FLORENTINE HISTORY***


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THE TWO FIRST CENTURIES OF FLORENTINE HISTORY


      *      *      *      *      *      *

BY THE SAME AUTHOR


THE LIFE AND TIMES OF GIROLAMO SAVONAROLA.

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THE BARBARIAN INVASIONS OF ITALY.

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STUDIES HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL.

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LONDON: T. FISHER UNWIN.

      *      *      *      *      *      *


[Illustration: THE MERCATO VECCHIO BEFORE ITS DEMOLITION.]


THE TWO FIRST CENTURIES OF FLORENTINE HISTORY

The Republic and Parties at the Time of Dante

by

PROFESSOR PASQUALE VILLARI

Translated by Linda Villari

FOURTH IMPRESSION

Illustrated







London
T. Fisher Unwin
1 Adelphi Terrace
1908




AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH VERSION.


_Before deciding to issue this translation I had first to reflect
whether my Florentine studies could be of any use to the English
public. Since Roscoe's day English literature has been enriched
by works of much importance on different phases of the political,
literary, and artistic history of Florence. Both Napier and Trollope
have bequeathed very complete narratives of Florentine events, and
translations of notable foreign works have also been produced. But
nearly all these works appeared before any scientific research as to
the origin of the City and Commonwealth had begun, or, at least, before
it had reached the results I have briefly expounded, and which deserve
notice, not only on the score of intrinsic worth, but also because they
throw new light on the subsequent history of Florence._

_To attempt any new delineation of the special vicissitudes of the
Florentine Republic, already so exhaustively and lucidly treated by
other historians, would have been outside my purpose. As stated in
the preface to the Italian edition, my sole aim was to investigate in
what manner the Republic was formed, the nature of its constitution,
the why and wherefore of its continual transmutations, the first
causes and genuine motives of the factions by which the city was torn,
and likewise to ascertain how it came about that--despite all this
turbulence and strife--commerce and industry, the fine arts and letters
should have been able to achieve such marvellous results. Now, so far
as I know, English literature contains nothing on this particular
theme, although one that can scarcely fail to be of some use and
interest even to readers familiar with greater works and more extended
and detailed accounts of Florentine history._

_These researches are not pursued beyond the times of Dante and Henry
VII., inasmuch as that term actually marks the close of the period
during which the Republic took shape and built up its constitution.
This was followed by a new phase of equally high importance but very
different character, during which the Republic entered, instead, on a
course of decomposition. In fact, we have only to draw a comparison
between the "Divine Comedy" and the "Decameron," to instantly perceive
how deep was the change a few years had wrought in the spirit of
Florence and of all Italy. These two works were almost contemporaneous,
yet when reading them they seem to us the product of two entirely
different ages. Whether in politics, religion, morals, or letters, the
character of these two periods is seen to be essentially diverse. The
Middle Ages, with all their rough primitive originality, have come to
an end; classic learning and the Renaissance have begun. Touching this
second period, there is no scarcity of information, documents, or
chroniclers, as in the case of the first. The historian is confronted
by totally novel problems to which numerous modern writers have given
their attention, and which have also been investigated in previous
works of my own._

_Even this second period would certainly afford matter for another work
on the gradual course of political and moral dissolution, during which
art and literature blossomed to new splendour. Such investigations,
however, would transport me beyond the limits I have set to this book.
Under what conditions and amid what difficulties these researches were
begun and carried forward has been already plainly told in my preface
to the Italian edition. It only remains for me to crave the indulgence
of English readers._

            _PASQUALE VILLARI._




AUTHOR'S PREFACE.


A word of explanation is due to my readers touching the genesis of the
present work.

In 1866 I began a course of lectures at our Istituto Superiore on
the History of Florence, chiefly for the purpose of examining the
political constitution of the Republic, and investigating the various
transformations it had undergone during the long series of internal
revolutions by which the city was harassed. In this way I hoped to
ascertain the veritable causes of those revolutions, to discover some
leading thread through the mazes of Florentine history, which even when
treated by great writers has often been found exceedingly involved and
obscure, and likewise to determine the most logical mode of arranging
it in periods. Even a partial solution of these problems would have
been of some use. I continued the lectures for a considerable time,
but suspended them on reaching the period of Giano della Bella's
"Decrees of Justice" (_Ordinamenti di Giustizia_), 1293. Some of these
discourses were published in the Milan _Politecnico_, others in the
_Nuova Antologia_ at Florence. It was then my intention to collect them
in a volume; but after some hesitation I renounced the idea. It seemed
indispensable to at least add some outline of the course of events
subsequent to the fall of Giano della Bella and the exile of Dante, in
order to conclude the first and most important period of the political
history of Florence. Besides, I saw that the necessity of continuing
these lectures on fixed days had not always allowed sufficient time for
overcoming obstacles encountered by the way. Accordingly, more than a
superficial revisal was required; gaps had to be filled in, certain
pages re-written. Hence fresh researches were demanded, for which other
labours granted no leisure at the moment.

Meanwhile new documents, new dissertations, and monographs on
Florentine history were continually appearing, besides notable works on
a larger scale such as those of Capponi, Del Lungo, Hartwig, Perrens,
&c. All this increased the difficulty of revising and correcting
lectures, now lapsing inevitably more and more out of date. On the
other hand I sometimes found previous deductions confirmed by recently
discovered documents, and that certain general ideas I had enounced
were accepted and followed by writers of note. This naturally inclined
me to be less severe in judging my work, and more disposed to listen to
the tried friends who were urging its republication.

Being thus encouraged to resume my forsaken studies, I lectured in 1888
on the times of Henry VII. of Germany and the exile of Dante. Later
on, in 1890, recognising that my previous work on the origins of the
city and its commonwealth had become altogether inadequate since the
appearance of so much new material, I returned to the subject in a
fresh course of lectures, which likewise saw the light in the _Nuova
Antologia_. Then, I finally began to put the scattered papers together
to revise and correct them.

Hence it will be plainly seen that this book is composed of various
separate parts which, although informed, one and all, by the same
leading idea and treating of the same argument, were produced at
distant intervals during a quarter of a century, in which the study
of Florentine history had made rapid advance through the labours of
numerous and competent writers. Therefore, in spite of devoting my best
efforts to pruning, revising, and arranging my lectures, they are still
old essays more or less disjointed, and containing many unavoidable
repetitions. Greater organic unity could only have been attained by
re-writing the whole and composing a new book; whereas my intention
was merely to republish a series of scattered compositions, under the
fitting title of "Researches."

What finally decided me to reprint them was, that, as I venture to
think, their dominant and fundamental notes still ring true, even
after the numerous works produced by other hands. Indeed, unless I be
mistaken, those works frequently support my observations, and confirm
the ideas expressed throughout on the general character and progressive
development of Florentine history. Whether I be right or wrong in this
belief the reader must decide. At any rate I venture to hope that,
in judging this book, he will kindly make allowance for the time and
manner in which it came into existence.




CONTENTS.


                                                                PAGE
  INTRODUCTION                                                     1

                               CHAPTER I.

  THE ORIGIN OF FLORENCE                                          38

                              CHAPTER II.

  THE ORIGIN OF THE FLORENTINE COMMUNE                            80

                              CHAPTER III.

  THE FIRST WARS AND FIRST REFORMS OF THE FLORENTINE COMMUNE     131

                              CHAPTER IV.

  STATE OF PARTIES--CONSTITUTION OF THE FIRST POPULAR
      GOVERNMENT AND OF THE GREATER GUILDS IN FLORENCE           173

                               CHAPTER V.

  FLORENCE THE DOMINANT POWER IN TUSCANY                         240

                              CHAPTER VI.

  THE COMMERCIAL INTERESTS AND POLICY OF THE GREATER GUILDS
      IN FLORENCE                                                310

                              CHAPTER VII.

  THE FAMILY AND THE STATE IN ITALIAN COMMUNES                   360

                             CHAPTER VIII.

  THE ENACTMENTS OF JUSTICE                                      431

                              CHAPTER IX.

  THE FLORENTINE REPUBLIC IN DANTE'S TIME                        484

                               CHAPTER X.

  DANTE, FLORENTINE EXILES AND HENRY VII.                        521




ILLUSTRATIONS.


  THE MERCATO VECCHIO, BEFORE ITS DEMOLITION         _Frontispiece._

                                                      _To face page_
  VARIOUS REMAINS DISCOVERED IN THE MERCATO VECCHIO, NOW
      IN THE ETRUSCAN MUSEUM, FLORENCE                             1

  THE ARNO RIVER-GOD. BAS-RELIEF. ETRUSCAN MUSEUM                 39

  ETRUSCAN TOMBSTONES, FROM THE MERCATO VECCHIO                   55

  SITE OF ROMAN VILLA, NEAR SAN ANDREA, FLORENCE                  57

  PAVEMENT OF A ROMAN HOUSE, WITH IMPLUVIUM, FOUND UNDER
      THE MERCATO VECCHIO                                         59

  MOSAIC PAVEMENT OF A _SALA DELLE TERME_                         59

  PISCINA FRIGIDARIA, WITH CONNECTED CHILDREN'S BATHS, FOUND
      NEAR THE CAMPIDOGLIO                                        66

  ATTACK ON THE MONKS OF SAN SALVI. BAS-RELIEF BY BENEDETTO
      DA ROVEZZANO; NATIONAL MUSEUM, FLORENCE                     74

  MIRACLE OF SAN GIOVANNI GUALBERTO (EXORCISING A DEVIL).
  BAS-RELIEF BY BENEDETTO DA ROVEZZANO                            78

  A ROMAN HYPOCAUST, PARTLY RECONSTRUCTED                         85

  EXTERIOR VIEW OF THE CALIDARIUM AND FURNACE                     85

  DESCENT TO A ROMAN WELL; DISCOVERED BENEATH THE
      CAMPIDOGLIO, FLORENCE                                       89

  ROMAN CALIDARIUM, WITH FURNACE BENEATH; FLORENCE                93

  IMPLUVIUM OF A ROMAN HOUSE; FLORENCE                            93

  MOUTH OF ROMAN FURNACE (MERCATO VECCHIO)                        96

  CALIDARIUM (_ibidem_)                                           96

  BELFRY OF SAN ANDREA, MERCATO VECCHIO, FLORENCE                130

  PALACE OF THE PODESTA, FLORENCE                                192

  PALAZZO VECCHIO, FLORENCE                                      241

  SUPPOSED PALACE OF THEODORIC IN RAVENNA                        383

  THE TOMB OF THEODORIC, RAVENNA                                 384

  ANCIENT SHRINE, RAVENNA                                        388

  CHURCH OF SAN VITALE, RAVENNA                                  401

  EMPEROR JUSTINIAN                                              403

  EMPRESS THEODORA AND COURT, RAVENNA                            404

  SCENE IN CORN MARKET, FLORENCE                                 475

  RIOT IN CORN MARKET, FLORENCE                                  476

[Illustration]




[Illustration: VARIOUS REMAINS DISCOVERED IN THE MERCATO VECCHIO OF
FLORENCE.

(_Now in the Etruscan Museum._)

            [_To face page 1._]




INTRODUCTION.[1]


I.

The history of Italian freedom, from the Middle Ages to the new series
of foreign invasions, dating from the descent of Charles VIII. in
1494, mainly consists of the history of our communes. But this history
is as yet unwritten, and, worse still, can never be written until
the material required for the task shall have been brought to light,
sifted, and illustrated. What were the most ancient political statutes,
what those of the guilds of art and commerce, what the penal and civil
laws, the individual conditions, revenue, expenditure, trade, and
industry of those republics? To all these questions we can give but
imperfect replies at the best, and some are left altogether unsolved.
Yet until all are decided the civil history of our communes remains
involved in obscurity.

Through Machiavelli and Giannone Italy gave the world the first
essays in constitutional history, and by Muratori's gigantic labours
inaugurated the great school of learning that is the only settled
basis of modern and, more especially, of constitutional history.
But we soon allowed the sceptre we had won to be snatched from our
grasp. It is true that we have never experienced any dearth of great
scholars or historians, but the complete national history of a people
is a task exceeding the powers of one or of several individuals. Such
history must be produced, as it were, by the nation itself. Only the
combined efforts of many scholars and of many generations can succeed
in co-ordinating and investigating the vast mass of material that has
to be ransacked in order to trace through the vicissitudes of numerous
municipalities, all differing from, and at war with one another, the
history of the Italian people. It has been long the custom with us for
every one to work independently: hence we lack the spirit of agreement
and co-operation required to enable individual efforts to carry forward
the work of the whole country at the same pace. Certainly, however, I
must not forget to note the example of our various national historical
societies, subsidised by the Government, and composed of most learned
and deserving men. But these associations and commissions have as
yet no general nor united plan of work; and, in fact, some of their
members are apt to devote their energies to labours which, however
important, are disconnected from the main object. Thus there will be
much delay before our learned men complete the investigation of any
one period of our history. Yet the rules which should be followed are
not far to seek, since Italians were the first to discover them, and
we still bear them in mind. Nor has the issue of highly important
collections of documents been relegated exclusively to our societies
and commissions. None can have forgotten the untiring labours of the
worthy Vieusseux and his friends in their management of the "Archivio
Storico Italiano"! To show what excellent results may be achieved by
the publication of a single series of State papers, it is sufficient to
mention the Despatches (_Relazioni_) of Venetian Ambassadors, given to
the world by Alberi, and whereby not only Italian but European history
has been so greatly profited. What progress might not be made would all
Italian scholars consent to devote their labours to a common end! We
have seen how much Professor Pertz was enabled to achieve at Berlin,
with a subsidy from the Confederation, and aided by all the scholars
of Germany. Truly, his "Monumenta" form an enduring memorial of the
national history of the Fatherland, and has become the nucleus of a new
school of scholars and historians.

Now that Italy is united, and her many states fused into one, she
should know the history of her communes, and trace out the history of
her people. It should also be kept in view that the Commune was the
institution by whose means modern society was evolved from the Middle
Ages. Rising in the midst of a throng of slaves, vassals, barons,
marquises, dukes, the Commune gave birth to the _third estate_ and the
people which, after first destroying feudalism in Italy, subsequently
by the French Revolution, destroyed it throughout Europe. Even Augustin
Thierry notes that "thus was formed the immense congregation of free
men who in 1789 undertook for all France that which had been achieved
by their forefathers in mediaeval municipalities."[2] Accordingly,
since Italy was the centre and seat of municipal liberty, the purpose
of the present work is not only to investigate our civil history,
but to demonstrate how much we contributed to the discovery of the
principles of modern society and civilisation. All careful students
of the history of Roman law in the Middle Ages will have occasion to
remark that our commentators while reviewing ancient jurisprudence,
unconsciously modified it in adapting it to their own times. Francesco
Forti has declared that no student of our statutes can fail to perceive
that many of the regulations found in the Napoleon Code, and supposed
to be created by the French Revolution, already formed part of the
old Italian law. I have come to the conclusion that in every branch
of Italian civil life our history will be able to prove that the same
remark holds good, inasmuch as our civil institutions contained the
primary germs of modern freedom. But no one has yet dared to attempt
this task, and, as I said before, no single strength could suffice for
it. We have now to deal with a far humbler theme. By tracing in bold
outline the history of a single commune, we desire to show what fresh
researches remain to be made, and how many problems to be solved.

The vicissitudes of the Florentine Republic can only be paralleled
with those of the most flourishing periods of Athenian freedom.
Throughout modern history we might seek in vain the example of another
city simultaneously so turbulent and prosperous, where, despite so
much internecine carnage, fine arts, letters, commerce, and industry,
all flourished equally. The historian almost doubts his own veracity
when bound to recount how a handful of men settled on a small spot of
earth, extended their trade to the East and the West; establishing
banks throughout Europe; and accumulated such vast wealth, that private
fortunes sometimes sufficed to support tottering thrones. He has also
to relate how these rich merchants founded modern poetry with their
Dante, painting with their Giotto; how with the aid of their Arnolfo
and Brunellesco, and of their Michelangelo, who was poet, painter,
sculptor, and architect in one, they raised the stupendous buildings
which the world will lastingly admire. The first and subtlest of
European diplomatists were Florentines; political science and civil
history were born in Florence with Machiavelli. Towards the end of the
Middle Ages this narrow township seems a small point of fire shedding
light over the whole world.

It might well be thought that all difficulties regarding the history
of this commune must have been already overcome, seeing that the
finest Italian writers, the greatest modern historians, have for
so long made it the theme of extended labours. In fact, what other
city can boast annals penned by such men as Villani, Compagni,
Machiavelli, Guicciardini, Nardi, Varchi? And, in addition to histories
and chronicles, we find an endless string of Diaries, _Prioristi_
(Notebooks), Reminiscences, before coming down to modern writers.
Among the Florentines it was a very common practice to keep a daily
register of events, and in this wise their splendid store of historic
literature was continually enlarged. But, nevertheless, no history
bristles with so many difficulties as that of Florence, nor offers so
many apparently insurmountable contradictions. Events pass before our
eyes, well described, vividly ; they flit past in a rapid and
uninterrupted whirl, never resting, subject to no law, and seemingly
obedient to chance alone. Personal hatred, jealousy, and private
revenge produce political revolutions, drenching the city with the
blood of its children. These revolutions endure for months, perhaps
even for years, and end with arbitrary decrees, which are violated or
undone the moment they have received magisterial sanction. Thus we
are often moved to inquire, How can this be the work of far-seeing
diplomats, of great politicians? Either lofty commendations for
political good sense and acuteness were falsely lavished on men
incapable of giving their country sound laws and stable institutions,
and who in the gravest affairs of State were solely influenced by
personal loves and hates; or else for centuries past we have accorded
unmerited praise to the historians who have described impossible events
to us in the most vivid colours. In fact, how could it possibly be that
so much good sense should breed so much disorder? How, too, in the
midst of this disorder, with the vessel of the State at the mercy of
every wind that blew, could art, science, and literature give forth so
glorious a harvest?

Undoubtedly history, as we interpret it to-day, was unknown to the
ancients. We seek the causes of events, whereas they merely described
them. We wish to know the laws, manners, ideas, and prejudices of
mankind, whereas our forefathers were exclusively concerned with human
passions and actions. In the fifteenth century political science was
chiefly a study of human nature, while at this day it is mainly a study
of institutions. Modern history aims at the examination of mankind and
society in every form, and from every point of view. That is why we
have had to so often re-fashion the work that, nevertheless, had been
splendidly performed by writers of old.

Leaving aside all compilers of those fables and legends on the origin
of Florence found repeated in even later works, Florentine historians
may be divided into two great schools. First come the authors of
Chronicles or Diaries, who flourished chiefly in the fourteenth
century, although they continued long after that period. These writers
record day by day the events they have witnessed and in which they have
often taken part; stirred by the very passions they describe, they
sometimes rise to eloquence, and the heat of their own words leaves
them no time to dwell on abstract ideas. They presuppose in their
readers their own detailed knowledge of the political institutions
among which their lives were spent, but which are unknown to us,
and the object of our keenest desire. Frequently, however, some
fourteenth-century chronicler, such as Giovanni Villani, with his
incomparable gift of observation, supplies such minute descriptions
of events, reports so many details, that, almost unawares, we find
ourselves carried back to his day. Sometimes, when descending to
particulars, he apologises for detaining the reader on topics of
small moment, little foreseeing what value we later generations would
attach to all those details of the trade, instruction, revenue, and
expenditure of the Republic, or how we should long for more facts of
the same kind. But as soon as these writers touch upon times and events
outside their own experience, they have either to copy verbatim from
other chroniclers, or their narratives remain cold, colourless, and
devoid of merit or authority. We pass at once from the most lively and
graphic descriptions to the strangest fables, the greatest incoherence,
since these men are incapable of using any discernment even in copying
literally from others. Proofs of this are seen in their puerile
accounts of the foundation of Florence. Historical criticism was as yet
unborn.

The scholarship of the fifteenth century gave rise to the study and
imitation of Sallust and Livy; and Italian writers were no longer
content to register facts from day to day, unconnectedly and without
order. Many wrote in Latin, others in Italian; but all sought to
compose historical narratives in a more artistic, or at all events,
more artificial way. They launched into exordiums and general
considerations; gave lengthy descriptions, eked out by many flights of
fancy, of wars they had never witnessed, and of which they knew little
or nothing; they attributed imaginary speeches to their personages,
and sometimes fashioned their narratives in the shape of dialogues, to
increase the distance between themselves and their fourteenth-century
predecessors.[3]

It was a period of rhetorical essays and servile imitations of the
classics, during which Italian history and literature declined,
although preparing for revival in the coming age. In fact, we find the
art of history notably advanced in the sixteenth century. Machiavelli,
who may be styled the most illustrious founder of that art, begins with
a word of blame to preceding historians exactly because "they had said
little or nothing of civil discords, or of existing internal enmities
and their effects, and described other matters with a brevity that
could be neither useful nor pleasing to the reader." Indirectly, these
words serve as a faithful portrait of the book that has proved the
most lasting monument to his own fame. He inquires into the causes of
events, the origin of all the parties and revolutions of the Republic;
thus creating a new method and opening a new road. He reduces the
whole history of the Commonwealth into an admirable unity; he rejects
with profound contempt the fabulous tales bequeathed by the chronicler
regarding the foundation of Florence, and throws an eagle glance on
party manoeuvres from their origin down to his own day. He was the
first to undertake these researches, and, notwithstanding all newer
investigations, his fundamental idea maintains its value.

But Machiavelli gave little heed to institutions, scarcely any at all
to laws and customs. Furthermore, he was so entirely guided by his
instinct of divination as to care little for the historic exactitude
of particular facts. To ascertain the infinite number of inaccuracies
and blunders contained in his book, and which would be unpardonable in
a modern writer, his narrative must be compared with the contemporary
accounts of the old chroniclers, some of which were known to him. Not
only are there frequent errors of date, but also of the names and
number of magistrates and of the framework of institutions. It would
seem that while divining the spirit of events, he simultaneously
remoulded them according to his own fancy. Sometimes we find him
appropriating entire pages from Cavalcanti's history, even transcribing
the fictitious speeches attributed by that chronicler to historic
characters, and by a few touches of his own pouring new life into the
dull narrative without troubling to undertake any fresh research. Thus,
his book, although a valuable guide, is also an unsafe one. He cannot
always abstain from transplanting a true fact to the place best suited
to his own theories, thus filling up inconvenient gaps without many
scruples of conscience. His aim, so he tells us, was to investigate
the causes of parties and revolutions. What is now designated as local
colour--_i.e._, the historic colour of facts--is entirely absent from
his narrative, and particularly from that of the earlier days of the
Republic. Men adhere to different factions, sometimes commit evil,
sometimes generous deeds, but are apparently always the same in his
eyes. To what extent the clear appreciation of events is hampered by
this theory may easily be imagined. Then, too, as Machiavelli draws
nearer to his own times, he sees the constitution of the Republic
changing and decaying, freedom disappearing, and a thousand personal
passions arising to hasten the overthrow of enfeebled institutions.
A knowledge of minute particulars would be doubly desirable at this
period to make us understand the social revolution in question; but
Machiavelli, though always a fifteenth-century Florentine, never
lost sight of the example of Titus Livy and other Roman writers, and
consequently, like all the scholars of his age, was inspired with a
lofty contempt for any small details apt to endanger the epic unity
of historic narrative. Then, later on, in approaching the distinct
domination of the Medici, under whose rule he was living, he turns
aside with ill-concealed disgust from the internal vicissitudes of
the Republic and gives his whole attention to external events. He
then discourses of warfare and of the Italian policy that was the
passion of his life. In the midst of court intrigues and the contested
predominance of this or that party, we find him chiefly concerned in
ascertaining how a new prince might best reunite the scattered members
of his torn and oppressed motherland; and note that this noble design
frequently makes him forget the history of Florence.

In reading old chronicles of contemporary events, we see before our
eyes the living, speaking figures of Giano della Bella, Farinata degli
Uberti, Corso Donati, and Michele di Lando. Their feelings, loves,
and hates are known and almost familiar to us; but we are plunged in
a restless, unrestrained tumult of passions, without knowing whence
blows the blast driving men and things onward in a whirl of confusion,
without one moment's truce. No sooner do we pass beyond the visual
horizon of the writer, than all images become confused, and our sight
is no less obscured than his own. Even at moments of most eloquent
description we hear of institutions and magistrates conveying no
meaning to our ears, and often see these change, disappear, and return
without grasping the why and wherefore. But when, on the other hand,
by the study and imitation of ancient authors, the art of embracing a
vaster circle of facts springs into being, and the causes and relations
of those facts are investigated in order to weld them into visible
unity, historic criticism is still lacking to verify events, to examine
and define laws and institutions, to colour and almost revive the past
in all its varied and changeful aspects. The genius of the historian
emits, as it were, flashes of light; but these, while illuminating some
occasional point, only leave a confused and uncertain view of past ages
in our mind. We require to know men and institutions, parties and laws,
as they really were; nor is this enough: we must also comprehend how
all these elements were fused into unity, and how laws and institutions
were begotten by those men in those times.

This was the task modern writers should have performed, but many
reasons have prevented its completion. First of all, the progress
achieved by art and literature while liberty was perishing in Florence,
and their great influence on all modern culture, fixed the principal
attention of writers on this section of Florentine history as being
one of very general importance, and more easily intelligible to all.
Accordingly, the greater number of modern, and especially of foreign
students neither examined nor understood the precise period in which
all the noblest qualities of the Florentine nature had been formed,
and during which were evolved and trained the intellectual powers
afterwards expressed in art and letters to the admiration of the whole
world. Many foreigners seemed to believe that art and letters had not
only flourished when manners were most corrupt, but were almost the
result of and identified with the corruption that led to their decline.
For the fine arts, being the offspring of liberty and morality, could
not long survive their parent forces.

It should be also observed that no great modern writer has yet produced
any work specially devoted to the political and constitutional history
of Florence.[4] It must be confessed that more than by any modern
pen was achieved to this effect by the elder and younger Ammirato,
who, although writers of the seventeenth century, already began to
ransack State papers, and composed a work that was new and remarkable
at that period. But they neither proposed to write a history of the
Florentine constitution, nor possessed sufficient critical equipment
for the purpose, had they sought to fulfil it. They often overload new
and valuable information regarding events, and even institutions, with
a mass of useless detail, destructive to the general unity of their
narrative.

It is scarcely requisite to add that modern writers, only treating of
Florence in general histories of Italy, were necessarily compelled to
pass briefly over secondary parts of their work. They often relied too
blindly on old authors of acknowledged repute and influence, without
using enough discrimination in sifting material of undeniable value
from other parts composed of second-hand narratives and repetitions
of fabulous tales. We have only to compare Villani with Malespini to
see that one of the two undoubtedly copied many chapters from the
other.[5] Nor is this a solitary example. As we have before remarked,
Machiavelli borrowed whole chapters from Cavalcanti;[6] Guicciardini
often translated from Galeazzo Capra, better known under the name of
Capella;[7] Nardi reproduced Buonaccorsi verbatim. Therefore, without
critical examination of these writers, and careful decision as to
their relative value and the confidence to be accorded to different
parts of their works, it is uncommonly easy to be misled. For this,
and many other reasons, modern historians of Italy encounter numerous
pitfalls when treating of Florentine matters. Now and then we see them
halting, in common with chroniclers of the widest renown, to define the
precise functions of the Captain of the people, or Podesta, or Council
of the Commune, and afterwards finding it extremely difficult to make
their definitions agree with actual facts whenever those titles recur
in their pages. Such mistakes nearly always proceed from a double
source. The definitions supplied by old writers regarding magistrates
and their functions were extremely slight, when they alluded to their
own times, and often inexact where other periods were in question.
Also, modern writers generally demand a precise and fixed definition
of institutions which were subject to change from the day of their
birth, and unalterable only in name. The name not only remains intact
after the institution has become entirely different from what it was at
first, but often long outlives the institution itself. It is curious
to see what ingenious theories are then started to give substance and
reality to names now become ghosts of a vanished past. The only way to
thread this labyrinth is by endeavouring to reconstruct the series of
radical changes every one of those institutions underwent, and without
once losing sight of the mutual relations preserved between them during
the continual vicissitudes to which they are subject. Only by seeking
the law that regulates and dominates these changes is it possible to
discern the general idea of the Republic and determine the value of its
institutions.

But what can be done while we lack so many of the elements most needed
for the completion of this task? The learned have yet to arrange,
examine, and illustrate the endless series of provisions, statutes,
_consulte_, _pratiche_, ambassadorial reports, and, in short, of all
the State papers of the Republic, many of which are still unsought and
undiscovered. Nevertheless, we believe that, without attempting for the
present any complete history of Florence, some rather useful work may
be performed. We may certainly follow the guidance of old chroniclers
and historians regarding events of which they had ocular testimony,
trying, when needed, to temper their party spirit by confronting them
with writers of an opposite faction. Vast numbers of documents have
been published in driblets, and many learned dissertations, although
the series is still incomplete; besides, one may easily resort to the
Florence archives in order to vanquish difficulties and bridge the
principal gaps. And after undertaking researches of this kind, it seems
easy to us to clearly prove how the whole history of Florence may be
illumined by a new light, and its apparent disorder made to disappear.
In fact, as soon as one begins to carefully examine the veritable
first causes underlying the apparent, and often, fallacious causes of
political revolutions in Florence, these revolutions will be found to
follow one another in a marvellously logical sequence. Then in the
wildest chaos we seem rapidly able to discern a mathematical succession
and connection of causes and effects. Personal hatreds and jealousies
are not causes, but only opportunities serving to accelerate the fast
and feverish sequence of reforms by which the Florentine Commune, after
trying by turns every political constitution possible at the time,
gradually attained to the highest liberty compatible with the Middle
Ages. It is this noble aim, this largeness of freedom, that rouses all
the intellectual and moral force contained in the Republic, evolves its
admirable political acumen, and allows letters and art and science to
put forth such splendid flowers in the midst of apparent disorder. But
when strictly personal passions and hatreds prevail, then real chaos
begins, the constitution becomes corrupt, and the downfall of freedom
is at hand.

The sole aim of the present work is to offer a brief sketch of the
history of Florence during the foundation of its liberties. So great is
the importance of the theme that the historian Thiers has given long
attention to it, and we know that an illustrious Italian has already
made it the object of many years of strenuous research.[8]


II.

The history of every Italian republic may be divided into two chief
periods: the origin of the commune, the development of its constitution
and its liberties. In the first period, during which an old state of
society is decaying and a new one arising, it is hard to distinguish
the history of any one commune from that of the rest, inasmuch as it
treats of Goths, Longobards, Greeks, and Franks, who dominate the
greater part of Italy in turn, reducing the country, almost throughout
its extent, to identical conditions. The position of conquerors and of
conquered is everywhere the same, only altered by change of rulers.
Amid the obscurity of the times and scarcity of information, there
seems scarcely any difference between one Italian city and another.
But differences are more clearly defined, and become increasingly
prominent after the first arisal of freedom. Most obscure, though not
of earliest date, was perhaps the origin of Florence, which tarried
long before beginning to rise to importance. Our present purpose being
merely to throw light on the history of the Florentine Constitution, we
need not devote many words to the first period mentioned above--namely,
of the origin of Italian communes in general. At one time this
question was the theme of a learned, lengthy, and most lively dispute,
chiefly carried on by Italian and German writers. But the scientific
severity of researches, in which Italian scholars won much honour,
was often impaired by patriotism and national prejudice. It being
recognised that the origin of the Commune was likewise the origin of
modern liberty and society, the problem was tacitly transformed into
another question--_i.e._, whether Italians or Germans were the first
founders of these liberties, this society? It is easy to understand
how political feelings were then imported into the controversy, and
effectually removed it from the ground of tranquil debate.

Towards the end of the last century the question was often discussed
in Italy by learned men of different views, such as Giannone, Maffei,
Sigonio, Pagnoncelli, &c. Muratori, though lacking any prearranged
system, threw powerful flashes of light on the subject, and raised
it to higher regions by force of his stupendous learning. But the
dispute did not become heated until Savigny took up the theme in his
renowned "History of Roman Law in the Middle Ages." In endeavouring
to prove the uninterrupted continuity of the said jurisprudence,
he was obliged--inasmuch as all historical events are more or less
connected together--to maintain that the Italians, when subject to
barbarian and even to Longobard rule, lost neither all their personal
liberty nor their ancient rights, and that the Roman Commune was never
completely destroyed. Accordingly, the revival of our republics and
of Roman law was no more than a renewal of old institutions and laws
which had never entirely disappeared. Germany was quick to see to what
conclusions the ideas of our great historian tended, and thereupon
Eichorn, Leo, Bethmann, Karl Hegel, and others, rose up in arms
against the theory of the Italian Commune being of Roman birth. They
maintained, on the contrary, that the barbarians, and more especially
the Longobards, whose domination was harsher and more prolonged than
the rest, had stripped us of all liberty, destroyed every vestige of
Roman institutions, and that, consequently, the new communes and their
statutes were of new creation, and originally derived from Germanic
tribes alone.

To all appearance these views should have stirred Italian patriotism
to furious opposition, and made Savigny's ideas universally popular
among us. Yet this was not the case. We supplied many learned adherents
to either side. At that time our national feeling had just awakened;
we already desired--nay, claimed--a united Italy, no matter at what
cost, and detested everything that seemed opposed to our unity.
Well, the Longobards had been on the point of mastering the whole of
Italy, and the Papacy alone had been able to arrest their conquests
by securing the aid of the Franks. But for this, even the Italy of
the ninth or tenth century might have become as united a country as
France. Already the school of thinkers had been revived among us that,
even in Machiavelli's day, had regarded the Pope as the fatal cause
of Italy's divisions. Therefore, naturally enough, while confuting
Savigny's views, our nineteenth-century Ghibellines exalted the
Longobards, ventured to praise their goodness and humanity, and hurled
invectives against the Papacy for having prevented their general and
permanent conquest of Italy. But, on the other hand, there was also
a political school that looked to the Pope as the future saviour of
Italy, and this school, prevailing later on during the revolution of
1848, adopted the opposite theory, and possessed two most illustrious
representatives in Manzoni and Carlo Troya. At any rate, they had
little difficulty in proving that barbarians had been invariably
barbaric, killing, destroying, and trampling down all things, and
that the Papacy, by summoning the Franks, no matter for what end, had
certainly rendered some help to the harshly oppressed masses. The
Franks, in fact, gave some relief to the Latin population, sanctioned
the use of Roman law and granted new powers to Popes and bishops, who
undoubtedly contributed to the revival of the communes. Thus, although
for opposite ends, identical opinions were maintained on both sides of
the Alps. Throughout this controversy learning was always subordinated
to political aims, although the disputants may not have been always
aware of it; and historic truth and serenity consequently suffered
unavoidable hurt. Balbo, Capponi, and Capei, after throwing their
weight on this side or that, ended by holding very temperate views, and
their teachings cast much light on the point at issue.

The main difficulty proceeds from the fact that few persons are willing
to believe that in the Middle Ages, as well as throughout modern
history, we can always trace the continuous reciprocal action of the
Latin and German races, and that it is impossible to award the merit of
any of the chief political, social, or literary revolutions exclusively
to either. On the contrary, wherever the absolute predominance of
one of the two races seems most undoubted, we have to tread with
most caution, and seek to discover what share of the work was due to
the other. Likewise, in order to justly weigh and determine their
reciprocal rights in history, impartial narrative would have a better
chance of success than any system based on political ideas. Assuredly,
when facts are once thoroughly verified, no system is needed, since
general ideas result naturally from facts. Were it allowable to
introduce here a comparison with far younger times, we might remark
that when French literature invaded Germany in the eighteenth century
it obtained general imitation there, and unexpectedly led to the
revival of national German literature. In order to glorify the national
tone of this literature, would it be necessary to maintain that the
great previous diffusion of French writings was only imagined by
historians? Later, the French flag was flaunted in nearly every city of
Germany, and the people humiliated and crushed. From that moment we see
the national German spirit springing to vigorous life. Must we say that
this revival was due to the French? Is it not better to describe events
as they occurred, rejecting all foregone conclusions? I am quite aware
of the abyss between these recent events and those of old days; but,
nevertheless, I consider that Balbo was right in remarking that the
fact of the origin of the communes being disputed at such length and
with so much heat and learning by the two rival schools, proved that
the truth was not confined exclusively to either. Accordingly, we will
rapidly sum up the conclusions we deem the most reasonable.

Every one knows that, after the earlier barbarian descents, by which
the Empire was devastated, and Rome itself frequently ravaged, Italy
endured five real and thorough invasions. Odoacer, with his mercenary
horde, composed of men of different tribes, but generally designated as
Heruli, was the leader who dealt the mortal blow in 476, and becoming
master of Italy for more than ten years, scarcely attempted to govern
it, and only seized a third of the soil. But a new host poured in from
the banks of the Danube, commonly styled Goths, and subdivided into
Visigoths and Ostrogoths. The former division, commanded by Alaric,
had already besieged and sacked Rome; the latter, led by Theodoric,
appeared in 489, and speedily subjected all Italy. Theodoric's reign
was highly praised. The chiefs of these early barbarian tribes had
often served for many years in Roman legions, and had sometimes been
educated in Rome. Accordingly they felt a genuine admiration for the
majesty of the very empire that the heat of victory now urged them
to destroy. Theodoric organised the government; and, according to
the barbarian custom, seized a third of the land for his men; but he
left the Romans their laws and their magistrates. In every province a
count was at the head of the government, and held jurisdiction over
the Ostrogoths. The Romans were ruled according to their own laws,
and these laws administered by a mixed tribunal of both races. But
Theodoric's government became gradually harsher and more intolerable
to the Romans, so that, after his death, they revolted against his
successors, and invoked the aid of the Greeks of the Eastern Empire.
But revolt brought them nothing save increased suffering, inasmuch as
the Goths began to murder the Romans in self-defence, deprived them
of what liberty and institutions they had been allowed to retain, and
organised a military and absolute government. This was the government
Belisarius and Narses found established on coming from Constantinople
to deliver and reconquer Italy; this was the government they copied
with their dukes, or _duces_. The Ostrogoths had ruled Italy for
fifty-nine years (493-552), and the Greeks held it for sixteen more
(552-568). Theirs also was a purely martial government, under the
General-in-chief Narses, but with dukes, tribunes, and inferior judges
nominated by the Empire. As usual, the newcomers appropriated a share
of the soil, and probably this share now went to the State. Their
tyranny was different from that of the barbarians, but it was the
tyranny of corrupt rulers, and therefore more cruel. The Greeks had
expelled the Goths, and next came the Longobards to drive out the
Greeks. They gradually extended their conquests, and in fifteen years
became masters of three-fourths of Italy, leaving only a few strips
of land, mainly near the sea, to the Greeks whom they never succeeded
in expelling altogether. The Longobards struck deep roots in Italian
soil, and dwelt on it for more than two hundred years (568-773),
ruling in a very harsh and tyrannous fashion. They took a third of the
land, reduced the Italians almost to slavery, and respected neither
Roman laws nor Roman institutions. Beneath their sway the ancient
civilisation seemed annihilated, and the germs of a newer one were
prepared, although its first budding forth is still involved in much
obscurity. Every controversy as to the origin of our communes started
from inquiries into the condition of the Italians under the Longobard
rule. If ancient tradition were at any time really broken off and
replaced by a totally new one, it must have occurred under that rule.
Or, if it only underwent a great change before assuming new life and
vigour at a later time, the process must have dated from the same
period.

Nevertheless, wherever the Byzantine domination had obtained, a feebler
and more vacillating government weighed less cruelly on the people;
therefore, as early as the seventh and eighth centuries, certain cities
were seen to develop new life. The Commune speedily took shape, even
in Rome, where the power of the Papacy, hostile to the Longobards, had
greatly increased. On first coming among us, these barbarians of the
Arian creed respected neither the Catholic bishops, the minor clergy,
nor anything sacred or profane, and later on menaced the Eternal City
itself. Accordingly, as a means of defence against the threatening
enemy at his gates, the Pontiff summoned the Franks to save the
Church and country from oppression. They came in obedience to this
call, led first by Pepin and then by Charlemagne, who, driving out
the Longobards, and fortifying the Papacy by grants of land, enabled
the Pope to inaugurate his temporal dominion. In reward for this
Charlemagne was crowned emperor; and thus the ancient Empire of the
West was re-established by the new Empire of the Franks, to which the
Holy Roman-Germanic Empire afterwards succeeded.

Thereupon the dissolution of barbarian institutions, already begun in
Italy, proceeded at a more rapid pace. There was a ferment in Italian
public life, heralding the approach of a new era. Institutions,
usages, laws, traditions of all kinds--Longobard, Greek, Frankish,
ecclesiastical, Roman--were found side by side and jumbled together.
Next ensued a prolonged term of violence and turmoil, during which the
name of Italy was scarcely heard. All old and new institutions seem at
war, all struggling in vain for supremacy, when suddenly the Commune
arises to solve the problem, and the era of freedom begins. But what
gave birth to the Commune? This is the question by which we are always
confronted.

It would be outside our present purpose to follow the learned scholars
who have sought to deduce ingenious and complicated theories from
some doubtful phrase in an old codex, or the vague words of some
chronicler. It is certain that the Roman Empire was an aggregation of
municipalities exercising self-government. The city was the primitive
atom, the germ-cell, as it may be called, of the great Roman society
that began to disperse when the capital lost the power of attraction
required to bind together so great a number of cities separated by
vast tracts of country either totally deserted, or only inhabited by
the slaves cultivating the soil. The barbarians, on the other hand,
knew nothing of citizen life, and the _Gau_ or _Comitatus_ (whence
the term _contado_ is derived), only comprising embryo towns, or
rather villages, which were sometimes burnt when the tribes moved on
elsewhere, resembled the primitive nucleus of Teutonic society. In
the _comitatus_ the count ruled and administered justice with his
magistrates; the chiefs of the soldiery were his subordinates, and
became barons later on. Several countships joined together formed the
dukedoms or marquisates into which Italy was then divided, and the
whole of the invading nation was commanded by a king elected by the
people.

When, therefore, the Germanic tribes held sway over the Latin, the
_Gau_ held sway over the cities which indeed formed its constituents.
And the counts, as military chieftains, ruled the conquered land,
of which the victors appropriated one-third. The Goths pursued the
same plan; so too the Greeks, who replaced all counts by their own
_duces_; and so also the Longobards. Only the latter's rule was far
more tyrannous, especially at first, and their history is very obscure.
They began by slaughtering the richest and most powerful Romans; they
seized one-third of the revenues, it would seem, instead of the lands,
thus leaving the oppressed masses without any free property, and
consequently in a worse condition than before. The Goths had permitted
the Romans to live in their own way, but the Longobards respected no
laws, rights, nor institutions of the vanquished race. On this head
Manzoni remarks[9] that no mention is found of any Italian personage,
whether actual or imaginary, in connection with any royal office or
public act of the time. Nevertheless, from absolute tyranny, and even
downright subjection, to the total destroyal of every Roman law, right,
and institution, there is a long step. In order to attribute to the
Longobards--numbering, it is said, some 130,000 souls in all--the total
extinction of Roman life in every direction, we must credit them with
an administrative power, far too well ordered and disciplined, too
steadfast and permanent, to be any way compatible with their condition.
How could a tribe incapable of comprehending Roman life persecute it
to extinction on all sides? Granting even, although this is another
disputed point, that the Romans were deprived of all independent
property; granting that Roman law was neither legally recognised nor
respected by the Longobards, it by no means follows that every vestige
of Roman law and civilisation was therefore destroyed at the time. Far
more just and credible seems the opinion of other writers who have
maintained that when the Longobards descended into Italy they thought
chiefly of their own needs, made no legal provision for the Italians,
and were satisfied with keeping them in subjection.[10] Thus, in all
private concerns, and in matters beyond the grasp of the barbarian
administration, the conquered people could continue to live according
to the Roman law and in pursuance of ancient customs. In fact, Romans
and Longobards lived on Italian soil as two separate nations; the
fusion of victors and vanquished, so easy elsewhere, is seen to have
been difficult in Italy, even after the lapse of two centuries. So
great is the tenacity and persistence of the Latin race among us, that
it is easier to reduce the conquered to slavery, or extirpate them
altogether, than to deprive them of their individuality. In fact,
whenever, by the force of things, and by long intercourse, conquerors
and conquered come into closer contact, the barbarians are unavoidably
driven to make large concessions to the Latin civilisation, which
even when apparently extinguished is always found to have life. How
explain otherwise the gradual yielding of Longobard law to the pressure
of Roman law; how explain the new species of code that gradually took
shape, and was styled by Capponi _an almost Roman edifice built upon
Germanic foundations_?

As the Longobards became more firmly established in Italy, they began
to inhabit the cities which they had been unable to entirely destroy;
they also began to covet real property, and accordingly, during the
reign of their king Autari, instead of a third of the revenues, seized
an even larger proportion of the land. This measure aggravated the
condition of the vanquished on the one hand, but greatly improved
it on the other, by leaving them in possession of some independent
property.[11] And although, as Manzoni observed, we find no royal
officials, great or small, of Roman blood, it is no less certain
that the Longobards, having need of mariners, builders, and artisans,
were obliged to make use of Romans and their superior skill in
those capacities. It was in this way that the ancient _scholae_, or
associations of craftsmen, continued to survive throughout the Middle
Ages, as we know to have been the case with the _magistri comacini_, or
Guild of Como Masons, to whose skill the conquering race had frequent
recourse. In however rough and disorderly a fashion these associations
contrived to withstand the barbarian impact, they were certainly an
element of the old civilisation, and kept the thread of it unbroken.
Other remains and traditions of that same civilisation also clung
about them; and when every other form of government or protecting
force was lacking to the inhabitants of cities, these associations
guarded the public welfare to some extent. Do we not find that an
ancient municipality, when first left to its own resources, sometimes
closed the city gates against the barbarians, and defended itself,
almost after the manner of an independent state? Was it not sometimes
successful in repulsing the foe? Even when conquered, trampled, and
crushed, can we suppose it to have been destroyed everywhere alike, or
so thoroughly cancelled from the memory of the Latins, that, on seeing
it reappear, we must attribute its resurrection to Germanic tribes, to
whom all idea of a city was unknown until they had invaded our soil?
Did not the resuscitation of the Greek cities of Southern Italy begin
as far back as the seventh and eighth centuries--namely, in the time of
the Longobards--and assuredly without the help of Germanic traditions?
Did not the Roman Commune arise at the same period? And if the ancient
municipalities, fallen beneath the Longobard yoke, and therefore more
cruelly oppressed, delayed almost four centuries longer, did they not
also follow the example of their fellow-cities at last? What is the
meaning of the widely spread tradition, that only in that paragon of
independent, free republics, Byzantine Amalfi, were preserved the Roman
Pandects, which were then captured by Pisa, and cherished as her most
valued treasure? Does not the whole subsequent history of the Commune
consist of the continual struggle of the re-born Latin race against the
descendants of Teuton hordes? If Latin civilisation had been utterly
destroyed, how came it that the dead could rise again to combat the
living? Therefore, it seems clear to us that, although the Longobards
accorded no legal rights to the conquered people, they could not
practically deprive them of all; they either tolerated or were unaware
of many things, and the tradition, usage, and persistence of the race
kept alive some remnants of Latin civilisation. Thus alone can it be
explained how, after enduring a harsh and long-continued tyranny that
apparently destroyed everything, no sooner were a few links snapped
off the strong, barbaric chain, by which the Italian population was
so straitly bound, than Latin institutions sprang to new life, and
regained all the ground they had lost.

Barbarian society, both in form and tendency, was essentially different
from the Latin. Its predominant characteristic was the so-called
Germanic individualism, as opposed to the Latin sociability. We note
a prevalent tendency to divide into distinct and separate groups. As
a body, it no sooner lost the force of cohesion and union induced by
the progress and rush of conquest, than it immediately began to be
scattered and disintegrated. Owing to their nomadic and savage life,
as well as to the blood in their veins, the barbarians seemed to have
inherited an exaggerated personality and independence, making it
difficult for them to submit for long to a common authority. Thus,
when peace was established, germs of enfeebling discord soon appeared
among them. In fact, when the Longobards had completed the conquest
of nearly the whole of Italy, they divided the land into thirty-six
Duchies, governed by independent dukes enjoying absolute rule in their
respective territories. Under the dukes were sometimes counts, residing
in cities of secondary importance, and at the head of the _comitati_;
while still smaller cities were often ruled by a _sculdascius_, or
bailiff. Both dukes and bailies administered justice according to
the Longobard code, together with the assistant judges, who, under
the Franks, developed into _scabini_, or sheriffs. Little by little
military leaders gained possession of the strongholds, and subsequently
became almost independent chiefs. Then, too, the royal officials,
styled _gasindi_, likewise exercised great power. And even as the
dukes finally asserted their independence from the king, so counts and
_sculdasci_ sought emancipation from the ducal sway, although without
immediate success. In the first century, after the conquest, there
was no law, no recognised protection for the vanquished, nor was the
authority of the bishops and clergy in any way respected. The history
of the Longobard rule shows it to have been so tremendously oppressive
as to apparently crush the very life of the people, so that even at the
most favourable moments no serious revolts were attempted. Even the
example of the free cities in the South failed to excite them.

Nevertheless, as we have already noted, the Church, having gained
meanwhile a great increase of power, refused to tolerate the pride
and arrogance of barbarians who showed her so little respect. Hence
the Pope resolved to expel these strangers by the help of others, and
called the Franks into Italy. Charlemagne, the founder of the new
Empire, could not regard the Latins, to whom the growing civilisation
of his states was so much indebted, with the inextinguishable barbarian
contempt felt by the Longobards. He sought to extend his conquests and
his power. He wished to assist the Pope, in order to be consecrated
by him and obtain his moral support. Therefore he came to Italy, and
the already disintegrated Longobards could ill withstand the firm
unity of the Franks, strengthened as it was by the prestige of his
own victories. In vain the Longobards had already chosen and sworn
fealty to another monarch; in vain they prepared for defence. After
two hundred and five years of assured and almost unchecked domination,
their kingdom was overthrown for ever. In 774 Charlemagne became master
of Italy, and in the year 800 was crowned emperor by the Pope in Rome.
Thus the Western Empire became reconstituted and consecrated in a new
shape, entirely separate and independent from the Empire of the East.
The Franks deprived the Longobards of all their dominions, excepting
the Duchy of Benevento in Southern Italy. The power of the Pope was
greatly increased by his assumption of the right of anointing the
emperor, who rewarded him with rich donations and promised additions of
territory. Rome, however, was ruled as a free municipality; and Venice,
after the manner of the Greek cities in the South, had already asserted
her freedom. Such was the state of Italy after the last barbarian
invasion--that, namely, of the Franks.

As usual, the new masters appropriated one-third of the land; but the
condition of the natives was now decidedly changed for the better.
Roman law was recognised as the code of the vanquished, and this is
an evident sign that it was never entirely obsolete during the two
centuries of Longobard rule. Charlemagne greatly improved the condition
of the Latins, and sometimes promoted them to _honours_, _i.e._,
to offices of royal appointment. But the special characteristic of
his reign in Italy was the new hierarchy he established there. He
destroyed the power of the dukes, whose attitude was too threatening to
the unity of the Empire, and raised instead the position of the counts.
Even in the Marches, or border-provinces, he retained no dukes, but
replaced them by marquises (Mark-grafen, Praefecti limitum). In this
manner the ancient unity of the _comitatus_, or _Gau_, became likewise
the basis of the new barbarian society. Nor did Charlemagne stop at
this point, but began to distribute offices, lands, and possessions in
_beneficio_--_i.e._, in fief--and therefore on condition of obligatory
military service. This proved the beginning of a social revolution,
possibly originated at an earlier date, but now carried to completion
under the name of feudalism. Not the emperor only, but kings, counts,
and marquises also granted lands, revenues, and offices in fief, in
order to obtain a sufficient supply of vassals. Thus an infinite
number of new potentates was created: _vassalli_, _valvassori_, and
_valvassini_, the latter being lowest in degree. Gradually the whole
society of the Middle Ages took a feudal shape; the recipient of a
grant of land was bound to yield military service, at the head of
the peasants employed on his ground. Similar privileges, similar
obligations, accompanied every donation of land or bestowal of office;
for even official posts were generally supplemented by a concession
of land or of revenue. Thus the Germanic tendency to division and
subdivision in small groups was satisfied, while, at the same time,
the Empire, the cities, and even the Church itself, assumed a feudal
form. The bishops in their turn soon began to possess benefices,
and gradually rose to increased power, until we find them in the
position of so many counts and barons. Both in their own persons, and
those of their subordinates, they enjoy immunity from ordinary laws
and tribunals--an inestimable advantage, serving to enhance their
independence and unite large clusters of population beneath their
sheltering sway. Feudalism, accordingly, is a new order, a new and
thoroughly Germanic aristocracy, yet at the same time it is the root of
a veritable revolution in barbaric society, the which revolution will
continue to grow and extend through many vicissitudes. Step by step
the Crown will begin to exempt the benefices or fiefs of the vassals
from subjection to the count, and will then declare them hereditary by
means of a series of laws, all designed for the purpose of irritating
the lesser potentates against their superiors, and of giving increased
strength to the royal authority; but which served, on the contrary, to
open a way of redemption to the downtrodden people. All this, however,
was still unforeseen in the days of Charlemagne. He organised the
feudal system, and kept his realm united and flourishing, although soon
after his death (814) the Empire was split into several kingdoms.

The rule of the Franks in Italy lasted to the death of Charles the
Fat, in 888. And throughout this rule of 115 years, the revolution to
which we have alluded was steadily making way. On all sides the number
of benefices or fiefs continually grew, and year by year exemptions
increased at an equal rate. These were conceded more easily to prelates
than to others, since when laymen received benefices they were entitled
to leave them to their heirs, and thus became inconveniently powerful.
This state of things proved very favourable to cities in which bishops
held residence. At first the count was sole ruler of the city, save
the portion appertaining to the Crown, and called _gastaldiale_, as
being under the command of a _gastaldo_, or steward; then, as the
power of the bishop increased, another portion was exempted from the
count's jurisdiction, as being _vescovile_, _i.e._, the property of
the bishop. Step by step this portion was enlarged until it included
nearly the whole of the town: many cities, in fact, were ruled solely
by the bishop. Thus the fibres of barbarian society were weakened, and
we might almost say unknit, by a method that would have served to keep
it in subjection to the supreme authority of the monarch, but for the
fact that the people, deemed to be dead, was not only breathing, but on
the point of asserting its strength against nobles, kings and emperors,
prelates, and Popes.

Two revolts in the cause of liberty successively took place, and both
began under the Carlovingians, and continued during the reigns of their
successors. The first enervated and enfeebled the barbarian society
to which the soil of Italy was so ill suited; the second prepared the
way for the rise of communes. With the death of Charles the Fat the
rule of the Franks lapsed, and barbarian invasions likewise ceased.
The Germanic tribes had settled down on Italian soil and were becoming
civilised. Nevertheless, Italy had still to pass through a string of
revolutions and years of ill fortune. At the dissolution of the Empire
of the Franks, certain counts and marquises, especially the latter,
who, by the union of several counties, had gained the power of dukes,
were found asserting extravagant pretensions, even endeavouring to form
independent states, and often with success. To this day, in fact, there
are reigning families descended from Frankish marquises and counts. To
compass their destruction benefices and immunities had been granted
in vain: their power was not to be so easily extinguished. For, even
in Italy, where, owing to the different character of the country,
the ancient civilisation had tenaciously lingered on, and now began
to awake to new life, and where, too, the Papacy and the Greeks of
Byzantium had impeded the absolute triumph of Germanic institutions,
feudal counts and marquises now arose to contest the crown. Next
followed long years of renewed devastation and conflict, ending by
the crown being retained in the grasp of German emperors and kings.
The first wars and quarrels were carried on by Berengarius of Friuli
and Guido of Spoleto, with other Italian and foreign nobles, a German
king, two Burgundian monarchs, and finally by King Otho of Germany, who
remained victor. It was during these seventy odd years of continued
strife that Italian kings first reigned in Italy, though with an always
uncertain and disputed rule. Then came a forty years' peace (961-1002),
during which Otho I., II., III. reigned in turn, and another Italian
marquis, Hardouin of Ivrea, disputed the crown of Italy with the
German kings. But in 1014 Hardouin was vanquished by Henry of Germany,
surnamed the _Saint_, to whom succeeded Conradin of the Franconian or
Salic dynasty.

These two German sovereigns completed the feudal revolution, already
mentioned by us, the which, begun by the Carlovingians, and continued
by the Othos, had failed nevertheless to assure the supremacy of kings
and emperors over Italy. But, at all events, seeing that the Othos had
purposely exempted numerous lesser vassals from rendering allegiance to
the counts and barons, and had accorded many cities to prelates; also
seeing that the renascence of communes was considerably promoted by all
the aforesaid exemptions, some writers conceived the idea that this
renascence was chiefly owed to the initiative of the Othos. But these
emperors had a very different aim in view, and had failed to achieve
it. They sought to undermine the strength of all possible assailants of
the Crown, when threatened by revolts such as that of the Marquis of
Ivrea. For this reason Henry the Saint continued to favour the greater
feudatories at the expense of "holders of honours"--that is to say, of
counts and marquises--and in fact almost annihilated the latter class.
Conradin the Salic carried out the scheme more completely, by favouring
even the minor feudatories and making benefices hereditary. From that
moment the victory of the German sovereigns over the feudal lords
was assured; for vassals once rendered masters of their fiefs owed
obedience to the Crown alone, and thus the pride of the great nobles
was permanently abased. Not so the new popular pride, which had grown
to be a power unawares.

Accordingly, we find a multitude of facts showing that the condition of
the Roman race was continually improving; that feudal society, by the
action of its own sovereigns, was daily losing substance and strength;
that as the Latin civilisation revived by the natural force of events,
it changed, assimilated, and absorbed the principles of Germanic
society. Even before the two races came into conflict, the traditions
of the conquered had frequently combated and overcome those of victors.
The latter, indeed, had already accepted the Roman law to some extent,
when the once subject race pleaded the sanction of their municipal
statutes.

Italians were in a state of ferment and of radical transformation
when the first signs of a revival of the communes appeared. Neither
the barbarian rule nor the Empire had ever really mastered the social
order of the peninsula; and exactly when feudalism was first founded
and seemed likely to spread everywhere and assure the quiet supremacy
of the emperors over Italy, fresh causes of peril and strife suddenly
sprang into existence. Papacy and clergy attained to loftier and
more menacing power; the immunities lavished on prelates, from dread
of the laity, rendered them temporal potentates dependent on the
emperors, while as spiritual dignitaries they owed obedience to the
Pope: thus practically enjoying a double investiture. This led to much
disorder and scandalous corruption in the Church, since prelates were
converted into feudal lords, holding sway over cities, making war on
other territories, keeping open court, and indulging in every worldly
pleasure. The Popes wished to re-establish discipline, to maintain
absolute rule over the bishops, and nominate them unhindered; but
this was opposed by the emperor, since the temporal authority of the
prelates made them logically subject to his rule as well. Thus began
the famous war of investitures between the Papacy and the Empire, the
issue of which was so long undecided. Meanwhile neither the Church, the
Empire, nor the feudal system could obtain complete mastery over the
social movement, and the confusion was increased by their continual
disputes. This state of things weakened even the authority of the
prelates; and then the communes, having necessarily learnt the art
of self-government during the period when dioceses were left vacant,
having noted the prosperity of the Southern republics, and found
their strength increased by the extension of commerce and the feudal
disorganisation, finally saw that the moment to achieve freedom had
arrived. Even in cities ruled by lay nobles, things followed the same
course, since to side either with the Empire or the Church always
served to excite much enmity against those in power, and procured many
allies for the weaker party.

Accordingly the eleventh century witnessed the arisal of communes
throughout Italy, and the joy of independence once realised, it was
impossible to return to a state of vassalage, whether under bishops,
counts, or the Empire itself. At first these communes were hemmed
in on all sides by a vast number of dukes, counts, and barons of
various degrees of strength, inasmuch as the feudal order was still
very powerful and still supreme in all country districts. Of German
descent and trained to arms, these nobles fought in their own interest,
although nominally for the Empire and its rights, against the new
communal order that suddenly faced them with such menacing strength.
They swooped down from their strongholds to bar the trade of the towns;
they levied tolls, threatened violence, and tried to treat free men
as their vassals. Thereupon the indignant citizens were stirred to
vengeance from time to time, and often ended by razing great fortresses
to the ground. On the other hand, the nobles still remaining in the
cities became wearied of living among men who no longer respected the
distinctions of class or race, and often departed to rejoin their
friends. They frequently emigrated in such numbers that the citizens
suffered injury by it, and issued decrees forbidding their exodus.
The Pope gave encouragement to the communes, because the reduction of
his prelates' temporal power did not displease him, and the abasement
of the Empire was indispensable to his aims. Thus the struggle of the
working classes against feudalism finally began, and with it the real
history of our communes.

But it should not be thought that the Commune arose to champion the
rights of man or in the name of national independence. Nothing of the
kind. The Empire was still held to be the sole and universal fount
of right. Almost to the close of the fifteenth century, in fact, all
cities, whether Guelph or Ghibelline, foes or friends of the Empire,
continued to indite their State papers in its name.[12] The revived
republics always acknowledged its supremacy, and their own dependence,
almost, one might say, as though in claiming a new and more general
exemption, they only sought to be, as it were, their own dukes or
counts. They combated the nobles and combated the Empire; but victory
once assured, they recognised the authority of the emperor, and prayed
him to sanction the privileges they had won. Nor was the destruction of
the Empire at any time desired by the Popes; its protection was often
indispensable to them, and they too recognised it as the legitimate
heir of ancient Rome, and consequently as the only source of political
and civil rights. Their purpose was to subject the temporal to the
spiritual power. Therefore, during the rise of the Commune, theocracy
and feudalism, Papacy and Empire, still subsisted together and always
in conflict. The Commune had to struggle long against obstacles of all
kinds; but it was destined to triumph, and to create the third estate
and people by whom alone modern society could be evolved from the chaos
of the Middle Ages. This constitutes the chief historical importance of
the Italian Commune.

[Illustration]




CHAPTER I.

_THE ORIGIN OF FLORENCE._


I.

The origin of Florence is wrapped in great obscurity, and little light
is to be derived from chroniclers, who either avoided the subject
altogether or clouded it over with legends. Much has been written
of late touching these chroniclers and on the value and varying
credibility of their accounts. But in endeavouring to ascertain
everything, and push research too subtly, long and learned disputes
have sometimes arisen on particulars which can never, perhaps, be
verified and are scarcely worth knowing, while more significant and
easily investigated points have been left untouched. By this method
some risk is incurred of building up from those writers a species of
occult science for the sole benefit of the initiated, whereas all that
is absolutely known of the origin of Florence may be expressed in a few
words.

The Florentine Commune being of tardier birth than many others,
its historians and chroniclers were likewise of later date, since
no commune possesses a written history until conscious of its own
personality. Thus, it was only in the twelfth century that yearly
records were first started, registering some of the more important
events of Florence, giving dates, and names of places and persons,
while, at the same time, lists were made of the Consuls, the first
magistrates of the Commune, and afterwards supplemented with the
names of the Podesta, who succeeded to the Consuls. These magistrates
being changed yearly, and even more frequently, this catalogue served
as a chronological guide, and was soon converted into a register of
contemporaneous events in the town.

[Illustration: THE ARNO RIVER-GOD.

(_Bas-relief now in the Etruscan Museum, Florence._)

            [_To face page 39._]

A very early fragment of these annals is preserved in the Vatican,
and is written on the back of a sheet forming part of a codex[13] of
Longobard laws. It contains eighteen records, running from 1110 to
1173, in different handwritings, all, however, of the twelfth century,
with some blunders and no chronological arrangement. Nevertheless
these records are of much importance, being the earliest we possess. A
similar and longer series of records of much later date, running from
1107 to 1247, is to be found in a thirteenth-century MS.[14] in the
National Library at Florence.

Both collections have been recently republished and illustrated by
Dr. Hartwig, under the title of "Annales florentini," i. and "Annales
florentini," ii.[15] The Codex containing the second series also
comprises the oldest list extant of Consuls and Podesta, from 1196 to
1267, and has been rendered more complete by the results of fresh
research.[16]

Other and similar records must have been certainly made, first in
Latin, then in Italian, and, in passing from this family to that, from
hand to hand, enlarged, revised, and altered according to the taste,
or even the fancy, of their transcribers. But, from the remains of
those records and all matter copied from them by the chroniclers, it
may be inferred with almost absolute certainty that they told little
or nothing of the origin of the Commune. We are therefore inclined to
believe that this was neither the outcome of virulent conflict nor of
downright revolution, for either would have been undoubtedly registered
in the annals, but that it gradually evolved and developed amid
struggles of secondary importance.

If in these days we desire to ascertain the origin of the Florentine
Commune, it is only natural that older generations should have felt
even a keener interest in the theme. They, however, lacked the art and
critical method enabling us to track and often lay bare the darkest and
most remote periods of history by means of public documents, although
many now perished must have been at their disposal. But our forefathers
were readier to draw on their own imagination, and thus a legend
regarding the origin of the city was created, and soon became widely
diffused.

The primary germ from which this legend was developed and expanded
must date from the twelfth century, seeing that it was known and
recorded by the chronicler Sanzanome, who wrote during the first years
of the thirteenth century. It cannot be much older than this, seeing
that the events and dates to which it alludes, in however vague
and shadowy a fashion, carry it down beyond the eleventh century.
Several inedited copies of this legend are still to be found in
Florentine libraries,[17] and it has been published in three different
compilations. The most ancient of these, in Latin, is contained in
a codex dating from the end of the thirteenth or beginning of the
fourteenth century.[18] The second, in Italian, is in a Lucchese
MS.,[19] compiled between 1290 and 1342; at one point it gives a
record of 1264,[20] and was probably written at that time. The third
and later version, known as the "Libro fiesolano", is comprised in an
Italian codex dated 1382, in the Marucellian Library at Florence, was
discovered by Signor Gargani and published by him in 1854.[21] Dr.
Hartwig discovered the second, which is identical, save in language,
with the first, and published all three under the title of "Chronica de
Origine Civitatis,"[22] found in the Lucca MS.; although in other MSS.
it is styled "Memoria del Nascimento di Firenze."

Such was the material at the service of the old chroniclers, and all
they had to rely upon regarding the origin of Florence. The earliest
chronicler of whom any remains are extant is the judge and notary
Sanzanome, who, as already noted by us, wrote his "Gesta Florentinorum"
at the beginning of the thirteenth century. We find him mentioned
more than once in Florentine documents from 1188-1245.[23] Although
we cannot be certain that this name always referred to the same
individual, it is certain that the same chronicler records his presence
in the war of Semifonte in the year 1202, and in that of Montalto
in 1207. Besides, his work is found in a Florentine codex of the
thirteenth century, and if not in his own hand, in the character of
about the same period.[24] This first attempt at Florentine history,
written in Latin by a judge and notary, supposed by Milanesi and
Hartwig to have been a native of a neighbouring town, but resident
in Florence, has a stamp of its own, very different from that of all
subsequent Florentine chronicles. Sanzanome says nothing as to the
origin of the Commune and its internal constitution. After a vague
and hasty allusion to the old legend,[25] he starts with the war
and destruction of Fiesole in 1125, "cum eius occasione Florentia
sumpsisset originem." Thus, from the beginning, he shows us the Commune
already established, with its consuls and captains, and proceeds to
recount its conflicts with neighbouring powers in a stilted, rhetorical
fashion, with uncertain and often erroneous dates, and with speeches
in strained imitation of ancient Roman historians. Consequently some
writers refused to assign any historic value to his work. But, on
the other hand, critics of greater weight and impartiality, such as
Hartwig, Hegel, and Paoli, have recognised that the work of this
notary, who was almost a precursor of the fifteenth-century humanists,
is a literary phenomenon, and that the fact of its isolation makes
it the more remarkable as a proof of ancient Florentine culture, and
also because we find beneath its rhetorical flourishes much useful
information on the early history of Florence.

Hence all the other chroniclers had to face one and the same problem:
how to write a history, or even a bare chronicle of the earliest
beginnings of Florence, from the scant and fragmentary accounts at
their disposal? The notary Sanzanome shirked the difficulty by saying
nothing of the foundation of the town, and then expanding his narrative
with rhetorical flights, fictitious speeches, and descriptions of
battles, in which his own fancy and imitation of the classics played
the main part. But this method was neither congenial nor possible to
the simpler folk of a later day, who sought to write as they spoke,
and whose culture was slighter, or at all events very different from
the notary's. These chroniclers, therefore, had no basis to build upon
save one legend and a few scraps of information that could not possibly
satisfy their patriotic pride.

Fortunately for their purpose, just at this time--namely, towards
the middle of the thirteenth century--an event of great literary
importance occurred, serving to put the Florentine chroniclers on a new
track. A Dominican monk, one Martin of Troppau, in Bohemia, surnamed
therefore _Oppaviensis_, vulgarly known as Martin Polono, chaplain,
apostolic penitentiary, and afterwards archbishop, wrote an historical
work which, although of no remarkable merit, had an extraordinary
and rapid success. It was a species of manual of universal history,
chronologically arranged under the names of the various emperors and
Popes, down to the year 1268. Its author afterwards carried it down to
a few years later, with an introduction treating of the times anterior
to the Roman Empire.[26] This book was mechanically arranged, and
stuffed with anecdotes, blunders, and fables; but was the work of an
eminent prelate, inspired with the Guelphic spirit. The author's method
of arranging the events of the Middle Ages under the headings of Popes
and Emperors served as a leading thread through the vast labyrinth.
It is certain that his book was rapidly diffused throughout Europe,
especially in Italy, and above all in Florence. As Prof. Scheffer
Boichorst remarks: "Its first translator was a Florentine, and another
Florentine, Brunetto Latini, the first to make use of it." In fact,
the Florence libraries have numerous copies of it in Latin MSS. of the
fourteenth century, while others of the same period comprise an Italian
translation that, according to the results of learned research,[27]
must have been produced in Florence towards 1279.[28] This fact alone
is a most luminous proof of the rapid popularity and diffusion of the
work. As it was a common practice with the scribes of that period to
insert alterations of their own in the works they copied out, it may
have easily occurred to some transcriber of this translation to enrich
it here and there with the more important of the few facts then known
of the early history of their city. But as Martin Polono's work was
only brought down to the end of the thirteenth century, and items of
Florentine history had increased in number and extent, so it came about
that all these additions forsook universal history and were solely
devoted to that of Florence. In this way the former merely served, as
it were, as an introduction to the latter; a result highly gratifying
to municipal self-complacency.

One of the first works introducing Martin Polono's book, translated,
shortened, re-written, and with several interpolated Florentine
items, is that entitled "Le Vite dei Pontefici et Imperatori Romani,"
once attributed to Petrarch, and existing in several Florentine
fourteenth-century codices. In this work, however, Florentine history
is still given very secondary importance, and indeed when at last,
after various sequels and alterations, it finally appeared in print
in 1478, Polono's primitive method was still maintained by giving
summaries here and there of the lives of the other emperors and Popes.
But other versions soon appeared in which Florentine history filled a
larger space.[29] In a fourteenth-century MS. of the Naples National
Library, first examined by Pertz, we find Martin Polono's share of
the work considerably curtailed, and the history of Florence not only
much extended, but likewise carried down to 1309.[30] Here one begins
to see that the writer was chiefly interested in Florentine events.
Professor Hartwig was so struck by this fact as to be at the pains to
extract everything relating to Florence from the MS., and print it
apart, as one of the authorities probably recurred to by Villani.[31]
In a chronicle attributed to Brunetto Latini the same purpose is
still more clearly indicated. Some of the Florentine news contained
in it were long and frequently extracted, printed, and employed;
notably the list of Consuls and Podesta used by Ammirato, and a
narrative of the Buondelmonti tragedy (1215), differing considerably
from Villani's version of the tale. It was speedily decided that the
author must have written in 1293, since he records an event of that
year, and says that he witnessed it with his own eyes.[32] Later, this
Chronicle was attributed to Brunetto Latini, although the narrative is
carried down to a date when Dante's master must have certainly ceased
to exist.[33] During his learned researches in Florence Dr. Hartwig
discovered a MS. that, in all probability, is the original autograph of
the Chronicle.[34] Although mutilated--starting only from 1181--this
Codex is doubly precious, as it clearly shows the method on which
this and many similar works were compiled. There is a middle column
containing the usual mangled version of Martin Polono[35]; and here
on the margins, between the rubrics and sometimes even the lines, are
added notices of general history, drawn from other sources, and special
records of Florentine events.

The history is thus brought down to 1249, where a gap occurs extending
to 1285, from which year the author continues his narrative to
1303.[36] But in this second part the character of the work is
entirely changed. Having no longer Martin Polono as a guide, he now
forsakes that prelate's method. The affairs of the Empire and the
Church are reduced to still smaller proportions, more space is given to
those of Florence, and instead of being scattered haphazard over the
narrative, they are now united and carried steadily on. Thus we see a
real chronicle of Florence gradually developing before us and acquiring
a special value of its own. Its discoverer, Dr. Hartwig, at first
considered it an autograph, but finally conceived doubts on that score.
The great disorder of the manuscript; its mutilated commencement; the
gap between thirty-six years in the middle; the absence of certain
records, comprised in certain excerpts from it, quoted by old writers;
the discovery that many of these writers quoted from another MS. of
the Chronicle belonging to the Gaddi Library; all this justified his
statement that the problem could not be finally solved without the aid
of the Gaddi Codex, which he had not yet been able to discover.

On the other hand, Professor Santini maintained, in a prize essay,
that the Gaddi Codex could only be a copy of that found by Hartwig,
and that the latter must be the mutilated original manuscript. After a
short time the question was ultimately decided by another student of
our Istituto Superiore, Signor Alvisi, who, having unearthed the Gaddi
Codex in the Laurentian Library, found it to be a fifteenth-century
copy.[37] Here the various fragments--arranged in separate columns in
the original MS.--are joined with the remainder of the text, though
often in an arbitrary fashion. Here, too, there is the gap between
1249-85, but the Chronicle, instead of starting from 1181, begins, like
Martin Polono's first compilation, with Jesus Christ--_primo e sommo
Pontefice_--and the Emperor Octavian. Thus, it may now be affirmed,
that the Codex in the Florence National Library is a genuine and, as
it were, photographic representation of the method employed for the
earliest compilations of Florentine historiography. It allows us to see
the author at work, as it were, before our eyes.

Another, but far less perfect, specimen of this kind of production
is afforded by the Lucca MS., to which previous allusion has been
made. The author carefully tells us that it was composed between the
years 1290 and 1342. He transcribes the whole legend of the origin of
Florence, and then gives his Italian _pasticcio_ of Martin Polono,
beginning from the Emperor Octavian. But he intersperses it with "many
things relating to the affairs of Tuscany, and especially of Florence
... the greater part being found in divers books on Tuscany, of which
some contain more, some less" (_qual na piu, qual na meno_). Having
reached the year 1309 in this fashion, he continues his narrative by
borrowing from Villani, several books of whose history had already
appeared in 1341, and with this assistance carries his work down to
1342. He continues by reproducing a Latin description of Florence
written in 1339, and then gives the Latin introduction that Martin
Polono had added to his history. The compiler of this Lucca Codex
avows that his method is neither logical nor chronological; but craves
the reader's indulgence, saying that in this work he had first put
together all the Italian and then all the Latin portions, with the
intention of arranging them better afterwards, by fusing them together
and writing the whole in Latin. This intention he seems to have found
no time to fulfil. From this Codex also, all the portions relating to
Florence were subsequently extracted and printed.[38] As may be seen,
the compiler's method is always the same, although in this case heavier
and more mechanical than usual, for lack of any inherent connection
between the different parts. The only novelty consists in transcribing
the entire legend to make it serve as an introduction to Florentine
history; an example that, as will be seen, was afterwards followed by
others.

But however flattering to Florentine self-love this system of fusing
the history of the Commune with that of the universe might be, it
was clearly apparent that the former remained crushed, as it were,
by the contact. Hence even the fourteenth century witnessed attempts
to expound it apart. Paolo Pieri begins his Chronicle from 1080, the
year from which the other writers also date their earliest historical
account of Florence, and continues it, with slight allusions to the
Popes and slighter to the emperors, down to 1305, including the scanty
Florentine records "gleaned from many chronicles and books, with
certain novel matters seen by me, Paolino di Piero, and written _ad
memoriam_." On the other hand, Simone della Tosa, who died in 1380,
begins his "Annals" with a list of Consuls and Podesta (1196-1278),
and then passes to the death of Countess Matilda (1115) and on to
1346, supplementing towards the close his meagre account of Florentine
affairs with details about his own family. But simple summaries such as
these, consisting only of a few pages, were more inadequate than ever
to satisfy the needs of a city that now, in the fourteenth century, had
already won a foremost place in Italy, was proudly asserting equality
with Rome, and aspired to have a history similar to that of the ancient
metropolis of the world.

Such was the ambitious problem that Giovanni Villani as shown by
his own words, proposed to solve. In the year 1300, he says, "being
in Rome for the Jubilee, admiring the grand memories of that city,
reading the glorious deeds narrated by Virgil, Sallust, Lucan, Titus
Livy, Paul Orosio, and other masters of history, who recounted, not
the events of Rome alone, but likewise strange events of the universal
world: I borrowed their style and form."[39] Reflecting that "our old
Florentines had left few and confused records of past deeds in our city
of Florence,[40] and that our city, the child and creature of Rome,
was on the upward path, and about to achieve great things, whereas
Rome was on the decline," I resolved "to bring into this volume and
new chronicle all the events and beginnings of the city of Florence,
... and give henceforth _in full_ the deeds of the Florentines, and
_briefly_ the notable affairs of the rest of the universe."[41] Thus,
according to Villani, the course to be pursued was to connect the
history of Florence with that of the world, as others had done before
him, but in such wise that Florence should not be the loser, but rather
play the chief part. Hence his work is no longer a mechanical mosaic;
he arranges his history, dividing it in books and chapters, after the
manner of the ancients. We do not know all the authorities from whom
his work was derived, for this question has not yet been completely
investigated. But we know that they were many in number. For general
history, Martin Polono was still the main source; but Villani also drew
from the "Gesta Imperatorum et Pontificum" of Thomas Tuscus,[42] the
"Vita di San Giovanni Gualberto," the "Cronache di San Dionigi" (an
Italian translation of which was printed--1476--before the original
text), and the "Libro del Conquisto d'Oltremare," which was a history
of the Crusades, translated from the French into almost every other
language during the Middle Ages.[43]

That Villani is a very valuable authority in Florentine history dating
from the end of the thirteenth century, is a fact well known to all,
and need not be discussed here. As to the origin of the city, he has
little that is genuinely historical to tell us. His accounts begin, as
usual, from 1080, are more or less identical with those disseminated
by other writers, not unfrequently charged with the same blunders, and
often in the same words. This singular resemblance between many of the
Florentine chroniclers when treating of early times, and remarked upon
later, was easily explained so long as it was taken for granted that
some chroniclers had copied from others. But when it could be proved,
as was often the case, that the same resemblance existed even between
totally independent writers, the problem was not so readily solved.
For this reason, Prof. Scheffer-Boichorst, in noting the fact, after
impartial and keen investigation, suggested the theory that all the
different chroniclers had drawn from some common source, of which
nothing was now known. Seeing that Tolomeo of Lucca, whose Annals
were already concluded before Villani began to colour his design,
often quotes from "Gesta" and "Acta Florentinorum," "Gesta" and "Acta
Lucensium," the German critic assigned the name of "Gesta Florentinum"
to what, in his opinion, must have been the original source used by all
the chroniclers of Florence down to the beginning of the fourteenth
century. This hypothesis became generally accepted as the most probable
explanation of a fact that was otherwise inexplicable. But when
attempts were made to precisely define the nature and limits of the
"Gesta"--to define, not only its language, but in which year it was
begun, in which ended, together with the style and exact character both
of the work and its author--the question then stood on very disputable
ground. Accordingly, I will leave discussions of this kind on one
side, as beyond the sphere of a general outline. Besides, I must agree
with Prof. C. Paoli[44] in considering that the "Gesta" cannot have
been a strictly individual work, but rather a collection of Florentine
news, originally of very meagre proportions, but gradually enriched by
fresh annalistic matter and new additions, as it passed from hand to
hand. Some compilation of this kind, but of greater weight and repute
(now unluckily perished), must have fallen into the hands of various
chroniclers, who made use of it in turn, unconscious that it had served
others before them. And these chroniclers were again copied by several
of a later period.

Villani begins with the Tower of Babel and the confusion of tongues
and then passes on to the legendary origin of Florence, dividing it
in chapters and expounding it as though it were genuine history, but
inserting various alterations, to which we shall refer later on. He
then proceeds with a general history of the Middle Ages, and from the
year 1080 engrafts on this stock all the accounts of Florence he had
been able to collect, and even colours these by a variety of other
legends much diffused among the people at the time, and often, also,
by the addition of fantastic considerations of his own. What amount
of accurate knowledge can be derived from all this? Substantially
we find a single legend, and a small number of historical facts of
undoubted value, though not free from errors, floating, as elsewhere,
in an ocean of events quite unconnected with Florence, intermixed with
scraps of misty traditions or legends, arbitrarily interpreted and
explained. Therefore, the first question to be decided is that of the
origin and value of the legend itself. Can any historical information
be derived from it, either directly or indirectly? The second question
is: Can it be ascertained with any certainty what original nucleus of
authentic information the "Gesta Florentinorum" must have contained?
The latter at least presents no serious difficulty, seeing that when
we compare the various chroniclers, particularly those who worked
independently, and extract what Florentine material they used in common
and often gave in the same words, the main point is won. But, after
all this, and after trying to extract some substance (scant enough,
as will be seen) from the legend, very little genuine information is
gained. It is therefore an absolute necessity to seek the aid of all
public and private documents contained in our Archives, and of all
learned modern investigations regarding mediaeval history in general,
and that of Florence in particular. Florentine historical research,
first inaugurated by Ammirato, was diligently pursued in the eighteenth
century by Borghini, Lami, and numerous other scholars, down to the
present day. Nevertheless, the definite results of these prolonged
inquiries, this vast display of learning, were still very few. For
instance, we find that even the illustrious Gino Capponi, after a
short introduction to his History of Florence, is compelled, like the
ancients, to leap to the death of Countess Matilda, and makes his
first mention, so to say, of the Commune after it had already existed
for some time. Then the history of almost two centuries, to the year
1215, or thereabouts, is summed up in twelve pages, and only from the
thirteenth forward are events related really in full.

[Illustration: ETRUSCAN TOMBSTONES, FROM THE MERCATO VECCHIO, FLORENCE.]

But in these days the study of mediaeval documents has made
extraordinary progress, above all in Germany, and accordingly the
Florentine question has been again reopened. Dr. O. Hartwig was the
first to apply his learning to the task, employing the scientific
method. He not only examined all that was published on the subject,
but made fresh researches in Italian libraries and archives, further
aided by precious notes of documents newly discovered in Tuscany by D.
Wuestenfeld. Thus, in the work from which we have frequently quoted, he
was enabled to give a collection of valuable documents and of learned
dissertations which have been already turned to account, will serve
as a basis for future researches, and would be still better known and
appreciated were they penned in a more popular style. Much has been
found, very much read by Prof. Perrens, who has devoted his life to
Florentine history, and already published eight volumes of his work.
His first volume, of five hundred pages, only extends to the middle
of the thirteenth century, and therefore treats of the origin of the
city learnedly and at length. All Italians owe him gratitude for
this; but it must be confessed that his untiring zeal, vast learning,
and prodigious reading have not always resulted in a due amount of
historical accuracy, and sureness of method. Treating of a period
in which all has to be built up on a very scanty number of known
facts, unless these facts are thoroughly ascertained disastrous
consequences are apt to ensue. For example, in investigating the first
origin of the Consuls, he still relies on the document of Pogna,
dated March 4, 1101, in which they are named, and without remarking
that Capponi, from whom, nevertheless, he continually quotes, had
proved that, although long thought correct, this date was erroneous,
and should be altered to March 4, 1181, Florentine style, the which
signifies 1182 in the modern style. Thus Prof. Perrens introduces
Consuls long before they were born.[45] Elsewhere he plunges into the
very intricate dispute as to the jurisdiction exercised over their
own territory by the Florentines of the twelfth century. He repeats
with the old chroniclers that in 1186 Frederic I. deprived them of
all jurisdiction beyond the city walls, but that they re-acquired it
in 1188. He adds that on the Emperor Frederic's decease in 1190, his
successor, Henry VI. "comme don de joyeux evenement, multiplie les
privileges." He fails to reflect that the patent quoted in support of
the latter assertion bears the date of 1187, and that he gives the date
in a note of his own.[46] How is the reader to disentangle this skein?
As another example, we may add that the author gives as an historical
fact the legendary tale of the origin of the Colombina festival held
on Holy Saturday. The Florentines are sent to the Crusades by their
archbishop, Ranieri, in 1099: that is several centuries before Florence
possessed an archbishop. Pazzino de Pazzi, in reward for his feats of
valour at the taking of Jerusalem, receives the _mural crown_ from
Godfrey de Bouillon, together with the right to change his arms and
adopt the crosses and dolphins, the which change was only effected by
the Pazzi several centuries later.[47] Pazzino returns to Florence
in triumph, mounted on a car, of which the description is given; and
at a time when the Commune was not yet established,[48] is received
in the style of a Roman conqueror by the people, the clergy, and the
magistrates. He has brought three stones from the Holy Sepulchre, and
these are the flints from which the sparks are still struck to fire
the Car of the Dove. All this is derived from Gamurrini's "Storia
genealogica," an utterly valueless work.[49] Readers may consider it
strangely invidious on my part to be at the pains to refer to certain
blunders contained in a work of which I am the first to recognise the
merits, and by which I have often profited. But it seemed necessary to
explain why, in spite of having praised, I should so seldom quote it.
The work undeniably comprises abundant historic material, is written
with vivacity and clearness, contains many keen observations, and
does honour to an author to whom Italians are bound to be grateful.
But although for all these reasons it is a book deserving attention,
no possible use can be made of it, without continually verifying the
authorities cited in it.

Here a word must be said touching another and far less imposing work,
to which we have been able to refer with far greater security. Already,
in certain short papers appearing in the "Archivio Storico Italiano,"
Prof. Santini had proved his power of keen research on the early
history of Florence, and has now had the happy idea of collecting all
the documents on the subject, both published and unpublished, existing
in the Florentine Archives. After copying and verifying them from
the originals, he is now bringing them out in a bulky volume. It would
be well if he or other writers could complete the same task in all
cities, or at least in those of Tuscany, which had so many ties in
common. Meanwhile, his book will form a new and solid foundation for
Florentine historic research. We are doubly grateful for his kindness
in allowing us to examine his press proofs. Thus we have been enabled
to profit by his forthcoming book in advance of its publication, and
shall have frequent occasion to quote from it. Other works, unmentioned
in the text, will be recorded in the notes for our readers' benefit.

[Illustration: SITE OF A ROMAN VILLA DISCOVERED NEAR S. ANDREA,
FLORENCE.]


II.

Turning away for the moment from codices and chroniclers, we now come
to the legend presenting the first problem that has to be solved, or at
any rate discussed. Undoubtedly this legend was very widely circulated
among the people. Even the "Divina Commedia" (Par. xv. 125) tells us
how the Florentine dame at her spinning wheel--

      "Favoleggiava con la sua famiglia
       De' Troiani di Fiesole e di Roma."

Nevertheless, it appears to have had a literary rather than a purely
popular origin. In fact, it is only a strange medley of classical
and mediaeval traditions, chiefly taken from books, and more or less
arbitrarily altered, regarding the siege of Troy, the flight of Aeneas,
and the origin of Rome; and as municipal pride sought to connect the
latter with that of Florence, all the scanty and vague notices, or
rather traditions, existing on the subject had been carefully scraped
together. The legend begins with Adam, but quickly leaving him aside,
strides on to the foundation of Fiesole by Atlas and his spouse,
aided by the counsels of Apollonius the astrologer. Fiesole was the
first city built; it was erected on the healthiest spot in Europe,
and hence its name--_Fie sola_. The children of Atlas spread over the
land and populated it. The eldest son was called Italo, and gave Italy
its name; the third was Sicano, who conquered and named Sicily. The
second son, Dardano, wandered farther a-field, and founded the city of
Troy.[50] The legend next passes rapidly to the Trojan war, the flight
of Aeneas, and the foundation of Rome, of which city Florence is the
favourite offspring. It then goes on to speak at much greater length,
of Catiline, regarding whom so many particulars are given, that he must
have been the subject of a separate legend which either, when united
with the rest, at a later date, formed the so-called "Chronica de
origine Civitatis," or was, more probably, anterior to this, and only
amalgamated with it in subsequent compilations.

After conspiring against Rome Catiline came to Fiesole, whither
the Romans pursued and attacked him, under their consuls Metellus
and Fiorinus. The latter falling in battle, their army was totally
defeated on the banks of the Arno. But Julius Caesar came to avenge
them, besieged and destroyed Fiesole; and then, on the same spot where
Fiorinus had fallen, a new city was built, and called Fiorenza to
commemorate his name. Catiline fled to the Pistorian Appennines, but
was pursued there and routed. So great was the number of the killed,
that a pestilence broke out, and from this Pistoia derived its name.[51]

[Illustration: PAVEMENT OF ROMAN HOUSE UNDER THE MERCATO VECCHIO,
FLORENCE.]

[Illustration: MOSAIC PAVEMENT OF ROMAN BATHS, FLORENCE.

            [_To face page 59_.]

In the legend the nomenclature of Tuscan cities is always explained on
the same principles, Pisa, for instance, being derived from _pesare_
(to weigh). For the Romans received their tributes there, and these
were so numerous that they had to be weighed in two different places.
This is why they spoke of the city in the plural, _Pisae Pisarum_.
Lucca comes from _lucere_ (to shine), because it was the first city
converted to the light of Christianity. When the Franks[52] marched
against the Longobards in the South they halted at a place in central
Italy, and left all their aged people behind them. Thus the city built
on that site received the name, likewise in the plural, of _Senae
Senarum_. Florence, however, according to the legend, derived its name
from Fiorinus, although later writers declared it to be taken from the
word _Fluentia_, because it stood by the river Arno; others, again,
from the numerous flowers springing from its soil. It was built in the
likeness of Rome, with a capitol, forum, theatre, and baths, and was
consequently called Little Rome. Its friends are always the friends of
Rome; the foes of the one are foes of the other.

After five hundred years, so runs the legend, _Totila flagellum Dei_
came and destroyed Florence, and immediately rebuilt the rival city
of Fiesole. This clearly alludes to Attila, since he bore the title
of _flagellum Dei_, and in the Middle Ages was the real type of the
devastator and destroyer of cities. As he never came to Florence he was
converted into Totila, who had been there, although never designated
by the same appellation. This exchange of names was aided by their
resemblance, nor is it the sole example the Middle Ages afford of the
confusion of Attila with Totila. In the "Divina Commedia" ("Inferno,"
xiii. 148-9) we find Dante attributing the destruction of Florence to
Attila, when he says:

      "Quei cittadin che poi la rifondarno
       Sovra il cener che d'Attila rimase."

And hereby he doubly deserts the legend; for, according to that,
Florence was rebuilt by the Romans and then, naturally, on the pattern
of Christian Rome, with churches dedicated to St. Peter, St. John, St.
Laurence, &c., as in the Eternal City.

Thereupon more than 500 years[53] elapsed in peace; but then Florence,
finally resolving to be revenged on its perpetual rival, suddenly
attacked and destroyed Fiesole. At this point we may remark that, if
Florence had been first founded in Caesar's time, and adorned with Roman
monuments at a later date; if, after 500 years,[54] it was destroyed
by Totila, and then itself overthrew Fiesole after another interval
of 500 years, the chronology of the legend clearly brings us to the
eleventh century at least. If we also add that the assault and partial
destruction of Fiesole really occurred in 1125, it follows that, as
we have noted, the legend cannot have been framed before the twelfth
century.

Here, then, it should end and give place to history. In fact,
Sanzanome, the earliest of the chroniclers, begins his work with the
destruction of Fiesole. But the "Libro fiesolano" sometimes introduces
capricious turns in the framework of the legend, and at this point
makes an addition worthy of note as an evidence of the mode in which
these fantastic stories were built up. The added portion refers to
the Uberti, powerful citizens always opposed to popular government in
Florence. According to tradition, they came originally from Germany
with the Othos. Evidently, however, this theory was repugnant to the
author of the "Libro fiesolano," possibly an adherent of the Uberti,
and he therefore remarks, with some heat, that, on the contrary, the
Uberti were descended from Catiline, "most noble king of Rome," with
Trojan blood running in his veins. Catiline's son Uberto Cesare had a
Fiesolan wife, who bore him sixteen children; and he was afterwards
sent by Augustus to reconquer Saxony, which had risen in rebellion.
While in that country Uberto Catilina married a German lady of high
position, and from this union sprang "the lineage of the good Ceto
[Otho] of Sansognia." Thus it is false that the Uberti were "born of
the Emperor of Germany, the truth being that the emperor was born of
their race."[55] This addition, posterior to the rest of the legend,
shows that the author desired to exalt the Uberti; but, remembering
their constant hostility to the Florentine government, declared them
descended from Catiline and his Fiesolan bride. Also, being unable to
deny outright their Ghibelline proclivities and Germanic origin, yet
unwilling to acknowledge their descent from the Othos, he converts them
into the latter's progenitors. Thus the legend is brought into harmony
with its compiler's views, or rather, with his intent of magnifying his
friends.

Inquiry into the sources of this legend would only lead us astray,
without throwing any new light on the origin of Florence, since the
fable has no real historical value. We need only say that, besides
Darses' "De excidio Troiae," the commentary to Virgil of Servius;
Orosio's History, Paolo Diacono's Roman History, and the "Storia
Miscella," &c., must have been consulted for its compilation.[56]
Leaving the question aside, we may rather note that, although Villani
and Malespini both give the legend as a preface to their histories,
they not only refer to two separate compilations, but use them in
a totally different way.[57] This is another proof that even if
Malespini's chronicle were copied from Villani, it is not always
an exact reproduction. He refers to the "Libro fiesolano,"[58] but
enlarges it with two entire chapters of his own, containing a complete
story, probably derived from some episode of the Catiline legend. And
although teeming with the strangest anachronisms, it is better written
and far livelier than the rest.

In this tale we find Fiorino converted into a Roman king, married
to the most beautiful woman ever seen, appropriately named Belisca.
After the defeat and death of her husband, Queen Belisca remained the
captive of a wicked knight named Pravus, but Catiline causes him to
be put to death, and carries off Belisca, of whom he is desperately
enamoured. The queen, however, is in despair concerning the fate of her
lovely daughter Teverina, imprisoned in the house of one Centurione,
and adored by him. In kissing Teverina's beautiful hair this man had
exclaimed: "It is these that enchain me, for lovelier locks have I
never seen." On the day of Pentecost the mother attended mass in the
Fiesole church, and with bitter tears bemoaned the loss of her child.
Her prayer was heard by a serving-maid, who knew where Teverina was
hidden, and revealed it to the weeping mother. On receiving the news,
Catiline instantly attacked Centurione's palace, and, after a fierce
struggle, succeeded in capturing him. The prisoner owed his life to
Belisca's intercession; for, having regained her child, she desired
to save him, dressed his wounds, and urged him to fly from Catiline's
wrath. Centurione consented to escape, and having mounted his horse,
implored permission to bid a last farewell to Teverina. But when she
appeared, he caught her in his arms, and galloped away, followed by
his men. The mother fainted from grief, and Catiline, "with all his
barons," a thousand horse and two thousand foot, pursued the traitor to
the castle of Naldo, ten miles off, and proceeded to attack him there.
But at that moment news came that the Romans were marching on Fiesole,
so he was obliged to hasten back there before the siege should begin.
Thus ends the singular episode annexed to the legend, when, having
lost its primitive character, it became a fairy tale while pretending
to be history.

Villani, on the other hand, follows a more ancient compilation, and
rejects the Belisca story. He, too, is acquainted with the "Libro
fiesolano," makes some use of it, but considers it unauthentic exactly
at the point where we find Malespini adhering to it. In fact, when
recording the pretended descent of the Uberti from Catiline, Villani
adds: "We find no proof of these matters in any authentic history."[59]
Also, in trying, as far as possible, to give the legend a more genuine
and historical appearance, he often inserts alterations drawn from the
sources on which the legend itself was based, sometimes quoting Roman
poets and historians such as Ovid, Lucan, Titus Livy, and, above all,
Sallust, to whom he refers when adding certain historical particulars
to the Catiline legends. A permanently instructive psychological fact
is afforded us by the men of this period, and most of all by Villani.
How was it that a contemporary of Dante--a man practised in affairs,
cultivated, intellectual, and acutely observant--could mingle so much
and such puerile credulity with great intelligence, culture, and common
sense?

In short, what substantial information can be gleaned from the
"Chronica de origine civitatis"? Besides the ambitious aim, common to
nearly all the cities of Italy, of trying to trace their origin back
to the Romans and Trojans, the "Chronica" wishes to impress upon us
that the Etruscan Fiesole was the constant rival of Roman Florence,
which could not prosper until the former was destroyed. Therefore,
Catiline, the enemy of Rome, is the defender of Fiesole, Caesar,
Augustus, the emperors, are the founders, champions, and restorers of
Florence, which is always described as being in the likeness of Rome
and styled little Rome, Augusta, Cesarea, &c. Totila or Attila--that
is, barbarians who overthrew the Empire--are likewise destroyers of
Florence. Another legend of later date attributes the rebuilding of the
city to Charlemagne, the restorer of the Empire. So at least the tale
runs in Villani and Malespini; but there is no trace of it either in
the "De Origine," or the "Libro fiesolano," both impregnated with Roman
traditions only, and the legends of chivalry being as yet unknown to
Florence. In fact, Villani remarks, when repeating the tale: "We find
(it) in the 'Chronicles of France.'"[60]

We may accept as a certainty that the first origin of Florence was owed
to Etruscan Fiesole, and that this was known even in the days of Dante
is proved by his lines to the Florentines ("Inferno," xv. 61-3):

      "Ma quell' ingrato popolo maligno,
         Che discese da Fiesole ab antico,
       E tiene ancor del monte e del macigno."

And Niccolo Machiavelli, leaving all legends aside (as Aretino had done
before him), justly declared that the traders of Fiesole had begun from
very remote times to form a commercial settlement on the Arno, at the
point where the Mugnone runs into the river. So gradually a cluster of
cabins arose, grew into houses, and finally became a rival city. But
the city was entirely constructed by the Romans, though at what precise
period is still unascertained. It is scarcely probable that the event
can have occurred earlier than two centuries before Christ. Perhaps
the city began to rise when, to protect Tuscany against Ligurian
invaders, the Romans made a network of roads through the valley of the
Arno; that is, when (according to Livy) C. Flaminius _viam a Bononia
perduxit Arretium_, the which road crossed the Ponte Vecchio. Strabo
says nothing of Florence; Tacitus and Pliny are the first to mention
it. But in the second century of the Vulgar Era Florius already styles
it _Municipium splendidissimum_, and records it among the cities
which suffered most in the days of Sulla.[61] Recent excavations made
in digging new sewers under Florence have furnished proofs that in
Sulla's time the city must have already possessed buildings of no small
importance, including an amphitheatre.[62] The restoration of Florence,
after the serious injuries inflicted on it in Sulla's day, is generally
attributed to Augustus, who is supposed to have made it the seat of
one of the twenty-eight colonies founded by him, whence the name
_Julia, Augusta, Florentia_. The "Liber Coloniarum" (p. 213, 6) numbers
Florence among the colonies formed by the _Triumviri_ (45 B.C.), and
it certainly must have been a colony in 15 B.C., when the city sent
a deputation to Tiberius asking him to forbid the junction of the
river Chiana with the Arno, on account of the damage this would cause
(Tacitus, "Ann.," i. 79). But the weighty authority of Mommsen supports
the view that, in spite of the testimony given by Florius, the colony
of Florence was founded instead by Sulla.[63] The same date may be
assigned to the construction of the oldest circuit of walls, existing
during a great part of the Middle Ages, and some remains of which have
been discovered in our own day.

[Illustration: PISCINA FRIGIDARIA.

_Discovered near the Campidoglio, Florence._

            [_To face page 66._]

Florence would seem to have been built in the form of the ancient Roman
_Castrum_, a quadrangle traversed by two wide and perfectly straight
streets, crossing it in the centre at right angles and dividing it into
quarters. The Campidoglio stood in the middle on the site afterwards
occupied by the Church of Santa Maria in Campidoglio, and the Forum was
near at hand, on the site of the now demolished Mercato Vecchio. There
was also the amphitheatre, known in the Middle Ages as the _Parlascio_,
of which some traces exist near Borgo de' Greci; a theatre (in Via de'
Gondi.); a temple of Isis (on the site of San Firenze); and baths in
the street still known as Via delle Terme.[64] Accordingly, it is not
surprising that the city, which was then very small and limited to this
side of the Arno, should have been called Little Rome, and sought to
base its origin on Roman traditions. The whole spirit of its monuments
spoke of Rome, and the same spirit was echoed by the minds and
imaginations of those who invented the legend. Even now, after so many
centuries, so many changes, we still find remains of Roman buildings,
and of so-called Byzantine architecture, but no single trace of the
real Gothic or Longobard style.

Florence gradually extended as time went on, and _borghi_ were built
outside the walls, the largest of these suburban quarters being the
_Borgo_, connected with the city proper by the Ponte Vecchio. In the
second half of the eleventh century, and in the year 1078, if Villani's
statement be correct (iv. 8), new walls were built to replace the
palisades surrounding the _Borghi_. Villani may be accepted as an
authority, now that he is known to have superintended the construction
of the third and last circuit of walls begun in 1299 (viii. 2 and 31),
and now almost entirely destroyed save for a fragment here and there.

For a long time after the epoch of the barbarian invasions the history
of Florence is involved in great obscurity, and what little information
we have on the subject is either entirely legendary or jumbled with
legends.

In 405 Radagasius led a horde of Goths, mixed with other tribes, into
Tuscany and lay siege to Florence. But the walls held out until the
Roman general Stilicho came to the rescue, defeated the assailants,
and put their leader to death. The resistance of Florence was greatly
magnified, and Stilicho's victory attributed to a miracle. Tradition
added that the battle having been fought on the 8th of October, the
Feast of Santa Reparata, the Florentines inaugurated their Pallio
races on that day, and founded the Church of Santa Reparata; but both
these events were of later occurrence. The tradition merely serves to
show how long Florence preserved the memory of its narrow escape from
destruction.

Regarding the next century there is an absolute blank; but then comes
the legend that even Villani accepts, relating how Totila, _flagellum
Dei_, destroyed Florence and re-built Fiesole.[65] To this the
chronicler appends a second tale to the effect that after the city
had remained thus devastated and ruined for 350 years, Charlemagne
summoned the Romans to join him in rebuilding the city in the likeness
of Rome, and that it thus arose anew, adorned with churches dedicated,
like those of Rome, to San Pietro, San Lorenzo, Santa Maria Maggiore,
&c., and was also granted a territory extending three miles beyond
the walls.[66] Here one sees that although the chronicler had already
recorded, on the authority of the "De Origine," that Florence was
rebuilt immediately after its pretended destruction by Totila, he
thought that date premature, seeing that Florence really remained for
long after in a very desolate and obscure condition, and therefore,
to save trouble, he also jots down the posterior legend attributing
instead the reconstruction of the city to Charlemagne, the saviour of
the Empire.

What germs of truth can be gleaned from all this? Totila really
entered Tuscany in 542, and sent part of his host to besiege Florence.
Justin, the commander of the Imperial garrison there, then sought
aid from Ravenna; and when the relieving force approached the city,
Totila raised the siege and withdrew towards Sienna. Pursued by the
Imperial troops, he succeeded in routing them, but instead of returning
against Florence, directed his march towards Southern Italy. So at
least runs the account given by Procopius, and also followed by modern
writers.[67] The Goths, it is true, made another descent later, easily
mastered Tuscany and Florence, and committed much cruelty there,
though without destroying the city. These are the facts; all the rest
was a legendary excrescence signifying that the Florentines endured a
long period of obscurity and oppression, and only began to emerge from
it in the time of the Franks.

In fact, the Longobard occupation of Tuscany took place towards
570, and we have two centuries of utter darkness. We find mention
of one _Gudibrandus, Dux civitatis Florentinorum_, appointed by the
conquerors; but nothing else is known to us. Amid the many calamities
wrought by invasion, war, and harsh tyranny, not only was the trade, to
which Florence owed its existence, entirely ruined, but many families
escaped from the plains to safe places among the hills, and a good
number accordingly took refuge in Fiesole, which city profited as usual
by the ill fortune of Florence. And this to so great an extent, that
during the latter half of the eighth century we find documents alluding
to Florence as though it had become a suburb of Fiesole.[68] But soon,
beneath Charlemagne's rule, times of greater order and tranquillity
were inaugurated. Men began once more to forsake the hills for the
valley; Florence began to prosper at Fiesole's expense. And as the
Franks replaced the Longobard dukes by counts, so Florence too had
its count, exercising jurisdiction throughout the territories of the
bishopric that had been carved out of the old Roman division. This was
the so-called _contado fiorentino_, stretching on the one side to a
place called I Confini, near Prato, and thence towards Poggio a Caiano,
sweeping round by the Empoli district, and conterminous with the
borders of Lucca, Volterra, and the _contado_ of Fiesole.[69]

Charlemagne halted in Florence, and celebrated Christmas there in 786;
he likewise defended the property of the Florentine Church against
Longobard aggressions. This gave rise to the legend that the rebuilding
of the city was his work. Regardless of anachronisms, Villani not
only adds that many imaginary privileges were conceded by him, but
attributes to this period the birth of the Commune which only took
place several centuries later. "Charles," he tells us, "created many
knights, and granted privileges to the city by rendering free and
independent the Commune, its inhabitants, and the _contado_, with
all dwellers therein, for three miles round, inclusive of resident
strangers from other parts. For this reason many men returned to the
said city, and framed its government after the Roman mode, namely,
with two consuls and a council of one hundred senators."[70] But this
addition is made by the chronicler, and in a more arbitrary way than
the legend itself.

Nor was this all. Not Charlemagne only, but likewise Otho I., the
regenerator of the German Empire, must be necessarily the patron
of Florence, "because," continues the chronicler, "it had always
appertained to the Romans and been faithful to the Empire."[71] In the
year 955 the emperor halted in Florence on the way to Rome for his
coronation, and on this occasion the chronicler makes him grant the
city a territory of six miles in extent, that is, one as big again, but
no less imaginary, than that bestowed by Charlemagne. Villani goes on
to relate how Otho established peace in Italy, overthrew tyrants, and
left many of his barons settled in Lombardy and Tuscany, the Counts
Guidi and Uberti among the rest. He fails to reflect that some of these
Tuscan families were of much earlier origin, and that even in his
own day the leading nobles of the _contado_ bore the name of Cattani
Lombardi, in remembrance of their Longobard descent. Also, he again
forgets that Florence was not then a free city to whom the emperor
could concede a portion of territory, which, as we have seen, already
belonged to his own jurisdiction, and, towards Fiesole at least, could
not possibly be of six miles in extent.[72]

Another fabulous narrative, also given by Villani, is that of the
destruction of Fiesole in 1010. On the day of St. Romolo's feast the
Florentines, bent on revenge, are supposed to have entered the rival
city with arms concealed under their clothes, and suddenly drawing
their weapons and summoning comrades hidden in ambush, to have rushed
through the streets, seizing everything and destroying all houses and
buildings excepting the bishop's palace, the cathedral, two or three
churches, and the fortress, which refused to surrender. After this,
safety was promised to all disposed to migrate into Florence, and many
profited by the offer. Thus the two peoples were made one, and even
their flags united. That of the Florentines bore the white lily on a
red field, that of Fiesole a demi lune azur on a white field; and thus
was formed the red and white banner of the Commune.[73]

According to Villani this union of two separate peoples proved the
chief cause of the continual wars by which Florence was harassed,
together with the fact of the city being built "under the sway and
influence of the planet Mars, the which always leads to war and
discord." Then again, as though forgetting he had already made the
same statement regarding the times of Charlemagne, he repeats the
almost equal anachronism that the Florentines "then made common laws
and statutes, and lived under the rule of two consuls and a council of
senators, consisting of a hundred men, the best of the city, according
to the custom introduced in Florence by the Romans."[74] It is plain
that he does not know how the Commune arose, but feels persuaded its
origin was derived from Rome, and therefore records the fact as having
occurred at the moment suiting him best, or seeming least improbable.
But it is hard to see why he assigned the war and destruction of
Fiesole to the year 1010 when aware that those events occurred, on the
contrary, in 1125, as he afterwards relates in due place. The most
probable explanation is, that finding the legend gave an account of
the war and overthrow of Fiesole _more than five hundred years_ after
the destruction of Florence by Totila, whose invasion occurred _five
hundred years_ after the city was founded, the chronicler described the
destruction twice over, namely, in 1010 and 1125; thus following first
the legendary account, which had retraced its steps in a very vague
fashion, and next the historical account, commonly known in his day.
As for the causes of civil war being derived from the forced junction
of two hostile nationalities, it may be observed that the diversity
between the Germanic strain in the nobility and the Latin blood of the
people, really constituted a strong element of discord, and this may
have been felt, if not understood, by the chronicler.

It is certain that from the Frankish times downward the prosperity of
Florence slowly but surely increased. Nevertheless it is true that, as
Villani says, its whole territory bristled with the castles of feudal
barons of Germanic descent, all hostile to Florence, and many of whom,
safely ensconced on the neighbouring hill of Fiesole, were always ready
to swoop down on Florentine soil.

In spite of this the geographical position of the city, on the road to
Rome, proved increasingly advantageous to its commerce. As early as 825
the _Costitutiones olonenses_ of the Emperor Lothair proposed Florence,
with seven other Italian cities, as the seat of a public school,
thus attesting its importance even at that date. Besides, the German
emperors nearly always halted there on their way to coronation in Rome.
More often, and for longer periods, the Popes made sojourn there,
whenever--a by no means uncommon occurrence--popular disturbances
expelled them from Rome. Victor II. died in Florence in 1057, and had
held a council there two years before; in 1058 Stephen IX. drew his
last breath there; three years later Nicholas II. and his cardinals
stayed in the town pending the election of Alexander II. Full of Roman
traditions and monuments, in continual relation with the Eternal City,
Florence was subject to its influence from the earliest times, and
showed the Guelph and religious tendencies afterwards increasingly
prominent in the course of her history. Towards the close of the tenth
century many new churches arose within and without the city walls. At
the beginning of the eleventh century the construction of an edifice
such as San Miniato al Monte, in addition to the other churches
built about the same period, affords indubitable proof of awakening
prosperity and religious zeal. In fact, Florence now became one of the
chief centres of the movement in favour of monastic reform that, after
its first manifestation at Cluny, spread so widely on all sides. St.
Giovanni Gualberto, of Florentine birth, who died in 1073, inaugurated
the reformed Benedictine order known by the name of Vallombrosa, in
which place he founded his celebrated cloister, and subjected many of
the monasteries near Florence to the same rule.

[Illustration: ATTACK ON THE MONKS OF S. SALVI.

(_Bas-relief by Benedetto da Rovezzano in the National Museum,
Florence._)

            [_To face page 74._]

Before long this religious and monastic zeal burnt so fiercely in
Florence, that when its bishop, Pietro da Pavia, was accused of simony,
all the people rose against him. The friars declared that he owed his
high office to the favour of the emperor, and of Duke Goffredo and
Beatrice his wife, and that he had bought their protection at a
very heavy price. The multitude sided with the friars, and the quarrel
was carried on for five years (1063-68), and with so much heat as
to lead to bloodshed. The bishop, enraged by these accusations, and
emboldened by the duke's favour, caused an armed attack to be made on
the monastery of San Salvi near Florence. The first promoter of the
religious movement, St. Giovanni Gualberto, was, fortunately for him,
elsewhere at the time; but his altars were pillaged and several of his
monks injured. This incident naturally added fuel to the fire, and St.
Giovanni Gualberto, who had already inflamed men's minds by preaching
in the city streets, now cast aside all reserve, and openly declared
that no priests consecrated by a simoniacal bishop were real members
of the clergy. The popular excitement rose to so high a pitch, that it
is asserted that about a thousand persons preferred to die unassoiled,
rather than receive the sacrament from priests ordained by a bishop
guilty of simony.[75] Strange though it seem, this was by no means
incredible in times of earnest religious faith!

Pope Alexander II. vainly endeavoured to pacify the people; vainly
sent the pious, learned, and eloquent St. Pier Damiano to achieve that
end. The holy man came with the words of peace, afterwards repeated in
his letters addressed to _Dilectis in Christo civibus florentinis_. He
censured simony, but likewise blamed too easy credence of the charge.
It were better, he said, for the Florentines to send representatives to
the Synod in Rome, whose authority would decide the quarrel; meanwhile
they must remain quiet, without yielding to the blind and heinous
illusion that had left so many to die without the "sacraments" to their
souls' peril. Woe to those who seek to be juster than the just, wiser
than the wise. Through too great zeal, they end by joining the foes of
the Church. Croaking even as frogs (_velut ranae in paludibus_), they
throw everything into confusion, and may be likened to the plague of
locusts in Egypt, since they bring equal destruction on the Church.[76]

This movement much resembled that carried on about the same time by
the Patarini in Milan against the simony of the archbishop. There
too, as in Florence, St. Pier Damiano played the part of peacemaker,
and there also many preferred to die unassoiled, rather than take the
sacrament from simoniacal priests.[77] But, despite the resemblance
of the two insurrections, they led to different final results, owing
to the different conditions of the two cities, and the very diverse
attitude respectively assumed towards them by the Court of Rome. At any
rate, the exhortations of St. Pier Damiano had no effect in Florence.
The Vallombrosa monks sent representatives to Rome, but only to declare
before the Council, then in session, their readiness to decide the
question by appeal to the judgment of God. Not only was their proposal
rejected by Pope and Council, but they were also severely censured for
suggesting it, although the Archdeacon Hildebrand, there present, who
had already risen to great authority in the Church, tried to defend
them, as he had previously defended the Patarini of Milan. The Council
ordered the monks to withdraw to their monasteries, and abide in them
quietly, without daring again to inflame minds already unduly excited.
St. Giovanni Gualberto would have obeyed willingly now; but it was too
late: he could no longer quell the storm he had raised. For when the
populace heard of what the monks had proposed in Rome, they insisted
on the ordeal by fire. The champion chosen for the purpose, already
prepared and impatient to stand the test, was a certain Brother Pietro,
of Vallombrosa, afterwards known by the name of Pietro Igneo, who,
according to some writers, had been cowherd to the monastery, although
others assert him to have belonged to the noble family of the Counts
Aldobrandeschi of Sovana. Guglielmo, surnamed Bulguro, of the Counts of
Borgonuovo, offered the monks a free arena for the ordeal, close to the
Abbey of San Salvatore, in his patronage, at Settimo, five miles from
Florence.[78] The bishop, however, not only rejected the challenge with
indignation, but obtained a decree to the effect that whoever, whether
of the Church or the laity, should refuse to obey his authority, the
same would be seized, bound, and _not led, but dragged_ before the
chief of the city.[79] Likewise the goods of all persons having fled
in alarm were to be confiscated by the _Potesta_, that is, by Duke
Goffredo, who favoured the bishop. Meanwhile, certain rebellious
ecclesiastics who had sought refuge in an oratory,[80] were driven from
it by force. Naturally, these measures only increased the heat of the
popular fury. Pietro Igneo declared his readiness to pass through the
fire, and, if need be, alone. On February 13, 1068, an enormous crowd
of men, women (some about to be mothers), old people, and children, set
forth to Settimo, chanting prayers and psalms by the way. There, by the
Badia, two piles of wood were fired, and, as related by one who claims
to have witnessed the sight, the friar passed through the roaring
flames miraculously unhurt. This aroused an indescribable enthusiasm;
the sky echoed with cries of joy, and Pietro Igneo, though unscathed by
the fire, was nearly crushed to death by the throng pressing round him
to kiss the hem of his robe. With great difficulty, and only by main
force, some ecclesiastics succeeded in rescuing him.[81] The news flew
to Rome with lightning speed, and then, when all the details reached
the Pope's ear, he was compelled to bow to the miracle. The bishop of
Florence retired to a monastery; Pietro Igneo was named cardinal, made
bishop of Albano, and worshipped as a saint after his death.

[Illustration: MIRACLE OF SAN GIOVANNI GUALBERTO.

(_Bas-relief by Benedetto da Rovezzano in the National Museum,
Florence._)

            [_To face page 78._]

This reminds us of the other ordeal by fire proposed in Florence in
1498, and that led to Savonarola's martyrdom, shortly before the
fall of the Republic, of which the birth and death would thus seem to
have been preluded by similar events. For, albeit the account of the
affair may have been exaggerated by party feeling and superstition,
and although the terms of "Preside" and "Podesta" employed in the old
narrative only indicate in a general way the ruling powers in Florence
at the time, all shows that a new state of society had begun. We find
that there was a Duke of Tuscany, a military president, apparently
his representative in the city, and, what is more, a people which,
though only appearing as a fanatic mob, is plainly conscious at last
of its own strength, since it struggles against the bishop, resists
both the duke and the Pope, and finally obtains what it desires. In
addressing the Pope it assumes the title of _populus florentinus_; and
is addressed by St. Pier Damiano as _cives florentini_. It is true,
of course, that these were mere forms of speech imitated from the
ancients; assuredly the Commune was still unborn, and much time had
yet to elapse before its rise; but an entirely new condition of things
had begun, in which the elements conducing to its rise were already in
course of preparation. Accordingly, we must now retrace our steps, in
order to study the question more closely.

[Illustration]




CHAPTER II.

_THE ORIGIN OF THE FLORENTINE COMMUNE._[82]


I.

When the Longobards became masters of nearly the whole of Italy, and
subjected it to their long and cruel sway, they are known to have
appointed a duke to every one of the principal cities they occupied.
Rome remained free from them, having a Pope; Ravenna also escaped
because an Exarch was soon to hold rule there, and almost all the
cities by the sea were likewise exempted, inasmuch as the Longobards
were ignorant of navigation, and needed assistance for their maritime
trade. It was for the same reason that republics such as Venice,
Amalfi, Pisa, Naples, and Gaeta, were of earlier origin than the rest.
The dukes enjoyed great authority and independence; indeed, some of the
duchies, especially on the borders, became so extended as to resemble
small kingdoms--_e.g._, the dukedoms of Friuli, Spoleto, and Benevento.
This circumstance greatly contributed to the decomposition of the
kingdom and to the fall of the Longobards, whose strength and daring
were never conjoined with any real political capacity.

