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[Illustration:

  MAP SHOWING “THE REGIONS WHERE THE INTERESTS OF THE TWO POWERS MEET”
]




                      THE RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFLICT
                         ITS CAUSES AND ISSUES


                                   BY

                           K. ASAKAWA, PH. D.
  _Lecturer on the Civilization and History of East Asia at Dartmouth
   College; author of the “Early Institutional Life of Japan,” etc._

                        WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

                        FREDERICK WELLS WILLIAMS
  _Assistant Professor of Modern Oriental History in Yale University_

                             _ILLUSTRATED_

[Illustration: The Riverside Press]

                          BOSTON AND NEW YORK
                     HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY
                     The Riverside Press, Cambridge
                                  1904




              COPYRIGHT, 1904, BY HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN & CO.
                          ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

                       _Published November, 1904_

------------------------------------------------------------------------




                              INTRODUCTION


The issues of the conflict that forms the topic of this little volume
are bound inevitably to influence the future of the civilized world for
many years. Dr. Asakawa presents them with a logical thoroughness that
reminds us of the military operations of his countrymen now in evidence
elsewhere, and recalls very pleasantly to my own mind the sane and
accurate character of his scholastic work while a student at Yale. It is
the sort of presentation which a great subject needs. It is content with
a simple statement of fact and inference. It is convincing because of
its brevity and restraint.

The generous and almost passionate sympathy of our countrymen for Japan
in this crisis of her career has aroused some speculation and surprise
even amongst ourselves. The emotion is, doubtless, the outcome of
complex causes, but this much is obvious at present: the past
half-century has brought both America and Japan through experiences
strikingly similar, and their establishment at the same moment as new
world Powers has afforded both the same view of their older competitors
for first rank among nations. Both have earned their centralized and
effective governments after the throes of civil war; both have built
navies and expanded their foreign commerce; both have arrested the
belated and rather contemptuous attention of Europe by success in
foreign wars. No state of Christendom can appreciate so well as America
the vexation of enduring for generations the presumption or the
patronage of those European courts who have themselves been free for
less than a century from the bonds that Napoleon put upon the entire
Continental group; and Japan has suffered under the same observance.
With the acknowledgment of the existence of these two Powers of the
first class on either shore of the Pacific, the bottom drops out of that
system whereon was based the diplomacy of nineteenth-century Europe, and
the jealousy with which they are both regarded establishes a certain
_rapprochement_ between the two newly arrived nations.

The attitude of the American people does not appear to me to be greatly
influenced by prejudice against Russia. It is likely, indeed, that we
had less to fear directly from the ambition of the Great Colossus than
any other state. Yet we have been among the first to discern that Japan
is doing the world’s work if, by reducing the pressure of Russia’s
assault upon Eastern Asia, she removes China in the crisis of her
awakening from the list of those derelict states whose present
decrepitude offers such deplorable temptation to the military nations of
the West. There would seem to be fresh need, moreover, of convincing
modern statesmen that a policy of conducting diplomatic intercourse by
means of tergiversation and lies is unprofitable in the long run, and
therefore unjustified by the most cynical school of political ethics.
Without debating the righteousness of her pretensions, it is obvious
that Russia cannot proceed further in her headway without materially
affecting the legitimate ambitions of other peoples of proved vitality,
nor can her characteristic diplomacy secure success without debauching
the political morality of Christendom. While apprehension of Russian
aims need not involve dislike of the Russian people, we have an abiding
idea in this country that both alike lie under a necessity of
chastisement, and that Japan, as the only nation now really at home on
the Pacific, is the hand to hold the rod.

In conclusion—if I may be allowed to extend these reflections a little
further—the situation before us suggests the possibility that Asia may
at this moment be passing the threshold of a renascence similar to that
which awakened Europe at the opening of the sixteenth century from the
lethargy of her dark ages. As the able editor of the _North China
Herald_ has observed, native Asia from Korea to Siam is to-day no more
deeply immersed in the mire of poverty, ignorance, and superstition than
was Europe in the Middle Ages, nor was the task of relief and
enlightenment less hopeless to human agencies then than now. Yet with
the Age of Discoveries came not only new worlds and new paths of
commerce, but the end of the tyrannies of scholasticism, the church, and
the despot. Within a century were laid all the foundations of these
political and intellectual institutions that distinguish Europe and her
children to-day. A like reconstruction may be effected in Asia during
the century just begun. The parallel is not altogether inadmissible, and
it may be pushed even further. For as the newly awakened Europe of the
sixteenth century developed one monster Power whose aggrandizement
threatened the liberties of all the rest, so has the present era brought
forth a monster fearful in the same fashion to Asia. It was England, a
naval folk and a new Power, that struck at Spain three centuries ago,
and by that brave adventure not only won wealth and prestige for
herself, but rid Europe of a great menace. It is Japan, also a naval
race and a new—so far as Continental history is concerned—that strikes
at Russia and hopes by her success both to avert the undoing of the
ancient states about her and to establish herself as mistress in her own
waters. Confident in their understanding of their great mission, we of
America may rightfully bid the dazed Asiatic seek his salvation from the
children of the Rising Sun, and declare in the Sibylline utterance of
the Psalmist, “The dew of thy birth is of the womb of the morning.”

                                               FREDERICK WELLS WILLIAMS.

 NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT,
     November, 1904.




                                PREFACE


This is an attempt to present in a verifiable form some of the issues
and the historical causes of the war now waged between Russia and Japan.
Powerfully as it appeals to me, I would not have discussed a subject so
strange to the proper sphere of my investigation, had it not been for
the fact that no one else has, so far as I am aware, undertaken the task
in the same spirit in which I have endeavored to write these pages.
Although I deeply regret that I do not read the Russian language and
cannot do full justice to the Russian side of the question, the
impartial reader will observe, I trust, that this work is neither a plea
for the one side nor a condemnation of the other, but a mere exposition
of the subject-matter as I comprehend it. When the author offers what he
considers a natural explanation of a question, the reader should not
read into it a moral judgment. Indeed, I earnestly wish that the kind
reader would thrash out of these pages every grain of real prejudice.
Nor can I welcome a greater favor from any person than a more complete
and just statement of Russia’s case than I have been able to make. After
having said so much, it is unnecessary to tell the reader how, when the
substance of the introductory chapter to this volume was published last
May in the _Yale Review_, some of its critics ascribed to the writer
motives utterly foreign to himself. One of those alleged motives was
that I had sought to prove that the American trading interest in
Manchuria and Korea would be better served by a final victory of Japan
than by that of Russia. I neither proved nor disproved such a theme, but
I did state that Japan’s interest demanded the maintenance in those
regions of the principle of the impartial opportunity for all nations.
Whether the result of this policy would prove better or worse for the
interest of any one nation than the effect of an exclusive policy, did
not concern me. It did not and does not belong to me to appeal to the
commercial instinct of the reader, or even to his sympathy with, or
antipathy to, either of the present belligerents. My only plea is that
for truth.

The substance of the introductory chapter, as has been said, and also a
brief summary of the body of the volume have been published in the _Yale
Review_ for May and August of the present year. I am greatly indebted to
the editors of the _Review_ for allowing me to use the material in the
preparation of this work. I also wish to express my sincere thanks to my
friends who have encouraged me in the publication of this volume.

                                                                ASAKAWA.

                        HANOVER, NEW HAMPSHIRE,
                            August 30, 1904.




                                CONTENTS


                                                                    PAGE

 INTRODUCTORY                                                          1

      Economic issues: (1) Japan’s side; transition from an
      agricultural to an industrial stage, pp. 1–10; community of
      interest between Japan and Korea and Manchuria, 10–32. (2)
      Russia’s side, 32–47; comparison, 47–48; political issues,
      48–51; summary, 51–53; conclusion, 53–61.

 Supplementary Note                                                   61

 CHAPTER I. Retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula                   65

      Primorsk and Sakhalien, 65–67; intervention of 1895, 68–77;
      its historical significance, 77–78; its effects on Japan,
      78–82.

 CHAPTER II. The “Cassini Convention” and the Railway Agreement       83

      The Russo-French loan and the Russo-Chinese Bank, 83–85; the
      agreement of alliance, 85–87; the “Cassini Convention,”
      87–95; the railway agreement of September 8, and statutes of
      December 23, 1896, 95–100.

 CHAPTER III. Kiao-chau                                              101

      The seizure of Kiao-chau, and the Agreement of March 6, 1898,
      101–105; the conduct of Great Britain, 106–109.

 CHAPTER IV. Port Arthur and Talien-wan                              110

      Russian warships at Port Arthur, 111–112; British demand for
      the opening of Talien-wan, 113–118; Port Arthur and
      Talien-wan, the British and Russian Governments, 118–125;
      Wei-hai-Wei, 125–129; the Agreement of March 27, 1898, and
      supplementary agreements, 129–132; the administration of the
      leased territory, and Dalny, 132–134.

 CHAPTER V. Secretary Hay’s Circular Note                            135

      The circular of September, 1899, 135; the Powers’ replies,
      136–138.

 CHAPTER VI. The Occupation of Manchuria                             139

      Russia’s attitude toward the Boxer trouble in North China,
      139–143; the Manchurian campaign, 143–146.

 CHAPTER VII. North China and Manchuria                              147

      Characteristics of Russia’s diplomacy regarding Manchuria,
      147–148; the distinction made between North China and
      Manchuria; the circular note of August 25, 1900, 148–155.

 CHAPTER VIII. The Anglo-German Agreement                            156

      The Northern Railway affair, 156–157; the Anglo-German
      Agreement of October 16, 1900, 157–158; the Powers’ views,
      158–160; Germany’s view, 160–161.

 CHAPTER IX. A _Modus Vivendi_: the Alexieff-Tsêng Agreement         162

      Peace negotiations at Peking, and Russia’s Manchurian policy,
      162–165; the Alexieff-Tsêng Agreement of November, 1900,
      165–168; the protests of the Powers, 168–169; Count
      Lamsdorff’s explanation, 169–172.

 CHAPTER X. A “Starting-Point”—the Lamsdorff-Yang-yu Convention      173

      The Lamsdorff-Yang-yu Convention, 173–176; China’s appeal,
      and the Powers’ protests, 176–178; Russia detached herself
      from the allies, 178–181; the amendments of March, 1901,
      181–182; the British and Japanese remonstrances, and
      withdrawal of Russian demands, 182–188.

 CHAPTER XI. Further Demands                                         189

      M. Lessar’s demands in August, 189–190; in October, 190–193;
      protests, replies, and delays, 193–196.

 CHAPTER XII. The Anglo-Japanese Agreement and the Russo-French
   Declaration                                                       197

      A growing sympathy between Great Britain and Japan prior to
      the conclusion of the agreement, 197, 198; diplomatic steps
      toward the conclusion, 199–202; the Agreement of January 30,
      1902, 202–209; the Russo-French declaration of March 16,
      209–213.

 CHAPTER XIII. The Convention of Evacuation                          214

      The Russo-Chinese convention of April 8, 1902, 214–226; an
      analysis of the document, 226–232.

 CHAPTER XIV. The Evacuation                                         233

      The first evacuation, October 8, 1902, 233; the nominal
      character of the evacuation, 234–237; Niu-chwang, 237–238.

 CHAPTER XV. Demands in Seven Articles                               239

      The second evacuation, 239–241; new Russian demands, April 5,
      1903, 241–244; the opposition of three Powers to the demands,
      244–246; Count Lamsdorff’s disclaimer, 246–248; Count
      Cassini’s statement, 248–251; diplomacy at Peking, 251–256.

 CHAPTER XVI. Diplomatic Struggle in Korea, I                        257

      Japan’s failure and Russia’s success at Seul, the murder of
      the Queen, 257–261; the flight of the King, 262–263; the
      Yamagata-Lobanoff Protocol, June 6, and the Komura-Waeber
      Memorandum, May 14, 1896, 263–268; a decline of Russian
      influence, 268–271; the Nishi-Rosen Protocol, April 25, 1898,
      271–272.

 CHAPTER XVII. Diplomatic Struggle in Korea, II                      273

      Pavloff and Hayashi, 273; the Masampo affair, 274–278;
      abortive loans, 278–280; Russians and pro-Russian Koreans at
      Seul, 280; the bank-note trouble, 281–282; the Keyserling
      whaling concession, 282–283; the Tumên River telegraph lines,
      283–285; the Seul-Wiju Railway, 285–289; the Yong-am-po
      affair, 289–295.

 CHAPTER XVIII. The Russo-Japanese Negotiations, I                   296

      Japan’s invitation to negotiate, July 28, 1903, 296–299;
      Russia’s assent, 299; political changes in Russia, and the
      Viceroy of the Far East, 299–302; Japan’s first proposals,
      August 12, 302–307; negotiations transferred to Tokio,
      307–308; Russia’s first counter-proposals, October 3,
      308–311; Russian diplomacy at Peking, 311–318; the
      development of the Yong-am-po affair, 318–323.

 CHAPTER XIX. The Russo-Japanese Negotiations, II                    324

      Japan’s second proposals, October 30, 324–328; Russia’s
      second counter-proposals, December 11, 328–329; Japan’s third
      proposals, December 23, 329–331; pacific declarations of
      Russia, 331–332; Russia’s third counter-proposals, January 6,
      1904, 332–335; new ports opened in Manchuria, 335; Japan’s
      fourth proposals, January 13, 335–339; military activity of
      the Russians, 339–341; the termination of the negotiations
      and the rupture of diplomatic relations, February 5–6,
      341–344; the first acts of war, 345; the Russian Manifesto
      and the Japanese Declaration of War, January 10, 345–348.

 Supplementary Note to Chapter XIX                                   348

      The Russian _communiqué_, February 18, 348–349; the Russian
      statement of February 20, 349–351; Japan’s reply to the
      above, March 3, 352–354; the Russian note to the Powers
      regarding Korean neutrality, February 22, 355–356; Japan’s
      reply, March 9, 357–360; Russia’s counter-reply, March 12,
      360–362.

 CHAPTER XX. Chinese Neutrality and Korean Integrity                 363

      Japan’s advice to China to be neutral, 363, 364; Secretary
      Hay’s note, 364–365; China’s own declaration, 365; Japan’s
      pledge to China, 366; the Korean-Japanese alliance, 366–368;
      its nature analyzed, 368–372.

 INDEX                                                               373




                         LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS


                                                                    PAGE

 MAP SHOWING “THE REGIONS WHERE THE INTERESTS OF THE TWO
   POWERS MEET”                                           _Frontispiece_

 COUNT CASSINI, RUSSIAN MINISTER AT WASHINGTON, AND
   FORMERLY AT PEKING                                                 90

 COUNT LAMSDORFF, RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER                           146

 LI HUNG-CHANG                                                       193

 COUNT KATSURA, PREMIER OF JAPAN                                     202

 M. LESSAR, RUSSIAN MINISTER AT PEKING                               255

 M. PAVLOFF, LATE RUSSIAN MINISTER AT SEUL                           276
   Copyright, 1902, by George Grantham Bain

 BARON KOMURA, JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER                             296

 ADMIRAL ALEXIEFF, VICEROY OF THE FAR EAST                           303

 MR. KURINO, LATE JAPANESE MINISTER AT ST. PETERSBURG                331

 BARON DE ROSEN, LATE RUSSIAN MINISTER AT TOKIO                      347




                      THE RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFLICT




                              INTRODUCTORY


                   SOME OF THE ISSUES OF THE CONFLICT

The deeper significance of the present dramatic struggle between Russia
and Japan over territories belonging to neither of the contestants
cannot perhaps be understood, until we examine some of the issues at
stake between them. The more fundamental of these issues, however, as in
many another international crisis, seem to be oftener understood than
expressed, and hence understood only vaguely, although it may fairly be
said that they constitute the very forces which have with irresistible
certainty brought the belligerents into collision. For Japan, the issues
appear to be only partly political, but mainly economical; and perhaps
no better clue to the understanding, not only of the present situation,
but also, in general, of the activities at home and abroad of the
Japanese people, could be found than in the study of these profound
material interests.

Among the most remarkable tendencies of Japan’s economic life of recent
years has been the enormous increase of her population, along with an
immense growth of her trade and industries. The number of her
inhabitants increased from 27,200,000, as estimated in 1828, to only
34,000,000 in 1875, but since that year it has risen so fast that it is
to-day 46,305,000[1]—exclusive of the 3,082,404[1] in Formosa and the
Pescadores—and is increasing now at the annual rate of nearly 600,000.
At the same time, the foreign trade of Japan has grown from 49,742,831
_yen_ in 1873 to 606,637,959 _yen_ in 1903. Up to the end of May, 1904,
the total amount showed 274,012,437 _yen_, as compared with the
248,506,103 _yen_ of the same period of 1903.[2] The significance of
these figures must be seen in the light of the important fact that the
bulk of the increase in population and trade has been due to the
decisive change of the economic life of the nation from an agricultural
to an industrial stage. The new population seems to increase far more
rapidly in the urban than in the rural districts, for if we consider as
urban the inhabitants of communities containing each more than three
thousand people, the ratio of the urban population to the rural may be
estimated as 1 to 3. If only towns of more than 10,000 inhabitants each
are included in the urban class, it is seen that their population
increases annually 5 or 6 per cent., while the corresponding rate with
the rural communities never rises above 3 per cent. and is usually much
lower.[3] This comparatively rapid growth of the cities also indicates
that the new population must be mainly supported by commerce and
manufacture.

In 1903, 84.6 per cent. of the total export trade of Japan consisted of
either wholly or partly manufactured articles.[4] On the other hand,
agriculture has progressed only slowly,[5] and is no longer able either
to support the increased population or to produce enough raw articles
for the manufactures. The average annual crop of rice may be put at 210
million bushels, and that of barley, rye, and wheat, collectively called
_mugi_, at 94.3 million bushels, while the average annual consumption of
these cereals may safely be estimated, respectively, at 228.3 and 106.7
million bushels. In years of poor crops, the importation of rice, wheat,
and flour amounts to large figures; as, for instance, in 1903, they
together were imported to the value of about 67 million _yen_.[6] Raw
material and food-stuffs, consisting of cotton, wool, rice, flour and
starch, beans and oil-cakes, the importation of all of which was next to
nothing twenty years ago, were in 1903 supplied from abroad to the value
of 169,600,000 _yen_, or 53.5 per cent. of the total imports of
Japan.[7] Japan will not only always have to rely upon foreign countries
for the supply of these articles, but also have to import them in ever
increasing quantities. Nor does agriculture occupy in the national
finances the position it once did, for in 1875 the land tax, the
incidence of which fell, as it still falls, very largely on the farmer,
supplied 78 per cent. of the total revenue of the state, while the
percentage fell, in the estimated budget for the fiscal year 1902–3, to
16, the actual amount also decreasing during the interval from 67.7 to
37 million _yen_, and the expenditures of the government, on the other
hand, increasing from 73.4 million in 1874, to the enormous figure of
223.18 million _yen_ in 1904–5.[8]

No one can say a cheerful word about agriculture in Japan or the life of
her farmer. Exclusive of Formosa, the development of which seems to lie
in the direction of industry and trade rather than agriculture, less
than 13,000,000 acres are under cultivation,[9] or, about 13 per cent.
of the extent of the country, while the arable area of the land cannot
possibly be increased by more than 10,500,000 acres,[10] so that the
_per capita_ share of arable land is less than one half of an acre,[11]
which is even below the corresponding rate in England and less than one
half of that in China. Japan’s agricultural life can, however, be no
more intensively improved than extensively enlarged. The sedimentary
soil so well adapted to the rice cultivation and so abundantly blessed
with moisture[12] is too minutely and carefully tilled, the climate
conditions are too cleverly made use of,[13] and, above all, the lots of
land are too diminutive,[14] to make the importation of new machinery
and methods always profitable or desirable.[15] The day-laborers on the
farm receive wages ranging between nine and fifteen cents, though the
latter have risen more than 100 per cent. during the last fifteen
years.[16] With this meagre income, some of the laborers have to support
their aged parents, wives, and children. The tenants, whose number bears
the ratio of about two to one[17] to that of the proprietors, live
literally from hand to mouth, and cannot always afford even the
necessary manure, and the proprietor’s profit hardly rises above 5 per
cent., while the capital he employs pays an interest of 15 to 30 per
cent.[18] and his local and central taxes further reduce his income. The
farmer would in many cases be unable to subsist, were it not possible
for him, as it fortunately is, to try his hand at silk-culture or some
other subsidiary occupation.

Japan’s agriculture, then, can neither be much extended nor be greatly
improved, can neither satisfy the old population nor support the new,
and, above all, can only produce smaller and smaller portion of the
necessary raw material for her growing industries. Under these
circumstances, it is becoming more evident every year that the time is
forever past when the nation could rely solely upon agriculture for
subsistence. It is hardly necessary to repeat the well-known law of
population—which is at the root of our subject—that every advance in the
economic life of a nation creates a situation which is capable of
supporting a larger population than in the preceding stage. What
agriculture cannot support, industry and trade may. Japan’s growing
population may only be supported, as it has already begun to be, by an
increased importation of raw material and food-stuffs and an increased
exportation of manufactures. Trade statistics unmistakably show that
such markets for her manufactures and such supply regions of her raw and
food articles are found primarily in East Asia, with which the
commercial relations of Japan have grown 543 per cent. since 1890, as
compared with the 161 per cent.[19] increase of the American and the 190
per cent. increase of the European trade,[20] until the East Asiatic
trade amounted in 1903 to 295,940,000 _yen_ in value, or 48.7 per cent.
of the entire foreign trade of Japan.[21] The following table gives a
comparison of the importation in the years 1882, 1902, and 1903, of what
may be considered as primarily East Asiatic products:[22]—

                     1882            1902             1903
       Cotton    467,249 _yen_ 79,784,772 _yen_ 69,517,894 _yen_
       Wool                     3,397,564        4,811,811
       Rice      134,838       17,750,817       51,960,033
       Wheat                      240,050        4,767,832
       Flour                    3,278,324       10,324,415
       Beans                    4,956,000        7,993,411
       Oil-cakes  44,468       10,121,712       10,739,359

From these eloquent facts, the conclusion would seem tenable that,
should the markets of East Asia be closed, Japan’s national life would
be paralyzed, as her growing population would be largely deprived of its
food and occupation. These markets, then, must be left as open as the
circumstances permit, if Japan would exist as a growing nation. Observe
here the tremendous significance for Japan of the principle of the “open
door” as applied to East Asia—the principle, in a more accurate
language, of the equal opportunity in East Asia for the economic
enterprise of all foreign nations.[23]

In this great problem Manchuria and Korea occupy, perhaps, the most
important position, for they together receive a large portion of the
cotton yarn and cotton textiles exported from Japan, besides several
other manufactured goods and coal, and in return supply Japan with much
of the wheat and rice, and practically all of the millet, beans, and
oil-cakes, imported into the country. Let us briefly demonstrate these
statements by figures. First, consider the exportation of cotton yarns
and textiles from Japan to Manchuria and Korea. It is rather difficult
from the material on hand to estimate the exact ratio which the import
of these articles from Japan into Korea and Manchuria bears to the total
import of the same articles from all nations. In the case of Korea, we
can make an approximate estimate, as we possess both the export values
in Japan and import values in Korea, but with regard to Manchuria, we
know only the quantities, but not the values, of the cotton goods
imported. By assuming, however, that 40 per cent. of these goods
imported by the Chinese Empire from Japan go to North China (of which
Manchuria is here considered by far the most important part), it may be
said, roughly, that in 1903 about 6 per cent. of the cotton yarn
exported from Japan went to Korea and perhaps 40 per cent. to North
China. The average import of this article during the past two years was
probably 1,200,000 _yen_ in Korea and 8,000,000 _yen_ in North China,
making the total about 36 per cent. of the export value in Japan. On the
same basis of calculation, the average importation of cotton textiles
from Japan during the past three years was 3,190,000 _yen_ in Korea and
765,000 _yen_ in North China, or about 69.5 per cent. of the entire
export of these articles from Japan. These figures are only tentative,
but may serve to show that Manchuria receives comparatively much yarn
and Korea much textiles, and that they together receive at least a large
percentage of those articles exported by Japan, where their manufacture
occupies an increasingly important place in her economic life.[24] As to
the exportation of agricultural products from Manchuria and Korea, it is
seen that wheat is only beginning to be cultivated in Manchuria, while
the rice cultivation is there practically unknown except in a few places
near the Korean border, where during the campaign of 1894–5 the Japanese
troops introduced it. The position which Korea occupies in the
importation of wheat into Japan will be seen from the following table:—

       Wheat imported into Japan, 1898–1902,[25] _kin_ = 1.325 lbs. av.
                                                 _yen_ = 49.8 cents.

     From    │   1898       1899        1900        1901        1902
 Australia   │                         4,339,845   5,554,513      18,423
             │                           143,260     185,274         721
 ────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 Korea       │ 2,770,755   1,668,207   5,182,533   1,644,577   8,556,813
             │    72,698      71,764     132,734      43,875     237,217
 ────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 Great       │                           457,450
   Britain   │
             │                            15,502
 ────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 The United  │ 2,039,371     395,009  12,370,022   1,388,372         864
   States.   │
             │    71,173      14,697     400,829      43,720          43
 ────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 Other       │     1,560         990         547                  77,343
   countries.│
             │        41          27          14                   2,069
 ════════════╪══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
 Total       │ 4,811,686   2,064,206  22,350,397   8,587,462   8,653,443
             │   143,913      86,489     692,341     272,869     240,050

A glance at these figures will show that the import trade of wheat, like
that of rice, is dependent on many fluctuating conditions at home and
abroad. The poor crop in Japan caused an enormous importation of wheat
in 1903 to the value of 4,767,000 _yen_. From the above table, it is
seen that Korea supplied during the five years, respectively, 57.5,
80.7, 23.1, 19.1, and 98.8 per cent., in weight, of the wheat imported
into Japan. As regards rice, the following table will show that in the
five years between 1898 and 1902 Korea supplied, respectively, 5.5,
26.5, 49.4, 46.8, and 19.8 per cent. in weight of the cereal imported
into Japan:—

 Rice imported into Japan, 1898–1902,[26]        _picul_ = 133⅓ lbs. av.
                                                 _yen_ = 49.8 cents.

    From    │   1898        1899        1900        1901        1902
 British    │  2,663,087      53,827     249,344     220,650   1,793,362
   India    │
            │ 11,642,416     174,507     973,747     876,057   7,530,356
 ───────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 China      │    967,216      60,323      83,998     227,234      90,401
            │  3,989,422     231,625     327,673     867,272     341,689
 ───────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 Korea      │    649,570     436,716   1,131,787   1,456,661     891,186
            │  2,704,887   1,689,909   4,694,166   6,009,641   3,961,312
 ───────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 Dutch      │                                403
   Indies   │
            │                              1,816
 ───────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 French     │  6,445,390     956,142     726,859     919,774   1,324,789
   India    │
            │ 25,762,726   3,354,095   2,739,752   3,199,420   4,651,395
 ───────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 Siam       │    969,413     143,575      94,530     287,594     409,307
            │  4,114,065     510,007     284,178     926,486   1,265,970
 ───────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 Other      │      1,576           9          58          25          27
   countries│
            │      6,290          21         200          82          94
 ═══════════╪═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
 Total      │ 11,696,252   1,650,592   2,286,979   3,111,938   4,509,072
            │ 48,219,810   5,960,166   9,021,536  11,878,958  17,750,817

As will be seen in this table, much rice comes also from Saigon and
Bangkok, to which, however, Japan hardly exports anything. In Korea, on
the contrary, the greater her exportation of rice, the larger her
purchasing power of the goods from the country to which the rice goes.
In the case of beans and oil-cakes, Manchuria and Korea occupy in the
list of the importation of these articles into Japan an even more
important place than is the case with wheat or rice, as will be seen in
the following table:—

 Beans and oil-cakes imported into Japan in      _picul_ = 133⅓ lbs. av.
   1902,[27]                                     _yen_ = 49.8 cents.

          From          │Beans, pease, and pulse        Oil-cakes
 China                  │              1,306,103               4,064,198
                        │              3,524,138               8,656,775
 ───────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────
 Korea                  │                777,151                   5,671
                        │              2,254,899                  12,331
 ───────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────
 Russian Asia           │                    545                 345,022
                        │                  1,505               1,448,868
 ───────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────
 French India           │                    742
                        │                  2,178
 ───────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────
 The United States      │                    281
                        │                  2,405
 ───────────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────
 Other countries        │                    545                     846
                        │                  1,582                   3,738
 ═══════════════════════╪═══════════════════════════════════════════════
 Total                  │              2,086,367               4,415,737
                        │              5,786,707              10,121,712

An explanation is necessary that, to all probability, much of the
oil-cakes from Russian Asia was reëxported from Manchuria. In 1903,
beans and oil-cakes were imported to the value of, respectively,
7,993,000 and 10,739,000 _yen_. In considering all these facts as a
whole, attention is called to a point of immense importance, that
Manchuria and Korea supply Japan with necessaries of life, and receive
in return, in the main, useful goods, instead of wares of luxury. We
shall have occasion further to develop this point.

Let us now take a general survey of the position Japan holds in the
trade relations of Korea and Manchuria. In Korea, whence the Chinese
merchants withdrew during the China-Japan war of 1894–5 and were
replaced by the Japanese traders,[28] it is Japan alone of all trading
nations which enjoys a large share both in the import and export trade,
as is suggested in the following table:—

       Japan’s export    Total import of   Japan’s import   Total export of
          to Korea            Korea          from Korea          Korea
 1902 10,554,000 _yen_ (13,823,000  _yen_) 7,958,000 _yen_ (8,460,000  _yen_)
 1903 11,764,000       (18,207,000)        8,912,000       (9,472,000)

while the grains exported from Korea go almost entirely to Japan,
different ports of Korea present of course different characteristics in
their trade with Japan: as, for instance, at Chemulpo the Chinese
merchants still enjoy a considerable share in the import trade; at Seul
nearly all the export consists of gold bullion, which is almost
exclusively bought by the branch of the First Bank of Japan; while at
Fusan and Mokpo the Japanese monopoly of trade is almost complete. With
these variations, however, the Japanese merchants control the major part
of the trade of each port, and consequently of the entire trade of
Korea. They also carry a large amount of foreign goods to Korea, as seen
in the following table:—

                     Japanese goods       Foreign goods
             1902      9,344,859 _yen_     1,209,332 _yen_
             1901     10,410,563             961,897
             1900      9,423,821         529,450[29]

The shipping also is largely in the hands of the Japanese. In 1903,
their share in the Korean shipping was as follows:[30]—

                            Vessels           Tonnage
              Korean       25  per cent.      9+ per cent.
              Japanese     61+               78+
              Russian       2+                9+
              Others       11+                4–

Turning to Manchuria, it is found that Japan controlled in 1902 more
than 44 per cent. of the shipping tonnage,[31] besides 40 per cent. of
the direct import trade and over 90 per cent. of the export trade, as is
shown below:[32]—

                    Exports        (Japan)       Imports      (Japan)
 1901            1,080,345_l._ (  970,663_l._) 635,085_l._ (247,624_l._)
 1902            1,130,429_l._ (1,041,395_l._) 695,020_l._ (280,843_l._)
 Average five
   years,
   1896–99 and
   1891            965,553_l._ (  880,917_l._) 433,811_l._ (131,143_l._)

at Niu-chwang, which was then the only important port in Manchuria open
to foreign trade under the ordinary customs rules.[33]

In this connection, it should be remembered that both the Korean and
Manchurian trade are of recent origin. Niu-chwang was opened as a treaty
port in 1858, but its commercial importance may be said to date from
1899. Korea’s foreign trade did not begin till 1884, and it exceeded
10,000,000 _yen_ for the first time in 1895. The rapid growth of the
trade of these places has been largely due to the increasing trade
activity of Japan. In the case of Niu-chwang, it is true the development
of its import trade has been as much owing to the energy of the
Americans as to that of the Japanese, but its export business would be
meagre, and would consequently reduce the imports also, but for Japanese
activity. The recent increase in the production of millet in Manchuria,
for instance, may be said to be entirely due to Japanese trade at
Niu-chwang. Of the three staple products of Western Manchuria, tall
millet is consumed by the natives, and beans are partly consumed and
partly exported, while millet is cultivated purely for the purpose of
exportation. It began to be exported to Korea in August, 1901, and to
Japan in 1902. Since the latter year, Japan’s demand for millet has
steadily increased, and has caused a considerable rise in its price at
Niu-chwang. The cultivation of millet, therefore, is a pure gain that
has been created by the trade relations of Manchuria with Japan.[34] Far
more important than millet as articles for exportation are beans and
bean-cakes. The entire trade conditions at Niu-chwang may be said to
depend upon the amount of the sale of these articles. The more they are
sold, the greater is the importing capacity of the people of Manchuria.
The nation which buys beans and bean-cakes in the largest quantities
naturally commands the greatest facility in pushing their imports into
Niu-chwang. The exportation of these goods doubled during the ten years
between 1889 and 1898, while the amount of the bean production in
Manchuria for 1900 was estimated at between 1,930,000 and 2,450,000
_koku_. Both the production and the exportation must now be much
greater. The increase was due in the main to the growing demand in Japan
for beans and bean-cakes, as witness the following ratios of exports to
China and Japan from Niu-chwang:—

                          Beans           Bean-cakes
                    To China To Japan  To China  To Japan
               1889    98.0%     2.0%      95.8%     4.2%
               1893    67.5%    32.5%      68.3%    31.7%
               1897    60.7%    39.3%      50.2%    49.8%

In 1903, the ratios must have been much greater for Japan than for
China. The increasing demand for these products has induced many Chinese
to migrate from Shan-tung to Southern and Western Manchuria and
cultivate beans.[35] As regards the Korean trade, the following table
will speak for itself:—

       Korean trade in    Korean export        Total          Japan-Korea
         merchandise         of gold                             trade
 1897   19,041,000 _yen_ 2,034,000 _yen_   21,075,000 _yen_ 14,061,000 _yen_
 1898   17,527,000       2,375,000         19,902,000       10,641,000
 1899   15,225,000       2,933,000         18,158,000       11,972,000
 1900   20,380,000       3,633,000         24,013,000       18,759,000
 1901   23,158,000       4,993,000         28,151,000       21,425,000
 1902 (22,280,000)       5,064,000       (27,344,000)       18,512,000
 1903   27,679,000       5,456,000         33,135,000       20,676,000

If we examine the causes of the growth of individual open ports in
Korea, nothing can be plainer than that it has almost entirely resulted
from the increasing trade relations between Korea and Japan. It is
needless to mention Fusan, for its trade is nearly synonymous with its
Japanese trade. Kunsan was opened on May 1, 1899, and its population was
only 300 till two years ago, but the great demand by Japan for the rice
coming through this port has already tended to enlarge the number of its
inhabitants up to 2000 or more.[36] Similar remarks may be made of
Mokpo, Chinnampo, and other ports.[37] Most conspicuous, however, is the
case of Chemulpo. In 1883, when it was opened as a treaty port, it
contained only a few fishers’ houses, but now it holds a population of
15,000, and occupies a position in Korea similar to that of Shanghai in
China. Of the inhabitants of the ports, 8000, or more than a half, are
Japanese. Streams of Koreans also have flowed hither from inland towns,
for there the officials oppress people, while here they are so
constantly viewed by the foreigners that undue exactions are
impossible.[38] We have already noted the important fact that Korea and
Manchuria on the one hand and Japan on the other exchange, not wares of
luxury, but useful and necessary articles. We have now come to another
equally important fact, that the growth of the Manchurian and Korean
trade depends largely upon the commercial activity of Japan. From these
considerations, it would seem safe to say that the trade interests of
the three countries are largely _common_, for the more Korea and
Manchuria export to Japan, the greater will be their purchasing power of
Japanese goods, and, also, the larger the exportation from Japan to
Manchuria and Korea, the more readily they will dispose of their
products to her. On the one hand, Korea and Manchuria encourage the
growth of Japan’s manufacture, and supply her with food and manure; on
the other hand, the economic development and prosperity of Korea and
Manchuria must be largely determined by the increasing demand for their
products by Japan, and the easy supply of their wants from Japan. The
future growth of the three nations, then, must in a large measure depend
upon the intimate progress, of their trade interests, which, therefore,
not only are common, but should be increasingly common. If the history
of the past suggests the probable development in the future, there is
every reason to believe that, with reformed systems of currency and
improved and extended cultivation of land and means of transportation,
the trade of Manchuria and Korea will show a tremendous increase, and
then the community of interest between them and Japan will be most
profound.

This theme of the community of interest may further be elaborated.
Korea and Manchuria may with profit remain open, not only for the
trade, but also for the emigration and industrial enterprise, of the
Japanese people. Since 1902 no passports have been required for
travelers from Japan to Korea, whither, in spite of the occasional
obstacles placed in their way by Korean officials, the emigrants have
proceeded, now for years, in increasing numbers, until there resided
in 1903 nearly thirty thousand Japanese in the Peninsula.[39] It takes
only thirteen hours on sea from Bakan in Japan to Fusan in Korea, and
the cost is even less than that of sailing to the Japanese colony of
Formosa, the former being fifteen _yen_ and the latter twenty. It
seems easier to go from Bakan to Fusan than it is from Osaka to the
Hokkaidō within Japan proper.[40] The expense of living in Korea is
also as low as one third the corresponding figure in Japan, a monthly
income of ten or thirteen _yen_ being considered sufficient to support
a family of three persons in a rented house.[41] It is not strange,
under these conditions, that the Japanese migrate to Korea, not always
singly, like the Chinese, but often in families,[42] so that their
settlements assume there a normal and permanent character unseen even
in Japan’s own island of Formosa. Nor are all these colonists mere
laborers like their brethren in Manchuria and the Hawaiian Islands,
but many are independent men of business. They also naturally manifest
a stronger sense of kinship and coöperation in Korea than the
merchants and capitalists do in Japan. In several Korean towns these
Japanese settlers have established their own municipalities, with
modern improvements, chambers of commerce, police, and public schools,
all of which compare favorably with those of the larger cities in
Japan, and the advantages of which are enjoyed by native Koreans and
resident Chinese. It is said that in some places the influx of the
Japanese and their investments have caused a rise in the price of land
and house rent.[43] In Fusan, the port nearest to Japan, the 10,000
Japanese who live there own large tracts of land and occupy the main
sections of the city. Here and everywhere else the Japanese colonists
seem to hold a position similar to that of the foreigners living in
the so-called settlements in the larger treaty ports of China.
Tourists are wont to contrast the clean and well-ordered streets and
the general energetic appearance of the Japanese quarters in Korean
cities with the comparatively filthy and slothful Korean quarters. The
branches of the First Bank of Japan have been issuing recently one-,
five-, and ten-_yen_ bank-notes,[44] which have been of immense value
to the foreign trade in Korea, the native currency of which is in a
deplorable condition.[45] The coasting and river navigation, so far as
it concerns foreign trade, is largely controlled by the Japanese, who,
besides, own the only railway line in operation in Korea, twenty-six
miles long, running between the capital, Seul, and its port
Chemulpo.[46] They are also building,[47] under the management of
substantially the same company, another and longer line—two hundred
and eighty-seven miles—between Seul and the port of Fusan, which
passes through the richer and economically by far the more important
half of the Peninsula.[48] It is not impossible to suppose that the
Japanese people will succeed in their efforts to secure the right of
extending this line beyond Seul up to Wiju on the northern border,[49]
and thence ultimately connecting it with the Eastern Chinese and the
Peking-Shanghaikwan-Sinminting Railways, so as to render the
connection by rail between Fusan and China and Europe complete.[50]
The Mitsui Produce Company, another Japanese concern, monopolized the
export of Korean ginseng, and, in 1903, despite the competition of the
Russian Baron Gunzburg,[51] succeeded in extending the term of the
monopoly for five years. Twenty to forty thousand Japanese fishermen
along the Korean coast report an annual catch amounting sometimes to
large figures.

No part of Korea’s economic life, however, would seem to be of greater
importance to her own future, or to depend more closely upon the
enterprise of the Japanese settlers, than her agriculture. If it is
remembered that nearly all her exports consist of agricultural products,
and also that they largely supply the needs of Japan, we can readily
comprehend the great community of interest felt by both countries in the
agriculture of the Peninsula. It is remarkable to note, to take a single
instance, that the production of cereals and beans (respectively about
eight and four million _koku_) in Korea has grown to its present
dimensions largely owing to the stimulus given to it by the increased
demand for these articles in Japan.[52] We shall presently note also
that, owing to the peculiar circumstances prevailing in Korea, her
purchasing power and general commercial activity are so completely ruled
by the conditions of her weather and crops as is seldom the case with
other agricultural nations. The Koreans are comparatively happy in good
years, while in bad years they are reduced to great miseries and bandits
infest all parts of the country. Upon the state of her agriculture,
then, must depend the trade conditions of Korea, as well as most of her
material strength and much of that of Japan. From this it is plain that
the profound community of interest of the two nations calls for both the
extension and the improvement of the agriculture of Korea. It is
estimated that the extent of her land under cultivation is hardly more
than 3,185,000 acres, or about 6.3 per cent. of the 82,000 square miles
known as the total area of the country,[53] and that there exist at
least 3,500,000 more acres of arable land, which would be fully capable
of sustaining five or six millions of new population, and of increasing
the annual crops of the land by not less than 150,000,000 _yen_.[54]
Unfortunately, however, the Koreans lack energy to cultivate those three
and a half million acres of waste land. For it is well known that the
irregular but exhaustive exactions of the Korean officials have bred a
conviction in the mind of the peasant that it is unwise to bestir
himself and earn surplus wealth only to be fleeced by the officials. His
idleness has now for centuries been forced, until it has become an
agreeable habit. It is in this state of things that is has often been
suggested that the cultivation of the waste lands may most naturally be
begun by the superior energy of the Japanese settlers.[55] Not less
important than the cultivation of new land is the improvement of old
land in Korea, where the art of husbandry is far less advanced than in
either China or Japan. Lots are marked out carelessly, improvements are
crude, and the manure most universally used is dried grass. The great
rivers with all their numerous ramifications are hardly utilized for the
purpose of irrigation, and the forests have been mercilessly denuded for
fuel and in order to forestall the requisition of the government,—which
formerly used to order without compensation the cutting and transporting
of trees by their owners,—so that a slight drought or excess of rain
works frightful disasters upon agriculture. Another serious effect of
the absence of a good system of irrigation is the comparative want of
rice land, which always requires a most careful use of water.[56] These
conditions are all the more to be regretted, when it is seen that the
soil is generally fair and the climate favorable. The cultivation of
rice is said to have been first taught by the Japanese invaders toward
the end of the sixteenth century, and yet, with all their primitive
method, the Koreans are already exporting rice to the value of four
million _yen_ or more. Sericulture is still in its infancy, while tea,
cotton, hemp, sugar, and various fruits are all declared to be tolerably
well suited to the soil. The Japanese farmer finds here, particularly in
the south, a climate and general surroundings very similar to his own,
and otherwise eminently agreeable to his habits, and, along with the
application of his superior methods of cultivation, irrigation, and
forestry, the common interests of his country and Korea are bound to
develop with great rapidity. The progress of agriculture would also
gradually lead the Koreans into the beginnings of an industrial life,
while the expanding systems of railways and banking would be at once
cause and effect of the industrial growth of the nation. Another
inevitable result would be the development of the economic sense and the
saving capacity of the Korean, the latter of which has had little
opportunity to grow, not so much because of his small wage and high rent
and interest, as because of the onerous, irregular local dues and the
systematic exactions in various forms by the official.[57] An advanced
economic life, itself necessitating a reform of the official
organization, would at least make it possible for the peasant to work,
earn, and save. Simultaneously and in increasing degree would his wants,
as well as his purchasing power, increase. Around the progress of
Korea’s agriculture, then, must be built all other measures of her
growth and power, as, for instance, transportation, industries, trade
and commerce, finance, political reform, and military strength. In no
other way can we conceive of the possibility of her effective
independence, the cause of which has cost Japan, and is now costing her,
so dearly. In no other light can we interpret the Korean sovereignty
under the assistance of Japan.

In regard to Manchuria, where the chances for development are far
vaster, the Japanese people do not possess there as large vested
interests, but entertain as great expectations for its future settlement
and industry as in Korea. It was estimated before the present war that
there resided more than ten thousand Japanese in Manchuria, who were
either under the employment of Russian authorities in public works along
the railway, or engaged in such small occupations as laundry work,
carpentry, restaurant-keeping, photographing, and hair-dressing,[58]
while many of the Japanese women, whose numbers in many a town
preponderated over those of men, had been allured by unscrupulous
parties, who consigned them to disreputable occupations. Merchants and
business men of greater capital and resources would be, as they often
have been, attracted to Manchuria, were it not for the exclusive, and in
the hands of some of their officials, arbitrary, measures of the
Russians.[59] Under normal conditions of peace and “open door,” the
immensely greater resources of Manchuria and the much greater
productiveness of its people[60] would seem to promise even a more
important economic future than in Korea.

In summing up our preceding discussion, it may be stated that the
natural growth or unnatural decay of the Japanese nation will greatly
depend—ever more greatly than it now does—upon whether Manchuria and
Korea remain open or are closed to its trade, colonization, and economic
enterprise; and that, in her imperative desire for the open door,
Japan’s wish largely coincides with that of the European and American
countries, except Russia, whose over-production calls for an open market
in the East.

Thus far we have discussed only Japan’s side of the economic problem in
Manchuria and Korea. Passing to Russia’s side, it is seen that her
vested interests in Manchuria are as enormous as her commercial success
there has been small. The building of the Eastern Chinese Railway has
cost the incredible sum of 270,000,000 rubles, making the average cost
per verst more than 113,000 rubles,[61] or over $87,000 per mile,
besides 70,000,000 rubles lost and expended during the Boxer outrages
and Manchuria campaign of 1900,[62] to say nothing of the normal annual
cost of guarding the railway by soldiers, estimated at 24,000,000
rubles.[63] The investments in permanent properties alone, besides the
railway, are moderately valued at 500,000,000 rubles.[64] In return for
these heavy outlays, the trade relations between Russia and Manchuria
have been most disappointing. Though it is not possible to obtain the
exact figures of the actual trade between Manchuria and European Russia,
we can establish approximate estimates in the following manner.
According to official returns, exports from Russia to her Far Eastern
Possessions were as follows:—

                         1900 56,000,000 rubles
                         1901 51,000,000
                         1902 38,000,000

The decline must be largely due to the decreased demand for military and
railway supplies, for it is seen that the falling-off has been most
conspicuous in iron and steel wares and machinery.[65] At the same time
there was little or no import trade from the Russian possessions in the
East into Russia, for the native products sent out from the former never
passed beyond Eastern Siberia. It would be interesting if we could find
out how much of these Russian exports went to Manchuria. The figures for
the Pacific ports are given as follows:[66]—

                         1900 51,157,000 rubles
                         1901 49,827,000
                         1902 37,704,000

If these figures are reliable, the difference between them and those
given above, namely:—

                    1900 less than 5,000,000 rubles
                    1901 more than 1,000,000
                    1902 less than   300,000

might be considered an approximate amount of the export trade from
Russia to Manchuria (and Mongolia, which imports very little from
Russia), for, of the Pacific ports, no other port but Vladivostok
reëxports Russian goods into Manchuria, which reëxportation seems to be
slight enough to be ignored. The approximate correctness of the figures
is further seen from the fact that of the total 8,193,000 rubles of the
Manchurian trade at Blagovestchensk, Habarofsk, and the South Ussuri
region—the three main points of transit trade with Manchuria—only one
half showed exports to Manchuria, and again, of this one half, only a
portion consisted of reëxported Russian goods. The South Ussuri
district, for instance, sent only 130,800 and 206,000 rubles’ worth of
Russian and foreign goods to Manchuria, out of the total export trade of
799,500 and 2,221,300 rubles, respectively, in 1898 and 1899.[67] On the
other hand, before the opening of the Manchurian Railway (which took
place in February, 1903), the _direct_ trade between Russia and the
interior of Manchuria must have been so slight as not to materially
affect the sum-total of the Russian-Manchurian trade.

This remarkably unfavorable trade between Manchuria and Russia was
probably due to a decreased demand for military supplies since 1900 (for
Russia has little to export from Manchuria, and Chinese teas have
largely gone through Kiakhta or by the Amur, rather than by the
Manchurian Railway), and also to the difficulty of further reducing the
freight rates on the railway,[68] and of competing successfully with the
American and Japanese traders in certain articles for importation.[69]
In spite of all the effort made by the late Finance Minister, M. Witte,
Russia is not yet primarily a manufacturing country, her exportation of
manufactured goods forming in fact only 2.5 per cent. of her entire
export trade, and at best remaining stationary during the three years
1900–2, as will be seen below:—

                                 1900        1901          1902
                                Rubles      Rubles        Rubles
    Total exports from Russia 688,435,000 729,815,000    825,277,000
    Exports of manufacturers   19,553,000  21,039,000 19,263,000[70]

Russia’s commercial failure in Manchuria in the past would, however, in
no way justify the inference that the future will be as disappointing.
All competent observers seem to agree that the undeveloped resources of
the 364,000 square miles of Manchuria are enormous.[71] Its unknown
mineral wealth, its thousands of square miles of land now under the bean
and millet cultivation, but beginning to yield to the wheat culture and
producing wheat at a market price of not more than forty cents per
bushel, and its extensive lumber districts, as well as its millions of
cheap and most reliable Chinese laborers,[72] would before long enable
the Russians successfully to convert Manchuria into one of the richest
parts of China and one of the richest countries in the world. A success
of such magnitude must, however, largely depend upon a systematically
protective and exclusive policy on the part of Russia, or, in other
words, upon the completeness with which Russia transfers the bulk of the
Manchurian trade from the treaty port of Niu-chwang, and, so far as the
Russian import from China is concerned, even from the once important
Russian port of Vladivostok, to the commercial terminus of the
Manchurian Railway—Dalny. Particularly in order to capture the import
trade into Manchuria of cotton goods and kerosene oil, in the face of
the great advantages enjoyed by American and Japanese competitors,
Russia must at all costs make Dalny overshadow Niu-chwang, so as to
bring the trade under her complete control. Nothing but a highly
artificial system could accomplish such wonders, for, under normal
conditions, teas for Russia would go by the less costly routes through
Kiakhta, or up the Amur, or by sea to Odessa; the native products of
Manchuria for exportation to Japan would be sent to Niu-chwang by the
nearest, cheapest, and most natural channel, the Liao River, and, when
the latter freezes between the end of November and March, by the
Shan-hai-kwan Railway; and, finally, the smaller cost of production and
lower rates of freight of the American and Japanese cotton fabrics would
completely outdistance the Russian. Let us observe with what artificial
measures the Russians have been meeting this situation. With a view to
diverting the tea trade from Vladivostok to Dalny, Russia imposed an
import duty of 3 rubles per pood from August, 1902, and increased it in
May, 1903, to 25.50 rubles,[73] which with other measures dealt a
crushing blow to the prosperity of Vladivostok.[74] This must at least
have stifled the transportation of tea up the Amur, without, perhaps,
affecting the inroad of teas through the old Kiakhta and by sea.[75] As
regards the export trade at Niu-chwang, the Russians took advantage of
the important fact that the Shan-hai-kwan Railway did not penetrate
sufficiently north to reach some producing centres of Western Manchuria,
while the waters of the Liao were navigable only 200 miles from the
mouth, and were, together with the harbor itself, ice-bound from
November till March. Dalny was nearly ice-free, and the Manchurian
Railway was available through all seasons. The only competitors of the
railroad would seem to be the small bean-carrying junks plying down the
Liao, which were both owned and loaded by the same Chinese merchants.
This competition the Russians met by greatly reduced freight rates of
the railway, which made it possible for every 100 poods of Manchurian
grain and beans to be carried 600 miles between Harbin and Dalny for
about fifty-seven cents gold, or $10 per ton.[76] From Dalny, heavily
subsidized Russian boats transported Manchurian exports to Japan at a
freight rate which, in conjunction with railway rates, amounted to the
saving by the shipper of 4.50 _yen_ per ton, as compared with the
railway-rates _plus_ the freight-rates of non-Russian vessels.[77] When
the flour industry of the Russian towns in Manchuria is developed,
Russian steamers may be seen carrying flour from Dalny, not only to
Japan, but to Chinese and Eastern Siberian ports. As for the import
trade of Manchuria, the Russians, who have ousted American importers of
kerosene oil at Vladivostok, seem to be now by energetic methods slowly
driving away the same rivals from Chemulpo and from Dalny.[78] Vastly
more important as articles for importation than kerosene oil are cotton
yarn and textiles, which are annually supplied from abroad to the value
of over 12,000,000 _taels_. By far the greater part of sheetings,
drills, and jeans comes from America. The Russians were not unable to
produce cotton fabrics almost as good as the American goods, but the
trans-Siberian freight was twice as expensive as the Pacific
transportation, and could not be expected to be further reduced without
great difficulty.[79] It was not impossible to suppose that the Russian
Government might ultimately apply to Manchuria the system of granting a
premium and an additional drawback on textiles made from imported
cotton, which had been in successful operation in Persia. There was no
question but that, together with the development of Manchuria under
Russian control, foreigners would lose most of their import trade in
lumber, butter, and flour, and here again the Russian success must
depend on the exclusiveness of their policy.[80] Mr. H. B. Miller, the
United States Consul at Niu-chwang, seems to have made a delicate
reference to this point when he said, in his report dated December 5,
1903: “The United States trade in Manchuria with the Chinese amounted to
several millions of dollars per year, and was almost entirely imports.
It had grown very fast, and would have had an extended and most
substantial increase without the Russian development, for the country
was being improved and extensively developed with a continual
immigration from other provinces in China, before the railway
construction began.”[81] Much has been said regarding the oft-reiterated
wish of Russia to keep Dalny as a free port, but it is well known that
it has recently been placed under a protective tariff.[82] We are not in
possession of the details of this tariff, but its general significance
can hardly be mistaken when we see how the Russians have been reducing
freight rates to the utmost, subsidizing their own steamers, and pooling
together their great banking and railway facilities, all for the
purpose, on the one hand, of developing Russian industries in Manchuria,
and on the other, of monopolizing the bulk of its trade.

Not only in trade, but in colonization also, the Russians have been
building up new cities and developing old ones under their exclusive
policy with an unheard-of rapidity. Dalny is a good example of the
former class. Still more conspicuous is the city of Harbin, the
so-called Moscow of Asia, the geographical and commercial centre and
headquarters of the railway work in Manchuria, which is said to have
consisted of a single Chinese house in 1898,[83] but now contains 50,000
people.[84] Well might Count Cassini, as he did, refer, not only to the
colonization, but to the general civilizing influence of the Russians in
Manchuria in the following language:[85] “Through the pacific channels
of diplomacy my government acquired privileges which, accepted in good
faith, have been exercised in a spirit of true modern progressiveness,
until now the flower of enlightened civilization blooms throughout a
land that a few years ago was a wild, and in many parts a desolate,
seemingly unproductive waste. Before the signing of the treaty which I
had the honor to negotiate in behalf of my Sovereign, giving to Russia
railroad and other concessions in Manchuria, no white man could have
ventured into that province without danger to his life.... Upon the
basis of the rights to commercial exploitation thus peaceably obtained,
Russia built a railway into and through Manchuria. She built bridges,
roads, and canals. She has built cities whose rapid construction and
wonderful strides in population and industry have no parallel, certainly
in Europe and Asia, perhaps even in America. Harbin and Dalny are
monuments to Russian progressiveness and civilization. These great
undertakings, wonderful even in a day of marvelous human accomplishment,
have cost Russia more than 300,000,000 dollars.” Without stopping either
to dispute the historical accuracy of Count Cassini’s statement or to
deny the wonderful work the Russians have accomplished in Manchurian
cities, it seems pertinent to call our attention to the exclusive side
of the Russian enterprise in this vast territory. Harbin is one of the
so-called “depots,” over eighty in number, which are found along the
whole length of the Manchurian Railway, each one of which extends over
several square miles, within which none but the Russians and Chinese
have the right of permanent settlement.[86] Russia would not consent to
the opening of Harbin (and, presumably, all other cities within the
“depots” of the Manchurian Railway) to foreign trade. Even outside of
these cities, the Russian Government appeared to be opposed to the
opening of new ports, and when it was no longer politic to continue the
opposition, Russia informed other Powers in 1903 that she had no
intention of objecting to the opening of new treaty ports “without
foreign settlements” in Manchuria.[87]

The meaning of all these protective and exclusive measures becomes
plain, when it is seen that the complete control of the economic
resources of Manchuria would give Russia, not only sufficient means to
support Eastern Siberia, but also a great command over the trade of
China and Japan. The latter country Russia might be able to reduce to
dire distress, when necessary, by closing the supplies coming from
Manchuria, upon which Japan will have to depend every year more closely
than before.[88] The success of these great designs on the part of
Russia would depend upon how completely protective and exclusive her
Manchurian policy can be made.

Coming from Manchuria to Korea, we find the economic position of the
Russians in a totally different situation, for either their vested or
even their potential interests in the Peninsula were slight, excepting,
perhaps, their already acquired timber concessions[89] on the northern
frontier and the Kaiserling whale fishery on the northeastern coast.[90]
It has been pointed out, however, that the fact that Dalny was not
altogether ice-free made Russia covet Chemulpo or some other trade port
on the western coast of Korea.[91] However that may be, it is safe to
say that Russia’s interests in Korea are slightly economic, but almost
wholly strategic and political.

Let us sum up our discussion at this point, and compare the economic
interests of Russia and Japan in Manchuria and Korea. In Manchuria, both
Powers seek trade and colonization, with the important difference that
Japan’s interests are actually great and potentially greater, while
those of Russia are both actually and potentially preponderant. A
difference of greater moment lies, however, in the fact that, so far as
her trade and industry are concerned, Japan’s interests call for an
equal opportunity there for all industrial nations, while Russia’s
interests may be maintained and developed only by a highly exclusive
policy. In Korea, its opening for the trade, settlement, and enterprise
of the Japanese is not only the most natural method of strengthening
Korea herself, but also a primary condition for the life and growth of
Japan. Russia’s economic interests there, on the other hand, may be
measured by the number of her resident subjects and the extent of their
enterprise, which are, outside of Yong-am-po, next to nothing. Her
interests, being, as we shall soon see, mainly strategic and political,
demand here also a policy directly opposed to the open door. If we now
consider Manchuria and Korea together, it may be said that Russia’s
economic interests are, even in Manchuria, rather for her glory as a
great, expanding empire than for any imperative need of trade and
emigration in that particular part of her Asiatic dominion, while
similar interests of Japan, primarily in Korea and secondarily in
Manchuria, are vital, as they are essential for her own life and
development as a nation. The case for Russia can, perhaps, never be
understood until her _political_ issues are examined.

Politically, also, the interests of the two Powers are found to be
directly opposed to one another. It has been rightly said that Manchuria
is the keynote of the Eastern policy of Russia. Besides its immense
wealth still unexploited, Manchuria possesses the great Port Arthur,
which is the only nearly ice-free naval outlet for Russia in her vast
dominion in Asia, while the 1500 miles of the Manchurian Railway,
together with the Great Siberian Railway, connect this important naval
station with the army bases in Siberia and European Russia, so that
Manchuria alone would seem to be politically more valuable for Russia
than the rest of her Asiatic territories. Without Manchuria, Russia
would be left inclosed in the ice-bound Siberia, with no naval or
commercial outlet during nearly five months of each year. With
Manchuria, Russia’s traditional policy, which has repeatedly failed
since Peter the Great on the Baltic Sea and other European waters, as
also on the Persian Gulf,—the policy of becoming the dominant naval
power of the world,—would at last begin to be realized. The very
importance of Manchuria for Russia, however, constitutes a serious
menace to Japan and to the general peace of the Far East. In the first
place, the Russian control of Port Arthur gives her a large measure of
control over the water approaches to Peking, while the Mongolian Railway
now reported to be in contemplation would bring Russian land forces
directly upon the capital of the Chinese Empire. The very integrity of
China is threatened, and a more serious disturbance of the peace of the
world could hardly be imagined than the general partition and internal
outbreaks in China which would follow the fall of Peking under the
pressure of Russia from Manchuria and Mongolia. Not less grave is the
fact that Manchuria is geographically and historically connected with
the Peninsula of Korea,[92] which makes Russia’s occupation of Korea a
necessary adjunct of her possession of Manchuria. Geographically
considered, there exists no abrupt change from the eastern part of
Manchuria to the northern half of Korea,[93] which fact goes far to
explain the Russian solicitude to obtain railway and other concessions
between the frontier and Seul. Even more serious conditions exist on the
southern coast of Korea, which contains the magnificent harbor of
Masampo, which constitutes the Gibraltar between the Russian fleets at
the ice-bound and remote Vladivostok and the incommodious and not
altogether ice-free Port Arthur, with no effective means of connecting
them. By controlling this coast, Russia would not merely possess a truly
ice-free, and the best naval port to be found in East Asia,[94] but also
at last feel secure in Manchuria and complete her Far Eastern design of
absorbing Korea and China and pressing down toward India. If, on the
contrary, another Power should control Masampo, it would be able to
watch the movement of the Russian fleets in their attempts to unite with
one another, and also seriously impede the greatest hopes of Russia’s
Eastern expansion. From Japan’s standpoint, the Russian occupation of
this section of Korea would not only possibly close Korea against her
trade and enterprise, but also threaten her own integrity. Only fifty
miles away lie the Japanese islands of Tsushima, which Russia has always
coveted, and which would have been hers had it not been for the shrewd
diplomacy of the late Count Katsu.[95] From Tsushima the mainland of
Japan is visible on the eastern horizon, so that the presence of Russia
at Masampo would arouse in the heart of Japan the most profound feeling
of unrest. Russia must have Masampo, and Japan must not let her have it.

In concluding our discussion of the vital issues, both economical and
political, which are at stake, it would seem that Manchuria is for Japan
a great market as well as an increasingly important supply region of raw
and food products and a field for emigration, while for Russia it is the
keynote of her Eastern policy, and economically the most promising of
all her Asiatic possessions. On the other hand, Korea is essential for
Russia for the completion of her Manchurian policy,[96] and for
strengthening enormously her general position in the East. For Japan,
Korea is nothing short of one half of her vitality. By the opening or
closing, strength or weakness, independence or fall, of Korea, would
Japan’s fate as a nation be decided. On the contrary, Russia, with
Manchuria and ultimately Korea in her hands, would be able, on the one
hand, to build up under her exclusive policy a naval and commercial
influence strong enough to enable her to dominate the East, and, on the
other, to <DW36> forever Japan’s ambition as a nation, slowly drive her
to starvation and decay, and even politically annex her. From Japan’s
point of view, Korea and China must be left open freely to the economic
enterprise of herself and others alike, and, in order to effect that
end, they must remain independent and become stronger by their internal
development and reform.[97] Russia’s interests are intelligible, as are
Japan’s, but unfortunately their desires are antagonistic to each other,
so that a conflict between an open and an exclusive policy is rendered
inevitable. The series of events during the past decades, particularly
since 1895, which we shall narrate in this volume, has only served to
bring this conflict into a sharp clash in arms.

                  *       *       *       *       *

In closing, it may not be entirely out of place to attempt a speculation
upon the significance of the conflict, not to the belligerents, but to
the world at large. From the latter’s point of view, the contest may
fairly be regarded as a dramatic struggle between two civilizations, old
and new, Russia representing the old civilization and Japan the new. Two
dominant features, among others, seem to characterize the opposition of
the contending nations: namely, first, that Russia’s economics are
essentially agricultural, while those of Japan are largely and
increasingly industrial; and, secondly, that Japan’s strength lies more
on sea than on land, while Russia represents an enormous contiguous
expansion on land. It is evident that the wealth of a nation and its
earning capacity cannot grow fast under a trade system under which it
imports many and exports few manufactures.[98] The commercial prosperity
of Russia depended formerly upon its nearness, first to the trade route
with the Levant, and then to the free cities of Germany, but with the
fall of Constantinople and the decline of the Hansa towns the business
activity of Southern and Baltic Russia has in turn passed away. Then,
from the time of Ivan the Terrible, she unified her European territory,
and expanded eastward on land, until she had embraced within her
dominion much of Central and all of Northern Asia. For such an expansion
Russia seems to have been particularly fitted, for her primitive
economic organization suffers little from external disturbances, while
the autocratic form of her government enables her to maintain and
execute her traditional policy of expansion. But the real importance of
her expansion appears to be more territorial than commercial, for the
days of the land trade with the Orient are numbered. Even the great
Siberian Railway would not successfully divert the Eastern trade
landward.[99] If Russia would be prosperous she must control the Eastern
sea by occupying northeast China and Korea. Here she comes in conflict
with Japan, the champion in the East of the rising civilization. The
economic centre of the world has been fast passing to America, where
cotton, wheat, coal, and iron abound, the people excel in energy and
intelligence, and the government is servant to the welfare and progress
of the people. Japan has joined the circle of this civilization, ever
since the influence of the youthful nation of America was extended to
her through Commodore Perry[100] and Townsend Harris, and the spirit of
national progress through industry and education was eagerly adopted by
her. To-day, Japan stands within the range of the interests of the
British and American sea-power over the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian
oceans, while Russia, on the other hand, represents a vast expansion on
land.

The historical bearing of the effects of the old civilization to the
world may, perhaps, be best characterized by the one word—_unnatural_.
Observe, first, the effect of the policy of land aggression on the
internal affairs of Russia. The policy is costly. Hence the great
incongruity between the economics of the people, which are agricultural,
and the finance of her government, which would be too expensive even for
the most highly advanced industrial nation. Hence, also, it is, perhaps,
that the richer and more powerful her government becomes, the poorer and
more discontented her people seem to grow. Her administration must
naturally be maintained by the suspicion of her people and the
suppression of their freedom,[101] and the suspicion and suppression
must become more exhaustive as the disparity widens between rulers and
ruled.[102] Under these circumstances, a constitutional régime would not
be possible, for a free expression of the popular will would be hardly
compatible with a form of government which seeks to strengthen the state
at the expense of the nation. Again, consider the unnatural situation of
an agricultural nation competing in the world’s market with industrial,
trading nations which command a higher and more effective economic
organization. If Russia would sell her goods, her markets abroad must be
created and maintained by artificial means:[103] protective and
exclusive measures must be pushed to such an extent as to distance all
foreign competition, the interests of the consumer must be
disregarded,[104] and those of the growing industrial nations must be
sacrificed,[105] all for the sake of artificially promoting the belated
manufactures in Russia.[106] From this unnatural state of things would
seem to follow the Russian policy of territorial occupation and
commercial exclusion in the East, and also her free use of the old-time
intrigue in diplomacy; for it is Russia’s fortune that she would not be
able to compete freely with the new, growing civilization, whose open
arts she cannot employ to her advantage, but to whose advanced standard
of international morals she must appear to conform. Her position forbids
her to have recourse to an open policy and fair play, and yet she cannot
afford to overtly uphold the opposite principles.[107] On the other
hand, the new civilization, represented in the present contest by Japan,
relies more largely upon the energy and resources of the individual
person, whose rights it respects, and upon an upright treatment by the
nations of one another.

What is the goal of the warfare of these two civilizations? It is, it
may be said, the immensely rich and yet undeveloped North China, of
which Manchuria is a part, and to which Korea is an appendix. Over this
territory, the interests of Russia and Japan have come to a clear and
sharp clash, those of the former demanding the subjection and closure of
this great portion of the earth’s surface, and those of the latter
imperatively calling for its independence and progress.

Whoever wins, the issues are momentous. If Russia should win, not only
Korea and Manchuria, but also Mongolia would be either annexed by Russia
or placed under her protection, and Japan’s progress would be checked
and her life would begin to fail. Russia would assume a commanding
position over all the Powers in the East, while the trading nations of
the world would be either largely or completely excluded from an
important economic section of Asia. The Siberian railway system might at
last be made to pay, and Russia’s exclusive policy would enable her and
her ally France to divide the profit of the Eastern trade with the more
active industrial nations. The old civilization would enjoy an
artificial revival, under the influence of which China and Korea would
be exploited by the victors and, for the most part,[108] closed against
reformatory influences from abroad. All these momentous results would be
in the interest of an exclusive policy incorporating principles which
are generally regarded as inimical to freedom and progress. If, on the
contrary, Japan should win, the doubtful importance of the Siberian
Railroad as a carrier of the Eastern trade would in the mean time be
further overshadowed by the Panama Canal, and it would be compelled to
perform its perhaps proper function of developing the vast resources of
Siberia and Manchuria. The Oriental commerce would be equally free and
open to all; the Empires of China and Korea would not only remain
independent, but, under the influence of the new civilization, their
enormous resources would be developed and their national institutions
reformed, the immense advantages of which would be enjoyed by all the
nations which are interested in the East. There would naturally result a
lasting peace in the East and the general uplifting of one third of the
human race. Japan’s growth and progress after the war would be even more
remarkable than in the past. In short, East Asia would be forcibly
brought under the influence of the new civilization, the effect of which
would not be without a profound reaction upon Russia herself. Humanity
at large, including the Russians, would thereby be the gainer. The
difference in the effects of the outcome of the war, according to who is
the victor, would be tremendous. Which will win, the old civilization or
the new? The world at this moment stands at the parting of the ways.


                           SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE
                      ON THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY[109]

According to an estimate made by a Russian expert of the carrying
capacity of the great Siberian railway system,[110] the Siberian section
alone will carry at least 190 million poods, and the Manchurian section
from 100 to 150 million poods, making a total of 300 to 350 million
poods, approximately. It is contended, however, that, while the present
conditions of the inhabitants of Siberia and Manchuria make it possible
for the railway to carry only raw and crudely manufactured goods, these
are the very articles whose cost would easily be raised by the long
distance over which they have to be carried by rail. In Europe, it never
pays to carry these articles for a longer distance than 2000 miles. Nor
would it in Siberia, unless abnormal reductions are made in freight
rates, or unless commerce and manufacture are artificially fostered in
Siberia and Manchuria. It is supposed, therefore, that it would always
be unprofitable to carry bulky, cheap goods between Europe and the East
on the Siberian Railway. China’s exports to Russia consist of such
costly goods as teas and silks, which may be profitably transported by
rail, but thus far even teas have only begun to be so transported under
more or less artificial measures in favor of the railway traffic at the
expense of the routes through Kiakhta, up the Amur, and by sea to
Odessa. As to Russian imports into China, cotton and woolen goods and
metals would never be carried by rail under normal circumstances.[111]
The benefit of the eight thousand versts of the railway from Moscow to
Dalny may be safely said to be as slight to the carrying trade as it is
great to the travelers and postal service between Europe and the East.

The statistics for 1899 and 1900 show that the bulk of the Russian trade
with China was carried on land, but that the land trade was decreasing
and sea trade increasing. See the following table (unit 1000
rubles):[112]—

                     │     Export Import Total  Ratio
                 1899│Land  7,522 30,007 37,520    74%
                     │Sea       4 13,508 13,512    26%
                 ────┼────────────────────────────────
                 1900│Land  6,678 29,779 36,457    69%
                     │Sea      24 16,166 16,190    31%

It should be noted, however, that the period covered by the table is not
only too short, but also precedes the opening of the Manchurian Railroad
to trade, which took place only in 1903. Nor should it be overlooked
that the figures indicate the China trade of _Russia_ alone.

Regarding the _European_ trade with China in general, M. Sorokin,
Assistant Director of Customs at Niu-chwang, is reported to have
remarked that the freight per pood from Europe to the East was five
rubles on land and 1.50 on sea.[113] Certain articles, such as
glassware, tobacco, and the like, seem to be carried from Russia to
China at two rubles by rail and one ruble by ships.[114] The sea route
consumes nearly two months, but, for bulky merchandise, it would be
impossible for the railway to compete with it.

