shrink either
from blaming one’s friends or praising one’s enemies; nor be afraid
of finding fault with and commending the same persons at different
times. For it is impossible that men engaged in public affairs should
always be right, and unlikely that they should always be wrong. Holding
ourselves, therefore, entirely aloof from the actors, we must as
historians make statements and pronounce judgment in accordance with
the actions themselves.

[Sidenote: Philinus’s misrepresentations.]

+15.+ The writers whom I have named exemplify the truth of these
remarks. Philinus, for instance, commencing the narrative with his
second book, says that the “Carthaginians and Syracusans engaged in
the war and sat down before Messene; that the Romans arriving by
sea entered the town, and immediately sallied out from it to attack
the Syracusans; but that after suffering severely in the engagement
they retired into Messene; and that on a second occasion, having
issued forth to attack the Carthaginians, they not only suffered
severely but lost a considerable number of their men captured by
the enemy.” But while making this statement, he represents Hiero as
so destitute of sense as, after this engagement, not only to have
promptly burnt his stockade and tents and fled under cover of night
to Syracuse, but to have abandoned all the forts which had been
established to overawe the Messenian territory. Similarly he asserts
that “the Carthaginians immediately after their battle evacuated their
entrenchment and dispersed into various towns, without venturing any
longer even to dispute the possession of the open country; and that,
accordingly, their leaders seeing that their troops were utterly
demoralised determined in consideration not to risk a battle: that the
Romans followed them, and not only laid waste the territory of the
Carthaginians and Syracusans, but actually sat down before Syracuse
itself and began to lay siege to it.” These statements appear to me to
be full of glaring inconsistency, and to call for no refutation at all.
The very men whom he describes to begin with as besieging Messene, and
as victorious in the engagements, he afterwards represents as running
away, abandoning the open country, and utterly demoralised: while those
whom he starts by saying were defeated and besieged, he concludes by
describing as engaging in a pursuit, as promptly seizing the open
places, and finally as besieging Syracuse. Nothing can reconcile
these statements. It is impossible. Either his initial statement,
or his account of the subsequent events, must be false. In point of
fact the latter part of his story is the true one. The Syracusans and
Carthaginians _did_ abandon the open country, and the Romans _did_
immediately afterwards commence a siege of Syracuse and of Echetla,
which lies in the district between the Syracusan and Carthaginian
pales. For the rest it must necessarily be acknowledged that the
first part of his account is false; and that whereas the Romans were
victorious in the engagements under Messene, they have been represented
by this historian as defeated. Through the whole of this work we shall
find Philinus acting in a similar spirit: and much the same may be said
of Fabius, as I shall show when the several points arise.

I have now said what was proper on the subject of this digression.
Returning to the matter in hand I will endeavour by a continuous
narrative of moderate dimensions to guide my readers to a true
knowledge of this war.

[Sidenote: B.C. 264.]

[Sidenote: (Continuing from chap. xii.), B.C. 263, Manius Valerius
Maximus, Manius Otacilius Crassus, Coss. The Consuls with four legions
are sent to Sicily. A general move of the Sicilian cities to join them.
Hiero submits.]

+16.+ When news came to Rome of the successes of Appius and his
legions, the people elected Manius Otacilius and Manius Valerius
Consuls, and despatched their whole army to Sicily, and both Consuls
in command. Now the Romans have in all, as distinct from allies, four
legions of Roman citizens, which they enrol every year, each of which
consists of four thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry: and
on their arrival most of the cities revolted from Syracuse as well
as from Carthage, and joined the Romans. And when he saw the terror
and dismay of the Sicilians, and compared with them the number and
crushing strength of the legions of Rome, Hiero began, from a review
of all these points, to conclude that the prospects of the Romans
were brighter than those of the Carthaginians. Inclining therefore
from these considerations to the side of the former, he began sending
messages to the Consuls, proposing peace and friendship with them. The
Romans accepted his offer, their chief motive being the consideration
of provisions: for as the Carthaginians had command of the sea, they
were afraid of being cut off at every point from their supplies, warned
by the fact that the legions which had previously crossed had run very
short in that respect. They therefore gladly accepted Hiero’s offers
of friendship, supposing that he would be of signal service to them
in this particular. The king engaged to restore his prisoners without
ransom, and to pay besides an indemnity of a hundred talents of silver.
The treaty being arranged on these terms, the Romans thenceforth
regarded the Syracusans as friends and allies: while King Hiero, having
thus placed himself under the protection of the Romans, never failed
to supply their needs in times of difficulty; and for the rest of his
life reigned securely in Syracuse, devoting his energies to gaining
the gratitude and good opinion of the Greeks. And in point of fact no
monarch ever acquired a greater reputation, or enjoyed for a longer
period the fruits of his prudent policy in private as well as in public
affairs.

[Sidenote: The Carthaginians alarmed at Hiero’s defection make great
efforts to increase their army in Sicily.]

[Sidenote: They select Agrigentum as their headquarters.]

+17.+ When the text of this treaty reached Rome, and the people had
approved and confirmed the terms made with Hiero, the Roman government
thereupon decided not to send all their forces, as they had intended
doing, but only two legions. For they thought that the gravity of the
war was lessened by the adhesion of the king, and at the same time
that the army would thus be better off for provisions. But when the
Carthaginian government saw that Hiero had become their enemy, and that
the Romans were taking a more decided part in Sicilian politics, they
conceived that they must have a more formidable force to enable them
to confront their enemy and maintain their own interests in Sicily.
Accordingly, they enlisted mercenaries from over sea—a large number
of Ligurians and Celts, and a still larger number of Iberians—and
despatched them to Sicily. And perceiving that Agrigentum possessed
the greatest natural advantages as a place of arms, and was the most
powerful city in their province, they collected their supplies and
their forces into it, deciding to use this city as their headquarters
for the war.

[Sidenote: B.C. 262.]

[Sidenote: The new Consuls, Lucius Postumius Megellus and Quintus
Mamilius Vitulus, determined to lay siege to Agrigentum.]

[Sidenote: The Carthaginians make an unsuccessful sally.]

On the Roman side a change of commanders had now taken place. The
Consuls who made the treaty with Hiero had gone home, and their
successors, Lucius Postumius and Quintus Mamilius, were come to Sicily
with their legions. Observing the measure which the Carthaginians were
taking, and the forces they were concentrating at Agrigentum, they made
up their minds to take that matter in hand and strike a bold blow.
Accordingly they suspended every other department of the war, and
bearing down upon Agrigentum itself with their whole army, attacked it
in force; pitched their camp within a distance of eight stades from
the city; and confined the Carthaginians within the walls. Now it was
just harvest-time, and the siege was evidently destined to be a long
one: the soldiers, therefore, went out to collect the corn with greater
hardihood than they ought to have done. Accordingly the Carthaginians,
seeing the enemy scattered about the fields, sallied out and attacked
the harvesting-parties. They easily routed these; and then one portion
of them made a rush to destroy the Roman entrenchment, the other to
attack the pickets. But the peculiarity of their institutions saved the
Roman fortunes, as it had often done before. Among them it is death for
a man to desert his post, or to fly from his station on any pretext
whatever. Accordingly on this, as on other occasions, they gallantly
held their ground against opponents many times their own number; and
though they lost many of their own men, they killed still more of the
enemy, and at last outflanked the foes just as they were on the point
of demolishing the palisade of the camp. Some they put to the sword,
and the rest they pursued with slaughter into the city.

+18.+ The result was that thenceforth the Carthaginians were somewhat
less forward in making such attacks, and the Romans more cautious in
foraging.

[Sidenote: The Romans form two strongly-entrenched camps.]

[Sidenote: A relief comes from Carthage to Agrigentum.]

[Sidenote: Hanno seizes Herbesus.]

[Sidenote: The Romans faithfully supported by Hiero.]

Finding that the Carthaginians would not come out to meet them at close
quarters any more, the Roman generals divided their forces: with one
division they occupied the ground round the temple of Asclepius outside
the town; with the other they encamped in the outskirts of the city on
the side which looks towards Heracleia. The space between the camps on
either side of the city they secured by two trenches,—the inner one
to protect themselves against sallies from the city, the outer as a
precaution against attacks from without, and to intercept those persons
or supplies which always make their way surreptitiously into cities
that are sustaining a siege. The spaces between the trenches uniting
the camps they secured by pickets, taking care in their disposition
to strengthen the several accessible points. As for food and other
war material, the other allied cities all joined in collecting and
bringing these to Herbesus for them: and thus they supplied themselves
in abundance with necessaries, by continually getting provisions living
and dead from this town, which was conveniently near. For about five
months then they remained in the same position, without being able to
obtain any decided advantage over each other beyond the casualties
which occurred in the skirmishes. But the Carthaginians were beginning
to be hard pressed by hunger, owing to the number of men shut up in the
city, who amounted to no less than fifty thousand: and Hannibal, who
had been appointed commander of the besieged forces, beginning by this
time to be seriously alarmed at the state of things, kept perpetually
sending messages to Carthage explaining their critical state, and
begging for assistance. Thereupon the Carthaginian government put on
board ship the fresh troops and elephants which they had collected,
and despatched them to Sicily, with orders to join the other commander
Hanno. This officer collected all his war material and forces into
Heracleia, and as a first step possessed himself by a stratagem of
Herbesus, thus depriving the enemy of their provisions and supply of
necessaries. The result of this was that the Romans found themselves in
the position of besieged as much as in that of besiegers; for they were
reduced by short supplies of food and scarcity of necessaries to such a
condition that they more than once contemplated raising the siege. And
they would have done so at last had not Hiero, by using every effort
and contrivance imaginable, succeeded in keeping them supplied with
what satisfied, to a tolerable extent, their most pressing wants. This
was Hanno’s first step. His next was as follows.

[Sidenote: Hanno tempts the Roman cavalry out and defeats them.]

[Sidenote: After two months, Hanno is forced to try to relieve
Agrigentum,]

[Sidenote: but is defeated in a pitched battle, and his army cut to
pieces.]

[Sidenote: Hannibal escapes by night; and the Romans enter and plunder
Agrigentum.]

+19.+ He saw that the Romans were reduced by disease and want, owing
to an epidemic that had broken out among them, and he believed that
his own forces were strong enough to give them battle: he accordingly
collected his elephants, of which he had about fifty, and the whole
of the rest of his army, and advanced at a rapid pace from Heracleia;
having previously issued orders to the Numidian cavalry to precede
him, and to endeavour, when they came near the enemies’ stockade,
to provoke them and draw their cavalry out; and, having done so,
to wheel round and retire until they met him. The Numidians did as
they were ordered, and advanced up to one of the camps. Immediately
the Roman cavalry poured out and boldly charged the Numidians: the
Libyans retired, according to their orders, until they reached Hanno’s
division: then they wheeled round; surrounded, and repeatedly charged
the enemy; killed a great number of them, and chased the rest up to
their stockade. After this affair Hanno’s force encamped over against
the Romans, having seized the hill called Torus, at a distance of
about a mile and a quarter from their opponents. For two months they
remained in position without any decisive action, though skirmishes
took place daily. But as Hannibal all this time kept signalling and
sending messages from the town to Hanno,—telling him that his men were
impatient of the famine, and that many were even deserting to the enemy
owing to the distress for food,—the Carthaginian general determined to
risk a battle, the Romans being equally ready, for the reasons I have
mentioned. So both parties advanced into the space between the camps
and engaged. The battle lasted a long time, but at last the Romans
turned the advanced guard of Carthaginian mercenaries. The latter fell
back upon the elephants and the other divisions posted in their rear;
and thus the whole Punic army was thrown into confusion. The retreat
became general: the larger number of the men were killed, while some
effected their escape into Heracleia; and the Romans became masters
of most of the elephants and all the baggage. Now night came on, and
the victors, partly from joy at their success, partly from fatigue,
kept their watches somewhat more carelessly than usual; accordingly
Hannibal, having given up hope of holding out, made up his mind that
this state of things afforded him a good opportunity of escape. He
started about midnight from the town with his mercenary troops, and
having choked up the trenches with baskets stuffed full of chaff, led
off his force in safety, without being detected by the enemy. When
day dawned the Romans discovered what had happened, and indeed for a
short time were engaged with Hannibal’s rear; but eventually they all
made for the town gates. There they found no one to oppose them: they
therefore threw themselves into the town, plundered it, and secured
a large number of captives, besides a great booty of every sort and
description.

[Sidenote: This success inspires the Senate with the idea of expelling
the Carthaginians from Sicily.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 261.]

+20.+ Great was the joy of the Roman Senate when the news of what had
taken place at Agrigentum arrived. Their ideas too were so raised that
they no longer confined themselves to their original designs. They were
not content with having saved the Mamertines, nor with the advantages
gained in the course of the war; but conceived the idea that it was
possible to expel the Carthaginians entirely from the island, and that
if that were done their own power would receive a great increase: they
accordingly engaged in this policy and directed their whole thoughts to
this subject. As to their land forces they saw that things were going
on as well as they could wish. For the Consuls elected in succession to
those who had besieged Agrigentum, Lucius Valerius Flaccus and Titus
Otacilius Crassus, appeared to be managing the Sicilian business as
well as circumstances admitted. Yet so long as the Carthaginians were
in undisturbed command of the sea, the balance of success could not
incline decisively in their favour. For instance, in the period which
followed, though they were now in possession of Agrigentum, and though
consequently many of the inland towns joined the Romans from dread of
their land forces, yet a still larger number of seaboard towns held
aloof from them in terror of the Carthaginian fleet. Seeing therefore
that it was ever more and more the case that the balance of success
oscillated from one side to the other from these causes; and, moreover,
that while Italy was repeatedly ravaged by the naval force, Libya
remained permanently uninjured; they became eager to get upon the sea
and meet the Carthaginians there.

It was this branch of the subject that more than anything else induced
me to give an account of this war at somewhat greater length than I
otherwise should have done. I was unwilling that a first step of this
kind should be unknown,—namely how, and when, and why the Romans first
started a navy.

[Sidenote: The Romans boldly determine to build ships and meet the
Carthaginians at sea.]

[Sidenote: A Carthaginian ship used as a model.]

It was, then, because they saw that the war they had undertaken
lingered to a weary length, that they first thought of getting a fleet
built, consisting of a hundred quinqueremes and twenty triremes. But
one part of their undertaking caused them much difficulty. Their
shipbuilders were entirely unacquainted with the construction of
quinqueremes, because no one in Italy had at that time employed vessels
of that description. There could be no more signal proof of the
courage, or rather the extraordinary audacity of the Roman enterprise.
Not only had they no resources for it of reasonable sufficiency;
but without any resources for it at all, and without having ever
entertained an idea of naval war,—for it was the first time they had
thought of it,—they nevertheless handled the enterprise with such
extraordinary audacity, that, without so much as a preliminary trial,
they took upon themselves there and then to meet the Carthaginians
at sea, on which they had for generations held undisputed supremacy.
Proof of what I say, and of their surprising audacity, may be found in
this. When they first took in hand to send troops across to Messene
they not only had no decked vessels but no war-ships at all, not so
much as a single galley: but they borrowed quinqueremes and triremes
from Tarentum and Locri, and even from Elea and Neapolis; and having
thus collected a fleet, boldly sent their men across upon it. It was on
this occasion that, the Carthaginians having put to sea in the Strait
to attack them, a decked vessel of theirs charged so furiously that it
ran aground, and falling into the hands of the Romans served them as a
model on which they constructed their whole fleet. And if this had not
happened it is clear that they would have been completely hindered from
carrying out their design by want of constructive knowledge.

[Sidenote: B.C. 260. Cn. Cornelius Scipio Asina, C. Duilius, Coss.]

[Sidenote: Cornelius captured with the loss of his ships.]

[Sidenote: The rest of the Roman fleet arrive and nearly capture
Hannibal.]

+21.+ Meanwhile, however, those who were charged with the shipbuilding
were busied with the construction of the vessels; while others
collected crews and were engaged in teaching them to row on dry land:
which they contrived to do in the following manner. They made the men
sit on rower’s benches on dry land, in the same order as they would sit
on the benches in actual vessels: in the midst of them they stationed
the Celeustes, and trained them to get back and draw in their hands all
together in time, and then to swing forward and throw them out again,
and to begin and cease these movements at the word of the Celeustes.
By the time these preparations were completed the ships were built.
They therefore launched them, and, after a brief preliminary practice
of real sea-rowing, started on their coasting voyage along the shore
of Italy, in accordance with the Consul’s order. For Gnaeus Cornelius
Scipio, who had been appointed by the Roman people a few days before
to command the fleet, after giving the ship captains orders that as
soon as they had fitted out the fleet they should sail to the Straits,
had put to sea himself with seventeen ships and sailed in advance to
Messene; for he was very eager to secure all pressing necessaries for
the naval force. While there some negotiation was suggested to him for
the surrender of the town of Lipara. Snatching at the prospect somewhat
too eagerly, he sailed with the above-mentioned ships and anchored
off the town. But having been informed in Panormus of what had taken
place, the Carthaginian general Hannibal despatched Boōdes, a member
of the Senate, with a squadron of twenty ships. He accomplished the
voyage at night and shut up Gnaeus and his men within the harbour.
When day dawned the crews made for the shore and ran away, while
Gnaeus, in utter dismay, and not knowing in the least what to do,
eventually surrendered to the enemy. The Carthaginians having thus
possessed themselves of the ships as well as the commander of their
enemies, started to rejoin Hannibal. Yet a few days afterwards, though
the disaster of Gnaeus was so signal and recent, Hannibal himself was
within an ace of falling into the same glaring mistake. For having
been informed that the Roman fleet in its voyage along the coast of
Italy was close at hand, he conceived a wish to get a clear view of
the enemy’s number and disposition. He accordingly set sail with fifty
ships, and just as he was rounding the “Italian Headland” he fell in
with the enemy, who were sailing in good order and disposition. He
lost most of his ships, and with the rest effected his own escape in a
manner beyond hope or expectation.

[Sidenote: The “corvi” or “crows” for boarding.]

+22.+ When the Romans had neared the coasts of Sicily and learnt the
disaster which had befallen Gnaeus, their first step was to send for
Gaius Duilius, who was in command of the land forces. Until he should
come they stayed where they were; but at the same time, hearing that
the enemy’s fleet was no great way off, they busied themselves with
preparations for a sea-fight. Now their ships were badly fitted out
and not easy to manage, and so some one suggested to them as likely to
serve their turn in a fight the construction of what were afterwards
called “crows.” Their mechanism was this. A round pole was placed in
the prow, about twenty-four feet high, and with a diameter of four
palms. The pole itself had a pulley on the top, and a gangway made
with cross planks nailed together, four feet wide and thirty-six feet
long, was made to swing round it. Now the hole in the gangway was
oval shaped, and went round the pole twelve feet from one end of the
gangway, which had also a wooden railing running down each side of it
to the height of a man’s knee. At the extremity of this gangway was
fastened an iron spike like a miller’s pestle, sharpened at its lower
end and fitted with a ring at its upper end. The whole thing looked
like the machines for braising corn. To this ring the rope was fastened
with which, when the ships collided, they hauled up the “crows,” by
means of the pulley at the top of the pole, and dropped them down
upon the deck of the enemy’s ship, sometimes over the prow, sometimes
swinging them round when the ships collided broadsides. And as soon
as the “crows” were fixed in the planks of the decks and grappled the
ships together, if the ships were alongside of each other, the men
leaped on board anywhere along the side, but if they were prow to prow,
they used the “crow” itself for boarding, and advanced over it two
abreast. The first two protected their front by holding up before them
their shields, while those who came after them secured their sides by
placing the rims of their shields upon the top of the railing. Such
were the preparations which they made; and having completed them they
watched an opportunity of engaging at sea.

[Sidenote: Victory of Duilius at Mylae, B.C. 260.]

+23.+ As for Gaius Duilius, he no sooner heard of the disaster which
had befallen the commander of the navy than handing over his legions
to the military Tribunes he transferred himself to the fleet. There
he learnt that the enemy was plundering the territory of Mylae, and
at once sailed to attack him with the whole fleet. No sooner did the
Carthaginians sight him than with joy and alacrity they put to sea
with a hundred and thirty sail, feeling supreme contempt for the Roman
ignorance of seamanship. Accordingly they all sailed with their prows
directed straight at their enemy: they did not think the engagement
worth even the trouble of ranging their ships in any order, but
advanced as though to seize a booty exposed for their acceptance. Their
commander was that same Hannibal who had withdrawn his forces from
Agrigentum by a secret night movement, and he was on board a galley
with seven banks of oars which had once belonged to King Pyrrhus. When
they neared the enemy, and saw the “crows” raised aloft on the prows
of the several ships, the Carthaginians were for a time in a state of
perplexity; for they were quite strangers to such contrivances as these
engines. Feeling, however, a complete contempt for their opponents,
those on board the ships that were in the van of the squadron charged
without flinching. But as soon as they came to close quarters their
ships were invariably tightly grappled by these machines; the enemy
boarded by means of the “crows,” and engaged them on their decks;
and in the end some of the Carthaginians were cut down, while others
surrendered in bewildered terror at the battle in which they found
themselves engaged, which eventually became exactly like a land fight.
The result was that they lost the first thirty ships engaged, crews and
all. Among them was captured the commander’s ship also, though Hannibal
himself by an unexpected piece of luck and an act of great daring
effected his escape in the ship’s boat. The rest of the Carthaginian
squadron were sailing up with the view of charging; but as they were
coming near they saw what had happened to the ships which were sailing
in the front, and accordingly sheered off and avoided the blows of the
engines. Yet trusting to their speed, they managed by a manœuvre to
sail round and charge the enemy, some on their broadside and others on
their stern, expecting by that method to avoid danger. But the engines
swung round to meet them in every direction, and dropped down upon them
so infallibly, that no ships could come to close quarters without being
grappled. Eventually the Carthaginians turned and fled, bewildered at
the novelty of the occurrence, and with a loss of fifty ships.

[Sidenote: Further operations in Sicily.]

[Sidenote: Hamilcar.]

[Sidenote: Segesta and Macella.]

[Sidenote: Hannibal in Sardinia.]

+24.+ Having in this unlooked-for manner made good their maritime hopes
the Romans were doubly encouraged in their enthusiasm for the war. For
the present they put in upon the coast of Sicily, raised the siege of
Segesta when it was reduced to the last extremity, and on their way
back from Segesta carried the town Macella by assault. But Hamilcar,
the commander of the Carthaginian land forces happened, after the
naval battle, to be informed as he lay encamped near Panormus that the
allies were engaged in a dispute with the Romans about the post of
honour in the battles: and ascertaining that the allies were encamped
by themselves between Paropus and Himeraean Thermae, he made a sudden
attack in force as they were in the act of moving camp and killed
almost four thousand of them. After this action Hannibal sailed across
to Carthage with such ships as he had left; and thence before very long
crossed to Sardinia, with a reinforcement of ships, and accompanied
by some of those whose reputation as naval commanders stood high. But
before very long he was blockaded in a certain harbour by the Romans,
and lost a large number of ships; and was thereupon summarily arrested
by the surviving Carthaginians and crucified. This came about because
the first thing the Romans did upon getting a navy was to try to become
masters of Sardinia.

[Sidenote: B.C. 259.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 258. Coss. A. Atilius Calatinus, C. Sulpicius,
Paterculus.]

[Sidenote: Hippana and Myttistratum.]

[Sidenote: Camarina.]

During the next year the Roman legions in Sicily did nothing worthy
of mention. In the next, after the arrival of the new Consuls, Aulus
Atilius and Gaius Sulpicius, they started to attack Panormus because
the Carthaginian forces were wintering there. The Consuls advanced
close up to the city with their whole force, and drew up in order of
battle. But the enemy refusing to come out to meet them, they marched
away and attacked the town of Hippana. This they carried by assault:
but though they also took Myttistratum it was only after it had stood a
lengthened siege owing to the strength of its situation. It was at this
time, too, that they recovered Camarina, which had revolted a short
time previously. They threw up works against it, and captured it after
making a breach in its walls. They treated Henna, and sundry other
strong places which had been in the hands of the Carthaginians, in the
same way; and when they had finished these operations they undertook to
lay siege to Lipara.

[Sidenote: Fighting off Tyndaris.]

[Sidenote: Coss. C. Atilius Regulus, Cn. Cornelius, Blasio II. B.C.
257.]

+25.+ Next year Gaius Atilius, the Consul, happened to be at anchor
off Tyndaris, when he observed the Carthaginian fleet sailing by
in a straggling manner. He passed the word to the crews of his own
ships to follow the advanced squadron, and started himself before the
rest with ten ships of equal sailing powers. When the Carthaginians
became aware that while some of the enemy were still embarking, others
were already putting out to sea, and that the advanced squadron were
considerably ahead of the rest, they stood round and went to meet them.
They succeeded in surrounding and destroying all of them except the
Consul’s ship, and that they all but captured with its crew. This last,
however, by the perfection of its rowers and its consequent speed,
effected a desperate escape. Meanwhile the remaining ships of the
Romans were sailing up and gradually drawing close together. Having got
into line, they charged the enemy, took ten ships with their crews, and
sunk eight. The rest of the Carthaginian ships retired to the Liparean
Islands.

[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 257-256.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 256. Coss. L. Manlius, Vulso Longus, M. Atilius Regulus
II. (Suff.).]

The result of this battle was that both sides concluded that they were
now fairly matched, and accordingly made more systematic efforts to
secure a naval force, and to dispute the supremacy at sea. While these
things were going on, the land forces effected nothing worth recording;
but wasted all their time in such petty operations as chance threw in
their way. Therefore, after making the preparations I have mentioned
for the approaching summer, the Romans, with three hundred and thirty
decked ships of war, touched at Messene; thence put to sea, keeping
Sicily on their right; and after doubling the headland Pachynus passed
on to Ecnomus, because the land force was also in that district. The
Carthaginians on their part put to sea again with three hundred and
fifty decked ships, touched at Lilybaeum, and thence dropped anchor at
Heracleia Minoa.

[Sidenote: Preparations for the Battle of Ecnomus.]

[Sidenote: Roman forces. 330 ships, with average of 420 men (300 rowers
+ 120 marines) = 138,600 men.]

[Sidenote: Carthaginian numbers, 150,000 men.]

+26.+ Now it was the purpose of the Romans to sail across to Libya and
transfer the war there, in order that the Carthaginians might find the
danger affecting themselves and their own country rather than Sicily.
But the Carthaginians were determined to prevent this. They knew that
Libya was easily invaded, and that the invaders if they once effected
a landing would meet with little resistance from the inhabitants; and
they therefore made up their minds not to allow it, and were eager
rather to bring the matter to a decisive issue by a battle at sea. The
one side was determined to cross, the other to prevent their crossing;
and their enthusiastic rivalry gave promise of a desperate struggle.
The preparations of the Romans were made to suit either contingency, an
engagement at sea or a disembarkation on the enemy’s soil. Accordingly
they picked out the best hands from the land army and divided the
whole force which they meant to take on board into four divisions.
Each division had alternative titles; the first was called the “First
Legion” or the “First Squadron,”—and so on with the others. The fourth
had a third title besides. They were called “Triarii,” on the analogy
of land armies. The total number of men thus making up the naval force
amounted to nearly one hundred and forty thousand, reckoning each ship
as carrying three hundred rowers and one hundred and twenty soldiers.
The Carthaginians, on the other hand, made their preparations almost
exclusively with a view to a naval engagement. Their numbers, if we
reckon by the number of their ships, were over one hundred and fifty
thousand men. The mere recital of these figures must, I should imagine,
strike any one with astonishment at the magnitude of the struggle, and
the vast resources of the contending states. An actual view of them
itself could hardly be more impressive than the bare statement of the
number of men and ships.

[Sidenote: The Roman order at Ecnomus.]

Now the Romans had two facts to consider: First, that circumstances
compelled them to face the open sea; and, secondly, that their enemies
had the advantage of fast sailing vessels. They therefore took every
precaution for keeping their line unbroken and difficult to attack.
They had only two ships with six banks of oars, those, namely, on
which the Consuls Marcus Atilius and Lucius Manlius respectively were
sailing. These they stationed side by side in front and in a line with
each other. Behind each of these they stationed ships one behind the
other in single file—the first squadron behind the one, and the second
squadron behind the other. These were so arranged that, as each ship
came to its place, the two files diverged farther and farther from
each other; the vessels being also stationed one behind the other with
their prows inclining outwards. Having thus arranged the first and
second squadrons in single file so as to form a wedge, they stationed
the third division in a single line at its base; so that the whole
finally presented the appearance of a triangle. Behind this base they
stationed the horse-transports, attaching them by towing-ropes to the
ships of the third squadron. And to the rear of them they placed the
fourth squadron, called the Triarii, in a single line, so extended as
to overlap the line in front of them at both extremities. When these
dispositions were complete the general appearance was that of a beak
or wedge, the apex of which was open, the base compact and strong;
while the whole was easy to work and serviceable, and at the same time
difficult to break up.

[Sidenote: The disposition of the Carthaginian fleet.]

[Sidenote: ch. 19.]

[Sidenote: ch. 25.]

[Sidenote: The battle.]

+27.+ Meanwhile the Carthaginian commanders had briefly addressed their
men. They pointed out to them that victory in this battle would ensure
the war in the future being confined to the question of the possession
of Sicily; while if they were beaten they would have hereafter to fight
for their native land and for all that they held dear. With these words
they passed the word to embark. The order was obeyed with universal
enthusiasm, for what had been said brought home to them the issues at
stake; and they put to sea in the full fervour of excited gallantry,
which might well have struck terror into all who saw it. When their
commanders saw the arrangement of the enemies’ ships they adapted their
own to match it. Three-fourths of their force they posted in a single
line, extending their right wing towards the open sea with a view of
outflanking their opponents, and placing their ships with prows facing
the enemy; while the other fourth part was posted to form a left wing
of the whole, the vessels being at right angles to the others and
close to the shore. The two Carthaginian commanders were Hanno and
Hamilcar. The former was the general who had been defeated in the
engagement at Agrigentum. He now commanded the right wing, supported
by beaked vessels for charging, and the fastest sailing quinqueremes
for outflanking, the enemy. The latter, who had been in the engagement
off Tyndaris, had charge of the left wing. This officer, occupying
the central position of the entire line, on this occasion employed a
stratagem which I will now describe. The battle began by the Romans
charging the centre of the Carthaginians, because they observed that it
was weakened by their great extension. The ships in the Carthaginian
centre, in accordance with their orders, at once turned and fled with
a view of breaking up the Roman close order. They began to retire
with all speed, and the Romans pursued them with exultation. The
consequence was that, while the first and second Roman squadrons were
pressing the flying enemy, the third and fourth “legions” had become
detached and were left behind,—the former because they had to tow the
horse-transports, and the “Triarii” because they kept their station
with them and helped them to form a reserve. But when the Carthaginians
thought that they had drawn the first and second squadron a sufficient
distance from the main body a signal was hoisted on board Hamilcar’s
ship, and they all simultaneously swung their ships round and engaged
their pursuers. The contest was a severe one. The Carthaginians had
a great superiority in the rapidity with which they manœuvred their
ships. They darted out from their line and rowed round the enemy: they
approached them with ease, and retired with despatch. But the Romans,
no less than the Carthaginians, had their reasons for entertaining
hopes of victory: for when the vessels got locked together the contest
became one of sheer strength: their engines, the “crows,” grappled all
that once came to close quarters: and, finally, both the Consuls were
present in person and were witnesses of their behaviour in battle.

+28.+ This was the state of affairs on the centre. But meanwhile Hanno
with the right wing, which had held aloof when the first encounter
took place, crossing the open sea, charged the ships of the Triarii
and caused them great difficulty and embarrassment: while those of the
Carthaginians who had been posted near the land manœuvred into line,
and getting their ships straight, charged the men who were towing the
horse-transports. These latter let go the towing-ropes, grappled with
the enemy, and kept up a desperate struggle.

[Sidenote: Three separate battles.]

[Sidenote: First with Hamilcar’s squadron.]

[Sidenote: Second squadron under Regulus.]

So that the engagement was in three separate divisions, or rather there
were three sea-fights going on at wide intervals from each other. Now
in these three engagements the opposing parties were in each case
fairly matched, thanks to the original disposition of the ships, and
therefore the victory was in each case closely contested. However the
result in the several cases was very much what was to be expected where
forces were so equal. The first to engage were the first to separate:
for Hamilcar’s division at last were overpowered and fled. But while
Lucius was engaged in securing his prizes, Marcus observing the
struggle in which the Triarii and horse-transports were involved, went
with all speed to their assistance, taking with him all the ships of
the second squadron which were undamaged. As soon as he had reached and
engaged Hanno’s division, the Triarii quickly picked up courage, though
they were then getting much the worst of it, and returned with renewed
spirits to the fight. It was now the turn for the Carthaginians to be
in difficulties. They were charged in front and on the rear, and found
to their surprise that they were being surrounded by the relieving
squadron. They at once gave way and retreated in the direction of the
open sea.

[Sidenote: Third squadron relieved by Regulus and Manlius.]

While this was going on, Lucius, who was sailing back to rejoin his
colleague, observed that the third squadron had got wedged in by the
Carthaginians close in shore. Accordingly he and Marcus, who had by
this time secured the safety of the transports and Triarii, started
together to relieve their imperilled comrades, who were now sustaining
something very like a blockade. And the fact is that they would long
before this have been utterly destroyed had not the Carthaginians been
afraid of the “crows,” and confined themselves to surrounding and
penning them in close to land, without attempting to charge for fear
of being caught by the grappling-irons. The Consuls came up rapidly,
and surrounding the Carthaginians captured fifty of their ships with
their crews, while some few of them managed to slip away and escape by
keeping close to the shore.

[Sidenote: General result.]

Such was the result of the separate engagements. But the general upshot
of the whole battle was in favour of the Romans. Twenty-four of their
vessels were destroyed; over thirty of the Carthaginians. Not a single
Roman ship was captured with its crew; sixty-four of the Carthaginians
were so taken.

[Sidenote: Siege of Aspis. (Clupea.)]

+29.+ After the battle the Romans took in a fresh supply of victual,
repaired and refitted the ships they had captured, bestowed upon the
crews the attention which they had deserved by their victory, and
then put to sea with a view of continuing their voyage to Libya.
Their leading ships made the shore just under the headland called
the Hermaeum, which is the extreme point on the east of the Gulf of
Carthage, and runs out into the open sea in the direction of Sicily.
There they waited for the rest of the ships to come up, and having
got the entire fleet together coasted along until they came to the
city called Aspis. Here they disembarked, beached their ships, dug a
trench, and constructed a stockade round them; and on the inhabitants
of the city refusing to submit without compulsion, they set to work to
besiege the town. Presently those of the Carthaginians who had survived
the sea-fight came to land also; and feeling sure that the enemy, in
the flush of their victory, intended to sail straight against Carthage
itself, they began by keeping a chain of advanced guards at outlying
points to protect the capital with their military and naval forces.
But when they ascertained that the Romans had disembarked without
resistance and were engaged in besieging Aspis, they gave up the idea
of watching for the descent of the fleet; but concentrated their
forces, and devoted themselves to the protection of the capital and its
environs.

[Sidenote: Aspis taken.]

[Sidenote: M. Atilius Regulus remains in Africa, winter of B.C.
256-255.]

Meanwhile the Romans had taken Aspis, had placed in it a garrison
to hold it and its territory, and had besides sent home to Rome to
announce the events which had taken place and to ask for instructions
as to the future,—what they were to do, and what arrangements they
were to make. Having done this they made active preparations for a
general advance and set about plundering the country. They met with
no opposition in this: they destroyed numerous dwelling houses of
remarkably fine construction, possessed themselves of a great number
of cattle; and captured more than twenty thousand slaves whom they
took to their ships. In the midst of these proceedings the messengers
arrived from Rome with orders that one Consul was to remain with an
adequate force, the other was to bring the fleet to Rome. Accordingly
Marcus was left behind with forty ships, fifteen thousand infantry, and
five hundred cavalry; while Lucius put the crowd of captives on board,
and having embarked his men, sailed along the coast of Sicily without
encountering any danger, and reached Rome.

+30.+ The Carthaginians now saw that their enemies contemplated a
lengthened occupation of the country. They therefore proceeded first
of all to elect two of their own citizens, Hasdrubal son of Hanno,
and Bostarus, to the office of general; and next sent to Heracleia a
pressing summons to Hamilcar. He obeyed immediately, and arrived at
Carthage with five hundred cavalry and five thousand infantry. He was
forthwith appointed general in conjunction with the other two, and
entered into consultation with Hasdrubal and his colleague as to the
measures necessary to be taken in the present crisis. They decided
to defend the country and not to allow it to be devastated without
resistance.

[Sidenote: B.C. 256-255. The operations of Regulus in Libya.]

[Sidenote: Defeat of the Carthaginians near Adys.]

A few days afterwards Marcus sallied forth on one of his marauding
expeditions. Such towns as were unwalled he carried by assault and
plundered, and such as were walled he besieged. Among others he came to
the considerable town of Adys, and having placed his troops round it
was beginning with all speed to raise siege works. The Carthaginians
were both eager to relieve the town and determined to dispute the
possession of the open country. They therefore led out their army;
but their operations were not skilfully conducted. They indeed seized
and encamped upon a piece of rising ground which commanded the enemy;
but it was unsuitable to themselves. Their best hopes rested on their
cavalry and their elephants, and yet they abandoned the level plain
and cooped themselves up in a position at once steep and difficult of
access. The enemy, as might have been expected, were not slow to take
advantage of this mistake. The Roman commanders were skilful enough to
understand that the best and most formidable part of the forces opposed
to them was rendered useless by the nature of the ground. They did not
therefore wait for them to come down to the plain and offer battle, but
choosing the time which suited themselves, began at daybreak a forward
movement on both sides of the hill. In the battle which followed the
Carthaginians could not use their cavalry or elephants at all; but
their mercenary troops made a really gallant and spirited sally. They
even forced the first division of the Romans to give way and fly: but
they advanced too far, and were surrounded and routed by the division
which was advancing from the other direction. This was immediately
followed by the whole force being dislodged from their encampment.
The elephants and cavalry as soon as they gained level ground made
good their retreat without loss; but the infantry were pursued by
the Romans. The latter however soon desisted from the pursuit. They
presently returned, dismantled the enemy’s entrenchment, and destroyed
the stockade; and from thenceforth overran the whole country-side and
sacked the towns without opposition.

[Sidenote: Tunes.]

Among others they seized the town called Tunes. This place had many
natural advantages for expeditions such as those in which they were
engaged, and was so situated as to form a convenient base of operations
against the capital and its immediate neighbourhood. They accordingly
fixed their headquarters in it.

[Sidenote: Distress at Carthage, which is heightened by an inroad of
Numidians.]

[Sidenote: Spring of B.C. 255. Regulus proposes harsh terms.]

[Sidenote: The terms rejected.]

+31.+ The Carthaginians were now indeed in evil case. It was not long
since they had sustained a disaster at sea: and now they had met with
one on land, not from any failure of courage on the part of their
soldiers, but from the incompetency of their commanders. Simultaneously
with these misfortunes, they were suffering from an inroad of the
Numidians, who were doing even more damage to the country than the
Romans. The terror which they inspired drove the country folk to flock
for safety into the city; and the city itself had to face a serious
famine as well as a panic, the former from the numbers that crowded
into it, the latter from the hourly expectation of a siege. But Regulus
had different views. The double defeat sustained by the Carthaginians,
by land as well as by sea, convinced him that the capture of Carthage
was a question of a very short time; and he was in a state of great
anxiety lest his successor in the Consulship should arrive from Rome
in time to rob him of the glory of the achievement. He therefore
invited the Carthaginians to make terms. They were only too glad of
the proposal, and sent their leading citizens to meet him. The meeting
took place: but the commissioners could not bring their minds to
entertain his proposals; they were so severe that it was almost more
than they could bear to listen to them at all. Regulus regarded himself
as practically master of the city, and considered that they ought to
regard any concession on his part as a matter of favour and pure grace.
The Carthaginians on the other hand concluded that nothing worse could
be imposed on them if they suffered capture than was now enjoined.
They therefore returned home without accepting the offers of Regulus,
and extremely exasperated by his unreasonable harshness. When the
Carthaginian Senate heard the conditions offered by the Roman general,
though they had almost relinquished every hope of safety, they came to
the gallant and noble resolution that they would brave anything, that
they would try every possible means and endure every extremity, rather
than submit to terms so dishonourable and so unworthy of their past
history.

[Sidenote: Arrival of the Spartan Xanthippus in Carthage.]

+32.+ Now it happened that just about this time one of their recruiting
agents, who had some time before been despatched to Greece, arrived
home. He brought a large number of men with him, and among them a
certain Lacedaemonian named Xanthippus, a man trained in the Spartan
discipline, and of large experience in war. When this man was informed
of their defeat, and of how it had taken place, and when he had
reviewed the military resources still left to the Carthaginians, and
the number of their cavalry and elephants, he did not take long to
come to a decided conclusion. He expressed his opinion to his friends
that the Carthaginians had owed their defeat, not to the superiority
of the Romans, but to the unskilfulness of their own commanders. The
dangerous state of their affairs caused the words of Xanthippus to get
abroad quickly among the people and to reach the ears of the generals;
and the men in authority determined to summon and question him. He
appeared, and laid his views before the magistrates; in which he showed
to what they owed their present disasters, and that if they would
take his advice and keep to the flat parts of the country alike in
marching, encamping, and giving battle, they would be able with perfect
ease to secure safety for themselves and to defeat their opponents in
the field. The generals accepted the suggestion, resolved to follow
his advice, and there and then put their forces at his command. Among
the multitude the observation of Xanthippus was passed from mouth to
mouth, and gave rise, as was to be expected, to a good deal of popular
rumour and sanguine talk. This was confirmed when he had once handled
the troops. The way in which he got them into order when he had led
them outside the town; the skill with which he manœuvred the separate
detachments, and passed the word of command down the ranks in due
conformity to the rules of tactics, at once impressed every one with
the contrast to the blundering of their former generals. The multitude
expressed their approbation by loud cheers, and were for engaging
the enemy without delay, convinced that no harm could happen to them
as long as Xanthippus was their leader. The generals took advantage
of this circumstance, and of the extraordinary recovery which they
saw had taken place in the spirits of the people. They addressed
them some exhortations befitting the occasion, and after a few days’
delay got their forces on foot and started. Their army consisted of
twelve thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and nearly a hundred
elephants.

[Sidenote: The new strategy of the Carthaginians.]

[Sidenote: The dispositions for the battle.]

+33.+ The Romans at once noticed a change. They saw that the
Carthaginians chose level country for their line of march, and flat
places for their encampments. This novelty puzzled and rather alarmed
them, yet their prevailing feeling was an eager desire to come to
close quarters with the enemy. They therefore advanced to a position
about ten stades from them and employed the first day in pitching a
camp there. Next day, while the chief officers of the Carthaginians
were discussing in a council of war what dispositions were called for,
and what line of strategy they were to adopt, the common soldiers, in
their eagerness for the engagement, collected in groups, shouted out
the name of Xanthippus, and showed that their opinion was in favour of
an immediate forward movement. Influenced by the evident enthusiasm
and eagerness of the army, and by the appeals of Xanthippus that they
should not let the opportunity slip, the generals gave orders to the
men to get ready, and resigned to Xanthippus the entire direction of
affairs, with full authority to act as he thought most advantageous.
He at once acted upon this authority. He ordered out the elephants,
and placed them in a single line in front of the whole army. The heavy
phalanx of the Carthaginians he stationed at a moderate interval in
the rear of these. He divided the mercenaries into three corps. One
he stationed on the right wing; while the other two, which consisted
of the most active, he placed with the cavalry on both wings. When
the Romans saw that the enemy were drawn up to offer them battle
they readily advanced to accept it. They were however alarmed at
the elephants, and made special arrangements with a view to resist
their charge. They stationed the velites in the van, and behind them
the legionaries, many maniples deep, while they divided the cavalry
between the two wings. Their line of battle was thus less extended
than usual, but deeper. And though they had thereby made a sufficient
provision against the elephants, yet being far out-numbered in cavalry,
their provision in that part of the field was altogether inadequate.
At length both sides had made their dispositions according to their
respective plans of operation, and had placed their several men in the
posts assigned to them: and now they were standing drawn up in order,
and were each of them watching for the right moment for beginning the
attack.

[Sidenote: The battle.]

[Sidenote: The Romans are beaten and annihilated.]

[Sidenote: Regulus made prisoner.]

+34.+ No sooner had Xanthippus given the order to the men on the
elephants to advance and disperse the lines in front of them, and to
his cavalry to outflank both wings and charge the enemy, than the Roman
army—clashing their shields and spears together after their usual
custom, and simultaneously raising their battle-cry—charged the enemy.
The Roman cavalry being far out-numbered by the Carthaginians were soon
in full retreat on both wings. But the fortune of the several divisions
of the infantry was various. Those stationed on the left wing—partly
because they could avoid the elephants and partly because they thought
contemptuously of the mercenaries—charged the right wing of the
Carthaginians, succeeded in driving them from their ground, and pursued
them as far as their entrenchment. Those stationed in front of the
elephants were less fortunate. The maniples in front were thrown into
utter confusion by the crushing weight of the animals: knocked down and
trampled upon by them they perished in heaps upon the field; yet owing
to its great depth the main body remained for a time unbroken. But it
was not for long. The maniples on the rear found themselves outflanked
by the cavalry, and were forced to face round and resist them: those on
the other hand who forced their way to the front through the elephants,
and had now those beasts on their rear, found themselves confronted
by the phalanx of Carthaginians, which had not yet been in action and
was still in close unbroken order, and so were cut to pieces. This was
followed by a general rout. Most of the Romans were trampled to death
by the enormous weight of the elephants; the rest were shot down in
their ranks by the numerous cavalry: and there were only a very few who
attempted to save themselves by flight. But the flatness of the country
was unfavourable to escape in this manner. Some of the fugitives were
destroyed by the elephants and cavalry; while only those who fled with
the general Regulus, amounting perhaps to five hundred, were after a
short pursuit made prisoners with him to a man.

On the Carthaginian side there fell about eight hundred of the
mercenaries, those namely who had been stationed opposite the left wing
of the Romans. On the part of the Romans about two thousand survived.
These were those whom I have already described as having chased the
Carthaginian right wing to their entrenchment, and who were thus not
involved in the general engagement. The rest were entirely destroyed
with the exception of those who fled with Regulus. The surviving
maniples escaped with considerable difficulty to the town of Aspis. The
Carthaginians stripped the dead, and taking with them the Roman general
and the rest of their prisoners, returned to the capital in a high
state of exultation at the turn their affairs had now taken.

[Sidenote: Eurip. fr.]

+35.+ This event conveys many useful lessons to a thoughtful observer.
Above all, the disaster of Regulus gives the clearest possible warning
that no one should feel too confident of the favours of Fortune,
especially in the hour of success. Here we see one, who a short time
before refused all pity or consideration to the fallen, brought
incontinently to beg them for his own life. Again, we are taught the
truth of that saying of Euripides—

   One wise man’s skill is worth a world in arms.

For it was one man, one brain, that defeated the numbers which were
believed to be invincible and able to accomplish anything; and restored
to confidence a whole city that was unmistakably and utterly ruined,
and the spirits of its army which had sunk to the lowest depths of
despair. I record these things in the hope of benefiting my readers.
There are two roads to reformation for mankind—one through misfortunes
of their own, the other through those of others: the former is the most
unmistakable, the latter the less painful. One should never therefore
voluntarily choose the former, for it makes reformation a matter of
great difficulty and danger; but we should always look out for the
latter, for thereby we can without hurt to ourselves gain a clear view
of the best course to pursue. It is this which forces us to consider
that the knowledge gained from the study of true history is the best
of all educations for practical life. For it is history, and history
alone, which, without involving us in actual danger, will mature our
judgment and prepare us to take right views, whatever may be the crisis
or the posture of affairs.

[Sidenote: Xanthippus quits Carthage.]

+36.+ To return to our narrative. Having obtained this complete success
the Carthaginians indulged in every sign of exultation. Thanksgivings
were poured out to God, and joyful congratulations interchanged among
themselves. But Xanthippus, by whose means such a happy change had
been brought about and such an impulse been given to the fortunes of
Carthage, did not remain there long, but took ship for home again. In
this he showed his wisdom and discernment. For it is the nature of
extraordinary and conspicuous achievements to exasperate jealousies
and envenom slander; against which a native may perhaps stand with the
support of kinsfolk and friends, but a foreigner when exposed to one
or the other of them is inevitably overpowered before long and put
in danger. There is however another account sometimes given of the
departure of Xanthippus, which I will endeavour at a more suitable
opportunity to set forth.

[Sidenote: The Romans prepare a fleet to relieve their beaten army.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 255. Coss. Ser. Fulvius Paetinus Nobilior, M. Aemilius
Paullus.]

Upon this unlooked-for catastrophe in the Libyan campaign, the Roman
government at once set to work to fit out a fleet to take off the men
who were still surviving there; while the Carthaginians followed up
their success by sitting down before Aspis, and besieging it, being
anxious to get the survivors of the battle into their hands. But
failing to capture the place, owing to the gallantry and determined
courage of these men, they eventually raised the siege. When they
heard that the Romans were preparing their fleet, and were intending
to sail once more against Libya, they set about shipbuilding also,
partly repairing old vessels and partly constructing new. Before very
long they had manned and launched two hundred ships, and were on the
watch for the coming of their enemies. By the beginning of the summer
the Romans had launched three hundred and fifty vessels. They put them
under the command of the Consuls Marcus Aemilius and Servius Fulvius,
and despatched them. This fleet coasted along Sicily; made for Libya;
and having fallen in with the Carthaginian squadron off Hermaeum, at
once charged and easily turned them to flight; captured a hundred and
fourteen with their crews, and having taken on board their men who had
maintained themselves in Libya, started from Aspis on their return
voyage to Sicily.

[Sidenote: The fleet is lost in a storm.]

[Sidenote: Between June 28 and July 26.]

+37.+ The passage was effected in safety, and the coast of Camarina
was reached: but there they experienced so terrible a storm, and
suffered so dreadfully, as almost to beggar description. The disaster
was indeed extreme: for out of their three hundred and sixty-four
vessels eighty only remained. The rest were either swamped or driven
by the surf upon the rocks and headlands, where they went to pieces
and filled all the seaboard with corpses and wreckage. No greater
catastrophe is to be found in all history as befalling a fleet at one
time. And for this Fortune was not so much to blame as the commanders
themselves. They had been warned again and again by the pilots not to
steer along the southern coast of Sicily facing the Libyan sea, because
it was exposed and yielded no safe anchorage; and because, of the two
dangerous constellations, one had not yet set and the other was on the
point of rising (for their voyage fell between the rising of Orion and
that of the Dog Star). Yet they attended to none of these warnings;
but, intoxicated by their recent success, were anxious to capture
certain cities as they coasted along, and in pursuance of this idea
thoughtlessly exposed themselves to the full fury of the open sea. As
far as these particular men were concerned, the disaster which they
brought upon themselves in the pursuit of trivial advantages convinced
them of the folly of their conduct. But it is a peculiarity of the
Roman people as a whole to treat everything as a question of main
strength; to consider that they must of course accomplish whatever they
have proposed to themselves; and that nothing is impossible that they
have once determined upon. The result of such self-confidence is that
in many things they do succeed, while in some few they conspicuously
fail, and especially at sea. On land it is against men only and their
works that they have to direct their efforts: and as the forces against
which they exert their strength do not differ intrinsically from
their own, as a general rule they succeed; while their failures are
exceptional and rare. But to contend with the sea and sky is to fight
against a force immeasurably superior to their own: and when they trust
to an exertion of sheer strength in such a contest the disasters which
they meet with are signal. This is what they experienced on the present
occasion: they have often experienced it since; and will continue to do
so, as long as they maintain their headstrong and foolhardy notion that
any season of the year admits of sailing as well as marching.

[Sidenote: The Carthaginians renew operations in Sicily.]

+38.+ When the Carthaginians heard of the destruction which had
befallen the Roman fleet, they made up their minds that as their late
victory had made them a match for their enemy on land, so now the
Roman catastrophe had made them a match for him at sea. Accordingly
they devoted themselves with still greater eagerness than before to
their naval and military preparations. And first, they lost no time in
despatching Hasdrubal to Sicily, and with him not only the soldiers
that they had already collected, but those also whom they had recalled
from Heracleia; and along with them they sent also a hundred and forty
elephants. And next, after despatching him, they began fitting out two
hundred ships and making all other preparations necessary for a naval
expedition. Hasdrubal reached Lilybaeum safely, and immediately set to
work to train his elephants and drill his men, and showed his intention
of striking a blow for the possession of the open country.

[Sidenote: B.C. 254. Coss. Gn. Cornelius Scipio Asina II., Aulus
Atilius, Calatinus II.]

The Roman government, when they heard of this from the survivors of the
wreck on their arrival home, felt it to be a grievous misfortune; but
being absolutely resolved not to give in, they determined once more
to put two hundred and twenty vessels on the stocks and build afresh.
These were finished in three months, an almost incredibly short time,
and the new Consuls Aulus Atilius and Gnaeus Cornelius fitted out the
fleet and put to sea. As they passed through the straits they took up
from Messene those of the vessels which had been saved from the wreck;
and having thus arrived with three hundred ships off Panormus, which
is the strongest town of all the Carthaginian province in Sicily, they
began to besiege it. They threw up works in two distinct places, and
after other necessary preparations brought up their battering rams. The
tower next the sea was destroyed with ease, and the soldiers forced
their way in through the breach: and so what is called the New Town was
carried by assault; while what is called the Old Town being placed by
this event in imminent danger, its inhabitants made haste to surrender
it. Having thus made themselves masters of the place, the army sailed
back to Rome, leaving a garrison in the town.

[Sidenote: B.C. 253. Coss. Gn. Servilius Caepio, G. Sempronius Blaesus.]

+39.+ But next summer the new Consuls Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius
Sempronius put again to sea with their full strength, and after
touching at Sicily started thence for Libya. There, as they coasted
along the shore, they made a great number of descents upon the country
without accomplishing anything of importance in any of them. At length
they came to the island of the Lotophagi called Mēnix, which is not
far from the Lesser Syrtis. There, from ignorance of the waters, they
ran upon some shallows; the tide receded, their ships went aground,
and they were in extreme peril. However, after a while the tide
unexpectedly flowed back again, and by dint of throwing overboard all
their heavy goods they just managed to float the ships. After this
their return voyage was more like a flight than anything else. When
they reached Sicily and had made the promontory of Lilybaeum they cast
anchor at Panormus. Thence they weighed anchor for Rome, and rashly
ventured upon the open sea-line as the shortest; but while on their
voyage they once more encountered so terrible a storm that they lost
more than a hundred and fifty ships.

[Sidenote: B.C. 252.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 251. Coss. Lucius Caecilius Metellus, G. Furius
Pacilus.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 252-251.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 250.]

The Romans after this misfortune, though they are eminently persistent
in carrying out their undertakings, yet owing to the severity and
frequency of their disasters, now yielded to the force of circumstances
and refrained from constructing another fleet. All the hopes still left
to them they rested upon their land forces: and, accordingly, they
despatched the Consuls Lucius Caecilius and Gaius Furius with their
legions to Sicily; but they only manned sixty ships to carry provisions
for the legions. The fortunes of the Carthaginians had in their turn
considerably improved owing to the catastrophes I have described. They
now commanded the sea without let or hindrance, since the Romans had
abandoned it; while in their land forces their hopes were high. Nor
was it unreasonable that it should be so. The account of the battle
of Libya had reached the ears of the Romans: they had heard that the
elephants had broken their ranks and had killed the large part of those
that fell: and they were in such terror of them, that though during
two years running after that time they had on many occasions, in the
territory either of Lilybaeum or Selinus, found themselves in order of
battle within five or six stades of the enemy, they never plucked up
courage to begin an attack, or in fact to come down upon level ground
at all, all because of their fear of an elephant charge. And in these
two seasons all they did was to reduce Therma and Lipara by siege,
keeping close all the while to mountainous districts and such as were
difficult to cross. The timidity and want of confidence thus displayed
by their land forces induced the Roman government to change their minds
and once more to attempt success at sea. Accordingly, in the second
consulship of Caius Atilius and Lucius Manlius, we find them ordering
fifty ships to be built, enrolling sailors and energetically collecting
a naval armament.

[Sidenote: B.C. 251.]

[Sidenote: Skirmishing at Panormus.]

+40.+ Meanwhile Hasdrubal noticed the terror displayed by the Romans
whenever they had lately found themselves in the presence of the
enemy. He learnt also that one of the Consuls had departed and gone
to Italy, and that Caecilius was lingering in Panormus with the other
half of the army, with the view of protecting the corn-crops of the
allies just then ripe for the harvest. He therefore got his troops in
motion, marched out, and encamped on the frontier of the territory
of Panormus. Caecilius saw well enough that the enemy had become
supremely confident, and he was anxious to draw him on; he therefore
kept his men within the walls. Hasdrubal imagined that Caecilius
dared not come out to give him battle. Elated with this idea, he
pushed boldly forward with his whole army and marched over the pass
into the territory of Panormus. But though he was destroying all the
standing crops up to the very walls of the town, Caecilius was not
shaken from his resolution, but kept persistently to it, until he had
induced him to cross the river which lay between him and the town. But
no sooner had the Carthaginians got their elephants and men across,
than Caecilius commenced sending out his light-armed troops to harass
them, until he had forced them to get their whole army into fighting
order. When he saw that everything was happening as he designed it,
he placed some of his light troops to line the wall and moat, with
instructions that if the elephants came within range they should pour
volleys of their missiles upon them; but that whenever they found
themselves being forced from their ground by them, they should retreat
into the moat, rush out of it again, and hurl darts at the elephants
which happened to be nearest. At the same time he gave orders to the
armourers in the market-place to carry the missiles and heap them up
outside at the foot of the wall. Meanwhile he took up his own position
with his maniples at the gate which was opposite the enemy’s left
wing, and kept despatching detachment after detachment to reinforce
his skirmishers. The engagement commenced by them becoming more and
more general, a feeling of emulation took possession of the officers
in charge of the elephants. They wished to distinguish themselves in
the eyes of Hasdrubal, and they desired that the credit of the victory
should be theirs: they therefore, with one accord, charged the advanced
skirmishing parties of the enemy, routed them with ease, and pursued
them up to the moat. But no sooner did the elephants thus come to
close quarters than they were wounded by the archers on the wall, and
overwhelmed with volleys of pila and javelins which poured thick and
fast upon them from the men stationed on the outer edge of the moat,
and who had not yet been engaged,—and thus, studded all over with
darts, and wounded past all bearing, they soon got beyond control. They
turned and bore down upon their own masters, trampling men to death,
and throwing their own lines into utter disorder and confusion. When
Caecilius saw this he led out his men with promptitude. His troops were
fresh; the enemy were in disorder; and he charged them diagonally on
the flank: the result was that he inflicted a severe defeat upon them,
killed a large number, and forced the rest into precipitate flight. Of
the elephants he captured ten along with their Indian riders: the rest
which had thrown their Indians he managed to drive into a herd after
the battle, and secured every one of them. This achievement gained him
the credit on all hands of having substantially benefited the Roman
cause, by once more restoring confidence to the army, and giving them
the command of the open country.

[Sidenote: B.C. 250. C. Caecilius Regulus II., L. Manlius Vulso II.]

+41.+ The announcement of this success at Rome was received with
extreme delight; not so much at the blow inflicted on the enemy by
the loss of their elephants, as at the confidence inspired in their
own troops by a victory over these animals. With their confidence
thus restored, the Roman government recurred to their original plan
of sending out the Consuls upon this service with a fleet and naval
forces; for they were eager, by all means in their power, to put a
period to the war. Accordingly, in the fourteenth year of the war,
the supplies necessary for the despatch of the expedition were got
ready, and the Consuls set sail for Sicily with two hundred ships.
They dropped anchor at Lilybaeum; and the army having met them there,
they began to besiege it by sea and land. Their view was that if they
could obtain possession of this town they would have no difficulty in
transferring the seat of war to Libya. The Carthaginian leaders were
of the same opinion, and entirely agreed with the Roman view of the
value of the place. They accordingly subordinated everything else to
this; devoted themselves to the relief of the place at all hazards; and
resolved to retain this town at any sacrifice: for now that the Romans
were masters of all the rest of Sicily, except Drepana, it was the only
foothold they had left in the island.

To understand my story a knowledge of the topography of the district
is necessary. I will therefore endeavour in a few words to convey
a comprehension to my readers of its geographical position and its
peculiar advantages.

+42.+ Sicily, then, lies towards Southern Italy very much in the same
relative position as the Peloponnese does to the rest of Greece. The
only difference is that the one is an island, the other a peninsula;
and consequently in the former case there is no communication except
by sea, in the latter there is a land communication also. The shape
of Sicily is a triangle, of which the several angles are represented
by promontories: that to the south jutting out into the Sicilian Sea
is called Pachynus; that which looks to the north forms the western
extremity of the Straits of Messene and is about twelve stades from
Italy, its name is Pelorus; while the third projects in the direction
of Libya itself, and is conveniently situated opposite the promontories
which cover Carthage, at a distance of about a thousand stades:
it looks somewhat south of due west, dividing the Libyan from the
Sardinian Sea, and is called Lilybaeum. On this last there is a city
of the same name. It was this city that the Romans were now besieging.
It was exceedingly strongly fortified: for besides its walls there was
a deep ditch running all round it, and on the side of the sea it was
protected by lagoons, to steer through which into the harbour was a
task requiring much skill and practice.

[Sidenote: Siege of Lilybaeum, B.C. 250.]

The Romans made two camps, one on each side of the town, and connected
them with a ditch, stockade, and wall. Having done this, they began
the assault by advancing their siege-works in the direction of the
tower nearest the sea, which commands a view of the Libyan main.
They did this gradually, always adding something to what they had
already constructed; and thus bit by bit pushed their works forward
and extended them laterally, till at last they had brought down not
only this tower, but the six next to it also; and at the same time
began battering all the others with battering-rams. The siege was
carried on with vigour and terrific energy: every day some of the
towers were shaken and others reduced to ruins; every day too the
siege-works advanced farther and farther, and more and more towards
the heart of the city. And though there were in the town, besides the
ordinary inhabitants, as many as ten thousand hired soldiers, the
consternation and despondency became overwhelming. Yet their commander
Himilco omitted no measure within his power. As fast as the enemy
demolished a fortification he threw up a new one; he also countermined
them, and reduced the assailants to straits of no ordinary difficulty.
Moreover, he made daily sallies, attempted to carry or throw fire
into the siege-works, and with this end in view fought many desperate
engagements by night as well as by day: so determined was the fighting
in these struggles, that sometimes the number of the dead was greater
than it ordinarily is in a pitched battle.

[Sidenote: Attempted treason in Lilybaeum.]

+43.+ But about this time some of the officers of highest rank in the
mercenary army discussed among themselves a project for surrendering
the town to the Romans, being fully persuaded that the men under their
command would obey their orders. They got out of the city at night,
went to the enemy’s camp, and held a parley with the Roman commander on
the subject. But Alexon the Achaean, who on a former occasion had saved
Agrigentum from destruction when the mercenary troops of Syracuse made
a plot to betray it, was on this occasion once more the first to detect
this treason, and to report it to the general of the Carthaginians.
The latter no sooner heard it than he at once summoned a meeting of
those officers who were still in their quarters; and exhorted them to
loyalty with prayers and promises of liberal bounties and favours, if
they would only remain faithful to him, and not join in the treason
of the officers who had left the town. They received his speech with
enthusiasm, and were there and then commissioned by him, some to go
to the Celts accompanied by Hannibal, who was the son of the Hannibal
killed in Sardinia, and who had a previous acquaintance with that
people gained in the expedition against them; others to fetch the rest
of the mercenary troops, accompanied by Alexon, because he was liked
and trusted by them. These officers then proceeded to summon a meeting
of their men and address them. They pledged their own credit for the
bounties promised them severally by the General, and without difficulty
persuaded the men to remain staunch. The result was that when the
officers, who had joined in the secret mission, returned to the walls
and tried to address their men, and communicate the terms offered by
the Romans, so far from finding any adherents, they could not even
obtain a hearing, but were driven from the wall with volleys of stones
and darts. But this treason among their mercenaries constituted a
serious danger: the Carthaginians had a narrow escape from absolute
ruin, and they owed their preservation from it to that same Alexon
whose fidelity had on a former occasion preserved for Agrigentum her
territory, constitution, and freedom.

[Sidenote: Hannibal relieves Lilybaeum.]

+44.+ Meanwhile the Carthaginians at home knew nothing of what was
going on. But they could calculate the requirements of a besieged
garrison; and they accordingly filled fifty vessels with soldiers,
furnished their commander Hannibal, a son of Hamilcar, and an officer
and prime favourite of Adherbal’s, with instructions suitable to the
business in hand, and despatched him with all speed: charging him to
be guilty of no delay, to omit no opportunity, and to shrink from no
attempt however venturesome to relieve the besieged. He put to sea with
his ten thousand men, and dropped anchor at the islands called Aegusae,
which lie in the course between Lilybaeum and Carthage, and there
looked out for an opportunity of making Lilybaeum. At last a strong
breeze sprang up in exactly the right quarter: he crowded all sail and
bore down before the wind right upon the entrance of the harbour, with
his men upon the decks fully armed and ready for battle. Partly from
astonishment at this sudden appearance, partly from dread of being
carried along with the enemy by the violence of the gale into the
harbour of their opponents, the Romans did not venture to obstruct the
entrance of the reinforcement; but stood out at sea overpowered with
amazement at the audacity of the enemy.

The town population crowded to the walls, in an agony of anxiety as to
what would happen, no less than in an excess of joy at the unlooked-for
appearance of hope, and cheered on the crews as they sailed into the
harbour, with clapping hands and cries of gladness. To sail into the
harbour was an achievement of great danger; but Hannibal accomplished
it gallantly, and, dropping anchor there, safely disembarked his
soldiers. The exultation of all who were in the city was not caused
so much by the presence of the reinforcement, though they had thereby
gained a strong revival of hope, and a large addition to their
strength, as by the fact that the Romans had not dared to intercept the
course of the Carthaginians.

[Sidenote: A sally from Lilybaeum.]

[Sidenote: It fails.]

+45.+ Himilco, the general in command at Lilybaeum, now saw that both
divisions of his troops were in high spirits and eager for service,—the
original garrison owing to the presence of the reinforcement, the newly
arrived because they had as yet had no experience of the hardships of
the situation. He wished to take advantage of the excited feelings
of both parties, before they cooled, in order to organise an attempt
to set fire to the works of the besiegers. He therefore summoned
the whole army to a meeting, and dwelt upon the themes suitable to
the occasion at somewhat greater length than usual. He raised their
zeal to an enthusiastic height by the magnitude of his promises for
individual acts of courage, and by declaring the favours and rewards
which awaited them as an army at the hands of the Carthaginians. His
speech was received with lively marks of satisfaction; and the men
with loud shouts bade him delay no more, but lead them into the field.
For the present, however, he contented himself with thanking them and
expressing his delight at their excellent spirit, and bidding them go
early to rest and obey their officers, dismissed them. But shortly
afterwards he summoned the officers; assigned to them severally the
posts best calculated for the success of the undertaking; communicated
to them the watchword and the exact moment the movement was to be made;
and issued orders to the commanders to be at the posts assigned with
their men at the morning watch. His orders were punctually obeyed:
and at daybreak he led out his forces and made attempts upon the
siege-works at several points. But the Romans had not been blind to
what was coming, and were neither idle nor unprepared. Wherever help
was required it was promptly rendered; and at every point they made a
stout resistance to the enemy. Before long there was fighting all along
the line, and an obstinate struggle round the entire circuit of the
wall; for the sallying party were not less than twenty thousand strong,
and their opponents more numerous still. The contest was all the
hotter from the fact that the men were not fighting in their regular
ranks, but indiscriminately, and as their own judgment directed; the
result of which was that a spirit of personal emulation arose among
the combatants, because, though the numbers engaged were so great,
there was a series of single combats between man and man, or company
and company. However, it was at the siege-works themselves that the
shouting was loudest and the throng of combatants the densest. At
these troops had been massed deliberately for attack and defence. The
assailants strove their utmost to dislodge the defenders, the defenders
exerted all their courage to hold their ground and not yield an inch
to the assailants,—and with such emulation and fury on both sides,
that they ended by falling at their posts rather than yield. But
there were others mingled with these, carrying torchwood and tow and
fire, who made a simultaneous attack upon the battering-rams at every
point: hurling these fiery missiles against them with such audacity,
that the Romans were reduced to the last extremity of danger, being
quite unable to overpower the attack of the enemy. But the general
of the Carthaginians, seeing that he was losing large numbers in the
engagement, without being able to gain the object of the sortie,
which was to take the siege-works, ordered his trumpeters to sound a
recall. So the Romans, after coming within an ace of losing all their
siege-gear, finally kept possession of the works, and were able to
maintain them all without dispute.

+46.+ After this affair Hannibal eluded the enemy’s watch, and sailed
out of the harbour by night with his ships to Drepana, to join the
Carthaginian Commander-in-Chief, Adherbal. Drepana is about one hundred
and twenty stades from Lilybaeum, and was always an object of special
care to the Carthaginians from the convenience of its position and the
excellence of its harbour.

[Sidenote: Hannibal the Rhodian offers to run the blockade.]

Now the Carthaginian government were anxious to learn the state of
affairs at Lilybaeum, but could not do so because the garrison was
strictly blockaded, and the Romans were exceedingly vigilant. In this
difficulty a nobleman, called Hannibal the Rhodian, came to them, and
offered to run the blockade, to see what was going on in Lilybaeum with
his own eyes, and to report. The offer delighted them, but they did
not believe in the possibility of its fulfilment with the Roman fleet
lying at the very entrance of the channel. However, the man fitted out
his own private vessel and put to sea. He first crossed to one of the
islands lying off Lilybaeum. Next day he obtained a wind in the right
quarter, and about ten o’clock in the morning actually sailed into the
harbour in the full view of the enemy, who looked on with amazement
at his audacity. Next day he lost no time in setting about a return
voyage. The Roman Consul had determined on taking extra precautions
for watching the sea near the channel: with this view he had during
the night got ready his ten fastest-sailing vessels, and taking up a
position on shore close to the harbour mouth, was watching with his own
eyes what would happen. The whole army was watching also; while the
ships on both sides of the mouth of the channel got as close to the
shallows as it was possible to approach, and there rested with their
oars out, and ready to run down and capture the ship that was about to
sail out. The Rhodian, on his side, attempted no concealment. He put
boldly to sea, and so confounded the enemy by his audacity, and the
speed of his vessel, that he not only sailed out without receiving any
damage to ship or crew, scudding along the bows of the enemy as though
they were fixed in their places, but even brought his ship to, after
running a short way ahead, and, with his oars out and ready, seemed
to challenge the foe to a contest. When none of them ventured to put
out to attack him, because of the speed of his rowing, he sailed away:
having thus with his one ship successfully defied the entire fleet of
the enemy. From this time he frequently performed the same feat, and
proved exceedingly serviceable both to the government at Carthage and
the besieged garrison. To the former by informing them from time to
time of what was pressingly necessary; and to the latter by inspiring
them with confidence, and dismaying the Romans by his audacity.

[Sidenote: His example is followed by others.]

[Sidenote: The Rhodian is at length captured.]

+47.+ What contributed most to encourage him to a repetition of the
feat was the fact that by frequent experience he had marked out the
course for himself by clear land marks. As soon as he had crossed
the open sea, and was coming into sight, he used to steer as though
he were coming from Italy, keeping the seaward tower exactly on his
bows, in such a way as to be in a line with the city towers which
faced towards Libya; and this is the only possible course to hit the
mouth of the channel with the wind astern. The successful boldness of
the Rhodian inspired several of those who were acquainted with these
waters to make similar attempts. The Romans felt themselves to be
in a great difficulty; and what was taking place determined them to
attempt blocking up the mouth of the harbour. The greater part of the
attempted work was a failure: the sea was too deep, and none of the
material which they threw into it would hold, or in fact keep in the
least compact. The breakers and the force of the current dislodged and
scattered everything that was thrown in, before it could even reach the
bottom. But there was one point where the water was shallow, at which
a mole was with infinite labour made to hold together; and upon it a
vessel with four banks of oars and of unusually fine build stuck fast
as it was making the outward passage at night, and thus fell into the
hands of the enemy. The Romans took possession of it, manned it with a
picked crew, and used it for keeping a look out for all who should try
to enter the harbour, and especially for the Rhodian. He had sailed in,
as it happened, that very night, and was afterwards putting out to sea
again in his usual open manner. He was, however, startled to see the
four-banked vessel put out to sea again simultaneously with himself.
He recognised what ship it was, and his first impulse was to escape
her by his superior speed. But finding himself getting overhauled by
the excellence of her rowers, he was finally compelled to bring to and
engage at close quarters. But in a struggle of marines he was at a
complete disadvantage: the enemy were superior in numbers, and their
soldiers were picked men; and he was made prisoner. The possession of
this ship of superior build enabled the Romans, by equipping her with
whatever was wanted for the service she had to perform, to intercept
all who were adventurous enough to try running the blockade of
Lilybaeum.

[Sidenote: A storm having damaged the siege-works, the Lilybaeans
succeed in burning them.]

+48.+ Meanwhile, the besieged were energetically carrying on
counterworks, having abandoned the hope of damaging or destroying the
constructions of the enemy. But in the midst of these proceedings a
storm of wind, of such tremendous violence and fury, blew upon the
machinery of the engines, that it wrecked the pent-houses, and carried
away by its force the towers erected to cover them. Some of the Greek
mercenaries perceived the advantage such a state of things offered
for the destruction of the siege-works, and communicated their idea
to the commander. He caught at the suggestion, and lost no time in
making every preparation suitable to the undertaking. Then the young
men mustered at three several points, and threw lighted brands into the
enemy’s works. The length of time during which these works had been
standing made them exactly in the proper state to catch fire easily;
and when to this was added a violent wind, blowing right upon the
engines and towers, the natural result was that the spreading of the
fire became rapid and destructive; while all attempts on the Roman side
to master it, and rescue their works, had to be abandoned as difficult
or wholly impracticable. Those who tried to come to the rescue were
so appalled at the scene, that they could neither fully grasp nor
clearly see what was going on. Flames, sparks, and volumes of smoke
blew right in their faces and blinded them; and not a few dropped down
and perished without ever getting near enough to attempt to combat
the fire. The same circumstances, which caused these overwhelming
difficulties to the besiegers, favoured those who were throwing the
fire-brands in exactly the same proportion. Everything that could
obscure their vision or hurt them was blown clean away and carried into
the faces of the enemy; while their being able to see the intervening
space enabled the shooters to take a good aim at those of the enemy who
came to the rescue, and the throwers of the fire-brands to lodge them
at the proper places for the destruction of the works. The violence
of the wind, too, contributed to the deadly effect of the missiles by
increasing the force of their blows. Eventually the destruction was
so complete, that the foundations of the siege-towers and the blocks
of the battering-rams were rendered unusable by the fire. In spite of
this disaster, though they gave up the idea of assaulting the place
any longer by means of their works, the Romans still persisted. They
surrounded the town with a ditch and stockade, threw up an additional
wall to secure their own encampment, and left the completion of their
purpose to time. Nor were the besieged less determined. They repaired
the part of their walls which had been thrown down, and prepared to
endure the siege with good courage.

[Sidenote: The Roman army is reinforced.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 249. Coss. P. Claudius Pulcher, L. Junius Pullus.]

[Sidenote: Claudius sails to attack Drepana.]

+49.+ When the announcement of these events at Rome was followed by
reiterated tidings that the larger part of the crews of the fleet had
been destroyed, either at the works, or in the general conduct of the
siege, the Roman government set zealously to work to enlist sailors;
and, having collected as many as ten thousand, sent them to Sicily.
They crossed the straits, and reached the camp on foot; and when they
had joined, Publius Claudius, the Consul, assembled his tribunes,
and said that it was just the time to sail to the attack of Drepana
with the whole squadron: for that Adherbal,[139] who was in command
there, was quite unprepared for such an event, because he as yet knew
nothing of the new crews having arrived; and was fully persuaded
that their fleet could not sail, owing to their loss of men in the
siege. His proposition met with a ready assent from the council of
officers, and he immediately set about getting his men on board, the
old crews as well as those who had recently joined. As for marines, he
selected the best men from the whole army, who were ready enough to
join an expedition which involved so short a voyage and so immediate
and certain an advantage. Having completed these preparations, he set
sail about midnight, without being detected by the enemy; and for the
first part of the day he sailed in close order, keeping the land on
his right. By daybreak the leading ships could be seen coming towards
Drepana; and at the first sight of them Adherbal was overwhelmed with
surprise. He quickly recovered his self-possession however: and, fully
appreciating the significance of the enemy’s attack, he determined to
try every manœuvre, and hazard every danger, rather than allow himself
and his men to be shut up in the blockade which threatened them.
He lost no time in collecting his rowing-crews upon the beach, and
summoning the mercenary soldiers who were in the town by proclamation.
When the muster had taken place, he endeavoured to impress upon them
in a few words what good hopes of victory they had, if they were bold
enough to fight at sea; and what hardships they would have to endure
in a blockade, if they hesitated from any fear of danger and played
the coward. The men showed a ready enthusiasm for the sea-fight, and
demanded with shouts that he would lead them to it without delay. He
thanked them, praised their zeal, and gave the order to embark with all
speed, to keep their eyes upon his ship, and follow in its wake. Having
made these instructions clear as quickly as he could, he got under
weigh himself first, and guided his fleet close under the rocks, on the
opposite side of the harbour to that by which the enemy were entering.

[Sidenote: Unexpected resistance of Adherbal. The Roman fleet checked.]

+50.+ When the Consul Publius saw, to his surprise, that the enemy, so
far from giving in or being dismayed at his approach, were determined
upon fighting him at sea: while of his own ships some were already
within the harbour, others just in the very entrance channel, and
others still on their way towards it; he at once issued orders to all
the ships to turn round and make the best of their way out again. The
result of this was that, as some of the ships were in the harbour,
and others at the entrance, they fouled each other when they began
reversing their course; and not only did a great confusion arise among
the men, but the ships got their oars broken also in the collisions
which occurred. However, the captains exerted themselves to get the
ships into line close under the shore, as they successively cleared
the harbour, and with their prows directed towards the enemy. Publius
himself was originally bringing up the rear of the entire squadron; but
he now, while the movement was actually in execution, turned towards
the open sea and transferred himself to a position on the left wing of
the fleet. At the same moment Adherbal succeeded in outflanking the
left of his opponents with five vessels furnished with charging beaks.
He turned his own ship with its prow towards the enemy, and brought to.
As each of the others came up, and fell into line with him, he sent
orders to them by his staff officers to do the same as he had done.
Thus they all fell in and formed a complete line. The signal which had
been agreed upon before was given, and an advance was begun, which was
made at first without disarranging the line. The Romans were still
close in-shore, waiting for the coming out of their ships from the
harbour; and this proximity to the land proved of infinite disadvantage
to them in the engagement.

[Sidenote: The battle.]

[Sidenote: The Romans beaten.]

+51.+ And now the fleets were within a short distance of each other:
the signals were raised from the ships of the respective commanders;
the charge was made; and ship grappled with ship. At first the
engagement was evenly balanced, because each fleet had the pick of
their land forces serving as marines on board. But as it went on
the many advantages which, taking it as a whole, the Carthaginians
possessed, gave them a continually increasing superiority. Owing to the
better construction of their ships they had much the advantage in point
of speed, while their position with the open sea behind them materially
contributed to their success, by giving them freer space for their
manœuvres. Were any of them hard pressed by the enemy? Their speed
secured them a sure escape, and a wide expanse of water was open to
their flight. There they would swing round and attack the leading ships
which were pursuing them: sometimes rowing round them and charging
their broadsides, at other times running alongside them as they lurched
awkwardly round, from the weight of the vessels and the unskilfulness
of the crews. In this way they were charging perpetually, and managed
to sink a large number of the ships. Or was one of their number in
danger? They were ready to come to the rescue, being out of danger
themselves, and being able to effect a movement to right or left, by
steering along the sterns of their own ships and through the open sea
unmolested. The case of the Romans was exactly the reverse. If any of
them were hard pressed, there was nowhere for them to retreat, for they
were fighting close to the shore; and any ship of theirs that was hard
driven by the enemy either backed into shallow water and stuck fast,
or ran ashore and was stranded. Moreover, that most effective of all
manœuvres in sea fights,—sailing through the enemy’s line and appearing
on their stern while they are engaged with others,—was rendered
impossible for them, owing to the bulk of their vessels; and still more
so by the unskilfulness of their crews. Nor, again, were they able
to bring help from behind to those who wanted it, because they were
hemmed in so close to the shore that there was not the smallest space
left in which those who wished to render such help might move. When
the Consul saw how ill things were going for him all along the line;
when he saw some of his ships sticking fast in the shallows, and others
cast ashore; he took to flight. Thirty other ships which happened to be
near him followed him as he sailed from the left, and coasted along the
shore. But the remaining vessels, which amounted to ninety-three, the
Carthaginians captured with their crews, except in the case of those
who ran their ships ashore and got away.

[Sidenote: The Romans not discouraged send the Consul L. Junius with a
large supply of provisions in 800 transports, convoyed by 60 ships of
war to Lilybaeum.]

+52.+ The result of this sea fight gave Adherbal a high reputation at
Carthage; for his success was looked upon as wholly due to himself,
and his own foresight and courage: while at Rome Publius fell into
great disrepute, and was loudly censured as having acted without due
caution or calculation, and as having during his administration, as
far as a single man could, involved Rome in serious disasters. He was
accordingly some time afterwards brought to trial, was heavily fined,
and exposed to considerable danger. Not that the Romans gave way in
consequence of these events. On the contrary, they omitted nothing
that was within their power to do, and continued resolute to prosecute
the campaign. It was now the time for the Consular elections: as soon
as they were over and two Consuls appointed; one of them, Lucius
Junius,[140] was immediately sent to convey corn to the besiegers of
Lilybaeum, and other provisions and supplies necessary for the army,
sixty ships being also manned to convoy them. Upon his arrival at
Messene, Junius took over such ships as he found there to meet him,
whether from the army or from the other parts of Sicily, and coasted
along with all speed to Syracuse, with a hundred and twenty ships, and
his supplies on board about eight hundred transports. Arrived there,
he handed over to the Quaestors half his transports and some of his
war-ships, and sent them off, being very anxious that what the army
needed should reach them promptly. He remained at Syracuse himself,
waiting for such of his ships as had not yet arrived from Messene, and
collecting additional supplies of corn from the allies in the central
districts of the island.

[Sidenote: Carthalo tries to intercept the transports.]

+53.+ Meanwhile Adherbal sent the prisoners he had taken in the sea
fight, and the captured vessels, to Carthage; and giving Carthalo his
colleague thirty vessels, in addition to the seventy in command of
which he had come, despatched him with instructions to make a sudden
attack upon the enemy’s ships that were at anchor off Lilybaeum,
capture all he could, and set fire to the rest. In obedience to
these instructions Carthalo accomplished his passage just before
daybreak, fired some of the vessels, and towed off others. Great was
the commotion at the quarters of the Romans. For as they hurried to
the rescue of the ships, the attention of Himilco, the commander of
the garrison, was aroused by their shouts; and as the day was now
beginning to break, he could see what was happening, and despatched
the mercenary troops who were in the town. Thus the Romans found
themselves surrounded by danger on every side, and fell into a state of
consternation more than usually profound and serious. The Carthaginian
admiral contented himself with either towing off or breaking up some
few of their vessels, and shortly afterwards coasted along under the
pretence of making for Heracleia: though he was really lying in wait,
with the view of intercepting those who were coming by sea to the
Roman army. When his look-out men brought him word that a considerable
number of vessels of all sorts were bearing down upon him, and were
now getting close, he stood out to sea and started to meet them: for
the success just obtained over the Romans inspired him with such
contempt for them, that he was eager to come to an engagement. The
vessels in question were those which had been despatched in advance
under the charge of the Quaestors from Syracuse. And they too had
warning of their danger. Light boats were accustomed to sail in advance
of a squadron, and these announced the approach of the enemy to the
Quaestors; who being convinced that they were not strong enough to
stand a battle at sea, dropped anchor under a small fortified town
which was subject to Rome, and which, though it had no regular harbour,
yet possessed roadsteads, and headlands projecting from the mainland,
and surrounding the roadsteads, so as to form a convenient refuge.
There they disembarked; and having set up some catapults and ballistae,
which they got from the town, awaited the approach of the enemy. When
the Carthaginians arrived, their first idea was to blockade them:
for they supposed that the men would be terrified and retreat to the
fortified town, leaving them to take possession of the vessels without
resistance. Their expectations, however, were not fulfilled; and
finding that the men on the contrary resisted with spirit, and that the
situation of the spot presented many difficulties of every description,
they sailed away again after towing off some few of the transports
laden with provisions, and retired to a certain river, in which they
anchored and kept a look out for the enemy to renew their voyage.

+54.+ In complete ignorance of what had happened to his advanced
squadron, the Consul, who had remained behind at Syracuse, after
completing all he meant to do there, put to sea; and, after rounding
Pachynus, was proceeding on his voyage to Lilybaeum. The appearance of
the enemy was once more signalled to the Carthaginian admiral by his
look-out men, and he at once put out to sea, with the view of engaging
them as far as possible away from their comrades. Junius saw the
Carthaginian fleet from a considerable distance, and observing their
great numbers did not dare to engage them, and yet found it impossible
to avoid them by flight because they were now too close. He therefore
steered towards land, and anchored under a rocky and altogether
dangerous part of the shore; for he judged it better to run all risks
rather than allow his squadron, with all its men, to fall into the
hands of the enemy. The Carthaginian admiral saw what he had done;
and determined that it was unadvisable for him to engage the enemy,
or bring his ships near such a dangerous place. He therefore made for
a certain headland between the two squadrons of the enemy, and there
kept a look out upon both with equal vigilance. Presently, however,
the weather became rough, and there was an appearance of an unusually
dangerous disturbance setting in from the sea. The Carthaginian pilots,
from their knowledge of the particular localities, and of seamanship
generally, foresaw what was coming; and persuaded Carthalo to avoid
the storm and round the promontory of Pachynus.[141] He had the good
sense to take their advice: [Sidenote: The Roman fleet is wrecked.] and
accordingly these men, with great exertions and extreme difficulty,
did get round the promontory and anchored in safety; while the Romans,
being exposed to the storm in places entirely destitute of harbours,
suffered such complete destruction, that not one of the wrecks even was
left in a state available for use. Both of their squadrons in fact were
completely disabled to a degree past belief.

[Sidenote: The Romans abandon the sea.]

+55.+ This occurrence caused the Carthaginian interests to look up
again and their hopes to revive. But the Romans, though they had met
with partial misfortunes before, had never suffered a naval disaster
so complete and final. They, in fact, abandoned the sea, and confined
themselves to holding the country; while the Carthaginians remained
masters of the sea, without wholly despairing of the land.

[Sidenote: Lucius Junius perseveres in the siege. B.C. 248.]

[Sidenote: Eryx.]

Great and general was the dismay both at Rome and in the camp at
Lilybaeum. Yet they did not abandon their determination of starving
out that town. The Roman government did not allow their disasters
to prevent their sending provisions into the camp overland; and the
besiegers kept up the investment as strictly as they possibly could.
Lucius Junius joined the camp after the shipwreck, and, being in a
state of great distress at what had happened, was all eagerness to
strike some new and effective blow, and thus repair the disaster which
had befallen him. Accordingly he took the first slight opening that
offered to surprise and seize Eryx; and became master both of the
temple of Aphrodite and of the city. This is a mountain close to the
sea-coast on that side of Sicily which looks towards Italy, between
Drepana and Panormus, but nearer to Drepana of the two. It is by far
the greatest mountain in Sicily next to Aetna; and on its summit, which
is flat, stands the temple of Erycinian Aphrodite, confessedly the
most splendid of all the temples in Sicily for its wealth and general
magnificence. The town stands immediately below the summit, and is
approached by a very long and steep ascent. Lucius seized both town and
temple; and established a garrison both upon the summit and at the foot
of the road to it from Drepana. He kept a strict guard at both points,
but more especially at the foot of the ascent, believing that by so
doing he should secure possession of the whole mountain as well as the
town.

[Sidenote: B.C. 247.]

[Sidenote: Occupation of Hercte by Hamilcar.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 247-244.]

+56.+ Next year, the eighteenth of the war, the Carthaginians
appointed Hamilcar Barcas general, and put the management of the
fleet in his hands. He took over the command, and started to ravage
the Italian coast. After devastating the districts of Locri, and the
rest of Bruttium, he sailed away with his whole fleet to the coast of
Panormus and seized on a place called Hercte, which lies between Eryx
and Panormus on the coast, and is reputed the best situation in the
district for a safe and permanent camp. For it is a mountain rising
sheer on every side, standing out above the surrounding country to a
considerable height. The table-land on its summit has a circumference
of not less than a hundred stades, within which the soil is rich
in pasture and suitable for agriculture; the sea-breezes render it
healthy; and it is entirely free from all dangerous animals. On the
side which looks towards the sea, as well as that which faces the
central part of the island, it is enclosed by inaccessible precipices;
while the spaces between them require only slight fortifications,
and of no great extent, to make them secure. There is in it also an
eminence, which serves at once as an acropolis and as a convenient
tower of observation, commanding the surrounding district. It also
commands a harbour conveniently situated for the passage from Drepana
and Lilybaeum to Italy, in which there is always abundant depth of
water; finally, it can only be reached by three ways—two from the land
side, one from the sea, all of them difficult. Here Hamilcar entrenched
himself. It was a bold measure: but he had no city which he could
count upon as friendly, and no other hope on which he could rely; and
though by so doing he placed himself in the very midst of the enemy,
he nevertheless managed to involve the Romans in many struggles and
dangers. To begin with, he would start from this place and ravage the
seaboard of Italy as far as Cumae; and again on shore, when the Romans
had pitched a camp to overawe him, in front of the city of Panormus,
within about five stades of him, he harassed them in every sort of
way, and forced them to engage in numerous skirmishes, for the space
of nearly three years. Of these combats it is impossible to give a
detailed account in writing.

+57.+ It is like the case of two boxers, eminent alike for their
courage and their physical condition, engaged in a formal contest
for the prize. As the match goes on, blow after blow is interchanged
without intermission; but to anticipate, or keep account of every feint
or every blow delivered is impossible for combatants and spectators
alike. Still one may conceive a sufficiently distinct idea of the
affair by taking into account the general activity of the men, the
ambition actuating each side, and the amount of their experience,
strength, and courage. The same may be said of these two generals. No
writer could set down, and no reader would endure the wearisome and
profitless task of reading, a detailed statement of the transactions
of every day; why they were undertaken, and how they were carried out.
For every day had its ambuscade on one side or the other, its attack,
or assault. A general assertion in regard to the men, combined with the
actual result of their mutual determination to conquer, will give a far
better idea of the facts. It may be said then, generally, that nothing
was left untried,—whether it be stratagems which could be learnt from
history, or plans suggested by the necessities of the hour and the
immediate circumstances of the case, or undertakings depending upon
an adventurous spirit and a reckless daring. The matter, however, for
several reasons, could not be brought to a decisive issue. In the first
place, the forces on either side were evenly matched: and in the second
place, while the camps were in the case of both equally impregnable,
the space which separated the two was very small. The result of this
was that skirmishes between detached parties on both sides were always
going on during the day, and yet nothing decisive occurred. For though
the men actually engaged in such skirmishes from time to time were cut
to pieces, it did not affect the main body. They had only to wheel
round to find themselves out of the reach of danger behind their own
defences. Once there, they could face about and again engage the enemy.

[Sidenote: Siege of Eryx, B.C. 244.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 243-242.]

+58.+ Presently however Fortune, acting like a good umpire in the
games, transferred them by a bold stroke from the locality just
described, and the contest in which they were engaged, to a struggle
of greater danger and a locality of narrower dimensions. The Romans,
as we have said, were in occupation of the summit of Eryx, and had a
guard stationed at its foot. But Hamilcar managed to seize the town
which lay between these two spots. There ensued a siege of the Romans
who were on the summit, supported by them with extraordinary hardihood
and adventurous daring: while the Carthaginians, finding themselves
between two hostile armies, and their supplies brought to them with
difficulty, because they were in communication with the sea at only one
point and by one road, yet held out with a determination that passes
belief. Every contrivance which skill or force could sustain did they
put in use against each other, as before; every imaginable privation
was submitted to; surprises and pitched battles were alike tried: and
finally they left the combat a drawn one, not, as Fabius says, from
utter weakness and misery, but like men still unbroken and unconquered.
The fact is that before either party had got completely the better of
the other, though they had maintained the conflict for another two
years, the war happened to be decided in quite a different manner.

[Sidenote: The obstinate persistence of the Romans and Carthaginians.]

Such was the state of affairs at Eryx and with the forces employed
there. The two nations engaged were like well-bred game-cocks that
fight to their last gasp. You may see them often, when too weak to
use their wings, yet full of pluck to the end, and striking again
and again. Finally, chance brings them the opportunity of once more
grappling, and they hold on until one or other of them drops down dead.

[Sidenote: The Romans once more fit out a fleet.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 242. Coss. C. Lutatius Catulus, A. Postumius Albinus.]

+59.+ So it was with the Romans and Carthaginians. They were worn out
by the labours of the war; the perpetual succession of hard fought
struggles was at last driving them to despair; their strength had
become paralysed, and their resources reduced almost to extinction by
war-taxes and expenses extending over so many years. And yet the Romans
did not give in. For the last five years indeed they had entirely
abandoned the sea, partly because of the disasters they had sustained
there, and partly because they felt confident of deciding the war by
means of their land forces; but they now determined for the third time
to make trial of their fortune in naval warfare. They saw that their
operations were not succeeding according to their calculations, mainly
owing to the obstinate gallantry of the Carthaginian general. They
therefore adopted this resolution from a conviction that by this means
alone, if their design were but well directed, would they be able to
bring the war to a successful conclusion. In their first attempt they
had been compelled to abandon the sea by disasters arising from sheer
bad luck; in their second by the loss of the naval battle off Drepana.
This third attempt was successful: they shut off the Carthaginian
forces at Eryx from getting their supplies by sea, and eventually put
a period to the whole war. Nevertheless it was essentially an effort
of despair. The treasury was empty, and would not supply the funds
necessary for the undertaking, which were, however, obtained by the
patriotism and generosity of the leading citizens. They undertook
singly, or by two or three combining, according to their means, to
supply a quinquereme fully fitted out, on the understanding that they
were to be repaid if the expedition was successful. By these means a
fleet of two hundred quinqueremes were quickly prepared, built on the
model of the ship of the Rhodian. Gaius Lutatius was then appointed
to the command, and despatched at the beginning of the summer. His
appearance on the coasts of Sicily was a surprise: the whole of the
Carthaginian fleet had gone home; and he took possession both of the
harbour near Drepana, and the roadsteads near Lilybaeum. He then
threw up works round the city on Drepana, and made other preparations
for besieging it. And while he pushed on these operations with all
his might, he did not at the same time lose sight of the approach of
the Carthaginian fleet. He kept in mind the original idea of this
expedition, that it was by a victory at sea alone that the result of
the whole war could be decided. He did not, therefore, allow the time
to be wasted or unemployed. He practised and drilled his crews every
day in the manœuvres which they would be called upon to perform; and
by his attention to discipline generally brought his sailors in a very
short time to the condition of trained athletes for the contest before
them.

[Sidenote: The Carthaginians send Hanno with a fleet.]

[Sidenote: 10th March B.C. 241. A strong breeze is blowing.]

[Sidenote: Lutatius however decides to fight.]

+60.+ That the Romans should have a fleet afloat once more, and
be again bidding for the mastery at sea, was a contingency wholly
unexpected by the Carthaginians. They at once set about fitting out
their ships, loaded them with corn and other provisions, and despatched
their fleet: determined that their troops round Eryx should not run
short of necessary provisions. Hanno, who was appointed to command the
fleet, put to sea and arrived at the island called Holy Isle. He was
eager as soon as possible, if he could escape the observation of the
enemy, to get across to Eryx; disembark his stores; and having thus
lightened his ships, take on board as marines those of the mercenary
troops who were suitable to the service, and Barcas with them; and
not to engage the enemy until he had thus reinforced himself. But
Lutatius was informed of the arrival of Hanno’s squadron, and correctly
interpreted their design. He at once took on board the best soldiers
of his army, and crossed to the Island of Aegusa, which lies directly
opposite Lilybaeum. There he addressed his forces some words suitable
to the occasion, and gave full instructions to the pilots, with the
understanding that a battle was to be fought on the morrow. At daybreak
the next morning Lutatius found that a strong breeze had sprung up on
the stern of the enemy, and that an advance towards them in the teeth
of it would be difficult for his ships. The sea too was rough and
boisterous: and for a while he could not make up his mind what he had
better do in the circumstances. Finally, however, he was decided by the
following considerations. If he boarded the enemy’s fleet during the
continuance of the storm, he would only have to contend with Hanno,
and the levies of sailors which he had on board, before they could be
reinforced by the troops, and with ships which were still heavily laden
with stores: but if he waited for calm weather, and allowed the enemy
to get across and unite with their land forces, he would then have to
contend with ships lightened of their burden, and therefore in a more
navigable condition, and against the picked men of the land forces; and
what was more formidable than anything else, against the determined
bravery of Hamilcar. He made up his mind, therefore, not to let the
present opportunity slip; and when he saw the enemy’s ships crowding
sail, he put to sea with all speed. The rowers, from their excellent
physical condition, found no difficulty in overcoming the heavy sea,
and Lutatius soon got his fleet into single line with prows directed to
the foe.

[Sidenote: The battle of Aegusa.]

[Sidenote: Victory of the Romans.]

+61.+ When the Carthaginians saw that the Romans were intercepting
their passage across, they lowered their masts, and after some words of
mutual exhortation had been uttered in the several ships, closed with
their opponents. But the respective state of equipment of the two sides
was exactly the converse of what it had been in the battle off Drepana;
and the result of the battle was, therefore, naturally reversed also.
The Romans had reformed their mode of shipbuilding, and had eased
their vessels of all freight, except the provisions necessary for the
battle: while their rowers having been thoroughly trained and got well
together, performed their office in an altogether superior manner, and
were backed up by marines who, being picked men from the legions, were
all but invincible. The case with the Carthaginians was exactly the
reverse. Their ships were heavily laden and therefore unmanageable in
the engagement; while their rowers were entirely untrained, and merely
put on board for the emergency; and such marines as they had were raw
recruits, who had never had any previous experience of any difficult or
dangerous service. The fact is that the Carthaginian government never
expected that the Romans would again attempt to dispute the supremacy
at sea: they had, therefore, in contempt for them, neglected their
navy. The result was that, as soon as they closed, their manifold
disadvantages quickly decided the battle against them. They had fifty
ships sunk, and seventy taken with their crews. The rest set their
sails, and running before the wind, which luckily for them suddenly
veered round at the nick of time to help them, got away again to Holy
Isle. The Roman Consul sailed back to Lilybaeum to join the army, and
there occupied himself in making arrangements for the ships and men
which he had captured; which was a business of considerable magnitude,
for the prisoners made in the battle amounted to little short of ten
thousand.

[Sidenote: Barcas makes terms.]

[Sidenote: The treaty, B.C. 242.]

+62.+ As far as strength of feeling and desire for victory were
concerned, this unexpected reverse did not diminish the readiness of
the Carthaginians to carry on the war; but when they came to reckon up
their resources they were at a complete standstill. On the one hand,
they could not any longer send supplies to their forces in Sicily,
because the enemy commanded the sea: on the other, to abandon and, as
it were, to betray these, left them without men and without leaders
to carry on the war. They therefore sent a despatch to Barcas with
all speed, leaving the decision of the whole matter in his hands.
Nor was their confidence misplaced. He acted the part of a gallant
general and a sensible man. As long as there was any reasonable hope
of success in the business he had in hand, nothing was too adventurous
or too dangerous for him to attempt; and if any general ever did so,
he put every chance of victory to the fullest proof. But when all his
endeavours miscarried, and no reasonable expectation was left of saving
his troops, he yielded to the inevitable, and sent ambassadors to
treat of peace and terms of accommodation. And in this he showed great
good sense and practical ability; for it is quite as much the duty of
a leader to be able to see when it is time to give in, as when it is
the time to win a victory. Lutatius was ready enough to listen to the
proposal, because he was fully aware that the resources of Rome were at
the lowest ebb from the strain of the war; and eventually it was his
fortune to put an end to the contest by a treaty of which I here give
the terms. “_Friendship is established between the Carthaginians and
Romans on the following terms, provided always that they are ratified
by the Roman people. The Carthaginians shall evacuate the whole of
Sicily: they shall not make war upon Hiero, nor bear arms against the
Syracusans or their allies. The Carthaginians shall give up to the
Romans all prisoners without ransom. The Carthaginians shall pay to the
Romans in twenty years 2200 Euboic talents of silver._”[142]

+63.+ When this treaty was sent to Rome the people refused to accept
it, but sent ten commissioners to examine into the business. Upon their
arrival they made no change in the general terms of the treaty, but
they introduced some slight alterations in the direction of increased
severity towards Carthage. Thus they reduced the time allowed for the
payment of the indemnity by one half; they added a thousand talents to
the sum demanded; and extended the evacuation of Sicily to all islands
lying between Sicily and Italy.

[Sidenote: Greatness of the war.]

Such were the conditions on which the war was ended, after lasting
twenty-four years continuously. It was at once the longest, most
continuous, and most severely contested war known to us in history.
Apart from the other battles fought and the preparations made, which
I have described in my previous chapters, there were two sea fights,
in one of which the combined numbers of the two fleets exceeded five
hundred quinqueremes, in the other nearly approached seven hundred.
In the course of the war, counting what were destroyed by shipwreck,
the Romans lost seven hundred quinqueremes, the Carthaginians five
hundred. Those therefore who have spoken with wonder of the sea-battles
of an Antigonus, a Ptolemy, or a Demetrius, and the greatness of
their fleets, would we may well believe have been overwhelmed with
astonishment at the hugeness of these proportions if they had had
to tell the story of this war.[143] If, further, we take into
consideration the superior size of the quinqueremes, compared with the
triremes employed by the Persians against the Greeks, and again by the
Athenians and Lacedaemonians in their wars with each other, we shall
find that never in the whole history of the world have such enormous
forces contended for mastery at sea.

These considerations will establish my original observation, and show
the falseness of the opinion entertained by certain Greeks. It was
_not_ by mere chance or without knowing what they were doing that the
Romans struck their bold stroke for universal supremacy and dominion,
and justified their boldness by its success. No: it was the natural
result of discipline gained in the stern school of difficulty and
danger.

+64.+ And no doubt the question does naturally arise here as to why
they find it impossible in our days to man so many ships, or take
the sea with such large fleets, though masters of the world, and
possessing a superiority over others many times as great as before.
The explanation of this difficulty will be clearly understood when
we come to the description of their civil constitution. I look
upon this description as a most important part of my work, and one
demanding close attention on the part of my readers. For the subject
is calculated to afford pleasure in the contemplation, and is up to
this time so to speak absolutely unknown, thanks to historians, some
of whom have been ignorant, while others have given so confused an
account of it as to be practically useless. For the present it suffices
to say that, as far as the late war was concerned, the two nations
were closely matched in the character of the designs they entertained,
as well as in the lofty courage they showed in prosecuting them: and
this is especially true of the eager ambition displayed on either side
to secure the supremacy. But in the individual gallantry of their
men the Romans had decidedly the advantage; while we must credit the
Carthaginians with the best general of the day both for genius and
daring. I mean Hamilcar Barcas, own father of Rome’s future enemy
Hannibal.

[Sidenote: War between Rome and Falerii.]

[Sidenote: The mercenary war, B.C. 241.]

+65.+ The confirmation of this peace was followed by events which
involved both nations in a struggle of an identical or similar nature.
At Rome the late war was succeeded by a social war against the
Faliscans, which, however, they brought to a speedy and successful
termination by the capture of Falerii after only a few days’ siege.
The Carthaginians were not so fortunate. Just about the same time
they found themselves confronted by three enemies at once, their own
mercenaries, the Numidians, and such Libyans as joined the former
in their revolt. And this war proved to be neither insignificant
nor contemptible. It exposed them to frequent and terrible alarms;
and, finally, it became a question to them not merely of a loss of
territory, but of their own bare existence, and of the safety of the
very walls and buildings of their city. There are many reasons that
make it worth while to dwell upon the history of this war: yet I must
give only a summary account of it, in accordance with the original plan
of this work. The nature and peculiar ferocity of the struggle, which
has been generally called the “truceless war,” may be best learnt from
its incidents. It conveys two important lessons: it most conspicuously
shows those who employ mercenaries what dangers they should foresee
and provide against; and secondly, it teaches how wide the distinction
is between the character of troops composed of a confused mass of
uncivilised tribes, and of those which have had the benefit of
education, the habits of social life, and the restraints of law. But
what is of most importance to us is, that we may trace from the actual
events of this period the causes which led to the war between Rome and
Carthage in the time of Hannibal. These causes have not only been a
subject of dispute among historians, but still continue to be so among
those who were actually engaged; it is therefore a matter of importance
to enable students to form an opinion on this matter as nearly as
possible in accordance with the truth.

[Sidenote: Evacuation of Sicily.]

[Sidenote: The mercenaries sent to Sicca.]

+66.+ The course of events at Carthage subsequent to the peace was
as follows: As soon as possible after it was finally ratified Barcas
withdrew the troops at Eryx to Lilybaeum, and then immediately laid
down his command. Gesco, who was commandant of the town, proceeded
to transport the soldiers into Libya. But foreseeing what was likely
to happen, he very prudently embarked them in detachments, and did
not send them all in one voyage. His object was to gain time for the
Carthaginian government; so that one detachment should come to shore,
receive the pay due to them, and depart from Carthage to their own
country, before the next detachment was brought across and joined
them. In accordance with this idea Gesco began the transportation of
the troops. But the Government—partly because the recent expenses
had reduced their finances to a low ebb, partly because they felt
certain that, if they collected the whole force and entertained them
in Carthage, they would be able to persuade the mercenaries to accept
something less than the whole pay due to them—did not dismiss the
detachments as they landed, but kept them massed in the city. But
when this resulted in the commission of many acts of lawlessness by
night and day, they began to feel uneasy at their numbers and their
growing licentiousness; and required the officers, until such time as
arrangements for discharging their pay should have been made, and the
rest of the army should have arrived, to withdraw with all their men
to a certain town called Sicca, receiving each a piece of gold for
their immediate necessities. As far as quitting the city was concerned
they were ready enough to obey; but they desired to leave their heavy
baggage there as before, on the ground that they would soon have to
return to the city for their wages. But the Carthaginian government
were in terror lest, considering the length of their absence and their
natural desire for the society of wives or children, they would either
not quit the city at all; or, if they did, would be sure to be enticed
by these feelings to return, and that thus there would be no decrease
of outrages in the city. Accordingly they forced them to take their
baggage with them: but it was sorely against the will of the men, and
roused strong feelings of animosity among them. These mercenaries
being forced to retire to Sicca, lived there as they chose without any
restraint upon their lawlessness. For they had obtained two things
the most demoralising for hired forces, and which in a word are in
themselves the all-sufficient source and origin of mutinies,—relaxation
of discipline and want of employment.[144] For lack of something better
to do, some of them began calculating, always to their own advantage,
the amount of pay owing to them; and thus making out the total to be
many times more than was really due, they gave out that this was the
amount which they ought to demand from the Carthaginians. Moreover they
all began to call to mind the promises made to them by the generals
in their harangues, delivered on various occasions of special danger,
and to entertain high hopes and great expectations of the amount of
compensation which awaited them. The natural result followed.

[Sidenote: The beginning of the outbreak, B.C. 241.]

+67.+ When the whole army had mustered at Sicca, and Hanno, now
appointed general in Libya, far from satisfying these hopes and the
promises they had received, talked on the contrary of the burden of
the taxes and the embarrassment of the public finances; and actually
endeavoured to obtain from them an abatement even from the amount of
pay acknowledged to be due to them; excited and mutinous feelings at
once began to manifest themselves. There were constant conferences
hastily got together, sometimes in separate nationalities, sometimes
of the whole army; and there being no unity of race or language
among them, the whole camp became a babel of confusion, a scene
of inarticulate tumult, and a veritable revel of misrule. For the
Carthaginians being always accustomed to employ mercenary troops of
miscellaneous nationalities, in securing that an army should consist
of several different races, act wisely as far as the prevention of
any rapid combinations for mutiny, or difficulty on the part of the
commanders in overawing insubordination, are concerned: but the
policy utterly breaks down when an outburst of anger, or popular
delusion, or internal dissension, has actually occurred; for it makes
it impossible for the commander to soothe excited feelings, to remove
misapprehensions, or to show the ignorant their error. Armies in such a
state are not usually content with mere human wickedness; they end by
assuming the ferocity of wild beasts and the vindictiveness of insanity.

This is just what happened in this case. There were in the army
Iberians and Celts, men from Liguria and the Balearic Islands, and
a considerable number of half-bred Greeks, mostly deserters and
slaves; while the main body consisted of Libyans. Consequently it was
impossible to collect and address them _en masse_, or to approach
them with this view by any means whatever. There was no help for it:
the general could not possibly know their several languages; and to
make a speech four or five times on the same subject, by the mouths
of several interpreters, was almost more impossible, if I may say so,
than that. The only alternative was for him to address his entreaties
and exhortations to the soldiers through their officers. And this Hanno
continually endeavoured to do. But there was the same difficulty with
them. Sometimes they failed to understand what he said: at others they
received his words with expressions of approval to his face, and yet
from error or malice reported them in a contrary sense to the common
soldiers. The result was a general scene of uncertainty, mistrust,
and misunderstanding. And to crown all, they took it into their heads
that the Carthaginian government had a design in thus sending Hanno to
them: that they purposely did not send the generals who were acquainted
with the services they had rendered in Sicily, and who had been the
authors of the promises made to them; but had sent the one man who had
not been present at any of these transactions. Whether that were so or
not, they finally broke off all negotiations with Hanno; conceived a
violent mistrust of their several commanders; and in a furious outburst
of anger with the Carthaginians started towards the city, and pitched
their camp about a hundred and twenty stades from Carthage, at the town
of Tunes, to the number of over twenty thousand.

[Sidenote: The mercenaries at Tunes.]

[Sidenote: Attempts to pacify them.]

[Sidenote: The demands of the mercenaries.]

[Sidenote: The dispute referred to the arbitration of Gesco.]

+68.+ The Carthaginians saw their folly when it was too late. It was a
grave mistake to have collected so large a number of mercenaries into
one place without any warlike force of their own citizens to fall back
upon: but it was a still graver mistake to have delivered up to them
their children and wives, with their heavy baggage to boot; which they
might have retained as hostages, and thus have had greater security for
concerting their own measures, and more power of ensuring obedience to
their orders. However, being thoroughly alarmed at the action of the
men in regard to their encampment, they went to every length in their
eagerness to pacify their anger. They sent them supplies of provisions
in rich abundance, to be purchased exactly on their own terms, and
at their own price. Members of the Senate were despatched, one after
the other, to treat with them; and they were promised that whatever
they demanded should be conceded if it were within the bounds of
possibility. Day by day the ideas of the mercenaries rose higher. For
their contempt became supreme when they saw the dismay and excitement
in Carthage; their confidence in themselves was profound; and their
engagements with the Roman legions in Sicily had convinced them, that
not only was it impossible for the Carthaginians to face them in the
field, but that it would be difficult to find any nation in the world
who could. Therefore, when the Carthaginians conceded the point of
their pay, they made a further claim for the value of the horses they
had lost. When this too was conceded, they said that they ought to
receive the value of the rations of corn due to them from a long time
previous, reckoned at the highest price reached during the war. And
in short, the ill-disposed and mutinous among them being numerous,
they always found out some new demand which made it impossible to
come to terms. Upon the Carthaginian government, however, pledging
themselves to the full extent of their powers, they eventually agreed
to refer the matter to the arbitration of some one of the generals who
had been actually engaged in Sicily. Now they were displeased with
Hamilcar Barcas, who was one of those under whom they had fought in
Sicily, because they thought that their present unfavourable position
was attributable chiefly to him. They thought this from the fact that
he never came to them as an ambassador, and had, as was believed,
voluntarily resigned his command. But towards Gesco their feelings were
altogether friendly. He had, as they thought, taken every possible
precaution for their interests, and especially in the arrangements for
their conveyance to Libya. Accordingly they referred the dispute to the
arbitration of the latter.

[Sidenote: Spendius.]

[Sidenote: Mathōs.]

[Sidenote: Spendius and Mathōs cause an outbreak.]

+69.+ Gesco came to Tunes by sea, bringing the money with him. There he
held a meeting first of the officers, and then of the men, according
to their nationalities; rebuked them for their past behaviour, and
endeavoured to convince them as to their duty in the present: but
most of all he dwelt upon their obligation in the future to show
themselves well-disposed towards the people whose pay they had been
so long enjoying. Finally, he proceeded to discharge the arrears of
pay, taking each nationality separately. But there was a certain
Campanian in the army, a runaway Roman slave named Spendius, a man of
extraordinary physical strength and reckless courage in the field.
Alarmed lest his master should recover possession of him, and he should
be put to death with torture, in accordance with the laws of Rome,
this man exerted himself to the utmost in word and deed to break off
the arrangement with the Carthaginians. He was seconded by a Libyan
called Mathōs, who was not a slave but free, and had actually served
in the campaign. But he had been one of the most active agitators in
the late disturbances: and being in terror of punishment for the past,
he now gave in his adhesion to the party of Spendius; and taking the
Libyans aside, suggested to them that, when the men of other races
had received their pay, and taken their departure to their several
countries, the Carthaginians would wreak upon them the full weight of
the resentment which they had, in common with themselves, incurred;
and would look upon their punishment as a means of striking terror
into all the inhabitants of Libya. It did not take long to rouse the
men by such arguments, nor were they at a loss for a pretext, however
insignificant. In discharging the pay, Gesco postponed the payment
of the valuations of rations and horses. This was enough: the men at
once hurried to make a meeting; Spendius and Mathōs delivered violent
invectives against Gesco and the Carthaginians; their words were
received with every sign of approval; no one else could get a hearing;
whoever did attempt to speak was promptly stoned to death, without the
assembly so much as waiting to ascertain whether he intended to support
the party of Spendius or no.

[Sidenote: βάλλε.]

A considerable number of privates as well as officers were killed in
this manner in the various _émeutes_ which took place; and from the
constant repetition of this act of violence the whole army learnt the
meaning of the word “throw,” although there was not another word which
was intelligible to them all in common. The most usual occasion for
this to happen was when they collected in crowds flushed with wine
after their midday meal. On such occasions, if only some one started
the cry “throw,” such volleys were poured in from every side, and with
such rapidity, that it was impossible for any one to escape who once
ventured to stand forward to address them. The result was that soon
no one had the courage to offer them any counsel at all; and they
accordingly appointed Mathōs and Spendius as their commanders.

[Sidenote: Gesco and his staff seized and thrown into chains.]

+70.+ This complete disorganisation and disorder did not escape
the observation of Gesco. But his chief anxiety was to secure the
safety of his country; and seeing clearly that, if these men were
driven to exasperation, the Carthaginians would be in danger of total
destruction, he exerted himself with desperate courage and persistence:
sometimes summoning their officers, sometimes calling a meeting of
the men according to their nationalities and remonstrating with them.
But on one occasion the Libyans, not having received their wages as
soon as they considered that they ought to have been paid to them,
approached Gesco himself with some insolence. With the idea of rebuking
their precipitancy he refused to produce the pay, and bade them “go
and ask their general Mathōs for it.” This so enraged them, that
without a moment’s delay they first made a raid upon the money that
was kept in readiness, and then arrested Gesco and the Carthaginians
with him. Mathōs and Spendius thought that the speediest way to secure
an outbreak of war was for the men to commit some outrage upon the
sanctity of law and in violation of their engagements. They therefore
co-operated with the mass of the men in their reckless outrages;
plundered the baggage of the Carthaginians along with their money;
manacled Gesco and his staff with every mark of insolent violence,
and committed them into custody. Thenceforth they were at open war
with Carthage, having bound themselves together by oaths which were at
once impious and contrary to the principles universally received among
mankind.

[Sidenote: B.C. 240.]

This was the origin and beginning of the mercenary, or, as it is
also called, the Libyan war. Mathōs lost no time after this outrage
in sending emissaries to the various cities in Libya, urging them to
assert their freedom, and begging them to come to their aid and join
them in their undertaking. The appeal was successful: nearly all the
cities in Libya readily listened to the proposal that they should
revolt against Carthage, and were soon zealously engaged in sending
them supplies and reinforcements. They therefore divided themselves
into two parties; one of which laid siege to Utica, the other to Hippo
Zarytus, because these two cities refused to participate in the revolt.

[Sidenote: Despair at Carthage.]

+71.+ Three things must be noticed in regard to the Carthaginians.
First, among them the means of life of private persons are supplied by
the produce of the land; secondly, all public expenses for war material
and stores are discharged from the tribute paid by the people of Libya;
and thirdly, it is their regular custom to carry on war by means
of mercenary troops. At this moment they not only found themselves
unexpectedly deprived of all these resources at once, but saw each one
of them actually employed against themselves. Such an unlooked-for
event naturally reduced them to a state of great discouragement and
despair. After the long agony of the Sicilian war they were in hopes,
when the peace was ratified, that they might obtain some breathing
space and some period of settled content. The very reverse was now
befalling them. They were confronted by an outbreak of war still more
difficult and formidable. In the former they were disputing with Rome
for the possession of Sicily: but this was a domestic war, and the
issue at stake was the bare existence of themselves and their country.
Besides, the many battles in which they had been engaged at sea had
naturally left them ill supplied with arms, sailors, and vessels.
They had no store of provisions ready, and no expectation whatever
of external assistance from friends or allies. They were indeed now
thoroughly taught the difference between a foreign war, carried on
beyond the seas, and a domestic insurrection and disturbance.

+72.+ And for these overpowering miseries they had themselves to thank
more than any one else. During the late war they had availed themselves
of what they regarded as a reasonable pretext for exercising their
supremacy over the inhabitants of Libya with excessive harshness. They
had exacted half of all agricultural produce; had doubled the tribute
of the towns; and, in levying these contributions, had refused to show
any grace or indulgence whatever to those who were in embarrassed
circumstances. Their admiration and rewards were reserved, not for
those generals who treated the people with mildness and humanity, but
exclusively for those who like Hanno secured them the most abundant
supplies and war material, though at the cost of the harshest treatment
of the provincials.

[Sidenote: Revolt of the country people.]

These people therefore needed no urging to revolt: a single messenger
sufficed. The women, who up to this time had passively looked on
while their husbands and fathers were being led off to prison for the
non-payment of the taxes, now bound themselves by an oath in their
several towns that they would conceal nothing that they possessed;
and, stripping off their ornaments, unreservedly contributed them to
furnish pay for the soldiers. They thus put such large means into the
hands of Mathōs and Spendius, that they not only discharged the arrears
due to the mercenaries, which they had promised them as an inducement
to mutiny, but remained well supplied for future needs. A striking
illustration of the fact that true policy does not regard only the
immediate necessities of the hour, but must ever look still more keenly
to the future.

[Sidenote: Hanno’s management of the war.]

+73.+ No such considerations, however, prevented the Carthaginians
in their hour of distress from appointing Hanno general; because he
had the credit of having on a former occasion reduced the city called
Hecatompylos, in Libya, to obedience. They also set about collecting
mercenaries; arming their own citizens who were of military age;
training and drilling the city cavalry; and refitting what were left of
their ships, triremes, penteconters, and the largest of the pinnaces.
Meanwhile Mathōs, being joined by as many as seventy thousand Libyans,
distributed these fresh troops between the two forces which were
besieging Utica and Hippo Zarytus, and carried on those sieges without
let or hindrance. At the same time they kept firm possession of the
encampment at Tunes, and had thus shut out the Carthaginians from
the whole of outer Libya. For Carthage itself stands on a projecting
peninsula in a gulf, nearly surrounded by the sea and in part also by
a lake. The isthmus that connects it with Libya is three miles broad:
upon one side of this isthmus, in the direction of the open sea and at
no great distance, stands the city of Utica, and on the other stands
Tunes, upon the shore of the lake. The mercenaries occupied both
these points, and having thus cut off the Carthaginians from the open
country, proceeded to take measures against Utica itself. They made
frequent excursions up to the town wall, sometimes by day and sometimes
by night, and were continually throwing the citizens into a state of
alarm and absolute panic.

[Sidenote: Fails to relieve Utica.]

+74.+ Hanno, however, was busying himself with some success in
providing defences. In this department of a general’s duty he showed
considerable ability; but he was quite a different man at the head of
a sally in force: he was not sagacious in his use of opportunities,
and managed the whole business with neither skill nor promptitude. It
was thus that his first expedition miscarried when he went to relieve
Utica. The number of his elephants, of which he had as many as a
hundred, struck terror into the enemy; yet he made so poor a use of
this advantage that, instead of turning it into a complete victory,
he very nearly brought the besieged, as well as himself, to utter
destruction. He brought from Carthage catapults and darts, and in
fact all the apparatus for a siege; and having encamped outside Utica
undertook an assault upon the enemy’s entrenchment. The elephants
forced their way into the camp, and the enemy, unable to withstand
their weight and the fury of their attack, entirely evacuated the
position. They lost a large number from wounds inflicted by the
elephants’ tusks; while the survivors made their way to a certain hill,
which was a kind of natural fortification thickly covered with trees,
and there halted, relying upon the strength of the position. But Hanno,
accustomed to fight with Numidians and Libyans, who, once turned, never
stay their flight till they are two days removed from the scene of the
action, imagined that he had already put an end to the war and had
gained a complete victory. He therefore troubled himself no more about
his men, or about the camp generally, but went inside the town and
occupied himself with his own personal comfort. But the mercenaries,
who had fled in a body on to the hill, had been trained in the daring
tactics of Barcas, and accustomed from their experience in the Sicilian
warfare to retreat and return again to the attack many times in the
same day. They now saw that the general had left his army and gone into
the town, and that the soldiers, owing to their victory, were behaving
carelessly, and in fact slipping out of the camp in various directions:
they accordingly got themselves into order and made an assault upon
the camp; killed a large number of the men; forced the rest to fly
ignominiously to the protection of the city walls and gates; and
possessed themselves of all the baggage and apparatus belonging to the
besieged, which Hanno had brought outside the town in addition to his
own, and thus put into the hands of the enemy.

[Sidenote: Hanno’s continued ill success.]

But this was not the only instance of his incompetence. A few days
afterwards, near a place called Gorza, he came right upon the enemy,
who lay encamped there, and had two opportunities of securing a
victory by pitched battles; and two more by surprising them, as they
changed quarters close to where he was. But in both cases he let the
opportunities slip for want of care and proper calculation.

[Sidenote: Hamilcar Barcas takes the command.]

+75.+ The Carthaginians, therefore, when they saw his mismanagement
of the campaign, once more placed Hamilcar Barcas at the head of
affairs; and despatched him to the war as commander-in-chief, with
seventy elephants, the newly-collected mercenaries, and the deserters
from the enemy; and along with them the cavalry and infantry enrolled
from the citizens themselves, amounting in all to ten thousand men.
His appearance from the first produced an immediate impression. The
expedition was unexpected; and he was thus able, by the dismay which
it produced, to lower the courage of the enemy. He succeeded in
raising the siege of Utica, and showed himself worthy of his former
achievements, and of the confidence felt in him by the people. What he
accomplished on this service was this.

[Sidenote: He gets his men across the Macaras.]

A chain of hills runs along the isthmus connecting Carthage with the
mainland, which are difficult of access, and are crossed by artificial
passes into the mainland; of these hills Mathōs had occupied all the
available points and posted guards there. Besides these there is a
river called Macaras (Bagradas), which at certain points interrupts
the passage of travellers from the city to the mainland, and though
for the most part impassable, owing to the strength of its stream,
is only crossed by one bridge. This means of egress also Mathōs was
guarding securely, and had built a town on it. The result was that, to
say nothing of the Carthaginians entering the mainland with an army,
it was rendered exceedingly difficult even for private individuals,
who might wish to make their way through, to elude the vigilance of
the enemy. This did not escape the observation and care of Hamilcar;
and while revolving every means and every chance of putting an end to
this difficulty about a passage, he at length hit upon the following.
He observed that where the river discharges itself into the sea its
mouth got silted up in certain positions of the wind, and that then
the passage over the river at its mouth became like that over a marsh.
He accordingly got everything ready in the camp for the expedition,
without telling any one what he was going to do; and then watched
for this state of things to occur. When the right moment arrived,
he started under cover of night; and by daybreak had, without being
observed by any one, got his army across this place, to the surprise
of the citizens of Utica as well as of the enemy. Marching across the
plain, he led his men straight against the enemy who were guarding the
bridge.

[Sidenote: And defeats Spendius.]

+76.+ When he understood what had taken place Spendius advanced into
the plain to meet Hamilcar. The force from the city at the bridge
amounted to ten thousand men; that from before Utica to more than
fifteen thousand men; both of which now advanced to support each
other. When they had effected a junction they imagined that they
had the Carthaginians in a trap, and therefore with mutual words of
exhortation passed the order to engage, and at once commenced. Hamilcar
was marching with his elephants in front, his cavalry and light troops
next, while his heavy armed hoplites brought up the rear. But when he
saw the precipitation of the enemy’s attack, he passed the word to
his men to turn to the rear. His instructions were that the troops in
front should, after thus turning to the rear, retire with all speed:
while he again wheeled to the right about what had been originally
his rear divisions, and got them into line successively so as to face
the enemy. The Libyans and mercenaries mistook the object of this
movement, and imagined that the Carthaginians were panic-stricken and
in full retreat. Thereupon they broke from their ranks and, rushing
forward, began a vigorous hand to hand struggle. When, however, they
found that the cavalry had wheeled round again, and were drawn up close
to the hoplites, and that the rest of the army also was being brought
up, surprise filled the Libyans with panic; they immediately turned
and began a retreat as precipitate and disorderly as their advance.
In the blind flight which followed some of them ran foul of their own
rear-guard, who were still advancing, and caused their own destruction
or that of their comrades; but the greater part were trampled to death
by the cavalry and elephants who immediately charged. As many as six
thousand of the Libyans and foreign troops were killed, and about two
thousand taken prisoners. The rest made good their escape, either to
the town on the bridge or to the camp near Utica. After this victory
Hamilcar followed close upon the heels of the enemy, carried the town
on the bridge by assault, the enemy there abandoning it and flying to
Tunes, and then proceeded to scour the rest of the district: some of
the towns submitting, while the greater number he had to reduce by
force. And thus he revived in the breasts of the Carthaginians some
little spirit and courage, or at least rescued them from the state of
absolute despair into which they had fallen.

[Sidenote: Mathōs harasses Hamilcar’s march.]

+77.+ Meanwhile Mathōs himself was continuing the siege of Hippo
Zarytus, and he now counselled Autaritus, the leader of the Gauls,
and Spendius to stick close to the skirts of the enemy, avoiding
the plains, because the enemy were strong in cavalry and elephants,
but marching parallel with them on the <DW72>s of the mountains,
and attacking them whenever they saw them in any difficulty. While
suggesting these tactics, he at the same time sent messengers to the
Numidians and Libyans, entreating them to come to their aid, and not to
let slip the opportunity of securing their own freedom. Accordingly,
Spendius took with him a force of six thousand men, selected from each
of the several nationalities at Tunes, and started, keeping along a
line of hills parallel to the Carthaginians. Besides these six thousand
he had two thousand Gauls under Autaritus, who were all that were
left of the original number, the rest having deserted to the Romans
during the period of the occupation of Eryx. Now it happened that, just
when Hamilcar had taken up a position in a certain plain which was
surrounded on all sides by mountains, the reinforcements of Numidians
and Libyans joined Spendius. The Carthaginians, therefore, suddenly
found a Libyan encampment right on their front, another of Numidians
on their rear, and that of Spendius on their flank; and it seemed
impossible to escape from the danger which thus menaced them on every
side.

[Sidenote: Hamilcar is joined by the Numidian Narávas.]

[Sidenote: Again defeats Spendius.]

+78.+ But there was at that time a certain Narávas, a Numidian of
high rank and warlike spirit, who entertained an ancestral feeling of
affection for the Carthaginians, rendered especially warm at that time
by admiration for Hamilcar. He now thought that he had an excellent
opportunity for an interview and association with that general; and
accordingly came to the Carthaginian quarters with a body of a hundred
Numidians, and boldly approaching the out-works, remained there waving
his hand. Wondering what his object could be Hamilcar sent a horseman
to see; to whom Narávas said that he wished for an interview with
the general. The Carthaginian leader still showing hesitation and
incredulity, Narávas committed his horse and javelins to the care of
his guards, and boldly came into the camp unarmed. His fearlessness
made a profound impression not unmixed with surprise. No further
objection, however, was made to his presence, and the desired interview
was accorded; in which he declared his goodwill to the Carthaginians
generally, and his especial desire to be friends with Barcas. “This
was the motive of his presence,” he said; “he was come with the full
intention of taking his place by his side and of faithfully sharing
all his actions and undertakings.” Hamilcar, on hearing these words,
was so immensely charmed by the young man’s courage in coming, and
his honest simplicity in the interview, that he not only consented to
accept his co-operation, but promised also with an oath that he would
give him his daughter in marriage if he kept faith with Carthage to
the end. The agreement having been thus made, Narávas came with his
division of Numidians, numbering two thousand. Thus reinforced Hamilcar
offered the enemy battle; which Spendius, having joined forces with
the Libyans, accepted; and descending into the plain engaged the
Carthaginians. In the severe battle which followed Hamilcar’s army was
victorious: a result which he owed partly to the excellent behaviour
of the elephants, but particularly to the brilliant services rendered
by Narávas. Autaritus and Spendius managed to escape; but of the rest
as many as ten thousand were killed and four thousand taken prisoners.
When the victory was complete, Hamilcar gave permission to those of
the prisoners who chose to enlist in his army, and furnished them with
arms from the spoils of the enemy’s slain: those who did not choose to
accept this offer he summoned to a meeting and harangued them. He told
them that the crimes committed by them up to that moment were pardoned,
and they were permitted to go their several ways, wheresoever they
chose, but on condition that none of them bore arms against Carthage
again: if any one of them were ever caught so doing, he warned them
distinctly that he would meet with no mercy.

[Sidenote: Mutiny in Sardinia.]

+79.+ This conspiracy of Mathōs and Spendius caused an outbreak about
this same time in another quarter. For the mercenaries who were
in garrison in Sardinia, inspired by their example, attacked the
Carthaginians in the island; beleaguered Bostarus, the commander of
the foreign contingent, in the citadel; and finally put him and his
compatriots to the sword. The Carthaginians thereupon sent another army
into the island under Hanno. But the men deserted to the mutineers; who
then seized Hanno and crucified him, and exercising all their ingenuity
in the invention of tortures racked to death every Carthaginian in
the island. Having got the towns into their power, they thenceforth
kept forcible possession of the island; until they quarrelled with the
natives and were driven by them into Italy. This was the way in which
Carthage lost Sardinia, an island of first rate importance from its
size, the number of its inhabitants, and its natural products. But as
many have described it at great length, I do not think that I need
repeat statements about which there is no manner of dispute.

[Sidenote: B.C. 239. Plan of Spendius for doing away with the good
impression made by the leniency of Barcas.]

To return to Libya. The indulgence shown by Hamilcar to the captives
alarmed Mathōs and Spendius and Autaritus the Gaul. They were afraid
that conciliatory treatment of this sort would induce the Libyans,
and the main body of the mercenaries, to embrace with eagerness the
impunity thus displayed before their eyes. They consulted together,
therefore, how they might by some new act of infamy inflame to
the highest pitch of fury the feelings of their men against the
Carthaginians. They finally determined upon the following plan. They
summoned a meeting of the soldiers; and when it was assembled, they
introduced a bearer of a despatch which they represented to have been
sent by their fellow conspirators in Sardinia. The despatch warned them
to keep a careful watch over Gesco and all his fellow prisoners (whom,
as has been stated, they had treacherously seized in Tunes), as certain
persons in the camp were secretly negotiating with the Carthaginians
for their release. Taking this as his text, Spendius commenced by
urging the men not to put any trust in the indulgence shown by the
Carthaginian general to the prisoners of war, “For,” said he, “it is
with no intention of saving their lives that he adopted this course
in regard to the prisoners; his aim was, by releasing them, to get
us into his power, that punishment might not be confined to some of
us, but might fall on all at once.” He went on to urge them to be on
their guard, lest by letting Gesco’s party go they should teach their
enemies to despise them; and should also do great practical damage to
their own interests, by suffering a man to escape who was an excellent
general, and likely to be a most formidable enemy to themselves. Before
he had finished this speech another courier arrived, pretending to have
been sent by the garrison at Tunes, and bearing a despatch containing
warnings similar to that from Sardinia.

[Sidenote: Murder of Gesco.]

+80.+ It was now the turn of Autaritus the Gaul. “Your only hope,”
he said, “of safety is to reject all hopes which rest on the
Carthaginians. So long as any man clings to the idea of indulgence
at their hands, he cannot possibly be a genuine ally of yours. Never
trust, never listen, never attend to anyone, unless he recommend
unrelenting hostility and implacable hatred towards the Carthaginians:
all who speak on the other side regard as traitors and enemies.” After
this preface, he gave it as his advice that they should put to death
with torture both Gesco and those who had been seized with him, as
well as the Carthaginian prisoners of war who had been captured since.
Now this Autaritus was the most effective speaker of any, because he
could make himself understood to a large number of those present at
a meeting. For, owing to his length of service, he knew how to speak
Phoenician; and Phoenician was the language in which the largest number
of men, thanks to the length of the late war, could listen to with
satisfaction. Accordingly his speech was received with acclamation, and
he stood down amidst loud applause. But when many came forward from the
several nationalities at the same time; and, moved by Gesco’s former
kindnesses to themselves, would have deprecated at least the infliction
of torture, not a word of what they said was understood: partly because
many were speaking at the same time, and partly because each spoke in
his own language. But when at length it was disclosed that what they
meant was to dissuade the infliction of torture, upon one of those
present shouting out “Throw!” they promptly stoned to death all who had
come forward to speak; and their relations buried their bodies, which
were crushed into shapeless masses as though by the feet of elephants.
Still they at least were buried. But the followers of Spendius now
seized Gesco and his fellow prisoners, numbering about seven hundred,
led them outside the stockade, and having made them march a short
distance from the camp, first cut off their hands, beginning with
Gesco, the man whom a short while before they had selected out of all
Carthage as their benefactor and had chosen as arbitrator in their
controversy. When they had cut off their hands, they proceeded to lop
off the extremities of the unhappy men, and having thus mutilated them
and broken their legs, they threw them still alive into a trench.

+81.+ When news of this dreadful affair reached the Carthaginians, they
were powerless indeed to do anything, but they were filled with horror;
and in a transport of agony despatched messengers to Hamilcar and the
second general Hanno, entreating them to rally to their aid and avenge
the unhappy victims; and at the same time they sent heralds to the
authors of this crime to negotiate for the recovery of the dead bodies.
But the latter sternly refused; and warned the messengers to send
neither herald nor ambassador to them again; for the same punishment
which had just befallen Gesco awaited all who came. And for the future
they passed a resolution, which they encouraged each other to observe,
to put every Carthaginian whom they caught to death with torture; and
that whenever they captured one of their auxiliaries they would cut
off his hands and send him back to Carthage. And this resolution they
exactly and persistently carried out. Such horrors justify the remark
that it is not only the bodies of men, and the ulcers and imposthumes
which are bred in them, that grow to a fatal and completely incurable
state of inflammation, but their souls also most of all. For as in
the case of ulcers, sometimes medical treatment on the one hand only
serves to irritate them and make them spread more rapidly, while if,
on the other hand, the medical treatment is stopped, having nothing
to check their natural destructiveness, they gradually destroy the
substance on which they feed; just so at times it happens that similar
plague spots and gangrenes fasten upon men’s souls; and when this is
so, no wild beast can be more wicked or more cruel than a man. To men
in such a frame of mind if you show indulgence or kindness, they regard
it as a cover for trickery and sinister designs, and only become more
suspicious and more inflamed against the authors of it; while if you
retaliate, their passions are aroused to a kind of dreadful rivalry,
and then there is no crime too monstrous or too cruel for them to
commit. The upshot with these men was, that their feelings became so
brutalised that they lost the instincts of humanity: which we must
ascribe in the first place, and to the greatest extent, to uncivilised
habits and a wretchedly bad early training; but many other things
contributed to this result, and among them we must reckon as most
important the acts of violence and rapacity committed by their leaders,
sins which at that time were prevalent among the whole mercenary body,
but especially so with their leaders.