On the arrival of the Franks, counts took the place of dukes, but with
less power and smaller territories. Charlemagne, with his genuine
talent for statesmanship, refused to maintain lords who, in seeking
their own independence, might endanger the existence of his empire.
Nevertheless, as it was indispensable to keep his borders more strongly
defended, he constituted _marches_, on the pattern of the greater
Longobard duchies, and entrusted them to margraves, or marquises
(_Mark-grafen_--frontier counts, marquises, or margraves). Thus too the
marquisate of Tuscany was formed and the government centred in Lucca;
for this city having had a duke of its own ever since the times of
the Longobards, was already of considerable importance, while, as we
have seen, Florence had fallen so low that the documents of the period
merely refer to it as a suburb of Fiesole. Nearly all the margraves
acquired great power, and aspired to still higher dignities. From their
ranks in fact came men such as Hardouin and Berengarius, who, aspiring
to form an Italian kingdom, became formidable opponents of the Empire,
often wrought it much harm, and involved it in sanguinary wars.

Hence it is not surprising if, later on, the policy of the German
emperors should have constantly aimed at the enfeeblement of the
leading Italian counts and margraves, and, by granting exemptions and
benefices to prelates or lesser feudatories, and making all benefices
conceded to the latter hereditary estates, rendered these independent
of all greater and more dangerous potentates. Therefore, particularly
in Lombardy, this class rose to importance, and so, too, the political
authority of the bishops, who in point of fact held the position of
counts. But in Tuscany things took a different turn. Whether feudalism
there, having smaller strength and power of expansion, seemed less
formidable to the Empire; whether the country, being more distant,
proved less easy to govern; or because a strong state in central
Italy was felt to be needed to arrest the growing power of the Papacy;
whether the latter may have favoured its formation, as a possible
check to the Empire; or again, as seems probable, for all these
reasons combined, it is certain that the dukes or marquises of Tuscany
(either title was borne by them) increased in power and consequence,
and afterwards, in their turn, became a danger to the Empire. But in
Tuscany the power of bishops and counts suffered more reduction than
in Lombardy from the growing strength of the margraves, whose sway was
extending on all sides, so that they sometimes appear to be virtual
sovereigns of central Italy. The same reasons served to delay the rise
of cities, and specially hindered that of Florence.

Already, from the second part of the tenth century, a Marquis Ugo,
surnamed the Great, of Salic descent, ruled over Tuscany, the duchy
of Spoleto and the _march_ of Camerino. He reigned in Lucca almost in
the guise of an independent monarch, and enjoyed the favour of the
Othos. His successors continued to govern with much the same authority
as the dukes of Benevento; and Bonifazio III. extended his State even
to Northern Italy, thus giving umbrage to Henry III., whom he often
outrivalled in cunning. Bonifazio being voracious for power, and of
tyrannical temper, stripped many prelates, counts, and monasteries of
their possessions, either to seize them in his own grasp or give them
to better trusted vassals. He also tightened his grasp on all cities
which, having risen to some importance, coveted increased freedom. This
was specially the case with Lucca and Pisa. The former had prospered
through being long the chief seat of the duchy, while the latter owed
its prosperity to the sea, on which, as Amari happily phrased it, Pisa
was already a free city, while still a subject city on land. Florence,
however, still existed in humble obscurity, trading in a small way,
and girt about on all sides by feudal strongholds.

In 1037 Bonifazio had taken to wife Beatrice of Lorraine, who in
1046 gave birth to a daughter, Matilda, the celebrated countess or
_comitissa_, as she is entitled by the chroniclers. After the death
of Bonifazio, by assassination, in 1052, Matilda was soon associated
with her mother in the government of Tuscany and of the whole duchy,
and when left an orphan in 1076, became sole ruler of those extensive
dominions. Beatrice had remarried, and as she was very religious, and
her second husband, Goffredo of Lorraine, was brother to Pope Stephen
IX., this served to increase their common zeal for the papal policy,
afterwards so devotedly pursued by Matilda. When this high-minded,
energetic woman became sole ruler, she held the reins of government in
a firm grasp, and was often seen on battle-fields with a sword at her
side. Her political position was one of great peril, for she was driven
to take part in the fierce quarrel, recently begun, between the Church
and the Empire. At first the great, high-tempered Hildebrand conducted
the struggle as the inspiring genius of various Popes; later on, when
raised to the pontifical Chair as Gregory VII., he fought in person
against Henry IV. of Germany, and found Matilda his strongest and best
ally. In this conflict, stirring and dividing all Europe, it was only
natural that many opposing passions should be excited in Italy. All
cities that, like Pisa and Lucca, considered themselves wronged by
Duke Bonifazio, now declared for the Empire, and the Empire sided with
them against Matilda. The same course was followed by all dissatisfied
feudatories, especially by those whom Bonifazio had stripped of their
possessions. More than once, it is true, Countess Matilda seized
estates which had been arbitrarily alienated; but she seldom restored
them to their original owners, preferring instead to bestow them on
churches, convents, and trusty adherents of her own. This added fresh
fuel to the flame. Hence an increasingly tangled web of opposing
passions, of conflicting interests, from which at last some profit
accrued to Florence. The Guelph spirit of the city and its commercial
position, on the highway to Rome, had from the outset inclined it to
the Church, and now, as a declared ally, was actively favoured by
Beatrice and Matilda.


II.

It was long believed that Florence had had Consuls, and consequently
an independent government, from the year 1102, since Consuls are
mentioned in a treaty of that date, whereby the inhabitants of Pogna
swore submission to the city. But it was difficult to reconcile this
fact with the clearly proved dependence of Florence on Countess
Matilda at the time. It was afterwards ascertained that the document
in question bore a wrong date, and that the correct one was 1182,
when the submission of Pogna really took place. Accordingly, the
independence of the city was transferred to after 1115, the year of
the countess's death. But it was still difficult to explain the wars
previously carried on by the city on its own account, and other events
of a like nature. The fact is that no fixed year can be assigned to
the birth of the Florentine Commune, which took shape very slowly,
and resulted from the conditions of Florence under the rule of the
last dukes or marquises. We have already recorded the popular riots
of 1063-68 against the bishop Mezzabarba, when accused of simony,
and we have related how they ended with the ordeal of fire, braved
by Pietro Igneo in 1068. On this head we have cited the letters of
St. Pier Damiano addressed _civibus florentinis_. We also referred
to a document[83] in which the _clerus et populus florentinus_ made
appeal to the Pope, and, in narrating what had occurred, mentioned
a _municipale praesidium_, a _praeses_ of the city, and a superior
_potestas_. This proved, before all, that the civic body of the period
was already conscious of its personality, and that there was already an
embryo local government within the city walls. Doubtless the supreme
_potestas_ was the Duke Goffredo, husband to Beatrice; the _praeses_,
his representative in Florence. It was before him that, as we have
seen, the bishop threatened to drag his adversaries, whose property was
to be confiscated should they persist in disobedience. This _preside_
commanded the _praesidium_, designated _municipal_ even before the
municipality had come into being, and at least the name shows that the
majority of the _praesidium_ must have consisted of citizens. But all
this makes it equally plain that, while Florence was still an integral
part of the margraviate, Roman forms, traditions, and ideas already
prevailed there to the extent of assigning Roman names to institutions
of feudal origin. We must pause to consider this fact, since it gave
rise to a question, not only of form, but of genuine historical
importance.

[Illustration: A ROMAN HYPO-CAUST, PARTLY CONSTRUCTED.]

[Illustration: EXTERIOR VIEW OF CALIDARIUM AND FURNACE.

            [_To face page 85._]

The employment of Roman terms need cause little surprise when we
remember that the study of elementary Roman law, as well as of
rhetoric,[84] the _ars dictandi_ then formed part of the _Trivium_,
and was therefore widely taught in Italy. In the first half of the
eleventh century a still more advanced study of law already flourished
at the school of Ravenna, and as its influence increased, extended
through Romagna into Tuscany. This system of law seemed to spring
to life again spontaneously from the midst of Latin populations,
with whom it had never entirely died out, and now in its new vigour
brought modifications and changes into the different institutions
and legislations with which it came in contact.[85] In fact, in the
sentences pronounced by Beatrice and Matilda, we find occasional
quotations from the _Digesto_, or Code, that, according to the
procedure of the time, was carried to the tribunals by those basing
their rights on its clauses.[86] The works of St. Pier Damiano afford
satisfactory proof that the Florentines pursued the same study, and set
great value on Roman law. The saint mentions a juridical dispute of
the Florentines, regarding which, towards the middle of the eleventh
century, they had asked the opinion of the _sapientes_ of Ravenna,
who, much to his own disgust, presumed to alter the prescriptions of
canonical law on the authority of the _Digesto_. Among those wise men,
he adds, the most impetuous and subtle chanced to be a Florentine.[87]
Another proof might be deduced from the remark previously made by
Ficker,[88] namely, that the courts held in Florence and its territory
were seldom attended by the Romagnol assessors, or _causidici_,
frequenting other Tuscan tribunals. This would seem to imply that in
this respect Florentines had no need to recur to Romagna. Later--that
is towards the end of the century--the school of Irnerius (Werner)
began to flourish at Bologna, the which school aimed at an exact
reproduction of Roman law and promoted its genuine revival. But at the
time of which we speak the Ravenna school represented, on the contrary,
a continuation of the ancient jurisprudence, partly decayed and partly
changed by the diverse elements of civilisation in the midst of which
it had survived, and in which it was now producing radical changes.[89]
One of these changes--leading to very remarkable consequences of a
political as well as a legal kind--took place in the constitution and
attributes of the margravial tribunal.

We know that Matilda, after the fashion of her predecessors,
administered justice in the name of the Empire, presiding in state
over the tribunals. Indeed, this was one of her chief functions. Some
sentences given by her have survived, and serve to show us how her
tribunal was composed. Certain high feudatories had seats flanking
her throne; next came the judges, assessors, pleaders (_causidici_),
and witnesses, and lastly, the notary. Prof. Lami has observed that
the judges, and more particularly the assessors, were changed as
the countess moved from city to city, which would prove that not a
few of them were inhabitants of the towns wherein they administered
justice.[90] In fact, what names do we find among them in Florence?
Those of the Gherardi, Caponsacchi, Uberti, Donati, Ughi, and a few
others.[91] These were already the first and most influential citizens,
the _boni homines_, the _sapientes_, the men we afterwards find
officiating as Consuls. Thus there were certain families who first
formed part of the margravial tribunal, and were afterwards at the head
of the Commune.

Political changes were facilitated and prepared by a juridical change,
followed by the increased action of the revived Roman law. What was
the nature of this change? The exact definition of the functions
respectively assigned by the Germanic code to the president of the
tribunal who gave sentence, or to the judges who led up to the same
by administering the law, had been gradually lost sight of. Sometimes
the countess pronounced sentence without the aid of judges; but more
often they conducted the trial, applied the law, and formulated the
verdict, to which the countess merely gave assent. Thus, as Ficker
states, her office was reduced to that of a passive president.[92]
This is confirmed on seeing that tribunals sometimes sat in her
absence, when the trials were entirely managed by the judges. A method
of this kind once adopted, Matilda's grave and numerous affairs of
State, together with the continual warfare in which she was involved,
must have augmented the number of the cases settled by local judges.
This must have been a matter of weighty importance at a time when
the administration of justice was one of the principal attributes of
political sovereignty. Hence these citizen tribunals are a precursory
sign of civic independence before the Commune had asserted its real
autonomy and individual position. The strange dearth of documents
certifying that any tribunal in Florence was presided over by Matilda
during the last fifteen years of her life, serves to confirm our
remarks. A similar fact is also verified in the Tuscan cities remaining
faithful to the Empire; for these too had tribunals in which justice
was administered, not by feudal potentates, but by citizens invested
by the emperor with judicial authority.[93] These, too, served as a
preliminary to communal independence, although hardly forming, as some
thought, its actual beginning.

[Illustration: DESCENT TO A ROMAN WELL.

_Discovered beneath the Campidoglio, Florence_

            [_To face page 89._]

It is certain that in this and other ways, during the contest between
Henry IV. and Matilda, many Tuscan cities, siding either with the
Empire or the Church, and therefore highly favoured by the one or the
other, were able to achieve a commencement of freedom. After Henry IV.
had defeated Matilda near Mantua in 1081 he granted large privileges to
Pisa and Lucca, in return for their proofs of goodwill to his cause. In
a letter patent issued at Rome June 23, 1081, he not only guaranteed
to Lucca the integrity of its walls, but also authorised it to forbid
the construction of any castles in the city or territory within a
circuit of six miles, and promised to exempt it from building an
Imperial palace. He likewise declared that no Imperial envoy should be
sent to give judgment in Lucca, but made a reservation in case of the
personal presence there of the emperor, or his son, or his chancellor.
In conclusion, he annulled the "evil customs" (_perverse consuetudini_)
imposed by Bonifazio III.[94] to the hurt of Lucca, and granted it full
permission to trade in the markets of San Donnino and Capannori, from
which he expressly excluded the Florentines. This final clause not only
proves the hostility of the Empire to Florence, but the importance
the latter's trade must have assumed by that time. In the same year
Pisa received a patent guaranteeing the maintenance of its ancient
rights, and Henry declared that no Imperial envoy belonging to another
territory should be sent to plead suits within the walls, or within the
boundaries of its _contado_. And, what was still more to the point,
he also declared that no marquis should be sent into Tuscany without
the consent of twelve _buoni uomini_ chosen by the popular assembly,
summoned in Pisa by sound of bell.[95] Here, if no Consuls yet appear
on the scene, we already find their precursors in these worthies, or
_sapientes_, elected of the people, and we have already a popular
assembly. Even though the Commune be still unborn, its birth is now, as
it were, in sight. Further (provided nothing was interpolated in the
document), it is most remarkable to find the appointment of an Imperial
margrave subject to the sanction of the people. There is also a hinted
desire--unattainable during Matilda's life--to assume the government of
the margraviate in person; after her death an attempt to this effect
was actually made, but, as we shall see, with very brief and partial
success.


III.

Nevertheless the condition of Florence was considerably different from
that of Pisa or Lucca. These two cities, as we have seen, had long
enjoyed greater prosperity. They had often fought against each other;
Pisa, haughty and daring by sea, had begun, even in the middle of the
tenth century, a long and arduous war against the Mussulmans[96] of
Sicily, Spain, and Africa. Florence, on the other hand, in siding with
Matilda, became necessarily the foe of all the great feudal nobles of
the _contado_, surrounding the city on all sides, and who, disgusted
by their treatment at the hands of the marquises of Tuscany, since the
time of Bonifazio III., now, for the most part, adhered to the Empire.
Their antagonism towards the Florentines was not only heightened by
the fact of these nobles being of Germanic origin, even as feudal
institutions were Germanic, whereas the population of Florence,
consisting chiefly of artisans, was of Roman origin and full of Roman
traditions; but it was likewise increased by the geographical position
of the city. Had Florence been situated in a plain like Pisa and Lucca,
or like Sienna and Arezzo on a height, the feudal nobility could have
promoted their interests better by settling within its walls. But it
lay in a valley in the midst of a girdle of hills bristling with feudal
turrets, whence the nobles threatened it on all sides, raiding its
lands and closing all outlets for its commerce.

These geographical conditions had no slight effect on the future
destiny of Florence; and, in fact, largely contributed to form the
special character of its history. As a primary result, conflict between
the feudal nobles and the city was more inevitable and more sanguinary
than elsewhere, while the city being, from the first, of far more
democratic temper than the rest, was therefore longer prevented from
asserting its independence, since this result could only be achieved
when Florence had gained sufficient strength to cope with the numerous
enemies girding it about. Until that moment arrived its interests
were best forwarded by remaining friendly and submissive to Countess
Matilda, the only power able to hold the barons in check, and the loss
of whose aid would have left Florence a prey to its foes. This explains
not only the city's delay in asserting its independence, but also the
total lack of documents concerning the origin of a commune that had
already risen to considerable strength, and started wars on its own
account before its existence was officially recognised. These wars
were still carried on in the name of the Countess, who occasionally
visited the camp in person; the city was unmentioned in public
documents, because it had as yet no personal existence. Nevertheless,
we are forced to recognise the first signs of its communal life in
the campaigns undertaken by Florence in defence of its trade against
the nobles of the _contado_; the which campaigns were continued on
an increasing and more vigorous scale until they ended in the total
annihilation of the feudal lords. This was both the starting point and
the aim of all Florentine history.

[Illustration: IMPLUVIUM OF ROMAN HOUSE, FLORENCE.]

[Illustration: ROMAN CALIDARIUM, FLORENCE.

            [_To face page 96._]

From the very beginning, it is true, we find that even Florence
possessed some families that may be called noble. Such were the Donati,
Caponsacchi, Uberti, Lamberti, and others whose names were included on
the lists of the judges and soon to be found on those of the Consuls.
These were the ruling, governing families at the head of the city.
But they were neither counts, marquises, nor dukes; they were not as
the Counts Cadolingi, Guidi, and Alberti, who dwelt in the outlying
territory or _contado_; nor did they belong to those _Cattani Lombardi_
so-called at the time, in remembrance of their Germanic descent. Rather
than veritable nobles, they were "worthies" (_boni homines_), "great
ones" (_grandi_),[97] owning no feudal titles; natives of the city
risen to high fortune, or scions of petty feudal lines, who, unable
to hold their own against greater neighbours of the country side,
had sought safety within the town. They quickly amalgamated with the
people, sharing and taking the lead in all the latter's expeditions
against the strongholds outside the city. Nor, as will be shown, was
it a rare case, later on, to find some of these nobles engaged in
trade, or heads of trade guilds, as soon as the latter became more
firmly established. And it is by no means an insignificant fact that
during disturbances at Pisa, Sienna, and elsewhere, we often see the
names of real citizen-nobles, counts, viscounts, and so on, never to
be met with in Florence. In documents concerning the Florentines the
word _nobiles_ seldom occurs, whereas it is often used in speaking of
the Pisans, Siennese, &c. The term _milites_, it is true, frequently
occurs in Florentine records; but although the _milites_ could not
be _popolani_, since the lower classes were not then admitted to
knighthood, neither could they be feudal nobles in Florence: they were
the leading citizens who exercised no trade, the _grandi_, in fact, to
whom we have previously alluded. They were members of Matilda's courts,
were employed by her in various ways; they commanded the _municipale
praesidium_, probably filled the office of _praeses_, and they were
leaders of the army. Richer, more cultivated and better fitted than
other citizens for politics and warfare by their freedom from daily
toil, they were the _boni viri_, the _sapientes_, the _milites_ found
more or less in all cities, but of a separate stamp in Florence.

Notwithstanding our knowledge of this _preside_ and _presidio_ and of
these Florentine tribunals, very little is known as to the government
and administration of the social body already beginning to prosper and
to have varied interests of its own. Matilda's sway in Florence must
have been of a shadowy kind, when the city was able to start wars on
its own account and to its own profit, albeit still undertaken in her
name. As its commercial prosperity increased and Matilda became more
absorbed in her struggle with the Empire, the city must have been left
more to itself. Consequently this is the time when the associations
serving to classify and organise the citizens were formed, which we
presently find flourishing and strongly established. Thus, being
almost without a central government, a local one could assert its
existence, and the strength of the Commune be developed long before its
independence was proclaimed. The same fact explains why the Commune,
its individuality once declared, should have made such rapid progress
and leapt to the headship of Tuscany. At any rate, by the second half
of the twelfth century we find on the one side the _grandi_, or
nobles--if we prefer to give them that name--formed in Societies of
Towers (_Societa delle torri_), with statutes soon to be made known
to us; while, on the other we find trade guilds or associations not
only in existence, but sometimes with sufficient political importance
to entitle them to the honour of representing the Republic. Can we
possibly suppose that such results could be achieved without a long,
preliminary course of preparation? Did not the _scholae_, progenitors
of the guilds, survive during the Lower Empire and throughout the
Middle Ages? do we not find them dividing all society, including both
the soldiery and foreigners in Rome and in Ravenna? How could they be
destroyed by barbarians ignorant of crafts which were nevertheless
indispensable to their own needs?

Florentine commerce and industry undoubtedly increased during the
rule of Countess Matilda. This has been proved by the patent of 1081,
and the first wars undertaken by the Florentines in the interest of
their trade afford sure confirmation of the fact. Were we to exclude
trade associations from the conditions of the period, we should have
to admit the existence, at that day, of the modern workman, isolated
and independent: a decided impossibility in the Middle Ages. Those
were times in which every trade was exercised by distinct groups
of families, and handed down by them as a tradition from father to
son. Frequently, even offices of the State were the monopoly of
certain families. It was from a society split into groups and castes
that the Commune eventually developed the modern State, but in old
times the very idea of the latter was unconceived. It is absurd to
suppose--though a few writers accept the notion--that the guilds only
began when they had regular statutes. These statutes only formulated
what had already existed for some time, and undoubtedly in Florence
everything conduces to the belief that the associations of the trades
and of the towers, though still embryonic, must have preceded the
formation of the Commune evolved in their midst.


IV.

For on all sides, if in diverse modes, we perceive that a long period
of incubation was needed to form the Commune, which naturally owed its
birth to pre-existing elements. The celebrated agreement or _concordia_
made at Pisa by Bishop Daiberto, about 1090, or even, perhaps, a year
or so earlier,[98] shows that the nobles were organised and waging
fierce war against one another from their towers. The bishop induced
them to partly demolish these towers, and solemnly vow never to carry
them above the height of thirty-six braccia (about one hundred feet),
as previously decreed by the patent of Henry IV. in 1081.[99] And the
agreement proceeded to set forth that any man believing his houses
to have been unjustly damaged was to bear his complaint _ad commune
Colloquium Civitatis_; nor could the dwelling of the offender be
demolished without the general consent of the citizens.[100]

[Illustration: MOUTH OF ROMAN FURNACE,

_Discovered beneath the Mercato Vecchio._]

[Illustration: CALIDARIUM.

_Ibid._

            [_To face page 96._]

The whole tenor of this document not only proves that the Pisan
nobles were already an organised body, but that they also boasted
a civic importance never attained by the nobles of Florence.[101]
Evidently Pisa had no Consuls as yet, or they would have been
certainly mentioned in the document. But all the elements destined to
make it a far more aristocratic commune than that of Florence were
already existent.[102] We see that there was a _commune consilium_
of _sapientes_ or _boni homines_, which was a species of senate,
and a _commune colloquium_, a general assembly of all the citizens,
afterwards developing into a parliament or _arrengo_. Five _sapientes_,
whose names are given, sat in council with the bishop.[103] These
were the immediate precursors or, as Pawinski rightly calls them, the
_vorbilder_ of the Consuls, who are actually mentioned shortly after
this time, in 1094, in another agreement (_concordia_), also drawn up
by Daiberto. He makes an explicit appeal to their authority (_huius
civitatis consulibus_) in decreeing that all smiths engaged on work
required for the Duomo should be left unmolested.[104] Thus the rise
of the Pisan Commune was preceded by a conflict waged by belligerent
nobles from their respective towers, and the Consuls of the town were
first named as the protectors of the smiths.

The existence of guilds in Venice as far back as the ninth century is
certified by the Altino Chronicle, proving that, even then, there were
some leading industries exercised by certain families only, and that
humbler trades, or _ministeria_, were already constituted, as it were,
in associations, the members of which pursued their avocation according
to traditional and definite rules. These craft-guilds or _ministeria_
implied certain accompanying obligations, since all members of them
were bound to yield some gratuitous service to the State. On the
other hand, the higher trades, such as mosaic work, architecture,
and so on, requiring more culture and talent, were exercised by the
leading families, and members of these guilds remained eligible for
the political offices of the State.[105] There is a document of the
eleventh century showing that the guild of smiths was constituted
under the rule of a _gastaldo_ (or steward), against whom one of the
members appealed for justice to the doge, according to a custom as
yet unwritten.[106] All this compels us to believe that the existence
of art and trade guilds, and in general of all the associations into
which the citizens of the communes were afterwards divided, dates from
a very remote period, and that in Florence, as elsewhere, all similar
associations were constituted before the Commune had proclaimed its
independence. Otherwise it would be impossible to explain the existence
of a city that, almost without any visible government, was already
prosperous in commerce and able to make war on its own account. For
otherwise all the ensuing facts, although beyond the reach of doubt,
would remain unexplained.


V.

Therefore, even in the days of Countess Matilda, we find the mass of
the citizens divided and arranged in groups. We see on the one side the
ancient _scholae_ transformed into associations of arts and trades,
containing the germ of future greater and lesser guilds; on the other,
family associations and clans of the _grandi_ or leading citizens,
embryos of future societies of the towers. All these associations
already formed the practical government of the city, in which the
principal offices were filled by _grandi_ of Matilda's choice. It is
quite probable that the post of _preside_ was reserved, in accordance
with mediaeval usage, to a single family or clan, perhaps to that of
the Uberti, who were, as we shall see, among the most powerful in the
city, and boasting a Germanic descent. Nevertheless, there was then
no hostility, no separation between the great folk or _grandi_ and
the people, all being united by common bonds and interests. In fact,
as we have said, there will be soon documentary evidence that some of
the _grandi_ engaged in commerce were chiefs of guilds, and already
beginning to fight, side by side with the people, against the outlying
nobility. It is true that they owned lands and herds, but these were
then the main source of that Florentine trade and commerce in defence
of which the first wars were undertaken. The castles surrounding the
city barred all outlets for commerce; armed men were always swooping
down from them to attack and maltreat all pack trains issuing from the
city to convey its products and merchandise to neighbouring towns.
With continual wars on her hands, the Countess Matilda could seldom
afford any help, and consequently the Florentines, although fighting
in her name, were practically left to their own resources. It was this
alliance of all classes of citizens, united by identity of interests
and singleness of purpose against a common foe, that then constituted
the strength of that Florentine people whose loyalty, purity, and
valour were so fervently praised by Dante and the chroniclers. This was
the moment when virtue laid the foundations of the Commune's future
freedom and wealth.

Villani is given to exaggerate, but there is a basis of truth in his
words when he states in the year 1107 (iv. 25) that "the city being
much risen and increased in population, men, and power, the Florentines
determined to extend their outlying _contado_, and widen their
authority, and that war should be waged against any castle refusing
obedience." This year, in fact, they began military operations by
attacking the fortress of Monte Orlando, near Lastra a Signa, also
described by the chroniclers as the castle of Gangalandi or Gualandi,
a fief of the Counts Cadolingi,[107] then a very powerful family,
and soon becoming bitterly hostile to Florence. During the same year
they captured and demolished the stronghold of Prato, owned by the
Counts Alberti, also very formidable enemies. But as on this occasion
the Countess was present in the camp, their success is more easily
explained.[108]

In 1110 we hear of another war. "Florentini iuxsta Pesa comites
vicerunt," we read in the "Annales," i. which start with this event
and date it the 26th of May. The _comites_ here mentioned cannot be
the Counts Guidi, then on friendly terms with Matilda and Florence,
although, when fighting against both at a much later date, they were
specially designated as "The Counts." In 1110 Florence attacked and
conquered the Cadolingi, also known as the _Cattani Lombardi_, whose
lands extended from Pistoia, by the Val di Nievole, towards Lucca, and
by the Lower Val d'Arno to the vicinity of Florence. If the city could
rout these nobles, it must have acquired great strength, even admitting
the probability that on this occasion also it had the aid of Matilda's
troops.

In 1113 there were two other military campaigns which, owing to the
very different accounts narrated by the chroniclers, have given rise
to an infinity of learned disputes. First of all came the assault and
destruction of Monte Cascioli, assigned by some to the year 1113, by
others to 1114, and postponed by a few to 1119, when it was supposed
to have been defended by an Imperial German vicar named Rempoctus
or Rabodo, who perished in the fight. Other chroniclers assign the
overthrow of the castle to three different years, and Villani puts
a climax to the confusion by jumbling together the various assaults
described, assigning them all to 1113, and saying that the castle
had revolted against Robert the German, vicar of the Empire, holding
residence at San Miniato al Tedesco (iv. 29). But in 1113--that is,
before the Countess's death--there was no Imperial vicar in Tuscany,
and consequently none could be installed at San Miniato, to which the
appellation "al Tedesco" was not yet applied. But the confusion can be
cleared, the chroniclers made to agree, and the different narratives
easily explained, if it is admitted that only the first attack upon
Monte Cascioli took place in 1113, when the castle was held by the
Cadolingi and could be vigorously defended.[109] As the walls on that
occasion were only partially destroyed, it was necessary to renew
the assault in 1114, when they were totally demolished. They were
afterwards rebuilt by the Cadolingi, and therefore, in 1119, when
Florence had achieved independence, two more attempts were made to
capture the stronghold; the Imperial envoy was killed while assisting
in its defence, and the building was finally demolished and burnt
to the ground. But without anticipating events we may conclude that
even before Matilda's death the Florentines had succeeded, by their
expeditions against Monte Orlando, Prato, Val di Pesa, and Monte
Cascioli, in opening the highways of Signa, Prato, and Val d'Elsa to
their trade.

Another event, likewise occurring in the years 1113-15, although
dated by the chroniclers in 1117, namely, the Pisan expedition to the
Balearic Isles, also led to a somewhat complicated dispute. As already
related, the Pisans began to make war on the Mussulmans from the
middle of the tenth century, and during the latter half of the next
century the strife was pursued more hotly than ever. In 1087 Pisa and
Genoa combined, displayed a fleet of forty sail in battle array before
Mehdia, and in 1113 both cities joined in the more important expedition
to the Balearic Isles. They were also accompanied by many counts
and marquises from Lombardy and Central Italy, likewise including a
few from the Florentine territory. Then, combining with the Counts
of Barcelona and Montpellier, the Viscount of Narbonne, and others,
they attacked the Balearic Isles, and, in spite of a very obstinate
resistance, seized the castle of Majorca, and captured young Burabe,
the last scion of the ruling dynasty there. Villani, in alluding to
this war of 1113-15, assigns it, like the other chroniclers, to the
year 1117, adding that the Pisans fearing, when about to set sail, that
the Lucchese might, as once before, take advantage of their absence
to attack their city, entrusted the Florentines with its defence. The
latter immediately encamped two miles from the walls and forbade their
men to enter Pisa, under penalty of death; for, seeing that scarcely
any males were left in the city, they feared some attempts might be
made on the honour of its women, to the grave discredit of Florentine
loyalty. And this decree was rigorously enforced. One soldier who
dared to violate the rules of discipline was condemned to death,
notwithstanding the prayers of the Pisans, who, as the only chance of
saving the man's life, protested that they could not permit a capital
sentence to be executed on their territory. Whereupon the Florentines,
showing even in this matter their scrupulous regard for others' rights,
purchased a scrap of land, and there put the culprit to death.

Meanwhile, the Pisans returning from Majorca, laden with spoil,
offered in token of gratitude to their faithful friends the choice
of accepting either two bronze doors or two porphyry columns. The
Florentines preferred the latter. The columns were consigned to them
wrapped in scarlet cloth, in token of their value, and now stand in
the chief portal of San Giovanni. However, when the cloth was stripped
off, it was seen that some envious person had injured the columns with
fire. Evidently part of this account is legendary, and we also discern
that something must have been added to it afterwards, when Pisa and
Florence were separated by long and inextinguishable animosity.[110]

But the wrong date repeated in Villani and many other chroniclers,
regarding a war that lasted several years, and was apparently only
recommenced in 1117, does not justify us in denying a fact so
constantly affirmed by many writers.[111] The Balearic expedition
certainly took place, and there is equal certainty that it was led by
the Pisans, with the help of various friends and allies. Their fear
lest the city should be attacked by the Lucchese in their absence
was justified by the fact that this had really happened in former
times. The Pisans were now foes of Lucca and friends of Florence,
whose loyalty during that early period was very generally recognised.
Why should it be incredible that these friendly Pisans should have
entrusted the city to their care, or that they should have proved
worthy of the confidence reposed in them? Paolino Pieri not only
repeats the story as told by all the other chroniclers, but also adds
that the bit of ground upon which the guilty soldier was executed had
been purchased with the help of Bello the Syndic, and that even in his
own day he saw that it was still left uncultivated in memory of the
deed: "it was on the fourth day of July, three hundred and two years
more than one thousand, when I saw that ground untouched." At any rate,
this is a proof that the tradition of the fact still survived in the
fourteenth century, and that every one had the fullest belief in it.


VI.

The death of Countess Matilda, in 1115, was followed by a period
of so much disorder as to mark the beginning of a new era for all
Central Italy, and more especially for Florence. The countess, as
we know, left a will bequeathing all her possessions to the Church;
but this donation could only affect her allodial estates, since
all those held in fief naturally reverted to the Empire. It was
not always easy to precisely distinguish these from those; often,
indeed, impossible: hence an endless succession of disputes. And such
disputes became increasingly complicated by the pretensions of the
Pope and the emperor, each of whom asserted his right to the whole
inheritance, the one as Matilda's universal legatee, and the other as
the supreme head of the margraviate. Then, too, as we have seen, many
considered themselves to have been unjustly deprived of their estates,
in favour of others with no rightful claim. All this led to a real
politico-social crisis that brought the disorder to a climax. Thereupon
the emperor, Henry IV., sent a representative, bearing the title of
_Marchio, Iudex, Praeses_, to assume the government of Tuscany in his
name. Of course, no one could legally contest his right to do this;
but the Papal opposition, the attitude of the cities now asserting
their independence, and the general disorder split the margraviate into
fragments. Accordingly the representatives of the Empire could only
place themselves at the head of the feudal nobility of the various
_contadi_ and, by gathering them together, form a Germanic party
opposed to the cities. In the documents of the period the members
of this party are continually designated by the name of Teutons
(_Teutonici_).[112]

Florence, surrounded by the castled nobility occupying her hills, could
only decide on one of two courses. Either to yield to those who had
always been her mortal enemies, and were now emboldened by Henry's
favour, or to combat them openly, and thus declare enmity to the
Empire, the which, in the present state of affairs, would amount to a
proclamation of independence; and the latter was the course adopted.
Florence was now conscious of her own strength, and recognised that
safety could only be gained by force. The change was accomplished in
a very simple and almost imperceptible way. The same worthies who had
administered justice, governed the people, and commanded the garrison
in Matilda's name, now that she was dead, and no one in her place,
continued to rule in the name of the people, and asked its advice
in all grave emergencies. Thus these _grandi_ became Consuls of the
Commune that may be said to have leapt into existence unperceived. This
is why no chroniclers mention its birth, no documents record it, and a
plain and self-evident fact is made to appear extremely complicated and
obscure. In endeavouring to discover unknown events and lost documents
which had never existed, the solution of a very easy problem was hedged
round with difficulties, while evident and well-established particulars
best fitted to explain it were entirely lost sight of.

Nevertheless, we are not to believe that the event was accomplished
without any shock, for the change was of a very remarkable kind. It is
true that the actual government remained almost intact; but its basis
was altered, since it was now carried on in the name of the people,
instead of that of the Countess. This, in itself, signified little,
inasmuch as for some time past the city had been practically, if not
legally, its own master, and the people beginning to feel and make felt
its personality. But the social and political results of the change
were neither few nor inconsiderable. Naturally, during Matilda's reign,
the governing authorities were men of her choice; and although all
official and judicial posts changed hands from time to time, they
became increasingly monopolised by a small cluster of families, chief
among whom, as we have already said, were most probably the Uberti and
their clan. Now, however, that the authorities were to be elected by
the people, there was a broader, although still somewhat limited, range
of choice. Accordingly, there was more change of office, and men were
removed in turn from one to another. This custom already prevailed in
other communes, and had been adopted even in Florence both by popular
associations and those of the _grandi_. Hence it necessarily prevailed
in the formation of the new government.

Nor can we believe that those always to the front in former times
could have now withdrawn without resistance, or without attempting to
maintain their position by favour of the Empire and the _Teutonici_;
nor is it credible that those now entitled to a larger share in the
government should have refrained from relying, in their turn, on the
strength of the popular favour, backed by the most vital interests
of the city. Friction between the leading families seems inevitable
to us in this state of things, and Florence must have witnessed some
such conflict as at Pisa in Daiberto's day, and in almost all other
Italian communes. We learn from Villani (v. 30), from the "Annales,"
and many other works, that there was a great fire in Florence in 1115,
a similar one in 1117, and that "what was left unburned in the first
fire was consumed in the second." It was certainly an exaggeration to
say that the whole city was destroyed, but the fact of the fire is
generally affirmed.[113] We also know that in those times, before
gunpowder was invented, fire and arson were the most efficacious
weapons in popular riots. Villani says, farther, that "fighting went on
among the citizens ... sword in hand, in many parts of Florence." It
is true, that, in his opinion, the fight was _for the faith_, seeing
that the city being given over to heresy, licence, and the sect of
the Epicureans, God therefore chastised it with pestilence and civil
war. But, although we find no certain traces in history of any widely
diffused heresy in Florence at the time, it is undoubted that from 1068
the earliest gleams of Florentine freedom were mixed and confused, as
we have seen, with a religious movement, and it is also certain that
the "Annales," i., of the year 1120 record the fact of one named Petrus
Mingardole being condemned for heresy to the ordeal by fire,[114] and
also add that, between 1138 and 1173, the city was thrice smitten by an
interdict, all of which goes to prove a continued religious agitation.
Besides, Florence, and particularly her people, remained constantly
faithful to the Church party, while the Uberti and their adherents,
who sided with the Empire, were opposed to it, and consequently, in
those days, may have easily incurred the charge of heresy. Even in
Villani's time the general name of _Paterini_ was bestowed not only
upon all heretics, but on Ghibellines as well.[115] Besides, as he had
placed the origin of Florence before Charlemagne's day, and then
again immediately after the imaginary destruction of Fiesole in 1010,
he naturally refused to recognise that origin for the third time at
the moment of the Commune's real birth. Accordingly, slurring over the
political movement, that was undoubtedly the main factor in the change,
he tried to exaggerate the religious movement that played a very minor
part in it.

At any rate, since it appears certain that the Uberti asked the
support of the Empire, they must have been now necessarily driven to
prove themselves foes of the Church. Therefore, it cannot have been
unusual for them to be styled heretics or _Paterini_, especially by so
pronounced a Guelph as Villani. We know that the Uberti were already
powerful in Matilda's time, from the frequent appearance of their name
in contemporary documents. That they also enjoyed a lion's share of
the government, and that the revolt was chiefly directed against them,
is explicitly proved by the words of a chronicler--so far little read,
we might almost say unknown--whose work being derived from different
sources than that of Villani, shows some events in a new light. The
pseudo Brunetto Latini, in fact, agrees with the other chroniclers in
ascribing the first fire to the year 1115, saying that it began at the
Santi Apostoli, and spread as far as the bishop's palace, "whereby
the greater part of the city was burnt, and many folk perished in the
flames." He says nothing concerning heresy, but touching the second
fire of 1117, he adds: "In this year a fire broke out in Florence in
the houses of the Uberti, who _ruled_ the city, whereof little was
saved from the burning, and many folk perished by fire and sword."[116]
It is evident that there was a real outbreak, almost a revolution waged
with fire and sword, against the Uberti, rulers of the city.

Can we be surprised at the hatred roused by the Uberti, or at the civil
war of which they were the cause? As we know, they were traditionally
supposed to have come with the Othos from Germany; and we have seen how
the legend of the _Libro fiesolano_, while refusing credence to this,
spoke of them as descended from "the most noble race of Catiline,"
the enemy of Florence. Even on historical evidence, were they not the
forefathers of those Uberti, who afterwards, in 1177, proved the first
to attack the Consular government and begin the civil warfare by which
the city was so long torn asunder? Were they not the forefathers of the
Schiatta Uberti, ringleaders of the band that stabbed Buondelmonti to
death, by the statue of Mars on the Ponte Vecchio, in 1215? Were they
not the ancestors of the celebrated Farinata, who routed the Guelphs
at Montaperti, and attended that Council of Empoli where such fierce
measures were proposed against Florence, the perpetual nest of the
Guelphs--the same Farinata described by Dante among the heretics in the
bog of hell?[117]


VII.

Meanwhile, which party conquered in the struggle following Matilda's
death? Facts prove it clearly enough. In the year 1119 the Florentines
made that final assault on the castle of Monte Cascioli, to which
reference has been already made. This is the moment when the
before-mentioned _Rempoctus_,[118] or Rabodo, really comes upon the
scene, although Villani (iv. 29) and other chroniclers make him
appear in 1113, under the name of Robert the German, Imperial vicar,
and suppose him to have fallen in fight that year while defending
the castle. We have shown that there could be no Imperial vicar in
Tuscany at that date, seeing that none was sent until after Matilda's
decease. In fact, no documents mention any vicar before then, and only
on September 11, 1116, we find one recorded as "Rabodo ex largitione
Imperatoris Marchio Tuscia,"[119] and then in 1119, "Rabodo Dei gratia
si quid est,"[120] the identical formula that had been employed in
Matilda's patents. In 1120 Rabodo's name disappears, and is replaced
by that of the Margrave Corrado. It may therefore be taken for
granted that Rabodo really perished in 1119 during the defence of
Monte Cascioli against the Florentines, who now succeeded in finally
demolishing the stronghold and burning it to the ground.[121] Thus
their first achievement, after Matilda's decease, was the destruction
of a Cadolingi castle, together with the defeat and death in battle of
the first Imperial vicar then established in Tuscany. This is more than
enough to show the nature of their attitude with regard to the Empire
and the Teutonic party.

Shortly after, an event of even greater significance occurred in the
capture and sack of Fiesole during 1125. Sanzanome, whose so-called
modern history of Florence starts with this war, describes it at much
length, in flights of wordy rhetoric. The gist of it is that the chief
cause of the conflict was a commercial dispute. The people of Fiesole
would seem to have maltreated and plundered a Florentine trader who was
quietly passing through the city with his goods. This incident, added
to the remembrance of past rancours and other recent depredations,
seems to have stirred the Florentines to war. Instantly, "factum est
Consilium per tunc dominantes Consules de processu." One of the leading
citizens harangued the people, beginning his speech with these words:
"Si de nobili Romanorum prosapia originem duximus ... decet nos patrum
adherere vestigiis." Thereupon, "illico a Consulibus exivit edictum." A
man of Fiesole, on the other hand, began his address by alluding to the
legendary origin of his city: "Viri, frates, qui ab Ytalo sumpsistis
originem, a quo tota Ytalia dicitur esse derivata." Although so much
learned rhetoric in a writer of the early part of the thirteenth
century is another proof of the strong influence of Roman tradition on
ancient Florentines, both before and after the rise of their Commune,
it cannot conceal the real cause of the war, as proved even by the
evidence of Villani, whose chronicle begins to acquire greater historic
value at this point. The latter relates that Fiesole had become a
veritable nest of _Cattani_ and brigands, who infested the Florentine
highways and territories.[122] As usual, the feudal barons were
swooping down from their strongholds to hinder the trade and traffic of
the Commune.

At this moment also there were special causes tending to provoke a
war of an unusually sanguinary kind. The counties, or _contadi_, of
the two cities, as sometimes occurred elsewhere, had been carved out
of the territories of bishoprics, based, in their turn, on ancient
Roman partitions of the soil. Accordingly, these counties being not
only adjacent, but wedged in and almost tangled one with the other,
and their respective bishops having never wielded, as in Lombardy,
the authority or power of counts they had ended by forming a single,
combined jurisdiction. In fact, many documents refer to the county or
jurisdiction of Fiesole and Florence, as though it were one and the
same thing. Hence it was only natural that on becoming an independent
Commune, after Matilda's death, Florence should seek to dominate over
both counties, and equally natural that Fiesole should be violently
opposed to the idea, and, notwithstanding the inferior size of the
town, should have trusted to the superior strength of its fortified
position, and, making alliance with the nobles of the _contado_, should
have harboured them in the citadel, and joined them in continual
attacks on Florentine traders or in raiding Florentine lands. This
was the beginning of the war. Its details are unknown to us, those
supplied by Sanzanome being too extravagant for belief,[123] and other
chroniclers furnishing none at all. Seeing the strength of Fiesole's
position, the campaign could have been neither short nor easy, and
undoubtedly ended in cruel slaughter and the almost total destruction
of the town. The chroniclers are not the only authorities for this
fact. Shortly afterwards, the Abbot Atto of Vallombrosa implored a
pardon from Pope Honorius II., _pro Florentinorum excessibus_, urging
in their favour that there were many aged persons, women, and children,
in Florence, who had assuredly taken no part in the _destruccio
fesulana_, and also that many participants in the war now confessed
the error of their ways, and sincerely repented all the excesses that
"non meditata nequitia commisere."[124] The event was long remembered
in Florence, is frequently recorded in documents,[125] and, together
with the rout of the Imperial vicar at Monte Cascioli, undoubtedly
contributed to establish the independence of the Commune on a firmer
basis.


VIII.

It is certain that Florence now had a separate government under Consuls
of her own, although there is no documentary proof to this effect
earlier than 1138. Sanzanome, however, makes explicit allusion to it
at the time of the Fiesole campaign, when, as we have seen, war was
declared by the Consuls. But what was the real nature and origin of
this new magistracy? Formerly it was opined by many writers that the
Consuls were an institution derived in general from the judges of
older days. In Lombardy they would have been merely another form of
the Frankish _scabini_, and accordingly in Florence it was natural
to suppose them to be an altered survival of those judges of the
margravial tribunal to whom, for some time before her death, Matilda
had accorded the right to give sentence. But this view can be no longer
maintained, since it does not comprise the whole truth of the matter.
For even when the Consuls are seen in the exercise of their functions,
what are they, what do they do, according to chronicles and documents?
They conduct wars, conclude treaties in the name of the people, of whom
they are the representatives; they govern the city; they administer
justice. And at Florence, as elsewhere, the latter is only one of
their duties, and only undertaken by them because so closely connected
with the exercise of the political power that is, above all, their
genuine and principal function. Besides, what was it that really led
to the birth of the Florentine Commune? What save the lack of the
higher political authority hitherto ruling Tuscany, and the necessity
of making war against old and new foes! Accordingly the military and
political elements unavoidably prevailed.

We are further confirmed in this idea by examining the constitution
of the Consular bench. At first it would seem that all or some of the
Consuls presided without distinction, while later, three members were
chosen in turn, and entitled _Consules super facto iustitiae_, or even
_Consules de iustitia_, to preside for one month; at a still later date
two Consuls presided for a term of two months, and finally, after the
nature of the primitive government has been changed, we find a single
Consul acting as president throughout a whole year.[126]

They might be, but were not necessarily, legal experts, since they
only pronounced and confirmed the judgment decided upon without either
preparing or formulating it. This duty fell to a real _iudex ordinarius
pro Comune_, together with three proveditors or _provisores_, who
examined the case and wrote the sentence. The Consuls merely sat as
presidents of the tribunal, and when, as sometimes occurred, they
failed to appear, the tribunal acted on its own account. Therefore
their office was practically the same as that of Countess Matilda
herself--_i.e._, to represent sovereignty without filling the place of
judges.[127]

The real nature of the new government will be best understood after
investigating the different elements of the civic body from which
that government was necessarily evolved. As we are aware, there were
two leading classes and interests dividing the city between them--that
is, the trade guilds, and the associations of worthies, or of the
Towers. In numerical strength the people had greatly the advantage;
but the worthies (_grandi_) were far more cultivated, trained to arms
and politics, and already somewhat versed in the art of government.
Therefore, the Consuls were recruited from this class, and at first
always chosen from so small a number of families, that the office
appeared to be almost an hereditary one. The misfortune of Florence,
as indeed of all the other communes, Venice excepted, was that the
_grandi_ were never agreed among themselves. Feudal nobility in Italy
resembled an exotic plant transferred to uncongenial soil. Elsewhere,
being of German origin, it formed part of an entire political system;
it was under the orders of the emperor to whom it adhered; it had
certain heroic qualities; it created a special form of civilisation,
and a literature that flourished in France and Germany, but it never
throve in Italy, and in Tuscany least of all. Our feudal lords, being
solely dominated by personal interests, leant on the Empire, the better
to combat the Pope; on the Pope, to combat the Empire; on the one or
the other indiscriminately to combat the cities. Even on Florentine
territory the same thing continually occurred. The _grandi_ established
within the city walls were, it is true, of a very different temper, and
much nearer to the people, whose life they shared; but they comprised
very discordant elements; for whereas some of these _grandi_ had risen
from the people, others were descended from feudal houses, with whom
they maintained friendly relations and on whose aid they could rely.
Thirst for power was a speedy cause of division among them, and the
ease with which one party gained favour with the working classes,
while the other was backed by the nobles of the _contado_, fostered the
growth of civil strife. Then, later on, as more nobles deserted their
castles for the city, a regularly aristocratic and Ghibelline party
was formed in opposition to the Guelph and popular side. This point,
however, was still far removed, for the common necessity of making head
against the baronage of the _contado_ long prevailed over all other
interests, since the very life of the Commune was involved in that
struggle.

All that we have so far related serves to show with increasing
clearness that two quite distinct classes of citizens already existed
in Florence--namely, that of the people or trades (_arti_), and that
of the worthies (_grandi_). Had the new government been evolved from
the trades alone, it would have assumed a form constituted on the basis
of a trade guild. Had it issued from the _grandi_ alone, it would have
given rise to a regional and local constitution, corresponding with
the _sestieri_ of the city over which their abodes were scattered.
In all Italian communes this double tendency is to be found. In
Rome the constitution by districts, or _rioni_, prevailed; while
at Florence, after a time, the constitution by guilds obtained in
consequence of the enormous prosperity of commerce and industry in
that city. Meanwhile, however, the moral predominance of the _grandi_
and the pressing exigencies of war favoured a division of the city
in _sestieri_, whereby the first assembling and organising of the
army was greatly facilitated. It was for this reason that the Consuls
were elected by their respective _sestieri_.[128] That the _grandi_
were already organised in "Societies of the Towers" there is written
evidence to prove. A document of 1165 alludes to these societies as
having been in existence for some time,[129] and the parchments of the
Florence Archives comprise actual fragments of their statutes dated
only a few years later on.[130] The "Tower" was possessed in common
by the partners or associates, and no share in it could be bequeathed
to any one outside the society, or to any member elected by less
than all votes save one. Women were naturally excluded. The expense
of maintaining and fortifying the Tower, which always communicated
with the houses of neighbouring members, and served for their common
defence, was divided among them all. Three or more rectors, also
sometimes called Consuls, managed the society, settled disputes, and
named their own successors. These rectors and their companions are
the men we now find at the head of the government; and there is clear
documentary evidence that the Consuls of the Commune were almost
invariably chosen from families belonging to the Societies of the
Towers. When, too, we observe that some of them were occasionally
nominated Consuls of the guilds,[131] as Cavalcanti, for example,
and several others, we gain an undoubted proof of the friendly terms
preserved, as we have previously noted, between these nobles and the
people. The societies were organised somewhat after the fashion of the
guilds, by which they may have been originally inspired, and were not
on a strictly feudal basis.[132]

Had the more aristocratic Uberti achieved sole predominance in the
city, things would have assuredly taken a different turn; but these
patricians were compelled, although reluctantly, to yield to the
force of events frequently opposed to their views. In fact, they were
seldom Consuls before the year 1177, when, after exciting a genuine
revolution, they were more frequently named to that post. This confirms
the fact of their previous defeat in 1115. The consular government had
then fallen into the hands of several noble families on good terms
with the people. And it was the popular voice that prevailed in the
assemblies where all the chief questions and interests of the State
were decided.

The Consuls[133] were elected at the beginning of the year, two for
each _sestieri_. At least, this seems to have been the ordinary
number, although we cannot be quite certain, since the number was
not invariably the same. Two of the twelve, chosen in rotation, acted
as heads of the college, and were styled _Consules priores_. For
this reason the chroniclers only mentioned two Consuls as a rule,
and sometimes one alone. In documents two, three, or even more are
mentioned, but always as representing the rest of their colleagues,
whose names are often added. Most rarely and only at exceptional
moments do we find record of a higher number than twelve.[134] Then
perhaps because the retiring Consuls continued in office with the new
ones for a few days, or from some other passing cause that is unknown
to us. Such variations are not surprising if it is kept in mind that
the constitution of Florence, being then in course of formation, must
have been liable to uncertainty and change, as will often be seen
further on.


IX.

Attention should now be called to the popular element in the
constitution. That the guilds were solidly established by the early
part of the twelfth century is indubitably proved. Villani says that
towards the year 1150 the Consuls of the Merchants, or rather of the
"Calimala Guild," were entrusted by the Commune of Florence with the
building works of "San Giovanni" (i. 60). Of still greater significance
is the fact that on February 3, 1182, the men of Empoli, in making
submission to Florence, were bound to make a yearly payment of fifty
pounds of "good money" (_buoni denari_) to the Consuls or Rectors
of the city, and, failing these officials, to the Consuls of the
Merchants,[135] as representing the Commune. Now, if these Consuls
had reached so high a degree of importance in 1182, we are entitled
to believe that the guild was of no recent origin. And remembering
that the guild in question was the Calimala--_i.e._, that of finishers
and dyers of woollen cloths manufactured abroad, and more especially
in Flanders, imported by Florence, and thence despatched to foreign
markets--we shall understand that Florentine commerce must have
already attained a prodigious development, and consequently that many
of the guilds must have been already long established. A solitary
instance would naturally afford little proof, since it might be open
to various interpretations; but others can be adduced to the same
effect. In a treaty between Lucca and Florence of July 21, 1184, we
find a stipulation according to which the terms might be modified by
the Florentine Consuls _comuni populo electi_, and by twenty-five
counsellors, provided, as was expressly declared, the Consuls of the
merchants were comprised in the number.[136] Likewise, when the men of
Trebbio made submission on July 14, 1193, the power of incorporating
the agreement in the City Statutes was exclusively reserved to the
seven _Rectores qui sunt super Capitibus Artium_.[137]

But a final observation occurs to us at this point, again showing the
very uncertain and changeable nature of this consular government. In
mentioning the chief authorities of the Commune, almost all documents
refer to them as "_Consules seu rectores vel rector_," with the
addition, at a later date, of "_Potestas sive dominator_."[138] All
these terms had a very general meaning at the period. Nevertheless,
there must have been some reason for employing the formula--Consuls
or Rectors or _Potesta_--in treaties of peace, or alliance, or state
documents of high importance; and probably a special reason, seeing
that we often find the formula ending as follows: "_Consules qui pro
tempore erint, et si non erint_," the Rectors or the _Potesta_ or
the Consuls of the guilds were to act in their stead. Why so much
vagueness in indicating the chief magistrate of the Republic? Only one
explanation is possible. The real practical government of the city was
carried on by the various associations; the office of Consul had few
attributes and never attained the power and importance due to a central
government, as conceived in the modern sense. The same remark may be
also applied to the Priors, the Ancients, and other officers of later
date; but it is specially true as applied to the consuls, under whom
the various civic societies were first united in a single government.
Therefore, to meet the eventuality of no Consuls being in office at the
moment, it was provided that the Rectors of the Towers or of the guilds
should naturally assume the power directly emanating from them. But as
no public acts performed in the name of the Rectors are extant, we may
conclude that the contingency arranged for seldom arose.

Frequent mention occurs of _counsellors_ (_consilarii_), and we note
that representatives of the guilds were comprised among them. We know,
in fact, that there was a council in Florence, as in other Italian
communes, and Villani tells us (iv. 7, and v. 32) that this council was
called a senate "according to the custom given by the Romans to the
Florentines," and composed of one hundred worthies (_Buoni Uomini_).
In documents, however, they are nearly always entitled _consiliarii_,
the term "senator"[139] only occurring once; but in those days the
term _senato_ or _consiglio_, _senatori_ or _consiglieri_, were often
indiscriminately applied, particularly with regard to the limited or
_Special_ Council, as it was afterwards called. No documents supply
us with the precise number of the councillors; but we believe the
one hundred recorded by Villani must be somewhat under the exact
figure, since a form of oath sworn by 133 councillors is extant.[140]
Perhaps each _sestiere_ elected about twenty or twenty-five members,
without this being the invariable rule, and thus the Council might be
approximately designated as that of the "Hundred." Then, too, there was
the parliament, also known as the _Arengo_,[141] which was a general
assembly of the people, held on great occasions for the gravest affairs
of the State.


X.

Thus the Florentine Commune resembled a confederation of Trade Guilds
and Societies of the Towers. Its directing authorities for affairs of
war, finance, justice, and other matters of the highest importance,
were the Consuls, elected yearly, with a senate or council of about a
hundred worthies, likewise elected yearly, and lastly a parliament. The
Consuls were almost invariably chosen from members of the Companies of
the Towers, and if, for any reason, no election of Consuls took place,
the rectors of the Towers or of the guilds were provisionally empowered
to act in their stead. But the guilds predominated in the Council, and
as a natural consequence the government assumed a popular character
from that time, and the whole policy of Florence always tended to
promote the trade and commerce of the city.

Nevertheless, to obtain a still clearer idea of a government of this
kind, it would be requisite to ascertain exactly who and what were the
citizens entitled to a share in it, and this point is still somewhat
doubtful. The outlying territory (_contado_) was entirely excluded
from citizenship, nor was this privilege granted to all dwellers within
the walls, the lower class of artisans and the populace being excluded
from it.[142] Hence the government was concentrated in the hands of a
few powerful families, the heads of the guilds, and their principal
adherents. In fact, even down to the last days of the Republic real
citizenship--the possessors of which alone were eligible to political
posts--was a privilege conceded to few, and even in 1494 the number
of citizens scarcely exceeded three thousand. For this reason, even
at the present day, we may find a few humble families asserting their
inheritance of old Florentine civic rights, as a rare privilege and
almost as a title of nobility. At Venice, even in the eighteenth
century, to the last days of the Republic there still existed different
grades of citizenship, and the right of government was restricted to a
small caste. This is one of the points in our history demanding closer
investigation. It is true that the whole people met indistinctly in
parliament; but such assemblies were mostly of a purely formal kind.
For, seeing that the parliament was convoked either in some square,
often of small extent, or inside a church, we are bound to infer that
the privilege accorded to all the inhabitants of the city was nominal
rather than real.

It were likewise superfluous to add that the exact division of power,
as in modern constitutions, was entirely ignored in those days.
Affairs were divided according to their importance and the quality
of the individuals concerned in them, rather than according to their
nature. The Council of the Hundred was not, as might be supposed,
at this day, a legislative assembly, nor was the executive power
vested in the Consuls. The latter gave judgment, administered affairs,
commanded armies, executed the will of the people, and occasionally
completed legislative acts even without the aid of the Council. This,
however, was always consulted regarding very important reforms, but
often voted for or against them without any discussion. On questions
of extraordinary moment the parliament gave its _placet_ without
always understanding the nature of the question. On the other hand,
not only affairs of some gravity, and particularly those for which
money was needed, were referred to the Council; but this could also be
consulted, at the Consul's pleasure, on any question whatever, from the
proposed execution of some political offender to granting some citizen
permission to transfer his abode from one _sestiere_ to another.[143]
Although a question of the latter kind seems very insignificant to
us nowadays, it was an important one then, since it altered the
distribution of the inhabitants in different parts of the city, and
consequently the relative strength of these parts and the proportional
right of the citizens to fill public offices--a point that was very
jealously watched.

[Illustration: BELFRY OF S. ANDREA, MERCATO VECCHIO, FLORENCE.

            [_To face page 130._]

Such was the first form of government adopted by the Florentine
Commune. But the Commune was not yet consolidated nor sufficiently
sure of its strength. The territory beneath its sway was very limited
in extent, with ill-defined, disputable and disputed frontiers. Even
within these borders the Commune had very little power, inasmuch as
the castled nobility not only vaunted their independence of the city,
refusing to acknowledge any authority save that of the Empire, to
which they were not always submissive, but waged constant war on the
Commune, and perpetually incited neighbouring lands to rebellion.
Accordingly, the first thing to be done at this juncture was to seize
the _contado_ by force of arms, reduce it to subjection and govern it,
the which, as we shall see, led to many new and serious complications,
both within and without the walls. These vicissitudes constitute the
real civil history of Florence, which finally starts from this moment.

[Illustration]




CHAPTER III.

_THE FIRST WARS AND FIRST REFORMS OF THE FLORENTINE COMMUNE._[144]


I.

After Countess Matilda's death the envoys despatched from Germany to
reassume the margraviate of Tuscany in the name of the Empire followed
one another in rapid succession.[145] But almost all were men of small
ability, pursuing a vacillating policy that led to no results. They
tried to exercise the power of margraves, but were merely temporary
officials of the emperor. Without resources, without knowledge of the
country, they relied now on this party, now on that, incapable of
distinguishing friends from foes, and never understanding the causes
of the wars continually breaking out on every side. This state of
things, well adapted to promote communal independence, lasted to 1162,
when Frederic Barbarossa began to make the weight of his hand felt
by initiating a clearer and more determined policy, although even his
talent failed to obtain any notable results.

The Florentines were those best able to profit by the weakness of the
Empire. In 1129 they took possession of the Castle of Vignalo in the
Val d'Elsa;[146] and in 1135 destroyed the stronghold of Monteboni,
belonging to the Buondelmonti, whose name was derived from it, and who
were now forced to submit to the Commune, yield it military service,
and dwell in the city a certain part of the year.[147] On this head
Villani remarks that the Commune now began to extend its borders "by
violence rather than by reason, ... subjecting every noble of the
_contado_, and demolishing fortresses." This was, in fact, the policy
of Florence, and it led to two inevitable results. An increase of
territory was the first; the second, that the always-increasing number
of nobles brought into the city paved the way for the formation of an
aristocratic party opposed to the people, and consequently promoting
civil strife and future changes of government.

In June, 1135, the Imperial envoy Engelbert entered Florence, and
seemed amicable to the Commune.[148] He speedily moved on to Lucca,
where he met with a serious defeat. The succeeding envoy, Errico of
Bavaria, came with a considerable force, and appeared ill-disposed
towards the Florentines. His stay, however, was short, and his
successor, Ulrico d'Attems, showed friendly intentions, and in 1141
even aided the Florentines in a skirmishing expedition against
Sienna.[149] But all these envoys came and disappeared like meteors.
Florence was now beginning its great war with Count Guido, surnamed
the Old, who had become their foe. A contested inheritance served as
a pretext for the rupture; but the real cause must have lain in the
increased power and menacing attitude of the count. His possessions
hemmed in the Republic on all sides, and Sanzanome said of him, "Per
se quasi civitas est et provincia."[150] The citizens first seized a
castle of his near Ponte a Sieve, and then attacked his stronghold of
Monte di Croce. But, aided by neighbouring towns, the count succeeded
in defeating the Florentines on June 24, 1146. Nevertheless, they
contrived even then to extort advantageous terms, namely: that part
of the walls should be dismantled, and that the castle should hoist
the banner of Florence.[151] All this was done, and there was truce
for a time, while the count seems to have been engaged on distant
expeditions. But later, the walls were restored, and thereupon the
Florentines,[152] declaring that the agreement had been violated,
suddenly stormed the castle in 1153, and rased it to the ground. And
thus, wrote Sanzanome, "_Mons Crucis est cruciatus_." Certainly all
this could not lead to peace. Count Guido ceded part of Poggibonsi to
the Siennese on condition of their fortifying and defending it against
the Florentines, who were preparing to make an assault. By accepting
the gift Sienna stood pledged to play an active part in the war, which
thus continued to spread.[153]


II.

Just at this time, however, the state of affairs changed, for Tuscany
was beginning to feel the influence of Frederic I. (Barbarossa).
This emperor, finding that Duke Guelfo was unable to make himself
respected, despatched (1162-3) the Archbishop Reinhold of Cologne, a
man of energy and brains, with the title of "Italiae archicancellarius
et imperatoriae maiestatis legatus," and charged to reorganise
the Imperial administration on a new plan. Frederic regarded the
dissolution of the margraviate as an accomplished fact, and wished to
assume the direct government of its various component parts by means
of German counts or Podesta, in the manner already adopted by him in
Lombardy. Reinhold set to the task with zeal, establishing German
governors and garrisons in the principal castles of the _contado_; and
where no castles remained new ones were erected.[154] San Miniato, with
its tower on the hill, dominating the suburb of San Genesio below, was
the headquarters of this new administration. Here Reinhold established
Eberhard von Amern with the title of "_Comes et Federici imperatoris
legatus_."[155] Frederic's scheme of policy was clear and precise; but
in order to carry it into effect against the will of communes that were
already emancipated, and against the interests of many native counts,
would have required much time and a great army, both of which were
lacking at the moment. Reinhold was soon called elsewhere for other
undertakings, and although his successor, the Archbishop Christian
of Mayence, was likewise a man of ability, their efforts led to few
practical results. Their only success consisted in the amount of money
squeezed from the people; for, as a chronicler puts it, "like good
fishermen, they drew everything cleverly into their nets." But they
established no firm political basis.

It is true that the new German Podesta, or _Teutonici_, as they were
called, were seen springing up on all sides. We now find, in fact,
continual mention of the _Potestas Florentiae and Florentinorum_,
and of the same dignitaries in Sienna, Arezzo, and many other towns.
Nevertheless, they exercised little or no power in great cities: these
being still governed by Consuls, who disputed the authority of the
_Teutonici_ of the _contado_ outside the walls. This state of things
could not be of long continuance. By special permission from the
emperor, the Consuls of certain well-affected cities were allowed to
exercise jurisdiction, in his name, not only within the walls, but
even sometimes over part of the _contado_; always, however, with a
reservation in favour of nobles, and often of churches and convents,
who were to remain subject to the Imperial authority alone.[156]
Everywhere else in Central Italy the Imperial Podesta were to take the
entire command, for the emperor admitted no doubt as to the complete
and absolute nature of his rights. But the question now hinged on
facts rather than on rights, and was only to be solved by a greater
force than that possessed by the Empire in Tuscany. Hence, an enormous
confusion ensued. All the great cities, and more especially Florence,
continued to rule themselves as before; while in the rural territories
(_contadi_), Imperial Podesta, Tuscan counts, feudal lords, Consuls
great and small, or other officers of the Commune, daily contested one
another's authority, and the masses no longer knew whom to obey. Even
the cities and nobles siding with the Empire not only failed to carry
out Frederic's designs, but actually opposed them; for, in point of
fact, this Teutonic over-lordship, wielded by grasping and tyrannous
Imperial officials, was equally odious to all.

A sufficiently accurate idea of this state of things may be gleaned
from the accounts of contemporary witnesses, who were summoned at
various times to furnish authentic details as to the condition of the
country. Those sent to report upon the monastery of Rosano describe
it as being subject to Count Guido, who was continually driven to
defend it "against the warden of Montegrossoli, other Teutons, and the
Florentine Consuls," all of whom tried to exercise authority there.
They also describe how at Monte di Croce, the Consuls of that place
and the _vice comites_ all held command simultaneously, and were
compelled to defend themselves from the _Teutonici_, and against the
encroachments of the Consuls and other officers of the Florentine
Commune.[157]

On another occasion an equally chaotic state of things is described in
the reports on the castle and valley of Paterno, of which Florentines
and Siennese disputed the dominion. One witness tells us that in his
day he saw a certain Pipino, _Potestas Florentiae_, holding sway
there, and over all the rest of the Florentine _contado_. Another
records how he visited the Paterno valley and the whole of the
_contado_, together with the consuls of the Commune and a _Teutonico_.
Several declare to have gone there now with Pipino, now with other
_Teutonici_, and at other times with the Consuls, and that all received
obedience and levied taxes in the same way. Then we have the curious
deposition of one Giovanni _de Citinaia_, who gives a long account
of recent events in the district. He tells us how a big pillar was
uprooted by a priest, who, not knowing for what purpose it had been
planted, wanted to use it for the church he was building. But it was so
heavy that even with a cart and two oxen he failed to remove it. And
some peasants who were looking on, cried out to him: "Domini sacerdos,
male fecisti, quia est terminus inter Florentinos et Senenses" ("Master
priest, thou hast done ill, for this is the boundary stone between
Florence and Sienna"). After this, the witness continues, two persons
went to the warden of Montegrossoli, and said that if he would help
them to rebuild the Castle of Paterno, they would furnish him with
proofs of his right over it. The warden cheerfully hastened to Florence
to get the permission of the authorities, but quickly returned,
saying that the building could not go on, for the Florentines refused
consent, because the Archbishop Christian of Mayence was already in
Lombardy on the way to Tuscany. Thereupon the Siennese made use of the
favourable opportunity to demolish the neglected works, and play the
masters themselves. It is certainly impossible to conceive a greater
multiplicity and confusion of contrasting rights and authorities.[158]

Hence the only course open to Florence and the Tuscan communes in
general was to seize every convenient occasion of asserting their
rights either by craft or by violence. The war between Pisa and Lucca
had already broken out, and as Count Guido, the foe of the Florentines,
had joined with Lucca, they formed an alliance with Pisa. This treaty
was very advantageous to their commerce, but it pledged them to an
active share in the war.[159] They willingly undertook this, for it
was an opportunity of fighting not only the Lucchese, but also the
latter's patrons, Count Guido and Christian of Mayence. At first it
seemed as though Pisa would be forced to make peace, for on March 23,
1173, Christian declared that city to be under ban of the Empire,
thus stripping it of all the privileges it had previously enjoyed. In
fact, on the 23rd of May an agreement was concluded (witnessed also by
the Florentines) to the effect that Pisa and Lucca should proceed to
an exchange of prisoners. The ban was raised on the 28th of the same
month, and peace was solemnly proclaimed in Pisa on the 1st of June.

But two months afterwards an unexpected event caused the war to be
speedily renewed. The archbishop had invited the Consuls of Pisa and
Florence to come to San Genesio on the 4th of August, and on their
arrival had them promptly seized and cast into prison. What could
have caused an act rendering war unavoidable, after such strenuous
efforts to establish peace? Many explanations have been suggested,
but one fact alone is well ascertained. Certain men of San Miniato,
having been expelled as rebels to the Empire, had sought the Bishop
of Florence[160] in his palace, and sworn not only to make common
cause with the Pisans and Florentines, but to cede them the territory
of San Miniato, should they succeed in retaking it, and even if the
fortress remained in the hands of the Germans.[161] This is certainly
true, for the document containing the agreement is still extant. It
is no regular treaty, being unwitnessed by Consuls, and lacking the
proper legal formulas. But the fact of its having been sworn to and
signed in the bishop's palace; of some leading citizens, including one
of the Uberti,[162] having been parties to it; and of the document
being preserved in the Archives,[163] proves that the rulers of the
two cities were not unaware of the agreement, but merely preferred to
hide, or rather disguise the real importance of it. All this, joined to
their reluctance and delay as to the exchange of prisoners, persuaded
Christian that they were trying to trick and betray him by a fictitious
peace. Accordingly, his patience being exhausted, he was led to commit
an imprudent and ill-considered action, that destroyed all hope of the
peace he was so anxious to conclude.

In fact, by August the Florentines were already at Castel Fiorentino,
and, reinforced by a contingent of 225 horse, accompanied by two
Consuls from Pisa, encamped at Pontedera. Christian quickly marched
against them, together with Guido and the Lucchese, but the latter
were obliged to forsake him, for the Pisans, by advice of the
Florentines, had entered the Lucca territory and were laying it waste.
Notwithstanding his diminished force he attacked the enemy, and
valiantly defended his banner, but was worsted in the fight. How the
war went on is unknown to us; but it is certain that Christian soon
took his departure, that in 1174 the rebels of San Miniato returned
with honour to their native town, and that finally in the following
year peace was concluded between the three hostile cities.[164]

Meanwhile the Florentines continued to subject the towns and castles of
the territory to their rule.[165] Before this, in 1170, they had wrung
hard conditions from the Aretines,[166] who were friendly to Count
Guido, and they now marched against Asciano, a walled town near Arezzo,
partly under their rule and partly under that of the Siennese, who were
now trying to get full possession of it. The latter were routed on July
7, 1174, and leaving a thousand prisoners in the enemy's hands were
accordingly obliged to submit to very disadvantageous terms.[167] The
negotiations were carried on slowly, but peace was concluded at last in
1176.

The Florentines were acknowledged as the legitimate masters of the
whole _contado_ of Fiesole and Florence, and obtained part of the
Siennese possessions at Poggibonsi, the said Siennese being bound to
help them in all wars,[168] save against the emperor or his envoys,
and likewise pledged to use every endeavour to conciliate the latter in
favour of Florence. Several more of the conditions were particularly
harsh.[169] That the Florentines could extort such terms as these after
the petty war of Asciano is an undeniable proof of their increased
power; but it is equally certain that unless the Siennese were
hopelessly ruined, this was only a fictitious peace, concluded after
great hesitation, and for the sole purpose of securing the release of
the prisoners.


III.

Nevertheless, these triumphs abroad were counteracted by unforeseen
events in Florence itself. Owing to the prevalence of the popular party
in the consular government, powerful houses in general, and the Uberti
faction in particular, were increasingly excluded from public affairs,
and naturally showed signs of discontent. At this moment we seldom find
any of their names at the head of the Commune.[170] Meanwhile, however,
many neighbouring castles and lands having been reduced to submission,
the number of nobles of the _contado_ dwelling in the city had been
greatly augmented. These, being merely counted as _assidui habitatores_
or _cives salvatichi_, could have no share in the government, but there
was nothing to prevent them from joining the disaffected party and
swelling its numbers and strength. And when, in course of time, they
became full citizens, their power of action was enlarged. Accordingly,
at last, in 1177, the Uberti were encouraged to hazard the revolution
that first initiated civil war in Florence.

All the chroniclers speak of this war, and it must have been of
considerable importance, seeing that it was pursued for nearly two
years with much bloodshed and the destruction by fire of the greater
part of the city. Likewise, the river Arno overflowed and broke down
the Ponte Vecchio. Villani describes the two fires of 1177, saying that
the first extended from the bridge to the Old Market; the second, from
San Martino del Vescovo to Santa Maria Ughi and the Cathedral. He also
relates the fall of the bridge, adding, as usual, that all this was a
righteous chastisement from Heaven on the proud, ungrateful, sinful
city. He speaks of the revolution that occurred at the same time as
though it had nothing to do with the burning of the town. He goes on to
say that the Uberti, who were the "principal and most powerful citizens
of Florence, with their followers, both noble and plebeian, began to
make war against the Consuls, lords and rulers of the Commune, at a
fixed moment and on a fixed plan, from hatred of the Signory, which
was not to their liking. And the war was so fierce, that in many parts
neighbours fought against neighbours from fortified towers, the which
were 100 to 120 _braccia_ in height (150 to 180 feet). Likewise certain
new towers were erected by the street companies with monies obtained
from neighbours, and these were called the Towers of the Companies.

For two years the fighting went on in this fashion, and with much
slaughter; and the citizens became so inured to perpetual strife,
that they would fight one day and eat and drink together the next,
recounting one to another their various deeds and prowess. At last,
tired out, they made peace, and the Consuls remained in power; but
these things created and gave birth to the accursed factions which soon
broke out in Florence."[171]

On the other hand, the pseudo Brunetto Latini dates the first fire
extending from the bridge to the Old Market, on August 4, 1177. But
he quickly adds that in the same year began the "discord and war,
for the space of twenty-seven months, between the Consuls and the
Uberti, who refused to obey either the Consuls or the Signory, yet
nevertheless formed no government of their own. This strife among the
citizens caused great mortality, robbery, and arson. The city was set
on fire at five different points; the Sesto d'Oltrarno, and the part
between the Churches of San Martino, del Vescovo, and Sta. Maria, were
burnt down."[172] According to the same chronicler, the fall of the
bridge took place on November 4, 1178, and the civil war only came to
an end in 1180, with the triumph of the Uberti, one of whom, Uberto
degli Uberti, actually became Consul. "The which afterwards led to
the creation of Podesta, who were nobles, powerful, and of foreign
birth."[173]

In spite of a few seeming contradictions on the part of both
chroniclers, their evidence, joined to that of others, clearly proves
that in 1177 a revolution led by the Uberti took place and lasted about
two years, accompanied by rapine, murder, and arson. The Uberti did
not gain a complete victory, since the consular government survived;
but they and their friends were in power more frequently than before,
and for this reason the pseudo Brunetto Latini considers them to have
conquered. All this gave the government a more patrician tendency. It
heralded the change that replaced the Consuls by a Podesta, and cast
the first seed of the factions and civil wars destined to involve the
city in long-continued strife and bloodshed. Such, in fact, is the
gist of the chronicles, and all later documents and events serve to
confirm it. Nevertheless, peace was re-established within the walls for
the nonce, and the policy of Florence remained unaltered. The partial
triumph of the aristocracy had at least one good effect; inasmuch as
the nobles, being satisfied for the moment, lent efficacious assistance
to the Commune, and enabled all its affairs to be pushed forward more
briskly.

In fact, on February 3, 1182, the people of Empoli were reduced to
submission, bound over to pay annual tribute and to yield military
service at the request of the Florentine Consuls, whether of the
Commune or the Guilds, save in the event of a war against the Counts
Guidi.[174] The people of Pogna, which was a fief of the Alberti,[175]
were the next to make surrender on the 4th of March. And these Pognesi
not only pledged themselves to take the field at the command of the
Florentine Consuls, but to abstain from constructing new walls or
fortresses, either on their own territory or the neighbouring lands
of Semifonte. Also, should others attempt to fortify those places,
they (the Pognesi) were bound to oppose it and give notice of the
fact to the Florentines, who, on their side, promised friendship and
protection.[176] In the same year the Castle of Montegrossoli was
captured by the Florentines.[177] On July 21, 1184, they made an
alliance with the people of Lucca, who promised to send them yearly a
contingent of one hundred and fifty horse and five hundred foot, for
at least twenty days' service, in all wars waged within Florentine
territory.[178] In October the Florentines attacked the Castle of
Mangona in the Mugello, but as this fortress belonged to the Alberti,
the latter stirred Pogna to rebellion, and the Florentines quickly
marched against that town.[179] Count Alberti seems to have taken part
in the fight that ensued at Pogna, for it is known that by November he
was in captivity and forced to accept very hard terms for himself, his
wife and his children. He had to promise to dismantle his fortress of
Pogna the following April, only retaining his own palace and tower; to
demolish the tower of Certaldo, and never rebuild that of Semifonte.
He was to cede to the Florentines whichever one of the Capraia towers
they chose to take; he was to give them one-half of the ransom or tax
to be levied on all his possessions in general between the Arno and the
Elsa. Finally, as soon as he should be released from prison ("_postquam
exiero de prescione_"), he was pledged to compel all his men to swear
fealty, and to the payment of four hundred pounds of good Pisan money.
His sons were to reside in Florence two months of the year in time of
war, one month in time of peace.[180] The subjection and humiliation
of this Count Alberto was a very significant fact in itself. And when
we reflect that it occurred after Florence had already overthrown the
Cadolingi, lowered the power of the Guidi house, and concluded most
favourable alliances with Pisa, Sienna, and Lucca, it will be easily
seen how quickly the Commune had been able to soar to a position of
very great and almost menacing strength.


IV.

All this certainly contributed no little to hasten the coming of the
Emperor Frederic I., and, in fact, we find him in Tuscany for the
deliberate purpose of reducing the country to subjection in the year
1185. But he came without an army, reliant on the might of the Empire,
on his own shrewdness, and his own reputation. He believed in the
possibility of achieving his plans by alienating some of the Tuscan
cities from Florence, and compelling them to side with the Empire
against her. Above all, he counted upon Pistoia, situated between Lucca
and Florence, and hostile to both; upon Pisa, whom he hoped, by means
of large concessions, to win back to the Imperial cause, to which she
had so often adhered before. He became still more hopeful of success
when, on reaching San Miniato, in the summer of 1185, many nobles
of the _contado_ came to do him homage, with loud complaints of the
oppressive rule of the free cities. On the 25th of July he emancipated
many of these nobles, and some of their fiefs, from the jurisdiction of
Lucca.[181] On the 31st of the same month he entered Florence, still
surrounded by nobles of the _contado_, who, as Villani says, complained
bitterly of the city, "which had seized their castles, and thus grossly
insulted the Empire."[182] Hereupon, the chroniclers affirm that
Frederic deprived Florence of the right of jurisdiction over her own
territory, even just outside the city walls; and even assert that he
adopted the same measure with regard to all the Tuscan towns, excepting
Pisa and Pistoia.[183] But this point has been seriously disputed,
many refusing to admit the possibility of a fact unsupported by any
documentary proof. On the other hand, some writers consider it to be
proved by a later event, the which is not only related by several
chroniclers, but also confirmed by existing documents.

In fact, by a patent dated June 24, 1187, Henry VI., in reward, as
he expressed it, for services rendered by the Florentines to his
father and himself, granted them judicial rights over the city and
the _contado_ beyond, to the distance of one mile in the direction of
Fiesole, of three towards Settimo and Campi, and of ten in all other
directions.[184] Even within these narrow limits, however, the nobles
and soldiery were to be independent of the city. In token of gratitude
for this liberality on the part of the emperor, the Florentines were
bound to present him every year with a piece of good samite, _bonum
examitum_.[185] Similar and equally limited concessions were granted
to other cities also.[186] Accordingly, some have said, since Henry
restored right of jurisdiction to the Florentines, it is clear that
his father had deprived them of it. In fact, we know that throughout
Tuscany Frederic established Imperial Podesta, who bore the names of
their respective cities.[187] Also, reasoning in this style, those
writers went so far as to suppose Florence to have been deprived of
judicial powers even within the city walls. But, as we have seen,
Henry's patent does not speak of restitution--only of the liberality
shown in rewarding the services of the Florentines, although it is
impossible to understand what those services could have been.[188]
On the other hand, it is hard to believe that Florence, who had
dared, in weaker times, to use violent measures against the Imperial
envoys, murdering Rabodo and putting Christian of Mayence to flight,
should now, when so much stronger, and the chief power in Tuscany,
unresistingly submit to deprivation of judicial rights throughout her
own territory, and even within the city walls. In addition to all
this, there seems no doubt that there were Consuls of Florence during
the same period, and therefore the theory of there being Imperial
Podesta in the city itself naturally falls to the ground. In fact, the
Consuls' names are recorded in documents of 1184. It is true that,
for the three following years, the pseudo Brunetto Latini is the only
authority by whom they are mentioned; but it is difficult to suppose
that he invented them all, or that he could have been mistaken three
consecutive times. Although during these three years no documents give
the names of the Consuls, they afford, indirectly, continual hints of
their existence.[189]

Hence it is necessary, in my opinion, to begin by recognising that,
according to the ideas and the policy of Frederic I., there was no
question as to his right of exercising jurisdiction over Tuscany;
and that if the cities had virtually exercised this right without a
special grant to that effect, they had violated thereby the rights
of the emperor, who was accordingly justified in resuming them. For
this end, he had commissioned Reinhold and Christian to establish
Podesta everywhere,[190] and to restore affairs to what he deemed
their sole legal and normal condition. Only the difficulty here was
not in proving his right, according to the Imperial theory, but in
being able to enforce it. It was a question of fact, only to be
resolved by force. As we have seen, Imperial Podesta were established
on all sides; and while even in the _contado_ they could only obtain
partial and somewhat contested obedience, in the greater cities, and
particularly in Florence, they obtained none at all. The _Potestates
Florentiae_, or _Florentinorum_, as of Sienna or the Siennese, whose
names so often occur, are almost invariably--and in the case of
Florence, one may say quite invariably--Imperial Podesta, established
in the _contado_, and disputing its jurisdiction with the Consuls.
Now, seeing that the commune considered the _contado_ to be its own
territory, and therefore craved the sole command of it, while from the
Imperial point of view city and _contado_ were equally subject to the
Podesta of the Empire, it naturally followed that these dignitaries
were commonly styled Podesta of Florence or of the Florentines; and in
the same way, Podesta of Sienna or of the Siennese, of Arezzo or the
Aretini, &c. But, as a matter of fact, they not only failed to command
obedience within the gates of great cities, but even in the _contado_
outside were continually in conflict with the consular authority. We
have already seen what a chaos was the result. Nevertheless, it seems
natural to believe that the arrival of Frederic I. in Tuscany must
have strengthened immensely the power of these Podesta, and that, at
least for a time, they must have been enabled to enforce their judicial
rights throughout the country, and to the very gates of the town. This
made the chroniclers assert that the emperor had stripped Florence of
its _contado_. It is certain, however, that on his departure things
rapidly lapsed into their previous condition. That is to say, the
consuls did their utmost to neutralise the action and authority of the
Imperial officials. The rise of the communes had created a new state of
things which the Empire was powerless to destroy, even while refusing
to acknowledge its legal value. Therefore Henry was finally driven to
accord a partial valuation, in the guise of a generous concession, to
an actuality that by this means he might at least hope to keep within
definite limits.

And in reality his patent of 1187 granted Florence much less than
she had possessed for some time before. If, in fact, the territory
of the Commune was not to extend more than one mile in the direction
of Fiesole, this latter city remained outside the border, although
already subjected to Florence by force of arms, together with the
whole of its _contado_, which, indeed, as proved by every treaty,
had been incorporated in the Florentine territory since 1125. Also,
as though this were not enough, Henry declared all nobles within
the circumscribed area left to the city, to be exempted from its
jurisdiction, even including those who had legally and officially
made submission to it. Notwithstanding all this, Florence found it
best to accept the Imperial grant. Thus things remained practically
as before--that is to say, the Commune could continue to hold the
virtual command, and snatch as much more as should be possible. The
chronicler Paolino Pieri, in recording this concession, states that the
Florentines regained the _contado_--"that is, they took it back," and
by this phrase he unconsciously defines the real condition of things.
Meanwhile, the Empire yielded the point legally by recognising the
judicial rights of the Consuls within the city and over part of the
_contado_ outside. As to the rest, it was left to be decided, as in
the past, by force of arms. All this serves, in our opinion, to make
things clear, and likewise to explain the inexactitude and confusion
of the chroniclers, who, unable to distinguish between the practical
and legal side of the question, continually jumbled both together.
Undoubtedly it was hard to disentangle them, seeing that the fact was
confronted by two, or rather three, separate rights, each refusing to
acknowledge the others--namely, the right of the Empire, that of the
Commune, and, lastly, that of the Pope, whose voice was always heard
repeating--although always in vain--that the Church was Matilda's sole
heir.


V.

Nevertheless, the presence in the _contado_ of German Podesta or counts
exercised some influence, even if indirectly, on the city itself.
Or rather, their presence contributed to modify its constitution by
promoting in a certain way the creation of a new civic magistracy,
bearing their own title. In fact, the Latin term of _potestas_,
_potesta_, or _podesta_ was given to every chief authority during the
Middle Ages; even in 1068 it was the title attributed to Duke Goffredo
of Tuscany. Later, it was bestowed on the German counts governing
the _contado_ in the name of Frederic I. From them it was afterwards
transferred to municipal magistrates. It seems to have been given first
to officials despatched by the Commune to the _contado_, when this
was already occupied by German counts, in order to imitate and oppose
them. At least, there is reason to believe that certain officials
with Italian names, and bearing the title of Podesta of Florence--or
of Florentine Podesta--before any such post had been created in the
city, must have been of this class. Two of these officials, Renuccio
da Stagia and Guerrieri, are known to us and mentioned more than once
in the Rosano reports.[191] It seems probable enough that Renuccio may
have been appointed before the year 1180[192]--that is, when there
were assuredly Consuls in Florence.[193] Hence it is to be concluded
that he held office in the _contado_. But whether or no this theory be
admissible, it should be noted that all Florentine documents of the
time, when mentioning the Consuls, always add the words: "sive Rector
vel Potestas, vel Dominator." At first it is merely a generic formula,
vaguely suggesting the possibility of another magistrature. But little
by little the formula assumes a more concrete character; the term
_Potestas_ becoming of so much more importance, as to often precede
that of _Consules_.[194] Then, the new office is on the point of birth;
and finally, in 1193, makes its appearance in the person of Gherardo
Caponsacchi, a Florentine belonging to a consular family.

Ammirato was mistaken in thinking that there had been a magistrate
of this kind in the year 1184, because he found that the treaty
of alliance between Florence and Lucca mentioned no individual in
particular, but made a general allusion to the office of Podesta.[195]
As we have observed, however, too many similar allusions occur in State
papers, even when Florence was certainly ruled by Consuls, to allow us
to draw the same conclusion. It may be that Florence had a Podesta even
earlier than 1193, but until we find some document specifying the name
of a person filling that office, we cannot venture to assert it as a
fact.

At any rate, the institution of the new magistracy was preceded by an
increased influx of nobles within the city walls. This, indeed, was one
of the chief causes of the change. Continual proofs to this effect are
afforded by contemporary documents, and confirmed by the narratives
of the chroniclers. The pseudo Brunetto Latini tells us that in 1192
the Consuls included "Messer Tegrino of the Counts Guidi, 'paladin'
in Florence, and Chianni de' Fifanti." Now, to find a count and count
palatine or paladine among the Florentine Consuls is an absolutely new
thing. The same writer also says that in the same year "a decree was
issued in Florence that the Counts Guidi and the Counts Alberti and
the Counts da Certaldo, Ubaldini et Figiovanni, Pazzi and Ubertini,
the Counts of Panago, and many other nobles, being citizens, were to
dwell in the city of Florence during four months of the year." However
much or little value this chronicler may have, his statement agrees
with the information found in documents, and explains the origin of
the new magistrature. Assuredly the nobles cannot have relished being
subject to the popular consular government, against which they had
struggled since the year 1177, and must have particularly disliked
being under the jurisdiction of persons they deemed their inferiors
in rank and dignity. Besides, as the elements composing the mass of
the citizens became more heterogeneous, thus increasing the danger of
civil war, so much the more the possibility of being judged by their
political adversaries must have seemed unbearable to them. Hence the
need was felt of a new magistrature of a different and, preferably, of
an aristocratic character, and an Imperial institution, such as that of
the Podesta, was chosen for a model. The holder of this office is no
mere judge, as many believed and recorded; he is the positive head and
representative of the Commune; he signs treaties, commands the army,
and fills the place of the Consuls.

In fact, when on July 14, 1193, the Castle of Trebbio made submission
to Florence, the Commune was officially represented by Gherardo
Caponsacchi _Potestas Florentie et eius consiliarii_, together with
the seven rectors of the headships (_Capitudini_) of the guilds.[196]
The councillors, whose names are inserted in the document, are
likewise seven, and almost all of consular houses; two, indeed, are
nobles--namely, a Count Arrigo (perhaps of Capraia) and a Tegghiaio
Bundelmonti. It seems certain that Consuls were again chosen in 1194,
since the pseudo Brunetto Latini names two, one of whom was an Uberti.
In 1195 a Podesta reappears in the person of _Rainerius de Gaetano, cum
suis consiliariis_, among whom a _Consul iustitiae_ is included.[197]
It may be considered a certainty that these councillors, whose number
is continually varying in the documents, were no other than the
Consuls, who survived in this transitory form for some time, with the
Podesta as their chief. Together with him they represent the Commune,
sometimes even without him. But by degrees their importance diminishes,
while that of the Podesta is increased. In short, there is a period of
transformation during which the new, and as yet, ill-defined form of
government alternates with that of the Consuls.

In 1200 the Podesta is no longer a Florentine, but a foreigner, and
already represents the government, unaided by councillors, who have
disappeared altogether in 1207--namely, when the government has assumed
its definite shape. Or, to express it more accurately, their function
was continually changed and their number increased, until they were
converted into a special council of the whole city, beside the ancient
council or senate that was changed into a general council. On arriving
at that time we shall find the government represented by the Podesta
and two councils, sitting either separately or jointly, and styled in
the latter case the general and special council. Thus the consular
office may be considered to have been altogether extinguished. In
fact, excepting one final attempt in 1211 and 1212, when Consuls were
once more elected, we never meet with them again. What we have related
will make it easier to understand why the chroniclers attribute the
origin of the Podesta to various dates. The pseudo Brunetto Latini
makes the office begin in 1200--namely, the year when it was first
held by a foreigner, and alien birth considered an indispensable
qualification for the post. Therefore, before that time, the chronicler
seems to regard the Podesta chiefly as a head Consul.[198] We can
also understand why Villani, on the contrary, should have dated the
origin of the office from 1207. This, in fact, was the year in which
it assumed a really definite shape, since the Podesta was not only a
foreigner, but appears unescorted by councillors. Nevertheless, Villani
makes a mistake in representing him as a magistrate chosen for the
sole purpose of administering justice more impartially, and in adding
that "the signory of the Consuls did not cease then, inasmuch as they
continued to hold power over all other affairs of the Commune." He
makes two blunders here, but the second is little more than a simple
anachronism. In fact, although his statement cannot be true as regards
1207, it may have been at least partially true with reference to the
preceding years, when the Consuls still survived their own decease, as
it were, in the guise of councillors to the Podesta.


VI.

It is certain that there was a recurrence of consular government
between 1196 and 1199.[199] But just at that time an event of
considerable importance worked a radical change in the general
policy of Tuscany, and is accordingly worthy of notice. The Emperor
Frederic I. died on September 27, 1197, and his death led first to the
abandonment and then to the total ruin of the Imperial system he had
so persistently striven to establish throughout central Italy. The
people of San Miniato destroyed the fortress held by the Germans, and
subsequently the walls of St. Genesio.[200] The Florentines bought back
the Castle of Montegrossoli, which had been re-occupied and fortified
by nobles, who proved very troublesome.[201] After this Florence set a
greater undertaking on foot, by forming a league of the Tuscan cities
against the Empire. It was finally arranged at St. Genesio on November
11, 1197, when first the Lucchese, and then the Florentines, Siennese,
the people of San Miniato, and the Bishop of Volterra made oath to
maintain it, and the solemnity of the occasion was enhanced by the
presence of two cardinals of the Church. The main terms of the treaty
were, an alliance for the common defence against all opponents of the
League, and a pledge that neither peace nor truce should be made "cum
aliquo Imperatore vel Rege seu Principe, Duce vel Marchione," without
the consent of the Rectors of the said League. It was also agreed to
attack all cities, towns, counts, or bishops refusing to join the
alliance when requested so to do.[202] What was the pressing danger?
Why this alliance against the Empire at the moment when it was no
longer a source of alarm? There is one stipulation that best explains
the real object in view. It is to the effect that castles, towns, and
small domains were only to be admitted to the League as dependents
of the legitimate owners of the territory whereon these castles or
domains might be situated; but a single exception was made in favour of
Poggibonsi,[203] because its dominion was disputed by many claimants.
Montepulciano was to be admitted as a dependence of Sienna whenever
that city should be able to prove its right of dominion.

It seems clear from all this that the genuine purpose of the League was
to take advantage of the emperor's decease in order to secure to the
cities the complete possession of their respective territories. To this
end it was necessary that Tuscany should be united, and consequently
adherence to the League was to be, as far as possible, obligatory. Its
subsequent documents leave no doubt as to the true aim in view; indeed,
they furnish very ample proof that Florence had promoted the League,
in order that all Tuscany might aid her to regain speedy possession
of the _contado_. But, although the League was against the Empire, it
was by no means intended for the defence of the Pope, since it utterly
disregarded his pretensions to Matilda's inheritance. For refusing to
recognise any emperor, king, duke, or margrave, without the approval
of the Roman Church, a proviso was added showing that should the
Pope desire to join the League, he must accept its terms in order to
win admittance. Should he request assistance to reconquer his own
territories, everything was to be done according to the orders of the
Rectors of the League. But should the territory he wished to reconquer
be already in the hands of the communes, or of any of the allied
cities, the League could afford him no help. It was impossible to speak
more clearly. Accordingly, when Innocent III. became Pope, early in
1198, we soon find him manifesting much disapproval of the conduct of
the League, in spite of being adverse to the Empire and favourable to
the national Italian spirit.

At Castel Fiorentino, on December 4, 1197, the Rectors of the League
were sworn in. First among them were the Bishop of Volterra and the
Florentine Consul Acerbo, who was practically the head, although that
title was accorded to the bishop by reason of his ecclesiastical rank.
For the moment Pisa and Pistoia held back; but these and other Tuscan
cities had retained the right of adhering to the League.[204] Arezzo
had already joined on the 2nd of December, Count Guido gave his oath
on February 5, 1198, and Count Alberto on the seventh of the same
month. Nevertheless, in signing the second of these two treaties, the
Florentines expressly reserved their right to attach Semifonte, and
procure the submission of the Alberti estates of Certaldo and Mangone,
even by force if required.[205] Thus many other adhesions were
obtained by means of stipulations virtually implying acts of submission
to Florence.

This was the moment chosen by the newly elected Pope Innocent, soon
after his consecration in the same month of February, to write to the
two cardinals who had witnessed the oath to the League, stating that on
many points he considered the said treaty "nec utilitatem contineat,
nec sapiat honestatem," inasmuch as it neglected the fact of the Duchy
of Tuscany appertaining to the Church, "ad ius et dominium Ecclesiae
Romanae pertineat." He intended, therefore, to enforce his rights. If
the members of the League submitted to him, he would compel the Pisans,
under threat of interdict, to likewise join them against the Empire;
otherwise he would leave them at liberty to do as they chose.[206] But
as no attention was paid to him, he had to make a virtue of necessity
and considerably lower his tone.[207] Some slight concessions, though
of what nature is unknown, seem, however, to have been made to him,
for afterwards, when writing to the Pisans, he appeared to be better
satisfied, and urged them to join the League. It is, however, certain
that they persisted in their refusal, and although the Pope, grown
shrewder by experience, afterwards became a declared and energetic
champion of the League against the Empire, this fact only availed
to augment his moral and political influence, without winning him a
single handsbreadth of territory, or enabling him to enforce any one of
his pretended rights over Tuscany. The Florentines, on the contrary,
profited more and more by this state of things. On April 10, 1198,
Figline entered the League, not only made submission to Florence, but
paid a yearly tribute also[208]; and on the 11th of May Certaldo agreed
to identical terms.[209] The Republic persevered in the course it had
marked out with equal shrewdness and energy. It allowed the nobles to
take an increasing part in the government, so as to secure their hearty
co-operation in achieving the aim it had in view. The same Count Arrigo
da Capraia, who in 1193 was on the council of Podesta Caponsacchi, was
actually promoted to the consulship in 1199.[210] Finally, in 1200, a
foreigner was elected Podesta,[211] in the person of Paganello Porcari
of Lucca, a measure that, as we have already noted, the nobles had
long desired to carry out. And as Porcari showed energy and daring
in the conduct of the war he was again chosen the following year.
Then, in February, 1201, Count Alberto made oath to cede the height
of Semifonte, with its fortress and walls, to the Florentines; and to
assist them, whenever required, to gain possession of Colle, Certaldo,
and the town of Semifonte.[212] The Bishop of Volterra likewise made
oath to assist them in these campaigns.[213] All this seemed to come
about as an inherent consequence of the terms of the League, and before
long the allies, finding themselves reduced to serve the interests
of Florence alone, naturally began to show signs of weariness and
suspicion. But, heedless of all else, the Commune made ready for the
expedition against Semifonte, for which all these treaties had paved
the way.

Florence had long contemplated the seizure of that stronghold, for,
owing to its strategic advantages and the ease with which the position
could be reinforced by friendly neighbours, it had been a thorn in
her side. Accordingly the now haughty Republic determined to make
an end of it. We have already related how in 1184 Count Alberto had
been compelled to accept the same terms exacted from the people
of Pogna in 1182--namely, to give his solemn promise to build no
defences. Nevertheless, profiting by the arrival of Frederic I. and
the difficulties in which Florence was then involved, he had presently
erected the Castle of Semifonte on the Petrognano rock, and Florence
had never forgiven this offence. He had also assumed the title of
_Comes de Summofonte_. Near the castle a town had sprung up, and, as
many sought refuge there from neighbouring places conquered and taxed
by Florence, its population had rapidly increased. Indeed there was
already this rhyme afloat in the _contado_:

      "Firenze, fatti in la,
       Che Semifonte si fa citta."[214]

It was for these reasons that the Republic so persistently tried to
secure pledges of help from its neighbours by the numerous treaties to
which reference has been made, and likewise by others concluded through
the efforts of the energetic Podesta. But Sienna had still to be
reckoned with, and Sienna might do good service to the hostile Alberto,
who was already prepared for defence. Accordingly the Florentines
signed an alliance with that state on March 29, 1201, promising their
aid against Montalcino, which showed as threatening a front to Sienna
as the Semifonte position towards their own city.[215] Also Colle
was made to swear to accord no help to the people of Semifonte.[216]
Thereupon the war finally began.

The chronicler Sanzanome, who witnessed it, declares, with his habitual
exaggeration, that it lasted five years, but he may have counted
in all the preliminary skirmishes.[217] At any rate, it was a hard
struggle, for, treaties notwithstanding, Semifonte received help from
all its neighbours, whose jealous dread of Florence had considerably
increased. Then, too, owing to the strength of its position and the
ability of Scoto, its valiant Podesta, the castle opposed so vigorous
a resistance to the beleaguring army surrounding it on all sides, that
the Florentines, seeing no hope of winning it by force, called treason
to their aid. A certain Gonella, with some other fugitives, escaped
from an adjoining territory, had taken refuge in the castle, and been
entrusted with the defence of the Bagnuolo tower. This man made use of
his post to betray the place to the enemy. But at the moment that he
and his comrades were in the act of opening the gate, the defenders of
Semifonte fell on them with fury and killed them all. Nevertheless,
the evil deed had done its work, for Semifonte was speedily forced
to surrender. Even if this was not brought about by treason alone,
as Villani asserts (v. 30), the betrayal of the tower undoubtedly
contributed to that result. In fact, on February 20, 1202, the Consuls,
then returned to office in Florence, granted a perpetual exemption from
all dues or taxes to the descendants of Gonella and his companions
fallen in the cause of the Republic.[218] The same year, on the 3rd of
April, the terms of the castle's surrender were subscribed and sworn.
The Florentines assured pardon, protection, and the return of all
prisoners to the people of Semifonte, but the latter were bound to
demolish their fortress and walls; were to desert the hill and settle
in the plain; and all save the soldiery and the churches were to pay a
yearly tax of twenty-six _denari_ on every hearth.[219]

The Pope expostulated strongly with the Florentines for their cruelty
towards Semifonte, but after sending him a letter of justification
in reply, the Consuls continued to follow their own course, and
picked a quarrel with the Siennese.[220] The point of dispute was
the Castle of Tornano, in the Paterno valley. Florence wished to get
possession of it, and the Siennese declared that it was not theirs
to give, seeing that it was the property of independent lords.
Thereupon the Florentines set to work in their usual way, by persuading
Montepulciano, a large town belonging to Sienna, to swear submission
to them, and also promise an annual tribute.[221] Accordingly, war
would have broken out at once, but for the intervention of Ogerio, the
Podesta of Poggibonsi. Being accepted as arbiter, he carefully studied
the question of border lines, and conscientiously defined them. His
verdict was given on June 4, 1203.[222] According to the boundaries
traced by Ogerio, Florence retained the whole of the Fiesolan and
Florentine _contado_, and the valley of Paterno was comprised in
these limits. The Siennese were to do their best to persuade the
lords of the castle to cede that as well. Both sides agreed to this
arrangement;[223] it was scrupulously respected by the Siennese, and on
May 15, 1204, it was sanctioned by Pope Innocent III., at the express
desire of the Florentines.[224] Nevertheless, the latter continued
their secret practices with Montepulciano, and on the 30th and 31st
of May induced that town to renew its oath of offensive and defensive
alliance against Sienna.[225] As soon as this became known, there were
fresh complaints, fresh protests from the Siennese. They brought the
affair before the League, and the Rectors of the same were expressly
assembled at San Quirico di Osenna, April 5, 1205, under the presidency
of the Bishop of Volterra, the Florentines and Aretines having declined
to appear. By the examination of witnesses, it was clearly proved that
Montepulciano appertained to the Siennese.[226] We do not know whether
the verdict was then pronounced, nor do we know the final result of
the quarrel. But it seems clear that from this moment the League was
virtually dissolved, and by the act of the Florentines, its original
initiators. Their primary object was now achieved in the main, and
henceforth they could expect nothing from their allies save impediments
to the fulfilment of their ulterior designs. For, more or less, all
distrusted their ambition, and were tired of playing the part of
passive tools.

But the Florentine Consuls allowed nothing to check their course of
action, and quarrelled next with the Counts of Capraia owning a castle
of the same name on the right bank of the Arno, near the Pistoian
frontier. In conjunction with the Pistoiese, these nobles could easily
bar the Arno against the Florentines. Accordingly, before this, in
1203, the latter had deemed it well to erect another castle on the
opposite bank at a place called Malborghetto. The very significant
name of Montelupo that they gave to the new building was sufficiently
expressive of its purpose. In fact, men already repeated the saying,
"To destroy this goat, there needs a wolf."[227] This affair also would
have provoked strife had not the Florentines, with their accustomed
diplomatic subtlety, profited by the friendly offices of the Lucchese
to turn it to their own advantage, and avoid coming to blows. In fact,
a treaty was arranged in June, 1204, by which Florence was bound to
leave the right bank of the river unmolested, and the Counts of Capraia
to respect the left bank of the same.[228] And before long the count
decided to swear alliance and fealty to the Florentines, together with
his dependents, all of whom, excepting the soldiery, became subject to
a yearly hearth tax of twenty-six _denari_. He also ceded his castle
and other possessions on the left side of the Arno, near Montelupo,
being likewise pledged to the defence of this fort.[229]

According to the pseudo Brunetto,[230] and one of the old lists of
Consuls, although with no documentary evidence of the fact, Count
Rodolfo, son of Count Guido di Capraia, became Podesta of Florence in
1205. Now, if this be true, it must be concluded that his nomination
had been also stipulated in the treaty.[231] In the ensuing year the
consular government seems to have been resumed, but in 1207 we come
at last to the genuine Podesta of foreign birth, in the shape of
Gualfredotto Grasselli of Milan, who henceforth represented the Commune
without requiring the assistance of his _consiliarii_. Grasselli,
too, was re-elected the following year, to enable him to carry on the
campaigns the Florentines had planned with so much ardour some time
before. An occasion for renewing hostilities was not long delayed.
The Montepulciano question had become angrier; and accordingly the
Siennese, considering that territory to be theirs by right, resolved
to attack it. In the certainty of being reinforced, Montepulciano made
a most obstinate defence; and the Florentines, after waiting awhile,
also recurred to arms in 1207. In co-operation with Lombard, Romagnol,
and Aretine allies, they marched with their _Carroccio_ to the assault
of the Castle of Montalto della Berardenga, between the rivers Ambra
and Ombrone, which the Siennese had guarded on all sides with their
Pistoian, Lucchese, and Orvietan friends. These were all routed on the
20th of June, leaving many prisoners in the enemy's hands. According
to Paolino Pieri the number taken was 1,254. The castle was destroyed,
but the war went on, notwithstanding the Pope's efforts to bring about
a peace. The Florentines then made a furious attack on the Castle of
Rigomagno, and when the scaling ladders broke down they climbed on
one another's shoulders and thus won the walls. The capture of this
stronghold made them masters of the Ombrone valley.[232] Thereupon
(February, 1208) the Siennese were forced to accept peace on very
hard terms. By the treaty concluded between the 13th and 20th of
October,[233] they were pledged to yield all their possessions at
Poggibonsi, to cede Tornano and its tower, to observe the boundaries
adjudged by Ogerio, in every direction, and to leave Montepulciano
unmolested. The prisoners on either side were exchanged.

But this war already betokens the advent of a new period in Florentine
history. The conquest of the _contado_ was no longer in question, for
the Republic already possessed it in full. With the growing prosperity
born of its numerous victories, the city had now to open roads for
its vast commerce. It was not only the vagueness of their respective
frontiers and the wish to enlarge them that caused Sienna and Florence
to be continually at strife; it was their commercial rivalry in the
markets of Italy, and especially as regarded the trade with Rome; this
near neighbour having become, through the widespread relations of the
Church, the principal centre of financial affairs in the civilised
world. For some time past it had been the aim of Florence to obtain a
monopoly of these affairs, and this was one reason why she had always
adhered to the Guelphs. She had had frequent disputes with Arezzo,
Volterra, and above all with Sienna, as being the most powerful city on
the road to Rome. So the two rivals were perpetually stirred to fresh
and fiercer strife. So, too, before long, the irresistible need of
Florence for free communication with the sea became the chief cause of
her equally long and sanguinary wars with Pisa, the city barring her
way to the coast. But as this conflict had not yet begun, the subject
will be resumed in due time. In fact, the peace of Sienna was followed
by some years of truce with foreign foes, although there was little
peace within the city, where the seeds of civil war were already on the
point of bursting forth.

The foreign Podesta, unattended and unchecked by the former
councillor-consuls, as they might be called, has now become a settled
institution; and, save for their brief re-establishment during 1211 and
1212, the Consuls, as already related, have vanished for ever. This was
undeniably a triumph for the patricians, to whom the working people
had bent for the nonce, in order to secure their co-operation in the
difficult task of reducing the _contado_ to submission. The achievement
of this conquest gave an extraordinary impulse to trade, and by opening
an increasingly wide field for commercial enterprise, induced the
desire to develop it still more. Hence, it was not to be expected
that a republic whose prosperity and strength were wholly based on
its industry and commerce, could or would be satisfied, in the long
run, with a government suited to nobles, whose constant tendency was
to grow stronger, haughtier, and more overbearing. From this moment,
therefore, a struggle between the people and the patricians (_grandi_)
was inevitable. The long series of civil wars, lacerating the city and
staining its stones with blood, is in fact on the point of beginning.

[Illustration]




CHAPTER IV.

_STATE OF PARTIES--CONSTITUTION OF THE FIRST POPULAR GOVERNMENT AND OF
THE GREATER GUILDS IN FLORENCE._[234]


I.

After the office of Podesta had been permanently established in 1207,
its main favourers and promoters, the aristocrats, became more daring,
and forming a military organisation, of which the Podesta was the
head, took a more active part in all wars abroad. Everything seemed
progressing rapidly and well, when the Buondelmonti affair in 1215
caused an outbreak of civil war. Dissension was already lurking among
certain of the nobles, and particularly between the Buondelmonti on the
one hand, the Uberti and Fifanti on the other, either side numbering
many adherents. Accordingly, in the hope of pacifying the dispute, a
marriage was arranged between Bundelmonte Buondelmonti and a maiden
of the Amidei house. But when all the preliminaries were concluded,
the wife of Forese Donati called Buondelmonti to her and said: "Oh!
shameful knight, to take to wife a woman of the Uberti and Fifanti.
'Twere better and worthier to choose this bride." So saying, she
pointed to her own daughter. Buondelmonti accepted the offer, and,
forsaking his betrothed, speedily married the girl. Thereupon the
kinsfolk and friends of the deserted maiden assembled in the Amidei
palace and vowed to avenge her wrongs. It was then that Mosca Lamberti
turned to those charged to execute revenge, saying, "Whoever deals
a light blow or wound, may prepare for his own grave." And then, to
show that the quarrel was to the death, he added the memorable words:
"Once done, 'tis done with" ("_Cosa fatta, capo ha_"). So bloodshed was
ordained.

It was the Easter Day of 1215. The handsome young knight Buondelmonti,
elegantly attired and with a wreath on his head, mounted his white
horse and crossed from Oltrarno by the old bridge. He had reached
the statue of Mars, when he was suddenly attacked. Schiatta degli
Uberti hurled him to the ground with a blow from his mace, and the
other conspirators quickly fell upon him and severed his veins with
their knives. Afterwards the corpse was placed on a bier, the bride
supporting the head of her murdered husband, and both carried in
procession round the city, to move men to fresh deeds of hatred and
revenge.[235] And this was the beginning of the series of internecine
wars, from which many chroniclers date the origin of the Guelph and
Ghibelline factions in Florence. No modern historian, however, will
be apt to attribute so vast an importance to a private feud, nor to
believe that a breach of promise to an Amidei maiden could be the real
primary cause of the party strife that from the year 1177 had already
more than once drenched the city in blood. Even Villani, although
considering the Buondelmonti affair to be the origin of the Guelphs
and Ghibellines, is careful to add: "Nevertheless, long before this,
the noble citizens had split into sects and into the said parties,
by reason of the quarrels and disputes between the Church and the
Empire."[236] The Buondelmonti catastrophe, with all the private
enmities it involved, undoubtedly served to inflame the political
passions of two already existent parties, which now, in the days of
Frederic II., acquired a political importance of a far wider nature
by their connection with the general affairs of Italy. It was only
then that the parties in Florence assumed the German appellations
of Guelphs and Ghibellines. Also, it is worthy of remark that July,
1215, was the date of the second Frederic's state progress to Aix la
Chapelle, to be crowned king of Germany, a fact of some significance,
as regards the history of parties in Italy. This may easily explain why
the chroniclers should have attributed to the Buondelmonti tragedy,
occurring in the same year, the origin of the Guelphs and Ghibellines.
The names began then it is true, but the parties were of older date.

Villani's Chronicle (v. 39) now gives a list of the principal Guelph
and Ghibelline families, showing that the majority of the older houses
was almost invariably Ghibellines, whereas the Guelph party included
many "of no great antiquity," but "already beginning to be powerful."
Later on, when the Ghibellines are destroyed, we shall find the
Guelph nobles merged in the party of the well-to-do burghers (_popolo
grasso_). At present these patricians, being hostile to the Uberti,
begin to make advances to newly enriched families, and even to the
people, by siding with the Church. Fortunately Pope Innocent III.
started a Crusade at this time, and thus many powerful Florentines went
to the East and employed their fighting powers in a better cause. At
the siege of Damietta, in fact, they distinguished themselves greatly:
Bonaguisa dei Bonaguisi the first to scale the walls, planted the
banner of the Republic beside the Christian flag. In Giovanni Villani's
time this banner was still preserved and held in the greatest honour.

In 1218 Florence resumed hostilities in the _contado_, and by 1220 had
subdued various castles and domains, and exacted oaths of fealty from
all defeated foes. But immediately afterwards a far graver war broke
out with Pisa. The jealousy of the two rival republics was always on
the increase, and for some time past each had struggled against the
other for absolute commercial supremacy in Tuscany. Pisa commanded the
sea, Florence the mainland, therefore each city required the other's
help. Hence, in spite of repeated agreements and treaties, their mutual
jealousy remained undiminished. The Florentines adhered steadfastly
to the Church; the Pisans to the Empire. Things had gradually become
inflamed to so high a pitch that the smallest trifle was enough to
excite war, or rather to provoke the endless series of wars destined to
change the character of the Tuscan factions.

In fact, the first pretext for strife, at least as related by Villani
(vi. 2), is futile to the point of utter absurdity. Many ambassadors
attended the coronation of the Emperor Frederic II. in Rome (1220),
and among them, says the chronicler, were those of Pisa and Florence,
who had long eyed one another with distrust. It chanced that one of
the Florentine ambassadors, while feasting with a cardinal, begged the
gift of a certain very beautiful dog, and his host promised to grant
it. The next day the cardinal entertained the Pisans, and one of them,
happening to make the same request, the animal was promised likewise
to him. But the Florentine, being the first to send for the dog, he
actually obtained it. This led to quarrels and violence, not only on
the part of the ambassadors and their trains, but also between all
the Pisans and Florentines in Rome at the time. We can hardly assign
any historical value to this tale; but it shows that the amount of
ill-feeling between the rival states rendered any trifle a sufficient
pretext for bloodshed. The real fact, even according to the testimony
of Sanzanome, is that Pisans and Florentines came to blows in Rome.
The Pisans were the assailants, but had the worst of the bout. There
was great wrath in Pisa at the news of the riot, and as a speedy
reprisal all Florentine merchandise in the town was made confiscate.
Florence then seems to have done her utmost to avoid open war, but to
no purpose. Preparations went on for some time on either side, and then
in 1222, when war had burst forth between the Lucchese and Pisans,
the Florentines profited by the opportunity to attack the latter near
Castel del Bosco, defeated them, and, according to the chroniclers,
carried off thirteen hundred prisoners. Other attacks ensued, and
various small castles were captured between this time and 1228, when we
see the Florentines engaged in more serious strife with the Pistoians,
and reducing them to accept their terms. It is in 1228 that we find the
first mention of the _Carroccio_ on a Florentine battle-field.[237]
The Milanese had been the first to use the _Carroccio_, but in course
of time, and with slight modifications, the custom had been adopted by
the other Italian cities, who, with increasing wars and larger forces,
recognised the need of a rallying point in their midst. The _Carroccio_
was a chariot drawn by oxen with scarlet trappings and surmounted by
two lofty poles bearing the great banner of the Republic, swinging its
red and white folds on high. Behind, on a smaller car, came the bell,
called the _Martinella_, to ring out military orders. For some time
before a war was proclaimed the _Martinella_ was attached to the door
of Sta Maria in the New Market, and rung there to warn both citizens
and enemies to make ready for action. The _Carroccio_ was always
surrounded by a guard of picked men; its surrender was considered as
the final defeat and humiliation of the army.

Another prolonged and sanguinary conflict with Sienna was undertaken
and resumed almost yearly from 1227 to 1235. The Siennese suffered
severe losses, but were able to seize Montepulciano, demolish its
towers and ramparts, and do some damage to Montalcino, which had joined
alliance with the Florentines. The latter, however, not only devastated
the Siennese _contado_ time after time, and captured a large number of
prisoners, but also besieged the hostile capital, and although failing
to win it, pressed close enough to the walls to hurl donkeys over them
with catapults, to prove their contempt for the town. Finally, through
the mediation of the Pope, peace was concluded very advantageously for
Florence. The Siennese had to forfeit a large sum of money for the
rebuilding of the walls and towers of Montepulciano, were sworn to
leave that territory for ever unmolested, and likewise compelled to
repair the castle of Montalcino, at the pleasure of the Florentines,
who still retained their hold on Poggibonsi.


II.

Thus, throughout all these wars, in which the influence of Pope and
emperor was felt on this or the other side, we are enabled to trace the
gradual formation of parties in Tuscany, and to witness the process
by which the political and commercial supremacy of Florence was built
up. Her present rivals, Sienna and Pisa, both adhere to the Empire;
whereas Florence clings more and more closely to the Church. Pisa
shuts her out from the sea: hence the origin of their mutual rivalry
and continual strife. How, indeed, could war be avoided, when the
commercial power of Florence felt the increasingly imperative need of
free access to the coast? Sienna, on the other hand, competed with
Florence by trying to get all the affairs of the Roman _curia_ into the
hands of its own bankers, those affairs being so numerous and lucrative
as to enrich all concerned with them. These continual jealousies
invariably urged Pisa and Sienna to favour the Empire. Lucca, as the
rival of Pisa, inclined towards Florence, and became Guelph. Pistoia,
planted between two Guelph cities, and continually menaced by them,
naturally adopted the Ghibelline cause. Thus, the division of parties
in Tuscany afterwards reacted on the formation of Florentine sects, and
as the latter began to assume a more general character, through the
growing influence of Frederic II. in Italy, they adopted the German
names of Guelphs and Ghibellines. The Florentine Republic, having
triumphed over Pisa, Sienna, and Pistoia, was virtually the chief power
in Tuscany; but had one danger to face, in the possible augmentation
of Frederic's power. Frederic II. was the enemy of the Pope, who had
excommunicated him, and of all Guelphs! He had gone away for a time to
lead the Crusade in the East; was now in Germany engaged in a struggle
with his rebellious son, and all this had greatly advanced the fortunes
of Florence. But he was about to return to Italy, and his presence
might again embolden the foes of the Republic.