It is interesting, in this connection, to remember that, from _America_,
the freight between San Francisco and the Eastern ports has been reduced
repeatedly during the last year, owing to the competition among the
shipping companies, so that the charge for flour does not seem to be
more than one mill per ton-mile, or forty cents a hundred pounds for
8000 miles.

During 1901, according to the latest statistics available, the deficit
of the Ussuri branch of the Siberian Railway is said to have amounted to
$435,162, and that of the entire railway to $11,330,000.[115]

                  *       *       *       *       *

In this connection, it is interesting to note that this view is further
confirmed by no less authority than Count Cassini, the present Russian
Minister at Washington, who, in his statement given on April 9, and
published in the _North American Review_ for May, 1904, said:

“... Consider Russia’s position commercially toward Manchuria with that
of the United States. In this country [the United States] are made not
only the very materials that would find a sale among the people of the
province, but with American goods shipped by an all-water route, the
cost of transportation would be much lower than the cost of carrying on
the all-land routes to which Russia would be confined. Should Russia
ship by water to Manchuria from Odessa, the distance would still be too
great to make competition with the United States successful. From Moscow
to Port Arthur the distance by rail is 5000 miles. It is therefore easy
to realize the privileged position of the United States in competing
over an all-water route from the Pacific coast, with Russia over an
all-rail route.”[116]

-----

Footnote 1:

  Official figures for December 31, 1903. The _Fourth Financial and
  Economical Annual of Japan_, 1904 (hereafter abbreviated as the
  _Fourth Annual_), published by the Department of Finance, Imperial
  Government of Tokio, p. 5. The actual numbers may be even higher.

Footnote 2:

  _The Monthly Return of the Foreign Trade of the Empire of Japan_ for
  May, 1904, published by the Department of Finance, pp. 91–95.

Footnote 3:

  _Japan in the Beginning of the 20th Century_ (hereafter abbreviated as
  the _20th Century_), compiled by the Department of Agriculture and
  Commerce, Tokio, 1903, pp. 53–58.

Footnote 4:

  Or, 241,891,946 out of 285,971,623 _yen_. As the term manufacture is
  expansive, the articles herein included should be enumerated. They
  are: clothing, chemicals and drugs, metal wares, oil and wax, paper,
  cotton yarn and fabrics, raw and woven silks, tobacco, and sundries.
  Teas, grain, marine products and other food-stuffs, and furs, as well
  as reëxported articles, are excluded. See the _Kwampō_ (Official
  Gazette of Japan), No. 6199 (March 4, 1904), p. 77, table 7.

Footnote 5:

  The crop of rice has increased since 1877 from 26.6 million to about
  42,000,000 _koku_; that of barley, rye, and wheat from 9.6 million to
  19 million _koku_. But the increase has been due more to an improved
  cultivation than to an extension of acreage. Although the wheat,
  barley, and rye land has grown from 2.35 million in 1877 to 4.43
  million acres in 1901, the rice land has increased from 6,517,000 to
  only 6,982,000 acres. The crops of hemp and rape are stationary, while
  those of sugar, cotton, and indigo have largely fallen off. (These
  figures have been converted from those in the _20th Century_, pp. 119
  ff. One _koku_ dry is equivalent to 4.9629 bushels.)

Footnote 6:

  These figures have been worked out from the _Kokumin Shimbun_
  (National News, hereafter abbreviated as the _Kokumin_) of February 5,
  10, and 19, 1904. Also see a table and comment in the _Tōyō Keizai
  Shimpō_ (“Oriental Economist”), for May 5, 1903, pp. 17–19.

Footnote 7:

  If sugar is added to the list, the figures will go up to more than 190
  million _yen_, or 60 per cent. of the entire import trade.

Footnote 8:

  289.2 million _yen_ in 1902–3. The _Fourth Annual_, pp. 4 and 9, and
  plate 3. Also see the _Tōyō Keizai Shimpō_ (“Oriental Economist”) for
  December 5, 1902, pp. 19–21 and chart.

Footnote 9:

  Or, less than 7,000,000 acres of wet fields and less than 6,000,000 of
  upland fields, the latter including mulberry and tea gardens, besides
  fields for _mugi_, beans, and vegetables. Based on the _20th Century_,
  pp. 95 ff.

Footnote 10:

  This figure includes, however, all the land inclined at angles less
  than 15°, so that, from the practical point of view, it may be
  considered as highly exaggerated. The actual extent of the reclamation
  of wild land advances at a slow pace outside of the still largely
  undeveloped island of Hokkaidō. See _ibid._, pp. 95–96, 104.

Footnote 11:

  Or, about 23,000,000 acres for nearly 47,000,000 people. If we take
  only the land under cultivation, on the one hand, and only the farming
  population, on the other, the ratio still remains the same, for then
  we have 13,000,000 acres for 28,000,000 people. The aggregate of the
  capital involved in the agriculture of Japan, including the value of
  land, buildings, implements, and live stock, is estimated at
  7,400,000,000 _yen_, while the annual crops return about 1,000,000,000
  _yen_. See the _20th Century_, pp. 105–106.

Footnote 12:

  The annual rainfall of Japan proper averages between 1300 mm. at
  Awomori and 2040 mm. at Kagoshima. A fairly rich sedimentary formation
  of soil is found everywhere, owing to the hilly nature of the country
  and the short and rapid current of the rivers.

Footnote 13:

  Wherever possible, the farmer contrives to raise more than one crop on
  his land in different seasons during the year. In fact, more than 30
  per cent. of rice land yields other crops besides rice, at places
  _mugi_, indigo, beans, and rape being cultivated on the same piece of
  land.

Footnote 14:

  More than half of the wet fields of the country consist of lots
  smaller than one-eighth acre, and nearly three fourths are each less
  than one-quarter acre. The average size of the lots outside of Formosa
  and Hokkaidō is put down as .1 acre for wet fields and .12 acre for
  upland fields.

Footnote 15:

  Compare the report of the U. S. Consul-General Bellows at Yokohama in
  the U. S. _Consular Reports_, advance sheets, No. 1757 (September 24,
  1903). In addition to the conditions here enumerated, it must be
  remembered that there exists little or no pasture land in Japan, and
  that nearly all the labor is done by hand, there being only 1,500,000
  horses and 1,300,000 horned animals in the country. See the _20th
  Century_, chapters on agriculture; the _Annual_, No. III, tables
  x-xiii; J. J. Rein’s _Industries of Japan_, English translation, New
  York, 1889, chapters on agriculture; and H. Dumolard’s _Le Japon
  politique, économique et social_, Paris, 1903, pp. 109–121.

Footnote 16:

  The _20th Century_, p. 117; Dumolard, pp. 112–113.

Footnote 17:

  This ratio includes, however, in the tenant class those farmers who
  are partly lessees and partly proprietors of small lots. In 1888, the
  ratio between (1) independent farmers, (2) partly lessees, and (3)
  entirely lessees, was 147:200:95. Since that time the ratio must have
  grown in favor of the tenants. See the _20th Century_, p. 90.

Footnote 18:

  See the U. S. _Consular Reports_, advance sheets, No. 1529 (December
  26, 1902). In 1902 the total debts of the farming classes of Japan
  were estimated at 400 million _yen_. Mr. S. Nakayama, in the _Tōyō
  Keizai Shimpō_ (“Oriental Economist”) for July 15, 1902, p. 14.

Footnote 19:

  In 1903, Japan’s American trade was much below that of 1902. The
  latter showed an increase of 362 per cent. over 1890.

Footnote 20:

  The actual figures were:—

                European          American         Japanese
       1890  57,200,000 _yen_ 36,700,000 _yen_  45,700,000 _yen_
       1903 166,900,000 _yen_ 95,900,000 _yen_ 295,900,000 _yen_

Footnote 21:

  In East Asia are included Korea, China, Hong-kong, British India,
  French Indo-China, Dutch East Indies, the Straits Settlements, Siam,
  the Philippines, and Russian Eastern Asia. If Hong-kong, an
  essentially transit-trade port, is excluded, the East Asiatic trade of
  Japan amounts to 264,476,239 _yen_, or 43.6 per cent. of the entire
  foreign trade of Japan. See the _Kwampō_ (Official Gazette of Japan),
  No. 6199 (March 4, 1904), p. 74, table 4.

  Of the three great divisions of Japan’s markets, Europe sells her
  machineries and articles of general consumption, and buys in return
  such peculiar products of her soil as silks and teas. East Asia,
  including India and the southern islands, takes coal and manufactured
  goods in general and furnishes cotton, food-stuffs, and other articles
  of more direct need than the European goods. America occupies a unique
  position in regard to Japan, as it combines to a large extent the
  peculiarities of both Europe and East Asia: it exports to Japan cotton
  and flour, besides machinery and goods of general consumption, and
  imports from her, not only raw silk and tea, but also smaller
  manufactured articles.

Footnote 22:

  Oil-cakes are used as manure. As to rice, wheat, and flour, it is
  unnecessary to say that their importation depends largely upon the
  conditions of the crop at home.

Footnote 23:

  The present author has often met persons who misinterpreted the “open
  door” to mean the complete throwing open of a country to the ruthless
  exploitation of the foreigner. The “open door,” it is needless to say,
  merely negatives a differential treatment in favor of one or more
  foreign nations at the expense of all the others. It does not
  necessarily imply a wide opening, but an impartial, even if narrow,
  opening for all nations.

Footnote 24:

  Consult the British _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, Annual Series,
  Nos. 2995 and 2999; the U. S. _Monthly Summary of Commerce and
  Finance_, January, 1904, pp. 2410–1; the _Kokumin_, September 19–21,
  1901; Minister Kiyoura’s address before the Osaka Chamber of Commerce,
  February, 1904.

Footnote 25:

  The figures were taken from the _Monthly Summary of Commerce and
  Finance of the United States_ for February, 1904, p. 3006.

Footnote 26:

  From _ibid._, p. 3006. In 1903, rice imported amounted to 51,960,000
  _yen_ in value. The _Fourth Annual_, p. 77.

Footnote 27:

  See the U. S. _Monthly Summary_, February, 1904, pp. 3006 and 3013.

Footnote 28:

  At present, Chinese merchants in Korea compete with the Japanese only
  at the ports on the western coast, principally in the import trade of
  silk. The number of the Chinese residents in Korea is one tenth that
  of the Japanese, or about 4000.

Footnote 29:

  The _Kokumin_, January 30, 1904.

Footnote 30:

  Based on the figures in the _British Diplomatic and Consular Report:
  Trade of Corea for the Year 1903_, pp. 11–13.

Footnote 31:

  Of the 1430 vessels, aggregating 1,104,000 tons, entered at and
  cleared from Niu-chwang in 1902, the Japanese had 710 vessels and
  491,000 tons, the British, 374 vessels and 350,000 tons, the Germans,
  88 vessels and 73,000 tons, and so forth.—The _Kokumin_, April 29,
  1904, from the _Tai Shin-Kan Bōyeki Chōsa Hōkoku_ (report on the trade
  with China and Korea), compiled by the Department of Agriculture and
  Commerce, Tokio, 1904. The Russians could show only 3 vessels and
  1,223 tons, which was below their record for 1901 and less than one
  half of the average of the five years 1886, 1897, 1898, 1899, and
  1901.—The British _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, Annual Series,
  No. 2999 (on Niu-chwang), p. 9.

Footnote 32:

  _Ibid._, p. 8.

Footnote 33:

  The direct import trade of any trading nation at Niu-chwang does not
  represent the actual amount of the articles imported from the country
  of that nation, for most of the foreign goods come to Niu-chwang
  through some other distributing centres in China, such as Hong-kong or
  Shanghai. The Japanese goods, however, are nearly all carried by
  Japanese vessels. On the contrary, the American imports, besides
  jeans, drills, sheetings, kerosenes, and flour, are not specified in
  the customs returns of Niu-chwang, and consequently their nominal
  figures are insignificant (7396 _l._ in 1901 and 4089 _l._ in 1902),
  while Hong-kong, through which most of the American goods are imported
  into Niu-chwang, showed, in 1902, 385,302 _l._, or 55 per cent. of the
  entire direct trade. On the other hand, the estimate made by the
  Bureau of Statistics, Department of Commerce and Labor, Washington,
  showing 18,000,000 haikwan taels for the _real_ import of American
  goods into Niu-chwang, seems to be pretty liberal. See British _D. and
  C. Reports_, annual series, No. 2999, p. 8, and the U. S. _Monthly
  Summary of Commerce and Finance_, January, 1904, p. 2328.

Footnote 34:

  See the _Tsūshō Isan_ for January 22, 1903, pp. 10–11.

Footnote 35:

  See the _Tōyō Keizai Shimpō_ (“Oriental Economist”), No. 165 (July 15,
  1900), and No. 244 (September 25, 1902).

Footnote 36:

  The _Kokumin_, November 26, 1903.

Footnote 37:

  The _Annai_, pp. 58–61.

Footnote 38:

  Mr. Shiga’s letter, in the _Kokumin_, July 5, 1904.

Footnote 39:

  In July, 1903, there were, besides soldiers, 26,705 Japanese in the
  eight treaty ports and Seul and Ping-yang. To these must be added
  about 4000 who lived on some islands and places outside of the treaty
  ports. See the _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_ (Report of the Dōbun Association),
  No. 41, pp. 95–96, and the _Tsūshō Isan_ for October 18, 1903, pp.
  29–47; April 8, 1904, pp. 28–52. Mr. Yamamoto places the number of the
  Japanese residents in Korea at 40,000. See his _Saishin Chōsen Ijū
  Annai_ (latest guide for emigration to Korea; hereafter abbreviated as
  the _Annai_), Tokio, 1904, p. 14.

Footnote 40:

  The _Annai_, pp. 8–9, 19–20.

Footnote 41:

  _Ibid._, p. 81.

Footnote 42:

  In July, 1903, of the 26,645 Japanese in Korea, 15,442 were men and
  11,263 women. It may be noted, in passing, that, in the case of
  Manchuria, a great majority of the Japanese women residing there are
  not the wives of the male settlers, and hence the comparative numbers
  of men and women there should not lead us to a similar conclusion as
  to Korea. This part of the problem of Japanese emigration opens up an
  interesting social question, which it is hardly necessary for us to
  discuss here.

Footnote 43:

  From the legal standpoint, the Japanese had no right, outside of the
  treaty settlements, to live or buy land.

Footnote 44:

  On March 31, 1904, there were about 1,234,000 _yen_ of these notes in
  circulation against a reserve of 944,000 _yen_. From the British _C.
  and D. Reports_; _Trade of Korea for the Year 1903_, pp. 7–8.

  The Russians and their sympathizers at Seul have more than once tried,
  though unsuccessfully, to induce the Korean Government to suppress the
  issue of the notes. See pp. 281–284, below.

Footnote 45:

  The nickel coins of Korea have been so debased and so much
  counterfeited that they are at a discount of much more than 100 per
  cent.

Footnote 46:

  The right of building this line was originally granted by the Korean
  Government to Mr. Morse, an American citizen, in March, 1896, who,
  however, sold it to a Japanese syndicate in November, 1898, and handed
  the line over to the latter before it was completed. The whole line
  was in working order in July, 1899. See p. 286 (Article 3), below.

Footnote 47:

  Actual work was begun in August, 1901, but Japan’s want of capital was
  such that by the first of December, 1903, only thirty-one miles from
  both ends had been built. In view of the immense economic and
  strategic importance of the line, the Japanese Government, which had
  for a certain period of time guaranteed 6 per cent. annual interest on
  25,000,000 _yen_, which was fixed as the minimum capital of the
  company, now further promoted its work by liberal measures, so as to
  make it possible for the company to complete the line before the end
  of the present year. Both the Korean and Japanese Imperial Houses own
  shares of the company.

Footnote 48:

  The line passes through the richest and most populous four provinces
  of Korea, which comprise nearly seven tenths of all the houses in the
  Empire, and cover more than five sevenths of the cultivated area of
  the country, with considerable capacity for future cultivation and
  improvement. The road also connects places to which the Koreans flock
  from neighboring regions for the periodical fairs held there. These
  fairs occur six times each month, held alternately in different
  places, besides great annual fairs in large cities. Among the
  thirty-nine stations of this railroad, six will be daily seen holding
  fairs, for which the traffic of passengers and merchandise through the
  road will be considerable. It is safe to say that five sevenths of the
  entire Korean foreign trade belong to the sphere controlled by this
  line, and also that nearly all of this trade is in reality the fast
  growing Japan-Korea trade. The effect of the completion of the line
  upon this trade will be tremendous. See Mr. J. Shinobu’s _Kan Hantō_
  (“The Korean Peninsula”), Tokio, 1901.

Footnote 49:

  The French have an agreement with the Korean Government regarding a
  Seul-Fusan railway. The Seul Government is to build it with its own
  money, and the French to furnish engineers and material. Not a mile of
  rail has been laid by the impecunious Government, and the present war
  is rapidly changing the entire situation. A Japanese railway for
  strategic purposes has already been started from Seul northward.
  Another line, between Seul and Wonsan (Gensan), will also be built by
  the Japanese in the near future.

Footnote 50:

  It was one of the first propositions from Japan to Russia during the
  long negotiations between them which have ended in the present war,
  that Russia should not impede Japan’s possible attempt in the future
  to extend the Fusan-Seul Railway in the manner above described. See p.
  286 (Article 3), below.

Footnote 51:

  A promoter of Russian interests in Korea, and to all intents and
  purposes a semi-official diplomat for Russia, living at Seul and
  observing the political barometer of the Court at close range. Another
  person, perhaps less known to the outside world, but far more
  influential at Court, is a woman, Fräulein Sonntag, a relative of the
  wife of the ex-Russian Minister Waeber at Seul. See p. 280, below.

Footnote 52:

  The _Kokumin_, January 15, 1904.

Footnote 53:

  From an address by Mr. Suerō Katō, of the Department of Agriculture
  and Commerce, who had studied the agriculture of Korea on the ground
  three times in succession.—_Ibid._, May 27, 1904.

Footnote 54:

  Calculated from the data given in the _Kokumin_ for January 8, 1904.
  The official census of Korea for 1902 gives a population of 5,782,806,
  but assuming that there live 145 people per square mile, which is one
  half the density of the population in China, the Korean population
  cannot be much below 12,000,000. The official record of the land under
  cultivation is also untrustworthy for institutional reasons not
  necessary to mention here.

Footnote 55:

  The question of cultivating the waste land in Korea by Japanese
  enterprise, however, has called forth a very delicate situation which
  still awaits the most careful solution. The progress of this situation
  will be a matter of great interest, but it is still too early to
  discuss it. Cf. the _Korea Review_ for July and August, 1904, and
  follow its subsequent numbers.

Footnote 56:

  See the _Tsūshō Isan_ for August 3, 1903, and the _Kokumin_ for
  January 7, 15, and 16, 1904.

Footnote 57:

  The rent is of two kinds: either to be decided anew each year after
  the harvest, or to deliver to the proprietor 50 per cent. of the crop.
  It should always be remembered that a large majority of actual
  cultivators are tenants, the proprietors being limited to a small
  class of rich men, officers, and nobles. The daily wage of the laborer
  on the farm averages 20 _sen_, but it is usually paid in kind, as are
  debts and repayments in many cases. The standard of life of the Korean
  farmer is perhaps lower than that of the Japanese, but apparently not
  less comfortable. The national land tax is said to be mild and largely
  discarded, but the house tax, special tax, local tax, and the like,
  bring up the dues of the farmer sometimes to an unendurable extent.
  The tenant, after paying his rent and other charges, is obliged to
  sell what little rice is left to him at the earliest opportunity, so
  that he henceforth becomes a buyer of rice, and consequently has
  little to buy other articles with, and still less to save, until his
  spring harvest of wheat comes in. Woe betide him when both the rice
  and the wheat crops fail! See the _Kokumin_, January 13 and 14, 1904,
  and the _Tsūshō Isan_ for August 3, 1903, p. 21.

Footnote 58:

  An address by Mr. G. Hirose, a competent eye-witness, in the
  _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No. 48, November, 1903, pp. 15 ff. Official
  census, however, gives only 2806 Japanese in Manchuria (December 30,
  1903). See the _Tsūshō Isan_ for April 13, 1904, pp. 33–38.

Footnote 59:

  Mr. Hirose, already mentioned, refers to a Japanese capitalist who
  started a lumber business in Kirin Province and another who discovered
  coal deposits near Harbin and began to mine them, both of whom, in
  spite of the permits they had received from the Chinese authorities by
  regular process, were driven away arbitrarily under threats of the
  Russian military. The _Dōbun-kwai_, No. 48, pp. 21–22.

Footnote 60:

  The so-called Manchus, the original inhabitants of Manchuria, have
  migrated to China proper, which they conquered during the seventeenth
  century. The present inhabitants of Manchuria are immigrant Chinese,
  whose greater economic capacity has been rapidly developing this
  immensely rich territory.

Footnote 61:

  An official report of the Province of Amur, dated June 22, 1903,
  denies that the actual cost of construction per verst was, as had been
  alleged, 150,000 rubles, but 113,183 rubles. The _Tsūshō Isan_ for
  August 8, 1903, p. 46. A ruble is equivalent to about 51.5 cents.

  In this connection, it is interesting to note in M. Witte’s report to
  the Czar after the former’s tour in the Far East in 1902, that the
  Siberian Railway had cost 758,955,907 rubles, but, with the
  Circum-Baikal section, would cost not less than 1,000,000,000 rubles,
  excluding the salaries of officers, expenses for soldiers, the Pacific
  fleet, harbor work, and the like. The _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No. 42, p.
  30.

Footnote 62:

  According to the “Past and Present of the Siberian Railway,” compiled
  in 1903 by the government committee in charge of the railway, as
  quoted in the _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No. 51, pp. 58–60.

Footnote 63:

  M. Witte’s report of September, 1901, quoted in the _Kokumin_ for
  October 1, 1904.

Footnote 64:

  Consul Miller at Niu-chwang, in the U. S. daily _Consular Reports_,
  February 15, 1904 (No. 1877), p. 8.

Footnote 65:

  The _Tsūshō Isan_, November 25, 1903, pp. 16–18.

Footnote 66:

  The U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, July 30, 1903.

Footnote 67:

  See the _Shiberiya oyobi Manshū_ (“Siberia and Manchuria”) Tokio,
  1904, compiled by T. Kawakami, special agent of the Foreign Office of
  Japan, who was sent to Siberia and Northern Manchuria to investigate
  economic and military conditions there, pp. 94, 119–121, 124, 138.

Footnote 68:

  For the relative advantages of the Manchurian Railway and the Amur
  River, see the U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, August 5 and October 5,
  1903, and January 19, 1904.

Footnote 69:

  The Russia-China trade began more than 250 years ago. Before 1860, it
  was carried wholly on land, and its balance was nearly even. Since
  1860, when sea trade from Odessa was opened, the progress of this
  trade has been slower than the general foreign trade of China, and its
  balance has been heavily against Russia (6,702,000 against 45,945,000
  rubles in 1900). More than half of the Russian imports into China
  consists of cotton fabrics, and over 80 per cent. of the exports from
  China to Russia are teas. Russia’s share in the entire foreign trade
  of China has also fallen from 4.6 per cent. in 1899 to 4.4 per cent.
  in 1900, 2.6 per cent. in 1901, and 2.3 per cent. in 1902, as compared
  with the growing share of the trade by Japan amounting to 14.2 per
  cent., 15.9 per cent., 15.7 per cent., and 18.4 per cent., in those
  respective years. Of the Russian share of 2.6 per cent. in 1901,
  Russian Manchuria occupied only 0.6 per cent. See the _Tsūshō Isan_,
  July 8, 1903, pp. 1–4; T. Yoshida’s _Shina Bōyeki Jijō_ (Trade
  Conditions in China), Tokio, 1902, pp. 128–129, etc. For the gold
  values of the figures up to 1903, see the British _D. and C. Reports_,
  annual series, No. 3280.

Footnote 70:

  From Russian official figures quoted in the _Tsūshō Isan_, November
  25, 1903.

Footnote 71:

  The reader is recommended to the reports of the United States Consul
  Miller at Niu-chwang, particularly those which appeared in the daily
  _Consular Reports_ for January 21 and 24, and February 5, 1904 (Nos.
  1856, 1858, and 1869). Reference should also be made to the ex-British
  Consul at Niu-chwang, Alexander Hosie’s _Manchuria_, London, 1901 (new
  edition, New York, 1904).

  The resources of Eastern Manchuria are well described in the _Tsūshō
  Isan_, October 13, 1903, and those of Northern Manchuria in the
  _Shiberiya oyobi Manshū_, Tokio, 1904, compiled by the Foreign Office
  of Japan, pp. 427–485.

Footnote 72:

  The present population of Manchuria is differently estimated between
  the limits of 6.5 and 15 millions. Probably there are more than 10
  millions. Immigration was said to have been progressing rapidly under
  the Chinese rule.

  It is noteworthy that Siberia, with a larger area than Manchuria,
  contains only about 8,000,000 inhabitants. The productive capacity of
  the Manchurian population must be measured, however, not only by their
  larger numbers, but also by their far superior economic training.

Footnote 73:

  The _Tsūshō Isan_ for June 23, 1903, pp. 34–35. Pood = 36.112 lbs.;
  ruble = 51.5 cents.

Footnote 74:

  Under this and other differential measures the commercial importance
  of Vladivostok is said to be fast passing away. Local merchants made a
  strong plea of their case before M. Witte when he traveled in the East
  in 1902, but on his return he reported to the Czar that the interests
  of the Empire demanded a large sacrifice at Vladivostok for the sake
  of Dalny.

Footnote 75:

  The effect of the new duties levied on tea at other places than Dalny
  is seen in the following comparative table. The figures for 1902 are
  taken from the U. S. _Monthly Summary_ for January, 1904, p. 2420, and
  those for 1903 have been converted from data given in the British _D.
  and C. Reports_, Annual Series No. 3280.

  In 1902, the Russian Empire took 882,893 out of the 1,519,211 _piculs_
  of tea exported from China, while in 1903 the corresponding amounts
  were 1,010,580 out of 1,677,530. The distribution of the imported teas
  to the Russian Empire, according to the routes, was as follows:—

                                      1902             1903
       _Via_ Odessa and Batum   206,699 _piculs_ 200,391 _piculs_
       _Via_ Kiakhta            403,648          244,668
       To Russian Manchuria     272,546          191,679
       To Port Arthur and Dalny                  373,842

  We presume that most of the teas exported to Russian Manchuria went
  through Niu-chwang. The table plainly shows an increased importation
  at Dalny at the expense of all other points. It is not known how much
  of the 373,842 _piculs_ imported at Dalny and Port Arthur was
  reshipped to other ports not mentioned here. (_Picul_ = 133⅓ lbs. av.)

Footnote 76:

  See the _Tsūshō Isan_, April 18 and August 3, 1903, and the U. S.
  daily _Consular Reports_, January 21, 1904 (No. 1856). Reduction
  apparently had not reached its minimum point. It was unknown whether
  Dalny handled much of the Manchurian export trade.

Footnote 77:

  The _Kokumin_, March 7, 1903. The ex-Japanese Consul at Niu-chwang,
  Mr. K. Tanabe, doubts that Dalny will completely displace Niu-chwang
  as an exporting centre. The latter is geographically the nature outlet
  for the grain from the Liao Valley, and, in winter, the handling of
  this product is apt to be done more at Mukden than at Dalny, the
  latter becoming in that case a mere port of transit. Moreover,
  mercantile customs differ so much at Niu-chwang and Dalny that it is
  not possible that the conservative Chinese merchants should readily
  transfer their business from the one place to the other. See Tanabe’s
  conversation in the _Tōyō Keizai Zasshi_ (“Oriental Economist”), No.
  244 (September 25, 1902), p. 16.

Footnote 78:

  The central distributing station at Vladivostok has a capacity of
  600,000 poods, and the one to be built at Dalny will hold 1,500,000
  poods, to which a special tank steamer will bring oil from Batum.—The
  _Tsūshō Isan_, May 3, 1903. Americans tried to build warehouses at
  Dalny, but were opposed by Russians. The importation of American
  kerosenes at Niu-chwang decreased from 3,172,000 gallons ($410,500) in
  1901 to 603,000 gallons ($77,000) in 1902, and the decrease was in no
  small measure due to the Russian competition at Dalny.

Footnote 79:

  The _Tsūshō Isan_, October 23, 1903, pp. 1–21; the U. S. daily
  _Consular Reports_, May 7, July 16, and August 28, 1903, and February
  23, 1904.

Footnote 80:

  See Mr. Miller’s reports in the U. S. daily _Consular Reports_ for
  January 21 and 24, and February 5 and 6, 1904 (Nos. 1856 1858, 1859,
  and 1870).

  Mr. James J. Hill, in a recent speech at Minneapolis, said that his
  great system of transportation, by taking advantage of all conditions,
  and by carrying full loads both ways, had been able to make a freight
  rate of forty cents a hundred pounds of flour to the Orient, or one
  mill per ton-mile. According to him, the effect of the growing
  exportation of wheat from the Pacific coast to the East seems to have
  caused an advance in its price at Minneapolis of five to seven cents
  per bushel. In view of these facts, the possible exclusion of American
  flour from Manchuria would not be without serious effects, especially
  if we consider Mr. Hill’s opinion that the success of Mr.
  Chamberlain’s financial scheme would result in enabling Manitoba to
  supply all the wheat needed in Great Britain, thus leaving in the
  United States a large surplus of grain, for which other markets would
  have to be developed. See the American _Review of Reviews_ for
  February, 1904.

Footnote 81:

  The U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, February 15, 1904 (No. 877), p.
  11.

Footnote 82:

  The U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, January 19, 1904 (No. 1854). Also
  see _ibid._, April 4, 1903.

Footnote 83:

  British Consul Hosie’s report, the _British Parliamentary Papers_
  (“Blue Books”), _China, No. 1 (1900)_, p. 154.

Footnote 84:

  See U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, February 15, 1904 (No. 1877), and
  the _Tsūshō Isan_, October 8, 1903, pp. 42–43.

Footnote 85:

  The _North American Review_ for May, 1904, pp. 683–684.

Footnote 86:

  For the laborious process of obtaining permits to carry on business
  only for short terms in these great sites for future cities, see the
  _Tsūshō Isan_, September 18 (pp. 40–41) and November 23 (pp. 39–40),
  1903.

  At Dalny, however, Russia has welcomed the coöperation of all
  nationalities in its development, and has been rather disappointed at
  their comparative indifference. See Mr. F. Nakasawa’s conversation in
  the _Tōyō Keizai Zasshi_ (“Oriental Economist”), No. 262 (March 15,
  1903), p. 13. The reasons for this modification at Dalny of the
  customary Russian policy are plain, for the port must be developed as
  rapidly as possible before the Russians can absolutely control its
  trade. Thus the importance of Dalny as a trading port brings to
  conspicuous prominence the universal contradiction of the Russian
  commercial policy in East Asia. Russia would exclude other trading
  nations from her possessions in order to control the trade, but is at
  the same time unable to develop it without either the coöperation of
  other people or some unnatural devices.

Footnote 87:

  See pp. 313 ff., below.

Footnote 88:

  On March 27, 1904, Russia declared that Niu-chwang was under her
  martial law. This eventuality had been fully expected by Japan. The
  gravity of the situation, however, may be understood, when we remember
  that the Russian law of neutrality considers food as among contraband
  goods, so that the supply of millet, beans, and bean-cakes from
  Manchuria to Japan was henceforth completely closed, until the
  Russians evacuated Niu-chwang in July.

Footnote 89:

  These concessions were acquired by the Russians in 1896 when the
  Korean King was still living in the Russian Legation in Seul. About
  May, 1903, after more than seven years’ inactivity, the Russians began
  to cut timber on a large scale along the Yalu River, and subsequently
  made extensive improvements at Yongampu at the mouth of the river. The
  political features of this event do not concern us here. See pp. 263,
  289 ff., 318 ff., below.

Footnote 90:

  Kaiserling is a successor to the two other Russians who, one after the
  other, had been engaged in the whale fishery on the Japan Sea for a
  long period of time. It was Kaiserling, however, who extended the
  work, made an agreement with the Korean Government, and was turning
  the business into an apparently successful enterprise. In 1901, his
  two vessels caught about eighty whales, which number was in 1902
  increased to 300.—The _Tsūshō Isan_, September 28, 1903, p. 34.

Footnote 91:

  Mr. J. Sloat Fassett’s article in the American _Review of Reviews_,
  for February, 1904, p. 174.

  In the winter of 1902–3, ice at Dalny was six inches thick.—Mr. F.
  Nakasawa in the _Tōyō Keizai Zasshi_ (“Oriental Economist”), No. 262
  (March 15, 1903), p. 13.

Footnote 92:

  It is well known that at several times in history kingdoms have been
  built which extended over both sides of the present boundaries between
  Korea and Manchuria.

Footnote 93:

  It is noticeable that the Russian diplomatic historian already
  referred to gives as a reason for the desirability of placing Korea
  under Russian protection the need of safe-guarding the frontiers of
  Russian territories adjacent to Korea.—The _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No.
  49, p. 8.

Footnote 94:

  The Bay of Masampo, generally so-called, which lies between the Island
  of Koji and the Korean coast, is said to be deep and broad enough to
  hold the largest fleet, sheltered from winds from all directions.
  Several islands with sufficiently wide passages between them form a
  splendid gate to the bay, while the western extremity of the latter
  may be walked across, when the tide is low, from the Koji to the
  coast.

  As to the Masampo reach or inlet, specifically, which is the head of
  the gulf, “its entrance, five cables wide, named the Gate, is
  perfectly free from dangers, and is available for all classes of
  vessels. On either side are treeless hills, bare in winter, but in
  summer covered with grass; these hills, near the entrance, <DW72>
  steeply to the water’s edge. The general depth over the reach is seven
  fathoms, but it shallows gradually as the town of Masampo is neared,
  until at one mile from the town the depth is four fathoms....
  Anchorage may be had anywhere in Masampo reach, according to draught;
  a depth of three fathoms being found at half a mile from the town, and
  six to seven fathoms at two miles below it.”—The _Sailing Directions
  for Japan, Korea, and Adjacent Seas_, published by the British
  Admiralty, London, 1904, pp. 114–115. Masampo is the best but not the
  only good naval harbor on the southern coast of Korea.

Footnote 95:

  In 1861, when some Russian marines landed here and took virtual
  possession of the islands, Awa Katsu, who was then one of the officers
  appointed by the Yedo government to study the possibility of
  organizing military forces after the Western model, succeeded in
  setting the British Minister against the Russian Minister about the
  Tsushima affair. Russia was obliged to abandon the islands. See the
  _Katsu Kaishū_ (a life of Katsu), Tokio, 1899, iii. pp. 57–59.

Footnote 96:

  It is interesting to hear that Russian school text-books enumerate
  Korea and Manchuria among the Russian spheres of influence.—A letter
  from Tōsuisei, dated St. Petersburg, February 13, 1900, in the
  _Kokumin_, April 1, 1900.

Footnote 97:

  It is remarkable how little the spirit of Japan’s policy, which the
  writer has attempted to express in this sentence, is understood among
  the people here. A vast majority of people, not excluding recognized
  writers and speakers on the East, seem to ascribe to Japan certain
  territorial designs, particularly in Korea. It is not remembered that
  Japan was the first country to recognize the independence of Korea,
  the cause of which also cost Japan a war with China. The present war
  with Russia is waged largely on the same issue, for it is to Japan’s
  vital interest to keep Korea independent. From this it hardly follows
  that Japan should occupy Korea in order not to allow her to fall into
  the hands of another Power. If Korea is really unable to stand on her
  feet, the solution of the difficulty does not, in Japan’s view,
  consist in possessing her, but in making her independence real by
  developing her resources and reorganizing and strengthening her
  national institutions. It is in this work that Japan’s assistance was
  offered and accepted. It would be as difficult for any impartial
  student not to see the need of such assistance as to confuse it with
  annexation. It would, however, be entirely legitimate to regard the
  task as extremely difficult and dangerously prone to abuse. Further,
  see pp. 366 ff., below.

Footnote 98:

  Russian exports for 1900–2 are classified as follows (1000 rubles as
  unit):—

            Food-stuffs Raw material Animals Manufactures  Total
       1900     381,174      269,806  17,902       19,553 688,435
       1901     430,955      256,697  20,224       21,939 729,815
       1902     526,189      258,267  21,558       19,263 825,277

  It is seen that the exportation of food-stuffs was the largest in
  value and increasing, while that of manufactured articles was the
  smallest (2.5 per cent.) and, to say the least, stationary. Imports
  were as follows:—

            Food-stuffs Raw material Animals Manufactures  Total
       1900      79,844      307,402   1,136      183,682 572,064
       1901      84,349      288,107   1,495      158,993 532,944
       1902      81,409      295,483   1,403      148,800 527,095

  The importation of manufactures decreased, but also that of raw
  material did not increase, while, as shown above, the exportation of
  manufactures was slight and stationary. Figures have been taken from
  the _Tsūshō Isan_ for November 25, 1903, which drew them from Russian
  official sources.

  It is interesting to note the unfavorable conditions of the foreign
  trade of Russia’s ally, France, in U. S. Consul Atwell’s report in the
  daily _Consular Reports_ for February 24, 1904 (No. 1884), who quotes
  from Georges Blondel.

Footnote 99:

  See the Supplementary Note to this chapter on pages 61–64.

Footnote 100:

  Documents of that time clearly indicate that the discovery of gold in
  California and the westward expansion of the American nation, as well
  as the growing prospects of the China trade and the increasing
  application of steam in navigation, were the motives which prompted
  the United States Government to open negotiations with Japan in 1853.

Footnote 101:

  To-day there seem to be about 84,500 public schools in Russia, of
  which 40,000 are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education
  [compared with 30,157 public and private schools in Japan in 1902].
  Toward the maintenance of the 40,000 schools, the ministry
  appropriates only about $2,000,000, or a little over one eighth of the
  annual cost. The teachers number 172,000 [in Japan, 126,703, in 1902],
  and pupils and students, 4,568,763 [in Japan in 1902, 5,469,419].
  7,250,000 children of school age are without any education [while in
  Japan, in 1902, the ratio of attendance to the number of children of
  school age was 95.80 per cent. for boys and 87.00 per cent. for girls,
  or, on the average, 91.57 per cent.]. See the U. S. daily _Consular
  Reports_ for February 8 and March 4, 1902 (Nos. 1871 and 1892), [and
  the _Kwampō_, April 8, 1904].

Footnote 102:

  As an evidence for this striking state of things the reader is
  referred to Dr. E. J. Dillon’s article in the American _Review of
  Reviews_ for October, 1904, pp. 449–454. The whole subject should be
  more carefully studied than it seems to have been thus far.

Footnote 103:

  “The whole northern part of _Asia Minor_, according to the treaty
  between Russia and Turkey, is now placed under such conditions that
  Russian capitalists have the area open to them, to the exclusion of
  foreign enterprise. A situation analogous is found in _Persia_, where
  the entire northern portion is acknowledged to be under the exclusive
  economic influence of Russia.”—Consul Greener at Vladivostok, in the
  U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, April 22, 1903 (No. 1627).

Footnote 104:

  For example, the normal freight per ton from Russia to Eastern Siberia
  would be about twenty-one rubles, while that from Japan or Shanghai is
  three or four rubles. If Russian goods were sold to the artificial
  exclusion of articles exported from nearer countries, the consumer’s
  burden would be greatly increased.

Footnote 105:

  Count Cassini, the present Russian Ambassador at Washington, wrote, in
  the _North American Review_ for May, 1904: “... But let us suppose for
  argument’s sake that Russia, triumphant in this war, finds herself
  dominant in Manchuria. Japan, her enemy, could look for no favors; she
  could not expect to find encouragement for the importation of her
  manufactures” (p. 688).

Footnote 106:

  Continuing, the Count stated: “But Manchuria would require many things
  that Russia could not supply, or supply at figures reasonable enough
  to create a market. In Russia, agriculture is, comparatively speaking,
  more important than manufacturing, and those goods which are made in
  my country are not such as Manchuria would need. Russia, too, would be
  obliged to use the railway with its high freight tariffs....”—_Ibid._

Footnote 107:

  One can seldom find a more outspoken confession of a diplomacy
  consisting of a series of deliberate falsehoods than the chapters on
  the Russian relations with China, Korea, and Japan, in a diplomatic
  history by a Russian writer, as translated in the _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_,
  Nos. 45, 46, 48, 49, and 50 (August, September, November, and
  December, 1903, and January, 1904).

Footnote 108:

  The Russian diplomatic historian to whom frequent reference has been
  made frankly says that the feebleness and internal disorder of China
  are welcome conditions for the expansion of Russian influence in the
  Far East, and that it would be the height of folly to displace the
  weak China with a colonial possession of a European power.—The
  _Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No. 48, p. 36.

Footnote 109:

  See p. 55, note 1, above.

Footnote 110:

  The _Shiberiya oyobi Manshū_, pp. 221–223.

Footnote 111:

  The _Shiberiya oyobi Manshū_, pp. 223–225, 490–495.

Footnote 112:

  The _Tsūshō Isan_, July 8, 1903, p. 4.

Footnote 113:

  The New York _Evening Post_, January 20, 1903.

Footnote 114:

  The U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, April 22, 1903 (No. 1627).

Footnote 115:

  The U. S. daily _Consular Reports_, February 24, 1904 (No. 1884).

Footnote 116:

  The _North American Review_, May, 1904, p. 688.




                               CHAPTER I
                RETROCESSION OF THE LIAO-TUNG PENINSULA


The way in which the momentous _issues_ already discussed in the
introductory chapter have been at work and have steadily culminated in
the present conflict is with unusual clearness and in the most
instructive manner illustrated by the _historic events_ which led up to
the outbreak of the war. The study of these events also appears
essential for an intelligent understanding of the situation, for, in
this crisis, as in many another in history, the contestants do not seem
to be always conscious of even the more important issues at stake, while
the events, in their main outlines, are patent to every one. The former
may be found only by an analysis of facts, some of which are obscure,
but the latter are narrated dramatically, from time to time as they
occur or are published, in the press and in the diplomatic
correspondence, so that it is little wonder that the events are often
taken for the causes, even the significance, of the supreme fact to
which they seem to point. The student should investigate the issues if
he would know the meaning of the war, but, if he wishes to see something
of the conscious attitude which the belligerents take toward the
situation, perhaps no more profitable way can be found than in a study
of the events through which the issues have been writing history.

The conflict of Russia and Japan was foreshadowed already in the middle
of the past century, when the former began to claim some of the Kurile
Islands and the whole of Sakhalien, upon parts of which Japan had long
exercised vague sovereign rights.[117] Presently, in 1858, Muravieff
“Amurski” succeeded in creating a common proprietary right with China
over the vast territory lying between the Ussuri River and the sea.[118]
The same territory was, only two years later, definitively annexed[119]
to Russia through the skillful diplomacy of Ignatieff, Russian Minister
at Peking, who, taking advantage of China’s defeat at the hands of the
allied forces of England and France, had won the favor of the Chinese
Government by acting as mediator between it and the allies. The Eastern
naval headquarters of Russia, which had been transferred from
Peterpavlofsk in Kamchatka to Nicolaiefsk at the mouth of the Amur, was
now again moved further south to Vladivostok, founded in 1860, at the
southern end of the new territory. No sooner did the remote but certain
pressure from the expanding northern Power begin to be felt in Japan
than, in 1861, a Russian man-of-war took possession of the Japanese
islands of Tsushima in the Korean straits, from which it withdrew only
at the instance of the British Minister, Sir Rutherford Alcock.[120]
Half a dozen years after, the island of Sakhalien was placed under a
common possession between Russia and Japan, while, in 1875, the island
was surrendered to Russia, Japan receiving in return the chain of
sterile Chishima Islands (the Kuriles).[121] This brought the presence
of Russia still nearer home to Japan than before. On the other hand,
Russia seemed to have only begun her ambitious career in Eastern Asia,
for she could hardly be expected to be forever satisfied with her naval
headquarters at Vladivostok, a station which, situated as it was at the
southern extremity of her Oriental dominion, was so completely ice-bound
during a large part of each year that her fleet was obliged to winter in
Japanese harbors.

Then followed a comparatively long period of inactivity on the part of
Russia. When, however, in 1891, she finally resolved to build the
trans-Siberian Railway, the inadequacy of Vladivostok, not only as the
Pacific naval harbor of the Russian Empire, but also as the terminus of
the great railroad, became evident. To Russia a southern expansion
toward an ice-free outlet seemed now a necessity. For the realization of
this desire, an opportunity presented itself in a striking form, in
1895, at the end of the Chinese-Japanese war.

In order to obtain a clear understanding of this situation, it is
necessary to return to the outbreak of hostilities and thence trace the
evolution of Chinese diplomacy up to their close. At the unexpected
dispatch of large forces by Japan to Korea, in June, 1894, the Chinese
Government appealed to some foreign Ministers at Peking to bring
pressure to bear upon Japan to withdraw her troops from the Peninsula.
The Russian Minister is said to have observed that Russia would not be
prepared to organize an armed coercion until Japan endeavored to
exercise actual control over the Korean Kingdom, but might undertake to
tender friendly advice to Japan to withdraw. England was reluctant, but
as an appeal was again made to the Powers, she took the lead in
persuading others to join in a concert to stay Japan’s hand in Korea.
The plan was, however, frustrated by the emphatic refusal of Germany to
consider it. An ineffectual counsel was then made to Japan by a few of
the Powers individually, not to embark upon a war against China.[122] A
war, nevertheless, ensued, with a rare success on the part of Japan.
During the course of hostilities, China seems to have more than
once[123] avowed her impotence and requested the Powers to intervene,
until her repeated reverses on land and the well-nigh complete
annihilation of her northern squadron brought her to such straits that
the friendly Powers could no longer remain inactive. Japan also
intimated her willingness to negotiate for peace. After the envoys whom
China had sent with insufficient powers had been twice refused by Japan,
Li Hung-chang, later to be joined by his son-in-law, Li Ching-fang,
arrived with plenary powers at Shimonoseki, on March 19, 1895, where he
was received by the Japanese Plenipotentiaries, Count Itō, Premier, and
Viscount Mutsu, Foreign Minister. It appears, however, that China had
already signified to certain Powers her suspicion that Japan desired the
cession of a territory on the Chinese mainland. Before, therefore, Li
Hung-chang left the Chinese shores, the German Minister at Tokio was
instructed by his government to warn the Japanese Foreign Office that
certain Powers had been contemplating assent to China’s appeal to
interfere, and that the demand for a cession of territory on the
continent would be particularly calculated to provoke such an
intervention.[124]

It was under these circumstances that negotiations were opened between
the Chinese and Japanese Plenipotentiaries on March 20. It is
unnecessary here to recount the story of an abortive attempt made on
Li’s life by a fanatic, and of the consequent armistice for twenty days.
At Li’s recovery, the Japanese terms for peace were proposed on April 1,
which with amendments became the basis of the final Treaty[125] signed
at Shimonoseki on April 17. It provided, among other things, for the
absolute independence of Korea, the cession to Japan of the Liao-tung
Peninsula, Formosa, and the Pescadores, and an indemnity of two hundred
million _taels_. Of the ceded territories, the Liao-tung being situated,
as it were, in a position to hold a key at once to Peking, Manchuria,
and Korea, its cession to Japan was probably calculated, from the
latter’s point of view, first, to render any renewed attempt of China to
dominate Korea impossible, and, secondly, to establish an effective
barrier against the southern expansion of Russia.[126]

Naturally, the progress of the peace negotiations had been watched with
keen interest by the European Powers. Particularly alert was Russia,
whose press deprecated so early as March 31 the alleged intention of
Japan to secure territory on the mainland, and which, as soon as Li
Hung-chang communicated to her early in April the terms proposed by
Japan and appealed to her to interfere, discerned in those terms a great
turning-point of her own career in the East. She must at once have
realized the grave danger to the entire future of her Eastern policy
from Japan’s occupation of the Liao-tung Peninsula, as well as the
immense advantages which her own possession of the same territory would
confer upon herself. Nor did the Korean independence, which the new
treaty secured, fail to be interpreted by the Russian press as an
exclusive protectorate to be exercised by Japan over the Kingdom.
“Russia,” wrote the _Novoe Vremya_ about April 20, “cannot permit the
protectorate over Korea which Japan has secured for herself by the
conditions of the treaty. If the single port of Port Arthur remain in
possession of Japan, Russia will severely suffer in the material
interest and in the prestige of a Great Power.”[127] It was just the
time to intervene. China had shown herself impotent, and had appealed
for intervention, and Japan was an exhausted victor. By one clever
stroke Russia might coerce the latter and ingratiate herself with the
former. She would, however, perhaps have thought twice before she acted,
had it not been for the active assistance rendered to her by France and
Germany. At a council, it is said, Russian naval and military
authorities concluded that Russia alone could not successfully combat
Japan, which, however, might be coerced if Russia coöperated with
France. An active communication of views now ensued between the Foreign
Offices of St. Petersburg, Berlin, Paris, and London. The diplomatic
correspondence of the day is still withheld from the public view, but it
is well-known that France readily acceded to the Russian desire for a
joint intervention, and Germany suddenly changed her former attitude
toward Japan and allied herself with the two intervening Powers; while
Great Britain, which had more than once acted in favor of China, altered
her course to the opposite direction by declining to admit that Japan’s
terms of peace were prejudicial to her own interests. The reasons avowed
by Germany and France for their assistance to Russia would seem to be
rather unconvincing, unless one takes for granted the existence of
certain unexpressed motives for the act. Germany claimed to have found
in the terms of peace a future menace to the political and economical
interests of Europe, for those terms “would constitute a political
preponderance of Japan over China,” to use the language of “an evidently
inspired article” of the _Cologne Gazette_, “and would exercise a
determining influence on the development of China’s economic condition,
and of the sway of Japan in that country. From this it is concluded that
Japan is endeavoring to post herself as a sentry, as it were, before all
the chief important routes of China. As Japan commands, by Port Arthur
and Wei-hai-Wei, the approach to the Yellow Sea, and, by Formosa and the
Pescadores, the chief commercial route to China, it is taken to be
desirous of encircling her with a firm girdle, in order, if necessary,
to seclude her completely from the world. The European Powers,
therefore, wish to ward off in time any steps prejudicial to their
interests.”[128] Nor did the reasons brought forward by France seem to
be more germane to her own interests than those of Germany were to hers.
The _Débats_ wrote, on April 31, that all the clauses on the occupation
of continental territory were impossible for Europe to recognize.
Moreover, Port Arthur, with a strip of territory round it in the hands
of the Japanese, would be a menace for the independence of Korea, as
much as for the security of Peking. The _Temps_ also said that Japan’s
predominance over China, which would be the ultimate result of the
arrangement, was “a constant menace for the interests of Europe. It was
a serious blow dealt at the rights of the immediate adjacent Powers....
A European concert was now a duty toward civilization.” Perhaps it is
safe to say that, so far as France was concerned, her desire to oblige
her political ally was a more real ground for her coöperation with the
latter than any other presented in her press. As for Germany, her
Foreign Minister then remarked, it is said, that Japan had never
requited the favors Germany had done her during the war, but had, on the
contrary, deliberately concluded with China a treaty containing
provisions not only excessively favorable to Japan, but also prejudicial
to the political and economic interests of Europe. This remark, again,
hardly explains the suddenly changed attitude of Germany. Perhaps it is
well to surmise that there existed deeper and more complex diplomatic
reasons, upon which it would be idle here to speculate. The declination
of Great Britain to join in the concert may more easily be accounted
for. China, which she had at first favored, had not only been inclining
toward Russia, but had shown herself by her incompetency less worthy of
trust than the ambitious Japan. The latter had also secured in the
treaty certain commercial and industrial privileges in South China which
would be even more advantageous to Great Britain than to Japan, while,
on the other hand, the former had little reason to suppose that Japan’s
retention of the Liao-tung was designed to imperil China and Korea. On
the contrary, the presence of Japan at the strategic position on the
mainland might prove an effective check upon Russia, whose cause Great
Britain was the least inclined to advocate. She therefore stood aloof
from the joint intervention, and her conduct provoked a bitter
resentment in the Russian and French press.[129]

The plan of intervention seems to have matured between Russia, France,
and Germany by April 20, and, on April 23, their representatives at
Tokio separately presented brief notes at the Foreign Office. These
notes, accompanied as they were by the verbal profession of each of the
Governments, particularly the German, of its friendly motive in the act,
intimated that Japan’s retention of the territory was considered by them
as not only imperiling the Chinese Capital, but also making the Korean
independence illusory, and, consequently, prejudicial to the permanent
peace of the Far East.[130] The treaty of Shimonoseki had been signed on
April 17, and the exchange of its ratifications fixed for May 8. The
Japanese Government had to answer the three Powers within the fifteen
days between April 23 and May 8, for, whatever its decision regarding
the Liao-tung, it would be unwise to postpone the ratification of the
treaty with China.[131] In the mean time, the Eastern fleets of the
three Powers were augmented and concentrated, and made ready, if need
be, for an immediate and concerted action, Russia going even so far as
to prepare the army contingents in the Amur region for quick
mobilization. Unknown as it was how thoroughly the Powers were
determined, in case Japan should refuse to consider their counsel, to
appeal to force of arms, none the less real was their idea of coercion,
as well as the exhaustion of Japan’s resources. On the other hand, the
common interests of Japan, Great Britain, and the United States had not
developed to such an extent as to justify their united resistance
against the intervening Powers. Japan seems to have complied with the
Powers’ wishes so far as to agree to retrocede the Liao-tung save the
small peninsula of Kin-chow containing Port Arthur, but the Powers
declined for evident reasons to accede to the proposed compromise. The
British Foreign Minister also urged Japan to make to the
susceptibilities of Europe all concessions compatible with her dignity
and her permanent interests.[132] The Japanese Government, after holding
repeated conference before the Throne and with military councilors,[133]
definitely resolved, on May 4, to relinquish, for an additional monetary
consideration from China,[134] all of the Liao-tung. Evidently time was
too limited and the occasion too inopportune for Japan successfully to
induce China to pledge not to alienate in the future any part of the
retroceded territory to another Power. On May 10, the entire nation of
Japan beheld with deep emotions the simultaneous publication of the
treaty of Shimonoseki, which had been ratified in its original form, and
of a special Imperial decree countersigned by all the Ministers of the
Cabinet, announcing that a desire to insure a permanent repose of the
Orient had compelled Japan to go to war, and that the same desire had
now prompted the three Powers to tender to Japan their present friendly
counsel, which the Emperor, for the sake of peace, had accepted.[135]

The historical significance of this memorable incident deserves special
emphasis. It is not too much to say that with it Eastern Asiatic history
radically changed its character, for it marks the beginning of a new
era, in which the struggle is waged no longer among the Oriental nations
themselves, but between sets of interests and principles which
characterize human progress at its present stage, and which are
represented by the greatest Powers of the world. China’s position as a
dominant exclusive force was no sooner overthrown in Korea than it was
replaced by that of another power of a like policy and with aggressive
tendencies. Moreover, the area opened to the advance of Russia covered
not only Korea, but also Northern China and beyond, and the new
aggressor was the very power which had thirty years before created a
restless feeling among the Japanese, by extending toward them through
Primorsk and Sakhalien its already enormous contiguous dominion. The
influence of Russia was now brought face to face with that of Japan,
each with a promise to extend against, and perhaps to clash with, the
other. With the movement of Russia there traveled from Europe to East
Asia her sympathetic relations with France, while against this practical
alliance stood the increasing common interests and sympathies of Japan,
Great Britain, and the United States; Germany remaining as a free lance
between the two groups of Powers. This remarkable accession, in both
area and agents, of the new activity in the East was heralded in, to all
appearance, not gradually, but with a sudden sweep. And gravely ominous
was its opening scene, representing at once a pretended good-will toward
a feeble empire and an armed coercion of a proud nation whom coercion
would only stimulate to greater ambition.

It now remains for us to interpret the effects wrought upon Japan by the
intervention of the three Powers, for the sentiment of the nation seems
to be so universally and persistently misunderstood as to have caused
even some of the natives to misconstrue their own feelings. It is
generally supposed that the conduct of the Powers in depriving Japan of
her prize of victory excited in her breast a deep feeling of revenge,
but this view seems to evince too slight an understanding of the
characteristics of the nation. Also, the prevailing sense of pity
manifested by friendly foreigners toward Japan for her alleged
misfortune appears entirely misplaced, for, on the contrary, she has
derived an inestimable benefit from the experience. Let us explain. The
most obvious lesson drawn by the best minds of Japan, and unconsciously
but deeply shared by the entire nation, was neither that the Powers were
acting upon a principle altogether different from their professed
motive, for that was too plain to every one; nor that she must some day
humiliate the very Powers which had brought coercion upon her, because
it was well known that their self-interest had demanded it, as hers
would, were she in their place. Japan suddenly awoke to an absorbing
desire which left little room for the question of national revenge. It
became to her as clear as daylight that the new position she had
acquired in the Orient by her victory over China could be maintained,
and even her independence must be guarded, only by an armament powerful
enough to give her a voice among the first Powers of the world. If she
would not retire into herself, and finally cease to exist, she must
compete with the greatest nations, not only in the arts of peace,[136]
but also in those of war. Moreover, a far vaster conflict than she had
ever known in her history, excepting the Mongol invasion of the
thirteenth century, was seen to be awaiting her. It is perhaps
characteristic of modern Japan that she scarcely has time to breathe.
The only course to save her seemed to be, now as at any other recent
crisis of her life, to go forward and become equal to the new, expanding
situation. As soon as her supremacy in the East was assured, Japan thus
found herself confronted with a task hitherto almost unpremeditated, and
henceforth began an enormous extension of her military forces,[137] as
well as a redoubled activity in all other lines of national
progress.[138]

What is less obvious, but still more important, is—it is questionable if
there is in the entire range of Japan’s national life another point less
understood abroad but more essential for an insight into the present and
future of the Extreme Orient than this—the increased enthusiasm of Japan
in her ardent effort to strengthen her position in the world by basing
her international conduct upon the fairest and best-tried principles of
human progress. The effort is not free from occasional errors, but the
large issue grows ever clearer in Japan’s mind. A study of her past
would seem to convince one with overwhelming evidence that her historic
training has produced in Japan moral and material characteristics
eminently fit for the pursuit of such a policy. However that may be, the
subsequent evolution of her interests at home and abroad seems, by a
fortunate combination of circumstances, to have irrevocably committed
her to this course; for not only does a common policy along these lines
draw her and the Anglo-Saxon nations closer together, but it is therein
also that the vital promise of her future seems to lie.[139] And it may
be added, the consciousness of this powerful unity of moral and material
life seems to have infused a thrilling new force into that historic love
of country of the Japanese nation.[139] It is to the intervention of
1895 and the situation that ensued that Japan owes the hastening of all
these results.

-----

Footnote 117:

  See the negotiations of 1852, 1859, and 1862, and the treaties of 1855
  and 1867, between Russia and Japan, regarding the Kuriles and
  Sakhalien. The _Tō-A Kwankei Tokushu Jōyaku Isan_ (a collection of
  special treaties relating to Eastern Asia, compiled by the Tō-A
  Dōbun-kivai, Tokio, 1904. Cloth, 4^o, xiv + xii + 812 + 70; hereafter
  abbreviated as _Tokushu Jōyaku_), pp. 1–8. This work, which is in
  Japanese and Chinese, is by far the most complete collection of the
  treaties and conventions concluded between Japan, China, and Korea,
  and other Powers. It also contains historical notes explaining the
  origin and nature of many important agreements.

Footnote 118:

  Treaty of Aigun, May 16, 1858, Article I.—_Ibid._, pp. 200–202
  (Chinese); W. F. Mayers’s _Treaties between the Empire of China and
  Foreign Powers_, 3d edition, Shanghai, 1901, p. 100 (French).

Footnote 119:

  Treaty of Peking, November 14, 1860, Article I.—_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp.
  202–203 (Japanese); Mayers, p. 105 (French).

Footnote 120:

  See p. 51, note 1, above.

Footnote 121:

  See _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 5–14. See a Russian view of these affairs in
  the _Dōbun-kwai_, No. 50 (January, 1904), pp. 25–30. See also Z.
  Nakamura, _Chishima Karafuto Shinryaku-shi_ (history of Russian
  aggression in the Kuriles and Sakhalien), Tokio, 1904.

Footnote 122:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 78–79, 719.

Footnote 123:

  See, for instance, the London _Times_, November 7, 1894, p. 5.

Footnote 124:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 79–80.

Footnote 125:

  For the text of this treaty, see the _Treaties and Conventions between
  the Empire of Japan and Other Powers_, compiled by the Foreign Office,
  Tokio, 1899, pp. 377 ff.; Mayers, pp. 181–184; U. S. 54th Congress,
  1st Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. pp. 200–203; etc.

Footnote 126:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 43–45, 80.

Footnote 127:

  The London _Times_, April 22, 1895, p. 5.

Footnote 128:

  The London _Times_, April 22, 1895, p. 5.

Footnote 129:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 81–82.

Footnote 130:

  The German note, which was accompanied by a Romanized translation into
  Japanese, is said to have contained a statement to the effect that
  Japan was weak, Germany was powerful, and Japan would surely be
  defeated in case she should go to war with Germany. This peculiar
  sentence was, at the protest of the Japanese Foreign Office, expunged
  from the note.—_Tokushu Jōyaku_, p. 86

Footnote 131:

  To the last moment Russia, it is said, persisted in advising China to
  postpone the ratification.

Footnote 132:

  The London _Times_, May 3, 1895, p. 5; M. de Blowitz’s correspondence,
  dated Paris, May 2.

Footnote 133:

  The declaration made in November, 1903, by a person intimately
  associated with Marquis Itō, who was the Premier during the war.—The
  _Kokumin Shimbun_, November 10, 1903.

Footnote 134:

  Germany is said to have undertaken, when her note was presented, to
  guarantee a monetary consideration from China. By the treaty between
  Japan and China, concluded on September 22, the sum was fixed at
  30,000,000 _taels_.

Footnote 135:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 81–87. As has been said, the diplomatic
  correspondence of the day has not been published by any of the Powers
  concerned. The information briefly given in the text has been culled
  from, besides _Tokushu Jōyaku_, the leading articles of the _Tokio
  Nichi-Nichi Shimbun_ (Tokio Daily News), a semi-official organ of the
  Japanese Government at the time, as quoted in the _Nisshin Sen Shi_
  (history of the Japan-China war, Tokio, 1894–5, 8 vols.), vol. viii.
  pp. 141–171. These articles give a minute and careful account of the
  diplomacy of the day, and may largely be relied upon as authentic.

Footnote 136:

  It will be remembered that Japan had in 1894 revised her treaties with
  the Powers, and thereby freed herself from the yoke of consular
  jurisdiction and placed the foreign residents within her domain under
  the jurisdiction of her own law, and also largely restored her tariff
  autonomy.

Footnote 137:

  The position which the military and naval expenditures have occupied
  in the finance of the Japanese Government since the war of 1894–5 may
  be gathered from the following table (unit, 1000 _yen_; _yen_ = 49.8
  cents):—

                Total revenue     Total      Army and navy Ratio of the
                   of the      expenditures  expenditures    last two
                 Government       of the
                                Government
 1894–5[139]           98,170         78,128        20,662         26.4%
 1895–6[139]          118,432         85,317        23,536         27.6%
 1896–7[139]          187,019        168,856        73,248         43.4%
 1897–8[139]          226,390        223,678       110,542         49.3%
 1898–9[139]          220,054        219,757       112,427         51.1%
 1899–1900[139]       254,254        254,165       114,212         44.9%
 1900–1[140]          295,854        292,750       133,113         45.4%
 1901–2[141]          274,359        266,856       102,360         38.3%
 1902–3[141]          297,341        289,226        85,768         29.7%
 1903–4[142]          251,681        244,752        71,368         31.7%
 1904–5[143]          229,855        223,181        69,433         31.1%

Footnote 138:

  To take only a few tangible instances, Japan’s national budget grew
  more than three-fold during the ten years before 1903, her foreign
  trade in 1903 was 263% as large as it was in 1894, her private
  companies increased from less than 3000 in 1894 to 8600 in 1902, with
  a corresponding growth of their authorized capital from less than 200
  million to 1,226.7 million _yen_, and her population itself has
  increased perhaps by 12%. A decisive development has also taken place
  in both the internal politics and the international relations of
  Japan.

Footnote 139:

  An attempt has been universally made during the present war to explain
  the apparent contempt of death of the Japanese soldier as due to his
  low estimate of human life, or else to his fatalistic view of the
  world. It may be seriously doubted whether these explanations are
  tenable. At least it may be said that in no other case would the sons
  of Japan so fearlessly and cheerfully face death. It is impossible to
  discover in them a less fear of death than in other nations. Life is
  dear, but it is sacrificed to a cause which is considered higher than
  life. It was the primary lesson in the education of the _samurai_ to
  choose death when it saved honor and when life was selfish. This view
  of life has now been transferred from the narrow sphere of the
  individual person or fief to the large field of the entire nation,
  whose cause, it is believed, represents the best postulates of human
  progress. It would, perhaps, be legitimate to criticise the incidental
  abuse of this feeling, or to question whether the same loyalty might
  not be transferred to a still higher region than the state, but the
  subject must first be understood by the critic.

Footnote 140:

  See our Introduction.

Footnote 141:

  Actual account on October 31, 1903.

Footnote 142:

  Settled accounts.

Footnote 143:

  Estimates in the budget. All based on the Fourth Annual.




                               CHAPTER II
           THE “CASSINI CONVENTION” AND THE RAILWAY AGREEMENT


Regarded, however, from a broader point of view, no one could predict a
happy consequence of so ominous a beginning, as has been described, of
the new Eastern situation. By her successful intervention, Russia had
conferred upon China a signal favor, for which a reward was expected;
but the reward, again, assumed such a form that it at the same time
served as a new favor looking toward a fresh reward, so that the final
resultant of the repeated process proved altogether out of proportion to
the initial deed of patronage. The first step of this process was a 4
per cent. loan[144] to China of 400,000,000 francs at 94⅛, and payable
in thirty-six years, beginning with 1896. Not only were these liberal
terms attended by no security, but also the interest was guaranteed by a
special edict of the Czar.[145] The loan was issued principally from
Paris in July, 1895,[146] and the income was intended to cover one
half[147] of China’s indemnity to Japan.[148] In order to facilitate the
transactions in connection with this loan, as well as to promote the
commercial relations between Russia and Eastern Asia, the Russo-Chinese
Bank was organized late in 1895. In August, 1896,[149] the Chinese
Government was induced to contribute 5,000,000 _taels_ toward the
capital of the Bank, which seem to have been paid out of the new
loan.[150] Later in the same year, Prince Ukhtomsky, president of the
Bank, who had come to Peking with an immense number of costly presents
to be distributed among the members of the Court, succeeded in securing
the consent of the Chinese Government to the Statutes of the Bank, which
were subsequently published on December 8.[151] The privileges of the
institution as enumerated in these Statutes included the receiving of
tax returns, management of local finances, coining, payment of the
interests of the public bonds, and construction of railways and
telegraph lines in China, in so far as concessions should be made by her
Government to the Bank. The latter now has more than thirty branches and
agencies in East Asia, and this professedly private corporation has
since proved to be a great instrument through which the Russian
Government has obtained from China enormous concessions in Manchuria.

Before we examine the nature of these concessions, it is important to
observe what took place between Russia and China through the official
channels. On March 27, 1896, the Eastern world was startled to see the
publication in the _North China Daily News_ of a treaty of defensive
alliance concluded earlier in the same year between Russia and China.
The Japanese Government had already, on March 16, been assured by the
Foreign Office at St. Petersburg that the treaty did not exist.[152] It
is not clear whether the denial referred to the particular treaty in
question or to any treaty of alliance whatsoever. However that may be,
the reported agreement[153] was of the most serious character, as will
be gathered from the following abstract. In recognition of the service
rendered by Russia regarding the matter of the Liao-tung Peninsula and
of the loan, the Chinese Emperor desired to conclude with Russia a
treaty of alliance; and, consequently, it was agreed, in secrecy, that,
if Russia should come in conflict with other Asiatic Powers, she should
be allowed to make free use of any port or harbor on the Chinese coast,
and, in case of urgent need, levy troops from among the Chinese people.
If a protest should be made by other Powers, China should answer that
she was powerless to resist Russian demands. If she should desire even
to render active assistance to Russia against the common enemy, she
might do so, but this point required further discussion. In view of the
great disadvantages of the ice-bound naval harbors of Russia, China
agreed to allow her in time of peace a free use of Port Arthur, or, if
the other Powers should object, of Kiao-chau. If the latter should be
found inadequate, Russia might choose any harbor on the coast of
Kiang-su and Che-kiang. If, on the other hand, China should be at war
with another Power, Russia should endeavor to effect a compromise
between the belligerents, and, if the effort should fail, it should be
the duty of Russia openly to assist China and thereby strengthen the
alliance between the two Powers. In regard to Manchuria, Russian
military officers should be free to travel along the eastern frontiers
of the Sheng-king and Kirin Provinces and to navigate the Yalu and other
rivers, the object being either to further trade or to patrol the
frontiers. When the Siberian Railway was completed, a branch line might
be constructed under the joint control of China and Russia, passing
through the Provinces of Heilung and Kirin, and reaching Talien or some
other place selected by Russia. In order to protect this line, Russia
might possess near Talien-wan an island and the opposite shore, fortify
them, and station there her squadron and military forces. If a war
should arise between Russia and Japan concerning Korea, China should
allow Russia to send her troops toward the Yalu, so as to enable them to
attack the western boundary of Korea.

No matter whether any treaty of alliance had been signed between China
and Russia early in 1896, significant events soon followed which gave
rise to rumors of grave import. When it was resolved by China to send
Wang Tsz-chun to St. Petersburg as special envoy to attend the
coronation of the Czar, which was to take place in May of the same year,
M. Cassini, Russian Minister at Peking, is said to have intimated that
no one but Li Hung-chang was acceptable to Russia as the representative
of the Chinese Emperor. Li’s pro-Russian proclivities had been well
known, but he had up to this time been in disgrace for having concluded
the treaty of Shimonoseki so unfavorable to China. He now regained his
favor with the Court, and started on his mission to Russia, presumably
taking with him the draft of the Russo-Chinese convention which M.
Cassini had framed. The convention is reported to have been signed, to
avoid suspicion of other Powers, not at St. Petersburg, but at Moscow,
and, on the Russian side, not by M. Lobanoff, Foreign Minister, but by
M. Witte, Minister of Finance. When, however, the agreement was referred
to the Yamên at Peking for ratification, a large majority of the Chinese
Ministers are said to have disapproved the terms of Li’s treaty, until
the strenuous efforts of M. Cassini turned the tide and the convention
was ratified by the Emperor on September 30, 1896. This is the
celebrated “Cassini Convention.”[154] Let us now examine the more
important of its contents. The preamble explicitly referred, as also did
the treaty of alliance already summarized, to the favors done to China
by Russia at the close of the recent war. The body of the convention
falls, in its substance, into two large divisions, namely, the Articles
(1–6) relating to railway concessions in Manchuria, and those (8–11) in
regard to the disposition of certain ports on the Chinese littoral.
Russia was allowed to extend the Siberian Railway to Vladivostok across
Manchuria _via_ Aigun, Tsitsihar, Petuna, Kirin, and Kun-chun (Art. 1).
As regards the projected Chinese railroad between Shan-hai-kwan and
Mukden, if China should find it inconvenient to build it, Russia might
furnish capital and construct the line, China reserving to herself the
option of buying it after ten years of Russian management (Art. 2).
Another Chinese line in contemplation between Shan-hai-kwan and Port
Arthur and Talien-wan _via_ Niu-chwang, and its appurtenances, should be
built in accordance with the general railway regulations of Russia (Art.
4). The fifth Article was striking: All the railways built by Russia in
the Chinese territory were to be protected by the local Chinese
authorities, but in the more remote regions, where the necessary
protection was not available, Russia was allowed, in order to afford a
better protection to her railroad and property, to station special
battalions of Russian infantry and cavalry. Regarding the ports, it was
agreed that Russia might lease Kiao-chau for fifteen years for the use
of her squadron, but, in order to avoid suspicion by other Powers, she
should not immediately occupy the harbor or seize the points commanding
it (Art. 9). In view of the strategic importance of Port Arthur and
Talien-wan and their adjacent territories, China should in haste provide
for their adequate defense and repair their fortification, and Russia
should render all necessary aid for the protection of the two harbors,
and should not allow any other Power to attack them; if, for urgent
necessity, Russia should engage in a war, China should allow her, to
enable her to attack the enemy and defend her own position with greater
ease, temporarily to concentrate her military and naval forces in those
harbors (Art. 10). So long, however, as Russia was not involved in
hostilities, China should retain all rights in the control of Port
Arthur and Talien-wan, and Russia should not interfere with them in any
manner (Art. 11). In addition to these Articles, it was provided that,
if China should desire to reorganize the entire army of Manchuria on the
European basis, she should engage the services of Russian military
instructors (Art. 8). In the matter of mining, Russian and Chinese
subjects might, with the consent of local authorities, work all kinds of
minerals in the Heilung and Kirin Provinces, and in the Long White
Mountains (Art. 7).