[Sidenote: Quarrels of Hanno and Hamilcar.]

[Sidenote: Revolt of Hippo Zarytus and Utica.]

+82.+ Alarmed by the recklessness displayed by the enemy, Hamilcar
summoned Hanno to join him, being convinced that a consolidation of
the two armies would give him the best chance of putting an end to
the whole war. Such of the enemy as he took in the field he put to
execution on the spot, while those who were made prisoners and brought
to him he threw to the elephants to be trampled to death; for he now
made up his mind that the only possibility of finishing the war was
to entirely destroy the enemy. But just as the Carthaginians were
beginning to entertain brighter hopes in regard to the war, a reverse
as complete as it was unexpected brought their fortunes to the lowest
ebb. For these two generals, when they had joined forces, quarrelled so
bitterly with each other, that they not only omitted to take advantage
of chances against the enemy, but by their mutual animosity gave the
enemy many opportunities against themselves. Finding this to be the
case, the Carthaginian government sent out instructions that one of the
generals was to retire, the other to remain, and that the army itself
was to decide which of them it should be. This was one cause of the
reverse in the fortunes of Carthage at this time. Another, which was
almost contemporaneous, was this. Their chief hope of furnishing the
army with provisions and other necessaries rested upon the supplies
that were being brought from a place to which they give the name of
Emporiae: but as these supplies were on their way, they were overtaken
by a storm at sea and entirely destroyed. This was all the more fatal
because Sardinia was lost to them at the time, as we have seen,
and that island had always been of the greatest service to them in
difficulties of this sort. But the worst blow of all was the revolt of
the cities of Hippo Zarytus and Utica, the only cities in all Libya
that had been faithful to them, not only in the present war, but also
at the time of the invasion of Agathocles, as well as that of the
Romans. To both these latter they had offered a gallant resistance;
and, in short, had never at any time adopted any policy hostile to
Carthage. But now they were not satisfied with simply revolting to
the Libyans, without any reason to allege for their conduct. With all
the bitterness of turncoats, they suddenly paraded an ostentatious
friendship and fidelity to them, and gave practical expression to
implacable rage and hatred towards the Carthaginians. They killed every
man of the force which had come from Carthage to their aid, as well as
its commander, and threw the bodies from the wall. They surrendered
their town to the Libyans, while they even refused the request of the
Carthaginians to be allowed to bury the corpses of their unfortunate
soldiers. Mathōs and Spendius were so elated by these events that
they were emboldened to attempt Carthage itself. But Barcas had now
got Hannibal as his coadjutor, who had been sent by the citizens
to the army in the place of Hanno,—recalled in accordance with the
sentence of the army, which the government had left to their discretion
in reference to the disputes that arose between the two generals.
Accompanied, therefore, by this Hannibal and by Narávas, Hamilcar
scoured the country to intercept the supplies of Mathōs and Spendius,
receiving his most efficient support in this, as in other things, from
the Numidian Narávas.

[Sidenote: Friendly disposition of Rome.]

[Sidenote: Hiero of Syracuse.]

+83.+ Such being the position of their forces in the field, the
Carthaginians, finding themselves hemmed in on every side, were
compelled to have recourse to the help of the free states in alliance
with them.[145] Now Hiero, of Syracuse, had during this war been all
along exceedingly anxious to do everything which the Carthaginians
asked him; and at this point of it was more forward to do so than
ever, from a conviction that it was for his interest, with a view
alike to his own sovereignty and to his friendship with Rome, that
Carthage should not perish, and so leave the superior power to work
its own will without resistance. And his reasoning was entirely sound
and prudent. It is never right to permit such a state of things; nor
to help any one to build up so preponderating a power as to make
resistance to it impossible, however just the cause. Not that the
Romans themselves had failed to observe the obligations of the treaty,
or were showing any failure of friendly dispositions; though at first
a question had arisen between the two powers, from the following
circumstance. At the beginning of the war, certain persons sailing from
Italy with provisions for the mutineers, the Carthaginians captured
them and forced them to land in their own harbour; and presently had
as many as five hundred such persons in their prisons. This caused
considerable annoyance at Rome: but, after sending ambassadors to
Carthage and recovering possession of the men by diplomatic means, the
Romans were so much gratified that, by way of returning the favour,
they restored the prisoners made in the Sicilian war whom they still
retained; and from that time forth responded cheerfully and generously
to all requests made to them. They allowed their merchants to export
to Carthage whatever from time to time was wanted, and prohibited
those who were exporting to the mutineers. When, subsequently, the
mercenaries in Sardinia, having revolted from Carthage, invited their
interference on the island, they did not respond to the invitation; nor
when the people of Utica offered them their submission did they accept
it, but kept strictly to the engagements contained in the treaty.

[Sidenote: B.C. 238. Hamilcar, with assistance from Sicily, surrounds
Mathōs and Spendius.]

+84.+ The assistance thus obtained from these allies encouraged the
Carthaginians to maintain their resistance: while Mathōs and Spendius
found themselves quite as much in the position of besieged as in that
of besiegers; for Hamilcar’s force reduced them to such distress
for provisions that they were at last compelled to raise the siege.
However, after a short interval, they managed to muster the most
effective of the mercenaries and Libyans, to the number in all of fifty
thousand, among whom, besides others, was Zarzas the Libyan, with his
division, and commenced once more to watch and follow on the flank of
Hamilcar’s march. Their method was to keep away from the level country,
for fear of the elephants and the cavalry of Narávas; but to seize in
advance of him all points of vantage, whether it were rising ground or
narrow pass. In these operations they showed themselves quite a match
for their opponents in the fury of their assault and the gallantry of
their attempts; but their ignorance of military tactics frequently
placed them at a disadvantage. It was, in fact, a real and practical
illustration of the difference between scientific and unscientific
warfare: between the art of a general and the mechanical movements of
a soldier. Like a good draught-player, by isolating and surrounding
them, he destroyed large numbers in detail without coming to a general
engagement at all; and in movements of more importance he cut off
many without resistance by enticing them into ambushes; while he
threw others into utter dismay by suddenly appearing where they least
expected him, sometimes by day and sometimes by night: and all whom he
took alive he threw to the elephants. Finally, he managed unexpectedly
to beleaguer them on ground highly unfavourable to them and convenient
for his own force; and reduced them to such a pitch of distress that,
neither venturing to risk an engagement nor being able to run away,
because they were entirely surrounded by a trench and stockade, they
were at last compelled by starvation to feed on each other: a fitting
retribution at the hands of Providence for their violation of all laws
human and divine in their conduct to their enemies. To sally forth to
an engagement they did not dare, for certain defeat stared them in the
face, and they knew what vengeance awaited them if they were taken; and
as to making terms, it never occurred to them to mention it, they were
conscious that they had gone too far for that. They still hoped for the
arrival of relief from Tunes, of which their officers assured them, and
accordingly shrank from no suffering however terrible.

[Sidenote: Spendius and Autaritus fall into the hands of Hamilcar.]

+85.+ But when they had used up for food the captives in this horrible
manner, and then the bodies of their slaves, and still no one came to
their relief from Tunes, their sufferings became too dreadful to bear;
and the common soldiers broke out into open threats of violence against
their officers. Thereupon Autaritus, Zarzas, and Spendius decided
to put themselves into the hands of the enemy and to hold a parley
with Hamilcar, and try to make terms. They accordingly sent a herald
and obtained permission for the despatch of an embassy. It consisted
of ten ambassadors, who, on their arrival at the Carthaginian camp,
concluded an agreement with Hamilcar on these terms: “The Carthaginians
may select any ten men they choose from the enemy, and allow the rest
to depart with one tunic a-piece.” No sooner had these terms been
agreed to, than Hamilcar said at once that he selected, according
to the terms of the agreement, the ten ambassadors themselves. The
Carthaginians thus got possession of Autaritus, Spendius, and the other
most conspicuous officers. The Libyans saw that their officers were
arrested, and not knowing the terms of the treaty, believed that some
perfidy was being practised against them, and accordingly flew to seize
their arms. Hamilcar thereupon surrounded them with his elephants and
his entire force, and destroyed them to a man. This slaughter, by which
more than forty thousand perished, took place near a place called the
Saw, so named from its shape resembling that tool.

[Sidenote: Siege of Mathōs in Tunes.]

[Sidenote: Defeat and death of Hannibal.]

+86.+ This achievement of Hamilcar revived the hopes of the
Carthaginians who had been in absolute despair: while he, in
conjunction with Narávas and Hannibal, employed himself in traversing
the country and visiting the cities. His victory secured the submission
of the Libyans; and when they had come in, and the greater number of
the towns had been reduced to obedience, he and his colleagues advanced
to attack Tunes, and commenced besieging Mathōs. Hannibal pitched his
camp on the side of the town nearest to Carthage, and Hamilcar on the
opposite side. When this was done they brought the captives taken from
the army of Spendius and crucified them in the sight of the enemy. But
observing that Hannibal was conducting his command with negligence and
over-confidence, Mathōs assaulted the ramparts, killed many of the
Carthaginians, and drove the entire army from the camp. All the baggage
fell into the hands of the enemy, and Hannibal himself was made a
prisoner. They at once took him up to the cross on which Spendius was
hanging, and after the infliction of exquisite tortures, took down the
latter’s body and fastened Hannibal, still living, to his cross; and
then slaughtered thirty Carthaginians of the highest rank round the
corpse of Spendius. It seemed as though Fortune designed a competition
in cruelty, giving either side alternately the opportunity of outdoing
the other in mutual vengeance. Owing to the distance of the two camps
from each other it was late before Barcas discovered the attack made
from the town; nor, when he had discovered it, could he even then go to
the rescue with the necessary speed, because the intervening country
was rugged and difficult. He therefore broke up his camp, and leaving
Tunes marched down the bank of the river Macaras, and pitched his camp
close to its mouth and to the sea.

[Sidenote: By a final effort the Carthaginians raise a reinforcement
for Hamilcar.]

[Sidenote: Mathōs beaten and captured.]

+87.+ This unexpected reverse reduced the Carthaginians once more to
a melancholy state of despair. But though their recent elation of
spirit was followed so closely by this depression, they did not fail
to do what they could for their own preservation. They selected thirty
members of the Senate; with them they associated Hanno, who had some
time ago been recalled; and, arming all that were left of military
age in the city, despatched them to Barcas, with the feeling that
they were now making their supreme effort. They strictly charged the
members of the Senate to use every effort to reconcile the two generals
Hamilcar and Hanno, and to make them forget their old quarrel and act
harmoniously, in view of the imminence of the danger. Accordingly,
after the employment of many various arguments, they induced the
generals to meet; and Hanno and Barcas were compelled to give in
and yield to their representations. The result was that they ever
afterwards co-operated with each other so cordially, that Mathōs found
himself continually worsted in the numerous skirmishes which took place
round the town called Leptis, as well as certain other towns; and at
last became eager to bring the matter to the decision of a general
engagement, a desire in which the Carthaginians also shared in an equal
degree. Both sides therefore having determined upon this course: they
summoned all their allies to join them in confronting the peril, and
collected the garrisons stationed in the various towns, conscious that
they were about to stake their all on the hazard. All being ready on
either side for the conflict, they gave each other battle by mutual
consent, both sides being drawn up in full military array. When victory
declared itself on the side of the Carthaginians, the larger number of
the Libyans perished on the field; and the rest, having escaped to a
certain town, surrendered shortly afterwards; while Mathōs himself was
taken prisoner by his enemies.

[Sidenote: Reduction of Hippo and Utica, B.C. 238.]

+88.+ Most places in Libya submitted to Carthage after this battle.
But the towns of Hippo and Utica still held out, feeling that they had
no reasonable grounds for obtaining terms, because their original acts
of hostility left them no place for mercy or pardon. So true is it
that even in such outbreaks, however criminal in themselves, it is of
inestimable advantage to be moderate, and to refrain from wanton acts
which commit their perpetrator beyond all power of forgiveness. Nor did
their attitude of defiance help these cities. Hanno invested one and
Barcas the other, and quickly reduced them to accept whatever terms the
Carthaginians might determine.

[Sidenote: B.C. 241-238.]

The war with the Libyans had indeed reduced Carthage to dreadful
danger; but its termination enabled her not only to re-establish her
authority over Libya, but also to inflict condign punishment upon the
authors of the revolt. For the last act in the drama was performed by
the young men conducting a triumphal procession through the town, and
finally inflicting every kind of torture upon Mathōs. For three years
and about four months did the mercenaries maintain a war against the
Carthaginians which far surpassed any that I ever heard of for cruelty
and inhumanity.

[Sidenote: The Romans interfere in Sardinia.]

And about the same time the Romans took in hand a naval expedition to
Sardinia upon the request of the mercenaries who had deserted from
that island and come to Italy; and when the Carthaginians expressed
indignation at this, on the ground that the lordship over Sardinia
more properly belonged to them, and were preparing to take measures
against those who caused the revolt of the island, the Romans voted
to declare war against them, on the pretence that they were making
warlike preparations, not against Sardinia, but against themselves. The
Carthaginians, however, having just had an almost miraculous escape
from annihilation in the recent war, were in every respect disabled
from renewing their quarrel with the Romans. They therefore yielded to
the necessities of the hour, and not only abandoned Sardinia, but paid
the Romans twelve hundred talents into the bargain, that they might not
be obliged to undertake the war for the present.




BOOK II


[Sidenote: Recapitulation of the subjects treated in Book I.]

+1.+ In the previous book I have described how the Romans, having
subdued all Italy, began to aim at foreign dominion; how they crossed
to Sicily, and the reasons of the war which they entered into against
the Carthaginians for the possession of that island. Next I stated at
what period they began the formation of a navy; and what befell both
the one side and the other up to the end of the war; the consequence
of which was that the Carthaginians entirely evacuated Sicily, and the
Romans took possession of the whole island, except such parts as were
still under the rule of Hiero. Following these events I endeavoured to
describe how the mutiny of the mercenaries against Carthage, in what
is called the Libyan War, burst out; the lengths to which the shocking
outrages in it went; its surprises and extraordinary incidents, until
its conclusion, and the final triumph of Carthage. I must now relate
the events which immediately succeeded these, touching summarily upon
each in accordance with my original plan.

[Sidenote: B.C. 238, Hamilcar and his son Hannibal sent to Spain.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 238-229.]

As soon as they had brought the Libyan war to a conclusion the
Carthaginian government collected an army and despatched it under the
command of Hamilcar to Iberia. This general took over the command of
the troops, and with his son Hannibal, then nine years old, crossing
by the Pillars of Hercules, set about recovering the Carthaginian
possessions in Iberia. He spent nine years in Iberia, and after
reducing many Iberian tribes by war or diplomacy to obedience to
Carthage he died in a manner worthy of his great achievements; for he
lost his life in a battle against the most warlike and powerful tribes,
in which he showed a conspicuous and even reckless personal gallantry.
The Carthaginians appointed his son-in-law Hasdrubal to succeed him,
who was at the time in command of the fleet.

[Sidenote: Illyricum.]

+2.+ It was at this same period that the Romans for the first time
crossed to Illyricum and that part of Europe with an army. The history
of this expedition must not be treated as immaterial; but must be
carefully studied by those who wish to understand clearly the story I
have undertaken to tell, and to trace the progress and consolidation of
the Roman Empire.

[Sidenote: B.C. 233-232.]

[Sidenote: Siege of Medion in Acarnania.]

Agron, king of the Illyrians, was the son of Pleuratus, and possessed
the most powerful force, both by land and sea, of any of the kings who
had reigned in Illyria before him. By a bribe received from Demetrius
he was induced to promise help to the Medionians, who were at that
time being besieged by the Aetolians, who, being unable to persuade
the Medionians to join their league, had determined to reduce the city
by force. They accordingly levied their full army, pitched their camp
under the walls of the city, and kept up a continuous blockade, using
every means to force their way in, and every kind of siege-machine. But
when the time of the annual election of their Strategus drew near, the
besieged being now in great distress, and seeming likely every day to
surrender, the existing Strategus made an appeal to the Aetolians. He
argued that as he had had during his term of office all the suffering
and the danger, it was but fair that when they got possession of the
town he should have the apportioning of the spoil, and the privilege
of inscribing his name on such arms as should be preserved for
dedication. This was resisted by some, and especially by those who were
candidates for the office, who urged upon the Assembly not to prejudge
this matter, but to leave it open for fortune to determine who was
to be invested with this honour; and, finally, the Aetolians decided
that whoever was general when the city was taken should share the
apportioning of the spoils, and the honour of inscribing the arms, with
his predecessor.

[Sidenote: The Illyrians relieve Medion.]

+3.+ The decision was come to on the day before the election of a
new Strategus, and the transference of the command had, according
to the Aetolian custom, to take place. But on that very night a
hundred galleys with five thousand Illyrians on board, sailed up to
land near Medion. Having dropped anchor at daybreak, they effected
a disembarkation with secrecy and despatch; they then formed in the
order customary in their country, and advanced in their several
companies against the Aetolian lines. These last were overwhelmed
with astonishment at the unexpected nature and boldness of the move;
but they had long been inspired with overweening self-confidence, and
having full reliance in their own forces were far from being dismayed.
They drew up the greater part of their hoplites and cavalry in front of
their lines on the level ground, and with a portion of their cavalry
and their light infantry they hastened to occupy some rising ground in
front of their camp, which nature had made easily defensible. A single
charge, however, of the Illyrians, whose numbers and close order gave
them irresistible weight, served to dislodge the light-armed troops,
and forced the cavalry who were on the ground with them to retire
to the hoplites. But the Illyrians, being on the higher ground, and
charging down from it upon the Aetolian troops formed up on the plain,
routed them without difficulty; the Medionians at the same time making
a diversion in their favour by sallying out of the town and charging
the Aetolians. Thus, after killing a great number, and taking a still
greater number prisoners, and becoming masters also of their arms and
baggage, the Illyrians, having carried out the orders of their king,
conveyed their baggage and the rest of the booty to their boats, and
immediately set sail for their own country.

+4.+ This was a most unexpected relief to the Medionians. They met in
public assembly and deliberated on the whole business, and especially
as to the inscribing the arms reserved for dedication. They decided,
in mockery of the Aetolian decree, that the inscription should contain
the name of the Aetolian commander on the day of battle, and of the
candidates for succession to his office. And indeed Fortune seems,
in what happened to them, to have designed a display of her power to
the rest of mankind. The very thing which these men were in momentary
expectation of undergoing at the hands of their enemies, she put it in
their power to inflict upon those enemies, and all within a very brief
interval. The unexpected disaster of the Aetolians, too, may teach all
the world not to calculate on the future as though it were the actually
existent, and not to reckon securely on what may still turn out quite
otherwise, but to allow a certain margin to the unexpected. And as this
is true everywhere and to every man, so is it especially true in war.

[Sidenote: Death of Agron, who is succeeded by his wife Teuta, B.C.
231.]

When his galleys returned, and he heard from his officers the events
of the expedition, King Agron was so beside himself with joy at the
idea of having conquered the Aetolians, whose confidence in their
own prowess had been extreme, that, giving himself over to excessive
drinking and other similar indulgences, he was attacked by a pleurisy
of which in a few days he died. His wife Teuta succeeded him on the
throne; and managed the various details of administration by means of
friends whom she could trust. But her woman’s head had been turned by
the success just related, and she fixed her gaze upon that, and had no
eyes for anything going on outside the country. Her first measure was
to grant letters of marque to privateers, authorising them to plunder
all whom they fell in with; and she next collected a fleet and military
force as large as the former one, and despatched them with general
instructions to the leaders to regard every land as belonging to an
enemy.

[Sidenote: Teuta’s piratical fleet, B.C. 230.]

[Sidenote: Takes Phoenice in Epirus.]

+5.+ Their first attack was to be upon the coast of Elis and Messenia,
which had been from time immemorial the scene of the raids of the
Illyrians. For owing to the length of their seaboard, and to the fact
that their most powerful cities were inland, troops raised to resist
them had a great way to go, and were long in coming to the spot where
the Illyrian pirates landed; who accordingly overran those districts,
and swept them clean without having anything to fear. However, when
this fleet was off Phoenice in Epirus they landed to get supplies.
There they fell in with some Gauls, who to the number of eight hundred
were stationed at Phoenice, being in the pay of the Epirotes; and
contracted with them to betray the town into their hands. Having made
this bargain, they disembarked and took the town and everything in
it at the first blow, the Gauls within the walls acting in collusion
with them. When this news was known, the Epirotes raised a general
levy and came in haste to the rescue. Arriving in the neighbourhood
of Phoenice, they pitched their camp so as to have the river which
flows past Phoenice between them and the enemy, tearing up the planks
of the bridge over it for security. But news being brought them that
Scerdilaidas with five thousand Illyrians was marching overland by
way of the pass near Antigoneia, they detached some of their forces
to guard that town; while the main body gave themselves over to an
unrestrained indulgence in all the luxuries which the country could
supply; and among other signs of demoralisation they neglected the
necessary precaution of posting sentries and night pickets. The
division of their forces, as well as the careless conduct of the
remainder, did not escape the observation of the Illyrians; who,
sallying out at night, and replacing the planks on the bridge, crossed
the river safely, and having secured a strong position, remained there
quietly for the rest of the night. At daybreak both armies drew up
their forces in front of the town and engaged. In this battle the
Epirotes were decidedly worsted: a large number of them fell, still
more were taken prisoners, and the rest fled in the direction of the
country of the Atintanes.

[Sidenote: The Aetolian and Achaean leagues send a force to the relief
of the Epirotes. A truce is made. The Illyrians depart.]

+6.+ Having met with this reverse, and having lost all the hopes which
they had cherished, the Epirotes turned to the despatch of ambassadors
to the Aetolians and Achaeans, earnestly begging for their assistance.
Moved by pity for their misfortunes, these nations consented; and
an army of relief sent out by them arrived at Helicranum. Meanwhile
the Illyrians who had occupied Phoenice, having effected a junction
with Scerdilaidas, advanced with him to this place, and, taking up a
position opposite to this army of relief, wished at first to give it
battle. But they were embarrassed by the unfavourable nature of the
ground; and just then a despatch was received from Teuta, ordering
their instant return, because certain Illyrians had revolted to the
Dardani. Accordingly, after merely stopping to plunder Epirus, they
made a truce with the inhabitants, by which they undertook to deliver
up all freemen, and the city of Phoenice, for a fixed ransom. They
then took the slaves they had captured and the rest of their booty to
their galleys, and some of them sailed away; while those who were with
Scerdilaidas retired by land through the pass at Antigoneia, after
inspiring no small or ordinary terror in the minds of the Greeks who
lived along the coast. For seeing the most securely placed and powerful
city of Epirus thus unexpectedly reduced to slavery, they one and all
began henceforth to feel anxious, not merely as in former times for
their property in the open country, but for the safety of their own
persons and cities.

The Epirotes were thus unexpectedly preserved: but so far from trying
to retaliate on those who had wronged them, or expressing gratitude
to those who had come to their relief, they sent ambassadors in
conjunction with the Acarnanians to Queen Teuta, and made a treaty with
the Illyrians, in virtue of which they engaged henceforth to co-operate
with them and against the Achaean and Aetolian leagues. All which
proceedings showed conclusively the levity of their conduct towards men
who had stood their friends, as well as an originally short-sighted
policy in regard to their own interests.

+7.+ That men, in the infirmity of human nature, should fall into
misfortunes which defy calculation, is the fault not of the sufferers
but of Fortune, and of those who do the wrong; but that they should
from mere levity, and with their eyes open, thrust themselves upon the
most serious disasters is without dispute the fault of the victims
themselves. Therefore it is that pity and sympathy and assistance await
those whose failure is due to Fortune: reproach and rebuke from all men
of sense those who have only their own folly to thank for it.

[Sidenote: The career of a body of Gallic mercenaries,]

[Sidenote: at Agrigentum,]

[Sidenote: at Eryx.]

[Sidenote: Disarmed by the Romans.]

It is the latter that the Epirotes now richly deserved at the hands
of the Greeks. For in the first place, who in his senses, knowing
the common report as to the character of the Gauls, would not have
hesitated to trust to them a city so rich, and offering so many
opportunities for treason? And again, who would not have been on his
guard against the bad character of this particular body of them?
For they had originally been driven from their native country by an
outburst of popular indignation at an act of treachery done by them
to their own kinsfolk and relations. Then having been received by
the Carthaginians, because of the exigencies of the war in which the
latter were engaged, and being drafted into Agrigentum to garrison
it (being at the time more than three thousand strong), they seized
the opportunity of a dispute as to pay, arising between the soldiers
and their generals, to plunder the city; and again being brought by
the Carthaginians into Eryx to perform the same duty, they first
endeavoured to betray the city and those who were shut up in it with
them to the Romans who were besieging it; and when they failed in that
treason, they deserted in a body to the enemy: whose trust they also
betrayed by plundering the temple of Aphrodite in Eryx. Thoroughly
convinced, therefore, of their abominable character, as soon as they
had made peace with Carthage the Romans made it their first business to
disarm them, put them on board ship, and forbid them ever to enter any
part of Italy. These were the men whom the Epirotes made the protectors
of their democracy and the guardians of their laws! To such men as
these they entrusted their most wealthy city! How then can it be denied
that they were the cause of their own misfortunes?

My object, in commenting on the blind folly of the Epirotes, is to
point out that it is never wise to introduce a foreign garrison,
especially of barbarians, which is too strong to be controlled.

[Sidenote: Illyrian pirates.]

[Sidenote: The Romans interfere, B.C. 230.]

[Sidenote: Queen Teuta’s reception of the Roman legates.]

[Sidenote: A Roman legate assassinated.]

+8.+ To return to the Illyrians. From time immemorial they had
oppressed and pillaged vessels sailing from Italy: and now while
their fleet was engaged at Phoenice a considerable number of them,
separating from the main body, committed acts of piracy on a number of
Italian merchants: some they merely plundered, others they murdered,
and a great many they carried off alive into captivity. Now, though
complaints against the Illyrians had reached the Roman government in
times past, they had always been neglected; but now when more and
more persons approached the Senate on this subject, they appointed
two ambassadors, Gaius and Lucius Coruncanius, to go to Illyricum and
investigate the matter. But on the arrival of her galleys from Epirus,
the enormous quantity and beauty of the spoils which they brought
home (for Phoenice was by far the wealthiest city in Epirus at that
time), so fired the imagination of Queen Teuta, that she was doubly
eager to carry on the predatory warfare on the coasts of Greece. At
the moment, however, she was stopped by the rebellion at home; but it
had not taken her long to put down the revolt in Illyria, and she was
engaged in besieging Issa, the last town which held out, when just
at that very time the Roman ambassadors arrived. A time was fixed
for their audience, and they proceeded to discuss the injuries which
their citizens had sustained. Throughout the interview, however,
Teuta listened with an insolent and disdainful air; and when they had
finished their speech, she replied that she would endeavour to take
care that no injury should be inflicted on Roman citizens by Illyrian
officials; but that it was not the custom for the sovereigns of Illyria
to hinder private persons from taking booty at sea. Angered by these
words, the younger of the two ambassadors used a plainness of speech
which, though thoroughly to the point, was rather ill-timed. “The
Romans,” he said, “O Teuta, have a most excellent custom of using the
State for the punishment of private wrongs and the redress of private
grievances: and we will endeavour, God willing, before long to compel
you to improve the relations between the sovereign and the subject
in Illyria.” The queen received this plain speaking with womanish
passion and unreasoning anger. So enraged was she at the speech that,
in despite of the conventions universally observed among mankind, she
despatched some men after the ambassadors, as they were sailing home,
to kill the one who had used this plainness. Upon this being reported
at Rome the people were highly incensed at the queen’s violation of the
law of nations, and at once set about preparations for war, enrolling
legions and collecting a fleet.

[Sidenote: B.C. 229. Another piratical fleet sent out by Teuta.]

[Sidenote: Their treacherous attack on Epidamnus, which is repulsed.]

[Sidenote: Attack on Corcyra.]

[Sidenote: The Corcyreans appeal to the Aetolian and Achaean leagues.]

+9.+ When the season for sailing was come Teuta sent out a larger fleet
of galleys than ever against the Greek shores, some of which sailed
straight to Corcyra; while a portion of them put into the harbour of
Epidamnus on the pretext of taking in victual and water, but really to
attack the town. The Epidamnians received them without suspicion and
without taking any precautions. Entering the town therefore clothed
merely in their tunics, as though they were only come to fetch water,
but with swords concealed in the water vessels, they slew the guards
stationed at the gates, and in a brief space were masters of the
gate-tower. Being energetically supported by a reinforcement from the
ships, which came quickly up in accordance with a pre-arrangement, they
got possession of the greater part of the walls without difficulty. But
though the citizens were taken off their guard they made a determined
and desperate resistance, and the Illyrians after maintaining their
ground for some time were eventually driven out of the town. So the
Epidamnians on this occasion went near to lose their city by their
carelessness; but by the courage which they displayed they saved
themselves from actual damage while receiving a useful lesson for the
future. The Illyrians who had engaged in this enterprise made haste to
put to sea, and, rejoining the advanced squadron, put in at Corcyra:
there, to the terror of the inhabitants, they disembarked and set
about besieging the town. Dismayed and despairing of their safety, the
Corcyreans, acting in conjunction with the people of Apollonia and
Epidamnus, sent off envoys to the Achaean and Aetolian leagues, begging
for instant help, and entreating them not to allow of their being
deprived of their homes by the Illyrians. The petition was accepted,
and the Achaean and Aetolian leagues combined to send aid. The ten
decked ships of war belonging to the Achaeans were manned, and having
been fitted out in a few days, set sail for Corcyra in hopes of raising
the siege.

[Sidenote: Defeat of the Achaean ships.]

[Sidenote: Corcyra submits.]

+10.+ But the Illyrians obtained a reinforcement of seven decked ships
from the Acarnanians, in virtue of their treaty with that people, and,
putting to sea, engaged the Achaean fleet off the islands called Paxi.
The Acarnanian and Achaean ships fought without victory declaring for
either, and without receiving any further damage than having some
of their crew wounded. But the Illyrians lashed their galleys four
together, and, caring nothing for any damage that might happen to
them, grappled with the enemy by throwing their galleys athwart their
prows and encouraging them to charge; when the enemies’ prows struck
them, and got entangled by the lashed-together galleys getting hitched
on to their forward gear, the Illyrians leaped upon the decks of the
Achaean ships and captured them by the superior number of their armed
men. In this way they took four triremes, and sunk one quinquereme with
all hands, on board of which Margos of Caryneia was sailing, who had
all his life served the Achaean league with complete integrity. The
vessels engaged with the Acarnanians, seeing the triumphant success of
the Illyrians, and trusting to their own speed, hoisted their sails
to the wind and effected their voyage home without further disaster.
The Illyrians, on the other hand, filled with self-confidence by their
success, continued their siege of the town in high spirits, and without
putting themselves to any unnecessary trouble; while the Corcyreans,
reduced to despair of safety by what had happened, after sustaining
the siege for a short time longer, made terms with the Illyrians,
consenting to receive a garrison, and with it Demetrius of Pharos.
After this had been settled, the Illyrian admirals put to sea again;
and, having arrived at Epidamnus, once more set about besieging that
town.

[Sidenote: B.C. 229. The Roman Consuls, with fleet and army, start to
punish the Illyrians.]

[Sidenote: Demetrius of Pharos.]

[Sidenote: Corcyra becomes a “friend of Rome.”]

[Sidenote: Aulus Postumius.]

[Sidenote: The Roman settlement of Illyricum.]

+11.+ In this same season one of the Consuls, Gnaeus Fulvius, started
from Rome with two hundred ships, and the other Consul, Aulus
Postumius, with the land forces. The plan of Gnaeus was to sail direct
to Corcyra, because he supposed that he should find the result of the
siege still undecided. But when he found that he was too late for
that, he determined nevertheless to sail to the island because he
wished to know the exact facts as to what had happened there, and to
test the sincerity of the overtures that had been made by Demetrius.
For Demetrius, being in disgrace with Teuta, and afraid of what she
might do to him, had been sending messages to Rome, offering to put
the city and everything else of which he was in charge into their
hands. Delighted at the appearance of the Romans, the Corcyreans not
only surrendered the garrison to them, with the consent of Demetrius,
but committed themselves also unconditionally to the Roman protection;
believing that this was their only security in the future against the
piratical incursions of the Illyrians. So the Romans, having admitted
the Corcyreans into the number of the friends of Rome, sailed for
Apollonia, with Demetrius to act as their guide for the rest of the
campaign. At the same time the other Consul, Aulus Postumius, conveyed
his army across from Brundisium, consisting of twenty thousand infantry
and about two thousand horse. This army, as well as the fleet under
Gnaeus Fulvius, being directed upon Apollonia, which at once put itself
under Roman protection, both forces were again put in motion on news
being brought that Epidamnus was being besieged by the enemy. No sooner
did the Illyrians learn the approach of the Romans than they hurriedly
broke up the siege and fled. The Romans, taking the Epidamnians under
their protection, advanced into the interior of Illyricum, subduing the
Ardiaei as they went. They were met on their march by envoys from many
tribes: those of the Partheni offered an unconditional surrender, as
also did those of the Atintanes. Both were accepted: and the Roman army
proceeded towards Issa, which was being besieged by Illyrian troops. On
their arrival, they forced the enemy to raise the siege, and received
the Issaeans also under their protection. Besides, as the fleet coasted
along, they took certain Illyrian cities by storm; among which was
Nutria, where they lost not only a large number of soldiers, but some
of the Military Tribunes also and the Quaestor. But they captured
twenty of the galleys which were conveying the plunder from the country.

Of the Illyrian troops engaged in blockading Issa, those that belonged
to Pharos were left unharmed, as a favour to Demetrius; while all
the rest scattered and fled to Arbo. Teuta herself, with a very few
attendants, escaped to Rhizon, a small town very strongly fortified,
and situated on the river of the same name. Having accomplished all
this, and having placed the greater part of Illyria under Demetrius,
and invested him with a wide dominion, the Consuls retired to Epidamnus
with their fleet and army.

[Sidenote: B.C. 228. Teuta submits.]

+12.+ Then Gnaeus Fulvius sailed back to Rome with the larger part of
the naval and military forces, while Postumius, staying behind and
collecting forty vessels and a legion from the cities in that district,
wintered there to guard the Ardiaei and other tribes that had committed
themselves to the protection of Rome. Just before spring in the next
year, Teuta sent envoys to Rome and concluded a treaty; in virtue
of which she consented to pay a fixed tribute, and to abandon all
Illyricum, with the exception of some few districts: and what affected
Greece more than anything, she agreed not to sail beyond Lissus with
more than two galleys, and those unarmed. When this arrangement had
been concluded, Postumius sent legates to the Aetolian and Achaean
leagues, who on their arrival first explained the reasons for the war
and the Roman invasion; and then stated what had been accomplished in
it, and read the treaty which had been made with the Illyrians. The
envoys then returned to Corcyra after receiving the thanks of both
leagues: for they had freed Greece by this treaty from a very serious
cause for alarm, the fact being that the Illyrians were not the enemies
of this or that people, but the common enemies of all alike.

Such were the circumstances of the first armed interference of the
Romans in Illyricum and that part of Europe, and their first diplomatic
relations with Greece; and such too were the motives which suggested
them. But having thus begun, the Romans immediately afterwards sent
envoys to Corinth and Athens. And it was then that the Corinthians
first admitted Romans to take part in the Isthmian games.

[Sidenote: Hasdrubal in Spain. The founding of New Carthage, B.C. 228.]

[Sidenote: Dread of the Gauls.]

[Sidenote: Treaty with Hasdrubal.]

+13.+ We must now return to Hasdrubal in Iberia. He had during this
period been conducting his command with ability and success, and
had not only given in general a great impulse to the Carthaginian
interests there, but in particular had greatly strengthened them by the
fortification of the town, variously called Carthage, and New Town,
the situation of which was exceedingly convenient for operations in
Libya as well as in Iberia. I shall take a more suitable opportunity
of speaking of the site of this town, and pointing out the advantages
offered by it to both countries: I must at present speak of the
impression made by Hasdrubal’s policy at Rome. Seeing him strengthening
the Carthaginian influence in Spain, and rendering it continually more
formidable, the Romans were anxious to interfere in the politics of
that country. They discovered, as they thought, that they had allowed
their suspicions to be lulled to sleep, and had meanwhile given the
Carthaginians the opportunity of consolidating their power. They did
not venture, however, at the moment to impose conditions or make war
on them, because they were in almost daily dread of an attack from
the Celts. They determined therefore to mollify Hasdrubal by gentle
measures, and so to leave themselves free to attack the Celts first
and try conclusions with them: for they were convinced that, with such
enemies on their flank, they would not only be unable to keep their
hold over the rest of Italy, but even to reckon on safety in their own
city. Accordingly, while sending envoys to Hasdrubal, and making a
treaty with him by which the Carthaginians, without saying anything of
the rest of Iberia, engaged not to cross the Iber in arms, they pushed
on the war with the Celts in Italy.

+14.+ This war itself I shall treat only summarily, to avoid breaking
the thread of my history; but I must go back somewhat in point of time,
and refer to the period at which these tribes originally occupied their
districts in Italy. For the story I think is worth knowing for its own
sake, and must absolutely be kept in mind, if we wish to understand
what tribes and districts they were on which Hannibal relied to assist
him in his bold design of destroying the Roman dominion. I will first
describe the country in which they live, its nature, and its relation
to the rest of Italy; for if we clearly understand its peculiarities,
geographical and natural, we shall be better able to grasp the salient
points in the history of the war.

[Sidenote: The Geography of Italy.]

[Sidenote: Col di Tenda.]

Italy, taken as a whole, is a triangle, of which the eastern side is
bounded by the Ionian Sea and the Adriatic Gulf, its southern and
western sides by the Sicilian and Tyrrhenian seas; these two sides
converge to form the apex of the triangle, which is represented by the
southern promontory of Italy called Cocinthus, and which separates the
Ionian from the Sicilian Sea.[146] The third side, or base of this
triangle, is on the north, and is formed by the chain of the Alps
stretching right across the country, beginning at Marseilles and the
coast of the Sardinian Sea, and with no break in its continuity until
within a short distance of the head of the Adriatic. To the south of
this range, which I said we must regard as the base of the triangle,
are the most northerly plains of Italy, the largest and most fertile
of any with which I am acquainted in all Europe. This is the district
with which we are at present concerned. Taken as a whole, it too forms
a triangle, the apex of which is the point where the Apennines and Alps
converge, above Marseilles, and not far from the coast of the Sardinian
Sea. The northern side of this triangle is formed by the Alps,
extending for 2200 stades; the southern by the Apennines, extending
3600; and the base is the seaboard of the Adriatic, from the town of
Sena to the head of the gulf, a distance of more than 2500 stades. The
total length of the three sides will thus be nearly 10,000 stades.

[Sidenote: Gallia Cis-Alpina.]

+15.+ The yield of corn in this district is so abundant that wheat
is often sold at four obols a Sicilian medimnus, barley at two, or a
metretes of wine for an equal measure of barley. The quantity of panic
and millet produced is extraordinary; and the amount of acorns grown
in the oak forests scattered about the country may be gathered from
the fact that, though nowhere are more pigs slaughtered than in Italy,
for sacrifices as well as for family use, and for feeding the army,
by far the most important supply is from these plains. The cheapness
and abundance of all articles of food may also be clearly shown from
the fact that travellers in these parts, when stopping at inns, do not
bargain for particular articles, but simply ask what the charge is per
head for board. And for the most part the innkeepers are content to
supply their guests with every necessary at a charge rarely exceeding
half an as (that is, the fourth part of an obol)[147] a day each. Of
the numbers, stature, and personal beauty of the inhabitants, and still
more of their bravery in war, we shall be able to satisfy ourselves
from the facts of their history.

[Sidenote: The Alps.]

[Sidenote: The Apennines.]

[Sidenote: The Po.]

[Sidenote: 15th July.]

+16.+ Such parts of both <DW72>s of the Alps as are not too rocky or
too precipitous are inhabited by different tribes; those on the north
towards the Rhone by the Gauls, called Transalpine; those towards
the Italian plains by the Taurisci and Agones and a number of other
barbarous tribes. The name Transalpine is not tribal, but local, from
the Latin proposition _trans_, “across.” The summits of the Alps,
from their rugged character, and the great depth of eternal snow, are
entirely uninhabited. Both <DW72>s of the Apennines, towards the Tuscan
Sea and towards the plains, are inhabited by the Ligurians, from above
Marseilles and the junction with the Alps to Pisae on the coast, the
first city on the west of Etruria, and inland to Arretium. Next to them
come the Etruscans; and next on both <DW72>s the Umbrians. The distance
between the Apennines and the Adriatic averages about five hundred
stades; and when it leaves the northern plains the chain verges to the
right, and goes entirely through the middle of the rest of Italy, as
far as the Sicilian Sea. The remaining portion of this triangle, namely
the plain along the sea coast, extends as far as the town of Sena. The
Padus, celebrated by the poets under the name of Eridanus, rises in
the Alps near the apex of the triangle, and flows down to the plains
with a southerly course; but after reaching the plains, it turns to the
east, and flowing through them discharges itself by two mouths into
the Adriatic. The larger part of the plain is thus cut off by it, and
lies between this river and the Alps to the head of the Adriatic. In
body of water it is second to no river in Italy, because the mountain
streams, descending from the Alps and Apennines to the plain, one and
all flow into it on both sides; and its stream is at its height and
beauty about the time of the rising of the Dog Star, because it is then
swollen by the melting snows on those mountains. It is navigable for
nearly two thousand stades up stream, the ships entering by the mouth
called Olana; for though it is a single main stream to begin with, it
branches off into two at the place called Trigoboli, of which streams
the northern is called the Padoa, the southern the Olana. At the mouth
of the latter there is a harbour affording as safe anchorage as any
in the Adriatic. The whole river is called by the country folk the
Bodencus. As to the other stories current in Greece about this river,—I
mean Phaethon and his fall, and the tears of the poplars and the black
clothes of the inhabitants along this stream, which they are said to
wear at this day as mourning for Phaethon,—all such tragic incidents
I omit for the present, as not being suitable to the kind of work I
have in hand; but I shall return to them at some other more fitting
opportunity, particularly because Timaeus has shown a strange ignorance
of this district.

[Sidenote: Their character.]

[Sidenote: Gauls expel Etruscans from the valley of the Po.]

+17.+ To continue my description. These plains were anciently inhabited
by Etruscans,[148] at the same period as what are called the Phlegraean
plains round Capua and Nola; which latter, however, have enjoyed the
highest reputation, because they lay in a great many people’s way and
so got known. In speaking then of the history of the Etruscan Empire,
we should not refer to the district occupied by them at the present
time, but to these northern plains, and to what they did when they
inhabited them. Their chief intercourse was with the Celts, because
they occupied the adjoining districts; who, envying the beauty of their
lands, seized some slight pretext to gather a great host and expel
the Etruscans from the valley of the Padus, which they at once took
possession of themselves. First, the country near the source of the
Padus was occupied by the Laevi and Lebecii; after them the Insubres
settled in the country, the largest tribe of all; and next them,
along the bank of the river, the Cenomani. But the district along the
shore of the Adriatic was held by another very ancient tribe called
Venĕti, in customs and dress nearly allied to Celts, but using quite a
different language, about whom the tragic poets have written a great
many wonderful tales. South of the Padus, in the Apennine district,
first beginning from the west, the Ananes, and next them the Boii
settled. Next them, on the coast of the Adriatic, the Lingones; and
south of these, still on the sea-coast, the Senones. These are the most
important tribes that took possession of this part of the country.
They lived in open villages, and without any permanent buildings. As
they made their beds of straw or leaves, and fed on meat, and followed
no pursuits but those of war and agriculture, they lived simple lives
without being acquainted with any science or art whatever. Each man’s
property, moreover, consisted in cattle and gold; as they were the only
things that could be easily carried with them, when they wandered from
place to place, and changed their dwelling as their fancy directed.
They made a great point, however, of friendship: for the man who
had the largest number of clients or companions in his wanderings,
was looked upon as the most formidable and powerful member of the
tribe.[149]

[Sidenote: Battle of the Allia, 18th July, B.C. 390.]

[Sidenote: Latin war, B.C. 349-340.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 360.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 348.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 334.]

+18.+ In the early times of their settlement they did not merely
subdue the territory which they occupied, but rendered also many of
the neighbouring peoples subject to them, whom they overawed by their
audacity. Some time afterwards they conquered the Romans in battle, and
pursuing the flying legions, in three days after the battle occupied
Rome itself with the exception of the Capitol. But a circumstance
intervened which recalled them home, an invasion, that is to say, of
their territory by the Venĕti. Accordingly they made terms with the
Romans, handed back the city, and returned to their own land; and
subsequently were occupied with domestic wars. Some of the tribes,
also, who dwelt on the Alps, comparing their own barren districts with
the rich territory occupied by the others, were continually making
raids upon them, and collecting their forces to attack them. This gave
the Romans time to recover their strength, and to come to terms with
the people of Latium. When, thirty years after the capture of the city,
the Celts came again as far as Alba, the Romans were taken by surprise;
and having had no intelligence of the intended invasion, nor time to
collect the forces of the Socii, did not venture to give them battle.
But when another invasion in great force took place twelve years later,
they did get previous intelligence of it; and, having mustered their
allies, sallied forth to meet them with great spirit, being eager to
engage them and fight a decisive battle. But the Gauls were dismayed
at their approach; and, being besides weakened by internal feuds,
retreated homewards as soon as night fell, with all the appearance of
a regular flight. After this alarm they kept quiet for thirteen years;
at the end of which period, seeing that the power of the Romans was
growing formidable, they made a peace and a definite treaty with them.

[Sidenote: B.C. 299.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 297.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 283.]

[Sidenote: Sena Gallica.]

+19.+ They abided by this treaty for thirty years: but at that time,
alarmed by a threatening movement on the part of the Transalpine
tribes, and fearing that a dangerous war was imminent, they diverted
the attack of the invading horde from themselves by presents and
appeals to their ties of kindred, but incited them to attack the
Romans, joining in the expedition themselves. They directed their march
through Etruria, and were joined by the Etruscans; and the combined
armies, after taking a great quantity of booty, got safely back from
the Roman territory. But when they got home, they quarrelled about the
division of the spoil, and in the end destroyed most of it, as well as
the flower of their own force. This is the way of the Gauls when they
have appropriated their neighbours’ property; and it mostly arises from
brutal drunkenness, and intemperate feeding. In the fourth year after
this, the Samnites and Gauls made a league, gave the Romans battle in
the neighbourhood of Camerium, and slew a large number. Incensed at
this defeat, the Romans marched out a few days afterwards, and with
two Consular armies engaged the enemy in the territory of Sentinum;
and, having killed the greater number of them, forced the survivors
to retreat in hot haste each to his own land. Again, after another
interval of ten years, the Gauls besieged Arretium with a great army,
and the Romans went to the assistance of the town, and were beaten in
an engagement under its walls. The Praetor Lucius[150] having fallen in
this battle, Manius Curius was appointed in his place. The ambassadors,
sent by him to the Gauls to treat for the prisoners, were treacherously
murdered by them. At this the Romans, in high wrath, sent an expedition
against them, which was met by the tribe called the Senones. In a
pitched battle the army of the Senones were cut to pieces, and the rest
of the tribe expelled from the country; into which the Romans sent
the first colony which they ever planted in Gaul—namely, the town of
Sena, so called from the tribe of Gauls which formerly occupied it.
This is the town which I mentioned before as lying on the coast at the
extremity of the plains of the Padus.

[Sidenote: B.C. 282.]

+20.+ Seeing the expulsion of the Senones, and fearing the same fate
for themselves, the Boii made a general levy, summoned the Etruscans
to join them, and set out to war. They mustered their forces near
the lacus Vadimonis, and there gave the Romans battle; in which the
Etruscans indeed suffered a loss of more than half their men, while
scarcely any of the Boii escaped. But yet in the very next year the
same two nations joined forces once more; and arming even those of them
who had only just reached manhood, gave the Romans battle again; and it
was not until they had been utterly defeated in this engagement that
they humbled themselves so far as to send ambassadors to Rome and make
a treaty.[151]

These events took place in the third year before Pyrrhus crossed into
Italy, and in the fifth before the destruction of the Gauls at Delphi.
For at this period fortune seems to have plagued the Gauls with a kind
of epidemic of war. But the Romans gained two most important advantages
from these events. First, their constant defeats at the hands of the
Gauls had inured them to the worst that could befall them; and so, when
they had to fight with Pyrrhus, they came to the contest like trained
and experienced gladiators. And in the second place, they had crushed
the insolence of the Gauls just in time to allow them to give an
undivided attention, first to the war with Pyrrhus for the possession
of Italy, and then to the war with Carthage for the supremacy in Sicily.

[Sidenote: B.C. 236.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 232.]

+21.+ After these defeats the Gauls maintained an unbroken peace with
Rome for forty-five years. But when the generation which had witnessed
the actual struggle had passed away, and a younger generation of men
had taken their places, filled with unreflecting hardihood, and who
had neither experienced nor seen any suffering or reverse, they began,
as was natural, to disturb the settlement; and on the one hand to let
trifling causes exasperate them against Rome, and on the other to
invite the Alpine Gauls to join the fray. At first these intrigues were
carried on by their chiefs without the knowledge of the tribesmen;
and accordingly, when an armed host of Transalpine Gauls arrived at
Ariminum, the Boii were suspicious; and forming a conspiracy against
their own leaders, as well as against the new-comers, they put their
own two kings Atis and Galatus to death, and cut each other to pieces
in a pitched battle. Just then the Romans, alarmed at the threatened
invasion, had despatched an army; but learning that the Gauls had
committed this act of self-destruction, it returned home again. In
the fifth year after this alarm, in the Consulship of Marcus Aemilius
Lepidus, the Romans divided among their citizens the territory of
Picenum, from which they had ejected the Senones when they conquered
them: a democratic measure introduced by Gaius Flaminius, and a
policy which we must pronounce to have been the first step in the
demoralisation of the people, as well as the cause of the next Gallic
war. For many of the Gauls, and especially the Boii whose lands were
coterminous with the Roman territory, entered upon that war from
the conviction that the object of Rome in her wars with them was no
longer supremacy and empire over them, but their total expulsion and
destruction.

[Sidenote: B.C. 231.]

+22.+ Accordingly the two most extensive tribes, the Insubres and
Boii, joined in the despatch of messengers to the tribes living about
the Alps and on the Rhone, who from a word which means “serving for
hire,” are called Gaesatae. To their kings Concolitanus and Aneroetes
they offered a large sum of gold on the spot; and, for the future,
pointed out to them the greatness of the wealth of Rome, and all the
riches of which they would become possessed, if they took it. In
these attempts to inflame their cupidity and induce them to join the
expedition against Rome they easily succeeded. For they added to the
above arguments pledges of their own alliance; and reminded them of the
campaign of their own ancestors in which they had seized Rome itself,
and had been masters of all it contained, as well as the city itself,
for seven months; and had at last evacuated it of their own free will,
and restored it by an act of free grace, returning unconquered and
scatheless with the booty to their own land. These arguments made the
leaders so eager for the expedition, that there never at any other time
came from that part of Gaul a larger host, or one consisting of more
notable warriors. Meanwhile, the Romans, informed of what was coming,
partly by report and partly by conjecture, were in such a state of
constant alarm and excitement, that they hurriedly enrolled legions,
collected supplies, and sent out their forces to the frontier, as
though the enemy were already in their territory, before the Gauls had
stirred from their own lands.

It was this movement of the Gauls that, more than anything else, helped
the Carthaginians to consolidate their power in Iberia. For the Romans,
as I have said, looked upon the Celtic question as the more pressing
one of the two, as being so near home; and were forced to wink at what
was going on in Iberia, in their anxiety to settle it satisfactorily
first. Having, therefore, put their relations with the Carthaginians on
a safe footing by the treaty with Hasdrubal, which I spoke of a short
time back,[152] they gave an undivided attention to the Celtic war,
convinced that their interest demanded that a decisive battle should be
fought with them.

[Sidenote: B. C. 225. Coss. L. Aemilius Papus. C. Atilius Regulus.]

+23.+ The Gaesatae, then, having collected their forces, crossed the
Alps and descended into the valley of the Padus with a formidable army,

furnished with a variety of armour, in the eighth year after the
distribution of the lands of Picenum. The Insubres and Boii remained
loyal to the agreement they had made with them: but the Venĕti and
Cenomani being induced by embassies from Rome to take the Roman
side, the Celtic kings were obliged to leave a portion of their
forces behind, to guard against an invasion of their territory by
those tribes. They themselves, with their main army, consisting of
one hundred and fifty thousand foot, and twenty thousand horse and
chariots, struck camp and started on their march, which was to be
through Etruria, in high spirits. As soon as it was known at Rome that
the Celts had crossed the Alps, one of the Consuls, Lucius Aemilius
Papus, was sent with an army to Ariminum to guard against the passage
of the enemy, and one of the Praetors into Etruria: for the other
Consul, Gaius Atilius Regulus, happened to be in Sardinia with his
legions. There was universal terror in Rome, for the danger threatening
them was believed to be great and formidable. And naturally so: for
the old fear of the Gauls had never been eradicated from their minds.
No one thought of anything else: they were incessantly occupied in
mustering the legions, or enrolling new ones, and in ordering up such
of the allies as were ready for service. The proper magistrates were
ordered to give in lists of all citizens of military age; that it might
at once be known to what the total of the available forces amounted.
And such stores of corn, and darts, and other military equipments were
collected as no one could remember on any former occasion. From every
side assistance was eagerly rendered; for the inhabitants of Italy, in
their terror at the Gallic invasion, no longer thought of the matter
as a question of alliance with Rome, or of the war as undertaken to
support Roman supremacy, but each people regarded it as a danger
menacing themselves and their own city and territory. The response to
the Roman appeal therefore was prompt.

[Sidenote: The Roman resources.]

+24.+ But in order that we may learn from actual facts how great the
power was which Hannibal subsequently ventured to attack, and what a
mighty empire he faced when he succeeded in inflicting upon the Roman
people the most severe disasters, I must now state the amount of the
forces they could at that time bring into the field. The two Consuls
had marched out with four legions, each consisting of five thousand
two hundred infantry and three hundred cavalry. Besides this there
were with each Consul allies to the number of thirty thousand infantry
and two thousand cavalry. Of Sabines and Etruscans too, there had
come to Rome, for that special occasion, four thousand horse and more
than fifty thousand foot. These were formed into an army and sent
in advance into Etruria, under the command of one of the Praetors.
Moreover, the Umbrians and Sarsinatae, hill tribes of the Apennine
district, were collected to the number of twenty thousand; and with
them were twenty thousand Venĕti and Cenomani. These were stationed
on the frontier of the Gallic territory, that they might divert the
attention of the invaders, by making an incursion into the territory of
the Boii. These were the forces guarding the frontier. In Rome itself,
ready as a reserve in case of the accidents of war, there remained
twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse of citizens, and thirty
thousand foot and two thousand horse of the allies. Lists of men for
service had also been returned, of Latins eighty thousand foot and five
thousand horse; of Samnites seventy thousand foot and seven thousand
horse; of Iapygians and Messapians together fifty thousand foot and
sixteen thousand horse; and of Lucanians thirty thousand foot and three
thousand horse; of Marsi, and Marrucini, and Ferentani, and Vestini,
twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse. And besides these, there
were in reserve in Sicily and Tarentum two legions, each of which
consisted of about four thousand two hundred foot, and two hundred
horse. Of the Romans and Campanians the total of those put on the roll
was two hundred and fifty thousand foot and twenty-three thousand
horse; so that the grand total of the forces actually defending Rome
was over 150,000 foot, 6000 cavalry:[153] and of the men able to bear
arms, Romans and allies, over 700,000 foot and 70,000 horse; while
Hannibal, when he invaded Italy, had less than twenty thousand to put
against this immense force.

[Sidenote: The Gauls enter Etruria.]

[Sidenote: The Praetor’s army defeated at Clusium.]

+25.+ There will be another opportunity of treating the subject
in greater detail; for the present I must return to the Celts.
Having entered Etruria, they began their march through the country,
devastating it as they chose, and without any opposition; and finally
directed their course against Rome itself. But when they were encamped
under the walls of Clusium, which is three days’ march from Rome, news
was brought them that the Roman forces, which were on duty in Etruria,
were following on their rear and were close upon them; upon which they
turned back to meet them, eager to offer them battle. The two armies
came in sight of each other about sunset, and encamped for the night a
short distance apart. But when night fell, the Celts lit their watch
fires; and leaving their cavalry on the ground, with instructions
that, as soon as daylight made them visible to the enemy, they should
follow by the same route, they made a secret retreat along the road to
Faesulae, and took up their position there; that they might be joined
by their own cavalry, and might disconcert the attack of the enemy.
Accordingly, when at daybreak the Romans saw that the cavalry were
alone, they believed that the Celts had fled, and hastened in pursuit
of the retreating horse; but when they approached the spot where the
enemy were stationed, the Celts suddenly left their position and fell
upon them. The struggle was at first maintained with fury on both
sides: but the courage and superior numbers of the Celts eventually
gave them the victory. No less than six thousand Romans fell: while
the rest fled, most of whom made their way to a certain strongly
fortified height, and there remained. The first impulse of the Celts
was to besiege them: but they were worn out by their previous night
march, and all the suffering and fatigue of the day; leaving therefore
a detachment of cavalry to keep guard round the hill, they hastened to
procure rest and refreshment, resolving to besiege the fugitives next
day unless they voluntarily surrendered.

[Sidenote: On the arrival of Aemilius the Gauls retire.]

+26.+ But meanwhile Lucius Aemilius, who had been stationed on the
coast of the Adriatic at Ariminum, having been informed that the Gauls
had entered Etruria and were approaching Rome, set off to the rescue;
and after a rapid march appeared on the ground just at the critical
moment. He pitched his camp close to the enemy; and the fugitives on
the hill, seeing his watch fires, and understanding what had happened,
quickly recovered their courage and sent some of their men unarmed
to make their way through the forest and tell the Consul what had
happened. This news left the Consul as he thought no alternative but
to fight. He therefore ordered the Tribunes to lead out the infantry
at daybreak, while he, taking command of the cavalry, led the way
towards the hill. The Gallic chieftains too had seen his watch fires,
and understood that the enemy was come; and at once held council of
war. The advice of King Aneroestes was, “that seeing the amount of
booty they had taken,—an incalculable quantity indeed of captives,
cattle, and other spoil,—they had better not run the risk of another
general engagement, but return home in safety; and having disposed of
this booty, and freed themselves from its incumbrance, return, if they
thought good, to make another determined attack upon Rome.” Having
resolved to follow the advice of Aneroestes in the present juncture,
the chiefs broke up their night council, and before daybreak struck
camp, and marched through Etruria by the road which follows the coast
of the Ligurian bay. While Lucius, having taken off the remnant of the
army from the hill, and combined it with his own forces, determined
that it would not be by any means advantageous to offer the enemy
regular battle; but that it was better to dog their footsteps, watching
for favourable times and places at which to inflict damage upon them,
or wrest some of their booty from their hands.

[Sidenote: Atilius landing at Pisa intercepts the march of the Gauls.]

+27.+ Just at that time the Consul Gaius Atilius had crossed from
Sardinia, and having landed at Pisae was on his way to Rome; and
therefore he and the enemy were advancing to meet each other. When the
Celts were at Telamon in Etruria, their advanced guard fell in with
that of Gaius, and the men being made prisoners informed the Consul in
answer to questions of what had taken place; and told him that both
the armies were in the neighbourhood: that of the Celts, namely, and
that of Lucius close upon their rear. Though somewhat disturbed at
the events which he thus learnt, Gaius regarded the situation as a
hopeful one, when he considered that the Celts were on the road between
two hostile armies. He therefore ordered the Tribunes to martial the
legions and to advance at the ordinary pace, and in line as far as the
breadth of the ground permitted; while he himself having surveyed a
piece of rising ground which commanded the road, and under which the
Celts must march, took his cavalry with him and hurried on to seize the
eminence, and so begin the battle in person; convinced that by these
means he would get the principal credit of the action for himself.
At first the Celts not knowing anything about the presence of Gaius
Atilius, but supposing from what was taking place, that the cavalry of
Aemilius had outmarched them in the night, and were seizing the points
of vantage in the van of their route, immediately detached some cavalry
and light armed infantry to dispute the possession of this eminence.
But having shortly afterwards learnt the truth about the presence of
Gaius from a prisoner who was brought in, they hurriedly got their
infantry into position, and drew them up so as to face two opposite
ways, some, that is, to the front and others to the rear. For they knew
that one army was following on their rear; and they expected from the
intelligence which had reached them, and from what they saw actually
occurring, that they would have to meet another on their front.

[Sidenote: The battle of the horse. Atilius falls.]

+28.+ Aemilius had heard of the landing of the legions at Pisae, but
had not expected them to be already so far on their road; but the
contest at the eminence proved to him that the two armies were quite
close. He accordingly despatched his horse at once to support the
struggle for the possession of the hill, while he marshalled his foot
in their usual order, and advanced to attack the enemy who barred his
way. The Celts had stationed the Alpine tribe of the Gaesatae to face
their enemies on the rear, and behind them the Insubres; on their front
they had placed the Taurisci, and the Cispadane tribe of the Boii,
facing the legions of Gaius. Their waggons and chariots they placed on
the extremity of either wing, while the booty they massed upon one of
the hills that skirted the road, under the protection of a guard. The
army of the Celts was thus double-faced, and their mode of marshalling
their forces was effective as well as calculated to inspire terror.
The Insubres and Boii were clothed in their breeches and light cloaks;
but the Gaesatae from vanity and bravado threw these garments away,
and fell in in front of the army naked, with nothing but their arms;
believing that, as the ground was in parts encumbered with brambles,
which might possibly catch in their clothes and impede the use of their
weapons, they would be more effective in this state. At first the
only actual fighting was that for the possession of the hill: and the
numbers of the cavalry, from all three armies, that had joined in the
struggle made it a conspicuous sight to all. In the midst of it the
Consul Gaius fell, fighting with reckless bravery in the thick of the
battle, and his head was brought to the king of the Celts. The Roman
cavalry, however, continued the struggle with spirit, and finally won
the position and overpowered their opponents. Then the foot also came
to close quarters.

+29.+ It was surely a peculiar and surprising battle to witness, and
scarcely less so to hear described. A battle, to begin with, in which
three distinct armies were engaged, must have presented a strange
and unusual appearance, and must have been fought under strange and
unusual conditions. Again, it must have seemed to a spectator open to
question, whether the position of the Gauls were the most dangerous
conceivable, from being between two attacking forces; or the most
favourable, as enabling them to meet both armies at once, while their
own two divisions afforded each other a mutual support: and, above
all, as putting retreat out of the question, or any hope of safety
except in victory. For this is the peculiar advantage of having an
army facing in two opposite directions. The Romans, on the other hand,
while encouraged by having got their enemy between two of their own
armies, were at the same time dismayed by the ornaments and clamour of
the Celtic host. For there were among them such innumerable horns and
trumpets, which were being blown simultaneously in all parts of their
army, and their cries were so loud and piercing, that the noise seemed
not to come merely from trumpets and human voices, but from the whole
country-side at once. Not less terrifying was the appearance and rapid
movement of the naked warriors in the van, which indicated men in the
prime of their strength and beauty: while all the warriors in the front
ranks were richly adorned with gold necklaces and bracelets. These
sights certainly dismayed the Romans; still the hope they gave of a
profitable victory redoubled their eagerness for the battle.

[Sidenote: The infantry engage.]

+30.+ When the men who were armed with the _pilum_ advanced in front of
the legions, in accordance with the regular method of Roman warfare,
and hurled their _pila_ in rapid and effective volleys, the inner ranks
of the Celts found their jerkins and leather breeches of great service;
but to the naked men in the front ranks this unexpected mode of attack
caused great distress and discomfiture. For the Gallic shields not
being big enough to cover the man, the larger the naked body the more
certainty was there of the _pilum_ hitting. And at last, not being
able to retaliate, because the pilum-throwers were out of reach, and
their weapons kept pouring in, some of them, in the extremity of their
distress and helplessness, threw themselves with desperate courage
and reckless violence upon the enemy, and thus met a voluntary death;
while others gave ground step by step towards their own friends, whom
they threw into confusion by this manifest acknowledgment of their
panic. Thus the courage of the Gaesatae had broken down before the
preliminary attack of the _pilum_. But when the throwers of it had
rejoined their ranks, and the whole Roman line charged, the Insubres,
Boii, and Taurisci received the attack, and maintained a desperate
hand-to-hand fight. Though almost cut to pieces, they held their ground
with unabated courage, in spite of the fact that man for man, as well
as collectively, they were inferior to the Romans in point of arms. The
shields and swords of the latter were proved to be manifestly superior
for defence and attack, for the Gallic sword can only deliver a cut,
but cannot thrust. And when, besides, the Roman horse charged down
from the high ground on their flank, and attacked them vigorously, the
infantry of the Celts were cut to pieces on the field, while their
horse turned and fled.

[Sidenote: Aemilius returns home.]

+31.+ Forty thousand of them were slain, and quite ten thousand taken
prisoners, among whom was one of their kings, Concolitanus: the other
king, Aneroestes, fled with a few followers; joined a few of his people
in escaping to a place of security; and there put an end to his own
life and that of his friends. Lucius Aemilius, the surviving Consul,
collected the spoils of the slain and sent them to Rome, and restored
the property taken by the Gauls to its owners. Then taking command of
the legions, he marched along the frontier of Liguria, and made a raid
upon the territory of the Boii; and having satisfied the desires of the
legions with plunder, returned with his forces to Rome in a few days’
march. There he adorned the Capitol with the captured standards and
necklaces, which are gold chains worn by the Gauls round their necks;
but the rest of the spoils, and the captives, he converted to the
benefit of his own estate and to the adornment of his triumph.

[Sidenote: B.C. 224.]

Thus was the most formidable Celtic invasion repelled, which had been
regarded by all Italians, and especially by the Romans, as a danger of
the utmost gravity. The victory inspired the Romans with a hope that
they might be able to entirely expel the Celts from the valley of the
Padus: and accordingly the Consuls of the next year, Quintus Fulvius
Flaccus and Titus Manlius Torquatus, were both sent out with their
legions, and military preparations on a large scale, against them. By
a rapid attack they terrified the Boii into making submission to Rome;
but the campaign had no other practical effect, because, during the
rest of it, there was a season of excessive rains, and an outbreak of
pestilence in the army.

[Sidenote: B.C. 223.]

+32.+ The Consuls of the next year, however, Publius Furius Philus and
Caius Flaminius, once more invaded the Celtic lands, marching through
the territory of the Anamares, who live not far from Placentia.[154]
Having secured the friendship of this tribe, they crossed into the
country of the Insubres, near the confluence of the Adua and Padus.
They suffered some annoyance from the enemy, as they were crossing
the river, and as they were pitching their camp; and after remaining
for a short time, they made terms with the Insubres and left their
country. After a circuitous march of several days, they crossed the
River Clusius, and came into the territory of the Cenomani. As these
people were allies of Rome, they reinforced the army with some of
their men, which then descended once more from the Alpine regions
into the plains belonging to the Insubres, and began laying waste
their land and plundering their houses. The Insubrian chiefs, seeing
that nothing could change the determination of the Romans to destroy
them, determined that they had better try their fortune by a great
and decisive battle. They therefore mustered all their forces, took
down from the temple of Minerva the golden standards, which are called
“the immovables,” and having made other necessary preparations, in
high spirits and formidable array, encamped opposite to their enemies
to the number of fifty thousand. Seeing themselves thus out-numbered,
the Romans at first determined to avail themselves of the forces
of the allied Celtic tribes; but when they reflected on the fickle
character of the Gauls, and that they were about to fight with an
enemy of the same race as these auxiliary troops, they hesitated to
associate such men with themselves, at a crisis of such danger, and
in an action of such importance. However, they finally decided to do
this. They themselves stayed on the side of the river next the enemy:
and sending the Celtic contingent to the other side, they pulled up the
bridges; which at once precluded any fear of danger from them, and left
themselves no hope of safety except in victory; the impassable river
being thus in their rear. These dispositions made, they were ready to
engage.

[Sidenote: Battle with the Insubres.]

+33.+ The Romans are thought to have shown uncommon skill in this
battle; the Tribunes instructing the troops how they were to conduct
themselves both collectively and individually. They had learned from
former engagements that Gallic tribes were always most formidable at
the first onslaught, before their courage was at all damped by a check;
and that the swords with which they were furnished, as I have mentioned
before, could only give one downward cut with any effect, but that
after this the edges got so turned and the blade so bent, that unless
they had time to straighten them with their foot against the ground,
they could not deliver a second blow. The Tribunes accordingly gave
out the spears of the Triarii, who are the last of the three ranks, to
the first ranks, or Hastati: and ordering the men to use their swords
only, after their spears were done with, they charged the Celts full
in front. When the Celts had rendered their swords useless by the
first blows delivered on the spears, the Romans closed with them, and
rendered them quite helpless, by preventing them from raising their
hands to strike with their swords, which is their peculiar and only
stroke, because their blade has no point. The Romans, on the contrary,
having excellent points to their swords, used them not to cut but to
thrust: and by thus repeatedly hitting the breasts and faces of the
enemy, they eventually killed the greater number of them. And this
was due to the foresight of the Tribunes: for the Consul Flaminius is
thought to have made a strategic mistake in his arrangements for this
battle. By drawing up his men along the very brink of the river, he
rendered impossible a manœuvre characteristic of Roman tactics, because
he left the lines no room for their deliberate retrograde movements;
for if, in the course of the battle, the men had been forced ever so
little from their ground, they would have been obliged by this blunder
of their leader to throw themselves into the river. However, the valour
of the soldiers secured them a brilliant victory, as I have said, and
they returned to Rome with abundance of booty of every kind, and of
trophies stripped from the enemy.

[Sidenote: B.C. 222. Attack on the Insubres.]

+34.+ Next year, upon embassies coming from the Celts, desiring peace
and making unlimited offers of submission, the new Consuls, Marcus
Claudius Marcellus and Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus, were urgent that
no peace should be granted them. Thus frustrated, they determined to
try a last chance, and once more took active measures to hire thirty
thousand Gaesatae,—the Gallic tribe which lives on the Rhone. Having
obtained these, they held themselves in readiness, and waited for
the attack of their enemies. At the beginning of spring the Consuls
assumed command of their forces, and marched them into the territory
of the Insubres; and there encamped under the walls of the city of
Acerrae, which lies between the Padus and the Alps, and laid siege to
it. The Insubres, being unable to render any assistance, because all
the positions of vantage had been seized by the enemy first, and being
yet very anxious to break up the siege of Acerrae, detached a portion
of their forces to affect a diversion by crossing the Padus and laying
siege to Clastidium. Intelligence of this movement being brought to the
Consuls, Marcus Claudius, taking with him his cavalry and some light
infantry, made a forced march to relieve the besieged inhabitants. When
the Celts heard of his approach, they raised the siege; and, marching
out to meet him, offered him battle. At first they held their ground
against a furious charge of cavalry which the Roman Consul launched at
them; but when they presently found themselves surrounded by the enemy
on their rear and flank, unable to maintain the fight any longer, they
fled before the cavalry; and many of them were driven into the river,
and were swept away by the stream, though the larger number were cut
down by their enemies. Acerrae also, richly stored with corn, fell into
the hands of the Romans: the Gauls having evacuated it, and retired
to Mediolanum, which is the most commanding position in the territory
of the Insubres. Gnaeus followed them closely, and suddenly appeared
at Mediolanum. The Gauls at first did not stir; but upon his starting
on his return march to Acerrae, they sallied out, and having boldly
attacked his rear, killed a good many men, and even drove a part of
it into flight; until Gnaeus recalled some of his vanguard, and urged
them to stand and engage the enemy. The Roman soldiers obeyed orders,
and offered a vigorous resistance to the attacking party. The Celts,
encouraged by their success, held their ground for a certain time with
some gallantry, but before long turned and fled to the neighbouring
mountains. Gnaeus followed them, wasting the country as he went,
and took Mediolanum by assault. At this the chiefs of the Insubres,
despairing of safety, made a complete and absolute submission to Rome.

[Sidenote: B.C. 480.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 279.]

+35.+ Such was the end of the Celtic war: which, for the desperate
determination and boldness of the enemy, for the obstinacy of the
battles fought, and for the number of those who fell and of those
who were engaged, is second to none recorded in history, but which,
regarded as a specimen of scientific strategy, is utterly contemptible.
The Gauls showed no power of planning or carrying out a campaign, and
in everything they did were swayed by impulse rather than by sober
calculation. As I have seen these tribes, after a short struggle,
entirely ejected from the valley of the Padus, with the exception of
some few localities lying close to the Alps, I thought I ought not
to let their original attack upon Italy pass unrecorded, any more
than their subsequent attempts, or their final ejectment: for it is
the function of the historian to record and transmit to posterity
such episodes in the drama of Fortune; that our posterity may not
from ignorance of the past be unreasonably dismayed at the sudden
and unexpected invasions of these barbarians, but may reflect how
short-lived and easily damped the spirit of this race is; and so may
stand to their defence, and try every possible means before yielding an
inch to them. I think, for instance, that those who have recorded for
our information the invasion of Greece by the Persians, and of Delphi
by the Gauls, have contributed materially to the struggles made for
the common freedom of Greece. For a superiority in supplies, arms, or
numbers, would scarcely deter any one from putting the last possible
hope to the test, in a struggle for the integrity and the safety of
his city and its territory, if he had before his eyes the surprising
result of those expeditions; and remembered how many myriads of men,
what daring confidence, and what immense armaments were baffled by the
skill and ability of opponents, who conducted their measures under the
dictates of reason and sober calculation. And as an invasion of Gauls
has been a source of alarm to Greece in our day, as well as in ancient
times, I thought it worth while to give a summary sketch of their
doings from the earliest times.

[Sidenote: Death of Hasdrubal in Spain, B.C. 221. See chap. 13.]

[Sidenote: Succession of Hannibal to the command in Spain. His
hostility to Rome.]

+36.+ Our narrative now returns to Hasdrubal, whom we left in command
of the Carthaginian forces in Iberia. After eight years command in
that country, he was assassinated in his own house at night by a
certain Celt in revenge for some private wrong. Before his death he
had done much to strengthen the Carthaginian power in Iberia, not so
much by military achievements, as by the friendly relations which
he maintained with the native princes. Now that he was dead, the
Carthaginians invested Hannibal with the command in Iberia, in spite
of his youth, because of the ability in the conduct of affairs, and
the daring spirit which he had displayed. He had no sooner assumed the
command, than he nourished a fixed resolve to make war on Rome; nor was
it long before he carried out this resolution. From that time forth
there were constant suspicions and causes of offence arising between
the Carthaginians and Romans. And no wonder: for the Carthaginians
were meditating revenge for their defeats in Sicily; and the Romans
were made distrustful from a knowledge of their designs. These things
made it clear to every one of correct judgment that before long a war
between these two nations was inevitable.

[Sidenote: Social war, B.C. 220-217.]

+37.+ At the same period the Achaean league and King Philip, with their
allies, were entering upon the war with the Aetolian league, which is
called the Social war. Now this was the point at which I proposed to
begin my general history; and as I have brought the account of the
affairs of Sicily and Libya, and those which immediately followed, in
a continuous narrative, up to the date of the beginning of the Social
and Second Punic, generally called the Hannibalic, wars, it will be
proper to leave this branch of my subject for a while, and to take up
the history of events in Greece, that I may start upon my full and
detailed narrative, after bringing the prefatory sketch of the history
of the several countries to the same point of time. For since I have
not undertaken, as previous writers have done, to write the history of
particular peoples, such as the Greeks or Persians, but the history
of all known parts of the world at once, because there was something
in the state of our own times which made such a plan peculiarly
feasible,—of which I shall speak more at length hereafter,—it will be
proper, before entering on my main subject, to touch briefly on the
state of the most important of the recognised nations of the world.

[Sidenote: The progress of the Achaean league.]

Of Asia and Egypt I need not speak before the time at which my history
commences. The previous history of these countries has been written
by a number of historians already, and is known to all the world;
nor in our days has any change specially remarkable or unprecedented
occurred to them demanding a reference to their past. But in regard to
the Achaean league, and the royal family of Macedonia, it will be in
harmony with my design to go somewhat farther back: for the latter has
become entirely extinct; while the Achaeans, as I have stated before,
have in our time made extraordinary progress in material prosperity and
internal unity. For though many statesmen had tried in past times to
induce the Peloponnesians to join in a league for the common interests
of all, and had always failed, because every one was working to secure
his own power rather than the freedom of the whole; yet in our day
this policy has made such progress, and been carried out with such
completeness, that not only is there in the Peloponnese a community of
interests such as exists between allies or friends, but an absolute
identity of laws, weights, measures, and currency.[155] All the States
have the same magistrates, senate, and judges. Nor is there any
difference between the entire Peloponnese and a single city, except in
the fact that its inhabitants are not included within the same wall; in
other respects, both as a whole and in their individual cities, there
is a nearly absolute assimilation of institutions.

[Sidenote: The origin of the name as embracing all the Peloponnese.]

+38.+ It will be useful to ascertain, to begin with, how it came to
pass that the name of the Achaeans became the universal one for all
the inhabitants of the Peloponnese. For the original bearers of this
ancestral name have no superiority over others, either in the size of
their territory and cities, or in wealth, or in the prowess of their
men. For they are a long way off being superior to the Arcadians and
Lacedaemonians in number of inhabitants and extent of territory; nor
can these latter nations be said to yield the first place in warlike
courage to any Greek people whatever. Whence then comes it that these
nations, with the rest of the inhabitants of the Peloponnese, have
been content to adopt the constitution and the name of the Achaeans?
To speak of chance in such a matter would not be to offer any adequate
solution of the question, and would be a mere idle evasion. A cause
must be sought; for without a cause nothing, expected or unexpected,
can be accomplished. The cause then, in my opinion, was this. Nowhere
could be found a more unalloyed and deliberately established system of
equality and absolute freedom, and, in a word, of democracy, than among
the Achaeans. This constitution found many of the Peloponnesians ready
enough to adopt it of their own accord: many were brought to share in
it by persuasion and argument: some, though acting under compulsion
at first, were quickly brought to acquiesce in its benefits; for none
of the original members had any special privilege reserved for them,
but equal rights were given to all comers: the object aimed at was
therefore quickly attained by the two most unfailing expedients of
equality and fraternity. This then must be looked upon as the source
and original cause of Peloponnesian unity and consequent prosperity.

That this was the original principle on which the Achaeans acted in
forming their constitution might be demonstrated by many proofs; but
for the present purpose it will be sufficient to allege one or two in
confirmation of my assertion.

[Sidenote: B.C. 371.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 405-367.]

[Sidenote: Ζεὺς ὁμάριος or ἀμάριος]

+39.+ And first: When the burning of the Pythagorean clubs in Magna
Grecia was followed by great constitutional disturbances, as was
natural on the sudden disappearance of the leading men in each state;
and the Greek cities in that part of Italy became the scene of murder,
revolutionary warfare, and every kind of confusion; deputations
were sent from most parts of Greece to endeavour to bring about
some settlement of these disorders.[156] But the disturbed states
preferred the intervention of the Achaeans above all others, and
showed the greatest confidence in them, in regard to the measures
to be adopted for removing the evils that oppressed them. Nor was
this the only occasion on which they displayed this preference. For
shortly afterwards there was a general movement among them to adopt
the model of the Achaean constitution. The first states to move in
the matter were Croton, Sybaris, and Caulonia, who began by erecting
a common temple to Zeus Homorios,[157] and a place in which to hold
their meetings and common councils. They then adopted the laws and
customs of the Achaeans, and determined to conduct their constitution
according to their principles; but finding themselves hampered by the
tyranny of Dionysius of Syracuse, and also by the encroachment of the
neighbouring barbarians, they were forced much against their will
to abandon them. Again, later on, when the Lacedaemonians met with
their unexpected reverse at Leuctra, and the Thebans as unexpectedly
claimed the hegemony in Greece, a feeling of uncertainty prevailed
throughout the country, and especially among the Lacedaemonians and
Thebans themselves, because the former refused to allow that they were
beaten, the latter felt hardly certain that they had conquered. On
this occasion, once more, the Achaeans were the people selected by the
two parties, out of all Greece, to act as arbitrators on the points
in dispute. And this could not have been from any special view of
their power, for at that time they were perhaps the weakest state in
Greece; it was rather from a conviction of their good faith and high
principles, in regard to which there was but one opinion universally
entertained. At that period of their history, however, they possessed
only the elements of success; success itself, and material increase,
were barred by the fact that they had not yet been able to produce a
leader worthy of the occasion. Whenever any man had given indications
of such ability, he was systematically thrust into the background and
hampered, at one time by the Lacedaemonian government, and at another,
still more effectually, by that of Macedonia.

+40.+ When at length, however, the country did obtain leaders of
sufficient ability, it quickly manifested its intrinsic excellence by
the accomplishment of that most glorious achievement,—the union of the
Peloponnese. The originator of this policy in the first instance was
Aratus of Sicyon; its active promotion and consummation was due to
Philopoemen of Megalopolis; while Lycortas and his party must be looked
upon as the authors of the permanence which it enjoyed. The actual
achievements of these several statesmen I shall narrate in their proper
places: but while deferring a more detailed account of the other two, I
think it will be right to briefly record here, as well as in a future
portion of my work, the political measures of Aratus, because he has
left a record of them himself in an admirably honest and lucid book of
commentaries.

I think the easiest method for myself, and most intelligible to my
readers, will be to start from the period of the restoration of the
Achaean league and federation, after its disintegration into separate
states by the Macedonian kings: from which time it has enjoyed an
unbroken progress towards the state of completion which now exists, and
of which I have already spoken at some length.

[Sidenote: 124th Olympiad, B.C. 284-280.]

[Sidenote: First Achaean league.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 371.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 323-284.]

+41.+ The period I mean is the 124th Olympiad. In this occurred the
first league of Patrae and Dyme, and the deaths of Ptolemy son of
Lagus, Lysimachus, Seleucus, Ptolemy Ceraunus. In the period before
this the state of Achaia was as follows. It was ruled by kings from
the time of Tisamenus, son of Orestes, who, being expelled from
Sparta on the return of the Heraclidae, formed a kingdom in Achaia.
The last of this royal line to maintain his power was Ogyges,
whose sons so alienated the people by their unconstitutional and
tyrannical government, that a revolution took place and a democracy
was established. In the period subsequent to this, up to the time of
the establishment of the supreme authority of Alexander and Philip,
their fortunes were subject to various fluctuations, but they always
endeavoured to maintain intact in their league a democratical form of
government, as I have already stated. This league consisted of twelve
cities, all of them still surviving, with the exception of Olenus, and
Helice which was engulfed by the sea before the battle of Leuctra.
The other ten were Patrae, Dyme, Pharae, Tritaea, Leontium, Aegium,
Aegeira, Pellene, Bura, Caryneia. In the period immediately succeeding
Alexander, and before the above-named 124th Olympiad, these cities,
chiefly through the instrumentality of the Macedonian kings, became so
estranged and ill-disposed to each other, and so divided and opposed
in their interests, that some of them had to submit to the presence
of foreign garrisons, sent first by Demetrius and Cassander, and
afterwards by Antigonus Gonatas, while others even fell under the power
of Tyrants; for no one set up more of such absolute rulers in the Greek
states than this last-named king.

[Sidenote: B.C. 284-280, Second Achaean league.]

But about the 124th Olympiad, as I have said, a change of sentiment
prevailed among the Achaean cities, and they began again to form a
league. This was just at the time of Pyrrhus’s invasion of Italy. The
first to take this step were the peoples of Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, and
Pharae. And as they thus formed the nucleus of the league, we find no
column extant recording the compact between these cities. But about
five years afterwards the people of Aegium expelled their foreign
garrison and joined the league; next, the people of Bura put their
tyrant to death and did the same; simultaneously, the state of Caryneia
was restored to the league. For Iseas, the then tyrant of Caryneia,
when he saw the expulsion of the garrison from Aegium, and the death of
the despot in Bura at the hands of Margos and the Achaeans, and when he
saw that he was himself on the point of being attacked on all sides,
voluntarily laid down his office; and having obtained a guarantee for
his personal safety from the Achaeans, formally gave in the adhesion of
his city to the league.

+42.+ My object in thus going back in point of time was, first, to show
clearly at what epoch the Achaeans entered into the second league,
which exists at this day, and which were the first members of the
original league to do so; and, secondly, that the continuity of the
policy pursued by the Achaeans might rest, not on my word only, but on
the evidence of the actual facts. It was in virtue of this policy,—by
holding out the bait of equality and freedom, and by invariably making
war upon and crushing those who on their own account, or with the
support of the kings, enslaved any of the states within their borders,
that they finally accomplished the design which they had deliberately
adopted, in some cases by their own unaided efforts, and in others
by the help of their allies. For in fact whatever was effected in
this direction, by the help of these allies in after times, must be
put down to the credit of the deliberately adopted policy of the
Achaeans themselves. They acted indeed jointly with others in many
honourable undertakings, and in none more so than with the Romans:
yet in no instance can they be said to have aimed at obtaining from
their success any advantage for a particular state. In return for the
zealous assistance rendered by them to their allies, they bargained for
nothing but the freedom of each state and the union of the Peloponnese.
But this will be more clearly seen from the record of their actual
proceedings.

[Sidenote: Victory of Lutatius off the insulae Aegates, B.C. 241.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 243-242.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 255-254. Margos.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 251-250. Aratus.]

+43.+ For the first twenty-five years of the league between the cities
I have mentioned, a secretary and two strategi for the whole union were
elected by each city in turn. But after this period they determined
to appoint one strategus only,[158] and put the entire management of
the affairs of the union in his hands. The first to obtain this honour
was Margos of Caryneia. In the fourth year after this man’s tenure
of the office, Aratus of Sicyon caused his city to join the league,
which, by his energy and courage, he had, when only twenty years of
age, delivered from the yoke of its tyrant. In the eighth year again
after this, Aratus, being elected strategus for the second time, laid
a plot to seize the Acrocorinthus, then held by Antigonus; and by his
success freed the inhabitants of the Peloponnese from a source of
serious alarm: and having thus liberated Corinth he caused it to join
the league. In his same term of office he got Megara into his hands,
and caused it to join also. These events occurred in the year before
the decisive defeat of the Carthaginians, in consequence of which they
evacuated Sicily and consented for the first time to pay tribute to
Rome.

[Sidenote: Antigonus Gonatas, B.C. 283-239.]

Having made this remarkable progress in his design in so short a time,
Aratus continued thenceforth in the position of leader of the Achaean
league, and in the consistent direction of his whole policy to one
single end; which was to expel Macedonians from the Peloponnese, to
depose the despots, and to establish in each state the common freedom
which their ancestors had enjoyed before them. So long, therefore,
as Antigonus Gonatas was alive, he maintained a continual opposition
to his interference, as well as to the encroaching spirit of the
Aetolians, and in both cases with signal skill and success; although
their presumption and contempt for justice had risen to such a pitch,
that they had actually made a formal compact with each other for the
disruption of the Achaeans.

[Sidenote: Demetrius, B.C. 239-229.]

+44.+ After the death of Antigonus, however, the Achaeans made terms
with the Aetolians, and joined them energetically in the war against
Demetrius; and, in place of the feelings of estrangement and hostility,
there gradually grew up a sentiment of brotherhood and affection
between the two peoples. Upon the death of Demetrius, after a reign of
only ten years, just about the time of the first invasion of Illyricum
by the Romans, the Achaeans had a most excellent opportunity of
establishing the policy which they had all along maintained. For the
despots in the Peloponnese were in despair at the death of Demetrius.
It was the loss to them of their chief supporter and paymaster. And now
Aratus was for ever impressing upon them that they ought to abdicate,
holding out rewards and honours for those of them who consented,
and threatening those who refused with still greater vengeance from
the Achaeans. There was therefore a general movement among them to
voluntarily restore their several states to freedom and to join the
league. I ought however to say that Ludiades of Megalopolis, in the
lifetime of Demetrius, of his own deliberate choice, and foreseeing
with great shrewdness and good sense what was going to happen, had
abdicated his sovereignty and become a citizen of the national league.
His example was followed by Aristomachus, tyrant of Argos, Xeno of
Hermione, and Cleonymus of Phlius, who all likewise abdicated and
joined the democratic league.

[Sidenote: The Aetolians and Antigonus Doson, B.C. 229-220.]

+45.+ But the increased power and national advancement which these
events brought to the Achaeans excited the envy of the Aetolians; who,
besides their natural inclination to unjust and selfish aggrandisement,
were inspired with the hope of breaking up the union of Achaean states,
as they had before succeeded in partitioning those of Acarnania with
Alexander,[159] and had planned to do those of Achaia with Antigonus
Gonatas. Instigated once more by similar expectations, they had now
the assurance to enter into communication and close alliance at once
with Antigonus (at that time ruling Macedonia as guardian of the
young King Philip), and with Cleomenes, King of Sparta. They saw that
Antigonus had undisputed possession of the throne of Macedonia, while
he was an open and avowed enemy of the Achaeans owing to the surprise
of the Acrocorinthus; and they supposed that if they could get the
Lacedaemonians to join them in their hostility to the league, they
would easily subdue it, by selecting a favourable opportunity for
their attack, and securing that it should be assaulted on all sides at
once. And they would in all probability have succeeded, but that they
had left out the most important element in the calculation, namely,
that in Aratus they had to reckon with an opponent to their plans of
ability equal to almost any emergency. Accordingly, when they attempted
this violent and unjust interference in Achaia, so far from succeeding
in any of their devices, they, on the contrary, strengthened Aratus,
the then president of the league, as well as the league itself. So
consummate was the ability with which he foiled their plan and reduced
them to impotence. The manner in which this was done will be made clear
in what I am about to relate.

[Sidenote: The Aetolians intrigue with Cleomenes, King of Sparta, B.C.
229-227.]

+46.+ There could be no doubt of the policy of the Aetolians. They
were ashamed indeed to attack the Achaeans openly, because they could
not ignore their recent obligations to them in the war with Demetrius:
but they were plotting with the Lacedaemonians; and showed their
jealousy of the Achaeans by not only conniving at the treacherous
attack of Cleomenes upon Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenus (cities not
only in alliance with them, but actually members of their league), but
by confirming his occupation of those places. In old times they had
thought almost any excuse good enough to justify an appeal to arms
against those who, after all, had done them no wrong: yet they now
allowed themselves to be treated with such treachery, and submitted
without remonstrance to the loss of the most important towns, solely
with the view of creating in Cleomenes a formidable antagonist to
the Achaeans. These facts were not lost upon Aratus and the other
officers of the league: and they resolved that, without taking the
initiative in going to war with any one, they would resist the attempts
of the Lacedaemonians. Such was their determination, and for a time
they persisted in it: but immediately afterwards Cleomenes began to
build the hostile fort in the territory of Megalopolis, called the
Athenaeum,[160] and showed an undisguised and bitter hostility. Aratus
and his colleagues accordingly summoned a meeting of the league, and it
was decided to proclaim war openly against Sparta.

[Sidenote: Cleomenes, B.C. 227-221.]

[Sidenote: Aratus applies to Antigonus Doson.]

+47.+ This was the origin of what is called the Cleomenic war. At
first the Achaeans were for depending on their own resources for
facing the Lacedaemonians. They looked upon it as more honourable not
to look to others for preservation, but to guard their own territory
and cities themselves; and at the same time the remembrances of his
former services made them desirous of keeping up their friendship with
Ptolemy,[161] and averse from the appearance of seeking aid elsewhere.
But when the war had lasted some time; and Cleomenes had revolutionised
the constitution of his country, and had turned its constitutional
monarchy into a despotism; and, moreover, was conducting the war with
extraordinary skill and boldness: seeing clearly what would happen, and
fearing the reckless audacity of the Aetolians, Aratus determined that
his first duty was to be well beforehand in frustrating their plans. He
satisfied himself that Antigonus was a man of activity and practical
ability, with some pretensions to the character of a man of honour;
he however knew perfectly well that kings look on no man as a friend
or foe from personal considerations, but ever measure friendships and
enmities solely by the standard of expediency. He, therefore, conceived
the idea of addressing himself to this monarch, and entering into
friendly relations with him, taking occasion to point out to him the
certain result of his present policy. But to act openly in this matter
he thought inexpedient for several reasons. By doing so he would not
only incur the opposition of Cleomenes and the Aetolians, but would
cause consternation among the Achaeans themselves, because his appeal
to their enemies would give the impression that he had abandoned all
the hopes he once had in them. This was the very last idea he desired
should go abroad; and he therefore determined to conduct this intrigue
in secrecy.

The result of this was that he was often compelled to speak and act
towards the public in a sense contrary to his true sentiments, that he
might conceal his real design by suggesting one of an exactly opposite
nature. For which reason there are some particulars which he did not
even commit to his own commentaries.

[Sidenote: Philip II. in the Peloponnese, B.C. 338.]

+48.+ It did not escape the observation of Aratus that the people of
Megalopolis would be more ready than others to seek the protection of
Antigonus, and the hopes of safety offered by Macedonia; for their
neighbourhood to Sparta exposed them to attack before the other
states; while they were unable to get the help which they ought to
have, because the Achaeans were themselves hard pressed and in great
difficulties. Besides they had special reasons for entertaining
feelings of affection towards the royal family of Macedonia, founded
on the favours received in the time of Philip, son of Amyntas. He
therefore imparted his general design under pledge of secrecy to
Nicophanes and Cercidas of Megalopolis, who were family friends of
his own and of a character suited to the undertaking; and by their
means experienced no difficulty in inducing the people of Megalopolis
to send envoys to the league, to advise that an application for help
should be made to Antigonus. Nicophanes and Cercidas were themselves
selected to go on this mission to the league, and thence, if their view
was accepted, to Antigonus. The league consented to allow the people
of Megalopolis to send the mission; and accordingly Nicophanes lost no
time in obtaining an interview with the king. About the interests of
his own country he spoke briefly and summarily, confining himself to
the most necessary statements; the greater part of his speech was, in
accordance with the directions of Aratus, concerned with the national
question.

[Sidenote: The message to Antigonus Doson.]

+49.+ The points suggested by Aratus for the envoy to dwell on were
“the scope and object of the understanding between the Aetolians and
Cleomenes, and the necessity of caution on the part primarily of the
Achaeans, but still more even on that of Antigonus himself: first,
because the Achaeans plainly could not resist the attack of both; and,
secondly, because if the Aetolians and Cleomenes conquered them, any
man of sense could easily see that they would not be satisfied or stop
there. For the encroaching spirit of the Aetolians, far from being
content to be confined by the boundaries of the Peloponnese, would
find even those of Greece too narrow for them. Again, the ambition of
Cleomenes was at present directed to the supremacy in the Peloponnese:
but this obtained, he would promptly aim at that of all Greece, in
which it would be impossible for him to succeed without first crushing
the government of Macedonia. They were, therefore, to urge him to
consider, with a view to the future, which of the two courses would
be the more to his own interests,—to fight for supremacy in Greece in
conjunction with the Achaeans and Boeotians against Cleomenes in the
Peloponnese; or to abandon the most powerful race, and to stake the
Macedonian empire on a battle in Thessaly, against a combined force
of Aetolians and Boeotians, with the Achaeans and Lacedaemonians to
boot. If the Aetolians, from regard to the goodwill shown them by
the Achaeans in the time of Demetrius, were to pretend to be anxious
to keep the peace as they were at present doing, they were to assert
that the Achaeans were ready to engage Cleomenes by themselves; and if
fortune declared in their favour they would want no assistance from
any one: but if fortune went against them, and the Aetolians joined
in the attack, they begged him to watch the course of events, that he
might not let things go too far, but might aid the Peloponnesians while
they were still capable of being saved. He had no need to be anxious
about the good faith or gratitude of the Achaeans: when the time for
action came, Aratus pledged himself to find guarantees which would be
satisfactory to both parties; and similarly would himself indicate the
moment at which the aid should be given.”

[Sidenote: Aratus wishes to do without the king if possible.]

+50.+ These arguments seemed to Antigonus to have been put by Aratus
with equal sincerity and ability: and after listening to them, he
eagerly took the first necessary step by writing a letter to the people
of Megalopolis with an offer of assistance, on condition that such a
measure should receive the consent of the Achaeans. When Nicophanes
and Cercidas returned home and delivered this despatch from the king,
reporting at the same time his other expressions of goodwill and zeal
in the cause, the spirits of the people of Megalopolis were greatly
elated; and they were all eagerness to attend the meeting of the
league, and urge that measures should be taken to secure the alliance
of Antigonus, and to put the management of the war in his hands with
all despatch. Aratus learnt privately from Nicophanes the king’s
feelings towards the league and towards himself; and was delighted
that his plan had not failed, and that he had not found the king
completely alienated from himself, as the Aetolians hoped he would
be. He regarded it also as eminently favourable to his policy, that
the people of Megalopolis were so eager to use the Achaean league as
the channel of communication with Antigonus. For his first object was
if possible to do without this assistance; but if he were compelled
to have recourse to it, he wished that the invitation should not be
sent through himself personally, but that it should rather come from
the Achaeans as a nation. For he feared that, if the king came, and
conquered Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians in the war, and should then
adopt any policy hostile to the interests of the national constitution,
he would have himself by general consent to bear the blame of the
result: while Antigonus would be justified, by the injury which had
been inflicted on the royal house of Macedonia in the matter of the
Acrocorinthus. Accordingly when Megalopolitan envoys appeared in the
national council, and showed the royal despatch, and further declared
the general friendly disposition of the king, and added an appeal to
the congress to secure the king’s alliance without delay; and when also
the sense of the meeting was clearly shown to be in favour of taking
this course, Aratus rose, and, after setting forth the king’s zeal, and
complimenting the meeting upon their readiness to act in the matter,
he proceeded to urge upon them in a long speech that “They should
try if possible to preserve their cities and territory by their own
efforts, for that nothing could be more honourable or more expedient
than that: but that, if it turned out that fortune declared against
them in this effort, they might then have recourse to the assistance of
their friends; but not until they had tried all their own resources to
the uttermost.” This speech was received with general applause: and it
was decided to take no fresh departure at present, and to endeavour to
bring the existing war to a conclusion unaided.

[Sidenote: Euergetes jealous of the Macedonian policy of Aratus, helps
Cleomenes.]

+51.+ But when Ptolemy, despairing of retaining the league’s
friendship, began to furnish Cleomenes with supplies,—which he did
with a view of setting him up as a foil to Antigonus, thinking the
Lacedaemonians offered him better hopes than the Achaeans of being able
to thwart the policy of the Macedonian kings; and when the Achaeans
themselves had suffered three defeats,—one at Lycaeum in an engagement
with Cleomenes whom they had met on a march; and again in a pitched
battle at Ladocaea in the territory of Megalopolis, in which Lydiades
fell; and a third time decisively at a place called Hecatomboeum in
the territory of Dyme where their whole forces had been engaged,—after
these misfortunes, no further delay was possible, and they were
compelled by the force of circumstances to appeal unanimously to
Antigonus. Thereupon Aratus sent his son to Antigonus, and ratified
the terms of the subvention. The great difficulty was this: it was
believed to be certain that the king would send no assistance, except
on the condition of the restoration of the Acrocorinthus, and of having
the city of Corinth put into his hands as a base of operations in this
war; and on the other hand it seemed impossible that the Achaeans
should venture to put the Corinthians in the king’s power against their
own consent. The final determination of the matter was accordingly
postponed, that they might investigate the question of the securities
to be given to the king.

[Sidenote: The Achaeans offer to surrender the Acrocorinthus to
Antigonus.]

+52.+ Meanwhile, on the strength of the dismay caused by his successes,
Cleomenes was making an unopposed progress through the cities,
winning some by persuasion and others by threats. In this way, he
got possession of Caphyae, Pellene, Pheneus, Argos, Phlius, Cleonae,
Epidaurus, Hermione, Troezen, and last of all Corinth, while he
personally commanded a siege of Sicyon. But this in reality relieved
the Achaeans from a very grave difficulty. For the Corinthians by
ordering Aratus, as Strategus of the league, and the Achaeans to
evacuate the town, and by sending messages to Cleomenes inviting his
presence, gave the Achaeans a ground of action and a reasonable pretext
for moving. Aratus was quick to take advantage of this; and, as the
Achaeans were in actual possession of the Acrocorinthus, he made his
peace with the royal family of Macedonia by offering it to Antigonus;
and at the same time gave thus a sufficient guarantee for friendship in
the future, and further secured Antigonus a base of operations for the
war with Sparta.

[Sidenote: Cleomenes prepares to resist.]

[Sidenote: Antigonus comes to the Isthmus, B.C. 224.]

Upon learning of this compact between the league and Antigonus,
Cleomenes raised the siege of Sicyon and pitched his camp near the
Isthmus; and, having thrown up a line of fortification uniting the
Acrocorinthus with the mountain called the “Ass’s Back,” began from
this time to expect with confidence the empire of the Peloponnese. But
Antigonus had made his preparations long in advance, in accordance with
the suggestion of Aratus, and was only waiting for the right moment to
act. And now the news which he received convinced him that the entrance
of Cleomenes into Thessaly, at the head of an army, was only a question
of a very few days: he accordingly despatched envoys to Aratus and the
league to conclude the terms of the treaty[162] and marched to the
Isthmus with his army by way of Euboea. He took this route because
the Aetolians, after trying other expedients for preventing Antigonus
bringing this aid, now forbade his marching south of Thermopylae with
an army, threatening that, if he did, they would offer armed opposition
to his passage.

+53.+ Thus Antigonus and Cleomenes were encamped face to face: the
former desirous of effecting an entrance into the Peloponnese,
Cleomenes determined to prevent him.

[Sidenote: The Achaeans seize Argos.]

Meanwhile the Achaeans, in spite of their severe disasters, did
not abandon their purpose or give up all hopes of retrieving their
fortunes. They gave Aristotle of Argos assistance when he headed
a rising against the Cleomenic faction; and, under the command of
Timoxenus the Strategus, surprised and seized Argos. And this must be
regarded as the chief cause of the improvement which took place in
their fortunes; for this reverse checked the ardour of Cleomenes and
damped the courage of his soldiers in advance, as was clearly shown by
what took place afterwards. For though Cleomenes had already possession
of more advantageous posts, and was in the enjoyment of more abundant
supplies than Antigonus, and was at the same time inspired with
superior courage and ambition: yet, as soon as he was informed that
Argos was in the hands of the Achaeans, he at once drew back, abandoned
all these advantages, and retreated from the Isthmus with every
appearance of precipitation, in terror of being completely surrounded
by his enemies. At first he retired upon Argos, and for a time made
some attempt to regain the town. But the Achaeans offered a gallant
resistance; and the Argives themselves were stirred up to do the same
by remorse for having admitted him before: and so, having failed in
this attempt also, he marched back to Sparta by way of Mantinea.

[Sidenote: Antigonus receives the Acrocorinthus.]

+54.+ On his part, Antigonus advanced without any casualty into the
Peloponnese, and took over the Acrocorinthus; and, without wasting
time there, pushed on in his enterprise and entered Argos. He only
stayed there long enough to compliment the Argives on their conduct,
and to provide for the security of the city; and then immediately
starting again directed his march towards Arcadia; and after ejecting
the garrisons from the posts which had been fortified by Cleomenes in
the territories of Aegys and Belmina, and, putting those strongholds
in the hands of the people of Megalopolis, he went to Aegium to attend
the meeting of the Achaean league. There he made a statement of his own
proceedings, and consulted with the meeting as to the measures to be
taken in the future. He was appointed commander-in-chief of the allied
army, and went into winter quarters at Sicyon and Corinth.

[Sidenote: B.C. 223. Recovery of Tegea.]

[Sidenote: Skirmish with Cleomenes.]

[Sidenote: Capture of Orchomenus]

[Sidenote: and Mantinea]

[Sidenote: and Heraea and Telphusa.]

At the approach of spring he broke up his camp and got on the march.
On the third day he arrived at Tegea, and being joined there by the
Achaean forces, he proceeded to regularly invest the city. But the
vigour displayed by the Macedonians in conducting the siege, and
especially in the digging of mines, soon reduced the Tegeans to
despair, and they accordingly surrendered. After taking the proper
measures for securing the town, Antigonus proceeded to extend his
expedition. He now marched with all speed into Laconia; and having
found Cleomenes in position on the frontier, he was trying to bring him
to an engagement, and was harassing him with skirmishing attacks, when
news was brought to him by his scouts that the garrison of Orchomenus
had started to join Cleomenes. He at once broke up his camp, hurried
thither, and carried the town by assault. Having done that, he next
invested Mantinea and began to besiege it. This town also being soon
terrified into surrender by the Macedonians, he started again along the
road to Heraea and Telphusa. These towns, too, being secured by the
voluntary surrender of their inhabitants, as the winter was by this
time approaching, he went again to Aegium to attend the meeting of the
league. His Macedonian soldiers he sent away to winter at home, while
he himself remained to confer with the Achaeans on the existing state
of affairs.

+55.+ But Cleomenes was on the alert. He saw that the Macedonians in
the army of Antigonus had been sent home; and that the king and his
mercenaries in Aegium were three days’ march from Megalopolis; and
this latter town he well knew to be difficult to guard, owing to its
great extent, and the sparseness of its inhabitants; and, moreover,
that it was just then being kept with even greater carelessness than
usual, owing to Antigonus being in the country; and what was more
important than anything else, he knew that the larger number of its
men of military age had fallen at the battles of Lycaeum and Ladoceia.
There happened to be residing in Megalopolis some Messenian exiles; by
whose help he managed, under cover of night, to get within the walls
without being detected. When day broke he had a narrow escape from
being ejected, if not from absolute destruction, through the valour
of the citizens. This had been his fortune three months before, when
he had made his way into the city by the region which is called the
Cōlaeum: but on this occasion, by the superiority of his force, and the
seizure in advance of the strongest positions in the town, he succeeded
in effecting his purpose. He eventually ejected the inhabitants,
and took entire possession of the city; which, once in his power,
he dismantled in so savage and ruthless a manner as to preclude the
least hope that it might ever be restored. The reason of his acting in
this manner was, I believe, that Megalopolis and Stymphalus were the
only towns in which, during the vicissitudes of that period, he never
succeeded in obtaining a single partisan, or inducing a single citizen
to turn traitor. For the passion for liberty and the loyalty of the
Clitorians had been stained by the baseness of one man, Thearces; whom
the Clitorians, with some reason, denied to be a native of their city,
asserting that he had been foisted in from Orchomenus, and was the
offspring of one of the foreign garrison there.

[Sidenote: Digression (to ch. 63) on the misstatements of Phylarchus.]

[Sidenote: Mantinea.]

+56.+ For the history of the same period, with which we are now
engaged, there are two authorities, Aratus and Phylarchus,[163] whose
opinions are opposed in many points and their statements contradictory.
I think, therefore, it will be advantageous, or rather necessary, since
I follow Aratus in my account of the Cleomenic war, to go into the
question; and not by any neglect on my part to suffer misstatements in
historical writings to enjoy an authority equal to that of truth. The
fact is that the latter of these two writers has, throughout the whole
of his history, made statements at random and without discrimination.
It is not, however, necessary for me to criticise him on other points
on the present occasion, or to call him to strict account concerning
them; but such of his statements as relate to the period which I have
now in hand, that is the Cleomenic war, these I must thoroughly sift.
They will be quite sufficient to enable us to form a judgment on the
general spirit and ability with which he approaches historical writing.
It was his object to bring into prominence the cruelty of Antigonus
and the Macedonians, as well as that of Aratus and the Achaeans; and
he accordingly asserts that, when Mantinea fell into their hands, it
was cruelly treated; and that the most ancient and important of all
the Arcadian towns was involved in calamities so terrible as to move
all Greece to horror and tears. And being eager to stir the hearts
of his readers to pity, and to enlist their sympathies by his story,
he talks of women embracing, tearing their hair, and exposing their
breasts; and again of the tears and lamentations of men and women, led
off into captivity along with their children and aged parents. And
this he does again and again throughout his whole history, by way of
bringing the terrible scene vividly before his readers. I say nothing
of the unworthiness and unmanliness of the course he has adopted: let
us only inquire what is essential and to the purpose in history. Surely
an historian’s object should not be to amaze his readers by a series
of thrilling anecdotes; nor should he aim at producing speeches which
_might_ have been delivered, nor study dramatic propriety in details
like a writer of tragedy: but his function is above all to record
with fidelity what was actually said or done, however commonplace
it may be. For the purposes of history and of the drama are not the
same, but widely opposed to each other. In the former the object is
to strike and delight by words as true to nature as possible; in the
latter to instruct and convince by genuine words and deeds; in the
former the effect is meant to be temporary, in the latter permanent.
In the former, again, the power of carrying an audience is the chief
excellence, because the object is to create illusion; but in the latter
the thing of primary importance is truth, because the object is to
benefit the learner. And apart from these considerations, Phylarchus,
in most of the catastrophes which he relates, omits to suggest the
causes which gave rise to them, or the course of events which led up
to them: and without knowing these, it is impossible to feel the due
indignation or pity at anything which occurs. For instance, everybody
looks upon it as an outrage that the free should be struck: still,
if a man provokes it by an act of violence, he is considered to have
got no more than he deserved; and, where it is done for correction
and discipline, those who strike free men are deemed worthy of honour
and gratitude. Again, the killing of a fellow-citizen is regarded
as a heinous crime, deserving the severest penalties: and yet it is
notorious that the man who kills a thief, or his wife’s paramour, is
held guiltless; while he who kills a traitor or tyrant in every country
receives honours and pre-eminence. And so in everything our final
judgment does not depend upon the mere things done, but upon their
causes and the views of the actors, according as these differ.

[Sidenote: B.C. 227.]

+57.+ Now the people of Mantinea had in the first instance abandoned
the league, and voluntarily submitted, first to the Aetolians,
and afterwards to Cleomenes. Being therefore, in accordance with
this policy, members of the Lacedaemonian community, in the fourth
year before the coming of Antigonus, their city was forcibly taken
possession of by the Achaeans owing to the skilful plotting of Aratus.
But on that occasion, so far from being subjected to any severity
for their act of treason, it became a matter of general remark how
promptly the feelings of the conquerors and the conquered underwent a
revolution. As soon as he had got possession of the town, Aratus issued
orders to his own men that no one was to lay a finger on anything
that did not belong to him; and then, having summoned the Mantineans
to a meeting, he bade them be of good cheer, and stay in their own
houses; for that, as long as they remained members of the league,
their safety was secured. On their part, the Mantineans, surprised
at this unlooked-for prospect of safety, immediately experienced a
universal revulsion of feeling. The very men against whom they had
a little while before been engaged in a war, in which they had seen
many of their kinsfolk killed, and no small number grievously wounded,
they now received into their houses, and entertained as their guests,
interchanging every imaginable kindness with them. And naturally so.
For I believe that there never were men who met with more kindly foes,
or came out of a struggle with what seemed the most dreadful disasters
more scatheless, than did the Mantineans, owing to the humanity of
Aratus and the Achaeans towards them.

+58.+ But they still saw certain dangers ahead from intestine
disorders, and the hostile designs of the Aetolians and Lacedaemonians;
they subsequently, therefore, sent envoys to the league asking for a
guard for their town. The request was granted: and three hundred of
the league army were selected by lot to form it. These men on whom the
lot fell started for Mantinea; and, abandoning their native cities
and their callings in life, remained there to protect the lives and
liberties of the citizens. Besides them, the league despatched two
hundred mercenaries, who joined the Achaean guard in protecting the
established constitution. But this state of things did not last long:
an insurrection broke out in the town, and the Mantineans called in the
aid of the Lacedaemonians; delivered the city into their hands; and
put to death the garrison sent by the league. It would not be easy to
mention a grosser or blacker act of treachery. Even if they resolved to
utterly set at nought the gratitude they owed to, and the friendship
they had formed with, the league; they ought at least to have spared
these men, and to have let every one of them depart under some terms
or another: for this much it is the custom by the law of nations to
grant even to foreign enemies. But in order to satisfy Cleomenes and
the Lacedaemonians of their fidelity in the policy of the hour, they
deliberately, and in violation of international law, consummated a
crime of the most impious description. To slaughter and wreak vengeance
on the men who had just before taken their city, and refrained from
doing them the least harm, and who were at that very moment engaged in
protecting their lives and liberties,—can anything be imagined more
detestable? What punishment can be conceived to correspond with its
enormity? If one suggests that they would be rightly served by being
sold into slavery, with their wives and children, as soon as they were
beaten in war; it may be answered that this much is only what, by the
laws of warfare, awaits even those who have been guilty of no special
act of impiety. They deserved therefore to meet with a punishment even
more complete and heavy than they did; so that, even if what Phylarchus
mentions did happen to them, there was no reason for the pity of Greece
being bestowed on them: praise and approval rather were due to those
who exacted vengeance for their impious crime. But since, as a matter
of fact, nothing worse befel the Mantineans than the plunder of their
property and the selling of their free citizens into slavery, this
historian, for the mere sake of a sensational story, has not only told
a pure lie, but an improbable lie. His wilful ignorance also was so
supreme, that he was unable to compare with this alleged cruelty of the
Achaeans the conduct of the same people in the case of Tegea, which
they took by force at the same period, and yet did no injury to its
inhabitants. And yet, if the natural cruelty of the perpetrators was
the sole cause of the severity to Mantinea, it is to be presumed that
Tegea would have been treated in the same way. But if their treatment
of Mantinea was an exception to that of every other town, the necessary
inference is that the cause for their anger was exceptional also.

[Sidenote: Aristomachus.]

+59.+ Again Phylarchus says that Aristomachus the Argive, a man of
a most distinguished family, who had been despot of Argos, as his
fathers had been before him, upon falling into the hands of Antigonus
and the league “was hurried off to Cenchreae and there racked to
death,—an unparalleled instance of injustice and cruelty.” But in this
matter also our author preserves his peculiar method. He makes up a
story about certain cries of this man, when he was on the rack, being
heard through the night by the neighbours: “some of whom,” he says,
“rushed to the house in their horror, or incredulity, or indignation
at the outrage.” As for the sensational story, let it pass; I have
said enough on that point. But I must express my opinion that, even
if Aristomachus had committed no crime against the Achaeans besides,
yet his whole life and his treason to his own country deserved the
heaviest possible punishment. And in order, forsooth, to enhance this
man’s reputation, and move his reader’s sympathies for his sufferings,
our historian remarks that he had not only been a tyrant himself,
but that his fathers had been so before him. It would not be easy to
bring a graver or more bitter charge against a man than this: for the
mere word “tyrant” involves the idea of everything that is wickedest,
and includes every injustice and crime possible to mankind. And if
Aristomachus endured the most terrible tortures, as Phylarchus says,
he yet would not have been sufficiently punished for the crime of one
day, in which, when Aratus had effected an entrance into Argos with the
Achaean soldiers,—and after supporting the most severe struggles and
dangers for the freedom of its citizens, had eventually been driven
out, because the party within who were in league with him had not
ventured to stir, for fear of the tyrant,—Aristomachus availed himself
of the pretext of their complicity with the irruption of the Achaeans
to put to the rack and execute eighty of the leading citizens, who were
perfectly innocent, in the presence of their relations. I pass by the
history of his whole life and the crimes of his ancestors; for that
would be too long a story.

+60.+ But this shows that we ought not to be indignant if a man reaps
as he has sown; but rather if he is allowed to end his days in peace,
without experiencing such retribution at all. Nor ought we to accuse
Antigonus or Aratus of crime, for having racked and put to death a
tyrant whom they had captured in war: to have killed and wreaked
vengeance on whom, even in time of peace, would have brought praise and
honour to the doers from all right-minded persons.

But when, in addition to these crimes, he was guilty also of treachery
to the league, what shall we say that he deserved? The facts of the
case are these. He abdicted his sovereignty of Argos shortly before,
finding himself in difficulties, owing to the state of affairs brought
on by the death of Demetrius. He was, however, protected by the
clemency and generosity of the league; and, much to his own surprise,
was left unmolested. For the Achaean government not only secured him an
indemnity for all crimes committed by him while despot, but admitted
him as a member of the league, and invested him with the highest office
in it,—that, namely, of Commander-in-Chief and Strategus.[164] All
these favours he immediately forgot, as soon as his hopes were a little
raised by the Cleomenic war; and at a crisis of the utmost importance
he withdrew his native city, as well as his own personal adhesion,
from the league, and attached them to its enemies. For such an act of
treason what he deserved was not to be racked under cover of night at
Cenchreae, and then put to death, as Phylarchus says: he ought to have
been taken from city to city in the Peloponnese, and to have ended his
life only after exemplary torture in each of them. And yet the only
severity that this guilty wretch had to endure was to be drowned in the
sea by order of the officers at Cenchreae.

[Sidenote: Megalopolis.]

+61.+ There is another illustration of this writer’s manner to be
found in his treatment of the cases of Mantinea and Megalopolis. The
misfortunes of the former he has depicted with his usual exaggeration
and picturesqueness: apparently from the notion, that it is the
peculiar function of an historian to select for special mention only
such actions as are conspicuously bad. But about the noble conduct
of the Megalopolitans at that same period he has not said a word: as
though it were the province of history to deal with crimes rather than
with instances of just and noble conduct; or as though his readers
would be less improved by the record of what is great and worthy of
imitation, than by that of such deeds as are base and fit only to be
avoided. For instance, he has told us clearly enough how Cleomenes
took the town, preserved it from damage, and forthwith sent couriers
to the Megalopolitans in Messene with a despatch, offering them the
safe enjoyment of their country if they would throw in their lot with
him;—and his object in telling all this is to enhance the magnanimity
and moderation of Cleomenes towards his enemies. Nay, he has gone
farther, and told us how the people of Megalopolis would not allow
the letter to be read to the end, and were not far from stoning the
bearers of it. Thus much he does tell us. But the sequel to this, so
appropriate to an historian,—the commendation, I mean, and honourable
mention of their noble conduct,—this he has altogether left out. And
yet he had an opportunity ready to his hand. For if we view with
approval the conduct of a people who merely by their declarations and
votes support a war in behalf of friends and allies; while to those
who go so far as to endure the devastation of their territory, and a
siege of their town, we give not only praise but active gratitude:
what must be our estimate of the people of Megalopolis? Must it not
be of the most exalted character? First of all, they allowed their
territory to be at the mercy of Cleomenes, and then consented to be
entirely deprived of their city, rather than be false to the league:
and, finally, in spite of an unexpected chance of recovering it, they
deliberately preferred the loss of their territory, the tombs of their
ancestors, their temples, their homes and property, of everything in
fact which men value most, to forfeiting their faith to their allies.
No nobler action has ever been, or ever will be performed; none to
which an historian could better draw his reader’s attention. For what
could be a higher incentive to good faith, or the maintenance of frank
and permanent relations between states? But of all this Phylarchus says
not a word, being, as it seems to me, entirely blind as to all that is
noblest and best suited to be the theme of an historian.

[Sidenote: and its wealth.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 378.]

+62.+ He does, however, state in the course of his narrative that,
from the spoils of Megalopolis, six thousand talents fell to the
Lacedaemonians, of which two thousand, according to custom, were given
to Cleomenes. This shows, to begin with, an astounding ignorance of the
ordinary facts as to the resources of Greece: a knowledge which above
all others should be possessed by historians. I am not of course now
speaking of the period in which the Peloponnese had been ruined by the
Macedonian kings, and still more completely by a long continuance of
intestine struggles; but of our own times, in which it is believed, by
the establishment of its unity, to be enjoying the highest prosperity
of which it is capable. Still even at this period, if you could
collect all the movable property of the whole Peloponnese (leaving
out the value of slaves), it would be impossible to get so large a
sum of money together. That I speak on good grounds and not at random
will appear from the following fact. Every one has read that when the
Athenians, in conjunction with the Thebans, entered upon the war with
the Lacedaemonians, and despatched an army of twenty thousand men,
and manned a hundred triremes, they resolved to supply the expenses
of the war by the assessment of a property tax; and accordingly had a
valuation taken, not only of the whole land of Attica and the houses in
it, but of all other property: but yet the value returned fell short
of six thousand talents by two hundred and fifty; which will show that
what I have just said about the Peloponnese is not far wide of the
mark. But at this period the most exaggerated estimate could scarcely
give more than three hundred talents, as coming from Megalopolis
itself; for it is acknowledged that most of the inhabitants, free and
slaves, escaped to Messene. But the strongest confirmation of my words
is the case of Mantinea, which, as he himself observes, was second to
no Arcadian city in wealth and numbers. Though it was surrendered after
a siege, so that no one could escape, and no property could without
great difficulty be concealed; yet the value of the whole spoil of the
town, including the price of the captives sold, amounted at this same
period to only three hundred talents.

[Sidenote: Ptolemy Euergetes and Cleomenes.]

+63.+ But a more astonishing misstatement remains to be remarked. In
the course of his history of this war, Phylarchus asserts “that about
ten days before the battle an ambassador came from Ptolemy announcing
to Cleomenes, that the king declined to continue to support him with
supplies, and advised him to make terms with Antigonus. And that when
this message had been delivered to Cleomenes, he made up his mind that
he had better put his fortune to the supreme test as soon as possible,
before his forces learnt about this message, because he could not hope
to provide the soldiers’ pay from his own resources.” But if he had
at that very time become the master of six thousand talents, he would
have been better supplied than Ptolemy himself. And as for war with
Antigonus, if he had become master of only three hundred talents, he
would have been able to continue it without any difficulty. But the
writer states two inconsistent propositions—that Cleomenes depended
wholly on Ptolemy for money: and that he at the same time had become
master of that enormous sum. Is this not irrational, and grossly
careless besides? I might mention many instances of a similar kind, not
only in his account of this period, but throughout his whole work; but
I think for my present purpose enough has been said.

[Sidenote: B.C. 222. Cleomenes invades Argos.]

+64.+ Megalopolis having fallen, then, Antigonus spent the winter at
Argos. But at the approach of spring Cleomenes collected his army,
addressed a suitable exhortation to them, and led them into the Argive
territory. Most people thought this a hazardous and foolhardy step,
because the places at which the frontier was crossed were strongly
fortified; but those who were capable of judging regarded the measure
as at once safe and prudent. For seeing that Antigonus had dismissed
his forces, he reckoned on two things,—there would be no one to resist
him, and therefore he would run no risk; and when the Argives found
that their territory was being laid waste up to their walls, they would
be certain to be roused to anger and to lay the blame upon Antigonus:
therefore, if on the one hand Antigonus, unable to bear the complaints
of the populace, were to sally forth and give him battle with his
present forces, Cleomenes felt sure of an easy victory; but if on the
other hand Antigonus refused to alter his plans, and kept persistently
aloof, he believed that he would be able to effect a safe retreat home,
after succeeding by this expedition in terrifying his enemies and
inspiring his own forces with courage. And this was the actual result.
For as the devastation of the country went on, crowds began to collect
and abuse Antigonus: but like a wise general and king, he refused
to allow any consideration to outweigh that of sound strategy, and
persisted in remaining inactive. Accordingly Cleomenes, in pursuance of
his plan, having terrified his enemies and inspired courage in his own
army for the coming struggle, returned home unmolested.

[Sidenote: The summer campaign. The army of Antigonus.]

+65.+ Summer having now come, and the Macedonian and Achaean soldiers
having assembled from their winter quarters, Antigonus moved his army,
along with his allies, into Laconia. The main force consisted of ten
thousand Macedonians for the phalanx, three thousand light armed, and
three hundred cavalry. With these were a thousand Agraei; the same
number of Gauls; three thousand mercenary infantry, and three hundred
cavalry; picked troops of the Achaeans, three thousand infantry and
three hundred cavalry; and a thousand Megalopolitans armed in the
Macedonian manner, under the command of Cercidas of Megalopolis. Of
the allies there were two thousand infantry, and two hundred cavalry,
from Boeotia; a thousand infantry and fifty cavalry from Epirus; the
same number from Acarnania; and sixteen hundred from Illyria, under
the command of Demetrius of Pharos. The whole amounted to twenty-eight
thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry.

[Sidenote: The position of Cleomenes at Sellasia.]

Cleomenes had expected the attack, and had secured the passes into the
country by posting garrisons, digging trenches, and felling trees;
while he took up position at a place called Sellasia, with an army
amounting to twenty thousand, having calculated that the invading
forces would take that direction: which turned out to be the case. This
pass lies between two hills, called respectively Evas and Olympus, and
the road to Sparta follows the course of the river Oenus. Cleomenes
strengthened both these hills by lines of fortification, consisting of
trench and palisade. On Evas he posted the perioeci and allies, under
the command of his brother Eucleidas; while he himself held Olympus
with the Lacedaemonians and mercenaries. On the level ground along the
river he stationed his cavalry, with a division of his mercenaries,
on both sides of the road. When Antigonus arrived, he saw at once
the strength of the position, and the skill with which Cleomenes had
selected the different branches of his army to occupy the points of
vantage, so that the whole aspect of the position was like that of
skilled soldiers drawn up ready for a charge. For no preparation for
attack or defence had been omitted; but everything was in order, either
for offering battle with effect, or for holding an almost unassailable
position.

+66.+ The sight of these preparations decided Antigonus not to make an
immediate attack upon the position, or rashly hazard an engagement. He
pitched his camp a short distance from it, covering his front by the
stream called Gorgylus, and there remained for some days; informing
himself by reconnaissances of the peculiarities of the ground and the
character of the troops, and at the same time endeavouring by feigned
movements to elicit the intentions of the enemy. But he could never
find an unguarded point, or one where the troops were not entirely
on the alert, for Cleomenes was always ready at a moment’s notice to
be at any point that was attacked. He therefore gave up all thoughts
of attacking the position; and finally an understanding was come to
between him and Cleomenes to bring the matter to the decision of
battle. And, indeed, Fortune had there brought into competition two
commanders equally endowed by nature with military skill. To face
the division of the enemy on Evas Antigonus stationed his Macedonian
hoplites with brazen shields, and the Illyrians, drawn up in alternate
lines, under the command of Alexander, son of Acmetus, and Demetrius
of Pharos, respectively. Behind them he placed the Acarnanians and
Cretans, and behind them again were two thousand Achaeans to act
as a reserve. His cavalry, on the banks of the river Oenous, were
posted opposite the enemy’s cavalry, under the command of Alexander,
and flanked by a thousand Achaean infantry and the same number of
Megalopolitans. Antigonus himself determined to lead his mercenaries
and Macedonian troops in person against the division on Olympus
commanded by Cleomenes. Owing to the narrowness of the ground, the
Macedonians were arranged in a double phalanx, one close behind the
other, while the mercenaries were placed in front of them. It was
arranged that the Illyrians, who had bivouacked in full order during
the previous night along the river Gorgylus, close to the foot of Evas,
were to begin their assault on the hill when they saw a flag of linen
raised from the direction of Olympus; and that the Megalopolitans and
cavalry should do the same when the king raised a scarlet flag.

[Sidenote: Battle of Sellasia.]

[Sidenote: Philopoemen’s presence of mind.]

+67.+ The moment for beginning the battle had come: the signal was
given to the Illyrians, and the word passed by the officers to their
men to do their duty, and in a moment they started into view of the
enemy and began assaulting the hill. But the light-armed troops who
were stationed with Cleomenes’s cavalry, observing that the Achaean
lines were not covered by any other troops behind them, charged them
on the rear; and thus reduced the division while endeavouring to carry
the hill of Evas to a state of great peril,—being met as they were on
their front by Eucleidas from the top of the hill, and being charged
and vigorously attacked by the light-armed mercenaries on their rear.
It was at this point that Philopoemen of Megalopolis, with a clear
understanding of the situation and a foresight of what would happen,
vainly endeavoured to point out the certain result to his superior
officers. They disregarded him for his want of experience in command
and his extreme youth; and, accordingly he acted for himself, and
cheering on the men of his own city, made a vigorous charge on the
enemy. This effected a diversion; for the light-armed mercenaries,
who were engaged in harassing the rear of the party ascending Evas,
hearing the shouting and seeing the cavalry engaged, abandoned their
attack upon this party and hurried back to their original position to
render assistance to the cavalry. The result was that the division of
Illyrians, Macedonians, and the rest who were advancing with them, no
longer had their attention diverted by an attack upon their rear, and
so continued their advance upon the enemy with high spirits and renewed
confidence. And this afterwards caused it to be acknowledged that to
Philopoemen was due the honour of the success against Eucleidas.

+68.+ It is clear that Antigonus at any rate entertained that opinion,
for after the battle he asked Alexander, the commander of the cavalry,
with the view of convicting him of his shortcoming, “Why he had engaged
before the signal was given?” And upon Alexander answering that “He had
not done so, but that a young officer from Megalopolis had presumed to
anticipate the signal, contrary to his wish:” Antigonus replied, “That
young man acted like a good general in grasping the situation; you,
general, were the youngster.”

[Sidenote: Defeat of Eucleidas.]

What Eucleidas ought to have done, when he saw the enemy’s lines
advancing, was to have rushed down at once upon them; thrown their
ranks into disorder; and then retired himself, step by step, to
continually higher ground into a safe position: for by thus breaking
them up and depriving them, to begin with, of the advantages of their
peculiar armour and disposition, he would have secured the victory by
the superiority of his position. But he did the very opposite of all
this, and thereby forfeited the advantages of the ground. As though
victory were assured, he kept his original position on the summit of
the hill, with the view of catching the enemy at as great an elevation
as possible, that their flight might be all the longer over steep and
precipitous ground. The result, as might have been anticipated, was
exactly the reverse. For he left himself no place of retreat, and by
allowing the enemy to reach his position, unharmed and in unbroken
order, he was placed at the disadvantage of having to give them battle
on the very summit of the hill; and so, as soon as he was forced by the
weight of their heavy armour and their close order to give any ground,
it was immediately occupied by the Illyrians; while his own men were
obliged to take lower ground, because they had no space for manœuvring
on the top. The result was not long in arriving: they suffered a
repulse, which the difficult and precipitous nature of the ground over
which they had to retire turned into a disastrous flight.

[Sidenote: Defeat of Cleomenes.]

+69.+ Simultaneously with these events the cavalry engagement was also
being brought to a decision; in which all the Achaean cavalry, and
especially Philopoemen, fought with conspicuous gallantry, for to them
it was a contest for freedom. Philopoemen himself had his horse killed
under him, and while fighting accordingly on foot received a severe
wound through both his thighs. Meanwhile the two kings on the other
hill Olympus began by bringing their light-armed troops and mercenaries
into action, of which each of them had five thousand. Both the kings
and their entire armies had a full view of this action, which was
fought with great gallantry on both sides: the charges taking place
sometimes in detachments, and at other times along the whole line, and
an eager emulation being displayed between the several ranks, and even
between individuals. But when Cleomenes saw that his brother’s division
was retreating, and that the cavalry in the low ground were on the
point of doing the same, alarmed at the prospect of an attack at all
points at once, he was compelled to demolish the palisade in his front,
and to lead out his whole force in line by one side of his position.
A recall was sounded on the bugle for the light-armed troops of both
sides, who were on the ground between the two armies: and the phalanxes
shouting their war cries, and with spears couched, charged each other.
Then a fierce struggle arose: the Macedonians sometimes slowly giving
ground and yielding to the superior courage of the soldiers of Sparta,
and at another time the Lacedaemonians being forced to give way before
the overpowering weight of the Macedonian phalanx. At length Antigonus
ordered a charge in close order and in double phalanx; the enormous
weight of this peculiar formation proved sufficient to finally dislodge
the Lacedaemonians from their strongholds, and they fled in disorder
and suffering severely as they went. Cleomenes himself, with a guard
of cavalry, effected his retreat to Sparta: but the same night he went
down to Gythium, where all preparations for crossing the sea had been
made long before in case of mishap, and with his friends sailed to
Alexandria.

+70.+ Having surprised and taken Sparta, Antigonus treated the citizens
with magnanimity and humanity; and after re-establishing their ancient
constitution, he left the town in a few days, on receiving intelligence
that the Illyrians had invaded Macedonia and were laying waste the
country. This was an instance of the fantastic way in which Fortune
decides the most important matters. For if Cleomenes had only put off
the battle for a few days, or if when he returned to Sparta he had only
held out for a brief space of time, he would have saved his crown.

[Sidenote: Death of Antigonus Doson, B.C. 220.]

As it was, Antigonus after going to Tegea and restoring its
constitution, arrived on the second day at Argos, at the very time
of the Nemean games. Having at this assembly received every mark of
immortal honour and glory at the hands of the Achaean community, as
well as of the several states, he made all haste to reach Macedonia.
He found the Illyrians still in the country, and forced them to give
him battle, in which, though he proved entirely successful, he exerted
himself to such a pitch in shouting encouragement to his men, that
he ruptured a bloodvessel, and fell into an illness which terminated
shortly in his death. He was a great loss to the Greeks, whom he had
inspired with good hopes, not only by his support in the field, but
still more by his character and good principles. He left the kingdom of
Macedonia to Philip, son of Demetrius.

+71.+ My reason for writing about this war at such length, was the
advisability, or rather necessity, in view of the general purpose of my
history, of making clear the relations existing between Macedonia and
Greece at a time which coincides with the period of which I am about to
treat.

[Sidenote: B.C. 284-280. B.C. 224-220.]

Just about the same time, by the death of Euergetes, Ptolemy Philopator
succeeded to the throne of Egypt. At the same period died Seleucus,
son of that Seleucus who had the double surnames of Callinicus
and Pogon: he was succeeded on the throne of Syria by his brother
Antiochus. The deaths of these three sovereigns—Antigonus, Ptolemy,
and Seleucus—fell in the same Olympiad, as was the case with the three
immediate successors to Alexander the Great,—Seleucus, Ptolemy, and
Lysimachus,—for the latter all died in the 124th Olympiad, and the
former in the 139th.

I may now fitly close this book. I have completed the introduction and
laid the foundation on which my history must rest. I have shown when,
how, and why the Romans, after becoming supreme in Italy, began to
aim at dominion outside of it, and to dispute with the Carthaginians
the dominion of the sea. I have at the same time explained the state
of Greece, Macedonia, and Carthage at this epoch. I have now arrived
at the period which I originally marked out,—that namely in which
the Greeks were on the point of beginning the Social, the Romans the
Hannibalic war, and the kings in Asia the war for the possession of
Coele-Syria. The termination therefore of the wars just described, and
the death of the princes engaged in them, forms a natural period to
this book.




BOOK III


+1.+ I stated in my first book that my work was to start from the
Social war, the Hannibalian war, and the war for the possession of
Coele-Syria. In the same book I stated my reasons for devoting my first
two books to a sketch of the period preceding those events. I will now,
after a few prefatory remarks as to the scope of my own work, address
myself to giving a complete account of these wars, the causes which led
to them, and which account for the proportions to which they attained.

[Sidenote: A summary of the work from B.C. 220 to B.C. 168.]

The one aim and object, then, of all that I have undertaken to write is
to show how, when, and why all the known parts of the world fell under
the dominion of Rome. Now as this great event admits of being exactly
dated as to its beginning, duration, and final accomplishment, I think
it will be advantageous to give, by way of preface, a summary statement
of the most important phases in it between the beginning and the end.
For I think I shall thus best secure to the student an adequate idea
of my whole plan, for as the comprehension of the whole is a help to
the understanding of details, and the knowledge of details of great
service to the clear conception of the whole; believing that the best
and clearest knowledge is that which is obtained from a combination
of these, I will preface my whole history by a brief summary of its
contents.

[Sidenote: B.C. 220-216.]

I have already described its scope and limits. As to its several parts,
the first consists of the above mentioned wars, while the conclusion or
closing scene is the fall of the Macedonian monarchy. The time included
between these limits is fifty-three years, and never has an equal space
embraced events of such magnitude and importance. In describing them I
shall start from the 140th Olympiad and shall arrange my exposition in
the following order:

[Sidenote: 1. The cause and course of the Hannibalian war.]

+2.+ First I shall indicate the causes of the Punic or Hannibalian war:
and shall have to describe how the Carthaginians entered Italy; broke
up the Roman power there; made the Romans tremble for their safety
and the very soil of their country; and contrary to all calculation
acquired a good prospect of surprising Rome itself.