Meanwhile, under the rule of successive Podesta, Florence had
prospered in war, and devoted times of peace to internal organisation
and embellishment. At the instance of the Podesta Torello da Strada
(1233) all the male inhabitants of the _contado_ were summoned to
inscribe their names and specify their condition, whether freemen,
serfs, or dependents, with a view to ascertaining the real state of
the population and providing for its better government. In 1237-38 the
Podesta Rubaconte da Mandello built a new bridge over the Arno, which
was first designated by his own name of Rubaconte, and afterwards
as the Ponte alle Grazie, in honour of an adjoining church. It was
also by order of the same Podesta that all the streets of Florence
were first paved, and other works completed for the improvement of
the public health, or the decoration of the city. Thus a magistrate
originally appointed--according to the chroniclers--to do the work of
an ordinary judge is seen gradually fulfilling the functions of the
head of the Republic. And the patricians over whom he presided daily
rose to greater power and daring, and particularly when the arrival
of Frederic II. began to encourage the Ghibelline party throughout
Italy. In fact, when Brescia was besieged by the Ghibellines in 1237,
we find many Florentine nobles in their camp. Every day brought fresh
proofs that the emperor might count on many friends and much assistance
from Florence. Consequently numerous riots took place, for the Guelph
nobles offered violent opposition and joined with the people, which
was entirely Guelph.[238] In 1240 we find that three citizens were
nominated to collect funds in aid of the Imperial army: surely a
strange proceeding in a republic[239] where the mass of the population
was thoroughly Guelph! But it is not surprising that such events should
have inevitably caused a reaction.

Already in 1246 Frederic II. had appointed his natural son, Frederic
of Antioch, vicar-general of Tuscany, and also sent other vicars to
Florence to fill the office of Podesta. This aroused discontent on
the part of the Guelph nobles, who wished their own faction to regain
the upper hand in the city. About this time, 1247, Frederic was in
Lombardy,[240] and at almost open war with the Pope, who continued to
launch excommunications at him, deprived him of the Imperial title, and
stirred enemies from all sides against him. Accordingly, Frederic sent
messengers to the Uberti in Florence, advising them that the moment had
come for them to assume the government of Florence. Provided they had
the courage to fly to arms, his succour would not be long delayed. The
Uberti were not deaf to his words. The heads of the chief Ghibelline
houses met in council and decided on immediate resort to violence.
There was instant division in the city; the Ghibelline aristocracy on
one side, the Guelph nobles, with all the people on the other; and the
alarm bell was pealed. Fighting went on from street to street, by day
and by night, behind barricades, from tower-roofs, and with catapults,
rams, and other engines of war. As the popular excitement increased the
strife became general. The Ghibellines had the advantage of superior
military training; they were confident of receiving reinforcements;
and, massed under one leader, took all their orders from the Uberti
palaces. The people, on the contrary, fought at random, and were soon
surrounded and repulsed. Nevertheless, at one moment their very defeat
seemed about to win them the victory. Hard-pressed on all sides, they
were gradually driven back towards the chain barricades (_serraglio_)
of the Bagnesi and Guidalotti mansions; and being massed about this
defence, fought so vigorously as almost to regain their former
position. But just then the Imperial contingent appeared on the scene,
and all was lost. The vicar-general Frederic, son of the emperor,
entered Florence at the head of sixteen hundred German knights, and
made furious charges on the people. The latter opposed a sturdy
resistance, prolonging the fight for three days, but it was a vain
struggle. The Ghibellines were victorious on all sides, and the emperor
could have sent fresh reinforcements if required. One of the most
valiant of the Guelphs, Rustico Marignolli, who had borne the standard
of the people throughout the melee, fell wounded to the death by a shot
in the face from a crossbow. Thereupon the leaders of the party finally
decided to surrender and fly into exile on Candlemas night (February
2, 1249). All those resolved on flight gathered together fully armed,
and taking possession of Marignolli's corpse, bore it away in a solemn
procession with a crowd of _popolani_, and a great show of weapons and
torches, to celebrate the funeral at San Lorenzo by night. The bier was
carried on the shoulders of the worthiest cavaliers, and the defeated
but not dishonoured banner hung trailing from it to the ground. The
whole function resembled a pact of vengeance sworn on the body of the
dead warrior rather than a mere burial ceremony.

After this the leading Guelphs fled the city and took refuge in
neighbouring castles; the same in fact from which, at the cost of much
blood, they had once ousted the feudal lords. These latter, having
been compelled to settle in the town, had now won their revenge for
past injuries. Thirty-six Guelph houses were pulled down: among them
the Tosinghi palace in the New Market, a building measuring one hundred
and thirty-five feet in height, and faced with many tiers of marble
columns. Party hatred reached such a pitch as to justify the belief
expressed by many that the Ghibellines had positively decreed the
destruction of San Giovanni, because the Guelphs had used that church
as a place of assembly. It was affirmed that the victors had undermined
the foundations of the adjoining Guardamorto tower, hoping that this
might fall down on the temple and crush it. The failure of the attempt
was attributed to the fact that the tower had miraculously fallen in
another direction. A more credible account is given by Vasari. He says
that the Guardamorto was only demolished in order to widen the Piazza,
and that Niccolo Pisano, being charged with the work, cut the tower in
two and arranged its fall in a way to avoid any damage to the church or
neighbouring houses.

At all events, this proved the beginning of the long list of savage
reprisals darkening the history of Florence, when the winning faction
not only destroyed the dwellings of the defeated, but banished their
foes _en masse_. The Ghibellines were now masters of all, and for their
greater security retained the services of Count Giordano Lancia and
his eight hundred Germans. It seemed as though the party, being of
Teutonic origin, could not yet grasp the reins of government without
the support of German soldiery, and could only command the Republic in
the emperor's name. This was the final result of admitting the Imperial
feudal nobility within the walls of Florence, and allowing them to
institute a political and military chief instead of an ordinary judge
in the person of the Podesta.


III.

The Ghibelline victory over the Guelphs of Florence in 1249, with all
its violence and bloodshed, was by no means an assured triumph. The
Ghibellines had destroyed free institutions and exiled a vast number of
adversaries; aided by the Imperial vicar, Giordano Lancia and his eight
hundred men, they were absolute masters of Florence; nevertheless, the
populace, the burghers, and the greater part of the citizens still
remained Guelphs. Besides, Pope Innocent IV. roused so many enemies
against the emperor in Italy, that the latter's success was destined
to a speedy decline. The Florentine exiles were biding their time in
neighbouring strongholds, and above all in the Castles of Montevarchi
and Capraia in the upper and lower Val d'Arno. From these points they
made frequent skirmishing expeditions, clearly showing that they had
by no means lost hope of soon re-entering the city. Accordingly, the
conquerors had to be perpetually on the alert against them to provide
against some sudden attack restoring them to power.

Therefore Ghibellines and Germans marched against Montevarchi; but
almost the whole storming force was killed or captured. This defeat
opened the eyes of the Florentine Ghibellines to the danger of their
position, and decided them to lay regular siege to the Castle of
Capraia, headquarters of the principal Guelphs, chiefs of the party or
League, as it was called at the time, directing all the movements of
the rest. Although the beleaguering force greatly outnumbered their
own, the besieged decided on an obstinate defence, and the Ghibellines
were bent on winning the castle either by violence or starvation.
But they would have failed to accomplish this but for the arrival of
reinforcements from the emperor, who, having been compelled to raise
the siege of Parma, had now advanced into Tuscany. But, in spite of
these fresh foes, hunger alone drove the Guelphs to surrender. Their
leaders were given up to Frederic II., who was then at Fucecchio. He
carried them with him to the kingdom of Naples, and, according to the
Florentine chroniclers, had them barbarously blinded, beaten to death
with clubs, or drowned in the sea, with the exception of one alone,
whose life was spared after his eyes had been torn out.

By this time the emperor was irritated and exhausted by the continual
wars thrust on him by the Papacy. He had enjoyed no peace since the day
(June 24, 1243) when Sinibaldo de Fieschi ascended the Chair of St.
Peter as Pope Innocent IV. This pontiff had pronounced his deposition
at the Council of Lyons in 1245. He had then secretly excited many
conspiracies against him, and attempted more or less to ensure their
success. The emperor had been led to suspect his most devoted friend
and secretary, Pier delle Vigne, of complicity in one of these plots.
Accordingly this faithful servant was thrown into the tower of San
Miniato al Tedesco, condemned to lose his eyes, and then transferred
to another prison in Pisa, where he dashed out his brains against the
wall. Frederic's spirit was alternately cowed and irritated by the
hostility he encountered; for, with all his philosophy and unbelief, he
greatly dreaded the thunders of the Vatican. He sought reconciliation
with the Pope, wished to return to the East to fight the infidels; and
Innocent chose that moment to rouse all the Guelph cities against him,
thus again forcing him to fly to arms to support the Ghibelline cause
and maintain his own sway over Italy.

This he was unable to effect without recurring, as we have seen, to
incredible excesses of violence, which naturally increased the number
of his enemies on all sides. The Guelphs of Germany had already refused
to acknowledge the authority of his son Corrado, whom he had sent as
his representative. The army commanded by the emperor in person had
been routed at Parma. All the Guelph cities of Romagna, with Bologna
at their head, marched a powerful force against the Ghibellines under
King Enzo, another of Frederic's natural sons, and defeated them at
the battle of Fossalta on May 26, 1249. Enzo himself was captured and
carried in triumph to Bologna, where he remained a prisoner till his
death in 1271. But the emperor did not live long enough to feel this
last blow. On December 13, 1250, he ceased to breathe in a castle
near Lucera in Apulia, and his death completed the downfall of the
Ghibelline party in Florence and throughout Italy. For religious
hatred was now combined with political enmity against this party.
Not only because the Ghibellines combated the Pope, but still more,
because the various heresies gradually spreading through Italy found
many followers in their ranks, in consequence of frequent marks of
tolerance and favour received from the emperor. The heretical poison
now slowly infecting the Italian social body was a grave anxiety
to the Popes. The Albigenses had first roused attention and found
adherents in Provence, where native bards had devoted their talents
to attacking the Roman Court. But the religious orders of St. Francis
and St. Dominic were bent on crushing the new creed. Innocent III. had
founded the Holy Inquisition for the same purpose, and St. Dominic,
at the head of mobs thirsting for heretic blood, had ordained the
massacre of the Albigenses and ravaged all Provence. Some fugitives,
however, had escaped into Italy, to spread the same hatred against
Rome, the same poison of heresy. In fact, the _Paterini_, opposed to
the Pope, denying the virginity of the Madonna, and having no belief
in transubstantiation or other dogmas of the Catholic faith, found
followers everywhere and held public gatherings. The Epicurean,
Averrhoistic, and other philosophical tenets were rapidly propagated
among Italian scholars. For some time, during the most brilliant period
of the Imperial Court in Sicily, all this intellectual and religious
turmoil seemed to be chiefly centred at Palermo. For there Frederic
II. had gathered about him a throng of scholars, troubadours, poets
of every kind, Mussulmans, Greek schismatics, Provencal Albigenses,
and materialistic philosophers; and although a crusader and persecutor
of heretics, took singular delight in this mixed society, in whose
midst, and in a storm of sarcasm, doubt, and hatred of priests, Italian
poetry first sprang to life, and later on, in the Divine Comedy, gave
forth so great a wealth of earnest faith and lofty aspiration. In the
meantime, however, heresy and scepticism were current throughout the
Peninsula. The _Paterini_ quickly obtained many converts among the
Ghibellines in Florence, and the Pope established the Inquisition
there for the trial and punishment of backsliders. In 1244 Fra Pietro
of Verona, moved by religious fury rather than zeal, came to stir the
orthodox spirit by his inflammatory sermons; and founded the Society
of the Captains of Holy Mary or of Faith, composed of men and women
vowed to the extermination of heretics. Public feeling caught fire
in 1245, and a real battle between Catholics and heretics raged in
the Florence streets. Both at Santa Felicita and in the space by the
Croce al Trebbio, where a column still commemorates the ill-fated
event, the _Captains of the Faith_, robed in white, bearing the badge
of the cross, and commanded by their big, strong, dare-devil chief,
Friar Pietro of Verona, routed the _Paterini_ and drove them from
Florence. In reward for this sanguinary triumph the friar was appointed
Inquisitor of Tuscany, and subsequently of Lombardy as well. There
in the north, between Milan and Como, he finally met his death at the
hands of men wearied of his persecutions. This gained him the title of
a martyred saint, and he was known henceforth as St. Peter--Martyr of
Verona.[241]


IV.

Meanwhile, in 1250, the year now claiming our attention, Frederic II.
passed away, his son Enzo lay captive in Bologna, Innocent IV. was
stirring the Guelphs to action, and Pietro of Verona had become the
scourge of all heretics and foes of the Papacy in Tuscany and Lombardy.
Accordingly the Ghibelline domination in Florence was approaching
its end. In fact, from the moment that the emperor withdrew into
Apulia, already stricken with mortal disease, the Guelphs showed so
much boldness that the Ghibellines decided on a fresh expedition to
oust them from the Castle of Ostina, in the Valdarno, where they had
assembled in great force. But while laying siege to the stronghold
the Ghibellines were compelled to keep a strong reserve at Figline
to protect their rear from the many Guelph partisans lurking at
Montevarchi. The latter, however, made a night attack on the force
encamped at Figline, and routed it so thoroughly that when the news
reached Ostina the Ghibellines raised the siege and marched back to the
capital. Thereupon both the people and burghers of Florence, tired of
the unbearable load of taxation imposed on them by the continual wars
undertaken by the Ghibellines, and worn out by the "grave extortions
and acts of violence of these tyrannical masters," felt that the moment
for vengeance had come, and rose in open revolt. The rebels were led
by the more influential citizens of the so-called middle class, then
acting as heads of the people. These men first held their sittings in
the Church of San Firenze, then in Santa Croce, and finally, still
dreading attack from the Uberti, assembled in smaller numbers and
with greater safety in the houses of the Anchioni family. Here, in
October, 1250, they proclaimed the nomination of thirty-six "Corporals
of the people," six to each _sestiere_, forming the basis of the third
Florentine Constitution, known as the First Popular Government (_Primo
Popolo_), because its main purpose was to organise and strengthen the
people in opposition to the nobles, and by this time the latter being
much disheartened, unresistingly submitted to the new government.
The first measure adopted was the dismissal of all the magistrates
in office, and reforms were then undertaken. The post of Podesta was
retained, and henceforth this official became still more exclusively
the head of the patricians, being now counterbalanced by the newly
instituted Captain of the people, as chief of the _popolani_. But,
as in this way the Republic was divided in two parts, a central,
presiding body was established consisting of twelve elders (_anziani_)
of the people, two for each _sestiere_. These _anziani_ had some of
the attributes of the Consuls of former days, with this difference,
however, that not only were they men of the people, but that the
chief government of the city was now entrusted to the Podesta and
the Captain. In fact, the new and most important part of the reform
was this institution of a Captain as commander of the people, who
were now organised on a military footing. The city was divided into
twenty armed companies, with twenty gonfalons or banners, under as
many gonfalonieri. The _contado_, on the contrary, was organised in
ninety-six companies, corresponding with its ninety-six existing
parishes (_pivieri_). These town and country companies combined formed
a united popular militia, ready for action at any moment, either
against foreign foes or to curb patrician tyranny at home. The whole
of this armed multitude was under the orders of the Captain, and as he
combined the functions of tribune, general, and judge, he afterwards
bore the additional titles of _Defender of the Guilds and the People,
Captain of all the Guelphs_, &c. Similarly to the Podesta, the Captain
held office for one year, and it was indispensable that he should be a
Guelph, a noble, and an alien. He came to Florence provided with his
own judges, knights, and war-horses, inasmuch as he was leader of the
people in war and administrator of justice in times of peace. But,
as we have already stated, the Podesta still retained his civil and
military importance. In right of his office, he had to give judgment in
all civil and criminal cases, those reserved for the Captain's decision
being usually acts of violence committed by the _grandi_ against the
people, questions regarding taxes or valuations, and certain cases of
extortion, perjury, and violence, provided these had not been already
cited before the Podesta, or unless he should have refused them his
attention.[242] Also, in the above-mentioned cases, the Captain was
likewise empowered to adjudge capital punishment. The red and white
gonfalon or banner of the people was in his charge, and by ringing the
bell of the so-called Lion's Tower he summoned the people to assembly.
He resided in the Badia, together with the elders, who acted as his
counsellors in many respects. Messer Uberto of Lucca was the first
Captain of the people. As to the Podesta, although certain writers,
misled by the somewhat obscure statements of Villani and Malespini,
believed his office to have been at least temporarily abolished, it is
certain that he remained at the head of what was specially called the
Commune.[243] He, too, had his companies of armed men, and likewise
commanded the mounted bands composed almost exclusively of nobles,
the bowmen and crossbowmen, bucklermen (_palvesari_), &c., forming
conjointly the so-called host, or nucleus of regulars in the mass of
the Republican army. The Podesta was often commander-in-chief of the
whole army, but his special function was the command of the cavalry and
the host (_oste_).[244] And for the further enhancement of his dignity,
it was decided to build a great and monumental palace,[245] in which he
was to hold residence with his attendant officers and counsellors. But,
on the other hand, as nothing was neglected to increase the strength
of the people against the patricians, it was decreed that the towers
of all powerful houses should be cut down so that none should exceed
the height of seventy-five feet (fifty _braccia_), and the superfluous
material was used to wall in the city on the south side of the river
(_oltr' Arno_).[246]

This third constitution of Florence, known as the _Primo Popolo_, or
First Popular Government, was in fact a politico-military constitution,
dividing the Republic into two halves, the Commune and the people, and
in which the aristocrats and democrats formed, as it were, two opposing
camps. The army was marshalled under the banners both of the Commune
and the people; all important measures required the sanction both of
the Commune and the people. A similar division of authority may seem
strange at this day, but it was common enough in the Middle Ages. It
was customary to many Tuscan cities, and we find an example of it at
Bologna, where the nobility and people formed, as it were, two distinct
republics, having different laws and statutes, and two separate palaces
for their respective magistrates. At Milan we find a tripartite
republic in the Credenza dei Consoli, the Motta, and the Credenza
di Sant Ambrogio, consisting respectively of the greater and middle
nobility and the people. This seemed a perfectly natural arrangement,
seeing that social conditions are reflected in the institutions to
which they give birth; the social body was divided, because it owed
its origin to the struggle between the Latin and Teutonic races,
between conquerors and conquered. Accordingly, the remote heirs of
either race stood arrayed in two opposite camps, armed and prepared for
conflict.[247]

[Illustration: PALACE OF THE PODESTA, FLORENCE.

            [_To face page 192._]

In this state of things it is easy to understand why the central
government had so little authority in Florence, and why, during the
continual clash of opposing interests and jealousies, the power of
the Podesta and the Captain should have steadily increased. The
former, although his functions were now shared by other magistrates,
still remained the chief official representative of the Republic; for
he signed treaties of peace, accepted concessions of territory in
that capacity, received oaths of submission to Florence from other
towns, and, as in times past, still continued to preside over two
councils--_i.e._, the Special and the General, respectively composed
of ninety and of three hundred members. The Captain had likewise two
councils, the which, according to the usage of the time, consisted of a
Special Council, or _credenza_, of eighty members, making, in junction
with the Council-General, a total of three hundred. This body included
the elders, the heads of guilds, the gonfaloniers of companies, and
others, and, unlike the councils of the Podesta, to which nobles were
admitted, solely consisted of plebeians. Members of the Special Council
frequently sat in the General Assembly, which was therefore usually
styled the General and Special Council of the Podesta, or the Captain,
as the case might be. The elders had a privy council of their own,
composed of thirty-six plebeian worthies; and the parliament must not
be forgotten, although at the time of which we are treating it was only
summoned on occasions of exceptional importance. But, as will be shown,
some time elapsed before these councils were established on a definite
basis; none for the moment, save those of the Podesta, which were of
older origin, having any settled formation.[248] At any rate, the
Republic, as regarded its general outline, was ordered in the following
manner: the elders, the council of thirty-six, and the parliament,
formed a central government, already much weakened, however, by the
constitution and growing strength of the Commune and people, inasmuch
as these latter, commanded by the Podesta and Captain, and with their
respective greater and lesser councils, formed, as it were, two
opposing republics. The Commune undoubtedly enjoyed superior authority
and legal importance; but the popular party became daily bolder and
more numerous. Before long, in fact, ancient families began to change
their names and drop their titles, in order to join the ranks of the
people.

The great political writers of Florence differed in opinion with regard
to the new constitution. Donato Giannotti censured it, declaring it
to be "a cause of sedition, instead of a bond of peace and concord,
because the founders of that government directed it entirely against
the nobles, its former rulers in the days of Frederic, and who now
being in constant fear of attack, were obliged to fly to arms on every
occasion."[249] Machiavelli, on the contrary, praised the Constitution,
and wound up by saying: "With these military and civil institutions
the foundations of Florentine freedom were laid. Nor is it possible
to imagine how much authority and strength Florence thereby gained
in a short space. For she not only became the head of Tuscany, but
was counted among the foremost of Italian cities, and might have
risen to any height had she not been afflicted by new and frequent
divisions."[250] Machiavelli judged rightly. Both contemporary
chroniclers of these events and the impartial voice of history fully
confirm the truth of his words.

The city now began to be enriched by new public monuments. The Communal
palace, otherwise known as the palace of the Podesta, rose from the
ground, and the Santa Trinita bridge was built, chiefly at the expense
of a private citizen. The gold florin was now issued, and, being mixed
with the best alloy, speedily obtained currency[251] not only in all
European markets, but even in the Levant, greatly to the advantage of
Florentine commerce, which was daily becoming more widely extended.
The nobles were discontented, of course, and hastened to show their
ill-feeling, in 1251, by their almost unanimous refusal to join in the
war against Pistoia. But when a few of them were sent into banishment
the others soon quieted down. The Guelph exiles were recalled,
adversaries within the city made peace, and now, that Frederic II.
was dead, the aristocracy was kept in check by the strength and
self-confidence of the popular party. Shortly afterwards external
wars began, and these were carried on with so much success that the
following ten years were known as the years of victory.


V.

This First, or Old Popular Government, as it was called, because it was
in fact the first time that the people had a political and military
organisation of their own, quickly asserted its strength. In order to
give the spreading Florentine trade free access to the sea, without yet
coming to blows with Pisa, the city concluded an agreement on April 30,
1251, with the Counts Aldobrandeschi, powerful lords of the Maremma, by
which Florence was granted right of passage through their territories
to Porto Talamone and Port' Ercole and the free use of these harbours
for its merchandise.[252] Thereupon the Pisans, being naturally annoyed
by this measure, hastened to contract an alliance with Sienna, to
which Pistoia also adhered. Thus the three Ghibelline cities were
banded together against the Florentine Guelphs. Nor was this the
worst. On July 24, 1251, the Ghibellines of Florence joined the League
by a secret agreement with Sienna, binding either side to cooperate
towards their common aim--_i.e._, the triumph of their party throughout
Tuscany. And as the other Ghibellines of the country-side naturally
adhered to the treaty, the whole faction was united to the hurt of the
Republic.

Then the Florentines, finding themselves surrounded by so many foes,
began their defence by a rapid march on Pistoia, but the Ghibellines
of the city refused to take part in a war openly directed against
their cause. Accordingly, when the army returned from a successful
skirmishing expedition, many leading Ghibellines, including the Uberti
and the Lamberti, were driven into banishment. The affair must have
been really serious, for the exiles hoisted the banner of the Republic,
whereupon the State banner was changed, and instead of bearing the
white lily on a red field, henceforth displayed the red lily on a white
field; but the flag of the people remained as before, half white and
half red. During the summer of this year the Ubaldini, reinforced by a
body of exiles, rose to arms in the Mugello, but suffered defeat. The
Florentines at last realised the danger of their position. Therefore,
with the help of their former friends the Lucchese, they concluded an
alliance (August, 1251) with the town of San Miniato al Tedesco--where
there was no Imperial vicar for the moment--renewed in September their
former treaty with Orvieto, and in November made alliance with Genoa,
which was still hostile to Pisa.

Thus the whole of Tuscany was divided between the Guelph and Ghibelline
factions. The exiles, together with some German soldiers who had served
under Frederic II., occupied the Castle of Montaia, belonging to Count
Guido Novello, in the upper Val d'Arno. The Florentines marched to
the assault of the stronghold towards the end of the year, but were
ignominiously repulsed. On their return to the city, they rang the
alarm-bell, collected a large force, again took the field, people and
Commune combined, and pursued the war with energy during the month of
January, regardless of frost and snow. The general condition of affairs
in Tuscany enlarged the proportions of this war; for on the one side
Lucchese troops co-operated with the Florentine army, while the exiles
on the other received reinforcements from Pisa and Sienna. The First
Popular Government now proved its mettle. The adversaries were driven
off, the Castle of Mentaia captured and demolished, and its defenders
were led captives to Florence in January, 1252.[253]

The Florentines then marched into the Pistoian territory, laid it
waste, and halted to attack the Castle of Tizzano on their return.
But while thus engaged they heard that the Pisans, having routed the
Lucchese, were moving homewards with prisoners and spoil. Accordingly,
they raised the siege, hastened in pursuit, and giving battle to the
Pisans at Pontedera on July 1, 1252, completely defeated them. Even
the Podesta of Pisa was captured, and another curious incident took
place. The Lucchese prisoners who were being dragged to Pisa in bonds
not only regained their liberty, but were enabled, by the help of the
Florentines, to convey to Lucca as captives the same Pisans by whom
they had been previously seized.

Meanwhile, profiting by the absence of the Florentine troops, the
exiles and Count Guido Novello had taken refuge at Figline and made
it the centre of continual skirmishing expeditions. Hence it was
indispensable to unearth them all without delay. The town surrendered,
but only on condition that the strangers defending its wall should be
allowed to go free, and the exiles readmitted. This was granted but
then, in violation of the stipulated terms, Figline itself was sacked
and burnt (August, 1852).[254]

But, the Siennese having simultaneously profited by the opportunity
to lay siege to Montalcino, a border fortress always claimed by the
Florentines, the latter hastened to its relief, and after routing its
assailants and providing everything for the future defence of the
stronghold, marched back to Florence in triumph.

These successes were not unproductive of results. For when the
Florentines next attacked Pistoia in 1253, the town surrendered after
a brief resistance, and agreed (February 1, 1254) to forsake the
Ghibelline League, to grant readmittance to the Guelphs, and to be
entirely at the service of Florence.[255] Thereupon the Florentines
hastened to defend Montalcino against another attack by the Siennese;
and thus the war with the latter, begun at the end of 1253, was
vigorously pursued in 1254, to the month of June. Then, having lost
many strongholds--some captured by Florentine arms, others gained by
purchase from the Counts Guidi--Sienna was forced to end the war and
tender submission. On their way back to Florence the victors reduced
Poggibonsi, a large and important territory adhering to Sienna and the
Ghibellines. They next proceeded to devastate the lands about Volterra,
although the city itself seemed impregnable from the strength of its
position. But when the Volterrani, counting upon this, ventured to
sally forth and give battle, they were defeated and pursued with so
much vigour, that the Florentines found themselves inside the city
before they had even conceived the possibility of storming its walls.
There was such general alarm among the inhabitants that a great throng
of old men, women, and children, with the bishop at their head, came as
suppliants to make surrender. The Florentines showed much generosity,
prohibiting pillage, and merely reforming the government of the city
by transferring it to the Guelphs. And now Pisa, being bereft of all
allies, finally agreed to surrender, and the terms were subscribed on
August 4, 1254. As a result of this treaty the Florentines had right of
passage through Pisa, with their merchandise, and exemption from all
taxes, dues, or imposts, whether by sea or by land. Moreover, in all
contracts made with them, the Pisans were bound to employ Florentine
weights and measures, and also, to some extent, Florentine money. They
yielded several districts and castles, that of Ripafratta included. And
they were compelled to give 150 hostages to secure their observance
of these conditions and of the friendship to which they were sworn.
Shortly after this event Arezzo likewise made submission (25th of
August), and accepted a Podesta from Florence.[256]

These were the "victorious years" of the First Popular Government,
whose merits and virtues received such high praise from the
chroniclers. Villani tells us, in words afterwards repeated by his
plagiarist, Malespini, that it took "much pride in great and lofty
undertakings," and that its rulers "were very loyal and devoted to
the Commune."[257] And he presently adds: "The citizens of Florence
lived soberly, on coarse viands and at little expense; their manners
were very good; they had courteous ways; they were plain and frugal;
and used rough stuff for their own and their women's dress. And many
wore skins uncovered by cloth, and caps on their heads; all were shod
with leather; and the Florentine women wore plain hose, and only the
greater among them donned very narrow petticoats of coarse scarlet
Ipro or Camo cloth, gathered in at the waist by a leather belt in the
old style,[258] and a fur-lined mantle with a hood attached to cover
the head;[259] and common women wore gowns of coarse green Cambragio
stuff, made in the same fashion. And one hundred _lire_ was the usual
dowry for a bride, two or three hundred _lire_ being considered in
those times a splendid sum, and even the most beautiful maidens were
not given in marriage until they were aged twenty years, or more."[260]
Even the evidence of the "Divina Commedia" fully corroborates this
account of the goodness and honesty of the Florentines of old, and
events continued to prove the truth of the verdict.

Fortune favoured the city not only in war, but also in peace both
within and without the walls. In addition to the many great public
works we have already mentioned, and which were now completed, other
buildings were in course of erection on various sites bought by the
_anziani_ for the purpose in different parts of the city. These
officials, together with the captain of the people, Lambertino di Guido
Lambertini, likewise decreed (1252-53) that the register of all the
communal deeds should be re-copied and carried on regularly, in order,
as they said, that the _jura et rationes Communis_ might not be left
unknown nor neglected, but open to the public in various places. These
papers are the _capitoli_ still preserved at the present time, and
affording so much useful information on the history of Florence.[261]

Now, however, the state of affairs was about to take a fresh turn. In
consequence of Conrad's decease, Manfred, the other son of Frederic
II., succeeded to the Neapolitan throne. The new sovereign, being
dauntless, ambitious, and full of talent, devoted all his powers
to forwarding the interests of the Italian Ghibellines; and the
Florentines, with their usual shrewdness, immediately became more
cautious in their proceedings. In 1255 they made alliance with Sienna,
the following year with Arezzo, severely blamed their captain, Count
Guido Guerra, for expelling the Ghibellines from the latter city, and
compelled him to recall them. They even treated their own exiles with
greater indulgence and liberality, permitting some of them to return
from time to time. But on either side these were false demonstrations,
leading to no result. All were temporising, waiting to see what fresh
turn the general affairs of Italy might take.

Supposing Manfred's fortunes to be really restored, the Florentines
would suffer severely, and of this they were perfectly aware. A first
warning was received by them in 1256, when the Pisans, oblivious
of sworn terms and promises, made an attack upon Ponte a Serchio,
a castle held by the Lucchese, the allies of Florence. Accordingly
the Florentines hastened to their friends' relief, and routed the
assailants, many of whom were drowned in the river in their flight.
After this victory the troops marched towards Pisa and coined money in
sight of the walls, an act then considered to inflict deep humiliation
on the enemy. In addition to this the Pisans were not only forced to
renew (September 23, 1256) the ignominious peace concluded in 1254,
but also to cede many castles to the Florentines, and some few to the
Lucchese.[262] And another clause was added to the terms stipulating
that the Castle of Mutrone, a position of great strategical importance
both to Lucchese and Florentines, should be given up to the latter,
with power to destroy or preserve it, as their magistrates might
decide. Accordingly the question was discussed by a council of elders
in Florence, and one of the number, Aldobrandino Ottobuoni, who,
although poor and plebeian, had much influence as a patriot, asserted
the necessity of demolishing the fortress. His proposal was carried,
but with the proviso that it should be first submitted to the approval
of the parliament. Meanwhile the Pisans, unaware of the result of the
discussion and of Ottobuoni's amendment, but knowing that the castle,
if held by the Lucchese, would be a serious menace to themselves, sent
to offer Ottobuoni four thousand florins--in those days a prodigious
sum--if he would address the council in favour of the very plan he had
already pleaded with success. But this offer merely opened his eyes to
the blunder he had committed, and returning to the council, he induced
the elders to reverse their decision. Aldobrandino's reputation was so
greatly enhanced by this affair, that on his death it was decreed that
a monument should be erected to him in the Duomo of greater height than
any other, and at the public expense.[263]

Many men were famed for their virtue in the time of the First Popular
Government; but this government only lasted ten years, and a period of
new reforms and revolutions, costing much travail to the Republic, is
already near at hand.


VI.

The seeds of revolt were already lurking in the Constitution, and, as
we have seen, only waiting a convenient opportunity to break forth.
Nor was the moment long delayed. The Ghibelline party, after declining
in consequence of Frederic's decease, was now revived in Italy by
the strenuous efforts of Manfred in its cause. This monarch's envoys
finally came to Florence in 1258, and naturally made their abode with
the Uberti, whom they found quite prepared to try the hazard of war.
These nobles quickly assembled their adherents, and formed a plot for
the overthrow of the popular government. But the times were not yet
ripe, because, as Machiavelli has justly remarked, "In those days
the Guelphs had much more power than the Ghibellines, partly because
the people hated the latter for their arrogant conduct as rulers in
Frederic's time; and partly because the side of the Church was in
greater favour than that of the emperor, seeing that with the aid of
the Church they [the Florentines] hoped to preserve their liberty,
and feared to lose it under the emperor."[264] The conspiracy was soon
discovered, in fact, and the Uberti were cited to appear before the
elders. But, instead of obeying the summons, they barricaded themselves
within their own dwellings by the advice of their chief, Farinata.
Thereupon the enraged people flew to the assault; the houses of the
Uberti were sacked; some of their friends captured, others killed,
and no mercy shown even to those merely suspected of complicity. The
Abbot of Vallombrosa, one of the Beccaria of Pavia, was beheaded,
although his innocence was afterwards acknowledged by many.[265] The
whole Uberti family and their principal followers had to seek safety
in exile and fly to Sienna, the which city was the declared ally of
Manfred, and the headquarters of all Tuscan Ghibellines. The exiles
collected there chose Farinata, the most daring and influential member
of the band, for their leader. Upon this the Florentines justly
complained that the Siennese violated the treaty of 1255 by harbouring
the fugitives; but Sienna, having been long the secret ally of the
Ghibellines, was deaf to remonstrance.

Hence collision was inevitable, and Florence dealt the first blow
by speedily attacking several castles and villages in the Siennese
Maremma.[266] Then the _Martinella_ was hung in the arch of the
Mercato Nuovo, and repeatedly rang the alarm, announcing an expedition
of far greater importance. Both sides began to prepare for war, and
even summoned their friends to assemble. Florence had sent Brunetto
Latini on an embassy to Alfonso of Castile, one of the aspirants to
the Imperial crown, inviting him to march into Italy against Manfred.
The Siennese, however, had already, and with greater hopes of success,
applied for help, through the Florentine exiles, to Manfred in person.
This monarch being much occupied with his own kingdom at the time,
despatched Giordano d'Anglona, Count of San Severino, with about one
hundred German knights, who reached Sienna in December, 1259, bearing
the royal banner. At last, in April, 1260, the Florentines set forth
with the _carroccio_, people and Commune in full array, with the
_Podesta Iacopino Rangoni_, the elders and leaders of companies at
their head, and encamped close to the walls of Sienna, near Porta
Camollia. On the 17th of May a battle took place on the site of the
monastery of Santa Petronilla. It is related that when Farinata degli
Uberti, who, as chief of the exiles, had done much to promote the war,
saw how small a contingent Manfred had sent with the standard, he
exclaimed: "We will lead it into such straits, that he [the king] will
fain be the enemy of the Florentines, and will give us more [knights]
than we shall want."[267] It is also told that the German soldiers were
purposely intoxicated to make them fight with blind fury.[268] What is
certain is that the Siennese citizens marched out under the command
of their Podesta, and that the Germans, jointly with the exiles, of
whom Farinata was still the chief, were led by Count Guido Novello.
The Germans began the engagement with so furious an onslaught that
the Florentines, believing a formidable army was on them, scattered
in dismay; but then, perceiving the hostile force to be inferior to
their own, stood their ground valiantly, and after a sanguinary melee
repulsed the foe, and capturing Manfred's flag, dragged it in the mud.
There was much rejoicing in Florence, although the victory had been
dearly bought, and it was seen that a small band of well-trained German
cavalry had put to the rout, at least for a moment, a large army of
peasants and artisans. The Siennese derived courage from the same fact,
particularly now that their chief citizen, Provenzano Salvani, and
other ambassadors, were returning from Naples with a stout contingent
of eight hundred[269] Germans, also under the command of Count
Giordano, now promoted to the post of vicar-royal to Manfred in Tuscany.

Accordingly the war had to be pursued; for with the Siennese already
in the field to subdue Staggia and Poggibonsi, and devastate Colle,
Montalcino, and Montepulciano, the Florentines were compelled to resume
hostilities. Farinata degli Uberti and his fellow-exiles continually
cast fresh fuel on the flame by using every device of ingenuity to
provoke their foes, and weave treasonable plots within the walls of
Florence. In fact, two friars were sent there to inform the elders,
with great affectation of secresy, that Sienna was weary of the
Ghibellines and of Provenzano Salvani's domination, that accordingly
it would be easy to have the gates opened to the Florentine army by
means of a bribe of ten thousand florins. The friars, being deceived
themselves, as it appears, had no difficulty in duping others.
According to Villani's account, on arriving in the city, they asked
leave to confer with two elders alone, under pledge of the strictest
secresy. Two members were deputed to receive their proposals, who,
believing the men to come from the exiles, sons of their own Republic,
and forgetting how they had always been dominated by party hatred,
accepted the false message in good faith. Although great mystery was
observed in the affair, yet it was necessary to consult the citizens
before deciding on war. For that purpose a numerous council of nobles
and _popolani_ was assembled, and the elders, under more or less
plausible pretexts, urged the necessity of quickly resuming the war
against Sienna. Nevertheless, there was much disagreement. Although the
Florentine laws opposed every possible check to general discussion,
and especially when directed against any proposal brought forward by a
magistrate,[270] the import of this question was seen to be so grave,
that several speakers combated it, pointing out the enormous folly of
plunging into war at this moment, when it was known that Sienna had no
means of maintaining the Germans for long. The nobles were specially
adverse to the proposal, for they had recognised the superiority of
the German cavalry, and judged that no army composed of artisans and
traders, little practised in war, could possibly make a stand against
it, especially now that it was in much greater force. Also, seeing
what progress had been already made in the art of war, battles could
no more be won by deeds of personal prowess alone. Unluckily the
opposition of the nobles inflamed the people in the contrary sense, and
set them shouting that they must arm and march forth without delay.
Tegghiaio Aldobrandi degli Adimari was one of the first patricians
to speak against the proposal and in favour of delay. But an elder
named Spedito, and, according to Villani, one of the two sharing the
secret, replied to him in insulting terms, winding up with a coarse
sneer at Adimari's supposed cowardice.[271] Whereupon Messer Tegghiaio
retorted, exclaiming that Spedito would lack the courage to follow far
at his heels in battle. After this squabble Cece Gherardini rose up and
openly inveighed against the war proposed by the elders. The latter
then insisted on his silence, in the name of the law, threatening to
make him pay the fine of one hundred _lire_ imposed by the statutes on
all venturing to speak without the permission of the magistrates; but
Gherardini replied that he would pay it and speak. Accordingly they
increased the fine to two hundred, then to three hundred _lire_, but
only succeeded in silencing him by threats of capital punishment.[272]
So the motion for war was finally carried, although even without the
secret intrigues retailed and exaggerated by the chroniclers, the
heated state of public feeling made hostilities unavoidable.

The Florentine army was still commanded in 1260 by the same Podesta who
had led it to battle the previous May. But it was now reinforced by all
the Guelphs of Tuscany, from Perugia, Orvieto, Bologna, and many other
cities, so that its total strength amounted to thirty thousand foot and
three thousand horse. This large force marched forth in the month of
August, with all its chiefs, with the _Carroccio_, and a well-furnished
baggage train, crossed the Siennese border, and reaching Pieve Asciata
on September 2nd, halted there to rest. The intrigues carried on by
the exiles had produced two results; for on the one hand they had
inspired Florence with the vain hope that Sienna could be gained
without bloodshed, merely by spending money and making a great show of
strength; on the other hand there were traitors in the army itself,
actually pledged to secret agreements with the enemy. The first measure
adopted was to send messengers to the city haughtily demanding its
surrender. But when these envoys entered Sienna they found the whole
population burning for war and revenge. They were solemnly received
by the Council of Twenty-four, the heads of the State; and these, on
hearing their demands, made reply: "_That they should have an answer,
by word of mouth, in the field_." Hence the only thing to do was to
prepare for a decisive engagement.

On the morning of the 3rd of September a herald went through the
streets of Sienna calling on all men to hasten to join his own flag,
"in the name of God and the Virgin Mary."[273] Thus a considerable army
was collected and marched the same day to encounter the Florentines.
The details supplied by the chroniclers are so discrepant that it
is difficult to decide as to the exact strength of the force. The
Germans, the exiled Ghibellines of Florence, and several contingents
from allies swelled the Siennese ranks. Nevertheless the total number
was certainly inferior to that of the enemy. According to custom, the
Podesta, Francesco Troghisio, held the post of Commander-in-chief. But
the actual leaders of the army were Count Giordano and Count D'Arras
in command of the German horse and foot; Count Aldobrandino of Santa
Fiora, and other valiant captains. The Florentine exiles, including
Farinata degli Uberti, who was excited to the highest pitch, were under
the command of Count Guido Novello. The army of Florence was also led
by its Podesta, Jacopo Rangoni; but its captains were untrained men,
who still clung to the hope of winning the victory without striking a
blow. They advanced with the _Carroccio_ as far as Monselvoli in Val
di Biena, and encamped at a short distance from the Arbia stream and
the fortress of Montaperti, some four miles from Sienna. On the morning
of the 4th of September the Siennese, and more especially the Germans,
began the battle by a tremendous onslaught. The Count of Arras kept his
men in ambush in order to fall on the enemy's flank at the best moment.
Until the hour of vespers, the Florentines made a steadfast resistance,
but then began to show signs of failing strength. Thereupon Arras
led up his reserve with cries of "St. George," and attacked them so
furiously in flank that they were speedily routed. At the same moment
Bocca degli Abati, one of the Florentine traitors, severed at a blow
the hand of Jacopo dei Pazzi, the standard-bearer of the cavalry. As
the flag fell the troop, composed almost entirely of nobles, instantly
took to flight, some from panic, others with treasonable intent. But
the infantry, consisting of stout _popolani_ and faithful allies,
stood its ground for a time; then wavered, gave way, and was involved
in the general rout. Only the guards of the _Carroccio_, commanded by
Giovanni Tornaquinci, a veteran of seventy years, who fought like a
lion, maintained their position until the last man fell dead defending
the banner. Then, finally, the _Carroccio_, the _Martinella_, and the
flag of the Republic were captured by the foe, who bore their spoil
to Sienna in triumph and reduced it to atoms.[274] Great slaughter
took place, and although many Florentines sought safety in the castle
of Montaperti, crying, "Mercy, I surrender!" no mercy was shown them.
Finally the Siennese captain, Count Giordano, by the advice of Farinata
degli Uberti and with the consent of the gonfaloniers of the people,
gave orders that the slaughter should be stopped, and safety granted
to all who surrendered.[275] It is difficult to decide how many were
killed on that fatal day. Villani, keeping to the minimum, states that
all the cavalry escaped by flight, the slaughter being confined to the
infantry, of whom 2,500 were killed and 1,500 captured. The Siennese,
reducing their own losses to 600 killed and 400 wounded, estimate those
of the Florentines at 10,000 killed, 15,000 taken prisoner, 5,000
wounded, and 18,000 horses either killed or strayed. These figures may
be exaggerated, but Villani's are certainly below the real number.[276]
Nevertheless, the chronicler shows the true state of things when he
says in conclusion, "and then the ancient Florentine people was put to
rout and annihilated."[277] This, in fact, was the ultimate result of
the battle "_that stained the Arbia red_" ("_che fece l'Arbia colorata
in rosso_").

Sienna triumphed with great rejoicing, great festivities; but there
was a terrible outcry and lamentation in Florence, where no family had
escaped loss. The leading Guelphs knew that their last chance of safety
had vanished, and therefore many of their noble families fled into
exile together with a considerable number of _popolani_. They escaped
from the city on the 13th of September, and although a few of them were
scattered among the Tuscan castles, the majority repaired to Lucca,
this being still the chief centre of the Guelph faction.

On the 16th of September Count Giordano entered Florence with his
German troops, accompanied by the Ghibelline exiles laden with spoil
and ready to play the conquerors. One of their first deeds was the
destruction of the Ottobuoni monument in the Duomo, forgetful that
whether Guelph or Ghibelline that virtuous citizen deserved honour as
a patriot. Thus, from the beginning, the Ghibellines did their best to
make themselves more detested and unbearable. Poggibonsi, Montalcino,
and many of the castles which had cost so much strife, were given up to
Sienna. The "ordinances of liberty" were annulled, and Count Giordano
nominated Count Guido Novello Podesta of Florence for two years.[278]
The latter immediately took possession of the Communal palace, and
opened a road thence to the city walls, with the name it still bears of
Via Ghibellina. Meanwhile sentences of banishment and persecution of
all sorts befel the Guelphs. Their houses and towers were demolished,
and their confiscated property devoted to the service of the Ghibelline
cause, which was everywhere destined to triumph. Brunetto Latini was
also condemned to exile. As we have seen, he had been an ambassador to
Alphonso of Castile, and was now in France, where he wrote the "Tesoro"
containing an account of his mission.

Count Giordano, being recalled to Naples by Manfred, soon took his
departure, leaving Guido Novello to replace him. Thereupon all the
Ghibelline chiefs met in council at Empoli to arrange what was to be
done. As an instance of the pitch of ferocity to which party hatred
against Florence had attained, it was proposed at this meeting to
demolish the city walls, pull down all the houses, and reduce this
"nest of Guelphs" to a mere suburb, since otherwise they would be sure
to revive there once more. But Farinata degli Uberti had the generosity
to oppose the suggestion, and in the impulse of his wrath clapped his
hand on his sword-hilt, and declared to Count Giordano and the other
captains that he had fought to regain his country, not to lose it, and
would defend it against all would-be destroyers even more zealously
than he had fought against the Guelphs.[279] These words caused the
wild proposal to be instantly rejected.

Count Guido appointed several Ghibelline Podesta in Tuscany, while
retaining the general government of that province in his own grasp,
and likewise ruling Florence as vicar to King Manfred. He basely
allowed himself to be the tool of Ghibelline vengeance, although his
uncertainty of conduct and weakness of character did little service to
the party. Nevertheless, the Guelphs continued to suffer persecution,
not only in Florence, where confiscation of their property and
destruction of their dwellings and towers were long the order of the
day,[280] but also in the neighbouring castles and at Lucca, whence all
fugitive Guelphs were expelled. It was on this occasion that Farinata
degli Uberti, having seized Cece dei Buondelmonti, hoisted him on his
saddle and carried him off, either to save his life, as some have said,
or, according to another version, as prisoner of war. But his brother
Pietro degli Uberti was so maddened at the sight, that he clubbed the
captive to death on Farinata's horse. Such was the ferocity of party
hatred at the time. After the defeat of 1260 many Guelphs wandered
homeless about the world. Some devoted their swords to the service of
their faction in Emilia, and became experts in the newest developments
of military science; while others settled in France as traders, thus
giving a fresh and much increased impulse to Florentine commerce.


VII.

From the close of 1260, the year of the battle of Montaperti, down to
1266, when the rule of Count Guido and King Manfred came to an end, the
history of Florence records no remarkable event. The city's freedom is
crushed, its wars reduced to petty and inglorious party strife, and
its new institutions, if worthy to be so called, have no effect on the
historical development of the Florentine constitution. In trying to
discover the logical connection between the various forms assumed by
it in the history of the Republic, no attention need be given to the
checks suffered by freedom nor to the intervals wherein tyranny breaks
the regular course of events and institutions, seeing that these
resume their normal march as soon as liberty is restored to life.

The Podesta ruling in Manfred's name retained the two councils, _i.e._,
the general council of three hundred, and the special of ninety
members, in both of which the nobles and the Ghibellines naturally
prevailed. But we hear nothing more of the Captain of the people and
his councils, nor of the elders and their assembly. But we find in
their place a body of twenty-four citizens, four to each _sestiere_,
privileged to sit in council with the Podesta.[281] Of the ancient
Constitution a few fragments alone remain, and even these are ancient
only in name. As a matter of fact the Ghibellines had succeeded, with
Manfred's assistance, in establishing an aristocratic despotism, as
strangely different from the constitution preceding it as from that
destined to replace it, these being in perfect harmony and connection
one with the other.

Meanwhile the war against the Guelphs was carried on, not only by
razing their houses and confiscating their goods, but by the imposition
of repeated fines weighing heavily on the lower classes who were now
deprived of all share in the government. But in 1264 Farinata degli
Uberti died, in 1265 Dante Alighieri was born, and Italy began to be
stirred by novel events soon to be echoed even in Florence.

For some time past, in truth, Italian politics had showed signs of
approaching to a radical change. Frederic II., although often cruelly
despotic, had gathered about him, nevertheless, all the most cultured
men of the country and was highly popular among them. His successor,
Manfred, was an adventurous and unfortunate prince, whose loftiness
of spirit deservedly gained him numerous admirers. It is true that
the Papacy had combated both in their quality of Ghibellines; but
the policy of Rome was gradually becoming no less hostile to communal
freedom than to the Ghibelline cause, inasmuch as the Papal ambition
daily increased and sought to strengthen the temporal power at the
expense of the communes. Florence still remained Guelph; but with
changed times the character and value, if not the names of parties
were beginning to suffer alteration throughout Italy. Hence men often
changed sides with small hesitation, nor was it always easy to say
whether those who deserted their own party had changed, or whether the
alteration of the party itself had caused it to be forsaken. Also the
general confusion was greatly increased now that the Popes, with their
usual anxiety and dread of losing their supremacy in Italy, resolved on
calling fresh strangers to their aid and thus drew fresh miseries on
the land.

Alarmed by the great power and reputation gained by the Swabian line,
they sought defence in the course of policy so well described by
Machiavelli when he remarks that the Popes, "sometimes for the love of
religion, at others to forward their own ambitions, never ceased to
call fresh humours into Italy and stir fresh wars. And no sooner had
they raised a prince to power than they repented and sought to compass
his ruin, nor would they consent that any province their own weakness
prevented them from seizing should be possessed by another."[282] Thus,
after many persistent intrigues, they finally decided the Angevins to
undertake an expedition against Manfred, and for the conquest of the
Neapolitan kingdom.

With the aid and benediction of Pope Clement IV., Charles of Anjou
brought an army composed not only of his own subjects, but of many
Italians, among whom the exiled Florentine Guelphs were some of the
most distinguished for bravery.[283] He advanced to the Neapolitan
frontier, and near Benevento, on February 26, 1266, gave battle to the
foe. King Manfred fought valiantly, and when forsaken and betrayed by
his soldiery, died the death of a hero on the field. For three days,
vain search was made for his corpse among the slain, then it was found,
and carried off on the back of an ass. The French monarch refused
Manfred burial in consecrated ground, because the Pope had declared
him excommunicate. Accordingly he was laid in a ditch by the bridge
of Benevento, where the French soldiers, casting each a stone on the
corpse, raised a pile that proved a fitting monument to the courage
and ill fortune of a warrior slain sword in hand. But Pope Clement
grudged him even this humble grave, and at his command the Archbishop
of Cosenza persuaded the Angevin monarch to have the corpse exhumed,
and thrown beyond the frontier of the Neapolitan kingdom, on the banks
of the river Verde.[284] All these events completed the overthrow of
the Ghibelline party in Italy. The Imperial throne stood vacant, the
Suabians were crushed, and another foreign dynasty succeeded them in
Naples, summoned thither by the Pope. If Frederic's decease had caused
the decline of the Ghibellines in Florence, it is easy to imagine
what was to befal them now that their evil sway had accumulated such
increased detestation of their rule, and that the death of Manfred
not only deprived them of a friendly sovereign, but extinguished in
Italy the domination of an Imperial and royal line that had been their
strongest support.

In fact, when the result of the campaign was announced in Florence, the
whole population was moved and stirred to fresh courage against the
nobles still holding rule over them. And when it was known that the
majority of the Florentine Guelphs, who had done such brave service
in the ranks of King Charles, were returning to Florence under his
flag, the populace seemed so ready to revolt that Count Guido and his
followers were stricken with fear. Therefore, as Machiavelli says, "the
Ghibellines judged it well to conciliate by some acts of beneficence
the people they had hitherto overwhelmed with injuries; but although
these remedies would have succeeded had they been applied before the
emergency arose, now, on the contrary, being used too late, not only
failed of effect, but hastened the party's ruin."[285] In fact, when
Count Guido and the Ghibelline leaders sought to pacify the people
by certain liberal concessions they knew not where to begin. The old
laws had been annulled, and these men had so completely alienated the
people by their arbitrary government and exactions, that no concession
could now be made without yielding on all points. On the other hand,
the people, being excluded from all share in the management of the
State, had turned to trade and commerce, employing therein all the
power and energy they were forbidden to bring to bear upon politics.
Accordingly all branches of trade were marvellously developed and
organised more firmly than before in the shape of politico-industrial
associations, entitled Greater and Lesser Guilds (_Arti maggiori
ed Arti minori_), the which, dating from the earliest years of the
Middle Ages, had gradually become significant political forces, and
exercised very great civic influence. Thus many new powerful families
had arisen, constituting a new aristocracy, as it were, of wealthy
traders, or, according to the designation already bestowed on them,
of _popolani grassi_ (stout burghers) now the virtual masters of the
Florentine citizens.[286] Gradually, therefore, the Ghibellines in
power were reduced to an isolated caste, and only enabled to maintain
their position by Manfred's friendly support and the help of his German
contingent. Being accordingly in the attitude of invaders encamped on
alien soil, their moral and political ascendency, their civil authority
daily declined; while the burghers under their rule had won by means of
trade and commerce a separate world for themselves and constituted a
separate body, independent to some extent of the governing authorities.
It was both difficult and dangerous to seek the help of the leading
burghers, for these, being chiefs of the Guelph population, would
undoubtedly insist on giving the latter a share in the government, the
which would lead to the speedy downfall of the nobles and Ghibellines.
Neither was it easy for the nobles to initiate partial reforms, since
they neither knew what concessions to make, nor how to grant any at
a moment when the people were conscious of sufficient strength to
dominate the city. It was accordingly decided to summon from Bologna
two knights of a new order known as the _Frati Gaudenti_, whose mission
it was to succour widows and orphans and reconcile hostile parties.
Also, as a visible sign of impartiality, one of the chosen knights was
to be a Guelph, the other a Ghibelline. All this was arranged with the
consent and almost at the instance of Pope Clement IV., who, being
of Provencal birth and a strenuous supporter of Charles of Anjou,
continually addressed imperious missives to the Florentines,[287] as
though the Imperial throne being vacant, its authority had devolved
upon himself, and the victory gained by King Charles had made him
master of Florence.

But, according to Villani's account, the short-lived order of Frati
Gaudenti consisted of men chiefly devoted to their own pleasures, and
little fitted for the serious task of acting as Podesta of Florence,
and promoting novel reforms there. This was so evident that the two
knights speedily saw the necessity of consulting and coming to an
understanding with the guilds. Therefore, on reaching the city, they
made their abode in the palace of the Commune, and convoked a council
of thirty-six Guelph and Ghibelline merchants. The members soon began
to hold daily discussions in their meeting-place, the court of the
Calimala, or Clothdressers' Guild. The business of dressing foreign
woollen stuffs had made great progress in Florence, and the guild was
more powerful than any of the others. The council soon agreed that the
first measure proposed should be the conversion of the seven greater
guilds into an industrial and political body, with special banners,
weapons, and chiefs of its own. So they began to organise all the
details, assigning a gonfalon to each guild, and arranging them as
follows: Judges and Notaries; Calimala, or Dressers of Foreign Cloth;
Woollen Trade; Money-changers; Physicians and Druggists; Silk Trade,
and Fur Trade. The Ghibellines, however, foresaw that this course
would inevitably lead to the reconstruction of the _Primo Popolo_
under another name. Accordingly the Uberti, Lamberti, Fifanti, and
Scolari decidedly opposed these innovations, and impressed Count Guido
with the necessity of putting a stop to them at once if he wished to
keep the government in his grasp. This being precisely what the count
most desired, he instantly sent to demand aid from Ghibelline cities.
Arezzo, Sienna, Pisa, Pistoia, Colle, and San Gimignano contributed
some cavalry, which, with his German guard, raised his forces to
fifteen hundred. But, although these troops were under Count Guido's
command, they were also at his expense; his Germans were already
clamouring for their pay, and all his money was spent. Accordingly,
while still negotiating terms of agreement with the people, he decided
to levy an additional income tax of ten per cent. in Florence. But the
citizens were already so heavily burdened that this new impost was more
than small fortunes could support. The people were already weary of
misgovernment, and much irritated by the count's action in stripping
the Communal palace of its armoury to enrich his own castle at Poppi;
also being encouraged by commercial success and increasingly hostile
to the Ghibellines, they now made vigorous protest, and clearly showed
their readiness to fly to arms. Then the Council of Thirty-six tried to
pacify the citizens, and acting as mediators, proposed to undertake the
collection of the new tax, levying it in such wise as to make it fall
chiefly on the rich and powerful.

Just then, however, the nobles, emboldened by the arrival of
reinforcements, thought the moment had arrived for a decisive blow, and
rose to arms in the city. The Lamberti took the initiative by rushing
to the Piazza, sword in hand, shouting, "Out with these thieves, the
Thirty-six; let us cut them to pieces!" At this outcry all shops were
closed; the Thirty-six broke up their council, and the people rising
in revolt took their orders from them and from the consuls of the
guilds, with Giovanni Soldanieri as their leader-in-chief. The latter
was a patrician, urged by personal ambition to join the riot at the
head of the people. Concentrating in Piazza St. Trinita, they were soon
attacked by Count Guido and his cavalry, who thought to make short
work of them. But, on the contrary, the crowd threw up barricades and
made a stubborn resistance, while such a storm of stones and darts
rained down from windows and roofs that the Germans began to lose
heart, and the count, stricken with dismay, ordered his standards to
withdraw, retreated to Piazza St. Giovanni, and then hurrying to the
two _Gaudenti_ in the Communal palace, demanded the keys of the town
in order to effect his escape. Neither his friends' supplications nor
the wrath of his followers could persuade him that the danger was
not serious, and that he might safely remain in the town. He was so
bewildered by fear that, having obtained the keys, he insisted on being
escorted by three of the Thirty-six, lest he should be shot from some
window by the way. So, on St. Martin's Day, November 11, 1266, he left
Florence by the so-called Gate of the Oxen, and fled with his followers
to Prato.

The following day, being cured of his panic, he perceived his mistake,
and by the advice of the Florentine Ghibellines in his company
tried, as Machiavelli puts it, "to recapture by force the city he had
forsaken from cowardice."[288] He came with his men in order of battle
as far as the Gate by the Carraia Bridge, on the site of the present
Borgo Ognissanti; but the people who could have scarcely succeeded
in expelling him before, save for his own exaggerated fears, had no
difficulty in repulsing him now. When the count demanded admission
with a mixture of threats and entreaties, the only reply was a shower
of arrows from the walls. He was therefore compelled to retreat, and
his men were so enraged and humiliated that on the way back they tried
to capture a neighbouring castle in order to prove their strength.
But even this small attempt failed, and they reached Prato more
humbled than ever, and with much dissension in their ranks. The count,
convinced of the hopelessness of recovering the state, sought refuge
in the Casentino, and the Florentine Ghibellines dispersed to various
fortresses and mansions about the _contado_.


VIII.

The Guelphs were now masters of Florence. They set to work at the
changes required for the reorganisation of the popular government, and
were favoured with much imperious advice from the Pope. However, they
only gave heed to his epistles in sufficient measure to avoid exciting
his wrath. Their first act was the dismissal of the two _Gaudenti_
friars, whose incapacity had been well proved; their next to request
Orvieto to furnish them with a Captain of the people, a Podesta, and
a body of knights to guard the safety of the Commune. Accordingly
one hundred knights arrived, with Messer Ormanno Monaldeschi as
Podesta, and a Messer Bernardini as Captain. For the sake of peace they
allowed the Ghibellines to return to Florence, and arranged various
reconciliations and marriages between them and the Guelphs, hoping thus
to promote unity among the people and mitigate party hatred. But, in
the still heated state of the public mind, these measures only excited
fresh rancour.

At this juncture Florence seemed to have lost all her former
self-reliance, so that, in the midst of the grave complications of
Italian politics, even the Guelphs felt the need of foreign support.
It was a fatal habit, first owed to the Ghibellines, who, in token of
respect toward the Empire, had requested the presence of an Imperial
vicar in Florence. So, now that the people had won the victory because
the Angevins had succeeded the Suabian line on the Neapolitan throne,
recurrence to the same perilous measure seemed almost unavoidable. The
Pope, with an assumption of Imperial prerogative, had nominated Charles
of Anjou, first as peacemaker, and then as actual vicar-imperial, in
Tuscany, for a term of ten years. The Florentines considering it a duty
to conform with this new state of things, and even to accept it with
a good grace, accordingly offered Charles the lordship of their city
for six years, a term afterwards extended to ten. But either because
the conditions attached to the offer were distasteful to the French
monarch, or because he wished it to be pressed more energetically, he
certainly showed much hesitation in deciding to accept it. Shortly
afterwards he despatched to Florence Philip de Monfort, who made his
entry with eight hundred knights on Easter Day, 1267, the anniversary,
as it was remarked at the time, of Buondelmonti's assassination. The
king subsequently sent Guy de Monfort as his vicar;[289] and at last
came in person to lead the war against the Ghibellines in Tuscany.

The Ghibellines being now expelled, and the supremacy of Charles
accepted as an accomplished fact, the necessity remained of
establishing the government of Florence on a definite basis,
and endeavouring to secure its freedom amid new and hazardous
complications. To this end the fourth constitution of the Republic was
evolved. The state of Florentine society had undergone considerable
change, and this implied a corresponding change in the character of the
new constitution. The Ghibelline or patrician party was now reduced
to a small number of nobles, soldiers by profession, and eager to
exercise tyranny. But, as we have seen, almost a new aristocracy had
come to the front, composed of nobles, who, renouncing their titles
and altering their names, had joined the popular side, and likewise of
well-to-do burghers (_popolo grasso_), who, having leapt to fortune as
traders, had now entered a new sphere of civil life, and dominated the
city.[290] Another point to be noted is that both burghers and populace
were rapidly losing their aptitude for arms, and this not merely
because in all wars of the period the superiority of trained soldiers
was a recognised fact, and popular armies seen to be of small use,
but also because commerce had become too important for busy traders,
engaged in their shops or travelling about the world, to be able, as
in past times, to spend two or three months of the year in the field.
Commerce was now the chief occupation and almost the very life of the
Florentines, so that they really deserved to be called a people of
bankers and merchants.

In addition to all this there was now a foreign power upheld by
foreign soldiery in Florence. Whether in person or by means of other
officials of his own nomination, Charles of Anjou filled the post of
Podesta of the city, and even the Captain of the people was often a man
of his choice. Therefore, with their usual sagacity, the Florentines
re-established the twelve elders, two for each _sestiere_, under the
name of the Twelve Worthies, as advisers to the Podesta. Also, in
place of the Thirty-six, they constituted a council of one hundred
worthies of the people, "without whose sanction no important measure
nor any expenditure was to be undertaken." With this council and
with the parliament, which legally, at all events, never ceased to
exist in Florence, we see the reconstitution of a central and popular
government, limiting the authority of the Angevin Podesta.

It was, indeed, almost a revival of the old consular government by
which the Podesta and Captain, now to be made subordinate to it, had
been originally raised to power. Nor did matters stop at this point.
The two councils, special and general, of the Podesta and Captain were
likewise repristinated. With this difference, however, that whereas by
the constitution of 1250 the Captain of the people had been second in
command, and then almost abolished under the Ghibelline sway, now at
this date he not only resumed his functions, but was given precedence
over the Podesta.

In fact, any Bill proposed by the Twelve to the Hundred and approved by
the latter, was passed on to the Captain's two councils, in the first
place to his special council of the _capitudini_--also known as the
_credenza_--consisting, as formerly, of eighty members. Approved by
this assembly, the Bill was then proposed to the council-general and
special and of the _capitudini_, comprising three hundred members. As a
rule, all the three councils put it to the vote the same day. Then, on
the following day, the Bill was presented to both the councils of the
Podesta, first to the special council of ninety, next to the general
council of three hundred, sometimes increased to 390 by deliberating
jointly with the special assembly. We know very little regarding
the mode of election to these councils, but they usually lasted six
months. Nevertheless, as they were very large and, on the other hand,
the number of the citizens was small, we opine that all eligible
persons--_abili a sedere_, namely, fully qualified citizens--must have
been chosen in turn. It should also be added that projected motions
were neither all nor invariably submitted to every one of these
different councils. Both by law and usage the magistrates were often
privileged to recur to certain councils only, even as they were allowed
the right of assembling a preliminary and more restricted council of
_richiesti_ (or invited persons), composed solely of officials or
citizens whose experience might be useful in drawing up the required
schemes. At other times even a few outsiders were invited to the
councils. Thus, for instance, when affairs of war were under discussion
the presence was requested of those charged to superintend them. The
statutes were neither very precise nor very stringent on this point.
Special efforts, however, seem to have been used to put checks on free
discussion, possibly to prevent the multitude of councils from causing
undue delay. The right of proposing any measure or decree was strictly
reserved to magistrates, by whom some notary or other qualified person
was commissioned to support it in their name. Save in very grave cases,
the councillors only said a few words before voting. The opposition was
never more than a small minority, partly because every project brought
before the councils had been already sifted several times. Later on,
while still allowing men to vote against the magisterial proposals, no
one was permitted to speak save in their favour. Hence, in spite of
possessing so many public assemblies, Italy produced no real political
oratory, and in fact our literature is very poor in this branch of
eloquence. And another point should also be noted here. The Council
of One Hundred was entirely plebeian, so too those of the Captain; on
the other hand, nobles, as well as plebeians, sat in the Podesta's
councils. The _capitudini_, or guild-masters, were always admitted,
as we have shown, to the Captain's councils, and very frequently also
to those of the Podesta. All this plainly proves that the democratic
party and the greater guilds constituting its main nucleus were
decidedly predominant.[291] Thus, although King Charles obtained the
lordship of Florence, his power was fettered by so many restrictions
that all administrative authority remained vested in the people, and
particularly in the well-to-do burgher class (_popolo grasso_).

The new laws examined by us contain very few allusions to Guelphs and
Ghibellines, many to nobles and people (_grandi_ and _popolani_);
for party conflict was beginning to wear its real name, and plainly
signified the struggle between the aristocracy and democracy.
Nevertheless, the Ghibelline faction still survived and constituted
in fact the aristocratic party. For this reason the people desired
its total destruction, and another clause of the new constitution
aimed at the same result. A list was drawn up of all who had suffered
persecution from the Ghibellines between 1260 and 1266, together with
an inventory of their confiscated property. The number of victims was
found to be very great, and their losses to amount to the then enormous
sum of 132,160,8,4 _lire_.[292] It was accordingly resolved to treat
the Ghibellines in the same way, and during the years 1268 and 1269
about three thousand were condemned, including contumacious rebels,
and as many sentences of confiscation pronounced, which remained
enforced for a long period.[293] At first, all confiscated property was
collected to form a so-called "_monte_," or fund; then afterwards it
became the custom to divide this into three parts: one to the Commune;
one to individual Guelphs as indemnity for past losses; and the other
third to the party, in order to strengthen it at the Ghibellines'
expense. In course of time, however, almost all confiscated estates
were granted to the party alone, and their administration entrusted
to six governors, chosen for the purpose, three of whom were nobles
and three men of the people. These officials were originally styled
consuls of the knights, then captains of the Guelph party, in deference
to the ill-omened counsels of Pope Clement IV. and Charles of Anjou.
As every important magistracy of the time was associated with two
councils, so the Captains of the party also possessed a special or
privy council of fourteen, and a council-general of sixty members.[294]
The Captains kept office for two months, and held their sittings in the
Church of Sta. Maria sopra Porta. Later on they had a palace of their
own, and were entrusted with the superintendence of public works, of
the officials of the Towers, and other functions of a similar kind.
But their chief duty was always to promote the cause and persecute
Ghibellines. They performed their task with so much zeal, pursuing
their adversaries so fiercely, that at last the ruling spirit among the
Captains of the party was the virtual ruler of Florence. By excluding
all opponents from public posts, sentencing them to exile, and
confiscating their goods, these functionaries rose to increasing power,
and injured the Republic they served.

Taking a general view of the new constitution, with all its intricate
multiplicity of councils and magistracies, our first impression is that
all was confusion and arbitrary rule. But on looking more closely into
the purpose for which it had been formed, we are obliged to admit that
this government was singularly well adapted for success. Civil war is
not yet stamped out: on the contrary, must undoubtedly continue for a
long time; democracy is pressing on towards the fulness of its triumph
and the complete destruction of the aristocracy. Nor will democracy be
satisfied with ousting the nobles from the government of the republics,
but will seek to deprive them of life itself, and this is only to be
accomplished by much bloodshed and many revolutions.

In the new political organisation, the central power, soon to be
changed every two months, occupies a very feeble position compared
with the high importance, permanence, and strength now assigned to
the Podesta and the Captain. These officers are at the head of the
Commune and the people; each of them presides over two councils: they
are, as it were, the chiefs of two armed and hostile republics. But
in that of the people, hitherto the weaker, no patrician is admitted;
while in that of the Commune, the people has assumed a very important
position relatively to that of the nobles, and therefore has legally
obtained the casting vote in all decisions, notwithstanding the
supremacy virtually exercised by Charles of Anjou in moments of the
gravest emergency. It is easy to foresee the bitterness of strife to be
engendered by this state of things. If we likewise remember that this
Republic, as though foredoomed to civil war, included so important a
magistracy as the Captains of the party, apparently created for the
sole purpose of perpetuating discord, as an engine of war, serving to
keep all these heterogeneous forces in continual agitation and promote
ceaseless bloodshed and destruction, we can understand the course of
coming events in Florence. We must be prepared for continual struggles,
restless changes of institutions and laws, prepared to behold webs
carefully woven one month pulled to pieces before the next moon begins
to wane. Nevertheless, the whole machinery of the government was
singularly fitted to compass the end that the Republic from the first
had constantly in view.


IX.

Much more, however, remains to be said in order to give our readers a
lucid and adequate idea of the Constitution and society of Florence in
the latter half of the thirteenth century. So far we have dwelt too
slightly on the most important detail of the new reforms--_i.e._, the
organisation of the guilds. The measures suggested for this purpose by
the Thirty-six from their first meetings in the Calimala Court, and
against which the nobles had most strongly protested, were speedily
approved by the people, and from that moment became the chief basis of
the Florentine statutes. Associations of arts and trades had existed
throughout Italy from a very early date, and had soon attained greater
development in Florence than in other communes. For, as we have had
occasion to note, the whole life of the people was concentrated in
these associations when the Ghibelline tyranny, upheld by Manfred,
excluded the lower classes from participation in the government of the
city. Therefore all that was done now was to embody naturally evolved
results in a more regular and legal shape. Only the greater guilds,
seven in number, had risen to any really great political importance in
1260; the others had to wait much longer before being reorganised on
the same footing. What was the position attained by the seven greater
guilds at the moment we are now studying? By devoting our attention to
the guild that was first and foremost in the race it will serve as a
model, and enlighten us as to the others.

At the period of which we treat the fine arts flourished in Italy side
by side with trade, and this was not only advantageous to the national
culture, but already enabled our manufactures to dictate the laws of
taste to all Europe. In those times Florence, Milan,[295] and Venice
set the fashions, as Paris sets them now. The fine Italian taste helped
to create the _Calimala_[296] trade, and secured its rapid prosperity.
This trade was the art of dressing foreign cloths--from Flanders,
France, and England--and dyeing them with colours known to Florence
alone. Then, in their finished state, these stuffs were sent to all the
European markets stamped with the mark of the Calimala Guild. This mark
was highly prized as a proof of good quality, as showing that the exact
length of the pieces had been scrupulously verified in Florence, and
as a guarantee against any falsification of material. It is therefore
easy to see why the Calimala merchants had trading relations with all
Europe, and interests extending to every place where civilisation and
luxury were known.

Hence the necessity, even in early times, of choosing directors of
the guild, framing statutes, and appointing consuls abroad as well as
at home, to protect its undertakings. Now, however, with the newly
inaugurated reforms, the Calimala, together with the other greater
guilds, was constituted on the lines of a miniature republic.[297]

Every six months, _i.e._, in June and December, the heads of warehouses
and shops held a meeting, and this _Union_--exercising much the same
function in the guild as that of the parliament in the Republic--chose
the electors to be charged with the nomination of the magistrates.
First came four consuls, who administered justice according to the
statutes, acted as representatives of the guild, and ruled it with the
assistance of two councils, one being a special council with a minimum
of twelve members, and the other a general assembly often varying in
number and sometimes limited to eighteen. With the consent of these
councils the consuls were even empowered to alter the statutes. They
carried the banner of the guild, and in emergencies the citizens
assembled at arms under their command. Then there was the _camarlingo_,
or chamberlain, holding office for one year, who administered the
revenue and expenditure of the association. And even as the Republic
had a foreign magistrate in the person of the Podesta, so the guild
had one also in the person of its notary, likewise appointed for one
year. He was chosen by the council-general, had to speak in both
councils as the representative of the consuls; was often employed
on missions for the guild, and was specially charged to enforce
scrupulous observation of the statutes, with the power of inflicting
severe punishment on all violators of the same, were they even the
consuls themselves. All these officials were sworn adherents of the
Guelph party. The notary's stipend was fixed from year to year. The
consuls were bound to accept office if elected, and could not be
re-elected under an interval of one year; their salary was first fixed
at ten _lire_, and the product of certain fines; but was afterwards
reduced to several pounds of pepper and saffron, and a few wooden
baskets and spoons. The _camarlingo_, or _camerario_, was remunerated
even more slightly, and much in the same way. Three accountants were
chosen every year to investigate the actions of the outgoing consuls,
_camarlingo_, and other magistrates. Twelve statutory merchants were
similarly elected, with authority to revise and improve the statutes of
the guild; but all reforms suggested by them had to be approved first
by both councils, and then by the Captain of the people. The consuls
who, under the title of _capitudini_, took part in the councils of the
Captain and Podesta, were pledged to protect the interests of the guild
and advocate laws in its favour. But what were these statutes for the
good of the trade of which so many magistrates enforced the observance?
They prescribed fixed rules and regulations for the exercise of the
business. Very severe punishments were enacted when the merchandise was
of bad quality, defective, or counterfeit. Every piece of cloth was
bound to be labelled, and any stain or rent unrecorded by this label
entailed punishment on the merchant concerned. Above all, there was
great strictness as to exactness of measure. The officers of the guild
frequently inspected the cloth, and made a bi-monthly examination of
the measures used in all the shops. Models of the prescribed measures
were exhibited to the public in certain parts of the city. Nor was
this all. The consuls sent delegates to every counting-house to verify
the merchants' books and accounts, and punished every deviation from
established rules. Every guild had a tribunal composed either solely of
its own members, or jointly with those of another, for the settlement
of all disputes connected with the trade, and enforced severe penalties
on all who referred such disputes to ordinary courts. It may be asked
how the consuls were enabled to give effect to their verdicts? The
punishments were generally fines, and persons refusing to pay them,
after receiving several admonitions and increased fines if still
recalcitrant, were excluded from the guild and practically ruined.
From that moment their merchandise, being unstamped, was no longer
guaranteed by the guild; they also lost many other notable advantages,
and were finally unable to continue their business in Florence, and
not often elsewhere. In fact, as we have seen, the consuls chosen in
Florence guarded the interests of the guild even outside the State by
deputing vice-consuls for that purpose to other parts of Italy and
Europe, and increasing their number in proportion with the increase of
their commercial relations. The two more important consuls abroad were
those in France. All these delegates were charged with even the choice
of the inns to be frequented by the members of the guild. Whenever,
according to the usage of the day, any state exercised reprisals on the
members' goods, the consuls were bound to assist and defend them. Thus,
wherever he might be, a member of the guild was sure of protection
from every sort of injury or loss. The guild was a jealous custodian
of its members' rights, and, in order to defend them in foreign
countries or to obtain justice for injuries received, often despatched
ambassadors to the governments concerned.[298] This was an invaluable
help at a time when no international law existed for the protection of
foreigners, and reprisals were continually used. Accordingly merchants
found it better to submit to any penalty rather than be dismissed
from the guild; no worse threat was needed to enforce obedience to
the statutes. The six other greater guilds were all governed on the
same principle as the _Calimala_. Their united body of consuls formed
the _capitudini_, and these were afterwards headed by a proconsul, a
magistrate held in the highest esteem.

Putting aside the immense commercial and industrial advantages that
this organisation of the guilds afforded to the Republic during the
thirteenth century, we shall see that they were equally useful from
the political point of view. All these merchants, constituting a large
majority of the citizens, were continually engaged in directing great
undertakings, settling commercial disputes, discussing statutes and
laws; they maintained relations with all parts of the known world,
and travelled to all parts on special missions in defence of their
common interests. We see that they all took a continuous and eager
share in political life, inasmuch as every guild was an independent,
self-ruling institution, with separate magistrates, laws, statutes,
and councils, and that it became a centre of industrial, intellectual,
and political activity. Thanks to this freedom of circulation, the
pulse of the Florentine people was quickened to redoubled strength,
and every faculty of the human mind, all moral and political energy of
which man is capable, suddenly rose to a prodigious height in Florence.
Choosing any one of these merchants almost at random, one might be sure
to find him capable of governing the Republic; a man to be trusted
with the most delicate of diplomatic missions, and honourably acquit
himself of it; one able to command a respectful hearing from Pope,
king, or emperor, without allowing himself to be duped, yet without
failing to conform to the requirements of court ceremonial. Thus the
Florentines rose to great fame throughout Europe for their shrewdness
and subtlety, and as in the midst of all this extraordinary commercial
and political activity Italian art and literature also developed, the
small mercantile Republic soon shed its lustre over the whole world.

The greater guilds also achieved another good result in Florence. At a
time when the State organisation divided the city in two halves, as it
were; at a time when the strife of factions was about to be fiercely
renewed, when party leaders excited men's passions by nourishing the
flame of discord, and the continual change of the supreme Council
of Twelve transferred the direction of the government to citizens
of all tempers, and all devoted to their respective parties, then
the decentralisation of the government in a large number of small
associations was indeed an inestimable benefit. If nobles or people
rebelled against their rulers in order to change the Twelve, or the
Podesta, the Captain, or even the statutes, the suspension of public
business that inevitably ensued produced much less real than apparent
confusion. Being split up into so many small associations, the Republic
could exist without a government even for several months; since the
armed, disciplined, and strongly constituted guilds, were now even
better prepared than in past times to seize the reins, and prevent the
troubles which would have certainly befallen the city had it been left
without guidance. Thus the constitution of the guilds, as established
in 1266, likewise serves to explain how it was that poetry, painting,
sculpture, and architecture were enabled to flourish among a people of
traders; even as it explains why so much progress was possible amid
such, apparently, enormous confusion, and how democracy succeeded
in destroying every relic of feudalism in Florence, and in achieving
absolute equality together with the highest degree of freedom known
to the Middle Ages. The Florentine Commune was the centre of so much
culture because it was also the seat of the largest freedom compatible
with the times. Of this culture the best and loveliest fruits are owed
to the democracy; for we find in Arnolfo's towers and churches, in the
paintings of Cimabue and Giotto, as also in Dante's verse, the special
stamp and characteristic of the Florentine people. During the Middle
Ages in Provence, France, Germany, and England, many nobles rose to
literary fame, and indeed nearly all the poets of those lands were of
patrician birth. But Florentine art and letters, constituting the most
fertile seeds of art and letters in Italy, were essentially republican;
many writers, and most of the artists, of Florence were the offspring
of traders or labouring men.

[Illustration]




CHAPTER V.

_FLORENCE THE DOMINANT POWER IN TUSCANY._[299]


I.

After the death of Frederic II., the Imperial throne long remained
vacant. For twenty-three years no king of the Romans was definitively
proclaimed in Germany, and sixty-two years elapsed before any prince
came to Rome to assume the crown of the Empire. Therefore during this
interval the Ghibelline party was left to its own resources, and its
leaders tried to maintain their feudal rights by employing their
forces and prestige against all communes and small potentates enjoying
no chance of gaining the Imperial protection. Hence petty tyrants
began to arise on all sides, Ghibelline lords for the most part, who,
notwithstanding the many defeats endured by the aristocracy in Italy,
derived new and unexpected advantages from the changed conditions of
the times. Another factor of this result was the new mode of warfare.
Men-at-arms were now the chief strength of an army, and these mounted
soldiers, cased as well as their horses, in heavy armour and armed with
long spears, were able to overcome infantry before the latter's
halberds could come into play. But a lengthy training was required
for cavalry service, and it was increasingly difficult for artisans
or merchants to pursue the military career to any effect, whereas war
was becoming the chief occupation of the nobles. In fact, many of the
leading patricians were acquiring a reputation in the new mode of
war, gaining followers, and by taking the command of small companies
gradually rising to power, and aspiring to become tyrants. For this and
other reasons, to be made clearer farther on, nearly all the Lombard
cities, and some of those in Central Italy, were now losing their
independence.

[Illustration: PALAZZO VECCHIO, FLORENCE.

            [_To face page 241._]

The same ambitions doubtless existed among the Guelphs, but the feudal
aristocracy had far less influence in their party, the majority of
which consisted of merchants and wealthy men of the people. Besides,
the Pope was a near neighbour during the interregnum of the Empire,
the Guelph cities were at the same time under the dangerous protection
of an ambitious pontiff, and that of the equally ambitious Charles I.
of Anjou, peacemaker and vicar-imperial of Tuscany. Charles nominated
the Podesta of every Guelph Tuscan city, and whenever he failed to
appear in person, sent a representative, called by the chroniclers a
royal _maliscalco_, with an escort of some hundred horse and foot.
Pisa, Arezzo, and all other Ghibelline cities refusing to acknowledge
his authority, were exposed to continual threats from without, and
lacerated within their walls by the attacks of would-be tyrants. On
the other hand, the Guelph cities lived in continual terror of the
king's ambitious designs; but Charles's position was not sufficiently
assured for him to be able to use his temporary and limited office as a
pretext for asserting sovereign power over Tuscany, although such was
his secret aim. For the moment it was enough to play the part of high
protector of all civic rights and privileges, so that the Guelph cities
might be tricked into counting on his help both against Ghibelline
attacks from without and internal treason in favour of tyranny.

The Florentines, however, were not easily hoodwinked regarding either
future or present events. They had asked Charles to accord them his
protection, but only within certain limits, which, at any cost, they
were determined should not be overstepped. They too nourished a
secret aim--namely, to use the king's forces, not for the increase of
his power, but towards the establishment of their own supremacy in
Tuscany. The authority of the Empire was much diminished in Italy;
the temporal strength of the Papacy was also on the wane, and the
Communes, realising their greater independence, hastened to enlarge
their respective territories. All Italian cities now had this end in
view. But if one city waxed powerful, all its neighbours had either to
pursue the same course or become its prey. Thus there was continual war
between this and that city, less from party strife or jealousy than in
necessary defence of their own interests. Besides, with the new custom
of hiring foreign soldiers and captains of adventure, any one with
gold at his command could quickly collect a powerful force and attack
some of his neighbours. Hence every city or state had to be always on
the alert and continually enlarging its strength and power. It was for
this purpose that the Florentines now resolved to turn to account the
authority, prestige, and forces of King Charles.

Accordingly when (1267) his mandatories, the Podesta Emilio di
Corbano,[300] and Marshal Philip de Montfort,[301] with eight hundred
French knights, arrived in Florence, a Florentine army, composed of
recruits from two _sestieri_ of the city, in junction with the French
cavalry under Montfort, immediately marched to the siege of St. Ilario,
or St. Ellero, in which castle a number of Ghibellines had sought
refuge with their leader, Filippo da Volognano. The castle was taken,
and its eight hundred Ghibelline defenders were all either killed or
captured.[302] They comprised many members of the highest Florentine
nobility, Uberti, Fifanti, Scolari, &c., and party hatred was then
so fierce that a youthful scion of the Uberti, finding surrender
inevitable, threw himself from the top of a tower to avoid falling into
the hands of the Buondelmonti.[303] In the course of this campaign the
castles of Campi and Gressa were captured; and many cities, including
Lucca, Pistoia, Volterra, Prato, San Gimignano, and Colle, being won
over to the Guelph cause by the expulsion of their Ghibellines, joined
the Florentines in the League, or _Taglia_, commanded by the French
marshal.

Pisa and Sienna still remained Ghibelline; the former had always
been and still continued to be the strongest bulwark of the party
in Tuscany; the latter had, as usual, given refuge to the banished
Ghibellines of Florence, and also to some of Manfred's Germans who
had escaped the massacre of Benevento. The Florentines had not yet
succeeded in revenging the rout of Montaperti, and were burning to
pluck this thorn from their side; while King Charles, equally eager for
the destruction of all surviving friends and supporters of the Suabian
line, was preparing to come to Tuscany to lead the war against Sienna
in person. Pending his arrival, the Florentines, after an abortive
attack on the city, laid waste the surrounding territory, and finding
that the exiles, the Germans and other Ghibellines, were entrenched
at Poggibonsi, marched against that town with the French contingent
and the Guelphs of the _Taglia_, and began preparations for a regular
siege. At the same time King Charles entered Florence, and was
naturally welcomed with great joy. All the chief citizens went forth to
meet him, with the _Carroccio_, as a sign of the highest honour, and
after spending a festal week in the city and raising several persons to
the knighthood, the king repaired to the camp before Poggibonsi. The
siege lasted four months, and then, towards the middle of December,
1267, the stronghold was driven to surrender by famine. Charles left
a Podesta there to govern in his name, and began to build a fortress,
providing for that expense, in his accustomed way, by levying heavy
taxes from the cities of the League. Florence had to contribute 1,992
_lire_. After this, the army was immediately marched against Pisa.
The reduction of this powerful and warlike republic proved no easy
task; the king had to be satisfied for the time with humiliating it,
by seizing Porto Pisano and levelling the towers there. In February,
1268, he repaired to Lucca, and marching thence to the siege of
Mutrone, captured that castle and gave it to the Lucchese. Thus, by a
series of small victories, which, although of slight importance, were
achieved with dazzling rapidity, he greatly raised the authority and
prestige of the Guelph party, which had not only contributed troops to
the war, but borne its entire expense, granting all the large sums of
money continually demanded by their imperious protector. In fact, by
the end of February, 1268, Florence alone had disbursed no less than
seventy-two thousand _lire_, twenty thousand of which were devoted to
the reduction of Poggibonsi, although Charles had not fulfilled his
promise of erecting a fortress there. But at this moment a war-cry
was raised, stirring all Italy to alarm, and the monarch was suddenly
threatened by so imminent a peril, that after some hesitation he was
compelled to decide on flying to the defence of the Neapolitan kingdom.


II.

Prince Conradin, son of Conrad, and grandson of Frederic II., was
the last representative of the Suabian line in Germany, and the last
hope of the Ghibellines in Italy. He was rightful heir to the crown
of Naples that Charles of Anjou had forcibly usurped; and in many
quarters he was regarded as the future emperor of Germany. On attaining
the age of fifteen years, numerous exiles, from Naples, Sicily and
other parts of Italy, sought his presence, imploring him to reconquer
his kingdom and restore the Imperial party in Italy. Conradin was a
youth of precocious intelligence, full of ardour and ambition; so,
fired by this flash of hope, he instantly resolved to cross the Alps.
Selling what little property remained to him, and collecting the most
devoted of his adherents, he gathered a small army and entered Verona
on the 20th of October, with three thousand horse and a considerable
number of infantry. From this city he despatched letters to all the
Christian powers, recounting his misfortunes: the injuries inflicted
on him by the usurpation of King Charles and the hatred of Pope Urban
IV., who, not content with summoning a French pretender to trample on
the Imperial rights, had gone to the length of excommunicating the
legitimate heirs of the Empire itself. By way of reply, Pope Clement
now renewed the sentence of excommunication on Conradin, tried to stir
all the powers against him by means of violent and venomous epistles;
and wrote pressingly to Charles, now waiting to give battle in Tuscany,
bidding him hasten to defend his kingdom from the threatened and
imminent danger. In fact, the Ghibelline movement was now spreading
throughout Italy. Pisa and Sienna were roused to great hopes, for the
cities of Romagna, Naples, and especially of Sicily, had all risen
against the French. By April, 1268, Conradin was already in Pisa with
his army, and numerous adherents flocked to his standard, although
the emptiness of his purse had caused some of the Germans to desert.
By this time Charles had reached Naples, was making preparations for
defence, and laying siege to Lucera, where Manfred's Saracens had
hoisted the Suabian flag. Conradin was ready to fly thither, without
even halting in Tuscany to encourage the cities revolted in his favour.
Pisa and Sienna openly sided with him; Poggibonsi had promptly thrown
off the Florentine yoke; and other places were preparing to do the
same. Meanwhile, the German troops at once directed their march on
Rome, where the Senator Errico of Castile was awaiting them. The French
in Florence sallied forth to intercept their passage, but were driven
back with heavy loss, to the great encouragement of Conradin and his
followers.

But the prince's fate was to be decided by the battle of Tagliacozzo,
fought near the banks of the Salto on August 23, 1268. At the beginning
of the engagement Charles's inferior forces seemed almost routed, so
that the German horse rode forward on all sides in pursuit. But while
all were scattered, riding down and pillaging their retreating foes,
Charles suddenly fell on them with the reserve of eight hundred horse
he had kept in ambush, and quickly turned the fortunes of the day. The
same evening, in a frenzy of delight, he announced his victory to
the Pope, who was equally exultant. The prisoners were treated with
unparalleled cruelty, being mutilated, beheaded, or even burnt alive.
Conradin escaped with about five hundred men, and escorted by Henry of
Austria, Galvano Lancia, Count Gherardo Donatico of Pisa, and other
devoted friends, made for Rome. But being then deserted by most of his
followers, he had to fly to the Maremma and seek shelter in the Castle
of Astura. But here, by the sea, when on the point of embarking for
Sicily with a handful of friends, he was seized by Giovanni Frangipani,
lord of Astura, who handed him over to Charles, and was rewarded by
grants of land.

The French monarch hastened to manifest his joy by renewed acts of
cruelty. It is said that one of the towers of Corneto was garlanded
with the corpses of some of the most distinguished and valiant
Ghibellines. In all the Neapolitan cities he excited the populace to
the fiercest excesses against the nobles of Conradin's party. And
his ministers in Sicily outrivalled one another in ferocity, for it
is said that, among other barbarities, so many unhappy Sicilians
were put to death in one day at Augusta, that the executioner became
exhausted with fatigue, and wine was poured down his throat to give
him strength to continue the slaughter. But the king's ferocious mind
was chiefly devoted to considering what should be Conradin's fate. To
murder thousands of fellow Christians, and let them die amid the worst
torments, was a matter of very slight consequence to him; but where a
victim of royal and Imperial blood was in question, he felt obliged to
hesitate a little. In fact, it is said that he sought counsel from the
Pope; but then, without waiting the reply, he sought to give an honest
colour to his revenge by investing it with a false air of legality. He
presumed to treat the rival whose throne he had usurped as one who
had rebelled against a legitimate sovereign, and to treat a prisoner
of war as a criminal guilty of high treason, and justly responsible
for all the excesses of the German soldiery during the campaign. Yet,
although the tribunal consisted of foes of the Hohenstauffen selected
by the king, some of its members spoke nobly in Conradin's defence. It
was affirmed that Guido du Suzzara, a juris-consult of Emilia, renowned
in his day, pleaded the youthfulness of the accused, his belief in his
own right to the Neapolitan crown, the motives of the campaign. It
was also reported that many of the judges remained silent, and that
one alone openly declared against the prisoner. But all was in vain.
Charles, who had already put some of the barons to death, and forced
one of them, Count Galvano Lancia, to witness the strangling of his own
son before being executed, never intended the trial to be more than
a sham, so, choosing to interpret the judges' silence as a sign of
consent to the prince's death, gave sentence accordingly. The verdict
was communicated to Conradin in prison while he was playing chess with
his cousin Frederic of Austria. On October 29, 1268, both were led to
the scaffold on the Market Place at Naples. The protonotary Roberto
di Bari, counsel for the prosecution, read the sentence aloud, in the
presence of the exultant King Charles. It is asserted that even many of
the French were stirred to rage and humiliation by this cruel scene. An
immense throng filled the Piazza, and many fell on their knees touched
with pity. Conradin removed his cloak, glanced at the silent people,
threw his glove to them, as an augury of vengeance in time to come, and
then submitted his neck to the axe. Thus died the Emperor Frederic's
heir, the last of the Suabian line. Frederic of Austria tried to kiss
his cousin's head, but was instantly seized by the executioner and put
to the same death. Many details, either historical or legendary, are
added by the chroniclers in describing this dismal tragedy. Although
a Guelph, Villani believed the false rumour (vii. 29) to the effect
that Count Robert of Flanders, son-in-law to Charles, on hearing the
sentence read by di Bari, was moved to such fury that he drew his sword
and slew the protonotary forthwith before the king's eyes. At least,
this tale serves to show what was the general impression produced by
the deed. Opinions vary as to the Pope's share in the tragedy. It is
certain that he beheld it in silence.[304]


III.

Although these events excited general and very severe condemnation in
Italy, they wrought immediate benefit to Charles and the Guelphs. The
Florentines profited by the opportunity to launch new sentences against
the Ghibellines, and shortly afterwards prepared to make fresh attacks
on their neighbours, and particularly on Sienna. For they still yearned
to avenge the defeat at Montaperti, and were now additionally irritated
by seeing their exiles again flocking to Sienna, and heartily welcomed
there. They also held that city responsible for the recent revolt of
Poggibonsi, and their action in devastating the latter's territory
sufficed to start hostilities afresh. The hopes of the Siennese had
been greatly inflamed by Conradin's passage, and even now they were
not disposed to be easily worsted. The chief ruler of the city was
still Provenzano Salvani, one of those who had advised the battle of
Montaperti and given notable proofs of valour in the fight. Since then
his fame had been increased by many noble deeds. It was said that when
a friend of his was seized by King Charles and condemned to pay a fine
of ten thousand crowns in exchange for his life, Provenzano came to the
rescue, and as neither he nor the prisoner's kindred could contrive to
pay the ransom, he stretched a carpet on the Piazza and stood there,
asking public alms for his friend until the required sum was collected.
Consequently he had great influence with the people, was a Ghibelline
and the declared enemy of Florence. Sienna likewise contained a
considerable number of Spaniards and Germans, old soldiers of the
Ghibelline wars, and there was also Count Guido Novello, who, although
of little worth, continually agitated in favour of hostilities. Thus an
army was recruited, consisting, Villani says, of fourteen hundred horse
and eight thousand foot, and this force besieged the Castle of Colle in
Val d'Elsa, as a reprisal for the devastation of Poggibonsi. Thereupon
the Florentines took the field with a small body of infantry, led by
the vicar of King Charles, and eight hundred horse, and notwithstanding
their inferiority of numbers advanced against the Siennese, gave
them battle (June 17, 1269), and achieved their defeat. Count Guido
Novello secured his safety, as usual, by flight; but Provenzano Salvani
justified his fame by dying sword in hand. His head was carried
round the field on the point of a spear. This was the fulfilment of
a prophecy made to him before the battle: "Thy head shall be the
highest in the field," although he had interpreted the saying as an
omen of success. The Siennese received no quarter from their foes, who
returned home in triumph, and thinking they had now avenged the rout of
Montaperti, began negotiations for peace. The first condition exacted
was that Sienna should no longer harbour Ghibelline refugees, who, in
fact, were soon compelled to depart and wander from place to place,
everywhere exposed to persecution and cruelty. Among others were the
Pazzi, who, having excited the Castle of Ostina to revolt, were seized
and hacked to pieces.

After a devastating raid on Pisan territory, executed by the
Florentines and Lucchese, Pisa signed a treaty of peace with Charles in
April, 1270. Florence herself concluded an alliance with that republic
on the 2nd of May, stipulating almost the identical terms and the same
politico-commercial agreements previously arranged by the peace of
1256.[305] Just at that time Azzolino, Neracozzo, and Conticino degli
Uberti, together with a knight named Bindo dei Grifoni, left Sienna
to take refuge in the Casentino, and were captured by the Florentines
on the way. The latter asked Charles what should be done with these
prisoners, and he replied, that they were to be punished as traitors,
save Conticino the youngest, who was to be sent to him. The others were
speedily beheaded, by order of the Podesta Berardino d'Ariano (May 8,
1270). It is related that on nearing the scaffold Neracozzo said to
Azzolino: "Whither are we going?" To which his kinsman quietly replied:
"To pay a debt bequeathed us by our fathers." Conticino perished in
a Capuan dungeon. This instance clearly proves the great supremacy
exercised by Charles over the Commonwealth. But the Florentines
were willing to tolerate anything from him in order to assure their
predominance in Tuscany by his help, and restore the prestige of the
Guelph party. The latter aim was already practically achieved, for all
Tuscany now adhered to the Guelphs, and both old and recent injuries
had been avenged. At this time Florence also demolished the Castle of
Pian di Mezzo in the Val d'Arno and razed the walls of Poggibonsi.

Meanwhile, however, the power of the Angevins had swelled to a
formidable extent. Charles was firmly established on the Neapolitan
throne; and during the interregnum had been nominated by the Popes
senator of Rome and vicar-imperial of Romagna as well as Tuscany.
Accordingly, while restoring the strength of the Guelph party, he
had notably aggrandised his own authority. His lurking ambition to
be master of all Italy was now clearly discernible, and accordingly
the Florentines began to kick against his perpetual interference, and
to object to every commune being subject to a Podesta of his choice
exercising absolute judicial power in his name and under his authority.
And as though this were not enough, there was also a royal marshal or
vicar in Tuscany who jointly with the rest perpetually harassed the
city by threatening demands for fresh subsidies. But even greater than
elsewhere was the jealousy excited in Rome. The Popes had summoned
the Angevins to the overthrow of the Suabians, less on account of
these being Ghibellines, those Guelphs, than because the Suabians had
entertained the identical ambition that Charles was now beginning to
conceive. Accordingly, there was now the same motive for combating him.

Niccolo Machiavelli has often repeated that the Popes "always feared
every one who rose to great power in Italy, albeit his power was
exercised by favour of the Church. And inasmuch as they [the Popes]
sought to lower that power, frequent tumults would arise and frequent
changes of power, since fear of a tyrant led to the exaltation of some
feebler personage, and then, as his power became increased, he in turn
was feared, and, being feared, his overthrow was desired. Thus, the
government taken from Manfred was conceded to Charles; thus, later,
when he excited fear, his ruin likewise was planned."[306] In fact,
Urban IV. had invited Charles to seize the kingdom of Naples; Clement
IV. had named him his vicar; Gregory X. was now beginning to oppose
him, and succeeding pontiffs followed his example. Thus three different
political games were now being played in Central Italy: the Angevins
already yearning for the dominion of Italy; the Florentines scheming
to use the French monarch's power to assure their own predominance in
Tuscany; and the Popes seeking to check the king's ambition and resume
their former supremacy over that state.


IV.

The first sign of this alteration in the Papal policy was quickly
detected by Florence, although Rome used every device to conceal the
real cause and object of the change; and, indeed, to prevent its
change of purpose from appearing on the surface. Gregory X. began by
expressing regret that a city so rich and powerful as Florence should
still be divided by the party strife of the Guelphs and Ghibellines.
He desired to see them at peace. No wish should have seemed more
natural on the part of the Head of the Church; but it roused the
king's suspicions to find the Pope suddenly inflamed by such unusual
compassion towards the Ghibellines. His distrust was heightened on
seeing how cheerfully the Florentines accepted the proposals of
the Pope. They had already shown signs of wishing to shake off the
royal yoke by requesting the king to give them an Italian Podesta,
as their statutes required, and already in January, 1270,[307] he
had felt obliged to make this concession in a graciously worded
decree. Instantly divining the real intention of Rome, the Florentines
now understood that the moment had come to second it for their own
advantage. They were all the more willing to do so not only to impose
a check on the growing tyranny of the king, but in order to remedy
another evil wrought by his supremacy in Florence. Charles was always
surrounded by his own barons and captains, whose foreign presence was
unwelcome, and by Guelph nobles and knights not only of Tuscany, but
from other parts of Italy as well. In Florence he constantly favoured
the old Guelph nobility, and on every visit to the city created new
knights. Thus, ennobled Guelph merchants were joined to the other
aristocrats, and assuming the rank of _grandi_, soon became opposed to
the people, and revived the old antipathy of the Florentine democrats,
who, just as they had rebelled in past times against the feudal pride
of the Ghibellines, now refused to tolerate that of the old and new
Guelph patriciate. Therefore it was necessary to curb the _grandi_ at
any cost, and it seemed the wisest plan to recall the Ghibellines,
who were equally opposed to them and the king. Thus the people would
be strengthened by the division of the nobles, and the latter, by
quarrelling among themselves, would lessen the number of those most
subservient to Charles. The king, however, could not be blind to the
hidden purpose of these intrigues, and was quite awake to the Pope's
real intentions. He knew that the latter was now urging the Germans to
elect Rudolf of Hapsburg as King of the Romans, in order to put an
end to the Imperial interregnum, and consequently to his own tenure of
the vicariate. Why should the Pope desire the election of an emperor
save for the purpose of weakening the Angevin power? Meanwhile both
pontiff and king preserved a feint of amity, and seemed to be on the
best possible terms, although their mutual distrust continually flashed
forth.

Gregory X. had decreed the convocation of a Council at Lyons in 1274 in
order to promote a crusade against the infidels; and reaching Florence
on June 18, 1273, suspended his journey for awhile for the purpose,
as he said, of re-establishing the general peace. He arrived with his
whole train of cardinals and prelates, accompanied by the Emperor of
Byzantium, Baldwin II., who came to ask Christian aid against the
Infidel, and escorted by Charles of Anjou, whose sense of the honour
due to the pontiff, so he said, forbade leaving him alone in Florence.
And as the Pope found the city to his liking, he decided to spend the
whole summer there. The 2nd of July was the day fixed for the solemn
reconciliation of the Guelphs and Ghibellines, and the syndics, or
leaders, of either party were gathered in the town. On the waste
of dry sand in the bed of the Arno by the Ponte alle Grazie wooden
platforms had been erected, and here the Pope, the Emperor Baldwin,
and Charles of Anjou were seated in state. The oath of peace was sworn
in the presence of a great throng of spectators; the syndics exchanged
kisses, and the Pope gave his benediction, threatening excommunication
on all who should dare to break the peace. Both sides gave hostages
and yielded castles as pledges of faith, and everything seemed to be
arranged in accordance with the benevolent intentions of the Pope. The
Holy Father was lodged in the palace of his bankers, the Mozzi, Baldwin
in that of the bishop, while Charles occupied several houses in the
Frescobaldi gardens. There was now time to enjoy life in Florence
before the return of the banished Ghibellines and the festivals to be
given in their honour. But suddenly it was learnt that the Ghibelline
syndics, instead of carrying out the concluding terms of the peace, had
hastily fled from Florence. And the reason alleged for this was, that
the king's vicar had sent them an intimation that unless they left the
city without delay, he would have them all cut to pieces at the request
of the Guelph nobles. Thereupon the Pope instantly set out for the
Mugello, much enraged not only with the king, but even more with the
Florentines for their indifference to the whole farce, and he punished
their violation of the oath by pronouncing an interdict on the city.

Meanwhile Charles continued his aggressive policy with regard to the
Ghibellines, and was seconded by the Florentines, who marched out under
the banner of the Commune, sometimes alone, but oftener in junction
with the French cavalry, to impose peace and assure the triumph of
their party in all the neighbouring towns. But their arrogant daring
was sometimes pushed too far. When the Ghibellines were expelled
from Bologna, the Florentines immediately set out to proffer their
unrequested aid to that city. But, much to their amazement, on reaching
the banks of the Reno, they found the Bolognese waiting to drive
them back. The latter had achieved their purpose of banishing the
Ghibellines, but had no intention of allowing the haughty Florentines
to come to disseminate their own party rancours under pretence of
assisting the city. The Podesta of the Florentines was killed in trying
to push through the opposing force, and the humiliated expedition had
to retrace its steps (1274).

They were more fortunate with regard to Pisa. That city, being torn
by party strife, had banished Giovanni Visconti, judge of Gallura,
and Count Ugolino della Gherardesca di Donoratico, two ambitious
Ghibelline nobles, who, deserting their own for the Guelph cause,
applied to the Florentines for help. They immediately granted it, and
joining forces with their new friends and the French, invaded the
territories of their old rival, capturing the Castle of Asciano in
September, 1275. The following June, at the instigation of the same
exiled nobles, they resumed hostilities with a larger army, aided by
the Lucchese and other Guelphs, and accompanied by the king's marshal.
Again victorious, they compelled Pisa to make peace on June 13, 1276,
and recall her exiles, especially the Count Ugolino, whose ambition was
destined to bring fatal consequences on himself and his native town.

Meanwhile Pope Gregory had returned from Lyons and reached Tuscany in
December, 1275. Still highly irritated against Florence, he refused
to enter its gates; but as the Arno was too swollen to be fordable,
he was obliged to cross one of its bridges, and therefore raised the
interdict from the city, although only during the time required for
his passage. His death took place shortly afterwards, January 10,
1276, and in a single year three new Popes rapidly succeeded him:
Innocent V., Adrian V., and John XXI. Then, on November 25, 1277,
Nicholas III. was elected to the pontifical Chair, and during his three
years' reign followed the same policy pursued by Gregory X., and with
even greater zeal. Full of haughtiness and ambition, Nicholas sought
to aggrandise his own family as well as the Papal power. He renewed
the scandalous practice of nepotism and simony by making some of his
kinsmen cardinals and appointing others to high offices of the State.
But on trying to negotiate the marriage of one of his nieces with a
nephew of King Charles, the latter mortally wounded his pride by the
reply, that although the Pope had crimson hose, his blood had not been
sufficiently ennobled to be mixed with that of French royalty.[308]
Nicholas III., already disgusted with the king, and suspicious of
his motives, could not easily pardon this affront. Hence he seized
the first opportunity to let Charles know that although Rudolf of
Hapsburg had not yet been crowned emperor in Rome, he had been already
elected king of the Romans in Germany, and that accordingly it was
no longer needful for Charles to fill the post of vicar-imperial,
only granted him during the interregnum. Thus the French monarch was
finally compelled to resign the vicariate of Tuscany, the title of
Roman Senator, and even his jurisdiction over Romagna and the Marches,
that had been partly accorded to, partly usurped by him. Perceiving
that there was no possibility of evading this blow, the king instantly
yielded the point without showing the slightest resentment, so that
the Pope was driven to declare: "This prince may have inherited his
fortune from the House of France, his cunning from Spain, but his
shrewdness of address could only have been acquired by frequenting the
Court of Rome."[309] Nevertheless, he was not in the least deceived by
the king's apparent calmness, and neglected no chance of diminishing
his power and aggrandising that of the Holy See. Thus, when Giovanni
da Procida was going through Italy seeking help for the Sicilian
revolution that was soon to burst forth, he received encouragement
from the Pope. Then, after showing much favour to Rudolph of Hapsburg,
Nicholas profited by the occasion to obtain his sanction for extending
the states of the Church as far as the Neapolitan frontier on one side,
and for including the March of Ancona, Romagna and the Pentapolis
on the other. And down to our own day the states of the Church
preserved these boundaries almost unaltered. Although at the time,
the domination of the Popes was chiefly nominal over part of this
territory, yet by dint of insistence they gradually achieved practical
supremacy over the whole of it.


V.

As a first step in this direction, Nicholas III. sent his nephew,
Cardinal Latino de' Frangipani, to establish peace in Romagna. As a
Dominican monk, Frangipani had shown great powers of oratory, and
was therefore fitted to enforce the new authority of the Church.
Count Bertoldo Orsini was also sent with him. After a short stay in
Romagna, the cardinal was transferred to Florence to renew with better
success the reconciliation of hostile parties Gregory X. had failed
to conclude. Now, however, the Florentines themselves seemed really
desirous of peace. Although freed from the too oppressive protection
of King Charles, they still suffered from the evil results of his
policy. The _grandi_, turbulent as ever, and with increased numbers and
strength, were threatening division even among the Guelphs. Villani
says of them that, "Resting from victories and honours won in wars
abroad, and fattening on the lands of exiled Ghibellines and other
fruits of enterprise, they began from pride and envy to fall out with
one another; so that many quarrels and feuds arose among the citizens
of Florence, and much killing and wounding."[310] First the Adimari
began to stir riots from hatred against the Tosinghi, next the Pazzi
and Donati came to blows; and this was seen to be a prelude to greater
evils. Accordingly the Guelphs sent messengers to the Pope, praying him
to send some one to pacify the city, unless he wished to see the party
divided against itself. The Ghibellines seemed equally anxious for
peace. They were weary of prolonged exile and continual confiscation
of their property, and cherished hopes that the popular hatred, being
now inflamed against the Guelph nobles, would be softened towards
themselves.[311]

Accordingly Cardinal Latino entered Florence on October 8, 1279, with
three hundred knights and prelates in his train, and was received
with every token of honour. The Florentine clergy went to meet him in
procession, and the Republic sent forth the _Carroccio_ with a great
number of standard-bearers. Being a Dominican, he was lodged in the
monastery of Santa Maria Novella, and laid the first stone of the
celebrated church of that name. He immediately began the negotiations
for the arrangement of peace.

On the 19th of November platforms were raised in the Piazza of Santa
Maria Novella Vecchia, and the parliament being assembled there in
the presence of the magistrates and councils, the cardinal asked
and obtained the power of concluding peace with the same authority
possessed by the people--that is to say, the right of imposing fines,
decreeing confiscations, and occupying castles, to guarantee the
due performance of the terms about to be sworn. He next essayed to
reconcile the bitterest foes: Guelphs who had come to a rupture,
quarrelsome Ghibellines, and hostile Guelphs and Ghibellines. All
went well until he came to the Buondelmonti and Uberti, whose ancient
hatred was too deeply rooted. It was impossible to persuade them to
be reconciled, for some of them indignantly rejected the proposal.
Hence the Cardinal had to decree their excommunication, and banish the
more obstinate from the Commune. Finally, January 18, 1280, was fixed
for the conclusion of the general peace. Great preparations for the
ceremony were made in the Piazza of Santa Maria Novella Vecchia; the
platforms were hung with tapestries, and the whole square carpeted
with cloth. Hither came the Twelve, the Podesta, the Captain of the
people (then styled Captain of the mass of the Guelph party), and
their councils, together with all the rest of the magistrates, and
a great concourse of spectators. Lastly came the cardinal with his
attendant prelates, and the general excitement was heightened by the
expectation of his speech, since he was known to be one of the most
eloquent orators of his time. He gave an address on the merit and
necessity of making peace, and finally the treaty was read aloud. It
was to put an end to all the old hatreds; it stipulated the restitution
of confiscated property to the Ghibellines, with some interest on the
capital; all sentences, oaths, leagues, and associations made by the
one party to the hurt of the other were declared null and void, and
every clause of the statutes tending to the perpetuation of strife
was to be cancelled. Either party was to furnish fifty sureties, and
bound to forfeit the sum of fifty thousand silver marks, in case of
any violation of the peace. As an additional guarantee certain castles
were to be given up, and the right was reserved of demanding more
hostages should occasion require. Then came a long string of minute
stipulations, all directed to the same end. Many of the chief families
were to be confined to fixed places until they made peace with their
foes and gave money and hostages in pledge of good faith. The delegates
of both parties kissed one another on the mouth, the documents of the
treaty were solemnly registered, and party decrees of banishment and
other sentences cancelled or burnt. The exiles were authorised to
return; and, without prejudice to the functions of the Podesta, the
captains, and guild-masters, were charged with the strict maintenance
of the terms of peace. For this reason the Captain was no longer to
be entitled Captain of the Guelph party, but Captain of the city and
conservator of peace. Also, the office of vicar-imperial granted to
Charles having now lapsed, it was decreed that henceforward the Podesta
and Captain were to be nominated for two years by the Pope, and have
each the command of fifty horse and fifty foot soldiers. After two
years the right of election would be resumed by the people, provided
their nominees were not opposed to, but actually approved by, the Head
of the Church. Each Captain would then have the command of one hundred
horse and one hundred foot, but, for the better preservation of peace,
the said troops must neither be citizens nor natives of the territory.
The guilds were likewise sworn to assist in maintaining peace. It was
farther decreed that the statutes should be revised, the government of
the city reformed, and an estimate made of the property of all persons
who had been condemned to pay fines or damages.[312]

This would seem to show that the cardinal was almost in the position of
a provisional dictator, with arbitrary power of decision. But he first
consulted the magistrates as to many clauses proposed by him, while
regarding other conditions of the agreement the Florentines obeyed them
or not as they chose. The people desired peace for the reasons we have
already described and the cardinal was therefore given full powers
to conclude it on his own authority and that of the Church. But his
success was far more apparent than real. In fact, the constitution of
the Guelph party remained in force, and as soon as he had gone, the
city was again torn by faction strife. He left Florence on April 24,
1280, after receiving a recompense of "mille floreni auri in pecunia
numerata, et alie zoie empte pro Comuni Florentie."

Nevertheless, during February and the beginning of March, he was so
satisfied with his imagined success as to attempt the reconciliation of
many adversaries confined to fixed domiciles. He likewise tried to give
effect to the constitutional reforms prescribed by the peace; above
all, that of replacing the twelve worthies by fourteen "good men,"
composed of eight Guelphs and six Ghibellines. These functionaries, in
co-operation with the Captains and the councils, formed the government
of the city, and were changed every second month. Nevertheless,
the Podesta and Captain remained in office for one year more. The
authority of the Podesta, as the nominee of King Charles, had been much
diminished under the latter's rule; accordingly increased powers were
now conferred on the Captain and Twelve, and the latter being augmented
to fourteen,[313] constituted the supreme power or Signory of Florence.

This custom of changing the Signory every second month--a custom
maintained to the close of the Republic--has given rise to much
discussion. Certainly, this rapid mutation of the highest power in the
State could not be favourable to peace; but, as we have had frequent
occasion to note, the new constitution of the guilds had reduced
the attributes of the central government to a minimum. Besides,
the manifest tendency of all Italian republics to degenerate into
despotism made the Florentines distrustful of any Signory of longer
duration. Now, too, the Ghibellines having returned, there was special
cause to fear that the government might be induced to conspire in
favour of some ambitious personage disposed to play the tyrant at a
moment's notice. For these reasons, it was decided on the one hand to
lessen the authority of the Podesta, and on the other to frequently
change not only the heads of the government but even, as will be seen,
other political functionaries as well. Later on, election by ballot
was adopted as another means of preventing the carrying out of any
prearranged design against freedom.[314]


VI.

Meanwhile the King of the Romans was sending his vicar to Italy, with
an escort of three hundred men only, to ascertain the temper of the
land, and whether the cities still acknowledged the suzerainty of the
Empire. On arriving in Tuscany, the vicar made halt at San Miniato al
Tedesco, and found the Pisans still Ghibellines, and eager to swear
fealty. But when the other Tuscan cities refused to recognise the
rights of the Empire the Florentines corrupted the vicar with bribes,
and, showing him the futility of his mission, persuaded him to depart
acknowledging the force of the privileges granted them by the Pope.

Thus they dexterously contrived to make the altered policy of Rome
a means of advancing their own interests and damaging those of King
Charles, whose power over Central Italy was entirely lost. By once more
calling the Empire to the front, and encouraging Rudolph of Hapsburg
to assert himself against Charles, Nicholas III. succeeded in weakening
both, while giving new strength to the Papacy. So, too, with equal
sagacity, the Florentines had made use of the king to dominate Tuscany;
of the Pope to enfeeble the king; and, finally, of both to avoid
yielding submission to Rudolph.

Nicholas III. died in 1280. He had compelled Charles to leave Tuscany,
and be satisfied with receiving from Rudolph the investiture of
Provence and the kingdom of Naples. To render this agreement more
binding, by means of a family alliance, Rudolph gave his daughter
in marriage to a grandson of King Charles. But naturally the latter
accepted the arrangement most reluctantly, and took every opportunity
of secretly exciting the Tuscan Guelphs against the Ghibellines,
who were again coming to the front. Also, having learnt by his own
experience the serious difference between having the Popes as friends
or as foes, he hastened to Orvieto, where the new conclave was sitting,
determined to use every means to procure the election of some candidate
favouring his views. As usual, he pursued this purpose unhesitatingly
and without scruple. Perceiving that the cardinals were temporising,
and dreading the consequences of delay, he excited a revolt, during
which the populace captured two cardinals of the Orsini house,
relations of the deceased Pope, and decidedly opposed to the Angevin
interests. After this event the election took place, and on February
22, 1281, Martin IV. was proclaimed. The new pontiff was French, and
being very friendly to Charles, immediately undertook to forward his
policy and support the Guelphs.

But the general conditions of Italy were much changed, and therefore
the king's triumph at Orvieto failed to prevent the consequences
entailed by his cruelty in Naples, and by the policy of Nicholas III.
from producing their natural effect. The latter's agreement with
Rudolph was ratified by the new Pope, who counselled the cities of
Italy to accord a hearty welcome to the emperor's daughter, when she
came as the bride of the king's nephew. Even Florence was obliged to
give the princess an honourable reception, although she was accompanied
by an Imperial vicar, who, as usual, abode at San Miniato, in order
to attempt to resuscitate the rights of the Empire in Tuscany. But a
far graver change occurred in March, 1282, when the Sicilians, wearied
of misgovernment, at last snatched up the gauntlet thrown by Conradin
to the people, and with the sanguinary revolt of the Vespers began
the long and glorious war that was to free Sicily for ever from the
Angevin yoke. In order to keep faith with the Guelph party and avoid
unnecessarily irritating the Pope or the king, the Florentines sent
five hundred horse to the latter's aid; and this contingent, commanded
by Count Guido di Battifolle of the Guidi house, and bearing the banner
of Florence, took part in the siege of Messina. But the revolution was
everywhere triumphant; the Florentines shared in the general defeat,
and had to return, leaving their flag in the enemy's hands. The island
was inevitably lost to the French.