[Illustration:

  COUNT CASSINI

  _Russian Minister at Washington, and formerly at Peking_
]

Such are the contents, in brief, of the much debated “Cassini
Convention,” the existence of which has been as often alleged as denied.
The reported document may well be unauthentic, at any rate in several
important particulars. Its main interest consists, however, not so much
in the question of its literal authenticity, as in the important facts,
(1) that the subsequent course of events is largely foreshadowed in its
contents, and (2) that high Russian authorities have obtained, or at
least claimed, certain privileges which cannot be found in all the other
Russo-Chinese contracts that are known to us, but are in one way or
another reflected in the present convention. The universal belief in the
diplomatic world appears to be that, if the published text of the
Cassini Convention is untrustworthy, some of its substance must have
been contained in an agreement which Li Hung-chang signed in Russia in
1895, and in some later secret agreements. Nor is it impossible to
substantiate this belief from evidence of undoubted authenticity. Thus
M. Pavloff, the Russian _Chargé d’Affaires_ at Peking, said, on October
8, 1897, to Sir Claude MacDonald, the British Minister, that “shortly
after the return of Li Hung-chang from his mission to St. Petersburg,
the Chinese Government had informed the Russian Minister that they had
up intention of continuing the Northern line [beyond Shan-hai-kwan
toward Kirin], but if at any time they did continue it, owing to the
particularly friendly relations existing between the Russian and Chinese
Governments, they would in the first instance address themselves to
Russian engineers and employ, if necessary, Russian capital.”[155] It
will at once be observed that this closely corresponds to Article 3 of
the Cassini Convention. On this ground, M. Pavloff considered it a
“contravention of the agreement”[156] on the part of the Chinese
Government that the latter allowed British subjects, on June 7, 1898, to
furnish capital and the chief engineer for the extension of the Northern
line, and, repeatedly and in a manner highly irritating to the British
and Chinese Governments, demanded the replacement of Mr. Kinder and his
staff with Russian engineers.[157] It was again in the same spirit that
Russia succeeded in inducing England to insert in the additional clauses
of the Anglo-Russian railway agreement of April 28, 1899, a statement to
the effect that the Russians might extend the Manchurian Railway in a
southwesterly direction through the region traversed by the Northern
Chinese line built with British capital,[158] Count Muravieff explaining
that M. Witte attached importance to the insertion of this clause.[159]
Well he might, for no sooner was the Agreement concluded than Russia
pressed China, though without success, for the concession for a railway
reaching directly to Peking itself.[160] Again, if the provision in the
Cassini Convention that China should with all haste repair the
fortification of Port Arthur, with the assistance of Russia, and, in
case of necessity, turn it over to the use of the latter’s fleet (Art.
10), was false, it was not long before Count Muravieff could declare, in
December, 1897, that an “offer” had been made by the Chinese Government
to allow the Russian squadron to winter at the port.[161] More
significant still was M. Pavloff’s remark to Sir Claude MacDonald, that
“he must tell him frankly that the Russian Government intended that the
provinces of China bordering on the Russian frontier must not come under
the influence of any nation except Russia.”[162] Sir Claude pointed out
that Kirin, the probable terminus of the extension line, to which M.
Pavloff had objected, was more than two hundred miles from the Russian
frontier, but the _Chargé_ had evidently marked out the entire
Manchurian provinces as a Russian sphere of influence. It may be said
that this claim even exceeded the Cassini Convention and verged to the
less trustworthy treaty of alliance. The attention of the reader may,
however, be called to a still more direct evidence than the veiled
remarks of M. Pavloff. In the official statement accompanying the text
of the Russo-Chinese Convention of April 8, 1902, which was published in
the _Official Messenger_ of April 12, occur the following words: “The
Chinese Government, on their side, confirm all the obligations they have
previously undertaken toward Russia, and particularly the provisions of
_the 1896 agreement_, which must serve as a basis for the friendly
relations of the neighboring Empires. By this _defensive agreement_,
Russia undertook in 1896 to maintain the principle of the independence
and integrity of China, who, on her side, gave Russia the right to
construct a line through Manchuria, and to enjoy the material privileges
which are directly connected with the above undertaking.”[163] It is
impossible to find any one contract concluded in 1896 which either might
be considered a “defensive agreement” or contains the points enumerated
in the quoted passage. The so-called Cassini Convention alone contains
the provisions about the railway, as well as Articles 9 and 10, which
may be said to “maintain the principle of the independence and integrity
of China.”[164] The coincidence becomes even more striking when we
consider, together with the Convention, the reported treaty of defensive
alliance of 1896, which may be regarded, if any, the preliminary plan of
the Convention. It is also interesting to note that when Dr. George
Morrison, the noted Peking correspondent of the _Times_, had an
interview with Prince Ching on March 19, 1901, and directly referred to
the supposed existence of a series of secret agreements between Russia
and China, beginning with the one which Li Hung-chang negotiated during
his mission in St. Petersburg, the Prince “assented without the
slightest demur.”[165] Finally, we are in possession of a vague
statement made by Count Cassini himself, who, in 1904, referred to the
treaty “giving to Russia railroad and other concessions in Manchuria,”
which, said he, “I had the honor to negotiate [at Peking] in behalf of
my Sovereign.”[166] The agreement of September 8, 1896, to which we
shall presently turn, “giving railway and other concessions in
Manchuria,” was concluded between the Chinese Minister at St. Petersburg
and the Russo-Chinese Bank, and, unless Count Cassini negotiated it at
Peking at the same time that the Chinese Minister did at the Russian
capital, it may be inferred that the former, in his quoted statement,
referred to a “Cassini Convention.” It is not at all impossible,
however, that both he in China and Mr. Hu in Russia took part in the
negotiations which resulted in the conclusion of the agreement of
September 8, 1896.

Taking all these indications together, it seems almost safe to aver that
at least two important items of concessions—namely, railway grants and
the use of some ports for strategic purposes—must in some form have been
secured by Russia after 1896, and before the actual lease of Port Arthur
and Talien-wan in 1898. It is needless to say that these two objects,
railways and ports, possessed a political meaning of the greatest
moment, the ports affording the Russian navy a commanding point on the
Pacific coast, and the railways ultimately connecting that point with
the army bases in Siberia and European Russia.

Of these two items, it was the railways that first emerged from the
state of a preliminary to that of a final agreement between Russia and
China. And it was here that the Russo-Chinese Bank played a great rôle
for the Russian Government, for the Agreement of August 27 (September
8), 1896,[167] providing for the construction by the Russians of a
railway through Manchuria connecting the Trans-Baikal and South Ussuri
lines of the Siberian railway system, was concluded between the Chinese
Minister at St. Petersburg and the Bank. The latter undertook to
organize the Eastern Chinese[168] Railway Company with its accounts
separate from those of the Bank (Art. 1). It is instructive to note that
it is stated in the preamble of this Agreement that the Chinese
Government “intrusted”[169] the Bank to undertake the construction of
the line, and that the government agreed to contribute 5,000,000 _taels_
toward the capital of the Company.[170] The Russian troops should be
transported by the railway without obstruction and at half-fare (Arts. 8
and 9). Upon the basis of this Agreement were promulgated by the
Government of the Czar Statutes[171] providing for the construction and
operation of the railway. Nothing can better betray than these two
documents, the Agreement and the Statutes, that the enterprise was only
in a very limited sense an undertaking of a private company. In the
first place, the capital of the Company was divided into share-capital
and bond-capital, the former, not guaranteed by the Russian Government,
being limited to only 5,000,000 rubles, while the latter, which was
officially guaranteed, could be indefinitely expanded according to
necessity.[172] It in fact had already before the present war swollen to
the enormous sum of over 270,000,000 rubles.[173] In the second place,
the operation of the railroad was placed upon the uniform basis of the
Siberian system, and under the management of a board whose nominal
president was a Chinese,[174] but whose vice-president, who was to
assume the actual direction, was under the supervision of the Minister
of Finance.[175] Finally, but not the least in importance, was the
provision regarding the protection of the railway and its employees and
the policing of the lands assigned to the road and its appurtenances.
The former duty was to be performed by the Chinese Government, but the
latter “was confined to police agents appointed by the Company. The
Company shall for this purpose draw up and establish police
regulations.”[176] In these police agents, ostensibly to be employed by
the Company, one may discern the origin of the famous “railway guards,”
later called the “frontier guards,” whose existence has become an
important problem since 1902 in connection with the Russian evacuation
of Manchuria. It should also be noted that this provision concerning the
police agents does not appear in the corresponding Article in the text
of the Agreement between China and the Bank, upon which the Statutes
were based, so that one is at a loss to know what was the conventional
ground for this Russian law, unless, indeed, it was the so-called
Cassini Convention, which was alleged to have provided for the
organization of Russian infantry and cavalry battalions in order to
protect Russian interests in the more remote parts of Manchuria.

It was agreed that the line should, after eighty years, come under the
possession of the Chinese Government, which might also buy up the road
and its appurtenances after thirty-six years.[177] It is interesting to
see that it also provided that during the eighty years of Russian
management, all commodities carried between China and Russia by the
railway should pay in China duties one third less than the ordinary
import and export duties in that Empire,[178] a provision hardly
reconcilable with the open door principle, and explicitly contrary to
the principles proposed by the United States to the Powers two years
later.[179]

The Eastern Chinese Railway Company was organized in February, 1897, and
the first sod of the Manchuria Railway was cut with great ceremony on
the eastern frontier of the Kirin Province on August 28, 1897.

To some this railway concession may have appeared at first to have been
intended merely to reduce the time and expense of completing the eastern
section of the Siberian Railway by allowing it to pass across Manchuria
through a route shorter and easier than the one along the Amur and
Ussuri rivers. Such a belief was, however, soon dispelled, or rather,
modified, by the acquisition by Russia of the lease of the greatest
naval harbor in the Yellow Sea, and, simultaneously, of the right to
join this naval basis by a new railway with the main Manchurian line, so
as to make complete the connection between Port Arthur and the army
centres in Siberia and Russia. The Russian lease of this port was,
however, preceded by and modeled after the German lease of Kiao-chau,
which should therefore receive our brief attention first.

-----

Footnote 144:

  See Henri Cordier, _Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les
  puissances occidentales_, 1860–1902 (3 vols.), vol. iii (Paris, 1902),
  pp. 305–306. The loan contract, dated June 24, 1895, appears in
  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 660–667.

Footnote 145:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 667–668.

Footnote 146:

  Cf. Art. 15 of the contract.

Footnote 147:

  The other half, £16,000,000, was supplied by some British and German
  subjects by the contract of March 11, 1896, at 5% interest, and
  repayable in thirty-six years. Another £16,000,000 loan was later
  supplied by the same parties.—_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 668–673.

Footnote 148:

  5,000,000 _taels_ were, however, as will be seen below, used for
  another purpose.

Footnote 149:

  The contract dated August 25, 1896.—_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 640–641.

Footnote 150:

  According to a Peking correspondent to the _Kokumin_ (May 30, 1904),
  the Chinese Government had been paying the stipulated 4% interest for
  this sum to the French creditors, but the Bank had never repaid the
  interest to China. Moreover, the Niu-chwang branch of the Bank, since
  the Russians occupied the port in August, 1900, had been receiving the
  returns of the Chinese maritime customs there, which finally amounted
  to about 5,000,000 _taels_. Neither the principal nor the interest of
  this sum had been paid by the Bank to the Chinese Government.

Footnote 151:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 642–660.

Footnote 152:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, p. 231.

Footnote 153:

  The Japanese text appears in _ibid._, pp. 231–234.

Footnote 154:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 234–236. A French translation is found in
  Cordier, _Histoire_, vol. iii. pp. 343–347.

Footnote 155:

  _The British Parliamentary Papers, China, No. 1 (1898)_, Dispatch No.
  14, pp. 5–6. Cf. _China, No. 2 (1899)_, No. 2, in which M. Pavloff
  claims to have secured in December, 1897, a repetition of this pledge.

Footnote 156:

  See _China, No. 2 (1904)_, Nos. 28–29, modified Article 12. Sir Ernest
  Satow, however, denied that any such agreement existed. See _China,
  No. 2 (1904)_, No. 30, March 19, 1901.

Footnote 157:

  See _China, No. 1 (1898)_, Nos. 13, 38, 26, 43, 111, 113, 115, 117,
  121; _China, No. 2 (1899)_, Nos. 2, 9, 10, 52, 65; _China, No. 1
  (1900)_, No. 321.

Footnote 158:

  _China, No. 2 (1899)_, No. 138.

Footnote 159:

  _China, No. 1 (1900)_, No. 148.

Footnote 160:

  _Ibid._, pp. 112, 116, 120, 132, 160, 180, 214–215.

Footnote 161:

  _China, No. 1 (1898)_, Dispatch No. 37, pp. 12–13, Goschen to
  Salisbury.

Footnote 162:

  _China, No. 1 (1896)_, p. 6, Conversation on October 18, 1897.

Footnote 163:

  See _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 274–275.

Footnote 164:

  See _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 274–275.

Footnote 165:

  The _Times_, March 20, 1901, p. 5. This evidence, however, cannot for
  a moment be considered equivalent to the others which have been cited.
  Not only is it silent about the contents of the agreements, but also
  the “assent” of the Prince may be due to some misunderstanding. In the
  same article, Dr. Morrison goes on to say: “I have reason to believe
  that the original Russian draft promised China protection only against
  Japan, but was modified at the request of the Chinese to include
  protection against aggression by all foreign Powers. China invoked its
  provisions after Germany seized Kiao-chau, but Russia turned a deaf
  ear.” This statement is again as vague as the reported text of the
  treaty of alliance of 1896. It is to be regretted that the writer did
  not explicitly state his “reason.”

Footnote 166:

  The _North American Review_ for May, 1904, p. 683.

Footnote 167:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 495–498 (a Japanese translation). The present
  writer is also in possession of the Chinese text. He is not aware that
  its European translation has ever been published. Its contents are
  found in Alexander Hosie, _Manchuria_, pp. 43–44.

Footnote 168:

  The Manchurian provinces are called “the Chinese Eastern Three
  Provinces,” and hence the name of this railway and of the Company. It
  is essential to keep this line in mind apart from the Chinese Northern
  railway system referred to on pages 156–157.

Footnote 169:

  “Of her own volition,” as Cassini added. See the _North American
  Review_ for May, 1904, p. 683.

Footnote 170:

  According to Art. 12, these 5,000,000 _taels_ were to be returned to
  the Chinese Government as soon as the line was in running order. It
  will be remembered that the government was responsible for the
  contribution of an equal amount of money to the capital of the
  Russo-Chinese Bank. It is probable that the money has been transferred
  from the Company to the Bank, so as to make it pay two bills, the one
  after the other. It has already been reported that the money was
  originally paid out of the Russo-French loan of 1895. If this report
  is true, the whole arrangement may be characterized as extremely
  clever on the part of Russia. Cf. p. 84, note 4, above.

Footnote 171:

  Confirmed by the Czar on December 4/16, presented to the Ruling Senate
  on December 8/20, and finally published in the _Bulletins des Lois_ on
  December 11/23, 1896. See an English translation of their text in the
  _British Parliamentary Papers, Russia, No. 1 (1898)_, and _China, No.
  1 (1900)_, pp. 57–61; a Japanese translation in _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp.
  495–500. At the further extension of the railway by the agreement of
  March 27, 1898, supplementary statutes were promulgated on February 5,
  1899. See _ibid._, pp. 516–520.

Footnote 172:

  Articles 10–16.

Footnote 173:

  Page 32, above.

Footnote 174:

  The Chinese Minister to St. Petersburg at that time was appointed the
  first president.

Footnote 175:

  Articles 18–27; Agreement, Article 1.

Footnote 176:

  Article 8. Compare Art. 5 of the Agreement, which contains merely the
  former part of this arrangement, i. e., the protection of the railway
  and its appurtenances by the Chinese Government.

Footnote 177:

  The Agreement, Art. 12; the Statutes, Art. 2.

Footnote 178:

  The Agreement, Art. 10; the Statutes, Art. 3.

Footnote 179:

  See p. 150, note 1, below.




                              CHAPTER III
                               KIAO-CHAU


Kiao-chau, in the Province of Shan-tung, was, as will be remembered, a
port marked in the so-called Cassini Convention for the use of the
Russian squadron. Its value as a commercial and strategical _point
d’appui_, as well as the greatness of the mineral wealth of Shan-tung,
must have been as well known to the Germans as to the Russians.[180] How
it happened that Russia forsook this important position, or, more
accurately, how Germany succeeded in securing its lease without a
protest from Russia, still remains to be explained. It is known,
however, that the offers which had been made by China, perhaps in
recognition of Germany’s service in the Liao-tung affair,[181] of a
docking and coaling station on the southern coast, had been declined by
Germany;[182] and also that Germany’s own attempts to secure a point on
the Lappa Island near Amoy, and later in Amoy itself, had never
materialized. As to Kiao-chau; the desire of Germany for its possession
had henceforth been often observed by the Chinese Minister at
Berlin,[183] but, for the realization of the desire, either the time was
not ripe, or the susceptibilities of Russia had to be considered. Toward
the latter half of 1897, however, the German Government seemed to have
concluded that a general partition of China was now a likelihood, for
which emergency Germany should prepare herself by obtaining a powerful
foothold on the littoral. Observe the following statement made, in a
retroactive manner, after the lease of Kiao-chau had been acquired, by
Herr von Bülow in the Reichstag, on April 27, 1898: “Mention has been
made of the partition of China. Such a partition will not be brought
about by us, at any rate. All we have done is to provide that, come what
may, we ourselves shall not go empty-handed. The traveller cannot decide
when the train is to start, but he can make sure not to miss it when it
does start. The devil takes the hindmost.... In any case, we have
secured in Kiao-chau a strategical and political position which assures
us a decisive influence in the future of the Far East. From this strong
position we can look on with complacency on the development of affairs.
We have such a large sphere of action and such important tasks before us
that we have no occasion to grudge other nations the concessions made
them. German diplomacy will pursue its path in the East as everywhere
else—calmly, firmly, and peacefully. We will never play the part of
mischief-maker; nor will we play that of Cinderella.”[184] Before this
glorious consummation was reached, Germany must have, it is presumed,
made diplomatic efforts to conciliate Russia, and it is in this
connection that it is alleged by some that the two Powers then matured
between themselves a compromise whereby Germany should not be molested
in her possible attempt to seize Kiao-chau at the first opportunity, and
Russia, in her turn, should be free to follow the precedent and demand
of China a lease of Port Arthur.[185]

However that may be, an opportunity for Germany’s action came when, as
is well known, two German Catholic priests were murdered by a mob in the
Kü-ye District, in Shan-tung, on November 1, 1897. The late Provincial
Governor, Li Ping-hing, who had recently been transferred to Sz-chwan,
was suspected of having instigated the crime. The Peking Government at
once ordered a strict search for the culprits, and in three weeks the
local authorities succeeded in arresting four of the guilty
persons.[186] It was too late. Three German men-of-war had arrived at
Kiao-chau, about November 17, to be joined later by several others, and
landed 600 marines, who seized the Chinese barracks of the port.[187] As
the Tsung-li Yamên had received no previous communication from the
German authorities regarding the demonstration, it “could only surmise
that Kiao-chau had been seized on account of the murder of the German
missionaries.”[188] The German Minister at Peking, Baron von Heyking,
then presented six demands, including the punishment of the late
Governor Li, an indemnity for the murdered, and the preference for
German capital and engineers in the future railway and mining
enterprises in the Province of Shan-tung—the desire for the lease of
Kiao-chau being still veiled,—and these demands were, with some
modifications, accepted by China. At this time, however, Prince Henry of
Germany, whom the Kaiser had bade farewell at Kiel in his celebrated
“mailed fist” speech, was on his way to China with his squadron. As soon
as he arrived, Baron von Heyking presented the long concealed demand for
a lease of the bay and the surrounding promontories of Kiao-chau. In the
face of the strong position and forces commanded by Germany, China had
no choice but to yield.[189] When she was finally, on March 6, 1898,
prevailed upon to sign the Agreement with Germany, the Government of the
latter declined to publish anything but its first section containing the
use and lease of Kiao-chau,[190] and the contents of its other two
sections concerning the railway and mining privileges granted to
Germany[191] in the Shan-tung Province, as well as a separate agreement
concerning the direct reparation for the crime of Kü-ye, have not, so
far as is known, been officially given to the world from Berlin.[192]

The act of Germany was a _débâcle_, and in the concessions she wrested
from China were involved questions of grave importance and
far-reaching consequences. In the first place, was not the lease of a
commanding port in reality an infringement of the territorial
sovereignty of the Chinese Empire? In the second place, how could the
preference given to Germany in the future railway and mining
operations in one of the richest of the eighteen Provinces be
reconciled with the principle of the equal opportunity for the
economic enterprise of all nations in China? If the action of Germany
could be, as it soon seemed to be, used by other Powers as a
precedent, would not the consequences for the cause, to say the least,
of the fair treatment and mutual harmony in China of the nations among
themselves be disastrous? It is interesting to observe the attitude
taken toward this incident by Great Britain, the Power which possessed
the greatest interest in insisting upon, as well as strongest power to
enforce, the two cardinal principles of the world’s diplomacy in
China, namely, the territorial sovereignty of the Chinese Empire and
the equality therein of economic opportunity for all nations. Official
dispatches of the day clearly indicate that, on the one hand, Germany
made efforts to allay the susceptibilities of Great Britain, and that,
on the other, the British remonstrances were not only so mollified as
to be ineffective, but were also turned in such a direction as only to
add to the dangers of the situation. Let us observe how this was done.
It was repeatedly declared, during the negotiations between Germany
and China, by the German Representatives at Peking and London and by
Herr von Bülow himself, that the northern port of Kiao-chau had been
chosen for its remoteness, for one thing, from the regions in which
England was directly interested; that nothing was being done during
the negotiations with China which would be embarrassing to Great
Britain; that Germany was raising no objections to the British terms
of the Anglo-German loan to China now under consideration; that the
management of the new colony would be found to be liberal, for the
German Government was convinced that the British system of
colonization was the right one; and that the Kaiser and his Government
were strong partisans of a good understanding between Germany and
England.[193] Beside these assurances from Germany, it is interesting
to note that, on December 1, 1897, Sir Claude MacDonald wrote from
Peking to the Marquess of Salisbury: “If the German occupation of
Kiao-chau is only used as a leverage for obtaining satisfactory
reparation ... for the murder of the German missionaries, the effect
on the security of our own people will be of the best. If, on the
other hand, the German object is to secure Kiao-chau as a naval
station, under cover of their demands for reparation, it is by no
means clear that their acquisition of it will prejudice our
interests.”[194] Whether or not this idea was indorsed by the British
Government, Sir Frank C. Lascelles, the Representative at Berlin, said
to Herr von Bülow, on December 30, “That, so far as he knew, Her
Majesty’s Government had raised no objection to the German ships going
to Kaio-chau. Should, however, a demand be put forward for exclusive
privileges, or should other countries seek to take possession of
Chinese ports, it would probably become necessary for Her Majesty’s
Government to take steps for the protection of her vast interests in
China.”[195] In this last sentence is seen a curse of China’s foreign
relations, that is, the idea of the balance of power—a balance between
foreign nations on her ground and at her expense. An offending Power
would not retrace its steps, and another Power would virtually
recognize them by itself demanding counterbalancing rights from China,
which might expect other Powers also to follow suit with little regard
to her primary rights of sovereignty. Germany could scarcely have felt
the force of the British protest which was, indeed, rather directed to
China than to Germany. The latter secured what she asked, and made
Kiao-chau as free a port as her treaty-tariff system would allow;[196]
but German claims to the sole right of railroad and mining concessions
in the province were speedily emphasized by the organization of the
_Schan-tung Eisenbahngesellschaft_, with a capital of fifty-four
million marks, and also of the _Deutsche Bergbaugesellschaft_.[197]

-----

Footnote 180:

  Herr von Richthofen, now the Foreign Minister of Germany, and the
  greatest authority on Chinese geology, wrote an article in the
  _Kolonialzeitung_ of January 6, 1898, describing the mineral resources
  of the province, and concluding that the Power which possessed
  Kiao-chau would control the coal supply in northern Chinese waters.
  See _China, No. 1 (1898)_, p. 21. The same authority had shown years
  ago the advantageous position of Kiao-chau.

  It will also be remembered that during the Chinese-Japanese war,
  war-vessels of several Powers were temporarily anchored here, so that
  the superb position of the port was familiar to every one.

Footnote 181:

  “Considering that there has never been any disagreement existing
  between China and Germany, and that the German Government came to the
  assistance of China in securing the evacuation of the Liao-tung
  Peninsula by the Japanese for which she has never been recompensed;
  and further, as England, France, and Russia have taken maritime ports
  in the East, and as Germany has no port as a rendezvous for her
  vessels and for a coaling station, her position is not equal to the
  other great Powers.”—The Tsung-li Yamên’s memorial to the Throne,
  translated in Mr. Denby’s dispatch of March 9, 1898 (U. S. 55th
  Congress, 3d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i, p. 189). The same
  sentiment may have prompted the Tsung-li Yamên to make the offers
  stated in the text.

Footnote 182:

  _China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 25.

Footnote 183:

  U. S. 55th Congress, 3d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. p. 189.

Footnote 184:

  _China, No. 1 (1899)_, p. 67.

Footnote 185:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, p. 355.

Footnote 186:

  _China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 3.

Footnote 187:

  _Ibid._

Footnote 188:

  _Ibid._, No. 2. Cf. _House Documents_, op. cit., pp. 187–189, a
  memorial of the Yamên to the Throne.

Footnote 189:

  The lease was later fixed for ninety-nine years. The leased territory
  covers about 540 square kilometres (208.4 square miles), including
  about 80,000 inhabitants.

Footnote 190:

  _Das Staatsarchiv_, Band 61, No. 11518.

Footnote 191:

  Meyers, pp. 281–282; _China, No. 1 (1899)_, No. 65; _Tokushu Jōyaku_,
  pp. 359–360, 363–365.

Footnote 192:

  For the extraordinary proceedings of the German Minister in his
  dealings with the Chinese Government, see _China, No. 1 (1898)_, Nos.
  5, 6, 17, 20, 34, 35, 40, 53, 70, 73, and 113. Also see _Tokushu
  Jōyaku_, pp. 355–357.

Footnote 193:

  See _China, No. 1 (1898)_, Nos. 39, 49, 74. It is interesting to
  observe that when, in order to restore the balance of power in the
  Gulf of Pechili, which had been disturbed by the lease of Port Arthur
  by Russia, England demanded the lease of Wei-hai-Wei, she took pains
  to explain to Germany that her acquisition of the port, the meaning of
  which was purely military, would in no way interfere with the German
  interests in Shan-tung, and that there would be no attempt to make
  railway connections with Wei-hai-Wei. An interesting diplomatic
  correspondence followed this explanation, which it is hardly necessary
  to describe. What is emphasized here is that England, in negotiating
  the lease of Wei-hai-Wei, largely reciprocated the cordiality Germany
  had shown in her occupation of Kiao-chau. See _China, No. 1 (1899)_,
  Nos. 2, 8, 9, 10, and 31.

Footnote 194:

  _China, No. 1 (1898)_, p. 20.

Footnote 195:

  _Ibid._, p. 14, No. 39. Sir Claude MacDonald had already written to
  the Tsung-li Yamên, on December 10: “I have the honor to inform your
  Highnesses and your Excellencies that I have received telegraphic
  instructions from Her Majesty’s Government to address the Yamên with
  regard to the concession in Shan-tung which it is reported that the
  German Government has asked from China. I am directed to state that
  Her Majesty’s Government will demand equality of treatment for British
  subjects according to the treaty rights possessed by Great Britain,
  and that Her Majesty’s Government will require compensation on any
  points in respect to which those rights may be disregarded.”—_Ibid._,
  p. 28, inclosure in No. 70.

Footnote 196:

  See _China, No. 1 (1899)_, p. 240, No. 322; _China, No. 1 (1900)_, pp.
  12–13, 35, 146–147, 106, 233, and 241–244.

Footnote 197:

  It is unnecessary to recount the painful negotiations in 1898–9
  concerning the Tien-tsin-Ching-kiang railway concession, in which the
  German claim in Shan-tung was strongly presented, and had to be
  recognized to a large extent by the British Government. See _China,
  No. 1 (1900)_, pp. 14, 16, 17–18, 33, 118, 121, 175, 180.




                               CHAPTER IV
                       PORT ARTHUR AND TALIEN-WAN


As has been said, it appears impossible at the present state of our
knowledge to trace the exact connection of Russia with the German
occupation of Kiao-chau.[198] What is of more direct interest to our
study, and is more easily established by evidence, is the fact that,
with the plea that she could not be denied what had been granted to
Germany,[199] Russia closely followed the latter’s example,[200] and,
under similar terms to hers,[201] demanded a lease of Port Arthur and
Talien-wan, and also a railway concession between a point in the
Manchurian line granted in 1896 and the ports. Recent years have seldom
seen a situation so instructive of the character of the Far Eastern
diplomacy in general, and of Russia’s method in particular, as the
foreign relations in China which culminated in the conclusion of the
Russo-Chinese Agreement of March 27, 1898. These relations were also
unusually complex, owing to the position which England held therein,
whose vast interests in various parts of China were at once brought in
many-sided contact, not only with Russia, but also with other Powers
interested in China.

On December 20, 1897, a report reached the British Foreign Office that
three Russian men-of-war had arrived at Port Arthur, and that three
others were expected at Talien-wan and three more at Port Arthur.[202]
Two days later it was officially explained by Count Muravieff “that the
step taken was entirely a question of convenience for the ships, and had
absolutely no connection with the occupation of the bay of Kiao-chau by
Germany.” The Count added “that there had always been a difficulty about
keeping more than a certain number of men-of-war at a time in Japanese
ports, and that, consequently, the Imperial Government had been glad to
accept the offer of the Chinese Government to allow the Russian squadron
to winter at Port Arthur. This arrangement was all the more convenient
as that port was within an easy distance of Vladivostok, and had an
arsenal where their ships could undergo all necessary repairs. Moreover,
it was an advantage that Port Arthur was quite free from ice in the
winter, though this fact was not so important now, as Vladivostok was at
present furnished with an exceptionally powerful ice-breaker, which it
was hoped would make that port available for egress and ingress during
the winter months. In fact, Vladivostok remained, as heretofore, their
centre in the Far East, and the headquarters of their land and sea
forces, so that the mere fact of the Russian squadron wintering at Port
Arthur made no change whatever in the situation.”[203] On the same day
that this pacific declaration was made, it was reported, as it was later
confirmed by Chinese authorities, that Russia was offering to China a 4
per cent. loan of 16,000,000 pounds at 93, an extremely favorable term,
to pay off the balance of the Japanese indemnity. The suggested security
was the income of the land tax and _likin_, besides which Russia was
said to have demanded as _quid pro quo_ all future railway concessions
in Manchuria and North China, as well as the succession of a Russian
subject to Sir Robert Hart as Inspector-General of the Maritime
Customs.[204] It was on this occasion that M. Pavloff, claiming that the
Tsung-li Yamên had promised to employ Russian engineers and Russian
capital in the construction of any railway between the Great Wall and
the Russian frontier, undertook to record the alleged promise and
express his gratification, and, seeing that the Yamên did not reply,
took it for granted that the matter was settled, and notified the St.
Petersburg Government to that effect.[205] Nor did the Russian
Representatives at Peking fail thereafter to appeal to this agreement
concluded by M. Pavloff in so striking a fashion, whenever China opened
any discussion with another Power regarding any subject connected with
railways north of Shan-hai-kwan. In the mean time, an Anglo-German
syndicate had made an offer, last June, of a loan for the same purpose,
and now Sir Claude MacDonald strongly supported a scheme of a new loan
presented by the Hong-kong and Shanghai Bank, a British concern, in
competition with the Russian proposals.[206] One of the terms of the
British loan as matured between the Bank, Sir Claude, and the Marquess
of Salisbury, was the opening of Talien-wan to foreign trade.[207] The
British Minister’s intention obviously was, among other things, to
forestall the possible Russian occupation of this port as well as Port
Arthur.[208] The significance was well understood by the Tsung-li Yamên,
which was, however, afraid to embroil China with Russia, for the
latter’s _Chargé d’Affaires_ “had protested, under instructions from his
Government, against its [Talien-wan’s] opening in the strongest manner,
and had warned the Yamên that it would incur the hostility of Russia by
doing so.”[209] The reason for this strenuous opposition was, on January
19, 1898, explained by the Russian Ambassador at London, who “urged very
strongly that if we [the British Government] insisted on making
Talien-wan an open port, we should be encroaching on the Russian sphere
of influence, and denying her in the future that right to the use of
Port Arthur to which the progress of events had given her a claim.”
These remarks were significant in showing how foreign was the idea of
the open door to the Russian policy in Manchuria. When Lord Salisbury
asked the Ambassador, in the same interview, what possible objection he
could have to making Talien-wan a free port if Russia had no designs on
that territory, the latter replied “that without any such designs it was
generally admitted that Russia might claim a commercial _débouché_ upon
the open sea, and that in order to enjoy that advantage fully she ought
to be at liberty to make such arrangements with China as she could
obtain with respect to the commercial régime which was to prevail
there.” Here is a clear indication that Russia had little faith in the
compatibility of other nations’ commercial welfare in China with her
own, or, in other words, in the ability of her people and the efficiency
of their economic organization to compete with other nations in an open
market. Else, she would not object to the opening of a port to the
world’s trade. Lord Salisbury reminded the Russian Representative that
“the most-favored-nation clause forbade China to give Russia at
Talien-wan more favorable terms with regard to customs duties than she
gave to other treaty Powers.”[210] England’s position, which was
repeatedly shown to Russia, was that it was natural that Russia should
open a port for her commerce on the coasts of the North Pacific,[211]
but that it would be a contravention of the treaty rights[212] of other
nations to make of the port an exclusive market for Russian trade. Under
these persistent representations, Count Muravieff at last declared, on
January 28, through M. de Staal, Ambassador at London, that any
(_tout_)[213] commercial outlet secured by Russia “would be open to the
ships of all the great Powers, like other ports on the Chinese mainland.
It would be open to the commerce of all the world, and England, whose
trade interests are so important in those regions, would share in the
advantage.”[214] Then what was meant by “open”? M. de Staal stated on
February 10: “I cannot in any way anticipate the decisions of my
Government, which, in the event of acquiring an outlet in Chinese
waters, naturally remains free either to establish a _porto franco_ [i.
e., a port where goods imported are exempt from all import dues] there,
or to assimilate the port in question to the treaty ports of the Chinese
littoral.”[215] It will be seen later that, through the Imperial Order
of July 30 (August 11), 1899,[216] Russia declared Dalny a “free port”
in the sense of a _porto franco_, under certain conditions. In the face
of these elastic conditions, one would be slow, in spite of the Order,
to admit that the question stated by M. de Staal in the quoted passage
has been definitively settled by his government one way or the other, or
in a third alternative.[217]

Up to this point, namely, about February 10, 1898, one can follow the
gradual withdrawal of Lord Salisbury’s position. He at first seemed to
have accepted Sir Claude MacDonald’s suggestion to insist upon the
opening of Talien-wan as a condition of the British-Chinese loan, but,
evidently at the Russian opposition, presently contented himself with
giving the following instruction to the British Minister at Peking: “You
are not bound to insist on making Talien-wan a treaty port if you think
it impracticable, though we give it up with regret. Would it be possible
to obtain a promise of such a concession if ever a railway was made to
that port? You should maintain demand for opening of other ports.”[218]
Then, when the Chinese Government was so pressed by the opposition of
Russia and France as to declare on January 30 that unless England
pledged herself to offer protection to China against Russia, she could
not consent to accept the loan,[219] Lord Salisbury’s policy receded
further than before. He now made representations to Russia not to
infringe the most-favored-nation treatment in Talien-wan, if she should
lease the port. It is needless to say that such a direct request to
Russia was tantamount, on the part of England, to abandoning the desire
of securing the opening of the port from China, which, save for Russian
threats, was willing to comply with the desire; and to acquiescing in
and even recognizing Russia’s right to lease the port, instead of
opening it as a treaty port. Under these circumstances, it was not
strange that the British Government was met by Russia with the ambiguous
phrase, “open port,” which, in spite of Lord Salisbury’s attempt[220] to
interpret it in the sense of a _porto franco_, was found, in M. de
Staal’s statement of February 10, already quoted, to be still more
uncertain than it appeared when it was first declared. Russia seemed to
have gained all that England lost, but it was a mere prelude to a far
more serious situation which was still to develop.

It would have been plain to any one, had he been susceptible to certain
unmistakable signs, that Russia’s desires in Manchuria were more
extensive than the mere acquisition of a lease of a commercial outlet on
the Yellow Sea. The same Count Muravieff, who had said three weeks
before that the presence of Russian ships at Port Arthur late in 1897
was purely for the sake of wintering there, and that the fact that Port
Arthur was ice-free was not very important, now declared, on January 12,
1898, that when the Russian fleet had left the port, after wintering
there, the Chinese Government had given the Russians a prior right of
anchorage—_le droit du premier mouillage_.[221] The question so gently
broached was more clearly pronounced a week later, when M. de Staal
strongly maintained that the opening of Talien-wan would result in an
encroachment upon the Russian sphere of influence, and in “denying her
in the future that right to the use of Port Arthur to which the progress
of events had given her a claim.”[222] In the face of these official
remarks, it would be impossible to deny that Russia wished to use, not
only Talien-wan, but also Port Arthur, and the latter for purposes
clearly other than commercial. Yet the British Government does not seem
to have taken any action in the matter, but, on the contrary, its tacit
recognition of Russia’s demand of the lease of Talien-wan was not of a
nature to discourage her design upon Port Arthur. On February 14, China
made concessions to Great Britain regarding internal navigation, the
non-alienation of the Yang-tsze Provinces, and the appointment of an
Englishman to the inspectorate-general of customs so long as the British
trade was preponderant in China;[223] on the 19th, the preliminary
agreement of the British loan was signed;[224] and March 6 saw the
conclusion of the German agreement concerning the lease of Kiao-chau and
privileges in the Province of Shan-tung. Russia immediately seized this
opportunity in bringing forward her long cherished design, for, on March
7, it was simultaneously reported in the London _Times_ and by Sir
Claude MacDonald, soon to be confirmed by the Tsungli-Yamên and admitted
by Count Muravieff, that M. Pavloff was pressing the Peking Government
to grant the lease of Port Arthur and Talien-wan and the railway
concession from Petuna on the trans-Manchurian Railway to the
ports.[225] The report appears to have made a profound impression upon
the British Government, which, on the day it was received, was compelled
to say that, if the Russian demands were granted, “her influence over
the Government of Peking would be so increased, to the detriment of that
of Her Majesty’s Government, that it seemed desirable for them to make
some counter-move. The best plan would perhaps be, on the cession of
Wei-hai-Wei by the Japanese [who had been holding it, according to the
treaty, pending the final payment of Chinese indemnity], to insist on
the refusal of a lease of that port on terms similar to those granted to
Germany.”[226] This view was sounded, it is true, to the British
Minister at Peking, and not to the Russian Government, but the latter
was not to encounter an effective protest from a government which had so
soon made up its mind that the protest might fail and be compensated by
itself reproducing the evil at China’s expense.[227] At any rate, Count
Muravieff deemed it now safe to declare, beginning with March 8, that no
alternative had been left to Russia, under the uncertainty attending the
development of affairs in the Far East and other circumstances, but to
demand a cession both of Talien-wan and Port Arthur, the former only to
be opened to foreign trade; that one of these ports without the other
would be of no use to Russia, while the use of both was of vital
necessity to her; and that the lease would not interfere with the
sovereign rights of the Chinese Empire. To the last pledge was added,
probably at the persistent representations of England, that the treaty
rights acquired by the Powers in China would be respected.[228]

The distinction made by Count Muravieff between Port Arthur and
Talien-wan at once brought home to the British Government the gravity of
the situation. The first impulse on the part of Lord Salisbury was to
fall back upon M. de Staal’s statement of February 10, that any (_tout_)
port which Russia might acquire on the Chinese coast should be open to
the foreign trade.[229] Count Muravieff, however, explained that the
statement applied only to Talien-wan, but no promise had been made
regarding Port Arthur.[230] On March 15, however, he was authorized by
the Czar to give to Sir N. O’Conor “an assurance that both Port Arthur
and Talien-wan would be open to foreign trade, like other Chinese ports,
in the event of the Russian Government’s obtaining a lease of these
places from the Chinese Government.” The Count intimated next morning
that it would be desirable for the British Government not to repeat this
assurance in the House of Commons, for “it might be considered as a want
of courtesy toward the Chinese Government, who had not yet formally
agreed to give the Russian Government a lease of the ports in
question.”[231]

Presently, however, the British Government awoke to the conviction that
Port Arthur was “not a commercial harbor,” and “it was doubtful whether
it could be converted into one.” “But,” stated the Marquess of
Salisbury, “though not a commercial harbor, Port Arthur supplies a naval
base, limited indeed in extent, but possessing great natural and
artificial strength. And this, taken in connection with its strategic
position, gives it an importance in the Gulf of Pechili and therefore at
Peking, upon which, in their representation to Japan at the close of the
war with China, the Russian Government laid the greatest emphasis....
The possession, even if temporary, of this particular position, is
likely to have political consequences at Peking of great international
importance, and the acquisition of a Chinese harbor notoriously useless
for commercial purposes by a foreign Power will be universally
interpreted in the Far East as indicating that the partition of China
has begun.... It may, perhaps, be proper to observe that a great
military Power which is conterminous for over four thousand miles with
the land frontier of China, including the portion lying nearest to its
capital, is never likely to be without its due share of influence on the
councils of that country. Her Majesty’s Government regard it as most
unfortunate that it has been thought necessary, in addition, to obtain
control of a port which, if the rest of the Gulf of Pechili remains in
hands so helpless as that of the sovereign Power, will command the
maritime approaches to its capital, and give to Russia the same
strategic advantage by sea which she already possesses in so ample a
measure by land.”[232] In this spirit, the British Government asked
Count Muravieff through Sir N. O’Conor, on March 23, to reconsider the
advisability of pressing demands upon China in regard to Port Arthur.
England would not object to the Russian lease of an ice-free commercial
harbor connected by rail with the trans-Siberian Railway, but questions
of an entirely different kind were opened if Russia obtained control of
a military port in the neighborhood of Peking. England, on her part, was
prepared to give assurances that beyond the maintenance of the existing
treaty rights she had no interests in Manchuria, and to pledge herself
not to occupy any port in the Gulf of Pechili as long as other Powers
maintained the same policy.[233] To this protest, so plainly attended by
a second wish of Great Britain to make a counter-move when the prime
move of Russia could not be checked, Count Muravieff made, on March 23,
a firm reply, refusing absolutely to admit that the integrity of the
Chinese Empire was violated by the proposed lease of Port Arthur, and
repeating his assertion that the possession of that harbor was a
question of vital necessity to Russia. Sir N. O’Conor confessed the
futility of his protest.[234] About the same day, M. Pavloff informed
the Peking Government that Russia could not consider the question of
Port Arthur and Talien-wan apart, and insisted upon their lease before
the 27th, failing which, Russia would take hostile measures.[235] Now
England definitely resolved, on March 25, to obtain speedily the lease
of Wei-hai-Wei in terms similar to those granted to Russia for Port
Arthur, and ordered the British fleet to proceed from Hong-kong to the
Gulf of Pechili,[236] and, three days later, notified the Russian
Government that she would retain her entire liberty of action to take
steps to protect her interests, and to diminish the evil consequences
which she anticipated.[237] On the preceding day, however, a
Russo-Chinese Agreement had been signed, incorporating all the points
upon which Russia had insisted and against which England had vainly
protested. Count Muravieff at once briefly announced to the Powers the
successful conclusion of the Agreement;[238] and, when the British
Government called upon him to fulfill his promise to give a written
assurance of Russia’s declared intention to respect the sovereign rights
of China and the treaty privileges of the other Powers in the leased
territory, he calmly replied that what was interpreted as promises was
in fact “very confidentially” expressed views, and that “the time was
not opportune” for making the assurances public. Russia would not, he
added, so “abuse the lease granted by a friendly Power” as “to
arbitrarily transform a closed and principally military port into a
commercial port like any other.”[239] The triumph of Russia was tardily
followed, on April 3, by the promise England secured from China to lease
Wei-hai-Wei to her for the same period as Port Arthur,[240] thus again
substituting for an effective prevention of evils the “balance”[241] and
retaliation between the Powers at the expense of China.[242]

In this connection, it may be noted that the Russian Government
considered, according to Count Muravieff, “that China owed them this
[the lease of the ports] for the services they had rendered her in her
war with Japan, and these services must be properly requited.”[243] It
was no matter of surprise to Japan that Russia now secured for herself
the most strategic portion of the territory, the retention of which by
Japan was, three years ago, declared by the same Power to be imperiling
the position of Peking, rendering Korean independence nominal, and
interfering with the permanent peace of the Far East. When it was
announced by Russia, in December last, that Port Arthur had been lent to
her by China only temporarily as a winter anchorage, the Japanese
Government merely “credited this assurance, and accordingly took note of
it.”[244] When the negotiations for the lease were in progress, the
Japanese Government made no protest, and when they were consummated, it
manifested no appreciable sentiment. At the same time, it quietly
approved of the British lease of Wei-hai-Wei,[245] which the Japanese
troops had still held pending the final payment of the Chinese
indemnity. Then they speedily evacuated the port in favor of England,
leaving behind them every accommodation to the successor.[246]

The Agreement concluded, on March 15/27, 1898, between Li Hung-chang and
the Russian _Chargé_, M. Pavloff, has never been published by the
Russian Government, and the only sources to which we can turn are an
English translation of a Chinese _précis_ forwarded by Sir Claude
MacDonald more than a month after the conclusion of the Agreement,[247]
and the Chinese text that appears in the _Tō-A Kwankei Tokushu Jōyaku
Isan_.[248] Port Arthur and Talien-wan, with their adjacent waters, were
leased to Russia for twenty-five years, subject to renewal by mutual
agreement, the lease not affecting the sovereign rights of China
(Articles 1 and 3); within the leased territory, Chinese citizens might
continue to live, but no Chinese troops should be stationed, and the
responsibility of military affairs should be vested in one Russian
officer, who should not bear the Chinese title of governor-general or
governor (Article 4); Port Arthur would be a naval port open only to the
Russian and Chinese men-of-war, but closed against the commercial and
naval ships of other nations, while Talien-wan, except the portion used
exclusively for naval purposes, would be a trading port open freely to
the merchant vessels of all nations (Article 6); the Russians would be
allowed to build forts and barracks, and provide defenses (Article 7);
there should be a neutral territory to the north of the leased ground,
which would be administered by Chinese officials, but into which no
Chinese troops should be sent without consulting the Russian authorities
(Article 5); the railway contract of 1896 might be extended so as to
cover a branch line to Talien-wan and, if necessary, another line
between Niu-chwang and the Yalu, but the construction of the railways
should not be made a ground for securing territory (Article 8). Sir
Claude Macdonald presented also, on June 14, what he believed to be an
authentic version of the Special Russo-Chinese Agreement concluded on
April 25 (May 7), 1898, to supplement the Agreement of March 15.[249] It
defined the extent of the leased territory, and of the neutral territory
to the north of the former (Articles 1 and 2).[250] Within the latter,
it was agreed, no ports should be open to the trade of other nations,
and no economic concessions made to them, without Russian consent
(Article 5). At Kin-chow, the administration and police were to be
Chinese, but the military, Russian (Article 4). Regarding railways, it
was provided that Port Arthur and Talien-wan should be the termini of
the conceded line, along which no railway privileges should be given to
other nations. Russia would, however, have nothing to say if China
herself should undertake to construct a railway from Shan-hai-kwan to a
point near the Russian line (Article 3).

These agreements were accompanied by some characteristically pacific and
magnanimous utterances by the Czar, professing his firm friendship with
China, extolling the wise decision of the Son of Heaven in granting the
lease, and emphasizing that the direct communication by means of the
great Siberian Railway with the hitherto closed-up country would largely
contribute to the peaceful intercourse of the peoples of the East and
West, to which task Russia was called by Divine Providence.[251]

The leased territory was named Kwan-tung[252] by the Russians, and the
Provisional Regulations for its administration were published at St.
Petersburg through the _Bulletin des Lois_ of August 20 (September 1),
1899.[253] By these regulations, the Kwan-tung region was placed under
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War, with its chief seat of
administration at Port Arthur (Articles 4 and 6). The Administration was
headed by a Governor, appointed and removed at the immediate will of the
Czar, who was also Commander-in-Chief of the army forces of the
territory and entered into immediate communication with the commander of
the cis-Amur region, and in addition commanded the navy at Port Arthur
and Vladivostok; the latter port, however, retained its Commander of the
port, who was subservient to the Governor (Articles 3, 7, 12, 13, and
14). In matters concerning frontier and foreign relations, the Governor
directly communicated with the Russian Representatives at Peking, Tokio,
and Seul, and with the Russian military and naval agents (Article 22).
At the creation on August 13, 1903, of a Vice-regency in this region,
which will receive attention later, it became necessary to make some
changes in the administrative rules, which had not been completed at the
outbreak of the present war.

Talien-wan being mainly open to foreign trade, its organization and
administration were set on a separate basis from the rest of the
Kwan-tung. At the instance of M. Witte, then the Minister of Finance, an
Imperial Order was promulgated on July 30 (August 11), 1899, ordering
that near Talien-wan a new town named Dalny should be built, which was
simultaneously declared a free port under the following conditions,
namely, that the importation and exportation of merchandise should be
allowed free of customs dues in Dalny within the limits determined, and
liable to modification, by the Minister of Finance; but that goods
imported into Russia from Dalny should pay the regular import duties in
force in the Russian Empire.[254] By the Provisional Regulations already
referred to of August 20 (September 1) of the same year, the
organization of Dalny was assigned to the Eastern Chinese Railway
Company, under the chief direction of the Minister of Finance, and its
administration was intrusted to a Prefect, to be appointed and dismissed
by Imperial orders and subordinate to the Governor of the Kwan-tung
(Articles 99 and 101).[255] It is already well known that Dalny, now
covering about 100 square versts in area, was, according to M. Witte’s
plan, intended to be the commercial terminus of the great Siberian
Railway, and eventually the mercantile outlet on the Pacific of the vast
Russian Empire. Before the war, the works at Dalny, including its large
docks and piers, had cost already nearly 20,000,000 rubles. Part of this
immense expenditure was to have been met by the income of the public
sales at auction of land-lots, held three times since 1902, in spite of
the fact that the twenty-five year lease of the territory to Russia
would hardly justify her in alienating portions of it permanently.[256]

-----

Footnote 198:

  Cf. _China, No. 1 (1898)_, Nos. 1 and 15. China seems to have
  requested Russia to advise Germany to reconsider her action. Later,
  Russia is said to have reported that she had failed to change the mind
  of the Kaiser.

Footnote 199:

  Count Muravieff’s remark to Sir N. O’Conor, the British _Chargé_ at
  St. Petersburg, on March 28, 1898.—_China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 125.

Footnote 200:

  Kiao-chau was occupied on November 17, three Russian war-vessels came
  to Port Arthur on December 18, 1897; the German-Chinese Agreement was
  concluded on March 5, the formal demand by Russia was presented about
  the 7th, and granted on the 27th of the same month, 1898.

Footnote 201:

  _Ibid._, pp. 42–43, Nos. 95, 96, 98, 100. It is interesting to note
  that, on February 4, 1902, when negotiations were in progress between
  Russia and China, the former supporting large exclusive demands made
  by the Russo-Chinese Bank in Manchuria, M. Lessar, the Russian
  Minister, said that his Government was merely asking for privileges
  similar to those of Germany in Shan-tung.—U. S. 57th Congress, 2d
  Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. p. 274.

Footnote 202:

  _China, No. 1 (1898)_, p. 9, No. 231.

Footnote 203:

  The statement made by Count Muravieff, on December 22, 1897, at his
  diplomatic reception, and reported by Mr. W. E. Goschen.—_China, No. 1
  (1898)_, pp. 12–13, No. 37.

Footnote 204:

  See _Ibid._, Nos. 26, 43, 62. At the same time, M. Pavloff, the
  Russian _Chargé_ at Peking, demanded the dismissal of Mr. Kinder,
  British chief engineer of the Northern Railway.—_Ibid._, No. 38; cf.
  Nos. 111, 115, 117.

Footnote 205:

  M. Pavloff’s own story to Sir Claude MacDonald, on March 17,
  1898.—_China, No. 2 (1899)_, No. 2.

Footnote 206:

  _China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 26.

Footnote 207:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 30, 32, 43, 46. Some of the other terms were: (1) the
  maritime and native customs, salt tax, and _likin_, as security; (2) a
  railway from the Burmese frontier to the Yang-tsze valley; (3) a
  guarantee against the cession of territory in the Yang-tsze valley to
  any other Power; (4) the opening of some other ports; (5) the pledge
  that so long as the British trade with China was larger than the trade
  of any other nation, the inspector-general of customs should always be
  an Englishman; (6) a freer internal navigation; etc. These terms seem
  to have been framed so as to protect British interests in China
  strictly within the scope of the most-favored-nation principle. The
  demand for the opening of Talien-wan and Nanning strongly prejudiced
  England against Russia and France, while the Burma-Yang-tsze Railway
  was unpleasing to France, and the non-alienation of the river valley
  was sometimes regarded by Russia as a counterpart of her own claims
  beyond the Great Wall. The whole story of the loan negotiation, as
  well as that of the Northern Railway extension loan, is highly
  interesting and important in the recent history of China, but we are
  here concerned with the bearing of the first loan on the development
  of the Manchurian question.

Footnote 208:

  It is highly interesting to note that during the latter part of 1903,
  when Russian aggression in Manchuria and on the northern frontier of
  Korea was feared, the American and Japanese Governments, with the
  moral support of the British, made successful efforts to open Mukden,
  Tatung-kao, and An-tung to foreign trade. This proposition had met a
  strong Russian opposition, which also delayed, till after the outbreak
  of the present war, the opening of Wiju on the Korean border.

Footnote 209:

  _China, No. 1 (1898)_, Nos. 51, 57.

Footnote 210:

  _China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 59.

Footnote 211:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 72, 76, 123, etc.

Footnote 212:

  The most-favored-nation clause is referred to, which—sometimes in
  general and sometimes in specific terms, and sometimes reciprocal and
  conditional, but nearly always unilateral and unconditional—is
  inserted in the treaty of China with each Power. See Mayers, op. cit.

Footnote 213:

  A dispute arose later between the Russian and British Governments on
  this word “any” (_tout_). The latter interpreted it to mean any port
  secured by Russia in China, while the former claimed that the Czar’s
  Government had never promised to open Port Arthur to foreign
  trade.—March 13, 1898; _China, No. 1 (1898)_, pp. 47–48, No. 114.

Footnote 214:

  _Ibid._, No. 76.

Footnote 215:

  _China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 83.

Footnote 216:

  See p. 133, below.

Footnote 217:

  Compare the Russian reply to Secretary Hay’s note of September, 1899,
  pp. 135–138, below.

Footnote 218:

  On January 17.—_China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 56. Cf. No. 62.

Footnote 219:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 65, 69, 75, 78, 79.

Footnote 220:

  In his speech before the House of Lords on February 8. See _ibid._,
  Nos. 82, 83, 87; the _Parliamentary Debates_, 4th Series, vol. 53, pp.
  40–41.

Footnote 221:

  _China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 54.

Footnote 222:

  _Ibid._, No. 59.

Footnote 223:

  _China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 85.

Footnote 224:

  _Ibid._, No. 88.

Footnote 225:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 95, 96, 99, 100, 101, 103.

Footnote 226:

  _China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 95 (Salisbury to MacDonald).

Footnote 227:

  The Russian Government soon had occasion to gauge the strength of the
  British protest, for, on March 8, Sir N. O’Conor made a striking
  statement to Count Muravieff, as will be seen in the following report
  (_ibid._, No. 108, O’Conor to Salisbury): “I alluded, as no doubt his
  Excellency was aware, to the junction of the Burmese and Chinese
  railway systems. This demand became at once still more necessary and
  reasonable if greater privileges of the same kind were accorded to
  Russia in the Liao-tung Peninsula, as they had apparently already been
  accorded in Manchuria. Count Muravieff did not, however, respond to
  these remarks beyond saying that he supposed the Burma-Chinese line
  would, in this case, descend to the valley of the Yang-tsze.” The
  Count’s remark may be considered a sufficient reply, when it is seen
  in connection with another remark he made a few moments earlier. When
  Sir N. O’Conor alluded to the objectionable features of leasing Port
  Arthur, the Foreign Minister reminded him that British interests were
  principally represented in the neighborhood of the Yang-tsze. Russia
  would evade the British protest by turning England’s attention to her
  own sphere, in which Russia had little interest, and would not object
  to a British repetition there of Russia’s conduct in Manchuria.
  Muravieff must have thought that O’Conor, by his reference to the
  Burmese Railway, now voluntarily threw himself into his net. Russia
  later succeeded in inducing England to conclude the Anglo-Russian
  railway declaration of April 28, 1899, delimiting in a negative manner
  the railway spheres of the two Powers in China, Russia pledging not to
  seek concessions and not to obstruct those of the British in the
  Yang-tsze valley, and England pledging similarly in regard to Russian
  concessions beyond the Great Wall. (See _China, No. 2 (1899)_, No.
  138.) The Russian Government naturally considered the conclusion of
  this agreement as a diplomatic victory over the British, and seemed to
  have interpreted its terms as implying that all the territory beyond
  the Great Wall was the Russian sphere, not only of railway
  concessions, but also of general interests and influence. Already in
  May of the same year, M. Pavloff renewed his demand at Peking for the
  concession of a Russian railway to be built directly to the Chinese
  capital, thus even overreaching the limit set in the British agreement
  of less than a fortnight previous. See _China, No. 1 (1900)_, pp. 112,
  116, 120, 129, 132–133, 214–215.

Footnote 228:

  _China, No. 1 (1898)_, Nos. 101, 105, 108, 110, 114, 120, 149.

Footnote 229:

  _China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 104.

Footnote 230:

  _Ibid._, No. 114.

Footnote 231:

  _Ibid._, No. 120.

Footnote 232:

  _China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 138. The Marquess did not refer to a matter
  of enormous importance, that the proposed railways would _connect_ the
  immense land and sea forces of Russia, which he emphasized.

Footnote 233:

  _China, No. 1 (1900)_, Nos. 123 and 133.

Footnote 234:

  “I cannot say that my efforts were successful.... I was unable to
  induce his Excellency to modify his views.”—_Ibid._, Nos. 125 and 132.

Footnote 235:

  _Ibid._, No. 126.

Footnote 236:

  _China, No. 1 (1900)_, No. 129.

Footnote 237:

  _Ibid._, No. 138.

Footnote 238:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 134, 136, and 137.

Footnote 239:

  Cf. _ibid._, Nos. 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 149, and 151.

Footnote 240:

  _Ibid._, No. 144. The agreement was signed at Peking on July 1. See
  _Treaty Series_, No. 14, 1898.

Footnote 241:

  “Balance of power in Gulf of Pechili is materially altered by
  surrender of Port Arthur by the Yamên to Russia. It is therefore
  necessary to obtain,” etc.—Salisbury to MacDonald, March 25; _China,
  No. 1 (1898)_, No. 129. Cf. also _China, No. 1 (1899)_, No. 2.

  It should be said, in justice to Great Britain, that at first, when
  the Chinese Government intimated toward the end of February that they
  would lease Wei-hai-Wei to her if she would accept it, Lord Salisbury
  considered such an offer premature, for his Government “aimed at
  discouraging any alienation of Chinese territory.”—_Ibid._, Nos. 90
  and 91.

Footnote 242:

  Two other instances may here be cited to further illustrate the policy
  of the British Government during this critical period of time. (1)
  Soon after the appearance of Russian war-vessels at Port Arthur,
  Admiral Buller, of the China station of the British navy, arrived at
  Chemulpo with seven ships, on December 29, and ordered the
  “Immortalité” and “Iphigenia” to proceed to Port Arthur. The former
  was, on January 10, ordered to leave for Chefu. The presence of the
  British boats created “a bad impression” on Russia, which requested
  England to avoid dangers of conflict in the Russian “sphere of
  influence.” The British Government explained that the ships had been
  sent by the Admiral without instruction from the Admiralty, and would
  soon leave, “in ordinary course of cruising.” It was added, at the
  same time, that British ships had a perfect right to proceed to Port
  Arthur. It was reported at one time that the two boats had been
  ordered away from Port Arthur under protest from Russia.—_Ibid._, Nos.
  31, 48, 52, 63, 66, 68. (2) On March 8, Sir Claude MacDonald was
  informed by the Tsung-li Yamên that the only reason given by M.
  Pavloff for the demand of the lease of the two ports was to “assist in
  protecting Manchuria against the aggression of other Powers.” Probably
  England and Japan were meant, and the Yamên was fully alive to the
  absurdity of this pretext, but was unable to resist the Russian
  demands. It therefore begged earnestly that the British Government
  would assist it by giving a formal assurance to the Russian Government
  that England had no designs on Manchuria. It does not seem to have
  been thought necessary by the British Government to give such an
  assurance. See _ibid._, Nos. 100 and 109.

Footnote 243:

  _China, No. 1 (1898)_, No. 114 (O’Conor to Salisbury, March 13).

Footnote 244:

  _Ibid._, No. 29.

Footnote 245:

  “The Japanese Government,” said Baron Nishi, Foreign Minister of
  Japan, confidentially, to Sir Ernest Satow, about March 20, “had been
  anxious that China should be able to maintain her position at
  Wei-hai-Wei, but if she found it impossible to do so, Japan would have
  no objection to its being held by a Power disposed to assist in
  maintaining the independence of China.”—_China, No. 1 (1899)_, No. 35.
  Cf. also Nos. 49, 79, 81, 107, etc.

Footnote 246:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 85, 112, 118, 231, 238.

  Russia had undertaken to request Japan to promise that China would
  secure Wei-hai-Wei after the Japanese evacuation, but Japan declined
  to make such a pledge.—_Ibid._, No. 30. In April, 1902, the control of
  Wei-hai-Wei was transferred from the Admiralty to the Colonial Office.
  The mouth of the harbor is so large that it would require an enormous
  expenditure and large forces to fortify and defend it adequately. At
  the time when England leased the port, she was hardly inclined to let
  financial considerations thwart her effort to restore her prestige so
  abruptly foreshadowed by that of Russia. In 1902, however, the lately
  concluded Anglo-Japanese agreement of alliance rendered the
  fortification of Wei-hai-Wei no longer necessary. See _Tokushu
  Jōyaku_, pp. 172–173.

Footnote 247:

  _China, No. 1 (1899)_, pp. 127–129, No. 187, dated Peking, April 29.
  Regarding this _précis_, Sir Claude says: “It bears every sign of
  foreign authorship, and the original cannot have been drafted by a
  Chinese. I have no doubt that the document correctly represents the
  sense of the original agreement, for it fully corresponds with what I
  have been able to learn of the contents of the latter.” M. Cordier
  also relies on this _précis_ in his _Histoire des relations de la
  Chine avec les puissances occidentales_, vol. iii. pp. 362–364.

Footnote 248:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 244–245. This Chinese text naturally clears up
  some points which are obscure in the _précis_.

Footnote 249:

  See _China, No. 1 (1899)_, p. 188, No. 273. Also Cordier, _Histoire_,
  vol. iii. pp. 365–366. A Japanese version obtained from the Foreign
  Office at Tokio appears in _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 246–247. The Special
  Agreement was supplemented by another Agreement concluded on April 25
  (o. s.), 1899.

Footnote 250:

  The boundary of the leased territory began with the northern side of
  A-tang Bay (Port Adams), on the west coast of the Liao-tung Peninsula,
  and passed through and included the A-tang Mountains, ending near
  Pi-tse-wo, and including the adjacent waters and isles. The northern
  limit of the neutral ground started at the mouth of the Kai-chow
  River, passed north of Yuyen-ch’êng and along the Ta-yang River, and
  ended at and included its mouth.

Footnote 251:

  See the Czar’s telegraphic message to the Chinese Emperor, on March
  15/27; and his Imperial orders of March 17/29 and July 30/August 11.
  _China, No. 1 (1899)_, pp. 20–21, 1–2, and 262–263.

Footnote 252:

  Meaning, presumably, east of Shan-hai-kwan.

Footnote 253:

  See _China, No. 1 (1900)_, pp. 292–293, 304–311, and 335. Also the
  _Tsūshō Isan_ (Japanese Consular Reports), April 28, 1904, pp. 33–46.

Footnote 254:

  See _China, No. 1 (1900)_, pp. 262–263.

Footnote 255:

  _China, No. 1 (1900)_, pp. 308–311.

Footnote 256:

  Conditions at Dalny since its foundation are minutely described by M.
  Suzuki, agent of the Japanese Foreign Office in the _Tsūshō Isan_ for
  April 23 (pp. 39–49), 28 (pp. 32–46), May 3 (pp. 37–49), 8 (pp.
  42–55), 12 (pp. 36–42), and 18 (pp. 33–37), 1904.




                               CHAPTER V
                     SECRETARY HAY’S CIRCULAR NOTE


It is unnecessary for us to describe how, between 1897 and 1899, other
so-called spheres of influence and of economic concessions than those
already mentioned were marked out in China by the Powers, for, important
as they are in the general history of the modern East, they have little
bearing upon our immediate subject. It suffices to recall that the
process was begun by the German seizure of Kiao-chau; that unfortunately
Great Britain felt obliged to have recourse to the policy of the balance
of power; and that no other “sphere” had the grave significance and the
evil forebodings of the Russian territory of the Kwan-tung in Manchuria.
It was during this period that a Power whose position was so unique as
to justify the act appealed to the other interested Powers, in
September, 1899, to make declarations that they would observe the
principle of the equal economic opportunity for all nations in their
respective spheres of interest in China. The principle thus proposed by
the United States was stated to imply (1) non-interference with the
treaty rights and vested interests of each other; (2) the maintenance of
the Chinese treaty tariff, except in “free ports,” under the Chinese
management; and (3) no differential treatment in the harbor duties and
railway charges, in the spheres. The phrase “leased territory” was used
in connection with only the first of these three points, while the words
“spheres of interest” were applied to all three, so that it was
uncertain whether the second and third points were intended by Secretary
Hay to cover the leases, as well as the spheres.[257] In reply to this
proposition, Great Britain, which had stronger reason than the United
States to indorse a policy which had originated with her and which she
had long upheld in China at enormous cost, and Japan expressed their
unequivocal adherence to the proposed principle. Germany, France, and
Italy also assented, all except Italy, however, with the natural
reservation that the desired declarations would be made if all other
interested Powers acted likewise.[258] As regards the question whether
the three points applied to the leases and spheres alike, it is
interesting to note that Germany, France, and Great Britain replied, in
effect, in the affirmative, Germany using the expression “its Chinese
possessions,” and France employing the phrase “the territories which
were leased to her.” The statement used by Great Britain was the most
explicit and comprehensive, for she mentioned “the leased territory of
Wei-hai-Wei and all territory in China which may hereafter be acquired
by Great Britain, by lease or otherwise, and all ‘spheres of interest’
now held, or that may hereafter be held in China.” Beside these
assurances, the Russian assent was highly significant, which, with the
reservation similar to that of the other Powers, stated: “As to the
ports now opened, or hereafter to be opened, to foreign commerce _by the
Chinese Government_,[259] and which lie _beyond_ the leased territory to
Russia, the settlement of the question of customs duties belongs to
China herself, and the Imperial Government [of Russia] has no intention
whatever of claiming any privileges for its own subjects to the
exclusion of foreigners.” But “in so far as the territory leased by
China to Russia is concerned, the Imperial Government [of Russia] has
already demonstrated its firm intention to follow the policy of the
‘open door’ by creating Dalny (Talien-wan) a free port; and _if at some
future time that port, although remaining free itself, should be
separated by a custom-limit from other portions of the territory in
question_, the customs duties would be levied, in the zone subject to
the tariff, upon all _foreign_ merchants without distinction as to
nationality. With the conviction,” the Russian note concluded, “that
this reply is such as to ratify the inquiry made in the aforementioned
note [of the United States], the Imperial Government is happy to have
complied with the wishes of the American Government, especially as it
attaches the highest value to anything that may strengthen and
consolidate the traditional relations of friendship existing between the
two countries.”[260] On the strength of the various replies from the
Powers, however, the United States Government considered that “the
Declaration suggested by the United States on that subject [i. e., the
proposals about the Chinese trade] had been accepted by those Powers,”
and regarded the assent given by them “as final and definite.”[261] It
is interesting to note that no Power made a formal declaration[262]
suggested by Secretary Hay, who, however, seems to have deemed the
replies with reservations as equivalent to such a declaration. It is
problematical whether this exchange of notes did in the slightest degree
have the effect of changing the actual situation, at least so far as
Russia was concerned.

-----

Footnote 257:

  _China, No. 2 (1900)_, No. 1.

Footnote 258:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 2, 3, 4, and inclosures 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, in No. 5.

Footnote 259:

  The italics in the quotations are the author’s.

Footnote 260:

  _China, No. 2 (1900)_, inclosure 6 in No. 5.

Footnote 261:

  _Ibid._, No. 5, White to Salisbury, March 30, 1900.

Footnote 262:

  Cf. _ibid._, No. 6.