[Sidenote: 2. Macedonian treaty with Carthage, B.C. 216.]

I shall next try to make it clear how in the same period Philip of
Macedon, after finishing his war with the Aetolians, and subsequently
settling the affairs of Greece, entered upon a design of forming an
offensive and defensive alliance with Carthage.

[Sidenote: 3. Syrian war, B.C. 218.]

Then I shall tell how Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator first quarrelled
and finally went to war with each other for the possession of
Coele-Syria.

[Sidenote: 4. Byzantine war, B.C. 220.]

Next how the Rhodians and Prusias went to war with the Byzantines, and
compelled them to desist from exacting dues from ships sailing into the
Pontus.

[Sidenote: First digression on the Roman Constitution.]

At this point I shall pause in my narrative to introduce a disquisition
upon the Roman Constitution, in which I shall show that its peculiar
character contributed largely to their success, not only in reducing
all Italy to their authority, and in acquiring a supremacy over the
Iberians and Gauls besides, but also at last, after their conquest of
Carthage, to their conceiving the idea of universal dominion.

[Sidenote: Second on Hiero of Syracuse.]

Along with this I shall introduce another digression on the fall of
Hiero of Syracuse.

[Sidenote: 5. The attempted partition of the dominions of Ptolemy
Epiphanes, B.C. 204.]

After these digressions will come the disturbances in Egypt; how, after
the death of King Ptolemy, Antiochus and Philip entered into a compact
for the partition of the dominions of that monarch’s infant son. I
shall describe their treacherous dealings, Philip laying hands upon the
islands of the Aegean, and Caria and Samos, Antiochus upon Coele-Syria
and Phoenicia.

[Sidenote: 6. War with Philip, B.C. 201-197.]

+3.+ Next, after a summary recapitulation of the proceedings of the
Carthaginians and Romans in Iberia, Libya, and Sicily, I shall,
following the changes of events, shift the scene of my story entirely
to Greece. Here I shall first describe the naval battles of Attalus and
the Rhodians against Philip; and the war between Philip and Rome, the
persons engaged, its circumstances, and result.

[Sidenote: 7. Asiatic war, B.C. 192-191.]

Next to this I shall have to record the wrath of the Aetolians, in
consequence of which they invited the aid of Antiochus, and thereby
gave rise to what is called the Asiatic war against Rome and the
Achaean league. Having stated the causes of this war, and described
the crossing of Antiochus into Europe, I shall have to show first in
what manner he was driven from Greece; secondly, how, being defeated in
the war, he was forced to cede all his territory west of Taurus; and
thirdly, how the Romans, after crushing the insolence of the Gauls,
secured undisputed possession of Asia, and freed all the nations on
the west of Taurus from the fear of barbarian inroads and the lawless
violence of the Gauls.

[Sidenote: 8. Gallic wars of Eumenes and Prusias.]

Next, after reviewing the disasters of the Aetolians and Cephallenians,
I shall pass to the wars waged by Eumenes against Prusias and the
Gauls; as well as that carried on in alliance with Ariarathes against
Pharnaces.

[Sidenote: 9. Union of the Peloponnese. Antiochus Epiphanes in Egypt.
Fall of the Macedonian monarchy, B.C. 188-168.]

Finally, after speaking of the unity and settlement of the Peloponnese,
and of the growth of the commonwealth of Rhodes, I shall add a summary
of my whole work, concluding by an account of the expedition of
Antiochus Epiphanes against Egypt; of the war against Perseus; and the
destruction of the Macedonian monarchy. Throughout the whole narrative
it will be shown how the policy adopted by the Romans in one after
another of these cases, as they arose, led to their eventual conquest
of the whole world.

[Sidenote: The plan extended to embrace the period from B.C. 168-146.]

+4.+ And if our judgment of individuals and constitutions, for praise
or blame, could be adequately formed from a simple consideration of
their successes or defeats, I must necessarily have stopped at this
point, and have concluded my history as soon as I reached these last
events in accordance with my original plan. For at this point the
fifty-three years were coming to an end, and the progress of the Roman
power had arrived at its consummation. And, besides, by this time the
acknowledgment had been extorted from all that the supremacy of Rome
must be accepted, and her commands obeyed. But in truth, judgments of
either side founded on the bare facts of success or failure in the
field are by no means final. It has often happened that what seemed
the most signal successes have, from ill management, brought the
most crushing disasters in their train; while not unfrequently the
most terrible calamities, sustained with spirit, have been turned to
actual advantage. I am bound, therefore, to add to my statement of
facts a discussion on the subsequent policy of the conquerors, and
their administration of their universal dominion: and again on the
various feelings and opinions entertained by other nations towards
their rulers. And I must also describe the tastes and aims of the
several nations, whether in their private lives or public policy. The
present generation will learn from this whether they should shun or
seek the rule of Rome; and future generations will be taught whether
to praise and imitate, or to decry it. The usefulness of my history,
whether for the present or the future, will mainly lie in this. For
the end of a policy should not be, in the eyes either of the actors
or their historians, simply to conquer others and bring all into
subjection. Nor does any man of sense go to war with his neighbours
for the mere purpose of mastering his opponents; nor go to sea for
the mere sake of the voyage; nor engage in professions and trades for
the sole purpose of learning them. In all these cases the objects are
invariably the pleasure, honour, or profit which are the results of
the several employments. Accordingly the object of this work shall
be to ascertain exactly what the position of the several states was,
after the universal conquest by which they fell under the power of
Rome, until the commotions and disturbances which broke out at a later
period. These I designed to make the starting-point of what may almost
be called a new work, partly because of the greatness and surprising
nature of the events themselves, but chiefly because, in the case of
most of them, I was not only an eye-witness, but in some cases one of
the actors, and in others the chief director.

[Sidenote: A new departure; the breaking-up of the arrangement made
after the fall of Macedonia. Wars of Carthage against Massinissa; and
of Rome against the Celtiberians, B.C. 155-150; and against Carthage
(3d Punic war, B.C. 149-146).]

+5.+ The events I refer to are the wars of Rome against the
Celtiberians and Vaccaei; those of Carthage against Massinissa, king of
Libya; and those of Attalus and Prusias in Asia. Then also Ariarathes,
King of Cappadocia, having been ejected from his throne by Orophernes
through the agency of King Demetrius, recovered his ancestral power by
the help of Attalus; while Demetrius, son of Seleucus, after twelve
years' possession of the throne of Syria, was deprived of it, and of
his life at the same time, by a combination of the other kings against
him. Then it was, too, that the Romans restored to their country those
Greeks who had been charged with guilt in the matter of the war with
Perseus, after formally acquitting them of the crimes alleged against
them. Not long afterwards the same people turned their hands against
Carthage: at first with the intention of forcing its removal to some
other spot, but finally, for reasons to be afterwards stated, with the
resolution of utterly destroying it. Contemporaneous with this came the
renunciation by the Macedonians of their friendship to Rome, and by the
Lacedaemonians of their membership of the Achaean league, to which the
disaster that befell all Greece alike owed its beginning and end.

This is my purpose: but its fulfilment must depend upon whether Fortune
protracts my life to the necessary length. I am persuaded, however,
that, even if the common human destiny does overtake me, this theme
will not be allowed to lie idle for want of competent men to handle
it; for there are many besides myself who will readily undertake its
completion. But having given the heads of the most remarkable events,
with the object of enabling the reader to grasp the general scope of my
history as well as the arrangement of its several parts, I must now,
remembering my original plan, go back to the point at which my history
starts.

[Sidenote: The origin of the 2d Punic war;]

[Sidenote: B.C. 334,]

[Sidenote: B.C. 192,]

[Sidenote: B.C. 401-400,]

[Sidenote: B.C. 396-394,]

+6.+ Some historians of the Hannibalian war, when they wish to point
out to us the causes of this contest between Rome and Carthage, allege
first the siege of Saguntum by the Carthaginians, and, secondly,
their breach of treaty by crossing the river called by the natives
the Iber. But though I should call these the first actions in the
war, I cannot admit them to be its causes. One might just as well say
that the crossing of Alexander the Great into Asia was the _cause_
of the Persian war, and the descent of Antiochus upon Demetrias the
_cause_ of his war with Rome. In neither would it be a probable or true
statement. In the first case, this action of Alexander’s could not be
called the cause of a war, for which both he and his father Philip in
his lifetime had made elaborate preparations: and in the second case,
we know that the Aetolian league had done the same, with a view to a
war with Rome, before Antiochus came upon the scene. Such definitions
are only worthy of men who cannot distinguish between a first overt
act and a cause or pretext; and who do not perceive that a _cause_
is the first in a series of events of which such an overt act is the
last. I shall therefore regard the first attempt to put into execution
what had already been determined as a “beginning,” but I shall look
for “causes” in the motives which suggested such action and the policy
which dictated it; for it is by these, and the calculations to which
they give rise, that men are led to decide upon a particular line of
conduct. The soundness of this method will be proved by the following
considerations. The true causes and origin of the invasion of Persia
by Alexander are patent to everybody. They were, first, the return
march of the Greeks under Xenophon through the country from the upper
Satrapies; in the course of which, though throughout Asia all the
populations were hostile, not a single barbarian ventured to face them:
secondly, the invasion of Asia by the Spartan king Agesilaus, in which,
though he was obliged by troubles in Greece to return in the middle of
his expedition without effecting his object, he yet found no resistance
of any importance or adequacy. It was these circumstances which
convinced Philip of the cowardice and inefficiency of the Persians; and
comparing them with his own high state of efficiency for war, and that
of his Macedonian subjects, and placing before his eyes the splendour
of the rewards to be gained by such a war, and the popularity which it
would bring him in Greece, he seized on the pretext of avenging the
injuries done by Persia to Greece, and determined with great eagerness
to undertake this war; and was in fact at the time of his death engaged
in making every kind of preparation for it.

Here we have the _cause_ and the _pretext_ of the Persian war.
Alexander’s expedition into Asia was the _first action_ in it.

[Sidenote: and of the war with Antiochus.]

+7.+ So too of the war of Antiochus with Rome. The _cause_ was
evidently the exasperation of the Aetolians, who, thinking that they
had been slighted in a number of instances at the end of the war with
Philip, not only called in the aid of Antiochus, but resolved to go to
every extremity in satisfying the anger which the events of that time
had aroused in them. This was the _cause_. As for the _pretext_, it
was the liberation of Greece, which they went from city to city with
Antiochus proclaiming, without regard to reason or truth; while the
_first act_ in the war was the descent of Antiochus upon Demetrias.

My object in enlarging upon this distinction is not to attack the
historians in question, but to rectify the ideas of the studious. A
physician can do no good to the sick who does not know the causes
of their ailments; nor can a statesman do any good who is unable to
conceive the manner, cause, and source of the events with which he has
from time to time to deal. Surely the former could not be expected to
institute a suitable system of treatment for the body; nor the latter
to grapple with the exigencies of the situation, without possessing
this knowledge of its elements. There is nothing, therefore, which we
ought to be more alive to, and to seek for, than the causes of every
event which occurs. For the most important results are often produced
by trifles; and it is invariably easier to apply remedial measures at
the beginning, before things have got beyond the stage of conception
and intention.

[Sidenote: The credibility of Fabius Pictor.]

+8.+ Now the Roman annalist Fabius asserts that the cause of the
Hannibalian war, besides the injury inflicted upon Saguntum, was the
encroaching and ambitious spirit of Hasdrubal. “Having secured great
power in Iberia, he returned to Libya with the design of destroying
the constitution and reducing Carthage to a despotism. But the leading
statesmen, getting timely warning of his intention, banded themselves
together and successfully opposed him. Suspecting this Hasdrubal
retired from Libya, and thenceforth governed Iberia entirely at his own
will without taking any account whatever of the Carthaginian Senate.
This policy had had in Hannibal from his earliest youth a zealous
supporter and imitator; and when he succeeded to the command in Iberia
he continued it: and accordingly, even in the case of this war with
Rome, was acting on his own authority and contrary to the wish of the
Carthaginians; for none of the men of note in Carthage approved of
his attack upon Saguntum.” This is the statement of Fabius, who goes
on to say, that “after the capture of that city an embassy arrived in
Carthage from Rome demanding that Hannibal should be given up on pain
of a declaration of war.”

Now what answer could Fabius have given if we had put the following
question to him? “What better chance or opportunity could the
Carthaginians have had of combining justice and interest? According to
your own account they disliked the proceeding of Hannibal: why did they
not submit to the demands of Rome by surrendering the author of the
injury; and thus get rid of the common enemy of the state without the
odium of doing it themselves, and secure the safety of their territory
by ridding themselves of the threatened war—all of which they could
have effected by merely passing a decree?” If this question were put,
I say, it would admit of no answer. The fact is that, so far from
doing anything of the sort, they maintained the war in accordance with
Hannibal’s policy for seventeen years; and refused to make terms until,
at the end of a most determined struggle, they found their own city and
persons in imminent danger of destruction.

+9.+ I do not allude to Fabius and his annals from any fear of their
wearing such an air of probability in themselves as to gain any
credit,—for the fact is that his assertions are so contrary to reason,
that it does not need any argument of mine to help his readers to
perceive it,—but I wished to warn those who take up his books not to
be misled by the authority of his name, but to be guided by facts.
For there is a certain class of readers in whose eyes the personality
of the writer is of more account than what he says. They look to the
fact that Fabius was a contemporary and a member of the Senate, and
assume without more ado that everything he says may be trusted. My
view, however, is that we ought not to hold the authority of this
writer lightly: yet at the same time that we should not regard it as
all-sufficient; but in reading his writings should test them by a
reference to the facts themselves.

[Sidenote: The Hannibalian or 2nd Punic war. First cause.]

This is a digression from my immediate subject, which is the war
between Carthage and Rome. The cause of this war we must reckon to be
the exasperation of Hamilcar, surnamed Barcas, the father of Hannibal.
The result of the war in Sicily had not broken the spirit of that
commander. He regarded himself as unconquered; for the troops at
Eryx which he commanded were still sound and undismayed: and though
he yielded so far as to make a treaty, it was a concession to the
exigencies of the times brought on by the defeat of the Carthaginians
at sea. But he never relaxed in his determined purpose of revenge; and,
had it not been for the mutiny of the mercenaries at Carthage, he would
at once have sought and made another occasion for bringing about a war,
as far as he was able to do so: as it was, he was preoccupied by the
domestic war, and had to give his attention entirely to that.

[Sidenote: B.C. 238. Bk. i. ch. 88. Second cause.]

[Sidenote: Third cause.]

+10.+ When the Romans, at the conclusion of this mercenary war,
proclaimed war with Carthage, the latter at first was inclined to
resist at all hazards, because the goodness of her cause gave her
hopes of victory,—as I have shown in my former book, without which
it would be impossible to understand adequately either this or what
is to follow. The Romans, however, would not listen to anything: and
the Carthaginians therefore yielded to the force of circumstances;
and though feeling bitterly aggrieved, yet being quite unable to do
anything, evacuated Sardinia, and consented to pay a sum of twelve
hundred talents, in addition to the former indemnity paid them, on
condition of avoiding the war at that time. This is the second and
the most important cause of the subsequent war. For Hamilcar, having
this public grievance in addition to his private feelings of anger, as
soon as he had secured his country’s safety by reducing the rebellious
mercenaries, set at once about securing the Carthaginian power in
Iberia with the intention of using it as a base of operations against
Rome. So that I record as a third cause of the war the Carthaginian
success in Iberia: for it was the confidence inspired by their forces
there which encouraged them to embark upon it. It would be easy to
adduce other facts to show that Hamilcar, though he had been dead ten
years at its commencement, largely contributed to bring about the
second Punic war, but what I am about to say will be sufficient to
establish the fact.

[Sidenote: Hannibal’s oath.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 195.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 238.]

+11.+ When, after his final defeat by the Romans, Hannibal had at last
quitted his country and was staying at the court of Antiochus, the
warlike attitude of the Aetolian league induced the Romans to send
ambassadors to Antiochus, that they might be informed of the king’s
intentions. These ambassadors found that Antiochus was inclined to the
Aetolian alliance, and was eager for war with Rome; they accordingly
paid great court to Hannibal with a view of bringing him into suspicion
with the king. And in this they entirely succeeded. As time went on the
king became ever more and more suspicious of Hannibal, until at length
an opportunity occurred for an explanation of the alienation that had
been thus secretly growing up between them. Hannibal then defended
himself at great length, but without success, until at last he made the
following statement: “When my father was about to go on his Iberian
expedition I was nine years old: and as he was offering the sacrifice
to Zeus I stood near the altar. The sacrifice successfully performed,
my father poured the libation and went through the usual ritual. He
then bade all the other worshippers stand a little back, and calling
me to him asked me affectionately whether I wished to go with him on
his expedition. Upon my eagerly assenting, and begging with boyish
enthusiasm to be allowed to go, he took me by the right hand and led me
up to the altar, and bade me lay my hand upon the victim and swear that
I would never be friends with Rome. So long, then, Antiochus, as your
policy is one of hostility to Rome, you may feel quite secure of having
in me a most thorough-going supporter. But if ever you make terms or
friendship with her, then you need not wait for any slander to make you
distrust me and be on your guard against me; for there is nothing in my
power that I would not do against her.”

+12.+ Antiochus listened to this story, and being convinced that
it was told with genuine feeling and sincerity, gave up all his
suspicions. And we, too, must regard this as an unquestionable proof
of the animosity of Hamilcar and of the aim of his general policy;
which, indeed, is also proved by facts. For he inspired his son-in-law
Hasdrubal and his son Hannibal with a bitterness of resentment against
Rome which nothing could surpass. Hasdrubal, indeed, was prevented
by death from showing the full extent of his purpose; but time gave
Hannibal abundant opportunity to manifest the hatred of Rome which he
had inherited from his father.

The most important thing, then, for statesmen to observe is the
motives of those who lay aside old enmities or form new friendships;
and to ascertain when their consent to treaties is a mere concession
to the necessities of the hour, and when it is the indication of a
real consciousness of defeat. In the former case they must be on their
guard against such people lying in wait for an opportunity; while
in the latter they may unhesitatingly impose whatever injunctions
are necessary, in full reliance on the genuineness of their feelings
whether as subjects or friends. So much for the causes of the war. I
will now relate the first actions in it.

[Sidenote: Death of Hamilcar, B.C. 229.]

[Sidenote: Death of Hasdrubal, B.C. 221.]

+13.+ The Carthaginians were highly incensed by their loss of Sicily,
but their resentment was heightened still more, as I have said, by
the transaction as to Sardinia, and by the addition recently made to
their tribute. Accordingly, when the greater part of Iberia had fallen
into their power, they were on the alert to seize any opportunity that
presented itself of retaliating upon Rome. At the death of Hasdrubal,
to whom they had committed the command in Iberia after the death of
Hamilcar, they waited at first to ascertain the feelings of the army;
but when news came from thence that the troops had elected Hannibal as
commander-in-chief, a popular assembly was at once held, and the choice
of the army confirmed by a unanimous vote. As soon as he had taken over
the command, Hannibal set out to subdue the tribe of the Olcades; and,
having arrived before their most formidable city Althaea, he pitched
his camp under its walls; and by a series of energetic and formidable
assaults succeeded before long in taking it: by which the rest of
the tribe were overawed into submission to Carthage. Having imposed
a contribution upon the towns, and thus become possessed of a large
sum of money, he went to the New Town to winter. There, by a liberal
treatment of the forces under his command, giving them an instalment of
their pay at once and promising the rest, he established an excellent
feeling towards himself in the army, as well as great hopes for the
future.

[Sidenote: B.C. 220. Hannibal attacks the Vaccaei.]

+14.+ Next summer he set out on another expedition against the Vaccaei,
in which he took Salmantica by assault, but only succeeded in storming
Arbucala, owing to the size of the town and the number and valour of
its inhabitants, after a laborious siege. After this he suddenly found
himself in a position of very great danger on his return march: being
set upon by the Carpesii, the strongest tribe in those parts, who were
joined also by neighbouring tribes, incited principally by refugees
of the Olcades, but roused also to great wrath by those who escaped
from Salmantica. If the Carthaginians had been compelled to give these
people regular battle, there can be no doubt that they would have been
defeated: but as it was, Hannibal, with admirable skill and caution,
slowly retreated until he had put the Tagus between himself and the
enemy; and thus giving battle at the crossing of the stream, supported
by it and the elephants, of which he had about forty, he gained, to
every one’s surprise, a complete success. For when the barbarians
attempted to force a crossing at several points of the river at once,
the greater number of them were killed as they left the water by the
elephants, who marched up and down along the brink of the river and
caught them as they were coming out. Many of them also were killed
in the river itself by the cavalry, because the horses were better
able than the men to stand against the stream, and also because the
cavalry were fighting on higher ground than the infantry which they
were attacking. At length Hannibal turned the tables on the enemy, and,
recrossing the river, attacked and put to flight their whole army, to
the number of more than a hundred thousand men. After the defeat of
this host, no one south of the Iber rashly ventured to face him except
the people of Saguntum. From that town Hannibal tried his best to keep
aloof; because, acting on the suggestions and advice of his father
Hamilcar, he did not wish to give the Romans an avowed pretext for war
until he had thoroughly secured the rest of the country.

[Sidenote: Saguntum appeals to Rome. Winter of B.C. 220-219.]

[Sidenote: Hannibal’s defiance.]

+15.+ But the people of Saguntum kept sending ambassadors to Rome,
partly because they foresaw what was coming, and trembled for their
own existence, and partly that the Romans might be kept fully aware
of the growing power of the Carthaginians in Iberia. For a long
time the Romans disregarded their words: but now they sent out some
commissioners to see what was going on. Just at that time Hannibal had
finished the conquests which he intended for that season, and was going
into winter quarters at the New Town again, which was in a way the
chief glory and capital town of the Carthaginians in Iberia. He found
there the embassy from Rome, granted them an interview, and listened to
the message with which they were charged. It was a strong injunction
to him to leave Saguntum alone, as being under the protection of Rome;
and not to cross the Iber, in accordance with the agreement come to
in the time of Hasdrubal. To this Hannibal answered with all the
heat of youth, inflamed by martial ardour, recent success, and his
long-standing hatred of Rome. He charged the Romans with having a short
time before, when on some political disturbances arising in the town
they had been chosen to act as arbitrators, seized the opportunity to
put some of the leading citizens to death; and he declared that the
Carthaginians would not allow the Saguntines to be thus treacherously
dealt with, for it was the traditional policy of Carthage to protect
all persons so wronged. At the same time he sent home for instructions
as to what he was to do “in view of the fact that the Saguntines were
injuring certain of their subject allies.” And altogether he was in a
state of unreasoning anger and violent exasperation, which prevented
him from availing himself of the real causes for war, and made him
take refuge in pretexts which would not admit of justification, after
the manner of men whose passions master all considerations of equity.
How much better it would have been to demand of Rome the restoration
of Sardinia, and the remission of the tribute, which she had taken an
unfair opportunity to impose on pain of a declaration of war. As it
was, he said not a word of the real cause, but alleged the fictitious
one of the matter of Saguntum; and so got the credit of beginning the
war, not only in defiance of reason, but still more in defiance of
justice. The Roman ambassadors, finding that there must undoubtedly be
a war, sailed to Carthage to enter the same protest before the people
there. They expected, however, that they would have to fight not in
Italy, but in Iberia, and that they would have Saguntum as a base of
operations.

[Sidenote: Illyrian war, B.C. 219.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 219. Coss. M. Livius Salinator L. Aemilius Paullus.]

+16.+ Wherefore the Senate, by way of preparing to undertake this
business, and foreseeing that the war would be severe and protracted,
and at a long distance from the mother country, determined to make
Illyria safe. For it happened that, just at this time, Demetrius
of Pharos was sacking and subduing to his authority the cities of
Illyria which were subject to Rome, and had sailed beyond Lissus, in
violation of the treaty, with fifty galleys, and had ravaged many of
the Cyclades. For he had quite forgotten the former kindnesses done
him by Rome, and had conceived a contempt for its power, when he saw
it threatened first by the Gauls and then by Carthage; and he now
rested all his hopes on the royal family of Macedonia, because he had
fought on the side of Antigonus, and shared with him the dangers of the
war against Cleomenes. These transactions attracted the observation
of the Romans; who, seeing that the royal house of Macedonia was in
a flourishing condition, were very anxious to secure the country
east of Italy, feeling convinced that they would have ample time to
correct the rash folly of the Illyrians, and rebuke and chastise the
ingratitude and temerity of Demetrius. But they were deceived in their
calculations. For Hannibal anticipated their measures by the capture
of Saguntum: the result of which was that the war took place not in
Iberia, but close to Rome itself, and in various parts throughout all
Italy. However, with these ideas fixed in their minds, the Romans
despatched Lucius Aemilius just before summer to conduct the Illyrian
campaign in the first year of the 140th Olympiad.

[Sidenote: Hannibal besieges Saguntum.]

+17.+ But Hannibal had started from New Carthage and was leading
his army straight against Saguntum. This city is situated on the
seaward foot of the mountain chain on which the frontiers of Iberia
and Celtiberia converge, and is about seven stades from the sea. The
district cultivated by its inhabitants is exceedingly productive, and
has a soil superior to any in all Iberia. Under the walls of this
town Hannibal pitched his camp and set energetically to work on the
siege, foreseeing many advantages that would accrue if he could take
it. Of these the first was that he would thereby disappoint the Romans
in their expectation of making Iberia the seat of war: a second was
that he would thereby strike a general terror, which would render the
already obedient tribes more submissive, and the still independent
ones more cautious of offending him: but the greatest advantage of
all was that thereby he would be able to push on his advance, without
leaving an enemy on his rear. Besides these advantages, he calculated
that the possession of this city would secure him abundant supplies
for his expedition, and create an enthusiasm in the troops excited
by individual acquisitions of booty; while he would conciliate the
goodwill of those who remained at Carthage by the spoils which would
be sent home. With these ideas he pressed on the siege with energy:
sometimes setting an example to his soldiers by personally sharing in
the fatigues of throwing up the siege works; and sometimes cheering on
his men and recklessly exposing himself to danger.

[Sidenote: Fall of Saguntum.]

After a siege extending to the eighth month, in the course of which
he endured every kind of suffering and anxiety, he finally succeeded
in taking the town. An immense booty in money, slaves, and property
fell into his hands, which he disposed of in accordance with his
original design. The money he reserved for the needs of his projected
expedition; the slaves were distributed according to merit among his
men; while the property was at once sent entire to Carthage. The result
answered his expectations: the army was rendered more eager for action;
the home populace more ready to grant whatever he asked; and he himself
was enabled, by the possession of such abundant means, to carry out
many measures that were of service to his expedition.

[Sidenote: Illyrian war, B.C. 219.]

+18.+ While this was taking place, Demetrius, discovering the
intentions of Rome, threw a sufficient garrison into Dimale and
victualled it in proportion. In the other towns he put those who were
opposed to him to death, and placed the chief power in the hands of
his own partisans; and selecting six thousand of the bravest of his
subjects, quartered them in Pharos. When the Consul arrived in Illyria
with his army, he found the enemies of Rome confident in the strength
of Dimale and the elaborate preparations in it, and encouraged to
resistance by their belief in its impregnability; he determined,
therefore, to attack that town first, in order to strike terror into
the enemy. Accordingly, after addressing an exhortation to the several
officers of the legions, and throwing up siege works at several points,
he began the siege in form. In seven days he took the town by assault,
which so dismayed the enemy, that envoys immediately appeared from all
the towns, surrendering themselves unconditionally to the protection
of Rome. The Consul accepted their submission: and after imposing
such conditions as appeared suitable to the several cases, he sailed
to Pharos to attack Demetrius himself. Being informed that the city
there was strongly fortified, thronged with excellent soldiers, and
well-furnished with provisions and all other munitions of war, he began
to entertain misgivings that the siege would be long and difficult; and
therefore, with a view to these difficulties, he adopted on the spur of
the moment the following strategem. He crossed to the island by night
with his whole army. The greater part of it he disembarked at a spot
where the ground was well-wooded and low; while with only twenty ships
he sailed at daybreak to the harbour nearest the town. The smallness
of the number of the ships moved only the contempt of Demetrius when
he saw them, and he immediately marched out of the town down to the
harbour to oppose the landing of the enemy.

[Sidenote: Capture of Pharos.]

+19.+ A violent struggle at once began: and, as it went on, division
after division of the troops in the city came down to support him,
until at length the whole force had poured out to take part in the
engagement. The Romans who had landed in the night arrived at the
critical moment, after a march by an obscure route; and seizing a
strong position on some rising ground between the city and the harbour,
efficiently cut off from the city the troops that had sallied out.
When Demetrius became aware of what had taken place, he desisted from
opposing the disembarkation; and having rallied his men and addressed
the ranks, he put them in motion, with the resolution of fighting a
pitched battle with the troops on the hill. When the Romans saw the
Illyrian advance being made in good order and with great spirit, they
formed their ranks and charged furiously. At the same moment the Roman
troops which had just effected their landing, seeing what was going on,
charged the enemy on the rear, who being thus attacked on both sides,
were thrown into great disorder and confusion. The result was that,
finding both his van and his rear in difficulties, Demetrius fled.
Some of his men retreated towards the city; but most of them escaped
by bye-paths into various parts of the island. Demetrius himself made
his way to some galleys which he kept at anchor at a solitary point
on the coast, with a view to every contingency; and going on board,
he sailed away at nightfall, and arrived unexpectedly at the court of
King Philip, where he passed the remainder of his life:—a man whose
undoubted boldness and courage were unsupported by either prudence or
judgment. His end was of a piece with the whole tenor of his life; for
while endeavouring at the instigation of Philip to seize Messene, he
exposed himself during the battle with a careless rashness which cost
him his life; of which I shall speak in detail when I come to that
period.

The Consul Aemilius having thus taken Pharos at a blow, levelled the
city to the ground; and then having become master of all Illyria, and
having ordered all its affairs as he thought right, returned towards
the end of the summer to Rome, where he celebrated a triumph amid
expressions of unmixed approval; for people considered that he had
managed this business with great prudence and even greater courage.

[Sidenote: Indignation at Rome at the fall of Saguntum.]

+20.+ But when news came to Rome of the fall of Saguntum, there was
indeed no debate on the question of war, as some historians assert; who
even add the speeches delivered on either side. But nothing could be
more ridiculous. For is it conceivable that the Romans should have a
year before proclaimed war with the Carthaginians in the event of their
entering the territory of Saguntum, and yet, when the city itself had
been taken, should have debated whether they should go to war or no?
Just as absurd are the wonderful statements that the senators put on
mourning, and that the fathers introduced their sons above twelve years
old into the Senate House, who, being admitted to the debate, refrained
from divulging any of its secrets even to their nearest relations. All
this is as improbable as it is untrue; unless we are to believe that
Fortune, among its other bounties, granted the Romans the privilege of
being men of the world from their cradles. I need not waste any more
words upon such compositions as those of Chaereas and Sosilus;[165]
which, in my judgment, are more like the gossip of the barber’s shop
and the pavement than history.

[Sidenote: Envoys sent to Carthage to demand surrender of Hannibal.]

The truth is that, when the Romans heard of the disaster at Saguntum,
they at once elected envoys, whom they despatched in all haste to
Carthage with the offer of two alternatives, one of which appeared
to the Carthaginians to involve disgrace as well as injury if they
accepted it, while the other was the beginning of a great struggle
and of great dangers. For one of these alternatives was the surrender
of Hannibal and his staff to Rome, the other was war. When the Roman
envoys arrived and declared their message to the Senate, the choice
proposed to them between these alternatives was listened to by the
Carthaginians with indignation. Still they selected the most capable of
their number to state their case, which was grounded on the following
pleas.

+21.+ Passing over the treaty made with Hasdrubal, as not having ever
been made, and, if it had, as not being binding on them because made
without their consent (and on this point they quoted the precedent of
the Romans themselves, who in the Sicilian war repudiated the terms
agreed upon and accepted by Lutatius, as having been made without
their consent)—passing over this, they pressed with all the vehemence
they could, throughout the discussion, the last treaty made in the
Sicilian war; in which they affirmed that there was no clause relating
to Iberia, but one expressly providing security for the allies of both
parties to the treaty. Now, they pointed out that the Saguntines at
that time were not allies of Rome, and therefore were not protected
by the clause. To prove their point, they read the treaty more than
once aloud. On this occasion the Roman envoys contented themselves
with the reply that, while Saguntum was intact, the matter in
dispute admitted of pleadings and of a discussion on its merits; but
that, that city having been treacherously seized, they had only two
alternatives,—either to deliver the persons guilty of the act, and
thereby make it clear that they had no share in their crime, and that
it was done without their consent; or, if they were not willing to do
that, and avowed their complicity in it, to take the consequences.

The question of treaties between Rome and Carthage was referred
to in general terms in the course of this debate: but I think a
more particular examination of it will be useful both to practical
statesmen, who require to know the exact truth of the matter, in order
to avoid mistakes in any critical deliberation; and to historical
students, that they may not be led astray by the ignorance or partisan
bias of historians; but may have before them a conspectus, acknowledged
to be accurate, of the various compacts which have been made between
Rome and Carthage from the earliest times to our own day.

[Sidenote: Treaties between Rome and Carthage.]

[Sidenote: The first treaty, B.C. 509-508.]

+22.+ The first treaty between Rome and Carthage was made in the
year of Lucius Junius Brutus and Marcus Horatius, the first Consuls
appointed after the expulsion of the kings, by which men also the
temple of Jupiter Capitolinus was consecrated. This was twenty-eight
years before the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. Of this treaty I append
a translation, as accurate as I could make it,—for the fact is that
the ancient language differs so much from that at present in use, that
the best scholars among the Romans themselves have great difficulty in
interpreting some points in it, even after much study. The treaty is as
follows:—

“There shall be friendship between the Romans and their allies, and the
Carthaginians and their allies, on these conditions:

“Neither the Romans nor their allies are to sail beyond the Fair
Promontory, unless driven by stress of weather or the fear of enemies.
If any one of them be driven ashore he shall not buy or take aught for
himself save what is needful for the repair of his ship and the service
of the gods, and he shall depart within five days.

“Men landing for traffic shall strike no bargain save in the presence
of a herald or town-clerk. Whatever is sold in the presence of these,
let the price be secured to the seller on the credit of the state—that
is to say, if such sale be in Libya or Sardinia.

“If any Roman comes to the Carthaginian province in Sicily he shall
enjoy all rights enjoyed by others. The Carthaginians shall do no
injury to the people of Ardea, Antium, Laurentium, Circeii, Tarracina,
nor any other people of the Latins that are subject to Rome.

“From those townships even which are not subject to Rome[166] they
shall hold their hands; and if they take one shall deliver it unharmed
to the Romans. They shall build no fort in Latium; and if they enter
the district in arms, they shall not stay a night therein.”

+23.+ The “Fair Promontory” here referred to is that which lies
immediately to the north of Carthage; south of which the Carthaginians
stipulated that the Romans should not sail with ships of war, because,
as I imagine, they did not wish them to be acquainted with the coast
near Byzacium, or the lesser Syrtis, which places they call Emporia,
owing to the productiveness of the district. The treaty then goes on
to say that, if any one of them is driven thither by stress of weather
or fear of an enemy, and stands in need of anything for the worship of
the gods and the repair of his vessel, this and no more he may take;
and all those who have come to anchor there must necessarily depart
within five days. To Carthage, and all the country on the Carthaginian
side of the Fair Promontory in Libya, to Sardinia, and the Carthaginian
province of Sicily, the treaty allows the Romans to sail for mercantile
purposes; and the Carthaginians engage their public credit that such
persons shall enjoy absolute security.

It is clear from this treaty that the Carthaginians speak of Sardinia
and Libya as belonging to them entirely; but, on the other hand, make
a distinction in the case of Sicily, and only stipulate for that part
of it which is subject to Carthage. Similarly, the Romans also only
stipulate concerning Latium; the rest of Italy they do not mention, as
not being under their authority.

[Sidenote: Second treaty, B.C. 306 (?).]

+24.+ After this treaty there was a second, in which we find that the
Carthaginians have included the Tyrians and the township of Utica
in addition to their former territory; and to the Fair Promontory
Mastia and Tarseium are added, as the points east of which the
Romans are not to make marauding expeditions or found a city. The
treaty is as follows: “There shall be friendship between the Romans
and their allies, and the Carthaginians, Tyrians, and township of
Utica, on these terms: The Romans shall not maraud, nor traffic, nor
found a city east of the Fair Promontory, Mastia, Tarseium. If the
Carthaginians take any city in Latium which is not subject to Rome,
they may keep the prisoners and the goods, but shall deliver up the
town. If the Carthaginians take any folk, between whom and Rome a peace
has been made in writing, though they be not subject to them, they
shall not bring them into any harbours of the Romans; if such an one
be so brought ashore, and any Roman lay claim to him,[167] he shall
be released. In like manner shall the Romans be bound towards the
Carthaginians.

“If a Roman take water or provisions from any district within the
jurisdiction of Carthage, he shall not injure, while so doing, any
between whom and Carthage there is peace and friendship. Neither shall
a Carthaginian in like case. If any one shall do so, he shall not
be punished by private vengeance, but such action shall be a public
misdemeanour.

“In Sardinia and Libya no Roman shall traffic nor found a city; he
shall do no more than take in provisions and refit his ship. If a storm
drive him upon those coasts, he shall depart within five days.

“In the Carthaginian province of Sicily and in Carthage he may transact
business and sell whatsoever it is lawful for a citizen to do. In like
manner also may a Carthaginian at Rome.”

Once more in this treaty we may notice that the Carthaginians emphasise
the fact of their entire possession of Libya and Sardinia, and prohibit
any attempt of the Romans to land in them at all; and on the other
hand, in the case of Sicily, they clearly distinguish their own
province in it. So, too, the Romans, in regard to Latium, stipulate
that the Carthaginians shall do no wrong to Ardea, Antium, Circeii,
Tarracina, all of which are on the seaboard of Latium, to which alone
the treaty refers.

[Sidenote: Third treaty, B.C. 279.]

+25.+ A third treaty again was made by Rome at the time of the invasion
of Pyrrhus into Sicily, before the Carthaginians undertook the war for
the possession of Sicily. This treaty contains the same provisions as
the two earlier treaties with these additional clauses:—

“If they make a treaty of alliance with Pyrrhus, the Romans or
Carthaginians shall make it on such terms as not to preclude the one
giving aid to the other, if that one’s territory is attacked.

“If one or the other stand in need of help, the Carthaginians shall
supply the ships, whether for transport or war; but each people shall
supply the pay for its own men employed on them.

“The Carthaginians shall also give aid by sea to the Romans if need be;
but no one shall compel the crews to disembark against their will.”

Provision was also made for swearing to these treaties. In the case
of the first, the Carthaginians were to swear by the gods of their
ancestors, the Romans by Jupiter Lapis, in accordance with an ancient
custom; in the case of the last treaty, by Mars and Quirinus.

The form of swearing by Jupiter Lapis was this. The commissioner for
swearing to the treaty took a stone in his hand, and, having taken the
oath in the name of his country, added these words, “If I abide by this
oath may he bless me; but if I do otherwise in thought or act, may all
others be kept safe each in his own country, under his own laws, in
enjoyment of his own goods, household gods, and tombs,—may I alone be
cast out, even as this stone is now.” And having uttered these words he
throws the stone from his hand.

[Sidenote: Misstatement of Philinus.]

+26.+ Seeing that such treaties exist and are preserved to this day,
engraved on brass in the treasury of the Aediles in the temple of
Jupiter Capitolinus, the historian Philinus certainly does give us some
reason to be surprised at him. Not at his ignorance of their existence:
for even in our own day those Romans and Carthaginians, whose age
placed them nearest to the times, and who had the reputation of taking
the greatest interest in public affairs, were unaware of it. But what
is surprising is, that he should have ventured on a statement exactly
opposite: “That there was a treaty between Rome and Carthage, in virtue
of which the Romans were bound to keep away from the whole of Sicily,
the Carthaginians from the whole of Italy; and that the Romans broke
the treaty and their oath when they first crossed over to Sicily.”
Whereas there does not exist, nor ever has existed, any such written
compact at all. Yet this assertion he makes in so many words in his
second book. I referred to this in the preface of my work, but reserved
a more detailed discussion of it to this place; which was necessary,
because the assertion of Philinus has misled a considerable number of
people on this point. I have nothing to say if a man chooses to attack
the Romans for crossing into Sicily, on the grounds of their having
taken the Mamertines into alliance at all; or in having thus acted in
answer to their request, after these men’s treachery to Rhegium as well
as Messene: but if any one supposes that in so crossing they broke
oaths or treaties, he is manifestly ignorant of the truth.

[Sidenote: Fourth treaty, B.C. 241.]

+27.+ At the end of the first Punic war another treaty was made,
of which the chief provisions were these: “The Carthaginians shall
evacuate Sicily and all islands lying between Italy and Sicily.

“The allies of neither of the parties to the treaty shall be attacked
by the other.

“Neither party shall impose any contribution, nor erect any public
building, nor enlist soldiers in the dominions of the other, nor make
any compact of friendship with the allies of the other.

“The Carthaginians shall within ten years pay to the Romans
two-thousand two-hundred talents, and a thousand on the spot; and shall
restore all prisoners, without ransom, to the Romans.”

[Sidenote: Fifth treaty, B.C. 238.]

Afterwards, at the end of the Mercenary war in Africa, the Romans went
so far as to pass a decree for war with Carthage, but eventually made
a treaty to the following effect: “The Carthaginians shall evacuate
Sardinia, and pay an additional twelve hundred talents.”

[Sidenote: Sixth treaty, B.C. 228.]

Finally, in addition to these treaties, came that negotiated with
Hasdrubal in Iberia, in which it was stipulated that “the Carthaginians
should not cross the Iber with arms.”

Such were the mutual obligations established between Rome and Carthage
from the earliest times to that of Hannibal.

[Sidenote: No excuse for the Roman claim on Sardinia.]

+28.+ As we find then that the Roman invasion of Sicily was not in
contravention of their oaths, so we must acknowledge in the case of
the second proclamation of war, in consequence of which the treaty for
the evacuation of Sardinia was made, that it is impossible to find any
reasonable pretext or ground for the Roman action. The Carthaginians
were beyond question compelled by the necessities of their position,
contrary to all justice, to evacuate Sardinia, and to pay this enormous
sum of money. For as to the allegation of the Romans, that they had
during the Mercenary war been guilty of acts of hostility to ships
sailing from Rome,—that was barred by their own act in restoring,
without ransom, the Carthaginian prisoners, in gratitude for similar
conduct on the part of Carthage to Romans who had landed on their
shores; a transaction which I have spoken of at length in my previous
book.[168]

These facts established, it remains to decide by a thorough
investigation to which of the two nations the origin of the Hannibalian
war is to be imputed.

[Sidenote: The Roman Case.]

+29.+ I have explained the pleas advanced by the Carthaginians; I must
now state what is alleged on the contrary by the Romans. For though
it is true that in this particular interview, owing to their anger at
the fall of Saguntum, they did not use these arguments, yet they were
appealed to on many occasions, and by many of their citizens. First,
they argued that the treaty of Hasdrubal could not be ignored, as the
Carthaginians had the assurance to do: for it did not contain the
clause, which that of Lutatius did, making its validity conditional
on its ratification by the people of Rome; but Hasdrubal made the
agreement absolutely and authoritatively that “the Carthaginians should
not cross the Iber in arms.”

Next they alleged that the clause in the treaty respecting Sicily,
which by their own admission stipulated that “the allies of neither
party should be attacked by the other,” did not refer to then existing
allies only, as the Carthaginians interpreted it; for in that case
a clause would have been added, disabling either from making new
alliances in addition to those already existing, or excluding allies,
taken subsequently to the making of the treaty, from its benefits.
But since neither of these provisions was made, it was plain that
both the then existing allies, and all those taken subsequently on
either side, were entitled to reciprocal security. And this was only
reasonable. For it was not likely that they would have made a treaty
depriving them of the power, when opportunity offered, of taking on
such friends or allies as seemed to their interest; nor, again, if they
had taken any such under their protection, was it to be supposed that
they would allow them to be injured by any persons whatever. But, in
fact, the main thing present in the minds of both parties to the treaty
was, that they should mutually agree to abstain from attacking each
other’s allies, and on no account admit into alliance with themselves
the allies of the other: and it was to subsequent allies that this
particular clause applied, “Neither shall enlist soldiers, or impose
contributions on the provinces or allies of the other; and all shall be
alike secure of attack from the other side.”

+30.+ These things being so, they argued that it was beyond controversy
that Saguntum had accepted the protection of Rome, several years before
the time of Hannibal. The strongest proof of this, and one which would
not be contested by the Carthaginians themselves, was that, when
political disturbances broke out at Saguntum, the people chose the
Romans, and not the Carthaginians, as arbitrators to settle the dispute
and restore their constitution, although the latter were close at hand
and were already established in Iberia.

[Sidenote: Mutual provocation.]

I conclude, then, that if the destruction of Saguntum is to be regarded
as the cause of this war, the Carthaginians must be acknowledged to be
in the wrong, both in view of the treaty of Lutatius, which secured
immunity from attack for the allies of both parties, and in view of
the treaty of Hasdrubal, which disabled the Carthaginians from passing
the Iber with arms.[169] If on the other hand the taking Sardinia from
them, and imposing the heavy money fine which accompanied it, are to
be regarded as the causes, we must certainly acknowledge that the
Carthaginians had good reason for undertaking the Hannibalian war: for
as they had only yielded to the pressure of circumstances, so they
seized a favourable turn in those circumstances to revenge themselves
on their injurers.

+31.+ Some uncritical readers may perhaps say that such minute
discussion on points of this kind is unnecessary. And if any man were
entirely self-sufficing in every event, I might allow that the accurate
knowledge of the past, though a graceful accomplishment, was perhaps
not essential: but as long as it is not in mere mortals to say this,
either in public or private affairs,—seeing that no man of sense, even
if he is prosperous for the moment, will ever reckon with certainty
on the future,—then I say that such knowledge is essential, and not
merely graceful. For take the three commonest cases. Suppose, first,
a statesman to be attacked either in his own person or in that of his
country: or, secondly, suppose him to be anxious for a forward policy
and to anticipate the attack of an enemy: or, lastly, suppose him to
desire to maintain the _status quo_. In all these cases it is history
alone that can supply him with precedents, and teach him how, in the
first case, to find supporters and allies; in the second, to incite
co-operation; and in the third, to give vigour to the conservative
forces which tend to maintain, as he desires, the existing state of
things. In the case of contemporaries, it is difficult to obtain an
insight into their purposes; because, as their words and actions are
dictated by a desire of accommodating themselves to the necessity
of the hour, and of keeping up appearances, the truth is too often
obscured. Whereas the transactions of the past admit of being tested by
naked fact; and accordingly display without disguise the motives and
purposes of the several persons engaged; and teach us from what sort
of people to expect favour, active kindness, and assistance, or the
reverse. They give us also many opportunities of distinguishing who
would be likely to pity us, feel indignation at our wrongs, and defend
our cause,—a power that contributes very greatly to national as well
as individual security. Neither the writer nor the reader of history,
therefore, should confine his attention to a bare statement of facts:
he must take into account all that preceded, accompanied, or followed
them. For if you take from history all explanation of cause, principle,
and motive, and of the adaptation of the means to the end, what is left
is a mere panorama without being instructive; and, though it may please
for the moment, has no abiding value.

+32.+ Another mistake is to look upon my history as difficult to
obtain or master, because of the number and size of the books. Compare
it in these particulars with the various writings of the episodical
historians. Is it not much easier to purchase and read my forty
books, which are as it were all in one piece, and so to follow with a
comprehensive glance the events in Italy, Sicily, and Libya from the
time of Pyrrhus to the fall of Carthage, and those in the rest of the
world from the flight of Cleomenes of Sparta, continuously, to the
battle between the Achaeans and Romans at the Isthmus? To say nothing
of the fact that the compositions of these historians are many times
as numerous as mine, it is impossible for their readers to get any
certain information from them: first, because most of them differ in
their account of the same transactions; and secondly, because they
omit contemporary history,—the comparative review of which would put
a very different complexion upon events to that derived from isolated
treatment,—and are unable to touch upon the most decisive events at
all. For, indeed, the most important parts of history are those which
treat the events which follow or accompany a certain course of conduct,
and pre-eminently so those which treat of causes. For instance, we
see that the war with Antiochus took its rise from that with Philip;
that with Philip from the Hannibalian; and the Hannibalian from the
Sicilian war: and though between these wars there were numerous events
of various character, they all converged upon the same consummation.
Such a comprehensive view may be obtained from universal history, but
not from the histories of particular wars, such as those with Perseus
or Philip; unless we fondly imagine that, by reading the accounts
contained in them of the pitched battles, we gain a knowledge of the
conduct and plan of the whole war. This of course is not the case; and
in the present instance I hope that there will be as wide a difference
between my history and such episodical compositions, as between real
learning and mere listening.

+33.+ To resume the story of the Carthaginians and the Roman
deputies.[170] To the arguments of the former the [Sidenote: Answer
of Fabius. See Livy, 21, 18.] ambassadors made no answer, except that
the senior among them, in the presence of the assembly, pointed to the
folds of his toga and said that in them he carried peace and war, and
that he would bring out and leave with them whichever they bade him.
The Carthaginian Suffete[171] bade him bring out whichever of the two
he chose: and upon the Roman saying that it should be war, a majority
of the senators cried out in answer that they accepted it. It was on
these terms that the Senate and the Roman ambassadors parted.

[Sidenote: Winter of 219-218 B.C. Hannibal’s arrangements for the
coming campaign.]

Meanwhile Hannibal, upon going into winter quarters at New Carthage,
first of all dismissed the Iberians to their various cities, with
the view of their being prepared and vigorous for the next campaign.
Secondly, he instructed his brother Hasdrubal in the management of
his government in Iberia, and of the preparations to be made against
Rome, in case he himself should be separated from him. Thirdly, he
took precautions for the security of Libya, by selecting with prudent
skill certain soldiers from the home army to come over to Iberia, and
certain from the Iberian army to go to Libya; by which interchange
he secured cordial feeling of confidence between the two armies. The
Iberians sent to Libya were the Thersitae, the Mastiani, as well as
the Oretes and Olcades, mustering together twelve hundred cavalry and
thirteen thousand eight hundred and fifty foot. Besides these there
were eight hundred and seventy slingers from the Balearic Isles,
whose name, as that of the islands they inhabit, is derived from the
word _ballein_, “to throw,” because of their peculiar skill with the
sling. Most of these troops he ordered to be stationed at Metagonia
in Libya, and the rest in Carthage itself. And from the cities in the
district of Metagonia he sent four thousand foot also into Carthage,
to serve at once as hostages for the fidelity of their country, and
as an additional guard for the city. With his brother Hasdrubal in
Iberia he left fifty quinqueremes, two quadriremes, and five triremes,
thirty-two of the quinqueremes being furnished with crews, and all five
of the triremes; also cavalry consisting of four hundred and fifty
Libyophenicians and Libyans, three hundred Lergetae, eighteen hundred
Numidians of the Massolian, Massaesylian, Maccoeian, and Maurian
tribes, who dwell by the ocean; with eleven thousand eight hundred and
fifty Libyans, three hundred Ligures, five hundred of the Balearic
Islanders, and twenty-one elephants.

[Sidenote: The inscription recording these facts.]

The accuracy of this enumeration of Hannibal’s Iberian establishment
need excite no surprise, though it is such as a commander himself would
have some difficulty in displaying; nor ought I to be condemned at once
of imitating the specious falsehoods of historians: for the fact is
that I myself found on Lacinium[172] a bronze tablet, which Hannibal
had caused to be inscribed with these particulars when he was in Italy;
and holding it to be an entirely trustworthy authority for such facts,
I did not hesitate to follow it.

+34.+ Though Hannibal had taken every precaution for the security of
Libya and Iberia, he yet waited for the messengers whom he expected to
arrive from the Celts. He had thoroughly acquainted himself with the
fertility and populousness of the districts at the foot of the Alps
and in the valley of the Padus, as well as with the warlike courage
of the men; but most important of all, with their hostile feelings
to Rome derived from the previous war, which I described in my last
book, with the express purpose of enabling my readers to follow my
narrative. He therefore reckoned very much on the chance of their
co-operation; and was careful to send messages to the chiefs of the
Celts, whether dwelling actually on the Alps or on the Italian side of
them, with unlimited promises; because he believed that he would be
able to confine the war against Rome to Italy, if he could make his way
through the intervening difficulties to these parts, and avail himself
of the active alliance of the Celts. When his messengers returned with
a report that the Celts were ready to help him and all eagerness for
his approach; and that the passage of the Alps, though laborious and
difficult, was not, however, impossible, he collected his forces from
their winter quarters at the approach of spring. Just before receiving
this report he had learnt the circumstances attending the Roman embassy
at Carthage. Encouraged by the assurance thus given him, that he would
be supported by the popular sentiment at home, he no longer disguised
from his army that the object of the forthcoming campaign was Rome; and
tried to inspire them with courage for the undertaking. He explained to
them how the Romans had demanded the surrender of himself and all the
officers of the army: and pointed out the fertility of the country to
which they were going, and the goodwill and active alliance which the
Celts were prepared to offer them. When the crowd of soldiers showed
an enthusiastic readiness to accompany him, he dismissed the assembly,
after thanking them, and naming the day on which he intended to march.

[Sidenote: B.C. 218. Hannibal breaks up his winter quarters and starts
for Italy.]

+35.+ These measures satisfactorily accomplished while he was in winter
quarters, and the security of Libya and Iberia being sufficiently
provided for; when the appointed day arrived, Hannibal got his army in
motion, which consisted of ninety thousand infantry and about twelve
thousand cavalry. After crossing the Iber, he set about subduing the
tribes of the Ilurgetes and Bargusii, as well as the Aerenosii and
Andosini, as far as the Pyrenees. When he had reduced all this country
under his power, and taken certain towns by storm, which he did with
unexpected rapidity, though not without severe fighting and serious
loss; he left Hanno in chief command of all the district north of the
Iber, and with absolute authority over the Burgusii, who were the
people that gave him most uneasiness on account of their friendly
feeling towards Rome. He then detached from his army ten thousand
foot and a thousand horse for the service of Hanno,—to whom also he
entrusted the heavy baggage of the troops that were to accompany
himself,—and the same number to go to their own land. The object of
this last measure was twofold: he thereby left a certain number of
well-affected persons behind him; and also held out to the others a
hope of returning home, both to those Iberians who were to accompany
him on his march, and to those also who for the present were to remain
at home, so that there might be a general alacrity to join him if he
were ever in want of a reinforcement. He then set his remaining troops
in motion unencumbered by heavy baggage, fifty thousand infantry and
nine thousand cavalry, and led them through the Pyrenees to the passage
of the river Rhone. The army was not so much numerous, as highly
efficient, and in an extraordinary state of physical training from
their continuous battles with the Iberians.

[Sidenote: Geography of Hannibal’s march.]

+36.+ But as a knowledge of topography is necessary for the right
understanding of my narrative, I must state the places from which
Hannibal started, through which he marched, and into which he descended
when he arrived in Italy. Nor must I, like some historians, content
myself with mentioning the mere names of places and rivers, under
the idea that that is quite sufficient to give a clear knowledge. My
opinion is that, in the case of well-known places, the mention of names
is of great assistance, but that, in the case of unknown countries,
names are no better than unintelligible and unmeaning sounds: for the
understanding having nothing to go upon, and being unable by referring
to something known to translate the words into thought, the narrative
becomes confused and vague, and conveys no clear idea. A plan therefore
must be discovered, whereby it shall be possible, while speaking of
unknown countries, to convey real and intelligible notions.

The first, most important, and most general conception is that of the
division of the heaven into four quarters, which all of us that are
capable of a general idea at all know as east, west, south, and north.
The next is to arrange the several parts of the globe according to
these points, and always to refer in thought any place mentioned to
one or other of them. We shall thus get an intelligible and familiar
conception of places which we do not know or have never seen.

[Sidenote: General view of the geography of the world.]

+37.+ This principle established as universally applicable to the
world, the next point will be to make the geography of our own part of
it intelligible by a corresponding division.

It falls, then, into three divisions, each distinguished by a
particular name,—Asia, Libya, Europe.[173] The boundaries are
respectively the Don, the Nile, and the Straits of the Pillars of
Hercules. Asia lies between the Don and the Nile, and lies under that
portion of the heaven which is between the north-east and the south.
Libya lies between the Nile and the Pillars of Hercules, and falls
beneath the south portion of the heaven, extending to the south-west
without a break, till it reaches the point of the equinoctial sunset,
which corresponds with the Pillars of Hercules. These two divisions
of the earth, therefore, regarded in a general point of view, occupy
all that part which is south of the Mediterranean from east to west.
Europe with respect to both of these lies to the north facing them,
and extending continuously from east to west. Its most important and
extensive part lies under the northern sky between the river Don and
the Narbo, which is only a short distance west of Marseilles and
the mouths by which the Rhone discharges itself into the Sardinian
Sea. From Narbo is the district occupied by the Celts as far as the
Pyrenees, stretching continuously from the Mediterranean to the Mare
Externum. The rest of Europe south of the Pyrenees, to the point where
it approaches the Pillars of Hercules, is bounded on one side by the
Mediterranean, on the other by the Mare Externum; and that part of it
which is washed by the Mediterranean as far as the Pillars of Hercules
is called Iberia, while the part which lies along the Outer or Great
Sea has no general name, because it has but recently been discovered,
and is inhabited entirely by barbarous tribes, who are very numerous,
and of whom I will speak in more detail hereafter.

[Sidenote: The extreme north and south unknown.]

+38.+ But as no one up to our time has been able to settle in regard
to those parts of Asia and Libya, where they approach each other in
the neighbourhood of Ethiopia, whether the continent is continuous to
the south, or is surrounded by the sea, so it is in regard to the part
between Narbo and the Don: none of us as yet knows anything of the
northern extent of this district, and anything we can ever know must be
the result of future exploration; and those who rashly venture by word
of mouth or written statements to describe this district must be looked
upon as ignorant or romancing.

My object in these observations was to prevent my narrative being
entirely vague to those who were unacquainted with the localities. I
hoped that, by keeping these broad distinctions in mind, they would
have some definite standard to which to refer every mention of a place,
starting from the primary one of the division of the sky into four
quarters. For, as in the case of physical sight, we instinctively turn
our faces to any object pointed at; so in the case of the mind, our
thoughts ought to turn naturally to localities as they are mentioned
from time to time.

It is time now to return to the story we have in hand.

[Sidenote: The length of the march from Carthagena to the Po, 1125
Roman miles.]

+39.+ At this period the Carthaginians were masters of the whole
Mediterranean coast of Libya from the Altars of Philaenus,[174]
opposite the Great Syrtis, to the Pillars of Hercules, a seaboard of
over sixteen thousand stades. They had also crossed the strait of the
Pillars of Hercules, and got possession of the whole seaboard of Iberia
on the Mediterranean as far as the Pyrenees, which separate the Iberes
from the Celts—that is, for a distance of about eight thousand stades:
for it is three thousand from the Pillars to New Carthage, from which
Hannibal started for Italy; two thousand six hundred from thence to
the Iber; and from that river to Emporium again sixteen hundred; from
which town, I may add, to the passage of the Rhone is a distance of
about sixteen hundred stades; for all these distances have now been
carefully measured by the Romans and marked with milestones at every
eighth stade.[175] After crossing the river there was a march up stream
along its bank of fourteen hundred stades, before reaching the foot of
the pass over the Alps into Italy. The pass itself was about twelve
hundred stades, which being crossed would bring him into the plains
of the Padus in Italy. So that the whole length of his march from New
Carthage was about nine thousand stades, or 1125 Roman miles. Of the
country he had thus to traverse he had already passed almost half in
mere distance, but in the difficulties the greater part of his task was
still before him.

[Sidenote: Coss. P. Cornelius Scipio and Tib. Sempronius Longus. B.C.
218. The Consuls are sent, one to Spain, and the other to Africa.]

[Sidenote: Placentia and Cremona.]

[Sidenote: Outrage by Boii and Insubres.]

+40.+ While Hannibal was thus engaged in effecting a passage over the
Pyrenees, where he was greatly alarmed at the extraordinary strength
of the positions occupied by the Celts; the Romans, having heard the
result of the embassy to Carthage, and that Hannibal had crossed
the Iber earlier than they expected, at the head of an army, voted
to send Publius Cornelius Scipio with his legions into Iberia, and
Tiberius Sempronius Longus into Libya. And while the Consuls were
engaged in hastening on the enrolment of their legions and other
military preparations, the people were active in bringing to completion
the colonies which they had already voted to send into Gaul. They
accordingly caused the fortification of these towns to be energetically
pushed on, and ordered the colonists to be in residence within thirty
days: six thousand having been assigned to each colony. One of these
colonies was on the south bank of the Padus, and was called Placentia;
the other on the north bank, called Cremona. But no sooner had these
colonies been formed, than the Boian Gauls, who had long been lying in
wait to throw off their loyalty to Rome, but had up to that time lacked
an opportunity, encouraged by the news that reached them of Hannibal’s
approach, revolted; thus abandoning the hostages which they had given
at the end of the war described in my last book. The ill-feeling still
remaining towards Rome enabled them to induce the Insubres to join in
the revolt; and the united tribes swept over the territory recently
allotted by the Romans, and following close upon the track of the
flying colonists, laid siege to the Roman colony of Mutina, in which
the fugitives had taken refuge. Among them were the _triumviri_ or
three commissioners who had been sent out to allot the lands, of whom
one—Gaius Lutatius—was an ex-consul, the other two ex-praetors. These
men having demanded a parley with the enemy, the Boii consented: but
treacherously seized them upon their leaving the town, hoping by their
means to recover their own hostages. The praetor Lucius Manlius was
on guard in the district with an army, and as soon as he heard what
had happened, he advanced with all speed to the relief of Mutina.
But the Boii, having got intelligence of his approach, prepared an
ambuscade; and as soon as his army had entered a certain wood, they
rushed out upon it from every side and killed a large number of his
men. The survivors at first fled with precipitation: but having gained
some higher ground, they rallied sufficiently to enable them with much
difficulty to effect an honourable retreat. Even so, the Boii followed
close upon their heels, and besieged them in a place called the
village of Tannes.[176] When the news arrived at Rome, that the fourth
legion was surrounded and closely besieged by the Boii, the people in
all haste despatched the legions which had been voted to the Consul
Publius, to their relief, under the command of a Praetor, and ordered
the Consul to enrol two more legions for himself from the allies.

+41.+ Such was the state of Celtic affairs from the beginning to the
arrival of Hannibal; thus completing the course of events which I have
already had occasion to describe.

[Sidenote: Tiberius Sempronius prepares to attack Carthage.]

Meanwhile the Consuls, having completed the necessary preparations for
their respective missions, set sail at the beginning of summer—Publius
to Iberia, with sixty ships, and Tiberius Sempronius to Libya, with a
hundred and sixty quinqueremes. The latter thought by means of this
great fleet to strike terror into the enemy; and made vast preparations
at Lilybaeum, collecting fresh troops wherever he could get them, as
though with the view of at once blockading Carthage itself.

[Sidenote: Publius Scipio lands near Marseilles.]

Publius Cornelius coasted along Liguria, and crossing in five days
from Pisae to Marseilles, dropped anchor at the most eastern mouth of
the Rhone, called the Mouth of Marseilles,[177] and began disembarking
his troops. For though he heard that Hannibal was already crossing the
Pyrenees, he felt sure that he was still a long way off, owing to the
difficulty of his line of country, and the number of the intervening
Celtic tribes. But long before he was expected, Hannibal had arrived
at the crossing of the Rhone, keeping the Sardinian Sea on his right
as he marched, and having made his way through the Celts partly by
bribes and partly by force. Being informed that the enemy were at hand,
Publius was at first incredulous of the fact, because of the rapidity
of the advance; but wishing to know the exact state of the case,—while
staying behind himself to refresh his troops after their voyage, and to
consult with the Tribunes as to the best ground on which to give the
enemy battle,—he sent out a reconnoitring party, consisting of three
hundred of his bravest horse; joining with them as guides and supports
some Celts, who chanced to be serving as mercenaries at the time in
Marseilles.

[Sidenote: Hannibal reaches the Rhone.]

+42.+ Meanwhile Hannibal had reached the river and was trying to get
across it where the stream was single, at a distance of four days’
march from the sea. He did all he could to make the natives living by
the river friendly to him, and purchased from them all their canoes of
hollow trunks, and wherries, of which there were a large number, owing
to the extensive sea traffic of the inhabitants of the Rhone valley.
He got from them also the timber suited to the construction of these
canoes; and so in two days had an innumerable supply of transports,
every soldier seeking to be independent of his neighbour, and to have
the means of crossing in his own hands. But now a large multitude of
barbarians collected on the other side of the stream to hinder the
passage of the Carthaginians. When Hannibal saw them, he came to the
conclusion that it would be impossible either to force a passage in
the face of so large a body of the enemy, or to remain where he was,
for fear of being attacked on all sides at once: and he accordingly,
on the third night, sent forward a detachment of his army with native
guides, under the command of Hanno, the son of the Suffete[178]
Bomilcar. [Sidenote: A detachment crosses higher up the river.] This
force marched up stream along the bank for two hundred stades, until
they arrived at a certain spot where the stream is divided by an eyot,
and there halted. They found enough wood close at hand to enable them,
by nailing or tying it together, to construct within a short time a
large number of rafts good enough for temporary use; and on these they
crossed in safety, without any one trying to stop them. Then, seizing
upon a strong position, they kept quiet for the rest of the day: partly
to refresh themselves after their fatigues, and at the same time to
complete their preparations for the service awaiting them, as they had
been ordered to do. Hannibal was preparing to proceed much in the same
way with the forces left behind with himself; but his chief difficulty
was in getting the elephants across, of which he had thirty-seven.

[Sidenote: The crossing begun.]

+43.+ When the fifth night came, however, the division which had
crossed first started before daybreak to march down the opposite bank
of the river and attack the barbarians; while Hannibal, having his men
in readiness, began to attempt the passage of the river. He had filled
the wherries with the heavy-armed cavalry, and the canoes with the most
active of his foot; and he now arranged that the wherries should cross
higher up the stream, and the canoes below them, that the violence of
the current might be broken by the former, and the canoes cross more
safely. The plan for the horses was that they should swim at the stern
of the wherries, one man on each side of the stern guiding three or
four with leading reins: so that a considerable number of horses were
brought over at once with the first detachment. When they saw what the
enemy meant to do, the barbarians, without forming their ranks, poured
out of their entrenchments in scattered groups, feeling no doubt of
being able to stop the crossing of the Carthaginians with ease. As soon
as Hannibal saw by the smoke, which was the signal agreed upon, that
the advanced detachment on the other side was approaching, he ordered
all to go on board, and the men in charge of the transports to push
out against the stream. This was promptly done: and then began a most
anxious and exciting scene. Cheer after cheer rose from the men who
were working the boats, as they struggled to outstrip each other, and
exerted themselves to the utmost to overcome the force of the current.
On the edge of either bank stood the two armies: the one sharing in the
struggles of their comrades by sympathy, and shouting encouragement
to them as they went; while the barbarians in front of them yelled
their war-cries and challenged them to battle. While this was going on
the barbarians had abandoned their tents, which the Carthaginians on
that side of the river suddenly and unexpectedly seized. Some of them
proceeded to set fire to the camp, while the greater number went to
attack the men who were standing ready to resist the passage. Surprised
by this unlooked-for event, some of the barbarians rushed off to save
their tents, while others prepared to resist the attack of the enemy,
and were now actually engaged. Seeing that everything was going as
he had intended, Hannibal at once formed the first division as it
disembarked: and after addressing some encouraging words to it, closed
with the barbarians, who, having no time to form their ranks, and being
taken by surprise, were quickly repulsed and put to flight.

[Sidenote: Completed.]

[Sidenote: Message from friendly Gauls.]

+44.+ Being thus master of the passage of the river, and victorious
over those who opposed him, the first care of the Carthaginian
leader was to bring his whole army across. This being expeditiously
accomplished, he pitched his camp for that night by the river-side, and
on the morrow, when he was told that the Roman fleet was anchored off
the mouths of the river, he detached five hundred Numidian horsemen
to reconnoitre the enemy and find out their position, their numbers,
and what they were going to do; and at the same time selected suitable
men to manage the passage of the elephants. These arrangements made,
he summoned a meeting of his army and introduced Magilus and the other
chiefs who had come to him from the valley of the Padus, and caused
them to declare to the whole army, by means of an interpreter, the
resolutions passed by their tribes. The points which were the strongest
encouragement to the army were, first, the actual appearance of envoys
inviting them to come, and promising to take part in the war with Rome;
secondly, the confidence inspired by their promise of guiding them by
a route where they would be abundantly supplied with necessaries, and
which would lead them with speed and safety into Italy; and, lastly,
the fertility and vast extent of the country to which they were going,
and the friendly feelings of the men with whose assistance they were
about to fight the armies of Rome.

Such was the substance of the speeches of the Celts. When they had
withdrawn, Hannibal himself rose, and after reminding the soldiers
of what they had already achieved, and pointing out that, though
they had under his counsel and advice engaged in many perilous and
dangerous enterprises, they had never failed in one, he bade them “not
lose courage now that the most serious part of their undertaking was
accomplished. The Rhone was crossed: they had seen with their own eyes
the display of goodwill and zeal of their allies. Let this convince
them that they should leave the rest to him with confidence; and while
obeying his orders show themselves men of courage and worthy of their
former deeds.” These words being received with shouts of approval, and
other manifestations of great enthusiasm, on the part of the soldiers,
Hannibal dismissed the assembly with words of praise to the men and
a prayer to the gods on their behalf; after giving out an order that
they should refresh themselves, and make all their preparations with
despatch, as the advance must begin on the morrow.

[Sidenote: Skirmish between reconnoitring parties.]

+45.+ When the assembly had been dismissed, the reconnoitring party
of Numidians returned in headlong flight, after losing more than half
their numbers. Not far from the camp they had fallen in with a party
of Roman horse, who had been sent out by Publius on the same errand;
and an engagement took place with such fury on either side, that the
Romans and Celts lost a hundred and forty men, and the Numidians more
than two hundred. After this skirmish, the Romans pursued them up to
the Carthaginian entrenchments: and having surveyed it, they hastened
back to announce to the Consul the presence of the enemy. As soon as
they arrived at the Roman camp with this intelligence, Publius put his
baggage on board ship, and marched his men up the bank of the river,
with the earnest desire of forcing the enemy to give him battle.

But at sunrise on the day after the assembly, Hannibal having stationed
his whole cavalry on the rear, in the direction of the sea, so as to
cover the advance, ordered his infantry to leave the entrenchment and
begin their march; while he himself waited behind for the elephants,
and the men who had not yet crossed the river.

[Sidenote: The passage of the elephants.]

+46.+ The mode of getting the elephants across was as follows. They
made a number of rafts strongly compacted, which they lashed firmly
two and two together, so as to form combined a breadth of about fifty
feet, and brought them close under the bank at the place of crossing.
To the outer edge of these they lashed some others and made them join
exactly; so that the whole raft thus constructed stretched out some way
into the channel, while the edges towards the stream were made fast to
the land with ropes tied to trees which grew along the brink, to secure
the raft keeping its place and not drifting down the river. These
combined rafts stretching about two hundred feet across the stream,
they joined two other very large ones to the outer edges, fastened very
firmly together, but connected with the others by ropes which admitted
of being easily cut. To these they fastened several towing lines,
that the wherries might prevent the rafts drifting down stream, and
might drag them forcibly against the current and so get the elephants
across on them. Then they threw a great deal of earth upon all the
rafts, until they had raised the surface to the level of the bank, and
made it look like the path on the land leading down to the passage.
The elephants were accustomed to obey their Indian riders until they
came to water, but could never be induced to step into water: they
therefore led them upon this earth, putting two females in front whom
the others obediently followed. When they had set foot on the rafts
that were farthest out in the stream, the ropes were cut which fastened
these to the other rafts, the towing lines were pulled taut by the
wherries, and the elephants, with the rafts on which they stood, were
quickly towed away from the mound of earth. When this happened, the
animals were terror-stricken; and at first turned round and round, and
rushed first to one part of the raft and then to another, but finding
themselves completely surrounded by the water, they were too frightened
to do anything, and were obliged to stay where they were. And it was by
repeating this contrivance of joining a pair of rafts to the others,
that eventually the greater part of the elephants were got across.
Some of them, however, in the middle of the crossing, threw themselves
in their terror into the river: but though their Indian riders were
drowned, the animals themselves got safe to land, saved by the strength
and great length of their probosces; for by raising these above the
water, they were enabled to breathe through them, and blow out any
water that got into them, while for the most part they got through the
river on their feet.

+47.+ The elephants having been thus got across, Hannibal formed them
and the cavalry into a rear-guard, and marched up the river bank away
from the sea in an easterly direction, as though making for the central
district of Europe.

The Rhone rises to the north-west of the Adriatic Gulf on the northern
<DW72>s of the Alps,[179] and flowing westward, eventually discharges
itself into the Sardinian Sea. It flows for the most part through
a deep valley, to the north of which lives the Celtic tribe of the
Ardyes; while its southern side is entirely walled in by the northern
<DW72>s of the Alps, the ridges of which, beginning at Marseilles and
extending to the head of the Adriatic, separate it from the valley of
the Padus, of which I have already had occasion to speak at length. It
was these mountains that Hannibal now crossed from the Rhone valley
into Italy.

Some historians of this passage of the Alps, in their desire to
produce a striking effect by their descriptions of the wonders of this
country, have fallen into two errors which are more alien than anything
else to the spirit of history,—perversion of fact and inconsistency.
Introducing Hannibal as a prodigy of strategic skill and boldness, they
yet represent him as acting with the most conspicuous indiscretion;
and then, finding themselves involved in an inextricable maze of
falsehood, they try to cut the knot by the introduction of gods and
heroes into what is meant to be genuine history. They begin by saying
that the Alps are so precipitous and inaccessible that, so far from
horses and troops, accompanied too by elephants, being able to cross
them, it would be very difficult for even active men on foot to do so:
and similarly they tell us that the desolation of this district is so
complete, that, had not some god or hero met Hannibal’s forces and
showed them the way, they would have been hopelessly lost and perished
to a man.

Such stories involve both the errors I have mentioned,—they are both
false and inconsistent.

+48.+ For could a more irrational proceeding on the part of a general
be imagined than that of Hannibal, if, when in command of so numerous
an army, on whom the success of his expedition entirely depended,
he allowed himself to remain in ignorance of the roads, the lie of
the country, the route to be taken, and the people to which it led,
and above all as to the practicability of what he was undertaking
to do? They, in fact, represent Hannibal, when at the height of his
expectation of success, doing what those would hardly do who have
utterly failed and have been reduced to despair,—that is, to entrust
themselves and their forces to an unknown country. And so, too, what
they say about the desolation of the district, and its precipitous and
inaccessible character, only serves to bring their untrustworthiness
into clearer light. For first, they pass over the fact that the Celts
of the Rhone valley had on several occasions before Hannibal came,
and that in very recent times, crossed the Alps with large forces,
and fought battles with the Romans in alliance with the Celts of the
valley of the Padus, as I have already stated. And secondly, they are
unaware of the fact that a very numerous tribe of people inhabit the
Alps. Accordingly in their ignorance of these facts they take refuge
in the assertion that a hero showed Hannibal the way. They are, in
fact, in the same case as tragedians, who, beginning with an improbable
and impossible plot, are obliged to bring in a _deus ex machina_ to
solve the difficulty and end the play. The absurd premises of these
historians naturally require some such supernatural agency to help them
out of the difficulty: an absurd beginning could only have an absurd
ending. For of course Hannibal did not act as these writers say he did;
but, on the contrary, conducted his plans with the utmost prudence.
He had thoroughly informed himself of the fertility of the country
into which he designed to descend, and of the hostile feelings of its
inhabitants towards Rome, and for his journey through the difficult
district which intervened he employed native guides and pioneers, whose
interests were bound up with his own. I speak with confidence on these
points, because I have questioned persons actually engaged on the
facts, and have inspected the country, and gone over the Alpine pass
myself, in order to inform myself of the truth and see with my own eyes.

[Sidenote: Scipio finds that Hannibal has escaped him.]

+49.+ Three days after Hannibal had resumed his march, the Consul
Publius arrived at the passage of the river. He was in the highest
degree astonished to find the enemy gone: for he had persuaded himself
that they would never venture to take this route into Italy, on account
of the numbers and fickleness of the barbarians who inhabited the
country. But seeing that they had done so, he hurried back to his ships
and at once embarked his forces. He then despatched his brother Gnaeus
to conduct the campaign in Iberia, while he himself turned back again
to Italy by sea, being anxious to anticipate the enemy by marching
through Etruria to the foot of the pass of the Alps.

[Sidenote: Hannibal’s march to the foot of the Alps.]

Meanwhile, after four days’ march from the passage of the Rhone,
Hannibal arrived at the place called the Island, a district thickly
inhabited and exceedingly productive of corn. Its name is derived
from its natural features: for the Rhone and Isara flowing on either
side of it make the apex of a triangle where they meet, very nearly
of the same size and shape as the delta of the Nile, except that the
base of the latter is formed by the sea into which its various streams
are discharged, while in the case of the former this base is formed
by mountains difficult to approach or climb, and, so to speak, almost
inaccessible. When Hannibal arrived in this district he found two
brothers engaged in a dispute for the royal power, and confronting each
other with their armies. The elder sought his alliance and invited
his assistance in gaining the crown: and the advantage which such a
circumstance might prove to him at that juncture of his affairs being
manifest, he consented; and having joined him in his attack upon his
brother, and aided in expelling him, he obtained valuable support from
the victorious chieftain. For this prince not only liberally supplied
his army with provisions, but exchanged all their old and damaged
weapons for new ones, and thus at a very opportune time thoroughly
restored the efficiency of the troops: he also gave most of the men
new clothes and boots, which proved of great advantage during their
passage of the mountains. But his most essential service was that, the
Carthaginians being greatly alarmed at the prospect of marching through
the territory of the Allobroges, he acted with his army as their
rear-guard, and secured them a safe passage as far as the foot of the
pass.

[Sidenote: The ascent.]

+50.+ Having in ten days’ march accomplished a distance of eight
hundred stades along the river bank, Hannibal began the ascent of the
Alps,[180] and immediately found himself involved in the most serious
dangers. For as long as the Carthaginians were on the plains, the
various chiefs of the Allobroges refrained from attacking them from
fear of their cavalry, as well as of the Gauls who were escorting
them. But when these last departed back again to their own lands,
and Hannibal began to enter the mountainous region, the chiefs of
the Allobroges collected large numbers of their tribe and occupied
the points of vantage in advance, on the route by which Hannibal’s
troops were constrained to make their ascent. If they had only kept
their design secret, the Carthaginian army would have been entirely
destroyed: as it was, their plans became known, and though they did
much damage to Hannibal’s army, they suffered as much themselves. For
when that general learnt that the natives were occupying the points
of vantage, he halted and pitched his camp at the foot of the pass,
and sent forward some of his Gallic guides to reconnoitre the enemy
and discover their plan of operations. The order was obeyed: and he
ascertained that it was the enemy’s practice to keep under arms, and
guard these posts carefully, during the day, but at night to retire
to some town in the neighbourhood. Hannibal accordingly adapted his
measures to this strategy of the enemy. He marched forward in broad
daylight, and as soon as he came to the mountainous part of the road,
pitched his camp only a little way from the enemy. At nightfall he gave
orders for the watch-fires to be lit; and leaving the main body of his
troops in the camp, and selecting the most suitable of his men, he had
them armed lightly, and led them through the narrow parts of the road
during the night, and seized on the spots which had been previously
occupied by the enemy: they having, according to their regular custom,
abandoned them for the nearest town.

[Sidenote: The Gauls harass the army.]

+51.+ When day broke the natives saw what had taken place, and at
first desisted from their attempts; but presently the sight of the
immense string of beasts of burden, and of the cavalry, slowly and
painfully making the ascent, tempted them to attack the advancing
line. Accordingly they fell upon it at many points at once; and the
Carthaginians sustained severe losses, not so much at the hands of
the enemy, as from the dangerous nature of the ground, which proved
especially fatal to the horses and beasts of burden. For as the ascent
was not only narrow and rough, but flanked also with precipices, at
every movement which tended to throw the line into disorder, large
numbers of the beasts of burden were hurled down the precipices with
their loads on their backs. And what added more than anything else to
this sort of confusion were the wounded horses; for, maddened by their
wounds, they either turned round and ran into the advancing beasts of
burden, or, rushing furiously forward, dashed aside everything that
came in their way on the narrow path, and so threw the whole line into
disorder. Hannibal saw what was taking place, and knowing that, even
if they escaped this attack, they could never survive the loss of all
their baggage, he took with him the men who had seized the strongholds
during the night and went to the relief of the advancing line. Having
the advantage of charging the enemy from the higher ground he inflicted
a severe loss upon them, but suffered also as severe a one in his
own army; for the commotion in the line now grew worse, and in both
directions at once—thanks to the shouting and struggling of these
combatants: and it was not until he had killed the greater number of
the Allobroges, and forced the rest to fly to their own land, that
the remainder of the beasts of burden and the horses got slowly, and
with difficulty, over the dangerous ground. Hannibal himself rallied
as many as he could after the fight, and assaulted the town from
which the enemy had sallied; and finding it almost deserted, because
its inhabitants had been all tempted out by the hope of booty, he
got possession of it: from which he obtained many advantages for the
future as well as for the present. The immediate gain consisted of a
large number of horses and beasts of burden, and men taken with them;
and for future use he got a supply of corn and cattle sufficient for
two or three days: but the most important result of all was the terror
inspired in the next tribes, which prevented any one of those who lived
near the ascent from lightly venturing to meddle with him again.

[Sidenote: Treachery of the Gauls.]

+52.+ Here he pitched a camp and remained a day, and started again. For
the next three days he accomplished a certain amount of his journey
without accident. But on the fourth he again found himself in serious
danger. For the dwellers along his route, having concerted a plan of
treachery, met him with branches and garlands, which among nearly all
the natives are signs of friendship, as the herald’s staff is among the
Greeks. Hannibal was cautious about accepting such assurances, and took
great pains to discover what their real intention and purpose were.
The Gauls however professed to be fully aware of the capture of the
town, and the destruction of those who had attempted to do him wrong;
and explained that those events had induced them to come, because they
wished neither to inflict nor receive any damage; and finally promised
to give him hostages. For a long while Hannibal hesitated and refused
to trust their speeches. But at length coming to the conclusion that,
if he accepted what was offered, he would perhaps render the men
before him less mischievous and implacable; but that, if he rejected
them, he must expect undisguised hostility from them, he acceded to
their request, and feigned to accept their offer of friendship. The
barbarians handed over the hostages, supplied him liberally with
cattle, and in fact put themselves unreservedly into his hands; so that
for a time Hannibal’s suspicions were allayed, and he employed them as
guides for the next difficulty that had to be passed. They guided the
army for two days: and then these tribes collected their numbers, and
keeping close up with the Carthaginians, attacked them just as they
were passing through a certain difficult and precipitous gorge.

[Sidenote: Severe losses.]

+53.+ Hannibal’s army would now have certainly been utterly destroyed,
had it not been for the fact that his fears were still on the alert,
and that, having a prescience of what was to come, he had placed his
baggage and cavalry in the van and his hoplites in the rear. These
latter covered his line, and were able to stem the attack of the enemy,
and accordingly the disaster was less than it would otherwise have
been. As it was, however, a large number of beasts of burden and horses
perished; for the advantage of the higher ground being with the enemy,
the Gauls moved along the <DW72>s parallel with the army below, and by
rolling down boulders, or throwing stones, reduced the troops to a
state of the utmost confusion and danger; so that Hannibal with half
his force was obliged to pass the night near a certain white rock,[181]
which afforded them protection, separated from his horses and baggage
which he was covering; until after a whole night’s struggle they slowly
and with difficulty emerged from the gorge.

[Sidenote: Arrives at the summit.]

Next morning the enemy had disappeared: and Hannibal, having effected
a junction with his cavalry and baggage, led his men towards the head
of the pass, without falling in again with any important muster of the
natives, though he was harassed by some of them from time to time;
who seized favourable opportunities, now on his van and now on his
rear, of carrying off some of his baggage. His best protection was his
elephants; on whatever parts of the line they were placed the enemy
never ventured to approach, being terrified at the unwonted appearance
of the animals. The ninth day’s march brought him to the head of the
pass: and there he encamped for two days, partly to rest his men and
partly to allow stragglers to come up. Whilst they were there, many of
the horses who had taken fright and run away, and many of the beasts of
burden that had got rid of their loads, unexpectedly appeared: they had
followed the tracks of the army and now joined the camp.

[Sidenote: 9th November.]

+54.+ But by this time, it being nearly the period of the setting of
the Pleiads, the snow was beginning to be thick on the heights; and
seeing his men in low spirits, owing both to the fatigue they had
gone through, and that which still lay before them, Hannibal called
them together and tried to cheer them by dwelling on the one possible
topic of consolation in his power, namely the view of Italy: which lay
stretched out in both directions below those mountains, giving the
Alps the appearance of a citadel to the whole of Italy. By pointing
therefore to the plains of the Padus, and reminding them of the
friendly welcome which awaited them from the Gauls who lived there,
and at the same time indicating the direction of Rome itself, he did
somewhat to raise the drooping spirits of his men.

[Sidenote: The descent.]

Next day he began the descent, in which he no longer met with any
enemies, except some few secret pillagers; but from the dangerous
ground and the snow he lost almost as many men as on the ascent.
For the path down was narrow and precipitous, and the snow made it
impossible for the men to see where they were treading, while to
step aside from the path, or to stumble, meant being hurled down the
precipices. The troops however bore up against the fatigue, having
now grown accustomed to such hardships; but when they came to a place
where the path was too narrow for the elephants or beasts of burden to
pass,—and which, narrowed before by landslips extending about a stade
and a half, had recently been made more so by another landslip,—then
once more despondency and consternation fell upon the troops.
Hannibal’s first idea was to avoid this _mauvais pas_ by a détour, but
this route too being made impossible by a snow-storm, he abandoned the
idea.

[Sidenote: A break in the road.]

+55.+ The effect of the storm was peculiar and extraordinary. For
the present fall of snow coming upon the top of that which was there
before, and had remained from the last winter, it was found that the
former, being fresh, was soft and offered no resistance to the foot;
but when the feet reached the lower frozen snow, they could no longer
make any impression upon it, but the men found both their feet slipping
from under them, as though they were on hard ground with a layer of mud
on the top. And a still more serious difficulty followed: for not being
able to get a foothold on the lower snow, when they fell and tried to
get themselves up by their hands and knees, the men found themselves
plunging downwards quicker and quicker, along with everything they laid
hold of, the ground being a very steep decline. The beasts, however,
when they fell did break through this lower snow as they struggled to
rise, and having done so were obliged to remain there with their loads,
as though they were frozen to it, both from the weight of these loads
and the hardness of the old snow. Giving up, therefore, all hope of
making this détour, he encamped upon the ridge after clearing away the
snow upon it. He then set large parties of his men to work, and, with
infinite toil, began constructing a road on the face of the precipice.
One day’s work sufficed to make a path practicable for beasts of burden
and horses; and he accordingly took them across at once, and having
pitched his camp at a spot below the snow line, he let them go in
search of pasture; while he told off the Numidians in detachments to
proceed with the making of the road; and after three days’ difficult
and painful labour he got his elephants across, though in a miserable
condition from hunger. For the tops of the Alps, and the parts
immediately below them, are completely treeless and bare of vegetation,
because the snow lies there summer and winter; but about half-way down
the <DW72>s on both sides they produce trees and shrubs, and are, in
fact, fit for human habitation.

[Sidenote: He reaches the plains.]

+56.+ So Hannibal mustered his forces and continued the descent; and
on the third day after passing the precipitous path just described he
reached the plains. From the beginning of his march he had lost many
men by the hands of the enemy, and in crossing rivers, and many more
on the precipices and dangerous passes of the Alps; and not only men
in this last way, but horses and beasts of burden in still greater
numbers. The whole march from New Carthage had occupied five months,
the actual passage of the Alps fifteen days; and he now boldly entered
the valley of the Padus, and the territory of the Insubres, with such
of his army as survived, consisting of twelve thousand Libyans and
eight thousand Iberians, and not more than six thousand cavalry in all,
as he himself distinctly states on the column erected on the promontory
of Lacinium to record the numbers.

At the same time, as I have before stated, Publius having left his
legions under the command of his brother Gnaeus, with orders to
prosecute the Iberian campaign and offer an energetic resistance to
Hasdrubal, landed at Pisae with a small body of men. Thence he marched
through Etruria, and taking over the army of the Praetors which was
guarding the country against the Boii, he arrived in the valley of the
Padus; and, pitching his camp there, waited for the enemy with an eager
desire to give him battle.

[Sidenote: Digression on the limits of history.]

+57.+ Having thus brought the generals of the two nations and the war
itself into Italy, before beginning the campaign, I wish to say a few
words about what I conceive to be germane or not to my history.

I can conceive some readers complaining that, while devoting a great
deal of space to Libya and Iberia, I have said little or nothing
about the strait of the Pillars of Hercules, the Mare Externum, or
the British Isles, and the manufacture of tin in them, or even of the
silver and gold mines in Iberia itself, of which historians give long
and contradictory accounts. It was not, let me say, because I thought
these subjects out of place in history that I passed them over; but
because, in the first place, I did not wish to be diffuse, or distract
the attention of students from the main current of my narrative; and,
in the next place, because I was determined not to treat of them in
scattered notices or casual allusions, but to assign them a distinct
time and place, and at these, to the best of my ability, to give a
trustworthy account of them. On the same principle I must deprecate
any feeling of surprise if, in the succeeding portions of my history,
I pass over other similar topics, which might seem naturally in place,
for the same reasons. Those who ask for dissertations in history on
every possible subject, are somewhat like greedy guests at a banquet,
who, by tasting every dish on the table, fail to really enjoy any
one of them at the time, or to digest and feel any benefit from them
afterwards. Such omnivorous readers get no real pleasure in the
present, and no adequate instruction for the future.

+58.+ There can be no clearer proof, than is afforded by these
particular instances, that this department of historical writing stands
above all others in need of study and correction. For as all, or at
least the greater number of writers, have endeavoured to describe the
peculiar features and positions of the countries on the confines of
the known world, and in doing so have, in most cases, made egregious
mistakes, it is impossible to pass over their errors without some
attempt at refutation; and that not in scattered observations or casual
remarks, but deliberately and formally. But such confutation should
not take the form of accusation or invective. While correcting their
mistakes we should praise the writers, feeling sure that, had they
lived to the present age, they would have altered and corrected many of
their statements. The fact is that, in past ages, we know of very few
Greeks who undertook to investigate these remote regions, owing to the
insuperable difficulties of the attempt. The dangers at sea were then
more than can easily be calculated, and those on land more numerous
still. And even if one did reach these countries on the confines of the
world, whether compulsorily or voluntarily, the difficulties in the way
of a personal inspection were only begun: for some of the regions were
utterly barbarous, others uninhabited; and a still greater obstacle
in way of gaining information as to what he saw was his ignorance
of the language of the country. And even if he learnt this, a still
greater difficulty was to preserve a strict moderation in his account
of what he had seen, and despising all attempts to glorify himself by
traveller’s tales of wonder, to report for our benefit the truth and
nothing but the truth.

+59.+ All these impediments made a true account of these regions in
past times difficult, if not impossible. Nor ought we to criticise
severely the omissions or mistakes of these writers: rather they
deserve our praise and admiration for having in such an age gained
information as to these places, which distinctly advanced knowledge.
In our own age, however, the Asiatic districts have been opened up
both by sea and land owing to the empire of Alexander, and the other
places owing to the supremacy of Rome. Men too of practical experience
in affairs, being released from the cares of martial or political
ambition, have thereby had excellent opportunities for research and
inquiry into these localities; and therefore it will be but right
for us to have a better and truer knowledge of what was formerly
unknown. And this I shall endeavour to establish, when I find a fitting
opportunity in the course of my history. I shall be especially anxious
to give the curious a full knowledge on these points, because it was
with that express object that I confronted the dangers and fatigues
of my travels in Libya, Iberia, and Gaul, as well as of the sea which
washes the western coasts of these countries; that I might correct the
imperfect knowledge of former writers, and make the Greeks acquainted
with these parts of the known world.

After this digression, I must go back to the pitched battles between
the Romans and Carthaginians in Italy.

[Sidenote: Rest and recovery.]

[Sidenote: Taking of Turin.]

+60.+ After arriving in Italy with the number of troops which I have
already stated, Hannibal pitched his camp at the very foot of the Alps,
and was occupied, to begin with, in refreshing his men. For not only
had his whole army suffered terribly from the difficulties of transit
in the ascent, and still more in the descent of the Alps, but it was
also in evil case from the shortness of provisions, and the inevitable
neglect of all proper attention to physical necessities. Many had quite
abandoned all care for their health under the influence of starvation
and continuous fatigue; for it had proved impossible to carry a full
supply of food for so many thousands over such mountains, and what they
did bring was in great part lost along with the beasts that carried it.
So that whereas, when Hannibal crossed the Rhone, he had thirty-eight
thousand infantry, and more than eight thousand cavalry, he lost
nearly half in the pass, as I have shown above; while the survivors
had by these long continued sufferings become almost savage in look
and general appearance. Hannibal therefore bent his whole energies to
the restoration of the spirits and bodies of his men, and of their
horses also. When his army had thus sufficiently recovered, finding
the Taurini, who live immediately under the Alps, at war with the
Insubres and inclined to be suspicious of the Carthaginians, Hannibal
first invited them to terms of friendship and alliance; and, on their
refusal, invested their chief city and carried it after a three day’s
siege. Having put to the sword all who had opposed him, he struck such
terror into the minds of the neighbouring tribes, that they all gave in
their submission out of hand. The other Celts inhabiting these plains
were also eager to join the Carthaginians, according to their original
purpose; but the Roman legions had by this time advanced too far, and
had intercepted the greater part of them: they were therefore unable to
stir, and in some cases were even obliged to serve in the Roman ranks.
This determined Hannibal not to delay his advance any longer, but to
strike some blow which might encourage those natives who were desirous
of sharing his enterprise.

[Sidenote: Approach of Scipio.]

[Sidenote: Tiberius Sempronius recalled.]

+61.+ When he heard, while engaged on this design, that Publius had
already crossed the Padus with his army, and was at no great distance,
he was at first inclined to disbelieve the fact, reflecting that it was
not many days since he had left him near the passage of the Rhone, and
that the voyage from Marseilles to Etruria was a long and difficult
one. He was told, moreover, that from the Tyrrhenian Sea to the Alps
through Italian soil was a long march, without good military roads.
But when messenger after messenger confirmed the intelligence with
increased positiveness, he was filled with amazement and admiration
at the Consul’s plan of campaign, and promptness in carrying it out.
The feelings of Publius were much the same: for he had not expected
that Hannibal would even attempt the passage of the Alps with forces
of different races, or, if he did attempt it, that he could escape
utter destruction. Entertaining such ideas he was immensely astonished
at his courage and adventurous daring, when he heard that he had not
only got safe across, but was actually besieging certain towns in
Italy. Similar feelings were entertained at Rome when the news arrived
there. For scarcely had the last rumour about the taking of Saguntum
by the Carthaginians ceased to attract attention, and scarcely had
the measures adopted in view of that event been taken,—namely the
despatch of one Consul to Libya to besiege Carthage, and of the other
to Iberia to meet Hannibal there,—than news came that Hannibal had
arrived in Italy with his army, and was already besieging certain towns
in it. Thrown into great alarm by this unexpected turn of affairs, the
Roman government sent at once to Tiberius at Lilybaeum, telling him
of the presence of the enemy in Italy, and ordering him to abandon
the original design of his expedition, and to make all haste home to
reinforce the defences of the country. Tiberius at once collected
the men of the fleet and sent them off, with orders to go home by
sea; while he caused the Tribunes to administer an oath to the men of
the legions that they would all appear at a fixed day at Ariminum by
bedtime. Ariminum is a town on the Adriatic, situated at the southern
boundary of the valley of the Padus. In every direction there was stir
and excitement: and the news being a complete surprise to everybody,
there was everywhere a great and irrepressible anxiety as to the future.

[Sidenote: Gallic prisoners.]

+62.+ The two armies being now within a short distance of each other,
Hannibal and Publius both thought it necessary to address their men in
terms suitable to the occasion.

The manner in which Hannibal tried to encourage his army was this. He
mustered the men, and caused some youthful prisoners whom he had caught
when they were attempting to hinder his march on the Alpine passes, to
be brought forward. They had been subjected to great severities with
this very object, loaded with heavy chains, half-starved, and their
bodies a mass of bruises from scourging. Hannibal caused these men to
be placed in the middle of the army, and some suits of Gallic armour,
such as are worn by their kings when they fight in single combat, to
be exhibited; in addition to these he placed there some horses, and
brought in some valuable military cloaks. He then asked these young
prisoners, which of them were willing to fight with each other on
condition of the conqueror taking these prizes, and the vanquished
escaping all his present miseries by death. Upon their all answering
with a loud shout that they were desirous of fighting in these single
combats, he bade them draw lots; and the pair, on whom the first lot
fell, to put on the armour and fight with each other. As soon as the
young men heard these orders, they lifted up their hands, and each
prayed the gods that he might be one of those to draw the lot. And
when the lots were drawn, those on whom they fell were overjoyed,
and the others in despair. When the fight was finished, too, the
surviving captives congratulated the one who had fallen no less than
the victor, as having been freed from many terrible sufferings, while
they themselves still remained to endure them. And in this feeling
the Carthaginian soldiers were much disposed to join, all pitying the
survivors and congratulating the fallen champion.

[Sidenote: Hannibal’s speech.]

+63.+ Having by this example made the impression he desired upon the
minds of his troops, Hannibal then came forward himself and said, “that
he had exhibited these captives in order that they might see in the
person of others a vivid representation of what they had to expect
themselves, and might so lay their plans all the better in view of the
actual state of affairs. Fortune had summoned them to a life and death
contest very like that of the two captives, and in which the prize of
victory was the same. For they must either conquer, or die, or fall
alive into the hands of their enemies; and the prize of victory would
not be mere horses and military cloaks, but the most enviable position
in the world if they became masters of the wealth of Rome: or if they
fell in battle their reward would be to end their life fighting to
their last breath for the noblest object, in the heat of the struggle,
and with no sense of pain; while if they were beaten, or from desire
of life were base enough to fly, or tried to prolong that life by
any means except victory, every sort of misery and misfortune would
be their lot: for it was impossible that any one of them could be so
irrational or senseless, when he remembered the length of the journey
he had performed from his native land, and the number of enemies that
lay between him and it, and the size of the rivers he had crossed, as
to cherish the hope of being able to reach his home by flight. They
should therefore cast away such vain hopes, and regard their position
as being exactly that of the combatants whom they had but now been
watching. For, as in their case, all congratulated the dead as much as
the victor, and commiserated the survivors; so they should think of
the alternatives before themselves, and should, one and all, come upon
the field of battle resolved, if possible, to conquer, and, if not,
to die. Life with defeat was a hope that must by no means whatever be
entertained. If they reasoned and resolved thus, victory and safety
would certainly attend them: for it never happened that men who came to
such a resolution, whether of deliberate purpose or from being driven
to bay, were disappointed in their hope of beating their opponents in
the field. And when it chanced, as was the case with the Romans, that
the enemy had in most cases a hope of quite an opposite character,
from the near neighbourhood of their native country making flight an
obvious means of safety, then it was clear that the courage which came
of despair would carry the day.”

When he saw that the example and the words he had spoken had gone home
to the minds of the rank and file, and that the spirit and enthusiasm
which he aimed at inspiring were created, he dismissed them for the
present with commendations, and gave orders for an advance at daybreak
on the next morning.

[Sidenote: Scipio crosses the Ticinus.]

+64.+ About the same day Publius Scipio, having now crossed the Padus,
and being resolved to make a farther advance across the Ticinus,
ordered those who were skilled in such works to construct a bridge
across this latter river; and then summoned a meeting of the remainder
of his army and addressed them: dwelling principally on the reputation
of their country and of the ancestors’ achievements. But he referred
particularly to their present position, saying, “that they ought to
entertain no doubt of victory, though they had never as yet had any
experience of the enemy; and should regard it as a piece of extravagant
presumption of the Carthaginians to venture to face Romans, by whom
they had been so often beaten, and to whom they had for so many years
paid tribute and been all but slaves. And when in addition to this they
at present knew thus much of their mettle,—that they dared not face
them, what was the fair inference to be drawn for the future? Their
cavalry, in a chance encounter on the Rhone with those of Rome, had,
so far from coming off well, lost a large number of men, and had fled
with disgrace to their own camp; and the general and his army, as soon
as they knew of the approach of his legions, had beat a retreat, which
was exceedingly like a flight, and, contrary to their original purpose,
had in their terror taken the road over the Alps. And it was evident
that Hannibal had destroyed the greater part of his army; and that what
he had left was feeble and unfit for service, from the hardships they
had undergone: in the same way he had lost the majority of his horses,
and made the rest useless from the length and difficult nature of the
journey. They had, therefore, only to show themselves to the enemy.”
But, above all, he pointed out that “his own presence at their head
ought to be special encouragement to them: for that he would not have
left his fleet and Spanish campaign, on which he had been sent, and
have come to them in such haste, if he had not seen on consideration
that his doing so was necessary for his country’s safety, and that a
certain victory was secured to him by it.”

The weight and influence of the speaker, as well as their belief
in his words, roused great enthusiasm among the men; which Scipio
acknowledged, and then dismissed them with the additional injunction
that they should hold themselves in readiness to obey any order sent
round to them.

[Sidenote: Skirmish of cavalry near the Ticinus, Nov. B.C. 219.]

+65.+ Next day both generals led their troops along the river Padus,
on the bank nearest the Alps, the Romans having the stream on their
left, the Carthaginians on their right; and having ascertained on the
second day, by means of scouts, that they were near each other, they
both halted and remained encamped for that day: but on the next, both
taking their cavalry, and Publius his sharp-shooters also, they hurried
across the plain to reconnoitre each other’s forces. As soon as they
came within distance, and saw the dust rising from the side of their
opponents, they drew up their lines for battle at once. Publius put his
sharp-shooters and Gallic horsemen in front, and bringing the others
into line, advanced at a slow pace. Hannibal placed his cavalry that
rode with bridles, and was most to be depended on, in his front, and
led them straight against the enemy; having put the Numidian cavalry on
either wing to take the enemy on the flanks. The two generals and the
cavalry were in such hot haste to engage, that they closed with each
other before the sharp-shooters had an opportunity of discharging their
javelines at all. Before they could do so, they left their ground, and
retreated to the rear of their own cavalry, making their way between
the squadrons, terrified at the approaching charge, and afraid of being
trampled to death by the horses which were galloping down upon them.
The cavalry charged each other front to front, and for a long time
maintained an equal contest; and a great many men dismounting on the
actual field, there was a mixed fight of horse and foot. The Numidian
horse, however, having outflanked the Romans, charged them on the rear:
and so the sharp-shooters, who had fled from the cavalry charge at
the beginning, were now trampled to death by the numbers and furious
onslaught of the Numidians; while the front ranks originally engaged
with the Carthaginians, after losing many of their men and inflicting a
still greater loss on the enemy, finding themselves charged on the rear
by the Numidians, broke into flight: most of them scattering in every
direction, while some of them kept closely massed round the Consul.

[Sidenote: Scipio retires to Placentia on the right bank of the Po.]

[Sidenote: Hannibal crosses the Po higher up and follows Scipio to
Placentia.]

+66.+ Publius then broke up his camp, and marched through the plains to
the bridge over the Padus, in haste to get his legions across before
the enemy came up. He saw that the level country where he was then was
favourable to the enemy with his superiority in cavalry. He was himself
disabled by a wound;[182] and he decided that it was necessary to shift
his quarters to a place of safety. For a time Hannibal imagined that
Scipio would give him battle with his infantry also: but when he saw
that he had abandoned his camp, he went in pursuit of him as far as
the bridge over the Ticinus; but finding that the greater part of the
timbers of this bridge had been torn away, while the men who guarded
the bridge were left still on his side of the river, he took them
prisoners to the number of about six hundred, and being informed that
the main army was far on its way, he wheeled round and again ascended
the Padus in search of a spot in it which admitted of being easily
bridged. After two days’ march he halted and constructed a bridge over
the river by means of boats. He committed the task of bringing over the
army to Hasdrubal;[183] while he himself crossed at once, and busied
himself in receiving the ambassadors who arrived from the neighbouring
districts. For no sooner had he gained the advantage in the cavalry
engagement, than all the Celts in the vicinity hastened to fulfil their
original engagement by avowing themselves his friends, supplying him
with provisions, and joining the Carthaginian forces. After giving
these men a cordial reception, and getting his own army across the
Padus, he began to march back again down stream, with an earnest
desire of giving the enemy battle. Publius, too, had crossed the river
and was now encamped under the walls of the Roman colony Placentia.
There he made no sign of any intention to move; for he was engaged in
trying to heal his own wound and those of his men, and considered that
he had a secure base of operations where he was. A two days’ march
from the place where he had crossed the Padus brought Hannibal to the
neighbourhood of the enemy; and on the third day he drew out his army
for battle in full view of his opponents: but as no one came out to
attack, he pitched his camp about fifty stades from them.

[Sidenote: Treachery of the Gauls serving in the army of Scipio.]

+67.+ But the Celtic contingent of the Roman army, seeing that
Hannibal’s prospects looked the brighter of the two, concerted their
plans for a fixed time, and waited in their several tents for the
moment of carrying them out. When the men within the rampart of the
camp had taken their supper and were gone to bed, the Celts let more
than half the night pass, and just about the time of the morning watch
armed themselves and fell upon the Romans who were quartered nearest
to them; killed a considerable number, and wounded not a few; and,
finally, cutting off the heads of the slain, departed with them to
join the Carthaginians, to the number of two thousand infantry and
nearly two hundred cavalry. They were received with great satisfaction
by Hannibal; who, after addressing them encouragingly, and promising
them all suitable rewards, sent them to their several cities, to
declare to their compatriots what they had done, and to urge them
to make alliance with him: for he knew that they would now all feel
compelled to take part with him, when they learnt the treachery of
which their fellow-countrymen had been guilty to the Romans. Just
at the same time the Boii came in, and handed over to him the three
Agrarian Commissioners, sent from Rome to divide the lands; whom, as
I have already related, they had seized by a sudden act of treachery
at the beginning of the war. Hannibal gratefully acknowledged their
good intention, and made a formal alliance with those who came: but he
handed them back their prisoners, bidding them keep them safe, in order
to get back their own hostages from Rome, as they intended at first.

[Sidenote: Scipio changes his position at Placentia to one on the
Trebia.]

Publius regarded this treachery as of most serious importance; and
feeling sure that the Celts in the neighbourhood had long been
ill-disposed, and would, after this event, all incline to the
Carthaginians, he made up his mind that some precaution for the future
was necessary. The next night, therefore, just before the morning
watch, he broke up his camp and marched for the river Trebia, and the
high ground near it, feeling confidence in the protection which the
strength of the position and the neighbourhood of his allies would give
him.

[Sidenote: Hannibal follows him.]

+68.+ When Hannibal was informed of Scipio’s change of quarters,
he sent the Numidian horse in pursuit at once, and the rest soon
afterwards, following close behind with his main army. The Numidians,
finding the Roman camp empty, stopped to set fire to it: which proved
of great service to the Romans; for if they had pushed on and caught
up the Roman baggage, a large number of the rear-guard would have
certainly been killed by the cavalry in the open plains. But as it was,
the greater part of them got across the River Trebia in time; while
those who were after all too far in the rear to escape, were either
killed or made prisoners by the Carthaginians.

[Sidenote: Scipio’s position on the <DW72>s of Apennines, near the
source of the Trebia.]

Scipio, however, having crossed the Trebia occupied the first high
ground; and having strengthened his camp with trench and palisade,
waited the arrival of his colleague, Tiberius Sempronius, and his army;
and was taking the greatest pains to cure his wound, because he was
exceedingly anxious to take part in the coming engagement. Hannibal
pitched his camp about forty stades from him. While the numerous
Celts inhabiting the plains, excited by the good prospects of the
Carthaginians, supplied his army with provisions in great abundance,
and were eager to take their share with Hannibal in every military
operation or battle.

When news of the cavalry engagement reached Rome, the disappointment
of their confident expectations caused a feeling of consternation in
the minds of the people. Not but that plenty of pretexts were found to
prove to their own satisfaction that the affair was not a defeat. Some
laid the blame on the Consul’s rashness, and others on the treacherous
lukewarmness of the Celts, which they concluded from their recent
revolt must have been shown by them on the field. But, after all, as
the infantry was still unimpaired, they made up their minds that the
general result was still as hopeful as ever. Accordingly, when Tiberius
and his legions arrived at Rome, and marched through the city, they
believed that his mere appearance at the seat of war would settle the
matter.

[Sidenote: Tiberius Sempronius joins Scipio.]

His men met Tiberius at Ariminum, according to their oath, and he
at once led them forward in all haste to join Publius Scipio. The
junction effected, and a camp pitched by the side of his colleague,
he was naturally obliged to refresh his men after their forty days’
continuous march between Ariminum and Lilybaeum: but he went on with
all preparations for a battle; and was continually in conference with
Scipio, asking questions as to what had happened in the past, and
discussing with him the measures to be taken in the present.

[Sidenote: Fall of Clastidium. Hannibal’s policy towards the Italians.]

[Sidenote: A skirmish favourable to the Romans.]

+69.+ Meanwhile Hannibal got possession of Clastidium, by the treachery
of a certain Brundisian, to whom it had been entrusted by the Romans.
Having become master of the garrison and the stores of corn he used the
latter for his present needs; but took the men whom he had captured
with him, without doing them any harm, being desirous of showing by
an example the policy he meant to pursue; that those whose present
position towards Rome was merely the result of circumstances should
not be terrified, and give up hope of being spared by him. The man
who betrayed Clastidium to him he treated with extraordinary honour,
by way of tempting all men in similar situations of authority to
share the prospects of the Carthaginians. But afterwards, finding
that certain Celts who lived in the fork of the Padus and the Trebia,
while pretending to have made terms with him, were sending messages
to the Romans at the same time, believing that they would thus secure
themselves from being harmed by either side, he sent two thousand
infantry with some Celtic and Numidian cavalry with orders to devastate
their territory. This order being executed, and a great booty obtained,
the Celts appeared at the Roman camp beseeching their aid. Tiberius
had been all along looking out for an opportunity of striking a blow:
and once seized on this pretext for sending out a party, consisting of
the greater part of his cavalry; and a thousand sharp-shooters of his
infantry along with them; who having speedily come up with the enemy
on the other side of the Trebia, and engaged them in a sharp struggle
for the possession of the booty, forced the Celts and Numidians to beat
a retreat to their own camp. Those who were on duty in front of the
Carthaginian camp quickly perceived what was going on, and brought some
reserves to support the retreating cavalry; then the Romans in their
turn were routed, and had to retreat to their camp. At this Tiberius
sent out all his cavalry and sharp-shooters; whereupon the Celts again
gave way, and sought the protection of their own camp. The Carthaginian
general being unprepared for a general engagement, and thinking it a
sound rule not to enter upon one on every casual opportunity, or except
in accordance with a settled design, acted, it must be confessed, on
this occasion with admirable generalship. He checked their flight when
his men were near the camp, and forced them to halt and face about; but
he sent out his aides and buglers to recall the rest, and prevented
them from pursuing and engaging the enemy any more. So the Romans after
a short halt went back, having killed a large number of the enemy, and
lost very few themselves.

[Sidenote: Sempronius resolves to give battle.]

+70.+ Excited and overjoyed at this success Tiberius was all eagerness
for a general engagement. Now, it was in his power to administer the
war for the present as he chose, owing to the ill-health of Publius
Scipio; yet wishing to have his colleague’s opinion in support of his
own, he consulted him on this subject. Publius however took quite
an opposite view of the situation. He thought his legions would be
all the better for a winter under arms; and that the fidelity of the
fickle Celts would never stand the test of want of success and enforced
inactivity on the part of the Carthaginians: they would be certain, he
thought, to turn against them once more. Besides, when he had recovered
from his wound, he hoped to be able to do good service to his country
himself. With these arguments he tried to dissuade Tiberius from his
design. The latter felt that every one of these arguments were true and
sound; but, urged on by ambition and a blind confidence in his fortune,
he was eager to have the credit of the decisive action to himself,
before Scipio should be able to be present at the battle, or the next
Consuls arrive to take over the command; for the time for that to take
place was now approaching. As therefore he selected the time for the
engagement from personal considerations, rather than with a view to the
actual circumstances of the case, he was bound to make a signal failure.

Hannibal took much the same view of the case as Scipio, and was
therefore, unlike him, eager for a battle; because, in the first place,
he wished to avail himself of the enthusiasm of the Celts before it
had at all gone off: in the second place, he wished to engage the
Roman legions while the soldiers in them were raw recruits without
practice in war: and, in the third place, because he wished to fight
the battle while Scipio was still unfit for service: but most of all
because he wanted to be doing something and not to let the time slip
by fruitlessly; for when a general leads his troops into a foreign
country, and attempts what looks like a desperate undertaking, the one
chance for him is to keep the hopes of his allies alive by continually
striking some fresh blow.

Such were Hannibal’s feelings when he knew of the intended attack of
Tiberius.

[Sidenote: Hannibal prepares an ambuscade.]

+71.+ Now he had some time before remarked a certain piece of ground
which was flat and treeless, and yet well suited for an ambush, because
there was a stream in it with a high overhanging bank thickly covered
with thorns and brambles. Here he determined to entrap the enemy. The
place was admirably adapted for putting them off their guard; because
the Romans were always suspicious of woods, from the fact of the Celts
invariably choosing such places for their ambuscades, but felt no fear
at all of places that were level and without trees: not knowing that
for the concealment and safety of an ambush such places are much better
than woods; because the men can command from them a distant view of
all that is going on: while nearly all places have sufficient cover to
make concealment possible,—a stream with an overhanging bank, reeds, or
ferns, or some sort of bramble-bushes,—which are good enough to hide
not infantry only, but sometimes even cavalry, if the simple precaution
is taken of laying conspicuous arms flat upon the ground and hiding
helmets under shields. Hannibal had confided his idea to his brother
Mago and to his council, who had all approved of the plan. Accordingly,
when the army had supped, he summoned this young man to his tent, who
was full of youthful enthusiasm, and had been trained from boyhood
in the art of war, and put under his command a hundred cavalry and
the same number of infantry. These men he had himself earlier in the
day selected as the most powerful of the whole army, and had ordered
to come to his tent after supper. Having addressed and inspired them
with the spirit suitable to the occasion, he bade each of them select
ten of the bravest men of their own company, and to come with them
to a particular spot in the camp. The order having been obeyed, he
despatched the whole party, numbering a thousand cavalry and as many
infantry, with guides, to the place selected for the ambuscade; and
gave his brother directions as to the time at which he was to make the
attempt. At daybreak he himself mustered the Numidian cavalry, who were
conspicuous for their powers of endurance; and after addressing them,
and promising them rewards if they behaved with gallantry, he ordered
them to ride up to the enemy’s lines, and then quickly cross the river,
and by throwing showers of darts at them tempt them to come out: his
object being to get at the enemy before they had had their breakfast,
or made any preparations for the day. The other officers of the army
also he summoned, and gave them similar instructions for the battle,
ordering all their men to get breakfast and to see to their arms and
horses.

[Sidenote: Battle of the Trebia, December B.C. 218.]

[Sidenote: Hannibal’s forces.]

[Sidenote: The Roman forces.]

+72.+ As soon as Tiberius saw the Numidian horse approaching, he
immediately sent out his cavalry by itself with orders to engage the
enemy, and keep them in play, while he despatched after them six
thousand foot armed with javelins, and got the rest of the army in
motion, with the idea that their appearance would decide the affair:
for his superiority in numbers, and his success in the cavalry skirmish
of the day before, had filled him with confidence. But it was now
mid-winter and the day was snowy and excessively cold, and men and
horses were marching out almost entirely without having tasted food;
and accordingly, though the troops were at first in high spirits, yet
when they had crossed the Trebia, swollen by the floods which the rain
of the previous night had brought down from the high ground above the
camp, wading breast deep through the stream, they were in a wretched
state from the cold and want of food as the day wore on. While the
Carthaginians on the contrary had eaten and drunk in their tents, and
got their horses ready, and were all anointing and arming themselves
round the fires. Hannibal waited for the right moment to strike, and
as soon as he saw that the Romans had crossed the Trebia, throwing out
eight thousand spearmen and slingers to cover his advance, he led out
his whole army. When he had advanced about eight stades from the camp,
he drew up his infantry, consisting of about twenty thousand Iberians,
Celts, and Libyans, in one long line, while he divided his cavalry and
placed half on each wing, amounting in all to more than ten thousand,
counting the Celtic allies; his elephants also he divided between the
two wings, where they occupied the front rank. Meanwhile Tiberius had
recalled his cavalry because he saw that they could do nothing with the
enemy. For the Numidians when attacked retreated without difficulty,
scattering in every direction, and then faced about again and charged,
which is the peculiar feature of their mode of warfare. But he drew up
his infantry in the regular Roman order, consisting of sixteen thousand
citizens and twenty thousand allies; for that is the complete number
of a Roman army in an important campaign, when the two Consuls are
compelled by circumstances to combine forces.[184] He then placed the
cavalry on either wing, numbering four thousand, and advanced against
the enemy in gallant style, in regular order, and at a deliberate pace.

[Sidenote: The Roman cavalry retreat.]

+73.+ When the two forces came within distance, the light-armed troops
in front of the two armies closed with each other. In this part of the
battle the Romans were in many respects at a disadvantage, while the
Carthaginians had everything in their favour. For the Roman spearmen
had been on hard service ever since daybreak, and had expended most of
their weapons in the engagement with the Numidians, while those weapons
which were left had become useless from being long wet. Nor were the
cavalry, or indeed the whole army, any better off in these respects.
The case of the Carthaginians was exactly the reverse: they had come on
the field perfectly sound and fresh, and were ready and eager for every
service required of them. As soon, therefore, as their advanced guard
had retired again within their lines, and the heavy-armed soldiers
were engaged, the cavalry on the two wings of the Carthaginian army at
once charged the enemy with all the effect of superiority in numbers,
and in the condition both of men and horses secured by their freshness
when they started. The Roman cavalry on the contrary retreated: and
the flanks of the line being thus left unprotected, the Carthaginian
spearmen and the main body of the Numidians, passing their own advanced
guard, charged the Roman flanks: and, by the damage which they did
them, prevented them from keeping up the fight with the troops on their
front. The heavy-armed soldiers, however, who were in the front rank
of both armies, and in the centre of that, maintained an obstinate and
equal fight for a considerable time.

[Sidenote: Both Roman wings defeated.]

[Sidenote: The Roman centre fights its way to Placentia.]

+74.+ Just then the Numidians, who had been lying in ambush, left their
hiding-place, and by a sudden charge on the centre of the Roman rear
produced great confusion and alarm throughout the army. Finally both
the Roman wings, being hard pressed in front by the elephants, and on
both flanks by the light-armed troops of the enemy, gave way, and in
their flight were forced upon the river behind them. After this, while
the centre of the Roman rear was losing heavily, and suffering severely
from the attack of the Numidian ambuscade, their front, thus driven to
bay, defeated the Celts and a division of Africans, and, after killing
a large number of them, succeeded in cutting their way through the
Carthaginian line. Then seeing that their wings had been forced off
their ground, they gave up all hope of relieving them or getting back
to their camp, partly because of the number of the enemy’s cavalry, and
partly because they were hindered by the river and the pelting storm
of rain which was pouring down upon their heads. They therefore closed
their ranks, and made their way safely to Placentia, to the number of
ten thousand. Of the rest of the army the greater number were killed
by the elephants and cavalry on the bank of the Trebia; while those of
the infantry who escaped, and the greater part of the cavalry, managed
to rejoin the ten thousand mentioned above, and arrived with them at
Placentia. Meanwhile the Carthaginian army pursued the enemy as far
as the Trebia; but being prevented by the storm from going farther,
returned to their camp. They regarded the result of the battle with
great exultation, as a complete success; for the loss of the Iberians
and Africans had been light, the heaviest having fallen on the Celts.
But from the rain and the snow which followed it, they suffered so
severely, that all the elephants except one died, and a large number of
men and horses perished from the cold.

[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 118-117. Great exertions at Rome to meet the
danger.]

+75.+ Fully aware of the nature of his disaster, but wishing to conceal
its extent as well as he could from the people at home, Tiberius sent
messengers to announce that a battle had taken place, but that the
storm had deprived them of the victory. For the moment this news was
believed at Rome; but when soon afterwards it became known that the
Carthaginians were in possession of the Roman camp, and that all the
Celts had joined them: while their own troops had abandoned their
camp, and, after retiring from the field of battle, were all collected
in the neighbouring cities; and were besides being supplied with
necessary provisions by sea up the Padus, the Roman people became
only too certain of what had really happened in the battle. It was a
most unexpected reverse, and it forced them at once to urge on with
energy the remaining preparations for the war. They reinforced those
positions which lay in the way of the enemy’s advance; sent legions
to Sardinia and Sicily, as well as garrisons to Tarentum, and other
places of strategical importance; and, moreover, fitted out a fleet
of sixty quinqueremes. The Consuls designate, Gnaeus Servilius and
Gaius Flaminius, were collecting the allies and enrolling the citizen
legions, and sending supplies to Ariminum and Etruria, with a view
of going to the seat of war by those two routes. They sent also to
king Hiero asking for reinforcements, who sent them five hundred
Cretan archers and a thousand peltasts. In fact they pushed on their
preparations in every direction with energy. For the Roman people are
most formidable, collectively and individually, when they have real
reason for alarm.

[Sidenote: Gnaeus Scipio in Spain.]

+76.+ While these events were happening in Italy, Gnaeus Cornelius
Scipio, who had been left by his brother Publius in command of the
fleet, setting sail from the mouth of the Rhone, came to land with his
whole squadron at a place in Iberia called Emporium. Starting from this
town, he made descents upon the coast, landing and besieging those who
refused to submit to him along the seaboard as far as the Iber; and
treating with every mark of kindness those who acceded to his demands,
and taking all the precautions he could for their safety. When he had
garrisoned those towns on the coast that submitted, he led his whole
army inland, having by this time a not inconsiderable contingent of
Iberian allies; and took possession of the towns on his line of march,
some by negotiation and some by force of arms. The Carthaginian troops
which Hannibal had left in that district under the command of Hanno,
lay entrenched to resist him under the walls of a town called Cissa.

Defeating this army in a pitched battle, Gnaeus not only got possession
of a rich booty, for the whole baggage of the army invading Italy had
been left under its charge, but secured the friendly alliance of all
the Iberian tribes north of the Iber, and took both Hanno, the general
of the Carthaginians, and Andobales, the general of the Iberians,
prisoners. The latter was despot of central Iberia, and had always been
especially inclined to the side of Carthage.

Immediately he learnt what had happened, Hasdrubal crossed the Iber to
bring aid. There he ascertained that the Roman troops left in charge
of the fleet had abandoned all precautions, and were trading on the
success of the land forces to pass their time in ease. He therefore
took with him eight thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry of his
own army, and finding the men of the fleet scattered about the country,
he killed a great many of them and forced the rest to fly for refuge
to their ships. He then retired across the Iber again, and employed
himself in fortifying and garrisoning the posts south of the river,
taking up his winter quarters at New Carthage. When Gnaeus rejoined his
fleet, he punished the authors of the disaster according to the Roman
custom; and then collected his land and sea forces together in Tarraco,
and there took up his winter quarters; and by dividing the booty
equally between his soldiers, inspired them at once with affection
towards himself and eagerness for future service. Such was the course
of the Iberian campaign.

[Sidenote: B.C. 217.]

+77.+ At the beginning of the following spring, Gaius Flaminius marched
his army through Etruria, and pitched his camp at Arretium; while his
colleague Gnaeus Servilius on the other hand went to Ariminum, to await
the advance of the enemy in that direction.

[Sidenote: Hannibal conciliates the Italians.]

Passing the winter in the Celtic territory, Hannibal kept his Roman
prisoners in close confinement, supplying them very sparingly with
food; while he treated their allies with great kindness from the first,
and finally called them together and addressed them, alleging, “that he
had not come to fight against them, but against Rome in their behalf;
and that, therefore, if they were wise, they would attach themselves
to him: because he had come to restore freedom to the Italians, and
to assist them to recover their cities and territory which they had
severally lost to Rome.” With these words he dismissed them without
ransom to their own homes: wishing by this policy to attract the
inhabitants of Italy to his cause, and to alienate their affections
from Rome, and to awaken the resentment of all those who considered
themselves to have suffered by the loss of harbours or cities under the
Roman rule.

+78.+ While he was in these winter quarters also he practised a ruse
truly Punic. Being apprehensive that from the fickleness of their
character, and the newness of the tie between himself and them, the
Celts might lay plots against his life, he caused a number of wigs
to be made for him, suited in appearance to men of various ages; and
these he constantly varied, changing at the same time his clothes also
to harmonise with the particular wig which he wore. He thus made it
hard to recognise him, not only for those who met him suddenly, but
even for his intimates. But seeing that the Celts were discontented at
the lengthened continuance of the war within their borders, and were
in a state of restless hurry to invade the enemy’s territory,—on the
pretence of hatred for Rome, but in reality from love of booty,—he
determined to break up his camp as soon as possible, and satisfy the
desires of his army. Accordingly as soon as the change of season set
in, by questioning those who were reputed to know the country best, he
ascertained that the other roads leading into Etruria were long and
well known to the enemy, but that the one which led through the marshes
was short, and would bring them upon Flaminius as a surprise.[185] This
was what suited his peculiar genius, and he therefore decided to take
this route. But when the report was spread in his army that the general
was going to lead them through some marshes, every soldier felt alarmed
at the idea of the quagmires and deep sloughs which they would find on
this march.

[Sidenote: Hannibal starts for Etruria. Spring of B.C. 217.]

+79.+ But after a careful inquiry as to what part of the road was
firm or boggy, Hannibal broke up his camp and marched out. He placed
the Libyans and Iberians and all his best soldiers in the van,
and the baggage within their lines, that there might be plenty of
provisions for their immediate needs. Provisions for the future he
entirely neglected. Because he calculated that on reaching the enemy’s
territory, if he were beaten he should not require them, and if he were
victorious he would find abundance in the open country. Behind this
vanguard he placed the Celts, and in the rear of all the cavalry. He
entrusted the command of the rear-guard to his brother Mago, that he
might see to the security of all, and especially to guard against the
cowardice and impatience of hard labour which characterised the Celts;
in order that, if the difficulty of the route should induce them to
turn back, he might intercept them by means of the cavalry and force
them to proceed. In point of fact, the Iberians and Libyans, having
great powers of endurance and being habituated to such fatigues, and
also because when they marched through them the marshes[186] were
fresh and untrodden, accomplished their march with a moderate amount
of distress: but the Celts advanced with great difficulty, because the
marshes were now disturbed and trodden into a deep morass: and being
quite unaccustomed to such painful labours, they bore the fatigue
with anger and impatience; but were hindered from turning back by the
cavalry in their rear. All however suffered grievously, especially
from the impossibility of getting sleep on a continuous march of four
days and three nights through a route which was under water: but none
suffered so much, or lost so many men, as the Celts. Most of his
beasts of burden also slipping in the mud fell and perished, and could
then only do the men one service: they sat upon their dead bodies,
and piling up baggage upon them so as to stand out above the water,
they managed to get a snatch of sleep[187] for a short portion of the
night. Another misfortune was that a considerable number of the horses
lost their hoofs by the prolonged march through bog. Hannibal himself
was with difficulty and much suffering got across riding on the only
elephant left alive, enduring great agony from a severe attack of
ophthalmia, by which he eventually lost the sight of one eye, because
the time and the difficulties of the situation did not admit of his
waiting or applying any treatment to it.

[Sidenote: Hannibal in the valley of the Arno.]

+80.+ Having crossed the marshes in this unexpected manner, Hannibal
found Flaminius in Etruria encamped under the walls of Arretium. For
the present he pitched his camp close to the marshes, to refresh his
army, and to investigate the plans of his enemies and the lie of the
country in his front. And being informed that the country before him
abounded in wealth, and that Flaminius was a mere mob-orator and
demagogue, with no ability for the actual conduct of military affairs,
and was moreover unreasonably confident in his resources; he calculated
that, if he passed his camp and made a descent into the district
beyond, partly for fear of popular reproach and partly from a personal
feeling of irritation, Flaminius would be unable to endure to watch
passively the devastation of the country, and would spontaneously
follow him wherever he went; and being eager to secure the credit of a
victory for himself, without waiting for the arrival of his colleague,
would give him many opportunities for an attack.

[Sidenote: Hannibal correctly judges the character of Flaminius.]

+81.+ And in making these calculations Hannibal showed his consummate
prudence and strategical ability. For it is mere blind ignorance to
believe that there can be anything of more vital importance to a
general than the knowledge of his opponent’s character and disposition.
As in combats between individuals or ranks, he who would conquer must
observe carefully how it is possible to attain his object, and what
part of his enemy appears unguarded or insufficiently armed,—so must
a commander of an army look out for the weak place, not in the body,
but in the mind of the leader of the hostile force. For it has often
happened before now that from mere idleness and lack of energy, men
have let not only the welfare of the state, but even their private
fortunes fall to ruin: some are so addicted to wine that they cannot
sleep without bemusing their intellects with drink; and others so
infatuated in their pursuit of sensual pleasures, that they have not
only been the ruin of their cities and fortunes, but have forfeited
life itself with disgrace. In the case of individuals, however,
cowardice and sloth bring shame only on themselves; but when it is a
commander-in-chief that is concerned, the disaster affects all alike
and is of the most fatal consequence. It not only infects the men under
him with an inactivity like his own; but it often brings absolute
dangers of the most serious description upon those who trust such a
general. For rashness, temerity, and uncalculating impetuosity, as well
as foolish ambition and vanity, give an easy victory to the enemy.
And are the source of numerous dangers to one’s friends: for a man
who is the prey of such weaknesses falls the easiest victim to every
stratagem, ambush or ruse. The general then who can gain a clear idea
of his opponent’s weaknesses, and direct his attack on the point where
he is most open to it, will very soon be the victor in the campaign.
For as a ship, if you deprive it of its steerer, falls with all its
crew into the hands of the enemy; so, in the case of an army in war, if
you outwit or out-manœuvre its general, the whole will often fall into
your hands.

[Sidenote: Flaminius is drawn out of camp.]

+82.+ Nor was Hannibal mistaken in his calculations in regard to
Flaminius. For no sooner had he left the neighbourhood of Faesulae,
and, advancing a short way beyond the Roman camp, made a raid upon
the neighbouring country, than Flaminius became excited, and enraged
at the idea that he was despised by the enemy: and as the devastation
of the country went on, and he saw from the smoke that rose in every
direction that the work of destruction was proceeding, he could not
patiently endure the sight. Some of his officers advised that they
should not follow the enemy at once nor engage him, but should act
on the defensive, in view of his great superiority in cavalry; and
especially that they should wait for the other Consul, and not give
battle until the two armies were combined. But Flaminius, far from
listening to their advice, was indignant at those who offered it; and
bade them consider what the people at home would say at the country
being laid waste almost up to the walls of Rome itself, while they
remained encamped in Etruria on the enemy’s rear. Finally, with these
words, he set his army in motion, without any settled plan of time or
place; but bent only on falling in with the enemy, as though certain
victory awaited him. For he had managed to inspire the people with such
confident expectations, that the unarmed citizens who followed his camp
in hope of booty, bringing chains and fetters and all such gear, were
more numerous than the soldiers themselves.

Meanwhile Hannibal was advancing on his way to Rome through Etruria,
keeping the city of Cortona and its hills on his left, and the
Thrasymene lake on his right; and as he marched, he burned and
wasted the country with a view of rousing the wrath of the enemy and
tempting him to come out. And when he saw Flaminius get well within
distance, and observed that the ground he then occupied was suited to
his purpose, he bent his whole energies on preparing for a general
engagement.

[Sidenote: The ambuscade at Lake Thrasymene.]

+83.+ The route which he was following led through a low valley
enclosed on both sides by long lines of lofty hills. Of its two ends,
that in front was blocked by an abrupt and inaccessible hill, and that
on the rear by the lake, between which and the foot of the cliff there
is only a very narrow defile leading into this valley. Making his way
to the end of the valley along the bank of the lake, Hannibal posted
himself with the Spanish and Libyan troops on the hill immediately in
front of him as he marched, and pitched a camp on it; but sent his
Balearic slingers and light-armed troops by a détour, and stationed
them in extended order under the cover of the hills to the right of the
valley; and by a similar détour placed the Gauls and cavalry under the
cover of hills to the left, causing them also to extend their line so
far as to cover the entrance of the defile running between the cliff
and lake into the valley.[188]

Having made these preparations during the night, and having thus
enclosed the valley with ambuscades, Hannibal remained quiet. In
pursuit of him came Flaminius, in hot haste to close with the enemy. It
was late in the evening before he pitched his camp on the border of the
lake; and at daybreak next morning, just before the morning watch, he
led his front maniples forward along the borders of the lake into the
valley with a view of engaging the enemy.

[Sidenote: The battle, 22d June.]

+84.+ The day was exceedingly misty: and as soon as the greater part
of the Roman line was in the valley, and the leading maniples were
getting close to him, Hannibal gave the signal for attack; and at the
same time sent orders to the troops lying in ambush on the hills to do
the same, and thus delivered an assault upon the enemy at every point
at once. Flaminius was taken completely by surprise: the mist was so
thick, and the enemy were charging down from the upper ground at so
many points at once, that not only were the Centurions and Tribunes
unable to relieve any part of the line that was in difficulties, but
were not even able to get any clear idea of what was going on: for
they were attacked simultaneously on front, rear, and both flanks.
The result was that most of them were cut down in the order of march,
without being able to defend themselves: exactly as though they had
been actually given up to slaughter by the folly of their leader.
Flaminius himself, in a state of the utmost distress and despair,
was attacked and killed by a company of Celts. As many as fifteen
thousand Romans fell in the valley, who could neither yield nor defend
themselves, being habituated to regard it as their supreme duty not
to fly or quit their ranks. But those who were caught in the defile
between the lake and the cliff perished in a shameful, or rather a
most miserable, manner: for being thrust into the lake, some in their
frantic terror endeavoured to swim with their armour on, and presently
sank and were drowned; while the greater number, wading as far as they
could into the lake, remained there with their heads above water; and
when the cavalry rode in after them, and certain death stared them in
the face, they raised their hands and begged for quarter, offering to
surrender, and using every imaginary appeal for mercy; but were finally
despatched by the enemy, or, in some cases, begged the favour of the
fatal blow from their friends, or inflicted it on themselves. A number
of men, however, amounting perhaps to six thousand, who were in the
valley, defeated the enemy immediately in front of them; but though
they might have done much to retrieve the fortune of the day, they
were unable to go to the relief of their comrades, or get to the rear
of their opponents, because they could not see what was going on. They
accordingly pushed on continually to the front, always expecting to
find themselves engaged with some of the enemy: until they discovered
that, without noticing it, they were issuing upon the higher ground.
But when they were on the crest of the hills, the mist broke and they
saw clearly the disaster which had befallen them; and being no longer
able to do any good, since the enemy was victorious all along the line,
and in complete possession of the ground, they closed their ranks and
made for a certain Etrurian village. After the battle Maharbal was sent
by Hannibal with the Iberians and light-armed troops to besiege the
village; and seeing themselves surrounded by a complication of dangers,
they laid down their arms and surrendered on condition of their lives
being spared. Such was the end of the final engagement between the
Romans and Carthaginians in Etruria.

[Sidenote: Hannibal’s treatment of prisoners.]

+85.+ When the prisoners who had surrendered on terms were with the
other prisoners brought to Hannibal, he had them all collected together
to the number of more than fifteen thousand, and began by saying that
Maharbal had no authority to grant them their lives without consulting
him. He then launched out into an invective against Rome: and when he
had finished that, he distributed all the prisoners who were Romans
among the companies of his army to be held in safe keeping; but allowed
all the allies to depart without ransom to their own country, with
the same remark as he had made before, that “he was not come to fight
against Italians, but in behalf of Italians against Rome.” He then gave
his army time to refresh themselves after their fatigue, and buried
those of highest rank who had fallen in his army, amounting to about
thirty; the total number of his loss being fifteen hundred, most of
whom were Celts. He then began considering, in conjunction with his
brother and friends, where and how he should continue his attack, for
he now felt confident of ultimate success.