Even before the outbreak of the Sicilian Vespers the Florentines
had naturally begun to be on the alert and watchful of their own
interests. Noting that the vicar was only attended by a small force,
and gained few adherents, they soon tried to win him with gold, and
succeeded in persuading him to leave the country after confirming the
concessions previously granted to them. At the same time, profiting
by the emperor's weakness in consequence of troubles at home, and by
the fact of Charles being at a distance in Naples and already gravely
preoccupied concerning the approaching crisis in Sicily, they seized
the opportunity to make some constitutional reforms. First of all,
now that the Podesta and Captain were no longer elected by the king,
but named instead by the Pope, they decided to grant them ampler
powers, in order to keep the city quiet by checking the arrogance of
the Ghibellines and tyranny of the _grandi_. Both factions were daily
becoming more threatening; and particularly the latter, which cancelled
magisterial decrees by absolute force, prevented the laws from being
executed, committed murder either directly or indirectly for the sake
of party revenge, and kept the city in a perpetual turmoil. It was
therefore decreed to allow the Podesta greater freedom of action in
the general repression of crime, and give the Captain a larger force
with which to maintain order and punish criminals to whom the Podesta
might have been too lenient. The _grandi_ were not only bound to swear
obedience to the laws, but to give hostages for their good faith;
so that even should they succeed in escaping from the city after
committing any crime, those who had given surety, or stood hostage for
them, would have to suffer in their stead all punishments or fines to
which the contumacious were condemned. To ensure the execution of all
these decrees a thousand armed men were chosen among the citizens. Of
this number two hundred were contributed by the Sesto of St. Piero
Scheraggio, as many by that of the Borgo, the four other Sesti each
giving 150 men, and then the whole thousand being divided in companies
with the banners of the different quarters, or rather _sestieri_ of
the city, 450 men were placed at the orders of the Podesta, and 550
under the Captain's command. They bore colours given them by either
magistrate in the presence of the public parliament, and whenever the
bell rang the signal for their assembly no gatherings of the people
were allowed in the city.[315]

This reform seemed the more indispensable, seeing that under Charles's
rule the employment of citizen soldiers commanded by the gonfaloniers
of the guilds had fallen into disuse, and order was maintained by
means of foreign troops. Thus the Captain had forfeited much of the
authority that it was now sought to restore to him. Now, too, we find
the Fourteen empowered to conduct the government without summoning the
Council of One Hundred, of which the documents cease to make mention.
Owing to this, and also to the lack of concord between the eight
Guelph and six Ghibelline members, the authority of the Fourteen,
instead of being strengthened, suffered decline. Accordingly, another
reform was in course of arrangement, when the outbreak of the Sicilian
Vespers gave the Florentines more freedom of action. They had three
special objects in view. Firstly, to make the Republic independent
of Pope, emperor and king; secondly, to close accounts with the
Ghibellines, because they were nobles, and as constant adherents to
the Empire supported its pretensions in Tuscany; thirdly, to lower
the pride of the _grandi_, whether Guelphs or Ghibellines, because
their tyrannous deeds kept the city in continual disturbance. This,
indeed, was one reason why the terms of Cardinal Latino's peace were
no longer observed; and why, above all, the promised indemnities to
injured Ghibellines had never been paid. Also, on February 8, 1282, a
Guelphic League was concluded with Lucca, Pistoia, Prato, Volterra,
and Sienna, whose adherence was compulsory; and San Gimignano, Colle,
and Poggibonsi were also given permission to join. The members of
the League swore to remain united ten years for the common defence,
and were each pledged to hire five hundred horse with the customary
number of squires. Also, as usual, the allies joined in a species of
convention touching the exchange and passage of merchandise.

But the most important point for Florence was the internal reform of
the city. All the guilds, and especially some of greater, were becoming
more strongly organised, and acquiring increased political influence.
In fact, the _capitudini_, or guild-masters, figure more frequently
in the public records, side by side with the Fourteen, the Captain,
and Podesta. It is at this period (1282-3) that we even find mentioned
a _Defensor Artificum et Artium_, together with two councils, an
indubitable sign of the growing power of the guilds.[316] For, although
the _Defensor_ disappears later on, and his office is deputed to the
Captain, this change only occurred when the government of the Republic
was actually carried on by the guilds. Meanwhile they already shared
in the election of the Fourteen, and aided them with their advice. The
chroniclers tell us that by a reform enacted in June, 1282, the priors
of the guilds were finally raised to office in place of the Fourteen;
but in fact the change happened less suddenly than might be inferred
from their account of the matter. For we find that--as was always the
case with Florentine reforms--the Fourteen continued to govern in
co-operation with the new priors, until, overshadowed by the growing
importance of the latter, they gradually disappeared altogether. It
is certain that on June 15, 1282, three _Priors of the Arts_ were
made chiefs of the Republic--namely, the priors of the Calimala,
Money Changers, and Woollen Guilds. They were attended by six guards
(_berrovieri_), and had six heralds to summon the citizens to council;
they dwelt in the Badia, without leaving it during their whole term
of office, and generally deliberated in junction with the captain.
The Fourteen remained in office with them for some time longer, but
chiefly _pro forma_.[317] After the first two months it was deemed
necessary to increase the number of the priors, not only because three
were found to be insufficient; but also being necessarily chosen from
one or the other half of the six _sestieri_, they invariably seemed
to represent one division only of the citizens. Accordingly, to avoid
delay, in the August of the same year, the three guilds of Doctors
and Druggists, Silkweavers and Mercers, Skinners and Furriers, were
added to the original number. Other guilds also were subsequently
added, but the number of the priors remained restricted to six, one
for each _sestiere_. Compagni says that "their laws [or functions]
consisted in guarding the property of the Commune, and in seeing that
the signories did justice to every one, and that petty and feeble folk
were not oppressed by the great and powerful."[318] At the end of
their two months' term the priors, assisted by the guild-masters and
a few additional citizens, designated as _arroti_, elected their own
successors to office.

Villani affirms that the title of prior was derived from a verse of
the Gospel, where Christ says to His disciples, "Vos estis priores."
What is certain is that by means of this reform the guilds, or rather
commerce and trade, had the whole government of the Republic in their
hands; and it should also be noted that although the above-mentioned
guilds, together with that of the jurists and notaries, constituted the
seven greater arts, yet the legal guild--perhaps because it represented
neither industry nor commerce--is left unnoticed by the chroniclers
at this point. Henceforward the Commonwealth is a true republic of
traders, and only to be governed by members of the guilds. Every title
of nobility, whether old or new, becomes an impediment rather than a
privilege.

Consequently many of the principal families began to change their
names in order to disguise their former rank. The Tornaquinci divided
into Popoleschi, Tornabuoni, Giachinotti, &c.; the Cavalcanti
became Malatesti and Ciampoli; and others assumed fresh names.[319]
Nevertheless, many proudly clung to their ancient appellations and
titles; and when King Charles' son, the Prince of Salerno, was summoned
to Naples from Provence, he halted in Florence by the way on purpose
to imitate his father by creating new knights. By these artificial
devices it was hoped to give new strength to an aristocracy that was
doomed to decline by the natural course of events; but the means
employed were too utterly opposed to the political and social temper
of Florence to have the slightest success there. No longer fettered by
Pope and emperor, and emancipated from the oppressive patronage of King
Charles, who was now absorbed in Sicilian matters, the Florentines had
organised the constitution in the manner that suited them best, and by
entrusting the greater guilds with the management of the State gained a
real predominance in Tuscany that they turned most skilfully to account
for the extension of their trade. The politico-commercial league,
concluded in March, 1282, to which we have already alluded, proved most
beneficial to their interests, and the subjection of neighbouring towns
and territories was another means to the same end.

Nevertheless, the two Ghibelline cities of Arezzo and Pisa still
remained hostile to Florence. The former was a threatening presence in
the upper Val d'Arno, while the latter, with its wealth, power, and
command of the sea, was a danger to the lower valley, and, standing
on the road to Leghorn and Porto Pisano, was an obstruction to the
maritime trade of Florence. Hence it was obvious that sooner or later
the Republic would be forced to combine with friendly neighbours and
new allies against both these foes, and especially against Pisa.
Free access to the sea-board was more indispensable than ever to the
Florentine trade, and should Pisa continue to block the way, the
Republic would reap nothing from the successes it had already achieved.

Meanwhile the Florentines enjoyed the benefits of peace for two quiet
years. During this time Charles' son, the Prince of Salerno, and other
members of the royal house were received in the city with all due
pomp and parade. In March, 1283, the king came in person to Florence
on his way to Bordeaux, where he was to engage in single combat with
Peter of Aragon, who had been proclaimed Lord of Sicily by the people
of the island. By this much-talked-of duel, that never took place,
the war desolating Southern Italy was to be brought to an end. Even
on this occasion the king, although noisily welcomed in Florence, and
probably oppressed by grave anxiety, insisted on creating more knights,
regardless of the trouble he caused to the people. Nevertheless, after
he had gone, the merrymakings were continued with greater zest than
before. On St. John's Day, always a great festival in Florence, a
company was formed of a thousand young men, who, clothed in white robes
and led by one of their number representing the "Lord of Love,"[320]
inaugurated games and diversions of every kind, giving dances in the
streets and within doors to persons of all ranks--ladies, knights, and
common folk. This Court of Love was in imitation of certain French
customs first introduced into Florence by the Angevins. It now
numbered three hundred knights, so-called _di corredo_, chiefly created
by King Charles, according to the French mode. They gave banquets and
had a train of pages, courtiers, and buffoons imported from various
parts of Italy and France. But all this was a fruitless attempt to
introduce customs opposed to the city's traditions, a childish means
of asserting the existence of a new patrician order. The populace
was enchanted with these gay doings; but the thriftier citizens at
the head of the government, and constituting the real strength of
the Republic, highly disapproved of them, and were disgusted to find
that after struggling so long to repress the nobility fresh efforts
were needed to stamp out its remains. Throughout Tuscany, indeed,
fresh warfare was impending, for the Sicilian Vespers seemed to have
roused the Imperialists to new vigour. For this reason Corso Donati
had declared, at a _consulta_ held on February 26, 1285, that all
districts appertaining to the Empire (_de Imperio_) and bordering the
Florentine territory were to be subject _ad iurisdictionem Comunis
Florentiae_.[321] New agreements were made to this effect with the
other Guelph cities.[322] But the most urgent consideration of all
was how to overcome the pride and power of Pisa, that obstinately
Ghibelline city with whom Florence had always been compelled to
struggle, and must now struggle anew. But how was success to be
assured? Florence was neither willing nor able to depend on the help
of the French king, and even with the combined aid of all its allies
could not muster sufficient strength for the enterprise. Therefore much
sagacity and diplomatic skill were required in order to multiply the
resources of the Republic, and the Florentines proved equal to the
occasion.


VII.

Although the city of Pisa derived all its strength and influence from
its maritime trade, nevertheless--either from being always on the
Imperial side, or because such was the predestined fate of all Italian
sea-board republics--it was dominated by a powerful aristocracy to the
same extent as were Genoa and Venice. With their usual astuteness, the
Florentines had long sought to bring their influence to bear on the
Pisan nobles, in order to create discord among them. Giovanni Visconti,
entitled Judge of Gallura, from the high and remunerative post once
held by him in Sardinia, as governor of several provinces, for the
Pisan Republic, had been subsequently (1274) exiled on account of his
Guelph proclivities, and had then joined the vicar of King Charles and
the Guelph League against his native state. He died in 1275; and just
at that time Count Ugolino della Gherardesca, one of the most powerful
and ambitious nobles of Pisa, who aspired to establish a despotism
there, was driven into banishment with other formidable Guelphs
(1275). These exiles not only made alliance with the Florentines,
but, in conjunction with the League, or _Taglia_, made war on Pisa
and captured several castles, Vico Pisano included. In the September
of the same year they returned to the attack in co-operation with the
Angevin vicar-royal, Florentines, and Lucchese, and, defeating their
fellow-citizens at three miles' distance from Pisa, seized the Castle
of Asciano, which was handed over to the Lucchese. In 1276 the war
was resumed by Florence and Lucca, and again at the instigation of
Count Ugolino and his friends. This was the occasion alluded to at
an earlier page, when both sides brought powerful armies into the
field and came to a pitched battle between Pisa and Pontedera, on the
banks of the so-called Fosso Arnonico, a canal into which the Pisans
had formerly diverted the waters of the Arno for the better defence
of their territory. Again the Pisans were worsted, and the bitterness
of defeat enhanced by having to accept peace on the terms proposed by
Florence, of which the first and hardest condition was the readmittance
in their city of all the banished Guelphs, and particularly of the
ambitious Count Ugolino, whom they hated so deeply.

Pope Gregory X. was highly displeased by this war, and by the ardour
and pertinacity with which it was pursued, for he considered the
Ghibelline spirit of Pisa a barrier to the growing power of the
Florentines, who, in spite of being Guelphs, used every effort to
become wholly independent of the Papacy. Wherefore, after vainly
enjoining them to put an end to the war, he excommunicated their city.
But the Florentines offered slight excuses, and until 1276 paid no
attention to his thunders. Then at last peace was declared, but during
its very brief duration plans were arranged for new expeditions.

After this the Republic of Pisa enjoyed a few tranquil years, and
owing to the vastness of its trade and the extension of its colonies,
its finances were rapidly restored to their former prosperity.
Unfortunately, certain Pisan families had become so powerful by means
of their wealth that, no longer satisfied with republican equality,
they sought to dominate the internal affairs of the State and direct
its foreign policy in favour of their personal ambition rather than
of the interests of the State. The Judges of Gallura and Arborea,
Counts Ugolino, Fazio, Neri, and Anselmo della Gherardesca, all had
their own little courts and men-at-arms after the fashion of princes.
Absorbed in covetous rivalries, they distracted the attention of the
magistrates from the dangers threatening their republic, and daily
becoming graver and more imminent. For, in fact, the strength of the
Republic was not only almost exhausted by the continuous attacks of the
Guelph League, but for some time past the rivalry of Genoa had been
threatening to culminate in a still deadlier strife. As both these
maritime cities were Ghibelline, they had every reason to be at peace
with each other and combine in defending their interests against the
far greater sea power of Venice. But, on the contrary, this only seemed
to exasperate their reciprocal jealousy. Their fleets were constantly
in collision in Levantine waters. They had a desperate encounter in
1277 near Constantinople and on the Black Sea. It ended in disaster
for the Pisans, who had been the assailants, and from that moment they
panted for revenge. Nor were opportunities lacking. While the Venetians
were asserting absolute dominion over the Adriatic, the Genoese and
Pisans, hard by on the Mediterranean, were always crossing each other's
tracks, inasmuch as both were engaged in the same trading ventures, and
both possessed colonies in the same islands of Corsica and Sardinia.
Thus, they were involved in continual conflict. Then, too, as the
Guelph League was specially hostile to Pisa, it supplied Genoa with
perpetual pretexts for beginning the hostilities which the Florentines
were seeking to incite by every political manoeuvre. At last their
reciprocal hatred reached so high a pitch that the Pisans themselves
were the first to provoke the war. Their burning desire for reprisals
was continually kept aflame by the greed of the nobles, who hoped to
convert the conflict into a ladder to power, and whose own ambitions
were spurred by the crafty encouragement of Florence.

Corsica was ruled by a certain Sinucello, bearing the title of Judge of
Cinarca. He had been educated in Pisa, and the Republic had assisted
him to regain and increase his hereditary possessions in the island.
Governing there as a vassal of Pisa, he nevertheless transferred his
allegiance to the Genoese, who occupied another part of the island.
Later on, after perpetrating every species of cruel and tyrannous
deeds, he turned against the Genoese and devastated their Corsican
towns. Taking refuge at Pisa, that republic granted him protection as
a former vassal, equally regardless of the subsequent treaties, by
which he had sworn fealty to Genoa, and of all the barbarities he had
committed. Pisa tried to reinstate Sinucello in Corsica by force, but
as the Genoese were determined to keep him at a distance, this served
to provoke hostilities. In fact, being sent back to the island with
120 horse and 200 foot, he was able to recapture his possessions; but
from that moment (1282) the Genoese and Pisan ships were always chasing
one another over the Mediterranean in order to engage. Accordingly,
from the end of 1282 to the August of 1283, a continual series of
sanguinary conflicts took place, sometimes attaining the proportions of
real naval battles; and although the Pisans were generally defeated,
they always rallied their forces, and prepared to resume the struggle.
On one occasion half their fleet perished in a storm; nevertheless,
shortly after this (1284) they sent twenty-four galleys to escort Count
Fazio to Sardinia, where collisions with the Genoese were of constant
occurrence. In fact, on the 1st of May, they encountered the latter's
fleet, gave battle, and carried on an obstinate fight that lasted
the whole day. Finally, however, the Pisans were beaten off, leaving
thirteen galleys and a great number of prisoners in the enemy's hands.
Notwithstanding this reverse, the same year witnessed another naval
battle between the two republics, that proved one of the most memorable
fights on record in the Middle Ages.

Genoa, whose victories had cost her dear, caused vessels to be built
and equipped in every port of the Riviera; while Pisa, although
exhausted by so many conflicts on sea and land, made prodigious
efforts of all kinds. By appealing to the patriotism of her noblest
families, she elicited a worthy response. The Lanfranchi, a numerous
Pisan clan, equipped no less than eleven galleys at their own expense;
the Gualandi, Lei, and Gaetani, furnished six; the Sismondi three;
the Orlandi four; the Upezzinghi five; the Visconti three; the Moschi
two; and other families joined in equipping one. Andrea Morosini,
the Venetian, one of the highest naval celebrities of the time, was
chosen Podesta, with full powers to make all requisite preparations
for the war, and to then assume the chief command of the fleet at sea.
Thus both sides sent forth the most formidable armaments to be seen
in those times. Genoese writers reckon their vessels to have been
ninety-six in number, and those of Pisa seventy-two; whereas Pisan
historians reckon their fleet at 103 sail against 130 of the Genoese.
At any rate, both are agreed that the Genoese fleet outnumbered the
Pisan, and that its superiority was enhanced by the greater skill of
its commanders. The two armadas cruised in search of each other for
some time, and then tacked about before giving battle, each trying to
gain the better position. It is averred that the Pisans sailed to the
entrance of the port of Genoa, discharging silver arrows and balls
covered with purple cloth, in order to make a display of wealth, after
the usage of the time. Anyhow, it is known that some of their galleys
were anchored off Porto Pisano, and others lying in the Arno, between
the two bridges of the city, when the news came that the Genoese fleet
had been sighted. All Pisa was in a turmoil; scattered crews hastened
on board, and the archbishop, attended by his clergy, and bearing the
banner of the Republic, appeared on the Ponte Vecchio, and blessed
the fleet. Thereupon, amid joyful shouts, the galleys weighed anchor,
and swept down the river to the sea. It is related that at the moment
the benediction was pronounced the crucifix on the standard fell down,
which was judged a bad omen.

The 6th of August, 1284, was a memorable day. The two fleets met off
Meloria, at a short distance from Porto Pisano. Here in past times
the Genoese had been severely defeated by the Pisans, and here they
now sought revenge in the famous battle so fully recorded by our
historians. The remoteness of the event, and the discrepancies between
Tuscan and Genoese accounts, make it very difficult to obtain absolute
knowledge of all the details of this fight. Accordingly it will be
safer to fix our attention on the best ascertained and more remarkable
points.

The Pisan fleet consisted of three squadrons. Of these, Admiral Andrea
Morosini commanded the first; while the second was under Count Ugolino,
who, in spite of his courage, was no trustworthy leader, on account of
the devouring personal ambition urging him to subordinate the interests
of the State to his own greed for power. The third was commanded by
Andreotto Saracini. Oberto Doria, an officer of great courage and
experience, was high admiral of the Genoese fleet. As it first hove in
sight, this armada seemed no greater than that of the Pisans, but only
because a reserve of thirty galleys, commanded by Benedetto Zaccaria,
lay hidden behind Meloria--or, according to other accounts, behind
Montenero--ready to join in the fight when required. Soon after midday
the battle began, and raged for some hours without any decisive result.
But when the two flag-ships met, both fleets closed in a general
engagement. On either side vast numbers of combatants, killed, wounded,
or stunned, were hurled into the sea. The waves were crimsoned with
blood; drowning men clutched at oars to save their lives, but were
relentlessly thrust under by the rowers' next strokes, owing to the
impossibility of checking the manoeuvres in the thick of the fight,
and at the most critical moment. Just then Benedetto Zaccaria, having
been signalled for, hove in sight, full sail, and with sweeping oars,
in time to decide the fate of the day. Seeing him draw near, the Pisans
knew they were outnumbered, and their courage began to fail, although
they continued the fight with undiminished ardour. As Zaccaria dashed
in, he contrived to bring his galley alongside Doria's, so as to wedge
Morosini, whose flag-ship was making a gallant defence. At the same
time the galley bearing the Pisan standard was also surrounded by the
foe. On all sides the sudden arrival of the reserve squadron had given
fresh courage to the Genoese and diminished the hopes of Pisa. The
struggle was now too unequal; nevertheless, both sides were unwilling
to end it, for each bitter enemy was seeking to destroy not only the
other's fleet, but the very life of the rival Republic.

But the conflict could not go on for ever. The Pisan banner, on its
tall iron shaft, was suddenly seen to bend, and the next instant it
fell with a horrible crash beneath a storm of blows, while at the same
moment the admiral's flag-ship began to give way, and Morosini, who
had been shockingly wounded in the face, was forced to surrender. At
this juncture Count Ugolino, for his own treasonable purposes, gave
the signal for flight, and thus completed the catastrophe. Seven Pisan
galleys were sunk, twenty-eight captured by the foe, while, according
to the inscription on the Church of St. Matteo at Genoa, no less than
9,272 prisoners were taken. Certain Pisan writers raise the number to
eleven, and some even to fifteen thousand; but this may have included
many of the slain, who may undoubtedly be reckoned at five thousand.
At all events, after the battle of Meloria, it became a common saying
in Tuscany that one must now go to Genoa in order to see Pisa.

When those who had escaped returned to Pisa, all the town flocked into
the streets to ask news of their kindred, and nearly all had to mourn
the loss of some killed or captured relations. A host of old men,
women, and children wandered about the city maddened with despair, so
that at last the magistrates were forced to ordain that all should
keep to their own homes. Soon all the inhabitants were clad in black,
and only women were seen in the streets. Genoa, on the contrary,
rejoiced and made glad; but victory had no wise softened its hatred
against Pisa. This was proved when the fate of the prisoners came to
be discussed. Some citizens proposed putting them to a heavy ransom;
others to exchange them for the Castel di Castro in Sardinia, the key
of the Pisan possessions there; but neither suggestion was approved.
Orators raised their voices, crying that it were best to retain the
prisoners until the war should be really at an end. Thus the women,
being practically widowed, but unable to re-marry, population would
be checked, and the Pisan army prevented from repairing its losses.
In fact, the war continued sixteen years longer; and by the time the
prisoners were released, their number was reduced to one thousand and
odd, all the rest having succumbed to disease, old age, injuries, or
hardships.


VIII.

It is difficult to decide which rose to greater proportions during
these years--the heroic endurance of calamity on the part of the
Pisans, or the insatiable hatred of their victors. Soon after the
catastrophe of Meloria, Florence and Lucca proposed an alliance with
Genoa, in order to join that power in completing the extermination of
the rival republic. This alliance was to be maintained for twenty-five
years from the conclusion of the war. Hostilities were to commence
within fifteen days, Genoa being pledged to provide fifty galleys,
and Florence and Lucca to furnish an army. Thus the allies could make
combined attacks by sea and by land, and were bound to carry on the
campaign for at least forty days every year. Pisa understood that
her total overthrow was decreed, and her detestation of Lucca, and
still more of Florence, was so keen that, to avoid yielding to those
states, she professed her readiness to accept instead the terms of
submission Genoa had sought to impose. But it was now too late. On
the 13th of October the treaty of alliance was subscribed, in the
Badia at Florence, by delegates from Lucca and Genoa, together with
the representatives of Florence, of whom Brunetto Latini was one. An
arrangement was also made allowing the other Tuscan cities to join the
League, and, what was far more remarkable, another clause provided for
the admission of Pisan prisoners of influential position who should
have sworn to make war on their own state. Even Count Ugolino, his
sons, and the Judge of Gallura, were to be admitted on the same terms,
provided they became Genoese citizens and acknowledged the suzerainty
of Genoa over their estates. Nevertheless, no prisoners were to be
admitted without the general consent of the allies, and were not to
exceed twenty in number. This clause clearly proves that many Pisans
were traitorous, or disposed to treason. Nor was Florence forgetful
of the aim she had constantly in view; for even on this occasion she
took care to insert profitable commercial agreements in the treaty of
political alliance.[323]

Several other cities of Tuscany speedily adhered to the League, and
preparations for war began. Pisa was soon surrounded on all sides.
The Florentines marched into Val d'Era, the Lucchese captured several
castles, while Spinola's Genoese squadron attacked Porto Pisano and
wrought much damage there. Suddenly, however, the Florentines showed so
much slackness in lending their aid, as to excite the grave discontent
of Lucca and Genoa. Their chief object was to promote their own
commerce; hence, while anxious to break Pisa's pride, and reduce the
city to submission on the plan pursued with other Tuscan towns, it did
not suit their views to let the Genoese usurp the chief share of the
work, much less the lion's share of the profit. Yet, as things stood,
the latter's naval superiority rendered this result only too certain.
For, were Genoa once mistress of Pisa, the Mediterranean would be
practically hers, and, with so much increased power, would be truly
formidable to Florence.

Accordingly, after raising such a host of enemies against Pisa, the
Florentines now tried to turn things to their own exclusive advantage,
and, with the usual double dealing of the period, paid little respect
to the treaties they had sworn to observe. The Pisans instantly saw
their opportunity and sought to profit by it; but in so bungling a
fashion as to hasten their ruin. As we have already related, they had
vainly attempted to come to terms with Genoa, and, their grievous
calamities rendering them unable to cope with assailants equally
formidable by land and by sea, they now made endeavours to conciliate
Florence. For this purpose they nominated Count Ugolino to the office
of Podesta, and even entrusted him subsequently with the direction of
the war, in spite of the general belief that he had played the traitor
at Meloria. For, knowing him to be Guelph, and secretly favourable to
the Florentines, they considered him fitted to fulfil their purpose
of detaching the latter from the Genoese interests. They knew, also,
that the count was absorbed in the single idea of establishing his own
domination in Pisa; therefore he would be ready to come to terms, if
required, with the enemies of his country, and be capable of the worst
crimes in order to gratify his enormous ambition. But, this ambition
once sated, the Pisans believed that, possessing many friends among
the Guelphs, his courage and astuteness would enable him to arrange
satisfactory terms. This proved to be the case, but his intervention
led to very unexpected results.

The chroniclers relate that Ugolino sent the rectors of Florence a
present of Vernaccia wine, with gold florins at the bottom of every
flask as a bribe.[324] This legend merely signifies that he was
considered capable of employing any means to attain his own ends. At
all events, he was obliged to impose very cruel sacrifices on Pisa
before the Florentines could be induced to suspend hostilities. It was
necessary to cede important domains, castles such as Sta Maria a Monte,
Fucecchio, Sta Croce, and Monte Calvoli, and to restore the city to the
Guelphs by banishing all the Ghibellines--the direst humiliation to a
republic that had always been steadfastly Ghibelline. But, with her
very existence at stake, Pisa was bound to submit even to this.

When, however, the Genoese and Lucchese discovered that the Florentines
had deserted them and were siding with Pisa against Lucca, they
complained so bitterly of this breach of faith, that Count Ugolino
deemed it well to at least silence Lucca by the cession of Bientina,
Ripafratta, and Viareggio. In this manner the haughty Pisan Republic
was stripped of nearly all its territories outside the city gates, and
deprived of all power of defending the coast, at a time when its ships
were being chased and plundered by the Genoese on every sea. Amid the
general ruin and desolation, however, Ugolino triumphed; for now, being
absolute lord of Pisa, his dearest desire was fulfilled. Nevertheless,
his power was much less secure than he supposed, for the fiery Pisan
spirit was not entirely extinguished, and already the majority of the
citizens were growing intolerant of a tyranny at home failing to spare
them humiliations abroad. The smallest occasion served to show that
public feeling was on the verge of an outbreak.

Much discontent was also provoked in the course of negotiations
with Genoa for the restitution of the prisoners, comprising many of
Pisa's best sons. Their release was desired at any cost; but the
count, knowing them to be Ghibellines, and consequently opposed to
himself, daily invented fresh obstacles to prevent their return, and
by proposing terms the Pisans could not accept, always caused fresh
delays. Thus, as he intended, no conclusion could be arrived at. But
his arrogance finally produced discord even among his own party. His
nephew, Nino Visconti, judge of Gallura, and the natural head of the
Guelph faction, began to make overtures to the Ghibellines for the
purpose of combating his uncle. Thereupon Ugolino promptly sent many
other Ghibellines into exile, and demolished ten of their grandest
palaces. This produced an outburst of indignation. Nino made close
alliance with the Gualandi and Sismondi, and all tried to hasten the
prisoners' release, while the count found fresh pretexts for delay by
reviving causes of dispute with Genoa.

After vain attempts to rouse the people against him, Nino and his
friends resorted to legal measures, hoping in this way to curb his
tyrannous excesses. He had been nominated Captain-general of the
people, but had illegally usurped the office of Podesta in addition,
and fixed his residence in the palace of the Signory, where he had no
right to dwell. His nephew and the others sued him for this before the
_Anziani_, and obliged him to leave the palace in conformity with the
law. He obeyed for a short time, but soon resumed his former supremacy
by force. Meanwhile, party hatred grew stronger, the count fomenting
discord with Genoa, while his enemies, as another means to his
overthrow, were doing their utmost to conclude peace and deliver the
prisoners.

At last the count discerned his peril, and tried to find some way
of escape. Seeing that certain Guelphs were no less hostile than
the Ghibellines and had joined with them against him, he decided on
conciliating the latter, in order to detach them from the Guelphs who
had forsaken his cause. Thus he might at once defeat these deserters,
and, having isolated the Ghibellines, find it easy to destroy them
later on.

But, in spite of these ingenious devices, both parties finally combined
against him, under the command of Archbishop Ruggiero, one of the most
powerful of the Ghibellines. Civil war raged in the city; the public
palace was alternately seized by the archbishop, and re-captured by
the count; while the latter, blinded by his fury for revenge, rejected
the warnings and advice of even his closest adherents. One day, when
the popular discontent had come to a climax, in consequence of the
high price of provisions, and no one ventured to inform him of it, one
of his nephews demanded audience, explained the state of things, and
advised him to suspend the levying of customs, so as to lower the price
of food. But this enraged the count to such a point that, drawing his
dagger, he stabbed the speaker in the arm. A nephew of the archbishop
chanced to be present, and being a friend of the wounded man, rushed
forward to shield him from further attack. Thereupon the count,
maddened with fury, caught up an axe that lay near, and with one blow
stretched the intruder dead at his feet.

The Archbishop Ruggieri dissimulated for a while, waiting his chance
to take revenge. It came at last. On July 1, 1288, the council of
the Republic was assembled in the Church of St. Sebastian to discuss
the arrangement of peace with Genoa. Both the Ghibellines and people
yearned for peace at any cost; but the count raised fresh obstacles,
still relying on the support of his friends. As the meeting dispersed,
the archbishop perceived that the favourable moment had arrived, and
that no time must be lost. The Gualandi, Sismondi, Lanfranchi and other
houses joined with him, and all proceeded to attack Ugolino. The latter
made a valiant resistance, aided by two of his sons, two nephews,
and a few devoted followers. After the first encounter, in which
Ugolino's natural son was slain before his eyes, he took refuge in the
palace of the people, and defended it from midday to dusk, when the
besiegers decided to set it on fire. Then, forcing their way through
the flames, they captured the count, with his two younger sons, Gaddo
and Uguccione, and his nephews Nino, surnamed Brigata, and Anselmuccio.
The prisoners were thrown into the Gualandi tower on the Piazza degli
Anziani, and Ruggieri kept them most closely confined there for several
months.[325] Finally the key of the tower was cast into the Arno,
and all left to die of starvation, amid the torments immortalised by
Dante's pen.[326]


IX.

These events, while still further reducing the strength of the
unfortunate city, likewise caused the overthrow of the Pisan Guelphs,
by once more driving them into exile, and promoted the hopes of the
Ghibellines, who now seemed to have gained new life in Tuscany.
Accordingly Florence was again compelled to recur to arms. Charles
I of Anjou was no more, and Pope Honorius, being favourable to the
Ghibellines, had instigated his kinsman, Prenzivalle del Fiesco, to
assume the post of vicar-imperial in Tuscany, But as the cities of
the League gave him a very rough reception, he retired to Arezzo, and
vainly promulgated edicts against the Guelphs. By this time no one
heeded the words of Imperial vicars. On realising this he went back to
Germany, leaving Arezzo a prey to conflicts, in which the Ghibellines
won the victory, with the help of numerous Florentine exiles. The
Guelphs sought refuge in neighbouring castles, whither reinforcements
reached them from the Florentine Signory. Thus the war spread even to
the Upper Val d'Arno; for as the Ghibellines had returned to power,
both in Arezzo and Pisa, led by the spiritual lord of either town, they
had now to be encountered on two sides. In Pisa their chief was the
Archbishop Ubaldini, in Arezzo, Guglielmo degli Ubertini, an equally
Ghibelline prelate. The latter was also a better warrior than priest,
the lord of many strongholds, and being of a very slippery nature,
first attempted to betray the city to the Florentines, in return for
an agreement guaranteeing him his possessions. The men of Arezzo
contrived, however, to compel him to keep faith with his own party.
On June 1, 1288, the army of the League took the field. It comprised
nobles and _popolani_ from every part of Tuscany, and together with
the mercenary troops reached a total of 2,600 horse and 12,000 foot.
They carried on the campaign for twenty-two days, capturing and razing
about forty castles, great and small, on the Aretine territory; but
then a great storm wrought so much damage to their encampments, that
they were forced to beat a retreat. As a mark of insult to the enemy,
they had held races under the walls of Arezzo, naming twelve knights
_di corredo_;[327] but then, raising the siege, they went back to
Florence, leaving their foes unconquered and undismayed. In fact, when
the Siennese separated from the main body on the way to their own city,
they were surprised by a band of Aretines in ambush, and thoroughly
routed.

During the month of August the Florentines joined with the Pisan
Guelph exile, Nino di Gallura, made raids on Pisan lands, and occupied
the Castle of Asciano; then, in September, they marched against the
Aretines, who had now gathered an army of seven hundred horse and eight
thousand foot. No pitched battle, however, took place, for the enemy
retreated before the Florentines, leaving them to devastate the country
at their will, but afterwards made reprisal in the beginning of 1289,
by laying waste the Florentine territory, and penetrating almost as far
as San Donato. These variously important skirmishes paved the way for
more serious hostilities.

All Tuscany was now preparing for war. The captain elected by Pisa was
Count Guido da Montefeltro, who had risen to the highest distinction by
his victory over the French troops of Charles of Anjou at the battle
of Forli. He was undoubtedly one of the bravest warriors of the time,
and on his arrival in Pisa quickly reorganised the militia, and created
a new body of light infantry of three thousand crossbowmen, able to
do good service against the heavy cavalry then considered the chief
strength of an army. On the other hand, the Aretines increased their
forces so much, that when Charles II. of Anjou passed through Florence
on the way to his coronation in Naples, the Florentines were obliged to
grant him an escort of their best horse and foot soldiers, to protect
him from the attack threatened by the men of Arezzo. On this occasion
they asked the king for a good leader, to enable them to pursue the
campaign energetically, and Amerigo de Narbonne being appointed to the
post, he joined them, accompanied by William de Durfort and one hundred
men-at-arms.

On June 2, 1289, the new captain, Narbonne, took the field with an army
of one thousand horse and ten thousand foot soldiers of the League. It
comprised the flower of the Florentine nobles and commons, including
six hundred of the best-equipped knights ever furnished by the city.
Prato, Pistoia, Sienna, and all the allies, including the Guelphs
of Romagna, had sent their due contingents. Meanwhile the Aretines
had collected all the Ghibellines from neighbouring cities, and were
encamped at Bibbiena with eight hundred horse and eight thousand foot,
under the command of their captains, the greatest of whom was the
daring Bishop Guglielmo degli Ubertini. On finding that he could not
make terms with Florence to secure his own strongholds, without being
exposed to the vengeance of the Aretines, he had plunged into the war
with youthful ardour. His conduct was arrogant and full of assurance;
for he relied on his own courage and that of his men, and despised the
Florentines, because, so he said, they were as sleek as womenfolk.

On the 11th of June the two armies met in the plain of Poppi, near
Campaldino, where the engagement began. The battle is known by that
name, and rendered all the more celebrated by the fact of Dante
Alighieri--then young and unknown--having fought in it. The Florentines
had placed a mixed host of infantry, crossbowmen, and bucklermen in
the van, and their wings were formed of 150 skirmishing light horse,
who were all picked men. Vieri de' Cerchi was among the latter; for,
having been entrusted with the choice of those of his _sestiere_, he
insisted, in spite of illness, on accompanying his son and nephews to
the battlefield. In the rear of the first division a stronger force
of heavy cavalry and infantry was drawn up, with the baggage-train
behind. Corso Donati led a band of about 250 foot and horse from Lucca,
Pistoia, and foreign parts. He was Podesta of Pistoia at the time, and
was directed to hold his reserve back until the commander-in-chief
gave the signal to advance. On either side there was a fever of
emulation between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines, and to gratify the
ambition of their respective leaders, some were awarded the honour
of knighthood that day, in order to spur them to greater feats. The
Florentines were under orders to await the enemy's charge, and Messer
Simone dei Mangiadori of San Miniato shouted to his men, "Signori!
our Tuscan battles used to be won by vigorous assault, but are now to
be won by standing still." The Aretines, on the contrary, trusting
to their own courage and their leader's skill, made so impetuous a
charge to the cry of "_Viva San Donato!_" that the Florentine army
wavered, and gave way before the shock. Nearly all the light horse
were hurled from their saddles, and the main body fell back. But the
foot soldiers flanking the second corps moved forward to the cry of
"_Narbona cavaliere!_" and by threatening to surround the enemy,
checked its advance, and thus gave their comrades time to re-form.
Count Guido Novello, in command of 150 Aretine mounted skirmishers,
lost his presence of mind, and by failing to attack the foe at the
moment when their ranks were in confusion, caused much harm by the
delay. But this was his usual behaviour, and presently, as the fight
grew hotter, he took to flight--also as usual. On the other hand,
Corso Donati, although instructed to keep his men steady, and not to
advance until expressly summoned, could not remain inert on beholding
the Florentines waver at the first shock of encounter, and cried aloud,
"If we lose, I will perish with my fellow-citizens; if we win, let who
likes come to Pistoia to punish our disobedience;" and so saying, gave
the command to take the enemy in flank. Thus the attacking Aretines
were now charged in their turn. They made an admirable resistance, and
their cavalry being insufficient, the infantry crawled on all fours
among the advancing troops, and disembowelled their steeds. But no
prodigies of personal courage could avail to decide the battle. There
was a fierce and prolonged melee; the Florentines fought stubbornly,
and nearly all the leaders of the Aretines were killed. Archbishop
Ubertini fell, sword in hand; so, too, his nephew, Guglielmino dei
Pazzi, held to be one of the bravest captains in Italy, and Buonconte,
the Count of Montefeltro's son. Many Florentines perished, including
three of the Uberti and one of the Abbati. Count Guido Novello alone
saved his skin by flight. The Aretines were thoroughly routed, and,
according to Villani, left seventeen hundred dead on the field, and two
thousand prisoners in the enemy's hands. But of these only 740 reached
Florence, the rest having escaped or been ransomed. This is not very
surprising, when we remember that in these Guelph and Ghibelline wars
fellow-citizens, and old friends or relations, often had to meet in
combat; and that consequently leniency was more natural than hatred,
although there are only too many instances of the ferocity to which
the latter feeling was carried. The Florentine losses were slight and
unimportant. Corso Donati, whose daring charge greatly contributed
to decide the struggle, and Vieri de' Cerchi were both covered with
glory. Many men previously deemed of little account won high reputation
that day, while many others forfeited their fame. At any rate, all the
best citizens and captains returned safely to Florence, and there was
general rejoicing in the city.[328]

The Florentines had felt assured of victory from the outset. In fact
we are told that the priors, having fallen asleep on the day of the
battle, worn out by their previous vigils, they were suddenly awakened
by the sound of a voice seeming to cry: "Arise, for the Aretines
are beaten." At that moment all the citizens were in the streets,
waiting impatiently the arrival of news. At last the desired messenger
appeared, and there was an outburst of joy and festivity. Later on
discontent was excited by hearing that the army had failed to follow
up the victory by giving pursuit to the foe. For had the latter been
driven back into Arezzo, that town might have been easily seized.
Instead of this, the forces captured Bibbiena, belonging to the bishop,
plundered several castles, and devastated the country for twenty
days. They ran races round the walls of Arezzo, and used their rams
to drop asses crowned with mitres into the town, in order to insult
its inhabitants. But they suspended all serious hostilities for the
time, although, when the new priors had been chosen, the government at
once despatched two of them to the camp, in order to push forward the
war in person, and hasten the capture of the city. But the favourable
moment had passed, for the Aretines made some successful sallies, and
set fire to all the besiegers' engines of assault. Accordingly, leaving
a sufficient force to guard the captured castles and unfinished
siege-works, the Florentines returned home on the 23rd of July, much
to the displeasure of the citizens, who murmured that the enemy's gold
must have been poured into the camp. Nevertheless, a great victory had
been won, and the soldiers were received with vast demonstrations of
delight. All the people, with the banners and insignia of every guild,
and the whole of the clergy, went forth in procession to welcome the
conquerors. The Captain, Amerigo de Narbonne, and Ugolino de' Rossi,
the Podesta, entered the town in state, beneath sumptuous canopies
of cloth of gold, borne by the noblest of Florentine knights. The
entire cost of the campaign was paid by levying a property tax of six
_lire_, six _soldi_ per cent. in the city and its territory. This tax
soon yielded a product of thirty-six thousand gold florins, owing,
as Villani remarks (vii. 132), to the admirable administration and
organisation of the financial affairs of the Commune at that time.

After humiliating the two hostile cities of Arezzo and Pisa, the
Florentine Republic had overthrown the Ghibellines and assured the
triumph of the Guelphs throughout Tuscany, and thus gained almost
unlimited influence, both political and commercial. Hence there was a
vast and rapid increase of prosperity. Great festivities and banquets
were held in all the wealthiest houses, and palace courtyards, covered
with silken canopies and draped with gorgeous stuffs, served as places
of entertainment for the citizens. In token of rejoicing the womenfolk
paraded the streets wearing garlands of flowers. Nevertheless, there
was a general wish to continue the war, in the hope of completing the
overthrow of the two most powerful Ghibelline cities. This, however,
was no easy task.

In 1289 there were fresh skirmishes between the Guelphs and
Ghibellines, although none of any importance. The Florentines made
several attempts to capture Arezzo by force and by fraud, but always
in vain. In November they had contrived a secret arrangement by means
of which it was hoped to surprise the city. A decree was suddenly
issued summoning all able-bodied men to assemble outside the walls
before a candle lighted at one of the gates should have time to burn
down. The army thus hastily gathered made a forced march on Arezzo; but
the treason plotted there had been already discovered: a dying man,
rumour said, having revealed it to his confessor. At any rate, the army
was obliged to withdraw from a bootless errand.

In the June of the ensuing year, 1290, the Florentines resumed the
campaign with an army of 1,500 horse and 6,000 foot, furnished by the
League. Surrounding Arezzo, they devastated the territory within a
circuit of six miles, for the space of twenty-nine days, but without
achieving any farther result. At that period all cities were fortified,
and before the invention of gunpowder siege operations had no chance
of success, save by treason, against a resolute defence. Now, too, the
Florentines were trying to carry on a double campaign, against Arezzo
on the one hand and Pisa on the other. In fact, presently leaving three
hundred horse and a considerable number of foot soldiers to garrison
the neighbouring strongholds, they transferred the rest of the army
from the Upper to the Lower Val d'Arno, to act against Pisa.

In the preceding year, aided by Florence and the League, Lucca had
taken the field with four hundred horse and two thousand foot, in
order to carry on the war with Pisa, while the Florentines were busied
with Arezzo. This force encamped before Pisa, and, according to usage,
held races there; harried the territory for twenty-five days, captured
the Castle of Caprona, and made several assaults on Vico Pisano, but
achieved no farther result. Now, in 1290, the Florentines resumed the
attack in combination with all the great forces of the League. And
while this army was making a general attack by land, the Genoese fleet
swooped down on the coast with deadly effect. Leghorn and Porto Pisano
were taken, the four towers guarding the harbour were thrown into the
sea, and the Meloria lighthouse destroyed in the same way, together
with its keepers. Before setting sail the Genoese blocked the mouth of
the harbour by sinking four ships laden with ballast, and demolished
all warehouses and palaces. But the havoc wrought by land was confined
to the destruction of crops and the demolition of petty strongholds.
Meanwhile the Pisans made a brave resistance on all sides. Guido di
Montefeltro, their captain, used his newly invented troop of light
horse to excellent effect against the Tuscan infantry of the League and
the heavy cavalry in its pay. By his successful sallies he repeatedly
achieved a bloody revenge for past losses. In December, 1291, the
Pisans marched on the Castle of Pontedera, and finding it slackly
defended, accomplished its capture, and shortly afterwards stirred
the Castle of Vignale to revolt against San Miniato. Thereupon the
Florentines decided on sending an army to provoke a fresh engagement;
but the expedition was too long delayed, and the troops had hardly
started before torrents of rain inundated the country and compelled
them to retreat.

Military operations now slackened more and more, for mischief was
brewing in the city, and all men foresaw that worse troubles were at
hand. Therefore, although urged to resume hostilities by their valiant
and energetic leader, the Judge of Gallura, the Florentines so sorely
needed tranquillity that they finally concluded a treaty of peace
at Fucecchio on June 12, 1293. According to its stipulations, all
prisoners of war were to be released; no duties were to be levied on
inhabitants of the communes of the League in passing through Pisa, nor
on Pisans passing through the said communes. The office of Podesta or
Captain of Pisa was only to be held by a member of the League, and it
was expressly forbidden to confer that post on any rebel or adversary
of the said League, or any scion of the Montefeltro house. Further,
Count Guido, the brave chief who had shown so much energy and daring
in defence of the Pisan Republic, was to be dismissed, together with
all the foreign Ghibellines; and twenty-five citizens of the best
Pisan blood were to be given in hostage to secure the due observance
of the terms. Such was the reward of the veteran leader's fidelity and
heroism! On being paid off, he entered the council chamber, and after
reproving the ingratitude of the Pisans in dignified words, took his
leave without expressing any wish for revenge. Yet, being still in
command of an experienced army devoted to himself, vengeance lay in his
power, had he chosen to follow the fashion of the times. Another clause
of the treaty provided that the descendants of Count Ugolino and the
Judge of Gallura should be freed from outlawry and reinstated in all
their possessions.[329]


X.

From this moment the Florentines devoted their chief attention to the
affairs of the city, although these had not been altogether neglected,
even during the last wars. Continual improvements had been made in
the administration of the Republic, and in many respects it was a
model administration, while there was also a notable increase of
commerce, trade, and wealth. At the same time many public works had
been completed under the direction of the famous architect Arnolfo
di Cambio, the creator of some of the grandest public buildings in
Florence. He planned the alterations for the enlargement of the city,
first undertaken in 1285, and afterwards built the third circuit
of walls, the which work was also superintended by the celebrated
chronicler Giovanni Villani. It was likewise by Arnolfo's care that
the Loggia of Or' San Michele, then used as a corn market, was built
in and paved, the Piazza dei Signori supplied with a pavement, and the
Badia embellished and restored. Folco Portinari, the father of Dante's
Beatrice, founded, at his own expense, the church and hospital of Santa
Maria Nuova. The Piazza of Santa Maria Novella was laid out, and many
other public works of a similar kind were begun.[330]

Meanwhile political reforms were uninterruptedly carried on, and among
them the notable measure passed in 1289, reducing the Podesta's term of
office from twelve to six months.[331] The post was then conferred on
Rosso Gabrielli of Gubbio, a city supplying many Podestas and Captains
of the people not only to Florence, but to all parts of Italy. At that
period Romagna, Umbria, and the Marches seemed to be a nursery of these
dignitaries, the inhabitants of those provinces being not only well
trained to arms, as is proved by the horde of captains and soldiers of
adventure they sent forth, but also well versed in the legal lore of
the neighbouring university of Bologna. This reduction to six months of
the Podesta's tenure of office was not long maintained, but had been
decreed for the same motives as the change of Signory every two months.
The power of a magistrate authorised to administer justice, in command
of the army and invariably escorted by a body of armed followers in his
private pay, might be easily transformed into a formidable despotism,
as several Italian republics had already found to their cost. Hence
it was endeavoured to avert this danger from Florence by changing
the magistrates so frequently as to allow no time for hatching plots
against the Commonwealth, or forming a party whose adherence could be
counted on for any length of time.

But political and social changes of a very different and far graver
kind were now brewing among the citizens of Florence. Signs of a new
and radical transformation were becoming daily more pronounced; hence
the greater need of assuring peace in order to withstand the inevitable
and imminent shock of coming revolutions. The presence of the Angevins
in Florence, the example set by their nobles, and their continual
creation of new knights, had swelled the arrogance of the leading
Guelphs to a boundless extent. These patricians were now known by the
name of _grandi_, and in imitation of the French nobility assumed
manners ill-suited to a republican state, trying to rule everything
and all men according to their will. A serious riot took place in
1287, because one of these chieftains, named Totto Mazzinghi, being
condemned to death by the Podesta for murder and other crimes, Messer
Corco Donati, one of the leading nobles of Florence, attempted to
rescue him by force on the way to the scaffold. Thereupon the Podesta,
resenting such open violation of the law, caused the alarm bell to be
rung. The people flocked to the place of execution sword in hand, some
mounted, some on foot, to the cry of "_Giustizia, Giustizia!_" and the
sentence was then carried out with the uttermost rigour of the law.
The condemned Mazzinghi was dragged through the streets before being
hung; the promoters of the revolt against the magistrates were heavily
fined, and order was re-established in the city. But these disturbances
were indicative of deeper evils to come, and Florentine statesmen were
full of anxiety. In order to check the arrogance of the _grandi_,
and prevent them from combining with the populace, the middle-class
Guelphs began to grant political rights on a continuously wider scale,
while restricting the power of the nobles. As we have already seen,
the latter had been obliged to provide sureties personally responsible
for their actions, to swear to abstain from deeds of vengeance, from
oppressing the people and so forth. The very remarkable law passed
on August 6, 1289, served to overthrow the might of the nobles, both
within and without the city walls, and to enhance that of the people by
destroying the last lingering remains of the feudal system. Thanks to
this decree, serfdom was entirely abolished throughout the territory;
for in terms resembling a proclamation of the rights of man, it
declared liberty to be an imprescriptible, natural right, a right never
to be dependent on another's will; and that the Republic was determined
not only to maintain liberty intact throughout its dominions, but
likewise increase the same.[332] Thus every species of bondage, whether
for a term or for life, was abolished, together with all contracts or
agreements infringing on the liberty of the individual.

It has been thought by some writers that the Commune of Bologna had
already achieved this most important reform in 1256, and that Florence
only followed its example thirty-three years later. But this was an
error induced by supposing that in the Italian communes the abolition
of serfdom was completed at one stroke, whereas, on the contrary, it
was carried out very slowly and in different degrees. In the territory
there were not only _nobles_ and their _serfs_, but also _fideles_,
whose personality was already recognised by law, but who still remained
dependents of the _nobiles_ and bound to yield them service and
tribute. At a later date the condition of the _fideles_ was further
ameliorated; they could hold land in fee from their lords, or by
payment of a yearly rent (a _livello_), but remained bound to them on
terms of villeinage, and therefore bound to the soil. For this reason
the lords believed, or feigned to believe themselves entitled to sell
the soil, together with the _fideles_ attached to it, even when this
was no longer in accordance with the spirit of the law. The Bolognese
abolished serfdom in 1256, but the peasantry remained in their master's
dependence, that is, more or less as _fideles_, and although these
conditions were ameliorated in 1283 they were not altogether abrogated.
But even earlier than 1289 serfs had ceased to exist in the Florentine
territory, and, judicially, the _fideles_ had been long considered
almost independent of their masters, although the latter, by the abuse
of purely personal contracts, often compelled them to remain attached
to the soil and claimed the right of disposing of them, as well as
of the land. These were the abuses condemned and suppressed by the
Florentines in 1289, as being adverse to liberty, "the which is a
natural and therefore inalienable right." The new law likewise decreed
that in consequence of this natural right all the above-mentioned sales
became null and void; and cancelling every illegal contract, it finally
guaranteed complete freedom to the peasantry. And by another clause
every peasant was thenceforth enabled (irrespective of any sale of the
land) to purchase his emancipation from any personal contract binding
him to the proprietor of the soil. Thus the law of 1289 did not abolish
serfdom, inasmuch as that institution had been already suppressed by
the Florentines some time before, but it assured, for the first time,
complete liberty to the cultivators of the soil. Economically, the new
law was very advantageous to the Commune, by converting the peasantry
into direct contributors, and no less advantageous to the democracy,
inasmuch as it broke the last links of the feudal system, and weakened
the power of the nobles throughout the _contado_.[333]

Many other measures were also passed in 1289 and 1290 for the purpose
of strengthening the position of the people in the city, and serving to
show that Florence steadily pursued the work of political and social
transformation. First of all, the number of legally constituted guilds
was increased by adding five more to the seven greater guilds, and
all having their special insignia, organisation, arms, and political
attributes.[334] We now find records of twelve greater guilds in the
archives of the Republic, whereas, previously to this date, seven
only were mentioned. It is true that the number was very soon reduced
again to seven; but then the five omitted were joined to nine others,
these fourteen designated as the lesser guilds, and the total number
of the guilds was finally fixed at twenty-one. In 1290 another law was
passed, called _the law of prohibition_, decreeing that no prior could
be re-elected to office until three years had elapsed. Later on this
prohibition was partially extended even to the kinsmen of a prior.[335]
The scope of these measures was always to prevent the rise of any
future tyranny and to keep the growing arrogance of the nobles in check.

Other laws were also framed for the same purpose. As, for instance,
the two decrees carried almost unanimously on June 30, and July 3,
1290.[336] By these all guild-masters were prohibited, under severe
penalties, from forming monopolies, agreements, compacts, fictitious
sales, or other arrangements tending to the imposition of arbitrary
prices, regardless of the rules prescribed by statute. And not only the
individuals guilty of such infringement were subject to punishment and
to be mulcted in the sum of 100 _lire_, but the guild to which they
belonged was also subject to a fine of 500 _lire_ for neglecting to
enforce obedience to the laws, and its rectors and consuls were to be
mulcted in 200 _lire_.

On January 2, 1291, another law was passed of a far weightier import,
with the clearly expressed aim of curbing by force the wolfish
rapacity of the nobles (volentes lupinas carnes salsamentis caninis
involvi).[337] This decree rigorously prohibited recourse to any
tribunal or magistrate save to the legally constituted authorities,
such as the priors, the Captain, Podesta, or the judges in ordinary
of the Commune. All persons having obtained from the Pope, Emperor,
King Charles, or their respective vicars exemptions of any kind, or
right of appeal to other magistrates, and pretending to exercise such
right, and all persons who, with the same intent, should assert the
power of exercising old feudal privileges, were warned to refrain
from attempting to use such rights under penalty of the severest
punishment. The new law minutely described different forms of similar
fictitious exemptions, and determined the penalties incurred by
their use. What seems strangest of all is, that this law decreed the
punishment not only of persons asserting and trying to exercise the
above-mentioned rights, of the notaries transcribing the acts, and the
lawyers declaring them valid; but in cases where the real criminals
should escape punishment, it likewise held responsible the relations
and distant connections of the guilty, and even their labourers and
tenants. At that period the populace, the well-to-do burghers and the
nobles (_grandi_) formed as it were three classes of citizens, or,
indeed, three distinct social bodies, who both for offence and defence,
in all questions of party rancour, revenge or political privilege,
acted as though every one was willingly and of necessity bound to be
responsible for the deeds of his colleagues. Hence, recognising this
state of things, certain extreme measures were decreed, which, although
opportune and even imperative at the moment--in order to forward
the democratic cause by assisting the weak to struggle against the
powerful class--were none the less arbitrary. However, the necessity of
employing the most stringent remedies was becoming daily more obvious.
The nobles had been too much uplifted by the favours heaped on them by
the Pope and the Angevins. And the brilliant success recently achieved
at Campaldino, where victory had been decided by the prowess of Corso
Donati and Vieri de' Cerchi, had so swelled their pride that they
openly vaunted their contempt for the law, and constantly violated its
prescriptions. This state of things finally produced the revolution of
1293, resulting in the constitution of the second popular government
(_il secondo popolo_) and the total overthrow of the nobles.


NOTE A.

    "In Dei nomine amen. Anno sue salutifere incarnationis
    millesimo ducetesimo octuagesimo nono, indictione secunda,
    die sexto intrante mense augusti. Cum libertas, qua cuiusque
    voluntas, non ex alieno, sed ex proprio dependet arbitrio,
    iure naturali multipliciter decoretur, qua etiam civitates et
    populi ab oppressionibus defenduntur, et ipsorum iura tuentur
    et augentur in melius, volentes ipsam et eius species non
    solum manutenere, sed etiam augmentare, per dominos Priores
    Artium civitatis Florentie, et alios Sapientes et bonos viros
    ad hoc habitos, et in domo Ghani Foresii et Consortum, in
    qua ipsi Priores pro Comuni morantur, occasione providendi
    super infrascriptis unanimiter congregatos, ex licentia,
    bailia et auctoritate in eos collata, et eisdem eshibita et
    concessa in Consiliis et per Consilia domini Defensoris et
    Capitanei et etiam Comunis Florentie, provisum, ordinatum
    extitit salubriter et firmatum: Quod nullus, undecumque sit et
    cuiuscumque conditioni dignitatis vel status existat, possit
    audeat vel presumat per se vel per alium tacite vel espresse
    emere, vel alio aliquo titulo, iure, modo vel causa adquirere
    in perpetuum vel ad tempus aliquos Fideles. Colonos perpetuos
    vel conditionales, Adscriptitios vel Censitos vel aliquos
    alios cuiuscumque conditionis existant, vel aliqua alia iura
    scilicet angharia vel perangharia, vel quevis alia contra
    libertatem et condictionem persone alicuius, in civitate vel
    comitatu vel districtu Florentie; et quod nullus, undecumque
    sit, et cuiusque condictionis, dignitatis vel status existat,
    possit, audeat vel presumat predicta vel aliquid predictorum
    vendere, vel quovis alio titulo alienare, iure modo vel causa
    concedere in perpetuum vel ad tempus alicui persone, undecumque
    sit, vel cuiusque condictionis dignitatis vel status, in
    Civitate vel comitatu vel districtu Florentie, decernentes
    irritum et inane et ipso iure non tenere, si quid in contrarium
    fieret in aliquo casu predictorum. Et tales contractus et
    alienationes quatenus procederent, de facto cassantes, ita
    quod nec emptoribus vel acquisitoribus ius aliquod acquiratur,
    nec etiam ad alienantes vel concedentes ins redeat, vel
    quomodolibet penes eos remaneat: sed sint tales Fideles, vel
    alterius conditionis astricti, et eorum bona, et filii et
    descendentes libere condictionis et status. Et nihilominus
    tales alienantes, vel quomodolibet in alios transferentes,
    in perpetuum vel ad tempus, per se vel per alium et quilibet
    eorum, et ipsorum et cuiusque eorum sindici, procuratores et
    nuntii, et tales emptores, vel alio quovis titulo, modo, causa
    vel iure acquirentes, per se vel per alium in perpetuum modo
    vel ad tempus, et eorum procuratores, sindici et nuntii et
    iudices et notarii et testes, qui predictis interfuerint vel ea
    scripserint, et quilibet eorum, condempnentur in libris mille
    f. p., que effectualiter exigantur, non obstantibus aliquibus
    pactis vel conventionibus, etiam iuramento vel pena vallatis,
    iam factis vel in posterum ineundis, super predictis vel aliquo
    predictorum vendendis, permutandis vel alio quovis modo vel
    titulo transferendis. Quos contractus supradicti domini Priores
    et Sapientes nullius valoris et roboris fore decreverunt, et
    quatenus de facto processissent vel procederent, totaliter
    cassaverunt et cassant. Decernentes etiam quod si aliquis
    non subiectus iurisdictioni Comunis Florentie, et qui non
    respondeat in civilibus et criminalibus regimini florentino,
    vel non solvat libras et factiones Comunis Florentie,
    undecunque sit, per se vel per alium, predictos contractus vel
    aliquem predictorum iniret aliquo modo iure vel causa, quod
    pater et fratres et alii propinquiores ipsius, si patrem vel
    fratrem non haberet, et quilibet eorum condempnentur in libris
    mille f. p., que pena effectualiter exigatur; reservantes
    etiam sibi et populo florentino potestatem super predictis et
    quolibet predictorum acrius providendi contra tales concedentes
    vel concessiones recipientes per se vel per alium in aliquibus
    casibus de predictis. Et quod in predictis omnibus et singulis
    et circa predicta domini Potestas et Defensor et Capitaneus
    presentes et futuri et quilibet eorum plenum, merum et liberum
    arbitrium habeant et exercere debeant contra illos, qui in
    predictis vel circa predicta committerent in personis et rebus,
    ita et taliter quod predicta omnia et singula effectualiter
    observentur et executioni mandentur. Salvo tamen quod Comuni
    Florentie quilibet possit licite vendere et in ipsum Comune
    predicta iura transferre; et etiam ipsi Fideles et alii
    supradicti se ipsos et eorum filios et descendentes et bona
    licite possint redimere sine pena; et illi tales qui talia
    iura haberent, possint ipsa iura ipsis fidelibus volentibus
    se redimere vendere et eos liberare a tali iure licite et
    impune. Et hec omnia et singula locum habeant ad futura et
    etiam ad preterita, a kallendis ianuarii proxime presentis
    citra, currentibus annis Domini millesimo CC^{o} LXXXVIII^{o}
    indictione secunda."

    This law was read and approved of in the general and special
    council of the captain and of the _capitudini_, as was the
    custom, but not in that of the Podesta. It has been published
    many times, but not without mistakes and omissions: by the
    lawyer Migliorotto Maccioni in a work of his in favour of
    the Counts of Gherardesca (vol. ii. p. 74); by C. F. Von
    Rumohr, "Ursprung der Besitzlosigkeit des Colonen in neuren
    Toscana" (Hamburg, 1830), pp. 100-103; and in the "Osservatore
    Fiorentino" (vol. iv. p. 179). Florence: Ricci, 1821. We give
    it as it is in the original text in the State Archives of
    Florence, _Provvisioni_ Registro 2, a. c. 24-25.


NOTE B.

    The defender of the artisans and of the guilds, Captain and
    _Conservatore_ of the city and commune of Florence, brought
    forward the proposal in the special and general council on
    June 30, 1290, "presentibus et volentibus Dominis Prioribus
    Artium," and the proposal, carried almost unanimously (_placuit
    quasi omnibus_), ran as follows:--"Quia per quamplures homines
    civitatis Florentie fide dignos, relatum est coram officio
    dominorum Priorum Artium, quod multi sunt artifices et
    comunitates seu universitates Artium et earum Rectores, qui
    certum modum et formam indecentem, et certum precium incongruum
    imponunt in eorum mercantiis et rebus eorum Artium vendendis
    contra iustitiam et Rempublicam." It ended by strictly
    forbidding every sort of monopoly and every contract of sale
    arranged in a manner contrary to custom or to the laws, "et
    quod dogana aliqua vel compositio non fiat contra honorem et
    iurisdictionem Comunis Florentie, per quam vel quas prohibitum
    sit a Rectoribus vel Consulibus ipsorum Artis, quod aliqui vel
    aliquis ad certum modum et certam formam et certum precium
    vendant, vel vendere debeant mercantias," ec. To which Guidotto
    Canigiani added, that the signory should henceforward formulate
    other articles, not so as to weaken the said provision, but
    only to strengthen it more and more in the interest of the
    guilds. And his amendment was approved together with the
    provision itself (State Archives, Florence, _Provvisioni_,
    Registro iv. c. 29). And on the 3rd of July, by reason of the
    former amendment, the _priori_ of the guilds, together with the
    other wise men consulted by them, decreed: "Quod nulli Consules
    vel Rectores alicuius Artis, aut aliquis alius, vice et nomine
    alicuius Artis, vel aliqua singularis persona alicuius Artis,
    utatur aliquo ordinamento scripto vel non scripto, extra
    Constitutum Artis approbatum per Comune Florentie, vel aliter
    vel ultra quam contineatur in statuto talis Artis, ec.... Et
    siqua facta essent in contarium vel fierent in futuro tacite
    vel expresse, non valeant nec teneant ullo modo vel iure, sed
    sint cassa et irrita ipso iure ec. Et quod nullus notarius
    vel alius scriptor scribere debeat aliquid de predictis vel
    contra predicta, et nullus nuntius vel alius precipiat aliquid
    aliquibus artificibus contra predicta: sub pena Rectori et
    Consuli contrafacienti auferenda librarum cc. pro quolibet et
    qualibet vice; et Arti, librarum quingentarum; et sub pena
    librarum centum pro quolibet, qui observaret talia ordinamenta
    vel precepta prohibita; et sub pena libr. centum cuilibet qui
    de predictis ordinamentis prohibitis faceret precepta Arti seu
    artificibus alicuius Artis." This provision was to be read in
    the captain's council every month and cried about the city.
    (_Provvisioni_, Registro, iv. a. c. 30-31.)


NOTE C.

    On the 31st of January (new style, 1291) a provision was
    made, beginning with this singular proemium:--"Ad honorem,
    ec. Ut cives et comitatini Florentie non opprimantur sicut
    hactenus oppressi sunt, et ut hominum fraudibus et malitiis
    que circa infrascripta committi solent, debitis remediis
    obvietur et resistatur, quod quidem videtur nullomodo fieri
    posse, nisi iuxta sapientis doctrinam, dicentis quod contraria
    suis purgantur contrariis; ideoquo volentes lupinas carnes
    salsamentis caninis involvi et castigari debere, ita quod lupi
    rapacitas et agni mansuetudo pari passu ambulent, et in eodem
    ovili vivant pacifice et quiete," ec.

    It goes on to severely forbid that any one should dare
    to: "aliquas litteras impetrare vel impetrari facere, aut
    privilegium vel rescriptum, per quas vel quod aliquis vel
    aliqui de civitate vel districtu Florentie citentur vel
    trahantur ad causam, questionem vel litigium aut examen
    alicuius indicis, nisi coram domino Potestate, Capitaneo et
    aliis officialibus Comunis Florentie;" and that he who, having
    falsified, did not cease from falsifying, when reprimanded,
    and failed to pay damages and interest within three days, was
    to be fined one hundred small _fiorini_, or more, according
    to the judgment of the _Podesta_ or of the captain, or of any
    other magistrate who had undertaken the prosecution. And if
    any one sought to disobey or escape from the jurisdiction of
    the magistrates, "teneantur Potestas et Capitaneus, qui de
    predictis requisitus esset, condemnare patrem vel filium vel
    fratrem carnalem vel cuginum ex parte patris vel patruum et
    nepotes eius, ec., in dicta pena, et dictam condemnationem
    exigere cum effectu, et etiam in maiori pena, ad arbitrium
    eorum et cuiuscunque eorum, si eis vel alteri eorum videbitur
    expedire. Et nichilominus compellat eos et quemlibet eorum
    dare et facere tali contra quem dicerentur tales littere vel
    privilegium vel rescriptum impetrata, omnes expensas quas
    faceret vel fecissit, occasione predicta, credendo de predictis
    expensis iuramento huiusmodi contra quem dicerentur predicta
    vel aliquod predictorum impetrata."

    Moreover, as we have said before, any one, who in the city,
    Commune, or district of Florence, directly or indirectly
    published such acts, together with the notary who wrote
    them out, and the lawyer who defended them, was subject to
    severe penalties. The Podesta and the captain could proceed
    as they pleased against any one who, "audeat vel presumat
    facere precipi eis vel alicui eorum, quod faciant aliquid vel
    ab aliquo desistant, vel citari Potestatem vel Capitaneum
    vel Priores vel Consiliarios vel aliquem officialem Comunis
    Florentie, vel eorum offitia impedire vel retardare coram
    aliquo vel aliquibus, ex autoritate aliquarum licterarum,
    privilegii vel rescripti, vel ex auctoritate alicuius indicii
    ordinarii, delegati vel subdelegati, vel vicarii." And as usual
    the penalties could be applied to relations.

    As it happened that many requested the support of civil
    justice (_brachium seculare_) "in deffectum iuris et in
    lesionem et in preiuditium personarum et locorum subdittorum
    Comuni Florentie," ec., it was decreed that this support
    should be given only when the suit was over, before competent
    magistrates, and after it had been examined. If in this case
    the magistrates refused, then action could be taken against
    them. But otherwise, those who should demand an unjust
    sentence were subject to penalties, together with their
    relations, according to the first paragraph of this law. "Verum
    si consanguineos, ut dictum est, non haberet, procedatur contra
    bona talis pretentis brachium seculare, et contra inquilinos,
    laboratores, pensionarios et fictaiuolos eiusdem potentis, et
    illorum cuius occasione petitur, et ad alia procedatur, prout
    ipsis dominis Potestati vel Capitaneo et Prioribus videbitur
    expedire." Two other paragraphs follow, of which there are
    ten in all, but at this point a gap occurs in the manuscript,
    (_Provvisioni_, Registro ii. a. c. 175-177).

[Illustration]




CHAPTER VI.

_THE COMMERCIAL INTERESTS AND POLICY OF THE GREATER GUILDS IN
FLORENCE._[338]


I.

The end of the thirteenth century marks the opening of a new era in
the history of Italy and of Europe. During the period of political
disorder prevailing throughout Northern Europe ever since the days of
Charlemagne, a literary culture was nevertheless developed, which,
although little heeded in past times, has been most clearly elucidated
by recent learned research. The literature of Provence, the romance of
chivalry, the poems arranged in the cycles of Charlemagne, the Round
Table, the Nibelungen Lied, the innumerable ballads, the splendid
cathedrals reared on both banks of the Rhine and constituting an art
never to be surpassed by its countless imitators, were one and all
the offspring of the mighty, primitive culture of the Middle Ages, in
which, for a long time, Italy had no share. In Northern Europe, where
conquerors and conquered amalgamated with less difficulty, national
art and literature were sooner able to spring into being. In Italy, on
the contrary, the conquered were oppressed, but never entirely fused
with their conquerors; gradually, rather, they began to assert their
individuality and their rights. The original rise of the communes was
the result of this struggle. Accordingly, at the time when France was
composing love-songs and poems of chivalry, Italy was absorbed in
founding political institutions and preparing to win freedom.

At the beginning of the fourteenth century the scene was completely
changed. Every branch of mediaeval literature seemed smitten with an
instantaneous decay, northern imagination and fancy to be suddenly
withered. Even there, in the north, men begin to strive, slowly and
painfully, at the task of political organisation. Meanwhile, the
Italian communes being already constituted, our country had already
given birth to a national literature, of so dazzling a splendour as
to banish all others from view, and relegate to centuries of oblivion
the fruits of earlier culture elsewhere. It was precisely at this
moment that Florence, then the chief seat and centre of the new Italian
culture, was subject to the rule of the greater guilds. The Empire
seemed to have abandoned its pretensions with regard to Italy; the
Papacy, weakened and menaced, no longer dared to impose its commands on
the secular world in its former imperious fashion; the struggle between
conquerors and conquered had come to an end, all distinction between
the German and Latin races having utterly disappeared, and Italy being
peopled by Italians alone.

Now, too, the prolonged conflict waged by the democracy of Florence
against the feudal aristocracy was about to terminate in the former's
victory, and the Commonwealth could be justly entitled a Republic
of merchants, whose trade was soon to enrich them to an apparently
fabulous extent. All seemed to herald a new era of peace, prosperity,
and concord. But in the light of after events we perceive that the
Republic continued to be sorely harassed by internecine strife; also
that, in spite of the splendid results achieved in art and commerce,
political institutions were on the wane, and the loss of liberty
becoming almost a foregone conclusion. How was it that a Commune,
enabled to assert its existence at the beginning of the twelfth century
and steadily progress in the face of tremendous obstacles, should now
show symptoms of decline in the heyday of its triumph? How was it that
civil war should still be carried on when all motive for discord seemed
extinguished by the victory of the popular party now at the head of the
State? We shall discover the answer to this problem by investigating
more closely the new conditions of Florentine society, and more
particularly the conditions of the trade guilds constituting its chief
strength and nucleus.

The number of the Florentine guilds welded in associations had been,
after various changes, finally fixed at twenty-one: seven greater and
fourteen lesser guilds, although often found otherwise divided into
twelve greater and twelve lesser. At any rate, the guilds of first rank
and decidedly highest importance were the following:--

  1. The Guild of Judges and Notaries.
  2. The Guild of Calimala, or Dressers of Foreign Cloth.
  3. The Guild of Wool.
  4. The Guild of Silk, or of Porta Santa Maria.
  5. The Guild of Money-changers.
  6. The Guild of Doctors and Druggists.
  7. The Guild of Skinners and Furriers.

As every one can see, the first on the list is altogether outside
the limits of trade and commerce, and seems rather to belong to the
learned professions. But it may be remarked that in those days judges
and notaries contributed very largely to the advancement of the
guilds, and were continually employed in their service. Together with
the consuls, they constituted the court or tribunal of every guild,
and gave judgment in all commercial suits tried there; they arranged
all disputes, pronounced or suggested penal sentences. Then, too, it
was the peculiar function of the notaries to draw up new statutes,
continually reform them, and provide for their due enforcement. They
were likewise engaged to prepare contracts, and were frequently the
mouthpieces of the consuls at the meetings of the greater and lesser
guilds. Good judges and notaries were in great demand throughout
Italy, and, as necessary instruments of prosperity, richly remunerated
for their services. Accordingly, their guild became one of the most
influential in Florence, and its notaries were reputed the best-skilled
in the world. Goro Dati speaks of this guild in his "Storia di
Firenze," saying that "it has a proconsul at the head of its consuls,
wields great authority, and may be considered the parent stem of the
whole notarial profession throughout Christendom, inasmuch as the great
masters of that profession have been leaders and members of this Guild.
Bologna is the fountain of doctors of the law, Florence of doctors of
the notariate."[339] At public functions the proconsul took precedence
over all the consuls, and came directly after the chief magistrate
of the Republic. As head of the judges and notaries he held judicial
authority, as it were, over all the guilds.

The four next in order--_i.e._, the Calimala, Wool, Silk, and
Exchange--commanded the largest share of Florentine commerce and
industry. They were of very ancient origin. Ammirato remarks that the
consuls of the guilds are mentioned in a Patent of 1204, but there
is documentary record of them at a much earlier date. But, although
boasting so old an existence, the guilds passed through a long period
of gradual formation, only developing their strength much later,
and each at a different time. The oldest and also the first to make
progress were the Calimala and Wool Guilds, virtually exercising almost
the same industry, inasmuch as both dressed woollen stuffs, and carried
on an extensive business with them. Nevertheless, seeing that each
pursued its trade in a way peculiar to itself, and achieved thereby a
special individual importance, the two guilds always remained separate
and distinct from each other.

From the earliest mediaeval times the manners and customs of the
Italians had been more refined and civilised than those of barbarian
peoples, and their handicraft far more advanced. We learn from a
chronicler, quoted in Muratori, that when Charlemagne was in Italy he
wished to go out hunting one day, and suddenly summoned his courtiers
from Pavia. Precious Eastern stuffs having been already brought to that
town by the Venetians, the courtiers were able to appear before the
emperor clad in the richest attire. But during the hunt their precious
stuffs and feathers were totally spoiled by rain and thorns, whereas
the emperor's plain tunic of goatskin was as good as before. Thereupon
Charlemagne turned to his followers and said, rather jeeringly: "Why do
you throw away your money so fruitlessly, when you might wear skins,
the most convenient, lasting, and least expensive of garments?"[340]
We may certainly doubt the historic truth of this incident; but the
chronicler's tale proves two things at all events, _i.e._, that the
custom of wearing the skins of goats or lambs was so general in the
ninth century, that even an emperor might not disdain their use; and
that, although Italian industry was then very undeveloped, beautiful
stuffs were procured from the Levant through the Venetian traders.


II.

The art of weaving coarse woollen stuffs is, however, so easy that it
must have been soon revived in Italy, and was probably never completely
abandoned. It would seem to have first begun to progress by imitating
the simpler fabrics of the Eastern Empire, where cultivation and
industry had survived to a much later date. In fact, all the earlier
Italian stuffs bear names indicative of their Byzantine derivation,
such, for instance, as _Velum holosericum_, _Fundathum alithinum_,
_Vela tiria_, _bizantina_, _Crysoclava_, _&c._[341] Nevertheless,
although the craft of woollen manufacture is of very early origin,
and was even practised by pastoral tribes, there were many obstacles
to its development in Italy. Improvement in the breeding of sheep,
and consequently in pasturing and agriculture, was required for its
progress. But, whereas the Italian communes showed great solicitude
for the promotion of trade, they not only despised but often crushed
agriculture. The Republic was constituted and governed by artisans,
who, after overthrowing the feudal lords, rose to supremacy; but
the agricultural class, although far better treated in Tuscany than
elsewhere, remained long bound to the soil, and never enjoyed rights of
citizenship. This fact alone serves to indicate the rest. All laws and
decrees relating to trade are full of good sense and foresight; while
all concerning agriculture seem dictated by prejudice or jealousy.

Then, too, regarding pasturage and consequently the woollen industry,
it should be added that Tuscany, being a mountainous country, is
adapted to the culture of vines and olives and excellent cereals, but
deficient in meadowland, whether natural or artificial. Accordingly, it
was an exceedingly difficult task to improve the quality and quantity
of the wool produced there. Although the Florentines soon succeeded
in manufacturing the woollen stuffs called _pignolati_, _schiavini_,
and _villaneschi_, these very coarse fabrics, the names of which
sufficiently indicate their quality, only served for a limited trade in
the territory or just beyond the borders of the Republic. And when it
was attempted to improve the manufacture serious difficulties arose.
To weave fine cloth from coarse wool was a fruitless labour; while to
procure foreign wool from distant countries was no easy task in times
when industry and commerce had scarcely any existence, and the cost
of transport would have devoured the profits. Nevertheless, it was by
conquering all these obstacles that the Florentines gave the first
proofs of their genius for trade.

In Flanders, Holland, and Brabant far better wool was obtainable, and
the art of weaving it so long established there that, as in the case of
the linen webs of North Germany, the origin of the craft is lost in the
obscurity of almost pre-historic times. But, notwithstanding the good
quality of the yarn, the woollen stuffs manufactured in those countries
were decidedly coarse, sent to market undressed, badly-finished, and
dyed in very ugly and evanescent colours. Accordingly the Florentine
merchants conceived the idea of importing these foreign stuffs in
order to dress and dye them in their own workshops. Hence the origin
of the Calimala or Calimara craft.[342] Bales of cloth began to arrive
from Flanders, Holland, and Brabant, and these so-called _Frankish_
or _ultramontane_ stuffs were carded, shaved, dressed, and cut in
Florence. This treatment removed all the knots coarsening the surface,
and as the material was much finer than Italian wool it could be easily
dyed in very delicate tints, and the Florentines soon surpassed all
competitors in this particular art. Then, after being carefully ironed,
faced, and folded, the cloth was re-sold in a very different condition
and at a much higher price. From the first there was a great demand for
these goods in Italy, and they were afterwards sent to the East, and
bartered for drugs, dyes, and other Asiatic products. Finally, as their
quality went on improving, they found their way to France, England,
and the same markets whence they had originally come, and where they
were sold in exchange for undressed fabrics. Thus the lack of original
material was not only supplied, but foreign manufactures served to
swell Florentine gains. A very extensive trade was carried on with
comparatively little trouble, and as the process of wool-dressing gave
employment to many hands, the Calimala Guild attained a position of
great influence that was naturally shared by the Guild of Wool.[343]

In fact, the latter being stirred by emulation and greed for profit,
used the utmost care to improve its manufactures. And the development
of the craft was equally assisted by the labours of private individuals
and the wise measures decreed by the State. At that time there was a
monastic order in Italy known as the Humble Friars, originally founded
by a few Lombard exiles, who, on being banished to North Germany in
1014 by Henry I., had learnt the very ancient craft of wool-weaving
practised there. Later on, having formed a pious association, the
exiles laboured at the trade for their bread, and after five years'
absence returned home a united band of workers. Down to the year
1140 they remained laymen, but then decided to form a religious
order, afterwards sanctioned by Pope Innocent III. Once admitted
to the priesthood, they no longer worked with their own hands, but
retained the management of the business, had it carried on by laymen
under the direction of a _mercatore_, and continually introduced new
improvements. It was natural that cultivated men, with members of their
order scattered over various provinces, should be able to forward
the progress of the trade they had founded. In fact, they acquired
so much celebrity for their administrative talents that we find them
engaged at Florence and elsewhere as treasurers of the public revenue
(_camarlinghi_) and as army contractors in time of war. Wherever a
house of their order was established the wool-weaving craft immediately
made advance. Hence, with its usual sharpsighted wisdom touching all
questions of trade and commerce, the Florentine Republic, considering
the houses of the _Umiliati_ to be great industrial schools, invited
the friars to establish a branch in the neighbourhood of Florence.

Accordingly in 1239 the Humble Brethren arrived and settled near the
city in the Church of San Donato a Torri, granted to them by the State.
Their presence led to the expected result. Before long their house
became one of the principal centres of Florentine industry, so that the
guild-masters complained of the friars' distance from the town, and
urged them to move their establishment nearer to the walls. In 1250
they obtained buildings and land in the suburb of Sta Lucia sul Prato,
and exemption from all taxes on their property, the which privilege
was usually accorded by the Florentines to any one introducing a new
branch of trade in the city. Then, in 1256, the Umiliati founded the
church and monastery of Sta Caterina, in Borgo Ognissanti, and carved
their arms over the entrance, _i.e._, a wool-pack fastened crosswise
by ropes. From that moment the wool craft made enormous advance in
Florence, and in every European market Florentine cloths began to rank
above all others. Efforts were made to improve the rough material and
to use additional care in dressing it, finer wools being imported
from Tunis, Barbary, Spain, Portugal, Flanders, and lastly even from
England. Thus so vast a trade was established, such great wealth
accumulated, that the wool craft rivalled and surpassed the Calimala
itself. Both guilds became great commercial powers in Europe, while in
Florence the government dared not oppose their decisions.[344]

Giovanni Villani informs us, in his valuable account of Florentine
statistics during the year 1338, that there were more than two hundred
wool factories, turning out from seventy thousand to eighty thousand
pieces of cloth, of the total value of one million two hundred thousand
florins, "of the which sum a good third was kept at home for the works,
without counting the earnings of the wool dressers in the said works,
the which supplied a living to over thirty thousand persons." The chief
profits of the trade were obtained by perfection of manufacture, rather
than by any increase of produce. Even Villani remarked that thirty
years earlier, that is, in 1308, the factories were more numerous,
actually as many as three hundred, and producing one hundred thousand
pieces of cloth: "but these stuffs were coarser, and of only half
the value, having no intermixture of English wool, the which indeed
they had not yet learnt to dress with the skill since acquired."[345]
This clearly shows that the craft owed its first improvement in the
thirteenth century to the Humble Friars, and was carried to perfection
in the fifteenth century by the introduction of English woollens.

In the same year of 1338 the Calimala Guild owned twenty warehouses
in Florence, "yearly receiving more than ten thousand pieces of
cloth, to the value of three hundred thousand florins, all sold in
Florence, and without including those sent out of the city."[346] The
Calimala craftsmen were exceedingly skilled as refiners and dyers,
and particularly successful in preparing the crimson cloth for which
there was a great demand in Florence, as it was used for the _lucco_,
a hooded robe worn by all citizens entitled to enter the Public Palace
and sit in the tribunals or councils of the Republic. The two guilds
afterwards made a division of labour in order to avoid infringing each
others rights. The statutes absolutely prohibited the Calimala from
dying anything save foreign stuffs, and the Woollen Guild had dyers
of its own, forming, as it were, a subordinate association. These
dyers were bound to deposit three hundred florins with the guild as
a warranty, and fines were deducted from this sum whenever the goods
delivered were soiled or dyed a bad colour. The officers of the guilds
were exceedingly severe on these points. Every inch of cloth underwent
the minutest examination, and the least defect in colour, quality, or
measure exposed the workman to heavy penalties. Some of these great
Florentine guilds were not composed solely of one trade, but were often
agglomerations of various crafts, particularly in the case of the Wool
Guild, which included many kinds of workmen, ranging from carders of
the rough material to dyers and finers of the most costly fabrics.
Thus, the guild being able to carry on the manufacture in all its
details, and the different craftsmen required for the common end being
all bonded together, there was no fear that any one branch of the trade
would raise its prices to the detriment of the rest. The emblem of the
Wool Guild was a lamb bearing a flag (_Agnus Dei_), while the Calimala
showed a red eagle on a white bale corded with many twists.

During the whole of the fourteenth and a considerable part of
the fifteenth century these two guilds continued to progress, and
maintained their supremacy in the markets of Europe. Nevertheless,
they were always in a difficult position, since Italy could not supply
them with sufficient raw material, nor could they obtain the number
of hands required to carry on all the work connected with their
business. To establish branches of the trade in neighbouring states
and subject cities was an idea that found no place in the economic and
political theories of the Middle Ages. In those days trade formed the
chief strength and social power of the communes: hence every commune
wished to have the monopoly of its advantages, and the statutes
bristled with decrees inspired by this blindly jealous exclusiveness.
For this reason, while pursuing the system of keeping the finer and
more profitable processes of the manufacture in their own hands, the
Florentines had opened factories for the first and coarser stages of
the work in every place where the best wool could be found, that is
in Holland, Brabant, England, and France. And even in these factories
they took care that the more difficult and profitable share of the
process should be done only by Florentine hands. Their chronicles prove
that they then spoke of foreigners in the same terms now used by the
latter with regard to ourselves: jeering at the indolence and stupidity
of the northerners, who even on their own soil allowed strangers to
snatch the bread from their mouths. But this state of things could
not last long. From very early times the Flemings had always been a
strong, hard-working race, and were very soon equalled by the French
and English. So gradually the eyes of the northerners were opened, and
the Florentines saw new factories rising abroad, side by side with and
soon rivalling their own, and were obliged to admit that, to their own
despite, they had taught foreigners the very trade of which they had
meant to preserve the monopoly. Nor was this the end of the matter.
Being now on the alert, the northerners tried to check the exportation
of their wools and of their uncut, or rather undressed, cloths; and
from the end of the fifteenth century Henry VII. of England began
to take measures to that effect. Thenceforth the Guilds of Wool and
Calimala were doomed to decline in Florence. Fortunately, however,
before this came about, the silk trade had assumed the same importance
in Florentine commerce that was gradually slipping away from the other
two crafts.

As every one is aware, the art of silk-weaving, though of very early
origin in the East, was only introduced much later to the Western
world. The Romans obtained a few silk stuffs from Persia, India, and
China at an enormous expense; they also had certain insects from
which material for highly esteemed fabrics was procured; but until
the closing years of the Middle Ages the real silkworm was unknown
in Italy, and the details of its first introduction in the West have
not yet been fully ascertained. It is related that during the sixth
century B.C. two Persian monks concealed some silkworm seed inside
their staffs, and thus succeeded in bearing it to Constantinople,
where they taught the art of rearing the insects. In this wise the
silk trade is supposed to have been originated in the dominions of the
Byzantine Empire, and carried thence by Arabs and Mahomedans to Sicily
and Greece. When Roger II., Count of Sicily, conquered the Ionian
islands, he returned to Palermo with numerous prisoners (1147-48),
who greatly assisted the progress of the silk trade there. Thence it
easily penetrated to Lombardy and Tuscany; but was first established
and perfected in Lucca, all the Florentines being still devoted to the
profitable wool trade.

The consuls of the Silk Guild--or of Por' Santa Maria, as it was
designated in Florence, from the name of its street--are mentioned
among other guild-masters in public treaties; but although this craft
too may be of ancient date, it certainly began to flourish much later
than the rest. Noting the fact that Giovanni Villani makes no allusion
to the Silk Guild in his very minute account of Florentine trade and
commerce in 1338, we are inclined to believe that it had made very
little advance at that period.[347]

We know that when Uguccioni della Faggiola besieged and took Lucca
(1314), fugitives from that city brought their improved method of
silk-weaving to Lombardy, Venice, and Tuscany, and the art being
particularly undeveloped in Florence, many chroniclers gave the
Lucchese the credit of having first introduced it there. Nevertheless,
for many years afterwards the silk trade was carried on by importing
the raw material from the East. But as the wool craft began to decline,
Florence gave its whole attention to silk, and the trade speedily
began to prosper. In the early years of the fifteenth century, Gino
Capponi--he who was commissary to the camp at the siege of Pisa--taught
the Florentines the art of spinning the gold thread they had hitherto
imported from Cologne or from Cyprus to interweave with their silk.
This was the beginning of that delicate manufacture of gold and silver
brocades, in which by the combination of technical skill with artistic
sense, the Florentines soon surpassed all rival manufacturers. The
markets from which their woollen stuffs had been ousted, were speedily
reconquered by their silken cloths and brocades. During the latter half
of the fifteenth century, in fact, we find Benedetto Dei, a merchant
of the Bardi Company, writing a letter to Venice praising the glory
and greatness of Florentine commerce and saying: "We have two crafts
worthier and greater than any four contained in your city of Venice."
And the gist of his subsequent remarks was to this effect: "Our
woollen stuffs go to Rome, Naples, Sicily, the Morea, Constantinople,
Broussa, Pera, Gallipoli, Schio, Rhodes, and Salonica. Then, as to the
silk and gold brocades, we produce more than Venice, Genoa, and Lucca
combined, and you see that we have houses, banks, and warehouses at
Lyons, Bruges, London, Antwerp, Avignon, Geneva, Marseilles, and in
Provence."[348] This long list of cities plainly shows that in Dei's
time Florentine woollens, though still prized in the East, had been
driven from the principal markets of the West, and replaced by silk
stuffs; and thus the two guilds shared commerce between them, one in
the East, the other in the West. Also, according to Dei, Florence
then possessed eighty-three factories, where various tissues of silk,
gold, and silver were produced known by the names of damasks, velvets,
satins, taffetas, and _maremmati_, and most of the raw silk used in
their fabrication was still imported from the East by Florentine
galleys.[349]

This is one of the trades longest preserved in Florence and other parts
of Italy, and to this day silk is among the most important of our
products. With this difference, however, that whereas in past times
the weaving of the silk was our chief source of profit, at present
we frequently export the raw material, repurchasing at an enormously
increased price the fabrics returned to us from foreign looms. In old
times we imported woollen and silk yarn, and exported Italian cloth
and brocade; in these days, on the contrary, we send no small portion
of our raw silk to Lyons, and receive it back in a manufactured state.
In the same way other raw materials, which we might easily work up
ourselves, are despatched to foreign factories.


III.

There was one branch of industry, however, almost solely the product
of human talent and energy, in which the Florentines stood positively
first. From the opening of the thirteenth to the end of the fifteenth
century the money-changers' craft was an essentially Florentine
business. For as soon as the merchants had established commercial
relations with all the markets of the East and the West, they naturally
put into circulation a large quantity of specie. Therefore it naturally
ensued that if any trader of Antwerp or Bruges wished to forward
money to Italy or Constantinople, the easiest and safest plan was to
apply to some of the Florentine merchants in his own town. The latter
bought up the wool and rough cloths, which, after being dressed in
Florence, either returned to Northern Europe, or found their way to
Constantinople, Caffa, or Tana (Azov), in exchange for silks, dyes,
and spices. Accordingly the transmittal of any sum to any part of the
then known world cost them little more trouble than the despatch of an
ordinary letter, and was always a source of gain. For they received
_agio_ on their money, and by sending it in the form of merchandise,
reaped a second profit. When, on the contrary, any Florentine wished
to send a hundred florins to London, he had only to walk a few steps
to find some merchant of the Calimala or Por' Santa Maria, who, by a
line to his correspondent in Lombard Street, caused the payment to be
made. These so-called letters of exchange (_lettere di cambio_) proved
one of the most useful of inventions for the advancement of modern
trade. There has been much discussion as to whom this discovery was
originally owed. Some attribute it to the fugitive, persecuted Jews in
France and England; while others ascribe it, at a much later date, to
the Guelphs banished from Florence in the thirteenth century. But it is
very difficult to ascertain who was the first author of what cannot be
justly styled a discovery, seeing that it is an arrangement so readily
occurring to the mind, that examples of it are even to be found in
very remote antiquity. Besides, the real importance of the letter of
exchange consists not in its invention, but in its legally authorised
value, its extensive use, and the thousand different ways in which it
may be turned to account for the speedy transmission and increase of
capital. On these points the Florentines of the period were altogether
unforestalled and unsurpassed, being superior masters of the art of
finance.

When the exiled Guelphs went wandering about the world in the
thirteenth century they strengthened the widespreading commercial
ties established by Florence, and founding banks in all parts, gave a
tremendous impulse to the money-changers' trade. Accordingly they were
credited with the invention of the "letters of exchange," which now
being widely circulated, gained added importance. In fact, all subtle
and ingenious devices for multiplying gold, by despatching it to every
market where, being scarce, it consequently commanded the highest
price and interest, and almost all the complicated and difficult
operations practised by our modern bankers, were already familiar to
the Florentines. Whenever the Republic was obliged to borrow money
it obtained loans from the bankers of Florence on precisely the same
system and method in use at this day, no source of profit being
unknown to those financiers. Also, when the total of these loans was
formed into the so-called _Monte Comune_, paying interest on the
consolidated capital, the _luoghi del Monte_, which would nowadays go
by the name of "shares of the public debt," were negotiated precisely
as at present. We find the Florentine merchants under the Arcades of
the New Market, speculating on the rise and fall of stock, like modern
men on "'Change" in great capitals.[350] And the profits of similar
ventures were far greater at a time when lawful interest varied between
10 and 20 per cent., and few felt any scruples against carrying it
up to 40 per cent. by means of fictitious contracts. For instance,
the lenders would fix an impossibly early date for the receipt of the
lawful interest, and after that date took 40 per cent. with the pretext
that the extra amount was the fine agreed upon in case of non-payment.

It should be kept in mind that the Florentines reaped great advantages
in all these banking operations from the excellent quality of their
coinage, for the Republican Mint always kept the best interests of
commerce in view. To this end, in the year 1252, the gold florin of
twenty carats was struck, with the figure of St. John on one side and
the lily of Florence on the reverse; and, owing to the goodness of
the metal and its alloy, soon obtained currency in every Eastern as
well as European market. Eight of these florins weighed one ounce,
and a single florin was valued at about twelve Italian _lire_. The
Florentines, however, usually made their calculations in _lire_,
_soldi_, and _denari_. The silver _lira_, then the conventional
standard, consisted of twenty _soldi_, and the _soldo_ of twelve
_denari_. The florin seldom altered in value, but the _lira_, either
from the greater variability in the price of silver, or from other
causes, was constantly altering its rate with regard to the florin. In
1252 the latter was equivalent to the _lira_, and therefore similarly
divided into twenty _soldi_; in 1282 it already consisted of thirty-two
_soldi_; in 1331, of sixty _soldi_, or three _lire_, and always
changing in value, rose to four _lire_, eight _soldi_ by the year 1464.

The Florentines had discerned how greatly their commerce was benefited
by the use of a coin universally prized in all markets supplied with
their goods. But in the beginning of the fifteenth century, when
their trade penetrated farther into the East, they found themselves
forestalled by the Venetians, whose gold ducat, somewhat larger and
heavier than the florin, was already current there. Accordingly,
in 1422, they decreed the issue of another florin, equivalent to
the Venetian ducat in weight, size, and value, and therefore easily
exchanged for it. And as this new and larger florin was to be carried
to the Levant on board-ship, they named it the "broad florin," or the
"galley florin," to distinguish it from the older "sealed florin"
(_fiorino di suggello_). In 1471 the older coin only was re-issued, and
kept in circulation down to 1530, when it was held equivalent to seven
_lire_, and was then withdrawn for a time.[351] Thus we see that for a
considerable period two different florins were in use, that the _lira_
altered in value from one year to another; and if we likewise remember
that economists are still unagreed as to the exact difference between
the present value of gold and silver and their value in the days of the
Republic, we shall recognise the difficulty of making any calculation
sufficiently exact to afford any precise idea of the relative prices of
things. It is asserted by some writers that a given quantity of gold
was only worth in those days double its present value; while others
exaggerated its value to fortyfold. Sismondi believes that in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries gold must have been worth four times
as much as at present. Certainly the florin, or _zechin_, as it was
called later, is worth about twelve Italian _lire_. But the difference
in the value of gold remains involved in uncertainty. Besides, when old
writers reckon by _lire_, it is needful to remember that these coins
varied in value; that it is impossible to make even an approximative
calculation without knowing the exact date referred to.

Returning to the Guild of Changers, we must again insist on the point
that, in addition to the extended commercial relations, the wise
measures enforced by the Republic and the singular activity of the
citizens, the rapid prosperity of the Florentine bankers was also
greatly enhanced by their nearness to Rome. The revenues of the Holy
See and of its prelates in all parts of Christendom were all poured
into the Eternal City. There gathered the spiritual lords, bishops, and
cardinals, holding rich benefices in the East or the West; thither from
all the remotest ends of the known world believers sent sums of "St.
Peter's pence," together with the costly offerings suited to a period
of religious faith and fanaticism. The keen-witted Florentines quickly
recognised the advantage of becoming bankers to the Pope; for thus the
largest floating capital in the world would have to pass through their
hands. So, from the first, they used the most persistent efforts to
obtain that position. If we find them clinging to the Guelph cause
through all changes of time and circumstance, and preserving the name
of Guelphs, even when the term had lost all meaning, we must attribute
no little weight to commercial as well as to political motives. Placed
in the centre of Italy, and not far from Rome, they had to struggle
chiefly against the Siennese, who were still nearer to the Eternal
City. For this reason we soon find them engaged in warfare and jealous
strife with Sienna, the which republic was subsequently worsted,
not only in fight, but also by the wider-stretching enterprise of
Florentine commerce. It is proved by the correspondence of Gregory IX.
that even in 1233 the Tuscans were forwarding remittances to the Pope
from various parts of the world; and gradually the monopoly of this
business became more exclusively concentrated in Florentine hands. When
the Pontifical Seat was transferred from Rome to Avignon (1305), and on
its restoration later to Rome again, there occurred, twice at least,
an enormous displacement of interest, a great movement of capital,
and a necessity for large remittances in cash; and, according to the
best authorities, this was the favourable moment when the Florentine
contractors of the Papal revenues were enabled to become the principal
bankers of Rome. From that time their fortune was assured, the greatest
banking business in Europe passed through their hands, and they rose to
so high a repute, that all sought their help and advice on matters of
finance.

We see the Florentines invited to manage the mints, and fix the weights
and measures of various European states. In 1278 a convention between
the King of France and the Lombard and Tuscan _Universitates_ invites
both to find money for the former's government. In 1306 the Modenese
people issued a decree, appealing for the same purpose, to the notaries
and bankers of Florence. Then in 1302, when the King of France,
lacking funds wherewith to make war, decided on repeated debasement
of the coinage, this fatal step was attributed to the advice of two
Florentines, Bicci and Musciatto Franzesi. These men were severely
censured by their fellow-citizens, many of whom had been ruined by
the bad French currency. On all occasions when the French sovereigns
were on the eve of a great war, they were practically compelled to
first secure the aid of some known Florentine banker in bearing the
expense. Some of these bankers held the same position in Europe as
the Rothschilds of the present day, and accumulated fortunes of
apparently fabulous amounts. In 1260 the Salimbeni house lent twenty
thousand florins to the Siennese. In 1338 we find the Bardi and Peruzzi
creditors of King Edward III. of England for one million three hundred
and sixty-five florins, the which, without reckoning the difference in
the value of gold, would amount to about sixteen millions of Italian
_lire_; and allowing for that difference, would amount, as Sismondi
has calculated, to no less than sixty-four millions. Pagnini adds a
list of many other loans, amounting to a positively enormous total.
In 1321 the Peruzzi had a credit of 191,000 florins on the Order of
Jerusalem alone, and the Bardi another of 133,000 florins. In 1348 the
house of Tommaso di Carroccio degli Alberti and his kinsmen had banks
at Avignon, Brussells, Paris, Sienna, Perugia, Rome, Naples, Barletta,
Constantinople, and Venice.[352] And at the close of the fifteenth
century Philippe de Commines declared that Edward IV. of England owed
his crown to the help of Florentine bankers.

The Money-changers' Guild was one of the oldest in Florence, its
consuls being named on the same footing as the rest in all public
records; and a copy of its statutes, dated 1299 (1300 new style),
makes reference to an earlier code of 1280, that was not the earliest
of all. This craft prospered and waned with the commerce of Florence.
It was carried on in the New Market, where it had shops with counters
or _tavoletti_, money-bags, and ledgers. All business had to be
performed in the shop, and registered in the account book, and heavy
penalties were exacted for any infringement of the rule; nor was any
one allowed to exercise the craft without being inscribed on the
matriculation list, a privilege only to be obtained by having given
proofs of capacity and honesty during matriculation, and sworn to obey
the statutes of the guild. In 1338 there were about eighty of these
money-changers' stalls, and Florence coined from 350,000 to 400,000
gold florins.[353] In 1422 these stalls numbered seventy-two, while
it was calculated that Florence had a capital of two million florins
in circulation, without including the value of the merchandise in the
city.[354] In 1472, partly because the first signs of the decline of
trade were appearing, and partly because trade was becoming restricted
to a more and more limited number of firms, the banks were already
reduced to thirty-three,[355] although the chronicler Benedetto Dei
still remarked with pride that these bankers did business in the East
and the West, "as is well known to the Venetians and Genoese, and
likewise to the Court of Rome."[356] They were everywhere known by
the names of changers, lenders, usurers, Tuscans, and Lombards, and,
together with other Italian houses, had a street of their own both in
London and Paris.


IV.

In order to complete the list of the greater guilds, we must say a few
words concerning the Doctors and Druggists, and Skinners and Furriers,
and particularly the former. Although of less importance commercially
than the guilds already described, they had a great share in promoting
Florentine trade in the Levant, whence nearly all drugs and spices were
received in exchange, and no less than twenty-two different qualities
of fur, many of which, being the skins of rare animals, formed some of
the dearest articles of luxury. Therefore these two guilds likewise
rose to great influence, inasmuch as the Eastern trade has invariably
proved the main source of wealth for all nations, and most of all
for Italy. It served to sustain the high fortunes of Venice; it had
enriched Amalfi, Genoa, and Pisa; and accordingly was constantly
coveted by the Florentines, whose highest prosperity indeed was only
attained when the Black Sea being opened to their galleys, they could
enjoy the same rights as the Venetians in Egypt, Constantinople, and
the Crimea. This, so long their principal aim, was not, however,
quickly attained: they continued to wrestle for it throughout almost
the whole of the fourteenth century.

The struggles maintained by the Florentines for the extension of their
trade play a very important part in the history of the Republic, not
only demonstrating the progress of their wealth, but likewise the
ruling motives of their policy. In fact, the moment they had won
their first successes against the nobles of the _contado_ surrounding
them on all sides, they immediately tried to monopolise the whole
trade with Lombardy. One of the first treaties signed by them was
with the Ubaldini, lords of the Mugello, for the purpose of opening
that highway for their products; and shortly afterwards they made a
treaty with the Bolognese (1203). But in course of time the latter,
profiting by their position, exacted heavier tolls on the merchandise
now continually passing through their territory; whereupon the
Florentines promptly came to terms with Modena, opening a fresh road
for their commerce, and thus compelling Bologna to respect the original
agreement. In 1282, at the time of the war against Pisa, they arranged
treaties guaranteeing free passage to their merchandise through Lucca,
Prato, Pistoia, and Volterra, and thus began their domination over the
commerce of Tuscany. Nearly all their wars were undertaken for purposes
of trade, and ended with trading agreements. In 1390 they entered into
conventions with Faenza and Ravenna, and then step by step with the
majority of the Italian cities.

The continual increase of Florentine commerce by land made the
necessity of free access to the sea ever more pressing and
indispensable. But to reach either Porto Pisano or Leghorn, the only
ports convenient for their trade, they must necessarily traverse the
republic of Pisa, their powerful neighbour and rival. For if the
Florentines were masters of nearly the whole Tuscan trade by land, the
Pisans were lords of the sea, and had no intention of allowing their
realm to be snatched from them by so industrious and energetic a race
as their competing neighbours. Accordingly the Pisans had only to
demand heavy tolls for the passage of those neighbours' goods, and the
Florentines were left with no remedy save recourse to arms. Hence the
continual warfare and perpetual rivalry of the two republics. After
the capture of Volterra by the Florentines in 1254, the threatening
attitude of their victorious troops drove the Pisans to grant free
passage to their merchandise, and in 1273, 1293, 1327, and 1329
similarly compelled them to adhere to the same terms. Pisa, however,
never yielded the point with a good grace, but merely to avoid war, or
in consequence of defeat.

Meanwhile the Florentines were continually extending their trade to
remoter parts of the East, and concluding fresh treaties there. This,
while increasing their desire to command the sea, fanned the jealousy
of Pisa to a fiercer flame. In Pagnini's work on "La Decima" we find an
essay on the "Practise of Trade" ("Pratica della Mercatura"), written
early in the fourteenth century by an agent of the Bardi firm, one
Balducci Pegolotti. Next to Marco Polo's "Milione," this work is one
of our most important sources of information regarding Italian travels
and trading enterprises in the Levant, and furnishes specially minute
details of Florentine traffic. From what Pegolotti tells us of his own
doings, we may judge what was done by his fellow-citizens in general.
In 1315 he succeeded in securing for them in Antwerp and Brabant
similar franchises to those already enjoyed by the Genoese, Germans,
and English. He afterwards went to the Levant, and found at Cyprus that
the Bardi and Peruzzi alone shared the privilege granted to the Pisans
of only paying 2 per cent. import and export duty; whereas all other
Florentines had either to pay 4 per cent., or feign to be Pisans, a
device exposing them to many spiteful reprisals from the latter, who
treated them _worse than slaves or Jews_. These proceedings aroused
Pegolotti's wrath, so that, although he was one of the Bardi firm,
he made great and successful efforts to have the same privilege of
franchise extended to the rest of the Florentines (1324). Thus, their
common interests being promoted no less by the energy of individuals
than by that of their government, these merchants continued to make
advance in the East, and stir the Pisans to greater envy. In fact, the
latter decided in 1343 to reduce the exemptions allowed on Florentine
merchandise, decreeing that goods only to the value of 200,000 florins
might pass untaxed through their city; all the rest being charged two
_soldi_ the _lira_--_i.e._, at the rate of 10 per cent. This left the
Florentines no choice save to make war, or find some mode of avoiding
the Pisan highway. To prove that their trade was not altogether at the
mercy of Pisa, they preferred the second alternative. By making treaty
with the Siennese, they obtained the concession of Porto Talamone,
and at great expense, and in the teeth of many difficulties, finally
succeeded in making it a vast emporium for their wares. The road to
Talamone was long and inconvenient; but the Pisans, soon perceiving
that they had done greater damage to themselves than to Florence, and
that although they might inflict annoyance on the latter, there was
no hope of destroying its trade, were therefore presently reduced to
permit the free passage of merchandise. Accordingly the Florentines
felt braced to more extensive enterprise in the Levant.[357]

The Egyptian route was the easiest and most direct for trading
purposes; but sultan and califs barred the road to Christians. The
Venetians alone, from having concluded treaties, it was said, "in the
holy name of God and Mahomet," had made some way in that country to
the jealous exclusion of all other Italians, who therefore usually
travelled by Constantinople and the Black Sea, where they, and more
especially the Genoese, had founded some populous and flourishing
cities. Farther on, by the Sea of Azoff, a mile or so from the mouth
of the Don, stood the town of Tana (Azov), a great business centre
for traders from Russia, Arabia, Persia, Armenia, Mogul, and Southern
China; and the chief place of exchange for Eastern and Western
products. The Italians brought silk or woollen fabrics, oil, wine,
pitch, tar, and common metals, and bartered them for precious stones,
pearls, gold, spices, sweetmeats, sugar, Eastern tissues of silk, wool,
or cotton, raw silk, goatskins, dye-woods, and likewise for Eastern
slaves of either sex, who were to be seen in Italy down to the end
of the fifteenth century.[358] All this varied commerce, originally
started by Amalfi and other southern states, was afterwards carried on
by the Venetians, Genoese, and Pisans. The argosies of those republics
traversed all parts of the Archipelago, the Bosphorus, and the Black
Sea. Italian was spoken in all the harbours of the East, where, besides
Italian banks, workshops, and factories, there were cities founded and
inhabited solely by Italians, with buildings in the Genoese or Venetian
style, but where Italian, and especially Venetian, architecture became
modified by Oriental influences. A great number of Genoese were settled
in those parts. To give some idea of the naval strength of Venice, it
will be enough to say that during the Crusade of 1202 that Republic
equipped a fleet able to convey 4,500 horsemen, 9,000 squires, 30,000
infantry, and stores for nine months. Their galleys, never less than
80 feet in length, sometimes measured 110 by 70 in width, and in the
fifteenth century were forty-five in number, with a total of 11,000
seamen. At the same time they also possessed 3,000 other vessels of
from ten to one hundred tons, with 17,000 men, and 300 big ships with
8,000 men. In all, therefore, 3,345 vessels, with 36,000 seamen,[359]
a strength that seems positively incredible, when we remember that
the 'Serenissima' Republic of Venice was a city built on the sandbanks
of the lagoons; that the entire management of its policy and trade was
in the hands of men born within the narrow bounds of those lagoons.
Accordingly we may imagine how great was the united strength of all the
maritime republics, and how signal the courage of the Florentines in
competing with them so obstinately for the Levantine trade.

Before launching a single galley, the Florentines had already
established many houses and banks in every place, and contrived to
introduce their merchandise in all the principal Eastern ports. We
not only find them doing a vast business at Tana with great energy
and enterprise, but also pushing on thence to far remoter regions.
Pegolotti minutely describes the route followed by them, their manner
of travelling, and the time employed in it. They journeyed, he tells
us, through Astracan (Gittarchan), to Saracanco (Sarai) on the Volga,
thence by Organci in Zagataio,[360] not far from the Caspian Sea, and
crossing Asia by many places of which the names cannot be identified
with any known at this day, they penetrated as far as Gambaluc, or
Gamulecco, the chief city of China, that is to say, the city of Pekin.
They employed eight or ten months to go from Tana to Pekin. Thus a
period of almost two years was required for the journey there and back
and time of sojourn, and when we also calculate the voyage from Porto
Pisano or Leghorn to Tana and back, it is plain that a Florentine bound
for Pekin could rarely count on returning home within three years.[361]

During the growth of this Eastern trade, carried on with such
indomitable energy, amid difficulties of all kinds, the Florentines
were always aiming at the command of the seaboard, and never losing
sight of the necessity of having a port of their own. And when, by the
capture of Pisa in 1406, that long-desired object was finally attained,
a new era began for their commerce. All their business concerns became
most rapidly extended, and the first half of the fifteenth century was
the time in which their greatest wealth was accumulated. In 1421 they
appointed "consuls of the sea," who were ordered to immediately build
two wide-beamed merchant galleons (_galee di mercato_) and six narrow
galleys, and to continue to launch one of either kind every six months,
for the which purpose a monthly sum of one hundred florins was assigned
from the revenues of the Pisan university. Accordingly Florence soon
possessed a merchant fleet of eleven stout galleons and fifteen narrow
galleys continually employed in the Eastern traffic by command of
the Republic. All these vessels had strict sailing orders as to the
course to be taken, the ports to be touched at, and the freight to be
carried. Announcements of their departure and arrival were hung in the
arcades of the New Market; and the vessels being chartered by private
individuals, the government was enabled to keep the Eastern routes open
to all, without any outlay. In 1422, when, as already related, the
"galley florin" was coined, the Florentines, at the instance of one
Taddeo Cenni, a merchant long established in Venice, despatched two
envoys to Egypt to obtain the right of having a church, warehouses,
dockmen, and porters of their own at Alexandria. The negotiation
proving successful, in 1423 they instructed the "consuls of the sea"
to appoint extra consuls at every port where their presence might be
useful to Florentine trade. Some had been established for more or less
time at Constantinople, Pera (1339), and London (1402); but from
this moment we find them at Alexandria, Majorca, Naples, and other
ports in all directions. These consuls had offices and clerks of their
own, interpreters, men-at-arms, and places of worship; and all their
expenses, salary included, were deducted from the freight dues received
by them.[362]

To fully understand to what extent and in what way the Florentines
profited by the new conditions resulting from their conquest of Pisa,
it is necessary to point out that this event not only marks the time
of their highest commercial prosperity, and the beginning of their
navy and merchant fleet, but also indicates the date of their first
attention to nautical and astronomical studies. We gain another proof
of their great intelligence and untiring activity when we see that
their first efforts in a branch of learning of which they had no
previous knowledge enabled them to initiate the era of scientific
triumphs, opening with Paolo Toscanelli, the first inspirer of
Christopher Columbus, continued by Amerigo Vespucci, and closing with
Galileo Galilei and his imperishable school.


V.

The seven guilds, already described by us, were styled the greater
guilds, as being those of most importance and having the chief
trade and wealth of the State in their hands. Several of these
guilds consisted, as we have seen, rather of different crafts banded
together, than of a single branch of industry; they gave employment to
many workers, gathered and made use of enormous funds. But Florence
also possessed the so-called lesser guilds numbering fourteen in
all, namely: Linenmakers and Mercers, Shoemakers, Smiths, Salters,
Butchers and Slaughterers, Wine-dealers, Innkeepers, Harnessmakers,
Leatherdressers, Armourers, Ironmongers, Masons, Carpenters,
Bakers.[363]

Certain smaller Florentine crafts had also obtained great repute in
Italy: for instance, that of the wood and stone carvers, who were
esteemed as some of the best in the world. In all work demanding
any share of artistic ability the Tuscans stood unrivalled. Thus
the Florentine moulders of waxen images were considered to have
incomparable skill, and we even find this remarked by the chronicler
Dei. But neither the carvers nor the wax moulders formed an
association, and were artists rather than artizans. But, leaving this
question aside, the lesser guilds, although numerous and energetic,
failed to achieve any noteworthy influence. Their difference from the
greater guilds mainly lay in the fact that, being solely concerned with
the local trade of the Republic, they were confined to a very limited
field of business and enterprise, while the others engaged in the trade
with the East and the West, were enabled to attain a high position even
in politics, and to finally become masters of the State.

Looking back on the period in which the greater guilds rose to power,
we shall see that they simultaneously held in their grasp the commerce,
wealth, and government of the Florentine Republic. We shall also
readily understand the enormous energy they must have displayed in
order to use politics as a means for increasing the opulence that, in
the existing conditions of Italy, had become the chief strength of our
communes. The Florentine merchants, having long divined that the future
would belong to them, were always the firmest supporters of the Guelph
party against the Imperial Ghibellinism of the nobles and had vowed
eternal hatred to the latter. We may now imagine Florence as a huge
house of business, situated in the centre of Tuscany, and surrounded by
others all competing with it in the race for success. International law
and equity were unknown to the Middle Ages: hence when any State felt
envious of its neighbour, the obvious course to adopt was to prohibit
that neighbour from traversing its territory, and exact unbearably
heavy dues from the rival it feared. Accordingly, the Republic of
Florence, being the object of still fiercer jealousy on account of the
continual increase of its commerce, and lacking room to breathe, as
it were, without access to the sea, would have been speedily reduced
to impotence had it not resisted its neighbours by force of arms.
Hence, the necessity of defending its existence involved the State in
an uninterrupted series of wars, invariably terminated by treaties of
commerce, in which the unfailing subtlety of the Florentines always won
the advantage.

We have seen from the beginning how Florence combated the neighbouring
barons in order to secure the progress of its dawning trade, and
subsequently obtained a passage through the Mugello for its increased
traffic with Romagna and Lombardy. Later on, we have seen it engaged in
fiercer struggles, and, after many vicissitudes, subduing almost all
the Ghibelline cities of Tuscany, as, for instance, Volterra, Sienna,
and Arezzo. And when inquiring why Florence should have remained so
obstinately Guelph, even in the face of Papal threats, and repeating
the same question Farinata put to Dante--

      "Dimmi, perche quel popolo e si empio
       Incontro a' miei in ciascuna sua legge?"[364]

the invariable reply has been that in addition to political motives of
a more general nature, it must be kept in mind that the plutocracy now
risen to power had first attained wealth by doing its chief business
with Rome. Sienna, Arezzo, and Volterra being on the road and closer to
Rome, were doomed to defeat in any competition with Florence.

Then, as soon as the Republic had secured its hold on Roman affairs
and the Lombard trade, we saw its irresistible need of access to the
sea, and that a war of extermination with Pisa had become altogether
inevitable. To suppose that this prolonged, constantly renewed and
sanguinary conflict was solely caused by a blind instinctive hatred of
Pisa, when other and more serious reasons were so plainly existent,
would be to deny the evidence of facts. From beginning to end it was
simply the clash of violently opposed interests. The Pisans were
perfectly aware that to yield a free passage to the power already
commanding the chief trade in the interior of Italy--the power that,
without having as yet a single galley afloat, had already made its way
to all the harbours of the East--the power so persistently struggling
for absolute supremacy in Tuscany--could only lead to their own lasting
subjection. Therefore they resisted to the utmost of their strength.
Their resources were undoubtedly great, and as many other Italians were
equally hostile to the supremacy of Florence, the latter could never
have succeeded in reducing the Pisans, had it not constantly employed
the shrewdest devices in addition to its efforts in the field. In fact
there is no better proof of the political ability of the Florentines
than their mode of conducting this war and the means they employed to
attain the object that, throughout the whole course of their history,
had been their chief and invariable aim. We find them steadfast in
their friendship to Lucca, and always prompt to succour that city at
all costs, because Lucca was never well disposed to the Pisans, and
might prove a most useful ally in any campaign against them. So, too,
we always find Florence on good terms with Genoa, and avoiding every
risk of giving offence to a power that was Pisa's natural rival on the
seas. Indeed, the Florentines always did their best to foster that
rivalry, inasmuch as without an ally strong enough to assist them by
crushing Pisa's power by sea, they could never hope to overthrow it
by land. And at last the Pisans were defeated by the Genoese in the
naval battle of Meloria (August 6, 1284). From that day the conquest
of Pisa by the Florentines, although still to be long contested, was a
foregone conclusion, and from that moment also their friendship for the
Genoese began to lose warmth. While desiring assistance in overcoming
Pisa, they wished to avoid aggrandising the power of a Ghibelline
republic, already very mighty on the sea. Accordingly, after having
so furiously attacked and enfeebled Pisa, we find them aiding that
state to withstand the Genoese, until the moment came when the latter
having abandoned the idea of conquering Pisa, they could successfully
undertake its conquest on their own account.