                               CHAPTER VI
                      THE OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA


We have given only an incomplete account of the manner in which certain
Powers seemed, during the years 1897 and 1898, to vie with one another
in transgressing, in effect, the principle of the territorial integrity
of the Chinese Empire, to which they at the same time professed their
adherence. Another principle, however,—that of the open door, or of the
equal opportunity in China for the commercial and industrial enterprise
of all nations,—was, as we have seen, not as openly ignored even by the
most aggressive Powers. The time arrived, in 1900, when the observance
of both principles appeared to be the only safeguard against a general
partition of China and an internal revolution through the length and
breadth of the vast Empire. The story of the Boxer trouble is too fresh
in every one’s memory to need to be retold. It was during this
insurrection, and during the march of the allied forces toward Peking
and the long negotiations which followed it, that all the Powers
concerned repeatedly and unequivocally pledged themselves to one another
to maintain the two cardinal principles of Chinese diplomacy. It now
belongs to us to relate, however, that it was in the midst of this
reiterated promise of fair play that the most acute stage of the
Manchurian question was reached. Evidence is abundant to show that
Russia was inclined greatly to underestimate the seriousness of the
troubles in North China, where a concerted action of all the interested
Powers was imperative, while in Manchuria, which Russia had for years
regarded as her sphere of influence,[263] she carried forward aggressive
measures with great rapidity and on an enormous scale. Thus, even so
late as June 20, when the railway communication of Peking with Tientsin
had been cut for three weeks;[264] when Prince Tuan and his anti-foreign
counselors swayed the Court, and the Tsung-li Yamên had long proved
utterly impotent to cope with the situation;[265] when the 6000 Chinese
soldiers sent against the Boxers around Tientsin betrayed themselves
into inaction;[266] when the international relief corps of marines led
by Admiral Seymour had already been forced backward;[267] when the
Boxers had at last poured into Peking[268] and held the foreigners in
siege for a week, killing many Chinese as well as the Japanese
Chancellor Sugiyama;[269] and when the Taku forts had been taken by the
allied squadron,[270] only to infuriate the anti-foreign sentiment all
over North China;[271] when no news had been received by him even from
Tientsin and Taku for the past four days,[272] and after he had
dispatched 4000 Russian soldiers for the disposal of M. de Giers at
Peking,[273]—Count Muravieff still held an optimistic view, and supposed
that the trouble would be over within two weeks, saying that Middle and
South China were under a greater peril than the North.[274] This last
assertion, which he made more than once,[275] is significant when we
consider that Middle and South China included regions where British
interests were predominant. Although Russia persistently declared her
firm intention to act in concert with other Powers in North China, it is
not altogether impossible to suppose, as it has been alleged, that she
was not unwilling to divert the attention of Great Britain and others
from North China, where Russia would not have hesitated, if possible, to
render her sole assistance to China to suppress the insurrection. At
least, Russia declared it to be one of her objects in China to “assist
the Chinese Government in the work of reëstablishing order so necessary
in the primary interest of China herself;”[276] at least, the
pro-Russian Li Hung-chang expressed, on June 22, an otherwise
inexplicable confidence in his ability to restore peace.[277] The real
siege and firing of the Peking Legations had begun two days before, on
June 20, the day when Count Muravieff uttered his optimistic remarks at
St. Petersburg. The latter died the next day, and was succeeded in the
Foreign Ministry by Count Lamsdorff. On June 26, the Russian Government
ordered the mobilization into Manchuria of six large corps of troops
from Hailar, Blagovestchensk and Habarofsk, Vladivostok and Possiet, and
European Russia.[278] One estimate put the number of the Russian
soldiers who had arrived in Manchuria by August at 30,000.[279] It is
not easy to determine whether Russia took the offensive in the great
Manchurian campaign which now began, or whether hostile acts of the
Chinese precipitated it, but it seems safe to say that rumors of
impending dangers had been abundant before the Russian troops poured
into the territory,[280] and also that the dispatch of the latter
apparently provoked more extensive outrages of the rioters than would
otherwise have been the case. We hear of the destruction of the railway
and burning of religious establishments near Liao-yang and Mukden only
from the end of June and beginning of July,[281] and the alleged
determination of the Chinese troops to drive out all Russians from
Manchuria was reported in the Russian _Official Messenger_ toward the
middle of July.[282] Just at this time riots occurred in the Liao-tung
and its vicinity, communication by the Amur ceased, and Blagovestchensk
was suddenly bombarded by the Chinese, followed by the slaughter of
thousands of Chinese inhabitants by the Russian soldiers under General
Gribsky.[283] Toward the south and east, the depot of Ninguta was
destroyed, and several Russians were murdered at An-tung, about July 20.
The Russian troops, many of whom had now arrived at different points in
Manchuria, captured Hun-chun on July 27, Argun on July 30, Haibin on
August 3, and Aigun and San-sin soon afterward.[284] Even the treaty
port of Niu-chwang had also been seized, for which conduct the British
and American consular agents could not find sufficient justification. On
August 5, the port was placed under the civil administration of Russian
authorities, under which injustice and disorder were said to have much
increased.[285] It was on August 14, the day when the allied forces had
almost reached Peking, that General Groderkoff in command of the
northern army of the Manchurian invasion wrote to the Minister of War at
St. Petersburg: “Fifty years ago Nevelskoy raised the Russian flag at
the mouth of the Amur, on its right bank, and laid the foundation for
our possessions on that great river. Now, after hard fighting, we have
taken possession of the right bank, thus consolidating the great
enterprise of annexing the whole of the Amur to Russia’s dominions, and
making that river an internal waterway and not a frontier stream,
whereby free and unmolested navigation of that artery through one of the
vastest regions of the Empire has been secured.” Indeed, by the time
when the Peking Legations were relieved, the major part of Manchuria had
been reduced under a military occupation by Russia.[286] This may be
said to mark a new stage in the development of the Manchurian question,
for no longer was this vast territory a mere sphere of Russian
influence; it was a prize of conquest.[287] The problem for the
Government of the Czar henceforth seemed to the outside world to be not
so much how it might tighten its hold upon Manchuria, as how it might
convert the temporary occupation into a permanent possession.

[Illustration:

  COUNT LAMSDORFF

  _Russian Foreign Minister_
]

-----

Footnote 263:

  It may reasonably be said that the meaning of the intervention of
  Russia, France, and Germany, in 1895, in regard to Japan’s claim upon
  the Liao-tung Peninsula may be gathered, in a retroactive way, from
  Russia’s conduct in Manchuria since 1896. At any rate, M. Pavloff
  declared, in October, 1897, that “the Russian Government intended that
  the provinces of China bordering on the Russian frontier must not come
  under the influence of any nation except Russia.”—_China, No. 1
  (1898)_, p. 6. This declaration throws light not only on the
  trans-Manchurian railway concessions and the lease of ports, but also
  on Russia’s action respecting the Northern Railway extension and the
  consequent Anglo-Russian agreement of April, 1899. In May, 1898, there
  were already 200 Russian soldiers in Kirin, and in December, 2000 in
  Port Arthur and Talien-wan, while many Cossacks guarded railway
  construction, and many barracks were being hurriedly built, so that
  there were sufficient indications even before 1900 that Russia
  regarded Manchuria as her sphere of influence.

Footnote 264:

  May 29.—_China, No. 3 (1900)_, No. 5.

Footnote 265:

  Cf. _China, No. 4 (1900)_, No. 1 (June 5).

Footnote 266:

  _China, No. 3 (1900)_, No. 94; _No. 4 (1900)_, No. 1 (June 8).

Footnote 267:

  _China, No. 3 (1900)_, No. 219 (June 16–26).

Footnote 268:

  _Ibid._, No. 133; _No. 4 (1900)_, No. 2 (evening, June 13).

Footnote 269:

  _China, No. 3 (1900)_, No. 122 (June 13).

Footnote 270:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 132, 148, 157, and 186 (June 17).

Footnote 271:

  _Ibid._, No. 157.

Footnote 272:

  _Ibid._, No. 159. It is true that some of these events had not been
  known to Muravieff, but enough news had reached him to show the
  extreme gravity of the situation.

Footnote 273:

  _Ibid._, No. 149 (June 16).

Footnote 274:

  _Ibid._, No. 159. Also see Nos. 43, 45, 48, 65, 58, 114, 120, all
  indicating the optimistic view of the Count.

Footnote 275:

  Cf. _ibid._, No. 120 (June 13).

Footnote 276:

  _China, No. 3 (1900)_, No. 149 (June 16). In the Czar’s reply to the
  Chinese Emperor’s appeal for a friendly intervention, it was stated
  that “the efforts of Russia had but one object in view, namely, to
  assist in the reëstablishment of order and tranquillity in the Chinese
  Empire, and, inspired by their traditional friendship for China, the
  Imperial Government have decided to render to the Chinese Government
  every assistance with a view to repressing the present troubles.” From
  the Russian Official Gazette, as reported by Sir Charles Scott on
  August 2, 1900; _China, No. 1 (1901)_, No. 105. It is noteworthy that
  Russia had raised objections to sending large forces from Japan to the
  relief of Peking, one reason being that she supposed they would be
  commissioned, not only to rescue the Legations, but also to suppress
  rebellion and restore peace in Peking and Tientsin.—_Ibid._, No. 29.

Footnote 277:

  _Ibid._, No. 175. A writer of diplomatic history of Russia, himself a
  Russian, considers that the anti-foreign uprising was owing to the
  conduct of other Powers [presumably in sending Christian
  missionaries], in which Russia had never participated; and that,
  therefore, it was purely accidental that she took part in the Boxer
  campaign. See the _Tō-A Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No. 48, pp. 35–36.

Footnote 278:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, p. 258. It is said that M. Witte was at the time
  opposed to sending so large forces into Manchuria.

Footnote 279:

  The _Kokumin_, March 8, 1901.

Footnote 280:

  But how soon before the order of mobilization is unknown. Writing on
  June 29 from St. Petersburg, Sir Charles Scott said that the Russian
  Government was alarmed by some news received on that day of the
  serious disturbances which had occurred near the Manchurian Railway,
  and it was rumored that the Boxers were attacking and destroying the
  line north of Mukden, and had cut off telegraphic communications with
  Vladivostok. “The Chinese Legation [at St. Petersburg] is much alarmed
  by this report,” continued the British Ambassador, “as they had been
  seriously warned that the slightest movement against the safety of the
  Russian line would be followed by an instant and forcible action by
  Russia.”—_China, No. 3 (1900)_, No. 240.

Footnote 281:

  The _Kokumin_, March 8, 1901, etc.

Footnote 282:

  _China, No. 1 (1901)_, No. 47.

Footnote 283:

  There were other cases reported of the slaughter of noncombatants. The
  aggregate of those people killed was said to have reached 25,000. See
  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, p. 261, which gives a list of these cases in detail.

Footnote 284:

  The _Kokumin_, March 8, 1901, etc.

Footnote 285:

  See the reports of the British Consuls Hosie and Fulford and the
  American Consul Miller, in _China, No. 5 (1900)_, p. 47; _No. 2
  (1904)_, pp. 29–33, etc.; and the 57th Congress, 2d Session, _House
  Documents_, vol. i. pp. 147–158. At one time the relations between the
  American sailors and citizens and the Russian authorities were wrought
  up to a high tension, and Mr. Miller used so strong language in his
  correspondence with the latter that he had to be warned by Minister
  Conger of Peking and Assistant Secretary Pierce at Washington.

Footnote 286:

  See _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 258–262.

Footnote 287:

  Count Lamsdorff said on November 22, 1903, to Mr. Kurino, Japanese
  Minister at St. Petersburg, that “Russia once took possession of
  Manchuria by right of conquest....” The _Kwampō_, March 24, 1904,
  supplement, p. 8.




                              CHAPTER VII
                       NORTH CHINA AND MANCHURIA


The problem stated at the close of the last chapter forms an index to a
period of Eastern diplomacy the singular features of which hardly find a
parallel in the world’s history. The affairs of the Extreme Orient had
in general advanced to such a stage that no single Power could again
seek to enforce its will without due regard to the interests of some
other Powers. The Russian problem in Manchuria was, as will be seen
after a little reflection, of such a nature that it could hardly be
literally propounded before the world. The absorption of a vast and rich
territory in China by a Power whose policy was known to be aggressive
would at once arouse a determined protest of the Powers which were, from
interest and from conviction, committed to the principles of the
integrity of the Chinese Empire and the open door therein as the best
means of insuring a lasting peace in the Far East. The Manchurian
question had to be developed under a disguise until it would be, if
ever, safe to cast aside the veil. Hence began Russia’s long, laborious
effort to explain to the critical world certain crude facts and deeds in
Manchuria in the terms of some refined foreign phrases—phrases whose
significance in this particular case her rivals well knew, but which
they could not repudiate so long as they themselves upheld the
principles indicated by those phrases. However, the moment a complex
diplomatic machinery relies upon subterfuges for its success, its
ingenuity will be taxed to the utmost, or its unity will be in danger.
For it will not be easy to make the entire body of diplomatic agents
speak the same untruths at all places and at all times. As soon as one
pretext is uncovered, another must be invented, as it were, on the spur
of the moment, in order to cover the retreat from the last one—a
necessary change which might render a quick readjustment of the entire
organism to the newly created situation almost impossible. It would
indeed have been one of the most striking feats of the government of a
nation, if the artful diplomacy of Russia had been able to combat
successfully to the end, with the enemy’s weapon, the straightforward
statecraft of the partisans of fair play. Let us now observe in the
remaining chapters of this work how this process went on, and how it
finally defeated itself,—how ingenuity gave place to threats, and how
diplomacy ended in war.

As has been suggested, Russia avowed that a point in her policy in China
at the outbreak of the Boxer trouble was to assist the friendly
Government of that Empire in suppressing the insurrection and restoring
the normal order.[288] When, however, in spite of Count Muravieff’s
inclination to regard this matter lightly, all the Powers concerned
deemed the situation grave enough to justify sending forces to the
rescue of their Representatives and subjects in Peking, it became
necessary for Russia to act in concert with the others, instead of alone
assisting China. Russia promptly, on June 16,[289] declared her
intention to coöperate with the other Powers, and claimed, about a month
later, to have proposed to the Powers the following “fundamental
principles as their rule of conduct in relation to events in China,”
which principles were agreed to by the majority of the Powers:[290] (1)
Harmony among the Powers; (2) the preservation of the _status quo_ in
China prior to the trouble; (3) the elimination of everything which
might conduce to a partition of China; and (4) the reëstablishment by
common action of the legitimate central Government at Peking, which
would be able of itself to guarantee order and tranquillity in that
country.[291] Probably before these propositions were penned by Count
Muravieff, orders had been issued by Russia to mobilize large forces
into Manchuria. In this territory and in North China, events progressed
rapidly in the next few weeks, and, by the middle of August, the
Legations had been relieved, and the three Eastern Provinces had largely
fallen into the hands of the Russians. It is essential to bear in mind
this dual state of affairs, for henceforth it appeared that the best
efforts of Russian diplomacy were made at once, in one sense, in
reconciling to one another, and, in another sense, in insisting upon,
the widely different situations of Manchuria and of North China. On the
one hand, the principle of the integrity of China applied to both
regions alike, but, on the other, Russia steadily declined to admit that
Manchuria was within the sphere of the concerted action of the Powers.
Thus, in her famous circular of August 25,[292] she declared, in regard
to Manchuria, where “temporary measures” of military occupation “had
been solely dictated by the absolute necessity of repelling the
aggression of the Chinese rebels, and not with interested motives, which
are absolutely foreign to the policy of the Imperial Government,” that,
as soon as peace was restored and the security of the railway was
assured, “Russia would not fail to withdraw her troops from the Chinese
territory, provided such action did not meet with obstacles caused by
the proceedings of other Powers.”[293] From these words it was evident
that Russia would not allow the Manchurian question to be discussed by
the Powers, for she would withdraw from it, as she had occupied it, on
her own initiative, and with no interference from others. More important
still was the fact that Russia, from this time on, pledged to evacuate
Manchuria under the apparently reasonable conditions—of the question of
the fulfillment of which, however, Russia would be the sole judge—that
peace and security was restored in the territory, and that other Powers
did not interfere with her intentions. As regards North China, the
circular bespoke a striking action on the part of Russia. Of the two
original intentions of Russia, namely, the rescue of the Russian
subjects in Peking and the assistance to China to restore peace, the
first had now been accomplished, but the second was hindered by the
absence of the Imperial Court from the capital. In these circumstances,
Russia, seeing no reason for maintaining the Legations and allied forces
in Peking, would now withdraw M. de Giers and the Russian troops to
Tientsin. It was explained later[294] that, while the action of Russia
was not a technical proposition to the other Powers, their concurrence
in these measures would conduce to the return of the Court to the
capital and facilitate the settlement of the affair between the allies
and China. It is interesting to see that at the same time the Chinese
Representative at St. Petersburg urgently begged Li Hung-chang to
memorialize the Throne to the effect that an edict should be issued to
show China’s severity and ability to maintain order when the European
troops were withdrawn, and the intention of the Court to return shortly.
The adoption of this course, it was thought, would allay the
apprehensions of the allies regarding the withdrawal of their troops
from Peking.[295] The Russian declaration, so far as it regarded North
China, in spite of her avowal that she would act strictly in concert
with the other Powers, was as surprising to some of the latter as it
must have been pleasing to China.[296] As might be expected, the Powers,
except France, doubted the practicability of so early an evacuation of
Peking.[297] A similar proposition by Russia, dated September 17, so far
as the withdrawal of the Legations to Tientsin was concerned, came to
the same result.[298] Russia, on her part, actually withdrew her troops
to Tientsin, but when peace negotiations were opened at Peking in
October, her Minister was obliged to be present there. In the mean time,
the different status in which Russia held Manchuria from North China was
made evident by the vigorous prosecution of the campaign in the former.
Ninguta, Kirin, and Tsitsihar fell into the Russian hands about the same
time as the evacuation of Peking was announced; Liao-yang was taken late
in September, and Mukden and Tieh-ling early in October.
Fêng-hwang-Chêng and An-tung were captured even so late as December. On
September 7, a solemn thanksgiving was held at the site of the burned
town Sakhalien on the right bank of the Amur across Blagovestchensk, in
which General Gribsky delivered a speech, and the high priest Konoploff
was reported to have said: “Now is the cross raised on that bank of the
Amur which yesterday was Chinese. Muravieff foretold that sooner or
later this bank would be ours.”[299]

-----

Footnote 288:

  The circular note addressed to the Powers on June 3/16, _China, No. 3
  (1900)_, No. 49; the letter to the Chinese Government on June 11/24,
  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, p. 18; the Czar’s reply to the Chinese Emperor,
  _China, No. 1 (1901)_, No. 105, etc.

  The Emperor had sent a specially worded personal message to each of
  the heads of the French, German, Russian, British, American, and
  Japanese nations, once about July 19 and again on October 14, that is,
  before and after the capture of Peking by the allied forces. In each
  case the Emperor made a special appeal to the person addressed, and
  begged him to take the initiative in coming to China’s assistance in
  solving the situation. The various replies are highly instructive. It
  seems that the Czar supposed that he had alone been singled out by the
  Chinese Empire for the first special plea, and answered accordingly.

  See _China, No. 1 (1901)_, Nos. 1, 51, 56, 61, 78, 79, 105, 113, 252;
  _China, No. 5 (1901)_, Nos. 5, 24, 72, 108, 134, 174, 197; _China, No.
  2 (1904)_, p. 18; 56th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol.
  i. pp. 293–296.

Footnote 289:

  _China, No. 3 (1900)_, No. 149.

Footnote 290:

  These principles, says Lord Salisbury, on July 15, “have never been
  accepted by Her Majesty’s Government, nor have we as yet discussed
  with other powers the circumstances to which those principles might
  possibly apply.”—_China, No. 1 (1901)_, No. 44. Secretary Hay thought
  that the Russian _Chargé’s_ oral communication was “not explicit
  enough” to enable him to comment upon the so-called fundamental
  principles of Russia.—_Ibid._, No. 114. Later, about July 30, Mr. Hay
  replied to Russia by referring to his own circular note of July 3, and
  said that he deemed it “premature to forecast the means of bringing
  about those results [i. e., the restoration of order and responsible
  government in China].”—_Ibid._, No. 140. It is particularly remarkable
  that two of the Powers most interested in the principles proposed by
  Russia should be so conservative when the question was propounded by
  that Power.

Footnote 291:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, pp. 1 and 18.

  It is interesting to compare these “fundamental principles” of Russia
  with the principles laid down in Secretary Hay’s circular telegraph
  addressed to the Powers on July 3, or probably some days before the
  Russian note: “... The purpose of the President is, as it has been
  heretofore,” it said, “to act concurrently with the other Powers,
  first, in opening up communication with Peking and securing the
  American officials, missionaries, and other Americans who are in
  danger; secondly, in affording all protection everywhere in China to
  American life and property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting all
  legitimate American interests; and fourthly, in aiding to prevent a
  spread of the disorders to the other provinces of the Empire and a
  recurrence of such disorders. It is, of course, too early to forecast
  the means of attaining this last result; but the policy of the
  Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring
  about permanent safety, and peace to China, preserve Chinese
  territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed
  to friendly Powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for
  the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of
  the Chinese Empire.”—The 56th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_,
  vol. i. p. 299. It will be observed that the American note is not only
  probably earlier in date, but also much wider in scope, than the
  Russian propositions, for the former contains the open door principle,
  among others, which receives no reference in the latter. It should be
  remembered, however, that the American note was not a proposition to
  the other Powers.

Footnote 292:

  _China, No. 1 (1901)_, No. 256.

Footnote 293:

  Statements of similar import occur in the _Official Messenger_ of
  August 13, in the instructions given on October 25 by Count Lamsdorff
  to the Russian Representatives abroad, and those on December 28 by
  General Kuropatkin to the governors-general of the Amur and Kwan-tung
  Provinces. See _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 259–260.

Footnote 294:

  Cf. _China, No. 1 (1901)_, Nos. 267, 300, 314, 315.

  Also see the most interesting Russian document, quoted in _China, No.
  2 (1904)_, p. 20. One of its passages reads as follows: “It must not
  be forgotten that an attack on the ancient traditions of the Chinese
  and on the prestige of their Government might be attended by the most
  disastrous consequences; all the more so that the international troops
  cannot occupy indefinitely the capital of a country of 400,000,000
  inhabitants, whose right to live at home as they please can hardly be
  questioned.”

Footnote 295:

  _China, No. 1 (1901)_, No. 306. Also see No. 313.

  On August 19 and 21, Li Hung-chang wired to Wu Ting-fang to urge upon
  the United States Government that, inasmuch as the declared purpose of
  the allies to relieve the Legations had now been accomplished, they
  should suspend hostilities, withdraw their troops, and appoint envoys
  to negotiate with China. See _ibid._, No. 239, and the 56th Congress,
  2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. pp. 197, 288–290. We may
  naturally infer either that Li sent similar telegrams to Russia, or
  that Russia had consulted Li before the circular was sent to the
  Powers, the general tenor of thought is so alike in the telegrams and
  in the circular.

Footnote 296:

  Russia herself was conscious of the fact that others attributed to her
  the motive of ingratiating herself with China at a critical moment by
  taking, separately from the other Powers, an action favorable to
  China. See _China, No. 2 (1904)_, pp. 19–20.

Footnote 297:

  See _China, No. 1 (1901)_, Nos. 275 (Austria); 280, 322, 328,
  (France); 309 (Italy); 281, 293, 305, 317, 318, 321, 327, 335, 378,
  383 (England); 307; _No. 5 (1901)_, Nos. 110, 124, 127 (Japan); _No. 1
  (1901)_, Nos. 270, 315; 56th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_,
  vol. ii. pp. 304–305, 378–379, 205 (the United States). As a matter of
  fact, the Boxers still roamed about Peking, and the Chinese Court,
  which had fled to Ta-yuen, was still under the control of Prince Tuan
  and his associates. A hasty withdrawal of troops from Peking would
  have been disastrous in its effect upon the foreigners and native
  Christians.

Footnote 298:

  See _China, No. 1 (1901)_, Nos. 356 (Russian proposition); 371, 395,
  401 (England); 398 (Italy); _No. 5 (1901)_, No. 128, (Japan); _House
  Documents_, op. cit., vol. i. pp. 203–204, 305–306, 381–382.

Footnote 299:

  _China, No. 1 (1901)_, No. 375.




                              CHAPTER VIII
                       THE ANGLO-GERMAN AGREEMENT


When we recall that even before 1900 Russia desired to control the
railway enterprises, not only in Manchuria, but also on the right side
of the Liao River, it is not altogether strange that, simultaneously
with the occupation of Manchuria, the northern Chinese line was seized
by her troops. This action, however, did not stop at the Great Wall. Had
it not been for the protest of Great Britain, the Russians would have
seized the entire line from Niu-chwang up to Peking. During the latter
part of June, they captured the Tientsin depot, burned the office,
destroyed the safe and the documents it contained, and seized land, some
tracts of which had been owned by British subjects.[300] On July 8, the
Northern Railway was seized and the British engineer, C. W. Kinder, and
his staff were turned out,[301] and, in spite of the dissent of the
British and American commanders, the Admirals of the allied Powers voted
on July 16 that the Russians should manage the railway.[302] In August,
the Russians claimed also the line between Tong-ku and Shanhai-Kwan, on
the one hand, and the one between Tientsin and Peking, on the other,
thus completing the control of the entire connection.[303] British
protests were in a measure waived by the new Commander-in-Chief of the
allied forces, Count von Waldersee, who early in October assigned the
repair of the section up to Yang-tsun to the Russians.[304] About this
time, fifty miles of railway material belonging to a British firm were
seized at Niu-chwang by the Russians,[305] followed by the seizure of
the collieries at Tong-shan and Lin-si hitherto operated by the Chinese
Engineering and Mining Company.[306] Other incidents followed, greatly
to the annoyance of those whose interests had been invested in the
works. It was at this juncture that, on October 16, 1900, an Agreement
was signed between the Governments of Great Britain and Germany,
upholding the principle of the open door in China (Article 1),
disclaiming territorial designs upon China on the part of the
contracting Powers (Article 2), and supplemented by the following
(Article 3), embodying the well-known principle of the balance of power
at China’s expense: “In case of another Power making use of the
complications in China in order to obtain under any form whatever such
territorial advantages, the two contracting parties reserve to
themselves the right to come to a preliminary understanding as to the
eventual steps to be taken for the protection of their own interests in
China.”[307] This is the notorious Anglo-German Agreement, the fate of
which has been an object of much ridicule among writers upon Chinese
affairs of recent years. The diplomacy which had resulted in the
conclusion of this Agreement has not been made known to the public, but
as to the circumstances which had caused the two Powers to negotiate, it
may safely be inferred that; so far as the British side was concerned,
the Russian conduct in North China was a potent factor.[308] As to the
deeper causes on both sides for the extraordinary _rapprochement_, it is
easy to speculate upon but unsafe to asseverate them.[309] The Agreement
further stated that other interested Powers should be invited to accept
the principles recorded in it (Article 4). It is interesting to see how
this peculiar combination of the principles of (1) the open door, (2)
the integrity of China, and (3) a balance between the Powers on the
Chinese ground, was viewed by the other Powers. Japan joined the
Agreement on October 29, as a signatory, but not as an adhering
State.[310] France, Austria, and Italy recognized as identical with
their own all of the principles proposed,[311] while the United States
did likewise with the first two, but expressed itself unconcerned with
the third.[312] As for Russia, she seized this opportunity to indulge
her diplomatic sarcasm. She declared that, from her point of view, the
Agreement “did not perceptibly modify the situation in China,” and the
second principle perfectly corresponded with Russia’s intentions, as
“she was the first to lay down the maintenance of the integrity of the
Chinese Empire as a fundamental principle of her policy in China.” Her
reply to the first principle was delicately expressed, as follows: It
“can be favorably entertained by Russia, as this stipulation does not
infringe in any way the _status quo_ established in China _by existing
treaties_.”[313] In other words, the open door may or may not apply to
other places not yet covered by the existing treaties and still open to
whatever development might take place. The evil genius of the third
Article of the Anglo-German Agreement was not less skillfully answered
by Russia: “The Imperial Government, while referring to its Circular of
the 12th (25th) August, can only renew the declaration that such an
infringement [by another Power] would oblige Russia to modify her
attitude according to circumstances.”[314] From these words, it was
plain that outside of the two contracting Powers, the Agreement could
not exercise great influence, and least upon Russia, which declined to
observe any new feature in the instrument. The virtue of the Agreement
was, moreover, seriously impaired by the insincerity of one of its
parties, and by the consequent difference of views between themselves.
The document was openly talked about in Germany as the Yang-tsze
Agreement, it being meant that Great Britain thereby pledged herself to
abstain from annexing the Yang-tsze Provinces, hitherto considered, much
to the jealousy of Germany, as a British sphere of interest.[315] More
momentous was the question whether the Agreement included in its scope,
not only the eighteen Provinces, but also Manchuria. The answer would,
of course, depend upon whether both parties would consider, under the
provision of the third Article, that they alike possessed “their own
interests” to protect in Manchuria. Seen in this light, it is not
strange that, in the opinion of Lord Lansdowne, the “Agreement most
unquestionably extended to Manchuria, which is part of the Chinese
Empire,”[316] while, from Count von Bülow’s point of view, “The
Anglo-German Agreement had no reference to Manchuria.” “I can imagine
nothing,” he added, “which we can regard with more indifference” than
Manchuria.[317] Evidently Germany had entered into the Agreement with
different motives from those of Great Britain, and perhaps also with
less zeal, if zeal there was.

-----

Footnote 300:

  _China, No. 7 (1901)_, Nos. 21, 76, 81, 84, 86, 95, 103, 149, 153,
  154, 174, 187, 189.

Footnote 301:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 1 and 7.

Footnote 302:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 2, 7, 9.

Footnote 303:

  _China, No. 7 (1901)_, Nos. 11, 14, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 30, 35, 36,
  57, 60, 103.

Footnote 304:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 24, 27, 37, 38, 43, 50, 54, 55, 66, 68.

Footnote 305:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 39, 77.

Footnote 306:

  _Ibid._, 40, 78.

Footnote 307:

  The _British Parliamentary Papers_, _Treaty Series_, No. 1, 1900.

Footnote 308:

  On November 1, Lord Salisbury wrote to the British _Chargé_ at St.
  Petersburg in unusually outspoken language, as follows: “In the event
  of the Russians making any complaint of our having concluded the
  Anglo-German Agreement without previously consulting them, you should
  dwell on the fact that the conduct and language of Russian officers in
  the Far East, in respect to the Chinese railway from Niu-chwang to
  Peking, and the way in which the property of British subjects on that
  railway has been dealt with by the Russian military authorities, has
  caused much perplexity to Her Majesty’s Government. The Russian
  Government have given us many satisfactory assurances with respect to
  their intentions in these matters, but the little attention paid to
  the avowed policy of the Russian Government by officers on the spot
  has deterred us from fuller communication.”—_China, No. 7 (1901)_, No.
  45.

Footnote 309:

  See, for instance, the explanation offered in _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp.
  384–386.

Footnote 310:

  _China, No. 5 (1901)_, Nos. 4 and 7, inclosure 2.

Footnote 311:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 6, 8, and 9.

Footnote 312:

  The 56th Congress, 2d Session, _Home Documents_, vol. i. p. 355.

Footnote 313:

  The italics are the author’s.

Footnote 314:

  _China, No. 5 (1900)_, No. 5.

Footnote 315:

  Also see the debate in the House of Lords, on August 6, 1901, between
  Earl Spencer and the Marquess of Lansdowne. The _Parliamentary
  Debates_, Fourth Series, vol. 98, pp. 1351–1365.

Footnote 316:

  At the House of Lords, on August 6, 1901. The Japanese Government,
  also, in its reply to a question of a member of the National Diet,
  interpreted the Agreement to apply to the whole of the Chinese
  Empire.—_Tokushu Jōyaku_, p. 389.

Footnote 317:

  At the Reichstag on March 15, 1901.—The London _Times_, August 6,
  1901, p. 7. He is also said to have declared to the Russian
  Representative at Berlin that Manchuria was outside of the sphere of
  German commercial rights, and consequently had no relation with the
  Anglo-German Agreement. It was reported even that Manchuria was
  originally mentioned specifically in the British draft of the
  Agreement, but the word was struck out at the request of Germany, and
  the more abstract phrase, “spheres of influence,” was used
  therefor.—_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 388–389.




                               CHAPTER IX
            A _MODUS VIVENDI_: THE ALEXIEFF-TSÊNG AGREEMENT


In the mean time, the Chinese Court[318] having largely emancipated
itself from the sway of the reactionary Prince Tuan and his associates,
the Representatives at Peking of the eleven interested Powers had agreed
in September to open discussions among themselves of the terms of peace
to be presented to the Chinese plenipotentiaries, Prince Ching and Li
Hung-chang.[319] The German Government, however, proposed, as a
prerequisite of peace negotiations with China, a drastic measure
demanding the surrender to the Powers of the chief culprits of the
recent trouble. The proposition meeting little encouragement from other
Ministers, Germany presented a new condition on October 3. The latter
was, however, supplanted by the basis for negotiations formulated on
September 30 and presented five days later to the Powers by the French
Minister.[320] His proposals, to which Russia immediately assented,[321]
and which with important amendments[322] and additions became the basis
of the Protocol signed on September 7, 1901, comprised the following six
points: (1) the punishment of the chief offenders designated by the
Representatives of the Powers at Peking; (2) maintenance of the
prohibition of the importation of arms into China; (3) indemnities for
the foreign governments, societies, and individuals; (4) establishment
of a permanent legation guard at Peking; (5) dismantlement of the Taku
forts; and (6) military occupation of two or three points on the road
from Tientsin to Taku, so as to keep open the passage between Peking and
the sea. It is needless for us to follow the negotiations which
proceeded at Peking after these proposals were made by France, but it is
important to observe that the French propositions were limited, in the
first place, to North China, and, in the second place, to those
questions in North China which concerned all the Powers alike. The
significance of all this, or at least of the prompt assent of
Russia,[323] may well be inferred from the opposition as readily offered
by the latter when Germany[324] and Japan,[325] respectively, urged that
a proper mention should be made in the peace protocol of China’s consent
to repair the murder of Baron von Ketteler and the Chancellor Sugiyama.
Russia maintained that “proposals of this nature, serving principally as
a satisfaction to be given to private views of one State, ought not to
enter into the common programme of the collective demands, which had as
their object the interests of all the Powers collectively and the
reëstablishment of a normal state of affairs in the Celestial
Empire.”[326] “In the Chinese question it is advisable,” said the
_Official Messenger_ of St. Petersburg, “not to lose sight of the
necessity of distinguishing clearly the questions which interest each of
the Powers in particular and those which affect the interests of all the
Powers in general.”[327] This distinction had been fundamental in the
Russian diplomacy in China since 1900, for, if one question of the
former class was allowed to be dealt with in the common deliberation of
the Representatives of all the Powers, why should not another question
of the same class be similarly treated? Or, in other words, if the
Sugiyama affair was referred to the collective council, the argument
that the Manchurian problem should be solved solely by Russia, without
intervention of the other Powers, would lose much of its force.[328] The
ultimate failure of Russian diplomacy—for diplomacy has failed when it
ends in a war, and, if Russia does succeed, her success will be that of
force, not of diplomacy—may be said to be largely due to the evident
contradiction of this fundamental distinction between North China and
Manchuria, upon which she sought to build her entire diplomatic
structure in this crisis. As a matter of fact, it was as impossible to
deny the profound interest felt by Great Britain and the United States,
and, above all, by Japan, in the economic development of Manchuria, as
it would have been to exclude Russia from the community of the Powers in
North China. It should be remembered that Russia herself persistently
maintained that the principle of the integrity of China applied also to
Manchuria, and she would have hardly antagonized other Powers had she
expressed an equally clear adhesion to the principle of the open door,
and made efforts to carry out pledges regarding both principles.

Events soon took place, however, which made other Powers skeptical of
Russia’s sincerity in her profession of even the principle of the
integrity of the Chinese Empire. The new question thus thrust upon the
attention of the Powers was of an extremely grave nature, for if the
sovereignty of Manchuria should eventually pass into the hands of
Russia, the treaty rights that other nations had acquired therein from
China might rightfully be terminated by Russia. Whatever her ultimate
objects, it was hardly politic for her to approach the difficult
Manchurian question at the time and in the manner selected by her. Dr.
George Morrison reported to the _Times_ on December 31, 1900, and Sir
Ernest Satow, the British Minister at Peking, confirmed it as
authentic,[329] that the delegates of Admiral Alexieff and the Tartar
General Tsêng-chi, of Mukden, had signed, in November last, an agreement
whereby Russia consented to return to the Chinese the civil government
of the Southern Province of Fêng-tien (Sheng-king) in Manchuria, on the
following conditions:—

  1. “The Tartar General Tsêng undertakes to protect the province and
  pacify it, and to assist in the construction of the railroad.

  2. “He must treat kindly the Russians in military occupation,
  protecting the railway and pacifying the province, and provide them
  with lodging and provisions.

  3. “He must disarm and disband the Chinese soldiery, delivering in
  their entirety to the Russian military officials all munitions of
  war in the arsenals not already occupied by the Russians.

  4. “All forts and defenses in Fêng-tien not occupied by the
  Russians, and all powder magazines not required by the Russians,
  must be dismantled in the presence of Russian officials.

  5. “Niu-chwang and other places now occupied by the Russians shall
  be restored to the Chinese civil administration when the Russian
  Government is satisfied that the pacification of the provinces is
  complete.

  6. “The Chinese shall maintain law and order by local police under
  the Tartar General.

  7. “A Russian Political Resident, with general powers of control,
  shall be stationed at Mukden, to whom the Tartar General must give
  all information respecting any important measure.

  8. “Should the local police be insufficient in any emergency, the
  Tartar General will communicate with the Russian Resident at Mukden,
  and invite Russia to dispatch reinforcements.

  9. “The Russian text shall be the standard.”[330]

In brief, the province was to be disarmed, its military government to be
in the Russian hands, its civil government to be placed under the
supervision of a Russian Resident, with additional duties on the part of
the Chinese to provide for the Russian military and to protect Russian
properties. The last provisions were coupled with the right of the
Russians to supply reinforcements, if the Chinese local police should
prove insufficient. The probable significance of this measure will be
fully discussed in connection with the Russo-Chinese Convention of April
8, 1902. As regards the Agreement now under discussion, Dr. Morrison
opined that it would necessarily be followed by similar agreements with
reference to the other two of the three Eastern Provinces,[331] and then
all Manchuria would be “a _de facto_ Russian protectorate, Russia by a
preëxisting agreement having already the right to maintain all necessary
troops for the protection of the railway.” It is needless to say that
the report of this Agreement caused universal amazement in the
diplomatic world. It soon became known[332] that the Chinese delegate
who signed it at Port Arthur had received no authorization to do so from
the Peking Government.[333] But the Japanese Government, hearing from a
reliable source that so late as the beginning of February, Russia was
pressing China to ratify the Agreement, undertook to express its opinion
to the Chinese Minister at Tokio, that the conclusion of any such
agreement would be a “source of danger” to the Chinese Government, and
that no arrangement affecting territorial rights of the Empire ought to
be concluded between the Chinese Government and any one of the
Powers.[334] At the instance of Japan, Great Britain also made precisely
the same representation to China,[335] Germany following the example in
slightly different language,[336] and the United States also reminding
China of “the impropriety, inexpediency, and even extreme danger to the
interests of China, of considering any private territorial and financial
engagements, at least without the full knowledge and approval of all the
Powers now engaged in negotiation.”[337]

It has often been reported in the press that the Agreement was never
ratified by either China or Russia. Before, however, any of the protests
of the Powers reached the Peking Government, Count Lamsdorff had, on
February 6, “very readily” explained the situation to the British
Ambassador at St. Petersburg. He said it was quite untrue that any
agreement which would give Russia new rights and a virtual protectorate
in Southern Manchuria had been concluded or was under discussion with
China, but “the Russian military authorities who had been engaged in the
temporary occupation and pacification of that province had been
directed, when reinstating the Chinese authorities in their former
posts, to arrange with the local civil authorities a _modus vivendi_ for
the duration of the simultaneous presence of Russian and Chinese
authorities in Southern Manchuria, the object being to prevent the
recurrence of disturbances in the vicinity of the Russian frontier, and
to protect the railway from the Russian frontier to Port Arthur.” “Some
of the details of the proposed _modus vivendi_ had been sent for
consideration to St. Petersburg, but no convention or arrangement with
the central Government of China or of a permanent character had been
concluded with regard to Manchuria, nor had the Emperor any intention of
departing in any way from the assurances which he had publicly given
that Manchuria would be entirely restored to its former condition in the
Chinese Empire as soon as circumstances admitted of it.”[338] A careful
reading of this statement, as typical of the many declarations made by
Russia in regard to Manchuria, will show how untenable is the popular
view that she persistently falsifies. There is here a fair admission
that a _modus vivendi_ was under way between the Russian military
officers in Southern Manchuria and the local Chinese authorities, and
that it was not of a permanent nature, nor was it concluded with the
central Government at Peking, and both of these points accord with the
reported facts. Nor can one deny the cogency of the argument that Russia
would evacuate Manchuria “as soon as circumstances admitted of it.” What
constituted the objectionable feature of the affair, from the standpoint
of the interested Powers, must have been that, inasmuch as Count
Lamsdorff would not publish the terms of the _modus vivendi_, it was not
possible for them to satisfy themselves that it contained nothing which
would render impossible the consummation of “circumstances” favorable
for evacuation, and eventually tend toward a “permanent” possession of
the territory by Russia. As matters stood, it would be as natural for
the Powers to entertain such a doubt, as it was for Russia to deem it
necessary to declare, in her circular of August 25, 1900, that she would
withdraw from Manchuria if, for one thing, no obstacle was placed in her
way by the action of other Powers. The doubt of the Powers was rather
intensified, if at all, by the further explanation by Count Lamsdorff on
February 6, that “when it came to the final and complete evacuation of
Manchuria, the Russian Government would be obliged to obtain from the
central Government of China an effective guarantee against the
recurrence of the recent attack on her frontier and the destruction of
her railway, but had no intention of seeking this guarantee in any
acquisition of territory or of an actual or virtual protectorate over
Manchuria, the object being to simply guarantee the faithful observance
in the future by China of the terms of the agreement [agreement between
the Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank, September 28, 1896?],
which she had been unable to fulfill during the disturbances. The terms
of this guarantee might possibly form the subject of conversation here
between Count Lamsdorff and the Chinese Minister, or be left for
discussion at Peking.”[339] A month before this official statement of
Russia reached the London Government, the latter heard from the Japanese
Minister, Baron Hayashi, that Russia and China had already made at St.
Petersburg some arrangement regarding Manchuria,[340] evidently referred
to by Count Lamsdorff in the quoted passage as “an effective guarantee.”

-----

Footnote 318:

  The Court had fled toward Ta-yuen-Fu before the allied troops reached
  Peking, and thence started toward Si-ngan-Fu, the capital of many a
  historic dynasty, on October 1.

Footnote 319:

  Russia had early advocated accepting Li as plenipotentiary, while
  other Powers were still skeptical of the nature of his credentials.
  See _China, No. 1 (1901)_, Nos. 254, 356, 368, 371, 398, 401; _China,
  No. 5 (1901)_, Nos. 5, 31, 111, 112, 128, 216; U. S. 56th Congress, 2d
  Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. pp. 203–204, 305–306, 381–382. It
  was not till September 20 that Li entered Peking. Prince Ching had
  arrived there September 3. The appointment of the Prince as a
  plenipotentiary is said to have been partly due to Japanese influence.

Footnote 320:

  _Documents diplomatiques: Chine, 1899–1900_, No. 327 (p. 174). Also
  see _China, No. 5 (1901)_, pp. 5, 46, 53–54.

Footnote 321:

  _China, No. 5 (1901)_, No. 17.

Footnote 322:

  For the Japanese amendments, see _ibid._, Nos. 60, 151, 178.

Footnote 323:

  Russia openly declared in her _Messager Officiel_ of March 24 (April
  6), 1901, that the Russian views regarding the settlement of the
  trouble in North China, as distinguished from Manchuria, had “served
  the French Government as a basis for the elaboration” of the latter’s
  propositions.—_China, No. 2 (1904)_, pp. 20–21.

Footnote 324:

  November 5.—_China, No. 5 (1901)_, No. 117.

Footnote 325:

  November 28.—_Ibid._, Nos. 178 and 198.

Footnote 326:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, p. 21.

Footnote 327:

  _Ibid._, p. 20.

Footnote 328:

  Russia allowed the question of the indemnity in Manchuria to be dealt
  with at the general conferences at Peking together with the indemnity
  respecting North China. In the matter of the punishment of guilty
  local officials, from the discussion of which Russia abruptly withdrew
  herself, the representatives of the other Powers included Manchuria in
  their consideration.

Footnote 329:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 5 (January 4, 1901). Sir Charles Scott,
  Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported on January 5, that it appeared
  to be generally believed there that “some provisional agreement, such
  as that indicated, had been concluded by Russia with the local
  authorities in Manchuria, and that she might eventually acquire by
  treaty the right to finish building the railway line through Manchuria
  to Port Arthur, and to protect it herself, the rights of the
  Russo-Chinese Company being transferred to the Russian
  Government.”—_Ibid._, No. 4.

Footnote 330:

  The London _Times_, January 3, 1901, p. 3. In this and other reports
  Dr. Morrison seems to have translated from Chinese texts.

Footnote 331:

  The Russian _Official Messenger_ of April 6, 1901, stated that
  “temporary agreements in writing (_modus vivendi_) respecting the
  reëstablishment of the local civil administration in the _three
  Provinces_ of Manchuria were, before all else, concluded between the
  Russian military authorities and the Chinese tsian-tsiouns [Generals]
  of the three Provinces.”—_China, No. 2 (1904)_, p. 22.

Footnote 332:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 5 (January 4).

Footnote 333:

  The Tartar General Tsêng-chi was degraded for this offense, but Russia
  succeeded in reinstating him.—_The Times_, February 20, 1901, p. 5.

Footnote 334:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 8.

Footnote 335:

  _Ibid._, No. 13 (February 13).

Footnote 336:

  The opinion of the German Government was that China “should not
  conclude with any Power individual treaties of a territorial or
  financial character _before_ they can estimate their obligations
  toward all the Powers as a whole, and _before_ the compliance with
  such obligations is accepted.”—_Ibid._, Nos. 12, 13.

Footnote 337:

  _Ibid._, No. 19 (February 19).

  What action the remaining Powers took is not shown in the Blue Books.
  Austria-Hungary and Italy are said to have also protested.

Footnote 338:

  _China, No. 2 (1901)._

Footnote 339:

  _China, No. 2 (1901)._

Footnote 340:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 6.




                               CHAPTER X
          A “STARTING-POINT”—THE LAMSDORFF-YANG-YU CONVENTION


It was as early as January 12 that the Japanese Government had made
inquiries directly at the Russian Government regarding the contents of
the Agreement reported to have been made between Count Lamsdorff and
Yang-yu at St. Petersburg.[341] The report was apparently premature, for
its contents were unknown for more than a month after, and even on
February 18, Dr. Morrison reported from Peking that, according to a
telegram to the Chinese Government from Yang-yu, it would be several
days before Count Lamsdorff and M. Witte could settle the terms between
themselves of the new agreement they wished to propose.[342] The _Times_
correspondent, however, was able to send certain preliminary articles
which, he said, had been verbally communicated by M. Witte to
Yang-yu.[343] On February 27, Sir Ernest Satow[344] and Dr.
Morrison[345] simultaneously reported the contents of the agreement
which Yang-yu had been called upon by Count Lamsdorff to sign, and which
he had telegraphed to Peking on the 23d. The proposed convention was,
according to Dr. Morrison, obviously intended to exist side by side with
the Alexieff-Tsêng Agreement concluded in the previous November. The
substance of this convention, the authenticity of which the same writer
claimed to have been admitted by the Russians in Peking, was as
follows:—

  1. “The Emperor of Russia, being desirous of manifesting his
  friendship for China, ignores the outbreak of hostilities in
  Manchuria, and agrees to restore the whole of that country to China,
  to be administered in all respects as of old.

  2. “By the 6th Article of the Manchurian Railway Agreement, the
  Railway Company was authorized to guard the line with troops. The
  country being at present in disorder, the number of those troops is
  insufficient for the purpose, and a _corps_ must be retained until
  order is restored and China has executed the last four Articles of
  the present convention.

  3. “In case of emergency the troops retained in Manchuria shall
  render every possible assistance to China in preserving order.

  4. “Chinese troops having been the greatest aggressors in the recent
  attacks on Russia, China agrees not to organize an army until the
  railway is completed and opened to traffic. When military forces are
  organized eventually, their numbers shall be fixed in consultation
  with Russia. The importation of arms and munitions of war into
  Manchuria is prohibited.

  5. “As a measure for the preservation of Manchuria, China shall
  dismiss from office all Generals-in-Chief (Tartar Generals) and high
  officials whose actions conflict with friendly relations, and who
  are denounced for that reason by Russia. China may organize mounted
  and foot police in the interior of Manchuria, but their numbers
  shall be fixed in consultation with Russia.

  “Cannon shall be excluded from their armament, and no subjects of
  another Power shall be employed in the execution of the functions.

  6. “In accordance with the understanding formerly accepted by China,
  no subject of another Power shall be employed to train naval or
  military forces in the Northern Provinces (i. e., Provinces in North
  China).

  7. “The local authorities nearest to the neutral zone referred to in
  Article 5 of the Liao-tung Agreement (of March 15/27, 1898) shall
  make special regulations for the preservation of order in the zone.

  “The administrative autonomy of Kin-chow shall be abolished.

  8. “Without the consent of Russia, China shall not concede mining,
  railway, or other privileges to another Power, in the countries
  adjoining Russia, that is to say, in Manchuria, Mongolia,
  Tarbagatai, Ili, Kashgar, Yarkand, Khoten, etc. China shall not
  herself construct a railway in those countries without Russia’s
  consent.

  “Outside of Niu-chwang, land shall not be leased to the subjects of
  another Power.

  9. “China is under obligation to pay Russia’s war expenses and
  indemnities to the Powers. The amount of indemnity due to Russia,
  the dates of payment, and the security, shall be arranged conjointly
  with the Powers.

  10. “The amounts due for damage done to the railway, for the
  property of the Company’s employees which was stolen, and for losses
  caused by delay of the works, shall be arranged by the company with
  China.

  11. “An understanding may be come to with the Railway Company to set
  off the whole or part of the above indemnities against privileges of
  other kinds. This may be arranged by an alteration of the existing
  Railway Agreement (of August 27 / September 8, 1896), or by the
  concession of further privileges.

  12. “China shall, as previously agreed,[346] grant a concession for
  the construction of a railway from Manchurian main line, or a branch
  line, to the Great Wall in the direction of Peking.”[347]

There never appeared an authentic text of the convention from either the
Russian or the Chinese official sources, but its existence in some
drastic form was intimated by the Viceroys Liu and Chang, and by the
Court Ministers then at Si-ngan, as well as by the Chinese Emperor
himself.[348] Furthermore, it could be plainly inferred that no one but
Chinese diplomatic officials could have let out the terms of the
proposed convention, or else it would have been impossible for one to
believe that an instrument of so immense a scope and so arbitrary a
nature, as had been reported, could have emanated from Russia. If the
reported text was in the main authentic, as Sir Ernest Satow believed it
was,[349] it is little wonder that Russia exercised a vigorous pressure
upon the Peking Government for a speedy signing of the convention before
the arrival of effective protests from other Powers, her Minister at
Peking stating to Prince Ching and Li Hung-chang that the Agreement
concerned only Russia and China, and that the Peking Government should
not take any notice of what the foreign Representatives might say about
it.[350] The Court appeared seized by a panic, excepting the pro-Russian
Li Hung-chang, who pretended that he considered that the proposed
convention would not impair the sovereignty of China in Manchuria.[351]
The Emperor, declaring that “it was impossible for China alone to incur
the displeasure of Russia by remaining firm,” appealed, on February 28,
to Great Britain, the United States, Germany, and Japan to mediate.[352]
The British Government at once instructed Sir Ernest Satow to stay the
hand of Li, who was about to sign, till he had received the replies of
the four Powers whose mediation had been formally requested by the
Emperor, and also to urge the patriotic Yang-tsze Viceroys to
memorialize the Throne against the acceptance of the Russian
proposition.[353] The Viceroys, as well as several other subjects of
China, had already done so.[354] The British remonstrance to China
against entering into separate agreements with individual Powers was
repeated on March 20.[355] At the same time Germany suggested, Great
Britain and Japan seconding, that China should refer the matter to the
conference of the foreign Representatives at Peking, who were, it should
be remembered, in the midst of their difficult discussion of the
preliminary terms of peace between the Powers and China.[356] It is
unnecessary to say that Japan, in concert with Great Britain, strongly
urged the Chinese Government not to sign the convention separately with
one of the Powers, for such an act was contrary to the principle of
solidarity which then united the Powers, and an individual convention
with a Power would materially lessen the capacity of China to meet her
obligations toward all the Powers.[357]

At this point we have to record a singular conjunction of circumstances
which has caused criticisms not altogether favorable to Russia. It has
already been shown that she had frequently had recourse to acts which at
once placed her somewhat apart from the community of the Powers, and
also were liable to be interpreted as being designed to ingratiate
herself with the afflicted China. Thus Count Lamsdorff more than once
deprecated the continuance of the punitive expeditions which the allied
forces made to one place or another in the Province of Chili.[358] His
reasons were so apparently plausible that, under different
circumstances, he might have been supported by certain other
Powers.[359] These very Powers, however, most keenly resented Russia’s
detachment from the allies, when she definitely cleared herself from the
deliberation of the Representatives of the Powers at Peking in regard to
the punishment to be inflicted by the Chinese Government upon certain
provincial officials who had been directly guilty of outrages to
foreigners during the recent trouble. The peace commissioners had almost
disposed of the punishment question, in order next to attack the knotty
problem of the indemnity to be paid by China, but M. de Giers had been
instructed by his Government “not only to abstain from entering into any
discussion as to the nature or method of execution of the capital
sentence, but also to take no part in the further discussions relative
to the punishment to be inflicted on the Chinese dignitaries.”[360] “At
the meeting [of the peace commissioners at Peking] to-day,” wrote Sir
Ernest Satow on February 28, the day after he reported the draft of the
most exhaustive agreement broached by Russia upon China, and the very
day when the Chinese Emperor appealed to Great Britain, Germany, the
United States, and Japan to intervene, “we presented to our colleagues
our list of provincial officials, of whom ten were named as deserving
the death penalty and about ninety to be punished in a lesser degree.
Objection was made only by the Russian Minister, who stated that he
could not accept our proposals unless he received fresh instructions,
and that his Government’s wish from the beginning had been to substitute
a less severe form of punishment for the death penalty. Both my French
colleague and I are of opinion that our death penalty list might justly
have included far more than what had been demanded, and is exceedingly
moderate in its reduced form.”[361] On March 15, that is, about the time
when the terms of her proposed agreement were, as will be presently
seen, modified by Russia in China’s favor, Sir Charles Scott wrote Lord
Salisbury that recently Count Lamsdorff had intimated that “he
considered the question of the punishment of Chinese officials at an end
as far as concerned Russia,” and that “he referred to the murders of the
missionaries as a subject in which Russia was not interested.”[362] Such
a remark was regarded as a radical departure from the diplomatic
amenities between the Powers. Russia might without offense have pleaded
her reasons against the opinion of the majority, and then dissented at
the final vote, but it was considered a very different matter for her to
declare, in such a way as would openly place the other Powers in a false
light in the eyes of the Chinese, that she had nothing to do with the
question. The act, it must be said, came with particular ill grace at a
time when Russia was believed to be negotiating an agreement with China,
separately, and in terms manifestly contrary to the fundamental
principles upon which the Powers’ diplomacy at Peking was based.[363] A
joint vote demanding the punishment of the officials had to be presented
to the Chinese commissioners, on April 1, with the signatures of all but
M. de Giers.[364]

Directly in connection with this episode may be considered the fact
that, at the urgent request of China, Russia had in the mean time
somewhat modified the terms of her proposition, about March 19, so as,
in brief, to allow China to station troops in Manchuria for the
protection of the Russian railways and the prevention of fresh
disorders, their numbers and posts to be determined by consulting
Russia; and also to prohibit the importation of arms and ammunition only
in accordance with the agreement with the Powers (Article 4); to exclude
cannon from the armament of the Chinese mounted and foot police forces
in Manchuria only until peace is restored (Article 5); to retain the
administrative autonomy of Kin-chow (Article 7); and to arrange with the
Company the matter of indemnities in accordance with the general method
used by the Powers (Article 10). The eighth Article was altered so as to
apply the exclusive measure only to Manchuria, and the sixth was
entirely expunged.[365] Simultaneously with these modifications in
China’s favor, Russia seemed to have suddenly increased her pressure
upon the helpless Court of China. Count Lamsdorff was reported[366] to
have declared to Yang-yu that he would withdraw the draft and break off
negotiations if it were not signed within two weeks from March 13. An
Imperial Decree, dated March 20, and addressed to Sir Chin-chen
Lo-fêng-luh, the Chinese Minister at London, stated: “The Manchurian
Agreement has now been amended, but the stipulated time within which the
Agreement is to be signed will soon expire. As the Marquess of Lansdowne
has advised us to wait for his reply [to the Edict of February 28], we
have now to command Lo-fêng-luh to ask Lord Lansdowne either (1) to help
us out of the difficulty, or (2) to ask Russia to extend the time
stipulated for signing the Agreement. Otherwise, we, being placed in
great difficulty, will be unable to oppose Russia any further. An
immediate reply is expected. Respect this.”[367] On the next day came an
urgent appeal from Yang-tsze Viceroys and Taotai Sheng, who requested,
under instructions from the Chinese Government, that Great Britain, the
United States, Germany, and Japan intervene to obtain an extension of
time with a view to the modification of the Articles regarding civil
administration in the Chinese garrisons in Manchuria, the exclusive
trading rights demanded by the Russians, and the proposed railway to the
Wall.[368] Six days later, on March 27, the two-week period expired, and
the Chinese Court, which still sojourned at Si-ngan in the Shen-si
Province, telegraphed to Sir Chin-chen Lo-fêng-luh, as follows: “We have
followed the advice of Lord Lansdowne, in not giving our authority to
sign the Manchurian Agreement. In your telegrams of the 20th[369] and
23d[370] instant, you have assured us of the moral support of England if
we followed her advice. Our Plenipotentiaries, Prince Ching and Viceroy
Li, report that Russia will now permanently occupy Manchuria, and that
the collective negotiations will have to be suspended. The Court feels
great anxiety about this matter. As Manchuria is the cradle of the
present dynasty, how could China tolerate a permanent occupation of that
region? We now apply for the positive assistance of England in bringing
about a satisfactory settlement between China and Russia, in order to
avoid a rupture with that Power, which could not fail to be detrimental
to the interests of China and the treaty Powers. Please lay the contents
of the telegram before Lord Lansdowne and request an immediate
reply.”[371] It is possible that these messages were simultaneously
repeated to some or all of the rest of the four Powers, and, if so, it
becomes tenable that, but for the protests of the Powers, Li Hung-chang
might have signed the agreement. Nor can it be denied that, even after
their final refusal to accept the Russian proposals, the Chinese
officials clearly apprehended that, failing the positive support of the
Powers, Manchuria would be _permanently_ occupied by the northern Power.
It is, of course, uncertain, and perhaps also immaterial, whether they
had voluntarily reached that conclusion, or whether the Russians had led
them to the belief by threats.

Let us now turn to see what explanations Russia had offered, for Japan
about January 12[372] and Great Britain on March 4[373] had made
inquiries at the Russian Government in respect to the actual text of the
Agreement. Lord Lansdowne repeated his query on March 9, adding that if
the version reported by Sir Ernest Satow was approximately accurate, it
was “impossible to describe it as a contract of a temporary and
provisional nature, and our treaty rights were certainly affected by
it.” Then, in his oft outspoken vein, the Marquess concluded: “On the
other hand, it is surely reasonable that we should ask his Excellency’s
[Count Lamsdorff’s] help in exposing the trick, and putting the saddle
on the right horse, if, as he suggests, garbled versions of the
Agreement are being circulated by the Chinese Government in order to
create dissension between the Powers; and you may state that to join the
Russian Government in exhibiting in its true light so discreditable a
manœuvre would afford the liveliest satisfaction to His Majesty’s
Government.”[374] Russia, however, would not communicate the text of the
proposed Agreement, and it was explained later by Count Lamsdorff that
there had been a “programme,” the detail of which had at one time or
another been under discussion, but there had never existed any regular
draft Agreement in twelve Articles; that the Czar had at no time given
him the full powers indispensable for concluding such an agreement, and
that in her negotiations with China [concerning the programme], three
different Departments of the Russian Government had been equally
engaged. These circumstances, and also “the unwise interference of the
press and public, which seemed to assert a very dangerous claim to be
admitted to a seat and voice in the councils of the Powers regarding
China,” made it very difficult for the Count to be as frankly
communicative as he would otherwise have wished to have been. Indeed,
“it would have been impossible for him to have discussed the details of
these negotiations with a third Government.”[375] To the Japanese
Minister, who had been instructed by his Government to make the friendly
proposal to Russia that the Representatives of the Powers at Peking
should be given an opportunity to consider the draft of the Manchurian
Agreement before it was signed, Count Lamsdorff replied in no less
interesting manner. He observed, on March 26, that the Agreement solely
concerned two independent States, and must be concluded without the
intervention of any other Powers, and politely but firmly declined to
consider any such proposal as was made by Japan. The Count added,
however, that “he could give an official assurance to the Japanese
Minister that neither the sovereignty and the integrity of China in
Manchuria nor the treaty rights of any other Power were affected by the
proposed Agreement; that it was of a provisional nature, and a necessary
preliminary to the Russian troops evacuating the province. Its early
signature was desired by his Excellency in order that the unjust
suspicions aroused by false reports with regard to it might be removed
by its publication.”[376] Satisfied neither with this statement nor with
China’s refusal to sign the Agreement, the Japanese Government is said
to have made a second protest at St. Petersburg in a more resolute tone
than in the first, on April 5.[377] On the same day, however, appeared
in the Russian _Messager Officiel_ a long statement recapitulating
Russia’s relations with China since the beginning of the Boxer affair,
and declaring that, owing to the publication in the foreign press of all
sorts of false reports of the alleged treaties with China, and to the
serious obstacles that had apparently been put in the way of China as
regards the conclusion of an agreement with Russia serving as “a
starting-point” toward the restoration of Manchuria to China, “it had
been found impossible immediately to take the measures contemplated for
the gradual evacuation of Manchuria.” The negotiations had been dropped.
“With regard to the question of the complete and final restitution of
this territory to China,” concluded the official statement, “it is
evident that it can only be accomplished after a normal state of affairs
has been reëstablished in the Chinese Empire, and a central Government
has been secured in the capital, independent and sufficiently strong to
guarantee Russia against the renewal of the disturbances of last year.
While maintaining the present temporary form of government with the
object of insuring order in the neighborhood of the vast Russian
frontier, but remaining unalterably true to their original programme, as
repeatedly formulated, the Imperial Government will quietly await the
future progress of events.”[378]

-----

Footnote 341:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 6.

Footnote 342:

  _The Times_, February 20, 1901, p. 5.

Footnote 343:

  _Ibid._ “The Chinese argue,” added Dr. Morrison, “that Russia, having
  no interests south of the Great Wall, no missionaries, no trade, and
  no troops, can reasonably expect in return benevolent treatment from
  China in any agreement proposed outside the Great Wall, especially as
  Russia is in military occupation.... Russia appears determined to
  profit by the condition to which China is reduced by the action of the
  other Powers, just as she profited by obtaining the Primorsk Province
  after the war of 1860, and Port Arthur and Talien-wan subsequent to
  the war of 1895.”

Footnote 344:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 14. Cf. _ibid._, Nos. 25 and 42.

Footnote 345:

  _The Times_, February 28, 1901, p. 5.

Footnote 346:

  See pp. 91–92, above.

Footnote 347:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 42. Other versions are similar in substance
  to this one, which was forwarded by Sir Ernest Satow.

Footnote 348:

  See _China, No. 2 (1904)_, Nos. 16, 17, 32, 35.

Footnote 349:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 30.

Footnote 350:

  _Ibid._, No. 18 (March 1).

Footnote 351:

  _Ibid._, No. 15 (February 28).

Footnote 352:

  _Ibid._, No. 16.

Footnote 353:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 21 (March 4).

Footnote 354:

  _Ibid._, No. 31.

Footnote 355:

  _Ibid._, No. 24.

Footnote 356:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 22 and 23 (March 5).

Footnote 357:

  _Ibid._, No. 28.

Footnote 358:

  _China, No. 6 (1901)_, Nos. 61 (January 30), and 119 (February 20).

Footnote 359:

  Cf., e. g., _ibid._, No. 62.

Footnote 360:

  From the _Official Messenger_ of St. Petersburg of April 5, 1901;
  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, p. 22.

Footnote 361:

  _China, No. 6 (1901)_, No. 135.

Footnote 362:

  _Ibid._, No. 176. It may be remembered that Japan had even a stronger
  reason than Russia to abstain from all the unpleasant questions
  connected with the missionaries, but it is needless to say that, in
  her joint action with other Powers in the matter of the official
  punishment and other questions, she regarded missionaries and other
  foreigners alike as subjects with certain inviolable rights.

Footnote 363:

  Dr. Morrison wrote from Peking on March 3: “To render China more
  willing speedily to sign the convention, M. de Giers has informed Li
  Hung-chang that Russia will not participate in the demand for the
  execution of ten provincial officials guilty of inhuman murders of
  white men, whose death justice demands. Thus the murdered English men,
  women, and children may be described as England’s contribution toward
  securing to Russia the advantages derived from this convention.”—The
  London _Times_, March 4, 1901, p. 5.

Footnote 364:

  _China, No. 6 (1901)_, No. 234.

Footnote 365:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, Nos. 28, 29, 42.

Footnote 366:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 28, 30. Later confirmed by the Chinese officials. See
  No. 33.

Footnote 367:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 32.

Footnote 368:

  _Ibid._, No. 33.

Footnote 369:

  Probably _ibid._, No. 31.

Footnote 370:

  This telegram has not appeared in the Blue Books.

Footnote 371:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 35.

Footnote 372:

  _Ibid._, No. 6.

Footnote 373:

  _Ibid._, No. 20.

Footnote 374:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 26.

Footnote 375:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 39.

Footnote 376:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 34.

Footnote 377:

  The _Kokumin_, April 6, 1901.

Footnote 378:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 37, pp. 17–23.




                               CHAPTER XI
                            FURTHER DEMANDS


Russia did not wait long before reaching another “starting-point.” No
sooner did the effort of Viceroy Chang Chih-tung and the late Viceroy
Liu Kun-yi to create among the Representatives of some Powers a
sentiment in favor of opening all Manchuria to foreign trade, so as to
forestall the annexation of the territory by Russia, miscarry,[379]
than Sir Ernest Satow reported from “a thoroughly trustworthy source,”
on August 14, 1901, that Russia was resuming her negotiations with
China to bring about the signature of the amended Manchurian Agreement
of the preceding March.[380] Lord Lansdowne at once instructed him to
inform the Chinese authorities, if his advice was requested, that the
proper course for them to pursue would be to call the attention of the
Powers to the matter and to communicate the text of the provisions in
question, should they prove inconsistent with the treaty obligations
of China to other Powers or with the integrity of the Empire; so that
the British Government should be ready to advise whether an infraction
of its treaty rights was involved, or whether the provisions were in
any other way objectionable.[381] It does not appear that Russia
exercised great pressure upon China for the conclusion of the
Agreement. Toward the end of the month, M. de Giers was replaced as
Russian Minister at Peking by M. Paul Lessar, formerly a railway
engineer on the Afghan frontier, and a man of delicate health but
brilliant parts. Meanwhile, the peace commissioners of the eleven
Powers had at last, on September 17, 1901, succeeded in signing at
Peking with the two Chinese Plenipotentiaries the final Protocol
between China and the Powers for the resumption of their friendly
relations.[382] It seems that, when the affairs in North China were
thus finally settled, Russia felt herself freer than she ever had been
to deal independently with China concerning the Manchurian question,
which the Powers had allowed to remain. Moreover, the Imperial Court
was expected shortly to return to the capital, and the Chinese
Government began to look anxiously for the withdrawal of foreign
troops from the realm. Seizing this opportunity, M. Lessar seems to
have mooted, probably on October 5,[383] a new convention of
evacuation, whose comparatively mild terms commended themselves
powerfully at this moment to the Chinese commissioners, especially to
Li Hung-chang.[384] Considering the feeble attitude of China, it would
have been extremely difficult for the interested Powers to protest to
her against the acceptance of the Russian demands, had not the
Viceroys Liu and Chang, after learning their contents, again strongly
reminded the Emperor and the Empress Dowager of the direct peril to
the reigning dynasty which might result from acceding to the Russian
proposals. In accordance with the wishes of the Court, the dying Li
Hung-chang is said to have, on his sick-bed, seen M. Lessar, and
appealed to the Russian friendship toward China to modify the terms of
the proposed amendment.[385] Li soon passed away, on November 7,
leaving the gravest problem of China in a state of extreme
uncertainty. As to the contents of the Russian proposition, it is
interesting to observe that they were presently revealed from a source
whose veracity could hardly be questioned. On December 11, Prince
Ching disclosed them to Mr. Conger.[386] They coincided with those
that the latter had reported to Secretary Hay on the 3d, namely, that,
stated briefly, Russia should evacuate Manchuria, under the usual
conditions, in three years; that China should protect the railways and
Russian subjects in the territory; that she might station, in places
other than lands assigned to the Railway Company, mounted and foot
soldiers, whose numbers should, however, be determined by an agreement
with Russia, and who should exclude artillery; that troops of no other
nationality should be employed in protecting the railways; that the
Anglo-Russian Agreement of April, 1899, should be strictly adhered to;
that subjects of no other nationality should without Russian consent
be allowed to build railways or bridges in Southern Manchuria; and
that the Shan-hai-kwan-Niu-chwang-Sinminting Railways should be
returned to China after her payment to Russia of the expenditure
incurred by the latter in their occupation.[387] Prince Ching, it
appears, presented a counter-proposition to the Russian convention,
which, among other things, seems to have requested that the evacuation
of Manchuria should be completed within one year, instead of three, as
was provided in the original draft. Russia’s reply to this arrived in
Peking the last of January, 1902, agreeing to reduce the period of
evacuation from three to two years.[388] At the same time, however,
the Russian Government now strongly supported, in addition to the
proposed convention, a separate agreement proposed by the
Russo-Chinese Bank. The latter, according to Prince Ching, contained,
besides the railway concessions already granted to the Bank, provision
that China should herself undertake all industrial development in
Manchuria, but if she required financial help from the outside,
application should always first be made to the Russo-Chinese Bank;
only when the latter did not wish to engage in the work might citizens
of other countries be allowed to undertake it. A clause was also to be
inserted, the practical value of which is not clear, that citizens of
every country should have the same rights as they then did to trade at
the open ports and in the interior.[389] Prince Ching was obliged to
acknowledge to Mr. Conger, on January 19, 1902, that, owing to the
pressure which Russia increased simultaneously with the apparent
concessions she had made, she would yield no further, and “he was
convinced that, if China held out longer, they would never again
secure terms so lenient; that the Russians were in full possession of
the territory, and their treatment of the Chinese was so aggravating
that longer occupation was intolerable; that they must be got out, and
that the only way left for China to accomplish this was to make the
best possible terms. The only terms that Russia would consent to were
the signing of both the Convention and the Russo-Chinese Bank
Agreement.”[390]

[Illustration:

  LI HUNG-CHANG
]

It is unnecessary to say that against the Russian demands Great Britain,
Japan, and the United States had separately and more than once entered
firm protests at Peking. The conduct of the first two Powers, however,
is not shown in the published documents. Secretary Hay reminded the
Russian and Chinese Governments, on February 3, of the repeated
assurances made by the Czar’s Foreign Minister of his devotion to the
principle of the open door in all parts of China, and said: “An
agreement whereby China gives any corporation or company the exclusive
right or privilege of opening mines, establishing railroads, or in any
other way industrially developing Manchuria, can but be viewed with the
greatest concern by the Government of the United States. It constitutes
a monopoly, which is a distinct breach of the stipulations of the
treaties concluded between China and foreign Powers, and thereby
seriously affects the rights of American citizens.”[391] To this note,
the interesting reply of Count Lamsdorff, signed by himself, was: “...
It [the Russian Government] feels itself bound ... to declare that
negotiations carried on between two entirely independent States are not
subject to be submitted to the approval of other Powers. There is no
thought of attacking the principle of the ‘open door’ _as that principle
is understood by the Imperial Government of Russia_,[392] and Russia has
no intention whatever to change _the policy followed by her in that
respect up to the present time_. If the Russo-Chinese Bank should obtain
concessions in China, the agreements of a private character relating to
them would not differ from those heretofore concluded by so many other
foreign corporations.[393] But would it not be very strange if the
‘door’ that is ‘open’ to certain nations should be closed to Russia,
whose frontier adjoins that of Manchuria, and who has been forced by
recent events to send her troops into that province to reëstablish order
in the plain and common interest of all nations?... It is impossible to
deny to an independent State the right to grant to others such
concessions as it is free to dispose of, and I have every reason to
believe that the demands of the Russo-Chinese Bank do not in the least
exceed those that have been so often formulated by other foreign
companies, and I feel that under the circumstances it would not be easy
for the Imperial Government to deny to the Russian companies that
support which is given by other Governments to companies and syndicates
of their own nationalities. At all events, I beg your Excellency to
believe that there is not, nor can there be, any question of the
contradiction of the assurances which, under the orders of His Majesty
the Emperor, I have had occasion to give heretofore in regard to the
principles which invariably direct the policy of Russia.”[394] It should
be noted here that Count Lamsdorff’s statement, while it refers to the
Agreement with the Bank, which he supported, contains no reference to
the Convention proposed by the Russian Government.