[Sidenote: Dismay at Rome.]

When the news of this disaster reached Rome, the chief men of the state
could not, in view of the gravity of the blow, conceal its extent or
soften it down, but were forced to assemble the people and tell them
the truth. When the Praetor, therefore, from the Rostra said, “We have
been beaten in a great battle,” there was such a consternation, that
those who had been present at the battle as well as at this meeting,
felt the disaster to be graver than when they were on the field of
battle itself. And this feeling of the people was not to be wondered
at. For many years they had been unaccustomed to the word or the fact
of defeat, and they could not now endure reverse with patience or
dignity. The Senate, however, rose to the occasion, and held protracted
debates and consultations as to the future, anxiously considering what
it was the duty of all classes to do, and how they were to do it.

[Sidenote: Servilius’s advanced guard cut to pieces.]

+86.+ About the same time as the battle of Thrasymene, the Consul
Gnaeus Servilius, who had been stationed on duty at Ariminum,—which is
on the coast of the Adriatic, where the plains of Cis-Alpine Gaul join
the rest of Italy, not far from the mouths of the Padus,—having heard
that Hannibal had entered Etruria and was encamped near Flaminius,
designed to join the latter with his whole army. But finding himself
hampered by the difficulty of transporting so heavy a force, he sent
Gaius Centenius forward in haste with four thousand horse, intending
that he should be there before himself in case of need. But Hannibal,
getting early intelligence after the battle of Thrasymene of this
reinforcement of the enemy, sent Maharbal with his light-armed troops,
and a detachment of cavalry, who falling in with Gaius, killed nearly
half his men at the first encounter; and having pursued the remainder
to a certain hill, on the very next day took them all prisoners. The
news of the battle of Thrasymene was three days’ old at Rome, and
the sorrow caused by it was, so to speak, at its hottest, when this
further disaster was announced. The consternation caused by it was no
longer confined to the people. The Senate now fully shared in it; and
it was resolved that the usual annual arrangements for the election of
magistrates should be suspended, and a more radical remedy be sought
for the present dangers; for they came to the conclusion that their
affairs were in such a state, as to require a commander with absolute
powers.

[Sidenote: Hannibal’s advance after the battle.]

Feeling now entirely confident of success, Hannibal rejected the
idea of approaching Rome for the present; but traversed the country
plundering it without resistance, and directing his march towards the
coast of the Adriatic. Having passed through Umbria and Picenum, he
came upon the coast after a ten days’ march with such enormous booty,
that the army could neither drive nor carry all the wealth which they
had taken, and after killing a large number of people on his road.
For the order was given, usual in the storming of cities, to kill all
adults who came in their way: an order which Hannibal was prompted to
give now by his deep-seated hatred of Rome.[189]

+87.+ Pitching his camp on the shore of the Adriatic, in a district
extraordinarily rich in every kind of produce, he took great pains to
refresh his men and restore their health, and no less so that of the
horses. For the cold and squalor of a winter spent in Gallia Cis-Alpina
without the protection of a roof, and then the painful march through
the marshes, had brought upon most of the horses, and the men as well,
an attack of scurvy and all its consequences. Having therefore now got
possession of a rich country, he got his horses into condition again,
and restored the bodies and spirits of his soldiers; and made the
Libyans change their own for Roman arms selected for the purpose, which
he could easily do from being possessed of so many sets stripped from
the bodies of the enemy. He now sent messengers, too, to Carthage by
sea, to report what had taken place, for this was the first time he had
reached the sea since he entered Italy. The Carthaginians were greatly
rejoiced at the news: and took measures with enthusiasm for forwarding
supplies to their armies, both in Iberia and Italy.

[Sidenote: Q. Fabius Maximus Dictator.]

Meanwhile the Romans had appointed Quintus Fabius Dictator,[190] a
man distinguished no less for his wisdom than his high birth; as is
still commemorated by the fact that the members of his family are even
now called _Maximi_, that is “Greatest,” in honour of his successful
achievements. A Dictator differs from the Consuls in this, that each
Consul is followed by twelve lictors, the Dictator by twenty-four.
Again, the Consuls have frequently to refer to the Senate to enable
them to carry out their proposed plans, but the Dictator is absolute,
and when he is appointed all other magistrates in Rome are at once
deprived of power, except the Tribunes of the People.[191] I shall,
however, take another opportunity of speaking in more detail about
these officers. With the Dictator they appointed Marcus Minucius master
of the horse; this is an officer under the Dictator, and takes his
place when engaged elsewhere.

+88.+ Though Hannibal shifted his quarters from time to time for short
distances in one direction or another, he remained in the neighbourhood
of the Adriatic; and by bathing his horses with old wine, of which he
had a great store, cured them of the scab and got them into condition
again. By a similar treatment he cured his men of their wounds, and got
the others into a sound state of health and spirits for the service
before them. After traversing with fire and sword the territories
of Praetutia,[192] Hadriana, Marrucina, and Frentana, he started on
his road to Iapygia. This district is divided among three peoples,
each with a district name, Daunii [Peucetii], and Messapii. Hannibal
first invaded the territory of the Daunii, beginning from Luceria, a
Roman colony, and laid the country waste. He next encamped near Vibo,
and overran the territory of Arpi, and plundered all Daunia without
resistance.

[Sidenote: Fabius takes the command.]

Meanwhile Fabius, after offering the usual sacrifice to the gods
upon his appointment, started with his master of the horse and four
legions which had been enrolled for the purpose; and having effected a
junction near Daunia with the troops that had come to the rescue from
Ariminum, he relieved Gnaeus of his command on shore and sent him with
an escort to Rome, with orders to be ready with help for any emergency,
in case the Carthaginians made any movement by sea. Fabius himself,
with his master of the horse, took over the command of the whole army
and pitched his camp opposite the Carthaginians, near a place called
Aecae,[193] about six miles from the enemy.

[Sidenote: Cunctator.]

+89.+ When Hannibal learnt that Fabius had arrived, he determined to
terrify the enemy by promptly attacking. He therefore led out his
army, approached the Roman camp, and there drew up his men in order of
battle; but when he had waited some time, and nobody came out to attack
him, he drew off and retired to his own camp. For Fabius, having made
up his mind to incur no danger and not to risk a battle, but to make
the safety of his men his first and greatest object, kept resolutely
to this purpose. At first he was despised for it, and gave rise to
scandalous insinuations that he was an utter coward and dared not face
an engagement: but in course of time he compelled everybody to confess
and allow that it was impossible for any one to have acted, in the
existing circumstances, with greater discretion and prudence. And it
was not long before facts testified to the wisdom of his policy. Nor
was it wonderful that it was so. For the forces of his opponents had
been trained from their earliest youth without intermission in war;
had a general who had grown up with them and from childhood had been
instructed in the arts of the camp; had won many battles in Iberia,
and twice running had beaten the Romans and their allies: and, what
was more than all, had thoroughly made up their minds that their one
hope of safety was in victory. In every respect the circumstances of
the Roman army were the exact opposite of these; and therefore, their
manifest inferiority making it impossible for Fabius to offer the enemy
battle, he fell back upon those resources in which the Romans had the
advantage of the enemy; clung to them; and conducted the war by their
means: and they were—an inexhaustible supply of provisions and of men.

[Sidenote: Minucius discontented.]

+90.+ He, then, during the following months, kept his army continually
hovering in the neighbourhood of the enemy, his superior knowledge
of the country enabling him to occupy beforehand all the posts of
vantage; and having supplies in abundance on his rear, he never allowed
his soldiers to go on foraging expeditions, or get separated, on any
pretence, from the camp; but keeping them continually massed together
and in close union, he watched for favourable opportunities of time
and place; and by this method of proceeding captured and killed a
large number of the enemy, who in their contempt of him straggled from
their camp in search of plunder. His object in these manœuvres was
twofold,—to gradually diminish the limited numbers of the enemy: and
to strengthen and renew by such successes in detail the spirits of his
own men, which had been depressed, to begin with, by the general defeat
of their armies. But nothing would induce him to agree to give his
enemy a set battle. This policy however was by no means approved of by
his master of the horse, Marcus. He joined in the general verdict, and
decried Fabius in every one’s hearing, as conducting his command in a
cowardly and unenterprising spirit; and was himself eager to venture
upon a decisive engagement.

[Sidenote: Hannibal in Samnium and Apulia.]

Meanwhile the Carthaginians, after wasting these districts, crossed
the Apennines; and descending upon Samnium, which was rich and had
been free from war for many years past, found themselves in possession
of such an abundance of provisions, that they could get rid of
them neither by use nor waste. They overran also the territory of
Beneventum, which was a Roman colony; and took the town of Venusia,
which was unwalled and richly furnished with every kind of property.
All this time the Romans were following on his rear, keeping one or
two days’ march behind him, but never venturing to approach or engage
the enemy. Accordingly, when Hannibal saw that Fabius plainly meant to
decline a battle, but yet would not abandon the country altogether, he
formed the bold resolution of penetrating to the plains round Capua;
and actually did so as far as Falernum, convinced that thereby he
should do one of two things,—force the enemy to give him battle, or
make it evident to all that the victory was his, and that the Romans
had abandoned the country to him. This he hoped would strike terror
into the various cities, and cause them to be eager to revolt from
Rome. For up to that time, though the Romans had been beaten in two
battles, not a single city in Italy had revolted to the Carthaginians;
but all maintained their fidelity, although some of them were suffering
severely;—a fact which may show us the awe and respect which the
Republic had inspired in its allies.

+91.+ Hannibal, however, had not adopted this plan without good reason.
For the plains about Capua are the best in Italy for fertility and
beauty and proximity to the sea, and for the commercial harbours, into
which merchants run who are sailing to Italy from nearly all parts of
the world. They contain, moreover, the most famous and beautiful cities
of Italy. On its seaboard are Sinuessa, Cumae, Puteoli, Naples, and
Nuceria; and inland to the north there are Cales and Teanum, to the
east and south [Caudium[194]] and Nola. In the centre of these plains
lies the richest of all the cities, that of Capua. No tale in all
mythology wears a greater appearance of probability than that which
is told of these, which, like others remarkable for their beauty, are
called the Phlegraean plains; for surely none are more likely for
beauty and fertility to have been contended for by gods. In addition to
these advantages, they are strongly protected by nature and difficult
of approach; for one side is protected by the sea, and the rest by a
long and high chain of mountains, through which there are but three
passes from the interior, narrow and difficult, one from Samnium [a
second from Latium[195]] and a third from Hirpini. So that if the
Carthaginians succeeded in fixing their quarters in these plains, they
would have the advantage of a kind of theatre, in which to display
the terrors of their power before the gaze of all Italy; and would
make a spectacle also of the cowardice of their enemies in shrinking
from giving them battle, while they themselves would be proved beyond
dispute to be masters of the country.

[Sidenote: Hannibal descends into the Falernian plain.]

+92.+ With this view Hannibal crossed from Samnium by the pass of the
hill called Eribianus,[196] and encamped on the bank of the river
Vulturnus, which almost divides these plains in half. His camp was on
the side of the river towards Rome, but he overran the whole plain with
foraging parties. Though utterly aghast at the audacity of the enemy’s
proceedings, Fabius stuck all the more firmly to the policy upon which
he had determined. But his colleague Minucius, and all the centurions
and tribunes of the army, thinking that they had caught the enemy in an
excellent trap, were of opinion that they should make all haste into
the plains, and not allow the most splendid part of the country to be
devastated. Until they reached the spot, Fabius hurried on, and feigned
to share their eager and adventurous spirit; and, when he was near
the ager Falernus, he showed himself on the mountain skirts and kept
in a line with the enemy, that he might not be thought by the allies
to abandon the country: but he would not let his army descend into
the plain, being still unwilling to risk a general engagement, partly
for the same reasons as before, and partly because the enemy were
conspicuously superior in cavalry.

[Sidenote: Fabius lies in wait.]

After trying to provoke his enemies, and collecting an unlimited
amount of booty by laying waste the whole plain, Hannibal began taking
measures for removing: wishing not to waste his booty, but to stow it
in some safe place, which he might also make his winter quarters; that
the army might not only be well off for the present, but might have
abundant supplies all through the winter. Fabius, learning that he
meditated returning the same way as he came, and seeing that the pass
was a narrow one, and extremely well suited for an attack by ambush,
placed about four thousand men at the exact spot that he would have to
pass; while he, with the main body of his troops, encamped on a hill
which commanded the entrance of the pass.

[Sidenote: Hannibal eludes him.]

+93.+ Fabius hoped when the Carthaginians came thither, and encamped on
the plain immediately under the foot of the hill, that he would be able
to snatch away their plunder without any risk to himself; and, most of
all, might even put an end to the whole war by means of the excellent
situation for an attack in which he now was. He was accordingly wholly
intent on forming plans for this purpose, anxiously considering in what
direction and in what manner he should avail himself of the advantages
of the ground, and which of his men were to be the first to attack
the enemy. Whilst his enemies were making these preparations for the
next day, Hannibal, guessing the truth, took care to give them no time
or leisure for executing their design; but summoning Hasdrubal, the
captain of his pioneers, ordered him, with all speed, to make as many
fagots of dry wood of all sorts as possible, and selecting two thousand
of the strongest of the working oxen from the booty, to collect them
outside the camp. When this was done, he summoned the pioneers, and
pointed out to them a certain ridge lying between the camp and the
gorge by which he meant to march. To this ridge they were to drive the
oxen, when the order was given, as actively and energetically as they
could, until they came to the top. Having given these instructions, he
bade them take their supper and go to rest betimes. Towards the end
of the third watch of the night he led the pioneers out of the camp,
and ordered them to tie the fagots to the horns of the oxen. The men
being numerous, this did not take long to do; and he then ordered them
to set the fagots all alight, and to drive the oxen off and force them
to mount the ridge; and placing his light-armed troops behind them he
ordered them to assist the drivers up to a certain distance: but, as
soon as the beasts had got well started, to take open order and pass
them at the double, and, with as much noise as possible, make for the
top of the ridge; that, if they found any of the enemy there, they
might close with and attack them at once. At the same time he himself
led the main army towards the narrow gorge of the pass,—his heavy-armed
men in front, next to them the cavalry, then the booty, and the
Iberians and Celts bringing up the rear.

+94.+ The Romans who were guarding the gorge, no sooner saw these
fiery fagots advancing to the heights, than, quitting the narrow part
of the pass, they made for the ridge to meet the enemy. But when they
got near the oxen, they were puzzled by the lights, imagining them
to be something more dangerous than they really were; and when the
Carthaginian light-armed troops came on to the ground, after some
slight skirmishing between the two parties, upon the oxen rushing in
among them, they separated and took up their positions on different
heights and waited for daybreak, not being able to comprehend what was
taking place.

[Sidenote: Hannibal gets through the pass. Autumn, B.C. 217.]

Partly because he was at a loss to understand what was happening, and,
in the words of the poet, “some deep design suspecting;”[197] and
partly that, in accordance with his original plan, he was determined
not to risk a general engagement, Fabius remained quietly within his
camp: while Hannibal, finding everything going as he designed, led his
army and booty in safety through the gorge, the men who had been set to
guard the narrow road having abandoned their post. At daybreak, seeing
the two troops fronting each other on the heights, he sent some Iberian
companies to the light-armed troops, who engaged the Romans, and,
killing a thousand of them, easily relieved his own light-armed troops
and brought them down to the main body.

[Sidenote: Fabius goes to Rome, leaving the command to M. Minucius.]

Having thus effected his departure from the Falernian plain, Hannibal
thenceforth busied himself in looking out for a place in which to
winter, and in making the necessary preparations, after having inspired
the utmost alarm and uncertainty in the cities and inhabitants of Italy.

Though Fabius meanwhile was in great disrepute among the common people,
for having let his enemy escape from such a trap, he nevertheless
refused to abandon his policy; and being shortly afterwards obliged to
go to Rome to perform certain sacrifices, he handed over the command of
his legions to his master of the horse, with many parting injunctions,
not to be so anxious to inflict a blow upon the enemy, as to avoid
receiving one himself. Marcus, however, paid no heed to the advice,
and, even while Fabius was speaking, had wholly resolved to risk a
general engagement.

[Sidenote: Spain, B.C. 217.]

+95.+ While these things were going on in Italy, Hasdrubal, who was in
command in Iberia, having during the winter repaired the thirty ships
left him by his brother, and manned ten additional ones, got a fleet of
forty decked vessels to sea, at the beginning of the summer, from New
Carthage, under the command of Hamilcar; and at the same time collected
his land forces, and led them out of their winter quarters. The fleet
coasted up the country, and the troops marched along the shore towards
the Iber. Suspecting their design, Gnaeus Scipio was for issuing from
his winter quarters and meeting them both by land and sea. But hearing
of the number of their troops, and the great scale on which their
preparations had been made, he gave up the idea of meeting them by
land; and manning thirty-five ships, and taking on board the best men
he could get from his land forces to serve as marines, he put to sea,
and arrived on the second day near the mouth of the Iber. Here he came
to anchor, at a distance of about ten miles from the enemy, and sent
two swift-sailing Massilian vessels to reconnoitre. For the sailors of
Marseilles were the first in every service of difficulty and danger,
and ready at the shortest notice to do whatever was required of them;
and, in fact, Marseilles has distinguished itself above all other
places, before and since, in fidelity to Rome, and never more so than
in the Hannibalian war. The ships sent to reconnoitre having reported
that the enemy’s fleet was lying off the mouth of the Iber, Scipio put
to sea with all speed, wishing to surprise them.

[Sidenote: Roman success at sea.]

+96.+ But being informed in good time by his look-out men that the
enemy were bearing down upon him, Hasdrubal drew up his troops on the
beach, and ordered his crews to go on board; and, when the Romans hove
in sight, gave the signal for the attack, determined to fight the
enemy at sea. But, after engaging, the Carthaginians made but a short
struggle for victory, and very soon gave way. For the support of the
troops on the beach did less service in encouraging them to attack,
than harm in offering them a safe place of retreat. Accordingly,
after losing two ships with their crews, and the oars and marines of
four others, they gave way and made for the land; and when the Romans
pressed on with spirit in pursuit, they ran their ships ashore, and
leaping from the vessels fled for refuge to the troops. The Romans
came boldly close to land, towed off such of the vessels as could be
got afloat, and sailed away in great exultation at having beaten the
enemy at the first blow, secured the mastery of the sea, and taken
twenty-five of the enemy’s ships.

In Iberia therefore, after this victory, the Roman prospects had begun
to brighten. But when news of this reverse arrived at Carthage, the
Carthaginians at once despatched a fleet of seventy ships, judging it
to be essential to their whole design that they should command the
sea. These ships touched first at Sardinia and then at Pisae in Italy,
the commanders believing that they should find Hannibal there. But
the Romans at once put to sea to attack them from Rome itself, with
a fleet of a hundred and twenty quinqueremes; and hearing of this
expedition against them, the Carthaginians sailed back to Sardinia, and
thence returned to Carthage. Gnaeus Servilius, who was in command of
this Roman fleet, followed the Carthaginians for a certain distance,
believing that he should fall in with them; but, finding that he was
far behind, he gave up the attempt. He first put in at Lilybaeum, and
afterwards sailed to the Libyan island of Cercina; and after receiving
a sum of money from the inhabitants on condition of not laying waste
the country, he departed. On his return voyage he took the island of
Cossyrus, and having put a garrison into its small capital, returned to
Lilybaeum. There he placed the fleet, and shortly afterwards went off
himself to join the land army.

[Sidenote: Publius Scipio, whose imperium is prolonged after his
Consulship of the previous year, with Spain assigned as his province,
is sent to join his brother there with 20 ships: early in B.C. 217.]

+97.+ When the Senate heard of Gnaeus Scipio’s naval success, believing
it to be advantageous or rather essential not to relax their hold on
Iberia, but to press on the war there against Carthage with redoubled
vigour, they prepared a fleet of twenty ships, and put them under the
command of Publius Scipio; and in accordance with arrangements already
made, despatched him with all speed to join his brother Gnaeus, and
carry on the Iberian campaign in conjunction with him. Their great
anxiety was lest the Carthaginians should get the upper hand in Iberia,
and thus possessing themselves of abundant supplies and recruits,
should get a more complete mastery of the sea, and assist the invasion
of Italy, by sending troops and money to Hannibal. Regarding therefore
the Iberian war as of the utmost importance, they sent these ships
and Publius Scipio to that country; who, when he arrived in Iberia,
effected a junction with his brother and did most substantial service
to the State. For up to that time the Romans had not ventured to cross
the Iber; but had thought themselves fortunate if they could secure the
friendship and allies of the tribes up to that river. They now however
did cross it, and for the first time had the courage to attempt a
movement on the other side: their designs being greatly favoured also
by an accidental circumstance.

When the two brothers, after overawing the Iberian tribes that lived
near the passage of the Iber, had arrived before the city of Saguntum,
they pitched their camp about forty stades from it, near the temple of
Aphrodite, selecting the position as offering at once security from the
attacks of the enemy, and a means of getting supplies by sea: for their
fleet was coasting down parallel with them.

[Sidenote: Treason of Abilyx.]

+98.+ Here an event occurred which produced a decisive change in their
favour. When Hannibal was about to start for Italy, from the Iberian
towns whose loyalty he suspected he took the sons of their leading men
as hostages, and placed them all in Saguntum, because of the strength
of that town and his confidence in the fidelity of those who were left
in charge of it. Now there was a certain Iberian there named Abilyx,
who enjoyed the highest character and reputation with his countrymen,
and was believed to be especially well disposed and loyal to the
Carthaginians. Seeing how affairs were going, and believing that the
fortune of the Romans was in the ascendant, he formed in his own mind a
scheme, worthy of an Iberian and barbarian, for giving up the hostages.
Convinced that he might obtain a high place in the favour of Rome, if
he gave a proof of his fidelity at a critical moment, he made up his
mind to turn traitor to Carthage and put the hostages in the hands
of the Romans. He began his machinations by addressing himself to
Bostar, the Carthaginian general who had been despatched by Hasdrubal
to prevent the Romans from crossing the river, but, not venturing to
do this, had retreated, and was now encamped in the region of Saguntum
next the sea. To this man, who was of a guileless and gentle character,
and quite disposed to trust him, Abilyx now introduced the subject of
the hostages. He argued that “the Romans having now crossed the Iber,
the Carthaginians could no longer hold Iberia by terror, but stood
now in need of the good feeling of their subjects: seeing then that
the Romans had actually approached Saguntum and were besieging it,
and that the city was in danger,—if he were to take the hostages and
restore them to their parents and cities, he would not only frustrate
the ambitious scheme of the Romans, who wished above all things by
getting possession of the hostages to have the credit of doing this;
but would also rouse a feeling of goodwill towards Carthage in all
the cities, for having taken thought for the future and provided for
the safety of the hostages. He would, too, much enhance the favour by
personally managing this business: for if he restored these boys to
their homes, he would provoke the gratitude, not only of their parents,
but of the people at large also, by giving a striking instance of
the magnanimous policy of Carthage towards her allies. He might even
expect large rewards for himself from the families that recovered their
children; for all those, who thus unexpectedly got into their hands
the dearest objects of their affection, would vie with each other in
heaping favours on the author of such a service.” By these and similar
arguments he persuaded Bostar to fall in with his proposals.

+99.+ Abilyx then went away, after arranging a fixed day on which he
would appear with everything necessary for conveying the boys. At
night he made his way to the Roman lines, and, having fallen in with
some Iberians serving in the Roman army, was by them conducted to
the generals; to whom he discoursed at great length on the revulsion
of feeling of the Iberians in their favour, which would be caused
if they got possession of the hostages: and finally offered to put
the boys in their hands. Publius Scipio received the proposal with
extreme eagerness: and, promising him large rewards, he agreed with
him on a day, hour, and place at which a party were to be waiting to
receive him. After returning home, Abilyx next went with a band of
chosen friends to Bostar; and, after receiving the boys, left the camp
at night, as though he wished not to be seen by the Roman camp as he
passed it, and came at the appointed time to the place arranged, and
there handed over all the boys to the Roman officers. Publius treated
Abilyx with special honour, and employed him in restoring the boys
to their native cities, along with certain of his own friends. He
accordingly went from city to city, giving them a visible proof by
the restoration of the boys of the Roman mildness and magnanimity, in
contrast to the Carthaginian suspiciousness and harshness; and bidding
them also observe that he had found it necessary to change sides, he
induced many Iberians to join the Roman alliance. Bostar was thought,
in thus surrendering the hostages to the enemy, to have behaved more
like a child than became a man of his age, and was in serious danger
of his life. For the present, however, as it was getting late in the
season, both sides began dispersing into winter quarters; the Romans
having made an important step towards success in the matter of the boys.

[Sidenote: Hannibal takes Geronium.]

+100.+ Such was the position of affairs in Iberia. To return to
Hannibal, whom we left having just effected the passage from the
Falernian plain. Hearing from his scouts that there was abundance of
corn in the district round Luceria and Geronium, and that Geronium
was an excellent place to store it in, he determined to make his
winter quarters there; and accordingly marched thither by way of Mount
Liburnum. And having come to Geronium, which is about two hundred
stades from Luceria, he first endeavoured to win over the inhabitants
by promises, offering them pledges of his good faith; but when no one
would listen to him, he determined to lay siege to the town. Having
taken it without much delay, he put the inhabitants to the sword;
but preserved most of the houses and walls, because he wished to use
them as granaries for his winter camp: and having encamped his army
in front of it, he fortified his position with trench and palisade.
Having finished these labours, he sent out two-thirds of the army to
collect corn, with orders to bring home every day, each division for
the use of its own men, as much as the regular heads of this department
would usually supply: while with the remaining third of his army he
kept watch over his camp, and occupied certain places with a view
of protecting the foraging parties in case they were attacked. The
district being mostly very accessible and flat, and the harvesting
party being almost innumerable, and the season moreover being at the
very best stage for such operations, the amount of corn collected every
day was very great.

[Sidenote: Minucius obtains a slight success. Autumn B.C. 217.]

+101.+ When Minucius took over the command from Fabius, he at first
kept along the line of hills, feeling certain that he would sooner
or later fall in with the Carthaginians; but when he heard that
Hannibal had already taken Geronium, and was collecting the corn of
the country, and had pitched his camp in front of the town, he changed
the direction of his march, and descended from the top of the hills by
way of a ridge leading down into the plains. Arriving at the height
which lies in the territory of Larinum, and is called Calena, he
encamped round its foot, being eager on any terms whatever to engage
the enemy. When Hannibal saw the enemy approaching, he sent a third of
his army foraging for corn, but took the other two-thirds with him,
and, advancing sixteen stades from Geronium towards the enemy, pitched
a camp upon a piece of rising ground, with a view at once of overawing
his opponents, and affording safety to his foraging parties: and there
being another elevation between him and the two armies, which was near,
and conveniently placed for an attack upon the enemy’s lines, he sent
out about two thousand light-armed troops in the night and seized it.
At daybreak when Minucius saw these men, he took his own light-armed
troops and assaulted the hill. After a gallant skirmish the Romans
prevailed; and subsequently their whole camp was transferred to this
place. For a certain time Hannibal kept his men for the most part
within their lines, because the camps were so close to each other; but,
after the lapse of some days, he was obliged to divide them into two
parties, one for pasturing the animals, and one for gathering corn:
being very anxious to carry out his design of avoiding the destruction
of his booty, and of collecting as much corn as possible, that his men
might have abundant food during the winter, and his horses and beasts
of burden as much so; for the chief hope of his army rested on his
cavalry.

[Sidenote: Carthaginian foragers cut off.]

+102.+ It was then that Minucius, seeing the great part of the enemy
scattered about the country on these services, selected the exact hour
of the day when they would be away to lead out his army. Having come
close to the Carthaginian lines he drew out his heavy-armed troops
there; and then, dividing his cavalry and light-armed into detachments,
sent them in search of the foragers, ordering them to give no quarter.
This put Hannibal into a great difficulty: for he was not strong
enough to accept battle with the enemy drawn up outside his lines, or
to relieve those of his men who were scattered about the country. The
Romans meanwhile who had been sent to take the foragers found a great
number of them scattered about, and killed them; while the troops
drawn up in front of the camp grew so contemptuous of the enemy, that
they even began to pull down their palisade, and all but assaulted
the Carthaginians. Hannibal was in a very dangerous position: but in
spite of the storm that had suddenly fallen on him, he held his ground,
repulsing the enemy when they approached and defending, though with
difficulty, the rampart; until Hasdrubal came to his relief with about
four thousand of the foraging parties, who had fled for refuge from the
country and collected within the lines near Geronium. This encouraged
Hannibal to make a sally: and having got into order of battle a short
distance from the camp, he just managed with difficulty to avert the
threatened danger. After killing large numbers of the enemy in the
struggle at the camp, and still more in the open country, Minucius for
the present retired, but with great hopes for the future; and on the
morrow, the Carthaginians having abandoned their lines on the hill, he
went up and occupied their position. For Hannibal being alarmed lest
the Romans should go by night and find the camp at Geronium undefended,
and become masters of his baggage and stores, determined to retire
thither himself and again fix his quarters there. After this the
Carthaginians were more timid and cautious in their manner of foraging;
while the Romans on the other hand acted with greater boldness and
recklessness.

[Sidenote: Minucius invested with co-equal powers with Fabius.]

+103.+ An exaggerated account of this success reached Rome, and caused
excessive exultation: first, because in their gloomy prospects some
sort of change for the better had at last shown itself; and, secondly,
because the people could now believe that the ill success and want of
nerve, which had hitherto attended the legions, had not arisen from
the cowardice of the men, but the timidity of their leader. Wherefore
everybody began finding fault with and depreciating Fabius, as failing
to seize his opportunities with spirit; while they extolled Minucius
to such a degree for what had happened, that a thing was done for
which there was no precedent. They gave him absolute power as well as
Fabius, believing that he would quickly put an end to the campaign; and
so there were two Dictators made for carrying on the same war, which
had never happened at Rome before. When Minucius was informed of his
popularity with the people, and of the office bestowed upon him by the
citizens, he felt doubly incited to run all risks and act with daring
boldness against the enemy. Fabius rejoined the army with sentiments
not in the least changed by what had happened, but rather fixed
still more immovably on his original policy. Seeing, however, that
Minucius was puffed up with pride, and inclined to offer him a jealous
opposition at every turn, and was wholly bent on risking an engagement,
he offered him the choice of two alternatives: either to command the
whole army on alternate days with him; or that they should separate
their two armies, and each command their respective part in their own
way. Minucius joyfully accepting the second alternative, they divided
the men and encamped separately about twelve stades apart.

[Sidenote: Hannibal draws on Minucius.]

+104.+ Partly from observing what was taking place, and partly from the
information of prisoners, Hannibal knew of the mutual jealousy of the
two generals, and the impetuosity and ambition of Minucius. Looking
upon what was happening in the enemy’s camp as rather in his favour
than otherwise, he set himself to deal with Minucius; being anxious
to put an end to his bold methods and check in time his adventurous
spirit. There being then an elevation between his camp and that of
Minucius, which might prove dangerous to either, he resolved to occupy
it; and, knowing full well that, elated by his previous success,
Minucius would be certain to move out at once to oppose his design, he
concerted the following plan. The country round the hill being bare of
trees, but having much broken ground and hollows of every description,
he despatched some men during the night, in bodies of two and three
hundred, to occupy the most favourable positions, numbering in all five
hundred horse and five thousand light-armed and other infantry: and in
order that they might not be observed in the morning by the enemy’s
foraging parties, he seized the hill at daybreak with his light-armed
troops. When Marcus saw what was taking place, he looked upon it as
an excellent opportunity; and immediately despatched his light-armed
troops, with orders to engage the enemy and contest the possession of
the position; after these he sent his cavalry, and close behind them
he led his heavy-armed troops in person, as on the former occasion,
intending to repeat exactly the same manœuvres.

[Sidenote: Fabius comes to the rescue.]

+105.+ As the day broke, and the thoughts and eyes of all were
engrossed in observing the combatants on the hill, the Romans had no
suspicion of the troops lying in ambush. But as Hannibal kept pouring
in reinforcements for his men on the hill, and followed close behind
them himself with his cavalry and main body, it was not long before
the cavalry also of both sides were engaged. The result was that the
Roman light-armed troops, finding themselves hard pressed by the
numbers of the cavalry, caused great confusion among the heavy-armed
troops by retreating into their lines; and the signal being given at
the same time to those who were in ambush, these latter suddenly showed
themselves and charged: whereby not only the Roman light-armed troops,
but their whole army, were in the greatest danger. At that moment
Fabius, seeing what was taking place, and being alarmed lest they
should sustain a complete defeat, led out his forces with all speed
and came to the relief of his imperilled comrades. At his approach
the Romans quickly recovered their courage; and though their lines
were entirely broken up, they rallied again round their standards,
and retired under cover of the army of Fabius, with a severe loss in
the light-armed division, and a still heavier one in the ranks of the
legions, and that too of the bravest men. Alarmed at the freshness and
perfect order of the relieving army, Hannibal retired from the pursuit
and ceased fighting. To those who were actually engaged it was quite
clear that an utter defeat had been brought about by the rashness of
Minucius, and that their safety on this and previous occasions had been
secured by the caution of Fabius; while those at home had a clear and
indisputable demonstration of the difference between the rashness and
bravado of a soldier, and the far-seeing prudence and cool calculation
of a general. Taught by experience the Romans joined camps once more,
and for the future listened to Fabius and obeyed his orders: while the
Carthaginians dug a trench across the space between the knoll and their
own lines, and threw up a palisade round the crest of the captured
hill; and, having placed a guard upon it, proceeded thenceforth with
their preparations for the winter unmolested.

[Sidenote: B.C. 216. Coss. G. Terentius Varro and L. Aemilius Paulus.]

+106.+ The Consular elections being now come, the Romans elected Lucius
Aemilius and Gaius Terentius. On their appointment the Dictators laid
down their offices, and the Consuls of the previous year, Gnaeus
Servilius and Marcus Regulus—who had been appointed after the death
of Flaminius,—were invested with proconsular authority by Aemilius;
and, taking the command at the seat of war, administered the affairs
of the army independently. Meanwhile Aemilius, in consultation with
the Senate, set at once to work to levy new soldiers, to fill up the
numbers of the legions required for the campaign, and despatched them
to headquarters; enjoining at the same time upon Servilius that he
should by no means hazard a general engagement, but contrive detailed
skirmishes, as sharp and as frequent as he could, for the sake of
practising the raw recruits, and giving them courage for a pitched
battle: for they held the opinion that their former defeats were owing,
as much as anything else, to the fact that they were employing troops
newly levied and entirely untrained. The Senate also sent the Praetor
Lucius Postumius into Gaul, to affect a diversion there, and induce the
Celts who were with Hannibal to return home. They also took measures
for recalling the fleet that had wintered at Lilybaeum, and for sending
to the commanders in Iberia such supplies as were necessary for the
service. Thus the Consul and Senate were busied with these and other
preparations for the campaign; and Servilius, having received his
instructions from the Consuls, carried them out in every particular.
The details of this part of the campaign, therefore, I shall omit to
record; for nothing of importance or worth remembering occurred, partly
in consequence of these instructions, and partly from circumstances;
but there were a considerable number of skirmishes and petty
engagements, in which the Roman commanders gained a high reputation for
courage and prudence.

[Sidenote: Autumn, B.C. 216.]

[Sidenote: The Senate order a battle.]

+107.+ Thus through all that winter and spring the two armies remained
encamped facing each other. But when the season for the new harvest was
come, Hannibal began to move from the camp at Geronium; and making up
his mind that it would be to his advantage to force the enemy by any
possible means to give him battle, he occupied the citadel of a town
called Cannae, into which the corn and other supplies from the district
round Canusium were collected by the Romans, and conveyed thence to the
camp as occasion required. The town itself, indeed, had been reduced to
ruins the year before: but the capture of its citadel and the material
of war contained in it, caused great commotion in the Roman army;
for it was not only the loss of the place and the stores in it that
distressed them, but the fact also that it commanded the surrounding
district. They therefore sent frequent messages to Rome asking for
instructions: for if they approached the enemy they would not be able
to avoid an engagement, in view of the fact that the country was being
plundered, and the allies all in a state of excitement. The Senate
passed a resolution that they should give the enemy battle: they,
however, bade Gnaeus Servilius wait, and despatched the Consuls to the
seat of war. It was to Aemilius that all eyes turned, and on him the
most confident hopes were fixed; for his life had been a noble one, and
he was thought to have managed the recent Illyrian war with advantage
to the State. The Senate determined to bring eight legions into the
field, which had never been done at Rome before, each legion consisting
of five thousand men besides allies. For the Romans, as I have stated
before,[198] habitually enrol four legions each year, each consisting
of about four thousand foot and two hundred horse; and when any unusual
necessity arises, they raise the number of foot to five thousand and of
the horse to three hundred. Of allies, the number in each legion is the
same as that of the citizens, but of the horse three times as great. Of
the four legions thus composed, they assign two to each of the Consuls
for whatever service is going on. Most of their wars are decided by one
Consul and two legions, with their quota of allies; and they rarely
employ all four at one time and on one service. But on this occasion,
so great was the alarm and terror of what would happen, they resolved
to bring not only four but eight legions into the field.

[Sidenote: The Consuls Aemilius Paulus, and Terentius Varro go to the
seat of war.]

[Sidenote: Speech of Aemilius.]

+108.+ With earnest words of exhortation, therefore, to Aemilius,
putting before him the gravity in every point of view of the result of
the battle, they despatched him with instructions to seek a favourable
opportunity to fight a decisive battle with a courage worthy of Rome.
Having arrived at the camp and united their forces, they made known
the will of the Senate to the soldiers, and Aemilius exhorted them
to do their duty in terms which evidently came from his heart. He
addressed himself especially to explain and excuse the reverses which
they had lately experienced; for it was on this point particularly
that the soldiers were depressed and stood in need of encouragement.
“The causes,” he argued, “of their defeats in former battles were
many, and could not be reduced to one or two. But those causes were at
an end; and no excuse existed now, if they only showed themselves to
be men of courage, for not conquering their enemies. Up to that time
both Consuls had never been engaged together, or employed thoroughly
trained soldiers: the combatants on the contrary had been raw levies,
entirely unexperienced in danger; and what was most important of all,
they had been so entirely ignorant of their opponents, that they had
been brought into the field, and engaged in a pitched battle with an
enemy that they had never once set eyes on. Those who had been defeated
on the Trebia were drawn up on the field at daybreak, on the very next
morning after their arrival from Sicily; while those who had fought in
Etruria, not only had never seen the enemy before, but did not do so
even during the very battle itself, owing to the unfortunate state of
the atmosphere.

+109.+ But now the conditions were quite different. For in the first
place both Consuls were with the army: and were not only prepared to
share the danger themselves, but had also induced the Consuls of the
previous year to remain and take part in the struggle. While the men
had not only seen the arms, order, and numbers of the enemy, but had
been engaged in almost daily fights with them for the last two years.
The conditions therefore under which the two former battles were fought
being quite different, it was but natural that the result of the coming
struggle should be different too. For it would be strange or rather
impossible that those who in various skirmishes, where the numbers of
either side were equal, had for the most part come off victorious,
should, when drawn up all together, and nearly double of the enemy in
number, be defeated.”

“Wherefore, men of the army,” he continued, “seeing that we have every
advantage on our side for securing a victory, there is only one thing
necessary—your determination, your zeal! And I do not think I need say
more to you on that point. To men serving others for pay, or to those
who fight as allies on behalf of others, who have no greater danger to
expect than meets them on the field, and for whom the issues at stake
are of little importance,—such men may need words of exhortation. But
men who, like you, are fighting not for others, but themselves,—for
country, wives, and children; and for whom the issue is of far more
momentous consequence than the mere danger of the hour, need only to
be reminded: require no exhortation. For who is there among you who
would not wish if possible to be victorious; and next, if that may not
be, to die with arms in his hands, rather than to live and see the
outrage and death of those dear objects which I have named? Wherefore,
men of the army, apart from any words of mine, place before your eyes
the momentous difference to you between victory and defeat, and all
their consequences. Enter upon this battle with the full conviction,
that in it your country is not risking a certain number of legions,
but her bare existence. For she has nothing to add to such an army as
this, to give her victory, if the day now goes against us. All she
has of confidence and strength rests on you; all her hopes of safety
are in your hands. Do not frustrate those hopes: but pay back to your
country the gratitude you owe her; and make it clear to all the world
that the former reverses occurred, not because the Romans are worse men
than the Carthaginians, but from the lack of experience on the part
of those who were then fighting, and through a combination of adverse
circumstances.” With such words Aemilius dismissed the troops.

[Sidenote: The Roman army approaches Cannae.]

[Sidenote: Terentius Varro orders an advance.]

[Sidenote: The Romans are successful.]

+110.+ Next morning the two Consuls broke up their camp, and advanced
to where they heard that the enemy were entrenched. On the second day
they arrived within sight of them, and pitched their camp at about
fifty stades’ distance. But when Aemilius observed that the ground
was flat and bare for some distance round, he said that they must not
engage there with an enemy superior to them in cavalry; but that they
must rather try to draw him off, and lead him to ground on which the
battle would be more in the hands of the infantry. But Gaius Terentius
being, from inexperience, of a contrary opinion, there was a dispute
and misunderstanding between the leaders, which of all things is the
most dangerous. It is the custom, when the two Consuls are present,
that they should take the chief command on alternate days; and the next
day happening to be the turn of Terentius, he ordered an advance with
a view of approaching the enemy, in spite of the protests and active
opposition of his colleague. Hannibal set his light-armed troops and
cavalry in motion to meet him, and charging the Romans while they were
still marching, took them by surprise and caused a great confusion in
their ranks. The Romans repulsed the first charge by putting some of
their heavy-armed in front; and then sending forward their light-armed
and cavalry, began to get the best of the fight all along the line:
the Carthaginians having no reserves of any importance, while certain
companies of the legionaries were mixed with the Roman light-armed,
and helped to sustain the battle. Nightfall for the present put an
end to a struggle which had not at all answered to the hopes of the
Carthaginians. But next day Aemilius, not thinking it right to engage,
and yet being unable any longer to lead off his army, encamped with
two-thirds of it on the banks of the Aufidus, the only river which
flows right through the Apennines,—that chain of mountains which forms
the watershed of all the Italian rivers, which flow either west to the
Tuscan sea, or east to the Hadriatic. This chain is, I say, pierced by
the Aufidus, which rises on the side of Italy nearest the Tuscan Sea,
and is discharged into the Hadriatic. For the other third of his army
he caused a camp to be made across the river, to the east of the ford,
about ten stades from his own lines, and a little more from those of
the enemy; that these men, being on the other side of the river, might
protect his own foraging parties, and threaten those of the enemy.

[Sidenote: Hannibal harangues his troops.]

+111.+ Then Hannibal, seeing that his circumstances called for a battle
with the enemy, being anxious lest his troops should be depressed by
their previous reverse, and believing that it was an occasion which
required some encouraging words, summoned a general meeting of his
soldiers. When they were assembled, he bid them all look round upon
the country, and asked them, “What better fortune they could have
asked from the gods, if they had had the choice, than to fight in such
ground as they saw there, with the vast superiority of cavalry on their
side?” And when all signified their acquiescence in such an evident
truth, he added: “First, then, give thanks to the gods: for they have
brought the enemy into this country, because they designed the victory
for us. And, next to me, for having compelled the enemy to fight,—for
they cannot avoid it any longer,—and to fight in a place so full of
advantages for us. But I do not think it becoming in me now to use many
words in exhorting you to be brave and forward in this battle. When
you had had no experience of fighting the Romans this was necessary,
and I did then suggest many arguments and examples to you. But now
seeing that you have undeniably beaten the Romans in three successive
battles of such magnitude, what arguments could have greater influence
with you in confirming your courage than the actual facts? Now, by
your previous battles you have got possession of the country and all
its wealth; in accordance with my promises: for I have been absolutely
true in everything I have ever said to you. But the present contest is
for the cities and the wealth in them: and if you win it, all Italy
will at once be in your power; and freed from your present hard toils,
and masters of the wealth of Rome, you will by this battle become the
leaders and lords of the world. This, then, is a time for deeds, not
words: for by God’s blessing I am persuaded that I shall carry out my
promises to you forthwith.” His words were received with approving
shouts, which he acknowledged with gratitude for their zeal; and having
dismissed the assembly, he at once formed a camp on the same bank of
the river as that on which was the larger camp of the Romans.

[Sidenote: Hannibal irritates the enemy.]

+112.+ Next day he gave orders that all should employ themselves in
making preparations and getting themselves into a fit state of body.
On the day after that he drew out his men along the bank of the river,
and showed that he was eager to give the enemy battle. But Aemilius,
dissatisfied with his position, and seeing that the Carthaginians would
soon be obliged to shift their quarters for the sake of supplies, kept
quiet in his camps, strengthening both with extra guards. After waiting
a considerable time, when no one came out to attack him, Hannibal
put the rest of the army into camp again, but sent out his Numidian
horse to attack the enemy’s water parties from the lesser camp. These
horsemen riding right up to the lines and preventing the watering,
Gaius Terentius became more than ever inflamed with the desire of
fighting, and the soldiers were eager for a battle, and chafed at the
delay. For there is nothing more intolerable to mankind than suspense;
when a thing is once decided, men can but endure whatever out of the
catalogue of evils it is their misfortune to undergo.

[Sidenote: Anxiety at Rome.]

But when the news arrived at Rome that the two armies were face to
face, and that skirmishes between advanced parties of both sides were
daily taking place, the city was in a state of high excitement and
uneasiness; the people dreading the result owing to the disasters
which had now befallen them on more than one occasion; and foreseeing
and anticipating in their imaginations what would happen if they were
utterly defeated. All the oracles preserved at Rome were in everybody’s
mouth; and every temple and house was full of prodigies and miracles:
in consequence of which the city was one scene of vows, sacrifices,
supplicatory processions, and prayers. For the Romans in times of
danger take extraordinary pains to appease gods and men, and look upon
no ceremony of that kind in such times as unbecoming or beneath their
dignity.

[Sidenote: Dispositions for the battle of Cannae.]

+113.+ When he took over the command on the following day, as soon as
the sun was above the horizon, Gaius Terentius got the army in motion
from both the camps. Those from the larger camp he drew up in order
of battle, as soon as he had got them across the river, and bringing
up those of the smaller camp he placed them all in the same line,
selecting the south as the aspect of the whole. The Roman horse he
stationed on the right wing along the river, and their foot next them
in the same line, placing the maniples, however, closer together than
usual, and making the depth of each maniple several times greater than
its front. The cavalry of the allies he stationed on the left wing,
and the light-armed troops he placed slightly in advance of the whole
army, which amounted with its allies to eighty thousand infantry and a
little more than six thousand horse. At the same time Hannibal brought
his Balearic slingers and spearmen across the river, and stationed
them in advance of his main body; which he led out of their camp, and,
getting them across the river at two spots, drew them up opposite the
enemy. On his left wing, close to the river, he stationed the Iberian
and Celtic horse opposite the Roman cavalry; and next to them half
the Libyan heavy-armed foot; and next to them the Iberian and Celtic
foot; next, the other half of the Libyans, and, on the right wing, the
Numidian horse. Having now got them all into line he advanced with
the central companies of the Iberians and Celts; and so arranged the
other companies next these in regular gradations, that the whole line
became crescent-shaped, diminishing in depth towards its extremities:
his object being to have his Libyans as a reserve in the battle, and to
commence the action with his Iberians and Celts.

+114.+ The armour of the Libyans was Roman, for Hannibal had armed
them with a selection of the spoils taken in previous battles. The
shield of the Iberians and Celts was about the same size, but their
swords were quite different. For that of the Roman can thrust with as
deadly effects as it can cut, while the Gallic sword can only cut, and
that requires some room. And the companies coming alternately,—the
naked Celts, and the Iberians with their short linen tunics bordered
with purple stripes, the whole appearance of the line was strange and
terrifying. The whole strength of the Carthaginian cavalry was ten
thousand, but that of their foot was not more than forty thousand,
including the Celts. Aemilius commanded on the Roman right, Gaius
Terentius on the left, Marcus Atilius and Gnaeus Servilius, the Consuls
of the previous year, on the centre. The left of the Carthaginians was
commanded by Hasdrubal, the right by Hanno, the centre by Hannibal in
person, attended by his brother Mago. And as the Roman line faced the
south, as I said before, and the Carthaginian the north, the rays of
the rising sun did not inconvenience either of them.

[Sidenote: The Battle, 2d August, B.C. 216.]

[Sidenote: The Romans outflanked by the cavalry.]

+115.+ The battle was begun by an engagement between the advanced guard
of the two armies; and at first the affair between these light-armed
troops was indecisive. But as soon as the Iberian and Celtic cavalry
got at the Romans, the battle began in earnest, and in the true
barbaric fashion: for there was none of the usual formal advance and
retreat; but when they once got to close quarters, they grappled man to
man, and, dismounting from their horses, fought on foot. But when the
Carthaginians had got the upper hand in this encounter and killed most
of their opponents on the ground,— because the Romans all maintained
the fight with spirit and determination,—and began chasing the
remainder along the river, slaying as they went and giving no quarter;
then the legionaries took the place of the light-armed and closed with
the enemy. For a short time the Iberian and Celtic lines stood their
ground and fought gallantly; but, presently overpowered by the weight
of the heavy-armed lines, they gave way and retired to the rear, thus
breaking up the crescent. The Roman maniples followed with spirit, and
easily cut their way through the enemy’s line; since the Celts had been
drawn up in a thin line, while the Romans had closed up from the wings
towards the centre and the point of danger. For the two wings did not
come into action at the same time as the centre: but the centre was
first engaged, because the Gauls, having been stationed on the arc of
the crescent, had come into contact with the enemy long before the
wings, the convex of the crescent being towards the enemy. The Romans,
however, going in pursuit of these troops, and hastily closing in
towards the centre and the part of the enemy which was giving ground,
advanced so far, that the Libyan heavy-armed troops on either wing got
on their flanks. Those on the right, facing to the left, charged from
the right upon the Roman flank; while those who were on the left wing
faced to the right, and, dressing by the left, charged their right
flank,[199] the exigency of the moment suggesting to them what they
ought to do. Thus it came about, as Hannibal had planned, that the
Romans were caught between two hostile lines of Libyans—thanks to their
impetuous pursuit of the Celts. Still they fought, though no longer in
line, yet singly, or in maniples, which faced about to meet those who
charged them on the flanks.

[Sidenote: Fall of Aemilius Paulus.]

+116.+ Though he had been from the first on the right wing, and had
taken part in the cavalry engagement, Lucius Aemilius still survived.
Determined to act up to his own exhortatory speech, and seeing that
the decision of the battle rested mainly on the legionaries, riding up
to the centre of the line he led the charge himself, and personally
grappled with the enemy, at the same time cheering on and exhorting
his soldiers to the charge. Hannibal, on the other side, did the same,
for he too had taken his place on the centre from the commencement.
The Numidian horse on the Carthaginian right were meanwhile charging
the cavalry on the Roman left; and though, from the peculiar nature
of their mode of fighting, they neither inflicted nor received much
harm, they yet rendered the enemy’s horse useless by keeping them
occupied, and charging them first on one side and then on another. But
when Hasdrubal, after all but annihilating the cavalry by the river,
came from the left to the support of the Numidians, the Roman allied
cavalry, seeing his charge approaching, broke and fled. At that point
Hasdrubal appears to have acted with great skill and discretion.
Seeing the Numidians to be strong in numbers, and more effective and
formidable to troops that had once been forced from their ground, he
left the pursuit to them; while he himself hastened to the part of
the field where the infantry were engaged, and brought his men up to
support the Libyans. Then, by charging the Roman legions on the rear,
and harassing them by hurling squadron after squadron upon them at many
points at once, he raised the spirits of the Libyans, and dismayed
and depressed those of the Romans. It was at this point that Lucius
Aemilius fell, in the thick of the fight, covered with wounds: a man
who did his duty to his country at that last hour of his life, as he
had throughout its previous years, if any man ever did.[200] As long as
the Romans could keep an unbroken front, to turn first in one direction
and then in another to meet the assaults of the enemy, they held out;
but the outer files of the circle continually falling, and the circle
becoming more and more contracted, they at last were all killed on the
field, and among them Marcus Atilius and Gnaeus Servilius, the Consuls
of the previous year, who had shown themselves brave men and worthy of
Rome in the battle. While this struggle and carnage were going on, the
Numidian horse were pursuing the fugitives, most of whom they cut down
or hurled from their horses; but some few escaped into Venusia, among
whom was Gaius Terentius, the Consul, who thus sought a flight, as
disgraceful to himself, as his conduct in office had been disastrous to
his country.

+117.+ Such was the end of the battle of Cannae, in which both sides
fought with the most conspicuous gallantry, the conquered no less
than the conquerors. This is proved by the fact that, out of six
thousand horse, only seventy escaped with Gaius Terentius to Venusia,
and about three hundred of the allied cavalry to various towns in
the neighbourhood. Of the infantry ten thousand were taken prisoners
in fair fight, but were not actually engaged in the battle: of those
who were actually engaged only about three thousand perhaps escaped
to the towns of the surrounding district, all the rest died nobly,
to the number of seventy thousand, the Carthaginians being on this
occasion, as on previous ones, mainly indebted for their victory to
their superiority in cavalry: a lesson to posterity that in actual war
it is better to have half the number of infantry, and the superiority
in cavalry, than to engage your enemy with an equality in both. On
the side of Hannibal there fell four thousand Celts, fifteen hundred
Iberians and Libyans, and about two hundred horse.

[Sidenote: Losses of the Romans.]

The ten thousand Romans who were captured had not, as I said, been
engaged in the actual battle; and the reason was this. Lucius Aemilius
left ten thousand infantry in his camp that, in case Hannibal should
disregard the safety of his own camp, and take his whole army on to the
field, they might seize the opportunity, while the battle was going on,
of forcing their way in and capturing the enemy’s baggage; or if, on
the other hand, Hannibal should, in view of this contingency, leave a
guard in his camp, the number of the enemy in the field might thereby
be diminished. These men were captured in the following circumstances.
Hannibal, as a matter of fact, did leave a sufficient guard in his
camp; and as soon as the battle began, the Romans, according to their
instructions, assaulted and tried to take those thus left by Hannibal.
At first they held their own: but just as they were beginning to waver,
Hannibal, who was by this time gaining a victory all along the line,
came to their relief, and routing the Romans, shut them up in their own
camp; killed two thousand of them; and took all the rest prisoners.
In like manner the Numidian horse brought in all those who had taken
refuge in the various strongholds about the district, amounting to two
thousand of the routed cavalry.

[Sidenote: The results of the battle. Defection of the allies.]

+118.+ The result of this battle, such as I have described it, had the
consequences which both sides expected. For the Carthaginians by their
victory were thenceforth masters of nearly the whole of the Italian
coast which is called _Magna Graecia_. Thus the Tarentines immediately
submitted; and the Arpani and some of the Campanian states invited
Hannibal to come to them; and the rest were with one consent turning
their eyes to the Carthaginians: who, accordingly, began now to have
high hopes of being able to carry even Rome itself by assault.

[Sidenote: Fall of Lucius Postumius in Gaul. See _supra_, ch. 106.]

On their side the Romans, after this disaster, despaired of retaining
their supremacy over the Italians, and were in the greatest alarm,
believing their own lives and the existence of their city to be in
danger, and every moment expecting that Hannibal would be upon them.
For, as though Fortune were in league with the disasters that had
already befallen them to fill up the measure of their ruin, it happened
that only a few days afterwards, while the city was still in this
panic, the Praetor who had been sent to Gaul fell unexpectedly into an
ambush and perished, and his army was utterly annihilated by the Celts.
In spite of all, however, the Senate left no means untried to save the
State. It exhorted the people to fresh exertions, strengthened the
city with guards, and deliberated on the crisis in a brave and manly
spirit. And subsequent events made this manifest. For though the Romans
were on that occasion indisputably beaten in the field, and had lost
reputation for military prowess; by the peculiar excellence of their
political constitution, and the prudence of their counsels, they not
only recovered their supremacy over Italy, by eventually conquering the
Carthaginians, but before very long became masters of the whole world.

[Sidenote: B.C. 216.]

I shall, therefore, end this book at this point, having now recounted
the events in Iberia and Italy, embraced by the 140th Olympiad. When
I have arrived at the same period in my history of Greece during this
Olympiad, I shall then fulfil my promise of devoting a book to a
formal account of the Roman constitution itself; for I think that a
description of it will not only be germane to the matter of my history,
but will also be of great help to practical statesmen, as well as
students, either in reforming or establishing other constitutions.




BOOK IV


[Sidenote: B.C. 220-216.]

+1.+ In my former book I explained the causes of the second war between
Rome and Carthage; and described Hannibal’s invasion of Italy, and the
engagements which took place between them up to the battle of Cannae,
on the banks of the Aufidus. I shall now take up the history of Greece
during the same period, ending at the same date, and commencing from
the 140th Olympiad. But I shall first recall to the recollection of my
readers what I stated in my second book on the subject of the Greeks,
and especially of the Achaeans; for the league of the latter has made
extraordinary progress up to our own age and the generation immediately
preceding.

[Sidenote: Recapitulation of Achaean history, before B.C. 220,
contained in Book II., cc. 41-71.]

[Sidenote: Ending with the deaths of Antigonus Doson, Seleucus
Ceraunus, and Ptolemy Euergetes, before the 140th Olympiad, B.C.
220-216.]

I started, then, from Tisamenus, one of the sons of Orestes, and
stated that the dynasty existed from his time to that of Ogygus: that
then there was an excellent form of democratical federal government
established: and that then the league was broken up by the kings of
Sparta into separate towns and villages. Then I tried to describe how
these towns began to form a league once more: which were the first to
join; and the policy subsequently pursued, which led to their inducing
all the Peloponnesians to adopt the general title of Achaeans, and to
be united under one federal government. Descending to particulars,
I brought my story up to the flight of Cleomenes, King of Sparta:
then briefly summarising the events included in my prefatory sketch
up to the deaths of Antigonus Doson, Seleucus Ceraunus, and Ptolemy
Euergetes, who all three died at about the same time, I announced that
my main history was to begin from that point.

[Sidenote: Reasons for starting from this point. (1.) The fact that the
history of Aratus ends at that point. (2.) The possibility of getting
good evidence. (3.) The changes in the various governments in the 139th
Olympiad. B.C. 224-220.]

+2.+ I thought this was the best point; first, because it is there that
Aratus leaves off, and I meant my work, as far as it was Greek history,
to be a continuation of his; and, secondly, because the period thus
embraced in my history would fall partly in the life of my father, and
partly in my own; and thus I should be able to speak as eye-witness
of some of the events, and from the information of eye-witnesses of
others. To go further back and write the report of a report, traditions
at second or third hand, seemed to me unsatisfactory either with a
view to giving clear impressions or making sound statements. But,
above all, I began at this period because it was then that the history
of the whole world entered on a new phase. Philip, son of Demetrius,
had just become the boy king of Macedonia; Achaeus, prince of Asia on
this side of Taurus, had converted his show of power into a reality;
Antiochus the Great had, a short time before, by the death of his
brother Seleucus, succeeded while quite a young man to the throne of
Syria; Ariarathes to that of Cappadocia; and Ptolemy Philopator to that
of Egypt. Not long afterwards Lycurgus became King of Sparta, and the
Carthaginians had recently elected Hannibal general to carry on the
war lately described. Every government therefore being changed about
this time, there seemed every likelihood of a new departure in policy:
which is but natural and usual, and in fact did at this time occur. For
the Romans and Carthaginians entered upon the war I have described;
Antiochus and Ptolemy on one for the possession of Coele-Syria; and the
Achaeans and Philip one against the Aetolians and Lacedaemonians. The
causes of this last war must now be stated.

[Sidenote: The Aetolians.]

+3.+ The Aetolians had long been discontented with a state of peace and
tired at living at their own charges; for they were accustomed to live
on their neighbours, and their natural ostentation required abundant
means to support it. Enslaved by this passion they live a life as
predatory as that of wild beasts, respecting no tie of friendship and
regarding every one as an enemy to be plundered.

[Sidenote: B.C. 222.]

Hitherto, however, as long as Antigonus Doson was alive, their fear
of the Macedonians had kept them quiet. But when he was succeeded at
his death by the boy Philip, they conceived a contempt for the royal
power, and at once began to look out for a pretext and opportunity
for interfering in the Peloponnese: induced partly by an old habit of
getting plunder from that country, and partly by the belief that, now
the Achaeans were unsupported by Macedonia, they would be a match for
them. While their thoughts were fixed on this, chance to a certain
extent contributed to give them the opportunity which they desired.

[Sidenote: The raids of Dorimachus in Messenia.]

There was a certain man of Trichonium[201] named Dorimachus, son of
that Nicostratus who made the treacherous attack on the Pan-Boeotian
congress.[202] This Dorimachus, being young and inspired with the
true spirit of Aetolian violence and aggressiveness, was sent by the
state to Phigalea in the Peloponnese, which, being on the borders of
Arcadia and Messenia, happened at that time to be in political union
with the Aetolian league. His mission was nominally to guard the city
and territory of Phigalea, but in fact to act as a spy on the politics
of the Peloponnese. A crowd of pirates flocked to him at Phigalea;
and being unable to get them any booty by fair means, because the
peace between all Greeks which Antigonus had concluded was still in
force, he was finally reduced to allowing the pirates to drive off the
cattle of the Messenians, though they were friends and allies of the
Aetolians. These injurious acts were at first confined to the sheep on
the border lands; but becoming more and more reckless and audacious,
they even ventured to break into the farm-houses by sudden attacks at
night. The Messenians were naturally indignant, and sent embassies to
Dorimachus; which he at first disregarded, because he wanted not only
to benefit the men under him, but himself also, by getting a share
in their spoils. But when the arrival of such embassies became more
and more frequent, owing to the perpetual recurrence of these acts of
depredation, he said at last that he would come in person to Messene,
and decide on the claims they had to make against the Aetolians.
When he came, however, and the sufferers appeared, he laughed at
some, threatened to strike others, and drove others away with abusive
language.

[Sidenote: Dorimachus leaves Messene.]

+4.+ Even while he was actually in Messene, the pirates came close to
the city walls in the night, and by means of scaling-ladders broke
into a country-house called Chiron’s villa; killed all the slaves who
resisted them; and having bound the others, took them and the cattle
away with them. The Messenian Ephors had long been much annoyed by
what was going on, and by the presence of Dorimachus in their town;
but this they thought was too insolent: and they accordingly summoned
him to appear before the assembled magistrates. There Sciron, who
happened to be an Ephor at the time, and enjoyed a high reputation for
integrity among his fellow-citizens, advised that they should not allow
Dorimachus to leave the city, until he had made good all the losses
sustained by the Messenians, and had given up the guilty persons to
be punished for the murders committed. This suggestion being received
with unanimous approval, as but just, Dorimachus passionately exclaimed
that “they were fools if they imagined that they were now insulting
only Dorimachus, and not the Aetolian league.” In fact he expressed the
greatest indignation at the whole affair, and said that “they would
meet with a public punishment, which would serve them well right.” Now
there was at that time in Messene a man of disgraceful and effeminate
character named Babyrtas, who was so exactly like Dorimachus in voice
and person, that, when he was dressed in Dorimachus’s sun-hat and
cloak, it was impossible to tell them apart; and of this Dorimachus was
perfectly aware. When therefore he was speaking in these threatening
and insolent tones to the Messenian magistrates, Sciron lost his temper
and said “Do you think we care for you or your threats, _Babyrtas_?”
After this Dorimachus was compelled for the present to yield to
circumstances, and to give satisfaction for the injuries inflicted
upon the Messenians: but when he returned to Aetolia, he nursed such a
bitter and furious feeling of anger at this taunt, that, without any
other reasonable pretext, but for this cause and this alone, he got up
a war against the Messenians.

[Sidenote: Dorimachus becomes practically Strategus of Aetolia, B.C.
221.]

[Sidenote: He induces Scopas to go to war with Messenia, Epirus,
Achaia, Acarnania, and Macedonia.]

+5.+ The Strategus of the Aetolians at that time was Ariston; but
being from physical infirmities unable to serve in the field, and
being a kinsman of Dorimachus and Scopas, he had somehow or another
surrendered his whole authority to the former. In his public capacity
Dorimachus could not venture to urge the Aetolians to undertake the
Messenian war, because he had no reasonable pretext for so doing:
the origin of his wish being, as everybody well knew, the wrongs
committed by himself and the bitter gibe which they had brought upon
him. He therefore gave up the idea of publicly advocating the war, but
tried privately to induce Scopas to join in the intrigue against the
Messenians: He pointed out that there was now no danger from the side
of Macedonia owing to the youth of the king (Philip being then only
seventeen years old); that the Lacedaemonians were alienated from the
Messenians; and that they possessed the affection and alliance of the
Eleans; and these circumstances taken together would make an invasion
of Messenia perfectly safe. But the argument most truly Aetolian which
he used was to put before him that a great booty was to be got from
Messenia, because it was entirely unguarded, and had alone, of all the
Peloponnesian districts, remained unravaged throughout the Cleomenic
war. And, to sum up all, he argued that such a move would secure them
great popularity with the Aetolians generally. And if the Achaeans were
to try to hinder their march through the country, they would not be
able to complain if they retaliated: and if, on the other hand, they
did not stir, would be no hindrance to their enterprise. Besides, he
affirmed that they would have plenty of pretext against the Messenians;
for they had long been in the position of aggressors by promising the
Achaeans and Macedonians to join their alliance.

By these, and similar arguments to the same effect, he roused such
a strong feeling in the minds of Scopas and his friends, that,
without waiting for a meeting of the Aetolian federal assembly, and
without communicating with the Apocleti or taking any of the proper
constitutional steps, of their own mere impulse and opinion they
committed acts of hostility simultaneously against Messenia, Epirus,
Achaia, Acarnania, and Macedonia.

[Sidenote: Acts of hostility against Macedonia,]

[Sidenote: Epirus, and Acarnania.]

+6.+ By sea they immediately sent out privateers, who, falling in
with a royal vessel of Macedonia near Cythera, brought it with all
its crew to Aetolia, and sold ship-owners, sailors, and marines, and
finally the ship itself. Then they began sacking the seaboard of
Epirus, employing the aid of some Cephallenian ships for carrying out
this act of violence. They tried also to capture Thyrium in Acarnania.
At the same time they secretly sent some men to seize a strong place
called Clarium, in the centre of the territory of Megalopolis; which
they used thenceforth as a place of sale for their spoils, and a
starting place for their marauding expeditions. However Timoxenus, the
Achaean Strategus, with the assistance of Taurion, who had been left
by Antigonus in charge of the Macedonian interests in the Peloponnese,
took the place after a siege of a very few days. For Antigonus retained
Corinth, in accordance with his convention with the Achaeans, made at
the time of the Cleomenic war;[203] and had never restored Orchomenus
to the Achaeans after he had taken it by force, but claimed and
retained it in his own hands; with the view, as I suppose, not only of
commanding the entrance of the Peloponnese, but of guarding also its
interior by means of his garrison and warlike apparatus in Orchomenus.

[Sidenote: Before midsummer B.C. 220. Invasion of Messenia by
Dorimachus and Scopas.]

Dorimachus and Scopas waited until Timoxenus had a very short time of
office left, and when Aratus, though elected by the Achaeans for the
coming year, would not yet be in office;[204] and then collecting a
general levy of Aetolians at Rhium, and preparing means of transport,
with some Cephallenian ships ready to convoy them, they got their
men across to the Peloponnese, and led them against Messenia. While
marching through the territories of Patrae, Pharae, and Tritaea they
pretended that they did not wish to do any injury to the Achaeans;
but their forces, from their inveterate passion for plunder, could
not be restrained from robbing the country; and consequently they
committed outrages and acts of violence all along their line of march,
till they arrived at Phigalea. Thence, by a bold and sudden movement,
they entered Messenia; and without any regard for their ancient
friendship and alliance with the Messenians, or for the principles
of international justice common to all mankind, subordinating every
consideration to their selfish greed, they set about plundering the
country without resistance, the Messenians being absolutely afraid to
come out to attack them.

[Sidenote: The Achaean league decide to assist the Messenians.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 222-221.]

[Sidenote: Aratus becomes Strategus of the Achaean league, B.C. 220
(May-June).]

+7.+ This being the time, according to their laws, for the meeting
of the Achaean federal assembly, the members arrived at Aegium. When
the assembly met, the deputies from Patrae and Pharae made a formal
statement of the injuries inflicted upon their territories during the
passage of the Aetolians: an embassy from Messenia also appeared,
begging for their assistance on the ground that the treatment from
which they were suffering was unjust and in defiance of treaty.
When these statements were heard, great indignation was felt at the
wrongs of Patrae and Pharae, and great sympathy for the misfortunes
of the Messenians. But it was regarded as especially outrageous that
the Aetolians should have ventured to enter Achaia with an army,
contrary to treaty, without obtaining or even asking for permission
from any one to pass through the country. Roused to indignation by
all these considerations, the assembly voted to give assistance to
the Messenians: that the Strategus should summon a general levy of
the Achaean arms: and that whatever was decided by this levy, when it
met, should be done. Now Timoxenus, the existing Strategus, was just
on the point of quitting office, and felt besides small confidence
in the Achaeans, because martial exercise had been allowed to fall
into neglect among them; he therefore shrank from undertaking the
expedition, or from even summoning the popular levy. The fact was that,
after the expulsion of Cleomenes, King of Sparta, the Peloponnesians,
weary of the wars that had taken place, and trusting to the peaceful
arrangement that had been come to, neglected all warlike preparations.
Aratus, however, indignant and incensed at the audacity of the
Aetolians, was not inclined to take things so calmly, for he had in
fact a grudge of long standing against these people. Wherefore he
was for instantly summoning the Achaeans to an armed levy, and was
all eagerness to attack the Aetolians. Eventually he took over from
Timoxenus the seal of the league, five days before the proper time,
and wrote to the various cities summoning a meeting in arms of all
those who were of the military age, at Megalopolis. But the peculiar
character of this man, I think, makes it proper for me to give a brief
preliminary sketch of him.

[Sidenote: Character of Aratus.]

+8.+ Aratus had many of the qualities of a great ruler. He could
speak, and contrive, and conceal his purpose: no one surpassed him
in the moderation which he showed in political contests, or in his
power of attaching friends and gaining allies: in intrigue, stratagem,
and laying plots against a foe, and in bringing them to a successful
termination by personal endurance and courage, he was pre-eminent.
Many clear instances of these qualities may be found; but none more
convincing than the episodes of the capture of Sicyon and Mantinea,
of the expulsion of the Aetolians from Pellene, and especially of the
surprise of the Acrocorinthus.[205] On the other hand whenever he
attempted a campaign in the field, he was slow in conception and timid
in execution, and without personal gallantry in the presence of danger.
The result was that the Peloponnese was full of trophies which marked
reverses sustained by him; and that in this particular department he
was always easily defeated. So true is it that men’s minds, no less
than their bodies, have many aspects. Not only is it the case that
the same man has an aptitude for one class of activities and not
for another; it often happens that in things closely analogous, the
same man will be exceedingly acute and exceedingly dull, exceedingly
courageous and exceedingly timid. Nor is this a paradox: it is a very
ordinary fact, well known to all attentive observers. For instance you
may find men who in hunting show the greatest daring in grappling with
wild beasts, and yet are utter cowards in the presence of an armed
enemy. Or again, in actual war some are active and skilful in single
combats, who are yet quite ineffective in the ranks. For example, the
Thessalian cavalry in squadron and column are irresistible, but when
their order is once broken up, they have not the skill in skirmishing
by which each man does whatever the time and place suggests: while,
on the other hand, exactly the reverse of this is the case with the
Aetolians. The Cretans, again, either by land or sea, in ambushes and
piratical excursions, in deceiving the enemy, in making night attacks,
and in fact in every service which involves craft and separate action,
are irresistible; but for a regular front to front charge in line they
have neither the courage nor firmness; and the reverse again is the
case with the Achaeans and Macedonians.

I have said thus much, that my readers may not refuse me credit if I
have at times to make contradictory statements about the same men and
in regard to analogous employments. To return to my narrative.

[Sidenote: The armed levy of Achaeans summoned.]

[Sidenote: Dorimachus ordered to quit Messenia without passing through
Achaia.]

[Sidenote: Scopas and Dorimachus prepare to obey.]

+9.+ The men of military age having assembled in arms at Megalopolis,
in accordance with the decree of the federal assembly, the Messenian
envoys once more came forward, and entreated the people not to
disregard the flagrant breach of treaty from which they were suffering;
and expressed their willingness to become allies of the league, and
their anxiety to be enrolled among its members. The Achaean magistrates
declined the offered alliance, on the ground that it was impossible
to admit a new member without the concurrence of Philip and the other
allies,—for the sworn alliance negotiated by Antigonus during the
Cleomenic war was still in force, and included Achaia, Epirus, Phocis,
Macedonia, Boeotia, Acarnania, and Thessaly;—but they said that they
would march out to their relief, if the envoys there present would
place their sons in Sparta, as hostages for their promise not to make
terms with the Aetolians without the consent of the Achaeans. The
Spartans among the rest were encamped on the frontier of Megalopolis,
having marched out in accordance with the terms of their alliance;
but they were acting rather as reserves and spectators than as active
allies. Having thus settled the terms of the arrangement with the
Messenians, Aratus sent a messenger to the Aetolians to inform them
of the decree of the Achaean federation, and to order them to quit
the territory of Messenia without entering that of Achaia, on pain of
being treated as enemies if they set foot in it. When they heard the
message and knew that the Achaeans were mustered in force, Scopas and
Dorimachus thought it best for the present to obey. They therefore at
once sent despatches to Cyllene and to the Aetolian Strategus, Ariston,
begging that the transports should be sent to a place on the coast of
Elis called the island of Pheia;[206] and they themselves two days
later struck camp, and laden with booty marched towards Elis. For the
Aetolians always maintained a friendship with the Eleans that they
might have through them an entrance for their plundering and piratical
expeditions into the Peloponnese.

[Sidenote: Aratus dismisses the Achaean levy, with the exception of
3000 foot and 300 horse.]

[Sidenote: Dorimachus turns upon Aratus.]

+10.+ Aratus waited two days: and then, foolishly believing that the
Aetolians would return by the route they had indicated, he dismissed
all the Achaeans and Lacedaemonians to their homes, except three
thousand foot and three hundred horse and the division under Taurion,
which he led to Patrae, with the view of keeping on the flank of the
Aetolians. But when Dorimachus learnt that Aratus was thus watching his
march, and was still under arms; partly from fear of being attacked
when his forces were engaged on the embarkation, and partly with a
view to confuse the enemy, he sent his booty on to the transports
with a sufficient number of men to secure their passage, under orders
to meet him at Rhium where he intended to embark; while he himself,
after remaining for a time to superintend and protect the shipment of
the booty, changed the direction of his march and advanced towards
Olympia. But hearing that Taurion, with the rest of the army, was
near Cleitoria; and feeling sure that in these circumstances he would
not be able to effect the crossing from Rhium without danger and a
struggle with the enemy; he made up his mind that it would be best for
his interests to bring on an engagement with the army of Aratus as
soon as possible, since it was weak in numbers and wholly unprepared
for the attack. He calculated that if he could defeat this force, he
could then plunder the country, and effect his crossing from Rhium in
safety, while Aratus was waiting and deliberating about again convoking
the Achaean levy; but if on the other hand Aratus were terrified and
declined the engagement, he would then effect his departure unmolested,
whenever he thought it advisable. With these views, therefore, he
advanced, and pitched his camp at Methydrium in the territory of
Megalopolis.

[Sidenote: The Battle of Caphyae, B.C. 220.]

+11.+ But the leaders of the Achaeans, on learning the arrival of the
Aetolians, adopted a course of proceeding quite unsurpassable for
folly. They left the territory of Cleitor and encamped at Caphyae; but
the Aetolians marching from Methydrium past the city of Orchomenus,
they led the Achaean troops into the plain of Caphyae, and there drew
them up for battle, with the river which flows through that plain
protecting their front. The difficulty of the ground between them and
their enemy, for there were besides the river a number of ditches
not easily crossed,[207] and the show of readiness on the part of
the Achaeans for the engagement, caused the Aetolians to shrink from
attacking according to their original purpose; but they retreated in
good order to the high ground of Oligyrtus, content if only they were
not attacked and forced to give battle. But Aratus, when the van of
the Aetolians was already making the ascent, while the cavalry were
bringing up the rear along the plain, and were approaching a place
called Propus at the foot of the hills, sent out his cavalry and
light-armed troops, under the command of Epistratus of Acarnania, with
orders to attack and harass the enemy’s rear. Now if an engagement was
necessary at all, they ought not to have attempted it with the enemy’s
rear, when they had already accomplished the march through the plain,
but with his van directly it had debouched upon the plain: for in this
way the battle would have been wholly confined to the plain and level
ground, where the peculiar nature of the Aetolian arms and general
tactics would have been least effective; while the Achaeans, from
precisely opposite reasons, would have been most effective and able to
act. As it was, they surrendered the advantages of time and place which
were in their favour, and deliberately accepted the conditions which
were in favour of the enemy.

[Sidenote: The Achaeans defeated.]

+12.+ Naturally the result of the engagement was in harmony with such
a beginning. For when the light-armed troops approached, the Aetolian
cavalry retired in good order up the hill, being anxious to effect
a junction with their own infantry. But Aratus, having an imperfect
view of what was going on, and making a bad conjecture of what would
happen next, no sooner saw the cavalry retiring, than, hoping that they
were in absolute flight, he sent forward the heavy-armed troops of
his two wings, with orders to join and support the advanced guard of
their light-armed troops; while he himself, with his remaining forces,
executed a flank movement, and led his men on at the double. But the
Aetolian cavalry had now cleared the plain, and, having effected the
junction with their infantry, drew up under cover of the hill; massed
the infantry on their flanks; and called to them to stand by them:
the infantry themselves showing great promptness in answering to
their shouts, and in coming to their relief, as the several companies
arrived. Thinking themselves now sufficiently strong in numbers, they
closed their ranks, and charged the advanced guard of Achaean cavalry
and light armed troops; and being superior in number, and having the
advantage of charging from higher ground, after a long struggle, they
finally turned their opponents to flight: whose flight involved that
of the heavy-armed troops also which were coming to their relief. For
the latter were advancing in separate detachments in loose order, and,
either in dismay at what was happening, or upon meeting their flying
comrades on their retreat, were compelled to follow their example: the
result being that, whereas the number of those actually defeated on the
field was less than five hundred, the number that fled was more than
two thousand. Taught by experience what to do, the Aetolians followed
behind them with round after round of loud and boisterous shouts. The
Achaeans at first retreated in good order and without danger, because
they were retiring upon their heavy-armed troops, whom they imagined
to be in a place of safety on their original ground; but when they
saw that these too had abandoned their position of safety, and were
marching in a long straggling line, some of them immediately broke
off from the main body and sought refuge in various towns in the
neighbourhood; while others, meeting the phalanx as it was coming up to
their relief, proved to be quite sufficient, without the presence of an
enemy, to strike fear into it and force it into headlong flight. They
directed their flight, as I said, to the towns of the neighbourhood.
Orchomenus and Caphyae, which were close by, saved large numbers of
them: and if this had not been the case, they would in all probability
have been annihilated by this unlooked-for catastrophe. Such was the
result of the engagement at Caphyae.

[Sidenote: The Aetolians retire at their leisure.]

+13.+ When the people of Megalopolis learnt that the Aetolians were
at Methydrium, they came to the rescue _en masse_, at the summons
of a trumpet, on the very day after the battle of Caphyae; and were
compelled to bury the very men with whose assistance they had expected
to fight the Aetolians. Having therefore dug a trench in the territory
of Caphyae, and collected the corpses, they performed the funeral rites
of these unhappy men with all imaginable honour. But the Aetolians,
after this unlooked-for success gained by the cavalry and light-armed
troops, traversed the Peloponnese from that time in complete security.
In the course of their march they made an attack upon the town of
Pellene, and, after ravaging the territory of Sicyon, finally quitted
the Peloponnese by way of the Isthmus.

This then, was the cause and occasion of the Social war: its formal
beginning was the decree passed by all the allies after these events,
which was confirmed by a general meeting held at Corinth, on the
proposal of King Philip, who presided at the assembly.

[Sidenote: Midsummer, B.C. 220.]

[Sidenote: Attacked at the Achaean Congress, Aratus successfully
defends himself.]

+14.+ A few days after the events just narrated the ordinary meeting
of the Achaean federal assembly took place, and Aratus was bitterly
denounced, publicly as well as privately, as indisputably responsible
for this disaster; and the anger of the general public was still
further roused and embittered by the invectives of his political
opponents. It was shown to every one’s satisfaction that Aratus had
been guilty of four flagrant errors. His first was that, having taken
office before his predecessor’s time was legally at an end, he had
availed himself of a time properly belonging to another to engage
in the sort of enterprise in which he was conscious of having often
failed. His second and graver error was the disbanding the Achaeans,
while the Aetolians were still in the middle of the Peloponnese;
especially as he had been well aware beforehand that Scopas and
Dorimachus were anxious to disturb the existing settlement, and to stir
up war. His third error was to engage the enemy, as he did, with such a
small force, without any strong necessity; when he might have retired
to the neighbouring towns and have summoned a levy of the Achaeans, and
then have engaged, if he had thought that measure absolutely necessary.
But his last and gravest error was that, having determined to fight,
he did so in such an ill-considered manner, and managed the business
with so little circumspection, as to deprive himself of the advantages
of the plain and the support of his heavy-armed troops, and allow
the battle to be settled by light-armed troops, and to take place on
the <DW72>s, than which nothing could have been more advantageous or
convenient to the Aetolians. Such were the allegations against Aratus.
He, however, came forward and reminded the assembly of his former
political services and achievements; and urged in his defence that,
in the matters alleged, his was not the blame for what had occurred.
He begged their indulgence if he had been guilty of any oversight
in the battle, and claimed that they should at any rate look at the
facts without prejudice or passion. These words created such a rapid
and generous change in the popular feeling, that great indignation
was roused against the political opponents who attacked him; and the
resolutions as to the measures to be taken in the future were passed
wholly in accordance with the views of Aratus.

[Sidenote: The Achaean league determine upon war with the Aetolians,
and send round to their allies for assistance.]

[Sidenote: 139th Olympiad, B.C. 224-220; 140th Olympiad, B.C. 220-216.]

+15.+ These events occurred in the previous Olympiad,[208] what I am
now going to relate belong to the 140th. The resolutions passed by the
Achaean federal assembly were these. That embassies should be sent to
Epirus, Boeotia, Phocis, Acarnania, and Philip, to declare how the
Aetolians, in defiance of treaty, had twice entered Achaia with arms,
and to call upon them for assistance in virtue of their agreement,
and for their consent to the admission of the Messenians into the
alliance. Next, that the Strategus of the Achaeans should enrol five
thousand foot and five hundred horse, and support the Messenians in
case the Aetolians were to invade their territory; and to arrange
with the Lacedaemonians and Messenians how many horse and foot were
to be supplied by them severally for the service of the league. These
decrees showed a noble spirit on the part of the Achaeans in the
presence of defeat, which prevented them from abandoning either the
cause of the Messenians or their own purpose. Those who were appointed
to serve on these embassies to the allies proceeded to carry them out;
while the Strategus at once, in accordance with the decree, set about
enrolling the troops from Achaia, and arranged with the Lacedaemonians
and Messenians to supply each two thousand five hundred infantry and
two hundred and fifty cavalry, so that the whole army for the coming
campaign should amount to ten thousand foot and a thousand horse.

On the day of their regular assembly the Aetolians also met and decided
to maintain peace with the Spartans and Messenians; hoping by that
crafty measure to tamper with the loyalty of the Achaean allies and
sow disunion among them. With the Achaeans themselves they voted to
maintain peace, on condition that they withdrew from alliance with
Messenia, and to proclaim war if they refused,—than which nothing could
have been more unreasonable. For being themselves in alliance, both
with Achaeans and Messenians, they proclaimed war against the former,
unless the two ceased to be in alliance and friendly relationship
with each other; while if the Achaeans chose to be at enmity with the
Messenians, they offered them a separate peace. Their proposition was
too iniquitous and unreasonable to admit of being even considered.

[Sidenote: Treachery of the Spartans.]

+16.+ The Epirotes and King Philip on hearing the ambassadors consented
to admit the Messenians to alliance; but though the conduct of the
Aetolians caused them momentary indignation, they were not excessively
moved by it, because it was no more than what the Aetolians habitually
did. Their anger, therefore, was short-lived, and they presently
voted against going to war with them. So true is it that an habitual
course of wrong-doing finds readier pardon than when it is spasmodic
or isolated. The former, at any rate, was the case with the Aetolians:
they perpetually plundered Greece, and levied unprovoked war upon many
of its people: they did not deign either to make any defence to those
who complained, but answered only by additional insults if any one
challenged them to arbitration for injuries which they had inflicted,
or indeed which they meditated inflicting. And yet the Lacedaemonians,
who had but recently been liberated by means of Antigonus and the
generous zeal of the Achaeans, and though they were bound not to
commit any act of hostility towards the Macedonians and Philip, sent
clandestine messages to the Aetolians, and arranged a secret treaty of
alliance and friendship with them.

[Sidenote: Invasion of Achaia by the Aetolians and Illyrians.]

The army had already been enrolled from the Achaeans of military age,
and had been assigned to the duty of assisting the Lacedaemonians and
Messenians, when Scerdilaidas and Demetrius of Pharos sailed with
ninety galleys beyond Lissus, contrary to the terms of their treaty
with Rome. These men first touched at Pylos, and failing in an attack
upon it, they separated: Demetrius making for the Cyclades, from some
of which he exacted money and plundered others; while Scerdilaidas,
directing his course homewards, put in at Naupactus with forty galleys
at the instigation of Amynas, king of the Athamanes, who happened to be
his brother-in-law; and after making an agreement with the Aetolians,
by the agency of Agelaus, for a division of spoils, he promised to
join them in their invasion of Achaia. With this agreement made with
Scerdilaidas, and with the co-operation of the city of Cynaetha,
Agelaus, Dorimachus, and Scopas, collected a general levy of the
Aetolians, and invaded Achaia in conjunction with the Illyrians.

+17.+ But the Aetolian Strategus Ariston, ignoring everything that was
going on, remained quietly at home, asserting that he was not at war
with the Achaeans, but was maintaining peace: a foolish and childish
mode of acting,—for what better epithets could be applied to a man who
supposed that he could cloak notorious facts by mere words? Meanwhile
Dorimachus and his colleague had marched through the Achaean territory
and suddenly appeared at Cynaetha.

[Sidenote: The previous history of Cynaetha.]

Cynaetha was an Arcadian city[209] which, for many years past, had
been afflicted with implacable and violent political factions. The
two parties had frequently retaliated on each other with massacres,
banishments, confiscations, and redivisions of lands; but finally the
party which affected the Achaean connexion prevailed and got possession
of the city, securing themselves by a city-guard and commandant from
Achaia. This was the state of affairs when, shortly before the Aetolian
invasion, the exiled party sent to the party in possession intreating
that they would be reconciled and allow them to return to their own
city; whereupon the latter were persuaded, and sent an embassy to the
Achaeans with the view of obtaining their consent to the pacification.
The Achaeans readily consented, in the belief that both parties would
regard them with goodwill: since the party in possession had all
their hopes centred in the Achaeans, while those who were about to be
restored would owe that restoration to the consent of the same people.
Accordingly the Cynaethans dismissed the city guard and commandant,
and restored the exiles, to the number of nearly three hundred, after
taking such pledges from them as are reckoned the most inviolable among
all mankind. But no sooner had they secured their return, than, without
any cause or pretext arising which might give a colour to the renewal
of the quarrel, but on the contrary, at the very first moment of their
restoration, they began plotting against their country, and against
those who had been their preservers. I even believe that at the very
sacrifices, which consecrated the oaths and pledges which they gave
each other, they were already, even at such a solemn moment, revolving
in their minds this offence against religion and those who had trusted
them. For, as soon as they were restored to their civil rights they
called in the Aetolians, and betrayed the city into their hands, eager
to effect the utter ruin both of the people who had preserved, and the
city which had nourished, them.

+18.+ The bold stroke by which they actually consummated this treason
was as follows. Of the restored exiles certain officers had been
appointed called Polemarchs, whose duty it was to lock the city-gates,
and keep the keys while they remained closed, and also to be on guard
during the day at the gate-houses. The Aetolians accordingly waited
for this period of closing the gates, ready to make the attempt, and
provided with ladders; while the Polemarchs of the exiles, having
assassinated their colleagues on guard at the gate-house, opened the
gate. Some of the Aetolians, therefore, got into the town by it, while
others applied their ladders to the walls, and mounting by their
means, took forcible possession of them. The inhabitants of the town,
panic-stricken at the occurrence, could not tell which way to turn.
They could not give their undivided energies to opposing the party
which was forcing its way through the gate, because of those who were
attacking them at the walls; nor could they defend the walls owing to
the enemies that were pouring through the gate. The Aetolians having
thus become rapidly masters of the town, in spite of the injustice of
the whole proceeding, did one act of supreme justice. For the very men
who had invited them, and betrayed the town to them, they massacred
before any one else, and plundered their property. They then treated
all the others of the party in the same way; and, finally, taking
up their quarters in the houses, they systematically robbed them
of all valuables, and in many cases put Cynaethans to the rack, if
they suspected them of having anything concealed, whether money, or
furniture, or anything else of unusual value.

After inflicting this ruin on the Cynaethans they departed, leaving a
garrison to guard the walls, and marched towards Lusi. Arrived at the
temple of Artemis, which lies between Cleitor and Cynaetha, and is
regarded as inviolable by the Greeks, they threatened to plunder the
cattle of the goddess and the other property round the temple. But the
people of Lusi acted with great prudence: they gave the Aetolians some
of the sacred furniture, and appealed to them not to commit the impiety
of inflicting any outrage. The gift was accepted, and the Aetolians at
once removed to Cleitor and pitched their camp under its walls.

[Sidenote: Measures taken by Aratus.]

+19.+ Meanwhile Aratus, the Achaean Strategus, had despatched an appeal
for help to Philip; was collecting the men selected for service; and
was sending for the troops, arranged for by virtue of the treaty, from
Sparta and Messenia.

[Sidenote: The Aetolians at the temple of Artemis. They fail at
Cleitor.]

[Sidenote: They burn Cynaetha and return home.]

[Sidenote: Demetrius of Pharos.]

The Aetolians at first urged the people of Cleitor to abandon their
alliance with the Achaeans and adopt one with themselves; and upon
the Cleitorians absolutely refusing, they began an assault upon the
town, and endeavoured to take it by an escalade. But meeting with a
bold and determined resistance from the inhabitants, they desisted
from the attempt; and breaking up their camp marched back to Cynaetha,
driving off with them on their route the cattle of the goddess. They
at first offered the city to the Eleans, but upon their refusing to
accept it, they determined to keep the town in their own hands, and
appointed Euripides to command it: but subsequently, on the alarm of
an army of relief coming from Macedonia, they set fire to the town and
abandoned it, directing their march to Rhium with the purpose of there
taking ship and crossing home. But when Taurion heard of the Aetolian
invasion, and what had taken place at Cynaetha, and saw that Demetrius
of Pharos had sailed into Cenchreae from his island expedition, he
urged the latter to assist the Achaeans, and dragging his galleys
across the Isthmus to attack the Aetolians as they crossed the gulf.
Now though Demetrius had enriched himself by his island expedition,
he had had to beat an ignominious retreat, owing to the Rhodians
putting out to sea to attack him: he was therefore glad to accede to
the request of Taurion, as the latter undertook the expense of having
his galleys dragged across the Isthmus.[210] He accordingly got them
across, and arriving two days after the passage of the Aetolians,
plundered some places on the seaboard of Aetolia and then returned to
Corinth.

[Sidenote: Treason of the Spartans.]

The Lacedaemonians had dishonourably failed to send the full complement
of men to which they were bound by their engagement, but had despatched
a small contingent only of horse and foot, to save appearances.

[Sidenote: Inactivity of Aratus.]

Aratus however, having his Achaean troops, behaved in this instance
also with the caution of a statesman, rather than the promptness of a
general: for remembering his previous failure he remained inactively
watching events, until Scopas and Dorimachus had accomplished all they
wanted and were safe home again; although they had marched through a
line of country which was quite open to attack, full of defiles, and
wanting only a trumpeter[211] to sound a call to arms. But the great
disaster and misfortunes endured by the Cynaethans at the hands of the
Aetolians were looked upon as most richly deserved by them.

[Sidenote: The reasons of the barbarity of the Cynaethans. Their
neglect of the refining influences of music, which is carefully
encouraged in the rest of Arcadia.]

+20.+ Now, seeing that the Arcadians as a whole have a reputation for
virtue throughout Greece, not only in respect of their hospitality and
humanity, but especially for their scrupulous piety, it seems worth
while to investigate briefly the barbarous character of the Cynaethans:
and inquire how it came about that, though indisputably Arcadians in
race, they at that time so far surpassed the rest of Greece in cruelty
and contempt of law.

They seem then to me to be the first, and indeed the only, Arcadians
who have abandoned institutions nobly conceived by their ancestors and
admirably adapted to the character of all the inhabitants of Arcadia.
For music, and I mean by that _true_ music, which it is advantageous
to every one to practise, is obligatory with the Arcadians. For we
must not think, as Ephorus in a hasty sentence of his preface, wholly
unworthy of him, says, that music was introduced among mankind for the
purpose of deception and jugglery; nor must the ancients Cretans and
Spartans be supposed to have introduced the pipe and rhythmic movement
in war, instead of the trumpet, without some reason; nor the early
Arcadians to have given music such a high place in their constitution,
that not only boys, but young men up to the age of thirty, are
compelled to practise it, though in other respects most simple and
primitive in their manner of life. Every one is familiarly acquainted
with the fact that the Arcadians are the only people among whom boys
are by the laws trained from infancy to sing hymns and paeans, in which
they celebrate in the traditional fashion the heroes and gods of their
particular towns. They next learn the airs of Philoxenus and Timotheus,
and dance with great spirit to the pipers at the yearly Dionysia in the
theatres, the boys at the boys’ festival, and the young men at what
is called the men’s festival. Similarly it is their universal custom,
at all festal gatherings and banquets, not to have strangers to make
the music, but to produce it themselves, calling on each other in turn
for a song. They do not look upon it as a disgrace to disclaim the
possession of any other accomplishment: but no one can disclaim the
knowledge of how to sing, because all are forced to learn, nor can they
confess the knowledge, and yet excuse themselves from practising it,
because that too among them is looked upon as disgraceful. Their young
men again practise a military step to the music of the pipe and in
regular order of battle, producing elaborate dances, which they display
to their fellow-citizens every year in the theatres, at the public
charge and expense.

[Sidenote: The object of the musical training of the Arcadians.]

+21.+ Now the object of the ancient Arcadians in introducing these
customs was not, as I think, the gratification of luxury and
extravagance. They saw that Arcadia was a nation of workers; that the
life of the people was laborious and hard; and that, as a natural
consequence of the coldness and gloom which were the prevailing
features of a great part of the country, the general character of the
people was austere. For we mortals have an irresistible tendency to
yield to climatic influences: and to this cause, and no other, may be
traced the great distinctions which prevail amongst us in character,
physical formation, and complexion, as well as in most of our habits,
varying with nationality or wide local separation. And it was with a
view of softening and tempering this natural ruggedness and rusticity,
that they not only introduced the things which I have mentioned,
but also the custom of holding assemblies and frequently offering
sacrifices, in both of which women took part equally with men; and
having mixed dances of girls and boys and in fact did everything they
could to humanise their souls by the civilising and softening influence
of such culture. The people of Cynaetha entirely neglected these
things, although they needed them more than any one else, because their
climate and country is by far the most unfavourable in all Arcadia;
and on the contrary gave their whole minds to mutual animosities and
contentions. They in consequence became finally so brutalised, that no
Greek city has ever witnessed a longer series of the most atrocious
crimes. I will give one instance of the ill fortune of Cynaetha in this
respect, and of the disapproval of such proceedings on the part of the
Arcadians at large. When the Cynaethans, after their great massacre,
sent an embassy to Sparta, every city which the ambassadors entered
on their road at once ordered them by a herald to depart; while the
Mantineans not only did that, but after their departure regularly
purified their city and territory from the taint of blood, by carrying
victims round them both.

I have had three objects in saying thus much on this subject. First,
that the character of the Arcadians should not suffer from the crimes
of one city: secondly, that other nations should not neglect music,
from an idea that certain Arcadians give an excessive and extravagant
attention to it: and, lastly, I speak for the sake of the Cynaethans
themselves, that, if ever God gives them better fortune, they may
humanise themselves by turning their attention to education, and
especially to music.

[Sidenote: Philip V. comes to Corinth. B.C. 220.]

[Sidenote: Advances toward Sparta.]

[Sidenote: Adeimantus assassinated.]

+22.+ To return from this digression. When the Aetolians had reached
their homes in safety after this raid upon the Peloponnese, Philip,
coming to the aid of the Achaeans with an army, arrived at Corinth.
Finding that he was too late, he sent despatches to all the allies
urging them to send deputies at once to Corinth, to consult on the
measures required for the common safety. Meanwhile he himself marched
towards Tegea, being informed that the Lacedaemonians were in a
state of revolution, and were fallen to mutual slaughter. For being
accustomed to have a king over them, and to be entirely submissive to
their rulers, their sudden enfranchisement by means of Antigonus, and
the absence of a king, produced a state of civil war; because they all
imagined themselves to be on a footing of complete political equality.
At first two of the five Ephors kept their views to themselves; while
the other three threw in their lot with the Aetolians, because they
were convinced that the youth of Philip would prevent him as yet from
having a decisive influence in the Peloponnese. But when, contrary to
their expectations, the Aetolians retired quickly from the Peloponnese,
and Philip arrived still more quickly from Macedonia, the three Ephors
became distrustful of Adeimantus, one of the other two, because he was
privy to and disapproved of their plans; and were in a great state of
anxiety lest he should tell Philip everything as soon as that monarch
approached. After some consultation therefore with certain young men,
they published a proclamation ordering all citizens of military age to
assemble in arms in the sacred enclosure of Athene of the Brazen-house,
on the pretext that the Macedonians were advancing against the town.
This startling announcement caused a rapid muster: when Adeimantus, who
disapproved of the measure, came forward and endeavoured to show that
“the proclamation and summons to assemble in arms should have been made
some time before, when they were told that their enemies the Aetolians
were approaching the frontier: not then, when they learnt that their
benefactors and preservers the Macedonians were coming with their
king.” In the middle of this dissuasive speech the young men whose
co-operation had been secured struck him dead, and with him Sthenelaus,
Alcamenes, Thyestes, Bionidas, and several other citizens; whereupon
Polyphontes and certain of his party, seeing clearly what was going to
happen, went off to join Philip.

[Sidenote: Philip summons Spartan deputies to Tegea.]

+23.+ Immediately after the commission of this crime, the Ephors who
were then in power sent men to Philip, to accuse the victims of this
massacre; and to beg him to delay his approach, until the affairs of
the city had returned to their normal state after this commotion;
and to be assured meanwhile that it was their purpose to be loyal
and friendly to the Macedonians in every respect. These ambassadors
found Philip near Mount Parthenius,[212] and communicated to him their
commission. Having listened, he bade the ambassadors make all haste
home, and inform the Ephors that he was going to continue his march to
Tegea, and expected that they would as quickly as possible send him
men of credit to consult with him on the present position of affairs.
After hearing this message from the king, the Lacedaemonian officers
despatched ten commissioners headed by Omias to meet Philip; who, on
arriving at Tegea, and entering the king’s council chamber, accused
Adeimantus of being the cause of the late commotion; and promised that
they would perform all their obligations as allies to Philip, and
show that they were second to none of those whom he looked upon as
his most loyal friends, in their affection for his person. With these
and similar asseverations the Lacedaemonian commissioners left the
council chamber. The members of the council were divided in opinion:
one party knowing the secret treachery of the Spartan magistrates, and
feeling certain that Adeimantus had lost his life from his loyalty
to Macedonia, while the Lacedaemonians had really determined upon an
alliance with the Aetolians, advised Philip to make an example of the
Lacedaemonians, by treating them precisely as Alexander had treated
the Thebans, immediately after his assumption of his sovereignty. But
another party, consisting of the older counsellors, sought to show
that such severity was too great for the occasion, and that all that
ought to be done was to rebuke the offenders, depose them, and put the
management of the state and the chief offices in the hands of his own
friends.

[Sidenote: The king decides not to chastise Sparta.]

+24.+ The king gave the final decision, if that decision may be
called the king’s: for it is not reasonable to suppose that a mere
boy should be able to come to a decision on matters of such moment.
Historians, however, must attribute to the highest official present
the final decisions arrived at: it being thoroughly understood among
their readers that propositions and opinions, such as these, in all
probability proceed from the members of the council, and particularly
from those highest in his confidence. In this case the decision of
the king ought most probably to be attributed to Aratus. It was to
this effect: the king said that “in the case of injuries inflicted by
the allies upon each other separately, his intervention ought to be
confined to a remonstrance by word of mouth or letter; but that it was
only injuries affecting the whole body of the allies which demanded
joint intervention and redress: and seeing that the Lacedaemonians had
plainly committed no such injury against the whole body of allies,
but professed their readiness to satisfy every claim that could with
justice be made upon them, he held that he ought not to decree any
measure of excessive severity against them. For it would be very
inconsistent for him to take severe measures against them for so
insignificant a cause; while his father inflicted no punishment at
all upon them, though when he conquered them they were not allies
but professed enemies.” It having, therefore, been formally decided
to overlook the incident, the king immediately sent Petraeus, one of
his most trusted friends, with Omias, to exhort the people to remain
faithful to their friendship with him and Macedonia, and to interchange
oaths of alliance; while he himself started once more with his army and
returned towards Corinth, having in his conduct to the Lacedaemonians
given an excellent specimen of his policy towards the allies.

[Sidenote: The congress of allies at Corinth declare war against the
Aetolians.]

+25.+ When he arrived at Corinth he found the envoys from the allied
cities already there; and in consultation with them he discussed the
measures to be taken in regard to the Aetolians. The complaints against
them were stated by the various envoys. The Boeotians accused them
of plundering the temple of Athene at Itone[213] in time of peace:
the Phocians of having attacked and attempted to seize the cities of
Ambrysus and Daulium: the Epirotes of having committed depredations in
their territory. The Acarnanians showed how they had contrived a plot
for the betrayal of Thyrium into their hands, and had gone so far as to
actually assault it under cover of night. The Achaeans made a statement
showing that they had seized Clarium in the territory of Megalopolis;
traversed the territories of Patrae and Pharae, pillaging the country
as they went; completely sacked Cynaetha; plundered the temple of
Artemis in Lusi; laid siege to Cleitor; attempted Pylus by sea, and
Megalopolis by land, doing all they could by aid of the Illyrians to
lay waste the latter after its recent restoration. After listening
to these depositions, the congress of allies unanimously decided to
go to war with the Aetolians. A decree was, therefore, formulated in
which the aforesaid causes for war were stated as a preamble, and a
declaration sub-joined of their intention of restoring to the several
allies any portion of their territory seized by the Aetolians since the
death of Demetrius, father of Philip; and similarly of restoring to
their ancestral forms of government all states that had been compelled
against their will to join the Aetolian league; with full possession
of their own territory and cities; subject to no foreign garrison
or tribute; in complete independence; and in enjoyment of their own
constitutions and laws. Finally a clause in the decree declared their
intention of assisting the Amphictyonic council to restore the laws,
and to recover its control of the Delphic temple, wrested from it by
the Aetolians, who were determined to keep in their own hands all that
belonged to that temple.

[Sidenote: B.C. 220.]

[Sidenote: Autumn, B.C. 220.]

+26.+ This decree was made in the first year of the 140th Olympiad,
and with it began the so-called Social war, the commencement of which
was thoroughly justifiable and a natural consequence of the injurious
acts of the Aetolians. The first step of the congress was to send
commissioners at once to the several allies, that the decree having
been confirmed by as many as possible, all might join in this national
war. Philip also sent a declaratory letter to the Aetolians, in order
that, if they had any justification to put forward on the points
alleged against them, they might even at that late hour meet and settle
the controversy by conference: “but if they supposed that they were,
with no public declaration of war, to sack and plunder, without the
injured parties retaliating, on pain of being considered, if they did
so, to have commenced hostilities, they were the most simple people in
the world.” On the receipt of this letter the Aetolian magistrates,
thinking that Philip would never come, named a day on which they would
meet him at Rhium. When they were informed, however, that he had
actually arrived there, they sent a despatch informing him that they
were not competent, before the meeting of the Aetolian assembly, to
settle any public matter on their own authority. But when the Achaeans
met at the usual federal assembly, they ratified the decree, and
published a proclamation authorising reprisals upon the Aetolians. And
when King Philip appeared before the council at Aegium, and informed
them at length of all that had taken place, they received his speech
with warmth, and formally renewed with him personally the friendship
which had existed between his ancestors and themselves.

[Sidenote: Scopas elected Aetolian Strategus.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 385.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 387.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 382.]

+27.+ Meanwhile, the time of the annual election having come round, the
Aetolians elected Scopas as their Strategus, the man who had been the
moving spirit in all these acts of violence. I am at a loss for fitting
terms to describe such a public policy. To pass a decree against going
to war,[214] and yet to go on an actual expedition in force and pillage
their neighbours' territories: not to punish one of those responsible
for this: but on the contrary to elect as Strategi and bestow honours
on the leaders in these transactions,—this seems to me to involve the
grossest disingenuousness. I can find no word which better describes
such a treacherous policy; and I will quote two instances to show what
I mean by it. When Phoebidas treacherously seized the Cadmeia, the
Lacedaemonians fined the guilty general but declined to withdraw the
garrison, on the ground that the wrong was fully atoned for by the
punishment of the perpetrator of it: though their plain duty was to
have done the reverse, for it was the latter which was of importance to
the Thebans. Again this same people published a proclamation giving the
various cities freedom and autonomy in accordance with the terms of the
peace of Antalcidas, and yet did not withdraw their Harmosts from the
cities. Again, having driven the Mantineans from their home, who were
at the time their friends and allies, they denied that they were doing
any wrong, inasmuch as they removed them from one city and settled
them in several. But indeed a man is a fool, as much as a knave, if he
imagines that, because he shuts his own eyes, his neighbours cannot
see. Their fondness for such tortuous policy proved however, both to
the Lacedaemonians and Aetolians, the source of the greatest disasters;
and it is not one which should commend itself to the imitation either
of individuals or states, if they are well advised.

King Philip, then, after his interview with the Achaean assembly,
started with his army on the way to Macedonia, in all haste to make
preparations for war; leaving a pleasant impression in the minds of all
the Greeks: for the nature of the decree, which I have mentioned as
having been passed by him,[215] gave them good hopes of finding him a
man of moderate temper and royal magnanimity.

[Sidenote: B.C. 118.]

+28.+ These transactions were contemporaneous with Hannibal’s
expedition against Saguntum, after his conquest of all Iberia south
of the Iber. Now, had the first attempts of Hannibal been from the
beginning involved with the transactions in Greece, it would have been
plainly my proper course to have narrated the latter side by side with
those in Iberia in my previous book, with an eye solely to dates.
But seeing that the wars in Italy, Greece, and Asia were at their
commencements entirely distinct, and yet became finally involved with
each other, I decided that my history of them must also be distinct,
until I came to the point at which they became inseparably interlaced,
and began to tend towards a common conclusion. Thus both will be made
clear,—the account of their several commencements: and the time,
manner, and causes which led to the complication and amalgamation, of
which I spoke in my introduction. This point having been reached, I
must thenceforth embrace them all in one uninterrupted narrative. This
amalgamation began towards the end of the war, in the third year of
the 140th Olympiad. From that year, therefore, my history will, with a
due regard to dates, become a general one. Before that year it must be
divided into distinct narratives, with a mere recapitulation in each
case of the events detailed in the preceding book, introduced for the
sake of facilitating the comprehension, and rousing the admiration, of
my readers.

[Sidenote: Philip secures the support of Scerdilaidas.]

+29.+ Philip then passed the winter in Macedonia, in an energetic
enlistment of troops for the coming campaign, and in securing his
frontier on the side of the Barbarians. And having accomplished these
objects, he met Scerdilaidas and put himself fearlessly in his power,
and discussed with him the terms of friendship and alliance; and partly
by promising to help him in securing his power in Illyria, and partly
by bringing against the Aetolians the charges to which they were only
too open, persuaded him without difficulty to assent to his proposals.
The fact is that public crimes do not differ from private, except in
quantity and extent; and just as in the case of petty thieves, what
brings them to ruin more than anything else is that they cheat and are
unfaithful to each other, so was it in the case of the Aetolians. They
had agreed with Scerdilaidas to give him half the booty, if he would
join them in their attack upon Achaea; but when, on his consenting
to do so, and actually carrying out his engagement, they had sacked
Cynaetha and carried off a large booty in slaves and cattle, they gave
him no share in the spoil at all. He was therefore already enraged
with them; and required very little persuasion on Philip’s part to
induce him to accept the proposal, and agree to join the alliance, on
condition of receiving a yearly subsidy of twenty talents; and, in
return, putting to sea with thirty galleys and carrying on a naval war
with the Aetolians.

[Sidenote: The Acarnanians, B.C. 220.]

[Sidenote: Duplicity of the Epirotes.]

+30.+ While Philip was thus engaged, the commissioners sent out to the
allies were performing their mission. The first place they came to was
Acarnania; and the Acarnanians, with a noble promptitude, confirmed the
decree and undertook to join the war against the Aetolians with their
full forces. And yet they, if any one, might have been excused if they
had put the matter off, and hesitated, and shown fear of entering upon
a war with their neighbours; both because they lived upon the frontiers
of Aetolia, and still more because they were peculiarly open to attack,
and, most of all, because they had a short time before experienced
the most dreadful disasters from the enmity of the Aetolians. But I
imagine that men of noble nature, whether in private or public affairs,
look upon duty as the highest consideration; and in adherence to this
principle no people in Greece have been more frequently conspicuous
than the Acarnanians, although the forces at their command were but
slender. With them, above all others in Greece, an alliance should be
sought at a crisis, without any misgiving; for they have, individually
and collectively, an element of stability and a spirit of liberality.
The conduct of the Epirotes was in strong contrast. When they heard
what the commissioners had to say, indeed, they, like the Acarnanians,
joined in confirming the decree, and voted to go to war with the
Aetolians at such time as Philip also did the same; but with ignoble
duplicity they told the Aetolian envoys that they had determined to
maintain peace with them.

[Sidenote: Ptolemy Philopator.]

Ambassadors were despatched also to King Ptolemy, to urge him not to
send money to the Aetolians, nor to supply them with any aid against
Philip and the allies.

[Sidenote: Timidity of the Messenians.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 480-479. Pindar fr.]

+31.+ The Messenians again, on whose account the war began, answered
the commissioners sent to them that, seeing Phigalia was on their
frontier and was in the power of the Aetolians, they would not
undertake the war until that city was wrested from them. This decision
was forcibly carried, much against the will of the people at large,
by the Ephors Oenis and Nicippus, and some others of the oligarchical
party: wherein they showed, to my thinking, great ignorance of their
true interests. I admit, indeed, that war is a terrible thing; but it
is less terrible than to submit to anything whatever in order to avoid
it. For what is the meaning of our fine talk about equality of rights,
freedom of speech, and liberty, if the one important thing is peace? We
have no good word for the Thebans, because they shrunk from fighting
for Greece and chose from fear to side with the Persians,—nor indeed
for Pindar who supported their inaction in the verses—[216]

   A quiet haven for the ship of state
     Should be the patriot’s aim,
   And smiling peace, to small and great
     That brings no shame.

For though his advice was for the moment acceptable, it was not long
before it became manifest that his opinion was as mischievous as it was
dishonourable. For peace, with justice and honour, is the noblest and
most advantageous thing in the world; when joined with disgrace and
contemptible cowardice, it is the basest and most disastrous.[217]

+32.+ The Messenian leaders, then, being of oligarchical tendencies,
and aiming at their own immediate advantage, were always too much
inclined to peace. On many critical occasions indeed they managed to
elude fear and danger: but all the while this policy of theirs was
accumulating a heavy retribution for themselves; and they finally
involved their country in the gravest misfortunes. And the reason in
my opinion was this, that being neighbours to two of the most powerful
nations in the Peloponnese, or I might almost say in Greece, I mean
the Arcadians and Lacedaemonians,—one of which had been irreconcilably
hostile to them from the moment they occupied the country, and the
other disposed to be friendly and protect them,—they never frankly
accepted hostility to the Spartans, or friendship with the Arcadians.
Accordingly when the attention of the former was distracted by domestic
or foreign war, the Messenians were secure; for they always enjoyed
peace and tranquillity from the fact of their country lying out of
the road: but when the Lacedaemonians, having nothing else on hand to
distract their attention, took to inflicting injuries on them, they
were unable to withstand the superior strength of the Lacedaemonians
by their own power; and, having failed to secure the support of their
true friends, who were ready to do anything for their protection, they
were reduced to the alternatives of becoming the slaves of Sparta and
enduring her heavy exactions; or of leaving their homes to escape from
this servitude, abandoning their country with wives and children. And
this has repeatedly happened to them within comparatively recent times.

That the present settlement of the Peloponnese may prove a lasting
one, so that no measure such as I am about to describe may be ever
necessary, is indeed my earnest wish: but if anything does happen
to disturb it, and threaten revolutionary changes, the only hope
for the Messenians and Megalopolitans of continuing to occupy their
present territory, that I can see, is a recurrence to the policy of
Epaminondas. They must resolve, that is to say, upon a cordial and
sincere partnership with each other in every danger and labour.

+33.+ And perhaps my observation may receive some support from
ancient history. For, among many other indications, it is a fact
that the Messenians did set up a pillar close to the altar of Zeus
Lycaeus in the time of Aristomenes,[218] according to the evidence of
Callisthenes, in which they inscribed the following verses:

   A faithless king will perish soon or late!
     Messene tracked him down right easily,
   The traitor:—perjury must meet its fate;
     Glory to Zeus, and life to Arcady!

[Sidenote: B.C. 362.]

The point of this is, that, having lost their own country, they pray
the gods to save Arcadia as their second country.[219] And it was
very natural that they should do so; for not only did the Arcadians
receive them when driven from their own land, at the time of the
Aristomenic war, and make them welcome to their homes and free of their
civic rights; but they also passed a vote bestowing their daughters
in marriage upon those of the Messenians who were of proper age; and
besides all this, investigated the treason of their king Aristocrates
in the battle of the Trench; and, finding him guilty, put him to death
and utterly destroyed his whole family. But setting aside these ancient
events, what has happened recently after the restoration of Megalopolis
and Messene will be sufficient to support what I have said. For when,
upon the death of Epaminondas leaving the result of the battle of
Mantinea doubtful, the Lacedaemonians endeavoured to prevent the
Messenians from being included in the truce, hoping even then to get
Messenia into their own hands, the Megalopolitans, and all the other
Arcadians who were allied with the Messenians, made such a point of
their being admitted to the benefits of the new confederacy, that they
were accepted by the allies and allowed to take the oaths and share in
the provisions of the peace; while the Lacedaemonians were the only
Greeks excluded from the treaty. With such facts before him, could any
one doubt the soundness of the suggestion I lately made?

I have said thus much for the sake of the Arcadians and Messenians
themselves; that, remembering all the misfortunes which have befallen
their countries at the hands of the Lacedaemonians, they may cling
close to the policy of mutual affection and fidelity; and let no fear
of war, or desire of peace, induce them to abandon each other in what
affects the highest interests of both.

[Sidenote: Division of opinion in Sparta, B.C. 220.]

+34.+ In the matter of the commissioners from the allies, to go back to
my story, the behaviour of the Lacedaemonians was very characteristic.
For their own ill-considered and tortuous policy had placed them in
such a difficulty, that they finally dismissed them without an answer:
thus illustrating, as it seems to me, the truth of the saying, that,
“boldness pushed to extremes amounts to want of sense, and comes to
nothing.” Subsequently, however, on the appointment of new Ephors, the
party who had originally promoted the outbreak, and had been the causes
of the massacre, sent to the Aetolians to induce them to despatch an
ambassador to Sparta. The Aetolians gladly consented, and in a short
time Machatas arrived there in that capacity. Pressure was at once
put upon the Ephors to allow Machatas to address the people,[220] and
to re-establish royalty in accordance with the ancient constitution,
and not to allow the Heraclid dynasty to be any longer suppressed,
contrary to the laws. The Ephors were annoyed at the proposal, but
were unable to withstand the pressure, and afraid of a rising of the
younger men: they therefore answered that the question of restoring the
kings must be reserved for future consideration; but they consented to
grant Machatas an opportunity of addressing a public assembly. When
the people accordingly were met, Machatas came forward, and in a long
speech urged them to embrace the alliance with Aetolia; inveighing in
reckless and audacious terms against the Macedonians, while he went
beyond all reason and truth in his commendations of the Aetolians. Upon
his retirement, there was a long and animated debate between those who
supported the Aetolians and advised the adoption of their alliance, and
those who took the opposite side. When, however, some of the elders
reminded the people of the good services rendered them by Antigonus
and the Macedonians, and the injuries inflicted on them by Charixenus
and Timaeus,—when the Aetolians invaded them with their full force
and ravaged their territory, enslaved the neighbouring villages, and
laid a plot for attacking Sparta itself by a fraudulent and forcible
restoration of exiles,—these words produced a great revulsion of
feeling, and the people finally decided to maintain the alliance with
Philip and the Macedonians. Machatas accordingly had to go home without
attaining the object of his mission.

[Sidenote: Murder of the Ephors, B.C. 220.]

[Sidenote: Agesipolis appointed king,]

[Sidenote: B.C. 242.]

+35.+ The party, however, at Sparta who were the original of the
instigators of the outbreak could not make up their minds to give way.
They once more therefore determined to commit a crime of the most
impious description, having first corrupted some of the younger men.
It was an ancestral custom that, at a certain sacrifice, all citizens
of military age should join fully armed in a procession to the temple
of Athene of the Brazen-house, while the Ephors remained in the sacred
precinct and completed the sacrifice. As the young men therefore were
conducting the procession, some of them suddenly fell upon the Ephors,
while they were engaged with the sacrifice, and slew them. The enormity
of this crime will be made apparent by remembering that the sanctity
of this temple was such, that it gave a safe asylum even to criminals
condemned to death; whereas its privileges were now by the cruelty of
these audacious men treated with such contempt, that the whole of the
Ephors were butchered round the altar and the table of the goddess. In
pursuance of their purpose they next killed one of the elders, Gyridas,
and drove into exile those who had spoken against the Aetolians. They
then chose some of their own body as Ephors, and made an alliance
with the Aetolians. Their motives for doing all this, for incurring
the enmity of the Achaeans, for their ingratitude to the Macedonians,
and generally for their unjustifiable conduct towards all, was before
everything else their devotion to Cleomenes, and the hopes and
expectations they continued to cherish that he would return to Sparta
in safety. So true it is that men who have the tact to ingratiate
themselves with those who surround them can, even when far removed,
leave in their hearts very effective materials for kindling the flame
of a renewed popularity. This people for instance, to say nothing of
other examples, after nearly three years of constitutional government,
following the banishment of Cleomenes, without once thinking of
appointing kings at Sparta, no sooner heard of the death of Cleomenes
than they were eager—populace and Ephors alike—to restore kingly rule.
Accordingly the Ephors who were in sympathy with the conspirators, and
who had made the alliance with Aetolia which I just now mentioned, did
so. One of these kings so restored they appointed in accordance with
the regular and legal succession, namely Agesipolis. He was a child
at the time, a son of Agesipolis, and grandson of that Cleombrotus
who had become king, as the next of kin to this family, when Leonidas
was driven from office. As guardian of the young king they elected
Cleomenes, son of Cleombrotus and brother of Agesipolis.

[Sidenote: and Lycurgas.]

Of the other royal house there were surviving two sons of Archidamus,
son of Eudamidas, by the daughter of Hippodemon; as well as Hippodemon
himself, the son of Agesilaus, and several other members of the same
branch, though somewhat less closely connected than those I have
mentioned. But these were all passed over, and Lycurgus was appointed
king, none of whose ancestors had ever enjoyed that title. A present
of a talent to each of the Ephors made him “descendant of Hercules”
and king of Sparta. So true is it all the world over that such
nobility[221] is a mere question of a little money.

The result was that the penalty for their folly had to be paid, not
by the third generation, but by the very authors of this royalist
restoration.

[Sidenote: Spartans attack Argos, and proclaim war with the Achaeans.]

+36.+ When Machatas heard what had happened at Sparta, he returned
thither and urged the Ephors and kings to go to war with the Achaeans;

arguing that that was the only way of stopping the ambition of the
party in Sparta who were doing all they could to break up the alliance
with the Aetolians, or of the party in Aetolia who were co-operating
with them. Having obtained the consent of the Ephors and kings,
Machatas returned home with a success secured him by the blindness
of his partisans in Sparta; while Lycurgus with the army and certain
others of the citizens invaded the Argive territory, the inhabitants
being quite unprepared for an attack, owing to the existing settlement.
By a sudden assault he seized Polichna, Prasiae, Leucae, and Cyphanta,
but was repulsed at Glympes and Zarax. After these achievements of
their king, the Lacedaemonians proclaimed a licence of reprisal
against the Achaeans. With the Eleans also Machatas was successful in
persuading them, by the same arguments as he had used at Sparta, to go
to war with the Achaeans.

The unexpected success of these intrigues caused the Aetolians to enter
upon the war with high spirits. But it was quite the contrary with the
Achaeans: for Philip, on whom their hopes rested, was still busy with
his preparations; the Epirotes were hesitating about going to war, and
the Messenians were entirely passive; and meantime the Aetolians, aided
by the blind policy of the Eleans and Lacedaemonians, were threatening
them with actual war on every side.

[Sidenote: Aratus succeeded by his son as Strategus of the Achaeans,
May B.C. 219.]

[Sidenote: June-September. B.C. 219.]

+37.+ The year of Aratus’s office was just expiring, and his son Aratus
the younger had been elected to succeed him as Strategus, and was on
the point of taking over the office. Scopas was still Strategus of
the Aetolians, and in fact it was just about the middle of his year.
For the Aetolians hold their elections immediately after the autumn
equinox, while the Achaeans hold theirs about the time of the rising of
the Pleiads. As soon therefore as summer had well set in, and Aratus
the younger had taken over his office, all these wars at once began
simultaneously. Hannibal began besieging Saguntum; the Romans sent
Lucius Aemilius with an army to Illyria against Demetrius of Pharos,—of
both which I spoke in the last book; Antiochus, having had Ptolemais
and Tyre betrayed to him by Theodotus, meditated attacking Coele-Syria;
and Ptolemy was engaged in preparing for the war with Antiochus. While
Lycurgus, wishing to make a beginning after the pattern of Cleomenes,
pitched his camp near the Athenaeum of Megalopolis and was laying
siege to it: the Achaeans were collecting mercenary horse and foot for
the war which was upon them: and Philip, finally, was starting from
Macedonia with an army consisting of ten thousand heavy-armed soldiers
of the phalanx, five thousand light-armed, and eight hundred cavalry.
Such was the universal state of war or preparation for war.

[Sidenote: Rhodian and Byzantium war, 220-219 B.C.]

+38.+ At the same time the Rhodians went to war with the Byzantines,
for reasons which I must now describe.

[Sidenote: Advantages of the situation of Byzantium.]

As far as the sea is concerned, Byzantium occupies a position the
most secure and in every way the most advantageous of any town in our
quarter of the world: while in regard to the land, its situation is in
both respects the most unfavourable. By sea it so completely commands
the entrance to the Pontus, that no merchant can sail in or out against
its will. The Pontus therefore being rich in what the rest of the
world requires for the support of life, the Byzantines are absolute
masters of all such things. For those commodities which are the first
necessaries of existence, cattle and slaves, are confessedly supplied
by the districts round the Pontus in greater profusion, and of better
quality, than by any others: and for luxuries, they supply us with
honey, wax, and salt-fish in great abundance; while they take our
superfluous stock of olive oil and every kind of wine. In the matter
of corn there is a mutual interchange, they supplying or taking it as
it happens to be convenient. Now the Greeks would necessarily have
been excluded entirely from traffic in these articles, or at least
would have had to carry it on at a loss, if the Byzantines had adopted
a hostile attitude, and made common cause formerly with the Gauls, or
still more at this time with the Thracians, or had abandoned the place
altogether: for owing to the narrowness of the strait, and the number
of the barbarians along its shores, it would have become entirely
impassable to our ships. The Byzantines themselves probably feel the
advantages of the situation, in the supplies of the necessaries of
life, more than any one else; for their superfluity finds a ready
means of export, and what they lack is readily imported, with profit
to themselves, and without difficulty or danger: but other people too,
as I have said, get a great many commodities by their means. As common
benefactors therefore of all Greece they might justly expect, not only
gratitude, but the united assistance of Greeks, when threatened by the
barbarians.

But since the peculiar natural advantages of this site are generally
unknown, because it lies somewhat outside the parts of the world
ordinarily visited; and since it is an universal wish to be acquainted
with things of this sort, by ocular inspection, if possible, of such
places as have any unusual or remarkable features; or, if that is
impossible, by having in our minds some ideas or images of them as like
the truth as may be, I must now state the facts of the case, and what
it is that makes this city so eminently rich and prosperous.

[Sidenote: The Pontus.]

+39.+ The sea called “The Pontus” has a circumference of twenty-two
thousand stades, and two mouths diametrically opposite to each other,
the one opening into the Propontis and the other into the Maeotic Lake;
which latter also has itself a circumference of eight thousand stades.
Into these two basins many great rivers discharge themselves on the
Asiatic side, and still larger and more numerous on the European; and
so the Maeotic lake, as it gets filled up, flows into the Pontus, and
the Pontus into the Propontis. The mouth of the Maeotic lake is called
the Cimmerian Bosporus, about thirty stades broad and sixty long, and
shallow all over; that of the Pontus is called the Thracian Bosporus,
and is a hundred and twenty stades long, and of a varying breadth.
Between Calchedon and Byzantium the channel is fourteen stades broad,
and this is the entrance at the end nearest the Propontis. Coming from
the Pontus, it begins at a place called Hieron, at which they say
that Jason on his return voyage from Colchis first sacrificed to the
twelve gods. This place is on the Asiatic side, and its distance from
the European coast is twelve stades, measuring to Sarapieium, which
lies exactly opposite in Thrace. There are two causes which account
for the fact that the waters, both of the Maeotic lake and the Pontus,
continually flow outwards. One is patent at once to every observer,
namely, that by the continual discharge of many streams into basins
which are of definite circumference and content, the water necessarily
is continually increasing in bulk, and, had there been no outlet,
would inevitably have encroached more and more, and occupied an ever
enlarging area in the depression: but as outlets do exist, the surplus
water is carried off by a natural process, and runs perpetually through
the channels that are there to receive it. The second cause is the
alluvial soil brought down, in immense quantities of every description,
by the rivers swollen from heavy rains, which forms shelving banks and
continually forces the water to take a higher level, which is thus also
carried through these outlets. Now as this process of alluvial deposit
and influx of water is unceasing and continuous, so also the discharge
through the channels is necessarily unceasing and continuous.

These are the true causes of the outflow of the Pontus, which do
not depend for their credit on the stories of merchants, but upon
the actual observation of nature, which is the most accurate method
discoverable.

+40.+ As I have started this topic I must not, as most historians do,
leave any point undiscussed, or only barely stated. My object is rather
to give information, and to clear up doubtful points for my readers.
This is the peculiarity of the present day, in which every sea and land
has been thrown open to travellers; and in which, therefore, one can no
longer employ the evidence of poets and fabulists, as my predecessors
have done on very many points, “offering,” as Heraclitus says, “tainted
witnesses to disputed facts,”—but I must try to make my narrative in
itself carry conviction to my readers.

I say then the Pontus has long been in process of being filled up with
mud, and that this process is actually going on now: and further, that
in process of time both it and the Propontis, assuming the same local
conditions to be maintained, and the causes of the alluvial deposit to
continue active, will be entirely filled up. For time being infinite,
and the depressions most undoubtedly finite, it is plain that, even
though the amount of deposit be small, they must in course of time
be filled. For a finite process, whether of accretion or decrease,
must, if we presuppose infinite time, be eventually completed, however
infinitesimal its progressive stages may be. In the present instance
the amount of soil deposited being not small, but exceedingly large,
it is plain that the result I mentioned will not be remote but rapid.
And, in fact, it is evident that it is already taking place. The
Maeotic lake is already so much choked up, that the greater part of it
is only from seven to five fathoms deep, and accordingly cannot any
longer be passed by large ships without a pilot. And having moreover
been originally a sea precisely on a level with the Pontus, it is now a
freshwater lake: the sea-water has been expelled by the silting up of
the bottom, and the discharge of the rivers has entirely overpowered
it. The same will happen to the Pontus, and indeed is taking place at
this moment; and though it is not evident to ordinary observers, owing
to the vastness of its basin, yet a moderately attentive study will
discover even now what is going on.

+41.+ For the Danube discharging itself into the Pontus by several
mouths, we find opposite it a bank formed by the mud discharged from
these mouths extending for nearly a thousand stades, at a distance of
a day’s sail from the shore as it now exists; upon which ships sailing
to the Pontus run, while apparently still in deep water, and find
themselves unexpectedly stranded on the sandbanks which the sailors
call the Breasts. That this deposit is not close to the shore, but
projected to some distance, must be accounted for thus: exactly as far
as the currents of the rivers retain their force from the strength of
the descending stream, and overpower that of the sea, it must of course
follow that to that distance the earth, and whatever else is carried
down by the rivers, would be projected, and neither settle nor become
fixed until it is reached. But when the force of the currents has
become quite spent by the depth and bulk of the sea, it is but natural
that the soil held in solution should settle down and assume a fixed
position. This is the explanation of the fact, that, in the case of
large and rapid rivers, such embankments are at considerable distances,
and the sea close in shore deep; while in the case of smaller and more
sluggish streams, these sandbanks are at their mouths. The strongest
proof of this is furnished by the case of heavy rains; for when they
occur, rivers of inferior size, overpowering the waves at their mouths,
project the alluvial deposit out to sea, to a distance exactly in
proportion to the force of the streams thus discharging themselves.
It would be mere foolish scepticism to disbelieve in the enormous
size of this sandbank, and in the mass of stones, timber, and earth
carried down by the rivers; when we often see with our own eyes an
insignificant stream suddenly swell into a torrent, and force its way
over lofty rocks, sweeping along with it every kind of timber, soil,
and stones, and making such huge moraines, that at times the appearance
of a locality becomes in a brief period difficult to recognise.[222]

+42.+ This should prevent any surprise that rivers of such magnitude
and rapidity, flowing perpetually instead of intermittently, should
produce these effects and end by filling up the Pontus. For it is not
a mere probability, but a logical certainty, that this must happen.
And a proof of what is going to take place is this, that in the same
proportion as the Maeotic lake is less salt than the Pontus, the
Pontus is less so than the Mediterranean. From which it is manifest
that, when the time which it has taken for the Maeotic lake to fill
up shall have been extended in proportion to the excess of the Pontic
over the Maeotic basin, then the Pontus will also become like a marsh
and lake, and filled with fresh water like the Maeotic lake: nay, we
must suppose that the process will be somewhat more rapid, insomuch
as the rivers falling into it are more numerous and more rapid. I
have said thus much in answer to the incredulity of those who cannot
believe that the Pontus is actually being silted up, and will some day
be filled; and that so vast a sea will ever become a lake or marsh.
But I have another and higher object also in thus speaking: which is
to prevent our ignorance from forcing us to give a childish credence
to every traveller’s tale and marvel related by voyagers; and that,
by possessing certain indications of the truth, we may be enabled by
them to test the truth or falsehood of anything alleged by this or that
person.

[Sidenote: Site of Byzantium.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 512.]

+43.+ I must now return to the discussion of the excellence of the
site of Byzantium. The length of the channel connecting the Pontus
and Propontis being, as I have said, a hundred and twenty stades, and
Hieron marking its termination towards the Pontus, and the Strait
of Byzantium that towards the Propontis,—half-way between these, on
the European side, stands Hermaeum, on a headland jutting out into
the channel, about five stades from the Asiatic coast, just at the
narrowest point of the whole channel; where Darius is said to have
made his bridge of ships across the strait, when he crossed to invade
Scythia. In the rest of the channel the running of the current from the
Pontus is much the same, owing to the similarity of the coast formation
on either side of it; but when it reaches Hermaeum on the European
side, which I said was the narrowest point, the stream flowing from the
Pontus, and being thus confined, strikes the European coast with great
violence, and then, as though by a rebound from a blow, dashes against
the opposite Asiatic coast, and thence again sweeps back and strikes
the European shore near some headlands called the Hearths: thence it
runs rapidly once more to the spot on the Asiatic side called the Cow,
the place on which the myth declares Io to have first stood after
swimming the channel. Finally the current runs from the Cow right up to
Byzantium, and dividing into two streams on either side of the city,
the lesser part of it forms the gulf called the Horn, while the greater
part swerves once more across. But it has no longer sufficient way on
it to reach the opposite shore on which Calchedon stands: for after
its several counter-blows the current, finding at this point a wider
channel, slackens; and no longer makes short rebounds at right angles
from one shore to the other, but more and more at an obtuse angle, and
accordingly, falling short of Calchedon, runs down the middle of the
channel.

[Sidenote: B.C. 410.]

+44.+ What then makes Byzantium a most excellent site, and Calchedon
the reverse, is just this: and although at first sight both positions
seem equally convenient, the practical fact is that it is difficult to
sail up to the latter, even if you wish to do so; while the current
carries you to the former, whether you will or no, as I have just
now shown. And a proof of my assertion is this: those who want to
cross from Calchedon to Byzantium cannot sail straight across the
channel, but coast up to the Cow and Chrysopolis,—which the Athenians
formerly seized, by the advice of Alcibiades, when they for the first
time levied customs on ships sailing into the Pontus,[223]—and then
drift down the current, which carries them as a matter of course to
Byzantium. And the same is the case with a voyage on either side
of Byzantium. For if a man is running before a south wind from the
Hellespont, or to the Hellespont from the Pontus before the Etesian
winds, if he keeps to the European shore, he has a direct and easy
course to the narrow part of the Hellespont between Abydos and Sestos,
and thence also back again to Byzantium: but if he goes from Calchedon
along the Asiatic coast, the case is exactly the reverse, from the fact
that the coast is broken up by deep bays, and that the territory of
Cyzicus projects to a considerable distance. Nor can a man coming from
the Hellespont to Calchedon obviate this by keeping to the European
coast as far as Byzantium, and then striking across to Calchedon;
for the current and other circumstances which I have mentioned make
it difficult. Similarly, for one sailing out from Calchedon it is
absolutely impossible to make straight for Thrace, owing to the
intervening current, and to the fact that both winds are unfavourable
to both voyages; for as the south wind blows into the Pontus, and the
north wind from it, the one or the other of these must be encountered
in both these voyages. These, then, are the advantages enjoyed by
Byzantium in regard to the sea: I must now describe its disadvantages
on shore.

[Sidenote: Disadvantages of Byzantium.]

+45.+ They consist in the fact that its territory is so completely
hemmed in by Thrace from shore to shore, that the Byzantines have a
perpetual and dangerous war continually on hand with the Thracians. For
they are unable once for all to arm and repel them by a single decisive
battle, owing to the number of their people and chiefs. For if they
conquer one chief, three others still more formidable invade their
territory. Nor again do they gain anything by consenting to pay tribute
and make terms; for a concession of any sort to one brings at once five
times as many enemies upon them. Therefore, as I say, they are burdened
by a perpetual and dangerous war: for what can be more hazardous or
more formidable than a war with barbarians living on your borders? Nay,
it is not only this perpetual struggle with danger on land, but, apart
from the evils that always accompany war, they have to endure a misery
like that ascribed by the poets to Tantalus: for being in possession
of an extremely fertile district, no sooner have they expended their
labour upon it and been rewarded by crops of the finest quality, than
the barbarians sweep down, and either destroy them, or collect and
carry them off; and then, to say nothing of the loss of their labour
and expense, the very excellence of the crops enhances the misery and
distress of seeing them destroyed before their eyes. Still, habit
making them able to endure the war with the Thracians, they maintained
their original connexions with the other Greeks; but when to their
other misfortunes was added the attack of the Gauls under Comontorius,
they were reduced to a sad state of distress indeed.