With equal sagacity they pursued the same course in the years during
which they were menaced by the powerful Dukes of Milan who sought to
become masters of all Italy, and also when threatened from the south by
the enmity of King Ladislaus of Naples. The art of stirring division
among their foes, of supporting the weaker party against overbearing
neighbours, of constantly contriving to rouse half Italy against every
potentate risen to sufficient strength to be a terror to their own
Republic, was the invariable means by which Florence maintained her
independence in the midst of States who were losing their liberty, and
in the midst of the numerous and formidable foes pressing about her
on all sides. And this successful policy was the work of the greater
guilds, or rather of the prosperous trading class (_popolani grassi_).

These mercantile aristocrats ruled the Republic with so much energy and
zeal, precisely because the aggrandisement of Florence conduced at the
same time to the increase of their own wealth and commerce. Thus a city
whose population was seldom more than 100,000, and often shrank far
below that number, and whose narrow territory was surrounded by so many
enemies, was enabled to become a State feared by the rest of Italy, and
respected throughout Europe. These Florentine merchants were so jealous
of their liberty as to deem no sacrifice too vast for its preservation,
and were neither bewildered nor daunted by any danger, even when their
trade was at stake. In fact, although so obstinately Guelph, and
connected with Rome by so many commercial interests and ties, we find
them ready to combat the Pope himself, when he made attacks on their
liberty, and see them giving the name of the _Eight Saints_ to the
magistrates charged to conduct the campaign against Gregory XI. (1376).
In the like manner we find them carrying on a war with the Visconti of
Milan at a yearly cost of millions of florins, without the resources of
the Republic being exhausted, or the courage of its rulers worn out.


VI.

Nevertheless, it would be an error to suppose that the domination of
the greater guilds was assured and uncontested in the interior, at
least, of the city. On the day when the scheme was first mooted, in the
Calimala court, of placing these guilds at the head of the government,
they speedily recognised that the possibility of success was solely
owed to the fact of their having fought and conquered the nobles with
the help of the lesser arts. Hence, on the one hand, they had to face
their natural and inveterate foes, the survivors of the feudal order,
and on the other the lesser guilds coveting a share in the government
which they had helped to establish. Thus the Republic comprised three
classes of citizens and three separate parties. It is true that the
greater guilds constituted by far the stronger of the three factions,
but the others might become, if united, a very formidable opposition.
And their union was no impossible contingency.

The difference, in fact, between the greater and lesser guilds was
not merely one of degree as regarded their respective wealth and
power; what divided them was the diversity of interests urging them
to pursue an opposite policy. The wool-dresser or silk merchant was
always ready to sacrifice his last florin, provided the Republic could
gain possession of Leghorn or Porto Pisano. Accordingly he invariably
kept a strict watch on the policy of Lucca and Genoa, to prevent them
from making friendly advances to the Pisans. The Florentine banker was
anxious that his Republic should always possess skilful ambassadors
and consuls, able to supply full details of all that occurred in Rome,
Antwerp, or Caffa, and impede the Siennese, Genoese, Venetians, and
Lombards from gaining too much influence in those cities. Where any
question of this kind was concerned the members of the greater guilds
were always disposed to promote hostilities, no matter how prolonged,
expensive, or dangerous, and to subject both themselves and the State
to unlimited sacrifices. But financial and political interests weighed
little with the blacksmiths, masons, carpenters, and other members of
the fourteen lesser guilds, which nevertheless formed so considerable
a part of the Florentine population. It mattered far more to them
that Florence should be inhabited by rich and splendid gentry; that
sumptuous palaces, villas, and monumental churches should have to be
built; that there should be a continual increase of luxury and good
living among the citizens of rank and wealth, by whom they earned their
subsistence. Warfare, on the contrary, put a check upon luxury, and the
greater guilds were always issuing decrees against it, precisely on
account of the exigences of the wars they so constantly had on hand.
Hence the poorer classes detested the opulent burghers, whom they had
helped to raise to power, who had subsequently excluded them, as well
as the nobles, from the government, and who, while accumulating untold
millions, often lived in the city on a footing of Spartan frugality;
the men daily promulgating new edicts against female luxury in dress;
forbidding the use of gold and silver ornaments, prohibiting all lavish
expenditure for entertainments or wedding banquets, even going so far
as to limit the number and choice of viands, and exclude gold and
silver plate from festive tables; but who, nevertheless, were always
very ready to squander millions in attacks on the Pisans, the King of
Naples, the Visconti of Milan, or even for a church, or an additional
consul at Caffa or Pera. This difference of temper generated party
hatred. Nor should it be omitted that some of the bitterest outcries
against the greater guilds came from the women of Florence, who, being
naturally opposed to warfare, and addicted to extravagance, objected
to the vexatious restrictions imposed by law, while yet contriving to
evade them with indescribable ingenuity.[365]

It is very easy to realise how good an opportunity this afforded the
nobles of gaining the favour of the populace by stirring these germs of
discord. They exercised no trade, lived on their revenues, but spent
freely and lavishly in Florence. Accordingly, whenever engaged in fresh
attempts to seize the government, or preserve their remaining share
in it, they always allied themselves with the mob that lived--or at
least believed itself to live--solely at their expense, and roused its
resentment against the _popolani grassi_--or well-to-do burghers--by
dwelling on the fact that whereas all the guilds were equally engaged
in trade and commerce, a considerable number of them had no share in
the power exclusively monopolised by the rest. The democratic spirit
was far too lively in Florence for these devices to assure the safety
of the nobles, much less their return to power; but they had the effect
of stirring the masses to a burning and irresistible thirst for power,
and of awakening revolutionary passions in the mob. Thus, at the moment
of finally losing their old supremacy in the city, the nobles achieved
the revenge of bequeathing to Florence a prolonged inheritance of
strife that kept the Republic divided, and hastened its fall.

In fact, when at last the lesser guilds obtained a share in the
government, they were never at one with the greater trades. Their
hostility was continually shown in all councils, tribunals, and
public gatherings; and they sometimes resorted to the perilous means
of inflaming the worst passions of the mob which, as usual, served
as a ready tool for ambitious aims. In this way a spirit of anarchy
was unloosed, leading first to the revolt of the Ciompi, then to the
necessity of seeking a protector for the Republic, and finally to the
rule of the Medici. But before arriving at these extremities, there
were two centuries of struggle, during which Florentine affairs were
almost invariably in the hands of the burghers. On several occasions
the reins of power seemed to have slipped from their grasp, but they
always managed to retain enough influence to secure the election of
magistrates of their own choice. In this way victory was restored
to them, and they again took possession of the government. When, on
the other hand, the triumph of anarchy made it requisite to seek a
protector, and this protector, summoned to the defence of the Republic,
sided with the malcontents and tried to establish a tyranny, the
burghers then contrived to unite every faction in the interest of their
common freedom and reinstate the Republican government, thus giving
it a fresh lease of life. By dint of incredible sagacity, daring, and
steadfastness, they managed to struggle on amid a thousand dangers,
both within and without the walls. Although plunged in perpetual
conflict with those who desired peace and claimed ever wider rights;
although surrounded by most powerful external foes now attempting to
destroy their trade, now their Republic, their energy and patriotism
never wearied, never failed to be on the alert. It was a feverish time
of unceasing stress and strain, and freedom, though always on the
verge of annihilation, was kept alive for two centuries in the midst
of communities where it was perishing. And even as the burghers had
managed to create all sorts of financial combinations for the increase
of trade and multiplication of wealth, so they showed inexhaustible
ingenuity in devising new schemes and institutions to prolong the life
of their Republic.

In matters of foreign policy Florentine diplomats became so renowned
for sagacity and quick-wittedness, that on certain points they enjoyed
even higher repute than the famed ambassadors of Venice. The latter, in
fact, with their old traditions of statecraft, pursued the invariable
policy of a strong, calm and self-reliant government. Their strength
was the outcome of the strength and wisdom of a republic commanding
both fear and respect, and whose voice seemed to be heard in the
speech of its envoys. Every Florentine ambassador exercised, on the
contrary, a direct personal influence, due to his own sharpness of
intellect, extraordinary knowledge of mankind, and marvellous aptitude
for comprehending everything and making everything clearly understood.
Undoubtedly the State acted in him and by him; but less because he
served as its mouthpiece than because it had succeeded in evoking
and training all his mental powers and rendering him an intelligent
and independent personality. Florentine merchants, notaries,
administrators, and diplomats were universally prized, and seemed at
home in every corner of the globe. Hence it is said that one day Pope
Boniface VIII., seeing that the ambassadors sent to him from different
parts of the world were one and all Florentines, quietly remarked, "You
Florentines are the fifth element in creation."

It was in the midst of these political conflicts, of this ferment
of the human mind, that art and literature rose to such splendour,
that the whole world was, as it were, illuminated by the radiance
shed by Italian cities, and shining most brightly from Florence. The
far-reaching energy of this city of commerce and trade was felt almost
everywhere; but even at points where this had failed to penetrate, the
genius of Florentine literature and art seems to have asserted its
power and initiated modern culture in Europe.


VII.

All this, however, was carried on in the face of continual and new
dangers, threatening the very life of the Republic, and sometimes only
to be averted by super-human efforts. Memory instinctively carries
us back to the Florence of old with its council and its Consuls,
yearly taking the field united and agreed, for the purpose of abasing
the nobles and clearing the highways for the march of its trade;
and then, having reduced the hostile barons one by one, compelling
them to live within the walls, subject to the equal pressure of
republican laws;--to the times when the State could only overcome its
more powerful neighbours by emancipating the slaves of the soil and
granting political privileges to traders hitherto unpossessed of any
such rights. On recalling those times, we easily recognise that they
contained the germs of future greatness for the Commune that by dint
of continual warfare succeeded in augmenting its resources in every
direction. Later, however, things were radically changed, owing to
many causes, and above all in consequence of the new method of warfare
to which we have already alluded and which must now be more fully
described.

Down to the fourteenth century republican armies were composed of
foot soldiers, lightly equipped with sword, shield, and helmet, and
some slight defensive armour for leg or breast. The horse were few in
number and never decided the fate of a battle. All barbarian armies
had been composed much on the same plan, excepting those of the Huns
and Moors, who were almost always mounted, and of the Byzantines,
whose cavalry had frequently defeated the Goths. Frederic Barbarossa's
Italian campaigns had been chiefly carried on by infantry and withstood
by the infantry of our communes, who could then turn all able-bodied
citizens into soldiers at a moment's notice. But in the campaigns of
Frederic II., Manfred and Charles of Anjou, a new method of war had
been imported into Italy from Germany and France. The Florentines had
learnt this to their cost at the battle of Montaperti, when their
numerous army was routed by the charge of a few German horse. From
that moment the issue of all Italian battles began to be decided by
heavy cavalry or by men-at-arms. The mounted soldier was clad in steel
from head to foot, although not yet, as at the close of the fifteenth
century, encased, together with his steed, in such ponderous armour,
that, once fallen, neither could rise from the ground without help.
Armed with a very long lance, the horseman could overthrow the foot
soldier before the latter could approach him with his short sword.
Besides, this weapon never served to pierce the armour either of man or
horse; and the arrows of the bowmen were equally useless. Accordingly,
a few hundred men-at-arms pushed forward like a movable and impregnable
fortress into the midst of a host of infantry sufficed to rout it in
a very short time. This state of things lasted until the invention of
powder and firearms produced a radical change in the condition of the
Italian communes. For mounted troops required much training and great
expenditure. It was not enough to maintain great arsenals, to create
and train a new breed of horses, but every trooper had also to be kept
in steady practice, devote his whole time to warfare, and keep two
or three squires continuously drilled and employed. These squires
carried all the armour and weapons and led the knight's charger, which
was only used in battle. Only then, too, were knight and steed in
full harness, otherwise both would have been exhausted in the hour of
danger. Hence it was impossible for our republics to raise cavalry,
seeing that citizens, earning their living by trade and commerce, could
not forsake their daily work to acquire the art of war. Therefore,
soldiering became a regular trade, and all choosing it for their career
speedily began to put a price on their swords. Thus from the closing
years of the thirteenth century we begin to find _soldiers_ of various
nationalities--Catalans, Burgundians, Germans, and other foreign
horse--in the ranks of republican armies, and the number of these
mercenaries was continually on the increase.

Gradually, also, tradesmen were obliged to recognise that they had
become personally useless in the field. Accordingly, whenever the
republics were threatened with attack, they no longer ventured to
give battle without hiring some captain with a band of foreign
horse. Italian valour rapidly lost its prestige, and "Companies of
Adventure"--soon to be the cause of our direst calamities--began to be
formed. Later on, it is true that when Alberico da Barbiano, Attendolo
Sforza, Braccio da Montone, and others adopted the same career, they
rivalled and even surpassed the foreign adventurers, who had now often
to yield the palm to Italian courage. Soon, in fact, many came from
afar to learn the new art of war under these Italian captains whose
skill first reduced it to a science. Nevertheless, few citizens of free
states were able to devote their whole life to war. It was the nobles,
the exiles, the unemployed--knowing no other trade--and the subjects
of petty tyrants who joined the "Companies of Adventure." And whether
small bands or large, Italian or foreign, they invariably hastened
the ruin of all our communes, and more especially of Florence. The
continual wars in which this State was now engaged no longer served to
foster the military spirit and energy of its people. Always compelled
to rely on the help of foreign mercenaries, it soon lost all confidence
in its own resources, the which therefore rapidly declined. A campaign
simply implied some financial operation, or the levying of fresh taxes
to furnish sufficient capital for the hire of one of the captains of
adventure, who always closed with the highest bid. The money found, it
was often enough to send it to the State's surest and most powerful
ally, who undertook to complete the affair by engaging the captain best
able to hire the largest number of men. So the chief thing was to know
how to gain friends and excite enemies against the foe, and in this the
Florentines always showed masterly skill. But these devices were no
proof of military capacity. The most important personages despatched
by them to the seat of war were commissioners charged to superintend
the general proceedings, the administration of the army, and the
political object of the campaign, and although we sometimes find these
commissioners suddenly transformed into captains, taking command of the
forces and deciding the fate of a battle with singular daring, their
functions were always civil and diplomatic rather than military.

It is easy to foresee the final results of this method with regard
to the future of the Republic, and the morals of its inhabitants.
The stout burghers at the head of the government were engaged in the
continual practice of cunning and craft. It was requisite to show
adroitness in the council chamber; to thwart the nobles; to remain
constantly on the alert to prevent the populace from growing unruly,
while persuading it to furnish funds to carry on wars which were
indispensable to secure the safety and prosperity of the foreign trade.
Hence, still greater subtlety was needed in diplomatic negotiations
to avoid being isolated, and to continually maintain the equilibrium
of Italian States in the way most advantageous for the Republic. Even
actual warfare being now reduced, as we have seen, to a financial
operation, had come to be a fresh proof of ingenuity. There were no
longer any of those vast sacrifices of citizens' blood and citizens'
lives which serve towards the continued regeneration of a people, no
longer any deeds of open and generous violence. And at times when the
rich burghers were not absorbed in politics, they and all the rest
of the citizens were devoted heart and soul to commerce, employing
their leisure moments in the study of Tacitus, Virgil, or Homer, kept
ready to hand under their counters. But, invariably, it was only
the intelligence that was kept always in training, while the nobler
faculties remained strangled and atrophied by the constant use of
cunning and trickery. This was destined to lead, sooner or later, to
the inevitable decay of the Republic's moral and political life, and to
the decline of the highest mental culture. If the manner in which wars
were planned and conducted caused fatal results, no less fatal were the
ulterior consequences of victorious campaigns. For the hired troops
once paid off, changed from friends into foes, and instantly sought to
sell their services to some other employer. Failing to find one, and
therefore receiving no pay, they dispersed in armed bands, ravaging
town and country, by a species of military brigandage. Generally, it
was found requisite to come to terms with them, and bribe them to keep
the peace.

But the most important point to be noted at this juncture is that the
conquest of fresh territory, although become an absolute necessity
to the Republic, now began to be a serious danger and the source of
future calamities. During the Middle Ages the Italian Commune had been
a fertile cause of progress; but as its possessions outside the walls
began to increase, it proved wholly powerless to convert the free
city into what we call a State without working radical changes in its
constitution. In fact, even in Florence, the most democratic of our
communes, citizens were only to be found within the circuit of the
walls. Laws were framed to ameliorate the condition of the territory
outside and to abolish serfdom there, but no one contemplated endowing
inhabitants of the _contado_ with political rights. The title of
citizens always remained, as it were, a privilege only granted to a
minority, even of dwellers within the walls, and was never extended to
the people at large. Whenever a new city was conquered and subjected to
the Republic, it was governed more or less harshly; allowed to retain
more or fewer local privileges; sometimes even permitted to retain a
republican form of government, subject to the authority of a Podesta,
captain, or commissary, and paying the taxes imposed by them; but its
inhabitants never enjoyed the freedom of the City, nor were their
representatives by any chance admitted to the councils or political
offices of Florence. Accordingly, as the State became enlarged by
fresh conquests, the cluster of citizens monopolising the government,
and already very limited in number, sank to a still smaller minority
compared with the ever-increasing population subject to their rule.
Similarly to all other republicans of the Middle Ages, the Florentines
were altogether unable to conceive the idea of a State governed with
a view to the general welfare. On the contrary, the prosperity and
grandeur of Florence formed the one object and aim to which every
other consideration had to be subservient. Nor had the lower classes
and populace, who were always clamouring for increased freedom, any
different or wider views on the subject. Their ideas, indeed, being
restricted in a narrower circle, were even more prejudiced, as their
passions were blinder. Consequently it was considered at that time
a greater calamity to be subjugated by a fellow republic than by a
monarchy; inasmuch as princes brought their tyranny to bear equally
on all alike, and thus, at any rate as regarded politics, the chief
majority of the conquered suffered less injury. When Florence, however,
by achieving the long-desired conquest of Pisa, at last became mistress
of the sea, and witnessed the rapid increase of her commerce, she
discovered that the annexation of a great and powerful republic, full
of life and strength and possessed of so large a trade, brought her
none of the advantages which might have ensued from a union of a freer
kind with an equal distribution of political rights. The chief citizens
of Pisa and all the wealthier families left the country, preferring to
live in Lombardy, France, or even in Sicily under the Aragonese, where
at least they enjoyed civil equality, rather than remain in their own
city subject to the harsh and tyrannous rule of Florentine shopkeepers.
The commerce and industry of Pisa, her navy, her merchant-fleet, all
vanished when freedom fell; while her _Studio_, or university, one of
the old glories of Italy, and afterwards reconstituted by the Medici,
was done away with, and the city soon reduced to a state of squalid
desolation. All conquered cities suffered this fate; those once of the
richest and most powerful in the days of their freedom being treated
with still greater harshness than the rest.[366] This makes it easy
to understand why, when Florence was in danger, all conquered cities
in which life was not altogether extinguished invariably seized the
opportunity to try to regain their independence, and always preferred
a native or foreign tyrant to cowering beneath the yoke of a republic
that refused to learn from experience the wisdom of changing its
policy. Nor could it have effected such change without radically
altering its whole constitution and manner of existence.

Thus, in accumulating riches and power, Florence was only multiplying
the causes of her approaching and unavoidable decline. The Commune
seemed increasingly incapable of giving birth to the modern State, and
accordingly, when its chief support, commerce, began to decay, the
strength of the burghers was sapped, and the oppressed multitude, now
a formidable majority, speedily looked to monarchical rule for their
relief. Thus the Medici were enabled to attain supremacy in the name of
freedom, and with the support of people and populace. Thus, likewise,
by violence, or fraud, or by both combined, the communes of Italy
were all reduced to principalities; and wherever, from exceptional
causes, the republican order still lingered on for a while, it was only
as a shadow of its former self, and no longer rendering any of the
advantages for which it had been originally designed. Populations which
had failed to establish equality by means of free institutions, were
now forced to learn the lesson of equality beneath the undiscriminating
oppression of a despotic prince. Signories formed the necessary link
of transition between the mediaeval commune and the modern state. For
these Signories traced a way towards the just administration and
method pursued by the vast kingdoms then in course of formation on the
continent of Europe, and which also remained absolute and despotic
monarchies until the French revolution effected in town, country, and
throughout every class that work of social emancipation which the
Italian communes had so admirably initiated, but had never learnt to
extend beyond the circuit of their walls.

Florence maintained a prolonged resistance, but finally shared the fate
of her fellow republics.

[Illustration]




CHAPTER VII.[367]

_THE FAMILY AND THE STATE IN ITALIAN COMMUNES._[368]


I.[369]

It is certain that no real national history of Italy can be written
until the statutes and laws of our communes have been published,
studied, and thoroughly investigated by the light not merely of
historical but of legal research. The necessity for such investigation
was first proclaimed by the learned Savigny, subsequently recognised
by many Italian scholars, but has never yet been entirely satisfied. An
accurate study of those old laws and statutes would make us acquainted
with the public law of the communes, and place before our eyes a clear
and exact picture of their political institutions which have been
hitherto very imperfectly understood. Moreover, what is certainly of no
less importance--it would enlarge our knowledge of our ancient private
law, to which many learned authorities, among others Francesco Forti,
attribute the origin of modern jurisprudence, and the germs of many
jural provisions, afterwards accepted by us as novelties derived from
the French Code.

Public and private law have far more affinity than is generally
supposed, and each conduces to the plainer and more exact comprehension
of the other. Society and the State have both their birth in the
family, reacting upon and modifying it in turn. No student therefore
who seeks to discover the true key to political institutions developing
themselves in a country spontaneously, should neglect the constitution
of the family wherein are to be found the earliest beginnings of civil
law, with which political law also is more or less connected. Cases,
it is true, frequently occur of one people adopting the civil law of
another, without altering its own political institutions; while in
other instances both are imposed simultaneously by a superior foreign
force. This has led many to question the reality of the connection
which in fact subsists between them. But these cases have nothing to do
with that natural and spontaneous development of law of which we are
now speaking. In this development, politics and jurisprudence, the
State and the family, are found to be closely interconnected.

In the course of Florentine history we often see political revolutions
break out suddenly and apparently without warning; but on closer
examination we perceive them to be the result of deep social changes
which have been maturing for a long time, and although imperceptible
at first, afterwards assuming such proportions as to become suddenly
visible to all eyes and productive of political reforms. Thus it
happens that private law, which always accompanies social movements and
changes with them, not unfrequently enables us to trace the sources
and unfold the true tendency and inexorable necessity of revolutions,
even before they come to pass. Accordingly, the habitual neglect of
this particular study in connection with the history of Italy has
proved a serious defect. No one at the present day would venture to
write the political history of Rome without giving attention to the
Roman jurisprudence. Nevertheless, we have written the history of our
republics over and over again, without bestowing a thought on their
civil and penal legislation.

It is true that the investigation required presents very great
difficulties, inasmuch as our history was subject, during the Middle
Ages, to a series of changes, always rapid and always different. The
number of our republics is infinite. Every province of Italy, every
fragment of Italian territory is divided and subdivided into communes,
every one of which has a distinct history, and political institutions
which are constantly changing. This perpetual mutation is faithfully
reflected in the statutes of the Commune. On the margins of these
statutes we find alterations and corrections registered from year
to year, and formulated, not unfrequently, after the streets of the
city had begun to run with blood. When annotations and corrections
reach a certain number, the statutes are drafted anew, and of these
re-drafts also many copies are still extant. It was the duty of the
officials in charge of the statutes (_statutari_) to enter from time to
time such farther modifications as were afterwards approved of in the
Councils of the People. Hence it sometimes happens that on referring
to the statutes of a given year, we may find the duties of some chief
magistrate of the Republic set forth in their text with the most minute
detail, whereas if we look to the notes it will appear that these
duties have already been changed. If we next consult the remodelled
statute it will be found that the magistracy itself no longer exists.
How is it possible, therefore, to give any idea of the political form
of a municipality fashioned in such wise? This can only be done by
gleaning from the mass of the statutes the history of the constitution
through all its successive changes of form. In a word, we must
recognise that, instead of being confronted by a system crystallised,
fixed and immutable, we are watching a living organism develop under
our eyes in obedience to a settled law. This law alone is uniform, and
it is this we must endeavour to trace, since it alone can solve the
mystery and supply exact ideas. Turning from public law to private
legislation, our difficulties rather increase than diminish. For, in
perusing this, by no means less important portion of the statutes, we
come upon a confused medley of legal systems differing from and often
opposed to one another. When we meet with such terms as _meta_ and
_mundium_, _wergild_ and _morgengab_, _dos_ and _tutela_, testamentary
succession and succession by agreement, we recognise that Longobard
law, Roman law, feudal law, and canon law are all present, and perceive
that they are blended in constantly varying proportions. These diverse
legal systems act and react one upon the other, producing reciprocal
changes. Into the Roman law, provisions are constantly filtering which
indubitably belong to the Longobard law, while the latter in its turn
is profoundly modified ("mutilated and castrated," as Gans expresses
it) by the Roman law. How are we to explain this congeries of different
laws? Is there any new and original principle that assimilates the
heterogeneous elements and constitutes a new law? If so, what is it?
This is the knotty problem which Savigny encouraged us to attack, but
which we have hitherto failed to unravel. But although the question
remains unsolved, its importance is now universally acknowledged; it
has been carefully studied, and many treatises, including some of the
highest value, have been published on the subject. Accordingly certain
observations may at last be offered to the public.

The constitution of the family and its relation with the State are,
as it were, the chief centre round which all fresh researches must
revolve, and these form the subject of this short and summary essay.
As a preliminary step towards the solution of the problem, an accurate
investigation is required of the various forms that the family assumed
under the various systems of law which succeeded one another in Italy,
in order to ascertain how it was that from the combination of those
various forms, another and widely different one should have resulted.
The first question therefore that presents itself has reference to the
condition of the Roman law and the Roman family at the time of the
barbarian invasion. As regards the Italian communes, it is only natural
that the Roman jurisprudence should strike the deepest and strongest
root in their social system, and that the history of our laws should
originally find in it their first beginning. Here, however, we are
forced to enter on a digression which, although seemingly apart from
the point, will presently help us to a clearer understanding of the
new society in course of development. With regard to this digression
it should also be said that so much learning and research have been
directed to the study of Roman law, that we are able to arrive at
certain trustworthy conclusions which, by affording evidence of the
close connection between the Roman family, and the political society
derived from it, will show us what path to take in pursuit of the same
connection in the history of Italy.


II.

Every student of the Pandects knows that the words "Roman law" denote
the outcome of long preliminary labours, and the ultimate form of a
jurisprudence which cannot be rightly understood without analysing
all the historical elements employed in preparing and building it up.
Treated in this way, the history of Roman law becomes, as it were,
instantly transformed into a history of many different legislations
following one another at intervals. From the Twelve Tables down to
Justinian, this law never halts for an hour in its constant course of
development. Even during the Middle Ages, when the compilations made
at Constantinople were studied with religious zeal by expounders and
commentators whose sole object was to faithfully reproduce and diffuse
this law, even thus, in the hands of those interpreters, influenced
by the altered spirit of the times and by new social developments, it
underwent changes of which they were not themselves conscious. It is
not until the fifteenth century that this historic development can be
said to have ceased among us, and Roman law become mainly a subject of
learned research. It is at this time that a new and modern system of
jurisprudence first reveals itself to history, endowed with a separate
life, and with a form of its own, though borrowing much from the Roman
law, which in consequence continues to be of the utmost value to us,
and still deserves our most assiduous attention, although for a very
different purpose from that with which it was studied during the Middle
Ages. Our object is now to familiarise ourselves with an immortal
monument of ancient wisdom, to shape our legal education by it, to
be helped by it to a clearer understanding of our own codes, and to
contemplate it in its successive manifestations, while we search for
its regulating law. It is in fact the discovery of this law that has at
once thrown a new light upon the whole history of Roman jurisprudence,
which we perceive to have been always and unceasingly governed by
it, and thus forced to assume a character so constant and continuous
through all its various transformations, that what had before seemed
to be a series of distinct legislations takes an entirely new aspect,
making us spectators, as it were, of the evolution of a single idea,
the progressive development of a work of Nature.

All this continuous progress or evolution was the result of two forces,
of two different elements. The true, primitive law of Rome was the
special law of the Quirites, of which we find the remains in the Twelve
Tables: a severe and restricted law abounding in formulas which had to
be sacredly observed, and its administration was entrusted to a small
number of citizens who alone were acquainted with its rules, whose
authority was sanctioned by religion. The smallest mistake of form
made void the most just decree, and where the law omitted to define
the formula to be observed, no valid action could be brought. When the
due formula, making the contract binding, had once been pronounced, no
proof of mistake or fraud could annul it. "Uti lingua nuncupassit ita
ius esto." A slave to forms, the judge could not listen to the voice
of morality or rectitude; the most just complaint failed to move him,
unless supported by a text of law. The defendant dared not stir a step
without the continual guidance of the legislator, inasmuch as every
juridical formula was sacred and inviolable; and as the science of
law was monopolised by the College of Pontiffs, the most aristocratic
and conservative body in Rome, it became a kind of occult science.
It was this very character, however, apparently so restricted and
pedantic, that gave its great force to the law in Rome. For law, being
now freed for the first time from every extraneous element belonging
to morals and good faith, became firm and inexorable. Any one who
had the law in his favour was safe to see it promptly carried out.
History affords no example elsewhere of legal sanction and redress
being applied so swiftly and surely as in Rome. In Athens, indeed,
where the laws were more philosophical, and the popular conscience gave
judgment, investigating motives, despising formulas, and looking only
to substantial justice, caprice often prevailed, and law never attained
the iron strength and tenacity of the Roman jurisprudence.

But with changing times, all things changed in Rome. This jurisprudence
revered as sacred, but described by Vico as _made up of formulas and
phrases_, was well adapted to a rude and primitive people. Ideas
had greatly altered in the days of Cicero, who in his speech _pro
Murena_ severely satirises a science which, in his eyes, had become
ridiculous: "res enim sunt parvae, prope in singulis literis atque
interpunctionibus occupatae." He looked upon the whole thing as a fraud
designed by the priests to secure themselves a monopoly. Was he in the
right or the wrong? Vico, in examining a similar question, showed that
Cicero was mistaken on this score. Cicero and his contemporaries, he
said, lived in too cultivated an age to comprehend rude and primitive
jurisprudence; they could not grasp its true significance, but
formed their judgment of the ancient laws according to the ideas and
principles of their own times. This view, which was first broached in
the _Scienza Nuova_, was afterwards accepted by many other writers;
and it is now placed beyond a doubt that the primitive Roman law was
not the artifice of a learned few, but was a spontaneous and necessary
growth among the people with whom it had its origin. At first, custom,
clearly distinguished from the law formulated and written, tempered
its rigid severity. Good faith and equity, disregarded and rejected
by the law, found their sanction in custom, were administered by a
separate tribunal, and were always respected, inasmuch as the sentence
pronounced by the officiating magistrate was morally, though not
legally, binding, and was therefore of great efficacy as the genuine
expression of public opinion. The sentence of condemnation could not be
carried out by force; but it made the condemned man infamous, and, as a
last resort, the magistrate could cite the accused before the people,
as the supreme legislator and judge.

But at a later date customs grew corrupt, and no longer sufficed to
protect public good faith and morality, which were driven to seek
asylum and sanction in the law, and so began gradually to modify its
primitive character. Substance now prevailed over form, equity over
the ancient text of the law, the intention of the contracting parties
over words uttered by mistake; the law became more moral as customs
grew more degraded. This transformation, though very gradual at the
beginning, was afterward, accelerated by the new conditions of the
Republics in which a change took place not unlike that occurring in
the history of jurisprudence, towards the beginning of the seventeenth
century. At that time the various European States, with their various
systems of law, having contracted new relations with one another, came
to recognise the necessity of establishing some fixed rules by which
all should be bound, and thus, under the auspices of Hugh Grotius,
the so-called School of Natural Law was built up. The same occurred in
Rome, if not in the science, at any rate in the practice of law. As
the dominion of the Republic became extended in Italy, its relations
increased with neighbouring nations, among whom the more philosophical
and less severe laws and principles of the Greek jurisprudence
prevailed. It was impossible to impose upon all these nations, without
modification, the rigid law of the Roman patriciate. Accordingly a
new system of law, of a simpler character and wider reach, took shape
and rapidly grew. This was named the _jus gentium_, to distinguish
it from the other, the _jus civile_. "Jus gentium est quod naturalis
ratio inter omnes homines constituit." This system, however, was not
deduced from philosophic theories concerning human nature, as was
the, appropriately styled, natural law of the eighteenth century; it
originated in the practical needs of the Romans and their new relations
with other Italian peoples: it was fostered by the principles of Greek
jurisprudence that had been transplanted into Southern Italy; it met
the new requirements of the Romans themselves; and taking the place
that custom had previously filled in the Roman courts, grew side by
side with the law of the Patricians with which it long maintained its
union.

There were thus two systems of law in force in Rome; and we accordingly
find on the one hand judges and courts faithful to the ancient
formalism, on the other, judges and courts taking cognizance of equity
and good faith, and almost discharging the duties of the Censor. The
continuous onward progress of the _jus gentium_, the reciprocal action
of the two legal systems ultimately fusing them into one, wherein
the old Roman formation gradually lost its rigidity, and equity,
becoming incorporated with the civil law, began to assume a more
definite and regular form, were all consequences of the principle
which dominates the life and history of the Roman law, and may even
be said to constitute it. For it has been moulded and diffused through
the world, inheriting from the old Quirites its frame of iron; from
contact with other races and from such germs as it could assimilate of
Greek civilisation, its more comprehensive and human spirit. Assuming
thus a character at once exact and philosophical, it seemed as though
destined to become, from its superiority, the universal jurisprudence,
the indispensable foundation, as it were, of all future legislation.
This union of legal systems was effected by the Praetor. He it was who
represented both the modern spirit and the ancient, enlarging the old
law with the defences of equity which he strengthened by submitting it
to the trammels of a formal procedure. This in substance was what took
place with regard to customs, letters, and everything else. The fusion
of Greek civilisation with the Roman constitutes the history of the
ancient world.


III.

As is natural, we also meet with the same phenomena in the history of
the family, from which the civil law is to a great extent derived.
In fact, whoever contemplates the primitive Roman family, at once
recognises it as the basis upon which the future juridical and
political greatness of Rome was erected. The family is sacred; the
father is absolute master of the goods, the liberty and the life
both of his wife and of his children. He is priest, judge, supreme
arbiter: wife, children, and grandchildren form with him a single
joint society, one legal entity of which he is the representative. The
woman may be bartered away, killed, or sold in execution; freed by
marriage from the despotic control of her father, she at once falls
under that of her husband; her legal incapacity lasts through her
whole life. But primitive customs so temper this harsh law that we find
no other people of antiquity so observant of the sanctity of family,
or showing so much respect to woman. Matrimony is styled "consortium
omnis vitae, divini et humani iuris communicatio." Divorce on the part
of the husband (_repudium_) is not forbidden by law, but any man who
repudiates his wife is dishonoured by the Censor, excommunicated by the
priest, and for a period of five centuries few cases of repudiation are
recorded. In ancient Greece some traces of oriental polygamy are still
discernible, but in Italy monogamy is coeval with Rome itself. Natural
children, as such, never rank as members of the family, but they may
be legitimated. Adoption is a solemn act, the moral propriety of which
is referred to the decision of the pontifex, as the guardian of the
sanctity of the family, and is thus submitted to the popular sanction.
The woman is never seen in places of public resort, nor does she attend
popular gathering; but within doors she is _domina_, and the husband
addresses her by that title. The _Atrium_ is the centre and sanctuary
of the house. Here relations, friends, and strangers meet together;
here stand the domestic hearth, the altar dedicated to the _Lares_, and
all those objects which the family holds sacred: the nuptial coach,
the ancestral likenesses moulded in wax from the faces of the dead,
the matron's rock and spindle, the chest containing the household
records and monies. All these possessions are entrusted to the care and
superintendence of the mother of the family, who, together with her
husband, sacrifices to the gods and assists him in the management of
the common patrimony: she directs all domestic work, and watches over
the education of her children. In the annals and legends of Rome the
name of some heroine, such as Virginia or Lucretia, is indissolubly
linked with the chief glories of the Eternal City. It is not so in
Greece. In instituting and sanctifying the family, the Romans laid the
foundation-stone of the Capitol. But to maintain this primitive nucleus
of Roman society firm and compact, the law must always watch with
vigilance and multiply its ordinances. The property of the family must
be kept together as strictly as possible and for the longest possible
time. The father is its sole master and arbiter; but on his death the
patrimony is equally divided between sons and daughters. The _unity_ of
the family must also be guarded and defended by the law, since there is
serious danger that a woman marrying may carry away from the family an
interest in the family property. She is accordingly subjected by the
law to a perpetual tutelage which prevents her from disposing at will
of her own property. On the death of her father the woman comes under
the tutelage of the agnati. In Cicero's day, when as Vico has noted,
the true significance of primitive Roman law had been lost, lawyers
believed that this tutelage of women had been established on account of
the weakness of the sex, _propter sexus infirmitatem_. But Gaius refers
to this opinion as a plausible and prevalent error, and maintains that
the restriction was instituted in the interest of the agnati, so that
the woman, whose presumptive heirs they were, should have no power to
alienate, diminish, or otherwise defraud them of their inheritance.[370]

So long as the woman remained under the tutelage of her father,
inasmuch as she had not yet inherited, the law allowed her to incur
legal obligations. The danger for the family began when, on her
father's death, she became an heir. It was from that precise moment,
accordingly, that she came under the tutelage of her own heirs the
agnati, and could no longer bind herself without their consent. This
tutelage, therefore, became not merely a duty on the part of the
agnati, but was also a right and privilege. Where the agnate was a
minor, of weak mind, or otherwise incapacitated, he did not forfeit
this right, but it had to be exercised by a third party. The tutor
fixed the dowry to be given with the woman on her marriage; but the
remainder of her patrimony had to be preserved intact, that it might
return afterwards to the agnati. No woman could make a will, that she
might not have it in her power to defraud the family. On passing _in
manus viri_, the woman underwent a _capitis diminutio_. She entered
another family, as it were, _loco filiae_, and her new relations became
her lawful heirs. Under these circumstances the law permitted her to
make a testamentary disposition, whereby, notwithstanding her new
relationships, she might restore her patrimony to her own original
family.

When the woman was under the _manus_ of her husband, she was
emancipated from the paternal authority and from the tutelage of her
agnates. The displeasure thereby caused to her own family was so
great that, before long, marriage by simple consent was resorted to,
according to which the woman became personally subject to her husband's
authority, but he had no right of _manus_ over her, and consequently
no power over her property. In this way the woman remained under the
power of her father or of the agnates, and at the same time came under
the authority of her husband, an arrangement that inevitably led to
many collisions, and hastened the advent of the most radical change
in the Roman family--the complete independence of woman. But, before
reaching this point, disputes were for a long time kept in check and
efficaciously remedied by the mediating influence of a most important
institution--the domestic tribunal. This family council, regulated
by usage, not law, was composed of agnates, cognates, relations,
and sometimes also of friends. It presided at espousals and at the
assumption of the _toga virilis_; it protected orphans; it aided the
head of the family in adjudicating and in awarding punishment, and
acted as a restraint on his authority. By law, the father could act
even without the co-operation of the Council; but by doing so, he
exposed himself to being publicly blamed and noted with ignominy by
the Censor, who, if necessary, might accuse him before the people. The
marriageable maiden was subject to and protected by this Council.

Becoming a wife by that form of marriage which brought her _in manus
viri_, she left her own family to become member of another; but if
not married under that form, she still remained subject to the family
Council, in which her husband was now included.


IV.

In the age of Caesar, the Roman family is no longer what it was at
first. Laws, usages, ideas, all are changed; and everything is moving
onward to a still more radical transformation. The _jus gentium_
seems to have become identical with the more rigorous _jus civile_.
The _fideicommissum_ has almost the force of a testament in solemn
form, and has become part, as it were, of the _jus civile_; _verbal
contract_, the ancient _stipulatio_, once so hampered by formulas, is
grown so flexible as to resemble a contract under the _jus gentium_.
But the greatest change of all has taken place in the family. The
domestic hearth is no longer the household sanctuary. The _Atrium_ is
transformed into an open courtyard, enlivened with flowers and limpid
fountains, ornamented with gilded busts and statues, often of an
obscene character. Sacrifices are no longer offered there to the gods
amid the stillness and purity of domestic and religious affection; it
now serves the enriched and corrupt patrician as a place of reception
for his numerous friends and clients. The family of former days, once
almost a State within the State, is now dissolved, and, as it were,
swallowed up by the political power. The agnates no longer cleave
together, the domestic tribunal has either lost its strength or has
entirely disappeared. Paternal authority, though less absolute, is
more oppressive, being no longer in harmony with the changed customs.
If a father disinherits his son, the judge cancels the will. Should he
refuse consent to his son's marriage, the State compels him to grant
it; should he punish his son with death, the emperor sends him into
exile; he cannot ill-use even his slaves without being punished by
the law, for the law has grown moral as manners become more corrupt.
By gradual degrees woman escapes from tutelage, and from _manus_, and
ultimately attains her independence. But the more she is emancipated
from her family and relations, the greater becomes her subjection
to the State. In her new independence she incurs new disabilities,
no longer resulting from her position as daughter or wife, but from
the fact of her sex, disabilities no longer imposed in the interest
of the family, but created as a protection for her infirmity. This
explains how it was that the lawyers of later days were mistaken as to
the significance of the old law touching the _tutela_ of woman. The
wife's dowry is guaranteed to her more and more strictly, until it
finally becomes her almost inseparable property. It must neither be
alienated nor diminished. On her becoming a widow, being divorced, or
returning to the paternal roof, she remains absolute mistress of it. A
husband who surprises his wife in adultery can no longer--hiding his
dishonour within his own walls--judge and put her to death with the
consent of the domestic tribunal. He must now leave the State to avenge
his wrongs, and must resort to the courts, even though seeking only
minor penalties. Divorce has become a public act of not unfrequent
occurrence. The woman, in short, is no longer under her husband's
_manus_, no longer subject to the _patria potestas_, no longer under
the tutelage of the _agnati_: she is protected by the State. When the
law still requires her to have a _tutor_ or procurator, she can choose
a stranger who becomes her servant rather than her master. Eventually
even this last shadow of subjection disappears. Absolutely her own
mistress, the woman may now hold property, increase her fortune, make
her will, lose her virtue; but her dowry, guaranteed and kept intact by
law, remains hers to the end of her life.

Nevertheless, as regards succession, the woman's rights are not yet the
same as the man's. It is true, that should her father die intestate,
she takes an equal share with her brothers of the inheritance; but
in all other cases of intestacy the nearest female agnate stands
after the most distant male. The woman cannot now do any legal act
for others, though this had not been forbidden previously; she cannot
be a witness; she cannot stand security for the debts of others. The
_Senatus-consultum Velleianum_ lays it down as a fixed rule, which,
to a certain extent, has remained in force to our own days--that the
woman must not undertake any obligation on behalf of others. She
may alienate her possessions in others' favour, may incur a direct
obligation, contract a debt, and transfer the money to others; but she
cannot bind herself to pay another's debt, nor guarantee its payment.
In the legislator's opinion, the infirmity of her sex leaves her enough
intelligence to escape danger in assuming direct obligations, or by
alienating her property, but not enough to guard her from lightly
undertaking remote and indirect liabilities which are often no less
serious.

But the progressive changes in the Roman family are not yet at an end.
To the numberless causes for change already in existence another is
added, when Christianity finds its way into the Empire, into literature
and law, and subverts all things. According to the law of Christ, man
and woman are equal; father and mother have equal rights and duties
in respect of their children, for whose advantage all things must be
ordered; whereas, by the old law, the rights of the children were
subordinated to the interests of the family. A new element is now
introduced into Roman law which further changes its character, already
much modified by Greek philosophy and by Byzantine despotism. The Canon
law accepts the principles of the Roman, recognises the wife's absolute
interest in her marriage portion, and rejects the pretensions of the
husband. Woman remains excluded from every office which the ancients
deemed proper to man; she cannot enter into obligations for others,
nor arbitrate, nor lay an accusation, nor bear witness in court; her
evidence has no legal effect. On the other hand, Roman law tends
inexorably to democratic equality, natural equity, and to the absolute
predominance of the State. The public authority deprives domestic
authority of its last remnant of power; it may almost be said that
the family, as a body-politic, disappears, to be reconstituted on the
footing of reciprocal affection. The final seal to these alterations
was imposed by the famous law of succession (Nov. 118 and 127) enacted
by Justinian in the years 543 and 547, which, suppressing every
privilege of sex and agnation, fixes rights according to the degree
of relationship, and makes them reciprocal. It moreover enlarges the
amount of the legitim, and ordains that the dowry of the wife should
be met by a _donatio propter nuptias_ of equal value from the husband,
and that, in the interest of the children, both should be inalienable.
Even with the consent of his wife, the husband cannot sell the dowry;
he may only administer it, and there must be complete reciprocity. The
wife is not only the owner of the dowry, she has besides a general
charge over her husband's property for its restitution, with a right of
action to enforce it as against all his other creditors. In inheriting
from their children the mother has equal right with the father, and
she is now qualified to be their guardian. Even the _Senatus-consultum
Velleianum_, which forbade women to incur obligations on behalf of
others, is modified with the same scope. Justinian, indeed, from his
desire to protect the property of the woman against all danger, is
strenuously opposed to her incurring obligations on behalf of her
husband; but he is much more indulgent in respect to obligations
undertaken on behalf of a stranger. These, if incurred for manifestly
good cause, are valid if renewed after two years. Thus modified, the
_Senatus-consultum Velleianum_ is treated with respect throughout the
Middle Ages. Reciprocal equality is now achieved, but the ancient unity
of the family is dissolved; the compact and iron nucleus of Roman
society is broken to fragments by the continual and increasing action
of the State. In all her institutions, Rome has succeeded in arriving
at democracy and equality, but at the cost of complete individual
liberty, and by sacrificing the development of special associations and
of local life to the unity of the State. How to conciliate these two
elements without destroying the one in the interest of the other will
be the problem of a new era and a new civilisation.

However highly we may rate the amazing and indisputable greatness
of the labours of Imperial legislators and juris-consults collected
in the _Corpus iuris_ in the time of Justinian, it is nevertheless
certain that the ancient and primitive character of Roman law has been
profoundly changed by it, and that the despotism of the State, always
prevalent in Rome, has been enormously increased. It is for this reason
that Tocqueville, and others with him, go so far as to maintain that
the great diffusion of the Justinian law among the Latin races has
more than once proved hurtful to political freedom. To many, such an
assertion may seem absurd; but granting that there is a close bond of
connection between private and public law, and that the final changes
in Roman law were introduced by the action of the growing despotism of
the State, the opinion advanced by the French writer is not without its
value.


V.

However that may be, it is undeniable that the family, as we now find
it constituted, or, more correctly speaking, weakened, by the Justinian
law has not the qualities which would enable it, in the ages of
barbarism now at hand, to withstand the violent onset of the advancing
Germanic peoples, much less to be the nucleus and germ from which the
new society of the Italian Commune may take birth. In fact, in the
statutes we find the family constituted on a very different footing.
Agnation has recovered its ascendancy. The woman is under a new
species of guardianship; and although the dotal system is rigorously
observed, there are innumerable regulations designed to keep family
property together, or make it revert to the family, so as to preserve
the domestic patrimony intact. Here an important question arises,
namely, whether this new constitution of the family, which stands in
close relation with the public law of the communes, is a return to
the pre-Justinian law, or derived from Germanic institutions and the
Longobard law, in which we find, in fact, precedence accorded to agnate
kin and a more stable family organisation? Italian writers, the earlier
writers more especially, adhered for the most part to the former
theory, while the majority of German authors, who have recently found
disciples even among ourselves, adopt the second view. Thus, on either
side we find theories propounded as to the constitution of the Italian
family in the Middle Ages, analogous to those concerning the origin of
the communes.[371]

The persistence of Roman law in the Middle Ages, even when the
condition of the Italians was most wretched, and when all things
seemed to be subject to the law of the Longobard, was maintained with
marvellous learning and acumen in the immortal work of Savigny. But,
in truth, though public law and penal law might readily be altered
under the rule of the conqueror, there was little likelihood that
the civil law which, for so many centuries, had filtered into the
usages and into the very blood of the Romans, which had regulated the
manifold relations of a civilised people and satisfied its countless
requirements, should perish utterly beneath the sword of barbarians
unconscious of those requirements and not always able to comprehend
those relations. Matters of which they were to a great extent
ignorant, or as to which they were indifferent, must often have been
passed over without notice in the laws framed by the barbarians, or
have evaded their action. Various provisions, therefore, of the Roman
law--those, for instance, relating to marriage, to succession, and to
contract--must often have continued to be applied by the Italians in
conformity with ancient usage. This will be more readily understood
if we reflect that while the Roman law had become the law of _all_
in those countries in which the Roman conquest had taken deep root,
the laws of the barbarians, on the contrary, according to Teutonic
usage, always presented a personal character--that is to say, extended
only to the people with whom they originated, and were not easily
communicated to others. In fact, when, as a consequence of successive
invasions, different Germanic tribes, whether independent of each
other or in subjection one to another, came together in the same
country, each of them continued to be governed by its own peculiar
laws. The Romans, on the contrary, regarding their law as universal in
character, communicated it to, and imposed it upon all. It was almost
the first germ of the greatness and the civilisation of Rome, and for
that reason its diffusion was considered the most sacred of duties
by this sovereign people. Thus it was that, even under the harshest
barbaric oppression, the Roman law continued to be the private law of
the Italians in all those cases, and they were not few, in which the
German laws failed to notice it, and neither abrogated it directly nor
substituted another in its place.

But the presence of two diverse legislations, the one imposed by
force, the other preserved by custom, the radical change of conditions
occasioned by the destruction of the old Roman State and the formation
of a new society, could not fail to originate a new life, a new
history for the Italian law. In the statute books of our communes we
find Roman and Longobard law confronted and almost contending, each
modified in turn by the action of the other. But under which of the
many forms through which it has passed is the Roman law found among
us at the moment when it seemed on the point of being overcome by the
Germanic law? Was it in the literary and philosophic form given to
it by Justinian, or was it in the _pre_-Justinian form, which, while
less systematic, was also less altered by Byzantine ideas, and more in
accordance with usage? Savigny roundly asserts that the Pandects on
their completion were at once sent into Italy, and that immediately
after the power of the Goths had been shattered by the Greeks Justinian
hastened to issue the Constitution (534), whereby legal effect was
given to them in the land. In consequence of this, he continues, the
Pandects were then to be met with in every corner of Italy, where they
were at once received with favour, inasmuch as the Justinian law was
specially adapted to the requirements of the land. This, he goes on
to say, likewise explains why it was that all the earliest Italian
commentators or glossators devoted themselves exclusively to the
study of the _Corpus iuris_. The reader, however, may easily discover
that, on this head, Savigny has pushed his inferences too far. More
than once, indeed, he is compelled to put a false interpretation on
documents that they may not contradict his theories; and more than
once the documents themselves seem to warn him that, even in the
Middle Ages, vestiges of a _pre_-Justinian law are to be traced; but
he persists still more resolutely in considering all this to be only
a survival of antiquated forms. Many new documents have recently been
published, and the question again presents itself, always with the same
urgency.

As a German writer, well versed in the subject, has recently observed,
everything tends to show that the history of Roman law in the
Middle Ages should be divided into two entirely distinct periods.[372]
During the first it endured by force of custom, and accordingly many
pre-Justinian formulas survived with it; in the second and much later
period the Justinian law prevailed, promoted still further by the
literary study of the Pandects undertaken by the Bolognese professors;
it was only then that the most ancient formulas wholly disappeared.
This view is supported by documentary evidence and harmonises with the
character of the times and with the requirements of society, and is
confirmed by our old writers and our literary traditions.

[Illustration: SUPPOSED PALACE OF THEODORIC, IN RAVENNA.

            [_To face page 383._]

In fact, Savigny himself examines and recognises the full importance of
the various sources of _pre_-Justinian law diffused in the Middle Ages.
The code of Theodosius (438) which then possessed great authority, and
the edict drawn up by order of Theodoric the Ostrogoth (500), were
direct compilations of the old Roman Jurisprudence.

If in these compilations we turn our attention to the constitution of
the family, more particularly as regards succession, we find it exactly
as it was before the law was interwoven with the Imperial edicts.[373]
The Breviary of Alaric ("Lex Romana Visigothorum") and the so-called
_Papian_ code ("Lex Romana Burgundioram"), both posterior to the year
500, are likewise compilations of _pre_-Justinian law, and are found
to be diffused in several provinces of the Empire. The often-mentioned
"Lex Romana Utiniensis, seu Curiensis," which seems to be ninth century
_rimpasto_ of Alaric's Breviary for the use of Italians in lands
previously under Longobard rule, also shows the same characteristics.
It is true that, according to the hypothesis of Savigny, the Breviary
of Alaric must have been in use among the Franks and brought by them
to Italy after the expulsion of the Longobards. In this case we should
find the old law to have been in force among us only before and after
the period of the Longobards; while during their oppressive rule we
should discover no certain trace of it. But it is very difficult to
suppose that the ancient law, based as it was upon custom, should have
died out precisely when custom might have preserved it, or that Roman
law should at that time have assumed the literary Justinian form and
afterwards have returned to a form more primitive. Had the legislation
of Justinian in its genuine form been once accepted, it must have
continued to gain ground with the advance of civilisation and under
the less severe rule of the Franks, whose mode of life approached much
nearer to that of the Latins. The fact is, that throughout the Middle
Ages we meet with pre-Justinian legal forms, more or less modified,
even among the laws of the Longobards.[374] As to the remark that
the earliest Italian commentators, the _glossators_, directed their
studies to the Pandects and the whole of the _Corpus iuris_--this only
shows that on the revival of the communes and of letters they turned,
as was natural, to the most authoritative and literary source of
jurisprudence. From that time, in fact, no other is looked for.[375]

[Illustration: THE TOMB OF THEODORIC, RAVENNA.

            [_To face page 384._]

It should also be remembered that, when the Greeks came into Italy
to combat the Goths, they found the ancient Roman customary laws in
force and sanctioned by the edict of Theodoric; that the Goths were
definitely vanquished in 553; that in 568 the Greek domination was
followed by that of the Longobards; that the latter confined their
rivals to Southern Italy, whence they were afterwards expelled by the
Normans. There, in the south, the corrupt Byzantine despotism proved
no less fatal than the oppression of the barbarians, and was perhaps
the prime cause of the many disasters and prolonged neglect into which
those provinces afterwards fell. But was it possible for a dominion
so brief and troubled to diffuse the law of Justinian in Italy with
such effect as not only to make it universally accepted, but also so
thoroughly incorporated with customary law, that it could survive
even when its binding legal effect was no longer recognised by the
barbarians?

Such an hypothesis will seem even less tenable as regards everything
relating to the family and to succession, if we reflect that the
reforms introduced into this branch of the law by Justinian at
Constantinople in no way corresponded to the conditions in which Italy
then stood. Notwithstanding the diffusion of Greek philosophy among
us, the spirit of Byzantium was by no means identical with that of
Rome, and there was still less identity in their social conditions. In
Constantinople Oriental despotism corrupted, nay, suffocated society
by excess of luxury and over-refinement of culture; the State assuming
everything to itself, imparted a new character to the laws. In Italy,
on the other hand, society, no less corrupt, had become disintegrated,
and was already falling to pieces; the ancient unity and strength of
the State were continually diminishing and losing strength, and less
and less resistance was opposed to the assaults of the barbarians. At
Constantinople the State was omnipotent, while in Italy its vigour was
on the wane. Among us, accordingly women and all who were weak were
naturally driven to seek refuge in private associations, and above
all in the bosom of the family. And if the natural force of events
had power to urge in any direction, and determine any new tendency,
it certainly could not have aimed at enfeebling the family bond by
subjecting it to the authority of a tottering State, but must rather
have sought to strengthen it as the only possible safeguard amid the
dangers that were threatening on every side. This, in fact, is the
course always followed in barbaric societies, where, the State being
powerless, the care of the weak and the punishment of injuries are
entrusted to the kinsmen. In short, both the disordered condition of
Latin society and the example of the barbarians themselves combined
to offer grave obstacles to the diffusion of Justinian's laws, more
especially when the old Roman customs were seen to be better suited
to the new and increasing needs of society, and useful for the
reconstruction, on a firmer basis, of the old family system, now become
more essential than before to the common welfare. No other way was
left for beginning anew the social task and advancing afterwards to
new methods and institutions. Nor need we attach much importance to
the constitution of the year 534, knowing how wide is the difference
between the promulgation of a law (especially when it is passed by a
short-lived and feeble Government in a society that is lapsing into
disorder) and its actual enforcement and incorporation with custom.
Even under the Roman Republic, or under the Empire, old laws did not at
once disappear when new ones were proclaimed. Even in modern societies
we may note how tenaciously ancient customs continue to be observed
when they are more in harmony with the character and requirements of
the people.

The principles of the Napoleonic code were proclaimed in our Southern
provinces during the French domination and afterwards confirmed by
subsequent legislation; and according to that code, every patrimony was
bound to be divided equally among the children. Nevertheless, in the
two Calabrias and many other Southern provinces, property is still kept
undivided in the family, since, by common consent, only one of the sons
marries, the others remaining single. For the same reason, the smallest
possible sum is assigned to the daughters; nor do all of them marry,
some being persuaded or forced to take the veil. Social progress alone
will slowly give real effect to the principles of equality sanctioned
by the codes.

Everything therefore points to the conclusion that Roman law survived
among us to the downfall of the Western Empire, preserving by usage
many of the forms that had belonged to it before the compilation of
the _Corpus iuris_. While in this state it came into contact with the
Germanic code, and thereupon began the series of mutual alterations,
from which the Italian family emerged, reconstituted in a totally new
way, and together with it the Commune. It was a slow transformation,
during which Latin ideas and traditions steadily gained ground, and
gradually fused or destroyed the barbarian laws and institutions.
When communal liberties were finally proclaimed, a new culture was
inaugurated, and with it a new epoch in the history of Roman law. The
university of Bologna became the centre for the diffusion and study
of the Pandects, and the _Corpus iuris_ became speedily regarded as
the primary and perennial source of common law in our country. The
tradition, according to which the Pandects of Amalfi, carried off by
the Pisans, were by them discovered and made known for the first time
to the Western world, dates this event about the year 1135, that is
to say in the same age that witnessed the rise of the communes, and
in which, as related by another tradition, Guarnerius founded the
Bolognese school at the request of Countess Matilda.[376] Thus our
conclusions are supported alike by history, legend, and logic.


VI.

In Italy, therefore, at the beginning of the Middle Ages, the family
accorded a preference to the agnates, and, in consequence of the
continuous weakening of the State, was obliged to seek in itself for
increased strength. The inroads of the barbarians brought with them
a different constitution of the family, but this could effect no
great change in our own family system until the Longobards had firmly
established their dominion over us. There then began a great change in
the social condition of Italy, which was forcibly compelled to assume a
form more or less barbaric. Hence it concerns us to study the Longobard
family system, that we may see how far and in what way it could thus
alter ours.

[Illustration: ANCIENT SHRINE, RAVENNA.

            [_To face page 388._]

Like every other barbaric society, that of the Longobards was
founded upon force; in time of war it was compactly united under a
king; during peace it split into groups, from want of vigour in the
central authority, and from the excessive independence of subordinate
chiefs. Hardly had barbarian kingdoms begun to be erected in the West
with a certain degree of stability, than we find them subdividing
into marquisates, dukedoms, separate groups, and at a later period
into feudal holdings. If we look to the primitive conditions of
these barbarians before they come among us, we find them scattered
over the country, without any city properly so-called, and with no
true conception of the State, which for them seems to consist in a
confederation of secondary groups. The social unity of the barbarians
is to be found in the villages or even in the tribes, which are
societies originally derived perhaps from a single family. Everywhere
the State assumes family forms. The social strength of the Germans is
more manifest in the lesser groups, and consequently in the family.
We ought not to be surprised, therefore, at finding the family
constituted more solidly with them than among the Latins, who now, for
many centuries, had been altering and modifying it under the growing
pressure of State control.

Originally the barbarian family had been, like the Roman, an
association consecrated by religion. A tutelary goddess presided over
the domestic hearth; the father was priest and protector of the family.
In Rome the control was in the hand of a single person, who ruled with
an iron authority, but in Germany this authority was shared by all
male members of the family fit to bear arms. At Rome the family was an
absolute monarchy, its senior members being always regarded as the most
powerful; but in Germany it more resembled a Republic, consisting of
all the adult male members, except such as were disqualified by bodily
infirmity. The family council aided the Roman father and tempered
his rigid despotism; whereas in Germany the council predominated and
assumed to itself the chief share of the family power. The Roman
father could rupture every domestic tie at his will; he could remove
his son from the family, sell him, or put him to death. The German
son, on the contrary, when able to bear arms and fight by his father's
side, might, if he chose, separate himself from his original family
and join another tribe. Among the Germans bodily strength, property
held in common, and natural ties of blood constituted the family; in
Rome it was the conception of the family in itself that dominated over
everything and made it authoritative and sacred. In Rome the individual
was merged in the State, the son in the father; whereas, among the
Germanic tribes, individual liberty was much greater, and if to us the
State has the appearance of a confederation, the family seems a society
of more independent members united by mutual agreement. Punishments,
transgressions, property, all were in common; if any member of the
family suffered wrong, it was the kinsmen's part to avenge him and
obtain retribution. For sales and donations, as well as for acts of
revenge, the consent of every member was required, inasmuch as the
property belonged to the whole family, and ought to stay with it:
whence the inutility of testamentary dispositions, which were in fact
unknown to the barbarians. Property was sacred; it constituted the
family, conferred social rights and obligations, and rested chiefly in
the hands of the males. In this family, and in this society founded
wholly on force, the woman, being incapable of bearing arms, was
committed, like all other weaklings, to the defence and protection
of her armed kinsmen, and so came under their perpetual guardianship
(_mundium_, _munt_, _manus_). This tutelage being established on
account of the weakness and infirmity of the sex, could never come to
an end, as it might in Rome, where it had been constituted wholly in
the interest of the family. But the Germanic woman, although oppressed,
liable to be deprived of her property, to be sold, or made a slave,
was under a power which, being divided among many, was feebler and
less despotic than the Roman domestic rule. She was a dependent member
of the family, but the authority of her father, brothers, or sons was
shared by all her other kinsmen. Hence it was easy for the woman to
find a protector. Her incapacity by reason of her infirmity did not
entail incapacity in the eye of the law. She could appear in court,
choose some one to represent her there; she could own property; she
could inherit, although taking a less share than would have come to her
had she been a man. The man listened to her advice, and treated her
with religious respect; but it was the respect due to her weaker sex,
not as in Rome, where respect was offered to the mother, to the wife,
to the sacred character which was the foundation at once of the Roman
family and of Roman greatness.

Longobard law, essentially Germanic, prevailed long in Italy,
where plain traces of its survival are to be recognised as late as
the fourteenth century. Under the stronger influence of the Roman
jurisprudence it very soon lost its native rudeness and originality.
As to this change, Gans, in his "History of the Law of Succession,"
has observed: "The fact that after the historical redaction of this
law, another and systematic compilation of it was made, should prove
to us how it was that the more confused, but at the same time more
natural, spontaneous, and vigorous character of the Germanic law must
necessarily have been altered, and as it were crystallised into a form
that rather belongs to the Roman." It was precisely this form that so
greatly promoted its diffusion among us.


VII.

With the Longobards, as with all the Germanic nations, woman was never
released from tutelage (_mundium_), never became her own mistress
(_selbmundia_). The man who desired to make her his wife must first of
all pay the price of the _mundium_ or guardianship which the marriage
would give him over her; next he must bind himself to make good the
_meta_, a species of dowry noticed by Tacitus when he remarks that,
among the Germans, the husband brought the dower to the wife, instead
of the wife bringing it to the husband. To the _meta_, also known
afterwards under the name of _dotalitium_, _dos_, _sponsalicium_,
&c., there was added the _faderfium_, which the father might, if he
chose, give to his daughter. On the morning of the day after the
wedding the husband presented his bride with a gift (_morgengab_),
attended, according to a very questionable interpretation, as the
price of her virginity. When Longobard customs came to be affected by
the growing influence of the Roman law, the amount of the _meta_ and
of the _morgengab_ was restricted. In the age of the communes, the
_faderfium_, now transformed into a dower, was also limited by law. The
_meta_, _faderfium_, and _morgengab_ belonged to the wife, who could
require them to be given up to her on her husband's death. But by a
peculiarity of the Germanic law, retained in its entirety even by the
Longobards, the Roman regulation, which made the dower the separate
and independent property of the wife [even during her husband's
lifetime], was never accepted. The only property owned absolutely and
exclusively by the woman was what was given her by the husband. The
Germanic law favoured the principle of common ownership. As to this,
Gans observes:--"It is not necessary with us, as with the Romans, that
a woman should have separate property of her own in order to assert
her juridical personality, and prove her equality with her husband.
She possesses what her husband possesses, and her equality rests on
the mutual affection which makes all differences disappear." In the
ordeal by combat the husband represented the wife, since she was under
the protection of his sword; if she were taken in adultery he might
put her to death. All her possessions, movable or immovable, including
even nuptial gifts made to her by friends, became the property of
her husband, who had only to provide against the contingency of the
marriage being dissolved by death: whence the necessity of the _meta_
and the _donatium_.

If the wife died without issue, everything went to the husband; on
the husband's death, the wife was entitled to receive the _meta_ and
_morgengab_ (donation). For anything more she was entirely dependent on
the generosity of her husband, who, at a later period, was permitted
to leave her the half, and, eventually, the whole usufruct of his
possessions.

While the marriage laws of the Longobards and the Romans differed thus
widely, their laws relating to guardianship were also different. The
_mundium_ of the Longobards, as we have seen, is not to be confounded
with the _tutela_ to which the Roman woman was subjected. Originating
in the incapacity to bear arms, it was of limited duration in the case
of males, and ceased with their incapacity. At first the limit was
fixed at the age of twelve, at a later period of eighteen years. But
for the woman, who could never become capable of bearing arms, it was
perpetual. From the _mundium_ of her father, she passed, on marriage,
under that of her husband; and on the death of her father, if then a
widow, under the _mundium_ of her own son, or of the agnates, who were
also her heirs.

In default of other guardians she was protected by the _Curtis Regia_.
But in every case, whether under father, husband, son, agnates, or
_Curtis Regia_, the _mundium_ was identical in character, having for
its object the protection of the weak. This could not be said of the
Roman _tutela_, which had its origin in the Roman conception of the
family. The _tutela_ of the Roman father over his children lasted all
his life; but he could divest himself of it. The _mundium_ of the
Longobard father lasted while his children were incapable of bearing
arms, and, as a logical consequence, ceased when the incapacity
terminated. While it cannot be positively asserted that emancipation
was unknown to the Longobards, it may be believed, from the tendency of
their law, to have been of rare occurrence. When the Roman woman was
subjected to the _potestas_ of her father, the _manus_ of her husband,
the _tutela_ of the agnates, there were three kinds of guardianship
very different from each other, corresponding with the difference in
the domestic relations of those who exercised the right. No one of them
had anything in common with the _mundium_.

The Longobard father had the right to sell his sons; he represented
them in courts of law; whatever they acquired was his. But, as
we have already shown, his authority was tempered by the family
council, in which the brothers of the mother--the children's natural
protectress--had much to say.

The Longobard family law has marked peculiarities in regard to
succession as well as to marriage. And first, it should be noted that
the disposal of property by will was recognised by the Longobards. This
seems contrary to the usage of the Germanic tribes, among whom wills
were unknown, but may be referred to the modifying action of the Roman
on the Longobard law.

The fact, however, that with the Longobards donations and wills were
irrevocable, indicates a Germanic character, or rather the trace of it,
for the main feature of the Roman will consisted in its revocability.
Of the essential principles of the Roman _Testamenti factio_ the
Longobards were ignorant. Legitimate children came first in the
order of inheritance, and with them came natural children also, the
latter--though not in strictness forming part of the family--being
admitted to succeed along with the former, though taking a less share.
They might, however, be put on an equal footing by being legitimated.
At a later period this essentially Germanic peculiarity of the laws
of succession was done away with by the action of the Roman and Canon
laws, which exclude natural children. Originally, by the Longobard
law, a legitimate child took two-thirds of the inheritance, leaving
one-third only to the natural children. If there were two legitimate
children, the natural children took only a fifth; if three, a seventh.

It was forbidden to leave more than the prescribed share to natural
children, and no child could be disinherited without just and manifest
cause. The reasons for disinheriting a child were borrowed from the
Roman code. It was allowable, however, to favour one son more than the
rest.

The preference accorded to males over females is a point of much
importance, and is another of the special characteristics of the
Longobard law. When the testator had one son and one or more unmarried
daughters he was obliged to leave a fourth of the inheritance to the
latter, but when there were several sons the daughters only received
a seventh part. Married daughters had no right to any share in the
inheritance, but had to be content with what they had received on
the day of their marriage, and could claim nothing more. Failing
male issue, daughters were next heirs, and whether married or single
inherited as though they were males. Another peculiarity of Longobard
law was the great favour shown to daughters or sisters of the testator
domiciled in his house--_in capillo_. A brother is excluded in
favour of a daughter or niece--a remarkable instance of this strange
and singular preference accorded to females. We likewise find that
unmarried daughters and sisters inherit on equal terms when living
under the parental or fraternal roof.

We have already noticed that the statutes of the Italian communes
accord, as does also the Longobard law, a decided preference to
_agnates_ over _cognates_, and that this circumstance has given rise
to keen discussion. Many persons, indeed, insist on detecting in this
preference an absolutely Germanic characteristic transfused into the
statutes from the Longobard law. But we have seen that through the
greater part of its history the Roman law also gave a preference to
the agnates, and that it was only at a very late period that it lost
this feature, which was still to some extent retained in Italy at the
time of the barbarian invasions. That the preference of the agnates
was not borrowed by the statutes from the Longobard law will be even
more conclusively shown if we consider the manifest differences which
prevail on this very point between the Germanic and the Italian laws;
and bear in mind the important fact that the preference continued to
increase in strength, at the very time when the action and influence
of the Roman law are increasingly apparent in the statutes. In truth,
the more closely we examine the matter, the more we are compelled to
recognise that it was political reasons altogether peculiar to the
Italian communes and to Italian society in the Middle Ages that led to
this preference of the agnates. But even here the reciprocal action of
the one law upon the other is clearly traceable, for we can perceive
that the succession of the agnates, under the Longobard law, has itself
been modified by the Roman, which has made it careless of the nature
of the property of which the inheritance consists; whereas it is the
peculiar and constant characteristic of the Germanic law that such
succession should be ruled according both to the degree of kinship and
the nature of the inheritance.

In conclusion, it may be said generally that with the Longobards the
ties of blood predominate; that in their family there is greater
individual freedom, and the family itself is much less affected by the
action of the State. With the Romans, on the contrary, the conception
of the family is stronger than the ties of blood; the unity of the
family depends at first on an absolute paternal despotism, afterwards
destroyed by the authority of the State, which to a great extent
assumes its place.

From this time the State is predominant in all things; it reduces
the family to fragments, and aims at the complete equality of all
without having the strength to consolidate a society in which neither
individual liberty, local activity, nor free associations were
allowed sufficient scope for their development. Yet all these were
absolutely necessary for the preservation of a huge social structure
made up of distinct races, and consequently destitute of the national
character and unity which the Republic and the Empire had imposed.
It was precisely these new elements that were introduced among us by
the barbarians. And thus it was that two peoples, two forms of family
and society, I might almost say two ideas, two wholly different types
of society were brought together, of which the one had become the
necessary complement of the other. From their forests the Germans
brought individual freedom, personal independence, the force of small
associations; the Latins had already discovered the unity of the State,
the wider and more organic conception of society, and the political
idea of the family which we shall see hereafter triumphing in the
Commune.

From the fusion of these two different societies that modern society
is to arise in which the action of the one is seldom dissociated from
that of the other, and it becomes impossible to ascribe the result
exclusively to either.


VIII.

But while the co-existing and contending laws of the Romans and
Longobards are the two juridical elements most plainly to be recognised
in the Italian statutes, there are others also claiming remembrance,
and among these the feudal and the Canon law must be noticed. Feudalism
is one of the most important institutions in the history of the Middle
Ages; it is the first form that society assumes on emerging from the
chaos of barbarism, and it is stamped with a character essentially
Germanic. With it, property and the family take a new and peculiar
shape. We may pronounce it to be the first and chief political and
social manifestation of Germanic individualism. The barbarian tribe
had a natural tendency to split into small groups, into families
solely united by the bond of common danger. During invasions the
tribe transformed itself into an armed band, left behind all weak or
incapable members, accepted recruits even from neighbouring tribes,
and being under the command of one chief, was forced by the exigencies
of war to be firmly and compactly united. The attacks previously made
on them by the Romans had, for like reasons, the effect of creating
among the barbarians certain strong and powerful kingdoms by the union
of different tribes; but these never lasted long, since as soon as
peace was restored they began anew to fall apart and dissolve. Scarcely
had the barbarians begun to settle themselves in the West, than their
incapacity to establish the unity of a State was made clearly manifest.
The moment peace was declared the leaders of the various armed bands
proceeded to divide the conquered territory. They then separated,
and their king, or supreme chief, remained, as it were, isolated,
and with very scant authority. Every leader tried to possess himself
of some stronghold where he might rule as an absolute lord, barely
acknowledging his dependence on the king. In the fief thus created,
ownership and sovereignty became confused, but were both considered
to be held (_per beneficium_) as of favour from a more powerful lord,
subject to certain burthens and obligations. Originally a temporary
grant, the _benefice_ or _fief_ only became hereditary at a later
time. At first it could be resumed by the donor; it reverted to him
on the death of the feudatory, that it might be transmitted by a new
grant to the feudatory's heirs; it then gradually, by use, abuse, or
special act of concession, became an hereditary estate. Eventually all
property, possession, or ownership came to be held, during the Middle
Ages, on feudal tenure. The want of vigour in the supreme political
power obliged the weak to seek protection elsewhere. Many independent
landowners voluntarily accepted the position of vassals; while, on the
other hand, the obstacles encountered by the great lords in enforcing
their authority over wide territories compelled them to cede part of
their land in _benefice_ to lesser vassals. In this way the State, the
Church, all things assumed a feudal form. This system was completely
established in the eleventh century, when the communes arose in Italy
to combat and overthrow it.

In a fortified castle it was natural that the ties of the family should
become continually stronger: a fortress must suffice for itself. It
was, as it were, the independent world of the lord who dwelt in it,
and divided his time between perilous adventures and domestic life.
All historians have noted that feudalism produced increased respect,
affection, and chivalrous regard for woman, and made man more resolute
and energetic. Save in times of war, the baron was almost absolute and
independent lord of his small realm, wherein all were his subjects.
From him his vassals received the posts of seneschal, count of the
palace, equerry, and the like, which offices, being granted in a form
more or less feudal to persons of noble birth, had a tendency to become
hereditary. A numerous retinue somewhat relieved the loneliness of the
castle. The sons of subordinate nobles frequented the court of their
liege lord, to be trained to polite manners and the arts of chivalry,
and finally to receive the sword from his hands and be proclaimed
knights. All this gave prestige to the castle, and secured the fidelity
of the vassals to their lord, while at the same time it flattered the
pride of the inferior nobility.

The Longobard feudal law is found to have points of connection with
the laws of Rome which, though very different in spirit, are often
called to its aid. Often, however, they are found to be in opposition.
There can be no doubt that the Roman law manifests in Italy its
persistent action on the feudal law. The fief, as is well known, not
being absolute independent property, but only a limited and conditional
grant, cannot, from its nature, be subject to the hereditary principle.
On the contrary, the right of the heir must be recognised anew in his
person, since, as we have seen, he does not derive it from any right
in his predecessor. And this continued to be the practice even after
custom had begun to make the tenure hereditary. According to feudal
law, the successor was not then considered to represent the person
whose heir he was; the original grant was renewed in his behalf.
Moreover, when a fief has once become hereditary, the whole family has
a right to it, not derived from the will of the last holder at his
death, but already existent during his life. It is therefore necessary
to establish an order of succession to determine which member of the
family shall be preferred, and this order of succession begins to be
borrowed from the Roman code. Although differing from the true and
correct order of succession, it is gradually confounded with it, and
finally alters and dissolves the fief. Thus the Roman law penetrates
and modifies the feudal.

[Illustration: CHURCH OF SAN VITALE, RAVENNA.

            [_To face page 401._]

From the very nature of a fief, female descendants cannot inherit,
and the male descendants of deceased sons succeed equally with
surviving sons. Nevertheless there are certain fiefs which, having
been originally bestowed upon females, must, in default of heirs male,
naturally pass to females; but as soon as the male line is established,
male heirs have the preference. Ascendants cannot succeed, because
succession is determined, not by relationship, but by the original
grant; accordingly the reversion falls, not to the ascendant, but to
the original granter of the fief. Collaterals of the last holder,
unless descendants of the first, are not entitled to succeed; nor can
brothers, as such, succeed, unless their father has held the fief.
Nor can husband and wife succeed to each other. But under the growing
influence of common law all these primitive characteristics likewise
disappear. Feudal law has little importance in the Italian statutes;
but the political and social importance of feudalism in the history
of our communes is immense. It represents a society distinguished by
laws and usages of its own, and that appeals to the Emperor, whose
judgments and judges it always prefers to the laws and magistrates of
the Republic which it despises, and would fain ignore. The Republic in
consequence looks on the nobility as a foe to be destroyed, but this it
can only effect after sanguinary struggles in the course of which it
will be itself profoundly changed.

Canon law undoubtedly plays a part in the history and formation
of the communes that should not be overlooked, though by no means
corresponding with the greatness of the political, social, and
religious influence of the Church. Made up of fragments from the
writings of the Fathers, ordinances of ecclesiastical councils, papal
decretals, and with a large admixture of Roman law, it appeals also
to the authority of reason and of Holy Writ. It thus declared itself
favourable to natural equity, as opposed to legal sophistry, tempered
the harshness of barbaric laws, protected the weak, upheld the sanctity
of the family, and aided the triumph of the Roman law over that of
the Longobards. But it also sought to subordinate the civil power to
the ecclesiastical; it added to the number of exceptional tribunals;
it favoured inquisitorial jurisdiction, torture, and trial by ordeal.
Moreover, its constant tendency to encroach on the field of civil law
found an open door in the oath which every magistrate, the Podesta
included, had to take, with the prescribed formula: "saving conscience"
(_salva la coscienza_) expressed or understood. As it rested with the
clergy to determine cases of conscience, so also it was for them to
decide on the validity of oaths. This naturally fostered the diffusion
of canon law. The exclusion of natural children from succession and
the suppression of divorce are not a little due to the operation of
this law. Its action is to be seen plainly enough in the statutes,
but still more clearly in the struggle between the civil authority
and the ecclesiastical, wherein the latter endeavours to maintain its
inviolable privileges, its exceptional tribunals, its supremacy even in
causes civil and political.


IX.

In the statutes therefore, we find four different legislations,
contending, as it were, with one another: the Longobard, the Roman,
the Feudal and the Canon law. These, however, may almost be reduced
to two, seeing that feudal law is Germanic, and canon law, in so far
as it affects the statutes, is mainly Roman. So that here again
we are met by the old hostility between Germans and Latins. The two
races are opposed, as also their institutions, laws, and ideas; their
minds seem to challenge one another wherever they meet, whether in the
field of letters, politics, or art. Yet each has need of the other,
and both must disappear to make way for a new social system and a more
comprehensive spirit which, resulting from the fusion of two warring
elements, will remain sole victor in this prolonged contest. In Italy,
however, the Latin strain always predominates, as we see even in the
statutes, wherein Roman law forms the keystone of the whole juridical
structure.

[Illustration: EMPEROR JUSTINIAN.

(_From a Mosaic, Ravenna._)

            [_To face page 403._]

The earliest compilation of the statutes dates from the very time when
a knowledge of the _Corpus iuris_ begins to be diffused throughout
Italy from the University of Bologna. From that time forth the
legislation of Justinian was regarded as an epitome of juridical
philosophy, as the law _par excellence_, and is recognised by all
our Republics as the common law, the law to be applied whenever the
statutes are silent. For this reason that part of the statutes which
relates to the civil law is very much less developed than the political
part; and for this reason those teachers whose studies have been
directed chiefly to civil jurisprudence occupy themselves much more
with Roman, canon, feudal, and Longobard law than with the law of the
statutes. These they examined, especially at first, rather as a result
of the study of the Roman law, than as deserving careful attention on
their own account; they regarded them as the written expression of
popular custom to which no great scientific value could be attached, as
something outside the one legal system which alone merited universal
admiration.

A long period elapsed before writers on law began to apply their minds
to the consideration of the statutes, the great importance of which
has been only completely recognised in our day. Venice is perhaps the
only Commune in which it was customary, in the absence of statutory
provisions, to appeal to natural reason: whence Bartolo's remark
that the Venetian magistrate gave judgment _manu regia et arbitrio
suo_.[377] But even in Venice such decisions must always have been
inspired or guided by a knowledge and admiration of the Roman law.

[Illustration: EMPRESS THEODORA AND COURT, RAVENNA.

            [_To face page 404._]

What has been said will put in a clear light the extraordinary
importance accorded to the University and the professors of Bologna
in connection with their labours in annotating and interpreting the
_Corpus iuris_ so as to make it intelligible to all, and an instrument
for instructing and training all those who sought to follow the legal
profession, whether as notaries, judges, Podestas, or captains of the
people. That these teachers possessed a very slender knowledge of
history is seen from their writings. Their merit lay in the intelligent
exposition of a system of law which had never become extinct. It was
a precept of theirs that "as the unskilled rider must hold on by the
pommel, so the judge should stick to the gloss." In this way the
school of Bologna became, as it were, the depository of an universal
law which was looked upon as almost sacred. Thither popes sent their
decretals, emperors their edicts for registry or revision. The Emperor
was, however, regarded as the living source of legislation, as alone
entitled to add new laws to the Roman. Any one speaking evil of
the Emperor met with condign punishment. Any one who questioned his
universal authority was declared heretical by the jurists themselves.
This authority belonged to him as lord of all nations, and was
transmitted to him from the Roman Empire as its rightful heir. It
was natural, therefore, that to determine the extent and limits of
this authority, recourse should again be had to the professors of
Bologna, the veritable depositaries of the Roman law, who accordingly
acquired a constantly increasing importance. The _ratio scripta_ was
what was always called for; and the communes, even while avowing their
determination to preserve their ancient liberties undiminished, never
forgot to profess their willingness to leave the Emperor all the
_veteres justitias_ which belonged to him, and which they declared
themselves desirous to respect. The only question was to ascertain
what these were, and hence fresh occasion to consult the professors of
Bologna.

Before the great contest between the Lombards and Frederic Barbarossa,
a genuine judicial trial was held, ending with the condemnation of
the Milanese, who were declared rebels, _adstipulantibus judicibus
et primis de Italia_. At Roncaglia, Frederic exercised judicial and
legislative authority, with the assistance of four professors from
Bologna, who maintained the Emperor's rights, not from any hostility to
their own country, but because, as professors of Roman law, they were
the natural champions of the Holy Roman Empire. Nor did the communes
themselves raise any objection to these claims. After Frederic's defeat
they continued to draw up their statutes, laws, and public instruments
in his name. Even as late as the fifteenth century, we find that
notaries still gave validity to public documents by making them run in
the name of the Empire. At the peace of Constance the power to appoint
magistrates, civil and criminal, consuls, Podesta, and notaries, was
expressly reserved to the Emperor, whose prerogative in such matters,
as well as of deciding causes of serious importance on final appeal,
was fully recognised. If, in fact, the Milanese paid little regard to
the Emperor's authority, his right was not questioned. The Lombards
acknowledged themselves his lawful subjects, though they afterwards
chose to act as if free and independent.

When Henry VII. came to Italy, in Dante's time, he too, brought the
Italian cities to trial, pronounced sentence on them, exacted fines on
men and money, and cited King Robert of Naples to appear before him. At
that time many must have deemed these proceedings farcical; but they
were echoes of a bygone age, of a past which even Alighieri's immortal
genius thought to recall to life, as his letters and his book, "De
Monarchia," serve to show. The Church, it is true, constantly withstood
the Empire, but during the whole of the Middle Ages the Emperor's
political and juridical authority was never called in question, was
invariably recognised.

While the continual struggle between Church and Empire, communes and
feudal lords, Guelphs and Ghibellines, was being waged, the statutes
were framed. In these were recorded, not only new customs written
down as they were formed, but also all the old customs that had been
modified by the new. Although the jurists of Bologna thought it no
concern of theirs to study a system of law, which being in common
use was then well known, and which had its source in that Roman
jurisprudence which engaged their attention through their whole lives,
for us it is certainly a study of grave importance, as a means of
accurately estimating the value and character of this communal life in
the Middle Ages. We may have very long to wait before we can completely
solve the problem. Nevertheless we may make a beginning by examining
the various statutes, comparing them with one another, and also
comparing the different forms which each of them received at different
stages of drafting, in order to discern the evolution of the new law,
to ascertain and understand the principle which governs it.


X.

The whole life of the Commune is embraced in the statutes: the election
and functions of political magistrates; public, civil, criminal,
administrative, and commercial law. Public law is the subject most
fully dealt with; while, for reasons already explained, civil law is
left very incomplete. Nevertheless the statutes handle, with more or
less detail, such matters as personal _status_, dowers, contracts,
judicial procedure, succession, wills, rights arising in respect of
contiguous lands or houses, and, above all, the family. They aim at
a simple and summary procedure, free from chicanery, whereby causes
may be settled fairly and promptly; but from defective drafting, from
admitting a running commentary, altogether out of place in legal
enactments, and from leaving too much to the discretion of the judge,
they generally lead to a contrary result. It is indeed astonishing to
observe how, during those centuries in which a splendid literature was
growing up, when the most unpretentious writings offer us an example of
good style, and when judges, notaries, and professors of law had the
imperishable model of the _Corpus iuris_ constantly before their eyes,
the statutes should have been written in a form so illiterate that we
may often pronounce it barbarous, and always involved and confused. The
statutes constitute a legislation based upon custom, mutable, popular,
still uncertain of itself, which, taking its birth in the midst of
civil wars, always retained their likeness, and never arrived at
classical elegances, which in any case would have been made impossible
by the scholastic jargon that still prevailed in our Universities and
among our jurists. Petrarch's animadversions, directed chiefly against
the obscure phraseology of the professors of law in his time, were
fully justified. The classical revival which sought to introduce a
purer and more elegant latinity had to make a beginning outside, and
often in opposition to the Universities. It spread far and wide during
the fifteenth century, but always retained a literary and philosophical
rather than a juridical character.

Notwithstanding the greatness of its merits and aims, the Italian
Commune has in it something of the transitory and mediaeval; it
constantly indicates a period of change. It is the germ from which,
at a later time, modern society is to issue, but the birth cannot
be accomplished until the germ itself is destroyed; consequently it
always remained in a state of incessant transformation. Sprung from
the conjunction of two different societies, the Roman and Germanic,
it derived from the former the general idea of the State, from the
latter individual liberty, local activity, and the force of special
associations. The problem it had to solve, and that constitutes its
essential life and history, lies precisely in its ceaseless efforts to
harmonise those two elements which long remained not only separate but
often opposed. Until complete fusion was effected by the destruction
of the Commune itself, the contest continued to be waged, and was
accompanied by inevitable disorder. In the Commune, government and
public policy have an importance unknown to barbaric society, but the
Commune still wears the character of a powerful assemblage of small
associations rather than of a single society, or of a State in the
true and strict sense of the word. Life indeed courses more swiftly
through these numberless groups, and is quickened by their activity.
Social vigour is chiefly to be looked for in family cliques, and
in the Companies of the Arts and Trades, of the Nobles and of the
Burghers, all of whom have laws, statutes, magistrates, and tribunals
of their own. Hence arises an extraordinary interlacing of ordinances,
of conflicting passions, of diverging or clashing interests. True
individual liberty, true equality before the law is not yet understood;
but the individual is trained and protected by the association to
which he belongs, which lends him a certain degree of strength, and
secures him an increasing share of freedom. These subsidiary groups,
however, unlike those which we have already met with in the Germanic
societies, cannot be separated, but must live together in the State,
outside of which there is no reason for their existence. The infinite
multiplication of these groups, their jealousies and continual jarrings
and collisions, made the Republic all the more indispensable to them,
all the more the object of their hopes and love. Every one of these
merchant-citizens was ready to give his life for this Republic, on
which, both in peace and in war, his own welfare and that of the
various associations depended. The heads and leading members of these
associations were privileged to sit in the Councils of the State,
governed it as masters, and found it their only sure defence against
the countless rivals with whom each of them had to contend. Individual
and general interests thus worked in concert, and the fragmentary power
divided among so many hands, was nevertheless able to guard the liberty
of all, at a time when no true conception of the State or of general
equality had yet arisen. Still, it is easy to imagine how ill-arranged
and inconclusive must have been the legislation of republics thus
divided and subdivided, in which at every step some new special statute
or tribunal was encountered. And this at a time when judicial and
political power were so strangely intermixed, that whoever had a share
in the one necessarily shared in the other.

The dominant feature in all the civil enactments of the statutes
seems to be a jealousy of neighbouring communes, and a fear lest, as
a result of marriage, property should be withdrawn from the city, the
society, or the family. To guard against this, both law and custom
provided so efficaciously, that even in a Republic as democratic as
that of Florence, wherein every vestige of aristocracy was destroyed,
and the Ciompi obtained the upper hand, we find landed property so
strictly tied up that there are families who, to this day, own the
same estates which were held by their ancestors in the fourteenth
century. The necessity for keeping families, associations, and
party-circles intimately united, and making each member of them bound
for the rest, is so strikingly apparent, that it is these political
and social considerations which determine the tendency of the civil
law, and often impede its natural development. So that even here,
notwithstanding the weakness of the State, we again recognise the
old Latin tradition, which always accords an excessive importance to
political considerations, and consequently a preponderating influence
to public over private law. The Italian statutes, therefore, can only
be explained and understood in connection with the history of the
communes, which they illustrate in their turn. And this is another
reason why the professors of Bologna, accustomed to the philosophical
character of Justinian's legislation, and unfamiliar with the methods
of historical exposition, so long neglected the statutes.

Also, as might be expected, the predominating action of political
considerations is most clearly shown in the constitution of the family.
Here the rights which flow from the Commune's conception of the family
prevail over the ties of blood which by the Germanic law are much
more respected. The regulations of the Roman law as to dower are
fully accepted, but the dower itself is restricted to a small amount.
Males have a marked precedence over females, and over descendants in
the female line. But in all circumstances the woman is entitled to
alimony. It is not meant that she should be rich, or should divide the
domestic patrimony, and transfer it to another family, much less to
another Commune; but in any event she must be assured of a suitable
maintenance, according to her rank of life. She remains under the
perpetual protection of the _mondualdo_ (legal guardian), but the
_mundium_ assumes in the statutes the character of the later Roman
_tutela_, with which it almost seems to be confounded. The woman may
call upon the judge to assign her a _mondualdo_, and may choose him
herself when she requires him for any special business. Everywhere,
indeed, we see this tendency to transform Longobard institutions into
Roman, so that often nothing is left to the former save the name.

Immovable property was so strictly settled that a very small part of
it could be disposed of by the father at his death. No one, therefore,
born of a family in easy circumstances was exposed to any anxiety as to
his future. It is to be noted, however, that in our communes, all of
which resembled great commercial houses, the proportion of immovable
to movable property was extremely small; and that if, as regards the
former, there was much security and stability, for the latter there
were rapid gains, unforeseen fortunes, and sudden fluctuations of
capital.

The father's authority was held in veneration, and the utmost
confidence reposed in guardians of his choice; but we do not find in
the statutes any great development of the _patria potestas_. On the
contrary, as in other cities, the marked characteristic of the family
is their doing everything in common. All affairs of moment are settled
by the family council, by an assembly of relations. Both law and custom
continue to follow this course. In the family, the party-circle, or
_clique_, and the association, the community of interests is sometimes
carried to extraordinary lengths. Not only may a father or brother be
summoned to pay the debts of a son or brother, but every creditor of
a consociation can sue its individual members, and one associate may
be made liable even for the crimes of another. Within the circle of
the family or association, disputes were settled by arbiters, whose
awards had the validity of legal sentences. The trade associations, as
we have already stated, had regularly constituted, special tribunals
of their own. These incidents and characteristics of statutory law
certainly cannot be referred to the Roman legislation, but find their
explanation in the very beginnings of Italian history to which Germanic
races and institutions undoubtedly contributed in no small degree. The
distinctive character of the Commune remains always the same. On the
one hand particular associations attain great development; on the other
the action of the political power is sometimes too feeble, but at times
exercises a pressure such as would seem excessive even at this day.
In a society in which the State is so feeble that its very existence
seems continually threatened, it is certainly strange to find it
interfering so directly and extensively in the private affairs of the
citizens. The emancipation of sons is to be effected with due solemnity
at a full meeting of the Council of the People, in the presence of
the heads of the Republic. Should a noble citizen desire to change
his abode and move to another quarter of the city, the matter must be
brought before the same Councils of the People and the Commune, and
decided by a special Act.[378] We find the chief magistrates of the
Florentine commonwealth continually altering the boundaries and extent
of the Quartieri or Sestieri of the city, enlarging or contracting now
one and now another in order to preserve the balance which is always
being threatened by parties and sects, and prevent any one quarter from
winning undue predominance. A change of abode from one district of the
town to another might drag a citizen into a different sect or party,
and so become of political importance. All this shows more and more
clearly that society had not yet found its natural and permanent basis.
The manifold new and varied elements entering into its composition were
being developed on all sides; but the synthetic power which unites and
assimilates could never be attained by the Italian Commune.


XI.

Coming now to a particular examination of the statutory provisions
which most nearly concern the subject in hand, we shall direct our
attention more especially to the Florentine statutes which, for us,
have a twofold importance. We have undertaken this study as an aid to
the clearer comprehension of certain political reforms in Florence,
which are only to be explained by the social conditions of the
Republic. In this study of the Florentine Commune it is necessary to
bear in mind that in no other Commune was aristocracy so radically
destroyed and democracy so thoroughly triumphant. Every trace of
feudalism, every foreign element disappears from its statute book,
which consequently, in spite of perennial alterations, preserves a
uniform and consistent character, and tends always towards the scope
that it finally attains. Other statute books, on the contrary, are no
less copiously altered; but the alterations are due to less permanent
causes, to elements most extraneous to the life of the Commune, and
which therefore make it still more difficult to understand what are
the true principles moulding the laws and determining their historical
character.

If we begin by examining the paternal authority as set forth in the
statutes, we at once perceive the uncertainty that prevails in this
legislation. At first we find the Longobard _mundium_, but this
gradually takes the shape of the Roman _patria potestas_, as regulated
by Justinian's legislation, which finally prevails, although never
absolutely. In the various provisions of the statutes, which, even on
this point, are always defective, we sometimes find the son placed
under a stricter subjection than by Roman law, while at other times,
the Longobard law predominating, he enjoys the greatest independence.
Generally there are special political or commercial reasons at the
root of this illogical inconsistency. By the Roman statutes the son
is entitled to appear in criminal cases, without permission from his
father, who is not held liable for crimes committed by his son. The
son, however, may be punished by his parents at their discretion. The
natural children of magnates are in an inferior position, both civilly
and politically, to sons born in wedlock, inasmuch as they are never
eligible to any public office.[379] According to the Pesaro statutes,
a son may dispose by will of all his earnings, provided he leaves the
obligatory usufruct to his father; but sons marrying without their
father's consent may be disinherited.[380] When a son is condemned
to pay a fine, the father must give him his share of the inheritance
wherewith to pay it. Should a father beat his sons or grandsons or
their wives, _in nihilo puniatur, nisi pro enormi delicto_.[381] In
Lucca, a son who is eighteen years of age, may contract a loan, even
without his father's leave. But a father may send his son, whether
emancipated or under tutelage, to prison if he has dissipated his
private means or led an evil life. The magistrates must execute the
father's decision without calling for proofs.[382] A son may thus be
arbitrarily confined to the house, fettered and imprisoned by his
father, who is only bound to supply him with the necessaries of life.
The same rule obtains with regard to other descendants. If in all
this great variety of laws we try to discover any one characteristic
peculiar to the statutes, we must seek it in the _unitas personae_
between father and son, which is often carried to a great length. This,
too, is a result of the general conception of the family recognised
by the statutes. In Urbino and elsewhere the father may be punished
for the son, the master for the servant.[383] As to the liabilities
of commerce, these are shared, not only by father and son, but by
the whole body of the relations, as we find was the case in Genoa,
Florence, and many of the principal trading cities. In Florence, the
father, grandfather, and great-grandfather incur the same liability
for a descendant (even if under guardianship) who engages in trade,
as though they stood surety for him. To escape this responsibility
they must make a public and formal disclaimer of liability.[384] Thus,
if an unemancipated son is agent or factor of a company or house of
business, the father is responsible for him, unless he has given
the parties legal notice to the contrary. For the same reason the
emancipation of the son must be publicly performed and communicated to
the Society of Merchants.[385] When a daughter marries, she ceases to
be subject to the paternal authority, and can no longer be held in any
way responsible for her father, either as regards civil obligations or
criminal, should the father have evaded punishment by flight.

In Florence, the woman is under the perpetual protection of the
_Mondualdo_. The term was still retained in the eighteenth century, but
under the statutes the _mundio_ soon becomes almost identical with the
Roman tutelage; as time goes on it gradually falls into disuse, but the
rights of women are never made equal with those of men. In respect of
marriage the intermixture of different legal systems is most marked.
Professor Gans has noted how the Pisans, finding that the Roman law
forbade a woman to re-marry within a year from her husband's death,
that the Canon law (interpreting the apostle's words as an unqualified
permission) contained no such prohibition, and that the Longobard law
forbade re-marriage only for thirty days, fixed by their statutes the
prohibited period at six months. But this rough compromise neither met
the object intended by the Roman law, namely, that a second marriage
should not take place during the pregnancy which might possibly result
from the first, nor conceded the liberty allowed by the Canon law and
the Longobard. More commonly, however, the union of different laws
is brought about by the gradual transformation of one into another.
The Pisan statutes, for instance, regulate marriage almost entirely
according to the Roman Code. To the dower (_dos_) brought by the wife,
and the donation (_donatio propter nuptias_, called also _antefactum_)
given by the husband, they join other gifts, to which they give the
name "_corredo_," which, on the dissolution of the marriage, belong to
the wife: should they then be found to have been consumed or made away
with, she would be entitled to two-thirds of their value. As a rule
Pisan husbands and wives hold their property entirely separate, so that
marriage seems sometimes to involve a hostile relation, rather than a
community of interests.[386]

Certain statutes admit the _dos_ and _donatio propter nuptias_ together
with the _meta_ and the Longobard donation. The Florentine statute
speaks of a dowry, of a donation that must be equal to one half of
the dowry--provided this does not exceed the sum of fifty _lire_--and
of an augmentation. Failing sons, grandsons, or grandsons of sons,
the wife, at her husband's death, recovered possession of her dowry,
with the donation and augmentation; otherwise she had her dowry alone,
and whatever her husband might leave her by will. If the husband died
before receiving the dowry, the wife took the promised donation,
limited however to one-eighth of her husband's estate, over which, to
the extent of her dower, she had a preferential mortgage. Nor had the
wife's consent to the sale or alienation of her husband's property the
effect of releasing her right to the subjects so sold or alienated.
This regulation, however, only comes into force from the year
1388.[387] This date, which is given in the printed Florentine statute
of 1415, shows that the dotal system and the separation of property
had by this time made great progress, a fact farther confirmed by the
statutes.

The wife could not maintain her right to her husband's property
(_defendere bona viri_) against her husband's creditors at large,
but only against those who were liable for the restitution of the
dower. Dotal property, of which no valuation had been made, might be
claimed by her as against any creditor, and if her husband fell into
difficulties, she could always demand restitution of her dower.[388]
Property acquired or inherited by the wife during the husband's life,
belonged to her; but she could not alienate it without the consent of
the husband, who was also entitled to the usufruct. On the decease of
the husband, whatever remained of the usufruct might be claimed by the
wife, or, if she too were dead, by the children.


XII.

The dotal system and separation of conjugal property are not only
recognised in all the statutes,[389] but are often enacted in an
exaggerated form, as seems to be the case in the statutes of Pisa. Thus
gifts between husband and wife are forbidden, sometimes even gifts from
them to strangers, where there is ground to suspect that these are
meant to disguise a gift between the spouses. Zealous precautions to
hinder property being withdrawn from the family, still more from the
city, are universal. In Urbino, for instance, no alien could inherit
_ab intestato_, without first pledging his word to reside within the
city or territory.[390] At Pesaro a similar pledge was exacted from
any alien who sought a bride in that city; he had also to obtain the
consent of the Podesta.

In Verona,[391] women might, under a will, share equally with their
brothers; but _ab intestato_, they had only their dower. In Pisa,
testate succession was regulated in accordance with the Roman law:
_de ultimis voluntatibus pen legem romanum iudicetur_. The lawful
share, however, was fixed on almost the same scale as by Longobard
law; and, as provided by that law, one child might be favoured more
than the rest. As regards intestate succession, male heirs had, as
always, marked preference. Failing descendants in the male line,
females inherited, but even in the succession to maternal estate, male
descendants had priority when there were no surviving daughters.[392]
This rule prevails in all statute books, not excluding the
"Consuetudini" of Naples, of Amalfi, and of Sorrento, although in these
cities the influence of the Longobard law was much less felt.[393]
The real object of these regulations is clearly expressed in the
statutes themselves. In the statutes of Mantua it is thus set forth:
"Ut familiarum dignitas, nomen et ordo serventur, et bona morientium
in eorum agnatos et posteros transmittantur, per quos nomina generis
conservantur, statuimus et ordinamus,"[394] &c.

It would seem that in Ravenna the prolonged continuance of the
Byzantine rule had the effect of suppressing this preference of
the agnates, and that there the Novel of Justinian was in force.
The same was the case at Osimo. Adoption was of rare occurrence;
legitimated children were postponed to legitimate; natural children
who, under the influence of the Longobard law, had been favoured in
earlier statutes, were afterwards neglected, in consequence of the
growing ascendancy of Canon and Roman law. The whole statutory law of
succession is so dominated by the political conception which, so far
from losing, is constantly gaining ground, that the disposing power of
the testator--always extremely restricted--can only arrive at a result
slightly more equitable and natural, but never attains to absolute
freedom of decision in the Roman sense of the word. In this, as in
every branch of civil law, the Florentine Statute Book, like all the
others, does not present us with a complete treatise, but only with
fragments, the statutes making constant reference to the Roman law.

No woman succeeds _ab intestato_ to her sons or daughters, when there
are direct descendants or ascendants even in the third degree; and
uncle, brother, sister, son, or grandson of a brother are preferred
to her. Though excluded from succession, she can nevertheless claim
alimony from those who by law exclude her. If there be no such
relatives, she inherits _ab intestato_ one-fourth of her son's estate,
provided it does not amount to more than five hundred _lire_. In any
case, she only receives money, not real property. If there is no money,
she will be entitled to the price of the lands forming her inheritance.
The same provisions apply when a grandmother, great-grandmother, or
descendants in the maternal line succeed _ab intestato_.

A woman could not succeed _ab intestato_ to a brother leaving children,
grandchildren, or brothers; but when thus excluded from the succession,
she was still entitled to alimony. She could not succeed even to her
father; but was entitled to receive her dowry from the agnates, and
could meanwhile, even if a widow, claim alimony from them.[395]

It is plain from all these provisions that the woman's rights of
succession were very limited; but she was always insured of the
wherewithal to live. We find, indeed, from the Florentine statutes,
that while the preference given to the agnates increases as time goes
on, so too the woman's rights to alimony increase. The statute of 1355
concedes to her the usufruct of the paternal inheritance, on failure
of male issue, while under the same circumstances, later statutes
deny her this right, allowing her alimony instead.[396] Speaking of
aliment, and of those bound to supply it, the statute of 1324 says:
"Si filius, nepos vel pronepos facultatis abundarent,"[397] so that
they can _commode subvenire_, &c.; and the statute of 1355 imposes
the same obligation, with the same conditions.[398] But the printed
statute of 1415 is far more explicit; the father, mother, grandfather,
grandmother, great-grandfather, and great-grandmother are all entitled
to alimony, and the Podesta is bound to enforce the law. The female
inherits _ab intestato_ from her mother or other female ascendants,
but only on failure of male issue. Uterine brothers, being of the
female line, cannot succeed one another should there be relations of
the deceased in the male line as far as the fourth degree,[399] these
being preferred to the mother and relations in the female line. The
Florentine statute goes on to declare that the wife is to be preferred
to the public treasury, _uxor mariti defuncti praeferatur fisco_;
showing how little the woman's rights were considered, when an express
enactment was needed to prevent the revenue authorities from depriving
her of her husband's estate. Natural children were also preferred to
the treasury, which only succeeded on failure of relations as far as
the fourth degree. Relations, however, could succeed to bastards,
as though these had been legitimate.[400] It should be added that
Florentine custom did not allow natural children to be left without
some means of support, or without provision for their education, as is
shown by many still existing wills. In the case of males, the father
generally tried to obtain employment for them; in the case of females,
to find them husbands, and he recommended them to the care of his
legitimate heirs.

The husband succeeded to his wife's dowry, failing children or other
near descendants. Of her extra-dotal property he was entitled to
one-third, and the wife could not dispose of her dowry either by will
or donation, so as to exclude her husband or children.[401]


XIII.

Besides the law of succession, there is another branch of the Italian
statutes in which the action of the political idea upon civil law
is equally apparent, namely, that which treats of rights between
neighbours, and of the obligations _in solidum_ attaching not only
to the members of families, but likewise to the members of sects and
associations. We have already observed that these are carried so far
as to make one member responsible for another's debts, and even for
his delicts: this is a law to which we shall have more than once to
return and give our attention. When real property is sold, we find that
the agnates and cognates have always a preferential right of purchase.
In the March of Ancona, the blood-relations of a prisoner condemned
to death may be compelled to purchase his estate.[402] At Bologna,
relations are often made legally responsible for one another, and, by
the rules of the corporations of merchants in that city, the brothers
of any bankrupt, who have lived in community with him within a month
before his failure, are held responsible for his debts--even if they
have separated from him since that time.[403]

According to the Florentine statute, the creditor of any Commune
or of any _Universitas_ (corporation) might proceed against it,
_sicut procedi potest contra alias singulares personas debitrices,
in persona_. This was carried so far, that it was permissible to
proceed against every individual member of the association, and even
to have him arrested, _liceat ipsi creditori capi et detinere omnes
et singulares personas dicti Communis vel Universitatis, quousque
fuerit integre satisfactum_.[404] If landed property had been laid
waste or houses burnt, the proprietor was entitled to compensation
from the author of the deed; from his associates (_consorti_), were
he a noble, or from his relations, even to the fourth degree, if a
commoner. Nay more, the injured person might also proceed against the
Commune, University, or district (_plebatum_) in which the crime had
been committed; he was at liberty to follow any of these modes of
redress, and if unsuccessful in one to try another.[405] The statute
prescribed the form of procedure and the terms of the sentence.[406]
The Commune, University, or district was thus compelled to be always
ready to raise the alarm, when similar acts were perpetrated, and to
pursue and arrest the criminal, since, in case of failure, they were
held responsible.[407]

In all matters, even such as purchases or sales, great importance
was assigned to the condition of the persons concerned. In some
cases, where land was to be sold, the law required that it should
be sold to a neighbour; commoners, however, were not compelled to
sell to magnates.[408] Similarly no one might buy, sell, or acquire
the usufruct of lands held in common, or any piece of land or house
touching another man's wall, without according the joint-owner,
associate, or neighbour the right of pre-emption.[409]

In case of a dispute between relations or associates, _qui consortes
sint de eadem stirpe, per lineam masculinam usque ad infinitum_,[410]
the judge was bound, at the request of one of the parties concerned,
to leave the matter to the decision of arbiters chosen by the parties
themselves; but no plebeian could act as arbiter between nobles.[411]
In reviving a law of much earlier date, the statute of 1355 informs us
that arbiters were therein mentioned, as blood-relations.[412] Whence
it may be inferred that similar compromises began to be customary, at
a very remote period, between relations and associates who voluntarily
selected arbiters from their own group. Down to the year 1324,
the custom had been sanctioned by law; at a later time it lost its
primitive character of a voluntary and domestic agreement, and assumed
the shape of a regular legal trial.


XIV.

If we now compare the Florentine Statute Book with those of other
Italian cities, we shall find it marked by various distinguishing
characteristics, chiefly resulting from the fact that in it democratic
freedom was carried to the farthest point obtainable during the Middle
Ages. Not only had every feudal privilege gradually disappeared from
it, but the great nobles had ended by finding themselves in a position
inferior to that of the commonalty. Florence, as we have already
seen, was one of the first Italian cities to abolish serfdom in her
outlying territory by the law of 1289.[413] And although her rural
population was always treated much worse than the inhabitants of the
city, it nevertheless enjoyed far better conditions than prevailed in
a great number of communes. We have proof of this in the contract of
_Mezzeria_, which makes the cultivator of the soil an actual partner
with the proprietor, and which still remains a great monument of
civilisation and the cynosure of modern economists who have never been
able to devise any better system.[414]

The freedom and strength of associations, the extraordinary ease with
which any one might participate in the government of the Commune, all
contributed to the triumph of democracy on the widest basis. Another
general characteristic to be noted, not only in the Florentine, but in
almost all the Italian statutes, is the constant endeavour to shake off
the intervention of the ecclesiastical authority, which labours with
incredible obstinacy to maintain its privileges undiminished, and even
seeks to increase them; but which, nevertheless, finds them gradually
reduced almost to zero. The statute of 1415 ordains that "no person,
university, or church, no religious or clerical house shall presume to
question the jurisdiction of the Commune under pretence of 'benefice'
or privilege, and that any one who opposes this enactment shall be
imprisoned until he renounce such privilege.[415] No excommunication
nor interdict shall hinder or diminish the action of the magistrates
or the effect of their decrees.[416] Every man may freely exercise his
rights over all Church property derived from secular sources."[417]


XV.

Turning now to a general view of the Italian statutes, we must remark
that although the history of statutory law presents many difficulties,
owing to the infinite number of different provisions to be found in
it, the diversity of these provisions is chiefly due to accidental and
temporary causes, extraneous to the natural and spontaneous development
of the law itself, which, examined apart and with reference to its
essential characteristics, presents a striking uniformity. It may,
however, be noted that in the republics of Northern Italy the Longobard
law is far more predominant; while in those of Central and Southern
Italy Roman law obtains an early and rapid ascendancy, and, subject
to the changes which have been indicated, ends by dominating at all
points. This progress becomes more apparent from year to year, so that
even in examining the statutes, the very same conflict of antagonistic
elements which we have already noted, throughout the entire history of
the communes and of Italian civilisation, is brought before our eyes in
civil wars, in sanguinary struggles between Guelphs and Ghibellines, in
art, in literature, in all things. It is true that the statutes only
treat of juridical ideas and enactments; but these seem to strive with
the same ardour, and to aim at the same ends, as the men whom they
control.

Towards the close of the fourteenth century Italian commerce began
to make enormous advance, and this gave a new impetus to Italian
legislation. In fact, we find a series of enactments enabling all
mercantile affairs to be transacted with much greater celerity,
avoiding legal quibbles, releasing merchant's credits from mortgage
or sequestration, and severely punishing all frauds and fraudulent
bankruptcies. In a word, we clearly discern the inchoation of the
modern commercial code with which these enactments are frequently in
unison.

But in all these laws we always recognise the consequences of commerce
being divided and split into a multitude of separate associations
with statutes of their own, judges of their own, and an exuberance of
vitality. At the same time, we recognise that the central authority,
though aware that its natural rights are threatened and usurped on
all sides, continues to exert its influence, without method, indeed,
or uniformity, but not without vigour, and occasionally even with
violence. At one moment it seems to be vanquished; at another it comes
forth victorious. The entire history of the Commune demonstrates a
constant tendency to harmonise all these distinct and often jarring
elements--political, social, and legislative--but this problem it
never succeeds in solving, and ends by relapsing into despotism.
A true conception of social unity was wanting; the idea of a due
distribution of authority was still unknown, either in real life or in
theory; accordingly whoever happened to have a share in the executive
authority, also assumed, as necessarily connected with it, a share
not only in judicial, but likewise in administrative and legislative
functions. Wherefore it seemed that the only way to preserve liberty
was to parcel out the government among an infinity of hands, and so
to contrive that parties, associations, _cliques_ (_consorterie_),
families, and quarters of the town should each and severally serve as
checks upon all the others. In this process of division and subdivision
all the elements afterwards constituting modern society were prepared,
but the State, in its true sense, was never discovered. Without
ballast to steady her, the ship of the Commune, driven hither and
thither in a ceaseless storm and buffeted by winds from all quarters,
could neither find anchorage nor keep a settled course. No clear and
certain conception was ever reached of that law which, by limiting and
defining the amount of liberty guaranteed to each individual, secures
freedom to all.

The political life of communes, moreover, was always confined within
the walls of the dominant cities, since not only the outlying territory
was excluded from it, but likewise all towns that had been annexed or
conquered. Every form of representative government was as yet unknown.
All who enjoyed political rights entered, each in his turn, the
Councils of the Republic, and sooner or later nearly all rose to power.
This made it necessary that the States should have very circumscribed
borders, as otherwise it would have been impossible to govern them at
all. The French Revolution, by achieving for the first time, in behalf
of the nation at large, what the Italian communes had effected for
the cities, was able to proclaim the civil and political equality of
all who formed part of the nation, and who were in consequence to be
recognised as citizens. From that time democracy became the predominant
characteristic of modern societies which, by means of representative
institutions, have found it possible to secure freedom, even in large
states, reconciling the unity and vigorous action of the central
government with personal independence and with local liberty and
activity. But the Commune always wavered between the opposing elements
of which it was made up and which it never succeeded in fusing into a
true political organism.

The history of our republics may, in fact, be summed up in an account
of the varying predominance of one or other of the great associations
of which they were composed. In Florence, we have, first of all, the
conflict of nobles and commons which is maintained with changing
fortunes. When the fraternities (_consorterie_) of the leading magnates
obtained such ascendancy as to menace popular liberties and destroy
the social balance, notable reforms were made in the statutes; the
Commune was completely transformed, and by means of the Ordinances
of Justice (of which we shall soon have to speak), the nobles were
overthrown and their associations broken up. But as these associations
were an integral part of the State, their downfall was followed by a
phase of rapid corruption and decay. To the passions and interests of
caste succeeded personal ambitions, hatreds and passions of a still
more dangerous character. Families began to be at strife; men who were
at once powerful and ambitious, came to the front; and Corso Donati,
or some other like him, would have soon become master and tyrant of
the Republic, save for the fact that a mighty people, enriched by the
speedy gains of an extended commerce, devoted to freedom and opposed
to the nobility, had first to be disarmed. Thus to the supremacy of
the leagues of the magnates succeeded the predominance of the Greater
Guilds, between whom and the Lesser Guilds a struggle was entered upon
in the course of which the latter obtained, in their turn, a share of
power. At a later period, the populace, represented by the plebeian
Ciompi, comes to the front, and threatens the utter dissolution of the
old social form of the Republic. Then new personal ambitions, more
fatal to freedom because more fortunate, occupy the scene. The struggle
between the Albizzi, Pitti, and Medici terminates in the triumph of
the last-named family in the person of Cosimo the Elder, who slew the
Republic. Yet nothing of all this should cause us much surprise. For
if we bear in mind the beginnings of the Commune and the elements out
of which it was constituted, we may readily see that all that happened
was, in the main, unavoidably bound to occur.




CHAPTER VIII.

_THE ENACTMENTS OF JUSTICE._[418]


I.

There are many reasons why the history of Florence in the closing
years of the thirteenth century should demand our fullest attention.
It was the period of the very important political revolution resulting
in the establishment of those Enactments of Justice of which the
authorship is attributed to Giano della Bella, and which Bonaini has
entitled the Magna Charta of the Florentine Republic. Even should
this comparison seem strained, it is certain that those enactments,
sometimes strengthened, sometimes modified, and occasionally suspended,
remained in vigour nevertheless for more than a century--a fact of no
small weight in so mutable a commonwealth as that of Florence. Sooner
or later many neighbouring cities imitated these enactments, and in
1338 the Romans sent to request a copy of them, in order to re-organise
their city by the same means. On this subject Villani wrote as follows:
"It is known how times and conditions change, for the Romans, who of
old built the city of Florence and gave it their own laws, now, in
our days, have sent to ask laws from the Florentines."[419] It is
likewise during this period that we behold arts and letters suddenly
blossoming to the greatest splendour in the bosom of the Republic.
Language, poetry, painting, architecture, sculpture had already put
forth their first shoots in various Italian cities; but all are now
permanently rooted in Florence, and initiating a new era in the
history of the national intellect, suddenly flash forth into a glory
of light, irradiating all Europe as well as Italy. Hence it behoves us
to investigate most minutely the nature of the favourable conditions,
both political and social, which rendered Florence the centre of such
marvellous activity and the focus of all those far-spreading beams.