Negotiations lagged, China probably declining to sign under the
remonstrances of Great Britain, the United States, and Japan. On March
2, Prince Ching showed Mr. Conger a draft of his new counter-proposals,
which Japan was said to have wholly, and Great Britain in the main,
approved.[395] These proposals are interesting for their practical
identity, save a slight difference,[396] with the final Russo-Chinese
Convention of April 8, 1902, which will be fully treated in a subsequent
chapter. This fact is a conclusive evidence that after March, Russia
suddenly accepted nearly all of the counter-proposals made by China.
This abrupt condescension on the part of Russia is supposed to have been
partly due to an important event which had recently taken place in the
diplomatic world—the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement signed
at London on January 30, 1902, and simultaneously announced in
Parliament and the Imperial Diet of Tokio on February 12.

-----

Footnote 379:

  The _Kokumin_, May 19, 1901.

Footnote 380:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 40. In No. 42 (August 21), Sir Ernest
  gives, in three parallel columns, the original terms proposed by
  Russia in February, the alterations of March, and the proposals now
  made in August. The last two are nearly identical.

Footnote 381:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 41 (August 16).

Footnote 382:

  See Mayers, pp. 283–318; or the Blue Book, _Treaty Series_, No. 17,
  1902; _Final Protocol between the Foreign Powers and China for the
  Resumption of Friendly Relations_.

Footnote 383:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, p. 266.

Footnote 384:

  See the summary of Li’s highly interesting letter of September 30,
  which has just appeared in the London _Times_ for October 12, 1904, p.
  6.

Footnote 385:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 266–267; The _Kokumin_, November 2, pp. 23, 30,
  190–191.

Footnote 386:

  The U. S. 57th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. p.
  272.

Footnote 387:

  The U. S. 57th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. p.
  271. Compare a version in _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 266–267.

Footnote 388:

  The U. S. 57th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. p.
  272.

Footnote 389:

  The U. S. 57th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. pp.
  273–274.

Footnote 390:

  _Ibid._, pp. 273–274 (Conger to Hay).

Footnote 391:

  The U. S. 57th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. pp.
  926–928.

Footnote 392:

  The italics in the quotation are the author’s.

Footnote 393:

  Observe how powerfully Russia applies this argument. On February 4, M.
  Lessar said that Russia was merely asking privileges in Manchuria
  similar to those granted to Germany in Shan-tung.—The U. S. 57th
  Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. p. 274. Russia, if
  she would, could with a certain amount of impunity inquire of Great
  Britain and other Powers how it was that they allowed Germany to
  acquire her apparently exclusive rights in Shan-tung, and now objected
  to Russia’s following her example only on a larger scale.

Footnote 394:

  The U. S. 57th Congress, 2d Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. p.
  929.

Footnote 395:

  _Ibid._, pp. 277–279.

Footnote 396:

  I. e., the draft of March limited the period of evacuation to one
  year, instead of a year and a half, as in the convention of April.




                              CHAPTER XII
     THE ANGLO-JAPANESE AGREEMENT AND THE RUSSO-FRENCH DECLARATION


The details of the negotiations preliminary to the consummation of this
remarkable stroke of diplomacy have not been made public, but we are in
possession of some salient facts from which successive steps leading up
to the final conclusion may be inferred with tolerable certainty. It is
well known that Great Britain, which had always occupied a predominant
place in the foreign relations of Japan, had persistently opposed the
latter’s ardent wish and continual struggle to revise the humiliating
treaties which had, about 1858, been imposed by the Powers upon the weak
feudal Government of Yedo. In 1894, however, contrary to her past
policy, Great Britain led other Powers in according to Japan a cordial
recognition of the latter’s progress in various lines of her national
activity, and assenting to the revision of her treaties. During the war
with China in 1894–5, the British attitude was one of friendly
neutrality between the two Oriental Empires, but the events after the
conclusion of the war, especially the forced retrocession of the
Liao-tung Peninsula, closely followed by the tightening hold of the
Muscovites upon the Peking Court, seemed to have aroused the sympathy of
Great Britain with Japan, mingled probably with the fear of the loss of
some of her own predominant economic interests in China. From this time
on, the interests of the two Powers had been seen to coincide in the Far
East to an increasing degree, and the relations of their Governments had
steadily risen in cordiality.[397] At the rupture of the Boxer
insurrection in 1900, the Cabinet of Lord Salisbury manifested so much
faith in Japan as to request her immediately to dispatch large forces to
the relief of the besieged Legations at Peking, Great Britain going even
so far as to engage to undertake the necessary financial
responsibilities of the proposed expedition.[398] Both during the
campaign and throughout the negotiation for peace, the two Powers, as
well as the United States, conducted themselves together, as is apparent
from our foregoing discussion, in perfect harmony.[399] The common
danger in Manchuria still further cemented their friendship. All this
cordial relation, spontaneous as it was, would not, however, account for
the formation of a definite alliance between the two Governments. It
seems at least probable that the Anglo-German Agreement of October,
1900, as much by the importance of some of its principles as by its very
inefficiency, served as a natural step toward a more wholesome
alliance.[400] In this new direction, Great Britain is said to have
taken the initiative. This supposition will appear not improbable when
it is considered that her immense interests in China, which had begun to
be eclipsed by other Powers, would be best secured and promoted by the
maintenance of the integrity of China and the open door in her market,
and that this object could not be better assured than by an alliance
with the strongest Eastern Power, whose fast growing interests in the
neighboring lands were in a large measure identical with hers.
Suggestions for such an agreement are known to have been made by Great
Britain to Japan under the Itō Cabinet in April, 1901, and again under
the present Katsura Cabinet in July, but it was not till October of that
year that definite negotiations were opened by Japan. The Premier,
Viscount Katsura, seems to have ascertained in December that the elder
statesmen of the Empire were in hearty accord with the agreement toward
which the negotiations had pointed.[401] At this stage of the
negotiations, also, there had developed other circumstances under which
the “splendid” isolation of Great Britain appeared less tenable than
before. Half a year after the Anglo-German Agreement was rendered
valueless by the declarations of Herr von Bülow, the Czar paid a
significant visit, in September, not only to France, but also to
Germany. The ebullition of friendly sentiments between the heads of the
States was not less effervescent at Danzig than at Dunkirk. The
Russo-Chinese Bank presently floated a loan of 80,000,000 marks at
Berlin, thus insuring to that extent the interests of the Germans in
Russian success in the East. At the same time the situation in Manchuria
had been growing more serious than before, while Germany had seemed no
longer inclined to join Great Britain in the latter’s protests against
the menacing conduct of Russia. Grave as was the danger to the political
and commercial prestige of Great Britain in the East, her hands were
still closely tied by the vexatious South African question. If there
ever was need of an agreement with the rising Power of the Orient, it
had probably been never more keenly felt by the British Government than
in the last part of the year 1901. Side by side with these favorable
circumstances for an understanding, the student should not for a moment
lose from sight two fundamental conditions which drew together, not only
the Governments, but also the people, of Great Britain and Japan with
mutual attraction. One was sentimental: each of the two nations found in
the other, though in different ways from one another, something of a
counterpart of its geographical position, its material needs and
aspirations, and the energy and enterprise of its individual members.
This mutual sympathy was largely intensified by, not, indeed, so much
the identity of their interests in the East, as the common principles
under which these interests would be best protected—the independence and
strength of China and Korea, and the equal opportunity therein for the
economic enterprise of all nations.

[Illustration:

  COUNT KATSURA

  _Premier of Japan_
]

The final outcome of the Anglo-Japanese negotiations was a remarkable
product, the like of which is seldom seen in history, especially when it
is considered that it united reciprocally two nations widely apart in
race, religion, and history, one of which had rarely in time of peace
entered into a regular alliance even with a European Power.[402] The
most striking, as well as the most important for our study, must be
regarded the entirely fair and open principles to which the Agreement
gave clear expression. These remarks may not be better substantiated
than by quoting the exact words of the document itself, and of the
dispatch inclosing the Agreement from Lord Lansdowne to Sir Claude
MacDonald, the British Minister at Tokio, which read as follows:—

  “The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a
  desire to maintain the _status quo_ and general peace in the extreme
  East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining the
  independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and
  the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in those
  countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, hereby agree
  as follows:—

  “ARTICLE I. The High Contracting Parties having mutually recognized
  the independence of China and Korea, declare themselves to be
  entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either
  country. Having in view, however, their special interests, of which
  those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in
  addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is
  interested in a peculiar degree, politically as well as commercially
  and industrially, in Korea, the High Contracting Parties recognize
  that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures
  as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if
  threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by
  disturbances arising in China or Korea, and necessitating the
  intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties for the
  protection of the lives and property of its subjects.

  “ARTICLE II. If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defense of
  their respective interests as above described, should become
  involved in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party
  will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent
  other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.

  “ARTICLE III. If in the above event, any other Power or Powers
  should join in hostilities against that ally, the other High
  Contracting Party will come to its assistance, and will conduct war
  in common, and will make peace in mutual agreement with it.

  “ARTICLE IV. The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them
  will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements
  with another Power to the prejudice of the interests above
  described.

  “ARTICLE V. Whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or
  Japan, the above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two
  Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly.

  “ARTICLE VI. The present Agreement shall come into effect
  immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for
  five years from that date.

  “In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have
  notified twelve months before the expiration of the said five years
  the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the
  expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High
  Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date
  fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in
  war, the alliance shall, _ipso facto_, continue until peace is
  concluded.

  “In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized by their
  respective Governments, have signed this Agreement, and have affixed
  thereto their seals.

  “Done in duplicate at London, the 30th January, 1902.

  “LANSDOWNE,
    _His Britannic Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign
       Affairs._

  “HAYASHI,
    _Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty
       the Emperor of Japan at the Court of St. James.”_[403]

                                    “FOREIGN OFFICE, January 30, 1902.

  “SIR CLAUDE MACDONALD [the British Minister at Tokio]:

  “I have signed to-day, with the Japanese Minister, an Agreement
  between Great Britain and Japan, of which a copy is inclosed in this
  dispatch.

  “This Agreement may be regarded as the outcome of the events which
  have taken place during the past two years in the Far East, and of
  the part taken by Great Britain and Japan in dealing with them.

  “Throughout the troubles and complications which arose in China
  consequent upon the Boxer outbreak and the attack upon the Peking
  Legations, the two Powers have been in close and uninterrupted
  communication, and have been actuated by similar views.

  “We have each of us desired that the integrity and independence of
  the Chinese Empire should be preserved, that there should be no
  disturbance of the territorial _status quo_ either in China or in
  the adjoining regions, that all nations should, within those
  regions, as well as within the limits of the Chinese Empire, be
  afforded equal opportunities for the development of their commerce
  and industry, and that peace should not only be restored, but
  should, for the future, be maintained.

  “From the frequent exchanges of view which have taken place between
  the two Governments, and from the discovery that their Far Eastern
  policy was identical, it has resulted that each side has expressed
  the desire that their common policy should find expression in an
  international contract of binding validity.

  “We have thought it desirable to record in the Preamble of that
  instrument the main objects of our common policy in the Far East to
  which I have already referred, and in the first Article we join in
  entirely disclaiming any aggressive tendencies either in China or
  Korea. We have, however, thought it necessary also to place on
  record the view entertained by both the High Contracting Parties,
  that should their interests as above described be endangered, it
  will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may
  be indispensable in order to safeguard their interests, and words
  have been added which will render it clear that such precautionary
  measures might become necessary and might be legitimately taken, not
  only in the case of aggressive action or of an actual attack of some
  other Power, but in the event of disturbances arising of a character
  to necessitate the intervention of either of the High Contracting
  Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its
  subjects.

  “The principal obligations undertaken mutually by the High
  Contracting Parties are those of maintaining a strict neutrality in
  the event of either of them becoming involved in war, and of coming
  to one another’s assistance in the event of either of them being
  confronted by the opposition of more than one hostile Power. Under
  the remaining provisions of the Agreement, the High Contracting
  Parties undertake that neither of them will, without consultation
  with the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power
  to the prejudice of the interests described in the Agreement, and
  that whenever those interests are in jeopardy, they will communicate
  with one another fully and frankly.

  “The concluding Article has reference to the duration of the
  Agreement which, after five years, is terminable by either of the
  High Contracting Parties at one year’s notice.

  “His Majesty’s Government had been largely influenced in their
  decision to enter into this important contract by the conviction
  that it contains no provisions which can be regarded as an
  indication of aggressive or self-seeking tendencies in the regions
  to which it applies. It has been concluded purely as a measure of
  precaution, to be invoked, should occasion arise, in the defence of
  important British interests. It in no way threatens the present
  position or the legitimate interests of other Powers. On the
  contrary, that part of it which renders either of the High
  Contracting Parties liable to be called upon by the other for
  assistance can operate only when one of the allies has found himself
  obliged to go to war in defence of interests which are common to
  both, when the circumstances in which he has taken this step are
  such as to establish that the quarrel has not been of his own
  seeking, and when, being engaged in his own defence, he finds
  himself threatened, not only by a single Power, but by a hostile
  coalition.

  “His Majesty’s Government trust that the Agreement may be found of
  mutual advantage to the two countries, that it will make for the
  preservation of peace, and that, should peace be unfortunately
  broken, it will have the effect of restricting the area of
  hostilities.

                                             “I am, etc.,
                                                     “LANSDOWNE.”[404]

The singular nature of these documents stands out so clearly on their
face that it hardly needs a special reference. Not only has Manchuria at
last been clearly interpreted by both Powers as lying within the scope
of the Agreement, but it is explicitly admitted therein that Japan
possesses extensive interests in the Korean peninsula, which is for that
reason included in the sphere within which the contracting parties
unequivocally disavow aggressive tendencies. Nor does this sum up all
the difference between this and the Anglo-German Agreement, for, while
in the latter the denial of the parties’ aggressive designs was limited
to the period of the Boxer complication, and, moreover, coupled with a
reservation amounting to the recognition of the theory of readjusting
the balance between the Powers at the expense of China, the new alliance
unconditionally upholds the independence of China and Korea, and any
measure, either peaceful or warlike, taken by either party to safeguard
its interests, if they are in any way threatened, would by no means
alter its devotion to the principles of the territorial integrity of the
Chinese and Korean Empires and of the open door in those countries. The
alliance exists solely for the purpose of effectively safe-guarding the
interests already acquired by the two Powers on the common ground, and
it is implied in an unmistakable manner that those interests may best be
maintained by the total abstention, in any event, from all aggressive or
exclusive tendencies in China and Korea, and, what is equally important,
that the observation of these principles would forcibly tend to preserve
the general peace in the Far East. Owing to the covert violation of
these principles by another Power, however, peace has been broken, but
the Anglo-Japanese Agreement has not expired. The latter would, however,
fall to the ground the moment one of the parties, either as a result of
a war or otherwise, should attempt to depart from the principles of the
open door and the territorial integrity of the neighboring Empires.

Lord Lansdowne considered the Agreement “a measure of precaution,” and
hoped that it would “make for the preservation of peace, and that,
should peace be unfortunately broken, it would have the effect of
restricting the area of hostilities.” Presently these hopes were openly
seconded, but in reality neutralized, by the Russo-French Declaration of
March 17, which stated:—

  “The allied Governments of Russia and France have received a copy of
  the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of the 30th January, 1902, concluded
  with the object of maintaining the _status quo_ and the general
  peace in the Far East, and preserving the independence of China and
  Korea, which are to remain open to the commerce and industry of all
  nations, and have been fully satisfied to find therein affirmed the
  fundamental principles which they have themselves, on several
  occasions, declared to form the basis of their policy, and still
  remain so.

  “The two Governments consider that the observance of these
  principles is at the same time a guarantee of their special
  interests in the Far East.[405] Nevertheless, being obliged
  themselves also to take into consideration the case in which either
  the aggressive action of third Powers, or the recurrence of
  disturbances in China, jeopardizing the integrity and free
  development of that Power, might become a menace to their own
  interests, the two allied Governments reserve to themselves the
  right to consult in that contingency as to the means to be adopted
  for securing those interests.”[406]

The St. Petersburg _Messager Officiel_ of March 20, published, with the
Declaration, the statement that the Russian Government had received the
announcement of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement “with the most perfect
calm,” for Russia likewise insisted on the maintenance and integrity of
China and Korea. “Russia,” it continued to say, “desires the
preservation of the _status quo_ and general peace in the Far East, by
the construction of the great Siberian Railroad, together with its
branch line through Manchuria, toward a port always ice-free. Russia
aids in the extension in these regions of the commerce and industry of
the whole world. Would it be to her interest to put forward obstacles at
the present time? The intention expressed by Great Britain and Japan to
attain those same objects, which have invariably been pursued by the
Russian Government, can meet with nothing but sympathy in Russia, in
spite of the comments in certain political spheres and in some of the
foreign newspapers, which endeavored to present in quite a different
light the impassive attitude of the Imperial Government toward a
diplomatic act which, in its eye, does not change in any way the general
situation of the political horizon.”[407]

It seems to be generally overlooked that, so far as the published
documents are concerned, there occurs no statement that the Russo-French
alliance extended from Europe to the Far East under precisely the same
conditions as those of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. In other words,
although the general principles of the latter are indorsed, one finds
nowhere that its terms of war and neutrality and its provisions
regarding the duration of the validity of the instrument have also been
reproduced by Russia and France in their mutual convention. Regarding
the precise conditions of their alliance, therefore, the world is left
much in the dark, save what it takes for granted. Nor are the principles
of the integrity and the open door of China and Korea so fully and
explicitly stated here as in the Agreement of the rival allies, while
the reservation at the end of the Declaration does not make it clear
that these principles may not be discarded, under certain circumstances,
according to the interpretations of the parties themselves of the means
to be taken to safeguard their interests.

Turning to the general tenor of the documents, the student will at once
observe their marked characteristics. It is at least singular, one would
think, that the “most perfect calm” and the “impassive attitude” of the
Russian Government should be expressed in so many words. If, again, the
allied Powers were, as they declare, in perfect accord with the
principles of Great Britain and Japan, it is not intelligible why they
should entertain, as it appears, so deep a suspicion toward the
“political spheres” in which the Russian calmness was said to have been
deliberately misinterpreted, and also toward the “third Powers” “whose
aggressive action” might “jeopardize the integrity and free development”
of China. This sense of distrust becomes all the more pronounced when it
is contrasted with the assertion that the agreement between Great
Britain and Japan brought no change on the political horizon of the
East. It was reported about the time when the Russian Minister and the
French _Chargé d’Affaires_ at Tokio handed the Declaration to Baron
Komura, that the allied Powers had made their Declaration because they
feared that Great Britain and Japan might, in virtue of the first
Article of their Agreement, object even to legitimate means of
protecting the French and Russian interests in the Far East.[408] If the
four Powers upheld the same principles, no such apprehension of two of
them against the other two could be either cordial or even justifiable.
Under these considerations, one can hardly avoid the conclusion that the
allied Governments of Russia and France must have been animated less by
the principles they professed than by the deep rivalry of their
interests with those of the other allies. For it is at least certain
that, ever since their memorable coalition with Germany in 1895, in the
coercion of Japan, Russia and France had acted in mutual good-will, the
former being mainly aided by the latter in Manchuria and Korea, and the
latter by the former in the southern Chinese provinces,[409] in their
diplomatic manœuvres in those countries and in their struggles with
Japan and Great Britain.[410] If the Agreement and the Declaration are
considered the formal expression of the cordial sentiment which had long
existed and been growing between the two sets of the Powers, they may be
said to have brought no change upon the political horizon; but it seems
impossible to deny that their publication greatly clarified the
political atmosphere in the East, and, in spite of the verbal meaning of
the declaration, not a little accentuated the widening contrast between
the two different policies upheld by the two powerful coalitions. In
this sense, the political evolution of the Far East may be said to have
now reached an important stage after the European intervention in Japan
in 1895.[411]

-----

Footnote 397:

  The reader will remember the cordial exchange of views between the two
  Powers when Wei-hai-Wei was leased to Great Britain in 1898. There
  occurred in the East several affairs of minor importance in which the
  British and Japanese authorities acted with mutual good-will; e. g.,
  the arrangement for a British concession at Niu-chwang in 1899. See
  _China, No. 1 (1900)_, pp. 215–218.

Footnote 398:

  See the _British Parliamentary Papers_: _China, No. 3 (1900)_, Nos.
  146, 121, 129, 134, 141, 155, 169–171, 180–181, 188–189, 191, 193,
  203, 210, 216, 238, 241, 212, 217, 224, 236, 246–247, 252, 260,
  265–267; _China, No. 1 (1901)_, Nos. 122–124, 42, 4, 18, 23, 29, 32
  (July 13, 1900), 41, 52, 57, 38.

Footnote 399:

  Mr. Katō, Foreign Minister at Tokio at the time, remarked later that
  even in matters about which the two Powers had not exchanged their
  views, their Representatives at Peking acted in such mutual sympathy
  that it was suspected that a secret understanding must have existed
  between them.—_Tokushu Jōyaku_, p. 411.

Footnote 400:

  In this connection it was thought not improbable that Germany herself
  might have informally suggested the feasibility of a triple alliance
  between herself and Great Britain and Japan in the same line as the
  Anglo-German Agreement, which Japan had joined as a signatory. In his
  speech before the Reichstag, however, Herr von Bülow declared, on
  March 3, that Germany was not the father of the Anglo-Japanese
  alliance. At any rate, the German suggestion, if there was one, never
  materialized, but gave place to another and still more important form
  of agreement in which the world-politics of the versatile Kaiser
  played no part.

Footnote 401:

  The position which one of the elder statesmen out of office, Marquis
  Itō, occupied in this diplomatic evolution, has been a subject of much
  speculation. He was not only on his tour in America and Europe when
  the Agreement was concluded, but also had made efforts at St.
  Petersburg to come to an _entente_ with Russia. From this, it has even
  been charged that he was opposed to an Agreement with Great Britain.
  It now appears, however, that he had discussed the latter question
  with Premier Katsura before he sailed for Europe, and that he
  proceeded to St. Petersburg with a full authorization from the
  Government to exchange views with Count Lamsdorff regarding Korea. In
  the mean time, the Cabinet continued its negotiations with Great
  Britain. Each must have kept the other well informed of the progress
  of the respective negotiations, with this important difference,
  however, that Marquis Itō apparently entertained the view, which the
  Cabinet respected without accepting, that a British alliance would be,
  not less desirable, but more difficult of realization, than a Russian
  agreement concerning Korea. Unexpectedly to the Marquis, his effort
  did not materialize as well as he had hoped, while, on the other hand,
  it seemed as if his significant presence in Russia had hastened the
  hands of the jealous British Foreign Office, which now put its seal
  upon the terms as agreed upon with rather unexpected readiness.

Footnote 402:

  The writer is indebted to the _Kokumin Shimbun_ for many important
  suggestions regarding the negotiations between the two Powers which
  resulted in the conclusion of the Agreement. _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp.
  407–411, gives a brief explanatory view of the conditions under which
  the Agreement was concluded.

Footnote 403:

  _The British Parliamentary Papers, Treaty Series, No. 3, 1902:
  Agreement between the United Kingdom and Japan relative to China and
  Korea, signed at London, January 30, 1902._

Footnote 404:

  The _British Parliamentary Papers: Japan, No. 1 (1902), Dispatch to
  His Majesty’s Minister at Tokio, forwarding Agreement between Great
  Britain and Japan, of January 30, 1902_.

Footnote 405:

  Observe the clearness of this statement. This idea is only implied in
  the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. It is remarkable that an explicit
  statement of this nature should come, as it did, from the Powers from
  which it would have been less expected than from their rivals.

Footnote 406:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 50. The so-called triple alliance of Europe
  was renewed in May, with a declaration that it, together with the
  Russo-French alliance, maintained peace. The latter, as is shown here,
  had extended itself from Europe to the Far East, owing largely to the
  conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. The growing solidarity of
  the world’s international politics may in some degree be discerned
  here.

Footnote 407:

  The _Evening Post_, March 20, 1902; _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 415–416.

Footnote 408:

  The _Kokumin_, March 23, 1902.

Footnote 409:

  See, for instance, _Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Documents
  Diplomatiques: Chine, 1894–8_, No. 19 (p. 12); No. 36 (p. 29); No. 37
  (p. 30); No. 61 (pp. 45–46); No. 65 (p. 49).

Footnote 410:

  During the peace negotiations at Peking after the Boxer war, Russia
  and France coöperated as closely as did Great Britain, Japan, and the
  United States.

Footnote 411:

  See pp. 77 ff., above.




                              CHAPTER XIII
                      THE CONVENTION OF EVACUATION


It will be remembered that we left the Russo-Chinese negotiation
regarding Manchuria at the point where Prince Ching, either late in
February or early in March, presented a counter-proposal to the Russian
demands.[412] It has also been shown that the Anglo-Japanese Agreement
closely preceded, and the Franco-Russian Declaration followed, this
event. By that time the allied forces had gradually retired from North
China, and the Chinese Court, which had fled to Si-ngan, had retraced
its steps to Peking, arriving at the palace on January 7, 1902. The
political surroundings of the East seemed to have assumed a somewhat
more reassuring outlook, except in Manchuria, than they had worn at any
time since the siege of the Legations in 1900. The Russian Government
seized this opportunity to conclude with China, on April 8, 1902, along
the line suggested by the counter-draft of Prince Ching, the now
celebrated Convention providing for the evacuation of Manchuria, which
went into effect simultaneously with its signature. We subjoin this
important document,[413] together with the official statement with which
the former was published in the St. Petersburg _Messager Officiel_ of
April 12:—

  “The grave internal disorders which suddenly broke out over the
  whole of China in the year 1900, exposing the Imperial Mission and
  Russian subjects to danger, obliged Russia to take decided measures
  to protect her Imperial interests. With this object in view, the
  Imperial Government, as is already known, dispatched a considerable
  military force to Peking, which had been abandoned by the Emperor
  and the Government authorities, and introduced a Russian army into
  the frontier State of Manchuria, to which the disorders in the
  Province of Pechili had quickly spread, and were manifested by an
  attack upon the Russian frontier by the native chiefs and army,
  accompanied by a formal declaration of war on Russia by the local
  Chinese authorities.

  “Nevertheless, the Imperial Government informed the Government of
  the Emperor that Russia, in undertaking these measures, had no
  hostile intentions toward China, whose independence and integrity
  were the foundation of Russian policy in the Far East.

  “True to these principles, Russia, as soon as the danger threatening
  the Imperial Mission and Russian subjects was over, withdrew her
  forces from Pechili before any of the other Powers, and, at the
  first indication of peace in Manchuria being restored, declared her
  readiness to determine, in a private Agreement with China, the
  manner and earliest date of her evacuation of that province, with,
  however, certain guarantees of a temporary nature, which were
  rendered necessary by the disorderly condition of affairs in the
  above-mentioned province.

  “The conclusion of this Agreement dragged over many months, owing to
  the difficult position in which the high Chinese dignitaries were
  placed, being unable, in the absence of the Court, to decide upon
  action, as becomes the Representatives of a perfectly independent
  Empire.

  “Latterly, however, the pacification of China has progressed with
  notable success. After the signature of the Protocol of the 25th of
  August (7th September), 1901, the Imperial Court returned to Peking;
  the central lawful authority resumed its rights, and in many parts
  of the Empire the local administrations were reëstablished. At the
  first reception of the Corps Diplomatique in Peking, the Chinese
  Empress expressed to the foreign Representatives her gratitude for
  their coöperation in suppressing the disturbances, and assured them
  of her unshakable determination to take every measure for the
  reëstablishment in the country of the normal state of affairs
  existing before the disturbances arose.

  “This, indeed, solved the problem in which Russia was principally
  interested when the disorders broke out in the neighboring Empire.
  The Imperial Government, pursuing no selfish aims, insisted that
  other Powers also should not violate the independence and integrity
  of China; and that the lawful Government, with which Russia had
  concluded various agreements, should be reinstated, and thus, when
  the disorders were over, the friendly relations with China, which
  had existed from time immemorial, should be continued.

  “Taking into consideration that this was the only object with which
  Russian troops were sent into the Celestial Empire, and that China
  has given written guarantee for the maintenance of order in the
  country, and repaid Russia with material expenses to which she was
  put by her military operations in China, the Imperial Government
  henceforth sees no necessity for leaving armed forces within the
  confines of the neighboring territory. Therefore, by Imperial will,
  on the 26th March (April 8) was signed by the Russian Minister at
  Peking, M. Lessar, and by the Chinese Plenipotentiaries, the
  following Agreement as to the conditions of the recall of the
  Russian forces from Manchuria.


        “AGREEMENT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA RESPECTING MANCHURIA

  “His Majesty the Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias, and His
  Majesty the Emperor of China, with the object of reëstablishing and
  confirming the relations of good neighborhood, which were disturbed
  by the rising in the Celestial Empire of the year 1900, have
  appointed their Plenipotentiaries to come to an agreement on certain
  questions relating to Manchuria. These Plenipotentiaries, furnished
  with full powers, which were found to be in order, agreed as
  follows:—

  “ARTICLE 1. His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia, desirous of
  giving fresh proof of his peaceable and friendly disposition toward
  His Majesty the Emperor of China, and overlooking the fact that
  attacks were first made from frontier posts in Manchuria on
  peaceable Russian settlements, agrees to the reëstablishment of the
  authority of the Chinese Government in that region, which remains an
  integral part of the Chinese Empire, and restores to the Chinese
  Government the right to exercise therein governmental and
  administrative authority, as it existed previous to the occupation
  by Russian troops of that region.

  “ARTICLE 2. In taking possession of the governmental and
  administrative authority in Manchuria, the Chinese Government
  confirms, both with regard to the period and with regard to all
  other Articles, the obligation to observe strictly the stipulations
  of the contract concluded with the Russo-Chinese Bank on the 27th
  August, 1896, and in virtue of paragraph 5 of the above-mentioned
  contract, takes upon itself the obligation to use all means to
  protect the railway and the persons in its employ, and binds itself
  also to secure within the boundaries of Manchuria the safety of all
  Russian subjects in general and the undertakings established by
  them.

  “The Russian Government, in view of these obligations accepted by
  the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of China, agrees on its
  side, provided that no disturbances arise and that the action of
  other Powers should not prevent it, to withdraw gradually all its
  forces from within the limits of Manchuria in the following manner:—

  “(a.) Within six months from the signature of the Agreement to clear
  the southwestern portion of the Province of Mukden up to the river
  Liao-ho of Russian troops, and to hand the railways over to China.

  “(b.) Within further six months to clear the remainder of the
  Province of Mukden and the Province of Kirin of Imperial troops.

  “(c.) Within the six months following to remove the remaining
  Imperial Russian troops from the Province of Hei-lung-chang.

  “ARTICLE 3. In view of the necessity of preventing in the future any
  recurrence of the disorders of last year, in which Chinese troops
  stationed on the Manchurian frontier also took part, the Imperial
  Russian and Chinese Governments shall undertake to instruct the
  Russian military authorities and the Tsiang-Tsungs, mutually to come
  to an agreement respecting the numbers and the disposition of the
  Chinese forces until the Russian forces shall have been withdrawn.
  At the same time the Chinese Government binds itself to organize no
  other forces over and above those decided upon by the Russian
  military authorities and the Tsiang-Tsungs as sufficient to suppress
  brigandage and pacify the country.

  “After the complete evacuation of Manchuria by Russian troops, the
  Chinese Government shall have the right to increase or diminish the
  number of its troops in Manchuria, but of this must duly notify the
  Russian Government, as it is natural that the maintenance in the
  above-mentioned district of an over large number of troops must
  necessarily lead to a reinforcement of the Russian military force in
  the neighboring districts, and thus would bring about an increase of
  expenditure on military requirements undesirable for both States.

  “For police service and maintenance of internal order in the
  districts outside those parts allotted to the Eastern Chinese
  Railway Company, a police guard, under the local Governors
  (‘Tsiang-Tsungs’), consisting of cavalry and infantry, shall be
  organized exclusively of subjects of His Majesty the Emperor of
  China.

  “ARTICLE 4. The Russian Government agrees to restore to the owners
  the Railway Shan-hai-kwan-Niu-chwang-Sinminting, which, since the
  end of September, 1900, has been occupied and guarded by Russian
  troops. In view of this, the Government of His Majesty the Emperor
  of China binds itself:—

  “1. In case protection of the above-mentioned line should be
  necessary, that obligation shall fall exclusively on the Chinese
  Government, which shall not invite other Powers to participate in
  its protection, construction, or working, nor allow other Powers to
  occupy the territory evacuated by the Russians.

  “2. The completion and working of the above-mentioned line shall be
  conducted in strict accordance with the Agreement between Russia and
  England of the 16th April, 1899, and the Agreement with the private
  Corporation respecting the loan for the construction of the line.
  And furthermore, the corporation shall observe its obligations not
  to enter into possession of, or in any way to administer, the
  Shan-hai-kwan-Niu-chwang-Sinminting line.

  “3. Should, in the course of time, extensions of the line in
  Southern Manchuria, or construction of branch lines in connection
  with it, or the erection of a bridge in Niu-chwang, or the moving of
  the terminus there, be undertaken, these questions shall first form
  the subject of mutual discussion between the Russian and Chinese
  Governments.

  “4. In view of the fact that the expenses incurred by
  the Russian Government for the repair and working of the
  Shan-hai-kwan-Niu-chwang-Sinminting line were not included in the
  sum total of damages, the Chinese Government shall be bound to pay
  back the sum which, after examination with the Russian Government,
  shall be found to be due.

  “The stipulations of all former Treaties between Russia and China
  which are not affected by the present Agreement shall remain in
  force.

  “The Agreement shall have legal force from the day of its signature
  by the Plenipotentiaries of both States.

  “The exchange of ratifications shall take place in St. Petersburg
  within three months from the date of the signature of the Agreement.

  “For the confirmation of the above, the Plenipotentiaries of the two
  Contracting Powers have signed and sealed two copies of the
  Agreement in the Russian, French, and Chinese languages. Of the
  three texts which, after comparison, have been found to correspond
  with each other, that in the French language shall be considered as
  authoritative for the interpretation of the Agreement.

  “Done in Peking in duplicate, the 26th March, 1902.”

  “At the same time, M. Lessar handed a note to the Chinese
  Plenipotentiaries, which declares, in the name of the Imperial
  Government, that the surrender of the civil government of Niu-chwang
  into the hands of the Chinese administration will take place only
  upon the withdrawal from that part of foreign forces and landing
  parties, and the restoration to the Chinese of the town of
  Tien-tsin, at present under international administration.

  “From the above, it is shown that the Imperial Government, in
  complete adherence to its repeated declarations, commences the
  gradual evacuation of Manchuria in order to carry it out upon the
  conditions above enumerated, if no obstacles are placed in the way
  by the unexpected action of other Powers or of China herself; that
  the surrender of the civil government of Niu-chwang into the hands
  of the Chinese administration is to take place according to a
  written declaration given to the Celestial Government, only when
  foreign forces and landing parties are withdrawn from the port, and
  if, at the same time, the question of the restoration of Tien-tsin
  to the Chinese has been conclusively settled.

  “The Chinese Government, on its side, confirms all the obligations
  it has previously undertaken toward Russia, and particularly the
  provisions of the 1896 Agreement, which must serve as a basis for
  the friendly relations of the neighboring Empires. By this defensive
  Agreement, Russia undertook in 1896 to maintain the principle of the
  independence and integrity of China, who, on her side, gave Russia
  the right to construct a line through Manchuria and to enjoy the
  material privileges which are directly connected with the above
  undertaking.

  “After the instructive events of the last two years, it is possible
  to hope for the complete pacification of the Far East, and the
  development of friendly relations with China in the interests of the
  two Empires. But, undoubtedly, if the Chinese Government, in spite
  of their positive assurances, should, on any pretext, violate the
  above conditions, the Imperial Government would no longer consider
  itself bound by the provisions of the Manchurian Agreement, nor by
  its declarations on this subject, and would have to decline to take
  the responsibility for all the consequences which might ensue.”[414]

The comparatively mild terms of this Convention may well be pointed
out.[415] Except in the negative reservations of Article 4, there is
found here no provision for the exclusive control by the Russians of the
mining and railway enterprises either in or out of Manchuria. On the
contrary, the sovereign rights in Manchuria, including those respecting
the disposition of military forces, will in eighteen months be almost
completely restored to the Chinese Government, and the entire agreement
will become operative from the very day of its signature. The Convention
seemed to confirm the avowed intention of Russia to love peace and
respect the integrity of China. It is not strange that Prince Ching
personally thanked Great Britain, Japan, and the United States for the
valuable support they had rendered China in the negotiations which had
terminated in the conclusion of this instrument.[416]

If, however, the subsequent conduct of Russia in Manchuria has appeared
to contradict the tenor of the Agreement, it is only necessary to point
out how elastic and expansive its terms are. Paragraph 5, Article 2, of
the Bank Agreement of September 8, 1896, imposing upon the Chinese
Government the duty to protect the Manchurian Railway and the persons
employed in it, is not only reinforced but also expanded so as to make
it incumbent upon China “to secure within the boundaries of Manchuria
the safety of all Russian subjects in general and the undertakings
established by them.” Unless Manchuria is considered a territory
distinct from the rest of the Chinese Empire, no Russians or other
foreigners have the right to reside in the interior save in the treaty
posts. Yet the Chinese Government is held responsible for the security
of the Russians and their enterprises in Manchuria, which is regarded
virtually as a Russian colony, into which immigrants from Siberia and
European Russia have been sent with wonderful rapidity. Nor does this
additional obligation on the part of China any longer bind her to a
private company called the Russo-Chinese Bank, but henceforth to the
Government of the Czar. The discharge of so onerous a duty is made a
condition for the Russian evacuation of Manchuria.

It is not generally known that this condition, otherwise so difficult,
was practically impossible so long as the presence of the Russian forces
kept the Chinese troops greatly reduced in number. The apprehended
disorder must come, as it always has done, and as none knew better than
the Russians, from the groups of unoccupied men, the so-called mounted
bandits (_ma tseh_), who infested the Provinces of Sheng-king and Kirin,
where they sided with whatever power suited their fancy and interest,
exercised their own law, and in one way or another kept the country in a
state of great instability. It should be noted that they were either
disbanded soldiers or the possible candidates for the Chinese troops to
be levied to safeguard Manchuria—for military life in China seldom
attracts peaceful citizens. So long as the presence of the Russian
forces rendered the regular service of the outlaws in the Chinese army
unnecessary, their means of subsistence would be derived less often from
a settled agricultural life than from plundering. Between March, 1902,
and August, 1903, a Russian officer successfully enlisted the service of
some 450 of these marauders, and employed them in the timber work which
the Russians secured in Eastern Manchuria in the name of one of the
chiefs of the bandits.[417] Before and after this period, however, the
Russian officers continually reported sanguinary conflicts with the
robbers, the fear of whom has seemed to constitute the main
justification for the steady progress of the Russian measures of
tightening a hold upon Manchuria.[418] Side by side with this grave
situation, we should also observe that the Convention provided that,
even after the evacuation, if an evacuation were possible, the numbers
and the stations of the Chinese troops, upon whom the duty of protecting
the rapidly increasing Russian subjects and properties in Manchuria
would devolve, should always be made known to Russia, so that
unnecessarily large forces should not be stationed. Russia would judge
whether the Chinese forces were excessive, and exert her influence to
keep them in reduced numbers,[419] while, at the same time, their
capacity as well for receiving the banditti into their ranks as for
affording protection to the Russian life and property would, to say the
least, soon reach its limits. Thus the explicit terms of the Convention
were constructed so as to be greatly neutralized, as it would seem, by
what was implied and could only be inferred by analysis. In the light of
these considerations may be seen the statement that, “undoubtedly, if
the Chinese Government, in spite of their positive assurances, should,
on any pretext, violate the above conditions [i. e., of the Convention],
the Imperial Government would no longer consider itself bound by the
provisions of the Manchurian Agreement, nor by its declarations on this
subject, and would have to decline to take the responsibility for all
the consequences which might ensue,”[420]—a reservation which Count
Lamsdorff considered “a very necessary one.”[421] In the same light,
also, one may read the statement made by Sir Ernest Satow to Prince
Ching, that “the Convention did not appear to His Majesty’s Government
to be entirely satisfactory,”[422] and also the pungent remark of Lord
Lansdowne to M. de Staal, that there were several points in the
Agreement which had caused much criticism in England, particularly those
provisions which limited China’s right to dispose of her own military
forces and to construct railway extensions within her own territory. “I
did not, however,” adds the Marquess, “desire to examine these
provisions too microscopically, and I shared his [M. de Staal’s] hope
that the Agreement would be loyally and considerately interpreted on
both sides, and that the evacuation of the province would be completed
within the appointed time.”[423]

The last but not the least difficulty about the Agreement was its
absolute silence regarding the so-called “railway guards,” organized
ostensibly by the Eastern Chinese Railway Company, whose existence would
make the promised evacuation almost entirely nominal. It will be
remembered that, so far as the published agreements between China and
Russia are concerned, one fails to find any conventional ground for the
organization of the railway guards, save in Article 8 of the
Statutes—not a Russo-Chinese agreement, but purely Russian
statutes—published on December 11/13, 1896, which provided: “The
preservation of order and decorum on the lands assigned to the railway
and its appurtenances should be confined to the _police agents_
appointed by the Company. The Company should draw up and establish
police regulations.”[424] This right of Russia to police the railway
lands seems to have been tacitly perpetuated by the present Convention
of 1902,[425] and, from this, it may perhaps be assumed that the Chinese
Government had some time before April 8, 1902, agreed to the statutory
rule of Russia which has just been quoted. However that may be, a
permission to establish a police force could scarcely justify the
organization of railway guards selected from the regular troops and
receiving a higher pay than the latter. Moreover, it still remains to be
officially declared that the numbers of the guards would not be
determined by Russia at will and without consulting China. These guards
seem to have numbered only 2000 or 3000 before the Manchurian campaign
of 1900, but in October of that year Mr. Charles Hardinge, the British
_Chargé d’Affaires_ at St. Petersburg, wrote to Lord Salisbury: “I learn
that active recruiting for this force is now in progress, and its
numbers are to be raised to 12,000 men under command of officers in the
regular army. Intrenched camps are also being constructed at all the
strategic positions along the line.”[426] Then, on the eve of the
termination of the first period of evacuation in 1902, it was reported
by Consul Hosie: “I am credibly informed that the number of the military
guard of the Russian railways in Manchuria has been fixed at 30,000
men.”[427] Latterly, the name has been changed to the “frontier guards,”
which, after the beginning of the present war, were said to have been
made up of fifty-five mounted squadrons, fifty-five foot companies, and
six batteries of artillery, aggregating 25,000 men, instead of 30,000,
and guarding the railways in sections of thirty-three miles.[428] There
is no intention here to maintain the accuracy of these reports, or to
decide whether the numbers are adequate for the purpose in view, but one
would be tempted to think that the Russian Government made a regrettable
omission in the new Manchurian Agreement, when it made no reference to
the forces which were justified by no open contract with China, and,
theoretically speaking, were not incapable of an indefinite expansion.

-----

Footnote 412:

  It was said with a great deal of probability that the conclusion of
  the Anglo-Japanese Agreement had had a reassuring effect upon Prince
  Ching in his struggle to refuse Russian demands.

Footnote 413:

  The following is the French text, which is considered as the standard
  in the interpretation of the Convention (_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No.
  54, inclosure):—

  “Sa Majesté l’Empereur et Autocrate de Toutes les Russies et Sa
  Majesté l’Empereur de Chine, dans le but de rétablir et de consolider
  les relations de bon voisinage rompues par le soulèvement qui a eu
  lieu en 1900 dans le Céleste Empire, ont nommé pour leurs
  Plénipotentiaires, à l’effet d’établir un accord sur certaines
  questions concernant la Mandchourie:—

  “Les susdits Plénipotentiaires, munis de pleins pouvoirs, qui ont été
  trouvés suffisants, sont convenus des stipulations suivantes:—

  “Article 1. Sa Majesté Impériale l’Empereur de Toutes les Russies,
  désireux de donner une nouvelle preuve de son amour de la paix et de
  ses sentiments d’amitié envers Sa Majesté l’Empereur de Chine, malgré
  que ce soit de différents points de la Mandchourie situés sur la
  frontière que les premières attacques contre la population paisible
  Russe aient été faites, consent au rétablissement de l’autorité du
  Gouvernement Chinois dans la province précitée, qui reste une partie
  intégrale de l’Empire de Chine et restitue au Gouvernement Chinois le
  droit d’y exercer les pouvoirs gouvernementaux et administratifs,
  comme avant son occupation par les troupes Russes.

  “Article 2. En prenant possession des pouvoirs gouvernementaux et
  administratifs de la Mandchourie, le Gouvernement Chinois confirme,
  aussi bien par rapport aux termes que par rapport à tous les autres
  Articles, l’engagement d’observer strictement les stipulations du
  contract conclu avec la Banque Russo-Chinoise le 27 Août, 1896, et
  assume, conformément à l’Article 5 du dit contrat, l’obligation de
  protéger par tous les moyens le chemin de fer et son personnel, et
  s’oblige également de sauvegarder la sécurité en Mandchourie de tous
  les sujets Russes en général qui s’y trouvent et des enterprises
  fondées par eux.

  “Le Gouvernement Russe, en vue de cette obligation assumée par le
  Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l’Empereur de Chine, consent de son côté
  dans le cas où il n’y aura pas de troubles, et si la manière d’agir
  des autres Puissances n’y mettra pas obstacle, à retirer graduellement
  toutes ses troupes de la Mandchourie de manière à:—

  “(a.) Évacuer dans le courant de six mois après la signature de la
  Convention les troupes Russes de la partie sud-ouest de la Province de
  Moukden jusqu’au fleuve Liao-ho, en remettant les chemins de fer à la
  Chine;

  “(b.) Évacuer dans le courant des six mois suivants les troupes
  Impériales Russes de la partie restante de la Province de Moukden et
  de la Province de Kirin; et

  “(c.) Retirer dans le courant des six mois suivants le reste des
  troupes Impériales Russes qui se trouvent dans la Province de
  Hei-Lung-Kiang.

  “Article 3. En vue de la nécessité de conjurer à l’avenir la
  repetition des troubles de 1900, dans lesquels les troupes Chinoises
  cantonnées dans les provinces limitrophes à la Russie ont pris part,
  le Gouvernement Russe et le Gouvernement Chinois se chargeront
  d’ordonner aux autorités militaires Russes et aux dzian-dziuns de
  s’entendre en vue de fixer le nombre et de déterminer les lieux de
  cantonnement des troupes Chinoises en Mandchourie tant que les troupes
  Russes n’auront pas été retirées; le Gouvernement Chinois s’engage en
  outre à ne pas former d’autres troupes en sus du nombre determiné de
  cette manière par les autorités militaires Russes et les dzian-dziuns,
  et lequel doit être suffisant pour exterminer les brigands et pacifier
  le pays.

  “Après l’évacuation complète des troupes Russes, le Gouvernement
  Chinois aura le droit de procéder à l’examen du nombre des troupes se
  trouvant en Mandchourie et sujettes à être augmentées ou diminuées, en
  informant à temps le Gouvernement Impérial; car il va de soi que le
  maintien de troupes dans la province précitée en nombre superflu
  mènerait inévitablement à l’augmentation des forces militaires Russes
  dans les districts voisins, et provoquerait ainsi un accroissement de
  dépenses militaires, au grand désavantage des deux États.

  “Pour le service de police et le maintien de l’ordre intérieur dans
  cette région, en dehors du territoire cédé à la Société du Chemin de
  Fer Chinois de l’Est, il sera formé, auprès des Gouverneurs locaux—,
  dzian-dziuns, une gendarmerie Chinoise à pied et à cheval composée
  exclusivement de sujets de Sa Majesté l’Empereur de Chine.

  “Article 4. Le Gouvernement Russe consent à restituer à leurs
  propriétaires les lignes ferrées de Shanhaikwan-Yinkow-Sinminting,
  occupées et protégées par les troupes Russes depuis la fin du mois de
  Septembre, 1900. En vue de cela, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté
  l’Empereur de Chine s’engage:—

  “1. Que dans le cas ou il serait nécessaire d’assurer la sécurité des
  lignes ferrées précitées, le Gouvernement Chinois s’en chargera
  lui-même et n’invitera aucune autre Puissance à entreprendre ou à
  participer à la défense, construction, ou exploitation de ces lignes,
  et ne permettra pas aux Puissances étrangères d’occuper le territoire
  restitué par la Russie.

  “2. Que les lignes ferrées susmentionnées seront achevées et
  exploitées sur les bases précises tant de l’Arrangement entre la
  Russie et l’Angleterre en date du 16 Avril, 1899, que du contrat
  conclu le 28 Septembre, 1898, avec une Compagnie particulière
  relativement à un emprunt pour la construction des lignes précitées,
  et, en outre, en observant les obligations assumées par cette
  Compagnie, c’est-à-dire, de ne pas prendre possession de la ligne
  Shanhaikwan-Yinkow-Sinminting ni d’en disposer de quelque façon que ce
  soit.

  “3. Que si par la suite il sera procédé à la continuation des lignes
  ferrées dans le sud de la Mandchourie ou à la construction
  d’embranchements vers elles, aussi bien qu’à la construction d’un pont
  à Yinkow ou au transfert du terminus du chemin de fer de Shanhaikwan
  qui s’y trouve, ce sera fait après une entente préamable entre les
  Gouvernements de Russie et de Chine.

  “4. Vu que les dépenses faites par la Russie pour le
  rétablissement et l’exploitation des lignes ferrées restituées de
  Shanhaikwan-Yinkow-Sinminting n’ont pas été comprises dans la
  somme totale de l’indemnité, elles lui seront remboursées par le
  Gouvernement Chinois. Les deux Gouvernements s’entendront sur le
  montant des sommes à rembourser.

  “Les dispositions de tous les Traités antérieurs entre la Russie et la
  Chine, non modifiées par la présente Convention, restent en pleine
  vigueur.

  “La présente Convention aura force légale à dater du jour de la
  signature de ses exemplaires par les Plénipotentiaires, de l’un et de
  l’autre Empire.

  “L’échange des ratifications aura lieu à Saint-Pétersbourg dans le
  délai de trois mois à compter du jour de la signature de la
  Convention.

  “En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires respectifs des deux Hautes
  Parties Contractantes ont signé et scellé de leurs sceaux deux
  exemplaires de la présente Convention, en langues Russe, Chinoise, et
  Française. Des trois textes, dûment confrontés et trouvés concordants,
  le texte Français fera foi pour l’interprétation de la présente
  convention.

  “Faite en double expédition à Pékin, le ..., correspondant au....”

Footnote 414:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 51, inclosure.

Footnote 415:

  Glance over the comparative terms, shown in parallel columns, of the
  Russian demands of February, the amendments of March, 1901, and the
  present Agreement. _Ibid._, No. 42, inclosure.

Footnote 416:

  See _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 55.

Footnote 417:

  Mr. Eitarō Tsurouka, who has personally visited several of the chiefs
  of the banditti, gives an extremely interesting account of their
  origin, their relations to the Chinese authorities and Russian
  officers, and the history of their affairs down to the end of
  1903.—The _Tō-A Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No. 53 (April, 1904), pp. 1–14.
  Cf. _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 130, inclosure.

Footnote 418:

  About August, 1901, the British Consul at Niu-chwang, Mr. A. Hosie,
  reported that the force then at the disposal of the Tartar General of
  the Sheng-king Province was limited by the Russian authorities to 6500
  men, which meant that over 10,000 men possessing firearms had been let
  loose. The Chinese police force was insufficient to back the authority
  of the Governor-General, and constant military expeditions by the
  Russians were consequently rendered necessary.—_China, No. 2 (1904)_,
  p. 33. Also see the _British Consular Report_ on Niu-chwang for 1901,
  pp. 3–4.

Footnote 419:

  Early in March, 1903, Prince Ching negotiated with M. Lessar about the
  number of Chinese troops that should occupy the country after the
  withdrawal of the Russians. “The Chinese Government were proposing to
  send 18,000 men, whilst the Russian Legation considered that 12,000
  men would be sufficient.”—_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 84 (Townley to
  Lansdowne).

Footnote 420:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, p. 38, already quoted in p. 225, above.

Footnote 421:

  _Ibid._, No. 53 (Lamsdorff’s statement to Scott, on April 23).

Footnote 422:

  _Ibid._, No. 55 (April 15).

Footnote 423:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 52 (Lansdowne to Scott, April 30). This
  conversation had ensued from M. de Staal’s visit to Lord Lansdowne,
  the purpose of which was, on the part of the Russian Ambassador, to
  explain to the British Foreign Minister the unreasonableness of the
  popular allegation that Russia had, in concluding the Agreement of
  April 8, surrendered to the diplomatic pressure exerted by Great
  Britain.

Footnote 424:

  _Russia, No. 2 (1904)_, p. 6. Already quoted in p. 98, above.

Footnote 425:

  Cf. the last clause of Article 3.

Footnote 426:

  _China, No. 5 (1901)_, No. 23.

Footnote 427:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 63, September 9, 1902 (Hosie to Satow).

Footnote 428:

  Telegraph from Miandonha [?], May 18, 1904. In the _Evening Post_ of a
  few days later.




                              CHAPTER XIV
                             THE EVACUATION


Unsatisfactory as the Manchurian Agreement of April 8, 1902, appeared to
Great Britain and Japan, they refrained from entering any protest
against its conclusion. They probably preferred the imperfect obligation
the Convention imposed upon the contracting parties to an indefinite
prolongation of the dangerous conditions which had prevailed. What
remained for them and for China was to watch the conduct of Russia in
Manchuria and test her veracity according to their own interpretations
of the Agreement. In the mean time, the questions which had existed
between China and the Powers were being one after another disposed of;
the distribution of the indemnities was finally agreed upon on June 14,
the Provisional Government of Tien-tsin by the Powers came to an end on
August 15, and the rendition of the city to the Chinese authorities was
accomplished. The date set for the evacuation of the southwest of the
Sheng-king Province up to the Liao River, October 8, drew on, and the
evacuation took place. The Tartar General Tsêng-chi had received an
Imperial mandate to take over from the hands of the Russians the
specified territory and its railways, even before the middle of
September,[429] and, on October 28, Prince Ching was able to state to
Sir Ernest Satow: “Their Excellencies the Minister Superintendent of
Northern Ports and the Military Governor of Mukden have now severally
reported by telegram that all the railways outside the Great Wall have
been handed back, and that the southwest portion of the Mukden
(Sheng-king) Province as far as the Liao River has been completely
evacuated by Russian troops.”[430] But what was evacuation? Some troops
may have been sent to European Russia, others to different stations in
Siberia, including the strategically important Nikolsk, near the eastern
border of Manchuria, and still others to Mongolia, where Russian forces
were reported to have suddenly increased, until in December they were
said to have numbered about 27,000.[431] No small number were also
transferred to Port Arthur[432] and Vladivostok.[433] It was, however,
alleged by several observers that the main part of the so-called
evacuation meant nothing more than the transferring of Russian troops
from Chinese towns and settlements to the rapidly developing Russian
settlements and quarters within Manchuria. It was reported from various
sources[434] that along the 2326 versts of the railroads there were
about eighty so-called depots, each two to five square miles in extent,
which had been marked out as the sites of new Russian settlements, and
in many cases as stations of the railway guards. The most important
line, connecting Port Arthur with Harbin, was studded with such depots
at every fifteen or twenty miles. In many of these depots were to be
seen extensive barracks built of brick, one at Liao-yang, for example,
being capable of holding 3000 men, and another at Mukden, in the
building of which bricks of the wall of the Chinese Temple of Earth were
surreptitiously utilized,[435] accommodating 6000. Besides the barracks,
permanent blockhouses were met with every three or four miles. The
guards of the railways, whose numbers were just at this time fixed at
30,000,[436] were recruited from the regular troops, from whom they were
distinguished by green shoulder-straps and collar-patches, and also by
higher pay, and the regular troops themselves could be contained in
large numbers in the depots and barracks and blockhouses when the
evacuation was completed.[437] At the same time, the Russians seemed to
have destroyed nearly all the forts and confiscated the guns of the
Chinese, whose defense had thus been reduced almost to nil. The military
power of the Tartar Generals at the capitals of the three Manchurian
Provinces was held under a strict surveillance of the Russian officers,
who also readily controlled highroads and rivers. It was, moreover,
uncertain how much of this control and supervision by the Russians would
be relaxed after the promised evacuation, or how much it would then be
replaced by the powerful position the Russians would hold in their own
quarters in Manchuria. The conclusion seemed inevitable to some people
that by the so-called evacuation, if it should ever take place in the
face of the enormous obstacles which the Agreement did not seek to
remove, Russia would gain a much stronger hold upon the Manchurian
territory than during the preceding period of open military
occupation.[438] It was also pointed out that the forts, docks, and
other military and naval establishments at Port Arthur, costing millions
of rubles, were not compatible with the short term of the lease of the
port, and their practical value would be seriously impaired by a true
evacuation of the rest of Manchuria.

So far as the immediate interests of foreign nations, aside from the
general principle of the integrity of the Chinese Empire, were
concerned, nothing was more to be desired than a speedy evacuation of
the treaty port of Niu-chwang, where the Russians had maintained a
provisional government since August 5, 1900.[439] At the conclusion of
the Agreement of April, 1901, M. Lessar delivered a _note verbale_ to
the Chinese Government, stating that Niu-chwang would be restored as
soon as the Powers terminated their administration of Tien-tsin, and
that, if the latter event did not take place before October 8, then
Niu-chwang would be surrendered to China in the first or second month
after that date.[440] The rendition of Tien-tsin was accomplished by the
Powers on August 15, but the restoration of Niu-chwang not only did not
follow it, but seemed to be indefinitely delayed for the trivial reasons
presented one after another by the Russian authorities: that, for
instance, one or two foreign gunboats were present in the harbor;[441]
that the Chinese had refused to agree to the constitution of a sanitary
board;[442] and that the Chinese Tao-tai detailed to receive back the
civil government of the port had not arrived from Mukden, where, it has
been discovered, he had been detained by the Russians much against his
will.[443] Up to the present time, the maritime customs dues at this
important trade port have been paid to the Russo-Chinese Bank, and, for
a large sum thus received, the Bank is said to have paid to the Chinese
authorities neither the amount nor the interest.[444]

-----

Footnote 429:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 65, inclosure 2.

Footnote 430:

  _Ibid._, No. 66, inclosure.

Footnote 431:

  The _Tō-A Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, No. 38 (January, 1903), pp. 105–106.

Footnote 432:

  E. g., 400 men from (probably) Shan-hai-kwan, June 24.—_China, No. 2
  (1904)_, No. 58, inclosure. Also some from Liao-yang, in
  August.—_Ibid._, No. 61, inclosure.

Footnote 433:

  E. g., from Kin-chou-Fu early in September.—_Ibid._, No. 62,
  inclosure.

Footnote 434:

  Cf. Dr. Morrison’s articles in _The Times_, January 3 (p. 8) and 14
  (p. 5), 1903.

Footnote 435:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 56, inclosure (Hosie to Satow).

Footnote 436:

  _Ibid._, No. 63, inclosure (Hosie to Satow, September 9).

Footnote 437:

  Cf. _ibid._, No. 61, inclosure (Hosie to Satow, August 21), which
  says: “I have the honor to report that a considerable town, to consist
  of some 300 cottages, of which about 100 have already been built, is
  in course of construction on both sides of the Russian railway to the
  immediate northwest of the city of Liao-yang Chou. These cottages,
  which when completed will occupy a large piece of land bought from the
  Chinese proprietors by the Railway Company, are intended for the
  residence of railway employees and of the artisans who will be engaged
  at the cleaning and repairing shops to be established at this
  important depot.

  “While this foreign town is growing outside, the Chinese Government
  buildings inside the city of Liao-yang are being rapidly evacuated, in
  many cases the only vestige of the Russian occupation being a solitary
  sentry keeping guard over the property. Russian troops are also being
  withdrawn from Liao-yang and conveyed by rail to Port Arthur.”

  A more direct testimony came from the Russian diplomats, probably M.
  Lessar himself, who, even so late as at the beginning of September,
  1903, or a month before the end of the stipulated period for the
  complete evacuation of Manchuria, intimated to Prince Ching that the
  reason for the delay of the actual evacuation was “that the barracks
  for the railway guards were not ready.”—_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No.
  156.

Footnote 438:

  The _Novoe Vremya_ itself declared toward the end of the year 1902
  that, contrary to the popular notion that Russia was evacuating
  Manchuria, she was just beginning to consolidate her influence in that
  region.

  As regards the number of the Russian troops left in Manchuria after
  the first period of evacuation, we have the following authoritative
  statement by Count Cassini, Russian Ambassador to the United States:
  “Faithfully adhering to the terms of her treaty with China respecting
  Manchuria, she [Russia] had withdrawn the major portion of her troops
  from that province until _between 60,000 and 70,000_ only
  remained.”—The _North American Review_ for May, 1904, pp. 682–683. It
  is not clear whether this number included the Russian soldiers
  stationed outside of the Chinese quarters.

Footnote 439:

  See pp. 144–145, above.

Footnote 440:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, pp. 38 and 42.

Footnote 441:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 72, 74, 75, 111, 112.

Footnote 442:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 131, 132.

Footnote 443:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 70, 122, 130, 131.

Footnote 444:

  The _Kokumin_, May 30, 1904; a Peking correspondence. Also see _China,
  No. 2 (1904)_, Nos. 44, 46–48, 69, 73, 96, 99, 102, 105, 124.




                               CHAPTER XV
                       DEMANDS IN SEVEN ARTICLES


The most important section of Manchuria, strategically, namely, that
part of the Province of Sheng-king which lies east of the Liao River and
the entire Province of Kirin, was to be evacuated, according to the
Agreement, before April 8, 1903. As that date drew near, and long
afterward, the disposition of the Russian forces appeared incompatible
with even the nominal withdrawal which characterized the first period of
evacuation. It is true that in the Sheng-king Province, except the
regions bordering on the Yalu River on the Korean frontier, the Russian
troops began to withdraw soon after the end of the first period, but
only “to the railway line.”[445] The important border regions,
especially Fêng-hwang-Chêng and An-tung, however, remained in Russian
occupation, the former still holding 700 cavalry in June.[446] From
March, there had been mysterious movements of small detachments of
troops toward this frontier,[447] of which Count Lamsdorff and M. Witte
alike professed a complete ignorance,[448] but concerning which M.
Plançon, the Russian _Chargé d’Affaires_ at Peking, had made an
explanation which seemed utterly unintelligible, that the Russian troops
had been moved in order to counteract a threatened Japanese movement. It
soon appeared, however, that the Russians had begun to cut timber on
both sides of the Yalu River,[449] and, with the consent of Admiral
Alexieff, had hired the services of some Russian soldiers,[450] some of
whom had gone to Yong-am-po on the Korean side of the Yalu.[451] The
detachments outside of Fêng-hwang-Chêng, amounting at first to only five
men at Tatung-kao and twenty at Yong-am-po, would have been small enough
to be ignored, had it not been for the significant fact that the
occupation of Yong-am-po, which will be discussed later on,[452]
constituted a menace to the integrity of the Korean Empire similar to
one which threatened China when Russia leased Port Arthur; for a railway
concession granted in the Russo-Chinese Agreement of March 27,
1898,[453] would bring this port into connection with the entire
railroad and military system of Manchuria and the great Russian Empire.
Further west, at Liao-yang, except the nominal withdrawal reported in
the previous August,[454] there was no indication of its
evacuation,[455] and at Mukden, the capital of Sheng-king, 3200
soldiers, who constituted the major part of the forces, were reported to
have evacuated,[456] but the remainder, after proceeding to the train,
suddenly returned and took up their old quarters,[457] some or all of
them wearing civilian dress.[458] It is unknown whither the 3200 men had
gone, but the Russian Consul merely moved to the railway outside the
town.[459] To the north, it was evident in May that the Province of
Kirin had hardly begun to be evacuated even in the nominal sense, as in
parts of the Sheng-king Province.[460] So late as in September, the
Russian authorities at Peking talked to Prince Ching of leaving 6000 or
7000 troops in the Kirin and Hei-lung Provinces for another year.[461]

Long before September, however, it had become apparent that the delay in
the second part of the Manchurian evacuation was due to no casual event.
The appointed time-limit, the 8th of April, had hardly been twenty days
past, with no signs indicative of a possible speedy withdrawal, when new
demands in seven articles of an highly exclusive nature, which the
Russian _Chargé d’Affaires_ had lodged at the Foreign Office of
Peking,[462] leaked out,[463] were confirmed by Prince Ching,[464] and
spread broadcast over the astonished world. Further evacuation was
probably implied, if not declared, to be dependent upon the acceptance
of these demands,[465] the most authentic version[466] of which is here
subjoined:—

  “1. No portion of territory restored to China by Russia, especially
  at Niu-chwang and in the valley of Liao-ho, shall be leased or sold
  to any other Power under any circumstances; if such sale or lease to
  another Power be concluded, Russia will take decisive steps in order
  to safeguard her own interests, as she considers such sale or lease
  to be a menace to her.

  “2. The system of government actually existing throughout Mongolia
  shall not be altered, as such alteration will tend to produce a
  regrettable state of affairs, such as the uprising of the people and
  the disturbances along the Russian frontier; the utmost precaution
  shall be taken in that direction.

  “3. China shall engage herself not to open, of her own accord, new
  ports or towns in Manchuria, without giving previous notice to the
  Russian Government, nor shall she permit foreign consuls to reside
  in those towns or ports.

  “4. The authority of foreigners who may be engaged by China for the
  administration of any affairs whatever, shall not be permitted to
  extend over any affairs in Northern Provinces (including Chili),
  where Russia has the predominant interests.

  “In case China desires to engage foreigners for the administration
  of affairs in Northern Provinces, special offices shall be
  established for the control of Russians: for instance, no authority
  over the mining affairs of Mongolia and Manchuria shall be given to
  foreigners who may be engaged by China for the administration of
  mining affairs; such authority shall be left entirely in the hands
  of Russian experts.

  “5. As long as there exists a telegraph line at Niu-chwang and Port
  Arthur, the Niu-chwang-Peking line shall be maintained, as the
  telegraph line at Niu-chwang and Port Arthur and throughout
  Sheng-king Province is under Russian control, and its connection
  with her line on the Chinese telegraph poles at Niu-chwang, Port
  Arthur, and Peking is of the utmost importance.

  “6. After restoring Niu-chwang to the Chinese local authorities, the
  customs receipts there shall, as at present, be deposited with the
  Russo-Chinese Bank.

  “7. After the evacuation of Manchuria, the rights which have been
  acquired in Manchuria by Russian subjects and foreign companies
  during Russian occupation shall remain unaffected; moreover, as
  Russia is duty-bound to insure the life of the people residing in
  all the regions traversed by the railway, it is necessary, in order
  to provide against the spread of epidemic diseases in the Northern
  Provinces by the transportation of passengers and goods by railway
  train, to establish at Niu-chwang a quarantine office after the
  restoration of the place to China; the Russian civil administrators
  will consider the best means to attain that end. Russians only shall
  be employed at the posts of Commissioner of Customs and Customs
  Physician, and they shall be placed under the control of the
  Inspector-General of the Imperial Maritime Customs. These officials
  shall perform their duties conscientiously, shall protect the
  interests of the Imperial maritime customs, and shall exhaust their
  efforts in preventing the spread of those diseases into the Russian
  territories. A permanent Sanitary Board, presided over by the
  Customs Tao-tai, shall be established. The foreign Consuls,
  Commissioner of Customs, Customs Physician, and Agent of the Chinese
  Eastern Railway Company shall be Councilors of the Board. As regards
  the establishment of the Board and the management of its affairs,
  the Customs Tao-tai shall consult with the Russian Consul, and the
  Customs Tao-tai shall devise the best means to obtain funds
  necessary for the purpose.”