[Sidenote: The Gauls, B.C. 279.]

+46.+ These Gauls had left their country with Brennus, and having
survived the battle at Delphi and made their way to the Hellespont,
instead of crossing to Asia, were captivated by the beauty of the
district round Byzantium, and settled there. Then, having conquered
the Thracians and erected Tyle[224] into a capital, they placed the
Byzantines in extreme danger. In their earlier attacks, made under the
command of Comontorius their first king, the Byzantines always bought
them off by presents amounting to three, or five, or sometimes even
ten thousand gold pieces, on condition of their not devastating their
territory: and at last were compelled to agree to pay them a yearly
tribute of eighty talents, until the time of Cavarus, in whose reign
their kingdom came to an end; and their whole tribe, being in their
turn conquered by the Thracians, were entirely annihilated. It was in
these times, then, that being hard pressed by the payment of these
exactions, the Byzantines first sent embassies to the Greek states with
a prayer for aid and support in their dangerous situation: but being
disregarded by the greater number, they, under pressure of necessity,
attempted to levy dues upon ships sailing into the Pontus.

[Sidenote: The Byzantines levy a toll.]

+47.+ Now this exaction by the Byzantines of a duty upon goods brought
from the Pontus, being a heavy loss and burden to everybody, was
universally regarded as a grievance; and accordingly an appeal from all
those engaged in the trade was made to the Rhodians, as acknowledged
masters of the sea: and it was from this circumstance that the war
originated of which I am about to speak.

[Sidenote: The Rhodians declare war, B.C. 220.]

For the Rhodians, roused to action by the loss incurred by themselves,
as well as that of their neighbours, at first joined their allies in
an embassy to Byzantium, and demanded the abolition of the impost. The
Byzantines refused compliance, being persuaded that they were in the
right by the arguments advanced by their chief magistrates, Hecatorus
and Olympidorus, in their interview with the ambassadors. The Rhodian
envoys accordingly departed without effecting their object. But upon
their return home, war was at once voted against Byzantium on these
grounds; and messengers were immediately despatched to Prusias inviting
his co-operation in the war: for they knew that Prusias was from
various causes incensed with the Byzantines.

[Sidenote: Achaeus.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 226.]

+48.+ The Byzantines took steps of a similar nature, by sending to
Attalus and Achaeus begging for their assistance. For his part Attalus
was ready enough to give it: but his importance was small, because
he had been reduced within the limits of his ancestral dominions by
Achaeus. But Achaeus who exercised dominion throughout Asia on this
side Taurus, and had recently established his regal power, promised
assistance; and his attitude roused high hopes in the minds of the
Byzantines, and corresponding depression in those of the Rhodians and
Prusias. Achaeus was a relation of the Antiochus who had just succeeded
to the kingdom of Syria; and he became possessed of the dominion I
have mentioned through the following circumstances. After the death of
Seleucus, father of the above-named Antiochus, and the succession of
his eldest son Seleucus to the throne, Achaeus accompanied the latter
in an expedition over Mount Taurus, about two years before the period
of which we are speaking.[225] For as soon as Seleucus the younger had
succeeded to the kingdom he learnt that Attalus had already reduced
all Asia on this side of Taurus under his power; and being accordingly
eager to support his own rights, he crossed Taurus with a large army.
There he was treacherously assassinated by Apaturius the Gaul, and
Nicanor. Achaeus, in right of his relationship, promptly revenged his
murder by killing Nicanor and Apaturius; and taking supreme command of
the army and administration, conducted it with wisdom and integrity.
For the opportunity was a convenient one, and the feeling of the common
soldiers was all in favour of his assuming the crown; yet he refused to
do so, and preserving the royal title for Antiochus the younger, son of
Seleucus, went on energetically with the expedition, and the recovery
of the whole of the territory this side Taurus. Meeting however with
unexpected success,—for he shut up Attalus within the walls of Pergamus
and became master of all the rest of the country,—he was puffed up by
his good fortune, and at once swerved from his straightforward course
of policy. He assumed the diadem, adopted the title of king, and was at
this time the most powerful and formidable of all the kings and princes
this side Taurus. This was the man on whose help the Byzantines relied
when they undertook the war against the Rhodians and Prusias.

[Sidenote: Prusias.]

+49.+ As to the provocations given before this to Prusias by the
Byzantines they were various. In the first place he complained that,
having voted to put up certain statues of him, they had not done so,
but had delayed or forgotten it. In the second place he was annoyed
with them for taking great pains to compose the hostility, and put an
end to the war, between Achaeus and Attalus; because he looked upon a
friendship between these two as in many ways detrimental to his own
interests. He was provoked also because it appeared that when Attalus
was keeping the festival of Athene, the Byzantines had sent a mission
to join in the celebration; but had sent no one to him when he was
celebrating the Soteria. Nursing therefore a secret resentment for
these various offences, he gladly snatched at the pretext offered him
by the Rhodians; and arranged with their ambassadors that they were to
carry on the war by sea, while he would undertake to inflict no less
damage on the enemy by land.

Such were the causes and origin of the war between Rhodes and Byzantium.

[Sidenote: Hostilities commence, B.C. 220.]

+50.+ At first the Byzantines entered upon the war with energy, in full
confidence of receiving the assistance of Achaeus; and of being able
to cause Prusias as much alarm and danger by fetching Tiboetes from
Macedonia as he had done to them. For Prusias, entering upon the war
with all the animosity which I have described, had seized the place
called Hieron at the entrance of the channel, which the Byzantines not
long before had purchased for a considerable sum of money, because of
its convenient situation; and because they did not wish to leave in
any one else’s hands a point of vantage to be used against merchants
sailing into the Pontus, or one which commanded the slave trade, or the
fishing. Besides this, Prusias had seized in Asia a district of Mysia,
which had been in the possession of Byzantium for many years past.

Meanwhile the Rhodians manned six ships and received four from their
allies; and, having elected Xenophantus to command them, they sailed
with this squadron of ten ships to the Hellespont. Nine of them dropped
anchor near Sestos, and stopped ships sailing into the Pontus; with
the tenth the admiral sailed to Byzantium, to test the spirit of the
people, and see whether they were already sufficiently alarmed to
change their minds about the war. Finding them resolved not to listen
he sailed away, and, taking up his other nine ships, returned to Rhodes
with the whole squadron.

Meanwhile the Byzantines sent a message to Achaeus asking for aid, and
an escort to conduct Tiboetes from Macedonia. For it was believed that
Tiboetes had as good a claim to the kingdom of Bithynia as Prusias, who
was his nephew.

[Sidenote: The Rhodians secure the friendship of Achaeus.]

+51.+ But seeing the confident spirit of the Byzantines, the Rhodians
adopted an exceedingly able plan to obtain their object. They perceived
that the resolution of the Byzantines in venturing on the war rested
mainly on their hopes of the support of Achaeus. Now they knew that
the father of Achaeus was detained at Alexandria, and that Achaeus was
exceedingly anxious for his father’s safety: they therefore hit upon
the idea of sending an embassy to Ptolemy, and asking him to deliver
this Andromachus to them. This request, indeed, they had before made,
but without laying any great stress upon it: now, however, they were
genuinely anxious for it; that, by doing this favour to Achaeus,
they might lay him under such an obligation to them, that he would
be unable to refuse any request they might make to him. When the
ambassadors arrived, Ptolemy at first deliberated as to detaining
Andromachus; because there still remained some points of dispute
between himself and Antiochus unsettled; and Achaeus, who had recently
declared himself king, could exercise a decisive influence in several
important particulars. For Andromachus was not only father of Achaeus,
but brother also of Laodice, the wife of Seleucus.[226] However, on a
review of the whole situation, Ptolemy inclined to the Rhodians; and
being anxious to show them every favour, he yielded to their request,
and handed over Andromachus to them to conduct to his son. Having
accordingly done this, and having conferred some additional marks of
honour on Achaeus, they deprived the Byzantines of their most important
hope. And this was not the only disappointment which the Byzantines
had to encounter; for as Tiboetes was being escorted from Macedonia,
he entirely defeated their plans by dying. This misfortune damped the
ardour of the Byzantines, while it encouraged Prusias to push on the
war. On the Asiatic side he carried it on in person, and with great
energy; while on the European side he hired Thracians who prevented the
Byzantines from leaving their gates. For their party being thus baulked
of their hopes, and surrounded on every side by enemies, the Byzantines
began to look about then for some decent pretext for withdrawing from
the war.

[Sidenote: The Gallic king, Cavarus, negotiates a peace, B.C. 220.]

+52.+ So when the Gallic king, Cavarus, came to Byzantium, and showed
himself eager to put an end to the war, and earnestly offered his
friendly intervention, both Prusias and the Byzantines consented to his
proposals. And when the Rhodians were informed of the interference of
Cavarus and the consent of Prusias, being very anxious to secure their
own object also, they elected Aridices as ambassador to Byzantium, and
sent Polemocles with him in command of three triremes, wishing, as the
saying is, to send the Byzantines “spear and herald’s staff at once.”
Upon their appearance a pacification was arranged, in the year of
Cothon, son of Callisthenes, Hieromnemon in Byzantium.[227] The treaty
with the Rhodians was simple: “The Byzantines will not collect toll
from any ship sailing into the Pontus; and in that case the Rhodians
and their allies are at peace with the Byzantines.” But that with
Prusias contained the following provisions: “There shall be peace and
amity for ever between Prusias and the Byzantines; the Byzantines shall
in no way attack Prusias, nor Prusias the Byzantines. Prusias shall
restore to Byzantines all lands, forts, populations, and prisoners
of war, without ransom; and besides these things, the ships taken at
the beginning of the war, and the arms seized in the fortresses; and
also the timbers, stone-work, and roofing belonging to the fort called
Hieron” (for Prusias, in his terror of the approach of Tiboetes, had
pulled down every fort which seemed to lie conveniently for him):
“finally, Prusias shall compel such of the Bithynians as have any
property taken from the Byzantine district of Mysia to restore it to
the farmers.”

Such were the beginning and end of the war of Rhodes and Prusias with
Byzantium.

[Sidenote: War between Rhodes and Crete.]

+53.+ At the same time the Cnossians sent an embassy to the Rhodians,
and persuaded them to send them the ships that were under the command
of Polemocles, and to launch three undecked vessels besides and send
them also to Crete. The Rhodians having complied, and the vessels
having arrived at Crete, the people of Eleutherna suspecting that one
of their citizens named Timarchus had been put to death by Polemocles
to please the Cnossians, first proclaimed a right of reprisal against
the Rhodians, and then went to open war with them.

[Sidenote: The destruction of Lyttos.]

The people of Lyttos,[228] too, a short time before this, met with an
irretrievable disaster. At that time the political state of Crete as
a whole was this. The Cnossians, in league with the people of Gortyn,
had a short time previously reduced the whole island under their power,
with the exception of the city of Lyttos; and this being the only city
which refused obedience, they resolved to go to war with it, being
bent upon removing its inhabitants from their homes, as an example and
terror to the rest of Crete. Accordingly at first the whole of the
other Cretan cities were united in war against Lyttos: but presently
when some jealousy arose from certain trifling causes, as is the way
with the Cretans, they separated into hostile parties, the peoples of
Polyrrhen, Cere, and Lappa, along with the Horii and Arcades,[229]
forming one party and separating themselves from connexion with the
Cnossians, resolved to make common cause with the Lyttians. Among the
people of Gortyn, again, the elder men espoused the side of Cnossus,
the younger that of Lyttos, and so were in opposition to each other.
Taken by surprise by this disintegration of their allies, the Cnossians
fetched over a thousand men from Aetolia in virtue of their alliance:
upon which the party of the elders in Gortyn immediately seized the
citadel; introduced the Cnossians and Aetolians; and either expelled
or put to death the young men, and delivered the city into the hands
of the Cnossians. And at the same time, the Lyttians having gone out
with their full forces on an expedition into the enemy’s territory, the
Cnossians got information of the fact, and seized Lyttos while thus
denuded of its defenders. The children and women they sent to Cnossus;
and having set fire to the town, thrown down its buildings, and damaged
it in every possible way, returned. When the Lyttians reached home from
their expedition, and saw what had happened, they were struck with
such violent grief that not a man of the whole host had the heart to
enter his native city; but one and all having marched round its walls,
with frequent cries and lamentations over their misfortune and that of
their country, turned back again towards the city of Lappa. The people
of Lappa gave them a kind and entirely cordial reception; and having
thus in one day become cityless and aliens, they joined these allies in
their war against the Cnossians. Thus at one fell swoop was Lyttos, a
colony of Sparta and allied with the Lacedaemonians in blood, the most
ancient of the cities in Crete, and by common consent the mother of the
bravest men in the island, utterly cut off.

[Sidenote: Appeal to the Achaeans and Philip.]

+55.+ But the peoples of Polyrrhen and Lappa and all their allies,
seeing that the Cnossians clung to the alliance of the Aetolians, and
that the Aetolians were at war with King Philip and the Achaeans,
sent ambassadors to the two latter asking for their help and to be
admitted to alliance with them. Both requests were granted: they
were admitted into the roll of allies, and assistance was sent to
them, consisting of four hundred Illyrians under Plator, two hundred
Achaeans, and a hundred Phocians; whose arrival was of the utmost
advantage to the interest of Polyrrhenia and her allies: for in a brief
space of time they shut the Eleuthernaeans and Cydonians within their
walls, and compelled the people of Aptera to forsake the alliance of
the Cnossians and share their fortunes. When these results had been
obtained, the Polyrrhenians and their allies joined in sending to the
aid of Philip and the Achaeans five hundred Cretans, the Cnossians
having sent a thousand to the Aetolians a short time before; both of
which contingents took part in the existing war on their respective
sides. Nay more, the exiled party of Gortyn seized the harbour of
Phaestus,[230] and also by a sudden and bold attack occupied the port
of Gortyn itself; and from these two places as bases of operation they
carried on the war with the party in the town. Such was the state of
Crete.

[Sidenote: Mithridates IV., king of Pontus, declares war against
Sinope.]

+56.+ About the same time Mithridates also declared war against the
people of Sinope; which proved to be the beginning and occasion of the
disaster which ultimately befell the Sinopeans. Upon their sending
an embassy with a view to this war to beg for assistance from the
Rhodians, the latter decided to elect three men, and to grant them a
hundred and forty thousand drachmae with which to procure supplies
needed by the Sinopeans. The men so appointed got ready ten thousand
jars of wine, three hundred talents[231] of prepared hair, a hundred
talents of made-up bowstring, a thousand suits of armour, three
thousand gold pieces, and four catapults with engineers to work them.
The Sinopean envoys took these presents and departed; for the people
of Sinope, being in great anxiety lest Mithridates should attempt
to besiege them both by land and sea, were making all manner of
preparations with this view. Sinope lies on the right-hand shore of the
Pontus as one sails to Phasis, and is built upon a peninsula jutting
out into the sea: it is on the neck of this peninsula, connecting it
with Asia, which is not more than two stades wide, that the city is
so placed as to entirely close it up from sea to sea; the rest of
the peninsula stretches out into the open sea,—a piece of flat land
from which the town is easily accessible, but surrounded by a steep
coast offering very bad harbourage, and having exceedingly few spots
admitting of disembarkation. The Sinopeans then were dreadfully alarmed
lest Mithridates should blockade them, by throwing up works against
their town on the side towards Asia, and by making a descent on the
opposite side upon the low ground in front of the town: and they
accordingly determined to strengthen the line of the peninsula, where
it was washed by the sea, by putting up wooden defences and erecting
palisades round the places accessible from the sea; and at the same
time by storing weapons and stationing guards at all points open to
attack: for the whole area is not large, but is capable of being easily
defended and by a moderate force.

Such was the situation at Sinope at the time of the commencement of the
Social war,—to which I must now return.

[Sidenote: The History of the Social war resumed from ch. 37. Philip
starts for Aetolia, B.C. 219. Night surprise of Aegira.]

+57.+ King Philip started from Macedonia with his army for Thessaly and
Epirus, being bent on taking that route in his invasion of Aetolia.
And at the same time Alexander and Dorimachus, having succeeded in
establishing an intrigue for the betrayal of Aegira, had collected
about twelve hundred Aetolians into Oeanthe, which is in Aetolia,
exactly opposite the above-named town; and, having prepared vessels
to convey them across the gulf, were waiting for favourable weather
for making the voyage in fulfilment of their design. For a deserter
from Aetolia, who had spent a long time at Aegira, and had had full
opportunity of observing that the guards of the gate towards Aegium
were in the habit of getting drunk, and keeping their watch with great
slackness, had again and again crossed over to Dorimachus; and, laying
this fact before him, had invited him to make the attempt, well knowing
that he was thoroughly accustomed to such practices. The city of Aegira
lies on the Peloponnesian coast of the Corinthian gulf, between the
cities of Aegium and Sicyon, upon some strong and inaccessible heights,
facing towards Parnassus and that district of the opposite coast, and
standing about seven stades back from the sea. At the mouth of the
river which flows past this town Dorimachus dropped anchor under cover
of night, having at length obtained favourable weather for crossing.
He and Alexander, accompanied by Archidamus the son of Pantaleon and
the main body of the Aetolians, then advanced towards the city along
the road leading from Aegium. But the deserter, with twenty of the
most active men, having made his way by a shorter cut than the others
over the cliffs where there was no road, owing to his knowledge of the
locality, got into the city through a certain water-course and found
the guards of the gate still asleep. Having killed them while actually
in their beds, and cut the bolts of the gates with their axes, they
opened them to the Aetolians. Having thus surprised the town, they
behaved with a conspicuous want of caution, which eventually saved
the people of Aegira, and proved the destruction of the Aetolians
themselves. They seemed to imagine that to get within the gates was all
there was to do in occupying an enemy’s town; and accordingly acted as
I shall now describe.

[Sidenote: Alexander killed.]

+58.+ They kept together for a very brief space of time near the
market-place, and then scattering in every direction, in their passion
for plunder, rushed into the houses and began carrying off the wealth
they contained. But it was now broad daylight: and the attack being
wholly unexpected and sudden, those of the Aegiratans whose houses
were actually entered by the enemy, in the utmost terror and alarm,
all took to flight and made their way out of the town, believing it
to be completely in the power of the enemy; but those of them whose
houses were untouched, and who, hearing the shouting, sallied out to
the rescue, all rushed with one accord to the citadel. These last
continually increased in number and confidence; while the Aetolians on
the contrary kept continually becoming less closely united, and less
subject to discipline, from the causes above mentioned. But Dorimachus,
becoming conscious of his danger, rallied his men and charged the
citizens who were occupying the citadel: imagining that, by acting
with decision and boldness, he would terrify and turn to flight those
who had rallied to defend the town. But the Aegiratans, cheering each
other on, offered a strenuous resistance, and grappled gallantly with
the Aetolians. The citadel being unwalled, and the struggle being at
close quarters and man to man, the battle was at first as desperate
as might be expected between two sides, of which one was fighting for
country and children, the other for bare life. Finally the invading
Aetolians were repulsed: and the Aegiratans, taking advantage of their
higher position, made a fierce and vigorous charge down the <DW72> upon
the enemy; which struck such terror in them, that in the confusion
that followed the fugitives trampled each other to death at the gates.
Alexander himself fell fighting in the actual battle; but Archidamus
was killed in the struggle and crush at the gates. Of the main body of
Aetolians, some were trampled to death; others flying over the pathless
hills fell over precipices and broke their necks; while such as escaped
in safety to the ships managed, after shamefully throwing away their
arms, to sail away and escape from what seemed a desperate danger.
Thus it came about that the Aegiratans having lost their city by their
carelessness, unexpectedly regained it by their valour and gallantry.

[Sidenote: Euripidas.]

+59.+ About the same time Euripidas, who had been sent out to act
as general to the Eleans, after overrunning the districts of Dyme,
Pharae, and Tritaea, and collecting a considerable amount of booty, was
marching back to Elis. But Miccus of Dyme, who happened at the time to
be Sub-strategus of the Achaean league, went out to the rescue with a
body of Dymaeans, Pharaeans, and Tritaeans, and attacked him as he was
returning. But proceeding too precipitately, he fell into an ambush
and lost a large number of his men: for forty of his infantry were
killed and about two hundred taken prisoners. Elated by this success,
Euripidas a few days afterwards made another expedition, and seized
a fort belonging to the Dymaeans on the river Araxus, standing in an
excellent situation, and called the Wall, which the myths affirm to
have been anciently built by Hercules, when at war with the Eleans, as
a base of operations against them.

[Sidenote: Inactivity of Aratus. Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea separate
from the league.]

+60.+ The peoples of Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea having been worsted in
their attempt to relieve the country, and afraid of what would happen
from this capture of the fort, first sent messengers to the Strategus,
Aratus, to inform him of what had happened and to ask for aid, and
afterwards a formal embassy with the same request. But Aratus was
unable to get the mercenaries together, because in the Cleomenic war
the Achaeans had failed to pay some of the wages of the hired troops:
and his entire policy and management of the whole war was in a word
without spirit or nerve. Accordingly Lycurgus seized the Athenaeum of
Megalopolis, and Euripidas followed up his former successes by taking
Gortyna[232] in the territory of Telphusa. But the people of Dyme,
Pharae, and Tritaea, despairing of assistance from the Strategus,
came to a mutual agreement to cease paying the common contribution
to the Achaean league, and to collect a mercenary army on their own
account, three hundred infantry and fifty horse; and to secure the
country by their means. In this action they were considered to have
shown a prudent regard for their own interests, but not for those of
the community at large; for they were thought to have set an evil
example, and supplied a precedent to those whose wish it was to break
up the league. But in fact the chief blame for their proceeding must
rightfully be assigned to the Strategus, who pursued such a dilatory
policy, and slighted or wholly rejected the prayers for help which
reached him from time to time. For as long as he has any hope, from
relations and allies, any man who is in danger will cling to them; but
when in his distress he has to give up that hope, he is forced to help
himself the best way he can. Wherefore we must not find fault with the
people of Tritaea, Pharae, and Dyme for having mercenaries on their own
account, when the chief magistrate of the league hesitated to act: but
some blame does attach to them for renouncing the joint contribution.
They certainly were not bound to neglect to secure their own safety by
every opportunity and means in their power; but they were bound at the
same time to keep up their just dues to the league: especially as the
recovery of such payment was perfectly secured to them by the common
laws; and most of all because they had been the originators of the
Achaean confederacy.[233]

[Sidenote: Philip V. at Ambracia, B.C. 219.]

+61.+ Such was the state of things in the Peloponnese when King
Philip, after crossing Thessaly, arrived in Epirus. Reinforcing his
Macedonians by a full levy of Epirotes, and being joined by three
hundred slingers from Achaia, and the five hundred Cretans sent him by
the Polyrrhenians, he continued his march through Epirus and arrived
in the territory of the Ambracians. Now, if he had continued his march
without interruption, and thrown himself into the interior of Aetolia,
by the sudden and unlooked-for attack of so formidable an army he
would have put an end to the whole campaign: but as it was, he was
over-persuaded by the Epirotes to take Ambracus first; and so gave the
Aetolians an interval in which to make a stand, to take precautionary
measures, and to prepare for the future. For the Epirotes, thinking
more of their own advantage than of that of the confederacy, and being
very anxious to get Ambracus[234] into their power, begged Philip to
invest the town and take it before doing anything else: the fact being
that they regarded it as a matter of the utmost importance to recover
Ambracia from the Aetolians; and thought that the only way of doing
this was to become masters of this place, Ambracus, and besiege the
town of Ambracia from it. For Ambracus is a place strongly fortified by
walls and out-works, standing in the midst of marshes, and approached
from the land by only one narrow raised causeway; and commanding by its
situation both the district and town of Ambracia.

[Sidenote: Scopas tries to effect a diversion by invading Macedonia. On
his return he destroys Dium.]

+62.+ While Philip, then, by the persuasion of the Epirotes, pitching
his camp near Ambracus, was engaged in making his preparations for
the siege, Scopas raised a general levy of Aetolians, and marching
through Thessaly crossed the frontiers of Macedonia; traversed the
plain of Plena, and laid it waste; and after securing considerable
booty, returned by the road leading to Dium. The inhabitants of that
town abandoning the place, he entered it and threw down its walls,
houses, and gymnasium; set fire to the covered walks round the sacred
enclosure, and destroyed all the other offerings which had been placed
in it, either for ornament, or for the use of visitors to the public
assemblies, and threw down all the statues of the kings. And this
man, who, at the very beginning and first action of the war, had thus
turned his arms against the gods as well as men, was not treated on his
return to Aetolia as guilty of impiety, but was honoured and looked
up to. For he had indeed filled the Aetolians with empty hopes and
irrational conceit. From this time they indulged the idea that no one
would venture to set foot in Aetolia, while they would be able without
resistance not only to plunder the Peloponnese, which they were quite
accustomed to do, but Thessaly and Macedonia also.

[Sidenote: Ambracus taken.]

[Sidenote: Philip enters Aetolia; takes Phoeteiae.]

+63.+ When he heard what had happened in Macedonia, and had thus paid
on the spot for the selfishness and folly of the Epirotes, Philip
proceeded to besiege Ambracus. By an energetic use of earthworks,
and other siege operations, he quickly terrified the people into
submission, and the place surrendered after a delay of forty days in
all. He let the garrison, consisting of five hundred Aetolians, depart
on fixed conditions, and gratified the cupidity of the Epirotes by
handing over Ambracus to them, while he himself set his army in motion,
and marched by way of Charadra, being anxious to cross the Ambracian
gulf where it is narrowest, that is to say, near the Acarnanian temple
called Actium. For this gulf is a branch of the Sicilian sea between
Epirus and Acarnania, with a very narrow opening of less than five
stades, but expanding as it extends inland to a breadth of a hundred
stades; while the length of the whole arm from the open sea is about
three hundred stades. It forms the boundary between Epirus on the north
and Acarnania on the south. Philip, therefore, having got his army
across this entrance of the gulf, and advanced through Acarnania, came
to the city of Phoeteiae, which belonged to the Aetolians;[235] having,
during his march, been joined by an Acarnanian force of two thousand
foot and two hundred horse. Encamping under the walls of this town,
and making energetic and formidable assaults upon it during two days,
it was surrendered to him on terms, and the Aetolian garrison were
dismissed on parole. Next night, however, five hundred other Aetolians,
believing the town still untaken, came to its relief; whose arrival
being ascertained beforehand by the king, he stationed some men in
ambush at certain convenient spots, and slew most of the new-comers
and captured all but a very few of the rest. After these events, he
distributed a month’s rations of corn among his men from what had been
captured, for a large store was found collected at Phoeteiae, and
then continued his advance into the territory of Stratus. At about
ten stades from that town he pitched his camp on the banks of the
river Achelous; and from that began laying waste the country without
resistance, none of the enemy venturing out to attack him.

[Sidenote: Metropolis and Conope.]

[Sidenote: Skirmish on the Achelous.]

[Sidenote: Ithoria.]

+64.+ Meanwhile the Achaeans, being hard pressed by the war, and
ascertaining that the king was not far off, sent ambassadors to him
begging for help. They found Philip still in his camp near Stratus,
and there delivered their commission: and besides the message with
which they were charged, they pointed out to him the richness of the
booty which his army would get from the enemy’s country, and tried to
persuade him to cross to Rhium and invade Elis. The king listened to
what they had to say, and kept the ambassadors with him, alleging that
he must consider of their request; and meanwhile broke up his camp,
and marched in the direction of Metropolis and Conope. The Aetolians
kept possession of the citadel of Metropolis but abandoned the town:
whereupon Philip set fire to Metropolis, and continued his advance
against Conope. But when the Aetolian horse rallied and ventured to
meet him at the ford of the Achelous, which is about twenty stades
before you reach the town, believing that they would either stop his
advance altogether, or inflict much damage on the Macedonians while
crossing the river; the king, fully understanding their tactics,
ordered his light-armed troops to enter the river first and to cross it
in close order, keeping to their regular companies, and with shields
interlocked. His orders were obeyed: and as soon as the first company
had effected the crossing, the Aetolian cavalry attacked it; but
they could make no impression upon it, standing as it did in close
order, and being joined in similar close order, shield to shield, by
a second and a third company as they crossed. Therefore they wheeled
off discomfited and retired to the city. From this time forth the
proud gallantry of the Aetolians was fain to confine itself to the
protection of the towns, and keep quiet; while Philip crossed with his
army, and after wasting this district also without resistance, arrived
at Ithoria. This is a position completely commanding the road, and of
extraordinary strength, natural as well as artificial. On his approach,
however, the garrison occupying the place abandoned it in a panic; and
the king, taking possession, levelled it to the ground: and gave orders
to his skirmishing parties to treat all forts in the district in the
same way.

[Sidenote: Paeanium.]

[Sidenote: Fortifies Oeniadae.]

+65.+ Having thus passed the narrow part of the road, he proceeded
at a slow and deliberate pace, giving his army time to collect booty
from the country; and by the time he reached Oeniadae his army was
richly provided with every kind of goods. But he resolved first to
take Paeanium: and having pitched his camp under its walls, by a
series of assaults carried the place by force,—a town not large in
circumference, for that was less than seven stades, but second to none
in the construction of its houses, walls, and towers. The wall of this
town he levelled with its foundation, and, breaking down its houses,
he packed their timbers and tiles with great care upon rafts, and sent
them down the river to Oeniadae. At first the Aetolians resolved to
hold the citadel in Oeniadae, which they had strengthened with walls
and other fortifications; but upon Philip’s approach they evacuated it
in a panic. The king therefore having taken this city also, advanced
from it and encamped on a certain secure position in Calydonia, called
Elaeus, which had been rendered extraordinarily strong with walls
and other fortifications by Attalus, who undertook the work for the
Aetolians. Having carried this also by assault, and plundered the whole
of Calydonia, the Macedonians returned to Oeniadae. And observing the
convenient position of this place for all purposes, and especially as
providing a place of embarkation for the Peloponnese, Philip resolved
to build a wall round the town. For Oeniadae lies on the sea-coast,
at the juncture of the Acarnanian and Aetolian frontiers, just at the
entrance of the Corinthian gulf; and the town faces the sea-coast of
Dyme in the Peloponnesus, and is the nearest point to the promontory of
Araxus in it; for the intervening sea is not more than a hundred stades
across. Looking to these facts he fortified the citadel by itself;
and, building a wall round the harbour and dockyards, was intending
to connect them with the citadel, employing for the construction the
materials brought from Paeanium.

[Sidenote: Philip recalled to Macedonia by a threatened invasion of
Dardani.]

[Sidenote: Late summer of B.C. 219.]

+66.+ But whilst he was still engaged on this work, news was brought
to the king that the Dardani, suspecting his intention of invading
the Peloponnese, were collecting forces and making great preparations
with the determination of invading Macedonia. When he heard this,
Philip made up his mind that he was bound to go with all speed to the
protection of Macedonia: and accordingly he dismissed the Achaean
envoys with the answer, which he now gave them, that when he had taken
effectual measures with regard to the circumstances that had just been
announced to him, he would look upon it as his first business to bring
them aid to the best of his ability. Thereupon he broke up his camp,
and began his return march with all speed, by the same route as that by
which he had come. When he was on the point of recrossing the Ambracian
gulf from Acarnania into Epirus, Demetrius of Pharos presented himself,
sailing with a single galley, having just been banished from Illyria by
the Romans,—as I have stated in the previous book.[236] Philip received
him with kindness and bade him sail to Corinth, and go thence through
Thessaly to Macedonia; while he himself crossed into Epirus and pushed
on without a halt. When he had reached Pella in Macedonia, the Dardani
learnt from some Thracian deserters that he was in the country, and
they at once in a panic broke up their army, though they were close to
the Macedonian frontier. And Philip, being informed of their change of
purpose, dismissed his Macedonian soldiers to gather in their harvest:
while he himself went to Thessaly, and spent the rest of the summer at
Larisa.

[Sidenote: Contemporary events in Spain and Italy.]

It was at this season that Aemilius celebrated a splendid triumph at
Rome for his Illyrian victories; and Hannibal after the capture of
Saguntum dismissed his troops into winter quarters; while the Romans,
on hearing of the capture of Saguntum, were sending ambassadors to
Carthage to demand the surrender of Hannibal, and at the same time were
making preparations for the war after electing Publius Cornelius Scipio
and Tiberius Sempronius Longus Consuls for the following year, as I
have stated in detail in the previous book. My object in recalling the
facts here is to carry out my original plan of showing what events in
various parts of the world were contemporaneous.

[Sidenote: Midsummer B.C. 217. Dorimachus Aetolian Strategus, Sept.
B.C. 119.]

[Sidenote: Destroys Dodona.]

+67.+ And so the first year of this Olympiad was drawing to a close.
In Aetolia, the time of the elections having come round, Dorimachus
was elected Strategus. He was no sooner invested with his office,
than, summoning the Aetolian forces, he made an armed foray upon
the highlands of Epirus, and began wasting the country with an even
stronger passion for destruction than usual; for his object in
everything he did was not so much to secure booty for himself, as
to damage the Epirotes. And having come to Dodona[237] he burnt the
colonnades, destroyed the sacred offerings, and even demolished the
sacred building; so that we may say that the Aetolians had no regard
for the laws of peace or war, but in the one as well as in the other,
acted in defiance of the customs and principles of mankind. After
those, and other similar achievements, Dorimachus returned home.

[Sidenote: Philip starts again.]

[Sidenote: Dec. B.C. 219.]

But the winter being now considerably advanced, and all idea of the
king coming being given up owing to the time of the year, Philip
suddenly started from Larisa with an army of three thousand hoplites
armed with brass shields, two thousand light-armed, three hundred
Cretans, and four hundred horse of the royal guard; and having
transported them into Euboea and thence to Cynos he came through
Boeotia and the Megarid to Corinth, about the time of the winter
solstice; having conducted his arrival with such promptitude and
secrecy, that not a single Peloponnesian suspected it. He at once
closed the gates of Corinth and secured the roads by guards; and on the
very next day sent for Aratus the elder to come to him from Sicyon,
and issued despatches to the Strategus of the Achaean league and the
cities, in which he named a time and place for them all to meet him in
arms. Having made these arrangements, he again started, and pitched his
camp near the temple of the Dioscuri in Phliasia.

[Sidenote: B.C. 218, Jan.-Feb. Destruction of a marauding army of
Eleans under Euripidas.]

+68.+ Meanwhile Euripidas, with two companies of Eleans,—who combined
with the pirates and mercenaries made up an army of two thousand two
hundred men, besides a hundred horse,—started from Psophis and began
marching by way of Pheneus and Stymphalus, knowing nothing about
Philip’s arrival, with the purpose of wasting the territory of Sicyon.
The very night in which it chanced that Philip had pitched his camp
near the temple of the Dioscuri, he passed the royal quarters, and
succeeded in entering the territory of Sicyon, about the time of the
morning watch. But some Cretans of Philip’s army who had left their
ranks, and were prowling about on the track of prey, fell into the
hands of Euripidas, and being questioned by him informed him of the
arrival of the Macedonians. Without saying a word of his discovery to
any one, he at once caused his army to face about, and marched back
by the same road as that by which he had come; with the intention and
hope of getting through Stymphalia, and reaching the difficult ground
beyond it, before the Macedonians could catch him. But the king knowing
nothing at all about the proceedings of the enemy, at daybreak broke
up his camp and began his advance in pursuance of his original plan,
determining to march by way of Stymphalus itself to Caphyae: for it was
at that town that he had written to the Achaeans to meet him.

[Sidenote: The Eleans come across the Macedonians at the junction of
the two roads above Stymphalus.]

+69.+ Now it happened that, just as the Macedonian advanced guard
came to the top of the hill, near a place called Apelaurus, about
ten stades before you come to Stymphalus, the advanced guard of
the Eleans converged upon it also. Understanding from his previous
information what had happened, Euripidas took some horsemen with him
and avoided the danger by flight, making his way across country to
Psophis. The rest of the Eleans being thus deserted by their leader,
and panic-struck at what had happened, remained stationary on the
road, not knowing what to do, or which way to turn. For at first their
officers imagined that the troops they saw were some Achaeans come
out to resist them. What favoured this mistake more than anything
else were the brass shields of the hoplites: for they imagined that
they were Megalopolitans, because the soldiers of that town had borne
shields of that sort at the battle of Sellasia against Cleomenes, King
Antigonus having furnished them for the occasion. Under this idea, they
retired in good order to some rising ground, by no means despairing of
getting off safely: but as soon as the Macedonians had advanced close
up to them, grasping the true state of the case, they threw down their
shields and fled. About twelve hundred of them were taken prisoners;
but the rest perished utterly, some at the hands of the Macedonians,
and others by falling down precipices: and finally not more than a
hundred altogether escaped. Having despatched the spoils and the
prisoners to Corinth, Philip continued his expedition. But a great
impression was made upon the Peloponnesians: for they had not heard of
the king’s arrival until they heard of his victory.

[Sidenote: Philip advances to Psophis.]

[Sidenote: A description of Psophis.]

+70.+ Continuing his march through Arcadia, and encountering heavy snow
storms and much fatigue in the pass over Mount Oligyrtus, he arrived on
the third day at Caphyae. There he rested his army for two days, and
was joined by Aratus the younger, and the Achaean soldiers whom he had
collected; so that, with an army now amounting to ten thousand men,
he advanced by way of Clitoria towards Psophis, collecting missiles
and scaling ladders from the towns through which he passed. Psophis is
a place of acknowledged antiquity, and a colony of the Arcadian town
of Azanis. Taking the Peloponnesus as a whole, it occupies a central
position in the country; but in regard to Arcadia it is on its western
frontier, and is close also to the western borderland of Achaia: its
position also commands the territory of the Eleans, with whom at that
time it was politically united. Philip reached this town on the third
day after leaving Caphyae, and pitched his camp on some rising ground
overhanging the city, from which he could in perfect security command
a view both of the whole town and the country round it. But when the
king saw the great strength of the place, he was at a loss what to do.
Along the left side of it rushes a violent winter torrent, which for
the greater part of the winter is impassable, and in any case renders
the city secure and difficult of approach, owing to the size of the
bed which its waters have worn out for themselves by slow degrees, in
the course of ages, as it comes rushing down from the higher ground.
On the east again there is a broad and rapid river, the Erymanthus,
about which so many tales are told. This river is joined by the
winter torrent at a point south of the town, which is thus defended
on three sides by these streams; while the fourth, or northern, side
is commanded by a hill, which has been fortified, and serves as a
convenient and efficient citadel. The town has walls also of unusual
size and construction; and besides all this, a reinforcement of Eleans
happened to have just come in, and Euripidas himself was in the town
after his escape from Stymphalus.

[Sidenote: Capture of Psophis.]

+71.+ The sight of these things caused Philip much anxious thought.
Sometimes he was for giving up his plan of attacking and besieging
the place: at others the excellence of its situation made him eager
to accomplish this. For just as it was then a source of danger to the
Achaeans and Arcadians, and a safe place of arms for the Eleans; so
would it on the other hand, if captured, become a source of safety
to the Arcadians, and a most convenient base of operations for the
allies against the Eleans. These considerations finally decided him to
make the attempt: and he therefore issued orders to the Macedonians
to get their breakfasts at daybreak, and be ready for service with
all preparations completed. Everything being done as he ordered, the
king led his army over the bridge across the Erymanthus; and no one
having offered him resistance, owing to the unexpectedness of the
movement, he arrived under the walls of the town in gallant style and
with formidable show. Euripidas and the garrison were overpowered
with astonishment; because they had felt certain that the enemy would
not venture on an assault, or try to carry a town of such strength;
and that a siege could not last long either, owing to the severity of
the season. This calculation of chances made them begin to entertain
suspicions of each other, from a misgiving that Philip must have
established a secret intrigue with some persons in the town against
it. But finding that nothing of the sort existed among themselves, the
greater number hurried to the walls to defend them, while the mercenary
Elean soldiers sallied out of a gate in the upper part of the town
to attack the enemy. The king stationed his men who had ladders at
three different spots, and divided the other Macedonians among these
three parties; this being arranged, he gave the signal by the sound
of trumpet, and began the assault on the walls at once. At first the
garrison offered a spirited resistance and hurled many of the enemy
from their ladders; but when the supply of weapons inside the town, as
well as other necessary materials, began to run short,—as was to be
expected from the hasty nature of the preparations for defence,—and the
Macedonians showed no sign of terror, the next man filling up the place
of each who was hurled from the scaling-ladder, the garrison at length
turned to flight, and made their escape one and all into the citadel.
In the king’s army the Macedonians then made good their footing on
the wall, while the Cretans went against the party of mercenaries who
had sallied from the upper gate, and forced them to throw away their
shields and fly in disorder. Following the fugitives with slaughter,
they forced their way along with them through the gate: so that the
town was captured at all points at once. The Psophidians with their
wives and children retreated into the citadel, and Euripidas with them,
as well as all the soldiers who had escaped destruction.

[Sidenote: Surrender of the citadel of Psophis.]

+72.+ Having thus carried the place, the Macedonians at once plundered
all the furniture of the houses; and then, setting up their quarters
in the houses, took regular possession of the town. But the people
who had taken refuge in a body in the citadel, having no provisions
with them, and well foreseeing what must happen, made up their minds
to give themselves up to Philip. They accordingly sent a herald to
the king; and having received a safe-conduct for an embassy, they
despatched their magistrates and Euripidas with them on this mission,
who made terms with the king by which the lives and liberties of all
who were on the citadel, whether citizens or foreigners, were secured.
The ambassadors then returned whence they came, carrying an order to
the people to remain where they were until the army had marched out,
for fear any of the soldiers should disobey orders and plunder them. A
fall of snow however compelled the king to remain where he was for some
days; in the course of which he summoned a meeting of such Achaeans
as were in the army, and after pointing out to them the strength and
excellent position of the town for the purposes of the present war,
he spoke also of his own friendly disposition towards their nation:
and ended by saying, “We hereby yield up and present this town to
the Achaeans; for it is our purpose to show them all the favour in
our power, and to omit nothing that may testify to our zeal.” After
receiving the thanks of Aratus and the meeting, Philip dismissed the
assembly, and getting his army in motion, marched towards Lasion. The
Psophidians descending from the citadel received back the possession of
the town, each man recovering his own house; while Euripidas departed
to Corinth, and thence to Aetolia. Those of the Achaean magistrates who
were present put Prolaus of Sicyon in command of the citadel, with an
adequate garrison; and Pythias of Pallene in command of the town. Such
was the end of the incident of Psophis.

[Sidenote: Lasion and Stratus.]

[Sidenote: Philip at Olympia.]

[Sidenote: Prosperity of Elis.]

+73.+ But when the Elean garrison of Lasion heard of the coming of the
Macedonians, and were informed of what had taken place at Psophis, they
at once abandoned the town; so that upon his arrival the king took it
immediately, and by way of enhancing his favours to the Achaeans handed
Lasion also over to them; and in a similar spirit restored Stratus
to the Telphusians, which was also evacuated by the Eleans. On the
fifth day after settling these matters he arrived at Olympia. There he
offered a sacrifice to Zeus and entertained his officers at a banquet;
and, having given his army three days’ rest, commenced his return
march. After advancing some way into Elis, he allowed foraging parties
to scour the country while he himself lay encamped near Artemisium, as
it is called; and after receiving the booty there, he removed to the
Dioscurium.[238] In the course of this devastation of the country the
number of the captives was indeed great, but a still greater number
made their escape to the neighbouring villages and strongholds. For
Elis is more populous, as well as more richly furnished with slaves
and other property, than the rest of the Peloponnese: and some of the
Eleans are so enamoured of a country life, that there are cases of
families who, being in enjoyment of considerable wealth, have for two
or three generations never entered a public law-court at all.[239]
And this result is brought about by the great care and attention
bestowed upon the agricultural class by the government, to see that
their law-suits should be settled on the spot, and every necessary of
life abundantly supplied them. To me it seems that they owed these
laws and customs originally to the wide extent of their arable land,
and still more to the fact that their lives were under the protection
of religion; for, owing to the Olympic assembly, their territory
was especially exempted by the Greeks from pillage; and they had
accordingly been free from all injury and hostile invasion.

[Sidenote: The ancient privileges of Elis lost.]

+74.+ But in the course of time, when the Arcadians advanced a claim
for Lasion and the whole district of Pisa, being forced to defend
their territory and change their habits of life, they no longer
troubled themselves in the least about recovering from the Greeks
their ancient and ancestral immunity from pillage, but were content to
remain exactly as they were. This in my opinion was a short-sighted
policy. For peace is a thing we all desire, and are willing to submit
to anything to obtain: it is the only one of our so-called blessings
that no one questions. If then there are people who, having the
opportunity of obtaining it, with justice and honour, from the Greeks,
without question and for perpetuity, neglect to do so, or regard other
objects as of superior importance to it, must we not look upon them
as undoubtedly blind to their true interests? But if it be objected
that, by adopting such a mode of life, they would become easily open
to attack and exposed to treachery: I answer that such an event would
be rare, and if it did happen, would be a claim on the aid of united
Greece; but that for minor injuries, having all the wealth which
unbroken peace would be sure to bring them, they would never have
been at a loss for foreign soldiers or mercenaries to protect them at
certain places and times. As it is, from dread of what is occasional
and unlikely, they involve their country and property in perpetual wars
and losses.

My object in thus speaking is to admonish the Eleans: for they have
never had a more favourable time than the present to get back their
ancient privilege of exemption from pillage, which is universally
acknowledged to belong to them. Even now, some sparks, so to speak, of
their old habit remaining, Elis is more thickly populated than other
districts.

[Sidenote: Capture of Thalamae.]

+75.+ And therefore during Philip’s occupation of the country the
number of prisoners taken was immense; and the number of those who
escaped by flight still greater. An enormous amount of movable
property, and an enormous crowd of slaves and cattle, were collected at
a place called Thalamae; which was selected for the purpose, because
the approach to it was narrow and difficult, and the place itself
was retired and not easy to enter. But when the king was informed
of the number of those who had taken refuge in this place, resolved
to leave nothing unattempted or incomplete, he occupied certain
spots which commanded the approach to it, with his mercenaries:
while leaving his baggage and main army in his entrenched camp, he
himself led his peltasts and light-armed troops through the gorge,
and, without meeting with any resistance, came directly under the
fortress. The fugitives were panic-stricken at his approach: for
they were utterly inexperienced in war and unprovided with means of
defence,—a mere rabble hurriedly collected together; they therefore
at once surrendered, and among them two hundred mercenary soldiers,
of various nationalities, who had been brought there by Amphidamas
the Elean Strategus. Having thus become master of an immense booty in
goods, and of more than five thousand slaves, and having in addition
to these driven off an incalculable number of cattle, Philip now
returned to his camp; but finding his army overburdened with spoils of
every description, and rendered by that means cumbrous and useless for
service, he retraced his steps, and once more marched to Olympia.

[Sidenote: Oppressive conduct of Apelles to the Achaeans.]

+76.+ But now a difficulty arose which was created by Apelles. Apelles
was one of those who had been left by Antigonus as guardians of his
son, and had, as it happened, more influence than any one else with
the king. He conceived the wish to bring the Achaeans into the same
position as the Thessalians; and adopted for that purpose a very
offensive line of conduct. The Thessalians were supposed to enjoy
their own constitution, and to have quite a different status to the
Macedonians; but in fact they had exactly the same, and obeyed every
order of the royal ministers. It was with the purpose of bringing about
the same state of things, that this officer now set himself to test the
subservience of the Achaean contingent. At first he confined himself
to giving the Macedonian soldiers leave to eject Achaeans from their
quarters, who on any occasion had taken possession of them first, as
well as to wrest from them any booty they might have taken; but he
afterwards treated them with actual violence, through the agency of
his subordinates, on any trifling pretext; while such as complained of
this treatment, or took the part of those who were being beaten, he
personally arrested and put into confinement: being convinced that by
this method he would gradually and imperceptibly bring them into the
habit of submitting, without remonstrance, to any thing which the king
might choose to inflict. And this opinion he deduced from his previous
experience in the army of Antigonus, when he had seen the Achaeans
willing to endure any hardship, on the one condition of escaping from
the yoke of Cleomenes. However, certain young Achaeans held a meeting,
and going to Aratus explained to him the policy which was being pursued
by Apelles: whereupon Aratus at once went to Philip, feeling that a
stand must be made on this point at once and without delay. He made his
statement to the king; who, being informed of the facts, first of all
encouraged the young men by a promise that nothing of the sort should
happen to them again; and then commanded Apelles not to impose any
orders upon the Achaeans without consulting their own Strategus.

[Sidenote: Character of Philip V.]

+77.+ Philip, then, was acquiring a great reputation, not only among
those actually in his army, but among the other Peloponnesians also,
for his behaviour to the allies serving with him, as well as for his
ability and courage in the field. Indeed it would not be easy to find a
king endowed with more natural qualities requisite for the acquisition
of power. He had in an eminent degree a quick understanding, a
retentive memory, and a winning grace of manner, joined to a look of
royal dignity and authority; and most important of all, ability and
courage as a general. What neutralised all these excellent qualities,
and made a cruel tyrant of a naturally well-disposed king, it is not
easy to say in a few words: and therefore that inquiry must be reserved
for a more suitable time than the present.

[Sidenote: Philip continues his campaign.]

Starting from Olympia by the road leading to Pharae, Philip came first
to Telphusa, and thence to Heraea. There he had the booty sold by
auction, and repaired the bridge over the Alpheus, with the view of
passing over it to the invasion of Triphylia.

[Sidenote: Arrival of Aetolian troops under Phillidas, B.C. 218.]

[Sidenote: Triphylia.]

Just at that time the Aetolian Strategus, Dorimachus, in answer to
a request of the Eleans for protection against the devastation they
were enduring, despatched six hundred Aetolians, under the command
of Phillidas, to their aid. Having arrived in Elis, and taken over
the Elean mercenaries, who were five hundred in number, as well as a
thousand citizen soldiers and the Tarentine cavalry,[240] he marched to
the relief of Triphylia. This district is so called from Triphylus, one
of the sons of Arcas, and lies on the coast of the Peloponnese between
Elis and Messenia, facing the Libyan Sea, and touching the south-west
frontier of Arcadia. It contains the following towns, Samicum, Lepreum,
Hypana, Typaneae, Pyrgos, Aepium, Bolax, Stylangium, Phrixa; all of
which, shortly before this, the Eleans had conquered and annexed, as
well as the city of Alipheira, which had originally been subject to
Arcadia and Megalopolis, but had been exchanged with the Eleans, for
some private object of his own, by Lydiadas when tyrant of Megalopolis.

+78.+ Phillidas, then, sent his Elean troops to Lepreum, and his
mercenaries to Aliphera; while he himself went with the Aetolian troops
to Typaneae, and waited to see what would happen. Meanwhile the king,
having got rid of his heavy baggage, and crossed the bridge over the
river Alpheus, which flows right under Heraea, came to Alipheira, which
lies on a hill precipitous on every side, and the ascent of which is
more than ten stades. The citadel is on the very summit of this hill,
adorned with a colossal statue of Athene, of extraordinary size and
beauty. The origin and purpose of this statue, and at whose expense it
was set up, are doubtful questions even among the natives; for it has
never been clearly discovered why or by whom it was dedicated: yet it
is universally allowed that its skilful workmanship classes it among
the most splendid and artistic productions of Hecatodorus[241] and
Sostratus.

[Sidenote: Capture of Alipheira.]

The next morning being fine and bright, the king made his dispositions
at daybreak. He placed parties of men with scaling ladders at several
points, and supported each of them with bodies of mercenaries, and
detachments of Macedonian hoplites, on the rear of these several
parties. His orders being fulfilled with enthusiasm and a formidable
display of power, the garrison of Alipheira were kept continually
rushing and rallying to the particular spots to which they saw the
Macedonians approaching: and while this was going on, the king himself
took some picked men, and mounted unobserved over some steep hills up
to the suburb of the citadel; and then, at a given signal, all at once
put the scaling ladders to the walls and began attempting the town.
The king was the first to take the suburb of the acropolis, which had
been abandoned by the garrison; and when this was set on fire, those
who were defending the town walls, foreseeing what must happen, and
afraid that by the fall of the citadel they would be deprived of their
last hope, abandoned the town walls, and fled into it: whereupon the
Macedonians at once took the walls and the town. Subsequently the
garrison on the citadel sent an embassy to Philip, who granted them
their lives, and received possession of it also by formal surrender.

[Sidenote: Typanae and Phigalia surrender to Philip.]

+79.+ These achievements of the king alarmed the whole people of
Triphylia, and made them take counsel severally for the safety of
themselves and their respective cities: while Phillidas left Typaneae,
after plundering some of the houses there, and retired to Lepreum.
This was the reward which the allies of the Aetolians at that time
usually got: not only to be deserted at the hour of utmost need in the
most barefaced way, but, by being plundered as well as betrayed, to
suffer at the hands of their allies exactly what they had a right to
expect from a victorious enemy. But the people of Typaneae surrendered
their city to Philip; as also did the inhabitants of Hypana. And the
people of Phigalia, hearing of what had taken place in Triphylia, and
disliking the alliance with the Aetolians, rose in arms and seized
the space round the Polemarchium.[242] The Aetolian pirates who were
residing in this city, for the purpose of plundering Messene, were
able at first to keep down and overawe the people; but when they saw
that the whole town was mustering to the rescue, they desisted from
the attempt. Having made terms with them, they took their baggage
and evacuated the town; whereupon the inhabitants sent an embassy to
Philip, and delivered themselves and their town into his hands.

[Sidenote: Lepreum.]

[Sidenote: Samicum,]

[Sidenote: and other towns.]

+80.+ While these things were going on, the people of Lepreum, having
seized a certain quarter of their town, demanded that the Elean,
Aetolian, and Lacedaemonian garrisons (for a reinforcement had come
from Sparta also) should all alike evacuate the citadel and city.
At first Phillidas refused, and stayed on, hoping to overawe the
citizens; but when the king, despatching Taurion with a guard of
soldiers to Phigalia, advanced in person towards Lepreum, and was
now close to the town, Phillidas lowered his tone, and the Lepreates
were encouraged in their determination. It was indeed a glorious act
of gallantry on their part. Though there was a garrison within their
walls of a thousand Eleans, a thousand Aetolians with the pirates,
five hundred mercenaries, and two hundred Lacedaemonians, and though
too their citadel was in the occupation of these troops, yet they
ventured to make a stand for the freedom of their native city, and
would not give up hope of deliverance. Phillidas therefore, seeing
that the Lepreates were prepared to offer a stout resistance, and that
the Macedonians were approaching, evacuated the town with the Eleans
and Lacedaemonians. The Cretans, who had been sent by the Spartans,
made their way home through Messenia; but Phillidas departed for
Samicum. The people of Lepreum, having thus got control of their own
town, sent ambassadors to place it in the power of Philip. Hearing the
news, Philip sent all his army, except the peltasts and light-armed
troops, to Lepreum; and taking the latter with him, he made all the
haste he could to catch Phillidas. He succeeded so far as to capture
all his baggage; but Phillidas himself managed to outstrip him and
throw himself into Samicum. The king therefore sat down before this
place: and having sent for the rest of his army from Lepreum, made the
garrison believe that he meant to besiege the town. But the Aetolians
and Eleans within it, having nothing ready for sustaining a siege
beyond their bare hands, alarmed at their situation, held a parley
with Philip to secure their lives; and having obtained leave from
him to march out with their arms, they departed into Elis. Thus the
king became master of Samicum on the spot: and this was followed by
deputations from other towns to him, with entreaties for protection;
in virtue of which he took over Phrixa, Stylangium, Aepium, Bolax,
Pyrgos, and Epitalium. Having settled these things, and reduced all
Triphylia into his power in six days, he returned to Lepreum; and
having addressed the necessary warnings to the Lepreates, and put a
garrison into the citadel, he departed with his army towards Heraea,
leaving Ladicus of Acarnania in command of Triphylia. When he arrived
at Heraea, he made a distribution of all the booty; and taking up again
his baggage from Heraea, arrived about the middle of the winter at
Megalopolis.

[Sidenote: Chilon tries to seize the crown of Sparta, B.C. 218.]

+81.+ While Philip was thus engaged in Triphylia, Chilon the
Lacedaemonian, holding that the kingship belonged to him in virtue
of birth, and annoyed at the neglect of his claims by the Ephors in
selecting Lycurgus, determined to stir up a revolution: and believing
that if he took the same course as Cleomenes had done, and gave the
common people hopes of land allotments and redivision of property,
the masses would quickly follow him, he addressed himself to carrying
out this policy. Having therefore agreed with his friends on this
subject, and got as many as two hundred people to join his conspiracy,
he entered upon the execution of his project. But perceiving that the
chief obstacles in the way of the accomplishment of his design were
Lycurgus, and those Ephors who had invested him with the crown, he
directed his first efforts against them. The Ephors he seized while at
dinner, and put them all to death on the spot,—chance thus inflicting
upon them the punishment they deserved: for whether we regard the
person at whose hands, or the person for whose sake they were thus
destroyed, we cannot but say that they richly merited their fate.

After the successful accomplishment of this deed, Chilon went to the
house of Lycurgus, whom he found at home, but failed to seize. Assisted
by slaves and neighbours Lycurgus was smuggled out of the house, and
effected a secret escape; and thence got away by a cross-country route
to the town of Pellene in Tripolis. Thus baffled in the most important
point of his enterprise, Chilon was greatly discouraged; but was forced
all the same to go on with what he had begun. Accordingly he made
a descent upon the market-place, and laid violent hands upon those
opposed to him; tried to rouse his relations and friends; and declared
to the rest of the people there what hopes of success he had. But when
nobody seemed inclined to join him, but on the contrary a mob began to
collect with threatening looks, he saw how it was, and found a secret
way of leaving the town; and, making his way across Laconia, arrived
in Achaia alone and an exile. But the Lacedaemonians who were in the
territory of Megalopolis, terrified by the arrival of Philip, stowed
away all the goods they had got from the country, and first demolished
and then abandoned the Athenaeum.

[Sidenote: Decline of Sparta.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 800(?)-B.C. 371.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 236-222.]

The fact is that the Lacedaemonians enjoyed a most excellent
constitution, and had a most extensive power, from the time of the
legislation of Lycurgus to that of the battle of Leuctra. But after
that event their fortune took an unfavourable turn; and their political
state continued ever growing worse and worse, until they finally
suffered from a long succession of internal struggles and partisan
warfare; were repeatedly agitated by schemes for the redivision of
lands and the banishment of one party or another; and were subjected to
the severest possible slavery, culminating in the tyrannical government
of Nabis: though the word “tyrant” was one which they had in old times
scarcely endured to hear mentioned. However, the ancient history of
Sparta as well as the great part of it since, has been recorded by
many in terms of eulogy or the reverse; but the part of that history
which admits of the least controversy is that which followed the entire
destruction of the ancient constitution by Cleomenes;[243] and that
shall be narrated by me in the order of events as they occur.

[Sidenote: Apelles opposes Aratus, Jan.-May, B.C. 218.]

[Sidenote: May, B.C. 218.]

[Sidenote: Election of Eperatus as Achaean Strategus.]

+82.+ Meanwhile Philip left Megalopolis, and marching by way of Tegea
arrived at Argos, and there spent the rest of the winter, having gained
in this campaign an admiration beyond his years for his general conduct
and his brilliant achievements. But, in spite of all that had happened,
Apelles was by no means inclined to desist from the policy on which he
had entered; but was resolved little by little to bring the Achaeans
under the yoke. He saw that the most determined opponents of his
scheme were the elder and younger Aratus; and that Philip was inclined
to listen to them, and especially to the elder, both on account of
his former intimacy with Antigonus, and his pre-eminent influence in
Achaia, and, most of all, because of his readiness of resource and
practical ability: he therefore determined to devote his attention to
them, and enter upon the intrigue against them which I shall proceed to
describe. He sought out in the several cities all such as were opposed
to Aratus, and invited them to visit him: and having got them into his
hands he tried all he could to win their affections, encouraged them to
look upon him as a friend, and introduced them to Philip. To the king
he was always pointing out that, if he listened to Aratus, he would
have to treat the Achaeans according to the letter of the treaty of
alliance; but that, if he would listen to him, and take men like those
which he had introduced to him into favour, he would have the whole of
the Peloponnese at his own unfettered disposal. But what he was most
anxious about was the election; being desirous to secure the office
of Strategus for one of this party, and to oust Aratus in accordance
with his settled plan. With this purpose, he persuaded Philip to be at
Aegium at the time of the Achaean election, on the pretext of being on
his way to Elis. The king’s consent to this enabled Apelles himself
to be there at the right time; and though he found great difficulty,
in spite of entreaties and threats, in carrying his point; yet he did
eventually succeed in getting Eperatus of Pharae elected Strategus, and
Timoxenus, the candidate proposed by Aratus, rejected.

[Sidenote: Capture of the Wall, and expedition into Elis.]

+83.+ This over, the king departed by way of Patrae and Dyme, and
arrived with his army before the fortress called the Wall, which is
situated on the frontier of the territory of Dyme, and had a short
time before, as I mentioned above,[244] been occupied by Euripidas.
The king, being anxious at all hazards to recover this place for the
Dymaeans, encamped under its walls with his full force: and thereupon
the Elean garrison in alarm surrendered the place to Philip, which,
though not large, had been fortified with extraordinary care. For
though the circumference of its walls was not more than a stade and a
half, its height was nowhere less than thirty cubits. Having handed the
place over to the Dymaeans, Philip continued his advance, plundering
the territory of Elis: and when he had thoroughly devastated it, and
acquired a large booty, he returned with his army to Dyme.

[Sidenote: The intrigue of Apelles.]

+84.+ Meanwhile Apelles, thinking that, by the election of the Achaean
Strategus through his influence, he had partly succeeded in his policy,
began once more attacking Aratus, with the view of entirely detaching
Philip from his friendship: and he accordingly determined to make up
an accusation against him grounded on the following circumstance: When
Amphidamus, the Elean Strategus, had been, with the other refugees,
made prisoner at Thalamae, and had been brought among other captives to
Olympia, he made earnest efforts by the agency of certain individuals
to be allowed an interview with the king. This favour having been
accorded him, he made a statement to the effect that it was in his
power to bring over the Eleans to the king’s side, and induce them to
enter into alliance with him. Philip believed him; and accordingly
dismissed Amphidamus without ransom, with instructions to promise the
Eleans, that, if they would join the king, he would restore their
captive citizens without ransom, and would himself secure their
territory safely from all outside attacks: and besides this would
maintain them in freedom, without impost or foreign garrison, and in
enjoyment of their several constitutions.

But the Eleans refused to listen to the proposal, although the offer
was thought attractive and substantial. Apelles therefore used this
circumstance to found the false accusation which he now brought before
Philip, alleging that Aratus was not a loyal friend to the Macedonians,
nor sincere in his feelings towards them: “He was responsible for this
alienation of the Eleans; for when the king despatched Amphidamus from
Olympia into Elis, Aratus took him aside and talked to him, asserting
that it was by no means to the interest of the Peloponnesians that
Philip should become supreme in Elis: and this was the reason of the
Eleans despising the king’s offers, and clinging to the friendship of
the Aetolians, and persisting in war against the Macedonians.”

[Sidenote: The king investigates the charge against Aratus.]

+85.+ Regarding the matter as important, the first step the king took
was to summon the elder and younger Aratus, and order Apelles to repeat
these assertions in their presence: which he thereupon did in a bold
and threatening tone. And upon the king still not saying a word, he
added: “Since his Majesty finds you, Aratus, so ungrateful and so
exceedingly adverse to his interests, he is determined to summon a
meeting of the Achaeans, and, after making a statement of his reasons,
forthwith to return to Macedonia.” Aratus the elder answered him with a
general exhortation to Philip, never to give a hasty or inconsiderate
credit to any thing which might be alleged before him against his
friends and allies: but when any such allegation were made, to test
its truth before accepting it; for that was the conduct which became
a king, and was in every way to his interest. Wherefore he said, “I
claim that you should, in the present instance of these accusations of
Apelles, summon those who heard my words; and openly produce the man
that informed Apelles of them, and omit no means of ascertaining the
real truth, before making any statement in regard to these matters to
the Achaeans.”

[Sidenote: Aratus is cleared.]

+86.+ The king approved of this speech, and said that he would not
neglect the matter, but would thoroughly investigate it. And so for
the present the audience was dissolved. But during the following days,
while Apelles failed to bring any proof of his allegations, Aratus was
favoured by the following combination of circumstances. While Philip
was laying waste their territory, the Eleans, suspecting Amphidamus of
treachery, determined to arrest him and send him in chains to Aetolia.
But getting intelligence of their purpose, he escaped first to Olympia;
and there, hearing that Philip was at Dyme engaged in the division
of his spoils, he followed him to that town in great haste. When
Aratus heard that Amphidamus had been driven from Elis and was come to
Dyme, he was delighted, because his conscience was quite clear in the
matter; and going to the king demanded that he should summon Amphidamus
to his presence; on the ground that the man to whom the words were
alleged to have been spoken would best know about the accusations,
and would declare the truth; for he had become an exile from his home
from Philip’s sake, and had now no hope of safety except in him.
These arguments satisfied the king, who thereupon sent for Amphidamus
and ascertained that the accusation was false. The result was that
from that day forward his liking and respect for Aratus continually
increased, while he began to regard Apelles with suspicion; though
being still under the influence of his old ascendency, he was compelled
to connive at many of his actions.

+87.+ Apelles however by no means abandoned his policy. He began
undermining the position of Taurion also, who had been placed in
command of the Peloponnese by Antigonus, not indeed openly attacking
him, but rather praising his character, and asserting that he was a
proper person to be with the king on a campaign; his object being
to get some one else appointed to conduct the government of the
Peloponnese. This was indeed a novel method of defamation,—to damage
one’s neighbours, not by attacking, but by praising their characters;
and this method of wreaking one’s malice, envy, and treachery may be
regarded as primarily and specially the invention of the jealousy and
selfish ambition of courtiers. In the same spirit he began making
covert attacks upon Alexander, the captain of the bodyguard, whenever
he got an opportunity; being bent on reconstituting by his own
authority even the personal attendants of the king, and on making a
clean sweep of all arrangements left existing by Antigonus. For as in
his life Antigonus had managed his kingdom and his son with wisdom, so
at his death he made wise provisions for every department of the State.
For in his will he explained to the Macedonians the nature of these
arrangements; and also gave definite instructions for the future, how
and by whom each of these arrangements was to be carried out: being
desirous of leaving no vantage-ground to the courtiers for mutual
rivalry and strife. Among these arrangements was one selecting Apelles
from among his companions in arms to be one of the guardians of his
son; Leontius to command the peltasts; Megaleas to be chief secretary;
Taurion to be governor of the Peloponnese; and Alexander to be captain
of the bodyguard. Apelles had already got Leontius and Megaleas
completely under his influence: and he was now desirous to remove
Alexander and Taurion from their offices, and so to control these, as
well as all other departments of the government, by the agency of his
own friends. And he would have easily succeeded in doing so, had he not
raised up an opponent in the person of Aratus. As it was, he quickly
reaped the fruits of his own blind selfishness and ambition; for
that which he purposed inflicting on his neighbours he had to endure
himself, and that within a very brief space. How and by what means this
was brought about, I must forbear to tell for the present, and must
bring this book to an end: but in subsequent parts of my work I will
endeavour to make every detail of these transactions clear.

For the present, after concluding the business which I have described,
Philip returned to Argos, and there spent the rest of the winter season
with his friends, while he sent back his forces to Macedonia.




BOOK V


[Sidenote: May, B.C. 218.]

+1.+ The year of office as Strategus of the younger Aratus had now
come to an end with the rising of the Pleiades; for that was the
arrangement of time then observed by the Achaeans.[245] Accordingly he
laid down his office and was succeeded in the command of the Achaeans
by Eperatus; Dorimachus being still Strategus of the Aetolians.

It was at the beginning of this summer that Hannibal entered upon
open war with Rome; started from New Carthage; and crossing the Iber,
definitely began his expedition and march into Italy; while the Romans
despatched Tiberius Sempronius to Libya with an army, and Publius
Cornelius to Iberia.

This year, too, Antiochus and Ptolemy, abandoning diplomacy, and the
support of their mutual claims upon Coele-Syria by negotiation, began
actual war with each other.

[Sidenote: Recognition of Philip’s services by the assembly of the
Achaean league.]

As for Philip, being in need of corn and money for his army, he
summoned the Achaeans to a general assembly by means of their
magistrates. When the assembly had met, according to the federal law,
at Aegium,[246] the king saw that Aratus and his son were indisposed
to act for him, because of the intrigues against them in the matter of
the election, which had been carried on by Apelles; and that Eperatus
was naturally inefficient, and an object of general contempt. These
facts convinced the king of the folly of Apelles and Leontius, and
he once more decided to stand by Aratus. He therefore persuaded the
magistrates to transfer the assembly to Sicyon; and there inviting both
the elder and younger Aratus to an interview, he laid the blame of
all that had happened upon Apelles, and urged them to maintain their
original policy. Receiving a ready consent from them, he then entered
the Achaean assembly, and being energetically supported by these two
statesmen, earned all the measures that he desired. For the Achaeans
passed a vote decreeing “that five hundred talents should be paid to
the king at once for his last campaign, that three months’ pay should
be given to his army, and ten thousand medimni of corn; and that, for
the future, so long as the king should remain in the Peloponnese as
their ally in the war, he should receive seventeen talents a month from
the Achaeans.

[Sidenote: The king prepares to carry on the war by sea.]

+2.+ Having passed this decree, the Achaeans dispersed to their various
cities. And now the king’s forces mustered again from their winter
quarters; and after deliberations with his friends, Philip decided to
transfer the war to the sea. For he had become convinced that it was
only by so doing that he would himself be able to surprise the enemy
at all points at once, and would best deprive them of the opportunity
of coming to each others' relief; as they were widely scattered, and
each would be in alarm for their own safety, because the approach of
an enemy by sea is so silent and rapid. For he was at war with three
separate nations,—Aetolians, Lacedaemonians, and Eleans.

Having arrived at this decision, he ordered the ships of the Achaeans
as well as his own to muster at Lechaeum; and there he made continual
experiments in practising the soldiers of the phalanx to the use of
the oar. The Macedonians answered to his instructions with ready
enthusiasm: for they are in fact the most gallant soldiers on the field
of battle, the promptest to undertake service at sea if need be, and
the most laborious workers at digging trenches, making palisades, and
all such engineering work, in the world: just such as Hesiod describes
the Aeacidae to be

   “Joying in war as in a feast.”

[Sidenote: Fresh intrigue of Apelles.]

[Sidenote: Philip starts on his naval expedition, B.C. 218.]

The king, then, and the main body of the Macedonian army, remained in
Corinth, busied with these practisings and preparations for taking
the sea. But Apelles, being neither able to retain an ascendency over
Philip, nor to submit to the loss of influence which resulted from
this disregard, entered into a conspiracy with Leontius and Megaleas,
by which it was agreed that these two men should stay on the spot and
damage the king’s service by deliberate neglect; while he went to
Chalcis, and contrived that no supplies should be brought the king from
thence for the promotion of his designs. Having made this arrangement
and mischievous stipulation with these two men, Apelles set out for
Chalcis, having found some false pretexts to satisfy the king as to
his departure. And while protracting his stay there, he carried out
his sworn agreement with such determination, that, as all men obeyed
him because of this former credit, the king was at last reduced by
want of money to pawn some of the silver-plate used at his own table,
to carry on his affairs. However, when the ships were all collected,
and the Macedonian soldiers already well trained to the oar; the king,
giving out rations of corn and pay to the army, put to sea, and arrived
at Patrae on the second day, with six thousand Macedonians and twelve
hundred mercenaries.

[Sidenote: The siege of Palus.]

+3.+ Just at that time the Aetolian Strategus Dorimachus sent Agelaus
and Scopas with five hundred Neo-Cretans[247] into Elis; while the
Eleans, in fear of Philip’s attempting the siege of Cyllene, were
collecting mercenaries, preparing their own citizens, and carefully
strengthening the defences of Cyllene. When Philip saw what was
going on, he stationed a force at Dyme, consisting of the Achaean
mercenaries, some of the Cretans serving with him, and some of the
Gallic horse, together with two thousand picked Achaean infantry.
These he left there as a reserve, as well as an advance guard to
prevent the danger of an attack from Elis; while he himself, having
first written to the Acarnanians and Scerdilaidas, that each of their
towns should man such vessels as they had and meet him at Cephallenia,
put to sea from Patrae at the time arranged, and arrived off Pronni
in Cephallenia. But when he saw that this fortress was difficult to
besiege, and its position a contracted one, he coasted past it with
his fleet and came to anchor at Palus. Finding that the country there
was full of corn and capable of supporting an army, he disembarked
his troops and encamped close to the city: and having beached his
ships close together, secured them with a trench and palisade, and
sent out his Macedonian soldiers to forage. He himself made a personal
inspection of the town, to see how he could bring his siege-works and
artillery to bear upon the wall. He wished to be able to use the place
as a rendezvous for his allies; but he was also desirous of taking it:
first, because he would thereby deprive the Aetolians of their most
useful support,—for it was by means of Cephallenian ships that they
made their descents upon the Peloponnese, and ravaged the seaboards of
Epirus and Acarnania,—and, secondly, that he might secure for himself
and his allies a convenient base of operations against the enemy’s
territory. For Cephallenia lies exactly opposite the Corinthian Gulf,
in the direction of the Sicilian Sea, and commands the north-western
district of the Peloponnese, and especially Elis; as well as the
south-western parts of Epirus, Aetolia, and Acarnania.

+4.+ The excellent position, therefore, of the island, both as a
rendezvous for the allies and as a base of attack against the hostile,
or of defence for the friendly, territory, made the king very anxious
to get it into his power. His survey of the town showed him that it
was entirely defended by the sea and steep hills, except for a short
distance in the direction of Zacynthus, where the ground was flat; and
he accordingly resolved to erect his works and concentrate his attack
at that spot.

[Sidenote: Arrival of the allies at Palus.]

[Sidenote: The walls are undermined and a breach made. Leontius plays
the traitor.]

While the king was engaged in these operations fifty galleys arrived
from Scerdilaidas, who had been prevented from sending more by the
plots and civil broils throughout Illyria, caused by the despots of
the various cities. There arrived also the appointed contingents of
allies from Epirus, Acarnania, and even Messenia; for the Messenians
had ceased to excuse themselves from taking part in the war ever since
the capture of Phigalia. Having now made his arrangements for the
siege, and having got his catapults and ballistae in position to annoy
the defenders on the walls, the king harangued his Macedonian troops,
and, bringing his siege-machines up to the walls, began under their
protection to sink mines. The Macedonians worked with such enthusiastic
eagerness that in a short time two hundred feet of the wall were
undermined and underpinned: and the king then approached the walls and
invited the citizens to come to terms. Upon their refusal, he set fire
to the props, and thus brought down the whole part of the wall that
rested upon them simultaneously. Into this breach he first sent his
peltasts under the command of Leontius, divided into cohorts, and with
orders to force their way over the ruin. But Leontius, in fulfilment of
his compact with Apelles, three times running prevented the soldiers,
even after they had carried the breach, from effecting the capture of
the town. He had corrupted beforehand the most important officers of
the several cohorts; and he himself deliberately affected fear, and
shrunk from every service of danger; and finally they were ejected from
the town with considerable loss, although they could have mastered the
enemy with ease. When the king saw that the officers were behaving with
cowardice, and that a considerable number of the Macedonian soldiers
were wounded, he abandoned the siege, and deliberated with his friends
on the next step to be taken.

[Sidenote: Ambassadors from Acarnania urge Philip to invade Aetolia;
others from Messenia beg him to come there.]

[Sidenote: Philip decides on the invasion of Aetolia.]

+5.+ Meanwhile Lycurgus had invaded Messenia; and Dorimachus had
started for Thessaly with half the Aetolian army,—both with the
idea that they would thus draw off Philip from the siege of Palus.
Presently ambassadors arrived at the court to make representations on
these subjects from Acarnania and Messenia: the former urging Philip
to prevent Dorimachus’s invasion of Macedonia by himself invading
Aetolia, and traversing and plundering the whole country while there
was no one to resist him; the latter begged him to come to their
assistance, representing that in the existing state of the Etesian
winds the passage from Cephallenia to Messenia could be effected
in a single day, whereby, so Gorgus of Messenia and his colleagues
argued, a sudden and effective attack would be made upon Lycurgus.
In pursuance of his policy Leontius eagerly supported Gorgus, seeing
that by this means Philip would absolutely waste the summer. For it
was easy enough to sail to Messenia; but to sail back again, while
the Etesian winds prevailed, was impossible. It was plain therefore
that Philip would get shut up in Messenia with his army, and remain
inactive for what remained of the summer; while the Aetolians would
traverse Thessaly and Epirus and plunder them at their pleasure. Such
was the insidious nature of the advice given by Gorgus and Leontius.
But Aratus, who was present, advocated an exactly opposite policy,
urging the king to sail to Aetolia and devote himself to that part of
the campaign: for as the Aetolians had gone on an expedition across
the frontier under Dorimachus, it was a most excellent opportunity
for invading and plundering Aetolia. The king had begun to entertain
distrust of Leontius since his exhibition of cowardice in the siege;
and had detected his dishonesty in the course of the discussions held
about Palus: he therefore decided to act in the present instance in
accordance with the opinion of Aratus. Accordingly he wrote to the
Achaean Strategus Eperatus, bidding him take the Achaean levies, and
go to the aid of the Messenians; while he himself put to sea from
Cephallenia, and arrived at night after a two days’ voyage at Leucas:
and having managed by proper contrivances to get his ships through the
channel of Dioryctus,[248] he sailed up the Ambracian Gulf, which, as
I have already stated,[249] stretches from the Sicilian Sea a long
distance into the interior of Aetolia. Having made the whole length of
this gulf, and anchored a short time before daybreak at Limnaea, he
ordered his men to get their breakfast, and leaving the greater part of
their baggage behind them, to make themselves ready in light equipment
for a march; while he himself collected the guides, and made careful
inquiries of them about the country and neighbouring towns.

[Sidenote: Philip is joined by the Acarnanians, and marches to the
Achelous.]

+6.+ Before they started, Aristophanes the Acarnanian Strategus arrived
with the full levy of his people. For having in former times suffered
many severe injuries at the hands of the Aetolians, they were now
inspired with a fierce determination to be revenged upon them and
damage them in every possible way: they gladly therefore seized this
opportunity of getting the help of the Macedonians; and the men who now
appeared in arms were not confined to those forced by law to serve, but
were in some cases past the military age. The Epirotes were quite as
eager to join, and for the same motives; but owing to the wide extent
of their country, and the suddenness of the Macedonian arrival, they
had not been able to muster their forces in time. As to the Aetolians,
Dorimachus had taken half their army with him, as I have said, while
the the other half he had left at home, thinking that it would be an
adequate reserve to defend the towns and district against unforeseen
contingencies. The king, leaving a sufficient guard for his baggage,
started from Limnaea in the evening, and after a march of sixty stades
pitched his camp: but, having dined and given his men a short rest,
he started again; and marching right through the night, arrived just
as the day was breaking at the river Achelous, between the towns of
Stratus and Conope, being anxious that his entrance into the district
of Thermus should be sudden and unexpected.

[Sidenote: Leontius tries to hinder the march.]

+7.+ Leontius saw that it was likely that the king would attain his
object, and the Aetolians be unable to resist him, for the double
reason of the speed and unexpectedness of the Macedonian attack, and
of his having gone to Thermus; for the Aetolians would never suppose
him likely to venture to expose himself so rashly, seeing the strongly
fortified nature of the country, and would therefore be sure to be
caught off their guard and wholly unprepared for the danger. Clinging
still to his purpose, therefore, he advised the king to encamp on the
Achelous, and rest his army after their night’s march; being anxious
to give the Aetolians a short respite to make preparations for their
defence. But Aratus, seeing clearly that the opportunity for action was
fleeting, and that Leontius was plainly trying to hinder their success,
conjured Philip not to let slip the opportunity by delaying.

[Sidenote: The king crosses the Achelous and advances against Thermus.]

The king was now thoroughly annoyed with Leontius: and accepting the
advice of Aratus, continued his march without interruption; and, after
crossing the Achelous, advanced rapidly upon Thermus, plundering and
devastating the country as he went, and marching so as to keep Stratus,
Agrinium, and Thestia on his left, Conope, Lysimachia, Trichonium, and
Phytaeum on his right. Arrived at the town of Metapa, which is on the
borders of the Trichonian Lake, and close to the narrow pass along
it, about sixty stades from Thermus, he found it abandoned by the
Aetolians, and occupied it with a detachment of five hundred men, with
a view of its serving as a fortress to secure both ends of the pass:
for the whole shore of the lake is mountainous and rugged, closely
fringed with forest, and therefore affording but a narrow and difficult
path. He now arranged his order of march, putting the mercenaries in
the van, next them the Illyrians, and then the peltasts and the men of
the phalanx, and thus advanced through the pass; his rear protected
by the Cretans: while the Thracians and light-armed troops took a
different line of country, parallel to his own, and kept up with him on
his right: his left being secured by the lake for nearly thirty stades.

[Sidenote: The plundering of Thermus.]

+8.+ At the end of this distance he arrived at the village of Pamphia;
and having, as in the case of Panapa, secured it by a guard, he
continued his advance towards Thermus: the road now being not only
steep and exceedingly rough, but with deep precipices also on either
side, so as to make the path in places very dangerous and narrow; and
the whole ascent being nearly thirty stades. But having accomplished
this also in a short time, thanks to the energy with which the
Macedonians conducted the march, he arrived late in the day at Thermus.
There he pitched a camp, and allowed his men to go off plundering the
neighbouring villages and scouring the plain of Thermus, as well as
to sack the dwelling-houses in Thermus itself, which were full, not
only of corn and such like provisions, but of all the most valuable
property which the Aetolians possessed. For as the annual fair and most
famous games, as well as the elections, were held there, everybody
kept their most costly possessions in store at Thermus, to enable
them to entertain their friends, and to celebrate the festivals with
proper magnificence. But besides this occasion for the employment
of their property, they expected to find the most complete security
for it there, because no enemy had ever yet ventured to penetrate to
that place; while its natural strength was so great as to serve as an
acropolis to the whole of Aetolia. The place therefore having been
in the enjoyment of peace from time immemorial, not only were the
buildings immediately round the temple filled with a great variety of
property, but the homesteads on the outskirts also. For that night the
army bivouacked on the spot laden with booty of every description; but
the next morning they selected the most valuable and portable part of
it, and making the rest into a heap in front of their tents, set fire
to it. So also in regard to the dedicated arms which were hanging up
in the porticoes,—those of them which were valuable they took down and
carried off, some they exchanged for their own, while the rest they
collected together and burnt. The number of these was more than fifteen
thousand.

[Sidenote: Sacrilege committed at Thermus. Was it justifiable?]

+9.+ Up to this point everything was right and fair by the laws of
war; but I do not know how to characterise their next proceedings. For
remembering what the Aetolians had done at Dium[250] and Dodona,[251]
they burnt the colonnades, and destroyed what were left of the
dedicated offerings, some of which were of costly material, and had
been elaborated with great skill and expense. And they were not
content with destroying the roofs of these buildings with fire, they
levelled them to their foundations; and threw down all the statues,
which numbered no less than two thousand; and many of them they broke
to pieces, sparing only those that were inscribed with the names or
figures of gods. Such they did abstain from injuring. On the walls
also they wrote the celebrated line composed by Samus, the son of
Chrysogonus, a foster-brother of the king, whose genius was then
beginning to manifest itself. The line was this—

   “Seest thou the path the bolt divine has sped?”

And in fact the king and his staff were fully convinced that, in
thus acting, they were obeying the dictates of right and justice,
by retaliating upon the Aetolians with the same impious outrages as
they had themselves committed at Dium.[252] But I am clearly of an
opposite opinion. And the readiest argument, to prove the correctness
of my view, may be drawn from the history of this same royal family of
Macedonia.

For when Antigonus, by his victory in a pitched battle over Cleomenes
the King of the Lacedaemonians, had become master of Sparta, and had
it absolutely in his own power to treat the town and its citizens as
he chose, he was so far from doing any injury to those who had thus
fallen into his hands, that he did not return to his own country until
he had bestowed upon the Lacedaemonians, collectively and individually,
some benefits of the utmost importance. The consequence was that he
was honoured at the time with the title of “Benefactor,” and after his
death with that of “Preserver”; and not only among the Lacedaemonians,
but among the Greeks generally, has obtained undying honour and
glory.[253]

[Sidenote: B.C. 338.]

+10.+ Take again the case of Philip, the founder of the family
splendour, and the first of the race to establish the greatness of the
kingdom. The success which he obtained, after his victory over the
Athenians at Chaeronea, was not due so much to his superiority in arms,
as to his justice and humanity. His victory in the field gave him the
mastery only over those immediately engaged against him; while his
equity and moderation secured his hold upon the entire Athenian people
and their city. For he did not allow his measures to be dictated by
vindictive passion; but laid aside his arms and warlike measures, as
soon as he found himself in a position to display the mildness of his
temper and the uprightness of his motives. With this view he dismissed
his Athenian prisoners without ransom, and took measures for the burial
of those who had fallen, and, by the agency of Antipater, caused their
bones to be conveyed home; and presented most of those whom he released
with suits of clothes. And thus, at small expense, his prudence gained
him a most important advantage. The pride of the Athenians was not
proof against such magnanimity; and they became his zealous supporters,
instead of antagonists, in all his schemes.

[Sidenote: B.C. 335.]

[Sidenote: The subsequent decline in Philip’s character.]

Again in the case of Alexander the Great. He was so enraged with the
Thebans that he sold all the inhabitants of the town into slavery, and
levelled the city itself with the ground; yet in making its capture he
was careful not to outrage religion, and took the utmost precautions
against even involuntary damage being done to the temples, or any part
of their sacred enclosures. Once more, when he crossed into Asia, to
avenge on the Persians the impious outrages which they had inflicted
on the Greeks, he did his best to exact the full penalty from men,
but refrained from injuring places dedicated to the gods; though it
was in precisely such that the injuries of the Persians in Greece had
been most conspicuous. These were the precedents which Philip should
have called to mind on this occasion; and so have shown himself the
successor and heir of these men,—not so much of their power, as of
their principles and magnanimity. But throughout his life he was
exceedingly anxious to establish his relationship to Alexander and
Philip, and yet took not the least pains to imitate them. The result
was that, as he advanced in years, as his conduct differed from theirs,
so his general reputation came to be different also.

+11.+ The present affair was an instance of this. He imagined
that he was doing nothing wrong in giving the rein to his anger,
and retaliating upon the impious acts of the Aetolians by similar
impieties, and “curing ill by ill”; and while he was always reproaching
Scopas and Dorimachus with depravity and abandoned wickedness, on
the grounds of their acts of impiety at Dodona and Dium, he imagined
that, while emulating their crimes, he would leave quite a different
impression of his character in the minds of those to whom he spoke.
But the fact is, that whereas the taking and demolishing an enemy’s
forts, harbours, cities, men, ships and crops, and other such things,
by which our enemy is weakened, and our own interests and tactics
supported, are necessary acts according to the laws and rights of war;
to deface temples, statues, and such like erections in pure wantonness,
and without any prospect of strengthening oneself or weakening the
enemy, must be regarded as an act of blind passion and insanity. For
the purpose with which good men wage war is not the destruction and
annihilation of the wrongdoers, but the reformation and alteration of
the wrongful acts. Nor is it their object to involve the innocent in
the destruction of the guilty, but rather to see that those who are
held to be guilty should share in the preservation and elevation of
the guiltless. It is the act of a tyrant to inflict injury, and so to
maintain his power over unwilling subjects by terror,—hated, and hating
those under him: but it is the glory of a king to secure, by doing good
to all, that he should rule over willing subjects, whose love he has
earned by humanity and beneficence.

[Sidenote: The error of such sacrilege as a matter of policy.]

But the best way of appreciating the gravity of Philip’s mistake is
to put before our eyes the idea which the Aetolians would probably
have conceived of him, had he acted in an opposite way, and destroyed
neither colonnades nor statutes, nor done injury to any of the sacred
offerings. For my part I think it would have been one of the greatest
goodness and humanity. For they would have had on their consciences
their own acts at Dium and Dodona; and would have seen unmistakably
that, whereas Philip was absolutely master of the situation, and could
do what he chose, and would have been held fully justified as far as
their deserts went in taking the severest measures, yet deliberately,
from mere gentleness and magnanimity, he refused to copy their conduct
in any respect.

+12.+ Clearly these considerations would most probably have led them
to condemn themselves, and to view Philip with respect and admiration
for his kingly and high minded qualities, shown by his respect for
religion and by the moderation of his anger against themselves. For in
truth to conquer one’s enemies in integrity and equity is not of less,
but of greater, practical advantage than victories in the field. In the
one case the defeated party yields under compulsion; in the other with
cheerful assent. In the one case the victor effects his reformation at
the cost of great losses; in the other he recalls the erring to better
courses without any damage to himself. But above all, in the one case
the chief credit of the victory belongs to the soldiers, in the other
it falls wholly and solely to the part of the leaders.

[Sidenote: The blame chiefly belongs to Demetrius of Pharos.]

Perhaps, however, one ought not to lay all the blame for what was
done on that occasion on Philip, taking his age into consideration;
but chiefly on his friends, who were in attendance upon him and
co-operating with him, among whom were Aratus and Demetrius of Pharos.
In regard to them it would not be difficult to assert, even without
being there, from which of the two a counsel of this sort proceeded.
For apart from the general principles animating the whole course of
his life, in which nothing savouring of rashness and want of judgment
can be alleged of Aratus, while the exact contrary may be said of
Demetrius, we have an undisputed instance of the principles actuating
both the one and the other in analogous circumstances, on which I shall
speak in its proper place.

[Sidenote: The return of Philip from Thermus.]

[Sidenote: Matape.]

[Sidenote: Acrae.]

[Sidenote: Stratus.]

+13.+ To return then to Philip. Taking with him as much booty living
and dead as he could, he started from Thermus, returning by the same
road as that by which he had come; putting the booty and heavy-armed
infantry in the van, and reserving the Acarnanians and mercenaries
to bring up the rear. He was in great haste to get through the
difficult passes, because he expected that the Aetolians, relying
on the security of their strongholds, would harass his rear. And
this in fact promptly took place: for a body of Aetolians, that had
collected to the number of nearly three thousand for the defence of
the country, under the command of Alexander of Trichonium, hovered
about, concealing themselves in certain secret hiding-places, and not
venturing to approach as long as Philip was on the high ground; but as
soon as he got his rear-guard in motion they promptly threw themselves
into Thermus and began harassing the hindermost of the enemy’s column.
The rear being thus thrown into confusion, the attacks and charges of
the Aetolians became more and more furious, encouraged by the nature
of the ground. But Philip had foreseen this danger, and had provided
for it, by stationing his Illyrians and his best peltasts under cover
of a certain hill on the descent. These men suddenly fell upon the
advanced bodies of the enemy as they were charging; whereupon the rest
of the Aetolian army fled in headlong haste over a wild and trackless
country, with a loss of a hundred and thirty killed, and about the
same number taken prisoners. This success relieved his rear; which,
after burning Pamphium, accomplished the passage of the narrow gorge
with rapidity and safety, and effected a junction with the Macedonians
near Matape, at which place Philip had pitched a camp and was waiting
for his rear-guard to come up. Next day, after levelling Metape to
the ground, he advanced to the city called Acrae; next day to Conope,
ravaging the country as he passed, and there encamped for the night.
On the next he marched along the Achelous as far as Stratus; there he
crossed the river, and, having halted his men out of range, endeavoured
to tempt the garrison outside the walls; for he had been informed that
two thousand Aetolian infantry and about four hundred horse, with five
hundred Cretans, had collected into Stratus. But when no one ventured
out, he renewed his march, and ordered his van to advance towards
Limnaea and the ships.

[Sidenote: Philip victorious in a skirmish with the garrison of
Stratus.]

[Sidenote: Arrival at Limnaea.]

+14.+ But no sooner had his rear passed the town than, first, a small
body of Aetolian cavalry sallied out and began harassing the hindmost
men; and then, the whole of the Cretans and some Aetolian troops having
joined their cavalry, the conflict became more severe, and the rear of
Philip’s army were forced to face about and engage the enemy. At first
the conflict was undecided; but on Philip’s mercenaries being supported
by the arrival of the Illyrians, the Aetolian cavalry and mercenaries
gave way and fled in disorder. The royal troops pursued most of them
to the entrance of the gates, or up to the walls, and killed about a
hundred of them. After this skirmish the garrison remained inactive,
and the rear of the royal army reached the camp and the ships in safety.

Philip pitched his camp early in the day, and proceeded to make a thank
offering to the gods for the successful issue of his undertaking; and
to invite the officers to a banquet, at which it was his intention to
entertain them all. His view was that he had ventured upon a dangerous
country, and such as no one had ever ventured to enter with an army
before; while he had not only entered it with an army, but had returned
in safety, after accomplishing all that he had intended. But while he
was thus intent on entertaining his officers in great elation of mind,
Megaleas and Leontius were nursing feelings of great annoyance at the
success of the king. They had arranged with Apelles to hamper all his
plans, but had been unable to do so; and now saw everything turning out
exactly contrary to their views.

[Sidenote: Megaleas and Leontius betray their chagrin at the king’s
success.]

[Sidenote: They assault Aratus.]

[Sidenote: Megaleas and Crinon held to bail.]

+15.+ Still they came to the banquet, where they from the first excited
the suspicions of the king and the rest of the company, by showing
less joy at the events than the others present. But as the drinking
went on, and grew less and less moderate, being forced to do just as
the others did, they soon showed themselves in their true colours.
For as soon as the company broke up, losing control over themselves
under the influence of wine, they roamed about looking for Aratus;
and having fallen in with him on his way home, they first attacked
him with abusive language, and then threw stones at him; and a number
of people coming to the assistance of both parties, there was a noise
and disturbance in the camp. But the king hearing the noise sent some
officers to ascertain the cause, and to put an end to the disturbance.
On their coming upon the scene, Aratus stated what had occurred, called
those present to witness the truth of his words, and retired to his own
tent; but Leontius by some unexplained means slipped away in the crowd.
When informed of what had taken place, the king sent for Megaleas and
Crinon and rebuked them sharply: and when they not only expressed no
submission, but actually retorted with a declaration that they would
never desist until they had paid Aratus out, the king, enraged at their
words, at once required them to give security for the payment of a fine
of twenty talents, and ordered them to be placed under arrest.

[Sidenote: Arrival at Leucas. Megaleas fined twenty talents.]

+16.+ Next morning, too, he sent for Aratus and bade him have no
fears, for that he would see that the business was properly settled.
When Leontius learned what had happened to Megaleas, he came to the
king’s tent with some peltasts, believing that, owing to his youth,
he should overawe the king, and quickly induce him to repent of his
purpose. Coming into the royal presence he demanded who had ventured
to lay hands on Megaleas, and lead him to confinement? But when the
king answered with firmness that he had given the order, Leontius was
dismayed; and, with an exclamation of indignant sorrow, departed in
high wrath.

Immediately after getting the fleet across the gulf, and anchoring
at Leucas, the king first gave orders to the officers appointed to
distribute the spoils to carry out that business with all despatch; and
then summoned his friends to council, and tried the case of Megaleas.
In his speech as accuser Aratus went over the crimes of Leontius
and his party from beginning to end; detailed the massacre in Argos
perpetrated by them after the departure of Antigonus; their arrangement
made with Apelles; and finally their contrivance to prevent success at
Palus. Of all these accusations he gave distinct proof, and brought
forward witnesses: and Megaleas and Crinon being entirely unable to
refute any of them, were unanimously condemned by the king’s friends.
Crinon remained under arrest, but Leontius went bail for the payment of
the Megaleas’s fine. Thus the intrigue of Apelles and Leontius turned
out quite contrary to their original hopes: for they had expected, by
terrifying Aratus and isolating Philip, to do whatever seemed to suit
their interests; whereas the result had been exactly the reverse.

[Sidenote: Lycurgus of Sparta attacks Tegea.]

+17.+ About the same time Lycurgus returned from Messenia without
having accomplished anything of importance. Afterwards he started again
and seized Tegea. The inhabitants having retreated into the citadel,
he determined to besiege it; but finding himself unable to make any
impression upon it he returned once more to Sparta.

[Sidenote: Elis.]

The Eleans after overrunning Dymaea, gained an easy victory over some
cavalry that had come out to resist them, by decoying them into an
ambush. They killed a considerable number of the Gallic mercenaries,
and among the natives whom they took prisoners were Polymedes of
Aegium, and Agesipolis, and Diocles of Dyme.

[Sidenote: Dorimachus recalled from Thessaly by Philip’s invasion of
Aetolia.]

Dorimachus had made his expedition originally, as I have already
mentioned, under the conviction that he would be able to devastate
Thessaly without danger to himself, and would force Philip to raise the
siege of Palus. But when he found Chrysogonus and Petraeus ready in
Thessaly to engage him, he did not venture to descend into the plain,
but kept close upon the skirts of the mountains; and when news reached
him of the Macedonian invasion of Aetolia, he abandoned his attempt
upon Thessaly, and hurried home to resist the invaders, whom he found
however already departed from Aetolia: and so was too late for the
campaign at all points.

[Sidenote: Philip arrives at Corinth.]

Meanwhile the king set sail from Leucas; and after ravaging the
territory of Oeanthe as he coasted along, arrived with his whole fleet
at Corinth, and dropping anchor in the harbour of Lechaeum, disembarked
his troops, and sent his letter-bearers to the allied cities in the
Peloponnese, naming a day on which he wished all to be at Tegea by
bedtime.

[Sidenote: Tegea.]

[Sidenote: Amyclae and Sparta.]

[Sidenote: Dismay at Sparta.]

+18.+ Then, without making any stay in Corinth, he gave the Macedonians
marching orders; and came at the end of a two days’ march by way of
Argos to Tegea. There he took on the Achaean troops that had assembled,
and advanced by the mountain road, being very desirous to effect an
entrance into the territory of the Lacedaemonians before they became
aware of it. Thus after a circuitous route through an uninhabited
district he came out upon the hills facing the town, and continued his
advance right upon Amyclae, keeping the Menelaïum on his right. The
Lacedaemonians were dismayed and terrified at seeing from the town the
army passing along the hills, and wondered what was happening. For
they were still in a state of excitement at the news of Philip which
had arrived,—his destruction of Thermus, and his whole campaign in
Aetolia; and there was even some talk among them of sending Lycurgus
to the assistance of the Aetolians. But no one had so much as thought
of danger coming so quickly to their own gates from such a distance,
especially as the youth of the king still gave room for a certain
feeling of contempt. The event therefore being totally contrary to
their expectations, they were naturally in a state of great dismay.
For the courage and energy beyond his years, with which Philip acted,
reduced all his enemies to a state of the utmost difficulty and terror.
For setting out, as I have shown, from the centre of Aetolia, and
crossing the Ambracian gulf by night, he passed over to Leucas; and
after a two days’ halt there, on the third he renewed his voyage before
daybreak, and after a two days' sail, during which he ravaged the
seaboard of the Aetolians, he dropped anchor in Lechaeum; thence, after
seven days' continuous march, he arrived on the heights above Sparta in
the neighbourhood of the Menelaïum,—a feat which most of those even who
saw it done could scarcely believe.

[Sidenote: Helos.]

[Sidenote: Gythium.]

[Sidenote: Carnium.]

+19.+ While the Lacedaemonians were thus thoroughly terrified at the
unexpected danger, and at a loss what to do to meet it, Philip encamped
on the first day at Amyclae: a place in Laconia about twenty stades
from Lacedaemon, exceedingly rich in forest and corn, and containing a
temple of Apollo, which is about the most splendid of all the temples
in Laconia, situated in that quarter of the city which <DW72>s down
towards the sea. Next day the king descended to a place called the Camp
of Pyrrhus,[254] wasting the country as he went. After devastating
the neighbouring districts for the two following days, he encamped
near Carnium; thence he started for Asine, and after some fruitless
assaults upon it, he started again, and thenceforth devoted himself
to plundering all the country bordering on the Cretan Sea as far as
Taenarum. Then, once more changing the direction of his march, he
advanced to Gythium, the naval arsenal of Sparta, which possesses a
safe harbour, and is about thirty stades from the city. Then leaving
this on the right, he pitched his camp in the territory of Helos,
which of all the districts of Laconia is the most extensive and most
beautiful. Thence he sent out foraging parties and wasted the country
with fire and sword, and destroyed the crops in it: pushing his
devastation as far as Acriae and Leucae, and even to the district of
Boeae.

[Sidenote: Abortive attempt of the Messenians to join Philip.]

[Sidenote: Lycurgus resolves to intercept Philip on his return at the
pass opposite Sparta.]

+20.+ On the receipt of the despatch from Philip commanding the
levy, the Messenians were no less forward than the other allies to
undertake it. They showed indeed great zeal in making the expedition,
sending out the flower of their troops, two thousand infantry and two
hundred cavalry. Owing, however, to their distance from the seat of
war, they arrived at Tegea after Philip had left, and at first were
at a loss what to do; but being very anxious not to appear lukewarm
in the campaign, because of the suspicions which had attached to them
before, they pressed forward through Argolis into Laconia, with a view
of effecting a junction with Philip; and having reached a fort called
Glympes, which is situated on the frontiers of Argolis and Laconia,
they encamped there in an unskilful and careless manner: for they
neither entrenched themselves with ditch nor rampart, nor selected an
advantageous spot; but trusting to the friendly disposition of the
natives, bivouacked there unsuspiciously outside the walls of the
fortress. But on news being brought to Lycurgus of the arrival of the
Messenians, he took his mercenaries and some Lacedaemonians with him,
and reaching the place before daybreak, boldly attacked the camp. Ill
advised as the proceedings of the Messenians had been, and especially
in advancing from Tegea with inadequate numbers and without the
direction of experts, in the actual hour of danger, when the enemy was
upon them, they did all that circumstances admitted of to secure their
safety. For as soon as they saw the enemy appearing they abandoned
everything and took refuge within the fort. Accordingly, though
Lycurgus captured most of the horses and the baggage, he did not take
a single prisoner, and only succeeded in killing eight of the cavalry.
After this reverse, the Messenians returned home through Argolis: but
elated with success Lycurgus went to Sparta, and set about preparations
for war; and took secret counsel with his friends to prevent Philip
from getting safe out of the country without an engagement. Meanwhile
the king had started from the district of Helos, and was on his return
march, wasting the country as he came; and on the fourth day, about
noon, arrived once more with his whole army at Amyclae.

+21.+ Leaving directions with his officers and friends as to the coming
engagement, Lycurgus himself left Sparta and occupied the ground
near the Menelaïum, with as many as two thousand men. He agreed with
the officers in the town that they should watch carefully, in order
that, whenever he raised the signal, they might lead out their troops
from the town at several points at once, and draw them up facing the
Eurotas, at the spot where it is nearest the town. Such were the
measures and designs of Lycurgus and the Lacedaemonians.

[Sidenote: Value of local knowledge.]

But lest ignorance of the locality should render my story
unintelligible and vague, I must describe its natural features and
general position: following my practice throughout this work of drawing
out the analogies and likenesses between places which are unknown and
those already known and described. For seeing that in war, whether
by sea or land, it is the difference of position which generally is
the cause of failure; and since I wish all to know, not so much what
happened, as how it happened, I must not pass over local description in
detailing events of any sort, least of all in such as relate to war:
and I must not shrink from using as landmarks, at one time harbours and
seas and islands, at another temples, mountains, or local names; or,
finally, variations in the aspect of the heaven, these being of the
most universal application throughout the world. For it is thus, and
thus only, that it is possible, as I have said, to bring my readers to
a conception of an unknown scene.

[Sidenote: The position of Sparta and the neighbouring heights.]

[Sidenote: The dispositions of Lycurgus.]

+22.+ These then are the features of the country in question. Sparta,
as a whole, is in the shape of a circle; and is situated on level
ground, broken at certain points by irregularities and hills. The river
Eurotas flows past it on the east, and for the greater part of the year
is too large to be forded; and the hills on which the Menelaïum stands
are on the other side of the river, to the south-east of the town,
rugged and difficult of access and exceedingly lofty; they exactly
command the space between the town and the Eurotas, which flows at the
very foot of the hill, the whole valley being at this point no more
than a stade and a half wide. Through this Philip was obliged to pass
on his return march, with the city, and the Lacedaemonians ready and
drawn up for battle, on his left hand, and on his right the river, and
the division of Lycurgus posted upon the hills. In addition to these
arrangements the Lacedaemonians had had recourse to the following
device: They had dammed up the river above the town, and turned the
stream upon the space between the town and the hills; with the result
that the ground became so wet that men could not keep their feet, to
say nothing of horses. The only course, therefore, left to the king was
to lead his men close under the skirts of the hills, thus presenting to
the attack of the enemy a long line of march, in which it was difficult
for one part to relieve another.

[Sidenote: Philip succeeds in baffling Lycurgus.]

Philip perceived these difficulties, and after consultation with
his friends decided that the matter of most urgent necessity was to
dislodge the division of Lycurgus, first of all, from the position
near the Menelaïum. He took therefore his mercenaries, peltasts, and
Illyrians, and advanced across the river in the direction of the hills.
Perceiving Philip’s design, Lycurgus began getting his men ready, and
exhorted them to face the battle, and at the same time displayed the
signal to the forces in the town: whereupon those whose duty it was
immediately led out the troops from the town, as had been arranged, and
drew them up outside the wall, with the cavalry on their right wing.

+23.+ When he had got within distance of Lycurgus, Philip at first
ordered the mercenaries to charge alone: and, accordingly, their
superiority in arms and position contributed not a little to give the
Lacedaemonians the upper hand at the beginning of the engagement. But
when Philip supported his men by sending his reserve of peltasts on to
the field, and caused the Illyrians to charge the enemy on the flanks,
the king’s mercenaries were encouraged by the appearance of these
reserves to renew the battle with much more vigour than ever; while
Lycurgus’s men, terrified at the approach of the heavy-armed soldiers,
gave way and fled, leaving a hundred killed and rather more prisoners,
while the rest escaped into the town. Lycurgus himself, with a few
followers going by a deserted and pathless route, made his way into the
town under cover of night. Philip secured the hills by means of the
Illyrians; and, accompanied by his light-armed troops and peltasts,
rejoined his main forces. Just at the same time Aratus, leading the
phalanx from Amyclae, had come close to the town. So the king, after
recrossing the Eurotas, halted with his light-armed peltasts and
cavalry until the heavy-armed got safely through the narrow part of the
road at the foot of the hills. Then the troops in the city ventured to
attack the covering force of cavalry. There was a serious engagement,
in which the peltasts fought with conspicuous valour; and the success
of Philip being now beyond dispute, he chased the Lacedaemonians to
their very gates, and then, having got his army safely across the
Eurotas he brought up the rear of his phalanx.

[Sidenote: Philip’s strong position.]

[Sidenote: Sellasia, B.C. 222.]

[Sidenote: Philip proceeds to Tegea, where he is visited by ambassadors
from Rhodes and Chios seeking to end the Aetolian war.]

+24.+ But it was now getting late: and being obliged to encamp, he
availed himself for that purpose of a place at the very mouth of the
pass, his officers having chanced already to have selected that very
place; than which it would be impossible to find one more advantageous
for making an invasion of Laconia by way of Sparta itself. For it is
at the very commencement of this pass, just where a man coming from
Tegea, or, indeed, from any point in the interior, approaches Sparta;
being about two stades from the town and right upon the river. The
side of it which looks towards the town and river is entirely covered
by a steep, lofty, and entirely inaccessible rock; while the top of
this rock is a table-land of good soil and well supplied with water,
and very conveniently situated for the exit and entrance of troops.
A general, therefore, who was encamped there, and who had command of
the height overhanging it, would evidently be in a place of safety as
regards the neighbouring town, and in a most advantageous situation as
commanding the entrance and exit of the narrow pass. Having accordingly
encamped himself on this spot in safety, next day Philip sent forward
his baggage; but drew out his army on the table-land in full view of
the citizens, and remained thus for a short time. Then he wheeled to
the left and marched in the direction of Tegea; and when he reached
the site of the battle of Antigonus and Cleomenes, he encamped there.
Next day, having made an inspection of the ground and sacrificed to
the gods on both the eminences, Olympus and Evas, he advanced with his
rear-guard strengthened. On arriving at Tegea he caused all the booty
to be sold; and then, marching through Argos, arrived with his whole
force at Corinth. There ambassadors appeared from Rhodes and Chios to
negotiate a suspension of hostilities; to whom the king gave audience,
and feigning that he was, and always had been, quite ready to come to
terms with the Aetolians, sent them away to negotiate with the latter
also; while he himself went down to Lechaeum, and made preparations
for an embarkation, as he had an important undertaking to complete in
Phocis.

[Sidenote: Treason of Megaleas and Ptolemy.]

+25.+ Leontius, Megaleas, and Ptolemy, being still persuaded that they
could frighten Philip, and thus neutralise their former failures,
took this opportunity of tampering with the peltasts, and what the
Macedonians call the _Agema_,[255] by suggesting to them that they were
risking their all, and getting none of their just rights, nor receiving
the booty which, according to custom, properly fell to their share. By
these words they incited the young men to collect together, and attempt
to plunder the tents of the most prominent of the king’s friends,
and to pull down the doors, and break through the roof of the royal
headquarters.

The whole city being thereby in a state of confusion and uproar, the
king heard of it and immediately came hastily running to the town
from Lechaeum; and having summoned the Macedonians to the theatre he
addressed them in terms of mingled exhortation and rebuke for what had
happened. A scene of great uproar and confusion followed: and while
some advised him to arrest and call to account the guilty, others
to come to terms and declare an indemnity, for the moment the king
dissembled his feelings, and pretended to be satisfied; and so with
some words of exhortation addressed to all, retired: and though he
knew quite well who were the ringleaders in the disturbance, he made a
politic pretence of not doing so.

[Sidenote: Apelles sent for by Leontius.]

[Sidenote: Apelles rebuffed by the king.]

[Sidenote: Courtiers.]

+26.+ After this outbreak the king’s schemes in Phocis met with
certain impediments which prevented their present execution. Meanwhile
Leontius, despairing of success by his own efforts, had recourse to
Apelles, urging him by frequent messages to come from Chalcis, and
setting forth his own difficulties and the awkwardness of his position
owing to his quarrel with the king. Now Apelles had been acting in
Chalcis with an unwarrantable assumption of authority. He gave out
that the king was still a mere boy, and for the most part under his
control, and without independent power over anything; the management
of affairs and the supreme authority in the kingdom he asserted to
belong to himself. Accordingly, the magistrates and commissioners of
Macedonia and Thessaly reported to him; and the cities in Greece in
their decrees and votes of honours and rewards made brief reference to
the king, while Apelles was all in all to them. Philip had been kept
informed of this, and had for some time past been feeling annoyed and
offended at it,—Aratus being at his side, and using skilful means to
further his own views; still he kept his own counsel, and did not let
any one see what he intended to do, or what he had in his mind. In
ignorance, therefore, of his own position, and persuaded that, if he
could only come into Philip’s presence, he would manage everything as
he chose, Apelles set out from Chalcis to the assistance of Leontius.
On his arrival at Corinth, Leontius, Ptolemy and Megaleas, being
commanders of the peltasts and the other chief divisions of the army,
took great pains to incite the young men to go to meet him. He entered
the town, therefore, with great pomp, owing to the number of officers
and soldiers who went to meet him, and proceeded straight to the royal
quarters. But when he would have entered, according to his former
custom, one of the ushers prevented him, saying that the king was
engaged. Troubled at this unusual repulse, and hesitating for a long
while what to do, Apelles at last turned round and retired. Thereupon
all those who were escorting him began at once openly to fall off from
him and disperse, so that at last he entered his own lodging, with
his children, absolutely alone. So true it is all the world over that
a moment exalts and abases us; but most especially is this true of
courtiers. They indeed are exactly like counters on a board, which,
according to the pleasure of the calculator, are one moment worth a
farthing, the next a talent. Even so courtiers at the king’s nod are
one moment at the summit of prosperity, at another the objects of
pity. When Megaleas saw that the help he had looked for from Apelles
was failing him, he was exceedingly frightened, and made preparations
for flight. Apelles meanwhile was admitted to the king’s banquets
and honours of that sort, but had no share in his council or daily
social employments; and when, some days afterwards, the king resumed
his voyage from Lechaeum, to complete his designs in Phocis, he took
Apelles with him.

[Sidenote: Flight of Megaleas.]

[Sidenote: Leontius put to death.]

+27.+ The expedition to Phocis proving a failure, the king was retiring
from Elatea; and while this was going on, Megaleas removed to Athens,
leaving Leontius behind him as his security for his twenty talents
fine. The Athenian Strategi however refused to admit him, and he
therefore resumed his journey and went to Thebes. Meanwhile the king
put to sea from the coast of Cirrha and sailed with his guards[256]
to the harbour of Sicyon, whence he went up to the city and, excusing
himself to the magistrates, took up his quarters with Aratus, and
spent the whole of his time with him, ordering Apelles to sail back
to Corinth. But upon news being brought him of the proceedings of
Megaleas, he despatched the peltasts, whose regular commander was
Leontius, in the charge of Taurion to Triphylia, on the pretext of some
service of pressing need; and, when they had departed, he gave orders
to arrest Leontius to answer his bail. When the peltasts heard what had
happened from a messenger sent to them by Leontius, they despatched
ambassadors to the king, begging him that, “if he had arrested Leontius
on any other score, not to have him tried on the charges alleged
against him without their presence: for otherwise they should consider
themselves treated with signal contempt, and to be one and all involved
in the condemnation.” Such was the freedom of speech towards their king
which the Macedonians always enjoyed. They added, that “if the arrest
was on account of his bail for Megaleas, they would themselves pay the
money by a common subscription.” The king however was so enraged, that
he put Leontius to death sooner than he had intended, owing to the zeal
displayed by the peltasts.

[Sidenote: A thirty days' truce offered by the Aetolians through the
Rhodian and Chian ambassadors.]

[Sidenote: Treason of Megaleas detected. His arrest and suicide.]

[Sidenote: Death of Appelles.]

+28.+ Presently the ambassadors of Rhodes and Chios returned from
Aetolia. They had agreed to a truce of thirty days, and asserted that
the Aetolians were ready to make peace: they had also arranged for
a stated day on which they claimed that Philip should meet them at
Rhium; undertaking that the Aetolians would be ready to do anything on
condition of making peace. Philip accepted the truce and wrote letters
to the allies, bidding them send assessors and commissioners to discuss
the terms with the Aetolians; while he himself sailed from Lechaeum and
arrived on the second day at Patrae. Just then certain letters were
sent to him from Phocis, which Megaleas had written to the Aetolians,
exhorting them not to be frightened, but to persist in the war, because
Philip was in extremities through a lack of provisions. Besides this
the letters contained some offensive and bitter abuse of the king. As
soon as he had read these, the king feeling no doubt that Apelles was
the ringleader of the mischief, placed him under a guard and despatched
him in all haste to Corinth, with his son and favourite boy; while
he sent Alexander to Thebes to arrest Megaleas, with orders to bring
him before the magistrates to answer to his bail. When Alexander had
fulfilled his commission, Megaleas, not daring to await the issue,
committed suicide: and about the same time Apelles, his son and
favourite boy, ended their lives also. Such was the end of these men,
thoroughly deserved in every way, and especially for their outrageous
conduct to Aratus.

[Sidenote: Failure of the negotiations with the Aetolians.]

+29.+ Now the Aetolians were at first very anxious for the ratification
of a peace, because they found the war burdensome, and because things
had not gone as they expected. For, looking to his tender years and
lack of experience, they had expected to have a mere child to deal with
in Philip; but had found him a full-grown man both in his designs and
his manner of executing them: while they had themselves made a display
of imbecility and childishness alike in the general conduct, and the
particular actions, of the campaign. But as soon as they heard of the
outbreak of the disturbance among the peltasts, and of the deaths of
Apelles and Leontius, hoping that there was a serious and formidable
disaffection at the court, they procrastinated until they had outstayed
the day appointed for the meeting at Rhium. But Philip was delighted
to seize the pretext: for he felt confident of success in the war,
and had already resolved to avoid coming to terms. He therefore at
once exhorted such of the allies as had come to meet him to make
preparations, not for the peace, but for war; and putting to sea again
sailed back to Corinth. He then dismissed his Macedonian soldiers to go
home through Thessaly for the winter: while he himself putting to sea
from Cenchreae, and coasting along Attica, sailed through the Euripus
to Demetrias, and there before a jury of Macedonians had Ptolemy tried
and put to death, who was the last survivor of the conspiracy of
Leontius.

[Sidenote: B.C. 218. Review of the events of the year in Italy, Asia,
Sparta.]

It was in this season that Hannibal, having succeeded in entering
Italy, was lying encamped in presence of the Roman army in the
valley of the Padus. Antiochus, after subduing the greater part of
Coele-Syria, had once more dismissed his army into winter quarters.
The Spartan king Lycurgus fled to Aetolia in fear of the Ephors: for
acting on a false charge that he was meditating a _coup d'état_, they
had collected the young men and come to his house at night. But getting
previous intimation of what was impending, he had quitted the town
accompanied by the members of his household.

[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 218-217.]

[Sidenote: Disorder in Achaia owing to the incompetence of the
Strategus Eperatus.]

[Sidenote: May, B.C. 217. Aratus the elder elected Strategus.]

+30.+ When the next winter came, Philip having departed to Macedonia,
and the Achaean Strategus Eperatus having incurred the contempt of the
Achaean soldiers and the complete disregard of the mercenaries, no one
would obey his orders, and no preparation was made for the defence of
the country. This was observed by Pyrrhias, who had been sent by the
Aetolians to command the Eleans. He had under him a force of thirteen
hundred Aetolians, and the mercenaries hired by the Eleans, as well as
a thousand Elean infantry and two hundred Elean cavalry, amounting in
all to three thousand: and he now began committing frequent raids, not
only upon the territories of Dyme and Pharae, but upon that of Patrae
also. Finally he pitched his camp on what is called the Panachaean
Mountain, which commands the town of Patrae, and began wasting the
whole district towards Rhium and Aegium. The result was that the
cities, being exposed to much suffering, and unable to obtain any
assistance, began to make difficulties about paying their contribution
to the league; and the soldiers finding their pay always in arrear
and never paid at the right time acted in the same way about going to
the relief of the towns. Both parties thus mutually retaliating on
each other, affairs went from bad to worse, and at last the foreign
contingent broke up altogether. And all this was the result of the
incompetence of the chief magistrate. The time for the next election
finding Achaean affairs in this state, Eperatus laid down his office,
and just at the beginning of summer Aratus the elder was elected
Strategus.[257]

[Sidenote: 140th Olympiad, Asia.]

Such was the position of affairs in Europe. We have now arrived at a
proper juncture, both of events and of time, to transfer our narrative
to the history of Asia. I will therefore resume my story of the
transactions which occurred there during the same Olympiad.

+31.+ I will first endeavour, in accordance with my original plan,
to give an account of the war between Antiochus and Ptolemy for the
possession of Coele-Syria. Though I am fully aware that at the period,
at which I have stopped in my Greek history, this war was all but
decided and concluded, I have yet deliberately chosen this particular
break and division in my narrative; believing that I shall effectually
provide against the possibility of mistakes on the part of my readers
in regard to dates, if I indicate in the course of my narrative the
years in this Olympiad in which the events in the several parts of the
world, as well as in Greece, began and ended. For I think nothing more
essential to the clearness of my history of this Olympiad than to avoid
confusing the several narratives. Our object should be to distinguish
and keep them separate as much as possible, until we come to the next
Olympiad, and begin setting down the contemporary events in the several
countries under each year. For since I have undertaken to write, not a
particular, but a universal history, and have ventured upon a plan on
a greater scale, as I have already shown, than any of my predecessors,
it will be necessary also for me to take greater care than they, as
to my method of treatment and arrangement; so as to secure clearness,
both in the details, and in the general view adopted in my history. I
will accordingly go back a short way in the history of the kingdoms
of Antiochus and Ptolemy, and try to fix upon a starting-point for my
narrative which shall be accepted and recognised by all: for this is a
matter of the first importance.

+32.+ For the old saying, “Well begun is half done,” was meant by its
inventors to urge the importance of taking the greater pains to make a
good beginning than anything else. And though some may consider this an
exaggeration, in my opinion it comes short of the truth; for one might
say with confidence, not that “the beginning was half the business,”
but rather that it was near being the whole. For how can one make a
good beginning without having first grasped in thought the complete
plan, or without knowing where, with what object, and with what purpose
he is undertaking the business? Or how can a man sum up a series
of events satisfactorily without a reference to their origin, and
without showing his point of departure, or why and how he has arrived
at the particular crisis at which he finds himself? Therefore both
historian and reader alike should be exceedingly careful to mark the
beginnings of events, with a conviction that their influence does not
stop half-way, but is paramount to the end. And this is what I shall
endeavour to do.

+33.+ I am aware, however, that a similar profession has been made by
many other historians of an intention to write a universal history,
and of undertaking a work on a larger scale than their predecessors.
About these writers, putting out of the question Ephorus, the first
and only man who has really attempted a universal history, I will
not mention any name or say more about them than this,—that several
of my contemporaries, while professing to write a universal history
have imagined that they could tell the story of the war of Rome and
Carthage in three or four pages. Yet every one knows that events more
numerous or important were never accomplished in Iberia, Libya, Sicily,
and Italy than in that war; and that the Hannibalian war was the most
famous and lasting of any that has taken place except the Sicilian.
So momentous was it, that all the rest of the world were compelled to
watch it in terrified expectation of what would follow from its final
catastrophe. Yet some of these writers, without even giving as many
details of it as those who, after the manner of the vulgar, inscribe
rude records of events on house walls, pretend to have embraced the
whole of Greek and foreign history. The truth of the matter is, that
it is a very easy matter to profess to undertake works of the greatest
importance; but by no means so simple a matter in practice to attain
to any excellence. The former is open to every one with the requisite
audacity: the latter is rare, and is given to few. So much for those
who use pompous language about themselves and their historical works. I
will now return to my narrative.

[Sidenote: Death of Ptolemy Euergetes, B.C. 222.]

+34.+ Immediately after his father’s death, Ptolemy Philopator put his
brother Magas and his partisans to death, and took possession of the
throne of Egypt. He thought that he had now freed himself by this act
from domestic danger; and that by the deaths of Antigonus and Seleucus,
and their being respectively succeeded by mere children like Antiochus
and Philip, fortune had released him from danger abroad. He therefore
felt secure of his position and began conducting his reign as though it
were a perpetual festival. He would attend to no business, and would
hardly grant an interview to the officials about the court, or at the
head of the administrative departments in Egypt. Even his agents abroad
found him entirely careless and indifferent; though his predecessors,
far from taking less interest in foreign affairs, had generally given
them precedence over those of Egypt itself. For being masters of
Coele-Syria and Cyprus, they maintained a threatening attitude towards
the kings of Syria, both by land and sea; and were also in a commanding
position in regard to the princes of Asia, as well as the islands,
through their possession of the most splendid cities, strongholds, and
harbours all along the sea-coast from Pamphylia to the Hellespont and
the district round Lysimachia. Moreover they were favourably placed for
an attack upon Thrace and Macedonia from their possession of Aenus,
Maroneia, and more distant cities still. And having thus stretched
forth their hands to remote regions, and long ago strengthened their
position by a ring of princedoms, these kings had never been anxious
about their rule in Egypt; and had naturally, therefore, given great
attention to foreign politics. But when Philopator, absorbed in
unworthy intrigues, and senseless and continuous drunkenness, treated
these several branches of government with equal indifference, it was
naturally not long before more than one was found to lay plots against
his life as well as his power: of whom the first was Cleomenes, the
Spartan.[258]

[Sidenote: Cleomenes endeavours to get assistance from the Egyptian
court.]

+35.+ As long as Euergetes was alive, with whom he had agreed to make
an alliance and confederacy, Cleomenes took no steps. But upon that
monarch’s death, seeing that the time was slipping away, and that the
peculiar position of affairs in Greece seemed almost to cry aloud
for Cleomenes,—for Antigonus was dead, the Achaeans involved in war,
and the Lacedaemonians were at one with the Aetolians in hostility
to the Achaeans and Macedonians, which was the policy originally
adopted by Cleomenes,—then, indeed, he was actually compelled to use
some expedition, and to bestir himself to secure his departure from
Alexandria. First therefore, in interviews with the king, he urged him
to send him out with the needful amount of supplies and troops; but
not being listened to in this request, he next begged him earnestly
to let him go alone with his own servants; for he affirmed that the
state of affairs was such as to show him sufficient opportunities for
recovering his ancestral throne. The king, however, for the reasons
I have mentioned, taking absolutely no interest in such matters, nor
exercising any foresight whatever, continued with extraordinary folly
and blindness to neglect the petitions of Cleomenes. But the party of
Sosibius, the leading statesman at the time, took counsel together,
and agreed on the following course of action in regard to him. They
decided not to send him out with a fleet and supplies; for, owing to
the death of Antigonus, they took little account of foreign affairs,
and thought money spent on such things would be thrown away. Besides,
they were afraid that since Antigonus was dead, and no one was left
who could balance him, Cleomenes might, if he got Greece into his
power quickly and without trouble, prove a serious and formidable
rival to themselves; especially as he had had a clear view of Egyptian
affairs, had learnt to despise the king; and had discovered that the
kingdom had many parts loosely attached, and widely removed from the
centre, and presenting many facilities for revolutionary movements:
for not a few of their ships were at Samos, and a considerable force
of soldiers at Ephesus. These considerations induced them to reject
the idea of sending Cleomenes out with supplies; for they thought it
by no means conducive to their interests to carelessly let a man go,
who was certain to be their opponent and enemy. The other proposal was
to keep him there against his will; but this they all rejected at once
without discussion, on the principle that the lion and the flock could
not safely share the same stall. Sosibius himself took the lead in
regarding this idea with aversion, and his reason was this.

[Sidenote: The reason of the opposition of Sosibius.]

+36.+ While engaged in effecting the destruction of Magas and Berenice,
his anxiety at the possible failure of his attempt, especially through
the courageous character of Berenice, had forced him to flatter the
courtiers, and give them all hopes of advantage in case his intrigue
succeeded. It was at this juncture that, observing Cleomenes to
stand in need of the king’s help, and to be possessed of a clear
understanding and a genuine grasp of the situation, he admitted him to
a knowledge of his design, holding out to him hopes of great advantage.
And when Cleomenes saw that Sosibius was in a state of great anxiety,
and above all afraid of the foreign soldiers and mercenaries, he bade
him not be alarmed; and undertook that the foreign soldiers should do
him no harm, but should rather be of assistance to him. And on Sosibius
expressing surprise rather than conviction at this promise, he said,
“Don't you see that there are three thousand foreign soldiers here from
the Peloponnese, and a thousand from Crete? I have only to nod to these
men, and every man of them will at once do what I want. With these all
ready to hand, whom do you fear? Surely not mere Syrians and Carians.”
Sosibius was much pleased at the remark at the time, and doubly
encouraged in his intrigue against Berenice; but ever afterwards, when
observing the indifference of the king, he repeated it to himself, and
put before his eyes the boldness of Cleomenes, and the goodwill of the
foreign contingent towards him.

[Sidenote: The intrigue of Sosibius against Cleomenes.]

+37.+ These feelings now moved him to advise the king and his friends
above all things to arrest and incarcerate Cleomenes: and to carry
out this policy he availed himself of the following circumstance,
which happened conveniently for him. There was a certain Messenian
called Nicagoras, an ancestral guest-friend of the Lacedaemonian
king Archidamus. They had not previously had much intercourse; but
when Archidamus fled from Sparta, for fear of Cleomenes, and came to
Messenia, not only did Nicagoras show great kindness in receiving
him under his roof and furnishing him with other necessaries, but
from the close association that followed a very warm friendship and
intimacy sprang up between them: and accordingly when Cleomenes
subsequently gave Archidamus some expectation of being restored to
his city, and composing their quarrels, Nicagoras devoted himself to
conducting the negotiation and settling the terms of their compact.
These being ratified, Archidamus returned to Sparta relying on the
treaty made by the agency of Nicagoras. But as soon as he met him,
Cleomenes assassinated Archidamus,[259] sparing however Nicagoras
and his companions. To the outside world Nicagoras pretended to be
under an obligation to Cleomenes for saving his life; but in heart
he was exceedingly incensed at what had happened, because he had the
discredit of having been the cause of the king’s death. Now it happened
that this same Nicagoras had, a short time before the events of which
we are speaking, come to Alexandria with a cargo of horses. Just as
he was disembarking he came upon Cleomenes, Panterus, and Hippitas
walking together along the quay. When Cleomenes saw him, he came up
and welcomed him warmly, and asked him on what business he was come.
Upon his replying that he had brought a cargo of horses, “You had
better,” said he, “have brought a cargo of catamites and sakbut girls;
for that is what the present king is fond of.” Nicagoras laughed, and
said nothing at the time: but some days afterwards, when he had, in the
course of his horse-sales, become more intimate with Sosibius, he did
Cleomenes the ill turn of repeating his recent sarcasm; and seeing that
Sosibius heard it with satisfaction, he related to him the whole story
of his grievance against Cleomenes.

[Sidenote: Cleomenes put under arrest.]

+38.+ Finding then that he was hostile in feeling to Cleomenes,
Sosibius persuaded Nicagoras, partly by presents given on the spot
and partly by promises for the future, to write a letter accusing
Cleomenes, and leave it sealed; that as soon as he had sailed, as he
would do in a few days, his servant might bring it to him as though
sent by Nicagoras. Nicagoras performed his part in the plot; and after
he had sailed, the letter was brought by the servant to Sosibius,
who at once took the servant and the letter to the king. The servant
stated that Nicagoras had left the letter with orders to deliver it
to Sosibius; and the letter declared that it was the intention of
Cleomenes, if he failed to secure his despatch from the country with
suitable escort and provisions, to stir up a rebellion against the
king. Sosibius at once seized the opportunity of urging on the king and
his friends to take prompt precautions against Cleomenes and to put him
in ward. This was at once done, and a very large house was assigned to
him in which he lived under guard, differing from other prisoners only
in the superior size of his prison. Finding himself in this distressing
plight, and with fear of worse for the future, Cleomenes determined to
make the most desperate attempts for freedom: not so much because he
felt confident of success,—for he had none of the elements of success
in such an enterprise on his side,—but rather because he was eager to
die nobly, and endure nothing unworthy of the gallantry which he had
previously displayed. He must, I think, as is usually the case with men
of high courage, have recalled and reflected upon as his model those
words of the hero:[260]—

   “Yea, let me die,—but not a coward’s death,
   Nor all inglorious: let me do one deed,
   That children yet unborn may hear and mark!”

[Sidenote: Bold attempt of Cleomenes to recover his liberty. His
failure and death, B.C. 220.]

+39.+ He therefore waited for the time at which the king left
Alexandria for Canopus, and then spread a report among his guards
that he was going to be released by the king; and on this pretext
entertained his own attendants at a banquet, and sent out some flesh
of the sacrificial victims, some garlands, and some wine to his
guards. The latter indulged in these good things unsuspiciously, and
became completely drunk; whereupon Cleomenes walked out about noon,
accompanied by his friends and servants armed with daggers, without
being noticed by his guard. As the party advanced they met Ptolemy in
the street, who had been left by the king in charge of the city; and
overawing his attendants by the audacity of his proceeding, dragged
Ptolemy himself from his chariot and put him in a place of security,
while they loudly called upon the crowds of citizens to assert their
freedom. But every one was unprepared for the movement, and therefore
no one obeyed their summons or joined them; and they accordingly turned
their steps to the citadel, with the intention of bursting open the
doors and obtaining the help of the prisoners confined there. But the
commanders of the citadel were on the alert, and learning what was
going to take place had secured the entrance gate: having therefore
failed in this design they killed themselves like brave men and
Spartans.

Such was the end of Cleomenes: a man of brilliant social qualities,
with a natural aptitude for affairs, and, in a word, endued with all
the qualifications of a general and a king.

[Sidenote: B.C. 220-219. The origin of the war in Coele-Syria.]

+40.+ Shortly after the catastrophe of Cleomenes, the governor of
Coele-Syria, who was an Aetolian by birth, resolved to hold treasonable
parley with Antiochus and put the cities of that province into his
hands. He was induced to take this step partly by the contempt with
which Ptolemy’s shameful debauchery and general conduct had inspired
him; and partly by distrust of the king’s ministers, which he had
learned to entertain in the course of the recent attempt of Antiochus
upon Coele-Syria: for in that campaign he had rendered signal service
to Ptolemy, and yet, far from receiving any thanks for it, he had been
summoned to Alexandria and barely escaped losing his life. The advances
which he now made to Antiochus were gladly received, and the affair was
soon in the course of being rapidly completed.

But I must make my readers acquainted with the position of the royal
family of Syria as I have already done with that of Egypt; and in order
to do so, I will go back to the succession of Antiochus to the throne,
and give a summary of events from that point to the beginning of the
war of which I am to speak.

[Sidenote: B.C. 226.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 223. See 4, 48.]

Antiochus was the younger son of Seleucus Callinicus; and on the
death of his father, and the succession in right of seniority of his
brother Seleucus to the throne, he at first removed to upper Asia
and lived there. But Seleucus having been treacherously assassinated
after crossing Mount Taurus with his army, as I have already related,
he succeeded to the throne himself; and made Achaeus governor of Asia
on this side Taurus, Molon and his brother Alexander guardians of his
dominions in upper Asia,—Molon acting as Satrap of Media, his brother
of Persia.

[Sidenote: Revolt of Molon.]

+41.+ These two brothers despising the king for his youth, and hoping
that Achaeus would join in their treason, but most of all because
they dreaded the cruel character and malign influence of Hermeias,
who was at that time the chief minister of the entire kingdom, formed
the design of revolting themselves and causing the upper Satrapies to
revolt also.

[Sidenote: Intrigues of Hermeias.]

This Hermeias was a Carian and had obtained his power by the
appointment of the king’s brother Seleucus, who had entrusted it to him
when he was setting out on his expedition to the Taurus. Invested with
this authority he at once began to display jealousy of all those about
the court who were in any way prominent; and being cruel by nature he
inflicted punishment on some for acts of ignorance, on which he always
managed to place the worst interpretation; while against others he
brought trumped-up and lying charges, and then acted towards them the
part of an inflexible and harsh judge. But his chief end and object was
to secure the destruction of Epigenes who had brought home the forces
which had accompanied Seleucus; because he saw that he was a man of
eloquence and practical ability, and highly acceptable to the army.
With this design he was ever on the watch to lay hold of some handle
or pretext against him. Accordingly when a council was summoned on
the subject of Molon’s revolt, and when the king bade each councillor
deliver his opinion on the measures to be taken against the rebels,
Epigenes spoke first and urged that “there ought to be no delay,
but the matter should be taken in hand at once; and that, first and
foremost, the king should go in person to the district, and be ready
to seize the right moments for action. For the actual presence of the
king, and his appearance at the head of an army before the eyes of the
common people, would prevent the party of Molon from venturing upon
revolutionary measures at all; or if they had the audacity to do so,
and persisted in their design, they would be quickly arrested by the
populace and handed over into the king’s power.”

+42.+ While Epigenes was still speaking in this strain, Hermeias, in
a burst of rage, exclaimed, “That Epigenes had long been secretly
plotting treason against the king; but that now he had happily shown
his real sentiments by the advice which he had given, proving how eager
he was to expose the king’s person to the rebels with an insignificant
guard.” For the present he was content with making this insinuation as
fuel for a future outburst of slander, and without further reference
to Epigenes, after what was rather an ill-timed ebullition of temper
than serious hostility, he delivered his own opinion; which, from his
fear of the danger and his inexperience in war, was against undertaking
the expedition against Molon personally, but was warmly in favour of
an attack upon Ptolemy, because he was of opinion that this latter war
would involve no danger, owing to that monarch’s cowardly character.
For the present he overawed the rest of the council into agreement
with him and he thereupon sent Xenon and Theodotus Hemiolius with an
army against Molon; while he employed himself in continually inciting
Antiochus to undertake the expedition into Coele-Syria: thinking that
it was only by involving the young king in war on every side that he
could escape punishment for his past misdeeds, and avoid being deprived
of his position of authority, for the king would have need of his
services when he found himself surrounded by struggles and dangers.
With this object in view, he finally hit on the device of forging a
letter, which he presented to the king as having been sent by Achaeus.
In it Achaeus was made to state that “Ptolemy had urged him to assert
his right to the government and promised to supply him with ships and
money for all his attempts, if he would only take the crown, and come
forward in the sight of all the world as a claimant of the sovereign
power; which he already possessed, in fact, though he grudged himself
the title, and rejected the crown which fortune gave him.”