The remark might certainly occur, that although this period has such
undoubted claims upon our attention, its history is already very
familiar to us; it has been recounted by contemporary writers such as
Compagni and Villani, who were not only eye-witnesses, but often active
participants in the events they described; it has been corroborated by
many original documents, and recently expounded afresh by some most
illustrious modern writers. Nevertheless, the attentive student is
compelled to recognise that those times are less well known than might
be supposed; for even in perusing the works of the newest historians we
are perplexed by numerous difficulties and doubts. In point of fact,
what is it we learn from Machiavelli, Ammirato, Sismondi, and Napier,
and even from Vannucci, Giudici, and Trollope, who wrote subsequently
to the publication of many newly discovered original documents? That,
after the battle of Campaldino the arrogance of the nobles in Florence
exceeded all bounds; that they insulted, oppressed, and trampled on
the people; that there arose a daring and generous man named Giano
della Bella, a noble devoted to the popular party, who when holding
the office of Prior proposed a new law as a permanent remedy for these
evils; that this law was passed and sanctioned under the name of
Enactments of Justice, and that it excluded the nobles--or, rather,
the magnates--from every political post; that it only permitted those
really engaged in some trade or craft to share in the government of
the Republic; that it punished every grave offence against the people,
on the part of the nobles, with exceptionally severe sentences and
penalties, such as chopping off hands, death at the block, and, more
frequently, by confiscation of property; that slighter offences were
only punished by fines; that the magistrates were empowered to chastise
any man of the people (_popolano_) showing hostility to the Republic or
breaking its laws, by proclaiming him a noble, and that this sentence
immediately excluded him from the government and placed him under the
same restrictions to which aristocrats were subject. Furthermore,
that if any magnate convicted of offence should escape justice, one
of his relations or associates would have to expiate the crime in his
stead.[420]

"A fact without parallel in the world's history!" Giudici exclaims.
For truly, although a fundamental law of the Republic, this decree
seems rather a freak of revenge solely inspired by the blindest party
spirit. Accordingly almost every word of the decree excites our
suspicion. How can it be explained that Dante was one of the Priors
in office at the time, together with others who undoubtedly were not
artisans, or only so in name, if it were true that the enactments
excluded all who were not _practically exercising_ some trade? And
apart from a thousand lesser doubts, the fact that innocent men were
then condemned to death merely because they were relations or fellow
associates of criminals who had escaped justice, is a point that we
cannot possibly understand. In a period of the densest barbarism,
it would be barely comprehensible; in Dante's age, it is a mystery
and a contradiction, confusing all our ideas concerning those times.
Therefore renewed investigation of the subject cannot be altogether
futile. It is requisite to penetrate the true nature of the revolution
that had then been accomplished, and of the law that resulted from it,
and to bring both into harmony with the times and with the history of
Florence.


II.

Towards the end of the thirteenth century the Republic had acquired
very high importance throughout Italy as well as Tuscany. The fall
of the Hohenstauffens, the coming of the Angevins, the vacancy of
the Imperial throne had given an enormous ascendancy to the Guelph
party which in Florence was that of the democracy. Its three great
Ghibelline rivals, Pisa, Sienna, and Arezzo, had been humiliated and
conquered by the subtle diplomacy of Florence and Florentine arms; and
these victories had not only re-established the Republic's political
authority in Tuscany, but opened and secured to it all the chief
highways of commerce. Through Pisa it had access to the sea; through
Sienna and Arezzo, to Rome, Umbria, and Southern Italy; it could pass
to the north through distant Bologna, peopled with friendly Guelphs.
Accordingly the commerce of Florence was then rapidly increased, and
this republic of merchants, surrounded by other republics equally
devoted to trade and industry, stood at the head of all Tuscany. On the
other hand, however, the augmented power of the Angevins was beginning
to excite the jealousy of the Popes who had first called them to Italy,
and who now turned their eyes towards Germany in order to revive the
Imperial pretensions, and thus check the growing ambition of the French
king. For Charles of Anjou, whom they had named Senator of Rome and
Vicar-Imperial of Tuscany, now seemed determined to follow the daring
policy of the Swabian line by aspiring to supremacy over Italy.

During this state of things, the Florentines managed to keep their
balance with marvellous _finesse_, and by leaning this way, or that,
frequently turned the scales on the side they preferred. They utilised
the king's soldiery to crush Ghibelline cities and Ghibelline nobles;
they leaned on the Pope, to check Charles's arrogance; and they showed
readiness to favour the Empire, when the Pope tried to assert temporal
supremacy, as though, in the present _interregnum_, he were the natural
inheritor of the imperial rights. By this means, the Republic not only
preserved its independence, but became a State commanding the fear and
respect of all Italy.[421] This was all the result of the shrewdness,
energy, and intelligence of its burghers, who governed with so much
thriftiness and wisdom as to achieve an unparalleled prosperity. "It
is a known thing," says Villani, "that down to this time and for long
past, such was the tranquillity of Florence, that the City gates
stood unlocked by night,[422] no duties were exacted in Florence;[423]
and rather than impose burdens, when money was needed, old walls and
bits of land within and without the City were sold to the owners of
conterminous portions of the soil."[424] With few taxes and no debts,
the administration was excellently conducted; it left the citizens
unhampered, and increased the general well-being.


III.

Nevertheless, beneath this tranquil surface the seeds of deep-rooted
discord lurked in the bosom of the State, and occasionally broke forth
in sanguinary conflicts, of which the discontent of the nobles was the
principal cause. It would be a serious mistake to believe that they
were first excluded from the government in virtue of the Enactments
of Justice. The measure had been prepared long before, and although
not then rigorously carried out, may be said to have been already
sanctioned in 1282, by the decree placing the Priors of the Guild at
the head of the Republic. But it should not be thought on this account,
that the nobles had lost all actual power in the city at the time.
First of all, the new system of warfare, in which municipal armies,
composed of artisans, unprovided with cavalry or men-at-arms, proved
very incompetent, had made the assistance of the nobles indispensable,
and also began to render it necessary to employ foreigners: soldiers
of adventure from Germany, France, and Spain, who earned their
living by war alone. At Montaperti (1260) the terrible defeat of the
Republic's Guelph host had been achieved by Manfred's Germans, and
the Ghibelline nobles banished from Florence. At Campaldino (1289) it
was Corso Donati, Vieri de' Cerchi, and other Florentine nobles or
potentates who had decided the fate of the day. The nobles knew this,
and constantly boasted of it, in their contempt for the artisans and
people. Being trained to arms, and undisturbed by commercial cares,
they sorely chafed against being excluded from the government by
rougher folk far less fitted for war than themselves. Accordingly,
political animosities became more and more heated; the nobles could
neither be still nor leave others in peace.

It should also be remarked that the nobles of the period were no longer
the feudal lords of former times, who, isolated in their well-guarded
strongholds, like so many sovereigns, depended solely from the Empire
and were foes to the Republic. Having been ousted from the territory,
and obliged for some time back to reside in the city, they now clung to
the latter, but desired to hold rule over it. Being surrounded on all
sides by a powerful population banded in trade guilds and masters of
the Government; being forcibly made subject to Republican laws refusing
all recognition of feudal rights, the nobles had been obliged, in
self-defence, to form Associations or Societies of the Towers, which
being ruled by custom rather than law, were all the more firmly knit
together. Originally, the nobles had been chiefly united by family ties
which were still more closely respected on the disintegration of the
feudal order, when, in order to maintain their strength, kinsmen banded
together in separate castes or associations and gave admittance to a
widening circle of members. They clustered together in neighbouring
palaces, often lining one or more of the city streets; they lived in
the midst of their adherents, squires, domestics, and grooms, and in
moments of danger even summoned to their aid the peasantry of their
rural estates. Their possessions were always handed down to their
families or the Society to which they belonged, and their disputes
were settled by chosen arbiters.[425] Besides all this, their deeds of
vengeance were decided upon in common, and the individuals charged to
execute them were always placed in safety by their comrades, the whole
association assuming the responsibility of every deed of this kind.
Often, between one house and another, or in one of their palace yards,
there was an archway under which they administered torture to any one
they chose. In fact, speaking of the Bostichi family, Compagni tells
us that: "They committed many evil deeds, and continued to do them for
long. In their own palaces, situated in the New Market, in the centre
of the city, they would string men up, and put them to the torture at
mid-day. And it was a common saying in the land that there were too
many tribunals; and in counting the places where torture was applied,
people said: 'In the Bostichi house, by the Market.'"[426] All this
continued to be done, notwithstanding the very severe laws already
promulgated against the nobles. A man of the people could be flogged,
stabbed, or tortured, without the author of the misdeed being brought
within the grasp of the law. Out in the country these same nobles used
all sorts of devices to perpetuate serfdom, although for many years it
had been legally abolished, and by threats or open violence induced
their peasants, by means of fictitious contracts, to acknowledge
obligations from which they were lawfully exempt.[427]

Thus citizens, already powerful in virtue of their social position,
contrived to retain much strength and great political influence in the
Republic, notwithstanding the laws designed to keep them in check.
Being excluded from the Signory they could neither enter the Council
of One Hundred nor the Councils of the Captain, in which the more
important questions were discussed. But they were admitted to those
of the Podesta, and this official, being of necessity a knight, often
gave judgment in favour of the nobles. Also, they were continually
employed as ambassadors, and given the first posts in war; but they
enjoyed most prominence in the institution entitled the Guelph
Society (_Parte Guelfa_), and were specially appointed to all its
chief offices. This Society, founded, as we have previously shown, in
1267, after the expulsion of Count Guido Novello, was charged with
the administration of all confiscated Ghibelline property which had
been formed into a _monte_ or _mobile_, or, as would now be said,
capitalised. This property was to be employed for the subjection of
the Ghibellines and the support of the Guelphs, of whom Florence was
the Tuscan headquarters. It was on this account that Cardinal Ottavio
degli Ubandini had exclaimed: "Now that the Guelphs have formed a fund
in Florence, the Ghibellines will never return there;" and his prophecy
was fulfilled.[428] In fact, the Ghibelline party was gradually
swept away by the steady persecution to which it was subjected on the
complete overthrow of the Suabian line; and Florence, having become
exclusively Guelph, was divided between the parties of burghers and
populace, and that of the nobles and magnates or _grandi_. The latter,
although excluded from the government, or from _honours_, to use the
phraseology of the time, could never be ousted from the Guelph Society,
and continued to administer its large revenues. This Society was
ordered in the fashion of a miniature republic, and notwithstanding
numerous attempts to introduce an increasing burgher element within
its pale, these efforts proved so fruitless and were so invariably
thwarted, that the statutes compiled in 1335, and now extant in print,
record the fact that money premiums were offered to promote the
nomination of new knights. To each of the six knights elected during
the year the sum of fifty gold florins were awarded, "so that a city
of such great magnificence may be duly glorified by the number of its
knights." Thus while, on the one hand, every means was taken to abase
the great nobles, almost to the extent of securing their extermination,
on the other, this threatened class continually gained reinforcement
and support.[429]


IV.

With all these advantages, had the nobles been united, they might
have regained their position even after the defeats of '66 and '82
and succeeded in dominating the people. But they were divided, and
hotly at strife even among themselves. "There was much warfare"
(Villani says) "between the Adimari and Tosinghi, between the Rossi
and Tornaquinci, between the Bardi and Mozzi, between the Gherardini
and Manieri, between the Cavalcanti and Buondelmonti, and likewise
between certain of the Buondelmonti and Giandonati; between the
Visdomini and Falconieri, between the Bostichi and Foraboschi, between
the Foraboschi and Malespini, and among the Frescobaldi themselves,
and between the members of the Donati family, and also among those of
many other houses."[430] Nor is it surprising that such strong and
powerful cliques should have felt jealous of one another. Added to
this, the Guelph nobles included the remains of the Ghibelline party,
which cherished Imperial tendencies; thus another germ of discord was
sown that encouraged and excited the people to prosecute the war of
extermination it had already set on foot. The popular party was far
better organised and united; it was banded in various guilds forming
part of the general constitution of the State, and on every occasion
showed an energy and singleness of purpose never possessed by nobles.
It is true, that even at this juncture, some seeds of jealousy were
beginning to be discernible between the greater and lesser guilds
and the populace; but open discord was long delayed. For the moment
there was no hint of it. Certain special conventions, drawn up in
regular documentary form, had been arranged between the members of one
or more of the guilds, and these agreements were designated at the
time _Legbe_, _Posture_, or _Convegni_. But their object was chiefly
commercial, being designed to keep the price of certain commodities up
to a forced standard, and create illegal monopolies, and was seldom the
result of political interests or animosities. They were not sanctioned
by law, they certainly did not promote concord, but their importance
was slight.

Thus the city became increasingly divided and subdivided into groups,
and was apparently in danger of falling to pieces. The lower classes
were still undoubted rulers of the government, but the nobles were
also powerful, if in a different way; hence unity and concord were
continually and seriously imperilled. Necessarily, therefore, the
chief aim to be pursued, in order to avert a catastrophe, was the
attainment of greater equality among the citizens, of greater union and
strength in the various societies as well as in the government itself.
In fact, for a long time past, Florentine legislation and successive
revolutions had alike kept this object in view. The law of August 6,
1289, abolishing serfdom in order to emancipate the peasantry, was also
another step towards equality. Those of June 30, and July 3, 1290,
prohibited all agreements in any way opposed to the lawful constitution
of the guilds. The law of January 31, 1291, imposed a fresh check on
the nobles, by obliging all citizens, without any exception, to submit
to the jurisdiction of the regular courts, and decreeing the severest
penalties on any one asserting, or trying to obtain, the privilege of
trial by special tribunals.[431]

But a more notable point is the fact that every fine decreed in such
cases fell upon the fellow-associate or relation of the criminal,
should the latter contrive to evade justice. However strange this rule
may appear to the modern mind, its explanation is to be found in the
account we have already given of the mode in which property was held at
the time, and of the constitution of families and associations. When
almost the whole of the patrimony was shared by the family in common,
it would have been very difficult, and even dangerous, to inflict a
fine on any one member of the house while exempting the rest, and
for this reason the invariable tendency of the law was to insist on
their solidarity. This principle seemed still more logical when it
was a question of inflicting fines on nobles banded in closely united
associations, and who, keeping all their interests in common, decided
on acts of vengeance, and proved their intention of holding all things
in common and dividing one another's responsibilities. Where property
belonged to the whole family, it was only just that the whole family
should be liable for the fine; where an act of vengeance was done in
common, and the gravest offences committed in the name, and with the
sanction, of the whole kindred, there could be nothing extraordinary
in the law compelling one associate or kinsman to be mulcted in lieu
of another, beginning with his nearest relations. Precisely for these
reasons, it had long been customary in drawing out the list of the
nobles, for the law to compel the said nobles to _sodare_, that is,
to compel every one of them to stand surety not merely for himself
alone, but also for his relations, by depositing the sum of two
thousand _lire_. In this way, since money-penalties seldom exceeded
the said amount, whenever a noble was fined he could use the money he
had already deposited, or it could be employed for the same end by
the kinsman bound surety for him, in case he should have escaped or
contrived to evade the law by some unauthorised device.[432] These
were exclusively and precisely the principles upon which the Enactments
of Justice were also founded. Accordingly it is impossible to consider
them the personal invention of Giano della Bella, seeing that they were
merely a logical consequence and natural result, inevitably evolved
from preceding revolutions, institutions, and laws. Indeed, for the
most part they only sum up and arrange older laws, so as to accentuate
more plainly their primary and enduring intent.


V.

Giano della Bella was neither a legislator nor a politician, but a man
of action. A noble by birth, he had fought at Campaldino, where his
horse was killed under him; he afterwards joined the popular side, by
reason, it was averred, of a quarrel at San Piero Scheraggio with Piero
Frescobaldi, who had dared to strike him in the face, and threaten
to cut off his nose.[433] Whether this tale were true or not, it is
certain that Giano was a man of violent disposition, great daring,
small prudence, and disinterested love of freedom; but he was by no
means devoid of the passion for revenge that even his admirers laid to
his charge. "A forcible and very spirited man" (says Compagni), "he was
so daring, that he defended matters forsaken by others, said things
others left unspoken, did his utmost to bring justice to bear on the
guilty, and was so much feared by the Rectors that they dared not
conceal evil deeds."[434] According to Villani "he was a most loyal and
upright _popolano_, and more devoted to the public good than any man
in Florence, one that gave help to the Commune without seeking his own
profit. He was overbearing and obstinate in wreaking revenge, and also
achieved some deeds of vengeance on his neighbours, the Abati, by using
the authority of the Commune,"[435] for which the worthy chronicler
severely blames him.

When appointed Podesta of Pistoia, he immediately plunged into
party strife, persecuting one side and favouring the other, with so
much ardour that, instead of fulfilling his duty of pacifying the
different factions, he inflamed their hatred to such a pitch that it
was impossible for him to remain there to the end of his official
term.[436] The whole course of his conduct in Florence proves, as we
shall see, that he must have been a man of scant prudence and great
impulsiveness. It was precisely these characteristics which made
him a leader of the people instead of a legislator, and likewise an
implacable enemy of the nobles.

After the battle of Campaldino the latter showed more audacity and
growing insolence. "It was we who won the victory at Campaldino," they
continually repeated, "and yet you seek our ruin." Bent on forcing
their way to the front and gaining command, they daily insulted or
injured some man of the people. The law was powerless against them,
inasmuch as the offenders could never be unearthed; the latter were
carefully sheltered, and no one desired or dared to testify against
them. A _popolano_ could be surrounded, attacked, even stabbed, yet
nobody had seen the doer of the crime. Or some one would be dragged
into the houses of an association, maltreated, beaten or tortured on
the cord, yet all that occurred in those places remained unrevealed.
If some noble was condemned to a fine, he made haste to declare that
he possessed no separate estate, and by his own negligence, or that
of the magistrates, had failed to give surety, while his relations
repeated the same story.[437] Hence it was necessary to recall the
old laws into vigour, make them still stricter, and decide on new and
sterner measures. So at last the priors in office from the 15th of
December, 1292, to the 15th of February, 1293, urged on by the public
voice, under Giano's guidance, commissioned three citizens, Donato
Ristori, Ubertino della Strozza, and Baldo Aguglioni, to frame a new
law fitted, not only to meet present dangers, but to assure greater
stability to the Republic in the future. On the 10th of January, the
Bill being then drawn up, the Captain of the People assembled the
Council of One Hundred, and proposed that the required Councils should
be asked to grant them full powers (_balia_)[438] to proclaim it, if it
were approved by the magistrates and by certain citizen worthies. Some
proposed, in amendment, that it should be first read and discussed by
the councils; but this would have entailed a risk of the whole thing
coming to nothing. Accordingly the more practical course was chosen,
and by seventy-two votes, against two negatives only, the requested
_balia_ was granted. On the 18th of January the new law, entitled
"Ordinamenti," or "Ordini di Giustizia," was proclaimed in the names of
the Podesta, captain, and priors, and with the concurrence of the Heads
of the Twenty-one Guilds and certain citizen worthies.[439] There is
every reason to believe that Giano della Bella was one of the worthies
in question; but although historians suppose him to have been the
creator and initiator of the law, since, as leader of public opinion,
he compelled the Signory to pass it, yet he was not in the government
at the time, nor does his name appear in any official decree.[440]
Therefore he was by no means the sole author or compiler of the new law.


VI.

What, then, are these enactments? In replying to this question it is
requisite to leave the historians aside and turn to the law itself. But
there are several old compilations of it, differing so much from each
other, that one form only comprises twenty-two rubrics, whereas some
have more than a hundred. Accordingly, the first thing to be done is to
ascertain which is the genuine and primary law passed on the 18th of
January, 1293, since on this alone can an accurate judgment be based,
and no other starting-point is possible. There are six of these very
different compilations--four in print, and two still inedited. Two of
the number may be summarily dealt with as unnecessary to our purpose.
One is included in the general collection of Florentine statistics,
formed in 1415 by Bartolommeo Volpi and Paolo de Castro, and printed
with the false date of Friburg, towards the close of the eighteenth
century (1778-1783). This consists of laws of entirely different
periods arranged haphazard, without regard to chronology, and including
the enactments, but these are given with all the modifications and
changes introduced at a later date, and are also confusedly jumbled.
No historian engaged on the times of Giano della Bella can make any use
of a collection of this kind, since it shows no proof of authenticity.
For the same reason we may also reject the Miscellany preserved in the
Florence Archives, and that Bonaini calls "a _huge medley_," containing
unconnected laws of different periods, and different tendencies, some
enforcing and others modifying the Enactments of Justice. Hence,
while possibly of some importance with regard to the history of the
"Ordinamenti," this Miscellany cannot help us to discover their primary
form.

Four other compilations remain, one of which only is inedited.
Examination quickly shows that the one brought out by Bonaini comprises
no more than twenty-one rubrics, and that the last of these, forming a
general summary, is mutilated; the other compilations contain a greater
number of rubrics, but, in all three, the general special enactments
of January, 1293, are invariably given under the first twenty-eight
rubrics.[441] In fact, from the twenty-ninth forward, appendices and
posterior laws begin to occur, often separately dated, and seemingly
tacked on to the enactments, in order sometimes to modify, sometimes to
strengthen them, or again to diminish their effect, or because of their
relation to cognate matters. All the laws and statutes of the Republic
suffered more or less the same fate. Thus the notable divergences
found in the various compilations are reduced to very narrow limits as
regards the original body of enactments. Certain doubts still assail
us, however, seeing that we not only find twenty-two rubrics on the
one hand against twenty-eight on the other, but because these rubrics
clash on various points. First of all, then, let us remark that the
oldest compilation is undoubtedly the one published by Bonaini in
1855, from the original MS. in the State Archives. The editor felt
assured of having discovered the original document of the enactments,
but conscientiously preferred to entitle it the original draft,[442]
seeing that, as Hegel has since ascertained, it is not the actual law
that was approved and proclaimed by the magistrates. The codex is of
great antiquity, and may be ascribed to Giano della Bella's day. In
fact, in one heading, first inscribed and then cancelled, we find the
date of 1292 _de mense ianuarii_ (1293, new style).[443] The usual
formula heading all decrees of the Republic is missing, and the said
formula not only gave the date and title, but occasionally added the
names of the magistrates promulgating the law. The codex is of small
size, full of erasures, alterations, and additions written by different
hands: often, too, there are empty spaces left between one rubric and
another to allow room for future additions or corrections. Everything
plainly shows that this old codex is only a rough copy of the law,
standing exactly as it was drawn up, at the request of the magistrates,
by the three previously mentioned citizens, and before it had been cast
in its final form, or legally sanctioned by those charged to discuss
and approve it, prior to its promulgation. Accordingly it is impossible
to decide with any certainty whether it was modified at all, or in
what degree. But although this rough draft is somewhat anterior to the
actual law itself, the existing compilations are all posterior to it,
and may consequently include later appendices and modifications. Thus,
on examining the Latin compilation edited by Fineschi in 1790, and the
Italian one brought out by Giudici in 1853, both derived from old and
authentic manuscripts, we find each to have all the characteristics
of a regularly proclaimed law. Both begin with the official formula,
and are dated the 18th of January, 1292 (1293, new style). On reading
the rubrics appended to the second (the Italian copy), which is much
longer than the other, we find various dates given, including that
of 1324; whereas the first (the Latin version) contains none later
than the 6th of July, 1295. Therefore the latter is the older of the
two, and the occasional divergences existing even among its first
twenty-eight rubrics are undoubtedly caused by amendments introduced at
a subsequent time. Nevertheless, even the first rubrics of the Latin
compilation evidently contain modifications of an earlier date than the
6th of July, 1295. For instance, in rubric vi. we find the number of
witnesses--a point left undecided in the rough draft (rubric v.)--fixed
at three in the two posterior compilations, and this point (as we shall
see) can be proved on documentary evidence to have been settled by law
in July, 1295. Therefore we are justified in concluding that it is the
Latin and older compilation that gives the enactments as they stood in
July, 1295; while the Italian copy, although proved, by examination
of the codex, to be an official translation, occasionally includes
alterations of even a later date than 1295. If, however, we only keep
in view their first twenty-eight rubrics, and collate these with
Bonaini's draft, it will be seen that, saving for the non-appearance
in the latter of six rubrics, chiefly of a very insignificant kind,
all other divergences are rather formal than substantial. In any
case, wherever the three versions are found to agree, we may be sure
of possessing the law passed on the 18th of January, 1293, in the
precise shape it wore at the time; but wherever, on the contrary,
divergences exist, we must seek the aid of the chroniclers and of any
new documents, should such be found, before arriving at a definite
conclusion.

Following these rules, we may therefore proceed to examine the
law.[444]


VII.

What, then, were these Enactments of Justice, as originally framed, and
what is to be learnt from them? They work a political and social change
in the Republic, for the evident purpose of promoting civil equality,
giving greater unity to the government and increased strength to the
guilds; also of assuring the harmony and concord of the people, and
curbing the arrogance of the nobles. The more strictly political reform
is confined to establishing safe rules for the election of Priors,
and creating a new and more powerful magistrate, the Gonfalonier of
Justice, to sit in junction with the Priors.

By request of the Captain of the People, the Priors authorised him
to call a meeting of the Heads, or Consuls of the Twelve Guilds,
in order to deliberate as to the safest and most fitting mode of
choosing their own successors. All candidates to the priorate had to
be enrolled in some guild, and to exercise its trade, as the surest
means of proving that they were not of the aristocracy--always the
chief point to be ascertained. In fact no one remaining a noble could
be eligible to the Signory, even if engaged in trade.[445] By means of
subtle and often quibbling interpretations of the law, it was possible
to compromise as to the actual practice of a craft, but never as to
being absolutely free from all taint of aristocracy.[446] Thus Giano
della Bella, in spite of merely having, as Villani relates, some slight
commercial interests in France, was qualified, on discarding his rank
and becoming one of the people, to enter the Signory in February,
1293. In July, 1295, as we shall see, the enactments were modified,
and it was sufficient for candidates to be enrolled in some guild
without practically exercising its trade, always providing they did not
belong to the nobility. Many regulations were added to assure an equal
division of public posts among all the Sestieri of the city and all the
guilds, while prohibiting the nomination of several Priors belonging
to the same Sestiere, family, or guild. None leaving office could be
re-elected to it within two years, and this prohibition was extended
to his relations as well. The office of Prior was held for two months;
no one was allowed to ask or intrigue for it, but neither might one
refuse to accept it. The Priors had to dwell altogether in one house,
where they lived and ate in common, without accepting invitations
elsewhere or giving private audiences.[447]

The next subject considered was the election of the new magistrate,
namely, the Gonfalonier of Justice. He was chosen every two months from
a different Sestiere of the city, and his electors were the incoming
Priors, captains, and guild-masters, with the addition of two worthies
of each Sestiere. He was elected on precisely the same terms as the
Priors, saving that he might return to office after one year instead
of two; he lived with the Priors as _primus inter pares_; he received
the same honorarium of ten _soldi_ per day, expenses included, so that
he was practically unremunerated. But having higher attributes in the
eyes of the law, he became speedily and of necessity the chief of the
Signory.[448] At the public parliament the Gonfalon of the People
was solemnly consigned to him, and one hundred _pavesi_, or shields,
and twenty-five cross-bows with bolts were placed at his disposal,
for the better equipment of part of the thousand _popolani_ yearly
selected to serve under him, the Podesta and Captain to preserve
order and enforce the execution of the new laws.[449] No relation
of the Priors in office could be elected to the Gonfaloniership. The
creation of this new post certainly serves to prove that the necessity
of giving increased unity and supremacy to the Government was already
acknowledged. But at that period Republican jealousy was too strong to
sanction anything more than a mere show of supremacy. Accordingly, the
Gonfalonier was only the most influential of the Priors, and liable
to be changed on the same terms, albeit the fact of having the free
disposal, at given moments, of the citizen army undoubtedly endued him
with higher authority.

In treating of the branch of the enactments bearing on social rather
than political cases, we should remark first of all that to these
enactments was owed the settled constitution of the Florentine guilds,
which now hastened to reframe or renew their own special statutes.
The normal number of the guilds was likewise established by the
enactments, and from that moment remained fixed at twenty-one.[450]
In fact, the first rubric decreed that the guilds should take a
solemn oath to maintain union and concord among the people. The second
rubric annulled and forbade, under heavy penalties, all _companies_,
_leagues_, _promises_, _conventions_, _obligations_, and _sworn pacts_,
that is, all agreements among the people unprovided or unsanctioned
by the laws, and opposed or alien to the constitution of the guilds.
Both procurators and stipulators of similar agreements were liable
even to capital punishment; and any guild known to be concerned in
such agreement would be mulcted in one thousand _lire_; the consuls of
the said guild, and the notary who had drawn the deed, in five hundred
_lire_.[451] All this plainly proves that the law was not devised, as
once believed and asserted, for the sole purpose of wreaking vengeance
on the nobles, but was also framed with the intent of reforming the
city and government by solidly organising the guilds and granting them
higher political importance. Nevertheless, the humiliation of the
leading nobles was certainly one of the principal objects of the law.
Therefore we may now proceed to examine the clauses directed to that
end.


VIII.

First of all, to punish the nobles for their continual attacks on
the people it was requisite to make them guarantee their collective
responsibility, since, in defiance of preceding laws, they frequently
contrived to shirk that obligation. Most offences being punishable by
fines, persons bound by no guarantees could easily evade the prescribed
penalty on some pretext or another: therefore the enactments were
framed to prevent such evasion of justice.[452] They likewise gave
fresh force to old laws which had been too often violated. "Further, to
prevent the numerous frauds daily committed by certain leading nobles
of the city and territory of Florence with regard to the guarantees
pledged, or rather, bound to be pledged by the said nobles according to
the terms of the statute of the Florentine Commune, as decreed under
the rubric: 'De la securtadi che si debbono fare da' grandi de la citta
di Firenze,' and beginning with the words: 'Accio che la isfrenata
spezialmente de' grandi,' &c.--it is provided and ordained," &c.[453]

Consequently, all the nobles already enumerated in the above-mentioned
statute, and of whom a new list was then made, were ordered to give
guaranty, from the age of fifteen years to seventy, without exception,
by the payment of two thousand _lire_, a sum generally sufficient to
cover the highest fines exacted, apart from confiscation, which penalty
was not only commonly, but abusively employed. The fact of being
enrolled in a guild did not suffice to exempt any of these nobles from
the duty of giving guarantees; the privilege of exemption being solely
granted to him whose entire family, for this or that reason, even by
special indulgence, had been spared the duty of giving guarantees for
five years at least, or declared absolutely free (_francata_). In
either case the family was considered to be thoroughly of the people,
and entitled to all the advantages deriving therefrom. The Signory was
empowered to reduce the sum guaranteed (_il sodamento_) in the case
of the poorer nobles, but it was precisely this clause that opened
the door to partiality and fraud.[454] The law proceeded to state
that the fixed time for giving guarantees was the month of January
or February at the latest: any one refusing or delaying obedience,
no matter in what way, would be banished, and his nearest kin in the
male line compelled to give surety in his stead. The penalty of any
crime committed by an unguaranteed person was to fall on that person's
relations. But when the penalty was death, and the criminal had fled,
his relations must pay three thousand _lire_ instead of the guaranteed
two thousand. But in case of mortal feud between the members of a
family their obligation of giving surety for one another was cancelled.
This plainly shows that when community of interests and passions
had ceased to exist the law no longer insisted on the collective
responsibility of kinsmen or associates. This assists our better
comprehension of the real scope of the enactment.[455]

When, however, the members of associations acted in common, as one
entity, the law framed for the purpose of dissolving those associations
made the members reciprocally responsible, obliging them to guarantee
and pay for one another. But no penalties save fines, and these
only within certain limits, were exacted from relations and fellow
associates, since an association was only fined as a collective
body. This will explain what Compagni and Villani meant by saying
that according to the enactments, "one associate was bound for the
other."[456] We may see how Machiavelli blundered, or at least
exaggerated, in his interpretation of their words when he stated in
general terms that "the associates of a criminal were made to suffer
the same penalty to which the latter was condemned;"[457] and we can
also note the mistake committed by modern writers in clinging to an
interpretation, that is totally contradicted by the terms of the
enactments, which would be otherwise in opposition to the culture of
the period and the most fundamental principles of law. The measures
specially directed against the nobles may be reduced to two leading
clauses, namely the revival in a more rigorous shape of the old laws
excluding the nobles from office and obliging them to guarantee and
pay one another's fines; and the increased severity of the punishments
inflicted on them by--to use Villani's words--"a different mode of
doubling ordinary penalties."[458] Let us now see what these penalties
were in their aggravated form.

According to the enactments, should a noble murder or procure the
murder of one of the people, both the noble and the doer of the deed
are to be condemned to death by the Podesta, and their property
destroyed and made confiscate.[459] Should they escape by flight, they
are to be sentenced in contumacy, and their property confiscated.
Nevertheless their guarantor will have to pay the sum for which he
stood surety, but with right of reimbursement from the confiscated and
demolished property of the fugitive criminal. All other nobles who,
without being direct accomplices in the crime, have had any share in
it, are sentenced to a fine of two thousand _lire_; if failing to pay
this, their property is confiscated, and their kinsmen or guarantors
bound to pay it in their stead. But when the crime in question was
that of inflicting serious bodily hurt, the doer of the deed and
its instigators were sentenced to a fine of two thousand _lire_. If
refusing to pay the penalty, their hands were chopped off; if escaping
the reach of justice, their possessions were sacked, their funds
confiscated, and their guarantors bound to pay the fine, but with the
usual right of reimbursement from the sums confiscated by the State.
For slighter offences, slighter penalties were adjudged. In every case
the guilty were forbidden to hold any public office until five years
had elapsed. For murderous attempts, the sworn testimony of the injured
person or his nearest relation, together with that of two witnesses
to the public voice on the matter (_testimoni di pubblica fama_), was
considered sufficient proof of the crime; nor was it necessary for
the two witnesses to have seen the crime actually committed. This was
the clause most obnoxious to the nobles. In general they were little
disturbed by threatened punishment, even of the severest kind, since
they always hoped to escape it. But they were roused to fury as well
as alarm, when measures were taken for the rigorous enforcement of
the penalties prescribed. And this was precisely the chief intent and
soul of the enactments. The whole course of procedure enjoined by
them was almost as summary as that of martial law, and allowed much
weight to public opinion, which, in the midst of party strife, was
no trustworthy guide. The close union prevailing in associations had
made ordinary legal procedure very difficult, if not impossible. Hence
it was ordained that whenever a crime was perpetrated, the Podesta
was bound to discover its author within five, or at most eight days,
according to the gravity of the deed, under pain, in case of neglect of
loss of office and a fine of five hundred _lire_ for minor offences.
In such case, however, the Captain was charged to take the matter in
hand, and subject to the same penalties. All shops were then to be
closed, the artisans called to arms, and the Gonfalonier to be on
the alert to punish all recusants. But when the Podesta discovered
the criminal, and it was a case of homicide, he and the Gonfalonier
together were to ring the tocsin without waiting for the sentence of
the court, and assembling the thousand select men, proceed to demolish
the houses belonging to the criminal. The guild-masters were prompt to
obey the Captain's summons. When slighter offences were in question
the criminal's houses were not destroyed until sentence had been
passed.[460] It should be remarked that this pulling down of houses
was never carried to the point of total demolition, and, particularly
in cases of petty crimes, the Gonfalonier and Podesta always settled
beforehand what damage should be wrought.[461]

Very severe penalties were imposed both on injured persons failing to
denounce crime,[462] and on the makers of false accusations.[463] When
one of the people received hurt through joining in some quarrel of the
nobles, or in cases of conflict between master and man, the enactments
were not applied, and the common law was again enforced.[464] Other
clauses followed touching unjust appropriation of the people's property
on the part of the nobles, and obstacles interposed by them to bar the
former from due receipt of income, for which offences, fines varying
between one thousand and five hundred _lire_ were prescribed in the
customary way.[465] A noble sentenced to any fine was forbidden to beg
or collect the amount from others, since this would have made it easier
to commit deeds of vengeance in common and pay the penalty by means of
a general subscription. Therefore any noble begging contributions from
others was condemned to a special fine of five hundred _lire_; while
all trying to collect money for him, as well as those supplying it,
were mulcted in one hundred _lire_.[466]

No appeal of any sort was permitted against sentences pronounced
according to the enactments,[467] since these overruled all ordinary
statutes, and it was forbidden either to prorogue, suspend, or alter
them, under penalty of incurring the severe punishment prescribed in
the _General Conclusion_.[468]


IX.

Thus the Enactments of Justice were framed. As already stated, their
object was to fortify the guilds, give greater unity to the Government
and the people, humble the nobles, and promote the dispersal of
associations. Only it was to be doubted whether a law of this kind
could be fully carried out, or would not rather be violated by the
nobles, thus sharing the fate of many earlier laws promulgated for
the same purpose. Giano della Bella used his best efforts to avert
this danger. He had not compiled the enactments, nor was he in office
when they were discussed and passed; but he undoubtedly assisted in
promoting them. On the 15th of February, 1293, shortly after they
were proclaimed, he was elected to the "Priors," and on the 10th of
April--namely, ten days before his term of office expired--we find that
a new law, devised for the purpose of "fortifying" the enactments among
which it was subsequently incorporated, was presented, discussed, and
passed by all the State Councils.

This additional law, one decidedly accordant with the spirit of action
rather than of debate, possessed by Giano della Bella, was of a very
simple kind. It ordained that another thousand men, together with
one hundred and fifty _magistri de lapide et lignamine_ and fifty
_piconarii fortes et robusti, cum bonis picconibus_,[469] should be
added to the force of one thousand _popolani_ at the disposition of
the Gonfalonier of Justice, of the Captain and Podesta. The object
of this new measure was self-evident: it was intended to inflict
real punishment; to thoroughly confiscate the property and demolish
the abodes of all nobles doing injury to the people. Accordingly the
aristocrats were provoked to fury, and their hatred of Giano could no
longer be restrained. But he was nowise alarmed; on the contrary, it
spurred him to new efforts, and he planned another measure, that, if
carried into effect, would have proved a deathblow to the nobles.

As we have seen, the latter's position as magistrates of the Guelph
Society still kept their power intact; so, in order to humble them,
Giano proposed to deprive their captains "of the Seal of the Society,
and of its property, which was considerable, and hand these over to
the Commune. Although a Guelph, and of Guelph nationality, he hoped,
by this measure, to humble the power of the magnates."[470] In fact,
once deprived of the seal, that was the symbol, as it were, of their
separate entity; once their movable property, or funds, transferred
to the Commune, their caste would have been notably enfeebled, if not
destroyed, and the last stronghold of nobility lost. Giano's proposal
was likewise justified by a law established by the Guelph Society,
decreeing the latter to be only entitled to one-third of the property
confiscated from the Ghibellines, while as matter of fact it had
appropriated the whole. Hence there was some reason for compelling the
Society to disgorge at least the two-thirds it had unduly usurped. To
what extent Giano's plan was fulfilled, the absence of documents leaves
us in ignorance. Although the incident is recorded by historians,[471]
the Guelph Society long continued to exercise tyrannous rule. At any
rate the mere fact of proposing this law suffices to explain the
increasing hatred developed against Giano, and the speedily visible
signs of approaching disaster in the city.


X.

Thereupon the people rose to the emergency, and in order to be prepared
for events, hastened to avert all risk of foreign war by concluding
peace with the Pisans, in spite of the latter being already reduced
to such extremities, that the continuation of the war would have
certainly led to their still deeper humiliation and abasement. But the
Florentines decided for peace in order to "fortify the position of the
people, and lower the power of nobles and potentates, who often acquire
renewed strength and vitality by war."[472]

Negotiations were set on foot during the Gonfaloniership of Migliore
Guadagni (April 15 to June 15, 1293), and concluded soon afterwards
during that of Dino Compagni. The terms arranged were: the restitution
of prisoners; free passage through Pisa for the merchandise of all
communes included in the Tuscan League, and the same right of passage,
free of duty, for Pisan merchandise through the States of the League.
For the term of four years the Pisans were to contrive the election
of their Podesta and Captain, in such wise that one of the pair
should always belong to one of the communes of the League, the other
to some house not rebelled against the same, and no member of the
family of the Counts of Montefeltro was ever to be chosen. Now the
Pisan leader who had defended the city so valiantly, and filled the
offices of Podesta, Captain of the people and of war, was precisely
Count Guido Montefeltro. Hence, by the terms of the treaty, he was now
forced to leave Pisa, together with all the foreign Ghibellines; and
twenty-five leading citizens were also to be given in hostage. Thus
the Pisans were compelled to behave with the harshest ingratitude. The
count, indeed, might have made them pay dearly for it, being still in
command of a numerous and most devoted army; but he preferred to bear
the insult with dignity. Appearing before the Council, he recounted
his services to Pisa, the ill return made for them, and then, having
received the monies due to him, instantly went away. The Pisans were
likewise pledged to dismantle the walls of the fortress of Pontedera,
and to fill up the trenches; farther, to recall to the city all the
leading Guelph exiles. On the other hand, Florence was to give back
their castle of Monte-Cuccoli, and all their other possessions in Val
d'Era.[473]

Having thus put an end to what seemed for the moment their wealthiest
concern, the Florentines devoted more energy to the less important
undertakings on hand. Various districts or castles, such as Poggibonsi,
Certaldo, Gambassi, and Cutignano were reduced to submission. The
Counts Guidi were deprived of jurisdiction over numerous domains in
the upper valley of the Arno. Also possession was resumed of many
others in the Mugello, which had been illegally usurped by the said
Counts Guidi, the Ubaldini, and other powerful lords. A commission
of three burghers of the lower class was then appointed to estimate
all possessions appertaining to the city and its territory. These
commissioners likewise cleared the lands of the St. Eustachio Hospital,
near Florence, of many unlawful occupants, and put the estate under the
direct protection of the Consuls of the Calimala Guild.[474] Another
fact should also be noted, if only to prove what universal energy was
displayed at this juncture by the Florentine people who, as Villani
phrases it, "were heated with presumption and consciousness of power."
A certain man fled to Prato after committing some crime, and was given
refuge there. The Republic immediately demanded his extradition, and on
Prato's refusal, sentenced the Commune to a fine of ten thousand _lire_
and the surrender of the criminal, despatching a single messenger
with a letter to this effect. As the authorities of Prato were still
recalcitrant, war was promptly declared, horse and foot called to arms,
and the town was finally compelled to yield the point. "And this is
how the hot-blooded Florentines managed their affairs."[475]


XI.

Just when all was safe and tranquil outside the walls, the worst of
dangers began in the city. The nobles were determined to prevent the
Enactments of Justice from taking effect, and accordingly contrived
that after all attacks upon the people, the offenders should be cited
before judges belonging to their own party. These conducted the trial
to their advantage, and thus the Podesta, without being aware of it,
punished the innocent instead of the guilty. For the nobles sheltered
evildoers, protected their fellow associates, and on every attempt to
enforce the law, did their best to raise riots. All these proceedings
were fiercely combated by the people, under the guidance of Giano della
Bella, who was always reiterating the cry, "Perish the city rather than
justice!" Accordingly public feeling became so inflamed that the most
sanguinary measures were threatened in retaliation on the nobles. The
first family to incur the worst penalties decreed by the enactments
were the Galli. One of that line having mortally wounded a Florentine
merchant in France, their dwellings in Florence were demolished.[476]
This instance easily prepared the way for sterner measures. The people
clamoured for new and more vigorous sentences; therefore it was
feared, says Compagni, "that were the accused left unpunished, the
rector would be left to bear the brunt, and thus no accused person was
granted impunity." The fury of the nobles reached its climax, and they
complained, with some show of reason, that "if a horse at full gallop
chanced to whisk its tail in the face of a _popolano_, or some one in
a crowd pushed against another man's breast, or small children came to
blows, there was no reason why their property should be ruined on such
slender pretext."[477]

Accordingly they conceived the idea of conspiring to the bodily hurt
of Giano, the ringleader and head of the people, and thus getting
rid of him for ever. To compass his assassination seemed easy, by
reason of his straightforward impetuosity and incautiousness. He had
great influence over the populace, but even this was a point open to
attack. As we have seen, the Lesser Guilds and the populace lived by
petty industry and small trades carried on within the city; and their
chief profits being derived from noble customers, the latter had much
ascendancy over them and no few adherents in their ranks. Besides this,
a certain amount of jealousy had already sprung up between the lowest
class and the well-to-do burghers, who, being mainly concerned in the
export and import trade,[478] were independent of the nobles, hated
them, and sought their destruction. Nevertheless these burghers could
not approve of Giano's attempts to rouse the ambition and increase the
strength of the lowest class, which was disgusted at being excluded
from the Government and yearning to have a share in it.

Another element of strife was soon to be introduced by the election of
Pope Boniface VIII. (December, 1294). This Pontiff had an immoderate
appetite for temporal power, and believed that owing to the interregnum
of the Empire, its rights could now be assumed by the Papacy throughout
Italy and Europe. He was particularly anxious to increase his power in
Florence, the leading city of Tuscany, where his own predecessors had
appointed Charles of Anjou to the post of imperial vicar. Therefore
he quickly began to open negotiations with the nobles, whose present
weakness increased their readiness to come to terms with him, and who
would have willingly resumed the government of the city in his name,
just as their Ghibelline ancestors had often held it in the name of
the emperor. But this was naturally opposed by the burghers, who being
determined, on the contrary, to maintain the liberty and independence
of the Republic, could not, albeit staunch Guelphs, side with the Pope
at that moment.

Secret intrigues between Boniface and the nobles were now carried on
through the Spini, rich Florentine merchants, who, as bankers to the
Curia, had agents in Rome. The first step hazarded was to call to
Tuscany a certain Giovanni di Celona,[479] who was already on the march
towards Italy with several hundred men, in response to a summons from
the Pope and the nobles. The latter, intending to use his force for
their own ends, had made him many promises, and with the concurrence,
it would seem, of certain of the burghers. But the affair dragged, and
men's passions were now outstripping the political manoeuvres employed
to feed the flame. Accordingly, without further delay, it was decided
to hatch a scheme for the murder of Giano della Bella. "The shepherd
struck down, his flock will be scattered," so said the nobles.

Only, as it fell out, the party in favour of craft prevailed over the
side preferring violence. At this moment frequent excesses, perpetrated
by the people, remained unpunished through the pusillanimity of the
judges. The butchers in particular, led by one Pecora, an audacious
ruffian, who had publicly threatened the Signory, committed worse
outrages from day to day. Hence, at the popular meetings frequently
held by Giano, the nobles, knowing his love of justice, would whet his
indignation by saying, "Dost not see the violence of the butchers? Dost
not see the insolence of the judges, who, by threatening to punish
the rectors when the time of investigation arrives,[480] wrest unjust
favours from them? Suits are suspended for three or four years, and
sentences never pronounced." Thereupon the loyal Giano would promptly
reply, "May the city perish, rather than this state of things be
continued! Let laws be framed to repress all this wickedness." And then
the nobles would maliciously hasten to inform judges and butchers that
Giano meant to crush them with new laws.[481] In pursuance of this
cunning scheme, they suggested a law against exiles, in the hope of
soon being able to apply it to Giano himself. It seems that he was on
the point of falling into the trap, but received timely warning. So
then, refusing to hear another word, either from friends or foes, he
forbade that any law whatever should be proposed, and threatened his
enemies with death. Accordingly the meeting only served to increase the
general heat and ferment.[482]

The nobles were not to be checked so easily. Seeing that Giano still
retained many friends, and that there was no hope of conquering
by craft, they held a private sitting in the church of San Jacopo
Oltrarno, to discuss what should be done; and violent measures were
once more suggested. Giano's personal enemy, Betto Frescobaldi, the
same who had once struck him in the face at San Piero Scheraggio, spoke
to this effect: "Let us cast off this slavery; let us arm and rush
to the Piazza; let us kill both friends and enemies of the popular
class, as many as we find of them, so that neither ourselves nor our
sons may ever be crushed by them." But the promoters of intrigue
were again in opposition, and Baldo della Tosa replied very quietly,
"The wise knight's counsel is good, but too risky, since, should the
scheme fail, we should all perish. First let us conquer (our enemies)
by cunning, and excommunicate them with soft words.... And when thus
excommunicated, let us harry them in such sort that they can never lift
their heads again."[483]

But quite suddenly a fitting opportunity for violence spontaneously
arose. Corso Donati, one of the most powerful and arrogant of
Florentines, induced some of his followers to assault Messer Simone
Galastroni, and a riot ensued in which one man was killed and two
wounded. Both sides laid complaints; but when the affair was brought
before the judges charged to try the case, one of them, influenced
by the usual party spirit, arranged that the notary should reverse
the depositions of the witnesses. When the case, thus garbled, was
brought before the Podesta, Giano di Lucino, he acquitted Donati, and
condemned Galastroni. Thereupon the people who had witnessed the riot,
and knew all the circumstances, rose to arms, shouting through the
streets: "Perish the Podesta; he shall perish by fire!" They made for
the palace, <DW19>s in hand, to burn down the door, and expecting to be
actively assisted by Giano della Bella. But, on the contrary, he sided
with the magistrates, whose authority he invariably held in respect.
Nevertheless, the door of the Podesta's palace was consumed, his horses
and chattels were stolen, his men captured, and his papers scattered
and torn. And as many persons knew him to possess indictments against
them, they took care to destroy his official documents. He and his wife
contrived to escape to an adjoining house, and obtained refuge there.
Corso Donati, who was in the palace at the time, saved his life by
flying from roof to roof.

The Councils assembled the next day, and for the honour of the Republic
decided to restore all the Podesta's stolen property to pay him his
salary and send him away. Thus order was re-established at once, but
public feeling was still very inflamed, and the nobles saw that the
moment for wreaking vengeance on Giano had finally arrived. In fact,
some of the people were his foes, owing to the numerous calumnies
purposely launched against him, and among others the charge of having
promoted decrees to the hurt of the judges and butchers; some, again,
were furious because he had sided with the Podesta, while others
denounced him as the author of the riot. Accordingly, profiting by the
general confusion and uncertainty, his enemies succeeded in obtaining
the premature election of a Signory opposed to his views; and he was
speedily cited before the new magistrates on the charge of having
caused the disturbance. At this the whole city rose in tumult. Some
desired his condemnation; but the populace hastened to assume his
defence. Thereupon he decided to go away, and left Florence on the 5th
of March, 1295, for he shrank from being the cause of civil strife,
hoped that his departure would open the eyes of the wiser citizens,
and that the latter would speedily procure his recall. However, in
this his calculations were at fault, for he had many more enemies than
he imagined. Accordingly he was sentenced in contumacy in the name
of the enactments he had urged, and of which he was held to be the
author. The Pope hastened to congratulate the Florentines, and Giano
realised that his star had set. So, acting with his usual impetuosity,
he unhesitatingly removed to France, where he possessed some share in
the Pazzi bank, and died there in exile. His Florentine houses were
demolished, his friends and relations condemned to punishment, but
the Enactments of Justice long remained in force.[484] With regard
to Giano, Villani remarks that "every one who became a leader of the
people or the masses in Florence was invariably deserted." He adds that
"on account of this novelty, there was great perturbation and change in
the people and city of Florence, and that henceforth the artisans and
populace had little power over the Commune; and that the government
remained in the grasp of rich and powerful burghers."[485]

[Illustration: SCENE IN CORN MARKET, FLORENCE.

(_From early XIV. Century MS. in the Laurentian Library._)

            [_To face page 475._]


XII.

These concluding words from the chronicle of a skilled observer such as
Villani enable us to understand more completely the general character
of the revolution described; for as this was the natural outcome of
many preceding disturbances, its study throws a new light on earlier
events.

When the Florentines succeeded in destroying the castles of feudal
and Ghibelline nobles scattered over their territory, and in forcing
the conquered to inhabit the city, the Republic became split, as we
have seen, in two parties, constantly at strife: the one composed
of Ghibelline lords, the other of Guelph _popolani_. When the
Hohenstauffens of Naples and Palermo called all the Ghibellines of
Italy to arms, the magnates of the party took the lead in Tuscany,
with Frederic and Manfred to back them, again dominated Florence and
drove out the Guelphs. But when the Swabians fell and were replaced
by the House of Anjou, the Empire became weakened, and Italian policy
took a new turn. The Guelphs once more triumphed in Florence, and the
democratic element, already constituting the real strength of the
State, wreaked vengeance on the Ghibellines, who seemed to be almost
annihilated. Only as it chanced, at this moment, the Guelphs were split
into two factions, the nobles on one side, the people on the other; and
this division led to another and equally bitter struggle, undertaken
for the purpose of crushing the magnates outright. Thus the latter
were driven to crave admission to the guilds, to assume democratic
habits, and even to discard their old family names, unless resigned to
exclusion from the government. After a prolonged series of different
legal measures and revolutions, the Enactments of Justice finally
achieved the aim that the Florentine Republic had so long--and, indeed,
from its birth--kept in view, namely, the triumph of democracy.

[Illustration: RIOT IN CORN MARKET, FLORENCE.

(_From an old MS. in the Laurentian Library._)

            [_To face page 476._]

But the Republic comprised the populace as well as the people; and
although both orders were united in fighting the nobles, they split
apart as soon as their common victory was assured. Thus the party of
the rich burghers, or Greater Guilds, gradually sprang into being. At
first there were twelve of these guilds, and they seemed to be at one
with the nine Lesser Trades, afterwards increased to fourteen; but, as
time went on, these fell more widely apart from the remaining seven,
and strictly Greater, Guilds, and began to struggle against them, thus
constituting the party of the rich burghers or _popolo grasso_. The
formation and successful career of this party, so long at the head of
the Government, dates, as Villani tells us, from the defeat of Giano
della Bella, whose downfall was caused by the temporary alliance of the
nobles and the more powerful section of the people. The latter soon
divided both from the nobles and lower class, was equally victorious
over either party, and constituted one of the most energetic,
sharp-witted, and intelligent democracies of which history has record.
It comprised the richest and most vigorous section of the people, known
for that reason as the _popolo grasso_, and gradually became master
of the city. And albeit this state of things was a natural result of
past revolutions, it was undoubtedly precipitated by the Enactments of
Justice. These had been promoted by Giano, with the aid of the people,
to be used as a weapon against the nobles. He fell a victim to the
latter, when they hoodwinked the people by feigning to unite with them
for the nonce. It was certainly altogether against his own will that
Giano helped to promote the formation of a party, that, issuing from
the wreck of the nobles and populace, finally excluded both alike from
all participation in the government of Florence.

For a long time, at any rate, this party raised the power of the
Republic to a very lofty height, and directed its policy for more than
a century. The moment of its consolidation coincided with that in which
Florence became the seat of Italian culture, and hence of the general
culture of Europe. Nor is there any cause to be surprised by the vast
intellectual, political, and moral success of the commercial democracy
of Florence. In the days of the Hohenstauffen, the Italian aristocracy
undoubtedly constituted the most cultivated and civilised part of
the nation; all great political questions, and the great struggles
between the Papacy and the Empire, in which the whole of Europe took
so lively a share, were alike carried on by that class. The Court of
Frederic II. had been the headquarters of those contests, and the most
dazzling centre of mental light in the world at the time. The language
spoken there was the language of courtiers; the Court was sceptical,
and the first poets were princes or barons. The Emperor Frederic, his
son Enzo, and his secretary, Pier della Vigna, gave voice to the first
notes of the Italian muse. It was a privileged and limited order, in
which literature and science still retained the characteristics of
chivalry and scholasticism. In imitation of their French and Provencal
masters, these poets lauded some imaginary woman or some fantastic and
unreal love in obstinately artificial verse. They were never able to
cast off mediaeval and conventional forms. At the same time, however,
the merchants and working men of our republics, more especially of
Florence, were scouring the world, founding banks and business firms
throughout the East and the West; they were studying jurisprudence,
always and everywhere demonstrating a special aptitude for framing
laws, creating new institutions, and directing vast concerns. By
this means they acquired that practical knowledge of mankind and the
universe, that sense of truth and reality, so entirely absent from
pre-existent literatures, and precisely required to originate the first
literature of the modern world.

Naturally, however, those merchants, solely versed in commerce and
petty local politics, lacked the breadth and loftiness of thought, the
mental culture and refinement needed to solve the hard problem without
help. At the same moment, Florence, the most active and intelligent
of Italian republics, was enduring the series of great and radical
changes, already described, which after much sanguinary strife and
a new rearrangement of social conditions, suddenly raised her to a
truly fortunate position. Owing to her successes in war, Florence
now commanded every highway of commerce, and, by the amazingly rapid
extension of her trade, was enabled to acquire mighty and no longer
contested preponderance in Tuscany and become its chief as well as
its central city. The actual antagonism between the Pope and the
Angevins, together with the altered conditions of the Empire, enabled
her to steer cautiously between those rival powers and assume for the
first time great and genuine political importance in Italy. Thus the
extent of her concerns and the circle of her ideas were simultaneously
enlarged. The two most intelligent and most hostile classes of her
citizens, namely, the now powerful traders and the nobles now reduced
to equality with them, became transformed and definitely fused in one
class during the course of their fierce conflict, excluding, on the one
hand, the lowest order of the people, and on the other, those of the
nobles who, whether aspiring to absolute rule or obstinately clinging
to feudal customs and the authority of the Empire, remained blindly
opposed to municipal institutions which were nevertheless predestined
to triumph. Need we then feel surprised if at this moment art and
literature put forth their fairest blossoms, and in the life-giving air
of freedom were seen to expand their leaves and shed their fragrance
through the world? It is enough to read the records and glance at the
laws of the Republic in order to discern that in the closing years of
the fourteenth century a new spirit was stirring the people and a new
sun, as it were, rising in the sky.

Every page of the chronicles records the undertaking of very important
public works, the erection of city squares, canals, bridges, and walls.
And simultaneously with these, the most enduring monuments of modern
art were springing up from the ground. During the same period Arnolfo
di Cambio worked on the Baptistery, began the church of Santa Croce,
and, according to the chroniclers, received from the Signory a solemnly
worded order to reconstruct the old cathedral from the foundations
by erecting a new one "of the most magnificent design the mind of
man could conceive, rendering it worthy of a heart expanded to much
greatness by the union of many spirits in one."[486] Undoubtedly it
was then that Arnolfo laid the first stone of the fane considered by
many the finest church in the world. At the same time a great number of
monumental buildings and public works were being also carried on: Santo
Spirito, for instance, Orsammichele, and Santa Maria Novella. In 1299
Arnolfo likewise began the Palace of the Signoria, another marvel of
modern architecture, that seems to be so thoroughly in character with
the Republic and expressive of the youthful vigour then animating the
Florentine people. In the same year the construction of new walls,
suspended since 1285, was also resumed. And while churches, public
buildings, and private palaces were rising on all sides, Giotto's brush
was employed to cover their walls with a lavish profusion of lofty
and immortal compositions; sculpture rivalled painting in decorating
temples with imperishable works, and gave birth to the Tuscan school
that was afterwards to culminate in Donatello, Ghiberti, the Della
Robbia, and Michelangelo. What, too, are the names most frequently
occurring in the records of those times, and amid the struggles
promoting or following the Enactments of Justice? At every turn, among
the Priors, the Gonfaloniers, and ambassadors, or at hot debates in
council, we meet with Dante Alighieri, Brunetto Latini, Giovanni
Villani, Dino Compagni, and Guido Cavalcanti, the creators of Italian
poetry and prose. The Divine Comedy bristles with continual allusions
to the events, amid which it was conceived, and which all seem to be
informed by the same spirit, since, even in a thousand varying garbs,
it always asserts its identity. Therefore the Enactments of Justice are
neither the work of a single individual, nor suddenly improvised by
Giano della Bella, but rather the outcome of many revolutions: a body
of statutes proving and explaining the definite form and character of
the Florentine Republic. The same character, albeit less splendidly
displayed, appertained in varying degree to the other Italian communes.
But of them all Florence was ever the most original and brilliant
example.


NOTE TO CHAPTER VIII.

At this point it is necessary to allude to a question that has recently
arisen concerning the Enactments of Justice. Signor Salvioli and
Prof. Pertile, when describing certain Bolognese statutes of 1271 for
keeping the nobles in check, took it for granted that the Florentine
enactments of 1293 had been copied from those. But the Bolognese
statutes of 1271 having never been unearthed, the hypothesis met with
little favour. When Prof. Gaudenzi edited the "Ordinamenta sacrata et
sacratissima" of Bologna in 1282-84 (Bologna, the Merlani Press, 1888),
he noted their marked resemblance to the Enactments of Justice of 1293,
and considered it to be beyond a doubt that the latter had been derived
from the former. Indeed, he went to the point of asserting as a fact
"Che in genere i rivolgimenti e gli ordini di Firenze non furono che
l'imitazione di quelli di Bologna" (Preface, p. v.).

The decided injustice of this last assertion has been already pointed
out by Dr. Hartwig, in his recent precious work on Florentine history
("Ein Menschenalter Florentinische Geschichte, 1250-1293" (Freiburg,
1889-91), extracted from vols. i., ii., and v. of the "Deutsche
Zeitschrift fuer Geschichtwissenschaft"). For in truth Florentine laws
and institutions issue very directly from the history of Florentine
society and Florentine revolutions, which are very different from those
of Bologna.

As to the other question, that is, whether the Florentine enactments,
of 1293 were really derived from the Bologna statutes of 1282, I
feel considerable doubt, and believe that no definite solution can
be reached until fresh researches in the Florence Archives have
corroborated the result of Prof. Gaudenzi's studies of Bolognese
documents. Meanwhile I need merely remark--That the people's struggles
with the magnates, and the harsh and often cruel laws promulgated
against them, were not exclusively confined to Florence, but
incidents of very common occurrence in the history of our communes.
Notwithstanding many points of general resemblance, these conflicts
and laws varied very much in different communes. Hence, in order to
prove to what extent the Bolognese enactments served as models for
those of Florence, it is not enough to compare the two codes and
note their respective dates. As plainly proved by the events we have
related, and additionally confirmed by all the later researches of
Hartwig, Del Lungo, and Perrens, the Florentine ordinances are found
to be a synthesis of other and much earlier laws against the nobles,
and sometimes literal reproductions of them. The enactments themselves
quote a law of 1286 frequently mentioned by historians, and, as we
have seen, even the "Consulte" of 1282 refer to an earlier law against
the nobles. These anterior laws are the veritable source of the
Florentine enactments, which, however, are not solely designed, like
the Bolognese ordinances, for the repression of the nobles, but to
promote the transfer of the government to the Greater Guilds, a change
already inaugurated in Florence as far back as 1250. It is this double
purpose that constitutes their specific character. It behoves us to
unearth more of these laws in the Florence Archives and collate them
with those of Bologna before deciding that the Enactments of Justice,
so peculiarly connected with the whole course of Florentine history,
were mere copies of the Bolognese ordinances. Professor Gaudenzi's
publications do honour to his historical research. But I venture to
repeat that, in my opinion, the question cannot be really settled
without fresh investigation of the Florentine rolls. This task is now
being carried on by Signor Salvemini, and I hope that he may make some
new and profitable discovery. The problem is interesting enough to
claim solution.


DOCUMENTO.[487]

V.

In nomine domini amen. Liber defensionum et excusationum Magnatum
Civitatis et comitatus Florentie, qui se excusare volunt a
satisdationibus Magnatum non prestandis, receptarum per me Bax. de
Amgnetello notarium nobilis Militis domini Amtonii de Fuxiraga de
Laude, potestatis Florentie.

In anno currente Millesimo ducentesimo ottuagesimo septimo.

Ad defensionem

  Absoluti { Dardoccii quondam domini Uguicionis } de Sachettis
           { Manni fratris sui                   } producta fuit
             intentio singnata per Credo (_sic_), et ad ipsam probandam
             producti fuerunt infradicti testes.

Baldus Brode populi sancti Stephani de Abatia, iuratus die suprascripta
de veritate dicenda, et lecta sibi intentione per me Bax., dixit quod
bene vidit dictum Dardocium et Mannum eius fratrem facere artem cambii
in Civitate Florentie, iam sunt xx anni, et ab eo tempore citra, et
credit eos fecisse. Set propter guerram et brigam quam nunc habent,
predicti fratres Dardocci non tenent tabulam in mercato, set stat in
doma sua, et ibi facet (_sic_) artem canbii. Interrogatus si ipsi
palam tenent banchum et tapetum ante dischum domus sue sicut faciunt
alii campsores, respondit non, quia est consuetudo prestatorum et non
campsorum tenere tapetum. Interrogatus, dixit quod predictus senper
cotidie exercuit.

Lapus Benvenuti qui vocatur Borrectus populi sancti Petri Maioris
iuratus die suprascripto (?) ut supra, lecta sibi intentione per Be.,
dixit quod ipse testis est consocius predictorum Dardoccii et fratris
in arte canbii; et vidit dictum Dardoccium et fratrem dictam artem in
civitate Florentie continue [exercere], et predictum Mannum vidit in
Borgongna facere dictam artem per decem annos et plus, quibus stetit in
Borgongna; set dixit quod predictus Dardocius[488] propter guerram quam
ad presens habet, non audet uti ipsa arte in mercato sive in pubblico,
set ea continue utitur in domo sua, et vidit ipse testis; et vox et
fama est in populo dictorum fratrum et in civitate Florentie, quod ipsi
fratres fuerunt et sunt campsores.

    L. S. Ego Ruffus Guidi notarius predicta ex actibus Communis
    Florentie exemplando transcripsi, pubblicavi rogatus.




CHAPTER IX.[489]

_THE FLORENTINE REPUBLIC IN DANTE'S TIME._


I.

After the enforcement of the Enactments of Justice (1293) and the
expulsion of Giano della Bella, the Florentine Republic passed through
a phase of extraordinary and almost delirious confusion. Its incidents
are very familiar to us, owing to the splendid series of chroniclers
and historians who, from that moment, began to record the minutest
particulars of all that occurred under their eyes. Modern writers have
also studied that period and ransacked its archives; more especially
Professor Del Lungo, who has recently given proofs of an industry
and learning which cannot be sufficiently praised. Nevertheless, I
believe that some useful work may be done by trying to bring all those
facts together and scrutinising their organic unity, in order to
ascertain whence they proceeded, whither they tended, and thus explain,
if possible, the primary cause of so much disorder and the real
significance of the new revolutions undertaken. I may also add that
such investigation might prove to have much historical importance,
since it concerns the time in which not only a new art, new literature,
and new civilisation first sprang into being, but when the old mediaeval
social order was decaying and fading away, and the society of the
Renaissance beginning to take shape.

In the midst of these events the figure of Dante Alighieri stands forth
in giant mould, instantaneously arousing the most earnest attention,
and enhancing the value of all his surroundings.

As we have frequently observed and repeated, the history of Florence
runs a very plain course down to the year 1293, through the series
of wars and revolutions, during which the Guelph inhabitants of the
city first attacked the Ghibelline feudal lords, who, castled on every
surrounding hill, impeded all trade; and then, having conquered them,
demolished their strongholds, and forced them to dwell inside the
city walls, subject to the laws of the Commune. Next, the people were
compelled to combat and break down the surviving feudal element that
sought to assert itself in the city. Before the year 1293 this too
had been destroyed, and only the _Grandi_ were left, namely, nobles
stripped of their titles and of the old feudal privileges of their
class. The Enactments of Justice, which dissolved their associations
and excluded them from all share in the government, had increased,
on the other hand, the strength of the guilds and the people. These
accordingly were the masters of Florence, and the new law supplied
them with a most efficacious means of continuing the persecution and
routing the nobles in the tribunals of the State. The terms Guelph
and Ghibelline were still retained, but had lost their original
meaning. The old aristocracy, constituting the real nucleus of the
Ghibelline party, having now disappeared, the city was wholly Guelph.
The general condition of Italy also fostered this state of things. In
fact, owing to the fall of the Hohenstauffens and the success of the
Angevins, summoned to Italy by the Pope, the Guelph party had triumphed
throughout the Peninsula. The murder of Conradin (1298) had proved the
death knell of the Ghibellines.

The triumph of France was more and more assured, and during the
interregnum of the Empire Philip the Beautiful played almost the part
of an emperor. At the same time Boniface VIII. loudly declared that the
Pope stood above all kings and princes of the earth, and that all were
bound to yield him submission.

But division still reigned in Florence. First of all, germs of future
discord were lurking in the bosom of the people itself, owing to
its subdivision into rich people (_popolo grasso_), or the Greater
Guilds, and small people (_popolo minuto_), or Lesser Guilds, having
the populace at their back. The Greater Guilds, at the head of the
principal manufacturing business and the vast export and import trade,
were always ready to undertake fresh wars, which, by burdening the
city with taxes, greatly diminished the internal luxury upon which
the Lesser Guilds, engaged in small crafts, depended for their daily
support. It needed little to convert this clash of material interests
into a political conflict, especially when we remember that the Greater
Guilds had taken possession of the government without allowing the
Smaller Crafts any share in it. For the moment, however, the lower
class, although so turbulent and numerically strong, lacked cohesion
and experience, and had no leading men at its head. But although
without real elements of political strength, and still incapable of
forming a party, it was excellently suited to swell the ranks of
already constituted parties having the wit to use its aid in their
progress to power.

The nobles, on the other hand, although defeated, persecuted, and
oppressed, were by no means stamped out, and still retained some
measure of influence and skill. The expulsion of Giano della Bella was
an instance in point; for, by contriving to make the people believe him
its foe, they induced it to desert him and then provoked the mob to
attack him. Although deprived of legal authority, the nobles were still
practically strong. Always boasting of their victory of Campaldino,
they had undoubtedly played a prominent part in all the greater wars
of the Republic in past times, and even now made far better soldiers
than the popular class. As the wealthy proprietors of town and country
mansions, castles, and farms, they were undistracted by commercial
cares, and had more leisure for military pursuits; while the material
independence they enjoyed made them all the more sensitive to the
sting of political ambition. It was natural that they should seek and
obtain the co-operation of the populace in their contest with the
burghers. Thus, in junction with the former, they constituted a vast
and dangerous body of agitators, but without organic cohesion, and all
equally ineligible to office, inasmuch as the nobles had been excluded
from power in 1293, and the populace had never been allowed any share
of it.


II.

At this time the world began to perceive what results the subtle craft
of the Florentines was capable of achieving. The art of secretly
becoming masters of the State, that, at a later period, gave Cosimo
and Lorenzo dei Medici such triumphant supremacy in the Republic,
enabling them to hold sovereign rule while remaining private citizens
in the eyes of the law, this art was now discovered by the nobles. It
consisted in leaving republican institutions untouched, and showing no
desire to be concerned in them, yet contriving that none save personal
adherents should be admitted to power. The offices of the Guelph
Society afforded an efficacious means to this end, for, as we know,
the nobles were eligible to those offices, and when holding them could
declare any citizen a Ghibelline, confiscate his property, and exclude
him from the government at their own pleasure. Thus, without being
members of the Signory, they had found a more or less legal method of
preventing their worst enemies from entering it. Giano della Bella was
fully awake to this danger, and had tried to avert it; but the nobles
had frustrated his purpose by compassing his expulsion from the city.

As another useful means of regaining their forfeited power, the nobles
managed to obtain the right of choosing the magistrates, in order
to exercise a personal influence over them. Many of the magistrates
were foreigners who came provided with foreign notaries, chancellors,
and subordinate judges, while certain others, as, for instance, the
Podesta and the Captain of the People, were necessarily bound to be
knights--that is to say, nobles. They gave judgment in political as
well as civil and criminal cases. In fact, it was the function of the
Podesta and Captain, in junction with the Gonfalonier, to enforce
the enactments; and besides this, political and common law were so
intermixed at the time, that it was impossible to separate the one from
the other. Originally, as we have already seen, the Podesta was the
virtual head of the Commune. He commanded the army, signed treaties
of peace; and even as ancient historians recorded Roman events in the
name of the Consuls in office, so the Florentine chroniclers registered
the events of their city under the name of its Podesta and even
occasionally of its Consuls. But towards the close of the thirteenth
century things were changed. With the destroyal of feudalism, the
development of civil equality and increased recognition of Roman law,
the political importance of those offices was lessened. The Podesta and
Captains of the People were gradually lowered to the status of ordinary
high judges. Hence both they and their subordinates steadily declined
in authority and strength; and being worse paid and less feared, became
more open to bribery, and more easily subjected to the influence of the
nobles. Many of these officers came from Romagna, and the Marches, and
the greater number from Gubbio. Reared under tyrannical governments and
trained to Roman law in the school of Bologna, they had no previous
knowledge of the real significance of party conflicts in Florence, and
seldom succeeded in acquiring it; hence they also failed to discern
the true meaning of laws such as the Enactments of Justice, which were
mainly political laws. All this contributed to render them easily
and blindly subservient to those desiring to use them as tools. In
fact, the whole literature of the period teems with fierce invectives
against "the wicked, accursed, and perverted judges bringing ruin upon
cities."[490]

Thus by favour of the lower class and the mob, by the unjust verdicts
of the Captains of the Guelph Society and the corruption of alien
judges, the nobles endeavoured to regain their lost ground and again
seize possession of the government. Nor was it an altogether impossible
plan, seeing that at this moment (as will be presently shown) they
received powerful foreign aid. But unity was indispensably required,
and no unity was to be secured among a party composed of not only
different, but heterogeneous elements. Accordingly it was already easy
to foresee that, sooner or later, the fiercest discord must inevitably
break out in their midst.

Dino Compagni remarks in his Chronicle, that "the powerful citizens
were not all nobles by birth, but were sometimes styled _Grandi_ for
other reasons."[491] The _Grandi_, in fact, were composed of ancient
aristocratic families, despoiled of feudal privileges and titles; of
old-established burghers raised to a higher position on the score
of their wealth and of those proclaimed _Grandi_ by the people for
the sole purpose of subjecting them to the penalty of exclusion from
power. Naturally the old aristocracy were full of distrust and contempt
for new-comers, who often continued (if not personally, by means of
their kinsmen) to carry on trades and manufactures, and thus maintain
their relations with the rich burghers opposed to the lower classes,
whereas the latter were more in sympathy with the really influential
and aristocratic section of the _Grandi_. Nor was this all. The latter
party likewise comprised country nobles, such as the Ubertini, the
Pazzi of Valdarno, and more particularly the Ubaldini owning nearly the
whole of the Mugello and dominating it with their fortified castles.
The fortress of Montaccenico, one of their main strongholds, guarded
by a triple circuit of walls, had been founded by the Cardinal Ottavio
degli Ubaldini, who has a place in Dante's "Inferno," and who once
said, "If I ever had a soul, I have lost it, for the sake of the
Ghibelline cause." All these territorial lords clung to their feudal
traditions with far greater tenacity than the rest, and being very
hostile to the people, were equally opposed to the Republic, which
was always at strife with them. When residing in the city they were
undoubtedly compelled, like the others, to obey the common laws; but in
their own castles they and their kindred still asserted the rights of
feudal barons.

In order to sap the strength of the Pazzi and Ubertini, the
Florentines, in 1296, established the two colonies of San Giovanni and
Castelfranco between Figline and Montevarchi in the Upper Valdarno.
All adherents of the nobles willing to settle on these domains were
freed from vassalage and exempted from taxation for ten years.[492] But
measures of this kind would have been useless against the Ubaldini, and
prolonged and sanguinary hostilities had to be engaged with them. By
logical rule these territorial lords should have been Ghibellines and
imperialists; but the Empire was now distant and feeble, France and the
Pope were menacing close at hand. Accordingly they rather tended to
combine with the Guelph nobles of Florence, and more particularly with
those of ancient descent, thus forming a new element in that curious
agglomeration of diverse forces. Also, seeing that private jealousies
and hates are always readier to burst into flame when unrestrained by
the organic unity and common interest of a well-organised party, it
will be easy to understand what confusion and disorder prevailed.


III.

Notwithstanding the powerful support of one kind or another furnished
to the nobles from abroad, and in spite of their really menacing
attitude, there remained one inexorable truth that must be always
kept in view, since it affords the best explanation of the phase of
Florentine history. It consisted in the fact that the aristocratic
faction, doomed to decay and dissolution, was confronted by the young
and vigorous party united in the Greater Guilds, bound by common
interests, and constituting the real motive power and future of the
Commune. The history of those times is nothing more, in short, than
the history of the process by which the Greater Guilds succeeded in
becoming the very core of the Republic, in spite of the numerous
obstacles in their path, and likewise succeeded in eliminating all
hostile or alien elements. For some time past these guilds, and
especially the first five, on which all the others were more or less
dependent,[493] had been prospering to an extraordinary degree. And
when their position was farther strengthened by the Enactments of
Justice, their statutes, with the amendments then introduced, very
clearly showed that in augmenting their own wealth they purposed not
only to enrich the Republic, but also to heighten its power. Before
long the five leading guilds jointly constituted an _Universitas
Mercatorum_ that rose to the authority of a regular commercial tribunal
in 1308, and issued a definite set of statutes in 1312. Indeed all this
may be considered the main part of the reforms promoted by Giano della
Bella,[494] and the point on which, favoured by the conditions of the
period, he was most successful. We have the best proof of this in the
fact that incessant party strife notwithstanding, the prosperity of
Florence increased, at that time, to a positively prodigious extent.
Villani repeatedly alludes to this state of prosperity and general
well-being, adding that continual festivities were then held in
Florence, and that the Republic could call to arms as many as 30,000
men in the city, and 70,000 in the territory.[495] What was of still
greater moment, its bankers manipulated the chief trade of the world,
and flooded all markets with Florentine goods. They conducted the
affairs of the Roman Curia; they managed nearly the whole commerce of
France and Southern Italy; all the sovereigns of Europe came to these
bankers for aid, and frequently employed keen-witted, enterprising
Florentines in their mints, their treasuries, and their embassies. Thus
money flowed into the city from all sides; and it was at this moment,
so it is said, that Boniface VIII., giving audience to the ambassadors
of various powers, and finding to his surprise that all of them were
Florentines, cried out, "You Florentines must be the fifth element!" As
a natural result of this state of things the petty Republic became a
first-class power, wielding everywhere, and over Italy in particular,
a preponderating influence. All neighbouring cities, great and small,
tried to copy the laws and institutions they deemed the source of its
amazing prosperity. Even Rome herself seemed desirous to organise her
magistracies, councils, and Commune on the Florentine pattern.[496]

It was this that most irritated the Popes in their perpetual struggle
with the Roman municipality, and now specially irritated Boniface
VIII., who seemed determined to crush the Commune. But he was
strenuously opposed by the nobility and people, who gave him no truce,
and drove him to wander, almost a fugitive, from town to town. Of
haughty temper and boundless ambition, his conception of the papal
authority rose to the height of craving universal rule. Hence he could
not be resigned to the stubbornness of the Romans, and still less to
the example and encouragement afforded them by Florence. He therefore
conceived the plan of subduing the latter city and reducing it almost
to the condition of a fief of the Church, under a governor of his
own choice. Having once formed this scheme, he began to prosecute
it with his customary ardour. There was certainly a good chance of
success, save for one insurmountable obstacle that he omitted to take
into account. The chance in his favour was the fact that Florence,
being now a republic of traders, had small means of offering armed
resistance. The army of 100,000 men, so proudly enumerated by Villani,
consisted of a species of national guard of artisans and peasants
having the barest smattering of military training, with no officers
and no generals fitted to take command. It comprised no mounted
troops, since nobles alone could find time for the requisite cavalry
training. The Commune naturally feared to place any trust in the nobles
of the town, while those of the territory were avowedly hostile. The
Companies of Adventure, afterwards open to hire, had not yet begun to
be established. Nevertheless, an army was needed, and, moreover, one
commanded by competent leaders, if the Republic wished to preserve its
authority in Italy, and protect its trade from the growing jealousy
of its neighbours. This was the reason formerly inducing its rash
acceptance of Vicars nominated by the Popes, and that had also induced
it to confer supremacy for ten years on Charles of Anjou, who had
accordingly supplied the State with captains and soldiery. Why should
not Boniface be able to clench a similar bargain on even more effective
and permanent terms? The Republic's need of a military leader was as
urgent, nay, more urgent than before; while the consent and support
of the nobles might be considered assured. But the insurmountable
obstacle, unforeseen by the Pope, was that the Florentines had always
wanted and still wanted defenders, but refused to have rulers; nor
would it be easy to induce them to yield this point, either by craft or
persuasion. The subject on which they were most tenacious, and would
never give way, was the popular government of the guilds, and this
government would have to be destroyed or reduced to submission before
the Pope's scheme could be carried into effect.

The task certainly had its difficulties. In fact, the problem could
only be solved by force, and Boniface was not the man to shrink from
employing it; hence collision was unavoidable. As an additional
complication, the Republic, about to bear the brunt of the Pope's
fury, was thoroughly and determinately Guelph, not only Guelph from
sentiment or by force of old traditions, but even more from motives of
interest. In fact, it had risen to existence by centuries of struggle
with powerful Ghibellines and aristocrats, and had finally built up the
government of the guilds on the ruins of those adversaries' strength,
and greatly assisted therein by the success of the Angevins summoned
to Italy by the Popes. The chief trade of the Republic, and main
source of its vitality and power, was that carried on with France, with
Southern Italy--now held by the Angevins--and with Rome. Hence it could
not entertain the idea of rousing the enmity of the French king, Pope,
and Angevins, who were all allied at the time. Besides, the Ghibelline
party in Tuscany was then represented by all the cities hostile to
Florence. Sienna, Arezzo, and Pistoia inclined more or less openly
to the Ghibelline side. The Pisan Republic, which had so zealously
assisted Conradin's cause, still flaunted the Ghibelline flag. This
State was in perpetual rivalry with Florence, and sought to bar her
from access to the sea, the command of which was now more pressingly
needed than before. The strife between these republics could only end
in the annihilation of the one or the other. Therefore the Florentines
were compelled to keep on good terms with the Pope, yet at the same
time forced into opposition against him. In this condition of affairs
all will understand why Florentine history should be so complicated and
obscure.


IV.

After the expulsion of Giano della Bella, the nobles seemed again
masters of the city for a time; and their spirits were immoderately
raised by their success in procuring the election of a Signory (June
15, 1295) exclusively composed of their own friends. By the beginning
of July they had concerted their plans, and repaired to the Piazza
armed for the fray. But the people were already gathered there and
in superior force, so that civil war would have instantly broken
out had not certain friars and citizens intervened, and fortunately
contrived to pacify the public excitement. Nevertheless, the Signory
being favourable to the nobles, determined to turn the opportunity
to account, and on July 6, 1295, managed to get the Bill passed that,
as we have previously related, was incorporated in the enactments
for the purpose of modifying them and considerably attenuating their
severity.[497]

Some of these modifications were of a purely formal kind, but others
encroached on the substance of the law. As the enactments now stood,
accomplices in the offences decreed punishable were no longer classed
with the direct authors of crimes, a single _Capitanus homicidii_ now
being recognised. Nor was the testimony of two witnesses of good repute
any longer considered sufficient proof of the crime, the testimony
of three witnesses now being required. Finally it was no longer
indispensable that candidates to the Signory should be practically
engaged in some trade, _continue artem exercentes_; their enrolment
in the guild of the trade being decreed sufficient proof of their
eligibility, _qui scripti sint in libro seu matricola alicuius artis_.
This last concession was, in fact, slighter than it appeared, seeing
that even before then the _practical_ exercise of trade had been more
often apparent than real. But the principle for which men had fought
was now cast aside, and putting together the various concessions
granted in 1295, we plainly see that the amendment of the law was a
genuine victory for the nobles. In fact, the popular discontent ran
high at the passing of this Bill, and Villani tells us that the Signory
who had proposed and carried it were treated with much contumely and
scorn on leaving office, and even greeted with volleys of stones in the
public streets.[498] Accordingly a popular reaction ensued that proved
to be the germ of new and serious discord among the citizens. The first
step taken was to deprive the nobles of certain of their weapons; the
next to proclaim some of the less factious aristocrats members of the
popular class, in order to weaken their party.[499] Besides this, fresh
laws were soon decreed to restore the pristine force of the enactments,
followed by other measures of the same kind, culminating in the
creation of a new magistrate for the express purpose, as will be seen,
of ensuring the strict fulfilment of the law. But it was impossible for
these changes to be effected without fresh discord and bloodshed in the
city.

For there was not only fiercer strife just then between the nobles
and the people, but the former now split into two divisions, formed
respectively of those bent on doing away with the enactments, and those
who had renounced that idea. These new factions were designated by the
names of the two families acting as leaders, namely, the Donati and the
Cerchi. The latter were of humble origin, but had made their way up and
were now counted among the richest merchants in the world. They boasted
a wide-spreading kindred, numerous friends, owned vast estates both in
town and country, and lived in grand style. They had recently purchased
many palaces of the Counts Guidi, members of the oldest Florentine
nobility; and by lending their houses at St. Procolo to the Signory, to
whom no palace had yet been assigned, were more easily enabled to keep
in favour with the heads of the State. Villani, being of the opposite
party, says that the Cerchi were "easy-going, innocent, and savage."
They were, in fact, business folk, unpractised in warfare, and with
small aptitude for political intrigue. The term "savage" was applied
to them on account of their humble descent, and Dante himself, though
an adherent of their party, speaks of it as "savage" (_selvaggia_).
In virtue of their origin and continued practice of trade, they were
liked and esteemed by the people, and their avowed opposition to the
Donati[500] won them still higher favour. Besides the advantages of
wealth and of wide-spreading family ties, their courtesy of manner
helped to advance their popularity.

On the contrary, the "gentle-born and warlike" Donati, as Villani
calls them, were of old feudal descent. Messer Corso, the head of the
family, was a daring, shrewd, hard-hitting man, of moderate means, but
so immoderately haughty and ambitious as to tolerate no equals, and
least of all among the enriched merchants. He was known as the baron,
and Compagni, who was on the Cerchi side, says that whenever Corso rode
through the streets, "he seemed the lord of the earth" ("_che la terra
fosse sua_"). Many magnates of the city, many nobles of the territory,
and particularly the Pazzi of the Upper Valdarno, considered him their
leader. Some of the merchants also adhered to him, and among others the
Spini, who owned a bank in Rome, and as business agents for the Pope
and the Curia, drove a very profitable trade. This Donati faction was
detested by the burghers, but in favour with the populace, who greeted
the baron with shouts of applause as he passed through the streets. But
although Corso's courage and subtlety stood him in good stead during
the struggle now impending, his arrogance alienated many followers
and disposed them to join the Cerchi. The Cavalcanti were among his
opponents, and that graceful poet and valorous knight, young Guido
Cavalcanti, had conceived so special and deadly a hatred for him that
the two never met in the streets without drawing their swords. The
Donati's influence in the city was chiefly owed to the favour of the
captains of the party, while that of the Cerchi was maintained by the
support of the Signory. Thus the palace of the Guelph Society and of
the Priors became the headquarters, as it were, of the two opposing
camps. The two families likewise owned neighbouring estates in the
country and dwelt near each other in town. Their respective houses were
situated in the St. Piero quarter or _sesto_ of the city, which, on
account of the continual disturbances occurring there at the time, was
known by the name of "The Scandalous Sesto" (_Sesto dello Scandalo_).
Everything served as fuel to the flame. Words uttered by either party
were reported and exaggerated to the other. How Corso Donati always
spoke of Guido Cavalcanti as Guido Cavicchia; how, when alluding to the
head of the family and party chief, Vieri de' Cerchi, he would ask,
"Has the ass of Porta brayed to-day?" On the other hand, the Donati
were styled by their adversaries "The Ill-famed," as being men of bad
repute and doers of evil.

It is not easy to exactly ascertain how and when these parties first
became known as _Bianchi_ and _Neri_, for the chroniclers are rather
vague and not altogether agreed upon the point. Both names were of
old usage in Florence as distinctive family appellations; in fact,
there had already been White Cerchi and Black Cerchi, but the latter
afterwards became the chiefs of the White party.[501] The same names
had then been employed to designate two opposite factions of the
Cancellieri house waging fierce strife in Pistoia. The Florentines,
who exercised great authority in that town, mediated between the two
sides to bring them to make peace; and to achieve this intent sent some
members of the Pistoian, Bianchi, and Neri to Florence. The Whites
were quartered in the Frescobaldi palace, the Blacks in the house of
certain Cerchi, to whom they were related. But this measure had a very
unexpected result, for, as Villani[502] remarks, even as one sick sheep
infects another with disease, so the Pistoians communicated their party
hatred to the Florentines, who thus became increasingly divided. At all
events, from that time the Donati were Blacks, the Cerchi Whites.

Hence it may be clearly seen that this division of parties no longer
corresponds with that of the Guelphs and Ghibellines. Principles are
set aside and personal passions and hatreds more and more dominant.
But, in the nature of things, no Florentine family at the time could
have a better claim to be entitled Ghibellines than the Donati, a
line boasting feudal descent, and connected with the oldest nobility
of the city and its territory. The head of the house was Messer
Corso, who, after the death of his first wife, contracted a second
marriage with one of the Ubertini, an old Ghibelline family that had
been always opposed to the popular government, and seemed to have
the very blood of the tyrants of Romagna and Lombardy in its veins.
Yet it was principally through Corso Donati that events again took
another unexpected turn. Spurred by his devouring ambition, he started
a secret intrigue with Boniface VIII. through his Roman agents, the
Spini, and the Pope believed that at last he had found a man after his
own heart.[503] And before very long these secret practices produced
visible results.


V.

The Pope's purpose of exercising undue interference in Florentine
affairs was plainly seen when the question was discussed as to revoking
the banishment of Giano della Bella. Though without any lawful voice
in the matter, he not only made violent opposition to the proposal,
but also, on January 23, 1296, addressed a letter to the Florentines,
threatening them with interdict, unless they abandoned the idea.[504]
No one, however, was yet aware that he had already formed a scheme, and
was secretly plotting to carry it into effect; nor did any one imagine
that _Papa Bonifacius volebat sibi dari totam Tusciam_,[505] although
this was afterwards ascertained to be the case, and written proof
of it is extant in an old document that serves to explain his real
aims.[506] These were also formulated clearly enough by the chronicler
Ferreto, when he wrote that Boniface meditated "faesulanum popolum iugo
supprimere, et sic Thusciam ipsam, servire desuetam, tyrannico more
comprehendere."[507] In fact, in May, 1300, the Pope had already sent
word to the Duke of Saxony that the Tuscan factions having infected his
own States, it was impossible for him to achieve any result without
first reducing Tuscany to subjection. And he continued that although
able to do this on his own authority, he nevertheless preferred to gain
the consent of the electoral princes, and likewise that of Albert of
Austria, king of the Romans, to whom he forwarded a minute of the act
of renunciation.[508] Donati, being privy to the scheme, had hastened
to assume the attitude of the most Guelph of all Guelphs, and denounce
the Cerchi as Ghibellines. Consequently all who distrusted the Pope
were increasingly willing to join the Cerchi side.

Suddenly Florence was startled by receiving well certified news of the
clandestine intrigues Donati was carrying on in Rome through the agency
of the Spini. Messer Lapo Salterelli, an advocate of much skill but
doubtful integrity, and always ready to go with the tide, came before
the magistrates accompanied by two personal friends,[509] and publicly
accused of treasonable attempts against the State three Florentines
domiciled in Rome at Spini's bank, three "mercatores Romanam Curiam
sequentes."[510] Corso Donati was not in Florence at the time, but at
Massa Trabaria, a city in the States of the Church and close to the
Tuscan frontier, where he had just been appointed rector by the Pope, a
circumstance that heightened suspicion, and made the danger appear all
the more serious and imminent. Determined to be on the alert, without
giving undue provocation to the Pope, the magistrates immediately
sentenced the three citizens in question to pay heavy fines, but
awaited fresh intelligence before proceeding against all the other
persons undoubtedly concerned in the plot. To allay the suspicions
roused against him, the Pope should have now maintained a prudent
silence, but his impetuous nature brooked no restraint. Therefore,
giving vent to his fury, he wrote on April 24, 1300, threatening
excommunication on the city for daring to sentence _his own familiars_,
and summoned the three accusers to come to Rome without delay.[511]
He gained nothing by this move--on the contrary, Lapo Salterelli,
having just been elected a prior, raised the question of jurisdiction
by denying his right of interference with the internal affairs of the
Republic. Meanwhile Boniface had called Vieri de' Cerchi to Rome, for
the purpose of inducing him to make peace with Donati, who had already
arrived there. But Cerchi, without betraying any knowledge of the
trial, merely declared that he bore no hatred to any man, and alleging
other vague excuses, declined the proposed reconciliation, thus
stirring the Pope's wrath to the highest degree.[512] It was naturally
very important for him to pacify the nobles, since this was the only
means of compassing the subjection of the people. But precisely on
that account the people preferred to keep them divided, and therefore
throwing its weight on the side of the Cerchi, vehemently urged the
latter to oppose the Donati.


VI.

Such was the state of public feeling on the day known to some as the
fatal May Kalend. According to an old custom, the maidens of Florence
greeted the coming of spring in the year 1300 by performing a dance
in the S^{ta} Trinita Square. Crowds flocked to the spot, struggling
for a better sight of the festivity. Certain youths on horseback, both
of the Bianchi and Neri factions, came into collision while pressing
to the front. Hot words were exchanged followed by blows, swords
flashed out, and many wounds were inflicted. Ricoverino de' Cerchi had
his nose slashed off, an injury naturally demanding mortal revenge.
So, in the same way that the Buondelmonti tragedy was declared by the
chroniclers to have given birth to the Guelph and Ghibelline factions,
this May-day festival was now considered by others to be the origin
of the White and Black factions.[513] Yet this, too, was only the
sudden outburst of long repressed passions, now raised to boiling point
by the plots of the Pope. In consequence of these disturbances, the
councils immediately passed a decree (4th of May), granting the Signory
full powers to reduce the city to order; to enforce the Enactments of
Justice; to guard "the ancient, customary, and continued independence
of the Florentine Commune and people, in present danger of being
changed to servitude by many perilous innovations _tam introrsum, quam
etiam de foris venientes_."[514] The concluding words clearly referred
to Boniface, and accordingly on the 15th of May the Pope despatched
from Anagni a most violent letter to the bishop and the inquisitor of
Florence. He made complaint against those "children of iniquity who,
in order to turn the people from their submission to the Keys of St.
Peter, were spreading the rumour that he sought to deprive the city of
its power of jurisdiction, and diminish its independence, whereas, on
the contrary, he wished to enlarge its freedom." But he then proceeded
to cry: "Is not the Pontiff supreme lord over all, and particularly
over Florence, which for special reasons is bound to be subject to
him? Do not emperors and kings of the Romans yield submission to
us, yet are they not superior to Florence? During the vacancy of
the Imperial throne, did not the Holy See appoint King Charles of
Anjou Vicar-general of Tuscany? Was he not recognised as such by
themselves? The Empire is now vacant, inasmuch as the Holy See has not
yet confirmed the election of the noble Albert of Austria." And thus,
in a rising _crescendo_, he threatened the Florentines that, failing
obedience, "he would not only launch his interdict and excommunication
against them, but inflict the utmost injury on their citizens and
merchants, cause their property to be pillaged and confiscated in all
parts of the world and release all their debtors from the duty of
payment." He again inveighed against the three audacious informers,
vowing to have them treated and punished as heretics, and wrote with
special acrimony of Lapo Salterelli for having dared to declare that
the Pope had no right to meddle with the tribunals of the Commune.
And he wound up by insisting that the sentence on his three familiars
should be annulled.[515]

The Florentines refused to heed his words, and the Neri then began to
feel anxious, dreading lest the White, or, as they already called it,
the Ghibelline party, "should be exalted in Florence, which, under
pretence of good government, already wore a Ghibelline aspect."[516]
They accordingly induced the Pope to send the Cardinal of Acquasparta
to arrange the pacification of the nobles. The Cardinal arrived at
the beginning of June, at once requested full powers to conclude the
agreement, and likewise proposed that the Signory should be chosen
by lot, in order to avert the disturbances always accompanying their
election.[517] The Florentines lavished verbal promises on him, but
refused to invest him with the desired Balia. Previous experience
had warned them that peace between the nobles meant "ruin to the
people," and a fresh proof to this effect was afforded at the moment.
In fact, the Cardinal had barely begun to dispose the nobles towards
reconciliation, than they rose to arms, and on St. John's Eve (23rd
of June), almost under the Cardinal's eyes, made a violent assault on
the Consuls of the Guilds, who were bearing offerings to the shrine of
the saint, and shouted while raining blows on them: "We are the men
that routed the foe at Campaldino, yet you have driven us from office
and power in our own city."[518] So enormous an outrage demanded heavy
punishment, and as the Signory was then composed of burghers of the
White party, including Dante Alighieri, it exiled several nobles of
either side within twenty-four hours.[519]

The Bianchi promptly obeyed the decree and withdrew to Sarzana; but
the Neri rebelled against it, and only when threatened with worse
chastisement, removed to Castel della Pieve in the Perugian territory.
It was said that they had ventured to resist because they had the
Cardinal's permission to await help from Lucca, which after all was
never sent. And it was added that this succour was withheld because
the Florentines, gaining some inkling of the scheme, had prepared
for defence, and advised Lucca to that effect. Whether this were
true or false, it is an ascertained fact that the public wrath was
so hot against the Cardinal, that the people aimed their crossbows
at the windows of the bishop's palace where he was lodged. One of
the bolts actually struck the beam of his ceiling, and so greatly
alarmed him, that after first removing to another house he took his
departure, leaving the city under interdict and excommunication.[520]
Nevertheless, animosity and riot continued to prevail; and before
long the exiled Bianchi were permitted to return. This indulgence was
accorded them, partly because the climate of Sarzana was so unhealthy
that Guido Cavalcanti contracted an illness there, of which he
subsequently died, but partly too because the Bianchi nobles were on
far better terms with the people. The Neri, on the contrary, joined
more actively than before in the Pope's plots, and seconded by the
Captains of the Party, conspired for the purpose of trying conclusions
by force.

Meanwhile Boniface was pressingly urging Charles of Valois, the king's
brother, to march into Tuscany from France, and Charles II. of Anjou
had already implored that prince to come to aid him in his struggle
with the Sicilians. The Valois was an enterprising and cruel leader.
During the Gascon campaign of 1294 he had hung sixty citizens, and
slaughtered the inhabitants of Reole after they had laid down their
arms. He had fought in Flanders at the beginning of the year 1300, and
after capturing various cities, had compelled the reigning Court to
open to him the gates of Ghent. Then, after swearing in the name of the
king to restore his States, he nevertheless sent him to Paris, and in
violation of the oath he had taken, annexed the county to France.[521]
This was the man now summoned to Florence by the Pope. To induce him
to come promptly and with good will, the Pope even dazzled him with
hopes of the imperial crown. In any case, by right of the authority he
asserted during the interregnum, he would appoint him vicar-general
and peacemaker in Tuscany, "to enforce the execution of his purpose
there."[522] In what that purpose consisted, even Villani, who was on
his side, admits that Boniface intended "to crush the people and the
Whites."[523] Accordingly the Blacks own displayed great activity,
with the aid of their adherents in town and country. They held various
meetings, of which the most notorious and turbulent was that assembled
in June at Santa Trinita, for the purpose of urging the Pope to send
Charles of Valois to straighten their affairs, and declaring that, for
their own part, they were ready to join him at any cost.[524] Naturally
all this could not be kept secret, and in fact the Signory immediately
sentenced the conspirators to various penalties. Messer Corso, being
absent, was condemned in contumacy to confiscation as well as personal
punishment; some of the Blacks were relegated to a fixed domicile;
others mulcted in 2,000 lire each, and even their friends at Pistoia
expelled from that city, for the greater enfeeblement of the party.

Meanwhile Charles of Valois marched across the Alps, and the same
summer was already in occupation of Parma, "cum magno arnese equorum
et somariorum."[525] Reaching Bologna on the 1st of August he found
convoys from the Bianchi and the Neri awaiting him there. The latter
party had already handed over to the "curia domini Papae" the large sum
of 70,000 florins to assist the expedition which was now absolutely
decided.[526] As a preliminary step, Valois went to Anagni with 500
knights, saw King Charles of Naples, and made arrangements with him
concerning the Sicilian campaign. The Pope hastened to create Valois
Count of Romagna, and afterwards, in the name of the vacant Empire,
Mediator (_Paciaro_) in Tuscany.[527] So, without farther delay, the
Court started for Florence, joined on the road by the exiles who
flocked to his ranks. His mission was to crush the Bianchi and the
people and to uplift the Neri. He had deliberately undertaken the
task, but rather for the purpose of satisfying the Pope, of whose
support in Sicily the Angevins had now pressing need, than from any
personal motive. In fact, knowing that he could never hope to be lord
of Florence, he felt very little interest in the matter. Nevertheless
he counted on being able to extort a considerable sum of money from
the city, and to this end brought Messer Musciatto Franzesi with
him to serve, Villani tells us, as his _pedotto_, _i.e._, as guide
and factotum. This man was a well-known merchant of the Florentine
territory, who had made his fortune in France by illegal as well
as lawful means and had been knighted by the French king in reward
for many services, among others for having suggested a device for
replenishing the treasury during the war in Flanders by debasing the
coinage.[528] Charles of Valois hoped to gain much by this man's
assistance; whereas the Florentines regarded the said _pedotto_ with
great distrust.

On the 13th of September all the councils assembled in the palace of
the Podesta--Dante Alighieri sitting among them that day--to decide
"quid sit providendum et faciendum super conservatione Ordinamentorum
Iustitiae et Statutorum Populi."[529] This, and not the struggle between
the Bianchi and Neri, was always the main point with the Florentines.
Hence it was resolved that, for the present, everything should remain
in the hands of the magistrates of the Republic, and that it would be
advisable to dispatch an embassy to the Pope. Whether Dante Alighieri
was one of the ambassadors sent, as asserted by the historians, has
been no less disputed than all other incidents of the poet's life. At
that time he was ardently devoted to politics, and although belonging
to the old nobility, was not only enrolled in the guilds and a partisan
of the Bianchi, but thoroughly at one with the people, a supporter of
the Enactments of Justice, and opposed to the Pope's designs. From
the 15th of June to the 15th of August, 1300, he had been one of the
Priors who had exiled the leaders of the Bianchi and the Neri. In the
"Consulte" of 1296 we find him combating the proposal of furnishing a
subsidy to Charles of Anjou, to assist his Sicilian campaign. In 1301
he took an even more prominent share in the debates of the councils,
and always manifested unchanged opinions. In fact, during the debates
of the 14th of April, when it was proposed to supply a hundred soldiers
at the expense of the Commune, for the Pope's service, Dante twice,
at least, made reply, "Quod de servitio faciendo domino Papae nihil
fiat."[530] He had been also frequently employed in other public posts:
accordingly it is quite possible that he may have been sent to Rome
at this time, as many of his biographers have stated. What could be
said to the Pope? It was now hopeless to expect him to refrain from
sending Charles of Valois; but in addition to soothing him with fair
words, it might be neither inopportune nor useless to endeavour to
make him understand that it could not serve his purpose to expel the
Bianchi and aggrandise the Neri, seeing that the government of the city
would still remain in the hands of the guilds. It would, therefore, be
wiser for him to come to terms with the people, which was steadfastly
Guelph, and, once pacified, might consent, as in past times, to accept
from him, in the future, a provisional Vicar, always provided that
the freedom of its popular government, its statutes and enactments,
were left intact. But this popular government was precisely what the
Pope was determined not to tolerate any longer. Therefore, without
many words, and almost without giving any heed to the ambassadors,
he only replied to their arguments by saying, so Compagni relates:
"Make humiliation to us." According to the same chronicler, two of the
ambassadors returned to Florence without delay, but Dante, who was the
third, lingered in Rome for a while.[531]


VIII.

Meanwhile Valois, with his usual deceit, and to hoodwink every one
more completely, wrote to the Commune of San Gimignano on the 20th
of September in the following terms: "Be assured that neither the
Pope nor I have the slightest intention 'de juribus iurisdictionibus
seu libertatibus, quae per comunitatis Tusciae tenentur et possidentur,
in aliquo nos intromictere, sed potius ... favorare.'"[532] The
Florentines, however, were not to be tricked by these false promises,
and on the 7th of October elected a new Signory, in advance of the
usual time, trying to assign either faction an equal share in it, in
the hope of effecting some mitigation of party rancour. But, as justly
observed by Compagni, this was rather the time "for the sharpening of
swords." Valois, being at Sienna on the 14th, dispatched ambassadors
thence to announce his arrival, and these envoys were received by
the councils in full assembly, including that of the Guelph Society.
Accordingly many Neri and Grandi being present, and joining with those
who at every time and everywhere invariably go with the winning side,
they all vied warmly with one another in proposing to welcome the
stranger with open arms.[533] In point of fact, no one was inclined to
oppose what had now become an unavoidable necessity, particularly as
Charles had again given the Florentine envoys at Sienna written as well
as verbal assurances of his intention to respect the city's laws and
rights of jurisdiction.[534] So, on All Souls' Day, 1st of November,
welcomed with great pomp and display of force, Valois entered Florence
as "Peacemaker," and, as Villani says, "with his men disarmed." But in
the "Divina Commedia" Dante describes his entry thus:--

      "Per far conoscere meglio se e i suoi,
       Senz 'armi n'esce solo con la lancia
       Con la qual giostro Giuda, e quella ponta
       Si che a Fiorenza fa scoppiar la pancia."[535]

His troops had gained so many recruits by the way as to now amount to
about 800 foreign and 1,400 Italian horse. They were certainly too
few to besiege or enslave Florence; but Valois had the influence of
Rome and France at his back, and the Neri were ready to fly to arms.
Hence, assured of safety, he established his quarters across the river
(Oltrarno) in the house of the Frescobaldi, once friends, but now foes
of the Cerchi. After resting there quietly for a few days, in order to
mature his plans, he demanded the lordship and custody of the city,
with a view to its pacification. Accordingly a solemn meeting was
held in Santa Maria Novella on the 5th of November, attended by all
the leading citizens and magistrates of Florence. Valois's request
was granted when he pledged his princely word to preserve the city in
good order, peace, and independence. Villani, who was present at the
ceremony, and favourable to Charles, relates, nevertheless, that "he"
(Valois) "and his troops immediately began to do the contrary." In
fact, by the advice of Musciatto Franzesi, who had connived with the
Neri to that effect, violence was resorted to without delay, and all
Florence rose in a tumult, perceiving that the moment for assault and
treachery had now arrived.

The Signory being attacked by the Neri, betrayed by Charles and
forsaken by the Bianchi on the charge of having allowed itself to
be surprised unprepared for defence, was utterly powerless, and the
Republic was left without a government. The new Podesta, Messer Cante
dei Gabrielli of Gubbio, had entered the city with Charles de Valois,
and for what purpose may be easily divined. At this juncture Corso
Donati appeared, sword in hand, with his followers at the Pinti gate.
Finding it closed, he managed to break through the postern door, with
the help of friends within, and, entering the city, was hailed by
the mob with the usual cries of "Viva Messer Corso, viva il Barone!"
Hastening first to throw open the prisons, he then went to the Public
Palace, and driving out the Signory, compelled them to return to their
homes. Villani relates that "during all this laceration of the city,
Charles, violating the terms he had just sworn to observe, never
attempted to check the fray, but only looked on."[536] The Bianchi
were speedily overpowered, many wounded and killed, and their houses
sacked. This "pestilence lasted for five days in Florence, and for
eight in the territory, armed bands scouring the country, maltreating
the inhabitants, and plundering and burning their dwellings. Some of
the worst and most ferocious excesses were committed by the Medici
family.[537] By the 7th of November the Signory were so overwhelmed
with terror as to suggest a decree authorising them to withdraw before
the legal expiration of their term. Therefore on the following day a
new Signory was appointed to hold office until the 14th of December,
when, according to the law, another one would have to be elected in
regular course. The existing Signory hastened to announce to all the
fortunate triumph of the Church party under the auspices of the Pope
and Valois, by whose means "Populus roboratus, Status et Ordinamenta
Iustitiae, iurisdictiones, honores et possessiones Populi et Comunis
Florentiae suorumque civium observata."[538] In spite of these very
hypocritical words, we know that even then no one dared attempt to
annul the enactments, or to remove the government from the grasp of
the people; while it was equally true that with a Signory composed of
Neri, a Podesta such as Cante dei Gabrielli and Valois, with Musciatto
Franzesi and Corso Donati at his elbow, the Bianchi were doomed to
destruction. In fact, the work of pillage never ceased; exiled friends
were recalled, the banishment of adversaries was rigidly maintained,
and Charles began to extort money from the citizens by threat.[539] His
first victims were the members of the late Signory, who were given the
choice of opening their purses or being sent as prisoners to Puglia, an
alternative of which the meaning was clear.[540]

Meanwhile, the Pope having little confidence in Valois, or in the
latter's scanty knowledge of Florence, and still adhering to his plan
of reconciling the magnates in order to crush the people, again sent
the Cardinal of Acquasparta, for the purpose--as stated in his letter
dated 2nd of December, 1301--"of seconding Charles's efforts, by
checking dissension among the citizens and converting them to peace
and charity."[541] These were vain hopes, however. The Cardinal did
his utmost, and arranged a few reconciliations and even some marriages
between Bianchi and Neri; but when he proposed that either party should
have an equal share in the government, the Neri, backed by Charles,
made the most vehement opposition. And as the Cardinal persisted in his
fruitless endeavours, Messer Niccolo de' Cerchi, when riding out to the
country for a day's pleasuring with his friends, was attacked in Piazza
Santa Croce, pursued by Corso Donati's son Simone, and murdered by him
on the Africo bridge. But in the course of the struggle the victim
dealt his assailant a mortal wound that soon brought him also to the
grave.

As Simone was Corso's favourite son, it may be imagined how this
effected the peace that the Pope had hoped to establish through the
Cardinal's mediation. Messer Cante dei Gabrielli had already begun to
pronounce sentences on the Bianchi, which were subsequently transcribed
on the first pages of the still extant "Libro del Chiodo." Four of the
Bianchi faction were exiled on the 18th of January, 1302; five more,
including Dante Alighieri, on the 27th. In February four other verdicts
were issued for the banishment of over one hundred nobles and burghers
of the city and territory.[542] Enraged by these proceedings, the
Cardinal hurried off, again leaving Florence under interdict, but not
before he had received the 1,100 florins assigned to him on the 27th of
February, 1302, in remuneration of his abortive efforts.

In the meantime Charles of Valois had gone to Rome, though for what
purpose is scarcely ascertained. Compagni says that he went to seek
money from the Pope, who replied to him: "I have sent thee to the
source of gold; now profit by it as best thou canst." It is, therefore,
highly probable that he went to convince the Pope of the impossibility
of the pacification His Holiness had dreamt of arranging, and that the
only thing to be done was to exalt the Neri and crush the Bianchi,
together with the people abetting them. Knowing little of the Italian
communes in general or of Florence in particular, he failed to discern,
that though the Bianchi might be crushed, not so the people. To quell
the latter, nothing short of wholesale slaughter could suffice, and
even this would have failed in the long run.

At any rate, on returning to Florence on the 19th of March, Valois
feigned to have discovered that the Bianchi had formed a plot against
him with the connivance of one of his barons, Pietro Ferrando of
Provence; and an agreement signed and sealed by the conspirators was
actually produced.[543] The chroniclers, Villani included, declare
that the plot was entirely fictitious; nevertheless, the agreement
in question, dated 26th of March, is still extant in the Florentine
Archives.[544] Either it was forged at the time to furnish an excuse
for fresh arrangements, or was drafted by Pietro Ferrando for the
purpose of entrapping the Bianchi and giving Charles another weapon
against them. In fact, he immediately subjected them to fresh
persecutions. The heads of the party were cited to appear; but
disregarding the summons, they hastily fled to Pistoia, Arezzo, and
Pisa, there reinforcing, the Ghibellines and all other enemies of
Florence. Eleven of their number were outlawed as rebels; their houses
and property confiscated or destroyed.

Having dealt the Bianchi this fresh blow, and secured the triumph
of the Neri, Valois took his departure, but not without obtaining
a promise of further subsidies from his friends. In fact 20,000
florins were awarded him in December, and 5,000 more sent in October,
1303.[545] Meanwhile the Podesta, Messer Cante, continued to rain
penalties on the town. By May no fewer than 250 condemnations had been
pronounced, and as his successor pursued the same course, more than
600 sentences of confiscation, exile, and death were issued during the
year 1302.[546] Villani says in conclusion: "Thus by the agency of
Charles and the orders of Boniface VIII., the hated Bianchi faction
was defeated and expelled, wherefrom great trouble ensued later
on."[547] Up to this point the succession of events may be traced with
sufficient ease. But from the moment the exiles sought friends abroad,
and waged war on their native city, it became increasingly difficult
to disentangle the chaos of parties, and comprehend the real meaning
of all that took place. Therefore this is the moment to test whether
our previous remarks have served to cast any new light upon a period of
history that is still somewhat obscure, in spite of the close study and
deep learning devoted by so many writers to its investigation.




CHAPTER X.[548]

_DANTE, FLORENTINE EXILES AND HENRY VII._


I.

After Valois's departure and the events by which it was followed, the
history of Florence enters on a new phase. The exiles united with
the nobles of the territory and the Ghibelline cities in raising a
rebellion against the Republic, in order to pave the way for their own
recall. This naturally brought about a temporary reconciliation and
agreement between the magnates of the Black party, who made greater
boast than ever of being the only genuine Guelphs, and stigmatised all
the exiles as Ghibellines. Pistoia and the fortress of Piantravigne
were the first to revolt, but were speedily reduced to submission.
Then, on the 8th of June, 1302, the leading exiles, of whom Dante
Alighieri was one, assembled in the church of St. Godenzio among the
Apennines, and arranged explicit terms of alliance with the Ubaldini,
undertaking to compensate them at their own expense for the injuries
caused by the war to that family's possessions in the Mugello,
where the stronghold of Montaccenico was to serve as headquarters
for the adversaries of Florence. Thereupon the Florentines at once
proceeded to ravage all the lands of the Ubaldini on either side of
the Apennines.[549] By tremendous exertions, and with the support of
Pisa and Bologna, the exiles managed to collect an army of 800 horse
and 6,000 foot, and in the spring of 1303 beleaguered the Castle of
Pulicciano, appertaining to the Florentines. But even there they had
little success. The "people and knights" of Florence took arms and
hastily marched against them. The Pisans failed to send the promised
succour, the Ubaldini remained inert, and as the Bolognese withdrew
declaring themselves betrayed, the Bianchi, being left unassisted,
ignominiously dispersed. So the Neri returned to the city in triumph,
after taking many prisoners, some of whom were killed on the way and
others beheaded by the Podesta. They afterwards surprised the Castle of
Montale near Pistoia, and ravaged the surrounding territory. Thus the
war seemed at an end, and the hopes of the exiles fallen.

But at this juncture discord again broke out in Florence. Preliminary
manifestations of turbulence and rebellion had already led to some
fresh sentences of exile and a few executions. But matters now grew
more serious. Corso Donati's arrogance once more produced its usual
results. By disgusting his friends he drove them to side with the
rich burghers they despised. Being alienated from the nobles of the
territory who had made common cause with the exiles, he tried again
to become the leader of the more intolerant section of the magnates,
and curried favour with the populace, declaring it to be unjustly
overtaxed, merely to fill the pockets of certain fat burghers. "Let the
people see where that great sum has gone, for no such amount can have
been expended on the war." And he demanded an inquiry, thus beginning,
as Villani remarks, "to sow discord by a feint of justice and
compassion."[550] Much discussion, great turmoil ensued, but nothing
was done, although a law was actually passed (24th of July, 1303)
granting the Podesta and captain full powers of inquiry and decision.
Meanwhile much irritation was felt by the "fat burghers" against whom
the accusation had been launched, and in order to strike a fresh blow
at the magnates, they obtained the recall of certain exiles belonging
to the popular party, who had not broken bounds. They likewise recalled
a few of the Cerchi family, thereby gaining the approbation of the
Pope, who was much troubled by the disturbances the Bianchi were
exciting on all sides and even in cities belonging to the Church.[551]
Thus, as Del Lungo happily expresses it, "by dint of fishing magnates
out of the crucible,"[552] Corso Donati was enabled to gather about
him more than thirty families, including some of the burgher class
and a few returned exiles. Several members of the Tosinghi house were
adherents of the Bianchi, and amongst them the valiant Baschiera della
Tosa was one of the exiles. There were also Donati's former foes, the
Cavalcanti, a very wealthy and numerous clan, comprising members of all
parties, although more Bianchi than Neri, and who, as the owners of
a mass of houses, shops, and magazines in the centre of the city and
tenanted by merchants, were naturally on good terms with the trading
class. Accordingly the Donati no longer commanded a party, but rather
an ill-assorted crowd, only united by the common bond of hatred against
the people. In fact, Messer Corso was wont to say that they were all
"captive and enslaved to a herd of fat burghers, or rather dogs, who
tyrannised over them and robbed them of power."[553] Nevertheless, the
real magnates, namely, noblemen by birth and temper, mostly leaned
to his side, while those unable to tolerate his insolence preferred
to play the part of spectators. Another of Corso's allies was Messer
Lottieri della Tosa, Archbishop of Florence, who was making warlike
preparations within the walls of his palace. In opposition to these
confederates, several families, such as the Spini, Pazzi, Gherardini,
and certain of the Frescobaldi had banded together under the lead of
Messer Rosso della Tosa, another man of soaring ambition, who, in
pursuance of the policy formerly employed by Vieri dei Cerchi, inclined
to the burghers' side. And by means of some of his bravest followers,
more particularly certain democrats of the Neri party, named Bordoni,
"serving him," Compagni says, "as pincers to seize hot iron,"[554] he
daily harassed the Donati in the councils of the State.


II.

Thus matters seemed again at the same point as before the arrival of
Valois. In fact, we see Rosso della Tosa and his following combining
with the people in defence of the Signory; while, on the other
hand, Donati, backed by the captains of the party, was continually
threatening and attacking it. Again, the citizens daily drew swords and
came to blows; again, robbery, bloodshed, murder, and arson were rife
in the town and throughout the territory. Even from the tower of the
bishop's palace a mangonel hurled stones on Corso Donati's foes. Both
the Signory and Podesta were reduced to impotence. Things reached at
last such a pitch that recourse was had to the very strange plan of
transferring the government to the Lucchese for sixteen days to see
whether they could succeed in quieting the city. They re-established
order, but without punishing the guilty; consequently, as soon as
they were gone everything went on as before. It was even endeavoured
to choose a Signory (solely of the people, however) approved by both
parties, but the attempt came to nothing.[555] What brought the
confusion to a climax, and rendered it permanent, was the fact that
whereas the split between the magnates and the people had caused two
genuine parties to be formed, the division among the magnates now
convulsing the city, solely proceeded from the ambition of Corso Donati
and a few others, had no political motive, and no basis of general
principle or general interest. As we have seen, in fact, Donati's
following comprised magnates of every shade, returned exiles owning
friends and relations still in banishment, together with a sprinkling
of the lower class. Nor could there be much cohesion in the ranks of
the adverse party supporting the Signory, since this was also made
up of aristocrats and men of the people, conflicting elements whose
union could never be permanently assured. If the foes of the Signory
were held together by Corso's energy and ambition, its supporters were
chiefly united by their common hatred for him. Therefore, owing to this
predominance of the personal element, both the parties were exposed to
perpetual division, subdivision, and change, to a perpetual shifting
of the pieces, and restless passing and repassing from one group to
another.