These demands, as will be seen, comprised, besides the non-alienation of
Manchuria to any other Power, and the _status quo_ in Mongolia, drastic
measures of closing the former territory against the economic enterprise
of all nations but the Russians; and, in that respect, were
supplementary to the Agreement concluded a year before, which studiously
omitted clauses prejudicial to the principle of the open door. From the
standpoint of this last principle, therefore, no demands could be more
objectionable than those now presented by M. Plançon. The Empress
Dowager of China was said to have sneered at the report, and to have
remarked that, if she had been disposed to grant such demands, she would
never have requested the Powers to withdraw as soon as possible their
forces from North China.[467] Prince Ching not only considered the
Russian terms quite unacceptable, but failed to see any reason or right
on the part of Russia to impose fresh conditions which infringed China’s
sovereign rights. He accordingly refused to entertain these conditions,
perhaps on April 23.[468] The Japanese Government had already entered a
firm protest,[469] and was followed by that of the British Government,
which considered the demands as violating the most-favored-nation
clause, and otherwise highly inadmissible.[470] Before the British
protest reached him, Mr. Townley, the British _Chargé_, had assured
Prince Ching that the latter would receive from Great Britain similar
support in resisting the Russian demands to that which was given him
during the negotiation of the Manchurian Convention.[471] Soon
afterward, the United States Government also instructed Mr. Conger to
urge on the Peking Foreign Office the advisability of refusing the first
and second of the conditions laid down by Russia, and, moreover, made
direct inquiries at the Russian Government in a friendly spirit,
pointing out that the reported demands were not in accordance with the
proposed stipulations contained in the new draft treaty between the
United States and China, a copy of which was communicated to Count
Lamsdorff.[472] This latter act of Secretary Hay was promptly followed
by Great Britain, whose Government instructed its Ambassador at St.
Petersburg to address the Foreign Minister in language similar to that
used by the American Representative.[473] It may be safely inferred that
the Japanese Government also took a similar step. There thus resulted a
natural coöperation between the three Powers, whose straightforward
policy was clearly expressed by Lord Lansdowne as follows: “To open
China impartially to the commerce of the whole world, to maintain her
independence and integrity, and to insist upon the fulfillment of treaty
and other obligations by the Chinese Government which they have
contracted towards us.”[474]

According to the instructions he had received from his Government, Mr.
MacCormick, the United States Ambassador, had an interview with Count
Lamsdorff in the evening of April 28. The Count at once denied in the
most positive manner that such demands as were rumored had been made by
the Russian Government. He expressed surprise that they should have been
credited in any quarter, and that a friendly government like that of the
United States should be the only one to question him as to whether
Russia could have made demands some of which were on the face of them
ridiculous, as, for instance, those for the right of using China’s
telegraph poles and for the restriction of foreign trade in Manchuria.
It may be questioned whether Count Lamsdorff has ever made to a strong
Power another denial in as positive language, which was, one will soon
observe, as quickly falsified by subsequent events, as this remarkable
disclaimer of April 28, 1903. He went on to say that he could give the
United States Government the most positive assurances that Russia would
faithfully adhere to its pledges regarding Manchuria, and to her
assurances to respect the rights of other Powers. Moreover, American
capital and commerce were what Russia most desired to attract in order
to develop Manchuria. The Count also intimated that any delay in the
evacuation was due to the natural necessity of obtaining assurances that
China was fulfilling her part of the agreement. This could be better
ascertained by the Russian Minister, M. Lessar, who had been absent from
Peking on sick leave, but was about to return to his post, than by an
acting _Chargé d’Affaires_.[475] A careful reading of this disclaimer
will show that it denied that the reported demands had been made by
Russia, but it did not establish that no demands whatsoever had been
made by her. This consideration would seem to make it truly remarkable
that Mr. MacCormick should have been, as he was, entirely satisfied with
the result of the interview, and should have had no further remark to
make. He could perhaps have inquired whether M. Plançon had acted
without authorization, what were the conditions he had proposed, and by
what means M. Lessar was expected to obtain the assurances from China
that her obligations would be fulfilled.[476]

The positive statements of Count Lamsdorff were partly reinforced and
partly neutralized by the clever remarks made on April 29 by Count
Cassini, the Russian Ambassador at Washington, which appeared in the New
York _Tribune_ of May 1. He considered it unfortunate that Mr. Conger
should have been misinformed, by unreliable parties, of Russia’s
intentions in Manchuria, of which they were grossly ignorant,—a matter
which was regretted, he was sure, no less by the American Government
than by Russia. He, however, not only intimated that some sort of
negotiation was in progress between Russia and China regarding
Manchuria, but was bold enough to say that the United States would
assist Russia in quieting the uneasy sentiment caused by false reports.
He said:—

  “Because of the singularity of the interest held by the United
  States in Manchuria—for all the world realizes that yours is a
  trade, not a territorial one—it lies within the power of your
  Government to exert a powerful influence in the preservation of
  peace there. Russia’s desire is also for peace, not disturbances, in
  Manchuria, and it is to this end that negotiations are now
  proceeding in Peking in the effort to establish a condition of
  evacuation, and to safeguard Manchuria against a recurrence of the
  troubles of 1900.

  “Striking evidence of the direct effect in this country caused by
  unrest in China was seen in 1900, when, I am told, many cotton mills
  in the United States were forced to shut down until conditions in
  China were again normal. This fact and the evidence the United
  States has already given of its desire to make for peace are
  sufficient assurance that the Washington Government will lend its
  strong moral support to calm excitement wherever it has been aroused
  by the incorrect reports from Peking.”

According to Count Cassini, it was “because of the long standing and
genuine friendliness which, without exception, had characterized the
relations of these two great countries, as well as in recognition of the
frankness with which the American Secretary of State had dealt with my
Government in all diplomatic matters,” that the latter took pleasure in
assuring the United States regarding negotiations pending with another
Power, “even though in so doing all diplomatic precedent was broken.” “I
am not aware,” he said, “that any other Powers have received from the
Foreign Office [of St. Petersburg] such a statement as was handed your
Ambassador.” In referring to Mr. MacCormick’s interview, however, it
will be seen that Count Lamsdorff made no direct reference to the
negotiations at Peking, still less to their contents, and the assurances
he gave had before and have since been frequently and in similar terms
repeated to other Powers by Russia.

By far the most illuminating part of M. Cassini’s conversation was its
practical confirmation of the truth of one of the reported demands of
Russia which were considered the most objectionable, and which Count
Lamsdorff specifically denied, characterizing them “as on the face of
them ridiculous,” namely, that no new ports should be opened in
Manchuria for the world’s trade. “Of the opening of new treaty ports in
Manchuria,” said M. Cassini, “it is impossible for me to speak at
present, but it is the earnest conviction of those best acquainted with
the state of affairs there that such a move will not be to the best
interest of the territory. Were the question solely a commercial one, it
would be different. But open a treaty port in Manchuria, and close upon
the heels of commerce will follow political complications of all kinds,
which will increase the threats to peace.” In this statement Count
Cassini not only virtually contradicted Count Lamsdorff, but also, as we
shall soon see, was subsequently contradicted by the latter.

A careful reader of these words uttered by one of Russia’s greatest
diplomatic agents abroad will feel satisfied that, despite Count
Lamsdorff’s elastic statement to the contrary, Russia was actually
proposing some terms to China, and that one of those terms probably was
that Manchuria should have no more treaty ports. When diplomacy relies,
even to a slight extent, upon subterfuges, it risks a certain lack of
consistent unity among its exponents, and the rule could hardly have for
exceptions even such highly trained diplomats as Lamsdorff and Cassini.

Count Lamsdorff’s disclaimer was uttered on April 28, and Count
Cassini’s statement was dated April 29 and appeared in the press on May
1. In the mean time, the Foreign Office of Peking had refused the
Russian conditions in an official note. Yet, on April 29, M. Plançon
suggested that each condition might be answered separately, and the
suggestion was verbally refused by Prince Ching. Thereupon the Russian
_Chargé_ presented a note intimating that his Government wished to be
assured on the first three of the original demands, namely, whether a
territorial cession to another power in the Liao Valley was contemplated
by China; whether there was an intention to assimilate the
administration of Mongolia to that of China proper; and whether China
would permit the appointment of foreign Consuls in Manchuria in other
places than Niu-chwang. In reply, Prince Ching stated, naturally, that
there had never been any question of ceding territory in the Liao Valley
to a foreign Power; that the question of altering the administrative
system of Mongolia had been discussed, but it had been disapproved by
the Throne, and was not under consideration for the present; and that,
in regard to the appointment of new Consuls in Manchuria, it depended
upon the opening of new ports, which would be decided only by the extent
of the commercial development of Manchuria.[477] On the next day, or, as
the late Sir M. Herbert rather inaccurately wrote to Lord Lansdowne,
“two days after the Russian Government had categorically denied that the
demands had been made,” M. Plançon reiterated to Prince Ching, not
three, but all, of the seven conditions, and, consequently, the Chinese
treaty commissioners at Shanghai were instructed, for the present, to
refuse to their American colleagues the opening of treaty ports in
Manchuria, which the latter had been demanding. The United States
Government, however, taking little heed of M. Cassini’s argument,
instructed its commissioners at Shanghai, on the strength of Count
Lamsdorff’s denial, to insist upon the opening of new Manchurian
ports.[478] Against this demand, M. Plançon seems to have renewed his
pressure upon the Chinese Government several times during May,[479]
saying that he had received no instructions from St. Petersburg to
revoke his opposition.[480] At last, Secretary Hay instructed Mr. Conger
to suggest to M. Lessar, on the latter’s arrival at Peking, that a
simultaneous communication should be made by them to the Peking Foreign
Office to the effect that the Russian Government had, as Count Lamsdorff
had said, no objection to the opening of the treaty ports.[481] The
Russian Minister returned to Peking toward the end of May, and
telegraphed to his Government the suggestion made by the American
Government.[482] He, as well as M. Cassini, renewed the assurance that
Russia was not opposed to the opening of the ports, and Mr. MacCormick,
who returned on leave to Washington, confirmed the assurance.[483]
Secretary Hay now hoped that the only possible opposition to be met
would come from none but the Chinese Government, and requested the
support in the matter[484] of the British and Japanese Ministers at
Peking, which was willingly given. So late as on June 5, however, M.
Cassini addressed a note to Mr. Hay, inquiring what was the meaning
attached by the United States Government to the term “treaty port,” and
what action it wished Russia to take. Mr. Hay could only refer, in
answer to the first query, to the correspondence which passed between
the Russian and the United States Governments in 1899,[485] and request,
in reply to the second, that Russia should inform China that it was
untrue that the former was, as had been stated by China, preventing the
opening of the treaty ports.[486] Secretary Hay was so urgent about this
matter that he considered it indifferent whether the opening was granted
in a treaty or, as a compromise, by a special Imperial edict.[487] M.
Lessar had the first interview after his return with Prince Ching on
June 10,[488] and, according to the Japanese press, renewed the original
seven conditions,[489] including the refusal of ports. The Prince was
believed to have refused to discuss any of the conditions except those
regarding the establishment of a sanitary board and the payment of
customs duties into the Russo-Chinese Bank at Niu-chwang, which might be
reconsidered. The Prince was then granted another five days’ sick leave,
returned to the summer palace, and declined to see any foreign
Minister.[490] Rumors were then afloat which would have one believe that
the Prince, in spite of the earnest protests of the British and Japanese
Representatives, was gradually yielding to Russian influence. It is at
least significant that at this critical point he informed Mr. Townley,
the British _Chargé d’Affaires_, on June 19, that an agreement would
soon be arrived at with Russia whereby Manchuria would be preserved to
China without any loss of sovereign rights. He added that China would
open treaty ports in Manchuria, if she saw fit, after the Russian
evacuation.[491] The significance of these remarks could easily be read
between the lines. Not only was the Russian evacuation uncertain, but
also it was no less patent to Russia than to China that, in the marts,
the opening of which was under discussion, namely, Mukden and perhaps
Harbin, as well as An-tung and Tatung-kao near the Korean boundary, the
immediate trade prospects were not considered so great as the political
danger which their opening might to some degree avert. Had the
evacuation been certain, and had the commercial consideration been the
sole question involved, it would have been unnecessary either to hasten
their opening or even to select those very places. Nor would MM.
Cassini, Lessar, and Plançon have been so strongly opposed to the
proposition. Seen in the light of these considerations, Prince Ching’s
new position appeared plainly to indicate the gaining of Russian
influence upon the helpless Foreign Office of Peking.

[Illustration:

  M. LESSAR

  _Russian Minister at Peking_
]

Nor for two years and a half since the first agreement was reported to
have been concluded between Admiral Alexieff and Tartar General
Tsêng-chi, had the Manchuria question vexed the world. If the question
had concerned none but Russia and China, and the former had been slow to
promise and loyal to her pledges and the latter strong enough to guard
her own interest, the uncertain conditions in Manchuria would not have
constituted, as they did, a grave and continual menace to the general
peace of the Far East. Unfortunately, the Russian pledges, on the one
hand, were attended by serious conditions, some of which it seemed
impossible to fulfill and others contrary to the recognized principles
of international intercourse to which Russia had professed constant
devotion, and, on the other, China had again and again shown herself
impotent to resist what she would otherwise reject. Above all, Great
Britain and the United States were, both from interest and from
principle, firmly committed in the East to a policy which was in
constant danger of being undermined by the conduct of Russia. For Japan,
however, the Manchurian question possessed an even graver significance,
for, with the fall of the Three Eastern Provinces into the Russian
hands, the independence of Korea, as well as the security of Japan
herself, would be threatened, while a consequent closure of Manchuria
against Japan’s economic activity would seriously maim her growth and
life as a nation. It was now considered, therefore, that the irritating
situation should no longer be allowed to continue, and that the time had
at last come when Japan should with determination deal _directly_ with
Russia, in order to effect once for all an arrangement satisfactory and
beneficial to all the parties concerned and to the world at large.

-----

Footnote 445:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 57, inclosure (Hosie to Satow, November 7,
  1902). Also No. 106 (Townley to Lansdowne, May 5, 1903).

Footnote 446:

  _Ibid._, No. 128 (Hosie, June 22, 1903).

Footnote 447:

  _Ibid._, No. 116 (April 8).

Footnote 448:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 75 (April 15); 113 (May 14).

Footnote 449:

  For the Manchurian side, see p. 227, above. The timber concession on
  the Korean side will be taken up in a later section.

Footnote 450:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, Nos. 75, 115, 128.

Footnote 451:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 115, 129.

Footnote 452:

  Pp. 289 ff., 318 ff., below.

Footnote 453:

  Article 8. See pp. 130–131, above.

Footnote 454:

  See p. 235, note 4, above.

Footnote 455:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 130, inclosure (May 4, 1903).

Footnote 456:

  _Ibid._, No. 71 (April 14).

Footnote 457:

  _Ibid._, No. 122.

Footnote 458:

  _Ibid._, No. 130, inclosure (May 4).

Footnote 459:

  _Ibid._

Footnote 460:

  _Ibid._, No. 137, inclosure (Consul Fulford at Niu-chwang, May 19).

Footnote 461:

  _Ibid._, No. 156 (Satow to Lansdowne, September 10).

Footnote 462:

  The author has been informed from a reliable source that the
  _Chargé’s_ note containing those demands was dated April 5, 1903.

Footnote 463:

  Again the revelation must have emanated from the Chinese official
  circle. M. Lessar is said to have, about June 4, bitterly complained
  at the Peking Foreign Office of their breach of faith, and requested
  that there should be appointed two special Chinese negotiators, who
  should be entirely responsible for the secrecy of the matter.

Footnote 464:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 81 (Townley to Lansdowne, April 24).

Footnote 465:

  _Ibid._, No. 127.

Footnote 466:

  _Ibid._, No. 94. Also see Nos. 77, 78, 81, 82, 86.

Footnote 467:

  The _Kokumin_.

Footnote 468:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, Nos. 78, 81, 127.

Footnote 469:

  Perhaps on April 21.

Footnote 470:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, Nos. 79 and 80 (April 23).

Footnote 471:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 81, 82 (April 24).

Footnote 472:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, Nos. 83, 85 (April 26 and 27). Cf. No. 82.

Footnote 473:

  _Ibid._, No. 89 (April 28). It does not appear that this instruction
  was carried out, for when Count Lamsdorff gave to the American
  Ambassador a positive denial of the truth of the current reports, the
  British Ambassador deemed it unnecessary to repeat the inquiry. See
  _ibid._, No. 91 (April 29).

Footnote 474:

  _Ibid._, No. 90, Lansdowne to Herbert (April 28).

Footnote 475:

  Namely, M. Plançon. The same M. Plançon stated the next day to Prince
  Ching that the delay in the evacuation was due to the military party
  in Russia.—_China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 95. The statements of the two
  diplomats are not necessarily contradictory to each other.

Footnote 476:

  For the interview between MacCormick and Lamsdorff, see _ibid._, Nos.
  91, 92, 103.

Footnote 477:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 95.

Footnote 478:

  _Ibid._, No. 98.

Footnote 479:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 110 (May 8); 114 (May 19); 117 (May 23).

Footnote 480:

  _Ibid._, No. 114 (May 19).

Footnote 481:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 117.

Footnote 482:

  _Ibid._, No. 119.

Footnote 483:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 119, 120.

Footnote 484:

  _Ibid._, No. 120 (June 4).

Footnote 485:

  See Chapter V., above.

Footnote 486:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 121.

Footnote 487:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 117, 121.

Footnote 488:

  _Ibid._, No. 123.

Footnote 489:

  Cf. _ibid._, No. 125.

Footnote 490:

  _Ibid._, No. 123, and the Japanese press.

Footnote 491:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 126.




                              CHAPTER XVI
                    DIPLOMATIC STRUGGLE IN KOREA, I


Manchuria, however, constituted only one half—perhaps the less important
half—of the great Eastern problem which perplexed the world and
imperiled the future life of Japan. In the other half, namely, Korea,
Japan was confronted by a situation similar and closely allied to that
in Manchuria, and more directly menacing to herself. Let us briefly
describe the evolution of the complex Korean question which ensued upon
the Chinese-Japanese war of 1894–5.

The war had arisen from the conflicting wishes of the belligerent Powers
regarding Korea, China asserting suzerain rights over the Peninsular
Kingdom, and the interests of Japan making its effective independence
imperative. Unfortunately, Korea’s lack of material strength rendered
her real independence impossible, and her strength could be secured,
from the Japanese point of view, only by a thoroughgoing reform of her
administrative, financial, and economic system, which had sunk into a
state of unspeakable corruption and decay. By her victory, the colossal
task devolved upon Japan of reforming the national institutions of a
people whose political training in the past seemed to have made them
particularly impervious to such an effort. Perhaps no work more delicate
and more liable to blunder and misunderstanding could befall a nation
than that of setting another nation’s house in order who would not feel
its necessity. In this difficult enterprise, the Japanese showed
themselves as inexperienced as the Koreans were reluctant and resentful.
Three million _yen_ were furnished by Japan to Korea in the interest of
various reforms, as also were numerous councilors, including such able
men as Shūichirō Saitō and the late Tōru Hoshi. Some of the others,
however, were either inferior in attainments or impatient of slow
processes. The entire movement was intrusted to the direction of the new
Japanese Minister, Count K. Inoüé, a generous, brilliant, and bold
statesman. He presented to the Korean sovereign a plan of reform, which
included the proposal to remove from her share of political control the
versatile Queen, whose family of the Min had grown powerful by means of
the abuses which the Count wished to eradicate. In this attempt, in
which he was largely successful, of drawing a line of demarcation
between the Court and the Government, he inevitably incurred the deep
ire of the family whose influence had been predominant both at the
capital and in the country. Other measures of his reform further
antagonized the official nobility of the Kingdom.[492] The influence of
the Count, however, was so great, and the training of Korean troops by
Japanese officers seemed so successful, that even the domineering Queen
was obliged to await a more favorable moment to regain her lost
prestige.

At that time Russia was represented at Seul by M. Waeber, who had been
in Korea for more than ten years, and whose personality and diplomatic
arts had won him warm friends in the Court, particularly the Queen and
her party. At one time, before the late war, when the ascendency of the
Chinese Resident, Yuan Shi-kai, had created disaffection among certain
Koreans, M. Waeber was said to have succeeded in quietly allying himself
with those people and promoting Russian influence over them.[493] It was
now again found possible for him and his talented wife to recommend
themselves to the large body of men and women whose feeling the Japanese
had in one way or another alienated, and slowly but surely to undermine
the latter’s influence in Seul.[494] The successful coercion of Japan by
the three Powers after the treaty of Shimonoseki must also have gone far
toward reducing the prestige of Japan in the eye of the Koreans, who are
singularly susceptible to the influence of events of this nature.

As soon as Count Inoüé left Seul, the Queen again came to the front. On
July 7, 1895, she suddenly accused of treason the most influential
member of the Cabinet and chief of the pro-Japanese party, Pak Yong-hio,
who again had to flee to Japan, where he had recently spent ten years of
a refugee’s life.[495] Count Inoüé returned to Seul, and again the Queen
held her breath. A Cabinet was organized of partisans of reform. The
Count was, however, relieved of his post late in July, and in September
was succeeded as the Japanese Minister by Viscount Lieutenant-General
Gorō Miura, a man of undoubted sincerity, but utterly without diplomatic
training. No sooner had Inoüé left Korea than the Queen reasserted
herself, increased the personnel of her household, and restored many of
her old extravagances so lately removed by the reformer. She had been
further embittered by the sharp rivalry shown against her and the Min by
the King’s father, Tai-wen-kun, and his party. The Queen finally planned
a _coup d’état_, early in October, with a view to disbanding the
soldiers trained by Japanese officers and replacing the progressive
Cabinet members with her friends. A crisis was imminent, and it was at
this juncture that some of the Japanese in Seul betrayed themselves into
a crime which caused a bitter disappointment and lasting disgrace to the
Government and the nation at home. Perceiving that a passive attitude
would result in a great calamity, certain Koreans and Japanese rose
early on October 8, to bring Tai-wen-kun out of his secluded residence.
Accompanied by two battalions of trained soldiers, the veteran statesman
rode toward the King’s palace, where he was to present a plan of reform,
but was opposed by the guard, who fired at his escort. In the midst of
the mêlée which ensued, some of the bravoes rushed into the Inner Palace
and murdered the Queen.[496] The deed was no less crushing a blow to the
Japanese nation than it was to the bereaved King of Korea, for the
former’s ardent desire always to adhere to the fairest principles of
international conduct was, for once, frustrated by the rash act of a
handful of their brethren at Seul. The pernicious influence of the Queen
passed away, and the power of the reform Cabinet was for the moment
assured, but only at the expense of a revolting crime which the Japanese
will never cease to lament. It is probable that the murder of the Queen,
as apart from the rise of Tai-wen-kun, was premeditated, and also that
Minister Miura had been prevailed upon to connive at the guilt. The
Japanese Government at once recalled and tried him and forty-seven other
suspected persons, and prohibited Japanese from visiting Korea without
special permission.

Mr. (now Baron) Komura, who presently succeeded to the Ministry at Seul,
seemed to reverse the policy of his predecessors and abstain from active
interference. The Korean Cabinet also appeared powerless to check the
Russian party, whose power was growing apace. Prominent politicians out
of office frequently conferred at the Russian Legation, where some of
them were even said to have taken refuge from the law. There a leader of
this party (who till May of the present year represented Korea at St.
Petersburg) matured a plan to overthrow the Cabinet, or, in case of
failure, to abduct the King and the Crown Prince to Vladivostok. The
plan, however, was discovered on November 28,[497] only to be followed
by another, which proved successful. In January, 1896, there took place
a slight uprising in Northern Korea, at the instigation, it was said, of
pro-Russian leaders. When the major portion of the army had been sent
out of the capital to suppress the alleged rebellion, 127 Russian
marines with a cannon suddenly landed at Chemulpo on February 10, and
immediately entered Seul. The next day, before dawn, the King, with the
seal of the state, as well as the Crown Prince and Princess and some
court ladies, fled in disguise to the Russian Legation, where the King
remained for a twelvemonth, till February 20 of the following year. At
his arrival at the Legation, an edict was issued proclaiming the Cabinet
Ministers guilty of treason, and ordering their decapitation. Another
edict canceling the order appeared too late, for the Prime Minister and
two other Ministers had been murdered on the streets in broad daylight,
and their heads exposed by the wayside, while three others had fled to
Japan for life.[498] The murders of February, 1896, would have come down
to history as more atrocious than the crime of October 8, 1895, had it
not been for the fact that the latter involved the life of a queen.

The King being virtually in the custody of the Russians, their
ascendency resulted as a matter of course. They secured, among other
things, an immense timber concession on the northern frontier and on
Uinung Island,[499] and a mining concession along the Tumên River.[500]
The Korean forces trained by Japanese officers were abolished in
May,[501] and the Japanese soldiers stationed at the ports and Seul also
were reduced in number.[502]

The Government at Tokio even appeared, for a time at least, to forsake
its historic policy of safe-guarding Korea’s independence by its sole
aid, but to seek Russia’s coöperation toward the same end. With this
object in view, Japan seized the occasion of the coronation of the Czar
to send Field Marshal Marquis Aritomo Yamagata[503] as special envoy to
St. Petersburg, with a commission to negotiate with the Russian
Government an agreement regarding the relative position of the two
Powers in Korea. The result was the following Yamagata-Lobanoff
Protocol, signed on June 9, 1896:—

  “ARTICLE I. The Japanese and Russian Governments should, with the
  object of remedying the financial embarrassments of Korea, counsel
  the Korean Government to suppress all unnecessary expenses and to
  establish an equilibrium between expenditure and revenue. If, as a
  result of the reforms which should be considered indispensable, it
  should become necessary to have recourse to foreign debts, the two
  Governments should, of a common accord, render their support to
  Korea.

  “ARTICLE II. The Japanese and Russian Governments should try to
  abandon to Korea, in so far as the financial and economic situation
  of that country should permit, the creation and the maintenance of
  an armed force and of a police organized of native subjects, in
  proportions sufficient to maintain internal order, without foreign
  aid.

  “ARTICLE III. With a view to facilitating communications with Korea,
  the Japanese Government shall continue to administer the telegraphic
  lines which are actually in its possession.

  “It is reserved to Russia to establish a telegraphic line from Seul
  to her frontier.

  “These various lines should be purchased by the Korean Government,
  as soon as it finds means so to do.

  “ARTICLE IV. In case the principles above expounded require a more
  precise and more detailed definition, or if in the future other
  points should arise about which it should be necessary to consult,
  the Representatives of the two Governments should be instructed to
  discuss them amicably.”[504]

A few days earlier, on May 14, there was concluded at Seul between M.
Komura and M. Waeber, the Japanese and Russian Ministers, a Memorandum
dealing with matters of more immediate interest to the two Powers.[505]
M. Waeber agreed to advise the Korean King to return from the Russian
Legation to his palace, as soon as there was no more apprehension for
his safety, M. Komura pledging in return to keep the Japanese political
bravoes (_sō-shi_) in Seul under a strict surveillance (Article I.). It
was declared that the present Cabinet members[506] of Korea were noted
for generous and mild principles, and had been appointed to their posts
by the King of his own accord. The Japanese and Russian Representatives
should always make it their aim to advise the King to govern his people
in generous spirit (Article II.). The remainder of the Memorandum is
more worthy of record:—

  “ARTICLE III. The Representative of Russia quite agrees with the
  Representative of Japan that, at the present state of affairs in
  Korea, it may be necessary to have the Japanese guards stationed at
  some places for the protection of the Japanese telegraph line
  between Fusan and Seul, and that these guards, now consisting of
  three companies of soldiers, should be withdrawn as soon as possible
  and replaced by gendarmes, who will be stationed as follows: fifty
  men at Tai-ku, fifty men at Ka-heung, and ten men each at ten
  intermediate posts between Fusan and Seul. This distribution may be
  liable to some changes, but the total number of gendarme force shall
  never exceed 200 men, who will afterwards be gradually withdrawn
  from those places in which peace and order have been restored by the
  Korean Government.[507]

  “ARTICLE IV. For the protection of the Japanese settlements at Seul
  and the open ports against the possible attacks by the Korean
  populace, two companies of Japanese troops may be stationed at Seul,
  one company at Fusan and one at Gensan, each company not to exceed
  200 men. These troops shall be quartered near the settlements, and
  should be withdrawn as soon as no apprehensions of such attacks
  could be entertained.

  “For the protection of the Russian Legation and Consulates, the
  Russian Government may also keep guards not exceeding in number the
  Japanese troops at these places, which will be withdrawn as soon as
  tranquillity in the interior is completely restored.”[508]

A casual reading of these agreements will show how far the Japanese
Government had receded from the position she originally took in regard
to Korea. Ever since Japan concluded her treaty with Korea in 1876,[509]
which for the first time established the international position of the
latter State as a sovereign Power, Japan’s policy had been to uphold the
independence and the opening of the Peninsular Kingdom. From the strict
terms of this policy, Japan has allowed herself to depart twice,—in her
agreements, first, with China in 1885, and, again, with Russia in
1896,—not by forsaking its principles, but in each case by entering, in
the pursuit of the policy, into an impossible association with an
aggressive Power. In each of the two instances the attempt failed within
a decade, and resulted in hostilities. In 1885, Japan and China
simultaneously withdrew their forces from Korea, and thereby cleared the
ground for the renewed conflict of their opposing interests, which were
artificially placed on a par with one another. In 1896, Japan admitted
Russia’s right to build a telegraph line in North Korea which should
correspond to the Japanese line in the south, and to station in Korea a
number of troops equal to that of the Japanese soldiers. Despite the
millenniums of her historic relations with Korea, and the actual
preponderance of her interests therein, and after her successful
liberation of the Kingdom from Chinese suzerainty by a costly war,
Japan, now admitted into the Peninsular politics on an equal footing
with herself a Power which owed its bright success to a mere diplomacy
of less than two years’ standing, and whose policy seemed to be guided
by principles entirely at variance with the independence and strength of
Korea.

At the coronation of the Czar, Korea was represented by an influential,
pro-Russian member of the Min family. It was then rumored that he
concluded with the Russian Government a secret agreement by which Korea
undertook to employ Russian military instructors and financial
councilors. However that may be, the Russian Representatives at Seul are
said to have since appealed more than once to the “secret agreement” in
their attempts to force the engagement of Russian service upon the
Korean Government.[510] If these reports were true, no better proof of
the light estimate with which Russia from the first regarded the
Yamagata-Lobanoff Protocol could be found than her alleged agreement
with Min Yong-hwan, for the latter was a direct reversal of the first
two Articles of the former. Russia may be credited with having
succeeded, by her separate and mutually contradictory arrangements with
Min, Yamagata, and Li Hung-chang,[511] in simultaneously bringing the
three Eastern Powers to terms.

Whatever the truth of the reported Russo-Korean Agreement, Russia did no
sooner sign her Japanese Protocol of June 9, than she began to violate
its terms. In the same month, it was resolved that Korean troops should
henceforth be instructed under the Russian system of military education,
and accordingly, in October, three army officers, a medical officer, and
ten soldiers from Russia arrived at Seul. In April, 1897, M. Waeber was
urging upon the Seul Government the employment of 160 officers and
soldiers, and, despite the reluctance of Korea and inquiries from Japan,
three Russian officers and ten soldiers entered the capital in July,
whose service for three years was finally, on September 6, imposed upon
the Korean Government by M. A. de Speyer, the new Russian Minister. Thus
the royal guard and five battalions of the Korean infantry, numbering
about 3000, came under Russian instruction.[512] A month later, M.
Speyer requested that the control of all the receipts from the taxes and
customs be placed in the hands of one M. Kir Alexieff. At that time,
however, a British subject, Mr. MacLeavy Brown, had not served his term
as Financial Adviser and General Director of Customs of Korea. Failing
the assent of the Finance Department, M. Speyer pressed upon the Foreign
Department, which yielded at last. The British Consul, Mr. Jordan,
protested in vain, for, on October 26, the Korean King issued an edict
releasing Mr. Brown from his duties. A Russo-Korean Bank was soon
organized to transact the financial and economical affairs of Korea. On
December 27, seven British men-of-war visited Chemulpo, and Mr. Jordan
went thither, returning to Seul accompanied by a naval officer and ten
marines. Mr. Brown was consequently restored to his office, and M.
Alexieff had to content himself with a subordinate position under
him.[513]

It was a misfortune to Russia that her able representative at Seul, M.
Waeber, who had been in Korea since 1884, had been transferred to
Mexico, and was replaced by M. Speyer. The former diplomat’s pleasing
manners were succeeded by the latter’s overbearing conduct, which
appeared gradually to alienate from Russian influence many a former
friend of M. Waeber. The anti-Russian sentiment grew finally so strong
that a large number of intelligent Koreans organized the Korean
Independence Society, whose object was declared to be to restore the
military, financial, and political control of the Kingdom to the hands
of the Koreans. The impatient M. Speyer was reported to have written a
note to the Korean Government, on March 7, 1898, asking for a reply
within twenty-four hours to the query whether Korea was really in want
of the service of the Russian experts, whose position had become rather
precarious. The astounded Government replied politely but firmly in the
negative. Other events occurred which further evinced the arbitrary
attitude of M. Speyer. With an equally astonishing decision, he ordered,
on March 17, all the financial and military councilors to be recalled to
Russia. The Russo-Korean Bank was also disorganized. M. Speyer himself
leaving Korea in April, his post was occupied by the amiable M.
Matunine.[514] About this time, a new Russo-Japanese Protocol was signed
at Tokio between Baron Rosen, the Russian Minister to Japan, and Baron
Nishi, the Foreign Minister of the Japanese Government.

It is evident that the relaxation of Russia’s diplomacy in Korea was in
no small measure due to the swift movement of events, as well as her own
all-engrossing activity, in China. The Nishi-Rosen Protocol of April 25,
1898, concluded as it was at this unfavorable moment for Russia, was far
more in Japan’s favor than the agreements of 1896. It not only gave an
explicit recognition of the independence of Korea, but also incorporated
in the second Article the best principles of the previous agreement,
and, in addition, fully recognized the special economic interests of
Japan in the Peninsula. The entire Protocol deserves quotation:—

  “ARTICLE I. The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia definitely
  recognize the independence and the perfect sovereignty of Korea, and
  mutually engage to abstain from all direct interference in the
  internal affairs of that country.

  “ARTICLE II. Desirous of removing all possible causes of
  misunderstanding in the future, the Imperial Governments of Japan
  and Russia mutually engage, in case Korea should have recourse to
  the counsel and assistance of either Japan or Russia, not to take
  any measure regarding the nomination of military instructors and
  financial advisers, without having previously arrived at a mutual
  accord on the subject.

  “ARTICLE III. In view of the great development of the commercial and
  industrial enterprises of Japan in Korea, as also of the
  considerable number of the Japanese subjects residing in that
  country, the Russian Imperial Government shall not obstruct the
  development of the commercial and industrial relations between Japan
  and Korea.”[515]

Each one of these three Articles should be carefully noted, for five
years later, in 1903, they, together with the last Article of the
Yamagata-Lobanoff Protocol of June 9, 1896, became a conventional ground
for Japan’s direct negotiations with Russia which preceded the present
war. Particular attention is called to the third Article, wherein Russia
recognized for the first time the peculiar interest of the Japanese
nation in the economic development of Korea.

Less artificial as the Protocol was in comparison with the former
agreements, it was, however, hardly adequate as an instrument to
reconcile the conflicting interests of Russia and Japan. Fresh
complications could well be expected from the second Article, for it, on
the other hand, barred the reformatory attempts of a Power whose
interests demanded the independence and strength of Korea, and, on the
other, cleared the ground for the renewed activity of another Power
which had little intention to abstain from undermining the vital
interests of Japan. Under these precarious circumstances was opened the
second period of the Russo-Japanese relations in Korea.

-----

Footnote 492:

  Cf. _Dōbun-kwai_, No. 49, p. 7.

Footnote 493:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 731–732.

Footnote 494:

  _Ibid._, p. 740.

Footnote 495:

  G. Takeda, _Kinji Kyokutō Gwaikō Shi_ (recent history of diplomacy in
  the Far East, Tokio, 1904), pp. 22–23.

Footnote 496:

  G. Takeda, pp. 25–30; Y. Hamada, _Nichi-Ro Gwaikō Jūnen Shi_ (ten
  years of Japanese-Russian diplomacy, Tokio, 1904), p. 47. Also see the
  _Korea Review_, July (pp. 331–336) and August (pp. 369–371), 1904.

Footnote 497:

  G. Takeda, pp. 30–32.

Footnote 498:

  _Ibid._, pp. 33–34; _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 740–741. See also the _Korea
  Review_, August, 1904, pp. 377–378.

Footnote 499:

  The contract dated August 28, 1896 (o. s.).—_Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp.
  781–791.

Footnote 500:

  The contract of April 22, 1896.—_Ibid._, pp. 772–775.

Footnote 501:

  G. Takeda, p. 45.

Footnote 502:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 740–741.

Footnote 503:

  It is said that Marquis Itō himself had a mind to represent Japan at
  the coronation, but the mission was finally intrusted to the Field
  Marshal. It will be remembered that China sent Li Hung-chang for this
  occasion.

Footnote 504:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 742–744; the _Kaitei Jōyaku Isan_, pp. 601–602;
  the _Treaties and Conventions between the Empire of Japan and other
  Powers_, p. 393.

Footnote 505:

  See the same references as are given in the preceding note, pp.
  740–742, 596–600, and 391, respectively.

Footnote 506:

  Some of them were strongly pro-Russian.

Footnote 507:

  These gendarmes had never been withdrawn before the present war broke
  out. The Koreans frequently tried to cut the telegraph line.

Footnote 508:

  Japanese soldiers in Korea before the present war were stationed to
  the fullest extent stipulated in this Article. Owing to the small
  number of the Russian residents in Korea, the Russian Government never
  stationed as many soldiers in Korea as did the Japanese.

Footnote 509:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 714–717.

Footnote 510:

  G. Takeda, pp. 50–51.

Footnote 511:

  See pp. 87 ff., above.

Footnote 512:

  G. Takeda, pp. 45–47.

Footnote 513:

  _Ibid._, pp. 48–50.

Footnote 514:

  G. Takeda, pp. 53–54, and Jumpei Shinobu, _Kan Hantō_ (the Korean
  peninsula), pp. 505–512.

Footnote 515:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 744–745; the _Kaitei Jōyaku Isan_, p. 603; the
  _Treaties and Conventions_, p. 394 (French text).




                              CHAPTER XVII
                    DIPLOMATIC STRUGGLE IN KOREA, II


From 1899, both Japan and Russia were represented at Seul by new
Ministers, Mr. G. Hayashi and M. Paul Pavloff. The latter had been the
_Chargé_ at Peking, where he had recently made a brilliant success in
securing for Russia a lease of Port Arthur and Talien-wan, and the right
to connect these ports by rail with the great Siberian line. The
contrast of character between the bold and ambitious Pavloff and the
slow, tenacious Hayashi was an interesting index to the dramatic
struggle which ensued in Korea between the rival Powers. For five years
after the arrival of the diplomats, the desires of Russia and Japan
seemed to clash, not only in Seul, but also in all directions within the
Peninsula. Nearly every move made by either Power was countervailed by
the other, Russia in most cases being the prime mover and Japan closely
disputing the action of her rival. The feeble Government of Korea was
sorely vexed between the vigorous demands and protests of the contending
Powers, while the flexible will of the Emperor[516] and the discord and
venality of his servants aggravated the endless confusion of the
situation. Let us now briefly observe how this keen rivalry manifested
itself in the south, at the capital, and in the north of Korea.

In South Korea, nothing better could be desired by Russia than a lease
of Masampo, a harbor unsurpassed for its naval facilities and most
admirably situated as a connecting-point between Vladivostok and Port
Arthur. An opportunity came in May, 1899, when Masampo, together with
two other ports, was opened for foreign trade, for the foreigner is at
liberty to purchase land within the three-mile radius of an open port.
In the same month, M. Pavloff with the Military _Attaché_ visited
Masampo on his way home on a furlough, and was met there by Admiral
Makaroff, commander of the Eastern squadron of the Russian navy, and,
after making an extended survey of the coast and the harbor, selected
the most strategic site on the foreshore, which he earmarked by setting
up posts at its limits. This large lot, M. Pavloff notified the local
authorities, would presently be purchased by a private Russian steamship
company as the site for a dock and coaling-sheds. It was not till July
that M. Stein, interpreter at the Russian Legation, went to the port
with a view to effecting the purchase of the selected lot, which, to his
chagrin, had already been bought by certain Japanese subjects from its
legitimate owners. In vain the Russian _Chargé_ demanded the Seul
Government to cancel the contract and resell the land to the Russian
company, for, as the Government repeatedly explained, the authorities
had no right to interfere with the alienation of private land by its
owners within the three-mile radius of any treaty port. As unavailing
was the request of the _Chargé_ upon Mr. Hayashi to induce the buyers to
relinquish even a portion of the purchased lot. Then the local
authorities at Masampo were approached by the Russian Representatives,
and consequently the deed of purchase was for a long time withheld by
them, though it was at length given to the new owners. On September 14,
M. Stein, now the _Chargé_, notified the Korean Government that, under
the instructions of the Russian Foreign Minister, he would be obliged to
take liberty of action in order to protect Russian interest, if the
Japanese contract was not canceled; on October 4, again, he threatened
that a forcible seizure of land would result from the non-compliance of
the Korean Government. The replies of the latter were unalterably firm
in refusing to annul a lawful transaction.[517] In the mean time,
Russian diplomatic agents, naval officers, and engineers from Seul and
Vladivostok were frequently visiting Masampo, and buying from the
natives tracts of indifferent value.[518] In March, 1900, M. Pavloff
returned from his furlough, and demanded the signature of the Masampo
lease-contract in quite indefinite terms which he had previously framed.
On March 16, Rear Admiral Hilidebrand came to Chemulpo with several
war-vessels, and proceeded to Seul, where he was magnificently received
by M. Pavloff and had an audience with the Emperor. Two days later, the
lease agreement was signed[519] by the Korean Foreign Minister and M.
Pavloff, which, however, was of little practical use so long as the most
important tract had been bought by the Japanese. On the same day, the
Minister secured from the Korean Government a pledge not to alienate any
part of the Kojedo Island near Masampo and its surrounding territories,
Russia herself engaging not to seek such alienation on her part.[520]

[Illustration:

  M. PAVLOFF

  _Late Russian Minister at Seul_
]

No sooner did Russia appear to content herself with these valueless
formal pledges from Korea than she again sought to acquire land round
Masampo. At the close of March, M. Pavloff had almost succeeded in
securing the purchase of Nampo outside the three-mile limit of Masampo,
but the reminder of Mr. Hayashi, expressed through the Foreign Office of
Seul, that the foreigner was not entitled to own land beyond the fixed
radius of a treaty port, produced its desired effect. Nampo was
forsaken, and another lot inside the three-mile boundary was purchased
by the Russians.[521] In May, M. Pavloff wished to lease Tja-pok on the
inner shore of Masampo, but, finding again that a Japanese subject had
already leased it, finally acquired the lease of Pankumi upon the outer
shore, for the purpose of erecting a hospital, warehouses, and a
recreation ground, for the use of the Russian navy.[522] This
concession, however, has not been extensively utilized by the Russians,
owing probably to the inferior site of Pankumi.[523] Mr. Hayashi met the
Russian concession by acquiring, between May and October 29, 1901, about
forty acres of land within the treaty limits of Masampo as a settlement
for Japanese citizens.[524]

It is needless to add that the firm attitude of the Korean Government,
which alone saved Masampo from the fate of Port Arthur, was in the main
due to the persistent representations and support rendered to Korea by
Mr. Hayashi against Russian encroachment. For if the control of Masampo
was a matter of supreme importance for the Russian navy, Japan, on her
part, could not for a moment tolerate the presence, in the harbor so
near to herself, of a Power whose vast dominion was extending eastward
with tremendous pressure. Russia’s ill success at Masampo, however, was
not to mark the end of her activity on the southern coast of Korea,
which contains a few other harbors only second in importance to Masampo.
In one of these, Chinhai Bay, M. Pavloff made, about March, 1901, an
unauthorized demand for a lease, which again was refused.[525] From that
time till the opening of the Russo-Japanese negotiations in 1903, the
Russian Representative did not think the time opportune to prefer
further demands on this coast.

Turning now to the diplomacy at the Korean capital, we observe that its
first aim seems to have been to repeat the old policy of replacing Mr.
MacLeavy Brown, a British subject, as the Director-General of Korean
Customs, with M. Kir Alexieff, and also to put Korea under financial
obligation to Russia by means of a loan. In March, 1901, Mr. Brown was
suddenly ordered by the Korean Government, which acted obviously at the
instance of the Russian Representative, to vacate his residence and
surrender his post. The British _Chargé_, Mr. Gubbins, had barely
succeeded in prevailing upon the Korean Government to revoke the latter
half of the order, when in May another order was issued calling for the
delivery, not only of Mr. Brown’s official residence, but also of the
customs office building—an order equivalent to a dismissal from office.
From this predicament Mr. Brown was narrowly rescued by an earnest
representation made on May 5 by Mr. Hayashi to the Korean Emperor.[526]
By this time, the affair had been complicated by an agreement of a
5,000,000 _yen_ loan, which had been signed on April 19, between the
Korean Government and the French agent, M. Cazalis, of the Yunnan
Syndicate.[527] It is hardly necessary to give the detail of this
abortive agreement, for it was never ratified by the Emperor, but fell
through from the inability of the Syndicate to fulfill its terms.[528]
It is only necessary to say that if the loan had materialized, a large
control over the coinage, mining, and general finances of Korea would
have passed into the hands of the French subjects and perhaps also of
the Russo-Chinese Bank. This Bank, in the latter half of 1902, seems to
have offered a fresh loan through its agents at Seul, Gunzburg and
Company, under the condition that the firm should obtain a permanent
monopoly of ginseng, which had then been in the hands of the Japanese,
and also the right of working certain mines.[529] This proposition also
miscarried, evidently owing to the protest from the Japanese Minister,
who discovered in it a violation of the first Article of the
Yamagata-Lobanoff Protocol of June 9, 1896. A Belgian loan, which was
rumored early in 1903, seems to have shared the same fate with all the
loans previously suggested.[530]

In this connection, it should be noted, in justice to all the parties
concerned, that toward the latter half of 1900 there was a movement in
Japan to suggest a loan to the Korean Government, but that the Premier,
Marquis Yamagata, declined to countenance the scheme.[531] He probably
did not wish his nation to become a party to a violation of an agreement
it made with Russia in 1896.

In 1902–3, the interest of Russia was represented at Seul, not only by
her regular Representative, but also by Baron Gunzburg, who served as an
agent for many an economic enterprise in Korea proposed by the Russians,
by an Alsatian lady, Mlle. Sonntag, a relative of Mme. Waeber and an
influential member of the court circle, and, temporarily, by M. Waeber
himself,[532] who had come to Seul as special envoy of the Czar to
attend the fortieth anniversary of the accession of the Korean Sovereign
to the throne.[533] These persons were further supported by a few
Koreans who had lived in Siberia and adopted Russian citizenship, and
whose rapid promotion in office had excited jealousy among the nobility
in Seul.[534] Among the latter, also, there were Russian sympathizers of
the greatest political influence. Taking advantage of the continual
discord among the politicians in Seul, which at that time manifested
itself in the rancorous hatred between the supporters of the Crown
Prince and those of Lady Öm, who aspired to the position of the Queen,
the Russians succeeded in enlisting the good-will of the leaders of both
parties, Yi Yong-ik and Yi-Keun-thaik. Once a lad of mean birth in the
north,[535] Yi Yong-ik, by his unscrupulous methods, had amassed a large
fortune and risen to the Ministry of the Imperial Household, until, in
November, 1902, he found himself the object of a sharp opposition by Yi
Keun-thaik and a large section of the gentry of Seul. He at once took
refuge in the Russian Legation, and was then taken on board the
“Korietz” to Port Arthur, where he used his seal of the Imperial Estates
Board and transacted his official business as before.[536] On January
13, 1903, he returned to Seul, and used his influence to further the
already started obstruction to the bank-notes issued by the Korean
branch of the First Bank of Japan. These notes had first appeared in
May, 1902, and, beside the deplorable monetary system of Korea, met so
great a demand from the commercial world that, by the end of the year,
the amount issued had risen nearly to 1,000,000 _yen_ against a reserve
only a little below that sum.[537] Suddenly, at the instance of the
Russians who wished to issue similar notes from the Russo-Chinese Bank,
the Korean Government had prohibited the circulation of the Japanese
notes in December, 1902. The credit of the notes and the benefit of
their use had been so obvious, however, that, in spite of the Government
order, the Director-General of the Customs had still received payments
in them, and the Chinese Minister had advised his countrymen to continue
their use. The veto had then been removed, only to be renewed at the
return of Yi Yong-ik from Port Arthur. He had entertained the desire,
which has been found utterly impracticable, of himself establishing a
central bank and issuing paper notes.[538] He employed all the means at
his disposal to resist the opposition of the Japanese Representative,
who was now supported by his British colleague, Mr. Jordan. The
bank-notes were not reinstated till February 13, 1903, when a compromise
was at last reached with the Korean Government.[539] It is impossible to
establish the complicity of the Russian diplomats in Yi Yong-ik’s
obstruction, which thus ended in failure, beyond the fact that the
Korean politician had been in close touch with the Muscovites. From the
historical point of view, Russia could hardly have interfered with the
issue of the Japanese bank-notes without transgressing the third Article
of the Nishi-Rosen Protocol of April 25, 1898.

Thus far we have related the comparative failure of Russia’s diplomacy
in South Korea and at the capital. In the north, however, which was
conterminous with her dominion and with Manchuria, Russia achieved a
greater success. On March 29, 1899,[540] M. Pavloff succeeded, after his
earlier and much larger demands had failed, in leasing for twelve years,
for the use of Count H. Keyserling, a Russian subject, three whaling
stations[541] on the northeastern coast, each 700 by 350 feet in extent.
This concession was offset by one secured by a Japanese citizen, on
February 14, 1900,[542] which conferred upon him the right of whaling
for three years, subject to renewal, along the Korean coast, excepting
the waters for the distance of three _li_ adjoining the three provinces
on which the Keyserling concessions were situated and the Province of
Chul-la.

Farther north, upon the frontier, the long boundary line naturally
divides itself into two parts, namely, the Tumên River, separating Korea
from Primorsk of Siberia and the Kirin Province of Manchuria, and the
Yalu River, which borders upon the strategically most important Province
of Sheng-king of South Manchuria. Along the former stream, Russia
acquired by a treaty of 1884[543] the opening of the port of Kiong-hung
to the Russian land trade, and a free navigation of the Tumên. A dozen
years later,[544] when the Sovereign sojourned at the Russian Legation,
the Muscovites concluded an agreement with the Seul Government whereby
they were granted the privilege of mining gold and other minerals for
fifteen years, and coal for twenty years, in two districts near
Kiong-hung, as well as the right to construct a railway or carriage-road
from the mines to the shore. It has often been reported that the
poverty-stricken people as well as the venal officers along the river
have continually mortgaged their property to the Russians, who thus have
acquired extensive tracts of land, circulated Russian coins among the
natives, and otherwise implanted their influence far and wide. Then
early in 1902, M. Pavloff sought to make a step in advance in this
direction, when, without permission from Korea, a telegraph line was
extended from Possiet to Kiong-hung across the Tumên River. He desired
that the Seul Government should recognize the accomplished fact, and
Rear Admiral Skrydloff, commanding the Pacific squadron of the Russian
navy, visited the capital on February 17, and intimated his hope that
the question would be amicably settled. The Foreign Minister, Pak
Che-sun, however, successfully ordered on February 22 that the telegraph
line so surreptitiously built be removed. In the mean while, it was
discovered that the St. Petersburg Government had had nothing to do with
the building of the line which had recently been removed. M. Pavloff,
however, succeeded in securing the dismissal of Pak from his post. He
also persisted in demanding the right of the Russians to reconstruct the
line across the Tumên River. He was as much justified in preferring such
a demand, as was the Korean Government in refusing to accede to it. The
latter was probably apprehensive that its concession to Russia would be
followed by similar demands from other Powers. At present, the Korean
telegraph line reaches from Seul to Kion-song, some forty miles from
Kiong-hung.[545]

On the Yalu River, also, M. Pavloff desired a telegraphic connection
with Wiju from Port Arthur and from Harbin, which, after a failure in
May, 1902, was at last granted in April, 1903.[546]

More important, however, is the question of the Seul-Wiju Railway, which
had been the bone of contention between Japan and the allied Powers of
Russia and France, until the outbreak of the present war suddenly
changed the situation in favor of the former. By the temporary articles
of August 20, 1894,[547] Korea had granted a prior right to the Japanese
Government or companies to construct railways between Seul and Fusan.
The actual undertaking, however, was so delayed, that, on March 29,
1896,[548] Mr. James R. Morse, an American citizen, succeeded in
acquiring the Seul-Chemulpo concession, and began to build the line. In
October, 1898, Mr. Morse sold the concession to certain Japanese
capitalists, and the line, which was the first railway owned abroad by
Japanese subjects, has been in running order since July, 1900. The
contract for the other line—Fusan-Seul—was not made by the Japanese till
September 8, 1898.[549] Prior to this, on July 3, 1896,[550] a French
company had acquired a grant to connect Seul with Wiju on the Yalu by
rail. Finding, however, little prospect of starting the work within the
specified period of three years, the company tried to sell the
concession, first to the Russian Government and then to Japan, but
neither was prepared to accept the proposed terms. About 1900, Yi
Yong-ik instituted in the Imperial Household Department the Northwestern
Railway Bureau, over which he presided, with the express purpose of
building the line with Korean capital. The French Minister at Seul,
however, had a short time before obtained exclusive right to furnish
material and engineers for the building of the line, so that Korean
money and French skill were to be enlisted for the service.[551] After a
long delay, President Yi held a great undertaking ceremony on May 8,
1902, but it was patent to every one that no Korean capital was
forthcoming. As was expected, not a mile of rail having been laid, the
work was suspended in June, and indefinitely postponed.[552]
Considering, however, that a Seul-Wiju line would naturally pass through
the gold mines of Yun-san and Yin-san and the coal region of Ping-yang,
and the great agricultural province of Hwang-hai, as well as such
commercial centres as Kai-song, Ping-yang, Hwang-ju, and An-ju, the
advantages of controlling this line appeared too great for the competing
foreigners to leave its construction to the care of the impecunious
Korean Government. Particularly jealous were the Russians of the line
passing into the hands of their political rivals, for then—if,
furthermore, a railway connection were effected by the same rivals
between Wiju and Niu-chwang—the deep-laid design of Russia to make Dalny
the great trading port for Manchuria and North China would be seriously
upset by the railway reaching directly from the producing centres of
these regions and Korea to the port of Fusan, whence a ready
communication oversea might well radiate toward Japan, Europe, and
America. It was natural, therefore, for M. Stein, Russian _Chargé
d’Affaires_, again to recommend, as he did on February 15, 1903, the
honest Baron Gunzburg to the Korean Government, and to demand of the
latter on behalf of the Baron the right of laying the Seul-Wiju Railway.
The Government, however, declined[553] to entertain the application, as
it was its intention to complete the line on its own resources, and not
to concede it to any foreign Power.[554] Later, another attempt was made
in August by the Seul Government to reopen the work of construction, for
which a French syndicate represented by M. Rondon was to supply all
machinery,[555] but, again, the lack of funds frustrated the attempt.
Since that time, no important development of this question had
transpired before the beginning of hostilities between Russia and Japan.

We have so far seen enough of Korean diplomacy to comprehend something
of the Russian method of furthering her influence over Korea, and of the
manner in which Japan struggled to safeguard her fast increasing
interests[556] in the peninsula and to maintain the terms of the Russian
agreements of 1896 and 1898. We have, however, reserved up to this point
the latest and most important question of the timber concession upon the
northern frontier. In no other matter had the characteristic method of
Russian diplomacy excited more apprehension in Korea and Japan, for
nothing could better illustrate the close connection, in the Muscovite
policy, of Manchuria and North Korea—a connection which appeared to
threaten at once the integrity of the two adjoining Empires and the
safety of Japan—than the Yong-am-po incident which arose in April, 1903,
in relation to the timber concession. The contract[557] for this
concession dated so far back as August 28, 1896, when the Korean King
was a guest at the Russian Legation. It had secured for a Russian
merchant at Vladivostok the right to organize a Korean lumber company
(Article 1), having a monopoly for twenty years of the forestry
enterprise round the Mu-san region upon the Tumên River and also on the
Uinung Island in Japan Sea (Article 2). The work, in order to be valid,
had to be begun within one year after the signature of the agreement
(Article 15). Only when work in these two regions should have been under
way, the company might, within five years[558] from the same date, start
a similar exploitation along the Yalu River (Article 2).[559]
Accordingly, the Russian syndicate undertook to fell trees at Mu-san in
1897 and again in 1898,[560] though never on a large scale.[561] On the
Uinung Island, however, where good timber had nearly been exhausted
after many years of cutting by the Japanese, the Russians had at no time
made a serious attempt to exploit it. Under these circumstances, the
right of the Russians to exploit forests upon the Yalu so late as 1903
was at least not clear.[562] Nevertheless, the extensive public works at
Port Arthur and Dalny and on the railways had created so great a demand
for timber, that the Chinese woodmen were cutting trees along the foot
of the Long White Mountains and sending them downstream to An-tung,
where alone the traffic annually aggregated the sum of 1,500,000
_taels_.[563] The Russians now seemed to have planned to exploit both
sides of the Yalu, and they would not have caused trouble, had they
employed legitimate means to accomplish their ends. On the Manchurian
side, finding that a foreigner could not get a timber concession from
the Chinese authorities, they used the name of a leader of the mounted
bandits whom a Russian military officer had befriended, and, after
securing a concession, employed those bandits in felling trees.[564] In
regard to the Korean side of the river, after nearly seven years’
inactivity since the grant of the concession, M. Stein, Russian _Chargé_
at Seul, suddenly notified the Korean Government, on April 13, 1903,
that Baron Gunzburg would henceforth represent at Seul the interest of
the timber syndicate, which would now commence its work upon the
Yalu.[565] Early in May, forty-seven Russian soldiers in civilian dress,
presently increased to sixty, besides a larger number of Chinese and
Koreans under Russian employ, were reported to have come to
Yong-am-po,[566] a point near the mouth of the river and rather remote
from the places[567] where actual cutting was in progress, and had begun
to construct what was claimed to be timber-warehouses, but later proved
to be, besides some godowns, a blacksmith plant and a six-foot
mound.[568] At the same time, there was taking place a mysterious
mobilization of troops from Liao-yang and Port Arthur towards
Fêng-hwang-Chêng and An-tung on the other side of the Yalu.[569] The
Korean frontier officers reported that a panic had been created among
the inhabitants, and that the Korean-Manchurian commerce had
stopped.[570] Presently, the Russian soldiers at Yong-am-po were
reported to have been increased, first by 100, and then by 200, who
purchased from the natives, under the name of a Korean citizen and
against the wishes of the local authorities, fifteen houses and some
twelve acres of land.[571] When the Korean Government had, on May 15,
demanded of M. Stein to order the evacuation of the Russians,[572] M.
Pavloff, who had recently returned from his trip to Russia, requested,
on the contrary, that the Korean Government should protect the Russian
subjects at Yong-am-po.[573] A desultory discussion then ensued between
M. Pavloff and the Korean Government, while further increases of the
Russian forces at An-tung beyond the river were reducing the frontier
regions generally into a state of anarchy.[574] About the middle of
June, the Russians forcibly seized rafts belonging to some Koreans and
Chinese that came down the stream, and shot two Chinese who
resisted.[575] A Japanese-Chinese syndicate, also, which had secured a
timber concession in this region in March from the Korean Government,
reported that its rafts had been seized, and its work had consequently
been suspended.[576] Prior to this, four Russian war-vessels under
command of Admiral Starck came to Chemulpo in the night of June 5,[577]
and stayed there till the 11th. No matter whether there was any
significance in this act, it is sufficient to record that it took place
at this critical moment. Not the least serious feature of the affair was
the disagreement of opinion about it inside the Korean Government. When,
on June 11, the Council of State passed a resolution that the conduct of
the Russians upon the frontier was contrary to the treaty arrangements
between the two Powers, the Foreign Office, on the 14th, sought to
refute the ground in an elaborate note.[578] The gravity of the
situation as evinced in all these facts need hardly be pointed out.
Whatever the intentions of the Russian Government or even of its
Representative at Seul, the action of the Muscovites at Yong-am-po was
precisely of a nature to remind one of their previous fortification of
Port Arthur, which had eventually prepared their entry into the whole of
Manchuria. The fact that the occupation of Yong-am-po took place
simultaneously with the suspension of the evacuation of Manchuria and
with the active military connection between its army centres and the
Korean frontier, gave the present affair an exceedingly ominous
appearance. And yet, in the face of these perilous circumstances, the
Korean Government showed itself so impotent and so little alive to the
situation as to be divided against itself on a minor point of the law of
the case. In such a state of things, the usual method of Japan to resist
Russia through Korea would be utterly futile.

It is unnecessary to recall that any attempt upon the integrity of Korea
was in violation of the fundamental principle which formed the first
Article of the Nishi-Rosen Protocol of April 25, 1898,[579] as well as
against the spirit of this and the two other Russo-Japanese agreements
regarding Korea. These agreements seemed to Japan to have in one way or
another been palpably violated by the Russians in many of their actions
in Korea, to which the Yong-am-po affair was a climax. Under
circumstances so continually irritating to the peace of the East and so
threatening to her own vital interests, the Government of Japan now felt
justified, when the climax was reached, in opening _direct_ negotiations
with Russia, in order to arrive at such a definite understanding of the
relative position of the Powers in Korea, as would insure the mutual
benefit of the three nations concerned.

-----

Footnote 516:

  The sovereign of Korea, formerly King (_wang_), assumed the title
  Emperor (_Hwang-ti_), on October 12, 1897, for, in the Chinese
  language, the _wang_ may be a tributary prince, but the _ti_ is the
  master of an independent state.

Footnote 517:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 747–751. See also _The Times_, August 30, 1899.

Footnote 518:

  The _Kokumin_, October 10, 1899.

Footnote 519:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 751–752.

Footnote 520:

  _Ibid._, pp. 752–753.

Footnote 521:

  The _Kokumin_, April 1, and 3, 1900.

Footnote 522:

  The _Kokumin_, May 25, 1900, and May 21, 1901.

Footnote 523:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, p. 751.

Footnote 524:

  The _Kokumin_, May 21 and November 1, 1901. The final agreement
  between Hayashi and the Korean Foreign Minister was signed on May 17,
  1902, and published in the _Kwampō_.

Footnote 525:

  The _Kokumin_, March 20, 1901, and August 7, 1902.

Footnote 526:

  _Ibid._, May 5 and 10, 1901.

Footnote 527:

  The _Kokumin_, April 23, 24, May 3, June 9, 1901.

Footnote 528:

  _Ibid._, May 18, 1901; January 19, February 1, correspondence dated
  April 2, 1902.

Footnote 529:

  _Ibid._, October 22, November 17, 1902.

Footnote 530:

  _Ibid._, January 27, 1903.

Footnote 531:

  From a statement made by an intimate friend of Marquis Itō, who, in
  October, 1900, succeeded Yamagata in the premiership. See the
  _Kokumin_, November 10, 1903.

Footnote 532:

  From 1900 till May, 1903.

Footnote 533:

  A Government can seldom afford so many foreign councilors and
  commissioners as were found in Korea. Besides these and several other
  Russians, there were in Seul, Mr. Masuo Katō, a Japanese adviser, Mr.
  Sands, the once influential American adviser, several French
  engineers, and a Belgian councilor to the ministry of internal
  affairs.

Footnote 534:

  The _Kokumin_, Seul correspondence, dated August 7, 1902.

Footnote 535:

  The _Kokumin_, Seul correspondence, dated June 3, 1899; November 30,
  1902.

Footnote 536:

  _Ibid._, Seul correspondence, dated December 23, 1902.

Footnote 537:

  See p. 23, above.

Footnote 538:

  The _Kokumin_, telegrams, March 11, 26, 27, April 11, 1903.

Footnote 539:

  _Ibid._, correspondence, February 2, 5, 9, 16, 18, March 4, 1903.

Footnote 540:

  The contract is found in _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 800–806. Also see the
  U. S. 56th Congress, 1st Session, _House Documents_, vol. i. pp.
  484–488.

Footnote 541:

  (1) Along the coast near Cape Tikhmeneff, Ulsan Bay, Kiong-sang
  Province; (2) on the island of Ching-po, Ham-kiung Province; and (3)
  at Chang-shing, Kang-wan Province.

Footnote 542:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 799–800.

Footnote 543:

  _Ibid._, pp. 731–732 (August 8, 1884, o. s.).

Footnote 544:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 772–775, April 22, 1896.

Footnote 545:

  The _Kokumin_, Seul correspondence, dated April 8, 1902.

Footnote 546:

  _Ibid._, telegram, May 8, correspondence, May 11, 1902; telegram,
  March 28, and correspondence, April 16, 1903.

Footnote 547:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, p. 722.

Footnote 548:

  _Ibid._, pp. 761–764.

Footnote 549:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 765–768. This contract includes certain
  interesting provisions, which the reader may compare with those of the
  Manchurian railways. There occur two exclusive measures, that none but
  Koreans and Japanese may hold shares of the railway capital (Article
  15), and that no other foreigners shall reside within lands assigned
  for the depots (Article 5). The work should be begun within three
  years after the signature of the contract, and be completed within ten
  years hence (Article 10). After fifteen years of operation, the Korean
  Government might purchase the entire line, and, if unable to do so,
  the purchase would be postponed by periods of ten years (Article 12).
  As soon as the Korean finances should admit, the railway might be made
  a common work between the Koreans and Japanese (Article 13). The
  laborers and the timber employed in the construction should as far as
  possible be obtained in Korea (Article 6). The lands assigned for the
  line and its depots shall belong to the company only so long as it
  operates the road, and the Korean Government should furnish no other
  lands to the company (Articles 3 and 8). It should be added that the
  Japanese Government guaranteed a six per cent. interest for the
  capital of the company.

  For further details of the Seul-Chemulpo and Fusan-Seul Railways, see
  p. 24, and notes, above.

Footnote 550:

  For the contract, see _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 770–772.

Footnote 551:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 768–770; the _Kokumin_, September 7, 1901.

Footnote 552:

  The _Kokumin_, July 4, 1902.

Footnote 553:

  It is said that the Russian Representative obtained a promise from the
  Korean Government to grant to no other foreigners the right of either
  the construction or the mortgage of this railway.—The _Kokumin_,
  December 10, 1903. It now matters little whether this report was true
  or not, since the Korean Government abrogated on May 18, 1904, all the
  agreements it had concluded with the Russians.

Footnote 554:

  The _Kokumin_, February 18, 1903; the _Dōbun-kwai_, No. 41, pp. 91–93.

Footnote 555:

  The _Kokumin_, August 4, 1903.

Footnote 556:

  See, e. g., pp. 10–30.

Footnote 557:

  _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp. 781–791.

Footnote 558:

  It is said that the time-limit was extended, on January 1, 1901, for
  twenty years. See _Tokushu Jōyaku_, p. 783.

Footnote 559:

  The company agreed to pay to the Korean Imperial House, through the
  Russo-Chinese Bank, a royalty amounting to one fourth of the annual
  profit. The company was to furnish all the capital, and was exempt
  from all kinds of taxes and dues (Articles 10, 11, 14).

Footnote 560:

  The _Kokumin_, correspondence, April 18, 1903; _Tokushu Jōyaku_, pp.
  781–782.

Footnote 561:

  Toward the end of May, 1903, simultaneously with their activity on the
  Yalu, the Russian soldiers began again to cut trees at Mu-san.

Footnote 562:

  Cf. Article 2 of the contract.

Footnote 563:

  The _Kokumin_, correspondence, July 27, 1903. Lower down the stream,
  at Tatung-kao, the amount sometimes reached the annual value of
  7,000,000 _taels_.

Footnote 564:

  See an address by Eitaro Tsuruoka, who has recently traveled in
  Manchuria and is acquainted with several of the leaders of the
  bandits. The _Dōbun-kwai_, No. 53 (April, 1904), pp. 1–14.

Footnote 565:

  The _Kokumin_, April 23, 1903. The capital of the syndicate was
  reported to be 5,000,000 rubles, of which 2,000,000 were said to have
  been furnished by the Russian Government.—_Ibid._, correspondence,
  June 19, 1903. This rumor was not authenticated. It is safe to say,
  however, that Baron Gunzburg’s connection with the syndicate was
  largely nominal. The present writer is not in a position to explain
  the relation of the notorious M. Bezobrazoff to the timber work on the
  Yalu.

Footnote 566:

  The _Kokumin_, telegram, May 8 and 9, 1903.

Footnote 567:

  Principally Mt. Paik-ma.

Footnote 568:

  The _Kokumin_, telegram, June 11, correspondence, June 19, 1903. When
  Japanese soldiers reached Yong-am-po soon after the beginning of the
  present war, they found there a large warehouse, and fifteen large
  brick and twenty or more smaller buildings. Rails had been laid
  between the sea and the warehouse, which was also connected with the
  Yalu by a new canal. A fort had also been left standing, but the guns
  had been taken away.

Footnote 569:

  _Ibid._, telegram, May 8 and 9, 1900. Cf. the _British Parliamentary
  Papers: China, No. 2 (1904)_, Nos. 115, 116, 128, 129, 131, 134.

Footnote 570:

  The _Kokumin_, telegram, May 9, 1903.

Footnote 571:

  _Ibid._, telegram, May 22 and 25, 1903.

Footnote 572:

  The _Kokumin_, telegram, May 16.

Footnote 573:

  _Ibid._, correspondence, May 20.

Footnote 574:

  _Ibid._, telegram, June 13.

Footnote 575:

  _Ibid._, telegram, June 17.

Footnote 576:

  _Ibid._, June 16.

Footnote 577:

  _Ibid._, telegram, June 6.

Footnote 578:

  The _Kokumin_, correspondence, June 19.

Footnote 579:

  See p. 271, above.




                             CHAPTER XVIII
                   THE RUSSO-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS, I


It was in view of these dangerously unstable circumstances in Manchuria
and Korea that, on June 23, 1903, the four principal members of the
Japanese Cabinet[580] and five Privy Councilors[581] met before the
Throne, and decided on the principles upon which negotiations with
Russia should be opened.[582] Having thus formulated the policy to be
pursued, Baron Komura telegraphed to the Japanese Minister at St.
Petersburg, Mr. Kurino, on July 28, as follows[583]:—

[Illustration:

  BARON KOMURA

  _Japanese Foreign Minister_
]

  “The Imperial Government [of Japan] have observed with close
  attention the development of affairs in Manchuria, and its present
  situation causes them to view it with grave concern.

  “So long as it was hoped that Russia would carry out, on the one
  hand, the engagement that she made with China, and, on the other,
  the assurances she had given to other Powers, regarding the subject
  of the evacuation of Manchuria, the Imperial Government maintained
  an attitude of watchful reserve. But the recent conduct of Russia
  has been, at Peking, to propose new demands, and, in Manchuria, to
  tighten her hold upon it, until the Imperial Government is led to
  believe that Russia must have abandoned the intention of retiring
  from Manchuria. At the same time, her increased activity upon the
  Korean frontier is such as to raise doubts as to the limits of her
  ambition.

  “The unconditioned and permanent occupation of Manchuria by Russia
  would create a state of things prejudicial to the security and
  interest of Japan. The principle of equal opportunity would thereby
  be annulled, and the territorial integrity of China impaired. There
  is, however, a still more serious consideration for the Japanese
  Government. That is to say, if Russia was established on the flank
  of Korea, it would be a constant menace to the separate existence of
  that Empire, or at least would make Russia the dominant Power in
  Korea. Korea is an important outpost in Japan’s line of defense, and
  Japan consequently considers her independence absolutely essential
  to her own repose and safety. Moreover, the political as well as
  commercial and industrial interests and influence which Japan
  possesses in Korea are paramount over those of other Powers. These
  interests and influence, Japan, having regard to her own security,
  cannot consent to surrender to, or share with, another Power.

  “The Imperial Government, after the most serious consideration, have
  resolved to consult the Russian Government, in a spirit of
  conciliation and frankness, with a view to the conclusion of an
  understanding designed to compose questions which are at this time
  the cause of their anxiety. In the estimation of the Imperial
  Government, the moment is opportune for making the attempt to bring
  about the desired adjustment, and it is believed that, failing this
  opportunity, there would be no room for another understanding.

  “The Imperial Government, reposing confidence in your judgment and
  discretion, have decided to place the delicate negotiations in your
  hands.

  “It being the wish of the Imperial Government to place their present
  invitation to the Russian Government entirely on an official
  footing, you are accordingly instructed to open the question by
  presenting to Count Lamsdorff, Minister of Foreign Affairs of
  Russia, a _note verbale_ to the following effect:—

  “‘The Japanese Government desire to remove from the relations of the
  two Empires every cause of future misunderstanding, and believe that
  the Russian Government share the same desire. The Japanese
  Government would therefore be glad to enter with the Imperial
  Russian Government upon an examination of the condition of affairs
  in the regions of the extreme East, where their interests meet, with
  a view to defining their respective special interests in those
  regions.

  “‘If this suggestion fortunately meets with the approval, in
  principle, of the Russian Government, the Japanese Government will
  be prepared to present to the Russian Government their views as to
  the nature and scope of the proposed understanding.’