This letter successfully imposed on the king, who became ready and
eager to go on the expedition against Coele-Syria.

[Sidenote: Marriage of Antiochus III.]

+43.+ While this was going on, Antiochus happened to be at Seleucia,
on the Zeugma, when the Navarchus Diognetus arrived from Cappadocia,
on the Euxine, bringing Laodice, the daughter of king Mithridates,
an unmarried girl, destined to be the king’s wife. This Mithridates
boasted of being a descendant of one of the seven Persians who killed
the Magus,[261] and he had maintained the sovereignty handed down from
his ancestors, as it had been originally given to them by Darius along
the shore of the Euxine. Having gone to meet the princess with all
due pomp and splendour, Antiochus immediately celebrated his nuptials
with royal magnificence. The marriage having been completed, he went
to Antioch, and after proclaiming Laodice queen, devoted himself
thenceforth to making preparation for the war.

[Sidenote: Molon.]

Meanwhile Molon had prepared the people of his own Satrapy to go all
lengths, partly by holding out to them hopes of advantages to be
gained, and partly by working on the fears of their chief men, by
means of forged letters purporting to be from the king, and couched
in threatening terms. He had also a ready coadjutor in his brother
Alexander; and had secured the co-operation of the neighbouring
Satrapies, by winning the goodwill of their leading men with bribes.
It was, therefore, at the head of a large force that he took the
field against the royal generals. Terrified at his approach Xenon
and Theodotus retired into the cities; and Molon, having secured the
territory of Apollonia, had now a superabundance of supplies.

[Sidenote: Description of Media.]

+44.+ But, indeed, even before that he was a formidable enemy owing to
the importance of his province. For the whole of the royal horses out
at grass are entrusted to the Medes;[262] and they have an incalculable
quantity of corn and cattle. Of the natural strength and extent of
the district it would be impossible to speak highly enough. For Media
lies nearly in the centre of Asia and in its size, and in the height
of its steppes compares favourably with every other district of Asia.
And again it overlooks some of the most warlike and powerful tribes. On
the east lie the plains of the desert which intervenes between Persia
and Parthia; and, moreover, it borders on and commands the “Caspian
Gates,” and touches the mountains of the Tapyri, which are not far from
the Hyrcanian Sea. On the south it <DW72>s down to Mesopotamia and the
territory of Apollonia. It is protected from Persia by the barrier of
Mount Zagrus, which has an ascent of a hundred stades, and containing
in its range many separate peaks and defiles is subdivided by deep
valleys, and at certain points by cañons, inhabited by Cosseans,
Corbrenians, Carchi, and several other barbarous tribes who have
the reputation of being excellent warriors. Again on the west it is
coterminous with the tribe called Satrapeii, who are not far from the
tribes which extend as far as the Euxine. Its northern frontier is
fringed by Elymaeans, Aniaracae, Cadusii, and Matiani, and overlooks
that part of the Pontus which adjoins the Maeotis. Media itself is
subdivided by several mountain chains running from east to west,
between which are plains thickly studded with cities and villages.

[Sidenote: Molon takes up arms.]

+45.+ Being masters, then, of a territory of proportions worthy of a
kingdom, his great power had made Molon from the first a formidable
enemy: but when the royal generals appeared to have abandoned the
country to him, and his own forces were elated at the successful issue
of their first hopes, the terror which he inspired became absolute, and
he was believed by the Asiatics to be irresistible. Taking advantage
of this, he first of all resolved to cross the Tigris and lay siege to
Seleucia; but when his passage across the river was stopped by Zeuxis
seizing the river boats, he retired to the camp at Ctesiphon, and set
about preparing winter quarters for his army.

[Sidenote: Xenoetas sent against Molon, B.C. 221.]

[Sidenote: King Antiochus in Coele-Syria.]

When King Antiochus heard of Molon’s advance and the retreat of his
own generals, he was once more for giving up the expedition against
Ptolemy, and going in person on the campaign against Molon, and not
letting slip the proper time for action. But Hermeias persisted in his
original plan, and despatched the Achaean Xenoetas against Molon, in
command of an army, with full powers; asserting that against rebels it
was fitting that generals should have the command; but that the king
ought to confine himself to directing plans and conducting national
wars against monarchs. Having therefore the young king entirely in
his power, owing to his age, he set out; and having mustered the army
at Apameia he started thence and arrived at Laodiceia. Advancing from
that time with his whole army, the king crossed the desert and entered
the cañon called Marsyas, which lies between the skirts of Libanus
and Anti-Libanus, and is contracted into a narrow gorge by those two
mountains. Just where the valley is narrowest it is divided by marshes
and lakes, from which the scented reed is cut.

+46.+ On one side of the entrance to this pass lies a place called
Brochi, on the other Gerrha, which leave but a narrow space between
them. After a march of several days through this cañon, and subduing
the towns that lay along it, Antiochus arrived at Gerrha. Finding that
Theodotus the Aetolian had already occupied Gerrha and Brochi, and had
secured the narrow road by the lakes with ditches and palisades and a
proper disposition of guards, the king at first tried to carry the pass
by force; but after sustaining more loss than he inflicted, and finding
that Theodotus remained still stanch, he gave up the attempt. In the
midst of these difficulties news was brought that Xenoetas had suffered
a total defeat and that Molon was in possession of all the upper
country: he therefore abandoned his foreign expedition and started to
relieve his own dominions.

[Sidenote: Xenoetas at first successful.]

The fact was that when the general Xenoetas had been despatched with
absolute powers, as I have before stated, his unexpected elevation
caused him to treat his friends with haughtiness and his enemies with
overweening temerity. His first move however was sufficiently prudent.
He marched to Seleucia, and after sending for Diogenes the governor of
Susiana, and Pythiades the commander in the Persian Gulf, he led out
his forces and encamped with the river Tigris protecting his front. But
there he was visited by many men from Molon’s camp, who swam across
the river and assured him that, if he would only cross the Tigris, the
whole of Molon’s army would declare for him; for the common soldiers
were jealous of Molon and warmly disposed towards the king. Xenoetas
was encouraged by these statements to attempt the passage of the
Tigris. He made a feint of bridging the river at a spot where it is
divided by an island; but as he was getting nothing ready for such an
operation, Molon took no notice of his pretended move; while he was
really occupied in collecting boats and getting them ready with every
possible care. Then having selected the most courageous men, horse and
foot, from his entire army, he left Zeuxis and Pythiades in charge of
his camp, and marched up stream at night about eighty stades above
Molon’s camp; and having got his force safely over in boats, encamped
them before daybreak in an excellent position, nearly surrounded by the
river, and covered where there was no river by marshes and swamps.

+47.+ When Molon learnt what had taken place, he sent his cavalry,
under the idea that they would easily stop those who were actually
crossing, and ride down those who had already crossed. But as soon as
they got near Xenoetas’s force, their ignorance of the ground proved
fatal to them without any enemy to attack them; for they got immersed
by their own weight, and sinking in the lakes were all rendered
useless, while many of them actually lost their lives. Xenoetas,
however, feeling sure that if he only approached, Molon’s forces would
all desert to him, advanced along the bank of the river and pitched
a camp close to the enemy. Thereupon Molon, either as a stratagem,
or because he really felt some doubt of the fidelity of his men, and
was afraid that some of Xenoetas’s expectations might be fulfilled,
left his baggage in his camp and started under cover of night in the
direction of Media. Xenoetas, imagining that Molon had fled in terror
at his approach, and because he distrusted the fidelity of his own
troops, first attacked and took the enemy’s camp, and then sent for
his own cavalry and their baggage from the camp of Zeuxis. He next
summoned the soldiers to a meeting, and told them that they should feel
encouraged and hopeful now that Molon had fled. With this preface,
he ordered them all to attend to their bodily wants and refresh
themselves; as he intended without delay to go in pursuit of the enemy
early next morning.

[Sidenote: Molon returns to his camp.]

+48.+ But the soldiers, filled with confidence, and enriched with
every kind of provisions, eagerly turned to feasting and wine and the
demoralisation which always accompanies such excesses. But Molon,
after marching a considerable distance, caused his army to get their
dinner, and then wheeling round reappeared at the camp. He found all
the enemy scattered about and drunk, and attacked their palisade just
before daybreak. Dismayed by this unexpected danger, and unable to
awake his men from their drunken slumber, Xenoetas and his staff rushed
furiously upon the enemy and were killed. Of the sleeping soldiers most
were killed in their beds, while the rest threw themselves into the
river and endeavoured to cross to the opposite camp. The greater part
however even of these perished; for in the blind hurry and confusion
which prevailed, and in the universal panic and dismay, seeing the camp
on the other side divided by so narrow a space, they all forgot the
violence of the stream, and the difficulty of crossing it, in their
eagerness to reach a place of safety. In wild excitement therefore,
and with a blind instinct of self-preservation, they not only hurled
themselves into the river, but threw their beasts of burden in also,
with their packs, as though they thought that the river by some
providential instinct would take their part and convey them safely to
the opposite camp. The result was that the stream presented a truly
pitiable and extraordinary spectacle,—horses, beasts of burden, arms,
corpses, and every kind of baggage being carried down the current along
with the swimmers.

[Sidenote: Molon’s successful campaign. B.C. 221.]

Having secured the camp of Xenoetas, Molon crossed the river in perfect
safety and without any resistance, as Zeuxis also now fled at his
approach; took possession of the latter’s camp, and then advanced with
his whole army to Seleucia; carried it at the first assault, Zeuxis and
Diomedon the governor of the place both abandoning it and flying; and
advancing from this place reduced the upper Satrapies to submission
without a blow. That of Babylon fell next, and then the Satrapy which
lay along the Persian Gulf. This brought him to Susa, which he also
carried without a blow; though his assaults upon the citadel proved
unavailing, because Diogenes the general had thrown himself into it
before he could get there. He therefore abandoned the idea of carrying
it by storm, and leaving a detachment to lay siege to it, hurried back
with his main army to Seleucia on the Tigris. There he took great pains
to refresh his army, and after addressing his men in encouraging terms
he started once more to complete his designs, and occupied Parapotamia
as far as the city Europus, and Mesopotamia as far as Dura.

[Sidenote: Epigenes put to death by the intrigues of Hermeias.]

+49.+ When news of these events was brought to Antiochus, as I have
said before, he gave up all idea of the Coele-Syrian campaign, and
turned all his attention to this war. Another meeting of his council
was thereupon summoned: and on the king ordering the members of it to
deliver their opinions as to the tactics to be employed against Molon,
the first to speak on the business was again Epigenes: who said that
“his advice should have been followed all along, and measures have been
promptly taken before the enemy had obtained such important successes:
still even at this late hour they ought to take it in hand resolutely.”
Thereupon Hermeias broke out again into an unreasonable and violent fit
of anger and began to heap abuse upon Epigenes; and while belauding
himself in a fulsome manner, brought accusations against Epigenes that
were absurd as well as false. He ended by adjuring the king not to be
diverted from his purpose without better reason, nor to abandon his
hopes in Coele-Syria. This advice was ill-received by the majority of
the council, and displeasing to Antiochus himself; and, accordingly,
as the king showed great anxiety to reconcile the two men, Hermeias
was at length induced to put an end to his invectives. The council
decided by a majority that the course recommended by Epigenes was the
most practical and advantageous, and a resolution was come to that the
king should go on the campaign against Molon, and devote his attention
to that. Thereupon Hermeias promptly made a hypocritical pretence of
having changed his mind and remarking that it was the duty of all to
acquiesce loyally in the decision, made a great show of readiness and
activity in pushing on the preparations.

+50.+ The forces, however, having been mustered at Apameia, upon a kind
of mutiny arising among the common soldiers, on account of some arrears
of pay, Hermeias, observing the king to be in a state of anxiety, and
to be alarmed at the disturbance at so critical a moment, offered to
discharge all arrears, if the king would only consent to Epigenes
not accompanying the expedition; on the ground that nothing could be
properly managed in the army when such angry feelings, and such party
spirit, had been excited. The proposal was very displeasing to the
king, who was exceedingly anxious that Epigenes should accompany him on
the campaign, owing to his experience in the field; but he was bound
so completely hand and foot, and entangled by the craft of Hermeias,
his skilful finance, constant watchfulness, and designing flattery,
that he was not his own master; and accordingly he yielded to the
necessity of the moment and consented to his demand. When Epigenes
thereupon retired, as he was bidden, the members of the council were
too much afraid of incurring displeasure to remonstrate; while the
army generally, by a revulsion of feeling, turned with gratitude to
the man to whom they owed the settlement of their claims for pay. The
Cyrrhestae were the only ones that stood out: and they broke out into
open mutiny, and for some time occasioned much trouble; but, being
at last conquered by one of the king’s generals, most of them were
killed, and the rest submitted to the king’s mercy. Hermeias having
thus secured the allegiance of his friends by fear, and of the troops
by being of service to them, started on the expedition in company with
the king; while in regard to Epigenes he elaborated the following plot,
with the assistance of Alexis, the commander of the citadel of Apameia.
He wrote a letter purporting to have been sent from Molon to Epigenes,
and persuaded one of the latter’s servants, by holding out the hope of
great rewards, to take it to the house of Epigenes, and mix it with his
other papers. Immediately after this had been done, Alexis came to the
house and asked Epigenes whether he had not received certain letters
from Molon; and, upon his denial, demanded in menacing terms to be
allowed to search. Having entered, he quickly discovered the letter,
which he availed himself of as a pretext for putting Epigenes to death
on the spot. By this means the king was persuaded to believe that
Epigenes had justly forfeited his life; and though the courtiers had
their suspicions, they were afraid to say anything.

[Sidenote: B.C. 221-220. Antiochus advances through Mesopotamia.]

+51.+ When Antiochus had reached the Euphrates, and had taken over the
force stationed there, he once more started on his march and got as far
as Antioch, in Mygdonia, about mid-winter, and there remained until the
worst of the winter should be over. Thence after a stay of forty days
he advanced to Libba. Molon was now in the neighbourhood of Babylon:
and Antiochus consulted his council as to the route to be pursued,
the tactics to be adopted, and the source from which provisions could
best be obtained for his army on the march in their expedition against
Molon. The proposal of Hermeias was to march along the Tigris, with
this river, and the Lycus and Caprus, on their flank. Zeuxis, having
the fate of Epigenes before his eyes, was in a state of painful doubt
whether to speak his real opinion or no; but as the mistake involved
in the advice of Hermeias was flagrant, he at last mustered courage
to advise that the Tigris should be crossed; alleging as a reason the
general difficulty of the road along the river: especially from the
fact that, after a considerable march, the last six days of which
would be through a desert, they would reach what was called the
“King’s <DW18>,” which it would be impossible to cross if they found it
invested by the enemy; while a retirement by a second march through
the wilderness would be manifestly dangerous, especially as their
provisions would be sure to be running short. On the other hand he
showed that if they crossed the Tigris it was evident the Apolloniates
would repent of their treason and join the king; for even as it was
they had submitted to Molon, not from choice, but under compulsion
and terror; and the fertility of their soil promised abundance of
provisions for the troops. But his most weighty argument was that by
their thus acting Molon would be cut off from a return to Media, and
from drawing supplies from that country, and would thereby be compelled
to risk a general action: or, if he refused to do so, his troops would
promptly fix their hopes upon the king.

[Sidenote: Antiochus crosses the Tigris.]

+52.+ The suggestion of Zeuxis being approved, the army was immediately
arranged in three divisions, and got across with the baggage at three
points in the river. Thence they marched in the direction of Dura,
where they quickly caused the siege of the citadel to be raised, which
was being invested at the time by some of Molon’s officers; and thence,
after a march of eight successive days, they crossed the mountain
called Oreicum and arrived at Apollonia.

[Sidenote: Molon also crosses the Tigris.]

[Sidenote: Abortive attempt of Molon to make a night attack on the
king.]

Meanwhile Molon had heard of the king’s arrival, and not feeling
confidence in the inhabitants of Susiana and Babylonia, because he
had conquered them so recently and by surprise, fearing also to be
cut off from a retreat to Media, he determined to throw a bridge over
the Tigris and get his army across; being eager if it were possible
to secure the mountain district of Apollonia, because he had great
confidence in his corps of slingers called Cyrtii. He carried out his
resolution, and was pushing forward in an unbroken series of forced
marches. Thus it came about that, just as he was entering the district
of Apollonia, the king at the head of his whole army was marching out.
The advanced guard of skirmishers of the two armies fell in with each
other on some high ground, and at first engaged and made trial of each
other’s strength; but upon the main armies on either side coming on
to the ground, they separated. For the present both retired to their
respective entrenchments, and encamped at a distance of forty stades
from each other. When night had fallen, Molon reflected that there
was some risk and disadvantage in a battle by broad daylight and in
the open field between rebels and their sovereign, and he determined
therefore to attack Antiochus by night. Selecting the best and most
vigorous of his soldiers, he made a considerable détour, with the
object of making his attack from higher ground. But having learnt
during his march that ten young men had deserted in a body to the king,
he gave up his design, and facing right about returned in haste to his
own entrenchment where he arrived about daybreak. His arrival caused a
panic in the army; for the troops in the camp, startled out of their
sleep by the arrival of the returning men, were very near rushing out
of the lines.

[Sidenote: Disposition of the king’s army.]

+53.+ But while Molon was doing his best to calm the panic, the king,
fully prepared for the engagement, was marching his whole army out of
their lines at daybreak. On his right wing he stationed his lancers
under the command of Ardys, a man of proved ability in the field; next
to them the Cretan allies, and next the Gallic Rhigosages. Next these
he placed the foreign contingent and mercenary soldiers from Greece,
and next to them he stationed his phalanx: the left wing he assigned to
the cavalry called the “Companions.”[263] His elephants, which were ten
in number, he placed at intervals in front of the line. His reserves of
infantry and cavalry he divided between the two wings, with orders to
outflank the enemy as soon as the battle had begun. He then went along
the line and addressed a few words of exhortation to the men suitable
to the occasion; and put Hermeias and Zeuxis in command of the left
wing, taking that of the right himself.

[Sidenote: Molon’s disposition.]

On the other side, owing to the panic caused by his rash movement of
the previous night, Molon was unable to get his men out of camp, or
into position without difficulty and confusion. He did however divide
his cavalry between his two wings, guessing what the disposition of the
enemy would be; and stationed the scutati and Gauls, and in short all
his heavy-armed men in the space between the two bodies of cavalry. His
archers, slingers, and all such kind of troops he placed on the outer
flank of the cavalry on either wing; while his scythed chariots he
placed at intervals in front of his line. He gave his brother Neolaus
command of the left wing, taking that of the right himself.

[Sidenote: Death of Molon and his fellow-conspirators.]

+54.+ When the two armies advanced to the battle, Molon’s right wing
remained faithful to him, and vigorously engaged the division of
Zeuxis; but the left wing no sooner came within sight of the king than
it deserted to the enemy: the result of which was that Molon’s army was
thrown into consternation, while the king’s troops were inspired with
redoubled confidence. When Molon comprehended what had taken place,
and found himself surrounded on every side, reflecting on the tortures
which would be inflicted upon him if he were taken alive, he put an
end to his own life. So too all who had taken part in the plot fled
severally to their own homes, and terminated their lives in the same
way. Neolaus escaped from the field and found his way into Persis, to
the house of Molon’s brother Alexander; and there first killed his
mother and Molon’s children and afterwards himself, having previously
persuaded Alexander to do the same to himself. After plundering the
enemy’s camp, the king ordered the body of Molon to be impaled on the
most conspicuous spot in Media: which the men appointed to the work
immediately did; for they took it to Callonitis and impaled it close
to the pass over Mount Zagrus. The king, after plundering the enemy’s
camp, rebuked the rebel army in a long speech; and finally receiving
them back into favour by holding out his right hand to them, appointed
certain officers to lead them back to Media and settle the affairs
of that district; while he himself went down to Seleucia and made
arrangements for the government of the Satrapies round it, treating
all with equal clemency and prudence. But Hermeias acted with his
usual harshness: he got up charges against the people of Seleucia,
and imposed a fine of a thousand talents upon the city; drove their
magistrates, called Adeiganes, into exile; and put many Seleucians to
death with various tortures, by mutilation, the sword and the rack.
With great difficulty, sometimes by dissuading Hermeias, and sometimes
by interposing his own authority, the king did at length put an end
to these severities; and, exacting only a fine of a hundred and fifty
talents from the citizens for the error they had committed, restored
the city to a state of order. This being done, he left Diogenes in
command of Media, and Apollodorus of Susiana; and sent Tychon, his
chief military secretary, to command the district along the Persian
Gulf.

Thus was the rebellion of Molon and the rising in the upper Satrapies
suppressed and quieted.

[Sidenote: Extension of the expedition. The treasonable designs of
Hermeias.]

[Sidenote: Artabazanes.]

+55.+ Elated by his success, and wishing to strike awe and terror
into the minds of the princes of the barbarians who were near, or
conterminous with his own Satrapies, that they might never venture to
aid by supplies or arms those who revolted from him, he determined to
march against them. And first of all against Artabazanes, who appeared
to be the most formidable and able of all the princes, and who ruled
over a tribe called the Satrapeii, and others on their borders. But
Hermeias was at that time afraid of an expedition further up country,
owing to its danger; and was always yearning for the expedition against
Ptolemy in accordance with his original plan. When news, however,
came that a son had been born to the king, thinking that Antiochus
might possibly fall by the hands of the barbarians in upper Asia, or
give him opportunities of putting him out of the way, he consented
to the expedition; believing that, if he could only effect the death
of Antiochus, he would be guardian to his son and so sole master of
the whole kingdom. This having been decided, the army crossed Mount
Zagrus and entered the territory of Artabazanes, which borders on
Media, and is separated from it by an intervening chain of mountains.
Part of it overlooks the Pontus, near the valley of the Phasis; and
it extends to the Hyrcanian Sea. Its inhabitants are numerous and
warlike and especially strong in horsemen; while the district produces
within itself all other things necessary for war. The dynasty has
lasted from the time of the Persians, having been overlooked at the
period of Alexander’s conquests. But now in great alarm at the king’s
approach, and at his own infirmities, for he was an extremely old man,
Artabazanes yielded to the force of circumstances, and made a treaty
with Antiochus on his own terms.

[Sidenote: Fall and death of Hermeias, B.C. 220.]

+56.+ It was after the settlement of this treaty that Apollophanes,
the physician, who was regarded with great affection by the king,
observing that Hermeias was getting beyond all bounds in his high
place, began to be anxious for the king’s safety, and still more
suspicious and uneasy for his own. He took an opportunity, therefore,
of conveying a suggestion to the king, that he had better not be too
careless or unsuspicious of the audacious character of Hermeias; nor
let things go on until he found himself involved in a disaster like
that of his brother. “The danger,” he said, “is not at all remote.”
And he begged him to be on his guard, and take prompt measures for
the safety of himself and his friends. Antiochus owned to him that
he disliked and feared Hermeias; and thanked him for the care of his
person, which had emboldened him to speak to him on the subject. This
conversation encouraged Apollophanes by convincing him that he had
not been mistaken about the feelings and opinions of the king; and
Antiochus begged him not to confine his assistance to words, but to
take some practical steps to secure the safety of himself and his
friends. Upon Apollophanes replying that he was ready to do anything
in the world, they concerted the following plan. On the pretext of the
king being afflicted with an attack of vertigo, it was given out that
the daily attendance of courtiers and officials was to be discontinued
for a few days: the king and his physician thus getting the opportunity
of conferring with such of his friends as he chose, who came on the
pretext of visiting him. In the course of these visits suitable persons
for carrying out the design were prepared and instructed; and every
one readily responding to the proposal, from hatred of Hermeias, they
proceeded to complete it. The physicians having prescribed walks at
daybreak for Antiochus on account of the coolness, Hermeias came to
the place assigned for the walk, and with him those of the king’s
friends who were privy to the design; while the rest were much too late
on account of the time of the king’s coming out being very different
from what it had usually been. Thus they got Hermeias gradually a
considerable distance from the camp, until they came to a certain
lonely spot, and then, on the king’s going a little off the road, on
the pretence of a necessary purpose, they stabbed him to death. Such
was the end of Hermeias, whose punishment was by no means equal to his
crimes. Thus freed from much fear and embarrassment, the king set out
on his march home amidst universal manifestations from the people of
the country in favour of his measures and policy; but nothing was more
emphatically applauded in the course of his progress than the removal
of Hermeias. In Apameia, at the same time, the women stoned the wife of
Hermeias to death, and the boys his sons.

[Sidenote: Attempted treason of Achaeus.]

+57.+ When he had reached home and had dismissed his troops into
winter quarters, Antiochus sent a message to Achaeus, protesting
against his assumption of the diadem and royal title, and warning him
that he was aware of his dealings with Ptolemy, and of his restless
intrigues generally. For while the king was engaged on his expedition
against Artabazanes, Achaeus, being persuaded that Antiochus would
fall, or that, if he did not fall, would be so far off, that it would
be possible for him to invade Syria before his return, and with the
assistance of the Cyrrhestae, who were in revolt against the king,
seize the kingdom, started from Lydia with his whole army; and on
arriving at Laodiceia, in Phrygia, assumed the diadem, and had the
audacity for the first time to adopt the title of king, and to send
royal despatches to the cities, the exile Garsyeris being his chief
adviser in this measure. But as he advanced farther and farther, and
was now almost at Lycaonia, a mutiny broke out among his forces,
arising from the dissatisfaction of the men at the idea of being led
against their natural king. When Achaeus found that this disturbed
state of feeling existed among them, he desisted from his enterprise;
and wishing to make his men believe that he had never had any intention
of invading Syria, he directed his march into Pisidia, and plundered
the country. By thus securing large booty for his army he conciliated
its affection and confidence, and then returned to his own Satrapy.

[Sidenote: War with Ptolemy, B.C. 219.]

[Sidenote: Apollophanes advises that they begin by taking Seleucia.]

+58.+ Every detail of these transactions was known to the king:
who, while sending frequent threatening messages to Achaeus, was
now concentrating all his efforts on the preparations for the war
against Ptolemy. Having accordingly mustered his forces at Apameia
just before spring, he summoned his friends to advise with him as to
the invasion of Coele-Syria. After many suggestions had been made in
respect to this undertaking, touching the nature of the country, the
military preparation required, and the assistance to be rendered by the
fleet,—Apollophanes of Seleucia, whom I mentioned before, put an abrupt
end to all these suggestions by remarking that “it was folly to desire
Coele-Syria and to march against that, while they allowed Seleucia to
be held by Ptolemy, which was the capital, and so to speak, the very
inner shrine of the king’s realm. Besides the disgrace to the kingdom
which its occupation by the Egyptian monarchs involved, it was a
position of the greatest practical importance, as a most admirable base
of operations. Occupied by the enemy it was of the utmost hindrance
to all the king’s designs; for in whatever direction he might have it
in his mind to move his forces, his own country, owing to the fear
of danger from this place, would need as much care and precaution
as the preparations against his foreign enemies. Once taken, on the
other hand, not only would it perfectly secure the safety of the home
district, but was also capable of rendering effective aid to the king’s
other designs and undertakings, whether by land or sea, owing to its
commanding situation.” His words carried conviction to the minds of
all, and it was resolved that the capture of the town should be their
first step. For Seleucia was still held by a garrison for the Egyptian
kings; and had been so since the time of Ptolemy Euergetes, who took it
when he invaded Syria to revenge the murder of Berenice.

+59.+ In consequence of this decision, orders were sent to Diognetus
the commander of the fleet to sail towards Seleucia: while Antiochus
himself started from Apameia with his army, and encamped near the
Hippodrome, about five stades from the town. He also despatched
Theodotus Hemiolius with an adequate force against Coele-Syria, with
orders to occupy the passes and to keep the road open for him.

[Sidenote: Description of Seleucia.]

The situation of Seleucia and the natural features of the surrounding
country are of this kind. The city stands on the sea coast between
Cilicia and Phoenicia; and has close to it a very great mountain called
Coryphaeus, which on the west is washed by the last waves of the sea
which lies between Cyprus and Phoenicia; while its eastern <DW72>s
overlook the territories of Antioch and Seleucia. It is on the southern
skirt of this mountain that the town of Seleucia lies, separated from
it by a deep and difficult ravine. The town extends down to the sea
in a straggling line broken by irregularities of the soil, and is
surrounded on most parts by cliffs and precipitous rocks. On the side
facing the sea, where the ground is level, stand the market-places, and
the lower town strongly walled. Similarly the whole of the main town
has been fortified by walls of a costly construction, and splendidly
decorated with temples and other elaborate buildings. There is only
one approach to it on the seaward side, which is an artificial ascent
cut in the form of a stair, interrupted by frequently occurring drops
and awkward places. Not far from the town is the mouth of the river
Orontes, which rises in the district of Libanus and Anti-Libanus, and
after traversing the plain of Amyca reaches Antioch; through which it
flows, and carrying off by the force of its current all the sewage
of that town, finally discharges itself into this sea not far from
Seleucia.

[Sidenote: Capture of Seleucia.]

+60.+ Antiochus first tried sending messages to the magistrates of
Seleucia, offering money and other rewards on condition of having the
city surrendered without fighting. And though he failed to persuade the
chief authorities, he corrupted some of the subordinate commanders;
and relying on them, he made preparations to assault the town on the
seaward side with the men of his fleet, and on the land side with
his soldiers. He divided his forces therefore into three parts, and
addressed suitable words of exhortation to them, causing a herald to
proclaim a promise to men and officers alike of great gifts and crowns
that should be bestowed for gallantry in action. To the division under
Zeuxis he entrusted the attack upon the gate leading to Antioch; to
Hermogenes that upon the walls near the temple of Castor and Pollux;
and to Ardys and Diognetus the assault upon the docks and the lower
town: in accordance with his understanding with his partisans in the
town, whereby it had been agreed that, if he could carry the lower
town by assault, the city also should then be put into his hands. When
the signal was given, a vigorous and determined assault was begun
simultaneously at all these points: though that made by Ardys and
Diognetus was by far the most daring; for the other points did not
admit of any assault at all by means of scaling ladders, nor could
be carried except by the men climbing up on their hands and knees;
while at the docks and lower town it was possible to apply scaling
ladders and fix them firmly and safely against the walls. The naval
contingent therefore having fixed their ladders on the docks, and the
division of Ardys theirs upon the lower town, a violent effort was
made to carry the walls: and the garrison of the upper town being
prevented from coming to the assistance of these places, because the
city was being assaulted at every other point at the same time, Ardys
was not long before he captured the lower town. No sooner had this
fallen, than the subordinate officers who had been corrupted hurried
to the commander-in-chief Leontius, and urged that he ought to send
ambassadors to Antiochus, and make terms with him, before the city was
taken by storm. Knowing nothing about the treason of these officers,
but alarmed by their consternation, Leontius sent commissioners to the
king to make terms for the safety of all within the city.

+61.+ The king accepted the proposal and agreed to grant safety to
all in the town who were free, amounting to six thousand souls. And
when he took over the town, he not only spared the free, but also
recalled those of the inhabitants who had been exiled, and restored to
them their citizenship and property; while he secured the harbour and
citadel with garrisons.

[Sidenote: Theodotus turns against Ptolemy. See ch. 46.]

While still engaged in this business, he received a letter from
Theodotus offering to put Coele-Syria into his hands, and inviting
him to come thither with all speed. This letter caused him great
embarrassment and doubt as to what he ought to do, and how best to
take advantage of the offer. This Theodotus was an Aetolian who, as I
have already narrated, had rendered important services to Ptolemy’s
kingdom: for which, far from being reckoned deserving of gratitude, he
had been in imminent danger of his life, just about the time of the
expedition of Antiochus against Molon. Thereupon conceiving a contempt
for Ptolemy, and a distrust of his courtiers, he seized upon Ptolemais
with his own hands, and upon Tyre by the agency of Panaetolus, and made
haste to invite Antiochus. Postponing therefore his expedition against
Achaeus, and regarding everything else as of secondary importance,
Antiochus started with his army by the same route as he had come. After
passing the cañon called Marsyas, he encamped near Gerrha, close to the
lake which lies between the two mountains. Hearing there that Ptolemy’s
general Nicolaus was besieging Theodotus in Ptolemais, he left his
heavy-armed troops behind with orders to their leaders to besiege
Brochi,—the stronghold which commands the road along the lake,—and led
his light-armed troops forward himself, with the intention of raising
the siege of Ptolemais. But Nicolaus had already got intelligence
of the king’s approach; and had accordingly retired from Ptolemais
himself, and sent forward Diogoras the Cretan and Dorymenes the
Aetolian to occupy the passes at Berytus. The king therefore attacked
these men, and having easily routed them took up a position near the
pass.

[Sidenote: Antiochus invades Coele-Syria.]

+62.+ There he awaited the coming up of the remainder of his forces,
and, after addressing them in words befitting the occasion, continued
his advance with his entire army, full of courage and with high
hopes of success. When Theodotus and Panaetolus met him with their
partisans he received them graciously, and took over from them Tyre
and Ptolemais, and the war material which those cities contained. Part
of this consisted of forty vessels, of which twenty were decked and
splendidly equipped, and none with less than four banks of oars; the
other twenty were made up of triremes, biremes, and cutters. These he
handed over to the care of the Navarch Diognetus; and being informed
that Ptolemy had come out against him, and had reached Memphis, and
that all his forces were collected at Pelusium, and were opening the
sluices, and filling up the wells of drinking water, he abandoned the
idea of attacking Pelusium; but making a progress through the several
cities, endeavoured to win them over by force or persuasion to his
authority. Some of the less-fortified cities were overawed at his
approach and made no difficulty about submitting, but others trusting
to their fortifications or the strength of their situations held
out; and to these he was forced to lay regular siege and so wasted a
considerable time.

Though treated with such flagrant perfidy, the character of Ptolemy was
so feeble, and his neglect of all military preparations had been so
great, that the idea of protecting his rights with the sword, which was
his most obvious duty, never occurred to him.

[Sidenote: Active measures of Agathocles and Sosibius.]

+63.+ Agathocles and Sosibius, however, the leading ministers in the
kingdom at that time, took counsel together and did the best they could
with the means at their disposal, in view of the existing crisis.
They resolved to devote themselves to the preparations for war; and,
meanwhile, by embassies to try to <DW44> the advance of Antiochus:
pretending to confirm him in the opinion he originally entertained
about Ptolemy, namely, that he would not venture to fight, but would
trust to negotiations, and the interposition of common friends, to
induce him to evacuate Coele-Syria. Having determined upon this policy,
Agathocles and Sosibius, to whom the whole business was entrusted, lost
no time in sending their ambassadors to Antiochus: and at the same time
they sent messages to Rhodes, Byzantium, and Cyzicus, not omitting the
Aetolians, inviting them to send commissioners to discuss the terms of
a treaty. The commissioners duly arrived, and by occupying the time
with going backwards and forwards between the two kings, abundantly
secured to these statesmen the two things which they wanted,—delay, and
time to make their preparations for war. They fixed their residence
at Memphis and there carried on these negotiations continuously. Nor
were they less attentive to the ambassadors from Antiochus, whom they
received with every mark of courtesy and kindness. But meanwhile they
were calling up and collecting at Alexandria the mercenaries whom
they had on service in towns outside Egypt; were despatching men to
recruit foreign soldiers; and were collecting provisions both for the
troops they already possessed, and for those that were coming in.
No less active were they in every other department of the military
preparations. They took turns in going on rapid and frequent visits to
Alexandria, to see that the supplies should in no point be inadequate
to the undertaking before them. The manufacture of arms, the selection
of men, and their division into companies, they committed to the care
of Echecrates of Thessaly and Phoxidas of Melita. With these they
associated Eurylochus of Magnesia, and Socrates of Boeotia, who were
also joined by Cnopias of Allaria. By the greatest good fortune they
had got hold of these officers, who, while serving with Demetrius and
Antigonus,[264] had acquired some experience of real war and actual
service in the field. Accordingly they took command of the assembled
troops, and made the best of them by giving them the training of
soldiers.

[Sidenote: Reorganisation of the army.]

+64.+ Their first measure was to divide them according to their country
and age, and to assign to each division its appropriate arms, taking
no account of what they had borne before. Next they broke up their
battalions and muster-rolls, which had been formed on the basis of
their old system of pay, and formed them into companies adapted to
the immediate purpose. Having effected this they began to drill the
men; habituating them severally not only to obey the words of command,
but also to the proper management of their weapons.[265] They also
frequently summoned general meetings at headquarters, and delivered
speeches to the men. The most useful in this respect were Andromachus
of Aspendus and Polycrates of Argos; because they had recently crossed
from Greece, and were still thoroughly imbued with the Greek spirit,
and the military ideas prevalent in the several states. Moreover, they
were illustrious on the score of their private wealth, as well as on
that of their respective countries; to which advantages Polycrates
added those of an ancient family, and of the reputation obtained by
his father Mnasiades as an athlete. By private and public exhortations
these officers inspired their men with a zeal and enthusiasm for the
struggle which awaited them.

+65.+ All these officers, too, had commands in the army suited to
their particular accomplishments. Eurylochus of Magnesia commanded
about three thousand men of what were called in the royal armies the
Agema, or Guard; Socrates of Boeotia had two thousand light-armed
troops under him; while the Achaean Phoxidas, and Ptolemy the son of
Thraseas, and Andromachus of Aspendus were associated in the duty of
drilling the phalanx and the mercenary Greek soldiers on the same
ground,—Andromachus and Ptolemy commanding the phalanx, Phoxidas
the mercenaries; of which the numbers were respectively twenty-five
thousand and eight thousand. The cavalry, again, attached to the court,
amounting to seven hundred, as well as that which was obtained from
Lybia or enlisted in the country, were being trained by Polycrates,
and were under his personal command: amounting in all to about three
thousand men. In the actual campaign the most effective service was
performed by Echecrates of Thessaly, by whom the Greek cavalry, which,
with the whole body of mercenary cavalry, amounted to two thousand
men, was splendidly trained. No one took more pains with the men under
his command than Cnopias of Allaria. He commanded all the Cretans, who
numbered three thousand, and among them a thousand Neo-Cretans,[266]
over whom he had set Philo of Cnossus. They also armed three thousand
Libyans in the Macedonian fashion, who were commanded by Ammonius of
Barce. The Egyptians themselves supplied twenty thousand soldiers
to the phalanx, and were under the command of Sosibius. A body of
Thracians and Gauls was also enrolled, four thousand being taken from
settlers in the country and their descendants, while two thousand had
been recently enlisted and brought over: and these were under the
command of Dionysius of Thrace. Such in its numbers, and in the variety
of the elements of which it was composed, was the force which was being
got ready for Ptolemy.

[Sidenote: Negotiations at Memphis, B.C. 219-218.]

+66.+ Meanwhile Antiochus had been engaged in the siege of Dura:[267]
but the strength of the place and the support given it by Nicolaus
prevented him from effecting anything; and as the winter was closing
in, he agreed with the ambassadors of Ptolemy to a suspension of
hostilities for four months, and promised that he would discuss the
whole question at issue in a friendly spirit. But he was as far as
possible from being sincere in this negotiation: his real object was
to avoid being detained any length of time from his own country, and
to be able to place his troops in winter quarters in Seleucia; because
Achaeus was now notoriously plotting against him, and without disguise
co-operating with Ptolemy. So having come to this agreement, Antiochus
dismissed the ambassadors with injunctions to acquaint him as soon as
possible with the decision of Ptolemy, and to meet him at Seleucia. He
then placed the necessary guards in the various strongholds, committed
to Theodotus the command-in-chief over them all, and returned home. On
his arrival at Seleucia he distributed his forces into their winter
quarters; and from that time forth took no pains to keep the mass of
his army under discipline, being persuaded that the business would
not call for any more fighting; because he was already master of some
portions of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, and expected to secure the rest
by voluntary submission or by diplomacy: for Ptolemy, he believed,
would not venture upon a general engagement. This opinion was shared
also by the ambassadors: because Sosibius fixing his residence at
Memphis conducted his negotiations with them in a friendly manner;
while he prevented those who went backwards and forwards to Antiochus
from ever becoming eye-witnesses of the preparations that were being
carried on at Alexandria. Nay, even by the time that the ambassadors
arrived, Sosibius was already prepared for every eventuality.

[Sidenote: Antiochus’s case.]

[Sidenote: Ptolemy’s case.]

[Sidenote: Ptolemy, son of Lagus, B.C. 323-285.]

+67.+ Meanwhile Antiochus was extremely anxious to have as much the
advantage over the government of Alexandria in diplomatic argument as
he had in arms. Accordingly when the ambassadors arrived at Seleucia,
and both parties began, in accordance with the instructions of
Sosibius, to discuss the clauses of the proposed arrangement in detail,
the king made very light of the loss recently sustained by Ptolemy, and
the injury which had been manifestly inflicted upon him by the existing
occupation of Coele-Syria; and in the pleadings on this subject he
refused to look upon this transaction in the light of an injury at all,
alleging that the places belonged to him of right. He asserted that
the original occupation of the country by Antigonus the One-eyed, and
the royal authority exercised over it by Seleucus,[268] constituted an
absolutely decisive and equitable claim, in virtue of which Coele-Syria
belonged of right to himself and not to Ptolemy; for Ptolemy I. went to
war with Antigonus with the view of annexing this country, not to his
own government, but to that of Seleucus. But, above all, he pressed the
convention entered into by the three kings, Cassander, Lysimachus, and
Seleucus, when, after having conquered Antigonus,[269] they deliberated
in common upon the arrangements to be made, and decided that the whole
of Syria should belong to Seleucus. The commissioners of Ptolemy
endeavoured to establish the opposite case. They magnified the existing
injury, and dilated on its hardship; asserting that the treason of
Theodotus and the invasion of Antiochus amounted to a breach of
treaty-rights. They alleged the possession of these places in the reign
of Ptolemy, son of Lagus; and tried to show that Ptolemy had joined
Seleucus in the war on the understanding that he was to invest Seleucus
with the government of the whole of Asia, but was to take Coele-Syria
and Phoenicia for himself.

Such were the arguments brought forward by the two contracting parties
in the course of the embassies and counter-embassies and conferences.
There was no prospect, however, of arriving at any result, because the
controversy was conducted, not by the principals, but by the common
friends of both; and there was no one to intervene authoritatively to
check and control the caprice of the party which they might decide to
be in the wrong. But what caused the most insuperable difficulty was
the matter of Achaeus. For Ptolemy was eager that the terms of the
treaty should include him: while Antiochus would not allow the subject
to be so much as mentioned; and was indignant that Ptolemy should
venture to protect rebels, or bring such a point into the discussion at
all.

[Sidenote: Renewal of hostilities, B.C. 218.]

+68.+ The approach of spring found both sides weary of negotiations,
and with no prospect of coming to a conclusion. Antiochus therefore
began collecting his forces, with a view of making an invasion by
land and sea, and completing his conquest of Coele-Syria. On his part
Ptolemy gave the supreme management of the war to Nicolaus, sent
abundant provisions to Gaza, and despatched land and sea forces. The
arrival of these reinforcements gave Nicolaus courage to enter upon
the war: the commander of the navy promptly co-operating with him in
carrying out all his orders. This admiral was Perigenes, whom Ptolemy
sent out in command of the fleet, consisting of thirty fully decked
ships and more than four thousand ships of burden. Nicolaus was by
birth an Aetolian, and was the boldest and most experienced officer
in the service of Ptolemy. With one division of his army he hastened
to seize the pass at Platanus; with the rest, which he personally
commanded, he occupied the environs of Porphyrion; and there prepared
to resist the invasion of the king: the fleet being also anchored close
to him.

[Sidenote: Antiochus marches to Beirût.]

Meanwhile Antiochus had advanced as far as Marathus. On his way he had
received a deputation of Aradians, asking for an alliance; and had
not only granted their request, but had put an end to a quarrel which
they had amongst themselves, by reconciling those of them who lived
on the island with those who lived on the mainland. Starting from
Marathus he entered the enemy’s country near the promontory called
Theoprosopon, and advanced to Berytus, having seized Botrys on his way,
and burnt Trieres and Calamus. From Berytus he sent forward Nicarchus
and Theodotus with orders to secure the difficult passes near the river
Lyons; while he himself set his army in motion and encamped near the
river Damuras: Diognetus, the commander of his navy, coasting along
parallel with him all the while. Thence once more, taking with him the
divisions commanded by Theodotus and Nicarchus, which were the light
troops of the army, he set out to reconnoitre the pass occupied already
by Nicolaus. After thoroughly surveying the nature of the ground,
he retired to his camp for that day. But on the next, leaving his
heavy-armed troops in the charge of Nicarchus, he set out with the rest
of his forces to execute his design.

[Sidenote: The pass at Porphyrion.]

[Sidenote: carried by Antiochus.]

+69.+ At this point there is but a small and narrow space between
the foot of Libanus and the sea; and even that is intersected by a
steep and rugged spur, leaving only a narrow and difficult passage
along the very water’s edge. On this pass Nicolaus had taken up his
position; and having occupied some of the points by means of his large
numbers, and secured others by artificial works, he felt certain that
he would be able to prevent Antiochus from effecting an entrance. But
the king divided his army into three parts, of which he entrusted one
to Theodotus with orders to close with the enemy and force their way
along the skirts of Libanus; the second to Menedemus with urgent orders
to attempt the centre of the spur; while the third he put under the
command of Diocles, the military governor of Parapotamia, and ordered
them to keep close to the sea. He himself with his guard occupied a
central position, intending to superintend the whole action and give
help where it was wanted. At the same time Diognetus and Perigenes
made preparations for a sea-fight, coming as close as possible to the
shore, and endeavouring to make the battles at sea and on land present
the appearance of a single contest. A general advance having begun by
sea and land, at the same signal and word of command, the battle on the
sea was undecided, because the number of vessels on either side and
their equipment were about equal: but on land the troops of Nicolaus
got the best of it at first, from the advantage of their position.
But when Theodotus routed the men on the mountain skirts, and then
charged from the higher ground, Nicolaus’s men all turned and fled
precipitately. In this flight two thousand of them fell, and as many
were taken prisoners: the rest retreated towards Sidon. Though he now
had the better prospect of the two in the sea-fight; yet, when he saw
the defeat of the army on land, Perigenes turned his prows and made
good his retreat to the same place.

[Sidenote: The advance of Antiochus continued.]

[Sidenote: Philoteria.]

[Sidenote: Scythopolis.]

[Sidenote: Atabyrium.]

[Sidenote: Defections from Ptolemy.]

[Sidenote: Pella, Camus, Gephrus.]

+70.+ Thereupon Antiochus got his army on the march, and, arriving at
Sidon, encamped under its wall. He did not however venture to attempt
the town, because of the vast stores it contained and the number of
its ordinary inhabitants, as well as of the refugees who had collected
there. He therefore broke up his camp again, and continued his march
towards Philoteria: ordering Diognetus his navarch to sail back with
his ships to Tyre. Now Philoteria is situated right upon the shores
of the lake into which the river Jordan discharges itself, and from
which it issues out again into the plains surrounding Scythopolis. The
surrender of these two cities to him encouraged him to prosecute his
further designs; because the country subject to them was easily able to
supply his whole army with provisions, and everything necessary for the
campaign in abundance. Having therefore secured them by garrisons, he
crossed the mountain chain and arrived at Atabyrium, which is situated
upon a rounded hill, the ascent of which is more than fifteen stades
long. But on this occasion he managed to take it by an ambuscade and
stratagem. He induced the men of the town to come out to a skirmish,
and enticed their leading columns to a considerable distance; then
his troops suddenly turned from their pretended flight, and those who
were concealed rising from their ambush, he attacked and killed a
large number of the enemy; and finally, by pursuing close upon their
heels, and thus creating a panic in the town before he reached it, he
carried it as he had done others by assault. At this juncture Ceraeas,
one of Ptolemy’s officers, deserted to Antiochus, whose distinguished
reception caused great excitement in the minds of many other of the
enemy’s officers. At any rate, not long afterwards, Hippolochus of
Thessaly joined Antiochus with four hundred cavalry of Ptolemy’s army.
Having therefore secured Atabyrium also with a garrison, Antiochus
started once more and took over Pella, Camus, and Gephrus.

[Sidenote: Abila.]

[Sidenote: Gadara.]

[Sidenote: Rabbatamana.]

[Sidenote: Fall of Rabbatamana.]

[Sidenote: Samaria.]

[Sidenote: Antiochus goes into winter quarters, B.C. 218-217.]

+71.+ This unbroken stream of success caused the inhabitants of the
neighbouring Arabia to rouse each other up to take action; and they
unanimously joined Antiochus. With the additional encouragement and
supplies which they afforded he continued his advance; and, arriving
in the district of Galatis, made himself master of Abila, and the
relieving force which had thrown itself into that town, under the
command of Nicias, a friend and kinsman of Menneas. Gadara was the
only town now left, which is thought to be the strongest of any in
those parts. He therefore encamped under its walls and, bringing
siege-works to bear upon it, quickly terrified it into submission.
Then hearing that a strong force of the enemy were concentrated at
Rabbatamana in Arabia, and were pillaging and overrunning the territory
of those Arabians who had joined him, he threw everything else aside
and started thither; and pitched his camp at the foot of the high
ground on which that city stands. After going round and reconnoitring
the hill, and finding that it admitted of being ascended only at two
points, he led his army to them and set up his siege artillery at these
points. He put one set of siege-works under the care of Nicarchus, the
other under that of Theodotus: while he superintended both equally,
and observed the zeal shown by the two respectively. Great exertions
were accordingly made by each, and a continual rivalry kept up as
to which should be the first to make a breach in the wall opposite
their works: and the result was that both breaches were made with
unexpected rapidity; whereupon they kept making assaults night and
day, and trying every means to force an entrance, without an hour’s
intermission. But though they kept up these attempts continuously,
they failed to make any impression; until a prisoner showed them the
underground passage through which the besieged were accustomed to
descend to fetch water. They broke into this and stopped it up with
timber and stones and everything of that sort; and when this was done,
the garrison surrendered for want of water. Having thus got possession
of Rabbatamana, Antiochus left Nicarchus with an adequate garrison in
command of it; and sent the two deserters from Ptolemy, Hippolochus and
Ceraeas, with five thousand infantry, to Samaria: with orders to take
the government of the district and protect all who submitted to him.
He then started with his army for Ptolemais, where he was resolved to
winter.

[Sidenote: Asia Minor,[270]

+72.+ In the course of this same summer, the Pednelissians, being
besieged and reduced to great straits by the Selgians, B.C. 218. Relief
of Pednelissus.] sent messages to Achaeus asking for help: and upon
receiving a ready assent, continued to sustain the siege with great
spirit in reliance upon this hope of relief. Achaeus selected Garsyeris
to conduct the expedition; and sent him out in all haste, with six
thousand infantry and five hundred horse, to relieve the Pednelissians.
But when they heard of the approach of the army of relief, the Selgians
occupied the pass called the Stair with the main body of their own
army; and put a garrison at the entrance into Saperda: breaking up
and spoiling all the paths and tracks leading to it. After entering
Milyades and encamping under the walls of Cretopolis, perceiving that
a farther advance was made impossible by the occupation of these
positions by the enemy, Garsyeris hit upon the following ruse. He broke
up his camp, and began his return march, as though he had abandoned
all thoughts of relieving Pednelissus, owing to the enemy’s occupation
of these positions. The Selgians were readily persuaded that he had
really abandoned the relief of Pednelissus, and departed, some to the
besieging camp and others home to Selge, as it was now close upon
harvest-time. Thereupon Garsyeris faced about, and, marching with great
speed, arrived at the pass over the mountain; and finding it unguarded,
secured it by a garrison, under the command of Phayllus; while he
himself with his main army went to Perga: and thence sent embassies
to the other states in Pisidia and Pamphylia, pointing out that the
power of the Selgians was a standing menace, and urging all to ally
themselves with Achaeus and join in relieving Pednelissus.

+73.+ Meanwhile the Selgians had sent out a general in command of
a force which they hoped would terrify Phallyus by their superior
knowledge of the country, and expel him from his strong position.
But when, far from attaining their object, they lost large numbers
of men in their attacks upon him; though they abandoned the hope
of accomplishing this, they yet persisted with increased ardour in
the siege of Pednelissus. Garsyeris was now reinforced by eight
thousand hoplites from the Etennes, who inhabit the highlands of
Pisidia above Side, and half that number from Aspendus. The people of
Side itself, partly from a wish to curry favour with Antiochus, but
chiefly from hatred to the Aspendians, refused to take part in the
relief of Pednelissus. With these reinforcements, as well as his own
army, Garsyeris advanced towards Pednelissus, feeling certain that he
would be able to raise the siege at the first attack: but when the
Selgians showed no sign of alarm, he entrenched himself at a moderate
distance from them. The Pednelissians were now becoming hard pressed
from want of provisions; and Garsyeris, being anxious to do all he
could, got ready two thousand men, giving each a medimnus of wheat,
and despatched them under cover of night into Pednelissus. But the
Selgians getting intelligence of what was going on, and, coming out
to intercept them, most of those who were carrying in the corn were
killed, and the Selgians got possession of the wheat. Elated with
this success, they now essayed to storm the camp of Garsyeris as well
as the city. An adventurous daring in the presence of the enemy is
indeed characteristic of the Selgians: and on this occasion they left
a barely sufficient number to guard their camp; and, surrounding the
enemy’s entrenchment with the rest, assaulted it at several points at
once. Finding himself unexpectedly attacked on every side, and portions
of his palisade being already torn down, Garsyeris, appreciating the
gravity of the danger, and feeling that there was but little chance
of averting total destruction, sent out some cavalry at a point which
the enemy had left unguarded. These the Selgians imagined to be flying
in a panic and for fear of what was coming: and therefore, instead of
attending to them, they treated them with utter contempt. When these
horsemen, however, had ridden round, so as to get on the rear of the
enemy, they charged and fought with great fierceness. This raised the
spirits of Garsyeris’s infantry, though they had already given way:
and they therefore faced round, and once more offered resistance to
the troops that were storming their camp. The Selgians, accordingly,
being now attacked on front and rear at once, broke and fled. At the
same time the Pednelissians sallied out and attacked the troops left in
charge of the Selgian camp, and drove them out. The pursuit lasted to
so great a distance that no less than ten thousand of the Selgian army
fell: of the survivors all who were allies fled to their own cities;
while the Selgians themselves escaped over the highlands into their
native land.

[Sidenote: Panic at Selge.]

[Sidenote: Logbasis turns traitor.]

+74.+ Garsyeris immediately started in pursuit of the fugitives, being
in haste to get over the narrow pass, and approach Selge, before they
could make a stand, and form any plan for meeting his approach. Thus he
came to Selge with his army. But the inhabitants, having no longer any
hopes in their allies, after the disaster which had affected them all
alike, and themselves dispirited at the misfortune which had befallen
them, became exceedingly anxious for the safety of themselves and their
country. They accordingly determined in public assembly to send one
of their citizens on an embassy to Gassyeris, and selected for the
purpose Logbasis, who had been for a long time on terms of intimacy
and friendship with the Antiochus that lost his life in Thrace.[271]
Laodice,[272] also, who became afterwards the wife of Achaeus, having
been committed to his care, he had brought this young lady up as his
daughter, and had treated her with conspicuous kindness. The Selgians
therefore thought that his character made him eminently fitted for
an ambassador in the circumstances, and accordingly sent him on the
mission. He, however, obtained a private interview with Garsyeris,
and was so far from carrying out the purpose for which he came, by
properly supporting the interests of his country, that on the contrary
he strongly urged Garsyeris to send with all speed for Achaeus, and
undertook to put the city into their hands. Garsyeris, of course,
grasped eagerly at the chance offered to him and sent messengers to
induce Achaeus to come, and to inform him of the position of affairs.
Meanwhile he concluded an armistice with the Selgians, and protracted
the negotiations for a treaty by continually bringing forward
objections and scruples on points of detail, in order to give time for
the arrival of Achaeus, and for Logbasis to conduct his negotiations
and mature his plot.

+75.+ While this was going on frequent meetings for discussion took
place between the camp and the town, and it became quite an ordinary
thing for the soldiers to go into the town to purchase corn. This is
a state of things which has on many occasions proved fatal. And it
appears to me that of all animals the most easily deceived is man,
though he has the credit of being the most cunning. For consider how
many entrenched camps and fortresses, how many and what great cities
have been betrayed by this kind of trick! And yet in spite of such
frequent and conspicuous examples of the many people to whom it has
happened, somehow or another we are always new to such deceit, and
fall into the trap with the inexperience of youth. The reason is that
we do not keep ready for reference in our minds the disasters of those
who have made mistakes before us in this or that particular. But while
preparing with great labour and cost stores of corn and money, and a
provision of walls and weapons to meet unforeseen eventualities, that
which is the easiest of all and the most serviceable in the hour of
danger—that we all neglect; although we might obtain this experience
from history and research, which in themselves add a dignity to leisure
and a charm to existence.

[Sidenote: Failure of the treason of Logbasis.]

Achaeus then duly arrived at the time expected: and after conference
with him, the Selgians had great hopes of experiencing some signal
kindness at his hands. But in the interval Logbasis had little by
little collected in his house some of the soldiers who came into the
town from the camp; and now advised the citizens not to let slip
the opportunity, but to act with the display of Achaeus’s kindly
disposition towards them before their eyes; and to put the finishing
stroke to the treaty, after holding a general assembly of the whole
community to discuss the situation. An assembly was at once convened,
to which even those on guard were all summoned to assist in bringing
the treaty to completion; and the citizens began deliberating on the
state of affairs.

+76.+ Meanwhile Logbasis, who had agreed with the enemy to take that
opportunity, began getting ready those who had congregated at his
house, and prepared and armed himself and his sons also for the fight.
And now Achaeus with half the hostile force was advancing towards the
city itself; while Garsyeris with the remainder was marching towards
the Cesbedium as it is called, or temple of Zeus, which stands in a
position commanding the city and presenting very much the appearance of
a citadel. But a goatherd, having by chance observed what was going on,
brought the news to the assembly; thereupon some of the citizens made a
hurried rush to the Cesbedium, others to their posts on the wall, and
the majority in great anger to the house of Logbasis. His treasonable
practice being thus detected, some of them climbed upon the roof,
others forced their way in by the front door, and murdered Logbasis
and his sons and all the other men which they found there at the same
time. Then they caused a proclamation to be made promising freedom to
all slaves who would join them: and dividing themselves into three
companies, they hastened to defend all the points of vantage. When he
saw that the Cesbedium was already occupied, Garsyeris abandoned his
enterprise; but Achaeus held on his way until he came right up to the
gates: whereupon the Selgians sallied out, killed seven hundred, and
forced the rest to give up the attempt. Upon this conclusion of their
enterprise, Achaeus and Garsyeris retired to the camp. But the Selgians
fearing treason among themselves, and alarmed at the presence of a
hostile camp, sent out some of their elders in the guise of suppliants,
and concluded a peace, on condition of paying four hundred talents on
the spot and restoring the Pednelissians whom they had taken prisoners,
and paying a further sum of three hundred talents at a fixed date. Thus
did the Selgians by their own valour save their country, which they had
been in danger of losing through the infamous treason of Logbasis; and
thus neither disgraced their freedom, nor their relationship to the
Lacedaemonians.[273]

+77.+ But after reducing Milyas, and the greater part of Pamphylia,
Achaeus took his departure, and arriving at Sardis kept up a continuous
warfare with Attalus, and began threatening Prusias, and making himself
an object of terror and alarm to all the inhabitants on this side
Taurus.

[Sidenote: The expedition of Attalus to recover cities which had joined
Achaeus.]

But while Achaeus was engaged on his expedition against Selge, Attalus
with the Aegosagae from Gaul was going through all the cities in
Aeolis, and the neighbourhood, which had before this been terrified
into joining Achaeus; but most of which now voluntarily and even
gratefully gave in their adherence to him, though there were some few
which waited to be forced. Now the cities which transferred their
allegiance to him in the first instance were Cyme, Smyrna, and Phocaea;
after them Aegae and Temnus submitted, in terror at his approach; and
thereupon he was waited upon by ambassadors from Teos and Colophon with
offers to surrender themselves and their cities. He received them also
upon the same terms as they had enjoyed before, taking hostages; but
he treated the ambassadors from Smyrna with special kindness, because
they had been the most constant in their loyalty of all. Continuing his
march without interruption, he crossed the Lycus and arrived at the
hamlets of Mysia, and thence came to Carseae. Overawing the inhabitants
of this town, as well as the garrison of the Two Walls, he got them
surrendered to him by Themistocles, who had been, as it happened, left
by Achaeus in command of this district. Starting thence, and wasting
the plain of Apia, he crossed Mount Pelecas and encamped near the river
Megistus.

[Sidenote: Mutiny of the Gauls.]

+78.+ While he was here an eclipse of the moon occurred: and the
Gauls who had all along been much discontented at the hardships of
the march,—which was rendered the more painful for them by the fact
of their being accompanied by their wives and children, who followed
the host in waggons,—now regarded the eclipse as an evil augury, and
refused to go on. But King Attalus, who got no effective service out
of them, and saw that they straggled during the march and encamped
by themselves, and wholly declined to obey orders and despised all
authority, was in great doubt as to what to do. He was anxious less
they should desert to Achaeus, and join in an attack upon himself:
and was at the same time uneasy at the scandal to which he would give
rise, if he caused his soldiers to surround and kill all these men, who
were believed to have crossed into Asia in reliance on his honour. He
therefore seized the occasion of their refusal to proceed, to promise
them that he would see that they were taken back to the place where
they had crossed into Asia; would assign them suitable lands for a
settlement; and would afterwards do them any service they asked for, if
it was within his power and consistent with justice.

Accordingly Attalus led the Aegosagae back to the Hellespont; and after
negotiations with the people of Lampsacus, Ilium, and Alexandria,
conducted in a friendly spirit because they had preserved their loyalty
to him, he returned with his army to Pergamum.

[Sidenote: Ptolemy’s army: 70,000 infantry, 5000 cavalry, 73 elephants.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 217. Antiochus and Ptolemy recommence hostilities in
the spring.]

[Sidenote: The army of Antiochus: 62,000 infantry, 6000 cavalry, 102
elephants.]

+79.+ At the beginning of the following spring, having all preparations
for war completed, Antiochus and Ptolemy determined to bring their
claims to Coele-Syria to the decision of a battle. Ptolemy accordingly
set out from Alexandria with seventy thousand infantry, five thousand
cavalry, and seventy three elephants. Being informed of his approach,
Antiochus drew his forces together. These consisted of Daae, Carmani,
and Cilicians, equipped as light armed troops to the number of about
five thousand, under the charge and command of Byttacus the Macedonian.
Under Theodotus, the Aetolian, who had deserted from Ptolemy, were ten
thousand picked men from the whole kingdom, armed in the Macedonian
fashion, most of whom had silver shields. The number of the phalanx
was twenty thousand, and they were led by Nicarchus and Theodotus
Hemiolius. In addition to these there were Agrianes and Persians, who
were either bowmen or slingers, to the number of two thousand. With
them were a thousand Thracians, under the command of Menedemus of
Alabanda. There was also a mixed force of Medes, Cissians, Cadusians,
and Carmanians, amounting to five thousand men, who were assigned to
the chief command of Aspasianus the Mede. Certain Arabians also and men
of neighbouring tribes, to the number of ten thousand, were commanded
by Zabdibelus. The mercenaries from Greece amounting to five thousand
were led by Hippolochus of Thessaly. Antiochus had also fifteen hundred
Cretans who came with Eurylochus, and a thousand Neo-Cretans commanded
by Zelys of Gortyna; with whom were five hundred javelin men of Lydia,
and a thousand Cardaces who came with Lysimachus the Gaul. The entire
number of his horse was six thousand; four thousand were commanded by
the king’s nephew Antipater, the rest by Themison; so that the whole
number of Antiochus’s force was sixty-two thousand infantry, six
thousand cavalry, and one hundred and two elephants.

[Sidenote: Ptolemy enters Palestine.]

+80.+ Having marched to Pelusium Ptolemy made his first halt in that
town: and having been there joined by the stragglers, and having given
out their rations of corn to his men, he got the army in motion, and
led them by a line of march which goes through the waterless region
skirting Mount Casius and the Marshes.[274] On the fifth day’s march
he reached his destination, and pitched his camp a distance of fifty
stades from Rhaphia, which is the first city of Coele-Syria towards
Egypt.

[Sidenote: Antiochus goes to meet him.]

While Ptolemy was effecting this movement Antiochus arrived with his
army at Gaza, where he was joined by some reinforcements, and once
more commenced his advance, proceeding at a leisurely pace. He passed
Rhaphia and encamped about ten stades from the enemy. For a while the
two armies preserved this distance, and remained encamped opposite each
other. But after some few days, wishing to remove to more advantageous
ground and to inspire confidence in his troops, Antiochus pushed
forward his camp so much nearer Ptolemy, that the palisades of the two
camps were not more than five stades from each other; and while in this
position, there were frequent struggles at the watering-places and on
forays, as well as infantry and cavalry skirmishes in the space between
the camps.

[Sidenote: Daring attempt of Theodotus to assassinate Ptolemy.]

+81.+ In the course of these proceedings Theodotus conceived and put
into execution an enterprise, very characteristic of an Aetolian, but
undoubtedly requiring great personal courage. Having formerly lived
at Ptolemy’s court he knew the king’s tastes and habits. Accordingly,
accompanied by two others, he entered the enemy’s camp just before
daybreak; where, owing to the dim light, he could not be recognised
by his face, while his dress and other accoutrements did not render
him noticeable, owing to the variety of costume prevailing among
themselves. He had marked the position of the king’s tent during the
preceding days, for the skirmishes took place quite close; and he
now walked boldly up to it, and passed through all the outer ring of
attendants without being observed: but when he came to the tent in
which the king was accustomed to transact business and dine, though he
searched it in every conceivable way, he failed to find the king; for
Ptolemy slept in another tent, separate from the public and official
tent. He however wounded two men who were sleeping there, and killed
Andreas, the king’s physician; and then returned safely to his own
camp, without meeting with any molestation, except just as he was
passing over the vallum of the enemy’s camp. As far as daring went, he
had fulfilled his purpose: but he had failed in prudence by not taking
the precaution to ascertain where Ptolemy was accustomed to sleep.

[Sidenote: Disposition of the two armies for the battle of Rhaphia.]

+82.+ After being encamped opposite each other for five days, the two
kings resolved to bring matters to the decision of battle. And upon
Ptolemy beginning to move his army outside its camp, Antiochus hastened
to do the same. Both formed their front of their phalanx and men armed
in the Macedonian manner. But Ptolemy’s two wings were formed as
follows:—Polycrates, with the cavalry under his command, occupied the
left, and between him and the phalanx were Cretans standing close by
the horsemen; next them came the royal guard;[275] then the peltasts
under Socrates, adjoining the Libyans armed in Macedonian fashion.
On the right wing was Echecrates of Thessaly, with his division of
cavalry; on his left were stationed Gauls and Thracians; next them
Phoxidas and the Greek mercenaries, extending to the Egyptian phalanx.
Of the elephants forty were on the left wing, where Ptolemy was to be
in person during the battle; the other thirty-three had been stationed
in front of the right wing opposite the mercenary cavalry.

Antiochus also placed sixty of his elephants commanded by his
foster-brother Philip in front of his right wing, on which he was to
be present personally, to fight opposite Ptolemy. Behind these he
stationed the two thousand cavalry commanded by Antipater, and two
thousand more at right angles to them.

In line with the cavalry he placed the Cretans, and next them the Greek
mercenaries; with the latter he mixed two thousand of these armed in
the Macedonian fashion under the command of the Macedonian Byttacus.
At the extreme point of the left wing he placed two thousand cavalry
under the command of Themison; by their side Cardacian and Lydian
javelin-men; next them the light-armed division of three thousand,
commanded by Menedemus; then the Cissians, Medes, and Carmanians; and
by their side the Arabians and neighbouring peoples who continued the
line up to the phalanx. The remainder of the elephants he placed in
front of his left wing under the command of Myiscus, one of the boys
about the court.

[Sidenote: Addresses to the two armies before the battle of Rhaphia.]

+83.+ The two armies having been drawn up in the order I have
described; the kings went along their respective lines, and addressed
words of encouragement and exhortation to their officers and friends.
But as they both rested their strongest hopes on their phalanx, they
showed their greatest earnestness and addressed their strongest
exhortations to them; which were re-echoed in Ptolemy’s case by
Andromachus and Sosibius and the king’s sister Arsinoe; in the case
of Antiochus by Theodotus and Nicarchus: these officers being the
commanders of the phalanx in the two armies respectively. The substance
of what was said on both sides was the same: for neither monarch had
any glorious or famous achievement of his own to quote to those whom he
was addressing, seeing that they had but recently succeeded to their
crowns; but they endeavoured to inspire the men of the phalanx with
spirit and boldness, by reminding them of the glory of their ancestors,
and the great deeds performed by them. But they chiefly dwelt upon the
hopes of advancement which the men might expect at their hands in the
future; and they called upon and exhorted the leaders and the whole
body of men, who were about to be engaged, to maintain the fight with a
manly and courageous spirit. So with these or similar words, delivered
by their own lips or by interpreters, they rode along their lines.

[Sidenote: The battle of Rhaphia.]

+84.+ Ptolemy, accompanied by his sister, having arrived at the left
wing of his army, and Antiochus with the royal guard at the right: they
gave the signal for the battle, and opened the fight by a charge of
elephants. Only some few of Ptolemy’s elephants came to close quarters
with the foe: seated on these the soldiers in the howdahs maintained
a brilliant fight, lunging at and striking each other with crossed
pikes.[276] But the elephants themselves fought still more brilliantly,
using all their strength in the encounter, and pushing against each
other, forehead to forehead.

[Sidenote: Fighting elephants.]

[Sidenote: Antiochus’s right wing successful.]

The way in which elephants fight is this: they get their tusks
entangled and jammed, and then push against one another with all their
might, trying to make each other yield ground until one of them proving
superior in strength has pushed aside the other’s trunk; and when once
he can get a side blow at his enemy, he pierces him with his tusks as
a bull would with his horns. Now, most of Ptolemy’s animals, as is the
way with Libyan elephants, were afraid to face the fight: for they
cannot stand the smell or the trumpeting of the Indian elephants, but
are frightened at their size and strength, I suppose, and run away from
them at once without waiting to come near them. This is exactly what
happened on this occasion: and upon their being thrown into confusion
and being driven back upon their own lines, Ptolemy’s guard gave way
before the rush of the animals; while Antiochus, wheeling his men
so as to avoid the elephants, charged the division of cavalry under
Polycrates. At the same time the Greek mercenaries stationed near the
phalanx, and behind the elephants, charged Ptolemy’s peltasts and made
them give ground, the elephants having already thrown their ranks also
into confusion. Thus Ptolemy’s whole left wing began to give way before
the enemy.

[Sidenote: Ptolemy’s right wing also successful.]

[Sidenote: The centre coming into action. Ptolemy is victorious.]

[Sidenote: Final retreat of Antiochus.]

+85.+ Echecrates the commander of the right wing waited at first
to see the result of the struggle between the other wings of the
two armies: but when he saw the dust coming his way, and that the
elephants opposite his division were afraid even to approach the
hostile elephants at all, he ordered Phoxidas to charge the part of the
enemy opposite him with his Greek mercenaries; while he made a flank
movement with the cavalry and the division behind the elephants; and
so getting out of the line of the hostile elephants’ attack, charged
the enemy’s cavalry on the rear or the flank and quickly drove them
from their ground. Phoxidas and his men were similarly successful: for
they charged the Arabians and Medes and forced them into precipitate
flight. Thus Antiochus’s right wing gained a victory, while his left
was defeated. The phalanxes, left without the support of either wing,
remained intact in the centre of the plain, in a state of alternate
hope and fear for the result. Meanwhile Antiochus was assisting in
gaining the victory on his right wing; while Ptolemy, who had retired
behind his phalanx, now came forward in the centre, and showing
himself in the view of both armies struck terror in the hearts of the
enemy, but inspired great spirit and enthusiasm in his own men; and
Andromachus and Sosibius at once ordered them to lower their sarissae
and charge. The picked Syrian troops stood their ground only for a
short time, and the division of Nicarchus quickly broke and fled.
Antiochus presuming, in his youthful inexperience, from the success of
his own division, that he would be equally victorious all along the
line, was pressing on the pursuit; but upon one of the older officers
at length giving him warning, and pointing out that the cloud of dust
raised by the phalanx was moving towards their own camp, he understood
too late what was happening; and endeavoured to gallop back with the
squadron of royal cavalry on to the field. But finding his whole line
in full retreat he was forced to retire to Rhaphia: comforting himself
with the belief that, as far as he was personally concerned, he had won
a victory, but had been defeated in the whole battle by the want of
spirit and courage shown by the rest.

[Sidenote: The losses on either side.]

+86.+ Having secured the final victory by his phalanx, and killed
large numbers of the enemy in the pursuit by means of his cavalry and
mercenaries on his right wing, Ptolemy retired to his own camp and
there spent the night. But next day, after picking up and burying his
own dead, and stripping the bodies of the enemy, he advanced towards
Rhaphia. Antiochus had wished, immediately after the retreat of his
army, to make a camp outside the city; and there rally such of his men
as had fled in compact bodies: but finding that the greater number had
retreated into the town, he was compelled to enter it himself also.
Next morning, however, before daybreak, he led out the relics of his
army and made the best of his way to Gaza. There he pitched a camp: and
having sent an embassy to obtain leave to pick up his dead, he obtained
a truce for performing their obsequies. His loss amounted to nearly ten
thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry killed, and four thousand
taken prisoners. Three elephants were killed on the field, and two died
afterwards of their wounds. On Ptolemy’s side the losses were fifteen
hundred infantry killed and seven hundred cavalry: sixteen of his
elephants were killed, and most of the others captured.

Such was the result of the battle of Rhaphia between kings Ptolemy and
Antiochus for the possession of Coele-Syria.

[Sidenote: The effect of the battle of Rhaphia.]

After picking up his dead Antiochus retired with his army to his own
country: while Ptolemy took over Rhaphia and the other towns without
difficulty, all the states vying with each other as to which should
be first to renew their allegiance and come over to him. And perhaps
it is the way of the world everywhere to accommodate one’s self to
circumstances at such times; but it is eminently true of the race
inhabiting that country, that they have a natural turn and inclination
to worship success. Moreover it was all the more natural in this
case, owing to the existing disposition of the people in favour of
the Alexandrian kings; for the inhabitants of Coele-Syria are somehow
always more loyally disposed to this family than to any other.
Accordingly they now stopped short of no extravagance of adulation,
honouring Ptolemy with crowns, sacrifices, and every possible
compliment of the kind.

[Sidenote: Peace between Ptolemy and Antiochus for a year, B.C. 217.]

+87.+ Meanwhile Antiochus, on arriving at the city which bears his
own name, immediately despatched an embassy to Ptolemy, consisting of
Antipater, his nephew, and Theodotus Hemiolius, to treat of a peace, in
great alarm lest the enemy should advance upon him. For his defeat had
inspired him with distrust of his own forces, and he was afraid that
Achaeus would seize the opportunity to attack him. It did not occur
to Ptolemy to take any of these circumstances into account: but being
thoroughly satisfied with his unexpected success, and generally at his
unlooked for acquisition of Coele-Syria, he was by no means indisposed
to peace; but even more inclined to it than he ought to have been:
influenced in that direction by the habitual effeminacy and corruption
of his manner of life. Accordingly, when Antipater and his colleague
arrived, after some little bluster and vituperation of Antiochus for
what had taken place, he agreed to a truce for a year. He sent Sosibius
back with the ambassadors to ratify the treaty: while he himself, after
remaining three months in Syria and Phoenicia, and settling the towns,
left Andromachus of Aspendus as governor of this district, and started
with his sister and friends for Alexandria: having brought the war to a
conclusion in a way that surprised his subjects, when they contrasted
it with the principles on which he spent the rest of his life.
Antiochus after exchanging ratifications of the treaty with Sosibius,
employed himself in making preparations for attacking Achaeus, as he
had originally begun doing. Such was the political situation in Asia.

[Sidenote: Earthquake at Rhodes. Royal liberality, B.C. 224.]

[Sidenote: Hiero and Gelo.]

+88.+ About the same period the earthquake occurred at Rhodes, which
overthrew the great Colossus and the larger part of the walls and
dockyards. But the adroit policy of the Rhodians converted this
misfortune into an opportunity; and under their skilful management,
instead of adding to their embarrassments, it became the means of
restoring their prosperity. So decisive in human affairs, public or
private, is the difference between incapacity and good sense, between
idle indifference and a close attention to business. Good fortune
only damages the one, while disaster is but a means of recovery to
the other. This was illustrated by the manner in which the Rhodians
turned the misfortune that befel them to account. They enhanced its
magnitude and importance by the prominence which they gave it, and the
serious tone in which they spoke of it, as well by the mouth of their
ambassadors as in the intercourse of private life; and they created
thus such an effect upon other states, and especially upon the feelings
of the kings, that they were not only overwhelmed with presents, but
made the donors feel actually obliged for their acceptance of them.
Hiero and Gelo, for instance, presented them with seventy-five talents
of silver, part at once, and the rest at a very short interval, as
a contribution towards the expenses of the gymnasium; gave them
for religious purposes some silver cauldrons and their stands, and
some water vessels; and in addition to this ten talents for their
sacrifices, and ten more to attract new citizens: their intention
being that the whole present should amount to a hundred talents.[277]
Not only so, but they gave immunity from customs to Rhodian merchants
coming to their ports; and presented them besides with fifty
catapults of three cubits length. In spite too of these large gifts,
they regarded themselves as under an obligation to the Rhodians;
and accordingly erected statues in the _Deigma_ or Mart of Rhodes,
representing the community of Rhodes crowned by that of Syracuse.

[Sidenote: Antigonus.]

+89.+ Then too Ptolemy offered them three hundred talents of silver;
a million medimni[278] of corn; [Sidenote: Ptolemy.] ship timber for
ten quinqueremes and ten triremes, consisting of forty thousand cubits
of squared pine planking; a thousand talents of bronze coinage; three
thousand talents[279] of tow; three thousand pieces of sail cloth;
three thousand talents for the repair of the Colossus; a hundred master
builders with three hundred and fifty workmen, and fourteen talents
yearly to pay their wages. Besides this he gave twelve thousand medimni
of corn for their public games and sacrifices, and twenty thousand
medimni for victualling ten triremes. The greater part of these goods
was delivered at once, as well as a third of the whole of the money
named. In a similar spirit Antigonus offered ten thousand timbers,
varying from sixteen to eight cubits in length, to be used as purlins;
five thousand rafters seven cubits long; three thousand talents of
iron; a thousand talents of pitch; a thousand amphorae of the same
unboiled; and a hundred talents of silver besides. His queen, Chryseis,
also gave a hundred thousand medimni of corn, and three thousand
talents of lead. Again Seleucus,[280] father of Antiochus, besides
granting freedom from imports to Rhodians sailing to his dominions,
and besides giving ten quinqueremes fully equipped, and two hundred
thousand medimni of corn; gave also ten thousand cubits of timber, and
a thousand talents of resin and hair.

[Sidenote: Other princes.]

+90.+ Nor were Prusias and Mithridates far behind these in liberality;
nor the princes Lysanias, Olympichus, and Lymnaeas, who were at that
time in power in different parts of Asia; and as for states that,
according to their several abilities contributed to their assistance,
it would be difficult to reckon their number. In fact, though when we
regard the time which it took the city to recover its populousness,
and the state of desolation from which it started, we cannot fail to
be struck at the rapidity and the extent of its improvement in regard
both to private and public wealth; yet when we contemplate the natural
advantages of its site, and the contributions from outside which served
to raise its fortunes to their original height, this feeling must give
way to a conviction that the advance was somewhat less than might have
been expected.

My object in giving these details is twofold. I wished to exhibit the
brilliant conduct of their public affairs by the Rhodians, for indeed
they deserve both to be commended and imitated: and I wished also to
point out the insignificance of the gifts bestowed by the kings of our
own day, and received by nations and states; that these monarchs may
not imagine that by the expenditure of four or five talents they are
doing anything so very great, or expect to receive at the hands of the
Greeks the honour enjoyed by former kings; and that states when they
see before their eyes the magnitude of the presents formerly bestowed,
may not, nowadays, in return for insignificant and paltry benefactions,
blindly bestow their most ample and splendid honours; but may use that
discrimination in apportioning their favours to desert, in which Greeks
excel the rest of the world.

[Sidenote: B.C. 217. Greece. Return of Lycurgus to Sparta. He projects
an invasion of Messenia.]

[Sidenote: The preparations of Aratus.]

+91.+ Just at the beginning of this summer, while Agetas was Strategus
of the Aetolians, and when Aratus had just become Strategus of the
Achaean league,—at which point we broke off in our history of the
Social war,[281]—Lycurgus of Sparta returned home from Aetolia. The
Ephors had discovered that the charge on which he had been banished
was false; and had accordingly sent for him back, and recalled him
from exile. He at once began making an arrangement with Pyrrhias the
Aetolian, who happened at the time to be commander in Elis, for an
invasion of Messenia. Now, when Aratus came into office, he found the
mercenary army of the league in a state of complete demoralisation, and
the cities very slack to pay the tax for their support, owing to the
bad and spiritless manner in which his predecessor Eperatus had managed
the affairs of the league. He, however, exhorted the members of the
league to reform, and obtained a decree dealing with this matter; and
then threw himself with energy into the preparations for the war. The
decree passed by the Achaeans ordered the maintenance of eight thousand
mercenary infantry and five hundred horse, together with three thousand
Achaean infantry and three hundred horse, enrolled in the usual way;
and that of these latter five hundred foot and fifty horse were to be
brazen-shield men from Megalopolis, and the same number of Argives.
It ordered also that three ships should be manned to cruise off Acte
and in the Argolic gulf, and three off Patrae and Dyme, and in the sea
there.

[Sidenote: The ill-success of Lycurgus.]

+92.+ While Aratus was engaged in these transactions, and in completing
these preparations, Lycurgus and Pyrrhias, after an interchange
of messages to secure their making their expedition at the same
time, marched into Messenia. The Achaean Strategus, aware of their
design, came with the mercenaries and some of the picked Achaeans to
Megalopolis, with the view of supporting the Messenians. After setting
out, Lycurgus got possession of Calamae, a stronghold in Messenia, by
treachery; and pressed hurriedly forward to effect a junction with the
Aetolians. But Pyrrhias had started from Elis with a wholly inadequate
force, and, having been easily stopped at the pass into Messenia by
the Cyparissians, had turned back. Lycurgus therefore being unable
to effect his junction with Pyrrhias, and not being strong enough by
himself, after assaulting Andania for a short time, returned back to
Sparta without having effected anything.

When the plot of the enemy had thus gone to pieces; Aratus, with a
provident regard for the future, arranged with Taurion to provide fifty
horse and five hundred foot, and with the Messenians to send an equal
number; with the view of using these men to protect the territories of
Messenia, Megalopolis, Tegea, and Argos,—for these districts, being
on the frontier of Laconia, have to bear the brunt of Lacedaemonian
invasion for the rest of the Peloponnese; while with the Achaean levies
and mercenaries he planned to guard the parts of Achaia which lay
towards Elis and Aetolia.

[Sidenote: Condition of Megalopolis.]

+93.+ After adjusting these matters, he settled in accordance with the
decree of the league the intestine disputes at Megalopolis. For it
happened that the people of this town having been recently deprived
of their country by Cleomenes,[282] and, to use a common expression,
shaken to their foundations, were in absolute want of many things,
and ill-provided with all: for they persisted in maintaining their
usual scale of living, while their means both public and private were
entirely crippled. The consequence was that the town was filled with
disputes, jealousies, and mutual hatred; which is ever the case,
both with states and individuals, when means fall short of desires.
The first controversy was about the walling of the town,—one party
maintaining that the limits of the city should be contracted to a size
admitting of being completely walled and guarded at a time of danger;
for that in the late occasion it was its size and unguarded state which
had caused their disaster. In addition to this it was maintained by
this party that the landowners should contribute the third part of
their land to provide for the enrolment of new citizens. The other
party rejected the notion of contracting the limits of the city and
would not consent to contribute a third part of their lands. But the
most serious controversy of all was in regard to the laws draughted for
them by Prytanis, an eminent Peripatetic philosopher, whom Antigonus
Doson appointed to draw them up a constitution. In this distracted
state of politics, Aratus intervened with all the earnestness he
could command, and succeeded in pacifying the heated feelings of the
citizens. The terms on which the controversies were settled were
engraved on a column, and set up near the altar of Vesta in the
Homarium.[283]

[Sidenote: Another raid of Aetolians from Elis.]

[Sidenote: The Achaean fleet retaliates on Aetolia.]

+94.+ After arranging this settlement, Aratus broke up his camp; and
going on himself to the congress from of the Achaeans, handed over the
mercenaries to Lycus of Pharae, as the Sub-Strategus of the league. But
the Eleans, being dissatisfied with Pyrrhias, once more induced the
Aetolians to send them Euripidas; who, waiting until the Achaeans were
engaged in their congress, took sixty horse and two thousand foot, and
started on a raid. Having passed through the territory of Pharae, he
overran the country up to the territory of Aegium; and after securing
and driving off a considerable booty, he began a retreat towards
Leontium. But Lycus, learning what had happened, went in all haste to
protect the country; and falling in with the enemy, he attacked them
at once and killed four hundred and took two hundred prisoners, among
whom were the following men of rank: Physsias, Antanor, Clearchus,
Androlochus, Euanoridas, Aristogeiton, Nicasippus, and Aspasius. The
arms and baggage fell entirely into his hands. About the same time
the Navarch of the league having gone on an expedition to Molycria,
returned with nearly a hundred captives. Returning once more to Aetolia
he sailed to Chalceia and captured two war ships, with their crews,
which put out to resist him; and took also a long boat with its men on
the Aetolian Rhium. There being thus an influx of booty both by sea
and land at the same period, and a considerable amount of money and
provisions being obtained from this, the soldiers felt confident of
getting their pay, and the cities of the league were sanguine of not
being likely to be hard pressed by their contributions.

[Sidenote: Scerdilaidas the Illyrian plunders the coast.]

+95.+ While these events were taking place Scerdilaidas, thinking
that he was not being treated fairly, because some of the payments
agreed upon in his treaty with Philip were in arrear, sent out fifteen
galleys, treacherously pretending that their object was to receive
and convoy the money. These galleys sailed to Leucas, where they were
received by all as friendly, owing to their former alliance: but the
only mischief they had time to do was to make a treacherous attack
on the Corinthian Agathinus and Cassander, who had come there on
board Taurion’s ships, and were lying at anchor close to them with
four vessels. These they captured with their vessels and sent to
Scerdilaidas; and then putting out to sea from Leucas, and sailing
towards Malea, they plundered and captured the merchants whom they met.

[Sidenote: More raids.]

Harvest time was now approaching: and as Taurion paid little attention
to the protection of the cities I mentioned above; Aratus in person,
at the head of some picked Achaean troops, protected the getting in
of the harvest round Argos: while Euripidas at the head of a force of
Aetolians set out on a raid, with the object of ravaging the territory
of Tritaea. But when Lycus and Demodocus, the Hipparch of the league,
heard of the expedition of the Aetolians from Elis, they collected
the people of Dymae, Patrae and Pharae, and joining the mercenaries
to these forces made an incursion upon Elis. Arrived at a place
called Phyxium, they allowed their light-armed troops and their horse
to plunder the country, but kept their hoplites concealed near this
place: and when the Eleans had sallied out in full force to attack
the foraging parties, and were pursuing them as they retreated, the
hoplites with Lycus rose from their hiding-place and charged them
as they rushed heedlessly on. The Eleans did not stand against the
attack, but fled at the mere appearance of the hoplites: who killed two
hundred of them and took eighty prisoners, and carried off with them
in safety all the booty that had been driven in from the country. At
the same time the Navarch of the league made numerous descents upon
Calydonia and the territory of Naupactus; and not only overran the
country, but twice annihilated the force sent out to resist him. Among
others he took Cleonicus of Naupactus prisoner: who owing to this being
a proxenus of the Achaeans was not sold on the spot, and after some
little time was set free without ransom.

[Sidenote: Acarnania.]

+96.+ About the same time Agetas, the Strategus of the Aetolian
league, proclaimed a general levy of Aetolians, and went on a foraging
expedition into the territory of the Acarnanians. He marched through
all Epirus, plundering as he went without let or hindrance; after doing
which he returned home, and dismissed the Aetolian levy to their own
cities. But the Acarnanians, upon making a retaliatory invasion of
the territory of Stratus, were seized with a panic: and returned with
disgrace, though without loss; because the people of Stratus did not
venture to pursue them, believing that their retreat was a ruse to
cover an ambuscade.

[Sidenote: Phanoteus in Phocis. The biter bit.]

An instance of counter-treachery occurred also at Phanoteus. Alexander
who had been appointed governor of Phocis by Philip, entered into a
plot against the Aetolians, through the agency of a certain Jason, who
had been appointed by himself to command the city of Phanoteus. This
man sent a message to Agetas, the Strategus of the Aetolian league,
agreeing to hand over to him the citadel of Phanoteus; and he confirmed
his offer by a regularly sworn treaty. On the appointed day Agetas
came with his Aetolian levy to Phanoteus under cover of night; and
concealing the rest at some little distance, he selected a hundred
of the most active men and sent them towards the citadel. Jason had
Alexander all ready with his soldiers, but duly received the Aetolians
as he had sworn into the citadel. Immediately Alexander and his men
threw themselves into the citadel also: the Aetolian hundred picked
soldiers were made prisoners; and when daylight showed Agetas what had
taken place, he drew off his troops,—baffled by a ruse very like what
he had on many occasions practised himself.

[Sidenote: Philip’s campaign in Upper Macedonia and Thessaly.]

[Sidenote: Meliteia.]

+97.+ About this same period King Philip captured Bylazora, the largest
town of Paeonia, and very favourably situated for commanding the pass
from Dardania to Macedonia: so that by this achievement he was all
but entirely freed from any fear of the Dardani, it being no longer
easy for them to invade Macedonia, as long as this city gave Philip
the command of the pass. Having secured this place, he despatched
Chrysogonus with all speed to summon the upper Macedonians to arms;
while he himself, taking on the men of Bottia and Amphaxitis, arrived
at Edessa. Waiting there until he was joined by the Macedonians under
Chrysogonus, he started with his whole army, and on the sixth day’s
march arrived at Larisa; and thence by a rapid night march he came
before daybreak to Meliteia, and placing scaling ladders against the
walls, attempted to take the town by escalade. The suddenness and
unexpectedness of the attack so dismayed the people of Meliteia, that
he would easily have taken the town; but he was baffled by the fact of
the ladders proving to be far too short.

+98.+ This is the kind of mistake which above all others reflects
discredit on the commanders. For what can be more culpable than to
arrive at a town which they mean to carry, in an entirely unprovided
state, without having taken the precaution of measuring walls, cliffs,
and the like, by which they intend to effect their entrance? Or again,
while satisfying themselves as to these measurements, to entrust
the construction of ladders and all such machinery, which, though
taking little time to make, have to stand the test of a very critical
service, without consideration, and to incompetent persons,—is not
this deserving of censure? For in such actions it is not a question of
succeeding or failing without ill consequences; but failure is followed
by positive damage in manifold respects: danger to the bravest of the
men at the actual time, and still greater danger during their retreat,
when they have once incurred the contempt of the enemy. The examples
of such disasters are numerous; for you will find that of those who
have failed in such attempts, many more have perished, or have been
reduced to the last extremity of danger, than have come off scatheless.
Moreover, no one can deny that they arouse distrust and hatred against
themselves for the future, and give all men warning to be on their
guard. For it is not only the persons attacked, but all who know what
has happened, who are thereby bidden to look out for themselves and be
on the watch. Wherefore it is never right for men in places of trust
to conduct such enterprises inconsiderately. The method also of taking
such measurements, and constructing machines of this kind, is easy and
liable to no mistakes, if they are taken in hand scientifically.

For the present, however, I must resume the thread of my narrative,
but I shall take another fitting opportunity in the course of my work
to speak of these matters, and will endeavour to show how mistakes may
best be avoided in such undertakings.

[Sidenote: Thebae Phthiotides, B.C. 217.]

+99.+ Thus baffled in his attempt upon Meliteia, Philip encamped upon
the bank of the Enipeus, and collected from Larisa and the other
cities the siege train which he had caused to be constructed during
the winter. For the chief object of his campaign was the capture of
the city called Phthiotid Thebes. Now this city lies no long way from
the sea, about thirty stades from Larisa, and is conveniently situated
in regard both to Magnesia and Thessaly; but especially as commanding
the district of Demetrias in Magnesia, and of Pharsalus and Pherae in
Thessaly. From it, at that very time, much damage was being inflicted
upon the Demetrians, Pharsalians, and Larisaeans; as the Aetolians
were in occupation of it, and made continual predatory expeditions,
often as far as to the plain of Amyrus. Philip did not regard the
matter as at all of small importance, but was exceedingly bent on
taking the town. Having therefore got together a hundred and fifty
catapults, and twenty-five stone-throwing ballistae, he sat down before
Thebes. He distributed his forces between three points in the vicinity
of the city; one was encamped near Scopium; a second near a place
called Heliotropium; and the third on the hill overhanging the town.
The spaces between these camps he fortified by a trench and double
palisade, and further secured them by towers of wood, at intervals of a
hundred feet, with an adequate guard. When these works were finished,
he collected all his siege train together and began to move his engines
towards the citadel.

[Sidenote: Thebes is taken, its inhabitants enslaved, and its name
changed to Philippopolis.]

+100.+ For the first three days the king was unable to make any
progress in bringing his machines against the town, owing to the
gallant and even desperate defence which the garrison opposed to him.
But when the continual skirmishing, and the volleys of missiles, had
began to tell upon the defenders, and some of them were killed and
others disabled by wounds; the defence becoming a little slacker, the
Macedonians began sinking mines, and at last after nine days' work
reached the walls. They then carried on the work by relays, so as never
to leave it off day or night: and thus in three days had undermined
and underpinned two hundred feet of the wall. The props, however,
proved too weak to support the weight, and gave way; so that the wall
fell without the Macedonians having the trouble of setting fire to
them. When they had worked energetically at clearing the debris, and
had made every preparation for entering by the breach, and were just
on the point of carrying it, the Thebans in a panic surrendered the
town. The security which this achievement of Philip’s gave to Magnesia
and Thessaly deprived the Aetolians of a rich field for plunder; and
demonstrated to his army that he had been justified in putting Leontius
to death, for his deliberate treachery in the previous siege of Palae.
Having thus become master of Thebes he sold its existing inhabitants
into slavery, and drafting in some Macedonian settlers changed its name
to Philippopolis.

Just as the king had finished the settlement of Thebes, ambassadors
once more came from Chios, Rhodes, Byzantium, and King Ptolemy to
negotiate terms of peace. He answered them in much the same terms as
he had the former,[284] that he was not averse to peace; and bade them
go and find out what the feelings of the Aetolians were. Meanwhile he
himself cared little about making peace, but continued steadily to
prosecute his designs.

[Sidenote: Philip hears of the Battle of Thrasymene, 22d June.]

[Sidenote: Nemean festival. Midsummer of B.C. 217.]

+101.+ Accordingly, when he heard that the galleys of Scerdilaidas
were committing acts of piracy off Malea, and treating all merchants
as open enemies, and had treacherously seized some of his own vessels
which were at anchor at Leucas, he fitted out twelve decked ships,
eight open vessels, and thirty light craft called hemioliae,[285] and
sailed through the Euripus in hot haste to come up with the Illyrians;
exceedingly excited about his plans for carrying on the war against the
Aetolians, as he knew nothing as yet of what had happened in Italy.
For the defeat of the Romans by Hannibal in Etruria took place while
Philip was besieging Thebes, but the report of that occurrence had not
yet reached Greece. Philip arrived too late to capture the galleys:
and therefore, dropping anchor at Cenchreae, he sent away his decked
ships, with orders to sail round Malea in the direction of Aegium and
Patrae; but having caused the rest of his vessels to be dragged across
the Isthmus, he ordered them to anchor at Lechaeum; while he went in
haste with his friends to Argos to attend the Nemean festival. Just as
he was engaged in watching the gymnastic contest, a courier arrived
from Macedonia with news of the Romans having been defeated in a great
battle, and of Hannibal being in possession of the open country.
Philip showed the letter to no one at the moment, except to Demetrius
of Pharos, enjoining him not to say a word. The latter seized the
occasion to advise Philip to throw over the war against the Aetolians
as soon as possible; and to concentrate his efforts upon Illyria,
and an expedition into Italy. “For Greece,” said he, “is already
entirely obedient to you, and will remain so: the Achaeans from genuine
affection; the Aetolians from the terror which their disasters in the
present war have inspired them. Italy, and your crossing into it, is
the first step in the acquirement of universal empire, to which no one
has a better claim than yourself. And now is the moment to act when the
Romans have suffered a reverse.”

+102.+ By using such arguments he found no difficulty in firing
Philip’s ambition: as was natural, I think, considering that he was
but a youthful monarch, who had as yet been successful in all his
undertakings, and was in any case of a singularly daring character;
and considering too that he was sprung from a family which above all
families has somehow a tendency to aim at universal monarchy.

[Sidenote: Zacynthus visited by Philip.]

[Sidenote: A peace congress summoned.]

At the moment then, as I said, Philip communicated the news conveyed
by the letter to Demetrius alone; and afterwards summoning a council
of his friends consulted them on the subject of making peace with the
Aetolians. And when even Aratus professed no disinclination to the
measure, on the ground that they would be making peace as conquerors,
the king without waiting for the ambassadors, who were officially
engaged in negotiating its terms, sent Cleonicus of Naupactus at once
to Aetolia, whom he found still awaiting the meeting of the Achaean
league after his captivity;[286] while he himself, taking his ships and
land force from Corinth, came with it to Aegium. Thence he advanced
as far as Lasion and took the Tower in Perippia, and pretended, in
order to avoid appearing too eager for the conclusion of the war, that
he was meditating an invasion of Elis. By this time Cleonicus had
been backwards and forwards two or three times; and as the Aetolians
begged that he would meet them personally in conference, he assented,
and abandoning all warlike measures, he sent couriers to the allied
cities, bidding their commissioners to sit in the conference with him
and take part in the discussion of the terms of peace: and then crossed
over with his army and encamped near Panormus, which is a harbour of
the Peloponnese, and lies exactly opposite Naupactus. There he waited
for the commissioners from the allies, and employed the time required
for their assembling in sailing to Zacynthus, and settling on his own
authority the affairs of the island; and having done so he sailed back
to Panormus.

[Sidenote: Philip goes to Naupactus.]

+103.+ The commissioners having now assembled, Philip sent Aratus and
Taurion, and some others who had come with them, to the Aetolians. They
found them in full assembly at Naupactus; and after a short conference
with them, and satisfying themselves as to their inclination for peace,
they sailed back to Philip to inform him of the state of the case.
But the Aetolians, being very eager to bring the war to a conclusion,
sent ambassadors with them to Philip urging him to visit them with his
army, that by a personal conference the business might be brought to
a satisfactory conclusion. Moved by these representations, the king
sailed across with his army to what is called the Hollows of Naupactus,
about twenty stades from the town. Having pitched a camp there, and
having caused both it and his ships to be surrounded by a palisade,
he waited for the time fixed for the interview. The Aetolians came
_en masse_ without arms; and keeping at a distance of two stades from
Philip’s camp, interchanged messages and discussions on the subjects
in question. The negotiation was begun by the king sending all the
commissioners of the allies, with instructions to offer the Aetolians
peace, on the condition of both parties retaining what they then held.
This preliminary the Aetolians readily agreed to; and then there began
a continuous interchange of messages between the two, most of which I
shall omit as containing no point of interest: but I shall record the
speech made by Agelaus of Naupactus in the first conference before the
king and the assembled allies. It was this.

[Sidenote: Speech of Agelaus of Naupactus foreshadowing the Roman
conquest.]

+104.+ “The best thing of all is that the Greeks should not go to war
with each other at all, but give the gods hearty thanks if by all
speaking with one voice, and joining hands like people crossing a
stream, they may be able to repel the attacks of barbarians and save
themselves and their cities. But if this is altogether impossible,
in the present juncture at least we ought to be unanimous and on our
guard, when we see the bloated armaments and the vast proportions
assumed by the war in the west. For even now it is evident to any one
who pays even a moderate attention to public affairs, that whether the
Carthaginians conquer the Romans, or the Romans the Carthaginians, it
is in every way improbable that the victors will remain contented with
the empire of Sicily and Italy. They will move forward: and will extend
their forces and their designs farther than we could wish. Wherefore, I
beseech you all to be on your guard against the danger of the crisis,
and above all you, O King. You will do this, if you abandon the policy
of weakening the Greeks, and thus rendering them an easy prey to the
invader; and consult on the contrary for their good as you would for
your own person, and have a care for all parts of Greece alike, as
part and parcel of your own domains. If you act in this spirit, the
Greeks will be your warm friends and faithful coadjutors in all your
undertakings; while foreigners will be less ready to form designs
against you, seeing with dismay the firm loyalty of the Greeks. If you
are eager for action, turn your eyes to the west, and let your thoughts
dwell upon the wars in Italy. Wait with coolness the turn of events
there, and seize the opportunity to strike for universal dominion. Nor
is the present crisis unfavourable for such a hope. But I intreat of
you to postpone your controversies and wars with the Greeks to a time
of greater tranquillity; and make it your supreme aim to retain the
power of making peace or war with them at your own will. For if once
you allow the clouds now gathering in the west to settle upon Greece, I
fear exceedingly that the power of making peace or war, and in a word
all these games which we are now playing against each other, will be so
completely knocked out of the hands of us all, that we shall be praying
heaven to grant us only this power of making war or peace with each
other at our own will and pleasure, and of settling our own disputes.”

[Sidenote: The peace is ratified.]

+105.+ This speech of Agelaus greatly influenced the allies in favour
of peace; and Philip more than any one: as the arguments employed
chimed in with the wishes which the advice of Demetrius had already
roused in him. Both parties therefore came to terms on the details of
the treaty; and after ratifying it, separated to their several cities,
taking peace with them instead of war.

[Sidenote: Olympiad 140, 3. Before July B.C. 217.]

These events all fell in the third year of the 140th Olympiad. I mean
the battle of the Romans in Etruria, that of Antiochus for Coele-Syria,
and lastly the treaty between Philip and the Aetolians.

[Sidenote: The Eastern and Western politics become involved with each
other.]

This then was the first point of time, and the first instance of a
deliberation, which may be said to have regarded the affairs of Greece,
Italy, and Libya as a connected whole: for neither Philip nor the
leading statesmen of the Greek cities made war or peace any longer
with each other with a view to Greek affairs, but were already all
fixing their eyes upon Italy. Nor was it long before the islanders and
inhabitants of Asia were affected in the same way; for those who were
displeased with Philip, or who had quarrels with Attalus, no longer
turned to Antiochus or Ptolemy, to the south or the east, but from this
time forth fixed their eyes on the west, some sending embassies to
Carthage, others to Rome. The Romans similarly began sending legates to
Greece, alarmed at the daring character of Philip, and afraid that he
might join in the attack upon them in their present critical position.
Having thus fulfilled my original promise of showing when, how, and why
Greek politics became involved in those of Italy and Libya, I shall now
bring my account of Greek affairs down to the date of the battle of
Cannae, to which I have already brought the history of Italy, and will
end this book at that point.

[Sidenote: Timoxenus Achaean Strategus, May B.C. 216]

[Sidenote: Isolation of Athens.]

+106.+ Directly the Achaeans had put an end to the war, they elected
Timoxenus Strategus for the next year[287] and departed to take up
once more their regular ways and habits. Along with the Achaeans the
other Peloponnesian communities also set to work to repair the losses
they had sustained; recommenced the cultivation of the land; and
re-established their national sacrifices, games, and other religious
observances peculiar to their several states. For these things had all
but sunk into oblivion in most of the states through the persistent
continuance of the late wars. It has ever somehow been the case that
the Peloponnesians, who of all men are the most inclined to a peaceful
and civilised way of life, have hitherto enjoyed it less than any
other nation in the world; but have been rather as Euripides[288] says
“still worn with toil and war’s unrest.” But to me it seems clear
that they bring this upon themselves in the natural course of events:
for their universal desire of supremacy, and their obstinate love of
freedom, involve them in perpetual wars with each other, all alike
being resolutely set upon occupying the first place. The Athenians
on the contrary had by this time freed themselves from fear of
Macedonia, and considered that they had now permanently secured their
independence. They accordingly adopted Eurycleidas and Micion as their
representatives, and took no part whatever in the politics of the rest
of Greece; but following the lead and instigation of these statesmen,
they laid themselves out to flatter all the kings, and Ptolemy most of
all; nor was there any kind of decree or proclamation too fulsome for
their digestion: any consideration of dignity being little regarded,
under the guidance of these vain and frivolous leaders.

[Sidenote: Revolt in Egypt.]

+107.+ Ptolemy however immediately after these events became involved
in a war with his Egyptian subjects. For in arming them for his
campaign against Antiochus he had taken a step which, while it served
his immediate purpose sufficiently well, proved eventually disastrous.
Elated with their victory at Rhaphia they refused any longer to receive
orders from the king; but looked out for a leader to represent them, on
the ground that they were quite able to maintain their independence.
And this they succeeded in doing before very long.

[Sidenote: Winter of 217-216 B.C. B.C. 216.]

Antiochus spent the winter in extensive preparations for war; and when
the next summer came, he crossed Mount Taurus and after making a treaty
of alliance with King Attalus entered upon the war against Achaeus.

[Sidenote: Discontent of the Aetolians with the peace.]

At the time the Aetolians were delighted at the settlement of peace
with the Achaean league, because the war had not answered to their
wishes; and they accordingly elected Agelaus of Naupactus as their
Strategus, because he was believed to have contributed more largely
than any one to the success of the negotiations. But this was scarcely
arranged before they began to be discontented, and to find fault with
Agelaus for having cut off all their opportunities of plundering
abroad, and all their hopes of gain for the future, since the peace was
not made with certain definite states, but with all Greeks. But this
statesman patiently endured these unreasonable reproaches and succeeded
in checking the popular impulse. The Aetolians therefore were forced to
acquiesce in an inactivity quite alien to their nature.

[Sidenote: Philip’s war against Scerdilaidas of Illyria, autumn of 217
B.C.]

+108.+ King Philip having returned, after the completion of the treaty
of peace, to Macedonia by sea, found that Scerdilaidas on the same
pretext of money owed to him, on which he had treacherously seized
the vessels at Leucas, had now plundered a town in Pelagonia called
Pissaeum; had won over by promises some cities of the Dassaretae,
namely, Phibotides, Antipatria, Chrysondym, and Geston; and had overrun
much of the district of Macedonia bordering on these places. He
therefore at once started with his army in great haste to recover the
revolted cities, and determined to proclaim open war with Scerdilaidas;
for he thought it a matter of the most vital importance to bring
Illyria into a state of good order, with a view to the success of all
his projects, and above all of his passage into Italy. For Demetrius
was so assiduous in keeping hot these hopes and projects in the king’s
mind, that Philip even dreamed of them in his sleep, and thought of
nothing else but this Italian expedition. The motive of Demetrius
in so acting was not a consideration for Philip, for he certainly
did not rank higher than third in the calculations of Demetrius. A
stronger motive than that was his hatred of Rome: but the strongest
of all was the consideration of his own prospects. For he had made
up his mind that it was only in this way that he could ever recover
his principality in Pharos. Be that as it may, Philip went on his
expedition and recovered the cities I have named, and took besides
Creonium and Gerus in Dassaretis; Enchelanae, Cerax, Sation, Boei,
round the Lychnidian Lake; Bantia in the district of the Calicoeni; and
Orgyssus in that of the Pisantini. After completing these operations he
dismissed his troops to their winter quarters.

[Sidenote: B.C. 217-216.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 216. Coss. Caius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius
Paulus II.]

This was the winter in which Hannibal, after plundering the fairest
districts of Italy, intended to place his winter quarters near Geranium
in Daunia. And it was then that at Rome Caius Terentius and Lucius
Aemilius entered upon their Consulship.

[Sidenote: Philip’s preparation for an invasion of Italy.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 216.]

+109.+ In the course of the winter, Philip, taking into consideration
that he would want ships to carry out his designs, and men for rowing,
not for fighting,—for he could never have even entertained a hope of
fighting the Romans at sea,—but rather for the transport of soldiers,
and to enable him to cross with greater speed to any point to which he
might desire to go, and so surprise the enemy by a sudden appearance,
and thinking that the Illyrian build was the best for the sort of ships
he wanted, determined to have a hundred galleys built; which hardly any
Macedonian king had ever done before. Having had these fitted out, he
collected his forces at the beginning of the summer; and, after a brief
training of the Macedonians in rowing them, put to sea. It was just at
the time that Antiochus crossed Mount Taurus when Philip, after sailing
through the Euripus and rounding Cape Malea, came to Cephallenia and
Leucas, where he dropped anchor, and awaited anxiously the movements of
the Roman fleet. Being informed that it was at anchor off Lilybaeum, he
mustered up courage to put to sea, and steered for Apollonia.

[Sidenote: Panic-stricken at the reported approach of a Roman squadron,
Philip retreats to Cephallenia.]

+110.+ As he neared the mouth of the Aous, which flows past Apollonia,
a panic fell upon his fleet such as happens to land forces. Certain
galleys on the rear of the fleet being anchored at an island called
Sason, which lies at the entrance to the Ionian Sea, came by night
to Philip with a report that some men who had lately come from the
Sicilian Strait had been anchored with them at Sason, who reported
that they left some Roman quinqueremes at Rhegium, which were bound
for Apollonia to support Scerdilaidas. Thinking this fleet must be all
but upon him, Philip, in great alarm, promptly ordered his ships to
weigh anchor and sail back the way they came. They started and got out
to sea in great disorder, and reached Cephallenia, after sailing two
nights and days without intermission. Having now partially recovered
his courage, Philip remained there, covering his flight under the
pretext of having returned for some operations in the Peloponnese. It
turned out that it was a false alarm altogether. The truth was that
Scerdilaidas, hearing in the course of the winter that Philip was
having a number of galleys built, and expecting him to come to attack
him by sea, had sent messages to Rome stating the facts and imploring
help; and the Romans had detached a squadron of ten ships from the
fleet at Lilybaeum, which were what had been seen at Rhegium. But if
Philip had not fled from them in such inconsiderate alarm, he would
have had the best opportunity possible of attaining his objects in
Illyria; because the thoughts and resources of Rome were absorbed in
the war with Hannibal and the battle of Cannae, and it may fairly be
presumed that he would have captured the ten Roman ships. As it was, he
was utterly upset by the news and returned to Macedonia, without loss
indeed, but with considerable dishonour.

[Sidenote: Prusias and the Gauls. See ch. 78.]

+111.+ During this period Prusias also did a thing which deserves to be
recorded. The Gauls, whom King Attalus had brought over from Europe to
assist him against Achaeus on account of their reputation for courage,
had separated from that monarch on account of the jealous suspicions
of which I have before spoken, and were plundering the cities on
the Hellespont with gross licentiousness and violence, and finally
went so far as actually to besiege Ilium. In these circumstances the
inhabitants of the Alexandria in the Troad acted with commendable
spirit. They sent Themistes with four thousand men and forced the
Gauls to raise the siege of Ilium, and drove them entirely out of the
Troad, by cutting off their supplies and frustrating all their designs.
Thereupon the Gauls seized Arisba, in the territory of Abydos, and
thenceforth devoted themselves to forming designs and committing acts
of hostility against the cities built in that district. Against them
Prusias led out an army; and in a pitched battle put the men to the
sword on the field, and slew nearly all their women and children in
the camp, leaving the baggage to be plundered by his soldiers. This
achievement of Prusias delivered the cities on the Hellespont from
great fear and danger, and was a signal warning for future generations
against barbarians from Europe being over-ready to cross into Asia.

[Sidenote: B.C. 220-216.]

Such was the state of affairs in Greece and Asia. Meanwhile the greater
part of Italy had joined the Carthaginians after the battle of Cannae,
as I have shown before. I will interrupt my narrative at this point,
after having detailed the events in Asia and Greece, embraced by the
140th Olympiad. In my next book after a brief recapitulation of this
narrative, I shall fulfil the promise made at the beginning of my work
by recurring to the discussion of the Roman constitution.




BOOK VI

PREFACE


+1.+ I am aware that some will be at a loss to account for my
interrupting the course of my narrative for the sake of entering upon
the following disquisition on the Roman constitution. But I think
that I have already in many passages made it fully evident that this
particular branch of my work was one of the necessities imposed on
me by the nature of my original design; and I pointed this out with
special clearness in the preface which explained the scope of my
history. I there stated that the feature of my work which was at once
the best in itself, and the most instructive to the students of it, was
that it would enable them to know and fully realise in what manner, and
under what kind of constitution, it came about that nearly the whole
world fell under the power of Rome in somewhat less than fifty-three
years,—an event certainly without precedent. This being my settled
purpose, I could see no more fitting period than the present for making
a pause, and examining the truth of the remarks about to be made on
this constitution. In private life if you wish to satisfy yourself as
to the badness or goodness of particular persons, you would not, if
you wish to get a genuine test, examine their conduct at a time of
uneventful repose, but in the hour of brilliant success or conspicuous
reverse. For the true test of a perfect man is the power of bearing
with spirit and dignity violent changes of fortune. An examination
of a constitution should be conducted in the same way: and therefore
being unable to find in our day a more rapid or more signal change
than that which has happened to Rome, I reserved my disquistion on its
constitution for this place....

What is really educational and beneficial to students of history is
the clear view of the causes of events, and the consequent power of
choosing the better policy in a particular case. Now in every practical
undertaking by a state we must regard as the most powerful agent for
success or failure the form of its constitution; for from this as from
a fountain-head all conceptions and plans of action not only proceed,
but attain their consummation.[289]...

       *       *       *       *       *

+3.+ Of the Greek republics, which have again and again risen to
greatness and fallen into insignificance, it is not difficult to speak,
whether we recount their past history or venture an opinion on their
future. For to report what is already known is an easy task, nor is it
hard to guess what is to come from our knowledge of what has been. But
in regard to the Romans it is neither an easy matter to describe their
present state, owing to the complexity of their constitution; nor to
speak with confidence of their future, from our inadequate acquaintance
with their peculiar institutions in the past whether affecting their
public or their private life. It will require then no ordinary
attention and study to get a clear and comprehensive conception of the
distinctive features of this constitution.

[Sidenote: Classification of polities.]

Now, it is undoubtedly the case that most of those who profess to give
us authoritative instruction on this subject distinguish three kinds
of constitutions, which they designate _kingship_, _aristocracy_,
_democracy_. But in my opinion the question might fairly be put to
them, whether they name these as being the _only_ ones, or as the
_best_. In either case I think they are wrong. For it is plain that
we must regard as the _best_ constitution that which partakes of all
these three elements. And this is no mere assertion, but has been
proved by the example of Lycurgus, who was the first to construct a
constitution—that of Sparta—on this principle. Nor can we admit that
these are the _only_ forms: for we have had before now examples of
absolute and tyrannical forms of government, which, while differing as
widely as possible from kingship, yet appear to have some points of
resemblance to it; on which account all absolute rulers falsely assume
and use, as far as they can, the title of king. Again there have been
many instances of oligarchical governments having in appearance some
analogy to aristocracies, which are, if I may say so, as different from
them as it is possible to be. The same also holds good about democracy.

[Sidenote: Six forms of polity, and their natural cycle.]

+4.+ I will illustrate the truth of what I say. We cannot hold every
absolute government to be a kingship, but only that which is accepted
voluntarily, and is directed by an appeal to reason rather than to
fear and force. Nor again is every oligarchy to be regarded as an
aristocracy; the latter exists only where the power is wielded by the
justest and wisest men selected on their merits. Similarly, it is not
enough to constitute a democracy that the whole crowd of citizens
should have the right to do whatever they wish or propose. But where
reverence to the gods, succour of parents, respect to elders, obedience
to laws, are traditional and habitual, in such communities, if the
will of the majority prevail, we may speak of the form of government
as a democracy. So then we enumerate six forms of government,—the
three commonly spoken of which I have just mentioned, and three more
allied forms, I mean _despotism_, _oligarchy_ and _mob-rule_. The
first of these arises without artificial aid and in the natural order
of events. Next to this, and produced from it by the aid of art and
adjustment, comes _kingship_; which degenerating into the evil form
allied to it, by which I mean _tyranny_, both are once more destroyed
and _aristocracy_ produced. Again the latter being in the course of
nature perverted to _oligarchy_, and the people passionately avenging
the unjust acts of their rulers, _democracy_ comes into existence;
which again by its violence and contempt of law becomes sheer
_mob-rule_.[290] No clearer proof of the truth of what I say could be
obtained than by a careful observation of the natural origin, genesis,
and decadence of these several forms of government. For it is only by
seeing distinctly how each of them is produced that a distinct view
can also be obtained of its growth, zenith, and decadence, and the
time, circumstance, and place in which each of these may be expected to
recur. This method I have assumed to be especially applicable to the
Roman constitution, because its origin and growth have from the first
followed natural causes.

+5.+ Now the natural laws which regulate the merging of one form of
government into another are perhaps discussed with greater accuracy
by Plato and some other philosophers. But their treatment, from its
intricacy and exhaustiveness, is only within the capacity of a few. I
will therefore endeavour to give a summary of the subject, just so far
as I suppose it to fall within the scope of a practical history and the
intelligence of ordinary people. For if my exposition appear in any way
inadequate, owing to the general terms in which it is expressed, the
details contained in what is immediately to follow will amply atone for
what is left for the present unsolved.

[Sidenote: The origin of the social compact.]

What is the origin then of a constitution, and whence is it produced?
Suppose that from floods, pestilences, failure of crops, or some such
causes the race of man is reduced almost to extinction. Such things
we are told have happened, and it is reasonable to think will happen
again. Suppose accordingly all knowledge of social habits and arts
to have been lost. Suppose that from the survivors, as from seeds,
the race of man to have again multiplied. In that case I presume they
would, like the animals, herd together; for it is but reasonable to
suppose that bodily weakness would induce them to seek those of their
own kind to herd with. And in that case too, as with the animals,
he who was superior to the rest in strength of body or courage of
soul would lead and rule them. For what we see happen in the case of
animals that are without the faculty of reason, such as bulls, goats,
and cocks,—among whom there can be no dispute that the strongest take
the lead,—that we must regard as in the truest sense the teaching of
nature. Originally then it is probable that the condition of life among
men was this,—herding together like animals and following the strongest
and bravest as leaders. The limit of this authority would be physical
strength, and the name we should give it would be despotism. But as
soon as the idea of family ties and social relation has arisen amongst
such agglomerations of men, then is born also the idea of kingship, and
then for the first time mankind conceives the notion of goodness and
justice and their reverse.

[Sidenote: Origin of morality.]

[Sidenote: which transmutes despotism into kingship,]

+6.+ The way in which such conceptions originate and come into
existence is this. The intercourse of the sexes is an instinct of
nature, and the result is the birth of children. Now, if any one of
these children who have been brought up, when arrived at maturity,
is ungrateful and makes no return to those by whom he was nurtured,
but on the contrary presumes to injure them by word and deed, it is
plain that he will probably offend and annoy such as are present, and
have seen the care and trouble bestowed by the parents on the nurture
and bringing up of their children. For seeing that men differ from
the other animals in being the only creatures possessed of reasoning
powers, it is clear that such a difference of conduct is not likely
to escape their observation; but that they will remark it when it
occurs, and express their displeasure on the spot: because they will
have an eye to the future, and will reason on the likelihood of the
same occurring to each of themselves. Again, if a man has been rescued
or helped in an hour of danger, and, instead of showing gratitude to
his preserver, seeks to do him harm, it is clearly probable that the
rest will be displeased and offended with him, when they know it:
sympathising with their neighbour and imagining themselves in his case.
Hence arises a notion in every breast of the meaning and theory of
duty, which is in fact the beginning and end of justice. Similarly,
again, when any one man stands out as the champion of all in a time of
danger, and braves with firm courage the onslaught of the most powerful
wild beasts, it is probable that such a man would meet with marks of
favour and pre-eminence from the common people; while he who acted in
a contrary way would fall under their contempt and dislike. From this,
once more, it is reasonable to suppose that there would arise in the
minds of the multitude a theory of the disgraceful and the honourable,
and of the difference between them; and that one should be sought and
imitated for its advantages, the other shunned. When, therefore, the
leading and most powerful man among his people ever encourages such
persons in accordance with the popular sentiment, and thereby assumes
in the eyes of his subject the appearance of being the distributor to
each man according to his deserts, they no longer obey him and support
his rule from fear of violence, but rather from conviction of its
utility, however old he may be, rallying round him with one heart and
soul, and fighting against all who form designs against his government.
In this way he becomes a _king_ instead of a _despot_ by imperceptible
degrees, reason having ousted brute courage and bodily strength from
their supremacy.

[Sidenote: which in its turn degenerates into tyranny.]

+7.+ This then is the natural process of formation among mankind of the
notion of goodness and justice, and their opposites; and this is the
origin and genesis of genuine kingship; for people do not only keep up
the government of such men personally, but for their descendants also
for many generations; from the conviction that those who are born from
and educated by men of this kind will have principles also like theirs.
But if they subsequently become displeased with their descendants, they
do not any longer decide their choice of rulers and kings by their
physical strength or brute courage; but by the differences of their
intellectual and reasoning faculties, from practical experience of the
decisive importance of such a distinction. In old times, then, those
who were once thus selected, and obtained this office, grew old in
their royal functions, making magnificent strongholds and surrounding
them with walls and extending their frontiers, partly for the security
of their subjects, and partly to provide them with abundance of the
necessaries of life; and while engaged in these works they were exempt
from all vituperation or jealousy; because they did not make their
distinctive dress, food, or drink, at all conspicuous, but lived very
much like the rest, and joined in the everyday employments of the
common people. But when their royal power became hereditary in their
family, and they found every necessary for security ready to their
hands, as well as more than was necessary for their personal support,
then they gave the rein to their appetites; imagined that rulers must
needs wear different clothes from those of subjects; have different and
elaborate luxuries of the table; and must even seek sensual indulgence,
however unlawful the source, without fear of denial. These things
having given rise in the one case to jealousy and offence, in the other
to outburst of hatred and passionate resentment, the kingship became a
tyranny; the first step in disintegration was taken; and plots began to
be formed against the government, which did not now proceed from the
worst men but from the noblest, most high-minded, and most courageous,
because these are the men who can least submit to the tyrannical acts
of their rulers.

[Sidenote: Tyranny is then displaced by aristocracy,]

[Sidenote: which degenerates into oligarchy,]

+8.+ But as soon as the people got leaders, they co-operated with
them against the dynasty for the reasons I have mentioned; and
then _kingship_ and _despotism_ were alike entirely abolished, and
_aristocracy_ once more began to revive and start afresh. For in
their immediate gratitude to those who had deposed the despots, the
people employed them as leaders, and entrusted their interests to
them; who, looking upon this charge at first as a great privilege,
made the public advantage their chief concern, and conducted all kinds
of business, public or private, with diligence and caution. But when
the sons of these men received the same position of authority from
their fathers,—having had no experience of misfortunes, and none at
all of civil equality and freedom of speech, but having been bred up
from the first under the shadow of their fathers’ authority and lofty
position,—some of them gave themselves up with passion to avarice
and unscrupulous love of money, others to drinking and the boundless
debaucheries which accompanies it, and others to the violation of
women or the forcible appropriation of boys; and so they turned an
_aristocracy_ into an _oligarchy_. But it was not long before they
roused in the minds of the people the same feelings as before; and
their fall therefore was very like the disaster which befell the
tyrants.

[Sidenote: which is replaced by democracy,]

[Sidenote: which degenerates into rule of corruption and violence, only
to be stopped by a return to despotism.]

+9.+ For no sooner had the knowledge of the jealousy and hatred
existing in the citizens against them emboldened some one to oppose
the government by word or deed, than he was sure to find the whole
people ready and prepared to take his side. Having then got rid of
these rulers by assassination or exile, they do not venture to set up
a king again, being still in terror of the injustice to which this led
before; nor dare they intrust the common interests again to more than
one, considering the recent example of their misconduct: and therefore,
as the only sound hope left them is that which depends upon themselves,
they are driven to take refuge in that; and so changed the constitution
from an oligarchy to a _democracy_, and took upon themselves the
superintendence and charge of the state. And as long as any survive
who have had experience of oligarchical supremacy and domination, they
regard their present constitution as a blessing, and hold equality and
freedom as of the utmost value. But as soon as a new generation has
arisen, and the democracy has descended to their children’s children,
long association weakens their value for equality and freedom, and
some seek to become more powerful than the ordinary citizens; and the
most liable to this temptation are the rich. So when they begin to
be fond of office, and find themselves unable to obtain it by their
own unassisted efforts and their own merits, they ruin their estates,
while enticing and corrupting the common people in every possible way.
By which means when, in their senseless mania for reputation, they
have made the populace ready and greedy to receive bribes, the virtue
of democracy is destroyed, and it is transformed into a government
of violence and the strong hand. For the mob, habituated to feed at
the expense of others, and to have its hopes of a livelihood in the
property of its neighbours, as soon as it has got a leader sufficiently
ambitious and daring, being excluded by poverty from the sweets of
civil honours, produces a reign of mere violence. Then come tumultuous
assemblies, massacres, banishments, redivisions of land; until, after
losing all trace of civilisation, it has once more found a master and a
despot.

This is the regular cycle of constitutional revolutions, and the
natural order in which constitutions change, are transformed, and
return again to their original stage. If a man have a clear grasp of
these principles he may perhaps make a mistake as to the dates at
which this or that will happen to a particular constitution; but he
will rarely be entirely mistaken as to the stage of growth or decay
at which it has arrived, or as to the point at which it will undergo
some revolutionary change. However, it is in the case of the Roman
constitution that this method of inquiry will most fully teach us its
formation, its growth, and zenith, as well as the changes awaiting it
in the future; for this, if any constitution ever did, owed, as I said
just now, its original foundation and growth to natural causes, and to
natural causes will owe its decay. My subsequent narrative will be the
best illustration of what I say.

[Sidenote: Lycurgus recognized these truths, and legislated
accordingly.]

+10.+ For the present I will make a brief reference to the legislation
of Lycurgus: for such a discussion is not at all alien to my subject.
That statesman was fully aware that all those changes which I have
enumerated come about by an undeviating law of nature; and reflected
that every form of government that was unmixed, and rested on one
species of power, was unstable; because it was swiftly perverted
into that particular form of evil peculiar to it and inherent in
its nature. For just as rust is the natural dissolvent of iron,
wood-worms and grubs to timber, by which they are destroyed without
any external injury, but by that which is engendered in themselves;
so in each constitution there is naturally engendered a particular
vice inseparable from it: in kingship it is absolutism; aristocracy
it is oligarchy; in democracy lawless ferocity and violence; and to
these vicious states all these forms of government are, as I have
lately shown, inevitably transformed. Lycurgus, I say, saw all this,
and accordingly combined together all the excellences and distinctive
features of the best constitutions, that no part should become unduly
predominant, and be perverted into its kindred vice; and that, each
power being checked by the others, no one part should turn the scale
or decisively out-balance the others; but that, by being accurately
adjusted and in exact equilibrium, the whole might remain long steady
like a ship sailing close to the wind. The royal power was prevented
from growing insolent by fear of the people, which had also assigned to
it an adequate share in the constitution. The people in their turn were
restrained from a bold contempt of the kings by fear of the Gerusia:
the members of which, being selected on grounds of merit, were certain
to throw their influence on the side of justice in every question that
arose; and thus the party placed at a disadvantage by its conservative
tendency was always strengthened and supported by the weight and
influence of the Gerusia. The result of this combination has been that
the Lacedaemonians retained their freedom for the longest period of any
people with which we are acquainted.

Lycurgus however established his constitution without the discipline of
adversity, because he was able to foresee by the light of reason the
course which events naturally take and the source from which they come.
But though the Romans have arrived at the same result in framing their
commonwealth, they have not done so by means of abstract reasoning, but
through many struggles and difficulties, and by continually adopting
reforms from knowledge gained in disaster. The result has been a
constitution like that of Lycurgus, and the best of any existing in my
time....

       *       *       *       *       *

+11.+ I have given an account of the constitution of Lycurgus, I
will now endeavour to describe that of Rome at the period of their
disastrous defeat at Cannae.

[Sidenote: The Roman constitution at the epoch of Cannae, B.C. 216.]

I am fully conscious that to those who actually live under this
constitution I shall appear to give an inadequate account of it by
the omission of certain details. Knowing accurately every portion
of it from personal experience, and from having been bred up in its
customs and laws from childhood, they will not be struck so much by
the accuracy of the description, as annoyed by its omissions; nor will
they believe that the historian has purposely omitted unimportant
distinctions, but will attribute his silence upon the origin of
existing institutions or other important facts to ignorance. What is
told they depreciate as insignificant or beside the purpose; what is
omitted they desiderate as vital to the question: their object being
to appear to know more than the writers. But a good critic should not
judge a writer by what he leaves unsaid, but from what he says: if
he detects misstatement in the latter, he may then feel certain that
ignorance accounts for the former; but if what he says is accurate,
his omissions ought to be attributed to deliberate judgment and not to
ignorance. So much for those whose criticisms are prompted by personal
ambition rather than by justice....

Another requisite for obtaining a judicious approval for an historical
disquisition, is that it should be germane to the matter in hand; if
this is not observed, though its style may be excellent and its matter
irreproachable, it will seem out of place, and disgust rather than
please....

[Sidenote: Triple element in the Roman Constitution.]

As for the Roman constitution, it had three elements, each of them
possessing sovereign powers: and their respective share of power in
the whole state had been regulated with such a scrupulous regard to
equality and equilibrium, that no one could say for certain, not even
a native, whether the constitution as a whole were an aristocracy
or democracy or despotism. And no wonder: for if we confine our
observation to the power of the Consuls we should be inclined to regard
it as despotic; if on that of the Senate, as aristocratic; and if
finally one looks at the power possessed by the people it would seem a
clear case of a democracy. What the exact powers of these several parts
were, and still, with slight modifications, are, I will now state.

[Sidenote: The Consuls.]

+12.+ The Consuls, before leading out the legions, remain in Rome and
are supreme masters of the administration. All other magistrates,
except the Tribunes, are under them and take their orders. They
introduce foreign ambassadors to the Senate; bring matters requiring
deliberation before it; and see to the execution of its decrees. If,
again, there are any matters of state which require the authorisation
of the people, it is their business to see to them, to summon the
popular meetings, to bring the proposals before them, and to carry out
the decrees of the majority. In the preparations for war also, and in
a word in the entire administration of a campaign, they have all but
absolute power. It is competent to them to impose on the allies such
levies as they think good, to appoint the Military Tribunes, to make
up the roll for soldiers and select those that are suitable. Besides
they have absolute power of inflicting punishment on all who are under
their command while on active service and they have authority to expend
as much of the public money as they choose, being accompanied by a
quaestor who is entirely at their orders. A survey of these powers
would in fact justify our describing the constitution as despotic,—a
clear case of royal government. Nor will it affect the truth of my
description, if any of the institutions I have described are changed in
our time, or in that of our posterity: and the same remarks apply to
what follows.

[Sidenote: The Senate.]

+13.+ The Senate has first of all the control of the treasury, and
regulates the receipts and disbursements alike. For the Quaestors
cannot issue any public money for the various departments of the state
without a decree of the Senate, except for the service of the Consuls.
The Senate controls also what is by far the largest and most important
expenditure, that, namely, which is made by the censors every _lustrum_
for the repair or construction of public buildings; this money cannot
be obtained by the censors except by the grant of the Senate. Similarly
all crimes committed in Italy requiring a public investigation, such
as treason, conspiracy, poisoning, or wilful murder, are in the hands
of the Senate. Besides, if any individual or state among the Italian
allies requires a controversy to be settled, a penalty to be assessed,
help or protection to be afforded,—all this is the province of the
Senate. Or again, outside Italy, if it is necessary to send an embassy
to reconcile warring communities, or to remind them of their duty,
or sometimes to impose requisitions upon them, or to receive their
submission, or finally to proclaim war against them,—this too is the
business of the Senate. In like manner the reception to be given to
foreign ambassadors in Rome, and the answers to be returned to them,
are decided by the Senate. With such business the people have nothing
to do. Consequently, if one were staying at Rome when the Consuls
were not in town, one would imagine the constitution to be a complete
aristocracy: and this has been the idea entertained by many Greeks, and
by many kings as well, from the fact that nearly all the business they
had with Rome was settled by the Senate.

[Sidenote: The people.]

+14.+ After this one would naturally be inclined to ask what part
is left for the people in the constitution, when the Senate has
these various functions, especially the control of the receipts and
expenditure of the exchequer; and when the Consuls, again, have
absolute power over the details of military preparation, and an
absolute authority in the field? There is, however, a part left the
people, and it is a most important one. For the people is the sole
fountain of honour and of punishment; and it is by these two things
and these alone that dynasties and constitutions and, in a word, human
society are held together: for where the distinction between them is
not sharply drawn both in theory and practice, there no undertaking
can be properly administered,—as indeed we might expect when good and
bad are held in exactly the same honour. The people then are the only
court to decide matters of life and death; and even in cases where the
penalty is money, if the sum to be assessed is sufficiently serious,
and especially when the accused have held the higher magistracies. And
in regard to this arrangement there is one point deserving especial
commendation and record. Men who are on trial for their lives at
Rome, while sentence is in process of being voted,—if even only one
of the tribes whose votes are needed to ratify the sentence has not
voted,—have the privilege at Rome of openly departing and condemning
themselves to a voluntary exile. Such men are safe at Naples or
Praeneste or at Tibur, and at other towns with which this arrangement
has been duly ratified on oath.

Again, it is the people who bestow offices on the deserving, which
are the most honourable rewards of virtue. It has also the absolute
power of passing or repealing laws; and, most important of all, it is
the people who deliberate on the question of peace or war. And when
provisional terms are made for alliance, suspension of hostilities, or
treaties, it is the people who ratify them or the reverse.

These considerations again would lead one to say that the chief
power in the state was the people’s, and that the constitution was a
democracy.

[Sidenote: The mutual relation of the three.]

+15.+ Such, then, is the distribution of power between the several
parts of the state. I must now show how each of these several parts
can, when they choose, oppose or support each other.

[Sidenote: The Consul dependent on the Senate,]

The Consul, then, when he has started on an expedition with the powers
I have described, is to all appearance absolute in the administration
of the business in hand; still he has need of the support both of
people and Senate, and, without them, is quite unable to bring the
matter to a successful conclusion. For it is plain that he must have
supplies sent to his legions from time to time; but without a decree
of the Senate they can be supplied neither with corn, nor clothes,
nor pay, so that all the plans of a commander must be futile, if the
Senate is resolved either to shrink from danger or hamper his plans.
And again, whether a Consul shall bring any undertaking to a conclusion
or no depends entirely upon the Senate: for it has absolute authority
at the end of a year to send another Consul to supersede him, or to
continue the existing one in his command. Again, even to the successes
of the generals the Senate has the power to add distinction and glory,
and on the other hand to obscure their merits and lower their credit.
For these high achievements are brought in tangible form before the
eyes of the citizens by what are called “triumphs.”

[Sidenote: and on the people.]

But these triumphs the commanders cannot celebrate with proper pomp, or
in some cases celebrate at all, unless the Senate concurs and grants
the necessary money. As for the people, the Consuls are pre-eminently
obliged to court their favour, however distant from home may be the
field of their operations; for it is the people, as I have said before,
that ratifies, or refuses to ratify, terms of peace and treaties; but
most of all because when laying down their office they have to give an
account[291] of their administration before it. Therefore in no case is
it safe for the Consuls to neglect either the Senate or the goodwill of
the people.