Confusion was now to be heightened by the death of Boniface VIII.
(October 11, 1303) and the election of Pope Benedict XI., a man
of gentler fibre and uncertain will. The new pontiff yearned to
re-establish peace in Florence at all costs, and procure the recall of
its exiles; for the latter were keeping his own states in a turmoil,
and even in Rome itself he had already encountered so much opposition
from the nobles and people, that shortly after his election he had
been compelled to seek refuge at Perugia, namely, on the borders of
disturbed, restless Tuscany. Nor was it now possible, amid all these
calamities, to count on any help from France, inasmuch as he had
brought a suit against the authors of the criminal attempt at Anagni
causing the death of Pope Boniface, that had been actually devised
by the king of the French. For these reasons, and at the earnest
solicitation of the Bianchi in Florence and elsewhere, Pope Benedict
dispatched a peacemaker to the city on the 31st of January, 1304, in
the person of Cardinal da Prato, a supposed Ghibelline. The Cardinal
arrived on the 10th of March, and tried to conciliate all alike;
magnates, people, exiles, Bianchi, the Neri led by Corso Donati and the
Neri under Rosso della Tosa. But what chiefly disturbed public feeling
and brought confusion to a climax was his scheme of recalling banished
men and reconciling them with the city. Nevertheless the popular class
was less opposed than others to the plan, discerning in it a possible
means of enfeebling the magnates by promoting fresh discord in their
ranks. Rosso della Tosa, on the contrary, was decidedly hostile to the
exiles' return, considering that this would strengthen the opposite
party, which was already favourable to many of the banished men. These
views were shared by some of his faction. On the excuse of suffering
from an attack of gout, Corso Donati remained a passive spectator for
the nonce. But the Cavalcanti warmly approved of the suggested treaty,
and were seemingly the first to promote it.

Having received full powers from the people, the Cardinal at once
began to arrange reconciliations, and with success as regarded the
Bishop and his former comrade, Messer Rosso della Tosa. He next
appointed Corso Donati Captain of the Guelph Society, and reorganised
the old popular militia, on the original plan, under nineteen
Gonfaloniers of Companies. But in spite of bestowing commands on some
of the magnates, the latter murmured bitterly against his reforms,
saying that they tended to increase the people's strength, that the
Cardinal was a Ghibelline, would end by leaving the city in the hands
of the Bianchi, and that the latter would forthwith claim restitution
of all property and estates made confiscate for the benefit of the
Guelph Society. Regardless of these complaints, the Cardinal persisted
in holding meetings to ratify the agreement. In fact, on the 26th of
April, several Neri of the Donati and Tosa factions exchanged pledges
of amity in the Square of Santa Maria Novella. Great festivities were
given in honour of the occasion, among others a grand performance
arranged by the Company of Borgo San Frediano, who announced throughout
Florence that all persons desiring news of the other world might
obtain it by assembling on the banks of the Arno on the evening of
the 1st of May. Blazing fireworks represented the infernal regions,
while boatloads of masks figured as condemned souls undergoing various
torments. The people flocked in vast numbers to the river and on to the
Carraia Bridge, which being only a wooden structure at the time, gave
way beneath their weight. Many were seriously injured, and many others
really went to the next world. The catastrophe was regarded by all as a
bad omen, and was truly the prelude of fresh calamity.


III.

Meanwhile, those most opposed to the recall of the exiles craftily
advised the Cardinal to begin by undertaking a mission of peace to
Pistoia, declaring that so long as that city remained in the power
of the Bianchi, Florence could never be really pacified. But the
Pistoians resisted his efforts so vigorously, that not only was he
compelled to leave the town without concluding any arrangement, but
on seeking to enter Prato, found the gates of his native city closed
in his face. The Pope, being highly enraged by all this, addressed an
indignant letter to the Florentines on the 29th of May.[556] But they
were in so disorderly and riotous a state, that after imploring the
Pontiff to find them a Podesta, they refused to accept either of the
four individuals proposed by him. Yet the Cardinal obstinately clung
to his idea of re-establishing peace. At his instance, safe conducts
were given to twelve delegates from the exiles, six Ghibellines and six
Bianchi, in order that they might come to Florence to settle terms with
as many representatives appointed by the City, each Sesto contributing
one of the Donati and one of the adverse faction.[557] These
twenty-four citizens were all magnates, and felt so much reciprocal
distrust that the twelve exiles, although well received by the people
and quartered under State protection in the Cardinal's own residence
at the Mozzi Palace, were most anxious to depart, fearing to be cut to
pieces at any moment. But they were advised by their friends to take
arms and seek refuge in the houses of the Cavalcanti, seeing that with
the latter's help they would be enabled, if necessary, to repulse and
overcome their enemies by force. The Cavalcanti seemed well disposed
to the plan, and began to arrange preliminaries. But after thus rousing
the suspicion and increasing the animosity of their foes, they suddenly
drew back, thereby disgusting even their friends. Accordingly on the
8th of June, 1304, the exiles hurried away from Florence as though
flying for their lives.[558] Thereupon there was a loud outcry against
the Cardinal; he was charged with having betrayed the city by his
stealthy manoeuvres, and it was even added that he had encouraged the
exiles to appear before the walls in warlike array. Letters bearing
his seal were shown, and it was affirmed that the exiles had marched
from the Mugello as far as Trespiano, and only beaten a retreat on
learning the failure of the meditated scheme. Villani declares that
these reports were mere slanders;[559] but even the epistles attributed
to Dante Alighieri lead us to infer that the Cardinal really desired
the exiles' return and had negotiated with them to that effect.[560]
But his patience being now exhausted, he departed on the 10th of
June, again leaving the city under interdict, and exclaiming: "Since
ye prefer to be at war and accursed, will neither hear nor obey the
messenger of God's Vicar, nor be at rest and at peace among yourselves,
remain under the curse of Heaven, under the curse of Holy Church."[561]

At this moment the Cavalcanti and their friends were at a truly
terrible pass. Their present junction with the Donati was insufficient
to blot out old animosities, which had been only laid aside for a while
in order to second the return of the Bianchi, at the expense of the
Tosinghi faction. The latter remained practically isolated, forsaken
even by the rich trading class, who, wearied of perpetual civil war,
had been persuaded by the Cardinal to promote a reconciliation between
the Cavalcanti and Donati. But the former's unexpected withdrawal at
the last moment, and when all seemed arranged, had stirred the old
hatred to new fury, and the Cavalcanti were now between two fires.
Messer Corso, being unwilling to join hands with the Tosinghi, kept his
rage in check for the nonce, and feigning to be ill with gout, still
remained passive, leaving his followers to do as they chose. But Rosso
della Tosa was a ferocious enemy of the Cavalcanti, by whom he had been
brought to the verge of ruin, and his hatred was not to be restrained.
So the Cardinal had scarcely disappeared before a catastrophe became
imminent in Florence. The Cavalcanti recognised their peril; but they
were numerous, courageous, and powerful. They could count on the
Gherardini, Pulci, and Cerchi del Garbo; they owned many friends even
outside the walls and among the exiled Bianchi; they had also adherents
of the burgher class, no few of whom tenanted their houses in the
centre of Florence. The foes now arming against the Cavalcanti were
aristocrats, not _popolani_. The Cerchi del Garbo began to scuffle day
and night with the Giugni. The Cavalcanti and their friends hastened
to the former's assistance, and so effectively as to be able to press
on from Or San Michele to Piazza San Giovanni almost unopposed. But
while at this distance from their own quarter a serious fire broke
out there. Their enemies had set the Cavalcanti houses ablaze with
combustibles kept in readiness for some days past. The first man to
start the fire, beginning with the dwellings of fellow associates, was
Neri degli Abati, prior of San Piero Scheraggio; and his incendiary
example was followed by many accomplices, including Simone della Tosa
and Sinibaldo Donati, Messer Corso's son.[562] It was the 10th of
June, 1304, and a strong north wind was blowing. Accordingly, the fire
spread with great rapidity to the Calimala street, the Old Market, and
Or San Michele, thus destroying the whole centre of Florence as well
as the Cavalcanti houses--in fact, as Villani expresses it, "all the
marrow, the yolk, and dearest spots of our city of Florence."[563] He
adds, that the palaces, houses and towers consumed amounted to more
than seventeen hundred, with enormous loss of property and merchandise,
seeing that everything saved from the fire was stolen when carried
away, and that fighting and pillage went on even in the midst of the
flames.[564] Paolino Pieri relates in his chronicle, that one-tenth
of the city was burnt, and one-sixth of its whole property. Many
families and associations were ruined, but the worst sufferers were the
Cavalcanti, who seemed paralysed with terror on beholding all their
possessions devoured by the flames. Yet so ferocious was the hatred
cherished against them, that even after these cruel calamities they
were driven from Florence as rebels.


IV.

Let us see what were the political consequences of these events. The
Donati and Della Tosa factions having combined for the undoing of
the Cavalcanti and their friends, it was decided at first that the
magnates, emboldened by union and victory, should next attempt to
annul the Enactments of Justice, and take the government in their
hands. And, in the midst of the General dismay, the project might have
succeeded, Villani says, had the nobles been really in unison. Instead,
"they were all at strife, and split into sects, wherefore either side
courted the people so as not to lose ground."[565] The division of
parties remained substantially the same. That is, on the one hand,
there were the quarrelsome magnates seeking support from the people
against their personal foes, and, on the other, the people trying to
profit by the magnates' dissensions. Of course the merchants had also
suffered heavily by the fire; but their wealth was of a kind to be
rapidly replaced, whereas the nobles had no means of repairing their
still greater losses. For the prosperity of the Florentine people was
so prodigious at the time that, even after this wholesale destruction,
their riches seemed nowise diminished. But there was a notable decline
in the power of the magnates, who disappeared almost entirely from the
first circuit, or centre of the city, where the old families had their
dwellings. Therefore Capponi has some reason to say in his history:
"From that moment the supremacy of the nobles seems to have been
uprooted, and new social orders established."[566] Thus, as always
happened in Florence, even this great calamity proved advantageous to
the people.

In consequence of these lamentable events, added to the reports sent
by Cardinal da Prato to the Pope in Perugia, the Holy Father cited
twelve leading magnates of Florence to appear before him there. Among
the persons thus summoned were Corso Donati and Rosso della Tosa, once
bitter enemies but now friends for the moment. They set out towards
Perugia with a great train of followers, forming a mounted company
of five hundred men in all. So the exiles considered this a most
favourable opportunity for making a fresh attempt to re-enter their
native city. As usual, it was rumoured that the Cardinal had encouraged
them to expect a good reception; and it was further announced that he
had instigated Pisa, Bologna, Arezzo, Pistoia, and the whole of Romagna
to come to their aid. But although some of the exiles' direst foes
were absent from Florence at the time, on the other hand, the position
of their adversaries must have been considerably strengthened by the
slaughter of the Cavalcanti and Gherardini. Likewise, although the
Greater Guilds had once been induced to favour the return of banished
men, and particularly those of the popular class, it was not to be
expected that they would now be disposed to welcome exiles advancing on
Florence under the wing of the Pisans, and joined with the Ghibellines
of Tuscany and Romagna. This league with the enemies of the State
naturally roused all Florence against them.

Nevertheless the exiles seemed very hopeful. Thanks to their new
allies, they had contrived to collect an army of 9,000 foot and 1,600
horse, and on the 19th of July marched into Lastra, to await other
reinforcements from Pistoia. These were to be commanded by Tolosato
degli Uberti, a valiant Ghibelline leader, of an ancient Florentine
house, persistently hated by the Guelphs, in memory of the rout at
Montaperti. As Uberti failed to appear, the exiles resolved to move on
without him; but the twenty-four hours' delay had sufficed to destroy
their chance of taking Florence by surprise. In fact, only twelve
hundred horse rode to the city in peaceful array, bearing olive boughs
in their hands; and passing the unfinished girdle of new walls, halted
beneath the old bastions, in the Cafaggio fields, between St. Mark's
and the Church of the Servi. There, on the 20th of July, panting from
fatigue, without water, and exposed to the burning sun, they vainly
waited for the gates to be opened to them. Meanwhile a small band of
their men had managed to enter the city by forcing the Spadai gate,
and advanced as far as Piazza San Giovanni. But instead of finding
friends there, they were met by 200 horse and 500 foot, who drove them
back, capturing some of their number, and leaving a good many wounded
and slain. This gave the signal for a retreat, soon converted into a
general flight. The force waiting at Cafaggio, exhausted from hunger
and heat combined, had already thrown down their weapons and dispersed
with "bands of volunteers" in pursuit. Many were killed or died of
fatigue, others were stripped, seized and strung up on trees. News of
the defeat reached Lastra before the fugitives returned; accordingly
those encamped there took to flight, and although Tolosato degli Uberti
met them on the way, he found it impossible to rally them to the
attack. Among other narratives of the affair we have that of Villani,
who witnessed all that occurred in Florence.[567] Dante Alighieri was
not with the army at Lastra, having separated from his companions in
exile shortly before, and almost in anger. He was probably disgusted
by their hybrid alliance with all the enemies of Florence, by the
secret agreements set on foot between Donati and the Cavalcanti, and
saddened by the internecine slaughter so blindly provoked in the vain
expectation of compassing the recall of a few banished men.[568]

The victory at Lastra must have undoubtedly augmented the daring and
power of the magnates. It may have been on this account that certain
of their number now insisted on their names being erased from the
rolls of the guilds.[569] Additional proof to this effect is furnished
by another important event occurring on the 5th of August, 1304. One
of the Adimari having perpetrated a crime, was brought before the
Podesta to be judged. But his associates made a violent assault on that
magistrate as he was leaving the Priors' palace, and after wounding
or killing several of his escort, broke into the prison and rescued
the criminal. Thereupon the Captain of the People, Messer Gigliolo da
Prato, temporarily acting as Podesta (since the continual disturbances
in the city had deterred every one from assuming that office), departed
from Florence in high indignation. Accordingly, to provide for the due
administration of justice, the Florentines were obliged to elect a
committee of twelve citizens, one noble and one _popolano_, from every
Sesto, to fulfil the duties of a Podesta.[570] Presently, however, the
resumption of hostilities outside the walls reduced the city to quiet
for a time.


V.

The exiles had again begun to scour the land, stirring neighbouring
strongholds to revolt; and the Florentines instantly marched against
them. The first place to be attacked was the castle of Stinche, which
had been incited to rebel by the Cavalcanti. Its reduction was easily
effected (August, 1304), and all the captives were lodged in the new
prisons, henceforth entitled the "Stinche." A more serious expedition
had to be undertaken in 1305 against Pistoia, when it rose to arms in
the Bianchi cause, aided by Arezzo and Pisa, and under the command of
Tolosato degli Uberti. A long and vigorous siege was the result. The
beleaguering force of Florentines and Lucchese was led by Duke Robert
of Calabria, who, as Captain of the League, had furnished a large
contingent of foot and 300 Catalan horse.[571] The town held out during
the whole winter, but in April, 1306, the Pistoiese were compelled to
surrender from famine. Their walls and towers were demolished, their
territory divided between the Florentines and Lucchese. Pope Clement V.
had vainly endeavoured to put an end to this war which dealt another
cruel blow to the Tuscan Ghibellines. He was a native of France, had
transferred the papal see to Avignon, and had no knowledge of Italy.
Nor could Italy feel any love for an alien Pope who had deserted Rome.
In fact, the Florentines declined to listen to the messengers of peace
he despatched to their camp, and paid no heed to the interdict he
launched against them. For although the Duke of Calabria withdrew,
this was only a feint, seeing that he left them all his men under the
command of Captain Pietro de la Rat. So the campaign was carried on to
the end.

Nor did the other envoy of peace, Cardinal Napoleon Orsini, meet
with any better fortune, for he was not only ill received in Tuscany
and Romagna, but robbed of his goods and even in danger of his life.
As for his excommunications, interdicts, and counsels of peace,
every one laughed at them. The Florentines were determined to do
the work thoroughly, and even before the conclusion of the war with
Pistoia, started another expedition against the formidable castle of
Montaccenico, chief stronghold of the Ubaldini, dominating the whole
of the Mugello and serving as the exiles' headquarters. By dint of
scattering bribes among the Ubaldini themselves, the Florentines
finally won the castle by treason, and, after reducing it to ruin,
immediately resolved to plant the towns of Scarperia and Firenzuola in
its vicinity, "to serve as scarecrows to the Ubaldini, and harbours
of refuge to faithful subjects." All willing to inhabit the little
town founded for that purpose, were to be exempt from every form of
vassalage. The first stone of Scarperia was laid, without delay, on
the 7th of September, 1307; but the construction of Firenzuola was
postponed to a much later date (1332).

We must now consider what was the object the Republic had in view,
and what it achieved by means of these continual campaigns, in which
even the magnates took a part; what too by the reduction of Ghibelline
cities, and the destruction of castles throughout the whole territory?
On the one hand, its political predominance in Tuscany was rapidly
increased, and new outlets of commerce acquired; while, on the other,
the power of the magnates outside Florence was overthrown by the
aid of those within the walls, who, in their blind fury against the
exiles, did not realise what they were doing. The Florentines of old
had demolished the castles, which at one time reached nearly to their
gates; they had forced the barons to dwell in the city, had subjected
them to republican laws, and lowered their pride by excluding them
from the government. Profiting by their disputes, the citizens had
next spurred them to destroy one another; and, in conclusion, were
now making them turn their weapons against more distant nobles, and
overthrow the latter's strongholds in the Casentino, Mugello, and
valley of the Arno. All this was invariably advantageous to the guilds
and the people. Therefore, in 1306, while the Pistoian campaign was
still going on, the Florentines reorganised citizen-armed bands under
nineteen Gonfalonieri. This was the constitution of "the good Guelph
people," a reform made, according to Villani, "in order to prevent
the 'Grandi' and other powerful folk from presuming to show arrogance
on the strength of having gained many victories over the Bianchi and
Ghibellines."[572]

But this was not all, for the real gist of the new reform consisted
in the law of the 23rd of December, 1306, by which the enactments
were strengthened and an Executor of Justice was appointed to enforce
their more rigorous application. The object of the law was clearly
expressed by the introductory words explaining that it was intended "to
preserve the liberties of the Florentine people, and break the pride of
iniquitous men, which has swollen to such extent that our eyes fail to
discern its limits."

In point of fact, the guilds showed no mercy to the magnates, even when
fighting side by side with them against common foes. The "Executor" was
required to be a Guelph, a man of the people, and a foreigner, _i.e._,
of non-Tuscan birth, from some city or place, subject to no lord,
and not less than eighty miles from Florence. He was neither to be a
knight nor a _law judge_, a prohibition caused by the growing hatred
against _perverse judges_ and fatal experience of recent Podestas.
The "Executor" was to remain in office for six months, and he was
to bring with him one judge, two notaries, twenty _masnadieri_, or
guards--all of whom were to be Guelphs and aliens--and two war-horses.
His office was to protect the people and all the weak against powerful
personages, and to call the companies to arms whenever any crime should
be committed, for the prompt enforcement of the penalties prescribed.
It was to be his special duty to ensure the due execution of the
Enactments of Justice, and whenever the Podesta or Captain failed to
do their part, he was instantly to assume their functions according
to the rules minutely laid down in the new law, that was henceforth
an integral portion of the enactments.[573] He was likewise to deal
punishment on all frauds and dishonest tricks practised in the offices
of the Commune. Should the Podesta fail to demolish buildings (churches
always excepted) in which conventicles or meetings had been illegally
held, he was to enforce the said demolition, and impose a fine of 500
_lire_ on the Podesta. Capital punishment was to be inflicted on all
who held meetings, to plot treason against liberty or the popular
government. In such case, if nobles were concerned the penalty was to
be adjudged by the Podesta, and should the Podesta hesitate to act,
the Executor was to mulct him as usual, and assume his functions. When
the guilty were _popolani_ the Executor alone was to condemn them to
death and degrade their descendants to the rank of nobles. Likewise
all _popolani_ accessory to crimes perpetrated by nobles were to be
condemned by the Executor to double the penalty prescribed by the
common law. It was also the Executor's task to examine the actions of
the outgoing Podesta and Captain, and he, in due turn, was subjected to
investigation by persons appointed by the Priors and Gonfaloniers of
the Companies.[574]


VI.

Meanwhile the Pope's anxiety being stirred by the increasing agitation
provoked by the Florentine exiles, throughout Romagna and the Marches,
as well as in Tuscany, again began to insist upon peace. But the person
charged to open negotiations to this effect was Cardinal Orsini, a man
of strong party feeling and doubtful integrity. For when at Arezzo
in 1307, he had called there, in addition to the Florentine exiles,
many adherents of his own from the adjoining States of the Church,
thus assembling a force of 1,700 cavalry and a great number of foot
soldiers. It appears that he had come to terms with Corso Donati and
received money from him for the undertaking in view. Messer Corso,
whose ambition was still unassuaged, had married a third time, and was
now related, through his wife, with the Ghibelline lord, Uguccione
della Faggiuola. This circumstance naturally exposed him to much
suspicion on the part of the Guelphs, and accordingly, being even more
angered and discontented than before, he was again bitterly hostile to
Messer Rosso della Tosa and his followers, who in their turn, and as an
inevitable consequence, had again combined with the wealthier burghers.
Hence, the latter, on noting the Cardinal's preparations, and Donati's
new manoeuvres, speedily collected an army of 3,000 horse and 15,000
foot, and without further hesitation marched towards Arezzo, ravaging
the enemies' lands by the way. Thereupon, by way of displaying his
military tactics, the Cardinal directed his march on Florence through
the Casentino. But as the Florentines outwitted him, by doubling back
and reaching the city before him, he was obliged to retreat to Arezzo
in a very crestfallen mood. He then opened negotiations with the
Florentines, who, feigning willingness to entertain his proposals,
despatched two ambassadors to gull him with fair words. Compagni
remarks that "no woman was ever more flattered and then abused by
betrayers than he (the Cardinal) by those two knights."[575] So that
all he could do was to go off with his tail between his legs, once more
leaving the city under sentence of excommunication.[576] In revenge
for this, the Florentines imposed fresh taxes on the clergy, punishing
those who refused to pay.[577]

The worst sufferer was Corso Donati, for the Cardinal, after extracting
money from him by promising to come to Florence to crush Della Tosa
and his Black faction, had not even dared to approach the walls. But
without acknowledging his defeat, Donati immediately plunged into
fresh and more daring schemes. After a short absence from Florence,
probably to gain funds and allies, he returned there in 1308.
Increasingly blinded by party passion, counting on assistance from
his father-in-law, Uguccione della Faggiuola, now lord of Arezzo, as
well as from Prato and Pistoia, he called a meeting of his adherents
in Florence. After explaining his hopes and vowing to do away with the
Enactments of Justice, he urged them to draw their swords and make
an end of those Neri, who, after receiving so much help from him and
gaining victory by his means, now treated him so iniquitously. But the
rumour being already abroad that he expected aid from that bitterest
foe of Florence--the formidable Uguccione--the popular feeling against
him was excited to the highest pitch.[578] After being repressed for
some time the general fury burst out all at once, and took Donati
unawares. Suddenly, on the 6th of October, 1308, the Signory sounded
the alarm-bell, and the people, rising to arms, united with the Della
Tosa faction, other friendly magnates, and De la Rat's Catalan troops.
Donati was denounced to the Podesta, Piero della Branca of Gubbio, as a
traitor to his country, and in less than an hour he was accused, tried,
and condemned. Immediately afterwards, the Signory, Podesta, Captain,
and Executor, with their respective familiars, the Catalan troops,
knights, and citizen-trained bands, marched to St. Piero Maggiore to
attack the Donati houses. But Messer Corso and his friends resisted so
valiantly, that had Uguccione and the others fulfilled their promise
of coming to the rescue in time, the affair might have taken an ugly
turn. It is supposed that the Aretines were already on the march, when,
hearing that all Florence had risen against Donati, they decided to
turn back. At all events, no succour arrived, and Messer Corso soon
found that even many of his Florentine friends had ceased to defend the
chain barricades, and relinquished the struggle. Thereupon the people
broke through, and soon demolished the houses he had been forced to
abandon. Accompanied by a few devoted adherents, he fled from the town
by the Croce gate, with the citizens and Catalans in hot pursuit. The
first man captured on the banks of the Africo was Gherardo dei Bordoni,
who was instantly slain. Next, the crowd cut off his hand and nailed
it on the door of the Adimari house, because Tedici degli Adimari had
first instigated the dead man to join with Donati. A few moments later
the Catalans overtook Donati himself at San Salvi, and in obedience
to orders killed him on the spot. According to another version of the
tale, he first tried to bribe them to spare his life, but without
success; so, to avoid falling into the hands of his Florentine foes,
he cast himself on the ground and was dispatched by a spear-thrust in
the throat. The monks of San Salvi bore away his dead body, and the
following day buried him in the Badia without any pomp for fear of
provoking the public wrath.[579]

The cause of this sudden and irresistible burst of popular fury is
clearly explained by the letters which the Commune shortly addressed
to the Lucchese, in whose territory the Bordoni had found refuge.
"It is known to all Tuscany that the Donati had planned a war to the
death, in order to give the city of Florence and the Guelph party
into the hands of the Ghibellines, and subject to their yoke, to the
utter extermination and destruction of the Guelph Government. Those
rebels intended to break all bounds, and subdue the city to their
rule, although Messer Corso and his followers shamelessly styled the
Signory Ghibelline instead."[580] These words were written by the
Signory in March, 1309. In fact, the Neri being split into Donati and
Tosinghi factions, and the latter having united with the wealthier
burghers, from whom could the Donati hope assistance, save from the
Ghibellines? The lower class of the people was weak, and the distant
Pope increasingly urged the return of the exiles. The latter had now
combined with Donati's whilom allies, the nobles of the _contado_,
standing aloof from many of the burgher Bianchi, who had been expelled
at the same moment, but were gradually permitted to return; and they
had also separated from all independent men, such as Dante Alighieri.
The poet, in fact, being opposed to Donati, and a promoter of the
Enactments of Justice, had been finally driven to adopt an individual
attitude. Thus the Bianchi, though exiled for having sided with
the people, were now on the side of the magnates, the Ghibellines,
Uguccione, and even of Corso Donati, the only person likely to profit
by so hybrid an alliance. Accordingly his death had the immediate
result of giving another terrible shock to the magnates' power, both
within and without the city. Speedy proof was afforded of this when, at
the beginning of 1309, the proud Ubaldini came to make submission to
the Florentine Commune, promising to guard the passes of the Apennines,
and supporting their offer by fitting guarantees of good faith. In
consequence of this they were accepted as friends, with the condition,
"that in every act and deed they should behave as good subjects and
citizens."[581]

Throughout the whole of its history the Florentine Commune invariably
adopted this plan when admitting nobles to its midst. But it had
also the effect of enabling conquered and subject magnates to gain
increased strength in the city itself. Therefore, first without and
then within the walls, they unceasingly combated the people and the
Republic, down to the distant time when they were finally crushed
by the State. If Florentine prosperity as yet showed no signs of
diminution during the sanguinary struggle now described, it was for two
reasons which should be duly kept in mind. The successive conflicts we
have narrated, all proceeded from the constant necessity of preserving
the merchant-republic from the impact of the extraneous feudal body
threatening to check its natural growth. These civil wars, however,
were carried by a comparatively small number of citizens, eager to gain
possession of a government that had far less influence on society than
is generally supposed. The true motive-power of the Republic proceeded
less from the Signory, which was changed every two months, than from
the commercial and political constitution of the guilds, which were
firmly organised and, so far, thoroughly in unison. The conditions of
an all-absorbing modern State, wherein every shock affects society
at large, had not yet sprung to life in the Middle Ages. The Italian
republics were miniature confederacies of separate associations, under
a central government of so feeble a kind, that even when totally
suppressed for a time, no great harm seemed to result from its loss.


VII.

Corso Donati's death put an end to the tragedy of which the expulsion
of the Bianchi had formed the first act; and now the condition of all
Italy, as well as Florence, was changed by a new event. This was the
murder of Albert of Hapsburg by his nephew, on the 1st of May, 1308.
Therefore the election of a new king of the Romans and future emperor
was now imminent. Philip the Beautiful aspired to win the Imperial
crown, if not for himself, at least for his brother, Charles of Valois,
through the help of Clement V. As the Pope was residing in France, he
could not directly oppose the design, but had certainly no intention of
favouring it. With the Angevins at Naples, the Holy See transferred to
Avignon, and Rome in revolt against him, the choice of a French emperor
would have placed him entirely at Philip's mercy. Accordingly he gave
secret support to Henry of Luxembourg, who was elected to the throne
as Henry VII. on the 27th of November, 1308. This emperor, born on the
French frontier, and educated in France, presented a combination of
Germanic and Latin characteristics. As lord of a petty State, he had
no real strength or power of his own; but having great nobility of
mind and an imagination disposed to mysticism, he had formed a lofty
idea of the dignity and might of the universal Empire that he hoped
to restore to Rome. He seemed totally unable to comprehend that the
feudal union of Germany and Italy, which had missed success even at the
beginning of the Middle Ages, had become totally impossible now that
feudalism itself, the principal basis of the Holy Roman Empire, was
almost annihilated in Italy. Nevertheless, when Henry first raised the
Imperial flag, enormous hopes were conceived by the Ghibellines, and
rapidly spread throughout the peninsula. All men seemed to be suddenly
stirred to genuine enthusiasm.

The Ghibellines of that day were no longer the Ghibellines of old, and
in Italy the conception of the Empire had undergone a total change.
The hostile attitude of the Popes towards republican freedom and
independence; their persistent struggle against the Roman Commune;
the fact of Clement V. being at a distance, in France, and weakly
dependent on the French monarch; the necessity, now beginning to
be generally recognised, of building up, from the ruins of old
municipalities, new forms of government, such as were now arising in
France and elsewhere; the revival of classical studies, enabling men
to glean from the Republic and Empire of ancient Rome some literary
conception of the unity and strength of the secular State required
to meet present needs;--had all combined to transform the mediaeval
idea of the Empire. For now that France and other countries were
detached from it, the Empire was no longer universal, but simply
Germanico-Roman; while to Italian eyes it was beginning, though still
very vaguely, to seem a revival of the old Rome that had always been
the spiritual head of the civilised world, and the possible centre
of an Italian confederated State. This idea was clearly expressed
for the first time in Dante's "Monarchia," which then served as the
manifesto of the Ghibelline party. The same idea was afterwards more
widely developed in the "Defensor Pacis" of Marsilio da Padova, and
at a subsequent date inspired the fantastic enthusiasm of Cola di
Rienzo. The latter's attempt--so lauded by Petrarch--to create a new
Roman, Italian, Imperial Republic was a confused dream of scholastic,
classico-humanistic, feudal, and mediaeval ideas, but nevertheless a
dream containing in embryo some vague conception of the future Italian
State as it was already dimly foreseen, although with no comprehension
of its real nature. Such as it was, however, this incoherent jumble of
ideas became the standard of the Italian Ghibellines.

The Guelphs had no philosophical programme of their own to flaunt in
return. The force of events, and the pressing need of maintaining the
independence of Italian cities against Pope and emperor, was then the
war-cry of the Florentine Guelphs. To Florence, the coming of the
emperor signified the revival of the old Ghibelline party, consequently
the revival of Arezzo, Pistoia, Pisa, and other hostile cities, all
ready to compress her within a circle of steel, and strangle her
commerce. For this reason she called on the Guelph cities, and all
seeking to preserve freedom and escape foreign tyranny, to join in an
Italian confederation, with herself at its head. It was, therefore, at
this moment that the small merchant-republic initiated a true national
policy, and became a great power in Italy. So, in the mediaeval shape
of a feudal and universal Empire, on the one hand, and in that of a
municipal confederation on the other, a gleam of the national idea
first began to appear, though still in the far distance and veiled in
clouds. Both sides fought eagerly for the interests of the moment, and
both were inspired with the presentiment of a new future; but neither
discerned that this future was only to be attained by the destruction
of both parties alike.

At this juncture the Pope seemed favourable to Henry VII., for he
encouraged his project of going to Rome to assume the Imperial crown,
and urged the Italians to accord him a good reception. Nevertheless--as
the Florentines had known from the first--he could not wish to see
Italy subject to the Empire, having too keen a remembrance of all
that the Church had endured at the hands of Frederic II. Following,
therefore, the traditional policy of the Roman Court, he simultaneously
encouraged Robert of Naples, formerly Duke of Calabria, who, having
succeeded to the throne at the death of King Charles II. (May 3, 1309),
was naturally prepared to resist Henry's pretensions to the utmost.
At first the Florentines appeared disposed to be passive lookers on,
but were not deceived by the Pope's pretence of encouraging Emperor
Henry. They desired a closer alliance with Clement, but he too was very
resentful with regard to their past conduct, and with some reason,
secretly echoed the words of Benedict XI.: "Who could imagine that
those men" (the Florentines) "should presume to be sons of the Church,
while fighting against her?" But nowise dismayed by this, they treated
with King Robert, who still allowed them to retain the services of
Captain De la Rat and his Catalan horse, and now sent them his flag
in addition. With the help of this contingent the Florentines made
repeated attacks on Arezzo, refusing to desist even when Henry warned
them to respect that city as a fief of the Empire. Their attacks were
invariably successful, and they even forced their way into the town,
but were prevented from holding it by the treachery of the magnates, as
it was rumoured at the time.[582] All acts and decrees of the Commune
bore the heading: "In honour of Holy Church and His Majesty King
Robert, and to the defeat of the German king."[583]


VIII.

In 1310 Henry set out for Italy, leaving the affairs of Germany to his
son's care. Louis of Savoy, the newly elected Senator of Rome, was sent
on in advance, and reached Florence on the 3rd of July, accompanied
by two German prelates. The latter were admitted to the council; but
in answer to their request that Florence should prepare to receive
the emperor with due honour, Betto Brunelleschi replied: "That the
Florentines had never lowered their horns before any lord whatsoever;"
and this somewhat indecorous response was sufficiently indicative of
the public feeling. In fact, the Imperial envoys, though everywhere
well received, obtained nothing from Florence, and even failed to put
a stop to the war with Arezzo. And when ambassadors from nearly every
city of Italy sought audience of Henry at Lausanne, no Florentine
envoys appeared. On the contrary, Florence was energetically preparing
for defence; the new walls were raised about sixteen feet higher, and
surrounded by moats from the Prato gate to that of San Gallo, and
thence to the Arno.[584] On the 30th of September Robert arrived in
Florence from Avignon, where the Pope had crowned him King of Naples,
and likewise appointed him Vicar of Romagna, to prevent Henry from
seizing that province which had recently seceded from the Empire.
King Robert soon came to an understanding with the Florentines, and
arranged measures with them for their common defence. Notwithstanding
this, Henry continued to advance, heading all his decrees with the
phrase, _in nomine regis pacifici_, and assuming the part of a just and
impartial judge. He summoned both Guelphs and Ghibellines to his side,
promising equal welcome to all. He reached Susa by the 24th of October,
and on the Feast of the Epiphany (January 6, 1311) assumed the Iron
Crown in the Church of St. Ambrogio at Milan.

But in this city his dream of peace was disturbed by a sudden outburst
of civil war. The Guelph Torriani were expelled by the Visconti before
his eyes; and from that moment, being forcibly dragged into the vortex
of party strife, Henry renounced his mission as peacemaker, and was
again a German, foreign, and _barbarian_ emperor. It was averred that
the Florentines had bribed Guido della Torre to raise a rebellion,
and that this was the cause of his expulsion. We have no certainty
that this was the case, but it is an ascertained fact that they sent
money, despatches, and envoys to Cremona, Lodi, Brescia, Pavia, and
other Lombard cities, and succeeded in stirring them to rise against
Henry.[585] They also sent ambassadors to Naples, France, and more
particularly to Avignon, where they lavished heavy bribes on the
officials of the Curia, for the purpose of learning when the Pope spoke
truly or falsely. On all sides they displayed such feverish activity
that one day the Cardinal da Prato exclaimed in the presence of the
French king: "How great is the insolence of these Florentines in daring
to tempt every lord with their lousy small coin!"[586]

Even in crises such as these the magnates of Florence could not lay
aside their animosities, but continued to disturb the city by fresh
riots now and then. In February, 1311, the Donati murdered Betto
Brunelleschi, whom they considered responsible for Messer Corso's
death, and immediately afterwards disinterred the latter's corpse
at San Salvi, and reburied him with due pomp now that he had been
avenged.[587]

Nevertheless, order was quickly restored, since there was little
leisure for private feuds, and men's minds were absorbed in graver
concerns. At the beginning of June, 1311, Florence, Pisa, Lucca,
Sienna, and Volterra gave their formal adherence to the Guelph
League, and swore to combine in armed defence against Henry. On the
26th of June, the Florentines despatched De la Rat to Bologna with
400 Catalan horse, while the Siennese and Lucchese forwarded another
contingent to King Robert in Romagna, where that monarch was harrying
and incarcerating all the Ghibellines and exiled Florentine Bianchi
who were then trying to stir the Papal cities to revolt.[588] And when
it was rumoured that the king was seeking to make terms with Henry,
the Florentines wrote to him, insisting on his entering Rome at once,
according to his promise, and likewise warning him that they would
stand no half-measures, and that if he delayed, or attempted any pact
with the emperor, they would instantly withdraw their forces from the
League. "Inasmuch as your Royal Majesty has repeatedly promised us to
make no terms with the German king, but to supply us with an armed
force and go in person to Rome to exterminate our common foe."[589]
This missive had some effect, for Robert speedily despatched 400 horse
to Rome under his brother John, who, with the help of the Orsini, soon
won the chief vantage-points of the city. The king still feigned to
act in the interests of the Empire; but no one was deceived by this
pretence, and the Florentines were satisfied.

Meanwhile Henry, still faithful to his original plan, and quite
unconscious of the extraordinary change that was going on, had reduced
Cremona to submission, and was now besieging Brescia, which opposed a
more stubborn resistance. The "peaceful" monarch vented his rage on
his prisoners and put one of the Guelph leaders to a most atrociously
cruel death. But the Brescians still refused to surrender; the flower
of the German army was perishing from sickness and wounds, and Henry's
brother died of his hurts. During these days of slaughter, Florence
wrote to the Brescians, saying, "Remember that the safety of all Italy
and all Guelphs depends on your resistance. The Latins must always hold
the Germans in enmity, seeing that they are opposed in act and deed, in
manners and soul; not only is it impossible to serve, but even to hold
any intercourse with that race."[590] At the same time they wrote to
encourage other cities to make a stand and rise to arms. They summoned
the Perugians "to shake off their bonds of vassalage, and proclaim
the sweets of liberty"; repeating to all that, for their own part,
they would unceasingly devote their arms, men, and gold to the task of
resistance.[591] Also, for the greater reinforcement of the citizens
and the Guelph party, they removed the ban from all exiles, probably
well disposed to the Guelphs, only maintaining it against several
hundred supposed Ghibellines, Dante Alighieri among the number. This
modification of the Law of Banishment was known as the Amendment of
Baldo d'Aguglione, one of the Priors by whom it was passed on September
2, 1311.[592]

Meanwhile, after an heroic defence, Brescia was forced to accept
terms of surrender, whereupon Henry immediately set out towards
Genoa, entering that city on October 21, 1311. Here, though deeply
grieved by the death of his wife, he allowed no delay in the necessary
preparations for continuing his journey to Rome by the Pisan route.
And, being informed of this, the Florentines redoubled their efforts.
They strengthened the garrison of San Miniato al Tedesco, recalled from
Bologna De la Rat and his troops, despatched reinforcements to Lucca,
Sarzana, Pietrasanta, and the fortresses in Lunigiana, and the western
Valdarno.[593] But remarkable as it may seem, they never neglected the
interests of their trade, even at this critical time. In fact, they
chose this moment to address the King of France, explaining the serious
difficulties in which Henry's descent had involved them, and lamenting
that the present war should have led His Majesty to take measures
hurtful to the interests of their merchants, upon whom the prosperity
of Florence so largely depended, "_cum Civitas nostra ex predictis
Florentinis ex maiori parte consistat_. You have always hitherto
protected them," they said in conclusion, "and our chief hopes are
placed, after God, in your Majesty, especially now that Henry threatens
to go to Pisa and march against us, _qui firmavimus et parati sumus
nostram quam a vobis et a vestris recognovimus, defendere libertatem_."
They likewise besought the king to order matters in such wise, that
their trade with France might be pursued without interruption, even
during the war.[594]

Meanwhile the emperor had despatched another embassy to Florence,
composed of Bishop Niccolo of Botrinto, and Pandolfo Savelli; but when
these envoys finally reached Lastra, after encountering many mishaps by
the way, they were not only robbed, but placed in mortal danger. The
bells rang the alarm at their approach, armed men poured into their
lodging, and the Podesta and Captain of Florence arrived barely in time
to save their lives. Accordingly, by the advice of those functionaries,
the strangers quitted the town in the utmost haste.[595] Thereupon
(20th of November, 1311) the emperor cited the Florentines to appear
before him in Genoa to tender apology and submission. Then, finding
that--as was to be expected--they disregarded his summons, he placed
their city under the ban of the Empire.[596] Even this was received
with the same indifference as the interdicts of the Pope. But recalling
their merchants from Genoa, they hastened their preparations for war.

The magnates now gave another proof of their irrepressible turbulence.
Precisely at this moment, and heedless of the grave danger menacing
the Republic, they plunged the city in disorder with their private
feuds. On the 11th of January, 1312, Pazzino de' Pazzi, one of the
leading men, and much beloved by the people, was set upon and killed,
as he rode to the chase, by Paffiera dei Cavalcanti, to avenge the
loss of Masino de' Cavalcanti and Betto Brunelleschi, whose murder
was attributed to Pazzi. The victim's body was carried to the Priors'
Palace, and the indignant people rising to arms, marched under their
own banner to the Cavalcanti houses, and burnt them to the ground.
As the speediest way of checking these tumults, the Signory exiled
the Cavalcanti at once, conferred knighthood on four of the Pazzi
family, and presented them with certain lands and property in the
gift of the Commune.[597] Thus, even at this juncture, order was soon
re-established.


IX.

During this time Henry was preparing to go to Rome. In the Imperial
camp minstrels were chanting the piteous tale of Conradin's death,
and the popular muse of the Ghibellines continued to shower laudatory
greetings on the just judge, the celestial peacemaker. Men of letters,
poets, jurisconsults, and philosophers persisted in regarding Henry
as the new redeemer who was to restore the Imperial crown to Rome,
give Italy freedom and peace. Cino da Pistoia cried, "Nunc dimittis
servum tuum, Domine, quia viderunt oculi mei salutare tuum."[598] But
Dante Alighieri was the most exultant of all, for at this moment he
was virtually the chief representative of the Imperial party in Italy.
On Henry's first approach to the Alps he had addressed an epistle to
the princes and governments of Italy, exclaiming, "Hosanna to thee,
suffering Italy, now wilt thou be envied of all, for 'Sponsus tuus et
mundi solatium et gloria plebis tuae, clementissimus Henricus, Divus et
Augustus et Caesar, ad nuptias properat.' Let the oppressed rejoice, for
their redemption draweth near. Let all who have endured injuries like
unto mine forgive and grant pardon, for now the Shepherd that cometh
from God will lead us all back to the fold."[599]

Afterwards, however, when Henry was about to march on Cremona, and
the Florentines had already declared openly against him, Alighieri's
joy turned to wrath, and from the source of the Arno in the Casentino
hills, he wrote another epistle, dated 31st of March, 1311, and
addressed, "_Scelestissimis Florentinis._ Know ye not, God hath
ordained that the human race be under the rule of one emperor, for the
defence of justice, peace, and civilisation, inasmuch as Italy was
always a prey to civil war whenever the Empire lapsed? Do ye dare,
ye alone, to cast off the yoke of freedom and seek for new kingdoms,
even as though _alia sit florentina civitas, alia sit romana_? Most
foolish and insensate men, ye shall succumb perforce to the Imperial
eagle. Know ye not that true liberty consisteth in voluntary obedience
to Divine and human laws? Yet while presuming to claim liberty, ye
conspire against all laws!"[600]

Then, when instead of marching forward, Henry tarried in Lombardy, to
attack the cities stirred to revolt against him by Florence, Dante's
indignation rose to its highest pitch, and on the 16th of April of the
same year he addressed another epistle to the emperor, saying, "Men
declare that thou dost waver in thy purpose, and wouldst turn back from
it, disheartened. Art not, then, the man expected by us all? When my
hands touched thy feet, I exultantly cried, 'Ecce Agnus Dei, ecce qui
abstulit peccata mundi.' Why tarriest thou? If thine own glory move
thee not, let thy son's, at least, stir thee.

      "Ascanium surgentem, et spes haeredis Tuli
       Respice, cui _regnum Italiae_, romanaque tellus
       Debetur.... (Aen. iv. 272.)

What may it profit thee to subdue Cremona? Brescia, Bergamo, Pavia, and
other cities will continue to revolt until thou hast extirpated the
root of the evil. Art ignorant mayhap where the rank fox lurketh in
hiding? The beast drinketh from the Arno, polluting the waters with its
jaws. Knowest thou not that Florence is its name? Florence is the viper
that stings its mother's breast, the black sheep that corrupts the
whole flock, the Myrrha guilty of incest with her father. In fact it is
Florence who rends the bosom of the mother--Rome, that created her in
the likeness of herself, and violates the commands of the Father of the
Faithful, who is agreed with thee. And Florence, while contemning her
own sovereign, sides with an alien monarch and others' rights. Delay no
more, but haste to slay the new Goliath with the sling of thy wisdom
and the stone of thy might."[601]

This semi-scholastic, semi-Biblico-classical, and often inflated
language, admirably represents the ideas of the period, and proves
the excited state of Dante's mind. He was undoubtedly the first
to put clearly into words the new Ghibelline theory that had been
gradually developing and maturing in his mind ever since he had
indignantly parted from his fellow-exiles, and turned to solitary
study. Although, as we have already remarked, this new conception--more
amply developed in Dante's "Monarchia"--was certainly theoretical and
literary rather than practical, it was deeply rooted nevertheless in
the thought of the period, and the work devoted to its disclosure
already shows, by unmistakable signs, that the spirit of the age was
about to be transformed. In reading the "Monarchia" we are often
plunged back in the Middle Ages, but the pale gleaming of a new dawn
often shimmers before our eyes. "The Empire represents the law upon
which human society is firmly based; it is derived accordingly from
God, the source of the Imperial, as of the Papal power." In this we
may already discern the conception of an independent secular society
emancipated from the Church, and thus the idea of a State founded upon
law--an idea inspired by ancient Rome, and suggested by new practical
needs--is first put into words at the close of the Middle Ages which
had denied its possibility. But even Dante failed to see that the new
State must be intrinsically national, neither could he perceive that
the universal Empire he invoked, and now represented by Henry VII.,
was precisely what made it impossible for that State to be formed.
Thus the novel and almost prophetic portion of his book is neutralised
by its theoretic and scholastic elements. The independent secular
State, foreseen by his lofty intellect, was indeed bound to triumph;
but its victory implied the destruction of the mediaeval Empire of
which his book was intended to be the apotheosis. On the contrary,
the "Monarchia" became its epitaph, as some one has justly remarked.
Nevertheless, some vaguely distant conception of the State, and even of
the national State, occasionally flashes forth in Dante's book, though
still battling with the mists of revived classic lore. The Empire is
not, in fact, to be separated from the Eternal City that gave it birth,
and of which it is the heir. Rome, the natural and permanent seat of
empire, was to be restored to her ancient grandeur by the coming of the
emperor. Also, were not Rome and Italy one and the same thing? Henry
VII. was the representative, not only of law but of peace, freedom, and
civilisation, therefore by him Italy's woes would be brought to an end,
and Italy's freedom guaranteed. Was not Henry the master of the world?
Hence he could desire nothing more, and could not fail to be the just
lord and father of all, respecting every legally acquired right and
jurisdiction. But it was precisely the emperor's yearning to be lord
of all men and all things that was so opposed to the national spirit
that was already beginning to stir many minds, and that--if almost
unawares--Alighieri was so earnestly lauding, while practically denying
it by imploring the resurrection of the Empire.

This contradiction gave a truly tragic hue to Dante's mental state at
the time. He was profoundly sincere, profoundly persuaded of the truth
of his ideas. Inflamed with holy wrath against all supporters of the
Pope and the Angevins, mindful of the deeds he had seen committed in
Florence by Boniface VIII. and Charles of Valois, he had a premonition,
amounting almost to second sight, of the numerous calamities to be
wrought upon all Italy by the obstinacy of his opponents. But he failed
to see that his own political theory would have thrust Italy back
into the feudal Middle Ages, neutralising the work of the communes
and the result of the prolonged struggles, in which he himself had
been recently involved. The conflicting emotions stirring within him
found vent in the "Divine Comedy" depicting two different and often
contrasting worlds, and wherein the past is touched and transformed by
a new spirit, made the source of a new future, new art, new literature
and new civilisation. In this great poem the reality of human passion
and human life breaks through the mystic clouds of the Middle Ages, and
finally disperses them for ever. Therefore philosophers and historians
may find in the poem all the constituents of an age in which one form
of society was dying out, and another springing, almost visibly, to
life. But although the conflict of thought in Dante's mind might
produce immortal verse, it could not possibly create any efficient
political system.

On the latter point the advantage lay with the Florentines, inasmuch
as they always clung to actualities and the needs of the moment. They
weighed and counted their bales of silks and woollens, and calculated
the probable damage to their import and export trade from the triumph
of the Empire in Italy. They saw that it would inevitably ruin their
commerce; and by assuring victory to their foes, _i.e._, to the
magnates, Pisans, and many petty Italian tyrants, would overthrow their
own freedom and the government of the guilds. Was not this belief
justified by the fate of Milan, Cremona, and Brescia? This was why the
Florentines called the Guelph cities to their side, and in the name
of Italy, freedom, and their common independence, united them all in
a defensive alliance against the foreign foe. Nevertheless they had
also leagued with King Robert and espoused the cause of France and the
Pope, whose triumph was destined to prove fatal to Italian liberty and
independence. As we have previously shown, the nation could only be
built up on the ruins and by the destruction of both parties. The long
and difficult course of historic evolution requisite to prepare the
way for a distant future was then unknown to all. The Florentines only
thought of securing present safety, and in this they were well advised
and fortunate.


X.

Meanwhile that "crowned victim of his own fate," as Del Lungo calls
Henry VII., continued his advance with untroubled self-confidence.
The royal peacemaker felt no remorse at having drenched Italian
cities in blood and disseminated discord. Not even the loss of wife
and brother, the slaughter of his best soldiers, the desertion of
numerous adherents, nor the scathing contempt of his foes availed to
shake his self-assurance and certainty of success. Calm and composed
as ever, he entered Pisa on the 6th of March, 1312, was welcomed with
great pomp, and remained amid this truly friendly population until
the 23rd of April. While at Lausanne he had already received sixty
thousand florins from the Pisans, and they now showed the sincerity
of their submission to him by accepting new magistrates at his hands
and promising a second gift of money equal to the first.[602] Neither
did he feel the slightest alarm on hearing that the army of Robert's
brother, Prince John, had gained reinforcements in Rome.

That prince had brought with him a force of over six hundred Catalan
and Apulian horse, and had now been joined by two hundred of the best
Florentine cavalry, led by De la Rat, who, in addition to his Catalan
troops, had also collected one thousand foot. Fresh contingents had
poured in from Lucca, Sienna, and other towns. The Capitol, the Castle
of St. Angelo, and Trastevere, and all the fortresses were therefore
held by the prince. And as a final stroke, the Neapolitan king, after
first stating that he occupied Rome for the Empire, now declared openly
against Henry. Nevertheless the latter continued his march with only
one thousand horse and a body of infantry, and on the 7th of May, 1312,
entered the Eternal City. He quickly attacked and won the Capitol; but
in seeking to force his way to St. Peter's to grasp the Imperial crown,
a real battle took place in the streets; and a _sortie_ from Castle
St. Angelo repulsed him with heavy loss. Nor would his coronation have
been accomplished at all, had not the Roman people declared in his
favour and by threats of violence compelled the prelates to disregard
custom and perform the solemn rite in the Lateran Church on the 29th
of June. But Henry was now obliged to recognise that even the Pope
was adverse, when the latter commanded him to refrain from attacking
Naples, to make a twelvemonth's truce with the king, to leave Rome on
the day of his coronation, to renounce all rights over the Eternal
City, and never re-enter it without permission. At last the Pope had
dropped his mask, and the Florentines were proved good prophets. But at
the very moment in which their Guelph policy triumphed, and the breach
between Pope and emperor was so plainly revealed, the people proclaimed
Rome an Imperial city and their Capitol the permanent seat of the
emperor, whose authority was to be acknowledged as emanating from
the Roman people alone. "Dum sola tribunitia, exterminatis Patribus,
potestas adolevisset illo sub magistratu ... omnia haec parari Caesari,
ipsum evocandum in Urbem, vehendumque triumphaliter in Capitolium,
principatum ab sola plebe recogniturum."[603]

Dante's own idea was now uttered by the voice of Rome.

At last, and after much hesitation, Henry decided to adopt the advice
proffered by the great poet some time before, and went to lay siege to
Florence. Crossing the Roman Campagna in August, his army was decimated
by fever, and after the capture of Montevarchi and San Giovanni, he
halted at Figline.[604] The Florentines, without good commanders and
with most disorderly haste, marched a large force of infantry and 1,800
horse to the Castle of Incisa. But they then declined to accept battle,
and the emperor continued his journey by another route, vigorously
repulsing every _sortie_ made from Incisa for the purpose of arresting
his passage. On the 19th of September he invested Florence on all
sides, establishing his headquarters at San Salvi. The citizens, having
received no news from the army, were almost taken by surprise, but,
snatching their weapons, hurried to the walls under the banners of
the people, and accompanied by their bishop, sword in hand, together
with all his clergy. Two days later the troops sent to take the field
against the emperor made their way back to Florence across country;
reinforcements arrived from Lucca, Sienna, Pistoia, Bologna, Romagna,
and in short from all the cities of the League. Thus, Villani tells
us, an army was collected of 4,000 horse and innumerable infantry.
The emperor having only a force of 800 German knights, 1,000 Italian
horse, and a considerable body of foot, was merely able to ravage the
land. Fortunately for him, the year's harvest had been so abundant
that there was no difficulty in provisioning his troops. Even now,
in spite of their great numerical superiority, the Florentines still
shrank from attempting a pitched battle; but inside the town they
felt so completely secure that they only closed the gates facing the
emperor's camp, leaving the others open to traffic as in times of
peace. This state of things lasted to the month of November, but then
Henry's patience being altogether exhausted, he raised the siege and
set out for Poggibonsi and Pisa. The Florentines started in pursuit,
and attacked him several times on the road, with varying results.
The emperor tarried at Poggibonsi to the 6th of March, 1313, without
provisions, or funds, and his army was so reduced that his cavalry
had dwindled to 1,000 horse. Nevertheless he continued his march, and
although, according to Villani, his assailants were four to one, he
contrived to fight his way to Pisa, and arrived there on the 9th of
March.

At this time, although his health was ruined by mental worry and bodily
hardship, his purse emptied, and his army melted away, the emperor
was still calm and hopeful. In Pisa he made many attempts to pursue
the war by legal devices: depriving the Florentines of their judicial
rights, dismissing their judges and notaries, imposing heavy fines,
and condemning many of their citizens to confiscation and punishment.
And regardless of the fact that these sentences had no effect, he
continued to launch them as before. He prohibited the Florentines from
coining money, while permitting Ubizzo Spinola of Genoa and the Marquis
of Monferrato to fabricate within their own territories false florins
marked with the Florentine stamp. Naturally an act so damaging to the
public credit provoked severe blame.[605] He condemned King Robert as
a traitor to the Empire, and made alliance with Frederic of Sicily and
the Genoese. He also determined to march against Naples, although the
Pope had threatened excommunication on any one attacking that kingdom,
which was considered a fief of the Church. Burning with zeal for this
new enterprise, he demanded money and men from Lombardy and Germany.
He was thus enabled to collect 2,500 foreign and 1,500 Italian horse,
besides an army of foot soldiers. Seventy galleys were equipped by the
Genoese; fifty by King Frederic. The Pisans, who had already sacrificed
everything to his cause, managed to furnish twenty galleys. He also
obtained a certain amount of money, and set off on the 8th of August,
1313, with some reasonable hope of success. But his sudden death at
Buonconvento, on the 24th of May, brought everything to an end.

On the 27th of the same month the Florentines exultantly announced to
their allies that "Jesus Christ had procured the death of that most
haughty tyrant, Henry, entitled King of the Romans and Emperor, by
the rebel persecutors of Holy Church, to wit, your Ghibellines and
our foes."[606] During Henry's life they had conferred the lordship
of Florence on Robert for five years, and now stretched the term to
three more, on the well-understood condition that their free, Guelph,
and popular government should be left intact. All they asked from him
was a military leader bearing the king's flag, acting in his name,
contributing a few sturdy men at arms, and competent to take command of
the citizen army in order to protect the Republic from possible attacks
on the part of Pisa or Genoa, and against Ghibelline captains such as
Uguccione della Fagguiola and others. Pisa and Uguccione were their
most dreaded foes. The latter, indeed, had already hired one thousand
of Henry's soldiers, composing the first of those Free Companies
destined to speedily become the real scourge of Italy.[607]

The Pope, now reduced to be the slave of France, threw himself into the
arms of King Robert, and named him Senator of Rome, thus causing the
return thither of Angevin vicars. As the Pontiff hoped to be able to
assume the authority of the Empire during the interregnum, he annulled
Henry's decree against Robert, and appointed him Imperial Vicar in
Italy for a term extending to two months after the election of the next
emperor.

Notwithstanding Robert's augmented power and his lordship over their
city, the Florentines were now vastly improved in strength, both
morally and materially, since they had foreseen future events far more
accurately than others, had been the chief authors of all that had
occurred, and were the friends and allies of those who had triumphed
with them. The people were substantially supreme; the magnates were
overthrown; and trade which had gone on uninterruptedly during the
war, attained more vigorous development now that peace was restored.
But what had become of the Guelph Federation, and of the name of Italy
invoked to call it into being? All had vanished in a flash. The very
fact of the Florentines now feeling compelled to crave protection from
a king, clearly proves that their vast prosperity, notwithstanding the
Republic, had neither sufficient self-reliance nor strength to preserve
its independence unaided. This state of things necessarily involved new
complications and new dangers which could be in no case long averted.
The Italian Commune was doomed to decay; the modern State destined to
be born; but the moment of its birth lay beyond a period of oppression.
The same fate was already distantly impending over Florence.

After Henry VII. was dead, both the nature of the Empire and its
relations with Italy were changed. So, too, the Pope's alliance with
France radically transformed the attitude of the Papal power towards
the Italian communes, for it became increasingly hostile to their
freedom and independence. The Middle Ages had come to an end, and an
entirely new epoch was now opening in the history of Florence and of
Italy in general.


THE END.




FOOTNOTES:


[1] Originally published in the Milan _Politecnico_, March, 1866.

[2] "Lettres sur l'hist. de France." close of Letter xxv.

[3] See, for example, Goro Dati's "Storia di Firenze."

[4] Since this paper first appeared many important researches have
been made on the origin of Florence and its Commune, particularly by
Professor D. O. Hartwig, of whose estimable work we shall speak later
on. Several general histories of Florence have also been published, of
which the more noteworthy are the "Storia della Repubblica di Firenze,"
by the Marquis Gino Capponi (Florence, Barbera, 1875, 2 vols.), and
"L'Histoire de Florence," by Mons. Perrens (Paris, 1877-90, 9 vols.),
both to be mentioned farther on.

[5] At the time when this sentence was written Malespini was held to be
anterior to Villani, and the latter his plagiarist. Later, the contrary
was proved by Scheffer-Boichorst, many of whose arguments admit of no
reply. But Marchese G. Capponi refused to be convinced, on the strength
of certain indications establishing, as he thought, that Malespini
had written at an earlier date than Villani. Later again the diligent
researches begun by Professor Lami confirmed the fact that Malespini's
work is a compilation, chiefly, from Villani, and perhaps, though only
here and there, from some other chronicler of possibly earlier date.
The latter hypothesis would explain the deductions of Gino Capponi.

[6] Published in Florence, 1838, 2 vols., at "The Sign of Dante"
printing office. See also Gervinus, "Geschichte der florentinischen
Historiographie." Frankfurt, 1833.

[7] Capellae, "Commentarii," of which eleven editions appeared between
1531 and 1542. Ranke, "Zur Kritik neurer Geschichtschreiber." I may now
add that in my opinion Ranke was exaggeratedly hostile to Guicciardini,
whose historic merits are proved by documentary evidence. _Vide_ my
work on Machiavelli, end of vol. iii.

[8] Here allusion is made to Capponi's "History," which was still
unpublished at the time.

[9] _Vide_ "Discorso Storico," chap. i.

[10] Gino Capponi, "Lettere sui Longobardi."

[11] Everything connected with the division of the land has been the
theme of much dispute, both in Italy and abroad. It was learnedly
treated by Troya, in his work on the "Condizione dei Romani vinti
dai Longobardi"; Capponi and Capei discussed it with much subtlety
in their "Lettere sui Longobardi" (appendix of the "Archivio Storico
Italiano," vols. i. and ii.); so too Manzoni, Balbo, &c. The question
turns on the interpretation of two passages in "Paulus Diaconus."
The passage alluding to the first division made, when the Longobards
seized one-third of the revenues of the land, is clear enough: "His
diebus multi nobilium Romanorum ob cupiditatem interfecti sunt. Reliqui
vero per hospites divisi, ut terciam partem suarum frugum Langobardis
persolverent, tributarii efficiuntur." But the other is much less
clear, and has been variously interpreted. This is the reading most
generally adopted: "Hujus in diebus" (_i.e._, in Autari's reign)
"ob restaurationem Regni, duces qui tunc erunt, omnem substantiarum
suarum mediatatem regalibus usibus tribuunt; populi tamen agravati per
langobardos hospites, partiuntur." But a tenth-century version, in the
Ambrosian Codex, runs as follows: "Aggravati pro Longobardis, hospitia
partiuntur." The division of the land (_hospitia_), and not of the
fruits of the land, would seem more clearly indicated in this second
reading, accepted by Balbo. Prof. Capei, on the other hand, while
accepting the first reading, asserts that the word _partiuntur_ should
be interpreted in an active sense. The conquered _divided_ their lands
with their conquerors, and therefore were oppressed (_aggravati_),
being compelled to yield one-half of their estates, but they had at
least the advantage of retaining the other half in their own possession.

[12] Among other authorities, _vide_ Gino Capponi, note to doc. 3, vol.
i. of the "Archivio Storico Italiano."

[13] Codex 772 of the Vatican Palatine Library, containing the
so-called Lombard collection of Longobard laws. The discovery of the
Florentine annals on the back of sheet 71 is owed to the librarian
Foggini. He communicated his find to Professor Lami, who published
part of the fragment, with notes. The whole was afterwards edited by
Professors Pertz and Hartwig, and finally Professor C. Paoli issued an
exact photo-type of the fragment in No. 1 of the "Archivio paleografico
Italiano," edited by Prof. Monaci, of Rome.

[14] This is a codex from Santa Maria Novella, now No. 776, E. A.
(Suppressed Monasteries section), of the Magliabecchian Library. It
consists of forty-six records, part of which (the first twenty-five,
down to the year 1217) were published by Fineschi in his "Memorie
Storiche degli uomini illustri di S. M. Novella," vol. i. pp. 330-332.

[15] D. O. Hartwig, "Quellen und Forschungen zur Altesten Geschichte
der Stadt Florenz." Part i. of this work was published in Marburg,
1875; part ii., containing both series of annals, at Halle, 1880.

[16] First published by Fineschi (op. cit., vol. i. p. 257) and
afterwards by Hartwig (ii. 185 and fol.), with many notes and
additions. Some new names of Consuls are contained in the so-called
"Chronicle" of Brunetto Latini, to be mentioned later on.

[17] One was discovered by Pro. C. Paoli in the Laurentian Library,
Codex xxviii. 8, _vide_ his paper "Di un libro del Dr. O. Hartwig,"
in the "Archivio Storico It.," tom. ix., anno 1882. Other copies were
discovered by the late Prof. Lami, who intended to mention them in an
essay on Malespini.

[18] Discovered, but not published, by Follini, the editor of
Malespini, in a codex of the Magliabecchian Library at Florence, shelf
ii. No. 67.

[19] In the Archives of Lucca, in a codex of the Orsucci Collection, O.
40.

[20] This date (Hartwig i. 64) is not found in the Latin version, which
is consequently held to be of earlier date.

[21] "Appendice alle Letture di famiglia," vol. i. Florence: Cellini,
1854.

[22] Hartwig, "Quellen und Forschungen," etc.

[23] _Vide_ Professor Santini, in pt. i. doc. 18 of his forthcoming
work, gives a document dated June 14, 1188, with the signature, "Ego
Sanzanome index et notarius." In the Acts of the Tuscan League of 1197
(Santini, vol. i. 21, p. 37) we find the name of "Sanzanome de Sancto
Miniato" among the signatures following that of the Consul of San
Miniato.

[24] Professor Paoli makes the same statement in his before-mentioned
work. The Codex in question is the Magliab.-Strozz., Cl. xxv. 571. The
"Gesta" were published about the same time by Hartwig (op. cit.) and by
the Tuscan "Deputazione di Storia patria" (Cellini, 1876).

[25] Just at this point there are several gaps in the Codex.

[26] _Vide_ Weiland's edition in the Mon^{ta.}-Germ^{a.} xxii. 377-475,
and the same editor's remarks in the "Archiv. der Gesellschaft fuer
aeltere deutsche Geschichte," vol. xii. p. 1 and fol.

[27] Ciampi, the editor of one part of it, and Scheffer Boichorst in
his "Florentiner Studien."

[28] Prof. Santini, who gave much attention to the subject, discovered
in Florence twelve copies of Martin Polono, and three of its
translations, all of the fourteenth century. Other copies have been
found since by Prof. Lami.

[29] "Impressum Florentiae apud Sanctum Jacobum de Ripoli, Anno Domini
mcccclxxviii." Other editions were produced in the sixteenth century.
Prof. Santini has discovered three fourteenth-century MSS. of this work
in Florence.

[30] The Naples Codex is marked xiii.-F. 16. A similar codex of the
fifteenth century, carried down to the death of Henry of Luxemburg, is
in the Laurentian-Gaddiano Collection, cxix.

[31] In pt. ii. of his "Quellen," &c., where these extracts are given
under the title of "Gesta Florentinorum und deren Ableitungen und
Fortsetzungen."

[32] In mentioning certain Saracen nobles, sent as prisoners that year
_alla Chiesa di Roma_, he adds: "_et io gli viddi_" ("and I beheld
them").

[33] It comes down to 1303, but the concluding paragraph seems to be
written by a later hand. But the preceding paragraph narrates events of
1297, and Brunetto Latini certainly died before then (1294).

[34] Florence National Library, cl. xxv. Cod. 566.

[35] This has also been clearly proved by Prof. Santini's numerous
verifications.

[36] Two very short records, or rather notes, were added by another
hand where the gap occurs, namely: "Pope Adrian V., born of the Fiesco
family of Genoa, 1276, reigned as Pope thirty days; the Chair vacant
twenty-eight days. Pope Innocent VI. elected, who came from Portugal."
The second note is certainly erroneous. Innocent VI. (Etienne d'Albert)
was a Frenchman of Limousin birth, and was raised to the Papacy in
1352. But Adrian's successor was John XXI., a Portuguese. The author
mistook _Johannes_ (probably written in an abbreviated form) for
_Innocentius_, XXI. for VI. Even in other chronicles the two records
stand together, and almost in the same words, but without the same
blunder.

[37] Codex Laur. Gadd. 77. On the back are these words: "Cronica
romanorum Pontificum et Imperatorum." This title explains the
connection of the Chronicle with Martin Polono, and why the MS. so long
escaped the researches of students of Florentine history. The work of
Professor Santini from which we have quoted being an essay sent in for
his B.A. examination, was discussed at the Istituto Superiore, and an
account given of it in the "Arch. Stor. It.," Series iv. vol. xii. No.
iv. p. 483 and fol., 1883. The paper itself has remained unpublished,
as Alvisi's discovery made its demonstrations superfluous. Santini
regarded the Chronicle as one of great importance, since it records the
names of certain consuls, omitted in all the others, but contained in
newly discovered documents, now in type, and forming part of the work
that will soon, we hope, be published by Signor Santini.

[38] Baluzio Manzi, "Miscellanea," tom. iv. This Orsucci Codex, in
the Lucca Archives, has been very minutely described by Hartwig (vol.
i. xxx. and fol.), who, as before mentioned, brought out the Italian
version of the legend he had extracted from it.

[39] VIII. 36.

[40] I. 1.

[41] VIII. 36.

[42] In the Acta Sanctorum.

[43] "L'estoire de Eracles empereur, et la conqueste de la terre
d'outremer (Receuil des historiens des Croisades)," translated into
Latin, Greek, German, Spanish, Italian. For the sources consulted by
Villani, _vide_ Busson, "Die florentinische Geschichte der Malespini"
(Innsbrueck, 1869), and Scheffer-Boichorst, "Die Geschichte Malespini,
eine Faelschung," in his "Florentiner Studien."

[44] _Vide_ Paoli's article on Hartwig's work.

[45] "II y en eut (des consuls) tout au moins en 1101." And after
quoting the document he adds this note:--"Devant de fait si positif,
il serait oiseux de S'arreter aux conjectures des auteurs meme presque
contemporains," p. 209.

[46] Perrens, pp. 152-4.

[47] Borghini, "Discorsi," vol. ii. pp. 27 and 93. Florence, 1755.

[48] The ninth and last volume is now published, and extends to the
fall of the Republic (1530-32).

[49] Concerning the numerous errors contained in this first volume, Dr.
Hartwig has written at some length in Sybil's "Historiche Zeitschrift,"
vol. iii. No. 3, anno 1868. Of the other volumes nothing need be said
at this point.

[50] Servius writes, in his Commentary on the Aenead (bk. iii. v. 104):
"Dardanus Iovis filius et Electrae, profectus de Corytho [Cortona],
civitate Tusciae, primus venit ad Troyam." And farther on (Com.,
bk. iii. v. 187), he says that "Dardanus et Iasius fratres ... cum
ex Etruria proposuissent sedes exteras petere ecc." In tracing the
genealogy of Aeneas, he begins thus: "Ex Electra Atalantis filia et
Iove Dardanus nascitur." This must have partly inspired the legend,
although, according to the latter, Electra is the wife of Atlas and the
daughter of Jove. _Vide_ Hartwig, vol. i. xxi.

[51] Even Brunetto Latini, in bk. i. of his "Tesoro," makes the
Catiline legend relate to the origin of Florence, records the great
slaughter occurring at the battle wherein Catiline was routed, and also
the subsequent pestilence. "E per quella grande peste di quella grande
uccisione, fu appellata la citta di Pistoia" (bk. i. chap. 37, in the
vulgate of Bono Giamboni). The principal authorities for the historical
information in the "Tesoro" are Dictys of Crete, and the "De excidio
Troie," attributed to Dares the Phrygian. Undoubtedly the latter is
also one of the sources of our legend. _Vide_ Thor Sundy, "Della vita
e delle opere di Brunetto Latini," translated, with many additions, by
Prof. R. Renier. Florence: Le Monnier, 1884.

[52] The "Libro fiesolano" styles them Africans instead of Franks,
_una compagnia venuta d'Africa_, as elsewhere, instead of _Ottone_
or _Otto_, it says _Ceto_, a blunder also found in the MS. that was
printed. The blunders probably originated from some ignorant copyist
of the legend, and were frequently repeated by later scribes. John of
Salisbury ("Polikratikus," vi. 17, edit. Giles), in mentioning the
cities built by Brennus, according to history, repeats the same story
of Siena contained in the legend. He remarks that all this is not real
history, _sed celebris traditio est_, adding, however, that tradition
is confirmed by the fact that in their constitution, beauty and
customs, the Siennese resemble "ad gallos et Britones a quibus originem
contraxerunt." John of Salisbury's words are also recorded by Benvenuto
da Imola in his Commentary on the "Divina Commedia," where he mentions
that Dante intended to allude to this resemblance ("Inferno," xxix.
121) in the lines:

          "Or fu giammai
      Gente si vana come la senese?
      Certo non la francesca si d'assai."

Boccaccio's "Commento" gives the same explanation of these lines.

[53] The Latin compilation says: _quingentos annos et plus_; the
Italian, and more modern versions, merely say, "five hundred years."

[54] Even history tells us that Totila was in Tuscany towards the
middle of the sixth century.

[55] "Libro fiesolano", chap. xv.

[56] This is also mentioned by Hartwig, i., xxiv., and fol.

[57] The first to note this was Hegel: "Ueber die Anfange der
florentinischen Geschichtschreibung," in Sybel's Historical Journal,
No. 1, anno 1876.

[58] Chaps. xvi. and xvii. of Follini's edition.

[59] Villani, i. 41.

[60] Villani, iii. 3.

[61] _Vide_ G. Rosa, "Delle Origini di Firenze," in the "Archivio
Storico Ital.," Series iii., vol. ii. p. 62 and fol. Hartwig, op. cit.,
and Milani, "Scavi di Mercato Vecchio," in the "Notizie degli scavi nel
mese d' Aprile, 1887, Atti dell' Accademia dei Lincei."

[62] In digging a sewer in the street called Borgo dei Greci, in
1886, the discovery was made in Professor Milani's presence, "at the
depth of about three metres beneath the street level, and exactly
beneath the pavement of the first circuit of the Amphitheatre,
... of a half _asse onciale_, weighing 12 grammes 25, undoubtedly
coeval with the construction of the Florentine Amphitheatre. This
kind of coin assuredly dates from 89 B.C., and was issued after the
Plautian-Papirian decree reducing the weight of the aes from 1 oz. to
1/2 oz. The aes cut with a chisel were only in currency for a short
time, and were withdrawn when the new coins were issued. Accordingly
they must have ceased by the date of the second triumvirate (43
B.C.), when the aes was further reduced to the third of an ounce. We
may therefore accept the conclusion that the Florence Amphitheatre
was of the Sullian period. Opposed to this conclusion is the fact
that, according to the report of Dione (li. 23), the first stone
amphitheatre built in Rome was that of Taurus, dating from anno 30
B.C. But recalling how Cicero accused Sulla of having wasted treasures
on magnificent buildings, exactly when he was under Fiesole, one is
justified in assigning the construction of the Florence amphitheatre,
and also of that of Pompei, to Sulla's day. Likewise the basements of
the _Tuscanic_ columns, found _in situ_ near the Amphitheatre, and some
architectural fragments discovered in 1887 on the south side of Santa
Maria del Fiore, confirmed the opinion that some of the chief public
buildings of Florence were connected with the times of Sulla and also
with the last days of the Republic." (From a letter by Prof. Milani
addressed to myself.)

[63] The inscription (now lost) beginning thus: "Col[_onia_] Iul[_ia_]
Aug[_usta_], Flor[_entia_]", should be differently interpreted,
according to Mommsen, as referring to Vienne in Dauphiny. _Vide_
"Hermes," 1883, p. 176 and p. 180, note 1. Prof. Milani takes the same
view regarding the new and important inscription recently found in the
excavation of the Mercato Vecchio, containing the following words:

      "... Genio Coloniae
       ... Florentiae."

_Vide_ "Scoperte epigrafiche nel Centro di Firenze," in the "Nazione,"
April 15, 1890.

[64] Milani, "Relazione degli scavi," &c.

[65] Villani, ii. 1 and 2, and also the "Chronica de Origine Civitatis."

[66] Ibid., ii. 1, 2, 3.

[67] _Vide_ Hodgkin, "Italy and her Invaders," vol. iv. p. 446 and fol.

[68] Lami, "Lezioni," pt. i. p. 293. From a document also quoted by
Maratori and Tiraboschi, it would seem that Florence was included, as
it were, in the _city of Fiesole_; and therefore some of the Florentine
churches were described as being in Fiesole. _Vide_ also pt. ii. p. 429
of the same work.

[69] This is described in detail by Lami, Borghini, and Hartwig.

[70] Villani, iii. 3.

[71] Ibid., iv. 1.

[72] Lami, "Lezioni," at preface to pts. cvi.-viii; Hartwig, i. 85, 86.

[73] Villani, iv. 6.

[74] Villani, iv. 7.

[75] It is related by St. Pier Damiano in the letter quoted farther on.

[76] Petri Damiani, "Epistolarum libri viii." Parisiis ex-officina
nivelliana, 1610, _vide_ p. 727. The epistle (p. 721 and fol.) is
addressed: "Dilectis in Christo civibus florentinis, Petrus peccator,
monachus, fraternae charitatis obsequium."

[77] Tocco, "L'Eresia nel Medio Evo," bk. i. chap. iii. pp. 207-228.

[78] Passerini, "Arch. Storico Italiano," New Series, vol. iii. pp. 43,
44; Perrens, i. 85 and fol.; Hartwig, i. 88, 89; Capecelatro, "Vita di
S. Pier Damiano," bk. vii. two vols. Florence: Barbera, 1862.

[79] "Ad hec ille se inquit, neutrum jubere, neutrum velle, neutrum
recipere. Quin etiam edictum a Preside per legatos suos impetravit, ut
quicumque laicorum, quicumque clericorum se ut episcopum non coleret
suique imperio non obediret, ad Presidem victus non duceretur, sed
traeretur: si quis autem his minis territus, de civitate fugeret,
ad dominium Potestatis assumeretur quicquid possedisset." Thus runs
the letter dated _Millesimo lxviii idus februari_, and beginning,
"Alexandro prime sedis reverentissimo, ac universali episcopo,
clerus et populus Florentinus sincere devotionis obsequium." It was
repeatedly, but incorrectly printed (_vide_ Brocchi, "Vite di Santi
e Beati," p. 145. Florence, 1742; "Acta Sanctorum," iii. luglio, pp.
359, 379), in the two lives of St. G. Gualberto; included in the
Laurentian Cod. xx. 22, in sec. xi. The letter placed at the end of
the Codex itself is written in a different and somewhat later hand;
but, according to the opinion of Prof. Paoli, who examined it at my
request, the writing has every characteristic of the eleventh century,
"and could not possibly be of later date than the first half, or rather
first quarter of the twelfth century." It more resembles a narrative
in an epistolary form than a genuine letter. The title given it in the
Codex also supports this view: "Incipit textus miraculi quod Dominus,"
&c. We shall have to recur to the subject later on.

At any rate, it is plain that the _Potestas_ above-mentioned has no
relation with the Podesta of a later period. Here the term signifies
_superior authority_--_i.e._, that of the Duke Goffredo. The _Preside_
I consider to mean Goffredo's representative in Florence. Both are
old-fashioned, rhetorical terms, similar to those afterwards employed
by Sanzanome.

[80] The same letter, after narrating how certain persons, having taken
refuge in an oratory, were threatened with expulsion, "extra Civitatem
pellerentur," unless they made submission, also adds that those persons
refused to obey. "Hincque factum est ut ... municipal. presid ... illos
extra emunitatem oratori ... eiceret." The two abbreviated words in the
Codex were printed in many different ways, changing the verb and often
altering the whole phrase, to the reader's great confusion. Several
colleagues I have consulted agree with my view, that the words should
be rendered _municipale praesidium_.

[81] This description is also taken from the same document.

[82] The _Nuova Antologia_ of Rome, June 1, 1890.

[83] In the Laurentian Codex previously referred to.

[84] _Rhetor_ was then synonymous with _causidicus_.

[85] Ficker's work pays great attention to this point, and is also
treated by Fitting. _Vide_ "Die Anfaenge der Rechtsschule zu Bologna."
Berlin and Leipzig, 1888.

[86] "Lege Digestorum libris inserta, considerata." So styled in a
_placito_ of 1076, pronounced by an envoy of Beatrice at Marturi,
near Poggibonsi ("prope plebem Sancte Marie, territurio fiorentino"),
where the presence is also noted of Pepone, the precursor of Irnerius
(Werner). A Florentine, who was contesting certain lands with the
monastery, adduced the _temperis praescripto_, on the authority of the
Digest, that, according to the legal custom of the time, he produced in
court. _Vide_ Fitting, op. cit., p. 88. Zdekauer, "Sull' Origine del
manoscritto Pisano delle Pandette Giustiniane." Sienna: Torrini, 1890.
In a document of 1061, treating of a dispute between two Florentine
Churches (_vide_ Della Rena e Camici, vols. ii. 2, p. 99), we find
"Indices secundum romanae legis tenorem, utramque ceperunt inquirere
partem." According to Ficker, the judges in question were Florentines:
"und zwar schienen das die gewoehnlichen staedtischen Iudices von Florenz
zu sein." Ficker, iii. par. 469, at p. 90. Goro Dati, a chronicler who
died at the beginning of the fifteenth century, stated in his Chronicle
that the Florence notaries were the best reputed of all, although the
most celebrated doctors of law were those of Bologna. _Vide_ Dati,
"Storia di Firenze," Florentine edition of 1735, at p. 133.

[87] Petrus Damiani, "De parentelae gradibus," in his "Opera, Opusc,
viii," chaps. i. and vii. He combats here the opinion expressed by
the _sapientes_ of Ravenna, in contradiction to the canonical law, as
to the degrees of relationship prohibiting marriage. Touching a wise
man he asserts to be a Florentine, he adds: "promptulus cerebrosus ac
dicax, scilicet acer ingenio, mordax eloquio vehemens argumento."

[88] Ficker says, in mentioning the before-quoted document of 1061:
"Diese Romagnolen scheinen nun weiter kaum nur zufaellig zu Florenz
gewesen zu sein."

[89] As regards the ever-increasing action of Roman law in Tuscany
there is a very remarkable passage in the Pisan Statutes of 1161, in
which it is said of that city, "a multis retro temporibus, vivendo lege
romana, retentis quibusdam de lege longobarda." In a Siennese document
of 1176, edited by Ficker (vol. iv. doc. 148), the Consuls declare:
"Item nos professi sumus lege romana cum tota Civitate vivere." The
mixture of Roman with Longobard or other legal systems is very frequent
throughout the whole of the eleventh century, and even later on. Often,
women who professed to live according to the Roman law, declared
themselves at the same time as being under the _mundium_ of their sons
or of others.

[90] Lami, "Lezioni," preface, p. cxv and fol. _Vide_ also
the documents published in Fiorentini's "Memorie delle gran
Contessa Matilde" (Lucca, 1756); Della Rena e Camici, "Serie
cronologica-diplomatica degli antichi duchi e marchesi di Toscana," pt.
ii. These documents clearly show in what manner Matilda's tribunal was
composed.

[91] _Vide_ Fiorentini, doc. at p. 168; Della Rena e Camici, pt. ii.
vol. ii. docs. xv. and xvi. pp. 106 and 108; vol. iii. p. 9; vol. iv.
doc. xiv. p. 61.

[92] "_Unthaetiger Vorsitzende_," says Ficker, when clearly proving this
fact. Vol. iii. par. 573, p. 294 and fol.

[93] On this head Ficker remarks: "Dass schon frueher die
Gerichtsbarheit in der Stadt nicht durch die Feudalgewalt, sondern
durch Buerger der Stadt als rechtskundige Koenigsboten geuebt wurde." Vol.
iii. par. 584, pp. 315-16.

[94] "Consuetudines etiam perversas a tempore Bonifactii Marchionis
duriter eisdem impositas, omnino interdicimus." Ficker, vol. i. par.
136, pp. 255-6, and the text of the document in vol. iv. pp. 124-5;
Pawinski, "Zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Consulats in den Comunen Nord
und Mittel-Italiens." Berlin, 1867, p. 29.

[95] "Nec Marchionem aliquem in Tusciam mittemus sine laudatione
hominum duodecim electorum in Colloquio facto sonantibus campaniis."
Murat., "Antiq." iv. 20. Also _vide_ Ficker and Giesebrecht, before
cited, and Pawinski at p. 31.

It has been suggested that some interpolations have been made in these
patents (of which only an ancient copy survives, not the original), and
especially in the second, but Ficker and Pawinski oppose this view. At
any rate, the substance of both documents is now accepted by all the
most competent writers. _Vide_ Ficker, vol. iii. p. 408; Giesebrecht
(4th ed.), vol. iii. pp. 537-8.

[96] Amari, "Storia dei Musulmani in Sicilia," vol. iii. p. 1 and fol.

[97] We use the word _grandi_ here for the sake of clearness, although
in this particular sense it only came into general use in Florence at
a later date, and more particularly in 1293 in the days of Giano della
Bella.

[98] Pawinski, p. 31, note 3.

[99] "Nec domum in predictis terminis relevari, neque ad triginta sex
brachia interdici, permittemus" (Pawinski, p. 34).

[100] Bonaini, "Statuti inediti della citta di Pisa," vol. i. p. 16.

[101] Frequent mention is made of counts and viscounts of whom, so far,
there was no record in Florence. Later on, from causes that will be
related, some few were found there.

[102] But I cannot agree with Pawinski when, in noting this
characteristic of Pisa and other similar communes, he neglects the
popular, commercial element, that even in Pisa, as elsewhere, was very
influential, and considers that the birth of the Italian Commune should
be solely attributed to the nobles.

[103] "Nisi fortitan communi Consilio Civitatis, vel maioris
partis Bonorum vel Sapientum ... ad commune Colloquium Civitatis
... supra-dictorum hominum consensu et omnibus Pisae habitantibus"
(Bonaini, op. cit., vol. i. p. 16).

[104] Murat., "Antiq.," iii., 1099. A poem attributed to Guido da Pisa
narrates the campaign of 1087 carried on by the Pisans, in alliance
with Genoa, Amalfi, and Rome, against the Saracens in Africa, and cites
the names of four Pisans:--

      "Vocat ad se Petrum et Sismundum
         Principales Consules,
       Lambertum et Glandulfum
         Cives cari [clari?] nobiles."

This, however, is a poetical work, and in order to accept it as a proof
that these Consuls existed in 1087 it would be necessary to carry back
to that year, at least, the first _concordia_ of Bishop Daiberto. This
might not be impossible, seeing that he held the bishopric from 1085
to 1092, when he was named archbishop. _Vide_ Pawinski, p. 31, note
3. Leonardo Vernese recounts the expedition to the Balearic Isles
(1113-15) in his "Carmen," and says:--

      "Inde duo et denos de culmine nobilitatis
       Constituere viros, quibus est permissa potestas
       Consulis atque ducis."

But the existence of Consuls at that time has been already proved by
other documents. _Vide_ Pawinski, pp. 38-9.

[105] The chronicler designates the chief families as _anteriores_,
possibly because they were the first to settle in Venice; he represents
them as a supreme and governing class, and in the list he gives of them
mentions what trades they carried on. "Cerbani de Cerbia venerunt,
anteriores fuerunt de omni artificio ingeniosi. Signati (variant:
Cugnati) Tribuni Ianni appellati sunt, anteriores fuerunt, mirabilia
artificia facere sciebant caliditate ingenii. Aberorlini ... anteriores
fuerunt; non aliud operabantur nisi negocia, sed advari et increduli."
And so on regarding other families exercising from generation to
generation the same trade, commerce, or liberal profession. As to the
guilds or _ministeria_, we find many expressions affording hints of
their embryo organisation. "Hetolus autem appellatus est, quia ipse
erat princeps de his qui ministerii erant retinendis." They were
sadlers, cattle-herds, &c. Many more of these families are named in the
list given in the Chronicle, and all seems to denote the continuation
of a state of things that had existed during the lower Empire.

[106] This document is in the Vatican (Urb. 440), and has also been
examined by Gfrorer. The ironsmith, Giovanni Sagornino, "insimul cum
cunctis meis parentibus," appeals first to the Doge Pietro Barbolano
(1026-31), and then to the Doge Domenico Flabiabico (1032-43), against
the _gastaldo_ of the guild, who sought to compel him to labour at
iron-work for the prisons in the palace yard, whereas Sagornino
asserted his right, according to custom, of making the iron-work at his
own house, when fulfilling his gratuitous task for the State. A regular
suit was carried on; and being decided in favour of the appellant, the
latter was permitted to do the work in his own shop. All this proves
that well-defined traditional customs prevailed before the guild
possessed written statutes (sec. xiii.), since these would have been
mentioned had they existed at the time.

The document we have quoted speaks at one point of the _gastaldo of
the doge_, and at another alludes to him as the _gastaldo of the
smiths_, because the director of the guild held his nomination from the
doge. This is clearly evidenced in the thirteenth century by a decree
(_pro-missione_) of the Doge Jacopo Tiepolo, dated March 6, 1229, and
by another of the Doge Marco Morosini (June 13, 1249). Thus we see,
on the one hand, how much the organisation of the Venetian guilds
differed from that of the Florentine, while, on the other, we note how
ancient and persistent in all Italian communes was the character of
their institutions in general and of the trade guilds in particular.
For the details given in this and the preceding note we are indebted to
Prof. Monticolo, a man of great learning, and now engaged in important
researches on Venetian history, of which the results will soon be
published. Meanwhile we seize this occasion to express our thanks in
print.

P.S.--We may now add that Prof. Monticolo has already begun to publish
his discoveries in "Le Fonti della Storia d'Italia," issued by the
Istituto Storico Italiano.

[107] Repetti, article on Gangalandi and Monte Orlando.

[108] "Dum in Dei nomine, Domina inclita Comitissa Matilda, Ducatrix,
stante ea in obsedione Prati," &c. Anno 1107. _Vide_ "Fiorentini," op.
cit., bk. ii. p. 299. Villani, vol. iv. pp. 25 and 26; Hartwig, vol.
ii. pp. 45 and 47; Repetti, art. "Prato"; "Arch. Stor. It.," Storie
v. vol. v. disp. i., p. 108 and fol. Villani's narrative, however, is
crammed with fantastic details concerning Prato. The destruction of
Monte Orlando is not mentioned in vol. i. of the "Annales," which only
begin with the year 1110; but is recorded in the Codex Neap. and in
Tolomeo da Lucca.

[109] The "Annales florentini," ii., followed by Villani, merely
relate the destruction of the castle in 1113, without any comments,
for the next event they mention relates to the year 1135. The "Annales
florentini," i., say nothing about it in 1113, and place the "secunda
et ultima destruccio murorum" in 1114. In 1119 they record two other
attacks on the castle, "quem marchio Rempoctus defendebat": by
the second of which the Florentines "Monte Cascioli ignem (_sic_)
consumpserunt." It seems clear that three attacks were made in
succession, and farther dispute on the point would be superfluous.

[110] The "Annales," i. and ii., omit this event. The Neap. Codex
assigns it, as does Villani, to the year 1117, but only says that the
Pisans went to the Balearic Isles, and that "the Florentines guarded
the city of Pisa" (Hartwig, ii. 272). The same account is given by
Tolomeo da Lucca, but he dates the event in 1118; so, too, the pseudo
Brunetto Latini, who records the gift of two porphyry columns, "by
reason that the Florentines guarded their lands, while they were at
the war," but adds nothing more to this statement. As to the error of
date, we will merely remark that Capmany, in his "Memorias historicas
sobra la marina ... de Barcelona," vol. i. p. 10, after narrating the
expedition of 1113-15, goes on to say that Raimondo Berengario III.
came to Pisa and Genoa in 1118, in order to promote another campaign.
Perhaps the remembrance of this visit contributed to the mistake, the
which, once made, was repeated by many subsequent writers.

[111] Dr. Hartwig quotes particulars received from Dr. Wuestenfeld of
a patent dated 1114, which would seem to show that the Florentines
also took part in the expedition, in which case, he observes, the
columns might have been the gift of the Pisans, and nevertheless part
of the spoil taken in common. I caused a search to be made for the
diploma in the Pisan Archives, and obtained it through the courtesy
of Prof. Lupi. It is inserted in another patent, dated _vi. idus
Augusti, 1233_, whereby King James of Aragon confirms the Pisans in the
privileges conferred on them by the preceding diploma that "Berengarius
Barchinione gloriosissimus Comes Pisanis fecit." This older patent is
reproduced in the document, and bears this date: "M.C. quarto decimo
... septimo idus septembris, indictione sexta." Although several other
words stand between those of decimo and septimo, this mode of writing
the date may have been another cause of the blunder committed by the
chroniclers who dated the event in 1117.

Whatever may be thought of these very disputable theories, it is
certain, on the other hand, that the privileges were conferred on the
_populo pisano_, and that three of their Consuls were invested with
them, and received "vice aliorum Consulum tociusque pisani populi,"
and that this concession was made "coram marchionibus, comitibus,
principibus romanis, lucensibus, florentinis, senensibus, volterranis,
pistoriensibus, longobardis, sardis et corsis, aliisque innumerabilis
gentibus, que in predicto exercitu aderant." Therefore it was no
mere alliance between one or two cities: it was the Pisan people in
conjunction with many potentates from different parts of Italy. The
chancellor of the Pisan Consuls drew up the diploma, in the presence
of the Archbishop of Pisa, "qui Dompni apostolici in predicto exercitu
vicem gerebat," of two _vice comites_ and nine Consuls, the names of
the latter being given. This diploma had never been published in Italy;
therefore Amari, who was much interested in the subject, wished to
print, just before his decease, the copy I had sent him, although he
had ascertained that it was already published in Spain by Moragues y
Bover in the notes to a "Historia de Mallorca," by Don Vincente Mut,
printed at Palma in 1841.

[112] _Vide_ "Documenti che illustrano la memoria di una monaca del
secolo xiii." ("Arch. Stor. It.," Series iii. vol. xxiii.). These
documents are among the earliest of the thirteenth century, and contain
the depositions of witnesses, alluding almost always to events of the
twelfth century, and continually mentioning the monastery of Rosano,
and of one who "defendit ipsum monasterium a Teutonicis" (_vide_ pages
206, 391-2, and other parts also).

[113] The "Annales," i., record two fires (1115 and 1117), which
destroyed the whole place; the Neap. Codex only mentions the second.
Thomas Tuscus, writing in Florence about 1279, speaks of both the fires
in his "Gesta Imperatorum et Pontificum," attributing to that cause the
destruction of many chronicles which he supposes to have existed, but
which probably never existed at all. Villani adopted the same theory,
being equally unable to understand that the Commune might have had no
historians of earlier date.

[114] Petrus f. Mingardole, who, "_ad defendendum se de crucifixo_,"
passed through the fire unhurt. Certain historians, unwilling to credit
the existence of heresy in Florence at that time, have disputed as
to the words _de crucifixo_, and proposed this reading instead: _cum
crucifixo_ or _de crimine infixo_. But the facsimile of the Codex,
published by Prof. Paoli, leaves no doubt on the point.

[115] In fact, Simone della Tosa, a later chronicler, who may have
copied from Villani at this point, after relating the second burning
of the city in 1117, goes on to say that "the heresy of the _Paterini_
was then abroad in Florence." Pope Innocent III. (1198-1216), in
discoursing on heretics, wrote: "Impii Manichaei qui se Catharos vel
Paterenos appellant" (Ep. lib. x. ep. 54, in Migne's ed. vol. ii. p.
1147). Also, in the "Annales Camaldulenses" (vol. iii. app. p. 396)
there is a sentence pronounced at Sutri, in 1141, running as follows:
"Igitur universi qui vulgo Paterenses vocantur, eo quia, sub iugo
peccati, retinebant omnia que de predicta ecclesia sancte Fortunate
accipiebant." Therefore it is plain that the name of _Paterini_
(although strictly speaking that of a special sect, quite separate
from others) was here applied to all those occupying Church lands, or
opposed in any way to the Church. Hartwig, vol. ii. pp. 17 and 21.

[116] _Vide_ the Chronicle, _ad annum_. As we have already observed,
all information regarding this period is derived from the Gaddi
Codex, discovered in the Laurentian Library a few years ago. The part
beginning from 1181 is also contained in the autograph Chronicle that
has been longer known to us; but being very difficult to decipher has
not been much studied.

[117] "Would to God that Ghibellines were declared to be _Paterini_!"
So says the pseudo Brunetto Latini in the year 1215.

[118] The MS. of the "Annales," i., writes, _Rempoctus_, not
_Remperoctus_, as it was printed elsewhere.

[119] Ficker, vol. ii. pp. 223, 224, par. 310; Murat., "Antiq.," iii.
1125.

[120] Murat., "Antiq.," i. 315.

[121] The "Annales," i., say that, "deo auctore, Florentini Monte
Cascioli igne consumpserunt." The MS. really seems to run, _de
auctore_, but this would be nonsense. Lami proposed the reading,
_des auctoritate_, but this too would lack sense. The interpretation
preferred and adopted by ourselves was suggested by Prof. Paoli. In
combating the Empire and fighting for the Church, the Florentines
believed themselves to be under Divine protection, and considering
their adversaries as enemies of God, accordingly named them heretics
and _Paterini_.

[122] "Teneanla certi gentiluomini Cattani, stati della citta di
Fiesole, e dentro vi si riducevano masnadieri e sbanditi e mala gente,
che alcuna volta faceano danno alle strade e al contado di Firenze"
(iv. 32).

[123] According to the "Annales," i., the war lasted less than three
months, while Sanzanome stretches it to three years. Possibly the
latter included all the attacks and skirmishes by which the war may
have been prefaced.

[124] Soldani, "Historia Monasterii S. Michaelis de Passiniano," p.
109, quoted by Lami, "Lezioni," i. 288.

[125] In Passerini's collection of documents, quoted above, one finds,
at p. 211, the following words: "Domina Sofia dixit et dicit quod est
lxxx. annorum et plus, et recordatur de destructione Fesularum." Others
give testimony to the same effect.

[126] In a sentence given on December 30, 1172, we find seven Consuls
named, a judge in ordinary, and three proveditors. The Consuls instal
the judge, "huic missioni in possessum auctoritatem prestans." This
document and many similar ones are in the Florence Archives, Curia di
S. Michele. Some have been printed separately by Prof. Santini, in pt.
ii. of a volume soon, we hope, to be given to the world. We call the
reader's attention to the fact that we quote from his work not only
with regard to documents which are still inedited, but also touching
those already edited by other writers, because we know that he has
carefully collated all with their originals. In his forthcoming work
he will probably indicate which documents were discovered by himself,
which simply reproduced. _Vide_ Santini, pt. ii. doc. i. In October,
1181, three Consuls preside "super facto iustitiae, nominatim in mense
octobris." The judge _Restauransdampnum_ confirms the sentence (ibid.,
doc. ii.). There are other documents to the same effect, though we
also sometimes find two Consuls for one month. On January 27, 1197,
there are two Consuls of justice for January and February (Santini, pt.
ii. doc. ix.), and so on for some time, two Consuls for two months.
On February 28, 1198, the two Consuls are judges by profession; but,
nevertheless, the assistance of a judge in ordinary--one _Spinello
Spada_--is still required (ibid., doc. x.). This is an additional proof
that the Consuls of justice did not exactly fulfil the function of real
judges. From 1201 downwards we find one Consul of justice _per totum
annum_ (ibid., docs. xiii., xv.).

[127] On April 18, 1201--there being then a _Potesta_--we only find
"Gerardus ordinarium iudex cognitor controversiae ... hanc sententiam
tuli ideoque subscripsi," without a Consul of justice, who reappears
soon afterwards (Santini, pt. ii. doc. xi.). It would seem that at
Pisa it was the rule to nominate special judges, _electi_, or _dati a
Consulibus et universo populo_, who pronounced judgment on their own
account, sometimes in the presence of the Consuls. Elsewhere we find
_Consules de placitis_, or _Assessores Consulum_ (as at Parma, for
instance), who pronounced judgment without the intervention of the
Consuls of the Commune (Ficker, iii. pars. 584 and 585).

[128] Originally, Florence was divided in quarters (_quartieri_). The
old city did not then comprise the part beyond the Arno, Oltrarno,
which was only inhabited by a few "low folk of small account" (Villani,
iv. 14). Afterwards, but from the earliest days of the Commune, the
city was arranged in _sestieri_, of which the Oltrarno formed one. In
the year 1343 (Villani, xii. 18) the division in four quarters was
resumed.

[129] It is dated January, 1165, and is to be found in the Florentine
Archives (S. Appendix ii. doc. i. p. 517). It is an act of donation,
giving part of a house to the members of the _Societa della Torre_ of
Capo di Ponte: "Tam qui modo sunt, aut in antea fuerunt ex Societate
vestre turris de Capite Pontis."

[130] On two scraps of parchment dated 1179 and 1180, together with
a document, part of which dates from May 16, 1209, and part from an
older period, in the Florence Archives. The Statute of the Podesta (in
1324) also mentions the Societies of the Towers. The whole question
has been minutely studied by Prof. Santini in his learned work on the
"Societa delle Torri in Firenze," first published in the "Arch. Stor.
It.," Series iv. t. xx. 1887, and subsequently in a separate form. In
Appendix ii. of his previously quoted work the author includes several
documents relating to these societies. They are respectively dated
1165, 1179, 1180, 1181, 1183, 1201, 1209, &c.

[131] In the above-quoted, separate, work, at p. 55, and fol. Prof.
Santini names many of these families, and supports his statements by
documentary evidence.

[132] On this point I differ from Santini. The rural societies he has
been able to discover are few in number, of a different nature from
the others, and of less ancient date. Out in the country the principal
basis of the society was lacking--_i.e._, the tower surrounded by
houses belonging to different members.

[133] Villani (v. 32) also tells us that Florence was under "the
rule of Consuls chosen from the greatest and best of the city, with
a council of the senate", that is of one hundred worthies, and that,
as in Rome, all these Consuls "guided and governed the city, holding
office for one year." He arbitrarily fixes their number at four or six,
according to the division of the city in quarters or sixths, and adds
that, whenever mentioned, only the chief Consul was named. January
seems to have been the time fixed for the election. In 1202 we find
the same Consuls in the first and second half of the year (March 1 and
October 1). This would likewise prove that the year was not then begun
on the 25th of March, according to Florentine style (Santini, doc. v.).
In Sienna, January was the time of the election, and on the evidence of
the chroniclers one may infer that it was the same in Florence.

[134] The first document recording the names of consuls is dated March
19, 1138 (quoted by Hartwig, ii. 185, from the "Memorie di Lucca,"
vol. iv. p. 173, doc. 122), and states that "_Broccardus et Selvorus_"
promise "_pro se et pro sociis suis_." The second is dated June 4, 1138
(Santini, pt. i. doc. ii.), and in this a Count Ugicio (or Egicio)
receives "launechild et meritum a Burello et Florenzito Consulibus,
vice totius populi." These two documents of the same year do not
contain identical names, perhaps because they only give those of the
_Consules priores_, who sat in turn, as we have before remarked. Even
in Sienna the _Consules priores_ seem to have been continually changed.
_Vide_ Caleffo Vecchio for June, August, October, 1202; Caleffo dell'
Assunta, 1202. And when Consuls were replaced by Governors, each of
these was _Prior_ for one week.

In two Florentine documents, among the Capitoli, dated April 7,
1174, and April 4, 1176 (Santini, pt. i. docs. vi. and ix.), all the
Consuls--ten in number--are named, possibly the Consuls of justice
being omitted. But, on the other hand, in an oath sworn by the men of
Mangona to Florence (October 28, 1184, in Santini, pt. i. doc. xv.) we
read: "Annualiter dabimus unam albergariam xij. Consulibus Florentie."
Even in 1204 we find twelve; but more than twelve are recorded in the
documents of the League (1197-8), and likewise in the year 1203. We
have already given the probable explanation of this fact. The _Consules
priores_, also existing in other communes, are seldom mentioned in
Florence by the name of _Priores_, especially in early days. But there
is one doc. dated October 24, and November 7, 1204 (S. pt. i. doc.
liii.) saying: "Potestas Florentie vel Consules eiusdem civitatis,
omnes vel maior pars vel Priores aut Prior eorum." So, too, another
document dated October 15, 1200.

[135] Santini, pt. i. doc. xii.

[136] Ibid., pt. i. doc. xv.

[137] There were, in fact, Consuls of the Commune, of the guilds, of
the Arno, of the city gates, of the Societies of the Towers, and the
latter were more specially styled Rectors. Yet even "Rectors" was a
generic term, indicating all who governed, and there were Rectors of
the Towers, of the city, and of the guilds. _Potestas_ then indicated
the supreme authority in general, and was only converted later on into
a special and separate office.

[138] There are so many examples of this, that quotation is unneeded.
It was the usual formula in other cities as well as in Florence. In
the treaty drawn up between Lucca and Florence (July 24, 1184), from
which we have already quoted, there was a proviso in case there might
be no Consuls at Lucca, no _Lucana Potestas_, and this addition was
accordingly made "aut bonos viros lucensis civitatis, si Consules vel
Rector aut Potestas tunc ibi non fuerit."

[139] "Forte Belicocci Senator eiusdem [Florentiae] Civitatis" (in
a document dated April 15, 1204, Santini pt. i. doc. li). Another
document of November 13 and 14, 1197, in the Acts of the Tuscan League,
we find the name _Bilicozus_ among the _consiliarii_ present. In the
"Breve Consulum Pisane Civitatis," of 1162, edited by Bonaini, the
councillors are styled _senatores_.

[140] This document (Santini, pt. i. doc. xxii.) is that of November
13 and 14, 1197, and also one of those of the Tuscan League. It should
be remarked, however, that even at this grave juncture there were more
than twelve Consuls; so, too, for similar reasons, either the number of
the councillors was augmented, or else (being towards the end of the
year) some of the newly elected members sat together with those about
to retire.

[141] The term _arengo_, _arrengo_, _aringo_, or _arringo_, was derived
from the verb _arringare_, to harangue, in the same way as parliament
from the verb _parlare_, to speak.

[142] In Italian communes _habitatores_, and even _assidui
habitatores_, are clearly distinguished both from _cives_ and
foreigners. Florentine documents often mention _cives salvatichi_, a
term that indicates, I believe, the quasi citizenship of persons living
in the country, but bound to dwell in the city during part of the year.
These greatly increased in number later on, and in course of time
became real and entire citizens, in accordance with certain rules not
yet fully known to us.

[143] Many examples of this have been found by us among _provvisioni_
(or decrees) of later date.

[144] _Nuova Antologia._ Rome, July 1, 1890.

[145] Ficker, vol. ii. par. 310, p. 223. Here the names of many of
these envoys are given, and what scanty details are known concerning
them. To Rabodo (died 1119) succeeded a Corrado (1120-27), afterwards
a Rampret (1131), then an Englebert (1134), then Errico of Bavaria
(1137), immediately followed by Ulrico d'Attems, then the Duke Guelfo
(1160-62), uncle to the Emperor Frederic I., by whom he was sent.

[146] "Annales," i.

[147] "Annales," i.; Sanzanome, Florentine ed., p. 128; Villani, iv. 36.

[148] "Annales, i.; 16 kal. Iulii. Ingelbertus Florentiam est
ingressus."

[149] "Annales," i.; Otho of Friesland, _vide_ Pertz, xx. 264, and the
Annali Senesi.

[150] Sanzanome, Florentine ed., p. 129.

[151] This is related by an eye witness in the Passerini collection of
documents (often quoted to us) at p. 389. The "Annales," i., manifestly
err in assigning precisely this date of 1147 to the capture of Monte
Orlando, which really happened in 1107. The erasures in the Codex just
where the date and places of the event narrated are written--_i.e._,
before the entry in Florence of Henry IV., 1111--also serve to prove
that a blunder had been made.

[152] The above-quoted Passerini Documents make repeated mention of the
reconstruction of the walls, both at p. 394 and p. 217. It records at
the same point the subsequent destruction of Monte di Croce: "Et dixit
quod sunt lx. annos quod fuit destructus Mons Crucis." Both Villani
(iv. 37) and the pseudo Brunetto Latini give the date of 1154; the
"Annales," ii., the Neapolitan Codex, and Paolino Pieri, that of 1153.
Sanzanome, according to his frequent practice, gives no precise date
even here (at p. 130). He merely says that the first attack on the
castle took place in 1146.

[153] Santini, i. doc. iii. dated April 4, 1156.

[154] "Constituit etiam Teutonicos principes ac dominatores super
Lombardos et Tuscos, ut de caetero eius voluntati nullus Ytalicus
resistendi locum habere ullatenus posset. Vita Alexandri," in the year
1164. In the "Cronica Urspergense," of the year 1186, we read that:
"Coepit Imperator in partibus Tusciae et terrae romanae castra ad se
spectantia, suae potestati vendicare, et quaedam nova construere, in
quorum presidiis Teutonicos praecipue collocavit." _Vide_ Ficker, vol.
ii. par. 311, p. 227.

[155] "Nullus enim Marchio et nullus nuntius Imperii fuit, qui tam
honorifice civitates Italiae tributaret, et romano subiceret Imperio."
_Vide_ the Annali Pisani, in Pertz's Mon^{ta.} Ger^{ma.} xx. 249.
Ficker, vol. i. par. 137, p. 259.

[156] Ficker, vol. i. par. 122-4.

[157] _Vide_ the Passerini Documents, pp. 208, 394-400.

[158] Some of these depositions have been printed before, but the whole
collection is now given in Santini, i. doc. xlv. They are dated May,
1203, but naturally refer to a much earlier period. _Vide_ Santini, pp.
115, 117-19.

[159] _Vide_ the treaty given in Santini, i. doc. iv.

[160] Count Macharius was the Imperial representative at San Miniato.
Ficker gives a list of other German counts in that castle (vol. ii.
par. 311, p. 227 and fol.).

[161] "Castrum autem intelligimus recuperatum etiam sine superiori
incastellatura."

[162] At this moment many former partisans of the Empire were fighting
against it. Pisa is one example.

[163] Nevertheless it was not kept among the _Capitoli_ comprising
real official documents, but among papers of an almost private nature.
Hartwig was the first to bring it to light (ii. 61); and it was
afterwards reprinted verbatim in Santini, pt. iii. doc. i.

[164] Tommasi, "Storia di Lucca," in the "Arch. Stor. It.," vol. x. _ad
annum_; Roncioni, "Istorie Pisane," in the "Arch. Stor. It.," vol. vi.
_ad annum_; Marangoni, i. 285; Ottoboni, "Annales," i. 95; Hartwig, ii.
58-63.

[165] _Vide_ Santini, i. docs, v., vi., vii., viii. The first of these
is dated Feb. 23, 1173; the others are of April 7, 1174.

[166] "Annales," ii., year 1170; Villani, v. 5.

[167] "Annales," ii.; Sanzanome; Villani, v. 6; Neapolitan Codex
(here, however, the event is ascribed to the year 1175); Repetti, art.
"Asciano"; Hartwig, ii. 64-5.

[168] This treaty (in which not only the emperor, but also Christian
of Mayence, and Count Macharius, who was then at San Miniato, are
expressly named) is in the Siennese Archives, Caleffo Vecchio, at c.
9, and Caleffo dell' Assunta, at c. 53. Dr. Hartwig published a large
summary of it, made by Wuestenfeld. Thanks to the kindness of Cavaliere
Lisini, Director of the Sienna Archives, we were enabled to obtain a
copy of the treaty, and of other documents connected with the peace.
Some belonging to Florence are comprised in Santini's work, i. docs.
ix., x., xi. (April 4 and 8, and December 11, 1176).

[169] "Et quod Comunis Senensis acquisierit extra eorum episcopatus et
comitatus, dabo medietatem Florentinis." In the above-quoted treaty
among the Siennese Archives.

[170] Nevertheless, in the year 1174, we find a Guido Uberti on the
list of Consuls. Santini, i. doc. vi.

[171] Villani, v. 8. The "Annales," ii., of 1177, say that "Orta est
guerra inter Consules et filios Uberti; eodem anno combusta est civitas
florentina." The Neapolitan Codex dates the first fire the 4th of
August, as Villani also does, and gives the commencement of the civil
war immediately afterwards, the which "filled two years." Paolino Pieri
dates the first fire August 4, 1174, and the fall of the bridge and the
second fire in 1178. Tolomeo da Lucca merely states that a revolution
broke out in 1177 and lasted for two years.

[172] Chronicle of the pseudo Brunetto Latini, _ad annum_.

[173] We subjoin an extract from the pseudo Brunetto Latini, as it
stands in the Gaddi Codex, with all its blunders. After giving an
account of the revolution, the chronicler goes on to say: "Then in the
year 1180 the Uberti gained the victory, and Messer Uberto degli Uberti
and Messer Lamberto Lamberti were consul and rector of the city of
Florence, together with their companions, and these formed the first
consulate of the city, the which was brought about by violence, only
afterwards they began to rule the city according to reason and justice,
every one preserving his own position, so that it was decided by the
citizen Consuls to summon powerful nobles of foreign birth to fill the
post of Podesta, as will be shown to you in writing farther on." It is
strange that the chronicler should ascribe the origin of the Consuls
to so late a date. But, seeing that his list of these magistrates only
begins at this point, it would seem that he really believed them to
have no earlier origin. Nevertheless, shortly before, in writing of
1177, he had stated that the Uberti began to make war on the Consuls;
hence it is clear that even in his opinion they had existed before
the year 1180. Still, blunders and incongruities of this sort are
frequently found even in Villani and other chroniclers of the same
period.

[174] Santini, i. doc. xii. This is the document stating that the
tribute of fifty pounds of "good money" was to be paid to the Consuls
of the city, or, failing these, to the Consuls of the merchants,
authorised to receive it for the Commune.

[175] This had been granted them in an Imperial patent, given at Pavia
_iv. Idus Augusti_, 1164, the which has been published several times,
and is also included in the "Storia della guerra di Semifonte," by
Messer Pace da Certaldo (p. 5). As all know, this is a counterfeit
"Storia" dating from the beginning of the seventeenth century.

[176] Santini, i. doc. xiii. This is the document with the erroneous
date, 1101, rectified by Marquis Capponi to 1181 (modern style, 1182).

[177] Villani, Paolino Pieri, the Neapolitan Codex, and the pseudo
Brunetto Latini. The "Annales," ii., wrongly assign the event to 1172.

[178] Santini, i. doc. xiv. The terms were not to be altered without
the consent of the Consuls of either city, together with that of at
least twenty-five councillors on either side; and the Consuls of the
soldiery and of the merchants were to be included in the number.
We note that in naming the Consuls a hint is already given of the
possible election of a Podesta, although none had as yet been chosen in
Florence. This subject will be resumed later on. Meanwhile, the words
of the document run as follows: "Inquisitis florentinis Consulibus,
vel florentina Potestate, sive Rectori vel Dominatore a comuni populo
electo." On Lucca's side mention is also made of the "bonos viros
lucensis civitatis, si Consules vel Rector aut Potestas ibi non
fuerint."

[179] The "Annales," ii., the pseudo Brunetto Latini, and the Neap.
Cod. date the event in 1185; Villani (v. ii.) dates it instead 1184,
and says that Pogna was occupied by nobles, who were _cattani_ and
hostile to Florence. We follow Villani, for otherwise it would be
impossible to explain the captivity of Count Alberto in 1184, an event
confirmed by documentary evidence.

[180] Santini, i. doc. xvi. and xvii.; the first dated November, 1184,
and the second, November 29, 1184.

[181] Hartwig, ii. 79.

[182] Villani, v. 12.

[183] The "Annales," ii., and Paolino Pieri except Pisa alone; Villani,
the Neap. Cod., and the pseudo Brunetto Latini except both Pisa and
Pistoia.

[184] The chroniclers only say, with obvious inexactitude, for ten
miles round.

[185] This diploma is given in Ficker, iv. doc. 170, p. 213. Henry
(then Henry VI., King of the Romans, afterwards, as emperor, also
called Henry V.), after granting the concession, adds: "Excepto ac
salvo iure nobilium et militum, a quibus etiam volumus ut Florentini
nihil exigant." The diploma only refers in general terms to the
services rendered by the Florentines to Henry and to his father,
Frederic I. Villani considers the grant a reward for their prowess in
the Crusade; but the Crusade took place in 1189, and the grant was
made in 1187; for although he wrongly dates the latter in 1188, this
blunder does not suffice to remove the anachronism. Besides, he also
states that the concession was granted through the intervention of Pope
Gregory VIII., who was elected in 1187, and died the same year.

[186] In 1186 Perugia was granted judicial rights over the _contado_
beyond the walls: "Exceptis domibus et possessionibus, quas habent
marchiones et monasterium S. Salvatoris," and, excepting several
nobles, specified by name, "in quibus nihil iuris Perusinis
relinquitur." Ficker, i. par. 128, p. 242. Sienna, after being deprived
of the _contado_ in June, 1186, received it back in October, under the
same conditions, and so, too, Lucca in the same year. Ficker, i. par.
125. p. 239, and par. 128, p. 2 2.

[187] Ficker often gives the names of these Imperial Podesta, as
gleaned from the depositions of witnesses. _Vide_ Ficker, vol. iii.
p. 440. Hartwig (ii. 192) cites one _Henricus comes florentinus_,
also mentioned by Stumpf and who seems to have been a Podesta of the
_contado_ in September, 1186. After all this, it is not surprising
that the Imperial authority should be often referred to in documents
of the latter half of the twelfth century. We may cite some instances
from the rolls of the Florence Archives: October 14, 1175 (Passignano),
"Sub obligo Consulum Florentinorum vel Nuntio Regis"; October 9,
1185 (Passignano), "Sub duplice pena Imperatoris et eius Missi aut
quicumque habuerint dominium pro tempore." (Reference is here made to
the _contado_, and is another proof of the uncertain rule previously
described by us.)

[188] "Liberalitate benefica ipsos respicere volentes, concedimus," &c.
... "huius munifice nostre concessionis."

[189] In 1184, _vide_ in addition to the chroniclers, Santini, i. docs.
xiv., xv., xvii. and Hartwig, ii. 191. For the years 1185, 1186, and
1187, besides the names recorded by the pseudo Brunetto Latini, the
documents furnish frequent allusions of the following kind: April 30,
1185 (Passignano), "Sub obligo Consulum Florentie resarcire promitto";
December 13, 1185 (Santa Felicita), "Sub obligo Consulum Florentie";
April 26, 1186 (Passignano), "Penam ad Consules Florentie"; September
21, 1187 (Arch. Capitolare, 629), "Consulum vel Rectorum pro tempore
Florentie existentium (Actum Florentie)." The rolls of the Arch.
Capitolare were examined by Santini, to whom we are indebted for
the information; those of the Florence Archives we have personally
examined, but some of these were first brought under our notice by
Santini.

In 1189 there were undoubtedly Consuls. Not only are the names of three
of them recorded by the pseudo Brunetto Latini, but documents give the
names of the Consuls of justice. Santini, ii. docs. v. and vi.

[190] Ficker (ii. par. 313, p. 234) cites the words of Pillius, a
jurist of the period: "Ut quando faciunt castellanos vel comites in
Tuscia"; and, further on: "Sicut fit hodie illis, qui pracficiuntur in
singulis provinciis, vel in parte alicuius provinciae, ut in comitatu
senensi, florentino vel aretino."

[191] They are both named in the Passerini documents, from which we
have frequently quoted.

[192] According to the results of Hartwig's inquiries, between 1150 and
1180.

[193] We find in the Passerini documents (p. 206) that one of the
witnesses states that Count Guidi "defendit ipsum monasterium [of
Rosano] a Teutonicis et a Renuccio de Stagia, quando erat Potestas
Florentinorum, et a Consulibus Florentinis."

[194] October 14, 1175 (Passignano), "Sub potestate consulum
Florentinorum vel Nuntio Regis"; July 5, 1191 (Arch. Capitolare, 347),
"Sub pena Consulum Florentie vel Potestatis"; April 15, 1192 (Arch.
Capitolare, 449), "Sub obligo Potestatis vel Rectorum pro tempore
Florentie existentibus"; November 7, 1192 (Passignano, in the Church
of St. Biagio), "Sub obligo Potestatis in hac terra existentis" (here
allusion is possibly made to some Podesta of the _contado_); May 9,
1193 (Passerini documents in the Florence Archives), "Sub obligo
Potestatis vel Consulum Florentinorum ... Actum Florentie." According
to these and other rolls examined by me in the Florence Archives, the
change is seen to have been carried out in a regular and steady manner.
The ancient formulas reappear from time to time.