  “In presenting the foregoing note to the Russian Foreign Minister,
  you will be careful to make him understand that our purposes are
  entirely friendly, but that we attach great importance to the
  subject.

  “You will present the note to Count Lamsdorff as soon as possible,
  and keep me fully informed regarding the steps taken by you under
  this instruction; and immediately upon the receipt of an affirmative
  reply from the Russian Government, the substance of our proposals
  will be telegraphed to you.”

To this request of Japan, Count Lamsdorff expressed a perfect
agreement,[584] for, as he had very often said to Mr. Kurino, “an
understanding between the two countries was not only desirable, but was
the best policy.” “Should Russia and Japan enter into a full
understanding,” said he, “no one would in future attempt to sow the
seeds of discord between the two countries.”[585] The assent of the
Foreign Minister was later sustained by the Czar.[586]

Thus the way was opened for an amicable interchange of the views of the
two Powers. This auspicious beginning of the negotiations stands in
striking contrast to their disastrous end. The discrepancy was perhaps
in no small measure due to a political situation at St. Petersburg which
was completely beyond the control of Count Lamsdorff, and probably also
of the Czar. It should be remembered that Baron Komura, like Marquis
Itō, was of the opinion that the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement
with Russia was not only desirable, but also possible. The same belief
was strongly shared by Mr. Kurino. It is also difficult to suppose that
Count Lamsdorff entered upon the negotiations with a deliberate
intention to introduce into them insurmountable difficulties, as he was
presently obliged to do, so as to bring them to a complete deadlock. On
the contrary, his remarks quoted in the preceding paragraph seem to
indicate that he and Mr. Kurino had frequently talked of the wisdom of
coming to a perfect adjustment of the interests of the two Powers in the
East, and that he was gratified that the opportunity was offered by the
Japanese Government to give effect to what he had long considered “the
best policy.” About this time, however, it had begun to be surmised
abroad that the peace party, with which the Count and M. Witte were said
to be in sympathy, had been largely overshadowed by the less intelligent
warlike faction. It was unknown what were the results of the
observations of General Kuropatkin, the then Minister of War, who had
made a tour of the East between the end of April and the end of July.
Nor was it possible to discover what took place in the great conference
held at Port Arthur early in July, in which the General, as well as
Admiral Alexieff, MM. Lessar, Pavloff, Rosen, and Pokotiloff, took part.
However that may be, it could hardly be denied that henceforth the
Eastern affairs passed under the sway of a less thoughtful body of men
at St. Petersburg, and of that executive officer of great talent, but
strategist and diplomat of unknown value, Admiral Alexieff, at Port
Arthur. M. Witte was relieved of his Ministry of Finance, and
transferred to the presidency of the council of ministers, which was
known to be of small real authority. On August 13, an Imperial _ukase_
was published in the Russian _Official Messenger_, stating that, “in
view of the complex problems of administration of the eastern confines
of the Empire, we [the Czar Nicolas] found it necessary to create a
power capable of assuring the peaceful development of the country and
satisfying urgent local needs.” For this purpose, a special vice-regency
called the Far East was created out of the Amur and Kwan-tung
territories, and Admiral Alexieff was appointed Viceroy of the Far East.
He was vested with supreme power in the civil administration of the
territories, with the command of the naval forces in the Pacific and of
all the troops quartered in the country under his jurisdiction, and with
the management of the diplomatic relations of these regions with the
neighboring States. The Viceroy was released from the jurisdiction of
the Ministers at St. Petersburg, and the only control to be exercised
over him by the central power was through a special committee of
men[587] nominated by the Czar and presided over by himself.[588]
Statutes concerning this special committee of the Far East—which has in
itself no executive power—were promulgated on September 30.[589] When we
consider the probable state of Russian politics at the time, the
significance of thus elevating Alexieff and clothing him with enormous
powers could hardly be concealed. Henceforth the control of the Eastern
diplomacy of Russia seemed to have rested more with the Viceroy at Port
Arthur than with the Foreign Minister at St. Petersburg.[590]

Admiral Alexieff was appointed Viceroy on August 13. On the preceding
day,[591] the first Japanese note was handed to Count Lamsdorff by Mr.
Kurino, who had held it for about a week pending the Czar’s assent to
Japan’s proposition of July 28, already quoted. In this note, delivered
on August 12, Baron Komura wrote as follows:—

[Illustration:

  ADMIRAL ALEXIEFF

  _Viceroy of the Far East_
]

  “In reference to my telegram of the 28th July, the Imperial
  Government, after giving most serious consideration to the condition
  of affairs in those regions where the interests of the two Powers
  meet, have decided to propose the following articles as the basis of
  an understanding between Japan and Russia:—

  “1. ‘A mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial
  integrity of the Chinese and Korean Empires, and to maintain the
  principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all
  nations in those countries.

  “2. ‘A reciprocal recognition of Japan’s preponderating interests in
  Korea and Russia’s special interests in railway enterprises in
  Manchuria, and of the right of Japan to take in Korea, and of Russia
  to take in Manchuria, such measures as may be necessary for the
  protection of their respective interests as above defined, subject,
  however, to the provisions of Article 1 of this Agreement.

  “3. ‘A reciprocal undertaking on the part of Russia and Japan not to
  impede the development of those industrial and commercial
  activities, respectively, of Japan in Korea and of Russia in
  Manchuria, which are not inconsistent with the stipulations of
  Article 1 of this Agreement.

  “‘An additional engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the
  eventual extension of the Korean Railway into Southern Manchuria so
  as to connect with the Eastern Chinese and Shan-hai-kwan-Niu-chwang
  lines.

  “4. ‘A reciprocal engagement that, in case it should be found
  necessary to send troops by Japan to Korea, or by Russia to
  Manchuria, for the purpose either of protecting the interests
  mentioned in Article 2 of this Agreement, or of suppressing
  insurrection or disorder liable to create international
  complications, the troops so sent are in no case to exceed the
  actual number required, and are to be forthwith recalled as soon as
  their missions are accomplished.

  “5. ‘The recognition on the part of Russia of the exclusive right of
  Japan to give advice and assistance in the interest of reform and
  good government in Korea, including necessary military assistance.

  “6. ‘This Agreement to supersede all previous arrangements between
  Japan and Russia respecting Korea.’

  “In handing the foregoing project to Count Lamsdorff,” wrote Baron
  Komura to Mr. Kurino in the same dispatch which contained the
  proposed Articles, “you will say that it is presented for the
  consideration of the Russian Government in the firm belief that it
  may be found adequate to serve as a basis upon which to construct a
  satisfactory arrangement between the two Governments, and you will
  assure Count Lamsdorff that any amendment or suggestion he may find
  it necessary to offer will receive the immediate and friendly
  consideration of the Imperial Government. It will not be necessary
  for you to say much in elucidation of the separate items of the
  project, as they are largely self-explanatory; but you might point
  out that the project taken as a whole will be found to be little
  more than a logical extension and amplification of the principles
  already recognized by, or of conditions embodied in the previous
  engagements[592] concluded between, the two Governments.”[593]

These articles are memorable, as their more essential features were
never altered in the later notes from Japan, as the persistent rejection
by Russia of the principles embodied in these articles inevitably ended
in hostilities, and, the most important of all, as much of the future of
the East would seem to depend upon whether these principles should win
or fail through the war. The principles were as obvious as the note was
“largely self-explanatory.” At their basis was the desire for a general,
lasting peace of the Far East, or, in other words, an effective
elimination of unnatural, irritating circumstances, so that the East may
develop its enormous material and moral resources, and thereby establish
with the West an intimate and mutually beneficial relationship. Upon
this fundamental desire were built two great principles, which had long
been the mottoes of Eastern diplomacy; namely, the territorial integrity
of, and the “open door” in, China and Korea. These principles, which
Russia had frequently avowed on her own initiative, Japan now requested
her to uphold mutually with herself. Side by side with these
considerations, the vested interests and the peculiar position,
respectively, of Russia in Manchuria and Japan in Korea, were to be
reciprocally recognized by the two Powers, in such a way, however, as
not to infringe the two great principles already named. Observe that the
Russian interests in Manchuria were not less respected than the Japanese
interests in Korea, nor was the Russian occupation of Manchuria more
guarded against than the Japanese annexation of Korea. The only ground
in the note for a possible misinterpretation was the Article which
provided for Japan’s sole right to advise and aid Korea for the cause of
the good government and reform of the latter. Experience had shown that
the independence and progress of Korea, upon which one half of Japan’s
own future rested, would be possible only by the internal reform and
development of the Peninsular Empire, and that, unfortunately, the task
of reform could not safely be left either with the indolent Korea or
with another Power, be it China or Russia, whose ultimate object would
be best served were Korea to remain feeble. The reform of Korea may
truly be called the penalty of Japan’s geographical position, and the
latter’s success in the fulfillment of this most delicate mission must
depend on her sense of just proportion and utmost self-control. And
nothing seems to kindle the Japanese nation with a higher ambition than
their profound determination to perform what they deem their historic
mission in the fairest spirit of human progress. Only along these lines,
moreover, by a peculiar coincidence of circumstances, the securest
interests of Japan as a nation seem to lie. For it appears to be her
singular fortune that her interests become every year more closely tied
with the best tried principles of progress. Upon fairness her life
depends, and upon it the natural growth of the millions of the East
would seem to rest. It appeared, therefore, evident to the Japanese
statesmen that in no other manner than along the course suggested by
their propositions to Russia could the welfare of all the interested
parties be assured, and the future repose and progress of the East
guaranteed. On the other hand, however, nothing could be more
distasteful to the party presumably in control of the Eastern policy of
Russia at the time than the reciprocal understanding proposed by Mr.
Kurino in his note of August 12.

Before replying to this note, Count Lamsdorff suddenly demanded, on
August 23, that negotiations should be conducted at Tokio instead of at
St. Petersburg, as had been desired by Japan[594]. This move of Russia
was closely parallel to the policy she once pursued in China regarding
the lease of Port Arthur, when she declined to negotiate at the Russian
Capital[595]. A discussion at St. Petersburg might save it from many of
the vexatious delays which would naturally attend its being held at an
Eastern capital, away from the Foreign Office of the Power whose
interest counseled procrastination. Of the several reasons presented by
Russia for her proposition, one was that the local knowledge of Viceroy
Alexieff had constantly to be consulted. Japan pointed out that the
proposed Agreement concerned matters of principle, and not of local
detail[596]. Her repeated request, however, to negotiate at St.
Petersburg was firmly refused by Russia, as was also Japan’s suggestion
that her note be made the basis of the discussion.[597] Negotiations
were therefore transferred to Tokio, and the Japanese note and the
Russian counter-note—the latter not then received—were together to serve
as the base of the _pourparlers_[598]. This question, which marked the
beginning of many long delays to follow, itself consumed two weeks
before any real progress of the negotiations could be made.

After a delay of nearly eight weeks, Russia, on October 3, sent her
counter-note, which, as will be seen from the following telegram of the
5th, from Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino, revealed the utter
irreconcilability of the wishes of the two Powers:—

  “Baron Rosen [Russian Minister at Tokio] came back from Port Arthur
  on the 3d instant. He called on me the same day, and handed me the
  following as the Russian counter-proposals, which, he said, had been
  sanctioned by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, upon the joint
  representations of Admiral Alexieff and himself:—

  “1. ‘Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial
  integrity of the Korean Empire.

  “2. ‘Recognition by Russia of Japan’s preponderating interests in
  Korea, and of the right of Japan to give advice and assistance to
  Korea tending to improve the civil administration of the Empire
  without infringing the stipulations of Article 1.

  “3. ‘Engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the commercial
  and industrial undertakings of Japan in Korea, nor to oppose any
  measures taken for the purpose of protecting them, so long as such
  measures do not infringe the stipulations of Article 1.

  “4. ‘Recognition of the right of Japan to send, for the same
  purpose, troops to Korea, with the knowledge of Russia, but their
  number not to exceed that actually required, and with the engagement
  on the part of Japan to recall such troops as soon as their mission
  is accomplished.

  “5. ‘Mutual engagement not to use any part of the territory of Korea
  for strategical purposes, nor to undertake on the coasts of Korea
  any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in
  the Straits of Korea.

  “6. ‘Mutual engagement to consider that part of the territory of
  Korea lying to the north of the thirty-ninth parallel as a neutral
  zone into which neither of the contracting parties shall introduce
  troops.

  “7. ‘Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as in all
  respects outside her sphere of interest.

  “8. ‘This Agreement to supersede all previous agreements between
  Russia and Japan regarding Korea.[599]’”

In comparing this counter-note with the original note of Japan, it will
at once be seen that Russia seriously reduced Japan’s demands concerning
Korea by excluding her right of rendering advice and assistance to Korea
in the latter’s military affairs, and also by quietly suppressing the
important clause providing for mutual recognition of the principle of
the equal economic opportunity for all nations in Korea. Moreover,
Russia imposed upon Japan the following new conditions regarding Korea:
not to use any part of the territory for strategical purposes; not to
fortify the southern coast; and to consider the territory north of the
thirty-ninth parallel, covering nearly one third of the area of the
Empire, as neutral[600] between the two Powers. As regards Manchuria,
Russia silently discarded the two fundamental principles proposed by
Japan and often avowed by Russia herself, namely, China’s sovereignty
over it and the equal economic opportunity for all nations therein. On
the contrary, Russia requested Japan to declare Manchuria and its
littoral as outside of her sphere of interest. If the Power which
exchanged necessaries of life with Manchuria in fast growing quantities,
controlled more than ninety per cent. of the exports at Niu-chwang, and
numbered tens of thousands of its subjects residing in the Three
Provinces, should be required by Russia to declare itself uninterested
in Manchuria, the exclusive designs of Russia upon the territory would
seem to need no stronger proof. The general tenor of the note of October
3 was, thus, to exclude Manchuria from discussion, and, furthermore, to
restrict Japan’s influence in Korea. Russia explained that the question
of Manchuria rested between herself and China, and that she had no
reason to make any arrangement about it with a third Power. To this,
Japan replied that she had asked from Russia no concession of any kind
in Manchuria, but merely requested her to recognize anew the principles
which she had voluntarily and repeatedly professed. Such a recognition,
Japan contended, was of vital interest to her, inasmuch as the Russian
occupation of Manchuria would continually threaten the independence of
Korea.[601] It was evident from Russia’s counter-note that there lay an
impassable gulf between the propositions of the two Powers, not only in
the actual terms under discussion, but also in the principles involved
in them, for, to all appearance, nothing could prove more clearly that
Russia was bent upon absorbing and closing up all Manchuria, as well as
marking out Northern Korea as an eventual sphere of her influence, and
that she was unwilling to recognize the profound and increasing common
interest of Japan and Manchuria, and the vital importance to the former
of the independence, strength, and development of Korea.

The date fixed in the Convention in April, 1902, for the final
evacuation of Manchuria arrived on October 8, 1903—five days after the
Russian counter-note was received by Japan, but the day came and passed
with no sign of the evacuation. On the contrary, the Russian Minister at
Peking was engaged, regardless of the negotiations at Tokio between his
Government and the Japanese, in urging Prince Ching to change the terms
of the Convention. Those who had been impressed by the manner and
contents of the Russian reply to the Japanese note did not fail to
observe in M. Lessar’s conduct at Peking another proof of the slight
weight which the Russians attached to the overtures of Japan at least
concerning Manchuria. For, if Russia succeeded in securing China’s
consent to her new demands regarding Manchuria, which in every way
transgressed the principles contained in the Japanese note, the
Manchurian negotiations between Russia and Japan would become
unnecessary. The Russian course of action at Tokio and Peking was thus
consistent in ignoring Japan’s vital interests in Manchuria, and,
therefore, was regarded as consistently insulting to Japan. The secret
of the situation seemed to be, as has been already suggested, that the
centre of gravity of Russian diplomacy in the East had largely shifted
from St. Petersburg to Port Arthur—from Count Lamsdorff to the
inflexible Admiral Alexieff. Ever since the latter had convened, at Port
Arthur, early in July, a large council of the diplomatic, military and
naval, and financial agents of Russia in the Eastern Asiatic countries,
as well as General Kuropatkin, who was then traveling in the Orient, it
had appeared that the Viceroy of the Far East,[602] and not the Foreign
Office at the Russian Capital, was the guiding spirit of the Czar’s
policy in Korea, China, and Japan. Hereafter, Count Lamsdorff could
perhaps moderate the terms, and transmit to Japan the revised contents,
of the Viceroy’s unconciliatory views, but had otherwise lost the
control of the situation. The reason why Alexieff had risen to such a
great influence may not be known until the relations he had with M.
Bezobrazoff, the late von Plehve, and other influential politicians at
St. Petersburg of that day, become more clearly understood than they are
to-day. As to the probable views of the Viceroy regarding the situation
in the East, it is not hard to infer them from the diplomatic history in
China, Korea, and Japan, during the half year ending with February,
1904.

Let us make a brief review of the diplomatic manœuvres of the Russian
Representative at Peking regarding Manchuria, which proceeded much as if
his Government were not engaged in negotiations with Japan in respect to
the same territory. The secret Manchurian agreement which was reported
to have been concluded on July 20[603] was probably unfounded, and its
detail may otherwise be safely left unnoticed. The nature of the Russian
policy regarding Manchuria could, however, be inferred from the
remarkable exchange of views which took place at London in July between
Lord Lansdowne and the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff. In this
interview on July 11, the latter said, in effect: “Whatever may be the
result of the negotiations which are pending between Russia and
China, ... the Imperial Government [of Russia] has no intention of
opposing the gradual opening of China, as _commercial relations
develop_,[1] of some towns in Manchuria to foreign commerce, _excluding,
however, the right to establish ‘Settlements.’_ This declaration does
not apply to Harbin. The town in question being within the limits of the
concessions for the Eastern Chinese Railway, _is not unrestrictedly
subject to the Chinese Government_;[604] the establishment there of
foreign consulates must therefore depend upon the consent of the Russian
Government.”[605] The three conditions here printed in italics would
seem not only contradictory to the declaration made by Count Lamsdorff
to Mr. MacCormick on April 28,[606] but also almost tantamount to
opposing the opening of any new treaty port in Manchuria. For it was
well understood that the desire on the part of some Powers for the
speedy opening of some new ports in Manchuria was largely calculated to
prevent the aggressive and exclusive proceedings of Russia in that
territory. If, as Count Benckendorff suggested, the development of trade
relations was the sole reason for “gradually” opening some towns, if
foreign settlements should be excluded from the new ports, and if
Harbin, and logically all the towns situated at the “depots” of the
railway, could not be opened without Russian consent, Manchuria,
excepting the regions touching the few towns which had already been
opened, would remain open to the growing influence of Russia, but
practically sealed to the rest of the world.[607] This inference was
presently demonstrated by the new demands made at the Peking Foreign
Office by M. Lessar on September 6. These demands, presented, as they
were, in the midst of the Russo-Japanese negotiations at Tokio and on
the eve of the close of the period of Manchurian evacuation, deserve a
special notice. Briefly stated, M. Lessar requested: (1) that China
should not alienate, in any manner, any port, of whatever size, of
Manchuria to any other Power; (2) that Russia should be allowed to
construct wharves on the Sungari River, to connect them by telegraph,
and to station Russian troops to protect the telegraph lines and the
ships plying the river; (3) that Russia should be allowed to establish
post stations along the road from Tsitishar to Blagovestchensk; (4) that
no greater duties should be imposed on goods brought into Manchuria by
rail than those now imposed on goods transported by road or river; (5)
that after the withdrawal of the Russian troops, the branches of the
Russo-Chinese Bank should be protected by Chinese troops, but at the
cost of the Bank; and (6) that a Russian doctor should be appointed
member of the Sanitary Board at Niu-chwang. On these conditions, the
Russian forces would evacuate Niu-chwang and the rest of the Sheng-king
Province on October 8, the Kirin Province after four months, and the
Hei-lung Province at the end of one year.[608] Of these, the first
demand was interpreted to imply the prevention of the establishment of
new foreign settlements and concessions in any part of Manchuria. As to
the meaning of stationing troops along the Sungari and building a post
road from Tsitsihar to Blagovestchensk, it is instructive to observe
that Prince Ching opined that, if China conceded these demands and
Russia then nominally withdrew, the latter would still be in virtual
possession of the territory.[609] The British and Japanese Ministers at
Peking naturally warned China not to accept the Russian
propositions.[610] The Foreign Office, after some hesitation,[611]
finally refused all of the demands in a written note, on September
24.[612] This refusal, however, by no means terminated the Manchurian
negotiations at Peking. As the Chinese Government showed inclinations,
vacillating as they were, to sympathize with Japan in her efforts to
maintain the sovereign rights of China in Manchuria, M. Lessar is said
to have resorted to occasional threats that, if a war should occur
between Russia and Japan and the latter be defeated, China would repent
her sorry plight only too late, for then Manchuria would not be hers.
Particularly vigorous was his obstruction of the effort of the United
States Commissioners at Shanghai to secure the opening of new ports in
Manchuria to foreign trade.[613] In spite of all this, however, on
October 8—the very day once fixed for the final evacuation of
Manchuria—the American-Chinese treaty was signed, opening Mukden and
An-tung as treaty ports. The next day saw the conclusion of the
Japanese-Chinese treaty, bearing the date of October 8, which also
provided for the opening of Mukden and Tatung-kao. It was perhaps
nothing more than a singular coincidence of circumstances that Mukden
should be, as it was, occupied by Russian soldiers shortly after its
opening had been secured by the United States and Japan. Early in the
morning of October 28, 780 Russian soldiers with eight cannon suddenly,
without warning, rushed through the city gate and took possession of the
_Yamên_ of the Tartar General, Tsêng-chi, holding him in custody and
reducing the military forces under his control.[1] A generally accepted
ground for this precipitous act was naught more than that a subordinate
Taotai under the jurisdiction of the Tartar General had undertaken to
punish some recalcitrant bandits who had been under Russian employ. The
_Journal de Saint Pétersbourg_ explained, however, that the seizure of
Mukden was owing “to the apathy of the Chinese authorities, to the
non-execution of the promises made on their part, and to the agitation
which prevailed in the district.”[614] Mukden being the sepulchral city
of the reigning dynasty of China, its sudden occupation by the Russians
appeared to have aroused a bitter resentment among the educated classes
throughout the Empire.

Turning to the Korean frontier, the conduct of the Russians at
Yong-am-po[615] on the left side of the Yalu, near its mouth, had now
assumed an unmistakably political character. Early in July a telegraphic
connection had been made without permission with An-tung, a strategic
centre in Eastern Manchuria. At the instance of the Japanese Minister,
the Korean Government succeeded in enforcing the removal of the
line.[616] Late in the same month, the Commissioner of Forestry of Korea
and Baron Gunzburg visited Yong-am-po, and drafted an agreement leasing
the port to the Timber Company, nominally represented by the Baron. The
contract bore neither a definite period of time for the lease nor fixed
area of the leased territory, in the Korean text of the agreement, but,
according to the Russian document, the lease is said to have extended
over twenty years and covered a space equivalent to 204 acres. The
company also was granted, in the Korean text, judiciary rights over the
residents within the leased area.[617] At the same time, extensive works
had been started by the Russians at Yong-am-po, including the erection
of large brick buildings and the laying out of roads, streets, and light
railways, to be later increased by what was conceded to be a fort;
while, beyond the river, the military forces at An-tung and other
centres had been in the process of augmentation.[618] The situation had
now become so grave that Mr. Hayashi, Japanese Minister at Seul, was
obliged to enter sharp protests at the Korean Foreign Office against the
conclusion of the lease agreement,[619] and to urge again the opening of
Wiju, and now also of Yong-am-po, to foreign trade. Both the British and
American Representatives also pressed the Seul Government to open these
ports.[620] The Russian Minister, M. Pavloff, however, was as
strenuously opposed to the opening of these ports as Mr. Hayashi was to
the conclusion of the lease agreement. The conditions were almost
identical with those in 1898 under which Great Britain urged the opening
of Talien-wan, so as to counteract the Russian aggression upon it and
Port Arthur, and also with those in Manchuria, in this same year, where
the American and Japanese Governments demanded the opening of new ports
in order to prevent the exclusion of foreign trade and industry from
Manchuria under Russian rule. The struggle between the open and the
exclusive policy, however, continued much longer in Korea than in China,
owing largely to the extremely unstable political conditions at Seul,
which enabled the Russian diplomats oftener and longer to influence the
Korean court.[621] As regards the lease of Yong-am-po, the Korean
Government was now so alive to the serious nature of the agreement that
it proposed to modify its terms late in August.[622] M. Pavloff,
however, persistently urged the Korean Government to ratify the original
agreement. On August 27, for instance, he and Baron Gunzburg remained at
the Foreign Office from one to six o’clock in the afternoon, requesting
the immediate conclusion of the contract, until the Foreign Minister
escaped out of the door and tendered his resignation.[623] At the same
time, the conduct of the Russians on the frontier grew even more
menacing than before. The cutting of timber was started at different
points, where many Koreans were forced into unpaid service, and the
bandits in Russian employ created disorder among peaceful citizens.[624]
Moreover, according to the reports of Korean officials, the Russians had
occupied at Yong-am-po—now named Nicolas—a ground far more extensive
than the lease-area stipulated in the yet unratified agreement.[625] All
this while, the Russians at the Capital exercised a powerful influence
over both Yi Keun-thaik and Yi Yong-ik, two of the most noted
politicians at Seul, and over the strong party upholding the interests
of Lady Öm.[626] It was through these pro-Russian people that the unique
idea of declaring the neutrality of Korea before the outbreak of any
war—an idea which had more than once been unsuccessfully
proposed[627]—was again brought forward, and finally, early in 1904,
carried into effect in an awkward manner.[628]

Russian activity in Korea and Manchuria, which has been briefly
described, may be said to constitute the reverse side of the diplomacy
of the Czar’s Government at Tokio. The actual control of the Eastern
situation having probably passed from the central power to Port Arthur,
it was now founded, perhaps not upon greater practical wisdom than
before, but apparently upon a uniform basis. For the conclusion is
forced upon the student that Viceroy Alexieff’s policy must have been,
on the one hand, to deal with Japan’s overtures lightly and leisurely,
but, on the other, to hasten the establishment of Russian control in
Manchuria and upon the Korean frontier, so that Japan might in time be
compelled to bow to the situation and accept terms dictated by Russia.
The proof of this policy had already seemed abundantly sufficient by the
time when the Russian counter-note reached Baron Komura on October 3. It
is impossible to tell whether, in framing such a policy, the Viceroy had
taken into consideration the fact that the entire nation of Japan felt
as one man that they had come to the greatest crisis known in their long
history.

-----

Footnote 580:

  Viscount Katsura, Premier; Baron Komura, Foreign Minister; and Messrs.
  Terauchi and Yamamoto, Ministers, respectively, of the Army and Navy.

Footnote 581:

  Marquises Itō and Yamagata, and Counts Matsukata, Inoüé and Ōyama.

Footnote 582:

  The Japanese dailies.

Footnote 583:

  The _Nichi-Ro Kōshō ni kwan su ru Ōfuku_ (diplomatic correspondence
  respecting the negotiations between Japan and Russia), dispatch No. 1.
  This correspondence (hereafter abbreviated as _N.-R._) was presented
  by the Japanese Government to the Houses of the Imperial Diet,
  respectively, on March 23 and 26, and published in the _Kwampō_
  (Official Gazette) of March 24 and 27, 1904. It contains fifty-one
  dispatches, all telegraphic, covering the period of more than six
  months between the opening of the negotiations and the severance of
  all diplomatic relations between the two Powers, namely, between July
  28, 1903, and February 6, 1904.

  An authoritative English translation of this correspondence has been
  issued from Washington, probably by members of the Japanese Legation
  there. In the quotations from the correspondence that appear in these
  pages, the language of the translation—accurate as it is—has been
  largely changed, in order to make it coincide as closely as possible
  with the literal meaning of the original.

Footnote 584:

  _N.-R._, No. 2.

Footnote 585:

  It is singular that even Count Lamsdorff should thus participate in
  the characteristic plaint of the Russians that they are an object of
  unjust machinations of other nations.

Footnote 586:

  _N.-R._, No. 3, received at Tokio on August 6.

Footnote 587:

  These men were, according to Article 2 of the Statutes of September
  30, “the Ministers of the Interior, of Finance, of Foreign Affairs,
  and of War, the head of the Ministry of Marine, and such persons as
  His Majesty the Emperor may find it expedient to summon, either to sit
  permanently on the committee, or to take part temporarily at its
  meetings. The Viceroy of the Far East, being, by his duties, a member
  of the committee, shall be present at the meetings when he is in St.
  Petersburg.”

Footnote 588:

  The _British Parliamentary Papers: China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 144.

Footnote 589:

  _Ibid._, No. 155.

Footnote 590:

  After the opening of hostilities in February of the present year, the
  Russian Foreign Office made a statement of Russia’s case, in which it
  was said that, when the Japanese Government proposed in August, 1903,
  to open the negotiations, “Russia consented, and Viceroy Alexieff was
  charged to draw up a project for a new understanding with Japan in
  coöperation with the Russian Minister at Tokio....” See p. 327, note
  9, below.

Footnote 591:

  _N.-R._, No. 6.

Footnote 592:

  Evidently the reference is to the three Russo-Japanese agreements
  concerning Korea concluded in 1896 and 1898.

Footnote 593:

  _N.-R._, No. 3, originally dated Tokio, August 6.

Footnote 594:

  _N.-R._, No. 7.

Footnote 595:

  The _British Parliamentary Papers: China, No. 1 (1898)_, Nos. 100 and
  109.

Footnote 596:

  _N.-R._, Nos. 8, 11.

Footnote 597:

  _N.-R._, Nos. 10, 11.

Footnote 598:

  _Ibid._, No. 14, September 7.

Footnote 599:

  _N.-R._, No. 17.

Footnote 600:

  The Russian Government explained later, in the note delivered on
  January 6, 1904, that the creation of a neutral zone was “for the very
  purpose which the Imperial Japanese Government had likewise in view,
  namely, ‘to eliminate everything that might lead to misunderstandings
  in the future;’ a similar zone, for example, existed between the
  Russian and British possessions in Central Asia.”—_N.-R._, No. 38.

  It is easy to see, however, that _neutralization_ is merely _common
  appropriation_ in a negative form, and might, like cases of the
  latter, as in Primorsk and Sakhalien, result in _absorption_ by one of
  the two Powers between which the territory was neutralized.

Footnote 601:

  _N.-R._, No. 20.

Footnote 602:

  Before August 13, when he was appointed Viceroy of the Far East,
  Alexieff was as yet Governor-General of the Kwan-tung region.

Footnote 603:

  The Japanese dailies.

Footnote 604:

  The italics in the quotation are the author’s.

Footnote 605:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 133 (Lansdowne to Scott).

Footnote 606:

  See pp. 246–248, above.

Footnote 607:

  It is highly interesting that at this moment, when the Russian
  Government was, on the one hand, negotiating with Japan, and, on the
  other, proposing new demands upon China, the Russian Ambassador at
  London intimated the desire of his Government to come to an agreement
  with Great Britain regarding their interest in China. It appears that
  Russia wished Great Britain to declare Manchuria as outside of her
  sphere of interest, in return for a similar declaration by Russia
  regarding the Yang-tsze valley. Lord Lansdowne’s reply was
  characteristic. “I repeated,” he wrote to Sir C. Scott, “that we
  should be glad to arrive at one [i. e., an agreement with Russia], but
  that it must, of course, include the Manchurian question. We could,
  however, of course not come to terms unless we were fully informed as
  to the intentions of the Russian Government [in Manchuria]. Count
  Benckendorff again asked me whether, if we were satisfied upon this
  point, we should be likely to _assist_ in bringing about an
  arrangement between the Russian and Chinese Governments. I said that
  we should certainly make no secret of our concurrence, if we were
  thoroughly satisfied. Meanwhile, however, I was afraid that our
  attitude must remain observant and critical.”—_China, No. 2 (1904)_,
  No. 142 (August 12). Cf. No. 139.

  The Russian Government could not have forgotten that Great Britain had
  agreed with Japan, on January 30, 1902, that neither of the two Powers
  should come to a separate understanding with another Power regarding
  China or Korea without a full and frank discussion between themselves.

Footnote 608:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, Nos. 147, 148, 149, 156.

Footnote 609:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 150.

Footnote 610:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 149, 151, 153, 160.

Footnote 611:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 147 and 156.

Footnote 612:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 150 and 160.

Footnote 613:

  See pp. 252 ff., above.

Footnote 614:

  _China, No. 2 (1904)_, No. 159.

Footnote 615:

  See pp. 289 ff., above.

Footnote 616:

  The _Kokumin_, Seul telegrams, July 6, 10, 17 (1903).

Footnote 617:

  _Ibid._, July 23, 27; August 2, 8, 18.

Footnote 618:

  _Ibid._, July 27, etc.

Footnote 619:

  _Ibid._, August 12, 14, 23 (cf. July 17, etc.).

Footnote 620:

  The _Kokumin_, August 10, September 2, etc.

Footnote 621:

  The opening of Wiju was once granted by the Foreign Office, but the
  Emperor refused to sanction it.—_Ibid._, November 21. This is another
  illustration of the peculiar circumstances at Seul, that there exist
  two political centres, the Government and the Court. (The opening of
  neither Wiju nor Yong-am-po had been effected before the outbreak of
  the present war.)

Footnote 622:

  The _Kokumin_, August 29.

Footnote 623:

  _Ibid._, August 27, 29.

Footnote 624:

  _Ibid._, September 29.

Footnote 625:

  About 2¾ by 5¾ miles.—_Ibid._, November 1. Late in December, a report
  reached the Korean Government from the frontier that the Russians had
  forbidden all but their countrymen to enter into the Russian territory
  at Yong-am-po.—_Ibid._, December 23.

Footnote 626:

  Many stories have been told of M. Pavloff’s influence over the venal
  politicians of Seul. Of these, two are given below, which are not
  verifiable, but certainly interesting.

  Yi Keun-thaik is said to have told the Emperor, late in December,
  1903, that the following assurance had been given by the Russian
  Representative: if the Korean refusal to open Wiju and Yong-am-po to
  foreign trade should result in the mobilization of Japanese forces,
  Russia would also dispatch troops against them; in 1894, Korea erred
  when she relied on China, but Russia was not a China, and might
  implicitly be relied upon.—The _Kokumin_, telegram, December 25.

  One day, it is said, M. Pavloff remarked in the presence of the Korean
  Emperor and his attendants: “The Koreans often rely upon Japan, or
  else are afraid of her, but where in the world is Japan?” Then he
  scanned a map through a pocket magnifier, and said: “Oh, I find a tiny
  country called Japan in a corner of the Pacific Ocean. My Russian
  Empire is the greatest country on the globe, spreading over two
  continents. If Korea relies upon our Empire, she will be as safe as in
  navigating a sea in a colossal vessel. Should Japan object to it, our
  Russia would only have to do thus.” Here, placing a few matches on his
  palm, he blew them off.—The _Kyōiku Jiron_.

Footnote 627:

  In the latter half of 1900, for example.

Footnote 628:

  Korean neutrality is said to have been telegraphed to the Korean
  Representatives abroad through the French channel. It was not until
  some time after the other Powers had received the declaration that it
  reached Japan. Russia, it will be remembered, told the world that
  Japan infringed the neutrality of Korea when the former’s warships had
  an encounter with the “Variag” and “Korietz” at Chemulpo. See pp. 355
  ff., below.




                              CHAPTER XIX
                  THE RUSSO-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS, II


The Russian counter-note having been received on October 3, Baron Komura
began to confer with Baron Rosen upon the basis of both the Japanese
note and the Russian reply.[629] Meanwhile, the Japanese statesmen again
held deliberations on the 10th and 24th of October,[630] and agreed upon
the “irreducible minimum,” which was accordingly communicated to the
Russian Minister on the 30th in the form of the following note:—

  “1. Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial
  integrity of the Chinese and Korean Empires.

  “2. Recognition by Russia of Japan’s preponderating interests in
  Korea, and of the right of Japan to give to Korea advice and
  assistance, including military assistance, tending to improve the
  administration of the Korean Empire.

  “3. Engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the development
  of the commercial and industrial activities of Japan in Korea, nor
  to oppose any measures taken for the purpose of protecting those
  interests.

  “4. Recognition by Russia of the right of Japan to send troops to
  Korea for the purpose mentioned in the preceding Article, or for the
  purpose of suppressing insurrection or disorder calculated to create
  international complications.

  “5. Engagement on the part of Japan not to undertake on the coasts
  of Korea any military works capable of menacing the freedom of
  navigation in the Korean Straits.

  “6. Mutual engagement to establish a neutral zone on the
  Korean-Manchurian frontier extending fifty kilometres on each side,
  into which zone neither of the contracting parties shall introduce
  troops without the consent of the other.

  “7. Recognition by Japan that Manchuria is outside her sphere of
  special interest, and recognition by Russia that Korea is outside
  her sphere of special interest.

  “8. Recognition by Japan of Russia’s special interests in Manchuria,
  and of the right of Russia to take such measures as may be necessary
  for the protection of those interests.

  “9. Engagement on the part of Japan not to interfere with the
  commercial and residential rights and immunities belonging to Russia
  in virtue of her treaty engagements with Korea, and engagement on
  the part of Russia not to interfere with the commercial and
  residential rights and immunities belonging to Japan in virtue of
  her treaty engagements with China.

  “10. Mutual engagement not to impede the connection of the Korean
  Railway and the Eastern Chinese Railway when those railways shall
  have been eventually extended to the Yalu.

  “11. This Agreement to supplant all previous Agreements between
  Japan and Russia respecting Korea.”[631]

It will be seen from this note that Japan made several important
concessions. These naturally fall under three classes: concessions made
to an expressed wish of Russia; those in which desires of Russia were
changed from a one-sided into a reciprocal form; and those made
voluntarily on the part of Japan. To the first class belongs the free
passage of the Korean Straits (Article 5), while the neutralization of
territory on both sides of the northern frontier (Article 6), and the
mutual declaration that Korea was beyond the sphere of the “special”
interests of Russia, and Manchuria of Japan (Article 7), may be said to
fall under the second class. Purely voluntary concessions may be said to
consist of the tenth Article regarding the Eastern Chinese and Korean
Railways meeting on the Yalu, and a part of the eighth Article, in which
the “special” interests—not necessarily in the railway work alone, as in
the first Japanese note—of Russia in Manchuria were unequivocally
recognized. Other Articles are largely identical with those of the first
note, except the new ninth Article, which embodied the matter-of-fact
principle that the treaty rights of Russia in Korea, and of Japan in
Manchuria, should be mutually respected. Taken as a whole—with the only
exception regarding the preponderating interests of Japan in Korea, and
the natural wishes of Japan arising from this peculiar situation, the
former of which had been wholly,[632] and the latter partially,[633]
recognized by Russia—the prevailing characteristic of the second
Japanese note may be said to be its reciprocal nature. The special
interests of Russia[634] in Manchuria counterbalanced the preponderant
interests of Japan in Korea,[635] and each other’s right to take
necessary measures to protect those interests was recognized.[636] At
the same time, Manchuria was declared as far beyond the sphere of
Japanese special interests as was Korea of the Russian,[637] while, on
the other hand, the treaty rights of Russia in Korea, and of Japan in
Manchuria, were to be respected as a matter of course.[638] If Russia
was requested not to impede the economic activity of the Japanese in
Korea,[639] Japan also agreed not to fortify the Korean coast.[640] The
case of the neutral zone[641] need not be repeated. In spite, however,
of the reciprocal nature of the note, it is unnecessary to say, so long
as the control of the Eastern policy of Russia remained in the same
hands as before, she could hardly be expected to acquiesce in the
Japanese proposals.[642]

As has been said, the second note was handed by Baron Komura to Baron
Rosen on October 30. To this note, after a repeated application from
Japan for a speedy answer,[643] Russia replied only on December 11, or
more than forty days after the receipt of the Japanese note. This second
reply of Russia[644] was as much a reduction of her former concessions
as was the second note of Japan an increase upon hers; for Russia was
now entirely silent on the subject of Manchuria, and, regarding Korea,
repeated the restrictions proposed in September, as if the second
Japanese note had never reached her, besides refusing to recognize
Japan’s right to give Korea anything beyond mere advice for the reform
of her civil administration. In short, the second counter-note was
equivalent to the first _minus_ the clauses regarding Manchuria and
Japan’s right to assist Korea in the latter’s reform. The possibility of
a reconciliation of the views of the two Powers now appeared remoter
than before. If the exact contents of the reply had been publicly shown
to the Japanese people, it would have been extremely difficult for the
Katsura Cabinet to control their resentment against what would have been
regarded under the circumstances as a deliberate insult to their
country.

After another meeting of the Cabinet members and Councilors on the 16th,
Baron Komura made one more attempt to appeal to the friendly sentiment
of the Russian Government. The nature of the third Japanese overture
will be seen from the following dispatch, telegraphed by the Baron to
Mr. Kurino on the 21st:—

  “In my interview with the Russian Minister on December 21, I pointed
  out that, between our original proposals and the new Russian
  counter-proposals, there was a fundamental difference concerning the
  geographical sphere of the understanding. After fully explaining how
  the Imperial Government had come to consider it desirable, in the
  general interest, to include in the proposed understanding all the
  regions in the Extreme East where the interests of the two Empires
  met, I expressed the hope that the Russian Government would
  reconsider their position regarding that branch of the question. I
  also informed him, in detail, of the amendments which the Imperial
  Government considered it necessary to introduce into Russia’s new
  counter-proposals. Accordingly, in order to remove every possibility
  of misunderstanding on the part of Russia respecting the attitude of
  the Imperial Government, you are instructed to deliver to Count
  Lamsdorff a _note verbale_ to the following effect:—

  “‘The Imperial Government have examined with great care the new
  Russian counter-proposals of the 11th instant. They regret that the
  Russian Government did not agree to extend the compass of the
  suggested understanding over the territory whose inclusion was
  deemed essential by Japan.

  “‘The Imperial Government, in their original proposition to the
  Russian Government in August last, endeavored to make it entirely
  clear that they desired, with a view to remove from the
  Japanese-Russian relations every cause for future misunderstanding,
  to bring within the purview of the proposed arrangement all those
  regions in the Extreme East where the interests of the two Empires
  met. They cannot believe that a full realization of that desire
  could be expected if a large and important section of those regions
  was wholly excluded from the understanding. Accordingly, the
  Imperial Government feel constrained to ask the Russian Government
  to reconsider their position on the subject, and they hope that the
  Russian Government will be able to see their way to arrive at a
  satisfactory solution of the question.

[Illustration:

  MR. KURINO

  _Late Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg_
]

  “‘The Imperial Government also find it necessary to ask for the
  following amendments to the new Russian counter-proposals:—

  “‘_a._ ARTICLE II. to read: Recognition by Russia of Japan’s
  preponderating interests in Korea, and of the right of Japan to give
  Korea advice and assistance tending to improve the administration of
  the Korean Empire;

  “‘_b._ ARTICLE V. to read: Mutual engagement not to undertake on the
  Korean coast any military works capable of menacing the freedom of
  navigation in the Korean Straits; and

  “‘_c._ ARTICLE VI. to be suppressed.

  “‘Not only as the main points of these amendments cannot be said to
  be in excess of the modifications which were agreed to _ad
  referendum_ at Tokio, but also as the Imperial Government considered
  those changes indispensable, it is believed that they will receive
  the ready agreement of the Russian Government.’

  “In presenting the foregoing note to Count Lamsdorff, you will say
  that I have spoken to Minister Rosen in a similar sense, and you
  will also express the desire for a prompt reply.”[645]

Mr. Kurino carried out his instructions on December 23, and telegraphed
on the same day to Baron Komura: “... He [Count Lamsdorff] told me he
had received a telegram from Minister Rosen, stating that the latter had
had an interview with Baron Komura, and that particulars would follow;
but such particulars had not yet been received by him [the Count.][646]
When I handed him the _note verbale_, he received it, and said that he
would do his best to send the Russian answer at the earliest possible
date; but added that he would have to communicate with Viceroy Alexieff.
In conclusion I stated to the Count that, under existing circumstances,
it might cause serious difficulties, even complications, if we failed to
come to an _entente_, and I hoped he would exercise his best influence
so as to enable us to reach the desired end.”[647]

When Minister Kurino saw Count Lamsdorff on January 1, 1904, the latter,
as he had been persistently doing during the past few days, remarked
that he saw no reason why an _entente_ could not be arrived at, for
Minister Rosen would soon be instructed to proceed with the negotiations
in a friendly and conciliatory spirit.[648] Other statements of the same
pacific nature were frequently made, not only by the Count, but also by
the Czar, and were circulated through the press and foreign telegraphic
service. When, however, the reply of Russia[649] reached Tokio on
January 6, it was found that here again, as in the first reply of
September last, the recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its coast as
beyond her sphere of interest—the word “special” not preceding the last
word—was insisted upon, while, as before, no mention was made of the
territorial integrity of China in Manchuria. As regards the equal
opportunity for the enterprise of other nations, it should be noted that
Russia now agreed to insert a clause not to obstruct the enjoyment by
Japan and other Powers of the treaty rights which they had acquired from
China in regard to Manchuria, but only on the condition of maintaining
the clauses on the neutral zone in Korea and the non-employment by Japan
of any part of Korea for strategical purposes. Moreover, the treaty
rights of other Powers in Manchuria, which Russia would respect,
explicitly excluded those concerning the foreign settlements in the open
ports,[650] thus again evincing her exclusive policy. Over and above
these considerations, it should be remembered that, as has been pointed
out by Baron Komura,[651] the treaty rights which China had accorded to
other Powers could not be maintained if her sovereignty in Manchuria,
the existence of which Russia declined to assure Japan that she would
respect, should cease.[652]

In a few days there took place an important event which made the Russian
position untenable. The Chinese-American[653] and Chinese-Japanese[654]
commercial treaties which had been concluded on October 8, 1903,[655]
the date appointed for the final evacuation of Manchuria, were ratified
on January 11, 1904, the former opening to the world’s trade Mukden and
An-tung, and the latter, Mukden and Tatung-kao, thus not only
multiplying the treaty rights, including rights of foreign settlements,
of Japan and the United States in Manchuria, but also forcibly
reinstating the sovereign rights of the Chinese Empire in the territory,
and directly reversing the exclusive claims of Russia therein. It will
be recalled that Russia had recently seized Mukden, and had been
strengthening her forces upon the Yalu, on which the other two new ports
were situated. The United States Government, immediately upon the
ratification of the treaty, appointed Consuls for the three new open
ports.

To return to the Russo-Japanese negotiations. Thus far notes and
replies, exchanged three times within a period of five months, must have
made the position of each negotiating Power perfectly clear to the
other. No further discussion could possibly bring the two Governments
nearer to a reconciliation of wishes so diametrically opposed. In the
mean time, the Japanese people were suffering from enormous economic
losses. A large part of their raw materials had ceased to come, the
shipping and trade with Korea and Northern China had declined, the
fishing industry had been paralyzed, and, contrary to the tendency at
normal times, the banks had been embarrassed with an over-abundance of
funds.[656] On the other hand, Russia, while circulating the optimistic
views of her Emperor and Foreign Minister, had continued her sharp
diplomacy at Seul and Peking, and pushed on land and sea her vast
warlike preparations in the East.[657]

Even then the Japanese Government would not terminate its negotiations
with Russia, for it was well aware that upon the conduct of these
negotiations the peace of the East depended. If the principles proposed
by Japan were not accepted, the integrity of China would be threatened,
and the independence of Korea, as well as the vital interest of Japan,
would be profoundly endangered; thus the entire future of the Far East
would be plunged into unknown perils. Under these circumstances, it
seemed that Japan owed to the world as much of patience, as she owed to
herself of determination. The situation was gravely discussed by the
statesmen on the 11th, and before the Throne again on the 12th.[658] On
the next day, January 13, now for the fourth time, and against the
wishes of the majority of the people, the Government of Tokio reminded
Russia of the serious position in which the two Powers found themselves,
and begged her to reconsider the situation. Observe the following
telegram of the same date from Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino:—

  “You are instructed to deliver to Count Lamsdorff the following
  _note verbale_ in order to confirm to him the views I have
  communicated to Baron Rosen on the 13th January:—

  “‘The Imperial Government, with a view to arriving at a pacific
  solution of the pending questions, and to firmly establishing for
  all time the basis of good relations between the two Powers, as well
  as to protect the rights and interests of Japan, have, from this
  point of view, given most careful and serious consideration to the
  reply of the Russian Government which was delivered by his
  Excellency Baron Rosen on the 26th instant. They have finally come
  to the conclusion that the following modifications are necessary, i.
  e.:—

  “1. ‘Suppression of the first clause of Article 5 of the Russian
  counter-proposals (presented to the Japanese Government through
  Baron Rosen on December 11), that is to say, not to use any part of
  Korean territory for strategical purposes.

  “2. ‘Suppression of the whole Article (6) concerning establishment
  of a neutral zone.

  “3. ‘The Russian proposal concerning Manchuria to be agreed to with
  the following modifications:—

  “_a._ ‘Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as being
  outside her sphere of interest, and an engagement on the part of
  Russia to respect the territorial integrity of China in Manchuria.

  “_b._ ‘Russia, within the limits of Manchuria, will not impede Japan
  nor other Powers in the enjoyment of rights and privileges acquired
  by them under the existing treaties with China.

  “_c._ ‘Recognition by Russia of Korea and its littoral as being
  outside her sphere of interest.

  “4. ‘Addition of an Article to the following effect: Recognition by
  Japan of Russia’s special interests in Manchuria, and of the right
  of Russia to take measures necessary for the protection of those
  interests.

  “‘The grounds for these amendments having been frequently and fully
  explained on previous occasions, the Imperial Government do not
  think it necessary to repeat the explanations, beyond expressing
  their earnest hope for reconsideration by the Russian Government. It
  is sufficient to say that the suppression of the clause excluding
  the establishment of settlements in Manchuria is desired because it
  conflicts with stipulations of the new commercial treaty between
  Japan and China. In this respect, however, Japan will be satisfied
  if she receives equal treatment with other Powers which have already
  acquired similar rights in regard to settlements....

  “‘Finally, the above-mentioned amendments being proposed by the
  Imperial Government entirely in a spirit of conciliation, it is
  expected that they will be received with the same spirit at the
  hands of the Russian Government; and the Imperial Government further
  hope for an early reply from the Russian Government, since further
  delay in the solution of the question will be extremely
  disadvantageous to the two countries.’”[659]

An early reply was urged by Mr. Kurino at least four times,[660] but,
even so late as February 1, Count Lamsdorff declined even to name the
date on which his reply would be given;[661] and, indeed, the reply[662]
which was being framed was found later to have contained substantially
the same points as the three previous replies—points some of which had
been repeatedly and unequivocally demonstrated to be entirely
irreconcilable with the vital interests of Japan. Just at this time, the
activity of the Russian forces in the East seemed to have been
accelerated: on January 21, numbers of infantry and artillery left Port
Arthur and Dalny for the Korean frontier, soon to be followed by
contingents from Liao-yang; on the 28th, Viceroy Alexieff ordered the
troops on the Yalu to be placed upon a war footing; on February 1, the
Governor of Vladivostok warned the Japanese Commercial Agent at the port
to prepare for withdrawing his compatriots to Habarofsk, as he had
received instructions from his Government and was ready to proclaim
martial law at any time; and, on the 3d, all the war-vessels located at
Port Arthur, excepting one, steamed out of the harbor.[663]

It was now considered by the Japanese Government that the critical point
had been reached. The Cabinet members and Privy Councilors held a
conference on February 3, and again, on the next day, before the Throne.
On February 5, at 2 P. M., two notes were telegraphed to Mr. Kurino, the
one communicating Japan’s decision to break off negotiations which had
not been met with proper consideration and had become useless, and to
reserve to herself the right to pursue an independent course of action,
in order to safeguard her interests and rights and to protect her
position menaced by Russia; and the other stating that Japan had been
obliged to sever her now valueless diplomatic relations with the Russian
Government. We subjoin the entire texts of the telegraphic messages from
Baron Komura to Mr. Kurino inclosing the above-mentioned notes:—

  “Further prolongation of the present situation being intolerable,
  the Imperial Government have decided to terminate the pending
  negotiations, and to take such independent action as they may deem
  necessary to defend our position menaced by Russia, and to protect
  our rights and interests. Accordingly you are instructed,
  immediately upon receipt of this telegram, to address to Count
  Lamsdorff the following signed note:—

  “‘The Undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
  of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, has the honor, in pursuance of
  instructions from his Government, to address to His Excellency the
  Minister of Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the Emperor of all the
  Russias the following communications:—

  “‘The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan regard the
  independence and territorial integrity of Korea as essential to the
  repose and safety of their own country, and they are consequently
  unable to view with indifference any action tending to render the
  position of Korea insecure.

  “‘The obstinate rejections by the Russian Government, by means of
  amendments impossible of agreement, of Japan’s proposals respecting
  Korea, the adoption of which the Imperial Government regard as
  indispensable to assure the existence of the Korean Empire and to
  safeguard Japan’s preponderating interests in the peninsula; and the
  obstinate refusals of Russia to enter into an engagement to respect
  China’s territorial integrity in Manchuria, which is seriously
  menaced by the continued occupation of the province, notwithstanding
  Russia’s treaty engagements with China and her repeated assurances
  to other Powers possessing interests in those regions—have made it
  necessary for the Imperial Government seriously to consider what
  measures of self-defense they are called upon to take.

  “‘In spite of Russia’s repeated delays to reply without intelligible
  reasons, and of her naval and military activities, irreconcilable
  with pacific aims, the Imperial Government have exercised during the
  present negotiations a degree of forbearance which they believe
  affords sufficient proof of their loyal desire to remove from their
  relations with the Russian Government every cause for future
  misunderstanding. But finding in their efforts no prospect of
  securing from the Russian Government an adhesion either to Japan’s
  moderate and unselfish proposals or to any other proposals likely to
  establish a firm and enduring peace in the Far East, the Imperial
  Government have no other alternative than to terminate the present
  futile negotiations.

  “‘In adopting this course, the Imperial Government reserve to
  themselves the right to take such independent action as they may
  deem best to consolidate and defend their menaced position, as well
  as to protect the acquired rights and legitimate interests of the
  Empire.

  “‘The Undersigned, etc., etc.’”[664]

  “You are instructed to address to Count Lamsdorff a signed note to
  the following effect, simultaneously with the note mentioned in my
  other telegram:—

  “‘The Undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
  of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, has the honor, in pursuance of
  instructions from his Government, to address to His Excellency the
  Minister of Foreign Affairs of his Majesty the Emperor of all the
  Russias the following communications:—

  “‘Having exhausted without effect every means of conciliation with a
  view to remove from their relations with the Imperial Russian
  Government every cause for future complications, and finding that
  their just representations and moderate and unselfish proposals made
  in the interest of a firm and lasting peace in the Far East are not
  receiving due consideration, and that their diplomatic relations
  with the Russian Government have for these reasons ceased to possess
  any value, the Imperial Government of Japan have resolved to sever
  those diplomatic relations.

  “‘In the further fulfillment of the command of his Government, the
  Undersigned has also the honor to announce to his Excellency Count
  Lamsdorff that it is his intention to take his departure from St.
  Petersburg with the staff of the Imperial Legation on the ... day.

  “‘The Undersigned, etc., etc.’”[665]

These notes were transmitted by the Japanese Minister to Count Lamsdorff
on February 6, at 4 P. M., Baron Rosen having already been informed by
Baron Komura of the severance of the negotiations and general diplomatic
relations between the two Powers.[666] The first naval engagement
occurred at Chemulpo two days later, followed by the naval battle at
Port Arthur on the night of February 8–9, and, on the 10th, war was
formally declared by the Emperors of both Powers. The Russian
Sovereign’s manifesto, which appeared in the _Official Messenger_,
said:—

  “We proclaim to all our faithful subjects that, in our solicitude
  for the preservation of that peace so dear to our heart, we have put
  forth every effort to assure tranquillity in the Far East. To these
  pacific ends we declared our assent to the revision, proposed by the
  Japanese Government, of the agreements existing between the two
  Empires concerning Korean affairs. The negotiations initiated on
  this subject were, however, not brought to a conclusion, and Japan,
  not even awaiting the arrival of our last reply and the proposals of
  our Government, informed us of the rupture of the negotiations and
  of diplomatic relations with Russia.

  “Without previously notifying us that the rupture of such relations
  implied the beginning of warlike action, the Japanese Government
  ordered its torpedo-boats to make a sudden attack on our squadron in
  the outer roadstead of the fortress of Port Arthur. After receiving
  the report of our Viceroy on the subject, we at once commanded
  Japan’s challenge to be replied to by arms.

  “While proclaiming this our resolve, we, in unshakable confidence in
  the help of the Almighty, and firmly trusting in the unanimous
  readiness of all our faithful subjects to defend the Fatherland
  together with ourselves, invoke God’s blessing on our glorious
  forces of the army and navy.”[667]

The Japanese Imperial Rescript, countersigned by all the members of the
Cabinet, and declaring war against Russia, read as follows:—

  “We, by the Grace of Heaven, the Emperor of Japan, seated on the
  Throne occupied by the same dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby
  make proclamation to all our loyal and brave subjects:—

  “We hereby declare war against Russia. We command our army and navy
  to carry on hostilities against her with all their strength, and we
  also command all our officials to make effort, in pursuance of their
  duties and in accordance with their powers, to attain the national
  aim, with all the means within the limits of the law of nations.

  “We deem it essential to international relations, and make it our
  constant aim, to promote the pacific progress of our Empire in
  civilization, to strengthen our friendly ties with other States, and
  thereby to establish a state of things which would maintain enduring
  peace in the East, and assure the future security of our Empire
  without injury to the rights and interests of other Powers. Our
  officials also perform their duties in obedience to our will, so
  that our relations with all Powers grow steadily in cordiality.

[Illustration:

  BARON DE ROSEN

  _Late Russian Minister at Tokio_
]

  “It is thus entirely against our wishes that we have unhappily come
  to open hostilities against Russia.

  “The integrity of Korea has long been a matter of the gravest
  concern to our Empire, not only because of the traditional relations
  between the two countries, but because the separate existence of
  Korea is essential to the safety of our Empire. Nevertheless,
  Russia, despite her explicit treaty pledges to China and her
  repeated assurances to other Powers, is still in occupation of
  Manchuria, and has consolidated and strengthened her hold upon it,
  and is bent upon its final absorption. Since the possession of
  Manchuria by Russia would render it impossible to maintain the
  integrity of Korea, and would, in addition, compel the abandonment
  of all hope for peace in the Far East, we expected, in these
  circumstances, to settle the question by negotiations and secure
  thereby a permanent peace. With this object in view, our officials
  by our order made proposals to Russia, and frequent conferences were
  held during the last half year. Russia, however, never met such
  proposals in a spirit of conciliation, but by her prolonged delays
  put off the settlement of the pending question, and, by ostensibly
  advocating peace on the one hand, and on the other secretly
  extending her naval and military preparations, sought to bring about
  our acquiescence. It is not possible in the least to admit that
  Russia had from the first a sincere desire for peace. She has
  rejected the proposals of our Empire; the safety of Korea is in
  danger; the interests of our Empire are menaced. At this crisis, the
  guarantees for the future which the Empire has sought to secure by
  peaceful negotiations can now only be sought by an appeal to arms.

  “It is our earnest wishes that, by the loyalty and valor of our
  faithful subjects, peace may soon be permanently restored and the
  glory of our Empire preserved.”[668]


                   SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE TO CHAPTER XIX

In view of the singular circumstances under which the war broke out, it
would be a matter of permanent interest to the student of international
law to observe the difference of opinion which arose between the
contending Powers respecting the legality of opening hostilities before
war was formally declared, and also respecting the so-called neutrality
of Korea. We reproduce below, without comment, the charges of Russia and
replies of Japan regarding these subjects.

On February 18, the Russian Government issued the following official
_communiqué_:—

  “Eight days have now elapsed since all Russia was shaken with
  profound indignation against an enemy who suddenly broke off
  negotiations, and, by a treacherous attack, endeavored to obtain an
  easy success in a war long desired. The Russian nation, with natural
  impatience, desires prompt vengeance, and feverishly awaits news
  from the Far East. The unity and strength of the Russian people
  leave no room for doubt that Japan will receive the chastisement she
  deserves for her treachery and her provocation of war at a time when
  our beloved Sovereign desired to maintain peace among all nations.

  “The conditions under which hostilities are being carried on compel
  us to wait with patience for news of the success of our troops,
  which cannot occur before decisive actions have been fought by the
  Russian army. The distance of the territory now attacked and the
  desire of the Czar to maintain peace were causes of the
  impossibility of preparations for war being made a long time in
  advance. Much time is now necessary in order to strike at Japan
  blows worthy of the dignity and might of Russia, and, while sparing
  as much as possible the shedding of blood of her children, to
  inflict just chastisement on the nation which has provoked the
  struggle.

  “Russia must await the event in patience, being sure that our army
  will avenge that provocation a hundredfold. Operations on land must
  not be expected for some time yet, and we cannot obtain early news
  from the theatre of war. The useless shedding of blood is unworthy
  of the greatness and power of Russia. Our country displays such
  unity and desire for self-sacrifice on behalf of the national cause
  that all true news from the scene of hostilities will be immediately
  due to the entire nation.”[669]

On February 20, the _Official Messenger_ published the following account
of the termination of the diplomatic relations between the two Powers:—

  “On January 16, after receipt of the last Japanese proposals, the
  Russian Imperial Government at once proceeded to examine them. On
  January 25 Mr. Kurino, the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg, in
  reply to his inquiry, was informed that the Czar had intrusted the
  consideration of these proposals to a special conference, which was
  to meet on January 28, and that his Majesty’s decision would
  probably not be given before February 2.[670] On the last-named date
  the Czar gave orders to prepare a draft of definite instructions for
  the Russian Minister at Tokio on the basis of the deliberations of
  the special conference. On the day following, three telegrams were
  dispatched to Viceroy Alexieff, containing the full text of a draft
  statement, the reasons which prompted the Russian Government in
  making some modifications in the Japanese proposals, and the general
  instructions for the Russian Minister at Tokio concerning the
  presentation of the reply to the Japanese Government. In order to
  save time, identical telegrams were sent direct to Baron Rosen.

  “On February 4, forty-eight hours before the receipt of the news of
  the rupture of diplomatic relations by Japan, Count Lamsdorff
  notified the Japanese Minister of the dispatch to Baron Rosen of the
  Russian proposals in reply to the Japanese note.[671] On February 5,
  a message arrived from the Viceroy stating that he had heard from
  the Baron that the latter had received the Russian reply. On the
  6th, at four o’clock in the afternoon, the Japanese Minister, quite
  unexpectedly, handed to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs two
  notes, the first of which notified the rupture of negotiations on
  the pretext that Russia was evading a reply[672] to the Japanese
  proposals, while the second announced the breaking off of diplomatic
  relations, and added that the Japanese Minister, with the staff of
  the Legation, would leave St. Petersburg on the 10th. These notes
  were accompanied by a private letter from the Japanese Minister to
  Count Lamsdorff, in which the hope was expressed that the rupture of
  diplomatic relations would be confined to as short a time as
  possible.

  “On the same day, Admiral Alexieff, Baron Rosen, and all the Russian
  Representatives in Peking, Tokio, and the capitals of the great
  Powers were informed by urgent telegrams of the rupture of
  diplomatic relations with Japan and the issue of our Imperial order
  for the withdrawal of the Russian Legation from Tokio. The said
  circular dispatch laid the responsibility of all consequences that
  might ensue on the Japanese Government.[673]

  “Although the breaking off of diplomatic relations by no means
  implies the opening of hostilities, the Japanese Government, as
  early as the night of the 8th, and in the course of the 9th and
  10th, committed a whole series of revolting attacks on Russian
  warships and merchantmen, attended by a violation of international
  law. The decree of the Emperor of Japan on the subject of the
  declaration of war against Russia was not issued until the 11th
  instant.”[674]

The substance of the reply of the Japanese Government to these notes, of
which the following is a free translation, was made public through the
press on March 3:—

  “The Russian Government, by their notes published on February 18 and
  20, charged Japan with unexpectedly attacking, and gaining a
  treacherous victory over, the forces of Russia, a Power anxious to
  maintain peace, and stated that the severance of diplomatic
  relations by no means implied the opening of hostilities, and that,
  although Japan declared war only on February 11, she had since the
  8th made revolting attacks upon Russian war-vessels and merchantmen
  and conducted herself in violation of principles of international
  law.

  “That, however, Russia did not sincerely desire peace may be readily
  seen from the fact that she never in any manner met the negotiations
  of Japan in a conciliatory spirit, but put off the solution of the
  pending question by prolonged delays, and, at the same time,
  diligently extended her naval and military preparations. Since
  Russia failed in April, 1903, to carry out her pledge respecting the
  second part of her evacuation of Manchuria, the facts concerning the
  increase of Russian forces in the Far East have been as follows:—

  “The following war-vessels were added:—

                        3 battleships        38,488 tons
                        1 armored cruiser     7,726
                        5 cruisers           26,417
                        7 torpedo-destroyers  2,450
                        1 gunboat             1,334
                        2 torpedo-tenders     6,000
                        —                    ——————
                Total, 19 vessels            82,415 tons

  “Besides these, Russia sent by rail to Port Arthur material for
  framing torpedo-destroyers, of which seven had already been made,
  and armed two volunteer fleet steamboats at Vladivostok and hoisted
  the naval flag upon them.

  “Moreover, Russia dispatched one battleship, three cruisers, seven
  torpedo-destroyers, and four torpedo-boats, aggregating about 37,040
  tons, which were on their way to the East. The total of all these
  vessels would therefore reach the tonnage of about 113,000 tons.

  “As regards the increased land forces, Russia, beginning with the
  two brigades of infantry, two battalions of artillery, and certain
  numbers of cavalry and of the commissariat, which she sent to China
  on June 29, 1903, under the pretext of making experiment of the
  carrying capacity of the Siberian Railway, continually dispatched
  troops to the Far East, until there were already, at the beginning
  of February of this year, more than 40,000 soldiers. Russia was
  further preparing to send, in case of necessity, over 200,000 more
  soldiers.

  “Simultaneously, Russia hastened her work through day and night in
  building new forts at the naval harbors of Port Arthur and
  Vladivostok; repaired fortifications at Kun-chun, Liao-yang, and
  other strategic points; sent to the Far East by the volunteer fleet
  and the Siberian Railway large quantities of arms and ammunition;
  and, so early as the middle of October, 1903, fourteen trains
  carrying field-hospital equipment left Russia in great haste. From
  these data, one may conclude that Russia had not the least desire
  for conciliation, but sought to coerce Japan by force of arms.

  “The military activity of Russia was further accelerated from the
  end of January. On the 21st of January, about two battalions of the
  infantry and some of the artillery were sent from Port Arthur and
  Talien to the northern frontier of Korea; on the 28th, Viceroy
  Alexieff ordered the Russian troops near the Yalu to be placed on a
  war footing; on February 1, the Governor of Vladivostok asked the
  Japanese Commercial Agent at the port to prepare to withdraw to
  Habarofsk the Japanese subjects residing there, as the Governor was,
  under instructions from his Government, ready at any time to
  proclaim martial law; all the capable warships at Port Arthur,
  except one battleship under repair, steamed out to sea; and army
  forces were continually leaving Liao-yang toward the Yalu. Who can
  say that Russia had neither desire nor preparation for war? Under
  these critical circumstances, rendering another day’s delay
  inadmissible, Japan was compelled to break off the useless
  negotiations and take necessary measures of self-protection. The
  responsibility of provoking war does not rest upon Japan, but, on
  the contrary, entirely upon Russia.

  “Moreover, Japan notified Russia, on February 6, that she would
  terminate her negotiations with Russia, and take such independent
  action as she deemed best in order to defend her position menaced by
  Russia and protect her interests, as well as that the diplomatic
  relations with Russia were severed and the Japanese Legation would
  withdraw from St. Petersburg. An independent action implies all,
  including, as a matter of course, the opening of hostile acts. Even
  if Russia were unable to understand it, Japan had no reason to hold
  herself responsible for the misunderstandings of Russia. The
  students of the international law all agree that a declaration of
  war is not a necessary condition for beginning hostilities, and it
  has been customary in modern warfare for the declaration to follow
  the opening of the war. The action of Japan had, therefore, no
  ground for censure in international law. It is singular that the
  censure should come, as it did, from Russia, for historical
  instances are not few in which she opened hostile acts without
  declaring war. In 1808, she moved troops to Finland even before
  diplomatic relations were severed.”[675]

                  *       *       *       *       *

By far the most important document containing Russian charges against
Japan was the following circular addressed by Count Lamsdorff, on
February 11, to the Russian Representatives abroad:—

  “Since the rupture of the negotiations between Russia and Japan, the
  attitude of the Tokio Cabinet has constituted an open violation of
  all customary laws governing the mutual relations of civilized
  nations.

  “Without specifying each particular violation of these laws on the
  part of Japan, the Imperial Government considers it necessary to
  draw the most serious attention of the Powers to the acts of
  violence committed by the Japanese Government with respect to Korea.

  “The independence and integrity of Korea, as a fully independent
  Empire, have been fully recognized by all the Powers, and the
  inviolability of this fundamental principle was confirmed by Article
  1 of the Shimonoseki treaty, and by the agreement especially
  concluded for this purpose between Japan and Great Britain on
  January 30, 1902, as well as by the Franco-Russian declaration of
  March 16, 1902.

  “The Emperor of Korea, foreseeing the danger of a possible conflict
  between Russia and Japan, addressed, early in January, 1904, a note
  to all the Powers, declaring his determination to preserve the
  strictest neutrality. This declaration was received with
  satisfaction by the Powers, and it was ratified by Russia. According
  to the Russian Minister to Korea, the British Government, which had
  signed the above-mentioned treaty with Japan on January 30, 1902,
  charged the British diplomatic Representative at Seul to present an
  official note to the Emperor of Korea, thanking him for his
  declaration of neutrality.[676]

  “In disregard of all these facts, in spite of all treaties, in spite
  of its obligations, and in violation of the fundamental rules of
  international law, it has been proved by exact and fully confirmed
  facts that the Japanese Government,

  “1. Before the opening of hostilities against Russia, landed its
  troops in the independent Empire of Korea, which had declared its
  neutrality.

  “2. With a division of its fleet made a sudden attack on February
  8—that is, three days prior to the declaration of war—on two Russian
  warships in the neutral port of Chemulpo. The commanders of these
  ships had not been notified of the severance of diplomatic
  relations, as the Japanese maliciously stopped the delivery of
  Russian telegrams by the Danish cable and destroyed the telegraphic
  communication of the Korean Government. The details of this
  dastardly attack are contained and published in an official telegram
  from the Russian Minister at Seul.

  “3. In spite of the international laws above mentioned, and shortly
  before the opening of hostilities, the Japanese captured as prizes
  of war certain Russian merchant ships in the neutral ports of Korea.

  “4. Japan declared to the Emperor of Korea, through the Japanese
  Minister at Seul, that Korea would henceforth be under Japanese
  administration, and she warned the Emperor that in case of his
  non-compliance, Japanese troops would occupy the palace.

  “5. Through the French Minister at Seul she summoned the Russian
  Representative at the Korean Court to leave the country, with the
  staffs of the Russian Legation and Consulate.

  “Recognizing that all of the above facts constitute a flagrant
  breach of international law, the Imperial Government considers it to
  be its duty to lodge a protest with all the Powers against this
  procedure of the Japanese Government, and it is firmly convinced
  that all the Powers, valuing the principles which guarantee their
  relations, will agree with the Russian attitude.