[Sidenote: The Senate controlled by the people.]

+16.+ As for the Senate, which possesses the immense power I have
described, in the first place it is obliged in public affairs to take
the multitude into account, and respect the wishes of the people; and
it cannot put into execution the penalty for offences against the
republic, which are punishable with death, unless the people first
ratify its decrees. Similarly even in matters which directly affect the
senators,—for instance, in the case of a law diminishing the Senate’s
traditional authority, or depriving senators of certain dignities and
offices, or even actually cutting down their property,—even in such
cases the people have the sole power of passing or rejecting the law.
But most important of all is the fact that, if the Tribunes interpose
their veto, the Senate not only are unable to pass a decree, but cannot
even hold a meeting at all, whether formal or informal. Now, the
Tribunes are always bound to carry out the decree of the people, and
above all things to have regard to their wishes: therefore, for all
these reasons the Senate stands in awe of the multitude, and cannot
neglect the feelings of the people.

[Sidenote: The people dependent on the Senate]

[Sidenote: and Consul.]

+17.+ In like manner the people on its part is far from being
independent of the Senate, and is bound to take its wishes into account
both collectively and individually. For contracts, too numerous
to count, are given out by the censors in all parts of Italy for
the repairs or construction of public buildings; there is also the
collection of revenue from many rivers, harbours, gardens, mines, and
land—everything, in a word, that comes under the control of the Roman
government: and in all these the people at large are engaged; so that
there is scarcely a man, so to speak, who is not interested either as
a contractor or as being employed in the works. For some purchase the
contracts from the censors for themselves; and others go partners with
them; while others again go security for these contractors, or actually
pledge their property to the treasury for them. Now over all these
transactions the Senate has absolute control. It can grant an extension
of time; and in case of unforeseen accident can relieve the contractors
from a portion of their obligation, or release them from it altogether,
if they are absolutely unable to fulfil it. And there are many details
in which the Senate can inflict great hardships, or, on the other hand,
grant great indulgences to the contractors: for in every case the
appeal is to it. But the most important point of all is that the judges
are taken from its members in the majority of trials, whether public
or private, in which the charges are heavy.[292] Consequently, all
citizens are much at its mercy; and being alarmed at the uncertainty as
to when they may need its aid, are cautious about resisting or actively
opposing its will. And for a similar reason men do not rashly resist
the wishes of the Consuls, because one and all may become subject to
their absolute authority on a campaign.

+18.+ The result of this power of the several estates for mutual
help or harm is a union sufficiently firm for all emergencies, and a
constitution than which it is impossible to find a better. For whenever
any danger from without compels them to unite and work together,
the strength which is developed by the State is so extraordinary,
that everything required is unfailingly carried out by the eager
rivalry shown by all classes to devote their whole minds to the need
of the hour, and to secure that any determination come to should
not fail for want of promptitude; while each individual works,
privately and publicly alike, for the accomplishment of the business
in hand. Accordingly, the peculiar constitution of the State makes
it irresistible, and certain of obtaining whatever it determines to
attempt. Nay, even when these external alarms are past, and the people
are enjoying their good fortune and the fruits of their victories, and,
as usually happens, growing corrupted by flattery and idleness, show
a tendency to violence and arrogance,—it is in these circumstances,
more than ever, that the constitution is seen to possess within itself
the power of correcting abuses. For when any one of the three classes
becomes puffed up, and manifests an inclination to be contentious
and unduly encroaching, the mutual interdependency of all the three,
and the possibility of the pretensions of any one being checked and
thwarted by the others, must plainly check this tendency: and so the
proper equilibrium is maintained by the impulsiveness of the one part
being checked by its fear of the other....


ON THE ROMAN ARMY

+19.+ After electing the Consuls they proceed to elect military
tribunes,—fourteen from those who had five years', and ten from those
who had ten years', service. All citizens must serve ten years in the
cavalry or twenty years in the infantry before the forty-sixth year of
their age, except those rated below four hundred asses. The latter are
employed in the navy; but if any great public necessity arises they
are obliged to serve as infantry also for twenty campaigns: and no one
can hold an office in the state until he has completed ten years of
military service....

[Sidenote: The levy.]

When the Consuls are about to enrol the army they give public notice
of the day on which all Roman citizens of military age must appear.
This is done every year. When the day has arrived, and the citizens fit
for service are come to Rome and have assembled on the Capitoline, the
fourteen junior tribunes divide themselves, in the order in which they
were appointed by the people or by the Imperators, into four divisions,
because the primary division of the forces thus raised is into four
legions. The four tribunes first appointed are assigned to the legion
called the 1st; the next three to the 2d; the next four to the 3d; and
the three last to the 4th. Of the ten senior tribunes, the two first
are assigned to the 1st legion; the next three to the 2d; the two next
to the 3d; and the three last to the 4th.

+20.+ This division and assignment of the tribunes having been settled
in such a way that all four legions have an equal number of officers,
the tribunes of the several legions take up a separate position and
draw lots for the tribes one by one; and summon the tribe on whom it
from time to time falls. From this tribe they select four young men
as nearly like each other in age and physical strength as possible.
These four are brought forward, and the tribunes of the first legion
picks out one of them, those of the second another, those of the third
another, and the fourth has to take the last. When the next four are
selected the tribunes of the second legion have the first choice, and
those of the first the last. With the next four the tribunes of the
third legion have the first choice, those of the second the last; and
so on in regular rotation: of which the result is that each legion
gets men of much the same standard. But when they have selected the
number prescribed,—which is four thousand two hundred infantry for each
legion, or at times of special danger five thousand,—they next used to
pass men for the cavalry, in old times _after_ the four thousand two
hundred infantry; but now they do it before them, the selection having
been made by the censor on the basis of wealth; and they enrol three
hundred for each legion.[293]

+21.+ The roll having been completed in this manner, the tribunes
belonging to the several legions muster their men; and selecting one
of the whole body that they think most suitable for the purpose, they
cause him to take an oath that he will obey his officers and do their
orders to the best of his ability. And all the others come up and take
the oath separately, merely affirming that they will do the same as the
first man.

At the same time the Consuls send orders to the magistrates of the
allied cities in Italy, from which they determine that allied troops
are to serve: declaring the number required, and the day and place at
which the men selected must appear. The cities then enrol their troops
with much the same ceremonies as to selection and administration of the
oath, and appoint a commander and a paymaster.[294]

[Sidenote: Fourfold division of the Legionaries.]

The Military Tribunes at Rome, after the administering of the oath
to their men, and giving out the day and place at which they are to
appear without arms, for the present dismiss them. When they arrive on
the appointed day, they first select the youngest and poorest to form
the _Velites_, the next to them the _Hastati_, while those who are in
the prime of life they select as _Principes_, and the oldest of all as
_Triarii_. For in the Roman army these divisions, distinct not only
as to their ages and nomenclature, but also as to the manner in which
they are armed, exist in each legion. The division is made in such
proportions that the senior men, called _Triarii_, should number six
hundred, the _Principes_ twelve hundred, the _Hastati_ twelve hundred,
and that all the rest as the youngest should be reckoned among the
_Velites_. And if the whole number of the legion is more than four
thousand, they vary the numbers of these divisions proportionally,
except those of the _Triarii_, which is always the same.

[Sidenote: 1. Arms of the _Velites_.]

+22.+ The youngest soldiers or _Velites_ are ordered to carry a sword,
spears, and target (_parma_). The target is strongly made, and large
enough to protect the man; being round, with a diameter of three feet.
Each man also wears a head-piece without a crest (_galea_); which he
sometimes covers with a piece of wolf’s skin or something of that kind,
for the sake both of protection and identification; that the officers
of his company may be able to observe whether he shows courage or the
reverse on confronting dangers. The spear of the velites has a wooden
haft of about two cubits, and about a finger’s breadth in thickness;
its head is a span long, hammered fine, and sharpened to such an extent
that it becomes bent the first time it strikes, and cannot be used by
the enemy to hurl back; otherwise the weapon would be available for
both sides alike.

[Sidenote: 2. Arms of the _Hastati_, _Principes_, and _Triarii_.]

The second rank, the _Hastati_, are ordered to have the complete
panoply. This to a Roman means, first, a large shield (_scutum_), the
surface of which is curved outwards, its breadth two and a half feet,
its length four feet,—though there is also an extra sized shield in
which these measures are increased by a palm’s breadth. It consists
of two layers of wood fastened together with bull’s-hide glue; the
outer surface of which is first covered with canvas, then with calf’s
skin, on the upper and lower edges it is bound with iron to resist
the downward strokes of the sword, and the wear of resting upon the
ground. Upon it also is fixed an iron boss (_umbo_), to resist the more
formidable blows of stones and pikes, and of heavy missiles generally.
With the shield they also carry a sword (_gladius_) hanging down by
their right thigh, which is called a Spanish sword.[295] It has an
excellent point, and can deal a formidable blow with either edge,
because its blade is stout and unbending. In addition to these they
have two _pila_, a brass helmet, and greaves (_ocreae_). Some of the
_pila_ are thick, some fine. Of the thicker, some are round with the
diameter of a palm’s length, others are a palm square. The fine pila
are like moderate sized hunting spears, and they are carried along with
the former sort. The wooden haft of them all is about three cubits
long; and the iron head fixed to each half is barbed, and of the same
length as the haft. They take extraordinary pains to attach the head
to the haft firmly; they make the fastening of the one to the other
so secure for use by binding it half way up the wood, and riveting
it with a series of clasps, that the iron breaks sooner than this
fastening comes loose, although its thickness at the socket and where
it is fastened to the wood is a finger and a half’s breadth. Besides
these each man is decorated with a plume of feathers, with three purple
or black feathers standing upright, about a cubit long. The effect of
these being placed on the helmet, combined with the rest of the armour,
is to give the man the appearance of being twice his real height, and
to give him a noble aspect calculated to strike terror into the enemy.
The common soldiers also receive a brass plate, a span square, which
they put upon their breast and call a breastpiece (_pectorale_), and so
complete their panoply. Those who are rated above a hundred thousand
asses, instead of these breastpieces wear, with the rest of their
armour, coats of mail (_loricae_). The Principes and Triarii are armed
in the same way as the _Hastati_, except that instead of _pila_ they
carry long spears (_hastae_).

[Sidenote: Election of Centurions.]

+24.+ The _Principes_, _Hastati_, and _Triarii_, each elect ten
centurions according to merit, and then a second ten each. All these
sixty have the title of centurion alike, of whom the first man chosen
is a member of the council of war. And they in their turn select a
rear-rank officer each who is called _optio_. Next, in conjunction with
the centurions, they divide the several orders (omitting the _Velites_)
into ten companies each, and appoint to each company two centurions
and two _optiones_; the _Velites_ are divided equally among all the
companies; these companies are called orders (_ordines_) or maniples
(_manipuli_), or vexilla, and their officers are called centurions or
_ordinum ductores_.[296] Each maniple selects two of their strongest
and best born men as standard-bearers (_vexillarii_). And that each
maniple should have two commanding officers is only reasonable; for
it being impossible to know what a commander may be doing or what
may happen to him, and necessities of war admitting of no parleying,
they are anxious that the maniple may never be without a leader and
commander.

When the two centurions are both on the field, the first elected
commands the right of the maniple, the second the left: if both are not
there, the one who is commands the whole. And they wish the centurions
not to be so much bold and adventurous, as men with a faculty for
command, steady, and of a profound rather than a showy spirit; not
prone to engage wantonly or be unnecessarily forward in giving battle;
but such as in the face of superior numbers and overwhelming pressure
will die in defence of their post.

[Sidenote: Officers and arms of the equites.]

+25.+ Similarly they divide the cavalry into ten squadrons (_turmae_),
and from each they select three officers (_decuriones_), who each
select a subaltern (_optio_). The decurio first elected commands the
squadron, the other two have the rank of _decuriones_: a name indeed
which applies to all alike. If the first _decurio_ is not on the
field, the second takes command of the squadron. The armour of the
cavalry is very like that in Greece. In old times they did not wear
the lorica, but fought in their tunics (_campestria_); the result of
which was that they were prompt and nimble at dismounting and mounting
again with despatch, but were in great danger at close quarters from
the unprotected state of their bodies. And their lances too were
useless in two ways: first because they were thin, and prevented
their taking a good aim; and before they could get the head fixed in
the enemy, the lances were so shaken by the mere motion of the horse
that they generally broke. Secondly, because, having no spike at the
butt end of their lance, they only had one stroke, namely that with
the spear-head; and if the lance broke, what was left in their hands
was entirely useless. Again they used to have shields of bull’s hide,
just like those round cakes, with a knob in the middle which are used
at sacrifices, which were useless at close quarters because they were
flexible rather than firm; and, when their leather shrunk and rotted
from the rain, unserviceable as they were before, they then became
entirely so. Wherefore, as experience showed them the uselessness of
these, they lost no time in changing to the Greek fashion of arms: the
advantages of which were, first, that men were able to deliver the
first stroke of their lance-head with a good aim and effect, because
the shaft from the nature of its construction was steady and not
quivering; and, secondly, that they were able, by reversing the lance,
to use the spike at the butt-end for a steady and effective blow. And
the same may be said about the Greek shields: for, whether used to
ward off a blow or to thrust against the enemy, they neither give nor
bend. When the Romans learnt these facts about the Greek arms they were
not long in copying them; for no nation has ever surpassed them in
readiness to adopt new fashions from other people, and to imitate what
they see is better in others than themselves.

[Sidenote: Assembly of the legions.]

[Sidenote: The Socii.]

+26.+ Having made this distribution of their men and given orders
for their being armed, as I have described, the military tribunes
dismiss them to their homes. But when the day has arrived on which
they were all bound by their oath to appear at the place named by the
Consuls (for each Consul generally appoints a separate place for his
own legions, each having assigned to him two legions and a moiety of
the allies), all whose names were placed on the roll appear without
fail: no excuse being accepted in the case of those who have taken the
oath, except a prohibitory omen or absolute impossibility. The allies
muster along with the citizens, and are distributed and managed by the
officers appointed by the Consuls, who have the title of _Praefecti
sociis_ and are twelve in number. These officers select for the Consuls
from the whole infantry and cavalry of the allies such as are most
fitted for actual service, and these are called _extraordinarii_ (which
in Greek is ἐπίλεκτοι.) The whole number of the infantry of the socii
generally equals that of the legions, but the cavalry is treble that of
the citizens. Of these they select a third of the cavalry, and a fifth
of the infantry to serve as _extraordinarii_. The rest they divide into
two parts, one of which is called the right, the other the left wing
(_alae_).

These arrangements made, the military tribunes take over the citizens
and allies and proceed to form a camp. Now the principle on which they
construct their camps, no matter when or where, is the same; I think
therefore that it will be in place here to try and make my readers
understand, as far as words can do so, the Roman tactics in regard to
the march (_agmen_), the camp (_castrorum metatio_), and the line of
battle (_acies_). I cannot imagine any one so indifferent to things
noble and great, as to refuse to take some little extra trouble to
understand things like these; for if he has once heard them, he will
be acquainted with one of those things genuinely worth observation and
knowledge.

[Sidenote: _Castrorum metatio._]

+27.+ Their method of laying out a camp is as follows. The place for
the camp having been selected, the spot in it best calculated to
give a view of the whole, and most convenient for issuing orders, is
appropriated for the general’s tent (_Praetorium_).

Having placed a standard on the spot on which they intend to put the
Praetorium, they measure off a square round this standard, in such
a way that each of its sides is a hundred feet from the standard,
and the area of the square is four plethra.[297] Along one side of
this square—whichever aspect appears most convenient for watering
and foraging—the legions are stationed as follows. I have said that
there were six Tribuni in each legion, and that each Consul had two
legions,—it follows that there are twelve _Tribuni_ in a Consular army.
Well, they pitch the tents of these Tribuni all in one straight line,
parallel to the side of the square selected, at a distance of fifty
feet from it (there is a place too selected for the horses, beasts of
burden, and other baggage of the Tribuni); these tents face the outer
side of the camp and away from the square described above,—a direction
which will henceforth be called “the front” by me. The tents of the
Tribuni stand at equal distances from each other, so that they extend
along the whole breadth of the space occupied by the legions.

[Sidenote: The principia.]

[Sidenote: The quarters.]

+28.+ From the line described by the front of these tents they measure
another distance of a hundred feet towards the front. At that distance
another parallel straight line is drawn, and it is from this last that
they begin arranging the quarters of the legions, which they do as
follows:—they bisect the last mentioned straight line and from that
point draw another straight line at right angles to it; along this
line, on either side of it facing each other, the cavalry of the two
legions are quartered with a space of fifty feet between them, which
space is exactly bisected by the line last mentioned. The manner of
encamping the infantry is similar to that of the cavalry. The whole
area of each space occupied by the maniples and squadrons is a square,
and faces the _via_;[298] the length facing the _via_ is one hundred
feet, and they generally try to make the depth the same, except in
the case of the socii; and when they are employing legions of an
extra number, they increase the length and depth of these squares
proportionally.

+29.+ The spaces assigned to the cavalry are opposite the space between
the two groups of tents belonging to the Tribuni of the two legions,
at right angles to the line along which they stand, like a cross-road;
and indeed the whole arrangement of the _viae_ is like a system of
cross-roads, running on either side of the blocks of tents, those of
the cavalry on one side and those of the infantry on the other. The
spaces assigned to the cavalry and the Triarii in each legion are back
to back, with no _via_ between them, but touching each other, looking
opposite ways; and the depth of the spaces assigned to the Triarii is
only half that assigned to other maniples, because their numbers are
generally only half; but though the number of the men is different,
the length of the space is always the same owing to the lesser depth.
Next, parallel with these spaces, at a distance of fifty feet, they
place the _Principes_ facing the Triarii; and as they face the space
between themselves and the _Triarii_, we have two more roads formed
at right angles to the hundred-foot area in front of the tents of the
Tribunes, and running down from it to the outer agger of the camp on
the side opposite to that of the Principia, which we agreed to call
the front of the camp. Behind the spaces for the _Triarii_ and looking
in the opposite direction, and touching each other, are the spaces
for the _Hastati_. These several branches of the service (_Triarii_,
_Principes_, _Hastati_), being each divided into ten maniples, the
cross-roads between the blocks are all the same length and terminate in
the front agger of the camp; towards which they cause the last maniples
in the rows to face.

[Sidenote: Via Quintana.]

+30.+ Beyond the _Hastati_ they again leave a space of fifty feet,
and there, beginning from the same base (the Principia), and going in
a parallel direction, and to the same distance as the other blocks,
they place the cavalry of the allies facing the _Hastati_. Now the
number of the allies, as I have stated above, is equal to that of the
legions in regard to the infantry, though it falls below that if we
omit the _extraordinarii_; but that of the cavalry is double, when
the third part is deducted for service among the _extraordinarii_.
Therefore in marking out the camp the spaces assigned to the latter
are made proportionally deeper, so that their length remains the same
as those occupied by the legions. Thus five viae are formed:[299] and
back to back with these cavalry are the spaces for the infantry of the
allies, the depth being proportionally increased according to their
numbers;[300] and these maniples face the outer sides of the camp and
the agger. In each maniple the first tent at either end is occupied
by the centurions. Between the fifth and sixth squadrons of cavalry,
and the fifth and sixth maniple of infantry, there is a space of fifty
left, so that another road is made across the camp at right angles to
the others and parallel to the tents of the Tribuni, and this they call
the _Via Quintana_, as it runs along the fifth squadrons and maniples.

[Sidenote: The space between the Principia and the agger.]

[Sidenote: The Staff, or Praetoria cohors.]

+31.+ The space behind the tents of the Tribuni is thus used. On one
side of the square of the Praetorium is the market, on the other the
office of the Quaestor and the supplies which he has charge of. Then
behind the last tent of the Tribuni on either side, arranged at right
angles to those tents, are the quarters of the cavalry picked out of
the _extraordinarii_, as well as of some of those who are serving as
volunteers from personal friendship to Consuls. All these are arranged
parallel to the side aggers, facing on the one side the Quaestorium, on
the other the market-place. And, generally speaking, it falls to the
lot of these men not only to be near the Consul in the camp, but to be
wholly employed about the persons of the Consul and the Quaestor on the
march and all other occasions. Back to back with these again, facing
the agger, are placed the infantry who serve in the same way as these
cavalry.[301]

Beyond these there is another empty space or road left, one hundred
feet broad, parallel to the tents of the Tribuni, skirting the
market-place, Praetorium, and Quaestorium, from agger to agger. On the
further side of this road the rest of the _equites extraordinarii_
are placed facing the market-place and Quaestorium: and between the
quarters of these cavalry of the two legions a passage is left of
fifty feet, exactly opposite and at right angles to the square of the
Praetorium, leading to the rearward agger.

Back to back with the _equites extraordinarii_ are the infantry of the
same, facing the agger at the rear of the whole camp. And the space
left empty on either side of these, facing the agger on each side of
the camp, is given up to foreigners and such allies as chance to come
to the camp.

[Sidenote: The space round the quarters.]

The result of these arrangements is that the whole camp is a square,
with streets and other constructions regularly planned like a town.
Between the line of the tents and the agger there is an empty space
of two hundred feet on every side of the square, which is turned to
a great variety of uses. To begin with, it is exceedingly convenient
for the marching in and out of the legions. For each division descends
into this space by the _via_ which passes its own quarters, and so
avoids crowding and hustling each other, as they would if they were all
collected on one road. Again, all cattle brought into the camp, as well
as booty of all sorts taken from the enemy, are deposited in this space
and securely guarded during the night-watches. But the most important
use of this space is that, in night assaults, it secures the tents from
the danger of being set on fire, and keeps the soldiers out of the
range of the enemy’s missiles; or, if a few of them do carry so far,
they are spent and cannot penetrate the tents.

[Sidenote: Provision for extra numbers,]

[Sidenote: and for two consular armies.]

+32.+ The number then of foot-soldiers and cavalry being given (at
the rate, that is to say, of four thousand or of five thousand for
each legion), and the length, depth, and number of the maniples being
likewise known, as well as the breadth of the passages and roads, it
becomes possible to calculate the area occupied by the camp and the
length of the aggers. If on any occasion the number of allies, either
those originally enrolled or those who joined subsequently, exceeds
their due proportion, the difficulty is provided for in this way. To
the overplus of allies who joined subsequent to the enrolment of the
army are assigned the spaces on either side of the Praetorium, the
market-place and Quaestorium being proportionally contracted. For the
extra numbers of allies who joined originally an extra line of tents
(forming thus another _via_) is put up parallel with the other tents
of the socii, facing the agger on either side of the camp. But if all
four legions and both Consuls are in the same camp, all we have to do
is to imagine a second army, arranged back to back to the one already
placed, in exactly the same spaces as the former, but side by side
with it at the part where the picked men from the _extraordinarii_ are
stationed facing the rearward agger. In this case the shape of the
camp becomes an oblong, the area double, and the length of the entire
agger half as much again. This is the arrangement when both Consuls are
within the same agger; but if they occupy two separate camps, the above
arrangements hold good, except that the market-place is placed half way
between the two camps.

[Sidenote: Guard duty.]

+33.+ The camp having thus been laid out, the Tribuni next administer
an oath to all in it separately, whether free or slave, that they will
steal nothing within the agger, and in case they find anything will
bring it to the Tribuni. They next select for their several duties the
maniples of the Principes and Hastati in each legion. Two are told
off to guard the space in front of the quarters of the Tribuni. For
in this space, which is called the Principia, most of the Romans in
the camp transact all the business of the day; and are therefore very
particular about its being kept well watered and properly swept. Of the
other eighteen maniples, three are assigned to each of the six Tribuni,
that being the respective numbers in each legion; and of these three
maniples each takes its turn of duty in waiting upon the Tribune. The
services they render him are such as these: they pitch his tent for
him when a place is selected for encampment, and level the ground all
round it; and if any extra precaution is required for the protection of
his baggage, it is their duty to see to it. They also supply him with
two relays of guards. A guard consists of four men, two of whom act
as sentries in front of his tent, and two on the rear of it near the
horses. Seeing that each Tribune has three maniples, and each maniple
has a hundred men, without counting _Triarii_ and _Velites_ who are
not liable for this service, the duty is a light one, coming round
to each maniple only once in three days; while by this arrangement
ample provision is made for the convenience as well as the dignity of
the Tribuni. The maniples of Triarii are exempted from this personal
service to the Tribuni, but they each supply a watch of four men to the
squadron of cavalry nearest them. These watches have to keep a general
look out; but their chief duty is to keep an eye upon the horses, to
prevent their hurting themselves by getting entangled in their tethers,
and so becoming unfit for use; or from getting loose, and making a
confusion and disturbance in the camp by running against other horses.
Finally, all the maniples take turns to mount guard for a day each at
the Consul’s tent, to protect him from plots, and maintain the dignity
of his office.

[Sidenote: Orders of the day.]

[Sidenote: Construction of the _fossa_ and _agger_.]

+34.+ As to the construction of the foss and vallum,[302] two sides
fall to the lot of the socii, each division taking that side along
which it is quartered; the other two are left to the Romans, one to
each legion. Each side is divided into portions according to the number
of maniples, and the centurions stand by and superintend the work of
each maniple; while two of the Tribunes superintend the construction
of the whole side and see that it is adequate. In the same way the
Tribunes superintend all other operations in the camp. They divide
themselves in twos, and each pair is on duty for two months out of six;
they draw lots for their turns, and the pair on whom the lot falls
takes the superintendence of all active operations. The prefects of
the socii divide their duty in the same way. At daybreak the officers
of the cavalry and the centurions muster at the tents of the Tribunes,
while the Tribunes go to that of the Consul. He gives the necessary
orders to the Tribunes, they to the cavalry officers and centurions,
and these last pass them on to the rank and file as occasion may demand.

[Sidenote: The watchword.]

To secure the passing round of the watchword for the night the
following course is followed. One man is selected from the tenth
maniple, which, in the case both of cavalry and infantry, is quartered
at the ends of the road between the tents; this man is relieved from
guard-duty and appears each day about sunset at the tent of the Tribune
on duty, takes the _tessera_ or wooden tablet on which the watchword
is inscribed, and returns to his own maniple and delivers the wooden
tablet and watchword in the presence of witnesses to the chief officer
of the maniple next his own; he in the same way to the officer of the
next, and so on, until it arrives at the first maniple stationed next
the Tribunes. These men are obliged to deliver the tablet (_tessera_)
to the Tribunes before dark. If they are all handed in, the Tribune
knows that the watchword has been delivered to all, and has passed
through all the ranks back to his hands: but if any one is missing,
he at once investigates the matter; for he knows by the marks on the
tablets from which division of the army the tablet has not appeared;
and the man who is discovered to be responsible for its non-appearance
is visited with condign punishment.

[Sidenote: Night watches.]

+35.+ Next as to the keeping guard at night. The Consul’s tent is
guarded by the maniple on duty: those of the Tribuni and praefects of
the cavalry by the pickets formed as described above from the several
maniples. And in the same way each maniple and squadron posts guards of
their own men. The other pickets are posted by the Consul. Generally
speaking there are three pickets at the Quaestorium, and two at the
tent of each of the legati or members of council. The vallum is lined
by the _velites_, who are on guard all along it from day to day. That
is their special duty; while they also guard all the entrances to the
camp, telling off ten sentinels to take their turn at each of them. Of
the men told off for duty at the several _stationes_, the man who in
each maniple is to take the first watch is brought by the rear-rank man
of his company to the Tribune at eventide. The latter hands over to
them severally small wooden tablets (_tesserae_), one for each watch,
inscribed with small marks; on receiving which they go off to the
places indicated.

[Sidenote: Visiting rounds.]

The duty of going the rounds is intrusted to the cavalry. The first
Praefect of cavalry in each legion, early in the morning, orders one
of his rear-rank men to give notice before breakfast to four young men
of his squadron who are to go the rounds. At evening this same man’s
duty is to give notice to the Praefect of the next squadron that it
is his turn to provide for going the rounds until next morning. This
officer thereupon takes measures similar to the preceding one until
the next day; and so on throughout the cavalry squadrons. The four
men thus selected by the rear-rank men from the first squadron, after
drawing lots for the watch they are to take, proceed to the tent of the
Tribune on duty, and receive from him a writing stating the order[303]
and the number of the watches they are to visit. The four then take
up their quarters for the night alongside of the first maniple of
Triarii; for it is the duty of the centurion of this maniple to see
that a bugle is blown at the beginning of every watch. When the time
has arrived, the man to whose lot the first watch has fallen goes his
rounds, taking some of his friends as witnesses. He walks through the
posts assigned, which are not only those along the vallum and gates,
but also the pickets set by the several maniples and squadrons. If he
find the men of the first watch awake he takes from them their tessera;
but if he find any one of them asleep or absent from his post, he calls
those with him to witness the fact and passes on. The same process
is repeated by those who go the rounds during the other watches. The
charge of seeing that the bugle is blown at the beginning of each
watch, so that the right man might visit the right pickets, is as I
have said, laid upon the centurions of the first maniple of Triarii,
each one taking the duty for a day.

Each of these men who have gone the rounds (_tessarii_) at daybreak
conveys the tesserae to the Tribune on duty. If the whole number are
given in they are dismissed without question; but if any of them brings
a number less than that of the pickets, an investigation is made by
means of the mark on the tessera, as to which picket he has omitted.
Upon this being ascertained the centurion is summoned; he brings the
men who were on duty, and they are confronted with the patrol. If the
fault is with the men on guard, the patrol clears himself by producing
the witnesses whom he took with him; for he cannot do so without. If
nothing of that sort happened, the blame recoils upon the patrol.

[Sidenote: Military punishments: the _fustuarium_.]

+37.+ Then the Tribunes at once hold a court-martial, and the man who
is found guilty is punished by the _fustuarium_; the nature of which
is this. The Tribune takes a cudgel and merely touches the condemned
man; whereupon all the soldiers fall upon him with cudgels and stones.
Generally speaking men thus punished are killed on the spot; but if by
any chance, after running the gauntlet, they manage to escape from the
camp, they have no hope of ultimately surviving even so. They may not
return to their own country, nor would any one venture to receive such
an one into his house. Therefore those who have once fallen into this
misfortune are utterly and finally ruined. The same fate awaits the
praefect of the squadron, as well as his rear-rank man, if they fail to
give the necessary order at the proper time, the latter to the patrols,
and the former to the praefect of the next squadron. The result of the
severity and inevitableness of this punishment is that in the Roman
army the night watches are faultlessly kept. The common soldiers are
amenable to the Tribunes; the Tribunes to the Consuls. The Tribune is
competent to punish a soldier by inflicting a fine, distraining his
goods, or ordering him to be flogged; so too the praefects in the case
of the socii. The punishment of the _fustuarium_ is assigned also to
any one committing theft in the camp, or bearing false witness: as also
to any one who in full manhood is detected in shameful immorality: or
to any one who has been thrice punished for the same offence. All these
things are punished as crimes. But such as the following are reckoned
as cowardly and dishonourable in a soldier:—for a man to make a false
report to the Tribunes of his valour in order to get reward; or for
men who have been told off to an ambuscade to quit the place assigned
them from fear; and also for a man to throw away any of his arms from
fear, on the actual field of battle. Consequently it sometimes happens
that men confront certain death at their stations, because, from their
fear of the punishment awaiting them at home, they refuse to quit their
post: while others, who have lost shield or spear or any other arm on
the field, throw themselves upon the foe, in hopes of recovering what
they have lost, or of escaping by death from certain disgrace and the
insults of their relations.[304]

[Sidenote: Decimatio.]

+38.+ But if it ever happens that a number of men are involved in these
same acts: if, for instance, some entire maniples have quitted their
ground in the presence of the enemy, it is deemed impossible to subject
all to the _fustuarium_ or to military execution; but a solution of
the difficulty has been found at once adequate to the maintenance of
discipline and calculated to strike terror. The Tribune assembles the
legion, calls the defaulters to the front, and, after administering
a sharp rebuke, selects five or eight or twenty out of them by lot,
so that those selected should be about a tenth of those who have been
guilty of the act of cowardice. These selected are punished with the
_fustuarium_ without mercy; the rest are put on rations of barley
instead of wheat, and are ordered to take up their quarters outside the
vallum and the protection of the camp. As all are equally in danger of
having the lot fall on them, and as all alike who escape that, are made
a conspicuous example of by having their rations of barley, the best
possible means are thus taken to inspire fear for the future, and to
correct the mischief which has actually occurred.

[Sidenote: Military decorations.]

[Sidenote: Mural crown.]

[Sidenote: Civic crown.]

+39.+ A very excellent plan also is adopted for inducing young soldiers
to brave danger. When an engagement has taken place and any of them
have showed conspicuous gallantry, the Consul summons an assembly of
the legion, puts forward those whom he considers to have distinguished
themselves in any way, and first compliments each of them individually
on his gallantry, and mentions any other distinction he may have
earned in the course of his life, and then presents them with gifts:
to the man who has wounded an enemy, a spear; to the man who has
killed one and stripped his armour, a cup, if he be in the infantry,
horse-trappings if in the cavalry: though originally the only present
made was a spear. This does not take place in the event of their
having wounded or stripped any of the enemy in a set engagement or
the storming of a town; but in skirmishes or other occasions of that
sort, in which, without there being any positive necessity for them to
expose themselves singly to danger, they have done so voluntarily and
deliberately. In the capture of a town those who are first to mount the
walls are presented with a gold crown. So too those who have covered
and saved any citizens or allies are distinguished by the Consul with
certain presents; and those whom they have preserved present them
voluntarily with a crown, or if not, they are compelled to do so by
the Tribunes. The man thus preserved, too, reverences his preserver
throughout his life as a father, and is bound to act towards him as
a father in every respect. By such incentives those who stay at home
are stirred up to a noble rivalry and emulation in confronting danger,
no less than those who actually hear and see what takes place. For
the recipients of such rewards not only enjoy great glory among their
comrades in the army, and an immediate reputation at home, but after
their return they are marked men in all solemn festivals; for they
alone, who have been thus distinguished by the Consuls for bravery,
are allowed to wear robes of honour on those occasions: and moreover
they place the spoils they have taken in the most conspicuous places in
their houses, as visible tokens and proofs of their valour. No wonder
that a people, whose rewards and punishments are allotted with such
care and received with such feelings, should be brilliantly successful
in war.

The pay of the foot soldier is 5⅓ asses a day; of the centurion 10⅔; of
the cavalry 16. The infantry receive a ration of wheat equal to about ⅔
of an Attic medimnus a month, and the cavalry 7 medimni of barley, and
2 of wheat; of the allies the infantry receive the same, the cavalry 1⅓
medimnus of wheat, and 5 of barley. This is a free gift to the allies;
but in the cases of the Romans, the Quaestor stops out of their pay
the price of their corn and clothes, or any additional arms they may
require at a fixed rate.

+40.+ The following is their manner of moving camp. At the first
bugle the men all strike their tents and collect their baggage; but
no soldier may strike his tent, or set it up either, till the same
is done to that of the Tribuni and the Consul. At the second bugle
they load the beasts of burden with their baggage: at the third
the first maniples must advance and set the whole camp in motion.
Generally speaking, the men appointed to make this start are the
_extraordinarii_: next comes the right wing of the socii; and behind
them their beasts of burden. These are followed by the first legion
with its own baggage immediately on its rear; then comes the second
legion, followed by its own beasts of burden, and the baggage of those
socii who have to bring up the rear of the march, that is to say, the
left wing of the socii. The cavalry sometimes ride on the rear of their
respective divisions, sometimes on either side of the beasts of burden,
to keep them together and secure them. If an attack is expected on the
rear, the _extraordinarii_ themselves occupy the rear instead of the
van. Of the two legions and wings each takes the lead in the march on
alternate days, that by this interchange of position all may have an
equal share in the advantage of being first at the water and forage.
The order of march, however, is different at times of unusual danger,
if they have open ground enough. For in that case they advance in
three parallel columns, consisting of the _Hastati_, _Principes_, and
_Triarii_: the beasts of burden belonging to the maniples in the van
are placed in front of all, those belonging to the second behind the
leading maniples, and those belonging to the third behind the second
maniples, thus having the baggage and the maniples in alternate lines.
With this order of march, on an alarm being given, the columns face to
the right or left according to the quarter on which the enemy appears,
and get clear of the baggage. So that in a short space of time, and by
one movement, the whole of the hoplites are in line of battle—except
that sometimes it is necessary to half-wheel the _Hastati_ also—and the
baggage and the rest of the army are in their proper place for safety,
namely, in the rear of the line of combatants.

[Sidenote: Encampment on the march.]

+41.+ When the army on the march is approaching the place of
encampment, a Tribune, and those of the centurions who have been from
time to time selected for that duty, are sent forward to survey the
place of encampment. Having done this they proceed first of all to fix
upon the place for the Consul’s tent (as I have described above), and
to determine on which side of the Praetorium to quarter the legions.
Having decided these points they measure out the Praetorium, then they
draw the straight line along which the tents of the Tribunes are to be
pitched, and then the line parallel to this, beyond which the quarters
of the legions are to begin. In the same way they draw the lines on
the other sides of the Praetorium in accordance with the plan which I
have already detailed at length. This does not take long, nor is the
marking out of the camp a matter of difficulty, because the dimensions
are all regularly laid down, and are in accordance with precedent. Then
they fix one flag in the ground where the Consul’s tent is to stand,
and another on the base of the square containing it, and a third on the
line of the Tribunes’ tents; the two latter are scarlet, that which
marks the Consul’s tent is white; the lines on the other sides of the
Praetorium are marked sometimes with plain spears and sometimes by
flags of other colours. After this they lay out the _viae_ between the
quarters, fixing spears at each _via_. Consequently when the legions
in the course of their march have come near enough to get a clear view
of the place of encampment, they can all make out exactly the whole
plan of it, taking as their base the Consul’s flag and calculating from
that. Moreover as each soldier knows precisely on which _via_, and at
what point of it, his quarters are to be, because all occupy the same
position in the camp wherever it may be, it is exactly like a legion
entering its own city; when breaking off at the gates each man makes
straight for his own residence without hesitation, because he knows
the direction and the quarter of the town in which home lies. It is
precisely the same in a Roman camp.

+42.+ It is because the first object of the Romans in the matter of
encampment is facility, that they seem to me to differ diametrically
from Greek military men in this respect. Greeks, in choosing a place
for a camp, think primarily of security from the natural strength of
the position: first, because they are averse from the toil of digging a
foss, and, secondly, because they think that no artificial defences are
comparable to those afforded by the nature of the ground. Accordingly,
they not only have to vary the whole configuration of the camp to suit
the nature of the ground, but to change the arrangement of details in
all kinds of irregular ways; so that neither soldier nor company has
a fixed place in it. The Romans, on the other hand, prefer to undergo
the fatigue of digging, and of the other labours of circumvallation,
for the sake of the facility in arrangement, and to secure a plan of
encampment which shall be one and the same and familiar to all.

Such are the most important facts in regard to the legions and the
method of encamping them....


THE ROMAN REPUBLIC COMPARED WITH OTHERS

[Sidenote: The Theban constitution may be put aside,]

+43.+ Nearly all historians have recorded as constitutions of eminent
excellence those of Lacedaemonia, Crete, Mantinea, and Carthage. Some
have also mentioned those of Athens and Thebes. The former I may allow
to pass; but I am convinced that little need be said of the Athenian
and Theban constitutions: their growth was abnormal, the period of
their zenith brief, and the changes they experienced unusually violent.
Their glory was a sudden and fortuitous flash, so to speak; and while
they still thought themselves prosperous, and likely to remain so, they
found themselves involved in circumstances completely the reverse. The
Thebans got their reputation for valour among the Greeks, by taking
advantage of the senseless policy of the Lacedaemonians, and the
hatred of the allies towards them, owing to the valour of one, or at
most two, men who were wise enough to appreciate the situation. Since
fortune quickly made it evident that it was not the peculiarity of
their constitution, but the valour of their leaders, which gave the
Thebans their success. For the great power of Thebes notoriously took
its rise, attained its zenith, and fell to the ground with the lives of
Epaminondas and Pelopidas. We must therefore conclude that it was not
its constitution, but its men, that caused the high fortune which it
then enjoyed.

[Sidenote: as also the Athenian.]

+44.+ A somewhat similar remark applies to the Athenian constitution
also. For though it perhaps had more frequent interludes of excellence,
yet its highest perfection was attained during the brilliant career
of Themistocles; and having reached that point it quickly declined,
owing to its essential instability. For the Athenian demus is always
in the position of a ship without a commander. In such a ship, if
fear of the enemy, or the occurrence of a storm induce the crew to be
of one mind and to obey the helmsman, everything goes well; but if
they recover from this fear, and begin to treat their officers with
contempt, and to quarrel with each other because they are no longer
all of one mind,—one party wishing to continue the voyage, and the
other urging the steersman to bring the ship to anchor; some letting
out the sheets, and others hauling them in, and ordering the sails to
be furled,—their discord and quarrels make a sorry show to lookers on;
and the position of affairs is full of risk to those on board engaged
on the same voyage: and the result has often been that, after escaping
the dangers of the widest seas, and the most violent storms, they wreck
their ship in harbour and close to shore. And this is what has often
happened to the Athenian constitution. For, after repelling, on various
occasions, the greatest and most formidable dangers by the valour of
its people and their leaders, there have been times when, in periods
of secure tranquillity, it has gratuitously and recklessly encountered
disaster.[305] Therefore I need say no more about either it, or the
Theban constitution: in both of which a mob manages everything on its
own unfettered impulse—a mob in the one city distinguished for headlong
outbursts of fiery temper, in the other trained in long habits of
violence and ferocity.

[Sidenote: The Spartan polity unlike that of Crete.]

+45.+ Passing to the Cretan polity there are two points which
deserve our consideration. The first is how such writers as Ephorus,
Xenophon, Callisthenes and Plato[306]—who are the most learned of the
ancients—could assert that it was like that of Sparta; and secondly
how they came to assert that it was at all admirable. I can agree with
neither assertion; and I will explain why I say so. And first as to its
dissimilarity with the Spartan constitution. The peculiar merit of the
latter is said to be its land laws, by which no one possesses more than
another, but all citizens have an equal share in the public land.[307]
The next distinctive feature regards the possession of money: for as it
is utterly discredited among them, the jealous competition which arises
from inequality of wealth is entirely removed from the city. A third
peculiarity of the Lacedaemonian polity is that, of the officials by
whose hands and with whose advice the whole government is conducted,
the kings hold an hereditary office, while the members of the Gerusia
are elected for life.

+46.+ Among the Cretans the exact reverse of all these arrangements
obtains. The laws allow them to possess as much land as they can get
with no limitation whatever. Money is so highly valued among them,
that its possession is not only thought to be necessary but in the
highest degree creditable. And in fact greed and avarice are so native
to the soil in Crete, that they are the only people in the world among
whom no stigma attaches to any sort of gain whatever. Again all their
offices are annual and on a democratical footing. I have therefore
often felt at a loss to account for these writers speaking of the two
constitutions, which are radically different, as though they were
closely united and allied. But, besides overlooking these important
differences, these writers have gone out of their way to comment at
length on the legislation of Lycurgus: “He was the only legislator,”
they say, “who saw the important points. For there being two things
on which the safety of a commonwealth depends,—courage in the face of
the enemy and concord at home,—by abolishing covetousness, he with
it removed all motive for civil broil and contest: whence it has
been brought about that the Lacedaemonians are the best governed and
most united people in Greece.” Yet while giving utterance to these
sentiments, and though they see that, in contrast to this, the Cretans
by their ingrained avarice are engaged in countless public and private
seditions, murders and civil wars, they yet regard these facts as
not affecting their contention, but are bold enough to speak of the
two constitutions as alike. Ephorus, indeed, putting aside names,
employs expressions so precisely the same, when discoursing on the
two constitutions, that, unless one noticed the proper names, there
would be no means whatever of distinguishing which of the two he was
describing.

+47.+ In what the difference between them consists I have already
stated. I will now address myself to showing that the Cretan
constitution deserves neither praise nor imitation.

[Sidenote: Tests of a good polity.]

To my mind, then, there are two things fundamental to every state,
in virtue of which its powers and constitution become desirable or
objectionable. These are customs and laws. Of these the desirable are
those which make men’s private lives holy and pure, and the public
character of the state civilised and just. The objectionable are those
whose effect is the reverse. As, then, when we see good customs and
good laws prevailing among certain people, we confidently assume that,
in consequence of them, the men and their civil constitution will be
good also, so when we see private life full of covetousness, and public
policy of injustice, plainly we have reason for asserting their laws,
particular customs, and general constitution to be bad. Now, with few
exceptions, you could find no habits prevailing in private life more
steeped in treachery than those in Crete, and no public policy more
inequitable. Holding, then, the Cretan constitution to be neither like
the Spartan, nor worthy of choice or imitation, I reject it from the
comparison which I have instituted.

[Sidenote: Ideal polities may be omitted.]

Nor again would it be fair to introduce the Republic of Plato, which
is also spoken of in high terms by some Philosophers. For just as we
refuse admission to the athletic contests to those actors or athletes
who have not acquired a recognised position[308] or trained for them,
so we ought not to admit this Platonic constitution to the contest
for the prize of merit unless it can first point to some genuine and
practical achievement. Up to this time the notion of bringing it into
comparison with the constitutions of Sparta, Rome, and Carthage would
be like putting up a statue to compare with living and breathing men.
Even if such a statue were faultless in point of art, the comparison
of the lifeless with the living would naturally leave an impression of
imperfection and incongruity upon the minds of the spectators.

[Sidenote: The aims of Lycurgus.]

[Sidenote: Their partial failure.]

+48.+ I shall therefore omit these, and proceed with my description
of the Laconian constitution. Now it seems to me that for securing
unity among the citizens, for safe-guarding the Laconian territory,
and preserving the liberty of Sparta inviolate, the legislation
and provisions of Lycurgus were so excellent, that I am forced to
regard his wisdom as something superhuman. For the equality of landed
possessions, the simplicity in their food, and the practice of taking
it in common, which he established, were well calculated to secure
morality in private life and to prevent civil broils in the State; as
also their training in the endurance of labours and dangers to make
men brave and noble minded: but when both these virtues, courage and
high morality, are combined in one soul or in one state, vice will
not readily spring from such a soil, nor will such men easily be
overcome by their enemies. By constructing his constitution therefore
in this spirit, and of these elements, he secured two blessings to
the Spartans,—safety for their territory, and a lasting freedom for
themselves long after he was gone. He appears however to have made no
one provision whatever, particular or general, for the acquisition
of the territory of their neighbours; or for the assertion of their
supremacy; or, in a word, for any policy of aggrandisement at all. What
he had still to do was to impose such a necessity, or create such a
spirit among the citizens, that, as he had succeeded in making their
individual lives independent and simple, the public character of the
state should also become independent and moral. But the actual fact
is, that, though he made them the most disinterested and sober-minded
men in the world, as far as their own ways of life and their national
institutions were concerned, he left them in regard to the rest of
Greece ambitious, eager for supremacy, and encroaching in the highest
degree.

[Sidenote: First and second Messenian wars, B.C. 745-724 (?), 685-668.]

[Sidenote: Battle of Plataea, B.C. 479.]

[Sidenote: Peace of Antalcidas, B.C. 387.]

[Sidenote: The causes of this failure.]

+49.+ For in the first place is it not notorious that they were nearly
the first Greeks to cast a covetous eye upon the territory of their
neighbours, and that accordingly they waged a war of subjugation on
the Messenians? In the next place is it not related in all histories
that in their dogged obstinacy they bound themselves with an oath
never to desist from the siege of Messene until they had taken it?
And lastly it is known to all that in their efforts for supremacy in
Greece they submitted to do the bidding of those whom they had once
conquered in war. For when the Persians invaded Greece, they conquered
them, as champions of the liberty of the Greeks; yet when the invaders
had retired and fled, they betrayed the cities of Greece into their
hands by the peace of Antalcidas, for the sake of getting money to
secure their supremacy over the Greeks. It was then that the defect
in their constitution was rendered apparent. For as long as their
ambition was confined to governing their immediate neighbours, or even
the Peloponnesians only, they were content with the resources and
supplies provided by Laconia itself, having all material of war ready
to hand, and being able without much expenditure of time to return
home or convey provisions with them. But directly they took in hand to
despatch naval expeditions, or to go on campaigns by land outside the
Peloponnese, it was evident that neither their iron currency, nor their
use of crops for payment in kind, would be able to supply them with
what they lacked if they abided by the legislation of Lycurgus; for
such undertakings required money universally current, and goods from
foreign countries. Thus they were compelled to wait humbly at Persian
doors, impose tribute on the islanders, and exact contributions from
all the Greeks: knowing that, if they abided by the laws of Lycurgus,
it was impossible to advance any claims upon any outside power at all,
much less upon the supremacy in Greece.

[Sidenote: Sparta fails where Rome succeeds.]

+50.+ My object, then, in this digression is to make it manifest by
actual facts that, for guarding their own country with absolute safety,
and for preserving their own freedom, the legislation of Lycurgus was
entirely sufficient; and for those who are content with these objects
we must concede that there neither exists, nor ever has existed, a
constitution and civil order preferable to that of Sparta. But if any
one is seeking aggrandisement, and believes that to be a leader and
ruler and despot of numerous subjects, and to have all looking and
turning to him, is a finer thing than that,—in this point of view we
must acknowledge that the Spartan constitution is deficient, and that
of Rome superior and better constituted for obtaining power. And this
has been proved by actual facts. For when the Lacedaemonians strove
to possess themselves of the supremacy in Greece, it was not long
before they brought their own freedom itself into danger. Whereas the
Romans, after obtaining supreme power over the Italians themselves,
soon brought the whole world under their rule,—in which achievement the
abundance and availability of their supplies largely contributed to
their success.

[Sidenote: Rome fresher than Carthage;]

+51.+ Now the Carthaginian constitution seems to me originally to
have been well contrived in these most distinctively important
particulars. For they had kings,[309] and the Gerusia had the powers
of an aristocracy, and the multitude were supreme in such things as
affected them; and on the whole the adjustment of its several parts
was very like that of Rome and Sparta. But about the period of its
entering on the Hannibalian war the political state of Carthage was
on the decline,[310] that of Rome improving. For whereas there is in
every body, or polity, or business a natural stage of growth, zenith,
and decay; and whereas everything in them is at its best at the zenith;
we may thereby judge of the difference between these two constitutions
as they existed at that period. For exactly so far as the strength and
prosperity of Carthage preceded that of Rome in point of time, by so
much was Carthage then past its prime, while Rome was exactly at its
zenith, as far as its political constitution was concerned. In Carthage
therefore the influence of the people in the policy of the state had
already risen to be supreme, while at Rome the Senate was at the height
of its power: and so, as in the one measures were deliberated upon by
the many, in the other by the best men, the policy of the Romans in all
public undertakings proved the stronger; on which account, though they
met with capital disasters, by force of prudent counsels they finally
conquered the Carthaginians in the war.

[Sidenote: and its citizen levies superior to Carthaginian mercenaries.]

+52.+ If we look however at separate details, for instance at the
provisions for carrying on a war, we shall find that whereas for
a naval expedition the Carthaginians are the better trained and
prepared,—as it is only natural with a people with whom it has been
hereditary for many generations to practise this craft, and to follow
the seaman’s trade above all nations in the world,—yet, in regard to
military service on land, the Romans train themselves to a much higher
pitch than the Carthaginians. The former bestow their whole attention
upon this department: whereas the Carthaginians wholly neglect their
infantry, though they do take some slight interest in the cavalry. The
reason of this is that they employ foreign mercenaries, the Romans
native and citizen levies. It is in this point that the latter polity
is preferable to the former. They have their hopes of freedom ever
resting on the courage of mercenary troops: the Romans on the valour
of their own citizens and the aid of their allies. The result is that
even if the Romans have suffered a defeat at first, they renew the
war with undiminished forces, which the Carthaginians cannot do. For,
as the Romans are fighting for country and children, it is impossible
for them to relax the fury of their struggle; but they persist with
obstinate resolution until they have overcome their enemies. What has
happened in regard to their navy is an instance in point. In skill the
Romans are much behind the Carthaginians, as I have already said; yet
the upshot of the whole naval war has been a decided triumph for the
Romans, owing to the valour of their men. For although nautical science
contributes largely to success in sea-fights, still it is the courage
of the marines that turns the scale most decisively in favour of
victory. The fact is that Italians as a nation are by nature superior
to Phoenicians and Libyans both in physical strength and courage; but
still their habits also do much to inspire the youth with enthusiasm
for such exploits. One example will be sufficient of the pains taken
by the Roman state to turn out men ready to endure anything to win a
reputation in their country for valour.

[Sidenote: Laudations at funerals.]

[Sidenote: Imagines.]

[Sidenote: Toga praetexta, purpurea, picta.]

[Sidenote: Sellae curules.]

+53.+ Whenever one of their illustrious men dies, in the course of his
funeral, the body with all its paraphernalia is carried into the forum
to the Rostra, as a raised platform there is called, and sometimes
is propped upright upon it so as to be conspicuous, or, more rarely,
is laid upon it. Then with all the people standing round, his son,
if he has left one of full age and he is there, or, failing him, one
of his relations, mounts the Rostra and delivers a speech concerning
the virtues of the deceased, and the successful exploits performed
by him in his lifetime. By these means the people are reminded of
what has been done, and made to see it with their own eyes,—not
only such as were engaged in the actual transactions but those also
who were not;—and their sympathies are so deeply moved, that the
loss appears not to be confined to the actual mourners, but to be a
public one affecting the whole people. After the burial and all the
usual ceremonies have been performed, they place the likeness of the
deceased in the most conspicuous spot in his house, surmounted by a
wooden canopy or shrine. This likeness consists of a mask made to
represent the deceased with extraordinary fidelity both in shape and
colour. These likenesses they display at public sacrifices adorned
with much care. And when any illustrious member of the family dies,
they carry these masks to the funeral, putting them on men whom they
thought as like the originals as possible in height and other personal
peculiarities. And these substitutes assume clothes according to the
rank of the person represented: if he was a consul or praetor, a toga
with purple stripes; if a censor, whole purple;[311] if he had also
celebrated a triumph or performed any exploit of that kind, a toga
embroidered with gold. These representatives also ride themselves
in chariots, while the fasces and axes, and all the other customary
insignia of the particular offices, lead the way, according to the
dignity of the rank in the state enjoyed by the deceased in his
lifetime; and on arriving at the Rostra they all take their seats on
ivory chairs in their order.

There could not easily be a more inspiring spectacle than this for
a young man of noble ambitions and virtuous aspirations. For can we
conceive any one to be unmoved at the sight of all the likenesses
collected together of the men who have earned glory, all as it were
living and breathing? Or what could be a more glorious spectacle?

[Sidenote: Devotion of the citizens.]

+54.+ Besides the speaker over the body about to be buried, after
having finished the panegyric of this particular person, starts upon
the others whose representatives are present, beginning with the most
ancient, and recounts the successes and achievements of each. By this
means the glorious memory of brave men is continually renewed; the fame
of those who have performed any noble deed is never allowed to die;
and the renown of those who have done good service to their country
becomes a matter of common knowledge to the multitude, and part of the
heritage of posterity. But the chief benefit of the ceremony is that it
inspires young men to shrink from no exertion for the general welfare,
in the hope of obtaining the glory which awaits the brave. And what I
say is confirmed by this fact. Many Romans have volunteered to decide
a whole battle by single combat; not a few have deliberately accepted
certain death, some in time of war to secure the safety of the rest,
some in time of peace to preserve the safety of the commonwealth. There
have also been instances of men in office putting their own sons to
death, in defiance of every custom and law, because they rated the
interests of their country higher than those of natural ties even with
their nearest and dearest. There are many stories of this kind, related
of many men in Roman history; but one will be enough for our present
purpose; and I will give the name as an instance to prove the truth of
my words.

[Sidenote: Horatius Cocles.]

+55.+ The story goes that Horatius Cocles, while fighting with two
enemies at the head of the bridge over the Tiber, which is the entrance
to the city on the north, seeing a large body of men advancing to
support his enemies, and fearing that they would force their way into
the city, turned round, and shouted to those behind him to hasten
back to the other side and break down the bridge. They obeyed him:
and whilst they were breaking the bridge, he remained at his post
receiving numerous wounds, and checked the progress of the enemy: his
opponents being panic stricken, not so much by his strength as by
the audacity with which he held his ground. When the bridge had been
broken down, the attack of the enemy was stopped; and Cocles then threw
himself into the river with his armour on and deliberately sacrificed
his life, because he valued the safety of his country and his own
future reputation more highly than his present life, and the years
of existence that remained to him.[312] Such is the enthusiasm and
emulation for noble deeds that are engendered among the Romans by their
customs.

[Sidenote: Purity of election.]

[Sidenote: Cf. ch. 14.]

+56.+ Again the Roman customs and principles regarding money
transactions are better than those of the Carthaginians. In the view
of the latter nothing is disgraceful that makes for gain; with the
former nothing is more disgraceful than to receive bribes and to make
profit by improper means. For they regard wealth obtained from unlawful
transactions to be as much a subject of reproach, as a fair profit from
the most unquestioned source is of commendation. A proof of the fact is
this. The Carthaginians obtain office by open bribery, but among the
Romans the penalty for it is death. With such a radical difference,
therefore, between the rewards offered to virtue among the two peoples,
it is natural that the ways adopted for obtaining them should be
different also.

[Sidenote: Regard to religion.]

But the most important difference for the better which the Roman
commonwealth appears to me to display is in their religious beliefs.
For I conceive that what in other nations is looked upon as a reproach,
I mean a scrupulous fear of the gods, is the very thing which keeps
the Roman commonwealth together. To such an extraordinary height is
this carried among them, both in private and public business, that
nothing could exceed it. Many people might think this unaccountable;
but in my opinion their object is to use it as a check upon the common
people. If it were possible to form a state wholly of philosophers,
such a custom would perhaps be unnecessary. But seeing that every
multitude is fickle, and full of lawless desires, unreasoning anger,
and violent passion, the only resource is to keep them in check by
mysterious terrors and scenic effects of this sort. Wherefore, to my
mind, the ancients were not acting without purpose or at random, when
they brought in among the vulgar those opinions about the gods, and the
belief in the punishments in Hades: much rather do I think that men
nowadays are acting rashly and foolishly in rejecting them. This is the
reason why, apart from anything else, Greek statesmen, if entrusted
with a single talent, though protected by ten checking-clerks, as many
seals, and twice as many witnesses, yet cannot be induced to keep
faith: whereas among the Romans, in their magistracies and embassies,
men have the handling of a great amount of money, and yet from pure
respect to their oath keep their faith intact. And, again, in other
nations it is a rare thing to find a man who keeps his hands out of
the public purse, and is entirely pure in such matters: but among the
Romans it is a rare thing to detect a man in the act of committing such
a crime.[313]...


RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSION

+57.+ That to all things, then, which exist there is ordained decay
and change I think requires no further arguments to show: for the
inexorable course of nature is sufficient to convince us of it.

But in all polities we observe two sources of decay existing from
natural causes, the one external, the other internal and self-produced.
The external admits of no certain or fixed definition, but the internal
follows a definite order. What kind of polity, then, comes naturally
first, and what second, I have already stated in such a way, that
those who are capable of taking in the whole drift of my argument can
henceforth draw their own conclusions as to the future of the Roman
polity. For it is quite clear, in my opinion. When a commonwealth,
after warding off many great dangers, has arrived at a high pitch of
prosperity and undisputed power, it is evident that, by the lengthened
continuance of great wealth within it, the manner of life of its
citizens will become more extravagant; and that the rivalry for
office, and in other spheres of activity, will become fiercer than it
ought to be. And as this state of things goes on more and more, the
desire of office and the shame of losing reputation, as well as the
ostentation and extravagance of living, will prove the beginning of
a deterioration. And of this change the people will be credited with
being the authors, when they become convinced that they are being
cheated by some from avarice, and are puffed up with flattery by others
from love of office. For when that comes about, in their passionate
resentment and acting under the dictates of anger, they will refuse to
obey any longer, or to be content with having equal powers with their
leaders, but will demand to have all or far the greatest themselves.
And when that comes to pass the constitution will receive a new name,
which sounds better than any other in the world, liberty or democracy;
but, in fact, it will become that worst of all governments, mob-rule.

With this description of the formation, growth, zenith, and present
state of the Roman polity, and having discussed also its difference,
for better and worse, from other polities, I will now at length bring
my essay on it to an end.

+58.+ Resuming my history from the point at which I started on this
digression I will briefly refer to one transaction, that I may give
a practical illustration of the perfection and power of the Roman
polity at that period, as though I were producing one of his works as a
specimen of the skill of a good artist.

[Sidenote: B.C. 216. Hannibal offers to put the prisoners at Cannae to
ransom.]

When Hannibal, after conquering the Romans in the battle at Cannae,
got possession of the eight thousand who were guarding the Roman camp,
he made them all prisoners of war, and granted them permission to send
messages to their relations that they might be ransomed and return
home. They accordingly selected ten of their chief men, whom Hannibal
allowed to depart after binding them with an oath to return. But one
of them, just as he had got outside the palisade of the camp, saying
that he had forgotten something, went back; and, having got what he
had left behind, once more set out, under the belief that by means of
this return he had kept his promise and discharged his oath. Upon the
arrival of the envoys at Rome, imploring and beseeching the Senate not
to grudge the captured troops their return home, but to allow them to
rejoin their friends by paying three minae each for them,—for these
were the terms, they said, granted by Hannibal,—and declaring that
the men deserved redemption, for they had neither played the coward
in the field, nor done anything unworthy of Rome, but had been left
behind to guard the camp; and that, when all the rest had perished,
they had yielded to absolute necessity in surrendering to Hannibal:
though the Romans had been severely defeated in the battles, and
though they were at the time deprived of, roughly speaking, all their
allies, they neither yielded so far to misfortune as to disregard
what was becoming to themselves, nor omitted to take into account any
necessary consideration. They saw through Hannibal’s purpose in thus
acting,—which was at once to get a large supply of money, and at the
same time to take away all enthusiasm from the troops opposed to him,
by showing that even the conquered had a hope of getting safe home
again. Therefore the Senate, far from acceding to the request, refused
all pity even to their own relations, and disregarded the services
to be expected from these men in the future: and thus frustrated
Hannibal’s calculations, and the hopes which he had founded on these
prisoners, by refusing to ransom them; and at the same time established
the rule for their own men, that they must either conquer or die on
the field, as there was no other hope of safety for them if they were
beaten. With this answer they dismissed the nine envoys who returned
of their own accord; but the tenth who had put the cunning trick in
practice for discharging himself of his oath they put in chains and
delivered to the enemy. So that Hannibal was not so much rejoiced at
his victory in the battle, as struck with astonishment at the unshaken
firmness and lofty spirit displayed in the resolutions of these
senators.[314]




BOOK VII

CAPUA AND PETELIA


[Sidenote: Capua and Petelia, the contrast of their fortunes.]

+1.+ The people of Capua, in Campania, becoming wealthy through the
fertility of their soil, degenerated into luxury and extravagance
surpassing even the common report about Croton and Sybaris. Being then
unable to support their burden of prosperity they called in Hannibal;
and were accordingly treated with great severity by Rome. But the
people of Petelia maintained their loyalty to Rome and held out so
obstinately, when besieged by Hannibal, that after having eaten all the
leather in the town, and the bark of all the trees in it, and having
stood the siege for eleven months, as no one came to their relief, they
surrendered with the entire approval of the Romans.... But Capua by its
influence drew over the other cities to the Carthaginians....


HIERONYMUS OF SYRACUSE

[Sidenote: Hieronymus succeeded his grandfather Hiero II. in B.C. 216.
Under the influence of his uncles, Zoippus and Andranodorus, members of
the Council of 15 established by Hiero, Hieronymus opens communications
with Hannibal.]

[Sidenote: Commissioners sent to Carthage to formulate a treaty of
alliance.]

+2.+ After the plot against Hieronymus, King of Syracuse, Thraso having
departed, Zoippus and Andranodorus persuaded Hieronymus to lose no time
in sending ambassadors to Hannibal. He accordingly selected Polycleitus
of Cyrene and Philodemus of Argos for the purpose, and sent them
into Italy, with a commission to discuss the subject of an alliance
with the Carthaginians; and at the same time he sent his brothers to
Alexandria. Hannibal received Polycleitus and Philodemus with warmth;
held out great prospects to the young king; and sent the ambassadors
back without delay, accompanied by the commander of his triremes, a
Carthaginian also named Hannibal, and the Syracusan Hippocrates and
his younger brother Epicydes. These men had been for some time serving
in Hannibal’s army, being domiciled at Carthage, owing to their
grandfather having been banished from Syracuse because he was believed
to have assassinated Agatharchus, one of the sons of Agathocles. On
the arrival of these commissioners at Syracuse, Polycleitus and his
colleague reported the result of their embassy, and the Carthaginian
delivered the message given by Hannibal: whereupon the king without
hesitation expressed his willingness to make a treaty with the
Carthaginians; and, begging the Hannibal who had come to him to go with
all speed to Carthage, promised that he also would send commissioners
from his own court, to settle matters with the Carthaginians.

[Sidenote: The Roman praetor sends to remonstrate. A scene with the
king.]

+3.+ Meanwhile intelligence of this transaction had reached the Roman
praetor at Lilybaeum, who immediately despatched legates to Hieronymus,
to renew the treaty which had been made with his ancestors. Being
thoroughly annoyed with this embassy, Hieronymus said that “He was
sorry for the Romans that they had come to such utter and shameful
grief[315] in the battles in Italy at the hands of the Carthaginians.”
The legates were overpowered by the rudeness of the answer: still they
proceeded to ask him, “Who said such things about them?” Whereupon
the king pointed to the Carthaginian envoys who were there, and said,
“You had better convict them, if they have really been telling me
lies?” The Roman legates answered that it was not their habit to take
the word of enemies: and advised him to do nothing in violation of
the existing treaty; for that would be at once equitable and the best
thing for himself. To this the king answered that he would take time
to consider of it, and tell them his decision another time; but he
proceeded to ask them, “How it came about that before his grandfather’s
death a squadron of fifty Roman ships had sailed as far as Pachynus and
then gone back again.” The fact was that a short time ago the Romans
had heard that Hiero was dead; and being much alarmed lest people in
Syracuse, despising the youth of the grandson whom he left, should stir
up a revolution, they had made this cruise with the intention of being
ready there to assist his youthful weakness, and to help in maintaining
his authority; but being informed that his grandfather was still alive,
they sailed back again. When the ambassadors had stated these facts,
the young king answered again, “Then please to allow me too now, O
Romans, to maintain my authority by ’sailing back’ to see what I can
get from Carthage.” The Roman legates perceiving the warmth with which
the king was engaging in his policy, said nothing at the time; but
returned and informed the praetor who had sent them of what had been
said. From that time forward, therefore, the Romans kept a careful
watch upon him as an enemy.

[Sidenote: The treaty with Carthage.]

[Sidenote: The king’s pretensions rise, and a new arrangement is made
with Carthage.]

+4.+ Hieronymus on his part selected Agatharchus, Onesimus, and
Hipposthenes to send with Hannibal to Carthage, with instructions to
make an alliance on the following terms: “The Carthaginians to assist
him with land and sea forces, in expelling the Romans from Sicily, and
then divide the island with him; so as to have the river Himera, which
divides Sicily almost exactly in half, as the boundary between the
two provinces.” The commissioners arrived in Carthage: and finding,
on coming to a conference, that the Carthaginians were prepared to
meet them in every point, they completed the arrangement. Meanwhile
Hippocrates got the young Hieronymus entirely into his hands: and at
first fired his imagination by telling him of Hannibal’s marches and
pitched battles in Italy; and afterwards by repeating to him that no
one had a better right to the government of all Siceliots than he; in
the first place as the son of Nereis daughter of Pyrrhus, the only
man whom all Siceliots alike had accepted deliberately and with full
assent as their leader and king; and in the second place in virtue of
his grandfather Hiero’s sovereign rights. At last he and his brother
so won upon the young man by their conversation, that he would attend
to no one else at all: partly from the natural feebleness of his
character, but still more from the ambitious feelings which they had
excited in him. And therefore, just when Agatharchus and his colleagues
were completing the business on which they had been sent in Carthage,
he sent fresh ambassadors, saying that all Sicily belonged to him; and
demanding that the Carthaginians should help him to recover Sicily:
while he promised he would assist the Carthaginians in their Italian
campaign. Though the Carthaginians now saw perfectly well the whole
extent of the young man’s fickleness and infatuation: yet thinking it
to be in manifold ways to their interests not to let Sicilian affairs
out of their hands, they assented to his demands; and having already
prepared ships and men, they set about arranging for the transport of
their forces into Sicily.

[Sidenote: The Romans again remonstrate. Another scene at the Council.]

[Sidenote: War with Rome decided upon.]

+5.+ When they heard of this, the Romans sent legates to him again,
protesting against his violation of the treaty made with his
forefathers. Hieronymus thereupon summoned a meeting of his council
consulted them as to what he was to do. The native members of it kept
silent, because they feared the folly of their ruler. Aristomachus
of Corinth, Damippus of Sparta, Autonous of Thessaly advised that
he should abide by the treaty with Rome. Andranodorus alone urged
that he should not let the opportunity slip; and affirmed that the
present was the only chance of establishing his rule over Sicily.
After the delivery of this speech, the king asked Hippocrates and
his brother what they thought, and upon their answering, “The same
as Andranodorus,” the deliberation was concluded in that sense.
Thus, then, war with Rome had been decided upon: but while the king
was anxious to be thought to have given an adroit answer to the
ambassadors, he committed himself to such an utter absurdity as to make
it certain that he would not only fail to conciliate the Romans, but
would inevitably offend them violently. For he said that he would abide
by the treaty, firstly, if the Romans would repay all the gold they had
received from his grandfather Hiero; and secondly, if they would return
the corn and other presents which they had received from him from the
first day of their intercourse with him; and thirdly, if they would
acknowledge all Sicily east of the Himera to be Syracusan territory.
At these propositions of course the ambassadors and council separated;
and from that time forth Hieronymus began pushing on his preparations
for war with energy: collected and armed his forces, and got ready the
other necessary provisions....

[Sidenote: Description of Leontini, where Hieronymus was murdered. See
Livy, 24, 7.]

+6.+ The city of Leontini taken as a whole faces north, and is divided
in half by a valley of level ground, in which are the state buildings,
the court-houses, and market-place. Along each side of this valley run
hills with steep banks all the way; the flat tops of which, reached
after crossing their brows, are covered with houses and temples. The
city has two gates, one on the southern extremity of this valley
leading to Syracuse, the other at the northern leading on to the
“Leontine plains,” and the arable district. Close under the westernmost
of the steep cliffs runs a river called Lissus; parallel to which are
built continuous rows of houses, in great numbers, close under the
cliff, between which and the river runs the road I have mentioned....

[Sidenote: Fall of Hieronymus, B.C. 214.]

+7.+ Some of the historians who have described the fall of Hieronymus
have written at great length and in terms of mysterious solemnity.
They tell us of prodigies preceding his coming to the throne, and of
the misfortunes of Syracuse. They describe in dramatic language the
cruelty of his character and the impiety of his actions; and crown all
with the sudden and terrible nature of the circumstances attending his
fall. One would think from their description that neither Phalaris,
nor Apollodorus, nor any other tyrant was ever fiercer than he. Yet
he was a mere boy when he succeeded to power, and only lived thirteen
months after. In this space of time it is possible that one or two men
may have been put to the rack, or certain of his friends, or other
Syracusan citizens, put to death; but it is improbable that his tyranny
could have been extravagantly wicked, or his impiety outrageous. It
must be confessed that he was reckless and unscrupulous in disposition;
still we cannot compare him with either of the tyrants I have named.
The fact is that those who write the histories of particular episodes,
having undertaken limited and narrow themes, appear to me to be
compelled from poverty of matter to exaggerate insignificant incidents,
and to speak at inordinate length on subjects that scarcely deserve
to be recorded at all. There are some, too, who fall into a similar
mistake from mere want of judgment. With how much more reason might the
space employed on these descriptions,—which they use merely to fill up
and spin out their books,—have been devoted to Hiero and Gelo, without
mentioning Hieronymus at all! It would have given greater pleasure to
readers and more instruction to students.

[Sidenote: Character of Hiero II., King of Syracuse, from B.C. 269 to
B.C. 215.]

+8.+ For, in the first place, Hiero gained the sovereignty of Syracuse
and her allies by his own unaided abilities without inheriting wealth,
or reputation, or any other advantage of fortune. And, in the second
place, was established king of Syracuse without putting to death,
banishing, or harassing any one of the citizens,—which is the most
astonishing circumstance of all. And what is quite as surprising as
the innocence of his acquisition of power is the fact that it did
not change his character. For during a reign of fifty-four years he
preserved peace for the country, maintained his own power free from
all hostile plots, and entirely escaped the envy which generally
follows greatness; for though he tried on several occasions to lay
down his power, he was prevented by the common remonstrances of the
citizens. And having shown himself most beneficent to the Greeks, and
most anxious to earn their good opinion, he left behind him not merely
a great personal reputation but also a universal feeling of goodwill
towards the Syracusans. Again, though he passed his life in the midst
of the greatest wealth, luxury, and abundance, he survived for more
than ninety years, in full possession of his senses and with all parts
of his body unimpaired; which, to my mind, is a decisive proof of a
well-spent life....

[Sidenote: Gelo, son of Hiero II., associated with his father in the
kingdom, B.C. 216. See 5, 88, Livy, 23, 30.]

Gelo, his son, in a life of more than fifty years regarded it as the
most honourable object of ambition to obey his father, and to regard
neither wealth, nor sovereign power, nor anything else as of higher
value than love and loyalty to his parents....


TREATY BETWEEN HANNIBAL AND KING PHILIP V. OF MACEDON

[Sidenote: Gods by whom the oath is taken on either side.]

[Sidenote: Preamble of a treaty made between Philip and Hannibal, by
envoys sent after the battle of Cannae. Ratified subsequently to March
13, B.C. 215. See Livy, 23, 33-39. _Ante_ 3, 2.]

+9.+ This is a sworn treaty made between Hannibal, Mago, Barmocarus,
and such members of the Carthaginian Gerusia as were present, and all
Carthaginians serving in his army, on the one part; and Xenophanes, son
of Cleomachus of Athens, sent to us by King Philip, as his ambassador,
on behalf of himself, the Macedonians, and their allies, on the other
part.

The oath is taken in the presence of Zeus, Hera, and Apollo: of the god
of the Carthaginians, Hercules, and Iolaus: of Ares, Triton, Poseidon:
of the gods that accompany the army, and of the sun, moon, and earth:
of rivers, harbours, waters: of all the gods who rule Carthage: of all
the gods who rule Macedonia and the rest of Greece: of all the gods of
war that are witnesses to this oath.

[Sidenote: Declaration on the part of Hannibal of the objects of the
treaty.]

Hannibal, general, and all the Carthaginian senators with him, and
all Carthaginians serving in his army, subject to our mutual consent,
proposes to make this sworn treaty of friendship and honourable
goodwill. Let us be friends, close allies, and brethren, on the
conditions herein following:—

[Sidenote: 1st article sworn to by Philip’s representative.]

(1) Let the Carthaginians, as supreme, Hannibal their chief general
and those serving with him, all members of the Carthaginian dominion
living under the same laws, as well as the people of Utica, and the
cities and tribes subject to Carthage, and their soldiers and allies,
and all cities and tribes in Italy, Celt-land, and Liguria, with whom
we have a compact of friendship, and with whomsoever in this country we
may hereafter form such compact, be supported by King Philip and the
Macedonians, and all other Greeks in alliance with them.

[Sidenote: 1st article sworn to by Hannibal and the Carthaginians.]

(2) On their parts also King Philip and the Macedonians, and such
other Greeks as are his allies, shall be supported and protected by
the Carthaginians now in this army, and by the people of Utica, and by
all cities and tribes subject to Carthage, both soldiers and allies,
and by all allied cities and tribes in Italy, Celt-land, and Liguria,
and by all others in Italy as shall hereafter become allies of the
Carthaginians.

[Sidenote: 2d article sworn to by Phillip’s representative.]

(3) We will not make plots against, nor lie in ambush for, each
other; but in all sincerity and goodwill, without reserve or secret
design, will be enemies to the enemies of the Carthaginians, saving
and excepting those kings, cities, and ports with which we have sworn
agreements and friendships.

[Sidenote: 2d article sworn to by Hannibal.]

(4) And we, too, will be enemies to the enemies of King Philip, saving
and excepting those kings, cities, and tribes, with which we have sworn
agreements and friendships.

[Sidenote: 3d article sworn to by Philip’s representative.]

(5) Ye shall be friends to us in the war in which we now are engaged
against the Romans, till such time as the gods give us and you the
victory: and ye shall assist us in all ways that be needful, and in
whatsoever way we may mutually determine.

[Sidenote: 3d article sworn to by Hannibal.]

(6) And when the gods have given us victory in our war with the Romans
and their allies, if Hannibal shall deem it right to make terms with
the Romans, these terms shall include the same friendship with you,
made on these conditions: (1) the Romans not to be allowed to make
war on you; (2) not to have power over Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnum,
Pharos, Dimale, Parthini, nor Atitania; (3) to restore to Demetrius of
Pharos all those of his friends now in the dominion of Rome.

[Sidenote: 1st joint article.]

(7) If the Romans ever make war on you or on us we will aid each other
in such war, according to the need of either.

[Sidenote: 2d joint article.]

(8) So also if any other nation whatever does so, always excepting
kings, cities, and tribes, with whom we have sworn agreements and
friendships.

[Sidenote: 3d joint article. Mutual consent required for an alteration.]

(9) If we decide to take away from, or add to this sworn treaty,

we will so take away, or add thereto, only as we both may agree....


MESSENE AND PHILIP V. IN B.C. 215

[Sidenote: Political state of Messene.]

+10.+ Democracy being established at Messene, and the men of rank
having been banished, while those who had received allotments on their
lands obtained the chief influence in the government, those of the old
citizens who remained found it very hard to put up with the equality
which these men had obtained....

[Sidenote: The character of the Messenian athlete and statesman Gorgus.
See _ante_, 5, 5.]

Gorgus of Messene, in wealth and extraction, was inferior to no one in
the town; and had been a famous athlete in his time, far surpassing all
rivals in that pursuit. In fact he was not behind any man of his day
in physical beauty, or the general dignity of his manner of life, or
the number of prizes he had won. Again, when he gave up athletics and
devoted himself to politics and the service of his country, he gained
no less reputation in this department than in his former pursuit.
For he was removed from the Philistinism that usually characterises
athletes, and was looked upon as in the highest degree an able and
clear-headed politician....

[Sidenote: Philip V. of Macedon at Messene, B.C. 215. See Plutarch,
_Arat._ 49-50.]

+11.+ Philip, king of the Macedonians, being desirous of seizing the
acropolis of Messene, told the leaders of the city that he wished to
see it and to sacrifice to Zeus, and accordingly walked up thither with
his attendants and joined in the sacrifice. When, according to custom,
the entrails of the slaughtered victims were brought to him, he took
them in his hands, and, turning round a little to one side, held them
out to Aratus and asked him “what he thought the sacrifices indicated?
To quit the citadel or hold it?” Thereupon Demetrius struck in on the
spur of the moment by saying, “If you have the heart of an augur,—to
quit it as quick as you can: but if of a gallant and wise king, to keep
it, lest if you quit it now you may never have so good an opportunity
again: for it is by thus holding the two horns that you can alone keep
the ox under your control.” By the “two horns” he meant Ithome and
the Acrocorinthus, and by the “ox” the Peloponnese. Thereupon Philip
turned to Aratus and said, “And do you give the same advice?” Aratus
not making any answer at once, he urged him to speak his real opinion.
After some hesitation he said, “If you can get possession of this place
without treachery to the Messenians, I advise you to do so; but if, by
the act of occupying this citadel with a guard, you shall ruin all the
citadels, and the guard wherewith the allies were protected when they
came into your hands from Antigonus” (meaning by that, _confidence_),
“consider whether it is not better to take your men away and leave
the confidence there, and with it guard the Messenians, and the other
allies as well.” As far as his own inclination was concerned, Philip
was ready enough to commit an act of treachery, as his own subsequent
conduct proved: but having been sharply rebuked a little while before
by the younger Aratus for his destruction of human life; and seeing
that, on the present occasion, the elder spoke with boldness and
authority, and begged him not to neglect his advice, he gave in from
sheer shame, and taking the latter by his right hand, said, “Then let
us go back the same way we came.”

[Sidenote: Deterioration in the character of Philip V. See 4, 77.]

+12.+ I wish here to stop in my narrative in order to speak briefly of
the character of Philip, because this was the beginning of the change
and deterioration in it. For I think that no more telling example can
be proposed to practical statesmen who wish to correct their ideas by
a study of history. For the splendour of his early career, and the
brilliancy of his genius, have caused the dispositions for good and
evil displayed by this king to be more conspicuous and widely known
throughout Greece than is the case with any other man; as well as the
contrast between the results accompanying the display of those opposite
tendencies.

Now that, upon his accession to the throne, Thessaly, Macedonia, and in
fact all parts of his own kingdom were more thoroughly loyal and well
disposed to him, young as he was on his succeeding to the government
of Macedonia, than they had ever been to any of his predecessors, may
be without difficulty inferred from the following fact. Though he
was with extreme frequency forced to leave Macedonia by the Aetolian
and Lacedaemonian wars, not only was there no disturbance in these
countries, but not a single one of the neighbouring barbarians
ventured to touch Macedonia. It would be impossible, again, to speak
in strong enough terms of the affection of Alexander, Chrysogonus, and
his other friends towards him; or that of the Epirotes, Acarnanians,
and all those on whom he had within a short time conferred great
benefits. On the whole, if one may use a somewhat hyperbolical phrase,
I think it has been said of Philip with very great propriety, that
his beneficent policy had made him “The darling of all Greece.” And
it is a conspicuous and striking proof of the advantage of lofty
principle and strict integrity, that the Cretans, having at length
come to an understanding with each other and made a national alliance,
selected Philip to arbitrate between them; and that this settlement
was completed without an appeal to arms and without danger,—a thing
for which it would be difficult to find a precedent in similar
circumstances. From the time of his exploits at Messene all this was
utterly changed. And it was natural that it should be so. For his
purposes being now entirely reversed, it inevitably followed that men’s
opinions of him should be reversed also, as well as the success of
his various undertakings. This actually was the case, as will become
evident to attentive students from what I am now about to relate....

+13.+ Aratus seeing that Philip was now openly engaging in war with
Rome, and entirely changed in his policy toward his allies, with
difficulty diverted him from his intention by suggesting numerous
difficulties and scruples.

[Sidenote: 5, 12.]

[Sidenote: Recapitulation of the substance of book 7, viz. the
treacherous dealings of Philip with the Messenians, B.C. 215.]

[Sidenote: Plato, _Rep._ 565 D.]

I wish now to remind my readers of what, in my fifth Book, I put
forward merely as a promise and unsupported statement, but which
has now been confirmed by facts; in order that I may not leave any
proposition of mine unproved or open to question. In the course of
my history of the Aetolian war, where I had to relate the violent
proceedings of Philip in destroying the colonnades and other sacred
objects at Thermus; and added that, in consideration of his youth, the
blame of these measures ought not to be referred to Philip so much as
to his advisers; I then remarked that the life of Aratus sufficiently
proved that he would not have committed such an act of wickedness,
but that such principles exactly suited Demetrius of Pharos; and I
promised to make this clear from what I was next to narrate. I thereby
designedly postponed the demonstration of the truth of my assertion,
till I had come to the period of which I have just been speaking; which
with the presence of Demetrius, and in the absence of Aratus, who
arrived a day too late, Philip made the first step in his career of
crime; and, as though from the first taste of human blood and murder
and treason to his allies, was changed not into a wolf from a man, as
in the Arcadian fable mentioned by Plato, but from a king into a savage
tyrant. But a still more decisive proof of the sentiments of these two
men is furnished by the plot against the citadel of Messene, and may
help us to make up our minds which of the two were responsible for the
proceedings in the Aetolian war; and, when we are satisfied on that
point, it will be easy to form a judgment on the differences of their
principles.

+14.+ For as in this instance, under the influence of Aratus, Philip
refrained from actually breaking faith with the Messenians in regard
to the citadel; and thus, to use a common expression, poured a little
balm into the wide wound which his slaughters had caused: so in the
Aetolian war, when under the influence of Demetrius, he sinned against
the gods by destroying the objects consecrated to them, and against man
by transgressing the laws of war; and entirely deserted his original
principles, by showing himself an implacable and bitter foe to all
who opposed him. The same remark applies to the Cretan business.[316]
As long as he employed Aratus as his chief director, not only without
doing injustice to a single islander, but without even causing them
any vexation, he kept the whole Cretan people under control; and led
all the Greeks to regard him with favour, owing to the greatness of
character which he displayed. So again, when under the guidance of
Demetrius, he became the cause of the misfortunes I have described to
the Messenians, he at once lost the goodwill of the allies and his
credit with the rest of Greece. Such a decisive influence for good or
evil in the security of their government has the choice by youthful
sovereigns of the friends who are to surround them; though it is a
subject on which by some unaccountable carelessness they take not the
smallest care....


THE WAR OF ANTIOCHUS WITH ACHAEUS

(See 5, 107)

[Sidenote: Siege of Sardis from the end of B.C. 216 to autumn of B.C.
215.]

+15.+ Round Sardis ceaseless and protracted skirmishes were taking
place and fighting by night and day, both armies inventing every
possible kind of plot and counterplot against each other: to describe
which in detail would be as useless as it would be in the last degree
wearisome. At last, when the siege had already entered upon its second
year, Lagoras the Cretan came forward. He had had a considerable
experience in war, and had learnt that as a rule cities fall into the
hands of their enemies most easily from some neglect on the part of
their inhabitants, when, trusting to the natural or artificial strength
of their defences, they neglect to keep proper guard and become
thoroughly careless. He had observed too, that in such fortified cities
captures were effected at the points of greatest strength, which were
believed to have been despaired of by the enemy. So in the present
instance, when he saw that the prevailing notion of the strength of
Sardis caused the whole army to despair of taking it by storm, and
to believe that the one hope of getting it was by starving it out,
he gave all the closer attention to the subject; and eagerly scanned
every possible method of making an attempt to capture the town. Having
observed therefore that a portion of the wall was unguarded, near a
place called the Saw, which unites the citadel and city, he conceived
the hope and idea of performing this exploit. He had discovered
the carelessness of the men guarding this wall from the following
circumstance. The place was extremely precipitous: and there was a deep
gully below, into which dead bodies from the city, and the offal of
horses and beasts of burden that died, were accustomed to be thrown;
and in this place therefore there was always a great number of vultures
and other birds collected. Having observed, then, that when these
creatures were gorged, they always sat undisturbed upon the cliffs and
the wall, he concluded that the wall must necessarily be left unguarded
and deserted for the larger part of the day. Accordingly, under cover
of night, he went to the spot and carefully examined the possibilities
of approaching it and setting ladders; and finding that this was
possible at one particular rock, he communicated the facts to the king.

+16.+ Antiochus encouraged the attempt and urged Lagoras to carry it
out. The latter promised to do his best, and desired the king to join
with him Theodotus the Aetolian, and Dionysius the commander of his
bodyguard, with orders to devote them to assist him in carrying out
the intended enterprise. The king at once granted his request, and
these officers agreed to undertake it: and having held a consultation
on the whole subject, they waited for a night on which there should be
no moon just before daybreak. Such a night having arrived, on the day
on which they intended to act, an hour before sunset, they selected
from the whole army fifteen of the strongest and most courageous men to
carry the ladders, and also to mount with them and share in the daring
attempt. After these they selected thirty others, to remain in reserve
at a certain distance; that, as soon as they had themselves climbed
over the walls, and come to the nearest gate, the thirty might come up
to it from the outside and try to knock off the hinges and fastenings,
while they on the inside cut the cross bar and bolt pins.[317] They
also selected two thousand men to follow behind the thirty, who were to
rush into the town with them and seize the area of the theatre, which
was a favourable position to hold against those on the citadel, as
well as those in the town. To prevent suspicion of the truth getting
about, owing to the picking out of the men, the king gave out that
the Aetolians were about to throw themselves into the town through a
certain gully, and that it was necessary, in view of that information,
to take energetic measures to prevent them.

[Sidenote: The town of Sardis entered and sacked.]

+17.+ When Lagoras and his party had made all their preparations, as
soon as the moon set, they came stealthily to the foot of the cliffs
with their scaling ladders, and ensconced themselves under a certain
overhanging rock. When day broke, and the picket as usual broke up
from that spot; and the king in the ordinary way told off some men to
take their usual posts, and led the main body on to the hippodrome and
drew them up; at first no one suspected what was going on. But when
two ladders were fixed, and Dionysius led the way up one, and Lagoras
up the other, there was excitement and a stir throughout the camp. For
while the climbing party were not visible to the people in the town,
or to Achaeus in the citadel, because of the beetling brow of the
rock, their bold and adventurous ascent was in full view of the camp;
which accordingly was divided in feeling between astonishment at the
strangeness of the spectacle, and a nervous horror of what was going
to happen next, all standing dumb with exulting wonder. Observing the
excitement in the camp, and wishing to divert the attention both of
his own men and of those in the city from what was going on, the king
ordered an advance; and delivered an attack upon the gates on the other
side of the town, called the Persian gates. Seeing from the citadel
the unwonted stir in the camp, Achaeus was for some time at a loss to
know what to do, being puzzled to account for it, and quite unable to
see what was taking place. However he despatched a force to oppose the
enemy at the gate; whose assistance was slow in arriving, because they
had to descend from the citadel by a narrow and precipitous path. But
Aribazus, the commandant of the town, went unsuspiciously to the gates
on which he saw Antiochus advancing; and caused some of his men to
mount the wall, and sent others out through the gate, with orders to
hinder the approaching enemies, and come to close quarters with them.

+18.+ Meanwhile Lagoras, Theodotus, Dionysius, and their men had
climbed the rocks and had arrived at the gate nearest them; and some
of them were engaged in fighting the troops sent from the citadel to
oppose them, while others were cutting through the bars; and at the
same time the party outside told off for that service were doing the
same. The gates having thus been quickly forced open, the two thousand
entered and occupied the area round the theatre. On this all the men
from the walls, and from the Persian gate, to which Aribazus had
already led a relieving force, rushed in hot haste to pass the word to
attack the enemy within the gates. The result was that, the gate having
been opened as they retreated, some of the king’s army rushed in along
with the retiring garrison; and, when they had thus taken possession of
the gate, they were followed by an unbroken stream of their comrades;
some of whom poured through the gate, while others employed themselves
in bursting open other gates in the vicinity. Aribazus and all the men
in the city, after a brief struggle against the enemy who had thus
got within the walls, fled with all speed to the citadel. After that,
Theodotus and Lagoras and their party remained on the ground near the
theatre, determining with great good sense and soldier-like prudence
to form a reserve until the whole operation was completed; while the
main body rushed in on every side and occupied the town. And now by
dint of some putting all they met to the sword, others setting fire to
the houses, others devoting themselves to plunder and taking booty, the
destruction and sacking of the town was completed. Thus did Antiochus
become master of Sardis....




BOOK VIII

THE NECESSITY OF CAUTION IN DEALING WITH AN ENEMY


[Sidenote: Fall of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus [Cons. B.C. 215 and 213]

+1.+ Tiberius a Roman Proconsul fell into an ambuscade, and, after
offering with his attendants a gallant as he was advancing from Lucania
to Capua, by the treachery of the Lucanian Flavius, B.C. 212. Livy, 25,
16.] resistance to the enemy, was killed.

[Sidenote: Fall of Archidamus, B.C. 226-225.]

[Sidenote: Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Asina with his fleet surprised and
captured at Lipara, B.C. 260. See 1, 21.]

[Sidenote: Fall of Pelopidas in Thessaly, B.C. 363.]

Now in regard to such catastrophes, whether it is right to blame or
pardon the sufferers is by no means a safe matter on which to pronounce
an opinion; because it has happened to several men, who have been
perfectly correct in all their actions, to fall into these misfortunes,
equally with those who do not scruple to transgress principles of right
confirmed by the consent of mankind. We should not however idly refrain
from pronouncing an opinion: but should blame or condone this or that
general, after a review of the necessities of the moment and the
circumstances of the case. And my observation will be rendered evident
by the following instances. Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians,
alarmed at the love of power which he observed in Cleomenes, fled
from Sparta; but being not long afterwards persuaded to return, put
himself in the power of the latter. The consequence was that he lost
his kingdom and his life together,[318] and left a character not to be
defended before posterity on the score of prudence; for while affairs
remained in the same state, and the ambition and power of Cleomenes
remained in exactly the same position, how could he expect to meet any
other fate than he did, if he put himself in the hands of the very men
from whom he had before barely escaped destruction by flight? Again
Pelopidas of Thebes, though acquainted with the unprincipled character
of the tyrant Alexander, and though he knew thoroughly well that
every tyrant regards the leaders of liberty as his bitterest enemies,
first took upon himself to persuade Epaminondas to stand forth as the
champion of democracy, not only in Thebes, but in all Greece also; and
then, being in Thessaly in arms, for the express purpose of destroying
the absolute rule of Alexander, he yet twice ventured to undertake a
mission to him. The consequence was that he fell into the hands of his
enemies, did great damage to Thebes, and ruined the reputation he had
acquired before; and all by putting a rash and ill advised confidence
in the very last person in whom he ought to have done so. Very similar
to these cases is that of the Roman Consul Gnaeus Cornelius who fell
in the Sicilian war by imprudently putting himself in the power of the
enemy. And many parallel cases might be quoted.

[Sidenote: Betrayal of Achaeus by Bolis. See _infra_, ch. 17-23.]

+2.+ The conclusion, then, is that those who put themselves in the
power of the enemy from want of proper precaution deserve blame;
but those who use every practicable precaution not so: for to trust
absolutely no one is to make all action impossible; but reasonable
action, taken after receiving adequate security, cannot be censured.
Adequate securities are oaths, children, wives, and, strongest of all,
a blameless past. To be betrayed and entrapped by such a security as
any of these is a slur, not on the deceived, but on the deceiver. The
first object then should be to seek such securities as it is impossible
for the recipient of the confidence to evade; but since such are rare,
the next best thing will be to take every reasonable precaution one’s
self: and then, if we meet with any disaster, we shall at least be
acquitted of wrong conduct by the lookers on. And this has been the
case with many before now: of which the most conspicuous example, and
the one nearest to the times on which we are engaged, will be the fate
of Achaeus. He omitted no possible precaution for securing his safety,
but thought of everything that it was possible for human ingenuity
to conceive: and yet he fell into the power of his enemies. In this
instance his misfortune procured the pity and pardon of the outside
world for the victim, and nothing but disparagement and loathing for
the successful perpetrators....

       *       *       *       *       *

[Sidenote: Sardinia reduced by T. Manlius Torquatus, B.C. 215.
Marcellus took Leontini, B.C. 214 (autumn). Livy, 24, 30.]

[Sidenote: Marcus Valerius Laevinus commands a fleet off Greece, B.C.
215-214. Livy, 24, 10. Publius Sulpicius Galba Cos. (B.C. 211.) sent to
Macedonia. Livy, 26, 22; 27, 31. Appius Claudius Pulcher, Praetor, sent
to Sicily, B.C. 215. Livy, 23, 31, Propraetor, B.C. 214. Livy 24, 33.]

[Sidenote: Marcus Claudius Marcellus, Cos. III., B.C. 214.]

+3.+ It appears to me not to be alien to my general purpose, and the
plan which I originally laid down, to recall the attention of my
readers to the magnitude of the events, and the persistency of purpose
displayed by the two States of Rome and Carthage. For who could think
it otherwise than remarkable that these two powers, while engaged in so
serious a war for the possession of Italy, and one no less serious for
that of Iberia; and being still both of them equally balanced between
uncertain hopes and fears for the future of these wars, and confronted
at the very time with battles equally formidable to either, should
yet not be content with their existing undertakings: but should raise
another controversy as to the possession of Sardinia and Sicily; and
not content with merely hoping for all these things, should grasp at
them with all the resources of their wealth and warlike forces? Indeed
the more we examine into details the greater becomes our astonishment.
The Romans had two complete armies under the two Consuls on active
service in Italy; two in Iberia in which Gnaeus Cornelius commanded the
land, Publius Cornelius the naval forces; and naturally the same was
the case with the Carthaginians. But besides this, a Roman fleet was
anchored off Greece, watching it and the movements of Philip, of which
first Marcus Valerius, and afterward Publius Sulpicius was in command.
Along with all these undertakings Appius with a hundred quinqueremes,
and Marcus Claudius with an army, were threatening Sicily; while
Hamilcar was doing the same on the side of the Carthaginians.

+4.+ By means of these facts I presume that what I more than once
asserted at the beginning of my work is now shown by actual experience
to deserve unmixed credit. I mean my assertion, that it is impossible
for historians of particular places to get a view of universal history.
For how is it possible for a man who has only read a separate history
of Sicilian or Spanish affairs to understand and grasp the greatness of
the events? Or, what is still more important, in what manner and under
what form of polity fortune brought to pass that most surprising of
all revolutions that have happened in our time, I mean the reduction
of all known parts of the world under one rule and governance, a
thing unprecedented in the history of mankind. In what manner the
Romans took Syracuse or Iberia may be possibly learned to a certain
extent by means of such particular histories; but how they arrived at
universal supremacy, and what opposition their grand designs met with
in particular places, or what on the other hand contributed to their
success, and at what epochs, this it is difficult to take in without
the aid of universal history. Nor, again, is it easy to appreciate the
greatness of their achievements except by the latter method. For the
fact of the Romans having sought to gain Iberia, or at another time
Sicily; or having gone on a campaign with military and naval forces,
told by itself, would not be anything very wonderful. But if we learn
that these were all done at once, and that many more undertakings were
in course of accomplishment at the same time,—all at the cost of one
government and commonwealth; and if we see what dangers and wars in
their own territory were, at the very time, encumbering the men who had
all these things on hand: thus, and only thus, will the astonishing
nature of the events fully dawn upon us, and obtain the attention which
they deserve. So much for those who suppose that by studying an episode
they have become acquainted with universal history....


THE SIEGE OF SYRACUSE

_Hieronymus succeeded his grandfather, Hiero, in B.C. 216, and was
assassinated in Leontini thirteen months afterwards, in B.C. 215. His
death, however, did not bring more peaceful relations between Syracuse
and Rome, but only gave the Syracusans more able leaders (Livy, 24,
21). After the slaughter of Themistius and Andramodorus, who had been
elected on the board of Generals, and the cruel murder of all the
royal family, Epicydes and Hippocrates,—Syracusans by descent, but
born and brought up at Carthage, and who had been sent to Syracuse on
a special mission by Hannibal,—were elected into the vacant places in
the board of Generals. They became the leading spirits in the Syracusan
government, and for a time kept up an appearance of wishing to come
to terms with Rome; and legates were actually sent to Marcellus, at
Morgantia (near Catana). But when the Carthaginian fleet arrived at
Pachynus, Hippocrates and Epicydes threw off their mask, and declared
that the other magistrates were betraying the town to the Romans. This
accusation was rendered more specious by the appearance of Appius with
a Roman fleet at the mouth of the harbour. A rush was made to the
shore by the inhabitants to prevent the Romans landing; and the tumult
was with difficulty composed by the wisdom of one of the magistrates,
Apollonides, who persuaded the people to vote for the peace with Rome
(B.C. 215. Livy, 24, 21-28). But Hippocrates and Epicydes determined
not to acknowledge the peace: they therefore provoked the Romans by
plundering in or near the Roman pale,[319] and then took refuge in
Leontini. Marcellus complained at Syracuse, but was told that Leontini
was not within Syracusan jurisdiction. Marcellus, therefore, took
Leontini. Hippocrates and Epicydes managed to escape, and by a mixture
of force and fraud contrived soon afterwards to force their way into
Syracuse, seize and put to death most of the generals, and induce the
excited mob, whom they had inspired with the utmost dread of being
betrayed to Rome, to elect them sole generals (Livy, 24, 29-32). The
Romans at once ordered Syracuse to be besieged, giving out that they
were coming not to wage war with the inhabitants, but to deliver them._

       *       *       *       *       *

[Sidenote: Siege of Syracuse, B.C. 215-214.]

[Sidenote: Archimedes.]

+5.+ When Epicydes and Hippocrates had occupied Syracuse, and had
alienated the rest of the citizens with themselves from the friendship
of Rome, the Romans who had already been informed of the murder of
Hieronymus, tyrant of Syracuse, appointed Appius Claudius as Propraetor
to command a land force, while Marcus Claudius Marcellus commanded
the fleet. These officers took up a position not far from Syracuse,
and determined to assault the town from the land at Hexapylus, and by
sea at what was called Stoa Scytice in Achradina, where the wall has
its foundation close down to the sea. Having prepared their wicker
pent-houses, and darts, and other siege material, they felt confident
that, with so many hands employed, they would in five days get their
works in such an advanced state as to give them the advantage over the
enemy. But in this they did not take into account the abilities of
Archimedes; nor calculate on the truth that, in certain circumstances,
the genius of one man is more effective than any numbers whatever.[320]
However they now learnt it by experience. The city was strong from
the fact of its encircling wall lying along a chain of hills with
overhanging brows, the ascent of which was no easy task, even with no
one to hinder it, except at certain definite points. Taking advantage
of this, Archimedes had constructed such defences both in the town, and
at the places where an attack might be made by sea, that the garrison
would have everything at hand which they might require at any moment,
and be ready to meet without delay whatever the enemy might attempt
against them.

[Sidenote: Sambucae or Harps.]

+6.+ The attack was begun by Appius bringing his pent-houses, and
scaling ladders, and attempting to fix the latter against that part of
the wall which abuts on Hexapylus towards the east. At the same time
Marcus Claudius Marcellus with sixty quinqueremes was making a descent
upon Achradina. Each of these vessels were full of men armed with bows
and slings and javelins, with which to dislodge those who fought on
the battlements. As well as these vessels he had eight quinqueremes
in pairs. Each pair had had their oars removed, one on the larboard
and the other on the starboard side, and then had been lashed together
on the sides thus left bare. On these double vessels, rowed by the
outer oars of each of the pair, they brought up under the walls some
engines called “Sambucae,” the construction of which was as follows:—A
ladder was made four feet broad, and of a height to reach the top of
the wall from the place where its foot had to rest; each side of the
ladder was protected by a railing, and a covering or pent-house was
added overhead. It was then placed so that its foot rested across the
sides of the lashed-together vessels, which touched each other with its
other extremity protruding a considerable way beyond the prows. On the
tops of the masts pulleys were fixed with ropes: and when the engines
were about to be used, men standing on the sterns of the vessels drew
the ropes tied to the head of the ladder, while others standing on
the prows assisted the raising of the machine and kept it steady with
long poles. Having then brought the ships close in shore by using the
outer oars of both vessels they tried to let the machine down upon the
wall. At the head of the ladder was fixed a wooden stage secured on
three sides by wicker-shields, upon which stood four men who fought
and struggled with those who tried to prevent the Sambuca from being
made to rest on the battlements. But when they have fixed it and so
got above the level of the top of the wall, the four men unfasten the
wicker-shields from either side of the stage, and walk out upon the
battlements or towers as the case may be; they are followed by their
comrades coming up by the Sambuca, since the ladder’s foot is safely
secured with ropes and stands upon both the ships. This construction
has got the name of “Sambuca,” or “Harp,” for the natural reason, that
when it is raised the combination of the ship and ladder has very much
the appearance of such an instrument.

[Sidenote: The engines invented by Archimedes. Cf. Plut. _Marcellus_,
15.]

[Sidenote: 570 lbs. av.]

+7.+ With such contrivances and preparations were the Romans intending
to assault the towers. But Archimedes had constructed catapults to suit
every range; and as the ships sailing up were still at a considerable
distance, he so wounded the enemy with stones and darts, from the
tighter wound and longer engines, as to harass and perplex them to the
last degree; and when these began to carry over their heads, he used
smaller engines graduated according to the range required from time
to time, and by this means caused so much confusion among them as to
altogether check their advance and attack; and finally Marcellus was
reduced in despair to bringing up his ships under cover of night. But
when they had come close to land, and so too near to be hit by the
catapults, they found that Archimedes had prepared another contrivance
against the soldiers who fought from the decks. He had pierced the wall
as high as a man’s stature with numerous loop-holes, which, on the
outside, were about as big as the palm of the hand. Inside the wall he
stationed archers and cross-bows, or scorpions,[321] and by the volleys
discharged through these he made the marines useless. By these means he
not only baffled the enemy, whether at a distance or close at hand, but
also killed the greater number of them. As often, too, as they tried
to work their Sambucae, he had engines ready all along the walls, not
visible at other times, but which suddenly reared themselves above the
wall from inside, when the moment for their use had come, and stretched
their beams far over the battlements, some of them carrying stones
weighing as much as ten talents, and others great masses of lead. So
whenever the Sambucae were approaching, these beams swung round on
their pivot the required distance, and by means of a rope running
through a pulley dropped the stone upon the Sambucae, with the result
that it not only smashed the machine itself to pieces, but put the ship
also and all on board into the most serious danger.

+8.+ Other machines which he invented were directed against storming
parties, who, advancing under the protection of pent-houses, were
secured by them from being hurt by missiles shot through the walls.
Against these he either shot stones big enough to drive the marines
from the prow; or let down an iron hand swung on a chain, by which the
man who guided the crane, having fastened on some part of the prow
where he could get a hold, pressed down the lever of the machine inside
the wall; and when he had thus lifted the prow and made the vessel rest
upright on its stern, he fastened the lever of his machine so that it
could not be moved; and then suddenly slackened the hand and chain by
means of a rope and pulley. The result was that many of the vessels
heeled over and fell on their sides: some completely capsized; while
the greater number, by their prows coming down suddenly from a height,
dipped low in the sea, shipped a great quantity of water, and became
a scene of the utmost confusion. Though reduced almost to despair by
these baffling inventions of Archimedes, and though he saw that all his
attempts were repulsed by the garrison with mockery on their part and
loss to himself, Marcellus could not yet refrain from making a joke at
his own expense, saying that “Archimedes was using his ships to ladle
out the sea-water, but that his 'harps’ not having been invited to the
party were buffeted and turned out with disgrace.” Such was the end of
the attempt at storming Syracuse by sea.

[Sidenote: The assault by land repulsed.]

[Sidenote: The siege turned into a blockade, B.C. 214. Coss. Q. Fabius
Maximus IV. M. Claudius Marcellus III.]

+9.+ Nor was Appius Claudius more successful. He, too, was compelled
by similar difficulties to desist from the attempt; for while his
men were still at a considerable distance from the wall, they began
falling by the stones and shots from the engines and catapults. The
volleys of missiles, indeed, were extraordinarily rapid and sharp,
for their construction had been provided for by all the liberality
of a Hiero, and had been planned and engineered by the skill of an
Archimedes. Moreover, when they did at length get near the walls, they
were prevented from making an assault by the unceasing fire through
the loop-holes, which I mentioned before; or if they tried to carry
the place under cover of pent-houses, they were killed by the stones
and beams let down upon their heads. The garrison also did them no
little damage with those hands at the end of their engines; for they
used to lift the men, armour, and all, into the air, and then throw
them down. At last Appius retired into the camp, and summoning the
Tribunes to a council of war, decided to try every possible means of
taking Syracuse except a storm. And this decision they carried out; for
during the eight months of siege which followed, though there was no
stratagem or measure of daring which they did not attempt, they never
again ventured to attempt a storm. So true it is that one man and one
intellect, properly qualified for the particular undertaking, is a
host in itself and of extraordinary efficacy. In this instance, at any
rate, we find the Romans confident that their forces by land and sea
would enable them to become masters of the town, if only one old man
could be got rid of; while as long as he remained there, they did not
venture even to think of making the attempt, at least by any method
which made it possible for Archimedes to oppose them. They believed,
however, that their best chance of reducing the garrison was by a
failure of provisions sufficient for so large a number as were within
the town; they therefore relied upon this hope, and with their ships
tried to cut off their supplies by sea, and with their army by land.
But desiring that the time during which they were blockading Syracuse
should not be entirely wasted, but that some addition should be made to
their power in other parts of the country, the two commanders separated
and divided the troops between them: Appius Claudius keeping two-thirds
and continuing the blockade, while Marcus Marcellus with the remaining
third went to attack the cities that sided with the Carthaginians....

       *       *       *       *       *

[Sidenote: Philip’s second devastation of Messene, B.C. 214.]

[Sidenote: See Plutarch, _Aratus_, ch. 51. Cp. _supra_, 7, 10-14.]

+10.+ Upon arriving in Messenia Philip began devastating the country,
like an open enemy, with more passion than reason; for while pursuing
this continuous course of injurious actions, he expected, it appears to
me, that the sufferers would feel no anger or hatred towards him. I was
induced to speak of these proceedings in somewhat full detail in the
present as well as in the last book, not alone by the same motives as
those which I have assigned for other parts of my work, but also by the
fact that of our historians, some have entirely omitted this Messenian
episode; while others from love or fear of kings have maintained that,
so far from the outrages committed by Philip in defiance of religion
and law upon the Messenians being a subject of blame, his actions were
on the contrary matters for praise and gratulation. But it is not
only in regard to the Messenians that we may notice the historians of
Philip acting thus; they have done much the same in other cases also.
And the result is that their compositions have the appearance of a
panegyric rather than of a history. I however hold that an historian
ought neither to blame or praise kings untruly, as has often been done;
but to make what we say consistent with what has been written before,
and tally with the characters of the several persons in question. But
it may be urged perhaps that this is easy to say, but very difficult
to carry out; because situations and circumstances are so many and
various, to which men have to give way in the course of their life,
and which prevent them from speaking out their real opinions. This may
excuse some, but not others.

[Sidenote: The extravagance of Theopompus’s account of Philip II.]

+11.+ I do not know any one who deserves more blame in this particular
than Theopompus. In the beginning of his history of Philip he said
that what chiefly induced him to undertake it was the fact that
Europe had never produced such a man as Philip son of Amyntas; and
then immediately afterwards, both in his preface and in the whole
course of his history, he represents this king as so madly addicted to
women, that he did all that in him lay to ruin his own family by this
inordinate passion; as having behaved with the grossest unfairness and
perfidy to his friends and allies, as having enslaved and treacherously
seized a vast number of towns by force or fraud; and as having been
besides so violently addicted to strong drink, that he was often
seen by his friends drunk in open day. But if any one will take the
trouble to read the opening passage of his forty-ninth book, he would
be indeed astonished at this writer’s extravagance. Besides his other
strange statements he has ventured to write as follows—for I here
subjoin his actual words:—“If there was any one in all Greece, or among
the Barbarians, whose character was lascivious and shameless, he was
invariably attracted to Philip’s court in Macedonia and got the title
of 'the king’s companion.’ For it was Philip’s constant habit to reject
those who lived respectably and were careful of their property; but to
honour and promote those who were extravagant, and passed their lives
in drinking and dicing. His influence accordingly tended not only to
confirm them in these vices, but to make them proficients in every kind
of rascality and lewdness. What vice or infamy did they not possess?
What was there virtuous or of good report that they did not lack? Some
of them, men as they were, were ever clean shaven and smooth-skinned;
and even bearded men did not shrink from mutual defilement. They took
about with them two or three slaves of their lust, while submitting
to the same shameful service themselves. The men whom they called
companions deserved a grosser name, and the title of soldier was but
a cover to mercenary vice; for, though bloodthirsty by nature, they
were lascivious by habit. In a word, to make a long story short,
especially as I have such a mass of matter to deal with, I believe that
the so-called 'friends’ and 'companions’ of Philip were more bestial
in nature and character than the Centaurs who lived on Pelion, or the
Laestrygones who inhabited the Leontine plain, or in fact any other
monsters whatever.”[322]

+12.+ Who would not disapprove of such bitterness and intemperance of
language in an historian? It is not only because his words contradict
his opening statement that he deserves stricture; but also because
he has libelled the king and his friends; and still more because his
falsehood is expressed in disgusting and unbecoming words. If he had
been speaking of Sardanapalus, or one of his associates, he could
hardly have ventured to use such foul language; and what that monarch’s
principles and debauchery were in his lifetime we gather from the
inscription on his tomb, which runs thus:

   “The joys I had from love or wine
   Or dainty meats—those now are mine.”

[Sidenote: The vigorous characters of the Diadochi.]

But when speaking of Philip and his friends, a man ought to be on
his guard, not so much of accusing them of effeminacy and want of
courage, or still more of shameless immorality, but on the contrary
lest he should prove unequal to express their praises in a manner
worthy of their manliness, indefatigable energy, and the general
virtue of their character. It is notorious that by their energy and
boldness they raised the Macedonian Empire from a most insignificant
monarchy to the first rank in reputation and extent. And, putting aside
the achievements of Philip, what was accomplished by them after his
death, under the rule of Alexander, has secured for them a reputation
for valour with posterity universally acknowledged. For although a
large share of the credit must perhaps be given to Alexander, as the
presiding genius of the whole, though so young a man; yet no less is
due to his coadjutors and friends, who won many wonderful victories
over the enemy; endured numerous desperate labours, dangers and
sufferings; and, though put into possession of the most ample wealth,
and the most abundant means of gratifying all their desires, never
lost their bodily vigour by these means, or contracted tastes for
violence or debauchery. On the contrary, all those who were associated
with Philip, and afterwards with Alexander, became truly royal in
greatness of soul, temperance of life, and courage. Nor is it necessary
to mention any names: but after Alexander’s death, in their mutual
rivalries for the possession of various parts of nearly all the world,
they filled a very large number of histories with the record of their
glorious deeds. We may admit then that the bitter invective of the
historian Timaeus against Agathocles, despot of Sicily, though it seems
unmeasured, has yet some reason in it,—for it is directed against a
personal enemy, a bad man, and a tyrant; but that of Theopompus is too
scurrilous to be taken seriously.

+13.+ For, after premising that he is going to write about a king most
richly endowed by nature with virtue, he has raked up against him every
shameful and atrocious charge that he could find. There are therefore
but two alternatives: either this writer in the preface to his work has
shown himself a liar and a flatterer; or in the body of that history a
fool and utter simpleton, if he imagined that by senseless and improper
invective he would either increase his own credit, or gain great
acceptance for his laudatory expressions about Philip.

[Sidenote: Thucydides breaks off in B.C. 411. Battle of Leuctra B.C.
371.]

But the fact is that the general plan of this writer is one also which
can meet with no one’s approval. For having undertaken to write a
Greek History from the point at which Thucydides left off, when he
got near the period of the battle of Leuctra, and the most splendid
exploits of the Greeks, he threw aside Greece and its achievements in
the middle of his story, and, changing his purpose, undertook to write
the history of Philip. And yet it would have been far more telling and
fair to have included the actions of Philip in the general history
of Greece, than the history of Greece in that of Philip. For one
cannot conceive of any one, who had been preoccupied by the study of a
royal government, hesitating, if he got the power and opportunity, to
transfer his attention to the great name and splendid personality of a
nation like Greece; but no one in his senses, after beginning with the
latter, would have exchanged it for the showy biography of a tyrant.
Now what could it have been that compelled Theopompus to overlook
such inconsistencies? Nothing surely but this, that whereas the aim
of his original history was honour, that of his history of Philip was
expediency. As to this deviation from the right path however, which
made him change the theme of his history, he might perhaps have had
something to say, if any one had questioned him about it; but as to
his abominable language about the king’s friends, I do not think that
he could have said a word of defence, but must have owned to a serious
breach of propriety....

[Sidenote: Death of Aratus, B.C. 213.]

+14.+ Though regarding the Messenians as open enemies, Philip was
unable to inflict serious damage upon them, in spite of his setting
to work to devastate their territory; but he was guilty of abominable
conduct of the worst description to men who had been his most intimate
friends. For on the elder Aratus showing disapproval of his proceedings
at Messene, he caused him not long afterwards to be made away with by
poison, through the agency of Taurion who had charge of his interests
in the Peloponnese. The crime was not known at the time by other
people; for the drug was not one of those which kill on the spot, but
was a slow poison producing a morbid state of the body. Aratus himself
however was fully aware of the cause of his illness; and showed that he
was so by the following circumstance. Though he kept the secret from
the rest of the world, he did not conceal it from one of his servants
named Cepholon, with whom he was on terms of great affection. This man
waited on him during his illness with great assiduity, and having one
day pointed out some spittle on the wall which was stained with blood,
Aratus remarked, “That is the reward I have got for my friendship to
Philip.” Such a grand and noble thing is disinterested virtue, that
the sufferer was more ashamed, than the inflicter of the injury, of
having it known, that, after so many splendid services performed in
the interests of Philip, he had got such a return as that for his
loyalty.[323]

[Sidenote: Seventeen times Strategus. Plutarch, _Aratus_, 53.]

In consequence of having been so often elected Strategus of the Achaean
league, and of having performed so many splendid services for that
people, Aratus after his death met with the honours he deserved, both
in his own native city and from the league as a body. They voted him
sacrifices and the honours of heroship, and in a word every thing
calculated to perpetuate his memory; so that, if the departed have any
consciousness, it is but reasonable to think that he feels pleasure at
the gratitude of the Achaeans, and at the thought of the hardships and
dangers he endured in his life....


PHILIP TAKES LISSUS IN ILLYRIA, B.C. 213

[Sidenote: Lissus founded by Dionysius of Syracuse, B.C. 385. See Diod.
Sic. 15, 13.]

+15.+ Philip had long had his thoughts fixed upon Lissus and its
citadel; and, being anxious to become master of those places, he
started with his army, and after two days’ march got through the pass
and pitched his camp on the bank of the river Ardaxanus, not far from
the town. He found on surveying the place that the fortifications of
Lissus, both on the side of the sea and of the land, were exceedingly
strong both by nature and art; and that the citadel, which was near it,
from its extraordinary height and its other sources of strength, looked
more than any one could hope to carry by storm. He therefore gave up
all hope of the latter, but did not entirely despair of taking the
town. He observed that there was a space between Lissus and the foot of
the Acrolissus which was fairly well suited for making an attempt upon
the town. He conceived the idea therefore of bringing on a skirmish in
this space, and then employing a strategem suited to the circumstances
of the case. Having given his men a day for rest; and having in the
course of it addressed them in suitable words of exhortation; he hid
the greater and most effective part of his light-armed troops during
the night in some woody gulleys, close to this space on the land side;
and next morning marched to the other side of the town next the sea,
with his peltasts and the rest of his light-armed. Having thus marched
round the town, and arrived at this spot, he made a show of intending
to assault it at that point. Now as Philip’s advent had been no secret,
a large body of men from the surrounding country of Illyria had flocked
into Lissus; but feeling confidence in the strength of the citadel,
they had assigned a very moderate number of men to garrison it.

[Sidenote: The Acrolissus taken by a feint, and Lissus afterwards.]

+16.+ As soon therefore as the Macedonians approached, they began
pouring out of the town, confident in their numbers and in the strength
of the places. The king stationed his peltasts on the level ground,
and ordered the light-armed troops to advance towards the hills and
energetically engage the enemy. These orders being obeyed, the fight
remained doubtful for a time; but presently Philip’s men yielded to the
inequality of the ground, and the superior number of the enemy, and
gave way. Upon their retreating within the ranks of the peltasts, the
sallying party advanced with feelings of contempt, and having descended
to the same level as the peltasts joined battle with them. But the
garrison of the citadel seeing Philip moving his divisions one after
the other slowly to the rear, and believing that he was abandoning
the field, allowed themselves to be insensibly decoyed out, in their
confidence in the strength of their fortifications; and thus, leaving
the citadel by degrees, kept pouring down by bye-ways into the lower
plain, under the belief that they would have an opportunity of getting
booty and completing the enemy’s discomfiture. Meanwhile the division,
which had been lying concealed on the side of the mainland, rose
without being observed, and advanced at a rapid pace. At their approach
the peltasts also wheeled round and charged the enemy. On this the
troops from Lissus were thrown into confusion, and, after a straggling
retreat, got safely back into the town; while the garrison which had
abandoned the citadel got cut off from it by the rising of the troops
which had been lying in ambush. The result accordingly was that what
seemed hopeless, namely the capture of the citadel, was effected
at once and without any fighting; while Lissus did not fall until
next day, and then only after desperate struggles, the Macedonians
assaulting with vigour and even terrific fury. Thus Philip having,
beyond all expectation, made himself master of these places, reduced
by this exploit all the neighbouring populations to obedience; so much
so that the greater number of the Illyrians voluntarily surrendered
their cities to his protection; for it had come to be believed that,
after the storming of such strongholds as these, no fortification and
no provision for security could be of any avail against the might of
Philip.


THE CAPTURE OF ACHAEUS AT SARDIS

(See 7, 15-18)

[Sidenote: B.C. 214. Sosibius secures the help of Bolis to rescue
Achaeus.]

+17.+ Bolis was by birth a Cretan, who had long enjoyed the honours of
high military rank at King Ptolemy’s court, and the reputation of being
second to none in natural ability, adventurous daring, and experience
in war. By repeated arguments Sosibius secured this man’s fidelity;
and when he felt sure of his zeal and affection he communicated the
business in hand to him. He told him that he could not do the king
a more acceptable service at the present crisis than by contriving
some way of saving Achaeus. At the moment Bolis listened, and retired
without saying more than that he would consider the suggestion. But
after two or three days’ reflection, he came to Sosibius and said that
he would undertake the business; remarking that, having spent some
considerable time at Sardis, he knew its topography, and that Cambylus,
the commander of the Cretan contingent of the army of Antiochus, was
not only a fellow citizen of his but a kinsmen and friend. It chanced
moreover that Cambylus and his men had in charge one of the outposts on
the rear of the acropolis, where the nature of the ground did not admit
of siege-works, but was guarded by the permanent cantonment of troops
under Cambylus. Sosibius caught at the suggestion, convinced that, if
Achaeus could be saved at all from his dangerous situation, it could be
better accomplished by the agency of Bolis than of any one else; and,
this conviction being backed by great zeal on the part of Bolis, the
undertaking was pushed on with despatch. Sosibius at once supplied the
money necessary for the attempt, and promised a large sum besides in
case of its success; at the same time raising the hopes of Bolis to the
utmost by dilating upon the favours he might look for from the king, as
well as from the rescued prince himself.

Full of eagerness therefore for success, Bolis set sail without delay,
taking with him a letter in cipher and other credentials addressed
to Nicomachus at Rhodes, who was believed to entertain a fatherly
affection and devotion for Achaeus, and also to Melancomas at Ephesus;
for these were the men formerly employed by Achaeus in his negotiations
with Ptolemy, and in all other foreign affairs.

[Sidenote: Bolis turns traitor.]

+18.+ Bolis went to Rhodes, and thence to Ephesus; communicated his
purpose to Nicomachus and Melancomas; and found them ready to do what
they were asked. He then despatched one of his staff, named Arianus,
to Cambylus, with a message to the effect that he had been sent from
Alexandria on a recruiting tour, and that he wished for an interview
with Cambylus on some matters of importance; he thought it therefore
necessary to have a time and place arranged for them to meet without
the privity of a third person. Arianus quickly obtained an interview
with Cambylus and delivered his message; nor was the latter at all
unwilling to listen to the proposal. Having appointed a day, and a
place known to both himself and Bolis, at which he would be after
nightfall, he dismissed Arianus. Now Bolis had all the subtlety of a
Cretan, and he accordingly weighed carefully in his own mind every
possible line of action, and patiently examined every idea which
presented itself to him. Finally he met Cambylus according to the
arrangement made with Arianus, and delivered his letter. This was
now made the subject of discussion between them in a truly Cretan
spirit. They never took into consideration the means of saving the
person in danger, or their obligations of honour to those who had
entrusted them with the undertaking, but confined their discussions
entirely to the question of their own safety and their own advantage.
As they were both Cretans they were not long in coming to an unanimous
agreement: which was, first of all, to divide the ten talents supplied
by Sosibius between themselves in equal shares; and, secondly, to
discover the whole affair to Antiochus, and to offer with his support
to put Achaeus into his hands, on condition of receiving a sum of
money and promises for the future, on a scale commensurate with the
greatness of the undertaking. Having settled upon this plan of action:
Cambylus undertook the negotiation with Antiochus, while to Bolis
was assigned the duty of sending Arianus within the next few days to
Achaeus, bearing letters in cipher from Nicomachus and Melancomas: he
bade Cambylus however take upon himself to consider how Arianus was
to make his way into the acropolis and return with safety. “If,” said
Bolis, “Achaeus consents to make the attempt, and sends an answer to
Nicomachus and Melancomas, I will be ready to act and will communicate
with you.” Having thus arranged the parts which each was to take in the
plot, they separated and set about their several tasks.

[Sidenote: The intended treason against Achaeus communicated to
Antiochus.]

[Sidenote: Achaeus is deceived.]

+19.+ At the first opportunity Cambylus laid the proposal before the
king. It was as acceptable to Antiochus as it was unexpected: in the
first flush of his exultation he promised everything they asked; but
presently feeling some distrust, he questioned Cambylus on every detail
of their plan, and their means of carrying it out. Being eventually
satisfied on these points, and believing that the undertaking was under
the special favour of Providence, he repeatedly begged and prayed
Cambylus to bring it to a conclusion. Bolis was equally successful with
Nicomachus and Melancomas. They entertained no doubt of his sincerity,
and joined him in the composition of letters to Achaeus,—composed in
a cipher which they had been accustomed to use,—to prevent any one
who got hold of the letter from making out its contents, exhorting
him to trust Bolis and Cambylus. So Arianus, having by the aid of
Cambylus made his way into the acropolis, delivered the letters to
Achaeus; and having had personal acquaintance with the whole business
from its commencement, he was able to give an account of every detail
when questioned and cross-questioned again and again by Achaeus
about Sosibius and Bolis, about Nicomachus and Melancomas, and most
particularly about the part which Cambylus was taking in the affair. He
could of course stand this cross-examination with some air of sincerity
and candour, because, in point of fact, he was not acquainted with the
most important part of the plan which Cambylus and Bolis had adopted.
Achaeus was convinced by the answers returned by Arianus, and still
more by the cipher of Nicomachus and Melancomas; gave his answer; and
sent Arianus back with it without delay. This kind of communication
was repeated more than once: and at last Achaeus entrusted himself
without reserve to Nicomachus, there being absolutely no other hope of
saving himself left remaining, and bade him send Bolis with Arianus
on a certain moonless night, promising to place himself in their
hands. The idea of Achaeus was, first of all, to escape his immediate
danger; and then by a circuitous route to make his way into Syria.
For he entertained very great hopes that, if he appeared suddenly
and unexpectedly to the Syrians, while Antiochus was still lingering
about Sardis, he would be able to stir up a great movement, and meet
with a cordial reception from the people of Antioch, Coele-Syria, and
Phoenicia.

With such expectations and calculations Achaeus was waiting for the
appearance of Bolis.

+20.+ Meanwhile Arianus had reached Melancomas, who, on reading the
letter which he brought, immediately despatched Bolis with many words
of exhortation and great promises of profit if he succeeded in his
enterprise. Bolis sent Arianus in advance to signify his arrival to
Cambylus, and went after nightfall to their usual place of meeting.
There they spent a whole day together settling every detail of their
plan of operations; and having done this they went into the camp under
cover of night. The arrangement made between them was this. If it
turned out that Achaeus came from the acropolis alone with Bolis and
Arianus, or with only one attendant, he would give them no cause for
anxiety at all, but would be easily captured by the ambuscade set for
him. If, on the other hand, he should be accompanied by a considerable
number, the business would be one of some difficulty to those on whose
good faith he relied; especially as they were anxious to capture him
alive, that being what would most gratify Antiochus. In that case,
therefore, Arianus, while conducting Achaeus, was to go in front,
because he knew the path by which he had on several occasions effected
his entrance and return; Bolis was to bring up the rear, in order that,
when they arrived at the spot where Cambylus was to have his ambuscade
ready, he might lay hold on Achaeus, and prevent his getting away
through wooded ground, in the confusion and darkness of the night, or
throwing himself in his terror from some precipice; thus they would
secure that he fell, as they intended, into his enemies’ hands alive.

These arrangements having been agreed upon, Bolis was taken by Cambylus
on the very night of his arrival, without any one else, and introduced
to Antiochus. The king was alone and received them graciously; he
pledged himself to the performance of his promises, and urged them both
again and again not to postpone any longer the performance of their
purpose. Thereupon they returned for the present to their own camp;
but towards morning Bolis, accompanied by Arianus, ascended to the
acropolis, and entered it before daybreak.

[Sidenote: Achaeus takes vain precautions.]

+21.+ Achaeus received them with warmth and cordiality, and questioned
Bolis at great length on every detail. From the expression of his
face, and his conversation, he judged Bolis to be a man of a character
weighty enough for so serious an undertaking; but while at one time he
exulted in the prospect of his release, at another, he grew painfully
excited, and was torn with an agony of anxiety at the gravity of the
issues at stake. But no one had a clearer head or greater experience in
affairs than he; and in spite of the good opinion he had formed of him,
he still determined that his safety should not depend entirely on the
good faith of Bolis. He accordingly told him that it was impossible for
him to leave the acropolis at the moment: but that he would send some
two or three of his friends with him, and by the time that they had
joined Melancomas he would be prepared to depart. So Achaeus did all
he could for his security; but he did not know that he was trying to
do what the proverb declares to be impossible—out-cretan a Cretan. For
there was no trick likely to be tried that Bolis had not anticipated.
However when the night came, in which Achaeus said that he would send
his friends with them, he sent on Arianus and Bolis to the entrance of
the acropolis, with instructions to wait there until those who were
to go with them arrived. They did as he bade them. Achaeus then, at
the very moment of his departure, communicated his plan to his wife
Laodice; and she was so terrified at his sudden resolve, that he had to
spend some time in entreating her to be calm, in soothing her feelings,
and encouraging her by pointing out the hopes which he entertained.
This done he started with four companions, whom he dressed in ordinary
clothes, while he himself put on a mean and common dress and disguised
his rank as much as possible. He selected one of his four companions to
be always prepared to answer anything said by Arianus, and to ask any
necessary question of him, and bade him say that the other four did not
speak Greek.

[Sidenote: Achaeus made prisoner.]

+22.+ The five then joined Arianus, and they all started together on
their journey. Arianus went in front, as being acquainted with the
way; while Bolis took up his position behind in accordance with the
original plan, puzzled and annoyed at the way things were turning out.
For, Cretan as he was, and ready to suspect every one he came near, he
yet could not make out which of the five was Achaeus, or whether he
was there at all. But the path was for the most part precipitous and
difficult, and in some places there were abrupt descents which were
slippery and dangerous; and whenever they came to one of these, some
of the four gave Achaeus a hand down, and the others caught him at the
bottom, for they could not entirely conceal their habitual respect
for him; and Bolis was quick to detect, by observing this, which of
them was Achaeus. When therefore they arrived at the spot at which it
had been arranged that Cambylus was to be, Bolis gave the signal by
a whistle, and the men sprang from their places of concealment and
seized the other four, while Bolis himself caught hold of Achaeus, at
the same time grasping his mantle, as his hands were inside it; for
he was afraid that having a sword concealed about his person he would
attempt to kill himself when he understood what was happening. Being
thus quickly surrounded on every side, Achaeus fell into the hands of
his enemies, and along with his four friends was taken straight off to
Antiochus.

[Sidenote: Achaeus brought to Antiochus, sentenced and executed.]

The king was in his tent in a state of extreme anxiety awaiting the
result. He had dismissed his usual court, and, with the exception
of two or three of the bodyguard, was alone and sleepless. But when
Cambylus and his men entered, and placed Achaeus in chains on the
ground, he fell into a state of speechless astonishment: and for a
considerable time could not utter a word, and finally overcome by a
feeling of pity burst into tears; caused, I have no doubt, by this
exhibition of the capriciousness of Fortune, which defies precaution
and calculation alike. For here was Achaeus, a son of Andromachus, the
brother of Seleucus’s queen Laodice, and married to Laodice, a daughter
of King Mithridates, and who had made himself master of all Asia this
side of Taurus, and who at that very moment was believed by his own
army, as well as by that of his enemy, to be safely ensconced in the
strongest position in the world,—sitting chained upon the ground, in
the hands of his enemies, before a single person knew of it except
those who had effected the capture.

[Sidenote: The citadel of Sardis surrendered.]

+23.+ And, indeed, when at daybreak the king’s friends assembled as
usual at his tent, and saw this strange spectacle, they too felt
emotions very like those of the king; while extreme astonishment
made them almost disbelieve the evidence of their senses. However
the council met, and a long debate ensued as to what punishment they
were to inflict upon Achaeus. Finally, it was resolved that his
extremities should be cut off, his head severed from his body and sewn
up in the skin of an ass, and his body impaled. When this sentence
had been carried out, and the army learnt what had happened, there
was such excitement in the ranks and such a rush of the soldiers to
the spectacle, that Laodice on the acropolis, who alone knew that her
husband had left it, guessed what had happened from the commotion and
stir in the camp. And before long a herald arrived, told Laodice what
had happened to Achaeus, and ordered her to resign the command and
quit the acropolis. At first any answer was prevented by an outburst
of sorrow and overpowering lamentation on the part of the occupants of
the acropolis; not so much from affection towards Achaeus, as from the
suddenness and utter unexpectedness of the catastrophe. But this was
succeeded by a feeling of hesitation and dismay; and Antiochus, having
got rid of Achaeus, never ceased putting pressure on the garrison of
the acropolis, feeling confident that a means of taking it would be put
into his hands by those who occupied it, and most probably by the rank
and file of the garrison. And this is just what did finally happen:
for the soldiers split up into factions, one joining Ariobazus, the
other Laodice. This produced mutual distrust, and before long both
parties surrendered themselves and the acropolis. Thus Achaeus, in
spite of having taken every reasonable precaution, lost his life by
the perfidy of those in whom he trusted. His fate may teach posterity
two useful lessons,—not to put faith in any one lightly; and not to
be over-confident in the hour of prosperity, knowing that, in human
affairs, there is no accident which we may not expect....


THE GALLIC KING, CAUARUS

[Sidenote: Cauarus, king of the Gauls, settled on the Hellespont. See
4, 46 and 52.]

+24.+ Cauarus, king of the Gauls in Thrace, was of a truly royal and
high-minded disposition, and gave the merchants sailing into the Pontus
great protection, and rendered the Byzantines important services in
their wars with the Thracians and Bithynians....

This king, so excellent in other respects, was corrupted by a flatterer
named Sostratus, who was a Chalchedonian by birth....


ANTIOCHUS THE GREAT AT ARMOSATA

[Sidenote: In the course of his campaigns for the recovering of the
eastern provinces (B.C. 212-205), Antiochus makes a demonstration
before the city of Armosata, in Armenia, to recover the arrears of
tribute owed by the late king, B.C. 212.]

+25.+ In the reign of Xerxes, prince of the city of Armosata, situated
on the “Fair Plain,” between the Tigris and Euphrates, King Antiochus
encamped under its walls and prepared to attack it. When he saw the
king’s forces, Xerxes at first conveyed himself away; but feeling
afterwards that, if his palace were seized by his enemies, his whole
kingdom would be overthrown, he changed his mind, and sent a message
to Antiochus declaring his wish for a conference. The most loyal of
the friends of Antiochus were against letting the young prince go when
they once got him into their hands, and advised Antiochus to take
possession of the town, and hand over the principality to Mithridates,
his own sister’s son. The king, however, would not listen to any of
these suggestions; but sent for the young prince and accommodated
their differences, forgiving him the larger part of the money which
he allowed to be owing from his father under the head of tribute,
and accepting a present payment from him of three hundred talents, a
thousand horses, and a thousand mules with their trappings. He then
settled the government of the city, and gave the prince his sister
Antiochis as a wife. By these proceedings, in which he was thought
to have acted with true royal magnanimity, he won the affection and
support of all the inhabitants of that part of the country.


THE HANNIBALIAN WAR—TARENTUM

+26.+ It was in the wantonness of excessive prosperity that the
Tarentines invited Pyrrhus of Epirus; for democratic liberty that has
enjoyed a long and unchecked career comes naturally to experience a
satiety of its blessings, and then it looks out for a master; and when
it has got one, it is not long before it hates him, because it is seen
that the change is for the worse. This is just what happened to the
Tarentines on that occasion....

On this news being brought to Tarentum and Thurii there was great
popular indignation....