[195] "Inquisitis florentinis Consulibus, vel florentina Potestate,
sive Rectore vel Dominatore ... florentini Consules vel florentina
Potestate sive Rector vel Dominator" (Santini, i. doc. xiv).

[196] Santini, i. doc. xx.

[197] Santini, ii. doc. viii. His name is _Corsus_, and at one point
he is styled a councillor _super facto iustitie_, at another, _consul
iustitie_.

[198] In the years 1193 and 1195 he still mentions the Consuls, and
even by name. These may have been the _consiliarii_ of the two Podesta
known to have existed in those years. It is well to observe here that
all this would have been impossible in the case of Imperial Podesta,
had there ever been any in Florence. They could never have appeared in
the light of chief Consuls.

[199] Florence Archives, "Bullettone," c. 131. July 10, 1196: "Dominus
Petrus episcopus habuit tenutam a consulibus curie Communis Florentie."
In the years 1197-99, _vide_ the documents of the Tuscan League, quoted
later on, and Hartwig, ii. 194.

[200] In the year 1197, Paolino Pieri tells us: "San Miniato al
Tedesco, or rather its fortress, was destroyed." In 1198, he tells how
"San Genesio was pulled down by the inhabitants" (_terrazzani_), who
then returned to the hill-top, and rebuilt San Miniato. Villani (v. 21)
says that San Miniato was destroyed, and its inhabitants came down to
St. Genesio in the plain. _Vide_ also the "Annales," ii., and the Neap.
Cod., _ad annum_. Hartwig (ii. 93) has examined the question minutely,
and swept away all inaccuracies and exaggerations.

[201] "Annales," ii., Neap. Cod., _ad annum_, Villani (v. 22). From
the reports of eye witnesses, published by Passerini, one sees that
Montegrossoli was troublesome to its neighbours, and even Villani
says that it was held by _cattani_, who made continual attacks on the
Florentines.

[202] _Vide_ the "Acts of the League" (November 11 and December 14,
1197; February 5 and 7, 1198), in Santini, i. doc. xxi., and in Ficker,
vol. iv. p. 242, doc. 196. Ficker uses some of the documents preserved
in Florence, and also some of those at Sienna which are more complete
and correct at certain points.

[203] Sed Podiumbonizi possit recipi per capud.

[204] _Vide_ the "Acts of the League" in Ficker, vol. iv. p. 246.

[205] "Atti della Lega." The Florentines swore to the League on
November 13 and 14, 1197. The document in Santini, i. doc. xxiii.
gives the names of sixteen Consuls and 133 councillors who took the
oath. In a preceding document, also relating to February 5 and 17,
1198, there are the names of ten Consuls, but three of them are not
the same on both days, so that there must have been more than twelve
Consuls in February, 1198. Some, too, were already in office even in
November, 1197, and this confirms our previous hypothesis that, on the
great occasion of the League, all or part of the withdrawing Consuls
remained in office with those just elected. Nor is this a solitary
instance. On April 2, 1212, the Commune of Prato, in arranging a treaty
with Florence, sent three _Consules veteri_, and three _Consules novi
eiusdem terre_ to conclude it. Santini, i. doc. lx.

[206] Innocentii III., "Epistolae," i. 15, 27, 34, 35; Ficker, vol. ii.
par. 363, p. 384.

[207] Instead of mentioning the _Ducatus Tusciae_, he now spoke of
the _magna pars Tusciae, quae in nostris privilegiis continetur_. To
the Pisans he wrote, "Post correctionem adhibitam, nihil invenimus
quod in ecclesiastici iuris vel cuiusquam maioris vel minoris personae
praeiudicium redundaret." And in February, 1199, he urged them to join
the League. Innocentii, "Ep.," bk. i. 401 and 555; "Gesta Innocentii,"
c. ii.; Ficker, vol. ii. par. 363, pp. 385-6.

[208] Santini, i. docs. xxiii., xxiv., xxv. The first is dated the
10th; the second, April 15, 1198; and the third, giving the names of
the men of Figline swearing fealty to the League, is also dated the
15th of April. The second alludes to the chief Consuls: "Comandamenta
Consulum florentine civitatis omnium vel maioris partis aut priorum ex
eis." The third informs us (pp. 43 and 44) that the oath was sworn:
"In Florentia, in ecclesia S. Reparate et Parlamento, coram florentino
populo iuraverunt." Also further on: "In ecclesia S. Reparate, in
Aringo." This is another instance of the parliament being convened in a
church.

[209] Santini, i. doc. xxvi. Obedience was sworn to the Consuls or
Rectors _vel segnoratico aliquo extante_. This, too, is an expression
having very little savour of the more democratic temper of former times.

[210] In Villani (v. 26) he is wrongly styled Count Arrigo della Tosa.
The Della Tosa family were not counts. The pseudo Brunetto Latini
speaks of him in an undated paragraph, anterior to his record of 1200,
as "Messer Arrigo, count of Capraia."

[211] As we have stated, it seems to be for this reason that the pseudo
Brunetto Latini dates the office of Podesta from this moment: "A
novel thing was done, and for the first time a Potestade was elected
in Florence, from jealousy of the Consuls, the which Potestade was
Paganello Porcaro of Lucca."

[212] Santini, i. doc. xxvii. (February 12 and 23, 1200); doc. xxviii.
(February 12 and 19); doc. xxix. (February 12 and 23, and March 25). In
these papers the Podesta is always mentioned with the councillors, and
the office of the Consuls is also invariably recorded: "Sive parabola
Potestatis et Consiliariorum vel Consulum sive Rectorum Florentie" (p.
49). "A Potestate vel Consiliariis eius, sive a Consulibus Florentie
vel Rectoribus" (p. 48). In a posterior document (Santini, i. doc.
xxxvii., dated August 14, 1201), we find the councillors representing
the Podesta: "Sitio filio condam Butrighelli, Melio filio Catalani
Consiliarii domini Potestatis Florentie, recipienti (_sic_) vice et
nomine dicte Potestatis et totius Comunis Florentie" (p. 72). These
councillors did not yet form a special council, but were on the way
to it, since the council or senate of the city being already called
the general council, the existence of a special one is implied: "In
Florentia, in ecclesia S. Reparate, coram generali consilio civitatis,
iuraverunt." Santini, i. doc. xxviii. p. 53.

[213] Santini, i. doc. xxx.

[214] It may be roughly rendered:

      "Florence, get out of the way,
       Semifonte's a city to-day."


[215] Santini, i. doc. xxxiv.

[216] This treaty was concluded April 27, 1201; about five hundred
inhabitants of Colle swearing adhesion to it on the 28th, 29th, and
30th of April. Santini, i. docs. xxxv. and xxxvi.

[217] "Per quinquennium guerra durante et eidem omnibus de Tuscia
prestantibus patrocinium.... Tacere tamen nolo magnalia quae inter
caetera vidi, guerra durante." Sanzanome, Florentine ed., pp. 134-5.

[218] The document is given in the "Delizie," of Ildefonso di San
Luigi, vii. 178. Perpetual exemption from all taxes was decreed to
Gonella and his comrades, "qui mortui fuere in turre de Bagunolo et in
muris apud Summumfontem, in servitio Communis Florentie." _Vide_ also
in Hartwig, ii. 100.

[219] Santini, i. xxxviii., xxxix. The treaty of peace was concluded
between Alberto da Montauto, lord of San Gimignano, for the people of
Semifonte, and Claritus Pillii, Consul of the merchants for Florence.

[220] This letter, published by Winkelmann (Philipp von Schwaben,
i. 556), is taken from a MS. of the Florentine Boncompagni, in the
Archives of Berne, No. 322, fol. 18, and part of it is referred to by
Hartwig, ii. 102.

[221] About eight hundred men of Montepulciano swore to these terms on
the hand of the Florentine Consul. Santini, i. doc. xl. October 19, 24,
1202.

[222] Santini, i. docs. xlii., xliii., xliv., and xlv. These papers,
dated April and May, 1203, give the names of all the Siennese citizens
and country people sanctioning the arbitration in the name of their
city. The last document contains the depositions of the witnesses
examined by Ogerio. Doc. xlvii., June 4, 1203, is the verdict
pronounced by him.

[223] On the days 4th, 7th, and 8th of June, the Bishop and Commune of
Sienna gave up all that was due to Florence, in accordance with the
verdict. Santini, i. doc. xlviii. On the 6th of the same month one
hundred and fifty Siennese councillors swore observance to the terms.
Santini, i. doc. xlix.

[224] Santini, i. doc. lii.

[225] Ibid., i. doc. xlvi.

[226] Murat., "Antiq. It.," iv. 576-83. _Vide_ also Ficker (vol. ii.
par. 312, p. 229 and fol.), who gleaned from this important document
the list of the Podesta established as Imperial envoys in the Siennese
territory. These Podesta are mentioned by the witnesses as "Comites
teutonici, Comites comitatus senensis pro imperatore Federigo," and
occasionally even as "Comites contadini."

[227] "Per distruggere questa capra, non ci vuol altro che un lupo."
_Vide_ Repetti, art. "Capraia e Montelupo"; Hartwig (ii. 106-9)
rectifies some chronological and other blunders made by Villani.

[228] The treaty is probably extant in the Archives of Pistoia.
Repetti, in citing it from the "Aneddoti" of Zaccaria, dates it the 3rd
of June; other writers date it July.

[229] Dated October 29, November 17, 1204, in Santini, i. doc. liii.
The oath sworn before the Consul Guido Uberto was of obedience to the
commands "que ... fecerint Potestas Florentie vel Consules Civitatis
vel maior pars vel priores aut prior eorum." Thus the Podesta's name
came first, even at a time when there were Consuls in office, before
whom the oath was sworn, in presence of "Angiolerii Beati, Doratini et
Burniti Paganiti sexcalcorum Comunis Florentie." Even the office of
_sexcalcus_ is new (it is also mentioned in another document of the
30-31st of May, in Santini, i. xlvi.), and seems to us a sign of the
change tending to a more aristocratic form of government in Florence.
The communal oath sworn on October 29, 1204 (Santini, i. doc. liv.)
began thus, "Hec sunt sacramenta, quae Potestas et Consules Comunis et
Consules militum, mercatorum et Priores Artium et generale Consilium,
ad sonum campane coadunatum, fecerunt Guidoni Borgognoni comiti et
filiis et Caprolensibus." The Consuls took the oath, not the Podesta,
for there was none, although nominally heading the formula.

[230] Recorded in the "Acta Sanctorum," the 1st of May, at p. 14, and
also in the list (known as that of Sta. Maria Novella) of the Consuls
and Podesta. _Vide_ Hartwig, ii. 197. But the documents of this year
only refer in general to the Consuls and Podesta without giving any
names.

[231] Sizio Butrigelli, or Butticelli, is mentioned in the Sta. Maria
Novella Catalogue. Hartwig, ii. 197.

[232] Sanzanome, pp. 139-40; Hartwig, ii. 111-12.

[233] Santini, i. doc. lviii. and lix. A great number of Siennese
swore to the treaty in the presence of the Podesta Gualfredotto
Grasselli, _vice et nomine Comunis Florentie recipienti_, without
the _consiliarii_. But the ceremony being very lengthy, he delegated
Ildebrandino Cavalcanti to represent him, _procuratoris nomine_. Some
of the documents of this peace are in Florence, the others in Sienna.
The former were discovered by Santini, and all are mentioned by
Hartwig, ii. 113-14.

[234] This chapter was originally published in the _Politecnico_ of
Milan, numbers for July and September, 1866.

[235] The details of this event are differently told by Villani (v.
38), by the pseudo Brunetto Latini (_ad annum_), and by Dino Compagni
at the beginning of his Chronicle. But the gist is the same in all
three, and we have mainly adhered to the first and second authorities,
whose accounts are longer and more detailed than that of Compagni.

[236] Villani, v. 38.

[237] Villani, vi. 5.

[238] Villani (vi. 33) says: "Albeit the said parties existed among
the nobles of Florence, and they oftentimes came to blows from
private enmities, and were split into factions by the said parties,"
nevertheless the people "remained united, for the good and honour and
dignity of the Republic" (vol. i. p. 253). The "Annales," ii., of the
year 1236 relate that the palaces of the Commune and of the Galigai
were destroyed, which would certainly seem to be a proof of a genuine
revolution.

[239] Ammirato, "Storie," lib. xi. (with additions made by Ammirato the
younger). Anno 1240.

[240] In this year we find the first official mention of the Florentine
Guelphs. Frederic II. complains of their conduct, saying: "Pars
Guelforum Florentiae, cui dudum nostra Maiestas pepercerat." The
"Annales," ii., first name the Guelphs in 1239, and in 1242 mention
the Guelphs and the Ghibellines. _Vide_ Hartwig, "Quellen," &c., vol.
ii. pp. 159-60 and 164. This author believes that the names of the two
Florentine parties first came into use in the year 1239.

[241] Lami, "Antichita Toscane," lesson xv.; Passerini, "Istituti di
Beneficenza--Il Bigallo." Florence: Le Monnier, 1853.

[242] _Vide_ "Statuta Populi et Communis Florentiae," published in
Florence, but with the mark of the Friburg press, vol. i.; Cantini,
"Saggi," vol. iii. chap. xvi.; "Delizie degli Eruditi Toscani," vol.
ix. p. 256 and fol.

[243] Villani says: "They stripped all power from the Podesta then in
Florence, and dismissed all the officers" (vi. 39). As usual, Malespini
copies from Villani (chap. cxxxvii.). But reading farther we see
clearly that the Podesta was elected as before, and that a palace was
built for his use. The chronicler's real meaning was that the form of
government was changed, and the actual governors dismissed from office.
The term Podesta was used in its general sense of magistrate-in-chief.

[244] Villani, vol. vi. pp. 39 and 40. _Vide_ also Coppo Stefani.

[245] It is thought to be the work of Lapo or Jacopo, the supposed
master of Arnolfo Brunelleschi.

[246] Villani, vi. 39.

[247] _Vide_ Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, "Storia Fiorentina,"
bk. ii. rubric 63. In relating the first rupture of the Guelphs
and Ghibellines, the author says: "Almost all the families on the
Ghibelline, or Imperial side, were nobles of the _contado_, because
these held lands or castles in fief from the Empire." Also Ammirato,
who was well versed in contemporary chronicles and documents, in
relating what was said by men of the people as to the reforms of 1250,
makes them continue their statement that the Uberti, as leaders of
the nobles, were the authors of all the misfortunes of Florence, with
the following words: "Who but the Uberti waste our substance and our
strength by exorbitant taxes and imposts? These haughty men deemed it
an honourable thing, among their other grand and noble usages, to be
our foes; inasmuch as, exulting in their descent from the princes of
Germany, they consider us to be churls and peasants, and despise us, as
though we were of a different clay from their own." Ammirato, "Storie,"
bk. ii. _ad annum_.

[248] In fact, Villani only mentions them at a much later date. But
there is documentary evidence of their previous existence. _Vide_, for
instance, the "Arch. Stor. Ital.," Series iii. vol. xxiii. p. 222. Doc.
dated April 30, 1251. _Vide_ M. di Coppo Stefani, rub. 90.

[249] Giannotti, "Opere," ed. Le Monnier, vol. i. p. 82.

[250] Machiavelli, "Storie," bk. ii. On this point it may be well to
repeat our former remarks, to the effect that Machiavelli is often as
inaccurate in his definition of facts as profound in his intuition of
their character and tendency. After the first book of his "Storie,"
giving a general introduction to the Middle Ages, he begins to
narrate the history of Florence in the second book. He was the first
writer, after L. Aretino, to put aside nearly all the fabulous tales
of the chroniclers touching the origins of Florence, and start from
well-authenticated facts. For although he, too, believes that Florence
was destroyed by Totila and rebuilt by Charlemagne, and even credits
the destruction of Fiesole by the Florentines in 1010, it is easy to
condone these blunders, remembering how many other legendary tales
were rejected by him, and how much time elapsed before some germ of
historic truth could be gleaned from the less incredible traditions
to which he adhered. But why did Machiavelli pass over almost at one
bound the interval between 1010 and 1215 without saying anything of
the first and second Florentine constitutions, or alluding to the
numerous deeds of war and political revolutions occurring during that
period? Regarding these events, he might have derived information from
the chroniclers. But he clings to the theory that the Buondelmonti
tragedy was the primary cause and origin of all internecine strife
in Florence, although the evidence of contemporary chroniclers and
his own historical acumen might have saved him from this error.
Continuing with the same strangely unaccountable negligence, he skips
another period--from 1215 to 1250--saying that then at last Guelphs
and Ghibellines came to an agreement, and "deemed the moment come to
establish free institutions," almost as though this were the first time
that the Florentines had contemplated organising a free government.
Yet we have seen that Florentine liberties were assured, and the first
constitution founded in 1115; that the constitution of 1250 was the
third, not the first, and established by the Guelph _popolani_, to the
hurt of the Ghibelline nobles, instead of being formed, as Machiavelli
states, by the united efforts of the Guelphs and the Ghibellines.
Nor is this the last of his blunders, for Machiavelli goes on to
say: "Likewise to remove causes of enmity arising from judgments
delivered, they [the Florentines] decreed the establishment of two
foreign judges, with the respective titles of Captain and Podesta,
authorised to administer justice to the citizens in all cases, whether
civil or criminal." In this manner he converts the two chief political
authorities into ordinary judges, places both on the same level,
and fails to remark that, although the Captain was a newly created
functionary, the Podesta had been in existence for more than half a
century. He also states that the _carroccio_ was instituted in 1250,
to give prestige, or _maesta_, to the army, although the Florentines
had adopted the use of the _carroccio_ long before this date. He shows
equal negligence in his account of the organisation of the army, and
without drawing any distinction between the forces of the Commune
and those of the people, although this point is fully elucidated
by the chroniclers. Villani, for instance, tells us: "Inasmuch as
we have treated of the gonfalons and banners of the people," it is
fitting to make mention of those "of the knights and the army proper"
(_guerra_). Nevertheless, whenever Machiavelli pauses to consider the
general character of Florentine revolutions, and particularly of those
subsequent to 1250, his definitions excel those of any other writer.

[251] November, 1252.

[252] "Arch. Stor. It." Series iii. vol. xxiii. p. 220.

[253] Villani and Ammirato, _ad annum_.

[254] Villani, vi. 51. Ammirato, _ad annum_.

[255] Ammirato, _ad annum_, contains a summary of the treaty of peace.

[256] Villani and Ammirato, _ad annum_.

[257] VI. 70.

[258] _Scaggiale_--a leathern belt with a buckle.

[259] _Tassello_--a square of cloth attached to the cloak so as to be
used as a hood.

[260] Villani, vi. 70.

[261] _Vide_ "I Capitoli del Comune di Firenze, inventario e regesto,"
vol. i., edited by C. Guasti. Florence: Cellini, 1866.

[262] Ammirato, _ad annum_, gives a summary of the treaty.

[263] Villani, vi. 62. This incident, highly praised by Villani as a
magnanimous example, has been quoted by others as a proof that the
Florentine people must have been corrupt at a time when so exceptional
a monument could be decreed to one of the citizens simply because he
had refused to betray his country. But it should be noted, first of
all, that he was not honoured with a monument merely because he had
rejected a bribe, but, as Villani goes on to say, because "Aldobrandino
died in such excellent repute for his virtuous deeds for the good of
the Commune." Even should Villani's praises of the deed in itself seem
too marked and consequently indicative of general corruption, this
corruption might be more fitly attributed to Villani's own days than to
the earlier period of Aldobrandino and the _Primo Popolo_, when genuine
virtue and true patriotism were undoubtedly predominant.

[264] "Storie," lib. ii.

[265] Villani, vi. 65.

[266] C. Paoli, "La battagali di Montaperti" (extract from vol. ii. of
the "Bollettino della Societa Senese di Storia patria"). Sienna, 1869.
In 1889 Prof. Paolo added another very important publication to this
work, _i.e._, "Il libro di Montaperti," in the "Documenti di Storia
Italiana," brought out by the Royal Commission for Tuscany, Umbria, and
the Marches, vol. ix.

[267] Marchionni di Coppo Stefani, "Stor. fior.," rubric 120.

[268] Villani and other Florentine chroniclers.

[269] The figures given by Florentine chroniclers are never exact, and
must be therefore regarded as approximate ones only.

[270] Here is an instance extracted from a law of 1284: "Item quod
nullus presumat consulere, vel arengare super aliquo quod non sit
principaliter propositum per dominum Potestatem, vel aliquem loco sui.
Et qui contrafacerit, in soldos sexaginta florenorum parvorum vice
qualibet puniatur, et plus et minus ad voluntatem domini Potestatis.
Et quicquid dictum vel consultum contra propositionem, non valeat, nec
teneat." "Consigli Maggiori, Provvisioni e Registri," i., sheets 12
_retro._ Archivio di Stato, Florence.

[271] Too coarse to be translated.--_Translator's note._

[272] Villani, vi. 78.

[273] Aldobrandini, "Chroniche," p. 9; Paoli, "La battaglia di
Montaperti," p. 46.

[274] In the cathedral of Sienna certain poles are shown traditionally
believed to have belonged to the Florentine _Carroccio_. But Siennese
scholars now justly maintain that these poles formed part of their own
_Carroccio_ instead.

[275] Paoli, op. cit., p. 58.

[276] Sismondi, after comparison of the chroniclers' accounts, raises
the number of killed to 10,000 and the wounded to the same figure.

[277] VI. 19.

[278] Lord of the Castle of Poppi in the Casentino. He had separated
from the other Counts Guidi, who were Guelphs.

[279] All this is narrated by Villani and other chroniclers, and is
likewise recorded by Dante in the "Divina Commedia." A few writers
have tried to throw doubt on the incident, but, as Dr. Hartwig justly
observes, it is difficult to suppose that Guelph chroniclers would have
invented a legend so entirely favourable to the Ghibelline chief.

[280] Prof. Del Lungo gives a full account of these demolitions in his
paper, "Una vendetta in Firenze," in the "Arch. Stor. It.," Series iv.
vol. 18, p. 355 and fol.

[281] P. Ildefonso, "Delizie," &c., vol. ix. p. 19 and fol.

[282] Machiavelli, "Storie," lib. i. p. 37.

[283] It is said that Manfred, on witnessing their attack, showed
his admiration for their courage by exclaiming, "Whoever may win the
victory, these Guelphs will not lose it."

[284] Dante (Purgatorio, iii. 121-32). The poet places Manfred in
purgatory, although at the period he was classed as a heretic together
with the Emperor Frederic, Farinata, and many other Ghibellines:

      "Orribili furon li peccati miei,
       Ma la bonta infinita ha si gran braccia
       Che prende cio che si rivolve a lei.
       Se il pastor di Cosenza, che alla caccia
       Di me fu messo per Clemente, allora
       Avesse in Dio ben letta questa faccia,
       L'ossa del corpo mio sarieno ancora
       In co' del ponte presso a Benevento,
       Sotto la guardia della grave mora.
       Or le bagna la pioggia e move il vento,
       Di fuor del Regno, quasi lungo il Verde,
       Ove le trasmuto a lume spento."


[285] Machiavelli, "Storie," lib. ii. p. 73.

[286] This result had come to pass at a much earlier period, was of
frequent occurrence in Florentine history, and was now more assured
than at any previous time. Malespini's Chronicle, chap. 104, even
before the coronation of Frederic II., refers to certain families who
"were beginning to be prominent, although too obscure to be mentioned a
short while ago.... The Mozzi, Bardi, Jacopi detti Rossi, Frescobaldi,
all these were of recent creation, inasmuch as they were still
merchants and of petty origin: likewise the Tornaquinci and Cavalcanti,
also traders, were of petty origin, and the same may be said of the
Cerchi, who shortly began to rise higher than the aforesaid."

[287] Most of these letters are given in Martene, others are published
by Del Giudice in his "Codice diplomatico di Carlo I. and Carlo II
d'Angio."

[288] Machiavelli, "Storie," lib. ii. p. 75.

[289] "Il Codice diplomatico di Carlo I. e II. d'Angio," published by
Del Giudice, in Naples, serves to rectify many blunders made by the
chroniclers on this point.

[290] "The citizens of ancient times being either entirely
extinguished, or, at least decayed by age, another race began to spring
up, as it were, in a new city." Ammirato, "Storie."

[291] There are so many discrepancies among Florentine authorities
regarding this question that, after careful study and comparison of the
different accounts given by the chroniclers, we have chosen Villani
as our guide. He is the most celebrated of the old writers and the
nearest to the times described. On close consideration of his words
(_vide_ Villani, lib. vii. chap. xvi.) we see that the councils are
to be specified as those of the Twelve, of the Captain and of the
Podesta. But reference to the State Archives, the _Consulte_, or first
volume of _Provvisioni_--dated a few years after the reform of which we
speak--will serve to prove that sometimes the Council of One Hundred
was assembled; at others both the special council of the Captain and
his council-general and special were summoned; sometimes again the
Podesta's special council--likewise styled the Council of Ninety--with
his council-general and special, amounting in all to 390 members (300
+ 90). We also find that admittance to these four last-mentioned
councils was usually granted to the seven masters (_capitudini_) of the
greater guilds, and that in course of time the number of the masters
increased, and that they were sometimes summoned to meet as a separate
council. By studying the number of votes given at the councils, we find
sufficient proof of the accuracy of Villani's statements. In special
councils the voting was done with black and white balls, a record being
kept of their respective numbers. But at that period general councils
only signified their verdict by standing up or remaining seated, and
the votes were not recorded in writing. But regarding these points
the rules changed as circumstances required, for the magistrates were
frequently authorised to consult _whichever councils they preferred_.

In affairs of the highest importance, and in discussions carried on in
a strictly legal way, every measure proposed had to be first approved
by the twelve worthies, who were likewise allowed to ask the advice
of confidential private persons, afterwards denominated _advisers_
(_richiesti_). The proposal was next submitted to the One Hundred, then
to the Captain's two councils, and finally to those of the Podesta. All
these details are confirmed by the documents in the Archives; and as a
more easily verified instance, although of later date than the period
now described, we may quote the opening sentence of the "Statuto dell'
Esecutore di Giustizia," given in the Appendix to Signor Giudici's
"Storia de' Municipi Italiani," p. 402 (1st edition). "In the name of
God, _Amen_. In the year of His Holy Incarnation, 1306, &c., firstly,
in the Council of One Hundred, and subsequently in the council and
through the special council of _Messere lo Capitano_ and the masters of
the twelve greater guilds (these having already increased in number)
... and farthermore, at once, without delay, in the council and
through the general and special council of _Messere lo Capitano_ and
of the people of Florence, and of the masters of the guilds ... done,
confirmed, and carried the vote by sitting and rising, as prescribed
by the same Statutes.... Likewise after these proceedings, in the same
year, same '_indiction_' and day, in the council and by the general
council of three hundred and special council of ninety men of the
Florentine Commune, with the aforesaid guild-masters, by order of the
noble gentleman, Messere Count Gabrielli d'Agobbio of the same city and
Commune of Florence, Podesta, &c." Here it should also be noted that
although in this case the councils of the Podesta assembled on the same
day as those of the captain, yet according to law and usage the former
should not have been convoked until one or two days had elapsed.

[292] _Vide_ "Delizie degli eruditi Toscani," by P. Ildefonso, vol.
vii. pp. 203-286.

[293] Del Lungo "Una Vendetta," in "Firenze Arch. Stor. It.," Series
iv. vol. xviii. p. 354 and fol.

[294] The _Giornale Storico degli Archivi Toscani_, anno i., No. 1,
contains "Lo Statuto di Parte Guelfa," of 1335, edited by Bonaini,
whose learned commentary on the same appeared in subsequent numbers.
Villani tells us (vii. 17) that, "by mandate from the Pope and the
king, the said Guelphs _nominated three_ knights as rectors of the
party." But this must be a blunder, since, according to the statutes
of the party, three knights and three men of the people were named
to the office. A document dated December 12, 1268, appended to Del
Lungo's "Una Vendetta in Firenze," mentions, "_Unus de sex Capitaneis
Partis Guelforum_." Villani, in the same chap. xvii., confuses Pope
Clement with Pope Urban, deceased in 1264. The statute of 1335 adds a
third council, of one hundred, to the others, and this probably served
the same purpose with regard to the councils as that fulfilled by the
parliament to the Republic.

[295] The English word "milliner" is derived from _Milan_.

[296] The term _calimala_ seems to have been taken from the name
of the street in which the guild was situated. The street led to a
house of ill-fame, hence the name _Calis malus_, in the sense of _Via
mala_--evil road or lane.

[297] A statute of the Calimala Guild, dated 1332, is given in the
appendix of Giudici's "Storia dei Municipi Italiani." Another, dated
1301-2, has been published, with a commentary by Dr. Filippi, "Il
piu antico Statuto dell' Arte di Calimala." Turin: Bocca, 1889. The
statutes formulated regulations already long in vigour by means of
special laws.

[298] All these details of the Calimala Guild are to be found in the
statutes cited above. We have quoted from the earliest statutes.

[299] Originally published in the Milan _Politecnico_, Nos. for
November and December, 1867.

[300] Ammirato (ed. of 1846; Florence, Batelli), i. 248.

[301] The chroniclers say Guy de Montfort, but the latter only came in
1269. _Vide_ Del Giudice, Cod. Dipl. ii. 23.

[302] Villani, vii. 19. The frequent mention of eight hundred knights
by the chroniclers of this period excites doubts as to their accuracy.
It is never safe to accept their statements regarding the number of
this or that army. Probably eight hundred horse was a species of
regulation number, signifying a squadron of French men-at-arms.

[303] Villani, vii. 19; Marchionne Stefani, rubric 138; Ammirato, lib.
iii.

[304] Gregorovius, vol. v. chap. 8: Cherrier, "Storia della lotta dei
Papi e degli Imperatori di Casa Sveva," lib. x.

[305] Ammirato, i. 262; "Delizie degli Eruditi," vol. ix. p. 41.

[306] Machiavelli, "Storie," vol. i. p. 77. Italy, 1813.

[307] "Ipsas petitiones benigne accessimus et audivimus cum effectu,
primo de conservando iure et honore Comunis Florentie; contra Pisanos
et Senenses invasores et Gibellinos et exiticios terre vestra et
infideles Podiibonizi proditores nostros proponimus, cum Dei auxilio
atque vestro, facere vivam guerram, donec peniteant de commissis,
et vos de factis vestris habeatis comodum et honorem.... Vicarium
Ytalicum virum providum discretum et fidelem, cuius devotionem, fidem
et probitatem in magnis factis nostris cognovimus, firmiter et ab
experto vobis concessimus secundum quod vestra postulatio continebat,
et volumus quod sit contentus salario et expensis et emendis, prout in
ipsius Civitatis statutis continetur, nec ultra aliquid exigat." Del
Giudice, "Codice Diplomatico," ii. 116-17.

We find that several Italian Podesta were afterwards appointed in
Florence by Charles.

[308] Villani, vii. 54.

[309] Raynaldi, anno 1278; Sismondi, vol. ii. chap. vii.

[310] Villani, vii. 56.

[311] Ammirato, vol. i. p. 274.

[312] Ammirato the younger was the first writer to give an exact report
of this agreement, with minute details derived from State papers, in
his additions to the elder Ammirato's "History" (Anno 1279 and 1280).
Several documents are given in the "Delizie degli Eruditi Toscani,"
by Padre Ildefonso, vol. ix. p. 63 and fol. Still ampler details are
given by Bonaini ("Della Parte Guelfa in Firenze") in the _Giornale
Storico degli Archivi Toscani_, vol. iii. p. 167 and fol. _Vide_ also
A. Gherardi's recent and very important work, "Le Consulte della
Repubblica Fiorentina" (Firenze, Sansoni). The original document of the
Peace is to be found (mutilated) in the State Archives of Florence.

[313] The Fourteen are mentioned together with the Twelve in the
cardinal's treaty of peace, and for some time later both bodies
are simultaneously mentioned in the "Consulte," according to the
usual Florentine custom of enumerating the old as well as the new
magistrates. Subsequently the Fourteen alone are recorded, and the
Twelve disappear entirely.

[314] Villani, vii. 56; Ammirato (Florentine edition of 1846), lib.
iii. p. 275, &c.

[315] The old chronicles contain indications of these particulars,
but for the minute description of them, corroborated by documentary
evidence, _vide_ Ammirato the younger, in his appendices to the
"Storie" of Ammirato the elder.

[316] Dr. Hartwig, who first called attention to this point, also
remarked that the office of _Defensor_ is first recorded in the
"Consulte," in November, 1282, and that the first Defender mentioned
by name is Bernardino della Porta. "Consulte," pp. 116, 132, 133, 140,
from November 6, 1282 to February 6, 1283.

[317] Dr. Hartwig also ascertained that in the "Consulte" the first
mention of the priors occurs on June 26, 1282. Their names are
recorded after those of the Fourteen; on April 24, 1283, they are
given precedence over the latter; and from December forwards they are
mentioned alone, without the Fourteen.

[318] Bk. i. p. 25 and fol. (the Del Lungo edition).

[319] Villani, vii, 79; Ammirato, iii. pp. 288-90.

[320] Villani says (vii. 89) that this "was the most noble and renowned
_court_ ever held in the city of Florence."

[321] "Consulte," vol. i. pp. 169-70.

[322] Hartwig, "Ein menschenalter florentinische Geschichte" (1250-93).
Freiburgi B., 1889-91, p. 111.

[323] Ammirato gives full details of this treaty. A summary of the
original document was afterwards included by Canale, in his "Nuova
Istoria della Repubblica di Genova" (the Le Monnier edition), vol. iii.
p. 34.

[324] Villani, vii. 98; Malespini, ccxliii.

[325] Some of the chroniclers assert that the archbishop hoped to
extract large sums of money from his captives before making an end of
them.

[326] For details of the Pisan war with Genoa and Florence, _vide_
"Storie e Cronache Pisane," edited by Bonaini and others in vol. vi.
(pts. i. and ii.) of the "Archivio Storico Italiano"; Canale, "Nuova
Istoria della Repubblica di Genova"; Villani; Flaminio dal Borgo;
Muratori Script., vol. xv.; Sismondi; "Hist. des Rep. It.," T. ii.
chap. 8.

[327] An order of knighthood limited to the nobility.

[328] G. Villani, Dino Compagni, and the other Florentine chroniclers.

[329] Villani, Compagni, Ammirato, and the Pisan historians previously
quoted.

[330] Villani, vii. 99; Vasari, "Vita di Arnolfo"; Ammirato (Florence:
Batelli and Co., 1846), vol. i. pp. 310-11.

[331] Ammirato, vol. i. p. 337.

[332] _Vide_ Note A at the end of this chapter.

[333] Prof. P. Santini has treated of this question in his article
entitled "Condizione personale degli abitanti del contado nel secolo
xiii.," "Arch. Stor. It." (Series iv. vol. xvii. p. 178 and fol.).
He justly remarks that there is no basis of comparison between the
Bolognese law of 1256 and the Florentine law of 1289, seeing that they
relate to persons of a different class and to two different periods
of the movement set on foot in every commune for ameliorating the
conditions of the inhabitants of the _contado_ (p. 188 and fol.).

[334] Villani, vii. 132.

[335] Ammirato, bk. iii. _ad annum_.

[336] _Vide_ Note B at the end of this chapter.

[337] _Vide_ Note C at the end of this chapter.

[338] Originally published in the _Politecnico_ of Milan; Nos. for June
and July, 1867.

[339] _Vide_ the Florentine edition of 1755, p. 133.

[340] This anecdote is related by the Friar of St. Gall, "De rebus
bellicis Caroli Magni." _Vide_ Muratori, Dissertazione xxv.

[341] Muratori, Dissertazione xxv. _Vide_ likewise Pignotti, "Storia
della Toscana," vol. iv. Saggio iii. Florence, 1824.

[342] We have already mentioned the probable derivation of this term.

[343] _Vide_ Pagnini, "Della Decima," vol. ii. sec. 4 and 5.

[344] Pagnini, "Della Decima," ibid.

[345] Villani, lib. xi. chap. 94.

[346] Villani, lib. xi. chap. 94.

[347] It would seem that the Guild of Por' Santa Maria originally
traded in Florentine woollen stuffs, and that the silk merchants formed
a secondary and separate branch. Gradually, however, they became
amalgamated with the guild (early in the thirteenth century), and then
became its principal components, until at last the Silk Guild and Por'
Santa Maria were entirely fused in one.

[348] _Vide_ the "Cronaca" of Benedetto Dei (1470-92), preserved among
the MSS. of the Magliabecchian Library. Many interesting portions of
this "Cronaca" have been published in the appendix to vol. ii. of
Pagnini's "Decima."

[349] _Vide_ the same "Cronaca" of Dei.

[350] "Again, a law was passed in 1371, inasmuch as many men traded the
shares of the Monte in this wise: One said to another: 'the shares of
the Monte are at thirty; I wish to do some business with you to-day.
This time next year I'll sell to you, or you to me, at what price shall
we say?' At thirty-one the share [of one hundred]? 'What premium do you
ask for this?' So they bargained, and the terms were fixed. When shares
fell, the merchant bought, if they rose, he sold out, and the stock
changed hands twenty times in the year. Accordingly a tax was charged
of two florins in the hundred for every transfer." Marchionne di Coppo
Stefani, vol. viii. p. 97, in the "Delizie degli Eruditi Toscani," vol.
xiv.

[351] Vettori, "Il Fiorino d'oro"; Orsini, "Storia delle Monete."
Florence, 1760.

[352] Pagnini, "Della Decima," vol. ii. sec. iii. chaps. i.-iv. Other
details are supplied by Ammirato, Dei, and more especially by Villani
(xi. 88, and xii. 55).

[353] G. Villani, xl. 54.

[354] Ammirato, lib. 18, _ad annum_.

[355] "Cronaca" of Benedetto Dei, given in Pagnini.

[356] Ibid., vol. ii. p. 275.

[357] Ammirato, _ad annum_; Pagnini, loc. cit.

[358] This led some writers to believe that slavery still existed in
Italy many centuries after it had disappeared. A praiseworthy article
on this theme, by Signor Salvatore Bongi, was published in the _Nuova
Antologia_, anno I. No. 6.

[359] _Vide_ the Speech of Tommaso Mocenigo, so often reproduced by
chroniclers and historians; Pagnini, "Della Decima," vol. ii. p. 7 and
fol.; Romanin, "Storia documentata di Venezia," vol. ii. pp. 156-7.

[360] Urghanj, the chief city of Khwarezm, the country now called
Khiva. New Urghanj, the present commercial capital of Khiva, is sixty
miles from the ancient city.

[361] Balducci Pegolotti, in Pagnini's book. Colonel H. Yule's "Cathay,
and the Way Thither, being a Collection of Mediaeval Notices of China"
(London, printed for the Hakluyt Society, 1866), is a very important
work, includes a series of documents translated by the author, and is
prefaced by a learned dissertation from his pen.

[362] Pagnini, vol. ii. sec. i. K. Sieveking, "Geschichte von Florenz."
This very brief but excellent work was published anonymously at Hamburg
in 1844. It has furnished many of the details given in this chapter.

[363] The first five were frequently joined to the greater guilds,
which were then increased to twelve.

[364] "Inferno," Canto x.

[365] Franco Sacchetti tells us that while he was a member of the
government the magistrates of the Republic never succeeded in enforcing
the laws against luxury. One of them, having been severely reprimanded
on this score and threatened with dismissal from office, gives the
following account of the devices by which Florentine women evaded the
regulations established by law:

"_Signori miei_,--All my life I have sought to acquire reason; and
now, when methought I knew something, I find I know nothing; inasmuch
as when searching for forbidden ornaments, according to your orders,
the women bring forward arguments of a kind never found by me in any
law; and among others I will quote these: There comes a woman with an
embroidered trimming turned down over her hood, and the notary says,
'Give me your name, since you wear an embroidered trimming.' The good
woman takes off this trimming, which is fastened to the hood by a
pin, and, holding it in her hand, declares it is a garland. He goes
to another woman and says, 'I find you have too many buttons on the
front of your gown; you must not wear those buttons.' But she replies,
'Yes, Messere, I can, for these are not buttons, but bosses; and if
you do not believe me, see, they have no shanks, and neither are there
button-holes.' The notary passes on to another woman wearing ermine
fur, saying to himself, 'What excuse can she allege for that? You wear
ermine,' and he begins to write her name. The woman says, 'Do not
write me down, for this is not ermine, but _lattizzi_ fur.' Says the
notary, 'What are these _lattizzi_?' 'They are animals....' One of the
magistrates says, 'We are trying to fight against a wall.' And another
remarks, 'It were better to attend to affairs of more importance!'"
(Novella, 137.)

[366] Guicciardini, "Considerazioni sui Discorsi del Machiavelli"
(Opere inedite, vol. i., Barbera, Florence). Full confirmation of the
above statements are to be found in this work. In treating of chap.
xii. bk. i., where Machiavelli charges the Popes with having prevented
the unity of Italy, the author qualifies his approval of the remark by
adding: "But I feel uncertain whether it were a good or an ill chance
for this province to escape being absorbed in a kingdom; for although
to be subject to a republic might prove a glory to the name of Italy
and a happiness to the dominant city, it could only bring calamity to
all other cities, seeing that, oppressed by the latter's shadow, they
were unable to rise to any greatness, it being the wont of republics
'to give no share of the fruits of their independence and power to
any save their own citizens.... This reason does not hold good in a
monarchy wherein all subjects enjoy more equality, and therefore we
behold France and many other provinces living contentedly under a
king.'"

[367] Originally published in the Milan Politecnico, July and August,
1868.

[368] To avoid the addition of too many notes to a chapter treating of
the general course of events, and only purposing to throw some light on
the political conditions of our communes, more especially of Florence,
I may say once for all, that besides the statutes, quoted in due place,
the authorities most frequently referred to are: Savigny, "Storia del
Diritto Romano nel Medio Evo"; Francesco Forti, "Istituzioni Civili e
Trattati inediti di giurisprudenza"; Gans, "Il Diritto di Successione
nella Storia Italiana," translated by A. Torchiarulo: Naples (Pedone,
Lauriel, 1853); Gide, "Etude sur la condition privee de la femme":
Paris, 1868; Schupfer, "La Famiglia Longobarda," in the Law Archives
of Bologna, Nos. 1, 2. At this date it is scarcely necessary to remark
that since 1868 these studies have made enormous progress in Italy,
and that many works of signal importance have been produced which were
naturally unknown to me while engaged on these pages, only intended--at
the moment--to assist my pupils to a clearer comprehension of the
Florentine revolution of 1293, and the "Ordinamenti di Giustizia,"
which were its inevitable and long needed results.

[369] _Translator's note to Chapter VII._--With regard to this
chapter, I am greatly indebted to the kindness of my learned friend
Mr. Ninian Thompson, late judge at Calcutta, since without his skilled
collaboration and revision it would have been impossible to cope with
the legal technicalities of the text. My thanks are also due to Signor
Del Vecchio, Professor of Jurisprudence, for his valuable explanation
of ancient terminology.--LINDA VILLARI.

[370] Gaius, i. pp. 890-2.

[371] Comitis Gabriellis Verri, "De ortu et progressu iuris
mediolanensis," &c. In Book I. of this work we find, among others, the
following words: "Quae omnia manifeste demonstrant, maiores nostros
maximum atque perpetuum studium, contulisse ad agnationem conservandam
pro veteri xii. tabularum iure, a Justiniano postea immutato, quo certe
nihil ad servandum augendumque familiarum splendorem ... utilius,
commodius, aptius, commendabilius potuit afferri."

Another of those old writers on law who steadfastly maintain this view
is Cardinal De Luca, who, in his "Theatrum veritatis et iustitiae,"
makes a singularly angry attack upon Justinian and all agreeing with
his views on the subject of agnation. According to De Luca, the
Italians never accepted the reforms, or, rather, as he calls them, the
_destructions and corruptions_, favoured by Justinian.

Even Giannone, in his "Storia Civile del Regno di Napoli" (bk. iii.
paragraph v.), says that Justinian's works met with no favour among
us. "They found no acceptance either in Italy or in our provinces,
nor could they be planted and strike deep roots here, as on foreign
soil; on the contrary, the ancient books of the juris-consults were
retained, and the code of Theodosius lost neither its reputation nor
its authority."

Here it may be well to remark that the persistence of the Roman law in
Italy during the Middle Ages, maintained by Savigny, but combated by
others, is now admitted on all hands.

[372] Dr. J. Ficker, "Forschungen zur Reichs und Rechtgeschicte
Italiens," 4 vols. Innsbruck, 1868-74.

[373] Gans, while accepting the ideas of Savigny as to the diffusion
of the Justinian law in Italy, also takes this view, which is in
accordance with his own theory that the new forms of the Italian law
were derived from the laws of the Longobards.

[374] Baudi de Vesme, in his notes on the Longobard laws, repeatedly
remarks: "Theodosiani juris vestigia hic agnoscere mihi vedetur." Del
Giudice has recently proved that certain passages are taken from the
Justinian law and others from the Theodosian code.

[375] This discussion may now be considered superfluous, it being
generally acknowledged at the present day, that even subsequently to
Justinian's constitution, the Theodosian code continued in force. In
this way the Justinian and pre-Justinian forms had a contemporaneous
existence, only the Pandects were longer neglected.

[376] According to Savigny, the school of Guarnerius was already
flourishing in 1113-18. It is now well ascertained that this school was
preceded by others adhering far less closely to Justinian forms.

[377] The ancient statute of Giacomo Tiepolo, of which the MS. is
extant in the Archives of the Frari, in Venice, and which has been
frequently printed, concludes its first prologue with these words: "Et
se alguna fiada occorresse cosse che per quelli statuti non fossero
ordinade, perche l'e de plui i facti che li statuti, s'el occorresse
question stranie, et in quele alcuna cossa simela se trovasse, de simel
cosse a simele e da proceder. Aver, secondo la consuetudine approvada,
oltremente, se al tuto sia diverso, over si facta consuetudine non se
trovase, despona i nostri iudexi come zusto et raxionevole a la so
providentia apparera, habiendo Dio avanti i ochi de la soa mente, si
fatamente che, al di del zudixio, de la streta examination davanti el
tremante (_tremendo_) Iudexe render possa degna raxione."

[378] Many examples to this effect will be found in the volumes of
"Provvisioni" in the Florence Archives.

[379] "Statuta Romae," Romae, 1519, ii. 110, 111, and iii. 17.

[380] "Statuta Pisauri, noviter impressa," 1531, ii. 79, 84, 106, 107.

[381] "Statuta Pisauri, noviter impressa," 1531, ii. 79, 84, 106, 107.

[382] "Etiam nullis probationibus, _quia volumus quod_ nuda patris
assertio plenam probationem faciat." _Vide_ "Statuta Civitatis
Lucensis," 1539, ii. 66, 67, 68.

[383] "Statuta Civitatis Urbini, impressa, Pisauri," 1519, vi. 30.
_Quod pater pro filis, dominus pro famulo teneatur in damnis datis._

[384] "Statuta Florentiae" (edition dated from Friburg), ii. 110.

[385] "Statuta Florentiae" (edition dated from Friburg), ii. 110.

[386] _Vide_ "Statuti Pisani," edited by Bonaini.

[387] "Statuta Florentiae," ii. 61, 62, 63.

[388] "Statuta Florentiae," ii. 64.

[389] Ibid. ii. 65. _Vide_ also the statutes of 1324 (ii. 36 and 74)
and of 1355 (ii. 39) in the State Archives.

[390] "Nisi promiserit de continuo habitando in dicta civitate, vel
comitatu Urbini" ("Statuta Urbini," Pisauri, 1519, ii. 54).

[391] "Liber juris civilis urbis Veronae," chap. xliv. Verona, 1728.

[392] See Gans, _op. cit._ This author made a very careful examination
of the Pisan law in the statutes (then unpublished) contained in a MS.
Codex at Berlin.

[393] _Vide_ the "Consuetudini della citta d'Amalfi," edited and
annotated by Scipione Volpicella, p. 22; and the "Consuetudini della
citta di Napoli," under the heading, "De successionibus ab intestato."
The same provisions are found also in the "Consuetudini Sorrentine."
See also Dr. Otto Hartwig's work, "Codex iuris municipalis Siciliae."
Heft 1, "Das Stadtrecht von Messina." Cassel und Goettingen, 1867.

[394] "Statuta Comunis Mantuae," Rubric li., "De successionibus ab
intestato." _Cod._ MS. F. T., 1, fourteenth century, Mantua Archives.
Similar terms are used in the Veronese statutes ("Statuta Veronae."
Veronae, 1588, bk. ii. chap. 82). "_Ut bona parentum in filios
masculos et caeteros per lineam masculinam descendentes conserventur_,
pro conservandis domibus et oneribus Communis Veronae sustinendis,
_statuimus_," &c.

[395] "Statuta Florentiae," ii. 130.

[396] Statutes 4 (of 1324), ii. 70, and 9 (of 1355), ii. 73, in the
State Archives, declare in fact that when there are no surviving sons,
but only brothers or their sons, the woman is entitled to have the
usufruct of her father's, grandfather's, or great-grandfather's estate:
"Tunc ipsa mulier habeat usufructum omnium bonorum talis patris,
avi, vel proavi defuncti." This is the usufruct for which alimony is
afterwards substituted.

[397] State Archives, "Statuti," 4, bk. ii. 50, and 9, bk. ii. 51.

[398] "Statuta Florentiae," ii. 32.

[399] Ibid. ii. 130.

[400] "Statuta Florentiae," ii. 126.

[401] Ibid. ii. 129.

[402] "Constitutiones Marchiae Anconitanae." Forolivii, 1507.

[403] "Statuti della honoranda Universitate deli Mercanti de la Citade
di Bologna," 1530, file 98 and following.

[404] "Statuta Florentiae," ii. 51.

[405] Ibid. ii. 76.

[406] "Statuta Florentiae," ii. 75.

[407] Ibid. ii. 77.

[408] Ibid. ii. 108.

[409] Ibid. ii. 109.

[410] The frequent repetition of this phrase is worthy of note, since
it enables us to understand the manner in which associations were
usually constituted.

[411] "Statuta Florentiae," ii. 66.

[412] State Archives, "Statuti" 9, ii. 30. The same provision is found
in the statutes of 1324 (ii. 87), and was already comprised in those of
Pistoia dated 1296 (ii. 6), having been copied from another Florentine
statute of earlier date.

[413] The _Mezzeria_ system obtains not only throughout Tuscany and
Lucca, but over a considerable part of Romagna. But the terms and
contracts most favourable to the peasantry are to be found near
Florence and in the Pistoian district. Contracts implying a system of
_Mezzeria_ more or less rudimentary, and dating from about the close of
the twelfth century, are still extant.

[414] Two of 1250 and 1251, in the Florentine territory, have been
edited by Ruhmor (_vide_ also Capei in the "Atti dei Georgofili,"
vol. xiv. p. 228); other hardly less ancient examples have been
found at Cortona by the Notary L. Ticciati, and published by him in
the "Archivio Storico Italiano," Series v., vol. x., No. 4, 1892.
Nevertheless, contracts on the true _Mezzeria_ system cannot have
been in general use earlier than the commencement of the fourteenth
century. A common contract drawn up in 1331 on Siennese territory was
communicated by Prof. C. Paoli to Baron S. Sonnino, and published by
the latter in 1875 Florence, in his work "Sulla Mezzeria in Toscana."
In a review, entitled "L'Agricoltura Italiana," nineteenth year (1893),
Nos. 274-5, Marquis L. Ridolfi justly remarks that the difficulty in
finding old _Mezzeria_ contracts in the Florentine territory proceeds
from the custom prevailing there of seldom referring to a public notary
for the purpose. As a rule, the parties concerned merely exchange
written copies of the agreement.

[415] "Statuta Florentiae," ii. 18.

[416] Ibid. ii. 21.

[417] Ibid. ii. 23. _Vide_, on this subject, Salvetti, "Antiquitates
Florentinae."

[418] "Nuova Antologia," Florence, July, 1869.

[419] G. Villani, "Cronica," xi. 96.

[420] P. E. Giudici, "Storia dei Comuni Italiani," bk. vi., paragraphs
53 and 54. Florence, Le Monnier, 1866. Vannucci, "I primi tempi della
liberta fiorentina," chap. iv. p. 161 and fol. Florence, Le Monnier,
1861. Napier's "Florentine History," vol. i. chap. xiii. p. 342.
London, 1846. T. A. Trollope, "A History of the Commonwealth of
Florence," bk. ii. chap. iii. p. 212. London, 1865. It should be noted
that although Mr. Trollope failed to overcome every difficulty, he was
enabled to avoid various blunders on this head by merely translating
certain parts of the enactments without explaining the more obscure
items. Mons. Perrens, in a recent work, written after the first
publication of this chapter, has generally accepted its conclusions and
corroborated them by fresh researches of his own.

[421] _Vide_ chaps. v. and vi. of the present work.

[422] It is impossible to believe that there were no duties of any
kind. Villani himself (bk. xi. chap. xcii.) enumerates a great many
imposed between 1336 and 1338, and certain of these were unquestionably
of earlier origin. Perhaps he meant to express that the duties were few
and slight.

[423] "Per non mettere gravezza." Whenever taxes were imposed on
the property of citizens, an estimate was made of it, as the tax
in question was paid in _lire_ or _libbre_, the term _far libbra,
allibbrare_, was often used to signify making valuations of property as
well as the imposition of taxes.

[424] G. Villani, viii. 2.

[425] _Vide_ the preceding chapter.

[426] Dino Compagni, bk. ii. p. 201, the Del Lungo edition. I quote
from this edition, as being far more correct than the others, although
it was only published in 1879, ten years after the first appearance of
this chapter in the form of a separate essay.

[427] _Vide_ in Padre Ildefonso's "Delizie degli Eruditi Toscani," the
document appended to vol. viii. It consists of a petition presented by
certain inhabitants of Castelnuovo after having been attacked by the
Pazzi and others, _armata manu, cum militibus et peditibus_, who had
burnt their houses, killed several persons, and compelled others to
sign a contract, under false pretence of a law suit, that had never
occurred, _et scribi faciendo litem contra eos esse super renovationem
servitiorum_.

[428] G. Villani, vii. 16.

[429] _Vide_ the "Statuto della Parte Guelfa," chap. xxxix. It may
be found in vol. i. (1857) of the "Giornale storico degli Archivi
Toscani," that was published for some years jointly with the "Arch.
Stor. It." This statute of 1355 (edited by Bonaini) is the earliest
known statute of the _Parte Guelfa_, but does not appear to be the
first that was compiled. In the above-mentioned "Giornale," vol. iii.
(1859), Bonaini began a monograph, entitled, "Della Parte Guelfa
in Firenze," which was continued in several numbers, but then left
incomplete. _Vide_ also G. Villani, vii. 17, describing the original
formation of the Society. Its precise condition in 1293 is as yet
imperfectly known, but this may be inferred from what it was shortly
before and after that period.

[430] G. Villani, viii. 1.

[431] The first of these laws, already known to the public, and the
others which were then inedited, have been fully examined in chap. v.
of this work and are printed in the appendix to the same.

[432] In fact the "Ordinamenti" (rubric xviii. of the Bonaini edition)
refer to this law, dated October 2, 1286 ("Provvisioni," i. 27), and
comprised in the statute. Both the rubric and title are quoted in
the "Ordinamenti." A _Consulta_ (or decree) of March 20, 1280 (81),
given in Gherardi's collection, p. 33, had also cited a similar and
still older law: "De securitatibus prestandis a magnatibus," which was
afterwards amended by that of 1286.

[433] Ammirato, at commencement of bk. iv.; also in "Provvisioni," ii.
72, Florentine Archives.

[434] Dino Compagni, bk. i. p. 56.

[435] G. Villani, viii. 8.

[436] Ammirato, bk. iv. p. 348.

[437] In fact, many neglected to give surety (_sodare_), and several
laws were framed to compel the contumacious to obey.

[438] This is known from the terms of the debate, which has been
published by Bonaini in the "Arch. Stor. It.," New Series, vol. i. p.
78, document B.

[439] At the period there were twelve Greater and nine Lesser Guilds.

[440] Many historians assert that he was among the priors when the
"Ordinamenti" were compiled. But these are officially dated the 18th of
January, and Compagni states that Giano entered the Signory on the 15th
of February. This statement is supported by the list of priors given by
Coppo Stefani, in his "Delizie degli Eruditi Toscani," and likewise by
documentary evidence.

[441] Another inedited compilation also exists in the Florence
Archives. Certain new rubrics were inserted in this at a later date,
and even, as we shall show further on, among the first twenty-eight.

[442] Dr. K. Hegel, "Die Ordnungen der Gerechtigheit," Erlangen, 1867.
This is a _Prolusion_, in which the learned author of the "Storia
della Costituzione dei Municipi Italiani," very carefully examines the
code edited by Bonaini, and compares it with others. But he does not
investigate the value or intrinsic importance of the enactments, and
merely gives a brief summary of them.

[443] "Arch. Stor. It.," New Series, vol. i. (1855) p. 38, note 1.

[444] Until this draft was published, we could only refer to posterior
compilations, and had no means of ascertaining to what extent they
differed from the law in its original form. Although Bonaini had
failed to discover the original document of the law as approved, his
publication of the first draft brings us very near to the real thing.
And this is a point of no small importance, seeing that the laws of
the Florentine Republic underwent such radical changes from one day to
another, that a compilation, dated only two or three years after the
original law, might be very different from it. For instance, Document
A, published by Bonaini ("Arch. Stor. It.," New Series, vol. i. p. 72),
contains a rider or addendum to the Ordinamenti passed on the 9th and
10th of April, 1293. This was inserted as part of the original law in
the compilations edited by Fineschi and Giudici.

In the following bibliographical notices I shall be obliged, for the
sake of greater clearness, to occasionally repeat or sum up previously
related facts.

1. Of the various compilations of the enactments, that included among
the printed statutes was the first to be published.

2. P. F. Vincenzo Fineschi published a second compilation in his
"Memorie storiche, che possono servire alle vite degli uomini illustri
di Santa Maria Novella," &c., Florence, 1790.

3. The third published compilation was given by Prof. P. E. Giudici
in the appendix to his "Storia dei Municipi Italiani," Florence,
Poligrafia italiana, 1853; reprinted in 3 vols., Florence, Le Monnier,
1864-66. The Italian compilation, divided in 118 rubrics, the last of
which is mutilated, was published from a codex in the State Archives of
Florence ("Statuti," No. 8). By some oversight the author chanced to
omit the three concluding rubrics.

4. The last published compilation is that brought out by Bonaini in the
"Arch. Stor. It.," New Series, vol. i, No. 1, 1855, of which we have
already spoken, and shall have to mention again farther on.

5. Another compilation, to which previous allusion has been made (p.
89, note 92), is also deserving of notice. It is among the MSS. of the
Florence Archives (ch. ii., dist. i., No. 1), and is still inedited.
Padre Ildefonso published certain fragments of it, however, in vol. ix.
of the "Delizie degli Eruditi Toscani," and Bonaini published an index
of its rubrics, 134 in number.

6. In conclusion, we may mention the Miscellany or "Zibaldone,"
likewise referred to before, which in addition to many decrees
issued between 1274 and 1465, some of which augment the force of
the enactments, also includes a petition presented by the people of
Florence in June, 1378--namely, the year in which the Revolt of the
Ciompi occurred, imploring that the Enactments of Justice should be
again enforced, the which request was granted. This codex is also a
useful contribution to the history of the enactments.

Recently both Prof. Del Lungo (_vide_ "Bullettino della Societa
Dantesca," Nos. 10, 11, of July, 1892) and Sig. G. Salvemini,
undergraduate of the Instituto Superior, Florence (_vide_ "Arch. Stor.
It.," Series v., vol. x. 1892), have published the provision of July
6, 1295, introducing several modifications and mitigations in the
enactments. Although this provision was already known to the world,
by Prof. Del Lungo's previous careful examination of it in his work
on "Dino Compagni" (vol i., 1078-80), Salvemini's clever commentary
has gleaned fresh information from it. This provision includes all the
modifications made in the enactments in 1295, and often gives fragments
of the law as it previously stood, together with the changes then
introduced. Hegel, having examined all the documents edited in his
day, was the first to prove, on assured evidence, that the rough draft
edited by Bonaini, although, as he thinks, omitting certain rubrics and
comprising some disparities, mostly of form, contained the real gist
of the original enactments. This in itself was an important result.
Regarding the disparities noted by Hegel, and the missing rubrics,
Salvemini was enabled, by studying the document of July 6, 1295, to
make some novel remarks, to which we shall refer later on.

[445] Rubric iii. of the draft states that "De prudentioribus,
melioribus et legalioribus artificibus civitatis Florentiae, continue
artem exercentibus, dummodo non sint milites." Also farther on:
"Aliquis qui continue artem non exerceat, vel aliquis miles non possit
nec debeat modo aliqui eligi, vel esse in dicto officio Prioratus."
"Arch. Stor. It.," New Series, vol. i. pp. 44, 45. Rubric xviii., p.
66, enumerates the persons bound to give guaranty as nobles, although
exercising a trade, "non obstante quod ipsi vel aliquis eorum de
dictis domibus et casatis ... sint artifices vel artem seu mercantiam
exerceant."

[446] _Vide_ on this point a document of 1287 appended to this chapter.
It proves that the practical exercise of a trade or craft was held
indispensable before 1293, and shows what precautions were required to
prevent the law from being easily evaded.

[447] Rubric iii., G. We generally quote from Giudici's Italian
compilation as being more widely known than the others. But we are
careful to collate it with the versions of Fineschi and Bonaini, taking
note of significant divergences. The letters B. G. F. are used to
indicate the respective editions of Bonaini, Giudici, and Fineschi.

[448] Mons. Perrens (vol. ii. p. 385, note 2) doubts this fact,
and states that it only occurred in 1305. It is certain that the
Gonfalonier's function was to enforce the enactments, and that when
released from this duty by the creation of an "Executor" in 1306, he
then began to be more specially considered as the chief of the Signory;
but it is none the less certain, that among seven magistrates, all of
the same legal standing, the one possessed from the first of loftier
attributes and more direct command of the army, was virtually, if not
nominally, their president and chief.

[449] Rubric iv., G. and F. We should note that the Latin draft reduces
the Gonfalonier's interval of ineligibility to one year only, while
the other compilations extend it to two years, as in the case of the
Priors and as subsequently enforced. We have followed the Latin draft,
for the additional reason that, in the law of 1293, edited by Bonaini
(Doc. A. at p. 74), we find it ordained that Priors and Gonfalonier
should share the same benefits and privileges, "salvo et excepto
quod quae in Ordinamento iustitie, loquente de electione Vexilliferi,
continentur circa devetum et tempus deveti ipsius Vexilliferi, et
circa alia omnia in ipso ordinamento descripta, in sua permaneant
firmitate." This is repeated even under rubric xxxi., G. and F.,
whence we are forced to conclude that the prescribed interval before
re-election to the Gonfaloniership was originally different from that
established with regard to the Priorate, and only equalised with the
latter at a subsequent time. Besides, in Compilations F. and G. no
thought was given to correcting the rule laid down in rubric xxxi.,
where it is taken for granted that the original diversity was still in
force. Florentine laws were always made and amended bit by bit. All
doubts, however, are solved by the document from which we have quoted,
dated July 6, 1295, extending the term of prohibition, as regarded the
Gonfalonier, from one to two years. Salvemini has found proofs in the
"Provvisioni" and "Consulte" that this rule had been already applied in
December, 1294.

[450] As we shall see farther on, Dr. Lastig was the first writer to
point this out.

[451] Rubrics i. and ii. in Compilations B., F., and G.

[452] Rubrics lxiii.-lxv., which, as we have noted, were added by
another hand in 1297, to the codex edited by Fineschi, and correspond
with rubrics lxxxii.-lxxxiv. of the codex edited by Giudici, there
is renewed reference to the tricks employed in order to avoid giving
guarantees or nullifying their effect. When a noble committed a
crime and refused to pay the prescribed fine, his nearest relation
was legally bound to pay it in his stead. But in this case the said
relation frequently made declaration, "that the guilty person who had
either failed to give guarantees or offered pledges unsuited to the
case, possessed one or more legitimate or natural children, aged one
year, or more or less; and that for this reason the next of kin, or
those supposed to be responsible in virtue of the said enactment, are
exempt from the penalty prescribed by the same." (Rubric lxxxii., G.,
lxv., F.)

[453] Rubric xvii., G. The law quoted here is of October 2, 1286
("Provvisioni," i. 27).

[454] Rubric xvii., B., F., G. The two later compilations have an
addition tacked on at the end, that is not included in Compilation B.
In the Italian codex (G.) this addition is undated, but in the Fineschi
compilation is dated July 6, 1295. Its purpose is that of attenuating
the law by declaring that all omitted from the list of nobles in the
statute, or who have changed their name, and are known by another, are
not to be considered nobles. This addition was contemporaneous with the
extension of the legal number of witnesses from two to three.

[455] Rubrics xviii. and xix., F., G. These and rubric xx. also are not
in the Latin draft, as we shall have again to remark farther on.

[456] Compagni, i. 11; Villani, viii. 1.

[457] "Storie," bk. ii. p. 80, Italy, 1813.

[458] viii. 1.

[459] The nobles frequently employed friends or dependents to execute
their deeds of vengeance or assault--hence the enactments nearly always
refer to authors of crime in the plural as those chiefly charged with
the deed. The law of the 6th of July, 1295, was attenuated on this
point, as we shall see, by its recognition of a single leader or
"captain" of the crime, the others being only punished as accessories.

[460] Rubric vi., F. G. and V. B.

[461] This is derived both from the terms of the enactments and from
the chroniclers. According to the latter, criminals occasionally
obtained partial compensation because the destruction of their property
had been carried too far.

[462] Rubric xii., F. G., vii., B.

[463] Rubric xiii., F. G. This being a codicil added in 1295, it is not
comprised in Compilation B.

[464] Rubrics vi., vii., F. and G. Not comprised in B, having been
added in 1295. It should be remarked that in the legal phraseology of
the time "common law" signified Roman law; the law as prescribed by the
statutes being held almost in the light of a special or exceptional
code. But as the enactments constituted in themselves an exception,
with regard to the statutes, the latter are referred to wherever
_common law_ is mentioned. When the question was of two municipalities,
one of which was subject to the other, the subject municipality was
always allowed (excepting in political concerns) to retain its own
statutes; but in cases where these proved insufficient, it had recourse
to those of the dominant city, as though these constituted the common
law.

[465] Rubric ix., F. G., and vi., B. In this case two witnesses
were always needed to prove the offence, and on this point all the
compilations, including the rough draft, are agreed. Regarding the
other cases, Compilation B (rubric v.) only says _per testes_, meaning
more than one, that is, two or three. On the 6th of July, 1295, _per
testes_ was changed to _per tres testes_, and so it stands also in
rubric vi., F. and G.

It should be remarked that in the Italian compilation this rubric
ix. has a codicil that is neither comprised in the draft nor even
in Fineschi's compilation, and this is an additional proof that the
Italian compilation was of later date than the Latin text, of which it
is generally the faithful translation. The codicil decrees that the
fine is to be paid to the Commune either by the offending party himself
or his nearest relation.

Rubric xi., F. and G., answering to rubric xvi., B., treats of
the rights acquired by nobles over real property appertaining to
the people, and alludes in this connection to the _associates_ or
_relatives of the popolani_. This proves that the custom of joining
in associations was very general at the time, and likewise shows how
nearly the ties of association resembled ties of relationship.

[466] Rubric xvi., F. and G., rubric ix., B.

[467] Rubric xxvi., G., xxi., B.

[468] This "Conclusion" is mutilated in the xxii. and final rubric of
Compilation B. It exists in full in rubric xxvii., F., and rubric xxv.,
G.

It should be noted at this point that, leaving aside other partial
disparities, those rubrics, included in Compilations G. and F., and
entirely omitted from Compilation B. (whether as the results of later
decrees, or actually passed at the time when the draft was engrossed in
its definite official shape, we have no means of really ascertaining),
were those indicated in Compilations G. and F. by the numbers xviii.,
xix., and xx.

[469] This law, drawn up in full official form, is contained in
Document A. of the Bonaini Compilation, but still as a separate law.
On the other hand, in Compilations F. and G. we find it incorporated
with the enactments it was designed to strengthen. In Compilation G.
it is dated April 10, 1293, so also in the Latin Codex, but is undated
in Compilation G. We should remark in this connection that the law
edited by Bonaini is not only incorporated with the enactments in
Compilations F. and G., but in both comprises codicils of a later
date--such, for instance, as giving power to call nearly the whole of
the city and territory to arms, up to the number of 12,200 men. Had
this clause been passed in Giano's time, the chroniclers could not
have failed to record it. Villani states that at first one thousand
men only were enrolled--that is, the same number authorised by the
earlier enactments; the number was afterwards raised to two thousand,
as enjoined by the new law, and later still to four thousand (viii.
1). Therefore, even according to Villani, the number was progressively
enlarged.

[470] Villani, viii. 8.

[471] After Villani, Ammirato wrote: "For in addition to the measures
ordained, Giano had deprived the Captains of the Society of their seal;
and had provided that the funds of the said Society, which amounted to
a large sum, should be consigned to the Commune" (vol i. bk. iv. p.
346, Batelli edition, Florence, 1846-49).

[472] Villani, viii. 2.

[473] Villani, viii. 2; Ammirato, _ad annum_, vol. i. pp. 339.

[474] Ibid. viii. 2; Ammirato, vol. i. pp. 340, 341.

[475] Villani, viii. 2; and "Cronica" of the pseudo B. Latini, _ad
annum_.

[476] Ibid. viii. 1. Compagni gives a different version in vol. i. 12.
He relates that the offenders were of the Galigai family, and that he,
being Gonfalonier at the time, had to demolish their dwellings. We
have adhered to Villani, who states the fact to have occurred under
the first Gonfalonier, Baldo Ruffoli (in office from February 15th
to April 15th), whereas Compagni held the Gonfaloniership from June
15th to August 15, 1293, and it is scarcely probable this could have
been the first occasion on which the enactments were enforced. It is
known that Compagni's Chronicle is only extant in copies dated after
his time, and therefore probably containing blunders, alterations, and
additions made by its transcribers. Compagni's chronology is often
extremely vague. While Gonfalonier he may have undoubtedly seen some
sentences executed; but the first sentence on the nobles seems to have
been carried out as related by Villani, and also corroborated by Coppo
Stefani, bk. iii., rubric 198, Ammirato, vol. i. p. 338, and other
historians of weight. Some years after the first publication of this
essay, Professor Scheffer Boichorst produced the famous work (_vide_
"Historische Zeitschrift," xxiv. p. 313, 1870) that raised the very
heated controversy as to the authenticity of Dino Compagni's Chronicle.
At a later period Professor Del Lungo's learned volumes induced the
German scholar to cede many of the points in dispute. Accordingly we
may still continue to refer to Dino Compagni, although not without
careful sifting and discrimination.

[477] Compagni, i. 12, p. 55.

[478] _Vide_ chap. vi. of this work.

[479] Jean of Chalons in Burgundy.

[480] It is known that the Podesta, Captain, and many other magistrates
were subjected to an investigation or _sindacato_, on retiring from
office.

[481] Dino Compagni, i. 13; Villani, viii. 10.

[482] Dino Compagni, i. 13. The author does not explain the nature
of these meetings in which nobles and people were brought together.
They may have been private or preliminary assemblies. But even at the
Councils of the Guelph Society, as also at those of the Podesta, nobles
and people sat together, and therefore had continual opportunities for
talking over affairs of the State and discussing proposed bills.

[483] Dino Compagni, i. 15.

[484] We have gleaned this narrative from Villani and Compagni,
endeavouring to make their accounts agree, although this is no easy
task, seeing that the two are at odds on many points. Accordingly we
have tried to collect all the details given by both which are not in
contradiction. Compagni, i. 16, 17; Villani, viii. 8.

[485] Villani, _loc. cit._

[486] This famed decree, quoted in Del Migliore's "Firenze Illustrata"
(Florence, Ricci, 1821), vol. i. p. 6, and repeated by numerous
writers, is certainly a very beautiful one; but the original document
of it has never been discovered, and the form in which it has come down
to us leads to the belief that some changes at least must have been
made in it by a modern hand.

[487] Florence Archives, the Strozzi-Uguccioni Collection, 127. This
document was discovered by Signor Salvemini, who has kindly placed it
at our disposal.

[488] This Daddoccio was admitted into the Money-Changers' Guild on
the 14th of December, 1283, and on the 1st of December, 1287, paid his
rate as member of the same (Strozzi-Uguccioni Collection, 1283, 14th of
December).

[489] Originally published in the "Nuova Antologia" of Rome, December
1, 1888.

[490] Many just observations and important notes on this subject are
to be found in L. Chiapelli's work, "L'Amministrazione della Giustizia
in Firenze" ("Arch. Stor. It.," Series iv., vol. xv. p. 35 and fol.);
and Francesco Novati's "La Giovinezza di Coluccio Salutati" (Turin,
Loescher, 1888, chap. iii. p. 66 and fol.). But in my opinion both
writers have devoted all their acuteness and learning to proving the
corrupt state of justice at the time, without dwelling on the origin of
that corruption and its notable increase during the fourteenth century.
Its origin should, I think, be sought in the changed conditions of the
Podesta, Captains of the People, chancellors, notaries, judges, &c.
What was said of judges in the fourteenth century, certainly could not
have applied to those of the times of Piero della Vigna, Rolandino
dei Passeggieri, or of the numerous mediaeval Podesta wielding so much
power, that they tried, and often with success, to become absolute
tyrants of the communes. These were not men to act as blind tools of
others' party passions; on the contrary, they strove for their own ends
alone. It may have been owing to the political decline of the Podesta's
office, and to his consequent inclination to serve party strife, that,
dating from 1290, his term of power was reduced from one year to six
months (_vide_ Ammirato, _ad annum_). Naturally the Captain's term also
had to be similarly shortened.

[491] "Cronica," i. 13, p. 57.

[492] G. Villani, viii. 17.

[493] The Calimala, or Guild of Dressers, Finers and Dyers of foreign
woollen stuffs; the Changers or Bankers, the Guild of Wool; the Porta
Sta Maria, or Silk Guild; lastly, the Guild of Physicians, Druggists,
and Mercers, with whom the Painters were also joined. Dante Alighieri
was a member of this guild.

[494] Lastig, "Entwicklungswege und Quellen des Handelsrechts,"
Stuttgart, Enke, 1877, p. 251 and fol. Among many other just
observations, the author notes that the enactments fixed the number
of the guilds at twenty-one, that this number remained unchanged from
that time, and that in the statutes of the guilds, the year 1293 is
continually referred to as their "normal year," "wiederholt geradezu
als Normaljahr" (p. 244). _Vide_ also p. 267 and fol.

[495] Villani, bk. viii. chaps. 2 and 39.

[496] _Vide_ "Il Comune di Roma nel Medio Evo," in my "Saggi Storici e
Critici," Bologna, Zanichelli, 1890.

[497] Villani, viii. 12. _Vide_ also the Provision of July 6, 1295,
that has been previously quoted.

[498] Villani, viii. 12.

[499] Del Lungo, "Dino Compagni e la sua Cronica," i. p. 162. The
author believes that Dante Alighieri may have been one of the nobles
proclaimed men of the people.

[500] The chroniclers have much to relate on this subject. Compagni
says (pp. 86-7) that the Cerchi "made friends with the people and the
rulers;" farther on he remarks that "all holding the views of Giano
della Bella gathered round them" (the Cerchi) (p. 106). Stefani (iv. p.
220) states that the people "adhered to the Cerchi from party spirit,
and chiefly because they were merchants."

[501] Professor Del Lungo supplies special information on this subject
in several passages of his work.

[502] Villani, viii. 38.

[503] The aims of Pope Boniface and his plots with the Blacks have
been placed in a new light by the careful researches of Signor Guido
Levi and the documents discovered by him. _Vide_ his excellent work,
"Bonifazio VIII. e la sue Relazioni col Comune di Firenze," first
published in vol. iv. of the "Archivio Storico della Societa Romana di
Storia Patria," and subsequently in separate form. Rome, Forzani, 1882.
My quotations are taken from the latter.

[504] Levi, Doc. i.

[505] _Vide_ Ficker, "Forschungen," iv. n. 499, p. 506; Levi, p. 49.

[506] The words quoted above form the heading of a copy of the document
mentioned by Signor Levi (p. 49, note 2), and were taken as a motto for
his work.

[507] Levi gives the whole passage at p. 51, note 2.

[508] Levi, pp. 48, 49, and Doc. iii.

[509] Bondone Gherardi and Lippo, son of Ranuccio del Becca.

[510] Levi, pp. 39, 40. According to a letter of the Pope, published
by Signor Levi, in Doc. iv., the three persons accused were: "Simonem
Gherardi familiarem nostrum, nostraeque Camerae mercatorem; Cambium de
Sexto procuratorem in audientia nostra; Noffum de Quintavallis, qui
tunc ad Curiam nostram accesserat."

[511] Levi, Doc. ii.

[512] Ibid. p. 66.

[513] Villani, too, compares it with the Buondelmonti affair (viii. 39).

[514] Levi, p. 42; Dino Compagni, "Cronica," i., xxii. note 9.

[515] G. Levi, Doc. iv.

[516] Villani, viii. 40.

[517] Ibid. viii. 40.

[518] Dino Compagni, i. pp. 96-7.

[519] Prof. Del Lungo, with his usual careful research, notes that
all the exiled were Grandi. Levi, in repeating the remark (at p. 59),
considers this a singular fact, "seeing that the evil germs of discord
had then spread through the mass of the citizens." Yet the fact seems
easily accounted for by the circumstances related above.

[520] Villani, viii. 40; Compagni, i. 21.

[521] Perrens, "Histoire de Florence," vol. iii. p. 31.

[522] Villani, viii. 43.

[523] Villani, viii. 42.

[524] Signor Levi gives a very clear explanation of the case by
distinguishing between various facts confused together by the
chroniclers.

[525] "Chronicon Parmense," in Muratori, r. i., ix. 843.

[526] Del Lungo, vol. i. p. 230; Dino Compagni, bk. ii. 8, note 3.

[527] Villani, viii. 43 and 49; Del Lungo, vol. i. p. 206.

[528] Villani, viii. 56. Boccaccio also alludes to Franzesi as "a
trader turned knight."

[529] Fraticelli's "Storia della Vita di Dante" (Florence, Barbera,
1861) includes at p. 135 and fol. fragments of the debates in which
Dante took a part, and the same were republished more correctly and
completely in Imbriani's work, "Sulla Rubrica Dantesca del Villani,"
first published in the "Propugnatore" of Bologna for 1879 and 1880, and
afterwards in a separate volume. Bologna, 1880; Del Lungo, p. 209.

[530] Fraticelli and Imbriani, _op. cit._

[531] One of the first writers refusing belief in this embassy was
Professor V. Imbriani in his already mentioned essay, "Sulla Rubrica
Dantesca del Villani." Subsequently, my colleague and friend, the
late Professor Bartoli, applied his learning to a re-examination of
Dante's entire career, in vol. v. of his "Storia della Letteratura
Italiana," and without explicitly denying that the embassy in question
had been sent, expounded the doubts which might be raised about it. He
included in the volume an essay by Professor Papa, who, with youthful
daring, decidedly disbelieves in the embassy. But that learned scholar,
Professor Del Lungo, asserts that it really took place. This is a
very important question with reference to Dante's career, but very
unimportant as regards the general history of Florence, since even
if the embassy were really sent, it produced no practical result.
Nevertheless, without presuming to decide the lengthy dispute, I will
show my reasons for crediting the fact of the embassy.

Although Villani says nothing on the subject, it is mentioned by Dino
Compagni (ii. 25), the authenticity of whose chronicle is maintained by
Bartoli, Papa, and Del Lungo. Hence, if any of these writers intends to
deny the fact of the embassy, without denying Compagni's authenticity,
he must suppose this special passage to be an interpolation. Yet it
is impossible that such interpolation could have been made at a later
date in the fifteenth century manuscript containing the passage.
Besides, the testimony of nearly all Dante's biographers has still to
be dealt with. Leonardo Bruno (born 1369) makes very explicit mention
of the embassy; Filippo Villani, Giovanni Villani's grandson, who
expounded the Divine Comedy in 1401, by order of the government, speaks
of a mission undertaken by Dante "ad summum Pontificem, urgentibus
Reipublicae necessitatibus." Boccaccio also alludes to it, but far
more indirectly and vaguely. Certainly the latter is no trustworthy
historian, nor were the other two contemporaries of Dante. But after
acknowledging all this, and even granting that some one of those
writers may have borrowed from the others, and likewise admitting the
theory of an interpolation inserted during the fifteenth century,
in Compagni's chronicle, we are still met by the undisputed fact,
that those who studied Dante's works, and wrote Dante's life at a
period little removed from his own day, and therefore enjoying better
opportunities than we possess for learning its details, all believed in
the fact of his mission to Rome.

Until fresh documents are found, what reasons can be alleged to justify
us in denying it at this distant date? In no case, says Professor Papa,
could such an adversary as the author of the "Monarchia" have gone
as ambassador to Boniface VIII. First of all, however, the period in
which the "Monarchia" was written is still disputable and disputed.
Professor Del Lungo and many others ascribe the work to a much later
period. As far as we know, Dante was still a Guelph then, but certainly
no favourer of the Papal pretensions against which the Florentine
Government sent him to protest. Hence, so far there is nothing to make
us think his mission incredible.

But Professor Papa winds up with an argument that, as he thinks, should
finally dispose of the question. If, as asserted by Compagni and
Aretino, Dante was really sent ambassador to Rome, and departed thence,
after a time, without returning to Florence, how is it that the decree
sentencing him to banishment should set forth, as it does, that he had
been cited by the Nuncio to appear in Rome? According to the statute,
_forenses_, or absent persons, had to be cited by letter. Therefore,
if the citation was made through the Nuncio, it proves that Dante was
undoubtedly in Florence, and had not gone to Rome. But _forensis_ does
not signify an absent person, _i.e._, one who _extra civitatem manet_,
but, on the contrary, signifies--according to the statute--one having
no domicile either in the city, _contado_, or district.

Accordingly Dante, having a domicile in Florence, was not _forensis_,
and if he went to Rome was only _absent_; his embassy, decreed in
September, must have been speedily ended, since a new and adverse
government came into office the 8th of November; and Dante's banishment
was only proclaimed on the 27th of January of the following year.
Together with three other persons he was cited to appear and be heard
in his own defence and exculpation. As neither he nor the others
appeared, and none of them would have consented to appear, even if in
Florence, they were condemned, as they would have been in any case.
Thus, strictly speaking, it cannot be said that even in this instance
there was any violation of legal procedure, although in those days
legality, justice, and humanity were trampled under foot without the
slightest scruple.

Therefore, as Professor Bartoli admits, there is no absolute proof
of the impossibility of the embassy in question. Even if Villani's
silence may seem strange, Compagni's statement to be considered an
interpolation, the fact remains that the embassy was credited at a time
little removed from Dante's day, and credited by men better acquainted
than we can be with the circumstances of his career. For these reasons,
while admitting the weight of often reiterated doubts, pending absolute
proof to the contrary, I shall retain my belief in the embassy.

[532] _Vide_ Del Lungo, vol. i., Letter in appendix vi. pp. xlv. and
xlvi.

[533] Compagni, ii. 8.

[534] Villani, viii. 49. Compagni says that he saw the sealed
(_bollate_) letters.

[535] "Purgatorio," xx. 72-5.

[536] Villani, viii. 49, p. 53.

[537] Ibid. viii. 49. Many other details are given in the Chronicles of
Compagni, Paolino Pieri, Neri degli Strinati, &c., &c.

[538] _Vide_ Del Lungo (vol. i., Appendix, Doc. vi. p. xlv.) in the
Letter dated 12th of November, sent to the Commune of San Gimignano.

[539] _Vide_ the "Provvisione" in Del Lungo, vol. i. p. 290.

[540] Compagni, "Cronica," ii. 20 and 21.

[541] Potthast, Boniface's Letter in the Regesta Pont. Rom., p. 2006.

[542] _Vide_ the notices and documents collected in Professor Del
Lungo's monograph, "Sull' Esilio di Dante," Florence, Le Monnier, 1881.
Some fragmentary information on this subject had been already published
in the "Delizie degli Eruditi Toscani."

[543] Bk. viii. chap. 49, p. 53.

[544] Dino Compagni, ii. 25; Prof. Del Lungo, pp. 212-13, note 3.

[545] Del Lungo, i. p. 305.

[546] _Vide_ the "Libro del Chiodo."

[547] G. Villani, bk. viii. chap. 49, p. 54.

[548] First published in the "Nuova Antologia" of Rome, in issue of
16th of December, 1888, and 16th of January, 1889.

[549] Villani, viii. 52, 53; Del Lungo, Appendix xii. to Compagni's
"Cronica," p. 562, and fol.; "Le guerre Mugellane e i primi anni dell'
esilio di Dante."

[550] Villani, viii. 58. Dino Compagni, "Cronica," ii., xxxiv., and
notes 13 and 14.

[551] Dino Compagni, "Cronica," ii., xxxiv., note 20 (document).

[552] Del Lungo, p. 546.

[553] Compagni, iii. 11.

[554] Ibid. iii. 11.

[555] Villani, viii. 68.

[556] _Vide_ the letter given by Del Lungo at pp. 556-7.

[557] Dino Compagni, iii., vii.

[558] Villani, viii. 69; Compagni iii., vii.

[559] Villani, viii. chap. 69, p. 87.

[560] An anonymous and undated epistle addressed to Cardinal Da Prato
by the Captain Alessandro (supposed to be Alessandro da Romena)
and the council and university of the Bianchi party, was published
among Dante's Letters as one composed by him for the use of his
fellow-exiles, and was long attributed to him by his biographers. But
the Captain's name is not given in the old manuscript from which the
letter was printed, but merely indicated thus: _A. ca._ (Epistle I. of
the Fraticelli edition, Florence, Barbera, 1863).

This epistle says in reply to letters and advice from the Cardinal
that the Bianchi are grateful to him and disposed to peace. "Ad quid
aliud in civile bellum corruimus? Quid aliud candida nostra signa
petebant? Et ad quid aliud enses et tela nostra rubebant, nisi ut qui
civilia iura, temeraria voluptate truncaverunt, et iugo piae legis
colla submitterent, et ad pacem patriae cogerentur?" Therefore the gist
of Dante's words would have been: The desire to have our laws and
liberties respected was the sole cause of our rebellion; all that we
now wish is to see justice and peace again triumphant. This language is
worthy of the poet, we think.

But doubts have lately arisen as to his authorship. Professor Bartoli,
after examining the subject from all points, and ingeniously discussing
all different theories respecting it, concludes his prolonged and
careful inquiry by stating that there is no historical evidence to
prove whether the letter were really by Dante or not ("Storia della
Letteratura Italiana," vol. v. chaps. 8-10). Professor Del Lungo says
that the style of the letter is Dantesque, in its merits as well as in
certain defects; but that this fact does not justify him in decidedly
attributing it to the poet's pen, since it may have proceeded from some
contemporary in similar circumstances. Indeed, after examining the
contents of the letter, he considers that it cannot have been written
by Dante, and, among other reasons, chiefly because the words _candida
nostra signa_, and _enses et tela nostra rubebant_, &c., are almost
identical with those used by Compagni in describing the fight that
occurred at Lastra on the 20th of July, 1304. Hence, he is of opinion
that the letter undoubtedly refers to that event, and was therefore
only written after that date. And seeing that Dante had separated from
the exiles before that time, Del Lungo considers that the letter cannot
be by him.

For my own part, I doubt whether the letter really referred to the
Lastra affair. Surely the words in question: "Our white ensigns were
displayed, and our weapons flashed," may have been used either in
reference to Lastra or any other battle fought by the exiles, in spite
of their resemblance to, and apparent translation from the passage in
Compagni relative to the fight at Lastra. This being the case, without
altogether rejecting Del Lungo's view, I will merely remark that his
argument is insufficient to disprove Dante's authorship, since the
poet may have written the letter in the name of the exiles, when they
were carrying on those negotiations with the Cardinal on the subject
of peace, afterwards leading, as we have seen, to the despatch of
twelve delegates to Florence. The failure of those negotiations, the
cruel slaughter of the Cavalcanti and their friends, the wholesale
destruction by fire and pillage, the partial junction of the Bianchi
with Corso Donati, and the union of the exiles with the Bolognese,
Pistoiese, Pisans, and all foes of Florence, immediately followed up by
the foolish attempt at Lastra, may well suffice to explain, not only
Dante's indignant withdrawal from the exiled Bianchi, but likewise the
withdrawal of many other citizens. In fact, the latter's non-appearance
at Lastra may be perhaps assigned to the same motive, as we shall have
occasion to show later on.

[561] Villani, viii. 69. This chronicler dates the Cardinal's
departure the 4th of June; Dino Compagni, the 9th; Paolino Pieri
and the "Cronica," designated by Del Lungo as the "Cronica
Marciana-Magliabecchiana," give the date of the 10th. This is also
adopted by Del Lungo, p. 563. _Vide_ Dino Compagni, "Cronica," iii. 7,
note 26.

[562] Compagni, iii. 8.

[563] Villani, viii. 71.

[564] Ibid.

[565] Villani, viii. 71.

[566] "Storia della Repubblica Fiorentina," vol. i. chap. 6, p. 116
(edition of 1875).

[567] Villani, viii. 72.

[568] _Vide_ the well-known words pronounced by Cacciaguida in Canto
xvii. of the "Paradiso":

      "E quel che piu ti gravera le spalle
       Sara la compagnia malvagia e scempia,
       Con la qual tu cadrai in questa valle;
       Che tutta ingrata, tutta matta ed empia,
       Si fara contra te; ma poco appresso
       Ella, non tu, n'avra rotta la tempia.
       Di sua bestialitade il suo processo
       Fara la pruova, si che a te fia bello
       L'averti fatta parte per te stesso."

              ("Paradiso," xvii. 61-69.)


[569] Del Lungo notes this fact (vol. i. p. 577), and observes that it
was frequently repeated between 1301 and 1304.

[570] Villani, viii. 74; Del Lungo, pp. 578-9.

[571] These Catalans, after fighting the Moors in Spain, scattered
to different parts of the world, and refused to return to their own
country.

[572] Villani, viii. 87.

[573] This law is placed under rubric lxxxiii. of the enactments.
_Vide_ Giudici, "Storia dei Comuni Italiani," vol. iii. p. 119 and fol.
Florence, Le Monnier, 1864-66.

[574] Other clauses tending to increase the rigour of this law were
added on to it in 1307, 1309, and 1324, as may be seen in Bonaini's
edition, published in the "Archivio Storico Italiano," new series, vol.
i., 1885.

[575] Dino Compagni, iii. 18, p. 326.

[576] Villani, viii. 89.

[577] Ibid.

[578] Ibid. viii. 96.

[579] Villani, viii. 96; Dino Compagni, iii. 20, 21.

[580] Dino Compagni, iii. 20, note 29; Del Lungo, Introduction, p.
607. Prof. Del Lungo, the editor of these documents, does not believe
that Corso was favourable at that time to the exiles and Ghibellines.
Besides, the latter were no longer the genuine Ghibellines of older
days. Therefore the Signory could have no motive for deceiving their
friends, the Lucchese, and their letters are likewise corroborated by
the previous events we have described.

[581] Villani, viii. 100.

[582] Villani, iii. 118, 119.

[583] Compagni, "Cronica," iii. 35, note. 26.

[584] Villani, ix. 10.

[585] Villani, ix. 11.

[586] Compagni, iii. 32.

[587] Villani, ix. 12.

[588] Ibid. ix. 18.

[589] _Vide_ the letter sent by Florence, June 17, 1311, in Gregorovius
(3rd edition), vol. vi. p. 39, note 2.

[590] Bonaini, "Acta Enrici VII.," ii., lv., lxxxvi., Florence,
Cellini, 1877.

[591] Ibid. ii., xcviii., xcix.

[592] Published in the "Delizie degli Eruditi Toscani," and given more
completely in Prof. Del Lungo's "Dell' Esilio di Dante," &c., p. 107
and fol.

[593] Villani, ix. 21, 24, 26, 29.

[594] "Ita quod ipsi Florentini possint uti, pro eorum faciendis
negotiis et mercationibus, regno vestro, non obstantibus novitatibus
antedictis." This letter is dated 1311, and though the month is not
indicated, it alludes to Henry's arrival in Genoa as a recent event.
_Vide_ Desjardins, "Negociations diplomatiques de la France avec la
Toscane," vol. i. p. 12. and fol.

[595] The Bishop of Botrinto gives an account of his strange and
perilous journey in his work, "De Henrici VII. imperatoris itinere
italico." This is to be found in Muratori, R. I., and has been recently
republished by Doctor Heyck (Innsbrueck, 1888).

[596] Villani, ix. 26-29; Del Lungo, p. 632.

[597] Villani, ix. 33. The fact of making the Pazzi knights by way of
compensation, serves to prove that the title of _cavaliere_ was already
losing its former significance. For, at the close of the thirteenth
century, when used as a sign of nobility, possession of this title
helped to exclude a man from the Government.

[598] Perrens, vol. iii. p. 145.

[599] This letter was written about the end of 1310 and beginning of
1311. It is No. v. of the Fraticelli edition.

[600] Epistola vi. of the Fraticelli edition.

[601] Epistle vii.

[602] Gregorovius, vol. vi. p. 40; Perrens, iii. 172; "Cronaca di
Pisa," R. T. S., xv. 985; Malavolti, par. ii. bk. iv. f. 66; Mussato,
bk. i. rub. 10.

[603] Mussato, in Gregorovius, vi. 73, note 1.

[604] Villani, ix. 45, p. 170.

[605] Villani, ix. 49.

[606] Bonaini, _op. cit._, ii., ccclxv.

[607] Gregorovius, vi. 89.




INDEX


  Abati, 210, 445

  Acquasparta, Cardinal of, 506, 517

  Adimari, 208, 441, 543

  Adrian V., Pope, 46, 257

  Agnati, 372, 373, 375, 376, 388, 393, 394, 396, 419, 421, 423

  Aguglioni, Baldo, 446

  Albert of Austria, 503, 506

  Albert of Hapsburg, 546

  Alberti, House of, 101, 145, 146, 155, 160, 163, 331

  Albizzi, 430

  Aldobrandeschi, House of, 196

  Aldobrandino, Count, 210

  Alexander II., Pope, 75

  Alfonso of Castile, 205

  Alighieri, Dante, 406, 480, 485, 507, 510, 511, 521, 529, 535, 544,
      556, 557, 563

  Altino Chronicle, 98

  Amalfi, 387

  Ammirato, 11, 53, 262, 267, 283, 432

  Amphitheatre, Florentine, 66

  Angevins, 434, 435, 478, 495, 496, 510, 546, 560

  Anglona, Giordano d', 205, 206

  Arnolfo di Cambio, 479

  Arras, Count of, 210

  Art and Literature, 238, 239

  Artisans, 91

  Arts, Association of, 232

  Asciano, Castle of, 289

  Astura, Castle of, 247

  Athens, 367

  Atrium, 371, 374

  Attems, Ulrico d', 132

  Atto of Vallombrosa, Abbot, 116

  Augustus, Restoration by, 66


  Badia, The, 544

  Baldo della Tosa, 472

  Baldwin II., 255

  Balearic Isles, 103, 106

  Barbarossa, Frederic, 132, 352, 405

  Barbolano, Doge Pietro, 99

  Bardi, 441

  Bartolo, 404

  Battifolle, Count Guido di, 266

  Belisea, Queen, 62

  Bella, Giano Della, 10

  Benedict XI., 525, 526, 549

  Benevento, Dukedom of, 80, 81

  Berengarius of Friuli, 33

  Bernardini, Messer, 224

  Bianchi, 504, 507, 508, 510, 511, 515, 516, 518, 519, 523, 528,
      531, 544, 545, 546

  Bishop Niccolo of Botrinto, 555

  Boichorst, Prof. Scheffer, 44, 51

  Bonaguisi, Bonaguisa dei, 176

  Bonaini, 431, 448, 449, 450, 451

  Boniface VIII., Pope, 350, 470, 486, 493, 494, 501, 502, 504, 508,
      519, 525, 526, 560

  Bonifazio III., 82, 83, 90, 91

  Bordoni, Gherardo dei, 543, 544

  Bostichi, 438, 441

  Bouillon, Godfrey de, 55

  Breviary of Alaric, The, 383

  Brunelleschi, Betto, 550, 551, 555

  Buondelmonti, The, 132, 173, 213, 260, 441, 505

  Byzantine, 382, 385


  Cadolingi, Castle of, 114

  Cadolingi, The, 102, 103

  Calabria, Duke of, 537

  Calimala, Court of, 232, 345

  Calimala Guild, 124, 233 _et seq._, 269, 319

  Cambio, Arnolfo di, 297

  Campaldino, 432, 437, 444, 445, 487

  Caponsacchi, Gherardo, 154, 155

  Capponi, Marquis Gino, 11, 15, 18, 36, 54

  Capraia, Siege of, 184

  Caprona, Castle of, 295

  "Captain of the People," 13, 189, 226, 262, 268

  Carroccio, The, 177

  Cascioli, Monte, 102, 103

  Castelfranco, 491

  Castro, Paolo de, 447

  Catiline, Legend, 61

  Cavalcanti, The, 441, 480, 499, 500, 508, 523, 526, 528, 529, 532,
      555

  Cavalcanti's History, 8, 12, 271

  Cerchi, 291, 293, 304, 498, 499, 504, 505, 517

  Certaldo, 155, 467

  Charles I. of Anjou, 216, 220 _et seq._, 352

  Charles II. of Anjou, 290, 435, 470, 495, 505, 508

  Charles of Naples, 509, 549

  Charles of Valois, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517,
      518, 521, 524, 546, 560

  Charles the Fat, 31, 32

  Charlemagne, 22, 28, 29, 31, 65, 69-71, 81, 314

  Christian of Mayence, Archbishop, 135, 137-140.

  Chronicles, Compilers of, 7

  Ciampoli, The, 271

  Cicero, 367, 372

  Cino da Pistoria, 556

  Ciompi, 430

  Civil War, 142

  Clement IV., Pope, 216, 220, 230, 246, 252

  Clement V., Pope, 537, 546, 547, 549

  Clothdressers' Guild, 220

  Codex, Gaddi, 47

  Codex, Lucca, 49

  Cognates, 396, 423

  College of Pontiffs, 367

  Colombina Festival, 55

  Columbus, Christopher, 340

  Commerce, 95, 225, 334

  Commonwealth of Merchants, 311

  Commune, Banner of the, 72

  Commune, Council of the, 13

  Commune, Origin of the, 16, 17

  Compagni, 432, 438, 444, 459, 466, 469, 480, 490, 499, 512, 514,
      524, 542

  "Companies of Adventure," 353

  Conradin, 245 _et seq._, 486, 556

  Constance, Peace of, 405

  Constantinople, 365

  Consuls, 39 _et seq._

  Corbano, Emilio di, 242

  Corpus juris, 382, 384, 387, 403, 407

  Corrado, Margrave, 113

  Corso Donati, 430, 437

  Costumes, 200

  Council of the Commune, 13

  Council of the Hundred, 129

  Council of the People, 363, 412

  Court of Love, 272

  Croce Gate, 543

  Curtis Regia, 393

  Cutignano, 467


  Daliberto, Bishop, 96, 97

  Damiano, St. Pier, 75, 76, 79, 86

  Dante, 465, 215, 217, 287, 291, 406, 434, 491, 498, 511, 512, 514,
      548, 558, 560, 563

  D'Arras, Count, 210

  Dati, Goro, 86, 313

  "De Monarchia," 406

  Dei, Benedetto, 324

  Della Robbia, 480

  Della Tosa Family, 162

  "Divine Comedy, The," 57, 60, 187, 201, 213

  Doctors' and Druggists' Guilds, 333 _et seq._

  Donatello, 480

  Donati, 10, 273, 291-293, 299, 304, 441, 472, 498-500, 503, 504,
      516, 517, 522-527, 531-533, 535, 541-546, 551

  Donoratico, Count Gherardo, 247

  Doria, Oberto, 279, 280

  Dotalitium, 392

  Dukes, Powers of, 80

  Durfort, William de, 290


  Eastern Trade, 337 _et seq._

  Edward III. of England, 331

  Edward IV. of England, 331

  Enactments of Justice, 431, 433, 436, 444, 448, 450, 463, 468, 474,
      476, 480, 484, 489, 492, 505, 540, 542, 544

  Engelbert, Envoy, 132

  Enzo, 477

  Errico of Bavaria, 132

  Etruscan Fiesole, 65


  Faderfium, 392

  Faggiola, Uguccione della, 323, 541, 542, 566

  Falconieri, 441

  Fazio, Count, 277

  Feudalism, 81

  Ficker, historian, 87, 89, 134, 135, 148, 150, 159, 160

  Fidei-commissum, 374

  Fiesole, 72, 114, 115

  Fiesco, Prenzivalle del, 288

  Fifanti, The, 221, 243

  Figiovanni, Count Ubaldini, 155

  Fineschi, 450

  Fires, 109, 142, 143

  First Popular Government, 189, 200, 203

  Flabiabico, Doge Domenico, 99

  Florentine Statutes, 421

  Foraboschi, 441

  Fourteen Worthies, The, 263, 268, 269

  Francesco Forti, 361

  Frangipani, Giovanni, 247, 259, 260

  Franks, Rule of, 31

  Franzesi, Messer Musciatto, 510, 515

  Frati Gaudenti, Order of, 220

  Frederic I., Emperor, 55, 134, 146, 148, 150, 151, 153, 158, 164

  Frederic II., Emperor, 175, 176, 179-181, 185, 187, 215, 240, 248,
      352, 475, 477, 549, 565

  French Revolution, 429

  Frescobaldi, 441, 444, 472

  Friburg, 447

  Friuli, Dukedom of, 80


  Gabrielli, Rosso, 298

  Gaddi Codex, 143, 212

  Gaddi Library, 47

  Gaius, 372

  Galastroni, Messer Simone, 473

  Galli, 468

  Gallura, Nino di, 289

  Gambassi, 467

  Gans, 364, 392, 416

  Gherardesca, Count Ugolino della, 257, 274, 275, 279, 280, 282,
      284, 286, 287

  Gherardini, 208, 441, 524

  Ghibellines, 406, 427, 434, 435, 437, 439, 441, 466, 470, 475, 486,
      488, 491, 495, 496, 501, 503, 505, 506, 519, 521, 528, 534,
      538, 541, 544, 545, 547, 548, 551, 556, 565, 566

  Ghiberti, 480

  Giachinotti, The, 271

  Giamboni, Bono, 59

  Giano della Bella, 431, 433, 444, 446, 448, 449, 453, 463, 465,
      468-470, 474, 476, 480, 487, 488, 493, 496, 502

  Giordano, Count, 210, 213

  Giotto, 480

  Giovanni di Celona, 470

  Giudici, 432, 433, 450

  Goffredo, Duke of Tuscany, 153

  Goffredo of Loraine, 83, 85

  Gonfalonier of Justice, 454, 455, 461, 464, 480, 488, 540

  Government, First Popular, 189, 196, 198

  Grandi, The, 490

  Grasselli, Gualfredotto, 169

  Gregory VII., Pope, 83

  Gregory VIII., Pope, 148

  Gregory IX., Pope, 330

  Gregory X., Pope, 253, 255, 257

  Gregory XI., Pope, 345

  Grotius, Hugh, 369

  Guadagni, Migliore, 466

  Gualberto Giovanni, 74-76

  Guardamorto Tower, The, 183

  Guarnerius, 388

  Guelfo, Duke, 134

  Guelphs, 406, 427, 434-437, 439-441, 464, 470, 475, 488, 490, 491,
      495, 503, 505, 511, 513, 527, 539, 541, 544, 548, 551-553, 565

  Guelphs and Ghibellines, Origin of, 174

  Guerra, Count Guido, 202

  Guicciardini, 6, 12, 357

  Guidi, House of, 33, 102, 133 _et seq._, 144, 153, 160, 199

  Guido, Counts, 439, 498

  Guilds, 269, 270, 302, 312-314, 333, 340 _et seq._

  Guilds, Venetian, 98


  Hardouin of Ivrea, 33

  Hartwig, Dr. O., 11, 39 _et seq._, 54 _et seq._, 105, 123, 140,
      149, 153, 158, 168-170, 181, 213, 270, 273

  Hegel, Karl, 16, 42, 449

  Henry I., 317

  Henry III., 82

  Henry IV. of Germany, 83, 89, 107

  Henry VI., 55, 148-152

  Henry VII. of England, 322

  Henry VII. of Luxembourg, 406, 546, 549-552, 554, 555, 557, 559,
      561-564, 567

  Historical Societies, 2

  Hohenstauffens, 434, 475, 477

  Honorius II., Pope, 116, 288

  "Humble Brethren, The," 318, 319


  Igneo, Pietro, 78, 84

  Incisa, Castle of, 563

  Industry and Commerce, 95

  "Inferno, The," 65

  Innocent III., Pope, 160, 161, 167, 175, 184, 186, 318

  Innocent IV., Pope, 185

  Innocent V., Pope, 257

  Innocent VI., Pope, 46

  Inquisition, The, 186

  Invasions of Italy, 19


  James of Aragon, 105

  John, Prince, 562

  John of Salisbury, 59

  John XXI., Pope, 46, 257

  Jus civile, 369, 374

  Jus gentium, 369, 374

  Justinian, 365, 378, 382, 385, 403, 414


  Ladislas of Naples, 344

  Lamberti, The, 143, 197, 221

  Lambertini, Guido, 201

  Lami, Prof., 12, 39, 41, 44, 53

  Lancia, Count Giordano, 183

  Lancia, Galvano, 247, 248

  Lando, Michele di, 10

  Lanfranchi, The, 278

  Lares, 371

  Lastra, 536

  Latini, Brunetto, 44-46, 59, 111, 144, 149, 154, 174, 205, 213,
      282, 480

  Laurentian Library, 47, 112

  League, Tuscan, 158 _et seq._, 197, 282, 289, 296, 310, 311

  Library, Florence National, 44, 46, 48

  Library, Gaddi, 47

  Library, Laurentian, 47, 112

  Library, Naples National, 45

  Livy, Titus, 7, 9

  Longobard laws, 39

  Longobard rule, 28

  Longobards, Fall of the, 80

  Lothair, Emperor, 73

  Louis of Savoy, 550

  Lucca Codex, 49

  Lucca MS., 48

  Lucca, Tolomeo da, 143

  Lucretia, 371

  Lupi, Prof., 105


  Macharius, Count, 138

  Machiavelli, 1, 4, 5, 8, 12, 65, 194, 204, 216, 218, 223, 252, 432,
      459

  Majorca, Isle and Castle of, 104

  Malatesti, The, 271

  Malespini, 12, 62, 200, 441

  Mandello, Rubaconte da, 180

  Manfred, 204, 205, 213, 217, 243, 352, 437, 475

  Mangiadori, Simone, dei, 291

  Manieri, 441

  Manzoni, 18, 23, 25

  March of Ancona, 423

  Marignolli, Rustico, 182

  Martin IV., Pope, 265

  Matilda, Countess, 50, 54, 83, 87, 92, 94, 100-107, 388

  Mazzinghi, Totto, 299

  Medici, The, 9, 349, 357, 358

  Meloria, Battle of, 281, 344

  Meloria Lighthouse, 296

  Messina, Siege of, 266

  Meta, The, 391-393

  Mezzabarba, Bishop, 84

  Michelangelo, 4, 480

  Milani, Prof., 66, 67

  Monaci, Prof., 39

  Monaldeschi, Messer Ormano, 223

  Money-changers, Guild of, 325 _et seq._

  Montaia, Castle of, 198

  Montalcino, Siege of, 199

  Montalto della Berardenga, Castle of, 169

  Montalto, Wars of, 42

  Montaperti, Battle of, 213, 352

  Monte-Cuccoli, 467

  Montefeltro, Count Guido da, 289, 296, 297, 466

  Montegrossoli, Castle of, 145, 158

  Montfort, Guy de, 224

  Montfort, Philip de, 224, 242

  Morgengab, 392, 393

  Morosini, Andrea, 278-280

  Morosini, Doge Marco, 99

  Mozzi, 441

  Mugello, 490, 538

  Mundium, The, 391, 393

  Mutrone, Castle of, 202

  Mutrone, Siege of, 244


  Napier, 432

  Napoleon Code, The, 3

  Narbonne, Amerigo de, 290, 294

  National Library, 39, 48

  Neri, 504, 506, 507, 510, 511, 515, 517, 518, 522, 523, 542

  Nicholas III., Pope, 257-259, 265

  Ninety, Council of, 228

  Novello, Count Guido, 198, 206, 210-214, 218-222, 291, 292


  Octavian, Emperor, 48

  Ogerio, Podesta, 166

  Ombrone Valley, 170

  One Hundred, Council of, 228, 268

  Ordeal by Fire, 77, 78

  Ordinamenti, Ordini di Giustizia, 446, 448

  Ordinances of Justice, 430

  Orsini, Cardinal Napoleon, 537, 541, 552

  Orsini, The, 259, 265

  Ottavio degli Ubaldini, Cardinal, 439

  Otto I. of Germany, 33, 71

  Otto II. of Germany, 33

  Otto III. of Germany, 33

  Ottobuoni, Aldobrandino, 203


  Panago, Counts, 155

  Pandects, 365, 382-384

  Paoli, Prof., 39, 41, 42, 52, 113, 211

  Passerini documents, 136, 153

  Patria potestas, 376

  Pavia, Bishop Pietro da, 74

  Pazzi, Count, 155

  Pazzi, Guglielmo dei, 292

  Pazzi, House of, 259

  Pazzi, Pazzino de, 55, 56, 555

  Pazzi of Valdarno, 490, 491, 524

  Pecora, 471

  Pegolotti, Balducci, 335

  Perrens, Prof., 54, 55

  Petrarch, 408

  Petrognano, Rock of, 164

  Philip the Beautiful, 486, 546

  Pieri, Paolo, 49, 106, 152, 158, 170

  Pietro de la Rat, Captain, 537

  Pietro of Verona, 187

  Pisan Expedition to Balearic Isles, 103

  Pisan Republic, 285

  Pisans, 387, 416

  Pistoia, 445

  Pitti, 430

  Podesta, The, 13, 143 _et seq._, 226, 284, 298, 310, 418, 421, 439,
      445, 446, 454, 459, 461, 464, 466, 468, 473, 474, 488, 489,
      510, 515, 517, 519, 522, 523, 536, 540, 543, 555

  Poggibonsi, 467

  Polono, Martin, 43-45, 47-51

  Pontedera, Castle of, 296

  Pontiffs, College of, 367

  Popoleschi, The, 271

  Poppi, Battle of, 290

  Porcari, Paganello, 162

  Portinari, Folco, 298

  Praetor, 370

  Prato, Cardinal da, 526, 551

  Prato Gate, 550

  Procida, Giovanni da, 258

  "Purgatorio, The," 217


  Quirites, 366, 370


  Radagasius, Siege by, 68

  Rangoni, Jacopo, 210

  Ranieri, Archbishop, 55, 59

  Reinhold, Archbishop, 134, 135

  Republic, Magistrate of the, 363

  Rienzo, Cola di, 548

  Rigomagno, Castle of, 170

  Ristori, Donato, 446

  Robert, King of Naples, 406, 549, 550, 561, 562, 565, 566

  Robert of Flanders, Count, 249

  Rodolfo, Count, 169

  Roger II. of Sicily, 322

  Roman Empire, 43

  Roman Law, 3

  Romans, Florence constructed by, 65

  Roncaglia, 405

  Rosano reports, 153

  Rossi, 441

  Rudolf of Hapsburg, 254, 258, 265

  Ruggiero, Archbishop, 286, 287


  Sacchetti, Franco, 347

  St. Angelo, Castle of, 562

  St. Ambrogio, 551

  St. Eustachio Hospital, 467

  St. Ilario, Siege of, 243

  Salerno, Prince of, 271, 272

  Salterelli, Messer Lapo, 503, 504, 506

  Salvani, Provenzano, 206, 207, 249

  San Gallo, Gate, 550

  San Giovanni, 491

  San Jacopo Oltrarno, The Church of, 472

  Sanctity of Roman women, 371

  Santini, Prof., 42 _et seq._, 108 _et seq._, 169, 170, 302

  Sanzanome, 40-43, 61, 114, 115, 133, 140, 165, 170

  Saracini, Andreotto, 279

  Savelli, Pandolfo, 555

  Savigny, 16, 17, 361, 364, 382-384

  Saxony, Duke of, 502

  Scheraggio, San Piero, 444, 472

  Scienza Nuova, 368

  Scolari, The, 221, 243

  Sea-fights, 277, 280

  Semifonte, Wars of, 42, 163, 164

  Serfdom abolished, 301

  Sicilian Vespers, 266, 268, 273

  Signory, Office of, 263, 264, 298, 358, 359

  Sinucello, Judge of Cinarca, 276

  Sismondi, 432

  Skinners' Guild, 333 _et seq._

  Society of Merchants, 416

  Soldanieri, Giovanni, 222

  Spadai, Gate, 535

  Spini, The, 470, 499, 503, 524

  Spinola, Ubizzo, 565

  Spoleto, Dukedom of, 80, 81

  Sponsalicium, 392

  Stagia, Renuccio da, 153

  Stinche, Castle of, 537

  Stipulatio, 374

  Swabian line, The, 435, 475


  Tacitus, 391

  Testamenti factio, 394

  Theodoric the Ostrogoth, 20, 383, 385

  Theodosius, 383

  Thierry, Augustin, 3

  Thirty-six, Council of, 221, 222, 226, 232

  Tiepolo, Doge Jacopo, 99

  Tizzano, Castle of, 198

  Tolomeo of Lucca, 52

  Tornabuoni, The, 271

  Tornano, Castle of, 166

  Tornaquinci, 441

  Tornaquinci, Giovanni, 211, 271

  Torre, Guido della, 551

  Tosa, Rosso della, 524, 526, 527, 532, 533, 541-543

  Tosa, Simone della, 49

  Toscanelli, Paolo, 340

  Tosinghi, The, 259, 441, 544

  Totila, Destruction of Florence, by, 73

  Trade and commerce, 95, 100

  Trades, 221, 232

  Trebbio, Castle of, 155

  Troghisio, Francesco, 210

  Trollope, 432

  Troya, Carlo, 18

  Tuscany, Feudalism in, 81

  Tuscus, Thomas, 51

  Tutela, 393

  Twelve, Council of, 226, 238, 263

  Twelve Tables, 365, 366

  Twenty-four, Council of, 209


  Ubaldini, The, 197, 288, 333, 467, 490, 521, 522, 538, 545

  Uberti, House of, 10, 100, 109-112, 122, 141-144, 175, 189, 197,
      204-215, 221, 243, 260

  Ubertini, Counts, 155, 288, 290, 292, 490, 491

  Ubertino della Strozza, 446

  Ugo, Marquis, 82

  University of Bologna, 403

  Urban IV., Pope, 230, 245, 252

  Urbino, 415, 418


  Vallombrosa, Order of, 74, 75, 204

  Vannucci, 432

  Vatican Library, 39

  Vatican, The, 39, 99

  Venice, Naval strength of, 337

  Verbal contract in Rome, 374

  Vespers, Sicilian, 266, 268, 273

  Vico, 367

  Vieri de' Cerchi, 437

  Vigna, Pier della, 185, 477

  Vignale, Castle of, 132, 296

  Villani, 6, 7, 12, 45 _et seq._, 431, 432, 435, 445, 453, 459, 467,
      474-476, 493, 497-499, 501, 508, 510, 514, 519, 522, 535

  Virginia, 371

  Visconti, Giovanni, 256, 274

  Visconti, Nino, 285

  Visconti of Milan, 345, 347

  Visdomini, 441

  Volognano, Filippo da, 243

  Volpi, Bartolommeo, 447

  Volterra, Capture of, 334


  Weaving, Art of, 315 _et seq._

  Wuestenfeld, Dr., 54, 105


  Zaccaria, Benedetto, 279, 280


UNWIN BROTHERS, LIMITED, PRINTERS, WOKING AND LONDON.




      *      *      *      *      *      *




Transcribers' note:

Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant
preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.

Simple typographical errors were corrected, often after referencing
other printings or editions of this book.

Occasional unpaired quotation marks have been retained unless the
position of the missing one was obvious.

Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.

Extraneous commas were retained.

Illustrations have been moved closer to the relevant text.

Footnotes have been collected and repositioned just before the Index.

Page references in the Index were not checked for accuracy.

Illustrations: The two illustrations listed as facing page 93 were
missing from the 1908 edition of this book, but were present in the
1905 edition, and have been added to this eBook.

Page 1: This page was numbered "2", as was the following page.

Page 67: "(in Via de' Gondi.);" was printed that way.

Page 81: "marches" was printed as "le Marche" in the Italian edition.

Page 116: "destruccio fesulana" was printed as "fesulana destruccio" in
the Italian edition.

Page 132: Likely misplaced closing quotation mark in footnote 147
(originally 3).

Page 133: "rased" was printed that way; "razed" also occurs in this
text.

Page 148: "p. 2 2." at the end of footnote 185 (originally 3) was
printed that way.

Page 165: "Bagnuolo" is spelled "Bagunolo" in footnote 217 (originally
2).

Page 199: "August, 1852" probably should be "1252".

Page 220: "instance of Pope" probably should be "insistance".

Page 229: "132,160,8,4" was printed that way.

Page 248: "Guido du Suzzara" was printed that way.

Page 316: "and" in "and _villaneschi_" was misprinted in italics.

Page 322: "sixth century B.C." probably should be "A.D.".

Page 328: "on board-ship" was printed that way.

Page 329: "zechin" was printed as "zecchino" in the Italian edition.

Page 331: "Brussells" was printed that way.

Page 393: "mundium" is Latinized Longobard (an extinct Germanic
language).

Page 411: "mondualdo" is Latinized Longobard.

Page 416: "mundio" is a Longobard word.

Page 420: "when there are direct descendants" was printed as "their".

Page 457: "la securtadi" was printed as "le securtadi" in the Italian
edition.

Pages 481, 482: Both "cambii" and "canbii" are used; neither was
changed.

Page 513: "Dante was really sent ambassador to Rome" was printed that
way.

Footnote 80: Missing period added in "municipal. presid" because the
discussion pertains to the meaning of the abbreviation.

Footnote 186: "p. 2 2." was printed that way.

Footnote 288: The word "and" in "Carlo I. and Carlo II" probably should
not have been translated, but left as "e".

Footnote 442: "Gerechtigheit" is a misprint for "Gerechtigkeit".



***