  “At the same time, the Imperial Government considers it necessary to
  issue a timely warning that, owing to Japan’s illegal assumption of
  power in Korea, the Government declares all orders and declarations
  which may be issued on the part of the Korean Government to be
  invalid.

  “I beg you to communicate this document to the Government to which
  you are accredited.

                                                     “LAMSDORFF.”[677]

In reply to the above, the Japanese Government issued, on March 9, the
following statement:—

  “The Russian Government are understood to have recently addressed a
  note to the Powers, in which the Japanese Government are charged
  with having committed certain acts in Korea which are considered by
  Russia to be in violation of international law, and in which Russia
  further declares all future orders and declarations of the Korean
  Government to be invalid.

  “The Imperial Government do not find it necessary in the present
  instance to concern themselves in any way with views, opinions, or
  declarations of the Russian Government, but they believe it to be
  their right and duty to correct misstatements of facts which, if
  permitted to remain uncontradicted, might give rise in the opinion
  of neutral Powers to incorrect inferences and conclusions.

  “Accordingly, the Imperial Government desire to make the following
  statement respecting the five acts which are declared, in the
  Russian note above referred to, to be fully proved and confirmed
  facts:—

  “1. The Imperial Government admit that a number of Japanese troops
  landed in Korea before the formal declaration of war was issued by
  Japan, but they must say that such landing did not take place before
  a state of war actually existed between Japan and Russia. The
  maintenance of the independence and territorial integrity of Korea
  is one of the objects of war, and, therefore, the dispatch of troops
  to the menaced territory was a matter of right and necessity, which,
  moreover, had the distinct consent of the Korean Government. The
  Imperial Government, therefore, drew a sharp distinction between the
  landing of the Japanese troops in Korea in the actual circumstances
  of the case and the sending of large bodies of Russian troops to
  Manchuria without the consent of China while peaceful negotiations
  were still in progress.

  “2. The Imperial Government declare that the Russian allegation that
  they stopped the delivery of Russian telegrams by the Danish cable
  and destroyed the Korean Government’s telegraphic communication is
  wholly untrue. No such acts were done by the Imperial Government.

  “Regarding the alleged sudden attack, on February 8 last, upon two
  Russian men-of-war in the port of Chemulpo, it is only necessary to
  say that a state of war then existed, and that, Korea having
  consented to the landing of Japanese troops at Chemulpo, that harbor
  had already ceased to be a neutral port, at least as between the
  belligerents.

  “3. The Imperial Government have established a Prize Court, with
  full authority to pronounce finally on the question of the legality
  of seizures of merchant vessels. Accordingly, they deem it
  manifestly out of place to make any statement on their part
  regarding the Russian assertion that they unlawfully captured as
  prizes of war the Russian merchantmen which were in the ports of
  Korea.

  “4. The Russian Government allege that the Japanese Government
  declared to the Emperor of Korea through their Minister at Seul that
  Korea would henceforth be under Japanese administration, and warned
  the Emperor that, in case of non-compliance, Japanese troops would
  occupy the palace. The Imperial Government declare this charge to be
  absolutely and wholly without foundation.

  “5. No demand, either direct or indirect, was addressed by the
  Japanese Government to the Russian Minister at Seul to retire from
  Korea. The fact is as follows:—

  “On February 10 last, the French _Chargé d’Affaires_ at Seul called
  on the Japanese Minister there and informed him, as it was confirmed
  afterwards in writing, that it was the desire of the Russian
  Minister to leave Korea, and asked the opinion of the Japanese
  Minister on the subject. The Japanese Minister replied that, if the
  Russian Minister would withdraw in a peaceful manner, taking with
  him his staff and the Legation guard, he would be fully protected by
  Japanese troops. So he withdrew of his own free will on the 12th of
  the same month, and an escort of Japanese soldiers was furnished for
  him as far as Chemulpo.[678]

  “The Russian allegation that the Japanese Government forwarded a
  summons through the French Representative in Korea to the Russian
  Minister to leave Korea is, therefore, not true. In this connection
  it may be remarked that the Russian Consul at Fusan remained at his
  post as late as until February 28 last. It is reported that he was
  compelled to stay so long owing to the absence of instructions which
  the Russian Minister apparently did not think of giving to the
  Consul before his own departure from Seul. When it was known that
  necessary instructions had at last reached the Russian Consul, and
  that he desired to leave Fusan as soon as possible, the Japanese
  Consul at the same port offered him every facility for the
  departure, and his passage to Shanghai _via_ Japan was arranged by
  the Japanese Consul.”[679]

In reply to the above, the Russian Government issued another statement
justifying its position, the purport of which may be gathered from the
following press dispatch:—

  “ST. PETERSBURG, March 12—2:50 P. M. The following reply, inspired
  by the Foreign Office, to Japan’s rejoinder to the Russian protest
  against the violation of Korean neutrality may be accepted as
  official:—

  “Japan’s argument that she was justified in landing troops in Korea
  before the declaration of war because she had Korea’s permission,
  and also that these troops arrived in Korea after ‘the existence of
  a state of war,’ is without value, as Korea in January promulgated
  her neutrality to the Powers, which received it warmly, Great
  Britain even officially conveying expressions of gratitude to the
  Korean Government. Therefore, no state of war gave the Japanese the
  right to violate her neutrality by landing troops in her territory.
  Even the consent of Korea, though extorted by the Japanese, is
  without force, from the fact that the dispatch of troops was not
  only before the war, but before the breaking off of diplomatic
  relations, as clearly established and indeed acknowledged by the
  Japanese themselves.

  “Japan’s contention in defense of the attack on the Russian ships at
  Chemulpo, that the port was not neutral on February 9, is false,
  again because Korea had proclaimed her neutrality.

  “Japan’s denial of malicious interference with the transmission of
  Russian telegrams over the Danish cable cannot be sustained. A
  telegram to Baron Rosen (then Russian Minister to Japan), at Tokio,
  sent from St. Petersburg February 4, was not delivered till the
  morning of February 7. That delay did not occur on the Siberian
  line, as was shown by the fact that a reply to a telegram from
  Viceroy Alexieff sent at the same time was received the same day.
  Therefore, it is conclusive that the Rosen telegram was held by the
  Japanese and not delivered for two days.

  “Communication with M. Pavloff (then Russian Minister to Korea) by
  the Korean telegraph ceased in the middle of January. As the Koreans
  were enjoying friendly relations with Russia, there is good ground
  for believing that the interruption was due to the Japanese.
  Thereafter M. Pavloff used a mail steamer or a special warship to
  communicate with Port Arthur. The Minister of Russia at Seul
  February 8, therefore, knew nothing of the diplomatic rupture.

  “Japan pleads that the charge against her seizure of Russian
  merchantmen before the declaration of war cannot lie after the
  establishment of prize courts. Their seizure before the declaration
  of war being piracy is not defensible by the establishment of prize
  courts, which cannot exist before a declaration of war. The steamer
  ‘Russia’ was seized in the waters of Southern Korea even before M.
  Kurino had presented his note here.

  “The reply concludes: ‘Our information regarding Japan’s
  announcement that in future Korea would be under her administration
  came from M. Pavloff and also from the Representative of a friendly
  Power at Seul. Japan’s denial, consequently, is fruitless, as also
  is the attempt to refute our statement that the Russian Minister and
  Consul at Seul were told to leave. We had conclusive proof in St.
  Petersburg on February 10 that the French Minister at Seul had
  officially notified our Representatives that the Japanese Government
  had intimated that they should leave, and that the Japanese had
  occupied territory in Korea. M. Pavloff was unable to notify our
  Consul at Fusan, his telegram being refused at the telegraph
  office.’”

-----

Footnote 629:

  _N.-R._, Nos. 18, 19, 20, 21.

Footnote 630:

  The Japanese dailies.

Footnote 631:

  _N.-R._, No. 22.

Footnote 632:

  In Article 3 of the Nishi-Rosen Protocol of 1898, and in Article 2 of
  the Russian counter-note of October 3.

Footnote 633:

  See the same Article of the counter-note.

Footnote 634:

  Article 8.

Footnote 635:

  Article 2.

Footnote 636:

  Articles 4 and 8.

Footnote 637:

  Article 7.

Footnote 638:

  Article 9.

Footnote 639:

  Article 3, made necessary from the past experience in Korea.

Footnote 640:

  Article 5.

Footnote 641:

  Article 6.

Footnote 642:

  Observe the following passage from the explanatory note issued by the
  Foreign Office at St. Petersburg on February 9, 1904:—

  “Last year, the Tokio Cabinet, under the pretext of establishing the
  balance of power and a more settled order of things on the shores of
  the Pacific, submitted to the Imperial Government a proposal for a
  revision of the existing treaties _with Korea_. Russia consented, and
  Viceroy Alexieff was charged to draw up a project for a new
  understanding with Japan in coöperation with the Russian Minister at
  Tokio, who was intrusted with the negotiations with the Japanese
  Government. Although the exchange of views with the Tokio Cabinet on
  this subject was of a friendly character, Japanese social circles and
  the local and foreign press attempted in every way to produce a
  warlike ferment among the Japanese, and to drive the Government into
  an armed conflict with Russia. Under the influence thereof, the _Tokio
  Cabinet began to formulate greater and greater demands in the
  negotiations_, at the same time taking most extensive measures to make
  the country ready for war.” (The italics are the author’s.)

Footnote 643:

  _N.-R._, Nos. 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33.

Footnote 644:

  The second reply was as follows:—

  “1. Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial
  integrity of the Korean Empire.

  “2. Recognition by Russia of Japan’s preponderating interest in Korea,
  and of the right of Japan to assist Korea with advice tending to
  improve her civil administration.

  “3. Engagement on the part of Russia not to oppose the development of
  the industrial and commercial activities of Japan in Korea, nor the
  adoption of measures for the protection of those interests.

  “4. Recognition by Russia of the right of Japan to send troops to
  Korea for the purpose mentioned in the preceding Article, or for the
  purpose of suppressing insurrections or disorders liable to create
  international complications.

  “5. Mutual engagement not to make use of any part of the Korean
  territory for strategical purposes, and not to undertake on the Korean
  coast any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation
  in the Korean Straits.

  “6. Mutual engagement to consider the territory of Korea to the north
  of the thirty-ninth parallel as a neutral zone, within the limits of
  which neither of the contracting parties shall introduce troops.

  “7. Mutual engagement not to impede the connection of the Korean and
  Eastern Chinese Railways, when those railways shall have been extended
  to the Yalu.

  “8. Abrogation of all previous agreements between Russia and Japan
  respecting Korea.”—_N.-R._, No. 34.

Footnote 645:

  _N.-R._, No. 35.

Footnote 646:

  Is it probable that Baron Rosen consulted Viceroy Alexieff by
  telegraph before he did Count Lamsdorff?

Footnote 647:

  _N.-R._, No. 36.

Footnote 648:

  _Ibid._, No. 38.

Footnote 649:

  The Russian counter-note was as follows:—

  “Having no objection to the amendments to Article 2 of the Russian
  counter-proposals as proposed by the Imperial Japanese Government, the
  Russian Government considers it necessary:—

  “1. To maintain the original wording of Article 5, which had already
  been agreed to by the Imperial Japanese Government, that is to say,
  ‘mutual engagement not to use any part of the territory of Korea for
  strategical purposes, not to undertake on the coasts of Korea any
  military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the
  Korean Straits.’ [The Japanese Government had, as was pointed out by
  Baron Komura in the dispatch No. 39, never agreed to the first half of
  Article 5.]

  “2. To maintain Article 6 concerning a neutral zone (this for the very
  purpose which the Imperial Japanese Government has likewise in view,
  that is to say, to eliminate everything that might lead to
  misunderstanding in the future; a similar zone, for example, exists
  between the Russian and British possessions in Central Asia).

  “In case the above conditions are agreed to, the Russian Government
  would be prepared to include in the projected agreement an article of
  the following tenor:—

  “‘Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and her littoral as being outside
  her sphere of interests, whilst Russia, within the limits of that
  province, will not impede Japan nor other Powers in the enjoyment of
  the rights and privileges acquired by them under existing treaties
  with China, exclusive of the establishment of settlements.’”—_N.-R._,
  No. 38.

Footnote 650:

  See _British Parliamentary Papers: China, No. 2 (1902)_, Nos. 133,
  136, 139, 142.

Footnote 651:

  His statements to the journalists on February 10 and at the Lower
  House on February 23.

Footnote 652:

  It is interesting to note that the Russian Representatives abroad
  declared to the Powers about the same time as the third counter-note
  was delivered at Tokio, that Russia “had no intention whatever of
  placing any obstacle in the way of the continued enjoyment by foreign
  Powers of the rights acquired by them [in Manchuria] in virtue of the
  treaties now in force.” The exclusion of foreign settlements was not
  mentioned, but, judging from the counter-note of January 6, was
  implied.

  When Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, handed the
  memorandum on January 8 to Lord Lansdowne, the latter made
  characteristically blunt remarks, as will be seen from the following
  dispatch from him to Sir C. Scott: “... I could not help regretting
  that Russia should have found it impossible to take even a single step
  in pursuance of the policy which she has thus prescribed for herself
  [regarding the evacuation of Manchuria]. I trusted that his Excellency
  would forgive me for telling him frankly that, in this country, people
  were looking for some concrete evidence of Russia’s intention to make
  good her promises. An announcement, for example, that Niu-chwang was
  to be evacuated at an early date would certainly have a reassuring
  effect. So far as I was aware, there was no local difficulty in the
  way.”—_China, No. 2 (1904)_, Nos. 162, 163.

Footnote 653:

  The text is found in the _Monthly Summary of the Commerce and Finance
  of the U. S._ for January, 1904.

Footnote 654:

  In the press and the _Kwampō_ of January 20.

Footnote 655:

  See pp. 252–254 and 317–318, above.

Footnote 656:

  See the _Kwampō_ for February 1 (p. 5), 5 (pp. 110–114), 18 (p. 243),
  20 (pp. 280–281); Mr. E. H. Vickers’s letter to the New York _Evening
  Post_, March 1; Mr. Soyeda’s address, in the _Kokumin_, February 6;
  _ibid._, on the fisheries.

Footnote 657:

  According to the estimate of the Japanese Government, Russia increased
  her forces in the Far East between April 8, 1903, and the outbreak of
  the war, by 19 war-vessels aggregating 82,415 tons, and 40,000
  soldiers, besides 200,000 more who were about to be sent. See pp.
  352–354, below.

Footnote 658:

  The Japanese dailies.

Footnote 659:

  _N.-R._, No. 39.

Footnote 660:

  _Ibid._, Nos. 40 (January 23), 42 (January 26), 44 (January 28), 46
  (January 30). On January 26, Baron Komura again instructed Mr. Kurino
  to remind Count Lamsdorff that “in the opinion of the Imperial
  Japanese Government, a further prolongation of the present state of
  things being calculated to accentuate the gravity of the situation, it
  was their earnest hope that they would be honored with an early reply,
  and that they wished to know at what time they might expect to receive
  the reply.”—No. 42. The probable nature of the forthcoming reply was
  also inquired into, without success, even so late as January 30.

Footnote 661:

  No. 47. It is unnecessary to point out the various excuses Count
  Lamsdorff presented for the delay. One of them was particularly
  significant, that is, that the opinions of Viceroy Alexieff and of the
  Cabinet Ministers at St. Petersburg had to be harmonized.—_Ibid._

Footnote 662:

  Mr. Kurino telegraphed to Baron Komura at 5.05 A. M., February 5:—

  “In compliance with the request of Count Lamsdorff, I went to see him
  at 8 P. M., February 4. He told me that the substance of the Russian
  answer had just been telegraphed to Viceroy Alexieff, to be
  transmitted by him to Minister Rosen. The Viceroy might happen to
  introduce some changes so as to meet local circumstances; but in all
  probability, there would be no such changes. The Count then stated, as
  his own opinion, that:—

  “‘Russia desired the principle of the independence and integrity of
  Korea, and, at the same time, considered the free passage of the
  Korean Straits necessary. Though Russia was willing to make every
  possible concession, she did not desire to see Korea utilized for
  strategic purposes against Russia. He also believed it profitable, for
  the consolidation of good relations with Japan, to establish by common
  accord a buffer region between confines of direct influence and action
  of the two Powers in the Far East.’

  “The above was expressed by the Count entirely as his personal
  opinion, and, though I cannot be positive, I think that the substance
  of the Russian reply must probably be the same.”—_N.-R._, No. 50. Cf.
  p. 350, below.

  It should be noted that this note from Mr. Kurino reached Tokio at
  5.15 P. M., or three hours and a quarter after the Japanese notes
  severing relations had been sent.

  Count Cassini, in the following striking sentence, includes, among the
  contents of the last Russian reply, a point which was not in the least
  mentioned in Count Lamsdorff’s personal opinion expressed to Mr.
  Kurino. M. Cassini says: “... However, in another effort to bring the
  negotiations to a peaceful conclusion, my country did all that dignity
  would permit, and _offered to give assurances again that the
  sovereignty of the Emperor of China in Manchuria would be
  recognized_.”—The _North American Review_ for May, 1904, p. 686.

Footnote 663:

  From the reply of the Japanese Government to the Russian charge that
  Japan had broken peace and taken Russia by surprise. See pp. 352–353,
  below.

  It should not be forgotten, at the same time, that Japan had all the
  while been taking precautionary measures in the most careful and
  exhaustive manner, not only in military and naval affairs, but also in
  other matters connected therewith. The difference between the Russian
  and Japanese attitude may thus be stated: Russia apparently played the
  three-fold game of employing sharp diplomacy at Seul and Peking, of
  strengthening her control over Manchuria and the Korean frontier, and
  of endeavoring at once to intimidate Japan by vast warlike measures,
  and to evade her overtures till she might be compelled to acquiesce in
  the situation to be at length perfected by Russia; Japan expressed her
  wishes in straightforward language, and relied upon her negotiations
  with Russia, which she, in spite of extremely trying circumstances,
  conducted with the utmost cordiality and patience, but at the same
  time prepared for any emergency in which the unconciliating attitude
  of Russia might probably result. It will perhaps be always regretted
  by many that the control of Russian diplomacy throughout the
  negotiations rested in the hands of those who seemed to fail to grasp
  the exact state of Japan’s mind in this greatest crisis of her
  national existence.

Footnote 664:

  _N.-R._, No. 48.

Footnote 665:

  _Ibid._, No. 49.

Footnote 666:

  Mr. Kurino left St. Petersburg on the 10th, and the next day saw the
  departure of Baron Rosen from Tokio. It was generally believed that
  the former had once sincerely desired that a satisfactory agreement
  between Russia and Japan should be effected. As for Baron Rosen, every
  one surmised that the respected gentleman was little responsible for
  the conduct of Russian diplomacy, of which he was regarded as an
  unfortunate agent. From a personal point of view, the sudden departure
  of both from their posts had something tragic about it, and Baron
  Rosen’s situation was deeply sympathized with by the Japanese people.

Footnote 667:

  From the English translation in the London _Times_, February 11, 1904,
  p. 3.

Footnote 668:

  The rescript appeared in the _Kwampō_, February 10, 1904, extra. An
  authoritative English translation, which has been slightly altered in
  our text in order to bring it nearer to the original language, was
  published in the London _Times_, February 12, 1904, p. 3.

Footnote 669:

  The London _Times_, February 19, 1904, p. 3.

Footnote 670:

  The reports from Mr. Kurino do not agree with this statement of
  Russia. According to the former, it was on January 26, not the 25th,
  that Count Lamsdorff referred to the conference to be held on the
  28th. The date February 2 in this connection does not appear till we
  reach Mr. Kurino’s dispatch of January 28. Moreover, on January 30,
  the Count told him that he could not tell him the exact date when the
  Russian reply would be sent. See _N.-R._, Nos. 43, 45, 47.

Footnote 671:

  This is evidently an error. The Count spoke to Mr. Kurino, at 8 p. m.,
  February 4, about the probable contents of the reply purely as the
  former’s personal opinion. It was not an official statement of the
  exact contents of the reply.—_N.-R._, No. 50. See p. 340, above.

Footnote 672:

  This statement is incorrect and misleading. Referring to the text of
  the Japanese note (pp. 342–344, above), it will be seen that it did
  not say that the Japanese Government would break off the negotiations
  because Russia had been evading a reply to the Japanese proposals. A
  reference was made to the prolonged delays of Russia before giving
  replies, but the note did not state that the delays were the only
  reason, still less that the delay of “a” reply—i. e., the last
  reply—was the ground, for the rupture of negotiations.

Footnote 673:

  See a vigorous statement of this charge made by Count Cassini in the
  _North American Review_ for May, 1904, pp. 681–682.

Footnote 674:

  The London _Times_, February 22, 1904, p. 5.

Footnote 675:

  Translated from the statement published in the Japanese press on March
  3, 1904.

  Professor Sakuye Takahashi enumerated in the _Kokumin_ (February
  27–29, 1904) some of the modern European wars in which declarations of
  war did not precede the opening of hostilities. He mentioned twelve
  such cases between 1715 and 1863, besides ten cases between 1700 and
  1853 in which Russia was on the offensive. For these latter instances,
  he refers to Colonel J. P. Maurice’s _Hostilities without Declaration
  of War_, pp. 12, 16, 22, 34, 38, 49, 50, 55, 64.

Footnote 676:

  See p. 322, above.

Footnote 677:

  The London _Times_, February 24, 1904, p. 7, and other papers.

Footnote 678:

  The diplomatic correspondence in connection with this affair has been
  published, in the _Kwampō_, February 15, 1904, pp. 275–276, which
  supports the literal truth of the statement contained in this
  paragraph.

Footnote 679:

  The _Kokumin_ (March 9). The above has been taken from an
  authoritative English translation, which was published in the London
  _Times_ (March 9), p. 5.




                               CHAPTER XX
                CHINESE NEUTRALITY AND KOREAN INTEGRITY


No sooner had the war broken out than the Japanese Government notified
other Powers, on February 9, that it had advised the Chinese Government
to observe a strict neutrality during hostilities. Below is a
translation of the identical note addressed on that day by the Minister
of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Representatives at London,
Washington, Paris, Vienna, and Rome:—

  “The Imperial Government have carefully considered the question as
  to what attitude China should assume to the best advantage, in case
  Japan and Russia should go to war. The conflict between Japan and
  Russia would affect the interests of China at least to the same
  extent that it would those of Japan, and the Imperial Government
  also fully recognize the advantage of utilizing for their aims the
  resources of China, so immense in population and material. But, on
  the other hand, they cannot overlook what effects would ensue should
  China assume a hostile attitude [in favor of Japan]. Such an
  attitude would probably plunge the finances of China into a still
  greater confusion [than at present], and, if it did not incapacitate
  her, it would render it difficult for her to meet her obligations.
  Her foreign trade would also suffer unfortunate results. There,
  however, exists an even greater apprehension, namely, that it is not
  unlikely that thereby an anti-foreign feeling might again be aroused
  in China, and the Powers of the world might be obliged to encounter
  troubles similar to those of 1900. For these reasons, the Imperial
  Government have advised the Chinese Government that, in case Japan
  and Russia should go to war, they should observe neutrality, and
  should take all possible measures to maintain order and peace within
  their Empire.

  “You are instructed to address a signed communication to this effect
  to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Government to which you
  are accredited, and also assure him that, if China maintains her
  neutrality, and so long as Russia respects it, the Imperial
  Government will likewise respect it.”[680]

Three days after this note was issued, the United States Minister at
Tokio, Mr. Griscom, delivered the circular note of Secretary Hay urging
on the belligerent Powers the advisability of respecting the neutrality
and maintaining the administrative entity of China, and of limiting the
zone of hostilities in the Chinese territory. The note, arriving as it
did, after the Japanese attitude had been clearly defined, Baron Komura
at once replied, on the 13th, that the Japanese Government were in
perfect accord with the United States Government in the desires
expressed by the latter, and would, so long as Russia made the same
pledge and faithfully observed it, promise to respect the neutrality and
the administrative entity of the Chinese Empire beyond regions actually
in Russian occupation. The result of the correspondence between the
United States and other Powers regarding Mr. Hay’s circular further
confirmed the views expressed in Japan’s reply, for the neutral rights
of China could hardly be enforced in Manchuria, or, in other words, the
zone of war would be best limited to that territory. These points were
agreed to by the Powers, including Germany, whose Emperor had
appealed[681] to the Government of Washington to take the initiative in
this general agreement.

The Japanese note of February 9 and the general agreement of the Powers
secured by the United States thus confirmed each other, the former
establishing the principle of neutrality and the latter defining the
geographical limit of its application. The latter point, however,
involved a debatable problem, the solution of which was left to China
herself. It will be remembered that Japan, in her reply of February 13
to the United States, mentioned, as the field for hostile action, not
all Manchuria, but only the territory actually occupied by Russian
forces. This territory naturally excluded that portion of Manchuria
lying west of the Liao River which Russian troops evacuated before
October 8, 1902. The Chinese Government, in declaring the neutrality of
the Empire on the 13th, practically confirmed the construction of the
Japanese Foreign Office, for, in her declaration, China announced her
intention, which has since been carried out by Viceroy Yuan and General
Ma, of dispatching forces to the west of the Liao River from which the
Russian forces had withdrawn, in order to defend it against the
incursion of troops of either belligerent.[682]

All the essential points regarding China’s neutrality having been
settled to the satisfaction of Japan, the Government of the latter was
in a position to reply in the following manner, on February 17, to the
Chinese declaration of the 13th:—

  “It being the desire of the Imperial Government to prevent
  disturbance of peaceful conditions within the Chinese Empire, they
  will, in all the Chinese dominion outside the territory under
  Russian occupation, and so long as Russia acts likewise, respect the
  neutrality of the Empire.... Japan’s hostilities against Russia
  having been actuated, not by a desire for conquest, but solely by
  the necessity of defending her just rights and interests, the
  Imperial Government have not the slightest intention of acquiring
  territory, as a result of the war, at the expense of China. It is
  also desired that the Chinese Government will clearly understand
  that the [warlike] measures to be taken [by Japan] in the field of
  action within the Chinese territory, arising, as they will, purely
  from military necessities, will not be of a nature to infringe the
  sovereign rights of the Chinese Empire....”[683]

                  *       *       *       *       *

Ten days after Japan disavowed aggressive intentions in Manchuria, on
February 27, was published the new Korean-Japanese Protocol,[684]
concluded on the 23d, whereby Japan pledged herself to guarantee for all
time the independence and the territorial integrity of the Korean
Empire. The text of this remarkable document, in its English
translation, is as follows:—

  “Gonsuke Hayashi, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
  of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, and Major General Yi Chi-yong,
  Minister of State for Foreign Affairs _ad interim_ of His Majesty
  the Emperor of Korea, being, respectively, duly empowered for the
  purpose, have agreed upon the following Articles:—

  “ARTICLE 1. For the purpose of maintaining a permanent and
  unalterable friendship between Japan and Korea, and of firmly
  establishing peace in the East, the Imperial Government of Korea
  shall place full confidence in the Imperial Government of Japan and
  adopt the advice of the latter regarding improvements in
  administration.

  “ARTICLE 2. The Imperial Government of Japan shall, in a spirit of
  firm friendship, insure the safety and repose of the Imperial House
  of Korea.

  “ARTICLE 3. The Imperial Government of Japan firmly guarantee the
  independence and the territorial integrity of the Korean Empire.

  “ARTICLE 4. In case the welfare of the Imperial House of Korea, or
  the territorial integrity of Korea, is endangered by the aggression
  of a third Power, or internal disturbances, the Imperial Government
  of Japan shall immediately take such necessary measures as
  circumstances require, and in such case the Imperial Government of
  Korea shall give full facilities to promote the action of the
  Imperial Japanese Government.

  “The Imperial Government of Japan may, for the attainment of the
  above-mentioned object, occupy, when circumstances require it, such
  places as may be necessary from the strategic point of view.

  “ARTICLE 5. The Government of the two countries shall not, in the
  future, without mutual consent, conclude with a third Power such an
  arrangement as may be contrary to the principles of the present
  Protocol.

  “ARTICLE 6. Details in connection with the present Protocol shall be
  arranged as the circumstances may require between the Representative
  of Japan and the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Korea.”

It is impossible to imagine in the history of the Russo-Japanese
conflict a more striking indication of the new situation it has opened
than this Protocol of February 23, 1904. It is at once a culmination of
past events and a background for future activities. It sums up the
failures of the past experience and calls forth innumerable new problems
and difficulties. It will be seen, in the first place, that the
agreement is limited by no fixed term; it exists for all time. Then the
fundamental problem of the Japanese-Korean relations is revealed here in
this Protocol in a clear outline, and is solved in the most logical
manner. The problem may be stated thus: Japan’s interest and conviction
demand that Korea should be independent, prosperous, and powerful; but
Korea neither could nor would be so. One remembers how Japan had
struggled to solve this problem, ever since she overthrew the feudal
régime of her own Government in 1868 and entered upon a new career as a
nation. At first, in 1876, she declared Korea independent, and opened a
few of her ports to the world’s trade. Korea did not desire and China
could not tolerate the independence. The result was the war of 1894–5,
which succeeded in forcing the independence of Korea. The latter,
however, proved neither more desirous nor more capable of an independent
career than she was under Chinese sovereignty, while at the time China’s
position was merely replaced by that of a more active Power, Russia.
Japan seemed, after her costly war, which, it is not too much to say,
alone had earned the sovereign rights of Korea, to acquiesce in the
altered situation to such an extent as to admit Russia into a
partnership with herself in the nonintervention in Korea.[685] Bitter
was Japan’s experience in this artificial arrangement. Korea would not
strive for a freer life any more than Russia would abstain from
incessant interference.[686] Thus the conviction was every year more
forcibly and painfully impressed upon Japan’s mind that the threatening
situation in the East arose from the two fundamental defects of the
existing arrangement: first, Korea’s independence would be illusory so
long as her administrative system remained, as it did, corrupt to the
core, but no reform would result from a system of non-interference;
second, no joint reform in Korea would be possible so long as one of the
contracting parties to the agreements of 1896 and 1898 found in Korea’s
decay the source of its influence over her. In short, in order to guard
the common interests of Japan and Korea, the former would be constrained
to reform the latter even against her will; and, again, in order to
effect a thoroughgoing reform, Japan would be obliged to part ways with
Russia in Korea. One half of the Russo-Japanese negotiations in 1903–4
hinged on Japan’s desire for a free hand in Korea in the interest of
reform. The negotiations having failed, and Russia having withdrawn from
Korea, Japan suddenly found herself alone with the latter, and hastened
to conclude with her an agreement which seemed to embody the only
possible logical solution of the great historic problem of the
Japanese-Korean relations.

Let us look this solution more squarely in the face. Japan’s ardent
desire for the independence and strength of Korea, as a means of
insuring the mutual benefit of the two Powers and of establishing a
lasting peace in the East, would seem to constitute the guiding
principle of the entire document. The historic inability of Korea to be
independent and strong is met in three different methods, each one of
which will not fail to bring about far-reaching consequences. In the
first place, the political influence of a third Power is absolutely
excluded (Article 5), for the latter’s interest might lie in the
direction of the dependence and weakness of Korea. In the second place,
Japan alone guarantees, for all time, the security and repose of the
reigning house of Korea and the independence and territorial integrity
of the Empire (Articles 2 and 3). For the practical execution of this
principle, Japan further pledges herself to defend Korea from dangers,
and Korea in return allows to Japan necessary strategic facilities
(Article 4). Finally, and immediately the most important of all, Japan
undertakes to institute reforms in Korea, for which she shall be
invested with the full confidence of Korea (Article 1). These three
important methods, it is needless to repeat, are subservient to the
central principle: the independence and integrity of Korea. This large
issue must always prevail over minor incidents.

Coming still nearer to the practical side of the Protocol, it is not
difficult to see that, of the three methods already explained, one
stands out as the most important and most difficult,—the reform. No
greater burden and no more delicate work for a nation can be imagined
than that of regenerating another whose nobility has grown powerful
under corruption, and whose lower classes do not desire a higher
existence. On the other hand, the inertia and resistance of Korea would
be tremendous, in which her “full confidence” would give place to hatred
and rancor. The proverbial machinations of the peninsular politicians
would be set in motion in all their speed and confusion. It would not be
surprising if, under the circumstances, even a military control of Korea
of a temporary and mild nature should become necessary in order to cure
her malady and set her house in order. On the other hand, when the
necessary reform should be so deep and wide as is required in the
present instance, the temptation of the reformer would be great, and the
suspicion of the reformed even greater, where political reformatory
enterprises border upon the economic.[687] Here and everywhere, Japan
would save herself from the gravest of errors, in spite of her best
intention in the large issue, only by the severest self-control and
consummate tact. Great is the penalty of Japan that arises from her
peculiar position. She has never encountered in her long history a
greater trial of her moral force as a nation than in the new situation
opened by the Protocol. As to the world at large, it will look forward
to an intensely interesting experiment of human history.

-----

Footnote 680:

  The _Kwampō_, February 19 (1904), p. 387.

Footnote 681:

  Ex-Secretary of War Elihu Root’s speech at the Republican Convention
  at Chicago, June 21, 1904.

Footnote 682:

  The _Kwampō_, February 19 (1904), pp. 387–388.

Footnote 683:

  _Ibid._, p. 388.

Footnote 684:

  _Ibid._, February 27 (1904), pp. 586–587.

Footnote 685:

  See the three Russo-Japanese agreements regarding Korea, concluded in
  1896 and 1898, pp. 263 ff., above.

Footnote 686:

  Chapter XVII.

Footnote 687:

  See the virulent opposition of certain reactionaries of Korea against
  the railroad, shipping, and other economic enterprises of the Japanese
  in the peninsula, as expressed in a circular letter issued by them in
  June, 1904, and published in the _Dōbun-kwai_, No. 56 (July, 1904),
  pp. 57–62. Here, as everywhere, the student should carefully observe
  the nature of the opposition, its agents, and their motives. Cf. the
  latest issues of the _Korea Review_, edited by Mr. H. B. Hulbert,
  Seul.




                                 INDEX


 Agriculture of Japan, 2;
   production, 3–4;
   in finance, 4–5;
   arable land, 5–6 and notes;
   improvements, 6;
   domestic animals, 6 n. 4;
   wages and profits, 6–7;
   subsidiary occupation, 7;
   owners and tenants, 7 and n. 2.

 Agriculture of Korea, 26–28;
   forestry, 28;
   waste land, 27–28 n. 1.

 Alexieff, Admiral, and Tsêng-chi, 166–172;
   at conference at Port Arthur, 301, 312–313;
   made Viceroy of the Far East, 301;
   position in the negotiations, 307, 312–313, 323, 332, 339 n. 3, n. 4.

 Alexieff, Kir, 269, 278.

 American, trade at Niu-chwang, 16 n. 3, 17, 165;
   kerosene, 40;
   cotton goods in Manchuria, 41;
   trade in Manchuria under Chinese and Russian rule, 41–42;
   Chinese treaty, 317, 335.
   (Also see the _United States_.)

 Amur, the, 144, 145.

 Anglo-German Agreement, 157 ff.;
   leading to the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, 199;
   differs from the latter, 207–208.
   (Also see _England_ and _Germany_.)

 Anglo-Japanese Agreement, 202–208, 315 n. 1, 355;
   events leading up to, 197–202;
   includes Manchuria, 207;
   compared with the Anglo-German Agreement, 207–208.
   (Also see _England_ and _Japan_.)

 An-tung, 155;
   in Russian occupation, 239;
   strengthened, 292, 319;
   as a timber port, 290;
   as an open port, 255, 317, 318, 335.

 Artillery, of Chinese police in Manchuria, 175, 192.

 Austria, 159.


 Balance of power in China, 108, 127 and n. 1, 159, 208.

 Bank-notes in Korea, 23, 281.

 Barley in Japan, 4.

 Beans, 4, 9, 13–14, 18.

 Benckendorff, 313, 314, 334 n. 3.

 Bezobrazoff, 291 n. 3, 313.

 Blagovestchensk, 144, 155, 316.

 Boxer trouble, the, 139;
   cost for Russia, 33.
   (Also see _China_, _Manchuria_.)

 Brown, MacLeavy, 269, 278.

 Bülow, von, on Kiao-chau, 102, 106;
   on the Anglo-German Agreement, 161;
   on the Anglo-Japanese alliance, 199 n. 1.
   (Also see _Germany_.)


 Cable at Chemulpo, 356, 358, 361.

 Cannon, in Chinese police in Manchuria, 175, 192.

 Cassini, Count, on the development of Manchuria, 43–44;
   at Peking, 87, 94;
   the “Cassini Convention,” 87–95, 98, 224–225;
   on Russian soldiers in Manchuria, 237 n. 1;
   on Lessar’s demands, 248 ff.;
   on new ports, 253;
   on the contents of the last Russian reply to Japan, 340 n.;
   on the responsibility of the war, 351 n. 1.

 Cazalis, 279.

 Chang Chih-tung, 176, 177, 178, 189, 191.

 Chemulpo, trade at, 15, 19–20;
   Seul Railway, 24 and n. 1;
   kerosene at, 40 and n. 3;
   Admiral Starck at, 293;
   cable at, 356, 358, 361;
   naval war at, 345, 356, 358, 361.

 Chili, Province of, 179, 218, 243.

 China, merchants of, in Korea, 14 n. 2, 15;
   ceding Primorsk to Russia, 66;
   suzerain over Korea, 257;
   war with Japan, 257, 369;
   loan guaranteed by Russia, 83–84;
   alliance with Russia, 85, 93, 94 n. 2;
   envoy at the Czar’s coronation, 87;
   contribution to the Russo-Chinese Bank, 84;
   to the Manchurian Railway, 96;
   railway agreement with Russia, 96–99;
   Anglo-German loan, 107, 113, 117–118;
   proposed Russian loan, 112;
   balance of power, 108, 127 and n. 1, 159, 208;
   Russian convention of evacuation, 93;
   treaties with Japan and the U. S., 317–318, 335.

 China, independence of, 203, 205, 208, 209;
   integrity of, 203, 205, 208, 297, 303, 305, 310–311, 324, 329, 333,
      336, 338, 340 n., 343, 347;
   neutrality of, advised by Japan, 363–364,
     declared, 365–366;
   the open door in, 202, 203, 205, 208, 211.
   (Also see _Boxer_, _Court_, _Emperor_, _Manchuria_, and _Russia_.)

 Ching, Prince, 94, 162 and n. 2, 177, 182, 191, 192, 193, 196, 214, 228
    n. 2, 229, 234, 245, 251, 254, 316.

 Chinnampo, 19.

 Chishima (the Kuriles), 66 and n. 1, 67.

 Conger, 191, 193, 196, 245, 252.

 Cotton and cotton goods, 9, 10–11, 41.

 Court, the Chinese, leaving for Si-ngan, 161, n. 1;
   returning to Peking, 214.


 Dalny, as Russia’s Manchurian port, 37–43;
   Cassini on, 44;
   organization and administration, 133–134;
   as a free port, 42, 45 n. 1, 117, 137;
   troops leaving for the Korean frontier, 340, 353;
   demand for timber, 290.

 “Depots” in Manchuria, 44–45, 235;
   not to be opened, 315.

 _Dōbun-kwai_ = the _Tō-A Dōbun-kwai Hōkoku_, monthly reports of the
    Tō-A Dōbun Association.


 East Asia, its extent, 8 n. 3;
   trade with Japan, 8 and notes;
   imports into Japan, 9;
   importance to Japan, 9–10.
   (Also see _Korea_ and _Manchuria_.)

 Eastern Chinese Railway, 32–33, 134, 325;
   Company, 96–99, 174, 176, 182, 230.
   (Also see _Manchuria_ and _Railway_.)

 Education in Japan and Russia, 56 n. 2.

 Emperor, Chinese, 176, 177, 182, 183.

 Empress Dowager, 219, 245.

 England, mediating for China, 68;
   declining to join in coercion, 72, 74;
   advising Japan to retrocede all Liao-tung, 76;
   increasing common interest with Japan and the U. S., 76, 78;
   attitude toward the Kiao-chau affair, 106–109;
   policy about Talien-wan, 113,
     about Port Arthur, 119 ff., 127 n. 2;
   at Wei-hai-wei, 107 n. 1, 125–126, 128–129;
   reply to Hay, 136;
   in South and Middle China, 141–142;
   agreement with Germany, 156–161;
   interests in Manchuria, 165;
   on the Alexieff-Tsêng Agreement, 169;
   appealed to by China, 182, 183–184;
   on the Lamsdorff-Yang-yu Agreement, 177, 184–185;
   on Russian demands, 193, 196;
   interests in China, 203, 206, 208;
   relations with Japan, 197–199, 205;
   agreement with her, 199–208;
   protest against Russian demands of 1903, 245, 246, 254;
   on Korean neutrality, 255, 360–361.

 Equal opportunity, the principle of (definition), 10 and n. 1, 106,
    135–138, 139, 159, 165, 202, 205, 208, 211, 297, 303, 305.

 Evacuation, the convention of, 93, 196, 214 ff.;
   conditions for, 225, 227 ff.;
   from the west of Liao, 233 ff., 365–366;
   nominal nature of, 234 ff.;
   the last day set for, 311;
   a new arrangement for, proposed, 311.
   (Also see _Manchuria_.)


 Far East, vice-royalty of the, 301–302.

 Fêng-hwang-Chêng, 155, 239, 292.

 Fêng-tien, Province of (Sheng-king), 166.
   (Also see _Sheng-king_.)

 Finance, Japanese, agriculture in, 4, 5;
   army and navy, and total revenue and expenditures, 80, n. 1.

 First Bank of Japan, in Korea, 23, 281.

 Fisheries in Korean waters, 26.

 Flour, 40.

 Food-stuffs. See _Agriculture_.

 Formosa, 2, 5, 22, 70.

 France, joining Russia in 1895, 71–77;
   sympathies with Russia, 78;
   reply to Hay, 136;
   on the Anglo-German Agreement, 159;
   peace terms after the Boxer trouble, 163;
   Declaration with Russia, 207–213, 355.

 Frontier guards, 98, 230–232.

 Fusan, trade at, 15, 19;
   Japanese in, 23;
   Seul Railway, 24 and n. 2, n. 3, 286 and n.;
   Seul telegraph, 265;
   Japanese gendarmes, 265;
   troops in, 266;
   Russian Consul at, 360, 362.


 Gensan (Wonsan), 25, n. 1;
   Japanese troops in, 266.

 Germany, not joining in intervention, 68;
   advising Japan, 69;
   coöperating with Russia and France, 71–77;
   as a free lance, 78;
   service to China, 101 and n. 2;
   leasing Kiao-chau, 101–109;
   attitude toward Wei-hai-Wei, 107 n. 1;
   reply to Hay, 136;
   agreement with England, 156–161;
   at peace conferences at Peking, 162;
   the Ketteler murder, 164;
   on the Alexieff-Tsêng Agreement, 169 and n. 3;
   on the Lamsdorff-Yang-yu Agreement, 178;
   on the Anglo-Japanese alliance, 199 n. 1;
   the Kaiser on China’s neutrality, 365.

 Giers, M. de, in Peking, 141, 152, 179, 181 and n. 1, 190.

 Ginseng, in Korea, 25.

 Great Britain. See _England_.

 Gribsky, General, 144, 155.

 Griscom, in Tokio, 364.

 Groderkoff, General, 145.

 Gubbins, in Seul, 278.

 Gunzburg, Baron, 25 and n. 3, 279, 280, 288, 319, 321.


 Habarofsk, 341, 353.

 Harbin, retaken, 144;
   development, 43–54;
   telegraphic connections with Wiju and Port Arthur, 285;
   as open port, 255;
   not to be opened, 45, 314.

 Hardinge, at St. Petersburg, 231.

 Harris, Townsend, 56.

 Hart, Sir Robert, 112.

 Hay, Secretary John, circular note of, in 1899, 135–138;
   on Russia’s propositions, 150 n. 1;
   circular of, July 3, 1900, 150 n. 1;
   on Russian demands, 194;
   making inquiries at St. Petersburg, 246;
   negotiating for opening Manchurian ports, 252–254;
   on China’s neutrality, 364–365.

 Hayashi, Gonsuke, in Korea, contrasted with Pavloff, 273;
   regarding Masampo, 275, 277;
   about MacLeavy Brown, 278;
   about Russian loan, 279;
   about Yong-am-po, 319, 320;
   signed the Korean Protocol, 367.

 Hayashi, Baron H., in London, 204.

 Hei-lung, Province of, 221, 241, 316.

 Herbert, Sir Michael, 252.

 Henry, Prince, of Germany, 104.

 Heyking, Baron von, 104–105, 105 n. 4.

 Hilidebrand, Admiral, 276.

 Hill, J. J., on freight to the East, 42 n.

 Hong-kong, 8 n. 3, 16 n. 3.

 Hoshi, Tōru, 258.

 Hosie, Alexander, 228 n. 1, 231.


 Ignatieff, 66.

 Indemnity, Chinese, to Japan, 70, 84;
   to the Powers, 233.

 Independence, of Korea, 257, 266, 271;
   of Korea and China, 202, 203, 205, 208, 209.

 Integrity of China, forgotten in 1898, 139;
   in the Anglo-German Agreement, 159;
   in 1900, 139, 165;
   of China and Korea, 105–106, 203, 205, 208, 211.

 Inoüé, Count, at Seul, 258, 259, 260;
   as Privy Councilor, 296, 324, 329, 337, 342.

 Issues of the conflict:
   (1) economic, Japan’s side, transition, 1–10;
     community of interest with Korea and Manchuria, 10–32;
     Russia’s side, 32–47;
     comparison, 47–48;
   (2) political, 48–51;
     summary, 51–53;
     conclusion, 53–61;
     issues not causes, 65.

 Italy, 159.

 Itō, Marquis H., as Peace Commissioner at Shimonoseki, 69;
   on agreements with Russia and Great Britain, 200 and n. 1, 263 n. 5;
   as Privy Councilor, 296, 324, 329, 337, 342.


 Japan, alleged disregard of life of the Japanese, 82;
   the _samurai’s_ ethical code, 82 n. 1;
   patriotism, 81, 82 n. 1;
   past training, 81, 82 n. 1;
   as representing new civilization, 53–64;
   fundamental policy, 81.

 ——, agriculture, 2–7;
   capitalization, 80 n. 2;
   education, 56 n. 2;
   finance, 4–5, 80 notes;
   manufacture, 2–3, 3 and note 2;
   population, 1–2, 8, 80 n. 2;
   trade, 2 ff.;
   trade with Korea and Manchuria, 10–21;
   interests in China, 203, 206, 208;
   economic interests in Manchuria, 10–18, 30–31, 165;
   political interests in Manchuria, 49–50;
   special interests in Korea, 10–16, 19–30, 203, 207, 298, 303,
      305–307, 308–309, 324, 326, 328, 331, 338, 367 ff.;
   soldiers in Korea, 265, 266 and n. 2;
   political policy in Korea, 52 and n. 2;
   common interest with other Powers in Korea and Manchuria, 32, 76, 78,
      81.

 ——, war with China, 68–69, 267;
   treaty of Shimonoseki, 70;
   retrocession of Liao-tung, 71–78,
     its effects, 78–82;
   army and navy expenses, 80 n. 1;
   inquiries at St. Petersburg, 85;
   attitude toward the Russian lease of Port Arthur, 128,
     toward the British lease of Wei-hai-Wei, 128–129, 128 n. 3, 129 n.
        1;
   reply to Hay, 136;
   signatory to the Anglo-German Agreement, 159;
   at peace conferences, 164;
   warning to China, 169;
   on the Yang-yu Agreement, 178, 186–187;
   on the question of official punishment, 181;
   on Russian demands, 193, 196;
   relations with England, 197–199, 205;
   negotiations for alliance, 199–202;
   the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, 202–208;
   on Plançon’s demands, 245, 246, 254, 256.

 ——, negotiations with Russia: invitation to negotiate, 296–299;
   the first note, 302–307;
   transfers negotiations to St. Petersburg, 307–308;
   the first Russian reply, 308–311;
   the second note, 324–327;
   the second Russian reply, 328 n. 2;
   the third note, 329–331;
   the third Russian reply, 332–334;
   economic losses, 336;
   the fourth note, 337–339;
   the probable contents of the reply, 339 n. 4;
   warlike preparations, 341 n. 1;
   negotiations broken, 342–344;
   all relations severed, 344;
   Russian views of the negotiations, 349–351;
   treaty with China, 317–318, 335;
   declaration of war, 346–348.

 ——, advises China to be neutral, 363–364;
   upholds China’s neutrality, 366;
   Korean relations, 356, 359;
   the Protocol, 366 ff.;
   reform in Korea, 257–260, 366 ff.

 Jordan, in Seul, 269, 282.


 Ka-heung, 265.

 Katō, Masuo, 280 n. 3.

 Katō, T., ex-Foreign Minister, 198 n. 3.

 Katsu, Awa, late Count, 51 n. 1.

 Katsura, Tarō, Viscount, Premier, 200, 296, 324, 329, 337, 342.

 Kerosene oil, at Vladivostok, 40;
   at Chemulpo, 40.

 Ketteler, Baron von, 164.

 Keyserling, whaling concession, 46 n. 3, 283 and n. 2.

 Kiakhta, 38.

 Kiao-chau, use by Russia promised, 86;
   in the “Cassini Convention,” 89;
   desired by Germany, 101–102;
   seized, 104;
   leased, 105.

 Kin-chow, 131, 175, 182.

 Kinder, C. W., 91, 156.

 Kion-song, 285.

 Kiong-hung, 284.

 Kirin, Province of, 221, 241, 316.

 Kojedo, Island, 276.

 _Koku_ = 4.9629 bushels (dry) or 39.7033 gallons (liquid).

 _Kokumin_ = the _Kokumin Shimbun_ (National News), a daily journal
    edited by Hon. I. Tokutomi, Tokio.

 Komura, Baron, J., 212;
   at Seul, 261, 265;
   the K.-Waeber Memorandum, 265–266;
   before the Throne, 296, 324, 329, 337, 342, etc.;
   invites Russia to negotiate, 296–299;
   desires an understanding with Russia, 300;
   sends the first note, 302;
   receives the first reply, 308;
   confers with Rosen, 324, etc.;
   sends the third note, 329–331;
   corrects Russia’s error, 333 n.;
   points out Russian fallacy, 334;
   sends the fourth note, 337–339;
   sends the final notes to Kurino, 342;
   on Chinese neutrality, 363–364;
   on Hay’s note, 364.
   (Also see _Japan_.)

 Korea, population of, 27–28 n. 1;
   fairs in, 24 n. 3;
   currency of, 23 and n. 3;
   railways in, 24 and n. 1, 303, 325;
   official corruption in, 20, 27;
   trade, 10–16, 17, 19–20, 21;
   Japanese in, 21–26;
   land-purchase in, 23 n. 1;
   land-rent in, 29 n. 1;
   connected with Manchuria, 49–50;
   Russian interests in, 46–48;
   Japanese and Russian interests in, compared, 47–48, 51–53.

 ——, dependent on China, 257, 267;
   China’s place in, replaced by Russia, 77;
   the Queen of, 258–261;
   the King (Emperor since October, 1897) of, 261, 262–263, 265, 269,
      273 n. 1,
     at the Russian Legation, 284, 289,
     flexible will of, 273–274,
     interested in timber work, 290 n. 2,
     E. and Government, 320 n. 2,
     Pavloff before E., 322 n.,
     E. neutral, 355,
     Russia claims E. was coerced, 356, 359;
   the Imperial House guaranteed by Japan, 367;
   timber concessions, 46 and n. 2;
   whaling concessions, 46 and n. 3;
   bank-notes, 23 and n. 2, 281;
   the Korean Straits, 309, 325, 326, 328, 331, 333, 340 n.

 ——, independence of, 52 and n. 2, 60, 70, 71, 73, 75, 128, 202, 203,
    208, 209, 257, 266, 271, 297, 303, 305–307, 308, 324, 328, 337,
    342–343, 347, 355, 367 ff.;
   integrity of, 203, 208, 211;
   “open door” in, 202, 203, 205, 208, 211;
   neutrality of, 322 and n. 2, 355–357, 357–360, 360–362.

 ——, Japan’s interests in and reform of (see _Issues_ and _Japan_),
    257–260, 298, 303, 304, 305–307, 308–309, 324, 326, 328, 331, 338,
    356, 359, 366 ff.;
   the new treaty with Japan, 366 ff.

 _Korea Review_, the, 372 n. 1, etc.

 “Korietz,” the, 281.

 Kun-chun, 353.

 Kurile Islands, the (Chishima), 66 and n. 1, 67.

 Kurino, S., at St. Petersburg, receives the first note, 296–299;
   reports Russia’s assent, 299;
   hands in the note, 302;
   hears of the first reply, 308;
   hands in the third note, 331;
   hears from Komura, 337;
   urges an early reply, 339;
   delivers the last notes, 345;
   leaves Russia, 345 n. 1; 349 and n. 2; 350 and n. 1.
   (Also see _Japan_ and _Komura_.)

 Kuropatkin, General, 300.

 _Kwampō_ = the _Kwampō_, Official Gazette of the Japanese Government,
    issued daily.

 Kwan-tung, the, 132–134, 301.


 Lamsdorff, succeeds Muravieff as Foreign Minister, 143;
   on Manchurian conquest, 146;
   on the Alexieff-Tsêng Agreement, 169–170, 171–172;
   deprecates punitive expeditions, 179;
   on official punishment, 180;
   presses Yang-yu, 182;
   on the agreement with him, 185–186;
   replies to Hay, 194–196;
   ignorant of soldiers near Korea, 239;
   disclaimer, 246 ff.

 ——, agrees to negotiate, 299 and n. 2, 300;
   probably overshadowed, 301–302;
   receives the first note, 302;
   insists on negotiating at St. Petersburg, 307;
   receives the third note, 331–332;
   delays reply, 339;
   intimates reply, 339 n.;
   receives the final notes, 344;
   misstatement, 349 n. 2, 350 n. 2;
   blames Japan for breaking peace, 349–351,
     for violating international law, 355–357, 360–362.
   (Also see _Manchuria_ and _Russia_.)

 Land trade with the East, 55, 61–64.

 Lansdowne, the Marquess of, on the Anglo-German Agreement, 161;
   on the Lamsdorff-Yang-yu Agreement, 185;
   warns China, 189;
   signs the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, 204;
   on the alliance, 205–207;
   on the convention of evacuation, 229;
   on British policy in China, 246;
   on Russian policy in Manchuria, 315 n. 1;
   on evacuation, 334 n. 3.
   (Also see _England_.)

 Lascelles, Sir Frank, in Berlin, 108.

 Lessar, Paul, new Russian Minister at Peking, 190;
   presents demands, 190;
   signs convention of evacuation, 220;
   his accompanying note, 224;
   on number of Chinese troops in Manchuria, 228 n. 2;
   on barracks, 236 n.;
   on evacuation of Niu-chwang, 237–238;
   on China’s breach of faith, 252 n. 2;
   on sick leave, 247;
   renews Plançon’s demands, 254;
   at Port Arthur, 301;
   diplomacy in Peking, 312, 315–316, 336.
   (Also see _Manchuria_ and _Russia_.)

 Li Ching-fang, 69.

 Li Hung-chang, peace envoy to Japan, 69–71;
   envoy to Russia, 87, 90, 268;
   signs the Port Arthur lease, 129;
   on the Boxer affair, 142;
   desires withdrawal of allied troops, 153 and n. 2;
   as plenipotentiary, 162 and n. 2;
   inclined to accept Russian demand early in 1901, 181 n. 1, 184;
   again later in 1901, 191 and n.

 Li Ping-hing, 104.

 Liao River, the, as trade artery, 39;
   as boundary of neutral territory, 366.

 Liao-tung Peninsula, the, ceded, 70;
   retroceded, 70–77;
   its significance, 77–78;
   effects on Japan, 78–82;
   on Korea, 259.

 Liao-yang, Boxers in, 144;
   retaken, 155;
   troops from, 292, 340, 353;
   barracks in, 235;
   soldiers in, 235 n. 4, 240;
   fortification of, 353.

 Liu Kun-yi, 176, 177, 178, 189.

 Lobanoff-Yamagata Protocol, the, 264.

 Lo-fêng-luh, 182–183.

 Long White Mountains, the, 290.


 _Ma tseh_ (mounted bandits), 227–229, 291 and n. 2.

 MacCormick, in St. Petersburg, 246, 253.

 MacDonald, Sir Claude, in Peking, 90, 92, 107, 113–114, 121, 129, 131;
   in Tokio, 205.

 Makaroff, Admiral, 274.

 Manchuria, people, 31 n. 3;
   population, 37 n. 1;
   resources, 36–37;
   wheat, 17;
   flour, 40;
   millet, 17–18;
   beans, 18;
   trade with Japan, 10–16, 17, 20, 21, 26 ff.;
   trade with Russia, 33–36, 41;
   mining, 90;
   Russian interests, 32–33 and notes, 303, 305, 325, 326;
   political interests, 48–49.

 ——, railway granted, 88, 96–99, 120, 130;
   political, 48–49;
   commercial, 32–33, 37–45, 134, 174, 176, 182, 230, 325.

 ——, campaign, 143–146, 154–155;
   M. and North China, 140, 151–155, 163–165, 165 n. 1;
   the Tsêng Agreement, 165 ff.;
   the Yang-yu Agreement, 173 ff.;
   the Lessar demands, 190 ff.;
   the convention of evacuation, 93, 196, 214 ff.;
   in the Anglo-German Agreement, 160–161, 161 n. 2,
     in the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, 207;
   conditions for evacuation, 152, etc.;
   protection of M., 226 ff.;
   new demands, 242;
   Lansdowne on evacuation, 334 n. 3.
   (Also see _Japan_ and _Russia_.)

 Masampo, 50–51 n. 2, 274–278.

 Matsukata, Count M., 296, 324, 329, 337, 342.

 Matunine, 270.

 Miller, H. B., 41, 145 n. 1.

 Millet, 17.

 Min Yong-hwan, 267–268.

 Mining, in Korea, 287;
   in Manchuria, 90;
   in Shan-tung, 105, 109;
   on the Tumên, 284.

 Mitsui Produce Co., the, 25.

 Miura, Lieut.-Gen. Gorō, 260–261.

 _Modus vivendi_, a, 169–171.

 Mokpo, 15, 19.

 Mongol invasion, 80.

 Mongolia, railway in, 49;
   Russian troops in, 234;
   _status quo_ in, 242, 251–252.

 Morrison, Dr., 94, 166, 167 n. 1, 168, 173, 174, 181 n. 1, 235 n. 1.

 Morse, J. R., 286.

 Most-favored-nation clause, the, 115, 245.

 Mounted bandits, 227–229, 291 and n. 2.

 _Mugi_, 4.

 Mukden, as trade mart, 40 n. 2;
   railway, 88;
   Boxers in, 144;
   retaken, 155;
   as capital of Manchuria, 167;
   barracks in, 235;
   troops in, 244;
   seized, 318;
   as open port, 255;
   opened, 317, 318, 335.

 Mukden, Province of (Sheng-king), 221, 234.

 Muravieff “Amurski,” 66, 155.

 Muravieff, late Count, on Talien-wan, 116;
   on Port Arthur, 92, 111–112, 119, 120, 121 n. 2, 122, 123, 125, 126;
   on the Boxer affair, 141, 149;
   his death, 143.

 Mu-san, 289.

 Mutsu, late Count, 69.


 Nampo, 276.

 Neutral territory in the Liao-tung, 131, 175.

 Neutral zone in Korea, 309, 310 and n. 1, 325, 328 n. 2, 331, 333 n.,
    338, 340 n.

 Neutrality of Great Britain, 203;
   of Korea, 322 and n. 2, 355–357, 357–360, 360–362.

 Nicolaiefsk, 67.

 Nicolas (Yong-am-po), 321.

 Nikolsk, 234.

 Nishi, Baron T., on Wei-hai-Wei, 128 n. 3;
   the N.-Rosen Memorandum, 270 ff., 282, 294.

 Niu-chwang, opened, 17;
   trade, 16–17;
   N. _vs._ Dalny, 37, 39;
   the Russo-Chinese Bank in, 84 n. 4;
   railway to the Yalu, 130;
   seized by Russians, 144–145, 157, 158 n. 2;
   in Russian demands, 167, 242, 243, 244, 316;
   restoration promised, 224;
   evacuation delayed, 237–238, 334 n. 3.

 Northern Railway, the, 38, 39, 88, 91, 92, 113, 121 n. 2, 131, 156, 158
    n. 2, 176, 192, 222–223, 303.


 O’Conor, Sir N., 121, 123, 124.

 Odessa, 38, 39 n. 1.

 Oil cakes, 4, 9 and n. 1, 13–14.

 Öm, Lady, 281, 321.

 “Open door,” defined, 10 and n. 1, 106, 135–138, 139, 159, 165, 202,
    205, 208, 211, 297, 303, 305.

 Open ports in Manchuria, 243, 247, 250–251, 253, 255, 314, 317.

 Ōyama, Marquis I., 296, 324, 329, 337, 342.


 Pak Che-sun, 284–285.

 Pak Yong-hio, 259.

 Pavloff, Paul, _Chargé_ at Peking, 90, 93, 113, 120, 125, 127 n. 2,
    129;
   Minister at Seul, compared with Hayashi, 273;
   desires Masampo, 274–278;
   regarding whaling concession, 283,
     telegraph, 284–285,
     Yong-am-po, 293;
   at Port Arthur, 301;
   against opening Yong-am-po, 321;
   before the Emperor, 322 n.;
   diplomacy, 336;
   leaves Korea, 356–357, 359–360, 361.

 Pechili. See _Chili_.

 Perry, Commodore M. C., 56 and n. 1.

 Pescadores, the, 70.

 Peterpavlofsk, 67.

 Petuna, 88.

 _Picul_ = 133⅓ lbs. avoirdupois.

 Ping-yang, 287.

 Plançon, 240, 242, 247 n. 1, 251, 252.

 Plehve, late von, 313.

 Pokotiloff, 301.

 _Pood_ = 36.112 lbs.

 Port Arthur, as naval port, 49, 50;
   its use promised, 86, 89,
     offered, 92;
   Russian war vessels at, 111;
   selected as naval port, 122, 123 ff.;
   as trade port, 39 n. 1;
   demand and lease, 119-126, 130, 234, 235, 237, 290;
   compared with Yong-am-po, 240, 320;
   troops to Korean border, 340, 353;
   new forts, 353;
   warships leave, 354;
   naval war at, 345, 346.

 _Porto Franco_, 117, 118.
   (Also see _Talien-wan_.)

 Ports, in Manchuria, 247, 250-251, 253, 255.

 Primorsk, 66.

 Prize of war, 356, 359, 361-362.

 Punishment of local officers, 179-181.


 Rainfall, in Japan, 6, n. 1.

 Railways, German in Shan-tung, 105, 109 and n. 2;
   Seul-Chemulpo, 24 and n. 1;
   Seul-Wiju, 25 and n. 1, n. 3;
   Seul-Fusan, 24 n. 2, n. 3;
   Seul-Wonsan, 25 n. 1.
   (Also see _Eastern Chinese Railway_, _Korea_, _Manchuria_,
      _Mongolia_, and _Northern Railway_.)

 Railway guards, 98, 230-232, 235.

 Rice, in Japan, crop, 3 and n. 3;
   consumption and importation, 4, 9, 13;
   in Manchuria, 12;
   in Korea, 28, 29.

 Richthofen, Fr. von, 101.

 Rondon, 288.

 Root, Elihu, 365 n. 1.

 Rosen, Baron, Nishi-R. Memorandum, 270 ff.;
   R. at Port Arthur, 301;
   conferences with Komura, 324, 332, etc.;
   leaves Tokio, 345 and n., 350, 351.

 _Ruble_ = 51.5 cents.

 Russia, declines to coerce Japan, 68;
   leads in coercion, 70-77;
   favors China, 83, 85, 88, 128;
   guarantees Chinese loan, 83-84;
   allies with China, 85, 93, 94 n. 2;
   the “Cassini Convention,” 87-95, 98;
   the railway agreement, 96-99;
   leases Talien-wan and Port Arthur, 110-134;
   replies to Hay, 137-138;
   the Boxer affair, 142 and notes, 149-150 and notes;
   circular of August 25, 151-154;
   features of diplomacy, 140, 147-148, 151-155, 163-165, 165, n. 1;
   on the Anglo-German Agreement, 159-160;
   the declaration with France, 78, 207-213;
   the convention of evacuation, 93, 214 ff.

 ——, investments in Manchuria, 32-33 and notes;
   colonization in Manchuria, 43;
   interests in Manchuria, 33-35, 47-48, 325, 326;
   economics of Russia, 36, 54-55;
   commercial policy, 36-43, 43-45, 45-46, 57-58;
   economics and politics, 56-57;
   representing old civilization, 53-64, 56 n. 2.

 ——, in Korea, takes China’s place, 77;
   influence after the Chinese war, 259, 261-272, chapter xvii.;
   economic interests, 46-47;
   telegraph, 284;
   bank, 267, 270;
   policy, 48-53.

 ——, negotiations with Japan (see _Japan_);
   Russian interpretation, 327 n. 9, 349-351;
   manifesto of war, 345-346.
   (Also see _Issues_, _Japan_, _Korea_, and _Manchuria_.)

 Russo-Chinese Bank, the, 84-85, 192, 201, 238, 243, 279, 290 n. 2, 316.

 Russo-Korean Bank, the, 269, 270.

 Rye, 4.


 St. Petersburg, politics in, 301.

 Saitō, Shūichirō, 258.

 Sakhalien, 66-67.

 Salisbury, the Marquess of, 108, 113, 115, 117, 123-125, 149 n. 2, 158
    n. 2.

 Sands, 280 n. 3.

 Satow, Sir Ernest, at Peking, 91, 166, 173, 177, 179, 189, 191, 229,
    234.

 Scott, Sir Charles, 142 n. 1, 143 n. 3, 166 n. 1, 180.

 Settlements, foreign, in Manchuria, 45, 314, 333-334 and n. 3, 338.

 Seul, trade at, 15;
   Japanese troops in, 266;
   S.-Chemulpo Railway, 24 and n. 1, 286;
   S.-Fusan Railway, 24 and n. 2, n. 3, 286 and n.;
   S.-Fusan telegraph, 265;
   S.-Wiju Railway, 25 and n. 1, n. 3, 285-288;
   S.-Wonsan Railway, 25 n. 1.
   (Also see _Korea_.)

 Seymour, Admiral, 141.

 Shan-hai-kwan. See _Northern Railway_.

 Shan-tung, Province, 101, 106, 107 n. 1, 109.

 Sheng-king, Province of 221, 233 ff., 239, 283, 316.

 Shimonoseki, the treaty of, 70, 355.

 Siberia, Eastern, 40, 46.

 Siberian Railway, as carrier, 41, 55, 61-64;
   projected, 68.

 Skrydloff, Rear Admiral, 284.

 _Sō-shi_ (political bravoes), 261-262, 265.

 Sonntag, Miss, 25 and n. 3, 280.

 Sovereignty, 105-106.
   (Also see _Balance_, _Independence_, and _Integrity_.)

 Speyer, A. de, 269-270.

 Staal, de, 115, 116, 118, 122, 229-230.

 Starck, Admiral, 293.

 Statutes, the Railway, 230.

 Stein, 274, 275, 288, 291, 292.

 Sugar, 4 n. 2.

 Sugiyama, 141, 164.

 Sungari River, the, 316.


 Tai-ku, 265.

 Tai-wen-kun, 260, 261.

 Talien-wan, 87, 89, 114, 122, 130.

 Tatung-kao, 240, 255, 291, 318, 335.

 Tea, from China to Russia, 35, 38-39, 39 n. 1.

 Telegraph lines, in Korea, 266, 267, 284-285;
   in Manchuria, 243, 247.

 Terauchi, 296, 324, 329, 337, 342.

 Three Eastern Provinces, the, 96.
   See _Manchuria_.

 Tieh-ling, 155.

 Tien-tsin, 156, 157, 163, 233.

 Timber concessions, in Korea, 46, and n. 2, 240, 263, 289 ff.

 Tja-pok, 276.

 _Tokushu Jōyaku_ = the _Tō-A Kwankei Tokushu Jōyaku Isan_ (a collection
    of special treaties relating to Eastern Asia), compiled by the Tō-A
    Dobun Association, Tokio, 1904.

 Townley, 245, 254.

 Treaty rights, 325, 326-327, 333 n., 334 and n. 3, 338.

 Triple Alliance, the, 210 n. 1.

 Tsêng-chi, 166, 168 n. 3, 228 n. 1, 233, 318.

 Tsitsihar, 316.

 Tsushima, 51 and n. 1, 67.

 _Tsūshō Isan_, the, Japanese Consular Reports, issued six times a
    month, with bi-monthly supplements, from the Department of Foreign
    Affairs, Tokio.

 Tuan, Prince, 140, 162.

 Tumên River, the, 263, 283, 284.


 Ukhtomsky, Prince, 84.

 Uinung Island, 263, 289-290.

 United States, the, trade with Japan, 8 and n. 1;
   cordial relations with Japan and England, 76, 78, 198;
   warns China, 169;
   against the Plançon demands, 245 ff., 253;
   on China’s neutrality, 364-365.
   (Also see _American_ and _Hay_.)


 Vladivostok, founded, 67;
   as naval port, 50, 112, 234;
   overshadowed by Dalny, 37, 38 and n. 2;
   American kerosene at, 49 and n. 3;
   Governor of, 341;
   new forts at, 353.


 Waeber, at Seul, 259;
   the Komura-W. Memorandum, 265-266;
   leaves Korea, 269;
   special envoy at Seul, 280.

 Waeber, Madame, 259, 280.

 Waldersee, Count von, 157.

 Wang Tsz-chun, 87.

 War, the Chinese-Japanese, 369;
   the Russo-Japanese, responsibility of, 349-351, 352-354;
   probable effects of, 59-60.

 Wei-hai-Wei, leased to England, 125-126;
   Japan’s attitude, 120, 128-129;
   Germany’s attitude, 107.

 Wheat, 4, 9, 12.

 Wiju, railway to Seul, 25 and n. 1, n. 3, 285-288;
   telegraph to Port Arthur and Harbin, 285;
   opening of, 320.

 Wonsan (Gensan), railway to Seul, 25 n. 1;
   Japanese troops in, 266.

 Witte, 36, 173, 239, 300, 301.

 Wu Ting-fang, 153 n. 2.


 Yalu River, the, navigation and policing of, 86-87;
   Russian troops upon, 239, 335;
   as boundary, 283;
   timber work on, 289 ff.
   (Also see _Yong-am-po_.)

 Yamagata, Marquis, at St. Petersburg, 253;
   the Y.-Lobanoff Protocol, 264, 279;
   against loan, 279-280;
   as Privy Councilor, 296, 324, 329, 337, 342.

 Yamamoto, G., 295, 324, 329, 337, 342.

 Yang-yu, 173, 182.

 Yang-tsze Provinces, the, 120, 121 n. 2, 160, 315 n. 1.

 _Yen_ = 49.8 cents.

 Yi Chi-yong, 367.

 Yi Keun-thaik, 281, 321, 322 n.

 Yi Yong-ik, 281 ff., 287, 321.

 Yin-san, 287.

 Yong-am-po, 240, 289-295, 318 ff.

 Yuan Shi-kai, 259.

 Yun-san, 287.


                          The Riverside Press
           _Electrotyped and printed by H. O. Houghton & Co.
                      Cambridge, Mass., U. S. A._

------------------------------------------------------------------------




                          TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES


 1. Silently corrected typographical errors.
 2. Retained anachronistic and non-standard spellings as printed.
 3. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.





End of Project Gutenberg's The Russo-Japanese Conflict, by K. Asakawa

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