[Sidenote: Hannibal marched south early in B.C. 212 to renew his
attempt upon Tarentum, on which he had wasted much of the previous
summer (Livy, 25, 1). The severity of the punishment of the Tarentine
hostages who tried to escape from Rome caused a conspiracy of
Tarentines to betray the town to Hannibal. Livy, 25, 7-8.]

The conspirators left the town at first under the pretext of a
foray, and got near Hannibal’s camp before daybreak. Then, while
the rest crouched down on a certain wooded spot by the side of the
road, Philemenus and Nicon went up to the camp. They were seized by
the sentries and taken off to Hannibal, without saying a word as to
where they came from or who they were, but simply stating that they
wished for an interview with the general. Being taken without delay to
Hannibal they said that they wished to speak with him privately. He
assented with the utmost readiness; whereupon they explained to him
their own position and that of their native city, charging the Romans
with many various acts of oppression, that they might not seem to be
entering on their present undertaking without good reason. For the
present Hannibal dismissed them with thanks and a cordial acceptance
of their proposed movement, and charging them to come back very soon
and have another interview with him. “This time,” he added, “when you
get at a sufficient distance from the camp, take possession of the
first cattle you find being driven out to pasture in the early morning,
and go off boldly with them and their herdsmen; for I will take care
that you are unmolested.” His object in doing this was to give himself
time to inquire into the tale of the young men; and also to confirm
their credit with their fellow-citizens, by making it appear that
their expedition had really been for the purpose of foraging. Nicon
and his companions did as they were bidden, and left Hannibal in great
exultation at having at last got an opportunity of completing his
enterprise: while they themselves were made all the more eager to carry
out their plot by having been able to accomplish their interview with
Hannibal without danger, and by having found him warmly disposed to
their undertaking, and by having besides gained the confidence of their
own people by the considerable amount of booty which they had brought
home. This they partly sold and partly used in splendid entertainments,
and thus not only were believed in by the Tarentines, but excited a
considerable number to emulate their exploit.

[Sidenote: Bargain made with Hannibal.]

+27.+ On their next expedition, which they conducted in the same way
as the first, they interchanged pledges of fidelity with Hannibal on
the following conditions: “He was to set the Tarentines free; and the
Carthaginians were neither to exact tribute of any sort from them,
nor impose any burden upon them; but the houses and lodgings occupied
by Romans should, on their taking possession of the town, be given up
to the Carthaginians to plunder.” They also arranged on a watchword
at which the sentries were to admit them without delay into the
camp whenever they came. After making these arrangements, they got
the opportunity of often having interviews with Hannibal: sometimes
pretending to be going out of the town on a foray, and sometimes on
a hunting expedition. Everything having thus been put in train, the
greater part of the conspirators waited for the proper occasions
for acting, while they assigned to Philemenus the part of leader of
their hunting excursions; for, owing to his excessive taste for that
amusement, he had the reputation of thinking hunting the most important
thing in life. Accordingly they left it to him, first to win the favour
of Gaius Livius the commander of the town by presents of game, and then
that of the guards of the gate-tower which protected what were called
the Temenid gates. Philemenus undertook the task: and partly by what he
caught himself, and partly with what Hannibal supplied, always managed
to bring in some game; which he divided between Livius and the guards
of the gate, to induce them to be always ready to open the wicket to
him. For he generally went and returned from his expeditions after
nightfall, under the pretext of being afraid of the enemy, but really
with a view of preparing for the plot. When Philemenus then had managed
to make it a regular arranged thing with the picket at the gate, that
the guards should have no hesitation; but that, whenever he came under
the wall and whistled, they should open the wicket to him; he waited
for a day on which the Roman commander of the town was engaged to be
present at a large party, meeting early in the Musaeum, which is near
the agora, and agreed with Hannibal to carry out their plot on that day.

[Sidenote: Hannibal prepares to act.]

+28.+ For some time before this, Hannibal had given out that he was
ill, to prevent the Romans wondering when they were told of his staying
so long on the same ground; and he now made a greater pretence than
ever of ill-health, and remained encamped three days’ march from
Tarentum. But when the time was come, he got ready the most conspicuous
for their speed and daring in his cavalry and infantry, to the number
of about ten thousand, and gave orders that they should take provisions
for four days. He started just before daybreak, and marched at full
speed; having told off eighty Numidian horsemen to keep thirty stades
ahead, and to scour the country on both sides of the road; so that
no one might get a sight of the main body, but might either be taken
prisoners by this advanced guard, or, if he escaped, might carry a
report of it into the city as if it were merely a raid of Numidian
horsemen. When the Numidians were about a hundred and twenty stades
from the town, Hannibal halted his men for supper by the side of a
river flowing through a deep gully, and offering excellent cover; and
having summoned his officers, did not indeed tell them outright what
the service was on which they were going, but simply exhorted them,
first to show themselves brave men, as the prize awaiting them was the
greatest they had ever had; and, secondly, that each should keep the
men of his own company well together, and rebuke sharply all who left
their own division on any pretext whatever; and, thirdly, to attend
strictly to orders, and not attempt anything on their own account
outside them. Dismissing the officers with these words, he got his
troops on the march just after dark, being very anxious to reach the
wall about midnight; having Philemenus to act as guide, and having got
ready for him a wild-boar to enable him to sustain the part which he
was to perform.

[Sidenote: Gaius Livius thrown off the scent.]

+29.+ About sunset news was brought to Gaius Livius, who had been
with his friends in the Musaeum since early in the day, just when
the drinking was at its height, that the Numidians were scouring
the country. He therefore took measures for that and nothing more,
calling some of his officers and bidding them take half the cavalry,
and sally out to stop the progress of the enemy, who were devastating
the country: but this only made him still more unsuspicious of the
whole extent of the movement. Nicon, Tragiscus, and their confederates
collected together at nightfall in the town and waited for the return
of Livius and his friends. As these last rose from table somewhat
early, because the banquet had begun before the usual time, the
greater number of the conspirators retired to a certain spot and there
remained; but some of the younger men went to meet Gaius, imitating by
their disorderly procession and mutual jests a company returning from
a carouse. As Livius and his company were even more flustered with
drink, as soon as they met laughter and joking were readily excited
on both sides. Finally, they turned and conducted Gaius to his house;
where he went to bed full of wine, as might be expected after a party
beginning so early in the day, without any anxiety or trouble in
his thoughts, but full of cheerfulness and idle content. Then Nicon
and Tragiscus rejoined their companions, and, dividing themselves
into three companies, took up their positions at the most favourable
points in the market-place, to keep themselves fully acquainted with
everything reported from outside the walls, or that happened within
the city itself. They posted some also close to the house of Livius:
being well aware that, if any suspicion of what was coming arose, it
would be to him that the news would be first brought, and that from him
every measure taken would originate. So when the noise of the returning
guests, and every disturbance of the sort, had subsided, and the great
bulk of the citizens was asleep; and now the night was advancing, and
nothing had happened to dash their hopes, they collected together and
proceeded to perform their part of the undertaking.

[Sidenote: Why the Tarentines bury within the walls.]

+30.+ The arrangements between these young men and Hannibal were these.
Hannibal was to arrive at the town by the inland road and on the
eastern side near the Temenid gates; and when there, was to light a
fire on the tomb, which some called the tomb of Hyacinthus, and others
of Apollo: Tragiscus and his confederates, when they saw this, were to
light an answering fire from within the walls. This done, Hannibal was
to put out his fire and advance slowly towards the gate. In pursuance
of these arrangements, the young men marched through the inhabited part
of the town and came to the tombs. For the eastern quarter of Tarentum
is full of monuments, because those who die there are to this day all
buried within the walls, in obedience to an ancient oracle. For it is
said that the god delivered this answer to the Tarentines, “That it
were better and more profitable for them if they made their dwelling
with the majority”; and they thought therefore that they would be
living in accordance with the oracle if they kept the departed within
the walls. That is why to this day they bury inside the gates.

[Sidenote: Hannibal arrives and gets into the town.]

The young men, then, having gone as far as the tomb of Pythionicus,
waited to see what would happen. Presently Hannibal arrived and did
as arranged: whereupon Nicon and Tragiscus with renewed courage
displayed their beacon also; and, as soon as they saw the fire of the
Carthaginians being put out, they ran to the gates as fast as they
could go, wishing to get the picket at the gate tower killed before
the Carthaginians arrived; as it had been agreed that they should
advance leisurely and at a foot’s pace. Everything went smoothly: the
guards were overpowered; and while some of the young men were engaged
in killing them, others were cutting the bolts. The gates having been
quickly thrown open, Hannibal arrived at the right moment, having so
timed his march that he never had to stop on the way to the town at all.

[Sidenote: Philemenus also gets in.]

+31.+ Having thus effected their intended entrance, without danger or
any disturbance whatever, and thinking that the most important part
of their undertaking was accomplished, the Carthaginians now began
advancing boldly along the street leading up from what is called the
Batheia or Deep Road. They left the cavalry however outside the walls,
numbering as many as two thousand, intending them to act as a reserve
both in case of any appearance of the enemy from without, and of any of
those unforeseen casualties which do occur in such operations. But when
they had come to the immediate neighbourhood of the market-place, they
halted, and waited to see how the attempt of Philemenus would turn out:
being anxious as to the success of this part of their plan as well as
the other. For at the same moment that he lighted his fire, and was on
the point of starting for the gates, Hannibal had despatched Philemenus
also, with his boar on a litter, and a thousand Libyans, to the next
gate; wishing, in accordance with his original design, not to depend
solely on one chance, but to have several. When Philemenus, then,
arrived at the wall and gave his customary signal by whistling, the
sentry immediately appeared coming down to open the wicket; and when
Philemenus told him from outside to open quickly because they had a
great weight to carry, as they were bringing a wild boar, he made haste
to open the wicket, expecting that some of the game which Philemenus
was conveying would come his way, as he had always had a share of what
was brought in.

Thereupon Philemenus himself, being at the head of the litter, entered
first; and with him another dressed like a shepherd, as though he
were one of the country folk of those parts; and after him two others
besides who were carrying the dead beast behind. But when the four had
got inside the wicket, they struck and killed the man who opened it,
as he was unsuspiciously examining and feeling the boar, and then let
the men who were just behind them, and were in advance of the main body
of Libyan horsemen, to the number of thirty, leisurely and quietly
through. This having been accomplished without a hitch, some set about
cutting the bolts, others were engaged in killing the picket on duty at
the gate, and others in giving the signal to the Libyans still outside
to come in. These having also effected their entrance in safety, they
began making their way towards the market-place according to the
arrangement. As soon as he was joined by this division also, in great
delight at the successful progress of the operation, Hannibal proceeded
to carry out the next step.

+32.+ He told off two thousand of his Celts: and, having divided them
into three companies, he assigned two of the young men who had managed
the plot to each company; and sent with them also certain of his own
officers, with orders to close up the several most convenient streets
that led to the market-place. And when he had done this, he bade the
young men of the town pick out and save those of their fellow-citizens
whom they might chance to meet, by shouting out before they came up
with them, “That Tarentines should remain where they were, as they were
in no danger”; but he ordered both Carthaginian and Celtic officers to
kill all the Romans they met.

[Sidenote: Escape of Livius into the Citadel.]

[Sidenote: Massacre of Roman soldiers.]

So these companies separated and proceeded to carry out their orders.
But when the entrance of the enemy became known to the Tarentines, the
city began to be full of shouting and extraordinary confusion. As for
Gaius, when the enemy’s entrance was announced to him, being fully
aware that his drunkenness had incapacitated him, he rushed straight
out of the house with his servants, and having come to the gate leading
to the harbour, and the sentinel having opened the wicket for him,
he got through that way; and having seized one of the boats lying at
anchor there, went on board it with his servants and arrived safely at
the citadel. Meanwhile Philemenus had provided himself with some Roman
bugles, and some men who were able to blow them, from being used to
do so; and they stood in the theatre and sounded a call to arms. The
Romans promptly rallying in arms, as was their custom at this sound,
and directing their steps towards the citadel, everything happened
exactly as the Carthaginians intended; for as the Roman soldiers came
into the streets, without any order and in scattered groups, some of
them came upon the Carthaginians and others upon the Celts; and by
their being in this way put to the sword in detail, a very considerable
number of them perished.

But when day began to break, the Tarentines kept quietly in their
houses, not yet being able to comprehend what was happening. For thanks
to the bugle, and the absence of all outrage or plundering in the town,
they thought that the movement arose from the Romans themselves. But
the sight of many of the latter lying killed in the streets, and the
spectacle of some Gauls openly stripping the Roman corpses, suggested a
suspicion of the presence of the Carthaginians.

[Sidenote: Roman houses sacked, Tarentines spared.]

+33.+ Presently when Hannibal had marched his forces into the
market-place, and the Romans had retired into the citadel, as having
been previously secured by them with a garrison, and it had become
broad daylight, the Carthaginian general caused a proclamation to be
made to the Tarentines to assemble in full number in the market-place;
while the young conspirators went meanwhile round the town talking
loudly about liberty, and bidding everybody not to be afraid, for the
Carthaginians had come to save them. Such of the Tarentines as held
to their loyalty to Rome, upon learning the state of the case, went
off to the citadel; but the rest came to the meeting, in obedience to
the proclamation, without their arms: and to them Hannibal addressed
a cordial speech. The Tarentines heartily cheered everything he said
from joy at their unexpected safety; and he dismissed the crowd with
an injunction to each man, to go with all speed to his own house, and
write over the door, “A Tarentine’s”; but if any one wrote the same
word on a house where a Roman was living, he declared the penalty to
be death. He then personally told off the best men he had for the
service, and sent them to plunder the houses of the Romans; giving them
as their instructions to consider all houses which had no inscription
as belonging to the enemy: the rest of his men he kept drawn up as a
reserve.

[Sidenote: Fortifications raised to preserve the town from attack from
the citadel.]

+34.+ A vast quantity of miscellaneous property having been got
together by this plundering, and a booty fully answering the
expectations of the Carthaginians, they bivouacked for that night
under arms. But the next day, after consulting with the Tarentines,
Hannibal decided to cut off the city from the citadel by a wall, that
the Tarentines might not any longer be under continual alarm from the
Romans in possession of the citadel. His first measure was to throw
up a palisade, parallel to the wall of the citadel and to the trench
in front of it. But as he very well knew that the enemy would not
allow this tamely, but would make a demonstration of their power in
that direction, he got ready for the work a number of his best hands,
thinking that the first thing necessary was to overawe the Romans and
give confidence to the Tarentines. But as soon as the first palisade
was begun, the Romans began a bold and determined attack; whereupon
Hannibal, offering just enough resistance to induce the rest to come
out, as soon as the greater part of them had crossed the trench, gave
the word of command to his men and charged the enemy. A desperate
struggle ensued; for the fight took place in a narrow space surrounded
by walls; but at last the Romans were forced to turn and fly. Many of
them fell in the actual fighting, but the larger number were forced
over the edge of the trench and were killed by the fall over its steep
bank.

[Sidenote: Further works of security.]

+35.+ For the present Hannibal, after completing the palisade
unmolested, was content to remain quiet, as his plan had succeeded to
his wish; for he had shut in the enemy and compelled them to remain
inside their wall, in terror for the safety of the citadel as well
as for their own; while he had raised the courage of the citizens of
Tarentum to such an extent, that they now imagined themselves to be a
match for the Romans, even without the Carthaginians. A little later
he made at a short distance from the palisade, in the direction of the
town, a trench parallel to the palisade and the wall of the citadel;
and the earth dug out from it having been piled up on the other side
along the edge nearest the town, he erected another palisade on the
top, thus making a fortification no less secure than the wall itself.
Once more, at a moderate distance, nearer the city, he commenced
building a wall, starting from the street called Soteira up to that
called Batheia; so that, even without a garrison, the Tarentines were
adequately protected by the mere constructions themselves. Then leaving
a sufficient garrison, and enough cavalry to serve on outpost duty for
the protection of the wall, he encamped along the bank of the river
which is called by some the Galaesus, but by most people the Eurotas,
after the river which flows past Sparta. The Tarentines have many such
derived names, both in town and country, from the acknowledged fact
of their being a colony from Sparta and connected by blood with the
Lacedaemonians. As the wall quickly approached completion, owing to
the activity and zeal of the Tarentines, and the vigorous co-operation
of the Carthaginians, Hannibal next conceived the idea of taking the
citadel also.

[Sidenote: Hannibal’s arrangements for storming the citadel frustrated.]

[Sidenote: Romans reinforced.]

[Sidenote: New plans for cutting off the Roman supplies by sea.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 212-211.]

+36.+ But when he had already completed the preparation of the
necessary engines for the assault, the Romans received some slight
encouragement on a reinforcement throwing itself into the citadel
by sea from Metapontium; and consequently they sallied out by night
and attacked the works, and destroyed all Hannibal’s apparatus and
engines. After this Hannibal abandoned the idea of a storm: but as the
new wall was now completed, he summoned a meeting of the Tarentines
and pointed out to them that the most imperative necessity, in view
of the present state of things, was to get command of the sea. For
as the citadel commanded the entrance to the harbour, the Tarentines
could not use their ships nor sail out of it; while the Romans could
get supplies conveyed to them by sea without danger: and as long as
that was the case, it was impossible that the city should have any
security for its freedom. Hannibal saw this clearly, and explained to
the Tarentines that, if the enemy on the citadel were deprived of hope
of succour by sea, they would at once give way, and abandon it of their
own accord, without attempting to defend the place. The Tarentines
were fully convinced by his words: but how it was to be brought about
in the present state of affairs they could form no idea, unless a
fleet should appear from Carthage; which at that time of the year was
impossible. They therefore said that they could not understand what
Hannibal was aiming at in these remarks to them. When he replied that
it was plain that, even without the Carthaginians, they were all but in
command of the sea, they were still more puzzled, and could not guess
his meaning. The truth was that Hannibal had noticed that the broad
street, which was at once within the wall separating the town from the
citadel, and led from the harbour into the open sea, was well suited
for the purpose; and he had conceived the idea of dragging the ships
out of the harbour to the sea on the southern side of the town. Upon
his disclosing his idea to the Tarentines, they not only expressed
their agreement with the proposal, but the greatest admiration for
himself; and made up their minds that there was nothing which his
acuteness and daring could not accomplish. Trucks on wheels were
quickly constructed: and it was scarcely sooner said than done, owing
to the zeal of the people and the numbers who helped to work at it. In
this way the Tarentines dragged their ships across into the open sea,
and were enabled without danger to themselves to blockade the Romans
on the citadel, having deprived them of their supplies from without.
But Hannibal himself, leaving a garrison for the city, started with his
army, and returned in a three days’ march to his original camp; and
there remained without further movements for the rest of the winter....

FALL OF SYRACUSE, B.C. 212

[Sidenote: The method taken by a Roman to estimate the height of the
wall of Syracuse. Livy, 25, 23.] +37.+ He counted the layers; for as
the tower had been built of regular layers of stone, it was very easy
to reckon the height of the battlements from the ground....

[Sidenote: Fall of Syracuse by an escalade, autumn B.C. 212. Livy, 24,
23-31.]

Some days afterwards on information being given by a deserter that
the Syracusans had been engaged in a public sacrifice to Artemis for
the last three days; and that they were using very scanty food in the
festival though plenty of wine, both Epicydes and certain Syracusans
having given a large supply; Marcus Marcellus selected a part of the
wall somewhat lower than the rest, and thinking it probable that the
men were drunk, owing to the license of the hour, and the short supply
of food with their wine, he determined to attempt an escalade. Two
ladders of the proper height for the wall having been quickly made,
he pressed on the undertaking. He spoke openly to those who were fit
to make the ascent and to face the first and most conspicuous risk,
holding out to them brilliant prospects of reward. He also picked
out some men to give them necessary help and bring ladders, without
telling them anything except to bid them be ready to obey orders.
His directions having been accurately obeyed, at the proper time in
the night he put the first men in motion, sending with them the men
with the ladders together with a maniple and a tribune, and having
first reminded them of the rewards awaiting them if they behaved with
gallantry. After this he got his whole force ready to start; and
despatching the vanguard by maniples at intervals, when a thousand had
been massed in this way, after a short pause, he marched himself with
the main body. The men carrying the ladders having succeeded in safely
placing them against the wall, those who had been told off to make the
ascent mounted at once without hesitation. Having accomplished this
without being observed, and having got a firm footing on the top of the
wall, the rest began to mount by the ladders also, not in any fixed
order, but as best they could. At first as they made their way upon the
wall they found no one to oppose them, for the guards of the several
towers, owing to it being a time of public sacrifice, were either
still drinking or were gone to sleep again in a state of drunkenness.
Consequently of the first and second companies of guards, which they
came upon, they killed the greater number before they knew that they
were being attacked. And when they came near Hexapyli, they descended
from the wall, and forced open the first postern they came to which was
let into the wall, through which they admitted the general and the rest
of the army. This is the way in which the Romans took Syracuse....

[Sidenote: Livy, 25, 24.] None of the citizens knew what was happening
because of the distance; for the town is a very large one....

[Sidenote: The first quarter occupied. Livy, 25, 24.] But the Romans
were rendered very confident by their conquest of Epipolae....

       *       *       *       *       *

+38.+ He gave orders that the infantry should take the beasts of burden
along with the baggage tied upon them from the rear and range them in
front of themselves. This produced a defence of greater security than
any palisade.[324]...

       *       *       *       *       *

So entirely unable are the majority of mankind to submit to that
lightest of all burdens—silence....

       *       *       *       *       *

Anything in the future seems preferable to what exists in the
present....




BOOK IX

EXTRACT FROM THE PREFACE


[Sidenote: 142d Olympiad, B.C. 212-208.]

+1.+ Such are the most conspicuous transactions of this Olympiad, that
is, of the four years which an Olympiad must be reckoned to contain;
and I shall endeavour to include the history of them in two books.

I am quite aware that my history has an element of austerity in it,
and is adapted to, and will be approved by only one class of readers,
owing to the uniformity of its plan. Nearly all other historians, or at
any rate most, attract a variety of readers by entering upon all the
various branches of history. The curious reader is attracted by the
genealogical style; the antiquarian by the discussion of colonisations,
origins of cities, and ties of blood, such as is found in Ephorus; the
student of polities by the story of tribes, cities, and dynasties. It
is to this last branch of the subject that I have had a single eye, and
have devoted my whole work; and accordingly have, as I said before,
accommodated all my plans to one particular class of narrative. The
result is that I have made my work by no means attractive reading to
the majority. Why I thus neglected other departments of history, and
deliberately resolved to confine myself to chronicling actions, I have
already stated at length; however, there is no reason why I should not
briefly remind my readers of it again in this place, for the sake of
impressing it upon them.

+2.+ Seeing that many writers have discussed in many varieties of style
the question of genealogies, myths, and colonisations, as well as of
the foundations of cities and the consanguinity of peoples, there
was nothing left for a writer at this date but to copy the words of
others and claim them as his own,—than which nothing could be more
dishonourable; or, if he did not choose to do that, to absolutely
waste his labour, being obliged to acknowledge that he is composing a
history and bestowing thought on what has already been sufficiently set
forth and transmitted to posterity by his predecessors. For these and
sundry other reasons I abandoned such themes as these, and determined
on writing a history of actions: first, because they are continually
new and require a new narrative,—as of course one generation cannot
give us the history of the next; and secondly, because such a narrative
is of all others the most instructive. This it has always been: but
it is eminently so now, because the arts and sciences have made such
an advance in our day, that students are able to arrange every event
as it happens according to fixed rules, as it were, of scientific
classification. Therefore, as I did not aim so much at giving pleasure
to my readers, as at profiting those who apply to such studies, I
omitted all other themes and devoted myself wholly to this. But on
these points, those who give a careful attention to my narrative will
be the best witnesses to the truth of what I say....


THE HANNIBALIAN WAR

_In the previous year (212 B.C.) Syracuse had fallen: the two Scipios
had been conquered and killed in Spain: the siege-works had been
constructed round Capua, at the very time of the fall of Syracuse, i.e.
in the autumn, Hannibal being engaged in fruitless attempts upon the
citadel of Tarentum. See Livy, 25, 22._

[Sidenote: Q. Fulvius and Appius Claudius, the Consuls of the previous
year, were continued in command there, with orders not to leave the
place till it fell. Livy, 26, 1. Hannibal tries to raise the siege.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 211. Coss. Gnaeus Fulvius Centumalus, P. Sulpicius
Galba. The Romans were still engaged in the siege of Capua.]

+3.+ Entirely surrounding the position of Appius Claudius, Hannibal
at first skirmished, and tried all he could to tempt him to come out
and give him battle. But as no one attended to him, his attack became
very like an attempt to storm the camp; for his cavalry charged in
their squadrons, and with loud cries hurled their javelins inside the
entrenchments, and the infantry attacked in their regular companies,
and tried to pull down the palisading round the camp. But not even
so could he move the Romans from their purpose: they employed their
light-armed troops to repulse those who were actually attacking the
palisade, but protecting themselves with their heavy shields against
the javelins of the enemy, they remained drawn up near their standards
without moving. Discomfited at being neither able to throw himself into
Capua, nor induce the Romans to leave their camp, Hannibal retired to
consult as to what was best to be done.

[Sidenote: The determination and cautious tactics of the Romans.]

It is no wonder, in my opinion, that the Carthaginians were puzzled. I
think any one who heard the facts would be the same. For who would not
have received with incredulity the statement that the Romans, after
losing so many battles to the Carthaginians, and though they did not
venture to meet them on the field, could not nevertheless be induced
to give up the contest or abandon the command of the country? Up to
this time, moreover, they had contented themselves with hovering in
his neighbourhood, keeping along the skirts of the mountains; but now
they had taken up a position on the plains, and those the fairest in
all Italy, and were besieging the strongest city in it; and that with
an enemy attacking them, whom they could not endure even the thought of
meeting face to face: while the Carthaginians, who beyond all dispute
had won the battles, were sometimes in as great difficulties as the
losers. I think the reason of the strategy adopted by the two sides
respectively was, that they both had seen that Hannibal’s cavalry
was the main cause of the Carthaginian victory and Roman defeat.
Accordingly the plan of the losers after the battles, of following
their enemies at a distance, was the natural one to adopt; for the
country through which they went was such that the enemy’s cavalry would
be unable to do them any damage. Similarly what now happened at Capua
to either side was natural and inevitable.

[Sidenote: Carthaginian difficulties.]

+4.+ For the Roman army did not venture to come out and give battle,
from fear of the enemy’s horse, but remained resolutely within their
entrenchment; well knowing that the cavalry, by which they had
been worsted in the battles, could not hurt them there. While the
Carthaginians, again, naturally could not remain any longer encamped
with their cavalry, because all the pastures in the surrounding country
had been utterly destroyed by the Romans with that very view; and it
was impossible for animals to come from such a distance, carrying on
their backs hay and barley for so large a body of cavalry, and so many
beasts of burden; nor again did they venture, when encamped without
their cavalry, to attack an enemy protected by a palisade and fosse,
with whom a contest, even without these advantages in their favour, was
likely to be a doubtful one if they had not got their cavalry. Besides
this they were much alarmed about the new Consuls, lest they should
come and encamp against them, and reduce them to serious straits by
cutting off their supplies of provisions.

[Sidenote: Hannibal determines on creating a diversion by threatening
Rome.]

These considerations convinced Hannibal that it was impossible to raise
the siege by an open attack, and he therefore changed his tactics. He
imagined that if by a secret march he could suddenly appear in the
neighbourhood of Rome, he might by the alarm which he would inspire in
the inhabitants by his unexpected movement, perhaps do something worth
while against the city itself; or, if he could not do that, would at
least force Appius either to raise the siege of Capua, in order to
hasten to the relief of his native town, or to divide the Roman forces;
which would then be easier for him to conquer in detail.

[Sidenote: Hannibal informs the Capuans of his purpose.]

+5.+ With this purpose in his mind he sent a letter-carrier into
Capua. This he did by persuading one of his Libyans to desert to the
Roman camp, and thence to Capua. He took this trouble to secure the
safe delivery of his letter, because he was very much afraid that the
Capuans, if they saw him departing, would consider that he despaired of
them, and would therefore give up hope and surrender to the Romans. He
wrote therefore an explanation of his design, and sent the Libyan the
day after, in order that the Capuans, being acquainted with the purpose
of his departure, might go on courageously sustaining the siege.

[Sidenote: Excitement and activity at Rome.]

[Sidenote: Hannibal starts.]

When the news had arrived at Rome that Hannibal had encamped over
against their lines, and was actually besieging their forces, there
was universal excitement and terror, from a feeling that the result of
the impending battle would decide the whole war. Consequently, with
one heart and soul, the citizens had all devoted themselves to sending
out reinforcements and making preparations for this struggle. On their
part, the Capuans were encouraged by the receipt of Hannibal’s letter,
and by thus learning the object of the Carthaginian movement, to stand
by their determination, and to await the issue of this new hope. At
the end of the fifth day, therefore, after his arrival on the ground,
Hannibal ordered his men to take their supper as usual, and leave their
watch-fires burning; and started with such secrecy, that none of the
enemy knew what was happening. He took the road through Samnium, and
marched at a great pace and without stopping, his skirmishers always
keeping before him to reconnoitre and occupy all the posts along the
route: and while those in Rome had their thoughts still wholly occupied
with Capua and the campaign there, he crossed the Anio without being
observed; and having arrived at a distance of not more than forty
stades from Rome, there pitched his camp.

[Sidenote: Terror at Rome.]

+6.+ On this being known at Rome, the utmost confusion and terror
prevailed among the inhabitants,—this movement of Hannibal’s being as
unexpected as it was sudden; for he had never been so close to the
city before. At the same time their alarm was increased by the idea
at once occurring to them, that he would not have ventured so near,
if it were not that the armies at Capua were destroyed. Accordingly,
the men at once went to line the walls, and the points of vantage in
the defences of the town; while the women went round to the temples of
the gods and implored their protection, sweeping the pavements of the
temples with their hair: for this is their customary way of behaving
when any serious danger comes upon their country. But just as Hannibal
had encamped, and was intending to attempt the city itself next day,
an extraordinary coincidence occurred which proved fortunate for the
preservation of Rome.

[Sidenote: The Consular levies fortunately being at Rome enable the
Romans to make a counter-demonstration.]

[Sidenote: Hannibal devastates the Campagna.]

For Gnaeus Fulvius and Publius Sulpicius, having already enrolled one
consular army, had bound the men with the usual oath to appear at Rome
armed on that very day; and were also engaged on that day in drawing
out the lists and testing the men for the other army:[325] whereby
it so happened that a large number of men had been collected in Rome
spontaneously in the very nick of time. These troops the Consuls boldly
led outside the walls, and, entrenching themselves there, checked
Hannibal’s intended movement. For the Carthaginians were at first eager
to advance, and were not altogether without hope that they would be
able to take Rome itself by assault. But when they saw the enemy drawn
up in order, and learnt before long from a prisoner what had happened,
they abandoned the idea of attacking the city, and began devastating
the country-side instead, and setting fire to the houses. In these
first raids they collected an innumerable amount of booty, for the
field of plunder upon which they were entered was one into which no one
had ever expected an enemy to set foot.

[Sidenote: Hannibal starts on his return.]

[Sidenote: The passage of the Anio.]

[Sidenote: Hannibal turns upon his pursuers.]

+7.+ But presently, when the Consuls ventured to encamp within ten
stades of him, Hannibal broke up his quarters before daylight. He did
so for three reasons:—first, because he had collected an enormous
booty; secondly, because he had given up all hope of taking Rome; and
lastly, because he reckoned that the time had now come at which he
expected, according to his original idea, that Appius would have learnt
the danger threatening Rome, and would have raised the siege of Capua
and come with his whole force to the relief of the city; or at any rate
would hurry up with the greater part, leaving a detachment to carry on
the siege. Publius had caused the bridges over the Anio to be broken
down, and thus compelled Hannibal to get his army across by a ford;
and he now attacked the Carthaginians as they were engaged in making
the passage of the stream and caused them great distress. They were
not able however to strike an important blow, owing to the number of
Hannibal’s cavalry, and the activity of the Numidians in every part of
the field. But before retiring to their camp they wrested the greater
part of the booty from them, and killed about three hundred men; and
then, being convinced that the Carthaginians were beating a hasty
retreat in a panic, they followed in their rear, keeping along the
line of hills. At first Hannibal continued to march at a rapid pace,
being anxious to meet the force which he expected; but at the end of
the fifth day, being informed that Appius had not left the siege of
Capua, he halted; and waiting for the enemy to come up, made an attack
upon his camp before daylight, killed a large number of them, and drove
the rest out of their camp. But when day broke, and he saw the Romans
in a strong position upon a steep hill, to which they had retired, he
decided not to continue his attack upon them; but marching through
Daunia and Bruttium he appeared at Rhegium, so unexpectedly, that he
was within an ace of capturing the city, and did cut off all who were
out in the country; and during this excursion captured a very large
number of the Rhegini.

+8.+ It seems to me that the courage and determination both of the
Carthaginians and Romans at this crisis were truly remarkable; and
merit quite as much admiration as the conduct of Epaminondas, which I
will describe here for the sake of pointing the comparison.

[Sidenote: The rapid march of Epaminondas to Sparta, and back again to
Mantinea. See Xenophon, _Hell._ 7, 5, 8 _sq._ B.C. 362.]

[Sidenote: Xenophon, _Hell._ 7, 5, 8 _sq._ B.C. 362.]

[Sidenote: A Cretan warns Agesilaus.]

He reached Tegea with the allies, and when he saw that the
Lacedaemonians with their own forces in full were come to Mantinea,
and that their allies had mustered together in the same city, with the
intention of offering the Thebans battle; having given orders to his
men to get their supper early, he led his army out immediately after
nightfall, on the pretext of being anxious to seize certain posts with
a view to the coming battle. But having impressed this idea upon the
common soldiers, he led them along the road to Lacedaemon itself; and
having arrived at the city about the third hour of his march, contrary
to all expectation, and finding Sparta destitute of defenders, he
forced his way right up to the market-place, and occupied the quarters
of the town which <DW72> down to the river. Then however a contretemps
occurred: a deserter made his way into Mantinea and told Agesilaus what
was going on. Assistance accordingly arrived just as the city was on
the point of being taken; and Epaminondas was disappointed of his hope.
But having caused his men to get their breakfast along the bank of the
Eurotas, and recovered them from their fatigue, he started to march
back again by the same road, calculating that, as the Lacedaemonians
and their allies had come to the relief of Sparta, Mantinea would in
its turn be left undefended: which turned out to be the case. So he
exhorted the Thebans to exert themselves; and, after a rapid night
march, arrived at Mantinea about midday, finding it entirely destitute
of defenders.

But the Athenians, who were at that time zealously supporting the
Lacedaemonians in their contest with the Thebans, had arrived in virtue
of their treaty of alliance; and just as the Theban vanguard reached
the temple of Poseidon, seven stades from the town, it happened that
the Athenians showed themselves, by design, as if on the brow of the
hill overhanging Mantinea. And when they saw them, the Mantineans who
had been left behind at last ventured to man the wall and resist the
attack of the Thebans. Therefore historians are justified in speaking
with some dissatisfaction of these events,[326] when they say that
the leader did everything which a good general could, but that, while
conquering his enemies, Epaminondas was conquered by Fortune.

+9.+ Much the same remark applies to Hannibal. For who can refrain
from regarding with respect and admiration a general capable of
doing what he did? First he attempted by harassing the enemy with
skirmishing attacks to raise the siege: having failed in this he
made direct for Rome itself: baffled once more by a turn of fortune
entirely independent of human calculation, he kept his pursuers in
play,[327] and waited till the moment was ripe to see whether the
besiegers of Capua stirred: and finally, without relaxing in his
determination, swept down upon his enemies to their destruction, and
all but depopulated Rhegium. One would be inclined however to judge the
Romans to be superior to the Lacedaemonians at this crisis. For the
Lacedaemonians rushed off _en masse_ at the first message and relieved
Sparta, but, as far as they were concerned, lost Mantinea. The Romans
guarded their own city without breaking up the siege of Capua: on the
contrary, they remained unshaken and firm in their purpose, and in fact
from that time pressed the Capuans with renewed spirit.

I have not said this for the sake of making a panegyric on either the
Romans or Carthaginians, whose great qualities I have already remarked
upon more than once: but for the sake of those who are in office among
the one or the other people, or who are in future times to direct
the affairs of any state whatever; that by the memory, or actual
contemplation, of exploits such as these they may be inspired with
emulation. For in an adventurous and hazardous policy it often turns
out that audacity was the truest safety and the finest sagacity;[328]
and success or failure does not affect the credit and excellence of
the original design, so long as the measures taken are the result of
deliberate thought....


TARENTUM

[Sidenote: The Carthaginian fleet invited from Sicily to relieve
Tarentum does more harm than good, and departs to the joy of the
people, B.C. 211. Livy, 26, 20.]

When the Romans were besieging Tarentum, Bomilcar the admiral of the
Carthaginian fleet came to its relief with a very large force; and
being unable to afford efficient aid to those in the town, owing to the
strict blockade maintained by the Romans, without meaning to do so he
used up more than he brought; and so after having been constrained by
entreaties and large promises to come, he was afterwards forced at the
earnest supplication of the people to depart....


THE SPOILS OF SYRACUSE

+10.+ A city is not really adorned by what is brought from without, but
by the virtue of its own inhabitants....

[Sidenote: Syracuse was taken in the autumn, B.C. 212. “The ornaments
of the city, statues and pictures were taken to Rome.” Livy, 25, 40,
cp. 26, 21.]

The Romans, then, decided to transfer these things to their own city
and to leave nothing behind. Whether they were right in doing so, and
consulted their true interests or the reverse, is a matter admitting
of much discussion; but I think the balance of argument is in favour
of believing it to have been wrong then, and wrong now. If such had
been the works by which they had exalted their country, it is clear
that there would have been some reason in transferring thither the
things by which they had become great. But the fact was that, while
leading lives of the greatest simplicity themselves, as far as possible
removed from the luxury and extravagance which these things imply, they
yet conquered the men who had always possessed them in the greatest
abundance and of the finest quality. Could there have been a greater
mistake than theirs? Surely it would be an incontestable error for a
people to abandon the habits of the conquerors and adopt those of the
conquered; and at the same time involve itself in that jealousy which
is the most dangerous concomitant of excessive prosperity. For the
looker-on never congratulates those who take what belongs to others,
without a feeling of jealousy mingling with his pity for the losers.
But suppose such prosperity to go on increasing, and a people to
accumulate into its own hands all the possessions of the rest of the
world, and moreover to invite in a way the plundered to share in the
spectacle they present, in that case surely the mischief is doubled.
For it is no longer a case of the spectators pitying their neighbours,
but themselves, as they recall the ruin of their own country. Such
a sight produces an outburst, not of jealousy merely, but of rage
against the victors. For the reminder of their own disaster serves
to enhance their hatred of the authors of it. To sweep the gold and
silver, however, into their own coffers was perhaps reasonable; for it
was impossible for them to aim at universal empire without crippling
the means of the rest of the world, and securing the same kind of
resources for themselves. But they might have left in their original
sites things that had nothing to do with material wealth; and thus at
the same time have avoided exciting jealousy, and raised the reputation
of their country: adorning it, not with pictures and statues, but with
dignity of character and greatness of soul. I have spoken thus much as
a warning to those who take upon themselves to rule over others, that
they may not imagine that, when they pillage cities, the misfortunes of
others are an honour to their own country. The Romans, however, when
they transferred these things to Rome, used such of them as belonged to
individuals to increase the splendour of private establishments, and
such as belonged to the state to adorn the city....


SPAIN

[Sidenote: The two Scipios fall in B.C. 212.]

[Sidenote: Hasdrubal Gisconis tertius Carthaginiensium dux. Livy 24,
41, cp. 25, 37.]

+11.+ The leaders of the Carthaginians, though they had conquered their
enemies, could not control themselves: and having made up their minds
that they had put an end to the Roman war, they began quarrelling
with each other, finding continual subjects of dispute through the
innate covetousness and ambition of the Phoenician character; among
whom Hasdrubal, son of Gesco, pushed his authority to such a pitch
of iniquity as to demand a large sum of money from Andobales, the
most faithful of all their Iberian friends, who had some time before
lost his chieftainship for the sake of the Carthaginians, and had but
recently recovered it through his loyalty to them. When Andobales,
trusting to his long fidelity to Carthage, refused this demand,
Hasdrubal got up a false charge against him and compelled him to give
up his daughters as hostages....


ON THE ART OF COMMANDING ARMIES

+12.+ The chances and accidents that attend military expeditions
require great circumspection; and it is possible to provide for all of
them with precision, provided that a man gives his mind to the conduct
of his plan of campaign. Now that fewer operations in war are carried
out openly and by mere force, than by stratagem and the skillful use of
opportunity, any one that chooses may readily learn from the history
of the past. And again that operations depending on the choice of
opportunity oftener fail than succeed is easily proved from experience.
Nor can there be any doubt that the greater part of such failures are
due to the folly or carelessness of the leaders. It is time therefore
to inquire into the rules of this art of strategy.

Such things as occur in campaigns without having been calculated upon
in any way we must not speak of as operations, but as accidents or
casualties. It is the conduct of a campaign in accordance with an exact
plan that I am to set forth: omitting all such things as do not fall
under a scientific rule, and have no fixed design.

[Sidenote: The points of inherent importance in the conduct of a
campaign,—time, place, secrecy, code of signals, agents, and method.]

+13.+ Every operation requires a time fixed for its commencement, a
period and place for its execution, secrecy, definite signals, persons
by whom and with whom it is to be executed, and a settled plan for
conducting it. It is evident that the man who has rightly provided
for each of these details will not fail in the ultimate result, while
he who has neglected any single one of them will fail in the whole.
Such is the order of nature, that one insignificant circumstance will
suffice for failure, while for success rigid perfection of every detail
is barely enough.

Leaders then should neglect no single point in conducting such
expeditions.

[Sidenote: Things necessary. 1. Silence.]

Now the head and front of such precautions is silence; and not to
allow either joy at the appearance of an unexpected hope, or fear, or
familiarity, or natural affection, to induce a man to communicate his
plans to any one unconcerned, but to impart it to those and those alone
without whom it is impossible to complete his plan, and not even to
them a moment sooner than necessary, but only when the exigencies of
the particular service make it inevitable. It is necessary, moreover,
not only to be silent with the tongue, but much more so in the mind.
For it has happened to many generals before now, while preserving an
inviolable silence, to betray their thoughts either by the expression
of their countenances or by their actions.

[Sidenote: 2. Knowledge of the capabilities of the force in moving.]

The second requisite is to know accurately the conditions under which
marches by day or night may be performed, and the distances to which
they can extend, and not only marches on land, but also voyages by sea.

The third and most important is to have some knowledge of the seasons,
and to be able to adapt the design to them.

Nor again is the selection of the ground for the operation to be
regarded as unimportant, since it often happens that it is this
which makes what seems impossible possible, and what seemed possible
impossible.

[Sidenote: 3. Care in concerting signals.]

[Sidenote: 4. Care in selecting men.]

Finally there must be no neglect of the subject of signals and counter
signals; and the choice of persons by whom and with whom the operation
is to be carried out.

[Sidenote: 5. Knowledge of localities.]

+14.+ Of these points some are learnt by experience, some from history,
and others by the study of scientific strategy. It is a most excellent
thing too that the general should have a personal knowledge both of
the roads, and the locality which he has to reach, and its natural
features, as well as of the persons by whom and with whom he is to act.
If that is not possible, the next best thing is that he should make
careful inquiries and not trust just any one: and men who undertake to
act as guides to such places should always deposit security with those
whom they are conducting.

[Sidenote: 6. Accurate knowledge of natural phenomena enabling a
general to make accurate calculation of time.]

These, and other points like them, it is perhaps possible that leaders
may learn sufficiently from the mere study of strategy, whether
practical or in books. But scientific investigation requires scientific
processes and demonstrations, especially in astronomy and geometry; the
working out of which is not much to our present point, though their
results are important, and may contribute largely to the success of
such undertakings.

The most important operation in astronomy is the calculation of the
lengths of the days and nights. If these had been uniform it would not
have been a matter requiring any study, but the knowledge would have
been common to all the world: since however they not only differ with
each other but also with themselves, it is plainly necessary to be
acquainted with the increase and diminution of both the one and the
other. How can a man calculate a march, and the distance practicable in
a day or in a night, if he is unacquainted with the variation of these
periods of time? In fact nothing can be done up to time without this
knowledge,—it is inevitable otherwise that a man should be sometimes
too late and sometimes too soon. And these operations are the only ones
in which being too soon is a worse fault than being too late. For the
general who overstays the proper hour of action only misses his chance,
since he can find out that he has done so before he arrives, and so
get off safely: but he that anticipates the hour is detected when he
comes up; and so not only misses his immediate aim, but runs a risk of
ruining himself altogether.

[Sidenote: The divisions of the day;]

[Sidenote: of the night.]

+15.+ In all human undertakings opportuneness is the most important
thing, but especially in operations of war. Therefore a general must
have at his fingers’ ends the season of the summer and winter solstice,
the equinoxes, and the periods between them in which the days and
nights increase and diminish. For it is by this knowledge alone that
he can compute the distance that can be done whether by sea or land.
Again, he must necessarily understand the subdivisions both of the day
and the night, in order to know at what hour to order the reveillé,
or the march out; for the end cannot be attained unless the beginning
be rightly taken. As for the periods of the day, they may be observed
by the shadows or by the sun’s course, and the quarter of the heaven
in which it has arrived, but it is difficult to do the same for the
night, unless a man is familiar with the phenomenon of the twelve signs
of the Zodiac, and their law and order: and this is easy to those
who have studied astronomy. For since, though the nights are unequal
in length, at least six of the signs of the Zodiac are nevertheless
above the horizon every night, it is plain that in the same portions
of every night equal portions of the twelve signs of the Zodiac rise.
Now as it is known what portion of the sphere is occupied by the sun
during the day, it is evident that when he has set the arc subtended by
the diameter of his arc must rise. Therefore the length of the night
is exactly commensurate with the portion of the Zodiac which appears
above the horizon after sunset. And, given that we know the number and
size of the signs of the Zodiac, the corresponding divisions of the
night are also known. If however the nights be cloudy, the moon must be
watched, since owing to its size its light as a general rule is always
visible, at whatsoever point in the heaven it may be. The hour may be
guessed sometimes by observing the time and place of its rising, or
again of its setting, if you only have sufficient acquaintance with
this phenomenon to be familiar with the daily variation of its rising.
And the law which it too follows admits of being easily observed; for
its revolution is limited by the period of one month, which serves as a
model to which all subsequent revolutions conform.

[Sidenote: The example of Ulysses. See Odyss. 5, 270 _sq._]

+16.+ And here one may mention with admiration that Homer represents
Ulysses, that truest type of a leader of men, taking observations of
the stars, not only to direct his voyages, but his operations on land
also. For such accidents as baffle expectation, and are incapable of
being accurately reckoned upon, are quite sufficient to bring us to
great and frequent distress, for instance, downpours of rain and rise
of torrents, excessive frosts and snows, misty and cloudy weather, and
other things like these;—but if we also neglect to provide for those
which can be foreseen, is it not likely that we shall have ourselves
to thank for frequent failures? None of these means then must be
neglected, if we wish to avoid those errors into which many others are
said to have fallen, as well as the particular generals whom I am about
to mention by way of examples.

[Sidenote: Aratus fails at Cynaetha.]

+17.+ When Aratus, the Strategus of the Achaean league, attempted to
take Cynaetha by treachery, he arranged a day with those in the town
who were co-operating with him, on which he was to arrive on the banks
of the river which flows past Cynaetha, and to remain there quietly
with his forces: while the party inside the town about midday, when
they got an opportunity, were to send out one of their men quietly,
wrapped in a cloak, and order him to take his stand upon a tomb agreed
upon in front of the city; the rest were to attack the officers who
were accustomed to guard the gate while taking their siesta. This
being done, the Achaeans were to rise from their ambush and to make
all haste to occupy the gate. These arrangements made, and the time
having come, Aratus arrived; and having concealed himself down by the
river, waited there for the signal. But about an hour before noon, a
man, whose profession it was to keep a fine kind of sheep near the
town, wishing to ask some business question of the shepherd, came out
of the gate with his cloak on, and standing upon the same tomb looked
round to find the shepherd. Whereupon Aratus, thinking that the signal
had been given, hurried with all his men as fast as he could towards
the gate. But the gate being hurriedly closed by the guard, owing to no
preparations having yet been made by the party in the town, the result
was that Aratus not only failed in his attempt but was the cause of the
worst misfortunes to his partisans. For being thus detected they were
dragged forward and put to death. What is one to say was the cause of
this catastrophe? Surely that the general arranged only for a single
signal, and being then quite young had no experience of the accuracy
secured by double signals and counter-signals. On so small a point in
war does the success or failure of an operation turn.

[Sidenote: Cleomenes. See 2, 55.]

[Sidenote: May 12.]

+18.+ Again the Spartan Cleomenes, when proposing to take Megalopolis
by a stratagem, arranged with the guards of that part of the wall
near what is called the Cavern to come out with all their men in the
third watch, the hour at which his partisans were on duty on the wall;
but not having taken into consideration the fact that at the time of
the rising of the Pleiads the nights are very short, he started his
army from Sparta about sunset. The result was that he was not able
to get there in time, but being overtaken by daybreak, made a rash
and ill-considered attempt to carry the town, and was repulsed with
considerable loss and the danger of a complete overthrow. Now if he
had, in accordance with his arrangement, hit the proper time, and led
in his men while his partisans were in command of the entrance, he
would not have failed in his attempt.

[Sidenote: Philip’s attack on Meliteia. See 5, 97.]

Similarly, once more, King Philip, as I have already stated, when
carrying on an intrigue in the city of Meliteia, made a mistake in two
ways. The ladders which he brought were too short for their purpose,
and he mistook the time. For having arranged to arrive about midnight,
when every one was fast asleep, he started from Larissa and arrived in
the territory of Meliteia too early, and was neither able to halt, for
fear of his arrival being announced in the city, nor to get back again
without being discovered. Being compelled therefore to continue his
advance, he arrived at the city while the inhabitants were still awake.
Consequently he could neither carry the wall by an escalade, because of
the insufficient length of the ladders; nor enter by the gate, because
it was too early for his partisans inside to help him. Finally, he
did nothing but irritate the people of the town, and, after losing a
considerable number of his own men, retired unsuccessful and covered
with disgrace; having only given a warning to the rest of the world to
distrust him and be on their guard against him.

[Sidenote: Nicias, B.C. 413. Thucyd. 7, 50.]

+19.+ Again Nicias, the general of the Athenians, had it in his power
to have saved the army besieging Syracuse, and had selected the proper
time of the night for escaping the observation of the enemy, and
retiring to a place of safety. And then because the moon was eclipsed,
regarding it superstitiously as of evil portent, he stopped the army
from starting. Thanks to this it came about that, when he started the
next day, the enemy had obtained information of his intention, and
army and generals alike fell into the hands of the Syracusans. Yet if
he had asked about this from men acquainted with such phenomena, he
might not only have avoided missing his opportunity for such an absurd
reason, but have also used the occurrence for his own benefit owing
to the ignorance of the enemy. For the ignorance of their neighbours
contributes more than anything else to the success of the instructed.

[Sidenote: The method of judging of the length necessary for scaling
ladders.]

Such then are examples of the necessity of studying celestial
phenomena. But as for securing the proper length of scaling ladders,
the following is the method of making the calculation. Suppose the
height of the wall to be given by one of the conspirators within, the
measurement required for the ladders is evident; for example, if the
height of the wall is ten feet or any other unit, the ladders must be
full twelve; and the interval between the wall and the foot of the
ladder must be half the length of the ladder, that the ladders may
not break under the weight of those mounting if they are set farther
away, nor be too steep to be safe if set nearer the perpendicular. But
supposing it not to be possible to measure or get near the wall: the
height of any object which rises perpendicularly on its base can be
taken by those who choose to study mathematics.

+20.+ Once more, therefore, those who wish to succeed in military
projects and operations must have studied geometry, not with
professional completeness, but far enough to have a comprehension
of proportion and equations. For it is not only in such cases that
these are necessary, but also for raising the scale of the divisions
of a camp. For sometimes the problem is to change the entire form of
the camp, and yet to keep the same proportion between all the parts
included: at other times to keep the same shape in the parts, and to
increase or diminish the whole area on which the camp stands, adding
or subtracting from all proportionally. On which point I have already
spoken in more elaborate detail in my Notes on Military Tactics. For
I do not think that any one will reasonably object to me that I add a
great burden to strategy, in urging on those who endeavour to acquire
it the study of astronomy and geometry: for, while rather rejecting
all that is superfluous in these studies, and brought in for show and
talk, as well as all idea of enjoining their prosecution beyond the
point of practical utility, I am most earnest and eager for so much
as is barely necessary. For it would be strange if those who aim at
the sciences of dancing and flute-playing should study the preparatory
sciences of rhythms and music, (and the like might be said of the
pursuits of the palaestra), from the belief that the final attainment
of each of these sciences requires the assistance of the latter; while
the students of strategy are to feel aggrieved if they find that they
require subsidiary sciences up to a certain point. That would mean that
men practising common and inferior arts are more diligent and energetic
than those who resolve to excel in the best and most dignified subject,
which no man of sense would admit....


THE COMPUTATION OF THE SIZE OF CITIES

+21.+ Most people calculate the area merely from the length of the
circumference [of towns or camps]. [Sidenote: Sparta and Megalopolis.]
Accordingly, when one says that the city of Megalopolis has a circuit
of fifty stades, and that of Sparta forty-eight, but that Sparta
is twice the size of Megalopolis, they look upon the assertion as
incredible. And if one, by way of increasing the difficulty, were
to say that a city or camp may have a circuit of forty stades and
yet be double the size of one having a perimeter of a hundred, the
statement would utterly puzzle them. The reason of this is that we do
not remember the lessons in geometry taught us at school. I was led to
make these remarks because it is not only common people, but actually
some statesmen and military commanders, who have puzzled themselves
sometimes by wondering whether it were possible that Sparta should be
bigger, and that too by a great deal, than Megalopolis, while having a
shorter circuit; and at other times by trying to conjecture the number
of men by considering the mere length of a camp’s circuit. A similar
mistake is also made in pronouncing as to the number of the inhabitants
of cities. For most people imagine that cities in which the ground is
broken and hilly contain more houses than a flat site. But the fact
is not so; because houses are built at right angles not to sloping
foundations but to the plains below, upon which the hills themselves
are excrescences. And this admits of a proof within the intelligence
of a child. For if one would imagine houses on <DW72>s to be raised
until they were of the same height; it is evident that the plane of the
roofs of the houses thus united will be equal and parallel to the plane
underlying the hills and foundations.

So much for those who aspire to be leaders and statesmen and are yet
ignorant and puzzled about such facts as these....

Those who do not enter upon undertakings with good will and zeal cannot
be expected to give real help when the time comes to act....


THE HANNIBALIAN WAR, B.C. 211

Such being the position of the Romans and Carthaginians, Fortune
continually oscillating between the two, we may say with the poet

   “Pain hard by joy possessed the souls of each.”[329]...

There is profound truth in the observation which I have often made,
that it is impossible to grasp or get a complete view of the fairest of
all subjects of contemplation, the tendency of history as a whole, from
writers of partial histories....


THE CHARACTER OF HANNIBAL

+22.+ Of all that befell the Romans and Carthaginians, good or bad, the
cause was one man and one mind,—Hannibal.

For it is notorious that he managed the Italian campaigns in person,
and the Spanish by the agency of the elder of his brothers, Hasdrubal,
and subsequently by that of Mago, the leaders who killed the two
Roman generals in Spain about the same time. Again, he conducted the
Sicilian campaign at first through Hippocrates and afterwards through
Myttonus[330] the Libyan. So also in Greece and Illyria: and, by
brandishing before their faces the dangers arising from these latter
places, he was enabled to distract the attention of the Romans, thanks
to his understanding with Philip. So great and wonderful is the
influence of a Man, and a mind duly fitted by original constitution for
any undertaking within the reach of human powers.

[Sidenote: ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δείξει. Bias, in Aristot. Eth. 5, 1.]

But since the position of affairs has brought us to an inquiry into the
genius of Hannibal, the occasion seems to me to demand that I should
explain in regard to him the peculiarities of his character which have
been especially the subject of controversy. Some regard him as having
been extraordinarily cruel, some exceedingly grasping of money. But to
speak the truth of him, or of any person engaged in public affairs,
is not easy. Some maintain that men’s real natures are brought out
by their circumstances, and that they are detected when in office,
or as some say when in misfortunes, though they have up to that time
completely maintained their secrecy. I, on the contrary, do not regard
this as a sound dictum. For I think that men in these circumstances
are compelled, not only occasionally but frequently, either by the
suggestions of friends or the complexity of affairs, to speak and act
contrary to their real principles.

[Sidenote: Examples to the contrary. 1. Agathocles.]

[Sidenote: 2. Cleomenes.]

[Sidenote: 3. Athens.]

[Sidenote: 4. Sparta.]

[Sidenote: 5. Philip V.]

+23.+ And there are many proofs of this to be found in past history
if any one will give the necessary attention. Is it not universally
stated by the historians that Agathocles, tyrant of Sicily, after
having the reputation of extreme cruelty in his original measures for
the establishment of his dynasty, when he had once become convinced
that his power over the Siceliots was firmly established, is considered
to have become the most humane and mild of rulers? Again, was not
Cleomenes of Sparta a most excellent king, a most cruel tyrant, and
then again as a private individual most obliging and benevolent? And
yet it is not reasonable to suppose the most opposite dispositions
to exist in the same nature. They are compelled to change with the
changes of circumstances: and so some rulers often display to the world
a disposition as opposite as possible to their true nature. Therefore
the natures of men not only are not brought out by such things, but
on the contrary are rather obscured. The same effect is produced also
not only in commanders, despots, and kings, but in states also, by
the suggestions of friends. For instance, you will find the Athenians
responsible for very few tyrannical acts, and of many kindly and noble
ones, while Aristeides and Pericles were at the head of the state:
but quite the reverse when Cleon and Chares were so. And when the
Lacedaemonians were supreme in Greece, all the measures taken by King
Cleombrotus were conceived in the interests of their allies, but those
by Agesilaus not so. The characters of states therefore vary with
the variations of their leaders. King Philip again, when Taurion and
Demetrius were acting with him, was most impious in his conduct, but
when Aratus or Chrysogonus, most humane.

[Sidenote: Hannibal mastered by circumstances.]

[Sidenote: His cruelty.]

+24.+ The case of Hannibal seems to me to be on a par with these. His
circumstances were so extraordinary and shifting, his closest friends
so widely different, that it is exceedingly difficult to estimate his
character from his proceedings in Italy. What those circumstances
suggested to him may easily be understood from what I have already
said, and what is immediately to follow; but it is not right to omit
the suggestions made by his friends either, especially as this matter
may be rendered sufficiently clear by one instance of the advice
offered him. At the time that Hannibal was meditating the march from
Iberia to Italy with his army, he was confronted with the extreme
difficulty of providing food and securing provisions, both because
the journey was thought to be of insuperable length, and because the
barbarians that lived in the intervening country were so numerous and
savage. It appears that at that time this difficulty frequently came
on for discussion at the council; and that one of his friends, called
Hannibal Monomachus, gave it as his opinion that there was one and
only one way by which it was possible to get as far as Italy. Upon
Hannibal bidding him speak out, he said that they must teach the army
to eat human flesh, and make them accustomed to it. Hannibal could
say nothing against the boldness and effectiveness of the idea, but
was unable to persuade himself or his friends to entertain it. It is
this man’s acts in Italy that they say were attributed to Hannibal, to
maintain the accusation of cruelty, as well as such as were the result
of circumstances.

[Sidenote: His avarice.]

+25.+ Fond of money indeed he does seem to have been to a conspicuous
degree, and to have had a friend of the same character—Mago, who
commanded in Bruttium. That account I got from the Carthaginians
themselves; for natives know best not only which way the wind lies, as
the proverb has it, but the characters also of their fellow-countrymen.
But I heard a still more detailed story from Massanissa, who maintained
the charge of money-loving against all Carthaginians generally, but
especially against Hannibal and Mago called the Samnite. Among other
stories, he told me that these two men had arranged a most generous
subdivision of operations between each other from their earliest
youth; and though they had each taken a very large number of cities in
Iberia and Italy by force or fraud, they had never taken part in the
same operation together; but had always schemed against each other,
more than against the enemy, in order to prevent the one being with
the other at the taking of a city: that they might neither quarrel in
consequence of things of this sort, nor have to divide the profit on
the ground of their equality of rank.

[Sidenote: Effect of the fall of Capua, B.C. 211.]

+26.+ The influence of friends then, and still more that of
circumstances, in doing violence to and changing the natural character
of Hannibal, is shown by what I have narrated and will be shown by
what I have to narrate. For as soon as Capua fell into the hands of
the Romans the other cities naturally became restless, and began to
look round for opportunities and pretexts for revolting back again to
Rome. It was then that Hannibal seems to have been at his lowest point
of distress and despair. For neither was he able to keep a watch upon
all the cities so widely removed from each other,—while he remained
entrenched at one spot, and the enemy were manœuvering against him with
several armies,—nor could he divide his force into many parts; for he
would have put an easy victory into the hands of the enemy by becoming
inferior to them in numbers, and finding it impossible to be personally
present at all points. Wherefore he was obliged to completely abandon
some of the cities, and withdraw his garrisons from others: being
afraid lest, in the course of the revolutions which might occur, he
should lose his own soldiers as well. Some cities again he made up his
mind to treat with treacherous violence, removing their inhabitants to
other cities, and giving their property up to plunder; in consequence
of which many were enraged with him, and accused him of impiety or
cruelty. For the fact was that these movements were accompanied by
robberies of money, murders, and violence, on various pretexts at the
hands of the outgoing or incoming soldiers in the cities, because they
always supposed that the inhabitants that were left behind were on the
verge of turning over to the enemy. It is, therefore, very difficult to
express an opinion on the natural character of Hannibal, owing to the
influence exercised on it by the counsel of friends and the force of
circumstances. The prevailing notion about him, however, at Carthage
was that he was greedy of money, at Rome that he was cruel.[331]...


AGRIGENTUM

[Sidenote: Agrigentum taken by Marcus Valerius Laevinus, late in the
year B.C. 210, _jam magna parte anni circumacta_. Livy, 26, 40.]

+27.+ The city of Agrigentum is not only superior to most cities in the
particulars I have mentioned, but above all in beauty and elaborate
ornamentation. It stands within eighteen stades of the sea, so that it
participates in every advantage from that quarter; while its circuit of
fortification is particularly strong both by nature and art. For its
wall is placed on a rock, steep and precipitous, on one side naturally,
on the other made so artificially. And it is enclosed by rivers: for
along the south side runs the river of the same name as the town, and
along the west and south-west side the river called Hypsas. The citadel
overlooks the city exactly at the south-east, girt on the outside by
an impassable ravine, and on the inside with only one approach from
the town. On the top of it is a temple of Athene and of Zeus Atabyrius
as at Rhodes: for as Agrigentum was founded by the Rhodians, it is
natural that this deity should have the same appellation as at Rhodes.
The city is sumptuously adorned in other respects also with temples and
colonnades. The temple of Zeus Olympius is still unfinished, but in its
plan and dimensions it seems to be inferior to no temple whatever in
all Greece....

       *       *       *       *       *

[Sidenote: The treatment of the refugees and desperadoes who had
collected at Agathyrna in Sicily. See Livy, 26, 40 _fin._]

Marcus Valerius persuaded these refugees, on giving them a pledge
for the security of their lives, to leave Sicily and go to Italy, on
condition that they should receive pay from the people of Rhegium
for plundering Bruttium, and retain all booty obtained from hostile
territory....


GREECE

_Speech of Chlaeneas, the Aetolian, at Sparta. In the autumn of_ B.C.
211 _the Consul-designate, M. Valerius Laevinus, induced the Aetolians,
Scopas being their Strategus, to form an alliance with them against
Philip. The treaty, as finally concluded, embraced also the Eleans,
Lacedaemonians, King Attalus of Pergamum, the Thracian King Pleuratus,
and the Illyrian Scerdilaidas. A mission was sent from Aetolia to
persuade the Lacedaemonians to join. See Livy, 26, 24._

[Sidenote: B.C. 347.]

[Sidenote: Battle of Chaeronea, B.C. 338.]

[Sidenote: Succession of Alexander the Great, B.C. 336.]

[Sidenote: Destruction of Thebes, B.C. 335.]

“That the Macedonian supremacy, men of Sparta, was the beginning of
slavery to the Greeks, I am persuaded that no one will venture to deny;
and you may satisfy yourselves by looking at it thus. There was a
league of Greeks living in the parts towards Thrace who were colonists
from Athens and Chalcis, of which the most conspicuous and powerful was
the city of Olynthus. Having enslaved and made an example of this town,
Philip not only became master of the Thraceward cities, but reduced
Thessaly also to his authority by the terror which he had thus set up.
Not long after this he conquered the Athenians in a pitched battle, and
used his success with magnanimity, not from any wish to benefit the
Athenians—far from it, but in order that his favourable treatment of
them might induce the other states to submit to him voluntarily. The
reputation of your city was still such that it seemed likely, that, if
a proper opportunity arose, it would recover its supremacy in Greece.
Accordingly, without waiting for any but the slightest pretext, Philip
came with his army and cut down everything standing in your fields, and
destroyed the houses with fire. And at last, after destroying towns and
open country alike, he assigned part of your territory to the Argives,
part to Tegea and Megalopolis, and part to the Messenians: determined
to benefit every people in spite of all justice, on the sole condition
of their injuring you. Alexander succeeded Philip on the throne, and
how he destroyed Thebes, because he thought that it contained a spark
of Hellenic life, however small, you all I think know well.

[Sidenote: Battle of Crannon, ending the Lamian war, 7th Aug., B.C.
322.]

[Sidenote: Defeat of Brennus at Delphi, B.C. 279. Pausan. 10, 15;
20-23.]

+29.+ “And why need I speak in detail of how the successors of this
king have treated the Greeks? For surely there is no man living, so
uninterested in public affairs, as not to have heard how Antipater in
his victory at Lamia treated the unhappy Athenians, as well as the
other Greeks; and how he went so far in violence and brutality as to
institute man-hunters, and send them to the various cities to catch all
who had ever spoken against, or in any way annoyed, the royal family
of Macedonia: of whom some were dragged by force from the temples,
and others from the very altars, and put to death with torture, and
others who escaped were forced to leave Greece entirely; nor had they
any refuge save the Aetolian nation alone. For the Aetolians were
the only people in Greece who withstood Antipater in behalf of those
unjustly defrauded of safety to their lives: they alone faced the
invasion of Brennus and his barbarian army: and they alone came to your
aid when called upon, with a determination to assist you in regaining
your ancestral supremacy in Greece.[332] Who again is ignorant of the
deeds of Cassander, Demetrius, and Antigonus Gonatas? For owing to
their recency the knowledge of them still remains distinct. Some of
them by introducing garrisons, and others by implanting despots in the
cities, effectually secured that every state should share the infamous
brand of slavery. But passing by all these I will now come to the last
Antigonus,[333] lest any of you, viewing his policy unsuspiciously,
should consider that you are under an obligation to the Macedonians.
For it was with no purpose of saving the Achaeans that he undertook
the war against you, nor from any dislike of the tyranny of Cleomenes
inducing him to free the Lacedaemonians. If any man among you holds
this opinion, he must be simple indeed. No! It was because he saw
that his own power would not be secure if you got the rule of the
Peloponnese; and because he saw that Cleomenes was of a nature well
calculated to secure this object, and that fortune was splendidly
seconding your efforts, that he came in a tumult of fear and jealousy,
not to help Peloponnesians, but to destroy your hopes and abase your
power. Therefore you do not owe the Macedonians so much gratitude for
not destroying your city when they had taken it, as hostility and
hatred, for having more than once already stood in your way, when you
were strong enough to grasp the supremacy of Greece.

[Sidenote: Philip V.]

+30.+ “Again, what need to speak more on the wickedness of Philip? For
of his impiety towards the gods his outrages on the temples at Thermus
are a sufficient proof; and of his cruelty towards man, his perfidy and
treachery to the Messenians.

“So much for the past. But as to the present resolution before you, it
is in a way necessary to draft it, and vote on it, as though you were
deciding on war, and yet in real truth not to regard it as a war. For
it is impossible for the Achaeans, beaten as they are, to damage your
territory: but I imagine that they will be only too thankful to heaven
if they can but protect their own, when they find themselves surrounded
by war with Eleans and Messenians as allied to us, and with ourselves
at the same time. And Philip, I am persuaded, will soon desist from his
attack, when involved in a war by land with Aetolians, and by sea with
Rome and King Attalus. The future may be easily conjectured from the
past. For if he always failed to subdue Aetolians when they were his
only enemies, can we conceive that he will be able to support the war
if all these combine?

+31.+ “I have said thus much with the deliberate purpose of showing you
that you are not hampered by previous engagements, but are entirely
free in your deliberations as to which you ought to join—Aetolians or
Macedonians. If you are under an earlier engagement, and have already
made up your minds on these points, what room is there for further
argument? For if you had made the alliance now existing between
yourselves and us, previous to the good services done you by Antigonus,
there might perhaps have been some reason for questioning whether it
were right to neglect an old treaty in gratitude for recent favours.
But since it was subsequent to this much vaunted freedom and security
given you by Antigonus, and with which they are perpetually taunting
you, that, after deliberation and frequent consideration as to which of
the two you ought to join, you decided to combine with us Aetolians;
and have actually exchanged pledges of fidelity with us, and have
fought by our side in the late war against Macedonia, how can any one
entertain a doubt on the subject any longer? For the obligations of
kindness between you and Antigonus and Philip were cancelled then. It
now remains for you to point out some subsequent wrong done you by
Aetolians, or subsequent favour by Macedonians: or if neither of these
exist, on what grounds are you now, at the instance of the very men to
whom you justly refused to listen formerly, when no obligation existed,
about to undo treaties and oaths—the strongest bonds of fidelity
existing among mankind.”

Such was the conclusion of what was considered a very cogent speech by
Chlaeneas.

+32.+ After him the ambassador of the Acarnanians, Lyciscus, came
forward: and at first he paused, seeing the multitude talking to each
other about the last speech; but when at last silence was obtained, he
began his speech as follows:—

[Sidenote: Speech of Lyciscus, envoy from Acarnania, which country was
to fall to the Aetolians by the proposed new treaty. See Livy, 26, 24.]

“I and my colleagues, men of Sparta, have been sent to you by the
common league of the Acarnanians; and as we have always shared in
the same prospects as the Macedonians, we consider that this mission
also is common to us and them. For just as on the field of war, owing
to the superiority and magnitude of the Macedonian force, our safety
is involved in their valour; so, in the controversies of diplomacy,
our interests are inseparable from the rights of the Macedonians.
Now Chlaeneas in the peroration of his address gave a summary of the
obligations existing between the Aetolians and yourselves. For he said,
'If subsequent to your making the alliance with them any fresh injury
or offence had been committed by Aetolians, or any kindness done by
Macedonians, the present proposal ought properly to be discussed as
a fresh start; but that if, nothing of the sort having taken place,
we believe that by quoting the services of Antigonus, and your former
decrees, we shall be able to annul existing oaths and treaties, we are
the greatest simpletons in the world.’ To this I reply by acknowledging
that I must indeed be the most foolish of men, and that the arguments
I am about to put forward are indeed futile, if, as he maintains,
nothing fresh has happened, and Greek affairs are in precisely the same
position as before. But if exactly the reverse be the case, as I shall
clearly prove in the course of my speech,—then I imagine that I shall
be shown to give you some salutary advice, and Chlaeneas to be quite in
the wrong. We are come, then, expressly because we are convinced that
it is needful for us to speak on this very point: namely, to point out
to you that it is at once your duty and your interest, after hearing of
the evils threatening Greece, to adopt if possible a policy excellent
and worthy of yourselves by uniting your prospects with ours; or if
that cannot be, at least to abstain from this movement for the present.

+33.+ “But since the last speaker has ventured to go back to ancient
times for his denunciations of the Macedonian royal family, I feel
it incumbent on me also to say a few words first on these points, to
remove the misconception of those who have been carried away by his
words.

[Sidenote: Sacred war, B.C. 357-346. Onomarchus killed near the gulf of
Pagasae, B.C. 352. See Diodor. 16, 32-35.]

[Sidenote: Philip elected generalissimo against Persia in the congress
of allies at Corinth, B.C. 338.]

“Chlaenaes said, then, that Philip son of Amyntas became master of
Thessaly by the ruin of Olynthus. But I conceive that not only the
Thessalians, but the other Greeks also, were preserved by Philip’s
means. For at the time when Onomarchus and Philomelus, in defiance
of religion and law seized Delphi and made themselves masters of the
treasury of the god, who is there among you who does not know that
they collected such a mighty force as no Greek dared any longer face?
Nay, along with this violation of religion, they were within an ace of
becoming lords of all Greece also. At that crisis Philip volunteered
his assistance; destroyed the tyrants, secured the temple, and became
the author of freedom to the Greeks, as is testified even to posterity
by the facts. For Philip was unanimously elected general-in-chief
by land and sea, not, as my opponent ventured to assert, as one who
had wronged Thessaly; but on the ground of his being a benefactor of
Greece: an honour which no one had previously obtained. 'Ay, but,’ he
says, 'Philip came with an armed force into Laconia.' Yes, but it was
not of his own choice, as you know: he reluctantly consented to do so,
after repeated invitations and appeals by the Peloponnesians, under
the name of their friend and ally. And when he did come, pray observe,
Chlaeneas, how he behaved. Though he could have availed himself of
the wishes of the neighbouring states for the destruction of these
men’s territory and the humiliation of their city, and have won much
gratitude too by his act, he by no means lent himself to such a policy;
but, by striking terror into the one and the other alike, he compelled
both parties to accommodate their differences in a congress, to the
common benefit of all: not putting himself forward as arbitrator of the
points in dispute, but appointing a joint board of arbitration selected
from all Greece. Is that a proceeding which deserves to be held up to
reproach and execration?

[Sidenote: Alexander’s services to Greece.]

+34.+ “Again, you bitterly denounced Alexander, because, when he
believed himself to be wronged, he punished Thebes: but of his having
exacted vengeance of the Persians for their outrages on all the Greeks
you made no mention at all, nor of his having released us all in common
from heavy miseries, by enslaving the barbarians, and depriving them
of the supplies which they used for the ruin of the Greeks,—sometimes
pitting the Athenians against the ancestors of these gentlemen here, at
another the Thebans; nor finally of his having subjected Asia to the
Greeks.

[Sidenote: The Diadochi.]

[Sidenote: The Aetolian policy.]

“As for Alexander’s successors how had you the audacity to mention
them? They were indeed, according to the circumstances of the time, on
many occasions the authors of good to some and of harm to others: for
which perhaps others might be allowed to bear them a grudge. But to
_you_ Aetolians it is in no circumstance open to do so,—you who have
never been the authors of anything good to any one, but of mischief
to many and on many occasions! Who was it that called in Antigonus
son of Demetrius to the partition of the Achaean league? Who was it
that made a sworn treaty with Alexander of Epirus for the enslaving
and dismembering of Acarnania? Was it not you? What nation ever sent
out military commanders duly accredited of the sort that you have? Men
that ventured to do violence to the sanctity of asylum itself! Timaeus
violated the sanctuary of Poseidon on Taenarum, and of Artemis at Lusi.
Pharylus and Polycritus plundered, the former the sacred enclosure of
Here in Argos, the latter that of Poseidon at Mantinea. What again
about Lattabus and Nicostratus? Did not they make a treacherous attack
on the assembly of the Pan-boeotians in time of peace, committing
outrages worthy of Scythians and Gauls? You will find no such crimes as
these committed by the Diadochi.

[Sidenote: B.C. 279.]

[Sidenote: Defeat and death of Ptolemy Ceraunus in the battle with the
Gauls, B.C. 280. See Pausan. 10, 19, 7.]

+35.+ “Not being able to say anything in defence of any of these acts,
you talk pompously about your having resisted the invasion of Delphi by
the barbarians, and allege that for this Greece ought to be grateful
to you. But if for this one service some gratitude is owing to the
Aetolians; what high honour do the Macedonians deserve, who throughout
nearly their whole lives are ceaselessly engaged in a struggle with
the barbarians for the safety of the Greeks? For that Greece would
have been continually involved in great dangers, if we had not had
the Macedonians and the ambition of their kings as a barrier, who is
ignorant? And there is a very striking proof of this. For no sooner had
the Gauls conceived a contempt for the Macedonians, by their victory
over Ptolemy Ceraunus, than, thinking the rest of no account, Brennus
promptly marched into the middle of Greece. And this would often have
happened if the Macedonians had not been on our frontiers.

“However, though I have much that I could say on the past, I think
this is enough. Of all the actions of Philip, they have selected his
destruction of the temple, to fasten the charge of impiety upon him.
They did not add a word about their own outrage and crime, which
they perpetrated in regard to the temples in Dium, and Dodona, and
the sacred enclosures of the gods. The speaker should have mentioned
this first. But anything you Aetolians have suffered you recount to
these gentlemen with exaggeration: but the things you have inflicted
unprovoked, though many times as numerous as the others, you pass over
in silence; because you know full well that everybody lays the blame
of acts of injustice and mischief on those who give the provocation by
unjust actions themselves.

+36.+ “Of Antigonus I will only make mention so far, as to avoid
appearing to despise what was done, or to treat as unimportant so great
an undertaking. For my part I think that history does not contain the
record of a more admirable service than that which Antigonus performed
for you: indeed it appears to me to be unsurpassable. And the following
facts will show this. Antigonus went to war with you and conquered
you in a pitched battle. By force of arms he became master of your
territory and city at once. He might have exercised all the rights of
war upon you: but he was so far from inflicting any hardships upon you,
that, besides other benefits, he expelled your tyrant and restored your
laws and ancestral constitution. In return for which, in the national
assemblies, calling the Greeks to witness your words, you proclaimed
Antigonus your benefactor and preserver.

“What then ought to have been your policy? I will speak what I really
think, gentlemen of Sparta: and you will I am sure bear with me. For
I shall do this now from no wish to go out of my way to bring railing
accusations against you, but under the pressure of circumstances, and
for the common good. What then am I to say? This: that both in the late
war you ought to have allied yourselves not with Aetolians but with
Macedonians; and now again, in answer to these invitations, you ought
to join Philip rather than the former people. But, it may be objected,
you will be breaking a treaty. Which will be the graver breach of right
on your part,—to neglect a private arrangement made with Aetolians, or
one that has been inscribed on a column and solemnly consecrated in
the sight of all Greece? On what ground are you so careful of breaking
faith with this people, from whom you have never received any favour,
while you pay no heed to Philip and the Macedonians, to whom you owe
even the very power of deliberating to-day? Do you regard it as a duty
to keep faith with friends? Yet it is not so much a point of conscience
to confirm written pledges of faith, as it is a violation of conscience
to go to war with those who preserved you: and this is what, in the
present instance, the Aetolians are come to demand of you.

+37.+ “Let it, however, be granted that what I have now said may in
the eyes of severe critics be regarded as beside the subject. I will
now return to the main point at issue, as they state it. It was this:
'If the circumstances are the same now as at the time when you made
alliance with the Aetolians, then your policy ought to remain on the
same lines.’ That was their first proposition. 'But if they have been
entirely changed, then it is fair that you should now deliberate on the
demands made to you as on a matter entirely new and unprejudiced.' I
ask you therefore, Cleonicus and Chlaeneas, who were your allies on the
former occasion when you invited this people to join you? Were they not
all the Greeks? But with whom are you now united, or to what kind of
federation are you now inviting this people? Is it not to one with the
foreigner? A mighty similarity exists, no doubt, in your minds, and no
diversity at all! _Then_ you were contending for glory and supremacy
with Achaeans and Macedonians, men of kindred blood with yourselves,
and with Philip their leader; _now_ a war of slavery is threatening
Greece against men of another race, whom you think to bring against
Philip, but have really unconsciously brought against yourselves and
all Greece. For just as men in the stress of war, by introducing into
their cities garrisons superior in strength to their own forces, while
successfully repelling all danger from the enemy, put themselves at the
mercy of their friends,—just so are the Aetolians acting in the present
case. For in their desire to conquer Philip and humble Macedonia, they
have unconsciously brought such a mighty cloud from the west, as for
the present perhaps will overshadow Macedonia first, but which in the
sequel will be the origin of heavy evils to all Greece.

[Sidenote: B.C. 492. Herod. 6, 48; 7, 133.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 480]

+38.+ “All Greeks indeed have need to be on the alert for the crisis
which is coming on: but Lacedaemonians above all. For why was it, do
you suppose, men of Sparta, that your ancestors, when Xerxes sent an
ambassador to your town demanding earth and water, thrust the man into
a well, and, throwing earth upon him, bade him take back word to Xerxes
that he had got from the Lacedaemonians what he had demanded from
them,—earth and water? Why was it again, do you suppose, that Leonidas
and his men started forth to a voluntary and certain death? Was it not
that they might have the glory of being the forlorn hope, not only of
their own freedom, but of that of all Greece also? And it would indeed
be a worthy action for descendants of such heroes as these to make a
league with the barbarians now, and to serve with them; and to war
against Epirotes, Achaeans, Acarnanians, Boeotians, Thessalians, and in
fact against nearly every Greek state except Aetolians! To these last
it is habitual to act thus: and to regard nothing as disgraceful, so
long only as it is accompanied by an opportunity of plunder. It is not
so, however, with you. And what must we expect these people to do, now
that they have obtained the support of the Roman alliance? For when
they obtained an accession of strength and support from the Illyrians,
they at once set about acts of piracy at sea, and treacherously seized
Pylus; while by land they stormed the city of Cleitor, and sold the
Cynethans into slavery. Once before they made a treaty with Antigonus,
as I said just now, for the destruction of the Achaean and Acarnanian
races; and now they have done the same with Rome for the destruction of
all Greece.

[Sidenote: Herod. 7, 132.]

+39.+ “With a knowledge of such transactions before his eyes who could
help suspecting an attack from Rome, and feeling abhorrence at the
abandoned conduct of the Aetolians in daring to make such a treaty?
They have already wrested Oeniadae and Nesus from the Acarnanians,
and recently seized the city of the unfortunate Anticyreans, whom, in
conjunction with the Romans, they have sold into slavery.[334] Their
children and women are led off by the Romans to suffer all the miseries
which those must expect who fall into the hands of aliens; while the
houses of the unhappy inhabitants are allotted among the Aetolians.
Surely a noble alliance this to join deliberately! Especially for
Lacedaemonians: who, after conquering the barbarians, decreed that the
Thebans, for being the only Greeks that resolved to remain neutral
during the Persian invasion, should pay a tenth of their goods to the
gods.

“The honourable course then, men of Sparta, and the one becoming your
character, is to remember from what ancestors you are sprung; to be
on your guard against an attack from Rome; to suspect the treachery
of the Aetolians. Above all to recall the services of Antigonus: and
so once more show your loathing for dishonest men; and, rejecting the
friendship of the Aetolians, unite your hopes for the future with those
of Achaia and Macedonia. If, however, any of your own influential
citizens are intriguing against this policy, then at least remain
neutral, and do not take part in the iniquities of these Aetolians....”

       *       *       *       *       *

_In the autumn of B.C. 211, Philip being in Thrace, Scopas made a
levy of Aetolians to invade Acarnania. The Acarnanians sent their
wives, children, and old men to Epirus, while the rest of them bound
themselves by a solemn execration never to rejoin their friends except
as conquerors of the invading Aetolians. Livy, 26, 25._

+40.+ When the Acarnanians heard of the intended invasion of the
Aetolians, in a tumult of despair and fury they adopted a measure of
almost frantic violence....

If any one of them survived the battle and fled from the danger, they
begged that no one should receive him in any city or give him a light
for a fire. And this they enjoined on all with a solemn execration, and
especially on the Epirotes, to the end that they should offer none of
those who fled an asylum in their territory....

       *       *       *       *       *

_When Philip was informed of the invasion he advanced promptly to the
relief of Acarnania; hearing of which the Aetolians returned home._
_Livy_, l. c.

       *       *       *       *       *

Zeal on the part of friends, if shown in time, is of great
service; but if it is dilatory and late, it renders the assistance
nugatory,—supposing, of course, that they wish to keep the terms of
their alliance, not merely on paper, but by actual deeds.[335]...


INVESTMENT OF ECHINUS BY PHILIP

[Sidenote: In the campaigns of Philip, during the time that Publius
Sulpicius Galba as Proconsul commanded a Roman fleet in Greek waters,
_i.e._ from B.C. 209 to B.C. 206. See Livy, 26, 22, 28; 28, 5-7; 29,
12.]

+41.+ Having determined to make his approach upon the town at the
two towers, he erected opposite to them diggers’ sheds and rams; and
opposite the space between the towers he erected a covered way between
the rams, parallel to the wall. And when the plan was complete, the
appearance of the works was very like the style of the wall. For the
super-structures on the pent-houses had the appearance and style of
towers, owing to the placing of the wattles side by side; and the space
between looked like a wall, because the row of wattles at the top of
the covered way were divided into battlements by the fashion in which
they were woven. In the lowest division of these besieging towers the
diggers employed in levelling inequalities, to allow the stands of the
battering-rams to be brought up, kept throwing on earth, and the ram
was propelled forward: in the second story were water vessels and other
appliances for quenching fires, and along with them the catapults: and
on the third a considerable body of men were placed to fight with all
who tried to damage the rams; and they were on a level with the city
towers. From the covered way between the besieging towers a double
trench was to be dug towards the wall, between the city towers. There
were also three batteries for stone-throwing machines, one of which
carried stones of a talent weight, and the other two half that weight.
From the camp to the pent-houses and diggers’ sheds underground tunnels
had been constructed, to prevent men, going to the works from the camp
or returning from the works, being wounded in any way by missiles from
the town. These works were completed in a very few days, because the
district round produced what was wanted for this service in abundance.
For Echinus is situated on the Melian Gulf, facing south, exactly
opposite the territory of Thronium, and enjoys a soil rich in every
kind of produce; thanks to which circumstance Philip had no scarcity of
anything he required for his purpose. Accordingly, as I said, as soon
as the works were completed, they begun at once pushing the trenches
and the siege machinery towards the walls....

[Sidenote: Spring of B.C. 209.[336]

+42.+ While Philip was investing Echinus, and had secured his position
excellently on the side of the town, and had strengthened the outer
line of his camp with a trench and wall, Publius Sulpicius, the Roman
proconsul, ] and Dorimachus, Strategus of the Aetolians, arrived in
person,—Publius with a fleet, and Dorimachus with an army of infantry
and cavalry,—and assaulted Philip’s entrenchment. Their repulse led to
greater exertions on Philip’s part in his attack upon the Echinaeans,
who in despair surrendered to him. For Dorimachus was not able to
reduce Philip by cutting off his supplies, as he got them by sea....

       *       *       *       *       *

[Sidenote: Aegina taken before the end of 208 B.C., for Sulpicius
wintered there between 208-207 B.C. See Livy, 27, 32.]

When Aegina was taken by the Romans, such of the inhabitants as had
not escaped crowded together at the ships, and begged the proconsul to
allow them to send ambassadors to cities of their kinsmen to obtain
ransom. Publius at first returned a harsh answer, saying, that “When
they were their own masters was the time that they ought to have sent
ambassadors to their betters to ask for mercy, not now when they were
slaves. A little while ago they had not thought an ambassador from him
worthy of even a word; now that they were captives they expected to
be allowed to send ambassadors to their kinsfolk: was that not sheer
folly?” So at the time he dismissed those who came to him with these
words. But next morning he called all the captives together and said
that, as to the Aeginetans, he owed them no favour; but for the sake of
the rest of the Greeks he would allow them to send ambassadors to get
ransom, since that was the custom of their country....


ASIA

[Sidenote: July 26.]

[Sidenote: The transport of the army of Antiochus in his eastern
campaigns. See _supra_, 8, 25.]

+43.+ The Euphrates rises in Armenia and flows through Syria and the
country beyond to Babylonia. It seems to discharge itself into the
Red Sea; but in point of fact it does not do so: for its waters are
dissipated among the ditches dug across the fields before it reaches
the sea. Accordingly the nature of this river is the reverse of that
of others. For in other rivers the volume of water is increased in
proportion to the greater distance traversed, and they are at their
highest in winter and lowest in midsummer; but this river is fullest
of water at the rising of the dog-star, and has the largest volume
of water in Syria, which continually decreases as it advances. The
reason of this is that the increase is not caused by the collection
of winter rains, but by the melting of the snows; and its decrease by
the diversion of its stream into the land, and its subdivision for the
purposes of irrigation. It was this which on this occasion made the
transport of the army slow, because as the boats were heavily laden,
and the stream very low, the forces of the current did exceedingly
little to help them down.


EMBASSY FROM ROME TO PTOLEMY

[Sidenote: M. Atilius and Manius Glabrio sent to Alexandria with
presents to Ptolemy Philopator and Queen Cleopatra. Livy, 27, 4, B.C.
210.]

+44.+ The Romans sent ambassadors to Ptolemy, wishing to be supplied
with corn, as they were suffering from a great scarcity of it at home;
and, moreover, when all Italy had been laid waste by the enemy’s
troops up to the gates of Rome, and when all supplies from abroad were
stopped by the fact that war was raging, and armies encamped, in all
parts of the world except in Egypt. In fact the scarcity at Rome had
come to such a pitch, that a Sicilian medimnus was sold for fifteen
drachmae.[337] But in spite of this distress the Romans did not relax
in their attention to the war.

END OF VOL. I


FOOTNOTES:

[1] Vita Nicolai V. a _Dominico Georgio_, Rome, 1742, p. 206.

[2] Casaubon mentions in his preface several partial editions and
translations which had appeared by Greeks, Spaniards, Italians, and
Belgians. But he says all such translations were founded on the faulty
Latin translation of Perotti; and none were of any value. The only
fairly good one was a German translation.

[3] Unless the avoidance of the hiatus be counted one, which has
been pointed out by Hultsch. I cannot forbear from quoting here the
admirable words of Casaubon on the style of Polybius:—_Non deest sed
non eminet in Polybio facundia. Nihil vero est iniquius illis, qui
nullam putant esse eloquentiam, nisi uti nihil est præter eloquentiam.
Semper mihi apprime placuit Diodori Siculi sententia, vehementius in
historico eloquentiae studium improbantis. Verborum enim curam nimiam
veri fere par sequitur incuria. Oratio vultus animi est: ut hic fuerit
gravis aut solutus, ita etiam illa vel severa erit vel mollis._ The
nearest Greek to that of Polybius is II. Maccabees.

[4] Livy, 38, 30-34.

[5] Polyb. 23, 1, 7, 9.

[6] Polyb. 24, 6.

[7] Polyb. 29, 24.

[8] Plutarch, _Timol._ ch. 39; Plato, _Laws_, 947.

[9] Cicero, _Ep. ad Fam._ 5, 12

[10] Lucian, _Macrobii_, § 22.

[11] Livy, 36, 31.

[12] Pausan. 7, 9, 4.

[13] As Callicrates in B.C. 179; Polyb. 36, 2.

[14] 25, 9.

[15] 26, 3. Callicrates at the same time secured a party in his favour,
during his year of office B.C. 179, by restoring the Spartan and
Messenian exiles; in return for which the former set up his statue at
Olympia, the base of which is preserved. Hicks’s _Greek Inscriptions_,
p. 330.

[16] 28, 3.

[17] 28, 6.

[18] See 11, 8.

[19] 28, 12.

[20] The decree was brought into the Peloponnese by C. Popilius and Cn.
Octavius in B.C. 171. See Livy, 43, 17, _ne quis ullam rem in bellum
magistratibus Romanis conferret præter quam quod Senatus censuisset_.
Cp. Polyb. 28, 3.

[21] 28, 13-14.

[22] 28, 7.

[23] 29, 23.

[24] 29, 25, 26.

[25] Thus Appius Claudius Cento would be hostile from the rejection of
his illegal demand for 5000 men. One of the common grounds of offence
had long been the refusal of Philopoemen and other Strategi to summon
an assembly to meet a Roman officer unless he came duly authorised
with a definite communication from the Senate. On this ground
Quintus Caecilius was refused in B.C. 185 (Polyb. 23, 19) and also
Titus Flamininus in B.C. 183 (Polyb. 24, 5). See Freeman’s _Federal
Government_, pp. 652-655. And no doubt other cases of a similar nature
would occur, generally leading to an unfavourable report at Rome.

[26] Polyb. 30, 13. Thirlwall, vol. viii. p. 419.

[27] Pausanias, 7, 10, 7-12.

[28] Some few, it appears, had managed to escape, though at the risk of
certain execution if caught.

[29] Polyb. 29, 21. Plutarch, _Aemilius_, ch. 28.

[30] Diodorus Sic. _fr. lib._ 31; Plutarch, _Apophth. Scip. min._ 2.

[31] 32, 8-16.

[32] Thus he seems to have searched the Archives of the Pontifices.
Dionys. Halicarn. 1, 73. And he observed and criticised all Roman
customs, as, for instance, the provision for boys’ education at Rome.
Cic. _de Rep._ 4, 3.

[33] 31, 19-21.

[34] 35, 6.

[35] Livy, _Ep._ 49; Appian, _Pun._ 74-77.

[36] I infer this, not very confidently, from 9, 25.

[37] 37, 3.

[38] Scipio was born B.C. 185.

[39] 9, 25.

[40] 39, 3.

[41] Pliny, _N. H._ 5, § 9.

[42] Pausanias, 7, 11-12.

[43] _Ib._ 13.

[44] _Ib._ 14; Polyb. 38, 7-8.

[45] 38, 7-10.

[46] Thucyd. 3. 92.

[47] Livy says the battle was at Thermopylae. This was near enough for
a general statement, but Scarpheia is some miles to the south. Livy,
_Ep._ 52, Pausan. 7. 15.

[48] 39, 8 _sq._ Pausan. 7, 12 _sq._

[49] This has been much disputed. See Thirlwall’s note, vol. viii. p.
455. If the fragment, 29, 13 (40, 7) is given correctly by Strabo, it
seems certain that he must have arrived either before or immediately
after the fall of Corinth.

[50] 39, 13-14.

[51] 39. 15.

[52] Livy, _Ep._ 52.

[53] Pausan. 7, 16, 9. Polyb. 39, 16.

[54] Thus in B.C. 44 Brutus going out as propraetor to take the
province of Macedonia, goes first to Athens, and there, as well as
in the rest of Greece, collects troops and money. See the note in
Mommsen’s _History of Rome_, vol. III. p. 50 (book IV. c. 1.)

[55] Pausan. 8, 9, 1.

[56] _Id._ 8, 30, 8.

[57] _Id._ 8, 37, 2.

[58] _Id._ 8, 44, 5.

[59] _Id._ 8, 48, 8.

[60] The base of this has been discovered with its inscription—

       Ἡ πόλις ἡ τῶν Ἠλείων Πολύβιον
       Λυκόρτα Μεγαλοπολείτην.

       Hê polis tôn Hêleiôn Polybion
       Lykorta Megalopoleitên.

[61] Cicero, _Ep. ad Fam._ 5, 12. For the Numantine war (B.C. 134-132)
the authorities are Appian, _Hisp._ 48-98; Eutrop. 4, 17; Cicero _de
Off._ 1, 11, Strabo, 3, p. 162.

[62] 34, 14. Strabo, p. 677.

[63] 1, 1.

[64] 3, 4. It is clear that such passages, as for instance the
beginning of 2, 42, must have been written before B.C. 146, and perhaps
published, and therefore not altered. Cp. the answer of Zeno of Rhodes
to corrections sent by Polybius, that he could not make alterations, as
his work was already published (16, 20).

[65] 3, 57, cp. 34, 5.

[66] 21, 38.

[67] Lucian, _Macrobii_, §22.

[68] 9, 20.

[69] 10, 21.

[70] Cicero, _Epist. ad Fam._ 5, 12.

[71] 29, 10.

[72] 22, 14.

[73] _Off._ 3, 32.

[74] Republ. 2, 14, § 27.

[75] 3, 48.

[76] 3, 33.

[77] 3, 59.

[78] 9, 25.

[79] 10, 11.

[80] 16, 15.

[81] Dionys. Halic. 1, 17.

[82] 3, 22 _sqq._

[83] 31, 38.

[84] 34, 14.

[85] 12, 5.

[86] The elder Africanus died in B.C. 183.

[87] I append a list of all writers referred to by Polybius, the index
will show the places where they are mentioned. Aeneas Tacticus, Alcaeus
a grammarian, Antiphanes of Berga, Antisthenes of Rhodes, Aratus of
Sicyon, Archedicus, Aristotle, Callisthenes, Demetrius of Phalerum,
Demosthenes, Dicaearchus, Echecrates, Ephorus of Cumae, Epicharmus of
Cos, Eratosthenes, Eudoxus, Euemerus, Euripides, Fabius Pictor, Hesiod,
Homer, Philinus, Phylarchus, Pindar, Plato, Pytheas, Simonides of
Ceos, Stasinus, Strabo, Theophrastus of <DW26>s, Theopompus of Chios,
Thucydides, Timaeus, Xenophon, Zaleucus, Zeno of Rhodes.

[88] 1, 14, 15.

[89] See bk. 12.

[90] 12, 15.

[91] Athenaeus, vi. 272 _b_.

[92] Plutarch, _Nicias_, 1, _Arat._ 38.

[93] In the reference to the Seven Magi (5, 43), and to the story of
Cleobis and Bito (22, 20).

[94] Cornelius Nepos, _Alcib._ 11. Plutarch, _Lys._ 30. Lucian,
_Quomodo hist. conscr._ § 59.

[95] The History of the Achaean league is given with unrivalled
learning, clearness, and impartiality by Bishop Thirlwall in the eighth
volume of his _History of Greece_. Its constitution has been discussed
with great fulness by Professor E. A. Freeman in his _History of
Federal Government_. Recently Mr. Capes has published an edition of the
parts of Polybius referring to it which will be found useful; and Mr.
Strachan-Davidson has an able essay upon it in his edition of Extracts
from Polybius. Still some brief statement of the main features of this
remarkable attempt to construct a durable Hellenic Federation could not
be altogether omitted here.

[96] Take for instance the oath of the Pylagorae (Aeschin. _de Fal.
L._ 121): “We will destroy no city of the Amphictyony, nor cut off its
streams in peace or war; if any shall do so, we will march against him
and destroy his cities; should any pillage the property of the god, or
be privy to or plan anything against what is in his temple, we will
take vengeance on him with hand and foot and voice and all our might.”
This is indeed the language rather of a Militant Church than a state;
but it is easily conceivable that, had these principles been carried
out (which they were not), something nearer a central and sovereign
parliament might have arisen.

[97] Herodotus, vi. 7, 11-12.

[98] See Herod. 9, 15; Thucyd. 2, 2; 4, 91; 5, 37; Xenophon _Hellen._
3, 4, 4, Boeckh, _C. I. G._ vol. i. p. 726.

[99] Herod. 7, 145-169.

[100] _Id._ 7, 172-174.

[101] Herod. 9, 88; Polyb. 9, 39. Equally abortive proved another
attempt at combination in B.C. 377, when the ξύνεδροι from the islands
met for a time at Athens. Grote, vol. ix. p. 319.

[102] Herod. 6, 49.

[103] Polybius (12, 26 _c_.) says that in his time the schools were
generally in disrepute. But is not this generally the verdict of
“practical” men on universities? The excitement at Rome at the visit
of the philosophers (B.C. 155) seems to show that they still enjoyed a
world-wide reputation.

[104] Herod. 8, 73.

[105] Thucy. 1, 103.

[106] _Id._ 3, 94-98.

[107] Xen. _Hellen._ 4, 6, 13, 14.

[108] Pausan. 10, 38, 10.

[109] Demosth. 3 _Phil._ 120.

[110] Pausan. 1, 4, 4.

[111] 18, 4 and 5.

[112] Herod. 1, 145. Instead of Rhypes and Aegae, the first of which
seems to have been burnt, and the other to have for some reason been
deserted, Polybius (2, 41) mentions Leontium and Caryneia.

[113] Thucyd. 1, 111, 115.

[114] Thucyd. 4, 21.

[115] 2, 38, 39.

[116] 2, 39, 40.

[117] Plutarch, _Arat._ ch. 9.

[118] Plutarch, _Arat._ ch. 22.

[119] Though this law was several times broken, certainly in the
case of Philopoemen, and probably in that of Aratus also. It is very
difficult to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement of Aratus’s seventeen
generalships if the strict alternation is preserved. See Freeman’s
_Federal Government_, p. 601.

[120] 2, 46.

[121] Plutarch, _Cleomenes_, 3-16.

[122] Plutarch, _Cleom._ 3. Messenia had been free from the Spartans
since the battle of Leuctra (B.C. 371). Epaminondas had meant by
the foundation of Megalopolis and Messene (B.C. 371-370) to form a
united Messenian and Arcadian state as a counterpoise to Sparta. The
Messenians had drifted away from this arrangement, but were now members
of the Achaean league. Polyb. 4, 32.

[123] 2, 46.

[124] Plutarch, _Cleom._ 15.

[125] See the remarks of Plutarch, _Arat._ 38.

[126] He was believed to have been long in secret communication with
Antigonus. Plutarch, _l.c._

[127] Polyb. 8, 14; Plutarch, _Arat._ 52.

[128] 10, 22, 24

[129] 11, 9-10.

[130] Plutarch, _Philop._ 12, 13.

[131] Plutarch, _Philop._ 16; Livy, 38, 32-34.

[132] 2, 38.

[133] 26, 3 _sq._

[134] The title of Achaean Strategus seems to have been revived under
the Empire. _C. I. G._ 1124. The principal authorities for the history
of the last hundred years of Greek Independence, including that of
the Achaean league, are Polybius, beginning with book 2, and in its
turn going on throughout the rest of his work which remains; scattered
notices in Livy from 27, 29 to the end of his extant work, and the
epitomes of the last books, mostly translated directly from Polybius;
Plutarch’s Lives of Agis, Cleomenes, Aratus, Philopoemen, Flamininus,
Aemilius; Pausanias, 7, 6-16; parts of Diodorus; Justinus (epitome of
Trogus); and some fragments of Greek historians collected by Müller.

[135] I speak of course of the restored league after the election of
one Strategus began, B.C. 255.

[136] For the change of time of the election see note on 5, 1.

[137] We hear nothing of a secretary under the new league after the
abolition of the dual presidency. But he probably still existed (2, 43).

[138] 10, 22.

[139] See ch. 46.

[140] This is certainly the meaning of the words of Polybius. But he
has confused matters. The two new Consuls designated at the comitia
of 249 were C. Aurelius Cotta II and P. Servilius Geminus II, whereas
Lucius Junius Pullus was the existing Consul with the disgraced P.
Claudius Pulcher. What really happened is made clear by Livy, Ep. 19.
The Senate sent Junius with these supplies, recalled Claudius, and
forced him to name a Dictator. Claudius retaliated by naming an obscure
person, who was compelled to abdicate, and then Atilius Calatinus was
nominated.

[141] The dangerous nature of the S. Coast of Sicily was well known to
the pilots. See above, ch. 37.

[142] About £500,000. For the value of the talent, taking the Euboic
and Attic talent as the same, see note on Book 34, 8.

[143] ἱστορήσαντας. There seems no need to give this word the unusual
sense of _narratum legere_ here, as some do.

[144] Sicca Venerea, so called from a temple of Venus, was notorious
for its licentiousness. Valer. Max. 2, 6, 15.

[145] A line of the text appears to have been lost, probably containing
an allusion to Hiero.

[146] The southernmost point of Italy is Leucopetra (Capo dell' Armi).
Cocinthus (Punta di Stilo) is much too far to the north; yet it may
have been regarded as the conventional point of separation between
the two seas, Sicilian and Ionian, which have no natural line of
demarcation.

[147] Really 3/16; for 16 ases = 6 obols (one drachma or denarius) see
34, 8. The Sicilian medimnus is about a bushel and a half; the metretes
8½ gallons.

[148] Livy, 5, 17, 33-49; Plutarch, _Camillus_, 16; Mommsen, _History
of Rome_, vol. i. p. 338 (Eng. tr.)

[149] Compare the description of the Gauls given by Caesar, B.G. 6,
11-20. They had apparently made considerable progress in civilisation
by that time, principally perhaps from the influence of Druidism.
But the last characteristic mentioned by Polybius is also observed
by Caesar (15), _omnes in bello versantur atque eorum ut quisque
est genere copiisque amplissimus, ita plurimos circum se ambactos
clienteeque habet. Hanc unam gratiam potentiamque habent._ Even in the
time of Cato they were at least beginning to add something to their
warlike propensities. Or, 2, 2 (Jordan) _Pleraque Gallia duas res
industrissime persequitur, rem militare et argute loqui_. Cf. Diod. 5,
27 _sq._

[150] Lucius Caecilius, Livy, Ep. 12.

[151] For a more complete list of Gallic invasions in this period, see
Mommsen, _H.R._ i. p. 344. The scantiness of continuous Roman history
from B.C. 390, and its total loss from 293 to the first Punic war
renders it difficult to determine exactly which of the many movements
Polybius has selected.

[152] Ch. 13.

[153] This clause is bracketed by Hultsch, Mommsen, and
Strachan-Davidson. See the essay of the last named in his Polybius, p.
22. Livy, Ep. 20, gives the number of Romans and Latins as 300,000.

[154] Others read Ananes and Marseilles [’Ανάνων ... Μασσαλίας]; but it
seems impossible that the Roman march should have extended so far.

[155] That is, each city struck its own coin, but on a common standard
of weight and value. See P. Gardner’s Introduction to Catalogue of
Greek Coins (Peloponnesus) in the British Museum, p. xxiv.

[156] The Pythagorean clubs, beginning in combinations for the
cultivation of mystic philosophy and ascetic life, had grown to be
political,— a combination of the upper or cultivated classes to secure
political power. Thus Archytas was for many years ruler in Tarentum
(Strabo, 1, 3, 4). The earliest was at Croton, but they were also
established in many cities of Magna Graecia. Sometime in the fourth
century B.C. a general democratic rising took place against them, and
their members were driven into exile. Strabo, 8, 7, 1; Justin, 20, 4;
Iamblichus _vit. Pythag._, 240-262.

[157] The MS. vary between ὁμάριος and ὁμόριος. The latter form seems
to mean “god of a common frontier.” But an inscription found at
Orchomenus gives the form ἀμάριος, which has been connected with ἡμάρα
“day.”

[158] There was still an under-strategus (ὑποστρατηγὸς), see 5, 94; 23,
16; 30, 11. But he was entirely subordinate, and did not even succeed
to power on the death of a strategus during the year of office, as the
vice-president in America does.

[159] Alexander II. of Epirus, son of Pyrrhus, whom he succeeded B.C.
272. The partition of Acarnania took place in B.C. 266.

[160] Near Bellina, a town on the north-west frontier of Laconia, which
had long been a subject of dispute between Sparta and the Achaeans.
Plutarch _Arat._ 4; Pausan. 8, 35, 4.

[161] Ptolemy Euergetes (B.C. 247-222).

[162] The treaty, besides securing the surrender of the Acrocorinthus,
provided that no embassy should be sent to any other king without the
consent of Antigonus, and that the Achaeans should supply food and pay
for the Macedonian army of relief. Solemn sacrifices and games were
also established in his honour, and kept up long after his death at
Sicyon, see 28, 19; 30, 23. Plutarch, _Arat._ 45. The conduct of Aratus
in thus bringing the Macedonians into the Peloponnese has been always
attacked (see Plut. _Cleom._ 16). It is enough here to say that our
judgment as to it must depend greatly on our view of the designs and
character of Cleomenes.

[163] Phylarchus, said by some to be a native of Athens, by others of
Naucratis, and by others again of Sicyon, wrote, among other things,
a history in twenty-eight books from the expedition of Pyrrhus into
the Peloponnese (B.C. 272) to the death of Cleomenes. He was a fervent
admirer of Cleomenes, and therefore probably wrote in a partisan
spirit; yet in the matter of the outrage upon Mantinea, Polybius
himself is not free from the same charge. See Mueller’s _Histor.
Graec._ fr. lxxvii.-lxxxi. Plutarch, though admitting Phylarchus’s
tendency to exaggeration (_Arat._ 38), yet uses his authority both in
his life of Aratus and of Cleomenes; and in the case of Aristomachus
says that he was both racked and drowned (_Arat._ 44).

[164] ἡγεμόνα καὶ στρατηγὸν. It is not quite clear whether this is
merely a description of the ordinary office of Strategus, or whether
any special office is meant, such as that conferred on Antigonus. In
4, 11 ἡγεμόνες includes the Strategus and other officers. See Freeman,
_Federal Government_, p. 299.

[165] Of Chaereas nothing seems known; a few fragments of an historian
of his name are given in Müller, vol. iii. Of Sosilus, Diodorus (26,
fr. 6) says that he was of Ilium and wrote a history of Hannibal in
seven books. Nepos (Hann. 13) calls him a Lacedaemonian, and says that
he lived in Hannibal’s camp and taught him Greek.

[166] _i.e._ in Latium.

[167] ἐπιλάβηται _injecerit manum_, the legal form of claiming a slave.

[168] 1, 83.

[169] Saguntum of course is south of the Iber, but the attack on it
by Hannibal was a breach of the former of the two treaties. Livy (21,
2) seems to assert that it was specially exempted from attack in the
treaty with Hasdrubal.

[170] From ch. 21.

[171] βασιλεύς. The two Suffetes represented the original Kings of
Carthage (6, 51). The title apparently remained for sacrificial
purposes, like the ἄρχων βασιλεύς, and the _rex sacrificulus_.
Polybius, like other Greek writers, calls them βασιλεῖς. _Infra_, 42.
Herod. 7, 165. Aristot. Pol. 2, 8.

[172] A promontory in Bruttium, _Capo del Colonne_.

[173] This division of the world into three parts was an advance upon
the ancient geographers, who divided it into two, combining Egypt with
Asia, and Africa with Europe. See Sall. _Jug._ 17; Lucan, _Phars._ 9,
411; Varro de L. L. 5, § 31. And note on 12, 25.

[174] The _arae Philaenorum_ were apparently set up as boundary stones
to mark the territory of the Pentapolis or Cyrene from Egypt: and the
place retained the name long after the disappearance of the altars
(Strabo, 3, 5, 5-6).

[175] For Polybius’s calculation as to the length of the stade, see
note on 34, 12.

[176] Livy, 21, 25, calls it _Tannetum_, and describes it only as
_vicus Pado propinquus_. It was a few miles from Parma.

[177] _Pluribus enim divisus amnis in mare decurrit_ (Livy, 21, 26).

[178] See on ch. 33, note 2.

[179] This statement has done much to ruin Polybius’s credit as a
geographer. It indicates indeed a strangely defective conception of
distance; as his idea, of the Rhone flowing always west, does of the
general lie of the country.

[180] I have no intention of rediscussing the famous question of the
pass by which Hannibal crossed the Alps. The reader will find an
admirably clear statement of the various views entertained, and the
latest arguments advanced in favour of each, in the notes to Mr. W. T.
Arnold’s edition of Dr. Arnold’s _History of the Second Punic War_, pp.
362-373.

[181] περί τι λευκόπετρον, which, however, perhaps only means “bare
rock,” cf. 10, 30. But see Law’s _Alps of Hannibal_, vol. i. p. 201
_sq._

[182] His life according to one story, was saved by his son, the famous
Scipio Africanus (10, 3); according to another, by a Ligurian slave
(Livy, 21, 46).

[183] Livy says “to Mago,” Hannibal’s younger brother (21, 47). This
Hasdrubal is called in ch. 93 “captain of pioneers.”

[184] That is, four legions and their regular contingent of socii. See
6, 19 _sqq._

[185] “He crossed the Apennines, not by the ordinary road to Lucca,
descending the valley of the Macra, but, as it appears, by a straighter
line down the valley of the Auser or Serchio.”—ARNOLD.

[186] The marshes between the Arno and the Apennines south of Florence.

[187] ἀπεκοιμῶντο Schw. translates simply _dormiebant_. But the
compound means more than that; it conveys the idea of an interval of
sleep snatched from other employments. See Herod. 8, 76; Aristoph.
_Vesp._ 211.

[188] Livy, 22, 4-6. For a discussion of the modern views as to the
scene of the battle, see W. T. Arnold’s edition of Dr. Arnold’s
_History of the Second Punic War_, pp. 384-393. The radical difference
between the account of Livy and that of Polybius seems to be that the
former conceives the fighting to have been on the north shore of the
lake between Tucro and Passignano; Polybius conceives the rear to have
been caught in the defile of Passignano, the main fighting to have
been more to the east, where the road turns up at right angles to the
lake by La Torricella. Mr. Capes, however in his note on the passage
of Livy, seems to think that both accounts agree in representing the
fighting on the vanguard as being opposite Tucro.

[189] This treatment of non-combatants was contrary to the usages of
civilised warfare even in those days, and seems to have been the true
ground for the charge of _crudelitas_ always attributed to Hannibal by
Roman writers, as opposed to the behaviour of such an enemy as Pyrrhus
(Cic. _de Am._ 28). It may be compared to the order of the Convention
to give no quarter to English soldiers, which the French officers nobly
refused to execute.

[190] Polybius expresses the fact accurately, for, in the absence of
a Consul to nominate a Dictator, Fabius was created by a plebiscitum;
but the scruples of the lawyers were quieted by his having the title of
_prodictator_ only (Livy, 22, 8).

[191] Ramsay (_Roman Antiquities_, p. 148) denies this exception,
quoting Livy, 6, 16. But Polybius could hardly have been mistaken on
such a point; and there are indications (Plutarch, _Anton._ 9) that
the Tribunes did not occupy the same position as the other magistrates
towards the Dictator.

[192] The _ager Praetutianus_ was the southern district of Picenum
(Livy, 22, 9; 27, 43). The chief town was Interamna.

[193] On the Appian Way between Equus Tuticus and Herdonia, mod.
_Troja_.

[194] Holsten for the Δαύνιοι of the old text; others suggest _Calatia_.

[195] Added by conjecture of Schw. One MS. has δευτέρα ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ
Ἐριβανοῦ.

[196] Near Cales.

[197] Homer, _Odyss._ 10, 230.

[198] See i. 16.

[199] ἐξ ἀσπίδος ἐπιπαρενέβαλλον. The ordinary word for “forming line”
or “taking dressing” is παρεμβάλλειν. In the other two passages where
ἐπιπαρεμβάλλειν is used, ἐπί has a distinct (though different) force. I
think here it must mean “against,” “so as to attack.” And this seems to
be Casaubon’s interpretation.

[200] There is nothing here absolutely to contradict the picturesque
story of the death of Paulus given by Livy (22, 49), but the words
certainly suggest that Polybius had never heard it.

[201] A town on the lake of Trichonis, in Aetolia, but its exact
situation is uncertain. Strabo (10, 2, 3) says that it was on a fertile
plain, which answers best to a situation north of the lake.

[202] Cf. 9, 34. We know nothing of this incident.

[203] See 2, 53.

[204] The Achaean Strategus was elected in the middle of May, the
Aetolian in the autumn. Aratus would be elected May 12, B.C. 220, and
come into office some time before midsummer; Ariston’s Aetolian office
would terminate in September B.C. 220. See v. 1.

[205] The capture of Sicyon and expulsion of the tyrant Nicocles was
the earliest exploit of Aratus, B.C. 251. Plutarch, _Arat._ 4-9. The
taking of the Acrocorinthus from the Macedonian garrison was in B.C.
243, _ib._ ch. 19-24. For the affair at Pellene see _ib._ 31. The
capture of Mantinea was immediately after a defeat by Cleomenes. See
Plutarch, _Cleom._ 5.

[206] The city of Pheia was on the isthmus connecting the promontory
Ichthys (_Cape Katákolo_) with the mainland: opposite its harbour is
a small island which Polybius here calls _Pheias_, _i.e._ the island
belonging to Pheia.

[207] Caphyae was on a small plain, which was subject to inundations
from the lake of Orchomenus; the ditches here mentioned appear to be
those dug to drain this district. They were in the time of Pausanias
superseded by a high <DW18>, from the inner side of which ran the River
Tragus (_Tara_). Pausan. 8, 23, 2.

[208] The Olympiads being counted from the summer solstice, these
events occurring before midsummer of B.C. 220 belong to the 139th
Olympiad. The 140th begins with midsummer B.C. 220.

[209] But outside the natural borders of Arcadia. Mod. Kalávryta.

[210] By the diolcos which had been formed for the purpose. Strabo, 8,
2. Ships had been dragged across the Isthmus on various occasions from
early times. See Thucyd. 3, 15.

[211] Reading, μόνου. See ch. 13.

[212] A mountain on the frontier, on the pass over which the roads to
Tegea and Argos converge.

[213] A town of Phthiotis in Thessaly. See Book 25, 3.

[214] See ch. 15.

[215] See ch. 24.

[216] See Stobaeus Floril. 58, 9, who gives three more lines.

[217] Cf. ch. 74.

[218] The hero of the second Messenian war, B.C. 685-668 (Pausan. 4,
14-24). The story told by Pausanias, who also quotes these verses, is
that Aristocrates, king of the Arcadians, twice played the traitor to
Aristomenes, the Messenian champion: once at the battle of the Great
Trench, and again when Aristomenes renewed the war after his escape
from the Pits at Sparta; and that on the second occasion his own people
stoned him to death, and set up this pillar in the sacred enclosure of
Zeus on Mount Lycaeus.

[219] But Pausanias represents the pillar as put up by the Arcadians,
not the Messenians (4, 22, 7).

[220] The text is uncertain here.

[221] Reading with Hultsch, τὰ καλὰ.

[222] However cogent may be the reasons for his prophecy adduced by
Polybius, there are no signs of its being fulfilled. Indeed, the bank
at the mouth of the Danube, which he mentions, has long disappeared.
The fact seems to be that he failed to take into calculation the
constant rush of water out of the Euxine, which is sufficient to carry
off any amount of alluvial deposit.

[223] Xenophon, _Hellen._ 1, 1, 22.

[224] Or Tylis, according to Stephanos Byz., who says it was near the
Haemus. Perhaps the modern Kilios.

[225] Seleucus II. (Callinicus), B.C. 246-226. Seleucus III.
(Ceraunus), B.C. 226-223. Antiochus the Great (son of Callinicus), B.C.
223-187.

[226] Of Seleucus Callinicus.

[227] That this was the name of a yearly officer at Byzantium appears
from a decree in Demosthenes (_de Cor._ § 90), and Byzantine coins,
Eckhel, ii. p. 31. The title seems to have been brought from the
mother-city Megara; as at Chalcedon, another colony of Megara, the same
existed (C. I. G. 3794). It was connected with the worship of Apollo
brought from Megara, Müller’s _Dorians_, i. p. 250. It seems that this
use of the name (generally employed of the deputies to the Amphictyonic
council) was peculiarly Dorian. See Boeckh. C. I., vol. i. p. 610.

[228] Or Lyctos (Steph. Byz.)

[229] Of Arcadia, a city of Crete (Steph. Byz.)

[230] Which had a harbour formed by a projecting headland called
Lisses. Steph. Byz., who quotes Homer, _Odyss._ 3, 293:

   ἔστι δέ τις Λισσὴς αἰπεῖά τε εἰς ἅλα πέτρη.

[231] As a measure of weight a talent = about 57 lbs. avoirdupois. The
prepared hair was for making ropes and bowstrings apparently.

[232] Gortyna or Gortys is an emendation of Reiske for Gorgus, which is
not known. Gortys is mentioned by Pausanias, 5, 7, 1; 8, 27, 4; 8, 28,
1; it was on the river Bouphagus, and in the time of Pausanias was a
mere village.

[233] See 2, 41. We have no hint, as far as I know, of the
circumstances under which such recovery would take place. We may
conjecture from this passage that it would be on showing that losses
had been sustained by reason of a failure of the league to give
protection.

[234] Stephanos describes Ambracus as a πολιχνίον close to Ambracia.

[235] Though it was in the territory of Acarnania (Steph. Byz.)

[236] 3, 19.

[237] The position of Dodona, long a subject of doubt, was settled by
the discovery of the numerous inscriptions found about seven miles from
Jannina, and published by Constantine Caraponos in 1878, _Dodon et ses
Ruines_. See also _Journal of Hellenic Studies_, vol. i. p. 228.

[238] See ch. 68.

[239] Reading ἁλίαν. See Müller’s _Dorians_, vol. II, p. 88.

[240] The local name of Tarentine, though doubtless originating in
fact, had come to indicate a species of mercenary cavalry armed in a
particular way. Arrian, _Tact._ 4, distinguishes two sorts of light
cavalry for skirmishing Tarentines armed with javelins (δορατία), and
horse archers (ἱπποτοξόται). Cp, 11, 12. Livy 35, 29; 37, 40.

[241] Pausanias (8, 26, 7) calls him Hypatodorus; and mentions another
work of his at Delphi (10, 10, 3). He flourished about B.C. 370. He
was a native of Thebes. Sostratos was a Chian, and father of another
statuary named Pantias. Paus. 6, 9, 3.

[242] That is the office of the Polemarch, as in Athens the Strategium
(στρατηγίον) is the office of the Strategi. Plutarch, _Nicias_, 5.

[243] Yet the avowed project of Cleomenes was the restoration of the
ancient constitution. Plutarch, _Cleom._ c. 10.

[244] See ch. 59.

[245] From 4, 6, it appears that the election took place at the rising
of the Pleiades (13th May) and that the new Strategus did not enter
upon his office until some time afterwards, towards the middle of June
or even midsummer. But the custom apparently varied, and the use of
τότε seems to indicate a change.

[246] Later on the assemblies were held at the different cities in
turn. See 23, 17; 24, 10, etc.

[247] Νεοκρῆτες, cf. cc. 65, 79. Livy (37, 40) transcribes the word
_Neocretes_. It is uncertain what the exact meaning of the word is. It
seems most reasonable to suppose that, like Tarentini, it had ceased
to be an ethnical term, and meant mercenary soldiers (νέοι) armed like
Cretans, that is, as archers.

[248] The narrow channel between Leucas and the mainland, which had
been artificially enlarged. Dionys Halic. 1, 50.

[249] 4, 63.

[250] 4, 62.

[251] 4, 67.

[252] The pun disappears in translation. The line is

   ὁρᾷς τὸ +δῖον+ οὗ βέλος δίεπτατο.

[253] Games in his honour were celebrated at Sicyon. See Plutarch,
_Arat._ 45. _Cleomenes_, 16. _Supra_, p. 147 n. _Infra_, 28, 19; 30, 23.

[254] A memorial, apparently, of the fruitless expedition of Pyrrhus
into Laconia in B.C. 272.

[255] The Guard. The word _agema_ properly means the leading corps in
an army; but it obtained this technical meaning in the Macedonian army
(see Arrian, 1, 1, 11), whence it was used in other armies also founded
on the Macedonian model, as for instance in Alexandria (see _infra_,
ch. 65).

[256] Hypaspists, originally a bodyguard to the king, had been extended
in number and formed one or more distinct corps of light infantry
(Grote, ch. 92).

[257] Here again, as in 5, 1, the outgoing Strategus appears to go out
of office at the time of the election of his successor (see note on ch.
1, and cp. 4, 6). There seems to have been some variety of practice.
Perhaps the interval was left somewhat to mutual arrangement, the
summer solstice being the outside limit.

[258] See 2, 69.

[259] Archidamus was the brother of Agis, the king of the other line,
who had been assassinated in B.C. 240. Plutarch, _Cleom._ 5, probably
on the authority of Phylarchus, represents the murder of Archidamus as
not the work of Cleomenes, but of the same party that had murdered Agis
and feared the vengeance of his brother. (See Thirlwall, 8, p. 158, who
agrees with Plutarch.)

[260] Homer, _Il._, 22, 304.

[261] The false Smerdis (Herod. 3, 61-82).

[262] Hence the sacred breed of Nisaean horses, used for the Persian
king’s chariot (Herod 7, 40; 9, 20). The Nisaean plain was one of those
in Media containing the best pasture, and is identified by Rawlinson
with that of _Khawar_ and _Alistan_ near _Behistun_.

[263] ἕταιροι are cavalry; the πεζέταιροι of the Macedonian army are
represented in Polybius by the Hypaspists. See _supra_, ch. 27, cp. 16,
18.

[264] That is, Demetrius II. and Antigonus Doson.

[265] See Professor Mahaffy, _Greek Life and Thought_, p. 405, who
points out that this refers to the Egyptian troops especially, whose
old military castes (see Herod. 2, 164-6) though not extinct had
forgotten their old skill. In a sense, however, it applies to both
kinds of troops; for they had to be trained to act _together_, as is
shown in the next chapter.

[266] See above, ch. 5 note.

[267] Two different towns of this name have already been mentioned (ch.
48, 52). This Dura appears to be in Phoenicia; but nothing is known of
it.

[268] Seleucus I., B.C. 306-280. Antigonus, the One-eyed, in B.C. 318,
occupied Coele-Syria and Phoenicia after a victory over Perdiccas.
Diodor. Sic. 18, 43.

[269] Battle of Ipsus, B.C. 301.

[270] See _ante_, ch. 40-2, 57-8.

[271] Antiochus Hierax, son of Antiochus II.

[272] Laodice was the sister of the wife of Antiochus (5, 43) and a
daughter of King Mithridates (8, 22-23).

[273] Selge was said to be a colony of the Lacedaemonians. Strabo 13,
7, 3.

[274] Called Barathra. See Strabo, 17, 1, 21.

[275] Agema. See note on 5, 25.

[276] Sarissae, the long Macedonian spears.

[277] Polybius therefore reckons the value of the λέβητες and ὑδρίαι as
five talents.

[278] That is about 171,000 lbs., see 34, 8, note, reckoning the talent
as = 57 lbs.

[279] ἀρτάβη, an Egyptian measure = the Attic medimnus.

[280] Callinicus, ob. B.C. 226. This must refer to another case.

[281] See _ante_, ch. 30. Agetas had been elected Aetolian Strategus in
the autumn of 218 B.C., Aratus Achaean Strategus in the early summer of
B.C. 217.

[282] See 2, 61-4. B.C. 222.

[283] See 2, 39.

[284] See _supra_, ch. 24.

[285] According to Suidas, these were light vessels used by pirates:
but whether the name arose from their construction, capacity, or the
number of their oars, seems uncertain. According to Hesychius they had
two banks of oars (δίκροτος ναῦς· πλοῖον μικρόν).

[286] See ch. 95.

[287] This language is so vague that we might suppose from it that
the Achaeans elected Timoxenus in the summer of B.C. 217 to come
into office in the following spring. But there is nowhere else any
indication of such an interval at this period, and we must suppose
Polybius to be speaking in general terms of the result of the peace
during the next ten months. Agelaus was elected Aetolian Strategus in
the autumn of B.C. 217.

[288] Euripides, fr. 529. Ed. Nauck.

[289] Some disconnected fragments which are usually placed at the end
of the first chapter, and form the second chapter of this book, I have
placed among the minor fragments at the end of these volumes.

[290] Aristotle’s classification is kingship, aristocracy, πολιτεία,
democracy, oligarchy, tyranny (Pol. 4, 2). This was derived from Plato
(Pol. 302, c.) who arranges the six (besides the ideal polity) in
pairs, kingship, tyranny,—aristocracy, oligarchy,—democracy, good and
bad. Plato has no distinct name except δημοκρατία παράνομος, for the
bad democracy which Polybius calls ὀχλοκρατία, “mob-rule.” Polybius’s
arrangement is this—

   Kingship (arising from a natural despotism or monarchy)
     degenerates into                                          Tyranny.

   Aristocracy degenerates into                              Oligarchy.

   Democracy   degenerates into                               Mob-rule.

[291] εὐθύνας. Polybius uses a word well known at Athens and other
Greek states, but the audit of a Consul seems to have been one of money
accounts only. At the expiration, however, of his office he took an
oath in public that he had obeyed the laws, and if any prosecution were
brought against him it would be tried before the people. See the case
of Publius Claudius, 1, 52.

[292] This refers primarily to the _consilium_ of the _quaesitor_ in
any special _quaestio_, which up to the time of the lex judiciaria of
Gracchus, B.C. 122, was invariably composed of Senators. The same would
apply to the _Quaestiones perpetuae_, only one of which existed in the
time of Polybius, i.e., _de repetundis_, established in 149 B.C. by the
lex Calpurnia. Other single judices in civil suits, though nominated by
the Praetor, were, Polybius intimates, almost necessarily Senators in
cases of importance.

[293] Casaubon altered this to “two hundred.” In 3, 107, Polybius
certainly states that the ordinary number of cavalry was 200, raised
in cases of emergency to 300, and Livy, 22, 36, gives an instance. But
both authors in many other passages mention 300 as the usual number,
and any alteration of this passage would be unsafe.

[294] _Praefectus sociis_ and _quaestor_. But this quaestor must be
distinguished from the Roman quaestors.

[295] For the Spanish sword see Fr. xxii.

[296] Polybius does not mention the subdivision of maniples into
centuries, for which the word ordines is sometimes used. Livy, 8, 8;
42, 34.

[297] The plethrum = 10,000 square feet. The side of the square of the
Praetorium, therefore, is 200 feet.

[298] That is the _via_ separating it from the next block, or from the
vallum.

[299] That is, one between the two legions, and two between the blocks
in each.

[300] That is to say—without the _extraordinarii_ (⅕)—there are 2400 to
get into 10 spaces instead of 3000 into 30.

[301] That is, who have been selected from the pedites sociorum to
serve on the praetoria cohors.

[302] Polybius always calls this the χάραξ or χαράκωμα. But the Romans
had two words, _agger_ the embankment, and _vallum_ the palisading on
the top of it. Either word, however, is often used to represent the
whole structure.

[303] That is, whether in first, second, or other watch in the night.

[304] See the story of Cato’s son, Plutarch, _Cato Maj._ 20.

[305] In seeking a constitution to compare with that of Rome, that of
Athens is rejected (1) as not being a mixed one, (2) as not having been
successful: successful, that is, in gaining or keeping an empire. He is
speaking somewhat loosely. The power of Athens, of which Themistocles
laid the foundation, was mainly consolidated by Pericles; so that
Polybius includes much of the period of her rise with that of her
decline.

[306] For what remains of the account of Ephorus see Strabo, 10, 4,
8-9. The reference to Plato is to the “Laws,” especially Book I.
See also Aristotle, _Pol._ 2, 10, who points out the likeness and
unlikeness between the Cretan and Lacedaemonian constitutions.

[307] This equality of land had gradually disappeared by the time of
King Agis IV. (B.C. 243-239): so that, according to Plutarch [_Agis_
5], the number of landowners was reduced to 100. This process had been
accelerated by the Rhetra of Epitadeus, allowing free bequest of land,
Plutarch, _ib._ See Thirlwall, vol. viii. p. 132.

[308] The meaning of νενεμημένους, which I here represent by “acquired
a recognised position,” is at least doubtful. Casaubon translates it
_qui in album non fuerint recepti_, referring to Sueton. Nero, 21. But
nothing is elsewhere known of such an _album_ for registering the names
of recognised athletes. The passage is important as helping to explain
how the number of those entering for the contests in the greater games
was practically limited, and therefore how it happened that, for
instance, the five contests of the Pentathlum did not often fall to
different athletes so as to leave the victory uncertain.

[309] The Carthaginian Suffetes are always called βασιλεῖς by the
Greek writers: see 3, 33, note; Herod. 7, 165; Diod. Sic. 14, 53.
Aristotle [_Pol._ 2, 11], in contrasting the Spartan and Carthaginian
constitutions, mentions with approval that, unlike the Spartan kings,
those at Carthage were elected, and were not confined to a particular
family.

[310] See Bosworth Smith, _Carthage and the Carthaginians_, p. 26 ff.

[311] This seems to be the only authority for assigning to the censors
the _toga purpurea_ instead of the _toga praetexta_: and, indeed,
Athenaeus speaks of them as wearing the toga praetexta περιπόρφυρος,
14, 69. In Livy, 40, 45, they occupy _sellae curules_.

[312] Livy (2, 10) makes Cocles succeed in reaching the bank alive.

[313] But Polybius afterwards admits that a falling off in this respect
had begun. See 18, 35; 32, 11.

[314] Livy, 22, 58-61.

[315] κακοὶ κακῶς, a phrase at once insulting and vulgar.

[316] Plutarch, _Aratus_, ch. 48.

[317] βαλανάγρας. The βαλανάγρα was a straight piece of wood with
upright pins corresponding with those that fall into the bolt (the
βάλανοι), and which are pushed up by it. It was thus used as a key
which could be taken out and kept by the Commandant, as in Herod. 3,
155; Thucyd. 2, 4. But Polybius here seems to use it as equivalent to
βάλανος. See Aeneas, _Tact._ 18-20, who recommends that the μόχλος
should be sheeted with iron to prevent this very operation. Cp. 4, 57.
What he means by ζύγωμα on the outside (here translated “fastenings”)
is also somewhat doubtful. From Hesychius, s.v. ἐπιξευκτήρ, it might be
conjectured that chains of some kind were intended. Casaubon supposed
it to be a cross bar similar to the μόχλος inside, and Schw. to
represent the posts and the lintel connecting them.

[318] See 5, 37. According to Phylarchus the murder of Archidamus was
against the wish of Cleomenes. Plut. _Cleom._ 5.

[319] To which proceedings may be referred a sentence of Polybius
preserved by Suidas, s.v. διεσκευασμένην—“They send out certain
Cretans, as though on a raid, giving them a sham despatch to carry.”
See Livy, 24, 30-31.

[320] Cp. 1, 35.

[321] σκορπίδια, mentioned among a number of similar engines in 1
Macc. 6, 51. Plutarch calls them σκορπίοι, and explains that they only
carried a short distance, but, being concealed, gave wounds at close
quarters; hence, doubtless, their name.

[322] See also Athenaeus, 4, 166-167. Theopompus of Chius was a
contemporary of Philip II. and Alexander, having been born about B.C.
376-372.

[323] The accusation of administering slow poisons is a very common
one, as readers of mediæval history know. But the ignorance of the
conditions of health was too great to allow us to accept them without
question. It is doubtful whether drugs, acting in this particular way,
were known to the ancients; and certainly spitting blood would be no
conclusive evidence of the presence of poison. See Creighton’s _History
of the Papacy_, vol. iv. Append.

[324] This fragment is supposed, by comparison with Livy, 25, 36, to
belong to the account of the fall of Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio in Spain,
B.C. 212.

[325] Or “legion,” according to others. But as both Consuls are engaged
in the business, it seems reasonable to refer it to the two consular
armies of two legions each.

[326] That is “blaming Fortune or Providence.” Schw. quotes Xenophon
_Hellen._ 7, 5, 12, ἔξεστι μὲν τὸ θεῖον αἰτιᾶσθαι.

[327] συμπέμψαι, a difficult word. See Strachan-Davidson’s note. It
seems to me to be opposed to φυγεῖν or some such idea. Hannibal was
not in flight, but kept the enemy with him, as it were, in a kind of
procession, until the moment for striking.

[328] There is some word wanting in the text here which has been
variously supplied. I have ventured to conjecture =τὰ γὰρ δοκοῦντα=
παράβολον κ.τ.λ., and to translate accordingly: for it is the boldness
and apparent rashness of Hannibal’s movement that Polybius seems to
wish to commend.

[329] Cp. Homer, _Odyss._ 19, 471.

[330] Livy, 25, 40, calls him Mutines.

[331] See 3, 86, note. Cp. Cicero de Am. § 8, cum duobus ducibus de
imperio in Italia decertatum est, Pyrrho et Annibale. Ab altero propter
probitatem ejus non nimis alien os animos habemus; alterum _propter
crudelitatem semper haec civitas oderit_.

[332] The paragraph “For the Aetolians ... in Greece,” follows “the
Messenians” in ch. 30, in the Greek texts. But it is evidently out of
place there, and falls naturally into this position.

[333] Antigonus Doson.

[334] B.C. 211. See Livy, 26, 24-26.

[335] On the margin of one MS. is written “For such is the
characteristic always maintained by the Athenian State.” But its
relevancy is not very apparent; and at any rate it seems more likely to
be a comment of the Epitomator, than a sentence from Polybius.

[336] Scopas (B.C. 211-210) must have gone out of office, _i.e._ it was
after autumn of 210 B.C.

[337] That is, 10s. 3¾d. for about a bushel and a half. See on 2, 15.


_Printed by_ R. & R. CLARK, _Edinburgh_





End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Histories of Polybius, Vol. I (of
2), by Polybius

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